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The Mercenaries of Hellenistic Crete

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The Mercenaries of Hellenistic Crete

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Dedication

To my parents.

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The Mercenaries of Hellenistic Crete

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This dissertation presents a new portrait of mercenaries as they pertain to the island of Crete during the Hellenistic period (323-30 BCE). Mercenaries ought to be contextualized among the diplomatic strategies by which Greek cities sought to remain vital, and by which some Cretan cities even succeeded up until the Roman conquest in 67 BCE. Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries need not be considered as the output of circumstances idiosyncratic to Crete, such as economic crisis, a demand for a brand of warfare unique to the island, or an exceptional culture of violence, but rather as part of a Mediterranean-wide cultural phenomenon. Furthermore, the most secure way to identify Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries is through unambiguous labels in textual sources. The study primarily uses close readings of literary and epigraphic texts to analyze the terminology for defining Cretan mercenaries and to better understand contemporary Hellenistic portrayals of and attitudes towards Crete and Cretans, especially those in Polybius' *Histories*. Chapter 1 observes that the Greek term *Krēs*, often taken to indicate Cretan mercenaries from Crete, could identify a person's origin and/or a specialized type of fighter, depending on context; but it was not always an unambiguous indicator of both, i.e., a Cretan mercenary from Crete. Examining material, literary, and epigraphic evidence, Chapters 2 and 3 maintain that warfare on Crete reflected mainline practices in the Greek world. Although *Krētes* fighters were undoubtedly specialists, their context

was hegemonic (i.e., royal, league, Roman) war, not the small *interpolis* warfare found on Crete. Chapter 4 first posits that Polybius uses Crete as a model to illustrate for his readers the symptoms of ailing political systems; it then applies this model to Polybius' historical accounts of Crete, concluding that Polybius criticizes how foreign aid enabled and sustained violence amongst Cretan cities. Chapter 5 offers a close reading of mercenary recruitment clauses in inscribed alliances and corroborates Polybius' observation: Cretan cities used alliances to create relationships that lasted beyond the immediate circumstances of alliance. Mercenaries were one means by which cities could offer substantive support for these relationships and, in turn, receive crucial aid in times of need.

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INTRODUCTION

This project about Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries began its life as a broader critique of the master narrative that dominates the field of Hellenistic Cretan history: that Crete was an exception to overarching trends of Greek history in terms of politics, society, and economics and stood out for its people's capacity for violence. The final product focuses on how to narrow the evidence of what might be securely identified as mercenaries from Hellenistic Crete and, once the pool of evidence has been limited, to analyze it for what conclusions can be drawn about Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries. The idea that Crete was a producer of mercenaries – indeed, a prodigious producer of mercenaries – is central to the master narrative: if, in the Greek world, mercenaries tended to come from places that were poor, insular, and violent, then large numbers of mercenaries from Crete would be reliable indicators of the poverty, insularity, and cultural normalization of violence that, according to the master narrative, characterized Hellenistic Crete. Therefore, a study that critiques these assumptions about mercenaries also critiques one of the central contentions of the master narrative of Hellenistic Crete.

Still, it is my hope that this study has implications for the Hellenistic world beyond Crete because of the ways in which Crete was not unique. Mercenaries came from Crete, but mercenaries also came from all over the Greek world, and were a feature of Greek society from at least the Archaic period if not before. The *poleis* of Crete made war on one another, as did *poleis* all over the Hellenistic world, on their own accord or as a result of the alliances in which they were involved. The ubiquity of war in the Hellenistic world is apparent from the epigraphic record, and from the Hellenistic historian Polybius, who singles out Cretans as greedy and quarrelsome but also censures the rest of the Greek world for this behavior. The central thesis of this dissertation is that, if the mercenaries of Hellenistic Crete were exceptional in any way, it

was not for their numbers, or for their specialized fighting techniques, or that Crete was exceptionally poor or Cretans as a society exceptionally violent. Rather, Cretan mercenaries should be contextualized as part of a unique geopolitical situation in which the *poleis* of Crete operated with latitude that, in a world dominated by kings, leagues, and Rome, was precarious yet stunning.

This dissertation makes its argument through source criticism. It gathers and examines primary evidence that has been used by scholars to identify and study Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries, and then builds a picture of Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries from the evidence that most clearly identifies them. This introduction provides background for how different categories of primary evidence (literary, epigraphic, and archaeological) are used in the study of mercenaries: first, in the construction of the prevailing narrative of Hellenistic Crete; second, in the study of Greek mercenaries in general; and third, in how this dissertation approaches the primary evidence. The final section will provide a road map for how this approach is applied in dissertation as a whole.

I. THE MASTER NARRATIVE OF HELLENISTIC CRETE

Over the past seventy years, it has been the *opinio communis* of scholars that Hellenistic Crete (323-67 BCE) was a place that was insulated, in spite of its central position, from the impact of trade and the cultural trends of the larger Hellenic world. Angelos Chaniotis provides an overview of this *opinio communis* (hereafter known as the “master narrative”) and the role of mercenaries within it in his handbook on war in the Hellenistic world (2005: 81-2). The main points are these: Cretan society was a rigid cultural holdover from the Archaic period: a minority of wealthy landowners, reared as warriors in a Lacedaemonian-style pedagogical system, fed off the produce of serfs who were subsistence farmers and transhumant herders – the term “subsistence” indicating that they produced just enough for their own consumption (see also

Chaniotis 1999b: 182-6). Cretan politics were marked by intense competition for resources and prodigious violence both among and within its many *poleis*, as its warrior class attempted to maintain their position in society. And, due to the preoccupations of the warrior class, the economy of Crete was not diversified in what it produced, nor did it participate actively in Mediterranean trade, despite its central location in proximity to southern Europe, northern Africa, and the Levant. The result of this cocktail of ingrown violence – both cultural and political – and economic stagnation was to push enterprising Cretan men out to make their fortunes elsewhere: this manifested in the phenomena of Cretan piracy and the large numbers of Cretans traveling or emigrating abroad as mercenaries.

Chaniotis' presentation of this master narrative is not unique in scholarship, nor is it uncontested by other scholars. It is, however, influential because Chaniotis has published on it so widely¹ and made it a large part of Hellenistic Cretan area studies, a realm of specialists. Furthermore, although Chaniotis is clear in portraying mercenaries as the natural output of the master narrative, even scholars who question this narrative do not question the idea of a proliferation of Cretan mercenaries, which is central to the narrative.² It is therefore necessary to break the master narrative down into its constituent parts, looking at the categories of evidence scholars have examined in order to arrive at the different parts of the master narrative.

These categories of evidence are literary, epigraphic, and archaeological; in this dissertation I will sometimes use the terms “textual” to include literature and textual aspects of epigraphic evidence and “material” to include archaeological and material aspects of epigraphic evidence. There is not a lot of literary evidence for Crete. For the fourth century, there are

¹ Chaniotis 1995, 1996, 1999, 2004, in addition to attempting to contextualize it in the larger picture of Hellenistic warfare in the abovementioned 2005 handbook.

² E.g., both Cross (2011) and de Souza (1998: 112) directly question the master narrative for the fact that it views Crete as a negative exception from economic development in the Hellenistic period. However, neither of them question the evidence for a lot of Cretan mercenaries: Cross (2011: 141, 168) treats mercenaries as migrant labor in a service economy while de Souza (1998: 115) imagines mercenaries among the wealthier citizens of Phalasarna.

detailed accounts of the Cretan system (*politeia*) of government and education (*paideia*) written by intellectuals associated with Athens – mainly Plato’s *Laws* (1.625c-626c), Aristotle’s *Politics* (2.1271b20-1272b23), and Ephorus whose account is preserved in Strabo (10.4.10). These sources, which present Crete’s *politeia* as akin to that of Sparta, corroborate one another. This is where the master narrative finds the evidence for the rigid militaristic system and practice of warriors together dining in a mess, the *sussition*. For the second century, there is the testimony of Polybius of Megalopolis, whose notoriously pessimistic comments about Crete create the impression of chaotic warfare and provide a chronology for events on Crete.

Next, there is the category of epigraphic evidence: the *Inscriptiones Creticae* consist of four volumes of inscriptions found on Crete and/or associated with Cretan *poleis* that collected, edited, and published by Margarita Guarducci (1935-50). Hellenistic Cretans, like many of their Greek contemporaries, inscribed laws and international agreements such as alliances (*summachiai*) on stone; these documents might be inscribed directly onto a wall, or on a stone stele that was placed in a public space in a *polis* or a sanctuary. Chaniotis has himself produced the most recent collection of the interstate documents that Cretan *poleis* made with one another (1996). These collections make it convenient to study the inscriptions as textual sources, though the fact that many of them lack an archaeological context makes it more difficult to study them as material objects. Generally speaking, the master narrative gets its impression of the frequency of Cretan warfare from a combination of the numerous interstate documents and the impressions gleaned from Polybius.

Beyond these textual sources, archaeological data for Hellenistic Crete has, up until the last few decades, been scarce. Some of this reflects a lack of scholarly interest in Crete after the discovery of the Minoan Civilization of the Bronze Age (Cross 2011: 22-3). There have also been issues of material surviving, especially with the rapid agricultural development of Crete

over the past sixty years (Rackham and Moody 1996: 5).³ And, a lot of material is simply difficult to find, and, when found accidentally, must be studied as part of a rescue excavation, without the benefit of time to better understand context, as in the case of Hierapytna (Gallimore 2015: 2-4). The larger question is whether this absence of Hellenistic material evidence is evidence for a wholesale lack of economic development, such as production of good for trade, proponents of the master narrative have assumed or argued (e.g., Brulé 1978: 142-8; Chaniotis 1999b).

This scarcity of archaeological information is one reason why the study of Hellenistic Crete has traditionally been textual. Two studies that are foundational to the field of Hellenistic Crete, Henri van Effenterre's 1948 *La Crète et le monde grec de Platon à Polybe* and Ronald Willetts' 1955 *Aristocratic Society in Ancient Crete*, have focused on textual evidence. Both studies approach the textual sources by comparing the literary sources with the texts of inscriptions, and finding commonalities between the two to bolster the reliability of the literary sources (Willetts 1955: 166-91). Van Effenterre in particular argues that Plato provides enough local color to have been present on Crete and based his observations on personal experience (1948: 66-72). Chaniotis follows Willetts⁴ and applies a similar method by comparing accounts of the Cretan *politeia* to economic clauses in inscribed documents (1995: 44-5; 1999b: 185-6). The method becomes problematic when it treats the literary sources uncritically. Michael Gagarin and Paula Perlman (2016: 67) observe that there may indeed be a few commonalities between the fourth century literary sources and contemporary Cretan legal inscriptions, but there are not enough to say that Plato, Aristotle, and Ephorus were well acquainted with the society of the whole island of Crete. Furthermore, Perlman has argued (2005) that these accounts represent

³ Harriet Blitzer (pers. comm.) reports that she traveled to the site of Lyttus in the 1970s and personally witnessed deep plows being used to dislodge ruins at the site.

⁴ Chaniotis 1995: 42-4 *cit.* Willetts 1955: 176-7.

a single portrayal of the *politeia* of Crete, and that their purpose was not to provide an account of Crete for its own sake, but rather to use the Cretan *politeia* as a tool for thinking about Sparta and, in turn, for making a philosophical exploration of what elements are needed to create a good and sustainable *polis*. In other words, these fourth century literary sources appear to be unreliable for speaking of fourth century Cretan society, much less using them to conclude that second-century Cretan society had the rigid, militaristic system described by these fourth-century authors and that this system contributed to the creation of Cretan mercenaries. This is to say nothing of similarly uncritical readings of Polybius, whose comments about the continuous quality of Cretan warfare are used in the master narrative as evidence for the continuing social crisis on Crete (e.g., Chaniotis 2005: 9).

A small number of textually focused studies of Hellenistic Crete has followed in the footsteps of Van Effenterre and Willetts. These include, besides Chaniotis' 1996 collection of inscriptions, studies of Cretan foreign relations by Angeliki Petropoulou (1985, *Beiträge zur Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte Kretas in hellenistischer Zeit*), and Sylvia Kreuter (1992, *Aussenbeziehungen kretischer Gemeinden zu den hellenistischen Staaten im 3. und 2. Jh. v. Chr.*). The larger question of what to do with the scarcity of material evidence remains. Willetts takes the scarcity of evidence as a evidence for little economic activity; he argues that the *sussition* described in the aforementioned literary evidence consumed all the resources of Cretan society in the fourth century (1955: 26-8), and that the continuation of this system into the Hellenistic period resulted in a social crisis, the output of which was pirates and mercenaries. Pierre Brulé (1978, *La piraterie crétoise hellénistique*), who shares the view that crisis was a generator of pirates and mercenaries, includes a survey of the resources of Crete in his monograph of Cretan piracy, and concludes that Cretans were essentially driven to vice by poverty (142-8). Chaniotis (1995 = 1999b) similarly surveys the resources and industry of Crete, and concludes that there is little evidence for complex economic developments, that many parts

of Crete were underdeveloped agriculturally, and that Cretans must have therefore been confined to “subsistence” agriculture and herding. He sees Cretan mercenaries as part of a larger pattern of emigration and conquest that was meant to relieve the pressures on the limited developed resources of the island (1995: 72-3; 1996: 26; 1999b). In all of these studies – with the exception of Kreuter 1992 – we can see the latent assumption that pirates and mercenaries are evidence for the breakdown of society; indeed, Petropoulou’s study of Cretan foreign relations views mercenaries as an unemployment problem that was a burden upon the *poleis* they came from (1985: 15-31).⁵ In addition to sharing an uncritical reading of fourth century sources, all of these studies, including Kreuter’s, seek an explanation for violence on Crete that is derived from Polybius: why was Crete more violent than other parts of the Greek world? Modern historians tend to view conflict and warfare as the natural result of competition for control of limited resources or resources perceived as limited (e.g., Chaniotis 2005: 13), so the reputation of Cretans for violence might suggest that the scarcity of archaeological material could reflect of the economic limitations of Hellenistic Crete.

Still, it is a somewhat precarious position to assume that a scanty archaeological record means that there is nothing to find. There are certainly difficulties with accessing the material record of Hellenistic Crete, as noted above, but study of the material that has come to light suggests the deep involvement of Cretan *poleis* in Mediterranean trade networks. In contrast to the picture of a Crete with a rigid system that precluded economic diversification in the Classical

⁵ Kreuter (1992) does not engage with the internal causes of Cretan warfare, in part because she circumscribes her investigation to Cretan foreign relations. Based upon her investigation of the material, she concludes that foreign alliances were not responsible for war on Crete. In his review of her book, Chaniotis (1996b: 231-2) sees her results as the opportunity to say that the internal causes that he envisions should be sought as the cause of Cretan violence: “K. erkennt, daß die politische Geschichte Kretas in Hellenismus mehr als die Ablösung des Einflusses einer fremden Macht durch den einer anderen war; doch, wenn sie konstatiert, die Suche nach einem System der kretischen Politik müsse ohne Ergebnis bleiben, dann m.E., weil die Wurzeln dieses Systems nicht in der Politik der auswärtigen Mächte zu suchen sind, sondern in einer Krise der aristokratischen Gesellschaftsordnung Kretas (insbesondere durch Landnot, Bevölkerungswachstum und Verorgungsprobleme), die zu einer deutlichen und konsequenten Expansionspolitik einzelner Städte (Gortyn, Knosos, Lyttos, Hierapytnas u.a.) und dementsprechend zu den ‘kretischen Kriegen’ führte.”

period, Perlman used a study of artisans and tradesmen at Eleutherna (2004) to argue that the economy of that city was already diversified in the Classical period. Furthermore, evidence against Cretan commercial isolation in the fifth and fourth centuries has recently come to light with the discovery of Cretan pottery from that period in the Levant (Gilboa et al. 2017).⁶ More evidence for Crete's integration into Hellenistic trade networks is apparent from the excavations of ancient harbors such as Phalasarna, the site of Trypetos near Siteia, and the aforementioned rescue excavations at Hierapytna (Gallimore 2015).⁷ Gallimore's work adds to the picture of Crete's role in the wine trade, showing that there were both foreign and local markets for Cretan-produced wine.⁸ Further evidence for the production of goods to market comes from Natalia Vogeikoff-Brogan's 2014 study of a Hellenistic beampress complex on the small offshore island of Mochlos, in the Gulf of Mirabello. Vogeikoff-Brogan suggests that olive oil production was taking place there at a level "beyond small-scale household 'substance' level," and observes that Cretan-made pottery was being used.⁹ Although the body of evidence is still difficult to acquire, it is growing, and there is no reason to support a narrative in which its absence indicates that Crete was culturally or economically cut off from the Mediterranean world.¹⁰

⁶ Chaniotis (2004: 77-8) argues that the arguments in favor of Cretan trade fail to distinguish between using Crete as a point for transferring goods from outside and destined elsewhere, and the deliberate export of Cretan goods. The new evidence from the Levant shows for the Classical period that evidence that some product was moved in Cretan-made pottery, and strongly supports the notion that the product being transported in those containers was made on Crete for export.

⁷ Didier Viviers (1999) proposes a variety of ways in which Hellenistic Cretan *poleis* cultivated economic relations both amongst each other and externally. For a detailed sociological approach that applies network theory to the placement of Cretan cities and their harbors, see Cross 2011.

⁸ See the 2004 study of transport amphorae by Natalia Vogeikoff-Brogan and Stavroula Apostolakou, remarks from Vogeikoff-Brogan 2014: 75-7. Note that *IC II.x.1* is a proxeny decree in which the *polis* of Kydonia makes gifts to its *proxenoi* in the form of land cultivated with vines.

⁹ Vogeikoff-Brogan 2014: for olive cultivation and pressing, see 71-5, esp. 75; for summarizing remarks on pottery, see 69-70.

¹⁰ Some archaeologists may use either textual studies and/or textual sources to help interpret their material findings. An example of the latter tendency is Watrous et al., who conclude their survey of the Western Mesara (including Gortyn and Phaestus) by interpreting the population shifts they see through Plato and Aristotle (i.e., as a social change from wealth concentrated in the hands of the Dorian elites, as described by Plato and Aristotle, into a system with greater and more widely dispersed economic opportunities) (2004: 448-9). Others, like Ruth Westgate's 2013 paper on domestic architecture, follows Chaniotis 2004 and interprets the plain and uniform houses of Lato, as

So far, I have suggested two points on which the master narrative advocated by Chaniotis and others may be weak. First, it has its roots in scholarship that focus on textual evidence but uses uncritical readings of literary sources as the backdrop for interpreting epigraphic sources. Therefore, the portrayal for the rigid, conservative social structure of Hellenistic Crete is not firmly grounded in a sound interpretation of the evidence. Second, it views the absence of archaeological evidence as evidence for economic isolation and social conservatism, meaning that the master narrative becomes dependent upon not finding more archaeological evidence for trade or creating goods for a market. But I have also noted that a number of these scholars – Willetts, Brulé, Petropoulou, Chaniotis – have all designated mercenaries as a symptom of a social crisis created by a rigid militaristic social hierarchy and a lack of economic options. Chaniotis himself uses the master narrative of Crete as the “best example” of the socioeconomic conditions that drove mercenary service in the Greek world more generally.¹¹ I propose that this reading of Greek mercenaries is itself an assumption, and must therefore be more closely examined.

II. ANCIENT GREEK MERCENARIES

In order to better examine Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries, we must next address the assumptions about Greek mercenaries that are inherent in the various iterations of the master narrative of Hellenistic Crete. This section examines those assumptions about the connection

evidence for the self-chosen cultural isolation of Cretans, in contrast with the cosmopolitan houses on Delos – never mind that Delos essentially existed as an international sanctuary and emporium, while Lato did not. One quality that distinguishes Vogeikoff-Brogan’s analyses of wine trade (and Apostolakou 2004) and the beampress complex (2014) is that she does not assume idiosyncratic cultural conditions for Crete in her interpretation of the evidence. My intent here is not to address archaeological method, but simply to point out that the lens that many of these archaeologists use for their interpretation is based upon a highly uncritical reading of fourth century sources, and this affects the interpretation of the material.

¹¹ Chaniotis (2005: 82) attributes similar conditions to Aetolia, where “again, the ideology of violence and seizure, combined with a surplus of population (see Paus. 1.4.4), made warfare a profitable occupation.” The Pausanias passage in question refers to the Aetolians being ἀκμῆ νεότητος, “the vigor of youth,” which could roughly mean that the Aetolians had a lot of young men, and hence a large population.

between mercenaries and crisis, and proposes a working definition of “mercenary” for this study that evades these assumptions.

As noted in the above discussion, the assumption of Chanotis and others is that a lot of mercenaries came from a specific origin were evidence for crisis conditions – political chaos, social upheaval, but especially dire poverty and/or lack of economic options – at their point of origin.¹² Mercenaries are thus often painted as economic refugees,¹³ and settlements aboard that are connected with a military organization are treated as evidence for economic and population stress.¹⁴ However, the master narrative partakes of a more general assumption about mercenaries in Greek history. That is, when Greek society created mercenaries, it happened under special circumstances: from exceptional moments of societal stress or crisis in the previous assumption, or from a place whose cultural norms allowed for an exceptional predisposition towards violence, or from a people having an exceptional method of carrying out war whose equipment and tactics from those of the rest of the Greek world. Scholars have lumped Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries into all three of these categories.¹⁵ In other words, mercenaries are assumed to be the result of exceptional conditions, so their association with a point of origin would indicate that they came from a place that suffered from exceptional crisis conditions.

The idea that the Greek mercenary was the result of a societal crisis is the most prominent in discussions of the fourth century BCE.¹⁶ One explanation for this is that the literary sources

¹² From André Aymard’s influential 1967 chapter: “L’apparition et le développement du mercenariat permettent donc de diagnostiquer l’existence d’une sérieuse crise économique ou sociale: il ne constitue qu’un pis-aller pour les plus valides des hommes que talonne la misère” (488).

¹³ See James Roy’s remarks about mercenaries within his 1999 study of the economic resources of Classical Arcadia (346-9) and Pierre Ducrey’s 1971 comparison of early modern Swiss mercenaries with those of Classical Arcadia and Hellenistic Crete, which emphasizes the economic poverty of all three historical scenarios.

¹⁴ Besides Chanotis 2005: 81-2, see also Brulé 1978: 162 and Ducrey 1986: 130-2.

¹⁵ For the latter two categories: differing cultural norms, e.g., Kvist 2001 and 2003; method of warfare with an atypical focus on archery tactics, e.g., Williams 2004 and Sekunda 2001 and 2007: I.343.

¹⁶ N.B. Chanotis 2005: 80 references this earlier fourth century crisis that followed the Peloponnesian War in preface to his discourse on Hellenistic mercenaries whose social context, he says, is best exemplified by the situation of Cretan mercenaries.

that most prominently feature Greek mercenaries cluster around this time period. Xenophon's *Anabasis* told of how the Ten Thousand Greek mercenaries hired by the Persian prince Cyrus marched into Central Asia, and, after Cyrus was killed in battle, how the Greeks banded together in order to march back to the Greek world (401-399 BCE). The contemporary speeches of the Athenian rhetors Demosthenes and Isocrates were critical of Greek mercenaries. In addition to this, later historians, especially Diodorus Siculus in the first century CE, portray mercenary armies as agents of chaos that empower their otherwise stateless leaders become very real political forces. Many scholars, from H.W. Parke in 1933 to Matthew Trundle in 2004, have sought an explanation for the sudden prominence of mercenaries in the literary record at this juncture in history – a moment that Harvey F. Miller (1984) has dubbed as the “Greek Mercenary Explosion.” Miller defines this “Explosion” as a result of crisis conditions at the end of the Peloponnesian Wars in 404: in this model, political upheaval, social instability, and widespread poverty created a supply of manpower that had not existed before in Greece.¹⁷ While some scholars, such as Paul McKechnie (1989; 1994) have emphasized the economic circumstances for mercenaries, Yvon Garlan (1986: 143-72) has also taken the new widespread existence of mercenaries to indicate a breakdown of the social order – and away from the ideals of the fifth century and earlier, when good Greek citizens demonstrated their citizenship by fighting as hoplites for their *polis*. Tied up in these crisis explanations is a larger question, as Marco Bettalli (2013: 403-4) observes: why would citizen men of a *polis* abandon the social order and give over their bodies, in exchange for pay, to the potentially lethal use of others?

There are at least three problems with the fourth century crisis model to explain mercenary service in the Greek world, much less the mercenary service of Cretans in the Hellenistic period, that must be identified. First of all, although it is probably true that there were

¹⁷ After Parke (1933: 229), see Aymard 1967, Lendon 2007: 500, and McKechnie 1989 (79-93), who argues from Isocrates 5 (which promotes a united campaign against the Persians, Papillon 2004: 74-5) that a major problem for the fourth century was underpaid or unemployed mercenaries banding together of their own accord.

many mercenaries who could not afford their own weapons, the evidence for whether this was true for all mercenaries is not secure (Whitehead 1992).¹⁸ Second, the evidence for the crisis conditions of the fourth century comes from an uncritical reading of the literary texts.¹⁹ Isocrates in particular is treated as a neutral observer when he reports large numbers of itinerant mercenaries in his *Panegyricus* (4) and *To Philip* (5). This interpretation at least disregards the larger context of Isocrates' remarks. In these speeches, Isocrates aimed to persuade his audience²⁰ that the fractious Greeks needed to unite with one another (under Athenian leadership) to be able to successfully oppose the Persians. In his *Panegyricus*, Isocrates not only sold this campaign as feasible, using the Ten Thousand – their poverty emphasized and their number reduced now to Six Thousand – as an example of how easily Greeks might undermine the Persian Empire (4.146-9), but he wanted to convince his audience that uniting for this “easy” campaign was the solution to the dire conditions of Greece. One of these dire conditions was the proliferation of wandering mercenaries, who were both symptomatic of and agents in the breakdown of Greek society (4.115-6). The immediacy of the crisis was itself a construct: Isocrates advocated for a united front against Persia throughout his career, did not deliver his speeches in any official capacity if at all, and spent extended time on the composition of his speeches – ten years, in the case of the *Panegyricus* (Papillon 2004: 23-8). In other words, even if Isocrates was correct about the presence of mercenaries and the problems they posed to established political institutions, historians should be cautious in connecting their presence

¹⁸ Whitehead 1992 is arguing in direct response to McKechnie 1989: he argues that McKechnie informs his readers that the evidence for who supplied the weapons to the Ten Thousand is ambiguous at best, but in spite of this McKechnie concludes that the soldiers likely had their weapons supplied to them. McKechnie 1994 responds to Whitehead that, if one already understands that mercenaries were poor and destitute, then the ambiguity of the evidence favors an interpretation that mercenaries did not own their own weapons.

¹⁹ Trundle 2004: 60-1 observes how previous scholars have tended to Xenophon, with his view of mercenaries as respectable and participants in a *xenia* relationship with Cyrus, as less reliable than Isocrates or Demosthenes, with their emphasis on the poverty and bad qualities of mercenaries.

²⁰ Nominally, Isocrates' audience for the *Panegyricus* (4) was the Greeks at Panhellenic Games in 380. However, it seems more likely that Isocrates composed this and other speeches for distribution rather than delivering them himself on the occasion that is the dramatic setting for each of his speeches (Papillon 2004: 7-8).

directly to an acute crisis. Thirdly, although it is true that large, organized armies of mercenary soldiers could be instrumental in destabilizing established powers and/or enabling the rise of new political powers (and certainly did in the fourth century²¹), the large, organized mercenary army scenario does not necessarily account for all Greek mercenaries in all periods of Greek history.

Indeed, since much of this evidence seems to come from mainland Greece the fourth century, but we are speaking of Crete in the third through first centuries, it seems more useful to take a diachronic view of mercenaries in Greek civilization in general. In a study of Greek mercenaries before the Archaic period, Nino Luraghi (2006: 21-5) proposes that mercenary service was, quite simply, a feature of Greek culture. He observes that, before the fourth century at least, the Greek *poleis* were in many ways peripheral to larger, significantly wealthier empires such as Assyria, Egypt, and Persia. These empires had the means and market to hire Greeks as mercenaries; for example, when Cyrus hired the Ten Thousand Greeks in 401, he was doing what other Persian rulers and satraps were doing and had done before him to get military manpower. It seems that those who were troubled by Greek mercenaries in the fourth century, like Isocrates and Demosthenes (*Phil.* 1), were bothered not so much by the idea that Greeks became mercenaries, as that Greeks themselves were spending money for other Greeks to become mercenaries against each other, and thus sustaining conflict at home rather than in foreign wars abroad.²² In other words, the existence of Greeks turned mercenary should not be thought of as an indication of a decline from a wholesome civic culture *par* Garlan, but rather Greeks continuing a traditional practice at home instead of abroad. One effect of this practice would have been to both normalize and necessitate military readiness among independent powers

²¹ See, for example, Gómez Castro (2012) on the political involvement of mercenaries from 494-386 and Austin (1986: 463-5) on the availability of mercenaries and mercenary training techniques, and the rise of Hellenistic kings.

²² Trundle (2004: 72) attributes the shift to a change in demand, but he is correct in observing that it is the demand for mercenaries, and not the supply, that is “the key to mercenary service. There are, after all, no mercenaries without employers.” Marco Bettalli pers. comm. regarding Dem. *Phil.* 1.

– even small ones – that wished to protect themselves;²³ an example of this in the Hellenistic period comes from 219, during the Social War, when three member cities of the Achaean League, feeling unprotected, diverted their league membership funds towards hiring *misthophoroi* themselves (Polyb. 4.59-60). At the very least, we might consider the possibility that mercenaries from Crete need not to have been the direct result of crisis conditions or abject poverty if they were following a practice that was, at its core, quintessentially Greek.

The social acceptability of an action often affects who takes part in it, and mercenary service in the ancient world appears to have run the gamut from highly respectable to not at all.²⁴ On the one hand, the mercenaries of Hellenistic Crete with the following premise: Cretan mercenaries were effectively Greek mercenaries, and the Greek mercenary was an institution of Greek culture that was most acceptable to one's fellow citizens when the violence that Greek mercenaries wrought was farthest away. On the other hand, one of the most dramatic episodes involving mercenaries in the Hellenistic period is the Carthaginian Mercenary War when, after the Roman victory in the First Punic War in 241, the unpaid army of the Carthaginians revolted:

²³ J.E. Lendon (2007: 500-3) argues that one shift from the fourth century into the Hellenistic period is that making war came to be considered a *technē*, or a skill that could be honed to expertise. He is perhaps correct in this observation, and how it might drive the use of mercenaries who could be trained in specialist fighting techniques; however, as is noted in Chapter 3 (p. 108), those *poleis* that were able hired trainers who specialized in different types of warfare to train their youth in the *gymnasion*. Thus, although warfare may have required greater skill than in earlier periods of Greek history, there seems to have been a conscious attempt on the part of cities to educate the youth in the more advanced skills of war, and make them less rarified. This suggests that existence of post-Classical mercenaries was not simply in response to changes in the skills necessary for war.

²⁴ There are historical parallels for shifts in the respectability politics around peripheral fighters like mercenaries or pirates. John Casparis' study of Swiss mercenaries (1982) observes a shift, around 1600, from a small number of mercenaries as specialists to a much larger number of non-specialized mercenaries, the proverbial cannon fodder. He attributes the shift to employers gaining power by paying mercenaries on time. Mark G. Hanna's recent study (2015) of piracy in the 17th and 18th century Atlantic documents a shift in the preception of the British Colonies of pirates as more respectable up until around 1700, and contemptible thereafter. The shift, he argues, is that before 1700, pirates from the Colonies helped colonial markets like Boston and Philadelphia cut into trade that was monopolized by the East India Company and the Royal Africa Company; however, as the British government removed the protections from those monopolies, pirates were no longer directly benefitted those colonial markets (and the powerful people who stood to benefit most from those colonial markets). While there is no deliberate shift like this for mercenaries in the ancient world, it is worth noting that there are parallels for a range of respectability: that is, it is possible that mercenaries in the ancient world could, in one quarter, be wealthy and/or up-and-coming men, and in another quarter the exploited and contingent.

Polybius notes that the fighters consisted heavily of Libyans who under Carthaginian oppressive colonial rule revolted, so in this case we might consider an exploitative relationship (Polyb. 1.66.5-10, 72). A study of mercenaries should therefore take into account the possibility that the term “mercenary” accommodates a range in terms of status and respectability, and that the status and respectability of an individual mercenary may even fluctuate depending upon the circumstances in which he operates (Bettalli 2013: 405). I use the term “mercenary” in this dissertation, but with two caveats: the modern English term “mercenary” implies a lack of morality in the individual for culturally specific reasons that would have been foreign to ancient Greece; and that “mercenary” is a blanket term that covers a range of Greek words.

The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines a “mercenary” as “a soldier paid to serve in a foreign army or other military organization,” although it can also mean, more generally, “a person who receives payment for his or her services.” The word originates from the Latin word *merces* (wage or reward), entering the English language through the Old French *mercenaire*.²⁵ The etymologies of the words for mercenary in English and the Romance languages, as well as the German *Söldner*, all have their root in words for payment.²⁶ With the emergence of nation states and the influence of nationalism over the last three hundred years, starting with the idea that citizens can and are morally obligated to fight for their own state,²⁷ the word “mercenary”

²⁵ The context for this is roving bands of French knights who, after the Crusades, returned to France and terrorized the countryside. Lords began to hire these bands to attack other lords.

²⁶ The German term *Söldner* has at its root “solidus,” i.e., a unit of currency. It shares this root with the English “soldier” and the German word for “soldier,” *Soldat*. According to *Das Wortauskunftssystem zur deutschen Sprache in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (www.dwds.de), *Soldat* entered the German language from the Italian *soldato* in the Early Modern Period; although the Italian has the same root, it appears to have lost the explicit mercenary association at that point, and so it simply meant a member of an army. *Söldner* appeared in German much earlier, in the High Middle Ages, and appears to have had much closer associations with being paid to be part of a king or warlord’s army.

²⁷ One factor that influenced this notion of the citizen soldier in new nation-states, especially in the 18th and 19th centuries, was the fact that kings might use foreign mercenaries in order effectively occupy their countries, and control both nobles and citizens (Casparis 1982: 604-5). While this is similar to the Greek notion of the tyrant using mercenaries to circumvent legitimate mechanisms of government, the scale and the cultural context of feudalism and the absolute monarch are distinct from the cultural forces at work in the Greek world.

takes on morally questionable and often pejorative implications, i.e., “a person whose actions are motivated by personal gain, often at the expense of ethics” (*OED*). The definition in English has at its heart the notion of the foreignness of the fighter and the contractual condition of his employment; but it also comes freighted with the moral judgment about what sort of person would decide to take up weapons for a cause other than that of his own country – or even potentially, with such questionable morals, against it.²⁸ Although citizenship in the Greek world entailed a strong sense of loyalty to one’s home city, or *patris*, the basic unit of that world was the city-state, not the nation-state: we should not assume that this also entailed that one’s military prowess should be exclusively devoted to his *polis*.

The second caveat is the fact that “mercenary” does not map exactly onto the Greek. Ancient Greek has multiple terms for people whom scholars have labeled in modern languages as mercenaries: ξένος, or “foreigner”; μισθοφόρος, or “wage-earner”; and στρατιώτης, which generically means “soldier,” but may at times be distinguished from the citizen forces, e.g., πολιτικάί δύνάμεις.²⁹ Scholars have contended that there is little substantive difference between these: for example, Matthew Trundle observes that, in the *Anabasis*, Xenophon refers to his own men as *xenoi* and the enemy’s fighters as *misthophoroi*, implying that his comrades, unlike the enemy, are invested in the fight through ties of *xenia* rather than being paid to be there (2004: 16). Trundle interprets this as a matter of perspective – our men are *xenoi*, their men are *misthophoroi*; indeed, in his study of Polybius’ use of *misthophoros* and *xenos*, Éric Foulon contends that there is no substantive difference in the men who are identified by these terms, and

²⁸ A news commentary from 2004 noted that the United Nations had, in 1989, “defined mercenaries... as foreign fighters recruited to undermine or overthrow a government” (Dao 2004). James Dao’s point in mentioning this was to address the problem with defining military contractors in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom: many of these were American nationals (i.e., not foreigners), but whose contract was through an independent firm like Blackwater, not as part of the United States Armed Forces, and whose practices and actions were therefore difficult to regulate.

²⁹ Trundle 2005: 2. The term ἐπίκουρος, which can be translated as “helper” or “ally,” occurs in archaic and early classical sources.

that when the two terms appear together (e.g., Polyb. 5.36.6) it is rhetorical flourish.³⁰ In any case, one important difference between the Greek terminology and the language used by American and Western European scholars is that none of the Greek terms bear the same intrinsic moral opprobrium that the modern language terms do. Even the term *misthophoros*, whose literal translation was closest to the English “mercenary,” is a bit more like the modern American term “contractor,” since it applies to someone who is doing work for pay. “Contractor” has become problematic in recent years due to controversies surrounding their employment by national military organizations,³¹ but the term does not have the same long association as “mercenary” with amorality, and it can also be used to indicate a paid worker in any field, as in the case of *misthophoros*.³²

Bearing in mind that the English term “mercenary” has pejorative connotations regarding the character of the soldier, this dissertation nevertheless uses “mercenary” to describe **a fighter who is not a citizen of the authority under whose banner he fights; whose presence is likely contractual, but certainly not the result of an alliance between his city and that authority; and who is paid.** To elaborate on each of these elements:

- In terms of being foreign (*xenos*), this could mean that an individual was from a non-Greek ethnic group, or it could also simply mean that he did not have citizenship through the authority that hired him. It could also include a citizen coming to the aid of his own *polis* but under the banner of a foreign power, such as the 500 Rhodians serving as

³⁰ Foulon 1995: 213: when these appear together, especially without a conjunction between them, “ce qui équivaut à la redondance et à l’hendiadys précédent.” See also Bettalli 2013: 22.

³¹ In the United States, the controversy over the military’s use of contractors had become a well-publicized issue in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Dao 2004). However, this use of contractors has been a larger result of the executive branch, in the wake of the unpopularity of the Vietnam War, searching for ways to engage in military action without seeking the approval of Congress or the American public - that is, a formal declaration of war and the resulting draft obligations that would directly affect American voters (Maddow 2012). Part of the controversy arises from the fact that many of the contractors are Americans, but it is difficult to make them accountable to the U.S. military and the U.S. government.

³² For example, Aristotle (*Pol.* 2.1274a9) uses the phrase τὰ δικαστήρια μισθοφόρα to describe the Athenian institution of paying jurors.

mercenaries under Ptolemy I who came to their *patris*' aid during the siege of Rhodes in 305 BCE (DS 20.88.9).

- A mercenary took his status as a mercenary through a contract, and “mercenary” was therefore a temporary status, not a fixed identity.³³ In this way he is similar to an ally (*summachos*) insofar as the ally takes his temporary status as ally because he is a citizen of an allied city who is part of a group of soldiers sent to aid the partner allied city (*summachia*) under the terms spelled out in an alliance (*summachia*). However, a mercenary is not an ally because he has a mercenary contract, not allied status. This does not preclude a mercenary from feeling personally invested in a conflict out of, for example, hereditary *xenia* or a *sungeneia* relationship.
- The contract would guarantee payment regardless of the success of the venture, although there are famous cases in which the employer failed to pay and encountered serious problems as the former mercenaries sought to claim their due payment. However, payment is not the sole distinguishing characteristic of mercenaries since, by the beginning of the Hellenistic period, even citizen soldiers received a wage.

Two observations must be made about this definition. First, it is broad: by excluding only members of citizen forces and *summachia* forces, it allows for a wide spectrum of circumstances in which a fighter could be considered a mercenary: those soldiers who take extended or multiple contracts as well as those who only become mercenaries once in their lives, armies as well as individuals, and possibly even non-citizen individuals who are contracted as mercenaries to fill out the numbers of a *summachia* force.³⁴ This is important because, although it is possible that

³³ The inscribed document most often described as a mercenary contract is *OGIS* 1.266, first identified as such by Guy T. Griffith (1935: 177). This agreement between King Attalus I and his mercenaries has been compared with the interstate document *IC* III.iii.3A, the central case study in Chapter 5. This comparison is one of the justifications that Launey and others (most recently Couvenhes 2016) make for classifying *IC* III.iii.3A as a type of mercenary contract.

³⁴ This dissertation was developed and written from the summer of 2013 up until the summer of 2017. During this period, there has been a rise in non-national enemies that have sorely tested the abilities of nation-states – today’s

mercenaries may not come from Crete in the “spectacular numbers” (Brulé 1978: 161) scholars have attributed to them, there were still some mercenaries from Crete and, significantly, there were *summachia* agreements made by Cretan cities that included provisions for mercenary recruitment, as I will explain below. Second, a definition that focuses only upon the contracted employment status of a mercenary means that one can be identified as a mercenary without being a professional or an expert.³⁵ This means that the label “mercenary” can be applied to a range of competences, such as a corps of mercenaries that is inexperienced (e.g., Polyb. 4.75.5-6), as well as instances in which mercenaries are better trained although less loyal (Polyb. 11.13.3-5). One advantage of a corps of mercenaries was that it was often better prepared to fight as a group than other troops; however for Greek writers, the expertise was viewed as the domain of the commander or recruiter (*xenologos*) who is familiar with military practice and able to train groups of men – who must, in turn, be paid to remain in order to be trained. This training likely occurred within the context of a royal or hegemonic military apparatus, particularly for specialist divisions. *Krētes*, or “Cretans” were one such division that in some cases might act like a special operations force at the edges of the phalanx. But there is no evidence for hegemonic-scale warfare on Crete to provide the context in which *Krētes* fighters tended to operate.

units of power – to maintain themselves. Extrastate extremist terrorist organizations like Daesh (ISIL) in the Middle East and Boko Haram in northern Africa (following in the footsteps of the Taliban and Al Qaeda) have led to a proliferation of different types of foreign fighters with a mixture of allegiances that are not national. For example, Jesse Rosenfeld (2015) interviewed freelance fighters of differing nationalities in Syria who reported a variety of reasons for fighting against Daesh, including American patriotism, hatred of ISIL, support for the Kurds, Christian values, and so forth – although all the interviewees are careful to emphasize that they are different from mercenaries. Meanwhile, the government of Nigeria famously hired South African mercenaries to fight Boko Haram (Nossiter 2015). All of this extranational combat activity has produced a host of legal problems because international law is not clear on how, in a manner that is both effective and ethically sound, to treat an enemy combatant who is not from a country that has formally declared war (Finkelstein, forthcoming). In other words, there is a spectrum of non-national fighters, and although they are not all mercenaries – and differ in their avowed and unspoken motivations for joining in combat – their presence outside of the framework of nations at war creates complications in international law.

³⁵ Lendon (2007: 500-8), who argues that the increased expertise required for warfare in the fourth century drove the creation of mercenaries, also observes that mercenaries and other troops could be retrained.

III. THE EVIDENCE FOR HELLENISTIC CRETAN MERCENARIES

In the previous sections, I have posited that economic factors cannot be wholly responsible for the creation of mercenaries in Greek society, and that mercenaries were likely part and parcel of Greek society; this means that we need not expect an archaeological picture of exceptional isolation or lack of economic development in the places from which Greek mercenaries came. I have also established a use for the English term “mercenary” that covers a wide array of circumstances for Greek mercenaries, but that, theoretically, all of these circumstances would have in common individuals who are neither citizen nor citizen of a foreign power, and who, theoretically, would have some species of contract to explain their presence in a fighting force. Given this small distinction to indicate a mercenary, as well as some of the problems in the interpretations of literary sources by both advocates of the Cretan master narrative and Greek mercenaries specialists, it seems fruitful to approach Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries primarily as a textual question. The following is an overview of the categories of evidence used in this dissertation and how they apply to the question of how to most clearly identify and study unambiguous Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries.

As with Greek mercenaries, one ought to be skeptical before interpreting archaeological evidence from Crete as evidence for a “mercenary” society. Even if there are specific regional differences that distinguish the archaeology of Hellenistic Crete, such as a shortage of monumental buildings financed by foreign benefactors (Chaniotis 2004: 79-80), this is not in itself an indicator of poverty, much less an indicator of a poor society producing mercenaries. We might instead approach Cretan mercenaries by looking at the material evidence warfare on Crete, such as sling bullets and arrowheads deposited outside the walls of cities. However, we would have to acknowledge that warfare was also a feature of Greek life and, in any case, we can posit that mercenaries were *likely* to wield some types of weapons but we cannot say for certain whether any specific weapon was wielded by a mercenary without some kind of textual label,

such as an epitaph. Finally, one limitation of this dissertation is that it does not consider the numismatic evidence from Crete. It is traditional to associate coin hoards on Crete as deposits left by Cretan mercenaries (MacDonald 1996); however, without a label, again, this is not necessarily a reliable indicator of mercenaries.

The next category of evidence for Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries is contained in inscriptions. Epigraphic evidence has both a material and a textual nature. In the material category, inscriptions have immediacy: their existence shows that they were created by and for specific people on a specific occasion, so information can be gleaned from where the inscription was found and how it was displayed. When Cretans appear on a list of garrison soldiers, as at Eleusis in Attica in 237/6 (*IG II² 1299*), this context makes it possible to infer that those Cretans were stationed there for an extended time and were on contract as mercenaries. The location where the inscription was found can help, but it does not provide the whole context: a stele inscribed with men's names and Cretan *polis* ethnic found at Demetrias in Thessaly indicates a very high likelihood that men from Crete came to Thessaly and died within reasonable proximity to where the grave stele was found (e.g., *IG IX,2.366*). It is possible that they arrived there as mercenaries for the royal palace garrison, and remained there in an army career, but there is nothing in the label to indicate this part for certain. In contrast, a funerary stele with an explicit label would be that of Charmas of Anopolis (*SEG 8.269*), discovered in the Levant, whose metrical epitaph – i.e. the textual aspect of the source – says that he served in the Ptolemaic army. But many grave stelai do not have such precise labeling: so while the material aspect can tell us that some Cretans died away from Crete, the text does not always allow us to unambiguously assume that the mobile Cretan was a mercenary.

The most unambiguous evidence for the recruitment of mercenaries, or *xenologia*, that is tied securely to Cretan *poleis* appears in the text of a small number of international proclamations and agreements. As *poleis* across the Hellenistic world, the *poleis* of Crete

concluded various categories of interstate/international agreements amongst themselves and with non-Cretan parties. These categories include, but are not limited to: alliances (*summachia*) between two nominally independent partners; declarations of inviolability (*asuleia*), a one-sided declaration in which one party assured protection to another; declarations of *proxenia*, which honor a citizen of a foreign city (*proxenos*) who would, theoretically, aid and represent citizens abroad from the *polis* making the declaration; and agreements establishing joint or shared citizenship between two *poleis*, such as *isopoliteia*, which provided dual citizenship for citizens of nominally equal *poleis*. All of the parties involved in interstate agreements needed, at least nominally, to be independent of the direct control of the other parties. These documents were posted in public contexts, such as the agora of a *polis* or in a sanctuary that was frequented by citizens of the partner cities. Some of these documents could be temporary: many agreements were inscribed on stelai that were erected in public contexts such as sanctuaries, and these stelai could be changed out or reused as circumstances between partners changed or the agreement fell out of use (Bolmarcich 2007b). In terms of text, language of these inscriptions was often highly formulaic. Yet even within these parameters, the framers of the agreements could make deliberate choices to deploy some formulae and not others, or variations on conventional formulae, in order to fit their needs.³⁶

The *poleis* of Crete, likewise, made interstate agreements amongst themselves (Chanotis 1996) and with external *poleis*, leagues of *poleis*, and kings all over the Greek world. Some of these agreements were found on Crete, while others were discovered outside of the island. But the use of *xenologia* clauses in Cretan agreements is exceptional: there are only four cases of *xenologia* clauses, of which three come from Crete in the late third century, while the fourth

³⁶ A good example of this is *boēthia* (see my discussion in Chapter 5) a term that means “emergency aid” and is customarily accompanied by a formula to send that as much aid as possible. However, within the corpus of evidence in Table 8, we may see variations on the concept of *boēthia*, including specific requests clarifying the nature of the *boēthia*, or replacement of the term *boēthia* with *epimeleia*. See also Bolmarcich 2007a: 32 for a discussion of how Greek agreements used clear language to express imbalances of power.

comes from Asia Minor in the early first century BCE.³⁷ The marked rarity of this clause and its association with Crete at a specific moment in time deserve explanation, even if we assume that mercenaries and mercenary recruitment might not be out of character for other parts of the Greek world. Furthermore, the temporary nature of these inscriptions suggests that individual circumstances surrounding the *xenologia* mentioned in the documents might be temporary and suited to a particular historical moment. In other words, one or two parties made an agreement because, at that moment, they needed certain things from each other; an agreement involving *xenologia* might be one of those needs; if this was so, then the parties would also establish the terms of *xenologia* in order to fill what they perceived to be a need of the moment. Many Cretan interstate agreements are framed around conflict: they provide terms for ending a war, for preventing the outbreak of war, for allying in anticipation of war, for sending aid in the event of an attack, and so forth. In order to better understand how *xenologia* might operate as part of a series of ephemeral needs, this dissertation examines interstate agreements associated with Cretan *poleis*. The corpus, provided in Table 8, contains sixty-six specimens from the abovementioned types of interstate agreements (*summachia*, *asuleia*, *proxenia*, *isopoliteia*, etc.) from the middle of the fourth century until the end of the second century BCE. While only three contain a discernable *xenologia* clause, others contain formulaic language that is similar³⁸ or mention recruited soldiers, some of whom are not Cretans.³⁹

³⁷ The three Cretan inscriptions all date from the second half of the third century, to the beginning of the second century: *IC* III.iii.1A: Macedon and Hierapytna, c. 227-224 BCE; *IC* III.iii.3A: Rhodes and Hierapytna, c. 200 BCE; *IC* II.iii.4C: Attalus II of Pergamon and Aptera, c. 241-197 BCE. The fourth, *IvP* II.268, is between Ephesus and Sardis, and is dated to c. 98-94 BCE.

³⁸ For example, *IC* I.vii.1 (Chaniotis 1991 no. 4 = *SEG* 41.768) contains remnants of a loyalty formula that appears in *IC* III.iii.3A in proximity with a *xenologia* clause. For more on this, see further discussion of this in Chapter 5.

³⁹ *IC* I.xvi.35 is a dedication by soldiers recruited by the Rhodians from Greece and stationed at Lato-*pros*-Kamara, the port of Lato. *IC* I.xxii.4B, xi is a *proxenia* decree by the *polis* of Olous honoring a citizen of Astypalaea who served as a soldier (l. 42: [στ]ρατευόμενος). *IC* III.iv.18 is a dedication to the Ptolemaic ruler cult by the garrison commander (*phrouarchōn*) for the Ptolemies at Itanus, a Roman called Gaius son of Lucius.

One limitation to analyzing this epigraphic evidence for the recruitment of mercenaries is that it is often difficult to establish a precise date for the text of an inscribed agreement, which would help contextualize the specific ephemeral circumstances outlined in an agreement within a larger historical picture. For detailed agreements with a lot of surviving text, internal context clues such as eponymous magistrates and references to previous agreements can sometimes provide evidence for chronology. Beyond this, one might also turn to literary sources in order to reconstruct the events and chronology that would have prompted the specific agreements. The main literary sources for the chronology and events involving Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries are Polybius, Livy, Diodorus, and Plutarch. The citations for all relevant literary passages involving Cretans and Cretan mercenaries are listed chronologically based upon the date of the events they describe in Table 1.

In addition to chronology and events, literary sources can be heavily informative about the attitudes that contemporary or near-contemporary observers would have had towards people and events. For this reason, it is important to have a clear understanding of the rhetorical motivations of the text. I mentioned above the example of Isocrates, whose portrayals of mercenaries in the fourth century as poor and desperate are potentially misrepresentative of Greek mercenary service because of how they are used in his argument, but he may be correct in how more Greeks paying for mercenaries would create more conflict in Greece. One salient observation must be made: no literary source ever states that employers particularly valued mercenaries from Crete, and, although there are a few accounts of commanders recruiting mercenaries from Crete, no literary source ever refers to Crete as a choice place for recruiting mercenaries.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ See my comments on Polyb. 31.16 and Strabo 10.4.10 in Chapter 5.

Of the authors who are sources for Cretan mercenaries, only Polybius (c. 200-c.118 BCE) is a contemporary; in comparison with the other authors, he is the only one to have lived at a time when mercenary service was still a living institution in the Greek world and when Crete was still independent of Rome. He himself was a statesman from a leading family of the Achaean League, and an actor in some of his own historical narratives. Thus, even if he was correct in his understanding of how the use of mercenaries was undermining the hegemonic powers of the Hellenistic Mediterranean, this use of mercenaries and even the idea that leading statesmen could have been mercenary commanders at some point in their careers was part of his world.⁴¹ Yet, even if we choose not to fully trust Polybius solely for his autobiography, his writing contains much of the same diplomatic terminology that appears within inscribed agreements. The use of this terminology common to both literary and epigraphic sources is a productive line of inquiry into how the rhetoric of Polybius might align with the legal rhetoric and thought process behind the inscribed documents, and thus how events in Polybius might serve to dramatize the sorts of diplomatic interactions outlined in those documents. I provide two practical examples for how an understanding of shared terminology can contribute to a study of Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries, both of which I will refer back to in other parts of this dissertation.

First, Polybius presents *summachia* agreements (e.g., 7.9), shows different types of allied aid in action (e.g., 4.55), and preserves the distinction between *summachia* (allied aid) and *boēthia* (emergency aid) that is made in inscribed documents like a *summachia* between a Cretan *polis* and Rhodes (*IC* III.iii.3A) around 200 BCE, the case study in Chapter 5. Marcel Launey (1949: I.36-38) characterizes *summachia* documents as state-sponsored mercenary recruitments where the state is the recruiter rather than the *xenologos*. In support of this, he observes that Livy used the Latin terms *auxilium* and its cognate *auxiliaris* to describe *summachia*; since the

⁴¹ For example, in the preceding generation, these included Philopoemen, the Achaean *prostatēs* who spent the early part of his career as a commander on Crete (Errington 1969: 27-48), and Telemnastus, the Gortynian commander who aided Philopoemen against Sparta, and whose son argued for aid before the Achaean Assembly (Polyb. 33.16).

Romans tended to use mercenaries for their auxiliaries – that is, the light fighters who are not part of the legion – the *summachoi* must therefore be mercenaries. Launey’s interpretation of *summachia* as the province of mercenaries and *IC* III.iii.3A as a mercenary contract has been echoed by other scholars (Chanotis 2005: 83; Couvenhes 2016b), but it misses a subtle difference between Roman and Greek views of foreign fighters and their relationship to the organization of the military. Romans were so certain of the presence of *auxiliares* that they assign them a specific role in their army. In Greek armies, allies and mercenaries could even fight in heavy armor alongside the phalanx but these had no assigned place, though in practice allied partners often send mercenaries as aid.⁴² Crucially, the assumption that allies would show up is not built into Greek military systems in the way it seems to have been built into the Roman.⁴³ Since both Polybius and the inscribed documents preserve the same terminological distinctions between *summachia* and *boēthia*, as well as between these and *xenologia*, Polybius’ narratives are potentially a good place to observe the differences between these terms in action, and what their implications might be for the Cretan cities that made the inscribed agreements, and how mercenaries fit into this picture.

A second example of how the rhetoric of Polybius might contribute to the study of Cretan mercenaries is in his conception of citizenship corresponds with how citizenship is conceived in

⁴² The closest Greek translation to describe what the Romans call *auxiliares* (i.e., light weapons, cavalry, and subservient allied relationship) is *prostaxis*, a noun that does not appear until Arrian in the second century CE (*Tact.* 20.3).

⁴³ A specific example of this difference can be seen in how Polybius and Livy tell the story of how Hieron II of Syracuse sent emergency aid to Rome in 218, during the Second Punic War. Polybius (3.75.7) portrays the Romans as energetic in their preparations, but otherwise like any other city: they send for *boēthia* from Hieron, and Hieron dispatches 500 Cretans (*Krētes*) and 1000 peltasts. As can be seen from the collection of passages showing alliance/recruitment (AR) in the Numbers Key [Appendix], it seems to have become fairly common for allies to send light troops or cavalry rather than hoplites. In contrast, Livy (22.37.8) turns the same event into an aetiology of how the Roman army got its *auxiliares*: he shows Hieron cleverly reasoning that, since the Romans only have themselves and Latins in their ranks, but their *auxiliares* consisted of other peoples, and because their enemy Hannibal had Moors, Balaeric slingers, and other missile weapons in his ranks, it would be best to send archers and slingers to the Romans as aid. So, the same episode that Livy portrays as an innovation in military organization, Polybius portrays as an exchange that was prudent on the Romans’ part and receptive on Hieron’s, but otherwise typical and ultimately diplomatic.

inscribed *summachiai*. In a discussion (6.46.1-5) of the attributes that make a state's sociopolitical system (i.e., education, military defense, and mode of governance) desirable, Polybius recommends judging the system based upon the character of the men as individuals (*κατ' ἰδίαν*) and the state as a collective (*κατὰ κοινόν*) (see pp. 152-5). Elsewhere, Polybius depicts a specific situation in which historical actors – members of the Achaean Assembly – make roughly the same assessment with the same dichotomy: they are inclined to favor speakers from Rhodes because they admire the behavior or its sociopolitical system and its men (33.16.3). The phrases *kat' idian* and *kata koinon* appear in inscribed interstate documents. Scholars have customarily translated these phrases into modern languages as “private” and “public,” respectively, but there are good reasons to reconsider this private/public dichotomy. First, individual/collective is a more flexible translation that lends itself to contexts, such as bilateral interstate agreements, where a more accurate translation for the formulae would be “separate” and “together.”⁴⁴ Second, although the modern notion of “public” indicating “something by/for the body politic” is a reasonable translation of *kat' idian*, the notion of private action – actions by a non-official that are entirely personal and whose public dimension is secondary or left unconsidered – is increasingly being seen as anachronistic.⁴⁵ New research⁴⁶ on Athenian law, for instance, shows a concept of citizenship in which the state as a collective (*koinon*) of all citizens, regardless of whether they were officials. This concept works for inside the state, but it might also be turned outward to say that the actions of individual citizens who were from their

⁴⁴ E.g., the opposition of common/separate in *IC III.iii.4* (Chaniotis 28), an *isopoliteia* agreement between Hierapytna and Priansus (shortly after 205): ll. 5-12 refer to preexisting agreements to set the terms. There was a separate agreement between Hierapytna and Gortyn (*ἰδίαι*) and the one that consisted of the two present partners and Gortyn (*κατὰ κοινόν*). This inscription is also discussed in n. 139.

⁴⁵ Polignac and Schmitt Pantel (1998: 7-8) note that the *idios* is essentially a part of a whole. This has been influential in the study of archaic lyric poetry (Budelmann 2009: 11-2). Alberto Maffi, in a forthcoming paper assessing the current state of the field of Greek law, also argues that a better understanding of how the *polis* functions is only possible with the breakdown of the categories of “public law” and “private law”.

⁴⁶ E.g., a forthcoming paper by Robert Wallace remarks on the role of the volunteer (*ho boulomenos*) prosecutor who was not an elected official in the Athenian court system.

state were abroad might nonetheless have diplomatic ramifications for their *polis* because this concept of citizenship made them part of the whole state.⁴⁷ Although Polybius' remarks about assessing people and their society could simply be read as stereotyping, the *kat' idian/kata koinon* dichotomy that he uses is reflective of epigraphic sources, including those with clauses about *xenologia* from Crete. At the very least, we should hesitate to read all mercenaries in Polybius as detached actors with no connection to their home cities, and including the solo Cretans who appear in the service of foreign warlords throughout the *Histories*.

IV. DISSERTATION OUTLINE

This dissertation proposes to study Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries by first narrowing down which evidence best indicates “a mercenary who comes from Crete in the Hellenistic period,” and then analyzing the unequivocal evidence once it has been identified.

Chapter 1 examines the textual evidence for the large numbers of Cretan mercenaries and the label that is used to identify them. One of the facets of the master narrative is that Crete was overpopulated and/or under resourced, and the mass emigration of mercenaries was an indicator of this. We cannot say anything conclusive from material evidence about whether the population of Crete was beyond carrying capacity. However, a study of the textual evidence for the numbers for Cretan mercenaries shows it can be potentially difficult to identify Cretan mercenaries from Crete. This is because the term used in textual sources, *Krēs*, can also label “Cretans” from communities outside of Crete and a particular type of fighter. In the case of hegemonic armies, the label seems more likely to indicate *Krētes* as a type of fighter, rather than necessarily a Cretan from Crete. In general, the chapter argues for skepticism towards using the numbers in these sources to count Cretan mercenaries.

⁴⁷ Certainly, the moniker “private” becomes cumbersome when it is applied to an institution like *proxenia* – for which there is inscribed evidence – in which the body politic of a *polis* awards an official capacity to a “private” individual of another *polis*. For help with this concept, please see the poundcake analogy in Chapter 4 (n. 223).

Chapters 2 and 3 examine the textual and material evidence for Cretans as military specialists, in order to understand the extent to which the fighting style of *Krētes* in non-Cretan armies was related with the style of warfare used by Cretans on Crete. Chapter 2 examines the material and textual evidence for war on Crete, which is said to have been exceptional for its especial use of archery, the result of its rugged landscape, and this atypical practice resulted in mercenaries who were archery specialists. Chapter 3 considers the larger context of archery in the Hellenistic world through material and literary evidence, as well as the literary evidence for the tactics of *Krētes* in foreign hegemonic armies. These chapters conclude that, although the inhabitants of Crete did use archery in the Hellenistic period, this was not the result of a divergent development and was in fact typical for Hellenistic Greek *interpolis* warfare. They further posit that *Krētes* – who may have been archers in the fourth century, but may not have used a bow at all in Polybius – were best suited to training and performing in the context of a large hegemonic army. This is not to say that Cretans did not train to be *Krētes*, but *Krētes* were not a natural product of specialized Cretan warfare.

Chapter 4 turns to the notion that Hellenistic Crete was violent and chaotic, and in turn produced mercenaries who were predisposed to violence. Since Polybius is the main source for this portrait and affects how scholars interpret the evidence of inscribed treaties, the chapter endeavors to produce a new close reading of the *Histories* that can also be used as a tool for historical analysis. The chapter argues that Polybius is himself using Crete – or more specifically, the Cretan *politeia* – to create his own philosophical diagnostic tool for his readers to assess the fitness of sociopolitical systems, and suggests that this tool can also be used by modern historians to better understand Polybius' presentation of the history of Crete. Within this framework, the Cretan *politeia* becomes emblematic of the kinds of traits that bring undermine the stability of states, including permissiveness towards laws and customs and susceptibility to foreign influences. It also becomes a way to explain how the presence of immoral behavior, even

when it does not seem to directly bring on negative consequences, it can still indicate that a state is vulnerable. When Polybius' diagnostic tool is applied to his historical narratives of Hellenistic Crete, we may find that what makes Cretan violence idiosyncratic is not that it was frequent or even markedly vicious for cities in that period. Rather, the Cretan cities differed from other warring Hellenistic cities by being able to continue fighting one another every generation or so because they could seek outside alliances with powerful players without those external players taking over Crete. When we apply the tool to Polybius' accounts of Cretans in foreign armies, we see that the author's objection applies to any mercenary: a state that relies upon foreigners to fight their wars makes itself infinitely vulnerable.

Having sought to winnow out ambiguous evidence for Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries in Chapter 1-4, Chapter 5 turns to the least ambiguous evidence for mercenaries from Hellenistic Crete: the inscribed interstate agreements that include *xenologia* clauses. A case study of the most extensive *summachia* with a *xenologia* clause, the abovementioned IC III.iii.3A, observes that the document distinguishes between different types of military aid (*boēthia*, *summachia*, *xenologia*, and conditions for aiding against pirates). By comparing these clauses with the uses of this terminology in other literary and epigraphic sources, the study argues that the differences in these clauses lie in the obligations that they place upon each of the allied partners to send or receive each type of military aid. Some obligations may restrict the circumstances under which a city can call for aid, or even prohibit an independent foreign policy within the scope of an alliance. The study suggests that mercenary recruitment could be appealing in certain ways as a solution for acquiring manpower with the least number of diplomatic obligations. It also observes that factors such as the citizenship of the mercenary and the alliances in which his *polis* might be involved could complicate this recruiting process. The study concludes with the proposition that Crete, with its tenuous internal alliances and lack of unified external control, could offer mercenaries with less complicated diplomatic ties than elsewhere. But this flexibility

may have come at a price for Cretan *poleis*: they made proclamations and alliances offering soldiers and other types of aid as credible diplomatic currency, in order to remain independent of other foreign powers, but more often fellow *poleis* on their own island.

Chapter 1: Identifying and Counting Cretan Fighters

This chapter contests the view in the master narrative that Cretan mercenaries were exceptionally numerous as a result of crisis conditions on the island, through a source criticism of the textual evidence for Cretan mercenaries. In order to do this, it will first briefly note that the material evidence for the study of population on Crete does not, at this point, unequivocally support or refute the view that Crete was overpopulated. Since overpopulation may not therefore explain the reputation of large numbers of Cretan mercenaries, the chapter will then address the textual evidence for labeling mercenaries from Crete; this will specifically focus on the Greek term *Krēs*, which is often interpreted in military contexts to indicate a Cretan mercenary. I will observe that this term is ambiguous, reflecting three different categories that may not be mutually exclusive, but does not always translate as “a Cretan coming from Crete.” One of these categories appears to be a particular type of fighter. Therefore, I will next turn to lists and catalogues in mainly literary sources in which *Krētes* appear in a military context, in order to inquire as to whether *Krētes* were disproportionately represented in Hellenistic armies and to see what information the numbers might provide about the role of *Krētes*. In order to do this, I collect into tables and analyze the numbers of all types of Cretans, regardless of under which categories of *Krēs* they might fall. As is observed in the chapter, many of these *Krētes* in the literary accounts of Hellenistic armies have no narrative connection to the island, and so the final portion of the chapter examines the evidence for quotas of soldiers promised to be sent to the Rhodians by the cities of Hierapytna and Olous (*IC* III.iii.3A; *SEG* 23:547). Observing that these quotas are for allies, not mercenaries, it will argue that these numbers demonstrate one way in

which even groups sent directly from Crete by Cretan cities might nonetheless be heterogeneous, and suggests that mercenaries might help cities fill out these quotas.

I. MERCENARIES AND THE POPULATION OF CRETE

One of the central ideas of the master narrative of Hellenistic Crete is that Crete produced a large number of mercenaries who appeared in armies all over the Mediterranean, and that both the quantity of mercenaries and their ubiquity must be explained through exceptional conditions on Crete. Although we have epigraphic evidence such as grave stelai and soldier lists testify to the mobility of Cretans and their presence in these armies, the impression of large numbers of Cretan mercenaries was originally gleaned from the large quantities of Cretan fighters, or Κρητες, who appear in the army catalogues of the ancient military accounts of Polybius and Livy. Marcel Launey, who collected all of the evidence for Cretans in Hellenistic armies (1949: I.248-86), draws attention to Polybius in particular and remarks that Crete must have possessed a considerably robust population while populations elsewhere were in decline.⁴⁸ Other scholars, most recently Alexandros Karafotias (2007) have followed Launey, using the numbers of soldiers in Polybius to argue for extreme population stress on Crete. Although this method is not directly questioned by other specialists on Hellenistic Crete, others have seen overpopulation and/or competition for limited resources on Crete as a factor that directly caused the Cretan mercenary phenomenon – i.e., that population stress was one among many conditions on Crete

⁴⁸ Launey 1949: I.275: “Car les Crétois apparaissant dans presque toutes les guerres, dans presque toutes les armées. L’impression la plus immédiate tirée de l’exposé est celle de l’abondance: encore faut-il songer que seul un petit nombre des faits est parvenu à notre connaissance; ainsi, de combien d’exemples supplémentaires disposerions-nous si l’œuvre de Polybe était intact? Il paraît hors de doute que, pendant la période qui nous occupe, la Crète a possédé une puissance démographique considérable. Dans un monde qu’épuise la dépopulation, la Crète échappe à cette maladie; elle n’aurait pas fourni tant de soldats sans un fort excès de population.”

so onerous that many Cretan men chose to leave the island as mercenaries (Brulé 1978: 162-4; Petropoulou 1985; Chaniotis 1995; 1999c; 2005: 80-2).

There is precedent for scholars of Hellenistic Crete to associate numerical figures for Cretan fighters with estimating the population of Crete. Examining mercenary numbers for demographic information and especially for calculating population figures in regions of the Greco-Roman world is a very old methodology. Karl Julius Beloch's 1886 *Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt* was the first to use of the numbers of soldiers in literary sources in order to calculate populations figures (Hansen 2006: 4-6). Although it is now considered old-fashioned to use these numbers from literary sources as a primary method for calculating population, the method still has traction when used in tandem with other metrics for estimating population (e.g., Hansen 2006: 6, 84; Fischer-Bovet 2011: 138-41). These metrics may include territory size and numbers of houses in a survey area, modern situations with ecological and cultural constraints making them comparable to ancient conditions, historical populations records from early modern periods, and estimating a rate of growth if there is a "known" base population (Rackham and Moody 1995: 97).

There is no conclusive way of determining whether Crete was overpopulated or stressed past carrying capacity in the Hellenistic period.⁴⁹ Even population estimates using these multiple metrics for calculation, especially those from material evidence, still rely upon assumptions that can be critiqued. In order to extrapolate population from a small sample across a wider space, one must make an assumption about density. Athanasis Kalpaxis (1999) examines available

⁴⁹ See Coutsinas 2013: 36-45 for an overview of these methods, including counting soldier numbers, for calculating the population of Hellenistic Crete. Coutsinas favors Kalpaxis 1999, which is mainly why I include him, but see below.

resources of the island and the layout of certain urban sites to arrive at an estimate of around 400,000 in the Hellenistic period. This estimate is quite large; it is around twice the estimate of Oliver Rackham and Jennifer Moody (*ibid.*), who, using all the abovementioned methods but lacking literary data, arrive at a range of 173,000-217,000 for Minoan Crete, with a height of 216,000-271,000 in the Palatial period, and matches the population of Crete in the first half of the twentieth century.⁵⁰ Kalpaxis assumes a high population density even in rural areas, though it is notable that this assumption is partly based upon considerations gleaned from fourth century literary sources, such as meeting the needs of the *sussition* (1999: 124).⁵¹ In contrast, Simon Price (2011) uses data from Sphakia, which was very rural in the Hellenistic period, to argue for that a lower density should be assumed Cretan population estimates. If we follow Price 2011, assuming a high density for rural zones of Crete is unnecessary to material analysis, so it is noteworthy that Kalpaxis' assumption of high density in his population calculation is gleaned from his interpretation of fourth century literary sources. If we look instead at the movements of peoples for information about population stress, there is evidence from the Western Mesara in central Crete (Watrous et al. 2004). In the Hellenistic period, people settled in and intensively cultivated rural zones outside of the urban centers of Phaestus and Gortyn, in areas not occupied or developed in the preceding centuries, and those Hellenistic settlement patterns that continued into the Roman period (*ibid.* 351-4, 357-8). One interpretation of this could be that population stress at the city centers drove people out into the countryside, but this shift could also have less to do with population stress than that conditions, such as relative peace in these rural areas, made

⁵⁰ For early modern and recent population of Crete, see Coutsinas 2013: 42.

⁵¹ In order to arrive at this number, Kalpaxis assumes a high density of settlement, including in rural areas, and suggests that, among other things, piracy could have increased carrying capacity (1999: 113).

them favorable to economic investment. For the present, though, the material evidence for population stress is not conclusive, and still subject to interpretation.

If we consider that population stress in Hellenistic Crete is not unambiguously reflected in the material record, we must draw attention to the textual evidence through which demographers like Kalpaxis filter their evidence. In his case, the impulse to calculate for a higher density comes from an uncritical reading of literary sources, even when the study aims to interpret non-literary evidence.⁵² Angelos Chaniotis directs his remarks about Cretan population away from literary sources, looking instead towards evidence for numbers of Cretan fighters in epigraphic sources to talk about relative population size (1995: 74), but he still makes the same assumptions, derived from the fourth century literary sources, that the rigid caste system meant that only a small minority of elites should be counted as fighters (*ibid.* 42-4). I have already suggested, in the Introduction to the dissertation, that the emergence of mercenaries from a particular point of origin need not indicate that these mercenaries came from, or were fleeing from, crisis conditions, and that this is a misreading of the literary sources. In the absence of unambiguous material evidence for crisis, and in an effort to study Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries without assuming that they are the result of crisis, I turn now to the textual sources for the numbers used to count Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries. After all, if we are going to study

⁵² Another example literary evidence affecting analysis is Spyridon Marinatos' calculation of the population of Crete based upon numbers of young men in the inscribed third century Oath of Dreros (*IC* I.xi.1 = Chaniotis no. 7): citing Ephorus' account in Strabo to assume an exceptionally narrow sliver of the population must be fighting men, Marinatos (1936: 284) arrives at what he admits to be an exorbitant population figure of 500,000. Marinatos assumes the figure of 180 accounts for an entire age class at Dreros and that the servile class would have exceptionally dwarfed the freeborn warrior class. While demographic estimates for Athens and other *poleis* do assume a large servile class, the key difference is that for Crete, Marinatos and others are estimating that the ratio of servile to citizen is *exceptionally* large. Chaniotis (1996: 199, no. 7) argues that the number is too round to represent a segment of the population, and proposes that it stood in for perhaps 60 representatives from three different age classes or different *phylai*. This would reduce Marinatos' calculations significantly but does not address with the assumption that this class would be exceptionally small on Crete.

Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries, we must first understand who has been counted in Polybius and other ancient sources, and decide for ourselves which of those counted belongs in our study.

II. DEFINING ΚΡΗΣ

The adjective “Cretan” is the English translation for the Greek Κρής, which always describes people rather than things. In its Hellenistic usage, the term *Krēs* appears to refer to three different categories of person: a person from Crete; a person who is a part of a Cretan emigrant community outside of Crete; and a light-armed skirmisher. When used in a military context, all three meanings appear describe individuals who are either located outside of Crete or going to leave the island.⁵³ These categories need not be mutually exclusive; for example, a *Krēs* could be a man from Crete who also fights as a *Krēs* skirmisher.

A. A Cretan from Crete

Although the term *Krēs* always, in all three categories, refers to an individual who is located outside of Crete, the first use of *Krēs* specifically refers to “a person from the island of Crete” who is not currently on the island. *Krēs* functions like a regional *ethnikon* in that it identifies an individual based upon a larger region rather than a *polis*. But it is only toponymic because, unlike other Greek regional *ethnika* like *Boiotios* or *Achaios*, *Krēs* does not imply membership in a formal regional political organization. Instead of *Krēs*, Cretans on the island referred to themselves with *polis-ethnika* or, when acting as a political group, they employed a neologism of the Hellenistic period, οἱ Κρηταιεῖς. In inscriptions, *Krētaieis* is the term by which members of the Cretan Koinon refer to themselves (Chaniotis 1999c: 289), and Polybius uses

⁵³ The term *Krēs* differs from the Latin *Cretensis*: the Latin refers to Cretans both on and off the island; when it is used in a military context, it is a modifier: *Cretenses sagitarii*.

this term to describe the collective political activities of Cretans on Crete.⁵⁴ Although the term *Krēs* describes Cretans from Crete in inscriptions found in numerous locations outside of Crete, it only appears once in a Hellenistic inscription uncovered on Crete, a dedicatory epigram at Gortyn describing a weapon.⁵⁵ It is notable that, while *Krēs* may describe an individual or a group, *Krētaieis* only appears in the plural in Hellenistic inscriptions (cf. Chaniotis 2004: 86). The locative distinction between the two terms is evident in an *asuleia* decree by an unknown Cretan city for Mylasa in Asia Minor: both “[those] *Krētaieis* on the island and all [those *Krētes* living [outside of the island]]” are obligated to send emergency aid to the recipient of *asuleia*.⁵⁶

In the epigraphic record, the most reliable indicator that an individual comes from Crete is if the *Krēs* label is coupled with a *polis-ethnikon*, such as the pair of brothers described as Κρητες Τυλύσσιοι who were buried in Thessaly in the early third century (*IG IX,2.366*). Without the *polis-ethnikon*, *Krētes* are most likely identifiable as Cretans from Crete rather than members of an emigrant community when they appear in an inscribed list of individuals. In *IG II² 1299*, a dedication from 236/5 by soldiers of the Macedonian garrison at Eleusis, the names of the *xenoi* (non-Athenians) are followed by either a *polis-ethnikon* from some mainland locations like

⁵⁴ Polybius does not mention the Cretan Koinon by name in the surviving text. In a passage (4.53.3, 4) about political upheaval on Crete, he likens the character of *Krētes* to the behavior of the *Krētaieis*, who go to war when they disagree over a small thing, ὅπερ ἔθος ἐστὶ Κρησίων, “as is the habit for Cretans.” He uses the term *Krētaieis* in reference to: the Lyttian War (4.53.5, 54.6); his description of the Cretan *politeia* (6.45.1, 46.1, 3, 9, 47.5); Philip V of Macedon’s foreign relations with the inhabitants of Crete (7.11.9, 7.14.4); a Roman arbitration of a Cretan dispute (22.15.2); a Rhodian embassy to Crete (29.10.6); a Cretan embassy to the Achaians (33.15.4) and a war between Crete and Rhodes (33.16.1).

⁵⁵ *IC IV.243* is an inscribed dedicatory epigram from the precinct of Isis and Serapis in Gortyn. Although it was found inscribed on Crete, the epigram has a number of features – not the least of which is the term *Krēs* – in support of Adalberto Magnelli’s argument (1994-95: 36) that the epigram is a representative of a playful genre of dedicatory epigrams, especially to Isis, a patroness of invention. The use of *Krēs* in this context is already odd for being the only instance found on Crete, but it is also playing with etic poetic conventions: the exception therefore seems to confirm the rule, that Cretans did not refer to themselves in inscriptions as *Krētes* while on Crete.

⁵⁶ Rigsby 1996 no. 190; *I.Mylasa* 644, ll. 4-6: καὶ τὸνς ἐν ταῖ νάσωι Κρηταιέανς καὶ / [τὸνς ἐξω τᾶς νάσω Κρ]ήτανς πάντανς τὸνς Φουκίον/[τάνς. Although the second half of the inscription is restored by Rigsby, the location of *Krētaieis* on the island is clear.

Megara and Megalopolis, or regional *ethnika* such as Φωκεύς and Θετταλός. This includes four *Krētes* who, because of the format of name and origin, might be inferred to be men from Crete despite the lack of *polis-ethnikon* because other men within the same context are being described by regional *ethnika*.⁵⁷

When otherwise unspecified groups of *Krētes* appear in literary sources, the men described may well be “Cretans from Crete” when they are part of group of *Krētes* dispatched as aid by a Cretan *polis* or connected to Crete by the narrative.⁵⁸ Even when there is a named Cretan *polis*, one should be cautious in assuming that all the men sent by that *polis* are citizens of that *polis*. For example, when Polybius describes *summachia* sent by a group of Cretan *poleis*, he does not describe them by their city of origin:

...ἐξἀπέστειλαν Πολυρρήνιοι μὲν καὶ μετὰ τούτων οἱ σύμμαχοι Φιλίππῳ καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς πεντακοσίους Κρήτας... (4.55.5)

...the Polyrrhenians and their allies sent five hundred *Krētes* to Philip and the Achaeans...

⁵⁷ The location of the inscription may make a difference in whether the mason decides to use a *polis-ethnikon* or a regional *ethnikon* to describe an individual. In *IG II² 1299*, the Athenians are listed by their demes, and the *xenoi* who have *polis-ethnika* come from famous mainland cities like Megalopolis or nearby cities like Megara. If we compare this with a list of soldiers from a Ptolemaic garrison at Pythagoreion at Samos (*IG XII,6 1:217*, after 280 BCE) we see two Cretans who are referred to by *polis-ethnikon*, without *Krēs* (Charmis the Knossian and Sotadas the Rhithymnian) with citizens of Colophon in Ionia and Pharbaethus in Egypt, but with the possible exceptions of a Thessalian from Hestiae and a Malian from perhaps Arcadia, the mainland Greeks (two Boeotians, two Aetolians, two Achaeans, two Acarnanians, and a Phocian) have regional *ethnika*. It might not be surprising if the mason or whoever commissioned the Eleuesis dedication felt it more useful to identify the men from Crete as *Krētes* rather than by a Cretan *polis-ethnikon*.

⁵⁸ E.g. Plut. *Pyrrh.* 29.6, in which King Areus defended Sparta from Pyrrhus in 272, when he opportunely arrived from Crete, after aiding the Gortynians, with 2000 soldiers (Ἄρευς ἦκεν ἐκ Κρήτης, δισχιλίους στρατιώτας κομίζων). In the ensuing fighting (30.4), Plutarch describes how Oryssus the Apteran killed Pyrrhus' son, and later shows Areus leading a mix of 1000 *Krētes* and light-armed *Spartiatiai* (32.2: ἔχων χιλίους Κρήτας καὶ Σπαρτιάτας τοὺς ἐλαφροτάτους). So there is at least a narrative connection between Areus of Sparta and Crete – even to the city of Gortyn, with one Cretan citizen actor from Apteran named.

The Greek text clearly identifies the Polyrrhenians and their *summachoi* as the issuing authority of the five hundred *Krētes*, and one might assume that this means the allied force consist of a mix of freeborn citizens from the allied cities. However, it is worth noting that Greek literary accounts, including Greek historian writing in the Roman era, tend to emphasize the identity of the city sending the *summachia* over the identity of the men who have been sent.⁵⁹ It may simply be that the identity of the authority that sends aid to its allies is much more important in Greek diplomatic practice than the identity of the soldiers that they sent. I will return to this point when we examine quotas for allied soldiers in inscribed Cretan alliances, in the last section of this chapter.

B. External “Cretan” Communities

The second use of *Krēs* is to denote to a person who is part of a community of *Krētes* outside of Crete: this may comprise recent emigrants and the descendants of emigrants from Crete. The Seleucids, Attalids,⁶⁰ Ptolemies,⁶¹ and Antigonids, as well as some smaller regional powers like the Rhodians (see Chapter 4), were interested in reliable access to manpower for their armies. To this end, they established colonies directly or participated in the establishment of

⁵⁹ See my previous example from Plutarch (n. 58). In Diodorus, when the Knossians send aid to the Rhodians during its besiegement by Demetrius Poliorcetes, their soldiers are referred to as “150 allies sent from the Knossians” (20.88.9: σύμμαχοι παρὰ μὲν Κνωσσίῳν ἑκατὸν πενήκοντα). In contrast to this, Livy describes an allied contingent as “five hundred Gortynian Cretans” (33.3.10: *quingenti Gortynii Cretensium*): the implication of this may be that Cydas the Gortynian led his fellow citizens as allies, not a mixed group of *Cretenses*, but this bears further study. Livy could have had his own ideological agenda for making this distinction, perhaps that the Romans were receiving aid from allies who committed by sending their own citizens.

⁶⁰ For the Attalids, Ma (2012: 73): “Attalid Asia Minor was a militarized landscape of mercenaries, Mysians (from Smooth Mysia, rural Mysia, and the managed colonization in Mysia Abbaeitis), Macedonians, and other military settlers.” Ma does not mention *Krētes* among the *katoikoi* (military settlers), but it is worth pointing out that Eumenes (probably Eumenes II) negotiates an alliance with thirty-one Cretan cities (IC IV.179).

⁶¹ E.g., a decree for the city of Aspendus (*SEG* 17:639, c. 305) that allows different regional groups, including *Krētes*, who aided the city with Ptolemy I to enroll as citizens.

settlements of Greeks within their spheres of influence. In some cases, the relationship between communities of *Krētes* settled abroad and communities on Crete⁶² could potentially be problematic, as when the *Krētaieis* – represented by Gortyn and Knossos – decided to seize the property of former Cretan citizens who had renounced their original citizenship in favor of Miletian citizenship (Magnetto 43 = *IC* I.viii.9 and *IC* IV.176). Starting early in the third century, Cretans came to Egypt to fight in the Ptolemaic army; they received land in payment and remained with their families for generations. These waves of immigration, as Christelle Fischer-Bovet (2011: 135-6) observes, were not a constant phenomenon across the Hellenistic period, but occurred sporadically. Some descendants of these Cretan cleruchs (settlers who received allotments of land) preserved the memory of their homeland, referring to themselves or being identified as Κρής τῆς ἐπιγονῆς.⁶³ This history of settlement and the retention of *Krēs* as an identifier in families outside of Crete suggests the possibility that some *Krētes* in foreign armies were not from Crete, and therefore cannot be labeled as mercenaries from Crete.

“Ethnic” labels like *Krēs* may also have described professions rather than an “ethnic” identity, at least in the Ptolemaic army. Fischer-Bovet (2014: 173-7, 184-91) observes a range of “ethnic” labels were used in the Ptolemaic army: some, like the *polis-ethnikon Athenaios*, were clearly associated with a political or ethnic identity, while others were “pseudo-ethnic” labels, like *Persēs* and *Makedōn*, that did not identify the bearer’s origins and appear almost exclusively in military context. *Krēs* (2014: 191-194; fig. 5.3) lies between these two poles: in the earlier

⁶² The abovementioned Mylasa *asylia* decree (n. 56: Rigsby 1995 no. 190) is an example of an agreement that incorporates both *Krētaieis* on Crete and *Krētes* living outside of Crete.

⁶³ A well known example of such a *Krēs* is Dryton, a cavalry officer of Ptolemais in Egypt, who left behind an “archive” of documents, including three wills. According to Katelijjn Vandorpe, Dryton called himself *Krēs* but was born in Egypt in around 192. His father Pamphilus “probably emigrated from Crete to Egypt under the reign of Ptolemy III or IV.” (<http://www.trismegistos.org/arch/archives/pdf/74.pdf>)

centuries there is both military and non-military usage, but by the mid-second century – when the evidence is more abundant than earlier – the military-professional usage predominates.⁶⁴ This military-professional use means that a group of *Krētes* could have referred to a unit of soldiers, and it is possible that some of these soldiers did not identify with *Krēs* in an ethnic sense. A late second century dedication at Hermopolis includes a subunit of *Krētes* led by a Cretan from Crete, Aristocrates the Gortynian, and mentions a man in his unit called Balacrus son of Dionysius (*I.Herm.Magn.* 4, ll. 56-8), a name more likely to be found among Macedonians than on Cretans (Fischer-Bovet 2014: 192, n. 133). Although onomastics do not allow secure identification and there does seem to be a clear preference for *Krētes* to be commanded by Cretans from Crete, Fischer-Bovet’s work at least suggests the possibility that *Krētes* in the Ptolemaic army did not necessarily need to come from Crete in order to be called *Krētes*.

This overview of use of *Krēs* to denote members of communities outside of Crete suggests, at the very least, one might be cautious when looking to *Krētes* outside of Crete for information about Cretans from Crete. Some members of these *Krētes* communities may have only left a generation before. Some *Krētes* communities, like the one at Miletus, received more immigrants from Crete but also took on new Miletian citizenship (Magnetto 43 = *IC* I.viii.9 and *IC* IV.176). Some *Krētes* may not have been from Crete in any sense, but were described as *Krēs* as part of a larger organization, such as a *politeuma*.⁶⁵ Even if some of these ambiguities are

⁶⁴ Fischer-Bovet notes that *Krēs* has usage patterns similar to *Kyrenaios* and *Thraix*. Her observation about the change over time supports the idea, as she argued previously (2011), that Cretan immigration to Egypt was a more prominent phenomenon at the outset the Hellenistic period and lessened in the second century.

⁶⁵ In addition to military units like the *Krētes* at Hermopolis, Fischer-Bovet also mentions an organization called the πολιτεῦμα τῶν Κρητῶν. The nature of *politeumata* is still hotly debated (2014: 292-295), but we can say that some may have formed as associations for recent immigrants who were hired as soldiers. In one case, Fischer-Bovet cites

idiosyncratic to the Ptolemaic socio-military structure, they still provide a useful point of caution that not all *Krētes* were necessarily Cretans from Crete.

C. Military Use: *Krētes* Skirmishers

The final category of *Krēs* is a military usage referring to weaponry and deployment. Although the use of *Krēs* could refer to a Cretan from Crete who fought in a unit of *Krētes*, the place from where this *Krēs* comes is irrelevant. In this section, I will define this category of *Krēs*; propose that neither the label *Krēs* nor the identity of the commander in charge of a unit of *Krētes* determined the composition of the men under him; and briefly point toward a definition of *Krēs* that will be developed more fully in Chapter 2.

The idea that *Krēs* might denote an individual who fought in a particular way, regardless of the fighter's ethnic identity, goes back to the early scholarship on Greek mercenaries. Guy T. Griffith, in his survey of Hellenistic mercenaries, speculates that *Krēs* refers to a type of armament and even expresses doubt that the island of Crete could have produced such large numbers of *Krētes* as are attested for the royal armies.⁶⁶ He points to the label Tarentine, which indicated a type of light cavalry fighter rather than an *ethnikon* for a fighter from Taras, as a possible comparandum.⁶⁷

There is evidence from Polybius that *Krēs* does not always denote the origin of the *Krēs* fighter. Polybius treats *Krētes* as a functional unit with a specific military purpose. For example,

an example of a member of the *politeuma* of the Cretans whose ancestry seems less likely to be Cretan, but who very likely found professional advancement through his *politeuma* membership.

⁶⁶ Griffith (1935: 251) cites a similar hunch by Karl Grote (1913).

⁶⁷ Livy identifies Tarantines as a type of cavalry (35.28.5): *dein Cretenses auxiliares et, quos Tarentinos vocabant, equites, binos secum trahantes equos, ad prima signa misit*. "...then he sent Cretan auxiliaries and cavalry, who were called Tarantines, each taking with them two horses, to the front ranks."

in his narrative of Philip V's march on Thermon in 218 (5.7.11), Polybius describes Philip arraying his forces – a list that includes *Krētes* among both weapons groups and *ethnika* – in way that suggests that he has a functional reason for placing each division where he does.⁶⁸ Polybius refers to the *Krētes* under the command of the Cretan Knopias the Allariot (5.65.7) in his of the reform of the Ptolemaic army in 219-217 BCE). He notes were reorganized into new cohorts according to *γένος* and age.⁶⁹ Fischer-Bovet and Willy Clarysse (2012: 27, n.3) note that most translators have taken *genos* to mean “ethnic group” or “origin” – the implication being that those identified as *Krētes* by origin or affiliation would be trained to fight as *Krētes* in the military usage; the authors observe, however, that Polybius also uses *genos* to indicate a “class” or “category,” as the *genē* of infantry and cavalry in the distinctly homogeneous Roman army (6.34.8). Furthermore, although the Cretan identity of the commander Knopias, as well as a subcommander, Philo the Knossian, would seem to suggest that the men under them were Cretans from Crete, Fischer-Bovet and Clarysse that “chiliarchies, numbered hipparchies and even ethnic hipparchies grouped soldiers with different ethnics” (2012: 28-9). It is possible that the origins of the eponymous commander may reflect the political leanings of his home city, but it is not essential, nor is it essential that his ethnic identity matches that of the men under his command. This applies both to Knopias – who was one of the main architects of the reform

⁶⁸ Philip V places mercenaries (μισθοφόροι) at the front, then Illyrians, peltasts, and hoplites in the middle, Thracians and light-armed infantry at the king's right flank, and *Krētes* at the rear.

⁶⁹ Polybius (5.64.1-3) describes the reformation and training of the new Ptolemaic army: *πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ κατὰ γένη* καὶ καθ' ἡλικίαν διελόντες ἀνέδοσαν ἐκάστοις τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους καθοπλισμούς, ὀλιγορήσαντες τῶν πρότερον αὐτοῖς ὑπαρχόντων· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνέταξαν οἰκείως πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν χρεῖαν, λύσαντες τὰ συστήματα καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῶν πρότερον ὀψωνιασμῶν καταγραφάς· ἐξῆς δὲ τούτοις ἐγύμαζον, συνήθεις ἐκάστους ποιοῦντες οὐ μόνον τοῖς παραγγέλμασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς οἰκείαις τῶν καθοπλισμῶν κινήσεσιν.

“First of all they divided them according to classes and ages, and provided each with suitable weaponry, taking no account of what they had before. Next they organized them in a way fitting the needs at hand, breaking up the regiments and abolishing the previous paymasters' lists (trans. Fischer-Bovet and Clarysse 2012: 26). Next they trained them, accustoming each not only to act on commands, but also to the proper uses of the weapons.”

(5.63.3) with experience gained from serving the Antigonid kings in the 230s and 220s (5.63.11-2) – and Aristocrates the Gortynian, the abovementioned commander of *Krētes* at Hermopolis (see n. 65).

So far, I have proposed that *Krētes* were a functional weapons group that could, but need not, include Cretans from the first two categories (i.e., Cretans from Crete and *Krētes* from external Cretan groups); and I have observed that neither the label *Krēs* nor the identity of a unit's eponymous commander in a royal (or hegemonic) army was a secure way to identify the origins of the men in that unit. I have not discussed the military function of a *Krētes* unit. I will return to investigate this question in much greater depth in Chapter 3, where I will argue that *Krēs* refers to a type of light skirmishing fighter who protected the vulnerable edge of the phalanx within a hegemonic military context.⁷⁰ In fourth century accounts, armies like Xenophon's might have a division of Κρητες τοξόται, short-range skirmishing archers but in the Hellenistic accounts of Polybius it is possible that *Krēs* without *toxotēs* may have indicated skirmishers who were not functionally archers.

As I noted at the beginning of this section, these uses of the term *Krēs* are frequently not distinct. This can make it difficult to say whether one is dealing with “a Cretan from Crete.” *Polis-ethnika* and connections to Crete that context provides seem like the safest criteria for identifying a *Krēs* as a Cretan from Crete, but, as far as groups are concerned, *Krētes* can still describe a group that is heterogeneous its members' origins. Furthermore, while some

⁷⁰ I use the term “hegemonic army” throughout this dissertation because it can encompass large-scale armies including those of kings, upstart kings, warlords, leagues, and the Roman republic, and is distinct in scale and complexity of organization from the fighting forces mustered by individual or small allied networks of *poleis*. In Chapter 2, I will argue that the nature of warfare on Crete did not provide the appropriate hegemonic context for training or deploying specialist forces like *Krētes*.

individuals identified by Cretan *polis-ethnika* could be commanders of *Krētes* within hegemonic armies, their presence need not indicate that the soldiers under their command were Cretans from Crete,⁷¹ just as it was not necessary for a commander of *Krētes* or even Cretans from Crete to himself be a Cretan.⁷² There is also the possibility that, at least within the context of the Ptolemaic army, *Krētes* denoted people who were neither themselves from Crete nor the descendants of Cretans from Crete, but who were nonetheless part of a unit or *politeuma* organization of *Krētes*.⁷³ And, generally speaking, weapons divisions of *Krētes* might consist of *Krētes* who recently emigrated from Crete – who may even have the intention of returning to Crete – or the descendants of immigrants from Crete. At the very least, these three categories of *Krēs* mean that caution should be exercised when ascertaining how many *Krētes* were leaving Crete to serve as mercenaries.

II. NUMBERS OF CRETANS

In the previous section, I argued that it is sometimes difficult to discern the precise meaning for the Greek term *Krēs* and to interpret it to unambiguously indicate a Cretan mercenary from Crete. In this section, I address the exceptionality of Cretan numbers: that is, if we say that the number of *Krētes* is “large,” is it “large” in comparison with other foreign groups in the armies in which they serve? In order to address this question, I analyze all of the numbers of *Krētes*, as well as *Cretenses* and secure “Cretans from Crete” that appear in the epigraphic and literary accounts of foreign armies. These are compiled in *Table 1*, organized by

⁷¹ It is of course possible that there is a preference for Cretans as commanders of a unit of *Krētes*.

⁷² Antiochus III had a Rhodian, Polyxenidas, in command of *Krētes* for his invasion of Hyrcania in 211 (Polyb. 10.29.7). For a non-Cretan commander of Cretans from Crete, see *ID* 1517, an inscription honoring a Coan who commanded *summachoi* from the *Krētaieis* around 154.

⁷³ See n. 65.

military context in *Tables 2-5*, and can be compared proportionally with other groups in *Table 6*. A tabulation of the data suggests that *Krētes* of all categories do not appear in disproportionately large numbers when compared with other groups, and that the context may offer a hint as to which of the three categories of *Krēs* is being emphasized in the list.

A. Method

As I have noted above, many scholars comment on the abundance of Cretan fighters, but there is very little substantive – much less quantitative – discussion about how that abundance stands in comparison to other groups. The only instance of a scholar addressing proportions of Cretans in foreign armies at all is Pierre Brulé, who observes that they make up, on average, ten percent of the Ptolemaic army, and present “spectacular numbers” where “one in five men” are Cretans.⁷⁴ Brulé does not show in his work how he arrived at these numbers; nor does he provide the numbers of any other *ethnos* – such as, for example, Thracians – who might put such “grand proportions” into perspective. Besides assuming that all *Krētes* count as “Cretans from Crete,” Brulé does not differentiate among the contexts in which the groups appear: as far as I could determine, his average of ten percent appears to accommodate both garrisons and full armies without considering that a garrison is unlikely to be a true, scaled down model of a full royal army.

The shortcomings of Brulé’s analysis do, however, suggest a useful set of guiding questions in order to assess whether the numbers of *Krētes* in foreign military action are

⁷⁴ Brulé 1978: 163: “En consultant les essais statistiques de M. Launey, on s’aperçoit que la Crète fournit, en moyenne, environ 10% des effectifs des armées égyptiennes. Dans les autres armées, la proportion de Crétois tombe rarement en dessous de 5%. On note parfois chiffres spectaculaires comme à Athènes, Alexandrie et Redesiyeh, là, près d’un homme sur 5 est Crétois.” This argument, in response to Marcel Launey’s position that Cretan mercenaries likely returned to Crete (1949: I.277-8), is meant to bolster Brulé’s case that conditions on Crete were so terrible as to cause a mass exodus of Cretans who took up employment as mercenaries abroad, and never returned.

exceptional. If we distinguish among different types of catalogues (e.g., a garrison vs. a full army), are there consistent patterns that emerge, such as consistent proportions of *Krētes* in one or another context? Are there groups whose presence in foreign armies is proportionately comparable to that of *Krētes*? The data on the size of groups of *Krētes/Cretenses* is organized into six tables. Since these tables are complex, it will be useful to describe their content before analyzing them.⁷⁵ After doing so, I will explain my criteria for including data.

Table 1 provides a chronological catalogue of all ancient attestations of groups of *Krētes* and *Cretenses* in foreign armies, regardless of whether these groups include a specific number. Those attestations that have a number are marked with a check (✓) in Column C: they comprise the data sample that is analyzed in *Table 2*. Column D identifies the kind the catalogue or list context in which these numbers appear:

Full Force (FF): a full army catalogue, either in battle array or muster

Division of Forces (FD): a portion of an army, usually in the context of a narrative about a small-scale maneuver

Aid/Recruitment (AR): forces with an accompanying narrative of allied aid or mercenary recruitment

Garrisons/Soldier Lists (GL): descriptions of the composition of garrisons and lists of individual soldiers⁷⁶

⁷⁵ The numbers I have used in my calculations and percentages are listed in the Numbers Key in Appendix 1.

⁷⁶ Although garrisons and soldier lists should be distinct categories, sometimes the context for the list of names is missing. These two categories are placed together because they provide group sampling of soldiers outside of the context of combat. See n. 77.

The items most likely to involve “Cretans from Crete” are marked in Column G. These include attestations that have a direct narrative tying the men to Crete, as well as the inscribed sources such as *summachia* agreements made by Cretan *poleis*.

Table 2 arranges all numerical attestations of *Krētes/Cretenses* (*Table 1*: Col. C) chronologically. Column A corresponds with *Table 1*: Col. D, which again categorizes the group of *Krētes/Cretenses* by the type of catalogue (FF, FD, AR, GL) in which their number appears. Where possible, Column C shows the total number of soldiers, both *Krētes/Cretenses* and all others, in the catalogue where the *Krētes* number (Column D) appears, and Column E calculates the percentage of *Krētes/Cretenses* in the total body of fighting men. Column F gives the percentage of *Krētes/Cretenses* among those who are not part of the phalanx or legion (heavy infantry) and including cavalry, while Column G shows the percentage of *Krētes/Cretenses* among the total light infantry, excluding cavalry.

Table 3 (*Full Force Catalogue (FF)*) arranges in chronological order all attestations with numerical figures of *Krētes* in full army catalogues. It compares the numbers and percentages for *Krētes* (Columns E and F) with the numbers and percentages of other military divisions, heavy infantry (Columns C and D) and cavalry (Columns G and H).

Table 4 (*Foreign Aid and Mercenary Recruitment (AR)*) arranges in chronological order all types of foreign recruitment. These are distinguished in Column A, following the wording of the sources: *xenologia* (mercenary recruitment), *summachia* (alliance), and *boēthia* (emergency allied aid) in the Greek sources, and *auxilium* in the Latin sources, since the Latin term *auxilium* does not recognize the differences between the Greek terms *summachia* and *boēthia*. Within the category *summachia*, there is also a distinction between the written agreement (*summachia*

(*Agr*)), which is by nature hypothetical, and *summachia* forces shown in action in literary texts (*summachia (Act)*). The table presents the total number of the force (Column E), the number of Cretans/*Krētes*/*Cretenses* (Column F), and their percentage within the total force (Column G), if there are non-Cretans in that force (e.g., FF or a division of a mixed *AR*).

Table 5 (*Garrisons and Soldier Lists (GL)*) arranges in chronological order the numbers and percentages for garrisons and lists of soldiers who may or may not constitute a garrison.⁷⁷ Column A distinguishes between whether this force appears to be an established, “stable” (S) garrison population, or whether the narrative reflects an emergency (E) manning of a garrison in response to a threat. Numbers and percentages of *Krētes* (Column C) are compared to numbers and percentages of soldiers from the local area or *ethnos* (Column D), and the *ethnos* that is most prominently represented in the garrison catalogue (Column E).

Table 6 presents other *xenos* groups besides *Krētes* in terms of their raw numbers and, when possible, their percentages.

The information contained in the tables casts a wide net in two ways: first, it covers attestations from Thucydides (*Krētes toxotai*) to Caesar (*Cretenses sagittarii*) in order to compare the use of *Krētes*/*Cretenses* in third and second-century BCE warfare with their use in earlier and later periods; and second, it remains agnostic about which category or categories of *Krēs* each entry might denote. I have limited the data to groups that include *Krētes*/*Cretenses* rather than individuals who appear alone, such as named characters in literary sources or

⁷⁷ This includes lists of names that are unlabeled but have been identified by previous scholars as an assemblage of soldiers. There can be debates (e.g., Fraser 1993: 445) about whether such a list would have constituted a garrison, casualty list, or something else. Furthermore, even when an inscribed list clearly is labeled as to the nature of a group of soldiers serving in a specific place, there can still be uncertainties, such as whether a dedication list constitutes the full unit of soldiers that is partially unreadable because of damage to the stone, or whether only a portion of the unit would have had their names inscribed.

inscribed epitaphs. A survey of individual Cretans outside of Crete⁷⁸ that could be systematically compared with individuals and groups of other *ethnika* would certainly be informative about their relative “abundance” in the epigraphic record, but it was beyond the scope of this project. Most of the data is literary,⁷⁹ but the few inscribed documents – which are more likely to deal with *Krēs* used as part of a personal name, if not necessarily a Cretan from Crete – provide some perspective, such as how many men are coming from which *poleis*.

In addition to the clear instances of Cretans from Crete (i.e. associated with a *polis*) and the three categories of *Krēs* in Greek texts, the data in the tables includes two other terms that bear explanation: the Latin *Cretenses/Cretenses sagittarii* and the Greek term Νεοκρήτες, rendered in Latin as *Neocretes*. For the first term, the Latin usage of *Cretensis* means “a Cretan person” and describes people located both on and off Crete, i.e., those whom the Greek would distinguish as *Krētaieis* and *Krētes* respectively. Latin writers will often specify *Cretenses sagittarii* when referring to Cretan archers at war,⁸⁰ which stands in contrast to Polybius, who never uses the phrase *Krēs toxotēs*. However, since this study encompasses all categories of Cretans, the inclusion of the Latin material is uncontroversial. The meaning of the second term,

⁷⁸ Data such as the graffito left by a man from Cydonia who served with one of the two Egyptian kings called Amyrtaeus (Perdrizet & Lefebvre, *Memnoneion* (1919) no. 405), dated either c. 460 or c. 400 BCE, is left out of this particular discussion; it could and should be considered as part of a larger prosopographic study about Archaic mercenaries: ἐπ’ Ἀμυρταίο ἐπίκορο[ι] Κρέτες. τυχαγαθαί. Ὀνάσανδρ[ος] Κυδων[ι]άτας, “*Krētes epikouroi* with Amyraios. With good luck. Onasandrus the Cydoniot.” *Epikouros* is a term that means “helper,” and is taken to indicate a mercenary, especially in the Archaic period. The term falls out of use in the fourth century. See also Kaplan (2002: 240).

⁷⁹ The tables do not include literary sources whose historical veracity is particularly problematic. For example, I have not included the Cretan archers mentioned by the second century CE writer Pausanias (4.8.3; 4.19.4) as allied with Sparta during the First Messenian War (eighth century BCE) because of the author’s chronological distance from the subject he narrates, but also because of the larger methodological problems with the First Messenian War in general.

⁸⁰ See, e.g., Livy (42.35.6): *addita auxilia, Ligurum duo milia, Cretenses sagittarii – incertus numerus, quantum rogati Cretenses misissent...*, “...auxiliaries were added: 2000 Ligurians, Cretan archers – the number of how many the Cretans sent when asked is uncertain.” The diplomatic fallout later in the narrative (43.7.2) points to the *Cretenses* as Cretans from Crete; Livy clearly identifies the aid that they sent as Cretan archers.

Neokrētes, is somewhat more complicated. It occurs only in the plural in four literary sources, and three occur within the time frame of two years.⁸¹ In his catalogues of the forces of the Ptolemaic and Seleucid armies before the battle of Raphia in 217, Polybius states that the *Neokrētes* were under Cretan commanders⁸² who were likely subordinate to the commander of *Krētes*, but they may have drilled separately from *Krētes*. However, *Neokrētes* appear alone with the Aetolians, and are separated from the *Cretenses* in Livy's account of the battle of Magnesia in 190.⁸³ Given the limited evidence, it is difficult to tell whether the distinction between *Krētes* and *Neokrētes* reflects a different type of weaponry (Griffith 1935: 144, n. 2; Head 1982: 100), or if the armament is the same and the distinction is solely between age groups (e.g., *neoi*, perhaps Polyb. 5.64.1);⁸⁴ Fischer-Bovet posits (2011: 140) that the terms distinguishes between *Krētes* communities from Egypt and newly recruited Cretans from Crete (i.e., *Neokrētes*), but this does not explain how the distinction would hold in the Seleucid or the Aetolian armies.⁸⁵

⁸¹ The four occurrences are: an Aetolian *boēthia* force for the Eleans during the Social War in 218 (Polyb. 5.3.1); the line-ups for both the Ptolemies and the Seleucids at the Battle of Raphia in 217 (Polyb. 5.65.7, 5.79.10, respectively); and the Seleucid line-up for the Battle of Magnesia 190 (Livy 37.40.12).

⁸² In Polybius' account of the preparations for the Battle of Raphia (217), he lists the commanders from both the Ptolemaic and Seleucid armies: for Ptolemy, *Krētes* under Knopias the Allariot and *Neokrētes* under Philo the Knossian (5.65.7); for Antiochus, *Krētes* under a Eurylochus whose origin is not given and *Neokrētes* under Zelys the Gortynian (5.79.10).

⁸³ In Livy's catalogue, the *Neocretes* are situated on the opposite flank from the *Cretenses*, though in the same position. Livy uses the transliterated form of the word *Neocretes* rather than a Latin translation such as *Neocretenses*. This is notable because Livy will happily translate other Greek terms into Latin: for example, he refers to Greek peltasts (*πελτασται*) as *caetrati*. In addition, the passage occurs within the context of a troop list that is meant to emphasize the enormity and hybridity of the Seleucid army, in contrast to the smaller, more homogeneous Roman army. This does not necessarily imply that there were no *Neocretes* in Antiochus' army in 190, but it does suggest that Livy either did not know what *Neocretes* were, or did not see fit to translate it in order to make its meaning understandable for his audience.

⁸⁴ As noted above (n. 69), Polyb. 5.64.1 observes that the reforms of the Ptolemaic army were along the lines of *genos* and age group. For bibliography on *neoi* in military roles separate from other citizens in the Hellenistic period, see van Bremen 2013: 33-5.

⁸⁵ Fischer-Bovet is tentative about this, and rightly so, because her own research suggests that the homeland of the eponymous commander is not always indicative of the origins of the soldiers under his command. Some scholars, including Angeliki Petropoulou (1985: 200-3) and Stelios Spyradakis (1992: 47-9), have tried to explain the term on

Although their positioning on the battle line, either with the *Krētes* or on the wing parallel to them, suggests that *Neokrētes* were fundamentally similar to *Krētes*, it is unclear whether the two groups were identical in both armament and function. Given this uncertainty, I have run the calculations with *Neokrētes* as a subunit of *Krētes*, and again with *Neokrētes* as a unit that is separate from *Krētes*.

Finally, since literary sources provide a significant proportion of the data, the reliability of numbers in literary texts should be addressed briefly. Setting aside questions about textual transmission,⁸⁶ there remain two considerations that make them difficult for historians to use: the feasibility of obtaining accurate information in the premodern world, especially when the author was geographically and/or temporally removed from the events in question (Marincola 1999: 70; Rubincam 2012: 108);⁸⁷ and the rhetorical agenda of the author, who was at liberty to emphasize or deemphasize elements in his narrative of a battle.⁸⁸ Livy credits Polybius as a reliable source

the basis of the political situation on Crete during the Lyttian War (221-219) when the pro-Lyttian *neoterioi* of Gortyn opposed the pro-Knossian *presbuteroi* (Polyb. 4.53.7, 55.6). Riet van Bremen (2013: 36-52) observes that a division between classes of youth (*neaniskoi*, *neotas*, *neoi*) from elders (*geraioi*, *presbuteroi*) was institutionalized in a number of Hellenistic *poleis*, and violence sometimes occurred between these age-related factions. So it is acceptable to suggest that hegemonic armies could have instituted an age-related division between *Krētes* and *Neokrētes* without having anything to do with the party politics of Gortyn.

⁸⁶ For Polybius, there are no textual inconsistencies in the transmission of numbers in the manuscript tradition (Moore 1965: 171-2). The only questionable locus is 4.61.2 and 4.67.6, where editors have argued about whether Philip has 300 *Krētes* “from the Polyrrhenians,” as the manuscript tradition has it (Van Effenterre 1948: 187-8; Walbank 1957: I.515), or 500, as mentioned in the *summachia* account (4.55.5) and first emended by Johannes Schweighäuser. None of these recent commenters have recognized that “Polyrrhenians” was not in the manuscript tradition at all: the manuscripts read “500 *Krētes* from the Messenians,” but Isaac Casaubon (1609) emended “Messenians” to “Polyrrhenians.” (Schweighäuser 1789: II.144) In any case, it seems strange that Polybius would use the Polyrrhenians in isolation after he mentions them as part of the *summachia* with their allies in 4.55.5; and, since their enemies the Spartans were using *Krētes* (4.80.1-6), it seems perfectly reasonable to follow the manuscript tradition that Messenians sent *Krētes* fighters to aid Philip. Both possibilities – Polyrrhenia and Messenia – are included in the entries for Polyb. 4.61.2 and 4.67.6 in *Tables 1* and *2*.

⁸⁷ Both Marincola and Rubincam caution that we should not assume that the ancients viewed providing a lot of numbers as evidence for credibility.

⁸⁸ For example, there is a recurrent narrative trope in Livy in which one opponent has a very heterogeneous force and outnumbers the other opponent to excess; the commander of the larger, more ethnically diverse force makes mistakes as a result of his overconfidence in his numbers; and, because of these mistakes, the larger heterogeneous

for numbers,⁸⁹ and Polybius' figures make some sense in comparison with numbers of soldiers in epigraphic sources, though there are not a lot of instances for comparison.⁹⁰ We might also consider the possibility that Polybius himself could have been working from conjecture in some cases – that is, what he thought to be a reasonable number of men in a particular context – rather than from some sort of official record or report.⁹¹ In such a case, Polybius' use of proportion would add an extra layer of interpretation between the modern scholar and the actual event. My analysis of the numbers nonetheless suggests that ancient authors like Polybius, or even authors who do not claim military knowledge such as Livy, could still have presented military catalogues that had historically proportionate groups of foreign fighters, even if we discount the difficulties of acquiring precise numbers in antiquity. While it is true that these proportions may have been dependent upon the needs of the narrative, the author's knowledge, and the audience's

force is soundly and humiliatingly defeated in the subsequent engagement. This happens to the Seleucids at the Battle of Magnesia in 190 (37.39-40), Philip's garrison commander at Corinth in 197 (33.14.4), and a Roman commander who gathers an excess of non-Roman ruffians, then fails miserably to take a garrisoned Illyrian town, Uscana, in 170 (43.10.1).

⁸⁹ Livy (33.10.10) reports the statistics for the Macedonian losses from three authors, and settles on those of Polybius: *nos non minimo potissimum numero credidimus sed Polybium secuti sumus, non incertum auctorem cum omnium Romanarum rerum tum praecipue in Graecia gestarum*. "We have trusted the number not chiefly because it is the smallest, but we have followed Polybius, a reliable author in all Roman matters as well as – especially – events in Greece." Given the kinds of narrative and stylistic differences (Erdkamp 2006) between Livy's narrative of the battle and that of Polybius, one might argue that Livy slyly implies that Polybius is *only* good for numbers.

⁹⁰ In this data set, the *summachia* quota for the up-and-coming *polis* Hierapytna (*IC* III.iii.3A, discussed below, and as a case study in Chapter 5) is a maximum of 200 men. If we compare this with the numbers in Polybius for the Cretan *summachiai* during the Lyttian War (4.55.5), it seems reasonable for a group of *poleis* to be able to muster 500 men. On the other hand, it would also be truly impressive for Knossus to send 1000 men to the Aetolians, perhaps reflecting that *polis*'s comparative power on Crete. There is also a late third century *summachia* between Attalus I and the Cretan *polis* of Malla (*KretChr* 1969: 281,2 = Ducrey 1970 no. 2), in which Attalus promises to send a maximum of 300 men if the Mallaiaans request it; this is the only inscribed example of a quota for a non-Cretan alliance partner, but it matches the figure of 300 that Eumenes II sent to the Cydoniats, c. 170 (Polyb. 28.15).

⁹¹ Polybius accuses his rivals of this exactly when, after reeling off a complex series of numbers and troop positionings, he cites as his source an inscription (also 3.56.3) that he says was posted by Hannibal himself (3.33.17-8): "one should not... prejudge, as if I did something equal to the plausible lies of authors." Setting aside the issues of Polybius' use of documentary evidence (e.g., Marincola 1999: 101-2), just because Polybius calls out his rivals for using false numbers does not mean that he himself would have been above using (what he considered to be) reasonable conjecture to fill in gaps on other occasions.

expectations,⁹² one of the great surprises to me in my research was that, at least for the descriptions of the full royal Hellenistic armies (*Table 3*), the proportions of *Krētes* and *Cretenses* were surprisingly consistent.

B. Analysis

1. Proportions of *Krētes*

As I suggested in my critique of Brulé’s remarks, the average proportion of Cretans varies depending upon context.⁹³ This can be confirmed by examining the catalogues by category (i.e., FF, FD, AR, and GL). In a full army (FF) catalogue, when Cretans are used, they make up around 6.31% on average.⁹⁴ When Cretans are deployed separately from the army in a smaller skirmishing unit (FD), they average around 18%.⁹⁵ This higher proportion comes from the narrative describing a skirmish, which necessarily involves light-armed fighters and sometimes cavalry, with less action from heavy-armed fighters.⁹⁶ A similar factor is at play with aid and

⁹² For example, there are two descriptions of the Romans at the Battle of Magnesia (190) that come to different totals: Livy (37.39) arrives at 25,600, while Appian (6.31) reports a round figure of 30,000. Livy’s catalogue is significantly more detailed than Appian’s. Appian’s ballpark figure for heavy infantry (2/3, or 66.7%) is close to average for the percentage of heavy infantry – at least for a Greek Hellenistic army – while Livy’s figure for heavy infantry seems slightly on the high end (78.3%). I ran calculations based upon both Livy’s total (L) and Appian’s total (A). Even if we do not assume that Livy’s figures are more accurate than Appian’s because of their detail, it is worth observing that Appian’s proportions are potentially inaccurate. As *Figure 1* shows, the proportion that Appian reports for the cavalry is ten percent (3000/30,000); this is especially high compared to the percentages of cavalry in other Hellenistic armies, even when Appian’s numbers (A) rather than Livy’s (L) are used to make the calculations. (See *Table 3* for the raw numbers of cavalry in hegemonic armies and *Table 7* for which cases fall away from the standard deviation on *Figure 1*. Appian’s figure of 10% for cavalry is not outlandish compared to other cavalry figures, but it is outside the final standard deviation of 6.31-9.25%.)

⁹³ N.B. In this section, when I use the term “Cretans” on its own, I am using it agnostically to mean any variety of possible “Cretan”: Cretans from Crete, emigrant *Krētes*, *Krētes*, *Cretenses*, and *Neokrētes/Neocretes*.

⁹⁴ Without *Neokrētes*, this number becomes 6.01%.

⁹⁵ See *Tab. 2* Col. A. The FD entries from Thuc. 6.43 and Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.9 are excluded.

⁹⁶ Polybius describes a few of these skirmishing scenes, e.g., 5.14.1, but he does not tend to give numbers for the men involved in the skirmishes in the way that Livy does. On the one hand, one should be cautious about this figure, inasmuch as the 18% is mostly calculated from Livy’s FD catalogues: Livy 33.3.10 (Roman allies at Cynoscephalae); 42.57.7 and 42.57.8 (Romans and Macedonians skirmishing before Callinicus); 42.65.2

recruitment (AR: *Table 4*), where Cretans make up large percentages – in some case, the entirety – of an aid group. With allied aid, it is often ambiguous whether a group’s label as *Krētes* refers to an *ethnikon* or a type of weapon: on the one hand, a group of *Krētes* may be tied to Crete via narrative context, but on the other, as noted before, allied aid in among Hellenistic Greek states generally tends to take the form of light fighters such as archers and slingers.⁹⁷ For garrisons and name lists (GL: *Table 5*), the sample size is admittedly very small and overrepresents garrisons in Athens: *Krētes* are present, but not always, and no more than other *ethnika*.⁹⁸ Within the GL context, a list of names and their *ethnika*, it seems more likely that *Krēs* would indicate a Cretan from Crete. If we compare *Krētes* with other ethnicities in inscribed garrison lists, we find that individuals from the local area often tend to make up the largest groups that are represented on the lists, although this is not always the case (*Table 5* Cols. D and E).⁹⁹ In general, that the context of the garrison list tends to favor interpreting *Krēs* as an identifier rather than as a weapons group, unless this is otherwise indicated, such as in the case with the men listed by unit at Hermopolis (*I.Herm.Magn.* 4).

Before moving on to comparative proportions, I draw the reader’s attention to where Cretans from Crete, *Krētes* emigrants, and *Krētes/Cretenses* might be found in a hegemonic army. There are no explicit examples of *Krētes* as heavy-armed or phalanx fighters in the

(Macedonians at Phalanna); and Plutarch *Aem. Paul.* 15-16 (Roman division at Perrhaebia). These are clustered around the Third Macedonian War and demonstrate a particular use of cavalry and light infantry that is not described at all in Polybius (Livy 31.35) and which Jeremiah B. McCall observes would be undesirable for cavalry on both sides (2002: 66). On the other hand, because light fighters like *Krētes* participated in skirmishes, we should expect their percentage to be significantly higher in FD catalogues than in FF catalogues.

⁹⁷ See my comments in the introduction about the differences between how the Greeks viewed aid troops as opposed to how the Romans viewed their *auxiliares* (pp. 27-8).

⁹⁸ I have provided a list of the composition of garrisons in the Numbers Key in the Appendix.

⁹⁹ For example, the list from the Ptolemaic garrison on Samos (*IG XII,6* 1:217 – see n. 57) has a slightly larger number of Greeks from the mainland, identified by regional *ethnikon*, than Greeks from elsewhere (Ionia, Egypt, Crete) who are identified by *polis-ethnika*.

literature of the Hellenistic period, as literary sources depict *Krētes/Cretenses* as light fighters, but it might be possible to have *Krētes* emigrants, if not also Cretans from Crete, in the phalanx. Mercenary hoplites are attested through the fourth century,¹⁰⁰ and some Hellenistic *misthophoroi* were heavily armed infantry.¹⁰¹ Most of the catalogues for full royal armies describe a phalanx consisting of *Makedōnes*, an *ethnikon* that, in Egypt at least, denoted a hoplite in the main phalanx (i.e., a *psuedoethnikon*: Fischer-Bovet 2014: 177). So it is possible that Cretans from Crete and *Krētes* emigrants, like other Greeks, might fight as heavy infantry for royal armies, even if there is not much direct evidence for it.¹⁰² On the other hand, there are good reasons why Cretans from Crete might also fight outside of the phalanx, in light units like *Krētes* fighters. Heavy infantry was the backbone of Hellenistic armies, including the Roman army in Greece;¹⁰³ it could comprise around seventy percent of the army, with the exception of the Seleucid army, where it seems to have been somewhere around fifty percent. In general, royal armies seem to have filled the ranks of the central phalanx with men under the direct control of the kingdom or polity: the phalanx was generally not something to be acquired by alliance or recruitment during the Hellenistic period. *Xenoi* and allied units usually appeared in the light-armed units and some units of cavalry on the flanks of the central formation. These lighter units were, by definition, more mobile, and tasked with protecting the frontally oriented phalanx on its vulnerable sides.

¹⁰⁰ Beginning with the Ten Thousand (Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.9), but see also the small number of heavy-armed *misthophoroi* in the Sicilian Expedition (Thuc. 6.43).

¹⁰¹ The Ptolemies field Greek *misthophoroi* in their phalanx at Raphia (making up 10.7% of the army). Some or all of these may be *misthophoroi* who were already in the employ of the king's ministers outside of Egypt before those same ministers began reorganizing the Ptolemaic army two years before Raphia (Polyb. 5.63.8).

¹⁰² There is also the instance of Diodotus the Hyrticianian, who is pictured as a heavy infantryman on his grave stele, is mentioned in Chapter 2 (p. 89, n. 130).

¹⁰³ "Heavy infantry" is the general term for the heavily armed Hellenistic hoplites who made up the phalanx of Greek armies, and the legionary soldiers of Roman armies. On the Greek side, "heavy infantry" could also include heavily armed fighters who were not part of the central phalanx, but who might be posted adjacent to it. See Chapter 3 for battle diagrams showing some examples (Figures 4-6).

We might therefore find Cretans from Crete, especially allies, in the non-phalanx divisions such as a unit of *Krētes*, and this would be by virtue of a diplomatic relationship.

2. Proportions of Krētes Compared with Proportions of Ethnic and Weapons Groups

As with the other catalogue types discussed in the previous section, I calculated the proportion of Cretans in Full Force (FF) catalogues in literary sources from the Classical period and across the Hellenistic. My initial calculation of the percentages of *Krētes/Cretenses/Neokrētes* in these FF catalogues (see *Table 3*) revealed a proportion (6.31% on average) that seemed relatively consistent. That is, it was more consistent than Cretans in other catalogue types (FD, AR, and GL) and than the percentages of other *xenos* groups that appeared in the same armies in *Table 6*). The Cretans also appeared more frequently than any other *xenos* group in *Table 6*. I decided to test whether the consistency in percentages of Cretans might be similar to the percentages for weapons divisions in FF catalogues. I chose traditional cavalry¹⁰⁴ because it was a weapons division essential to a Hellenistic army whether Greek or Roman. Since the proportions of Cretans were not going to be the same as those of the cavalry, I instead tested how the variation in the proportions of Cretans compared with the variation patterns of the cavalry, a unit of the army that was divided clearly by virtue of weaponry, not ethnicity.

First, I wanted to establish a range in the proportions of Cretans that could be tested against ranges in proportions the other weapons division. To do this, I used a statistical calculator¹⁰⁵ and the percentages from *Tab. 2*, Col. D (the number of *Krētes/Cretenses/Neokrētes* divided by the total number of forces in the army) to calculate a mean and to remove any obvious

¹⁰⁴ By “traditional,” I exclude heavy cavalry (*kataphraktoi*) and light cavalry (Tarantines).

¹⁰⁵ <http://www.calculator.net/standard-deviation-calculator.html>

outliers; I then repeated this exercise a second time to eliminate the less obvious outliers. The first result was a mean of 5.58%, with a standard deviation of 3.81 (1.77%-9.40%). There were three statistical outliers, whose implications I will return to below.¹⁰⁶ After these were removed from the pool, a second calculation of the ten remaining entries resulted in a new mean of 4.53% and a standard deviation of 1.90 (2.63%-6.40%). There were four outliers.¹⁰⁷ Of these four, Xenophon *Hel.* 4.2.16 was by far the earliest, outside of the Hellenistic period, while Livy 34.27.2 lies furthest outside of the standard deviation in proportion. Six entries remained within the standard deviation, resulting in a final mean of 4.50% that had a range of 2.1 and a standard deviation of 0.80.¹⁰⁸

At this point we may make some preliminary observations. The six core instances all come from Polybius and Livy (who covers material that would have been within the temporal and geographic purview covered by Polybius' *Histories*), and within the narrow time frame of about sixty years. The three Polybian entries (4.67.6, 5.65, and 5.79) vary in terms of the

¹⁰⁶ Thuc. 6.43 (Sicilian Expedition)	<i>Krētes toxotai:</i>	1.2%
Polyb. 5.14.1 (Aetolian League troops):	<i>Krētes:</i>	12.8%
Livy 34.27.2 (Nabis' reinforcement of Sparta):	<i>Cretenses:</i>	13.3%
¹⁰⁷ Xenophon, <i>Hellenika</i> 4.2.16 (Spartans at Nemea River):	<i>Krētes:</i>	2.0%
Livy 24.30.13 (Syracusan forces):	<i>Cretenses:</i>	7.5%
Livy 37.39.10 (Romans at Magnesia):	<i>Cretenses:</i>	1.8%
Livy 42.51.7 (Macedonians in Third Macedonian War):	<i>Cretenses:</i>	7.0%
¹⁰⁸ Polyb. 4.67.6 (Macedonians in Social War):	<i>Krētes:</i>	5.3%
Polyb. 5.65 (Ptolemies at Raphia):	<i>Krētes/Neokrētes:</i>	4.0%
Polyb. 5.79 (Seleucids at Raphia):	<i>Krētes/Neokrētes:</i>	3.7%
Livy 33.4.6 (Romans at Cynoscephalae):	<i>Cretenses/Gortynii Cretenses:</i>	4.7%
Livy 37.40 (Seleucids at Magnesia):	<i>Cretenses/Neocretes:</i>	3.6%
Livy 42.35 (Romans in Third Macedonian War):	<i>Cretenses:</i>	~5.7%

N.B. for Livy 42.35: This percentage, for the Roman forces in the Third Macedonian War, was arrived at through a combination of passages in Livy. These include the catalogue of Roman recruits in 42.35.7, where Livy states that the number of *sagittarii* sent by the Cretans is unknown; the reference to three thousand *Cretenses* in Perseus' army (42.51.7); the Roman Senate's complaint to the Cretan embassy that more *Cretenses* have joined Perseus than Rome (43.7.2); and Perseus' prediction about the numbers of Attalids and Numidians (42.52.8).

numbers of *Krētes*, from five hundred with Philip V in the Social War to three thousand with Ptolemy IV Philopator, and yet their proportions fall within 2.0% of one another. Furthermore, the low standard deviation (0.80) suggests that the average, 4.5%, may be a fair representation of a *preferred* proportion of *Krētes* in a Hellenistic army. However, these calculations rest on a number of assumptions. If the number presented here from Livy's account of the Roman army at Cynoscephalae is correct (1100),¹⁰⁹ the resulting ratio of around 4.5% more or less holds across armies of three different scales: a smaller Macedonian force (5700 total), a Roman force of around (23,000), and the full Seleukid (68,000) and Ptolemaic (75,000) forces at Raphia.¹¹⁰

These initial calculations included *Neokrētes* on the assumption that they were functionally the same as *Krētes*. Since it is not clear whether *Neokrētes* were a distinctly different weapons category, I ran the numbers a second time without *Neokrētes*. The result (see *Figure 1* below) yielded a slightly smaller average (4.36%) that showed much greater variation (2.17 vs. 0.80 with *Krētes*) over nine entries rather than six. This difference suggests two possibilities. The first possibility is that both *Neokrētes* and *Krētes* were weapons groups that were functionally the same, such that the whole combined group made up a proportion of around 4.5% of the total army. The second possibility is that *Krētes* and *Neokrētes* both identify people (*Krētes* of the first or second category), in which case there is no preferred proportion for either *Krētes* or

¹⁰⁹ Livy also mentions that the Gortynians were joined by 300 Illyrians from Apollonia in the same armament (*trecenti Apolloniatae haud dispari armatu*). If these Illyrians were identical in military function to the *Cretenses*, this results in 1400 "*Cretenses*," or 5.9%; this number is slightly high for proportions of *Cretenses*, but remains within a 3% of 4.5%. In Livy's narrative, Flaminius' army grows as it travels, but one expects that Flaminius had some control in achieving, through alliance, desirable proportions for his auxiliary divisions.

¹¹⁰ With regard to the textual question of the numbers disparities among Polyb. 4.55, 4.61, and 4.67, see above n. 86. Although 4.67 with its three hundred *Krētes* at Larisa is not problematic, I ran the numbers for Philip's army if he had had five hundred *Krētes* instead. The result for 500 *Krētes* in a 5900-man army was 8.5%, a number that would have been an outlier in the second round of calculations.

Neokrētes. Both of these conjectures rest on the hypothesis that a weapons group would have had a desired proportion that did not show a lot of variation across different types of armies: this hypothesis was tested next for cavalry.¹¹¹ The following figure (*Figure 1*) documents this procedure for cavalry and shows how the categories of Cretans match with those of the cavalry.

	<i>Krētes/Cretenses</i>		Cavalry	
	(+ <i>Neokrētes</i>)	(- <i>Neokrētes</i>)	(Livy)	(Appian)
m1	(13) 5.58%	(13) 5.25%	(13) 7.23%	(13) 7.34%
σ1	3.81	3.87	2.71	2.79
r1	1.77%-9.40%	1.38%-9.12%	4.52%-9.94%	4.55%-10.13%
m2	(10) 4.53%	(10) 4.1%	(9) 7.67%	(10) 8.05%
σ2	1.90	2.20	1.30	1.59
r2	2.63%-6.40%	1.90%-6.30%	6.39%-8.97%	6.46%-9.64%
m3	(6) 4.50%	(9) 4.36%	(6) 7.98%	(7) 7.81%
σ3	0.80	2.17	0.89	1.21

Figure 1: Calculation for Comparing the Variance of *Krētes* with Cavalry¹¹²

¹¹¹ There are two variations for cavalry that must be accounted for because the two accounts of the Roman forces at Magnesia, Livy 37.39 and Appian 6.31, produce different results for cavalry. Appian does not provide a number for *Krētes*. See *Table 7* for how the means and outliers correlate by passage.

¹¹² This test was initially also performed on heavy infantry (both legion and phalanx), which was the central element of a hegemonic army. The heavy infantry displayed a much wider range and volatility than either the *Krētes/Cretenses/Neokrētes* or the traditional cavalry, which is the other *sine qua non* of a Hellenistic hegemonic army. Part of the problem is that the size of heavy infantry was not similar across the board, but showed trends within different powers: so, the Seleucids tended to have a much lower proportion of heavy infantry than others (closer to half), and the Romans tended to have a very high proportion of heavy infantry (close to 80%). Perhaps these differences in proportion are idiosyncratic (e.g., the relationship between the Seleucid army and the structure of armies under the Persians), and it is more difficult to say anything of the statistical significance about each power's phalanx; but there are fourteen instances of cavalry and thirteen of *Krētes/Cretenses/Neokrētes* in hegemonic armies, so the low level of volatility in the proportions of Cretans is more likely to be significant.

Heavy Infantry	
(Livy)	(Appian)

The final average for cavalry (m3 ~8.0%), when adjusted for outliers, shows a standard deviation (around 1.0). This was very close to that of the *Krētes*.

The regularity in the proportions of cavalry and *Krētes*, when *Krētes* appear in an FF catalogue, suggests that there might have been a ballpark range for both groups that would have been desirable. Of course, all of these statistical calculations rest on certain assumptions, both in terms of numbers and who is being counted. The proportions of *Krētes* when *Neokrētes* are included show variation that is nearly identical to the proportions of cavalry, which suggests that *Neokrētes* were a division within a unit of *Krētes*. When *Neokrētes* were excluded, the variation of *Krētes* was much greater, which could be interpreted to mean that both *Krētes* and *Neokrētes* were ethnic, not weapons groups. One argument in favor of *Neokrētes* being considered as *Krētes* could be that the Ptolemaic army treats them as a subunit of *Krētes*, with the commander of *Neokrētes* appointed by the commander of *Krētes* (Polyb. 5.65.7).

In conclusion, the evidence suggests that, although *Krētes* and *Cretenses* appeared in foreign armies with greater frequency than other ethnic groups, they also functioned as a weapons division, particularly within the context of a full hegemonic army. The evidence from GL and AR lists shows all groups, including Cretans, being represented in highly variable proportions, while the *Krētes/Cretenses/Neokrētes* in FF catalogues show more stable variation and frequency that is similar to that of cavalry. There may be good reason for this: whereas

m1	(13) 70.46%	(13) 69.57%
σ1	15.2	15.0
r1	55.26%-85.66%	54.57%-84.57%
m2	(8) 70.87%	(8) 71.70%
σ2	8.81	5.91
r2	62.06%-79.68%	65.79%-77.61%
m3	(8) 70.87%	(6) 72.0%
σ3	8.81	4.51

garrisons were more likely to be composed of people who are available, and foreign aid was determined by whatever one's allies can manage, it would be in the interest of an army's general to have desirable proportions for the units under his command, regardless of the origins of the soldiers who made them up.

III. PROVISIONS CONCERNING NUMBERS IN INSCRIPTIONS

Having looked at the evidence for numbers of "Cretans" (to use the agnostic parlance from above) who may or may not have been connected to Crete, I turn now to the evidence for numbers of soldiers that can be tied directly to *poleis* of Hellenistic Crete, some of whom made interstate agreements with their allies (*summachiai*) that included very specific provisions for how many soldiers ought to be sent to the allied partner in response to a request for aid. These quotas explicitly refer to the composition of allied aid, and say nothing directly about mercenaries, but I suggest that they may also provide information about the difficulties of meeting the obligations of these alliances and the role that mercenaries might hypothetically play in being able to send the desired number of men. They also provide an illustration for a point made above (pp. 42-3), that Greek discourse made the identity of the authority sending men more important than the identities of the men who had been sent – and thus even groups of Cretans with direct connections to Cretan *poleis* might nonetheless be heterogeneous.

In order to address the composition of *summachia* groups and the role that mercenaries might play in them, I present a close reading and analysis of two passages from two *summachiai* made sometime around 200 BCE, between the democracy of Rhodes and two Cretan *poleis*, Hierapytna (*IC* III.iii.3A) and Olous (*SEG* 23:574). The language of these alliances invites

comparison: it is similar enough to suggest that they were made around the same time, but they differ enough to show that each city had its own relationship with the more powerful Rhodes. These documents show that the treaty partners imagined a scenario in which a specific number of Cretan fighters, with explicit ties to a specific *polis*, would leave Crete and be paid to fight.

Both documents give a specific number of *summachoi* that must be sent in response to request for a *summachia*, within thirty days of the Rhodians sending the request (*IC* III.iii.3A: l. 18; *SEG* 23:547: l. 33):

IC III.iii.3A, ll. 17-21:

“...ἀποστελλόντων τὰν συμμαχίαν Ἱεραπύτνιοι... ἄνδρας διακοσίους ὄπλα ἔχοντας, εἴ κα μὴ ἐλασσόνων χρεῖαν ἔχωντι Ῥόδιοι· τῶν δὲ ἀποστελλομένων ἐόντων μὴ ἐλάσσους τῶν ἡμίσεων Ἱεραπύτνιοι.”

“...let the Hierapytnians send the allied aid... two hundred men bearing weapons, unless the Rhodians have need of fewer; of those sent, let no fewer than half be Hierapytnians.”

SEG 23:547, ll. 32-35:

“...ἀποστελλόντων Ὀλ[ο]ύντιοι... ἄνδρας μὴ ἐλάσσους ἑκατὸν ἐλευθέρους ὄπλα ἔχοντας, τούτων δὲ ὄντων μὴ ἐλάσσους τῶν ἡμίσεων Ὀλούντιοι...”

“...let the Oluntians send... no fewer than 100 free men bearing weapons, of whom no fewer than half are Oluntians...”

Upon first inspection, it is tempting to conclude from that the fact that Hierapytna’s quota is double that of Olous reflected its greater population. Indeed, we cannot eliminate the possibility that Hierapytna was more populated than Olous. However, the quotas cannot simply be interpreted as a reflection of population since the numbers in these quotas are not absolute

numbers (e.g., *exactly* two hundred men). In the request to the Hierapytnians, two hundred men are required, “unless the Rhodians need fewer men:” so the figure of two hundred is the maximum number that the Hierapytnians would be required to send, and Rhodes could request a smaller number. By contrast, the request to the Oluntians is “no fewer than” one hundred men: the figure of one hundred is therefore the minimum number that the Oluntians would be required to send. If we follow the letter of the treaties, the Rhodians could theoretically summon an identical figure of one hundred fifty men from each of the allied cities, and still be within the terms of its *summachia* with each. At the very least, this means that Hierapytna’s larger quota cannot be a reliable indicator that its *polis* had a larger population than that of Olous.¹¹³

The other point about the numbers is that they establish a range for the composition of the *summachia* – that is, the identities of the men who are sent. Both treaties stipulate that at least half of the *summachoi* be citizens – Hierapytnians and Oluntians – of their respective *poleis*. Regardless of the identity of these non-citizen *summachoi*, it is clear that, for some reason, the Rhodians asked that the Cretan *poleis* must commit their own citizens as allied fighters under the terms of alliance. Perhaps this is because the Cretan *poleis* would try to send men who are not their own citizens, if they were able: and we might well ask why this is a possibility that Rhodes feels the need to address. From Rhodes’ point of view, the enforcement of loyalty could be at issue; perhaps a more a homogeneous group of citizens would be easier to control. The loyalty clauses, discussed in Chapter 5, suggest that one mode of regulating allied soldiers was to frame loyalty to the *summachikē polis* as a condition of citizenship to one’s own *polis*. But since we are

¹¹³ Chaniotis has argued that this expansionism, along with the doubled quota, is a symptom of Hierapytna’s overpopulation (1995: 74-5; 1999c: 203-4).

discussing numbers, we might frame the question in terms of the quota of citizen fighters, and ask to what sort of investment the Cretan *poleis* have committed themselves. Generally speaking, not all citizen males were able to fight, but many duties in the running of a *polis* – especially a democratic *polis* – had to be performed by adult citizen males, not the least fathering citizen children.

There is very little scholarly discussion about the clause, apart from M.M. Austin's unexplored suggestion (2006: no. 113) that the non-citizen component might consist of mercenaries.¹¹⁴ I am inclined to agree with his suggestion because, according to the criteria for “mercenary” that I established for this dissertation, any fighter who is present with a paid contract, and not by reason of being a citizen or ally, can be identified as a mercenary. On the level of the individual fighter, this distinction is not substantive: hypothetically, the same man could fight as a *summachos* on behalf of his own city, and as a species of mercenary included as a “free man bearing weapons” for some other city's *summachia* force. But the fact that he is a citizen of the city that sends the *summachia* makes him a *summachos* within that context. One reason why a city might hire mercenaries would be to fulfill its alliance obligations to its partner city because, as I will argue in Chapter 5, fulfilling alliance obligations to one's partner city was never an acceptable pretext to ask one's other allies to send aid. For these reasons, even when a group of *Krētes* is tied to a specific Cretan *polis*, we should not assume that the group is homogeneous and represents the population of that *polis*.

¹¹⁴ Given that these documents tend to stipulate freeborn men, another possibility would be men from another *polis* with which there was an *isopoliteia* or *sumpoliteia* arrangement.

Even if they cannot tell us anything conclusive about the population of a *polis*, these quota numbers that population could still provide us with information about the relative power and influence of that city. One of the major assumptions behind the hypothesis of Cretan overpopulation is that Cretan cities were deliberately using alliances like that with Rhodes to export an excess of citizens. *Summachia* arrangements have been portrayed as source of labor for unemployed citizen soldiers (Karafotias 1997, 2007), a release valve for internal strife among citizens (Petropoulou 1985), a way of dealing with economic disadvantage (Brulé 1978), or a state-sponsored mercenary contract (Launey 1949: I.37; Chaniotis 2005: 83). However, the stipulation that “no fewer than half” of the *summachoi* be citizens suggests some reluctance on the part of Cretan *poleis* to send their citizens off to foreign wars, or at least some difficulty in meeting the alliance obligations. On the other hand, even if Hierapytna were capable of fielding two hundred men on short notice, supplying their own citizen men could still have been a hardship; at least, given that citizen men were the ones who held power in a *polis* and anchored its social structure, it would be understandable if the *dēmos* of Hierapytna were not eager to hazard its own. Indeed, if we can say anything comparing the cities of Hierapytna and Olous, it could be that Hierapytna had more influence with Rhodes than Olous: the Hierapytnians had a maximum number that the Rhodians may ask of them, while Oluntians had a minimum quota to meet, and no maximum. This inequality will be discussed further in Chapter 5: Hierapytna’s *summachia* provided for slightly better pay; and, elsewhere in the agreements, Hierapytna was given latitude to make other *summachiai* independent of Rhodes, while Olous was not.

In conclusion, when approaching Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries to study them through their numbers, we ought to be attentive to terminology and context. The Greek term *Krēs* often taken to mean a Cretan mercenary from the island of Crete. However, *Krēs*, a term that indicates the location of an individual outside of Crete rather than a political affiliation with Crete, could denote a member of a descendant community of *Krētes*, or even an individual who was not directly connected to Crete, especially in the context of foreign hegemonic armies. Cretans from Crete can be most easily identified with garrisons and in military aid groups such as alliances that were connected with Crete; however, in the latter case, we should be cautious about what information is being provided about the composition of those groups, because they were likely not homogeneous. Within the context of full hegemonic armies, *Krētes* appear frequently enough and with proportionality that is steady enough to suggest that they were being identified as *Krētes* by virtue of their weaponry rather than their place of origin.

I have proposed that we ought not to use Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries as indicators of population stress or overpopulation for two reasons: first, the material evidence for population stress on Crete is still ambiguous and subject to interpretation, and second, Greek mercenaries were not inherently products of crisis at their point of origin, so it would make sense to have no crisis on Crete yet still have mercenaries. It seems more fruitful instead approach Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries by removing these crisis parameters, and by incorporating the methodological concerns that I have identified around the term *Krēs*, including being skeptical about which *Krētes* can be best identified as mercenaries from Crete. I have suggested that *summachia* agreements are one place to look because they are directly connected with Cretan *poleis*. Although the numbers mentioned in *summachia* agreements refer to the composition of

allied aid, the fact that only part of the quota must be made up of citizens allows for the possibility that mercenaries may have had a role to play in filling these quotas and thus enabling cities to meet their obligations to their allies.

Having identified reasons to contest the interpretation of the evidence cited for exceptional numbers of Cretan mercenaries, I next turn to the view that Cretans specialized in a type of warfare that was atypical for the Greek world, which will be the main concern of Chapter 2. In this chapter, I have suggested here that *Krētes* was a specific division of a Hellenistic army; in Chapter 3, I will describe the *Krēs* weapons category in greater detail. I will ultimately propose that, even if a *Krēs* fighter might conceivably come from Crete, his mode of fighting was not an exclusive product of a specialized Cretan system meant for a mercenary market.

Table 1: Cretans in Foreign Armies

- A. Non-Cretan Power (whose forces the Cretans join)
 B. Leader of Non-Cretan Forces
 C. A number is attached to a group of *Krētes/Cretenses*: ✓: yes; (✓): there is a possible number; (-): a hypothetical number is missing from source; -: no number is listed.
 D. Type of Catalogue: Full Forces (FF); Division of Forces (DF); Aid/Recruitment (AR); Garrisons/Soldier Lists (GL)
 E. Affiliate Cretan City
 F. X: Strong evidence that, within a group of *Krētes*, that majority are likely to have come from Crete; (X): there is a narrative connection to Crete

Source	Date	A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.
Thuc. 6.43	415	Athens	Nicias	✓	FF, FD		(X)
Thuc. 7.57.9	415	Athens	Nicias	-	FF		
Xen. <i>Anab.</i> 1.2.9	404	Persia	Cyrus	✓	FD, AR		
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 4.2.16	394	Sparta	Agésilas	✓	FF		
Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 1.8.4	335	Macedon	Alex. III Megas	✓	FD		
Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 2.9.3	333	Macedon	Alex. III Megas	-	FF		
DS 17.57.4	331	Macedon	Alex. III Megas	-	FF		
DS 20.85.3	305	Macedon	Dem. I Poliorcetes	-	FD		
DS 20.88.9	305	Egypt	Pt. I Soter	✓	AR	Knossos	X
SEG 17:639	301	Egypt	Pt. I Soter	-	AR		
Plut. <i>Pyr.</i> 29.6 Plut. <i>Pyr.</i> 32.2	272	Sparta Sparta	Areus I Areus I	✓ ✓	AR FD	Gortyn; [Aptera]	X X
<i>IG II</i> ² 1299	237/6	Macedon	Dem. II Aetolicus	✓	GL		(X)
<i>IC IV</i> .167	237/6	Macedon	Dem. II Aetolicus	-	AR	Gortyn	X
Plut. <i>Cleom.</i> 6.3	227	Sparta	Cleomenes III	-	FD		
<i>IC III</i> .iii.1A; SEG 46:1222	227-224	Macedon	Antig. III Doson	(-)	AR	Hierapytna	X
<i>IC II</i> .xii.20	227-224	Macedon	Antig. III Doson	(-)	AR	Eleutherna	X
Plut. <i>Cleom.</i> 21.3	222	Sparta	Cleomenes III	-	FD		
Polyb. 2.65.2, 66.6	222	Macedon	Antig. III Doson	-	FF		
Polyb. 5.36.4	221	Egypt	Pt. IV Philopator	✓	GL		
Polyb. 5.53.3	221	Syria	Antio. III Megas	-	FF	“ <i>summachikoi</i> ”	X
Polyb. 4.55.5	219	Aetolian Lg.	Dorimachus?	✓	AR	Knossos	X
Polyb. 4.55.5	219	Macedon Achaean Lg.	Philip V Aratus the Younger	✓	AR AR	Polyrrhenia, allies Polyrrhenia, allies	X X

<i>IG IV 729</i>	1. 3 rd C	Macedon?	Philip V?	✓	GL	Aptera?	(X)
Polyb. 4.61.2	219	Macedon Messenia [Macedon]	Philip V	✓ ✓	FF FF	[Polyrrhenia/ allies?]	X
Polyb. 4.67.6	219/8	Macedon (Messenia?) Macedon	Philip V	✓	FF FF	[Polyrrhenia, allies?]	X
Polyb. 4.80.1-6	218	Aetolian Lg.	Phillidas	✓	GL		X
Polyb. 5.3.1-2	218	Aetolian Lg.	Agelaus, Scopas	✓	AR		X?
Polyb. 5.3.2	218	Macedon	Philip V	-	FD		
Polyb. 5.7.11	218	Macedon	Philip V	-	FF		
Polyb. 5.14.1	218	Aetolian Lg.		✓	FF	[Knossus]	(X)
Polyb. 3.75.7	218	Syracuse Rome	Hieron II ?	✓	AR		
Polyb. 5.65.1-10	219-217	Egypt	Pt. IV Philopator	✓	FF	[Knossus, Allaria]	(X)
Polyb. 5.79.3-13	218/7	Syria	Antio. III Megas	✓	FF	[Gortyn]	(X)
Livy 24.30.13	214	Syracuse	Sosis, Dinomenes	✓	FF		
<i>IG II² 1958</i>	c. 210	Macedon	Philip V	✓	GL	Gortyn	X
Polyb. 10.29.6	209	Syria	Antio. III Megas	✓	FF		
Livy 28.6	207	Pergamon	Attalos II	-	FD		
Livy 31.35.1	200	Macedon	Philip V	✓	FD		
<i>IC III.iii.3A</i>	c. 200	Rhodes		✓	AR	Hierapytna	X
SEG 23:547	c. 200	Rhodes		✓	AR	Olous	X
Livy 32.40.4	197	Sparta Rome	Nabis T. Flamininus	✓	AR		
Livy 33.3.10	197	Rome	T. Flamininus	✓	FD, AR	Gortyn	X
Livy 33.4.6	197	Macedon	Philip V	-	FF		
Livy 33.14.4	197	Macedon	Philip V	✓	GL		
Livy 33.18.9	197	Macedon	Philip V	-	FF		
Polyb. 13.8.2	c. 195	Sparta	Nabis	-	AR		X
Livy 34.27.2	195	Sparta	Nabis	✓	FF		X
Polyb. 33.16.6 Livy 35.29.2	192	Achaian Lg.	Philopoimen	✓ -	FD, AR	Gortyn	X
Livy 37.39.10 App. Syr. 6.32	190	Rome Pergamon	P. Scipio/ Eumenes II	✓	FF, AR		
Livy 37.40.8, 12 App. Syr. 6.32	190	Syria	Antio. III Megas	✓	FF		

Livy 38.21.2	189	Rome Pergamon	M. Vulso/ Eumenes II	-	FF, AR		
<i>IC</i> IV.179	183	Pergamon	Eumenes II	-	AR	<i>Krētaieis</i>	X
Livy 39.49.1	183	Achaean Lg.	Philopoemen	-	FD		
Livy 42.35.7; 43.7.2	171	Rome	P. Crassus	(✓)	FF		X
Livy 42.51.7	171	Macedon	Perseus	✓	FF	Knossus, Phalasarna	X
Livy 42.57.7	171	Rome	P. Crassus	✓	FD		(X)
Livy 42.57.8	171	Macedon	Perseus	✓	FD		(X)
Livy 42.65.2	171	Macedon	Perseus	✓	FD		(X)
Livy 43.10.1	170	Macedon	Perseus	-	GL		(X)
Plut. <i>Aem.</i> 15-16	168	Rome	L. Paulus	✓	FD		(X)
Livy 44.43.6	168	Macedon	Perseus	✓	FD		(X)
Polyb. 31.17.8	162	Egypt	Pt. VIII Younger	✓	AR		X
<i>ID</i> 1517	154	Egypt	Pt. VI Elder	-	AR	<i>Krētaieis</i>	X
Just. 35.2.2; Jos. <i>JA</i> 13.86	147	Syria	Dem. II Nicator	-	GL		X
<i>Herm. Magn.</i> 4, ll. 56-8	late 2 nd C	Egypt	Pt. VI-X?	-	GL		
Strabo 10.4.10	120s	Pontus	Mithr. V Euergetes	-	AR	Knossus	X
Plut. <i>G. Gracch.</i> 16.3-4	121	Rome	L. Opimius	-	G		
Caes., <i>BG</i> 2.7	58	Rome	G. Caesar	-	FD		

Table 2: Numbers and Percentages of *Krētes* for all Catalogue Types

Key to Columns:

- A. Type of Catalogue: Full Forces (FF); Division of Forces (DF); Aid/Recruitment (AR); Garrisons/Soldier Lists (GL)
- B. Commanding Power
- C. Total Number of Forces
- D. Number of *Krētes*
- E. Percentage of *Krētes* among Total Number of Forces/Division
- F. Percentage of *Krētes* among Non-Hoplites/Auxiliaries, including Cavalry
- G. Percentage of *Krētes* among Non-Hoplite/Auxiliary Infantry, excluding Cavalry

Source	Date	A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.	G.
Thuc. 6.43	415	FF	Athens	6430	80	1.2%	6.0%	6.2%
		FD		480	80	16.7%		
Xen. <i>Anab.</i> 1.2.9	404	FD, AR	Persia	2040	200	10.2%		19.2%
Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 4.2.16	394	FF	Sparta	14800	300	2.0%	23.1%	42.9%
Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 1.8.4	335	FD	Macedon	U	>70?	U	U	U
Diod. Sik. 20.88.9	305	AR	[Egypt]	650	150	23.1%		N/A
Plut. <i>Pyr.</i> 29.6	272	AR	Sparta	2000	<2000	U		N/A
Plut. <i>Pyr.</i> 32.2		FD		1000	<1000	U	U	U
<i>IG</i> II ² 1299	237/6	GL	Macedon	59	≥4	≥6.8%		U
<i>IC</i> III.iii.1A, SEG 46:1222	227-224	AR	Macedon		?200			
Polyb. 5.36.4	221	GL	Egypt	4000	1000	25%		N/A
Polyb. 4.55.5	219	AR	Aitolian Lg.		1000			
Polyb. 4.55.5	219	AR	Macedon		500			
<i>IG</i> IV,729	l. 3 rd C	GL	Macedon?	43				
Polyb. 4.61.2	219	FF	Macedon	U	300 ----- 500	U	U	U
Polyb. 4.67.6	219/8	FF	Macedon	5700	300	5.3%	11.1%	13.0%
Polyb. 4.80.1-6	218	GL	Aitolian Lg.	2700	≤200	≤7.4%		U
Polyb. 5.3.1-2	218	AR	Aitolian Lg.	500	500	100%		
Polyb. 5.14.1	218	FF	Aitolian Lg.	3900	500	12.8%	12.8%- 55.6%	12.8%- 100%
Polyb. 3.75.7	218	AR	Syracusai	1500	500	33.3%		33.3%
Polyb. 5.65.1-10	219-217	FF	Egypt	75000	3000 or 2000	4.0% or 2.7%	15.8% or 10.5%	21.4% or 14.3%
Polyb. 5.79.3-13	218/7	FF	Syria	68000	2500 or 1500	3.7% or 2.2%	6.6% or 3.9%	7.8% or 4.7%
Livy 24.30.13	214	FF	Syracuse	8000	600	7.5%	U	U
Polyb. 10.29.6	209	FF	Syria	U	2000	U	U	U
<i>IC</i> III.iii.3A	c. 200	AR	Rhodes	200	≥100			
SEG 23:547	c. 200	AR	Rhodes	100	≥50			

Livy 31.35.1	200	FD	Macedon	1400	300	21.4%	21.4%	42.9%
Livy 32.40.4	197	AR	Sparta		600			
Livy 33.3.10		FD, AR	Rome	3600	500	13.9%	13.9%	15.6%
Livy 33.4.6		FF		c. 23600	1100	4.7%	19.6%	34.4%
Livy 33.14.4	197	GL	Macedon	6200	800	12.9%	N/A	U
Livy 34.27.2	195	FF, GL, AR	Sparta	15000	2000	13.3%	N/A	N/A
Polyb. 33.16.6, Livy 35.29.2	192	FD, AR	Achaean Lg.	U	500	U	U	U
Livy 37.39.10	190	FF	Rome	26600	500	1.9%	7.1%	12.5%
App. Syr. 31				30000	?	?	?	?
Livy 37.40.8, 12 App. Syr. 32	190	FF	Syria	70000	2500	3.6%	4.6%	8.6%
[w/o Neocretes]					1500	2.1%	3.8%	4.3%
Livy 42.35.7, 43.7.2 (42.52.8)	171	FF	Rome	<53000	<3000	~5.7%	~18.3 %	~21.4%
Livy 42.51.7	171	FF	Macedon	43000	3000	7.0%	17.6%	23.1%
Livy 42.57.7	171	FD	Rome	250	<150	<60%	<60%	N/A
Livy 42.57.8	171	FD	Macedon	?280	?80	28.6%	28.6%	50%
Livy 42.65.2	171	FD	Macedon	?3000	≥300	≥10%	≥10%	≥15%
Livy 43.10.1	170	GL	Macedon		<i>modicum</i>			
Plut. Aem. 15-16	168	FD	Rome	8320	<200	<2.4%	<62.5 %	<100%
Livy 44.43.6	168	FD	Macedon		500			
Polyb. 31.17.8	162	AR	Egypt		1000			

Table 3: Percentage Breakdown of Numbered Full Force (FF) Catalogues

- A. Commanding Power
- B. Total Number
- C. Number of Heavy Infantry (Phalanx/Legion)
- D. Percentage of Heavy Infantry (Phalanx/Legion)
- E. Number of *Krētes*
- F. Percentage of *Krētes* for Total Army
- G. Number of Cavalry
- H. Percentage of Cavalry

Source	Date	Event	A.	B.	Heavy Infantry		<i>Krētes</i>		Cavalry	
					C.	D.	E.	F.	G.	H.
Thuc. 6.43	415	Sicilian Expedition	Athens	6430	5100	79.3%	80	1.2%	30	0.5%
Xen. H. 4.2.16	394	Nemea River	Sparta	14800	13500	91.2%	300	2.0%	600	4.1%
Xen. H. 4.2.17	394	Nemea River	Corinth & Allies	<25550	24000	>93.9%			1550	>6.1%
Polyb. 4.67.6	219/8	Social War	Macedon	5700	3000	52.6%	300	5.3%	400	7.0%
Polyb. 5.14.1	218	Social War	Aetolian Lg.	3900	<3000	<76.9%	500	12.8%	400	10.3%
Polyb. 5.65.1-10 [w/o <i>Neokrētes</i>]	219-217	Raphia	Egypt	75000	56000	74.7%	3000 2000	4.0% 2.7%	5000	6.7%
Polyb. 5.79.3-13 [w/o <i>Neokrētes</i>]	218/7	Raphia	Syria	68000	35000	62.5%	2500 1500	3.7% 2.2%	6000	8.8%
Livy 24.30.13	214	2 nd Punic War	Syracuse	8000			600	7.5%		
Polyb. 10.29.6	209	Hyrkania	Syria				2000			
Livy 33.4.6	197	Cynoscephalae	Rome	~23600	18000	~76.3%	1100	~4.7%	2400	~10.1%
Livy 33.4.6	197	Cynoscephalae	Macedon	23500	16000	68.1%			2000	8.5%
Livy 34.27.2	195	Nabis	Sparta	15000			2000	13.3%		
Livy 37.39.10 ----- App. 6.31	190	Magnesia	Rome	27600 ----- 30000	21600 ----- 20000	78.3% ----- 66.7%	500	1.8%	2200 ----- 3000	8.6% ----- 10.0%
Livy 37.40.8, 12 w/o <i>Neocretes</i>	190	Magnesia	Syria	70000	31000	44.3%	2500 1500	3.6% 2.1%	?4000	?5.7%
Livy 42.35.7; 43.7.2	171	3 rd Mac.n War	Rome	<53000	36600	~69.1%	<3000	~5.7%	4400	8.3%
Livy 42.51.7	171	3 rd Mac.n War	Macedon	43000	21000	48.8%	3000	7.0%	4000	9.3%

Table 4: Foreign Aid and Mercenary Recruitment (AR)

- A. Type of Aid or Recruitment (*Xenologia*, *Boēthia*, *Summachia* [by Agreement], *Summachia* [in Action], *Auxilium*)
- B. Sending Power
- C. Receiving Power
- D. Cretan City Affiliated
- E. Total Aid Force
- F. Number of Cretans
- G. Percentage of Cretans

Source	Date	A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.	G.
Xen. <i>Anab.</i> 1.2.9	404	<i>Xenologia</i>		Persia		2040	200	9.8%
DS 20.88.9	305	<i>Boēthia</i>	[Egypt] Knossus	Rhodes	Knossus	650	150	23.1%
SEG 17:639	301	<i>Boēthia</i>	Egypt	Aspendus		U	U	U
Plut. <i>Pyr.</i> 29	272	<i>Boēthia</i>	Gortyn Sparta	Sparta	Gortyn Aptera?	2000	<2000	U
<i>IC</i> IV.167	237/6	<i>Summachia</i> (<i>Agr</i>)	Gortyn	Macedon	Gortyn			
<i>IC</i> III.iii.1A = SEG 46:1222	227- 224	<i>Summachia</i> (<i>Agr</i>)	Hierapytna	Macedon	Hierapytna	?200	?200	
<i>IC</i> II.xii.20 (SEG 46:1222)	227- 224	<i>Summachia</i> (<i>Agr</i>)	Eleutherna	Macedon	Eleutherna	?200	?200	
Polyb. 4.55.5	219	<i>Summachia</i> (<i>Act</i>)	Knossus	Aetolian Lg.	Knossos	1000	1000	
Polyb. 4.55.5	219	<i>Summachia</i> (<i>Act</i>)	Polyrrhenia & allies	Macedon & Achaean Lg.	Polyrrhenia & allies	500	500	
Polyb. 4.61.2	219	<i>Summachia</i> (<i>Act</i>)	Polyrrhenia & allies	Macedon & Achaean Lg.	Polyrrhenia & allies	300 200		
		----- ?	Messenia	Macedon	-----	500		
Polyb. 4.80.4, 6	218	<i>Boēthia</i>	Sparta	Aetolian Lg. & Elis		200	≤200	
Polyb. 5.3.1- 2	218	<i>Boēthia</i>	Aitolian Lg.	Elis		500	500	100%
Polyb. 3.75.7	218	<i>Boēthia</i>	Syracuse	Rome		1500	500	33.3%
<i>IC</i> III.iii.3A	c. 200	<i>Summachia</i> (<i>Agr</i>)	Hierapytna	Rhodes	Hierapytna	≤200		
SEG 23:547	c. 200	<i>Summachia</i> (<i>Agr</i>)	Olous	Rhodes	Olous	≥100		
Livy 32.40.4	197	<i>Auxilium</i> (<i>Summachia</i> ?)	Sparta	Rome		600	600	
Livy 33.3.10	197	<i>Auxilium</i> (<i>Summachia</i> ?)	Gortyn	Rome	Gortyn		500	
Polyb. 13.8.2	c. 195		<i>Krētes</i>	Sparta				
Polyb. 33.16.6 Livy 35.29.2	192		Gortyn	Achaean Lg.	Gortyn		500	
Livy	190	<i>Auxilium</i>	Pergamum	Rome			500	10.4%

37.39.10 App. Syr. 6.32		<i>(Summachia)</i>						
Livy 38.21.2; 38.12.8; 38.13.3	189	<i>Auxilium (Summachia)</i>	Pergamum	Rome		2800	?	unkn.
IC IV.179	183	<i>Summachia (Agr)</i>	Pergamum <i>Krētaieis</i>	<i>Krētaieis</i> Pergamum	31 Cretan cities			
Livy								
Polyb. 31.17.8	162	<i>Xenologia</i>		Egypt		1000	1000	100%
ID 1517	154	<i>Summachia (Act)</i>	<i>Krētaieis</i>	Egypt	<i>Krētaieis</i>			
Strabo 10.4.10	120s	<i>Xenologia</i>		Pontus	Knossos			

Table 5: Numbers and Percentages from Garrisons and Soldier Lists (GL)

- A. Type: Emergency (E) or Stable (S)
- B. Total
- C. *Krētes*: Number and Percentage
- D. Soldiers from Local Area, Number and Percentage
- E. Largest Represented Division, neither from Commanding Power nor Local Area, Number, Percentage

Source	Date	A.	Place	Power	B.	C. <i>Krētes</i>		D.		E.		
<i>IG II</i> ² 1956	315-309	S	Athens	Macedon	146 -164	0	0%	?46	31.5% -28.0%	Thracians	17	11.6% -10.4%
<i>IG II</i> ² 1299	p. 236/5	S	Eleusis	Macedon	59	≥4	≥6.8%	11	18.6%	Phocians	≥5	≥8.5%
<i>IG XII</i> ,6 1.217	p. 280	S	Samos	Egypt	16	2	12.5%	0	0%	Achaean, Aetolian, Cretans	2	12.5%
Polyb. 5.36.4	221	S	Alexandria	Egypt	4000	1000	25.0%	0	0%	Peloponnesians	3000	75.0%
<i>IG IV</i> 729	1. 3 rd C		Hermione	Macedon?	43					West Cretans?		
Polyb. 4.80.1-6	218	E	Lepreon	Aetolian Lg. & Elis	2700	≤200	7.4%	0	0%	<i>misthophoroi</i>	500	18.5%
<i>IG II</i> ² 1958	210	S	Eleusis	Macedon								
Livy 33.14.4	197	S	Corinth	Macedon	1300	0	0%			mixed aux.	800	61.5%
Livy 33.14.4	197	E	Corinth	Macedon	6200	800	12.9%	700	11.2%	Illyrians & Thracians	1200	19.4%
Livy 34.27.2	195	E	Sparta	Sparta	15000	2000	13.3%	10000	66.7%	mixed merc.	3000	20%
Livy 43.10.1	170	S	Uscana	Macedon			100%					
Polyb. 28.15.2	169	E	Cydonia	Pergamum	>300	?	?	?	?	“Attalids”	300	?
Just. 35.2.2; Jos. <i>JA</i> 13.86	147	S										
<i>Herm. Magn.</i> 4	late 2 nd C	S	Hermopolis Magna	Egypt								
Plut. <i>G. Gracch.</i> 16.3-4	121											

Table 6: Xenos Groups appearing alongside Krētes: Numbers and Percentages

Source	Date	Type of Catalogue	Weaponry	Raw Number	Percentage of Army
Achaean					
Polyb. 4.55.2	219	AR		200	28.6%
Polyb. 4.61.2	218	FF	Slingers	300	unknown
Livy 37.39.9	190	FF	Peltasts	≤3000	≤11.3%

App. <i>Syr.</i> 6.31				3000	10.0%
Aetolians					
Polyb. 4.53.6	219	AR		1000	100.0%
Livy 33.3.8	197	FD	Infantry	600	27.8%
		FF	Cavalry	400	
				1000	4.2%
Livy 42.51.9	171	FF	Infantry	<500	<1.2%
Gauls/Galatians					
Polyb. 5.65.10	219-217	FF		c. 3000	c. 4.0%
Livy 42.51.7	171	FF	Infantry	2000	4.7%
Greek <i>Misthophoroi</i>/ <i>Mercenarii</i> (Mixed)					
Thuc. 6.43	415	FF	Hoplites	250	3.9%
<i>SEG</i> 17.639	301-298	AR			
Polyb. 5.65.3	217-219	FF	Hoplites	8000	10.7%
Polyb. 5.79.10	219	FF	Hoplites	5000	7.4%
Livy 33.4.5	197	FF		1500	5.8%
Livy 34.27.2	195	FF	Hoplites?	3000	20.0%
Livy 42.51.8	171	FF		500	1.2%
Illyrians					
Polyb. 4.55.2	219	AR		400	57.1%
Livy 33.3.10	197	FF	Cretan-style	300	1.0%
Livy 33.4.5	197	FF	Trallians	2000	7.8%
Livy 37.39.10	190	FF	Trallians	500	1.9%
Livy 37.40.8, 13	190	FF	Trallians	3000	4.3%
Mysians					
Livy 37.40	190	FF	Archers	2500	3.6%
Peloponnesians					
Polyb. 5.36.4	221	GL		3000	75.0%
Polyb. 4.80.1-6	218	AR		<200	<7.4%
Phocians					
<i>IG</i> II ² 1299	237/6	G		≥5	≥8.5%
Polyb. 4.55.2	219	AR		100	14.3%
Rhodians					
Thuc. 6.43	415	FF	Slingers	700	2.7%
Diod. <i>Sik.</i> 20.88.9	305	AR		500	77.0%
Thracians					
Xen. <i>Anab.</i> 1.2.9	404	FD	Peltasts	800	41.2%
			Cavalry	40	
Polyb. 5.65.10	219-217	FF		c. 3000	c. 4.0%
Livy 37.39.12	190	FF		≤2000	≤7.0%

Livy 42.51.5	171	FF		<3000	<7.0%
Livy 42.51.7	171	FF		3000	7.0%
Livy 42.57.8	171	FD	Light Infantry Cavalry	80? 60	50.0%
Livy 42.65.2	171	FD	Light Infantry	≤1700	≤56.7%
Plut. <i>Aem.</i> 15-16	168	FD	Light Infantry	<200	<2.4%

Table 6: Statistical Relationships of Military Division Proportions based upon Literary Citation

This table accompanies Figure 1. There are three attempts at approximating an average for each weapons division; after each attempt, entries are evaluated as to whether they fall within the standard deviation, and then removed from consideration for the next attempt. “Out1” represents those removed after the first attempt, “Out2” shows those removed after the second. “Core” is the group that makes up the final average.

Some entries have multiple calculations in order to accommodate unknown variables.

Since the term *Neokrētes* is unknown, calculations for *Krētes* were done in which *Neokrētes* were included as *Krētes*, and a second time excluding them from being *Krētes* (“w/o NK”).

For the Roman side of the Battle of Magnesia (190), the results from calculations made for heavy infantry and cavalry based upon the descriptions by Livy and Appian differed enough that they required separate calculations. These are distinguished by (L) and (A), respectively.

Entry	Power	Heavy Infantry			<i>Krētes</i>			Cavalry		
		out1	out2	core	out1	out2	core	out1	out2	core
Thuc 6.43 (L) (A)	Athens		x		x			x		
X. <i>H.</i> 4.2.16 w/o NK	Sparta	x				x		x		
X. <i>H.</i> 4.2.17 (L) (A)	Corinth	x							x	
P. 4.67 w/o NK	Macedon	x					x			x
P. 5.14	Aetolians			x	x			x		
P. 5.65 NK w/o NK	Ptolemies			x			x			x
Entry	Power	Heavy Infantry			<i>Krētes</i>			Cavalry		

		out1	out2	core	out1	out2	core	out1	out2	core
P. 5.79 NK w/o NK	Seleucids		x				x x			x
L. 24.30	Syracuse					x				
P. 10.29	Seleucids									
L. 33.4 w/o NK (L) (A)	Rome			x x			x x	x	x	
L. 33.4	Macedon			x						x
L. 34.27 w/o NK	Sparta				x x					
L. 37.39 w/o NK App. 6.31	Rome Rome			x x		x x			x	x
L. 37.40 + App. 6.32 w/o NK L. 37.40 + App. 6.32	Seleucids	x					x x	x		
L. 42.35 w/o NK	Rome			x			x x			x
L. 42.51 (L) w/o NK (A)	Macedon	x x				x	x		x	x

Chapter 2: Arming and Deploying Cretan Fighters on Crete

This chapter and the next (Chapter 2 and 3) contest the view that Crete was an island whose modes of fighting were so markedly different from warfare in comparable parts of the Greek world that it produced specialist warriors for a mercenary market. To this end, the present chapter develops a picture of how Cretans fought in the Hellenistic period, gathering and presenting the evidence for what weaponry they carried and what roles they played in battle when fighting amongst themselves on Crete. Chapter 3 will evaluate the resulting portrait from this chapter's examination against the evidence of *Krētes* at war and the use of archery more generally in Hellenistic warfare.

The association between Cretan warriors and the bow existed in ancient times and continues to be a feature prominently in scholarly studies of ancient Greek warfare. The accepted narrative, as expressed by Anthony Snodgrass (1999: 40), has been that Cretans maintained the use of the bow after the fall of Mycenaean civilization and took up the Near Eastern archery tradition while other Greek peoples did not. As a result, warfare on Crete would have differed significantly from mainland Greek warfare in technology and tactics¹¹⁵ – meaning that commanders would have looked to Crete to hire mercenaries

¹¹⁵ Tarn 1930: 6: “The bow in particular was not really a factor in Greek warfare, except in Crete, which lay rather outside the general stream of Greek history; the bow belongs to Asia, and will have to be considered together with cavalry.” As of 2011, Everett Wheeler (2011: 99, no. 176) asserts that Tarn's 1930 series of lectures is still the best comprehensive overview of military (as opposed to social) aspects of Hellenistic warfare.

who were specialists in both.¹¹⁶ Literary accounts, especially the discussion of archery and landscape in Plato's *Laws* (625δ) and Polybius' comments on the strengths and weaknesses of Cretan fighters (4.8.11), have served to bolster the idea that warfare on Crete evolved divergently from the rest of Greece, with the bow as an exceptionally Cretan weapon. This characterization of Cretan warfare rests upon two assumptions: (1) that Greek warfare outside of Crete did not employ archery in the same way that Cretan warfare did; and (2) that *Krētes* outside of Crete made war in the same way that Cretans on Crete did. For the Archaic and Classical periods, the first assumption has recently received some welcome pushback, with demonstrations that, despite being underrepresented in the literary record, archery was a constant presence in mainland Greek warfare.¹¹⁷ This pushback has not occurred for the Hellenistic period, however, and the second assumption – that Cretans on Crete and *Krētes* outside of Crete make war in the same way – has received no pushback at all.

My objection to these assumptions is based upon certain features of Hellenistic warfare. As has been noted, large hegemonic armies were larger and more complex than *polis* armies, with unit divisions for specialists (Ma 2000). Allies and mercenaries tended to fight in the wings of hegemonic armies rather than in the phalanx. *Poleis* carried out warfare against each other on a different scale. In other words, we should not approach warfare on Crete with the assumption that *Krētes* (as allies or mercenaries armed in a

¹¹⁶ For instance, Philopoemen's sojourn on Crete in his youth has been viewed as the direct inspiration for the new light-armed and covert tactics he introduced into the Achaean army (see, e.g., Williams 2004: 276).

¹¹⁷ E.g., Trundle 2010: 147-152, Davis 2013: 210-218.

particular way) functioned within hegemonic armies in the same way as Cretans fighting for their own *poleis* fought against other Cretans. In order to address these assumptions, this chapter collects and evaluates both material and textual sources for warfare on Crete so as to develop a picture of inter- and intra-*polis* warfare there. It therefore prioritizes evidence that is unambiguously tied to Crete.

I. ARMING CRETANS

This study of Cretan arms is divided into two sections, heavy (A.) and light (B.). “Heavy armed” refers to infantry fighters who bear the hoplite panoply – helmet, corslet, greaves, spears or Macedonian *sarissa*, and the *hoplon* shield – and fight in a phalanx. Ideologically, this was the role of the citizen-soldier of the *polis*. As was observed in the previous chapter, the phalanx in a full Hellenistic royal army would have accounted for at least half, if not more, of the soldiers. “Light armed” (ψιλοί) refers to a category of infantry that wore lighter protection such as linen or none at all, wielded lighter weapons such as bows, slings, javelins, or lighter shields such as *peltai* or *aspides*, and who were more mobile as a result. Light-armed fighters in a hegemonic army might defend the flanks of the less mobile phalangite columns in battle or when the army was on the march. These sorts of weapons were to be the province of non-citizens – metics, non-Greeks, allies, and mercenaries.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ Van Wees (2004: 47-76, esp. 55-7) emphasizes the ties between wealth and citizenship, and the wealth and leisure time necessary for a hoplite to become elite. See also Trundle 2010 for the use of light fighters – who were not necessarily non-citizens – in Athens.

The Cretan interlocutor in Plato's *Laws* famously attributes the use of light armor and bow to the rugged landscape of Crete.¹¹⁹ Although it seems logical to say that landscape caused the adoption of certain types of armament, weaponry, and fighting – there are parts of Crete that are indeed quite rugged – this does not hold up to scrutiny. From a literary standpoint, the notion that landscape forms society is a trope of ancient ethnographic writing about marginal peoples; in both Herodotus (4.46.3-47.1) and the Hippocratic *Airs, Waters, Places* (20) external factors of landscape and climate influence or support aspects of Scythian society, including a distinctively “other” mode of warfare (Chiasson 2001: 58-9). From a practical standpoint, while the landscape of Crete is certainly rugged and in large part mountainous, the topography of much of mainland Greece is also quite rugged, and frequently not conducive to the kind of hoplite warfare that was supposed to be the ideal (cf. Ober 1991: 173). Furthermore, archery was a feature of archaic and classical warfare on mainland Greece, and in the Hellenistic period, as Chapter 3 will argue. All of these are good reasons to reexamine the evidence for warfare on the island of Crete itself.

¹¹⁹ 625d: ὁρᾶτε ὡς οὐκ ἔστι, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν, πεδιάς, διὸ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἵπποις ἐκεῖνοι χρῶνται μάλλον, δρόμοισιν δὲ ἡμεῖς: ἦδε γὰρ ἀνώμαλος αὖ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν πεζῆ δρόμων ἄσκησιν μάλλον σύμμετρος. ἐλαφρὰ δὴ τὰ ὄπλα ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ κεκτηῖσθαι καὶ μὴ βᾶρος ἔχοντα θεῖν: τῶν δὴ τόξων καὶ τοξευμάτων ἡ κουφότης ἀρμόττειν δοκεῖ.

“See how [Crete] is not level, like the land of the Thessalians; for this reason, we use running, while they use horses instead: this country is rough and more suitable to the training of runners on foot. In such circumstances it is necessary to acquire light weapons and eschew weight: the lightness of bows and arrows seems to be suited [to this].”

A. Cretans in Heavy Arms

Whatever may be said about the rugged landscape of Crete, Cretan warriors in the Archaic period seem to have fought under heavy arms. Indeed, a local tradition for making armor on the island developed independently from other parts of Greece. Spectacular examples of hoplite armor manufactured on Crete and dating from the seventh and sixth centuries have been found on Crete at Axus, Drerus, Praesus, Palaikastro, Rethymnon, and Afrati (identified as ancient Datala), as well as at Olympia and Delphi. These include helmets, corselets, greaves, and *mitrai* or groin guards, in addition to spearheads, spear butts, and arrowheads.¹²⁰ Most of the armor comes from votive contexts in sanctuaries,¹²¹ some armor and weapons bearing dedicatory inscriptions. These finds demonstrate not only the technical and artistic expertise of Cretan armorers, but also that developments in armor technology took place independently on the island. Scholars have noted a resemblance between the Cretan helmets and Corinthian helmets of the same period, but Herbert Hoffman (1972: 1-2) argues the design and construction of the Cretan specimens look instead to eastern antecedents. Hoffman also describes these helmets as “remarkably light” yet “extremely resilient,” which suggests a technique that developed to address the practical needs of a wearer, not simply for dedication or display. The *mitra*, a groin guard hung below the corslet, perhaps from a belt, seems to have only been in use in Crete, Thrace, and

¹²⁰ Hoffman 1972, *Early Cretan Armorers*; see also Perlman 2010.

¹²¹ Prent (2005: 703) provides a helpful chart for findspots of different types of votive armor in Early Iron Age sanctuaries. In addition to human-sized armor, votive miniatures of Archaic Cretan armor have also been discovered, on Crete at Gortyn, Praesus, and Palaikastro, as well as on the mainland, e.g., at Bassae (Snodgrass 1974: 63).

Etruria.¹²² Remains of shields dating to the Archaic period have not been found, yet Hoffman is rightly tentative about the view that the *mitra* may have been a substitute for the shield.¹²³ Arrowheads, spearheads, and spear butts have been found in the layers contemporaneous with the deposits of armor at Axus.¹²⁴ The collection of dedicatory bronzes points to a local metallurgical tradition that evolved to meet not only the artistic tastes of clientele, but also practical needs of warriors in heavy metal armor.¹²⁵ It seems likely (Prent 2005: 420; Gagarin and Perlman 2016: 14) that the expensive bronze items found at these sanctuaries would have been individual dedications celebrating personal prowess in battle; Paula Perlman (2010: 102) suggests that, based upon epigraphic evidence from Axus, collective/public dedications of arms may have been an institutional custom as well.¹²⁶

¹²² Hoffman (1972: 9-10) notes that all three places were associated with archery, and that the development of the *mitra* might somehow be associated with archery.

¹²³ No material remains of archaic shields survive, but Jarva (1986: 2) suggests that is a possible literary reference to a light leather shield in the so-called “Song of Hybrias” (Ath. 15.695-6): the “excellent hide, protector of skin” (τὸ καλὸν λαισήϊον, πρόβλημα χρωτός). One problem with this is that the date of the “Song” is unknown, and has views ranging from archaic to Hellenistic, in which case it might be evidence for a Hellenistic shield (Tedeschi 1991). The other categories of evidence are votives and miniatures. Marginesu (2003) cautiously dates an inscribed clay shield from a votive deposit at Gortyn to the sixth century. There appears to be a tradition in the eighth and seventh centuries of dedicating bronze shields and terracotta model shields with protruding animal protomes (Coldstream 2003: 269-70; e.g., J.P. Getty Museum no. 91.AD.24). For miniature representations, Stampolidis (2008: 142-144) publishes fragments of ten warriors with shields, roof decoration from a cenotaph (?) monument dated to the early seventh century, that were found at Orthi Petra Cemetery (Eleutherna). Stampolidis connects these to the mythical Couretes.

¹²⁴ Prent 2005: 703: arrowheads, spearheads, and spear butts were also found in small numbers in the contexts of archaic-level deposits of sanctuaries at Praisos, the Idaian Cave, Kommos, Psychro Cave, and Syme.

¹²⁵ Lempesi 1976: Hoplites are depicted (relief sculpture and paint) on nine seventh-century grave stelai from Prinias. In her analysis, Lempesi (71-83) argues that the young men shown reflected more widespread hoplite practices of the seventh century (esp. 82-3).

¹²⁶ Perlman (ibid.) notes that it is possible that some of the uninscribed bronze finds could date from later, perhaps in the fifth century which is not well understood on Crete, but the date of the writing for the inscribed pieces places them clearly in the sixth century.

Evidence for heavy-armed warfare on Crete essentially disappears at the end of the sixth century or beginning of the fifth. This may reflect an end to this type of warfare on Crete, and certainly a shift in dedicatory practice,¹²⁷ but the absence of evidence for elements of the bronze panoply coincides with a general dearth of evidence on Crete for other types of weaponry.¹²⁸ There are very few representations of heavy-armed warriors on Crete dating to the Classical and Hellenistic periods.¹²⁹ The Song of Hybrias the *Krēs* (Athen. 15.695-6) is of uncertain date (see above n. 123) but its speaker is an itinerant warrior who carries a spear, a sword, and a shield. Also, a stele found off the coast of northeastern Crete near Itanus, a city that had a Ptolemaic garrison for over a century, bears a relief of a soldier wearing a crested helmet, cuirass, and boots, carrying a medium-length javelin and a *thureos* shield, and wearing a sword at his left side. No inscription survives, but scholars have observed similarities between this figure and that of a second-century painted grave stele from Sidon for Diodotus the Hyrtacinian *Krēs*.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ Gagarin and Perlman (2016: 15) note that there was an abrupt shift, across all votive contexts on the island, at the beginning of the sixth century in Cretan votive practices, from one-time, expensive dedicated objects like armor to the predominance of mass produced and inexpensive objects.

¹²⁸ Kelly (2012: 274-275 and n. 3) comments on the disjuncture between the absence of evidence for warfare and the modern scholarly reputation of Crete as a warlike place.

¹²⁹ The *polis* of Aptera, from the fourth century until the first century BCE, issued coins that depicted a hero (perhaps the eponymous hero Apteras) in heavy armor, holding a spear and a shield (Le Rider 1966: 36, 269-74, pl 9, 12-17). At the very least, we can say that the Apteracians imagined their hero as a hoplite, even if we cannot use this as definitive proof of how they themselves were fighting. Cf. the votive clay shield of unknown provenance (Archaeological Museum of Chania, inv. no. Π296, 5th c. BCE?) depicting two heavy armed warriors in battle, one of whom has a shield bearing the emblem of a tripod, and a snake in the left field.

¹³⁰ Kelly 2012: 300-1, no. 48. Hyrtacina was a city in southwestern Crete. Sekunda (2001a: 71-3) points to Roman aspects of the apparel, but argues that the soldier was probably part of the Ptolemaic garrison at Itanos, and dates it to 160-145 BCE. Sekunda's dating is based upon his thesis that Ptolemaic military reforms in the 160s incorporated some Roman innovations.

The Hellenistic evidence is so scant that it seems fruitless to ask whether there were heavy-armored Cretan fighters on Crete at that time. Yet, while the disappearance of the hoplite from the record of Hellenistic Crete could perhaps evince changes in warfare, it also reflects changing practices in votive deposition at the sites where the dedications were found. We therefore cannot eliminate the possibility that the heavy-armed soldier on the stele near Itanus might have been Cretan.

B. Cretans in Light Arms

This section analyzes the evidence for light warfare on Crete in the Hellenistic period. It will first assess the material evidence for slinging and archery, then focus on the treatment of Cretans as archers in literary sources. While it is clear that archery was a component of Hellenistic Cretan warfare, the limited evidence suggests that it was one method of fighting that was used alongside other methods such as sling bullets.

There is no comprehensive study of Cretan arrowheads, or of Greek arrowheads after the fourth century. Iron arrowheads from the Hellenistic period have been found on Crete at Xerokambos on the southeastern coast (ancient Ambelus; fig. 1), Hagia Pelagia (ancient Apollonia),¹³¹ and Aptera (Niniou-Kintali 2008: 25-7), if not in other places as well. These arrowheads appear in the battle or destruction layers of the sites. This deposition distinguishes them from those arrowheads found in archaic votive contexts, mentioned above; for both periods, the arrowheads are made of iron. Most of the

¹³¹ On display in the Herakleon Archaeological Museum, along with lead sling-bullets, and iron nails and hinges. Apollonia was destroyed in 169 BCE. The museum's display is intended to illustrate the visceral violence of the destruction of the city.

arrowheads examined are tanged, meaning that they have a stem that would have extended down into the reed; as depicted in the assemblage from Ambelus (fig. 2), most – but not all – resemble Type 1d from Snodgrass’ 1964 typology of Greek arrowheads: “distinguished by its greater breadth, which leaves a small lateral gap between the boss and the barbs” (1964: 147). Snodgrass categorizes this type as a Cretan arrowhead,¹³² but concedes that what he calls a Cretan arrowhead, which is broader and heavier than the other archaic and classical arrowhead types he catalogues, occurs too widely to reliably indicate a Cretan origin or Cretan archers.¹³³ Todd Alexander Davis, whose dissertation reexamines Snodgrass’ typology, suggests (2013: 80) that regions in which iron arrowheads predominate were likely to be wealthier than those in which bronze was preferred; certainly, the use of a more expensive material indicated the “commitment of a valuable resource to the endeavor.” Furthermore, iron arrowheads had to be forged, so they could not be mass-produced as cheaply as bronze cast in a mold, but they could more reliably damage or even penetrate the bronze armor of an enemy.

In addition to arrowheads, sling bullets have been found in Hellenistic battle layers near city walls. The evidence for the use of the sling on Crete has been analyzed by Kelly (2012), who catalogues the lead sling bullets found on Crete and/or associated with

¹³² Snodgrass states (*ibid.*) that the profile of the so-called Cretan arrowhead is based upon numismatic iconography, but gives no citation. However, the points of the arrowheads on the coins depicting archers (Cydonia, see below p. 93) and bows (Le Rider 1966: 112, 2, pl. XXVIII 4-6), seem too small to make an educated assessment about an arrowhead’s profile, and, in any case, Le Rider (1966: 113-4, 1, pl. XXVIII 11-18) identifies the coins of Polyrrenia with points as javelin points, not arrowheads. These “javelin points” lack the barb and boss.

¹³³ For example, Snodgrass (1999: 81) cites the discovery on Samos of a Cretan-type arrowhead mold from the Archaic period. Snodgrass says nothing about the fact that a mold would be used to create bronze, not iron arrowheads like those found on Crete. For the Classical period, Snodgrass reports that this same type appears among the arrowheads at Olynthus (1964: 147). For a discussion of the different types of arrowheads as they apply to archery styles, see below pp. 107-14.

Cretan cities¹³⁴ – a total of forty bullets. Kelly enumerates the conventions of Hellenistic Greek usage for slingshot, especially the practice of providing (in relief, as part of the lead casting process) an image or text, indicating a *polis*, a commander's name, a military division, or perhaps even a taunt. She argues that these conventions are evident in the specimens discovered on Crete, suggesting that their use was in line with practices elsewhere in the Greek world (Kelly 2012: 299). That is, sling bullets (and arrows) were used in massed warfare: an attacking military force against a fortification or settlement would shower the besieged enemy with projectiles.



Figure 2: Iron arrowheads and cast lead sling bullets from ancient Ambelus (Xerokambos), Crete (Archaeological Museum of Siteia). Photo by author.

¹³⁴ Kelly 2012: 288-90, cat. no. 22: a bronze slingshot was found on the island of Anticythera, and is possibly but not securely associated with Phalasarua.

The etic literary tradition seems to favor depicting Cretan warriors armed with bows. This tradition spans all the way back to Homer,¹³⁵ through the Archaic period,¹³⁶ and down into the Hellenistic, when Callimachus, in a literary epigram (37), dramatizes the moment at which a Lyttian archer speaks over his bow and quiver, dedicating them – but not the arrows – to Serapis.¹³⁷ Noting the length of this tradition, we should observe that some of this literature was being written about Cretan archers in the eighth through sixth centuries while, at the same time, Cretans themselves were wearing hoplite armor and depicting themselves as hoplites on grave stelai (see n. 129 above). A similar consideration may be applied to the emic portrayals of archers in Hellenistic Cretan iconography, such as the *polis* of Cydonia’s coins that the archer Cydon stringing his bow on the reverse (Le Rider 1966: 9, 18, 37: 275-304, pl. IX, 18-24; X, 1-8). That is, one ought not to point to coins with archers as evidence for a divergent, archer-centered mode of warfare, when other *poleis* contemporaneously minted coins depicting different weapons besides bows, such as javelin heads of Polyrrhenia (see n. 132 above), and the Apteraeans from the fourth century onward issued coins with their eponymous hero, Apteras, depicted in heavy armor and shield (see n. 129 above).

¹³⁵ In *Iliad* (23.850-883), the Cretan Meriones bests the Achaean Teucer in the archery contest, shooting a bird out of the air. The Homeric narrator attributes Meriones’ victory not to his excellence over Teucer, but to the Cretan’s having made the requisite vow to Apollo, which the Achaean neglected.

¹³⁶ Mary Lefkowitz (1984: 38-9) identifies Pindar’s reference to “bow-bearing Cretans” in *Pythian 5* (53: Κρήτες τοξοφόροι) as a transferred epithet for the priests of Apollo, since, according to the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, Knossians were the god’s first priests at Delphi.

¹³⁷ Roman literature also echoes motifs of Cretan archery when at points where it is specifically emulating Hellenistic poetry. For example, Callimachus’ *Hymn to Artemis* refers to the Artemis’ “Cydonian bow” (3.81). This motif is picked up in Vergil’s *Ecl.* 10.59-60 (*Cydonia... spicula*) and *Aen.* 4.68-73 (Rosen and Farrell 1986: 252-253).

This brief discussion of the material evidence shows that both slings and arrows were an important feature of warfare on Hellenistic Crete. However, since earlier periods show concurrent use of heavy armor and archery, there is no reason to eliminate the possibility that warfare on Crete in the Hellenistic period could have developed similarly. Kelly argues that the use of sling bullets on Crete reflects light warfare tactics in line with contemporary Hellenistic Greek practices; a similar observation may be made for archery on Crete, as argued in Chapter 3.

II. DEPLOYING CRETANS

Having examined the weaponry that is unequivocally associated with the island of Crete through its discovery there, I now turn to how this weaponry was used in action against Cretans on Crete. The evidence surveyed includes battle narratives from Greek historiography, epigraphic evidence, and the remains of forts and fortifications on Crete.¹³⁸ This section will first address skirmishing and raiding in the Cretan hinterlands, although the bulk of the evidence is associated, either in findspot or in narrative, with the *astu*.

A. Skirmishing

One of the features of the master narrative of Hellenistic Crete, as described in the Introduction, is that excessive violence was a norm of Cretan life. One way in which this violence was supposedly exhibited was in frequent informal warfare in the *chora* or

¹³⁸ For defensive architecture on Crete, see Coutsinas 2013, *Défenses crétoises. Fortifications urbaines et défense du territoire en Crète au époques classique et hellénistique*.

countryside, especially over boundaries. A number of interstate treaties and alliances include clauses that describe boundaries and/or refer to the division of booty among participants of a joint-city enterprise. Chaniotis (1999b: 192) reads the former clauses as evidence for border skirmishes arising from competition for pasture land in the Cretan highlands, and the latter, which may refer to a *kat' idian* military enterprise (e.g., *IC* III.iii.4, ll. 53-7), as evidence for private warfare or raiding, and places this within a larger context of personal aggrandizement through piracy (1995: 261).¹³⁹ Although I think the *kat' idian/kata koinon* clauses differentiate between warfare carried out by a single city and warfare as a joint venture by the two partners, it is reasonable to say that Cretans probably did, at times, fight one another in the countryside, and so it is worthwhile to review the evidence for it.

The rural skirmishing and/or raiding that took place at the boundaries of Cretan *poleis* are, to date, invisible in the material record. Regional survey so far does not seem to have turned up arrowheads or other evidence of fighting. This need not indicate that no rural fighting took place, of course: valuable iron arrowheads were retrieved if possible

¹³⁹ *IC* III.iii.4, ll. 53-7: Αἰ δέ τι θεῶν βωλομένων ἔλομεν ἀγαθὸν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, ἢ κοινᾷ ἐξοδούσαντες ἢ ἰδίαι τι-
νὲς παρ' ἐκατέρων ἢ κατὰ γᾶν ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν, λαν-
χανόντων ἑκάτεροι κατὰ τὸς ἄνδρας τὸς ἔρποντας
καὶ τὰς δεκάτας λαμβανόντων ἑκάτεροι ἐς τὰν ἰδί-
αν πόλιν.

“If, with the gods willing, we should win something good from enemies, either setting out jointly or some from each citizenry in a separate expedition, either on land or on sea, let each group of citizenry take shares according to the number of men who went and let each group of citizenry take a tenth part into their own city.” N.B. I take the implied masculine plural subjects to mean “citizenry,” i.e. the Hierapytnians and the Priansians. Petropoulou (1985: 24-6) saw “private warfare” as warfare conducted by private citizens, something Chaniotis (n. 1445) rejects. See n. 143) below.

after use,¹⁴⁰ or fighters could have used other implements (e.g. bronze-tipped javelins, clubs, rocks) that would be more difficult to spot in the archaeological record, or they were simply not deposited in such a way that led to their preservation. It may also be that missile weapons were simply not used for this purpose in Cretan warfare (see the next Section below).

Bearing these concerns about weapons in mind, we might examine how *poleis* controlled the countryside and to what extent Cretans may have fought one another at the frontiers. Coutsinas (2013: 383, 398-9) observes that, although more than half of the cities of Crete in the Classical and Hellenistic periods were fortified, there is very little evidence of extraurban fortification beyond the extreme east and west on the island. She attributes this to dense clustering of the population around the urban centers. She concludes that extraurban fortifications did not play a significant role in controlling the Cretan countryside.

Even there is no material evidence for warfare in the hinterland, border disputes on Crete did occur. There are a handful of cases in which non-Cretan third parties were called in to arbitrate border disputes between Cretan *poleis* (Ager 1996 no. 164; *IC* III.iv.9 and 10; Polyb. 22.15.1-6).¹⁴¹ One of the few fortified extraurban sites in central

¹⁴⁰ One reason why iron arrowheads from battle might be difficult to find outside of the evidence for mass attacks on cities is that their value made it worthwhile to gather them up afterwards for reuse. Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.4.17) reports that, on a march through hostile territory, archers maintained their supply of arrows partly by retrieving and reusing the arrows of their enemies. See Lee (2007: 128) for a discussion of the techniques that archers on the road might have used to maintain their equipment and replenish their ammunition.

¹⁴¹ Ager 1996 no. 164 presents a dossier of inscriptions regarding a territorial dispute between Lato and Olous that was arbitrated at various points by the Knossians, the Romans, and the Milesians. *IC* III.iv.9 and 10 was a dispute between Itanus and Hierapytna, and arose from both sides having settlers on land that Itanus had contested with Praesus before Hierapytna destroyed Praesus in 142 and took up the latter's

Crete is Prinias, a site otherwise unoccupied in the Hellenistic period, where a quadrangular structure was built on a hilltop by Gortyn and may have been intended to observe Gortyn's route to the north past Rhaucus (Coutsinas 2013: 359-64). Some interstate agreements imagine the possibility of a border dispute between the allied parties, but this should not be taken as evidence that border disputes were chronic or inevitable. In 166, Gortyn and Knossus destroyed the *polis* of Rhaucus in a combined operation (Polyb. 30.23.1) and wrote a treaty that established their new boundaries cutting right through the heart of the defeated *astu* (Chaniotis 1996 n. 44b). Instead of simply taking this division as an example of the viciousness of Cretan warfare (Chaniotis 2005: 132; Ma 2000: 352), we might observe that, with the destruction of Rhaucus, Gortyn and Knossus now shared a border that had never existed before. I suggest instead that Gortyn and Knossus recognized the possibility that their new border could become a point of contention between them – and that disputes between settlers of the conquered territory could conceivably escalate to violence – and made their treaty in an effort to establish clear legal grounds for settling these conflicts before they became unmanageable.

The evidence for how Cretans may have fought in the countryside is limited: beyond a handful of fortifications, evidence of it does not survive in the material record. This is not to say that Cretans did not sometimes fight with one another, especially when

territorial claims. This dispute was arbitrated twice, shortly after Hierapytna's conquest of Praesus and a generation later, by the Milesians on the recommendation of the Romans, whose advice the Itanians initially sought (Morstein-Marx 1995: 177-82). According to Polybius (22.15.1-6), the Romans arbitrated an earlier iteration of this conflict in 184, when Gortyn was attempting to weaken Knossus by parceling off Knossian territories to Rhaucus and Lyttus.

boundaries were unclear or contested. We might also suggest that Cretan *poleis* made treaties to clearly demarcate boundaries with allies because they recognized that small-scale conflict was a possibility and wanted to set up a legal framework to resolve it before it could escalate.

B. Siege Warfare

The bulk of the archaeological evidence for interstate warfare on Crete lies around the walls of the *astu*. This evidence includes the walls themselves, the missile weapons discovered near them, and the literary narratives of siege warfare on Crete. As will become clear, this type of warfare was a difficult undertaking for all involved, both the besieged and the besiegers.

More than half of the urban sites on Crete in the Classical and Hellenistic periods have defense walls. According to Coutsinas, the decision to build or not to build might not always coincide with the relative power of the city, and was often affected by the accessibility of a source of good stone.¹⁴² Aptera and Phalasarna had impressive, well-cut stone walls; Itanus, a base for the Ptolemaic navy from the 260s until 145 BCE, had rubble fortifications.¹⁴³ In a few cases, it has been suggested that foreign money

¹⁴² For a list of fortified and unfortified sites, see Coutsinas 2013: 301-2.

¹⁴³ Itanus had a harbor wall and isolated towers made of both sideropetra and ammouda sandstone, the latter of which tends to erode badly. Coutsinas (2013: 394) observes, generally, that the “prestige” isodomic walls tend to be in the western part of the island, where less erosive stone is more readily available, while the non-isodomic defenses tend to appear in the eastern part, such as at Itanus.

contributed to these building projects, but none of this evidence is secure.¹⁴⁴ Meanwhile, the powerful cities of Lyttus, Hierapytna, and Knossus were all unfortified.

As mentioned above, lead slingshot and iron arrowheads were found in the battle trenches beneath walls. There is also evidence for the use of catapults: this is suggested by the reinforced towers at Phalasarna and Gortyn that were capable of supporting catapults (Coutsinas 2013: 78-80) and further demonstrated in the *lithoboles* found below the walls of Aptera.¹⁴⁵

Narratives of warfare on Hellenistic Crete in the historiographic record, Polybius in particular, describe the successful and unsuccessful sieglements of walled or unwalled urban sites; two episodes come from the first-century CE historian Diodorus' retelling of events that took place the mid-fourth century BCE. These episodes focus upon the Phocian mercenary exile Phalaecus, who, sometime in the 340s, was hired by the Knossians to take the unwalled city of Lyttus and was subsequently dislodged from this position by the Lyttians' allies, the Spartans (DS 16.62-3). Sometime after this, Phalaecus was killed while besieging the walls of Cydonia (DS 16.63). Three narratives concern the Lyttian War, more than a century later (221-19). First, unwalled Lyttus was again taken by the Knossians and the Aetolians during the Lyttian War (Polyb. 4.54).

¹⁴⁴ Strabo (10.4.11) says that Ptolemy IV Philopator (221-205) paid for the construction of a portion of Gortyn's walls. For the round tower at Phalasarna, the earliest portion of the fortifications around its manmade harbor, Elpida Hadjidaki (2000) suggests Persian financing, while Nicholas Sekunda (2004) argues for Sparta with Persian funds (Arr. *Anab.* 2.13.6). We should note that this particular structure predates the Hellenistic period (335-330), while other parts of the city's fortification system were likely constructed later. Even if we entertain the possibility that there was external funding at one point in a city's history, we need not jump to the conclusion that the whole fortification system was built entirely with foreign money.

¹⁴⁵ According to Dr. Coutsinas (personal correspondence), *lithoboles* were also found on the island of Anticythera, where a sling bullet was also discovered (see note 22). Both of these have been associated with Phalasarna, but the association is not fully secure.

Later, an alliance of Cretan cities aided by Philip V of Macedon and the Achaean League shut the inhabitants of Eleutherna,¹⁴⁶ Cydonia, and Aptera within their walls until they joined their besiegers' alliance (Polyb. 4.55.4). And, at some point while all this was happening, exiles from the *polis* of Gortyn took control of the harbors of Gortyn and Phaestus (4.55.6). After this, there is a cluster of conflicts around city that date from the second quarter of the second century BCE. Polybius tells us that Cydonia destroyed the city of Apollonia (28.14), that the Gortynians had unsuccessfully attacked Cydonia (28.15.1), and that Cydonians feared besiegement by the Gortynians to such an extent that they requested a garrison from Eumenes II, who sent three hundred men (28.15.2-3).¹⁴⁷ A few years after this, in 166/5, Gortyn and Knossos destroyed Rhaucus, which was unwalled (Polyb. 30.23.1; Chaniotis 1996 n. 44b).

Despite limitations such as Diodorus' distance from events and the fragmentary nature of Polybius, there are patterns that can be observed, and I highlight four of them here. First, sieges could be used to apply political pressure rather than for conquest. In the Lyttian War (221-219), an alliance of cities, aided by their *summachia* with Philip V of Macedon and the Achaean League, "rendered the Eleuthernians, Cydoniates, and Apteraeans wall-bound" (Polyb. 4.55.4: *τειχήρεις καταστήσαντες*), which intimidated these *poleis* into abandoning their alliance with Knossos. Sixty years later (c. 170/69), Polybius says that Cydonia was fearful enough (28.15: *δεδιότες ... κекινδονευκέναι τῆ*

¹⁴⁶ The *astu* of Eleutherna possessed an encircling wall of mudbrick during the Hellenistic period (Coutsinas 2013: 231). According to Dio Cassius (36.18.2), during his conquest of Crete in 67 BCE, Metellus' men took the city after dousing the mudbrick with vinegar.

¹⁴⁷ The fragmentary nature of the text of Polybius makes it difficult to date these passages, for which scholars have suggested a date to around 170. This fragmentation also means that we cannot assume that the Gortynian attacks on Cydonia (28.15) were in any way related to Cydonia's actions towards Apollonia.

πόλει) of an attack from Gortyn – which had attacked the previous year – that it welcomed an occupying garrison from Eumenes II. Second, the element of surprise can play a role in the taking and destruction of a city.¹⁴⁸ One of the events that possibly precipitated the Gortynian attacks on Cydonia in 170/69 was the latter’s destruction of Apollonia, which was shocking and unexpected because Cydonia and Apollonia had had a *sumpoliteia* relationship (Polyb. 28.14).¹⁴⁹ Third, some *poleis* – namely, Lyttus and Cydonia – have their *astu* attacked and even taken multiple times. Finally, most of the cases listed involve a non-Cretan ally, who either sent the force that enabled a Cretan *polis* to attack a Cretan enemy’s *astu*, or whose force helped prevent an attack, or even provided support to people whose *astu* was taken that turned out to be crucial to the survival and revival of their *polis*. This was the case for the Lyttians, who sought aid from Sparta in the 340s (DS 16.62) and shelter from the nearby Lappaeans in 220 (Polyb. 4.54.4) after their unwallled city was taken.

This evidence corroborates my earlier suggestion that siege warfare and the taking of cities was an endeavor that required significant investment on the part of the attackers. Certainly the walls provided an obstacle, but those inside feared the possibility of being shut in and attacked. Catapults and the use of both arrows and sling bullets would have effected shock and awe. Kelly (2012: 301) contextualizes the use of sling bullets within

¹⁴⁸ Numerous commentators, including Whitehead (2002: 18, 25-33) and Chaniotis (2013: 441-3) have observed how ancient handbooks on siege warfare, especially that of Aeneas Tacticus are most concerned not so much with techniques for repelling the enemy in battle, as for preventing those inside from betraying those inside to those outside.

¹⁴⁹ A *συμπολιτεία* agreement was a joining of two *poleis* into “one state with one citizenship.” This is different from an *ισοπολιτεία*, which joins *poleis* to one another through different facets (e.g., citizenship privileges, trade, and religious institutions) but nominally maintains each *polis*’ autonomy. Richard Billows (2007: 309) characterizes *sumpoliteiai* as the “most intrusive” form of interstate agreement, and rare.

“...wider Greek trends which involved collective strengths, targeted mass firing and synchronized strategies bolstered and underpinned by a proactively reinforced psychology that served to unite the corps and deflect panic in the face of enemy fire.” The involvement of foreign allies, both Cretan and non-Cretan, also represents a diplomatic investment. Looking the chronology of these events, it is notable that Cretan attacks on fellow Cretan cities tend to happen in close temporal proximity with one another, and then not at all for at least a generation. If the Lyttian War narrative is any indication, these direct attacks on the *astu* were not random occurrences, but happened within the context of a much larger conflict between alliance networks made up of many Cretan cities, and supported by external alliances.

Archery was clearly a part of warfare on Crete. The use of iron for arrowheads found both in archaic dedication deposits and in Hellenistic battle layers points to Cretans investing in a resource that was pricier and more difficult to work with than bronze, yet more effective against surfaces like bronze armor. However, archery should not be considered an idiosyncratic feature of warfare on Crete; for one thing, in spite of the rugged nature of the Cretan landscape, archers and heavy-armed warriors existed at the same time and fought one another in the Archaic period. Although evidence from the Hellenistic period is scant, the little that does survive points to archery, along with slinging, as a tactic deployed in a concentrated attack, especially on a besieged city. How this portrait compares with the deployment of *Krētes* and the tactics used by Hellenistic archers outside of Crete is the subject of Chapter 3. But none of this suggests that Crete

had an idiosyncratic mode of warfare that naturally produced mercenaries with specialized archery skills for a non-Cretan market.

Chapter 3: The Context for Arming and Deploying *Krētes*

This chapter (3) and the previous chapter (2) contest the idea that the inhabitants of Hellenistic Crete practiced an idiosyncratic mode of warfare that was preoccupied with the bow, and yielded mercenary specialists who were actively sought by non-Cretan commanders for their expertise. In the previous chapter (2), a portrait of warfare on Hellenistic Crete was outlined. It was observed that Cretans used iron arrows and had been doing so since the Archaic period; it also suggested that during the Hellenistic period, archers and slingers participated in massed attacks on cities. Bearing these points in mind, this chapter compares the use of archery on Crete with its use by other Greeks in the Hellenistic period and with the tactics of the *Krētes* that appear in literary accounts of military actions in order to show how Cretan archery is similar to Greek uses but distinct from the type of fighting done by *Krētes* in foreign armies. Section I (Fighting *Toxotai*) establishes a general portrait of the use of archery in the Hellenistic period, considering a variety of evidence for its use, and examining the actions of archers in Polybius. In my earlier discussion in Chapter 1, I observed that, in some contexts in which the term *Krēs* was used, the military function of *Krētes* was prioritized over the possible origins of the men in the unit. This military function is examined in Section II (Fighting *Krētes*), which assesses the tactics of *Krētes* deployed by non-Cretan commanders in Polybius, and compares them against both conventional practices as established in Section I and the use of archery by Cretans on Crete described in Chapter 2. In the course of this chapter, I observe that a *Krēs* in the military sense was a specialist

close-combat skirmisher who could – but certainly did not need to – come from Crete. Furthermore, although *Krētes* in foreign armies were clearly identified as archers (Κρητες τοξόται) into the fourth century, it is possible that, in the Hellenistic period, they were specialist skirmishers who were not necessarily archers. In sum, the chapter will contend that the military function of the *Krēs* was not the natural outgrowth of Cretan methods of fighting that were exceptional or especially divergent from those of the Hellenistic Greek world in general.

In the previous chapter, I observed that there were problems with attributing the role of *Krētes* in the large hegemonic armies of the Hellenistic period to a unique, archer-centric tradition of warfare on the island of Crete. First, the landscape of Crete is not significantly rougher than other parts of Greece, and, more to the point, it did not preclude the development of hoplite warfare in the Archaic period. Second, *Krētes* were light armed, and therefore supplemental¹⁵⁰ to the heavy armed infantry. We have no evidence for large-scale, set battles on Crete, and we cannot assume that a fighter who is a citizen defending his own city, or fighting as an ally or mercenary in a small army, would be deployed in the same way as when he is part of a hegemonic army of seventy thousand men in a formal pitched battle.

For the present study, the evidence for the use of archery and the role of *Krētes* is mainly literary, and special attention is given to the battle narratives of Polybius. The greatest emphasis in this study is placed on Polybius' contemporary accounts of action in

¹⁵⁰ The technical term for this type of force is “auxiliary.” I explain why I do not use the term auxiliary in the Introduction (pp. 27-8).

battle. Where possible, it considers evidence from other literary authors who also wrote about contemporary events (Thucydides, Xenophon, Aeneas the Tactician), together with material and epigraphic evidence. In a few cases, I make observations about the topography of the sites mentioned in Polybius.

I. FIGHTING *TOXOTAI*

As was observed in Chapter 2, the material record clearly shows that Cretans fought as archers from the Archaic period down into the Hellenistic period. There I suggested, based upon admittedly scant evidence, that Hellenistic archery on Crete might be considered within the context of siege warfare. In this section, I lay out the evidence for the use of archery in Hellenistic warfare and argue that the role of archery in interstate warfare on Crete does not differ from the role of archery in attacks on and in defense of Greek cities outside of Crete. I begin with a discussion of bow technology and its uses. Next, I examine the ways in which archery is described in Polybius: first establishing his terminology, next evaluating the accounts of archers in action in more mobile combat and in less mobile, protected positions, especially sieges. For the present discussion, I distinguish among “Cretans” (i.e., Cretans from Crete), *Krētes toxotai* (military *Krētes* who are clearly identified as archers), and *Krētes* (*Krētes* in a military context not clearly identified as archers). This general examination will allow us to compare the use of archery outside of Crete with its use on Crete; it will also lay the groundwork for reading

the actions of *Krētes* in Polybius (II. Fighting *Krētes*) and how these correspond with or differ from the general uses of archery in Hellenistic warfare.¹⁵¹

A. Archery Technology and *Krētes Toxotai*

This section examines the technology of the bow and the arrow and discusses how different types of archery, each of which demanded slightly different skill sets, were suited to different military objectives and contexts. It does this in order to better understand which qualities would make a particular type of archer a specialist. It will observe that Hellenistic Greek warfare had a range of uses and styles of archery, will suggest that Cretans on Crete also made use of this range of styles and uses, and argue that *Krētes toxotai*, when they operated in foreign armies, represented a particular style of archery. Much of the evidence for styles of archery, as well as *Krētes toxotai*, is derived from literary description, especially Xenophon's *Anabasis* – the first-hand account of a Greek mercenary army's escape from Persian territory, 404-401 BCE. Information about any bow type, whether Cretan, Persian, Scythian, or any other type used in Greek warfare, is often gleaned from comparisons of one type to one another, such as how much farther one type may shoot over another. As a result, attempts to describe the equipment and style of any archer, including *Krētes toxotai*, will necessarily describe other types of archery.

As with other light weapons like the sling and the javelin, the bow requires training and expertise to operate effectively. One might expect it to be found in the hands

¹⁵¹ My thanks to Giuseppe C. Castellano for feedback and dialogue about this section, based upon his experience as an archer.

of a specialist. Todd Alexander Davis (2013: 226) remarks that there was no point in putting the bow in the hands of the untrained or inexperienced, observing that Thucydides never depicts oarsmen being armed as archers, though they might be given other weapons (e.g. Thuc. 4.9.1). During the Hellenistic period, archery appears to have been part of the curriculum for young citizens, sometimes paired with ἀκοντισμός, or javelin-throwing (Kah 2004: 57; Chaniotis 2005: 98). For example, an inscription from c. 240 BCE honoring six trainers of the ephebes at Athens includes an *akontistēs* and a *toxotēs*; all these trainers were Athenian the archer, a Cretan (*Krēs*) training young Athenians in archery (Meritt 1933: 159; Pélékides 1962: 173-4, n. 5). Recent scholarship¹⁵² has argued that in Hellenistic *poleis*, the *gymnasion* and the *ephebeia* were training grounds for the production of men with fighting skills. Thus, even if not all the graduates of a city's educational system went on to be specialists of a particular archery style, it would not necessarily be outside of their skillset to pick up a bow in the event of a siege.

Beyond this basic training in the use of the bow, an archer's capabilities – particularly those of a specialist – were determined by the type of equipment he was using, the bow and the arrowhead. There are two general categories of bow composition to which the ancient Greeks would have had access, the self bow and the composite. Self bows are made from a wooden stave, while composite bows are created through laminating wood between horn and sinew – materials that provide the wood with

¹⁵² Kah 2004; Chankowski 2004; van Bremen 2013.

resilience and flexibility respectively.¹⁵³ Self bows need to be large in order to gain greater distance and accuracy, sacrificing the mobility of the archer (Miller et al. 1986: 181-2),¹⁵⁴ while composite bows can be smaller and still capable of greater accuracy than self bows of the same size. Persian and Scythian bows were both composite, but the larger Persian bow was comparable in size to bows that Greek fighters were using against them in Xenophon (see below), while the much smaller Scythian bow, with its significant recurve, enabled its archer to shoot small-headed arrows with accuracy despite encumbrances such as shooting from horseback.

As I noted above, the type of bow used by Cretans, *Krētes toxotai*, or (hypothetically) Hellenistic *Krētes* in foreign hegemonic armies is difficult to determine; Polybius does not describe the bow and images of bows are not sufficiently detailed. We might accept that Cretans used the recurve bow depicted on the coins of Cydonia,¹⁵⁵ and perhaps this was the type of bow used by *Krētes toxotai*, but we should be cautious in saying that this was also used by *Krētes* in hegemonic armies, if they even used a bow at all. Whereas the severe recurve of the Scythian bow is well-documented on pottery,¹⁵⁶ the

¹⁵³ The inclusion of horn is responsible for references to “horn bow,” as with Odysseus’ bow (*Od.* 21.395) and the bow of a Lyttian archer in Callimachus *Ep.* 37 (κέρας τοι δίδωμι καὶ φαρέτρην, “I dedicate my horn and quiver to you”). See Miller, et al. 1986 (182-185) for the weeks-long process of making a composite bow.

¹⁵⁴ The English longbow was a self bow made of yew and, although it was “the culmination of the bowyer’s art” (McLeod 1965: 13), archers had to remain relatively stationary in order to operate them, particularly in formation.

¹⁵⁵ E.g., the coinage of Cydonia (Le Rider 1966: 9, 18, 37: 275-304, pl. IX, 18-24; X, 1-8).

¹⁵⁶ Davis comments – unfortunately without substantiation – that “by 550 B.C.E. or thereabouts, when the Scythian bow has become the dominant bow portrayed in art, it will account for more than 90% of the bows depicted on Greek vases” (2013: 77). In addition to the distinctive profile, there is also the famously distinctive costume of the Scythian archer, in pants, that often accompanies the bow.

Cretan bow is not marked out by a distinctive profile.¹⁵⁷ Xenophon's *Anabasis* provides some evidence for assessing the bow used by *Krētes toxotai* for the very late fifth century, insofar as he compares their capabilities to those of the Persian archers. Two passages in the *Anabasis* facilitate this comparison. First, Xenophon observes that the *Krētes* were unable to match the range of Persian archers, and had to be protected by the hoplites in order to march (3.3.7). Second, the *Krētes* collected the used arrows of the Persians and practiced shooting in the Persian style a massed upward volley that would shower arrows downward upon the enemy (3.4.17).¹⁵⁸ The ability of the *Krētes toxotai* to shoot Persian arrows suggests that they had bows of a size similar to those of Persian archers, which were larger than the Scythian bow, but there was some difference that enabled the Persian archers to shoot farther than the *Krētes toxotai*.¹⁵⁹ Snodgrass (1999: 108) argues that this difference is not in the composition of the bow itself (i.e., a Cretan self bow and a Persian composite) but in the type of arrowhead: the *Krētes toxotai*'s reuse of Persian arrows would suggest that their bows could accommodate a reed length longer than the Scythian bow, and therefore the shorter range was the result of Cretan-type arrowheads being larger and heavier than Persian arrowheads. R. Miller et al. (1986: 181)

¹⁵⁷ Connolly (1998: 50) provides an illustration from a Classical vase from the Louvre of what he labels as a Cretan bow – straighter in the belly than the heavily curved Scythian bow, and curved back on the top and bottom – but he does not provide any bibliography or an accession number to allow one to retrace his steps.

¹⁵⁸ In practical terms, the maximum range of the shot seems to be somewhere around 175 m for the Cretan-type bow (McLeod 1965: 13; Davis 2013: 87) and 235 m for the Persian bow (Davis 2013: 88, no. 285). The maximum range of the Scythian bow is 500 m.

¹⁵⁹ Wallace McLeod, who calculated the range of the various types of bows (see preceding n. 158), identifies Cretan bows as self bows, which cannot generate as much power as a composite bow of similar size. McLeod suggests that the stave would have been cedar or yew, as they both make good bowstaves, asserting that both were available on Crete. However, this suggestion is problematic in that it assumes that *Krētes toxotai* were from Crete and besides, as Jennifer Moody pointed out to me, neither cedar nor yew grew on Crete in the Hellenistic period, and nor do they now.

note that self (or simple) bows must remain unstrung until just before battle in order to preserve the tension of the bow stave. Given this limitation of self bows, Snodgrass' position – that the arrowhead made the difference because both the large Persian and Cretan bows were composite – seems plausible. A delay in stringing the bow did not seem to be an issue for Xenophon's *Krētes toxotai*. Xenophon indicates the need to acquire ammunition and bowstrings while the Ten Thousand are on the march (*Anab.* 3.4.17), he does not mention the need to replace slack bow staves.¹⁶⁰

This suggests that the capabilities of specialized archers were determined not only by the bow itself, but also the arrowhead. We might therefore examine Snodgrass' argument that the greater difference between the Persian and Cretan-type archers in the *Anabasis* was not in the material of the bow, but in the arrowhead. As noted in Chapter 2 (pp. 90-1), arrowheads were made through casting bronze in a mold or, as in the examples from archaic and Hellenistic Crete, by forging iron. The casting process meant that bronze arrowheads could be produced in great numbers and relatively cheaply, in contrast to other weapons (Snodgrass 1964: 144), including the bow itself. Still, archers might retrieve arrows for reuse, as in the abovementioned case of the *Krētes toxotai* practicing to fire Persian arrows in a Persian fashion (*Anab.* 3.4.17). According to Davis, experienced archers who are dealing with an arrowhead of unaccustomed weight would

¹⁶⁰ Xenophon pairs οἱ τοξόται with a middle or passive form of ἐπιβάλλω twice (*Anab.* 4.3.28 and 5.2.12) to mean that they were at the ready. The first instance (4.3.28) pairs the cocked state of the bowmen with the drawn-back slings of the javelineers (διηκυλωμένους τοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς καὶ ἐπιβεβλημένους τοὺς τοξότας), while the second instance (5.2.12) explicitly references bowstrings (τοὺς τοξότας ἐπιβεβλήσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς νευραῖς). Given that, as Rausing (1967: 162) puts it, “a bow without arrows is no weapon,” it seems reasonable to agree with the LSJ and say τοξόται ἐπιβεβλημένοι refers to an arrow set upon a strung bow, rather than a strung bow on its own, and that the inclusion of the bowstring in the second instance would indicate that the archer had both notched and drawn the bowstring back in order to fire immediately upon Xenophon's order.

need to take practice shots in order to calibrate their aim.¹⁶¹ Xenophon's *Krētes toxotai*, being competent archers, needed to practice in order to become comfortable with a new, lighter arrowhead type.

Xenophon's account points to the connection between arrowhead form and function.¹⁶² A smaller, lighter arrowhead can travel farther and at greater velocity than a larger, heavier arrowhead when fired from the same bow. For example, the combination of the Scythian double recurve composite bow and the smaller Scythian arrow had sharpshooting capabilities at a greater distance, and with the kind of power more likely to pierce bronze armor. The large, boss-and-barb arrowhead, which Snodgrass labels as "Cretan" (Type 1d), has different capabilities from the Scythian type. A larger arrowhead could still be accurate at short range, and more forceful; when aimed against light armor or flesh, it could cause tearing flesh wounds that would be more likely to incapacitate the target immediately.¹⁶³ The barb would also make it more difficult to extricate from the flesh, or cause the inconvenience of tangling in clothing. Outside of warfare, this might make it an effective hunting weapon, especially for deer.¹⁶⁴ In warfare, it seems best suited to being a skirmishing weapon – aimed at disabling light-armored opponents at

¹⁶¹ Davis 2013: 321: Bows and arrows need to be calibrated to one another due to the "archer's paradox," a phenomenon by which an arrow oscillates after it has been fired and thus veers to the right or left of the target.

¹⁶² Davis (2013: 9-10, 77-83) is more descriptive in this regard than is Snodgrass (1964: 141-53).

¹⁶³ For more on arrow wounds, see Davis 2013: 137-44.

¹⁶⁴ Andrew Ward (who has presented on archery in siege warfare at Selinunte) says that the larger types are more likely to appear in domestic assemblages, and suggests (pers. comm.) that it was used for hunting large game such as deer. Phillips and Willcock (1999: 4, 20) comment that bowhunting is notably absent in Xenophon's *Kynēgetikos*, though it shows up in other writers such as Pollux (*Onom.* 5.20).

short range. The use of a larger arrowhead is a plausible explanation to account for the shorter range of the *Krētes toxotai* against the Persian archers in Xenophon.

If we consider form and function of bow type and arrowhead type, and combine this with the kinds of actions performed by archers, it becomes possible to talk about a style of archery rather than simply the origins of the archer. A useful parallel would be Scythian archers, whose mention in literature or appearance in distinctive apparel on vases, scholars have long noted, is too widespread to always indicate the presence of ethnic Scythians. Moreover, it is firmly established that the Cretan-type arrowhead occurs too widely to reliably indicate the presence of Cretans (e.g., Snodgrass 1964: 148), just as the Scythian arrowhead's dispersal was too wide to reliably indicate the presence of Scythians. Xenophon's *Krētes toxotai* fought as skirmishers with their proper equipment (i.e., larger composite bow and heavier arrowheads), but perhaps a shift in equipment could reflect a shift in archery style. At one point in his account of the Ten Thousand in Persia (*Anab.* 3.4.15), Xenophon inexplicably referred to the archers as οἱ Σκύθαι τοξόται; he did not mention Scythians anywhere else in the *Anabasis*, and soon afterwards described the *Krētes toxotai* practicing with the Persian arrows they had retrieved (*Anab.* 3.4.17). Previous editors and translators have treated this as a transmission error,¹⁶⁵ but I suggest that *Skythai* could refer to a distinct style of shooting as "Scythian." Perhaps Xenophon's archers were already using lighter Persian arrows and shooting in a style that was targeted from a distance, like snipers rather than skirmishers.

¹⁶⁵ Otto Lendle's commentary (1995) suggests that *Skythai* was a gloss on *toxotai* that was accidentally interpolated into the manuscript tradition. Robin Waterfield's translation (2005) ignores the problem by simply translating *Skythai toxotai* as "archers" or "bowmen."

In this context, the skirmishing function of *Krētes toxotai* would have been distinct enough within the general uses of archery as to indicate a separate style of skirmishing archery.

The following sections of this chapter examine, through the lens of Polybius, the use of archery in Hellenistic warfare in general. Moving forward, we might consider the *Krētes toxotai* of the *Anabasis* as archers who use large composite bows to shoot comparatively large arrowheads over relatively shorter distances. We might also say that this type of archery could have been practiced on Crete, but that it may have been one of a number of uses or styles that was employed in Greek warfare. However, I will suggest below that this definition of *Krēs toxotēs* may be of limited use in the Hellenistic period: it is possible that, as described by Polybius in the great hegemonic armies of the Hellenistic period, *Krētes* were skirmishers more than they were archers.

B. Archery in Polybius

The previous section worked out a general overview of Greek archery through a consideration of material evidence and the contemporary literary testimony of Xenophon to help illustrate the differences among styles of archery used by the Greeks and their respective tactics. I have suggested that, for the fourth century, the *Krēs toxotēs* was one such specialist, and I am arguing that a *Krēs* in the Hellenistic period was a specialist skirmisher, if not necessarily an archer. I have also proposed in the last chapter that the uses of archery on Crete in the Hellenistic period were like those deployed in other parts of the Greek world. In order to better understand how archery in the Hellenistic world

worked in general, and how specialists might function in particular, I turn to once again to Polybius, whose battle narratives of near contemporary events provide evidence for both. I first outline his use of terminology for the bow, and then analyze scenes of archers in action.

1. Terminology

Polybius mentions archery explicitly ten times in the surviving *Histories*.¹⁶⁶ For archery specifically, Polybius uses the nouns τόξον (bow: 8.4.1) and τοξότης (archer: 5.53.9, 5.79.6, 8.5.6, 10.29.5 and 30.9, 16.18.7), and the verb τοξεύω (to shoot a bow: 1.40.12, 13.6.8). He describes archers and archery adjacent to slingers (σφενδονήτης: 5.79.6, 10.29.5 and 30.9, 16.18.7) and slings (σφενδόνη: 8.4.1); the verb ἀκοντίζω (to throw a javelin: 10.29.5 and 30.9), as well as the nouns ὕσσός (*pilum*: 1.40.12) and γρόσφος (1.40.12, 8.4.1), different types of javelins; and the noun σκορπίδιον (8.5.6), a dart-shooting miniature version of Archimedes' stone-hurling scorpion. In this scheme, the bow-and-arrow is a missile weapon, in a class with slings and slingshot, as well as javelins. In Greek military organization, these weapons – the bow and arrow, the sling, and the javelin – were wielded by *psiloi*, or light fighters: Thucydides (6.69.2) describes a group of *psiloi* – stonethrowers, slingers, and archers – who engage in “the sort of routings of each other that is likely for *psiloi* to do” (τροπὰς οἴας εἰκὸς ψιλῶν ἀλλήλων ἐποίουν). This categorization bears out in the contexts wherein Polybius describes the use of archery in a Hellenistic context. In Polybius, an archer shoots a βέλος, but this term

¹⁶⁶ There is a possible eleventh instance, 13.3.4.

refers to a “missile” in general, not an arrowhead in particular. The term *belos* should be defined as ammunition that has been prepared by human technologies¹⁶⁷ (e.g., fletched arrows with cast or forged metal arrowheads, cast lead slingshot, javelins with cast or forged metal tips) to meet the specifications of particular weapons technologies (e.g. bow, sling).¹⁶⁸

Thus, we can see that the term *belos* is often used in Polybius to indicate a category of weapons that includes archery. We can also observe that the term is often deployed to describe masses of missiles. While occupying Panormus during the First Punic War, the Romans drew the Carthaginians to the city walls to fight in close quarters. In the course of this, the Roman forces attacked the Carthaginian elephants from above with arrows and spears,¹⁶⁹ as their commander, Caecilius, had ordered them to “use their *belē* unsparingly” on the elephants.¹⁷⁰ *Belē* are prominent in descriptions of stockpiles of weaponry and equipment, especially for sieges. Having a ready supply of *belē*, along with food (σίτος) and weapons (ὄπλα), was crucial both for cities that were worried about

¹⁶⁷ Polybius differentiates throwing rocks by hand from other types of projectile fighting, e.g. 10.29.5: τοξότας καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ τῶν ὀρείων τοὺς ἀκοντίζειν καὶ λιθάζειν.

¹⁶⁸ Throwing spears do not meet the criterion of requiring special technology beyond human skill (*technē*) to launch them, but they themselves can still be a specialized form of technology. Furthermore, shorter types of javelins were launched with a kind of sling (Xen. 4.3.28). Polybius (6.22) describes the shaft of a Roman javelin as a *belos* (τὸ δὲ τῶν γρόσφων βέλος) with a fine metal point on the end that is meant to bend upon impact. This damage is meant to make it difficult for the enemy to retrieve the same weapon and throw it back, causing it to be a κοινὸν βέλος.

¹⁶⁹ Polyb. 1.40.12: προσπεσόντων δὲ τῶν θηρίων καὶ τιτρωσκομένων μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ τεύχους τοξευόντων, συνακοντιζομένων δ' ἐνεργοῖς καὶ πυκνοῖς τοῖς ὕσσοις καὶ τοῖς γρόφοις... “But as the elephants attacked and were wounded by those shooting arrows from the walls, and were struck with effective and frequent pila and javelins...”

¹⁷⁰ Polyb. 1.40.7: ...προστάξας, ἂν ἐγγίξῃ τὰ θηρία πρὸς αὐτούς, χρῆσθαι τοῖς βέλεσιν ἀφθόνως.

being besieged¹⁷¹ and for those who prepared to besiege them.¹⁷² Running out of any of these was fatal, as when Philip V was able to take the well-fortified Psophis.¹⁷³ At the cessation of hostilities (4.52.7, 25.2.5, 36.6.5) the losing party might be required to surrender both weapons and ammunition, which could have a devastating effect.¹⁷⁴ The technical know-how that was required to make and maintain both the bow and its arrows, and the fact that the bow is rendered a more effective weapon by the ability to mass-produce ammunition, mean that the loss of *belē* also represented only the loss of investment that might not be easily replaced. We can also see that Polybius' discourse in these cases draws more attention to the preparation of having enough ammunition, with less attention to the problem of having skilled people to fire said ammunition. This is not to say that archery was not a skill but, as I have suggested, it is possible that the cities that could train their citizens incorporated the basics of archery into those skills.

¹⁷¹ Polyb. 4.56.3: A Rhodian commission provides the following to the city of Sinope in anticipation of a siege by Mithridates II of Pontus: 1000 ceramic jars of wine; three hundred talents of prepared hair (for catapults and bowstrings; cf. Caes. *BC* 3.9.3 for emergency use of women's hair during a siege); one hundred talents of prepared bowstring; 3000 gold coins; four stone-hurlers (λιθοφόροι) and their technicians. The list does not include *belē*, but does include other accoutrements of projectile weapons.

¹⁷² E.g., Philip V gathers ammunition and ladders (βέλη καὶ κλίμακες) as he makes his way to attack Psophis (Polyb. 4.70.2).

¹⁷³ Polyb. 4.71.10: The defenders of Psophis had an excellent position but were unprepared for Philip's arrival: they ran out of ammunition and other essentials before the Macedonians run out of men, ammunition, or ladders: ἐπεὶ δ' ἦ τε χορηγία τῶν βελῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν ἐπιτηδείων ἐνέλειπεν, ὡς ἂν ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ τῆς παρασκευῆς γεγενημένης... (...when the supply of ammunition and of the other necessary things ran out, as since they had made their preparations hastily...).

¹⁷⁴ Polyb. 36.6.5: The Romans demand ὅπλα καὶ βέλη καὶ τὰ ἄλλας παρασκευάς in the terms of Carthage's surrender; the Carthaginian representatives ask the Romans to consider what will happen if they give up all of their weapons, but end up conceding them anyway.

2. Uses of Archery

Having examined the terminology that Polybius uses relating to archery, I turn to how the Polybius depicts archery being used in Hellenistic warfare, bearing in mind what we know about warfare on Crete, and also thinking about the tactics of specialist archers, especially *Krētes toxotai*. I will speak first of less protected, more mobile uses of archery – pitched battle and skirmishes – and then move on to discuss sieges, in which the use of archery is potentially less mobile and better protected. This organization follows Davis (2013: 83-6), who develops a schema in which the light equipment of archers represents a trade-off with greater mobility and firepower (resulting from a greater range of motion in the upper body) gained at the expense of protection. While the archers who participated in skirmishes along with other light fighters (slingers, javelineers, rock-throwers, light cavalry, etc.) could be mobile yet vulnerable, it is worth noting the ways in which archers compensated for the lack of protection, whether through the coverage of other fighters, or firing from a covered position in a siege, on a boat, or upon a distracted enemy.

a. More Mobility, Less Protection: Pitched Battle and Skirmishes

In the Greek tradition of military organization, archers and other *psiloi* operated at the edges of the army. They often fought against other *psiloi*, but could be effective in undermining the efforts of the enemy hoplites. In Polybius' descriptions of full armies in formal array for pitched battle, archers and other ballistic units were located on the extreme edge of the infantry, usually near the cavalry. Along with the cavalry, these light fighters ultimately aimed to attack the phalanx on its side, or even, if possible, flank it

from behind (Serrati 2013: 185).¹⁷⁵ In some ways, the role of *psiloi* had more to do with distraction rather than destruction. Polybius describes *belē* being launched over the enemy's front ranks into the phalanx during pitched battle: even if not necessarily deadly,¹⁷⁶ this would at least have had the effect of forcing the hoplites to drop their gaze to avoid being hit in the face by arrows raining down from above.¹⁷⁷

When Polybius explicitly mentioned archers in a fully assembled army, it was almost always within the context of the Seleucid military arrangement.¹⁷⁸ The rebel satrap Molon, fighting against a very young Antiochus III at Apollonia in 221, positioned his slingers and archers at the extreme ends of both wings, past his cavalry (Polyb. 5.53.9; see Figure 4). Likewise, at Raphia, Antiochus placed his light forces – including Agrinian and Persian archers and slingers (Polyb. 5.79.6) – amongst a mix of subject, allied, and mercenary light divisions on the left wing, on the near side from his cavalry (Polyb. 5.82.11-12; see Figure 5).¹⁷⁹ In the Fourth Syrian War and the days leading up to the battle of Raphia, skirmishing broke out as Seleucid and Ptolemaic fighters foraged for

¹⁷⁵ Davis (2013: 104) observes that, in archaic warfare, the cavalry could serve as protection for archers from attacks by enemy cavalry.

¹⁷⁶ According to Polybius (18.30.3), the less mobile heavy-armed troops in the middle of the phalanx receive some protection from those *belē* that pass the front lines due to the density of their upraised *sarissai*. Furthermore, shots fired from a distance may not have necessarily pierced armor (for the Archaic period: Davis 2013: 125-127).

¹⁷⁷ Davis (2013: 101-2) provides the example of the Locrians breaking the formation of the Trojans with their massed volleys in *Il.* 13.718, as well as the famous image from Herodotus (7.226) of the Persian arrows “blotting out the sun.” Livy (36.18.5) uses this image to describe volleys of the Seleucid archers and slingers at Thermopylae (191 BCE): *qui...fundis velut nimum glandis et sagittas simul ac iacula ingerebant*, “who... heaped arrows and javelins upon sling bullets cast like a cloud...” In an interview recounting the Battle of Agincourt (*History Hit Podcast*, 25 October 2015), Tobias Capwell of The Wallace Collection makes a similar point: even when the volleys from the English longbow did not kill, they forced the advancing French to tilt their heads downward, breaking the pace of the charge (which was already slow due to mud). Both Davis and Capwell emphasize the psychological effect of this upon the enemy.

¹⁷⁸ A possible exception is 18.30, Polybius' general digression comparing the phalanx and the legion, which appears right after his account of Philip's defeat by the Romans at Cynoscephalae.

¹⁷⁹ Bar-Kochva 1976: 48-51.

food and sought water (Polyb. 5.80.7); the very word for “skirmishing”, ἀκροβολισμοί, implies that some projectiles would have been shot.¹⁸⁰ There was the potential for these light forces to get in the way of their own troops. Thucydides (6.69.2) reported a situation – albeit without the elephants – in which light forces (archers, slingers, and stonethrowers) became embroiled in their own fight and delayed the heavy forces of Syracuse and Athens from engaging with one another. This seems to be a hazard in battle, and not a deliberate choice by generals, as Bezelal Bar-Kochva implies.¹⁸¹

The peripheral function of light forces – both protecting the flanks of their heavy-armed and undermining the efforts of the enemy’s heavy fighters – played out when the army was on the move through difficult terrain, as in the account of Antiochus’ march (Polyb. 10.29-30) through the pass of Mount Labus in Hyrcania (southeast of the Caspian Sea). Antiochus’ plan was that, while laborers prepared the road for the phalanx and baggage carts to move through the pass below and *Krētes* with shields (Κρητες ἀσπιδιῶται) marched along the defile above the road, mixed light fighters – archers, slingers, and mountain men who could throw stones and javelins – would dislodge the local defenders who occupied positions in the heights (10.29.5). In the execution of the

¹⁸⁰ In Livy 35.29, Philopoemen’s Achaeans took control of a water source, turning what traditionally might have been a venue of informal skirmishing into a miniature battle against Nabis’ light fighters, *Cretenses* against *Cretenses* and Tarantine cavalry against Tarantines.

¹⁸¹ Bar-Kochva 1976: 154-7. Polybius criticized Zeno of Rhodes (16.18.7, 10) for reporting that Seleucid archers, slingers, light cavalry (Tarantines), and elephants were positioned in the front of the army before their phalanx clashed with the Aetolian-commanded Ptolemaic phalanx at Panion in 202. He declared (16.18.2-3) Zeno’s narrative (which does not survive) to be histrionic and improbable because it would have been impossible for the two phalanxes to engage directly with one another if the light fighters, Tarantines, and elephants were in between. Even if Zeno’s account were not entirely wrong, there might have been various reasons for the discrepancy; Bar-Kochva argues that both authors misunderstood the topography. Zeno’s account may also reflect the somewhat chaotic nature of battle in general (Lendon 1999: 274), or of light forces in particular in their capacity as skirmishers, functioning as a sort of mobile periphery for the army as a whole.

plan (10.30.6-9), Polybius describes the light forces seizing even higher positions and firing from above, with the slingers (like Xenophon's Rhodians) being the most effective of the lot thanks to their greater range. In this case, the mobility of these archers among other light fighters was employed to clamber over the steep and rocky slopes seeking advantageous and protected positions, rather than skirmishing directly with the enemy.

To sum up: In Polybius' descriptions of Hellenistic warfare, archery was often deployed to distract or disorder the enemy and to protect the flanks of the heavier-armed troops. It seems to have been used most commonly by Seleucid kings, or at least Antiochus III, and it should be noted that the technique of raining arrows down upon the enemy phalanx resembles Persian archery tactics. Archery could be used in a skirmishing context, but this seems to have been incidental rather than the intentional plan of the commander deploying the archers, who therefore do not sound like *Krētes toxotai*.

b. Less Mobility, More Protection: Poliorcetics

Having examined the tactics of archers in the more mobile/less protected situations of battle and accompanying armies on the march, we turn to stationary/more protected forms of warfare, especially poliorcetics, where we know that a ready supply of *belē* was crucial to success. Polybius mentions archery three times in the context of sieges: twice on Sicily with Roman archers at Panormus (1.40) and archers of both Syracuse and Rome at the siege of Syracuse (8.3-5), and in the preparations of Sinope in anticipation of its siege by Mithridates II of Pontus (4.56). In the last case, the Rhodians assisted with supplies, including one hundred talents of prepared bowstring (νεύρη

εἰργασμένη), and the Sinopeans stationed soldiers and *belē* at strategic intervals on the walls where they anticipated attack. Archery was an essential component of siege warfare, regardless of whether one was attacking or defending. Archers defending their city would target attackers as they attempted to place siege ladders against the walls. Among the attackers, archers would attempt to overwhelm the defenders on the walls while providing cover for siege ladders to be set up.¹⁸² Polybius' account of the Roman siege of Syracuse in the Second Punic War involves technical innovations by Archimedes for the defense of the city, but archery remains a weapon common to both the attackers and the defenders. After the Romans, initially held at bay by Archimedes' large catapults, sailed up to the walls during the night, they were still held off by archers and *skorpidia* shooting through small holes in the city wall (Polyb. 8.5.6). These prevented them from raising the *sambukē*: a siege ladder, attached to two ships, whose cover would protect invading soldiers from the ballistic onslaught. The Romans themselves had archers, slingers, and javelineers (Polyb. 8.4.1) on the ships whose purpose was to drive the defenders from the battlements so that the *sambukē* could be raised. This use of archers on ships harkens back to Demetrius Poliorcetes' use archers¹⁸³ who fired at the defenders of Rhodes from the cover of siege engines mounted on boats (DS 20.85.3), and perhaps

¹⁸² Aeneas suggests (32.1-2) a variety of defenses against *belē*, including smoke to block the enemy's vision and wicker bulwarks. Regarding the dislodging of siege ladders, he anticipates the possibility that defenders would not be able to approach the ladder immediately due to the onslaught (36.1: τὸ ὑποτοξεύεσθαι) of enemy arrows.

¹⁸³ Diodorus refers to these archers as *Krētes toxotai*, but this use does not take advantage of the skirmishing capabilities of this type of archer.

also to the use of archers in the Athenian navy during the Peloponnesian War.¹⁸⁴ The principle of trying to provide protective coverage from *belē* for ladders and other besieging equipment remains the same as with terrestrial warfare.¹⁸⁵

As we observed in Chapter 2, different types of *belē* – arrowheads, sling bullets, and catapult shot – were used to attack cities on Crete, and we can see from Polybius that they were used to attack walled cities in the Greek world in general. I have suggested that this more protected and stationary type of archery was more likely than other styles of archery to be taken up by individuals who were not specialists but at least had basic training in archery. However, we can also see that this use of archery behind walls for the defenders, or aimed at the defenders at a distance by the attackers, is not the style of skirmishing archery used by *Krētes toxotai*.

At this point, a few observations may be made about these uses of archers in Polybius in light of what we have said about the use of archers in interstate warfare on Crete. First of all, we can see different uses of archery at work. Protecting large armies on the march required mobile archers who picked off enemies on the march or, along with other *psiloi*, rained projectiles down on the opposing army's phalanx. Archers in the Seleucid army (5.79.6, 10.29.5 and 30.9, 16.18.7) may have differed somewhat in their style of shooting from other archers in hegemonic armies, in that they appear (10.29.5 and 30.9, 16.18.7) to rain down arrows upon their enemies in a style reminiscent of the

¹⁸⁴ Nicias mentions archers in naval combat in Thuc. 7.62.2; Trundle (2010: 148), in the absence of concrete evidence, hypothesizes about the role archers might have played in the Athenian navy as it developed from the 480s onward.

¹⁸⁵ Ma 2000, but also Martin's 2013 case study of Demetrius Poliorcetes, in which he argues that Hellenistic warfare differed from earlier warfare in terms of its scale, but did not show significant innovations in terms of technology.

Persians style in Xenophon's *Anabasis* (3.4.17). One might well hypothesize that this use of archery could be a holdover in the Seleucid army from the military organization it inherited from the Persians. In contrast, so far as we can tell, there is no evidence for large, set battles on Crete. Even if Cretans used archery in rural skirmishes, the scale of these hegemonic battles with their complex armies of tens of thousands seems too large for what we know about warfare on Crete. Second, there are at least three references in Polybius to archery and archers – alongside other *psiloi* – in the context of attacking and/or defending cities. This use of archery matches both the available material evidence and the settings for the evidence provided by the literary narratives for warfare on Crete.

Having examined the general use of archery in Hellenistic warfare, we now turn to the actions of *Krētes* in foreign hegemonic armies.

II. FIGHTING *KRĒTES*

In Chapter 1, I suggested that, within the descriptions of full hegemonic (i.e., Hellenistic royal or Roman imperial) armies provided by ancient literary sources, the term *Krētes* to a type of weapons class. The commander of the unit of *Krētes* was often a Cretan from a Cretan *polis*, but the men under him need not have been Cretans from Crete (see above pp. 43-6). This section collects and examines the evidence for how *Krētes* fought in foreign armies, first in formal pitched battle with the larger army and next in non-formation combat scenarios. Creating a fuller picture of how *Krētes* fought allows us to compare their actions with the descriptions of warfare on Crete from Chapter 2 and the general uses of archery in the previous section. I will continue to argue that the

hegemonic military context for *Krētes* prevents them from being a natural outgrowth of warfare on Crete, but I will also propose that *Krētes* differed in their tactics from those of other archers in Hellenistic warfare: they were specialist skirmishers, but may not necessarily have been specialist archers like *Krētes toxotai*.

A. Pitched Battle in Formation with Phalanx

Krētes appeared in the pre-battle line-up for Hellenistic armies in three secure instances in Polybius: among the forces of Antiochus III at the battle at Apollonia (Polyb. 5.53.5: 219 BCE), and in the armies of both Ptolemy IV Philopator and Antiochus III at the Battle of Raphia (Polyb. 5.83-86.6: 217 BCE).¹⁸⁶ There is also a possible fourth instance, the Battle of Sellasia (Polyb. 2.65-6: 222 BCE).¹⁸⁷ Polybius did not record the activities of the *Krētes* during any of these battle accounts, so we must extrapolate their mode of fighting from the description of their positioning. In both battles (Apollonia and Raphia), the *Krētes* are positioned towards the outer edge of the wing, next to the cavalry. At Apollonia, the *συμμαχικοί Κρητες* were out to the front of the heavy infantry on the right wing, near lancer cavalry (τοὺς ξυστοφόρους ἰππεῖς).¹⁸⁸ At Raphia, Ptolemy's *Krētes* were initially positioned at the end of the left wing, between cavalry and the royal

¹⁸⁶ Diagrams of the battle lines for Apollonia, Raphia, Sellasia are figures 4, 5, and 6, respectively, at the end of this chapter.

¹⁸⁷ A fourth instance, the army of Antigonos III Doson of Macedon at the Battle of Sellasia (2.66.6), is possible but not textually secure. Boeotians and Epeirots appear in the catalogue of Doson's forces (2.65), while *Krētes*, not Boeotians or Epeirots, appear in the catalogue of the arrangement of forces at the start of the battle (2.66). Cf. Walbank (1957: I.280; *sic* Pritchett 1965: I.69) who tentatively accepts Schorn's emendation of Ἐπειρώτας for Κρητες, but nonetheless admits that the manuscript tradition may be correct.

¹⁸⁸ They also appear next to Gallic Rhinosages, whom Walbank (1957: I.583) glosses as Galatian [Gallogreek] mercenaries.

agēma (a corps of elite heavy-armed infantry)¹⁸⁹ whilst Antiochus' *Krētes* were set at the end of the right wing, between a forward-facing unit of cavalry on the end and the heavy-armed unit of Greek *misthophoroi*.¹⁹⁰ Figure 5, a diagram of the Battle of Raphia based upon Polybius' description, shows that both armies had their *Krētes* positioned on opposing wings, so that these units roughly face one another.¹⁹¹

It is also possible that *Krētes* fought at the battle at Sellasia (222 BCE), which took place around two hills with the phalanxes divided and contesting for each of them. As part of the effort to take Evas Hill, Antigonos' *Krētes* were positioned with the Acarnanians, behind the heavy units of mixed Macedonians and Illyrians, and in front of a reserve force (ἐφεδρείας λαμβάνοντες τάξι) of Achaeans. At one point during the battle, Cleomenes' *misthophoroi* attacked the Achaeans from behind and were chased away by Philopoemen and the Megalopolitan cavalry. If the manuscript tradition is correct, the *Krētes* were positioned to aid in the push up the hill, but it is possible that they may have had to turn around and aid the Achaeans against the rear side attack (see n. 187 above).

There are limits to what can be deduced from this small sample. The chronological range of these battles is narrow (Sellasia: 222 BCE; Apollonia: 219 BCE;

¹⁸⁹ Polyb. 5.82.4: τούτου [Polycrates] δὲ καὶ τῆς φάλαγγος μεταξὺ Κρήτες ἦσαν παρ' αὐτοῦς τοὺς ἰππεῖς, ἐξῆς δὲ τούτους τὸ βασιλικὸν ἄγημα, "between him [Polycrates] and the phalanx were the *Krētes* beside his own cavalry, next to them the royal *agēma*..."

¹⁹⁰ Polyb. 5.82.10: παρὰ δὲ τοὺς ἰππεῖς ἐν μετώπῳ τοὺς Κρήτας ἔστησε· τούτοις δ' ἐξῆς ἔταξε τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μισθοφόρους, "he [i.e., Antiochus] set the *Krētes* beside his forward-facing cavalry: next to them he stationed the *misthophoroi* from Greece..." Walbank (1957: I.611) notes that ἐν μετώπῳ contrasts the forward-facing unit from a second unit of cavalry further on the wing, on an angle.

¹⁹¹ Cf. Bar-Kochva (1976: 134), who places the *Krētes* in front of the cavalry, among the line of elephants, saying that they have been "deprived of their traditional role as skirmishers in front of the troops." There seems to be little evidence for this "traditional role."

Raphia BCE: 217), and these large-scale, potentially kingdom-breaking battles were relatively rare. The brief timeframe could be attributed to the survival of the first five books of the *Histories*, which cover the period c. 222-216 BCE; yet, even if we lack a Polybian account of the battle at Magnesia in 190, Polybius' account of the battle at Cynoscephalae in 197 (18.18-27) does not mention *Krētes* in battle.¹⁹² Still, we may remark that the positioning of *Krētes* on the edges of the wings in these battles may generally have advantaged their mobility: they might engage with cavalry and other skirmishers attempting to break into the phalanx from the flank. For Sellasia, the positioning of *Krētes* at the rear, and as part of the push uphill, would be unusual, but so too was the topography of the battle. While their pushing function may have been ancillary to the success of the Macedonian heavy troops, their ability to turn and engage with an attack from behind may also have been a consideration in their positioning.

B. Non-Formation Combat Scenarios

Large pitched battles draw attention for the numbers of men involved and the ways in which their outcomes could decide the fate of a hegemonic power. However, in the course of the wars ended by momentous pitched battles, armies spent much more time maneuvering around one another, marching to claim positions in the landscape, laying siege to an enemy base, or sending out small details of men to raid or harry a foraging enemy. These operations often required lighter, swifter fighters who, as with the cavalry,

¹⁹² *Cretenses* do not appear in Livy's narrative of this battle. Their presence is suggested by the inclusion of the Gortynians among the allies of the Romans who joined Flamininus as he marched from Aetolia against Philip V (Livy 33.3.10), with the likely addition of a force of six hundred *Cretenses* from Nabis of Sparta (32.40.4). For the full list, see the Numbers Key in the Appendix.

could attack and then withdraw efficiently. Polybius (4.8.11) famously remarks that *Krētes* excelled at fighting in modes that were covert, deceptive, and not in formation (φαλαγγιδόν).¹⁹³ *Krētes* were employed in tasks that took advantage of their mobility, but one should be wary of the instances where Polybius' extranarrative remarks are not borne out by his combat narratives of *Krētes* in action.

1. Armies on the March

When the column of the army needed to march from place to place, *Krētes* and other light fighters were positioned at the edges of an army on the move in order to defend against attacks on the rest of the army. This was the case with Philip V's light fighters, who kept to the sides and rear of the column during his lightning march upon Thermon (Polyb. 5.7: 218 BCE). *Krētes* were stationed at the rear in case of an attack from behind (ἀπουραγούντων μὲν αὐτῶ τῶν Κρητῶν), although they were never called upon to engage, and appear not to have been at the rear when it was attacked on the return march (5.14.3-7).

Antiochus III put *Krētes* to a somewhat different use during his march through the pass of Mount Labus against Arsaces II of Parthia (10.29-30: 211 BCE; see above). The Seleucid king worried about defenders positioned above the pass who would be able to target the slow-moving parts of the army – the phalanx and baggage carts, as well as the workers who prepared the road for them beforehand. The initial plan was that *psiloi*

¹⁹³ See Appendix 2 for full passage. This term cannot mean “in a phalanx,” as Griffith (1935: 319) originally interpreted it, because Polybius uses the same term in the previous sentence (4.8.10) to refer to Thessalian and Aetolian cavalry in and out of formation.

(archers, slingers, javeliners, and stonethrowers) would attack the defenders in the heights while workers prepared the pass for the phalanx and carts below; a force of two thousand *Krētes* equipped with shields (10.29.6: Κρήτες ἀσπιδιώτας) would march in between. Bar-Kochva (1976: 144-145) calls them “bait”: as a bit of visual misdirection, the *Krētes* would draw the attention of the defenders in the heights who, by firing upon them, would in turn reveal their position to Seleucid light fighters who were scouting further above them. When Antiochus’ officers put this plan into practice, the *aspis*-bearers marched apace, in formation (10.30.9: παραπορευμένων ἐν τάξει καὶ βάδην), in the defile above the path of the army. Polybius described them as being actively “in reserve” (τῶν ἀσπιδιωτῶν ἐφεδρευόντων). This suggests that these *Krētes aspidiōtes* became part of a double misdirection: besides drawing the attention of the defenders away from the light attackers in the heights, they might also dispatch any defenders who, having managed to escape the *psiloi*, fell into their midst. The tactics around *Krētes* in this narrative suggest that they were more mobile than heavy-armed fighters, but, with the shield, they would be armed more heavily than the other *psiloi*. Furthermore, their task would have been challenging because they would have been deliberately vulnerable and would have needed to react as attacks occurred.

2. Ambushes

In his canonical statement about different *ethnē* and their respective strengths and weaknesses at war, Polybius expressly associates *Krētes* with ambushes (ἐνέδρα): ambushes were in their wheelhouse, along with piratical raids, surprise seizures,

nocturnal attacks, and general trickery at war.¹⁹⁴ Yet there are no unambiguous examples from the *Histories* in which groups of *Krētes* carry out ambushes. There are three instances of individual *Krētes* protagonists planning *enedrai* on behalf of non-Cretan commanders.¹⁹⁵ Of these, only one (16.37.7) involved circumstances in which soldiers hide and attack armed enemy soldiers – but the ambushers are Achaeans. One *enedra* (8.18-20) may plausibly have been executed by *Krētes*, because the ambushers were commanded by a *Krēs*, but the ambush involved the capture of a single individual, unarmed and accompanied by a small retinue. The third (7.16.5) was not an ambush, but hidden reinforcement (συνεφεδρεύω) at the gate of a besieged city for when wall climbers managed to enter and work to open it. Indeed, a survey of ἐνέδραι in Polybius, as well as the related verb form ἐνεδρεύω and ambush-related vocabulary (λόχος, ἐπίκειμαι, κρύπτω, πίπτω) reveals a greater use of ambushes by Achaeans and Aetolians, as well as by Philip V, Antiochus III, and Hamilcar and Hannibal Barca.¹⁹⁶ Thus,

¹⁹⁴ Polyb. 4.8.10-11: Κρήτες δὲ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν πρὸς μὲν ἐνέδρας καὶ ληστείας καὶ κλοπὰς πολεμίων καὶ νυκτερινὰς ἐπιθέσεις καὶ πάσας τὰς μετὰ δόλου καὶ κατὰ μέρος χρείας ἀνυπόστατοι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐξ ὁμολόγου καὶ κατὰ πρόσωπον φαλαγγηδὸν ἔφοδον ἀγεννεῖς καὶ πλάγιοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς· Ἀχαιοὶ δὲ καὶ Μακεδόνες τάναντία τούτων. “*Krētes*, both on land and sea, are irresistible in ambushes and raids and covert seizures and nighttime attacks and all practices that employ trickery and do not employ formation, but in the practice of frontal battle in formation, they are ignoble (unreliable) and wavering in their souls; Achaeans and Macedonians are the opposite of these.”

¹⁹⁵ The *Krētes* protagonists are Didascalondas, Bolis and Cambylus, and Lagoras. Didascalondas the Cretan was appointed by Philopoemen to take command of Achaean soldiers who, when harassed by enemy *misthophoroi*, were instructed by Philopoemen to place themselves under the *Krēs*’ command and lead the enemy into an ambush, where they themselves or other Achaeans would surprise them (16.37.7). Bolis and Cambylus arranged for an ambush, by Cambylus’ men, to capture the Seleucid royal claimant Achaeus after Bolis lured him from his stronghold (8.18.8; 8.20.5). As part of Lagoras the Cretan’s plan (7.16.5), thirty men lay in wait at one of the gates of Sardis.

¹⁹⁶ Ambushes in brackets indicate ambush-style attacks that are not part of a battle narrative. For Achaeans: ἐνέδρα: 9.17.4, [16.37.7]. For Aetolians: κρύφω and πίπτω, 5.95.8 (using Achaeans). For Philip V of Macedon: 4.63.9, 8.14; ἐπίκειμαι: 5.13.6. For Antiochus III: ἐνέδρα: 5.70.6, 7.15.1, [8.20.5]; [ἐνεδρεύω: 8.18.8]; [συνεφεδρεύω: 7.16.5]. For Carthaginians: ἐνέδρα: (Hamilcar) 1.57.3, 1.84.8; (Hannibal) 3.71-74, 3.84. For Eleans: ἐνέδρα: 4.59.2, 5.17.3. *Enedrai* by assorted *barbaroi*: Numidians:

although Polybius associated *Krētes* with *enedrai* in his programmatic statement, his narrative did not actually portray troops of *Krētes* as unusually disposed to their use.¹⁹⁷

3. Warfare around Walls

Krētes also participated in attacks on cities. I focus my comments on groups of *Krētes* rather than individual *Krēs* protagonists.¹⁹⁸ Given that trickery in sieges was certainly not an expertise unique to Cretans, it is not useful to discuss such protagonists here as representative of *Krētes* in battle.

Polybius described two episodes of skirmishing around the walls of a city in fairly close quarters that involved contingents of *Krētes*. The first, the taking of the Arcadian city of Psophis by the army of Philip V, was a siege of short duration (Polyb. 4.71.11-12: 219/8 BCE; see fig. 3 below and fig. 7 at the end of this chapter). While Philip's men planted ladders at the lower walls and overwhelmed the defenders, the *Krētes* took the city's upper gate:

[3.71-74], 10.32.3; Boei: 3.40.12; Gauls: 3.118.6. In terms of fearing ambush, Philip and Hannibal agree not to use *λόχος* against one another as part of their alliance against Rome (7.9.8), and the defenders of Stratus do not attack the retreating Acarnanians for fear of *enedra* (5.96.3). Polybius says that the Romans do not partake of *enedra*, but that their actions against Carthage in the Third Punic War go against this (36.9.9); hitherto, they seem to be the object of ambush (*enedra*: 1.57.3, 3.40.12, 3.71-74, 3.84, 3.118.6; *enedreuō* and *lochos*: 8.35.1), although 1.57.3 suggests that Romans may have been participating in *enedrai* in the First Punic War.

¹⁹⁷ This indirect relationship between *Krētes* and *enedrai* appears in Xenophon's *Anabasis*. In 5.2.28-32, *Krētes* engaged in an ambush, that was not actually an ambush – what Xenophon referred to as a “false ambush” (ψευδενέδρα). The point of this “ambush” was not to surprise the enemy, but use glinting bronze *peltai* shields to draw the enemy's attention so that the rest of the Ten Thousand could slip past unnoticed. In this way, their role might be more akin to that of Antiochus III's *Krētes aspidiōtai* (Polyb. 10.29-30), who also carried shields and served as “bait” to draw out the enemy so that the phalanx and artillery could make their road through the mountains without incident.

¹⁹⁸ Individual *Krēs* masterminds, Lagoras (7.15-18) and Bolis (8.15-21), both help Antiochus III during the siege of Sardis.

...οἱ δὲ Κρήτες πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν ὑπερδέξιον πύλην ἐπεξελθόντας τῶν μισθοφόρων συμμίζαντες ἠνάγκασαν αὐτοὺς οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ῥίψαντας τὰ ὅπλα φεύγειν. οἷς ἐπικείμενοι καὶ προσφέροντες τὰς χεῖρας συνεισέπεσον διὰ τῆς πύλης ἐξ οὗ συνέβη πανταχόθεν ἅμα καταληφθῆναι τὴν πόλιν.

...but the *Krētes*, engaging with those mercenaries sallying from the upper gate, forced them, having thrown away their weapons, to flee in disorder. Pressing upon and attacking these, [the *Krētes*] rushed in through the gate along with them, in which way it happened that the city was captured from every side at the same time.

This attack by the *Krētes* involved a vigorous upward assault from a disadvantaged position. The slope of the hill on which Psophis was built was steep, as can be seen from an eastward view taken from that site's fortified high point, or acropolis.



Figure 3: Psophis, facing eastward from its acropolis towards the side of the hill that the *Krētes* ascended, and illustrating the steep slope of the site. Photo by author, 9 March 2016.

W. Kendrick Pritchett (1989: VI.27) proposed that the gate in question was located on the eastern side of the city, about 100 meters above the Erymanthus River, a position that would be advantageous by virtue of being “upper” (Pritchett 1985: IV.81).

The second episode involves a sally from the walled city of Stratus in Acarnania: as Philip’s army marched past the Aetolian-controlled city, its defenders issued from the

gates in order to attack Philip's rearguard (5.14.3-7). First a few Aetolian cavalry sallied forth to harass the king's *misthophoroi*, then the majority (τό τε τῶν Κρητῶν πλῆθος) of the five hundred *Krētes* and some Aetolian infantry emanated from the city to join the attack. The continuing engagement (γινόμενης ὀλοσχερεστέρας συμπλοκῆς) forced Philip's *misthophoroi* to turn and engage, in what was a fairly even fight until Philip's Illyrians also turned back to help. The king's soldiers chased the Aetolians' horsemen and *misthophoroi* back to the gates and walls of Stratus, bringing down around a hundred of the defenders.

Both of these passages depict *Krētes* engaged in very close fighting around the walls of a city: mixing, shoving, rushing into the gate with the retreating enemy, or being pursued by the enemy. The phrase describing the actions of the *Krētes* at Psophis, προσφέροντες τὰς χεῖρας, appears to be idiomatic in Polybius, with meanings ranging from "attack" to "kill;"¹⁹⁹ still, the inclusion of "hands" in the expression could suggest a form of attack in closer quarters than a volley of arrows.²⁰⁰ In both these narratives, *Krētes* show themselves capable of fighting in very dangerous circumstances, against an enemy whose movements become strategically limited by close confines (Elean *misthophoroi* funneling through the gates of Psophis; *misthophoroi* at the rear of Philip's army at Stratus).

¹⁹⁹ The 2010 Loeb edition (Paton, et al.) translates προσφέροντες τὰς χεῖρας as "cutting them down." Polybius uses formulations of this phrase twenty-three times, and sometimes it is difficult to tell whether he simply means "attacking" or "killing," but it clearly signifies close-contact violence.

²⁰⁰ While a similar argument cannot be made for ὀλοσχερεστέρας συμπλοκῆς, "a more general engagement," Polybius does employ the same noun-adjective combination at 1.40.11, which also describes close and confused fighting below the walls of a city.

CONCLUSIONS

The evidence for *Krētes* in combat shows fighters who were mobile and who engaged in combat situations that are potentially in very close quarters with the enemy. If we compare this picture of *Krētes* in combat with the general uses of archers in the hegemonic armies of the Hellenistic period, there are functional distinctions between the two. For example, Antiochus deployed archers and *Krētes* in functionally different ways in order to draw out the attackers in the march under Mount Labus: *Krētes* marched in an orderly fashion along the defile of the pass, conspicuous with their *aspides*, while *toxotai* and other *psiloi* on the highest ground shot down upon the defenders who were shooting at the *Krētes*. One of the most glaring distinctions between *Krētes* and archers in general is the physical closeness of combat. Besides acting as “bait,” Antiochus’ *Krētes* were responsible for dispatching any defenders who fell into their midst as a result of the efforts of the *psiloi*. Although both *Krētes* and archers participated in siege actions, *Krētes* were deployed in situations where close combat was a real possibility.

One suggestion to account for this difference is that *Krētes* were simply archers who carried shields as part of their normal panoply. There are two instances in which *Krētes toxotai/Krētes* carry shields (πέλιτη: Xen. *Anab.* 5.2.28-32; ἀσπίς: Polyb. 10.29-30); in both cases, their role is not to engage the enemy, but to act as a visual distraction. Nicholas Sekunda argues that Cretan archers wore a small shield on the arm.²⁰¹ However,

²⁰¹ Sekunda 2001b; 2007: I.343. Sekunda (2001b: 21) cites the *pseudenedra* (Xen. *Anab.* 5.2.28-32; see above, n. 197) as his “*locus classicus*” for shielded Cretans. He imagines the shield to be small and on the arm of the archer. Sekunda’s interpretation of the episode has its own problems: he depicts the *Krētes* as firing while escaping down a ravine. In the original text, the *Krētes* only fire their arrows after they have left the ravine, when they are forced to return to the road in order to rescue that Mysian who, imprudently,

it seems much more likely, from the scant visual evidence²⁰² and from archaeological experimentation²⁰³ that the shield was large and could be hung down the back while operating the bow. Still, the close hand-to-hand combat from the two skirmishes around city walls suggests that the *Krētes*, in some instances, made use of a shield for protection may have made skirmishing archery very difficult. Perhaps, at some point between the *Krētes toxotai* of Xenophon and the *Krētes* of Polybius, there was a shift in the use of *Krētes*: while they may have had archery capabilities in the Hellenistic period, their primary function in the structure of hegemonic armies appears to be skirmishers with (large) shields.

In any case, two points remain clear: first, that the type of fighting done by *Krētes* was clearly a specialization that was distinct from uses of archery; and second, that this specialization was deployed within the context of a large hegemonic army to support

did not follow them down into the ravine. The distinction is important because it speaks to the limits of the capabilities of *Krētes toxotai*. See Appendix 2 for full text and translation.

²⁰² There is a small pool of visual evidence for Cretans and possible *Krētes* from grave stelai with images of men equipped with weapons painted in egg tempera and/or in relief. Two of these depict a male figure with equipment including a bow and a large shield slung down his back (VAM Λ61 and SEG 45: 987), and a third shows a shorter figure with a shield accompanying a central male figure whose arm crooked as though he may be holding a bow (VAM Λ8). As their excavator, A.S. Arvanitopoulos (1909: 120) observed, “Τὴν δὲ δεξιάν γυμνήν καὶ ρωμαλέαν τείνει πρὸς τὰ κάτω ἰσχυρῶς, ὡς κρατοῦσάν τι **δυσδιάκριτον, ἴσως τόξον.**” Cf., Sekunda 2001. The two painted stelai from Demetrias (early third-early first centuries: VAM Λ8 and VAM Λ61) are clearly labeled with *Krēs* and a *polis-ethnikon*, while the third, from Hermonassa in the Chersonesus on the Black Sea (SEG 45: 987 = Blavatskaja 1993) includes a male figure with a bow and a shield who is only identified in an epigram with τό γένος Κρής. Although Cretans may not always have depicted themselves on grave stelai as bow-bearing warriors and although I am suggesting that Hellenistic *Krētes* may have used the bow less often than *Krētes toxotai* in earlier armies, it is possible that the bow and a large shield remained a particular part of the iconography of the *Krēs*.

²⁰³ For archers shooting with shields, size may matter, and a bigger shield may actually be more feasible for archery than a smaller shield. Davis (2013: 85) notes that archers were shown carrying shields on Geometric period vases. There is an image of an archer – a *toxarchos*, or leader of archers – shooting a bow with his shield hanging down his back on the fourth-century Xanthus Monument. Spyros Bakas (2014: 25) and his reenactment group experimented with shooting arrows in full hoplite gear, the shield slung over the back. They reported that shooting with a shield on the back was not only possible, but that the extra weight behind had the effect of stabilizing them.

large-scale operations. There is only one reference in Polybius to a *Krētes* with a bow: *Krētes* shoot, in the service of Nabis (Κρηῆτες...τοξεύοντες), unsuspecting exiled aristocrats through the windows and holes in the broken-down walls of houses. The passage (13.6-8) is problematic for a number of reasons,²⁰⁴ not the least because it reflects the *topos* narrative of moral degeneration under a corrupt tyrant (Eckstein 1995: 260).²⁰⁵ It also stands out in contrast with the other episodes involving *Krētes* because it is not a battle narrative and does not reflect the style of combat carried out in the battle narratives by *Krētes* in hegemonic armies.

Returning now to warfare on Crete, we may recall that there is evidence for the use of larger, iron arrowheads of the type that Snodgrass calls “Cretan” during the Hellenistic period, including in siege warfare – but there were other types of arrowheads used on Crete as well. In contrast to the small-scale warfare on Crete described in Chapter 2, the types of actions in which the *Krētes* of Polybius engaged were in support of large armies. Given that *Krētes* tended to be part of hegemonic armies and act in support of large-scale military actions, it seems reasonable to suggest that a corps of *Krētes* required expert training and investment on a royal level of patronage.²⁰⁶ Crete may have produced warriors capable of wielding a bow – as did Greek *poleis* outside of Crete – and Cretans did serve in units of *Krētes*, but the lack of warfare at the hegemonic level

²⁰⁴ For the textual issues, see, e.g., Sage 1935: 299.

²⁰⁵ Sniping defenseless aristocrats is but one among other eccentric crimes perpetrated by Nabis, such as using a robotic woman with spikes (Sage 1935: “An Ancient Robotette”) to literally squeeze money out of helpless aristocrats (13.7). In other words, the episode is not reliable evidence for the normal practice of *Krētes*.

²⁰⁶ The only reference to the training of *Krētes* in Polybius is in the Ptolemaic military reforms initiated by Ptolemy IV’s ministers (5.63-5). The process represents a significant financial and diplomatic investment (i.e., maintaining an uneasy peace with the Seleucids) of around two years (219-217 BCE).

on Crete indicates that *Krētes* were probably not a natural outgrowth of a style of warfare idiosyncratic to Crete.

In Chapter 1, it was argued that the adjective *Krēs* could denote a type of soldier rather than a soldier from Crete. This chapter (3) hypothesizes that, although fourth century *Krēs toxotēs* denoted a short-range archer who used a large composite bow with large, heavy arrowheads for skirmishing, the *Krētes* of hegemonic foreign armies in Polybius' Hellenistic accounts were not necessarily archers. They were, however, skirmishers and capable, in some circumstances, of fighting in very close quarters. This style of fighting was distinct from other uses of archery in Greek warfare; and indeed, the uses of archery on Crete more closely resemble those of the Greek world outside of Crete than the specialized practice of *Krētes* or earlier *Krētes toxotai*. In other words, although some Cretans did take up arms for payment in units of *Krētes*, this specialty was not the direct result of a different style of warfare on Crete. The next chapter (4) will address the charge that interstate warfare on Crete was also more frequent and more violent than warfare elsewhere in the Greek world – and hence produced mercenaries of greater experience than other Greeks.

Figure 4: Schematic Drawing of the Battle of Apollonia (221 BCE)




Figure 6: Schematic Drawing of the Battle of Sellasia





Figure 7: Schematic Drawing of the Siege of Psophis



DRAWING PREPARED FROM MAP
DISPLAYED AT THE SITE OF PSOPHIS
(PSOFIDA), BY THE SIXTH EPHORATE
OF ANTIQUITIES, PATRAS

Chapter 4: Polybius and the Exceptionality of Cretan Violence

κατὰ δὲ τὴν Κρήτην ἀρχὴ πραγμάτων ἐκινεῖτο μεγάλων, εἰ χρηὴ λέγειν ἀρχὴν πραγμάτων ἐν Κρήτη: διὰ γὰρ τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν ἐμφυλίων πολέμων καὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς εἰς ἀλλήλους ὀμότητος ταῦτόν ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος ἐστὶν ἐν Κρήτη, καὶ τὸ δοκοῦν παραδόξως τισὶν εἰρῆσθαι τοῦτ' ἐκεῖ θεωρεῖται συνεχῶς [τὸ] γινόμενον. Polybius 24.3

“On Crete, the beginning of great troubles started up – if one must talk about a beginning of troubles on Crete: for, due to the continuation of civil wars and their excess of cruelty to one another, on Crete, the beginning and ending [of troubles] are the same thing: [this is something that] has been said by people who seem to speak paradoxically, [but on Crete] it can regularly be seen as fact.”

The previous chapters have been a reexamination of two aspects of the master narrative of Hellenistic Crete: that Cretan mercenaries were exceptionally numerous, reflecting conditions of overpopulation and/or a dearth of resources (1); and that Cretan mercenaries were purveyors of a particular set of military skills due to the idiosyncratic mode of warfare on the island (2 and 3). In Chapter 1, it was noted that unambiguous archaeological evidence for the overpopulation of Hellenistic Crete was not present. Moreover, the terminology in the textual sources often makes it difficult unequivocally identify Cretan mercenaries, much less use their numbers to reliably calculate population. Chapters 2 assessed the material and textual evidence point to the likelihood that Cretan warfare was typical of small-scale warfare in the Hellenistic Greek world, while Chapter 3 suggested that, by the Hellenistic period, the mercenary specialist known as a *Krēs* may have been a feature of hegemonic warfare, but his fighting style was probably not a direct product of Cretan inter-*polis* warfare. This chapter approaches a third aspect of the master narrative: the idea that Cretan mercenaries were a product of an exceptional culture of violence. In order to challenge this assumption, Chapter 4 focuses upon the primary

evidence for Crete's reputation as a locus for violence: the *Histories* of Polybius of Megalopolis.

In the Introduction, it was observed that the master narrative, in its portrayal of Cretan society, relies upon evidence gleaned from an uncritical reading of fourth century literary sources. Similarly, I have suggested that the impression of continuous violence on Crete in the Hellenistic period is gleaned from an uncritical reading of Polybius. The aim of this chapter is to provide a critical reading of Polybius on Crete and Cretans in order to then apply this reading of Polybius to the historical study of Cretan mercenaries. I highlight two reasons why it is fruitful to produce a literary analysis of Polybius for this study: because of his centrality in scholarship on the history of the Hellenistic period and because his anti-Cretan bias creates the impression that violence on Crete was frequent and continuous.

First, Polybius provides a lot of information about chronology for the third and second centuries BCE with a narrative that is temporally and geographically broad. This quality in his work makes it an invaluable resource for scholars of the Hellenistic period to help date and interpret epigraphic and other material evidence. He also provides information about how the events he relates would have been received within their contemporary cultural context: as also noted in the introduction, Polybius himself lived and was politically active during the second century, meaning that his work has value from its proximity to events and the fact that he had a native's understanding of the culture of Hellenistic Greece. Indeed, while epigraphic sources are more representative of local events and are not subject to the biases of a temporally, geographically, and socially

distant author, scholars of historical studies that center on epigraphic evidence still cite Polybius for chronology, context, or in support of a particular interpretation.²⁰⁷

However, the second reason to examine Polybius is that, for all this information about the contemporary cultural context of events and how they affected the people who witnessed them, those pertaining to Crete and Cretans are colored by his notorious anti-Cretan bias. Those historians who cite the *Histories* for the analysis of the epigraphic sources tend to engage with this bias superficially, acknowledging Polybius' biases without seeking to understand the thinking behind them, or how these biases might reflect a larger rhetorical framework,²⁰⁸ which might help, in turn, to explain some of the peculiarities of Polybius' account. It has also been noted that Polybius' portrayal of Crete is markedly and deliberately more critical than that of his predecessors, so his work may provide a turning point in ancient historiographical writing on Crete. Even those earlier authors who did not portray Crete as a disciplined and internally harmonious society still did not attribute to it the same social violence and political disorder that Polybius so infamously describes.²⁰⁹ The question is whether or not this was an accurate reflection of Hellenistic Crete. Polybius' commentary on the chaos of Cretan society is generally viewed as correct because it seems to support the epigraphic record from Crete, with its

²⁰⁷ The works of both John Ma (e.g., 2000) and Chaniotis (e.g., 2005) take this approach, but they are representative of a much larger trend in ancient scholarship on history of the Hellenistic period.

²⁰⁸ Walbank (1957: I.508) observes Polybius' Cretan bias, though he does not seek to explain it. Müller 2013 is an exception, and provides a good example of how a historian might use a literary critical approach in analyzing a section of Polybius – in this case, the moral decline of the Boeotians.

²⁰⁹ See, for example, Aristotle's remarks (*Pol.* 1271b20) on the weakness (*asthenia*) revealed the Cretan governing system by the intervention of outsiders, i.e., an event he refers to as a "foreign war" (ξενικὸς πόλεμος).

many alliances, peace treaties, arbitrations, and references to the destruction of cities.²¹⁰ Perhaps because of this, the often-derisive editorializing that accompanies his historical narrative has been taken as grouchy and hyperbolic, but never is scrutinized for whether it reflects a political situation on Crete that was exceptionally tumultuous. Attempts to explain Polybius' comments tend to focus narrowly on his attitude towards Cretans: how they might showcase the author's personal bias towards Crete or reflect historical realities in a "jaundiced" fashion. In the first category, Arthur Eckstein has portrayed the Polybian bias as the result of aristocratic snobbery and ethics, while Henri van Effenterre suggests that it has to do with Polybius' experience with Crete as a statesman of the Achaean League.²¹¹ Among other historians of Crete are those who have suggested that Polybius' critique is an underhanded compliment for what could be portrayed as positive attributes, such as "greed" (*pleonexia*) as "entrepreneurial spirit,"²¹² or as the natural result of poverty or an excessively militaristic culture (Brulé 1978; Chaniotis 2005: 82-3). Some (Kvist 2003: 188-9; Chaniotis 2004: 79-80) have argued that Crete's endemic violence

²¹⁰ For example, Chaniotis (2005: 9) presents Polybius' comments on the incessancy of Cretan wars (24.3) as emblematic for how conflicts on Crete was so frequent that they were difficult for even contemporary authors to track.

²¹¹ Eckstein (1995: 16-27) argues against what he sees as an overly pragmatic interpretation of Polybius, a view he attributes to Walbank. He advocates, for example, that Polybius' censure for those who succeed in spite of acting badly "suggests that Polybius was sincerely concerned with the *καλόν*" (*ibid.* 117). My approach will argue that Polybius sees practical consequences to moral flaws because, even when people are successful by immoral means, the presence of immoral behavior exposes flaws in the larger political system and places where the overall edifice of *polis* or empire is vulnerable to deterioration. Henri van Effenterre (1948: 285-92) suggests that Polybius' most negative comments occur at places where Cretan cities appear at odds with the Achaean League, though Walbank (1957: I.508) is heavily skeptical of this reading.

²¹² Malcolm Cross, in a sociological study of Hellenistic Crete, suggests that the *pleonexia* of which Polybius is critical could have reflected the profitability of the Cretan democratic system (2011: 153-54; *contra* see Chaniotis 2005: 79). Cross (2011: 29) deserves some credit for making the case that nothing about the scale or frequency of Crete's wars marks it out as unique within the Hellenistic period. Kelly (2012: 276) reads Polybius' "jaundiced" comments about *Krētes* fighters as a testament to their martial prowess.

necessitates a specialized reading of Cretan inscribed documents in which its peculiar societal norms directly affect how the texts should be interpreted (*cf.*, Rigsby 1995: 19-20). All of these attempts to interpret Polybian anti-Cretan bias tend to focus narrowly on his treatment of Cretans.

This approach is problematic because within the larger framework of the *Histories*, Polybius tends to attach specific traits to regional or ethnic groups, but these traits can also shift as their societies rise or decline. Indeed, as the work of Craige B. Champion (1996; 2004; 2007) demonstrates, Polybius will often use the characteristics of different regional or ethnic groups to indicate to his audience whether the behavior of individuals or groups should be viewed as civilized or barbarous. For example, in a 2007 case study on Polybius' portrayal of the Aetolians, another group against whom Polybius was notoriously biased, Champion observes that Polybius sometimes portrays the Aetolians as more powerful or influential at certain moments of history than they actually were at that point in time according to other types of evidence (e.g., Scholten 2000). Champion argues that Polybius elevates their importance in the narrative in order to use the Aetolians as a foil for the Achaeans (also 1996). The more similar to the contemptible Aetolians that the Achaeans become, the more it indicates that their society has declined. Champion's observation demonstrates that, although the events that Polybius portrays may not themselves be untrue, his handling of them can be misleading. Two questions are posed here: First, do larger programmatic motivations lie behind Polybius' singling out of Crete as a locus for extreme violence? Second, were acts of violence among Cretans so

much more extreme or frequent as compared with violence in the Hellenistic world and in Greek culture in general?

This chapter will use a critical reading of Polybius to argue that Crete's culture of violence was not exceptional, and cannot be interpreted as a special circumstance to explain the existence of mercenaries from Crete. Although there may be little reason to question the chronology of events on Crete in the *Histories*, Polybius' censorious remarks in response to acts of violence on Crete lend credence to the idea that a contemporary audience would have viewed them as egregious. However, I suggest that Polybius' negative critique of Crete is most informative when it is considered within a larger rhetorical and ideological agenda: his interest what sort of sociopolitical system, or πολιτεία,²¹³ can best create stable governments (*politeuma*) that are resilient and can best educate citizens (*andres*) who will maintain a stable government under pressure and their moral integrity when they are abroad. The capacity for a *politeia* to meet these goals affects not only the *polis* itself, but also the global community. This is a practical concern: in the Hellenistic period, *poleis* conquered one another, and individual citizens traveled and took up employment in royal bureaucracies and armies, faraway from the communities that raised them. Mercenaries would be one example in the latter category. Polybius uses his description of the Cretan *politeia* in particular as a locus for identifying the sorts of traits in a *politeia* that would create a weak and unstable society. Thus, when the same negative traits that he attributes to Cretans are demonstrated by other regional

²¹³ I follow Erskine (2013: 233-34), who translates Polybius' *politeia* as "system of government" rather than the traditional "constitution."

and ethnic groups in the *Histories* but do not appear to be immediately detrimental, those traits still indicate fundamental weakness and vulnerability that will ultimately compromise a society's resilience. For this reason, Polybius' description of the Cretan *politeia* may not indicate exceptionally frequent or egregious violence on Crete, especially when it describes violence on Crete that is similar in frequency and scale to the levels of violence for other Hellenistic *poleis*. I want to suggest a better reading of Polybius as a historical source for Crete, which would require the reader to first understand how "the Cretan *politeia*" operates within Polybius' rhetorical framework, and then apply the whole framework to passages about Crete. According to this reading, Polybian Crete would be anomalous not for the exceptional quality of its violence, but perhaps because, while the quarrels of other Greek *poleis* were eventually squelched by bigger players like Macedon and Rome, the *poleis* of Crete lived on to fight each other once again in the next generation.

In order to establish Polybius' framework as a tool for historical analysis, the chapter will first examine the organization around Polybius' description of the Cretan *politeia*, and how Polybius uses Crete to engage with the Greek philosophical tradition of studying *politeiai*. This is a tradition that places a monolithic Cretan *politeia* in comparison with the Lacedaemonian *politeia*, with the aim of studying the Spartan system, and which is uninterested in studying the governing systems of the Cretan *poleis* for their own sake. Next, the chapter will then look more closely at two moral criticisms that Polybius levels at Cretans – greed and duplicity – and show how Polybius attributes each of these moral failings to other groups besides Cretans. Finally, the chapter will look

at historical narratives of violence and warfare on Crete, interpreting them through the new reading of Cretan-*politeia*-as-diagnostic-model in order to better understand Crete as a historical place. Polybius' comments serve to reinforce his use of the Cretan *politeia* as this model, but also he provides historical evidence for the continuous decline – and thus, paradoxical resilience – of the Cretan *poleis*.

The chapter takes into consideration all *loci* where Polybius mentions Cretans. It pays special attention to the places where Polybius is contradictory, is inconsistent in his reactions to very similar events, or creates a general incompatibility between his historical narrative and his extranarrative digressions. By “historical narrative,” I mean a passage that presents the main events of history in an ostensibly chronological fashion to the reader. By “digression,” I refer to a passage, of variable length, that steps away from the historical narrative in order to expand upon a topic. In his *Histories*, Polybius uses digressions in order to speak directly about themes and didactic messages; in turn, these themes and didactic messages spelled out in the digressions are exemplified or dramatized in the historical narratives of events. Sometimes, he aids his reader in identifying the themes of digressions within his historical narratives by adding editorializing commentary to the historical narrative.

Polybius delivers programmatic assessments on Cretans (6.45-7) in the context of a very long digression (the fragments of Book 6) about the evolutionary cycle of forms of government (*anakyklosis*) and what makes a good or bad *politeia*. Elsewhere, he provides a handful of passages in the narrative describing events on Crete, which he often punctuates with additional commentary about how the events ought to be regarded (e.g.

4.53.5: a conflict among *Krētaieis* on Crete shows behavior typical of *Krētes*). I have identified three ways in which Polybius' treatment of Cretans is problematic for historians. First, his use of *Krēs* does not differentiate among the categories identified in Chapter 1, giving the impression of the ubiquity of Cretans without clearly identifying them as mercenaries from Crete. Second, there are incongruities between his digressionary or editorializing comments about Cretans and his historical narratives of their actions, as in the case of the non-ambushing *Krētes* in Chapter 2. Third, he signals the exceptionality of violence on Crete with his editorializing comments that accompany his historical narratives, in spite of the high level of chaos and violence in other parts of the Hellenistic world. All of these considerations ought to be taken into account when using Polybius for contemporary evidence about Hellenistic Crete and its mercenaries.

I. POLYBIUS' CRETAN *POLITEIA*

We begin our investigation of the Polybius' Cretan *politeia* by focusing on its structure: how the Cretan *politeia* fits into Polybius' comparison of *politeiai* in Book 6 and the function of the digression in Polybius' overall program. We will then examine how this structure compares with the earlier Greek philosophical tradition about Crete, the discourse comparing *politeiai*, and in particular the accounts of the Cretan *politeia* in this tradition. This comparison will foreground how Polybius uses his discussion of the Cretan *politeia* to articulate his views on the fitness of various socio-political systems, the apogee of which is the Roman *politeia* at the specific historical moment of Rome's defeat at Cannae during the Second Punic War. An investigation into the structure of the

passage highlights not only the ways in which Polybius' description of the Cretan *politeia* might be an unreliable support for interpreting other types of evidence such as inscribed treaties, but also suggests why he might use the Cretan *politeia* to illustrate a failing socio-political system.

A. The Cretan *Politeia*

Polybius' analysis of the Cretan *politeia* is located within the longest digression in the *Histories*. This digression, which constitutes nearly all of what survives of Book 6, is about πολιτεία, or the socio-political systems that constitute the state in the Hellenistic world. Book 6 is organized in the following way. In the preface (6.1-2), Polybius states that he wishes to understand what about the Roman *politeia* made the Romans so successful, so quickly, at a specific historical moment. Next, he moves to the *anakyklosis* (6.3-10), a term for the evolutionary cycle of governments. Polybius sees systems of government as fluid and changing: in what he calls the *anakyklosis*, he describes an evolutionary cycle of revolution and decline (6.3.18). Each system (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy) is established with morally upright leadership, but then, as generations pass, the moral quality of the leadership deteriorates (into, respectively, tyranny, oligarchy, and mob rule) until revolution replaces it with the next iteration of the cycle (tyranny to aristocracy, oligarchy to democracy, mob rule to monarchy). Having established these different systems (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy), he describes (6.11-8) the Roman mixed *politeia*, which incorporates the best versions of all three systems. Next preserved in the tradition is an excursus (6.19-42) on the Roman army and

encampments, which emphasizes homogeneity and interchangeability among men and army camps. The fragment after this is an assessment of the merits of various *politeiai* (6.43-56): Athens, Thebes, the Cretan *politeia*, Plato's *Republic* (*Politeia*), the Lycurgan system of Sparta, and Carthage; all of these are found lacking in comparison with the Roman *politeia*. The last known fragment of the book (6.57-9), which leaves the digression and returns to historical narrative: the Roman refusal to surrender to Hannibal after their disastrous defeat at Cannae.²¹⁴

Given this outline, it should come as no surprise that modern scholars tend to view Book 6 as a lesson for Polybius' fellow Greeks on why the Rome was victorious: after all, this is the very question that Polybius poses both in the prologue to his *Histories* and the preface of Book 6.²¹⁵ There are two ways that one can look at Polybius' treatment of the Roman *politeia*: as a specific historical description of the Roman sociopolitical system and, as Andrew Erskine (2013) suggests, as a more theoretical investigation into what traits in a *politeia* would make the most resilient political society, of which Rome is the best and only example. These ways of looking are not mutually exclusive, but simultaneous. On the one hand, despite inaccuracies in his account of Rome and its institutions in Book 6, the success of Rome in the Greek world is historical fact. On the other hand, in the abstract, the traits that he identifies in the Roman *politeia* could

²¹⁴ For a summary of this episode, see n. 221 below.

²¹⁵ 1.1.5; see also 6.1.3: τίς γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει φαῦλος ἢ ῥάθυμος ἀνθρώπων ὃς οὐκ ἂν βούλοιο γινῶναι πῶς καὶ τίνι γένοι πολιτείας ἐπικρατηθέντα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην οὐχ ὅλοις πεντήκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἔπεσε τὴν Ῥωμαίων... "For is there any person so foolish or lazy that he would not wish to understand how and with what sort of *politeia* practically the whole inhabited world, within not even fifty-three years, fell under the single control of the Romans?" As Walbank (1972) observes, Polybius uses Book 6 to position himself as the interpreter of this Roman success for his fellow Greeks.

theoretically be found in any successful *politeia*: the Roman *politeia* happens to nurture those traits, and this is why Rome was successful. The mixed nature of Rome's *politeia* makes it more stable than *politeiai* that are not mixed, though in Polybius' narrative even this quality does not exempt Rome from moral decline. This more theoretical take of the Roman *politeia* as the most successful type of *politeia* does not preclude reading Book 6 for historical information, but can be helpful consideration for some of Book 6's historical inaccuracies or points where historical information is inconsistent, as this theoretical framework may have necessitated that the author make specific choices about how he presented his information.

Polybius presents the Cretan *politeia* early in the section where he compares *politeiai* (6.43-56). Moving through the series of *politeiai*, he evaluates each for its viability as a system that should be imitated and can be sustained. The Cretan *politeia* (6.43-7) is one of the *politeiai* that Polybius rejects as a worthy object study. Polybius critiques Theban *politeia* (6.43-4) insofar as its success depended upon its rulers, and Athens' *politeia* because it was too prone to mob rule, and the *politeia* of (6.47.7-10) Plato²¹⁶ because it is imaginary. His comments on the Cretan *politeia* move outward in scope from specific components of the *politeia*, to general comments about the overall health of the *politeia*, and finally to general criteria for assessing the fitness of any *politeia*. Thus, he begins by challenging previous authors who said that the Cretan *politeia* was (a) the same as the Lycurgan *politeia* of Sparta and (b) worthy of

²¹⁶ One hint to this is Polybius' rejection of Plato's *Politeia*, which he makes right after the Cretan *politeia*: he deals in living political systems, not models (6.47.7-10). Polybius therefore provides historical examples to prop up the verisimilitude of his Cretan *politeia*; and, in turn, he inserts into his historical narratives editorializing comments in order to remind readers of the negative exemplarity of Crete.

approbation (6.45.1-3). He then compares specific points of the Spartan *politeia* (6.45.4-5) with specific points of the Cretan *politeia* (6.46.1-4). Pulling back, he contrasts the general internal harmony of the Spartan *politeia* with the general internal discord of the Cretan *politeia* (6.46.5-8). Having laid out these points, he dismisses the previous authors who, he says, praised the Cretan *politeia* in spite of witnessing the discord of Crete (6.46.9-10). Finally, he establishes criteria for judging an admirable *politeia* based upon its laws and customs (6.46.11-47.1) and uses Crete and Cretans as a negative example to illustrate how this would work: that is, since the Cretan *politeia* did not meet the criteria for an admirable society, it is neither worth of imitation nor admiration (6.47.5-6).

At the beginning of his presentation of the Cretan *politeia* (6.45.1), Polybius clearly states that he is at odds with predecessors who wrote about Crete's system of government and society. Polybius accuses these predecessors of erroneously likening the Cretan system with the Lacedaemonian *politeia* – a frame that allows him to describe Crete in comparison with Sparta on three points: the laws regarding acquisition of land, the general attitude towards money, and the system by which power was acquired. The Lacedaemonians (6.45.3) grant all citizens an equal share of public land, while the laws of the Cretans allow them to gain as much land as possible (6.46.1). Lacedaemonian society places no value on money-making (6.45.4), while Cretan society not only encourages acquiring disproportionately greater wealth than one's fellows, but holds gain (6.46.3), to be of highest value. Finally, while the Lacedaemonians (6.45.5) are ruled by a life-long king and a *gerousia* of men elected for life, the Cretans (6.46.4) have a democracy that elects annual magistrates. The result of these differences, Polybius

asserts, can be seen in the level of internal discord in these societies (6.46.8-9). Whereas Sparta is the Greek society with the greatest internal concord, Crete is the most internally discordant.

Having established these three points (laws on acquisition, attitude towards gain, and type of government), Polybius concludes his remarks on the Cretan *politeia* with a larger programmatic statement (6.47.2-4) that the fitness and admirability of a *politeia* must be evaluated based both upon the justness of the laws (νόμοι), as formulated and administered by the body public, and the uprightness of conduct (ἔθνη) of individual citizens in their own lives. He asserts (6.47.5) that the Cretan *politeia* exemplifies the most flagrant disregard for both *nomoi* and *ethē*, and is therefore neither to be admired nor imitated. Following this dismissal of the Cretan *politeia*, Polybius goes on to dismiss Plato's imaginary *politeia*, then critiques the Spartan *politeia* for its paradoxically greedy diplomatic behavior and Carthaginian *politeia* for its dependence on mercenaries, before concluding with the superiority of the Roman system.

B. Crete, Sparta, and the *Politeia* Tradition

Polybius frames his treatment of the Cretan *politeia* as a polemic against earlier authors. He charges that not only did these predecessors characterize the Cretan *politeia* as most similar to Sparta's and worthy of admiration, but they did so in spite of realities that they should have observed on Crete.²¹⁷ If we look at the authors to whom Polybius

²¹⁷ 6.46.9: ταῦτα δ' ἀποφηνάμενοι, καὶ θεωροῦντες ἐκ παραθέσεως Κρηταιεῖς... οὐδὲν οἶονται πρὸς σφᾶς εἶναι, θαρροῦσι δὲ λέγειν ὡς ὁμοίων ὄντων τῶν πολιτευμάτων. "After declaring these things, even though

directs his readers – Callisthenes, Xenophon, Ephorus, and Plato – we find that the juxtaposition of the Cretan and Spartan systems as similar, and even akin to one another, is a common element of the philosophical tradition in the study of *politeia*. We also note that Polybius may have been a bit misleading in the ways in which he characterized his predecessors. Among the four authors, there survive descriptions of the Cretan *politeia* from Plato’s *Laws* and the fragments of Ephorus in Strabo (10.4.16-18). In the case of the latter, whom Polybius singles out for special censure (6.46.10), Ephorus made reference to the decline of the Cretan *politeia* in his day (Strabo 10.4.17). Anything by Callisthenes has been lost, so it cannot be evaluated, and there is no other ancient reference to an extended description of the Cretan *politeia* by Xenophon, and Xenophon’s treatment of the Spartan *politeia* actually praised the singularity of Lycurgus’ system (Perlman 2005: 285). Finally, there is the omission of Aristotle, whose description of the Cretan *politeia* in his *Politics* handled topics that were set by his description of the Spartan *politeia* (Perlman 2005: 317). Paula Perlman (2005: 283) argues that the correspondent features of Plato and Ephorus, as well as Aristotle, represent a single philosophical model for the Cretan *politeia*, from which authors chose different features to present (e.g. education (*paideia*), institutional pederasty, group messes (*sussitia*) for men in the *andreion*). It was already observed in the Introduction that these previous accounts – all from the fourth century – are problematic when historians use them as a source of information for the society of Classical Crete for, among other reasons (see pp. 5-6), the fact that it is meant

they see the *Krētaieis* in contrast... they do not think it germane, but dare to say that the *politeumata* [of Sparta and Crete] are the same.”

not to study Crete for its own sake, but to produce philosophical discourse on the Spartan *politeia* and its treatment of Crete as monolithic. By using the Spartan *politeia* to set the terms of his Cretan *politeia*, Polybius is actually following a Greek intellectual tradition that he claims to oppose: this tradition was itself a dubious historical source of evidence for the history of Crete in the fourth century, and there is no reason that it would be less dubious for the third or second centuries. Elsewhere in the *Histories* (e.g. 4.53-5), Polybius shows attention local events on Crete, so it is possible that he understood that Crete did not operate under a monolithic system. So, if Polybius is operating within a philosophical tradition that even he might recognize as misrepresentative of Cretan history, we may well ask he it is doing with and, ultimately, how it might inform our interpretation of the history of Hellenistic Crete elsewhere in the *Histories*.

Aristotle is the one predecessor who is known to have compared the Cretan and Spartan *politeiai* whom Polybius omits. If Polybius' intent were simply to list predecessors in the tradition, the omission would be strange. But he does not list Plato, Xenophon, Callisthenes, or Plato simply as predecessors: he lists them as predecessors with whom he disagrees on two points, the resemblance and kinship between the Spartan and Cretan *politeiai*, and the reputation of the Cretan *politeia* as admirable. If Polybius does not mention Aristotle, perhaps it was because he does not disagree with Aristotle on these grounds. If we look at Aristotle's Cretan *politeia* (1271b20-1272b23), we can see that Aristotle does begin his account of the Cretan *politeia* by identifying it as akin to the Spartan *politeia*, but describes the Cretan *politeia* as a less developed ancestor of the Spartan *politeia* (1271b21-4). This is not a ringing endorsement of the Cretan *politeia*,

but nor is he so overtly critical as Polybius; indeed, Aristotle points out good and bad features of the Cretan *politeia*, whereas Polybius dismisses it completely.

Polybius also disagrees with Ephorus by name for praising the Cretan *politeia* without acknowledging Cretan current events. Even if this is a misrepresentation of Ephorus, who said that there was a decline in the Cretan *politeia* in his day (10.4.16), we might look again at Aristotle as the unnamed predecessor with whom Polybius potentially agrees. Aristotle, who initially comments on the suitability of Crete's location at the center of the Greek world for ruling Greeks (*Pol.* 1271b30), like Ephorus concludes his account of the Cretan *politeia* with a remark that it has declined in recent times. Aristotle says that Cretans had no external territorial aspirations in spite of their geographic centrality, and a foreign war (*polemos xenikos*) had recently demonstrated the weaknesses of its laws (*nomoi*).²¹⁸ Polybius (6.48.8-49.1) makes a similar criticism not of Crete, but of Sparta: that Lycurgus' system rendered the Lacedaemonians moderate at home, but left them immoderate towards other Greeks, when they left the bounds of Sparta. In the latter case, the catalyst for decline is success in foreign conquest rather than the imposition of a foreign war on one's own soil, as in the case of Aristotle's Crete, but the criticism remains the same: both the Spartan *politeia* and the Cretan *politeia* show their weaknesses when they have to contend with forces outside themselves.

There are good reasons to think of Aristotle's *Politics* as not only influential to Polybius' Book 6, as both model and a foil, but even central to the existence of Book 6.

²¹⁸ *Pol.* 1271b20: οὔτε γὰρ ἐξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς κοιωνοῦσιν οἱ Κρητες, νεωστί τε πόλεμος ξενικός διαβέβηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον, ὃς πεποίηκε φανεράν τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῶν ἐκεῖ νόμων.

There are a number of similarities between the two works. Aristotle's *Politics* also focused on *politeia* types and made a study of real-life political systems, rather imaginary *politeiai*.²¹⁹ Like Polybius, Aristotle put forth his own theory of mixed constitutions (Riesbeck 2016: 109). Aristotle made a focused study of three "real-life" *politeiai*: Sparta, Crete, and Carthage. Polybius' Book 6 digression also has a triad that includes Sparta and Carthage, but, with the conspicuous removal of the Cretan *politeia*, it culminates with Rome instead. But the differences are also quite telling. Aristotle was concerned with the constituent parts of the *politeia* in order to identify the best sort of *politeia*: assessing the constituent parts based on how they resulted in harmonious government, education of the youth (*paideia*), defense of the city, and so forth. The ability for the *polis* to sustain itself (*autarkia*) was of paramount importance, but Aristotle placed less emphasis on the ability for the system to withstand pressures from the outside. Indeed, the best *politeia* was the one that created the happiest circumstances for its citizens (Riesbeck 2016: 101-2). Polybius, too, seeks the most successful *politeia*: a functional *politeia* must still be able to form a just government, educate moderate youth,

²¹⁹ Polybius conceives of the entirety of the *Histories* as presenting a full understanding of past events (1.1.6) in order to educate those in his day who made policy: his history is thus practical in the sense of looking at specific examples more than theory, and in being intended for practical applications (1.2.8: he refers to the work as a *pragmatikē historia*). Aristotle was interested in the practical as well. As David J. Riesbeck (2016: 95) observes, "increasingly, philosophical studies of the *Politics* have come to see Aristotle's analyses of real, existing constitutions and his critique and construction of ideal constitutions as parts of a single, complex political science, one that is neither simply theoretical and normative nor strictly empirical and pragmatic, but thoroughly practical in Aristotle's distinctive sense of that term: grounded in an explanatory theory of politics based upon empirical study, but fundamentally oriented toward political action in the shape of the reforms that will stabilize and improve constitutions by bringing them closer to approximating the ideal." Polybius' *Histories* is more empirical than Aristotle's *Politics*, but we might consider that the Book 6 digression is Polybius' way of presenting a unified political theory that is ultimately practical: readers can use Book 6 to interpret the specific events in the narrative parts of the *Histories* and also apply it to their understanding of the political events with which they are involved.

and defend its territories. However, even such a *politeia* would be unsuccessful, by Polybius' assessment, if it did not produce a sustainable sociopolitical system that remained resilient under pressure – specifically, the pressure of expansionism. In other words, Aristotle's best *politeia* had to work for its own people; in Polybius, the Roman *politeia* is the most successful because it enjoys hegemonic success while maintaining inward harmony and producing both the government and the citizens who maintain their integrity in the face of the successes and failures that come with expansion.

In conclusion, Polybius's discussion of the Cretan *politeia* should give us pause before using it as a historical source for Hellenistic Crete. On the one hand, by only talking about the Cretan *politeia* in comparison with the Sparta *politeia*, Polybius is invokes a tradition that provides dubious information about Crete to scholars of ancient history. On the other hand, by following Aristotle in form yet omitting him from disagreement, Polybius is paradoxically signaling that his, too, is writing a practical typology of *politeiai*, but updated. Whereas for Aristotle internal stability marked success more prominently than resilience to outside forces, in Polybius' typology, the most resilient *politeia* will be more likely to remain intact in the face of foreign influence, whether as conqueror or conquered. Book 6 is a new *Politics* for a new international age, and this will have significant implications for how we might read Polybius' treatment of Crete and Cretans.

C. Assessing *Politeiai*

The final portion of Polybius' comments on the Cretan *politeia* lays out the criteria by which Polybius judges *politeiai* – criteria by which Polybius finds the Cretan *politeia* in particular to be lacking (6.47.1-6). I draw the reader's attention to three aspects of the passage: its placement within the Cretan *politeia* comments, its internal organizing dichotomies (*nomoi* and *ethē*, *kat' idian* and *kata koinon*), and the way in which it could be universally applied to any *politeia*, not just the Cretan:²²⁰

ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι δὴ ἀρχὰς εἶναι πάσης πολιτείας, δι' ὧν αἰρετὰς ἢ φευκτὰς συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τὰς τε δυνάμεις αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς συστάσεις· αὗται δ' εἰσὶν ἔθη καὶ νόμοι· ὧν τὰ μὲν αἰρετὰ τούς τε κατ' ἰδίαν βίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁσίους ἀποτελεῖ καὶ σώφρονας τό τε κοινὸν ἦθος τῆς πόλεως ἡμερον ἀπεργάζεται καὶ δίκαιον, τὰ δὲ φευκτὰ τὸναντίον. ὥσπερ οὖν, ὅταν τοὺς ἐθισμοὺς καὶ νόμους κατίδωμεν παρά τισι σπουδαίους ὑπάρχοντας, θαρροῦντες ἀποφαινόμεθα καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐκ τούτων ἔσεσθαι καὶ τὴν τούτων πολιτείαν σπουδαίαν, οὕτως, ὅταν τοὺς τε κατ' ἰδίαν βίους τινῶν πλεονεκτικούς τὰς τε κοινὰς πράξεις ἀδίκους θεωρήσωμεν, δῆλον ὡς εἰκὸς λέγειν τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἦθη καὶ τὴν ὅλην πολιτείαν αὐτῶν εἶναι φαύλην. καὶ μὴν οὔτε κατ' ἰδίαν ἦθη δολιώτερα Κρηταίων εὔροι τις ἂν πλὴν τελείως ὀλίγων οὔτε κατὰ κοινὸν ἐπιβολὰς ἀδικωτέρας. (6.47.1-5)

²²⁰ I will return to this passage in the next section, when I more closely examine its content for how Polybius describes the particular vices that he attributes to Cretans.

Therefore I think there are two elements of every *politeia*, on the basis of which, with regard to its powers and form of government, it is to be desired or avoided: these are laws (*nomoi*) and customs (*ethē*) The desirable qualities of these make the lives of individual men upstanding and moderate, and make the common *ethos* of the city mild and just; the qualities to be avoided are the opposite. So, just as when we see that some people's customs and laws are good, we boldly declare that the men and the *politeia* are good, likewise, when we observe that the lives of some individuals are greedy (*pleonektikoi*) and their collective deeds unjust, it is reasonable to say that, clearly, their laws and their particular customs and their whole *politeia* is worthless. And indeed, one could not find individual behavior more duplicitous than that of the *Krētaieis* nor – except in a few cases – collective endeavors more unjust.

As I contended earlier, the placement of this passage is important. Polybius has just used the Cretan *politeia* (6.45-6) to situate himself among his *politeia* predecessors, rejecting others while both following Aristotle and innovating on the earlier view that the greatest internal cohesion of the *polis* is the indicator of the best *politeia*. Now Polybius has moved outward from the Cretan (and Spartan) *politeia* to establish the criteria by which he assesses the fitness of any *politeia* for admiration and imitation, and then uses these criteria to dismiss the Cretan *politeia* as fit for neither.

The principal elements for judging the fitness of *politeiai* are custom (ἔθος) and law (νόμος) (6.47.1). A *politeia* with good customs and laws should be imitated, one with

bad customs and laws should be avoided (6.47.2-4). This is because customs and laws are normative: they set the standards of acceptability for how members of the *politeia* should act, and expectations for how they are likely to act.²²¹ In this context, the Cretan *politeia* is used as a practical application of the assessment process (6.47.5): that is, since individual Cretans are more likely than most people to flout custom by acting duplicitously and Cretan *poleis* more likely than most states to flout law and act unjustly, the Cretan *politeia* as a whole fails Polybius' fitness test.

Polybius places *ethē* and *nomoi* roughly in the categories of rules for individuals (*kat' idian*) and collective bodies (*kata koinon*), respectively.²²² In this model, Polybius treats the men (*andras*) of the *politeia* as both its product (from *paideia*) and a representative of the collective whole, especially in a democracy, where individual citizens constitute the government; in this way, he differs from Aristotle, who treats a *polis* as a whole made up of diverse constituent parts (Riesbeck 2016: 118-9).²²³ Furthermore, an individual who travels abroad in a non-official capacity – for example, a

²²¹ Polybius is especially interested in how well the norms of a *politeia* are upheld when its *nomoi* and *ethē* are not in force. He demonstrates this at the end of Book 6, when he returns to his historical narrative (left off from Book 3) of Hannibal's catastrophic defeat of the Romans at Cannae (6.58): Hannibal released ten Roman prisoners to ask the Senate for surrender, and made them swear an oath to return to him after, even though he had promised to kill them if the Senate refused. Nine prisoners honored the spirit of the oath, but a tenth tried to sidestep this by returning to the camp on the pretext that he had forgotten something. He was placed in chains by the other nine, and, after they failed to persuade the Senate to surrender, forced to return to Hannibal with them. In other words, not all the Romans were made of the same mettle, but the norm – in this case, of honoring the spirit of one's sworn oath – not only regulated the behavior of the nine in dire straits, but also caused them to punish the behavior of the tenth.

²²² See the introduction (pp. 28-30), where I have explained why I have opted for this translation rather than the traditional English translation of "private" and "public," respectively.

²²³ An analogy is to visualize the *politeia* as a poundcake. The Aristotelian view would look at citizens as differing, constituent parts like different ingredients (eggs, sugar, butter, flour) before baking. The Polybian view would look at the citizen as an undifferentiated product of the whole, like a slice of poundcake after the baking. The slice can be removed from the cake, and carried off to lunch in plastic wrap. But even removed from the poundcake, it is still recognizable as poundcake.

mercenary – is still the product of the *politeia* that produced him, and may behave well or badly depending upon how much respect for *nomoi* and *ethē* has been drummed into him through *paideia*.

Finally, the universality of the criteria laid out in 6.47.1-6 should be emphasized. Polybius' remarks about the *nomoi* of the collective state and the *ethē* of the *politeia*'s individual citizens do not apply only to Crete; they help establish the program by which he evaluates the *politeiai* of Sparta, Carthage, and ultimately Rome (6.47.9). Yet, Polybius happens to situate these criteria for evaluating *politeiai* in the context of his discussion of the Cretan *politeia*: the Cretan *politeia* is a tool for a larger analysis of politics, rather than a study whose primary interest was in Crete – just as the Cretan *politeia* was for Polybius' fourth century predecessors. The next portion of this chapter will focus on Polybius's critique of Cretans: the moral failings he attributes to them were indicators of the infirmity of any society, and the Cretan *politeia* has illustrated how.

II. CRETAN MORAL FAILINGS IN PRACTICE

Polybius accuses the Cretans of three vices: *pleonexia* (greed or acquisitiveness), duplicity (*dolos* and its cognate *dolios*), and injustice (*adikia*). This chapter will focus on the first two, *pleonexia* and duplicity, because they are the most readily associated with Crete and Cretans. I begin with an overview of Polybius' description of the Cretan *politeia* to show how both of these vices features in his critique. I will then address each of the vices in turn, looking more closely at how each is used to describe the *Krētaieis* and *Krētes*, how each applies to peoples outside of Crete, and how, in Polybius'

programmatic view of *politeiai*, each trait would undermine the vitality of political entities. The vices that Polybius attributes to Crete, Cretans, and the Cretan *politeia* are far from unique to Crete in the *Histories*: Polybius sees them as universal to humans and universally damaging to *poleis* throughout the Hellenistic world.

As was noted above, Polybius first identifies three specific points of the Spartan *politeia* – laws on the acquisition of land, attitude towards comparative wealth acquisition (i.e., the desire to possess more than one's peers), and organization and rules for public officials – then states that the Cretan *politeia* is the opposite (6.46.1: τάναντία) with regard to each of these points. In a comment on the first two, he asserts that, among the Cretans, a favorable disposition towards *pleonexia* and shameless profit is so normalized that any disproportionate gain, regardless how it is acquired, is not merely a necessity but the highest good:

παρὰ δὲ Κρηταιεῦσι ... τὴν τε γὰρ χώραν κατὰ δύναμιν αὐτοῖς ἐφιᾶσιν οἱ νόμοι, τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον, εἰς ἄπειρον κτᾶσθαι, τό τε διάφορον ἐκτετίμηται παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐπιτοσοῦτον ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἀναγκαίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ καλλίστην εἶναι δοκεῖν τὴν τούτου κτῆσιν. καθόλου θ' ὁ περὶ τὴν αἰσχροκέρδειαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν τρόπος οὕτως ἐπιχωριάζει παρ' αὐτοῖς ὥστε παρὰ μόνοις Κρηταιεῦσι τῶν ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν νομίζεσθαι κέρδος. (6.46.1-3)

Among the *Krētaieis*... the laws permit them to acquire land, as the saying goes, to the limits of what they are able, and disproportionate wealth is honored among them to such an extent that its acquisition seems not only as a necessity, but as the noblest thing. This disposition towards shameless profit and acquisitiveness is so

customary among them that only among the *Krētaieis*, out of all people, is no form of profit considered shameful.

We can observe here a general permissiveness in the standards of Cretan society, manifested in its lax laws for the acquisition of land and its social approbation of disproportionate wealth, without attaching shame when that wealth was acquired in shameful fashion.

Having laid out these three specific points of difference, he moves to the overall health of *politeiai*, and states that Lycurgus, who created the Spartan *politeia*, recognized the two points by which a civic body is saved (6.46.7: *politeuma*) as *andreia* against external enemies and internal harmony amongst themselves (τῆς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοῦς ὁμονοίας). Thus, Lycurgus' removal of laws and customs that promoted wealth difference and normalized *pleonexia*, such as unlimited land acquisition, resulted in a manifest and exemplary internal harmony among the Lacedaemonians. In contrast, the “ingrown” *pleonexia* of the Cretans produces equally manifest and exemplary displays of internal violence and conflict:

... Κρηταεῖς διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον σφίσι πλεονεξίαν ἐν πλείσταις ἰδίᾳ καὶ κατὰ κοινὸν στάσεσι καὶ φόνοις καὶ πολέμοις ἐμφυλίοις ἀναστρεφομένους... (6.46.9)

... the *Krētaieis*, because of their ingrown acquisitiveness [*pleonexia*], are occupied, individually and collectively, with a lot of internal upheaval and murders and civil wars...

So, whereas before, *pleonexia* was a vice that was permissive in Cretan society and encouraged by the Cretan prizing of disproportionate gain, the cumulative effect of this

encouragement is that both individuals and groups on Crete act out in lawless internal violence. We may recall that Lycurgus – and Polybius – saw internal harmony as one of the mechanisms for preserving a society, so we would expect Crete to be failing in some way.

Moving farther outward from the specific to the general, Polybius presents his criteria for assessing the fitness of a *politeia*, quoted above (6.47.1-6). Polybius asserts that a *polis* where the men show respect and self-control in their lives and whose state acts justly is in possession of a good *politeia*, while a *polis* where the lives of men are acquisitive (βίους τινῶν πλεονεκτικούς) and its public deeds are unjust (τάς τε κοινὰς πράξεις ἀδίκους) possesses a bad *politeia*. Using these criteria, he declares that the unfitness of the Cretan *politeia* is demonstrated through the disregard shown to its (already permissive) laws and customs: that is, that Cretans as individuals exceed everyone in duplicity (δολιώτερα) and practically everyone in the unjust actions (ἐπιβολὰς ἀδικωτέρας) of their states.

As was noted above, *nomoi* and *ethē* both establish and reflect the norms within a *politeia*. Thus, establishing lax laws for land acquisition both reflects a lax attitude towards *pleonexia* and encourages acquisitive behaviors. However, this lax attitude also encourages disregard for these very laws and customs, even if they might already be permissive, in pursuit of gain. This disregard manifests in the regular transgression of these laws and customs, that is, acts of duplicity (*doloi*) and injustice (*adikēmata*). Thus, the nurturing of *pleonexia* within a *politeia* causes the internal conflict that will destroy a

political system, while *dolos* and *adikia* are indications that the health of the political system is compromised.

A. *Pleonexia* (Acquisitiveness)

It is clear, then, that *πλεονεξία*, which means “wanting more for the sake of having more,” is central to Polybius’ critique of the Cretan *politeia*, since Cretan conflict is the result of a permissive attitude towards it. The idea that *pleonexia* caused conflict in society, whether internal *stasis* or unjustified quarrelling with neighbors, is a very old Greek idea,²²⁴ and contrasts with the conception of modern historians of the ancient world, who treat conflict as competition for scarce resources (van Wees 2007: 287). Aristotle (e.g. *Pol.* 1266b35-40) treats conflict as the result of inequality, i.e., people seeing others who have more and wanting to have more as a result. The special association between *pleonexia* and the Cretan *politeia* in Polybius – that idea that Cretans were so much greedier than other Greek peoples that it caused them to be in constant internal conflict – may be another of his contributions to the *politeia* tradition, and it is certainly part of his examination of the qualities that made the Roman *politeia* successful.

Aristotle never explicitly mentions the term *pleonexia* in the context of the Cretan *politeia*. However, although he praises the moderating way in which resources are pooled into the group messes, the *sussitia* (*Pol.* 1271b20), he also observes upheaval caused by aristocratic competition among the leaders for office (*kosmoi*), which itself can be a form of *pleonexia* (Balot 2001). The Aristotelian association between *pleonexia* and inequality

²²⁴*Pleonexia* may be characterized more as “acquisitiveness” than “greed,” and is not confined to money.

of property, which is described elsewhere in the *Politics* (1266b39: τὴν ἀνισότητα τῆς κτήσεως) is certainly present in Polybius' account of the Cretan *politeia* (6.46.3: διάφορον). The concept of *philotimia*, “ambition,” is also closely related forms of greed;²²⁵ this association may explain Polybius' editorializing remark about the Lyttian War – that war among the *Krētaieis* began from *philotimia*, as is the *ethos* of *Krētes* (4.53.3) – i.e., as a result of inequalities in a society of *pleonektikoi*.

As noted before, Polybius' Cretan *politeia* never discusses the possibility of Cretan imperial rule as Aristotle does (1271b30-40), or addresses the foreign influences on Cretan politics that are so apparent from his historical narratives (e.g., 4.53-5), but we have established that, for Polybius, a *politeia*'s capacity to maintain the integrity of the system in spite of outside influences is essential. This is why fact that the Spartans acted as *pleonektikoi* when it came to acquiring external territories (Polyb. 6.48.8-49.1) contributed to the breakdown of their state: the Lycurgan system set up *nomoi* and *ethē* that created the norms of moderation and concord that made Lacedaemonians behave when they were at home, but did not create a government and citizens who could retain these norms and restrain bad behavior inspired by *pleonexia* outside of their city.

If we look more broadly at the use of the term *pleonexia* and its cognates in the *Histories*, we can see that one of the effects of *pleonexia* upon individuals is to cause

²²⁵ Balot 2001: 28, n. 17: *Philotimia* can be a virtue or a vice. As a virtue, it is the healthy ambition of a male citizen; as a vice, it is ambition that strives for more than its due. Aristotle says that Lycurgus made the Spartan Ephors elected by acclaim because he did not want men lacking *philotimia* to rule; but he also says that *philotimia* and *philochēmatia* (love of money) are “exactly the motives which lead men to commit nearly all intentiona crimes” (1271a13-17; trans., Barker 1962). Balot goes on to argue throughout his book that, “*philotimia* and associated terms were often paired with *pleonexia* as a related mode of communally destructive excess.”

selfish behavior and create chaos that prevents orderly group action. Champion observes that the term and its cognate adjective *πλεονέκτης* appear more often with non-Cretan *ethnē* and are most frequently applied to the Aetolians.²²⁶ He also notes that the term often appears in Polybius where characters act not only with *pleonexia*, but with a lack of rationality that often jeopardizes their endeavors. For example, rapacious acquisitiveness, without intelligence, is on display when the Aetolians gain and lose the city of Aegira in a single day (4.57.2-58.12).²²⁷ Consumed by the opportunity to plunder (4.58.1: ἐκπαθειῖς ὄντες πρὸς τὰς ὠφελείας), the Aetolians scattered throughout the town, and were not prepared when the Aegirates rallied to defend themselves. It should be noted that none of the Cretans portrayed in any of the historical narratives display this species of chaotic acquisitiveness. Livy tells the story of *Cretenses* who were so overcome with greed that they overloaded a ship with treasure to the point that it sank in the river mouth,²²⁸ but there are no examples in the narrative of Polybius of Cretans demonstrating a similar irrational acquisitiveness. Such irrational acquisitiveness stands in pointed contrast to the behavior of Lagoras the *Krēs* and his Aetolian partner Theodotus: after planning and executing a climb over the walls of Sardis to break the siege for Antiochus III, these two

²²⁶ See Champion 2004: 242-3: three instances of *πλεονεξία* and its cognates for Cretans (6.46.3, 46.9, 47.4), nine for Aitolians (2.43.9, 45.1, 46.3, 49.3; 4.3.1, 3.5, 6.12; 9.38.6; 18.34.1).

²²⁷ Eckstein (1995: 74) notes that Polybius connects avarice to folly. For Champion (2004: 135-42), *pleonexia* is associated with Aetolians and other barbarians along with *alogia* and other terms that describe a lack of rationality, while rationality, or *logismos*, is associated with proper Hellenism (i.e. what is civilized).

²²⁸ Livy 44.45.13 (also Plutarch *Aem.* 23): Perseus, upon fleeing to Samothrace after his defeat at Pydna, leaves fifty talents on the shore at Amphipolis. His escort of *Cretenses* is desirous of being paid and tries to follow him in hopes of more pay (*spe pecuniae secuti*) in spite of the Thracians' doubts about the condition of the ships. The *Cretenses* pile so much treasure onto one of the ships that it sinks in the mouth of the river.

deliberately restrain themselves and their men from joining in the looting of the city, and hold themselves in reserve for the rest of the army.²²⁹

It seems clear that *pleonexia*, when it is an acceptable norm, hinders the ability for any political group to attain or sustain hegemony. On the opposite end of the *politeia* spectrum is the Roman *politeia*, where *pleonexia* is not normalized. Polybius praises the Roman system for its honest officials (6.56.2-3), who consider it shameful to take bribes or acquire (τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν) money unlawfully, and who consider *pleonexia* a reason for censure. He criticizes Greek bureaucrats in general for their dishonesty because it requires an absurd level of oversight in order to process large sums of money (6.56.13), while the Romans can administer affairs smoothly because they honor the oaths that they make (6.56.14: κατὰ τὸν ὄρκον πίστεως). Dealing with the dishonesty of individual Greeks (as well as Carthaginians),²³⁰ for the sake of easy personal acquisition, creates the need for red tape. In other words, the aggregate cost of individual aggrandizement is the hobbling of empire.

²²⁹ 7.18.8-10: οὗ συμβάντος οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Θεόδοτον καὶ Λαγόραν ἔμενον ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸ θέατρον τόπων, νουνεχῶς καὶ πραγματικῶς ἐφεδρεύοντες τοῖς ὅλοις, ἡ δὲ λοιπὴ δύναμις εἰσπεσοῦσα πανταχόθεν ἅμα κατειλήφει τὴν πόλιν. καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη, τῶν μὲν φονευόντων τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας, τῶν δὲ τὰς οἰκίσεις ἐμπιπρόντων, ἐγένετο παντελής ἡ τῆς πόλεως καταφθορὰ καὶ διαρπαγή. καὶ Σάρδεων μὲν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐγένετο κύριος Ἀντίοχος.

“After this, those with Theodotos [the Aetolian] and Lagoras [the *Krēs*] remained in the area below the theater, prudently and pragmatically holding themselves in reserve for all; the rest of the army fell in from all sides and seized the city. From then on, some of them slaughtering those they happened upon, some setting fire to houses, but others darting off to loot and pillage, the destruction and sack of the city was complete, and in this way Antiochus became master of Sardis.”

²³⁰ 6.56.2-3: Polybius does not call the Greeks *pleonektoi* in this passage, but he contrasts the bribe-taking of Carthaginian officials with the lack of bribes among the Romans.

B. *Duplicity*

Polybius attributes duplicity to Cretans twice, once using the term δόλος (4.8.11: deceit, or a trick) and once with its cognate adjective δολίος (6.47.5: deceptive). This quality tends to apply to the behavior of individuals rather than groups and can describe conduct in warfare or in other endeavors. As I noted above in the overview to the Cretan *politeia*, duplicitous behavior is one of the results – the other being *adikia* – of a *politeia* where *pleonexia* is normalized. Because of this universal quality, duplicity is not a quality limited to Cretans, even Polybius makes the association in superlative terms, suggesting that others too are duplicitous. Rather, Polybius uses Cretans once again demonstrate a moral failing that can be fundamentally detrimental to a *politeia* that, like Rome’s in the aftermath of Cannae, can survive and thrive as a hegemonic power.

In addition to Polybius’ depiction of *Krētaieis* as supremely duplicitous in Book 6, Polybius also refers to trickery (*dolos*) by *Krētes* in warfare. In a digression that includes an outline of the strengths and weaknesses of various *ethnē* at war (including Thessalians, Aetolians, Macedonians, and Achaeans), Polybius describes *Krētes* as excelling in indirect, non-formation forms of combat:

Κρήτες δὲ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν πρὸς μὲν ἐνέδρας καὶ ληστείας καὶ κλοπὰς πολεμίων καὶ νυκτερινὰς ἐπιθέσεις καὶ πάσας τὰς μετὰ δόλου καὶ κατὰ μέρος χρείας ἀνυπόστατοι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐξ ὁμολόγου καὶ κατὰ πρόσωπον φαλαγγηδὸν ἔφοδον ἀγεννεῖς καὶ πλάγιοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς: Ἀχαιοὶ δὲ καὶ Μακεδόνες τάναντία τούτων. (4.8.11)

Krētes, both on land and sea, are irresistible in ambushes and raids and covert maneuvers and nighttime attacks and all practices that employ deception and are carried out in small groups, but in the practice of frontal battle in formation, they are ignoble (unreliable) and wavering in their spirits; Achaeans and Macedonians are the opposite.

Polybius often uses *dolos* to describe behavior in military contexts, but never of Cretans.²³¹ He portrays *dolos* as a necessary evil in warfare of his day (9.12.2), though we should not believe his assertion that Hellenistic warfare had declined from honorable and straightforward warfare in the past.²³² Nor are all *doloi* necessarily malicious: Garsyeris, a general to the Seleucid lord Achaëus, uses a *dolos* to divert the enemy's attention away so that his army can reach a pass (5.72.6). The most repugnant *doloi*, however, involve manipulating the enemy's goodwill in order to do violence upon him when he least

²³¹ Fabius does not engage with Hannibal, suspecting a *dolos* (3.94.4); the Seleucid Garsyeris, general to Achaëus, uses a *dolos* to draw the enemy out of a pass (5.72.6); the Illyrian Scerdilaïdas attacks the friendly ships of Philip V's allies to recoup the money that Philip owes him (5.95.1); the writer Theopompos unfairly accused Philip II of using *dolos* or force (*bia*) to take cities (8.9.3); military operations used to be carried out more openly and with force (*bia*), but are now more likely to use *dolos* and opportunity (*kairos*) (9.12.2); the Carthaginians must give up their weapons and ammunition without *dolos* (36.6.6); the Carthaginians note that the Romans used to make war openly, without *dolos* (36.9.9). Also, *dolios* (6.47.5); Moagetes, the tyrant of Cibyra, is described as *dolios* and savage or cruel (ὀμός) (21.34.2). Non-military context for *dolos*: barbarians send an embassy to Hannibal as a *dolos* (3.52.3); the Aetolians use *dolos* and force (*bia*) against Spartans (4.34.9); the treacherous courtier Apelles uses *dolos* to satisfy his invidiousness (ζηλοτυπία) and *pleonexia* (4.87.4); Carthage and Macedon enter into alliance, with promises of neither *dolos* nor ambush (*enedra*) (7.9.8); the Romans ally with the Aetolians, forcing them to pay debts to other Greeks, without *dolos* (21.32.7); the Carthaginians observe that Roman diplomacy has employed *dolos* (36.9.10).

²³² Peter Krentz provides a list (2000: 183-200) of examples of military deceptions during the Archaic and Classical periods, and only one (Polyaenus 5.35) involves *Krētes*. And, of course, the most famous *dolos* is the Trojan Horse. Odysseus may have had certain Cretan-like associations, however. Christos Tsigalis (2012: 323-325) draws attention to the figure of Odysseus as both archer and ambusher. The disguised Odysseus, upon his return to Ithaca, tells a false story about spending his ten-year sojourn on Crete (*Od.* 14.199-234).

expects it – and it should be noted (see above n. 232) that many uses of *dolos*, both military and non-military, are associated with βία, “force.”

Cretans do perform acts of war that are covert or tricky, some against declared enemies – i.e., a necessary if problematic part of warfare – and some in betrayal of allies – i.e. worthy of condemnation. In the first category, among Cretans on Crete, would fall the sack of Lyttus, when the Knossians wait for the Lyttian men to depart for war against another enemy before attacking (4.54); into the second would fall the destruction of the *polis* of Apollonia by the Cydoniates, in spite of their *sumpoliteia* relationship (28.14). I will return to this episode in the next section. There are stories of the military specialists Lagoras and Bolis, both of whom originally serve the Ptolemies, but turn to the patronage of Antiochus III. Each proposes to the king a covert maneuver for infiltrating the besieged city of Sardis held by Achaeus, aspirant to the Seleucid throne. Lagoras (7.15-8), who has already left the service of the Ptolemies, plans and executes a scheme to capture Sardis that involves scaling its difficult cliff. Bolis (8.15-21) is originally hired by a Ptolemaic minister and friends of Achaeus to rescue the latter from his Sardis stronghold, but instead orchestrates his capture for Antiochus. As was observed, Polybius presents Lagoras the *Krēs* as professional, knowledgeable, and cool-headed. Lagoras is a helpful military expert who shows up at the right time. By contrast, Polybius uses a particularly heavy editorial hand in his account of Bolis the *Krēs*, making the protagonist’s Cretanness into a primary explanation for his mindset and actions. For example, Bolis is “Cretan by nature” and possesses a “Cretan outlook” – personal profit

and safety over previously made promises and the safety of Achaëus – which he shares with his Cretan friend, kinsman, and co-conspirator, Cambylus.²³³

The overwhelming Cretan commentary of this espionage narrative accompanies is somewhat distracting from a more universal reading of the episode: it is essentially a case study on how the duplicity of one person can cause people might not otherwise by duplicitous to employ duplicity in order to survive. Bolis and the man he entraps, Achaëus, are described in very similar language, emphasizing their military experience and natural intelligence. In an attempt to escape, Achaëus tries to “play the Cretan” and trick Bolis,²³⁴ and he nearly succeeds. Achaëus fails not from his own shortcomings, but is unwittingly betrayed by his friends, who are neither as crafty, nor as self-interested as he is. The men are presented as intellectual equals, and even have equal motivations to self-preserve and attain advantage. The substantive difference between the men becomes not a matter of ethnicity, but of circumstance (8.36.7-8).

Furthermore, if we look at the role of Antiochus in both the Bolis and Lagoras episodes, he plays the part of a patron who benefits from the chance appearance of experts who figure out how to accomplish something he and his advisors have hitherto

²³³ ὁ δὲ Βῶλις, ἅτε Κρής ὑπάρχων καὶ φύσει ποικίλος, πᾶν ἐβάσταζε πρᾶγμα καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπίνοιαν ἐψηλάφα. τέλος δὲ συμμίξας τῷ Καμβύλω... ἐποιοῦντο τὴν σκέψιν Κρητικὴν· οὐ γὰρ ἐσκόπουν ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ κινδενεύοντος σωτηρίας οὐδ' ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἐγχειρισάντων τὴν πρᾶξιν πίστεως, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτῶν ἀσφαλείας καὶ τοῦ σφίσις αὐτοῖς συμφέροντος. διόπερ ἀμφοτέροι Κρηῖτες ὄντες συντόμως κατηνέχθησαν ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην... (8.16.4-6) “Bolis, since he was a *Krēs* and wily by nature, was weighing the whole project and testing every possibility. When he finally met with Cambylus... they approached with a Cretan point of view: for they were concerned neither with the salvation of the man in danger, nor the trust of those who had commissioned the project, but on their own safety and their own advantage. Since both were *Krētes* they immediately came to the same opinion...” Here, the word ποικίλος can be translated as “wily” or “clever,” but elsewhere in Polybius means “complicated” (e.g. 9.24.2, describing the circumstances facing Hannibal) or “heterogeneous” (5.81.4, describing the multiethnic Ptolemaic army). See also Champion 2004: 5.

²³⁴ Polybius famously describes Achaëus as “playing Cretan to a Cretan” (8.19.5: πρὸς Κρητὰ κρητίζων).

been unable to do, and undertake the risk themselves because the king rewards this generously. In Polybius' book, this makes Antiochus vulnerable: he cannot accomplish these things on his own, and must rely on luck and outsiders who are themselves of unknowable credibility.²³⁵ A *Krēs* – or any chance subordinate – could be an intelligent, competent, moderate Lagoras, but he could easily be a Bolis – wily and self-serving.²³⁶ Had Bolis changed his mind and the *dolos*, and liberated Achaeus instead, he could have hurt Antiochus very badly.²³⁷

The emphasis on the Cretanness of Bolis, a character who, for the sake of gain, entraps and betrays the man he agreed to rescue, seems fairly consistent with Polybius' characterization of the men of the Cretan *politeia*, which is how Bolis the *Krēs* may serve as case study for duplicity. Just as the Cretan *politeia* becomes emblematic for how bad morals affect *politeia*, we might see Bolis, the product of a bad *politeia*, as similarly emblematic for how foreign subordinates from unknowable backgrounds and with acquisitive tendencies can potentially be a liability for the imperial institutions they serve. Philip V had – and was influenced by – both good- and bad-intentioned courtiers. The counselor that who influenced Philip to be at his best was Aratus of Sicyon, the Achaean

²³⁵ Polybius advises a general (9.14.2-3) before an operation being personally acquainted with a site is best, second to rely upon good inquiry. He should not trust chance informants (καὶ μὴ πιστεύειν τοῖς τυχοῦσι).

²³⁶ Another such case study is the story of Abilyx (3.98-9), an Iberian statesman who tricks the Carthaginian commander into giving up the Carthaginians' Iberian hostages so that he can transfer his allegiance to Rome. There are common elements in these narratives. Both emphasize the fact that the protagonist is foreign to the leader that he undermines, but finds co-conspirators against that leader among his own people: Abilyx's Iberian/barbarianness, like Bolis' Cretanness, is portrayed as an understanding based upon a shared ethnic background (*skepsis krētikē* / 3.98.4: συλλογισμὸν Ἰβηρικὸν καὶ βαρβαρικόν), and the plan comes together once the protagonist is able to mingle (συμμίξας) with people of his same *ethnos*.

²³⁷ I make this point in my 2016 SCS conference paper, "View to a Deception: Distrust and 'Cretan' Behavior in Polyb. 8.15-21."

prostatēs. Indeed, Polybius tells us that, so long as he is under Aratus' good influence, that Philip can influence the good in other, persuading even the *Krētaieis* to unite themselves under his leadership (7.14.4). Aratus, however, is an expert at backroom dealings and covert acts of warfare, and a spectacularly poor general in open combat (4.8). In stark contrast is the Macedonian courtier Apelles, a bad influence who also uses the excessive praise of his rivals in Philip's court in order to sabotage them. Polybius says that Apelles is not above "malicious action, malicious influence, and trickery" (κακεντρεχεία καὶ βασκανία καὶ δόλος) to get ahead in the royal court, driven as he is by jealousy (ζηλοτυπία) and *pleonexia* (4.87.4). Neither Aratus nor Apelles is Cretan – indeed, if we compare Aratus' strengths and weaknesses (4.8) with the abovementioned qualities that Polybius attributes to *Krētes* in war (4.8.11), the "good" courtier Aratus fights like a *Krēs*! But while Aratus manipulates Philip into acting for the betterment of many, Apelles seeks to undermine Aratus with deception for his own purposes.

The *dolos* of good men like Aratus and Achaeus should be viewed necessary and reasonable defenses against the efforts of self-interested and duplicitous individuals like Apelles and Bolis: for this reason, the duplicity of good men should also be viewed as a sign of the ill health of the system under which they operate. Within this context of good and bad men needing to arm themselves with tricks against one another, the *dolos* of Cretans becomes emblematic of the ways in which *dolos* can be a moral flaw with practical consequences. Thus, the model of the Cretan *politeia* shows how laws and customs can normalize *pleonexia* and promote a society of *dolioi* individuals. The capabilities of *Krētes* in war also model a type of warfare that is covert, secretive, and

shows the potential for treachery, but for all that is necessary for survival. The very Cretan Bolis episode showcases how self-interested and opportunistic subordinates who are cultural outsiders may offer great rewards to hegemonic employers, but could potentially bring high risks.

III. CRETAN VIOLENCE, OR, THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE CRETAN *POLITEIA*

The previous two sections have aimed to demonstrate the ways in which Polybius uses the Cretan *politeia* in a theoretical fashion. By identifying the negative features of the Cretan *politeia* – its pervasive attitude towards *pleonexia* and the duplicity of its citizens – Polybius shows his audience how the mere presence of these traits among its people demonstrates a weakness in any state. There are two considerations from this model that are most relevant apply to the study of the history of Hellenistic Crete and mercenaries from Hellenistic Crete. We have just explored the first point in detail: although Crete was not hegemonic, the hegemonies described in the *Histories* relied upon the talents of vast groups of people in order to function. Many of these people were foreigners who came from places that were less powerful than the hegemons they served. They brought with them their own motivations and cultural understandings, and they were not always as faithful to their employers or to the hegemonic project as their masters would have liked. Bolis and Lagoras might therefore be emblematic of a general anxiety about underlings such as mercenaries. The second, broader point is that, while Polybius' model is primarily concerned with the *politeiai* of hegemonies, Crete did not have any external hegemonic power, even though Aristotle said that it could have been

naturally suited to it. What is interesting about Crete is that, if it were the worst sort of *politeia*, one would expect it to fail. Yet throughout Polybius' accounts and, according to our historical knowledge throughout the Hellenistic period, Crete outlasted nearly all the major Hellenistic powers as an independent region. This is a paradox, which I take up in this last portion of the chapter.

If my hypothesis is correct, and Polybius intended his Book 6 "*Politics*" – his theoretical typology based upon "real" *politeiai* – to be a practical tool to aid his readers in interpreting events both historic and contemporary, it makes sense to use this tool for understanding the historical narratives of Hellenistic Crete. As was noted earlier, Polybius accompanies his historical narratives of Crete with editorializing comments, which in turn have created the impression for modern scholars of ancient history that conflict on Crete was more violent and frequent than in other parts of the Greek world. I suggest that there are two elements at play. On the one hand, these comments reinforce idea that Polybius' Cretan *politeia*, unlike the Cretan *politeiai* of the predecessors with whom he disagrees, is not idealized but based upon the evidence of real events on Crete. Thus, these remarks often criticize the Cretans for bad behavior that is no worse than bad behavior anywhere else, but the remarks also serve to reinforce his portrayal of the Cretan *politeia* in Book 6 as based in historical fact. On the other hand, Polybius may be commenting on the anomalous geopolitics on Crete: warfare consumes the island of Crete every so often, but instead of destroying itself completely, the *poleis* of Crete for the most part survive to fight each other once again, aided and abetted by foreign supporters. I will first present the evidence pool for Cretan warfare in Polybius, and then present two case

studies to show how these two interpretations work together to produce a historical reading of Polybius.

First, let us establish the evidence pool. Polybius provides five historical narratives of events on Crete. The most extensive is the first, the events of the Lyttian War around 220 BCE (4.53-5). Events took place at the same time as the Social War in mainland Greece, and the Cretan factions – Knossus and its allies against an alliance of cities originally led by Lyttus – took advantage of that conflict to solicit allied aid in return for sending allied aid to the warring parties in Greece. In this way, the Knossian party was aided by the Aetolians, and Philip V and the Achaeans sent aid to the opposing faction (4.55.5) after the Knossians destroyed Lyttus (4.54). The formerly pro-Lyttian faction used this aid to pressure other cities to leave Knossus and join them (4.55.4) Polybius tells us that, before this, the Rhodians were allied with Knossus and caused civil disturbances in Eleutherna (4.53.1-2), while the *polis* of Gortyn suffered internal fighting among its pro-Knossian and pro-Lyttian factions (4.53.7-9, 55.6). The other passages are relatively close together in the first half of the second century. One is a fragmentary account of the Roman Appius Claudius arbitrating disputes among various *poleis* in 184 BCE. Claudius intervened in a land dispute between Gortyn and Knossus, of which Rhaucus and Lyttus – refounded after its destruction – were the beneficiaries (22.15.1) and ordered Cydonia to leave Phalasarna (15.3). There is also reference to the killing of prominent citizens, perhaps in Phalasarna (15.6). Other fragments relate how the Cydoniates destroyed Apollonia, around 169 BCE (28.14), and how an attack by the Gortynians in a previous year prompted the Cydoniates to seek aid from Eumenes II in

the next year (28.15). In 165 BCE, the Knossians and the Gortynians made an agreement with one another to destroy Rhaucus (30.23.1). There is also a fragmentary remark, without historical context, about the interminable nature of warfare on Crete (24.3.3). The episodes are few, perhaps owing partly to the fragmentary nature of the *Histories* after Book 5, and there may be indications of lost episodes, perhaps in Book 13.²³⁸

From what survives we can see narratives with dense clusterings of events; we might consider that this clustering probably has to do with Polybius' decision not to write an annalistic history: he tends to begin his Cretan narratives *in medias res* at the point when they connect with external events. But the clustering might also reflect infrequency of warfare, as already observed in Chapter 2 with regard to siege warfare (pp. 98-102). Polybius says that Appius Claudius settled a *diaphora* between Knossus and Gortyn, which implies that this land dispute potentially could have become a cause of war, but it had not yet; indeed, the *Krētaieis* agreed settle (22.15.2), under Appius' good influence. If we remove this episode that depicts conflict resolution, we are left with only two time periods of conflict – the Lyttian War for perhaps three years in the last quarter of the third century and a series of violent actions in the second quarter of the second century, around fifty years later.²³⁹

Polybius' account of the Lyttian War is a good place to begin examining how the historical narratives might reinforce what Polybius says about the Cretan *politeia* in Book

²³⁸ This book includes the attempts by Philip V to incite Cretans to war against the Rhodians (13.4.2, 5.1); Nabis of Sparta's use of *Krētes* as archers (13.6.8); and Nabis' participation in Cretan piracy (13.8.2). 13.10.4-6 mentions the Cretan *poleis* Allaria, Ilattia, and Sibrytus. A fragment of unknown location (Fr. 85 (84)) mentions Hyrtacina.

²³⁹ Chaniotis (2005: 5-12) presents an overview of warfare in four locations in order to demonstrate the ubiquity of Hellenistic warfare

6 into his historical narrative and at the same time showcase the role of foreign interference in aiding and abetting war on Crete. Polybius begins the narrative with the Knossians' request for naval support from Rhodes and, subsequently, the declaration of war by the Eleuthernians against the Rhodians because they believe that the Rhodian navy murdered one of their citizens as a favor to the Knossians (4.53.1-2). Polybius then looks back to the earlier causes of the conflict:

Κνώσιοι συμφωνήσαντες Γορτυνίους πᾶσαν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν Κρήτην ὑφ' αὐτοὺς πλὴν τῆς Λυττίων πόλεως· μόνης δὲ ταύτης ἀπειθούσης, ἐπεβάλλοντο πολεμεῖν, σπεύδοντες αὐτὴν εἰς τέλος ἀναστατον ποιῆσαι καὶ παραδείγματος καὶ φόβου χάριν τῶν ἄλλων Κρηταιέων. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐπολέμουν πάντες οἱ Κρηταιεῖς τοῖς Λυττίοις: ἐγγενομένης δὲ φιλοτιμίας ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων, ὅπερ ἔθος ἐστὶ Κρησίην, ἐστασίασαν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους. καὶ Πολυρρήνιοι μὲν καὶ Κεραῖται καὶ Λαυπαῖοι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Ὅριοι μετ' Ἀρκάδων, ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἀποστάντες τῆς τῶν Κνωσίων φιλίας, ἔγνωσαν τοῖς Λυττίοις συμμαχεῖν, τῶν δὲ Γορτυνίων οἱ μὲν πρεσβύτεροι τὰ τῶν Κνωσίων, οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι τὰ τῶν Λυττίων αἰρούμενοι, διεστασίασαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. (4.53.4-7)

The Knossians, in concert with the Gortynians, brought all of Crete under them except for the city of the Lyttians: with this alone remaining defiant, they proceeded to war, seeking no less than its obliteration as an object lesson and fear for the other *Krētaieis*. So, at first all the *Krētaieis* made war against the Lyttians: but then, when some rivalry arose from the circumstances, as is the habit with *Krētes*, they were at odds with one another. The Polyrrhenians and the Ceraeans

and the Lappaeans, along with the Horii and Arcadians, all together separating from the friendship of the Knossians, decided to ally (συμμαχεῖν) with the Lyttians; among the Gortynians, the elder faction favoring the Knossians and the younger faction favoring the Lyttians fought (διεστασίασαν) amongst themselves.

The forms of violence of this narrative are certainly consistent with those described in the Cretan *politeia* digression in 6.46.9 (*stasis*, murder, and *emphulos polemos*), but whether they constitute injustice by Cretans is another matter. There is the murder of an Eleuthernian (4.53.2), *stasis* in Gortyn (4.53.7), and warfare (4.53.5) by weaker allies (Polyrrhenia and company) against the hegemonic leaders (Knossus and its Gortynian allies) – which could constitute an ἐμφύλιος πόλεμος, or “civil war.”²⁴⁰ Polybius attributes conflict to *philotimia* – as we recall, an Aristotelian component of *pleonexia* – and remarks that this behavior of the *Krētaieis* is typical of *Krētes*. However, even as he attributes conflict to the character of Cretans, his narrative also demonstrates how external alliances is an important component in promoting and sustaining war conflict.

The Rhodians, brought in by the Knossians, either provoke or seem to provoke rioting in

²⁴⁰ The adjective *emphulios*, which occurs a total of ten times within the *Histories*, exclusively modifies nouns describing some form of conflict (*polemos*, *stasis*, διάφορα, ταραχή), indicating that this conflict is taking place within what should ostensibly be a unified system. Polybius refers to conflicts on Crete twice as *emphulioi polemoi* and once as *emphulios diaphora*. The phrase *emphulios polemos* is used to describe the Romans fighting against their allies the Falisci (1.65.2), wars amongst Celtic peoples (2.18.4), infighting amongst the Aetolian *poleis* (30.11.4) and, sometimes, the Carthaginians’ war against their mercenaries (1.71.5). [Polybius frames the Carthaginians’ war against their mercenaries in parallel with the Romans’ *emphulios polemos*, as both the former rivals of the First Punic War suffered internal conflict with subservient peoples in its aftermath. Walbank (1957: I.131) observes, “the Carthaginian mercenaries were assisted by Libyan subjects of Carthage, who were probably themselves largely Carthaginianized.”] Polybius traces out the implications of a conflict that is “internal unrest and disorder” rather than “foreign and overseas war” in the Carthaginians’ Mercenary War (1.71.7: διὸ καὶ τότε σαφῶς ἐγνώσαν ἠλίκιην ἔχει διαφορὰν ξενικὸς καὶ διαπόντιος πόλεμος ἐμφυλίου στάσεως καὶ ταραχῆς), a conflict described by *emphulios* three times: in addition to needing to supply themselves and find their own soldiers, the Carthaginians were unable to summon the aid of friends and allies to help in either of these departments (1.71.6).

Eleutherna. The alliances (*summachein*) with the warring parties in the concurrent Social War (4.53.8, 55.2-4) allow both sides to grow in strength and continue to fight one another.

A second case study for how Polybius reinforces his remarks about the Cretan *politeia* while also drawing attention to how foreign influences sustain Cretan conflict is the surprise sack of Lyttus by the Knossians during the Lyttian War (4.54). Polybius' account evokes pity from the author. The Knossians, who had recently received aid from the Aetolian League (4.53.8-54.1), waited until the Lyttian men had left to fight another enemy, and then sacked the city. Polybius calls the destruction an "irremediable disaster" (4.53.3: ἀνηκέστῳ συμφορᾷ), describes the men of Lyttus returning home and so overcome with grief with the loss of their wives and children as to be unable to reenter the city before retreating to the sheltering hospitality of the Lappaeans (4.54.2-4), and mourns the loss a very old and Lacedaemonian city on Crete (4.54.6).

We can see how this act would be pitiable, but not necessarily egregious, if we compare it with the destruction of Apollonia by the Cydoniates, c.170. Polybius says that the Cydoniates had a *sumpoliteia* agreement with the Apolloniatas that had been inscribed and placed in the sanctuary of Idaean Zeus (28.14.3). Yet Polybius describes this act of betrayal as egregious even by the low standards of Cretan behavior:

...οἱ Κυδωνιάται κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἐποίησαν πρᾶγμα δεινὸν καὶ παράσπονδον ὁμολογουμένως. καίπερ γὰρ πολλῶν τοιούτων γενομένων κατὰ τὴν Κρήτην, ὅμως ἔδοξεν ὑπεραίρειν τὴν συνήθειαν τὸ τότε γενόμενον. (28.14.1-2)

The Cydoniates at that time committed a deed that was horrible and recognizably contrary to a treaty. For although there were many of these kinds of events on Crete, this particular event nevertheless was even worse than the usual.

This action would have been shocking to Greek culture, regardless of whether it took place on Crete, because it was an act of betrayal (*paraspondon*). The Apolloniaties had a close diplomatic relationship with the Cydoniates in their *sumpoliteia*.²⁴¹ Lyttus, in contrast, was the victim of tragic *tuchē*, and it might have been preventable if they had taken precautions,²⁴² but the Lyttians ultimately knew that Knossians were their enemies when they left the city unguarded. Polybius' editorializing acknowledges this, but also seeks to reinforce the impression of permissive norms on Crete as a result of the *pleonexia* that he attributes to the Cretan *politeia*.

Since the account of the destruction of Apollonia is fragmentary, we cannot say anything conclusive about foreign elements in the aftermath of the attack. In the case of Lyttus, however, we may note two foreign elements. First, the Knossians had recently acquired substantial allied aid from the Aetolian League (4.53.8-54.1), which they had recently used to drive help out the pro-Lyttian faction from Gortyn, and which probably played a role in their ability to sack Lyttus in the absence of the Lyttians. The second foreign element is another Cretan *polis*, Lappa, which took in the Lyttians immediately after the sack. Polybius says that the support of the Lappaeans allowed the Lyttians to

²⁴¹ Eckstein (1995: 24) observes that Polybius condemns it in moral terms.

²⁴² Polybius says that the Lyttians “left the city bereft of aid” (4.54.2: ἔρημον οὖσαν τῶν βοηθησόντων).

continue fighting against the Knossians in spite of no longer having a city.²⁴³ Knowing from later in Polybius' narrative (22.15.1) and archaeological evidence (Chaniotis 2012) that Lyttus was refounded, we should factor the support that the Lyttians received from the Lappaeans into the story of how Lyttus survived.²⁴⁴

Throughout this chapter, I have offered evidence for why Polybius' descriptions of Crete cannot be used as evidence that Crete was an excessively violent place in the Hellenistic world, and proposed a new reading based upon an understanding of Polybius' larger rhetorical aims. Even though warfare clearly took place on Crete, both in Polybius' historical narratives and in the documentation provided by inscribed sources, the quality of violence in warfare on Crete was not necessarily exceptional. Polybius is not completely untruthful about the Cretan *politeia*, but a fair reading of his remarks in Book 6 and Crete in his historical narratives needs to consider how his larger rhetorical purpose affects his remarks. That is, Polybius' primary interest in Book 6 is in hegemonic *politeiai*. To this end, he looks back to the *politeia* tradition – modeling his project on Aristotle's – to establish the Cretan *politeia* as an example to help his audience to understand the process by which political systems are brought down: permissive laws and customs normalize *pleonexia*; conflict results from normalized *pleonexia*; and duplicitous behavior motivated by *pleonexia* undermines institutions. It also shows how the true test

²⁴³ Polyb. 4.54.5: φιλανθρώπως δ' αὐτοὺς καὶ μετὰ πάσης προθυμίας τῶν Λαππαίων ὑποδεξαμένων, οὗτοι μὲν ἀντὶ πολιτῶν ἀπόλιδες ἐν ἡμέρᾳ μιᾷ καὶ ξένοι γεγονότες ἐπολέμουν πρὸς τοὺς Κνωσίουσ ἅμα τοῖς συμμάχοις.

“After the Lappaeans welcomed them humanely and enthusiastically, although they had become, instead of citizens, cityless and *xenoi* within a single day, they kept fighting against the Knossians and their allies.”

²⁴⁴ See Mackil 2004: 503-4 for a parallel example of on *polis* taking in a “wandering” *polis*.

of a good *politeia* is how long its institutions can withstand external influences. Crete was not a hegemonic power, and would not in itself be an object of primary interest, though Crete was more likely to contribute men to the hegemonic efforts of others.

Nevertheless, Crete in Polybius is a place where cities made use of external influences: foreign relations enabled Cretan cities to destroy one another, but also enabled Cretan cities to survive, whether through alliance or because there was always another potential ally somewhere else. Polybius remarks that the incessancy of Cretan conflict is a paradox, for “the beginning and ending [of troubles on Crete] are the same thing.²⁴⁵ He may not be referring to the exceptional frequency of violence on Crete, but instead to the ways in which cities that should have been destroyed kept returning, buoyed and enabled by new alliance partners.

Bearing this new interpretation of Polybius’ Crete in mind, we may now turn our attention to the study of the alliances that Cretan *poleis* made with one another, a handful of which contain clauses for mercenary recruitment (see Table 8) The next chapter (5) will argue that the *poleis* of Crete invested heavily in these relationships, including sending mercenaries as aid, allowing the recruitment of mercenaries, and using mercenaries abroad to form diplomatic connections. These external relationships, in turn,

²⁴⁵ 24.3: κατὰ δὲ τὴν Κρήτην ἀρχὴ πραγμάτων ἐκινεῖτο μεγάλων, εἰ χρὴ λέγειν ἀρχὴν πραγμάτων ἐν Κρήτῃ: διὰ γὰρ τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν ἐμφυλίων πολέμων καὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς εἰς ἀλλήλους ὀμότητος ταῦτόν ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος ἐστὶν ἐν Κρήτῃ, καὶ τὸ δοκοῦν παραδόξως τισὶν εἰρησθαι τοῦτ’ ἐκεῖ θεωρεῖται συνεχῶς [τὸ] γινόμενον. “On Crete, the beginning of great troubles started up – if one must talk about a beginning of troubles on Crete: for, due to the continuation of civil wars and their excess of cruelty to one another, on Crete, the beginning and ending [of troubles] are the same thing: [this is something that] has been said by people who seem to speak paradoxically, [but on Crete] it can regularly be seen as fact.”

sustained many of the *poleis* of Hellenistic Crete to resist the influences of more powerful players on and off the island.

Chapter 5: Mercenaries in Cretan Interstate *Summachia* Agreements

The previous chapters have sought to deconstruct the master narrative of Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries at three points: their exceptional numbers, their specialized fighting style, and the markedly violent society that produced them. In the first chapter, I examined the indicators by which scholars have identified mercenaries from Crete, and from which some have extrapolated that Crete was overpopulated. I observed these indicators were ambiguous: the term *Krēs* can, but does not reliably indicate, a mercenary from Crete, and even numbers of troops sent by specific Cretan *poleis* do not directly reflect the population of the *polis* that sent them. In the second and third chapters, I argued that the military use of *Krēs* – a type of light-armed skirmisher – was a product of hegemonic warfare and not directly representative of a divergent style of warfare on Crete characterized by the exceptional use of archery. In the fourth chapter, I proposed a new reading of the Cretan *politeia* in Polybius, and, using that reading, argued that his portrayal of the historical Crete represents not greater or more frequent violence on Crete, but rather that foreign alliances without foreign conquest allowed the *poleis* of Crete to continue fighting one another throughout the Hellenistic period. In sum, warfare on Crete did not necessarily employ weapons and tactics that were foreign to the experience of other Hellenistic Greeks – and actively sought after by employers – nor did the wars between Cretan *poleis* necessarily arise from a cultural propensity towards violence that was any greater than that of Greek *poleis* elsewhere.

None of this is any reason to tack in an opposite, revisionist direction, to say that Crete was exceptionally peaceful in the Hellenistic period, or that no Cretans went abroad

to fight – just as one cannot say, in the face of overwhelming evidence, that there was no piracy associated with Crete. There were clearly *some* inhabitants of Crete who left the island to fight abroad; some settled abroad, sometimes in emigrant communities of *Krētes*, as in Egypt, as Fischer-Bovet (2011) observed, and some may have returned to Crete. If we take these points into consideration with the work of the last four chapters, we can make the following observations about mercenaries from Crete:

1. Some men from Crete served in foreign armies. They reliably appear in the armies of the Ptolemies, the Antigonid Macedonians, and the Seleucids. Often their names appear in inscriptions with their home *polis* identified, but individual men labeled as *Krēs* on an inscribed list of soldiers were probably Cretans from Crete. There may have been some preference for having Cretans in command of *Krētes*, but this does not mean that they were in command of Cretan mercenaries.
2. Some Cretans did become *Krētes* fighters, or at least commanded them. Others, like Diodotus the Hyrtacinian, served as *thureophoroi* (p. 89). Some manned garrisons for foreign armies. Cretan citizen men may have received military training as part of the education system as citizen men did in *poleis* across the Greek world.
3. Some inscribed agreements set quotas for the number of soldiers a Cretan *polis* was obligated to send in the event of a request for allied aid (*summachia*). The category of men requested is “ally”, not “mercenary.” The agreements show that the foreign city may have had a preference for receiving citizens as allies, while the Cretan cities may have preferred to send someone other than their own

citizens. I have suggested that mercenaries would perhaps be among those who made up the difference between the number of citizens a *polis* was obligated to send and the total number of soldiers requested, and I will support that suggestion in this chapter.

4. Going to serve as a mercenary was an act on the level of an individual rather than a state, but it should not be treated as a “private” act, and it could have far reaching diplomatic implications at the community level.

As I observed in the Introduction to this dissertation, there are also inscribed Cretan interstate alliances that provide evidence for the recruitment of mercenaries. The inclusion of these recruitment stipulations is a rarity among Hellenistic interstate documents: only four documents do so, and three are from Crete.²⁴⁶ The terms for this recruited force of mercenaries, *ξενολόγιον*, and its cognates *ξενολογέω* (to recruit mercenaries) and *ξενολογία* (a recruitment), are very rare.²⁴⁷ The rarity of this terminology and its association with Cretan *poleis* suggests that there may be something idiosyncratic about Crete and its mercenaries, especially in the late third and early second centuries BCE. Since I have argued that Crete was neither desperate under demographic strain, nor specialized in its fighting industry, nor exceptional in its culture of political

²⁴⁶ The three Cretan inscriptions all date from the second half of the third century, to the beginning of the second century: *IC* III.iii.1A: Macedon and Hierapytna, c. 227-224 BCE; *IC* III.iii.3A: Rhodes and Hierapytna, c. 200 BCE; *IC* II.iii.4C: Attalus II of Pergamon and Aptaera, c. 241-197 BCE. The fourth, *IvP* II.268, is between Ephesos and Sardis, and dates to c. 98-94 BCE.

²⁴⁷ Two honorific inscriptions, *IC* I.xvi.35 and *I.Kition* 2023, mention recruited men (*ξενολογηθέντες*) among the dedicators, but Cretan men are mentioned in neither. Although *IC* I.xvi.35 (early 2nd century BCE) is from the port of Lato-pros-Kamara on Crete, the dedication is by the Rhodians and soldiers recruited from mainland Greece, not Crete. *I.Kition* 2023 (170-45 BCE) is an honorific statue on Cyprus for a Ptolemaic commander from Lamia (Boiotia), dedicated by recruited men whose origins are unknown.

and social violence, this idiosyncrasy must be explained in some other way. In addition to the evidence for mercenaries provided by these *xenologia* clauses, several Cretan agreements include loyalty clauses.²⁴⁸ I will suggest that these clauses may have acknowledged the likelihood that citizens of a partner city might go to war in an individual capacity as mercenaries, and they codified this likelihood in the alliance by presenting the possibility that a citizen might, as a mercenary for a third party, be placed into the position of attacking his home city's allied partner.

This chapter proposes that mercenary recruitment should be considered as a way in which treaty partners could demonstrate meaningful support for one another without the obligations attendant upon allied military aid. In support of this proposal, I examine mercenary recruitment from the point of view of the partners, observing how *xenologia* functions within the overall organization of agreements in contrast to other types of armed assistance. I first examine the placement of the provision concerning *xenologia* within the overarching organization of an extensive and mostly complete inscribed treaty between the southeast Cretan *polis* of Hierapytna and the powerful maritime democracy of Rhodes (*IC* III.iii.3A, c. 200 BCE). I then study the terminology for alliance and mercenary recruitment that occurs in other similar agreements and in literary sources. In order to aid the reader, all Cretan interstate documents that employ the terminology being examined are listed in Table 8 at the end of this chapter. The relevant line numbers in each inscription are provided for each of the following headings, which will be further

²⁴⁸Chaniotis 1991 no. 4, Magnetto no. 43, *IC* III.iii.1A, *IC* III.iii.3A, *IC* III.iii.5, *IC* III.iv.8, *IC* IV.179. For the line numbers in which these terms and formulae appear, please see Table 8.

explained in the body of this chapter: *Boēthia* and Related Terms (*boēthia* and cognates such as βοηθεῖν and formulae such as κατὰ τὸ δύνατον); *Summachia* and Related Terms (*summachia* and cognates such as συμμαχεῖν); *Xenologia* and Related Terms (*xenologion* and ξενολογεῖν); Loyalty Clauses, a broad category that deals with the consequences of citizens or soldiers sent by one treaty partner who are disobedient to or attack the other treaty partner. These include individual loyalty oaths, clauses that define loyalty based upon citizenship, and fines for a breach of loyalty. Booty Distribution: terms for the division of the spoils of war won by two treaty partners who collaborate in the victory. It is included because I consider it as a form of remuneration, alongside payment in currency, and Payment: wages for soldiers established in denominations of currency. The final column records Miscellaneous Observations: unusual variations in formulae (e.g., using the verb ἐπιμελέσθω (to manage or look out for) with a formula that is normally applied to *boēthein* (IC III.iii.3A, l. 61)) and uncertainties in the epigraphic text.

This analysis will show that there were different advantages and obligations for alliance partners depending upon which type of aid was invoked. Allowing an ally license to recruit mercenaries under prearranged conditions would be one strategy to demonstrate tangible support without violating the terms of other alliances. An important consideration is that, although the *poleis* of Crete had alliance networks amongst themselves and with outside powers, they were not controlled *en masse* by a single powerful external player at any point before the Roman conquest in 67 BCE. Offering mercenary recruitment – which carried fewer attendant obligations than other forms of support – might enable Cretan *poleis* to establish meaningful external relationships and

maintain their independence among larger *poleis* and powers. Likewise, those external powers may have viewed mercenary recruitment on Crete as a solution to the problem of manpower that was less diplomatically complicated than was the acquisition of soldiers elsewhere because the ties among Cretan *poleis* and especially between Cretan *poleis* and more powerful foreign players were always more flexible than for many *poleis* in other regions of the Greek world.

I. CASE STUDY: IC III.III.3A

I begin with a case study of how different types of aid compare with one another. Scholars have associated the aforementioned Rhodian-Hierapytnian agreement – though not securely – with events of the First Cretan War, which began around 205 BCE.²⁴⁹ According to the vague description of Diodorus (27.3), the Rhodians went to war against Cretan pirates who were attacking merchants. IC III.III.3A is one of three Rhodian treaties with Cretan cities, the other two being with Olous (*SEG* 23:547) and Chersonesus (Chaniotis 1991 no. 4). It is remarkable for its length and preservation,²⁵⁰ and is one of

²⁴⁹ Perlman (2000: 133, 136-7) is notably skeptical of this association. The only inscription that has been securely linked to this war and Cretan piratical activity is *Tit. Calymni* 64. There are two problems that need to be addressed somewhere else. First, *Tit. Calymni* 64 makes no explicit reference to piracy, claiming instead that the Hierapytnians “made war unjustly” on the people of Calymnus (ll. 4-5: ἐπειδὴ τῶι σύμπαντι δάμωι πολέμου ἐξενεχθέν[το]ς ὑπὸ Ἱεραπυτνίων ἀδίκως). Second, Calymnus, a deme of Cos, was allied with Rhodes (Carlsson 2010: 121-3): if IC III.III.3A predates *Tit. Calymni* 64, an attack on Calymnus would be “unjust” because it would contradict the terms of the *summachia*. I agree with de Souza (2008: 75) that the main goal of IC III.III.3A is to establish a working relationship for fighting piracy. Perlman (135) notes that IC III.III.3A does not contain a clause making peace: there is no need to assume that this *summachia* represents a cessation of hostilities between Rhodes and Hierapytna at the end of the war (c. 201 or 200), as many scholars have done (see Perlman 2000: 135 n. 15) or even early in the war (c. 205 or 204), as Brulé (1978: 51-4) suggests.

²⁵⁰ IC III.III.3 is inscribed on blue-gray limestone, 0.73 m across and 1.065 m high, and broken in two places. There are three separate texts, perhaps four, inscribed on it (Guarducci 1942: III.31): A, discussed here, on the front face, and B and C on the back face, upside down in relation to A. The stone was taken from Crete to Venice where it was incorporated into the walls of at least two buildings before being

the three Cretan documents (along with *IC* III.iii.1A and *IC* II.iii.4C) that discuss *xenologia* explicitly.

There are two reasons for choosing *IC* III.iii.3A as a starting point for examining *xenologia* in comparison with other forms of military aid. First, the agreement mentions *xenologion* in counterpoint with *boēthia* and *summachia* so the terms can be compared. *Boēthia* is aid sent in response to a direct threat to a *polis*' existence.²⁵¹ *Summachia* is allied military aid that is sent in accordance with stipulations laid out in an alliance, or *summachia*.²⁵² Although the agreement elaborates upon this terminology in greater detail than is typical for contemporary interstate agreements, it still deploys these terms in a way that is consistent with contemporary use, as will be seen. Second, its Hierapytnian *summachia* clause (ll. 15-39) has been interpreted – most recently by Jean-Christophe Couvenhes (2016b: 202-6) – as an example of a state-sponsored mercenary contract: that is, the Cretan *polis*, rather than a private individual, acts as the recruiter, or *xenologos* (Launey 1949: I.27; Chaniotis 2005: 83). Matthew Trundle (2008: 105) observes similarities between the *summachia* clause of *IC* III.iii.3A and *OGIS* 1.266, a *sui generis* mercenary contract between Eumenes I (r. 263-241) and his mercenaries garrisoned at

removed to the Venetian Museum in the early twentieth century. The first 70 lines of A were lost, but copied down before they were destroyed and preserved in Codex Ambrosianus R117. Guizzi (2001: 362, no. 19) notes that whoever made the manuscript copy did not adhere to the convention of preserving the line as it appears on the stone (i.e., the portions of the inscription from the destroyed faces are only fifty letters across, while those on the preserved faces are seventy letters across). The point is that 70% of this inscription cannot be evaluated by an epigrapher, but it has not been rejected by any editors, either: therefore, since the use of terminology and dialect in the transcription seem consistent with the time and the place, it is reasonable to proceed in the analysis, though aware of the limitations.

²⁵¹ This aid was often military, but it could also be financial or the donation of supplies.

²⁵² The term *summachia* can mean both “allied military aid” and “the agreement that lays out the circumstances for requesting and sending said allied military aid.” In my discussion below, I distinguish between these by referring to the former as “*summachia* aid” and the latter as “*summachia* agreement.”

Philetaireia-under-Ida and Attaleia, which also discusses *opsōnion*, or payment. But the treatment of the *summachia* clause in *IC III.iii.3A* as a “mercenary contract” is also partly rooted in the contention (Launey 1949: I.35-6) that mercenaries were used as allies, so the same men could have, in effect, been mercenaries or allies. While Launey is correct to observe that the same men could have been allies or mercenaries,²⁵³ this point has led scholars to interpret the egress of soldiers from Crete as driven by demographic pressures. When enterprising individuals left Crete of their own accord in response to its bad conditions, it is termed “mercenary service” (e.g. Brulé 1978: 163; Chaniotis 2005: 82-3), while *summachiai* enabled the *poleis* to rid themselves of bad elements (Petropoulou 1985). In Chapter 1, I argued that the quotas in *IC III.iii.3A* were more likely to reflect reluctance, rather than eagerness, on the part of Hierapytna to dispatch its citizens to the Rhodians as allies, or *summachoi* (pp. 63-8). If we remove demographic pressures as a consideration for studying Cretan mercenaries, it seems reasonable to ask what role *xenologia* played in the overarching organization of the partnership between Rhodes and Hierapytna.²⁵⁴ The following close reading analysis of *IC III.iii.3A* embraces the premise that law can be used to establish norms – what Julie Velissaropoulos-Karakostas (forthcoming) terms as “soft law.” In other words, an agreement like *IC III.iii.3A* should not be read solely as a direct response to problems, but also for the hypothetical way in which the parties envision their relationship and the expectations they have for one another.

²⁵³ Launey’s approach to this question is also problematic, because he essentially argues it from a Roman perspective (see pp. 27-8).

²⁵⁴ See also Carlsson (2010: e.g. 84-99) for a similar approach to terminology in *polis* inscriptions.

IC III.iii.3A is a bilateral agreement. It is a *summachia*, or alliance, and its subject is war. The war element makes it different from other interstate agreements that Cretan cities make in which provisions for war also appear: *IC III.iii.3A* contains no clauses relating to economic conditions, or provisions²⁵⁵ that give citizens of one of the partner cities some form of legal standing in the other(s). There would certainly be economic consequences of some of the conditions, such as the Rhodians' use of Hierapytna's harbors and moorings (l. 10) and the protection offered Hierapytna's maritime revenues (ll. 66-8), but the primary object of the document is to establish a relationship between the cities for war.

The *summachia* first presents the obligations that the Hierapytnians owe to the Rhodians, then the obligations that the Rhodians owe to the Hierapytnians. The respective of each *polis* are described in the same order: *boēthia* (βοαθειν), *summachia*, and *xenologia* (ξενολόγιον). There is also a fourth section for each partner that relates to fighting piratical groups, or ληστήρια (see Figure 8 below).

²⁵⁵ Chaniotis (1996: 135) points to archaic and classical examples in Cretan treaties with this type of clause, which he calls "*Rechtshilfe*." These provisions are to be distinguished from third-party arbitration (148).

	Hierapytna	Rhodes
βοήθεια	lines 12-15	lines 64-66
συμμαχία	15-39	66-77
ξενολόγιον	41-43	84-85
loyalty clause	45-48 (ξενολόγιον)	77-79 (συμμαχία)
ληστήρια ²⁵⁶	48-58	79-82

Figure 8: Respective obligations for Hierapytna and Rhodes, by line number.

A. *Boēthia*

Boēthia appears first. These clauses (ll. 12-15 for Hierapytna, 64-66 for Rhodes) are accompanied by the standard formula, that aid should be sent “with every effort, according to their ability” (ll. 14-15: βοαθεῖν... παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν). Hierapytna is to respond to a call from Rhodes for *boēthia* if someone leads an army (ll.

²⁵⁶ This is not the place to treat the implications of these clauses in detail, but I suggest that they should also be considered alongside *xenologia* as an arrangement that does not fit under the category of *boēthia* or *summachia*: it involves the Rhodians making use of Hierapytnian facilities, resources, and manpower (ll. 10-1, 60-4) in order to pursue *lēistai*, who are not a “legitimate” enemy – i.e., not another enemy (*polemia*) *polis* upon whom war can be declared or against whom *boēthia* and *summachia* may be sought from one’s allies. The seriousness of asking to use Hierapytnian resources to fight an illegitimate enemy, and the power demonstrated by the Hierapytnians who having these resources at their disposal, may partly explain why Hierapytna is permitted to retain its independent foreign policy within the bounds of the agreement, while Olous, whose agreement with Rhodes (*SEG* 23: 547) does not discuss such resources and probably does not have them, is not.

12-13: στρατεύηται) against the city or its *chora*, or destroys “its laws or byways or its established democracy.” Rhodes, however, will only send *boēthia* if an army led by a “king or dynast or whosoever else leads an army against the city of the Hierapytnians” (ll. 64-65); for recourse to attacks on its seaways or democracy, the Hierapytnians must request *summachia* instead (ll. 66-69). Rhodes also pledges to come to Hierapytna’s aid if it is attacked by groups affiliated with pirates as a result of its collaboration with Rhodes (ll. 79-82). *Boēthia*, then, is a type of aid that responds to a direct and imminent threat to the survival of the *polis*.

B. *Summachia*

The clauses dealing with *summachia* – in its sense as a particular type of military aid– are the most detailed in the document. The stipulations for both Hierapytna (ll. 15-39) and Rhodes (ll. 66-77) specify the amount of time within which that aid must be sent, describe the type of military aid that must be sent, set a rate of remuneration that the partner *polis* must pay for the use of this aid over a circumscribed period of time, and prescribe the circumstances in which the allied aid may be requested. In both cases (ll. 16-18; 74-75), if the request for allied aid is acceptable to the partner city, that city has thirty days from the arrival of that request to send the *summachia*. From here, the stipulations differ for each *polis*. Hierapytnian *summachia* consists of:

ἄνδρας διακοσίους ὄπλα ἔχοντας, εἴ
κα μὴ ἐλασσόνων χρεῖαν τῶν ἔχωντι Ῥόδιοι: τῶν δὲ ἀποστελλομέ-
νων ἐόντων μὴ ἐλάσσους τῶν ἡμίσεων Ἱεραπύτνιοι. (ll. 18-20)

...(let the Hierapytnians send) two hundred men bearing weapons, unless the Rhodians have need of fewer; let no fewer than half of those sent be Hierapytnians.

The Rhodian *summachia* would consist of two triremes (l. 70). One clear difference is that the Hierapytnians provide infantry and the Rhodians provide naval power. This difference bears out in stipulations for remuneration. For the Hierapytnians (ll. 25-35), there appears to be no time limit on how long their men may remain abroad, but the stipulations change after the first four years of the agreement. Initially, the Rhodians will pay nine Rhodian obols per day to each of the rank-and-file *summachoi*, and two drachmas per day to officers with fifty or more men under their command. After four years, the Hierapytnians would be responsible for providing payment (τὰ ὀψώνια) to their own men for the first thirty days, after which the Rhodians would pay them at the aforementioned rates. (*Opsōnia* is a term that means “payment, and a little extra”; soldiers would use this funding to feed themselves and for general upkeep such as weapons maintenance.) For the Rhodians: upon a request for *summachia* from the Hierapytnians, the Rhodians (ll. 71-72) would pay for the triremes for the first two months, after which the Hierapytnians would pay ten thousand drachmas per month per ship. It is notable that the rates of payment are specified only in the cases when the partner city is doing the paying: so, the Rhodians do not say how much they would pay for the upkeep of their own ships, nor do they set the rate for the Hierapytnians to pay their own soldiers when they are abroad. It is also worth observing that the payment to

the Hierapytnian *summachoi* over a thirty-day month is reasonably comparable to the amount that the Rhodians charge for the use of one ship over one month.²⁵⁷

In some ways, establishing the legitimate grounds for which one party can summon *summachia* from the other is one of the most complicated parts of this agreement. The grounds for which the Hierapytnians may request allied aid from the Rhodians are relatively clear:

εἰ δέ τις

κα τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαίου γινομένας ποθόδους ἐκ θαλάσσης
παραιρῆται Ἱεραπυτνίων ἢ τὰν καθεστακυῖαν δαμοκρατίαν
παρὰ Ἱεραπυτνίοις καταλύη καὶ συμμαχίαν μεταπέμπωνται
Ἱεραπύτνιοι... (ll. 66-70)

But if someone should take away the Hierapytnians' just revenue from the sea (Perlman 2000: 153) or should bring down the democracy established among the Hierapytnians, and the Hierapytnians send for allied aid...

This clause describes two concrete scenarios in which it would be acceptable for Hierapytna to request aid from Rhodes. The stipulations for the Rhodians, in contrast, are not specified (l. 15-16), except in the sense that they are not emergency conditions like those for *boēthia*. However, in the event that either *polis* is already at war, the terms of *summachia* are commuted to what are essentially *boēthia* terms (ll. 20-22: ὅσους κα[τα] δυνατὸν ἦι αὐτοῖς; ll. 72-73). There are also provisions for the possibility that either *polis*

²⁵⁷ Based upon a thirty-day month and one Rhodian drachma = six Rhodian obols: 9 obols times 30 days times 200 men is 54,000 obols, or 9000 drachmas. If we add to this the pay of the leaders – 2 drachmas times 30 days times 4 leaders – the pay is 240 drachmas per month. 9240 drachmas compares with the 10,000 drachmas for the support of one trireme, with its complement of about 200 rowers and crew.

might have *summachia* relationships with other *poleis*: the Hierapytnians must send *summachia* to Rhodes if Rhodes is attacked by an ally of Hierapytna, but not if the Rhodians themselves start the war (ll. 35-39); Rhodes will not enter the Hierapytnians' current war against Knossus and its allies, nor will it send *summachia* for a war that has not been approved by the Rhodians (ll. 73-76: ἀνεῖν τᾶς Ῥοδίων γνώμας). And while the Rhodians reserve the right to not send *summachia* without first approving the Hierapytnians' request, it is significant that the Hierapytnians can still make alliances and begin wars independently of Rhodes, all the while remaining within the bounds of their *summachia* agreement.

In Chapter 1, the quotas of *IC* III.iii.3A were compared with those in *SEG* 23: 547, a contemporary *summachia* agreement between Rhodes and the northeastern Cretan city of Olous. It was noted that, although the Rhodians seem to ask for twice as many men from the Hierapytnians as from the Oluntians, the quota of 200 Hierapytnians is an absolute maximum, whereas the 100 Oluntians is a minimum and the *per diem opsōnia* for Hierapytnian *summachoi* was greater by one obol than the *opsōnia* for an Olountian. In addition to this, the *summachia* of the Oluntians with the Rhodians requires that the Oluntians dissolve all preexisting *summachia* agreements with other parties, and prohibits them from starting any wars that do not meet with the approval of the Rhodian *dēmos*. Thus, even though Rhodes may refuse to collaborate in some wars with Hierapytna, it is significant that the conditions of *summachia* do not forbid the Hierapytnians from making independent decisions about war and alliance.

C. *Xenologion* and Loyalty Clauses

The clauses regarding ξενολόγιον and its cognate verb (ξενολογέω) follow the clauses for *summachia* aid. There are two components to Hierapytna's *xenologion* provision: the protection of the partner city's *xenologion* and the individual loyalty clause. Although Rhodes has a similar *xenologion* provision, its loyalty clause is placed just after its provision about *summachia* – a distinction to which we will return.

The protection clauses allow the partner city to recruit mercenaries, and guarantee that these mercenary forces will be protected “with every effort,” as with *boēthia*. This would protect a Rhodian *xenologion* when on Crete (l. 40) and a Hierapytnian *xenologion* in Asia Minor (l. 82). On Crete, the Hierapytnians (ll. 41-43) must guarantee the safety of the *xenologion* “in the city,” as well as “in their *chora* and in the islands” – in other words, not all of Crete, but within areas of Hierapytnian control. The Rhodians permit the Hierapytnians to recruit in Asia for a war that does not involve them (ll. 82-83: εἰς ἴδιο[v] πόλεμον) and, as with *summachia* aid, will provide transport over the sea. For each party, then, the protection of its partner's *xenologion* does not extend beyond its respective sphere of influence: the Hierapytnians have power within their territory on land and Rhodes has power in certain parts of Asia Minor. As for the *summachia* force, there is provision for transport, which might provide an opportunity for the Rhodians to express disapproval towards a Hierapytnian enterprise (for example, by not providing transport quickly or efficiently); yet the Rhodians are not permitted to work actively against a *xenologion* of the Hierapytnians (ll. 84-85), and the Hierapytnians may allow other powers to recruit within their sphere of influence on Crete, so long as the resulting

xenologion is not intended for use against Rhodes (ll. 44-45). This is significant because not only does the *summachia* with Rhodes allow Hierapytna latitude for an independent foreign policy, but the *xenologion* protections and transport offer the Hierapytnians a way to gain manpower with the help of Rhodes for a war in which the Rhodians would not otherwise be involved.

Although the placement of the loyalty clauses differs, the clauses themselves are identical.²⁵⁸ In both cases, an individual (Ἱεραπυτνίων μηθείς / Ῥοδίων μηθείς) may not march in an army against the partner city on any pretext whatsoever (εστατευέσθω ... παρευρέσει μηδεμιᾷ); doing so will make him liable to the penalties for attacking his own home *polis*. For both cities, those who may have done so before the agreement was made are exempted. While this document does not contain any formal oaths by individuals, it nevertheless turns an individual's behavior with regard to the partner city into a matter of loyalty to one's own *polis*, perhaps with the legal, religious, and social implications that loyalty to one's own *polis* would entail.²⁵⁹

This treaty is therefore not simply a matter of two states agreeing to a *summachia*, but also applies the terms of *summachia* to every individual citizen, whether he is at home or abroad. If this is indeed the case, then the differing placement of these identical formulae anticipates the scenarios in which individual citizens of each *polis* would be

²⁵⁸ Chaniotis (1991 no. 4) identifies the same loyalty clause formula in an extremely fragmentary agreement, *IC* I.vii.1, between Rhodes and Chersonesus.

²⁵⁹ Adriaan Lanni (forthcoming) has noted the ways in which litigants attacked the character of the opponent in Attic forensic speeches. She argues that one purpose of bringing these to light was an effort to punish an opponent for past violations of norms, whether they fell under the purview of the case or the law itself, or not. The loyalty clause can be considered such a norm: a violation of this norm might not result in immediate and direct prosecution, but it might be the sort of action that could make the offender vulnerable to character assassination later.

most likely positioned to participate in an attack on the partner city. For Hierapytna, the loyalty clause immediately follows the clause in which Hierapytna is prevented from allowing any *xenologion* against Rhodes. This indicates two things: first, that Rhodes has the privilege to recruit from the Hierapytnian sphere of influence and second, it is possible that Hierapytnian citizens might end up as mercenaries in a foreign army fighting against Rhodes. The individual loyalty clause for Rhodes is placed right after the clause in which Rhodes will reject any request by Hierapytna for *summachia* aid in the latter's war against Knossus and its allies. This placement suggests that Rhodes is not simply reluctant to become embroiled in an ongoing conflict: there may have been a risk that citizens of Rhodes, following the traditional ties between Rhodes and Knossus,²⁶⁰ might become involved in that struggle, and take up arms against Hierapytna.

The *xenologion* and loyalty clauses should be considered within the context of earlier remarks on *summachia* and the significant fact that both parties can continue with an independent foreign policy, albeit within limits. Both partners can only invoke *boēthia* and *summachia* under prescribed circumstances; however, granting permission to recruit a *xenologion* within the other party's sphere, under circumstances that do not meet the requirements of either *boēthia* or *summachia*, allows both sides the option to support each other without getting directly involved in a conflict. Similarly, although the loyalty clauses might be read as a way of controlling the actions of citizens, they also frame the nature of the relationship between the Rhodians and the Hierapytnians – as a *summachia*

²⁶⁰ In addition to the Knossian *boēthia* to Rhodes during its siege by Demetrius Poliorcetes in 305 (DS 20.88.9), Rhodes sent naval aid to Knossus during the Lyttian War in 220 (Polyb. 4.53.1-2), two decades before the proposed date of this agreement.

not only between *poleis*, but between the individual *politai* of these *poleis* – and it acknowledges the possibility of independent action on the part of citizens while also setting limits to it. In other words, the *xenologion* clauses both facilitate and circumscribe independent action on the state level, while the loyalty clauses acknowledge and circumscribe independent action on the individual level.

II. AID TERMS IN CONTEXT

The previous section presented a close reading of *IC* III.iii.3A that focused upon the way in which that agreement deployed the terminology of military aid, specifically how the conditions associated with *xenologia* compared with the obligations attendant upon *boēthia* and *summachia*. As was noted before, *IC* III.iii.3A is atypical for the quantity of detail it provides, as well as the fact that it includes *xenologia* as a possible option for gaining manpower alongside *summachia* and *boēthia*. This section will examine the wider use of the terms *boēthia* and *summachia* in order to show that, despite the atypical elaborateness of *IC* III.iii.3A, their use in that document is typical of their general use in the literary sources and interstate agreements of the Hellenistic period.²⁶¹ It will then lay out the evidence for *xenologia* on Crete.

A. *Boēthia*

In the epigraphic record for the Hellenistic period, *boēthia* appears in different types of interstate agreements: *summachiai* like *IC* III.iii.3A, *ισοπολιτεῖαι* (joint and

²⁶¹ Literary sources are quoted in the Appendix. Epigraphic sources are in Table 8 and their relevant passages also quoted in the Appendix.

theoretically equal citizenship between two *poleis*), and even ἀσυλείαι (declarations of inviolability). Provisions and formulae for *boēthia* are somewhat more frequent than *summachia* in Cretan documents, as can be seen in Table 8,²⁶² and *boēthia* appears frequently in Polybius to describe military aid.²⁶³ The verb *boēthein* usually appears with variations of the formula “with every effort according to their ability” (παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δύνατον), as it does in *IC III.iii.3A*.²⁶⁴ *Boēthia* is a quasi-essential element of *summachia* agreement; however, it differs from *summachia* aid in that it tends not to include other prearrangements such as number of troops or type of aid. It often consisted of troops, though in some cases, funds or supplies might be sought or offered instead. The imminent threat to the survival of the *polis* is the defining feature of this type of aid, sent by one ally to another ally in distress:²⁶⁵ thus, in *IC III.iii.3A*, both Rhodes and Hierapytna promised to send *boēthia* in response to a direct threat from an external enemy. What makes *IC III.iii.3A* somewhat atypical is the ways in which it limits the use of *boēthia*: for example, Hierapytna must request *summachia* for threats to its democracy or seaways (ll. 66-69), but Rhodes will provide *boēthia* in the event that *poleis* working with *lēistēria* attack Hierapytna directly (ll. 79-82). In other words, *IC III.iii.3A* is more

²⁶² Out of 67 total inscriptions in Table 8, 29 inscriptions mention *boēthia* without reconstruction and, 23 mention *summachia* without reconstruction.

²⁶³ *Boēthia* appears 85 times and *boēthein* 167 times in Polybius. *Summachia* appears 150 times. It would be useful to have further study of diplomatic terms in Polybius in order to see how his use correlates with use in the epigraphic sources.

²⁶⁴ An early variation on this formula is preserved in *Meiggs & Lewis* no. 42, a fifth century agreement among Argos, Knossus, and Tylissus: ll. 22-3: ὀφέλεν παντὶ σθένει.

²⁶⁵ E.g. in the 220s, the Cytēnians of Doris sought *boēthia* from the Xanthians in Lycia in the form of funds to rebuild the walls of their *astu* after Antigonos Doson destroyed them (*SEG* 38: 1476; Mackil 2004: 502-3).

specific than usual about the circumstances for *boēthia*, but the premise of making “every effort according to ability” remains.

One would expect to see direct benefits to having allies who promise to show up in an emergency situation. Where *boēthia* is summoned in fact, however, the results are actually somewhat mixed. For one, in spite of its urgent nature, there is not a lot of evidence for speed in *boēthia*.²⁶⁶ In historical accounts, help may show up too late, or be ineffective. The Rhodian mercenaries of Ptolemy and *summachoi* from Knossus arrived at the siege of Rhodes in 305 after those in the *astu* had successfully beaten back Demetrius Poliorcetes (DS 20.88.9), and the light fighters sent by Hieron II to the Romans in 217 (Polyb. 3.75.5) did not prevent the disaster at Cannae.

Instead, one might look at the benefits of allies showing up at all, regardless of whether their *boēthia* was actually successful at the moment it was requested. In Diodorus’ narrative of events on Crete in the 340s (16.62.3-4), the Knossians hired Phocian mercenaries, who dislodged the Lyttians from their city. The Lyttians appealed for *boēthia* to the Spartans, on the grounds of their *sungeneia* as a Lacedaemonian colony. The Spartans responded by sailing to Crete, dislodging the Phocians, and returning the city to the Lyttians. Diodorus describes the events as happening quickly and

²⁶⁶ The only evidence for this among Cretan agreements is the *summachia* between the Macedonian king Antigonus (Dodon III?) and the Cretan city of Eleutherna (IC II.xii.20: ll. 26-28), which prescribes a span of twenty days, within which the *polis* should assemble a *boēthia* force to dispatch to Antigonus. Guarducci (1939: II.159) restores the passage in this way: ἀποστέλλειν | [δὲ καὶ βασιλέα τὴν βοήθειαν ἐν ἡμέ]ραις εἴκοσι ἀφ’ ἧς ἂν πα|[ραγγείλωσιν οἱ πρεσβευταί. “Let them dispatch [the *boēthia* to the king within] twenty days from when [the ambassadors were present.” However, this “evidence” is all restoration and so not very likely insofar as similar provisions do not appear elsewhere.

providentially²⁶⁷ – the Lacedaemonians happened to be sailing to the aid of Tarentum when the Lyttian ambassadors arrived – but the response to the Lyttians’ request for *boēthia* was instrumental in that *polis*’ survival. Emily Mackil (2004) argues that *sungeneia* and *koina* were crucial support networks through which *poleis* could remain resilient under catastrophic circumstances; one way to use these networks was to appeal to “sister cities” for *boēthia* at moments of distress. Receiving *boēthia* from an ally might not always successfully alleviate the immediate crisis, but it reaffirmed these relationships that, in turn, could provide the best support for the people of the afflicted *polis*.

The offer of *boēthia*, even by a small *polis*, was not merely diplomatic decoration. Even when aid arrived late or was not enough to ensure a *polis*’ survival, it could still represent a substantial contribution on the part of that ally.²⁶⁸ In his discussion of the role of the navy and the appropriate population of a *polis*, Aristotle remarks that a city should be able to inspire fear in other *poleis*, but also have adequate strength to aid its allies (*Pol.* 1327b1-5: δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν). In other words, a *polis* that showed itself to be a reliable ally who could make good on the promise to show up in an emergency was demonstrating that it was strong. A group of Cretan cities – and only Cretan cities –

²⁶⁷ Diodorus describes the arrival of the Spartans as miraculous, and part of the divine punishment brought against the Phocians for the desecration of Delphi during the Third Sacred War. For this reason, it is difficult to judge how quickly after the capture of Lyttus the Spartans arrived.

²⁶⁸ In the abovementioned case of the Cytention (n. 265), its *boēthia* request on the basis of Dorian *sungeneia* received a positive response from Xanthus, which pulled together 500 drachmas, but apologized because they could manage no more. Mackil (2004: 503) notes that the Cytentions were ultimately unsuccessful in building new walls for their city. So, the appeal to *sungeneia* for *boēthia* met with a sympathetic and active response, but it was ineffective to saving their city in the way that Cytentions had hoped.

added non-mutual *boēthia* clauses to their *asuleia* proclamations for sanctuaries in Asia Minor.²⁶⁹ We might view this as both an investment in diplomatic capital – small *poleis* making a public declaration – as well as an advertisement of civic confidence to be able to keep this promise.

B. *Summachia*

As noted above, the term *summachia* describes the overall agreement between the two *poleis* (*IC* III.iii.3A, l. 7: κυρωθείσας δὲ τᾶς συμμαχίας) that sets the conditions under which *summachia* aid may be requested and it refers to allied military aid itself (*ibid.*, l. 36: ἀποστελλόντων τὰν συμμαχίαν).

In its first sense, “*summachia*” is shorthand for the terms of the relationship between partners. In theory, *summachia* might be a relationship between equal parties for making either offensive or defensive war; much more often in practice, though, the relationship was between unequal parties, and was used by a stronger power to pull a weaker power into its wars (Hall 2007: 102-4). Some *summachiai* are explicit about controlling the foreign policy of partners. The formula “to have the same friend and the same enemy” appears in numerous interstate documents of various types. As Couvenhes observes (2016a: 31-4), this phrase could mean that both sides would need to consult each other before making further alliances, but it could also mean that the more powerful partner would dictate the foreign policy of the less powerful partner. For example, in *SEG*

²⁶⁹ For Cretan cities: Rigsby nos. 157, 154, 160, 155, 189-191 (see Table VI). The two exceptional uses of *boēthia* are Rigsby no. 96, an *asuleia* for Artemis at Magnesia-on-the-Maeander by the Epidamnians – which refers to the previous *boēthia* of the goddess (l. 9) – and Rigsby no. 211, an *asuleia* at Stratonicea of unknown date by the Romans. It is also not a *boēthia* clause, and the participle of *boēthein* is Rigsby’s restoration (ll. 5-6).

23:547, the *summachia* between Rhodes and Olous, the latter is bound to have the same allies as Rhodians, to dissolve its previous *summachiai*, and to refrain from beginning wars that are counter to the will of the Rhodian *dēmos* (*SEG* 23:547, ll. 21-25; c. 200 BCE). It was noted above, that this stands in stark contrast to *IC* III.iii.3A, where both Rhodes and Hierapytna maintain an independent foreign policy so long as it does not place them in opposition to one another.

The first sense of *summachia* frames the circumstances in which it is appropriate for a partner to summon *summachia* in the second sense – prescribed military aid – and prescribes what sort of aid the other partner must send. For example, the *summachia* prescription in *IC* III.iii.3A details how many men, the citizenship of at least half the men, how much and in what currency they should be paid, and how they would get to where they need to go. The Rhodian *summachiai* share the formula ἐλευθεροῦς ἄνδρας ὄπλα ἔχοντες, “free men bearing weapons” with the Macedonian king’s *summachiai* with Eleutherna (*IC* II.xii.20, ll. 30-[31]) and Hierapytna (*IC* III.iii.1A, ll. [29]-30) a quarter century earlier. As with the Rhodian *summachiai*, the Macedonian *summachiai* possibly list a *per diem* to be paid by the king.²⁷⁰ In addition, the *summachiai* with Dason may also have the king providing passage (e.g. *IC* III.iii.1A, ll. [29]-30), as the Rhodians do for the Hierapytnians (ll. 23). The feature that makes both the Rhodian decrees stand out

²⁷⁰The Eleuthernian agreement, however, is heavily restored around the part where it discusses payment. *IC* II.xii.20, ll. 29-34: ἀποστελοῦσιν | [αὐτῶι Ἐλευθερναίων οἱ κοσμοὶ] ἄνδρας ἐλευθ<έ>ρου|[ς ὄπλα ἔχοντες, τῆι δὲ πεμπομέναι] συμμαχίαι παρέξει|[ι βασιλεὺς Αντιγονος ἐκάστης τ]ῆς ἡμέρας εἰς ἕκα|[στον τῶν ἀνδρῶν Ἀλεξανδρείαν] δρα[χ]μῆν ὀβο[λ]οῦ|[ς – – ἢ Αντιγονείαν ἢ Ἀττικ]ήν. “Let [the *kosmoi* of the Eleuthernaians] send to him (i.e. Antigonus) free men [bearing weapons; let King Antigonus] provide [to the dispatched] *summachia* [for each] day, to each [of the men an Alexandrian] *drachma* [or Antigonid or Attic], obols -- .”

most sharply is their interest in the citizen identity of the *summachoi* they receive from each of their allies. One explanation for this difference could be that the type of government could affect the symbolic nature of the alliance. Rhodes and Hierapytna were both democracies, and viewed an alliance between the bodies politic (*kata koinon*) of these *poleis* as simultaneously an alliance between the individual citizens (*kat' idian*) who made up the body politic, or *dēmos*. By contrast, the subjects of kings were not citizens of kingdoms, but rather a mix of people who were still citizens of their *poleis*. Regardless of whether a king was uninterested in the precise citizenship of his allies' *summachia* force for practical reasons or lacked the moral authority to request citizen *summachoi* because of his kingship, we might at least note that it would be ideologically incongruous for a king to make the kinds of requests for the citizen composition of a *summachia* from an allied democratic *polis* that a fellow democratic (if hegemonic) *polis* like Rhodes could.

C. Xenologia and Crete

Besides appearing in *IC* III.iii.3A (ll. 39-44, 82-85), *xenologia* is mentioned in *IC* III.iii.1A (l.13), the Macedonian *summachia* with Hierapytna mentioned above. Like the later Rhodian agreement, *IC* III.iii.1A prohibits the Hierapytnians allowing a *xenologion* to be recruited that would be used against the Macedonian king. It also contains a loyalty clause that imposes a fine upon those who march against the ally (ll. 3-7). The related verb, *xenologeō*, appears in two other inscriptions: in an early second century dedication at Lato-apud-Camara by mercenaries (*IC* I.xvi.35, ll. 6-7) of the Rhodians, who were

recruited from mainland Greece (τῶν στρατιωτῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ξενολογηθέντων), and a *proxenia* decree dated to 197 (*IC* II.iii.4C). In the latter document, the Cretan *polis* of Aptera extends to king Attalus II of Pergamum the privilege of undertaking *xenologia*, as well as using the city's moorings (l. 11-12: ξενολο[γ]ῆσθαι καὶ ὀρμίζεσθαι). This decree is roughly contemporaneous with *IC* III.iii.3A and, although it is not a *summachia*, it grants privileges that are similar to those that the Hierapytnians grant to the Rhodians under the terms of their *summachia*. The Apterans allow Attalus to conduct *xenologia* within their sphere of influence, and they extend to him the use of their maritime facilities, as the Hierapytnians do for the Rhodians (*IC* III.iii.3A, l. 10).

Literary sources provide two examples of *xenologoi* operating on Crete. The *xenologos* (recruiter of mercenaries) was responsible for assembling the men, and, depending upon the circumstances, possibly for equipping and training them.²⁷¹ Some *xenologoi* were exiles,²⁷² like Damasippus the Macedonian, a known murderer, whom Ptolemy VIII used to recruit mercenaries in 162 (Polyb. 31.17). Strabo's ancestor, Dorylaus the Tactician, had a career as a *xenologos* for Mithridates V Euergetes of Pontus in the third quarter of the second century before he went into exile on Crete. A *xenologos* would have needed to cultivate good working relationships with the authorities in the communities whence he recruited men and with the people who hired them.

²⁷¹ The equipping of men has proven very controversial in scholarship, at least for the fourth century. Paul McKechnie (1989; 1994) contends that mercenaries in the fourth century received their weapons from their employer, while David Whitehead (1991) counters that McKechnie's evidence for this is not secure.

²⁷² Cf. also Clearchus the Lacedaemonian, who assembled a tenth of the Ten Thousand for Cyrus' expedition (Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.9), but it should be noted that not all *xenologoi* were exiles.

Dorylaeus himself fought on behalf of the Knossians and was awarded Knossian citizenship as a result.²⁷³

In the past, some scholars have assumed that the process of mercenary recruitment took place at established depots where mercenaries would have gathered for prospective employers to hire them. Taenarum at the south tip of the Peloponnese is assumed to have been one such station; however, there is no good evidence for this as a mercenary “market” place.²⁷⁴ The entire island of Crete has similarly been thought of as a “recruiting station,” and the clauses regulating *xenologia* adduced as evidence of this.²⁷⁵ Strabo explains that his ancestor the *xenologos* went to Crete because of the “large numbers of mercenary and military types there,” a phenomenon that he attributes to the lack of Roman control of the island.²⁷⁶ It is notable that Crete was not the only place within Dorylaeus’ purview. Strabo says that he recruited from mainland Greece and

²⁷³An example of how a *xenologos* might be able to travel among spheres of influence is in Polybius’ narrative of Bolis the *Krēs* (Polyb. 8.16.2), a Ptolemaic agent on a secret mission, who makes contact with Cambylus, a *Krēs* serving under Antiochus III. Bolis’ initial cover story to explain his presence to Cambylus is that he is a *xenologos*.

²⁷⁴Fischer-Bovet 2014: 169: Taenarum is where some previously hired mercenary forces gathered, and were “enrolled depending upon historical circumstance.” I add that there do not appear to be any contemporary references to Taenarum as a recruiting station; most come from Diodorus in the first century CE. Incidentally, in Diodorus’ narrative (16.62), the Phocian mercenaries, after their mutiny against going to Sicily, ended up at the Malean Cape, where they were hired by Knossian emissaries.

²⁷⁵Spyridakis (1970) goes so far as to imagine Itanus as a recruiting depot for the Ptolemies.

²⁷⁶Strabo 10.4.10: οὐπω τὴν νῆσον ἔχόντων Ῥωμαίων, συχνοῦ δὲ ὄντος ἐν αὐτῇ τοῦ μισθοφορικοῦ καὶ στρατιωτικοῦ πλήθους, ἐξ οὗ καὶ τὰ ληστήρια πληροῦσθαι συνέβαιεν. “As the Romans did not yet possess the island, there was a large number of mercenary and soldier types, from which the pirate bands would also fill their ranks.” I have chosen to translate this such that it is ambiguous whether the genitive absolute is temporal or causal. Philip de Souza in his 1999 study of Greco-Roman piracy, observes that Strabo praises those historical actors who impose order, and that wiping out piracy is part of a narrative that culminates in praise of the provincial system, “which taxes the legitimate activities of its subjects” (203). That is, there may have been a lot of martial types on the island *because* the Romans did not control it yet.

Thrace as well.²⁷⁷ From a narrative standpoint, Strabo singles out Crete because he is informing his readers about his own familial connections to Knossus and Crete through Dorylaus. In Polybius' account, Ptolemy VIII, with Damasippus, recruited a force of one thousand *Krētes* directly from Crete in order to oppose his elder brother Ptolemy VI (31.17). Again, however, Crete was not the sole point of recruitment. The younger Ptolemy's first move was to recruit a large force from mainland Greece in order to invade Cyprus. At the urging of the Roman officials who accompanied him, Ptolemy reluctantly disbanded this *xenologion* and had to satisfy himself with the smaller recruitment from Crete.

Neither of these passages about *xenologoi* on Crete unequivocally portrays Crete as a prime location for acquiring excellent mercenaries. For Ptolemy the Younger's Roman companions, recruiting from Crete was less likely to provoke an unwanted conflict with Ptolemy the Elder than recruiting from Greece. Indeed, Dorylaus, who relocated to Knossus after the assassination of the king he served, may have chosen a Cretan city rather than one of the other places from which he had recruited because it might be somehow less provocative or problematic than settling in a city controlled, for example, by the Ptolemies or the Romans. There are a handful of narratives in which Crete and Cretans provide a somewhat neutral zone. According to Cornelius Nepos (*Vit. Hann.* 9.1-5), Hannibal lodged his fortune with the Gortynians in the aftermath of the

²⁷⁷ Strabo 10.4.10: οὗτος... ξενολογεῖν ἀποδειχθεὶς πολὺς ἦν ἐν τε τῇ Ἑλλάδι καὶ τῇ Θράκῃ, πολὺς δὲ καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τῆς Κρήτης ἰούσιν. "Having been appointed to recruit mercenaries, he often was in Greece and Thrace, and often among those who were on Crete." In addition to this, it may be notable that Strabo does not refer to either the recruitable men or the inhabitants of Crete as *Krētes*, which would allow for the possibility that some of the people who were recruited from Crete were not necessarily Cretans.

battle of Magnesia (189), and Knossus served as the place where a guarantee between Perseus and Eumenes II, former enemies who were exploring the possibility of alliance, could be lodged (Polyb. 29.6-8; Livy 44.13.9). For all its treaties and relationships between its *poleis* – or networks of *poleis* – with various outside players, Crete may have been a place to acquire soldiers or find safe haven because of its relative independence.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Our case study of *IC* III.iii.3A and survey of the terms *boēthia*, *summachia*, and *xenologia* suggest that the regional politics of Crete probably were idiosyncratic, but not for the reasons that earlier scholars have proposed. Cretan cities were the only ones to offer *boēthia* to recipients of *asuleia* decrees, and external treaties with Cretan cities make up the majority of instances in which *xenologia* and its cognates are mentioned. Perhaps the relative independence that the *poleis* of Crete exercised during the Hellenistic period allowed them to form (and re-form) alliance networks, attack and conquer one other, consolidate in various ways – what John Ma (2000: 352) terms “microimperialism” – and do so without being under the direct influence of an external hegemon. Mercenaries were both a sign of the flexibility of this independence and a mechanism by which it functioned.

It seems clear from *IC* III.iii.3A that *summachia* and *xenologia* are different arrangements. *Summachia* is military aid that must be requested and provided under specific, pre-agreed circumstances, to help an ally make war against an enemy. The *xenologion* clauses allow manpower to be recruited from an ally’s sphere of influence for

a purpose that is not covered by the *summachia* agreement. It is worth considering what sorts of actions might require men and, while not meeting the qualifications to summon *summachia*, also do not break the *summachia* by recruiting against one's allies' allies. Given the constraints of even the most flexible *summachia* and the potentially heavy task of assembling an effective *boēthia*, one of the most compelling reasons to recruit would be to meet the demands for aid from one's other allies, friends, and *sungeneia* relations. In other words, the non-Hierapytnians in the Rhodian request could be, as M. M. Austin (1996, no. 113) suggests, mercenaries. Nor should it matter that an allied contingent might be made up of mercenaries: the point is that *summachia* places a greater burden upon the *summachikē polis* than allowing *xenologia* does.

The *xenologia* clauses in the Rhodian and Macedonian *summachiai* – which, as I noted at the beginning, are quite rare – allow for non-*summachia* recruitment, but under the umbrella of the *summachia* as a whole. Still, diplomatic complications might arise from *summachia*, especially if an alliance comes into conflict with a *polis*' preexisting relationships and/or alliance networks. I suggest that this might be one way in which to read the proxeny decree issued by Aptera, which extends honors and a number of privileges to king Attalus II (*IC* II.iii.4C, c. 197 BCE). Some of the honors are typical for Hellenistic *proxenoi*, such as *asphaleia* (safety) and *ateleia* (exemption from taxes) in war and peace (ll. 11-12); but it was also noted that, like *IC* III.iii.3A, the decree includes the inheritable rights of recruiting mercenaries and sea access (ll. 12-13: ξενολο[γ]||ῆσθαι καὶ ὀρμύζεσθαι). A proxeny rather than an alliance – using the king's personhood (as opposed to statehood) – would allow the *polis* of Aptera, by extending some of the

privileges of its sovereignty to the king, to demonstrate support without coming into conflict with any of its own current *summachiai*.

Just as *summachia* could constrain the actions of a *polis* at the state level, it is worth considering how *summachia* may also incorporate individual citizens into the agreement through their democratic citizenship. In Chapter 4, I observed that Polybius viewed *politeia* as composed of both the *polis* as the collective citizenry (*kata koinon*) and the individual citizens who made up the *polis* (*kat' idian*); they share this language with Cretan interstate agreements, as I noted in the Introduction. Mercenaries have traditionally been treated as “private” actors. I would suggest instead that, using a citizenship model where citizens are considered as parts of a whole, mercenaries could still be citizens even when absent from their home city and, through the oaths and loyalty clauses that appear in interstate documents, they as citizens took part in their *polis*' allied relationship with a treaty partner. Thus, the loyalty clauses in *IC* III.iii.3A and the other Rhodian *summachiai* both acknowledge and attempt to control individual soldiering, i.e. mercenary activity, by framing an attack on the allied partner as an attack on one's own city, with whatever range of legal penalties and social consequences that might result.

I suggested above that Rhodian democratic ideology had a role to play in how this loyalty was enforced: the Rhodians request at least half citizen *summachoi* from their allies because their allies are fellow democracies where the power is distributed among the citizens. This is why the Rhodian loyalty clauses with Hierapytna contrast with the mechanisms of control for royal *summachiai*. The Macedonian *summachiai* (*IC* III.iii.1A and *IC* II.xii.20) both impose legal penalties, including fines, on citizens of the allied

polis who march against him. A *summachia* between Eumenes II and thirty-one *poleis* of the Cretan Koinon (*IC* IV.179), dated to 183 BCE, prescribes that those volunteers (θέλοντες) gathered for *boēthia* should be obedient (ὕπηκοοι) to the king if they are under his command, and to the leaders of the *Krētaieis* if under theirs. The solution presented in *IC* IV.179 differs from the fines of the Macedonian king in that allows both Eumenes and the Cretan Koinon the authority to handle insubordination as they see fit;²⁷⁸ but what seems important is that, in contrast with the Rhodian *summachiai*, loyalty is not dependent by one's citizenship. On the one hand, it is easy to be cynical and say that the kings had it right: direct penalties such as fines would seem the most effective mechanism to control the loyalty of mercenaries. On the other, we would do well not to underestimate the relationship between mercenary and home city. After all, at the siege of Rhodes in 305, the 150 *summachoi* sent by the Knossians were accompanied by 500 Rhodians, mercenaries of Ptolemy I who had returned to aid their *polis* (*DS* 20.88.9). Not all benefits were so dramatic, but mercenaries could form relationships abroad that might benefit their co-citizens at home, and, though individuals, help nurture the relationships between *poleis*. These relationships are the sort that Mackil finds to be crucial to the resilience of a *polis*. What might give a Cretan more flexibility as a mercenary than someone from another part of the Greek world – especially one under the sway of a king or dynast – was that he would be much less likely to be in the awkward position of serving in a foreign army against his *polis* or one of its *summachikai poleis*.

²⁷⁸ Another hypothetical consideration would be that Eumenes, who has been heavily involved as an ally of Rome, is trying to establish a relationship with Crete that is more Roman than Greek: meaning that he wants a large and lasting *summachia* arrangement that will guarantee him the most troops with the least hassle.

IV. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS FOR HELLENISTIC CRETAN MERCENARIES

In this last section, I want to take stock of where the close reading in this chapter has left us, and where I think the study of Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries could go. I begin first with a review of the scenarios in which we can be more certain that we are dealing with Cretans from Crete fighting in foreign armies. In terms of *xenologia*, we have the mercenaries who could be, hypothetically, recruited by the Rhodians from the sphere of Hierapytnian influence, under the terms of *summachia* (*IC* III.iii.3A, ll. 41-3), and by Attalus II from the sphere of Apteran influence, under the terms of proxeny (*IC* II.iii.4C, ll. 11-2). There is also reference to the possibility of other recruitments from Hierapytna, in the 220s BCE (*IC* III.iii.1A, l. 13). Besides this, there are the Cretans (*Krētes*) who appear on grave stelai, in military lists like the five *Krētes* in the Antigonid garrison at Eleusis (*IG* II² 1299: 237/6 BCE), and those, like Charmas the Anopolitan (*SEG* 8.269: third or second century BCE) and Eraton the Axian (*IC* II.v.19: c. 200-170 BCE), who were both explicitly described in the service of a Ptolemaic king. Finally, we have literary testimonia about Ptolemy VIII and Damasippus the Macedonian recruiting *Krētes* from Crete in 162 (Polyb. 31.16-7), and Dorylaus, the *xenologos* of Mithridates V, in the third quarter of the second century, who recruited from Crete as well as Greece and Thrace. I have also suggested that loyalty clauses and penalties for disloyalty, which range from fines to oaths, anticipate the possibility that some Cretans did go to war apart from their *polis*, in a mercenary capacity. These may provide evidence both for Cretan mercenaries and the possibility that their movements could be influenced by stringent interstate relationships like *summachiai*.

Furthermore, I suggest that *summachia* and other formal interstate relationships create a need for mercenaries. A request for *summachia* aid often depended upon particular circumstances, such as whether the enemy is “legitimate” – as opposed to an internal enemy or a band of brigands – and the level of threat that the *polis* is experiencing. *Summachia* is potentially for a limited time. Recruiting a *xenologion* becomes an alternative way of acquiring manpower for a fight that does not meet the criteria for *summachia* aid.²⁷⁹ I have suggested that the Rhodians’ stipulation that its allies send a *summachia* made up of at least half citizen-soldiers (hence, *summachoi*) may reflect the potential use of mercenaries to fill out the numbers. Moreover, Rhodes makes a reciprocal stipulation for Hierapytna that it may recruit a *xenologion* from Rhodes’ sphere of influence in Asia Minor; while we may not have unequivocal evidence that Hierapytna recruited from Asia Minor as a result of this *summachia*, there is no reason to suggest that the Rhodians and Hierapytnians viewed the reciprocal *xenologia* clause as a mere formality.²⁸⁰

It has been my contention throughout this dissertation that Crete stands out in the Hellenistic period because, up until the Roman conquest in 67 BCE it was not united under the direct influence of a single external power. This is in contrast to many other parts of the Greek world, like the cities of Asia Minor, whose various local histories include dependence, control, contention, influence, and, occasionally, independence from

²⁷⁹ Meeting the obligations of *boēthia* would also fall into the category of manpower needs for which *summachia* cannot be summoned from an ally.

²⁸⁰ For an example of an external ally promising to bring a quota of men to Crete, see *KretChr* 1969: 281,2 = Ducrey 1970 no. 2. This inscription includes clauses in which the Cretan city requesting the *summachia* must provide pay and grain to soldiers sent by Attalus I.

kings over the course of the period. The *poleis* of Crete had their networks around the rivals Gortyn and Knossus, and whichever Cretan third party became powerful enough to challenge these. In response to these third-party challenges, Gortyn and Knossus would sometimes join their alliance networks together to form the Cretan Koinon (τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Κρηταίων) – the *Krētaieis* in inscribed documents – an ephemeral union that so far as we know lacked many of the federal features of other Hellenistic *koina* such as federal citizenship or army (Chaniotis 1999a: 290). Both the literary and epigraphic records show efforts to reach out to external powers for alliance and/or intervention. For example, the *Krētaieis* consisting of Gortyn, Knossus, and 29 allied *poleis* concluded a *summachia* in 183 BCE with Eumenes II (*IC* IV.179). For the most part, however, the rivalries of the Cretan *poleis* played out on a small scale like the political rivalries of earlier periods of Greek history, quarreling with one another and sometimes absorbing smaller *poleis*, while the superpowers only played supporting roles in the drama.²⁸¹ Indeed, these external alliances were probably responsible for the resilience of smaller *poleis* that were not as powerful as Gortyn and Knossus.²⁸² At the time of conquest, the remaining Cretan *poleis* had outlasted all the Greek superpowers except for the Ptolemies, and the conquest itself – a second attempt, no less – may have been a pair of proxy civil wars, between

²⁸¹ For a complete summary, see Chaniotis 2005: 5-12.

²⁸² Itanus had a Ptolemaic presence from the Chremonidean War (260s) until 145, certainly the closest and longest-lasting affiliation of any Cretan *polis* with an external superpower. Whatever Ptolemaic presence entailed for Itanus, it is clear that the withdrawal of the navy under Ptolemy VIII shifted the balance of power in east Crete.

Metellus and Gortyn and its coalition on one side, Pompey, Knossus, and its allies on the other.²⁸³ This resilience should be considered remarkable.

One way to proceed from the work of this dissertation is to consider the strategies by which the *poleis* of Crete strove to survive and thrive, in spite of both external powers and internal rivalries, and what role Crete's mercenaries may have played in the resilience of many of these *poleis*. In what follows, my response to this question first explores the deliberate actions taken or agreements made by *poleis*, and then considers the incidental possibilities of having citizens abroad.

From the collective perspective, as Mackil (2004) and Ma (2003) have observed, the survival of *poleis* in the Hellenistic world lay in their ability to create connections, often outside of their immediate vicinity, through declarations of common kinship (*sungeneia*), friendship (*philia*), and other close relationships. These declarations were not merely empty rhetorical gestures. Their provisions might demand that a *polis* send aid, or *boēthia*, in the event of an emergency and, similarly they could lay the groundwork for that same *polis* to seek aid from its treaty partner(s) at moments when its own fate was in jeopardy. In five out of seven Cretan *asuleia* decrees that renew the *asuleia* of Teus and its sanctuary of Dionysus (sometime around 170 BCE or after), the Cretan *poleis* offer to send *boēthia* if someone violates the Teans or the sanctuary (last section of Table 8). *Boēthia* clauses represented a diplomatic investment, and potentially a real financial one. Perhaps the hiring and sending of mercenaries as *boēthia* or in lieu of

²⁸³ Livy, *Per.* 99.

summachoi might be one substantive way in which a *polis* could send aid to a friend, ally, or “sister city” in difficulty.

In any case, it seems worthwhile to contextualize *summachia*, *boēthia*, *xenologia*, and loyalty clauses among the substantive promises that a Cretan *polis* would and could make in order to cultivate a reputation for being able to deliver on the promises that it had made. On the one hand, the peripheral role of superpowers in Cretan politics meant that a recruiter or superpower would have greater flexibility to recruit soldiers from Crete. The sometime rivalries of the leading cities, Gortyn and Knossus, may have meant that the loyalties of *poleis* and their citizens were be less restricted than *poleis* and citizens under more direct royal control. This flexibility also allowed Cretan *poleis* greater latitude in the promises that they made to their friends, allies, and kin because they had greater flexibility to deliver on those promises. On the other hand, in order to maintain a network of friends, allies, and kin that was potentially life-saving against the threat of other Cretan *poleis*, a Cretan *polis* would need to make promises and be able to deliver on them. This may be one reason why Cretan *poleis* tended to make other types of substantive promises in their interstate agreements that other Greek *poleis* did not. For example, in addition to the *boēthia* clauses, Kent J. Rigsby notes in his study of *asuleia* that only Cretan *poleis* promised legal remedy within their own courts to the recipients of the *asuleia* in the event that they were harmed by brigands who set off from the city making the declaration (Rigsby nos. 139, 141, 151). Rigsby (1996: 287-8) observes, rightly in my opinion, that “the access to the courts and the right of seizure on foreign soil were substantial matters, should the need have arisen.” He points out that legal remedy was a hallmark of Cretan as

well as Aetolian diplomacy in the Hellenistic period, but that this should not undermine the significance of the privilege, normally the exclusive province of citizens, that is being offered. These *poleis* may not have been able to patrol the seas like Rhodes, but their courts were within their sphere of control and could potentially provide some satisfaction to those wronged. It seems like a small gesture but, like *boēthia*, it is within the realm of the possible for the *polis* declaring it, and therefore potentially actionable. These provisions in *asuleia* documents simultaneously demonstrate the flexibility of the *poleis* to make them while also obligating them to act in a substantive and responsive way when called upon by the *asuleia* recipient.

Moving away from the collective – but still looking broadly at ways in which Cretan *poleis* created a wide range of relationships abroad – we might see individual soldiers (whether mercenary or not) as having a role to play that was, if not a deliberate strategy on the part of their home city, still potentially beneficial. The proxeny lists from Cretan *poleis*, especially Aptera, Olous, and Gortyn, include the names of some individuals, like the Olountian *proxenos* Damatrios of Astypalaia (*IC* I.xxii.4bB, xi), a military man (l. 42: [στ]ρατευσάμενος), and, there were as well Cretans like Telemnastus of Gortyn who were honored for their military service abroad.²⁸⁴ In Polybius' account of representatives from the Rhodians and the *Krētaiēis* seeking the favor of the Achaean Assembly in a war against each other, the Achaeans were initially inclined to favor the

²⁸⁴ Telemnastus was also honored at Epidaurus with a statue and an epigram on the base (*IG* IV² 1.244). This does not automatically imply, as many scholars assume, that Telemnastus was a mercenary, but it does show one way in which collaboration in warfare can create more lasting diplomatic relationships. See also Orthotimus son of Calaethus, a Tylissian in the service of the Antigonid kings (c. 230-200 BCE), who appears as a *proxenos* of Trika (*SEG* 41: 539) and of Daulis(?) in Phokis (*IG* IX, 1.33; *SEG* 32: 568), and as a *proxenos* and citizen of Atrax in Thessaly (*SEG* 29: 502).

Rhodians, but gave pause to hear Telemnastus' son, Antiphatas of Gortyn, partly because of his father's participation in the fight against Nabis of Sparta.²⁸⁵

It is not new to point out that there were Cretan mercenaries who became *proxenoi* or mercenaries who became *proxenoi* for Cretan *poleis*; Christian Marek (1984) makes exactly this observation in his survey of proxeny. However, Marek bases his analysis on the assumption that mercenaries, because they were in foreign service, had no continuing interest in their home cities (1984: 316). There are a number of examples where this is patently untrue: besides the son of Telemnastus speaking to the Achaeans on behalf of the *Krētaieis*, Charmas is remembered on his grave stele for saving his *patris* of Anopolis after it was conquered (*SEG* 8.269), and the descendants of Eraton sued for *koinopoliteia* in the Aetolian League based upon the father's Axian citizenship (*IC* II.v.19; Chaniotis 2002: 111-2). Mercenary service did not automatically entail severing one's citizenship, and so the mobility of mercenaries may have provided opportunities to create and reaffirm relationships between Cretan *poleis* and other *poleis*, whether through proxeny or other institutions. However, I would caution that these observations – that mercenaries should not be assumed to be severed from home, and that their home *poleis* might use their mercenary sons to their diplomatic advantage – could be applied to other Greek *poleis* and mercenaries, not only Cretans.

This sketch has suggested that Cretan cities used all of the diplomatic tools at their disposal (such as native sons serving abroad), and, in a small number of cases, this included facilitating the recruitment of mercenaries within alliance agreements. I have

²⁸⁵ Polyb. 33.16.6, also Livy 35.29.1.

highlighted three implications for promises of *boēthia*: (1) as a mark of the flexibility with which Cretan diplomacy could operate; (2) as an example of a diplomatic investment that was a plausible and substantive, yet potentially difficult obligation to meet; and (3) as an obligation that might, in some cases, be met through the hiring and dispatch of mercenaries. Further research into mercenaries, Hellenistic Crete, and the Hellenistic world in general might well take into account what sorts of investments (both diplomatic and monetary) were necessary for nominally independent *poleis* to remain afloat in the Hellenistic world. For example, Andrew Meadows suggests in a forthcoming study of the coinage of Alabanda that, for an independent *polis* that was not under the direct control of a more powerful player, prodigious minting could be evidence of its vulnerable position, as it needed to make the costly investment of protecting itself. This may have implications for the numismatic evidence on Crete, which has often been associated, though not exclusively, with the return of Cretan mercenaries.²⁸⁶

By removing erroneous assumptions about mercenaries from the master narrative of Hellenistic Crete, and separating the master narrative from the study of Cretan mercenaries, one may view the mercenary phenomenon as part of how Greek cities made connections and met obligations. For the *poleis* of Crete, caught in tension between on-island rivalries and off-island relations with more powerful players, mercenaries represented both the diplomatic flexibility of these cities and the tremendous effort

²⁸⁶ MacDonald 1996 represents the view that mercenaries brought silver to Crete in the fourth century. Stefanakis' work on Ptolemaic coinage (2000) provides a greater range of explanations, such as Ptolemaic investment in the defenses of individual Cretan *poleis*, and highlights the chronic shortage of silver on Crete. His study with Traeger of counterstamps (2005) on Crete ties moments of minting in the Hellenistic period to moments of crisis.

required of small players to remain afloat in the face of the pressures of larger players. A useful historical parallel to the foreign relationships cultivated by the cities of Crete might be early modern Germany, where the princes and dukes of small states cultivated relationships with big powers like Great Britain by supplying soldiers through auxiliary treaties. These are most familiar to Americans as the Hessians – the German “mercenaries” of the Revolutionary War. By this time in the late eighteenth century, as Daniel Krebs observes, contemporaries who favored a single German state criticized the auxiliary treaty system partly because they believed that it prolonged their independence and prevented unification (2013: 29).²⁸⁷ So long as the *poleis* of Hellenistic Crete had the ability to make connections with external powers and each other through diverse means such as trade, honorific decrees, the social networks of individual mercenaries, and the promises and reliable delivery of aid, they might remain outside the full control of those external powers, and of each other.

²⁸⁷ Krebs’ 2013 study centers on the German soldiers fighting under the British who were captured by American forces in the Revolution, but the early chapters discuss the politics these arrangements and the demographics of the men. The study centers on a time period when attitudes towards mercenaries were changing, and nationalism was on the rise. In Europe and America, the general attitude was that a country’s citizens ought to be their country’s soldiers, and German nationalist poets portrayed the German soldiers serving the British as poor men who were being exploited by greedy princes (38-9). Krebs (26-35) however, illustrates how recruiters tended to prefer free men of means and reputable character if they were available, and cites a cohort song (30-31) that portrays fighting for the English as a very “Teutsch” thing to do – not only did the Hanoverian dynasty maintain its German connections, but some Germans felt that the British protected them from the Gallic threat to the west.

Inscription	Date	Partners ²⁸⁸	Type	βοήθεια and Related Terms	συμμαχία and Related Terms	ξενολογία and Related Terms	Loyalty Clause	Booty Distribution	Pay	Misc. Observations
Chaniotis 54-56, <i>test B</i>	c. 118 /115	Lato/Knossus Olous/Gortyn	arbitration		8 = 69					
<i>IC I.ix.1</i> Chaniotis 7	M3C	Drerus Knossus	oath				B49-60			Oath to not betray Drerus or Knossus
<i>IC I.xvi.5</i> Chaniotis 61, A&B	110/9 or 109/8	Lato Olous	<i>isopoliteia</i>	A[6]-7, [78]	A[3], [77], B10, 185, †214			17-18		
<i>IC I.xvi.17</i> Chaniotis 37	2C, a. 189 ?	Lato Eleutherna	<i>summachia isopoliteia</i>	14-19	[5]					β[οα]θέτ[ω ό Λάτιος]
<i>IC I.xvi.19</i> Chaniotis 34	c. 216 /200?	Lato	<i>summachia</i>		[5]					
<i>SEG 26:1049</i> Chaniotis 59	111/110	Lato Hierapytna	<i>summachia</i>	[7-8]	4, 68					
<i>IC I.xix.1</i> Chaniotis 11	M3C?	Lyttus Malla	alliance					4-8		
<i>IC I.xix.3 A&B</i> Chaniotis 17	3C	Knossus Lyttus (Malla)	honorific for judges	A28-29	[B1]					σωτήρας τε και [β]ο[α]θός και υπερμάχος
<i>SEG 41:770</i> Chaniotis 53	L2C a. 121	[(Olous)] Lyttus	alliance	[B2-6]						6: δ]ύναμιν
<i>SEG 41:731</i> Chaniotis 2	E3C?	Aptera Kydonia	<i>summachia</i>		[1], [2]					
<i>SEG 41:741</i> Chaniotis 10	c. 250 -230?	Eleutherna Phaestus	alliance	[2-3]			7-[12]			

²⁸⁸ Key: * = non-Cretan partner, e.g. Rhodes*; [] = epigraphic reconstruction, e.g. [Rhodes*]; () = unnamed location of inscription, e.g. (Lato). Proper names are given where the partner is an individual rather than a *polis*. Thus, “Mausolus and Artemisia*” rather than “Halicarnassus*.”

Inscription	Date	Partners	Type	βοήθεια and Related Terms	συμμαχία and Related Terms	ξενολογία and Related Terms	Loyalty Clause/ Oath	Booty Distribution	Pay	Misc. Observations
IC II.v.20B Chaniotis 15	L3C 221?	Axus Tyllissus	shared citizenship	(B10?)						B10: πέ]μψαντας
SEG 23:563 Chaniotis 13	c. 240 /221	Axus Gortyn	<i>summachia</i>	4, 16	2, 12, [15]					4: βοα[θή]σουσι 16: β]οηθήσω
SEG 59:1062 ²⁸⁹	c. 300 -250	Eleutherna [unknown(*)]	alliance?	3, 5?					?	
SEG 41:742 Chaniotis 38	E2C: a.184 ?	Aptera Eleutherna	alliance	[11]-12, [16-17]	[1], [7-8],			22-25		[11]-12: βοα]θήτω
IC III.iii.3B Chaniotis 26	P.c. 205	Hierapytna Lyttus	<i>isopoliteia?</i>		15, 21			7-8		
IC III.iii.4 Chaniotis 28	P.c. 205	Hierapytna Priansus	<i>isopoliteia</i>		[9-10]			53-58		
IC III.iii.5 Chaniotis 74	2C	Hierapytna Unknown	<i>isopoliteia</i>				15-22			17: πολεμησῶ ... παντι σθένει
IC III.iv.5 Chaniotis 19	c. 219 -204	Itanus Hierapytna	<i>summachia</i>	[9]	[12]					
IC III.iv.8 Chaniotis 5	E3C	Itanus	oath				36-38			καὶ ο<ὐ> πρ[ολειψέ]ω τὰν πολιτε[ί]αν
IC III.vi.7 Chaniotis 64 (A&B)	E3C	Praesus Stalitae	alliance?				15-23		B14- 15, B21- 23, B25 290	
IC III.vi.12 Chaniotis 23 (A&B)	L3C	Lyttus (Praesus)	alliance	[B5]	[A1]					

²⁸⁹ Stampolides and Oikonomaki 2009.

²⁹⁰ This agreement seems to be for state expeditions rather than warfare, but it still includes a pledge to supply τὰ ἐπιτάδεια (B10-12, 12-15, 25).

Inscription	Date	Partners	Type	βοήθεια and Related Terms	σμμαχία and Related Terms	ξενολογία and Related Terms	Loyalty Clause/ Oath	Booty Distri- bution	Pay	Misc. Observations
Chanotis 3	E3C	Praesus Unknown	alliance?							l. 8: ἀπο]στ[ελ]λομε[v-
IC IV.174 Chanotis 27 = Magnelli (2008) no. 15 ²⁹¹ (SEG 53:942)	P.c. 205	Gortyn Hierapytna	alliance	A14-16, [80-81] 17-24	A7-10, [60] 8-13					
IC IV.180 Chanotis 46	E2C	(Gortyn) Unknown	alliance	2-4				[1- 2] ²⁹²		
IC IV.185 Chanotis 33	c. 200 /189?	(Gortyn) Elyrus	alliance	3						
IC IV.186 Chanotis 31 Magnelli (2008) no. 13	c. 200 /189 or 216/ 204	Gortyn Lappa	<i>summachia</i>	7-10, 10- 15	3-4, 12					
Interstate Agreements involving Cretan <i>Poleis</i> and External Powers										
IC I.vii.1 Chanotis 1991 no. 4 SEG 41.768	c. 205 -195	Chersonesus [Rhodes*]	<i>summachia?</i>			[1-3]	1-8			
M&L #42 ²⁹³ IC I.xxx.1+I.viii.4	M5C	Tylissus Knossus Argos*	alliance	A22-23				B4-11		ὀφέλεν παντὶ σθένει
Inscription	Date	Partners	Type	βοήθεια	σμμαχία	ξενολογία	Loyalty	Booty	Pay	Misc. Observations

²⁹¹ Ed. Ch. Kritzas, 2003.

²⁹² Chanotis 1996: 302-303.

²⁹³ See also Gagarin and Perlman 2016: 117.

				and Related Terms	and Related Terms	and Related Terms	Clause/Oath	Distribution		
<i>IC I.viii.9+IC IV.176 Magnesia 35+29 Magnetto 43 (I & II)</i>	228-218	Knossus Gortyn Magnesia*	<i>proxenia</i>		III9		I36-38, [II28-32]			
<i>Labraunda 1</i> ²⁹⁴ <i>Crampa III.2 40</i>	c. 357	Knossus Mausulus and Artemisia*	<i>proxenia</i>							8-12: ἐπιμέλεσθαι
<i>IC I.xvi.35</i>	E2C	Rhodes* (Lato)	dedication			6-7				
<i>SEG 16: 524 Ducrey (1970) no. 1</i>	L3C	Attalus I (Lato)	oath <i>summachia?</i>		[5]		1-13			Oath is collective: 1st person plural verbs
<i>IC I.xviii.8</i>	249	Lyttus Antiochus II*	<i>summachia</i>		3, 5, 7, 11					
<i>IC I.xviii.9 (Aa,b,c) IG II₂ 1135 Chaniotis 60A&B</i>	111/0	Lyttus Olous (Athens*)	<i>isopoliteia</i>	A(c)[10]-11	A(a)[9], (c)8, B[6]					
<i>KretChr 1969: 281,2 Ducrey (1970) no. 2</i>	L3C	Malla Attalus I	<i>summachia</i>		A8, 10, 21, 28, A8-29		A4-8, B1-12		A20-26	Regulations for <i>summachia</i> sent by Attalus
<i>IC I.xxii.4B, xi</i>	E2C	Olous Damatrios of Astypalaea*	<i>proxenia</i>			42				[στ]ρατευσάμενος
<i>SEG 23:547</i>	c. 205-195	Olous Rhodes*	<i>summachia</i>	(5), 28-30, [56-58]	12, 19-[21], 22-24, 27, 31-35, 37, [47-49], [55]				37-41	
Inscription	Date	Partners	Type	βοήθεια	συμμαχία	ξενολογία	Loyalty	Booty	Pay	Misc. Observations

²⁹⁴ See also Hornblower 1982: 75. The formula ἐπιμέλισθαι... ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσονται, κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν αὐτῶν probably refers to judicial recourse rather than the pledging of armed aid in the sense of *boēthia*.

				and Related Terms	and Related Terms	and Related Terms	Clause/Oath	Distribution		
<i>IC</i> II.iii.4C	197	Aptera Attalus II*	<i>proxenia</i>			12-13				
<i>IC</i> II.v.18	L3C/ E2C	(Axus) Aetolians*	<i>isopoliteia</i>	7-8		10, 11				τὰ ὀψώνια
<i>IC</i> II.v.19 <i>Syll.</i> ₃ 622B	c. 200 -170	Axus Aetolians*	<i>koinopoliteia</i> citizenship claim			3				
<i>IC</i> II.v.21	149- c. 127	(Axus) Nicomedes II*	alliance?	3 (a & b)						
<i>SEG</i> 50: 936 (<i>IC</i> II.xi.1) Chaniotis 1	L3C: 222?	Polyrrhenia Phalasarua Sparta*	alliance					6-11		
<i>IC</i> II.xii.20 <i>SEG</i> 46:1211	c. 227 -224	Eleutherna Antigonus III*	<i>summachia</i>	[8], 18, [27]	2-3, 6-7, [29]-34				31-34	
<i>IC</i> II.xvii.1	278- c. 250	Oreii (Lisus) Magas I of Cyrene*	alliance	9-14	3, 5-6					
<i>IC</i> II.xxx.3 <i>IG</i> II ₂ 1130 <i>SEG</i> 58: 141	E2C	Unknown Athens*	alliance?	[10-11]						
<i>IC</i> III.iii.1A <i>SEG</i> 25:1033 <i>SEG</i> 46:1222	227- 224 ?	Hierapytna Antigonus III*	<i>summachia</i>	20, [22]	10-[11], 16, [27], [29]	13	1-7		29-32	
<i>IC</i> III.iii.3A Austin (2006) no. 113	c. 205 -195?	Hierapytna Rhodes*	<i>summachia</i>	12-15, 61?, 64- 66, 79-82	7, 8-9, 11, 15-20, 24- 27, 31, 33-34, 36, 37-39, (51-56), 59, 66-70, 73-74, 74- 77, 88, 95, 98	39-44, 45, 82-85,	44-48, 77-79, 84-85	56-58	25- 29, 72	61: ἐπιμελέσθω

Inscription	Date	Partners	Type	βοήθεια and Related Terms	συμμαχία and Related Terms	ξενολογία and Related Terms	Loyalty Clause/Oath	Booty Distribution	Pay	Misc. Observations
IC III.iv.9 Chaniotis 4 ²⁹⁵	112/1	Itanus Hierapytna Magnesia* Rome*	arbitration	(40)						χάριν βοήθειας
IC III.iv.10	112/1	Itanus Hierapytna Magnesia* Rome*	arbitration		3, 54					
IC III.iv.18	217/6 -209	(Itanus) Ptolemy IV* Gaius the Roman*	dedication			4				Dedicator identified as garrison commander: φρουράρχων
IC IV.167	237/6	Gortyn Demetrius II Aetolicus*	<i>summachia</i>		[5-6], [7], [10], 13, 15					17: νεανισ[
IC IV.179	183	Gortyn Knossus Phaestus Lyttus Rhaucus Hierapytna Eleutherna Aptera Polyrrhenia Sybria Lappa Axus Priansus Allaria Arkades	<i>summachia</i>	b15-19, 22, [26]	a2, [b13]		b15-19			b11-15: list of provisions b15-19: “of those gathered for <i>boēthia</i> , let οι θέλοντες be ύπήκοοι...”

²⁹⁵ Chaniotis (1996: 183-5) identifies ll. 56-60 as witness to an early third century (?) boundary treaty between Dragmos and Itanus.

		Keraea Praesus Lato Biannus Malla Eranna Chersonesus Apollonia Elyrus Hyrtaçina Eltyna Anopolis Araden Istron Tarrha Unknown Eumenes II*								
Inscription	Date	Partners	Type	βοήθεια and Related Terms	συμμαχία and Related Terms	ξενολογία and Related Terms	Loyalty Clause/ Oath	Booty Distri- bution	Pay	Misc. Observations
<i>IC</i> IV.195	c. 200 -150	Gortyn Ptolemy V or VI*	honorific list		2-[3]					
<i>I.Milet.</i> I.3 37 Miletus 55	223/2	Miletus*	decree of new citizens	[7a]	3a					
<i>ID</i> 1517	c. 154	Cretan Koinon Aglaus of Cos* Ptolemy VI* Delos*	honorific		2, 30-35					Aglaus of Cos is <i>proxenos</i> of “all <i>Krētaieis</i> ” (19); he was the <i>xenologos</i> who recruited and commanded the <i>summachia</i> sent by the <i>Krētaieis</i> .
Inscription	Date	Partners	Type	βοήθεια and	συμμαχία and	ξενολογία and Related	Loyalty Clause/	Booty Distri-	Pay	Misc. Observations

				Related Terms	Related Terms	Terms	Oath	bution		
<i>Asuleia</i> Decrees										
<i>IC</i> I.v.53 <i>Teos</i> 7 Rigsby 159	p.c. 170	Arkades Teus*	<i>asuleia</i>	38-42						l. 37: mentions <i>isopoliteia</i> request from Teans
<i>IC</i> I.vi.2 <i>Teos</i> 18 Rigsby 156	p.c. 170	Biannus Teus*	<i>asuleia</i>	26-30						
<i>IC</i> I.ix.2 <i>Teos</i> 22 Rigsby 157	p.c. 170	Malla Teus*	<i>asuleia</i> <i>isopoliteia</i>	15-18						ὡς καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἰδίας πατρίδος
<i>IC</i> II.iii.2 <i>Teos</i> 16 Rigsby 154	p.c. 170	Aptera Teus*	<i>asuleia</i>	42-46						
<i>IC</i> II.xv.2 <i>Teos</i> 54 Rigsby 160	p.c. 170	Hyrtačina Teus*	<i>asuleia</i>	4-9						l. 3: mentions <i>isopoliteia</i>
<i>IC</i> IV.178 <i>I.Mylasa</i> 654 Rigsby 200	2C	Gortyn Knossus Mylasa*	<i>asuleia?</i>	7?						l. 7: ἐπιμέλειαν
Rigsby 155	p.c. 170	Eranna Teus*	<i>asuleia</i>	31-37						
<i>SEG</i> 13:489 <i>I.Mylasa</i> 643 Rigsby 189	2C	Unknown Mylasa*	<i>asuleia</i>	[1]						
<i>I.Mylasa</i> 644 Rigsby 190	2C	Unknown Mylasa*	<i>asuleia</i>	3-[4]						
<i>I.Mylasa</i> 645 Rigsby 191	2C	Unknown Mylasa*	<i>asuleia</i>	6						
<i>I.Mylasa</i> 651 Rigsby 197	2C	Unknown (?) Mylasa*	<i>asuleia</i>		10					

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has contended that the least ambiguous evidence for mercenaries coming from Hellenistic Crete is to be found in the texts of inscribed interstate agreements that contain mercenary recruitment clauses. On the basis of this evidence, it has argued that mercenaries from Crete participated in a largely Greek phenomenon, but also that Cretan mercenaries and other forms of foreign aid from Cretan *poleis* had a large role to play in the somewhat anomalous story of how many of these *poleis* also remained independent and vital for most of the Hellenistic period.

As the Introduction observed, this argument differed from the most scholarly prevalent narrative of Hellenistic Crete (“master narrative”), which assumes that mercenaries were a phenomenon that both indicated and resulted directly from crisis conditions on the island. Much of this crisis picture – in which Crete was exceptional for its economic isolation, cultural stagnation, and frequent violence – was based upon an uncritical reading of literary sources, bolstered by the evidence of inscribed alliances, and seemingly confirmed by the scarcity of archaeological evidence. However, two crucial considerations called this narrative into question. First, archaeological evidence is changing our understanding of Hellenistic Crete to show that, before the Roman conquest, Cretans were enmeshed in Mediterranean trade and producing goods for export in the Classical and Hellenistic periods (Vogeikoff-Brogan 2014; Gallimore 2015; Gilboa et al. 2017). Second, recent scholarship on Greek mercenaries (Luraghi 2006; Bettalli 2013) suggests that mercenaries were a characteristic feature of the Greek society, and thus one cannot assume that mercenaries came from places of origin that were in crisis. Bearing in mind

these two considerations, this dissertation sought to create a new picture of Hellenistic Crete and its mercenaries that removed assumptions of permanent or chronic crisis, yet accounted for the fact that, with one known exception, Cretan *poleis* were the only ones to make interstate agreements that included clauses for the recruitment of mercenaries.

I established a definition for “mercenary” as a paid fighter whose status as a mercenary was temporary, contractual, and depended upon him not being a citizen or an ally. The distinction that this definition makes for mercenaries is essentially legal, not cultural, especially since mercenaries could appear from any part of Hellenistic Mediterranean culture. For this reason, and in the absence of a material methodology for unambiguously identifying mercenaries, I proposed that Cretan mercenaries might be best studied within the legal and rhetorical frameworks found in contemporary textual sources, both inscribed agreements and literary accounts. The subsequent chapters reevaluated the evidence for Hellenistic Cretan mercenaries on three points – the exceptional numbers of Cretan mercenaries; the exceptional type of warfare on Crete; and the exceptional culture of violence on Crete – before using the evidence for Cretan mercenaries in the mercenary recruitment clauses of inscribed diplomatic agreements to create the final picture.

Chapter 1 outlined the ways in which the terminology used to identify mercenaries from Crete may have been ambiguous, in order to address the exceptionality of their numbers. The idea that Crete produced exceptional numbers of mercenaries arose, in part, from the numbers of Cretans listed by ancient literary authors in the catalogues of soldiers that often accompany narratives about battle (Launey 1949: I.248-86, esp. 275) and from the method of using these soldier numbers to help calculate historical population. Even though G.T. Griffith (1935: 251)

suggested that the numbers for Cretans might not completely comprise Cretans from Crete, there had been little attempt (with the exception of Fischer-Bovet 2011) to scrutinize the extent to which these numbers were counting “Cretan mercenaries from Crete.” Recent proponents of the master narrative (esp. Chaniotis 1999b) have sidestepped the problem of numbers from literary sources by looking instead to non-literary categories of evidence, such as inscriptions that detail migrations of Cretans and indications in the Cretan landscape for the underutilization of resources, in order to bolster the claim that Crete experienced population stress on Crete and that Cretan mercenaries were one result of this stress. Yet the evidence for population stress is at present inconclusive. Furthermore, this more recent argument for exceptional numbers of mercenaries still has at its root the conclusions of the earlier scholars who were working from the numbers in literary sources, while even scholars who do not subscribe to the master narrative nevertheless do not question the reputation of Crete as a producer of mercenaries.

This historiography necessitated a closer examination of the terminology that scholars have interpreted to mean “Cretan mercenaries,” both to identify the subjects of study and to see what, if anything, could be learned from the numbers. The examination in Chapter 1 focused on the Greek term *Krēs* that could variously identify Cretans from Crete, members of Cretan emigrant communities, and/or a type of skirmishing fighter, depending on the context. Looking next at the use of *Krēs* in various military contexts, it was suggested that in some cases, *Krēs* identified personal origins, while in others, it referred to this type of fighter. In the particular case of the hegemonic army catalogues in literary sources, where the largest numbers of *Krētes* appear, it is even possible that there was a desirable proportion of *Krētes* and that the label in this context prioritized the function of the unit over the origins of the men within the unit. The

examination also addressed the quotas for allied soldiers in two inscribed alliances (*IC* III.iii.3A, *SEG* 23: 547) made by Cretan cities, which stipulate that a minimum proportion of the men sent must be allies, i.e., citizens of the partner city. Although neither mercenaries nor the term *Krēs* is mentioned in this context, these quotas help illuminate two concerns about identifying mercenaries from Crete. First, they show that even a group with a close connection to a Cretan *polis* could nonetheless be heterogeneous, and thus serve as a caution not to assume that groups of *Krētes* appearing in literary texts with a clear narrative connection to Crete were homogeneous. Second, I hypothesized that the other portion of the “free men bearing weapons” were likely mercenaries. The work of this chapter was to observe that one should be cautious before interpreting the term *Krēs* as “a Cretan mercenary from Crete,” much less viewing the *Krētes* counted in military catalogues as unequivocal evidence for an exceptionally large number of Cretan mercenaries.

Having established that *Krētes* could indicate either a person’s origin or a type of fighter – though sometimes both – Chapters 2 and 3 investigated to what extent the *Krēs* fighter’s tactics reflected warfare on Crete. Previous scholarship on Cretan warfare has assumed that its practice on Crete differed significantly from warfare elsewhere in the Greek world in its use of archery and its light-armed tactics, necessitated by its rugged terrain (e.g., Kelly 2011). This divergent mode of warfare would, hypothetically, produced specialist archers – that is, *Krētes* – for a mercenary market (e.g., Williams 2004). In my approach to this question, I prioritized material evidence that had a clear archaeological provenance, which could provide for information about the locations of fighting, what sorts of weapons were being used, and, depending on context, the self-presentation of warriors. However, as I had established earlier, the label “mercenary” is a

textual category: for one thing, without a label, anyone could have held any weapon. Where material information did not allow, I looked to literary sources largely for information about the people doing the fighting: that is, which sort of person held which weapon, what were his tactics, and how did others respond to his actions?

I first evaluated the evidence for war on Crete in Chapter 2. This study examined the material evidence for war such as armor, sling bullets, and arrowheads that were found on Crete, and supplemented this study with historical narratives from literary sources about warfare on Crete. It observed that, although the material record suggests that archery may have had a somewhat more prestigious role in Cretan warfare of the Archaic period, the terrain of Crete did not preclude contemporaneous developments in hoplite warfare. For the Hellenistic period, it observed that most of the admittedly scarce evidence for war tends to cluster around cities: this observation applies both to material finds such as arrowhead and sling bullets from battle trenches outside city walls and to literary accounts of the besiegement and taking of cities.

Chapter 3 turned to non-Cretan evidence for archery in order to both contextualize the evidence for war on Crete presented in Chapter 2 and to better understand how *Krētes* fought. Using a combination of material and textual evidence to survey the technology of the bow and arrow, Chapter 3 observed that the practice of Greek archery could involve a variety of styles and tactical uses that could require appropriately specialized types of technology and skill levels. It noted that a generalized type of archery requiring the lowest skill level was probably used in the context of massed attacks on and defenses of cities, and argued that these types of tactics were likely reflected in the evidence for warfare on Crete laid out in Chapter 2. However, specialized styles of archery such as the *Krēs toxotēs*, a short-range skirmishing archer described

in Xenophon's *Anabasis*, appear to have been part-and-parcel of hegemonic armies, which were significantly larger than any armies on Crete. These specialists might be among skirmishers of various sorts, such as slingers and javelineers, who acted as part of a mobile periphery to protect the vulnerable flanks of their own phalanx and attack those of their enemy. Analysis of the tactics of *Krētes* in Polybius showed that they were specialists who might be deployed in particularly dangerous hand-to-hand combat situations, but also suggested that, by the time Polybius was writing about them, they were functionally not archers. It is perfectly reasonable to say that some Cretans became mercenaries who fought as *Krētes* or that Cretan *poleis* sent *Krētes* to their allies, since it was common diplomatic practice in the Hellenistic period to send light fighters as military aid. However, the chapter concluded that the uses of archery among Cretan *poleis* were likely akin to those used in war among other Greek *poleis* of similar scale, and thus *Krētes*, whose function was best expressed as part of a hegemonic army, were probably not a natural result of an exceptional style of warfare on Crete.

Chapter 4 examined the exceptionality of violence on Crete through a close reading of Crete and Cretans in Polybius' *Histories*. This was necessary before addressing the epigraphic evidence in Chapter 5 because Polybius' portrayal of Crete as a place of continuous warfare has influenced modern historians to interpret the interstate agreements made by the Cretan *poleis* as evidence that these cities were excessively prone to war. Despite his resoundingly damning comments about Crete, it seemed odd that Polybius would single out Crete for frequent and/or severe bellicosity. After all, his *Histories* present most of the Hellenistic world as bellicose and violent, and the moral vices that he attributes to Cretans apply to many other ethnic groups. Recent scholarship on Polybius has also observed that he could sometimes use the characteristic

traits of ethnic groups to morally assess the actions of members of other ethnic groups (Champion 2004; Erskine 2013). I therefore proposed that there might be two possible, simultaneous readings for Polybius' treatment of Hellenistic Crete: a historically specific reading (e.g., the Cretan *politeia* experienced internal discord, as evinced by historical narratives of Cretan *poleis* fighting one another) and a schematic reading (e.g., the Cretan *politeia* contained certain traits that made Crete prone to conflict, but these traits can occur in any society and cause conflict). I suggested that using the schematic reading to understand why Polybius condemns the Cretan *politeia* might help explain why he portrays the historically specific events involving Crete and Cretans in the pessimistic way that he does, and, in turn, make his observations about these events more accessible to the modern reader.

The chapter was organized in the following way. First, it examined the schematic role of the Cretan *politeia* (6.45-47.6), or sociopolitical system, in Polybius' long digression about the nature of *politeiai* – and why the Romans had the best *politeia* – in Book 6. Second, it examined the specific traits that Polybius attributed to Cretans in the scheme of the Cretan *politeia*: how these traits appear among members of other ethnic groups, but also how Polybius used his remarks about Cretans to reinforce the schematic role he gave to the Cretan *politeia* in Book 6. Lastly, it used conclusions about the schematic role of the Cretan *politeia* to analyze specific historical accounts of events on Crete.

This schematic role for the Cretan *politeia* was to be an object lesson for readers to better understand which traits in a sociopolitical system set up a society and its citizens – especially society that extended hegemonic rule over others – for weakness and ultimate failure. Polybius identifies permissiveness towards *pleonexia*, or “acquisitiveness,” as a trait that causes internal

conflict, and says that duplicitous people (*dolioi*) can be the result of a society that permits its people to act upon their impulses to self-aggrandizement. Noting the similarities between Polybius' project in Book 6 and that of Aristotle's *Politics*, I have also suggested Polybius may also have rejected Crete for reasons found in Aristotle's earlier treatment of the Cretan *politeia*: Crete had the potential for external hegemony but did not act upon it, and indeed, the Cretan *politeia* revealed its weaknesses under pressure from a "foreign war." Thus, for Polybius, while the Roman *politeia* represented the best form of a hegemonic *politeia*, the Cretan *politeia* was exemplary to showcase the features that undermine any hegemonic rule, be it a powerful *polis*, a league of *poleis*, or a king: a culture of permissive *pleonexia* that both enabled and necessitated duplicity, susceptibility to foreign influence, and a reliance upon outsiders from unknowable backgrounds who may not be personally invested in the hegemonic project. This larger message may be applied to the historical specifics of Crete and Cretans in two ways. First, although Crete was not a hegemonic power, individual Cretans might become part of the hegemonic projects of others as bureaucrats, courtiers, and mercenaries. The widespread occurrence of Cretans in the employ of others (even if not in large numbers) can be verified independently with epigraphic evidence, but Polybius' treatment of them reveals a deep but more generalized anxiety about the risks of using foreigners to run empires. Second, applying these considerations to Polybius' historical accounts of events on Crete reveals that, although his treatment of the Cretan *politeia* in Book 6 is not factually incorrect – Cretan *poleis* did fight one another – the presence of a myriad of potential allies, both on and off the island, enabled Cretan *poleis* to do greater damage to one another, and to survive catastrophes that should have been their death knell. Therefore, according to Polybius, the central paradox of Crete (24.3) is not the extraordinary frequency or

vehemence of violence. Rather, the Cretan *politeia* had all the features that should have destroyed its *poleis*, but their foreign connections allowed them to survive, regenerate, and fight each other once again in the next generation.

Having thus proposed that the phenomenon of mercenaries from Hellenistic Crete could not be fully explained through population stress, an idiosyncratic method of warfare, or a culture exceptionally prone to violence, Chapter 5 finally turned to the most direct evidence, the mercenary recruitment clauses in the inscribed interstate agreements made by Cretan *poleis*. I posited that mercenary recruitment, or *xenologia*, might be best understood as one aspect of how Hellenistic *poleis* created substantive and meaningful foreign relationships with other states.

In order to better understand how mercenary recruitment, or *xenologia*, functioned within the legal framework of these agreements, I first presented a close reading of the most detailed inscribed agreement containing one of these clauses, *IC* III.iii.3A, an alliance from around 200 BCE between the Cretan *polis* of Hierapytna and the powerful democracy of Rhodes. In this close reading, I observed that the purpose of the overall alliance, or *summachia*, was for both sides to acquire military aid from one another, and that the nature of this aid would depend upon the circumstances under which it was sought. Thus, *boēthia*, or emergency aid, could be requested in the event of immediate danger to the *polis*, but the aid might consist of whatever the allied partner could gather at the moment. The clauses for *summachia*, or allied aid, were more specific about the type of aid that could be summoned, but necessitated that the allied partner provide wages for the men who were a part of that aid, and could only be summoned under a narrow set of circumstances. In contrast to these, granting permission for *xenologia* would allow

one's ally to have access to military support without invoking the more stringent conventions necessary to gain *boēthia* and *summachia* aid.

The clauses in *IC* III.iii.3A are remarkably detailed, so it was important to next demonstrate that its understanding of the concepts of *boēthia*, *summachia*, and *xenologia* were nonetheless representative of how these concepts were understood in Greek culture. This analysis was able to incorporate both epigraphic and Greek literary parallels that reflected a common understanding of these concepts, even if *IC* III.iii.3A specifically provided variations on those concepts. As a result, the chapter was able to make the following observations about how mercenaries and mercenary recruitment could have functioned in the international diplomatic relationships of not only Cretan *poleis*, but interstate relationships in the Greek world more generally. First, formal alliances could be stringent in how they might restrict the circumstances for summoning aid, how they might obligate allies to fulfill promises of aid, and how they might even prohibit a less powerful partner from having a foreign policy that was independent from a more powerful ally. In this context, mercenaries could be a solution for those in need of manpower to acquire military support outside of *summachia* conditions, and for those cities hoping to keep their options open to show support to potential allies without upsetting preexisting alliance networks. And, because of these stringencies, we might also include allies who needed to meet the obligations of an ally requesting *boēthia* or *summachia* among those who might need to hire mercenaries. Second, these alliances also frame the independent actions of citizens abroad as part of the overall alliance, through conceiving the government of the *polis* (*dēmos*) as made up of its citizens. At the very least, we should not assume that all mercenaries abroad were exiles, automatically renounced their citizenship, or ceased to act on behalf of their

home city. I hypothesized that we might even see some mercenaries who traveled abroad and formed relationships with kings and people in other cities as another facet of diplomatic relations for their home cities.

Throughout this dissertation, I posited that the behavior of both the *poleis* of Hellenistic Crete and the mercenaries of Hellenistic Crete ought to be considered as behavior that was more or less normal for *poleis* and people in the Greek world at the time. But I also noted the ways in which foreign relations buoyed the independent *poleis* of Crete and enabled conflict to continue on Crete when, in similar cases in other parts of the Greek world, it often resulted in the loss of independence to another power. This is supported by the testimony of Polybius. The secret to the survival of these cities was to make promises of foreign aid to potential allies, to demonstrate a proven record of delivering on those promises, and to receive substantive support from allies and other friendly states in times of crisis. Mercenaries, whether from Crete or dispatched by Cretan *poleis*, were part of how Cretan *poleis* maintained these relationships. This system continued throughout the Hellenistic period until the only potential external ally that remained was Rome.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Numbers Key

Full Forces (FF) and Divisions of Forces (FD) – Tables 2 and 3

Source	Date	Context	Forces Breakdown
Thuc. 6.43 ...τοξόταις δὲ τοῖς πᾶσιν... τούτων Κρητες οἱ ὀγδοήκοντα ἦσαν	415	(FF) Catalogue of Athenian forces sailing from Corcyra for invasion of Syracuse	5100 heavy infantry (1500 Athenians 700 <i>thētes</i> 2150 <i>summachoi</i> , <i>hypēkooi</i> 500 Argives 250 Manteneans, <i>misthophoroi</i>) 700 Rhodian slingers 120 Megarian exiles 480 archers (80 <i>Krētes</i>) 30 cavalry 6430 fighters
Xen. <i>A.</i> 1.2.9 τοξότας Κρητας διακοσίους	404	(FD, AR) Soldiers recruited by Clearchus the Spartan with Cyrus of Persia's money, among the Ten Thousand	
Xen. <i>H.</i> 4.2.16 Κρητες δὲ τοξόται ἠκολούθουν ὡς τριακόσιοι	394	(FF) Spartan forces at Nemea River	13500 hoplites 6000 Lacedaemonians 3000 Eleans, Triphylians, Acroreans, and Lasionians 1500 Sicyonians 3000 Epidaurians, Troezenians, Hermioneans, and Halieans 600 Spartan cavalry 300 Cretan archers 400 Marganean, Letrinian, and Amphidolian slingers 14800 fighters
Xen. <i>H.</i> 4.2.17	394	(FF) Athenian-Corinthian-Boeotian-Argive alliance forces at Nemea River	24000 hoplites 6000 Athenians 7000 Argives 5000 Boeotians 3000 Corinthians 3000 Euboeans 1550 cavalry 800 Boeotians 600 Athenians 100 Chalcidians (Euboea) 50 Opuntian Locrians lights Corinthians? Ozolian Locrians,

			Malians, Acarnanians >25550 fighters
Arr. <i>Anab.</i> 1.8.4 Εὐρυβότας τε ὁ Κρής πίπτει ὁ τοξάρχης καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν τοξοτῶν ἐς ἑβ- δομήκοντα	335	(FD) [Archers and their Cretan <i>toxarch</i> under Alexander III killed at Thebes]	
Polyb. 4.61.2 τοὺς παρὰ Πολυρρηνίων/ τῶν Μεσσηνίων ἀπεσταλμένους Κρήτας πεντακοσίους/ τριακοσίους	219	(FF) Philip V's forces at Epirus	???? Macedonians ???? complete levy of Epirotes 300 Achaean slingers 500 <i>Krētes</i> (Polyrrhenians) or 300 <i>Krētes</i> (Messenians) ²⁹⁶
Polyb. 4.67.6 Κρήτας τριακοσίους	219/8	(FF) Philip V's army from Larisa, after sack of Dodona	3000 bronze-shielded hoplites 2000 peltasts 400 court cavalry 300 Cretans 5700 fighters
Polyb. 5.14.1 Κρήτας	218	(FF) Aetolian forces at Stratus attack Philip's rear after sack of Thermon	3000 Aetolian infantry (<i>pezoi</i>) 400 cavalry 500 <i>Krētes</i> 3900 fighters
Polyb. 5.65.1-10; 5.79.2 ἔχων τοὺς μὲν Κρήτας εἰς τρι-σχίλιους αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων χιλίους Νεόκρητας	219- 217	(FF) Reforms to Ptolemaic army; Battle of Raphia: Ptolemaic forces	56000 Phalanx ²⁹⁷ (25000 hoplite 8000 <i>misthophoroi</i> 20000 Egyptian phalanx 3000 Libyans in Mac. arms) 2000 peltasts 3000 Royal Guard (<i>agēma</i>) 6000 Thracians and Gauls (4000 settlers 2000 recent recruits) 3000 <i>Krētes</i> (2000 <i>Krētes</i> 1000 <i>Neokrētes</i>) 5000 cavalry (2000 Greek and <i>misthophoroi</i> 3000 Ptolemaic [2300 Libyan and domestic 700 court]) 75000 fighters

²⁹⁶ See n. 86.

²⁹⁷ Walbank (1957: I.590) thinks it more plausible that the phalanx was made up of 25,000 hoplites, 20,000 of whom were Egyptian. This would mean that the total infantry would have been 50,000, and so phalanx would be 66.7% of the total force. Fischer-Bovet (2011: 139) argues that papyrological evidence suggests a higher Greek population in Egypt than what Walbank was willing to allow, and so her interpretation of the battle (2014: 87) attributes Philopator's success to his much larger phalanx and evenly matched cavalry.

			73 elephants
Polyb. 5.79.3-13 <u>Κρητας</u> δὲ χιλίους μὲν καὶ πεντακοσίους εἶχε τοὺς μετ' Εὐρυλόχου, χιλίους δὲ <u>Νεόκρητας</u> τοὺς ὑπὸ Ζέλυν τὸν Γορτύνιον ταπτομένους	218/7	(FF) Battle of Raphia: Seleucid forces ²⁹⁸	30000 phalanx (20,000 hoplite 10,000 picked, silver shields) 5000 light-armed Dahae, Carmanians, ²⁹⁹ and Cilicians 2000 Agrinian and Persian archers and slingers 1000 Thracians 5000 Cadusians, Cissians, Medes, and Carmanians 10000 Arabs and neighbors 5000 Greek <i>misthophoroi</i> 500 Lydian javelineers 1000 Cardaces 1500 Krētes 1000 Neokrētes 6000 cavalry 68000 fighters 102 elephants
Livy 24.30.13 <i>prima...signa ...Cretensium</i>	214	(FF) Syracusians march towards Leontini	8000 undifferentiated fighters (600 Cretenses)
Livy 31.35.1 <i>Cretenses trecentos</i>	200	(FD) Philip V sends auxiliaries to harass Roman cavalry in first engagement between Romans and Macedonians	700 cavalry 400 Illyrian Tralleis 300 Cretenses 1400 fighters
Livy 32.40.4 <i>Cretensibus ab tyranno datis</i> Livy 33.3.10 <i>Gortynii Cretensium</i> Livy 33.4.6 <i>Romanis ferme par numerus erat</i>	197	(FD, AR) Nabis defects from Philip V to Flamininus (FD, AR) Greek allies join Flamininus (FF) [See entry below for Macedonian army]	600 Cretenses 600 Aetolian infantry 500 Gortynians 300 Apolloniotes 1200 Athamene infantry 400 Aetolian cavalry 18000? Romans/Italians (= 4 legions?) 2000 Roman cavalry 23600 fighters (estimated)

²⁹⁸ Bar-Kochva 1976: 48-51.

²⁹⁹ Bar-Kochva (1997: 49) notes that the Carmanians are mentioned twice; he suggests that their appearance with the Dahae and Cilicians (of Cilicia Trachis) is a scribal error, since these two peoples were most likely Seleucid allies, while the Carmanians were more clearly under the sway of the Seleucids.

Livy 33.4.6 <i>Romanis ferme par numerus erat</i>	197	(FF) Livy says that Philip V and Flamininus were evenly matched at the Battle of Cynoscephalae	16000 phalanx 2000 peltasts 2000 Thracians and Illyrian Tralleis 1500 mixed merc. auxiliary 2000 cavalry 23500 fighters
Livy 34.27.2 <i>et a Creta mille delectos iuventutis eorum exciuit, cum mille iam haberet</i>	195	(FF, GL) Nabis gathers troops to defend Sparta against the Romans	10000 Lacedaemonians 3000 mercenaries 2000 Cretan youth 15000 fighters
Livy 35.29.2 Polyb. 33.16.6	192	(FD, AR) See AR Key for context	500 Krētes/Cretenses
Livy 37.39.10 <i>extremos... Cretensis ... statuit</i> App. Syr. 6.31	190	Battle of Magnesia: Roman forces	21600 legionaries (2 Roman legions 2 Latin allied legions) 3000 Attalid auxiliaries and Achaean peltasts 500 Tralleis 500 Cretans <3000 cavalry (800 Attalid cavalry <2200 Roman cavalry) 4 <i>turmae</i> cavalry [2000 Macedonian and Thracian “volunteers” guarding camp] 25600 fighters [27600 total] 16 elephants 10000 Roman legionaries 10000 Italian allies (4000) Attalid infantry 3000 Achaean peltasts ≤3000 cavalry (Roman, Italian, and Attalid) 30000 fighters
Livy 37.40.8 <i>pari ferme numero, pars Cretenses, pars Tralles</i> Livy 37.40.12 <i>Neocretes mille et eodem armatu Cares et Cilices</i>	190	(FF) Battle of Magnesia: Seleucid forces	16000 phalanx 3000 Galatian infantry ???? silver shields 1200 Dahae mounted archers 1500 Cretenses 1000 Neocretes 3000 Tralleis 2500 Mysian archers 8000 Cyrtian slingers and

App. <i>Syr.</i> 6.32 ³⁰⁰			<p>Elymaean archers³⁰¹ 1500 Carians and Cilicians 2000 Cappadocians 4000 Pisidian, Pamphylian, and Lycian peltasts 2700 mixed auxiliaries 6000 <i>cataphracti</i> (armored cavalry) 1000 Medes (<i>agēma</i>) cavalry 1000 Syrian, Phrygian, Lydian cavalry 2500 Galatian cavalry ??? Scythed chariots ??? Arab archers on dromedaries ???? Tarantines (cavalry)</p> <p>70000 fighters 54 elephants</p>
<p>Livy 42.35.7 <i>Cretenses sagittarii – incertus numerus quan- tum rogati [au-xilia] Cretenses misissent</i></p> <p>Livy 43.7.2 <i>apud Persea maiorem nume-rum sagittari-orum quam apud Romanos</i></p>	171	<p>(FF) Third Macedonian War: Roman consul requests the muster of forces against Perseus</p> <p>The Senate admonishes Cretan legates for sending more archers to Perseus than to Rome</p>	<p>21600 Roman legionaries (4 urban legions) 1200 Roman cavalry 16200 Latin allies (15000 infantry 1200 cavalry) <3000 Cretans 2000 Ligurians <9000?³⁰² Attalids and Numidians (<7000 infantry <2000 cavalry)</p> <p><53000 fighters</p>
<p>Livy 42.51.7 <i>Cretensium par ferme numerus suos duces se- quebatur, Susum Phalasarnaeum et Syllum Gnosium</i></p>	171	<p>(FF) Third Macedonian War: Macedonians assemble</p>	<p>21000 phalanx 2000 peltasts (<i>agēma</i>) 3000 peltasts 3000 Paeonians, Agrinians, and Thracian settlers 3000 Cretans 2000 Gauls 3000 free Thracians 1000 Odysae infantry 500 mixed Greeks</p>

³⁰⁰ I am using Appian's because it does not seem to be unreasonable against Livy's catalogue, and simply to have a number in order to be able to do percentages. I note that 13,100 are uncounted in Livy's catalogue.

³⁰¹ Four thousand Cyrtian slingers and Elymaean archers on the extreme end of the right flank; on the extreme end of the left flank, "auxiliaries of Cyrtians and Elymaeans equal to those located on the right flank." (Livy 37.40.13)

³⁰² These numbers are based upon Perseus' statement to his troops at Cition (Livy 42.52.8); this may be an underestimate, since Perseus only predicted the arrival of two legions rather than four.

			500 Aetolians and Boeotians 4000 cavalry (3000 Macedonian cavalry 1000 Odrysae cavalry) 43000 fighters
Livy 42.57.7 <i>levis armaturae... Mysi et Cretenses</i>	171	(FD) Skirmish before Callinicus Hill: Romans	150 light armed Cretans and Mysians 100 Galatian cavalry (=2 <i>alae</i>) 250 fighters
Livy 42.57.8 <i>cum binis Cretensium cohortibus</i>	171	(FD) Skirmish before Callinicus Hill: Macedonians	60 Macedonian cavalry (=2 <i>turmae</i>) 60 Thracian cavalry (=2 <i>turmae</i>) 80 Cretans (=1 cohort) 80 Thracians (=1 cohort) 280 fighters ³⁰³
Livy 42.65.2 <i>duobus milibus Thracum et Cretensium</i>	171	(FD) Macedonians make ad hoc raid on foraging Romans, Phalanna	?1000 cavalry 2000 Thracians and Cretans ?3000 fighters
Plut. <i>Aem.</i> 15-16 παρ' Ἀρπάλω Θρακῶν καὶ Κρητῶν ἀναμεμιγμένον	168	(FD) Scipio Nasica takes Perrhaebeia Pass from Perseus	5000 legionaries 3000 Italian allies 200 Thracians and Cretans 120 cavalry 8320 fighters ³⁰⁴
Livy 44.43.6 <i>quingenti Cretenses</i>	168	(FD) After defeat at Pydna, Cretans accompany Perseus to Amphipolis	500 Cretenses 500 fighters

Foreign Aid and Mercenary Recruitment (AR) – Table 4

Source	Date	Forces Breakdown	Affiliation, with either leader or power receiving aid
Xen. <i>Anab.</i> 1.2.9 τοξότας Κρητας διακοσίους	404	1000 hoplites 800 Thracian peltasts 200 Cretan archers 40 Thracian cavalry 2040 fighters	1000 Spartans? [Clearchus the Lacedaemonian]
D. S. 20.88.9	305	500 Rhodian mercenaries	500 Rhodians [Ptolemy I]

³⁰³ Livy states that the two sides were evenly matched in number and armament: *proelium, cum pares numero essent neque ab hac aut illa parte noua auxilia subuenirent, incerta uictoria finitum est.*

³⁰⁴ Cf. Livy (44.35.14) states that Nasica only took 5000 total (*cum quinque <milibus> delectis militum*). Plutarch (15.5) describes this number as “not so many as Polybios said,” and cites his source for these numbers as a letter written by Scipio Nasica himself.

σύμμαχοι παρὰ μὲν Κνωσίων ἑκατὸν πενήκοντα		150 Cretans [Knossus] 650 fighters	
SEG 17:639, ll. 6-8 παραγενόμενοι ἐβοή[θη]σαν τῇ πόλει τῇ Ἀσπενδίων [Πάμφ]υλοι Λύκιοι <u>Κρήτες</u> Ἕλληνας Πισίδαι	301-298	Pamphylia Lycians Cretans Hellenes Pisidians Total unknown	Pamphylia
Plut. <i>Pyrrh.</i> 29 Ἄρεως ἦκεν ἐκ Κρήτης δισχιλίους <u>στρατιώτας</u> κομίζων	272	2000 Spartans and Cretans [Gortyn] 2000 fighters	<2000 Spartans [Ares of Sparta]
IC IV.167 νεανισ[237/6		
IC III.iii.1A = SEG 46:1222 [ἄνδρας ἐλευθέρος <u>διακοσίους</u> ὅπλα] ἔχοντας	227-224	?200 Cretans?	
IC II.xii.20 [SEG 46:1222] ³⁰⁵ ἄνδρας ἐλευθέρου[ς <u>διακοσίους</u> ὅπλα ἔχοντας]	227-224	??200 Cretans??	
Polyb. 4.55.5 Κνώσιοι... ἕξαπ-εστάλκεισαν χιλίους	219	1000 Cretans	
Polyb. 4.55.5 Πολυρρήνιοι ... καὶ μετὰ τούτων οἱ σύμμαχοι... πεντακοσίους <u>Κρήτας</u>	219	500 Cretans	
Polyb. 4.61.2 τοὺς παρὰ Πολυρρηνίων/ τῶν Μεσσηνίων ἀπεσταλμένους <u>Κρήτας</u> πεντακοσίους/ τριακοσίους	219	See Full Forces above 500 Cretans 300 Cretans 300 Cretans	

³⁰⁵ Guizzi (1997: 22) provides this restoration, and also posits that IC II.xii.20, a *summachia* between Dason and Eleutherna that is probably contemporary, might also have requested specific numbers (19). His figure of 200 (διακοσίους) fits with the amount of space for letters, in addition to the comparison to IC III.iii.3A, which clearly calls for 200 men. The conjecture for a specific numerical figure on the Eleuthernian *summachia* is much less solid: Guizzi argues that Guarducci's estimate of the length of the lines is too short, and while I think he may have a point, I cannot confidently use his estimate in my calculations.

Polyb. 4.80.4, 6 διακοσίων δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων; οἱ ... παρὰ τῶν Σπαρ-τιατῶν <u>Κρητες</u>	218	See Garrisons below 200? Cretans 200? Lacedaemonians 200(+) fighters ³⁰⁶	≤200 Lacedaemonians
Polyb. 5.3.1 <u>Νεοκρήτων</u> πεντακοσίων	218	500 Neokrētes	
Polyb. 3.75.7 καὶ πεντακοσίους αὐτοῖς ἐξαπέστειλε <u>Κρητας</u>	218	1000 peltasts 500 Cretans 1500 fighters	1000 Syracusan(?) peltasts
<i>IC</i> III.iii.3A, ll. 19-21 ἄνδρας <u>διακοσίου</u> ὄπλα ἔχοντας... τῶν δὲ ἀποστελλομένων εὐόντων μὴ ἐλάσσους τῶν ἡμίσεων <u>Ἱεραπύτνιοι</u>	c. 200	≤ 100 Hierapytnians ≤200 fighters	≤100 Hierapytnians
<i>SEG</i> 23.547, ll. 33-35 μὴ ἐλάσσους ἑκατὸν ἐλευθέρους ὄπλα ἔχοντας, τούτων δὲ ὄντων μὴ ἐλάσσους τῶν ἡμίσεων Ὀλούντιοι	c. 200	≥ 50 Oluntians ≥100 fighters	≥50 Oluntians
Livy 32.40.4 <i>sescentis Cretensibus</i> <i>ab tyranno datis</i> <i>Romano</i>	197	600 Cretans	
Livy 33.3.10 <u><i>Gortynii Cretensium</i></u>	197	500 “Gortynians”	≤500 Gortynians
Polyb. 13.8.2 τοῖς Κρησὶ	c. 195		
Polyb. 33.16.6 μετὰ πεντακοσίων Κρητῶν Livy 35.29.2 <i>Telemnestus Cretensis</i> <i>popularibus suis</i>	192	500 Cretans	≤500 Gortynians
Livy 37.39.10 <i>Trallis et Cretensis</i> – <i>quingentorum utrique</i> <i>numerum explebant</i> – <i>statuit</i>	190	<3800 Attalid auxiliaries (<3000 infantry 800 cavalry) <3000 Achaean peltasts 500 Cretans 500 Tralleis	<3800 Attalids

³⁰⁶ Griffith (1935: 95) counts the whole contingent as Cretan. Van Effenterre (1948: 187) and Walbank (1957: I.533) disagree whether some sort of alliance was in place between Cretans and Sparta that resulted in the Cretans separating off and returning home after Lepreum fell.

App. <i>Syr.</i> 6.31		4800 fighters or <7000 Attalid auxiliaries (4000 infantry <3000 cavalry) 3000 Achaean peltasts 7000-10000 fighters	<7000 Attalids
Livy 38.12.8 Livy 38.21.2 <i>ab Attalo Cretenses sagittarii et funditores et Tralli<et>Thraeces</i> Livy 38.13.3	189	1000 infantry (Cretan archers Cretan? slingers Tralleis or Thracians OR Thracian Tralleis) 500 cavalry 1000 infantry 300 cavalry 2800 fighters	
<i>IC</i> IV.179	183		
Polyb. 31.17.8 ξενολογήσας δ' ἐκ τῆς Κρήτης περὶ χιλίους στρατιώτας	162	1000 from Crete	
<i>ID</i> 1517	154		
Strabo 10.4.10	a. 120		[Dorylaus becomes resident of Knossus]

Garrisons (G) – Table 5

Source	Date	Context	Total	Commanding Power	Locals	<i>Xenoi</i>
<i>IG</i> II ² 1956	315- 309	List of mercenaries(?) for Macedon(?)		15 Thracians (5 Cassandreia 6 Perinthus 1 Philippi 2 Olynthus 1 Samothrace)	46 “Athenians” [Thracian nomenclature?]	2 Thracians
<i>IG</i> XII,6 1.217	p. 280	List of Ptolemaic mercenaries on Cyprus	16	1 Pharbaethite (Egyptian nome)		Mixed Greeks: 2 Achaeans 2 Aetolians 2 Cretans (Knossus, Rhethymnon) 1 Acarnanian 1 Arcadian? 1 Ionian 1 Phocian 1 Thessalian

				1		1 Boeotian
						15
<i>IG II²</i> 1299	p. 236/5	Honorific: for the Athenian commander of the Macedonian garrison at Eleusis	59	3 “Macedonians”	11 Athenians	5 Phocians 4 <i>Krētes</i> 2 Thessalians 1 Argives 1 Megarian 1 Lycian 1 Aetolian 1 Opuntian 1 Plataean 1 Achaean 1 Megalopolitan
				≤3	11	≤19 [26 names missing]
<i>IG IV</i> 729	l. 3 rd C	List of names from Hermione. Guarducci (1935a) argues that these names are typically Western Cretan.	43			

Appendix 2: Selected Passages and Translations

All Greek literary texts come from the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae website.

All Greek epigraphic texts come from the Packard Humanities Institute website.

All Latin texts from The Latin Library (www.thelatinlibrary.com) website.

Any emendations or other editions are noted in the footnotes.

All numbers of soldiers have been written out in Arabic numerals to allow ease of consultation.

All translations without a citation are by author.

AENEAS TACTICUS, *Polioretica*

32.1-2

Πρὸς δὲ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων προσαγωγὰς μηχανήμασιν ἢ σώμασιν ἐναντιοῦσθαι ὧδε. Πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὰ ὑπεραιρόμενα ἐκ πύργων ἢ ἰστῶν ἢ τῶν ὁμοτρόπων τούτοις, <ἰστία,> οἷς <τὰ> προσαχθέντ' ἂν ὑπεραίροιτο, χρή τισιν ἀδιατημίτοις περιβληθέντα κατατετάσθαι ὑπ' ὄνευόντων. Ἄλλα δὲ καὶ ὑποθυμιᾶν καπνὸν πολὺν <ιέντα καὶ> ὑφάπτειν ὡς μέγιστον πῦρ πνέοντα· ἀνταίρεσθαι πύργους ξυλίνους ἢ ἄλλα ὕψη ἐκ φορμῶν πληρουμένων ψάμμου ἢ ἐκ λίθων ἢ ἐκ πλίνθων. Ἴσχοιεν δ' ἂν τὰ βέλη <καὶ> καλάμων ταρσοὶ ὀρθίων καὶ πλαγίων συντιθεμένων.

Your opponents' assaults, with machines or troops, can be resisted in the following ways. In the first place, <sails> offer protection against missiles coming over the wall from towers or masts or the like. Cover them with something tear-proof, use capstans to stretch them taut, and once <they> are in position the projectiles will have to overshoot them. You should also start fires <which will emit> thick smoke from below and make as big a blaze as possible, and raise in defence wooden towers or other tall structures made of sand-filled baskets or stones or bricks. <Even> cross-woven wickerwork can stop the missiles. (Trans. Whitehead 2002)

36.1

Ταῖς δὲ τῶν κλιμάκων προσθέσεσιν ἀντιοῦσθαι <ὧδε>. Ἐὰν μὲν ὑπερέχη τοῦ τείχους ἢ κλιμαξ προστεθεῖσα, χρή, ὅταν ἐπ' ἄκρων ἢ <ὁ> ἀναβαίνων, τότε ἀπῶσαι τὸν ἄνδρα ἢ τὴν κλίμακα ξύλω δικρῶ, ἐὰν μὴ ἄλλως κωλύειν δύνη διὰ τὸ ὑποτοξεύεσθαι.

The placing of ladders against the walls can be foiled <as follows>. If the ladder, when in place, projects higher than the wall, wait until <the> man climbing it has reached the top and then – should a hail of arrows from below preclude any other means of stopping him – use a wooden pitchfork to push either him or his ladder away. (Trans. Whitehead 2002)

APPIAN, *Syrian War*

6.31 (157-61)

τὸ μὲν λαιὸν εἶχον ὀπλίται Ῥωμαίων μύριοι παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν αὐτόν· καὶ μετ' ἐκείνους ἦσαν Ἴταλῶν ἕτεροι μύριοι, τρεῖς ἑκατέρων τάξεις ἐπὶ βάθος. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς Ἴταλοῖς ὁ Εὐμένους στρατὸς ἐτάσσετο καὶ Ἀχαιοῶν πελτασταὶ περὶ τρισχιλίους. ὧδε μὲν εἶχε τὸ λαιόν, τὸ δεξιὸν δ' ἦν ἱππεῖς,

οἱ τε Ῥωμαίων καὶ Ἰταλῶν καὶ Εὐμένους, οὐ πλείους οὐδ' οὗτοι τρισχιλίων· ἀναμεμίχαστο δ' ἅπασι ψιλοὶ τε καὶ τοξόται πολλοί, καὶ ἀμφὶ τὸν Δομίτιον αὐτὸν ἦσαν ἱπέων ἴλαι τέσσαρες, οὕτω μὲν ἐγίνοντο πάντες ἐς τρισμυρίους...

The left wing had 10000 Roman “hoplites,” against the river itself, and with these were another 10000 Italians, with triple ranks in depth. Behind the Italians was set the army of Eumenes, and around 3000 Achaean peltasts. Thus was arrayed the left; on the right wing was cavalry, those of the Romans and Italians and Eumenes, no more than 3000. Mixed with all of these were many lights (*psiloi*) and archers, and around Domitius himself were four troops of cavalry (c. 240). Thus they 30000 in all...

6.32 (161-8)

Ἀντιόχῳ δ' ἦν μὲν ὁ στρατὸς ἅπας ἑπτακισμύριοι, καὶ τούτων τὸ κράτιστον ἦν ἡ φάλαγξ ἡ Μακεδόνων, ἄνδρες ἑξακισχίλιοι καὶ μύριοι, ἐς τὸν Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ Φιλίππου τρόπον ἐτι κοσμούμενοι. ἴσθη δ' αὐτοὺς ἐν μέσῳ, διελὼν ἀνὰ χιλίους καὶ ἑξακοσίους εἰς δέκα μέρη, καὶ τούτων ἐκάστου μέρους ἦσαν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ μετώπου πενήκοντα ἄνδρες, ἐς δὲ τὸ βάθος δύο καὶ τριάκοντα, ἐς δὲ τὰ πλευρὰ ἐκάστου μέρους ἐλέφαντες δύο καὶ εἴκοσιν. ἡ δ' ὄψις ἦν τῆς μὲν φάλαγγος οἷα τείχους, τῶν δ' ἐλεφάντων οἷον πύργων. τοιοῦτον μὲν ἦν τὸ πεζὸν Ἀντιόχῳ, ἱππεῖς δ' ἐκατέρωθεν αὐτοῦ παρατετάχαστο Γαλάται τε κατάφρακτοι καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον ἄγημα τῶν Μακεδόνων· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οἶδε ἱππεῖς ἐπίλεκτοι, καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ ἄγημα λέγεται. τάδε μὲν ἐξ ἴσου τῆς φάλαγγος ἦν ἐκατέρωθεν· ἐπὶ δ' αὐτοῖς τὰ κέρατα κατεῖχον ἐν μὲν δεξιᾷ ψιλοὶ τέτινες καὶ ἕτεροι ἱππεῖς ἀργυράσπιδες καὶ ἵπποτοξόται διακόσιοι, τὸ δὲ λαιὸν Γαλατῶν τ' ἔθνη, Τεκτοσάγαι τε καὶ Τρόκμοι καὶ Τολιστόβιοι, καὶ Καππαδόκαι τινές, οὓς ἔπεμψεν Ἀριαράθης, καὶ μιγάδες ἄλλοι ξένοι κατάφρακτός τε ἵππος ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἕτερα καὶ ἦν ἐκάλουν ἵππον ἐταιρικὴν, ὠπλισμένη κούφως. ὧδε μὲν καὶ ὁ Ἀντιόχος ἐξέτασσε. καὶ δοκεῖ τὴν ἐλπίδα λαβεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν, οὓς πολλοὺς ἔστησεν ἐπὶ τοῦ μετώπου, τὴν δὲ φάλαγγα πυκνὴν ἐς ὀλίγον συναγαγεῖν ἀπειροπολέμως, ἧ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἔδει θαρρεῖν πάνυ ἡσκημένη. πολὺ δὲ καὶ ἄλλο πλῆθος ἦν λιθοβόλων τε καὶ τοξοτῶν καὶ ἀκοντιστῶν καὶ πελταστῶν, Φρυγῶν τε καὶ Λυκίων καὶ Παμφύλων καὶ Πισιδῶν Κρητῶν τε καὶ Τραλλιανῶν καὶ Κιλικίων ἐς τὸν Κρητῶν τρόπον ἐσκευασμένων. ἵπποτοξόται τε ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἕτεροι, Δᾶαι καὶ Μυσοὶ καὶ Ἑλυμαῖοι καὶ Ἀραβες, οἱ καμήλους ὀξυτάτας ἐπικαθήμενοι τοξεύουσί τε εὐμαρῶς ἀφ' ὑψηλοῦ καὶ μαχαίραις, ὅτε πλησιάζουσιν, ἐπιμήκεσι καὶ στεναῖς χρωῶνται. δρεπανηφόρα τε ἄρματα ἐν τῷ μεταίχμιῳ, προπολεμεῖν τοῦ μετώπου, τετάχαστο· καὶ εἶρητο αὐτοῖς μετὰ τὴν πρώτην πείραν ὑποχωρεῖν.

For Antiochus, the whole army was 70000 men, the strongest of which was the phalanx of Macedonians, 16000 men, still arrayed in the manner of Alexander and Philip: He placed these in the center, dividing them into ten parts of sixteen hundred men, with fifty men at the front of each part, to a depth of thirty-two rows, and at the flanks of each section were twenty-two elephants. The appearance of the phalanx was that of city walls, of the elephants that of towers. Such was Antiochus' infantry. Galatian cavalry were positioned on either side, and *kataphraktoi* and the so-called *agēma* of the Macedonians. These cavalrymen were selected, and it is called the *agēma* for this reason. These were evenly distributed on either side of the phalanx. Besides them, the wings contained on the right *psiloi* and some other silver-shielded cavalry and 200

mounted archers, and on the left the tribes of the Galatians, Tectosagae and Trocmi and Tolistoboei, and some Cappadocians whom Ariarathes sent, and other mixed *xenoi*, and another armored (*cataphracti*) cavalry among them, and that cavalry which they call Companion, lightly armed. In this way did Antiochus array his army. He seemed to take hope in his cavalries, many of which he set at the front; thick phalanx

ARISTOTLE, Politics

1266b35-1267a5

ἔστι γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν μὲν εἶναι καὶ μίαν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην εἶναι τοιαύτην ἐξ ἧς ἔσονται προαιρετικοὶ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τιμῆς ἢ συναμφοτέρων. ἔτι στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητά τῆς κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν, τούναντίον δὲ περὶ ἐκάτερον· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἄνισον, οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, ἐὰν ἴσαι· ὅθεν καὶ “ἐν δὲ ἰῆ τιμῇ ἡμὲν κακὸς ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός”. οὐ μόνον δ’ οἱ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὰναγκαῖα ἀδικοῦσιν, ὧν ἄκος εἶναι νομίζει τὴν ἰσότητα τῆς οὐσίας, ὥστε μὴ λωποδυτεῖν διὰ τὸ ῥιγοῦν ἢ πεινῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν·...

...for it is possible for education to be one and the same for all, and yet to be of a character which will produce a disposition to covet wealth, or to covet office, or to covet both. This raises a further point. [It is necessary to deal with office, or political power, as well as with property]: civil discord arises not only from inequality of property, but also from inequality of the offices which men hold. But here we must note a difference. The distribution of property works in the opposite way from the distribution of office. The masses become revolutionary when the distribution of property is equal. This is the point of the verse in Homer, “Office and honour are one and the same for the good and bad man.” [There is also further point which has to be taken into account. We have to consider not only the causes of civil discord, but also the causes of ordinary crime.] There are some crimes which are due to lack of necessities; and here, [Phalaeas thinks], equality of property will be a remedy, and will serve to prevent men from stealing simply through cold or hunger. But want is not the only cause of crimes. Men also commit them simply for the pleasure it gives them, and just to get rid of an unsatisfied desire. (Trans. Barker 1962)

2.1271a13-17

νῦν δ’ ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν ὁ νομοθέτης φαίνεται ποιῶν· φιλοτίμους γὰρ κατασκευάζων τοὺς πολίτας τούτῳ κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν αἴρεσιν τῶν γερόντων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἄρχειν αἰτήσαιτο μὴ φιλότιμος ὢν. καίτοι τῶν γ’ ἀδικημάτων τῶν ἐκουσίων τὰ πλεῖστα συμβαίνει σχεδὸν διὰ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ διὰ φιλοχρηματίαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

In requiring candidates to seek election, the legislator is plainly acting in the spirit which he seeks to infuse into the whole of the constitution. He has imposed the requirement because he wants to make his citizens ambitious of honors and office; for no one would seek election as councilor unless he had such an ambition. Yet ambition and avarice are exactly the motives which lead men to commit nearly all intentional crimes. (Trans., *ibid.*)

2.1271b20-1272b23

Ἡ δὲ Κρητικὴ πολιτεία πάρεγγυς μὲν ἐστὶ ταύτης, ἔχει δὲ μικρὰ μὲν οὐ χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἦττον γλαφυρῶς. καὶ γὰρ εἴκει καὶ λέγεται γε τὰ πλεῖστα μεμιῆσθαι τὴν Κρητικὴν πολιτείαν ἢ τῶν Λακῶνων· τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα τῶν ἀρχαίων ἦττον διήρθρωται τῶν νεωτέρων. φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Λυκοῦργον, ὅτε τὴν ἐπιτροπείαν τὴν Χαρίλλου τοῦ βασιλέως καταλιπὼν ἀπεδήμησεν, τότε τὸν πλεῖστον διατριῦσαι χρόνον περὶ Κρήτην διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν· ἀποικοὶ γὰρ οἱ Λύκτιοι τῶν Λακῶνων ἦσαν, κατέλαβον δ' οἱ πρὸς τὴν ἀποικίαν ἐλθόντες τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων ὑπάρχουσαν ἐν τοῖς τότε κατοικοῦσιν. διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίοικοι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον χρῶνται αὐτοῖς, ὡς κατασκευάσαντος Μίνω πρώτου τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων. δοκεῖ δ' ἡ νῆσος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πεφυκέναι καὶ κείσθαι καλῶς· πάση γὰρ ἐπίκειται τῇ θαλάττῃ, σχεδὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἰδρυμένων περὶ τὴν θάλατταν πάντων· ἀπέχει γὰρ τῇ μὲν τῆς Πελοποννήσου μικρὸν, τῇ δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας τοῦ περὶ Τριόπιον τόπου καὶ Ῥόδου. διὸ καὶ τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχὴν κατέσχευεν ὁ Μίνως, καὶ τὰς νήσους τὰς μὲν ἐχειρώσατο τὰς δ' ὤκισεν, τέλος δὲ ἐπιθέμενος τῇ Σικελίᾳ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησεν ἐκεῖ περὶ Καμικόν.

The Cretan type of *politeia* is allied to the Spartan; but it is, on the whole, inferior in finish, though equal at one or two points. It may well have been the model on which the *politeia* of Sparta was generally based; indeed, this is said to be the case; and institutions of an older origin are generally less elaborate than the more modern. Tradition records that Lycurgus, when he relinquished the office of guardian to King Charillus and went abroad, spent most of his time on Crete, to which he was drawn by ties of connexion - the people of Lyctus [one of the cities of Crete] being a colony from Sparta. . . . These Spartan settlers adopted the form of law which they found existing among the inhabitants at the time of their settlement. The adoption of these ancient laws by the Spartan colonists in Crete may help us to understand why they are still in vogue among the serfs of the island, as a body of law supposed to go back as far as the times of Minos. . . . [The mention of Minos may remind us that] the island seems to be naturally designed, and admirably situated, for holding an entire empire in the Greek world. It commands the whole of the sea [the eastern Mediterranean] on whose shores nearly all of the Greeks are settled: it is not far from the Peloponnese on the west, and close to the corner of Asia round Cape Krio and Rhodes on the east. This explains the success of Minos in establishing a maritime empire. He subdued some of the neighbouring islands, and colonized others; and finally he carried his attacks as far as Sicily, where he died near Camicus. . . . (Trans. Barker 1962)

ἔχει δ' ἀνάλογον ἢ Κρητικὴ τάξις πρὸς τὴν Λακωνικὴν. γεωργοῦσί τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἴλωτες τοῖς δὲ Κρησὶν οἱ περίοικοι, καὶ συσσίτια παρ' ἀμφοτέροις ἔστιν, καὶ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκάλουν οἱ Λάκωνες οὐ φιδίτια ἀλλὰ ἀνδρεῖα, καθάπερ οἱ Κρηῆτες, ἧ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν ἐλήλυθεν. ἐτι δὲ τῆς πολιτείας ἢ τάξις. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔφοροι τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ καλουμένοις κόσμοις, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἔφοροι πέντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν οἱ δὲ κόσμοι δέκα εἰσίν· οἱ δὲ γέροντες τοῖς γέρουσιν, οὓς καλοῦσιν οἱ Κρηῆτες βουλήν, ἴσοι· βασιλεία δὲ πρότερον μὲν ἦν, εἶτα κατέλυσαν οἱ Κρηῆτες, καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν οἱ μὲν ἦν, εἶτα κατέλυσαν οἱ Κρηῆτες, καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν οἱ κόσμοι τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔχουσιν· ἐκκλησίας δὲ μετέχουσι πάντες, κυρία δ' οὐδενός ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἢ συνεπιψηφίσαι τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς γέρουσι καὶ τοῖς κόσμοις.

The general body of the Cretan institutions resembles the Spartan. The helots who cultivate the land for the Spartans correspond to the Periodic, or serfs, on Crete; and both states have a system of common meals, which the Spartans, in former times, used to call *andreia* (and not, as they do now, *phiditia*) - a term still used but the Cretans, and a proof that the Spartans derived their system from Crete. There is also a resemblance between the constitutional system of Crete and that of Sparta. The Spartan Ephors have the same position as the Cretan *Cosmoi*: the only difference is that the Ephors are five in number and the *Cosmoi* ten. Similarly, the Spartan elders correspond to the Cretan; but the latter are called the *Boulē* [while the Spartan elders are called the *Gerousia*]. Like Sparta, Crete had formerly a monarchy; but it afterwards was abolished, and the *Cosmoi* are now in command of the army. All Cretan citizens [like the Spartans] have the right of attending the general assembly; but its only power is that of ratifying the decisions of the elders and the *Cosmoi*. (Trans., *ibid.*)

τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων ἔχει βέλτιον τοῖς Κρησὶν ἢ τοῖς Λάκωσιν. ἐν μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαίμονι κατὰ κεφαλὴν ἕκαστος εἰσφέρει τὸ τεταγμένον, εἰ δὲ μή, μετέχει νόμος κωλύει τῆς πολιτείας, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον, ἐν δὲ Κρήτῃ κοινοτέρως· ἀπὸ πάντων γὰρ τῶν γινομένων καρπῶν τε καὶ βοσκημάτων δημοσίων, καὶ ἐκ τῶν φόρων οὓς φέρουσιν οἱ περίοικοι, τέτακται μέρος τὸ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὰς κοινὰς λειτουργίας, τὸ δὲ τοῖς συσσιτίοις, ὥστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέφεσθαι πάντας, καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας καὶ ἄνδρας· πρὸς δὲ τὴν ὀλιγοσιτίαν ὡς ὠφέλιμον πολλὰ πεφίλοσόφηκεν ὁ νομοθέτης, καὶ πρὸς τὴν διάζευξιν τῶν γυναικῶν, ἵνα μὴ πολυτεκνώσι, τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας ποιήσας ὁμιλίαν, περὶ ἧς εἰ φαύλως ἢ μὴ φαύλως, ἕτερος ἔσται τοῦ διασκεψασθαι καιρός. ὅτι δὴ τὰ περὶ τὰ συσσίτια βέλτιον τέτακται τοῖς Κρησὶν ἢ τοῖς Λάκωσι, φανερόν· τὰ δὲ περὶ τοὺς κόσμους ἔτι χεῖρον τῶν ἐφόρων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει κακὸν τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον, ὑπάρχει καὶ τούτοις (γίνονται γὰρ οἱ τυχόντες), ὁ δ' ἐκεῖ συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐνταῦθ' οὐκ ἔστιν. ἐκεῖ μὲν γάρ, διὰ τὸ τὴν αἴρεσιν ἐκ πάντων εἶναι, μετέχων ὁ δῆμος τῆς μεγίστης ἀρχῆς βούλεται μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν· ἐνταῦθα δ' οὐκ ἐξ ἀπάντων αἰροῦνται τοὺς κόσμους ἀλλ' ἐκ τινῶν γενῶν, καὶ τοὺς γέροντας ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων, περὶ ὧν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄν τις εἴπειε λόγους καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι γινομένων (τὸ γὰρ ἀνυπεύθυνον καὶ τὸ διὰ βίου μεῖζόν ἐστι γέρας τῆς ἀξίας αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἄρχειν ἀλλ' αὐτογνώμονας ἐπισφαλές). τὸ δ' ἡσυχάζειν μὴ μετέχοντα τὸν δῆμον οὐδὲν σημεῖον τοῦ τετάχθαι καλῶς. οὐδὲν γὰρ λῆμμα ἔστι τοῖς κόσμοις ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐφόροις, πόρρω γ' ἀποικοῦσιν ἐν νήσῳ τῶν διαφθερούντων.

The arrangements for common meals (*sussitia*) in Crete are better than they are at Sparta. At Sparta, each citizen contributes individually the quota allotted to him, and if he fails to do so he is legally debarred, as has already been noted, from a share in constitutional rights. In Crete the common meals are placed on a more public footing. The whole of the agricultural produce and live stock raised on the public land, and all the rents paid in kind by the Perioeci, form a common fund, of which one moiety is devoted to the cult of the gods and the discharge of public services, and the other to the provision of common meals. This makes it possible for all alike - men, women, and children - to be fed at the public cost. The legislation of Crete contains a number of ingenious devices intended to encourage an abstemious form of diet in the interest of the state; it also includes the segregation of women, to prevent them from having too many children, and it

sanctions homosexual connexions. (Whether that is right or wrong is a question which may be left for a later occasion.) What we have said will show that the arrangements for common meals in Crete are superior to those at Sparta. On the other hand, the *Cosmoi* are an institution which is inferior even to the Ephoralty. They share the defect of the Ephors - that of being casually appointed [through an absence of an proper qualification] - without presenting the constitutional advantage which the Ephors present. In the Spartan system, under which every citizen is eligible for the Ephoralty, the people at large can share in the enjoyment of this highest of offices, and the popular will is therefore enlisted in support of the constitution. In Crete, however, the *Cosmoi* are drawn from a limited number of families, and not from the people at large; while the members of the council of elders are drawn, in their turn, from the limited circle of those who have served as *Cosmoi*. This Cretan council of elders may be criticized on the same grounds as the Spartan. Their immunity from the rendering of any account, and their life-tenure, are both prerogatives beyond their desert; and their power of acting at their own discretion - and not on the basis of written rules - is a positive danger. As for the institution of the *Cosmoi*, we must add that it is no proof of its being properly organized that the people should remain contented in spite of their exclusion from it. The *Cosmoi*, unlike the Ephors, have no opportunity of using their powers for their own profit: they live on an island, remote from the danger of corruption. (Trans., *ibid.*)

ἦν δὲ ποιῶνται τῆς ἀμαρτίας ταύτης ἰατρείαν, ἄτοπος καὶ οὐ πολιτικὴ ἀλλὰ δυναστευτικὴ. πολλάκις γὰρ ἐκβάλλουσι συστάντες τινὲς τοὺς κόσμους ἢ τῶν συναρχόντων αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ιδιωτῶν· ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ τοῖς κόσμοις ἀπειπεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα βέλτιον γίνεσθαι κατὰ νόμον ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων βούλησιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλῆς ὁ κανὼν. πάντων δὲ φαυλότατον τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας τῶν δυνατῶν, ἦν καθιστᾶσι πολλάκις ὅταν μὴ δίκας βούλωνται δοῦναι· ἢ καὶ δῆλον ὡς ἔχει τι πολιτείας ἢ τάξις, ἀλλ' οὐ πολιτεία ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ δυναστεία μᾶλλον. εἰώθασι δὲ διαλαμβάνοντες τὸν δῆμον καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἀναρχίαν ποιεῖν καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ μάχεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους· καίτοι τί διαφέρει τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ διὰ τίνος χρόνου μηκέτι πόλιν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην, ἀλλὰ λύεσθαι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν; ἔστι δ' ἐπικίνδυνος οὕτως ἔχουσα πόλις, τῶν βουλομένων ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυναμένων. ἀλλὰ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, σφύζεται διὰ τὸν τόπον· ξηνηλασίας γὰρ τὸ πόρρω πεποίηκεν. διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν περιοίκων μένει τοῖς Κρησίν, οἱ δ' εἴλωτες ἀφίστανται πολλάκις. οὔτε γὰρ ἐξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς κοινωνοῦσιν οἱ Κρηῖτες, νεωστὶ τε πόλεμος ξενικὸς διαβέβηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον, ὃς πεποίηκε φανερὰν τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῶν ἐκεῖ νόμων.

The remedy which the Cretans provide for the defects of this institution is curious, and belongs to an arbitrary oligarchy rather than a constitutional state. Again and again a confederation is formed - either by some of their own colleagues, or by a group of private persons - which proceeds to eject the *Cosmoi* from office; and they are also allowed to resign their office before their term has expired. Surely it is better that all such matters should be regulated by law, and not settled by the mere will of men, which is a dangerous standard for action. Still worse, however, is the practice of declaring an abeyance of office by the *Cosmoi*, to which powerful nobles often resort when they are unwilling to submit to justice. This proves that the Cretan system, if it has some of the elements of a constitution, is not really a constitution at all, but an arbitrary form of oligarchy (*dynasteia*). It is a habit [of the Cretan nobles] to break up the people and their own

followers into many factions; to set up, on that basis, as many monarchies; and then to quarrel and fight. In effect, and as long as it lasts, such a state of things simply means the disappearance of the state and the dissolution of political society. A state which is brought to this pass is in danger: those who wish to attack it will now have also the power. But Crete itself, as has already been noted, is saved from this danger by its geographical position; and distance has here the same effect which is achieved elsewhere by laws for the expulsion of aliens. The isolation of Crete will also explain why the Perioeci there stay quiet, while the helots of Sparta are often in revolt. The Cretans have no foreign dominions; and it is only lately that foreign forces (*polemos xenikos*) have penetrated into the island - with results which have got to show the frailty (*astheneia*) of Cretan institutions. (Trans., *ibid*)

2.1274a9

καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴν Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς, καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἕκαστος τῶν δημαγωγῶν προήγαγεν αὐξῶν εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν.

Both Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the powers of the *boulē* on the Areopagus, while Pericles established the institution of the hired juror (*dikastēria misthophora*), and in this way each of its leaders proceeded to grow [Athens] into the present democracy.

ARRIAN

Anabasis Alexandri, 1.8.4

καὶ Εὐρυβώτας τε ὁ Κρής πίπτει ὁ τοξάρχης καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν τοξοτῶν ἕς ἑβδομήκοντα·

...and Eurybotas the *Krēs*, the *toxarch* (commander of archers) fell, and up to 70 of his archers...

ATHENAEUS, Deipnosophistae

15.695-6 (“Song of Hybriasis”)

σκόλιον δὲ φασὶ τινες καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ Ὑβρίου τοῦ Κρητὸς ποιηθέν. ἔχει δ’ οὕτως·

ἔστι μοι πλοῦτος μέγας δόρυ καὶ ξίφος
καὶ τὸ καλὸν λαισήιον, πρόβλημα χρωτός.
τούτῳ γὰρ ἀρῶ, τούτῳ θερίζω,
τούτῳ πατέω τὸν ἀδὺν οἶνον ἀπ’ ἀμπέλω,
τούτῳ δεσπότης μνοίας κέκλημαι.
τοὶ δὲ μὴ τολμῶντ’ ἔχειν δόρυ καὶ ξίφος
καὶ τὸ καλὸν λαισήιον, πρόβλημα χρωτός,
πάντες γόνυ πεπτηῶτες ἐμὸν κυνέοντι, δεσπότην
καὶ μέγαν βασιλῆα φωνέοντες.

Some say call this piece a *skolion* by Hyriasis the *Krēs*. It goes like this:

My great wealth is my spear and my sword,
and my noble shield of hide, protector of my hide.
With this I plow, with this I reap,

with this I tread the sweet wine from the vine,
with this I am called lord of vassals.
Yes, all who do not dare to bear the spear and sword
and the noble shield of hide, protector of hide,
they fall down and kiss my knee, and call me
master and great king.

CALLIMACHUS

Epigram 37

Ὁ Λύκτιος Μενίτας
τὰ τόξα ταῦτ' ἐπειπὼν
ἔθηκε· τῆ, κέρασ τοι
δίδωμι καὶ φαρέτρην,
Σάραπι· τοὺς δ' οἴστους
ἔχουσιν Ἑσπεῖται·

The Lyttian Menitas,
dedicated his bow with these
words: “I give you here
my bow of horn and my quiver,
Sarapis; but the arrows –
the Hesperians have those!”

DIO CASSIUS

36.18.2

καὶ Κορνήλιος Σισέννας ὁ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἄρχων ἦλθε μὲν ἐς τὴν Κρήτην, ὡς ταῦτ' ἐπύθετο, καὶ παρήνεσε τῷ Μετέλλῳ φείσασθαι τῶν δήμων, οὐ μέντοι καὶ ἀντέπραξέ τι μὴ πείσας. ἄλλοις τε οὖν πολλοῖς ἐκεῖνος ἐλυμήνατο, καὶ Ἐλευθέραν τὴν πόλιν ἐκ προδοσίας ἐλὼν ἠγγυρολόγησε· πύργον γάρ τινα οἱ προδιδόντες ἔκ τε πλίνθων πεποιημένον καὶ μέγιστον δυσμαχώτατόν τε ὄντα ὄξει συνεχῶς νυκτὸς διέβρεξαν, ὥστε θραυστὸν γενέσθαι.

Cornelius Sisenna, the governor of Greece, did, to be sure, when he heard the news, come to Crete and advise Metellus to spare the towns, but failing to persuade him offered no active objection. Metellus in addition to many other injuries captured the city of Eleuthera by treachery and extorted money from it; for those who betrayed it had by night repeatedly saturated with vinegar a very large brick tower, most difficult to capture, so that it became brittle. (Trans., Cary 1969)

DIODORUS SICULUS

20.85.3

...ἀθροίσας τοὺς ἀδρότατους τῶν λέμβων καὶ τούτους καταφράξας σανίσι καὶ θυρίδας κλειστάς κατασκευάσας ἐνέθετο μὲν τῶν τριspiθάμων ὄξυβελῶν τοὺς πορρωτάτω βάλλοντας καὶ τοὺς τούτοις κατὰ τρόπον χρησομένους, ἔτι δὲ τοξότας Κρήτας, τὰς δὲ ναῦς προσαγαγὼν ἐντὸς

βέλους κατετίρωσκε τοὺς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ὑψηλότερα τὰ παρὰ τὸν λιμένα τείχη κατασκευάζοντας.

...having gathered the stoutest of the light ships, armored them with timber, and provided them with closable ports, he [Demetrius Poliorcetes] placed on them the furthest-shooting artillery that fired the three-palm-long bolts and the men who could use them properly, and also Cretan archers (*toxotas Krētas*); sending forth the ships within firing range he wounded those men of the city who were preparing the higher walls around the harbor.

20.88.9

τούτων δὲ τῶν προτερημάτων γενομένων τοῖς Ῥοδίοις κατέπλευσαν τῇ πόλει σύμμαχοι παρὰ μὲν Κνωσσιῶν ἑκατὸν πενήκοντα, παρὰ δὲ Πτολεμαίου πλείους τῶν πεντακοσίων, ὧν ἦσαν τινες Ῥόδιοι μισθοφοροῦντες παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ.

After there was an advantage for the Rhodians, there sailed in allies (*summachoi*) for the city, 150 from the Knossians, and from Ptolemy 500 more, some of whom were Rhodians serving as *misthophoroi* for the king.

HERODOTUS

4.46.3-47.1

Τοῖσι γὰρ μήτε ἄστεα μήτε τείχεα ἦ ἐκτισμένα, ἀλλὰ φερέοικοι ἐόντες πάντες ἕωσι ἵπποτοξόται, ζῶντες μὴ ἀπ' ἀρότου ἀλλ' ἀπὸ κτηνέων, οἰκήματά τε σφι ἦ ἐπὶ ζευγέων, κῶς οὐκ ἂν εἶψαν οὗτοι ἄμαχοί τε καὶ ἄποροι προσμίσγειν; Ἐξεύρηται δὲ σφι ταῦτα τῆς τε γῆς εὐρύτητος ἐπιτηδέης καὶ τῶν ποταμῶν ἐόντων σφι συμμάχων· ἢ τε γὰρ γῆ εὐρύτητος πεδιάς αὕτη ποιῶδης τε καὶ εὐδρόσης ἐστὶ, ποταμοὶ τε δι' αὐτῆς ῥέουσι οὐ πολλῶν τε ἀριθμὸν ἐλάσσονες τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ διωρῶντων.

For instead of establishing towns or walls, they are all mounted archers who carry their homes along with them and derive sustenance not from cultivated fields but from their herds. Since they make their homes on carts, how can they not be invincible or impossible even to engage in battle? They were helped in making this discovery by their rivers, which foster and support (*sphi summachōn*) this way of life. For their land is flat, grassy, and well watered, and the rivers running through it are not fewer in number than the canals of Egypt. (Trans. Purvis 2007)

HIPPOCRATIC CORPUS, *Airs, Waters, Places*

20

Μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον ἐς τὴν ὑγρότητα παρέξομαι. Σκυθέων γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς, ἅπαντας ὅσοι Νομάδες, εὐρήσεις κεκαυμένους τοὺς τε ὤμους καὶ τοὺς βραχίονας καὶ τοὺς καρπούς τῶν χειρέων, καὶ τὰ στήθεα, καὶ τὰ ἰσχία καὶ τὴν ὄσφυν, δι' ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ἢ διὰ τὴν ὑγρότητα τῆς φύσιος καὶ τὴν μαλακίην· οὐ γὰρ δύνανται οὔτε τοῖσι τόξοισι ζυγνείειν, οὔτε τῷ ἀκοντίῳ ἐμπίπτειν τῷ ὤμῳ ὑπὸ ὑγρότητος καὶ ἀτονίης· ὁκόταν δὲ καυθῶσιν, ἀναξηραίνεται ἐκ τῶν ἄρθρων τὸ πολὺ τοῦ ὑγροῦ, καὶ ἐντονώτερα μᾶλλον γίνονται, καὶ τροφιμώτερα, καὶ ἠρθρωμένα τὰ σώματα μᾶλλον. Ῥοῖκά δὲ γίνονται καὶ πλατέα· πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐ σπαργανοῦνται ὥσπερ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, οὐδὲ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν ἵππασίην, ὅπως ἂν εὐεδροὶ ἕωσιν· ἔπειτα δὲ διὰ τὴν ἔδρην· τά

τε γὰρ ἄρσενα, ἕως ἂν οὐχ οἶά τε ἐφ' ἵππου ὀχέεσθαι, τὸ πολὺ τοῦ χρόνου κάθηται ἐν τῇ ἀμάξῃ, καὶ βραχὺ τῇ βαδίσει χρέονται, διὰ τὰς μεταναστάσιας καὶ περιελάσιας· τὰ δὲ θήλεα θαυμαστὸν οἶον ροϊκὰ καὶ βραδέα εἶναι τὰ εἶδεα. Πυρρὸν δὲ τὸ γένος ἐστὶ τὸ Σκυθικὸν διὰ τὸ ψύχος, οὐκ ἐπιγιγνομένου ὀξέως τοῦ ἡλίου· ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ ψύχους ἡ λευκότης ἐπικαίεται καὶ γίγνεται πυρρὴ.

I will give clear testimony to their moistness. The majority of the Scythians, all that are Nomads, you will find have their shoulders cauterized, as well as their arms, wrists, breast, hips and loins, simply because of the moistness and softness of their constitution. For owing to their moistness and flabbiness they have not the strength either to draw a bow or to throw a javelin from the shoulder. But when they have been cauterized the excess of moisture dries up from their joints, and their bodies become more braced, more nourished and better articulated. Their bodies grow relaxed and squat, firstly because, unlike the Egyptians, they do not use swaddling clothes, of which they have not the habit, for the sake of their riding, that they may sit a horse well; secondly, through their sedentary lives. For the boys, until they can ride, sit the greater part of the time in the wagon, and because of the migrations and wanderings rarely walk on foot; while the girls are wonderfully flabby and torpid in physique. It is the cold that burns their white skin and turns it ruddy. (Trans., Jones 1957)

HOMER

***Odyssey* 21.393-5**

...ὁ δ' ἤδη τόξον ἐνώμα
πάντη ἀναστρωφῶν, πειρώμενος ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα,
μὴ κέρα ἵπες ἔδοιεν ἀποιχομένοιο ἄνακτος.

...Odysseus, who by now was handling the bow, turning it all up and down, and testing it from one side and another to see if worms had eaten the horn in the master's absence. (Trans., Lattimore 1967)

***Homeric Hymn to Apollo* 388-396**

Καὶ τότε δὴ κατὰ θυμὸν ἐφράζετο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων
οὓς τινας ἀνθρώπους ὀργιόνας εἰσαγάγοιτο
οἱ θεραπεύσονται Πυθοῖ ἐνὶ πετρηέσση·
ταῦτ' ἄρα ὀρμαίνων ἐνόησ' ἐπὶ οἴνοπι πόντῳ
νῆα θοήν· ἐν δ' ἄνδρες ἔσαν πολέες τε καὶ ἐσθλοί,
Κρήτες ἀπὸ Κνωσοῦ Μινωῖου, οἳ ρά τ' ἄνακτι
ιερὰ τε ῥέζουσι καὶ ἀγγέλλουσι θέμιστας
Φοίβου Ἀπόλλωνος χρυσαόρου, ὅττι κεν εἴπη
χρείων ἐκ δάφνης γυάλων ὑπο Παρνησοῖο.

And then did Phoibos Apollo begin to ponder at heart
what folk he might bring to serve him in rocky Pytho as priests.
While revolving this matter he saw a swift ship on the wine-dark sea;
aboard her from Minos' Knossos were many fine Cretan men –

it is they who offer the lord his sacrifice, they who report
the decrees of Phoibos Apollo whose sword is of gold, when he speaks
from the bay-tree proclaiming his oracles down in Parnassos' glens.
(Trans., Crudden 2001)

ISOCRATES

***Panegyricus* (4).115-6**

Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὴν παροῦσαν εἰρήνην, οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτονομίαν τὴν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις μὲν οὐκ ἐνοῦσαν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς συνθήκαις ἀναγεγραμμένην, ἄξιον ἐλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν ἡμετέραν. Τίς γὰρ ἂν τοιαύτης καταστάσεως ἐπιθυμήσειεν, ἐν ἣ καταποντισταὶ μὲν τὴν θάλατταν κατέχουσιν, πελτασταὶ δὲ τὰς πόλεις καταλαμβάνουσιν, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ πρὸς ἑτέρους περὶ τῆς χώρας πολεμεῖν ἐντὸς τείχους οἱ πολῖται πρὸς ἀλλήλους μάχονται, πλείους δὲ πόλεις αἰχμάλωτοι γεγόνασιν ἢ πρὶν τὴν εἰρήνην ἡμᾶς ποιήσασθαι, διὰ δὲ τὴν πυκνότητα τῶν μεταβολῶν ἀθυμοτέρως διάγουσιν οἱ τὰς πόλεις οἰκοῦντες τῶν ταῖς φυγαῖς ἐξημιωμένων· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέλλον δεδίασιν, οἱ δ' αἰεὶ κατιέναι προσδοκῶσιν.

And, indeed, neither the present peace nor the *autonomia* – even if not our own *politeiai*, inscribed in the treaties – should be preferred to our own rule. For who would desire the sort of situation in which pirates control the sea and peltasts (Papillon 2004: 56: “second-rank mercenaries”) take the cities? Instead of going to war against other people for territory, the citizens do battle against each other inside their walls. Many cities are taken before we make our peace. Due to the frequency of revolutions, those living in the cities show greater apathy than those banished to exile. The former fear the future, the latter always plan on returning.

4.146-9

Ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ Κύρου τελευτήσαντος συνῆλθον ἅπαντες οἱ τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντες, ἐν τούτοις τοῖς καιροῖς οὕτως αἰσχυρῶς ἐπολέμησαν ὥστε μηδένα λόγον ὑπολιπεῖν τοῖς εἰθισμένοις τὴν Περσῶν ἀνδρείαν ἐπαινεῖν. Λαβόντες γὰρ ἐξακισχιλίους τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὐκ ἀριστίνδην ἐπειλεγμένους, ἀλλ' οἱ διὰ φαυλότητ' ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν [πόλεσιν] οὐχ οἰοί τ' ἦσαν ζῆν, ἀπείρους μὲν τῆς χώρας ὄντας, ἐρήμους δὲ συμμάχων γεγενημένους, προδεδομένους δ' ὑπὸ τῶν συναναβάντων, ἀπεστερημένους δὲ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ μεθ' οὗ συνηκολούθησαν, τοσοῦτον αὐτῶν ἦττους ἦσαν ὥσθ' ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀπορήσας τοῖς παροῦσι πράγμασιν καὶ καταφρονήσας τῆς περὶ αὐτὸν δυνάμεως τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοὺς τῶν ἐπικούρων ὑποσπόνδους συλλαβεῖν ἐτόλμησεν, ὡς εἰ τοῦτο παρανομήσειεν συνταράξων τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ μᾶλλον εἴλετο περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐξαμαρτεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἐκείνους ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ διαγωνίσασθαι. Διαμαρτῶν δὲ τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν συμμεινάντων καὶ καλῶς ἐνεγκόντων τὴν συμφορὰν, ἀπιοῦσιν αὐτοῖς Τισσαφέρην καὶ τοὺς ἰππέας συνέπεμψεν, ὑφ' ὧν ἐκεῖνοι παρὰ πᾶσαν ἐπιβουλεύομενοι τὴν ὁδὸν ὁμοίως διεπορεύθησαν ὡσπερ ἀνὴρ προπεμπόμενος, μάλιστα μὲν φοβούμενος τὴν ἀοίκητον τῆς χώρας, μέγιστον δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν νομίζοντας, εἰ τῶν πολεμίων ὡς πλείστοις ἐντύχοιεν. Κεφάλαιον δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ λείαν ἐλθόντες, οὐδὲ κόμην καταλαβόντες, ἀλλ' ἐπ' αὐτὸν τὸν βασιλέα στρατεύσαντες, ἀσφαλέστερον κατέβησαν τῶν περὶ φιλίας ὡς αὐτὸν πρεσβευόντων. Ὡστε μοι δοκοῦσιν ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τόποις σαφῶς ἐπιδεδεῖχθαι τὴν αὐτῶν μαλακίαν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ παραλίᾳ τῆς Ἀσίας πολλὰς μάχας ἠττηνται, καὶ διαβάντες εἰς τὴν

Εὐρώπην δίκην ἔδοσαν, —οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν κακῶς ἀπώλονθ', οἱ δ' αἰσχρῶς ἐσώθησαν, —καὶ τελευτῶντες ὑπ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς βασιλείοις καταγέλαστοι γεγόνασιν.

But after Cyrus died and they all united in such favorable circumstances, they fought so shamefully that no argument remains for those who usually praise Persian courage. They faced 6000 Greeks, not chosen for merit but because, through poverty, they could not survive in their own land; these Greeks had no knowledge of the land, they had no allies (*summachōn*), they had been deserted by those who had come with them, and they had lost the general with whom they had come. Nevertheless, the King's forces were so inferior to these that the King, at a loss of what to do and lacking confidence in his own forces, dared to capture the leaders of the mercenaries (*epikourōn*), even though they were protected by a truce, in the hope that by committing such a crime, he would unnerve their army. He chose to sin against the gods rather than fight against the troops openly. When this plan failed, since the army remained together and endured their loss nobly, the King sent Tissaphernes and cavalry with the Greeks as they departed. Although the Greeks were harassed all along the way, they got through just as if they were being escorted in a procession. They especially feared the uninhabited parts of the land and thought that the best thing for them would be if they should meet as many of the enemy as possible. In sum, these men came not to plunder or to capture a town, but to march against the King himself, and they went away more safely than ambassadors who visit him seeking friendship. Thus the Persians seem to me to have shown their weakness clearly in all areas: on the coast of Asia they lost many battles; crossing over into Europe they paid the price when some of them were destroyed completely and other escaped in shame; and finally they have become a joke even inside the King's palace. (Trans. Papillon 2004)

LIVY

22.37.7

Milite atque equite scire nisi Romano Latiniq̄ue nominis non uti populum Romanum: leuium armorum auxilia etiam externa uidisse in castris Romanis. Itaque misisse mille sagittariorum ac funditorum, aptam manum aduersus Baliares ac Mauros pugnacesque alias missili telo gentes.

He [Hieron] knew that the Roman people did not use heavy infantry and horse unless it was Roman or Latin: but he had also seen that the auxiliaries of light arms in the Roman camp were foreign. So he had sent 1000 archers and slingers, a force well-suited against Baleaeric Islanders and Moors and other peoples who fought with missile weapons.

24.30

Hippocrates atque Epicydes postquam capi muros refringique portas uidere, in arcem sese cum paucis recepere; inde clam nocte Herbesum perfugiunt. Syracusanis octo milium armatorum agmine profectis domo ad Mylan flumen nuntius occurrit captam urbem esse, cetera falsa mixta ueris ferens... prima forte signa sescentorum Cretensium erant, qui apud Hieronymum meruerant sub eis et Hannibalis beneficium habebant, capti ad Trasumennum inter Romanorum

auxilia dimissique. quos ubi ex signis armorumque habitu cognouere Hippocrates atque Epicydes...

After Hippocrates and Epicydes saw that the walls were taken and the gates broken open, withdrew themselves into the citadel with a few men; then at night they secretly fled to Herbesus. The Syracusians, having departed from home with a column of 8000 armed soldiers, met a messenger at the Mylas River saying that the city was capture, but the rest of the news was false mixed with true things... By chance the first standards were those of 600 *Cretenses*, who had served under them [Hippocrates and Epicydes] when Hieronymus was in power, and who were indebted to Hannibal, since they were captured at Lake Trasumennus among the auxiliaries of the Romans and sent away. Hippocrates and Epicydes recognized them from their standards and the appearance of their armament...

31.35.1

Rex non tam celerem aleam uniuersi certaminis timens quadringentos Tralles—Illyriorum id, sicut alio diximus loco, est genus—et Cretenses trecentos, addito his peditibus pari numero equitum, cum duce Athenagora, uno ex purpuratis, ad lacessendos hostium equites misit.

The king [Philip V], fearing the quick gamble of an all-out battle too early, sent 400 Tralles – this is the Illyrian type, as I have said elsewhere – and 300 *Cretenses*, with a number of cavalry equal to these infantry, with Athenagoras – one of his court – as commander, to harass the cavalry of the enemies.

32.40.4

De conloquio discessum sescentis Cretensibus ab tyranno datis Romano induitiisque inter Nicostratum praetorem Achaeorum et Lacedaemoniorum tyrannum in quattuor menses factis. Inde Quinctius Corinthum est profectus et ad portam cum Cretensium cohorte accessit, ut Philocli praefecto urbis appareret tyrannum a Philippo descisse...

They departed from the meeting with 600 *Cretenses* handed over to the Roman by the tyrant [Nabis] and having made a cessation of hostilities between Nicostratus, leader of the Achaeans, and the tyrant of the Lacedaemonians for four months. Then Quinctius went to Corinth and approached the gate with the cohort of *Cretenses*, so that it would be clear to Philocles, the prefect of the city, that the tyrant had abandoned Philip...

33.3.10

nihil morati Aetoli sunt: Phaenea duce sex milia peditum cum equitibus quadringentis uenerunt. ne dubium esset quid expectasset, confestim Quinctius mouit castra. transgresso in Phthioticum agrum quingenti Gortynii Cretensium, duce Cydante, et trecenti Apolloniatae haud dispari armatu se coniunxere, nec ita multo post Amynander cum Athamanum peditum ducentis et mille.

The Aetolians did not delay: 6000 infantry and 400 cavalry came with Phaeneas as their commander. So that there would be no doubt what he had been waiting for, Quinctius

immediately moved camp. Having crossed into Phthionic territory, he was joined by 500 Gortynians of Crete, under the command of Cydas, and 300 Apolloniates in the same armament, and only a little afterwards by Amynder with 1200 Athamene infantry.

33.4.6

Macedonum uero phalangem ... decem et sex milia militum haec fuere, robur omne uirium eius regni; ad hoc duo milia caetratorum, quos peltas<tas> appellant, Thracumque et Illyriorum—Tralles est nomen genti—par numerus, bina milia erant, et mixti ex pluribus gentibus mercede conducti auxiliares mille ferme et quingenti et duo milia equitum. cum iis copiis rex hostem opperiebatur. Romanis ferme par numerus erat; qui tum copiis tantum quod Aetoli accesserant superabant.

This (the Macedonian phalanx) comprised 16000 soldiers, full strength of his kingdom; in addition, there were 2000 *caetratae*, who are called peltasts, an equal number (2000) of Thracians and Illyrians – Tralles is the name of the people, and, of mixed auxiliaries from even more peoples, contracted for pay (*mercede conducti*), nearly 1500, and 2000 cavalry. With these troops the king awaited the enemy. The Romans had a roughly equal number; they had more of these troops (i.e. cavalry) because the Aetolians had joined.

33.14.3-5

...et praeter quingentos Macedonas mixtosque ex omni genere auxiliorum octingentos, quot iam ante ibi fuerant, mille Macedonum eo miserat et mille ac ducentos Illyrios Thracasque et Cretenses, qui in utraque parte militabant, octingentos. his additi Boeoti Thessalique et Acarnanes mille, scutati omnes, et <septingenti ex> ipsorum Corinthiorum iuuentute, impleta ut essent sex milia armatorum, fiduciam Androsteni fecerunt acie decernendi.

...and in addition to 500 Macedonians mixed with 800 auxiliaries of every type, the number which at this point had already been there, he had sent there [Corinth] 1000 Macedonians and 1200 Illyrians and Thracians, and 800 *Cretenses*, who were fighting on both sides. To these were added 1000 Boeotians, Thessalians, and Acarnanians, all bearing shields, and 700 of the Corinthians own youth, so that his numbers filled to 6000 armed men, giving Androstenes the confidence to choose battle.

34.27.2

Cum terra marique tantum belli circumstaret tyrannum et prope nulla spes esset uere suas hostiumque aestimanti uires, non tamen omisit bellum sed et a Creta mille delectos iuuentutis eorum exciuit, cum mille iam haberet, et tria milia mercennariorum militum, decem milia popularium cum castellanis agrestibus in armis habuit et fossa ualloeque urbem communiuit...

Although so great a war on land and sea beset the tyrant [Nabis] and there was practically no hope for him considering his strength and that of the enemy, nevertheless he did not reject war, but summoned from Crete 1000 chosen youth, even though he already had 1000, and 3000

mercenary soldiers; he had 10000 of his own men in arms with countryside fortifications, and he fortified the city with a ditch and moat...

35.29.1-2

Luce orta Cretensium leuis armatura et Tarentini equites super torrentem proelium commiserunt. Telemnastus Cretensis popularibus suis, equitibus Lycortas Megalopolitanus praeerat. Cretenses et hostium auxiliares equitumque idem genus, Tarentini, praesidio aquatoribus erant.

At first light the light-armed *Cretenses* and the Tarentine cavalry joined in battle over the stream. Telemnastus the *Cretensis* led his countrymen, Lycortas the Megalopolitan led the cavalry. The guard for the water source was the *Cretenses* auxiliaries of the enemy and the same type of cavalry, Tarantines.

36.18.5

Macedones pro uallo locati primo facile sustinebant Romanos, temptantis ab omni parte aditus, multum adiuuantibus, qui ex loco superiore fundis uelut nimum glandis et sagittas simul ac iacula ingerebant...

The Macedonians, positioned before the rampart at first easily engaged with the Romans, who were trying out entry from every direction, with much help from those who, from the higher ground, were attacking them with sling bullets like a cloud as well as arrows and javelins...

37.39

Romana acies unius prope formae fuit et hominum et armorum genere. duae legiones Romanae, duae socium ac Latini nominis erant; quina milia et quadringenos singulae habebant. Romani mediam aciem, cornua Latini tenuerunt; hastatorum prima signa, dein principum erant, triarii postremos claudebant. extra hanc uelut iustam aciem a parte dextra consul Achaeorum caetratis immixtos auxiliares Eumenis, tria milia ferme peditum, aequata fronte instruxit; ultra eos equitum minus tria milia opposuit, ex quibus Eumenis octingenti, reliquus omnis Romanus equitatus erat; extremos Trallis et Cretensis— quingentorum utrique numerum explebant— statuit. laeuum cornu non egere uidebatur obiectis talibus auxiliis, quia flumen ab ea parte ripaeque deruptae claudebant; quattuor tamen inde turmae equitum oppositae. haec summa copiarum erat Romanis, et duo milia mixtorum Macedonum Thracumque, qui uoluntate secuti erant; hi praesidio castris relictis sunt. XVI elephantos post triarios in subsidio locauerunt...

The Roman line was practically of a single form and type of men and weapons. there were two Roman legions [10800 men] and two legions of allies and Latins [10800 men]; each legion had 5400 men. The Romans held the center, the Latins the held the flanks; the first standards were those of the *hastati*, then of the *principes*, and the *triarii* held the rear. Beyond what may be considered the usual battle line, on the right side and the same distance forward, the consul drew up the auxiliaries of Eumenes intermixed with *caetratae* (peltasts) of the Achaeans, roughly 3000 infantry; out beyond those he placed fewer than 3000 cavalry, 800 of whom were from Eumenes,

the remainder all Roman cavalry (<2200); he placed the Tralleis and *Cretenses* – 500 of each – at the extremes. The left flank did not seem to require the placement of so many auxiliaries, since a river and its precipitous banks protected that side; nevertheless four *turmae* of cavalry [est. 240 men] were placed there. This was the whole force of the Romans, as well as 2000 mixed Macedonians and Thracians, who had followed voluntarily: these remained behind as a guard for the camp. 16 elephants were placed behind the *triatrui* in reserve...

37.40

Regia acies uaria magis multis gentibus, dissimilitudine armorum auxiliorumque erat. decem et sex milia peditum more Macedonum armati fuere, qui phalangitae appellabantur. haec media acies fuit, in fronte in decem partes diuisa; partes eas interpositis binis elephantis distinguebat; a fronte introrsus in duos et triginta ordines armatorum acies patebat. hoc et roboris in regiis copiis erat, et perinde cum alia specie tum eminentibus tantum inter armatos elephantis magnum terrorem praebebat ... ad latus dextrum phalangitarum mille et quingentos Gallograecorum pedites opposuit. his tria milia equitum loricatorum—cataphractos ipsi appellant—adiunxit. addita his ala mille ferme equitum; agema eam uocabant; Medi erant, lecti uiri, et eiusdem regionis mixti multarum gentium equites. continens his grex sedecim elephantorum est oppositus in subsidiis. ab eadem parte, paulum producto cornu, regia cohors erat; argyraspides a genere armorum appellabantur; Dahae deinde, equites sagittarii, mille et ducenti; tum leuis armatura, trium milium, pari ferme numero, pars Cretenses, pars Tralles; duo milia et quingenti Mysi sagittarii his adiuncti erant. extremum cornu claudebant quattuor milia, mixti Cyrtii funditores et Elymaei sagittarii. ab laeuo cornu phalangitis adiuncti erant Gallograeci pedites mille et quingenti et similiter his armati duo milia Cappadocum—ab Ariarathe missi erant regi—; inde auxiliares mixti omnium generum, duo milia septingenti, et tria milia cataphractorum equitum et mille alii equites, regia ala leuioribus tegumentis suis equorumque, alio haud dissimili habitu; Syri plerique erant Phrygibus et Lydis immixti. ante hunc equitatum falcatae quadrigae et cameli, quos appellant dromadas. his insidebant Arabes sagittarii, gladios tenuis habentes longos quaterna cubita, ut ex tanta altitudine contingere hostem possent. inde alia multitudo, par ei, quae in dextro cornu erat: primi Tarentini, deinde Gallograecorum equitum duo milia et quingenti, inde Neocretes mille et eodem armatu Cares et Cilices mille et quingenti et totidem Tralles et quattuor milia caetratorum: Pisidae erant et Pamphylii et Lycii; tum Cyrtiorum et Elymaeorum paria in dextro cornu locatis auxilia, et sedecim elephantum modico interuallo distantes.

The royal line was more varied with many people and with heterogeneity of weapons and auxiliaries. 16000 infantry were armed in the fashion of the Macedonians, who were called *phalangites*. These were the center line, broken at the front into ten portions, which were separated by two elephants placed in between each; the formation extended back into thirty-two rows. This was the strength of the royal forces, and would induce great fear, not only for its appearance but also for the elephants standing out so prominently among the armed men. ...At the right flank of the phalanx he placed 1500 Galatian infantry. Next to these he placed 3000 armored cavalry, who are called *cataphracti*. A wing of cavalry, around 1000, was added; this was called the *agēma*; they were Medes, selected men, and cavalrymen of the same region were

a mix of many races. Next to these a herd of 16 elephants was set in reserve. On this side, a little set out from the wing, was the royal cohort; they were called *argyraspides* from the type of armament. Next were 1200 Dahae, mounted archers; then the light armed forces, 3000 with equal numbers of *Cretenses* and Tralleis; 2500 Mysian archers were joined to these. The extreme flank contained 4000 mixed Cyrtian slingers and Elymaean archers. At the left flank of the *phalangites* were joined 1500 Galatian infantry and 2000 Cappadocians – they were sent to the king by Ariarathes – armed similarly to these; next were 2700 mixed auxiliaries of all nationalities, 3000 *cataphracti* and 1000 other cavalry, a royal wing with lighter armaments for themselves and their horses, but hardly dissimilar in appearance; they were mostly Syrians mixed with Phrygians and Lydians. In front of this cavalry were scythed chariots and camels, which are called dromedaries. Arab archers sat on these, holding narrow swords four cubits long, so that they could attack the enemy from so great a height. Next was another multitude, the part that was in the right flank: first the Tarantines, then 2500 Galatian cavalry, then 1000 *Neocretes* and 1500 Carians and Cilicians in the same armament and the same number (1500) of Tralleis and 4000 *caetratae* (peltasts): these were Pisidians, Pamphylians, and Lycians; then auxiliaries of Cyrtians and Elymaeans equal to those set in the right flank, and 16 elephants set off by a short distance.

38.12.8

Paucos post dies profecto ab Epheso consuli ad Magnesiam occurrit Attalus cum mille peditibus equitibusque quingentis, Athenaeo fratre iusso cum ceteris copiis subsequi, commendata iis custodia Pergami, quos fratri regnoque fidus credebat.

After a few days, after the consul had departed from Ephesus for Magnesia, Attalus met him with 1000 infantry and 500 cavalry, having ordered his brother Athenaeus to follow with the rest of the troops after having entrusted the stewardship of Pergamum to those whom he believed loyal to his brother and the kingdom.

38.13.3

Eodem et Athenaeus, Eumenis et Attali frater, cum Cretense Leuso et Corrago Macedone uenit; mille pedites mixtarum gentium et trecentos equites secum adduxerunt.

Atheneaus, the brother of Eumenes and Attalus, also came to the same place with Leusus the *Cretensis* and Corragus the Macedonian; they brought 1000 infantry of mixed races and 300 cavalry with them.

38.21.2

Ante signa modico interuallo uelites eunt et ab Attalo Cretenses sagittarii et funditores et Tralli <et> Thraeces; signa peditum ut per arduum, leni gradu ducuntur, ita prae se habentium scuta, ut missilia tantum uitarent, pede collato non uiderentur pugnaturi.

The *velites* (skirmishers) went a short distance before the standards, as well as the *Cretenses* archers and slingers sent by Attalus and Thracian<s and> Tralleis; the standards of the infantry,

as through rough terrain, were led at a slow pace, likewise the shields they held before them, so as to avoid only the missiles, not so that they would seem inclined to engage in close quarters.

42.35.4-7

praeter eos exercitus, quos consules comparabant, C. Sulpicio Galbae praetori negotium datum, ut quattuor legiones scriberet urbanas, iusto numero peditum equitumque, iisque quattuor tribunos militum ex senatu legeret, qui praeessent; sociis Latini nominis imperaret quindecim milia peditum, mille et ducentos equites, is exercitus uti paratus esset, quo senatus censuisset. P. Licinio consuli ad exercitum ciuilem socialemque petenti addita auxilia, Ligurum duo milia, Cretenses sagittarii—incertus numerus, quantum rogati [auxilia] Cretenses misissent—, Numidae item equites elephantique.

In addition to those armies which the consuls were gathering, the task was given to the praetor G. Sulpicius Galba to enroll 4 urban legions, with the proper number of infantry and cavalry, and to choose four tribunes from the Senate who would command them; to order 15000 infantry and 1200 cavalry from the Latin allies; when this army was ready, it should be where the Senate had decided. Auxiliary forces were added to the citizen and allied army by P. Licinius the consul who summoned them: 2000 Ligurians, *Cretenses* archers – however many the *Cretenses* sent when asked, the number is uncertain – and then Numidian cavalry and elephants.

42.51

eo iam omnes Macedonum <et> externorum auxiliorum conuenerant copiae... summa omnium quadraginta <tria> milia armata fuere; quorum pars ferme dimidia phalangitae erant; Hippias Beroeaeus praeerat. delecta deinde et uiribus et robore aetatis ex omni caetratorum numero duo <milia> erant: agema hanc ipsi legionem uocabant; praefectos habebat Leonnatum et Thrasippum Eulyestas. ceterorum caetratorum, trium ferme milium hominum, dux erat Antiphilus Edessaeus. Paeones et ex Paroria et Parastrymonia—sunt autem ea loca subiecta Thraciae—et Agrianes, admixtis etiam Threcibus incolis, trium milium ferme et ipsi expleuerant numerum. armauerat contraxeratque eos Didas Paeon, qui adolescentem Demetrium occiderat. et armatorum duo milia Gallorum erant; praefectus Asclepiodotus ab Heraclea ex Sintis; tria milia Threcum liberorum suum ducem habebant. Cretensium par ferme numerus suos duces sequebatur, Susum Phalasarnaeum et Syllum Gnosium. et Leonides Lacedaemonius quingentis ex Graecia, mixto generi hominum, praeerat. regii is generis ferebatur, exul, damnatus frequenti concilio Achaeorum litteris ad Persea deprentis. Aetolorum et Boeotorum, qui non explebant plus quam quingentorum omnes numerum, Lyco Achaeus praefectus erat. ex his mixtis tot populorum, tot gentium auxiliis duodecim milia armatorum ferme efficiebantur. equitum ex tota Macedonia contraxerat <tria> milia. uenerat eodem Cotys, Seuthis filius, rex gentis Odrysarum, cum mille delectis equitibus, pari ferme peditum numero. ita summa totius exercitus triginta nouem milia peditum erant, quattuor equitum.

In that place had now convened all the forces of Macedonians and foreign auxiliaries. ...the sum total of all at arms was 43,000; of these, about half were phalangites; Hippias the Beroeian commanded them. Next there were 2000 selected from all the peltasts for their strength and vigor

of youth: they called this unit the *agēma*; they had the Eulyestans Leonnatus and Thrasippus as commanders. The leader of the rest of the peltasts, nearly 3000 men, was Antiphilus the Edessaean. Paeonians from both Paroria (“Mountainside”) and Parastrymonia (“Strymon Valley”) – these places were subject to Thrace – and Agrinians, with an additional mixture of Thracian settlers, filled up a number of nearly 3000. Didas the Paeonian, who had killed the young Demetrius, had armed and assembled them. There were 2000 armed Gauls; their commander was Asclepiodotus from Heraclea of the Sintians; 3000 free Thracians had their own commander. A roughly equal number of *Cretenses* followed with their own commanders, Susus the Phalasarnean and Syllus the Knossian. And Leonides the Lacedaemonian commanded 500 men of mixed origins from Greece. He was said to be of royal heritage, an exile, condemned by a full vote of the Achaeans for letters to Perseus that had been intercepted. Of the Aetolians and Boeotians, who did not total more than 500, Lycon the Achaean was commander. This mélange of auxiliaries from so many peoples and races came to around 12000 armed men. 3000 cavalry had been gathered from all of Macedonia. Cotys, the son of Seuthes, king of the tribe of the Odrysae, had come there with 1000 chosen horse and a roughly equal number of infantry. Thus the sum total of the whole army was 39,000 infantry, 4000 cavalry.

42.55.10

Achaei iuuentutis suae, Cretico maxime armatu, ad mille quingentos dederunt.

The Achaeans sent [to the Romans] about 1500 of their young men, mostly with Cretan armament (*Cretico... armatu*).

42.57.7-8

duae alae erant magna ex parte Gallorum— Cassignatus praeerat—et leuis armaturae centum fere et quinquaginta Mysi et Cretenses. constitit rex, incertus, quantae <hostium copiae> essent. duas inde ex agmine turmas Threcum, duas Macedonum cum binis Cretensium cohortibus et Threcum misit. proelium, cum pares numero essent neque ab hac aut illa parte noua auxilia subuenirent, incerta uictoria finitum est.

[From the Roman forces] there were two wings made up mostly of Gauls – Cassignatus was commander – and, of light infantry, nearly 150 Mysians and *Cretenses*. The king stopped, not certain of how many <cohorts of enemies> there were. Then he sent from his column two *turmae* of Thracians, two of Macedonians (i.e., 120 total), with two cohorts of *Cretenses* and Thracians (i.e., 160 total). The battle, since they were equal in number and no reinforcements were sent in from either side, ended without a clear victory.

42.65.2

ibi cum ex transfuga cognosset rex sine ullo armato praesidio passim uagantis per agros Romanos metere, cum <mille> equitibus, duobus milibus Thracum et Cretensium profectus, cum, quantum adcelerare poterat, effuso agmine isset, inprouiso adgressus est Romanos. iuncta uehicula, pleraque onusta, mille admodum capiuntur, sescenti ferme homines. praedam custodiendam ducendamque in castra trecentis Cretensium dedit...

When the king learned from a deserter that the Romans were foraging, wandering about through the fields without an armed guard, he departed with <1000>³⁰⁷ cavalry and 2000 Thracians and *Cretenses*, and since he went as quickly as he could go with scattered column, he fell upon the Romans suddenly. All told, one thousand wagons, yoked and mostly laden, and nearly six hundred men were captured. He gave the booty to 300 *Cretenses* to be guarded and led back to camp...

43.7.1-5

Cretensium legatis commemorantibus se, quantum sibi imperatum a P. Licinio consule esset sagittariorum, in Macedoniam misisse, cum interrogati non infitiarentur apud Persea maiorem numerum sagittariorum [suorum] quam apud Romanos militare, responsum est, si Cretenses bene ac nauiter destinarent potioem populi Romani quam regis Persei amicitiam habere, senatum quoque Romanum iis tamquam certis sociis responsum daturum esse. Interea nuntiarent suis placere senatui dare operam Cretenses, ut, quos milites intra praesidia regis Persei haberent, eos primo quoque tempore domum reuocarent. Cretensibus cum hoc responso dimissis Chalcidenses uocati...

When the ambassadors of the *Cretenses* reported that they had sent to Macedonia as many archers as has been ordered from them by the consul P. Licinius, and, when questioned, did not dispute that a greater number of [their] archers were serving with Perseus than with the Romans, they were told that, if the *Cretenses* should decide wholeheartedly to value the friendship of Roman people more than that of king Perseus, the Roman senate would also give them a response as it would for secure allies. Meanwhile, they should report to their people that it would please the Senate that the *Cretenses* should recall home at the earliest moment those soldiers whom they might have within the ranks of king Perseus. After the *Cretenses* were dismissed with this response, the Chalcideans were called...

44.43.5

tres erant tantum cum eo fugae comites, Euander Cretensis, Neo Boeotus et Archidamus Aetolus. ... secuti eum sunt admodum quingenti Cretenses. petebat Amphipolim...

There were only three companions with him [i.e., Perseus] in flight, Evander the *Cretensis*, Neon the Boeotian, and Archidamus the Aetolian. ...About 500 *Cretenses* accompanied him. He sought Amphipolis...

44.45.13-14

Thraces nauibus se committere non ausi domos dilapsi et alia militaris generis turba; Cretenses spe pecuniae secuti. et quoniam in diuidendo plus offensionum quam gratiae erat, quinquaginta talenta iis posita sunt in ripa diripienda. ab hac direptione cum per tumultum naues conscenderent, lembum unum in ostio amnis multitudine grauatum merserunt.

³⁰⁷ Briscoe 2012: 377: The emendation *mille* is not fully supported by the manuscript tradition.

The Thracians and the other cohorts of soldiers types returned home, not daring to entrust themselves to the ships; the *Cretenses* followed in hope of money. And since there was more offense than gratitude to be gained by dividing, fifty talents were left for them to grab what they could. After this free-for-all, when they were boarding the ships in complete disarray, they sank one light ship, weighed down by too many of them, in the mouth of the river.

Per. 99

Praeterea res gestas a Q. Metello aduersus Cretenses continet et epistulas Metelli et Cn. Pompei inuicem missas. Queritur Q. Metellus gloriam sibi rerum a se gestarum a Pompeio praeripi, qui in Cretam miserit legatum suum ad accipiendas urbium deditiones. Pompeius rationem reddit hoc se facere debuisse.

Mostly contains the actions performed by Q. Metellus against *Cretenses* and letters exchanged by Metellus and Gn. Pompey. Q. Metellus complains that the glory of the actions performed by him has been taken from him by Pompey, who sent his legate to Crete in order to accept the surrender of the cities. Pompey responds with the reason he had to do this.

PAUSANIAS

4.8.3

πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ψιλοὺς τῶν Μεσσηνίων τοξότας Κρήτας ἐπήγοντο μισθωτοὺς.

Against the light forces of the Messenians, [the Lacedaemonians] engaged hired *Krētes* archers.

4.19.4

Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ—ἐπήει γὰρ Ὑακίνθια—πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ Εἴρᾳ τεσσαράκοντα ἐποιήσαντο ἡμερῶν σπονδάς· καὶ αὐτοὶ μὲν ἀναχωρήσαντες οἴκαδε ἐώρταζον, Κρήτες δὲ τοξόται—μετεπέμψαντο γὰρ ἔκ τε Λύκτου καὶ ἐτέρων πόλεων μισθωτοὺς—οὗτοί σφισιν ἀνὰ τὴν Μεσσηνίαν ἐπλανῶντο.

The Hyacinthia was approaching. The Lacedaemonians made an agreement with those in Eira for forty days, and they themselves went home to celebrate the festival. But *Krētes toxotai* – they were sent as hirelings from Lyttus and other *poleis* – these roved about Messenia.

PINDAR

Pythian 5.53

τό σφ' ἔχει κυπαρίσσινον
μέλαθ' ῥον ἀμφ' ἀνδριάντι σχεδόν,
Κρήτες ὃν τοξοφόροι τέγει Παρνασσίῳ
καθέσσαντο μῶνὸδ' ῥοπον φυτόν.

The cypress chamber | enshrines it now, | beside the statue | hewn from the living wood, | which
Kretan bowmen dedicated | in the Parnassian temple. (Trans., Nisetich 1980)

PLATO

Laws, 1.625c-626c

ὄρατε ὡς οὐκ ἔστι, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν Θετταλῶν, πεδιάς, διὸ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἵπποις ἐκεῖνοι χρῶνται μᾶλλον, δρόμοισιν δὲ ἡμεῖς: ἦδε γὰρ ἀνώμαλος αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν πεζῆ δρόμων ἄσκησιν μᾶλλον σύμμετρος. ἐλαφρὰ δὴ τὰ ὄπλα ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ μὴ βᾶρος ἔχοντα θεῖν: τῶν δὴ τόξων καὶ τοξευμάτων ἡ κουφότης ἀρμόττειν δοκεῖ.

“See how [Crete] is not level, like the land of the Thessalians; for this reason, we use running, while they use horses instead: this country is rough and more suitable to the training of runners on foot. In such circumstances it is necessary to acquire light weapons and eschew weight: the lightness of bows and arrows seems to be suited [to this].”

PLUTARCH

Aemilius Paullus 15.5-7

ἦσθεις οὖν ὁ Αἰμίλιος δίδωσιν αὐτοῖς, οὐχ ὅσους Πολύβιος εἶρηκεν, ἀλλ’ ὅσους αὐτὸς ὁ Νασικᾶς λαβεῖν φησι, γεγραφῶς περὶ τῶν πράξεων τούτων ἐπιστόλιον πρὸς τινα τῶν βασιλέων (HRR I 47). οἱ μὲν ἐκτὸς τάξεως Ἰταλικοὶ τρισχίλιοι τὸ πλῆθος ἦσαν, τὸ δ’ εὐώνυμον κέρας εἰς πεντακισχιλίους. τούτοις προσλαβὼν ὁ Νασικᾶς ἵππεῖς ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι καὶ τῶν παρ’ Ἀρπάλῳ Θρακῶν καὶ Κρητῶν ἀναμειγμένων διακοσίους...

Aemilius, accordingly delighted, gave them, not as many man as Polybius (29.14) states, but as many as Nasica himself says they took, in a short letter which he wrote concerning these exploits to one of the kings, 3000 of his Italians who were not Romans, and his left wing numbering 5000. In addition to these, Nasica took 120 horsemen, besides 200 of the mixed Thracians and *Krētes* with Harpalus... (Trans. Perrin 1993)

Pyrrhus 29.5-6

ἡ δ’ ἀγαθὴ τύχη τῆς πόλεως, εἴτε πείραν ἀρετῆς λαμβάνουσα τῶν ἀνδρῶν, εἴθ’ ἑαυτῆς ὅσῃ ἐν ἀπόροις ἔχει δύναμιν ἀπόδειξιν διδοῦσα, μοχθηρὰς ἦδη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐχόντων τὰς ἐλπίδας, Αμεινίαν τε Φωκέα τῶν Ἀντιγόνου στρατηγῶν ἐκ Κορίνθου βοηθήσαντα παρεισήγαγε μετὰ ξένων, καὶ τοῦτον ἄρτι δεδεγμένων, ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτοῖς Ἄρευσ ἦκεν ἐκ Κρήτης, δισχιλίους στρατιώτας κομίζων. αἱ τε δὴ γυναῖκες εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὰς οἰκίας ἐσκεδάσθησαν...

But now the good fortune of the city, either because she was satisfied with the bravery of its men, or because she would show forth the great power which she herself has in desperate crises, brought to their aid (*boēthēsanta*) from Corinth, when the hopes of the Spartans were already sorry, Ameinias the Phocian, one of the generals of Antigonos, with mercenary troops (*meta xenōn*); and no sooner had he been received into the city than Areus the Spartan king came from Crete, bringing with him 2000 soldiers. So the women at once dispersed to their homes... (Trans., *ibid.*)

30.4

ὀξείας δὲ περὶ τὸν Πτολεμαῖον μάχης γενομένης, καὶ τῶν ἐπιλέκτων Λακεδαιμονίων, ὧν Εὐάλκος ἡγεῖτο, τοῖς μαχομένοις πρὸ αὐτοῦ συμπλεκομένων, ἀνὴρ πλήκτης καὶ δραμεῖν ὀξύς, Ὅροισσος ὄνομα, Κρής Ἀπτεραῖος, ἐκ πλαγίου παραδραμὼν ἀγωνιζόμενον ἐκθύμως τὸν νεανίσκον ἐπάταξε καὶ κατέβαλε.

A fierce battle raged where Ptolemy was, and while a band of picked Spartans under the command of Evalcus engaged the soldiers who were fighting in front of him, a man of stout arm and swift foot, Oryssus by name, (ed.) an Apteraean *Krēs*, ran up on one side of the young prince as he was fighting spiritedly, smote him, and laid him low. (Trans., *ibid.*)

32.2

τοὺς δὲ στρατηγοὺς καὶ τὸν υἱὸν εἰσέπεμψε συγχὴν βοήθειαν ἄγοντας. ἦκε δὲ καὶ Ἄρευς, ἔχων χιλίους Κρήτας καὶ Σπαρτιάτας τοὺς ἐλαφροτάτους. καὶ πάντες ἅμα τοῖς Γαλάταις προσβαλόντες, εἰς πολὺν θόρυβον κατέστησαν αὐτούς.

[Antigonus]...sent his generals and his son inside with a considerable relief-force (*boēthia*). Areus also came, with 1000 *Krētes* and Spartiatae (the most lightly armed). All these troops united in an assault upon the Gauls and threw them into great confusion. (Trans., *ibid.*)

POLYAENUS

5.35

Νέαρχος Κρής κατέσχε Τελμησσὸν Ἀντιπατρίδου κρατοῦντος. κατέπλευσε μὲν ἐς τὸν λιμένα Νέαρχος. ἐπεὶ δὲ Ἀντιπατρίδης, παλαιὸς ὧν φίλος, ἀπὸ τῆς ἄκρας κατέβη πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ διελέξαντο περὶ ὧν ἐβούλοντο, ὁ Κρής ἔφη βούλεσθαι γυναῖκας ἀποθέσθαι παρ' αὐτῷ καὶ παῖδας δεδεμένους. ὁ μὲν Ἀντιπατρίδης ἐπέτρεψεν, οἱ δὲ παῖδες οἱ δεδεμένοι τὰ σκεύη τῶν μουσουργῶν γυναικῶν ἀνεκόμισαν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς κιβωτίοις τῶν αὐλῶν ἐνῆν ἐγχειρίδια γυμνά, ἐν δὲ ταῖς κίσταις πέλται. ὡς δ' εἴσω τῆς ἄκρας ἐγένοντο, οἱ τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἄγοντες σπασάμενοι τὰ ἐγχειρίδια καταλαμβάνουσι τὴν ἄκραν, καὶ τῆς Τελμησσοῦ Νέαρχος ἐκράτησεν.

Nearchus the *Krēs* took possession of Telmessus, which was controlled by Antipatrides. Nearchus sailed into the harbor. When Antipatrides, who was an old friend, came down to him from the citadel and asked what he wanted, the *Krēs* said that he wished to leave with him some women and some bound slaves with him. Antpatridas assented, and the bound slaves brought up the gear of the lady musicians; in the cases of the flutes were unsheathed daggers, and in the baskets were shields. When they got inside the citadel, those leading the women and slaves drew the daggers and took the citadel, and Nearchus took control of Telmessus.

POLYBIUS

1.1.5

τίς γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει φαῦλος ἢ ῥάθυμος ἀνθρώπων ὃς οὐκ ἂν βούλοιτο γῶναι πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας ἐπικρατηθέντα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην οὐχ ὅλοις πεντήκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἔπεσε τὴν Ῥωμαίων...

For is there any person so foolish or lazy that he would not wish to understand how and with what sort of *politeia* practically the whole inhabited world, within not even fifty-three years, fell under the single control of the Romans?

1.2.8

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ πόσα καὶ πηλίκᾳ συμβάλλεσθαι πέφυκε τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσιν ὁ τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας τρόπος.

...and it will be seen how many and great advantages accrue to the student from the systematic treatment of history. (Trans., Paton 2010)

1.40.7-13

συνθεασάμενος δὲ γινόμενον ὃ προέθετο, τινὰς μὲν τῶν εὐκινήτων πρὸ τοῦ τείχους καὶ τάφρου παρενέβαλε, προστάξας, ἂν ἐγγίξῃ τὰ θηρία πρὸς αὐτούς, χρῆσθαι τοῖς βέλεσιν ἀφθόνως, ὅταν δ' ἐκπιέζωνται, καταφεύγειν εἰς τὴν τάφρον καὶ πάλιν ἐκ ταύτης ὀρμωμένους εἰσακοντίζειν εἰς τὰ προσπίπτοντα τῶν ζώων· τοῖς δ' ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς βαναύσοις φέρειν προσέταξε τὰ βέλη καὶ παραβάλλειν ἔξω παρὰ τὸν θεμέλιον τοῦ τείχους. αὐτὸς δὲ τὰς σημείας ἔχων ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ λαιὸν κέρας τῶν ὑπεναντίων κειμένης πύλης ἐφεστήκει, πλείους ἀεὶ καὶ πλείους ἐπαποστέλλων τοῖς ἀκροβολιζομένοις. ἅμα δὲ τῷ τούτων ὀλοσχερεστέραν γενέσθαι τὴν συμπλοκὴν ἀντιφιλοδοξοῦντες οἱ τῶν ἐλεφάντων ἐπιστάται πρὸς τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν καὶ βουλόμενοι δι' αὐτῶν ποιῆσαι τὸ προτέρημα πάντες ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τοὺς προκινδυνεύοντας· τρεψάμενοι δὲ τούτους ῥαδίως συνεδίωξαν εἰς τὴν τάφρον. προσπεσόντων δὲ τῶν θηρίων καὶ τιτρωσκομένων μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ τείχους τοξευόντων, συνακοντιζομένων δ' ἐνεργοῖς καὶ πυκνοῖς τοῖς ὑσσοῖς καὶ τοῖς γρόσφοις ὑπ' ἀκεραίων τῶν πρὸ τῆς τάφρου διατεταγμένων, συμβελῆ γινόμενα καὶ κατατραυματιζόμενα ταχέως διεταράχθη καὶ στραφέντα κατὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἐφέρετο, τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας καταπατοῦντα καὶ διαφθείροντα, τὰς δὲ τάξεις συγχέοντα καὶ κατασπῶντα τὰς αὐτῶν...

When he [Caecilius] saw that what he had designed was taking place he stationed some of his light troops before the wall and the trench, ordering them, if the elephants approached, not to spare their missiles, and when driven from their position, they were to take refuge in the trench and sallying from it again shoot at those elephants which charged at them. Ordering the lower classes of the civil population to bring the missiles and arrange them outside at the foot of the wall, he himself with his maniples took up his position at the gate which faced the enemy's left wing and kept sending constant reinforcements to those engaged in shooting. When this latter force more generally engaged with the enemy, the drivers of the elephants, anxious to exhibit their prowess to Hasdrubal and wishing the victory to be due to themselves, all charged those of the enemy who were in advance and putting them easily to flight pursued them to the trench. When the elephants charged the trench and began to be wounded by those who were shooting from the wall, while at the same time a rapid shower of javelins and spears fell on them from the fresh troops drawn up before the trench, they very soon, finding themselves hit and hurt in many places, were thrown into confusion and turned on their own troops, trampling down and killing the men and disturbing and breaking the ranks. (Trans., *ibid.*)

2.65.1-5

...ἔχων Μακεδόνας μὲν τοὺς εἰς τὴν φάλαγγα μυρίους, πελταστὰς δὲ τρισχιλίους, ἵππεῖς δὲ τριακοσίους, Ἀγριᾶνας δὲ σὺν τούτοις χιλίους καὶ Γαλάτας ἄλλους τοσοῦτους, μισθοφόρους δὲ τοὺς πάντας πεζοὺς μὲν τρισχιλίους, ἵππεῖς δὲ τριακοσίους, Ἀχαιῶν δ' ἐπιλέκτους πεζοὺς μὲν τρισχιλίους, ἵππεῖς δὲ τριακοσίους, καὶ Μεγαλοπολίτας χιλίους εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον καθωπλισμένους, ὧν ἠγεῖτο Κερκιδᾶς Μεγαλοπολίτης, τῶν δὲ συμμάχων Βοιωτῶν μὲν πεζοὺς δισχιλίους, ἵππεῖς δὲ διακοσίους, Ἑπειρωτῶν πεζοὺς χιλίους, ἵππεῖς πεντήκοντα, Ἀκαρνάνων ἄλλους τοσοῦτους, Ἰλλυριῶν χιλίους ἑξακοσίους, ἐφ' (ῶν) ἦν Δημήτριος ὁ Φάριος, ὥστ' εἶναι πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς δισμυρίους ὀκτακισχιλίους, ἵππεῖς δὲ χιλίους καὶ διακοσίους.

Antigonus had 10000 Macedonians in his phalanx, 3000 peltasts, 300 horse, with these 1000 Agrinians and as many (1000) Galatians, a total of 3000 *misthophoroi* infantry and 300 horse. From the Achaeans were 3000 picked infantry and 300 cavalry, and 1000 Megalopolitans armed in the Macedonian fashion led by Cercidas the Megalopolitan. From the allies (*summachōn*): there were 2000 Boeotian infantry and 200 horse; 1000 Epirot infantry, 500 horse; the same number of the Acarnanians, 1600 of the Illyrians led by Demetrius the Pharian, so that the whole force was 28000 infantry, 1200 cavalry.

2.66.6

πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς κατὰ τὸν Εὐᾶν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀντέταξε τῶν τε Μακεδόνων τοὺς χαλκάσπιδας καὶ τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς, κατὰ σπείρας ἐναλλάξ τεταγμένους, Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν Ἀκμήτου καὶ Δημήτριον τὸν Φάριον ἐπιστήσας. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τοὺς Ἀκαρνᾶνας καὶ Ἑπειρώτας ἐπέβαλετούτων δὲ κατοπιν ἦσαν δισχίλιοι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ἐφεδρείας λαμβάνοντες τάξιν.

To confront those on Evas Antigonus drew up the brazen-shielded Macedonians and the Illyrians in alternate lines, placing them under the command of Alexander son of Acmetus, and Demetrius of Pharos. Behind these stood the Acarnanians and *Krētes*, and in the rear as a reserve were two thousand Achaeans. (Trans., Paton 2010)

3.33.17-8

Οὐ χρή δὲ θαυμάζειν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τῆς ἀναγραφῆς, εἰ τοιαύτη κεχρήμεθα περὶ τῶν ὑπ' Ἀννίβου κατ' Ἰβηρίαν πεπραγμένων οἷα μόλις ἂν χρήσαιτό τις αὐτὸς κεχειρικῶς τὰς κατὰ μέρος πράξεις, οὐδὲ προκαταγινώσκειν, εἰ πεποιήκαμεν παραπλήσιον τοῖς ἀξιοπίστως ψευδομένοις τῶν συγγραφέων. ἡμεῖς γὰρ εὐρόντες ἐπὶ Λακινίῳ τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ἐν χαλκῶματι κατατεταγμένην ὑπ' Ἀννίβου, καθ' οὓς καιροὺς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν τόποις ἀνεστρέφετο, πάντως ἐνομίσαμεν αὐτὴν περὶ γε τῶν τοιούτων ἀξιοπίστον εἶναι· διὸ καὶ κατακολουθεῖν εἰλόμεθα τῇ γραφῇ ταύτῃ.

No one need be surprised at the accuracy of the information I give here about Hannibal's arrangements in Spain, an accuracy which even the actual organizer of the details would have some difficulty in attaining, and I need not be condemned off-hand under the idea that I am acting like those authors who try to make their misstatements plausible. The fact is that I found

on the Lacinian promontory a bronze tablet on which Hannibal himself had made out these lists during the time he was in Italy, and thinking this an absolutely first-rate authority, decided to follow the document. (Trans., *ibid.*)

3.75.7

ἔπεμψαν δὲ καὶ πρὸς Ἱέρωνα περὶ βοήθειας, ὃς καὶ πεντακοσίους αὐτοῖς ἐξαπέστειλε Κρήτας καὶ χιλίους πελτοφόρους· πάντα δὲ καὶ πανταχόθεν ἐνεργῶς ἠτοίμαζον. τότε γὰρ εἰσι φοβερῶτατοι Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν, ὅταν αὐτοὺς περιστῆ φόβος ἀληθινός.

[The Romans] sent to Hieron for help (*boēthia*). He dispatched to them 500 *Krētes* and 1000 peltasts; they made everything ready in every way with enthusiasm. For, the Romans are most fearful, both as a state and as people, at the moment when they encounter a genuine threat.

4.8

Ἄρατος γὰρ ἦν τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τέλειος ἀνὴρ εἰς τὸν πραγματικὸν τρόπον· καὶ γὰρ εἶπεν καὶ διανοηθῆναι καὶ στέξει τὸ κριθὲν δυνατός, καὶ μὴν ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς πολιτικὰς διαφορὰς πρῶως καὶ φίλους ἐνδήσασθαι καὶ συμμάχους προσλαβεῖν οὐδενὸς δεύτερος, ἔτι δὲ πράξεις, ἀπάτας, ἐπιβουλὰς συστήσασθαι κατὰ τῶν πολεμίων, καὶ ταύτας ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ κακοπαθείας καὶ τόλμης, δεινότητος. ἐναργῆ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων μαρτύρια καὶ πλείω μὲν, ἐκφανέστατα δὲ τοῖς ἱστορηκόσι κατὰ μέρος περὶ τε τῆς Σικυῶνος καὶ Μαντινείας καταλήψεως καὶ περὶ τῆς Αἰτωλῶν ἐκ τῆς Πελληνέων πόλεως ἐκβολῆς, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, περὶ τῆς (κατὰ τὸν) Ἀκροκόρινθον πράξεως. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς οὗτος, ὅτε τῶν ὑπαίθρων ἀντιποιήσασθαι βουλευθείη, νωθρὸς μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἐπινοίαις, ἄτολμος δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, ἐν ᾧ οὐ μόνον τὸ δεινόν. διὸ καὶ τροπαίων ἐπ' αὐτὸν βλέπόντων ἐπλήρωσε τὴν Πελοπόννησον, καὶ τῆδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀεί ποτ' ἦν εὐχείρωτος. οὕτως αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσεις οὐ μόνον τοῖς σώμασιν ἔχουσι τι πολυειδές, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ταῖς ψυχαῖς, ὥστε τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα μὴ μόνον ἐν τοῖς διαφέρουσι τῶν ἐνεργημάτων πρὸς ἃ μὲν εὐφυῶς ἔχειν, πρὸς ἃ δ' ἐναντίως, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τινὰ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν πολλάκις τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ συνετώτατον εἶναι καὶ βραδύτατον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τολμηρότατον καὶ δειλότατον. οὐ παράδοξα ταῦτά γε, συνήθη δὲ καὶ γνώριμα τοῖς βουλομένοις συνεφιστάνειν. τινὲς μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς κυνηγίαις εἰσὶ τολμηροὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν θηρίων συγκαταστάσεις, οἱ δ' αὐτοὶ πρὸς ὄπλα καὶ πολεμίους ἀγεννεῖς, καὶ τῆς γε πολεμικῆς χρείας τῆς κατ' ἄνδρα μὲν καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν εὐχερεῖς καὶ πρακτικοί, κοινῇ δὲ καὶ μετὰ πολεμικῆς ἐπ' ἴσον συντάξεως ἄπρακτοι. Θετταλῶν γοῦν ἰπέεις κατ' ἴλην μὲν καὶ φαλαγγηδὸν ἀνυπόστατοι, χωρὶς δὲ παρατάξεως πρὸς καιρὸν καὶ τόπον κατ' ἄνδρα κινδυνεῦσαι δύσχρηστοὶ καὶ βραδεῖς· Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ τούτων τάναντία. Κρήτες δὲ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν πρὸς μὲν ἐνέδρας καὶ ληστείας καὶ κλοπὰς πολεμίων καὶ νυκτερινὰς ἐπιθέσεις καὶ πάσας τὰς μετὰ δόλου καὶ κατὰ μέρος χρείας ἀνυπόστατοι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐξ ὁμολόγου καὶ κατὰ πρόσωπον φαλαγγηδὸν ἔφοδον ἀγεννεῖς καὶ πλάγιοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς· Ἀχαιοὶ δὲ καὶ Μακεδόνες τάναντία τούτων. ταῦτα μὲν εἰρήσθω μοι χάριν τοῦ μὴ διαπιστεῖν τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας τοῖς λεγομένοις, ἐάν ποῦ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐναντίας ἀποφάσεις ποιώμεθα περὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

Aratus was generally the perfect man for practical politics, for he was capable of speaking and making up his mind and keeping his own council. Indeed, in taking political disagreements

lightly and making friends and securing allies he was second to no one. Furthermore, he was brilliant at orchestrating tricks of war, seizures, and plots against his enemies, and carried them to completion through his exertion and daring. There are clear testimonia and more to these kinds of things, but the most obvious, from the historical accounts of Sicyon and Mantinia, are the expulsion of the Aetolians from the city of Pellene, and the greatest proof is the seizure of the Acrocorinth. But this same man, when he wished to fight out in the open, was dull in his planning, gutless in his exertions, and not so brilliant in the spotlight. Because of this, he filled the Peloponnese with the trophies you can see of his defeats, and in this capacity he was always easy for his enemies to overcome. The natures of people are like this: they vary one to another not only in their bodies, but in even their souls, such that the same man not only does well in some types of exertions and the opposite in others, but very often, in pursuits that are roughly similar, he can be both very intelligent and very slow, likewise very daring and very cowardly. These things are not incongruous: it is familiar to those who want to pay attention. For some men are dashing on the hunt when they encounter wild beasts, but then craven against weapons and enemies. Some men are cool-headed and agile in martial activities that involve fighting individual men on one's own, but clumsy with battle as a group, in a formation of equals. The horsemen of the Thessalians are irresistible in a group and in formation (*phalangēdon*), but when disorganized with regard to the time and the place, one on one, they fight uselessly and slowly. The Aetolians are the opposite of these things. *Krētes*, both on land and sea, are irresistible in ambushes and raids and covert seizures and nighttime attacks and all practices that employ trickery and do not employ formation, but in the practice of frontal battle in formation, they are ignoble (unreliable) and wavering in their souls; Achaeans and Macedonians are the opposite of these. I say these things so that my readers do not distrust the things that I am saying, whenever I should make contrary statements about the same men engaging in what should be very similar pursuits.

4.53-5

κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Κνωσίοι πρεσβεύσαντες πρὸς Ῥοδίους ἔπεισαν τὰς τε μετὰ Πολεμοκλέους ναῦς καὶ τρία τῶν ἀφράκτων προσκατασπᾶσαντας αὐτοῖς ἀποστεῖλαι. γενομένου δὲ τούτου, καὶ τῶν πλοίων ἀφικομένων εἰς τὴν Κρήτην, καὶ σχόντων ὑποψίαν τῶν Ἐλευθερναίων ὅτι τὸν πολίτην αὐτῶν Τίμαρχον οἱ περὶ τὸν Πολεμοκλῆ χαριζόμενοι τοῖς Κνωσίοις ἀνηρήκασι, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ῥύσια κατήγγειλαν τοῖς Ῥοδίοις, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν. περιέπεσον δὲ καὶ Λυττίοι βραχὺ πρὸ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν ἀνηκέστῳ συμφορᾷ. καθόλου γὰρ τὰ κατὰ τὴν σύμπασαν Κρήτην ὑπῆρχεν ἐν τοιαύτῃ τινὶ τότε καταστάσει. Κνωσίοι συμφρονήσαντες Γορτυνίους πᾶσαν ἐποίησαντο τὴν Κρήτην ὑφ' αὐτοῦς πλὴν τῆς Λυττίων πόλεως· μόνης δὲ ταύτης ἀπειθούσης, ἐπεβάλοντο πολεμεῖν, σπεύδοντες αὐτὴν εἰς τέλος ἀνάστατον ποιῆσαι καὶ παραδείγματος καὶ φόβου χάριν τῶν ἄλλων Κρηταιέων. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐπολέμουν πάντες οἱ Κρηταιεῖς τοῖς Λυττίοις· ἐγγενομένης δὲ φιλοτιμίας ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων, ὅπερ ἔθος ἐστὶ Κρησίν, ἐστασίασαν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους. καὶ Πολυρρήνιοι μὲν καὶ Κεραῖται καὶ Λαππαῖοι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Ὅριοι μετ' Ἀρκάδων, ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἀποστάντες τῆς τῶν Κνωσίων φιλίας, ἔγνωσαν τοῖς Λυττίοις συμμαχεῖν, τῶν δὲ Γορτυνίων οἱ μὲν πρεσβύτεροι τὰ τῶν Κνωσίων, οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι τὰ τῶν Λυττίων αἰρούμενοι, διεστασίασαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. οἱ δὲ Κνωσίοι, παραδόξου γεγονότος αὐτοῖς τοῦ περὶ τοὺς συμμάχους κινήματος, ἐπισπῶνται χιλίους

ἐξ Αἰτωλίας ἄνδρας κατὰ συμμαχίαν. οὗ γενομένου παραυτίκα τῶν Γορτυνίων οἱ πρεσβύτεροι καταλαμβανόμενοι τὴν ἄκραν εἰσάγονται τοὺς τε Κνωσίους καὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐξέβαλον, τοὺς δ' ἀπέκτειναν τῶν νέων, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐνεχείρισαν τοῖς Κνωσίοις. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Λυττίων ἐξωδευκόντων εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν πανδημεί, συννοήσαντες οἱ Κνώσιοι τὸ γεγονὸς καταλαμβάνονται τὴν Λύττον, ἔρημον οὖσαν τῶν βοηθησόντων· καὶ τὰ μὲν τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας εἰς Κνωσὸν ἀπέπεμψαν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐμπρήσαντες καὶ κατασκάψαντες καὶ λωβησάμενοι κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐπανήλθον. οἱ δὲ Λύττιοι παραγενόμενοι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐξοδείας, καὶ συνθεασάμενοι τὸ συμβεβηκός, οὕτως περιπαθεῖς ἐγένοντο ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὥστε μὴδ' εἰσελθεῖν μηδένα τολμήσαι τῶν παρόντων εἰς τὴν πατρίδα· πάντες δὲ περιπορευθέντες αὐτὴν κύκλω, καὶ πολλάκις ἀνοιμώξαντες καὶ κατολοφυράμενοι τὴν τε τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τὴν αὐτῶν τύχην, αὐθις ἐξ ἀναστροφῆς ἐπανήλθον εἰς τὴν τῶν Λαππαίων πόλιν. φιλανθρώπως δ' αὐτοὺς καὶ μετὰ πάσης προθυμίας τῶν Λαππαίων ὑποδεξαμένων, οὗτοι μὲν ἀντὶ πολιτῶν ἀπόλιδες ἐν ἡμέρᾳ μιᾷ καὶ ξένοι γεγονότες ἐπολέμουν πρὸς τοὺς Κνωσίους ἅμα τοῖς συμάχοις. Λύττος δ' ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἄποικος οὖσα καὶ συγγενής, ἀρχαιοτάτη δὲ τῶν κατὰ Κρήτην πόλεων, ἄνδρας δ' ὁμολογουμένως ἀρίστους ἀεὶ τρέφουσα Κρητῶν, οὕτως ἄρδην καὶ παραλόγως ἀνηρπᾶσθη.

At that time, the Knossians sent embassies to the Rhodians to dispatch to them the navy under Polemocles, including three undecked vessels. After this happened, and the ships reached Crete, the Eleuthernians had a suspicion that Polemocles' entourage, wishing to please the Knossians, had killed their fellow citizen Timarchus; they first announced reprisals against the Rhodians, and after this went to war. Just before this, the Lyttians had met with incurable disaster. Generally, conditions on all of Crete were these. The Knossians, in concert with the Gortynians, made all of Crete subject to them except for the city of the Lyttians; with only that city unpersuaded, they went to war, intent upon its complete ruination, in order to make it an example and a threat for all the *Krētaieis*. At first, all the *Krētaieis* made war against the Lyttians; but when competition (*philotimia*) arose from the circumstances, as is the habit for *Krētes*, they quarreled with each other, and the Polyrrhenians and Ceraetae and Lappaeans, along with the members of the Horioi and the Arcadians, unanimously rejecting the friendship of the Knossians, decided to ally (*summachein*) with the Lyttians; the elder faction of the Gortynians chose the Knossians, the younger faction chose the Lyttians, and they quarreled amongst themselves. The Knossians, since they had not anticipated this move by their allies (*summachous*), used their alliance (*summachia*) to draw 1000 men from Aetolia. When this happened, the elder faction of Gortynians, having taken the heights, immediately let in the Knossians and Aetolians; some of the younger faction they expelled, some they killed, and they handed over the city to the Knossians. Meanwhile, when all the Lyttian men had gone out on campaign, the Knossians, learning of the situation, took Lyttus, which was bereft of aid (*boēthēsontōn*); they sent off the children and women to Knossus, and, having burned and ravaged and defiled the city in every which way, they returned home. The Lyttians, upon returning to their city from campaign and seeing what had happened, were so emotionally overcome that not one of those present dared to enter their home (*patris*); all of them processed around it in a circle, lamenting and bewailing the fate of their homeland and of themselves, then turned away and went back to the city of the Lappaeans. After the Lappaeans welcomed them compassionately and enthusiastically, they

continued to make war against the Knossians and their allies (*summachois*), even though, within a day, they had been rendered, instead of citizens, men without a *polis* and foreigners (*xenoi*). In this way, Lyttus, colony and kin (*sungenēs*) of the Lacedaemonians, the oldest of the cities on Crete, and producer of men whom all agree are the best of the *Krētaiēis*, was utterly and unexpectedly snatched away.

Πολυρρήνιοι δὲ καὶ Λαππαῖοι καὶ πάντες οἱ τούτων σύμμαχοι, θεωροῦντες τοὺς Κνωσίους ἀντεχομένους τῆς τῶν Αἰτωλῶν συμμαχίας, τοὺς δ' Αἰτωλοὺς ὀρῶντες πολεμίους ὄντας τῷ τε βασιλεῖ Φιλίπῳ καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, πέμπουσι πρέσβεις πρὸς τε τὸν βασιλέα καὶ τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς περὶ βοήθειας καὶ συμμαχίας. οἱ δ' Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ Φίλιππος εἰς τε τὴν κοινὴν συμμαχίαν αὐτοὺς προσεδέξαντο καὶ βοήθειαν ἐξαπέστειλαν, Ἴλλυριοὺς μὲν τετρακοσίους, ὧν ἠγεῖτο Πλάτωρ, Ἀχαιοὺς δὲ διακοσίους, Φωκέας ἑκατόν. οἱ καὶ παραγενόμενοι (μετ' οὐ πολὺ πάλιν ἀπέπλευσαν) μεγάλην ποιήσαντες ἐπίδοσιν τοῖς Πολυρρηνίοις καὶ τοῖς τούτων συμμάχοις· πάνυ γὰρ ἐν βραχεῖ χρόνῳ τειχῆρεις καταστήσαντες τοὺς τ' Ἐλευθερναίους καὶ Κυδωνιάτας, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς Ἀπτεραίους, ἠνάγκασαν ἀποστάντας τῆς τῶν Κνωσίων συμμαχίας κοινωνῆσαι σφίσι τῶν αὐτῶν ἐλπίδων. τούτων δὲ γενομένων, ἐξαπέστειλαν Πολυρρήνιοι μὲν καὶ μετὰ τούτων οἱ σύμμαχοι Φιλίπῳ καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς πεντακοσίους Κρήτας, Κνώσιοι δὲ μικρῷ πρότερον ἐξαπεστάλκεισαν χιλίους τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς. οἱ καὶ συνεπολέμουν ἀμφοτέρους τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον. κατελάβοντο δὲ καὶ τὸν λιμένα τῶν Φαιστιῶν οἱ τῶν Γορτυνίων φυγάδες· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν αὐτῶν τῶν Γορτυνίων παραβόλῳ διακατεῖχον, καὶ προσεπολέμουν ἐκ τούτων ὀρμώμενοι τῶν τόπων τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει. Τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν Κρήτην ἐν τούτοις ἦν...

The Polyrrhenians and Lappaeans and all their allies (*summachoi*), seeing that the Knossians were sustained by the *summachia* of the Aetolians, and observing that the Aetolians were enemies of king Philip and the Achaeans, sent ambassadors to the king and the Achaeans on the subject of aid (*boēthia*) and *summachia*. The Achaeans and Philip accepted them into their common *summachia* and dispatched *boēthia*, 400 Illyrians who were led by Plator, 200 Achaeans, and 100 Phocians. They sailed back many times after this: by their presence, they made a great contribution to the Polyrrhenians and their *summachoi*, for, all in a short time, they shut up the Eleuthernians and the Cydoniates in their walls, and likewise the Apteraeans, and compelled them to abandon the *summachia* of the Knossians and make common cause with them. After these events, the Polyrrhenians together with their *summachoi* dispatched to Philip and the Achaeans 500 *Krētes*. The Knossians had dispatched 1000 to the Aetolians a short time before. They also joined in fighting each other in that ongoing war. And the exiled Gortynians took the harbor of the Phaestians; in the same way, they recklessly took the harbor of the Gortynians, and made these locations their bases, from which they attacked those in the city. Such were the circumstances of those on Crete...

4.61.2

ἀναλαβὼν δὲ τοὺς Ἠπειρώτας ἅμα τοῖς Μακεδόσι πανδημει καὶ τοὺς ἐξ Ἀχαΐας αὐτῶ
συννητηκότας σφενδονήτας τριακοσίους, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς παρὰ Μεσσηνίους³⁰⁸ ἀπεσταλμένους
Κρήτας τριακοσίους, προῆγε, καὶ διελθὼν τὴν Ἠπειρον παρῆν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἀμβρακιωτῶν χώραν.

Taking the full mass of Epirotes with his Macedonians and the 300 slingers from the Achaeans who joined him, and also the 300 *Krētes* sent by the Messenians, he advanced, and crossing Epirus he came into the territory of the Ambraciotes.

4.67.6

τοῦ δὲ χειμῶνος ἔτι προβαίνοντος, καὶ πάντων ἀπηλικότων τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ Φιλίππου διὰ τὸν καιρὸν, ἀναλαβὼν ὁ βασιλεὺς χαλκάσπιδας μὲν τρισχιλίους, πελταστὰς δὲ δισχιλίους καὶ Κρήτας τριακοσίους, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἵππεις τοὺς περὶ τὴν αὐλὴν εἰς τετρακοσίους, προῆγεν ἀπὸ Λαρίσης·

With winter mostly gone, and with no one expecting the presence of Philip because of the time of year, the king, taking 3000 bronze-shields, 2000 peltasts, and 300 *Krētes* along with 400 cavalry from his court, advanced from Larisa...

4.71.10-12

...οἱ δὲ Κρήτες πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν ὑπερδέξιον πύλην ἐπεξελθόντας τῶν μισθοφόρων συμμίξαντες ἠνάγκασαν αὐτοὺς οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ρίψαντας τὰ ὄπλα φεύγειν. οἷς ἐπικείμενοι καὶ προσφέροντες τὰς χεῖρας συνεισέπεσον διὰ τῆς πύλης ἐξ οὗ συνέβη πανταχόθεν ἅμα καταληφθῆναι τὴν πόλιν.

...but the *Krētes*, engaging with those mercenaries sallying from the upper gate, forced them, having thrown away their weapons, to flee in disorder. Pressing upon and attacking these, [the *Krētes*] rushed in through the gate along with them, in which way it happened that the city was captured from every side at the same time.

4.80.1-6

Ἔτι δὴ τούτων πραττομένων οἱ Λεπρεᾶται καταλαβόμενοι τόπον τινὰ τῆς πόλεως ἠξίουσαν ἐκχωρεῖν τῆς ἄκρας καὶ τῆς πόλεως τοὺς Ἠλείους καὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων· ἦκε γὰρ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνων αὐτοῖς βοήθεια. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον οἱ περὶ τὸν Φιλλίδαν οὐ προσεῖχον, ἀλλ' ἔμενον, ὡς καταπληξόμενοι τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει· τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως εἰς μὲν τὴν Φιγάλειαν Ταυρίωνα μετὰ στρατιωτῶν ἐξαποστείλαντος, αὐτοῦ δὲ προάγοντος εἰς τὸ Λέπρεον καὶ συνεγγίζοντος ἤδη τῇ πόλει, συνέντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Φιλλίδαν ἐταπεινώθησαν, οἱ δὲ Λεπρεᾶται προσεπερρώθησαν ταῖς ὀρμαῖς. καλὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο Λεπρεᾶταις ἔργον πέπρακται, τὸ χιλίων μὲν ἔνδον ὄντων Ἠλείων, χιλίων δὲ σὺν τοῖς πειραταῖς Αἰτωλῶν, πεντακοσίων δὲ μισθοφόρων, διακοσίων δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τῆς ἄκρας κατεχομένης, ὅμως ἀντιποιήσασθαι τῆς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδος καὶ μὴ προέσθαι τὰς σφετέρας ἐλπίδας. ὁ δὲ Φιλλίδαας,

³⁰⁸ This text has been emended from the TLG text, which read, τοὺς παρὰ Πολυρρηνίους ἀπεσταλμένους Κρήτας πεντεκοσίους. For the explanation of this, please see n. 86.

ὄρων τοὺς Λεπρεάτας ἀνδρωδῶς ὑφισταμένους καὶ τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἐγγίζοντας, ἐξεχώρησε τῆς πόλεως ἅμα τοῖς Ἠλείοις καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων. οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν Κρήτες διὰ τῆς Μεσσηνίας εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν ἐπανήλθον, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Φιλλίδαν ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ἀπόλυσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ Σαμικόν.

While these things were still being done, the Lepreates, seizing a portion of the city, decided that the Eleans and the Aetolians, and likewise those from the Lacedaemonians – for *boēthia* also came to them from Sparta – should leave their citadel and city. At first those with Phillidas ignored them, and remained so that they might intimidate those in the city. But the king dispatched Taurion with soldiers to Phigalia, and, leading troops himself to Lepreum, was now drawing near the city; hearing this, those with Phillidas fell back, while the Lepreates strengthened their attacks. This was indeed a valiant thing for the Lepreates to have done - for there were within 1000 Eleans, 1000 Aetolians with freebooters, 500 *misthophoroi*, and 200 Lacedaemonians, by whom the citadel was being held - to take back their homeland (*patris*), and not to dismiss their own odds. Phillidas, when he saw the Lepreates rising up gallantly and the Macedonians approaching, left the city along with the Eleans and those with the Lacedaemonians. Those *Krētes* with the Spartiates returned home by way of Messenia, while those with Phillidas made their departure in the direction of Samicum.

5.3.1-2

κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Δωρίμαχος ὁ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν στρατηγὸς Ἀγέλαον καὶ Σκόπαν ἐξαπέστειλε τοῖς Ἠλείοις μετὰ Νεοκρήτων πεντακοσίων· οἱ δ' Ἠλεῖοι δεδιότες μὴ τὴν Κυλλήνην ὁ Φίλιππος ἐπιβάληται πολιορκεῖν, στρατιώτας τε μισθοφόρους συνήθροισον καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἠτοιμάζον, ὠχυροῦντο δὲ καὶ τὴν Κυλλήνην ἐπιμελῶς. εἰς ἃ βλέπων ὁ Φίλιππος, τοὺς τε τῶν Ἀχαιῶν μισθοφόρους καὶ τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ Κρητῶν καὶ τῶν Γαλατικῶν ἰπέων τινάς, σὺν δὲ τούτοις τῶν ἐξ Ἀχαιῶν ἐπιλέκτων εἰς δισχιλίους πεζοὺς ἀθροίσας, ἐν τῇ τῶν Δυμαίων πόλει κατέλειπεν, ἅμα μὲν ἐφεδρείας ἔχοντας, ἅμα δὲ προφυλακῆς τάξιν πρὸς τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἠλείας φόβον.

Around the same time, Dorimachus, the *stratēgos* of the Aetolians, dispatched Agelaus and Scopas to the Eleans with 500 *Neokrētes*. The Eleans, afraid that Philip would attack and besiege Cyllene, were gathering soldiers and *misthophoroi* and making ready their citizen forces (*politikous*), and fortifying Cyllene with care. Seeing these things, Philip gathered the Achaeans' *misthophoroi* and some of the *Krētes* and Gallic cavalry with him, along with 200 infantry of those selected from the Achaeans, and left them at the city of the Dymaeans: he thus kept them in reserve, but also positioned them as a rearguard against the threat of Elea.

5.14.1

ἐπυνθάνετο γὰρ εἰς τὸν Στράτον συνδεδραμηκέναι τῶν Αἰτωλῶν πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς τρισχιλίους, ἰππεῖς δὲ περὶ τετρακοσίους, Κρήτας δ' εἰς πεντακοσίους.

For he learned that around 3000 infantry of the Aetolians had gathered at Stratus, around 400 cavalry, and 500 *Krētes*.

5.65.1-10

εἶχον δὲ καὶ τὰς ἡγεμονίας ἕκαστοι τῶν προειρημένων ἀνδρῶν οἰκείας ταῖς ἰδίαις ἐμπειρίαις. Εὐρύλοχος μὲν γὰρ ὁ Μάγνης ἡγεῖτο σχεδὸν ἀνδρῶν τρισχιλίων τοῦ καλουμένου παρὰ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν ἀγήματος, Σωκράτης δ' ὁ Βοιωτίος πελταστὰς ὑφ' αὐτὸν εἶχε δισχιλίους, ὁ δ' Ἀχαιὸς Φοξίδα καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Θρασέου, σὺν δὲ τούτοις Ἀνδρόμαχος [ὁ] Ἀσπένδιος, συνεγύμναζον μὲν ἐπὶ ταῦτὸ τὴν φάλαγγα καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους Ἕλληνας, ἡγοῦντο δὲ τῆς μὲν φάλαγγος Ἀνδρόμαχος καὶ Πτολεμαῖος, τῶν δὲ μισθοφόρων Φοξίδα, οὔσης τῆς μὲν φάλαγγος εἰς δισμυρίου καὶ πεντακισχιλίους, τῶν δὲ μισθοφόρων εἰς ὀκτακισχιλίους, τοὺς δ' ἵππεῖς τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὴν αὐλήν, ὄντας εἰς ἑπτακοσίους, Πολυκράτης παρεσκεύαζε καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ Λιβύης, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐγγχωρίους· καὶ τούτων αὐτὸς ἡγεῖτο πάντων, περὶ τρισχιλίους ὄντων τὸν ἀριθμὸν. τοὺς γε μὴν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ πᾶν τὸ τῶν μισθοφόρων ἵππέων πλῆθος Ἐχεκράτης ὁ Θετταλὸς διαφερόντως ἀσκήσας, ὄντας εἰς δισχιλίους, μεγίστην ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ κινδύνου παρέσχετο χρεῖαν. οὐδενὸς δ' ἦττον ἔσπευδε περὶ τοὺς ὑφ' αὐτὸν ταττομένους Κνωπίας Ἀλλαριώτης, ἔχων τοὺς μὲν πάντας Κρήτας εἰς τρισχιλίους, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων χιλίους Νεόκρητας, ἐφ' ὧν ἐτετάχει Φίλωνα τὸν Κνώσιον. καθώπλισαν δὲ καὶ Λίβυας τρισχιλίους εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον, ἐφ' ὧν ἦν Ἀμμώνιος ὁ Βαρκαῖος. τὸ δὲ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων πλῆθος ἦν μὲν εἰς δισμυρίου φαλαγγίτας, ὑπετάττετο δὲ Σωσιβίῳ. συνήχθη δὲ καὶ Θρακῶν καὶ Γαλατῶν πλῆθος, ἐκ μὲν τῶν κατοίκων καὶ τῶν ἐπιγόνων εἰς τετρακισχιλίους, οἱ δὲ προσφάτως ἐπισυναχθέντες ἦσαν εἰς δισχιλίους, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Διονύσιος ὁ Θρᾶξ.

Each of the aforementioned men held commands that were suitable to their own backgrounds. For Eurylochus the Magnesian commanded nearly 3000 men of the so-called royal guard (*agēma*), Socrates the Boeotian had under him 2000 peltasts. The Achaean Phoxidas and Ptolemy son of Tharseus, with them Andromachus the Aspendian, trained on the same ground the phalanx and the Greek *misthophoroi*: Andromachus and Ptolemy led the phalanx, Phoxidas the *misthophoroi*; the phalanx consisted of 25000 men and the *misthophoroi* 8000. Polycrates prepared the court cavalry, being 700, those from Libya and those from in country: he himself led all of these, the number being around 3000. Echeocrates the Thessalian, who trained with distinction the cavalry from Greece and the whole mass of *misthophoroi* cavalry, being 2000, rendered the greatest service in the battle itself. Knopias the Allariot showed no less zeal than anyone towards those under his command; he had all 3000 *Krētes*, of which 1000 were *Neokrētes*, over whom he appointed Philo the Knossian. They equipped 3000 Libyans in the Macedonian way, in command of whom was Ammonius the Barcian. The mass of the Egyptians was 20000 phalangites, commanded by Sosibius. A force of Thracians and Gauls was gathered together, 4000 from among settlers and settlers' descendants, 2000 recently recruited, of whom Dionysius the Thracian was the leader.

5.79.2

οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Πτολεμαῖον ὄρμησαν ἐκ τῆς Ἀλεξανδρείας, ἔχοντες πεζῶν μὲν εἰς ἑπτὰ μυριάδας, ἵππεῖς δὲ πεντακισχιλίους, ἐλέφαντας ἑβδομήκοντα τρεῖς·

Those with Ptolemy set out from Alexandria, having 70000 infantry, 5000 cavalry, and 73 elephants.

5.79.3-13

Ἀντίοχος δὲ γνοὺς τὴν ἔφοδον αὐτῶν συνῆγε τὰς δυνάμεις. ἦσαν δ' αὗται Δάαι μὲν καὶ Καρμάνιοι καὶ Κίλικες εἰς τὸν τῶν εὐζώνων τρόπον καθωπλισμένοι περὶ πεντακισχιλίους· τούτων δ' ἅμα τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἶχε καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν Βύττακος ὁ Μακεδών. ὑπὸ δὲ Θεόδοτον τὸν Αἰτωλὸν τὸν ποιησάμενον τὴν προδοσίαν ἦσαν ἐκ πάσης ἐκλελεγμένοι τῆς βασιλείας, καθωπλισμένοι δ' εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον, ἄνδρες μύριοι· τούτων οἱ πλείονες ἀργυράσπιδες. τὸ δὲ τῆς φάλαγγος πλῆθος ἦν εἰς δισμυρίους, ἧς ἡγεῖτο Νίκαρχος καὶ Θεόδοτος ὁ καλούμενος ἡμιόλιος. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Ἀγριαῖνες καὶ Πέρσαι τοξόται καὶ σφενδονῆται δισχίλιοι. μετὰ δὲ τούτων χίλιοι Θραῖκες, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Μενέδημος Ἀλαβανδεύς. ὑπῆρχον δὲ καὶ Μήδων καὶ Κισσίων καὶ Καδουσιῶν καὶ Καρμανῶν οἱ πάντες εἰς πεντακισχιλίους, οἷς ἀκούειν Ἀσπασιανοῦ προσετέτακτο τοῦ Μήδου. Ἄραβες δὲ καὶ τινες τῶν τούτοις προσχώρων ἦσαν μὲν εἰς μυρίους, ὑπετάττοντο δὲ Ζαβδιβήλω. τῶν δ' ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μισθοφόρων ἡγεῖτο μὲν Ἴππόλοχος Θετταλός, ὑπῆρχον δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἰς πεντακισχιλίους. Κρητῆτας δὲ χιλίους μὲν καὶ πεντακοσίους εἶχε τοὺς μετ' Εὐρυλόχου, χιλίους δὲ Νεόκρητας τοὺς ὑπὸ Ζέλυν τὸν Γορτύνιον ταττομένους· οἷς ἅμα συνῆσαν ἀκοντισταὶ Λυδοὶ πεντακόσιοι καὶ Κάρδακες οἱ μετὰ Λυσιμάχου τοῦ Γαλάτου χίλιοι. τῶν δ' ἰππέων ἦν τὸ πᾶν πλῆθος εἰς ἑξακισχιλίους· εἶχε δὲ τῶν μὲν τετρακισχιλίων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν Ἀντίπατρος ὁ τοῦ βασιλέως ἀδελφιδοῦς, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐτέτακτο Θεμίσιον. καὶ τῆς μὲν Ἀντιόχου δυνάμεως τὸ πλῆθος ἦν περὶ μὲν ἑξακισμύριοι καὶ δισχίλιοι, σὺν δὲ τούτοις ἰππεῖς ἑξακισχίλιοι, θηρία δὲ δυοὶ πλείω τῶν ἑκατόν.

Antiochus, knowing of his [i.e. Ptolemy's] advance assembled his forces. These were Dahae, Carmanians, and Cilicians equipped as *euzōnoi* (light-armed fighters), around 5000: Buttacus the Macedonian had responsibility and command for these. Under Theodotus the Aetolian, who had made the betrayal, were 10000 men picked from the whole kingdom and equipped in the Macedonian fashion; most of these were silver shields (*arguraspides*). The phalanx was made up of 20000 men, which was led by Nicarchus and Theodotus called "One-and-a-Half." Besides these there were 2000 Agrinian and Persian archers (*toxotai*) and slingers; with these were 1000 Thracians, whom Menedemus the Alabandeian led. There were also the forces of the Medes, Cissians, Cadusians, and Carmanians, 5000 in all, who were appointed to harken to Aspendianus the Mede. There were nearly 10000 Arabs and their neighbors, commanded by Zabdibelus. Hippolochus the Thessalian was leader of the *misthophoroi* from Greece, their number being 5000. He had 1500 *Krētes* with Eurylochus, and 1000 *Neokrētes* stationed under Zelys the Gortynian: with these were also 500 Lydian javelineers and 1000 Carducians with Lysimachus the Gaul. There was a body of 6000 cavalry: Antipater the king's nephew had command of 4000, while Themison commanded the rest. The number of Antiochus' force was 62000 infantry, with 6000 cavalry, and 102 elephants.

6.45-46

Ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν Κρηταιῶν μεταβάντας ἄξιον ἐπιστῆσαι κατὰ δύο τρόπους πῶς οἱ λογιώτατοι τῶν ἀρχαίων συγγραφέων, Ἐφορος, Ξενοφῶν, Καλλισθένης, Πλάτων, πρῶτον μὲν ὁμοίαν εἶναι φασί

καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων, δεύτερον δ' ἐπαινετὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἀποφαίνουσιν· ὧν οὐδέτερον ἀληθὲς εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ. σκοπεῖν δ' ἐκ τούτων πάρεστι. καὶ πρῶτον ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος διέξιμεν. τῆς μὲν δὴ Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας ἴδιον εἶναι φασι πρῶτον μὲν τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐγγαίους κτήσεις, ὧν οὐδενὶ μέτεστι πλεῖον, ἀλλὰ πάντας τοὺς πολίτας ἴσον ἔχειν δεῖ τῆς πολιτικῆς χώρας, δεύτερον τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ διαφόρου κτήσιν, ἧς εἰς τέλος ἀδοκίμου παρ' αὐτοῖς ὑπαρχούσης ἄρδην ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας ἀνηρησθαι συμβαίνει τὴν περὶ τὸ πλεῖον καὶ τοῦλαττον φιλοτιμίαν. τρίτον παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις οἱ μὲν βασιλεῖς αἴδιον ἔχουσι τὴν ἀρχήν, οἱ δὲ προσαγορευόμενοι γέροντες διὰ βίου, δι' ὧν καὶ μεθ' ὧν πάντα χειρίζεται τὰ κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν. παρὰ δὲ Κρηταιεῦσι πάντα τούτοις ὑπάρχει τάναντία· τὴν τε γὰρ χώραν κατὰ δύναμιν αὐτοῖς ἐφιασιν οἱ νόμοι, τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον, εἰς ἄπειρον κτᾶσθαι, τό τε διάφορον ἐκτετίμηται παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἀναγκαίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ καλλίστην εἶναι δοκεῖν τὴν τούτου κτήσιν. καθόλου θ' ὁ περὶ τὴν αἰσχροκέρδειαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν τρόπος οὕτως ἐπιχωριάζει παρ' αὐτοῖς ὥστε παρὰ μόνοις Κρηταιεῦσι τῶν ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν νομίζεσθαι κέρδος. καὶ μὴν τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐπέτεια παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ καὶ δημοκρατικὴν ἔχει διάθεσιν. ὥστε πολλάκις διαπορεῖν πῶς ἡμῖν περὶ τῶν τὴν ἐναντίαν φύσιν ἐχόντων ὡς οἰκείων καὶ συγγενῶν ὄντων ἀλλήλοις ἐξηγγέλκασιν. καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ παραβλέπειν τὰς τηλικαύτας διαφορὰς καὶ πολὺν δὴ τινα λόγον ἐν ἐπιμέτρῳ διατίθενται, φάσκοντες τὸν Λυκουῦργον μόνον τῶν γεγονότων τὰ συνέχοντα τεθεωρηκένα· δυεῖν γὰρ ὄντων, δι' ὧν σφάζεται πολιτευμα πᾶν, τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίου ἀνδρείας καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁμοιοῖας, ἀνηρηκότα τὴν πλεονεξίαν ἅμα ταύτη συνανηρηκένα πᾶσαν ἐμφύλιον διαφορὰν καὶ στάσιν· ἢ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, ἐκτὸς ὄντας τῶν κακῶν τούτων, κάλλιστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὰ πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ συμφρονεῖν ταυτά. ταυτά δ' ἀποφηνάμενοι, καὶ θεωροῦντες ἐκ παραθέσεως Κρηταιεῖς διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον σφίσι πλεονεξίαν ἐν πλείσταις ἰδίᾳ (καὶ) κατὰ κοινὸν στάσεσι καὶ φόνοις καὶ πολέμοις ἐμφυλίοις ἀναστρεφομένους, οὐδὲν οἴονται πρὸς σφᾶς εἶναι, θαρροῦσι δὲ λέγειν ὡς ὁμοίων ὄντων τῶν πολιτευμάτων. ὁ δ' Ἔφορος χωρὶς τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ταῖς λέξεσι κέχρηται ταῖς αὐταῖς, ὑπὲρ ἑκατέρας ποιούμενος τῆς πολιτείας ἐξήγησιν, ὥστ', εἴ τις μὴ τοῖς κυρίοις ὀνόμασι προσέχοι, κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον ἂν δύνασθαι διαγνῶναι περὶ ὁποτέρας ποιεῖται τὴν διήγησιν. Ἦι μὲν οὖν μοι δοκοῦσι διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων, ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἢ δὲ πάλιν οὐτ' ἐπαινετὴν οὔτε ζηλωτὴν ἡγοῦμεθ' εἶναι τὴν Κρητικὴν πολιτείαν, νῦν ἤδη διέξιμεν.

To pass to the *politeia* of the *Krētaieis*, two points here demand our attention. How was it that the most learned of the ancient writers — Ephorus, Xenophon, Callisthenes, and Plato — state in the first place that it is one and the same with that of the Lacedaemonians and in the second place pronounce it worthy of commendation? In my own opinion neither of these assertions is true. Whether or not I am right the following observations will show. And first as to its dissimilarity with the *politeia* of the Lacedaemonians. The peculiar features of the Spartan state are said to be first the land laws by which no citizen may own more than another, but all must possess an equal share of the public land; secondly their view of differences in wealth; for, disproportionate wealth being esteemed of no value at all among them, the jealous contention (*philotimia*) due to the possession of more or less is utterly done away with; and thirdly the fact that of the magistrates by whom or by whose co-operation the whole administration is conducted, the kings hold a hereditary office and the members of the Gerousia are elected for life. In all these respects, among the *Krētaieis* it is exactly the opposite. Their laws go as far as possible in letting

them acquire land to the extent of their power, as the saying is, and disproportionate wealth is held in such high honor among them that its acquisition is not only regarded as necessary, but as most honorable. So much in fact do sordid love of gain and lust for wealth (*pleonexia*) prevail among them, that among the *Krētaieis* alone, of all people in the world, is no gain considered disgraceful. Again their magistracies are annual and elected on a democratic system. So that it often causes surprise how these authors proclaim to us, that two political systems the nature of which is so opposed, are allied and akin to each other. Besides overlooking such differences, these writers go out of their way to give us their general views, saying that Lycurgus was the only man who ever saw the points of vital importance for good government. For, there being two things to which a state owes its preservation, bravery against the enemy and concord among the citizens, Lycurgus by doing away with the lust for wealth (*pleonexia*) did away also with all civil discord and broils. In consequence of which the Lacedaemonians, being free from these evils, excel all the Greeks in the conduct of their internal affairs and in their spirit of union. After asserting this, although they witness that the *Krētaieis*, on the other hand, owing to their ingrained lust of wealth (*pleonexia*) are involved in constant broils both individually and collectively, and in murders and civil wars, they regard this as immaterial, and have the audacity to say that the two political systems are similar. Ephorus actually, apart from the names, uses the same phrases in explaining the nature of the two states; so that if one did not attend to the proper names it would be impossible to tell of which he is speaking. Such are the points in which I consider these two political systems to differ, and I will now give my reasons for not regarding the Cretan *politeia* as worthy of praise or imitation. (Trans., Paton 2010, edited)

6.47.1-5: see pp. 162-3

6.48.8-49.1

λοιπὸν ἦ(ν) τοιαύτην τινὰ παρεισαγαγεῖν [δεῖ] τοῖς πολίταις ἀνάγκην ἢ πρόθεσιν, δι' ἧς ὡσπερ καὶ περὶ τοὺς κατ' ἰδίαν βίους αὐτάρκεις αὐτοὺς παρεσκεύασε καὶ λιτούς, οὕτως καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἔθος τῆς πόλεως αὐτάρκες ἔμελλε γίνεσθαι καὶ σῶφρον. νῦν δ' ἀφιλοτιμοτάτους καὶ νουνεχεστάτους ποιήσας περὶ τε τοὺς ἰδίους βίου, καὶ τὰ τῆς σφετέρας πόλεως νόμιμα, πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας φιλοτιμοτάτους καὶ φιλαρχοτάτους καὶ πλεονεκτικωτάτους ἀπέλιπε. Τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τίς οὐκ οἶδε διότι πρῶτοι σχεδὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐπιθυμήσαντες τῆς τῶν ἀστυγειτόνων χώρας διὰ πλεονεξίαν ἐπ' ἐξανδραποδισμῶ Μεσσηνίοις πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν;

What he [Lycurgus] left undone, therefore, was to bring to bear on the citizens some force or principle, by which, just as he had made them simple and contented in their lives as individuals, he might make collective spirit of the city as a whole likewise contented and moderate. But now, while he made them most unambitious and sensible people as regards their individual lives and the institutions of their city, he left them most ambitious (*philotimatatous*), domineering, and aggressive (*pleonektikōtatous*) towards the rest of the Greeks. For who is not aware that they were almost the first of the Greeks to cast longing eyes on the territory of their neighbors, making war on the Messenians out of covetousness and for the purpose of enslaving them? (Trans., Paton 2010, edited)

7.11.9

ἐκφανέστατον δὲ καὶ μέγιστον δεῖγμα περὶ τοῦ τί δύναται προαίρεσις καλοκάγαθική καὶ πίστις, τὸ πάντας Κρηταιεῖς συμφρονήσαντας καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς μετασχόντας συμμαχίας ἓνα προστάτην ἐλέσθαι τῆς νήσου Φίλιππον, καὶ ταῦτα συντελεσθῆναι χωρὶς ὄπλων καὶ κινδύνων, ὃ πρότερον οὐ ραδίως ἂν εὔροι τις γεγονός.

A most conspicuous and striking proof of the value of honorable principles and good faith is that all the *Krētaieis* united and entering into one *summachia* elected Philip *prostatēs* of the whole island, this being accomplished without any appeal to arms or violence, a thing of which it would be difficult to find a previous instance. (Trans., *ibid.*, edited)

7.14.4

ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τῶν κατὰ Κρήτην· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνων Ἀράτῳ μὲν καθηγεμόνι χρησάμενος περὶ τῶν ὄλων, οὐχ οἷον ἀδικήσας, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ λυπήσας οὐδένα τῶν κατὰ τὴν νῆσον, ἅπαντας μὲν εἶχε τοὺς Κρηταιεῖς ὑποχειρίους, ἅπαντας δὲ τοὺς Ἑλληνας εἰς τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐνοίαν ἐπήγετο διὰ τὴν σεμνότητα τῆς προαιρέσεως.

The same holds for his conduct towards Crete. There, too, as long as he was guided by Aratus in his general policy, not only was he not guilty of injustice to any of the islanders, but he did not give the least offense to any; so that he had all the *Krētaieis* at his service, and by the strictness of his principles attracted the affection of all the Greeks. (Trans., *ibid.*, edited)

7.18.8-10: see n. 229.

8.16.4-6: see n. 233.

10.29.4-6

προέθετο διατάττειν τὸ τῶν εὐζώνων πλῆθος καὶ τοὺς τούτων ἡγεμόνας μερίζειν, ὡς ἐκάστους δεήσει πορεύεσθαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς λειτουργοὺς, οὓς ἔδει παραπορευομένους τὸν καταλαμβανόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν εὐζώνων τόπον εὐβατον παρασκευάζειν τῇ τῶν φαλαγγιτῶν καὶ τῇ τῶν ὑποζυγίων πορείᾳ. ταῦτα δὲ διανοηθεὶς τὴν μὲν πρώτην ἔδωκε τάξιν Διογένει, συστήσας αὐτῷ τοξότας καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ τῶν ὀρείων τοὺς ἀκοντίζειν καὶ λιθάζειν δυναμένους, οἵτινες τάξιν μὲν οὐκ ἔνεμον, αἰεὶ δὲ πρὸς τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν καὶ τόπον κατ' ἄνδρα ποιούμενοι τὸν κίνδυνον πραγματικωτάτην παρείχοντο χρεῖαν ἐν ταῖς δυσχωρίαις. τούτοις δὲ συνεχεῖς Κρήτας ἀσπιδιώτας ἐπέταξε περὶ δισχιλίους, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Πολυξενίδας Ῥόδιος, τελευταίους δὲ θωρακίτας καὶ θυρεοφόρους, ὧν εἶχον τὴν ἡγεμονίαν Νικομήδης Κῶος καὶ Νικόλαος Αἰτωλός.

...Antiochus decided to break up his light-armed troops into several bodies and divide their officers among them, with instructions as to the route they should take. He also resolved to break up the pioneers whose duty it was to march together with the light-armed troops and make the ground occupied by these passable for the phalanx and the pack-train. Having made this plan he gave the command of the first division to Diogenes, entrusting him with archers and slingers and

those of the mountaineers who were expert in throwing javelins and stones, who also, whenever time and place called for it, fought singly and rendered most useful service on difficult ground. After these he placed about 2000 *Krētes* armed with bucklers (*Krētes aspidiōtai*) under the command of Polyxenidas the Rhodian, and lastly the light troops armed with breastplate and shield under Nicomedes the Coan and Nicolaus the Aetolian. (Trans., Paton 2010)

10.30.7-9

εὐθέως γὰρ κατὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος διδάσκοντος, ὑπερτιθέμενοι καὶ προσβαίνοντες πρὸς τὰ πλάγια τῶν χωρίων οἱ περὶ τὸν Διογένην, ὑπερδέξιοι τῶν πολεμίων ἐγίνοντο, καὶ χρώμενοι πυκνοῖς τοῖς ἀκοντίσμασι καὶ τοῖς ἐκ χειρὸς λίθοις κακῶς διετίθεσαν τοὺς βαρβάρους, καὶ μάλιστα ταῖς σφενδόνας ἐκακοποιοῦν ἐξ ἀποστήματος βάλλοντες. ὅτε δὲ τοὺς πρώτους ἐκβιασάμενοι κατὰσχοιεν τὸν τούτων τόπον, ἐδίδοτο τοῖς λειτουργοῖς καιρὸς εἰς τὸ πᾶν τὸ πρὸ ποδῶν ἀνακαθαίρειν καὶ λεαίνειν μετ' ἀσφαλείας. ἐγίνετο δὲ το το ταχέως διὰ τὴν πολυχειρίαν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ τῶν μὲν σφενδονητῶν καὶ τοξοτῶν ἔτι δ' ἀκοντιστῶν κατὰ τοὺς ὑπερδεξίους τόπους πορευομένων σποράδην, ποτὲ δὲ συναθροισζομένων καὶ καταλαμβανομένων τοὺς εὐκαίρους τόπους, τῶν (δ') ἀσπιδιωτῶν ἐφεδρευόντων, καὶ παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν χαράδραν παραπορευομένων (ἐν) τάξει καὶ βιάδην, οὐκ ἔμενον οἱ βάρβαροι, πάντες δὲ λιπόντες τοὺς τόπους ἠθροίσθησαν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολήν.

...or at once upon encountering the enemy Diogenes acted as circumstances suggested and making a further flank movement up hill got on higher ground, and by throwing showers of javelins and stones from the hand inflicted severe punishment on them, the greatest damage being done by the stones slung from a distance. As soon as they had forced this first post to withdraw and occupied their position the pioneers had time to clear and level the ground in front of them at their ease, a task soon accomplished owing to their large numbers. In fact, by this means, with the slingers, archers and javelineers marching along the high ground in loose order, but closing up and occupying favorable positions, and with the *aspidiōtai* (*Krētes*) covering their movements and marching parallel to them close to the defile slowly and in good order, the barbarians no longer stood their ground, but abandoning their positions collected on the actual summit of the pass. (Trans., *ibid.*)

11.13.3-5

χρόνου δὲ γινομένου κατίσχυον καὶ τῷ πλήθει καὶ ταῖς εὐχειρίαις διὰ τὴν ἕξιν οἱ παρὰ τοῦ τυράννου μισθοφόροι. τοῦτο δ' εἰκότως καὶ τὸ παράπαν εἴωθε γίνεσθαι. ὅσῳ γὰρ συμβαίνει τοὺς ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ὄχλους προθυμότερους ὑπάρχειν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀγῶσι τῶν τοῖς τυράννοις πολιτικῶν ὑποτακτομένων, τοσοῦτῳ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχους ξενικὰ τῶν ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μισθοφορούντων εἰκὸς ὑπεράγειν καὶ διαφέρειν.

But after some time the tyrant's mercenaries prevailed by their superior numbers and skill, for they were well trained. This is generally what is liable to happen, since by as much as the civic force of a democracy is more courageous in action than the subjects of a tyrant, by so much will a despot's mercenaries in all probability excel those who serve for hire in a democracy. (Trans., *ibid.*)

13.6.7-10

τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐπαποστέλλων ἀνήρει, τοὺς δ' ἐκ τῶν τόπων ἐπανάγοντας ἐφόνευε. τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τὰς σύνεγγυς οἰκίας, ὅπου τις τυγχάνοι κατοικῶν τῶν φυγάδων, μισθούμενος δι' ἀνυπονοήτων ἀνθρώπων, εἰς ταύτας εἰσέπεμπε Κρήτας, οἵτινες ῥήγματα ποιοῦντες ἐν τοῖς τοίχοις καὶ διὰ τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν θυρίδων τοξεύοντες τοὺς μὲν ἐστῶτας τῶν φυγάδων, τοὺς δ' ἀνακειμένους ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις οἰκίαις διέφθειρον, ὥστε μήτε τόπον εἶναι μηδένα φύξιμον μήτε καιρὸν ἀσφαλῆ τοῖς ταλαιπώροις Λακεδαιμονίοις.

[Nabis] killed some he banished on the road, he murdered others he brought back from out of town. Finally, in the cities he rented, through unsuspecting people, the houses next-door to those that happened to be the residences of the exiles. Into these he sent *Krētes*, who made holes in the walls and, through the windows, shot arrows. They killed some exiles standing up, some lying down, in their own dwellings. As a result, no place was refuge or any moment safe for the poor Lacedaemonians.

13.8.2

ἐκοινώνει μὲν γὰρ τοῖς Κρησὶ τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν ληστειῶν...

For [Nabis] took part with *Krētes* in predations on the sea...

22.15.1-6

Ὅτι κατὰ τὴν Κρήτην, κοσμοῦντος ἐν Γορτύνη Κύδα τοῦ Ἀντάλκου, κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐλαττούμενοι Γορτύνιοι τοὺς Κνωσίους, ἀποτεμόμενοι τῆς χώρας αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν καλούμενον Λυκάστιον προσένειμαν Ῥαυκίοις, τὸ (δὲ) Διατόνιον Λυττίοις, κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον παραγενομένων πρεσβευτῶν ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης εἰς τὴν Κρήτην τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἄππιον χάριν τοῦ διαλῦσαι τὰς ἐνεστώσας αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαφοράς, καὶ ποιησαμένων λόγους ὑπὲρ τούτων (ἐν) τῇ Κνωσίῳ καὶ Γορτυνίῳ, πεισθέντες οἱ Κρηταιεῖς ἐπέτρεψαν τὰ καθ' αὐτοὺς τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἄππιον. οἱ δὲ [πεισθέντες] Κνωσίοις μὲν ἀποκατέστησαν τὴν χώραν, Κυδωνιάταις δὲ προσέταξαν τοὺς μὲν ὁμήρους ἀπολαβεῖν, οὓς ἐγκατέλειπον δόντες τοῖς περὶ Χαρμίωνα πρότερον, τὴν δὲ Φαλάσαρναν ἀφεῖναι μηδὲν ἐξ αὐτῆς νοσφισαμένους. περὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ κοινοδίκιον συνεχώρησαν αὐτοῖς βουλομένοις μὲν [αὐτοῖς] ἐξεῖναι μετέχειν, μὴ βουλομένοις δὲ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐξεῖναι, πάσης ἀπεχομένοις τῆς ἄλλης Κρήτης αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἐκ Φαλασάρνης φυγάσιν. *** ἀπέκτειναν τοὺς περὶ Μενοίτιον, ἐπιφανεστάτους ὄντας τῶν πολιτῶν.

In Crete, when Cydas the son of Antalces held the office of *kosmos* at Gortyn, the Gortynians, exerting themselves to diminish in every way the power of the Knossians, parceled off from their territory the so-called Lycastium and assigned it to Rhaucus and the Diatonium to Lyttus. At this time Appius Claudius and the other commissioners arrived in Crete from Rome, for the purpose of settling the disputes existing in the island. When they had spoken on the subject among Knossians and Gortynians, the *Krētaieis* gave ear to them and put their affairs into their hands. They restored the territory to the Knossians: they ordered the Cydoniates to take back the hostages they had formerly left in Charmion's hands, and to leave Phalasarna without taking

anything away from it. As for the *koinodikion*, they allowed them, if they wished, to take part in it, and if they did not wish, to refuse on condition that they and the exiles from Phalasarna left the rest of Crete untouched. The . . . killed Menoetius and others, the most notable of their citizens. (Trans., Paton 2010, edited)

24.3: see n. 245.

28.14.1-2: see p. 186.

28.15.1-3

Ὅτι κατὰ τὴν Κρήτην δεδιότες Κυδωνιάται τοὺς Γορτυνίους διὰ τὸ καὶ τῷ πρότερον ἔτει παρ' ὀλίγον κεικινδυνευκέναι τῇ πόλει τῶν περὶ Νοθοκράτην ἐπιβαλομένων αὐτὴν κατασχεῖν, ἐξέπεμψαν πρέσβεις πρὸς Εὐμένη, βοήθειαν αἰτούμενοι κατὰ τὴν συμμαχίαν. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς προχειρισάμενος Λέοντα καὶ στρατιώτας σὺν τούτῳ τριακοσίους ἐξαπέστειλε κατὰ σπουδὴν. ὧν παραγενομένων οἱ Κυδωνιάται τὰς τε κλεῖς τῶν πυλῶν τῷ Λέοντι παρέδωκαν καὶ καθόλου τὴν πόλιν ἐνεχείρισαν.

In Crete the Cydoniates, standing in fear of the Gortynians, because in the previous year they had very nearly run the risk of losing their city owing to the attempt on the part of Nothocrates to seize it, now sent envoys to Eumenes, asking for help according to the terms of their alliance. The king, appointing Leon to command a force of 300 men, dispatched them at once. Upon their arrival the Cydoniates gave up the keys of the gates to Leon and placed their city entirely in his hands.

30.23.1

Ὅτι ἐξεπολέμησαν κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Κνώσιοι μετὰ Γορτυνίων πρὸς τοὺς Ῥαυκίους καὶ συνθήκας ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐνόρκους μὴ πρότερον λύσειν τὸν πόλεμον πρὶν ἢ κατὰ κράτος ἐλεῖν τὴν Ῥαῦκον.

At that time, the Knossians made an agreement with the Gortynians against Rhaucians, mutually swearing that they would not end the war until they had seized control of Rhaucus.

31.17

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Πτολεμαῖοις ὁ νεώτερος παραγεγονῶς εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα μετὰ τῶν πρεσβευτῶν συνήθροισεν ἑξενολόγιον ἐμβριθές. ἐν οἷς προσελάβετο καὶ τὸν Μακεδόνα Δαμάσιππον, ὃς κατασφάξας ἐν τῷ Φάκῳ τοὺς συνέδρους ἔφυγεν μετὰ γυναικὸς καὶ τέκνων ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας. ἀφικόμενος δ' εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥοδίων Περαιάν καὶ ξενισθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου προετίθετο πλεῖν εἰς τὴν Κύπρον. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Τορκουᾶτον θεωροῦντες αὐτὸν συνεσταμένον ξενικὴν χεῖρα βαρεῖαν ὑπεμίμησκον τῶν ἐντολῶν, διότι δεῖ χωρὶς πολέμου ποιεῖσθαι τὴν κάθοδον· καὶ τέλος ἔπεισαν αὐτὸν ἕως Σίδης προαγαγόντα τὸ ξενολόγιον διαλύσασθαι καὶ τῆς εἰς Κύπρον ἐπιβολῆς ἀποστήναι καὶ συμμίσγειν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς τῶν Κυρηναίων ὅρους. αὐτοὶ δὲ πλεύσαντες εἰς τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν ἔφασαν παραστήσεσθαι τὸν βασιλέα πρὸς τὰ παρακαλούμενα καὶ συναντήσειν ἐπὶ τοὺς ὅρους, ἔχοντες κάκεινον μεθ' αὐτῶν. τούτοις μὲν οὖν τοῖς λόγοις πεισθεὶς ὁ νεώτερος

Πτολεμαῖος, ἀπογνοὺς τὰ κατὰ τὴν Κύπρον τὸ μὲν ξενολόγιον διέλυσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς Κρήτην ἀπέπλευσεν, τὸν τε Δαμάσιππον ἔχων μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν πρεσβευτῶν ἓνα Γνάιον Μερόλαν· ξενολογήσας δ' ἐκ τῆς Κρήτης περὶ χιλίους στρατιώτας ἀνήχθη καὶ διάρας εἰς τὴν Λιβύην κατέσχευεν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἄπιν.

After these events, the younger Ptolemy {the future Ptolemy VIII}, having arrived in Greece with the legates, gathered a sizable foreign contingent (*xenologion*). Among them he also acquired the Macedonian Damasippus, who, having slaughtered the council members at Phacus, fled Macedonia with his wife and children. Arriving at Rhodian Peraea and being hosted by the *dēmos*, he determined to sail to Cyprus. Torquatus' party, seeing that he had united a powerful foreign (mercenary) force, reminded him of their orders, i.e., it was necessary to make his return {to Cyprus} without war. They finally persuaded him when he had gotten as far as Side to disband the *xenologion*, set aside the Cypriot enterprise, and join them at the border of Cyrene. They said that they themselves would sail to Alexandria to ask the king to stand down, and would meet him at the border, bringing him {i.e., his brother the king} with them. Persuaded by these arguments, the younger Ptolemy, diverting from his original plan for Cyprus, disbanded the *xenologion*. He first sailed to Crete, taking with him Damasippus and one of the legates, Gnaeus Merula. Once he had recruited (*xenologēsas*) 1000 soldiers from Crete, he transported them and, after making the passage to Libya, he took up his position at Apis.

33.16.1-6

Ὅτι κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον οἱ Κρηταιεῖς πρεσβευτὰς ἀπέστειλαν πρὸς Ἀχαιοὺς ὑπὲρ βοηθείας (τοὺς περὶ) Ἀντιφάταν Τηλεμνάστου Γορτύνιον, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ Ῥόδιοι τοὺς περὶ Θεοφάνην. οὕσης δὲ τῆς συνόδου τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐν Κορίνθῳ, καὶ διαλεγομένων τῶν πρεσβευτῶν ἑκατέρων ὑπὲρ τῆς βοηθείας, ἔρρεπον ταῖς γνώμαις οἱ πολλοὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τοὺς Ῥοδίους, ἐντρεπόμενοι καὶ τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀξίωμα καὶ τὴν ὅλην αἴρεσιν τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν. εἰς ἃ βλέπων Ἀντιφάτας ἐβουλήθη πάλιν ἐπεισελεθεῖν, τοῦ δὲ στρατηγοῦ συγχωρήσαντος ἐχρήσατο λόγοις βαρυτέροις ἢ κατὰ Κρήτα καὶ σπουδαιότεροις· καὶ γὰρ ἦν ὁ νεανίσκος οὐδαμῶς Κρητικὸς, ἀλλὰ πεφευγὼς τὴν Κρητικὴν ἀναγωγίαν. διὸ καὶ συνέβαινε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὴν παρηρσίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι διὰ (τὸ) τὸν πατέρα τοῦ προειρημένου Τηλέμναστον μετὰ πεντακοσίων Κρητῶν ἐλθόντα συμπεπολεμηκέναι τὸν πρὸς Νάβιν πόλεμον εὐγενῶς αὐτοῖς.

At this time, the *Krētaieis* sent ambassadors with Antiphatas the Gortynian, son of Telemnastus, to the Achaeans for *boēthia*, up against the Rhodian ambassadors with Theuphanes. The Council of the Achaeans was in session at Corinth, and after each of the ambassadors had spoken for *boēthia*, many inclined in sympathy to the Rhodians, regarding the reputation of the city and the whole disposition of the *politeia* and its men. Seeing this, Antiphatas wished to try again and, after strategus assented to this, used weightier and more zealous arguments than those of a *Krēs*; for the young man was not in any way Cretan (*Krētikos*), but had avoided the Cretan miseducation. On account of this, it happened that the Achaeans welcomed his speech, and more still because of the fact that his father, the aforementioned Telemnastus, who came with 500 *Krētes*, had fought nobly alongside them in the war against Nabis.

STRABO

10.4.10

Δορύλαος γὰρ ἦν ἀνὴρ τακτικός, τῶν Μιθριδάτου τοῦ Εὐεργέτου φίλων· οὗτος διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἐμπειρίαν ξενολογεῖν ἀποδειχθεὶς πολὺς ἦν ἐν τε τῇ Ἑλλάδι καὶ τῇ Θράκῃ, πολὺς δὲ καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τῆς Κρήτης ἰοῦσιν, οὕτω τὴν νῆσον ἐχόντων Ῥωμαίων, συχνοῦ δὲ ὄντος ἐν αὐτῇ τοῦ μισθοφορικοῦ καὶ στρατιωτικοῦ πλήθους, ἐξ οὗ καὶ τὰ ληστήρια πληροῦσθαι συνέβαινε· ἐπιδημοῦντος δὲ τοῦ Δορυλάου κατὰ τύχην ἐνέστη πόλεμος τοῖς Κνωσίοις πρὸς τοὺς Γορτυνίους· αἰρεθεὶς δὲ στρατηγὸς καὶ κατορθώσας διὰ ταχέων ἤρατο τιμὰς τὰς μεγίστας, καὶ ἐπειδὴ μικρὸν ὕστερον ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς δολοφονηθέντα ἔγνω τὸν Εὐεργέτην ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων ἐν Σινώπῃ, τὴν διαδοχὴν δὲ εἰς γυναῖκα καὶ παιδία ἤκουσαν, ἀπογνοὺς τῶν ἐκεῖ κατέμεινε [ἐν] τῇ Κνωσσῷ·

Dorylaeus was a military expert, a member of the inner circle of Mithridates Euergetes. Having been appointed to recruit mercenaries (*xenologein*) on account of his experience with matters, he often was in Greece and Thrace, and often among those who were on Crete. As the Romans did not yet possess the island, there was a large number of mercenary and soldier types, from which the pirate bands would also fill their ranks. While Dorylaeus was there by chance, there was a war for the Knossians against the Gortynians. He was chosen as general and, carrying it out swiftly to a successful conclusion, he received great honors, and, when he learned a short time later that Euergetes had been assassinated through a plot by his close friends at Sinope, and that the succession had gone to his wife and children, he decided to remain there at Knossus.

10.4.17

Λέγεσθαι δ' ὑπὸ τινῶν ὡς Λακωνικὰ εἶη τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομιζομένων Κρητικῶν, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς εὐρησθαι μὲν ὑπ' ἐκείνων, ἠκριβωκέναι δὲ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας, τοὺς δὲ Κρήτας ὀλιγορῆσαι, κακωθεισῶν τῶν πόλεων καὶ μάλιστα τῆς Κνωσσίῳν, τῶν πολεμικῶν· μείναι δὲ τινὰ τῶν νομίμων παρὰ Λυττίους καὶ Γορτυνίους καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶ πολυχίνις μᾶλλον ἢ παρ' ἐκείνοις·...

It is said by some that most of the Cretan (*Krētikōn*) institutions are Laconic, but the truth is that they were invented by the Cretans: while the Spartiatas sharpened them, the *Krētes* neglected military matters while their cities were being ill-treated, especially that of the Knossians. Some of the customs remain with the Lyttians and Gortynians and other small communities in their orbit....

THUCYDIDES

6.43

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοσηδε ἤδη τῇ παρασκευῇ Ἀθηναῖοι ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς Κερκύρας ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ἐπεραιοῦντο, τριήρεσι μὲν ταῖς πάσαις τέσσαρσι καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ἑκατόν, καὶ δυοῖν Ῥοδίῳ πεντηκοντόροιον (τούτων Ἀττικαὶ μὲν ἦσαν ἑκατόν, ὧν αἱ μὲν ἐξήκοντα ταχεῖαι, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι στρατιώτιδες, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ναυτικὸν Χίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων), ὀπλίταις δὲ τοῖς ξύμμασιν ἑκατόν καὶ πεντακισχίλιος (καὶ τούτων Ἀθηναίων μὲν αὐτῶν ἦσαν πεντακόσιοι μὲν καὶ χίλιοι ἐκ καταλόγου, ἑπτακόσιοι δὲ θῆτες ἐπιβάται τῶν νεῶν, ξύμμαχοι δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι ξυνεστράτευον, οἱ μὲν

τῶν ὑπηκόων, οἱ δ' Ἀργείων πεντακόσιοι καὶ Μαντινέων καὶ μισθοφόρων πενήκοντα καὶ διακόσιοι), τοξόταις δὲ τοῖς πᾶσιν ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ τετρακοσίους (καὶ τούτων Κρήτες οἱ ὀγδοήκοντα ἦσαν) καὶ σφενδονήταις Ῥοδίων ἑπτακοσίους, καὶ Μεγαρεῦσι ψιλοῖς φυγάσιν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν, καὶ ἱππαγωγῶ μιᾷ τριάκοντα ἀγούση ἱππέας.

After this the Athenians sailed from Corcyra, and proceeded to cross to cross to Sicily with an armament now consisting of 134 triremes in all (besides 2 Rhodian *pentekonters*) of which 100 were Athenian vessels – 60 men-of-war, and 40 troopships – and the remainder from Chios and the other allies; 5100 hoplites in all, of which 1500 were Athenian citizens from the rolls at Athens and 700 *thētes* shipped as marines, and the rest of the allied troops, some of them Athenian subjects, and besides these 500 Argives and 250 Mantineans and *misthophoroi*; 480 archers in all, 80 of whom were *Krētes*, 700 slingers from Rhodes, 120 light-armed exiles from Megara, and 1 horse-transport carrying 30 horses. (Trans. Crawley 1996)

6.69.2

καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρων οἱ τε λιθοβόλοι καὶ σφενδονήται καὶ τοξόται προυμάχοντο καὶ τροπὰς οἴας εἰκὸς ψιλοῦς ἀλλήλων ἐποίουν·

First, the stone-throwers, slingers, and archers of either army began skirmishing, and routed or were routed by one another, as might be expected of light troops... (Trans., *ibid.*)

7.62.2

καὶ γὰρ τοξόται πολλοὶ καὶ ἀκοντισταὶ ἐπιβήσονται καὶ ὄχλος, ᾧ ναυμαχίαν μὲν ποιούμενοι ἐν πελάγει οὐκ ἂν ἐχρώμεθα διὰ τὸ βλάπτειν ἂν τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῇ βαρύτητι τῶν νεῶν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐνθάδε ἠναγκασμένη ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζομαχίᾳ πρόσφορα ἔσται.

“A number of archers and darters will go on board, and a multitude that should not have employed in an action in the open sea, where our science would be crippled by the weight of the vessels; but in the present land fight that we are forced to make from shipboard all of this will be useful.” (Trans., *ibid.*)

XENOPHON

Anabasis 1.2.9

καὶ ἦκε Κλέαρχος ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος φυγάς ἔχων ὀπλίτας χιλίους καὶ πελταστὰς Θρᾷκας ὀκτακοσίους καὶ τοξότας Κρήτας διακοσίους.

And Clearchus the Lacedaemonian exile came with 1000 hoplites and 800 Thracian peltasts and 200 *Krētes toxotai*.

3.3.7

ἐπεὶ δ' ἐγγυὺς ἐγένοντο, ἐξαπίνης οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐτόξευον καὶ ἱππεῖς καὶ πεζοί, οἱ δ' ἐσφενδόνων καὶ ἐτίτρωσκον. οἱ δὲ ὀπισθοφύλακες τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔπασχον μὲν κακῶς, ἀντεποίουν δ' οὐδέν·

οἱ τε γὰρ Κρηῆτες βραχύτερα τῶν Περσῶν ἐτόξευον καὶ ἅμα ψιλοὶ ὄντες εἴσω τῶν ὅπλων κατεκέκλειντο, οἱ δὲ ἀκοντισταὶ βραχύτερα ἠκόντιζον ἢ ὡς ἐξικνεῖσθαι τῶν σφενδονητῶν.

When [Mithridates' men] got near, both horsemen and infantry suddenly fired their arrows, and the slingers also did damage. The rearguard of the Greeks suffered badly, as they could not retaliate in kind; for the range of the *Krētes* archers was shorter than that of the Persians, and being *psiloi* they enclosed among the hoplites, while the range of the javeliners was shorter than the reach of the slingers.

3.4.15

ἐπεὶ δὲ διαταχθέντες οἱ Ῥόδιοι ἐσφενδόνησαν καὶ οἱ [Σκύθαι] τοξόται ἐτόξευσαν καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμάρτανεν ἀνδρός (οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ πάνυ προυθυμεῖτο ῥάδιον ἦν), καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης μάλα ταχέως ἔξω βελῶν ἀπεχώρει καὶ <αἰ> ἄλλαι τάξεις ἀπεχώρησαν...

From this positions, the Rhodians hurled sling bullets and the Scythian archers shot and no one missed a man (for one could only miss if one really tried), and Tissiphernes very quickly moved out of range of the *belē*, as did the other ranks of the army...

3.4.17-18

μεγάλα δὲ καὶ τόξα τὰ Περσικά ἐστίν· ὥστε χρήσιμα ἦν ὅποσα ἀλίσκοιτο τῶν τοξευμάτων τοῖς Κρησί, καὶ διετέλουν χρώμενοι τοῖς τῶν πολεμίων τοξεύμασι, καὶ ἐμελέτων τοξεύειν ἄνω ἰέντες μακράν. ἠύρισκετο δὲ καὶ νεῦρα πολλὰ ἐν ταῖς κώμαις καὶ μόλυβδος, ὥστε χρῆσθαι εἰς τὰς σφενδόνας.

The Persians use large bows, so all the arrows of theirs which were picked up came in useful to the *Krētes*, who constantly used the enemy arrows and practices long-range shooting with a high trajectory. A number of bow-strings (*neura*) were found in the villages, and some lead also which could be used for the slings. (Trans., Warner 1972)

5.2.28-32

Τῇ δὲ ὑστεραία ἀπῆσαν οἱ Ἕλληνες ἔχοντες τὰ ἐπιτήδεια. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν κατάβασιν ἐφοβοῦντο τὴν εἰς Τραπεζοῦντα (πρανῆς γὰρ ἦν καὶ στενή), ψευδενέδραν ἐποίησαντο· καὶ ἀνήρ Μυσὸς καὶ τοῦνομα τοῦτο ἔχων τῶν Κρητῶν λαβὼν δέκα ἔμενεν ἐν λασίῳ χωρίῳ καὶ προσεποιεῖτο τοὺς πολεμίους πειρᾶσθαι λανθάνειν· αἱ δὲ πέλται αὐτῶν ἄλλοτε καὶ ἄλλοτε διεφαίνοντο χαλκαῖ οὔσαι. οἱ μὲν οὖν πολέμοι ταῦτα διορῶντες ἐφοβοῦντο ὡς ἐνέδραν οὔσαν· ἡ δὲ στρατιὰ ἐν τούτῳ κατέβαινε. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐδόκει ἤδη ἰκανὸν ὑπεληλυθέναι, τῷ Μυσῷ ἐσήμηνε φεύγειν ἀνὰ κράτος· καὶ ὃς ἐξαναστὰς φεύγει καὶ οἱ σὺν αὐτῷ. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι Κρηῆτες (ἀλίσκεσθαι γὰρ ἔφασαν τῷ δρόμῳ), ἐκπεσόντες ἐκ τῆς ὁδοῦ εἰς ὕλην κατὰ τὰς νάπας καλινδούμενοι ἐσώθησαν, ὁ Μυσὸς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν φεύγων ἐβόα βοηθεῖν· καὶ ἐβοήθησαν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἀνέλαβον τετρωμένον. καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ πόδα ἀνεχώρουν βαλλόμενοι οἱ βοηθήσαντες καὶ ἀντιτοξεύοντές τινες τῶν Κρητῶν. οὕτως ἀφίκοντο ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον πάντες σῶοι ὄντες.

On the next day, the Greeks went away, taking their supplies. Since they feared the descent into Trapezus, for it was steep and narrow, they made for themselves a false ambush (*pseudenedra*). A Mysian called Mysus, taking 10 *Krētes*, waited in a bush patch and pretended to try to lie in wait for the enemy; their shields (*peltai*), being bronze, glinted here and there. The enemy, seeing this, feared that it was indeed an ambush (*enedra*); the army made their descent. When he thought that a suitable interval had gone by, he signaled to the Mysian to make a run for it; getting up out of there, he and those with him fled. While the others – the *Krētes*, who said that they were would be seized in the road – saved themselves by falling off the road, into the woods, and tumbling down through the glen, the Mysian Mysus fled along the road bawling for help (*eboa boēthein*); and they helped him (*eboēthēsan*), and picked him up wounded. His rescuers (*boēthēsantes*) themselves ran in on foot, firing missiles and some of the *Krētes* shot arrows in retaliation. In this way, everyone returned safe to the army.

Hellenika 4.2.16

συνελέγησαν γὰρ ὀπλίται Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν εἰς ἑξακισχιλίους, Ἡλείων δὲ καὶ Τριφυλίων καὶ Ἀκρωρείων καὶ Λασιωνίων ἐγγὺς τρισχίλιοι καὶ Σικυωνίων πεντακόσιοι καὶ χίλιοι, Ἐπιδαυρίων δὲ καὶ Τροιζηνίων καὶ Ἑρμιονέων καὶ Ἀλιέων ἐγένοντο οὐκ ἐλάττους τρισχιλίων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἵππεῖς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων περὶ ἑξακοσίου, Κρήτες δὲ τοξόται ἠκολούθουν ὡς τριακόσιοι, καὶ μὴν σφενδονῆται Μαργανέων καὶ Λετρίνων καὶ Ἀμφιδόλων οὐκ ἐλάττους τετρακοσίων.

The hoplites of the Lacedaemonians numbered up to 6000, those of the Eleans, Triphylians, Acrorians, and Lasionians nearly 3000, 1500 of the Sicyonians, and the hoplites of the Epidaurians, the Hermaioneans, and the Halieans no fewer than 3000. In addition to these were the cavalry of the Lacedaemonians, around 600; 300 *Krētes toxotai* followed, also no fewer than 400 slingers from the Marganeans, the Letrinians, and the Amphidolians.

4.2.17

ἢ γε μὴν τῶν πολεμίων ἠθροίσθη Ἀθηναίων μὲν εἰς ἑξακισχιλίους ὀπλίτας, Ἀργείων δ' ἐλέγοντο περὶ ἑπτακισχιλίους, Βοιωτῶν δ', ἐπεὶ Ὀρχομένιοι οὐ παρήσαν, περὶ πεντακισχιλίους, Κορινθίων γε μὴν εἰς τρισχιλίους, καὶ μὴν ἐξ Εὐβοίας ἀπάσης οὐκ ἐλάττους τρισχιλίων. ὀπλιτικὸν μὲν δὴ τοσοῦτον· ἵππεῖς δὲ Βοιωτῶν μὲν [ἐπεὶ Ὀρχομένιοι οὐ παρήσαν] εἰς ὀκτακοσίους, Ἀθηναίων δ' εἰς ἑξακοσίους, καὶ Χαλκιδέων τῶν ἐξ Εὐβοίας εἰς ἑκατόν, Λοκρῶν δὲ τῶν Ὀπουντίων εἰς πενήκοντα. καὶ ψιλῶν δὲ σὺν τοῖς τῶν Κορινθίων πλέον ἦν· καὶ γὰρ Λοκροὶ οἱ Ὀζόλαι καὶ Μηλιεῖς καὶ Ἀκαρνᾶνες παρήσαν αὐτοῖς.

But the collected force of their enemies the Athenians was 6000 hoplites, of the Argives were said to be around 7000, of the Boeotians, since the Orchomeni were not present, around 5000, of the Corinthians 3000, and from all of Euboea no fewer than 3000; the cavalry of the Boeotians [since the Orchomeni were not present] were 800, of the Athenians 600, of the Chalcidians of Euboea 100, of the Opuntians of Locris 50. The majority of the lights were with those of the Corinthians, for the Ozolian Locrians, the Malians, and the Acarnanians were with them.

INSCRIPTIONS

IC I.vii.1 = Chaniotis 1991 no. 4

IC I.xvi.35

Lato-*apud*-Camara, early second century BCE

Ῥοδίων

οἱ στρατευσάμενοι μετὰ ἄρχοντος τᾶν τριήρεων
Εὐαγόρα τοῦ Πύθιος καὶ τριηράρχων Ἀγησιδάμου τοῦ
Ἀγήτορος, Τελέσωνος τοῦ Φιλοξένου, καὶ τοῦ ἐπα-
ποσταλέντος ὑπὸ Ἀγησιδάμου Κλεωνύμου τοῦ
Θεώρου, καὶ ἀγευμένου τῶν στρατιωτᾶν
τῶν ἐκ τᾶς Ἑλλάδος ξενολογηθέντων
Εὐδάμου τοῦ Ἐπαρμόστου
Ἀθάναι Λινδίαι.

4

8

Of the Rhodians. Those serving in the army with the commander of triremes Evagoras son of Pythius and with the trierarchs Agesidamus son of Agetorus, Telesonus son of Philoxenus, and with the one dispatched as commander by Agesidamus, Cleonymus son of Theorus, and with the commander of the soldiers recruited as mercenaries from Greece, Eudamus son of Eparmostus, [dedicate this] to Athena Lindia.

KretChr 1969: 281,2 = Ducrey 1970 no. 2, Side A

Malla, 241-197 BCE

[ὄρκον — — — ἐ]ὰν δέ τι τῶν γεγραμμέν-
[ων κοινῇ ἐν] τῇ ὁμολογίαι Μαλλαῖοι μὴ Ν. -
[. . . ΝΙΙ], ἔνοχοι ἔστωσαν τῶι παρησπ-
[ο]νδηκένοι καὶ λελύκεν τασυνθήκας. {κα}
κατὰ ταῦτά δὲ καὶ ἐὰν Μαλλαῖοι χρεῖαν ἔ[χ]-
οντες συνμαχίας πένπωσι πρὸς βασιλ-
έα Ἄτταλον, ἀποστελλέτω βασιλεὺς Ἄτ[τ]-
αλος ἄνδρας τριακοσίους καὶ ἡγεμόνα[ς]
[ἐ]π' αὐ[τῶ]ν, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐκποιῆι τὸ πλῆθος τοῦτ-
[ο] διὰ τινος καιροῦς, ὅσους ἂν ἐνδέχῃται, ἐ-
[ὰ]ν μὴ ἐπ' Ἰεραφυτινίους ἢ Πριανσίους ἢ Ἀρκά-
δας παρκαλῶσιν· οὗτοι δὲ ὑπεξαιρήσθων ὑ-
πὸ βασιλέος Ἀττάλου. τοῖς δὲ πενπομένοις
πορεῖα μὲν παρεχέτω βασιλεὺς Ἄτταλος κ-
αὶ τὰ ὀψώνια καὶ τὰ δέοντα ἐν τῶ<ι> πλοῶι. {οτα}
ὅταν δὲ παραγένωνται πρὸς Μαλλαίους, τ[ρ]-
ε[φ]έτωσαν τὴν συνμαχίαν αὐτοῖ, παρέχ[ο]-
ντες τῆς ἡμερᾶς ἐκάστωι ἀνδρὶ δραχμᾶν
αἰγιναιῶν, τῶν δ' ἡγεμόνων ἐκάστωι δραχμ-

8

12

16

20

ὰς δύο καὶ κατὰ σῶμα χοίρικα ἀττ[ικ]ήν, ἐὰν μ-
 ἢ ἐν πολεμῖαι ὧσιν, οὗ ἔσται σῆτον λαμβά-
 νειν. παραμενέτωσαν δὲ οἱ ἀποσταλέν-
 τες ἕως ἂν Μαλλαῖοι χρεῖαν ἔχωσι. ὅταν δὲ
 ἀπολύωσιν τουσυνμάχος πρὸς βασιλέα Ἄ-
 [τ]ταλον τὰ πορεῖα δότωσαν αὐτοῖ ΣΥΝΑ-

24

28

...[the] underwritten but [i]f the Mallaei do not. . . . let them be liable for violating the pledges and breaking the treaty. According to the same things, if the Mallaei also, having need of *summachia*, should send to king Attalus, let king At[t]alus dispatch 300 men and commanders for them. If he does not permit this force on account of some circumstances, (he will send) as many as is possible, as long as they are not against the Hierapytnians or the Priansians or the Arcades; let these be excepted by king Attalus. For those being sent, let king Attalus provide passage and the *opsōnia* and whatever is needed for the voyage. When they are present with the Mallaei, let them (the Mallaei) feed the *summachia*, providing to each man per day one Aeginetan drachma, to each of the commanders two drachmas and one Attic cheonix (of grain) per person, if they are not in enemy (territory) where it would be possible to take food. Let those dispatched remain as long as the Mallaei have need. But when they release the *summachoi* to king A[t]talus, let them (the Mallaei) give the passage...

IC II.iii.4C

Aptera, 197 BCE

ἔδοξε[ν] [τᾶι] βουλᾷ καὶ τῶι δ[άμωι]· — — — — εἶπε]

ἐπειδὴ ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἄτταλος φίλος [ὑπάρχων διὰ προ]-
 γόνων πρόνοιαν ποιῆται περὶ τῶ κοιν[ῶ τῶν Κρηταιέων]

καὶ ἰδία τᾶς τῶν Ἀπταραίων πόλιος, καὶ τοῖς [παραγι]-

4

νομένοις ποτ' αὐτὸν τὰμ πᾶσαν φιλανθρωπίαν ἐνδ[εῖ]-

κνυται, δεδόχθαι τᾶι βωλᾷ καὶ τῶι δάμωι· στεφανῶσ[αι]

βασιλέα *vac.* Ἄτταλον εἰκόνι χαλκέαι τελείαι, εἴτε κα [βώ]-

ληται πεζὸν εἴτε κα ἐφ' ἵππῳ. <κα>ἰ αἶ κα *vac.* προαιρηῆται καρυ-

8

χθῆμεν ἐν τινι τῶν ἀγόνων τῶν στεφανιτῶν, ἐπιμ[ε]-

λὲς γενέσθω τοῖς κόσμοις ὅπως καρυχθῆ· ἦμεν δὲ αὐτ[ῶι]

καὶ προεδρίαν καὶ ἀσυλίαν καὶ ἀτέλειαν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν καὶ π[ο]-

λέμω καὶ εἰρήνας καὶ ἐν πόλι καὶ ἐν τοῖς λιμένοις καὶ ξενολο[γ]-

12

ῆσθαι καὶ ὀρμίζεσθαι καὶ αὐτῶι καὶ τοῖς ἐκγόνοις, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ὑ[π]-
 ἀρχειν ὅσα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις *vac.* εὐεργέταις.

vacat

The council and the people decided; X made the motion: whereas king Attalus, [being] a friend [through his ancestors], shows care concerning the common[ality of the Cretans] and, individually, the city of the Apteraeans, and always displays complete humanity to those [present] before him, it has been decided by the council and the people: let Attalus the king be honored with a life-sized bronze statue, standing or on horseback, as he wishes; and so on. If he

[μοι, ἂν μή τι ἀναγκαῖον κωλύσ]ηι, ἐν ἡμέραις εἴκοσι [ἀφ' ἧς ἂν ψηφισθῆι. ὅταν δὲ παραγέ]νωνται πρὸς Ἐλευθερναί- [ους πρεσβευταὶ παρὰ Ἀντιγ]όνου, συναγέτωσαν	
[οἱ κόσμοι τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐν δέκ]α ἡμέραις ἀφ' ἧς ἂν πα- [ραγένωνται οἱ πρεσβευταί, ἐὰ]ν μή τι ἀναγκαῖον κωλύ- [σῃ, εἰ δὲ μὴ ὅταν δύνωνται τάχ]ιστα· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐκκλησί- [αι προσαγέτωσαν τοὺς Ἀντιγόν]ου βασιλέως πρεσ- [βευτὰς καὶ χρηματιζέτωσαν οἱ] κόσμοι ἄλλο μηθὲν	12
[πρὶν ἢ τοῖς πρεσβευταῖς τὰς ἀπο]κρίσεις δῶσιν· ἐὰν [δὲ μὴ ἀποστείλωσιν τὴν β]οήθειαν ἐν τῷ γεγρα- [μένῳ χρόνῳ οἱ κόσμοι οἱ Ἐλ]ευθερναίων ἢ τὴν [συνθήκαν λύωσιν τρόπῳ ὅτ]ωιοῦν, ἀποτινέτωσα[ν]	16
[Ἀντιγόνῳ δραχμὰς μυριάς] ἐν τῇ συναιρεθείσῃ [πόλει ἐκκλήτωι· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ σ]υναγάγωσιν τὴν ἐ- [κκλησίαν ἢ τοὺς πρεσβευτὰς μὴ] προσαγάγωσιν ἢ χρη- [ματίσωσιν ἄλλο τι πρὶν ἢ ἀπόκ]ρισιν δοῦναι τοῖς [πρεσβευταῖς, ἔνοχοι ἔστωσαν] τοῖς ἐπ<ι>μίοις οἷς- [περ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]ται. ἀποπέλλειν	20
[δὲ καὶ βασιλέα τὴν βοήθειαν ἐν ἡμέ]ραις εἴκοσι ἀφ' ἧς ἂν πα- [ραγγείλωσιν οἱ πρεσβευταί. καὶ] ἐὰν μὲν βασιλεὺς Ἀντ- [ίγονος χρεῖαν ἔχηι συμμαχῶν], ἀποστελοῦσιν [αὐτῷ Ἐλευθερναίων οἱ κόσμοι] ἄνδρας ἐλευθ<έ>ρου- [ς ὅπλα ἔχοντας, τῇ δὲ πεμπομένῃ] συμμαχία παρέξε- [ι βασιλεὺς Ἀντίγονος ἐκάστης τ]ῆς ἡμέρας εἰς ἕκα- [στον τῶν ἀνδρῶν Ἀλεξανδρείαν] δρα[χ]μὴν ὀβο[λ]οῦ- [ς — — ἢ Ἀντιγονείαν ἢ Ἀττικ]ήν. ἐὰν δ[ὲ — — — —]	24
	28
	32

... [the Eleuthernians should make] war against those against whom [king Antigonus would make war]; let not be possible for the Eleuthernians [to establish] another all[iance in opposition to] Antigonus and the Macedo[nians]; ... [the] Eleuthernians; according [to the same stipulations, let neither king An]tigonus nor [his descendants nor] any [Macedonian establish] an opposing allian[ce against them]. When the ci[ty] should vote [to send *boēthia*], let the *kos[moi]* send it, [if something pressing does not prevent this], within twenty days [of when it was voted. But when] the [ambassadors from Antig]onus [are pre]sent among the Eleuthernians, [let the *kosmoi*] convene [the assembly within ten] days from when [the ambassadors arrived, if] something pressing does not prevent it, [and, if not, as quickly as they are able]; in the assembly, [let them bring forward] ambas[sadors of] king [Antigonus] and let the *kosmoi* [conduct] no other business before] they give their decis[i]ons to the ambassadors]. If [the *kosmoi* of the El]euthernians [do not send the *b*]oēthia within the abovementioned [time] or [break the agreement any way wh]atsoever, let them pay [ten thousand drachmas to Antigonus] in [the neutral city] that both sides have agreed upon; if they do not] convene the [assembly, or do not] bring [the ambassadors forward], or they conduct [some other business before] giving [a dec]ision to the [ambassadors, let them be liable] for those fines.... Let them send [the *boēthia* to

the king within] twenty days of when the [ambassadors announced their message]. And if king Ant[igonos should have need of *summachoi*], let [the *kosmoi* of the Eleuthernians] send [to him] free men [bearing weapons; to the *summachia* [that was sent], let [king Antigonos] provide, [for each] day, to each [of the men one Alexandrian] drachma... obo[I]... [either Antigonid or Attic]. But if...

IC III.iii.1A = SEG 46:1222

Hierapytna, last half of the third century BCE (227-224 BCE?)

[-----]ι ἐπὶ τὰν τῶ βασιλέως α
 [----- παρευρέσει μηδεμιᾷ ὅσους μὴ πρὸ
 [τᾶσδε τὰς συνθήκας ----- ἐτύγ]χανον στρατουόμενοι παρὰ
 [-----] στρατευομένους ὑποδίκος εἶ- 4
 [ναι τοῖς ἐπιτιμίοις τοῖς ἐκ τῶν νόμων τῶν] παρ' ἐκάστοις ὑπαρχόντων
 [----- ἀ]ποτεισάντων ὁ μὲν ἀγεμῶν
 [δραχμὰς μυρίας, ὁ δὲ στρατιώτας δραχμ]ὰς χιλίας, ἐνδεικνύεν δὲ
 [τὸν βωλόμενον -----]αν ἐνδειχθῆι τὰ μὲν ἥμισσα 8
 [εἶναι τοῦ ἐνδείξαντος, τὰ δὲ ἥμι]σσα τὰς πόλεος ἐξ ἧς ἂν ἦ ὁ
 [ἐνδείξας ----- ὑ]πεναντίον τῆιδε τῆι συμ-
 [μαχίαι ----- πρὸς ο]ὔς ἂν πολεμῆι Ἀντίγονος
 [----- μηδ]ὲ τὸς ἐγγόνος μηδὲ Μα- 12
 [κεδόνων μηθένα -----] μηδὲ ξενολόγια παρέ-
 [χεν ----- ὑπ]εναντίον πράσσειεν τᾶι προ-
 [-----]ι τὸν πόλεμον πρὸς οὓς ἂν
 [-----] συμμαχίαν ὑπεναντί[αν] 16
 [----- π]ρὸς μηθέν<α> Ἱεραπυτνί[ο]ς].
 [κατὰ δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ μηδὲ Ἀντίγονον μηδὲ] τὸς ἐγγόνος αὐτοῦ μηδὲ
 [συντίθ]εσθαι ----- Ἱεραπυτνίος. ὅταν δὲ βασι-
 [λεὺς ἀποσ]τέλλῃ -----] πέμπεν τὰν βοάθειαν. ἀπο- 20
 [στελλέτωσαν δὲ οἱ Ἱερα]πύτνιοι ἀφ' ἧς ἂν βασιλεὺς ἀπ[αγγε]ίλῃ ἐν ἀ-
 [μέραις τριάκοντα· ἐὰν δ[ὲ] μὴ ἀποστείλωσιν τὰν βοάθειαν ἐν τῶι γε]-
 [γρα]μένῳ χρόνῳ ἢ τὰν σ[υνθή]καν λύωσιν τρόπῳ ὁτιοῦν, ἀποτινέτω]-
 [σαν οἱ κόσμοι δραχμὰς μυ]ρίας ἐν τᾶι συναιρεθείσαι πόλει ἐκ]- 24
 [κλήτωι. ἀποστέλλεν δ[ὲ] καὶ βασιλέα τὰν βοάθειαν ἐν ἀμέραις τριάκον]-
 [τα ἀφ' ἧς ἂν παραγγεί]λωσιν οἱ πρεσβευταί. καὶ ἐὰν μὲν βασιλε]-
 [ὺς Ἀντίγονος χρειά]ν ἔχη συμμαχῶν ----- ἀποστελοῦ]-
 [σιν αὐτῶι Ἱεραπυτν]ίων οἱ κόσμοι ἄνδρας ἐλευθέρους ὅπλα] 28
 [ἔχοντας. τᾶι δὲ πεμ]πομέναι συμμαχίαι παρέξει βασιλεὺς Ἀντί]-
 [γονος πορεῖ<α> καὶ δώσε]ι ----- Ἀ]-
 [λεξανδρείαν δραχμ]ὰν ----- ἢ Ἀτ]-
 [τικὴν. ἐὰν δὲ Ἱεραπύ]τνιοι -----] 32
 [κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν βα]σιλεὺς Ἀντίγονος -----]
 [νοῖς πορεῖά τε καὶ ὁψ]ώνια -----]
 [τεροὶ ἀπολυσ]-----]

...concerning the ___ of the king... on no [pretense] whatsoever, [except] however many before [this agreement. . . . happened] to march in an army against [.] having marched in an army, let him be liable [to the penalties of the laws] that exist for each... [.] let them pay a fine, the leader [10,000 drachmas, the common soldier] 1000 [drach]mas. Let [the volunteer (*bōlomenos*)] inform [. . . .] if he should be indicated, let half [be of the one who informed, and half] be of the city from which is the [one who informed] contrary to the *sum[machia against whom]* Antigonus makes war [. nor] his descendants nor [any Macedonian] nor pro[vide] *xenologia* [.] to act in opposition to [.] the war against whom [.] opposing *summachia* [. to]wards anyone... the Hierapytnians. [According to the same things, let neither Antigonus nor] his descendants establish [.] Hierapytnians. When the king [should] dispatch [. . . .] to send aid (*boatheia*). Let the Hierapytnioi dispatch within 30 days [from when the] king re[quest]ed it; if [they do not dispatch the *boēthia* in the pre]scribed time or [destroy the agreement in any way whatsoever, let] the *kosmoi* [pay as a fine ten thou]sand drachmas to the chosen] neutral [city]. Let them dispatch [to the king *boēthia* within 30 days] from when [the ambassadors] made their announcement. [And if king] Antigonus need[s *summachoi*], let the *kosmoi* of the Hierapytnians dispatch to him [free men] bearing [weapons]. To the sen[t *summachia*, let king Anti]gonus [provide] passage and pay [. an A]lexandrian drach[ma or At]tic. If the Hierapytnians] as they/he are/is able, ki[ng Antigonus] to them passage and o[psonia] either(?) [should?] destroy[.]

IC III.iii.3A

Hierapytna, c. 200 BCE

θεός, τύχαι ἀγαθαί.

ἔδοξε τῷ δάμῳι, ἀγαθαί τύχαι· εὐξασθαι μὲν τοὺς ἱερεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἱεροθύτας τῷ Ἀλίῳ καὶ τῷ Ῥόδῳι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις καὶ τοῖς ἀρχαγέταις καὶ τοῖς ἥρωσι, ὅσοι ἔχοντι τὰν πόλιν καὶ τὰν χώραν τὰν Ῥοδίων, συνενεγκεῖν Ῥοδίοις καὶ Ἱεραπυτνίοις τὰ δόξαντα περὶ τᾶς συμμαχίας· ἐπιτελέ<ω>ν δὲ τὰν εὐχᾶν γενομενᾶν θυσίαν καὶ πόθοδον ποιήσασθαι, καθὰ κα δόξῃ τῷ δάμῳι. *vac.* κυρωθείσας δὲ τᾶς συμμαχίας καὶ τῶν ὄρκων συντελεσθέντων κατὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα, ὑπάρχειν συμμαχίαν <Ἱεραπυτνίους> ποτὶ τὸν δᾶμον τὸν Ῥοδίων καὶ συνεργεῖν Ἱεραπυτνίους τῷ δάμῳι τῷ Ῥοδίων, καὶ πόλιν καὶ λιμένας καὶ ὀρματήρια παρέχει<ν>, καὶ εὐνοὺς καὶ φίλους καὶ συμμαχοὺς ὑπάρχειν εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον. *vac.* καὶ εἴ τις κα ἐπὶ πόλιν ἢ χώραν στρατεύηται τὰν Ῥοδίων ἢ τοὺς νόμους ἢ τὰς ποθόδους ἢ τὰν καθεστακυῖαν δαμοκρατίαν καταλύῃ, βοαθεῖν Ἱεραπυτνίους Ῥοδίοις παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. εἰ δὲ κα ὁ δᾶμος ὁ Ῥοδίων μεταπέμπῃται συμμαχίαν παρὰ Ἱεραπυτνίων, ἀποστελλόντων τὰν συμμαχίαν Ἱεραπυτνιοὶ ἐν ἀμέραις τριάκοντα, ἀφ' ἧς κα παραγγείλωντι Ῥόδιοι, ἄνδρας διακοσίους ὄπλα ἔχοντας, εἴ

κα μὴ ἐλασσόνων χρεῖαν ἔχωντι Ῥόδιοι· τῶν δὲ ἀποστελλομέ- νων ἐόντων μὴ ἐλάσσους τῶν ἡμίσεων Ἱεραπύτνιοι. <i>vac.</i> εἰ δὲ κα πόλεμος περιέχηι Ἱεραπυτνίους, ἀποστελλόντων ὅσους κα {τα} δυ- νατὸν ἦι αὐτοῖς. <i>vac.</i> τοῖς δὲ πεμπομένοις παρὰ Ἱεραπυτνίων παρ- εχόντων Ῥόδιοι πορεῖα εἰς τὰν διακομιδὰν τὰν ἐκ Κρήτας	20
εἰς Ῥόδον. καὶ εἰ μὲν κα τὰ<v> συμμαχίαν μεταπέμπωνται Ῥόδιοι ἐν τέσσαρσι τοῖς πρώτοις ἔτεσιν, ἀφ' ἧς κα παρα- γένωνται ἀμέρας εἰς Ῥόδον οἱ σύμμαχοι διδόντων ἐκάστω ἀνδρὶ Ῥόδιοι ἐκάστας ἀμέρας ἐννέ' ὀβολοὺς Ῥοδίους, τοῖς δὲ	24
ἀγεμόσι ἀγουμένοις ἐκάστωι ἀνδρῶν μὴ ἐλασσόνων πεντή- κοντα διδόντων ἐκάστωι τᾶς ἀμέρας ἐκάστας δραχμὰς δύο. <i>vac.</i> εἰ δὲ κα μετὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον χρόνον μεταπέμπωνται Ῥόδιοι τὰν συμμαχίαν, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα γινέσθω κατὰ ταῦτά, ἀφ' ἧς δὲ κα	28
ἔλθωνται ἀμέρας τοῖ ἀποστελλόμενοι σύμμαχοι παρὰ Ἱεραπυ- τνίων εἰς Ῥόδον, παρεχόντων Ἱεραπύτνιοι τοῖς ἀποσταλεῖσι συμ- μάχοις τὰ ὀψώνια ἀμέρας τριάκοντα, τοῦ δὲ ὑπολοίπου χρόνου διδόντων Ῥόδιοι καθὰ γέγραπται. <i>vac.</i> εἰ δὲ κα συστᾶ πόλεμος Ῥο- δίους ποτὶ τινα τῶν ἐν συμμαχίαι ἐόντων Ἱεραπυτνίοις, εἰ μὲν	32
κα πολεμῶντ<a> Ῥόδιοι, ἀποστελλόντων τὰν συμμαχίαν Ῥοδίους Ἱεραπύτν<i>οι, εἰ δὲ κα πολεμῶντι κατάρξαντες πολέμου, μὴ ἐπά- ναγκες ἔστω Ἱεραπυτνίοις ἀποστέλλειν συμμαχίαν Ῥοδίους. <i>vac.</i> εἰ δὲ κα ξενολογίου χρεῖαν ἔχωντι Ῥόδιοι ἐκ Κρήτας, παρεχόντων	36
Ἱεραπύτνιοι ἀσφάλειαν τῶι ξενολογίωι ἐν τῇ πόλει, παρεχόντων δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ χώρῃ καὶ ἐν ταῖς νάσοις ταῖς παρ' αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν, καὶ πάντα συνεργούντων εἰς τὸ συντελεσθῆμεν	40
Ῥοδίους τὸ ξενολόγιον· ἄλλωι δὲ κατὰ Ῥοδίων ξενολόγιον μηθενὶ διδόντων παρευρέσει μηδεμιᾷ, μηδὲ στρατευέσθω Ἱεραπυτνίων μηθεὶς κατὰ Ῥοδίων παρευρέσει μηδεμιᾷ, ἢ ἔνοχος ἔστω τοῖς	44
ἐπιτιμίοις καθάπερ εἰ ἐπὶ τὰν Ἱεραπυτνίων πόλιν ἐστρατεύετο, χωρὶς ἢ ὅσοι πρὸ τᾶσδε τᾶς συνθήκας ἐξεστρατεύκαντι. <i>vac.</i> ταῖς δὲ δυνάμεσι ταῖς ἀποστελλομέναις ὑπὸ Ῥοδίων πάντα συμπρασ- σόντων Ἱεραπύτνιοι κατὰ δύναμιν τὰν αὐτῶν, πᾶσαν πρόνοιαν	48
ποιούμενοι καθότι καὶ τῶν ἰδίων πολιτῶν. <i>vac.</i> καὶ εἴ κα συνιστᾶται λαστήρια ἐν Κρήται καὶ ἀγωνίζονται Ῥόδιοι κατὰ θάλασσαν ποτὶ τοὺς λαστὰς ἢ τοὺς ὑποδεχομένους ἢ τοὺς συνεργοῦντας	52
αὐτοῖς, συναγωνιζέσθων καὶ Ἱεραπύτνιοι κατὰ γᾶν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν παντὶ σθένει κατὰ <τὸ> δυνατὸν τελέσμασι τοῖς αὐ- τῶν· καὶ τοὶ μὲν λασταὶ τοὶ ἀλισκόμενοι καὶ τὰ πλοῖα αὐτῶν	56
παραδιδόσθω Ῥοδίους, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἔστω τὸ μέρος ἐκάστωι τῶν συναγωνιζαμένων. <i>vac.</i> κατὰ ταῦτά δὲ καὶ Ῥόδιοι ἐόντων Ἱεραπυτνίοις εὖνοι καὶ φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα	60
χρόνον, καὶ τοὶ ἄρχοντες τοὶ ἀποστελλόμενοι ὑπὸ Ῥοδίων ἐπὶ τὰν ναυτικῶν δυνάμεων ἐπιμελέσθω τᾶς πόλιος τᾶς	

Ἰεραπυτνίων καθάπερ τᾶς ὁμοτελοῦς, πάντα πράσσοντες
τὰ ποτ' ἀσφάλειαν καὶ σωτηρίαν τᾶς πόλιος τᾶς Ἰεραπυτ- 64
νίων. καὶ εἴ τις κα βασιλεὺς ἢ δυνάστας ἢ ἄλλος ὅστισοῦν
ἐπὶ πόλιν στρατεύ<ηται> τὰν Ἰεραπυτνίων, βοαθούτων Ἰεραπυτ-
νίοις εἰς τὰν πόλιν παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. *vac.* εἰ δέ τις
κα τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαίου γινομένας ποθοδούς ἐκ θαλάσσας 68
παραιρῆται Ἰεραπυτνίων ἢ τὰν καθεστακυῖαν δαμοκρατίαν
παρὰ Ἰεραπυτνίοις καταλύη καὶ συμμαχίαν μεταπέμπωνται
Ἰεραπύτνιοι, ἀποστελλόντων Ῥόδιοι Ἰεραπυτνίοις τριήρεις δύο
[τὰ δὲ τελούμενα εἰς τὰς τριήρεις μηνῶ]ν δύ[ο] διδόν[τω]ν Ῥόδιοι· τοῦ [δὲ] ὑπολοίπου χρόνου
δι[δ]- 72
[όντων Ἰεραπύτνιοι εἰς ἑκατέραν] τριήρη τοῦ μηνὸς ἐκάστου δραχμὰς μυρίας. ⚡ εἰ δέ κα
πόλεμος περιέχ[η]
[Ῥοδίους, ἀποστελλόν]των συμμαχίαν ἄγ κα δυνατόν ἦι. {²swastika}² εἰ δέ κα πόλεμον
ἐξενέγκωντι Ἰεραπύτνιοι
[ποτί τινας ἄνε]υ τᾶς Ῥοδίων γνώμας, μὴ ἐπάναγκες ἔστω Ῥοδίοις ἀποστέλλει<ν> συμμαχίαν.
τὰν δὲ συ[μ]-
μαχίαν ἀποστελλόντων Ῥόδιοι ἐν ἀμέραις τριάκοντα ἀφ' ἧς κα παραγγείλωντι Ἰεραπύτνιοι χωρὶς
ἢ εἰ[ς] 76
τὸν ἐνεστακότα Ἰεραπυτνίοις πόλεμον ποτὶ Κνωσίους καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους· εἰς δὲ τοῦτον μὴ
συμμα-
χούντων Ῥόδιοι Ἰεραπυτνίοις. μὴ στρατευέσθω δὲ μηδὲ Ῥοδίων μηθεὶς κατὰ Ἰεραπυτνίων
παρευρέσ[ει]
μηδεμιᾷ, ἢ ἔνοχος ἔστω τοῖς ἐπιτιμίαις καθάπερ εἰ ἐπὶ τὰν Ῥοδίαν ἐστρατεύετο, χωρὶς ἢ ὅσοι
πρὸ τᾶσδε [τᾶς]
συνθήκας ἐξεστρατεύκαντι. εἰ δὲ τινὲς κα τῶν ὑποδεχομένων τοὺς λαιστὰς ἢ συνεργούντων
α[ὐ]- 80
τοῖς, συστρατευσάντων Ἰεραπυτνίων Ῥοδίοις ἐπὶ τὰν κατάλυσιν τοῦ λαιστηρίου, πόλεμον
ἐξενέγκω[ν]-
τι Ἰεραπυτνίοις διὰ ταῦτα τὰν στρατείαν, βοαθούτων Ῥόδιοι Ἰεραπυτνίοις παντὶ σθένει κατὰ
τὸ δυ[να]-
τόν, καὶ ὁ ταῦτα πράσσων πολέμιος ἔστω Ῥοδίοις. εἰ δέ κα ξενολογήσωντι Ἰεραπύτνιοι ἐκ τᾶς
Ἀσίας εἰς ἴδιο[ν]
πόλεμον, πάντα τὰ δυνατὰ συμπρασσόντων αὐτοῖς Ῥόδιοι εἰς τὸ ἀσφαλῶς διακομισθῆμεν τὸ
ξενολόγι[ο]ν 84
εἰς Ἰεραπυτναν, ἄλλωι δὲ κατὰ Ἰεραπυτνίων ξενολόγιον μηθενὶ συνκατασκευαζόντων Ῥόδιοι
παρε[υ]-
ρέσει μηδεμιᾷ. ἐξέστω δὲ καὶ διορθώσασθαι τὰς συνθήκας, εἴ τί κα δοκῆι ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς
πόλεσι δια-
πρεσβευσαμένας ποθ' αὐτάς· ἃ δὲ κα κοινᾷ δόξει, ταῦτα κύρια ἔστω. κυρωθείσας δὲ τᾶς
συνθήκας ἐλ[έσ]-
θω ὁ δᾶμος παραχρῆμα ἄνδρας πέντε· τοὶ δὲ αἰρεθέντες μετὰ τῶν παραγεγενημένων ἐξ
Ἰεραπύτν[ας] 88

πρεσβευτῶν ὀρκιζάντων τὸν νόμιμον ὄρκον Ῥοδίουσ ἅπαντας τοὺς ὄντας ἐν ἀλικίαι ἐμμενεῖν τῷ
συμ<μ>αχ[ίαι]
καὶ τῷ συντάξει τῷ γεγενημένοι τῷ δάμωι ποτὶ Ἱεραπυτνίουσ ἀδόλωσ καὶ ἀπροφασίστωσ·
εὐο[ρ]-
κεῦντι μὲν εὖ εἶμεν, ἐπιποκοῦντι δὲ τὰ ἕναν{αν}τία. {²ἐναντία} κατὰ ταῦτὰ δὲ ὀρκιζάντων καὶ
τοὺσ πρεσβευτὰ[ς]
τοὺσ παρὰ Ἱεραπυτνίων τοὶ πρυτάνιεσ παραχρῆμα ἐν τῷ ἐκκλησίαι, ὄρκια παρεχέτω ὁ ἱερών[α],

92

τοὶ δὲ ταμίαι τελεσάντων τὸ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου γεγραμμένον. ὅπωσ δὲ καὶ Ἱεραπύτνιοι ὁμόσωντι τῷ
δ[ά]-
μωι, ἐλέσθαι ἄγγελον, ὁ δὲ αἰρεθεὶσ ἀφικόμενοσ ποτὶ Ἱεραπυτνίουσ ὀρκιζάτω αὐτοὺσ καθὰ καὶ
Ῥοδί[ουσ]
γέγραπται ποιήσασθαι τοὺσ ὄρκουσ, καὶ ἐμφανιζέτω τὰν εὐνοίαν τὰν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτοῖσ
παρὰ τῷ πλήθει τῷ Ῥοδίων. ὅπωσ δὲ καὶ τὰ δεδογμένα περὶ τῆσ συμμαχίασ καὶ τῆσ συντάξιουσ
ἀνα-

96

γραφέντα εἰσ στάλασ φανερὰ ἢ εἰσ πάντα τὸν χρόνον, ὁ μὲν δᾶμοσ ἀναθέτω στάλαν ἐν Ῥόδωι ἐν
τ[ῶι]

[ἱ]ερῶι τῆσ Ἀθάνασ, τοὶ δὲ πωληται ἀποδόσθων, καθὰ κα ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων συγγράψηι, ὅπωσ
ἐργασθῆι πέτρ[α]

Λαρτίας καὶ τὰ κεκυρωμένα περὶ τῆσ συμμαχίασ ταῖσ πόλεσι ἀναγραφῆι καὶ τεθῆι εἰσ τὸ ἱερὸν μὴ
[πλέ]-

ον τέλεσμα ποιοῦντεσ δραχμῶν ἑκατόν· τὸ δὲ εὐρὸν τοὶ ταμίαι δόντων ἀπὸ τῶν ἐσ τὰ κατὰ
ψαφίσμα[τα]

100

ἐκκειμένων. ἀναγραψάντων δὲ καὶ Ἱεραπύτνιοι καὶ θέντων παρ' αὐτοῖσ ἐν τῷ ἱερῶι ὁπεῖ κα
δόξηι Ἱεραπυτν[ίοι]. vac.]

αἰρέθη ἄγγελοσ vac. ποτὶ Ἱεραπυτνίουσ vac. Διογένησ Ἀριστόνδα. vac. ὀρκωται ἐν Ῥόδωι[ι]

Ἱερόμβροτοσ Ἀγησιτίμου, Ἀριστόλογοσ Πεισιστράτου καθ' ὑθεσίαν δὲ Ἀρχύλλου,

Τιμάρατοσ Νικοτίμου, vac. Νικόμαχοσ Ἀριστάρχου, vac. Σπαρτίων Φειδιάνακτοσ.

Gods, for good fortune.

The people (*damos*) decided, for good fortune: that the priests and the sacrificers vow to Helios and to Rhodes and to all the other gods and goddesses and to the founders and to the heroes, as many as hold the city and territory of the Rhodians, that the decisions concerning the *summachia* benefit Rhodians and Hierapytnians; and, having completed the vows, that they make the present sacrifice and procession, according to the consensus by the *damos*. After the *summachia* was ratified and the oaths completed in accordance with what had been written, let there be *summachia* <for the Hierapytnians> towards the *damos* of Rhodes, and let the Hierapytnians work in cooperation with the *damos* of Rhodes, and let them provide the city and harbors and moorings, and let them be well-wishers and friends and *summachoi* for all time. And if someone should march an army against the city or the territory of the Rhodians, or should destroy its laws or its revenues or its established democracy, let the Hierapytnians help (*boathein*) the Rhodians with all strength as they are able. But if the *damos* of the Rhodians requests *summachia* from the Hierapytnians, let the Hierapytnians dispatch the *summachia* within 30 days from when the

Rhodians requested it, 200 bearing weapons, if the Rhodians do not have need of fewer; of those being dispatched, let no fewer than half be Hierapytnians. If war also should occupy the Hierapytnians, let them dispatch as many as men as they are able. To those men sent by the Hierapytnians, let the Rhodians provide transport for the passage from Crete to Rhodes. And if the Rhodians request *summachia* within the first four years, from the day when the *summachoi* are present on Rhodes, let the Rhodians pay to each man per day 9 Rhodian obols, and to each of the leaders leading no fewer than 50 men each, let them pay 2 drachmas per day. If, after this prescribed time period the Rhodians request the *summachia*, let the other things be according to the same {stipulations}, but, from the day when the *summachoi* dispatched by the Hierapytnians come to Rhodes, let the Hierapytnians provide to the dispatched *summachoi* the *opsōnia* of 30 days, but for the remaining time, let the Rhodians pay as it is written. If there happens to be war against the Rhodians from some one of those in *summachia* with the Hierapytnians, and if the Rhodians should go to war, let the Hierapytnians dispatch *summachia* to the Rhodians; but if they go to war having started it, let it not be compulsory for the Hierapytnians to dispatch *summachia* to the Rhodians. If the Rhodians should need a recruited mercenary force (*xenologion*) from Crete, let the Hierapytnians provide safety to *xenologion* in the city, and let them provide it also in the territory and in their islands as well as they are able, and let them always collaborate with the Rhodians to complete the *xenologion*. Let them not give *xenologion* to anyone against the Rhodians on any pretext, and let not any one of the Hierapytnians march in an army against the Rhodians on any pretext, or let him be liable to the penalties just as if he had marched against the city of the Hierapytnians, except for those who did so in the time before the present agreement. Let the Hierapytnians always act in concert with the troops dispatched by the Rhodians as to they are able, taking every precaution just as they would for their own citizens. And if bands of brigands (*laistēria*) gather at Crete and the Rhodians are fighting on sea against the brigands or those who welcome them or those who collaborate with them, let the Hierapytnians also fight alongside {the Rhodians} on land and on sea with all strength as they are able with their own financial resources; and let the captured pirates and their ships be handed over to the Rhodians, but let there be a share of the other things for each of the parties fighting in collaboration against them. According to these same terms, let the Rhodians also be towards the Hierapytnians well-wishers and friends and allies for all time, and let the leaders dispatched by the Rhodians of the naval forces care for the city of the Hierapytnians as though it were paying the same taxes (*homotelous*), doing everything towards the safety and salvation of the city of the Hierapytnians. And if some king or dynast or whosoever other should march an army against the city of the Hierapytnians, let them help (*boathountōn*) the Hierapytnians in their city with all strength as they are able. If someone should take the Hierapytnians' just revenue from the sea or destroy established democracy against the Hierapytnians, and the Hierapytnians should request *summachia*, let the Rhodians send to the Hierapytnians two triremes and let the Rhodians pay the tax revenue of two months towards the triremes; but for the time thereafter let the Hierapytnians pay for each trireme 10,000 drachmas per month. But if war [should] occupy [the Rhodians], let dispatch [send] *summachia* as is possible. If the Hierapytnians undertake war [towards someone without] the consensus of the Rhodians, let it not be compulsory for the Rhodians to dispatch *summachia*. But let the Rhodians dispatch *summachia* within 30 days from the when the Hierapytnians request it, except towards the current war for the Hierapytnians against the

Knossians and their *summachoi*; towards this case, let the Rhodians not be allies (*summachountōn*) to the Hierapytnians. Let no one of the Rhodians march against the Hierapytnians on any pretext, or let him be liable to the penalties as though he had marched against Rhodes, except for those who did so in the time before the present agreement. If some of those that are welcoming brigands or collaborating with them, while the Hierapytnians are alongside with the Rhodians towards the destruction of the brigand band, should make war against the Hierapytnians by means of an army, let the Rhodians help (*boathountōn*) the Hierapytnians with all strength as they are able, and let the one doing these things also be an enemy to the Rhodians. And if the Hierapytnians are recruiting mercenaries (*xenologēsōnti*) from Asia for a war of their own, let Rhodians cooperate with them in every possible way to safely transport the *xenologion* to Hierapytna, but let the Rhodians provide *xenologion* to no one else against the Hierapytnians on any pretext. Let it be possible to amend the agreements, if both cities, having thoroughly negotiated through ambassadors, make a decision about them. Let those things which are in common accord be ratified. Having ratified the agreements, let the *damos* immediately [choose] five men; let the chosen men with the ambassadors present from Hierapytna administer the customary oath to all Rhodian men of age, that they remain [in] *summachia* and in the *damos*' present arrangement with the Hierapytnians, without duplicity (*adolōs*) and without pretense, swearing truly to be true, foreswearing the opposite things. But let the prytanies administer the oath also to ambassadors from the Hierapytnians immediately in the council. Let the priest provide the things to swear on. Let the treasurers have the law written. In order that the Hierapytnians also swear to the *damos*, choose a messenger: let the chosen man appear before the Hierapytnians to administer the oath to them just as the Rhodians in writing also made the oaths, and let him demonstrate the present goodwill to them from the whole of the Rhodians. And so that the things decided regarding the *summachia* and arrangement be validated for all time, let them be inscribed on *stelai*: let the *damos* erect a stele on Rhodes in the sanctuary of Athena; let the officials in charge of public projects (*pōlētai*) issue a contract, as the master-builder stipulates, so that he might make it from Lartian stone and let him inscribe (there) the things that have been authorized by the cities concerning the *summachia* and erect it in the sanctuary at a cost of no [more] than 100 drachmas. Let the treasurers pay the balance from those things set aside towards ratified decrees. Let the Hierapytnians likewise inscribe and place {a stele} in whichever sanctuary is chosen by the Hierapytnians. Let a messenger be chosen. Representing the Hierapytnians: Diogenes son of Aristondas. Oath administrators on Rhodes: Hierombrotus son of Agesitimus, Aristolochus son of Peisistratus and adoptive son of Archyllus, Timaratus son of Nicotimus, Nicomachus son of Aristarchus, Spartion son of Pheidianax.

IC III.iii.4 = Chaniotis no. 28

II. 5-12

τάδε συνέθε[ντο καὶ συνευ]-
 δόκησαν ἀλλάλοις Ἱεραπύτνιοι καὶ Πριάνσιοι [ἐμμένον]-
 τες ἐν ταῖς προὔπαρχώσαις στάλαις ἰδίαί τε [τᾶι κειμέναι]
 Γορτυνίους καὶ Ἱεραπυτνίους καὶ τᾶι κατὰ κοινὸν [Γορτυνίους]
 καὶ Ἱεραπυτνίους καὶ Πριανσίους καὶ ἐν τᾶι φιλίαι [καὶ συμμα]-
 χίαι καὶ ὄρκοις τοῖς προγεγονόσι ἐν ταύταις τ[αῖς πόλεσι]

8

καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς χώραι ἅι ἑκάτεροι ἔχοντες καὶ κρατόν[τες τὰν συν]-
θήκαν ἔθεντο ἐς τὸν πάντα χρόνον.

12

They established these things together, and the Hierapytnians and Priansians agreed with one another to continue to honor the [terms of the] earlier *stelai* [i.e., earlier agreements still in force], those [agreements] between the Gortynians and Hierapytnians alone and those among Gortynians and Hierapytnians and Priansians as a group, and [remain] in friendship and in [*summa*]chia and in the preexisting oaths among these cities and in the territory which each of the cities holds and controls: let them make an agreement for all time.

II. 53-7

Αἰ δέ τι θεῶν βωλομένων ἔλοιμεν ἀγα-
θὸν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, ἢ κοινᾷ ἐξοδούσαντες ἢ ἰδία τι-
νὲς παρ' ἑκατέρων ἢ κατὰ γᾶν ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν, λαν-
χανόντων ἑκάτεροι κατὰ τὸς ἄνδρας τὸς ἔρποντας
καὶ τὰς δεκάτας λαμβανόντων ἑκάτεροι ἐς τὰν ἰδί-
αν πόλιν.

If, with the gods willing, we should win something good from enemies, either setting out jointly or some from each citizenry in a separate expedition, either on land or on sea, let each group of citizenry take shares according to the number of men who went and let each group of citizenry take a tenth part into their own city.

IC IV.179

183 BCE

ἀγαθῆι τύχηι. ἐπὶ τοῖσδε συνέθεντο τὴμ φιλίαν καὶ συμα-
χίαν ἑαυτοῖς τε καὶ ἐκγόνοις εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον *vac.* βασι-
λεὺς Εὐμένης καὶ Κρηταιέων *vac.* Γορτύνιοι, Κνώσιοι, Φαίστιοι,
Λύττιοι, Ῥαύκιοι, Ἰεραπύτνιοι, Ἐλευθερναῖοι, Ἀπταραῖοι, Πολυρ-
ρήνιοι, Συβρίτιοι, Λαππαῖοι, Ἄξιοι, Πριανσιέες, Ἀλλαριῶται, Ἀρ-
[κ]άδες, Κεραῖται, Πραῖσιοι, Λάτιοι, Βιάννιοι, Μαλλαῖοι, Ἐρώνιοι, Χερ-
[σ]ονάσιοι, Ἀπολλωνιάται, Ἐλύριοι, Ὑρτακίνιοι, Ἐλτυναιεῖς, Ἀνω-
[πο]λίται, Ἡραδήννιοι, Ἰστρώνιοι, Ταρραῖοι, [. . .]ιοι, ὡς μὲν
[βα]σιλεὺς Εὐμένης ἄγει, ἔτους *vac.* τετάρτου καὶ δεκάτου, μηνὸς
[Π]ανήμου, ὡς δὲ Κρηταεῖς κοσμοῦν<των> ἐν Γόρτυνι τῶν σὺν Σα-

4

8

{²*complures versus desunt*}²

[— — — — —]ενα [ῶσα] βασιλεὺς Εὐμένης ὠμολόγησεν· καὶ b. 11
[ἂν χρεῖαν] ἔχουσι π[ρὸς] τοὺς συνισταμένους πολέμους 12
[ἢ συμμαχ]ῶν ἢ σίτου ἢ ὄπλ[ω]<ν> ἢ βελῶ[ν], συναντιλήψεσθαι
[τούτων χι]ππεῖς ἀποστέλλειν οἷς τ[ὰ] ὀψώνια δώσειν [ῶ]σον
[ἂν χρόνον] τὴν χρεῖαν παρέχοντα[ι]· τῶν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν βοήθε[ι]-
[αν συλλεγ]ομένων οἱ μὲν θέλοντες πρὸς βασιλέα Εὐμέ- 16
[νη καὶ ἐκ]γόνοους αὐτοῦ ὑπήκοοι ἔστωσαν τούτων καθ' ὁ-

[μολογίαν ὡς ἄ]ν οὔτοι π[ρο]στά[ξωσι]ν, οἱ δ' εἰς Κρήτην τῶν ἡγου-	
[μένων τῶν Κρητα]ιέων· ὅσοι δ' [ἄν ἄ]πειθῶσι τῶμ παραγ-	
[γελλομένων ὑπὸ] βασιλέ[ως Εὐμένους] κ[αί] τῶν ἐκγόνων	20
[καὶ τῶν ἡγουμένων τῶν Κρηταιέων, ἀπο]τινέτωσαν	
[-----]ε[ι]ς τῆς βοηθείας	
[-----]δραχμ]ᾶς τριακοσί-	
[ας -----]θω	24
[-----]ἀ]πολυθῶσι	
[-----]βοη]θεια	

For good fortune. Concerning these, they established friendship and *summachia* for themselves and their descendants for all time: king Eumenes and, of the *Krētaieis*, Gortynians, Knossians, Phaestians, Lyttians, Rhauicians, Hierapytnians, Eleuthernians, Apteraeans, Polyrrenians, Sybritans, Lappaeans, Axians, Priansians, Allariotes, Arcadians, Ceraetes, Praesians, Latians, Biannians, Mallaians, Erannians, Chersonesians, Apolloniates, Elyrians, Hyrtacinians, Eltynians, Anopolitans, Heradennians, Istronians, Tarrhaeans, [. .]ians, {dated} in the fourteenth year of king Eumenes' reign, in the month of [P]anemus, when, among the *Krētaieis*, the *kosmoi* were, at Gortyn, those with Sa - - . . .

[. . . so many things] to which king Eumenes agreed; and [if] they have [need], for the ongoing wars, of [*summachoi*] or food or weapons or ammunition (*belē*), let them assist [with these, and] dispatch cavalry to whom they should pay th[e *o*] *psōnia* for as much time as they are necessary. Of those [gather]ed for the *boēth[ia]*, let the volunteers for king Eume[nes and] his descendants be subject to them according to [the agreement, as] those in an auxiliary capacity (*prostaxis*) and those {going} to Crete {be subject to} the leaders of the *Krētaieis*. Whoever are [un]faithful to the things com[manded by] king [Eumenes and] his descendants [and by the leaders of the *Krētaieis*], let them pay as a fine... [.] to the *boēthia* [.] three hund[red drachm]as [.] let [.] they should destroy [.] *boē]thia*

IC IV.243

ὁ Κρής εὔρε Πύροος με ἀ μφ' ὄμοις διφάλετρον·	
τόξον ἐλὼν Ἄρεος ἤπτ ετο φυλόπιδα.	4
εὔρε δ' ἄρα πρόβλημα χρ οὸς καὶ τεῦχος οἴστῶν –	
ὁ θρασὺς, Ἐρταίων φέρ τατος ἐν προμάχοις,	8
ἐξ οὔ̄ πᾶσα φοβεῖ με νέ ων ὠκύδρομος ἤβη.	
σοὶ δὲ Σάραπι καὶ Ἴσι δῶ ρον ὑπὸ προδόμωι	12
θῆκε μνημόσυνον με Π ύρωσ σοὶ τόνδ' ἐπὶ νίκης	
πολλάκις ἐκ πολέμων κῦδος ἀηράμενος.	16

The Cretan Pyroos invented me, a double quiver for both shoulders; taking up his bow, he gave himself over to the battle cry of Ares. He then invented a bulwark of skin and a vessel of arrows – he, a bold one, the strongest of the Ertaeans in the front ranks: because of him, the whole fleet-footed generation of *neoi* fears me. To you, Serapis and Isis, Pyrōs placed beneath the forecourt a

also decided [to] respond [to the enemy]s. He was a good man in the engagement [that took place against the] enemies at Laceteras, remaining [most staunchly] at [their] side and risking danger, he took prisoners in contest, with orders. . .

ID 1517

Delos, c. 154 BCE

laurel wreath in a square

ἔδοξε τοῖς ἐξαπε[σταλ]μένοις εἰς Ἀλεξάνδρει-
 αν ὑπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶ[ν Κρητ]αιέων συμμάχοις· ἐπε[ι]-
 δὴ Ἀγλαὸς Θεοκλέου[ς Κ]ῶιος, τῆς μεγίστης
 τιμῆς καὶ προαγωγῆς ἠξιωμένος παρὰ βασιλ[εῖ]
 Πτολεμαίωι τῷ πρεσβυτέρωι, πρότερόν τε πολ- 4
 λὰς καὶ καλὰς ἀποδείξεις ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιο-
 τάτοις καιροῖς πεποίηται τῆς πρὸς τὰ πράγμα-
 τ' εὐνοίας *vac.* καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐν τῇ γενομένῃ 8
 κατὰ Κύπρον στρατείαι, βουλόμενος πᾶσι φα-
 νερὰν καθιστάναι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ καλοκαγαθίαν
 καὶ τὴν εἰς τὸν βασιλέα φιλοστοργίαν, οὔτε
 κίνδυνον οὔτε κακοπαθίαν οὐδεμίαν ἐκκέ- 12
 κ[λ]ικεν, ἀκολούθως δὲ τοῖς προπεπραγμένοις
 ἀπροφασίστως ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδιδούς καὶ διὰ
 τῶν ἔργων καὶ διὰ τῶν ἀρίστων συμβουλιῶν ἀγα-
 θὸς ὑφηγητῆς ἐγένετο καὶ ἄξιός τῆς τε πατρίδος κα[ι]
 [τ]ῆς ὑπαρχούσης αὐτῷ δόξης καὶ ἐν τῷ βίωι κα- 16
 [τ]ὰ πάντα καθαρειότητός τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης,
 [ὑπ]άρχων τε πάντων Κρηταιέων πρόξενος, τοὺς
 παραγινόμενους ἀπὸ τῶν πατρίδων ἡμῶν 20
 [κ]ατὰ πρεσβείαν ἢ κατ' ἄλλην ἠνδηποτοῦν χρει-
 [αν] τιμῶν καὶ πολυωρῶν διατελεῖ, *vac.* ἀκολού-
 [θ]ως δὲ καὶ τοῖς στρατευομένοις Κρητῶν ἐν τῇ
 βασιλείαι προθύμως ἑαυτὸν εἰς πᾶν τὸ παρακα- 24
 λούμενον ἐπιδίδωσιν, πειρώμενος ἐκάστωι
 τῶν προσδεομένων ἀγαθοῦ τινος γίνεσθαι παραί-
 τιος, κρίνων ἀεὶ ποτε κάλλιστον εἶναι μὴ μόνον
 τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς 28
 τύχης προτερήμασιν καταχρῆσθαι πρὸς εὐεργε-
 σίαν ἀνθρώπων ἐφ' ὅσον ἐστὶ δυνατός· ὅπως
 οὖν καὶ οἱ πεμφθέντες κατὰ συμμαχίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ
 κοινοῦ τῶν Κρηταιέων πρὸς βασιλέα Πτολεμαῖ- 32
 ον εὐχάριστοί τε φαίνονται καὶ τοὺς ἀξίους ἄν-
 δρας καὶ πολὺ διαφέροντας ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπισημα[ι]-
 νόμενοι· *vac.* τύχηι ἀγαθῆι· δεδόχθαι· διὰ τε τὰ
 προδεδηλωμένα καὶ διὰ τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἣν ἔχει 36

πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἐπαινέσαι Ἀγλαὸν Θεοκλέους Κωῖ-
 ον καὶ στεφανῶσαι χρυσῶι στεφάνωι, στήσαι
 δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰκόνας χαλκᾶς δύο, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἐν Κῶι,
 τὴν δ' ἑτέραν ἐν Δήλῳ, καὶ παραστήσαι ἑκατέ-
 ραι αὐτῶν στήλην ἀναγράφαντας τότε τὸ ψήφισ-
 μα· ἐλέσθαι δὲ καὶ πρεσβευτήν, ὅστις Κώϊους τε
 παρακαλέσει ἀποδείξαι τὸν κάλλιστον πρὸς
 τὴν ἀνάθεσιν τόπον, καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἵνα καὶ ἐν Δή-
 λῳ κατὰ τὸ ὅμοιον ἐπιφανέστατος ἀποδειχθῆι
 τόπος.

40

44

Those sent to Alexandria as *summachoi* by the Koinon of th[e *Krēt*]aieis decided: whereas Aglaus son of Theocles, the Coan, who was considered worthy of the greatest honor and rank from king Ptolemy the Elder, has before this made many excellent demonstrations of goodwill in action in the most dire of circumstances; and whereas even now in the present army at Cyprus, desiring to validate his own nobility and affection towards the king, he has pleaded neither danger nor any distress, but has pursued his actions without making excuses, having given himself over to them; through deeds and through the best advice he was a good supreme commander and worthy of his *patris* and of his present reputation, both of purity in all parts of his personal comportment and of justice. As *proxenos* of all *Krētaieis*, he accomplished the present group of us from our *patrides*, through seniority or whatever other need for honors and tender attention. When he also pursued those of the *Krētes* serving in the royal army, he gave himself over enthusiastically to the whole calling, endeavoring to be an agent of some good for each of the men contracted, always discerning when it was best to use the advantages that came not only for their individual excellence, but also from circumstance, towards the benefit of people in general, to the extent possible. Likewise, the men sent by the Koinon of the *Krētaieis* under the conditions of *summachia* to king Ptolemy are manifestly thankful and cognizant also that worthy men differ vastly in all things. For good fortune: it has been resolved: for the things demonstrated before and for the reverence which he holds toward the divine, let us praise Aglaus son of Theocles the Coan and let us crown him with a gold crown, and let us set up two bronze statues of him, one on Cos and the other on Delos, and let us place beside each of them a stele, inscribing upon them this resolution; let us choose an ambassador, who should ask the Coans to indicate the most beautiful location for its placement, and {ask} the same of the Athenians on Delos, that the most prominent location may be shown.

IvP II.268, fragment DE, ll. 12-18

Pergamum, c. 98-94 BCE

[Ἐφεσίῳ]ν δὲ καὶ τῶν κατοικούντων ἐν Ἐφέσῳ καὶ τῇ χώρῳι μηθεὶς στρα- 12
 [τευέσθῳ κατὰ Σαρ]διανῶν μηδὲ δίοδον διδότω μηδὲ ξενολόγιον παρεχέτω μηδὲ ὄπ<λ>α
 [διδότω μηδὲ χορηγ]εῖτω τοῖς Σαρδιανῶν πολεμίοις μήτε χρήματα μήτε ἀγορὰν μηδ[ἐ]
 [λάφυρον ἐπιδεχέ]σθῳ μηδὲ ἄλλο μηθὲν ἐπὶ βλάβῃ πρᾶσσέτω, ὁμοίως δὲ μηδὲ Σαρδ[ι]-
 [ανῶν μηθεὶς μ]ηδὲ τῶν κατοικούντων ἐν Σάρδεσιν ἢ τῇ χώρῳι στρατευέσθῳ κατὰ Ἐφ[ε]-
 [σίῳν μηδὲ δίο]δον διδότω μηδὲ ξενολόγιον παρεχέτω μηδὲ ὄπλα διδότω μηδὲ χορη-

[γείτω τοῖς Ἐφεσ]ίων πολεμίοις μήτε χρήματα μήτε ἀγορὰν μηδὲ λάφυρον ἐπιδεχέσθω μη-
[δὲ ἄλλο μη]δὲν ἐπὶ βλάβῃ πρασσέτω.

[Let] no one of [the Ephesian]s living in Ephesus and in its territory march in an army [against Sard]ians; let none of them provide passage or *xenologion*, nor [give] weapons, [nor minister] to the enemies of the Sardians, nor [accept] money or commerce or [spoils], nor do anything else toward injuring them. Likewise, let [no one of the] Sardians living in Sardis or in its territory march in an army against the Eph[esians]; let [none of them] provide passage nor *xenologion* nor give weapons nor mini[ster to the] enemies [of the Ephes]ians nor accept money or commerce or spoils, nor do [anything else] toward injuring them.

SEG 8: 269

Gaza, third/second century BCE

ἐξ εὐδαιμοσύνης πῦρ ἄγριον ἤλυθεν ὑμέων, Χαρμάδα, ἔσφηλεν δ' ἐλπίδα τις νέμεσις. ὄλετο μὲν κοῦρος [συν]ομώνυμος εἴκοσι μούνας δυσμᾶς Ἀρκτούρο[υ χειμε]ρίας ἐσιδών,	4
ὄλετο δ' ἑπταέτις θυγατρὸς θυγάτηρ Κλεόδοξα Ἀρχαγάθας, γονέων δ' ἔκλασεν εὐτεκνίην· οἰκτρὸν δὲ Αἰτωλὸς κούρην κώκυσε Μάχαιος, ἀλλὰ πλέον θνητοῖς οὐδὲν ὀδυρομένοις.	8
ἢ μὴν ἀμφοτέρους γε παλαίπλουτοι βασιλῆες Αἰγύπτου χρυσέαις ἠγλάϊσαν χάρισιν· ὡς δὲ πάτραν δμηθεῖσαν Ἀνώπολιν ἐγ' δορὸς ἐχθρῶν ὄρθωσας, Κρήτην μαρτυρέουσας ἔχεις.	12
μέμψασθαι δὲ θεοῖς ἀρκεῖ μόνον ἄνδρα γε θνητόν, ὃ παῖ Τασκομένους, γήραος ὡς χαλεποῦ ἦντησας, ψυχῇ δὲ τὰ μυρία πάντα πονήσας ἵκεο τὴν κοινὴν ἀτραπὸν εἰς Αἶδεω.	16

Out of your happiness came a savage fire,
Charmas, some retribution stifled your hope.
Your son of the same name died, having seen only twenty
settings of the wintery bear.
Cleodoxa, the seven-year-old daughter of your daughter
Archagatha, has died: she was the last fruit of her parents.
Aetolian Machaius weeps for his poor little girl,
but there is nothing more for pitiable mortals.
Surely the kings of Egypt, wealthy of old,
decorated both men with golden honors;
how you set aright your homeland Anopolis, made subject
beneath the spear of her enemies, you have Crete as a witness.

But it is {grounds} enough to censure the gods that you, child of Tascomenus,
 have met a difficult old age and die alone:
 having suffered in your soul all myriad of pains,
 go to the common fate in Hades.

SEG 17:639

Aspendus, 301-298 BCE

ἐπὶ δημιουργοῦ Ἀπολλωνίου τοῦ Δη-
 μοχάριος, ἐκκλησίας κυρίας γεν-
 ομένης, ἔδοξε τῶι δήμῳ τῶι Ἀσ-
 πενδίων· ὅσοι μετὰ [Φι]λοκλέους κ[αὶ] 4
 Λεωνίδου παραγενόμενοι ἐβοή[θη]-
 σαν τῆι πόλει τῆι Ἀσπενδίων [Πάμφ]-
 υλοῖ, Λύκιοι, Κρήτες, Ἑλληνας, Πισί-
 δαι, ἐπειδὴ ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ γεγ[έ]- 8
 [νη]νται καὶ χρήσιμοι τῶι τε βασιλ-
 [εῖ Π]τολεμαίῳ καὶ τῆι πόλει, εἶναι
 [αὐτο]ὺς πολίτας καὶ εὐεργέτας το[ῦ]
 [πλήθ]ους καὶ ἐκγόνους· στήλην δὲ σ- 12
 [τησ]άτωσαν ἐν τῶι [ιερωῖ τ]ῆς Ἀρτέ-
 [μι]δος καὶ ἀναγραψά[τωσα]ν τὰ ὀνό-
 ματα αὐτῶν καὶ π[ατέρω]ν· ἐὰν δέ
 [τις] αὐτῶν βούληται [κατ]αχωρ[ισθῆ]- 16
 [ν]αι εἰς φυλὴν, [τελείτω ἀργ]ύριον [ὅσ]-
 [ον] ἢ πόλις βου[λεύσεται].
 [A list of names would have followed.]

When Apollonius son of Democharius was demiurge, with the assembly {decision} certified, the people (*dēmos*) of the Aspendians decided: so many as were present to [Phi]locles and Leonidus to bring help (*eboē[thē]san*) to the city of the Aspendians – [Pamph]ylians, Lycians, *Krētes*, Hellenes, Pisidae, since they have been good and useful men to king [P]tolemy and to the city, let them and their children be citizens and benefactors [of the crowd?]; let them set up a stele in the [sanctuary] of Artemis and [let them] inscribe their names and [patronyms]; but if [someone] of them should wish to enroll(?) in a *phulē*, [let him pay as much sil]ver [as] the city wi[shes].

SEG 23: 547

Oloos, c. 200 BCE

ἔδοξε τῶι βουλᾷ καὶ τῶι δάμῳ· ἐπειδὴ Ὀλο[ύντιοι φίλοι καὶ]
 συγγενεῖς ὑπάρχοντες τοῦ δάμου πέμψαν[τες ψαφί]σματα]
 καὶ πρεσβευτὰς παρακαλοῦντι τὸν δᾶμον τὰν πᾶσ[αν] πρόνοιαν [ποιή]-
 σασ[θ]αὶ ὅπως, γενομένης συνθέσιος ἐγ[γ]ράπ[του, εἰς τὸν πάντα] 4
 χρόνον ἀσφαλῶς καὶ ἐτοιμῶς ὑπάρχη ταῖς πόλ[εσιν . . .] πᾶσα
 βοάθεια καὶ κοινοπραγία, καὶ ἐν τε τῶι παρόντι [χρό]νῳ [καὶ] ἐν τῶι ὕσ-

τερον πάντα τὰ συμφέροντα γίνηται ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς πόλεσι,
 καὶ τοὶ παραγενόμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν πρεσβευταὶ Πραΐσιος Ἡροδώρου, 8
 Χαριάνθης Λοκρίωνος, Σώτιμος Τυχασίου, ἐπελθόντες ἐπὶ τὰν βουλᾶν
 καὶ τὰν ἐκκλησίαν διέλεγεν σπουδᾶς καὶ φιλοτιμίας οὐθὲν ἐλλείπον-
 τες, ἀξιοῦντες τὸν δᾶμον ἰδία ποιήσασθαι ποτὶ τὰν πόλιν αὐτῶν
 συμμαχίαν· ὅπως οὖν ὁ δᾶμος φανερὸς ἦι πρόνοιαν πεποιημένος 12
 [Ο]λουντίων καὶ πάντα τὰ συμφέροντα συνκεχωρηκῶς αὐτοῖς καθ' ἃ [ἡ]ξίωσαν,
 [ἀ]ρχαῖ ἀγαθὰ εὗξασθαι μὲν τοὺς ἱερεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἱεροθύτας τῶι Διὶ καὶ τῶι Ἀλί-
 [ωι] καὶ τῶι Ῥόδωι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις καθ' ἱερῶν τῶν νομιζομέ-
 [ν]ων συνενέγκαι τὰ δόξαντα τῶι δάμωι τῶι Ῥοδίωι καὶ τῶι πόλει τῶι Ὀλουντί-16
 ων· ἐπιτελειᾶν δὲ τῶν εὐχᾶν γενομενᾶν θυσίαν καὶ πόθοδον ποιήσασθαι
 τοῖς θεοῖς κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα· κυρωθείσας δὲ τᾶς συμμαχ-
 [ί]ας καὶ τῶν ὄρκων συντελεσθέντων κατὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα ὑπάρχ[ειν]
 [τὰ]ν συμμαχίαν Ὀλουντίους ποτὶ τὸν δᾶμον τὸν Ῥοδίωι καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν σύ[μ]- 20
 [μαχ]ον καὶ φίλον αἰρεῖσθαι Ὀλουντίους Ῥοδίους καθ' ὅτι κα τῶι δάμωι δοκῆι· μὴ ἐ-
 [ξ]εῖμ[εν]ιν [δὲ Ὀλου]ντίους π[ο]τ' ἄλλον μηδένα συμμαχίαν ποιήσασθαι παρευρέ-
 [σει] μηδεμιᾶι, τὰς δὲ πρότερον αὐτοῖς ὑπαρχούσας συμμαχίας πάσας
 [κα]ταλελύσθαι· μὴ ἐ[ξ]εῖμ[εν]ιν δὲ Ὀλουντίους μηδὲ κατάρχειν πολέμου 24
 [πο]τὶ μεθένα ε[ἶ] κα μὴ συνδοκῆι τῶι δάμωι τῶι Ῥοδίωι· συνεργεῖν δὲ Ὀλουν-
 τίους τῶι δάμωι τῶι Ῥοδίωι καὶ πόλιν καὶ λιμένας καὶ ὀρματήρια παρέ-
 χεν καὶ εὐνοὺς καὶ φίλους καὶ συμμάχους ὑπάρχειν εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρό-
 νον, [κ]αὶ εἴ τις κα ἐπὶ πόλιν ἢ χώραν στρατεύηται τὰν Ῥοδίωι ἢ το[ῦ]ς νόμοις 28
 ἢ τὰς ποθόδο[υ]ς ἢ τᾶ[ν] καθεστακυῖαν δαμοκρατίαν καταλύη, βοαθεῖν Ὀ-
 λουντίους Ῥοδίους παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, καὶ εἶμ[εν]ιν τὸν πράσ-
 σοντ[α κακὸ]ν κατὰ [Ῥοδ]ίωι πολέμιον Ὀλουντίους· εἰ δὲ κ[α] ὁ δᾶμος μεταπέν-
 πηται συμμα[χί]αν παρὰ Ὀλουντίων, ἀποστελλόντων Ὀλ[ο]ύντιοι τὰν συμ- 32
 μαχίαν ἐν ἀμέραις τριάκοντα ἀφ' ἃς ἐπαγγείλων[τι] Ῥόδιοι ἄνδρας
 μὴ ἐλάσσους ἑκατὸν ἐλευθέρους ὅπλα ἔχοντας, τούτων δὲ ὄντων
 μὴ ἐλάσσους τῶν ἡμίσιων Ὀλουντίοι· τοῖς δὲ πεμπομένοις παρὰ Ὀλουντί-
 ων παρεχόντων Ῥόδιοι πορεῖα εἰς τὰν διακομιδὰν τὰν ἐκ Κρήτας εἰς Ῥό- 36
 δον· ἀφ' οὗ δὲ κα ἔλθωντι οἱ σύμμ[α]χοι εἰς Ῥόδον τὰν μὲν πράταν ἀμερᾶν
 [τριά]κοντα λαμβανόντων τὰ ὀψώνια μὲν <παρ'> Ὀλουντίων τοῦ δὲ ὑπολοίπου χρό-
 νου παρὰ Ῥοδίωι ἕκαστος τὰν ἀμέρα[ν ἐκάσταν] ὀκτῶ ὀβολοὺς Ῥοδίους,
 τοὶ δὲ ἀγεμόν[ες τῶν Ὀ]λουντίων δρ[αχμὰς δύο] ἕκαστος <ἀγούμενοι> ἀνδρῶν μὴ ἐ-
 40

[λασσόνων εἴκοσι λαμβ]ανόντων [ἀνδρῶν] ἕκαστος τὰς ἀμέρας ἐκάστ[ας — — —]
 αν συμφερο— — — — — 44
 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοι[ς] συμμάχοις — — — ἀναγινώσκειν(?) δὲ τοὺς]
 κόσμους τοῖς ἐπ[ι]γινομένοις ἀζώστοις(?) κατ' ἔτος τὰ δό]-
 ξαντα περὶ τῆς σ[υ]μμαχίας τῆς γεγενημένης Ὀλουντί]-
 οῖς καὶ Ῥοδίους καὶ τ[ὸν] ὄρκον τὸν περὶ τῆς συμμαχί]- 48
 ας· ὅπως δὲ καὶ ὁμό[σ]ωσι, τὴν ἀγέλην ἐξορκωσάντων οἱ κόσ]-
 μοι· ὁ δὲ ὄρκος ἔστω [Ὀλουντίους· ὁμνύω τὴν Ἐστίαν καὶ]

[τὸν] Ζῆ[ν]α τὸν Ἰδάτη[ν] κα[ὶ] τὸν Ζῆνα τὸν Ταλλαῖον(?) καὶ τὴν Ἥ[ρ]α- [ραν(?)] κα[ὶ] τὸν Ποσειδῶ<να> κα[ὶ] τὸν Ἄρην καὶ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην(?)]	52
[καὶ] τὸν Ἐρ[μ]ῆν τὸν Ἥγεμ[όνα] καὶ τὸν Ἥλιον(?) καὶ τὴν Βρι- [τόμαρτιν(?)] καὶ θεοὺς πάντ[ας] καὶ πάσας· ἢ μὴν ἐγὼ Ῥοδίοις [συμμαχήσ]ω ἀδόλως καὶ [ἀπροφασίστως] εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα [χρόνον, καὶ] ἐάν τις ἐπὶ π[όλιν] ἢ χώραν στρατεύηται Ῥοδί- [ων ἢ τοὺς νόμ]ους ἢ τὰς πρ[οσόδους] ἢ τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν [δημοκρατίαν] κ[αταλύη]ι, βοηθήσω Ῥοδίοις παντὶ σθένει· [ἐάν δὲ ὁ δῆμος ὁ] Ῥοδίων —————	56
————— ἐκ τῆς —————	60
————— ντα —————	
————— κε —————	

The council and the people (*damos*) decided: since the Ol[untians], are [friends and] relatives of the people and, having sent resolutions (votes?) and ambassadors, ask the people to [act] with the utmost solicitude that, with the present agreement engraved, there may be [for all] time, safely and readily for the cit[ies . . .] all help (*boathia*) and common endeavor; and, both in the present [ti]me [and] in the near future, that there be all advantages to both cities; and those present among them as ambassadors, Praesius son of Herodorus, Charianthes son of Locrion, Sotimus son of Tychasius, who came and spoke in the council and the assembly, sparing no element of zeal and distinction, and thinking the *damos* worthy, in its own right, to make a *summachia* with their city; that therefore {continue in official capacity the previous actions of} the *damos*, i.e. showing solicitude towards the Oluntians and sharing all the advantages with them as they th[ought] right. For a good beginning, let the priests and sacrificers vow to Zeus and to Heli[us] and to Rhodus and to the all the other gods and goddesses in their custom[ary] sanctuaries that the decisions be advantageous for the *damos* of Rhodes and for the city of the Oluntians. When the vows have been completed, let them make sacrifice and procession to the gods according to custom; when the *summach[i]a* has been authorized and the oaths completed together according to what has been written, let there be [th]e *summachia* for the Oluntians towards the *damos* of the Rhodians and let the Oluntians choose the same al[ly] (*summachos*) and friend as the Rhodians according to that which the *damos* decides; let it not [be possible] for [Olu]ntians ever to make any *summachia* with another {ally} on any pretext, but let them [dis]solve all the other preexisting *summachiai* that they had had before. Let it not be possible for Oluntians to start a war with anyone if the *damos* of Rhodes does not agree with it. But let the Oluntians work together with the *damos* of Rhodes, and provide the city and harbors and moorings and be well-wishers and friends and *summachoi* for the rest of time, [a]nd if someone should march an army against the city or territory of the Rhodians or should destroy the laws or revenues or the established democracy, let the Oluntians aid (*boathein*) the Rhodians with all strength to the extent they are able, and let the one committin[g evi]l against [the Rhod]ians be enemy to the Oluntians. If the *damos* should send for *summachia* from the Oluntians, let the Oluntians dispatch the *summachia* within 30 days from the day when the Rhodians ordered it: no fewer than 100 free men bearing weapons, of whom no fewer than half should be Oluntians; for those sent from the Oluntians let the Rhodians provide transport for the crossing from Crete to Rhodes;

from the first day when the *summachoi* arrive on Rhodes, let them take the *opsōnia* for [3]0 days from the Oluntians, for the rest of the time from the Rhodians, each man receiving 8 Rhodian obols [per d]ay, and the leader[s of the O]luntians, each <leading> no f[ewer than xx men,] each [t]aking [2] dr[achmas] per day . . . advantage? . . . and for the other [*summachoi* let the] *kosmoi* [read aloud(?)] to the [unarmed(?)] posterity each year the de]cisions concerning the [present] s[*ummachia* for Olunti]ans and Rhodians and t[he oath concerning the *summachi*]a; that they may also sw[ear, let the *kos*]moi [administer the oath to the *agelē*]; let (this) be the oath [Oluntians: I swear on Hestia and] Ze[u]s Idaeus and [Zeus Tallaeus (?) and Hera(?)] an[d] Poseido<n> an[d] Ares and Aphrodite(?) and] [Her]mes the Lead[er and Helios(?) and Britomartis(?)] and all the gods [and goddesses; surely indeed shall] I [be a *summachos* (*summachēsō*) to the Rhodians] without deceit and [without excuses for all time, and] if someone [should march] on the c[ity or territory of the Rhodians or] should destroy [their laws] or their [revenues or the established democracy, I shall aid (*boēthēsō*)the Rhodians with all strength; but if the *damos*] of the Rhodians. . . .

SEG 45: 987

Hermonassa (N. Black Sea), c. mid first century BCE

Διόδοτε Αἰνέου, χαῖρε·
 τοῦνομα Διόδοτος πατρὸς Αἰνείου τὸ γένος Κρής
 εἰμι, βιώσας εὖ πᾶσιν ἀμεμπτοτάτως· ννν
 ταῖς δ' υἱοῦ Παράλου στοργαῖς γλυκίου γεγαῶτος
 ἀθανάτου χάριτος μνήμα τόδ' ἐννέπομαι
 [. . .]Σ μοι, ὧ δέσποινα, τί τρύχη, Λυσιμάχεια; νν
 [. . . 9-12. . .]. ς Αἴδας καὶ ἐν χθονὶ δ' εἰμὶ μάκαρ.

Diodotus son of Aeneus, Greetings: Diodotus by name, of my father Aeneus, *Krēs* with respect to my *genos*, am I; I lived my life well, most blamelessly in all things. I say that this monument of undying gratitude (is due) to the care of my son Paralus, born sweet. Why do you pine [for] me, my lady Lysimachia? [. . .] Hades and in the earth, I am blessed.

Glossary

akropolis: The high point in the topography of a city (*astu*) that was often fortified. It usually housed a temple and had a good water source. Some English translators, such as Paton 2010, choose to translate this term as “citadel.”

astu: The urban center of a *polis*. Some *astē* were fortified, but not all.

aspis: A small round shield.

auxiliary: A term from the Latin *auxiliaris* that refers to portions of a Roman army that were not legionaries and consisted of people who were neither Roman nor Latin. Non-Roman cavalry could be auxiliary. I have avoided the term when referring to Greek armies. Both Greek and Roman armies might have the kinds of fighters that are labeled as “auxiliary”: archers, slingers, peltasts (*caetratae*), Thracians, *Krētes*, and other types of light fighters. However, the Roman military organization assigned a specific location to these foreign fighters, who could be some gradation of allied or mercenary, but whose presence was absolutely expected by the Romans because of the kinds of obligations that the Romans placed on their allies. Greek allies in the Hellenistic period certainly tended to send these types of fighters to their allies, but there was not an expected position in the military organization of a Greek army for *summachoi*: the hope, not the expectation, was that allies would show up. I suggest, therefore, that using the term auxiliary to apply to a Greek army implies Roman-style relationship with allies that Greeks simply did not or could not expect from their allies.

boēthia: Foreign aid that is requested in the event of a direct threat to one’s survival. The terms for *boēthia* were not usually dictated in a formal document, but the expectation was that a friend, ally, or party that claimed common ancestry would make some effort to comply.

Cretensis: The Latin word for a Cretan person, regardless of that Cretan person’s relative location. That is, it is a translation for both *Krēs* and *Krētaiēis*.

Cretensis sagittarius: The Latin term used by Livy for a Cretan in military capacity, whom Polybius refers to as a *Krēs*. Its use by Livy shows that the association between Cretans and archery outlasted the Hellenistic period, even if *Krētes* in Polybius’ accounts seem less likely to use archery.

digressive passage: A passage in a historiographic text – in this case, Polybius’ *Histories* – that breaks away from the historical narrative of events in order to focus on a particular theme, issue, or ideological point.

kata koinon: Greek term referring to something “collective” or shared, traditionally translated as “public.” The state, for example, is a collective of individual citizens.

kat’ idian: Greek term referring to something “individual;” it could also mean something that is one’s own or idiosyncratic, and has been traditionally translated as “private.” It can refer to an individual person who is a citizen but not an elected official, but this does not necessarily mean that he should be considered “private,” since non-officials could have “official” roles to play in the state.

Krēs/Krētes: Greek term with three potential aspects: a non-political term for a Cretan from Crete, a member of a community of *Krētes* outside of Crete (who might be settlers or descendants of settlers from Crete), and a light-armed, skirmishing specialist fighter who is part of a hegemonic army, in Hellenistic parlance. These aspects are not mutually exclusive – i.e., one could be a Cretan from Crete who fights as a *Krēs* fighter – but one cannot assume that it always translates to “a Cretan mercenary from Crete.” All of these have in common that they describe people outside of Crete, as opposed to the term *Krētaieis*, which describes a collective of Cretan *poleis*.

Krēs toxotēs: Greek term referring to a Cretan-style archer, i.e., a short-range skirmishing archer. These appear in the fourth century, but it is notable that the *Krētes* in Polybius appear to fight more often as skirmishers in heavy combat than archers.

Krētaieis: Hellenistic neologism used by a collective of Cretan *poleis* to refer to themselves in a political capacity. This usually consists of the leading cities, Gortyn and Knossus, and their allies, to the exclusion of other Cretan cities, such as Lyttus or Cydonia, that are not in compliance with the leaders.

narrative passage: In Polybius, a passage from the main narrative of historical events.

peltast: Light-armed fighters (in Latin, *caetratae*) who carried a lighter shield than a hoplite and a thrusting spear.

polis: A city-state; the basic political unit of the Greek world. Greeks took their citizenship through the *polis*.

politeia: Traditionally translated as “constitution,” essentially a socio-political system. It includes both the way in which the state is governed (*politeuma*) and the means of educating young citizens (*paideia*).

psilos: A light fighter. The Greek word translates literally as “naked,” i.e., not wearing armor.

summachia: The Greek word for alliance has two aspects: it refers to the alliance agreement between two sovereign political entities and it refers to a force of military aid that is

dispatched to one's ally according to the terms of the agreement. Parties might agree upon the content of *summachia*, as opposed to *boēthia*, as well as setting the conditions under which the other party could request it.

summachos: The Greek word for an ally. A *summachos* could be a *polis* that was in alliance or a citizen of an allied *polis* who comes to fight as part of a *summachia* force.

xenologia: The Greek word for a recruitment of foreign soldiers, that is, mercenaries. Although this recruitment could happen for circumstances outside of those for *summachia* (for example, a *xenologia* in order to have enough men to send a substantial *boēthia* force), recruitment could still happen within the context of a *summachia* relationship between two parties.

xenologion: The Greek word for a recruited force of mercenaries.

xenologos: An officer who recruited mercenaries and commanded mercenaries. Even if he was not formally an ally, he still needed to form working relationships with the people from whom and for whom he recruited.

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