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Prior Knowledge:

Innovations for the Austin Police Department

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by

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Prior Knowledge:

Innovations for the Austin Police Department

by

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The report evaluates the effects of standardized policing practices and policies that influence arrest rates within the Austin Police Department (APD). Using APD's 2016 Racial Profiling Data Set, I analyze various explanatory factors through logistic regression to understand minority arrest imbalances with regards to high-crime locations and high-crime times of the day. I find that policies requiring dispatchers to notify officers of a suspect's race before the officer is on-site increase the likelihood of minority arrest in high-crime locations, but not in high-crime times of the day. A major explanation is a cultural stigmatization associated with minority neighborhoods. APD should enact four policy changes to lessen such effects: Abbreviate the length of patrol shifts, increase the presence of minority officers in minority neighborhoods, institutionalize real-world training scenarios during initial entry training, and create a conviction integrity unit to audit existing minority arrest cases.

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OVERVIEW

Regression analysis that shows the Austin Police Department (APD) differs from other major cities in its arrests of minorities. APD released supporting documentation alongside its Annual Racial Profiling Report for the first time in 2016. In the spirit of transparency, citizens can access comprehensive data that supports yearly departmental summaries.

The purpose of this study is to analyze arrest trends at APD through use of the 2016 Annual Racial Profiling Data Set. Using logistic regression and statistical analysis, my report assesses arrest trends at APD. Available data included 9,200 analyzable arrests.

Demographic arrest trends in Austin align with national averages (Solomon, 2016). Arrests of Hispanics and blacks two and five times as likely than whites. Arrest of men are three times more likely than women and compose 75 percent of all arrests. The most commonly arrested age group is 18 to 24-year-olds, but Austin's juvenile arrest rate is much lower than in other metropolitan areas throughout the US at less than 1 percent as opposed to 2.7 percent nationally (OJJDP, 2017).

Race significantly influences one's probability of arrest (Renfigo, 2017). The disproportionate incarceration of blacks and Hispanics encouraged by location-based policing such as hotspot patrolling (Heath, 2014). It is important to note that 90 percent of such location-based arrests are unjustified (Rohlrich, 2014). Statistics suggest that racial imbalances are greater given the ambiguous nature of determining an inmate's ethnoracial identity (Nellis, 2016). Correctional imbalances magnify segregation due to poverty. Of the 25 most segregated cities in the US in terms of housing and education, "just five are in the South" (Sugrue, 2017). Locational segregation is not as prominent in Texas because of a comparative lack of low-income housing. Texas is 48th in the nation in affordable housing stock with 826 complexes available for a population exceeding 27 million (Wells, 2016). In the current study, results reveal different arrest patterns, specifically in Austin.

When officers move toward arrest sites, dispatchers notify them of the subject's race. This notification significantly increases the likelihood of minority arrest. My analysis shows arrests of blacks and Hispanics are at least 30% more likely in high-crime locations if officers know race ahead of time. Certain policy measures will decrease the effect of such biases.

First, abbreviate the length of patrol shifts. Currently there are day, evening, and night shifts. The night shift sees 61 percent of all arrests. Officers arrest minorities mostly at night (10 PM-2 AM) regardless of criminal activity. Officers could spend half their shifts patrolling, and a half conducting administrative work to alleviate fatigue and proper decision-making.

Second, increase the presence of minority officers in minority neighborhoods, especially during the night shift. Such placements will encourage officer involvement and support of the policed community (Sun and Payne, 2004).

Third, institutionalize real-world simulations during initial officer training. Seen in the military, scenario-driven training improves one's ability to react proportionately in instances of ambiguity and chaos.

Fourth, create a conviction integrity unit (CIU) like the flagship in Harris County. CIUs are internal auditing organizations composed of high-performing police officers dedicated to departmental improvement. Harris County now leads the nation in wrongful conviction exonerations (Fromson, 2016; Hause & Melber, 2016). Austin's ability to curb disproportionate arrests of minorities, particularly in hours of darkness, will greatly increase with activation of a CIU.

CURRENT STANDING

Since 2014, the rise in visible police brutality made known by social media makes policy change imperative at the municipal level. To optimize organizational change, policy-makers must consider four structural components when designing nuanced, city-specific solutions. To develop appropriate policies, policymakers must look to the past to analyze the present.

First, the history of American policing is rooted in the imprisonment of Blacks (O'Neill, 1978). Furthermore, organizational change is difficult due to the decentralized, fragmented nature of US policing, both of which are structural features ingrained in its historical development. Second, national policies enacted by the federal government and proliferated by local police forces exacerbate problematic organizational tendencies. Third, geography greatly influences policy effectiveness due to varying patterns in poverty concentration correlated to race and structural disadvantage. Regional differences in city makeup and urban design impact the implementation of crime-fighting activities. Finally, municipalities are all different. It is essential to understand APD's organizational structure and its interaction with adjacent police agencies as different from similarly structured metropolitan areas. Policy solutions particularized for Austin will prove the most effective.

Broken Windows Theory reinforces the extreme variation seen among police agencies at all levels of government (Ritchie and Mogol, 2008). This is largely by design. One of the three characteristics of modern American policing is local jurisdictional control, a trait that prevents streamlined training across municipalities. Obstacles to training can negatively impact the whole of police in the US. Departments largely incorporate non-lethal weapons as part of its escalation-of-force criteria. Use of non-lethal weaponry, however, decreases safety for officers and increases their probability of injury (Womack et al, 2016). Officers also utilize body cameras when responding to calls, creating enhanced transparency while on patrol.

The following table lists a few of the studies that inform the impression that race impacts arrest rates. Aside of historical observation of past trends, empirical analyses of current

arrest patterns show that race is a predominant factor in determining arrests, though coupled with other non-race variables like socioeconomic status, the neighborhoods or city in which one lives, and mental illness. Unfortunately, race influences many other factors and therefore offer broader, not alternate, indicators of racial influences regarding arrests.

Table 1: Studies Related to Arrest Factor

Study	Arrest Factor
Males, M.A. & Brown, E.A. (2014). Teenagers' High Arrest Rates. Journal of Adolescent Research 29(1), 3-24.	Race, Age, Delinquency
Messner, S.F., Raffalovich, L.E. and McMillan, R. (2001). Economic Deprivation and Changes in Homicide Arrest Rates for White and Black Youths, 1967-1998, Criminology 39(3). 591-614.	Race, Poverty, Geography, Socioeconomic Status
Renfigo, A.F. & Slocum, L.A. (2016). Community Responses to 'Stop-and-Frisk' in New York City, Criminal Justice Policy Review 27(7), 723-746.	Socioeconomic Status, Race, Geography
Kent, S.L. & Carmichael, J.T. Municipal Law Enforcement Policy on Illegal Immigration Stops. Sociological Inquiry 20(10), 1-28.	Socioeconomic Status, Race, Prior Offense
Henshaw, M. & Thomas, S. (2012). Police Encounters with People with Intellectual Disability. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 56(6), 620-631.	Race, Mental Illness, Geography, Race
Eitle, D. & Monahan, S. (2009). Revisiting the Racial Threat Thesis: The Role of Police Organizational Characteristics, Justice Quarterly 26(3), 528-561.	SES, Mental Illness, Race
Epp, C.R., Maynard-Moody, S. & Haider-Markel, D. (2017). Beyond Profiling: The Institutional Sources of Racial Disparities in Policing. Public Administration Review 77(2), 168-178.	Race, Geography, Socioeconomic Status

Austin

APD falls under the purview of Austin's City Manager's Office, therefore indirectly controlled by the City Council. Such organizational structure is perfect for implementation of policy improvements. In cities with strong mayor forms of government like Houston, the municipal legislative body controls the police within the guidelines of existing labor contracts. In other cities, regardless the relationship between the Mayor, Council, or Manager, police departments are separate entities, controlled only notionally by legislative controls, instead subject to Charter restrictions. Departmental association with municipal policymakers influences the effect of policy changes.

Four interlocking state and local organizations police the Austin metroplex: APD, Travis County Sheriff's Office, University of Texas Police Department, and the Department of Public Safety's State Troopers. APD retains predominant purview of criminal activity occurring within the city limits. This fragmentation of policing activity is vital to the maintenance of an objectively operating police force. Cities throughout the US are similarly structured, sometimes containing many more interlocking forces that patrol educational institutions and legal buildings. APD primarily patrols its 10 sectors of responsibility, excluding areas controlled by the county including public housing sites and county government buildings.

APD's chain of command consists of the Chief of Police, six Assistant Chiefs, and one Assistant Director who is the sole civilian in leadership. Administrative and operational policies fall within the I CARE framework, which stands for Integrity, Courage, Accountability, Respect, and Ethics. Progressively oriented and extremely transparent, APD is reputable in its fair treatment and rapid responsiveness. Citizens can easily express grievances through accessible internet platforms. They can also conduct shift rides with officers, in which community members complete an entire patrol shift of their choice during active patrols. They release detailed information regarding the criminal, financial, and operational activity.

Poverty in Austin is dispersed. Traditionally relegated to areas east of Interstate 35 and north of US Route 183, minority citizens are increasingly displaced. Unable to pay rising property taxes, and pressured by local developers, they move to outer suburbs such as Manor and Del Valle, where access to local resources such as public transportation lacks. Though the suburbs are cheaper in terms of groceries and rent, there is less access to jobs. Job training programs and nonprofits are generally clustered inside Austin's core.

Austin responds through programs that assist the displaced by spreading access to resources into appropriate suburbs. Through Community Care Clinics Austin offers access to medical care through Federally Qualified Health Centers. Most FQHCs are among communities of displaced minorities. Additionally, Austin recently announced a transportation expansion program called Connections 2025, a central tenet of which involves expanding public bus route coverage to far out communities that depend on Austin's city center for job training and social services.

To enhance the capabilities of law enforcement both within the city and in overlapping communities, Austin must encourage organizational change at APD. The lack of proactive departmental policies aimed at mitigating subjective enforcement and embedded racism drives disproportionate minority incarceration. To retain its reputation as a leader in law enforcement, the city must enact important changes to better the standing of Austin's minority community by minimizing the probability of wrongful arrests.

National Problems

Across the US, structural racism and subjective enforcement links to misguided national crime-prevention strategies, primarily hotspot policing and the drug war. Such strategies allowed subjective law enforcement according to racist tendencies, resulting in the imbalanced incarceration of minorities

At the crux of policing is incarceration, a growlingly important issue in the US. The correctional industry is terrifically profitable, driven by increasing rates of incarceration. America's incarceration rate has doubled since 1997 (Rohrlich, 2014). There are three main

ethnoracial categories in jails: Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics. Smaller subsets include Native Americans, Hawaiian/Pacific Islanders, Asians and Middle Easterners. Blacks and Hispanics compose most of the correctional population, imbalanced with their composition in the general population (Blow, 2014; Hartney, 2009). Overrepresentation holds true for all types of imprisonment. Blacks are both arrested for and the victims of violent crimes (Race, Ethnicity, and the Criminal Justice System, 2017; Sampson and Lauritsen, 1997). Victimization rates are troubling because Blacks and Hispanics are less likely than whites to request assistance from police. Minority neighborhoods are therefore less safe and more susceptible to criminal activity. Youth populations in the correctional system also reflect ethnoracial imbalance. Black youth represent 17% of all US youth but 48% of all US youth incarcerated for drug-related incidents (Jones, 2005).

Encouragingly, the percentage of Black men jailed in the US fell from 34.4% in 2013 to 26.6% in 2015 while the percentage of whites increased from 63.0% in 2013 to 69.7% in 2015 (FBI Table 43A, 2013-2015). Their composition in the correctional system remains unbalanced, especially about the actual criminal activity (Rohrlich, 2014). According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 2015 the correctional population totaled 1,526,800, resulting in an innocent but confined population between 35,116 and 76,340 (Carson & Anderson, 2016). The University of Michigan Law School's National Exoneration Registry indicates that only between 0.4% and 0.2% of all innocent prisoners will ever be released. In the past decade, the number of people released from jail for crimes not committed has increased from 61 in 2015 to 149 in 2015 (Ferner, 2016). Minorities endure the most of wrongful convictions. Among all the people wrongly convicted of the crime, generally half are black (Hause & Melber, 2016).

Aiding policing- and correctional-reform is social activism against police brutality. Because police are susceptible to public opinion, progressive policies spawn from egregious incidents aired on television and social media. Freddie Gray's murder by the Baltimore Police Department (BPD) received significant negative press. In examining policies that led to mistreatment of minority citizens, the Department of Justice identified BPD's Zero

Tolerance policy, which allowed police to stop, search and arrest pedestrians "on any available charges including misdemeanor offenses (DoJ, 2016). The Justice Department suggested that Zero Tolerance created long-term systemic problems by enabling police to arrest minorities unfairly. For example, in 2005 police arrested 23,000 people, quick to release most without charges (Jealous, 2015). BPD has since overturned its Zero Tolerance policy.

COMPONENTS OF IMPROVEMENT

There is a large body of literature that documents policy changes that enhance the effectiveness of police departments. Important challenges include embedded racism and subjective enforcement. The major drivers are community perceptions and standardized training. Analysis of existing policies enables development of strategies that lead to the implementation of progressive changes. Importantly, departments that adhere to strict formal policies and follow through with internal justice are characteristically successful, best able to combat challenges and exploit drivers that enhance crime-fighting capabilities.

Obstacles to Progress

The first obstacle, embedded structural racism, is inherent in modern day policing. Minorities are stopped and questioned disproportionately for all types of crimes, ranging from traffic stops to investigations of robberies and homicide (Epp, 2017). Blacks and Hispanics are targeted for criminal activity more often than whites. This is in large part due to the appearance of criminality as enhanced by the drug wars and hotspot policing. A person is more likely to be stopped if their appearance fits police officers' impression of criminals (Renigo and Pater, 2017). The most likely reason an individual will be arrested is their appearance, though when tied to the larger body of arrest data, one's appearance is correlated with neighborhood poverty, enhancing the effects of hotpot policing (Lee, 2010). The phenotype is aligned inextricably with police perceptions of criminal activity. Even Black police officers racially profile (Barlow and Barlow, 2002).

Numerous studies show that Blacks are particularly liable to be stopped, treated violently, and incarcerated. Blacks are more likely to be arrested for all types of crime among all demographics (Heath, 2014). Compared to other minority groups, Blacks fare poorly. Blacks are 2.5 times more likely to be arrested than Hispanics (Sentencing Project, 2013). A traffic stop, the ultimate mundane interaction between citizens and the police, is the most likely interaction leading to an arrest between an officer and a Black community member

(Traffic Stops, BJS). In 2008, traffic stop searches of blacks were twice the rate of Hispanics and three times that of whites (Eith and Durose, 2011). In 2011, whites were ticketed and searched less than minorities (Langton and Durose, 2016).

The War on Drugs solidified the notion that Blacks use and sell drugs at higher rates than whites, even though whites are just as likely to use and sell drugs. The image of criminality leads to startling arrest rates. Even though whites are more likely to sell drugs, drug sales affect blacks at four times the rate of whites (Eaglin and Solomon, 2015). Punitive action against blacks is more likely following initial interaction with police involving drug crimes. Arrest is more likely for Blacks than whites for drug use, though usage rates among whites are higher than any other demographic ("Billions of Dollars Wasted", 2013).

Arrests of Black juveniles are than for whites. Black children are more likely to be poor, and arrests of poor children are more likely than for the wealthy regardless of race (Messner et al, 2001). Interestingly, in the absence of poverty, the age-inclination for crime disappears (Males and Brown, 2014). At an early age, Increasing the likelihood of juvenile arrest, black boys are more likely than other demographics to display problematic behavioral tendencies in school (Fite et al, 2009). None-the-less, hotspots policing ensures that minority, poor neighborhoods will be disproportionately targeted.

Minorities are overrepresented in the correctional system, especially Blacks. Statistically, Black men are far more likely than whites to serve in federal and state facilities (Drake, 2013; Rothwell, 2014). Rates of incarceration are in some ways reflective of neighborhood compositions in high-arrest rate areas. Arrests occur more frequently in impoverished communities because of hotspots policing. Arrests for burglary occurs more frequently in neighborhoods with high levels of unemployment among young non-white males (Pollock et al, 2011), a claim that holds true even after controlling for crime rates.

The second obstacle to policy change is subjective enforcement. Wilson posits that individual police behavior falls within one of three categories: Watchman, Legalist, and Serviceman. The Watchman uses subjective intuition during enforcement. The Legalist uses

objective policy during enforcement. The Serviceman uses objective policy in most instances of enforcement but uses subjective intuition in morally ambiguous situations (Martin, 1970). The Watchman-style prevails in modern-day policing. Though "larger [wealthier] communities tended toward legalistic style, smaller [poorer] communities tended toward the watchmen style" (Leiderbach, 2008). Patrol of poor areas is more likely, therefore increasing the likelihood of subjective enforcement. To be sure, enforcement style varies according to individual officers' personalities and temperament (Hassell, 2007).

Regardless the neighborhood, officers use subjective enforcement when a suspect is reasonable, and conversely use objective enforcement when a suspect is unreasonable (Garner et al, 2002; McTackett, 2017; Waddington, 2007). In general, police are more likely to subjectively enforce policies related to minor offenses. The worse the offense, the more police adhere to formalized policies (Hirschel and Faggiani, 2012). Most officers are in fact ready and willing to arrest suspects for illegal activities. A study of willingness to arrest in a spectrum of law enforcement situations showed that officers are generally ready to arrest for all types of crime, especially when subject shows any sign of resistance (Phillips and Sobol, 2017). In chaotic or unclear situations, law enforcement officers fall back on formalized policies. In the era of social activism, police are increasingly placed in chaotic situations, signifying the importance of thought-out and well-rehearsed formal policies.

Policies must prohibit subjective enforcement. First, targeted communities have higher rates of unemployment because of interaction with the criminal justice system. Incarceration is causatively associated with increasing rates of poverty (DeFina and Hannon, 2013). Arrests preclude one's ability to gain meaningful employment after incarceration. If unable to gain employment, residents turn to criminal activity for income. Interaction with the criminal justice system increases barriers to the workforce (Bailey, 2014). In areas with higher rates of criminal activity, police officers are more likely to use unauthorized force and less likely to be audited regarding their unauthorized use of force. Unauthorized police activity foments distrust and unrest, leading to disruption of law enforcement legitimacy in

general. Second, community hostility against law enforcement has one of two results. Communities will either publicly demonstrate against mistreatment or privately rely on networks of gangs to enforce safety in their neighborhoods. In dangerous communities, without networks of gang support, residents may be more likely to ask for police support (Renfigo and Slocum, 2016). It is therefore beneficial for police to optimize fairness and transparency. Third, unwarranted interaction with the criminal justice system precludes civic participation. Because of contact with the criminal justice system, almost 10% of blacks cannot vote (Kelley, 2017). There are a plethora of barriers preventing reintegration post-incarceration. Expungement processes are bureaucratic, hiring a lawyer is expensive, and even approaching a legal establishment is frightening. People who only interaction negatively with law enforcement are less likely to feel a connection with the democratic process and the American system in general (Eterno, 2017).

Drivers of Change

The first driver of policy change is community perceptions. The way communities perceive the police impacts law enforcement capabilities. Perceptions are revealed through public hearings, city council meetings, and social media involvement. But departments frequently dismiss community complaints, especially if those complaints originate in poor or high-crime neighborhoods (Durr, 2015). Increasingly, Americans from wealthier neighborhoods approve of excessive police action to curb criminal activity (Silver, 2015). Suburban life and social media create fear among all Americans, especially those insulated from criminal activity. Poor communities' grievances, therefore, go unheeded in favor of the desires of citizens from wealthier communities. However, images of police brutality create negative perceptions of police even among the wealthy. Studies show that people are less likely to condone police shootings if the instigating event is observed (Culhane et al, 2016). Some police departments combat negative perceptions through transparency measures on social media and radio, leading decreases in negative sentiment from all levels of the population, rich or poor (Ho et al, 2017).

At the baseline, most people suggest their stop was unwarranted (BJS, 2013). Unfair interactions, especially those that lead to incarceration, amplify negative perceptions. Unfair interactions include fines, stops for petty offenses, and arrests unrelated to public safety (Grawert et al, 2017). Blacks and Hispanics languish in pre-trial confinement awaiting court dates, furthering feelings of unfairness. Detainment in pre-trial confinement of Blacks and Hispanics is twice as likely than for whites (Eaglin and Solomon, 2015), leading to unemployment and eventual recidivism.

Two strategies for improving community perceptions are force diversification and departmental audits. First, diverse police departments are more effective than racially homogenous departments. Specifically, Black officers are more welcome in Black communities than non-Black officers. They are better able to mitigate and resolve conflicts (Sun and Payne, 2004). Crime decreases in minority neighborhoods when the composition of assigned minority police officers increases (Hong, 2005; Parker et al, 2005). Officers who police areas that reflect their race are professional and high-performing. Generally, diverse organizations display higher levels of integrity and commitment to professionalism (Hong, 2017). Second, departments that conduct regular audits are more professional than those without auditing functions, connected with fewer events of targeted racism and less subjective policing. Auditors can be internal employees or external contractors, though the latter is associated with increased likelihood of constituent follow-up (Terrill and Ingram, 2016).

Even more important than diversification and auditing is training. With appropriate training, officers enforce the law objectively according to the legalistic style and minimize negative perceptions of their organization. The type and quality of initial training are important to eventual and ultimate professionalization. Ethics, marksmanship, and ability to interact with the mentally ill are the three most valuable characteristics of effective law enforcement. Ethics training, a nascent field, is essential in all kinetic professions. The US military requires three hours of ethics training every year for all active-duty personnel. For enlistees, ethics training occurs at every stage of initial entry training. Most police departments

fail to instill ethics. Students generally begin and end police academy training with no statistically identifiable increase in the ability to make ethical decisions (Blumberg et al, 2016). Ethical patrolmen act in a more ethical manner during law enforcement activities. Those with less training in ethics are more likely to exhibit a lack of self-control and more likely to use their weapons (Donner et al, 2017).

Even more important than ethics is marksmanship. Police officers can be very dangerous to themselves and their community when unable to properly use their weapon. Accidental and ill-aimed discharges are consequential (Miller et al, 2017). Police academy marksmanship training is one-dimensional, sometimes failing to conduct shooting ranges, reflexive firing scenarios, and close quarter drills. Without situational training, officers cannot progress to real-life training scenarios, therefore lowering their enforcement effectiveness. Anxiety degrades marksmanship (Nieuwenhuys, 2010), but training that incorporates anxiety and real-world stressors improve marksmanship (Nieuwenhuys and Oudejans, 2011).

Police officers trained to interact with the mentally ill are extremely effective. Mental illness is an indicator of increased interaction with police officers. A mentally ill individual displaying acting rowdily can be especially troublesome for officers. At one moment, their actions may merit police intervention. At the next moment, their demeanor may change such that they seem victimized. Officers face strange situations in which they cannot predict the immediate or future behavior of a suspect. For that reason, officers are more forceful with people exhibiting mental illness (Rossler and Terril, 2017; Morabito and Socia, 2015). Mentally-ill people are subject to criminalization and subsequent incarceration at higher rates than other at-risk groups. Up to 15% of those incarcerated in both jails and prisons are mentally ill. (Cooper et al, 2004). They are also more likely to be charged with a citation and a criminal violation than individuals with prior criminal records or individuals under the influence of drugs or alcohol (Schulenberg, 2016). Criminalization negatively affects perceptions of at-risk groups and exacerbates in cooperative behavior among law enforcement, even when their actions are not explicitly violent.

Without adequate training, police indicate frustration at the inability to appropriately handle the mentally ill during a law enforcement encounter (Godfredson et al, 2011). Instead of trying to change perceptions and behaviors, departments should change actions through real-time, hands-on training (Krameddine and Silverstone, 2015). Mental-illness training ties into situational marksmanship training. Situational training incorporates a variety of scenarios, including interaction with mentally-ill persons. Officers who conduct situational awareness training are better versed in target discrimination and escalation-of-force than their counterparts. More important than implicit bias training or any form of training conducted in a classroom, high-intensity situational awareness training effectively teaches law enforcement to think before acting. Such training is essential given that officers are more likely to rely on formalized training in chaotic situations. If formal training addresses the most difficult and ambiguous scenarios, then officers will be less likely to act subjectively and more likely to act in alignment with objective policy measures.

Another technique for addressing mental illness is the utilization of designated teams specifically trained to handle the mentally ill. The UK recently implemented Crisis Intervention Teams. CIT maintain safety and lower the likelihood that a mentally ill person will be charged with criminal activity (Browning et al, 2011). CIT is composed of law enforcement and medical professionals. Pilot programs in the US with CIT-like entities show positive results such as increased cooperation between service providers and decreased incarceration (Steadman et al, 2000). There are, however, significant cultural and structural obstacles to enlargement of such initiatives. First, US police deal with mental illness as individual officers. Second, even in cities with external intervention teams, officers cite difficulty in coordination with alternative service providers (Henshaw and Thomas, 2012). Service providers do not deploy with law enforcement in the US like in the UK. Instead of cohesion between officers and medical professionals, US departments operate as separate entities, compounding difficulties with over-incarceration, even though

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Characteristics of Success

Top-performing police departments demonstrate two characteristics: adherence to formalized policies and commitment to internal justice. First, professional standardization of procedures is very important (Eitle and Monahan, 2009), mitigating incidents of deadly force and predatory policing. Regarding deadly force, lower levels of organizational standardization increase the likelihood that an officer will use force (Marenin, 2016; Terrill and Paoline III, 2017). Formal policies clarify ambiguities. Research indicates that compulsory after-action paperwork is correlated with lower than average rates of deadly force (Jennings, 2017), suggesting that police will use force less often if required to justify their decisions. Procedural bureaucracies operate objectively. Regarding predatory policing, standardized operating procedures effectively mitigate racist and discriminatory practices by troopers (Myhill and Bradford, 2013; Wilson et al, 2015; Kent and Carmichael, 2016). Formal policies and legislation actively change socioeconomic perceptions among police officers of their policed community (Donato and Rodriguez, 2014). Illegal behavior decreases when leaders participate and enforce standard operating procedures (Eterno, 2017).

The second characteristic of top-performing police departments is a commitment to internal justice. Officers depend on internal departmental justice as a mechanism to correct for past experiences (Wolfe and Nix, 2017). When police officers are themselves treated fairly, they will, in turn, treat others more fairly. For this reason, most officers support standardization and professionalization efforts (Meyer et al, 2013). Internal departmental justice is important not just for the individual officer but for the health of the whole organization. Organizational justice is useful in creating a positive working environment and increasing police buy-in of policies and procedures (Chappell et al, 2006; Nix and Wolfe, 2016).

If subordinates can vocalize complaints, then there is a mechanism for organizational justice. Superiors must enable vocalization of grievances through open-door policies. Patrol officers confront moral and structural challenges regularly through interaction with their coworkers and policed constituents. Police work itself by nature morally ambiguous and

often confusing. Superiors must listen to their subordinates and try to enact their sugges-tions. In this way, departmental policies support police who are themselves more likely to enforce departmental policies while on patrol.

Similarly, subordinates must be able to address departmental shortcomings regarding dis-crimination, sexual harassment, or familial issues. Commanders should regularly check the pulse of their organizations through sensing sessions and surveys, ensuring that all subor-dinates feel valued. Simply advertising over-arching departmental programs is insufficient. Though police departments enact equal opportunity policies, some minority officers are unaware of the grievance process. Bigoted behavior often goes unchecked when lower-level employees keep silent. Likewise, departments in which subordinates are listened to and cared for are less likely to struggle with subjective enforcement.

THEORY

Innovations at APD are possible when aligned with John Kingdon's organizational change framework (Kingdon, 2010). MSA is especially suited for bureaucracies as seen in Austin Energy's profit rebate system. APD is a municipal bureaucracy, employing over 4,000 workers in multiple departments throughout the city. Municipal bureaucracies bring about organizational change by pushing for innovative policies at the agenda-setting level.

Multiple Streams Approach (MSA)

Kingdon's MSA uses in this study to assess organizational improvement opportunities at APD. MSA focuses on transforming amorphous ideas into tangible solutions (Cairney, 2016). MSA suggests that the most important catalyst for change within a bureaucratic organization is agenda setting. First, the public must take notice of an issue (Rawat, 2016). Second, two procedural streams must converge to open a policy window. The three procedural streams are problems, politics, and proposals (Coffman, 2007). When the three streams come together, policy change occurs (Larkin, 2012). Third, policy entrepreneurs bolster change after the policy window opens (Robinson and Eller, 2010). Bureaucracies are top-driven due to centralized command structures. Top-driven decision-making drives organizational change. To prevent stagnancy during implementation, policy entrepreneurs push for change at all levels of their organization, leading overhauls and overseeing full-scale implementation.

Critics say there is very little real-world indication of its true applicability in the policy-making process. MSA is a somewhat superficial mechanism by which to evaluate real-world policies (Cairney, 2016). Furthermore, some use MSA in separated parts to justify models of organizational change (Rawat, 2016). Specifically, detractors challenge the idea that the agenda-setting leads to the opening of a policy window (Howlett, 2015).

Supporters of MSA cite its applicability in forecasting policy change in a variety of settings, including the death penalty in America, transportation in Brazil (Khayesi, 2011), and healthcare in Vietnam. MSA is valuable in evaluating policy change in government bureaucracies for four reasons. First, participant involvement in bureaucracies is far-reaching.

Problems affect large swaths of employees within the bureaucracy. Government organizations contain embedded participant involvement regarding issues requiring change. Second, government organizations are uniquely able to enact change through the confluence of no more than two processes. In many instances, problem-solving occurs without political support. Likewise, political whims propose policies that impact unproblematic arenas. Third, leaders are specially situated to serve as policy entrepreneurs. Organizational change policies need champions. Fourth, these types of organizations enact and implement policies wholesale. Government is slow moving, but steady and unceasing. The following vignette serves as an example of the understanding MSA's effectiveness in evaluating policy change in government bureaucracies.

Evaluation of Policies

Government bureaucracies are especially suited to enact policy change via the MSA framework. Consider Austin Energy's profit rebate program. With the passage of Texas Senate Bill 7 in the year 2002, Texas deregulated their state-wide energy market, which entailed unbundling the three functions of utility companies. Traditional utility companies control energy production, distribution, and retail operations in a vertically integrated model. In the spirit of free trade, Texas' deregulation suggested that both consumers and utilities would benefit from the changes. Costs to utilities and consumers would lower as third-party providers built, maintained, and sold energy production plants through the facilitation of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas regulatory body, which oversaw sales and rates. Austin retained the ability to operate as a traditional vertically integrated utility because of exemptions for certain local utilities. Public perceptions drove resentment against Austin Energy with assumptions of profiteering and extortion. To combat negative perceptions, Austin created a profit rebate program, which required all excess profits gained during high-cost months returned to the city, buffering underfunded city needs. Austin Energy retained its autonomy and continues to provide reliable and low-cost electricity in large part due to these rebates.

Austin's rebate program resulted according to the MSA framework. First, Participants in-cluded both consumers and external retailers. Consumers vocalized their desire for low rates like those seen in adjacent cities such as Houston and Dallas. Additionally, retailers from those cities lobbied heavily for deregulation in Austin by fomenting rumors of profi-teering and personally contacting citizens and offering lower retail costs. Second, two pro-cedural streams colluded to open a policy window and place profit rebates on the city-wide policy agenda. Politics served an extremely important role, with then-Mayor Will Wynn advocating for consumer preferences. Local news outlets also advocated for lower electric-ity costs and transparency measures from Austin Energy to justify existing rates. Proposals served as the second procedural stream. Immediately upon the first vocalization of local grievances at City Council meetings. Austin Energy's project management team proposed profit rebates within one year of the passage of TX SB7. Once approved and implemented, profit rebates gained tremendous fanfare. Fluctuating profit margins are acceptable to Aus-tinites upon recognition of mechanisms that adjust funding requirements of other social programs. Finally, policy entrepreneur Roger Duncan, former General Manager of Austin Energy, promoted profit rebates through the Energy Institute at Austin Energy, currying favor among the national energy community and within the city of Austin. Profit rebates reached the agenda-setting level by the coupling of participants and two procedural streams, then retained momentum by advocacy from policy entrepreneurs.

MSA in Austin

Kingdon's framework indicates the potential for policy change. The first factor to consider is participant involvement, which in Austin includes nonprofits and poor minorities. Crim-inal justice nonprofits abound, including the Texas Criminal Justice Coalition, the Austin Justice Coalition, and the Prison Justice League, all of which regularly advocate for depart-mental reform. By currying support from Austin's residents, criminal justice organizations receive support and favor above policing organizations, especially in the current era. Aus-tin's social progressivism uniquely enables participant interaction an encourages depart-mental improvements. Austin attracts socially-minded individuals because of its political leanings and encouragement of police accountability. In part because of empowerment via

nonprofits, poor minority citizens can better express grievances. By utilizing institutions of support, an individual otherwise disenfranchised can vocalize dissent, make known abuses, and seek support. Participant involvement in Austin is significant and thriving.

Second, two procedural streams are especially prominent with regards to opening a policy window. The first procedural stream, problems, is present throughout the US due to incidences of police brutality. The year 2014 deaths of Eric Garner in New York and Michael Brown in Missouri sparked a nationwide interest in actions of policing organizations. Police brutality serves as the primary problematic policy stream. Receiving attention from nonprofits, social welfare organizations, and politicians, actions taken by police affect their public image more than in the past. Emboldened by accessible social media platforms and enabling local governments, citizens upon whom police departments prey are better able to communicate wrongdoings.

The second procedural stream is proposals. Due to the involvement of nonprofits and their embrace by Austin's local government, various proposals for police reform have led to significant changes in both internal organizational structure and actions of supervisory and elected officials. For example, APD was quick to react considering safety issues regarding Ford Explorer patrol vehicles. Immediately following indications of carbon monoxide leakage, police leadership encouraged the rapid transition to new patrol vehicles at a minimal cost to taxpayers. APD facilitates risk management teams that respond rapidly to departmental job performance issues. Considering that racial targeting affects job performance due to negative public perceptions, APD will be sure to affect change with expediency not seen in other municipal police departments.

Policy entrepreneurs currently hold top positions at APD. As demonstrated by past actions, Chief of Police Brian Manley emphasizes regular interaction with the community and promotes opportunities for professional development inside the force. Adherence to I CARE departmental values guides Manley's public interactions and current policy implementations, specifically regarding community accountability. His efforts to rectify backlogs of

forensic rape kits, opposition to legislation regarding gendered bathrooms and strict proce-
dural alignment with paid leave policies ensure his continued support of departmental im-
provement measures, especially those in which public relations play a predominant role.
The second policy entrepreneur is Travis County Sherriff Sally Hernandez. Indirectly con-
nected to APD as the lead of the adjacent police force, Hernandez is an elected official
dedicated to the promotion of progressive policies. Immediately following her 2016 elec-
tion, Hernandez condoned Austin's longstanding policy of only turning over immigrants
to Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials if arrest warrants accompanied detainer
requests. Her dedication to departmental values and established policies bolster her credi-
bility. Working cooperatively with Chief Manley and the APD, Travis County's Sherriff
will serve as an asset in encouraging changes that lessen subjectivity and racism in Austin's
police writ large.

DATA

APD released supporting documentation alongside its Annual Racial Profiling Report for the first time in 2016. In the spirit of transparency, citizens can access comprehensive data that supports yearly departmental summaries. Available information includes demographics along with temporal and geographic identifiers. Through regression analytics, I find that APD's policy of race-identification before the officer arrives on scene leads to higher rates of minority arrests. Specifically, in high-crime locations officers are more likely to arrest minorities when told their ethnoracial category ahead of time.

Descriptive

There are three categories of variables: demographic, geographic, and temporal. There are cross-cutting trends in each category, though this three-part breakdown facilitates understanding the types of data collected by APD.

Of all arrests, 9,126 contain full demographic data. Demographic characteristics are (1) gender, (2) age, and (3) race. Regarding gender, 6,847 (75.03%) are male, while 2,279 (24.97%) are female. Arrest rates affect males three-times that of females.

Regarding age, arrest rates most highly affect the 18-24 age-group (2,523, 27.65%), followed by 25-34 (3,535, 38.74%), and finally 35-44 (1,671, 18.31%). The highest likelihood of arrest occurs between the ages of 18 and 44. APD arrested 220 juveniles under the age of 18, making up 2.41% of those incarcerated. The likelihood of arresting underage offenders is 17.5 times that of the 18-24 age group.

Regarding race, three groups comprise most of arrests: Hispanic (3,430, 37.58%), white (3,412, 37.39%), and Black (2,146, 23.52%). Other arrested racial groups include Asian (93, 1.02%), Middle Eastern (35, 0.38%), Hawaiian/Pacific Islander (5, 0.05%), and American Indian/Alaskan Native (5, 0.05%). Officers identify race at time if arrest, their categorizations validated by administrative personnel at booking. Arrests affect Hispanics and Blacks at rates 1.3 and 4.2 times higher than whites respectively.

Of all arrests, 9,122 contain full geographic data. APD divides Austin into 10 sectors, each sector identified by a code name. Code names correspond approximately to an established neighborhood. Most arrests occurring in Edward (Rundberg, 17.35%) and Frank (Del Valle, 13.50%). Following in decreasing proportion of arrests are Charlie (East Austin, 11.53%), Henry (Montopolis, 10.71%), David (Barton Springs, 10.68%), and Baker (West Campus, 10.47%). Neighborhoods with highest the highest arrest rates are also predominately minority inhabited.

All 9,184 arrests contain full temporal data. Temporal factors are (1) date and (2) time. Date divides into month and season. Time divides into hours and officer shifts. Regarding the date, most arrests occur in January (11.56%), while the least occur in November (7.21%). Most arrests occur in the winter (28.92%) while the least occur in the spring (22.80%). Regarding time, most arrests occur from 11 PM to 12 AM (11.24%). The least take place from 6 AM to 7 AM (0.78%). Most arrests take place in the nighttime hours, with fewest occurring in hours of sunshine. Organizationally, APD breaks officer patrolling into three time-shifts: Day (6 AM to 2 PM), evening (2 PM to 10 PM) and night (10 PM to 6 AM). 60.63% of arrests take place during the night shift but only 12.40% in the day shift.

Of all arrests, 7,280 contain full criminal data. Criminal data categories include the reason for stop, search, and whether officers find contraband during the search. Regarding reason stopped, the most common is a violation of transportation code or vehicle laws (87.47%). Surprisingly, violation of penal codes and suspicious drivers only account for 0.77% and 2.05%.

Regarding reason searched, searches that are incidental to arrest account for 76.03% of searches. The most common non-procedural reason for a search is probable cause (18.56%). The least likely reason is consent, indicating that most people arrested are not complicit in the search.

Contraband found during search includes drugs (12.35%), cash (5.51%), and weapons (2.38%). However, most searches (64.92%) do not result in the discovery of contraband.

Regarding Race Known Before Stop, in 90.36% race is not known, compared to 9.64% in which race is known. Dispatchers may send racial information to the officer in the event of a call for service. Also, an officer annotates in an after-action report whether they were aware of an arrested suspect's race. However, because most arrests result from routine traffic stops, implicit bias probably increases the likelihood that officers used racial categorization to conduct traffic stops. Probably, there is a much larger percentage of arrests that result from an officer knowing the suspect's race before the stop.

Analysis

I conducted logistic regression to anticipate the effects of a certain set of explanatory variables on the dependent variable. There are two dependent variables of interest, and as such I have run two different models, each using the same sets of explanatory variables, to try and understand the way that demographics affect the location and time of arrest.

The first model evaluates the effects of race, the reason for stop, and whether the officer knew the suspect's race before the stop. The dependent variable is the location of arrest. Specifically, I created a binary variable out of the location of arrest. Most arrests happen in police districts Edward, Frank, and Charlie, with their portion of total arrest accounting for 17%, 14%, and 12% respectively. If an arrest offered in one of the three high-arrest districts, I assigned a value of 1, indicating high-crime location. If arrests occurred in any of the other districts, I assigned a value of 0. I can then conduct logistic regression based on the high-crime location of arrest.

The second model evaluates the effects of the same three explanatory variables on time of arrest. I created a binary variable based on arrest times by splitting arrests into two different time groups: high-crime times and low-crime times. Of three patrol shifts, the one in which the likelihood of arrest is greatest occurs between the hours of 10 PM to 6 AM (61% of all arrests). I, therefore, assigned a value of 1 to arrests occurring in the night shift, and a value of 0 to arrest occurring in the day or evening shifts, producing a binary dependent variable indicating high crime times of the day.

Though there are many other variables I could have used in evaluating outcomes of the dependent variable, I did not want to create endogeneity effects from variables that are too closely related. As such, I conducted tests for multicollinearity to determine which variables are too closely related. Unfortunately, many demographic variables suffer from multicollinearity such as race, gender, and age.

For both models, my hypothesis test is the same. I hope to find which variables affect the dependent variable in such a way that I can evaluate the policy results associated with such activities.

$$H_0: \text{Location of Arrest is not Affected by Explanatory Variables}$$

$$H_A: \text{Time of Arrest is Affected by Explanatory Variables}$$

My assumptions differ from the hypothesis test. I assume that officers behave in ways that exacerbate biased tendencies. For example, I anticipate finding that knowing the suspect's race before the stop leads to higher rates of incarceration. Additionally, I assume that an officer's preexisting knowledge of a suspect's activities will increase the likelihood of arrest.

Results

For the location-based model, there are five significant variables:

- Yes, the race of the suspect was known ahead of time
- No, the race of the suspect was not known ahead of time
- Call for service initiated the stop that resulted in the arrest
- Violation of city ordinance was the cause of arrest
- Water safety act was the cause of arrest

All variables achieved levels of significance of at least 95%.

Table 2: Statistical Output from Location-Based Model

Model 1		
Variable	**Odds**	**P-Value**
Intercept (High-Crime Location)	0.223	0.1803
Race Known	1.332	0.0614 .
Race Not Known	1.901	6.88e-05 ***
Reason: Call for Service	0.506	8.96e-05 ***
Reason: Violation of Ordinance	0.641	0.0639 .
Reason: Water Safety Act	0.005	4.28e-07 ***

The most interesting finding from the significant variables is that one's odds of arrest in a high-crime location increase both when the race is known before the arrest and when the race is not known. This may seem intuitive. The likelihood of arrest in high-crime areas is greater in general. But consider that the city's minorities cluster group in high-crime areas.[*] If an officer responds to a call for service in heavily minority neighborhoods, they have most likely already assumed that the perpetrator is black or Hispanic. It may not make any difference in terms of departmental policy if officers know the race of suspect before arriving on scene – the officer might already assume ethnoracial category.

The second model with relation to high-crime times of day gives similar results in terms of significant explanatory variables. There are three significant variables:

- The race is known before the stop
- Preexisting knowledge of crime is the reason for the stop
- Water safety act is the reason for the stop

All variables are significant at least at the 99% confidence level.

Table 3: Statistical Output from Time-Based Model

Model 2		
Variable	**Odds**	**P-Value**
Intercept (High-Crime Time)	1.175	0.8607
Race Known	0.288	8.69e-14 ***
Reason: Pre-Existing Knowledge	0.556	0.0138 *
Reason: Water Safety Act	0.002	2.36e-11 ***

In this category, the odds of arrest decrease by 80% if the race of a suspect is known ahead of time. I suspect that high-crime times of day do not correspond directly to arrests in high crime areas, rather the dispersion of crimes in high crime times spreads across the city. Therefore, an officer may be responding to more crimes committed by whites or females or older personnel in high crime times of day, and not as suspicious of acts perpetrated by minority groups.

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[*] This is largely due to economic factors that seriously affect minorities in Austin such as high rent prices.

It's essential to note that race did not significantly affect either dependent variable. This is strange given the disproportionate incarceration of blacks and Hispanics in Austin. One would assume that officers implicitly target minorities because of skin color.

I presume that implicit bias is at play. Race does not explain arrest occurrences due to location or time of day. Rather, knowledge of the race before or ahead of time does explain variation in the two dependent variables.

DISCUSSION

APD can effect change through policy proposals targeting organizational characteristics. Both predictive models show an officer's knowledge of race before the stop affects the likelihood of arrest. The best mechanism by which to bring about policy change in a municipal bureaucracy is through Kingdon's MSA framework. All policy proposals must combat enforcement subjectivity and embedded racism, recognizing that time-of-day policing influences such obstacles to improvement. Policy changes must also take advantage of public perceptions and encourage training standardization as drivers that lead to the development of successful operational and administrative characteristics.

Recommendations

To combat racism and subjectivity in policing, policies must enact innovations that reflect departmental nuances. Organizational change happens when organizations enact well-developed policies according to the MSA framework. In Austin, subject identification policies bolster racism and subjectivity. If arrests of Blacks and Hispanics are higher in high-crime locations when officers know their race ahead of time, departmental policies must change to optimize departmental effectiveness.

APD should enact four policies. First, shorten the length of each patrol shift, specifically the night shift (10PM-6AM). Racism and subjectivity are especially prevalent in the night hours. During such hours, officers should perform at peak, aware of their surroundings and engaged according to their training. Officers currently work eight-hour shifts in one of three possible time allocations. Considering that the evening hours entail heavier demographic profiling, officers be energetic and high-performing during the hours of high criminal activity. Abbreviated schedules, adding a fourth shift in each daily schedule, or splitting night-shift duties all serve to lessen the weight of each shift.

Second, connect officers with communities with whom they share ethnoracial traits, especially in hours of darkness. Blacks, Hispanics and white constituents trust officers of their own race. Officers are also likely to encourage and facilitate community involvement if embedded with communities to which they feel connected (Sun & Payne, 2004). To bolster

community trust and offset negative perceptions, during the night shift minority officers should patrol in predominately minority neighborhoods. Empirical evidence shows that communities policed by officers of the same race are more likely to report crimes and less likely to feel resentment against the police force. Because municipal police officers work in their own cities, individuals may enter the police force with prior knowledge of their assigned community. Young officers may patrol the neighborhoods where they grew up. Through objective policing that adheres to formalized policies and aligns with strict training regimens, new police officers can appropriately mitigate criminal activity while maintaining and bettering pre-existing relationships.

Third, create a CIU like in Harris County, which leads the nation in overturning wrongful convictions because of their police sponsored auditing organization. Like the military's Office of the Inspector General, CIU is composed of existing officers who have excelled as patrolmen and administrative leads. Internal inspection organizations can correct departmental shortcomings more easily than outside consultants and auditors. APD should fill the CIU with their best and longest-serving police officers and focus efforts on arrests that occur during the night shift. A mixture of quarterly inspections and annual compliance testing is sure to enforce adherence to departmental policies especially considering the tendency to revert to subjectivity during patrols late in the day. Quarterly inspections must prepare each department individually for the annual comprehensive inspection. Development of requirements checklists will enable each department to internally prepare their operational and administrative mechanisms for higher-level oversight. Internal audits also synchronize departments, a function especially valuable in sprawling municipal bureaucracies.

Finally, increase high-stress, weapons-based situational awareness training focusing on nighttime scenarios. The potential for race-influenced incidents decreases as officers receive better weapons training. Such training combines weapons skills will real-world scenarios where officers make split-second decisions in controlled environments. Various military and police consultancy organizations across the country provide such training, including Xe, Triple Canopy, and CRI Counter Terrorism Corporation. Police desperately need

to improve officer capabilities in chaotic situations. The 2016 murder of Philando Castile by Jeronimo Yanez near Minneapolis testifies to the importance of controlled decision-making in confusing situations. By training officers to strengthen their decision-making abilities, racist tendencies will decrease as officers adhere to formalized departmental policies focusing on mitigating criminal acts.

Innovations in policing occur across the nation at the city and county level. Police innovation is not, however, driven by any single organizational factor but by a variety of factors including those classified as administrative, programmatic, and tactical (King, 2000). Departmental change requires two attributes: Moral leaders and state-of-the-art physical crime-fighting tools (Darroch and Mazerolle). One obstacle to progress is uneven implementation of progressive policies. Highly bureaucratized government organizations are prone to adopt policies in a piecemeal fashion (Morabito, 2010). Regardless the speed of adoption, police departments are equally able to transform their inner workings and culture as any other government agency. External outputs often stimulate progress, like the adoption of body cameras or non-lethal weapons. Community policing and other organizational initiatives lead to the adoption of innovative technologies, which in turn lead to more effective policing (Randol, 2014).

More than effective replacing leadership or adopting new tools is the implementation of internal auditing. In Keller, TX, the police hired consultants that encouraged and implemented leadership and risk-taking, leading to organization-wide improvements (Fields, 2006). Auditing can specifically target wrongful convictions. Half (76 of 149) of all exonerations in 2015 came from Harris County, a leader in internal auditing techniques throughout the US criminal justice system (Exonerations in 2015, 2016). In Harris County, Conviction Integrity Units conduct regular audits of criminal charges and validate case files, serving an important function for inmates unable to access dependable legal assistance.

Outlook

Analyzing obstacles to change allows departments to enact organizational drivers that will bring about successful and innovative improvements. Like police departments across the

nation, Austin's disproportionate jailing of minorities exacerbates problems associated with poverty and further impoverishes citizens already affected by displacement and neglect. By addressing the factors that allow continuations of subjective enforcement and the proliferation of embedded racism, APD can serve as a model for organizational improvement throughout the US.

Policy solutions should not only address large systemic issues but analyze departmental nuances at the local level. Too often local policymakers enact changes suggested by federal organizations without regard for locational differences. Deficiencies and biases must receive individualized attention. Austin's problems are its own, and the best solutions precisely target local issues.

APD is progressive and innovative, filled with high-performing and excellence-driven leaders. Officers treat constituencies with respect and compassion. By implementing innovative practices, APD will continue to lead the policing community in efficiency and capability.

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