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“The most famous Indians in all the Indies are those from Chile, called Araucos. The next in New Spain, called Guachichiles or Chichimecs, who are now conquered.”

**Pacification projects in two frontiers of the New World’ Spanish Empire: New
Galicia and Chile (1529-1626)**

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This dissertation seeks to unravel some of the most interesting and least known characteristics of the early Spanish Empire in the New World borderlands: the origin and application of the first policy of non-violent pacification in the lands of New Galicia, and its subsequent transfer to Mapuche territory in southern Chile, whose materialization ended in a resounding failure. It is assumed that an empire is a political, social, economic and cultural system in which information circulates through different means –mainly written texts and people–, so that the experiences of a corner of this system could serve as a reference to the moment of making decisions for another region.

The Franciscans were the promoters of the first successful pacification project in a borderland of the American continent, which put an end to the prolonged Chichimec War in northwestern Mexico. This plan of pacification was the heir of other attempts carried out in various conflictive regions of the continent, in which numerous tests of trial and error were carried out. Along this process mixed in a tense relationship the theological and philosophical positions on the nature of Indians, the desires of wealth and glory of the diverse social strata that developed in these spaces, the role played by the religious orders, and the resistance of the Indians to the invasion of their territories.

Aware of the peacemaking success in Chichimec lands, the Jesuits tried to implement the essential guidelines of this project in southern Chile to put an end to the bloody Arauco War, but the ecological and cultural peculiarities of southern Chile, as well as the personalism of the main promoter of this transfer, prevented reaching the same happy result: in this way, a successful model would not necessarily have the same result in another region of the Spanish Empire.

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Introduction

This is a history of worlds, a narration of dissimilar and distant spaces inhabited by peoples who in pre-Columbian times and during the colony developed different lifestyles. It is the history of two societies whose fates were tied to a single European empire, whose men (soldiers, officials, merchants and missionaries) initially described them as nations “without God, without law, and without king.” The *Chichimecs* from the north of New Spain, and the *Reche-Mapuches* from the forests of southern Chile evidenced military and political agency that allowed them to resist the Spanish initiatives of conquest. The success of the native struggle induced the frustration of those who wielded metal weapons and clamored the discourse of conquest, applying to these indomitable indigenous warriors the categories of “idolaters” and “uncivilized”¹ with which the inhabitants of other regions of the continent had already been labeled, such as the Caribbeans. Officials of the Spanish administration, and even members of the clergy who ventured into these lands, made use of the conquest language on countless occasions to characterize the process by which independent Indian nations were being incorporated into the colonial orbit. In the minds of those men still beat the spirit of a Spain that had just consolidated the spatial and human control of the Iberian Peninsula.² Nevertheless, a series of factors that added during the sixteenth century, contributed to mold the Spanish policy on those societies that managed to successfully sustain a bitter resistance to the imperial advance on their territories, a transformation in which colluded geopolitical aspects, the peculiarities of the Spanish-Indian conflict at both ends of the American Spanish Empire, the need to respond with concrete measures to the vexatious propaganda of the *black legend* spread throughout the old continent by rival monarchies, and the determined action of the regular clergy claiming for the abuses that hindered the evangelizing work among natives. The Spanish agents of this process were part of a transformation in which they gradually defined their positions on the barbarian, development that had in the *Ordinances of Discovery and New Population* of 1573 its most important legal manifestation. Such a legal body meant a new framework that forced to rethink the role of the actors who would lead the approaching to the indomitable frontier societies, meaning for this reason a new method of incorporating the natives into the imperial system: the clergy

¹ Rubiés, “The concept of Gentile Civilization in missionary discourse and its European reception,” 322.

² Greer & Mills, “A Catholic Atlantic,” 7.

with the strategy of peaceful contact, avoiding the interference of the other social components of the *Republic of Spaniards*. The process, however, was slow and plagued with obstacles.

The new approach to the indigenous world was preceded by a history of prejudices and disagreements, as well as by laudable but failed early attempts to pacify the natives with no violence. Even though it is true that the establishment of the pacification policy did not end with the deployment of punitive measures or slave practices outside the law –and even with the permission of the authorities when circumstances so justified– it is clear that these alternatives reduced their frequency for the rest of the colonial period. With European explorations of the sixteenth century numerous windows were opened for the knowledge of diverse alterities, both as regards the cultures that inhabited the continents already internalized by the scholars through the stories of travelers, as in the newly discovered lands beyond the Atlantic Ocean. The set of information accumulated in chronicles, reports and epistles written by soldiers, royal officials, and priests who embarked on the voyage, on more than one occasion questioned the consensus traditionally founded on theology as well as on classical and medieval philosophy: activity of understanding *others* became an essential way of redefining *self*. From this moment it happened that “the comparison of different systems of behaviour and beliefs ultimately led to a hierarchical classification of peoples in terms of barbarism and civilization.”³ Present and past societies with diverse complexities ranging from the behetrias to the empires, encompassing the Greeks and Romans of the European past and the Chinese and Japanese from the Far East, among many others, were weighed for the purpose of establishing similarities and differences. Custom (virtuous and productive life forms), civil life (policy life) and faith (devotion to the Christian God) shaped the axes on which a spectrum of possibilities was built which placed the western European monarchies at the top. But this does not mean that in the sixteenth century there was a single ethnological

³ Rubiés, “Christianity and civilization in sixteenth-century ethnological discourse,” 42. Following John H. Elliot, “as soon as the process of comparison got under way –and it began in a relatively unrefined form when Europeans first set eyes on the Caribbean islanders– Europe had the opportunity to see itself in new perspectives. It had already learnt, by the late fifteenth century, to see itself in relation to the new world of America. For there was always something narcissistic in Europe’s approach both to antiquity and to America. In observing America it was, in the first instance, observing itself –and observing itself in one of two minors, each of which distorted as it revealed. It could see in America its own ideal past –a world still uncontaminated by greed or vice, where men lived in felicity and prelapsarian innocence. Or, as occurred increasingly with the advance of the sixteenth century, it could see in America its actual past –a time when Europe’s rude inhabitants were as yet untouched by civil manners or by Christianity.” See Elliot, “Renaissance Europe and America: a blunted impact?” 20.

discourse, since the ways of valuing otherness were diverse and sometimes even contradictory. From the beginning of contact, at least two opposing ways of understanding the relationship between Europeans and Indians developed: on the one hand, natives were conceived as a *continuous* of the Europeans humanity, and on this mode of relation the proselytizing and conversion policy was based; on the other hand, natives were also conceived as *contiguous* to the Europeans, since they represented an inferior race of humanity, and it was this mode of relationship that justified the war and extermination policies deployed in much of the New World.⁴

As a result of the Spanish expansion the scenario had become truly complex, since the work of soldiers and missionaries made many natives labeled as savages become Christians, without necessarily conforming into ideal forms of life: on the one hand, the indispensable support of the local inhabitants (the “friendly Indians”) to consolidate the territorial and human control forced on many occasions to maintain a condescending attitude toward practices in conflict with Christian norms and ethics, even after being baptized; on the other hand, the escapes of Indians from the missions, *encomiendas* or Spanish towns to mountains or forests left in a complex position to the escaped ones, since the voices in the Spanish side divided in more than one occasion between those who tried to reincorporate them into the flock of Christ (usually members of the regular orders), and who sustained the right to enslave them by their status as heretics (military and encomenderos).

In the case of conflicting border areas, the indigenous conceptualization used to embody in pejorative imagery adorned with menacing characteristics that revealed the fear towards that otherness, a matter that justified the use of violent actions. Not only scriptural but also graphic apparatus, shaped in drawings or maps, created a set of representations of the most varied nature. The portrait of the barbarians depended largely on the space in which they lived, but also on the actors who outlined the essential features of their physiognomy. Conditioned by their individual or collective agendas, soldiers, encomenderos, miners and hacendados on the one hand, and members of the regular and secular clergy on the other, used to coincide in the unpromising features that defined the rebellious Indians, but with the difference that the latter, once advanced the process of conquest, remained faithful to the hope of the final conversion.

⁴ White, “The Noble Savage theme as fetish,” 132.

After the imposition of Iberian steel on Mexicas and Incas after a brief but fierce resistance, it was not a coincidence that in the regions farthest from the main urban centers the pressing situations have been answered with equally drastic measures. Historical labels such as “Guerra Chichimeca” and “Guerra de Arauco” tell of violent episodes in which the actors who performed in the most bloody passages of the early Hispano-Indian contact confronted. A particularity that defined the interethnic relationship in many peripheries of the Spanish Empire was the consolidation of forms of production and a military institutionalism based on the Indian slave business, especially the groups reluctant to join the Spanish productive system, although it was not scarce the episodes of violent subjugation on the “friendly Indians,” thus eroding the bonds of trust on which indigenous reciprocity had initially operated. In this way, encouraged by the need to compensate the grievances received, to recover relatives or friends captured by slavery groups, or to face economic crises caused by the invaders through the looting of goods or the kidnapping of women and children in Spanish villages or estates, the natives used this reciprocity betrayed by the white man to create alliances among diverse groups, many of which had been rivals not long ago: the threat of the conquistadors was a powerful factor for indigenous cohesion, impelling a restructuring of their traditional forms of organization and socio-political interaction, which explains to a large extent the long-standing resistance that many frontier societies were able to oppose throughout the West Indies.

As a result of the above, there were many conjunctures in which both the *Chichimec* and *Mapuche* conflicts reached exorbitant proportions, threatening the complete ruin of every settlement founded by Spaniards. Unlike the favorable outcome of the conquests of Tenochtitlán and Cusco, the technological and logistical advantage granted by the means of navigation, firearms and steel, horses and tactical combat systems,⁵ were insufficient to contain the verve of bands and tribes mobilizing in the frontier territories, whose decentralized sociopolitical structure, characterized by the segmentation into numerous autonomous nuclei, made any hegemonic pretension difficult. Like an upside down world, the precarious balance that linked Indians and Europeans in these hidden spaces meant that

⁵ Headrick, *El Poder y el Imperio*, 13. Also Lee, “Projecting power in the early modern world,” 4.

on countless occasions the balance of power inclined in favor of the natives, something that Kathleen Du Val called the *Native Ground*.⁶

Although important in the conformation, increase and consolidation of the war alliances, the indigenous leaderships were generally of ephemeral duration. Qualities such as a charismatic personality complemented with a fluid oratory capable of captivating the audience, being able to act as mediators with sufficient prestige and social recognition to appease the conflicts that arose among the members of the group, as well as having the political ability to create networks of loyalty through reciprocity were inescapable requirements to hold the position in periods of peace.⁷ But in war times the legitimacy of the leader was based primarily on his military talent to guarantee the integrity of the group and lead it to victory. The anthropologist Pierre Clastres summarizes the primitive leader qualities, pointing out his “ability, diplomatic talent to consolidate the network of alliances that will ensure the security of the community, courage, warrior dispositions to ensure an effective defense against attacks from enemies or, if possible, victory in case of expedition against them.”⁸ As a result of his deeds figures such as Caupolican, Lautaro, Pelantaro and Anganamón in *Mapuche* territory, left their names engraved for posterity in works that make up some of the literary peaks of the Spanish Golden Age, such as *La Araucana* by Alonso de Ercilla and *El Purén Indómito* by Diego Arias y Saavedra. In the north of Mexico the names of Tenamaztle and Petlácatl also remained in the history, although they reached a lower resonance since they were not reflected in the pages of lyrical works of such magnitude. Why this difference? Why do we have the epic memory of the Caupolicanos in literary works that transcended in time, and not of the Tenamaztles? The four works⁹ that make up the “Cortes Epic Cycle¹⁰” in New Spain focus their verses on the achievements and misadventures of the conqueror of Mexico, which contrasts sharply with the works by Alonso de Ercilla and Diego Arias de Saavedra, where the *Mapuche* leaders overshadow the Spanish captains. The contrast is even greater in New Galicia, where the viceregal project to contain the *Chichimec*

⁶ Du Val, *The Native Ground*. See also Pulsipher, “Gaining the diplomatic edge,” 23.

⁷ Clastres, “Intercambio y poder: filosofía del liderazgo indígena,” 28.

⁸ Clastres, “La cuestión del poder en las sociedades primitivas,” 113.

⁹ Such as the works *Nuevo Mundo y conquista* (¿1572?) by Francisco de Terrazas, *Cortés valeroso* (1588) by Gabriel Lobo Lasso de la Vega, the *Mexicana* (1594) by the same author, and *El peregrino indiano* (1599) by Antonio de Saavedra y Guzmán.

¹⁰ Rodilla León, *El Peregrino Indiano: Introducción*, 35-6. Peña, “La poesía épica en la Nueva España (siglo XVI).”

attacks inspired Fernán González de Eslava to write the *Coloquio de los Siete Fuertes*,¹¹ a poem written around 1572 in which he extols the policy of fortresses erection in the northern places to subdue the native resistance. While Ercilla reconciles in his literary message the praise to the Spanish Empire with the Lascasian posture that justifies the Indian war of resistance, the González de Eslava's work characterizes by an eminently Hispanic disposition, omitting the names and feats of the indigenous people who staged the resistance.

Troubled by a rare climate of tensions that tested the tenacity and courage of the settlers, and especially when the horizon of opportunities disappeared after dark clouds that foreshadowed a prolonged time of storms, it was normal that in European minds molded unflattering images of their enemies. Since the ideological body of the conquest was primarily religious in nature,¹² Indians were accused of pagans, of being gentile possessed by the devil, who encouraged them to follow the most aberrant practices: sacrifices and cannibalism, whether real, supposed or fictitious, formed two of the customs most frequently portrayed by the chroniclers when describing the inhabitants of the peripheral regions of the New World. As the historian Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra points out, "the notion of an Amerindian collective servitude to the devil was closely linked to the idea that cannibalism was a widespread indigenous cultural institution."¹³ Although by the middle of the sixteenth century the human nature of the Indian was no longer officially in question, since the pope had decreed in 1537 by the *Bull Sublimis Deus*¹⁴ that they were descendants of Adam and Eve and, therefore, that they were endowed with understanding and linked genealogically to the rest of the human race, the border territories that held the seal of the conflict always questioned the established consensus. Their social instability (segmented entities constantly debating between cohesion and fragmentation), military (intergroup alliances with bellic aims that could be sporadic or longer) and politics (ephemeral leaderships around charismatic figures easily replaceable), in addition to the geostrategic or economic importance of the territories they inhabited, generated suspicion in Europeans, which made them an ideal target that attracted the attention of imperial and private agents with their own projects, which kept

¹¹ "Coloquio de los Siete Fuertes", in *Coloquios Espirituales y Sacramentales*, 61-70.

¹² Roldán, "La categoría social de indio: etnocentrismo y conciencia étnica," 51.

¹³ Cañizares-Esguerra, *Puritan conquistadors*, 88.

¹⁴ "Bula de Su Santidad el Papa Paulo III; Roma, 2 de junio de 1537," in Cuevas, *Documentos inéditos del siglo XVI*, 84-6.

conflicting and complementary interests each other. In this way, on the one hand we see that the sign of bestiality that permeates chronicles and official documents of the first decades,¹⁵ remained alive and almost unchanged along the century even after successive royal orders and papal bulls that contravened it, and it was so because local experiences were more determinant than the precepts supported by legislation or morality.

The Spanish borders, boosted by a process of continuous advancement of changing rhythms, in which official and private interests coexisted in a fragile game of complementarities and antagonisms, were a pool of old ideas and redefined prejudices that germinated almost without control when they found the proper ground. But in the same way, the reflexion of old ideas about the barbarian led the religious of different orders to elaborate theories of evangelization that culminated in the writing of vocabularies, catechisms and confessionals for the supreme purpose of conversion: the perfecting of the forms of evangelization, and not slavery, was in the eyes of most of the regular clergy the response to the indomitable attitude of the rebellious Indians. It was not a coincidence that when the attempts of conquest crashed again and again against the wall of indigenous resistance, these voices, which at that point had consolidated a more unified position than in the previous decades, had the opportunity to be heard by the imperial authorities, and is that the Spaniards were in fact a collection of groups with drastically contrasting agendas: settlers, state lay officials, ecclesiastics, and regulars. In the moments of greatest tension, and when everything seemed to be going uphill for the European settlers, the activity of the religious orders took on a dimension that was not only spiritual but also much more political than it had been until then, since the royal decrees included in the *Ordinances of Discovery and New Population* of 1573 had endowed them with an unprecedented pre-eminence in front of the other social levels of the *República de Españoles* in what refers to the entrances into unexplored spaces and the quieting of territories not yet submitted. Although by the second half of the sixteenth century missionary tasks had been working for several decades in many regions of the continent, the authority granted and the faith deposited by the monarch in Franciscans, Dominicans, Augustinians and, by the end of the century, in the Jesuits, made them become into agents of conversion not only religious but also social, economic and cultural as never before could have been.

¹⁵ An alternative vision in Gómez Canedo, “¿Hombres o bestias? (Nuevo examen crítico de un viejo tópico).”

The missionary discourse of the “peaceful conquest,” which on the border peripheries used to be a flag of struggle of the regular orders, manifested as a denunciation of the abuses committed on the Indians. In the first decades the Dominicans and Franciscans were those who maintained it more decidedly in high, joining the Jesuits at the end of the century, who became its most illustrious spokesmen. In the words of Fernando Domínguez Reboiras

[...] the Franciscans who went to Mexico at the beginning of the sixteenth century understood their mission as a ‘spiritual conquest’ that had to be firmly opposed to the brutal ‘military conquest.’ The base of their ‘spiritual conquest’ was poverty, understood according to the long and conflicting Franciscan tradition; and, on the contrary, the infinite faces of greed (gold, honor, power, slavery) were the basis of the ‘military conquest.’¹⁶

In the first decades of the sixteenth century the issue of pacification by non-violent means debated between the denunciation, the postponement by indifference of local authorities, or the simple omission in order to not inconvenience already consolidated interests of encomenderos, ranchers and military. The decisive landmark was the accusation made by the Dominican priest Antonio de Montesinos on the island of La Española (Santo Domingo) during a sermon on the Sunday of Advent in 1511, giving an account of the abuses to which the Indians were subjected and requiring their prompt remedy. The monarchical response, after an arduous debate, was the promulgation of the Laws of Burgos a year later, a set of provisions recognized by historiography as the first legislative body oriented to the government and instruction of the American aborigines. Its provisions basically referred “to the way of proceeding in the Indian evangelization (building of churches, obligations of worship and obligations of the Spaniards to them in this matter); to the obligations of the Spaniards in relation to the work of the Indians of *encomienda* (food, housing, clothing, etc.) and to the obligations of the Indians in relation to their work.”¹⁷ In other words, with the Laws of Burgos it was intended to regulate the social-labor relations of natives and Hispanics, as well as to establish the essential guidelines of the Indians’ program of acculturation.¹⁸

¹⁶ Domínguez, “Los indios se convirtieron a la tarde del mundo,” 149.

¹⁷ Sánchez Domingo, “Las Leyes de Burgos de 1512 y la doctrina jurídica de la conquista,” 18.

¹⁸ Pizarro Zelaya, “Leyes de Burgos: 500 años,” 41.

However, despite the fact that in the spirit of these laws was the search for good treatment of the natives, both men, women and children, prohibiting physical and psychological abuse by providing “that no person or people will beat or whip or call as dog or by any other name to any Indian,”¹⁹ a careful reading of provisions makes it clear that they did not rest on a conception that could be qualified as indiophilous, as the researcher Antonio Pizarro Zelaya has pointed out.²⁰ In effect, the conception of the indigenous was not only based on the idea that they were beings “inclined to idleness and bad vices,”²¹ but also that they kept imperfect and pernicious ways of life such as polygamy, so they had to convince that they should not “have more than one woman.”²² Moreover, in order to create the ideal conditions to implement the social, labor and cultural project, it was necessary to impose a new settlement model, given that “the main obstacle they have for not amending their vices and not taking benefits from the doctrine, is to have their settlements as far as they have them and away from the places where the Spaniards live.”²³ No passage of the First Law of the provisions of Burgos even allows to deduce that the move of the natives would be the result of a previous convincing, since being the *encomenderos* the main architects of this process of uprooting, the relocation had to be forced and in redoubts near the Spanish stays.²⁴ As the Indians reduction operated on a quantitative principle,²⁵ it is not difficult to infer the problems of coexistence that could generate between people whose fidelities and interpersonal relationships were not based on kinship. The labor issue, finally, was no less controversial, since the natives were not only subjected to a strictly regulated work regime and completely alien to their traditional economic activities, but the laws suffered from sufficient ambiguity in some of their mining provisions to leave the final decision of the time of tasks and the number of workers at the *encomenderos*’ discretion.²⁶

¹⁹ “Ordenanzas para el buen tratamiento de los indios (Leyes de Burgos); Valladolid, 23 de enero de 1513,” in Konetzke, *Colección de documentos*, I, 52.

²⁰ Pizarro Zelaya, “Leyes de Burgos: 500 años,” 61.

²¹ “Ordenanzas para el buen tratamiento de los indios (Leyes de Burgos); Valladolid, 23 de enero de 1513,” in Konetzke, *Colección de documentos*, I, 38.

²² *Ibid.*, 48.

²³ *Ibid.*, 38-9.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 41.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 40. The text says: “[...] that, in the first place, the people who have or have to have encomiendas for every fifty Indians make four cabins.”

²⁶ Pizarro Zelaya, “Leyes de Burgos: 500 años,” 43, 44-5.

The big problem that limited the scope of the Laws of Burgos' protective provisions was the naive conviction of leaving a good part of its application in the encomenderos' hands. In this context, the fact that the initial colonization process of the New World, which prevailed in most of the sixteenth century, was driven by two predominant trends can not be ignored: the first was the evangelizing ideal, which had in the mendicant orders the principal managers and in the kings, by disposition of the Alexandrian Bulls, to its jealous guardians; and the second was the profit motive of individuals, who went to the new continent in search of fortune, exploiting the resources using local labor in many unscrupulous ways. In this way, the laws of 1512 consolidated the institution of the encomienda of Indians in La Española and Puerto Rico, later extending to the rest of the Indies,²⁷ but this legal body dragged within itself the germ of its infeasibility, since "at the end it was clear that the Laws of Burgos were impracticable because *encomienda*, forced labor of Indians and their protection were incompatible."²⁸

But the limited results of this measure cannot be attributed exclusively to a lack of foresight of those who did not have the capacity to understand the real functioning of the American colonial economy and society. It is true that these laws included a series of sanctions for offenders, but it is also true that everything became a dead letter against the little compliance of local authorities to respect the clauses established by the Crown, motivated largely by the network of economic and family interests that wove, regardless of legality, in the governorates where they performed their administrative tasks. Thus, for example, through the Laws of Burgos the figure of the Visitors was created, in charge of the implementation and monitoring of the provisions established in their chapters, two of which should be established in each town to ensure the way in which the Indians are "instructed in the things of our holy faith and for the good treatment of them."²⁹ The effect was not as expected, since on many occasions officials became accomplices and beneficiaries of the abuses, given that very often those eligible for the office of Visitor belonged to the local *camarillas* that had been monopolizing resources and means of production.³⁰ This being the

²⁷ Sánchez Domingo, "Las Leyes de Burgos de 1512 y la doctrina jurídica de la conquista," 35.

²⁸ Pizarro Zelaya, "Leyes de Burgos: 500 años," 60.

²⁹ "Ordenanzas para el buen tratamiento de los indios (Leyes de Burgos); Valladolid, 23 de enero de 1513," in Konetzke, *Colección de documentos*, I, 54.

³⁰ Pizarro Zelaya, "Leyes de Burgos: 500 años," 54.

case, mistreatment and diseases affected the number of reduced Indians, creating an atmosphere of tensions and mistrust towards encomenderos and royal officials both from the indigenous world and from the clerical sector. The task of the religious committed to reverse the situation and win souls for the flock of Christ was thus difficult.

Given these antecedents, it is not surprising that a series of pioneering reduction projects endorsed by the monarchy ended in spectacular failures, such as the Dominican (1514-1515) and Franciscan (1514-1521) in the Paria region (Cumaná coast, Venezuela), the pacifying enterprise headed by the Dominican Bartolomé de las Casas in Vera Paz (Tezulutlán, Chiapa region, 1537-1541), and the Jesuit project in Florida (1566-1572): in all of them the action of slaving groups, the boycott of encomenderos who consolidated networks with the authorities to avoid losing their privileges, or the distrust and internal divisions so typical of native societies, were the forces that overthrew a novel form of conquest that made of the pact, the delivery of gifts and the respect of agreements the way to reach the natives' heart.

A case that deserves special attention is the one of Vasco de Quiroga, who being bishop of Michoacán (1536-1565) insisted on founding towns-hospitals with the purpose of relocating to purépechas Indians (tarascos) to be protected and educated by the friars. As Silvio Zavala has shown, Tomás Moro's *Utopia* was the source of inspiration for this project of spiritual, social, economic and political conversion,³¹ but the pacifying experience promoted by Archbishop Hernando de Talavera in Granada also served as an example, "who proposed using persuasion, good examples and religious instruction as methods to educate the Moors in the Spanish language and culture."³² Once the transformation was consolidated, the converts would act as civilizing agents of the natives who would later settle in each town. Quiroga's project considered that the best way to attract the aborigines was good treatment in order to gain their trust, despising the most used ways in those days, such as violence or slavery. Indeed, the passage of Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán's expedition through the region of Michoacán at the beginning of 1530 had left a sad memory, since the native ruler, at that time a Christian, was cruelly killed and many of his subjects taken as loaders to force. Faced with actions of this nature, the opposition and decision of the bishop was such that the same

³¹ Zavala, *La "Utopía" de Tomás Moro en la Nueva España*. Zavala, "The American Utopia of the sixteenth century," 339.

³² Marini, "La utopía americana en la obra de Vasco de Quiroga," 8.

Indians called him with the affectionate nickname of “Tata Quiroga,” in recognition for his protective efforts. The town-hospital of Santa Fé de la Laguna, in the vicinity of Patzcuaro, is the one that achieved the greatest renown.³³ This reduction system proved very useful for the care of the natives during the epidemics, such as those that occurred in 1545 and 1576,³⁴ but it was not as effective as would have been expected to protect them from the abuses of the white man, since Vasco de Quiroga did not express a radical rejection of the *encomiendas* because he considered them necessary to sustain his evangelizing work economically.³⁵

In this way, the early pacifying projects promoted by the religious orders had to deal with limited and sometimes even null support from the local authorities. It was not strange that members of the royal officialdom were involved in activities that contravened government regulations, such as slaving practice, making it difficult for missionaries to work. As a result, indigenous discontent not only manifested in escapes, but also in acts of violence in which the religious themselves were frequently victims. Very often the military and *encomendero* groups were the greatest obstacle throughout the sixteenth century, to whom joined the interests of a mercantile guild that gradually consolidated its influence in colonial society. The monarchical pretension to end the *encomienda* system through the New Laws of 1542 was as drastic as it was ephemeral, since the elites of the continent quickly made their discontent felt by preventing its application. It was not until the second half of the sixteenth century that a series of historical junctures allowed the until then ill-fated desire for “peaceful conquest” rises to the status of State policy, an issue in which the Franciscans – who had been missioning for decades in northern Mexico– played the most decisive role. In this process conspired both the interests and needs of the Crown, a more determined action of the orders in the midst of the counter-reformist spirit promoted by the Council of Trent (1545-1563) and the American Provincial Councils, a more protective legislation of indigenous rights that reached its culminating point in the *Ordinances of Discovery and New Population* promulgated by Felipe II in 1573,³⁶ and the fear of the Monarchy to lose strategic territories or with a high economic potential at the hands of the rival European powers. From

³³ Lacas, “A social welfare in sixteenth-century New Spain,” 69.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 79.

³⁵ Marini, “La utopía americana en la obra de Vasco de Quiroga,” 10-1.

³⁶ “Ordenanzas sobre descubrimiento nuevo y población; Bosque de Segovia, 13 de julio de 1573,” in Torres de Mendoza, *Colección de documentos inéditos*, 484-537.

the point of view of the missionaries, the primary objective was always to protect the souls of the natives, and that is for the priests Bartolomé de las Casas and José de Acosta, among many others, the inhabitants of the New World were rational beings members of the human community,³⁷ and consequently defended the principle that the Indians had the capacity of being part of salvation.³⁸

Under the new ordinances severe restrictions and regulations were established for the exploration and extension of the Spanish settlements, since it was forbidden to any person without royal authorization to make a “new discovery by sea or land, exploration, or new settlement, or *ranchería* in the already conquered land or to be discovered.”³⁹ The rest of the provisions that integrated this body of law showed that as of this moment the Spanish colonial policy had a new north, going from an orientation of offensive expansion sustained on the *Requerimiento* by Palacios Rubios, to the establishment of a rather defensive tendency, based on a project of “peaceful conquest” focused on the natives conversion.⁴⁰ What is more, this withdrawal in the foundation of colonial action also meant a change in the nomenclature of colonization, that is, a resignification of concepts that already operated in the colonial discursive scenario and, therefore, a renewal in the spirit of the social, political and cultural interaction that had been taking place since the first contact. From now on the discoveries prohibited the use of the term conquest, “because they should be done with as much peace and charity as we wish, we do not want the name gives occasion or pretext to make force or injury to the Indians.”⁴¹ In its place it was replaced by the term pacification, more in concordance with the new colonial inspiration of the monarchy.⁴² From this moment, having no more ‘conquests,’ the role of the evangelizers got more prominence,⁴³ in whose hands not only the conversion of the Indians was entrusted, but they also got priority in the undertaking

³⁷ Bestard & Contreras, *Bárbaros, paganos, salvajes y primitivos*, 113.

³⁸ Sievernich, “La misión en la Compañía de Jesús,” 283.

³⁹ “Ordenanzas sobre descubrimiento nuevo y población; Bosque de Segovia, 13 de julio de 1573,” in Torres de Mendoza, *Colección de documentos inéditos*, 486.

⁴⁰ Sheridan, *Anónimos y desterrados*, 77.

⁴¹ “Ordenanzas sobre descubrimiento nuevo y población; Bosque de Segovia, 13 de julio de 1573,” in Torres de Mendoza, *Colección de documentos inéditos*, 496.

⁴² This point, as stressed by a Spanish author, was more a formal than real advance, since the conquering mentality still survived, and its applicability in New Galicia clashed with the Chichimeca War, whose acts of violence were in decisive growth in that decade. See Vas Mingo, “Las Ordenanzas de 1573, sus antecedentes y consecuencias,” 87.

⁴³ Adams, “Consecuencias del contacto hispánico entre los Pueblo,” 82.

of new discoveries.⁴⁴ To facilitate the reduction of the natives it was not only recommended to entertain them with *rescates* (gifts)⁴⁵ to which it was expected they “get used,”⁴⁶ but also to initiate them into trade with the Spaniards, without showing “greed for their things”⁴⁷. In short, from this moment the legislation established that in any expedition to new lands the cross replaced the sword, which could only be used when “it was necessary for the defense of the settlers.”⁴⁸ The Franciscan historian Lino Gomez Canedo rightly stated that “with these ordinances the foundations of the missions system that was going to govern, with small changes, in the American future, were laid.”⁴⁹

This research intends to keep track of the factors that gave rise to the first nonviolent pacification policy successfully carried forward in the New World, analyze its gestation and implantation in the territory of New Galicia by the Franciscan Order in the second half of the sixteenth century, and study how this experience was transferred to the territory in which the Arauco War was unfolding in the southern latitudes of the Kingdom of Chile, seeking to explain the forces that influenced its failure at the hands of the Jesuit Order during the first quarter of the seventeenth century. The origin of this policy of pacification, as well as the transfer of Newgalician experience in southern Chile, was the result of intense discussions in which theological, political and economic-social positions were confronted, whose analysis can become a reference for other investigations focused precisely on the debates about the forms of conquest gestated not only in other regions of the American continent, but also for the understanding of the transfer of American experiences to other corners of the world, such as the Philippines, China or Japan. In other words, if we start from the principle that the Spanish Empire always sought to legitimize its expansion, and that the agents who carried forward this advance (military, royal officials, religious, private, etc.) developed their own agendas that could be complementary or opposed to each other, the historical analysis of the first successful project as well as one of the first transfers is an inevitable reference for the study of later historical cases.

⁴⁴ “Ordenanzas sobre descubrimiento nuevo y población; Bosque de Segovia, 13 de julio de 1573,” in Torres de Mendoza, *Colección de documentos inéditos*, 532.

⁴⁵ *Ibíd.*, 487.

⁴⁶ *Ibíd.*, 531.

⁴⁷ *Ibíd.*

⁴⁸ *Ibíd.*, 530.

⁴⁹ Gómez Canedo, “Evangelización y política indigenista,” 34.

A study of this nature puts in a central place the peripheries within the monarchical policies of consolidation of the territorial and human domain of the nascent Spanish Empire.⁵⁰ Although a large part of the decisions regarding how to incorporate indomitable natives fall within a legal framework emanating from the metropolis, it is no less true that local circumstances always contributed to shape for each particular case the way in which it should be established the official relationship with those “other” members of the empire. The characteristics of each border space, so dissimilar not only with respect to the axes of Spanish power in the New World (the viceroyalties), but also among themselves, made each of them a laboratory in which policy projects were put into play sustained on theological, legal and, in some cases, also cultural principles, gestated in a scenario of both local and metropolitan debates.

In this context, it is important to keep in mind that the new border policies were cultivated in a scenario of tense international relations, which encouraged their development by the practical principle of the difficulty that meant for Spain maintain an empire of such vast extensions and that began to be coveted by the European rival powers. The north of Mexico, first by its logistical position to find a way of communication with Asia, and later by the discovery of rich veins of silver in 1546, aroused a strong Spanish interest for its protection. A similar situation would occur with the Kingdom of Chile once the transoceanic passage that connected the Atlantic with the Pacific was found, and especially after Francis Drake crossed the Strait of Magellan in 1578, ravaging Spanish ports and ships. The international scene, from the second half of the sixteenth century, was of constant concern to the Spanish Crown, which experienced in its imperial peripheries the growing threat of French, Dutch and English ships that sought insistently to snatch part of its precious American booty.

Second, this work aims to demonstrate the leading role played by religious orders in the articulation of interethnic policies, going beyond a merely evangelizing role. The objective of regular clergy was to “civilize” the natives by incorporating them not only into the Christian flock, but also inculcating ways of living in order and policy, developing arts that would allow them to participate in the Western economy. This educational role has been treated, to a greater or lesser degree, by various scholars. Less studied has been the active

⁵⁰ Gould, “Entangled Atlantic historians: A response from the Anglo-American periphery,” 1416.

participation of these orders in the gestation of border pacification projects under a prism that goes beyond the lascasian denunciations. The objective was not only to convince the monarch, but also to royal officers and especially the highest officials, the viceroys, of the advantages represented by the new pacification mechanism, which considered granting a greater degree of autonomy to the religious orders, and in some cases even exclusivity in the relationship with the indigenous peoples. From the beginning Dominicans and Franciscans were the most advantaged of all, the latter being the first to consolidate a policy of successful approach to frontier Indians with the support of the monarchy, all this after a cumbersome process crossed by intense debates on the Spanish side and martyrdoms in the border evangelizing exercise. What is really interesting about the Franciscan case is that not only were those who first managed to consolidate within the Spanish side a way to pacify the border natives, but also that they were the first to obtain effective results, placing themselves ahead of the pioneering projects by Dominicans. The Jesuits were to reveal themselves, some decades later, as advanced apprentices of the Franciscan work.

A third point that connects with the previous one, is to verify the transmission of borderlands knowledge between the two most remote Spanish kingdoms of the New World: the New Galicia and Chile. What is proposed is to demonstrate that the basic guidelines of the pacification project successfully deployed in the northern border of Mexico was applied in southern Chile to curb the Arauco War. While it is very likely that the transmission of this borderland experience had been channeled through the government authorities (the viceroys transferred from Mexico to Peru), the clerical agency again played a leading role when a member of the Jesuit Order glimpsed the possibility of applying the model of Franciscan pacification in the *Mapuches* with the hope of an equally successful result. In other words, the gestation and transmission of borderland policies were not the exclusive consequence of the Spanish bureaucratic apparatus, and much less of the same religious order that deployed its experiences and knowledge in the corners of the New World, but it also necessary to bear in mind the “loans” or “appropriations” of knowledge from one religious order to another, with which we enrich the approach made by David Weber some years ago.

Finally, the dissertation seeks to account for the diversity of approaches to the indigenous world based on the principle that the “accommodation” to each border context involved the deployment of locally developed strategies, but always bearing in mind the legal

framework imposed by the Crown. The “accommodation” to each context implied that within a religious order distributed in the outermost regions of the empire different strategies were devised, some of which were even opposed to each other. Franciscan thought, for example, was not condensed into a single discourse in the early stages on American soil, and it changed according to each circumstance to the point that it sometimes seems contradictory,⁵¹ an erratic route that also followed the Jesuits, like father Luis of Valdivia in the Kingdom of Chile, who after approving the slavery of the rebellious Indians in 1599 became the most determined opponent of the capture of *Mapuches*. In addition, a sort of competition among different orders came to be waged not only for hoarding territories to deploy their missionary work (an aspect in which the Jesuits ran at a disadvantage when settling more tardily than the other orders on New World land), but also in the eagerness to convince the imperial authority that their proposal was the most convenient of all those presented on the king’s table.

The investigation is structured in five chapters. Chapter one is, initially, a geographical and cultural characterization of *Chichimec* and *Mapuche* territories. In the first instance, we intend to draw an ecological and cultural panorama giving account of the challenges that implied for the Spaniards (military, colonists and very especially religious) the spatial and human control of those regions. A profile is elaborated which complements the geographical features of every zone that allowed or hindered the European settlement, together with an introduction to the forms of cultural adaptation of the native groups, whose greater or lesser diversity-homogeneity and cultural integration impacted on their forms of social and political organization. All of this explain their ability to resist Spanish interference, and impacted in the long run on the success or failure of the missionaries’ peacekeeping work: Franciscan success in the north and Jesuit failure in the south. However, this initial characterization is an excuse to delve into conceptual aspects handled by those days. The methodological approach considers to ponder the way in which the variables of political society and territory supported the elaboration of human and spatial classifications (ethnography) oriented to evaluate the possibilities of missionary work among the natives who inhabited those spaces. The work of the Spaniards in the newly discovered territories, be they missionaries, military or royal officials, not only generated *encomiendas* or new Christians, but also produced knowledge about these otherness and the spaces in which they

⁵¹ Domínguez, “Los indios se convirtieron a la tarde del mundo,” 150.

lived, knowledge about which some or others pondered the most appropriate way to approach and convert the natives of these lands into the Spanish way of life, either by the force of the sword or the consensus of the word. The organization of this ethnographic information was based on classificatory principles that assumed that the nature of things or people depended greatly on the place where they settled, which meant that the degree of barbarism or civilization of a people depended on the *temple* of the region they inhabited.⁵² Both *Chichimecs* and *Mapuches* were heirs of ancient cultural traditions that Europeans conceived as inferior to those that developed in the nuclear regions where the great pre-Columbian civilizations settled, which however did not prevent them from being considered as susceptible of incorporating faith and forms of Western organization. In the first integrated classification scheme of American cultures, prepared by the Jesuit José de Acosta, it is striking that the *Mapuches* appear one step above the *Chichimecs*, which reveals that the former were considered more susceptible to pacifying and acculturating with non-violent media with respect to the latter, an assessment that would be denied by subsequent events: the “ethnography” of that time was based on formal analogies that regarded the forms of settlement and socio-political organization, economic development, the ways of dressing, the development of the arts and ritual practices, as the pillars on which could assess the level of civilization of a given society. In Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra’s words, “the use of classical analogies to interpret ancient Amerindian polities pervaded all Spanish sixteenth and seventeenth-century historiography.”⁵³ That is why the classifications used by the missionaries, materialized in schematic models and registered with terms and expressions such as “behetrías,” “dressed in skins,” or “living without laws,” hid a position on how to deal with that heterogeneous diversity of the New World.

Chapter two analyzes the dynamics of interethnic conflict in both frontiers before the implementation of non-violent pacification measures, all based on the analysis of three variables: corporal, economic and symbolic violence. Through this analytical triad we intend to bring into light and understand the functioning of the forces that gave life to the dynamics of violence and counter-violence in New Galicia and Chile, that is, to reveal the way in which the inter-ethnic relationship articulated in both frontiers, how it affected indigenous societies

⁵² Bestard & Contreras, *Bárbaros, paganos, salvajes y primitivos*, 32. Also Cisterna, “La retórica hispana del espacio durante el siglo XVI,” 118.

⁵³ Cañizares-Esguerra, *How to write the history of the New World*, 38.

and the responses they generated in the tribal world: social fragmentation, flights, alliances, sieges to fortresses and caravans, etc. I seek to account for the interests hidden behind the measures of force deployed by the military and encouraged by encomenderos, miners and / or ranchers (depending on the characteristics of each border territory) and, secondly, the evangelizing interests of religious orders (especially the Franciscans). For both cases it is necessary to always keep in mind the interests of the Crown, and the way in which the historical actors just mentioned sought to win the favor of it in order to impose their position on the way of relating to the no-subjected Indians. This factor, to a large extent, allows us to understand the erratic position of the monarchy regarding the preference to implement force measures or conciliatory policies to obtain the pacification of the natives, according to local circumstances.

- a) Economic violence: The economic potential of both regions of the Empire was sustained, in the sixteenth century, primarily on the mining of silver (New Galicia) and gold (Chile), although with unequal revenues: Chilean metal production never reached the levels of northern Mexico. This, however, was not an obstacle for developing scale economies in both regions, which made it possible to maintain both the mining settlements and the cities that supplied labor to said mills. The type of mining work deployed in both areas determined a considerable ecological impact in the southern region of Mexico (silver mining), and much less in Chile (gold mining), which implies recognizing that one of the main causes of *Chichimec* violence would not be valid for the *Mapuche*. It is probably this difference what explains, comparatively speaking, the greatest achievements of the Franciscans in their approach to the *Chichimecs* from the second half of the sixteenth century and the little profit among the *Mapuche*: to be provided with gifts, including food and clothing, was much more attractive to Mexican nomads who experienced a famine resulting from the devastation of the forest.

- b) Corporal violence: Second, the need for cheap labor to make the mines and ranches produce was a powerful factor of indigenous slavery in both regions, even becoming those border territories as slave suppliers for distant regions, such as the Caribbean,

the central region and central-northern Chile, and even the Peruvian viceroyalty. In both cases, the strong impact of the Spanish presence in the administrative core of these kingdoms (Mexico-Tenochtitlán for New Galicia, and the Santiago region in the case of Chile), especially the drastic demographic decline caused by diseases, determined the need to move slave labor from the border regions for agricultural and mining tasks. This action had two important consequences in both Hispanic kingdoms: on the one hand, it made the religious aware of the abuses suffered by natives, raising protests and contributing to consolidate the idea that the peaceful way was the desirable means to tame the Indians; on the other hand, it was the fertilizer for the hatred of natives against the Spaniards grows, animadversion of which the religious themselves were victims when they fell under the indigenous lances.

- c) Symbolic violence: Third, the symbolic violence, which meant mainly the destruction of idols and persecution of practices, was also a focus of violence, and at this point it was the religious who took the lead. Carrying out this approach invites us to also moderate the label of “nonviolent peacemakers” that is usually given to priests, since their evangelizing task also caused them to incur, at least, one type of violence against the indigenous world.

In short, through the analysis of the three forms of violence that characterized both borders, we intend to characterize the way in which the network of interests of the groups involved in the colonization of both regions (*encomenderos*, royal officials, military, merchants, priests) created an atmosphere of distrust that turned missionary work into a risky activity. Gives account of it the death of Franciscans that took place in the New Galicia and the limited missionary activity of members of the same order in the south of Chile. The actions of the Hispanic world segments involved in the border dynamics will be approached always bearing in mind the responses of the indigenous counterpart, also governed by their own interests. Indeed, a fragile and fragmented integration, based on the implementation of their own agendas, characterized the different actors that made up the two large conglomerates that developed in the borderlands: the indigenous and the Spanish. Therefore, the study of both spaces from the prism of the cultural, political and social fragmentation of

their actors offers the possibility of investigating the multiple logics that governed the inter-ethnic relationship –characterized fundamentally by violence– before the definitive implementation of the projects of peaceful conquest, going beyond the mere Indian/Hispanic dichotomy. It is to provide evidence of the situation that preceded the deployment of non-violent pacification attempts that were based on the provisions established in the Ordinances of 1573 and the Provincial Councils of Peru and Mexico. As in the previous chapter, the analysis will be structured on a comparative methodology in which the points in common and the differences that governed both frontiers come to light, thus retracting for the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the way in which David Weber focused on the study of borderlands in the Age of Enlightenment.⁵⁴

Chapter three analyzes the first phase of Franciscan missionary activity in New Galicia and in southern Chile, whose limit we place around 1585 for northern Mexico (Third Mexican Council) and 1593-94 for Chile (first Spanish-Mapuche conferences carried out by Martín García Óñez de Loyola, and arrival of the Society of Jesus).

Any analysis of the Jesuit evangelizing activity with the Indians should consider the previous missionary experiences in the American continent (since they served as reference to their subsequent tasks), the particular historical circumstances that impregnated this relationship in each region of the Empire (particular case of Chile and the New Galicia), and the juridical-theological framework that granted legitimacy to this work both in the eyes of the Monarchy and the ecclesiastical authorities. Therefore, this section is an entry to the missionary basis that governed the Franciscan work in the heart of Mexico, and how the implementation of this experience could only be partial in the dissimilar societies of Nueva Galicia, with which we want to demonstrate the diverse dynamics of functioning of the same religious order in culturally diverse and complex contexts. The case of Chile, which is the basis for a systematic counterpoint, will make this assumption even more evident by allowing a comparison of Franciscan action within an imperial framework. This mirror-image analysis will show, on the one hand, the ups and downs that the Franciscan work had in the heart of the same region, whose members lacked in the first phases of evangelization a univocal attitude about how to incorporate indigenous peoples into the European social, political, economic and religious forms of life: the positions ranged from extreme violence to

⁵⁴ Weber, *Bárbaros. Spaniards and their savages in the Age of Enlightenment*.

incorporation without military intervention. In both regions the consensus among the local representatives of the Order was the result of time and circumstances. On the other hand, the contradictory ways in which the Franciscans operated in both regions of the empire will also be evident: why the evangelizing tasks in the area of New Galicia show an attitude so committed to the spread of the faith with the nomadic barbarians, openly contrasting with the activity deployed in the Kingdom of Chile, basically limited to the cities in the southern forests? Probably the small number of Franciscans and their distant situation with respect to Lima, the heart of the *Provincia de los Doce Apóstoles del Perú* (Province of the Twelve Apostles of Peru), is a cause that explains the contrast with the work done by their brothers of Order who worked in New Galicia, much closer to the seat of the *Provincia de San Pedro y San Pablo* (Province of San Pedro and San Pablo) in Michoacán, and that of *San Francisco de Zacatecas* in the city of the same name.

In short, this chapter seeks to demonstrate how the Franciscan evangelizing activity lacked, in its early years, a unified posture at both the regional and continental levels: in New Galicia and the Kingdom of Chile there were conflicting positions on how to pacify the Indians, although the path of consensus was imposed. From a characterization of the missionary basis that governed the work of the San Francisco's sons, it is tried to demonstrate that in the two borderlands the members of this religious order operated with dynamics not entirely unified, which invites us to accept a less centralist activity of that usually attributed to regular orders. The corollary of all this is that the emergence of the nonviolent assimilation policy was the result of a process plenty of contradictions, and that had varying degrees of commitment in the continent.

Chapter four is basically focused on analyzing three points:

- a) The agreements of the Third Council of Lima that affected the development of border policy in northern Mexico.
- b) The revitalization of an old settlement project for northern Mexico. The factors that influenced on the elaboration of the peaceful conquest plan are studied, which required the deployment of a diplomatic relations policy headed by mestizos acting as go-betweens, a process in which the figure of Miguel Caldera stood out.

- c) The support given by the viceroys of New Spain to the project of peaceful conquest, especially Luis de Velasco II. Study the way in which diplomatic action was carried out with *Chichimecs* and *Tlaxcalans*, and the materialization of the reduction system through the founding of towns. Outline an approach to interethnic relations (*Chichimecs* and *Tlaxcalans*) in these reductions.

The reason for the success of this pacification plan on the northern border of Mexico is studied. It is true, as noted above, that by 1514 the Dominicans were pioneers in establishing a missionary project founded on the non-violent pacification of natives for the coasts of Venezuela, where the missionaries acted as guarantors of their safety and well-being. It is true, too, that almost in unison the Franciscans promoted a similar project on the shores of Cumaná. And it is equally true that both projects failed because of the uprising of the natives, who took the priests' lives to avenge the slaving incursions of the Spaniards from the Caribbean islands. What makes a difference is that the Franciscans were able to overcome such an unfortunate event, and years later they could successfully raise a project of similar nature in northern Mexico with the decisive support of the Crown and the viceregal authority. One of the keys for the achievement of that objective was that only the Franciscans were authorized to enter these towns, keeping apart the other members of the Republic of Spaniards.

Chapter five is an analysis of how the founding project, deployed in New Galicia, was transferred to southern Chile to stop the Arauco War after the second great rebellion started in Curalava at the end of 1598. Here the transfer and incorporation of knowledge is studied, from the Franciscan experience to the project promoted by the Jesuits by the hand of Father Luis de Valdivia, besides explaining the causes of Defensive War project's failure in Chile. We are interested in analyzing how a "model" based on a previous experience ended up crashing with a reality in which, at least in formal terms, it should have been equally successful.

- a) Characterize the conflict that involved clerics and encomenderos for the Indians' rights in the pre-Jesuit period. As was the case in New Galicia, it is observed the inexistence of a unique attitude among religious regarding issues such as the Indians slavery or the use of violent pacification measures.

- b) Analyze the foundations that guided the Jesuit missionary work, highlighting the similarities and differences with other religious orders, especially the Franciscans.
- c) Evaluate the evidence that supports the hypothesis that the Defensive War project used in Chile was inspired by the *Chichimec* pacification project used in the New Galicia.
- d) Explore the difficulties that Luis de Valdivia faced with the implementation of the Defensive War in Chile, explaining the reasons for its failure. The analysis covers up to 1626, when the project was dismantled.

The chapter is the conclusion to the analysis of one of the most interesting aspects of the functioning of the Spanish Empire in the New World, which is the circulation and use of knowledge among different religious orders. Every New World's geographical and cultural context meant a different challenge for the materialization of pacification projects, particularities that explain how a successful missionary work in one region of the empire could have an adverse outcome in another. However, despite the failure of the Jesuit project in Chile, the Society's activity laid the foundations of what would be the Spanish-Mapuche border dynamics in the decades and centuries to come.

In sum, the project intends to make a contribution to the historiography by placing the regular orders as entities capable of generating projects of interethnic border interaction as a result of a conflicting conjugation of imperial policies, particular interests and local situations. The adaptation to the situations of every American context would have to demonstrate that the need to solve the problem generated by the dialectic of Spanish abuses and indigenous resistance in border areas led to improvisations, to consider the referent of experiences gestated within the same religious order, and to adopt alien experiences deployed by other orders in different corners of the empire. If we analogize these projects with experiments, we will see that Dominicans, Franciscans and Jesuits were frontier alchemists who sought to find the philosopher's stone that would put an end to inter-ethnic conflict.

Chapter 1:

Between experiences and social epistemologies:

the geographical and human challenge for settlement and understanding

Chapter one fulfills three objectives: to provide an introduction to the main features of the geographical space of New Galicia and southern Chile, to define the cultural and organizational characteristics of the societies settled in these regions in the sixteenth century, and to evaluate the foundations with which the European ethnography operated on such spaces and societies at the time of incorporating them into the Western conception of the world.

Regarding the characteristics of both spaces, it is necessary to point out that both northern Mexico and southern Chile were two stages of disparate geographical characteristics which imposed challenges to the consolidation of Spanish power. Each subregion of their respective territories offered light and shadow to peninsular expansive project, embodied in fertile or rough soils, flat lands with agricultural potential or rugged areas of difficult access. Climate, depending on the season, made possible or hindered the transit of men and beasts, lavishing the necessary resources to sustain expeditions and burden animals, or spoiling their progress with the overflow of rivers or waterlogging the routes. The natives of each of these regions were able to make the most of their knowledge of the spaces they inhabited when resisting the Spanish expansive attacks.

The adaptive challenge that involved the ecological diversity of both spaces resulted in a set of cultural manifestations that ranged from hunter-gatherer societies (bands) to groups with more complex economies and social organizations (tribes and, in New Galicia, even chiefdoms). The cultural diversity of northern Mexico is highlighted, contrasting it with the relative homogeneity of southern Chile. This aspect could have played an important role in the *Chichimec* pacification and in the success of the *Reche-Mapuche* resistance, since the cultural diversity of the former could have meant a lower possibility for the consolidation of interregional alliances, unlike the great alliances (*Vutanmapus*) that were crucial in the indigenous success in the Arauco War.

All this panorama of geographical contrasts and cultural richness put to the test the Spanish –and European– classification schemes for alterity. To a large extent, the debates about the nature of the Indian centered around the possibility of evangelizing and educating them in the Western ways of life: the potentiality of introducing them into the uses and customs of European Christianity greatly determined the viability of violence as a means of conquest and, by extension, whether slavery was valid to subject the natives to the forms of Hispanic work. Theologians and jurists used interpretive schemes conceived in the times of the classical Greco-Roman and medieval tradition to understand the “Indian.” In a long and complex chain of proposals and debates that permeated throughout the sixteenth century, various alternatives were considered that contributed not only to understanding that otherness, but also to choosing the most ethical and juridically correct way to interact with them. This, of course, within a fundamentally theoretical ethnographic field.

The discussion proposed here considers the philosophical foundations that sustained the intellectual discussion on the native American in the sixteenth century. Although these debates laid the foundations of Spanish legislation regarding the rights of indigenous societies, in the next chapter we will see the little importance they had in the face of most of the Spanish settlers: soldiers, *encomenderos*, ranchers and miners.

New Galicia and southern Chile, two geographically complex spaces

Located northwest of New Spain, the territory that captain Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán baptized as *La Mayor España* (The Greater Spain),⁵⁵ and that was renamed by royal decree of 1531 as the *Nueva Galicia* (New Galicia),⁵⁶ was a huge extension that began administratively in banks of the Río Grande de Santiago (Santiago Totolotlán) and lagoon of Chiconavatengo,⁵⁷ also called Chapala.⁵⁸ Until the creation of the kingdoms of Nueva Vizcaya and Nuevo Leon in 1562 and 1580, the northern boundary was in the province of Sinaloa,⁵⁹ which gave it a long extension of “150 leagues in length from Lake Chapala to the farthest limits of the province of Culiacan.”⁶⁰ In current terms, it amounts to about 220,000 square kilometers.⁶¹ At the other end of the continent the Kingdom of Chile, initially divided into four provinces,⁶² got its first configuration with the provision granted by Pedro de la Gasca to Pedro de Valdivia on April 18, 1548, appointing him as governor of territories from “Copiapo in twenty seven degrees of height from equinoxial line to the southern part, in

⁵⁵ See “Relación de la jornada que hizo Nuño de Guzmán a Nueva Galicia, escrita por el capitán Cristóbal Flores,” “Relación de la entrada de Nuño de Guzmán a Nueva Galicia que dio García del Pilar, su intérprete en la jornada,” and “Relación hecha de viva voz por el alferez Francisco de Arceo, al capitán e historiador Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés,” in Razo, *Crónicas de la conquista*, 194, 226 and 257.

⁵⁶ About the name change, Nuño de Guzman states that “then Her Majesty wished the city be called Compostela.” See “Memoria de los servicios que habia hecho Nuño de Guzman desde que fue nombrado gobernador de Panuco en 1525”, in Razo, *Crónicas de la conquista del Reino de Nueva Galicia*, 186.

⁵⁷ “Información hecha en la Real Audiencia de Guadalajara sobre los límites de la Nueva Galicia y de Nueva España, 1561”, in Orozco y Jiménez, *Coleccion de documentos historicos*, V, 28.

⁵⁸ Lopez de Velasco, *Geografía*, 133.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* Domingo Lázaro de Arregui, in the early seventeenth century, specified that it limited “in the northern part with the Nuevo Reino de Leon and Nueva Vizcaya;” Arregui, *Descripción de la Nueva Galicia*, 73.

⁶⁰ Arregui, *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Van Young, “The indigenous peoples,” 139.

⁶² Such were the governorates of New Toledo granted to Diego de Almagro, New Andalucía or the Río de la Plata granted to Pedro de Mendoza, the one of New Leon or the Magellanic Lands assigned to Simón de Alcazaba, and the one of Terra Australis to Pedro Sancho de la Hoz; see Eyzaguirre, *Breve historia de las fronteras de Chile*, 16-8.

fourty one degrees, proceeding from north to south along the meridian.”⁶³ This concession was ratified by Charles V in Madrid in 1552.” Later, in 1554, the king extended the jurisdiction of Pedro de Valdivia to the Strait of Magellan, and a year later he ordered his successor, Jerónimo de Alderete, to take possession on behalf of him the lands extended beyond this interoceanic corridor,⁶⁴ by which the territory of the government of Chile reached one of the most enlarged longitudinal extensions among the kingdoms of the Indies. The area that draws our attention is, however, of more restricted dimensions: the Arauco War was a bitter conflict wich since the sixteenth century until the mid-seventeenth basically restricted to the plains, valleys and mountains framed between the Itata river drainage basin and Reloncaví Sound. It is a region dotted with lakes and rivers that originate in the Andes and flow into the vastness of the Pacific Ocean, covering an area of approximately 100,000 square kilometers.

Testimonies of soldiers, royal officials, litterateurs and religious provide a detailed description of both regions, classifying the features of their physiognomy on the basis of the ecological potential for establishing enclaves that would ensure the Spanish sovereignty. Thus, we see that the area of New Galicia was characterized by opposed testimonies. In the early seventeenth century the presbyter Domingo Lázaro de Arregui said it was a kingdom “generally poor... [and for] being a warmer land it is also no convenient for the cattle offspring.”⁶⁵ A few decades later the Franciscan fray Antonio Tello referred to it as a “very rich province of maintenance and very fertile land and abundant of beeswax and honey.”⁶⁶ The positive or negative nuances were a consequence of the geographic complexity of this region, defined by a series of ecological discontinuities which resulted in a wide range of resources distributed unevenly in space. In the second half of the sixteenth century clergyman Juan Alonso Velazquez characterized it as a “very fertile land and unique *temple*... [but] some parts are very sterile and lack of water.”⁶⁷ Arregui was even more explicit when stated that “in less than a league away hot and cold lands are found.”⁶⁸ Much farther south, the Kingdom

⁶³ Morla Vicuña, *Estudio histórico sobre el descubrimiento y conquista de la Patagonia*, 145.

⁶⁴ Eyzaguirre, *Breve historia de las fronteras de Chile*, 19-20.

⁶⁵ Arregui, *Descripción de la Nueva Galicia*, 84.

⁶⁶ Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. I, 8.

⁶⁷ “Relación de Juan Alonso Velázquez, clérigo beneficiado de la villa de San Miguel de los Chichimecas, sobre la guerra con los indios fronteros y los remedios para concluir con ella, 1582,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 453.

⁶⁸ Arregui, *Descripción de la Nueva Galicia*, 75.

of Chile was no strange to this counterpoint. After the ill-fated expedition of Diego de Almagro in 1535-1536, the territory was defamed by the uncertain possibility of enrichment and the fierceness of its inhabitants. This explains the difficulties faced by Pedro de Valdivia to recruit men for his conquest expedition started in 1540: in one of his letters to Charles V he states that “as this land was so bad defamed [...] I spent a lot of work in recruiting people that I brought, and to all of them I leaded with the support of friend soldiers who wanted to come in my company, even if I were to lose, as many thought.”⁶⁹ However, the discouragement in the early years of staying in the southernmost territory of the Empire turned into solid hopes when the arrival of reinforcements from Peru allowed to continue the exploration of the southern regions. Pedro de Valdivia reported that in the area around the mouth of Biobio river the land was “of good nature, fruitful and abundant of cultivated fields, and with a lot of wood and everything else that is necessary and required to be populated and perpetuated by us.”⁷⁰ Such a promising territory was chosen to lift the city of Concepcion in 1550, which in the following centuries became into the main Spanish settlement in the border area.

Territories of so complex geographies as the New Galicia and Chile meant a wide variety of resources distributed unevenly in space. The great biotic dispersion of northern New Spain is consequence of a geography marked by contrasts. The Sierra Madre Occidental, dotted with volcanoes, stands as a backbone that separates the coastal plains bathed by the Pacific Ocean, of the inland plateau watered by rivers that at times give birth to fertile valleys. The mountain peaks are a barrier that marks the boundary between the Savanna climate on the coast (Aw) and the Temperate highland tropical climate with dry winters in the central plateau (Cw).⁷¹ In the case of the southern territory of Chile, the decisive factor is also a coastal mountain range that separates the coastal plains from the central valley. Such mountains, named in precolumbian times as Nahuelbuta, extends along 150 kilometers between the rivers Biobío and Imperial, whose highest peaks averaging 800 meters (the Alto de la Cueva hill of 1,341 meters and the Lanalhue hill of 1,229 are the highest points) act as

⁶⁹ “Carta de Pedro de Valdivia al Emperador Carlos V; La Serena, 4 de septiembre de 1541,” in Medina, *Cartas de Pedro de Valdivia*, 37-9.

⁷⁰ “Carta de Pedro de Valdivia a sus apoderados en la Corte; Concepción, 15 de octubre de 1550,” in *Ibid.*, 137.

⁷¹ Vivo, “Marco geografico del norte de Mexico”, 15. Sauer, *Aztatlan*, 14.

a climatic folding screen, determining a higher rainfall in its western flank.⁷² From Imperial river the coastal mountain range undergoes a considerable decline in altitude, being crisscrossed and fragmented by river valleys as the Toltén, Valdivia, Bueno and Maullín, adopting different names as Mahuidanche mountain range in Cautín and Pelada in Valdivia.⁷³ At the eastern edge unfolds a broad and fertile longitudinal valley, interrupted at times by lacustrine basins and rivers of great ramifications born in the imponent Andean wall, plagued of volcanoes. In the entire basin of Biobío river, except in cordilleran nascents, prevails Warm-summer mediterranean climate (Csb), which product of gradual drop in temperatures and increased winter rainfall becomes into the Perhumid mediterranean mountain climate (Cfsb) as one moves south. The thin coastal strip flanked by the mountains of Nahuelbuta is exposed to the influence of ocean winds, determining a Warm-summer mediterranean climate with winter rains and high humidity (Csbn's). The Andean foothills, which is to windward, has a Temperate cold rainy climate with mediterranean influence (Cfsc), reaching extreme snowy conditions and low temperatures in the heart of the Andean massif, where the climate of Tundra by effect of height (ETH) prevails.⁷⁴

⁷² Errázuriz et al., *Manual de Geografía de Chile*, 94 and 133.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 94.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 70-4.




Figure 1. Map of the western part of the Viceroyalty of New Spain, including the New Galicia, from atlases of Janssonio and Blaeuw, XVI century. Source: Calderon et alii, *Cartografía histórica de la Nueva Galicia*, 5.

As a connoisseur of the region Pedro Gomez de Maraver, first bishop of New Galicia (1546-1561), reported to King Philip II on the vicissitudes of the kingdom in the mid-sixteenth century. In the first folios of his letter he makes an interesting classification of the neogalician space into three areas, assessing the virtues and pitfalls of each one for the Spanish colonization. Southern Chile also has three spaces clearly defined by geographic components, which are valued coincidentally by various chroniclers. First, both kingdoms have an extensive coastline, which are evaluated in very dissimilar way by contemporaries.

Thus we see that in the New Galicia it is characterized as a “warm, wet, [and] sick land, and very craggy in some parts, coast in which are populated the towns of Purificacion, Compostela and Culiacan.”⁷⁵ Such a so inauspicious assessment was shared by witnesses and scholars. The villa of the Purification, first Spanish enclave in the Jalisco region, was settled in “very warm and sick land,” according words by Juan Lopez de Velasco.⁷⁶ Compostela, the first capital of the kingdom, never had the approval of the population to host the *Real Audiencia* (High Court), as it was “in a wet and muddy valley, sick, surrounded by mountains of great bleakness and of terror by thunder and lightning, and in the most harmful place and of bad location in all the kingdom.”⁷⁷ Culiacan, founded by Nuño Beltran de Guzman with the name of Villa de San Miguel was established in a fertile area and abounding in maintenance,⁷⁸ but surrounded by Indians “of war in the mountains, which is hard to conquer for being a rough and bent land.”⁷⁹

The harsh climate, characterized by high temperatures and constant humidity reaching its highest point between June and October,⁸⁰ made difficult the human settlement. Heavy summer rainfall affected the settlements, razed the crops and made rivers invadeables. A good example is the flooding that undermined the expedition of Nuño de Guzman on September 20, 1530. One of the survivors, the interpreter Garcia del Pilar, says that while they were in the province of Aztatlan “came a flood on this town of water and wind, which demolished us the most of the houses; it was such a flood that we all thought to dye, and more than a thousand sick Indians who were in beds drowned.”⁸¹ The consequences of the disaster were not minor, because after three days of storm

the fields were filled in many parts of fish and deer and hares and rabbits and foxes and other drowned animals in everything reached by that flood, which was unbearable

⁷⁵ “Interesante relacion del Ilustrisimo Señor Maraver al Rey de España; Guadalajara, 12 de diciembre de 1550,” in Orozco y Jimenez, *Coleccion de documentos historicos*, I, 208. Other authors present alternative classifications of the territory of New Galicia, such as Calvo, *La Nueva Galicia*, 21-23, and Roman Gutierrez, *Sociedad y evangelizacion*, 33-67.

⁷⁶ Lopez de Velasco, *Geografía*, 137.

⁷⁷ “Interesante relacion del Ilustrisimo Señor Maraver al Rey de España; Guadalajara, 12 de diciembre de 1550”, in Orozco y Jimenez, *Coleccion de documentos historicos*, I, 211.

⁷⁸ Lopez de Velasco, *Geografía*, 141.

⁷⁹ “Informe al rey por el Cabildo Eclesiastico de Guadalajara, acerca de las cosas de aquel reino; 20 de enero de 1570,” in Garcia Icazbalceta, *Coleccion de documentos*, II, 493.

⁸⁰ “Relacion de la ciudad de Compostela por el teniente Lazaro Blanco; Compostela, 26 de noviembre de 1584,” in Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 88.

⁸¹ “Relacion de la entrada de Nuño de Guzman a Nueva Galicia que dio Garcia del Pilar, su interprete en la jornada; n.d.,” in Razo, *Crónicas de la conquista*, 227.

to see and novel to the eyes of those who looked upon: of friendly Indians, who were twenty thousand or more, the three parts of them died in the event told, and by the soil moisture and by hunger, and by losing all the supplies.⁸²

Intensifying the dire consequences of poor sanitary measures practiced by the conquerors, who were not used to daily cleaning, the torrid heat and overwhelming humidity conspired to create an unhealthy situation that collected many lives, so it is no coincidence that reports of these days claimed that “the people of these regions for being of coast are sick, skinny and of little work, and have been devastated by pestilences and diseases.”⁸³ The period of greatest mortality was just after the rains, when “many diseases of fever and swelling belly, of what many people die”⁸⁴ were experienced. It must be considered the impact of so particular environmental conditions on poorly acclimatized foreign groups in this point, such as was the case of Mexicas, Tarascans and Tlaxcalans who accompanied the Nuño de Guzman's expedition. An anonymous witness reported that when the rains lessened “the land stayed wet, and with that steam from the rain the friendly Indians who had taken Nuño de Guzman with him, natives from Mexico, became sick, and died on very large amount.”⁸⁵

The high pluviosity and alluvial nature of the soil meant three difficulties for the Spanish colonization. The first was the many lakes and swamps that only partially dried in the lower humidity season,⁸⁶ hindering communications and resulting, in many cases, in the loss of horses, as happened with the arrival of the expeditionary host to the province of Aztatlan, a very difficult crossing “because of the many swamps in the road, in which a Nuño

⁸² “Relación hecha de viva voz por el alferez Francisco de Arceo, al capitán e historiador Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés, 1535,” in Razo, *Crónicas de la conquista*, 261-262. Details of that unfortunate event are given in the same work in the “Relacion del descubrimiento y conquista que se hizo por el gobernador Nuño de Guzmán y su ejército en las provincias de la Nueva Galicia, escrita por Gonzalo Lopez y autorizada por Alonso de Matta, escribano de su Majestad, 1530,” “Relacion de la jornada que hizo Nuño de Guzmán a Nueva Galicia, escrita por el capitán Cristóbal de Flores; n.d.,” “Relación de la jornada que hizo Nuño de Guzman a Nueva Galicia. Anónima Primera del Instituto Jalisciense de Antropología e Historia; n.d.,” and “Relación de la conquista que hizo Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán. Anónima Segunda del Instituto Jalisciense de Antropología e Historia; n.d.,” 87-88, 196, 297-298 and 317-318.

⁸³ “Interesante relacion del Ilustrisimo Señor Maraver al Rey de España; Guadalajara, 12 de diciembre de 1550”, in Orozco y Jimenez, *Coleccion de documentos históricos*, I, 208. Fray Alonso de la Mota y Escobar moderates this assessment by emphasizing that “the Spaniards who were born and have lived for a long there are very healthy and with good color, but the newly arrived ones live very painfully and change their skin the first year;” see Mota y Escobar, *Descripcion geografica*, 49-50.

⁸⁴ “Relación y memorial que su Majestad mandó hacer de la villa de la Purificación y su provincia, por fray Luis Gomez de Alvarado; 12 de enero de 1585,” in Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 213.

⁸⁵ “Relación de la conquista que hizo Nuño Beltran de Guzman. Anonima Segunda del Instituto Jalisciense de Antropología e Historia; n.d.,” in Razo, *Cronicas de la conquista*, 318.

⁸⁶ Sauer, *Aztatlan*, 21.

de Guzman's good horse drown.”⁸⁷ Moreover, witnesses highlighted that “it is only possible to walk in six months of the year because in the rainy season, for becoming rivers large and having many swamps, the mobility is possible exclusively by sea.”⁸⁸ As a consequence the supply of resources from other regions became hard, as it was in the area of Culiacan where the carrying was mostly done in “mule trains since the land is so sick and mountainous that is impossible the transport due to the many deep swamps having in this roads in the rainy season, which prevents to enter and exit from this town in four months every year.”⁸⁹

The second obstacle was the difficulty of the Iberian cultigens for adapting into such a different environment to that of the peninsula. Many Old World domestic varieties did not acclimatize, and some as vital as wheat had a limited expansion and production, restricted to specific ecological niches. The Bishop of Tlaxcala Fray Alonso de la Mota y Escobar, a tireless traveler in every nook and cranny of New Spain, writes that “the bread that Spaniards usually eat are tortillas made from corn because wheat does not grow in many leagues around due to the so warm weather.”⁹⁰ Domingo Lazaro de Arregui adds succinctly that “the airs are harmful to seeds, either by humidity... either by heat, or by both things... so the wheat gotten by June is just possible to plant by October.”⁹¹ The same author appends that the plantings could be affected by “so thick and bushy weed that chokes wheat, doing impossible to save it with weeding and other things, because if a piece of land is cleaned today, with the daily rain and heat it is like if would not had been cleaned the next day.”⁹²

The third obstacle was the challenge to livestock production, since in the words of Mota y Escobar “in this province there is no cattle or sheep and is not possible to breed them because of the great heat of the land.”⁹³ Although other sources such as the *Relaciones Geográficas* of the New Galicia⁹⁴ allow to moderate this extreme assessment, the problem

⁸⁷ “Relación de la jornada que hizo Nuño de Guzmán a Nueva Galicia, escrita por el capitán Cristóbal de Flores; n.d.,” in Razo, *Crónicas de la conquista*, 195.

⁸⁸ “Relación de la villa del Espíritu Santo que fue fundada por Nuño de Guzmán, n.d. (1582?),” BMNAM, Caja 26, folio 30, vol. 2, doc. 70, 59.

⁸⁹ Mota y Escobar, *Descripción geográfica*, 49.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Arregui, *Descripción de la Nueva Galicia*, 81.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 82.

⁹³ Mota y Escobar, *Descripción geográfica*, 49.

⁹⁴ Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 88, 94, 212 and 216.

was undoubtedly real. The meat products were hard of getting so Spaniards used to acquire them from other regions, obtaining “beef jerky and sausages sold at inflated prices.”⁹⁵

If to all these drawbacks is added the destructive and sometimes lethal action of Indian raids, who constantly harassed villas, estates and mines in the region,⁹⁶ it is valid to ask why the Spanish eagerness for perpetuating their presence in such an inhospitable area. The factors were many and of varied kind. The coast of New Galicia was a territory in which the strategic interests for spatial control of the crown, the ambitions of conquest captains for getting fantastic cities they believed thriving in more northern latitudes, the need to reward soldiers with *encomiendas*, and the demand to make profitable the veins of gold and silver, crossed. That is why the privations and dangers were a cost worthy of paying. It is true, the hope of better opportunities had led some to move to other cities or regions, as happened in the town of Espiritu Santo, province of Culiacan, which was almost totally depopulated because of “the great news of Peru, and also for being the natives poor people and the most of the province in war, where they killed the alcalde mayor (district magistrate) and other Spaniards.”⁹⁷ But despite the inconveniences, this and other settlements persisted in the region, consolidating the Spanish presence in the coastal zone. Concerns about the presence of English ships demanded the deployment of preventive measures, such as the transfer of livestock inland “in part and place where they cannot come into the hands or power of the enemies.”⁹⁸ This was not unique to New Spain since in the Viceroyalty of Peru similar arrangements were made.⁹⁹ The need to bar any landing space to Spain's European rivals consolidated the Iberian interest even for the most hostile shores of the New World.

It is fair to say that the ecological barrier to European grain production was compensated by the abundant coastal resources and fishing in freshwater (rivers and lakes).¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ Mota y Escobar, *Descripción geográfica*, 49.

⁹⁶ “Relacion de los vezinos y moradores que su Magestad tiene en la villa de San Miguel y provincia de Culiacán, y en las minas de las Virgenes della, que estan pobladas, asi de hijos de conquistadores, porque conquistador ya no [h]ay ninguno en ella, y viudas y pobladores, y lo demas que su Magestad manda se le de aviso, la qual envio Gaspar Osorio, theniente de tesorero; Guadalajara, 6 de abril de 1583,” BMNAM, Caja 26, folio 30, vol. 2, doc. 68, 43.

⁹⁷ “Relación de la villa del Espiritu Santo, que fue fundada por Nuño de Guzmán, governador que fue deste reyno; n.d. (1583?),” BMNAM, Caja 26, folio 30, vol. 2, doc. 70, 59v.

⁹⁸ “Provisión de la Real Audiencia para Baltasar de Bañuelos, para que vaya a lo de los ingleses; Guadalajara, 28 de agosto de 1573,” in Enciso Contreras, *Cedulario de Zacatecas*, 516.

⁹⁹ “Parecer dado por don García Hurtado de Mendoza al Rey acerca de despoblar ciertas islas en Chile; n.d. (1590),” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 28, 351-53.

¹⁰⁰ Mota y Escobar, *Descripción geográfica*, 49.

Besides, the western slope of the Sierra Madre is covered by coniferous forests, formed specially by holm oaks and oaks, which mingled with fruit trees “such as sapodillas, avocados, guavas, plums, custard apples, bananas in abundance, ates, ilamas, mameys, pineapples, native pepper and many others,”¹⁰¹ besides cocoa. Some domestic trees acclimated successfully, such as mangoes and limes, but “does not germinate other Spain's fruits.”¹⁰² These forests and marshlands sheltered an abundant wildlife of “Castilian and native birds, and deer, pheasants, sparrow hawks and many other birds.”¹⁰³ If native agriculture of local products is added, such as “corn, chili, squash, bean, broad bean and other seeds,”¹⁰⁴ there is a wide range of foods based on hunting, fishing, harvesting, agricultural and livestock production. Every activity was framed in a specific niche, so the economic complementarity of each of these areas was vital for the maintenance of indigenous and Hispanic populations.

The pessimistic assessment that most Spaniards made about the coast and adjacent lands of the New Galicia contrasts diametrically with the laudatory characterization of the coastal plain that extends south of the Kingdom of Chile. The foundation of the city of Concepcion in the bay of Penco, which eventually became into the main Spanish settlement in the region, was due to its promising environmental conditions. Pedro de Valdivia wrote about it on

[...] the good land that is this, of good nature, fruitful and plentiful and with sementeras and lots of wood and everything else that is necessary and required to be populated and perpetuated by us, and rightly so, because it seems to have it our God of his hand and use us in the conquest and perpetuation of it.¹⁰⁵

In another letter addressed to the Emperor Charles V and dated the same day, he was even more explicit in stating that the southern part of the government, and especially the area of mouth of Biobio river

¹⁰¹ “Relación y memorial que su Majestad mandó hacer de la villa de la Purificación y su provincia, por fray Luis Gomez de Alvarado; 12 de enero de 1585,” in Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 214.

¹⁰² “Relacion de la ciudad de Compostela por el teniente Lazaro Blanco; Compostela, 26 de noviembre de 1584,” in Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 92.

¹⁰³ “Relacion y memorial que su Majestad mando hacer de la villa de la Purificacion y su provincia, por fray Luis Gomez de Alvarado; 12 de enero de 1585,” in Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 215.

¹⁰⁴ “Relacion de la ciudad de Compostela por el teniente Lazaro Blanco; Compostela, 26 de noviembre de 1584,” in Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 92.

¹⁰⁵ “Carta de Pedro de Valdivia a sus Apoderados en la Corte; Concepción, 15 de octubre de 1550,” in Medina, *Cartas de Pedro de Valdivia*, 137.

[...] is more populous than New Spain, very healthy, fertile and peaceful, of very nice temper, rich in gold mines, that nowhere has been checked without getting anything, plenty of people, livestock and goods, what is a great new, very close to abundant gold on earth, and along it there is no other shortage but of Spaniards and horses. It is very flat, and what is not, is a gentle coast, of abundant and very cute wooden.¹⁰⁶

The lands that extend beyond the Biobío were also praised for their abundance. For example, just south of this fluvial course is the area of Arauco, which the soldier Alonso de Góngora Marmolejo called “fertile,” which explained to his own eyes the large number of Indians who lived there.¹⁰⁷ Some leagues ahead, in the basin of the Cautín river where La Imperial city was founded, the same chronicler testified these virtues by saying that such a river “runs through fertile and very populated land.”¹⁰⁸ Throughout this coastal strip climatic similarity allowed virtually the production of the same fruits as in Spain, plus the same vegetables and legumes.¹⁰⁹ However, further south of this point the increasing rainfall determines ecological conditions different from what was characterized lines before: the impossibility of growing the same European products such as in the northern cities forced the people of Valdivia port to import these goods either by sea or by land.¹¹⁰ Product of the rains, the surface becomes very muddy,¹¹¹ making it difficult not only agricultural work but also terrestrial communications. Still, famine was not an issue in this region because the land was rich in “corn, legumes and fruits of the earth... [in addition to] sheep, cows, pigs and goats.”¹¹² In other words, the import of European vegetables produced in the fields surrounding the northern cities was complemented with the abundant production of native fruits derived from the work of Aborigines, which was supplemented with cattle that acclimated to the environment. Everything shows that the coastal plains of southern Chile had much more promising conditions for human settlement than their counterparts in northern New Spain.

¹⁰⁶ “Carta de Pedro de Valdivia al Emperador Carlos V; Concepción, 15 de octubre de 1550,” in *Ibid.*, 204-5.

¹⁰⁷ Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile, desde su descubrimiento hasta el año de 1575*, ch. LV, 147.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, ch. XIL, 25.

¹⁰⁹ Vivar, *Crónica y relación copiosa y verdadera de los reinos de Chile*, ch. CIII, 262.

¹¹⁰ Ocaña, *Relación del viaje a Chile, año de 1600*, 40.

¹¹¹ Vivar, *Crónica y relación copiosa y verdadera de los reinos de Chile*, ch. CVIII, 271.

¹¹² Mariño de Lovera, *Crónica del Reino de Chile*, book I, part II, ch. XXXVIII, 139.




Figure 2. Map of the Kingdom of Chile, *Cartografía hispano colonial de Chile*.

Returning our gaze to the New Galicia, we see that the second area defined by Bishop Maraver, now on the Sierra Madre’s eastern flank, is the northern region, “a cold land of great cliffs and mountains where the cazcanes are settled, strong and very courageous people who made the last uprising and rebellion.”¹¹³ The label “cold land” is because of the territory is at an altitude of two thousand meters, reaching even higher levels in the miner sector of San Martín, Sombrerete and Chalchihuites.¹¹⁴ An anonymous report of 1608 states that “the *temple* [weather] is cold and dry, and in two or three months of the year cold northerly winds blow. The variation in time is that from November to April is cold and from April to October is hot.”¹¹⁵

Much less humid than the coastal area, the northern region used to be depicted as “hilly and barren, like all the mining lands.”¹¹⁶ Very illustrative is the evaluation of Bishop

¹¹³ “Interesante relación del Ilustrísimo Señor Maraver al Rey de España; Guadalajara, 12 de diciembre de 1550,” in Orozco y Jiménez, *Colección de documentos históricos*, I, 208.

¹¹⁴ Román Gutiérrez, *Sociedad y evangelización*, 55.

¹¹⁵ “Relación de Nuestra Señora de los Çacatecas, sacada de la información que por mandado del Consejo en ella se hizo el año de mil y seiscientos y ocho,” BMNAM, Caja 26, folio 30, vol. 2, doc. 74, 121v-122.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 121. A similar description provides Lopez de Velasco, *Geografía*, 137.

Francisco Gomez de Mendiola about the Zacatecas mines when wrote that “in eight leagues around there are not Indian peoples for being sterile for them.”¹¹⁷ Most of the coetaneous coincide in stating that this situation meant a hard barrier for agriculture and limited greatly the establishment of cattle ranches,¹¹⁸ which forced to a high dependence on products supplied from New Spain to the mines. However, unlike the coastal region it was considered a healthy territory “where usually there are not serious diseases.”¹¹⁹

Indeed, the area of Zacatecas is a complex geography that refute any simplistic characterization. The altiplanic sub-region concentrates most of the descriptions and it is therefore no coincidence that the overall picture is of arid and rugged lands, not favorable to agriculture, although rich in silver veins. But this immense desolation is torn at times by mountains and “valleys of fertile land with numerous water sources, where smallholdings predominated during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.”¹²⁰ Those ecological niches were suitable for sustaining forests with diverse and abundant fauna,¹²¹ dominated by deer and birds as “hens [of the land], turtledoves, goslings, ducks and others.”¹²² More difficult to access and generally far from the large population centers, the canyons were fertile spaces of great natural diversity, where small, medium and large farms focused on agricultural and livestock production to supply mining centers.¹²³ Alonso de la Mota y Escobar wrote that “there are some Spaniards who have out of town large truck gardens of fruits and legumes.”¹²⁴

The most common vegetation is spiny desert scrub. Cactus, *nopales* (paddle cactus), mesquite and palm alternated with varied predominance in each sub-area. The *nopal* and its fruit the *tuna* (prickly pear), occupied a vital place in the feeding of the gatherer-hunters who roamed the mountains and streams of the highlands, standing out the Tunal Grande, a vast extension abundant of *nopales* located in the heart of the Malpais (covering the territories of

¹¹⁷ “Carta del obispo Francisco Gomez de Mendiola al rey; Guadalajara, 23 de diciembre de 1572,” in Enciso Contreras, *Epistolario de Zacatecas*, 111.

¹¹⁸ Arregui, *Descripción de la Nueva Galicia*, 163, writes that “there are just a few pastures all around.”

¹¹⁹ “Relacion de Nuestra Señora de los Çacatecas, sacada de la información que por mandado del Consejo en ella se hizo el año de mil y seiscientos y ocho,” BMNAM, Caja 26, folio 30, vol. 2, doc. 74, 122.

¹²⁰ Flores Olague *et alii*, *Breve historia de Zacatecas*, 86.

¹²¹ López Luján, *Nómadas y sedentarios*, 15.

¹²² “Relacion de Nuestra Señora de los Çacatecas, sacada de la informacion que por mandado del Consejo en ella se hizo el año de mil y seiscientos y ocho,” BMNAM, Caja 26, folio 30, vol. 2, doc. 74, 122v.

¹²³ Flores Olague *et alii*, *Breve historia de Zacatecas*, 86.

¹²⁴ Mota y Escobar, *Descripcion geografica*, 67.

modern Mexican states of Guanajuato, San Luis Potosi, Zacatecas, Aguascalientes and Jalisco),¹²⁵ where the Chichimecs used to sustain themselves with this fruit. Pedro de Ahumada, leader of the punitive expedition that crushed the rebellion of Zacatec and Guachichil Indians in 1561, said that the Malpais “has over thirty leagues of forest and very rough boulders where the Indians have many tunas and palm and hunting for their maintenance.”¹²⁶ When the Spaniards arrived to the region for the first time, the Zacatecas's surrounding mountains were covered of “holm oaks, pines and some cedars without fruit.”¹²⁷ However, the mining works caused a systematic deforestation that razed much of the forests, as we will see.

In the words of Thomas Calvo, this was “the mining and pioneer region par excellence.”¹²⁸ High revenues from mining activity were a powerful magnet for immigration of entrepreneurs and adventurers who wanted to carve out a more promising future. Since the discovery of Zacatecas in 1546 other towns and cities, as Nombre de Dios and Durango in 1562,¹²⁹ were founded, and new silver mines as Indehe and Santa Barbara in 1567, Mazapil in 1568 and Charcas in 1573, were discovered.¹³⁰ So it is no coincidence that the Mexican historian Wigberto Jimenez Moreno referred to Zacatecas as the “Mother of North.”¹³¹

The equivalent territory in Chilean land to the just described is the Andean piedmont inhabited by groups perfectly adapted to the harsh conditions of cold and snow prevailing especially in winter. The chroniclers agree that these natives, called *Pewenches* for their high economic dependence on the fruit of pewen tree (*Araucaria Araucaria*), which dispersion area extends between the Antuco and Quetrupillán volcanoes, were indeed a set of diverse populations that even shared a common language. In other words, the term involved “to human groups which without being fully coincident in their respective ethno-cultural

¹²⁵ Lopez Austin, *Mexico's indigenous past*, 128.

¹²⁶ “Informacion acerca de la rebelion de los indios zacatecas y guachichiles a pedimento de Pedro de Ahumada Samano: Interrogatorio; minas de Zacatecas, 24 de enero de 1562,” in Montoto, *Coleccion de documentos*, 256.

¹²⁷ “Relacion de Nuestra Señora de los Çacatecas, sacada de la informacion que por mandado del Consejo en ella se hizo el año de mil y seiscientos y ocho,” BMNAM, Caja 26, folio 30, vol. 2, doc. 74, 122. Mota y Escobar, *Descripcion geografica*, 63, states that “in the days of its discovery there were many trees and mountains in these gorges.”

¹²⁸ Calvo, *La Nueva Galicia en los siglos XVI y XVII*, 23.

¹²⁹ “Informe al rey por el Cabildo Eclesiastico de Guadalajara, acerca de las cosas de aquel reino; 20 de enero de 1570,” in Garcia Icazbalceta, *Coleccion de documentos*, II, 492-3. The historical confusion about the year of foundation of Nombre de Dios is treated by Barlow & Smisor, *Nombre de Dios*, XVII, footnote 6.

¹³⁰ Florescano, “Colonización, ocupacion del suelo..,” 47.

¹³¹ Jimenez Moreno, “Zacatecas, Madre del Norte,” 99-100.

histories, shared a peculiar eco-cultural adaptation to the humid forests of the rainy temperate environments placed on the edge of the Andean *Pewenía*.¹³² Only in the seventeenth century and as a result of the *Reche-Mapuche* immigration to transcordilleran territory, historical process known as Araucanization of the Pampa, the *Pewenches* incorporated mapudungun as a lingua franca,¹³³ whereby eventually passed into oblivion every one of the vernacular languages. Chroniclers usually characterized them with less laudatory terms than those for *Reche-Mapuches*, highlighting their high spatial mobility and their primitive economy based mainly on hunting and gathering. Soldier Gerónimo de Quiroga pictures them as follows

They are very rude and uncultured people, like the rigid country they inhabit; sustain themselves by hunting deer and ostriches and with carob seeds: they have no homes or crops; the air, mountains and rivers sustain them, and the sun guide the moving of their homes, moving from one to other sites, in the same way that birds and animals move to pass the seasons of year escaping from the snow; they are dressed in animal skins, or what is to say covered with a skin or many skins together. They are skilled with bows and arrows, and with stones tied to a rope made from nerves hit in the feet of the lighter deer or ostrich, and drink the hot blood of these animals.¹³⁴

The most important Spanish settlement on this ecological floor was the Villarrica city, founded by order of Pedro de Valdivia next to a huge lake that “has great abundance of fish from which all the town is provided.”¹³⁵ The name of the city was because the conqueror ordered to edify it informed by the natives that abounded silver ores there;¹³⁶ in the words of soldier Pedro Mariño de Lovera, “the cause of naming it Villarica was the large sum of gold and silver in its mines.”¹³⁷ Indeed, during the sixteenth century the jurisdiction of Villarrica became into one of the main suppliers of precious metals in the Kingdom of Chile.

Finally, bishop Maraver describes the southernmost section of the Kingdom of New Galicia, a warm and fruitful land of “great health and goodness, of rich silver mines, copper

¹³² Errázuriz et al., *Manual de Geografía de Chile*, 163.

¹³³ Silva & Téllez, “Los Pewenche: identidad y configuración,” 8.

¹³⁴ Quiroga, *Compendio histórico de los más principales sucesos de la Conquista del Reino de Chile*, 23.

¹³⁵ Ocaña, *Relación del viaje a Chile, año de 1600*, 41.

¹³⁶ Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile, desde su descubrimiento hasta el año de 1575*, ch. XIII, 30.

¹³⁷ Mariño de Lovera, *Crónica del Reino de Chile*, book I, part II, ch. XXXIX, 141.

and other metals.”¹³⁸ Stand out the Guachinango, Guaxacatlan, Xocotlan and Cuytlapilco mines, of high productivity although after the Zacatecas veins.¹³⁹

The hidric resource is more abundant than in the governorship's northern half, concentrating especially in fluvial valleys and lake basins, such as Lake Chapala. This situation, besides the proximity to the Mesoamerican's cultural influence area, meant that local communities were divided between those of gatherer-hunter technology, and those who developed more complex adaptations, food producers, characterized as “docile people who have reason and policy.”¹⁴⁰ The nomads used to mobilize in the “San Pedro de Analco mountains and Guainamota, and that of the Coras which are greatly scabrous, warm, and sterile, and there inhabit the barbarian Chichimec Indians as in a shelter against enemies, who maintain themselves of only roots, strawberry, hunting and fishing.”¹⁴¹ These mountain ranges were covered with conifers that provided food and shelter to the Indians.¹⁴²

The wide variety of ecological niches and the availability of water in the form of rain or canalizable fluvial currents, allowed a high production of local resources and the adaptation of a large number of crops from the Old World. Thus, fruits of the land such as “custard apple, aates, ilamas, sapodillas, zapotes, avocados, guamuchiles, guavas” alternated with other ones brought by Europeans such as “pear, peach, quince, apple, fig, pomegranate, grape, and others of this genre.”¹⁴³ As part of the visita general general inspection of 1550, Hernan Martinez of March “made to bring many grapes and vines from the province of Michoacan to plant and produce in the province of Guadalajara.”¹⁴⁴

Guadalajara, which ultimately became into the capital of Nueva Galicia displacing from this condition to Compostela, was the main political, economic and social enclave south of New Galicia.¹⁴⁵ Captain Cristobal de Oñate, following the instructions of Nuño Beltran de

¹³⁸ “Interesante relación del Ilustrísimo Señor Maraver al Rey de España; Guadalajara, 12 de diciembre de 1550,” in Orozco y Jimenez, *Colección de documentos históricos*, I, 209.

¹³⁹ Lopez de Velasco, *Geografía*, 136.

¹⁴⁰ “Interesante relacion del Ilustrísimo Señor Maraver al Rey de España; Guadalajara, 12 de diciembre de 1550,” in Orozco y Jimenez, *Colección de documentos históricos*, I, 209.

¹⁴¹ Mota y Escobar, *Descripción geográfica*, 27.

¹⁴² Román Gutiérrez, *Sociedad y evangelización*, 51.

¹⁴³ Mota y Escobar, *Descripción geográfica*, 19.

¹⁴⁴ “Suma de la visita general de 1550,” AGI, Guadalajara 5, 2v.

¹⁴⁵ By royal decree signed in Toledo on May 10, 1560, it was ordered that the *Real Audiencia* of New Galicia, royal cash and offices moved from Compostela to Guadalajara. On August 31, 1560, a royal decree and papal bull which authorized to transfer the Bishopric of Compostela to Guadalajara was issued. The arguments for the transfer of the capital and episcopal chair from Compostela to Guadalajara are detailed in Tello, *Crónica*

Guzman, established its first settlement in the area of Nochistlan on January 5, 1532, “in the most useful, fruitful, healthy and kindness place across the kingdom.”¹⁴⁶ However, the need to be near the routes of communication with surrounding regions, and the eagerness to control the nomadic groups that harassed the inhabitants, meant the city moved to the Tonalá place on August 8, 1533, contradicting the provisions of governor Guzman.¹⁴⁷ Feeling undermined his authority and interests, he ordered to move the city to the region of Tlacotan on March, 1535.¹⁴⁸ However, the Mixton War was a test for the new emplacement, since in September 1541 it was ravaged by rebel hordes that “burned the church and houses of the said town.”¹⁴⁹ Thus, Cristobal de Oñate, the first founder and current governor of New Galicia, ordered the definitive move to the valley of Atejamac, in the village of Tetlan in October 1541, formalizing the foundation on February 14, 1542. It was also in this year when the royal decrees issued by Emperor Charles V in November 1539 arrived. By this documents the monarchy granted to Guadalajara the title of city and coat of arms,¹⁵⁰ doing the proclamation on August 10, 1542.¹⁵¹

The Chilean territory equivalent to that just described, especially for its promising weather conditions and soil quality for agricultural production was the central valley that runs north to south flanked by the Cordillera de la Costa and the Andes. Fray Diego de Ocaña said early seventeenth century in his *Relación* that “the land is so fertile that wherever they sow maize, it grows.”¹⁵² Some decades later the Jesuit Alonso de Ovalle stated that “the land is very abundant and fertile, fruits and seeds mature very well; there is good wine and good crops of raisins, figs and other dried fruits.” Stresses in this region the Purén valley, which besides being “very cool at all times and very fertile”¹⁵³ was one of the mainstays of

Miscelánea, ch. 185, 576-578, and in the “Cuaderno de las provanzas que se hicieron por parte de la ciudad de Guadalajara, y de los otros pueblos de la Nueva Galicia, en el pleito entre los obispos de la Nueva Galicia [y] Mechacan sobre los limites, y mudar la silla a la ciudad de Guadalajara de la de Compostela; Guadalajara, 1550,” in Orozco y Jiménez, *Colección de documentos históricos*, I, 41-200.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ See the “Auto del gobernador Nuño de Guzmán para mudar la villa [de Guadalajara],” in Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. 66, 197-199.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, ch. 73, 223.

¹⁴⁹ “Fragmento de la visita hecha a don Antonio de Mendoza: Interrogatorio; México, 8 de enero de 1547,” in García Icazbalceta, *Colección de documentos*, II, 112.

¹⁵⁰ Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. 95, 314-317.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, ch. 142, 478.

¹⁵² Ocaña, *Relación del viaje a Chile, año de 1600*, 37.

¹⁵³ Ovalle, *Histórica relación del Reino de Chile*, I, 56.

indigenous resistance. Indeed, the high fertility of the central valley allowed to have sufficient resources to make it a densely populated area by natives. This situation was a factor of attraction for Hispanic interests, who did not waste the opportunity to get encomiendas by building in surroundings the city of Angol, which came to have good vines, a lot of cattle and large crops of wheat, as well to produce fruits such as apple and quince.

In sum, the three areas defined by bishop Maraver for New Galicia as well as soldiers and religious for the Kingdom of Chile show that both governorates were a mosaic of different ecological spaces. Each one involved a challenge for adaptation of both native groups and Spanish settlers and their allies. The geographic diversity and seasonal availability of resources entailed the implantation of nomads's programmed mobility strategies to optimize at maximum the exploitation of goods distributed unequally in northern Mexico and in the Andean foothills.

From roots to contact: ethnic panorama of New Galicia and south-central Chile

At the peak of Chichimec War, when the guidelines to follow for the final consolidation of Spanish power over the nomadic groups of Nueva Galicia and surrounding areas were discussed, the Franciscan clergyman Juan Alonso Velazquez made see that in all the land

there are many and great signs of ancient villages, and the land had been cultivated intensively, which convinces us that this land had been possessed by other people in other time, who were prone to build and to culture, of which totally lack all those who possess it now, because they do not have any kind of building and do not work the land but only in a very few places and in a little amount¹⁵⁴.

In his monumental *Historia General de los Hechos de los Castellanos* (General History of the Acts of the Castellanos), Antonio Herrera reinforces this assessment when writes that

¹⁵⁴ "Relación de Juan Alonso Velázquez, clérigo beneficiado de la villa de San Miguel de los Chichimecas, sobre la guerra con los indios fronteros y los remedios para concluir con ella, 1582," in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 454.

wherever the Spaniards have traveled on Chichimec land have found big towns, and that the land has been quite cultivated, which make to believe that it was possessed by people devoted to work and build, of which the Chichimecs completely lack, because they do not have any building and do not plow but just a little and in a few parts¹⁵⁵.

The allusion to a past characterized by the political life and devotion to work emerged from a deep contradiction manifested in the eyes of the Spaniards: people with so barbaric customs as the Chichimecs, devoted to idleness and vices, could not be the managers of monumental works which were now only ruins. By contrast, for Christians the nomadic bands were responsible for a political, economic and cultural decline throughout the region.

In recent times archeology has found evidence confirming this conjecture. What in the sixteenth century was the New Galicia –including its split territories of Nueva Vizcaya, Nuevo Leon and Sinaloa–, in previous centuries had been an area of interaction between two cultural traditions, the Mesoamerican and Aridamerican. Their borderlands experienced progressions and reversals to the rhythm of climatic changes and migratory waves that crossed the territory.

The Mesoamerican cultural area, defined by Paul Kirchoff in 1943, encompassed a set of highly complex cultures, food producers, settled in cities (nucleated or dispersed), with monumental buildings and art, where administrative, religious and economic tasks were carried forward with the support of writing and complex mathematics, among other variables.¹⁵⁶ On the contrary, like an absolute antithesis of its southern counterpart, northwestern Mexico has been traditionally defined as the land of “no”: “Where there is no monumental architecture, no stucco, no writing or calendar, no systematized religion, no urbanism, and so on.”¹⁵⁷ This is consequence that throughout the southwestern United States and northern Mexico developed several millennia ago a “culture of the desert,” many of whose characteristic elements lasted until the arrival of the Spaniards. The archeologist Beatriz Braniff, a leading specialist, appoints as characteristic elements

¹⁵⁵ Herrera, *Historia General de los hechos de los Castellanos*, Decade VIII, book VI, ch. 15, 78.

¹⁵⁶ Kirchoff, *Mesoamerica*, 92-107.

¹⁵⁷ Schondube, “El Occidente de México,” 130. For a discussion on the validity of the concept Mesoamerica and its spatial limits see Creamer, “Mesoamerica as a concept,” 35-62. Also the papers presented at the XIX Mesa Redonda de la Sociedad Mexicana de Antropología, compiled in *La validez teórica del concepto Mesoamérica*.

A dispersed population, small sociopolitical groups, preference for living in caves, seasonal nomadism, intense exploitation of the environment, small grains harvest and special techniques for their preparation, basketry and cordage, making of nets, mats, clothing garments made from skins, frames made of wood and net (cribs, baskets), sandals, atlatl (dart thrower), bow and arrow –in more recent times–, wood lances with points hardened by fire, unfluted projectile points, percussion techniques, use of large flakes and cores, chipped stones to make millstones and grindstones, digging poles, fire produced by rotating (hole), curved and flattened clubs (“rabbit sticks”), tubular pipes or suction tubes of stone, plant recipients, dogs, lack of axes and “throat” adzes, and no trace of agriculture.¹⁵⁸

In other words, the “desert culture” was a set of adaptive strategies based on the development of technologies for hunting, fishing and gathering, in order to maximize the efficient exploitation of resources distributed in an environment characterized by relative scarcity of water. The uneven distribution of natural resources meant an equally uneven distribution of population. The Sierra Madre Occidental, the backbone of the New Galicia, provided a range of ecological niches separated each other by short distances, which was favorable for relatively stable settlements.¹⁵⁹ In the central plateau, populated mostly by nonagricultural groups, the collecting activities followed an annual cycle; for instance, in the area of San Luis Potosi the vegetable feeding was based on fruits in summer and on roots in winter.¹⁶⁰ Collecting was complemented by hunting deer, squirrels and, in the lagoon edges, birds. Juan Alonso de Velazquez, speaking on the native economy, said that “they feed with hunting, wild fruits, roots and bugs.”¹⁶¹ In the following century Fray Antonio Tello stated that the Chichimecs “neither sow nor gather or have nothing for their sustenance except of grass's roots and what they hunt with the bow.”¹⁶²

Interdisciplinary studies have shown that ecological features of this region underwent changes over time. The “desert culture” has a more ancient origin than the Mesoamerican tradition, since its origins date back to about 7,000 years before present in the Holocene, when a global phenomenon of rising temperatures known as *Climatic Optimum* or

¹⁵⁸ Braniff, “Los teochichimecas,” 33-34.

¹⁵⁹ Hers, “La sombra de los desconocidos,” 66.

¹⁶⁰ Kirchoff, “Los recolectores-cazadores del norte de Mexico,” 136.

¹⁶¹ “Relación de Juan Alonso Velázquez, clérigo beneficiado de la villa de San Miguel de los Chichimecas, sobre la guerra con los indios fronteros y los remedios para concluir con ella, 1582,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 455.

¹⁶² Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. 28, 71.

Altithermal was experienced. The result was an increase in arid areas, and acclimatization, migration or extinction of plant and animal species, carrying the consequent adaptation of human populations. Within the limits of New Galicia this adaptation was expressed in two ways: some groups settled in the highlands with more moisture, while others settled in the semi-desert areas of the central plateau.¹⁶³

It was from this bifurcation in settlement patterns and exploitation of environment that gestated the cultural differentiation seen by conquerors many centuries later, is worth to say, economies of appropriation or extractives coexisting with economies of food production, also developing intermediate forms.¹⁶⁴ The Chupicuaro culture, maximum expression of Upper Formative (500 BC-100 AD)¹⁶⁵ in the areas of Michoacan, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Queretaro, Jalisco, Zacatecas and Durango, was born by the crossing of foreign influences with local traditions.¹⁶⁶ It meant the consolidation of agriculture development and village life which had been brewing for centuries,¹⁶⁷ and because of its transcendence in the cultural complexity of the region has been compared with the Olmec civilization, since it gave the basis that characterized the sedentary societies that followed.

The heiress of Chupicuaro as regent culture was Chalchihuites (AD 1-1300), a product of immigration of southern farmers, probably natives to the Valley of Mexico, who joined the numerous villages of the preceding tradition. This is why Marie-Areti Hers proposes the very admissible idea that Chalchihuites encompassed many peoples who probably spoke very different languages and were perhaps antagonistic to each other.¹⁶⁸ The defensive pattern of settlements gives account of these rivalries, to which must also be added the harassment of hostile hunter-gatherers, partakers of the desert culture, who raided villages tempted by surplus crops¹⁶⁹: site La Quemada, with its imposing walls, is which best exemplify this conflictive situation. During the middle phase (500-900 AD in Hers's

¹⁶³ Flores Olague et alii, *Breve historia de Zacatecas*, 27.

¹⁶⁴ Lopez Luján, *Nómadas y sedentarios*, 13.

¹⁶⁵ For a discussion on the chronology of Chupicuaro see Braniff, "La tradición del Golfo," 95-103.

¹⁶⁶ Braniff, "Oscilación de la frontera septentrional Mesoamericana," 40. Brooks, "A Loma San Gabriel/Chalchihuites cultural manifestation," 85. Chadwick, "Archaeological synthesis of Michoacan", 660. Schondube & Galvan, "Salvage archaeology at El Grillo-Tabachines," 158.

¹⁶⁷ Gorenstein, "Western and northwestern Mexico," 324.

¹⁶⁸ Hers, "Zacatecas y Durango," 116.

¹⁶⁹ Weigand & García, "Dinámica socioeconómica de la frontera prehispánica de Mesoamérica," 118. Flores Olague et alii, *Breve historia de Zacatecas*, 39. Hers, *Los toltecas en tierras chichimecas*, 106-112. Other researchers propose, however, that the expansion of southern farmers as well as their relationship to the gatherer-hunter groups was rather peaceful; see Kelley, "Speculations on the culture history," 20.

chronology, 300-900 AD in Lopez Lujan's)¹⁷⁰ they kept close contacts with the city of Teotihuacan, which provided of minerals such as ocher, hematite and turquoise for making luxury goods, becoming the site of Alta Vista (Zacatecas) in the core of this relationship. Thus, the region was incorporated marginally to the Mesoamerican area, although the degree of influence exercised by Toltecs of the Valley of Mexico on local groups is still debated.¹⁷¹

Anyway, the decline of Chalchihuites culture was contemporary with the disintegration of Teotihuacan, which would be a sign of the decisive influence of the Mesoamerican city, but it cannot rule out the intervention of possible climate changes that would have affected all of central and north of Mexico¹⁷². The fall of Alta Vista did not prevent that the village life pattern perpetuated for a few centuries because Tuitlán (also called La Quemada) assumed the hegemony of the region in the late stage (900-1300 AD), but its exacerbated centralism and eagerness to grow at the expense of their neighbors generated strong resistance culminating in its destruction around 1300 AD¹⁷³. This meant the disappearance of the high cultures across the area, leaving as the only living remnant the farmers of Cazcan society, and the ruins of the villages as mute testimony to a past characterized by social hierarchy and intraregional conflict.

Gradually, the area was occupied by gatherer-hunter groups while the agricultural frontier experienced a throwback to southern latitudes. This immigration, however, did not stop a sharp demographic drop in the region¹⁷⁴. A handful of farmer groups scattered throughout the territory, but mostly in the southern border, coexisted in an uneasy relationship with a large mass of nomadic societies. This was the cultural panorama the Spaniards met when arrived in the territory they would call the New Galicia. Its inhabitants were called *Chichimecs*, *Teochichimecs* or *Teules Chichimecs*, the “authentic chichimecs,” a term inherited from the Mesoamerican tradition to refer to northern societies involved in certain practices and customs that contrasted with its own, such as nomadism and political atomization. The Mesoamericans named that region *Chichimecatlalli*, the “Land of the Chichimecs,” or with the more illustrative expression *Teotlalpan tlacochcalco mictlampa*,

¹⁷⁰ Hers, *Ibid.*, 39. Lopez Luján, *Nómadas y sedentarios*, 56.

¹⁷¹ The one who best summarizes this discussion is López Luján, *Nómadas y sedentarios*, 60-67.

¹⁷² Flores Olague et alii, *Breve historia de Zacatecas*, 43.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 54.

¹⁷⁴ Gorenstein, “Western and northwestern Mexico,” 325.

referring to a place of misery, pain, suffering, thirst, hunger and death.¹⁷⁵ The Iberians called it simply the “Chichimec land,” although coated with the same derogatory epithets given by inhabitants of the valley of Mexico. In recent times it has established among specialists the expression “Gran Chichimeca,” alluding to a vast territory that stretched from the Lerma river in Guanajuato, to southern Utah and Colorado¹⁷⁶ in the parallel 38° N,¹⁷⁷ covering much of what today is northern Mexico and the southwestern United States. The limits of this geocultural space were changing over time, as has been well demonstrated by interdisciplinary studies.¹⁷⁸

If we look south of the continent, we see that the chronicler Garcilaso de la Vega does not attribute to *Reche-Mapuches* the destruction of great cultures, but do of having hampered the beneficial influence of Tawantinsuyu. The story of the origin myth holds that the Incas were devoted into the task of giving precepts and laws to societies incorporated into its empire so that they “live like men in reason and urbanity, to dwell in houses and towns, for tilling the lands, cultivate plants and crops, raise livestock and exploit them and the fruits of the earth as rational men and not like beasts”.¹⁷⁹ The resistance that northern *Reche-Mapuches* –called purumaucaes or promaucaes in chronicles– opposed to advancing of the Empire of the Sun had its climax in the Battle of the Maule, confrontation that lasted for three days, at the end of which the imperial forces “decided to get back into what they had gotten and mark the Maule river as the limit of their Empire.”¹⁸⁰ By consolidating the conquests and transferring to the dominated the benefits of civilization, the Incas hoped to attract the rebel groups, who would eventually join voluntarily to imperial life¹⁸¹. Prominent authors of nineteenth-century Chilean historiography, such as Diego Barros Arana, incorporated this idea in their works inflating it to the extent of proposing that every cultural development (agriculture, ceramic technology, animal domestication, etc.) of natives of northern and central Chilean territory was merit of Peruvian influence,¹⁸² approach that has been

¹⁷⁵ Armillas, “The arid frontier of Mexican civilization,” 697.

¹⁷⁶ Braniff, “Introducción,” 8.

¹⁷⁷ Di Peso, *Casas Grandes*, 53.

¹⁷⁸ Braniff, “The Mesoamerican Northern Frontier and the Gran Chichimeca,” 66.

¹⁷⁹ De la Vega, *Comentarios Reales de los Incas*, I, book I, ch. 15, 41.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, II, book VII, ch. 20, 132. On the problem of southern limit of the Inca Empire see Silva, “Los promaucaes y la frontera meridional incaica en Chile.” For an interdisciplinary debate, confront it with Planella et alii, “La fortaleza indígena del Cerro Grande de La Compañía.”

¹⁸¹ De la Vega, *Comentarios Reales de los Incas*, II, book VII, ch. 20, 132.

¹⁸² Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, I, 60.

discredited by archaeological research in the early decades of twentieth century¹⁸³ as well as those of the last time.¹⁸⁴

Before *Reche-Mapuches* the territory between Itata and Toltén rivers experienced the emergence of two cultural developments: the Pitrén and El Vergel Cultural Complexes. Pitrén Complex (*ca.* 500-1000 AD.) is the first agro-ceramic manifestation of the south central Chilean area,¹⁸⁵ although Dillehay warns the possibility that it was only “one of the different contemporary complexes present in different parts of the extreme southern region of Chile.”¹⁸⁶ Various authors agree in linking this ceramic manifestation with the formative cultures of South America, paying attention to the Molle, Bato and Lolleo developments in Chile, as well as Candelaria and Condorhuasi in Argentina.¹⁸⁷ However, until now there is not any work aimed at establishing systematic comparisons.

Carlos Aldunate has suggested that Pitrén has very deep roots in the earlier traditions of hunter-gatherers, which received from the north innovations such as ceramics and probably some knowledge of crops, as corn and potatoes. Everything indicates that they did not know large-scale agricultural technologies, such as crop rotation, irrigation works, or soil fertilization. In short, horticulture meant for Pitrén people “only a supplement to the resources provided by the gathering and hunting, which probably continued playing a leading role in the survival of these groups.”¹⁸⁸

By the first millennium of the Christian era the El Vergel Complex (1000-1550 AD.), which has been defined in various ways, emerges. Aldunate, based primarily on works by Latcham,¹⁸⁹ Bullock,¹⁹⁰ and Menghin,¹⁹¹ characterizes it as a funerary complex¹⁹² while Dillehay rather as a ceramic complex¹⁹³. The first characterizes El Vergel by the presence of various forms of burial, being the most characteristic the inhumation in urns, but also there

¹⁸³ Latcham, *Alfarería indígena chilena*, 235.

¹⁸⁴ Sánchez, “El Tawantinsuyu salvaje en el Finis Terrae Australis.”

¹⁸⁵ Aldunate, “Estadio alfarero en el sur de Chile,” 335.

¹⁸⁶ Dillehay, *Araucanía: presente y pasado*, 107.

¹⁸⁷ Menghin, *Estudios de Prehistoria Araucana*. Aldunate, “Estadio alfarero en el sur de Chile,” 338. Dillehay, *Araucanía: presente y pasado*.

¹⁸⁸ Aldunate, “En el país de los lagos, bosques y volcanes,” 62.

¹⁸⁹ Latcham, *Alfarería indígena chilena*.

¹⁹⁰ Bullock, “Urnas funerarias prehistóricas de la región de Angol.” Bullock, *La Cultura Kofkeche*.

¹⁹¹ Menghin, *Estudios de Prehistoria Araucana*.

¹⁹² Aldunate, “Estadio alfarero en el sur de Chile,” 339-42.

¹⁹³ Dillehay, *Araucanía: presente y pasado*.

are burial of bodies surrounded by stones, burials in extended position and in wooden coffins (“funeral canoes”). The funerary offerings include rectangular, trapezoidal or circular copper earrings, stone and pottery pipes, utilitarian pots with annular grooves in the neck, monochrome symmetrical and asymmetric jars, decorated with red or black pigments on white slip, keeping virtually the same ways of those in Pitrén Complex. The second, however, describes it as a pottery tradition different from Pitrén, which would have been gestated by the stimulus of Amazonian and/or Andean influences. Those people developed new economic strategies linked to food production through horticulture and domestication of camelids, including also the practice of metallurgy. The presence of pottery decorated with geometric motifs in red or black paint on white slip is one of the most characteristic features of this cultural complex.

Sites of El Vergel Complex usually located near rivers to irrigate their crops such as “potatoes, corn, beans and perhaps quinoa,” which means a higher agricultural dependence over their Pitrén predecessors. Similarly, domestication of camelids “was well established” and “land and sea gathering and hunting always played a dominant role in the economy.”¹⁹⁴

Using a reductionist approach, the men of the sword and the cross portrayed the *Chichimecs* and *Reche-Mapuches* by a series of traits opposed to the attributes of the Christian world and the high cultures included in the sphere of influence of the Toltec and Quechua civilizations. The letter of Hernan Cortes to the Emperor Charles V was the baptismal certificate of the ethnoterm *Chichimec* in colonial literature. In it the conqueror notes that “between the north coast and the province of Mechuacan there are certain people and population they call *Chichimecs*; they are very barbaric people and not so sensible like those in this provinces.”¹⁹⁵ From then on the denominations by which it was pursued to establish a subalternity relationship were repeated in chronicles, reports, letters, official and ecclesiastic documentation, although with different nuances. In this way, the category *Chichimec* hid behind a unique classificatory term “many differences of languages and nations in short distance such as pames, copuces, samues, tzantzas, guaxavanes, macolias, guamares, guachichiles and many others of different names, although in customs are almost

¹⁹⁴ Aldunate, “Estadio alfarero en el sur de Chile,” 341.

¹⁹⁵ “Quinta carta-relación de Hernán Cortés al emperador Carlos V. Tenuxtitan, 3 de septiembre de 1526,” in *Hernán Cortés. Cartas y documentos*, 321.

all of them one”¹⁹⁶. In this context, the term *Reche-Mapuche* involves a complexity of another nature, since natives of southern Chile were never called *Rechés* by the Spaniards, despite the evidence reveals that it was the ethnoterm by which the numerous groups of relatives appointed themselves throughout the colonial period alluding to the idea of “true or pure people,”¹⁹⁷ while the word *Mapuche* just appears in the historical literature in the late nineteenth century.¹⁹⁸ In sixteenth and the following centuries the Spaniards named populations of southern Biobio river according to two criteria: first, their spatial settlement, ie, because of the various sub-regions where the numerous native segments, and secondly, to the great cultural unity (language and customs) they shared. Both approaches are opposite, because while under the spatial variable Indians were identified according to the *ayllarewe* or province they were born (araucanos, tucapelinos, purenes, coyuncheses, quechereguas, etc.), with the latter they were simply identified with the generic term “Indians of Chile.” The principles supporting the second approach demonstrate a large gap between the reality of the *Chichimecs* and that of *Reche-Mapuches*, since the latter, unlike the former, participated of a great cultural unity, being very important in this integration the community of language: Mapudungun or language of the land.

Chantal Cramaussel has shown how imprecise and contradictory colonial sources can be at the time of distinguishing and characterizing societies named as *Chichimecs*¹⁹⁹. The main classification criterion was that of *nation*, which included the descendants of a common ancestor, not necessarily founded on principles of territoriality. As the author declares,

Nation, at that time, referred only to sets of individuals who lived together and resembled each other, and who were supposed to were from, therefore, a common lineage; the degree of accuracy or of fully knowledge by which it was used term in the documentation was, then, highly variable.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁶ “Relación de Juan Alonso Velázquez, clérigo beneficiado de la villa de San Miguel de los Chichimecas, sobre la guerra con los indios fronteros y los remedios para concluir con ella, 1582,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 453.

¹⁹⁷ Boccara, *Los vencedores*, 82.

¹⁹⁸ On the system of denominations of *Reche-Mapuches* and its historical evolution, see Sánchez, “¿Cómo se autodenominaban los mapuches?”

¹⁹⁹ Cramaussel, “De cómo los españoles clasificaban a los indios,” 275.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 277. The Covarrubias’ definition to the concept of *nation* proves to be unenlightening: “From the Latin name *natio*. Equivalent to Kingdom, or long Province, as the Spanish nation.” For greater precision, it must be said that the Latin word *natio* could mean birth, people (in the ethnic sense), kind or class; see Covarrubias, *Tesoro de la lengua Castellana*, 560. Tamar Herzog, however, has made to see that Spain was not defined solely

Language was a recurring category when classifying natives, but it was combined with other variables such as the nature of intergroup relationships (peaceful or violent).²⁰¹ The modern linguistic has determined that most of the New Galicia's linguistic families were part of the large Yuto-Nahua trunk,²⁰² better known in the Spanish American specialized literature as Uto-Aztecan.²⁰³ However, the limited and often null command that Spaniards had of the *lenguas peregrinas* [wandering languages], as the Count of Monterrey called the nomadic groups' tongues,²⁰⁴ made that in many occasions peninsulars create fictitious borders within a culture which only had dialectal differences as a result of an extensive regional dispersion.

Still, despite the cumulus of inaccuracies incurred by soldiers, bureaucrats and ecclesiastics in their descriptions of the societies that inhabited the New Galicia and adjacent regions, it is possible to sketch a classification founded, at the Hispanic eyes, on idiomatic, territorial, economic, technological and customs criteria. The Augustinian Friar Guillermo de Santa Maria, in his "Guerra de los Chichimecas" [Chichimecs' War],²⁰⁵ one of the most frequented treatises by scholars interested in the early contact of northern Mexico, draw one of the most detailed descriptions of the native societies of those days. In the first paragraphs he states that "these chichimecs are divided into many nations and factions and in different languages."²⁰⁶ Distributed between the river San Juan and the mines of Zacatecas, he

by reference to criteria such as religion, servitude or even descendents, which configures a more complex identity system; see Herzog, *Defining nations*, 10.

²⁰¹ Pérez de Ribas, *Historia de los triumphos de nuestra Santa Fee*, 5; the Jesuit priest illustrates this assertion when says that "I call them different nations, for although they are not as populated they are divided in treatment each other. Sometimes in totally different languages, but also happens to share one only language, and despite all this to be disunited and faced. And in which all of them are divided and opposed is in continuous wars among themselves, killing each other. And also in respecting the frontiers, lands, and places populated by each one of these nations, which they considered as an ownership, so that who dared to enter into alien lands was risking to lose the head in hands of the enemy he faced."

²⁰² Schumann, "Movimientos lingüísticos en el norte de Mexico," 169-171.

²⁰³ Gerhard, *The northern frontier of New Spain*, 39-42.

²⁰⁴ "Carta del Conde de Monterrey a Felipe III; México, 11 de junio de 1599," in Cuevas, *Documentos inéditos del siglo XVI*, 474.

²⁰⁵ The authorship of the text has been discussed for a long, no achieving a full consensus yet. The presence of the royal chronicler's name Gil Gonzalez D'Avila in the manuscript preserved in the Library of Paris made to attribute the authorship to him, though scholars were never fully convinced. More consensus had the belief that corresponded to military Gonzalo de las Casas the real authorship. However, after a thorough job of historical research, Alberto Carrillo Cazares has settled with solid arguments that merit belongs to the Augustinian friar Guillermo de Santa Maria. See Santa María, *Guerra de los Chichimecas*. Also the editions that give to Gonzalez D'Avila and Las Casas the authorship of the text in the bibliography.

²⁰⁶ Santa Maria, *Guerra de los Chichimecas*, 205.

distinguishes six main groups: Pamies, Guamares, Copuzes, Guaxacanes, Guachichiles and Zacatecas.

The Pamies shared the territory with Otomies and Tarascans around the twenty degrees latitude, that is, within the jurisdiction of New Spain, just south of New Galicia. They were scattered in various villages, such as Acambaro (head of the peoples of San Agustin, Santa Maria and Yrapundario) and Xilotepeque (head of El Tuliman, San Pedro and Izmiquilpa), all of which “are of the same language.”²⁰⁷ They are depicted as the most docile Chichimecs, and their settlement in towns is understandable by both the agricultural practice as well as by contacts with the Tarascans of Michoacan. It draws attention that Chichimec category was applied to sedentary groups. This may have been a result of their sporadic attacks against cattle ranches, as well as of the minor sociopolitical complexity compared to their Michoacan neighbors, which demonstrates that the application of this category was not exclusively subject to aspects of settlement and mobility. Finally, Santa Maria adds that “the Spaniards put them this name *Pami* which in their language means *no*, because they use this negative a lot and so have been left with,”²⁰⁸ which makes it clear that the gentilicium is an exonym.

The Guamares, possible hispanization of the ethnoterm *equamar*²⁰⁹, were distributed between 21 and 23 degrees of latitude, from the village of San Miguel to the mines of Guanajuato, near the Rio Grande. In a clear contrast to Pamies, the author considered them “the most brave and warlike, treacherous and harmful nation of all the Chichimecs.”²¹⁰ The four or five divisions in which they were distributed shared a common language, a variable that appears as the main factor of discrimination to distinguish societies. These divisions were also settled in villages, so it was not the nomadism but raids made to garrisons and ranches which determined their arbitrary ascription to the Chichimec category. In their attacks they used to federate with Copuzes, who in turn arranged belic alliances with Guaxavanes and Sanzas, all of whom spoke guachichil language.²¹¹ As the source does not specify the Guamares’ language is not possible to determine whether these alliances were held on the language community. Paul Kirchoff maintained that “wars were only between

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 206.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 207.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 206.

²¹¹ Ibid., 207.

tribes of entirely different languages; the tribes that spoke similar languages almost always were linked through alliances.”²¹² However, such assertion put into question the language as exclusive category of ethnicization (Copuzes, Guaxavanes and Sanzas shared the same language),²¹³ leaving open the idea that ethnogenesis depended on diverse and concurrent factors.²¹⁴

The Rio Grande was not only the gateway to New Galicia, but also the southern border of the Guachichiles. As in most cases, we do not know the name by which they called themselves, since the term Guachichil (red head) had been given them by the Indians of Mexico. From the Rio Grande they stretched until the Comanja mines, incorporating in their area of mobility part of the Tunal Grande. In the words of Augustinian priest these Indians “occupy much land and so they are the most of all the Chichimecs and who have done most damage.”²¹⁵ The captain Pedro Ahumada specified in 1562 that they were divided in three groups of undetermined number for the vastness of the territory: the Guachichiles of Mazapil (about 22 leagues northeast of the mines of Zacatecas), Las Salinas (14 leagues of the mines), and those who spread between the Cienaga Grande and Tunal Grande.²¹⁶ They were all “one language and nation,”²¹⁷ and lived in a perpetual nomadism because “do not have almost any town or known place,”²¹⁸ scurrying by mountains and hills.

Although the Guachichiles fully met the stereotypical attributes of the Chichimec, such as nomadism, lack of centralized power, practices of torture with enemies, painted body and hair coloring,²¹⁹ Pedro de Ahumada regarded them as a group other, more courageous and dangerous than *Chichimecs*, who stretched “from the Tunal Grande place to mines of Esmiquilpa and Meztitlan, and by the northern part towards Panuco, that is all very rough and intricate land.”²²⁰ The soldier’s assessment opposed to the many testimonies of that time, like when Pedro de Medina reported that in serranias of Charcas “live some Chichimec

²¹² Kirchoff, “Los recolectores-cazadores del norte de Mexico,” 139.

²¹³ Kirchoff, like many of his contemporaries, used the term tribe almost as synonymous of ethnic.

²¹⁴ A discussion on this topic from a historical perspective in Sidbury and Cañizares-Esguerra, “Mapping ethnogenesis in the Early Modern Atlantic.”

²¹⁵ Santa María, *Guerra de los Chichimecas*, 207.

²¹⁶ “Relación de Pedro de Ahumada; México, 20 de marzo de 1562,” in Barlow and Smisor, *Nombre de Dios*, 59.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 58.

²¹⁸ “Relación de minas del Fresnillo: Informe de las minas de San Demetrio por Pedro de Medina; 1 de enero de 1585,” in Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 106.

²¹⁹ Kirchoff, “Los recolectores-cazadores del norte de México,” 142.

²²⁰ “Relación de Pedro de Ahumada; México, 20 de marzo de 1562,” in Barlow & Smisor, *Nombre de Dios*, 60.

Indians, robbers, called Guachichiles, very warlike and brave people.”²²¹ Cases like this show that the ascription to Chichimec was loosely handled on the Spaniards’ pen, and as we will see, that the factors that came into play were valued differently over time.

The Zacatecs were one of the most important *Chichimec* groups in sixteenth-century, not only for its high number and extensive extension, but also because within its territory there were the famous silver mines to which they gave their name. In Santa Maria's words, “its significance stems of *zacate*, which is Mexican language and means grass, as if they said living in the grass.”²²² One of the earliest references dates back to the days of the Mixton War when an anonymous author described them as “great archers.”²²³ The historian Elias Amador traces their limits “from Cuzapala, Huecujar, Jerez and Zacatecas to Nieves, San Miguel del Mezquital and Chalchihuites within the territory of the state [of Zacatecas], and until Cuencame and Rio de Nazas in Durango.”²²⁴ However, their characteristic high mobility, the systematic raids carried out into territories of other groups, and war alliances with some neighbor groups made their borders imprecise.²²⁵ Thus, for instance, Pedro de Medina claimed that the Zacatecs “incorporated Guachichiles with them to steal and kill,”²²⁶ while captain Pedro de Ahumada stressed that in the rebellion of 1561 they had confederated “the caciques and principals of Guachichiles and Zacatecs.”²²⁷ Although the sources do not specify, it is very likely that the identification of the Zacatecs was sustained on a common language and different from the Guachichiles’: Pedro de Ahumada not only considered them as different from the Guachichiles but also more belic than *Chichimecs*.²²⁸

Fray Guillermo de Santa María does not include a set of societies classified as *Chichimecs* by other sources: Tepehuanes, Laguneros or Cazcanes, among others, are not mentioned by the religious man. And as we have seen, some groups in his report, such as

²²¹ “Relación de minas del Fresnillo: Informe de las minas de San Demetrio por Pedro de Medina; 1 de enero de 1585,” in Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 112.

²²² Santa María, *Guerra de los Chichimecas*, 208.

²²³ “Relación de la conquista de Nueva Galicia, alzóse año de 1542. Anónima Tercera del Instituto Jalisciense de Antropología e Historia; n.d.,” in Razo, *Crónicas de la conquista*, 333.

²²⁴ Amador, *Bosquejo histórico de Zacatecas*, 21. Saravia, “La Nueva Vizcaya, Durango oriental,” 52.

²²⁵ On the difficulty of defining the Zacatecos Indias’ boundaries, see Álvarez, 143-47.

²²⁶ “Relación de minas del Fresnillo: Informe de las minas de San Demetrio por Pedro de Medina; 1 de enero de 1585,” in Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 107.

²²⁷ “Información acerca de la rebelión de los indios zacatecas y guachichiles a pedimento de Pedro de Ahumada Samano: Interrogatorio; minas de Zacatecas, 24 de enero de 1562,” in Montoto, *Colección de documentos*, 250.

²²⁸ “Relación de Pedro de Ahumada; México, 20 de marzo de 1562,” in Barlow & Smisor, *Nombre de Dios*, 60.

Guachichiles and Zacatecs, were also not considered as *Chichimecs* by other authors. This shows that ethnic ascription codes were not uniformly handled by the Spaniards.

For an ethnography of the sixteenth century: is violence a valid means to domesticate the difference?

Since the second half of the twentieth century most of historians have agreed that Europeans operated with preconceived interpretive schemes, rooted in the literature of classical antiquity and the medieval tradition, projecting and adapting these schemes to the particularities of the Amerindian peoples that were crossing in their advance of discovery or conquest.²²⁹ This conceptualization was not static, since *the barbaric* was understood under various parameters through time and space, since according to circumstances and times, the pillars on which barbarism was defined could be the form of political organization, the way of subsistence, the rituals that defined their religiosity, the technological development that underpinned the material culture, or all of them at the same time.²³⁰ The emphasis placed on one or another aspect was a consequence of the interests and needs of those who articulated the discourse of otherness, so that identity construction was always changing. Thus, for example, the early Portuguese descriptions of Brazil pictured the *Botocudo* Indians as docile and industrious beings, who benefited in their daily tasks with the use of tools provided by the Lusitanians. However, this idyllic image underwent a transformation in the middle of sixteenth century, when the need for labor for mining and agricultural work determined that scenes of cannibalism began to appear in travelers' stories or in cartographic documentation, reflecting a behavior more bellicose of natives.²³¹ The menacing portrait of the natives became even more recurrent in texts of the coming centuries describing or illustrating extreme situations, as parents devouring their own children.²³²

²²⁹ Chicangana-Bayona, "El nacimiento del caníbal: un debate conceptual," 155. On this subject, see the documented book by Ramírez Alvarado, *Construir una imagen*.

²³⁰ Bestard & Contreras, *Bárbaros, paganos, salvajes y primitivos*, 54.

²³¹ Langfur, *The forbidden lands*, 38.

²³² *Ibid.*, 40-41.

Space was one pillar on which the definition of barbarian settled, that is, the physical environment in which living beings develop. Every geographical and cultural space of the New World was a laboratory in which the European categories of classification operated. Man, nature and the space that sheltered them were integrated into an epistemological framework that differentially valued the components of the physical environment and, by extension, those who lived in each of them. The space could be defined with positive or negative values based on a series of parameters linked to the possibility of Hispanic settlement. The European world had a clear hierarchical organization based on the Aristotelian principle of mutual benefit, in which some ruled and others obeyed.²³³ If the city was the center of civilized life in the Republic of Spaniards, in the Republic of Indians that place was the *encomienda*, where Indians existed in a state of servitude. But this was only valid within the organizational framework of the city and its immediate contours. Beyond the dominated territory, in the always unstable borderlands, the Spanish concept of the barbarian found in each space of difficult settlement and control an ideal place for adjectiving its inhabitants. The axis that ruled the environmental classification was the dichotomy valley/mountain, also called plain land/hilly land. This axis allowed to organize the space on the basis of a differentiated valuation which distinguished between “appropriate” and “inappropriate” for human settlement. The valley or plain is the space of continuous, uninterrupted geography, where it is possible to work the land and make it productive, where the Spanish cavalry can display its power and, finally, where it is possible to find a city, the maximum expression of the *vida en policía* (living in order). But the mountains, hills, abrupt areas, the hilly and roughed land, it is the space of discontinuity, the difficulty of access, where agriculture has limited potential for development, and in which the cavalry is not efficient. While in the valley and the plain land men are seated, the mountain is the place of beasts, where the policy can hardly develop.²³⁴

According to Surekha Davies, “sixteenth-century scholars inherited from the Middle Ages a framework for understanding human difference that was environmental, social and malleable, rather than biological and fixed [...] Christian bodies and behaviours might change under the influence of new geographical spaces.”²³⁵ The space in the Spaniards’

²³³ Hale, *The Civilization of Europe in the Renaissance*, 364.

²³⁴ Cisterna Alvarado, “La retórica hispana del espacio durante el siglo XVI.”

²³⁵ Davies, *Renaissance ethnography and the invention of the human New Worlds*, 43.

minds was linked to an “expected” behaviour of its inhabitants, which depended on both the *temple of the land*,²³⁶ and whether the settlements allowed a life of permanent communication (valley-plain v/s mountain/uplands). Alongside this, we note that the productive activities of the Indians demarcated a hierarchy in the socio-political classification, because farmers were valued as superiors respect to those who were not: the dichotomy of food producing societies and hunter-gatherer societies resulted in the possibility of a sedentary life (*reducciones*). And living in sedentariness, linked to a territory in which to produce, it was the desired condition to serve. The European world was structured in a clear hierarchical organization, where ones ruled and others obeyed under the Aristotelian principle of mutual benefit:²³⁷ if in the *República de Españoles* the place of civilized life was the city, in the *República de Indios* that place was the *encomienda*, ie, in servitude.

Now, in the conquerors’ minds the difficulties imposed by the environment went hand in hand with the Indian resistance: men’s identity was almost inseparable from the space they inhabited, because both shared the same nature. The historian Susi Colin argues that “the Wild Man becomes wild, not because he is created that way, but rather because of his hostile environment, his being raised in the wilderness, the hardness of his life, and his lack of reason.”²³⁸ In this way, it was customary to point out in the colonial documentation that natives who inhabited valleys and flat lands, ideal landscapes for agricultural work, were more docile than those who lived in the spatial discontinuities created by mountains and canyons, where only developed the wildest societies, those closest to animal life than to human race. As we have seen in the preceding sections of this chapter, both New Galicia and southern Chile are territories with complex geographies, where large fertile or semi-desert plains are cut by capricious mountainous areas in which nomadic societies difficult to control by the Spaniards prowled around. It was not a coincidence that the labels of barbarism and savagery, together with all the burden of vices and shortcomings that surround, have focused on them. In this way, the Cazcanes and Totonacas of Ameca were described as rude beings

²³⁶ *Temple* is something much more complex than the climate: earth communicates with vaults that are impacting and influencing each other, giving to each area a particular feature. The sky affects the earth from the “constellations,” the set of stars that by means of the “movement of airs” exercises influence in every region of the world, giving rise to *temple*.

²³⁷ Hale, *The Civilization of Europe in the Renaissance*, 364.

²³⁸ Colin, “The Wild Man and the Indian in early 16th Century book illustration,” 7.

“because they are mountain people.”²³⁹ In the environs of Guadalajara it was denounced that “the most of the natives of this kingdom were not gathered in towns, but they moved through the mountains as barbarous people.”²⁴⁰ In the mines of Zacatecas the rebellious Indians roamed the mountains like “savages eating wild fruits, naked, wandering from one part to another without having a certain place or home or any orderly way of living.”²⁴¹ This assessment of the mountain as a place of savagery is also in the descriptions of *Reche-Mapuche* territory. The mountain appears semantically associated with the sour, rough and intricate, and by extension, a form of space in which only the bellicose people inhabit.²⁴² The chronicler Miguel de Olaverria affirmed that

the war in Chile is divided into two parts, which are two mountain ranges that run from north to south; the one that they call the Nevada (snow) that is distant from the sea twenty leagues and in parts more or less; the other one is on the sea, it is small and mountainous and has three leagues in width, in which the states of Arauco and Tucapel and other provinces are included. These Indians are populated in latitude of 35 or 40 leagues sheltered by these mountain ranges, and the undergrowth proper of mountains and rivers, and the number of all those who are at war is 25 thousand Indians, and they have no king nor known leader, although they usually congregate to harm the Spaniards whenever they can taking advantage of our carelessness, and when they make a journey through tight and rough lands where they are helped by their skill and courage, which for being naked people have too much.²⁴³

In this way, a space flanked by rugged mountains (the Cordillera de Nahuelbuta and the Cordillera de los Andes) housed wild and untamed Indians, completely oblivious to the Spanish forms of organization since in addition to living almost naked they lacked leaders to obey. In the Spanish conception of space, the polar opposite of the mountains were the valleys

²³⁹ “Relación del pueblo de Ameca hecha por Antonio de Leiva, alcalde mayor de Su Majestad; Ameca, 2 de octubre de 1579,” in Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 32.

²⁴⁰ “Informe al rey por el Cabildo Eclesiástico de Guadalajara, acerca de las cosas de aquel reino; 20 de enero de 1570,” in García Icazbalceta, *Colección de documentos*, II, 501.

²⁴¹ “Fragmentos de la información hecha por el doctor Maldonado, fiscal de la Audiencia de México, sobre los daños cometidos por los chichimecas en el camino a Zacatecas; solicita un castigo ejemplar: declaración de Sancho Núñez, residente en las minas de Zacatecas, de 30 años; México, 14 de julio de 1561,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 336.

²⁴² Cisterna Alvarado, “La retórica hispana del espacio durante el siglo XVI,” 144.

²⁴³ “Instrucciones y memoriales presentados al virrey del Perú por el capitán Miguel de Olaverria por orden del gobernador Martín García de Oñez y Loyola con el objeto de obtener socorro para la guerra de Chile, abril de 1593: memorial del capitán Miguel de Olaverria que ha de presentar en el Consejo,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos* (second series), vol. 4, 273.

and flat lands, where the native populations are often described as well-disposed and well-dressed people,²⁴⁴ that is, capable of serving the Spaniards and being incorporated into the European production system under the modality of *encomienda*. Both New Galicia and the southern Kingdom of Chile were classified as mostly mountainous territories where wild societies lived.

Even so, European conceptions of alterity were always a complex reality. Although it is unquestionable that in the intellectual circles –scholars, theologians and jurists– of the sixteenth-century Europe transited and coexisted interpretative frameworks based on philosophical, theological and ethnographic principles, which allowed to “domesticate” (incorporate) the most remote alterities within the European worldview, recent research has come to demonstrate the lack of an unified and coherent ethnological discourse.²⁴⁵ The Aristotelian principles²⁴⁶ that filled the pages written by professors and jurists, or the postulates promoted by Renaissance scholasticism, among many other currents that formed the backbone of European thought, were insufficient to give a univocal meaning to diversity.²⁴⁷ Thus, for example, although the cannibal *trope* worked early as a colonial stereotype to signify the other, it was not until 1537 that Francisco de Vitoria’s text *Relección sobre la templanza o del uso de las comidas*,²⁴⁸ came up with a moral argument about the inconvenience for humans to consume the body of their congeners, with which the doctrine that established that the consumption or not of human flesh could be considered as a

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 142.

²⁴⁵ According to John Rowe, the words *ethnography* and *ethnology* were born in the late eighteenth century. In the sixteenth century, for the treatment of subjects that we would now call ethnographic, the phrase “life and customs” was generally used, while the closest equivalent in the seventeenth century to ethnology was the phrase “moral history” used by José de Acosta in 1590 as a parallel to “natural history;” see John Howland Rowe, “Ethnography and ethnology in the sixteenth century,” 1.

²⁴⁶ According to Lewis Hanke, of all the ideas that emerged during the first and tumultuous years of American history, none more dramatically employed than trying to apply to the aborigines the Aristotelian doctrine of natural slavery: that nature destines a part of humanity to be slaves in the service of masters, who born to lead a life of virtue exempt from manual labor. The Spanish jurist Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda was the most determined defender, although by 1510 John Major, a Scottish professor in Paris, was the first to apply to the Indians the Aristotelian doctrine of natural slavery. It is interesting to note that in the debate in Valladolid (1550-1551), the Dominican Bartolomé de Las Casas defended the freedom of the Indians against the arguments of Ginés de Sepúlveda, also based on the Aristotelian foundations to maintain that most of their ways of life and customs were commendable and proper to civilized people. See Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indians*, 12-13, 14 and 54-55. A succinct study of the Valladolid debate and the discussion about natural servility in Rolena Adorno, “Los debates sobre la naturaleza del indio en el siglo XVI: textos y contextos.” On the dispute generated around the servitude/freedom of the Indians, see also Silvio Zavala, *La filosofía política en la Conquista de América*, ch. IV: “Servidumbre natural,” and ch. V: “Libertad cristiana,” 42-77 and 78-105.

²⁴⁷ Rubiés, “Christianity and civilization in sixteenth-century ethnological discourse,” 35.

²⁴⁸ Vitoria, *Relección sobre la templanza o del uso de las comidas*.

definitive sign of the wild or civilized character of a certain society was settled.²⁴⁹ This systematization appeared almost half a century after the first voyage of discovery in which the term *cannibal* was born.

In the same vein, it is true that the Spain of the Golden Age bequeathed to posterity the concept of “Indian” provided by Christopher Columbus, who, using the rhetoric of Christian imperialism, sought to deprive the natives of their bestiality not only through the teaching of faith, but also with the liberating slavery.²⁵⁰ It is true, also, that we owe to Spain some of the essential elements on which the basic imaginary of the Indian was built:²⁵¹ barbarians who transgress the most fundamental forms of common life with practices such as infanticide or incest; lacking laws that govern their sociability, making violence the only means to settle their disputes; unconcerned with the modesty that should prevail in intimate relationships, and unfamiliar with the social order that allows the virtues of political life to emerge.²⁵² For the same reason, it should not be surprising that, seen from our time, almost all the narratives of the Spanish conquest represent the Iberians as committed “in a moral mission to eliminate the horrible things that the Native Americans did; in particular, idolatry, cannibalism, sodomy and human sacrifice were seen as morally detestable.”²⁵³ Being considered degraded, corrupted and ruined beings, the conquerors, missionaries and colonists implanted a discourse that, backed by the monarchical legislation, extolled the need and justified the intervention of Western man to ensure the salvation of the natives,²⁵⁴ for which slavery came to be considered as a valid means to redeem their souls. What is more, during the first decades of Spanish colonization the Crown did not openly oppose to Indian slavery, limiting itself rather to demanding that the practice be adjusted to the laws that had been given on each of the forms to acquire the slaves.²⁵⁵ The concept of barbarism served to place

²⁴⁹ Chaparro Amaya, *Pensar caníbal. Una perspectiva amerindia de la guerra, lo sagrado y la colonialidad*, 13.

²⁵⁰ Greenblat, *Marvelous possessions*, 70.

²⁵¹ Berkhofer, *The white man's Indian*, 5.

²⁵² Todorov, *El miedo a los bárbaros*, 31-2.

²⁵³ Seed, *American Pentimento*, 94. The parameters with which the Renaissance Europeans classified the other cultures were based on a series of attributes that involved the physiological characteristics, the temple of the land (in which geographical location and its relationship with the stars were crossed), and especially patterns of behavior (ways of dressing, economic and social activities, types of food, family and political customs, war organization, etc.); see Pagden, *La caída del Hombre Natural*, 33.

²⁵⁴ Hurbon, *El bárbaro imaginario*, 31.

²⁵⁵ Zavala, *Ensayos sobre la colonización española en América*, 98.

the Indian in a lower human hierarchy, elaborating a rhetoric of the monstrosity.²⁵⁶ However, this does not mean that the conceptual construction of these otherness had been immediate, that is, the inevitable fruit of a mechanical effect based on the exclusive application of epistemological schemes rooted in the knowledge of the classical and medieval world, and much less that its acceptance had been widespread.²⁵⁷ The process of construction and dissemination of these imaginaries was more complex than has traditionally been pointed out.

A good example was the European rhetoric regarding human sacrifices and cannibalism, which in the discourse of many jurists and men-at-arms constituted identity seals of the American in the early colonial centuries: in the voice and pen of the European both practices were considered as reprehensible facts and acted as sufficiently valid condemning terms to justify the extermination or slavery of entire societies,²⁵⁸ and therefore, constituted a foundation for the Just War. Carlos Jáuregui depicts this situation by stating that “the cannibal will enter the chronicles with the complementary ideological function of justifying the exploitation of work and the European appetite for American labor and

²⁵⁶ Morong, *Saberes hegemónicos y dominio colonial*, 43.

²⁵⁷ The Dominican Friar Bartolome de Las Casas, famous defender of the natives of the New World, treated cannibalism as a custom that had been practiced in different parts of the world during all periods of the mankind’s history. In his works he pointed out that the motives for carrying it out were due to the Aristotelian foundations of the climate and the influence of the stars, the diseases such as dementia or epilepsy, and the perverse customs that were transmitted from one generation to another. Since his concept of man was based on the unity of the human race, he tried to demonstrate that paganism and anthropophagy were not alien to the ancient inhabitants of France, Spain and Great Britain, with which he tried to de-Americanize these customs: influenced by universalism Thomist, proposed the existence of a *natural idolatry* possible to find in all men and societies before knowing God. Seeking to take the best missionary advantage of the natural inclination of the Indians to worship their gods, he stated that pagan devotion was a fertile and promissory ground to facilitate their conversion to Christianity, since it was a test of the high religiosity of the infidels. In a clear defense of the Indians, he declared that among the natives of Mexico, cannibalism had been limited only to religious rites. He did not only defend the right to salvation of the Amerindian societies that practiced anthropophagy, since the Church of Christ was open to all sinners, but he also affirmed that the siege of the Caribs to the Hispanic towns was a divine punishment caused by the unjustified and countless massacres carried out by Christians in the Central American islands. The conquerors and encomenderos had perverted the mandate that Christ gave his disciples to go preaching like sheep among wolves, since the role of the wolf had been assumed by the Spaniards who did not satisfy their cravings for wealth by devouring the dignity of the innocent inhabitants of these land. See the Works by Helminen, “¿Eran caníbales los caribes? Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas y el canibalismo,” and Jáuregui, “Saturno canibal: fronteras, reflejos y paradojas en la narrativa sobre el antropófago,” 27-9.

²⁵⁸ In the American context the term *cannibal* acted as a stereotype, that is, as a simplified conception that in many cases caricatured complex sociocultural phenomena. The concept *cannibal* was not only an Eurocentric assessment, because it also gives account of an inaccurate knowledge of the cultural, religious and/or social foundations involved in its practice.

riches.”²⁵⁹ In fact, as early as 1503 the Spanish Crown enacted a Royal Provision to captivate the cannibal Indians²⁶⁰ –updated eight years later in the Royal Provision of 1511– and in 1518 the lawyer Rodrigo de Figueroa was appointed judge in La Española, with full powers to produce a definitive classification of Amerindian cultures in all territories occupied by Spain; in the words of the anthropologist Neil Whitehead “the concern of the Crown in this matter arose from the desire to regulate the use of Amerindian labour force by the colonists, who, due to Isabella’s decree of 1503, were able to take into slavery any Amerindian considered to be a ‘carib.’”²⁶¹ By labeling the societies of the New World, not only was an identity wall erected, on which the juridical and cultural division that characterized the colonial history of this continent –the *República de Españoles* and the *República de Indios*– was sustained, since this also had as a result to divide the natives in civilizable and non-civilizable Indians. Cannibalism was thus regarded as a characteristic of the most extreme alterity and, of course, as “an excellent excuse to conquer, evangelize and enslave,”²⁶² that is, it acted as a mark of barbarism.²⁶³

The strong opposition that these governmental dispositions aroused in a large part of the ecclesiastical circles, determined that in the later legislation of the XVI century the idea of the free Indian prevailed,²⁶⁴ as attested by the Laws of Burgos issued on December 27, 1512,²⁶⁵ and three decades later the New Laws of 1542, in which it was established that “for no cause of war or any other, even in the case of rebellion, or by trade, or by any other way can not be made any Indian slave, and we want they be treated as our vassals of the Crown of Castile, as they are.”²⁶⁶ Even so, both legislative bodies maintained the principle of subalterity intact, justifying ethically and legally the Spanish intervention in various aspects

²⁵⁹ Jáuregui, *Canibalia. Canibalismo, calibanismo, antropofagia cultural y consumo en América Latina*, 70.

²⁶⁰ “Real Provisión para poder cautivar a los canibales rebeldes; Segovia, 30 de octubre de 1503,” in Konetzke, *Colección de documentos*, I, 14-6.

²⁶¹ Whitehead, “Carib cannibalism. The historical evidence,” 71.

²⁶² Vacas Mora, “Cuerpos, cadáveres y comida,” 274.

²⁶³ Myscofski, “Imagining cannibals: European encounters with native Brazilian women,” 150.

²⁶⁴ A general overview on the freedom of the Indians and the abolition of slavery in García Añoveros, “Carlos V y la abolición de la esclavitud de los indios.” This good synthesis, however, presents the important lack of obviating the particularities that indigenous slavery had in the borderland regions of the New World, as it was, for example, its expansion in time with respect to nuclear areas.

²⁶⁵ “Ordenanzas para el buen tratamiento de los indios (Leyes de Burgos); Burgos, 27 de diciembre de 1512,” in Konetzke, *Colección de documentos*, I, 38-57. Although the freedom of the Indians was the nodal point of these laws, it was established that they could be forced to work, so that the Laws of Burgos were the first real confirmation of the *encomienda* system.

²⁶⁶ “Real Provisión. Las Leyes Nuevas; Barcelona, 20 de noviembre de 1542,” in *Ibid.*, 217.

of the native culture: practices of daily use, religion, forms of social and labor organization were molded at the whim of encomenderos, soldiers and men of faith; the human nature of the Indian was not questioned (a subject solved in the *Bula Sublimis Deus* of June 9, 1537), but his intelligence and character of his habits.²⁶⁷

In the shadow of the Laws of Burgos, for which the Crown sought to reassure its own conscience and moral doubts, the jurist Juan López de Palacios Rubios wrote the famous *Requerimiento*, used for the first time in Panama by Pedrarias Dávila in 1513,²⁶⁸ and that would be the letter of presentation of future conquerors before the native communities in their advance through the American continent. It was a document that supported its legitimacy both in the papal concession of the *Bull Inter Caetera* of 1493, and in the Aristotelian principle of “natural servitude,” which established that prudent men (those who make use of reason) should dominate over the barbarians (who are ruled by the passions).²⁶⁹ In other words, the *Requerimiento* was the manifestation of a theocentric theology founded on the principle that the Supreme Pontiff had spiritual and temporal power over the entire world and all men.²⁷⁰ The reading of the text, made in a language incomprehensible to the natives and alluding to codes of authority totally alien to the mentality of most American societies, allowed the exercise of violence against populations reluctant to submit, since it legitimized the Spanish invasion by denying the culture of the Indians by stigmatizing them with the stamp of savagery. Those infidels reluctant to submit themselves under Christian rule, or who did not admit preachers of the faith, gave cause to a just war, and could consequently be enslaved. But if they did not resist and admitted the preachers, the inability of many of them to govern made it legitimate to turn them into servants of the Spaniards,²⁷¹ which within the encomienda system became in many cases a covert slavery. Both alternatives left the natives in a situation of inferiority before their Christian counterpart,

²⁶⁷ Solodkow, “Etnógrafos coloniales,” 198.

²⁶⁸ It is transcribed in the documentary appendix of the book by Zavala, *Las instituciones jurídicas en la conquista de América*, 215-17. The *Requerimiento* had different versions in each expansion context in which it was used, but all of them share basic information derived from this first text.

²⁶⁹ Zavala, *La filosofía política en la Conquista de América*, 50.

²⁷⁰ Capdevila, “La teoría de la guerra justa y los bárbaros,” 166. A few years after the elaboration of the *Requerimiento*, the author argued in a larger work that “as the Pope has supreme power over the entire universe, and that every creature is subject to him as the founder of the law and vicar of the Creator [...] he consequently has power and jurisdiction over all the infidels of the world, even over the most remote and ignored of us;” see Palacios Rubios, *De las islas del Mar Océano*, 100-1.

²⁷¹ Zavala, *La filosofía política en la Conquista de América*, 50.

which seems to confirm the affirmation of the historian Germán Morong that “from 1512, in the context of the Junta de Burgos, the identity awarded to the Indians is progressively distancing from being benevolent and becomes into a functional stereotype to the exercise of domination, at least in the body of bureaucrats and lawyers trying to justify violent domination over the Indians.”²⁷²

The secular priest, philosopher, theologian and jurist Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda was part of this strand of thinkers who considered that force was a valid means of conversion²⁷³ since the Indians were barbarians by nature and, therefore, destined to serve the Christians, bearers of a superior culture.²⁷⁴ In his concept, what defined the Indians was their low degree of civilization, reflected in their inability to govern themselves.²⁷⁵ According to the precepts of natural law, it was expected that the least prudent and wise would obey the most prudent and capable,²⁷⁶ for which the barbarian nations²⁷⁷ had to submit to

[...] the most civilized and educated by natural law, to be governed with better laws and institutions by them, according to their justice and prudence. And if they reject this just and beneficial domination for themselves, by natural right they can be forced to the duty and the justice of obedience if it is possible to afford it. With this right, the Romans, a people very civilized and excellent for their virtues, subjected the barbarian peoples to their domain.²⁷⁸

Consequently, it is just and necessary that the most capable men be obeyed by those of more limited virtues, since Sepúlveda considered that “virtuous man is the most perfect within the genre of animate beings [...] Among men, the more perfect one is, that is, more endowed with virtue and prudence, the more apt one is to command, and on the contrary, the more rude and less intelligent, the more qualified to serve.”²⁷⁹

²⁷² Morong, *Saberes hegemónicos y dominio colonial*, 45.

²⁷³ Beuchot, *La querrela de la Conquista*, 52-3.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 51.

²⁷⁵ Clément, “De las ofensas contra los indios,” 135.

²⁷⁶ Chaparro, “Pasiones políticas e imperialismo: la polémica entre Ginés de Sepúlveda y Bartolomé de las Casas,” 163.

²⁷⁷ Among other practices, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda defined the barbarians for “their wild life, similar to that of the beasts: their execrable and prodigious immolations of human victims to demons, feeding on human flesh, burying alive women of the magnates with their dead husbands and other similar crimes condemned by the law of nature;” see Ginés de Sepúlveda, “Del reino y los deberes del rey,” 33-4.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 34-5.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 33-4.

This anthropological hierarchy is graphed in his Aristotelian conception of the idea of justice, exposed in his *Demócrates primero* (1550), in which he argued that in order to judge the goodness or malice of things and find out where virtue or vice lay, it should be followed the judgment of the good and virtuous people, and not that of the bad people, which reveals an “elitism of the intellect.”²⁸⁰ Using a hermeneutic founded on the principles of analogy and similarity –very characteristic in those days–, he established similarities²⁸¹ between Native Americans, Moors and women, which he considered to share fundamental traits such as cowardice and cruelty.²⁸² In another work focused on the theological and ethical problems that enclosed the Spanish domain in the New World, his *Democrat alter* (1545) justified violence against the natives when they were reluctant to submit, contradicting the traditional position of the jurists that the enslavement of the Indians was as a result of having been defeated in just war, since this condition was natural and, therefore, pre-existing, because it was given by their congenital rudeness, so it was just and necessary that they were governed by smarter and more virtuous men.²⁸³ Only then would they abandon idolatry, human sacrifices and sins *contra natura* (against nature), among other vices that revealed their barbarism: force was necessary to remove the Indians their horrendous crimes.²⁸⁴ In this way, Ginés de Sepúlveda put “war at the service of the hierarchy based on the rational differences that exist among men,”²⁸⁵ which is equivalent to saying that the Conquest was justified by the native's innate weakness, which implied the discursive construction of a stereotype that could be attributed to all the natives of the continent.²⁸⁶

These postulates came into direct contradiction with the ideas of two of the most distinguished representatives of the Order of Santo Domingo, fray Francisco de Vitoria and fray Bartolomé de Las Casas. Both, contradicting Ginés de Sepúlveda, started from the neo-

²⁸⁰ Martínez Castilla, “Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda y la Guerra Justa en la conquista de América,” 117.

²⁸¹ Michel Foucault pointed out that until the late 16th century “similarity” played a constructive role in the knowledge of Western culture. This was the episteme that guided Spaniard’s interpretation of texts and understanding of otherness, and it had a significant impact on the process of describing America. The French philosopher says that “the world is covered with signs that must be deciphered, and those signs, which reveal resemblances and affinities, are themselves no more than forms of similitude;” see Foucault, *Las palabras y las cosas*, 40.

²⁸² Adorno, “El sujeto colonial y la construcción cultural de la alteridad,” 59.

²⁸³ In a just war the conqueror could kill his defeated enemy with complete legality or save his life by enslaving him and confiscating his property; see Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indians*, 68.

²⁸⁴ Marcos, *Los imperialismos de Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda en su Democrat alter*, 129.

²⁸⁵ Zavala, *Ensayos sobre la colonización española en América*, 82.

²⁸⁶ Morong, *Saberes hegemónicos y dominio colonial*, 44.

scholastic principle of the absolute separation between spiritual and temporal power, which put in question the legal bases of any claim of European sovereignty in America.²⁸⁷

Francisco de Vitoria already counted for the middle of the sixteenth-century with a large legal, philosophical and theological work. Professor of Salamanca, he elaborated his doctrine on conquest, opposing the way it had been carried out until then, discarding many principles that were invoked to make it. Thus, for example, he denied that both the emperor and the pope enjoyed universal power, which invalidated the pontifical concession on the territories and populations to be conquered, as well as the right of the Christian sovereign to exercise authority over them. What is more, the Salamanca professor argued that the right of possession was already validly exercised by the natives of the continent. On the spiritual plane and adhering to the postulates of St. Thomas, he considered it counterproductive to evangelize the natives by force, since this would give rise to fictitious conversions, sacrileges and blasphemies.²⁸⁸

What really justified the Spanish presence in the New World legally and morally was the peaceful propagation of the Christian religion, without compelling the natives with violent measures such as those used until that moment. In his work *De Unico Vocationis Modo* or *The only way to attract all peoples to the true religion*, he considered as essential to have the will of the infidels to expand the Christian faith, since Christ granted the apostles only the license and authority to preach the gospel to those who willingly wanted to hear it, but not to force those who did not want to hear them.²⁸⁹ He only admitted the use of force when the natives threatened the law of nations,²⁹⁰ mainly under four modalities: first, before the imperative need to defend themselves against the attacks of the natives; second, to protect those Indians who, having adopted the Christian faith and/or recognized the authority of the king, were harassed by others unwilling to submit themselves to the church and the royal will; third, the need to have allies made it imperative to support militarily the friendly Indians when they were threatened by rebel groups, regardless of whether they had not yet been incorporated into the flock of Christ; and fourth, to put an end to customs contrary to natural

²⁸⁷ Cañizares-Esguerra, "Las justificaciones hispánicas de los peregrinos (*circa* 1620) y puritanos (*circa* 1630) para colonizar América," 24 and 35.

²⁸⁸ Beuchot, *La querella de la Conquista*, 29-33.

²⁸⁹ Zavala, "La voluntad del gentil en la doctrina de Las Casas," 133-4.

²⁹⁰ Capdevila, "La teoría de la guerra justa y los bárbaros," 176.

laws.²⁹¹ In sum, neither the idolatry nor the territorial concessions granted by the Holy See were just causes for war. Only self-defense, or that of allies and converts, or the need to end extreme practices such as human sacrifice and cannibalism could authorize the use of weapons. Faithful to the principles of scholasticism, he affirmed that war must always be inspired by a just cause (to satisfy the insults received from the enemy) and be guided by the righteous intentions of those who headed it, without ever inflicting a disproportionate punishment.²⁹²

In the framework of these conditions to make just war, Vitoria differentiated several types of infidels. In the first place, those who have never had faith, who could not be forced to receive it, given that conversion was always a voluntary act, totally free. Others, he points out, are those who had never obeyed the law of God, but who could only be punished when they violated the right of Christians, that is, when they threatened the integrity of the faithful. Finally, those who, having ever accepted God, could be compelled to remain within the church, because they were his subjects and, therefore, had jurisdiction over their souls even if they had renounced it.²⁹³ In all these cases Vitoria recognized the validity of the life forms of these groups, the right they had to exercise dominion over their property, as well as their political and social organization, although obviously placing them at a lower level than the European Christian nations, which justified the need to have tutors to guide them on the path of spiritual and temporal perfection.²⁹⁴ In sum, the basic constitutional principles of the Vitorian position involved, first, the assumption that Indians and Spaniards were fundamentally equal as men; second, that the cultural and moral backwardness of the Indians was a consequence of their barbarous customs and lack of education, which, in the third place, did not prevent them from being legitimate owners of their properties because their lack of culture did not constitute a legitimate foundation to dispossess them; fourth, that as a consequence of their barbarism they could be entrusted to the protection of the Spaniards while they were in a situation of underdevelopment and, finally, that the Spanish intervention was legitimized fundamentally in the free election of the Indians.²⁹⁵

²⁹¹ Beuchot, *La querella de la Conquista*, 33-7.

²⁹² Zavala, *Ensayos sobre la colonización española en América*, 77-8.

²⁹³ Beuchot, *La querella de la Conquista*, 21.

²⁹⁴ Castilla Urbano, "Francisco de Vitoria y John Locke: sobre la justificación de la conquista de América al sur y al norte del continente," 49-50.

²⁹⁵ Pereña, "El proceso a la Conquista de América," 201.

Even more decisive and transcendent was the activity of fray Bartolomé de Las Casas. After having renounced his encomiendas in Cuba in 1514, he began to denounce the abuses suffered by the natives at the hands of the encomenderos. He was an important promoter of the New Laws of 1542, with which it was gotten a momentary abolition of slavery and encomienda, the same year in which he finished writing his *A Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies*, which laid the foundations for the debate about the rights of the indigenous. In this work he compared the Spaniards with hungry wolves, tigers and lions, who tormented the inhabitants of the newly discovered lands to “tear them apart, kill them, distress them, afflict them, torment them and destroy them.”²⁹⁶ He openly criticized the use that the conquerors gave to the *Requerimiento* by Palacios Rubios, arguing that captains and soldiers considered it “as a simple formality with which it is necessary to comply in order to attack the Indians with all tranquility and legality.”²⁹⁷ Very often he cataloged the actions of the Spaniards as works of the devil, since “from the beginning they have been developing greater infernal works,” qualifying the conquest and the harsh tasks to which they subjected the Indians as “exercise of hell.”²⁹⁸ What is more, he called the *encomenderos* “devils of the earth,” asserting that their cruelties were even more atrocious than that of the beings of hell, as the following passage illustrates

After the deaths and ravages of the wars they put people, as it has been told, in the horrible servitude mentioned above, and entrust the devils with one hundred and others three hundred Indians. The encomendero devil, it seems, calls a hundred Indians in front of him, then they come like lambs, and when arrived they cut off the heads of thirty or forty of them, and tell the others, *the same thing I am going to do with all of you if do not serve me well, or if you go without my permission*. Consider now by God, for those who read this, what work this is and if it exceeds all cruelty and injustices that can be thought. And if it suits such Christians well to call them devils, and if it would be better *encomendar* the Indians to the devils of hell, which is to entrust them to the Christians of the Indies.²⁹⁹

He highlighted the value shown by the Indians in defense of their land, citing the profound technological inequality between Spaniards and Indians, since the former did not have offensive or defensive weapons capable of counteracting the power of European

²⁹⁶ Las Casas, *Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias*, 8.

²⁹⁷ Clément, “De las ofensas contra los indios,” 138.

²⁹⁸ Las Casas, *Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias*, 28 and 56.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 77.

armaments. Thus, describing a fight fought on the island of Santo Domingo, the priest pointed out that the wars of the Indians

[...] were like children's games, having their bellies as shields to receive the arrows of the Spanish crossbows and the balls of the shotguns, as they fight naked in leathers, with no more weapons than their bows and arrows without poison and stones [where there were], little resistance they could have against the Spaniards, whose arms are iron, and their swords cut an Indian in half.³⁰⁰

Questioning the ethics of conquest, fray Bartolome de Las Casas accused that although the Indians were technically inferior, the just defense they made of their families and lands made them morally superior to the Spanish. On the contrary, the so-called Christians made an unjust war, since they contravened the papal clauses of the Bull of 1493.³⁰¹

In 1550-51 he starred in the famous controversy with Ginés de Sepúlveda in the Juntas de Valladolid, from which he succeeded after passionate debates, leaving settled the rationality of the Indians and the unfairness of the wars against them, thus pretending to suspend the conquests. He strongly defended the principle that the natives were capable of governing themselves by having a high rational level, and that therefore they were not natural slaves, as stated by Sepúlveda.³⁰² In his apology of the American Indians he never questioned the philosophy of Aristotle, but instead devoted himself to demonstrate the inapplicability of this doctrine with the natives of this continent, thus arguing a procedural error in his rival.³⁰³ He coincided with many of the arguments proposed by Vitoria to justify the Spanish presence in the Indies, as well as the few elements that would justify the use of violence, such as stopping practices as contrary to nations law as human sacrifice and cannibalism. Despite this, in his *Apologética Historia* he systematically compared many religions and American customs with classic examples in order to prove that the idolatry of the Indians of Mexico and Peru did not have a necessary relationship with the irrationality or the inability for self-government: throughout his work he vindicates the figure of the Indian, contesting the concept of savage with which they were stigmatized, establishing that the inhabitants of the

³⁰⁰ Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, II, book 2, ch. VIII, 232.

³⁰¹ Clément, "De las ofensas contra los indios," 131.

³⁰² Beuchot, *La querrela de la Conquista*, 59.

³⁰³ Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indians*, 58.

New World were rational beings, whose forms of political life could be compared to that of the ancient Greeks or Romans, and that practices that were contrary to Christian principles, such as human sacrifices, were only the consequence of a natural impulse to the worship of God. Therefore, the Lascasian purpose was to demonstrate that civilization could only be brought to a people through the peaceful and respectful way.³⁰⁴ the only acceptable way of preaching Christianity was non-violence, since only then the right of self-determination of the Indians was not infringed.

Already in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, at a time when Spain stood as the most advantaged colonial power in Europe, and faithful to a tendency projected from the early sixteenth century by theologians, jurists and philosophers, Jesuit José de Acosta devoted his energies to draw an interpretive picture of the New World. Although the pages that make up his intellectual production are not deprived of many prejudices of his time, it is clear the innovative effort to analyze and classify under an ethnographic approach the components of nature and diverse cultures developing in the new continent: understanding the difference was a way to interpret and appreciate the own Christian world.³⁰⁵ It was no longer the simple exercise of observing and describing through the western lens, or telling the events under a purely chronological criterion. Organize evidence and classify it around themes of various kinds give account of an analytical approach that was the prelude to a new epistemology of knowledge: appropriation of environment is mainly done through perception, and reflection is no longer based on the exercise of linking things together in order to establish their common nature (the analogy), but in discerning to establish the identities of each one.³⁰⁶ Thus, José de Acosta weighed the viability of evangelizing *Chichimecs* and *Reche-Mapuches* on the basis of knowing their forms of organization and history. Although in general terms he makes the words “Indian” and “barbarian” practically synonymous, recognizes various categories of natives, which puts in evidence the knowledge of the cultural mosaic of the New World reached by that time.³⁰⁷ In his *Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias (Natural and Moral History of the Indies)* celebrates the civilizing role played by Incas and Aztecs in the past, as their expansion not only helped to improve the

³⁰⁴ Queraltó Moreno, *El pensamiento filosófico-político de Bartolomé de Las Casas*, 145.

³⁰⁵ Boskovic, “‘World anthropologies’ and anthropologies in the world,” 230.

³⁰⁶ Foucault, *Las palabras y las cosas*, 62.

³⁰⁷ Lopetegui, *El padre José de Acosta S.J. y las misiones*, 259.

culture of less complex societies, but also formed big linguistic communities when Quechua and Nahuatl became into the official languages in vast expanses of their respective empires. The wide dissemination of these lingua francas made easier “preaching and converting people,”³⁰⁸ that is, the evangelization of the many ethnic groups spread throughout the territory, whose linguistic diversity would have meant a serious challenge for the purposes that inspired the presence of religious orders in those regions. However, José de Acosta regrets that such influence had not permeated into outlying areas, such as northern Mexico and southern Chile. *Chichimecs* and *Reche-Mapuches* were two of the most reluctant ethnic groups to Spanish rule, where the alleged military advantage conferred by firearms, steel and horses were of little importance in front of courage of the Indians

Anyone who appreciates very few the Indians and considers that it will be able to conquer any land and Indian nation with the Spanish advantage of themselves and their horses, and offensive and defensive weapons, deceives very much to himself. There is Chile, or more exactly Arauco and Tucapel, which are two valleys that our Spaniards for more than twenty-five years have failed in wresting even a foot of land to them, despite of fighting every year with all their forces, because when they lost fear to horses and muskets, and realized that the Spanish also falls down with the stone and the arrow thrown, the barbarians dare and enter by the side of landsknechts, and make their misdeed.

Since how many years ago people is recruited in New Spain, and then go against the Chichimecs, who are a few naked Indians with bows and arrows, and until this days they are not defeated, but every day they become more dared and brave?³⁰⁹

In the same way that the Indians of Chile are categorized as *behetrías* in the manner of those that existed in Peru before the advent of the Incas,³¹⁰ Chichimecs are characterized as “very barbaric and wild men, who only lived by hunting [...] They did not plant nor cultivate the land, nor lived together, because all their activity and life was hunting, and in this they were skilled. They dwelled in the cliffs and roughest places in the mountains, living beastly without order, completely naked.”³¹¹ Both cultures were classified as barbarians, that is, and following St. Thomas Aquinas, “beings who reject the right reason and common way of life of men,” usually defined in consideration of their ruggedness and wildness, as beings

³⁰⁸ Acosta, *Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias*, book VII, ch. XXVIII, 245.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, book VI, ch. XIX, 198.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, book VII, ch. II, 208-9.

of little understanding because “deviate from the common customs of others, and have little knowledge of wisdom, nor share the light of reason.”³¹²

José de Acosta does not deviate from his contemporaries when he uses the term *barbarians* as equivalent to the concept of *Indians*,³¹³ although admitting limitations in the application of the word.³¹⁴ In this way, convinced that the barbarous condition resided in the form of government and way of exercising authority,³¹⁵ he divided New World societies in three classes or, as he calls it, “kinds of government and life.”³¹⁶ The first, which he ponders the best of all is the monarchy, condition only held by natives of the great kingdoms of Peru and Mexico;³¹⁷ the second corresponds to *behetrías* or communities living “in towns and villages, and not wandering as beasts,”³¹⁸ ruling themselves through meetings “on the advice of many,”³¹⁹ and recognizing the authority of a leader only in wartime; the third kind, the most barbaric of all, which “involves the savages like beasts, who have little human feeling,”³²⁰ is identified with the “Indians without law, nor king, nor settlement, but who walk in herds like beasts and savages.”³²¹ The second class of barbarians were the *Mapuches* of Chile, while in Mexico the *Chichimecs* identified with the lowest condition.³²²

In any case, societies with few political and moral virtues were regarded as an obstacle to the progress and preservation of civilized life: *Chichimecs* and *Reche-Mapuches* were attributed the collapse of more advanced societies or of having prevented the cultural influence of great states. However, the expansion of the faith even in societies with little cultural development and reluctant to Spanish influence should be done peacefully. Facing the danger it was valid that the missionaries were accompanied by soldiers, for which it was allowed “to engage with them a deal that is partly human and partly fierce, until they begin

³¹² Acosta, *De Procuranda Indorum Salute*, Proem, 392.

³¹³ The jesuit points out that “we call Indians all the barbarians who in our era have been discovered by the Spaniards and Portuguese, all of whom are deprived of the light of gospel and unaware of the human pólice;” see *Ibid.*, 391-2.

³¹⁴ Lopetegui, *El padre José de Acosta y las misiones*, 259.

³¹⁵ Acosta, *Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias*, book VI, ch. 11, 191.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, ch. 19, 198.

³¹⁷ In his *De Procuranda Indorum Salute*, Proem, 392-3, Acosta relegates Mexicas and Incas to the second category of barbarians, placing them at the same level as “those of Arauco, Tucapel and the rest of the kingdom of Chile,” reserving the first category to Chinese, Japanese men “and other provinces of eastern India.”

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 393.

³¹⁹ Acosta, *Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias*, book VI, ch. 19, 199.

³²⁰ Acosta, *De Procuranda Indorum Salute*, Proem, 393.

³²¹ Acosta, *Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias*, book VI, ch. 19, 199.

³²² *Ibid.*

little by little to depose their native fierceness, and to tame themselves and to incorporate the discipline and customs of men.”³²³ But the deployment of violence was only valid within the legal and ethical parameters of the just war, which meant that, as far as possible, it was necessary to avoid incurring in “the horrors of war, such as burning villages, injuring or killing men, reduce them to perpetual slavery and other calamities that go together with war.”³²⁴

Although the approaches of jurists, theologians and ecclesiastics laid the foundations of monarchical policy on the Indian to a large extent, the border regions, however, remained to varying degrees alien to the protectionist intentions, the Neo-Galician and Chilean cases being the most illustrative. Only in the last decades of the sixteenth century there was a glimpse in both war territories of appeasement of the slaving practice and the use of violence as a means of pacification. The particularities of each case is what we will see in the following chapters.

Conclusion

The north of Mexico and the south of Chile, antipodes of the continental geography, were scenes that put to test the capacity of adaptation of the native societies that developed there. The greater ecological variability of the Neogalician territory resulted in an equally greater and more complex cultural mosaic with respect to the southern lands of the continent. However, bands and tribes were the most frequent and widespread forms of organization in both spaces, precisely the most difficult to incorporate into the Spanish labor and political system.

It has been a constant to state that man and geography conspired in the most isolated regions of the American continent imposing challenges to the expansionist advance of Spanish steel. An equally important challenge was to incorporate all that diversity into conceptual schemes that were understandable to Westerners. Classical and medieval philosophy played a crucial role in this problematization of newly discovered alterity, a

³²³ Acosta, *De Procuranda Indorum Salute*, book II, ch. 12, 450.

³²⁴ *Ibid*, ch. 15, 453.

process in which theologians and jurists sought to situate each of the manifestations in the right place within the chain of beings. The discussions held in the sixteenth century laid the pillars of Spanish legislation on indigenous rights, debating their proposals between the extremes of violence and slavery to peaceful incorporation. This was an eminently intellectual debate, whose legal manifestation would have to support or make legally and morally difficult the advance of the conquerors along the diverse spaces of the American geography.

Chapter 2:

Dynamics of the Spanish-Indian confrontation in the two extremes

of the American Spanish empire

The New World really was a set of new worlds, each one with its singularities defined by ecological and human aspects. While in some ends of the continent high civilizations flourished, in others lived peoples, such as the Chichimecas and Mapuches, that “have no sort of temple, nor priest, nor law or human order.”³²⁵ Every new space for discovering and ruling meant an opportunity to achieve the aims of fame and wealth of conquerors. In northern Mexico these ambitions were fed, at first, by the desire of discovering presumed geographical landmarks connecting the Old World with the newly discovered lands, such as the chimeric Strait of Anian, or by the existence of fantastic cities like Quivira, the Seven Cities of Cibola, or the village of the Amazons.³²⁶ The pioneer expeditions of Francisco Cortes de Buenaventura in 1524-25, Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán in 1530-31, Fray Marcos de Niza in 1538, Francisco Vázquez de Coronado in 1540-42, and Francisco de Ibarra in 1564-65, were all largely inspired by these aspirations.³²⁷ But when hope gave way to desilusion and disappointment, the explorers’s frustration was offset with the discovery of rich veins of silver at mid-sixteenth century, which eventually became a more powerful magnet to attract men and resources to the desert regions. The case of Chile was different, since it was not myths that propelled the conquest: very on the contrary, after the expedition of Diego de Almagro that long and narrow strip of land was vilified as poor in resources, inhabited by bellicose Indians. The imaginary about rich and fantastic towns arose only in the second half of the seventeenth century with the City of the Caesars, a city of gold lost in some hidden corner of southern Chile or in the immediate trans-Andean pampas. The search expeditions were organized by governors or Jesuits, but in a period that escapes the temporal framework of this investigation.

Whether for reasons based on fantasy or reality, any expeditionary project to north of New Spain or southern Chile meant go into the *Chichimec* or *Mapuche* territories, or berthing in their coasts. And since necessity knows no law, the desire of the Spaniards for realizing their hopes and consolidate their presence in these remote regions crushed with the natives’ lifestyle, not inclined to serve or to adapt themselves to European parameters of settlement, government, discipline and work. Referring to the Chichimecs, Gerónimo de Losada well illustrates when saying that “are lawless barbarians, savages who roam the fields wandering from one place to another, sustaining themselves by hunting with bows and arrows and various wild fruits, and they do not

³²⁵ Herrera, *Historia General de los hechos de los Castellanos*, Decade VIII, book VI, chapter 15, 78.

³²⁶ To understand the role of Medieval and Renaissance literature in the minds of the conquerors of America see the classic work by Leonard, *Books of the brave*. On the myth of the Amazons in the exploration of northern Mexico, see Leonard, “Conquerors and Amazons in Mexico.”

³²⁷ A good synthesis of these expeditions in Sauer, *Aztatlan*, chapter IV: “La ruta de Cibola,” 247-316.

have houses or stabled settlements, do not sow nor submit themselves to servitude or working.”³²⁸ Religious men of Guadalajara complement this description when pointing that “there is no caciques to obey in this kingdom because the most naturals of this kingdom were not reduced in towns, but they roamed the hills as barbarian people.”³²⁹ The description of the Mapuches is not very different, as can be seen in the quote by Alonso de Góngora Marmolejo, who characterized the Reche-Mapuches as societies that have no “master to whom respect, but behetries.”³³⁰

In both cases, the lack of native leaders with the authority to enforce obedience greatly hindered the colonization project based on the use of local labor, as had happened in the valley of Mexico or the valley of Cusco. The *Gran Chichimeca* and the *Arauco* territory meant real challenges to the hegemonic model displayed up to that point in the New World. The anxiety of conquerors, bordering on greed, and the reluctance of natives to submit to colonial labor system, gestated a contradiction settled through violence and abuses, contravening the protective provisions of Spanish legislation.

For many, the far north of México was a window of opportunities, while for a few it was a region to increase their privileges. After the entry of Francisco de Garay to the Gulf of Mexico coast in 1521, Hernán Cortés, recent conqueror of the Aztecs, organized an expedition to control the Huasteca in 1523, starting a lucrative slave business with the naturals reluctant to obey, sending them as labor to the central valley of Mexico. When Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán assumed the governorship of Pánuco in 1527, slave trafficking increased to immeasurable levels, reoriented now to the Antilles in exchange for cattle, where it was necessary to replace the nearly extinct Arawak Indians.³³¹

With the area of the Gulf closed to his claims, Hernán Cortés set eyes on the Pacific North Coast. Already in 1522 his men had occupied the Indian chiefdom of Colima, and the next year they founded the homonymous town as a bridgehead for further operations to the northwest. Driven by the strategic interest of the Crown to find a strait of intercommunication between the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific,³³² and influenced by the reports of the natives who talked about a province of Ciguatlán rich in pearls and gold, inhabited by women whom he thought were the Amazons,³³³ Cortés dispatched an expedition led by his nephew Francisco

³²⁸ “Información acerca de la rebelión de los indios zacatecas y guachichiles a pedimento de Pedro de Ahumada Samano: testimonio de Gerónimo de Losado; minas de Zacatecas, 24 de enero de 1562,” in Montoto, *Colección de documentos*, 307.

³²⁹ “Informe al rey por el Cabildo Eclesiástico de Guadalajara, acerca de las cosas de aquel reino; 20 de enero de 1570,” in García Icazbalceta, *Colección de documentos*, II, 501.

³³⁰ Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile, desde su descubrimiento hasta el año de 1575*, ch. XXXVI, 148.

³³¹ Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 27-9. Altman, *The war for Mexico west*, 21. Donald Chipman challenges the historical image built around Nuño de Guzman, charged with excessively negative features, see Chipman, “The traffic in Indian slaves in the Province of Panuco.” Also Chipman, *Nuño de Guzman and the Province of Panuco*.

³³² On the Cortesian expeditions to the north Pacific and the discovery of Baja California, see the interesting work by Gonzalez Rodriguez, “Hernan Cortes, la Mar del Sur.”

³³³ “Cuarta carta-relación de Hernán Cortés al emperador Carlos V; Tenuxtitan, 15 de octubre de 1524,” in *Hernán Cortés. Cartas y documentos*, 213. According to Jiménez Moreno, “this fable of the Amazons originated in the Nahuatl name for the West that is Cihuatlampa (‘toward the place of women’);” see Jiménez Moreno, “La colonización y evangelización de Guanajuato en el siglo XVI,” 69.

Cortés de Buenaventura in 1524.³³⁴ But dissatisfied by the lack of wealth, excessive heat, and hostility of Indians, they got back the following year and after having reached to the Tepic Indian town in the Nayarit region.

Despite this entrance, the territories north of the Río Grande remained practically unknown. The first plan of occupation came from the hand of the governor of Pánuco Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán, who was also appointed in the office of president of the first Audiencia of México in 1528 by the Crown. From that position he earned the enmity of Hernán Cortés, who felt undermined his authority when Guzman obtained authorization to undertake an expedition north of Michoacan, eager to overcome the successes of the Marques del Valle and leaving his name for posterity. This entrance represented the origin of New Galicia as a geo-administrative unit in Spanish empire, and also the beginning of a tense interethnic relationship that lasted for nearly six decades.

With regard to the Mapuche territory, the incursion led by captain Gómez de Alvarado in 1536 meant the first Spanish presence in the vicinity of the Biobío river. After a painful march facing torrential rains, marshy lands and overflowing rivers practically invadable, it was necessary to return to the valley of Aconcagua where the Adelantado Diego de Almagro awaited for them, not without first having waged fierce combat against “great number of naturals close to that territory [Itata river].”³³⁵

However, the most important exploration was commanded by Pedro de Valdivia ten years later. With the purpose of discovering new territories with the sufficient density of Indians to distribute encomiendas to the conquerors, he penetrated even beyond the margins of the Biobío. This was the first Spanish expedition to cross that fluvial limit. However, he suffered a similar fate to that of his predecessor Gómez de Alvarado, since along with checking the fertility of the land and having chosen the site where the future city of Concepción would build, the expedition had to face numerous attacks from the Indians, highlighting the ambush they suffered at the Quilacura site, where “seven or eight thousand Indians attacked us, and we fought with them for more than two hours, and they defended bravely, closed in a squadron, like tudescos.”³³⁶ The victory of the Spaniards was sealed with the martyrdom of the prisoners, to whom before returning to their lands “he commanded punishing by cutting their noses.”³³⁷ Actions like this were the keynote of this first stage of Hispanic-Indian contact, where the former sought to subdue the latter through the threat and example of extreme punishment. Unfortunately for their own purposes, the Spaniards did not count on that such a procedure would only contribute to increase the desire for revenge and to dilate the confrontation between both sides. The expeditionaries were informed of a

³³⁴ Cortés, “Instrucción civil y militar de Hernán Cortés a Francisco Cortés para la expedición de la costa de Colima; 1524,” *Estudios sobre las Culturas Contemporáneas*.

³³⁵ Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile, desde su descubrimiento hasta el año de 1575*, ch. II, 5. Mariño de Lovera, *Crónica del Reino de Chile*, book 1, ch. VI, 34, adds that in the combat “the number of Indians was excessive; their effort and forces were superior; their boldness and courage were reckless;” unfortunately the chapter that narrates the fight has many gaps attributable to the deterioration of the chronicle.

³³⁶ Valdivia, “Carta al Emperador Carlos V; Concepción, 15 de Octubre de 1550,” in Medina, *Cartas de Pedro de Valdivia*, 157. See also the “Carta a sus Apoderados en la Corte; Concepción, 15 de Octubre de 1550,” *Ibid.*, 113.

³³⁷ Vivar, *Crónica y relación copiosa y verdadera de los reinos de Chile*, ch. LXV, 180.

great meeting that was coming on them involving groups of both bands of the Biobío.³³⁸ Facing a so precarious situation and fearful of a more formidable attack than the previous one, “the General agreed to return to the city of Santiago before the possibility of a bad result.”³³⁹

It is not our purpose to make a historical account of this period, many classic and modern authors have made substantial descriptions to which one could add very little.³⁴⁰ In the following paragraphs we will delve into the factors that contributed to the emergence and maintenance of that conflictive relationship in northern Mexico and southern Chile. So, chapter two analyzes the dynamics of interethnic conflict in both frontiers before the implementation of non-violent pacification measures, all based on the analysis of three variables: corporal, economic and symbolic violence. Through this analytical triad we intend to bring into light and understand the functioning of the forces that gave life to the dynamics of violence and counter-violence in New Galicia and Chile, that is, to reveal the way in which the inter-ethnic relationship articulated in both frontiers, how it affected indigenous societies and the responses they generated in the tribal world. To this end we propose the following classification:

Physical violence, disease and slavery

Some recent historical works, written mainly by indigenous intellectuals from all corners of the American continent, have placed in a central place the role of pain, outrage and vexation for the understanding of the historical relationship between native societies and the white man. Inspired by the desire to denounce a traumatic and desolate past on which the precarious situation of their present rises, books like *Violence over the land* by Ned Blackhawk³⁴¹ or *¡...Escucha, winka...!* by Pablo Marimán et alii,³⁴² are a claiming attempt to denounce the hardships that emanated from this forced interaction in different stages of history. Despite the fact that the Caribbean and the Mesoamerican nucleus were the first native cultural areas to experience the impact of a relationship based on the Europeans’ threat

³³⁸ Valdivia, “Carta al Emperador Carlos V, Concepción; 15 de Octubre de 1550,” in Medina, *Cartas de Pedro de Valdivia*, 157. Vivar, ch. LXVI, 182.

³³⁹ Vivar, *Ibid.*

³⁴⁰ For New Galicia, I can mention: Altman, *The war for Mexico west*; Amador, *Bosquejo histórico de Zacatecas*; Assadourian, *Zacatecas*; Jiménez, *El Gran Norte de México*; Alvarez, *El Indio y la sociedad colonial norteña*; Lopez-Portillo y Weber, *La conquista de la Nueva Galicia*; Lopez-Portillo y Weber, *La rebelión de la Nueva Galicia*; Powell, *Soldiers, Indians and Silver*; Roman Gutierrez, *Sociedad y evangelización*. For Chile, Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, I-II; Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile. Pedro de Valdivia*, I-II; Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile sin Gobernador, 1554-1557*; Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile. Francisco de Villagra, 1561-1563*; Errázuriz, *Historia de Chile. Pedro de Villagra, 1563-1565*.

³⁴¹ Blackhawk, *Violence over the Land. Indians and Empires in the early American West*.

³⁴² Marimán, Caniuqueo, Millalén & Levil, *¡...Escucha, winka...! Cuatro ensayos de Historia Nacional Mapuche y un epílogo sobre el futuro*.

and violence, the borderlands were the scenarios in which the most active and longest conflicts took place, and the northwest of Mexico was the first of all in the New World. Chile, being a territory explored and colonized later, inhabited by a native culture that could keep its independence, maintained its borderland situation for all centuries of Spanish presence.

The *entradas*, or armed raids of Spanish conquistadors into the American territories, adhered to a pattern that experienced few changes in the first decades of expansion: the *empresas de rescate* inspired by the thirst for wealth (especially gold and silver), the *empresas de cabalgada* driven by the slave eagerness, and the *empresas de conquista* in the economic-social impulse for obtaining land and *encomiendas*,³⁴³ were carried out with similar tactics, which according to Clay Mathers “suggests a considerable sharing of information and intelligence between expeditions.”³⁴⁴ As Néstor Meza rightly points out, “the leaders of conquering expeditions were recruited among old soldiers from previous expeditions who, once converted into wealthy *encomenderos*, decided to make for themselves a new expedition.”³⁴⁵

The impact of the expeditions to northwestern Mexico and southern Chile on the local inhabitants was not different from other latitudes, since the search for precious metals, land and labor were usually made with excessive violence. The *requerimiento* by Juan López de Palacios Rubios, “that infamous interpellation” in the words of Jose Rabasa,³⁴⁶ was an instrument of spiritual and temporal self-legitimation for conquest, by which “practices to incorporate populations and territories discovered by conquerors into the peninsular subjection got legal value.”³⁴⁷

Despite the altruistic inspiration neither the New Laws of 1542,³⁴⁸ nor the Royal Decree of 1548 that established normative bases to free all “rescate” slaves,³⁴⁹ nor the

³⁴³ Meza, “Formas y motivos de las empresas españolas,” 22-23, 25 y 28.

³⁴⁴ Mathers, “Contest and violence on the Northern borderlands frontier,” 209.

³⁴⁵ Meza, “Formas y motivos de las empresas españolas,” 29.

³⁴⁶ Rabasa, *Writing violence on the Northern frontier*, 10.

³⁴⁷ Goicovich, “La etapa de la Conquista,” 56.

³⁴⁸ “Leyes y Ordenanzas nuevamente hechas por S.M. para la gobernación de las Indias, y buen tratamiento y conservación de los indios; 1542,” in García Icazbalceta, *Colección de documentos*, II, 204-27. Also in “Real Provisión. Las Leyes Nuevas; Barcelona, 20 de noviembre de 1542,” and the “Declaraciones añadidas a las Leyes Nuevas; Valladolid, 4 de junio de 1543,” in Konetzke, *Colección de documentos*, I, 216-20 and 222-6.

³⁴⁹ “Cédula Real fechada en Valladolid a 1 de septiembre de 1548,” in *Cedulario de 1574*, 29-30.

Provincial Councils of Mexico of 1555 and 1565,³⁵⁰ and of Lima of 1556 and 1561,³⁵¹ were enough to stop the abuses of officers, soldiers, *encomenderos*, miners and landowners.

The Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán's expedition marked the beginning of the controversial inter-ethnic relationship in New Galicia. As a preamble to what will happen in other regions of the continent, the entrada that began in December 1529 with a host of "one hundred and fifty horsemen and similar quantity of pawns, well armed, and twelve pieces of small artillery, and seven or eight thousand friendly Indians provided with all provisions,"³⁵² has remained in history as one of the bloodiest episodes of the New World conquest. The ferocity deployed by the Spaniards and their Mexica and Tlaxcalan allies so deeply affected the conscience of the Dominican Friar Bartolomé de Las Casas, that devoted a chapter of his *Breve relación de la destrucción de las Indias Occidentales* (A short account of the destruction of the Indies) to denounce the atrocities committed

Among many other [atrocities] he marked [Indians] with iron as slaves, unjustly, being free as they all are, four thousand and five hundred men, women and children of one year, still breastfeeding, and of two, three, four and five years old, even when they received them peacefully, without other infinite [injustices] that were not counted³⁵³.

The traditional and contemporary historiographies have erected a lapidary judgment of this excessive intervention, arriving at the consensus that this campaign "explains the continuous hatred with which the borderland Indians faced the Spaniards."³⁵⁴ As soon as the host arrived in Michoacan, the good will of the governor or *cazonci*, who provided each Spaniard with two hens, a half fanega of daily corn, grass for the horses, and "an Indian

³⁵⁰ Lorenzana, *Concilios Provinciales Primero y Segundo*.

³⁵¹ Vargas Ugarte, *Concilios Limenses*.

³⁵² "Carta a S. M. del Presidente de la Audiencia de Méjico, Nuño de Guzmán, en que refiere la jornada que hizo a Mechoacan, a conquistar la provincia de los Tebles Chichimecas que confina con Nueva España, 1530," in Razo, *Crónicas de la conquista del Nuevo Reyno de Galicia*, 25.

³⁵³ Las Casas, *Breve relación de la destrucción*, 99. Barely three years after the appearance of this work, the famous report by Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, *Nafragios*, was published, in which he testifies the horrors and destruction caused by the Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán's host. See also Adorno, "Peaceful, conquest and law in the *Relación* (Account)."

³⁵⁴ Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 29. Francisco Vázquez de Coronado, as soon as assumed the governorship of New Galicia by order of the viceroy Antonio de Mendoza, found that "most of the Indians of the Kingdom of New Galicia were in war, some of them for not having been conquered and others for bad treatments caused by the needs of the conquerors;" see Herrera, *Historia General de los hechos de los Castellanos*, vol. 12, Decade VI, book V, ch. 9, 412.

woman who cook for him,”³⁵⁵ was not enough to rid him from a cruel and unjust sentence: convinced to get the respect of the Indians through fear, frustrated by the limited wealth given, and sustained in unfounded suspicions of treason, Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán condemned the native leader to suffer “torment of fire,”³⁵⁶ and to be “dragged alive to a horse’s tail and to be burnt.”³⁵⁷ Some lords and *nahuatatos*, or *lenguaraces* of Michoacán, were subjected to “torment of fire to the feet until they were burned to the ankles.”³⁵⁸ The subjects of the ill-fated ruler did not fare any better, since eight thousand Tarascans accompanied the expedition as *tamemes* or porters, many of whom were “distributed to the Spaniards, and some chained, carrying the packs on their backs.”³⁵⁹

³⁵⁵ “Relación hecha de viva voz por el alférez Francisco de Arceo, al capitán e historiador Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés,” in Razo, *Crónicas de la conquista del Nuevo Reyno de Galicia*, 243.

³⁵⁶ “Relación de la entrada de Nuño de Guzmán a Nueva Galicia que dio García del Pilar, su intérprete en la jornada,” in *Ibid.*, 218.

³⁵⁷ Alcalá, *Relación de Michoacán*, ch. XXIX, 277. See also the relations by Juan de Sámano, Pedro de Carranza, Cristóbal de Flores and García del Pilar, in Razo, *Crónicas de la conquista del Nuevo Reyno de Galicia*, 117, 158, 189 and 220-221. Also Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. XXVII, 67-70.

³⁵⁸ “Relación de la entrada de Nuño de Guzmán a Nueva Galicia que dio García del Pilar, su intérprete en la jornada,” in Razo, *Crónicas de la conquista del Nuevo Reyno de Galicia*, 220. See also, in the same work, the testimony of Cristóbal Flores, 187-9.

³⁵⁹ “Relación de la entrada de Nuño de Guzmán a Nueva Galicia que dio García del Pilar, su intérprete en la jornada,” in *Ibid.*, 218-9. The relations by Pedro de Carranza and Cristóbal Flores are also explicit when saying that “they gave him many *tamemes*, whom he distributed for the Spaniards of the army he was leading, and I saw them take out from the city in chains,” and “the Indians were divided by the Spaniards who went to war to bring their herd; and for the security that these Indians did not flee and leave the herd, the lords and principals were in chains by the necks and many of them died in the prison;” see *Ibid.*, 156 and 186.




Figure 3. Fragment of sheet 44r of the Codex Telleriano-Remensis, compiled around 1563. The conqueror Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán is represented on a white horse. The text under the illustration says: “The year of Eleven Houses, 1529, Nuño de Guzmán left for Jalisco going to subject that land. They pretend that the snake comes out from the sky, saying that difficulties come to the natives going the Christians there.” Source: Eloise Quiñones Keber, ed., *Codex Telleriano Remensis*. (Courtesy Nettie Lee Benson Library, University of Texas at Austin).

In their subsequent course, the expeditionaries took everything they could to satisfy their desire for wealth and social status, because as Francisco Román Gutiérrez points out, the entry of Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán “was the first opportunity for all those who arrived after the conquest of Tenochtitlan and were not part of the Hernán Cortés’ host that emerged in expeditions to the west and south of Mexico.”³⁶⁰ The attempts at resistance were suffocated by the sword, trying to stifle any attempt of recidivism by means of extreme punishments that served as a warning. Two native leaders who encouraged the rebellion were captured in the Jalisco region, having to pay their obstinacy with the mutilation of “hands and noses,”³⁶¹ and some decades later Francisco Tenamaztle, cacique of the provinces of Nochistlán and Jalisco, denounced to the king the grievances of which he had been subjected, living banished

³⁶⁰ Román Gutiérrez, *Sociedad y evangelización*, 359.

³⁶¹ “Relación del descubrimiento y conquista que se hizo por el gobernador Nuño de Guzmán y su ejército en las provincias de la Nueva Galicia, escrita por Gonzalo López y autorizada por Alonso de Matta, escribano de su Majestad, 1530,” in Razo, *Crónicas de la conquista del Nuevo Reyno de Galicia*, 78. See also, in the same work, the relation by Pedro de Carranza, 164.

after being stripped of his chiefdom, “suffering many insults and affronts and persecutions.”³⁶²

In Chile, the first inter-ethnic contacts were not much better. From the beginning the Spanish-Indian relationship was marked by the abuses and excesses of the newcomers; even when they were received with gifts and festivities by the natives, the attentions were in many cases compensated with the coin of ingratitude. This happened, for example, in the maritime excursion that Francisco Pastene made in 1550 to the Mocha island.³⁶³ The natives of the island welcomed them, willingly giving the supplies they needed on the continent to consolidate their initial settlement in Penco; the chronicler Mariño de Lovera is the one who best illustrates this situation by saying that on that occasion, when they docked on the island, the natives felt fear when observing

[...] some armed men, with long beards so different in all to their own costume and appearance... [that] the Spaniards sought to encourage and attract the Indians by speaking to them through an Indian interpreter, explaining their need and of their mates in Penco, who suffered great lack of maintenance; and so they went there requesting their help. They had barely stopped when the Indians came, men as well as women loaded with food, and children bringing presents, putting everything in the boats.³⁶⁴

But the goodwill of the Indians was badly rewarded, because

[...] at the time of embarking, when picking up the loads that the Indians brought them, they also took the Indians, capturing the most of men and women they could, taking them in a forced way, without any other pretension that not losing the habit of giving bad in exchange for well.³⁶⁵

As the fragment reflects, practices of this nature were not strange to the Hispanic action, and as José Bengoa has emphasized, facts of this kind were a direct attack on the reciprocity of the indigenous.³⁶⁶ Acts of excessive repression were not infrequent in the face

³⁶² Tenamaztle, *Relación de los agravios hechos por Nuño de Guzmán*, 11. Among the numerous illustrations that make up the Lienzo de Tlaxcala there is one that represents the fight between the Chichimecs of Jalisco and the Tlaxcalans who accompanied the Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán expedition; see Chavero, *El Lienzo de Tlaxcala*, 53.

³⁶³ José Bengoa cree erradamente que estos acontecimientos sucedieron en la isla de Santa María; véase “Servidumbre y territorio...”, ob. cit., p. 89.

³⁶⁴ Mariño de Lovera, *Crónica del Reino de Chile*, book 1, part 2, ch. XXXII, 305.

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ Bengoa, “Servidumbre y territorio: españoles y mapuches,” 90.

of attempts at resistance; mutilations and tortures were common places when repressing insubordinations or attacks. A sample is in the actions undertaken by the host of Pedro de Valdivia when they were attacked by the local groups to Lake Villarrica a few months before the foundation of the homonymous city; once the persecution of the defeated began, “the Spaniards began to take some of those who were alive, and committed unworthy cruelties of Christians on them, cutting off some hands, others feet, others noses and ears, and cheeks, and even they cut the breasts of women and threw children on the soil mercilessly.”³⁶⁷

However, it was the forced and compulsive slavery, supported by an excessive violence, which left the clearest and most perennial testimony of the Spanish brutality in *Chichimecs* and *Mapuches*. It happened, for instance, in the first conquering expedition to the New Galicia’s core.³⁶⁸ The first victims were the Tarascans of Michoacán, many of whom marched with heavy loads of food behind their backs, chained to their necks to prevent defections. Despite these measures, leakage was unavoidable, which together with diseases and abuses reduced the number of loaders. Thus, the Spanish resorted to the support of the populations they were discovering, incorporating new *tamemes* with the argument of conviction or threat without any consideration for women and children, who ended up turned into true slaves: In the town of Aguacatlán, the “slaves were marked with burning iron at one’s discretion,”³⁶⁹ imprisoning eight hundred Indians;³⁷⁰ the resolute resistance of the Cacocalpa and Naguatlan natives was the perfect excuse for Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán to make war on them by fire and blood, condemning the captives to be “marked with hot iron as slaves;”³⁷¹ the natives of Jalisco, believing in the promises of peace and friendship, “were deceived and imprisoned”³⁷² in a large corral, an event in which Captain Gonzalo López, in a later statement, boasted “of having done a lot of prey of people, men and women, and

³⁶⁷ Mariño de Lovera, *Crónica del Reino de Chile*, book 1, part 2, ch. XXXV, 315.

³⁶⁸ A summary of the slaving activities deployed by the Spanish captain in the regions of New Spain is provided by Silvio Zavala, “Nuño de Guzmán y la esclavitud de los indios.”

³⁶⁹ “Relación de la jornada que hizo Nuño de Guzmán a Nueva Galicia, escrita por el capitán Cristóbal Flores,” in Razo, *Crónicas de la conquista del Nuevo Reyno de Galicia*, 199.

³⁷⁰ Relaciones de Cristóbal Flores y García del Pilar, in Razo, *Crónicas de la conquista del Nuevo Reyno de Galicia*, 193 and 224.

³⁷¹ “Relación del descubrimiento y conquista que se hizo por el gobernador Nuño de Guzmán y su ejército en las provincias de la Nueva Galicia, escrita por Gonzalo López y autorizada por Alonso de Matta, escribano de su Majestad, 1530,” in *Ibid.*, 88.

³⁷² “Relación de la entrada de Nuño de Guzmán a Nueva Galicia que dio García del Pilar, su intérprete en la jornada,” in *Ibid.*, 230.

children [...] that thus were marked with iron up to a thousand slaves.”³⁷³ The stories by Pedro de Carranza and Cristóbal Flores record one of the few mentions referring to the hardships suffered by these slaves, although they claim were not direct witnesses: the first one says he heard that “it was a pain to see the young children there,”³⁷⁴ and the second one “that all the little children of their wives died and killed on the way, that it was the greatest pain in the whole world.”³⁷⁵ Finally, captain Gonzalo López, sent to Michoacán and Aguacatlán by Nuño de Guzmán to get loaders, ordered to build “a large corral in which there were a lot of women, and Indians, and imprisoned children, men with chains around their necks, and women tied from ten to ten with ropes.”³⁷⁶

In addition to the inescapable hardships of the long voyages, two important factors eroded the resistance of the Indians. The first was the emerging of ailments, as happened in the town of Ixcatlán, where “an illness affected to friendly Indians, some of which died.”³⁷⁷ Of greater impact in the conscience of the aborigines was the painful trip to Culiacán, when they experienced in their own flesh the discriminatory treatment by Christians, since “the Spaniards did not eat but meat, and the Indians grass, where many of them perished.”³⁷⁸ The mountains and streams became the refuge of the fortunate few who could escape the scourges of hunger and disease.

Although the defenders of indigenous rights, both within and outside of New Spain, made a severe judgment on the expedition of Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán, whom they accused of putting “all that land in the ordinary and pestilential tyrannical servitude, [in which] all the Christian tyrants of the Indies usually pretend to put those people,”³⁷⁹ the Spanish conquistador acted convinced that his actions were in direct benefit of the Crown.³⁸⁰ When

³⁷³ “Relación del descubrimiento y conquista que se hizo por el gobernador Nuño de Guzmán y su ejército en las provincias de la Nueva Galicia, escrita por Gonzalo López y autorizada por Alonso de Matta, escribano de su Majestad, 1530,” in *Ibid.*, 111.

³⁷⁴ “Relación sobre la jornada que hizo Nuño de Guzmán, de la entrada y sucesos de la Nueva Galicia, hecha por Pedro de Carranza,” in *Ibid.*, 168.

³⁷⁵ Relation by Cristóbal Flores, in *Ibid.*, 200.

³⁷⁶ Relation by García del Pilar, in *Ibid.*, 229.

³⁷⁷ “Relación de la conquista de los teules chichimecas que dio el capitán de emergencia Juan de Sámano,” in *Ibid.*, 142. See in the same work the testimony by Pedro de Carranza about a similar fact, 169.

³⁷⁸ Relation by García del Pilar, in *Ibid.*, 236.

³⁷⁹ Las Casas, *Breve relación de la destrucción*, 99-100.

³⁸⁰ A biographical summary, which delves into the psychological traits of the character before the expedition to New Galicia, is in the essay by Marín-Tamayo, “Nuño de Guzmán: el hombre y sus antecedentes.”

Carlos V issued the Royal Provision of August 2, 1530,³⁸¹ prohibiting the servitude of the Indians even in cases of just war, Beltrán de Guzmán expressed his annoyance by arguing that Nueva Galicia was a territory of difficult settlement and communication due to natives hostility, so that slavery had the double merit of being the most effective means to subdue the rebels, and a compensation to the hardships and privations suffered by the conquerors, who risked their lives in favor of the monarchy and greatness of Spain.³⁸²

Despite the fact that the leaders of the later expeditions to the north of New Spain took measures to lessen the impact on the native populations, it was inevitable that situations of tension arose, born of the natives' distrust or the excesses of the host. Thus, for example, Richard Flint proves with documentary and archaeological evidence that the attitudes towards the indigenous societies of the members of Francisco Vázquez de Coronado's expedition in 1540-42, differed very little from those expressed by the most of other Spanish expeditions members.³⁸³ Some decades later, although the soldier-chronicler Baltasar de Obregón affirmed that the best way to pacify the populations settled in newly discovered lands was to give them a good treatment because "it pacifies even the animals becoming domestic,"³⁸⁴ during his participation in the conquering excursion of Francisco de Ibarra in 1564-65, he witnessed the execution of some natives who practiced anthropophagy and nefarious sin, in order to "rigorously uproot old sins of such abomination for example of those who would like to reoffend in this infernal poison."³⁸⁵

The southern Chilean territory, of much smaller dimensions although still imprecise considering that the conquest had just begun, was not in the sixteenth century a bridge through which expeditions traveled to other regions. The explorations were limited rather to

³⁸¹ "Real Provisión que no se pueda cautivar, ni hacer esclavo a ningún indio; Madrid, 2 de agosto de 1530," in Konetzke, *Colección de documentos*, I, 134-6. Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. LIX, 177. This provision was preceded by a decree dated July 12, 1530, as recorded in the *Cedulario de 1574* composed by Alonso Zorita, 27. See also Zavala, *Los esclavos indios en Nueva España*, 30.

³⁸² "Carta a la Emperatriz de Nuño de Guzmán, dando cuenta del estado en que se hallaba la conquista y población de la Nueva Galicia, y quejándose de los daños que le hacían la Audiencia y el Marqués del Valle; Compostela, 12 de junio de 1532," in Paso y Troncoso, *Epistolario de Nueva España*, II, 146-7.

³⁸³ Flint, *Great cruelties have been reported*; Flint y Flint, *Documents of the Coronado Expedition*. Charles di Peso tells of the battle that the Vázquez de Coronado expedition sustained with the Zuñis Indians in his book *Las sociedades no nucleares de América*, 160-1. See also the Works by Adams, "Consecuencias del contacto hispánico entre los Pueblo," 81; and Mathers, "Contest and violence on the Northern borderlands frontier," 222-3.

³⁸⁴ Obregón, *Historia de los descubrimientos*, ch. XX, 124.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, ch. XVII, 106.

recognize the internal territory, with the purpose of checking the population density for distributing Indians in *encomiendas*, and the searching for gold or silver mines, which were not abundant or as rich as the northern Mexico ones. In this way, we see that once the city of Concepción was established in 1550, which throughout the colony will be the main southern bulwark of the Kingdom, the months and years afterwards were destined to explore the interior regions, checking with satisfaction the ideal conditions for colonization: the natives of the Kingdom southern region were more numerous than those of the central area. Given such promising conditions it is not surprising that the Pedro de Valdivia's mind has been blinded by the foundational fever. Convinced that the southern Indians would be dominated shortly as had happened with those of Santiago and disregarding the prudence of not dispersing in such a vast territory the few men, the ambitious governor founded successively new settlements. He built a fort at the beginning of 1551 on the Cautín river plains,³⁸⁶ and the following year, with a reinforcement of one hundred men from Peru, he promoted it to the status of city on April 16, 1552,³⁸⁷ with the name of La Imperial. The following year two more foundations were executed; in the promising bay of Corral the width and depth of the river, conditions that made it navigable, sealed the destiny of that area for the erection of the Valdivia port; in parallel, the discovery of gold and silver in the Puelches valley, next to the Millalauquén lagoon at the foot of the mountain range, determined the foundation of Villarrica in an act held in the month of April.³⁸⁸ Finally, the year 1553 marks the conqueror's last founding cycle. Now he did not intend to extend the occupation area, but rather to consolidate the colonized territory and to guard against any insurrectional movement. To this end, in the spring, the fort of Arauco was built, located on the seashore and among reluctant populations, to serve as a defensive barrier around the Quilacoya gold mines and Concepción city. Soon, by the month of October, he made built the forts of Tucapel and Purén in the western and eastern foothills of the Nahuelbuta mountain range, respectively.³⁸⁹ The highlight was the founding of Los Confines city in the confluence of the Malleco and Huequén rivers.³⁹⁰ The Valdivia's founding vertigo was born of his conviction that only the

³⁸⁶ "Carta de Pedro de Valdivia al emperador Carlos V; Concepción, 15 de octubre de 1550," in Medina, *Cartas de Pedro de Valdivia*, 221.

³⁸⁷ Rosales, *Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes Indiano*, II, book 3, ch. XXIV, 402.

³⁸⁸ Mariño de Lovera, *Crónica del Reino de Chile*, book 1, part 2, ch. XXXIX, 322.

³⁸⁹ Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, I, 324.

³⁹⁰ Mariño de Lovera, *Crónica del Reino de Chile*, book 1, part 3, ch. XLVI, 342.

establishment of cities and forts could consolidate the Spanish presence in the occupied regions. However, the little interest that this government aroused among the Spanish and mestizos of the neighboring kingdoms, especially the Peruvian viceroyalty, determined that the foundations had small populations. The final result was a dispersed and unstable occupation, which meant an ineffective domination over the native masses:³⁹¹ the priority given to the areas of greater density and that harbored the metal wealth gave rise to a dispersed founding patron, with cities difficult to communicate with each other. The majority of *Mapuches* could not be incorporated into the cities control system (the *encomienda*), since they retreated to the ravines and mountain slopes to resist the Spanish. Two great indigenous rebellions, the most successful of the sixteenth century in the continent, ended with all vestige of Spanish presence south of the Biobío.

The corporal violence and the slavery practice were for a long time the hammer and the chisel with which the colonizers tried to get fortunes and mold the will of New Galicia and Chile natives. In the first kingdom, by 1538, just over a year before beginning his campaign, the then governor Francisco Vázquez de Coronado denounced to the king that many encomenderos used their Indians to work the mines, to whom

they sell and buy as slaves without iron and others who are free, and this way of living they have after the mines were discovered, that may have been three years ago, and this is due to the lack of slaves in this province, that although they were made in it in much quantity, all of them were taken to sell out and for this lack of them the mines are worked with slave Indians and with free Indians.³⁹²

The systematic discovery of argentiferous veins since the mid-sixteenth century in northern New Spain triggered a strong migratory current that challenged geographical barriers and the danger of Indian attacks;³⁹³ a brief but illustrative passage by François Chevalier is the one that best defines this situation: “The royal mines came to constitute the skeleton of colonization in the northern provinces, so that the Gulf of Mexico, where no mines were found, remained unsettled until the end of the seventeenth century and still until the eighteenth century.”³⁹⁴ The master coup occurred in September 1546, when Juanes de

³⁹¹ Jara, *Guerra y sociedad en Chile*, 19.

³⁹² Aiton, “Coronado’s first report on the government of New Galicia”, 310-1.

³⁹³ About the Spanish expansion on Chichimec territory, see the work by Cisneros Guerrero, “Cambios en la frontera chichimeca en la región centro-norte de la Nueva España durante el siglo XVI.”

³⁹⁴ Chevalier, *La formación de los latifundios en México*, 121.

Tolosa discovered the mines of Zacatecas³⁹⁵ Only four years passed so that a report by the lawyer Hernán Martínez de la Marcha, judge of the first Neogallega court in Compostela, showed that the economic interest of the miners was more powerful than their fear.³⁹⁶ Twelve years later, a witness declared that the people who were going to conquer the Chichimec land had “gone more with zeal to look for mines to be rich than for pacification.”³⁹⁷

In a few decades new mines were discovered, such as the Fresnillo mines, thirty leagues further north were the “mines of Sant Martin, Ranchos, Chalchihuites, Sombrerete, Las Nieves,” and in a range of forty leagues those of “Indehe and Santa Bárbara.”³⁹⁸ The historians Herbert Bolton and Thomas Marshall sustained at the beginning of the last century that the first mines exploited “in the south of the New Galicia were soon eclipsed by those of Zacatecas,”³⁹⁹ becoming active centers of settlement. The explosive demographic growth of Zacatecas is the best example of the growing attention focused on the newly discovered mines. According to the Alonso de Santacruz's report, a senior alguacil of the Zacatecas mines, by 1550 35 miners were working on their mining veins, along with some 23 Spanish neighbors accompanied by an unknown number of relatives and immigrants, in addition to 288 houses for slaves.⁴⁰⁰ Just four years later there were already 300 Spanish neighbors within the jurisdiction⁴⁰¹ In those days, the explorer Ginés Vázquez de Mercado affirmed that “after God the mines are what sustain and give existence to the earth.”⁴⁰²

³⁹⁵ “Información de las conquistas y poblaciones de Juanes de Tolosa, 1550,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 299. On the discovery and colonization of Zacatecas see the first chapter of Bakewell, *Silver mining and society in Colonial Mexico*, 4-25. Also Powell, “The Forty-Niners of sixteenth-century Mexico.”

³⁹⁶ Sescosse, “Zacatecas en 1550,” 4-9.

³⁹⁷ “Información hecha por el doctor Luis de Villanueva, oidor de la Real Audiencia de México, sobre las vejaciones y malos tratos que los españoles hacían a los indios chichimecas: declaración de Christóbal de Mata; Ciudad de México, 18 de marzo de 1562;” in Powell, *War and Peace*, 111.

³⁹⁸ “Informe al rey por el Cabildo Eclesiástico de Guadalajara, acerca de las cosas de aquel reino; 20 de enero de 1570,” in García Icazbalceta, *Colección de documentos*, II, 494.

³⁹⁹ Bolton & Marshall, *The colonization of North America*, 55.

⁴⁰⁰ Sescosse, “Zacatecas en 1550,” 4-9. In the same year Powell counts the presence of 50 smelters and refineries in the town of Zacatecas and its surroundings; see Powell, *Capitán mestizo: Miguel Caldera y la frontera norteña*, 26.

⁴⁰¹ “Carta de Lebrón de Quiñones, oidor de la Nueva Galicia, al príncipe; septiembre de 1554,” AGI, Guadalajara 51. Indeed, only a decade had elapsed since the discovery of the silver mines, and in that brief period “Zacatecas was transformed into the largest Spanish settlement in New Galicia, with more than 300 fixed neighbors and a total population that easily exceeded the one thousand people;” see Álvarez, “La primera regionalización (1530-1570),” 194.

⁴⁰² “Carta de Ginés Vázquez de Mercado al oidor Martínez de la Marcha; Guadalajara, 31 de julio de 1550,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 263.

Mining growth required a constant supply of resources for its sustenance. Feeding and dressing an increasing number of Spaniards, mestizos, blacks and Indians meant a real challenge, even more so as it was a territory characterized by a lack of water and with rough land, with few agricultural possibilities. Although Mexico and Michoacán were the first sources of supply, the extreme distances, the poor state of the routes, the high cost of freight and the harassment of the Indians demanded a closer and more expeditious flow of resources. To the extent that the New Galicia's silver production was awakening a growing interest for the Crown and the royal officials settled in the viceregal capital, the need to control the native tribes became more and more imperative in order to proceed to the erection of populated centers that provide the labor in charge of the exploitation of the seams, as well as farm-livestock ranches to provide the resources for their sustenance at a lower cost than the import from the large southern Hispanic centers. The rise and spontaneous development of these settlements was supported a few decades later by legislation that sought to appease the natives mood, urging them to "reduce for living in towns politically,"⁴⁰³ where they would be instructed in the mysteries of the faith, separating them from the custom of "robbing and robbing and killing by the roads the Spaniards and Indians who are in peace."⁴⁰⁴ In the European conception the savage man was conditioned by the hostile environment in which he developed, shaped in his mentality by the hardness of his way of life and lack of reason, but this condition could be rectified by acculturation.⁴⁰⁵ With this, the Crown did nothing but continue with a policy of civilization in the Roman sense of *civitas*, that is, the personification of society in the city,⁴⁰⁶ the center of all transformations and all virtues. The historian Jaime González Rodríguez has shown that since the beginning of the Iberian expansion in the New World, the nascent Spanish Empire proclaimed itself as a civilizing entity of the newly discovered continent in the same way that Rome civilized the Old World.⁴⁰⁷ The New Galicia was not the first nor should it be the last link in this chain of transformations. The progressive demand generated by an equally growing immigrant population was the seed of a system of

⁴⁰³ "Real Cédula para que los indios de la Nueva Galicia vivan en pueblos y congregados; El Escorial, 4 de noviembre de 1568," in Enciso Contreras, *Cedulario de Zacatecas*, 239.

⁴⁰⁴ "Real Cédula para que los indios de la Nueva Galicia se junten en pueblos y vivan en policía; El Carpio, 26 de mayo de 1570," in *Ibid.*, 261-2.

⁴⁰⁵ Colin, "The Wild Man and the Indian in early 16th century book Illustration," 7-8.

⁴⁰⁶ McEnroe, *From Colony to Nationhood in Mexico*, 30.

⁴⁰⁷ González Rodríguez, *La idea de Roma en la historiografía indiana (1492-1550)*.

scale economies in which a series of agricultural and cattle ranches emerged in spontaneous and accelerated way,⁴⁰⁸ especially in the most fertile regions of the southern New Galicia and east of Guadalajara, known as El Bajío.⁴⁰⁹ As Miguel Othón de Mendizábal points out, the colonization of the different deposits was a total action, that is, mining, agriculture, livestock and forestry.⁴¹⁰ The village of San Miguel was founded in 1555,⁴¹¹ the same year the town of Pénjamo was built on the border of the New Galicia as “frontier and defense against the Chichimec Indians,”⁴¹² San Luis de Xilotepec emerged in 1560,⁴¹³ San Felipe in 1562 to protect the peaceful Chichimecs of Xichú,⁴¹⁴ Santa María de los Lagos in 1563,⁴¹⁵ Sila and Nuestra Señora de la Concepción de Celaya in 1571,⁴¹⁶ Asunción de Aguascalientes in 1575, and León in 1576. Further north were erected Nombre de Dios⁴¹⁷ and Durango in 1563,⁴¹⁸

⁴⁰⁸ Silvio Zavala affirms that “the expansion towards the north of New Spain required the development of new centers of farming near the mining and cattle settlements. Since parts of the northern lands were arid, agriculture was necessarily practiced near rivers and springs.” See Zavala, “The frontiers of Hispanic America,” 43.

⁴⁰⁹ See Wright-Carr, *La conquista del Bajío*, ch. 3: “La colonización del Bajío durante el siglo XVI,” 36-65. Also Chevalier, *La formación de los latifundios en México*, 122; Florescano, “Colonización, ocupación del suelo,” 56; and Álvarez, *El Indio y la sociedad colonial nortea, 122-3*.

⁴¹⁰ Othón de Mendizábal, “Colonización del oriente de Jalisco y Zacatecas,” 44. On the population and economic stimulus in the region, see Powell, “The Forty-Niners of sixteenth-century Mexico,” 238.

⁴¹¹ “Comisión a Ángel de Villafañe para ir a fundar la villa de San Miguel; Estancia de Apaceo, 15 de diciembre de 1555,” in Powell, *War and Peace*, 66-9. “Mandamientos del virrey Luis de Velasco I, sobre la fundación de una villa de españoles en San Miguel de los Chichimecas; México, 18 de diciembre de 1555,” in Wright-Carr, *La conquista del Bajío*, 75-6.

⁴¹² Carrillo Cázares, “La congregación de pueblos en la frontera chichimeca,” especially the document “Petición de congregación en el pueblo de Pénjamo; México, 17 de enero de 1601,” 131.

⁴¹³ “Lo que Vuestra Señoría en nombre de Su Majestad concede a los indios de Xilotepeque que se han de poblar en el camino real de los Çacatecas en un sitio adelante de San Miguel; México, 29 de mayo de 1560,” in Powell, *War and Peace*, 81-4.

⁴¹⁴ Cruz Rangel, *Chichimecas, mineros, soldados y terratenientes*, 203.

⁴¹⁵ López de Velasco, *Geografía*, 136, says that “it was built only to preserve the Zacatecas rout from the Chichimec Indians, and so it is in poor land.” Also the “Informe al rey por el Cabildo Eclesiástico de Guadalajara, acerca de las cosas de aquel reino; 20 de enero de 1570,” in García Icazbalceta, *Colección de documentos*, II, 492.

⁴¹⁶ López de Velasco, *Geografía*, 273, includes Sila within the Indian towns under the Royal Crown protection. See also Vázquez de Espinosa, *Compendio*, 164-5.

⁴¹⁷ “Memorial de Francisco de Ibarra al Consejo de Indias sobre sus entradas y fundaciones hechas en la Nueva Vizcaya, 1574,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 398; the document says: “every year in it and its district are taken more than thirty thousand fanegas of wheat and more than twenty thousand fanegas of corn with which the royal mines have been conserved in extreme.” In the same work see the “Relación del clérigo Juan de Miranda sobre la comarca entre las minas de San Martín y las de Santa Bárbara, ca. 1575,” 428. López de Velasco, *Geografía*, 271, says that “it is in good soil, abundant of wheat and corn, which provide the mines of the Zacatecas and many other royal mines that are in its región.”

⁴¹⁸ López de Velasco, *Geografía*, 271, says that “it is in a good region, of very healthy land, of many rivers and irrigations, where much wheat, corn and other seeds are collected, and many large and small cattle are raised, for which there are many pastures and good mountains.”

and Jerez de la Frontera east of Zacatecas in 1570.⁴¹⁹ Although many of these defensive villages were on the verge of disappearing many times, in the long term they were fundamental for the pacification of the northern region, since in addition to their military function they “stimulated agricultural development, kept the roads alive, allowed the establishment of Indians already pacified, served as a magnet for the Chichimecs at war and, in short, were the best basis for the strength of Spaniards and sedentary Indians managed to impose order on the Chichimec land.”⁴²⁰



Figure 4. Map of the town of Ameca, jurisdiction of the Audiencia de Guadalajara, made around 1579. In its contours distinguishes a stay of donkeys, of pigs, of sheep and of cattle, intended to supply the mining regions. (Courtesy Nettie Lee Benson Library, Rare Books and Manuscripts Section, University of Texas at Austin).

⁴¹⁹ “Relación de la villa de Jerez de la Frontera y Taltenango, por el juez de comisión y justicia mayor Diego Nieto Maldonado; Jerez de la Frontera, 13 de octubre de 1584,” in Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 138. López de Velasco, *Geografía*, 269.

⁴²⁰ Gómez Serrano, *Guerra Chichimeca, la fundación de Aguascalientes*, 77.

The erection of these towns was supported by Mexicas from the Valley of Mexico, Tarascans from Michoacán, and especially from Otomis from the Querétaro region, who received special privileges such as the delivery of oxen and plows to work the land, the exemption of tributes for sixteen years,⁴²¹ and the caciques nobiliary titles in compensation for taking their subjects to the land of war.⁴²² For their livelihood they received seeds from the Crown and enjoyed royal protection,⁴²³ but this did not prevent the harassment of the nomadic groups, much less the appearance of conflicts with the few Chichimecs who had agreed to be reduced into villages, as happened with the inhabitants of the village of San Antonio Anyenta.⁴²⁴

Maintaining the traffic of supplies and labor to the mining region, as well as the flow of silver to Mexico, required the opening of a route that was known as Camino Real de la Tierra Adentro,⁴²⁵ besides a series of secondary roads and trails that linked the ranches with the exploitation centers. Alfredo Jiménez, showing a refined pen, describes this situation saying that “there were no roads that lead to the mines, but the mines created the roads.”⁴²⁶ The construction of the main penetration route to the northern high plateau fell to the miners, who took advantage of voluntary or forced local aboriginal labor to pave a path used initially by the *tamemes*, leaving it suitable for the transit of carts pulled by oxen, much more efficient in the transfer of the voluminous loads of goods that supplied the northern towns.⁴²⁷ In the construction of this route gravitated the strong European tradition of opening military corridors for the circulation of troops and military supplies in order to integrate more

⁴²¹ “Lo que Vuestra Señoría en nombre de Su Majestad concede a los indios de Xilotepeque que se han de poblar en el camino real de los Çacatecas en un sitio adelante de San Miguel; México, 29 de mayo de 1560,” in Powell, *War and Peace*, 83.

⁴²² See the documents published by Wright-Carr, *Conquistadores otomíes en la Guerra Chichimeca*. Also Cruz Rangel, *Chichimecas, mineros, soldados y terratenientes*, 203.

⁴²³ “Establecimiento defensivo de los otomíes en la Gran Chichimeca; México, 23 de mayo de 1560,” in Powell, *War and Peace*, 77-8.

⁴²⁴ “Relación Geográfica de Querétaro, 1582,” in Wright-Carr, *Querétaro en el siglo XVI*, 177.

⁴²⁵ Bakewell, *Silver mining and society in Colonial Mexico*, 19. The outgoing viceroy Antonio de Mendoza recommended to his successor Luis de Velasco that the road to Zacatecas be prepared “so that mule trains can come and go by it;” see the “Relación, apuntamientos y avisos que por mandado de Su Majestad el virrey don Antonio de Mendoza dio al señor don Luis de Velasco, visorrey y gobernador y Capitán General de esta Nueva España; México, s/f (¿1550?),” in Torre Villar & Navarro de Anda, *Instrucciones y Memorias*, 112.

⁴²⁶ Jiménez, *El Gran Norte de México*, 330.

⁴²⁷ Cramausse, “El camino real de tierra adentro,” 301-2.

efficiently the central administration with the most remote regions of the kingdoms, roads that in the Spanish case used to be known as *rutas reales* (royal routes).⁴²⁸

The discovery of new mines, as they progressed towards the north, made necessary to establish ranches that were emerging through the remote corners of the territory. The difficulty for the supply from the viceregal capital meant that the border mining districts were forced to find and exploit many supplies locally, such as “leathers to transport the eore, tallow to light the tunnels, and meat, cheese, milk and products to maintain the miners and their mules, [which shows that] an agrarian frontier was behind the mining frontier as it slipped through the fragmented north.”⁴²⁹ Getting economic autonomy was, however, an ideal against which conspired the wild characteristics of the environment, the few fertile portions of the territory, as well as the unpredictable attacks of the natives, so it was essential to maintain the flow of men and goods from Mexico and Michoacán.

However, the supply network barely endured the constant threat of Chichimec incursions, who used to go down from the surrounding highlands and ravines to ravage the mines, haciendas and caravans that sustained the economy of New Galicia. In a letter to the king of 1551, the *oidor* (civil judge) Hernán Martínez de la Marcha reported the damages that the Zacatecos and Guachichiles were doing “to the mule trains taking supplies to the said mines.”⁴³⁰ A little more than a decade later, an indigenous rebellion was the cause of great economic losses “because a lot of the benefit of the silver was lost due to the scarcity and lack of supplies and necessary things,” passing the Zacatecas mines great hardships because “it ceased to enter the supplies, so many of the settlers deserted them.”⁴³¹ Ten years later, in 1572, the New Galicia royal officials claimed of the great damage done by the hostile Indians, so that “in the region of these mines you can no longer walk because the roads are very dangerous; and many peace villages have been depopulated by the damage that the Chichimecs have done to them.”⁴³² After two years the problem was still in force, given that

⁴²⁸ On this point, see the works by Parker, *Empire, war and faith in early modern Europe*, and *The army of Flanders and the Spanish road*.

⁴²⁹ Sheridan, “The limits of power: the political ecology of the Spanish Empire in the Greater Southwest,” 160.

⁴³⁰ “Carta del oidor Hernando Martínez de la Marcha a Su Majestad; Compostela, 18 de febrero de 1551,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 252.

⁴³¹ “Información acerca de la rebelión de los indios zacatecas y guachichiles a pedimento de Pedro de Ahumada Sámano: Interrogatorio; minas de Zacatecas, 24 de enero de 1562,” in Montoto, *Colección de documentos*, 250 and 251.

⁴³² “Carta a Su Majestad de los oficiales reales de la Nueva Galicia; Zacatecas, 12 de abril de 1572,” in Enciso Contreras, *Epistolario de Zacatecas*, 102.

many mines “are left depopulated, and in others not as much silver is gotten as it would be obtained if the land were peaceful, because due to the great danger many supplies and things necessary for the benefit of silver are not carried.”⁴³³ Enough graphic was the letter that Dr. Moya de Contreras wrote to the president of the Council of the Indies in August 1574

News comes to this city every day. News of damage done by the Chichimec Indians in the region of the mines of Zacatecas, San Martin and Sombrerete, and in other parts of New Galicia, killing Spaniards and Indians, and taking away oxen and sheep, and doing many other damages that would be long to count, even entering in the mines of Sombrerete and Fresnillo, taking the mules with which they bring and grind the metals, from which very serious disadvantages are derived in addition to the deaths and thefts they make. Because of the fear that they have of them the carreteros, arrieros and chirrioneros, who provide food and carry merchandise to those mines because they are very far from populated land, they can not walk without a lot of people and weapons, and guarding day and night, which is why food and clothing have so high prices that the miners can hardly afford it.⁴³⁴

No less explicit is the epistle that six years later Dr. Orozco wrote to the king, while president of the New Galicia

[...] the Indians had come with great force and shamelessness to the region of those mines [Zacatecas and Sombrerete] and they did a lot of damage in them, so that no one could leave his house without the obvious risk of life. And they had closed the royal roads, from whose cause nobody dared to bring provisions and other necessary things to the neighbors and miners, for which the mines were not worked and the benefit of the silver had ceased, and that they determined to depopulate and forsake the earth constricted by these damages, oppression and needs.⁴³⁵

Like these, there were many reports that attributed to the Chichimecs the insecurity of the northern routes and counties, as well as the fluctuations in the mining production. In this way, the high cost of the provisions was not only a consequence of the long distances that separated the producing centers from the supply centers, but also of the uncertainty that

⁴³³ “Carta a Su Majestad de los oficiales de Zacatecas, 22 de febrero de 1574,” in Enciso Contreras, *Epistolario de Zacatecas*, 131.

⁴³⁴ “Carta del doctor Moya de Contreras al presidente del Consejo de Indias sobre la conveniencia de dar el azogue a precio moderado, e informando de los daños que hacían los indios chichimecas; México, 31 de agosto de 1574,” in *Ibid.*, 137. Another edition of this document in Paso y Troncoso, *Epistolario de Nueva España*, XI, 171-9.

⁴³⁵ “Carta del doctor Orozco, presidente de la Nueva Galicia, al rey; Zacatecas, 28 de septiembre de 1580,” in Enciso Contreras, *Ibid.*, 225.

meant traveling along routes in which anyone at any moment could be the victim of an ambush, losing the resources and even life.




Figure 5. Map of the New Galicia in the second half of the 16th century (Cartography by José Compañ Rodríguez)

The adaptation of the foundry haciendas to the new amalgamation system,⁴³⁶ in addition to the expenses and damages caused by the Chichimec War, meant that between 1559 and 1562 the mining profits barely exceeded the losses.⁴³⁷ In times of the rebellion of the Guachichil and Zacatecan Indians, the miners of the inland veins (San Martín, Avino and Chalchihuites, in the territory of New Vizcaya) asked the king for a reduction in the payment of the tax on silver due to their isolation “at twenty-five, and at thirty, and at forty leagues from the mines of the Zacatecas, on unpopulated lands, of war, and that [in] many leagues

⁴³⁶ On the origin and characteristics of this metal procurement system, see the work by Zavala, “La amalgama en la minería de Nueva España.”

⁴³⁷ Lacueva Muñoz, *La plata del rey y sus vasallos*, 148-9.

there are no peoples of peace, for whose cause the provisions are worth excessive prices.”⁴³⁸ As the situation did not improve in spite of the time, the miners of Zacatecas were benefited in 1567 with an extension in the reduction of the silver tithe due to the increasing price of the inputs, especially the quicksilver and the African slaves, besides the problem of supplying “firewood and charcoal, which is one of the most necessary expenses for the benefit of the silver that is brought from five and six leagues with great cost and work and risk of the lives of those who bring it from the mountains because of the many Indian robbers.”⁴³⁹ Seeking to win the will of the king, the officers of the New Galicia made him see how scarce were the means with which they counted “because this land is so expensive that all things are worth twice than in Mexico city.”⁴⁴⁰

The Chichimecs of New Galicia were the first natives of the continent to develop an equestrian culture,⁴⁴¹ and the Spaniards were largely responsible for this. Although there is evidence of the presence of wild horses in the northern regions around the 1540s, it was in the following decade that the viceroy Luis de Velasco I ordered the transfer of the larger cattle concentrated in the densely populated central regions of the New Spain to the northern area, all this in an attempt to protect the agricultural lands and food supplies of Indians and Spaniards who were usually damaged by the grazing of the beasts.⁴⁴² Border historiography has shown that various nomadic and semi-nomadic groups of the continent were able to take advantage of this animal using it as a source of meat and means of transport for their circuits of mobility and predatory incursions.⁴⁴³ David Weber, in a classic work, noted that thanks to the horse both the economy and the warlike actions of the natives enhanced to levels never seen before, since on the one hand they became into more efficient hunters, and on the other

⁴³⁸ “Real Cédula solicitando relación acerca de la situación de las minas de Zacatecas y parecer sobre la petición de rebajar el tributo de plata; Madrid, 8 de diciembre de 1562,” in Enciso Contreras, *Cedulario de Zacatecas*, 172. For the same year see also the “Información acerca de la rebelión de los indios zacatecas y guachichiles a pedimento de Pedro de Ahumada Sámano: Interrogatorio; minas de Zacatecas, 24 de enero de 1562,” in Montoto, *Colección de documentos*, 251.

⁴³⁹ “Real Cédula dando merced a los mineros de Zacatecas para prorrogar el pago del diezmo de la plata por otros seis años; Madrid, 3 de agosto de 1567,” in Enciso Contreras, *Cedulario de Zacatecas*, 224.

⁴⁴⁰ “Carta a Su Majestad de los oficiales de la Nueva Galicia; minas de Zacatecas, 15 de febrero de 1565,” in Enciso Contreras, *Epistolario de Zacatecas*, 77. Stafford Poole notes that “the miners had to suffer the depredations of the Chichimecs, whose raids were raising the cost of the goods, and therefore the general cost of living in the mining areas. Zacatecas, the richest mining region of New Spain, was the center of Chichimec activity;” see Poole, *Pedro Moya de Contreras*, 148.

⁴⁴¹ Lázaro Ávila, *Las fronteras de América y los ‘Flandes Indianos,’* 60-1.

⁴⁴² Melville, *A plague of sheep*, 24.

⁴⁴³ Jones, “Virgin soils revisited,” 99.

they had the possibility of penetrating deeper into enemy territory escaping swiftly with a greater booty in species, women and children, all of which contributed to intensify both the intertribal conflicts and the confrontation with the white man.⁴⁴⁴ In the same way, the horse also allowed to increase the number of people involved in the indigenous raids. The speed of the horses facilitated the formation of alliances with diverse groups distributed in the immense geography of the north, giving rise to the articulation of new mechanisms of social cooperation even reaching the fusion of dispersed bands. These alliances, which could be permanent, seasonal or circumstantial, made the defense of the natives more efficient and the transit of the Spaniards by the intricate northern routes more risky.

In effect, the Chichimec raids became more frequent and dynamic with the definitive incorporation of the horse at the end of the 1550s.⁴⁴⁵ Once this means of transport had been mastered, assaults on mines, towns and haciendas were carried out under the hit-and-run mode, while the caravans were ambushed,⁴⁴⁶ with the raids reaching a wider coverage range than the pedestrian mobility.

Captain Pedro de Ahumada said that in the Guachichil-Zacateco rebellion of 1561 he broke a party of Indians in the region of the mines of Avino, taking more than two hundred horses,⁴⁴⁷ which gives account of how numerous the equestrian incursions could be. Two decades later, and faithful to his position of intransigence in the face of the Chichimec threat, Dr. Orozco outlined to the king one of the most illustrative pictures of the situation

[...] they have become so skilled that Indians are already on horseback and armed with the weapons that have taken away the Spaniards who have died, and they have fired some arquebuses, in such a way that they devastated everything they came across. And if someone fled, they could easily reach him, with the speed of the horses, and killed him⁴⁴⁸.

⁴⁴⁴ Weber, *Bárbaros. Spaniards and their savages in the Age of Enlightenment*, 80.

⁴⁴⁵ Barral Gómez, *Rebeliones indígenas en la América española*, 99, argues that the incorporation of the horse by the natives of the north dates from the Mixton War days. Although it is true, it will not be until the second half of the 1550s that the rebels massify the taming of this animal.

⁴⁴⁶ Powell, "The Chichimecas: Scourge of the Silver Frontier", 334.

⁴⁴⁷ "Información acerca de la rebelión de los indios zacatecas y guachichiles a pedimento de Pedro de Ahumada Sámano: Interrogatorio; minas de Zacatecas, 24 de enero de 1562," in Montoto, *Colección de documentos*, 257.

⁴⁴⁸ "Carta del doctor Orozco, presidente de la Nueva Galicia, al rey; Zacatecas, 28 de septiembre de 1580," in Enciso Contreras, *Epistolario de Zacatecas*, 225-6.

Despite the setbacks, traveling through the northern routes of Mexico in the last decades of the sixteenth century was a risk that had to be run in order to ensure the supply of silver to the metropolis.⁴⁴⁹ By then the danger of being ambushed and falling into the hands of the robbers on horseback had spread to the Queretaro region, making clear that the Chichimec raids were at the gates of New Spain territory.

The measures adopted to address the problem of communications and harassment of the rebels ranged from the organization of escort troops for caravans of carts, to the construction of shelters (*casafuerte*) specially designed and reinforced to withstand attacks.⁴⁵⁰ The desire to counteract the assaults even inspired the invention of mobile defensive devices, the wagons, more resistant than the traditional carts pulled by oxen.⁴⁵¹

The meager support of the government made the greater weight of the defense carry on the shoulders of the private, the most affected.⁴⁵² The Crown ordered by Royal Decree of April 20, 1567 that the New Galicia's *Real Audiencia* take measures to protect the miners and communication routes, but that two thirds of the operations cost was paid by the settlers themselves, contributing the Royal Treasury with just one third.⁴⁵³ The monarchy always manifested a reluctance to finance operations against the Indians, leaving that costly task in the hands of private individuals as far as possible. Only well into the second half of the sixteenth century a professional army led by a *alcalde mayor* was implemented, who acted as captain general,⁴⁵⁴ and the establishment of presidios arranged in strategic points of the land of war, tactics conceived in the government of the viceroy Luis de Velasco I (1551-1564) and materialized by the virrey Martín Enríquez de Almanza (1568-1580), who pushed

⁴⁴⁹ The king, in a letter to the New Galicia's royal officers, thanked the sending of the *quintos de plata*, given the large and growing needs of the Crown, so he asked them "to send everything of the said *quintos* and all of the royal treasury, without falling behind anything of it;" see the "Carta a los oficiales reales de la Nueva Galicia; El Carpio, 26 de mayo de 1570," in Enciso Contreras, *Cedulario de Zacatecas*, 263.

⁴⁵⁰ Powell, "Genesis of the Frontier Presidio," 129. There is translation to Spanish, see Powell, "Génesis del presidio," 23.

⁴⁵¹ Powell, "The Forty-Niners of sixteenth-century Mexico," 239.

⁴⁵² Powell, "Spanish warfare against the Chichimecas in the 1570's," 597.

⁴⁵³ "Real Cédula para que se resguarden las minas y caminos de la Nueva Galicia; Madrid, 20 de abril de 1567," AGNM, Reales Cédulas Duplicadas 47, 588.

⁴⁵⁴ "Nombramiento e instrucciones dadas a Pedro de Gomar Reynoso como capitán contra los Chichimecas en la región de Comanja-León, 1576-1577," in Powell, *War and Peace*, 195-99. "Real Cédula para levantar un cuerpo de soldados a costa del rey; Badajoz, 10 de junio de 1580," in Enciso Contreras, *Cedulario de Zacatecas*, 460-1. Also Parry, *The Audience of New Galicia*, 85-6.

for a “war by fire and blood” to quell the Chichimec attacks.⁴⁵⁵ The function of these military garrisons was the protection of roads and populations, as well as the “opening of the countryside, pushing the tribes northward and liberating ample spaces for cultivation and breeding.”⁴⁵⁶ Some were destined to protect missionary settlements, others to protect the royal mines, and the vast majority to ensure communication of the Mexico-Zacatecas route, acting as refuge enclaves, supply centers and resting places for pedestrians. Philip Wayne Powell calculates in 57 the number of presidios raised between 1570 and 1600 in the *Chichimec* territory.⁴⁵⁷

However, the project always stumbled upon the problem of lack of resources. The low salary, which in the days of Enríquez’s administration barely amounted to 300 pesos or less per year, in addition to the lack of gunpowder⁴⁵⁸ and military equipment,⁴⁵⁹ meant that the soldiers’ desertions were frequent,⁴⁶⁰ many of whom were convicts who opted for serving their sentences in the frontier forts,⁴⁶¹ so indiscipline was a usual inconvenience. In addition, the difficult situation of many nearby haciendas prevented the supply of food, as was the case with the Aguascalientes fort near the Nuestra Señora de la Asunción town, with which it was impossible to maintain “any communication or use the sowing, because the Chichimec Indians of war do not allow it, who kill them and steal the horses and oxen that they have in any part of the year.”⁴⁶² In fact, although scarce in the mining region, the potentially agricultural lands

⁴⁵⁵ An excellent approach to the personality of this viceroy in Powell, “Portrait of an American Viceroy: Martín Enríquez, 1568-1583.”

⁴⁵⁶ Arnal, “El Presidio. Instrumento de población en el septentrion novohispano,” 110.

⁴⁵⁷ Powell, “Genesis of the Frontier Presidio,” 133-4 (note 18). On the development of the fort system in Chichimec territory see also Powell, “Presidios and towns on the Silver Frontier.”

⁴⁵⁸ “Informe sobre la situación de los fuertes y minas de la frontera chichimeca; México, 7 de mayo de 1587,” AGI, México 324.

⁴⁵⁹ Powell, “Spanish warfare against the Chichimecas in the 1570’s,” 593-4. For the payment of troops it came to resort to the saling of licenses for the wine trade. In addition, by 1581 the viceroy Count de la Coruña informed the Spanish sovereign that “there is no soldier who wants to serve for less than four hundred and fifty pesos of common gold each year;” see the “Pagamentos para licencias de vino en ciertas ciudades indias para ser aplicados en cubrir los costos de la guerra Chichimeca; México, 2 de enero de 1576,” and the “Carta del virrey Conde de la Coruña al rey concerniente a la muerte del doctor Orozco, Presidente de la Audiencia de la Nueva Galicia y sobre las cualidades de Rodrigo del Río de Loza; México, 1 de abril de 1581,” both in Powell, *War and Peace*, 193-4 and 212.

⁴⁶⁰ “Nombramiento dado a Martín de Pedraza, escribano, para las causas que se forman contra los soldados que se ausenten para no pelear contra los indios chichimecas; San Luis Potosí, 1582,” AGNM, Indios 2, exp. 206, 53v.

⁴⁶¹ “Solicitud de Bernardino Jiménez para que se le permita cumplir su castigo en un fuerte de los chichimecas; 1 de junio de 1583,” AGNM, Indios 2, exp. 856, 195v.

⁴⁶² “Relación del pueblo de Teucaltiche por Hernando de Gallegos; Teucaltiche, 30 de diciembre de 1584,” in Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 303.

not used to be worked because of the risk of losing a high investment as a consequence of the long distances, the climate rigor, and primarily by the natives' hostility.⁴⁶³ Time and circumstances showed that the fortresses system was an excessively expensive alternative to maintain and of doubtful effectiveness.⁴⁶⁴ A few years after its establishment, the lawyer Alonso Martínez made its limitations evident by pointing out that the forts and villages were not an effective solution because "the land where the robbers live is very long and their haunts are impregnable."⁴⁶⁵ At the same time, Dr. Juan Bautista de Orozco made a similar assessment when he stressed that

[with] the companies of salaried soldiers the desired effect is not achieved [given that] to build borders with these Indians is like putting doors into the countryside because the land is so long and with so many entrances and exits that it is impossible to control their moves or to hinder their bad actions with the troop garrisons there are.⁴⁶⁶

A few years later, Viceroy Lorenzo Suárez de Mendoza, Count of Coruña, represented to king Felipe II the difficulty of controlling an extensive territory with few soldiers and insufficient resources, "because there is a lot of distance where they [the Chichimecs] can enter, so it is impossible to insure all without a large army of people and excessive spending."⁴⁶⁷ By 1586, based on this and other reports dispatched from New Spain, the same king stated that "securing the roads with presidios of soldiers is not considered a good remedy."⁴⁶⁸ Until then, the soldiers in the fortresses partially solved the shortcomings

⁴⁶³ Dr. Moya de Contreras referred in 1574 that "because of the custom of these Indians of living in the depopulated areas of the land, nobody dares to populate something far from the populated areas, ranches of cattle and farms, being the land very apt for it;" see the "Carta del doctor Moya de Contreras al presidente del Consejo de Indias sobre la conveniencia de dar el azogue a precio moderado, e informando de los daños que hacían los indios chichimecas; México, 31 de agosto de 1574," in Enciso Contreras, *Epistolario de Zacatecas*, 138.

⁴⁶⁴ Odie B. Faulk made a global evaluation of the forts system as a mechanism of conquest in the northern frontier, arriving at the conclusion that it was unable to stop the Indian incursions into the interior of New Spain. It served as a refuge during raids for civilians and soldiers, but on rare occasions served as a safe area capable of organizing effective campaigns against the stalking natives. As a defense weapon, it was a fortress, as an offensive weapon, almost always was a sham; see Faulk, "El presidio: ¿fuerte o farsa?," 67.

⁴⁶⁵ "Fragmento de carta del licenciado Alonso Martínez a Juan de Ovando, Presidente del Consejo de Indias; 1576," in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 423.

⁴⁶⁶ "Carta del doctor Juan Bautista de Orozco al Rey sobre el modo de terminar la Guerra Chichimeca; México, 25 de noviembre de 1576," in Naylor & Polzer, *The Presidio and Militia*, 56.

⁴⁶⁷ "El Conde de Coruña, virrey de Nueva España, da cuenta al rey de asuntos muy diversos del virreinato; México, 12 de abril de 1583," AGI, México 20.

⁴⁶⁸ "Al Virrey de la Nueva España que embie relacion con su parecer sobre que se ha avisado que para reducir y pacificar los Yndios Chichimecas convenia usar de los medios que aquí se refieren fundando en su comarca pueblos y monasterios; Sant Lorenço, 19 de junio de 1586," in Hackett, *Historical documents*, 154. The

by looting the sowings of some semi-nomadic groups or even of reduced allies,⁴⁶⁹ and more often with the profits derived from the enslavement of the Indians,⁴⁷⁰ regardless of whether they were rebel natives or groups pacified. Juan Alonso Velázquez, clergyman of San Miguel town, raised his voice to accuse the captains who deceived the Indians with the purpose of kidnapping them “under deception and even inside the churches in pacified towns,” going as far as enslaving the friendly Indians who supported them in the campaigns; moreover, some military leaders had the habit of diverting their punitive expeditions to lands “further in search of other Indians who are neither robbers nor have harmed us.”⁴⁷¹ By 1574, the oidor Lope de Miranda accused the governor Francisco de Ibarra of having converted the province of Chiametla into a slave supply center for other regions.⁴⁷² Reaffirming the above, only two years later, Dr. Juan Bautista de Orozco informed the king that “the prize and salary that [captains and soldiers] have had have been the captures of Indians, selling them as slaves.”⁴⁷³ An emblematic case was that of Captain Roque Núñez, who along with forty soldiers captured more than a thousand Indians without discriminating between those of war and peace.⁴⁷⁴ For this reason it was not a coincidence that the religious Juan Alonso Velázquez made it clear to the king that some captains, soldiers and other men guided by their particular interests “want the land embraced by war and damages because this will increase their earnings and status.”⁴⁷⁵

transcript wrongly records the year 1566. The quotation is also in Enciso Contreras, *Cedulario de Zacatecas*, 521.

⁴⁶⁹ Alonso López, neighbor of San Felipe town, testified on February 22, 1582 that “the said soldiers, as some of them have been badly paid, have made grievances to the Indians of the pueblos de paz by taking away their meals and other things for not being able to support themselves comfortably;” see the “Petición ante el Virrey de los criadores de ganados, vecinos y moradores de la frontera Chichimeca para tomar represalias contra los ataques indios, presentando detallada información de la situación de la frontera, 1582,” in Powell, *War and Peace*, 231.

⁴⁷⁰ Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 129.

⁴⁷¹ “Relación de Juan Alonso Velázquez, clérigo beneficiado de la villa de San Miguel de los Chichimecas, sobre la guerra con los indios fronteros y los remedios para concluir con ella, 1582,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 459 and 464.

⁴⁷² “Carta de Lope de Miranda a Juan de Ovando; México, 24 de marzo de 1574”, AGI, México 99, 6v.

⁴⁷³ “Carta del doctor Juan Bautista de Orozco al Rey sobre el modo de terminar la Guerra Chichimeca; México, 25 de noviembre de 1576,” in Naylor & Polzer, *The Presidio and Militia*, 56.

⁴⁷⁴ “Carta del licenciado Santiago del Riego, oidor de la Audiencia de la Nueva Galicia, al rey; Zacatecas, 3 de septiembre de 1576,” in Enciso, *Epistolario de Zacatecas*, 169-70. See also the “Acusación contra Roque Núñez, capitán de la frontera Chichimeca en la Nueva Galicia, de hacer entradas contra indios pacíficos; Guadalajara, 26 de enero de 1577,” in Powell, *War and Peace*, 205-7.

⁴⁷⁵ “Relación de Juan Alonso Velázquez, clérigo beneficiado de la villa de San Miguel de los Chichimecas, sobre la guerra con los indios fronteros y los remedios para concluir con ella, 1582,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 460.

Apart from the legal and moral criticism raised by these incidents among religious, viceroys and law-abiding lawyers, there were also voices of practical men who pondered the inconveniences of having to face the reprisals of the Indians, who used to respond with raids to rescue their women and children.⁴⁷⁶ This, together with the need to compensate the offences received, were two powerful motives of the *Chichimec* offensives, a matter that the most acute minds of the Spanish side noticed after four decades of struggle. Dr. Juan Bautista de Orozco warned the king that as the number of soldiers and garrisons increased for the protection of the mines, “they also grew their quadrilles of war people and began with diabolic fury to attack everywhere and make many and greater damage than ever before;”⁴⁷⁷ the same recipient had the memorial of the cleric Juan Alonso Velázquez, in which he noted that “these entries that our people have made in the lands of these [chichimecs] have been very harmful because they have incited them to war against us more than ever;”⁴⁷⁸ finally, in a brief but explicit paragraph, the drafters of the Provincial Council of Mexico report talk about “the damages that the angry Indians make, robberies and deaths.”⁴⁷⁹ What is more, the punishment incursions used to be sterile because the *Chichimec* leaders were seldom captured,⁴⁸⁰ recruiting new adherents among the increasingly numerous groups dissatisfied with the Spanish treatment.

In addition, the capture of natives and their destiny as forced labor involved an unsuspected risk. When the kidnapping was of long duration, long enough to internalize the problems and weaknesses of the Spanish situation in the border region, the escapes became

⁴⁷⁶ “Carta del licenciado Alonso Martínez, fiscal de la Real Audiencia de la Nueva Galicia, al presidente Juan de Ovando; Guadalajara, 8 de marzo de 1576,” in Enciso, *Epistolario de Zacatecas*, 157. Also “Fragmentos de la información hecha por el doctor Maldonado, fiscal de la Audiencia de México, sobre los daños cometidos por los chichimecas en el camino a Zacatecas; solicita un castigo ejemplar: declaración de Sancho Núñez, residente en las minas de Zacatecas, de 30 años; México, 14 de julio de 1561,” and the “Relación de Juan Alonso Velázquez, clérigo beneficiado de la villa de San Miguel de los Chichimecas, sobre la guerra con los indios fronteros y los remedios para concluir con ella, 1582,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 330-1 and 464.

⁴⁷⁷ “Carta del doctor Orozco, presidente de la Nueva Galicia, al rey; Zacatecas, 28 de septiembre de 1580,” in Enciso Contreras, *Epistolario de Zacatecas*, 225.

⁴⁷⁸ “Relación de Juan Alonso Velázquez, clérigo beneficiado de la villa de San Miguel de los Chichimecas, sobre la guerra con los indios fronteros y los remedios para concluir con ella, 1582,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 463.

⁴⁷⁹ “Carta escrita por el Santo Concilio Provincial Mexicano a Su Majestad el rey; México, 16 de octubre de 1585,” in Llaguno, *La personalidad jurídica del indio*, 312.

⁴⁸⁰ “Carta a Su Majestad de fray Pedro de Ayala, obispo de Nueva Galicia, acerca de la conquista de los chichimecas; Guadalajara, 29 de octubre de 1568,” in Orozco y Jiménez, *Colección de documentos históricos*, V, 362.

a major dilemma. Slavery could, by its unexpected consequences, become a double-edged sword, as the Viceroy Lorenzo Suárez de Mendoza informed the Council of the Indies

[...] the people who make the most damage are those taken in the skirmishes, and being slaves for the time that the ordinances allow, they flee back to their lands; and it seems advisable to give orders that those captured in war not stay here, but take them so far from their land that even if they fled, they could not return to it.⁴⁸¹

Chichimec slavery was the subject of discussions and disputes among Hispanic actors in the border space almost from the first day they set foot there.⁴⁸² Thereafter, the governmental dispositions were gradually imposing new conditions as a result of the attention call made by the regular orders on the Indians right to use force when they were unjustly intimidated. Thus, for example, at the theologians meeting convened by Viceroy Martin Enríquez on June 16, 1574, it was agreed that only the hostile Indians who were in the land of war could be enslaved for a period of thirteen years, excluding of punishment all the minors⁴⁸³. But in borderlands, where institutionality is a fragmented reality, laws and norms tend to become a dead letter because the men's actions find the necessary interstices to stick to the mandate of personal ambitions rather than the force of legality, and it is that in new and distant lands there was a considerable possibility of establishing bases of autonomous power.⁴⁸⁴ That is why the Royal Provision of 1530,⁴⁸⁵ the New Laws of 1542,⁴⁸⁶ the Viceroyal Provision of 1543,⁴⁸⁷ the efforts of the lawyer Melgarejo in the 1550s to free

⁴⁸¹ “Carta del virrey Conde de Coruña al Consejo de Indias sobre la guerra con los indios; México, 13 de enero de 1582,” AGI, México 20.

⁴⁸² Zavala, “Los esclavos indios en el norte de México,” 84.

⁴⁸³ “Parecer de los religiosos sobre lo que toca a la guerra de los chichimecas; México, 19 de junio de 1574,” AGI, México 2547 (parecer 1569), 2v. According to Archbishop Moya de Contreras, in this meeting only the Dominicans opposed the war against the Chichimecs, “saying that the Spaniards were the aggressors as they entered and walked and took the land that was theirs;” see the “Carta del doctor Moya de Contreras al presidente del Consejo de Indias sobre la conveniencia de dar el azogue a precio moderado, e informando de los daños que hacían los indios chichimecas; México, 31 de agosto de 1574,” in Enciso Contreras, *Epistolario de Zacatecas*, 139.

⁴⁸⁴ Mathers, “Contest and violence on the Northern borderlands frontier”, 212.

⁴⁸⁵ “Real Provisión que no se pueda cautivar, ni hacer esclavo a ningún indio; Madrid, 2 de agosto de 1530,” in Konetzke, *Colección de documentos*, I, 134-6.

⁴⁸⁶ “Leyes y Ordenanzas nuevamente hechas por S.M. para la gobernación de las Indias, y buen tratamiento y conservación de los indios, 1542”, en García Icazbalceta, *Colección de documentos*, II, 204-27.

⁴⁸⁷ “Provisión virreinal para que se quiebre el hierro de los esclavos; Compostela de Galicia, 7 de abril de 1543”, en Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 233-5.

the unjustly enslaved Indians,⁴⁸⁸ and the Royal Decree of 1561⁴⁸⁹ were not enough to contain actions managed by the threads of greed. Only the Ordinances of 1573⁴⁹⁰ and 1583⁴⁹¹ began to have, although with a gradual effect, true results to restrict the Spanish arbitrarinesses.

Very often the success of the conquest campaigns and the consolidation of domain in the northern regions required an economic incentive that, in the absence of means, found its best excuse in the possibility of profiting from the appropriation of native labor. Fray Antonio Tello refers to the situation experienced by Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán in the city of Compostela around 1536, when near to being depopulated by the poverty and insecurity in which the neighbors lived—some of whom had already moved to Mexico—they were tempted by the governor giving them license to make slaves,⁴⁹² even though this openly contravened the Royal Provision of 1530.⁴⁹³ But slavery was not only a bait to induce Spanish greed, since it was also used to maintain the allegiance of the allied Indians. A decade later, in the Mixtón War, the viceroy Antonio de Mendoza gave to friendly Indians the 248 rebels captured in the rock of Coyna, in order to “encourage them to the war [...] because the said Indians asked to participate in the booty.”⁴⁹⁴ Two decades later, during the Guachichil-Zacateco rebellion of the early 1560s, Francisco Sosa, mayor of the Nombre de Dios town, promised to Mexicans and Tarascans allies that “anyone who catches a *chichimec* it will not be removed from him, because it will be his, as well as if he takes two or three.”⁴⁹⁵

Throughout this web of conflicts and interests, the great *Chichimec* uprisings were the ideal terrain for the discourse and slave-like practices to settle with greater force, and it is that there is no better incentive to feed an opportunist spirit than the resentment gestated

⁴⁸⁸ Zavala, “Los esclavos indios en el norte de México,” 85.

⁴⁸⁹ “Real Cédula para amparar a los indios de los abusos y la esclavitud injusta; Madrid, 18 de octubre de 1561,” in Powell, *War and Peace*, 106-7.

⁴⁹⁰ “Ordenanzas sobre descubrimiento nuevo y población; Bosque de Segovia, 13 de julio de 1573,” in Torres de Mendoza, *Colección de documentos inéditos*, 484-537. La transcripción señala erradamente el año 1563.

⁴⁹¹ “Ordenanzas sobre los indios chichimecas, que no los tomen por esclavos; agosto de 1583”, AGNM, Reales Cédulas Duplicadas 2, exp. 56, 21v.

⁴⁹² Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. LXXV, 230.

⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*, ch. LXXV, 230 and ch. LIX, 177. The chronicler wrongly dates this provision in 1532, perhaps mistaking it for the “Real Cédula para que no se hierren indios esclavos sin licencia real; Medina del Campo, 13 de enero de 1532,” in Konetzke, *Colección de documentos*, I, 138-9.

⁴⁹⁴ “Fragmento de la visita hecha a don Antonio de Mendoza: Interrogatorio; México, 8 de enero de 1547,” in García Icazbalceta, *Colección de documentos*, II, 113. See Altman, “Conquest, coercion, and collaboration,” 165-6.

⁴⁹⁵ “Memorial de los indios de Nombre de Dios, Durango, acerca de sus servicios al rey; c. 1563,” in Barlow & Smisor, *Nombre de Dios*, 30.

under the shade of frustration. On the occasion of the Mixtón rebellion the residents of Guadalajara wrote to the governor Francisco Vázquez de Coronado to request him “that it be possible to convert into slaves or *navoríos* by force those who are rebellious with the *Chichimecs* to serve us in our haciendas and farms, so that with this we could have horses and weapons, and the necessary things that are convenient for the transformation of this land.”⁴⁹⁶ In the face of pressing circumstances, the *Real Audiencia* of Mexico “dictated to be fair the war and to convert Indians into slaves”⁴⁹⁷ Once the victory consolidated thanks to Mexicas and Tlaxcalans support, with the prisoners “the punishment of slavery was made and they were delivered ..., [benefiting the] general and captains and soldiers and people of war.”⁴⁹⁸

Until the formation of the professional army, the security of mines and routes was in the hands of the residents of towns and cities, so the slavery of rebel Indians was one of the few incentives to ensure the continuity of settlements. When the mining stimulus consolidated its pre-eminence with the discovery of the mines of Zacatecas in 1546, slavery was seen as a valid means to reorient the *Chichimecs* warlike energy into the extractive tasks, rewarding the efforts of those who insisted on quelling the revolts that put at risk the Hispanic presence in the northern lands. For this reason it was not a coincidence that a few years later the *oidor* Hernán Martínez de la Marcha proposed to the king that the best way to achieve peace would be to “reward the people of war by making the most blamed Indians slaves or at least *naborias* [personal servants] by His Majesty’s will [...] And in this way it would cease the damages, deaths and shocks that we have every day.”⁴⁹⁹ In such circumstances it should not be surprising that, just after the Guachichil and Zacatecan attacks began at the beginning of the 1560s, measures similar to those taken in the Mixton War were adopted.⁵⁰⁰

The war sphere was not the only scenario on which *Chichimec* slavery was justified and deployed. Economic issues, arising from the need for day laborers for the agricultural

⁴⁹⁶ “Carta que los vecinos de Guadalajara escribieron al gobernador Francisco Vázquez de Coronado; Guadalajara, 26 de diciembre de 1540,” in Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. XCVII, 323.

⁴⁹⁷ “Fragmento de la visita hecha a don Antonio de Mendoza: Interrogatorio; México, 8 de enero de 1547,” in García Icazbalceta, *Colección de documentos*, II, 109.

⁴⁹⁸ “Respuesta del virrey Antonio de Mendoza a los capítulos puestos en la indagación del visitador Tello de Sandoval; s/f (¿1547?),” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 229.

⁴⁹⁹ “Carta del oidor Hernando Martínez de la Marcha a Su Majestad; Compostela, 18 de febrero de 1551,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 251.

⁵⁰⁰ “Comisión del Virrey al Alcalde Mayor de Zacatecas para ir contra los chichimecas; México, 30 de abril de 1560,” in Powell, *War and Peace*, 75-6.

and livestock farms that supplied the cities and mills, as well as workers for the silver seams, were the ideal fertilizer for the emergence of a collective animosity favorable to Indian slavery. It is true that the *Chichimec* beatings to caravans and the siege to towns, resulting in deaths and captives, were the great trunk on which the Indians subjection discourse was based, but this did not prevent the appearance of other argumentative branches seated on equally deep roots. As early as 1538, when the mine of Zacatecas was not yet discovered, native people were already assigned to the tasks of extracting silver, exploiting the veins with both slave and free Indians.⁵⁰¹ A year before, the residents of Purificación pointed out that one of their most frequent activities “was to make military entries into unsafe areas to attract the indigenous to servitude.”⁵⁰² During the second half of the sixteenth century, the capture of war and friendly Indians in the northern lands had become one of the main sources of workers for Spanish settlements: cities, towns, farms, and mines.⁵⁰³

In the sixteenth century Chile, an economic system as complex as in New Galicia was never developed. The gold mines were scarce and of a little durable productivity, and as the demographic growth of the Spaniards was scarce, nothing encouraged the development of economies of scale like in the north of Mexico. Something that could have acted as an incentive, which was the high population density of the Indians, was unbalanced by the bellicosity of the natives, reluctant to submit to the *encomienda* system. Of all the cities of southern Chile, Concepción and La Imperial are the ones that keep more information about the early Mapuche-Spanish relationship. In the first, there are frequent references to “the bad treatment on the Indians of *encomienda*, poorly fed and without rest,”⁵⁰⁴ who did not even have “Sundays to mourn their pains in the church or be heard by the priests,”⁵⁰⁵ and that “even children were forced to work the land by order of their encomenderos, who do not care about their temporal or spiritual welfare.”⁵⁰⁶ The situation was not very different in La Imperial, since the religious used to be the main denouncers of the abuses, arguing that it was

⁵⁰¹ Aiton, “Coronado’s first report on the government of New Galicia,” 311.

⁵⁰² Regalado Pinedo, “Una conquista a sangre y fuego (1530-1536),” 159.

⁵⁰³ Cramausse, *Poblar la frontera*, 41-5.

⁵⁰⁴ “Carta del licenciado Juan de Ozores al gobernador de Chile; Concepción, 5 de agosto de 1567,” ANCh, Fondo Morla Vicuña 1, 56.

⁵⁰⁵ “Carta del licenciado Juan de Ozores al rey Felipe II; Concepción, 4 de mayo de 1568,” ANCh, Fondo Morla Vicuña 1, 87.

⁵⁰⁶ “Documento anónimo sobre el estado de los indios de Concepción; 1570,” ANCh, Fondo Morla Vicuña 1, 116.

absurd to expect the rebellious Indians to pacify themselves knowing the bad treatment gotten by Indians of the city. In addition, they argued with ample justification that the escaped Indians from the *encomiendas*, who were taking refuge in the rebellious provinces, informed the war Indians “of our weaknesses, the number of our horses, how many soldiers there were and the quality of our armament.”⁵⁰⁷ The situation of the Mapuches encomendados was, evidently, a disincentive for the war Indians pacification, and, above all, a stimulus for the escapes to the Indian provinces of southern Biobío river.

Although the Spaniards lived with the fear of repeating the rebellion that had devastated the cities of the south between 1553 and 1557, they did not have the disposition to change the conditions of indigenous work that had stimulated it. Those who knew better the state of the Spanish situation as well as the number of Mapuche warriors willing to attack the Spanish settlements, knew very well the weakness of the Castilian position in the forests of the south. A Spanish soldier informed the governor of the need for reinforcements and supplies, “because our defenses are so weak and our resources so limited, the Indians could easily put the land back on us, destroying the cities, such as they did thirty five years ago.”⁵⁰⁸ And his fears were well founded, since only ten years later the second major Mapuche uprising, the most formidable of colonial history, would take place. As the groups of southern Biobío shared the same culture, it was not difficult that they formed military alliances of great magnitude to contain the Spanish advance. In this, they contrast with the *Chichimecs*, whose cultural diversity and lower population density, spread over a territory more extensive than southern Chile, made it difficult to form large-scale alliances. In fact, outside the Guachichil-Zacateco rebellion of 1561, the creation of macroalliances such as the *Mapuches*’ was hardly observed, which were recorded in chronicles and lyrical works such as *La Araucana* by Alonso de Ercilla, and which by the end of the sixteenth century were recognized with the name of *vutanmapus*. The *Mapuche* alliances were more durable, the *Chichimec* ones were much more ephemeral, but both proved to be efficient in war. When leading these confederations, *Mapuche* names like Caupolican in 1553 or Anganamón in 1598 were immortalized in history.

⁵⁰⁷ “Carta del padre Miguel Ramírez a al rey; La Imperial, 5 de Agosto de 1569,” ANCh, Fondo Morla Vicuña 1, 230.

⁵⁰⁸ “Carta del capitán Miguel de Avendaño al gobernador de Chile; La Imperial, 2 de julio de 1588,” ANCh, Fondo Morla Vicuña 1, 260.

Economic violence: ecological impact, looting, diseases and tribute

Most of the colonial testimonies explain the violence of New Galicia and Chile Indians in their barbaric and idolatrous nature, since they were people of little “understanding, subtle for evils, before inclined to the evil than to good,”⁵⁰⁹ beings “accustomed, in general, to get drunk, and to steal and lie and commit all baseness,”⁵¹⁰ almost animals “that only give false and untrustworthy peace.”⁵¹¹

The nature of the Indian, which was the subject of passionate juridical and theological debates throughout the sixteenth century, was initially considered within the framework of the psychology of the faculties: if they were incapable of living politically, isolated in their paganism, with primitive technologies and ignominious customs like cannibalism or polygamy, then they were imperfect human beings.⁵¹² The term “barbarian,” the label most used by conquistadors, erudites, missionaries and other witnesses of the New World societies, held in those days a double nuance: the relative one, in reference to the foreigner incomprehensible by his language and customs, and the absolute one, to refer to the brutal practices that exceeded the tolerance frameworks of the Christian world.⁵¹³ In Patricia Seed’s words “the moral distinction between people of reason (Spaniards) and people who were not quite reasonable (Indians) permeated numerous areas of everyday life during the colonial era.”⁵¹⁴

In 1513 the *Requerimiento* by Juan López de Palacios Rubios contributed enormously to consolidate the prejudices of the conquerors, and to legitimize the violence against the

⁵⁰⁹ “Relación de minas del Fresnillo: Informe de Alonso Tabuyo, minas del Fresnillo, 17 de enero de 1585,” in Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 115.

⁵¹⁰ “Relación de Cuiseo del Río, por el alcalde mayor y corregidor Antonio de Medina; valle de Cuiseo y Poncitlán, 9 de marzo de 1585,” in *Ibid.*, 183.

⁵¹¹ “Carta del capitán Hernán Saavedra al gobernador sobre el estado de la frontera; Concepción, 10 de agosto de 1577,” ANCh, Fondo Morla Vicuña 1, 164v.

⁵¹² Pagden, *La caída del hombre natural*, 48-9. Wilcomb Washburn delves into the moral virtues and vices attributed to the natives of the New World, highlighting qualities such as cannibalism, perseverance in friendship, generosity, eloquence, civility, cruelty or compassion with which the captives were treated, and sexual morality; see Washburn, “The clash of morality in the American forest,” 340-3.

⁵¹³ Todorov, *El miedo a los bárbaros*, 36-7. Bestard & Contreras emphasize the changing nature of the qualifier “barbarian” over time, since “according to circumstances and times, ‘barbarism’ may have consisted, fundamentally, in the mode of subsistence, or in the form of political organization, or in the marriage rules, or religious beliefs, or any other material and cultural aspects; or in all of it at once. Obviously, the emphasis on one aspect or another has responded to the specific needs of each moment by those who made use of these terms;” see Bestard & Contreras, *Bárbaros, paganos, salvajes y primitivos*, 54.

⁵¹⁴ Seed, *American Pentimento*, 119.

infidels reluctant to submit to the Christian domain.⁵¹⁵ Subsequently, although the *Papal Bull Sublimis Deus* of June 2, 1537 definitively settled the issue of the Indians humanity,⁵¹⁶ its promulgation did not alter the general image that settlers had over them, especially in the borderlands, which used to remain immune to the protective prerogatives for Indians

It should not be surprising that the oidor Hernán Martínez de la Marcha proposed to the king that the best way to pacify northern Mexico was enslaving rebellious Indians, which not only fulfilled the objective of rewarding the conquerors, but also with that of educating the Indians by taking them “out of their sodomy, idolatry and carnage of human flesh that they eat.”⁵¹⁷ In Chile, Captain Juan Ruiz de Gamboa advised the king “to allow the war Indians to be enslaved, because justice will be done to those who best serve his majesty in such a poor kingdom, and the evangelization of the barbarians is ensured.”⁵¹⁸ Almost like a euphemism, slavery was regarded as a means of salvation for the natives.

With the exception of the regular orders, some members of the secular clergy and a handful of royal officials, there was no willingness to interpret the lack of collaboration, escapes and indigenous violence as a consequence of the abuses they were victims. The grievances were of a diverse nature, exceeding the limits of physical vexation to extend to the scope of subsistence: either consciously or involuntarily, the body and its sustenance were from the first days of contact two focal points of the Spanish arbitrariness. The first entrances of exploration and conquest were characterized by the depredation of resources treasured by the food producing communities that came across during the advance.⁵¹⁹ Although in most cases the natives were willing to help the famished expeditioners by providing resources of all kinds, a series of attitudes that violated the principle of reciprocity undermined the initial confidence: long stays in the villages with the consequent dilapidation of reserves, in addition to the abuse of the dignity of women and local leaders.

⁵¹⁵ Zavala, *La filosofía política en la Conquista de América*, 50.

⁵¹⁶ An interesting approach to the document in Morales, “La evangelización en el siglo XVI,” 282. See the “Bula de Su Santidad el Papa Paulo III; Roma, 2 de junio de 1537,” in Cuevas, *Documentos inéditos del siglo XVI*, 84-6.

⁵¹⁷ “Carta del oidor Hernando Martínez de la Marcha a Su Majestad; Compostela, 18 de febrero de 1551,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 251.

⁵¹⁸ “Carta de Juan Ruiz de Gamboa a Su Majestad; 8 de abril de 1579,” in BNCh, Fondo Morla Vicuña 1, 40.

⁵¹⁹ Mathers, “Contest and violence on the Northern borderlands frontier,” 221-2.

In the New Galicia situations of this nature were experienced from the earliest contact. The entrance of Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán was a heavy burden for the native villages that had to supply the Spaniards and the large delegation of friendly Indians following them. In the Tumala village they remained for fifteen days being supplied “with much food and many chickens from the land and from Castile;”⁵²⁰ in the Tepique village “the Christians spent more than thirty days recovering from the trip and enjoying a good life;”⁵²¹ while they remained in the province of Chiametla, the natives welcomed them in lodgings on the outskirts of the town, treating them every day with “thirty chickens [...], and giving them thirty loads of fresh fish [...] and maiz, giving them what was necessary to everybody;”⁵²² in the province of Sinaloa stayed for more than forty days due to the difficulties that the heavy summer rains imposed on the transport, being supplied by local inhabitants “hunting pigeons, turtledoves, hares, and other things that killed with the arches, which sustained all the people of the army.”⁵²³ Fray Antonio Tello refers to the situation of Francisco Pentaclatl, cacique of Tzapotzinco, who fled from his lands due to the excesses of Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán, returning only when the conquistador left for the capital of New Spain; almost a decade later, and before new contingents that reinforced the Hispanic position in the northern lands, he decided to take refuge again in the mountains “thinking he would not have a good future there, and that the Spaniards would request him so many things, being not able to comply with them, that they would come to mistreat him.”⁵²⁴

The organizers of later excursions tried to supply the troops with sufficient resources in order to prevent controversial circumstances that triggered rebellions threatening the borderland, or assaults delaying and putting the expedition at risk. The viceroy Antonio de Mendoza, for example, supplied the expedition of Francisco Vázquez de Coronado for the discovery of the land of Cíbola with many bovine cattle and sheep, as well as gifts for the

⁵²⁰ “Relación sobre la jornada que hizo Nuño de Guzmán, de la entrada y sucesos de la Nueva Galicia, hecha por Pedro de Carranza,” in Razo, *Crónicas de la conquista del Nuevo Reyno de Galicia*, 161.

⁵²¹ “Relación hecha de viva voz por el alférez Francisco de Arceo, al capitán e historiador Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés,” in Razo, *Crónicas de la conquista del Nuevo Reyno de Galicia*, 255.

⁵²² Ibid., 262-3. See also the “Relación de la jornada que hizo Nuño de Guzmán a Nueva Galicia. Anónima Primera del Instituto Jalisciense de Antropología e Historia; sf.,” and “Relación de la conquista que hizo Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán. Anónima Segunda del Instituto Jalisciense de Antropología e Historia; sf.,” in Ibid., 298 and 319.

⁵²³ “Relación de la jornada que hizo Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán a la Nueva Galicia, escrita por Pedro de Guzmán,” in Ibid., 276. In the same work see also the “Relación de la jornada que hizo Nuño de Guzmán a Nueva Galicia. Anónima Primera del Instituto Jalisciense de Antropología e Historia,” 296.

⁵²⁴ Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. CXII, 360.

Indians that they found, so as not to bother the natives.⁵²⁵ A decade later the military and explorer Ginés Vázquez de Mercado led a quadrille to find the Huaynamota mines, accompanied by seventeen well-groomed men, supplied with gifts for the Indians they come across on the trip.⁵²⁶

The surpluses to sustain the troops and give gifts to the natives did not prevent, however, that the rigor of the sword made its way among the populations reluctant to collaborate. During the entry of Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán, whose group was at first well supplied by the Tarascans of Michoacán, not only were the episodes of depredation and dispossession numerous, but also those of desolation after the villages' houses and cellars became grass of flames stirred by the friendly Indians. When the natives of Cuynan left the town not to serve the newcomers, the friendly Indians were instructed to burn the houses, who "spread on the land and began to burn, that few things remained not burned."⁵²⁷ After torturing the chieftain of Cuitzeo with dogs that bit him to death, he was left "at the door of his room, burning all the town."⁵²⁸ The town of Nochistlán was "all scorched by fire of friendly Indians everywhere."⁵²⁹ The practice of razing reluctant villages to cooperate was so common that witnesses Pedro de Carranza and Cristóbal Flores agree that "all the [towns] that we left behind were burned"⁵³⁰ and "this burning was always continued along the way."⁵³¹ It is quite possible, as Ida Altman affirms, that the custom of ravaging the enemy land has been of indigenous roots, being incorporated by the conquerors into its strategy of space control.⁵³² Captain Cristóbal Flores says in his report that at the beginning of the campaign "Nuño de Guzmán ordered to put a lot of diligence in not burning the villages... [since] the friends we had have such a condition, that although they be burned alive, they will

⁵²⁵ "Fragmento de la visita hecha a don Antonio de Mendoza: Interrogatorio; México, 8 de enero de 1547," in García Icazbalceta, *Colección de documentos*, II, 119.

⁵²⁶ "Carta de Ginés Vázquez de Mercado al oidor Martínez de la Marcha; Guadalajara, 31 de julio de 1550," in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 261.

⁵²⁷ "Relación sobre la jornada que hizo Nuño de Guzmán, de la entrada y sucesos de la Nueva Galicia, hecha por Pedro de Carranza," in Razo, *Crónicas de la conquista del Nuevo Reyno de Galicia*, 159.

⁵²⁸ "Relación de la jornada que hizo Nuño de Guzmán a Nueva Galicia, escrita por el capitán Cristóbal Flores," in *Ibid.*, 191.

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.*, 192.

⁵³⁰ "Relación sobre la jornada que hizo Nuño de Guzmán, de la entrada y sucesos de la Nueva Galicia, hecha por Pedro de Carranza," in Razo, *Crónicas de la conquista del Nuevo Reyno de Galicia*, 173.

⁵³¹ "Relación de la jornada que hizo Nuño de Guzmán a Nueva Galicia, escrita por el capitán Cristóbal Flores," in *Ibid.*, 191.

⁵³² Altman, "Conquest, coercion, and collaboration," 158.

not stop putting fire wherever they go.”⁵³³ However, halfway through and facing the obstinacy of the natives, the conqueror ordered the use of fire more than once, as happened with Jalisco, where “he ordered the Indians to set fire and burn all the houses, and they did so.”⁵³⁴

In Chile, a similar tactic of burning crops and destroying homes in the indigenous provinces reluctant to submit to Spanish rule was applied. Although this punitive activity reached the highest point in the first decades of the seventeenth century, it was in the previous century when it began to be implemented in order to obtain the surrender of the *Mapuche* rebels through hunger. Already in 1568 Melchor Bravo de Saravia proposed the creation of a permanent border garrison, paid for by the work of the mines, which constantly ravaged the frontier Indians by cutting down their crops.⁵³⁵ At the end of the following decade Lorenzo Bernal del Mercado informed the king that he had found a large amount of land planted in the areas neighboring the cities of Concepción and Los Confines, so he destroyed them after breaking down a strong resistance.⁵³⁶ The fertility of the southern land was of recognized fame for the conquerors, who emphasized assiduously that “all these lands of Arauco and Tucapel, and the surrounding areas are so excellent in everything that they seem like a paradise on earth; the resources are so abundant, that anyone do not have to buy or sell anything, but take each one what he wants from those fields of God, which are abundant of all the necessary things [...] because everywhere is plenty of resources for men and also pastures for livestock [...]”⁵³⁷ In this way, the impact of the scorched earth strategy was not very large due to the great fertility of the land, which also had many areas of refuge in the passes of the Nahuelbuta mountain range, necessities to avoid direct confrontation with the Spanish army. In addition, the groups affected by the Spanish incursions had the economic support of the *Mapuches* living inland, where it was more difficult for the Spanish army to

⁵³³ “Relación de la jornada que hizo Nuño de Guzmán a Nueva Galicia, escrita por el capitán Cristóbal Flores,” in Razo, *Crónicas de la conquista del Nuevo Reyno de Galicia*, 191.

⁵³⁴ “Relación sobre la jornada que hizo Nuño de Guzmán, de la entrada y sucesos de la Nueva Galicia, hecha por Pedro de Carranza,” in *Ibid.*, 164.

⁵³⁵ Traslado de una carta que escribió el doctor Bravo de Saravia al cabildo de La Serena sobre destimar la octava parte del oro de las minas a los gastos de la Guerra, acompañado de otro traslado de los capítulos que se llevaron a tratar con los indios; Santiago, 19 y 28 de agosto de 1568,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 1 (second series), 115.

⁵³⁶ “Carta de Lorenzo Bernal de Mercado al virrey del Perú sobre el estado del reino; Santiago, 15 de junio de 1579,” in *Ibid.*, vol. 2 (second series), 441.

⁵³⁷ Mariño de Lovera, *Crónica del Reino de Chile*, book 1, part 2, ch. XXXIV, 309.

enter. There were situations, as in 1561, in which the constant conflict had resulted in a lack of resources in certain *Mapuche* provinces, such as Arauco. To recover and continue the fight, the inhabitants of the Gulf of Arauco agreed feigned peaces with the Spaniards while transferring resources to the rebel provinces further south; the document that talks about this situation specifies that

“It was agreed among all the natives to use a trick with the Spaniards, and it was that Arauco's *levo* and all its *rewes* were very great friends of the Spaniards, along two sowings, and that if they were requested for the war they would fight against their fathers and brothers and relatives, and that in this way they could sow so much food that it would be enough to provide the maintenance of ten years, in such a way that if the war Indians were in need, they would be favored from those of peace.”⁵³⁸

The position of the inhabitants of the Gulf of Arauco was based on a practical principle: rebelling in the midst of a growing famine was to condemn rebellion to failure. The false peace given to the Spaniards would allow, first, an economic recovery, and then, channeling the necessary support for the indigenous provinces that kept the rebellion alight. This was not the first, nor would it be the last time that the provinces of peace would economically support the rebellious groups. The political ties that bound the various *rewes* and *ayllarewes* of southern Biobío allowed that apparently pacified groups helped those facing the struggle: the Arauco War was basically fought over the construction of wide networks of mutual aid among the numerous groups of indigenous kinship. In addition, living in a much more fertile territory than New Galicia, the *Mapuches* were in better ecological conditions to face the Spanish invader than their *Chichimec* counterparts. Moreover, and as we will see in the following lines, the environmental fragility of the New Spain northern space was clearly exposed with the impact of mining activity, a situation that did not occur in southern Chile.

The food producing societies of northern New Spain were not, however, the only victims of Spanish explorations and settlements. Most of the Spanish villages and towns – with the exception of the mining enclaves– were located in places with a certain degree of fertility, close to river courses, in the middle of supply niches for nomadic groups, being

⁵³⁸ “Relación que hizo a S.M. Francisco de Bilbao, vecino de Chile, dando pormenores de la fatal condición de los indios de aquel reino, y la muerte que dieron a el gobernador don Pedro de Valdivia, Pedro de Avendaño y otros famosos españoles, s/f (1574),” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 9, 468-9.

henceforth forbidden to their mobility circuits. This was an inevitable consequence of the type of tasks demanded by the extraction and processing of silver, which foreshadowed to a large extent the pattern of Spanish settlement. In fact, unlike gold, which is found naturally in its pure state, silver is usually found in chemical compounds (oxides and sulphates), which made the construction of refining plants necessary. Peter Bakewell points out that for reasons of economy of scale it was logic to group these ingenios (mills) in certain places, so the production of silver, then, is associated with urbanism.⁵³⁹

Even more determining was the impact of mining activity on the highland forest, especially from the boom of Zacatecas in the middle of the sixteenth century. The growing mass of landowners, laborers, miners and slaves used the oaks to make “axles and wheels of wagons and carts,”⁵⁴⁰ plus “plows of two and three fathoms, which they use for cultivating the land,”⁵⁴¹ and the oaks “to make beams and boards.”⁵⁴² Pine trees and firs were used to make “beams for churches and houses for living.”⁵⁴³ The wood of these trees, especially the branches and the leftovers of artisanal and construction work, was used as firewood. However, it was the demand for fuel for the processing work by the melting system, assiduously used in the first decades, which mainly contributed to baring hills and ravines for the production of coal. The forest depredation reached such an extreme that the oidor Francisco de Mendiola issued a regulation on March 6, 1568 to control the felling of trees, placing special emphasis on curbing the irresponsible and inefficient work that was done with the oaks, to which used to cut only the branches, leaving on the hills large trunks that “do not return to sprout, as they dry and lose.”⁵⁴⁴ The persistence of the problem led the Cabildo de Zacatecas to insist on this provision in May 1575,⁵⁴⁵ but a year later the report of the *oidor* Santiago del Riego made it clear that the matter still had no solution, providing that in the

⁵³⁹ Bakewell, “Tres fronteras mineras en la colonia,” 119.

⁵⁴⁰ “Relación de las minas de San Martín y Llerena, y de su partido, por el alcalde mayor Rodrigo Balcázar; villa y minas de San Martín, 6 de febrero de 1585,” in Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 248.

⁵⁴¹ “Relación de la provincia de Tenamaztlán por el Corregidor Pedro de Ávila; 28 de noviembre de 1579,” in *Ibid.*, 285.

⁵⁴² “Relación de las minas de San Martín y Llerena, y de su partido, por el alcalde mayor Rodrigo Balcázar; villa y minas de San Martín, 6 de febrero de 1585,” in *Ibid.*, 248.

⁵⁴³ “Relación de la provincia de Tenamaztlán por el Corregidor Pedro de Ávila; 28 de noviembre de 1579,” in *Ibid.*, 286.

⁵⁴⁴ “Traslado de las ordenanzas que hizo el señor licenciado don Francisco de Mendiola; minas de Zacatecas, 6 de marzo de 1568,” in Fernández Sotelo, *La primigenia Audiencia de la Nueva Galicia*, 230.

⁵⁴⁵ “Acta del Cabildo de Zacatecas de 6 de mayo de 1575”, AHEZ, Fondo Ayuntamiento, Serie Libros de Cabildo: Primer libro de Cabildo, 51v.

future the supply of wood would be made beyond a radius of five leagues, with the hope that the immediate grove to the mines recover in a moderate time.⁵⁴⁶

Although the later use of the mercury processing system required less fuel, the felling of forests continued to be used for the process of separating the mercury from the amalgam by distillation.⁵⁴⁷ José Francisco Román Gutiérrez calculates that by the beginning of the seventeenth century the deforestation radius had almost tripled.⁵⁴⁸ Evidence of this is that by 1608 the already scarce trees in the hills of Zacatecas were still being used to produce coal, and “the wood that is cut is abundant and for the working of mines a large amount is spent, which will amount more than thirty thousand pesos a year.”⁵⁴⁹ Almost with resignation the bishop of Guadalajara, Alonso de la Mota Escobar, stated at the beginning of the seventeenth century that

There was in the days of its discovery [Zacatecas] a lot of trees and forests in these ravines, which have all been finished and cut with the smelters so that if they are not wild palms another thing has not remained. And so the firewood is very expensive in this city because it comes from eight and ten leagues in carts.⁵⁵⁰

With the amalgamation system, logging did not stop, so deforestation was a constant throughout the sixteenth century. The new system also increased the contamination of soil and water by the toxicity of heavy metals discarded, such as mercury and lead. A passage from the *Relación de Zacatecas* of 1608 describes this situation when it indicates that “a stream only has this city, and it passes through it and serves for the exploitation of the mines,” so “for drinking they use water wells and from two fountains although small.”⁵⁵¹ A no minor aggravation was the use of salt, indispensable “for the benefit of getting silver with mercury, that without it could not benefit.”⁵⁵² The waters of streams and rivers, as well as the scarce

⁵⁴⁶ “Ordenanzas hechas por el muy ilustre señor licenciado Santiago del Riego, oidor de la Real Audiencia de este reino y visitador general de él por su Majestad, para el buen gobierno de estas minas y real de Pánuco; año de 1576,” AGI, Patronato Real 182, ramo 52.

⁵⁴⁷ Bakewell, *Silver mining and society in Colonial Mexico*, 146.

⁵⁴⁸ Román Gutiérrez, “La frontera biológica en el Nuevo Mundo,” 85.

⁵⁴⁹ “Relación de Nuestra Señora de los Çacatecas, sacada de la información que por mandado del Consejo en ella se hizo el año de mil y seiscientos y ocho,” BMNAM, Caja 26, Legajo 30, Vol. 2, Doc. 74, 122.

⁵⁵⁰ Mota y Escobar, *Descripción geográfica*, 63.

⁵⁵¹ “Relación de Nuestra Señora de los Çacatecas, sacada de la información que por mandado del Consejo en ella se hizo el año de mil y seiscientos y ocho,” BMNAM, Caja 26, Legajo 30, Vol. 2, Doc. 74, 122.

⁵⁵² “Relación de las minas de Fresnillo por Juan de Huidobro; minas del Fresnillo, 20 de enero de 1585,” in Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 126.

organic cover of the soils surrounding the points of silver exploitation, were affected by the excessive salinity of the fluids discarded.

In sum, the deforestation of a good part of the forests was the result of the settlers economic needs in their desire to consolidate in the northern regions: the growing use of firewood for warming and preparation of food, the confection of utensils, the construction of houses for a growing population, and the exploitation of minerals created a demand that was only satisfied with the depredation of the forest. This extractive activity, which worked practically outside a handful of regulations, reduced the wild resources for the nomadic groups to a minimum: the oak not only provided them with a highly prized fruit, but also “in some of them they bred white honey beehives,”⁵⁵³ the mesquite provided them with “a strawberry that the natives eat that are like carob beans from Spain,”⁵⁵⁴ for diseases, the groups closest to the coast had, among many other herbs, fungi and roots, copal “which is a resin of a tree.”⁵⁵⁵ Regarding the fauna that hunted in the area of Zacatecas, Alonso de la Mota and Escobar writes, as if recalling a lost past, that “it was all this area of mountains and forests in the time of idolatry, the most famous reserve of deer, hares, rabbits, partridges, and pigeons.”⁵⁵⁶

Seeing their supply sources limited, the *Chichimecs* reoriented their hunting and gathering objectives to the livestock and agricultural ranches that supplied the mines and mineral mills. At the height of the Chichimec War it was common for the natives to take “many cows and even mares and mules when they can for food, and for this purpose they take them stolen into the land, where they have corrals like ours, where they enclose and kill them.”⁵⁵⁷ What the colonists labeled with the etiquettes of malevolence and bad tendency⁵⁵⁸

⁵⁵³ “Relación de la provincia de Tenamaztlán por el Corregidor Pedro de Ávila; 28 de noviembre de 1579,” in *Ibid.*, 285.

⁵⁵⁴ “Relación de la villa de Jerez de la Frontera y Taltenango, por el juez de comisión y justicia mayor Diego Nieto Maldonado; Jerez de la Frontera, 13 de octubre de 1584,” in *Ibid.*, 147.

⁵⁵⁵ “Relación de la ciudad de Compostela por el teniente Lázaro Blanco; Compostela, 26 de noviembre de 1584,” in *Ibid.*, 92.

⁵⁵⁶ Mota y Escobar, *Descripción geográfica*, 63.

⁵⁵⁷ “Relación de Juan Alonso Velázquez, clérigo beneficiado de la villa de San Miguel de los Chichimecas, sobre la guerra con los indios fronteros y los remedios para concluir con ella, 1582,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 455.

⁵⁵⁸ In this line, Dr. Juan Bautista de Orozco said that the main cause of the duration of this war was “to be those people very restless, of bad tendencies, lovers of war and who never were subjected;” see the “Carta del doctor Juan Bautista de Orozco al Rey sobre el modo de terminar la Guerra Chichimeca; México, 25 de noviembre de 1576,” in Naylor & Polzer, *The Presidio and Militia*, 55.

was nothing more than the inevitable consequence of the devastation they themselves had made of the environment: with increasingly restricted wild resources, hunter-gatherers' bands now focused on the acquisition of domestic goods from those that threatened their subsistence and freedom. Philip Wayne Powell's assessment that nomadic warriors were tempted by the comfort of the clothes and the relatively abundant supply of meat from the invaders⁵⁵⁹ turns out to be insufficient, since it does ignore the true economic background laying behind the *Chichimec* incursions. Without ignoring the vendetta, or collective impulse to compensate the grievances received as an important motor of the indigenous attacks, the economic motivations generated in the context of a depressed economy by the intervention of third parties cannot be ignored. Thus, for example, during the 1560s, the devastation of tunnels for livestock use in the area of Aguascalientes, Pinos and San Luis Potosí generated hostilities on the part of the Guachichil and Zacatecan Indians, who saw their subsistence threatened.⁵⁶⁰ Some years later, references to the period in which the greatest number of Chichimec attacks concentrated reveal that the assaults were motivated largely by the need for resources. In 1580, Dr. Orozco, president of New Galicia, undertook a punishment campaign against the Indians who had assaulted the Chalchihuites mines, capturing a teen who confessed that the assailants' leader, the Indian Juan Vaquero, "had sent messages to the inland to call for people to assault and kill the Christians, and they answered that they could not come because it was the rainy times and so they had too much for eating, that in the drought times, which is now, they would come."⁵⁶¹ Five years later and during his brief regency at the head of New Spain, Archbishop Pedro Moya de Contreras informed the king that during the rainy season "the Indian robbers do no harm," what they rather commit in the dry period in which "they run along the field."⁵⁶² Only when considering these variables is it possible to understand in its real dimension the difficulties that colonists had to face when

⁵⁵⁹ Powell, "Franciscans on the Silver Frontier of Old Mexico," 308.

⁵⁶⁰ Othón de Mendizábal, "Colonización del oriente de Jalisco y Zacatecas," 45. Fray Antonio Tello points out that in the punitive expedition led by Ginéz Vásquez de Mercado in the vicinity of Compostela in 1552, the army suffered great need, "which was satisfied with wild prickly pears;" see Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. CLXXI, 557. Elinor Melville has shown for El Bajío region the role played by domestic ungulates (horses, donkeys, cattle, goats, sheep and pigs) in soil erosion, which could explain to some degree the New Galicia's desertification of forested areas; see Melville, *A plague of sheep*, 6-7, 78-115.

⁵⁶¹ "Carta del doctor Orozco, presidente de la Nueva Galicia, al rey; Zacatecas, 28 de septiembre de 1580," in Enciso Contreras, *Epistolario de Zacatecas*, 227.

⁵⁶² "Carta al rey del arzobispo de México, gobernador de Nueva España, sobre asuntos de gobierno; México, 22 de enero de 1585," in Paso y Troncoso, *Epistolario de Nueva España*, XII, 126.

trying to settle in the most fertile lands of New Spain northern region: in a real war of subsistence, *Chichimecs* and Spaniards disputed the spaces that for some boasted the greatest amount of wild resources, and for others the best agricultural potential and for cattle breeding by the abundance of pastures. One example is the valley of Valparaíso, located north of El Peñol mines, so called “because it is very fertile with water and pastures, surrounded by many hills, full of cattle, uninhabited because of the war.”⁵⁶³

The idea of carrying out an economic war with the aim of subjecting the natives by hunger was also conceived in the minds of soldiers and royal officials, without being fully aware that the only result was to encourage the ambushes of increasingly numerous *Chichimec* groups. The earliest antecedent goes back to the first days of the Mixtón War, when Captain Cristóbal de Oñate rejected to make a direct attack on the native fortresses so as not to lose friendly Indians, so “he agreed to defeat them because of hunger, and sieged them.”⁵⁶⁴ Four decades later, cattle breeders from the Chichimec borderland asked the king to set up a fort in the San Francisco Valley, where the abundance of tunnels, wild fauna and wild cattle made it a convocation place for the rebel Indians, since due to the “fertility they make their meetings there, and they agree to rob and assault the Spaniards.”⁵⁶⁵ From the same period is the most systematic proposal, conceived by the cleric Juan Alonso Velázquez in the days when the possibility of replacing war by fire and blood for a policy of agreements based on peaceful reduction and the delivery of resources to the *Chichimecs* was debated. The religious man, in view of a conflict that showed no signs of ending quickly, proposed to the king that

[...] the war against these Indians and the pacification of them has only one remedy that is to populate their lands with loyal people, occupying their best and most fertile soils in such a way that from our settlements, put in good places, it could be monitored all their regions and mountain ranges, and to prevent as much as possible they go down to eat the prickly pear, dates and mesquites to the most desolate hills where

⁵⁶³ “Relación de minas del Fresnillo: Informe de las minas de El Peñol por Francisco Ruiz; 15 de enero de 1585,” in Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 111.

⁵⁶⁴ “Fragmento de la visita hecha a don Antonio de Mendoza: Interrogatorio; México, 8 de enero de 1547,” in García Icazbalceta, *Colección de documentos*, II, 107.

⁵⁶⁵ “Petición ante el Virrey de los criadores de ganados, vecinos y moradores de la frontera Chichimeca para tomar represalias contra los ataques indios, presentando detallada información de la situación de la frontera, 1582,” in Powell, *War and Peace*, 224.

raise, and that in the dry season they cannot safely go down to drink water where it is.⁵⁶⁶

Although the cleric was in a position opposed to the use of force as a means of subjugation, his proposal did not cease to be violent since he based the *Chichimec* subjugation on economic coercion by means of the occupation of their main sources of supply. In later times it was common the proposal and/or implementation of projects of this nature in other borderlands of the continent, although with generally unsuccessful results.

In southern Chile, no such ecological impact was experienced, although economic warfare was a recurrent strategy in the governors. Unlike the exploitation of silver, gold mining is much less dependent on foundry furnaces. For the rest, the veins found in southern Chile were gold pannings, that is, around river courses that did not require intense digging activity. As the gold veins distributed in the cities of Concepción, La Imperial and Villarrica never had a great productivity, there was not a strong migration towards these urban centers as happened in Zacatecas. Along with it, it is necessary to consider that the climatic conditions of southern Chile were of a higher humidity and more fertile soils, so the regeneration of the forest, very abundant, was much faster. In fact, agriculture was much more responsible for the felling of trees than mining, and even so the testimonies speak of the abundance of forests even well into the sixteenth century. The soldier Juan de la Cueva noted in 1586 that the dense forest greatly hindered the movement of horses, which made the use of infantry more efficient against rebellious Indians.⁵⁶⁷

This does not mean that the Mapuches have not experienced a lack of resources during the fight against the Spanish. Indeed, from the beginning of 1555 the consequences of the war and of a severe drought that affected the region the previous year were felt: the harvests, both of the Spanish populations of southern Cautín river and of the Indian's orchards were meager; a witness tells us that “there was a great death among the natives by hunger, because the crops dried for lack of water from the sky, and this was the cause of mortality.”⁵⁶⁸

⁵⁶⁶ “Relación de Juan Alonso Velázquez, clérigo beneficiado de la villa de San Miguel de los Chichimecas, sobre la guerra con los indios fronteros y los remedios para concluir con ella, 1582,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 471.

⁵⁶⁷ “Carta de Juan de la Cueva al gobernador sobre la situación de la guerra en el sur; Concepción, 14 de marzo de 1586,” BNCh, Fondo Morla Vicuña 1, 236.

⁵⁶⁸ “Proceso de Francisco de Villagra, 1558: declaración de Juan Jiménez,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos* 20, 616.

Other droughts affected the region in 1563, 1578-79 and in 1586. Therefore, the moments of famine as a consequence of an ecological impact in southern Chile obeyed to natural factors rather than human intervention. Along with this, the constant struggle that characterized the Arauco War also contributed to the emergence of momentary shortages, at least in the early years of the conflict, since “because everything is in chaos the Indians stopped working the land, occupying their hands in the bows, spears and clubs.”⁵⁶⁹ During the first decades the Indians even resorted to burning their own plantations “thinking that by famine the Spaniards would leave the land.”⁵⁷⁰ The tactic would not only have been useless since the Spaniards did not abandon the territory, but it would have played against the Indians themselves because of the hunger resulting from the lack of food. However, the chroniclers exaggerated the impact of these famines to justify the practice of cannibalism among the Mapuche when hunger raged, which under the lens of an unbiased analysis reveals that it was only a discursive strategy to justify the rebels’ slavery.

The *Chichimec* attacks were not only aimed at the procurement of resources, but also the capture of women who collaborated in the gathering economy and especially with the demographic recovery of bands. Hernando de Vargas, mayor of Querétaro, informed the king in 1582 of the cruelties committed by *Chichimecs* with the Spanish prisoners, blacks and friendly Indians, stressing that “with women it seems that they have some mercy because they keep them alive, and this they do because they lack of them.”⁵⁷¹ Although the documentary evidence is scarce, it is possible to establish a parallel with the situation experienced by the *Comanches* in the 1770s, when a prolonged drought and epidemic of smallpox conspired to cause a demographic decline of large proportions. James Brooks shows that the *Comanche* response was an increase not only in the pillage of cattle, but also in the capture of Spanish and mestizo women in order to compensate for the population decline.⁵⁷²

⁵⁶⁹ Mariño de Lovera, *Crónica del Reino de Chile*, book 1, part 3, ch. LI, 350.

⁵⁷⁰ Vivar, *Crónica y relación copiosa y verdadera de los reinos de Chile*, ch. CXIII, 312. No doubt the chroniclers magnified the consequences of this shortage; Tomás Guevara pointed out a century ago that: “Hunger came in many tribes in the winter of 1554; but not in the exaggerated proportions spoken of by the chroniclers, who drew horrific pictures of children eaten by their fathers, of Indians who hunted each other to devour, or of people fattened by the caciques to eat later;” see Guevara, *Historia de la Civilización de Araucanía*, 92.

⁵⁷¹ “Descripción de Querétaro por su Alcalde Mayor Hernando de Vargas; Querétaro, 30 de marzo de 1582,” in Velázquez, *Colección de documentos para la historia de San Luis Potosí*, 21.

⁵⁷² Brooks, *Captives and cousins*, 68-9.

In the case of northwestern Mexico, the epidemics were a silent but equally deadly ally of conquerors swords.⁵⁷³ The New Galicia and the adjacent territories were one of the multiple “virgin lands affected by epidemics,” as defined by Alfred Crosby four decades ago.⁵⁷⁴ By 1536 Fray Antonio Tello estimated that of the Culiacán Indians “one hundred and thirty thousand, who died of measles and blood holes,”⁵⁷⁵ had been lost, and by 1545 the high mortality caused by the plague forced the building of hospitals in New Galicia and Michoacán, in which “the Indians who fall ill, both neighbors and outsiders, enter,”⁵⁷⁶ and in 1564, 1576 and 1588 new plagues ravaged the northern border of Mexico with catastrophic results. The prosecutor of Guadalajara, for example, informed the king that the great typhoid epidemic of 1576-77 ended the lives of more than two thousand Indian workers of the Zacatecas mines.⁵⁷⁷

When examining the *Relaciones Geográficas*, it is common to find that native informants report that “they lived formerly healthier than now, and that there were no diseases as now,”⁵⁷⁸ that “in the past they were many, and at the present they are few... [as a consequence of] great diseases of smallpox, measles and blood fluids,”⁵⁷⁹ that “formerly they lived healthy, until the cocolitze came for them, which consisted in blood fluids, pox and measles,”⁵⁸⁰ that “because of the great diseases that have passed, they diminished,”⁵⁸¹ that “due to illness and pestilences that have passed, all of them have died,”⁵⁸² or that “they do

⁵⁷³ A scholarly work detailing the epidemics that devastated to the northwest of Mexico in the sixteenth century in Reff, *Disease, depopulation and culture change*, especially the chapter 3, “Disease episodes in Northwestern New Spain,” 97-142.

⁵⁷⁴ Crosby defines the virgin soil epidemics as “those in which the populations at risk have had no previous contact with the diseases that strike them and are therefore immunologically almost defenseless.” The inhabitants of the New World, as a result of their geographical and genetic isolation from populations of other continents, were practically defenseless against diseases of the Old World such as smallpox, measles or typhus, causing demographic catastrophes that reached extreme levels in diverse regions. See Crosby, “Virgin soil epidemics,” 289. For a debate, see Jones, “Virgin soils revisited.”

⁵⁷⁵ Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. LXXX, 251.

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, ch. CLV, 525.

⁵⁷⁷ Bakewell, *Silver mining and society in Colonial Mexico*, 126-7.

⁵⁷⁸ “Relación de la provincia de Amula por Francisco de Agüero: pueblo de Tuscacuesco; 1585,” in Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 74.

⁵⁷⁹ “Relación y memorial que su Majestad mandó hacer de la villa de la Purificación y su provincia, por fray Luis Gómez de Alvarado: pueblos de Tlaltenpa y Ocotitlán; 12 de enero de 1585,” in *Ibid.*, 223.

⁵⁸⁰ “Relación y memorial que su Majestad mandó hacer de la villa de la Purificación y su provincia, por fray Luis Gómez de Alvarado: pueblo de Xocotlán; 12 de enero de 1585,” in *Ibid.*, 225.

⁵⁸¹ “Relación y memorial que su Majestad mandó hacer de la villa de la Purificación y su provincia, por fray Luis Gómez de Alvarado: pueblos de Atengo y Piloto; 12 de enero de 1585,” in *Ibid.*, 230.

⁵⁸² “Relación y memorial que su Majestad mandó hacer de la villa de la Purificación y su provincia, por fray Luis Gómez de Alvarado: pueblo de Zoyatlán; 12 de enero de 1585,” in *Ibid.*, 233.

not remember that there has been death or pestilence among them before the Christians came, that it has been after that these lands were conquered.”⁵⁸³ The demographic data by Cook and Borah are eloquent proof of the population decline that affected New Galicia in the second half of the sixteenth century

Year	Population	Rate of change ⁵⁸⁴
1548	169.721	
1560	97.990	-42,26 %
1570	65.969	-32,67 %
1580	46.000	-30,27 %
1590	35.300	-23,26 %

Table 1: Demographic variation of the New Galicia, XVI century.
 Source: Cook & Borah, *Essays in population history: Mexico and the Caribbean*, 310.

Although the information is essentially based on the cadastre of towns and cities (including the Hispanic population, enslaved blacks and Indians of *encomienda*), it is plausible to extend this demographic decline to the nomadic groups at least to a certain degree, since their high range of mobility may have made them less vulnerable to the ravages of pests.⁵⁸⁵ The important thing to note is that the loss of women due to illnesses, slave catches and/or deaths was a severe blow to their economies and demographic stability, hence the abduction and incorporation into the nomadic social system was a way to compensate losses, such as stressed the religious Juan Alonso Velázquez

[...] as they are stripped of their wives and children, they seek revenge with cunning, since they can not with vigor. And for this they call their neighbors and allies and

⁵⁸³ “Relación de la provincia de Tenamaztlán por el Corregidor Pedro de Ávila; 28 de noviembre de 1579,” in *Ibid.*, 283.

⁵⁸⁴ The figures in this column were calculated by me.

⁵⁸⁵ Gómez Serrano, *Guerra Chichimeca, la fundación de Aguascalientes*, 87, asserts that while in New Spain the demographic collapse reached a ratio of 10 to 1, in New Galicia it seems to have experienced a less drastic fall, with a ratio of 6 to 1. See also Gómez Serrano, “El exterminio de los chichimecas en el norte de la Nueva Galicia,” 207. For New Spain, see Borah y Cook, “La despoblación del México central en el siglo XVI.” It is necessary to point out that Robert McCaa put into question the criteria on which researchers have constructed the demographic history of sixteenth century New Spain; see McCaa, “¿Fue el siglo XVI una catástrofe demográfica para México?”

even those of the inland and with them they go out to the roads to do the damages and deaths that they usually do, and for the lack of women they reserve for themselves the Indian and mulatto women they find in the cuadrillas of carts that they steal, and because all this is not enough they try to assault the nearest peace villages that can, killing the Indian men and taking the Indian women.⁵⁸⁶

The Alfred Crosby research sustains that diseases brought to the New World, such as smallpox, measles, influenza and tuberculosis, resulted in a high mortality rate in the age group that goes from fifteen to forty years of each indigenous society that came into contact with Europeans, that is to say, in the generational range that supported in greater degree the tasks of production and preparation of food, construction of shelters and defense of the community, besides corresponding to the subjects most involved in the reproduction of the group and upbringing of the infants, highlighting in this mainly the women. A strong demographic decline in this important fraction of the communities inevitably impacted on the others (children and the elderly), who used to maintain a situation of dependency respect to the adults.⁵⁸⁷ A logical consequence was that the surviving adults resorted to the abduction of women and children among the friendly Indians and those of *encomienda*.

The diseases caused more deaths among the Indians in Chile than the casualties of the war. The ethnohistorian Eduardo Téllez calculates that the native population between the Itata and Toltén rivers would have descended from around one million inhabitants in 1550 to around 480,000 by 1650.⁵⁸⁸ However, it is easy to infer that the demographic decline was not as drastic as in New Galicia, where just twelve years were enough to experience a 42% decrease between 1548 and 1560. This could explain in part that, although it is undoubted that the *Mapuches* kidnapped Spanish women during the Arauco War, especially in the general uprisings, there are no references indicating that the motivation was the need for demographic recovery of the groups. The historiography recognizes two great plagues that devastated the Mapuche territory in sixteenth century, both during the earliest contact, and although the documentation refers other diseases for final decades, they did not reach the mortality levels of the first ones, perhaps as a consequence of the adaptation of the Indians

⁵⁸⁶ “Relación de Juan Alonso Velázquez, clérigo beneficiado de la villa de San Miguel de los Chichimecas, sobre la guerra con los indios fronteros y los remedios para concluir con ella, 1582,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 462.

⁵⁸⁷ Crosby, “Virgin soil epidemics,” 293-4.

⁵⁸⁸ Téllez, “Evolución histórica de la población mapuche del reino de Chile, 1536-1810,” 108.

immune system, partly due to the intense miscegenation derived from the abduction of Spanish women. The year 1554, when the first *Mapuche* rebellion was at its highest point, coincided with a plague of smallpox that struck mercilessly to the natives, especially the Tucapelinos and Purenes, who in those days carried the weight of war; the governor impressions on this event summarizes in the following excerpt: “And God has given so much plague of pox in the Indians of this kingdom, that it is a matter of great pity those who have died, and greater to see those who are buried every day.”⁵⁸⁹ Just seven years later the ghost of death came from the hand of typhus, which affected especially the children, a disease that the Indians called “*chavalongo*, which in our language means headache.”⁵⁹⁰ Both plagues were a powerful ally of the Spaniards to contain the victorious advance of the first Mapuche rebellion.

Both in New Galicia and in Chile it was habitual for the Indians of *encomienda* and the few groups reduced to demand the Spanish protection and assistance. This happened, for example, with the natives of Centiquipaque, who claimed to the authorities their status as tributaries and vassals of the king, so it was unacceptable that they suffered constantly “the problems that were happening with the people of war, their confines [neighbors] and enemies.”⁵⁹¹ The Spaniards, pushed by the imperative need to maintain the loyalty of that handful of natives who supported a good part of the Hispanic economy in the border region,⁵⁹² engaged in punitive campaigns inside the land of war. But there were also situations in which the extreme isolation of the reductions made the search for military assistance in the cities so risky that the communities themselves consolidated ties of mutual assistance with other nearby reductions, as happened with the natives of the town of San Miguel, those who “have the custom to join with those of Sichú to go together to revenge the damages done by the Guachichil warrior Indians every time they hear about it, helping those of one town to the others.”⁵⁹³

⁵⁸⁹ “Carta del gobernador Francisco de Villagra al Virrey del Perú, dándole cuenta de lo que hasta entonces había hecho en su gobierno, 21 de enero de 1562,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos* 29, 134.

⁵⁹⁰ Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile, desde su descubrimiento hasta el año de 1575*, ch. XX, 117.

⁵⁹¹ “Carta del oidor Hernando Martínez de la Marcha a Su Majestad; Compostela, 18 de febrero de 1551,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 258.

⁵⁹² The importance of free Indians in Mexican mining activity was such that by the 1590s they represented 90% of the labor force in the Zacatecas mines.; see Tandeter, “The Mining Industry”, 318.

⁵⁹³ “Mandamiento del virrey Luis de Velasco para que los vecinos de la villa de San Miguel no impidan a los indios ir al socorro de los indios de Sichú en defensa contra los Chichimecas; Jocotitlán, 15 de noviembre de 1560,” in Powell, *War and Peace*, 87.

The Indians of *encomienda*, as well as the *Chichimec* groups that had agreed to voluntarily reduce themselves under the protection of the Otomi colonies, were of fundamental importance for the security and consolidation of northern Spanish settlements. This, however, did not protect them from being victims of the characteristic practices of that labor system or of the hidden pretensions of the settlers. The mistreatment and deprivations were grounds for complaints before the authorities,⁵⁹⁴ the incentive for numerous “vassals” to escape to the mountains increasing the contingents of “rebellious” Indians who ravaged cities, haciendas, mines and trafficking routes,⁵⁹⁵ and in extreme situations the incentive to attack against their own *encomenderos*, as happened in the Mixtón days in the town of Xalpa, where “the natives kicked out to Diego de Proaño, to whom they were encomendados, and to Diego de Mendoza who was with him, and the town rebelled and went all to the mountain.”⁵⁹⁶

The material and laboral load on the communities *encomendadas* operated in the same way as in the rest of the Spanish territories, under the modalities of tribute and personal service. Therefore, it is not a surprise that the vices denounced for the Valley of Mexico by religious,⁵⁹⁷ royal officials⁵⁹⁸ and the representatives of the communities⁵⁹⁹ were essentially the same as those that took place in New Galicia, but with the aggravating circumstance that the means of government supervision were, by the border condition, much more limited. In the middle of the sixteenth century the caciques of Ycatlán, Agualulco and Omagua towns, in the region of Guadalajara, notified the Bishop of Mexico that as a consequence of personal service

⁵⁹⁴ An interesting documentary corpus of early Jalisco makes it clear that its inhabitants resorted to the Spanish institutions and authorities to record the abuses of which they were victims; see Calvo et alii, *Xalisco*, especially the document “‘Que sepan nuestro sufrimiento’: Xalisco bajo el régimen de la encomienda (¿1572?),” 49-108.

⁵⁹⁵ Zavala, “Los esclavos indios en el norte de México,” 96-7.

⁵⁹⁶ “Fragmento de la visita hecha a don Antonio de Mendoza: Interrogatorio; México, 8 de enero de 1547,” in García Icazbalceta, *Colección de documentos*, II, 104.

⁵⁹⁷ “Carta de fray Pedro de Gante al Emperador don Carlos, exponiéndole el sensible estado a que tenía reducido a los indios el servicio personal; San Francisco de México, 15 de febrero de 1552,” in *Cartas de Indias*, 94.

⁵⁹⁸ “Carta de Diego Ramírez a Carlos V haciéndole relación del estado de los indios y de la conveniencia de adoptar ciertas medidas para su mejora y defensa; pueblo de Rinconada de la Nueva España, 3 de diciembre de 1552,” in Montoto, *Colección de documentos*, 196.

⁵⁹⁹ “Testimonio de ciertas querellas que tenían presentadas en la Audiencia de México los indios del pueblo de Tecama contra su encomendero Juan Ponde de León; Tescuco, 3 de febrero de 1552,” in Paso y Troncoso, *Epistolario de Nueva España*, VI, 133-7.

Every day we've got things and business that make us go to Mexico city that is ninety-one leagues from our town, because it is subjected to the jurisdiction of Mexico. And in the coming and going we've got many works, costs and needs, diseases and deaths. And sometimes for not going we suffer some annoyances and aggravations, we lose our haciendas and justice.⁶⁰⁰

The governor, mayors and sheriffs of the neighboring town of Ameca made a similar statement of their situation by saying that “we are so far from Mexico and to go there we pass very great jobs, people, and towns, and we tire and destroy and die and fall ill.”⁶⁰¹ Two decades later Felipe de Arellano, accountant of Mexico, in a letter to the king made it clear that the long distances still meant a serious problem for the payment of tributes, both of the towns *encomendados* and of those who were directly subordinated to the Royal Crown, given that the “naturals receive great damage and harm in bringing them to this city, and for being lands of different *temples*, as for being the roads so long and hard.”⁶⁰²

The impact of the tribute was no less important having in mind that most of the native populations of New Galicia and adjacent areas were egalitarian societies, originally structured as bands or tribes of low sociopolitical complexity, who did not practice any form of contribution. At most the representatives of the communities, who fulfilled tasks related to the cult, guaranteed the social order as mediators of conflicts, and assumed the role of spokespersons of the collective will, enjoyed the assistance of the community in the work of their lands, all this in a framework of reciprocal benefits. The natives of Maquili town, in the province of Michoacán, pointed out that “they did not give tributes, but they served the lords in everything they were ordered, and brought them gold, game stocks, chickens and maintenance,”⁶⁰³ the Otomíes of Cusalapa declared that “they did not pay anything to the

⁶⁰⁰ “Cuaderno de las Provanzas que se hicieron por parte de la ciudad de Guadalajara, y de los otros pueblos de la Nueva Galicia, en el pleito entre los obispos de la Nueva Galicia [y] Mechacan [Michoacán] sobre los límites, y mudar la silla [episcopal] a la ciudad de Guadalajara de la de Compostela: requerimiento de los caciques de Ycatlán al señor Obispo; Guadalajara, 4 de enero de 1550,” in Orozco y Jiménez, *Colección de documentos históricos*, I, 52.

⁶⁰¹ “Cuaderno de las Provanzas...: requerimiento de los caciques de Ameca al señor Obispo; Guadalajara, 24 de enero de 1550,” in *Ibid.*, 62.

⁶⁰² “Carta al rey de don Felipe de Arellano, contador de México, proponiendo medios para recaudar los tributos y para evitar fraudes en el cobro de los derechos de almojarifazgo; México, 26 de diciembre de 1570,” in Paso y Troncoso, *Epistolario de Nueva España*, XI, 106.

⁶⁰³ “Relación del pueblo de Maquili por el alcalde mayor Baltazar Dávila Quiñones, 15 de marzo de 1580,” BMNAM, Caja 26, Legajo 30, Vol. 2, Doc. 72, 91.

principal, but only sowed his seeds for his sustenance,”⁶⁰⁴ the natives of Taltenango town affirmed that before the Spanish arrival they only recognized the authority of warrior leaders whom they esteemed for their bravery, but “they did not pay anything,”⁶⁰⁵ the Nochistlan people had a leader whom only paid the “hunt they killed, such as deer, rabbits, quail and hares, and other maintenance items, and made him a sowing of corn,”⁶⁰⁶ and those of the village and encomienda of Tuito indicated that “in their idolatry they had no one governing them, but that all lived together as a community, and that they did not pay tribute to anybody.”⁶⁰⁷

With the payment of tributes under Spanish rule the situation changed radically, as revealed by the complaints emanating not only from the villas of New Galicia, but also from other New Spain’s borderlands. Around 1550 the Emperor Carlos V declared to be aware that the Indians of Veracruz, Mexico and Panuco “are very vexed and fatigued with the tributes, both from the encomenderos and from the people who in our name collect the tributes of the towns that are under our royal Crown.”⁶⁰⁸ Two years later, in response to this situation, the royal visitor Diego Ramírez confirmed the monarch’s appreciation, stating that many towns were practically abandoned for the escape of their inhabitants, and that “the cause of this loss has been the great disorder of the people who have had the Indians encomendados for a long time without tasa.”⁶⁰⁹ A similar situation occurred with the reduced Chichimecs in the estancias of Guardadácuaro, in the vicinity of the Acámbaro town, province of Michoacán, who were required to pay 30 pesos of gold, far exceeding the eight

⁶⁰⁴ “Relación de la provincia de Amula por Francisco de Agüero: relación de Cusalapa; 1585,” in Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 79.

⁶⁰⁵ “Relación de la villa de Jerez de la Frontera y Taltenango, por el juez de comisión y justicia mayor Diego Nieto Maldonado: diligencia hecha en el pueblo de Taltenango, 21 de octubre de 1584,” in *Ibid.*, 145.

⁶⁰⁶ “Relación del pueblo de Nuchiztlán por el alcalde mayor y corregidor Francisco de Plaza; Nuchiztlán, 2 de diciembre de 1584,” in *Ibid.*, 168-9.

⁶⁰⁷ “Relación y memorial que su Majestad mandó hacer de la villa de la Purificación y su provincia, por fray Luis Gómez de Alvarado: pueblo de Tuito; 12 de enero de 1585,” in *Ibid.*, 228.

⁶⁰⁸ “Traslado de una provisión del emperador por la que se manda a Diego Ramírez hacer la visita de varios pueblos y provincias entre México a la Veracruz y hacia la parte de Pánuco; Buitrago, 22 de mayo de 1550,” in Paso y Troncoso, *Epistolario de Nueva España*, VI, 12.

⁶⁰⁹ “Carta de Diego Ramírez a Carlos V haciéndole relación del estado de los indios y de la conveniencia de adoptar ciertas medidas para su mejora y defensa; pueblo de Rinconada de la Nueva España, 3 de diciembre de 1552,” in Montoto, *Colección de documentos*, 196.

pesos to which they were legally bound, so the viceroy Luis de Velasco ordered an end to such arbitrariness.⁶¹⁰

Under the shadow of tribute also developed an unsuspected practice that despite contravening Spanish legal and moral standards, it took some years to detect by the authorities. The New Galicia documentation states that “tributaries means, in all this kingdom, an Indian married, with wife and children, who tributes to His Majesty six reales, a fanega of corn and a hen of Castilla, and the single man or woman just gives the half.”⁶¹¹ The *encomenderos* used to force single men to marry girls who were just entering puberty, convinced that the per capita productivity of adults (father and mother) of each family was greater than that of isolated units, since the pressure for complying with quotas forced them to involve their children as a support workforce. In addition, by coercively encouraging the formation of marriages that in the short term would produce children, a disincentive to the Indians' escape was created by the difficulty of loading their offspring. When the king was aware of this, issued a Royal Decree on April 10, 1581, prohibiting the *encomenderos* from forcing “the Indian girls to marry without having a legitimate age.”⁶¹² The very small number of single tributary Indians in New Galicia in proportion to marriages, as revealed in a document of 1582, shows that such a practice was still in force one year later.⁶¹³

The scarcity of currency, an extreme problem in the most remote border regions, was an ingredient that contributed to aggravating things. A few years after founding Compostela city, then capital of New Galicia, the difficult situation of poverty urged many of its neighbors to abandon it “because there was no currency, of low or high grade.”⁶¹⁴ A quarter of a century later and at the request of Viceroy Luis de Velasco, the monarch Felipe II ordered to make

⁶¹⁰ “Ordenamiento al gobernador de Acámbaro para que no pida a los indios chichimecas de las estancias de Cancandáguaro (o Guardadáguaro) más de ocho pesos de tributo según su tasación; México, 24 de marzo de 1552,” in Paredes, “*Y por mí visto...*,” 96.

⁶¹¹ “Relación de los Pueblos de Su Majestad del Nuevo Reyno de Galicia, y de los yndios tributarios que en ellos ay, y del tributo que pagan y los cargos de Alcaldes Mayores y Corregidores que se proveen, y la jurisdicción que cada uno tiene, y de las minas e ciudades, villas y lugares que ay en el distrito del dicho Nuevo Reyno: el pueblo de Analco Tetlán, 1582,” BMNAM, Caja 26, Legajo 30, vol. 2, doc. 2, 11v.

⁶¹² “Real Cédula prohibiendo a los *encomenderos* que casen a las niñas indias a la fuerza; Tomar, 10 de abril de 1581,” in Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. CCXII, 656.

⁶¹³ “Relación de los Pueblos de Su Majestad del Nuevo Reyno de Galicia, y de los yndios tributarios que en ellos ay, y del tributo que pagan y los cargos de Alcaldes Mayores y Corregidores que se proveen, y la jurisdicción que cada uno tiene, y de las minas e ciudades, villas y lugares que ay en el distrito del dicho Nuevo Reyno: el pueblo de Analco Tetlán, 1582,” BMNAM, Caja 26, Legajo 30, vol. 2, doc. 2, 11v.

⁶¹⁴ Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. LXXIII, 223.

the necessary inquiries to weigh the advantages and difficulties of establishing a mint house in the city of Guadalajara “because there is a great lack of currency in that land.”⁶¹⁵ A little more than a decade later the same problem became latent in Zacatecas, and now the miners asked the king to establish a mint house in the mining region.⁶¹⁶ A set of documents guarded in the Biblioteca del Museo Nacional de Antropología de México, which synthesize the tributes paid by the peoples of New Galicia and the province of Culiacán, show that the matter was still valid in the northernmost latitudes of the Spanish domain in the dawn of the penultimate decade of the sixteenth century.⁶¹⁷ The immediate consequence for the Indian communities furthest from the administrative centers was that, in the shortage of cash, the encomenderos had the opportunity to transgress the *tasas* fixed by the royal officials, arbitrarily granting the goods produced by the native labor values below the real price, resulting in the payment of excessive taxes. There were communities forced to sell part of their land “to meet their needs and pay their taxes,”⁶¹⁸ although the documentation of the time shows it as a voluntary act, covering up the pressing situation that overwhelmed the natives. Others resorted to loans to settle their debts, which in most cases contributed to further aggravate their situation, so in many cases they chose to abandon the *encomiendas* and reductions, escaping to mountains and streams both in the territory of the New Spain as in the New Galicia.⁶¹⁹ Around the year 1572 the natives of Jalisco protested that

with each type of tribute they made us suffer. They made us weaken, they split our heads, although what we lacked in tribute was little, even if it was a little bit, that is

⁶¹⁵ “Oficio al virrey de la Nueva España para que envíe relación si convendrá que se haga casa de moneda en la Nueva Galicia; Madrid, 31 de agosto de 1561,” in Enciso, *Cedulario de Zacatecas*, 101.

⁶¹⁶ “Oficio para que se averigüe del beneficio que tendría instalar una casa de moneda en los Zacatecas; Madrid, 21 de abril de 1572,” in *Ibíd.*, 315-6.

⁶¹⁷ “Relación de los Pueblos de Su Majestad del Nuevo Reyno de Galicia, y de los yndios tributarios que en ellos ay, y del tributo que pagan y los cargos de Alcaldes Mayores y Corregidores que se proveen, y la jurisdicción que cada uno tiene, y de las minas e ciudades, villas y lugares que ay en el distrito del dicho Nuevo Reyno, 1582,” Biblioteca del Museo Nacional de Antropología de México, Caja 26, Legajo 30, vol. 2, docs. 2-67, 6-42v. See also “Los pueblos del partido de los Quatro Barrios de que se manda pagar por esta Real Audiencia quinientos pesos de tipuzque de salario en cada un año al Alcalde Mayor, no llegan al salario todos los años... [y] Relación de los tributos que a Su Magestad dan los naturales indios de la Provincia de Culiacán, y lo que an valido este año de 1582, conforme a las almonedas que dellos se an hecho por los thenientes de juezes oficiales desta provincia, por pesos de minas,” Biblioteca del Museo Nacional de Antropología de México, Caja 26, Legajo 30, vol. 2, doc. 69, 53-7v.

⁶¹⁸ “Oficio al gobernador de la Nueva Galicia para que informe al Consejo de Indias si ha de ser beneficioso para los naturales que vendan las tierras que les sobran a los vecinos de Guadalajara; Aranjuez, 23 de noviembre de 1568,” in Enciso, *Cedulario de Zacatecas*, 226.

⁶¹⁹ “Traslado de las ordenanzas que hizo el señor licenciado don Francisco de Mendiola; minas de Zacatecas, 6 de marzo de 1568”, in Fernández Sotelo, *La primigenia Audiencia de la Nueva Galicia*, 234.

why we worked too hard, which made ourselves weak and we were with fear and worry; at no time we were happy, for this reason we lost much of our property [...].⁶²⁰

It is no coincidence, therefore, that some of the main points of escapes, assaults and rebellions have been precisely the regions in which this occurred, such as Aguascalientes and Zacatecas.⁶²¹

Symbolic violence: “knocking down idols and raising churches”

The violence exerted by the Europeans was not limited to sully the Indians, to appropriate their productive capacity, alienate their goods and supply spaces, or to dismantle the family nuclei with the death or slavery of men, women and infants. An equally repressive aspect was the cruelty displayed against those elements that consolidated the social integration of the groups. The most powerful cultural resources were the ancestors cult, the sacred objects, and the set of uses and customs that reactivated the group unity throughout the annual cycle.

The anthropologist Mircea Eliade, a great connoisseur of the primitive world's religious forms, stressed that “the man of archaic societies has a tendency to live as much as possible *in* the sacred or in the intimacy of sacred objects.”⁶²² These objects, and the practices associated with them, constituted one of the pillars on which the identity of these societies rested, constituting as factors of group integration. The Spaniards, blinded by the dogma of revealed truth and encouraged by the spirit of crusade with which they justified their expansion in the New World, turned these sacred elements into a central objective of their extirpation of idolatries policy. It should not be surprising, therefore, that the military and religious have carried out an unbridled activity of search and destruction of fetish objects. Fray Antonio Tello, inspired by the prejudices of his time, described the Chichimecs as people who “have no laws, but who barbarously adore formidable idols of stone or clay with

⁶²⁰ “Que sepan nuestro sufrimiento”: Xalisco bajo el régimen de la encomienda (¿1572?),” in Calvo et alii, *Xalisco*, 86.

⁶²¹ Una síntesis introductoria a las sublevaciones nativas del norte de México en el siglo XVI en Galaviz, *Rebeliones indígenas en el norte del Reino de la Nueva España*, ch. IV: “Rebeliones indígenas en el siglo XVI,” 93-114.

⁶²² Eliade, *Lo Sagrado y lo Profano*, 15.

the shape of animals, to which offer in sacrifice blood they take out from their ears.”⁶²³ The examples provided by the *Relaciones Geográficas de la Nueva Galicia* are numerous, revealing that the cult of idols was a practice shared by egalitarian societies and those of greater sociopolitical complexity. Antonio de Leiva, mayor of the Ameca town, referred in his report that “the rites and adorations that they had in their idolatry was a stone idol”⁶²⁴ to which they sacrificed captives captured in war. The deputy mayor Lazaro Blanco, describing the natives of Compostela, said that “they offered blankets to the idol they had in each neighborhood.”⁶²⁵ The corregidor Francisco de Plaza says that the Indians of Nochistlán had “a stone idol whom they worshiped, and, through him, the devil told them what they had to do.”⁶²⁶ The priest Luis Gómez de Alvarado indicated that the Indians of Opono “worshiped, in ancient times, the devil in a stone statue, to whom only the governor [cacique] spoke and offered the sacrifice.”⁶²⁷

At this point, the evidence contrasts markedly with the *Mapuches*. The testimonies coincide in pointing out that the Indians of southern Chile did not worship idols, since their main source of veneration were the ancestors, who were in charge of protecting the integrity of each of the kinship groups. They paid homage to the *pillanes*, the founding ancestors of the lineages, who resided on top of the volcanoes. They used the *canelo*, a relatively abundant specie of tree in southern Chile, as a symbol of peace, so it was no coincidence that the Jesuits of the seventeenth century placed their crosses around these trees in order to produce a displacement of their sacred connotation towards the Christian symbol. But none of that happened in the sixteenth century, because Franciscans did not venture into the territory of war to evangelize.

It is common to find in the Neogalician documentation the expression “knocking down idols and raising churches,” explaining that the implantation of the Christian faith was done on the eradication of pagan beliefs and practices preceding the Spanish arrival in the

⁶²³ Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. I, 12.

⁶²⁴ “Relación del pueblo de Ameca hecha por Antonio de Leiva, alcalde mayor de Su Majestad; Ameca, 2 de octubre de 1579,” in Acuña, *Relaciones geográficas*, 35.

⁶²⁵ “Relación de la ciudad de Compostela por el teniente Lázaro Blanco; Compostela, 26 de noviembre de 1584,” in *Ibid.*, 91.

⁶²⁶ “Relación del pueblo de Nuchistlán por el alcalde mayor y corregidor Francisco de Plaza; Nuchistlán, 2 de diciembre de 1584,” in *Ibid.*, 169.

⁶²⁷ “Relación y memorial que su Majestad mandó hacer de la villa de la Purificación y su provincia, por fray Luis Gómez de Alvarado: descripción del pueblo de Opono; 12 de enero de 1585,” in *Ibid.*, 219.

region. In referring to the missionary activity of Fray Juan de Padilla in the province of Amula in the 1530s, Tello says that the religious “tore down their idols, [and] erected temples,”⁶²⁸ or that he got souls for God “by raising churches and overthrowing idols.”⁶²⁹

Men of arms inspired by this ideal of diffusion, such as Nuño Beltrán de Guzmán, used the same strategy of sweeping idolatries and raising churches, trying to make clear the evangelising zeal inspiring their actions as a way to legitimize the exploration and conquest they led by fire and sword. The conqueror reported the king that the provinces neighboring the Tonalá region confederated to prevent the advance of the host, and that once the Indians were defeated in a bloody battle fought at the top of a hill, he chose this place to build “a very beautiful church, that we named the Victoria de la Cruz, and we put a sixty foot long cross there.”⁶³⁰ Later, when they arrived in the Xalpa region, a group caciques appeared before the Spanish captain, who “brought certain idols, which, after having spoken the governor to them, and talked about their sin, ordered to burn in their presence.”⁶³¹ The natives had pointed out to him that those idols were responsible for the productivity of “their corn and beans and chili and chickens, and gave them sons and women and clothing and sun and water and all that they had; and they gave them life and death, when they pleased, and that as gods and lords they worshiped and obeyed and served them.”⁶³²

The capricious destruction of sacred elements was not a minor issue. In the midst of a social and economic crisis gestated in the trauma of contact, the revenge of the natives, fueled by the occupation of their lands, indiscriminate slavery and the deterioration of their ecosystems, was reinforced by the irreparable loss of the amulets that protected their future in the world. The impact, in this case, was greater for Chichimecs than for Mapuches, because as we have already pointed out, the Indians of the south of the world lacked sacred objects, leaving that condition exclusively to the ancestors and places where their spirits lived, the volcanoes.

⁶²⁸ Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. LXVI, 203.

⁶²⁹ *Ibid.*, ch. CXLVII, 487.

⁶³⁰ “Carta a S. M. del Presidente de la Audiencia de Méjico, Nuño de Guzmán, en que refiere la jornada que hizo a Mechoacan, a conquistar la provincia de los Tebles Chichimecas que confina con Nueva España, 1530,” in Razo, *Crónicas de la conquista del Nuevo Reyno de Galicia*, 41.

⁶³¹ “Relación del descubrimiento y conquista que se hizo por el gobernador Nuño de Guzmán y su ejército en las provincias de la Nueva Galicia, escrita por Gonzalo López y autorizada por Alonso de Matta, escribano de su Majestad, 1530,” in *Ibid.*, 73.

⁶³² “Relación hecha de viva voz por el alférez Francisco de Arceo, al capitán e historiador Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés, 1535,” in *Ibid.*, 252.

The Crown, motivated by economic rather than religious issues, was a strong driver of the confiscation of luxury objects in the New Galicia. In the instructions given to the *veedor* Bernardo Ramírez de Vargas in 1568, he was ordered that

all the gold and silver, precious stones and pearls and other things that will be found, as in the burials or temples of Indians as in the other places where they used to offer sacrifice to their idols or in other religious places, hidden or buried in house or land or in any other public or private part of any condition or dignity, that of all this and of the rest that of this quality be found there, whether it is by chance or looking for it on purpose, we be paid half without any discount, leaving the other half for the person who find it and discover⁶³³.

Almost like a euphemism, the evangelizing principle acted as a veil behind which the economic foundations of the extirpation were hidden, constituting a means of political and moral legitimation to transgress so sacred spaces for the natural ones such as the liturgical sites or the cemeteries in which their ancestors rested. The passage from paganism to the incorporation of the Christian faith precepts was an experience as violent as physical punishment or the occupation of their lands.

The leaders of each of these groups, who in most cases were only a first among equals, used to be in charge of the worship objects and the rites associated with them. To the extent that the extirpation of idolatries diminished their roles within society, resulting in a loss of political legitimacy, it is not surprising that they were the driving forces behind many of the rebellions that affected New Galicia in the second half of the sixteenth century. After the first decades of conflict, aware of the importance they would have as intermediaries to channel peace agreements, and pressured by the precarious situation in the territories of northern New Spain, the Spaniards chose to temper the violence against the ethnic representatives. Thus, for example, around 1565, Fray Pedro de Ayala, bishop of New Galicia, wrote to the king that the *oidores* of Guadalajara had some Indians prisoners for twenty-seven months “because it was convenient to the service of God and his majesty for the Indian land does not rebel [since] one of them, named Don Juan, was cacique and principal,”⁶³⁴ who was later

⁶³³ “Instrucción de factor y veedor a don Bernardo Ramírez de Vargas; Madrid, 19 de mayo de 1568,” in Enciso Contreras, *Cedulario de Zacatecas*, 234.

⁶³⁴ “Carta a Su Magestad del Arzobispo de la Nueva Galicia, en que da cuenta entre otras cosas de la falta de justicia que hay en el reino; México, 10 de noviembre de 1565,” in Orozco y Jiménez, *Colección de documentos históricos*, I, 304.

released along with other Indians. Be that as it may, the new position did not stop the abuses against the natives of northwestern Mexico, regardless of whether they were nomadic, semi-nomadic or sedentary.

Conclusion

Native American societies faced many forms of violence as a result of contact with the Spanish, and violence was precisely one of the fundamental elements that explain the borderland dynamics, especially in the early stages. Through the classification that we propose in this chapter, we wish to make it clear that the same type of violence affected the native societies of the New World in a different way. The ecological characteristics of the environment and the cultural ones of each society played an important role in the variability of ways in which the impact of the conquering action manifested, as well as the response of the natives of each region.

Chichimecs and *Mapuches*, despite having been classified by colonial ethnography as barbarians, with the political, social and moral characteristics of the lowest levels of development, challenged the many expressions of Christian violence, although paradoxically who denounced with greater firmness the acts of Spanish brutality were precisely the spokesmen of Christianity: the priests.

Religious of both kingdoms called the attention by the rough action of the Spanish estates with the Indians. Although the issue of indigenous rights was present in the discussion table from the first phases of contact, throughout the sixteenth century it never ceased to be a matter of debate. Given that *Ordinances of Discovery and New Population* of 1573 are the fundamental legal milestone in the change of vision regarding the way of approaching to indigenous societies, which was reinforced with the Third Ecclesiastical Councils of Lima and Mexico, we have focused the analysis basically on the previous stage, before the implementation of the pacification policies in the territories of New Galicia and Chile.

Chapter 3:

Trying to convert the Indian Frontiers into Mission Frontiers: gestation of the Franciscan project of pacification at both ends of the New World

Chapter three analyzes the first phase of Franciscan missionary activity both in New Galicia and in southern Chile, ending around 1582-83 in the southern kingdom when the Third Lima Council was held, and 1585 for the north of Mexico with the Third Mexican Council. The chapter describes and studies the process by which the North-Mexican territory converted from an Indian Frontier into a Mission Frontier by the Order of St. Francis of Assisi, and why this transformation was not possible in the Chilean territory during the same period, despite the fact that over the men of brown habit operating in both ends of the Spanish Empire influenced the same theological antecedents, the same anxious spirit for converting the native societies, and the same missionary experiences of other regions of the continent, which worked as a reference to carry out their evangelizing tasks on both frontiers.

Our approach is based on the premise that each American space meant a challenge that tested both the efficacy of the emerging monarchical legislation aimed at resolving the conflictive situations created within inter-ethnic relations, as well as the guiding principles that guided the Franciscans' evangelizing work. Both Spanish juridical and theological foundations that gave meaning to the Franciscan presence in the New World were a clay that got new forms in the light of the political, geostrategic and economic conjunctures that were being imposed on the newly discovered continent. With such an assumption it is possible to understand the historical paradox of the process by which the American landscape was gradually shaping the "official position" of Franciscan missionary activity among the New World's natives, and why that policy had so disparate applications and results on the two most extreme frontiers of the continent. Missionary experiences of the first decades of contact were responsible of shaping a way of understanding and approaching the Indian, which identified with a route opposite to that followed by the other levels of Hispanic world –*encomenderos*, miners, landowners, military, and various elements of royal officialdom–, thus creating a contradiction of irreconcilable positions. Those who supported each one of these divergent positions sought to safeguard their own interests, for which they sought the backing of government authorities insistently, which resulted in a momentary predominance of some to the detriment of others: beyond the legal framework governing the activity of every social level, delimiting the patterns of behavior towards native societies, the support of local authorities was a determining factor in the development of indigenous politics, since their sponsorship could tip the balance in favor of a pacification or conquest strategy on the indomitable warriors who put to test the Spanish power beyond the borders. This aspect would be one of the most solid foundations for understanding the divergent Franciscan activity on the frontiers of northern Mexico and southern Chile: New Galicia was a territory separated from the Mexican viceroyalty core, but this distance was not comparable with the almost

insurmountable remoteness of the *Reche-Mapuche* border with respect to the Viceroyalty of Peru. Thus, while on the first frontier the San Francisco's followers were able to conciliate, not without difficulty, the support of monarchical authorities once the missionary peace strategy had been defined, in the Araucanía forests they were a rather secondary player, always behind the local army (*ejército vecinal*) and the *encomendero* and mining estates, reason why they lacked the necessary support in resources and men.

The chapter is structured in five sections which give account of the historical processes that characterized the frontier territories of the Kingdom of New Galicia and the Kingdom of Chile in the sixteenth century. Our interest is focused on studying the characteristics of the Franciscan missionary action by making a counterpoint between the two regions and analyzing the way in which its project of pacification was molded from the earliest stages on American soil to the meeting of the Lima and Mexican Provincial Councils in the 1580s. Although at that point the Crown had issued the *Ordenanzas de Poblamiento* in 1573, laying the legal bases of interethnic relations on American soil, Councils offered the opportunity to outline the concrete form in which such an interaction would take place. That is why the holding of both councils marks the temporal limit of this chapter.

The first section presents the early pacification projects carried out by religious in the American continent. The pioneering attempts of Dominicans and Franciscans in the Cumaná region were almost contemporaneous with each other, and with an equally resounding end due to the constant intrusion of the slaveowners, a question that determined the rebellion and flight of the reduced natives. It describes the intricate process by which the later Franciscan experience was shaping the Indian policy that was to follow, a policy that lacked full consensus in the early stages given the divergence of views on how to meet the challenge of rebellious Indians.

The second section is a characterization of the monarchical provisions regarding the liberty of the native and the attempt to contain the abuses that affected them, legal framework within which the religious orders in the American continent would have to operate. Being considered as "younger brothers," the Indians' freedom was conditioned by the need for guides to prepare them for political and Christian living, thus legitimizing the missionaries' intervention in their customs, trying to get them closer to the Western ideal of policy and Christian virtues.

The third section explains the missionary foundations developed by Franciscans on American soil. It seeks to demonstrate that despite the little more than three centuries of Franciscan history, the cultural complexity of the New World imposed its own conditions, demanding the development of adequate methods of evangelization: the Caribbean islands were a first laboratory, followed by spaces as complex as the nuclear area of Mexico, all of which contributed with new experiences of intercultural contact, whose learning was useful but insufficient to face the challenges imposed by borderlands. In this way, the model of evangelization was modified with the experience of every new context. For example, the imperial policy developed in the Iberian Peninsula to instruct conquered groups in the Castilian language had to yield when faced the linguistic complexity in marginal areas of the newly discovered continent, and since this task fell mainly on the missionaries, they chose to evangelize in the vernacular languages. This process of learning led the Franciscans

to conceive ways of approaching insubordinate groups, becoming the true architects of a systematic policy of gift giving and good treatment.

The penultimate section tells of the contrasting missionary activity of Franciscans on American soil. The dynamics displayed by its members on both frontiers reveals the constant pursuit of protagonism in the pacification activity of Indians of northern Mexico, an issue that contrasted with the greater passivity of those working on the Chilean border, most likely as a result of less support in men and resources given the distance away from the main supply center: the Viceroyalty of Peru. This divergent disposition largely explains the great number of Mexican martyrs, whereas in Chile no Franciscan died at the hands of Indians until 1598, when the century was about to end. In this way, it is fair to point out that the strategy of frontier pacification based on gifts and good treatment was a creation of northern Mexico's Franciscans.

Finally, the fifth section reports on how divergent were the human and material resources available to both kingdoms for the implementation of settlement projects with peacemaking purposes. In both regions, many of the earliest Spanish settlements failed due to indigenous attacks, with Chile being one of the most extreme examples, since in the two general rebellions of the sixteenth century (1553-1557 and 1598-1605) all vestiges of Spanish presence in the southern territories of the kingdom were destroyed. In the midst of both conflicts, the Crown issued the *Ordinances of Discovery and New Population* in 1573, which gave a juridical basis of support and consolidation to missionary activity in the frontier territories.

In sum, this chapter seeks to demonstrate how the Franciscan evangelizing activity lacked, in the early years, a unified position both regionally and continentally: in New Galicia and the Kingdom of Chile there were conflicting positions on how to pacify the Indians, although the way of consensus finally prevailed. From a characterization of the missionary foundations that governed the work of Franciscans, it is sought to show that on both frontiers the members of this religious order operated with not completely unified dynamics, which invites us to accept a less centralist operativity of that usually attributed to regular orders. The corollary of all this is that the emergence of the policy of non-violent assimilation was the result of a process fraught with contradictions. The objective of pacifying the Indians by non-violent ways had varying degrees of commitment throughout the continent, even among members of the same religious order.

Historical background of missionary pacification in America

The American historian Alistair Hennessy defined the Indian Frontiers as spaces characterized by a so efficient native resistance, that colonial empires were unable to consolidate and expand their hegemony for a long time.⁶³⁵ The Kingdoms of New Galicia and Chile were Indian Frontiers during an important fraction of the sixteenth century, the first one until 1585 when the Third Mexican Council opened the doors to a decided policy of

⁶³⁵ Hennessy, *The Frontier in Latin American History*, 60-8.

evangelization, and the second one at least until 1605-1612, when the Society of Jesus began the evangelizing work beyond the limit imposed by the Biobio river to Spanish power, a geographical accident that has traditionally been regarded the physical frontier of the brave warriors described by Alonso de Ercilla in *La Araucana*. The Franciscans were by far the most present religious order on both frontiers during the sixteenth century, although it operated with diverse dynamics and with totally opposite results.

At the time of the Third Mexican Provincial Council, between January and September 1585, the geoadministrative unit located northwest of the Viceroyalty of New Spain, known as the Kingdom of New Galicia, was at the height of the Chichimeca War. The opinions of religious men and royal officials were often divergent on the causes that contributed to perpetuate the conflict, but they agreed when describing the unsustainable situation in which the Spanish settlements were. Only two years before chaplain Juan Salmeron warned the king about the need to attend “the defense of the roads and towns where the Chichimeca Indians and robbers come, because the damage they do is very great and it has never been remedied sufficiently.”⁶³⁶ Just a few months later Alonso de Oñate, representing the neighbors and miners of Zacatecas, drew the attention of viceroy about the precarious situation of the settlers, who after four decades in the region had to face the progressive diminution in the purity of metals, diseases that ravaged the labor force of blacks and free Indians, the uncontrollable flights of natives, the high price of supplies brought from the capital of the kingdom, and especially the permanent onslaughts of the “Chichimeca robbers in all those regions, who get even to the mines, killing slaves and all the people, and taking the mules from the mining complexes, and destroying the wagons and killing the carters who are the suppliers of the mines.”⁶³⁷

The vicissitudes of this interethnic conflict were beyond everything hitherto known. The intensity and unpredictability of Chichimeca attacks, the amount of resources and men involved in the defense, and especially the number of fallen Spaniards exceeded everything experienced by the Spanish empire in the New World. Very graphic is the appreciation of Dr. Pedro Moya de Contreras, for whom by the mid-1570s had already “died more Spaniards

⁶³⁶ “Carta de fray Juan Salmerón a Felipe II; México, 1 de enero de 1583,” in Cuevas, *Documentos inéditos del siglo XVI*, 321.

⁶³⁷ “Carta de don Alonso de Oñate al Virrey, sobre la crisis de la minería en Zacatecas; 1583,” in Enciso Contreras, *Epistolario de Zacatecas*, 264.

from ten years to this part by the hand of Chichimecas, than all those who [died] in the conquest of the New Spain.”⁶³⁸ At the same time, the Arauco War, fought in the southern forests of Chile and exalted with epic features by the Spanish poet Alonso de Ercilla, was the most intense Spanish-Indian conflict in the southern territories of the American Spanish empire, but only after the last decade of the sixteenth century it overcame the intensity of the conflict experienced at the other end of the New World. It is true that the struggle between *Reche-Mapuches* and Spaniards had meant the death of a governor –Pedro de Valdivia in 1553– and the consequent destruction and dismantling of cities (Concepción and Los Confines) and forts (Arauco, Tucapel and Purén) located between the Bay of Penco and the Cautín river. However, the extensive Chilean territory got a real geo-strategic importance for Spain only after the 1580s, when English vessels began to infest the Pacific coast with hostile pretensions. It all began with the boisterous expedition of Francis Drake, who arrived at the Chilean shores in 1578, whose raids by ports and coves, as well as the assault on ships, sowed terror among the Spanish subjects. With the English corsair began an era in which the European maritime powers sought to transfer to America the conflict with the then almost omnipotent Spain. Alluding to the panorama of tension that shaped this emerging climate of concern, the viceroy Francisco de Toledo wrote to Philip II in 1579, informing him of the feeling of insecurity that was emerging in the spirit of his vassals; referring to the recent past as if it were a time lost by the weight of events, in his epistle emphasized

[...] the great security that was here, whether by land or by sea. The silver went from one place to another traveling three hundred leagues, carried by Indians and blacks and a single muleteer [...] without disappearing any coin, as if the silver were transported by a troop composed of faithful soldiers in Castilla la Vieja. By sea it was possible to sail with great security from Panama to these coasts and from here to those of Chile, as if sailing from Seville to the San Lúcar port.⁶³⁹

Corsair raids in Chilean and Peruvian waters had ended the fragile confidence given by the distance from the conflictive European scenario. The chronicler Antonio de Herrera

⁶³⁸ “Carta del doctor Moya de Contreras al presidente del Consejo de Indias sobre la conveniencia de dar el azogue a precio moderado, e informando de los daños que hacían los indios chichimecas; México, 31 de agosto de 1574,” in *Ibid.*, 139.

⁶³⁹ “Carta del virrey Francisco de Toledo al rey; Lima, 11 de noviembre de 1579,” in Concha Monardes, *El Reino de Chile*, 40-1.

gave an account of the problem that the English threat meant for the South American Spanish trade, since “the interchange stopped because merchants did not want to risk their business and the sailors did not want to sail any more.”⁶⁴⁰ Faced with such a picture of uncertainty and insecurity, what until then was a kingdom of little value in the imperial framework became into a key piece of Spanish geopolitics in the southern Pacific. The governor of Chile, Rodrigo de Quiroga, a veteran of the Arauco War who had served under the orders of the deceased Pedro de Valdivia, warned the king of the danger that would entail for the viceroyalty of Peru an eventual British invasion and the consequent establishment of a settlement on the Chilean coast, because “this kingdom was the key to the kingdoms of Peru and New Spain in this part of the South Sea, and if the adversaries took possession of it, any human diligence and force would not be enough to drive them out and they would make cruel war to the kingdoms of Peru and New Spain from here.”⁶⁴¹ The strategic position of the previously despised Kingdom of Chile, whose southern projection placed it on the obligatory route of the Strait of Magellan, made it the bastion of Spanish possessions that spread on this flank of the Pacific Ocean.

The semi-arid lands of northwestern Mexico and the fertile plains of southern Chile were the scene of long conflicts in which old strategies were tested and new mechanisms of power tried, some under legality and others outside. In this way, it was not a novelty to disable the uprising Indians or to convert the rebels into slave labor, as had happened with the Caribbean Arawakos and the Indians of Tierra Firme who spread between the Darién and Nicaragua.⁶⁴² Much less it was the use of allied Indians to secure victory in battles and later consolidate control over the defeated populations, as happened with the Tlaxcalans in central Mexico or the Promaucaes, who supported the Spanish advance into the south of Chile once the conquest in the jurisdiction of Santiago city consolidated. What was certainly a novelty in northern Mexico was the use, first of Otomies and after Tlaxcalans as “godparent Indians,” that is, as native educators who served the newly reduced Chichimecas as an example of obedience and Christianity.⁶⁴³ Nothing similar was performed in the project of conquest of

⁶⁴⁰ Herrera, Tercera parte, book IV, ch. XIII.

⁶⁴¹ “Carta de Rodrigo de Quiroga a Su Majestad sobre la guerra de Arauco, aparición de Drake y asuntos de administración; Santiago, 12 de enero de 1579,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, (second series), vol. 2, 381.

⁶⁴² Las Casas, *Breve relación de la destrucción*, 71.

⁶⁴³ Sheridan, “‘Indios Madrineros.’ Colonizadores tlaxcaltecas en el noreste novohispano,” 27.

Reche-Mapuches in the sixteenth century, because in the vicinity of the Kingdom of Chile there were no such advanced societies or with the enough loyalty to the Spanish side to rest on their full confidence. However, in both kingdoms it was a shared innovation the widespread use of garrisons to secure communications between the cities and border towns with the heart of the Viceroyalty or the capital of the territory. In New Galicia, a professional army was even established in the 1570s, with the aim of ensuring the passage of caravans and the protection of missionaries, a military institution that had its parallel in Chile just in the second decade of seventeenth century. From the other side of the border, the *Chichimecs* first and the *Reche-Mapuches* shortly after, were among the first natives of the continent to make extensive use of the horse for their predatory raids in Hispanic villages, haciendas and mines. These and other situations show that Mexico's northern border was a prelude to future inter-ethnic conflicts in other regions of the empire.

In both Mexico and Chile, the failure of repressive measures carried out “by fire and blood” resulted in the implementation of a missionary policy that, in the long run, yielded far more promising results. The passage from violent interaction to peaceful relations based on diplomacy and the gift-giving was, to a large extent, the result of replacement of the sword language and slavery by the discourse of the cross and agreements. In Hennessy's words, the mission was the frontier institution par excellence in Spanish America, “gold and silver may have provided the initial impetus, drawing conquistadores and settlers into the far interior, but the work of consolidation, pacification, and trail-blazing was taken up by the missionaries.”⁶⁴⁴

The Franciscan labor of pacification in the Chichimecas, deployed without counterbalance by royal disposition from 1586,⁶⁴⁵ meant a successful innovation in the development of the border relation, since it allowed to reach the colonizing objectives of spatial and population control without using the sword, both unavoidable pillars of imperial expansion. The Franciscan enterprise in New Galicia and surrounding regions was not, however, the first project of missional pacification in the New World. The Dominican friars

⁶⁴⁴ Hennessy, *The Frontier in Latin American History*, 54.

⁶⁴⁵ “Al Virrey de la Nueva España que embie relacion con su parecer sobre que se ha avisado que para reducir y pacificar los Yndios Chichimecas conuernia usar de los medios que aquí se rrefieren fundando en su comarca pueblos y monasterios; Sant Lorenzo, 19 de junio de 1586,” in Hackett, *Historical documents*, 154-6. The transcript wrongly records the year 1566. Also in Enciso Contreras, *Cedulario de Zacatecas*, 521-2.

Pedro de Córdoba and Antonio de Montesinos promoted an exclusive evangelical plan on the coasts of Venezuela, in which the Republic of the Indians would be protected from the intrusion of the Spanish Republic. In its design the priests sought to follow the missionary model of the ancient Apostles, who worked in direct relationship with the infidels and without the protection of arms. The missionary project was inspired by an attempt to reconstruct the forgotten forms of primitive Christendom, rescuing those configurations of social life, and civil and political organization that had characterized the original communities.⁶⁴⁶ The experience would be made in Tierra Firme, in the Paria region (coasts of Cumaná, present Venezuela) where there were no Spaniards, because “where there were Spaniards it was not possible to have preaching, doctrine, or Indian conversion.”⁶⁴⁷ It was provided that religious men enjoyed of the greatest “security and attention possible,”⁶⁴⁸ and that once the missionary tasks have been initiated “no one by any means, pretext or manner, in an express or implied way, makes any alteration or maltreatment, nor engage in any other way of contract or communication with the Indians and land where friars were.”⁶⁴⁹ The Dominican project had strong royal support, materialized not only in protective provisions but also in material resources to consolidate it. However, the circumstances proved that the Indians were not the docile savages they were expected to be, and within a few months, between 1514 and early 1515, the 15 priests became the first martyrs of the New World.⁶⁵⁰ The pacification enterprise headed by Dominican Bartolomé de las Casas in Vera Paz (Tezulutlán, Chiapa region, 1537-1541) had a similar fate, where the action of slave groups and the boycott of *encomenderos*, who created networks with the authorities to preserve their privileges, collapsed a new form of conquest which made of the pact, the delivery of gifts and respect for agreements the way of reaching the natives’ heart.

Such an inauspicious beginning was not enough obstacle to discourage the regular orders which followed the example of Dominicans. The most prominent followers were

⁶⁴⁶ Botta, “Una negación teológico-política en la Nueva España,” 42.

⁶⁴⁷ Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*, book III, ch. XXXIII, 548.

⁶⁴⁸ “Real Cédula para que den a fray Pedro de Córdoba y a otros quinse [*sic*] frailes los mantenimientos e pasaje que ovieren menester para pasar a Tierra Firme; Valladolid, 10 de junio de 1513,” in Otte, *Cédulas reales relativas a Venezuela*, 63.

⁶⁴⁹ “Real Cédula para que ninguna persona que estoviere en las Indias no comunique ni [h]able con ningún indio que estoviere en tierra donde el dicho fray Pedro de Córdoba e sus frailes [van] sin licencia de los susodichos, so pena que, si otra cosa fisieren, pierda la mitad de los bienes; Valladolid, 2 de junio de 1513,” in *Ibid.*, 65

⁶⁵⁰ González Oropeza, “La evangelización fundante en la Venezuela oriental,” 119.

undoubtedly the Franciscans, who almost in unison settled on the Venezuelan coasts of Cumaná between 1514 and 1521,⁶⁵¹ but with equally unsuccessful results. However, St. Francis' sons had the courage to overcome any impediment, converting difficulties into a stimulus for their missionary work. It is in this way that after only two years three Flemish Franciscans put their feet on Mexican soil with the emperor's permission: fray Juan de Tecto (Johann Dekkers), fray Juan de Aora (Johann van den Auwera), and the lay brother Pedro de Gante (Peter van der Moere).⁶⁵² The first two, emulating the ill-fated destiny of the Dominican fathers, lost their lives in the failed expedition of Hernan Cortes to Hibueras region (Honduras) the following year. It was precisely in 1524 that the General Minister of the Franciscan Order, Father Francisco de los Ángeles Quiñones, decided on the preparation and travel of the so-called Twelve Apostles of Mexico,⁶⁵³ led by fray Martin de Valencia, with whom the systematic evangelization of New Spain began.⁶⁵⁴

Quiñones provided the expeditionaries with instructions, which should be strictly respected to achieve the missionary objectives proposed by the Order and the Crown. The General Minister urged them to follow the model of Christ, the legacy of the Apostles, and the teachings of St. Francis of Assisi, since as instruments of God's will, the good example they gave with their acts would be the best reinforcement to consolidate the conversions through preaching. The ideal place to carry out the tasks of evangelization was the city, where political and normative life would guarantee the safety of religious and the indoctrination of infidels.⁶⁵⁵ This, however, did not ignore the ever-latent possibility of losing one's own life during missionary activity, especially in regions far from urban centers, so it was a duty of the missionaries to carry the cross and keep it up until death.⁶⁵⁶

As expected from its peripheral status with respect to major Hispanic administrative centers, the arrival of Franciscans was a later event in the Kingdom of Chile. The first representatives of the secular clergy and Mercedarians had already established during the

⁶⁵¹ Gómez Canedo, "Evangelización y política indigenista," 29.

⁶⁵² Morales, "La evangelización en el siglo XVI," 282.

⁶⁵³ Francisco de Quiñones says in the Instructions that "this was the number that Christ took for his company to convert the world"; see the document edited by Meseguer Fernández, "Contenido misionológico de la Obediencia e Instrucción," 498.

⁶⁵⁴ Ricard, *The spiritual conquest of Mexico*, 15.

⁶⁵⁵ "Instrucciones", in Meseguer Fernández, "Contenido misionológico de la Obediencia e Instrucción," 499-500.

⁶⁵⁶ Meseguer Fernández, "Contenido misionológico de la Obediencia e Instrucción," 487.

first decade of Spanish settlement.⁶⁵⁷ Dominicans and Franciscans arrived at the express request of Pedro de Valdivia, the first in 1552 and the latter one year later⁶⁵⁸. Fray Martín de Robledo, with the title of commissary, led a journey that began in Lima to his brothers in the brown habit, fray Juan de Torralva, fray Cristóbal Ravaneda, fray Juan de la Torre, and the lay brother fray Francisco de Frenegal. The impetus of missionaries and their desire to spread the teachings of Christ among the southern barbaric infidels reflected in a vertiginous foundation of convents, a no insignificant merit if it is considered that the number of clerics was always insufficient for the magnitude of the enterprise and that in 1557 had just ended the first of a series of *Reche-Mapuche* rebellions against the European invader: Concepcion in 1559, Valdivia and La Imperial in 1560, Osorno and Angol in 1565, and Villarrica in 1568.⁶⁵⁹

The eminent ecclesiastical historian Lino Gómez Canedo has rightly stated that it is not possible to attribute to the Franciscan Order of those days an official, uniform and permanent Indian policy.⁶⁶⁰ In fact, despite of the theological principles that stimulated their labor, which served as a general framework for their action in every region of the New World, the men of the brown habit sought to solve each case in its particularity.⁶⁶¹ Therefore, to penetrate this dimension of the Franciscan thought demands to delve into letters, memorials and reports whose historical comparison reveals the lack of a univocal attitude. Beyond certain consensus on the treatment and governance of indigenous populations, in addition to the conviction shared with other regular orders that Indians were almost like children who should be instructed in the Christian faith precepts and good customs, the predominance of a common and uncontested discourse among the members of the order is not visible. A good example is the divergent approach to the just war issue. Although the majority position was contrary to the use of force as a means of subjugation, there were always dissonant voices appealing to coercion as a valid alternative, especially in pressing circumstances. In the New Galicia fray Juan Salmerón notified in a letter to king Felipe II the need to attend to defense

⁶⁵⁷ Eyzaguirre, *Historia de Chile*, 123.

⁶⁵⁸ Errázuriz, *Los orígenes de la Iglesia chilena*, 98 y 103.

⁶⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 104.

⁶⁶⁰ Gómez Canedo, “Evangelización y política indigenista,” 21.

⁶⁶¹ Gómez Canedo, “Aspectos característicos de la acción franciscana en América,” 441.

of the roads against the Chichimeca attacks, “that cursed and cruel people,”⁶⁶² being war the main and most fair remedy to put an end to the audacity of robbers, since for “the bestial sins that these Indians had in the destruction of nature, killing and sacrificing men... and not wanting to be amended, they could rightly be conquered.”⁶⁶³ At the other end of the continent, the inability to reduce the natives in villages, the systematic onslaughts of towns and fortresses, and the death of governor Pedro de Valdivia in the first great *Reche-Mapuche* rebellion were powerful factors that inclined the Spaniards’ will for the war without quarter and the slavery of rebel people. When Garcia Hurtado de Mendoza –the son of the viceroy of Peru– arrived in 1557 as the new ruler of the Kingdom of Chile, his policy of war on fire and blood and scorched earth had in the Franciscan Juan Gallegos a fervent ally, who even encouraged the governor and soldiers to take the provisions of Indians by force since it was lawful under the precepts of just war, and that if the day came when “there were no soldiers, he with Franciscan friars would wage war.”⁶⁶⁴ Four decades later, and after the death of governor Martín García Oñez de Loyola in 1598 at the hands of the *Reche-Mapuche* spears in the Spanish disaster of *Curalava*, emerged a general resentment favorable to the use of force as a means of control. The Franciscan Pedro de Sosa, acting on behalf of the most reluctant groups to establish the Defensive War system promoted by the Jesuit Order, reported this animosity to the king in a memorial personally presented to the Madrid court. In the writing he pointed out that “weapons are the most effective means to subject them, according to testimonies of vassals of your majesty, kingdom and superior prelates of religions.”⁶⁶⁵ The rebels were accused of impeding the propagation of the faith by threatening the integrity of the emissaries, since “to any preacher who comes to preach, they would take his life before catching any fruit.”⁶⁶⁶ These examples are only a glass of water in the midst of an ocean of situations that account for the changing Franciscan position given the dilemma of having to resort to violence in burdensome situations.

⁶⁶² “Carta de fray Juan Salmerón a Felipe II; México, 1 de enero de 1583,” in Cuevas, *Documentos inéditos del siglo XVI*, 321.

⁶⁶³ *Ibid.*, 322-3.

⁶⁶⁴ “Carta de fray Gil González de San Nicolás al Presidente y oidores del Consejo de Indias; Ciudad de Los Reyes, 26 de abril de 1559,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 28, 279. Korth, *Spanish policy in colonial Chile*, 44.

⁶⁶⁵ “Memorial de fray Pedro de Sosa del peligroso estado espiritual y temporal del Reyno de Chile; ¿1616?,” in Medina, *Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena*, 178.

⁶⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 179. See also Pinto Rodríguez, “Etnocentrismo y etnocidio,” 11.

The dynamics of borderland events determined that opinions and attitudes were always changing. Thus, for example, in the context of the Third Mexican Council, and just one year after fray Juan Salmerón's report, the general position of the Franciscan Order to the consultation on the legitimacy of making to Chichimecas a war on fire and blood, was that first "they must find out the grievances that these barbarians have received from ours."⁶⁶⁷ Manifesting an exemplary counterpoint with the Salmerón's proposal, the Franciscan Gaspar de Ricarte endorsed this conciliatory position when he condemned any warlike expedition against the Chichimeca Indians.⁶⁶⁸ A similar situation was experienced a couple of decades earlier in the southern Yucatan region. The Franciscan Diego de Landa, blinded by an ardent extirpator zeal, led in May 1562 a determined policy of eradicating idolatrous practices. According to John Lynch, during the three months he led this religious persecution more than 4,500 Indians were tortured and a later official investigation determined that 158 died during the interrogations or as a direct consequence of them.⁶⁶⁹ The violence spread by Landa and the Franciscans came to such an extent that the fear they inspired among the Indians caused them to leave the villages before the friars arrival. It was not until three months later, when bishop Francisco de Toral arrived in August, that order was restored, putting an end to the abuses and freeing the prisoners. Subsequent investigations found that the Indians were barely guilty of trivial idolatries as a result of poor instruction, and that Landa had made them victims of their cruelty and wrath.⁶⁷⁰ It should be noted that Francisco de Toral and Diego de Landa were Franciscans, which accounts for the contradictions that beset the Mendicant Order in its approaching to the natives.

At the same time, in the Kingdom of Chile, the position of intolerance sustained by the aforementioned fray Juan Gallegos had its counterpoint in the accusations and conciliatory action of his religious brothers, bishops Antonio de San Miguel in La Imperial, and Diego de Medellín in Santiago. The first assumed the administration of the southern diocese of the Kingdom in 1568,⁶⁷¹ the most conflictive territory of the governorship by the

⁶⁶⁷ "Consulta sobre la Guerra Chichimeca: parecer de la Orden de Sant Francisco; México, 1585," in Llaguno, *La personalidad jurídica del indio*, 233. Also in Carrillo Cázares, *El debate sobre la Guerra Chichimeca*, II, 701.

⁶⁶⁸ Gómez Canedo, "Evangelización y política indigenista," 28.

⁶⁶⁹ Lynch, *Dios en el Nuevo Mundo*, 66.

⁶⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 68.

⁶⁷¹ Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, II, 304.

Indians indomitable resistance. From the outset he openly opposed to the vexations that Spaniards inflicted on the natives, who forced them to perform tasks superior to their forces, defrauding them on their wages and thus circumventing the protective provisions included in the Tasa de Santillán, promulgated in 1558.⁶⁷²

In a letter to the king, San Miguel called attention on the neglect in which the Indians of *encomienda* were, “because there are neither religious nor clergymen for establishing in doctrines, nor the laws of God are preached to the Indians, nor even the laws of your Majesty, neither have a rate, nor there is personal service, which is all defended by your Majesty’s letters.”⁶⁷³ Through the intercession of the bishop, the *Real Audiencia* (High Court) arranged an extraordinary visit to the whole diocese, an action carried out with particular efficiency by the *oidor* (civil judge) Egas Venegas, who supervised the conduct of the encomenderos on the basis of the Indians’ claims,⁶⁷⁴ arriving at the disappointing result of that only in the Valdivia and La Imperial cities the fines applied to the offenders of laws and royal provisions amounted to more than 150,000 pesos.⁶⁷⁵ The second, native of Medellin in Extremadura, was appointed bishop of Santiago in 1574, but he only assumed the administration of the diocese in 1576.⁶⁷⁶ From the moment he exercised his functions, fray Diego focused his efforts to extend the pastoral work among natives and to alleviate their hardships derived from contact with the white man. The task, however, was more arduous than expected. The attempt to doctrine them in the vernacular language stumbled with the important obstacle of having few competent operators: when he arrived in 1576 found “no clergyman knowing the naturals’ language except only one,”⁶⁷⁷ and five years later he had scarcely four mestizo priests who commanded the language of natives. His greater efforts, nevertheless, were directed to give a definitive solution to the abuses derived from the *encomienda* system, for which he had the support of governor Martin Ruiz de Gamboa, who ordered the elaboration

⁶⁷² Errázuriz, *Los orígenes de la Iglesia chilena*, 222. “Tasa” was a tribute assessment.

⁶⁷³ “Carta de fray Antonio de San Miguel a Su Majestad en que se refiere al servicio personal de los indios y a la doctrina; Concepción, 25 de abril de 1569,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos* (second series), vol. 1, 165.

⁶⁷⁴ Barrios Valdés, “Antonio de San Miguel,” 339.

⁶⁷⁵ “Carta de fray Antonio de San Miguel a Su Majestad sobre que los indios tributan sin tasa y otros asuntos; Concepción, 24 de octubre de 1571,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos* (second series), vol. 1, 431.

⁶⁷⁶ Rehbein, “Diego de Medellín,” 131.

⁶⁷⁷ “Carta de fray Diego de Medellín a Su Majestad sobre la calidad de los sacerdotes, las dificultades de su diócesis y la pobreza de la tierra; Santiago, 14 de septiembre de 1581,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos* (second series), vol. 3, 118.

of a new tribute for the Indians of Santiago and La Imperial dioceses. By means of this labor-law instrument decreed in 1580, it was intended to abolish personal service and to regulate the natives tribute by establishing a fixed amount in money. But the measures were not only insufficient, but, as with the previous tax, the indifference of the encomenderos made it a worthless paper.

Even theologians and jurists of the Franciscan Order exhibited irreconcilable positions on this matter. While priest Alfonso de Castro (1495-1558), a professor at the University of Salamanca, considered idolatry as a cause of just war, Father Antonio de Córdoba (1485-1578), a moralist and canonist trained at the University of Alcalá, questioned the legitimacy of the conquest founded on the basis of infidelity, idolatry and sins against the natural laws incurred by the Indians. The theologian and jurist of French origin Juan Focher (? -1572), justified the use of force only when circumstances so require⁶⁷⁸, especially if the security of the priests was at stake, while the missionary Pedro de Azuaga (1545 or 46-1597) was an openly antilascasian Franciscan who validated the legitimacy of the encomienda and the Spanish conquest.⁶⁷⁹ Both Focher and Azuaga were on Mexican soil, feeding directly or indirectly from the border experience to support their writings.

In a general sense, and despite the numerous occasions when some members or the Order as a whole supported the use of repressive measures to control the northern regions, the majority –though not always prevailing– position favored a peaceful approaching with naturals. The molding and systematic transformation of this position involved legal (laws, ordinances, royal decrees, viceregal instructions and local orders in Chile), economic (the discovery and exploitation of silver mines, profit generated in the shadow of *Chichimec* and *Reche-Mapuche* slavery), geostrategic (the importance of the Kingdom of Chile in the light of corsair incursions) and conjunctural factors (indigenous rebellions, assaults to towns and caravans).

⁶⁷⁸ Juan Focher points out in his *Itinerario del misionero en América*, First Part, ch. VIII, 81, that “it is sometimes lawful, convenient and edifying that the Catholic Monarch, following the opinion expressed, oblige by threats or fear the pagans to embrace the faith; and in others, however, although it may be lawful, it is not convenient, nor edifying.”

⁶⁷⁹ On this point, see the interesting work by Aznar Gil, “La libertad religiosa del indio en autores franciscanos del siglo XVI.”

The long road to consensual peace: between the legal framework and the Franciscan spirit

Since the European set foot in the lands that extended beyond the Atlantic horizon, the legal status of its inhabitants was a field of debate in which theologians, moralists and lawyers clashed, leaving in the royal will the last word. When it was not yet fully realized that Spaniards had arrived to a new world, and by consulting with scholars and men of faith, the monarchs of Spain issued the first general declaration of Indians freedom by Royal Decree of June 20, 1500.⁶⁸⁰ This, however, did not mean the recognition of a political and moral autonomy, since most of the writers, including the most well-known defenders of the natives' rights, admitted the legality of Spanish penetration to fulfill the irreplaceable objective of evangelization. Although the conflict conjunctures gave rise to exceptional situations that spawned legislative bodies with clearly defined temporal and spatial validity, such as the Royal Provision of 1503 to captivate cannibal Indians⁶⁸¹ – reactualized eight years later in the Real Provision of 1511,⁶⁸² in the legislation of XVI-century prevailed the idea of the free Indian, as attested by the Laws of Burgos issued on December 27, 1512,⁶⁸³ and three decades later the New Laws of 1542, which established that “for no cause of war or any other, even for the sake of rebellion, or for gold, or otherwise cannot become slave any Indian and we want they be treated as our vassals of the crown of Castile, as they are.”⁶⁸⁴ Although this legislation experienced shortly some rectifications resulting from the complaints and revolts of those affected by such measures,⁶⁸⁵ in the following years new provisions

⁶⁸⁰ “Real Cédula mandando que los indios que se trajeron de las islas y se vendieron por mandado del almirante, se pongan en libertad y se restituyan a los países de su naturaleza; Sevilla, 20 de junio de 1500,” in Konetzke, *Colección de documentos*, I, 4. On the characteristics and scope of this first declaration of liberty, see Rumeu de Armas, “La primera declaración de libertad del aborigen americano.”

⁶⁸¹ “Real Provisión para poder cautivar a los caníbales rebeldes; Segovia, 30 de octubre de 1503,” in Konetzke, *Colección de documentos*, I, 14-6.

⁶⁸² “Real Provisión para que los indios caribes se puedan tomar por esclavos; Burgos, 23 de diciembre de 1511,” in *Ibid.*, 31-3.

⁶⁸³ “Ordenanzas para el buen tratamiento de los indios (Leyes de Burgos); Burgos, 27 de diciembre de 1512,” in *Ibid.*, 38-57. Although the freedom of Indians was the nodal point of these laws, it was established that they could be forced to work, so that the Laws of Burgos were the first real confirmation of encomienda system.

⁶⁸⁴ “Real Provisión. Las Leyes Nuevas; Barcelona, 20 de noviembre de 1542,” in *Ibid.*, 217.

⁶⁸⁵ “Real Provisión para que sin embargo de lo resuelto por las Nuevas Leyes se encomienden los indios beneméritos; Malinas, 20 de octubre de 1545,” in *Ibid.*, 236-7.

reinforced the original spirit of that legislative corpus, such as the Royal Decrees of 1548 focused to contain slaving practices in Yucatan,⁶⁸⁶ Nicaragua⁶⁸⁷ and New Spain.⁶⁸⁸

The Hispanic intervention in the way of life of the countless societies that crossed in their conquering advance was based on the self-legitimizing principle that they were human beings who lived under imperfect forms of organization and customs not always virtuous. The debates that helped to consolidate this idea resulted in the natives being considered as minor brothers, and in such a condition it was necessary to prepare them politically and morally for Christianity. Hence, the documents of royal and religious officials are plenty of expressions that seek to consolidate a relationship of subalterity, such as “living in policy,” “civil life,” “living as Spaniards” or even “living as men,” expressing the need to convert them into virtuous beings by means of instruction and example.⁶⁸⁹ Already in 1538 the Crown pointed out that it was necessary to put the Indians “in human policy to be a way and a means for making them to know the divine.”⁶⁹⁰ As the parameters with which Europeans classified other cultures were based on a series of attributes that involved the physiological characteristics, the nature of the land (in which the geographic location and its relation with the stars crossed), and especially the patterns of behavior (dressing, economic and social activities, types of food, family and political customs, war organization, etc.),⁶⁹¹ it is not surprising that this transformation, first earthly and later spiritual, involved aspects as varied as the social sphere (Indians must live in villages), personal and family (Indians should incorporate Spanish customs), economic-labor (they have to learn agriculture, livestock, cultivation of arts and crafts, and commerce), and cultural (teaching reading and writing).⁶⁹²

As a distant reflection of what was happening in the southern regions of the Iberian Peninsula, Christian law acted as a catalyst to overcome, by reason or force, the stumbling block that meant the diversity of traditions, languages and cultural practices. The *Bulls Alias*

⁶⁸⁶ “Real Cédula sobre los esclavos que se hicieron en Yucatán; Valladolid, 23 de abril de 1548,” in *Ibid*, 246-7.

⁶⁸⁷ “Real Cédula al Presidente de la Audiencia de Los Confines, sobre los indios que se hacen esclavos; Segovia, 25 de junio de 1548,” in *Ibid*, 247-8.

⁶⁸⁸ “Real Cédula del emperador en que se ordena dar por libres los indios esclavos; Castellón de Ampurias, 28 de octubre de 1548,” in *Cedulario de 1574*, 30-2.

⁶⁸⁹ On the instruction of Indians and the civilizing role of religious orders, see Borges Morán, “Evangelización y civilización en América.”

⁶⁹⁰ “Real Cédula para que se pongan en policía los indios; Valladolid, 23 de agosto de 1538,” in Konetzke, *Colección de documentos*, I, 186-7.

⁶⁹¹ Pagden, *La caída del hombre natural*, 33.

⁶⁹² Borges Morán, “Evangelización y civilización en América,” 242-3.

Felices by Leo X (25-IV-1521) and *Exponi Nobis Nuper Fecisti* by Hadrian VI (9-V-1522) granted missionaries ample powers in the administration of the sacraments, so that they “may freely preach, baptize, confess, absolve from all faults, marry and determine matrimonial causes, administer the sacraments of the Eucharist and Extreme Unction,”⁶⁹³ providing that the prelates of the Mendicant Orders do “whatever seems convenient for the conversion of the Indians.”⁶⁹⁴ With men predisposed and ideologically prepared to confront and transform the complex cultural heterogeneity of the new territories that were being incorporated into the Spanish empire, the Church became the most efficient ally to inculcate ways of life and social norms among the native populations settled in the far corners of West Indies. In this context, the regular orders played a prominent role, highlighting throughout the sixteenth century the men of brown habit in the New Spain extensions and the Kingdom of Chile.

Missionary Foundations of the Franciscan Order

The theoretical principles that underpinned the missionary activity of San Francisco’s sons in these regions were expressed in the Franciscan Codex, a set of colonial documents compiled and edited by Mexican historian and bibliographer Joaquín García Icazbalceta. Most of the texts, many of them written possibly by brother Jerónimo de Mendieta, date from the 1570s, although some were written before. In them the essential guidelines of the missionary activity and the process of native conversion, evangelizing model that was followed with small variations by the most of the Regular Orders that unfolded their work among the New World natives. As a product of long, strenuous and risky missionary excursions, by the second half of the sixteenth century the Franciscans had already attained a broad knowledge of the geographic, social and cultural features of the areas in which were divided the four provinces where they exercised their doctrinal work within the New Spain territory. The province of the Santo Evangelio in Mexico city, and the custodial provinces of San Jose in Yucatan, Nombre de Jesus in Guatemala, and the Apostoles San Pedro y San

⁶⁹³ Mendieta, *Historia Eclesiástica Indiana*, II, book 3°, ch. V, 30.

⁶⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, ch. VI, 34.

Pablo in Michoacan and Jalisco,⁶⁹⁵ were scenarios that imposed particular challenges to Franciscan evangelizing efforts. In South America six Franciscan provinces were organized during the sixteenth century,⁶⁹⁶ and among all of them that settled in the Kingdom of Chile was the most arduous to consolidate by a series of challenges, such as the long distance from the Ecclesiastical Province of Lima until it got independence in 1565, when increased its status from Custodia de Chile to Provincia de la Santísima Trinidad, or the overwhelming shortage of workers who were unable to work with natives scattered in ravines, hills and plains. Overcoming the difficulties imposed by each region of the continent, the preaching of friars and their acolytes adhered to a pattern that sought to instill a series of knowledge inherent in every Christian, ensuring the salvation of those who had lived in infidelity: the Articles of the Faith (the Creed), the Commandments, the Sacraments, the Deadly Sins and the Venial Sins, the Theological Virtues (faith, hope and charity) and Cardinals (prudence, fortitude, justice and temperance) were inseparable contents from Franciscan catechesis in the whole continent.

For reasons of practical comfort, a desire for security, and to ensure an efficient control of new parishioners, the transmission of these knowledge should be done in well-defined spaces. If the missionaries and royal officials considered the Indians as a *tabula rasa* on which they could register the knowledge and practices that would make them participants in the Spaniards' political and confessional life,⁶⁹⁷ children were seen as an empty page, barely contaminated by the idolatrous devotions and uncivilized habits of their progenitors and, therefore, as a much more promising objective for the purposes of cultural, political and spiritual conversion. In Mexico, fray Martin de Valencia related to the emperor Charles V interesting details of his missionary experience with the infants

⁶⁹⁵ "Códice Franciscano. Relación particular y descripción de toda la Provincia del Santo Evangelio, que es de la Orden de San Francisco en la Nueva España, y los límites de ella, hasta donde se extiende, y de todos los Monesterios [*sic*] de la dicha Orden que hay en ella, y el número de frailes que hay en cada Monesterio, y las calidades de cada religioso, y los pueblos que tienen a cargo de doctrinar, y de qué encomenderos son. La cual descripción va también puesta en pintura, para que por entrambas vías se dé mejor a entender; ¿1570?," in García Icazbalceta, *Nueva colección de documentos*, II, 1.

⁶⁹⁶ Vásquez Janeiro, "Estructura de la Orden Franciscana en América," 200-1.

⁶⁹⁷ Franciscan fray Jerónimo de Mendieta affirmed that the Indians of New Spain "are only a soft wax to print upon them what their king desired; nor do they have more resistance than some youths in school age to be led wherever their teachers guided them." See the "Códice Mendieta. Copia del cuaderno que fray Jerónimo de Mendieta envió al Arzobispo de México, ¿1589?," in García Icazbalceta, *Nueva colección de documentos*, V, 82.

Also, because the most true and lasting fruit was expected in children, and to remove such a bad memory from the root, we took when it was possible all their child, mostly sons of caciques and principal Indians, for raising them and educating them in our occupations, and with them we work a lot, teaching them to read and write and sing plainsong chants and organ singing, and say the liturgy of the hours singing, and officiate masses and introduce them in all good Christian and religious customs.⁶⁹⁸

Considered as hinges to disseminate the precepts of faith and the foundations of political life among native elites, the caciques' sons were always a priority objective for catechists, since once instructed in the law of God it was expected that "they consequently teach it to their fathers and mothers and to all the others."⁶⁹⁹ They were educated in schools "where they learn to read and write,"⁷⁰⁰ while the *macehuales*' children, or lower classes, were gathered in the courtyards of churches or monasteries, instructing them in the doctrines and Commandments, entrusting "their fathers and mothers to make them say the doctrine and pray every night."⁷⁰¹ Children of the indigenous nobility with better skills were instructed in the singing and playing of musical instruments, with such good results that in many towns of New Spain "the church celebrations are made with so much solemnity and musical apparatus as in many cathedral-churches of Spain."⁷⁰²

A means of supplementary instruction was the use of painting, by means of which "the mysteries of our faith should be understood in their tender age, for it is a natural thing to imprint in memory what at that time is perceived"⁷⁰³ Robert Ricard emphasizes that the use of images for instruction, illustrating the articles of faith, the Ten Commandments, or the seven sacraments, became a Franciscan tactic once they understood the importance of frescoes and codices in the Mesoamerican educative tradition,⁷⁰⁴ strategy in which played an

⁶⁹⁸ "Carta de Fray Martín de Valencia, custodio, y de otros religiosos de la orden de San Francisco, al Emperador Don Carlos, refiriéndole el resultado de sus misiones en la Nueva España y los grandes servicios del obispo electo Fray Juan de Zumárraga; Guatitán, 17 de noviembre de 1532," in *Cartas de Indias*, 56. Regarding the preference given to children evangelization, see the mention made by fray Jerónimo de Mendieta in his *Historia Eclesiástica Indiana*, II, book 3°, ch. XVII, 63-5.

⁶⁹⁹ "Código Franciscano. Carta de fray Pedro de Gante al Rey D. Felipe II; San Francisco de México, 1558," in García Icazbalceta, *Nueva colección de documentos*, II, 221.

⁷⁰⁰ "Código Franciscano. El orden que los religiosos tienen en enseñar a los indios la Doctrina, y otras cosas de policía cristiana; ca. 1570," in *Ibid.*, 62.

⁷⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 63. On this division of learners into two categories, see Ricard, *The spiritual conquest of Mexico*, 98-9.

⁷⁰² "Código Franciscano. El orden que los religiosos tienen en enseñar a los indios la Doctrina, y otras cosas de policía cristiana; ca. 1570," in García Icazbalceta, *Nueva colección de documentos*, II, 65.

⁷⁰³ *Ibid.*, 67.

⁷⁰⁴ Ricard, *The spiritual conquest of Mexico*, 104.

important role fray Jacobo de Testera⁷⁰⁵ as promoter, and fray Pedro de Gante⁷⁰⁶ as performer. The culture of the image became fundamental to support the evangelization.⁷⁰⁷ The same thing happened with singing, so the missionaries poured into musicalized verses the Our Father, Hail Mary and the Creed, among other pillars of faith.⁷⁰⁸ In this context, it is evident that the Franciscans made important contributions to the knowledge of native cultures,⁷⁰⁹ for, as fray Pedro de Gante demonstrates, the most seasoned members of the Congregation were able to take advantage of ancient indigenous practices to establish functional instruction forms for the objectives of evangelization

[...] by the grace of God I began to know them and understand their conditions and qualities, and how I should deal with them, and that all their worship of their gods was singing and dancing in front of them [...] and as I saw this and all their songs were dedicated to their gods, I composed a very solemn chant on the law of God and faith.⁷¹⁰

Finally, the catechizing theater also played an important role in the instruction of Indians, seeking to inculcate virtues of the Christian value corpus through the presentation of moralizing works, and solemnizing on special dates the feasts of liturgical calendar. The missionaries had a special predilection for those works in which the struggle between Good and Evil was more graphically staged, frequently depicting the first of these forces as missionaries or peace Indians, leaving the second to those obstinate Indians in remaining within their traditions, many times the war Indians.⁷¹¹

Music, painting and theater were, in short, the audiovisual media that formed the educational and communicational trilogy with which the San Francisco's sons sought to cultivate and conquer the souls and minds of New Spain natives.⁷¹² In the context of central Mexico, an area controlled by the Spaniards, the educational method deployed by the Order adhered to two traditions, the European and the Mesoamerican,⁷¹³ seeking a balance in which

⁷⁰⁵ Contreras, "El problema de las lenguas indígenas en México," 339.

⁷⁰⁶ Kobayashi, *La educación como conquista*, 143.

⁷⁰⁷ Durán, "El misionero en el siglo XVI," 234.

⁷⁰⁸ Ricard, *The spiritual conquest of Mexico*, 104.

⁷⁰⁹ Gómez Canedo, "Aspectos característicos de la acción franciscana en América," 456-7.

⁷¹⁰ "Códice Franciscano. Carta de fray Pedro de Gante al Rey D. Felipe II; San Francisco de México, 23 de junio de 1558," in García Icazbalceta, *Nueva colección de documentos*, II, 231.

⁷¹¹ Lienhard, *La voz y su huella*, 72.

⁷¹² Kobayashi, *La educación como conquista*, 145.

⁷¹³ Morales, "The native encounter with Christianity," 145.

to get the most out of the compatibilities of both. The policy of privileging the autochthon elites in education was inspired by a customary practice in Spain and was part of the Crown's missionary and indigenist enterprise. With a well-established missionary system by the last quarter of the sixteenth century, it should not be surprising that other Mendicant Orders have remained faithful to the main lines of the Franciscan evangelizing model even in frontier zones, as happened with the Jesuits in New Vizcaya around 1591⁷¹⁴ and in the south of Chile from 1605.

An important and exclusive aspect in the teaching of Indian nobility's children was the effort to introduce them in the writing skills, an aspiration that was initially identified with an attempt for Spanishing them. The Laws of Burgos, signed by king Ferdinand of Aragon, is one of the first legal documents to account for this, since the encomenderos were ordered to choose the most capable boy of their *encomiendas* to teach him "to read and write the things of our faith so that they will teach it to the Indians later,"⁷¹⁵ and the Franciscans were instructed to educate the caciques' children under thirteen, "so the friars may teach to them to read and write, and all the other things of our holy faith."⁷¹⁶ As in the ordinances no mention is made on the natives language, it is evident that the whole process of instruction should be carried out in Spanish. This initiative, carried out in the Caribbean region, had the antecedent of the literacy campaign of Castilla, the catechist enterprise among the Moors of Andalusia, the Hispanization of the Canary Islands, and the experience of religious orders in the overseas missions.⁷¹⁷ As Shirley Brice Heath points out, the practices implanted in New Spain were "continuation and expansion of policies that prevailed in Castile during the reign of Isabel and Ferdinand in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries."⁷¹⁸

However, in latitudes as far from the metropolis as it was the newly discovered continent, and even more so in the frontier zones, it became extremely difficult to materialize the peninsular model without it being modified. In the early stages of Spanish expansion, the Caribbean literacy project, directly inspired by the Iberian model, left the teaching of Castilian language in the encomenderos hands. But in the continent the missionaries, backed

⁷¹⁴ Álvarez, *El Indio y la sociedad colonial norteaña*, 218.

⁷¹⁵ "Ordenanzas para el buen tratamiento de los indios (Leyes de Burgos); Burgos, 27 de diciembre de 1512," in Konetzke, *Colección de documentos*, I, 45.

⁷¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 49.

⁷¹⁷ Ordóñez, "Echoes of the voiceless: language in Jesuit missions in Paraguay," 36.

⁷¹⁸ Heath, *La política del lenguaje en México*, 23-4.

by the experience gestated in the daily contact with natives, prioritized the vernacular languages as gospel's vehicles of transmission,⁷¹⁹ since they facilitated the knowledge of native customs in their purest form and diffusion of the sacred word. Then, two irreconcilable positions emerged. The defenders of Castilian postulated the primacy of this language to convey fundamental aspects of Iberian culture, criticizing limitations of the aboriginal languages to express moral concepts of Christianity; on the contrary, those who prioritized native languages emphasized the virtues of these dialects, especially their rich vocabularies, sufficient to translate any passage of the Bible without having to beg for words from Spanish.⁷²⁰ Friar Toribio de Benavente, one of the Twelve Apostles of Mexico, whom the Indians called Motolinia for his devotion to poverty, referred to *Nahuatl* as a language that "is necessary to speak, preach, talk, teach, and administer all the sacraments."⁷²¹ Historian John Leddy Phelan affirmed in his classic work *The millennial kingdom of the Franciscans in the New World* that most friars argued that it was not necessary to speak Spanish to be a good Christian, since God understands *Nahuatl* as well as Spanish.⁷²²

In spite of the *Gramática de la Lengua Castellana* (Grammar of the Castilian language) by Antonio de Nebrija played a leading role in the construction of Spanish nation by becoming an instrument in the policy of Castilianising of the kingdom, and that the emperor Charles V favored the teaching of Spanish to Indians,⁷²³ the circumstances of the American milieu ended up tilting the balance on those who supported the use of native languages.⁷²⁴ Moreover, the position of friars in favor of the native languages was based on the agreements of the Council of Trent,⁷²⁵ consolidating it in the Lima Provincial Councils

⁷¹⁹ Acevedo, "La política lingüística del siglo XVI en la Nueva España," 27.

⁷²⁰ Bono López, "La política lingüística en la Nueva España," 17-8.

⁷²¹ Motolinía, *Historia de los indios de la Nueva España*, Tratado Segundo, cap. 5, 112.

⁷²² Phelan, *The millennial kingdom of the Franciscans in the New World*, 88.

⁷²³ "Real Cédula para que a los indios se les enseñe la lengua castellana; Valladolid, 7 de junio de 1550," in Konetzke, *Colección de documentos*, I, 272-3. Martín Lienhard states that in the Carlos V times the strategic objective of the Spanish Crown was the fast castilianization of autochthon elites and, through them, the idiomatic assimilation of indigenous populations; see Lienhard, *La voz y su huella*, 137.

⁷²⁴ To enter into this interesting debate, see the interesting works by Torre Revello, "La enseñanza de las lenguas a los naturales de América;" Acevedo, "La política lingüística del siglo XVI en la Nueva España;" Zavala, *Poder y lenguaje desde el siglo XVI*; Bono López, "La política lingüística en la Nueva España;" Sánchez-Albornoz, "De las lenguas amerindias al castellano," and Wright-Carr, "La política lingüística en la Nueva España." Also the erudite introductions and documentary collections edited by Velasco Ceballos, *La alfabetización en la Nueva España*; and Solano, *Documentos sobre la política lingüística en Hispanoamérica (1492-1800)*.

⁷²⁵ Acevedo, "La política lingüística del siglo XVI en la Nueva España," 33.

of 1567 and 1582-83,⁷²⁶ and in the Mexican Provincial Councils of 1555, 1565 and 1585.⁷²⁷ In this regard, both Philip II and his successor Philip III supported the use of indigenous languages in teaching the doctrine.⁷²⁸ Thus, for example, the “Prudent King” ordered in 1578 that only priests who knew their parishioners’ language should be placed at the head of a doctrine or parish.⁷²⁹

It is necessary to say that the colonial authorities did not regard the Spanish language as an imperative tool of the empire, since the Crown considered it generally more useful to learn and use the Indian languages in order to consolidate a more efficient communication and a more direct control over the ethnic groups.⁷³⁰ The numerous books of sermons, confessionals, and bilingual dictionaries printed at the Mexican presses give account of this,⁷³¹ a process in which domestic languages were tried to tame under the parameters of Latin grammar,⁷³² converting them from now on into “Indian languages.”⁷³³ It should not be

⁷²⁶ The First Lima Provincial Council, held in 1552, was in Rubén Vargas Ugarte’s words “the first attempt for organizing the American Church and for unifying the methods followed in Indians conversion.” It is evident the ambiguous position adopted on the use of language, prioritizing Spanish for the teaching of “the common prayers of Pater Noster, Hail Mary, Creed, Commandments and works of mercy, articles of faith, etc.,” as it appears in the 1st. Constitution, but leaving the adults instruction in their own language, according to the 6th. Constitution. See Vargas Ugarte, *Historia del Perú*, 28. Vargas Ugarte, *Concilios Limenses*, 7 and 10-1.

⁷²⁷ Wright-Carr, “La política lingüística en la Nueva España,” 12. In the First Mexican Provincial Council it was agreed that the Christian doctrine should be taught “to Indians in their own language, because they could know better and retain it,” while in the Second Provincial Council, held ten years later, it was suggested that natives “learn the Christian Doctrine not only in their own language, but mainly in Castilian,” which reveals the influence of the Carlos V dispositions, but without abandoning the religious orders commitment with the teaching in vernacular languages; see Lorenzana, *Concilios Provinciales Primero y Segundo*, First Council, ch. 1, 41, and Second Council, 392. In the Third Provincial Council’s agreements was prioritized the use of vernacular languages, with the exception of Chichimecas, blacks and mulattoes, with whom the doctrine teaching “must be done in Castilian,” although it is well known that along the sixteenth century this castilianization policy did not yield the expected results; see Book 1st., Decree 3th., Title I, § 2, in Martínez Ferrer, *Decretos del Concilio Tercero Provincial Mexicano (1585)*, 216.

⁷²⁸ *Ibid.*, 7-8. Although at the beginning Felipe II followed his father’s guidelines, Carlos V, as it appears in a Royal Cedula of 1590, just six years later he went backward by means of another Royal Cedula, noting that “it does not seem advisable to urge them to leave their native language.” See the “Real Cédula para que desde la niñez los indios aprendan y hablen la lengua castellana; Madrid, 16 de enero de 1590,” in Konetzke, *Colección de documentos*, I, 603; and the “Consulta del Consejo de las Indias sobre las causas porque pareció se debía ordenar que los indios hablasen la lengua castellana; Madrid, 20 de junio de 1596,” in Konetzke, *Colección de documentos*, II, 39.

⁷²⁹ Sánchez-Albornoz, “De las lenguas amerindias al castellano,” 53.

⁷³⁰ Echávez-Solano & Dworkin y Méndez, “Introduction: revisiting Spanish and Empire,” XVIII.

⁷³¹ Queen Juana I of Castile instructed the viceroy Antonio de Mendoza to place special emphasis on religious men learning of Indian language, “and to reduce it to some arts and an easy way of learning,” see the “Ampliación de la Instrucción a Antonio de Mendoza; Madrid, 14 de julio de 1536,” in Torre Villar & Navarro de Anda, *Instrucciones y Memorias*, 92.

⁷³² Gruzinski, *Las cuatro partes del mundo*, 77.

⁷³³ Lienhard, *La voz y su huella*, 145.

surprising, therefore, that despite of the instructed in the royal orders, fray Pedro de Gante had informed the Emperor Charles V that “it has been my duty to teach the Christian doctrine [to the Indians], and to give it in their own language.”⁷³⁴ The diffusion of Castilian language was not a priority of the Spanish monarchy, since in the words of linguist Juan Ramón Lodares, “the ideological support of the empire rested on religious unity rather than linguistic.”⁷³⁵ Castilian language was a means to that aim.

The missionary challenge in New Galicia and the Kingdom of Chile: between the apostolic zeal and the glory of martyrdom

At first glance, it might be thought that a system of colonization and acculturation created in the heart of the empire (Iberian Peninsula and Canary Islands), later applied in the Caribbean region, and modified at the core of Mesoamerican cultural space, could have an assured success in any subsequent context. But the immensities of the newly discovered continent, its geographical richness and cultural variety, made of each new space a particular challenge for the Hispanic hegemonic project. The Kingdom of New Galicia, a geoadministrative unit dependent on the Viceroyalty of New Spain, was characterized by its contrasting geography of marshy coastal plains, fertile river valleys and wooded hills bordering vast desert plains.⁷³⁶ The Franciscan José Arlegui portrayed this situation a century later when he pointed out that “since the province of Zacatecas is so stretched that its distances are three hundred and thirty leagues long, and latitude is three hundred, its climates and temperaments are diverse and opposed.”⁷³⁷ In a region of such dissimilar features developed a myriad of cultural entities with an economic spectrum that ranged from groups with consolidated agriculture to those with mixed economies (seasonal agricultural production complemented by hunting and gathering in much of the year), including numerous

⁷³⁴ “Carta de fray Pedro de Gante al Emperador Don Carlos, exponiéndole sus trabajos en la doctrina e instrucción de los indios; México, 31 de octubre de 1532,” in *Cartas de Indias*, 52.

⁷³⁵ Ramón Lodares, “Languages, Catholicism, and Power in the Hispanic Empire,” 12.

⁷³⁶ Antonio de Herrera says that the “Chichimeca land is fertile and well-tempered, colder than hot, and drier than humid, which makes it very healthy [...] for the most part is land with few rains, and although some years rain less, it is not so necessary, because the few that falls, is suffice, and the earth, with its fertility, supplements it;” see Herrera, *Historia General de los hechos de los Castellanos*, vol. 17, Decade VIII, book VI, ch. 15, 77-8.

⁷³⁷ Arlegui, *Crónica de la Provincia de N.S.P.S. Francisco de Zacatecas*, Part 3, ch. I, 120.

hunter-gatherer communities. Such disparate economies involved equally diverse approaches to space, from absolute sedentarism to extreme nomadism, the latter being the predominant mode among the natives of the region.

Factors so far removed from the reality found in the valley of Mexico, where high civilizations prevailed with intensive agricultural economies and stratified socio-political structures based on taxation mechanisms, determined that the characteristics of both conquests differed markedly. While the bulk of the dominions and states that were part of the Mesoamerican universe were integrated into the Hispanic monarchy in a few years, the nomadic societies and the territories in which they mobilized meant one of the hardest problems of domination to solve for Spaniards. It was not easy, in fact, to subject dynamic many-headed groups, lacking a central authority with whom to agree on coexistence and mutual assistance, or through whom to force the submission of masses by means of its capture or death, as happened with Moctezuma in the conquest of Tenochtitlan. The defeat or capture of a Chichimeca leader only meant, at best, the temporary appeasement of his immediate relatives or, at most, of a tribe's segment of which he was a part, since in egalitarian societies leaders lack of power, acting as mere spokesmen of the collective will.⁷³⁸ The elasticity of intergroup political relations rested on that fragmentation or segmentary organization,⁷³⁹ characterized by a high dynamism of alliances that constantly rearticulated on the basis of the triumphs or failures of the Indian punitive expeditions or Spanish attacks.⁷⁴⁰ Coalitions, led temporarily by leaders with sufficient prestige, were made in order to deal with crisis situations, such as famines, demographic losses or conflicts, consolidating through kinship. Threats of a certain magnitude, as the Spanish interference in the northern lands, meant a necessary, at least momentary, overcoming of internal rivalries to better face the greatest danger.⁷⁴¹ The Mixton War and the lasting conflagration in which *Chichimecs* and Spaniards

⁷³⁸ Clastres, "La cuestión del poder en las sociedades primitivas," 113-4.

⁷³⁹ On this point George Pierre Castile points out that a factor contributing to the centrifugal tendency among the tribes was the custom of disputes. Each clan or lineage, if considered to be harmed by a member of another clan, and even within the tribe, or from another group, took collective measures to restore balance. Intergroup disputes were constantly being carried out to compensate for the damage received. See Castile, *North American Indians*, 89.

⁷⁴⁰ John Elliot points out the advantages and problems involved in confronting nomadic societies for Europeans, since "it was not difficult to antagonize one tribe with another, but the fluidity of intertribal relations meant that successes were likely to be temporary, since alliances changed and tribes regrouped;" see Elliot, *Imperios del Mundo Atlántico*, 108.

⁷⁴¹ Powell, "The Chichimecas: Scourge of the Silver Frontier," 333-4.

entangled in northwest New Spain, favored the development of more complex sociopolitical forms established on the constitution of alliances,⁷⁴² but this did not mean the emergence of perpetual leaderships, much less heritable. But these alliances, although effective in the war, were less permanent than the *Mapuche* ones.

In the southern territory of Chile there was no an ecological diversity as varied as in New Galicia. In the same way, as we pointed out in the first chapter of this research, it is not possible to find a cultural spectrum so varied and complex; only the cordilleran natives, known as *Pewenches*, differed in language and had a subsistence pattern distinct from that of *Reche-Mapuches*. However, in the course from the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries they adopted their neighbours language,⁷⁴³ preserving almost no vestige of their original tongue. Tribes with a well-established agricultural economy settled in the central valley and coastal plains, while elusive hunting-gatherer bands roamed by ravines and coniferous forests scattered in the Andean piedmont. Each *Reche-Mapuche* conglomerate was an independent grouping, based primarily on kinship relationships and ephemeral leaderships, since “in everything they do, there is no lord to respect, but behetrias.”⁷⁴⁴ As in the *Chichimecs*, natives of southern Chile had a dispersed settlement pattern, always displaying an irrevocable reluctance to any form of spatial reduction, such as the Franciscans wanted in order to facilitate the conversion process. They were only convened around a charismatic figure and with sufficient warlike abilities to lead them to victory, the *toki*, in times of conflict. Like the New Galicia natives, the *Reche-Mapuches* developed more complex forms of organization to confront the Hispanic threat, the *vutanmapus* or great alliances, conglomerates of military assistance that proved to be very efficient in maintaining the independence of the southern territories.

Numerous testimonies give account of the immense challenge that meant to try to subdue the *Chichimecs* of New Galicia and surrounding regions. The positions were debated among those who prioritized the use of force and those who advocated the use of more conciliatory forms, such as bishop fray Juan de Zumárraga, who advocated an apostolic approach that left behind the “tyrannical conquest that has been used in these parts until now,

⁷⁴² Lázaro Ávila, *Las fronteras de América y los 'Flandes Indianos'*, 61-2.

⁷⁴³ Silva & Téllez, “Los pewenche: identidad y configuración,” 11 and 17.

⁷⁴⁴ Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile, desde su descubrimiento hasta el año de 1575*, ch. XXXVI, 99.

offending God and with perdition of souls.”⁷⁴⁵ A pioneering work within this tendency was the one promoted by the Franciscan friar Juan de San Miguel,⁷⁴⁶ who founded in the El Bajío region the San Miguel el Grande village in 1542 with Otomí, Tarascan, some pacified Chichimeca colonists and a handful of Spaniards.⁷⁴⁷ This foundation represented the first moving of sedentary Indians from the southern regions for living with Chichimecas, using the distribution of food, clothing and agricultural implements among the nomads to achieve their peaceful settlement, which makes Franciscans in the real managers of the colonization and pacification policy carried out in New Galicia from the last decades of sixteenth century.⁷⁴⁸ This settlement was abandoned in 1551 because of a Chichimeca incursion, and was reinstated in 1555 as part of the colonization and pacification project promoted by the viceroy Luis de Velasco I with the support of Otomies from Xilotepec and Acambaro, although without getting pacification of northern regions.⁷⁴⁹

The Franciscans, since 1552, warned insistently the king of the convenience of using peaceful means to attract not submitted Indians to Christianity.⁷⁵⁰ But the obstacles to overcome were of a diverse nature, beginning with the intricate and vast geography in which they moved seasonally, to the difficulty of mastering their languages, without forgetting the danger posed by Indian attacks on Spanish groups ventured into their territories.⁷⁵¹ Don Luis de Velasco I, second viceroy of New Spain, in an extensive report addressed to king Felipe II, pointed out that New Galicia was “a very rough land and of brave Indians who have not been conquered.”⁷⁵² A couple of years before, the Franciscan Angel de Valencia stressed that

⁷⁴⁵ “Carta de Don Fray Juan de Zumárraga al Príncipe Don Felipe; México, 2 de junio de 1544”, in Cuevas, *Documentos inéditos del siglo XVI*, 121.

⁷⁴⁶ Una breve descripción de su labor fundacional en la Nueva Galicia en Miranda Godínez, “Fray Juan de San Miguel y la fundación de Patamban.”

⁷⁴⁷ Jiménez Moreno, “La colonización y evangelización de Guanajuato en el siglo XVI,” 77.

⁷⁴⁸ Powell, “Franciscans on the Silver Frontier of Old Mexico,” 306.

⁷⁴⁹ Cruz Rangel, *Chichimecas, mineros, soldados y terratenientes*, 203. On the role of Otomies in this plan of colonization, see the works by David Wright-Carr recorded in the bibliography, especially his *Conquistadores otomies en la Guerra Chichimeca*.

⁷⁵⁰ Román Gutiérrez, *Sociedad y evangelización*, 384-5.

⁷⁵¹ The concept of Franciscan preaching was born out of the need to leave the convent’s cloistering to establish the missionary, evangelical and itinerant preaching of the prophets, of Jesus and his apostles. Félix Herrero Salgado points out that St. Francis of Assisi decided to “change the intimacy of life devoted to prayer and contemplation for an ideal no less sublime and more necessary in a world corrupted by immorality and infected by heresies: the conversion of souls not only with the weapons of prayer but also with the word and example.” Véase Herrero Salgado, *La oratoria sagrada en los siglos XVI y XVII*, 554.

⁷⁵² “Carta de Don Luis de Velasco, el primero, a Felipe II; México, 7 de febrero de 1554,” in Cuevas, *Documentos inéditos del siglo XVI*, 214-5.

some of these setbacks meant a serious inconvenience for evangelization, “because as the land in some parts is rough and people barbaric, and it limits with a large number of war people, few religious think that living in this kingdom is not a hard work.”⁷⁵³ The risk of being shot down by the rebels’ spears was a difficulty for the missionary work that went hand in hand with the lack of competent operators in handling local languages, since “there is almost no one who knows any language, nor preaches, neither confesses, and so does not make the necessary fruit.”⁷⁵⁴ The New Galicia linguistic landscape, much more varied than that of the Valley of Mexico,⁷⁵⁵ proved to be as rugged as its topography. Although Felipe II issued between 1570 and 1592 many decrees granting preponderance to *Nahuatl* as instrument for the evangelization in all the New Spain territory,⁷⁵⁶ it was practically impossible to establish a linguistic reductionism in the northern provinces by the imposition of a *general language*, making it necessary to know those local languages with the greatest number of speakers.⁷⁵⁷ A clear example of this immense challenge was the extreme difficulty of working with northern Indians in the convents distributed along New Galicia, since the religious said to be themselves tied of hands “because few of these Indians are nahuales to confess and to receive the sacraments,”⁷⁵⁸ that is, the Valley of Mexico’s main language was practically unknown.

The space in which the Arauco War unfolded was not alien to the controversy generated by those who advocated peaceful conquest and those who defended the advance by violent means. As has already been pointed out, there were divided positions within the Franciscan Order, although as in the viceroyalty of New Spain, the prevailing position

⁷⁵³ “Carta de fray Ángel de Valencia, custodio, y otros religiosos de la orden de San Francisco, proponiendo los medios necesarios para doctrinar los indios del Nuevo Reino de Galicia y de la provincia de Mechoacan; Guadalajara, 8 de mayo de 1552,” in *Cartas de Indias*, 105. The document also in Enciso Contreras, *Epistolario de Zacatecas*, 36.

⁷⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 108.

⁷⁵⁵ Danna Levin Rojo states that “the Western Mexico sub-area, comprising present-day Sinaloa, Nayarit, Jalisco, Colima, Michoacán, and Guerrero, was culturally and perhaps linguistically the most heterogeneous Mesoamerican region, with numerous unclassified languages, today extinct;” see Levin Rojo, *Return to Aztlan*, 43.

⁷⁵⁶ By Royal Decree of September 19, 1580, it was ordered that the universities of Lima and Mexico and in the cities where there were high courts (reales audiencias), establish Indians’ “general language” chairs; see Torre Revello, “La enseñanza de las lenguas a los naturales de América,” 507. Also Ordóñez, “Echoes of the voiceless: language in Jesuit missions in Paraguay,” 36-7.

⁷⁵⁷ Bono López, “La política lingüística en la Nueva España,” 41.

⁷⁵⁸ “Códice Franciscano. Relación que los franciscanos de Guadalajara dieron de los conventos que tenía su orden, y de otros negocios generales de aquel reino; Guadalajara del Nuevo Reino de Galicia, 8 de noviembre de 1569,” in García Icazbalceta, *Nueva colección de documentos*, II, 166-8.

inclined towards the peaceful way. The measures implemented were, however, much less ambitious. The possibility of founding villages with allied Indians who helped to pacify the southern tribes was a forbidden alternative to any pretension not only because of the already mentioned lack of natives sufficiently docile and instructed in the Hispanic way of life, but especially because the encomenderos of the central area –the most controlled region of the Kingdom– were not willing to deprive themselves of a labor force that, as a result of escapes and especially of diseases, became less and less numerous, a situation that forced to import Huarpe Indians from the Argentine side at the beginning of the seventeenth century.⁷⁵⁹ On this point, Franciscans not only opposed in general terms to using violence, but also denounced the systematic abuses committed by encomenderos, soldiers and government authorities, drawing attention to natives protective laws. In response to this attitude, governor Melchor Bravo de Saravia wrote to the king in 1569, complaining that “friars mostly from the order of St. Francis help us little because they not only say that we cannot make war on Indians due to the bad treatments that hitherto they have received, and that is unjust what is done to them, but they do not want to absolve the soldiers or even to hear their confession.”⁷⁶⁰ In addition to the growing animosity of a large number of the Spaniards who inhabited the Kingdom, the St. Francis of Assisi’s sons also had to contend with the lack of competent operators in Mapudungun or native language. The conflicts and threats that daily shaped the distinctive features of the Arauco War contributed enormously to hampering the missionary approaching, a contact that under ideal conditions would have contributed to the development of a complete knowledge of the *Reche-Mapuche* language and culture.

Evangelization on both frontiers, under such dire conditions, was a truly titanic task. Inspired by a mystical zeal that impelled them to discover or erect the earthly paradise, the Franciscans faced the difficulties of the American milieu with the conviction that the New World was an opportunity to raise the St. Augustine’s City of God.⁷⁶¹ To be part of such a

⁷⁵⁹ Jara, “Importación de trabajadores indígenas en Chile en el siglo XVII,” 263. Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, III, 103-5.

⁷⁶⁰ “Carta del doctor Melchor Bravo de Saravia a Su Majestad advirtiéndole de las causas de la duración de la guerra, reformas que conviene introducir en la administración y necesidad de nuevos refuerzos militares; Talcamán, 27 de diciembre de 1569,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos* (second series), vol. 1, 252-3.

⁷⁶¹ To delve into the millenarian character of Franciscan evangelization in the New World, see the chapter “The millennial kingdom in the Age of Discovery,” in the Phelan’s book *The millennial kingdom of the Franciscans in the New World*, 69-77. A critical vision that questions the millenarianism of these first missionaries in Del Val, “El milenarismo en la primera evangelización de los franciscanos en América.”

monumental work at the service of Creator was an unequivocal guarantee of divine grace. Deprivations and efforts of the exhausting excursions through the corners of the governorates of Chile and New Galicia were an incentive for those missionaries who saw in the pain of their own surrender, and even more in martyrdom, the key to salvation.⁷⁶² A late chronicler refers the misadventures of fray Geronimo de Mendoza, the nephew of viceroy Antonio de Mendoza, through the Zacatecas lands, suffering thirst and hunger, “using no other food than the rude ones used by pagans.”⁷⁶³

When Pedro Gomez de Maraver assumed the bishopric of New Galicia in 1546, a few years after the Mixton War, an intense missionary work began, which contrasted with the relative passivity of previous years. Determined to spread the gospel among natives without difficulty, he asked the king not to allow Spaniards to enter the sierras of the governorship for a period of 15 years.⁷⁶⁴ The pioneering activity carried out in frontier regions by the Order of St. Francis, the privileges granted it by the civil and ecclesiastical authorities, and the impetus that characterized the work of its members, relegated to a secondary place to the rest of the orders that arrived shortly after to the northern regions. In the framework of the Franciscan meeting held in Guadalajara in May 1552, fray Angel de Valencia pointed out that the missionary experience had enabled them to identify some qualities in the Chichimecas’ nature that would account for their availability to incorporate in their own culture the way of life of more advanced peoples, but that this would only be possible by the way of the Gospel and not, as until that moment, by the measures of force used by the captains of conquest.⁷⁶⁵ In order to give an account of how promising the missionary activity was, he

⁷⁶² Durán, “El misionero en el siglo XVI,” 229.

⁷⁶³ Arlegui, *Crónica de la Provincia de N.S.P.S. Francisco de Zacatecas*, Part 1, ch. VI, 26.

⁷⁶⁴ Bernabéu Albert, “Sobre cartografía y fascinación de la Frontera,” 139. Pedro Gómez de Maraver is a good example of the contradictions that impregnated the Franciscan position on rebellious Indians. As we see, he advocated a missionary work that excluded the intervention of third parties outside the Order, but also favored the use of force and slavery with natives who refused to accept the Christian message. His eagerness for gaining the sympathy of emerging economic groups in the northern region (encomenderos, miners, merchants and farmers) prompted him to endorse the war by blood and fire when circumstances warranted; see Carrillo Cázares, *El debate sobre la Guerra Chichimeca*, I, 48. The source that describes this dichotomous position is the “Carta de Pedro Gómez de Maraver al Rey; México, 1 de junio de 1544,” transcribed in the second volume of the same Carrillo Cázares’ work, 470-5. It was also published by Torres de Mendoza, *Colección de documentos inéditos*, 199-212.

⁷⁶⁵ “Carta de fray Ángel de Valencia, custodio, y otros religiosos de la orden de San Francisco, proponiendo los medios necesarios para doctrinar los indios del Nuevo Reino de Galicia y de la provincia de Mechoacan; Guadalajara, 8 de mayo de 1552,” in *Cartas de Indias*, 104. The document is also in Enciso Contreras, *Epistolario de Zacatecas*, 35.

also highlighted the work of three Franciscans in Jalisco, Auacatlán and Yzatlán who, “through the grace of God, with no arms other than the cross of Christ and the word of the Gospel, have attracted great sum of Indians of peace.”⁷⁶⁶

But the strength of the friars had to pay a high price. The intricate geography of the north forced them in many cases to remain isolated, virtually lost and separated from each other in the villages or temporary camps of the native societies scattered over the northern margin of New Spain. Although on numerous occasions they were welcomed by local communities, the possibility of tragically perishing in full missionary action was a permanent concern. The conflict that progressively opposed Chichimecas against the military, mining and hacendal class fostered distrust between the parties, a matter in which the religious were the main victims. As the years passed, a growing number of missionaries swelled the list of martyrs slaughtered by the indigenous lances. Fray Juan Calero and fray Antonio de Cuellar were killed in the vicinity of the Ameca village during the indigenous rebellion of 1541.⁷⁶⁷ The following year it was the turn of fray Juan de Padilla, fray Juan de la Cruz⁷⁶⁸ and fray Luis de Ubeda.⁷⁶⁹ Fray Bernardo Cossin, who was “one of the first to preach to the Chichimeca barbarian Indians,” was martyred in 1543.⁷⁷⁰ One of the most intense missionary enterprises was carried out by friar Francisco Lorenzo, who was killed along with his companion by the Indians of Cacalotlan, in the province of Auaxocotlan, in 1554 according to the Antonio Tello chronology.⁷⁷¹ In 1555 two friar minor were dead, whose names “there is no one who know them, appart that one was an old priest, and the other friar was a young

⁷⁶⁶Ibid. Also Enciso Contreras, *Epistolario de Zacatecas*, 34-5, who transcribed the two last settlements as Autlán and Yzatlán.

⁷⁶⁷ “Auto de descargos del virrey Mendoza en Nueva Galicia: declaraciones de Antón, señor de Tepetlatauca, Tepitichán, 7 de enero de 1547; y del indio Antonio, originario de Azatlán, Tepitichán, 7 de enero de 1547,” AGI, Justicia 262, pieza 2, 150v-151 and 127-157v. See also Mendieta, *Historia Eclesiástica Indiana*, IV, book 5° (Second Part), ch. I-II, 191-8. This martyrdom is referred by Kieran McCarty, “Los franciscanos en la frontera chichimeca,” 331.

⁷⁶⁸ Fray Juan de Padilla and fray Juan de la Cruz accompanied Francisco Vázquez de Coronado to the Cíbola and Quivirá expeditions, and both were martyred on different dates while carrying out missionary tasks in the vicinity of Tiguex town. See Mendieta, *Ibid.*, ch. III, 198-201. Also Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. CXLVII and CXLVIII, 487-97.

⁷⁶⁹ Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. CLII, 517. Mendieta, *Historia Eclesiástica Indiana*, IV, book 5° (Second Part), ch. IV, 202-3. Arlegui, *Crónica de la Provincia de N.S.P.S. Francisco de Zacatecas*, Part 4, ch. I, 195-200.

⁷⁷⁰ Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. CLII, 517. Mendieta, *Historia Eclesiástica Indiana*, IV, book 5° (Second Part), ch. IV, 202-3. Arlegui, *Crónica de la Provincia de N.S.P.S. Francisco de Zacatecas*, Part 4, ch. I, 195-200.

⁷⁷¹ Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. CLXXIV, 560-4.

man.”⁷⁷² Fray Juan de Tapia, while evangelizing around the Zacatecas mines, “was shot with arrows and killed by barbarians called Guachichiles”⁷⁷³ around 1556.⁷⁷⁴ Fray Juan Serrano gave his soul to God in Atotonilco, Zacatecas region, in 1567,⁷⁷⁵ and fray Pablo de Acevedo along with fray Juan de Herrera in Sinaloa (adjacent to the original limits of New Galicia).⁷⁷⁶ In 1582 fray Luis de Villalobos was killed in a stream near Guajúcar, halfway between Zacatecas and Guadalajara.⁷⁷⁷ In the sierras of Huaynamota, fray Andrés de Ayala and fray Francisco Gil lost their lives in the second half of 1585.⁷⁷⁸ Fray Juan del Río fell victim to the Chichimeca Indians in the vicinity of Charcas town, land of Zacatecas, a year later.⁷⁷⁹ On imprecise dates, fray Francisco Doncel and fray Pedro de Burgos were killed on the way to San Miguel town (southern limit of New Galicia).⁷⁸⁰ The death of friars, mostly brutally, helped to reinforce the Chichimeca image as a traitor and barbarian, as well as to consolidate the argument of just war: if the general aversion of Christians was based on the incursions they made to estates and towns, in addition to the assaults to caravans, more difficult to tolerate were the tortures and martyrdoms with which they subjected to those who guarded by their earthly protection and spiritual salvation.⁷⁸¹ In Philip Wayne Powell words, the friars were often treated similarly to the other Spanish prisoners, being

frequently beaten mercilessly, with fists and sticks, when they rebuked the Chichimecas for their vices. Occasionally, the friars were attacked and beaten as they entered the Indian encampments (rancherías) to take children out for religious instruction.⁷⁸²

⁷⁷² Mendieta, *Historia Eclesiástica Indiana*, IV, book 5° (Second Part), ch. IV, 203.

⁷⁷³ Ibid. Arlegui, *Crónica de la Provincia de N.S.P.S. Francisco de Zacatecas*, Part 4, ch. V, 218-21.

⁷⁷⁴ Jerónimo de Mendieta dates the death in 1556, but Arlegui fix it one year later; see Mendieta, Ibid., 203, and Arlegui, Ibid., 221.

⁷⁷⁵ Arlegui, Ibid., 221-3.

⁷⁷⁶ Ibid., ch. II, 201-207. “Carta de Diego de Ybarra al Rey; México, 10 de noviembre de 1582”, in Hackett, *Historical documents*, 112-4.

⁷⁷⁷ Mendieta, *Historia Eclesiástica Indiana*, IV, book 5° (Second Part), ch. X, 224. Arlegui, *Crónica de la Provincia de N.S.P.S. Francisco de Zacatecas*, Part 4, ch. III, 211-2.

⁷⁷⁸ Mendieta, Ibid., 224-6. Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. CCXX-CCXXII, 676-85.

⁷⁷⁹ Mendieta, Ibid., 227. Arlegui, *Crónica de la Provincia de N.S.P.S. Francisco de Zacatecas*, Part 4, ch. VII, 225-7.

⁷⁸⁰ Mendieta, Ibid., ch. VIII, 217-20.

⁷⁸¹ Robert Jackson, when analyzing the writ by Father Guillermo de Santamaría *Guerra de los Chichimecas*, says that “the argument for a just war against the Chichimecas cited the apostasy and rebellion of the Chichimecas against royal authority, and their attacks on and murders of clerics;” see Jackson, “The Chichimeca frontier and the evangelization of the Sierra Gorda,” 55.

⁷⁸² Powell, “Franciscans on the Silver Frontier of Old Mexico,” 299.

Franciscans of the Kingdom of Chile also experienced the brutal death of some of their members, although the fatal event did not frame in the context of indigenous evangelization. Indeed, the brown habit men had a much more contained propensity to enter into the conflicting Indian territories of southern Chile than their counterparts in the northern hemisphere. The tendency to withdraw their actions in times of tension was what kept them safe from the indigenous spears for almost half a century. Although it was true that they were spokesmen of the Indians' discontent entrusted in the country central zone, and that on more than one occasion they sent complaints to the king about the excessive use of force to the southern Biobío river, it is paradoxical to verify that beyond that fluvial limit they acted more like chaplains of the Spanish troops than like missionaries, although they attended the doctrines in the submitted areas.⁷⁸³ Already in the twilight of the Spanish Golden Century and in the midst of a campaign of pacification headed by the governor Martín García Oñez de Loyola, the provincial Juan de Tobar, the priest Miguel Rovillo and the layman Melchor Arteaga fell in an ambush in December of 1598 together with the ruler in the place of *Curalava*: the three religious were the first martyrs of the Franciscan Order in the Kingdom of Chile.

Following the example of the stoic and long-suffering work of the Apostles, Franciscans put all their efforts into the native conversion, turning into lanterns for those who wander blind and disoriented in the world for living far from the Christian religion light. Through instruction, they hoped to be able to channel them not only in the way of salvation, but also in that of the civil life virtues. It did not matter if *Chichimecs* or *Reche-Mapuches* were seen as less capable than the natives of the valley of Mexico or those of Peru to attain the knowledge of the faith,⁷⁸⁴ since no effort was too much when the aim was to rescue souls from hell to incorporate them into the flock of Christ.

The *Crónica Miscelánea* by fray Antonio Tello gives an account of the measures taken by missionaries to attract to faith the natives of the steep northern regions. Referring to the vicissitudes of fray Francisco Lorenzo's apostolic work, an illustrative passage indicates that when he was in the Frailes province (Nayarit region), he founded seven towns, building

⁷⁸³ Duarte, *Ideales de la misión medieval en la conquista de América*, 366-7.

⁷⁸⁴ Fray Antonio Tello, referring to fray Pedro de Almonte's missionary experience, points out that the *Chichimecs* are "so uneducated and more gross than men, they are less apt and able to reach the mysteries of our holy faith;" see Tello, *Crónica Miscelánea*, ch. I, 12.

the respective churches, giving each one images of saints, “which they were always supplied with them.”⁷⁸⁵ Attracting the will of the indomitable northern societies was not an easy task, for the traumatic experiences with the white man impelled them to flee from contact with those who had deprived them of more than one relative, friend or ally, either by the edge of the sword or slave captures. The requirement imposed by those Chichimecas willing to reduce themselves was that “they did not want Spaniards to enter their lands,”⁷⁸⁶ a request to which the friars acceded based on the principle that the Republic of Indians should remain apart from the Republic of Spaniards. One of the main motivations of natives to congregate in the missions was the relative security that provided them a space in which they would be kept apart from the Spanish slaveholders as well as from other native groups with which they maintained territorial disputes. This congregation of Indians involved, as it is easy to observe, “a spatial reorganization of the indigenous population in more compact settlements and, therefore, more economically, politically and culturally manageable.”⁷⁸⁷ From a missionary point of view, the reduction of Indians meant resettling infidelity in an enclosed space, more restricted and easy to handle.⁷⁸⁸ It meant to leave behind the chaos of constant mobility, irregular and unpredictable by the order of norms founded on Christian rituality and the teaching of revealed truth. The time of natural cycles, in which the social habit is at the mercy of seasons, subjected to the whim of droughts and rains impossible to predict with absolute certainty, is displaced by the liturgical calendar rigidity and the tasks imposed.

The missions were an integral part of the Spanish conquest scheme.⁷⁸⁹ Throughout the colonial period they became one of the Hispanic presence’s bastions in the frontier zones of the New World, where the missionaries were expected to convert, civilize and control the Indians.⁷⁹⁰ Therefore, the missionaries were much more than mere religious agents, since they also acted as political and civilizing agents, becoming into a vital element of the Spanish colonial system.⁷⁹¹ Robert Ricard coined the term *missions of penetration* to refer to those sporadic settlements established in areas of difficult access, cumbersome climate and among

⁷⁸⁵ Ibid., ch. CLXXV, 565.

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁷ Sullivan, “La congregación como tecnología disciplinaria,” 33-4.

⁷⁸⁸ Sheridan, *Anónimos y desterrados*, 18.

⁷⁸⁹ Bolton, *The Spanish Borderlands*, 188-9.

⁷⁹⁰ Ibid., 191.

⁷⁹¹ Bolton, “The mission as a frontier institution,” 193.

populations sparsely pacified or absolutely indomitable, as was the case of Chile and New Galicia. They used to accompany or precede the military conquest.⁷⁹² In the Franciscan evangelizing project, reducing meant to teach and lead the body and soul of the converts to the greatest extent possible. The Christianization of Indians gathered in villages was carried out through the inculcation of practices, which were reinforced with a systematic vigilance in spaces (the church, the square) and well-defined times (the mass, annual festivities).⁷⁹³ The incorporation of the doctrine demanded a balance between the doctrinaires' word and work, or more precisely, a consequence between the message and the action, between the discourse and performance of its emitters, congruence never seen in the encomendero group. Christian rhetoric, whose ultimate goal was the persuasion of the hearers, consisted in "the art of finding, treating and disposing all that pertains to the salvation of souls; which will be achieved by the Christian speaker by teaching, exciting and conciliating the audience."⁷⁹⁴ Intercultural speaking demanded the mastery of vernacular languages, an immense challenge which, as I have already pointed out, greatly limited the missionary successes of this Order both in the most remote regions of the Mesoamerican sphere, where the first Franciscan attempts to impose on Nahuatl as lingua franca failed, as well as in the forests of southern Chile due to the lack of competent operators in native speaking. Very often the friars were accompanied by an interpreter who led "the barbarous and indomitable Indians to the presence of the religious men."⁷⁹⁵

⁷⁹² Ricard, *The spiritual conquest of Mexico*, 77.

⁷⁹³ Sullivan, "La congregación como tecnología disciplinaria," 40.

⁷⁹⁴ Valadés, *Retórica Cristiana*, First Part, 47.

⁷⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, Fourth Part, 501.



Figure 6. Engraving depicting the way Franciscans approached to Chichimecas. At the center, the religious carries the image of Christ crucified, accompanied by the interpreter and an entourage of helpers. The weapons carried by nomadic Indians reveals their initial mistrust. Source: Fray Diego Valadés, *Rhetorica Christiana*. (Courtesy of Centro de Estudios de Historia de México).

The missionaries, attempting to win over the natives with gestures of good will to overthrow the wall of apprehension that used to precede these encounters, were supplied with a large number of gifts, such as glass beads, mirrors, small metal objects, hats and some textiles or clothing, the latter reserved for the higher ranked persons within the communities. It was not easy to go through mountains and ravines bathed by a scorching sun or torrential rains depending on the season, and even less to enter into the heart of societies that for a long had been victims of Spanish steel. In New Galicia, despite having been aware of the dangers and deaths experienced by various members of the Franciscan Order in the first incursions into Chichimeca space, Diego Valadés' work shows a less dramatic picture than that drawn by letters and reports of royal officials, miners and landlords. The author describes the

Indians as well-intentioned but not exempt from vices,⁷⁹⁶ noble souls but stupid “for being born in such a heavy climate,”⁷⁹⁷ always ready to receive the friars in the best way when they arrived on their lands, offering them “something in sign of charity, as fruits or something like.”⁷⁹⁸

The enthusiasm of the author, bent on showing the ferocity of natives as a response to the unjustified aggressions of Europeans, might have inspired him to show an idyllic image of the northern naked men, but it cannot be discharged that the knowledge he had gotten on their customs and forms of sociability motivated him to ponder the virtues of indigenous reciprocity. Indeed, the meetings or parleys performed each other by the many native groups were a fundamental part of their sociability, through which they resolved old intergroup disputes or established agreements to solve problems of diverse nature through mutual social, warrior and/or economic assistance. Theologian Juan Focher, also aware of this, noted at the same time how much it helped the conversion of infidels to participate in their instances of interaction, because many fruits could be obtained from “this mutual colloquy and daily deal.”⁷⁹⁹ What is more, it was not a coincidence that one of the missionary strategies was to attract them by means of banquets or giving them food, with which “they are often reduced easily to the service of God and His Majesty the king.”⁸⁰⁰ The growing lack of wild resources due to the uncontrolled depredation of forests to support mining activity, a matter I have already mentioned, should have played a central role in this Chichimeca approach to the generous friars.

⁷⁹⁶ Ibid., 485. The religious man says: “Among the nefarious, horrendous and cruel crimes of the Indians, there were the magical arts, teaching how to have covenant and communication with demons, or to invoke them, or also for making them sacrifices or to elevate them requests as to God, in order to come in knowledge of things present or future, or to perform some portents, or to infer some evils. The cult of all these nefarious things is the cause of all evil and its beginning and end.”

⁷⁹⁷ Ibid., Second Part, 229.

⁷⁹⁸ Ibid., Fourth Part, 503.

⁷⁹⁹ Focher, *Itinerario del misionero en América*, Second Part, ch. XVI, 304.

⁸⁰⁰ Ibid.



Figure 7. The missionary teaches the gospel to Chichimeca men, women, and children. The weapons left in the Center represents the acceptance of Franciscans on their lands and the pacification of Indians.
Source: Fray Diego Valadés, *Rhetorica Christiana*. (Courtesy of Centro de Estudios de Historia de México).

There is no reason to doubt that on the frontier of Chile the Franciscans acted, at least initially, with the same enthusiasm as in northern Mexico. Before the arrival of the Order, when in Penco Bay had just risen what would become the main southern enclave of the kingdom, captain Pedro de Valdivia

“[...] assembled all the lords of the land who are encomendados to this city [Concepcion] and made a conference with all the people, making them to understand by the translators that he was sent from Your Highness to these kingdoms, not to take their houses or their estates or cattle, which they have in great quantity, but to have them in justice on behalf of Your Majesty, and that they did not kill each other for the lands, as they are accustomed to do, and make them to understand and show them who was their Creator, and thus he would give teachers to their children for learning it and they come to the true knowledge of the Creator of all created things, and they

said that they would do so and would give their children to their masters whom they were entrusted on behalf of Your Highness.”⁸⁰¹

The strategy of pactism, which had already been released in Santiago as soon as the Valdivian army arrived, was reactualized in the southern extensions of the territory due to the need of having the native populations support. By this means it was also tried to avoid the emergence of *malones* or Indian crews with pretensions of looting, kidnapping or destruction in the cities that were rising in the heart of native land. As indicated in the quotation, Pedro de Valdivia urged the caciques to surrender their children to the *encomenderos* to instill in them Christian education, a commitment that he reproduced in every new encomienda assigned to the nascent Spanish towns’ neighbors. For example, in the vicinity of La Imperial he benefited Pedro Martín de Villarreal with Indians of the Guallareba lebo, on the condition that they be used “according to royal commandments and ordinances, and you are obliged to leave the chief-cacique his women and children, and the other Indians of service, and to indoctrinate them in the things of our holy catholic faith; and having religious in the said city, to bring before them the children of the caciques to be instructed in the things of our Christian religion.”⁸⁰² The fragile Spanish position in the *Reche-Mapuche* territory led to an attitude of tolerance toward practices sanctioned both by Hispanic legislation and the Catholic morality, as it was the *lonkos*’ polygamy. If before long the illusions of concord turned into despair, it was because the Spaniards were unwilling to respect the agreements, reducing the collaborationist will of natives. Franciscans had to fight against this resentment in the *Reche-Mapuche* missionary space, who constantly experienced the Indians’ refusal to participate in instances of conversion. In addition, and as has already been stated, the Franciscans in Chilean territory were willing to work actively with Indians only in times of peace –a very sporadic and unstable situation in the sixteenth-century–, which marks a clear contrast with their peers who displayed their apostolic work in *Chichimec* land.

In the Franciscan missionary ideology, the ideal situation indicated that once the generosity, the good treatment and the preaching of gospel were able to appease the war spirit

⁸⁰¹ “Carta del Cabildo, Justicia y Regimiento de la ciudad de la Concepción de Chile, al Príncipe don Felipe; Concepción, 15 de octubre de 1550,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 9, 116.

⁸⁰² “Encomienda de Pedro de Valdivia a favor de Pedro Martín de Villarreal; Valdivia, 4 de marzo de 1552,” in *Ibíd.*, 411.

of barbarians, turning them benevolent and submissive, the next step was to concentrate them in towns and cities, aparting them from their primitive ways of life, dispersed in the mountains, where they ran the risk of returning to their former idolatry.⁸⁰³ The congregation was the best fertilizer to bring forth the good seed that had been planted in their hearts, and thus “to be able to instruct them better and more profitably in the faith.”⁸⁰⁴ Through the community work that demanded the edification and maintenance of towns, it was expected that neophytes develop a sense of submission and reverence towards the missionaries.⁸⁰⁵ From then on, everything would rest on the doctrinal teaching, the manual arts, and all the economic and civil activities that allowed the sedentary life to remove them definitively from their barbarism for making them part of the men herd.

Franciscan work, despite facing the geographical and cultural barriers imposed by the northern lands, was carried forward with special enthusiasm. After the Franciscan Custody of Zacatecas was founded in December 1566⁸⁰⁶ in the eponymous region –the most prone to Indian attacks– nine convents were erected between 1567 and 1584.⁸⁰⁷ At that point, the convent of Nombre de Dios, erected in 1562, had at least a dozen monasteries in the war land.⁸⁰⁸ Similar achievements were obtained in Chile, although within a much more limited spatial range: Concepcion in 1559, Valdivia and La Imperial in 1560, Osorno and Angol in 1565, and Villarrica in 1568.⁸⁰⁹

Population projects with Spanish settlers

The Franciscan effort went hand in hand with the protection measures implemented by the Crown, which by the 1570s had already placed over half of the New Galicia’s towns

⁸⁰³ Focher, *Itinerario del misionero en América*, Third Part, ch. VI, 372.

⁸⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid., 373.

⁸⁰⁶ Arlegui, *Crónica de la Provincia de N.S.P.S. Francisco de Zacatecas*, Part 1, ch. IX, 39. Antecedent of the Franciscan Province of Zacatecas, confirmed in 1604.

⁸⁰⁷ Jiménez Moreno, “Los orígenes de la Provincia Franciscana de Zacatecas,” 141.

⁸⁰⁸ However, it is necessary to say that a Franciscan document reveals that in 1569 they had fourteen convents; see the “Códice Franciscano. Relación que los franciscanos de Guadalajara dieron de los conventos que tenía su orden, y de otros negocios generales de aquel reino; Guadalajara del Nuevo Reino de Galicia, 8 de noviembre de 1569,” in García Icazbalceta, *Nueva colección de documentos*, II, 166-8.

⁸⁰⁹ Ibid., 104.

and tributary Indians under its custody (*en cabeza del rey*).⁸¹⁰ Beginning in 1550, monarchs, and viceroys in their name, promoted an ambitious program of Indian communities settlement in villages, relying on the work of missionaries to indoctrinate the newly reduced ones in the virtues of faith and introduce them into the advantages of policy life and Hispanic industries: agriculture and mechanical trades (stonework, carpentry, shoemaking, blacksmithing, etc.). A few years earlier, in 1546, the king had requested the advice of the Council of the Indies on the advisability of gathering the Indians in towns, for he had reports stating that “for the instruction and conversion of the Indies’ naturals, it is convenient and necessary that they come together in villages because other than the fruit that will be made, they will have human policy and there will be a disposition to doctriate them.”⁸¹¹ Three years later, this petition materialized in a royal decree, which provided that “for the good of the Indies’ naturals and their salvation it would be convenient for them to gather together and make towns of many houses together in the regions they want.”⁸¹² This measure was echoed by religious and some officials on this side of the Atlantic, especially since the First Mexican Provincial Council held in 1555: clerics discussed the difficulties that Indians’ dispersion in fields, mountains and mountains involved for evangelizing them, living “more like beasts than rational and political men.”⁸¹³ In this way, it was ordered that the natives should be persuaded, and even compelled if necessary, “to congregate in affluent towns, where they live politically and christianly, and may be administered the Holy Sacraments, and may be instructed, and taught in the things necessary to their salvation.”⁸¹⁴

This, however, did not prevent the warmongering positions from holding their flags high for a long time. Thus, for example, the Franciscan missionary fray Juan de Armellones,

⁸¹⁰ López de Velasco, *Geografía*, 138-40. The author estimates that by the middle of that decade there were about 71 villages and 13,450 Indian tributaries under the Royal Crown, in opposition to 60 villages and 11,300 Indians encomendados. If we refer to the report written by the notary Bernardino de Balbuena in 1570, there is a slight demographic increase from the 14,040 Indians who were at the head of His Majesty and the 11,600 encomendados at the beginning of the decade, which suggests that escapes of natives settled in the missions and towns become really important from 1575. See the “Testimonio de los naturales que hay en los pueblos de indios de Galicia, por el Escribano de Su Majestad Bernardo de Balbuena; Guadalajara, 20 de febrero de 1570,” in Fernández Sotelo, *La primigenia Audiencia de la Nueva Galicia*, 296-301.

⁸¹¹ “Su Majestad manda se le dé relación y parecer si converná [*sic*] que los indios se junten en pueblos; Valladolid, 26 de marzo de 1546,” in *Cedulario de 1574*, 19.

⁸¹² “Real Cédula en que se da la orden que se ha de tener en juntar los indios en pueblos; Valladolid, 9 de octubre de 1549,” in *Ibid.*, 20. Also in Konetzke, *Colección de documentos*, I, 260-1.

⁸¹³ Lorenzana, *Concilios Provinciales Primero y Segundo*, First Council, ch. LXXIII, 147.

⁸¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 148. Also Osante, “El septentrion novohispano,” 48.

conventual of Guadalajara, a few years after the Mixton War proposed to the king a peaceful means of settlement, manifesting himself in open opposition to the intransigent position of the oidor Hernán Martínez de la Marcha. This one, just three years before, had recommended to the king that it would be legitimate and necessary “to reward the warriors by making the most guilty Indians into slaves or at least *naborias* [Indians for service] by the will of your majesty, for by the atrocity of their crimes it would be lawful to exceed the rules of law.”⁸¹⁵ The position of the royal councilor was based on the experience acquired in his crossings by the northern districts, witnessing the halo of destruction left by the assailants, rather than in properly legal arguments.⁸¹⁶ The Franciscan, on the other hand, proposed the erection of six or eight cities, each populated by one hundred farmer neighbors, so that by their example and civility the land would be secured from the Indians threat, who would benefited from learning agriculture and enjoy the advantages of political life.⁸¹⁷ The hoe and the Roman plow, not the sword, were to be the tools to pave the route of pacification and to end the Chichimecas barbarism.

In the case of Chile, the official position was always more intransigent. As in northern Mexico, the role of civilizing enclaves fell directly into the cities southern of Biobio river, but the systematic destruction they experienced during that century, especially in the two largest rebellions of the period (1553-1557 and 1598-1605), turned this project into an utopia. The Franciscans of Chile, who at that time were the most active Order on the frontier, lacked the enthusiasm shown by their Mexican coreligionists or those that will deploy the Jesuits in the same space as early as the seventeenth century. Moreover, the government authorities were always more reluctant to use peaceful means to quiet the turbulent climate that prevailed in the southern regions. What is more, during the government of Alonso de Sotomayor (1583-1592) was implemented a fierce war by fire and blood against costal groups, which throughout the century were the most reluctant to submit to Spanish rule.⁸¹⁸ The Arauco War fueled an important slave trade dating almost from the beginning of the conflict, whereby indigenous labor was provided to the mines and estates of Santiago and La Serena, with some

⁸¹⁵ “Carta del oidor Hernando Martínez de la Marcha a Su Majestad; Compostela, 18 de febrero de 1551,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 251.

⁸¹⁶ Carrillo Cázares, *El debate sobre la Guerra Chichimeca*, I, 138.

⁸¹⁷ “Carta de fray Juan de Armellones al rey; Guadalajara, 20 de septiembre de 1554,” in Carrillo Cázares, *El debate sobre la Guerra Chichimeca*, II, 538.

⁸¹⁸ Goicovich, “La Etapa de la Conquista (1536-1598),” 108.

pieces destined even to the Peruvian viceroyalty. The chronicler Pedro Mariño de Lovera recounts a raid in 1578 by Julian Carrillo, corregidor of Osorno, who organized a punitive expedition to the Cordillera region supported by a large number of friendly Indians, and after a bitter battle made 170 captives.⁸¹⁹ The same chronicler denounces that the taking of slaves extended too often to peaceful Indians, as happened around 1580 in the Valdivia area, when

“[...] some Spaniards captured Indians, who could be blamed for the uprising, taking them to the port as guilty people, they sent them to be sold off their lands as slave captives in a lawful war. As a consequence, on this beach there was a so painful crying that it became more bitter with tears than salty with waves. Mothers wept for their children, and wives for their husbands, and even the husbands for their wives, for they were taken away as slaves of soldiers, and other worse things they usually do when having some women in their tents. And in this there are great abuses until today, going troops of soldiers out to explore the lands, moving away from heaven by their faults, snatching herds of Indians to sell the boys, and sending the girls to many ladies known by them.”⁸²⁰

Mining and agriculture of Chile central zone, therefore, were important engines to encourage the *Reche-Mapuche* slavery. In northern Mexico, these factors meant an even more powerful stimulus, since mining potential reached much higher levels. Good intentions would therefore be useless when the discovery of rich silver veins had turned the New Galicia scenario into a rarefied space of interethnic tensions. Meritorious attempts and proposals for peace ensued unsuccessfully in the 1560s. First, in 1561, an experienced Franciscan missionary who had participated in the conquest of Mexico with Hernan Cortes, fray Jacinto de San Francisco –known in his time as fray Cintos– requested in a large document to the king “that by no means Your Majesty allow war against these natives.”⁸²¹ After witnessing the horrors of a conquest process, the intention of the priest was that in New Galicia did not repeat the excesses experienced in New Spain. Offering himself to carry forward the pacification and conversion of *Chichimecs*, he proposed to the sovereign that the entering into the land of war should be headed by a group of experienced religious, escorted by a hundred soldiers under a captain named by the same Franciscan Order with the title of

⁸¹⁹ Mariño de Lovera, *Crónica del Reino de Chile*, book 2°, ch. XV, 378.

⁸²⁰ *Ibid*, book 3°, ch. XXVI, 406.

⁸²¹ “Código Franciscano. Carta de fray Jacinto de San Francisco al rey Felipe II; México, 20 de julio de 1561,” in García Icazbalceta, *Nueva colección de documentos*, II, 244.

“assistant and helper of our holy faith and religion of our Order.”⁸²² In other words, he proposed to the Crown a plan of pacification in which the pacific conversion of Indians was privileged, subordinating the military to the orders of religious men.⁸²³

On the same date Alonso Zorita, a *Real Audiencia*'s *oidor* in Mexico, wrote to the king a letter of a similar tenor to the one written by fray Cintos, but presenting a more detailed pacification proposal. Following the previous approach, he maintains the need for a competent governor and willing “to populate those provinces and to bring those people into peace.”⁸²⁴ This captain should be accompanied by a hundred Spaniards paid by the royal treasury of His Majesty, who would act as soldiers and settlers to protect the expedition and consolidate the settlements that were founded once pacified the land. Relying on their vast missionary experience and the knowledge acquired from the Indians of New Spain, the spiritual tasks would remain in the hands of twenty priests of the Order of St. Francis, “because they have known and visited many people from that land near to the New Galicia, and they have baptized and brought of peace very great amount of people.”⁸²⁵ Groups of friendly Indians supplied by the Crown were expected to voluntarily join the explorers, who would act as pedagogues of native groups that would be reduced in villages, “to teach others to sow and to breed cattle and birds and fruits and trees , because this will be of great utility.”⁸²⁶ To gain the esteem of natives basically depended on meeting four requirements. First, flattering them with gifts, “especially to their principal ones, to attract them into peace with more will and facility, and this is very necessary to be obeyed and esteemed and loved as it should be.”⁸²⁷ Secondly, to assure them a dignified treatment by keeping them apart from the Spaniards, who will be barred from entry in the newly founded settlements, because experience has shown that they usually did so in order to appropriate the Indian labor force, their lands and livestock.⁸²⁸ In addition to this, they will be promised to remain perpetually under the protection “of the royal crown of Castile, and that they will never be encomendados

⁸²² Ibid., 246. Fray Cintos mentions that “for this purpose, regarding all we the religious of these parts and Spaniards and naturals have understood, we think there is not another with the above conditions, but Dr. Alonso de Zurita.”

⁸²³ Cruz Rangel, *Chichimecas, mineros, soldados y terratenientes*, 203-4.

⁸²⁴ “Memorial de don Alonso de Zurita; 20 de julio de 1561,” in García Icazbalceta, *Colección de documentos*, II, 333.

⁸²⁵ Ibid., 338.

⁸²⁶ Ibid., 340.

⁸²⁷ Ibid., 334.

⁸²⁸ Ibid., 337.

to any person, neither sold nor pawned or donated, nor alienated by title or any way.”⁸²⁹ Third, they will be free to pay taxes of any kind for a period of ten years, at the end of which they will pay a tax “very moderate of what they have in their own lands.”⁸³⁰ Fourth, in case there are caciques or other principals, they will continue to enjoy “their lordships, rents and tributes.”⁸³¹ Not a few of these benefits seem to be rooted in the privileges that the monarchy granted to Tlaxcalans after their important help in the conquest of Mexico, so it would not be risky to argue that some of the peacemaking measures applied in border contexts had been inspired by the benefits of the successful Spanish-Tlaxcalan Alliance.⁸³² Historian Charles Gibson warned of this situation when he argued that the Spaniards also considered that the privileges granted to Tlaxcalans would serve as an incentive to other Indians for cooperative behavior.⁸³³

The tension generated by Indian attacks, intensified precisely in 1561 with the Guachichil-Zacateco rebellion that affected the Zacatecas area, meant that these pacification initiatives by population settlement did not prosper. By the time viceroy Luis de Velasco I died while in office in 1564, the Chichimeca war seemed to be resolved in favor of the Indians. Despite the indigenous protection measures implemented during his regency, such as the liberation of a considerable number of unjustly enslaved natives, the war balance was clearly unfavorable to Spaniards, who had not yet succeeded in organizing an efficient defensive system.⁸³⁴ Some years later, in the early months of 1567, the project of viceroy Gaston de Peralta to persuade the Chichimecas to settle peacefully meant a new setback.⁸³⁵ His immediate successor, viceroy Martin Enríquez de Almansa, was the main promoter of a series of theological meetings (1569, 1570, 1574 and probably in 1576) aimed at resolving the problem of ethics in the war against Chichimecas.⁸³⁶ The complaints of regular and secular clergy, expressed especially in the memorials by Alonso Maldonado de Buendia,

⁸²⁹ Ibid., 339.

⁸³⁰ Ibid.

⁸³¹ Ibid.

⁸³² Charles Gibson, in an interesting essay, invites to moderate the scope of the privileges granted to Tlaxcalans, which have been magnified by historiography. See Gibson, “Significación de la historia tlaxcalteca en el siglo XVI,” 594.

⁸³³ Gibson, *Tlaxcala in the Sixteenth Century*, 161.

⁸³⁴ Gómez Serrano, *Guerra Chichimeca, la fundación de Aguascalientes*, 30.

⁸³⁵ Zavala, “Los esclavos indios en el norte de México,” 89-90.

⁸³⁶ Detailed analysis of these meetings in Carrillo Cázares, *El debate sobre la Guerra Chichimeca*, I, cap. X, 223-45. The documents on which he bases his considerations were transcribed in the second volume of the same work, 575-81.

issued to the Council of the Indies to denounce the injustices of war and slavery arbitrarily exercised by Spanish soldiers,⁸³⁷ were decisive in taking this measure. However, factors as diverse as the urgent circumstances oppressing the colonizers of New Spain's north,⁸³⁸ the need for the Spanish monarchy to supply its coffers with tributes from Zacatecas' royal fifth,⁸³⁹ and the fear that other maritime powers would establish an enclave at some unknown point north of the New Spain coast,⁸⁴⁰ determined that the viceroy Martín Enríquez reinforced the forceful actions against assailants, allowing the slavery of Indians caught bearing arms. At the later ecclesiastical councils, most of the participants approved that "they should be made war by fire and blood,"⁸⁴¹ being enslaved all children under fifteen years old. In the warnings he wrote four years later to his successor, Lorenzo Suárez de Mendoza, viceroy Enríquez described the Chichimecas as rebels who ambushed the Spaniards in passages and roads, carrying out robberies and deaths with unnamed cruelties, being the war by fire and blood the only way to put a definitive remedy to the distressing situation faced by miners, farmers, merchants and soldiers.⁸⁴² Needless to say, however, that the New Spain authority undertook this extreme measure reluctantly, but aware of the priorities demanded by the

⁸³⁷ The memorials, written between 1561 and 1566, were compiled and transcribed by Carrillo Cázares, *El debate sobre la Guerra Chichimeca*, II, 558-62. A memorial, written in 1570, was addressed to Pope Pius V, 562-3.

⁸³⁸ Lawyer Alonso Martínez informed the president of the Council of the Indies that "the boldness and shamelessness of Indians who have been robbers of this land have come to such an extent that they have even got to inhabitants' doors of the Zacatecas mines, San Martín and others of that region, and they get there to kill every day the Spanish, black and Indian men who labor in the mines; and shoot them arrows, kill and take the beasts off and cattle of their estates." See the "Carta del licenciado Alonso Martínez, fiscal de aquella real audiencia de la Nueva Galicia, al presidente Juan de Ovando; Guadalajara, 8 de marzo de 1576," in Enciso Contreras, *Epistolario de Zacatecas*, 156. The picture that best describes the Spanish situation on the New Spain's northern border in the 1570s is that presented by Powell, "Spanish warfare against the Chichimecas in the 1570's."

⁸³⁹ The European economy of those days regarded precious metals as the most important and valuable product of the Indies. The Spanish monarchy took advantage of all the means at its disposal to stimulate the mining of gold and silver, getting the corresponding revenues through taxes. See Parry, *Europa y la expansión del mundo*, 106.

⁸⁴⁰ Following the Francis Drake expedition, who landed on the California northern coast in the middle of 1579, in England numerous plans were drawn up to expand English power in the Pacific. See Stewart Stokes, *Del Mar del Norte al Mar del Sur*, 32-3.

⁸⁴¹ "Carta del virey de la Nueva España Don Martín Enríquez al Rey Don Felipe II, dándole cuenta de la ejecución de diferentes órdenes que se le habían comunicado y de otros varios asuntos; México, 31 de octubre de 1576," in *Cartas de Indias*, 325.

⁸⁴² "Relación y advertimientos que el virrey don Martín Enríquez dejó al Conde de la Coruña, don Lorenzo Suárez de Mendoza, su sucesor en los cargos de Nueva España; 25 de septiembre de 1580," in Torre Villar & Navarro de Anda, *Instrucciones y Memorias*, 182. The war on fire and blood characterized the viceroys' frontier strategy until the mid-1580s.

kingdom in those days.⁸⁴³ In this way, he made the foundation of prisons and villages the cornerstone of the occupation and conquest policy of the northern regions, a strategy aimed at consolidating control of Chichimeca territory.⁸⁴⁴

The presidio was the military institution most representative of the northern occupation, the frontier advance was identified to a great extent with the progress of the garrisons line.⁸⁴⁵ In the case of Chile, forts were present from the first day when the Europeans set foot, but the constant harassment by pedestrian warriors or riders forced on numerous occasions their dismantling, making clear their little efficiency, acquiring a true strategic role just in the seventeenth century by the governor and military Alonso de Ribera. In both regions they were simple structures, basically constructed of adobe and less frequently of stone and wood. The soldiers it housed, many of whom had been forcibly sent there for criminal offenses committed in other regions of the kingdom, “constituted an ethnic and racial mosaic with varying numbers of Spaniards (Europeans and Creoles), mestizos, mulattoes and the product of their mixtures.”⁸⁴⁶ Generally, six to twelve soldiers sheltered behind their walls.⁸⁴⁷ It essentially had a dual function: to contain the clashes of untamed societies that threatened the Spanish settlements, and serve as a logistic enclave for the punitive expeditions that preceded the frontier line advance. Subsequent events, however, were to demonstrate, in both New Galicia and Chile, the poor efficiency of this device of space and human control, largely as a result of the immense numerical superiority of the assailants and the vast knowledge they had of the environment in which they mobilized. The animosity against the Spaniards arose from the abuses perpetually committed by soldiers against natives, taking their goods and women, evils of which even the already pacified Indians were not free.⁸⁴⁸

In Mexico, the Theological Council of 1574 made it possible for the Augustinian friar, Guillermo de Santa María, to elaborate his famous treatise *Guerra de los Chichimecas* (Chichimeca War), written in 1575, and from which he wrote five years later an abbreviated

⁸⁴³ Powell, “Portrait of an American Viceroy: Martín Enríquez, 1568-1583,” 8.

⁸⁴⁴ Powell, “Presidios and towns on the Silver Frontier,” 181 and 187-8.

⁸⁴⁵ García, *Civilización y salvajismo*, 157. David Weber complements this assessment when he points out that “as the Mexican border moved northwards, presidios were built along the way from Mexico City to Zacatecas in the midst of the lasting Chichimec war;” see Weber, *La frontera española en América del norte*, 304.

⁸⁴⁶ Jiménez, “Life and death in the far north: The Presidio,” 234.

⁸⁴⁷ Powell, *Capitán mestizo: Miguel Caldera y la frontera norteña*, 67.

⁸⁴⁸ Powell, “Presidios and towns on the Silver Frontier,” 195-6.

versión.⁸⁴⁹ Sustained in the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, the author drew a distinction between the justification of the war of conquest and that of the war of pacification. He believed that the peaceful reduction into sedentarism and Christian life, and the use of war as a punishment only in extreme cases of rebellion, were the best strategies to end the conflict and prevent the extermination of indigenous populations. Although he favored Indian slavery when it was carried out in the context of a just war, he was aware of the many abuses suffered by the Chichimecas, many of them being imprisoned under false conciliatory pledges of pacification. Santa María, acting as a spokesman for his religious order, outlined a reductional project that adhered to the framework of human and divine law, through which to achieve a true and just peace. Guachichiles, Guamares and other Chichimeca nations of the northern regions should be reduced in the best possible lands, providing them with “the necessary things to sustain human life, which is of eating and clothing, and this until they learn how to acquire them.”⁸⁵⁰ Therefore, in addition to the things of faith, men had to be instructed in the art of agriculture and “other mechanical trades such as pan makers, carpenters, masons,”⁸⁵¹ while women would be reserved the teaching of textile work and cooking, especially the bread making, which accounts for an attempt to instill the Iberian parameters of division of labor.

The Crown, at this point, was in an uncomfortable theological and moral position in the eyes of both its European peers and a good part of the regular clergy. Spain was harassed by an infamous publicity by which theologians, scholars and jurists, both inside and outside the Iberian borders, intended to sit her in the armchair of the accused. Concealing their opportunism behind the veil of Christian ethics, rival powers wove a vast propaganda that spoke of a *black legend* that sought to delegitimize the successful Spanish expansion in the new continent. Worst of all was that, despite the calculated exaggerations of its critics, the reports issued by authorities and royal officials scattered throughout the West Indies revealed that such accusations held true traces. Bodies of legislation aimed at putting an end to the excesses denounced against the natives, such as the Laws of Burgos of 1512, the New Laws of 1542, and an uncountable list of royal decrees, never produced the expected results. Thus, in the second half of the sixteenth century the monarch Philip II, convinced that the existing

⁸⁴⁹ Carrillo Cázares, *El debate sobre la Guerra Chichimeca*, I, 278.

⁸⁵⁰ Santa María, *Guerra de los Chichimecas*, 239.

⁸⁵¹ *Ibid.*

legislation had been ineffective in solving the problems posed by colonization, decided to provide a legal solution that would harmonize the opposing views posed by jurists and theologians of that time.⁸⁵² The population policy, which until then had been developed with many setbacks, “reached its most successful and systematic expression in the celebrated *Ordinances of Discovery and New Population* promulgated by Philip II in 1573.”⁸⁵³

The new ordinance established severe restrictions and regulations for the exploration and extension of Spanish settlements, since it prohibited any person without royal authorization to make “new discovery by sea or by land, entrance, any new population, or assaults to Indian settlements in everything discovered or for discovering.”⁸⁵⁴ The rest of the provisions that conformed this legal body showed that from this moment the Spanish colonial policy had a new north, going from an offensive expansionist orientation justified in the Palacios Rubios’s *Requirement*, to the establishment of a rather defensive tendency, based on a project of “peaceful conquest” focused on the natives conversion.⁸⁵⁵ Moreover, this retreat in the colonial action basis also meant a change in the nomenclature of colonization, that is, a resignifying of concepts that already worked in the colonial discursive scenario and, therefore, a renewal in the spirit of social, political and cultural interaction that had been occurring since the first contact. From now on the discoveries was prohibited the use of the term *conquest*, “since it must be done with as much peace and charity as we wish, because we do not want the name gives occasion or excuse to use force or injure to the Indians.”⁸⁵⁶ Instead, its was replaced by the one of pacification, more in agreement with the monarchy’s new colonialist inspiration.⁸⁵⁷ From this moment on, as there were no more ‘conquests,’ the evangelizers’ role got more prominence,⁸⁵⁸ in whose hands was not only entrusted the Indians

⁸⁵² Vas Mingo, “Las Ordenanzas de 1573, sus antecedentes y consecuencias,” 84.

⁸⁵³ Ots y Capdequí, *Historia del derecho español en América*, 84.

⁸⁵⁴ “Ordenanzas sobre descubrimiento nuevo y población; Bosque de Segovia, 13 de julio de 1573,” in Torres de Mendoza, *Colección de documentos inéditos*, 486. Due to a transcription or printing error the document is dated in 1563. It is also in Konetzke, *Colección de documentos*, I, 471-8; although not all the ordinances are transcribed.

⁸⁵⁵ Sheridan, *Anónimos y desterrados*, 77.

⁸⁵⁶ “Ordenanzas sobre descubrimiento nuevo y población; Bosque de Segovia, 13 de julio de 1573,” in Torres de Mendoza, *Colección de documentos inéditos*, 496.

⁸⁵⁷ This point, as a Spanish author points out, meant more a formal advance than a real one, given that the conquering mentality was still alive, and its applicability in New Galicia clashed with the Chichimec War, whose violent facts were in marked growth in that decade. See Vas Mingo, “Las Ordenanzas de 1573, sus antecedentes y consecuencias,” 87.

⁸⁵⁸ Adams, “Consecuencias del contacto hispánico entre los Pueblo,” 82.

conversion,⁸⁵⁹ but also were given priority in the undertaking of new discoveries.⁸⁶⁰ In order to facilitate the reduction of natives it was not only recommended to treat them with *rescates* (gifts)⁸⁶¹ who were expected to “to acquire a taste for them,”⁸⁶² but also to introduce them into trade with the Spaniards, without showing “greed for their things”⁸⁶³. In short, from this moment the legislation established that at any entering into new lands the cross replaced the sword, which could only be used if “it were necessary for defense of settlers.”⁸⁶⁴ Franciscan historian Lino Gómez Canedo rightly stated that “with these ordinances the foundations of the missions system, which with small changes was to rule in the American future, consolidated.”⁸⁶⁵

The application of the new legal parameters demarcating the way in which the Spanish expansion in the New World was to be carried out was limited, however, by two important obstacles both in the New Galician and Chilean spaces. The first was the uncontrollable dynamics of uninterrupted war decades, in which the ambitions of some and the rancor or needs of others had set a snowball rolling that never stopped growing. In this context, the real provisions could be interpreted in such a way that the belligerent spirit dragged in years of bitter struggle was kept alive. Four years after issued the ordinances, Dr. Juan Bautista de Orozco wrote an extensive letter to the monarch declaring the need to build settlements in the Indian lands to finish the war. His proposal, however, was inspired by a less conciliatory spirit than that of missionaries or the king’s. The new towns should work as intimidating enclaves, causing “fear and fainting”⁸⁶⁶ to discourage Indian incursions into Hispanic towns. The selection of places to establish the foundations would have to stick to basically strategic principles, trying to cut their communications to avoid the alliances agreements. With this strategy he hoped that many natives would approach the Spanish posts to request peace after having “seen their own damages.”⁸⁶⁷ Those who remain reluctant to

⁸⁵⁹ “Ordenanzas sobre descubrimiento nuevo y población; Bosque de Segovia, 13 de julio de 1573,” in Torres de Mendoza, *Colección de documentos inéditos*, 532.

⁸⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 495.

⁸⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 487.

⁸⁶² *Ibid.*, 531.

⁸⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 530.

⁸⁶⁵ Gómez Canedo, “Evangelización y política indigenista,” 34.

⁸⁶⁶ “Carta del doctor Juan Bautista de Orozco al Rey sobre el modo de terminar la Guerra Chichimeca; México, 25 de noviembre de 1576,” in Naylor & Polzer, *The Presidio and Militia*, 57.

⁸⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

requirements of peace will be done a just war. Orozco finishes his letter with an illustrative and definitive affirmation: “by populating the land in the referred form not only will be gotten the intended peace, but also the limits and territories of your majesty will extend.”⁸⁶⁸

The second obstacle was the shortage of religious workers, who were always insufficient to meet the pastoral needs that demanded territories so vast and so populated. Only the entrance of new actors allowed to fulfill the objectives proposed by the Ordinances of Felipe II: Tlaxcalan settlers in the New Galicia and surrounding regions, and the Society of Jesus in the Kingdom of Chile.

Conclusion

The way to reach peace through nonviolent means and to evangelize the American frontier societies was the result of a long process plagued by contradictory positions. The conquering and colonizing experiences in the southern Iberian territory, in the Caribbean islands, in the great American civilizations, or the evangelization projects in Tierra Firme and the region of Chiapa, among others, were useful but insufficient references to get success in the New World's most remote areas of imperial influence. The particularities of each space imposed on the religious men challenges that demanded not only to take advantage of the knowledge accumulated until then, but also stimulated their ability to adapt to the circumstances of every local reality. In this way, the inapplicability of the early attempts of evangelization in Spanish language determined that religious learn the vernacular languages in order to achieve a better approaching to societies settled in the most extreme regions. During much of the sixteenth century, the Dominicans, and especially the Franciscans, were the orders that more strongly encouraged a peaceful approaching founded on the knowledge of native culture for the subsequent transformation. However, their attempts failed under the weight of the interests of military men, encomenderos and even royal officials, since the need for indigenous labor for mining and agricultural mills was a powerful engine for the implementation of surreptitious slavery or covered by imperial legislation.

⁸⁶⁸ Ibid., 60.

The study of what happened in northern Mexico and southern Chile, from the Spanish-Indian contact until the 1580s, provides an opportunity to know how the same religious order, the Franciscans, operated in the core of two highly conflictive spaces. In both contexts, the indigenous resistance was a factor that strongly conditioned the Spanish presence and, therefore, made it difficult the evangelizing project by friars. Along with this, the unequal support gotten by priests, both in men and in resources, led to disparate inter-ethnic dynamics that reveal how divergently a same religious order could operate in different border spaces. This largely explains why the brown habit men played a so decisive role in the approach to New Galicia's frontier societies, a role that their brothers did not display in the southern forests of Chile. In the next chapter we will see the definitive consolidation of the policy of nonviolent pacification in New Galicia and Chile: the Franciscan success in ending the Chichimec War became a reference point for the subsequent Jesuit action in the Arauco War.

Chapter 4:

Four actors and a stage: mestizos, Franciscans and “madrinero Indians” in the Chichimecs pacification of northern New Spain

Chapter four describes the implementation of the non-violent pacification strategy imposed at the end of the 16th century in New Galicia. The *Ordinances of Discovery and New Population*, promulgated by Felipe II in 1573, established the legal framework to strengthen a new form of approach to the indigenous societies settled in the extreme regions of the New World. However, its continental implementation was not easy, since the particularities of each region –defined by geographical and human aspects– prevented a mechanical application of the royal provisions. In the case of New Galicia, the prolonged and violent Chichimeca War had created a rarefied atmosphere, difficult to modify with mere legislative clauses, especially if there was no will to implement them in all their scopes by the royal officials, much less to abide by those who felt most affected. In addition to the slaving interests hidden behind the veil of conflict, the deforestation of hills and pollution of streams as a result of mining activities led to naked men to make of predation a necessary way of life for their subsistence.

The 1570s was of permanent and progressive conflict for the Spanish pioneers. Established in a space agitated by the inter-ethnic turbulence, only the winter truce offered a small breathing space to the merchants, miners, landowners, soldiers and travelers who traveled along the “silver route.” The roads and trails of the north had become the heel of Achilles of the Spanish Empire in New Spain.⁸⁶⁹ At that point it was practically impossible to contain the audacity of the Chichimecas, who had achieved a dynamic and range of unattainable mobility after the incorporation of the horse. The foundation of presidios and towns, although they were vital elements to assure the Spanish presence in the frontier region, was not enough to guarantee the security of colonizers. Since the proclamation of the *Ordinances*, twelve years of war had elapsed until the pressing circumstances imposed the need for a change in the political consciousness of the authorities of New Spain towards whom the immigrants of New Galicia called “the barbarians of the north.”

A series of factors converged in the last decades of the sixteenth century for the definitive implementation of peaceful conquest. The first, of theological-juridical nature, was the celebration of the Third Mexican Provincial Council, whose agreements gave the missionaries the foundations and the method to follow in the conversion of the natives: the role of the missionaries in the task of protecting and evangelizing the natives was reinforced at the ecclesiastical level, something that had already been considered in the *Ordinances of 1573*. Along with this, at this point the advanced border mixture allowed to have men prepared to assume the status of cultural and political mediators, giving rise to communication between Indians and Spaniards, and enabling the refloating of an old integration strategy: the employment of Christianized Indians loyal to the crown.

⁸⁶⁹ Powell, *Capitán mestizo: Miguel Caldera y la frontera norteña*, 43. El autor indica que “la oleada de ataques chichimecas a los caminos y a las estancias de la frontera, a mediados del siglo, causó graves preocupaciones en la floreciente Zacatecas, que vio elevarse ante sí el espectro de un peligroso aislamiento entre un mar de hostilidad”.

Throughout this process, members of the Franciscan Order played a central role, true managers of this borderland peacemaking strategy.

A new framework for action: The Third Mexican Provincial Council (1585)

If the Ordinances put in clerics' hands the pacification and incorporation of indigenous into the Church and monarchy, it was necessary that ecclesiastical authorities assume the task of initiating a review of the principles and procedures by which they operated among parishioners until that moment, and even more, to get through the royal permission the full obedience of officials and other strata of the Novohispanic social body. In addition, it was essential to incorporate definitely the Council of Trent guidelines, which met until December 1563, a task that was only partially carried out in the Second Mexican Provincial Council of 1565.⁸⁷⁰ For all this, it was not a coincidence that would had been a religious, the third archbishop of Mexico and sixth viceroy of New Spain, Pedro Moya de Contreras (1584-1585),⁸⁷¹ who convened the Third Mexican Provincial Council, whose meetings lasted from January to October 1585. However, the objective of renewing the modalities of approach to nude men was not an easy task, because behind an explicitly opposed animosity to the change among military, miners and ranchers, there was hiding profit interests created over decades of frontier struggling. Less than three years from opening of conclave the border ranchers petitioned the viceroy Lorenzo Suarez de Mendoza, Count of La Coruña, that in view of the large excesses committed by raiders they could be authorized to make them "war by fire and blood naming them as enemies and converting in perpetual slaves, and giving general authority to be followed and punished toughly."⁸⁷² Just one year later Alonso de Oñate, representing residents and miners of Zacatecas region, presented to the king that the critical situation inevitably would lead to depopulation of mines. Factors conspiring in favor of this distressing reality were, at that point, the low ore grade (the best crests had already been

⁸⁷⁰ Llaguno, *La personalidad jurídica del indio*, 42.

⁸⁷¹ On June 12, 1584, Felipe II issued a cedula that named Moya de Contreras governor, captain general, and president of the Mexican audiencia, with all the powers of a viceroy until the king appointed a permanent one. Moya de Contreras was notified on September 15, twelve days later he notified the audience of this, taking possession of his post. See Poole, *Pedro Moya de Contreras*, 149.

⁸⁷² "Petición ante el Virrey de los criadores de ganados, vecinos y moradores de la frontera Chichimeca para tomar represalias contra los ataques indios, presentando detallada información de la situación de la frontera, 1582," in Powell, *War and Peace*, 218.

exploited in previous decades), the flooding of the mine lodes, diseases that affected the laborers, and especially the Chichimeca predatory raids, resulting in the escape of Indians working the mines and haciendas.⁸⁷³ Building garrisons near the Spanish settlements was the most convenient way to contain the rebels and consolidate peace on the land⁸⁷⁴. It is a paradox that just a few months apart the Real Audiencia of Mexico, which in those days was in charge of the interim government after the death of viceroy Lorenzo Suarez de Mendoza, had indicated that the roads were safer because chichimecas did less damage than before⁸⁷⁵. Just one year later the archbishop and viceroy Pedro Moya de Contreras confirmed this assessment when he notified the king that “Chichimeco Indians have been these days less harmful [than] they used to be.”⁸⁷⁶

The subjects treated in the Third Mexican Provincial Council covered many legal and doctrinal aspects, but the fundamental problems faced in most of the discussions were the status of native population and the problems affecting them, especially the *repartimientos* and the legality of total war against Chichimecas.⁸⁷⁷ In general, the views discussed in the meeting were divided into two opposing views: that of the religious orders, favoring a peaceful approach to the Indians, and that of counselors, who mostly supported a total war and permanent slavery.⁸⁷⁸ In the resolution prevailed the first position, giving primacy to preaching as a means of spreading the faith,⁸⁷⁹ and establishing the obligation to know indigenous languages to carry out pastoral work, especially to satisfactorily perform the sacrament of confession.⁸⁸⁰ Special emphasis was placed on the benefits that would accrue

⁸⁷³ “Carta de don Alonso de Oñate al Virrey, sobre la crisis de la minería en Zacatecas; 1583,” in Enciso Contreras, *Epistolario de Zacatecas*, 263-5.

⁸⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 271.

⁸⁷⁵ “Ordenanzas sobre los indios chichimecas, que no los tomen por esclavos; México, agosto de 1583”, AGNM, Reales Cédulas Duplicadas 2, exp. 56, 21v.

⁸⁷⁶ “Carta al rey, del arzobispo de México sobre asuntos de la gobernación de la Nueva España; México, 7 de noviembre de 1584,” in Paso y Troncoso, *Epistolario de Nueva España*, XII, 105.

⁸⁷⁷ Poole, “‘War by fire and blood.’ The church and the Chichimecas, 1585,” 117.

⁸⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 128. The best study on the proposals and debates of the Third Mexican Council is still the classic work by José Laguno, *La personalidad jurídica del indio*, cap. II: “Los Memoriales,” y cap. III: “Las Consultas,” 40-114. While developing the Provincial Council some Indians native of Zimapán were judged by their complicity in diverse attacks along the mining region, being some of them executed and others condemned to forced services; see the “Testimonio de las sentencias que don Pedro de Quesada, teniente de capitán general en la frontera Chichimeca, dio contra ciertos indios de Zimapán por complicidad en rebelión; abril de 1585,” in Powell, *War and Peace*, 262.

⁸⁷⁹ Book 1°, Decree 2°, Tit. I, § 1, in Martínez Ferrer, *Decretos del Concilio Tercero Provincial Mexicano (1585)*, 210.

⁸⁸⁰ Book 5°, Tit. XII, § 5, in *Ibid.*, 628.

gather them in villages, urging the governors to meet the royal mandates aimed at this purpose. Only in this way it would be possible to keep them away from their customs and fierceness, indoctrinate in the faith, reveal their mistakes and suppress their vices, and in this form become true Christians.⁸⁸¹ Through the reduction they could be “taken off the barbaric and wild way of living in scattered settlements, mountains and ravines and rough lands, distant from each other as savages, and not according to the natural human policy.”⁸⁸² Although it was not an explicit argument in the discussions, is indubitable that was taken into consideration the colonizing experience with Otomíes a quarter century ago to appease the war Indians, especially when it was suggested that the most effective way to achieve it was building

populations in such a number that they can occupy all the latitude of this land, populating it with Spaniards as well as Mexican Indians instructed in our holy Catholic faith, who live and work in our way, politically, honoring and exempting them from taxes and tasks.⁸⁸³

Regarding the Chichimec War, the opinion was that there was no any justification for subjecting them to slavery. Moreover, many innocent Indians had fallen as victims of the greed of unscrupulous Spaniards, who justified their operations in “imagined grievances, which because has never had the necessary punishment and compensation, have irritated all these barbarous nations who live and spread over the land.”⁸⁸⁴ Opposing at both ends of the scale the penetrations carried out by dint of sword with those led by the spirit of understanding, the final decision tipped in favor of the latter, stating that the protracted conflict could have been avoided if those entries would had proceeded with adherence to evangelical law.⁸⁸⁵

Strictly speaking, the settlement as an instrument for incorporating of nomadic societies into the canons of social, political, economic and religious life of Spaniards was not a creation of the Third Mexican Council.⁸⁸⁶ It had many precedents from the early days of

⁸⁸¹ Book 1º, Decree 6º, Tit. I, § 1, in *Ibid.*, 226.

⁸⁸² “Carta al rey Felipe II: cosas que se avisan y publican; México, 16 de octubre de 1585,” in Llaguno, *La personalidad jurídica del indio*, 310.

⁸⁸³ *Ibid.*, 313.

⁸⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 312.

⁸⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸⁶ Carrillo Cázares, “Continuidades y discontinuidades en la evangelización,” 151.

contact in the New World, as evidenced by chronicles, letters, reports and official documents of the time. What is really new is that in New Galicia it became into a necessary alternative to end a long, expensive and uncertain war. In other words, resolutions of the Third Mexican Council and subsequent measures make not only clear the triumph of clerical position –very especially Franciscan– regarding the way of ending a war of features such dissimilar to that sustained decades ago in the valley of Mexico, but also they are an act of recognition of the military strategy failure against opponents who lacked a single authority that tied their wills together: nor vicious war or unintentionally introduced pests prevented that the arrow and spear prevailed on steel impetuosity. But the Council decrees did not have the approval of the Holy See until 1589⁸⁸⁷ and the Council of the Indies in 1591,⁸⁸⁸ and were just published in 1622.⁸⁸⁹ It is therefore no surprise that in the following years various voices expressed their opposition to some of its provisions.⁸⁹⁰ Soldiers, ranchers, miners and officials regarded slavery as such a profitable exercise that they did not wish to finish the war and lose the pretext of enslaving rebel Indians.⁸⁹¹

Still, the minutes sent to Europe adhered to the precepts of the Ordinances of 1573, and with regard to the Chichimec War they had the approval of viceroys who ruled New Spain in the transition from sixteenth to seventeenth-century. This reveals in the instructions the king Felipe II left to viceroy Álvaro Manrique de Zúñiga (1585-1590), whom he entrusted the care of natives working in the silver mines, preventing them from damages and grievances, and seeking to have sufficient priests for indoctrination.⁸⁹² Faithful to the command of his master, Manrique revealed his successor Luis de Velasco II (1590-1595)

⁸⁸⁷ “Confirmación del Sínodo Provincial de México por el Papa Sixto X; Roma, 28 de octubre de 1589,” in Galván Rivera, *Concilio III Provincial Mexicano*, 1-4.

⁸⁸⁸ “Real Cédula para que se guarden los Concilios Limense y Mexicano últimamente celebrados en las Provincias del Perú y Nueva España; San Lorenzo, 18 de septiembre de 1591,” in *Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias*, 43.

⁸⁸⁹ Ernest Burrus, in an interesting article, showed that in some respects the agreements of the Third Mexican Council were not as favorable to the Indians as the decrees published in 1622 apparently showed. After comparing the printed version with the manuscripts and bylaws that were in the Vatican Archives, the author demonstrated that the official version was the result of a thorough revision process carried out in Madrid and Rome, which implied various changes to the New Spain posture, especially with regard to equal privileges. However, there was a general consensus on the means of achieving peace with the natives. See Burrus, “The Third Mexican Council (1585) in the light of the Vatican Archives,” 397-8.

⁸⁹⁰ On these oppositions consult the works by, “Opposition to the Third Mexican Council,” and by Pérez Puente, “Dos proyectos postergados. El Tercer Concilio Provincial Mexicano y la secularización parroquial.”

⁸⁹¹ Weber, *Bárbaros. Spaniards and their savages in the Age of Enlightenment*, 84.

⁸⁹² “Instrucciones al marqués de Villamanrique; Zaragoza, 1 de marzo de 1585,” in Torre Villar & Navarro de Anda, *Instrucciones y Memorias*, 213.

that had sought “by all means and possible ways to protect them”⁸⁹³ during his regency, but considering that mining was “the main nerve from where all the wealth of this land is made,”⁸⁹⁴ he requested the king to send three thousand blacks from Guinea to replace the native labor. Although the war against the Chichimecs was an inescapable source of worry, little time was enough to internalize its true causes, blaming the Spanish who harassed the peaceful Indians. The experience, he says, “revealed that war was done by the soldiers, who were without pay, and they were responsables of irritation and rebellion of Indians.”⁸⁹⁵ For all these cases documentation shows that, in last decades of the sixteenth century, the peaceful way appeared as a less expensive and more promising alternative than maintaining a permanent army and of dubious effectiveness, as had shown the events of recent years, so the sovereign had become convinced that garrisons were not a viable alternative in economic or military terms.⁸⁹⁶ Indeed, since around 1581 the tax imposed on the slaves sale was not enough to cover military costs and much less to pay for the services of allied Indians.⁸⁹⁷

A longstanding innovation: Captain Miguel Caldera and diplomacy of peace

Following the agreements of the Provincial Council, which faithfully adhered to guidelines of the *Ordinances of Discovery and New Population*, Spaniards had a formula to appease the northern nomads: pastoral working and good treatment. A few years earlier the cleric Juan Alonso Velazquez had stressed that the Indians “have much confidence of anyone doing wellness to them and who always treat them [with] truth.”⁸⁹⁸ However, it was still necessary some mechanism to attract them to the settlements where they would be converted

⁸⁹³ “Advertimientos generales que el Marqués de Villamanrique dio al virrey don Luis de Velasco en el gobierno de la Nueva España; Texcoco, 14 de febrero de 1590,” in *Ibid.*, 231.

⁸⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 232.

⁸⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 233.

⁸⁹⁶ “Al Virrey de la Nueva España que embie relacion con su parecer sobre que se ha avisado que para reducir y pacificar los Yndios Chichimecas convernía usar de los medios que aquí se refieren fundando en su comarca pueblos y monasterios; Sant Lorenzo, 19 de junio de 1586,” in Hackett, *Historical documents*, 154. The transcript wrongly records the year 1566. Also in Enciso Contreras, *Cedulario de Zacatecas*, 521. Juan de Torquemada says in his chronicle that to contain the Chichimeca assaults were useless “the garrisons, presidios and forts, which had been ordered by the Viceroy Don Martín Enríquez and others before him;” see Torquemada, *Monarquía indiana*, Lib. V, cap. XXXV, 669.

⁸⁹⁷ Powell, *Capitán mestizo: Miguel Caldera y la frontera norteña*, 12.

⁸⁹⁸ “Relación de Juan Alonso Velázquez, clérigo beneficiado de la villa de San Miguel de los Chichimecas, sobre la guerra con los indios fronteros y los remedios para concluir con ella, 1582,” in Assadourian, *Zacatecas*, 460.

into Christians and educated in the essential rules of political life and civil society. The Franciscan missionary experience proved crucial at this point. The few but important instances of successful rapprochement with the Chichimecs in the period of 1542 to 1568, just before the war by blood and fire be institutionalized, had shown the effectiveness of distributing gifts including clothes, ornaments and food. The same author adds that “when they are called and agree the peace, they are promised to feed and clothe,”⁸⁹⁹ issue that would necessarily involve an expense that, in consideration of the benefits hoped, should be charged to the Royal Treasury.

Until that moment, the military had emerged as one of the most stubborn defenders of total war and slavery against Chichimecs plaguing Hispanic settlements in the mining region. For this reason it might seem a coincidence or the result of a historical contradiction that it was a military man who reinstated, and with great success, the strategy of attracting nomadic rebels through a generous policy of gifts and parleys. But Miguel Caldera, born in the mines of Zacatecas, was a synthesis of frontier world, because he carried inside not only the blood and knowledge of the Hispanic world, but also that of cultures of the northern desert. Son of Spanish captain Pedro Caldera⁹⁰⁰ and a Guachichil Indian⁹⁰¹ named María, and guided by an ambition for social promotion channeled to overcome the limitations imposed by his mestizo condition, he was able to transit between both social, political and cultural fields, trying to get the most personal advantage of his own situation considering the possibilities open to him in a frontier context. The army, which he joined as a militiaman in 1569, was one of the few alternatives that offered the possibility of achieving these objectives. By dint of merit and military successes he climbed positions until the viceroy Lorenzo Suárez de Mendoza appointed him captain in 1582.⁹⁰²

With one foot in each half of the northern frontier world, Miguel Caldera managed to become in a cultural intermediary, a *go-between* in the American historians nomenclature. The knowledge not only of the environment in which they operate, but also of codes by which

⁸⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁰ “Testamento del capitán Miguel Caldera; San Luis Potosí, 2 de noviembre de 1596,” in Velázquez, *Colección de documentos para la historia de San Luis Potosí*, 277.

⁹⁰¹ Torquemada, *Monarquía Indiana*, book V, ch. XXXV, 669. Magaña, “Participación tlaxcalteca en el poblamiento del norte,” 23.

⁹⁰² “Probanza de méritos de Miguel Caldera, justicia mayor de las poblaciones de Chichimecas y Ataxcaltexas, 1592”, AGI, México 220, n° 30. See also Powell, “Caldera of New Spain,” 326.

the actors of border scenarios relate each other, gives to these characters a mobility, a set of information and a share of power that make them protagonists of political dynamics –and at times also of economical ones– developed in such spaces.⁹⁰³ The idiomatic and cultural knowledge of both ends puts them in an advantageous position for which they are able to handle not only the information flows (interethnic diplomacy), but also material (exchange under the modalities of trade or barter) and human (rescue of captives) that often characterize the areas of encounter and intercultural strife. In such a situation not only stability, but also instability so characteristic of borders could provide favorable opportunities for these intermediaries: depending on their ability and charisma, in the border regions –as spaces of transgression– they could reap substantial fruits, but also face considerable risks, in both war and peace.

Caldera was raised from childhood by Franciscan missionaries,⁹⁰⁴ internalizing not only their theological position on indigenous rights, but also the procedures through which they had tried to achieve a lasting peace with Chichimecs until then.⁹⁰⁵ This, however, did not prevent he grasped the sword against his blood-relatives as he served the king in the army. With always insufficient wages to offset the high prices that reached the imported goods from capital, it was usual that gestates forms of profit sustained in the plunder or capture of prisoners with slavery purposes, and Miguel Caldera was no stranger to it. Historian Juan Carlos Ruiz Guadalajara has rightly said that “Captain Caldera was, from a racial perspective, a mestizo, but from a cultural perspective he was the most Hispanic of all Chichimecs.”⁹⁰⁶ Capitalizing his command of some northern vernacular languages and of the principles governing the relations of indigenous reciprocity, he concluded an alliance in 1583 with the Cazcanes Indians of the Juchipila region, being escorted by a gang of them by around five years in his punitive raids along the northern mountains trying to keep available the roads linking Guadalajara to Zacatecas.⁹⁰⁷ Many victories was based on his perfect knowledge of nomad rebels' fighting tactics. In his proof of merits appears this illustrative passage

⁹⁰³ Metcalf, *Go-betweens and the colonization of Brazil, 1500-1600*, 3.

⁹⁰⁴ He says in his will: “I command that in the monastery of San Francisco de Zacatecas, where I was raised as a boy, and whom my parents were devotees;” see “Testamento del capitán Miguel Caldera; San Luis Potosí, 2 de noviembre de 1596,” in Velázquez, *Colección de documentos para la historia de San Luis Potosí*, 279.

⁹⁰⁵ Montejano y Aguiñaga, “El capitán Miguel Caldera, pacificador y fundador de pueblos,” 32.

⁹⁰⁶ Ruiz Guadalajara, “Capitán Miguel Caldera y la frontera chichimeca,” 30.

⁹⁰⁷ Velázquez, *Historia de San Luis Potosí*, 434-5.

He got his bow and arrows and naked went to fight with the Indians to precipitate them from the mountains, and imprison and punish [...] that in the time that captain Miguel Caldera served as captain and soldier going with his generals and captains, many war Indians were captured, and justice was done in all of them, hanging some and selling others, depending on their crimes.⁹⁰⁸

Cora Indians first, and Guaynamotas of the Sierra de Nayarit then, who had claimed the lives of parents Andrés Ayala and Francisco Gil, were subdued by the forces led by captain Caldera in 1585.⁹⁰⁹ But not everything was brandishing the sword. From this date a smart strategy of parleys and distribution of gifts began to displace the thrust of steel as a priority policy in the frontier relationship. What is more, efforts to pacify the region also headed to intercede in the internecine wars that faced various indigenous nations in the region, as happened with the Cazcanes and Guachichiles, whose ringleaders were gathered in Juchipila to agree a peace agreement.⁹¹⁰ Caldera was not alone in this, since around the same time a number of captains began to open negotiations with several tribes.⁹¹¹ This apparent synchrony could be based on various causes. First, a better understanding of the Chichimec reality supported by a growing number of local mestizos, heirs in part of their culture. This included to be aware of the economic needs of nomadic groups, who had been seriously affected by devastation of the forest that just a few decades ago crowned the hills of the region. Second, the irrevocable decision of Franciscans for stopping a war that hindered their pastoral work, wasting the few fruits harvested over and over. Third, the discovery of new veins of silver in what was to be the region of San Luis Potosi led stakeholders, Miguel Caldera among them, to ponder the dividends that would bring the mining work in a pacified land, which due to a matter of distances would be difficult of supplying and defending from the viceregal capital. Finally, the very possible influence of the Third Provincial Council, whose decrees even though did not yet have official and papal sanction, soon became generally known.

⁹⁰⁸ “Probanza de méritos de Miguel Caldera, justicia mayor de las poblaciones de Chichimecas y Ataxcaltexas, 1592,” AGI, México 220, n° 30.

⁹⁰⁹ “Mandamiento de la Audiencia de Nueva Galicia a Miguel Caldera para la pacificación de los guaynamota; 29 de octubre de 1585,” AGI, México 220.

⁹¹⁰ Powell, *Capitán mestizo: Miguel Caldera y la frontera norteña*, 141.

⁹¹¹ Powell, *Soldiers, Indians and Silver*, 205.

Miguel Caldera's successes made him obtain the viceroy Manrique's recognition, who quickly realized the benefits that this new pacification strategy provided both the royal treasury and the security of settlers. General Rodrigo del Río and a set of experienced men in the affairs of the Chichimec War had put him aware of the border situation on 1586, warning with concrete examples about the failure of increasing soldiers and presidio system as means of spatial and human control. Given a body of evidence that revealed the responsibility of some soldiers in the expansion and lasting of the conflict, he decided to strictly prohibit the capture of Indians for slavery business. This resolution, however, was far from responding to humanitarian considerations, since the capture of robber Indians was authorized, who instead of being enslaved should be sentenced to death.⁹¹² With the peacemaking project the viceroy put an end to the slave business, pursuing two objectives: to end the main engine of war, and leave behind the danger posed to safety of kingdom the escapes of captured Chichimecs, serving as informants to their own nations.⁹¹³ It is for this reason that imprisoned war Indians should face capital punishment.

Madrinero Indians and Franciscan missionaries: the cross and example rather than the sword

The pacification of northern New Spain was the result of a clever combination of diplomacy, gifts and religious conversion.⁹¹⁴ Captain Miguel Caldera was the successful architect of the Spanish consolidation in the kingdoms of New Galicia, New Vizcaya and the New Kingdom of Leon. With the support in resources and men provided by viceroy Alvaro Manrique, he toured the extensions of the northern rugged geography, attracting with gifts

⁹¹² "Proclama del virrey Álvaro Manrique a los oficiales de la Real Hacienda de Su Majestad sobre la esclavitud de los indios chichimecas; México, 10 de agosto de 1586," AGI, Patronato 151, ramo 4.

⁹¹³ Ibid.

⁹¹⁴ Powell, *Soldiers, Indians and Silver*, 204. Powell explicitly states that the strategies were diplomacy, buying and religious conversion. But to consider inter-ethnic agreements as the result of a mere transaction of goods is to focus them only from the capitalist perspective of Western culture. For the indigenous societies of the contact, diplomatic relations were always mediated by the circulation of "gifts," which cannot be valued as simple goods with exchange value. In this regard see the interesting article by Alfred Gell, "Inter-tribal commodity barter and reproductive gift-exchange in old Melanesia," 143-8.

and promises of peace to many nomadic groups refuged in the gorges and mountains. In exchange for peace and cooperation with the Spanish, of accepting being evangelized and swear allegiance to the Crown, an amnesty of all assaults and deaths perpetrated to the subjects of the king was promised to them, in addition to food, clothes to cover their bodies and to face winter rawness, fertile land to settle, farm implements to produce their own food, and agricultural education.⁹¹⁵ In the region of Mazapil captain Juan Morlete was carrying on a similar mission, although on a smaller scale. Thus the captains, who in previous years had drawn the sword to pursue, capture and kill the rebellious Indians, now would be the protectors and providers of Chichimecs who accepted peace.⁹¹⁶ The peacemaking effort was made so hard and so efficiently, that for 1588 it was possible to move almost smoothly from Colotlán to Río Verde, and from Nieves and Mazapil to Juchipila, San Felipe and San Luis de la Paz.⁹¹⁷ This non-confrontational attitude meant reducing the frontier military contingent, working now with smaller but better equipped exploratory crews. The licensing of soldiers obeyed in a good way to the need of lessen the royal treasury expenses, which at that point was quite meager.

When viceroy Alvaro Manrique de Zúñiga, Marquess of Villamanrique, left office in his successor's hands, Luis de Velasco II (1590-1595), wrote with pride that thanks to his own management it began to take another route in the treatment to Chichimecs, reducing the number of troops on the frontier and attracting “the Indians by means of good peace, giving them gifts and making good treatments, and feeding them and clothing at the expense of his majesty's estate, with all of which they are being tamed and appeased.”⁹¹⁸ The benefits to the royal treasury were considerable, since the 20,000 pesos invested in the gifts for Indians represented a tiny number compared to the 320,000 annual pesos destined to keep the military body up before its reduction by licensing men.⁹¹⁹ The final stilling of nomadic warriors had

⁹¹⁵ Monroy Castillo, “La vida cotidiana con los tlaxcaltecas. Una aportación a la historiografía de Tlaxcala,” 64.

⁹¹⁶ Powell, *Capitán mestizo: Miguel Caldera y la frontera norteña*, 158.

⁹¹⁷ Montejano y Aguiñaga, “El capitán Miguel Caldera, pacificador y fundador de pueblos,” 33.

⁹¹⁸ “Advertimientos generales que el Marqués de Villamanrique dio al virrey don Luis de Velasco en el gobierno de la Nueva España; Texcoco, 14 de febrero de 1590,” in Torre Villar & Navarro de Anda, *Instrucciones y Memorias*, 233-4.

⁹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 234.

ceased to be an utopia to become a reality close, since “from a year until now that they began to get peace, there has been no death or damage or theft in all the lan.”⁹²⁰

The outgoing viceroy, it is true, drew an exaggeratedly optimistic picture of his peacekeeping management in the frontier, but it can not ignore that in the five years of his administration the violence decreased significantly in the northern regions. As Luis de Velasco II received a frontier still not entirely pacified, his administrative work focused on consolidating his predecessor's achievements. The essential peace project guidelines were drawn up by viceroy Manrique, to which Velasco adhered in the strictest manner; in the exhortations that Manrique left to his successor states

And now I have ordered that in seven populations to be built in Galicia, in the valley of San Luis and the Mezquitic and San Francisco, the Charcas, Teocaltiche, Tlaltenango, San Andrés and other parts were given to them some friendly Indians and corn and ten oxen and one Spaniard with pay, for he taught them to cultivate and plow the land and so they could get the fruits and get used to the culture and political life, and in the meantime they would be supplied with the corn necessary for their sustenance from his majesty's treasury. And one religious man, who administers the sacraments to Christian Indians and those peaceful ones who were with them, and in that way they were getting used to each other, and learning the evangelical law and Christian doctrine, by which the land is so quiet, peaceful and safe that who walks from Mexico to Santa Barbara goes with the same security than to Tacuba.⁹²¹

One of the first measures by the incoming authority was to appoint Miguel Caldera as chief justice of the Chichimec frontier on 30 March 1590, with jurisdiction on Guadalajara and Mexico courts, honor that meant a recognition of his successful work on the northern frontier.⁹²² He, in order to carry out in the most efficient way the orders of his superior, had the wisdom of forming a retinue of men skilled in the vicissitudes that daily experienced on the frontier, and especially that they were familiarized with Chichimec languages and idiosyncrasies. It was not a coincidence, therefore, that a number was composed by friendly Indians with which he had been pacifying the region for some years: their role as interpreters, explorers, messengers and porters of gifts for honoring nomads and warriors was fundamental in materializing the plan of peace. Caldera and his men turned Zacatecas into the logistic center of their peacemaking incursions, whose royal revenues provided the

⁹²⁰ Ibid.

⁹²¹ Ibid.

⁹²² Powell, “Caldera of New Spain,” 328 y 333.

necessary funds to pay salaries, stock up on goods for delivering to the Indians, and the materials to build the missions.⁹²³ On horseback and after exhausting work days, they formed an efficient interethnic diplomacy network, attracting nomads with reconciliatory words and promises of good treatment. In certain cases it was got such good effect that some Chichimec leaders, anointed of personal prestige by their warrior feats and the gift of oratory, were escorted to the Mexican capital to discuss the terms of peace and the corresponding privileges with the viceroy.⁹²⁴ A few months after taking office, viceroy Velasco II described his meeting with the Chichimec representatives in these terms

I have found in this city some Chichimec Indians representing desire of wanting peace and friendship, due to which the Marquis of Villamanrique decided to dismiss all the war people, campaign, and garrisons.⁹²⁵

The royal judges of the New Galicia's *Real Audiencia*, wanting to put the Spanish sovereign up with the important advances operating at the frontier, informed him in a brief but explicit way that

The peace of the Chichimecs goes forward and continues. And for this the convenient diligences are made, treating them well and trying they love quiet life, and living congregated, in order and Christianity in their villages. There is peace in and out of town. And everywhere the war that kept them all occupied has ceased. Be the lord praised, that with this will be all ready for your majesty can be well served and the royal rents grow, and they are forgiven the expense that until now has been impossible to avoid, so that in everything there was peace and quiet, and no possibility for the differences and confrontations that have been in these kingdoms in time that governed the Marqués de Villamanrique.⁹²⁶

It was not coincidental that the work led by Miguel Caldera had enjoyed the recognition and immediate support of Viceroy Velasco II. In addition to his unalterable obedience to the Crown's new ethnic policy, and the obvious progress evidenced in the

⁹²³ Powell, "Peacemaking on North America's first frontier," 226-7.

⁹²⁴ Powell, *Soldiers, Indians and Silver*, 205.

⁹²⁵ "Carta del virrey Luis de Velasco II al rey; México, 2 de marzo de 1590," AGI, México 22, ramo 1, n° 11. This event is also referred by Juan de Torquemada in his *Monarquía indiana*, Book V, ch. XXXV, 669, when says that "once this pacification was done, and these Guachichil Indians came to this city [of Mexico] to make the capitulations, asking for baptism, he gave them Franciscan ministers."

⁹²⁶ "Carta de los oidores de la Audiencia de la Nueva Galicia al rey; Guadalajara, 24 de mayo de 1590," in Enciso Contreras, *Epistolario de Zacatecas*, 408.

relative tranquility of routes crossing the New Galicia, he was an official who had internalized the frontier world details, not only based on military reports but also in his own experience in the days when he was invested as ruler of Zempoala, despite of he did not exercise the job. As a son of the second viceroy of New Spain, don Luis de Velasco y Ruiz de Alarcón (1550-1564), he was always aware of the propensity of soldiers, miners and ranchers for enslaving natives.⁹²⁷ Thus, the possibility of losing the achievements gotten up to that moment as a consequence of well-known circumstances was a risk he wished to avoid at all costs. Like the Franciscans, he was convinced of benefits provided by reduccional system, a system that would not only guarantee the instruction of natives, but also their protection from the ambitions of white men, since it was not only expected they settle in fertile and remote lands, distant from the major Spanish cities and villas, but also they had the protection of religious in charge of their spiritual conversion. In those days fray Jeronimo de Mendieta exposed to the highest ecclesiastical authority in New Spain, Pedro Moya de Contreras, the benefits that remunerated the congregation of natives and vices that could be avoided with its implementation

For preventing them from returning to the rites of their ancient idolatry, because is easy for the devil instigating them in remote and isolated places.

For that magistrates of the church can administer the sacraments and Christian doctrine. And for knowing their number, because is a great confusion to know it considering they are spread over the land.

For assisting them physically and spiritually when they fall ill, avoiding death or giving confession when it is inevitable due to seriousness of their condition.

For that by communicating in villages they would introduce in policy life.

For protecting their property, preventing them from being offended, because in the countryside they are exposed to the action of thieves and bad men.⁹²⁸

In order to consolidate the incipient Chichimeca settlements and ensure their spiritual and civic conversion he conceived the idea of appealing for the support of a large contingent of Christian Indians from Tlaxcala, the former allies in the conquest of Mexico.⁹²⁹ To be fair

⁹²⁷ Powell, *Capitán mestizo: Miguel Caldera y la frontera norteña*, 174.

⁹²⁸ "Códice Mendieta. Copia del cuaderno que fray Jerónimo de Mendieta envió al Arzobispo de México, ¿1589?," in García Icazbalceta, *Nueva colección de documentos*, V, 90.

⁹²⁹ Torquemada, *Monarquía indiana*, Book V, ch. XXXV, 669. María Elena Ferrer affirms that "the strategy of occupation of New Spain north included the hauling of Hispanized Indians to the sites of new colonization to help with their own example in the task of teaching local natives the proper way to conduct themselves under the new order imposed by the Spanish;" see Ferrer Flores, *Guerreros y esclavos*, 45.

to history, it is necessary to recognize that interest for Tlaxcalteca support was an idea of king Philip II's advisors, who in his Royal Decree of 19 June 1586 stressed the need to stop the Chichimeca War with the founding of "villages that were to populate with natives from Tlaxcala."⁹³⁰ The requirement of having the Tlaxcalteca support was not only based on his proven loyalty and efficiency,⁹³¹ but also in the lack of religious workers who would promote the acculturative process. He thought the Tlaxcalteca presence would help to stabilize the frontier and its example would provide a model of ideal behavior to be followed by Chichimecas.⁹³² In this way, as well as the frontier diplomacy was merit of Miguel Caldera and those who seconded him in this task, negotiating with Tlaxcaltecas was the work of viceroy Luis de Velasco II, who had to deal with the reluctance of Franciscans in charge of their evangelization and protection. It was Jeronimo de Mendieta, guardian of the Franciscan convent in Tlaxcala, who presented to ruler the angriest argument against transference of his parishioners, saying they would be sacrificed like lambs by the barbarians.⁹³³ Viceroy's political skill, however, overcame the priest opposition and many of his coreligionists. But it was not easy to convince Tlaxcaltecas of providing 400 families to occupy the northern regions. More than three decades ago the caciques of Tlaxcala had rejected a similar plan, which forced the then viceroy Luis de Velasco I to resort to Otomis of Xilotepec to realize the project. That is why the negotiations lasted for so long, from December 1590 to March 14, 1591, when agreements for emigration were signed. Capitulations involved a number of privileges for transplanted Indians, most of which were proposed by themselves,⁹³⁴ which

⁹³⁰ "Al Virrey de la Nueva España que embie relacion con su parecer sobre que se ha avisado que para reducir y pacificar los Yndios Chichimecas convernía usar de los medios que aquí se refieren fundando en su comarca pueblos y monasterios; Sant Lorenço, 19 de junio de 1586," in Hackett, *Historical documents*, 154-6. The transcript wrongly records the year 1566. Also in Enciso Contreras, *Cedulario de Zacatecas*, 522.

⁹³¹ The historian Andrea Martínez Baracs affirms that the Tlaxcalans were rigorously faithful to their new loyalty, since after the submission of Mexico, the warriors "continued participating in the campaigns in which they were required, to magnify the crown and their own nation;" see Martínez Baracs, "Colonizaciones tlaxcaltecas," 197.

⁹³² Simmons, "Tlascalans in the Spanish Borderlands," 102.

⁹³³ Powell, *Capitán mestizo: Miguel Caldera y la frontera norteña*, 195. Shortly after Mendieta retracted this position and supported the migration of the Tlaxcalan families, although without abandoning his reluctance at all; see the "Código Mendieta. Carta para el mesmo virrey, para que no haga caso de que murmuren, como él haga lo que debe; Tlaxcala, 26 de junio de 1591," in García Icazbalceta, *Nueva colección de documentos*, V, 113-4.

⁹³⁴ The Tlaxcalans drew up a list of conditions that formed the basis of the definitive agreements that I transcribe in the following lines; see the "Memoria de las cosas que piden los indios de la provincia de Tlaxcala que han de ir a las nuevas poblaciones de los chichimecas," AGNM, Civil 1277.

demonstrates the negotiating capacity of Tlaxcaltecas.⁹³⁵ In general, volunteers for the expedition requested to maintain the privileges already enjoyed in Tlaxcala.⁹³⁶ The agreed points, and approved by the king, established the following

All Indians from the city and province of Tlaxcala who go to repopulate along with Chichimecas, they and their descendants will be perpetually gentlemen, free from all taxes, pecho tax, sales tax, and personal service, and at no time or for any reason it can be asked or taken anything to them.

Wherever they build their settlements is forbidden to populate next to Spaniards, but in a different place, and the ideal is they establish close to each other, either in different neighborhoods, and banning the Spaniards to take or buy any plot in the Tlaxcalans' neighborhood.

The distribution of land for populations should be apart from each other, so that the Tlaxcalans' land will be independent, and the Chichimecas too, and both must be signposted, so that in every time and forever, lands, pastures, mountains, rivers, fishing spots, salt mines and mills, and other kinds of estates be signposted for every party, and in no time can the first Indians enter into the properties of the other ones. That [in] five leagues around populations at least, it can not make any grant of ranch for cattle.

That can not enter in Indian productive lands any small livestock to feed without the express will of the Indians and their successors.

That lands and ranchs given to Tlaxcalans, both private and communal ones, can not be removed from them even if were depopulated.

That markets they make in populations be free, without sales tax and of any kind of taxation and armhole.

That Tlaxcalan Indians and their successors and descendants, besides being gentlemen and free from all taxes, enjoy all freedoms, exemptions and privileges that enjoy at present, and everything granted in the future to the city of Tlaxcala and its province by the kings of Castile my successors.

The main Indians of that city, who go to populate, and their descendants, can have and use weapons, and riding saddled horses without incurring in penalty. And to make the trip be given to them the necessary supplies, and clothes, and help them for two years with this things, and also to open the land for crops.

They be given a letter and Royal Provision in wich all my subjects are demanded to obey this agreements.⁹³⁷

⁹³⁵ Sego, *Aliados y adversarios*, 52-3.

⁹³⁶ Fernández & Román Gutiérrez, "Presencia tlaxcalteca en Nueva Galicia," 24.

⁹³⁷ "Capitulaciones del virrey Velasco con la ciudad de Tlaxcala para el envío de cuatrocientas familias a poblar en tierra de chichimecas," in Velázquez, *Colección de documentos para la historia de San Luis Potosí*, 179-81. The capitulations are also transcribed in Levaggi, *Diplomacia hispano-indígena en las fronteras de América*, 48-9. The original document in "Para que los indios de Tlaxcala que van a las nuevas poblaciones de chichimecas, se les guarden las preeminencias aquí contenidas; marzo de 1591," AGNM, Tierras 2956, exp. 99, 198-199v.

An achievement of trascental importance for Tlaxcalans, although it was not stated in the agreements, is that settlers would enjoy of considerable political autonomy since they would be outside the jurisdiction of Guadalajara, depending on the New Spain⁹³⁸ and therefore, enjoying the direct protection of the viceregal authority. The very known outrages in which incurred miners, ranchers and soldiers, many of them backed by northern governors and *reales audiencias*, should have played a crucial role in this so convenient concession for the transplanted Indians.

The capitulations were so attractively advantageous that there was no scarcity of volunteers for the expedition, but this did not prevent the emergence of discrepant people who attempted to dissuade the Indians due to the trip's dangers or impeding them by issues of personal debt. In such an eventuality the viceroy was obliged to take forceful measures, ordering to identify those who “disturb, disrupt and try to dissuade those four hundred friendly Indians of going in such travel, and those that were guilty and suspicious you shall send to me to be punished according to their faults, in which I'll put all my effort, to remedy the damage they cause.”⁹³⁹ Once identified those responsible,⁹⁴⁰ and willing to give a signal that would make clear his firm decision on this matter, the viceroy freed them of debts with Spaniards⁹⁴¹ and condoned or reduced the minor criminal offenses⁹⁴² for all the tlaxcalans who wanted to join the expedition. When setbacks were overcome and taken the precautions to secure the properties of expeditionary,⁹⁴³ the voyage begun on June 6, 1591, led by captain Agustín de Hinojosa Villavicencio and a handful of Franciscan friars led by Jerónimo de

⁹³⁸ Martínez Baracs, “Colonizaciones tlaxcaltecas,” 208.

⁹³⁹ “Al gobernador de Tlaxcala, para que con cuidado vea qué indios y personas inquietan y pretenden disuadir a cuatrocientos indios de hacer la jornada para la pacificación de Chichimecas, a fin de que sean castigados; México, 9 de marzo de 1591,” AGNM, Indios 5, exp. 267, 141.

⁹⁴⁰ “Al gobernador de Tlaxcala, para que en vista de ser informado que Leonardo, indio principal, es sospechoso en el caso relativo a disuadir a doscientos indios a visitar las poblaciones como pacificadores, lo envíe ante su Señoría para proveer lo conveniente; México, 9 de marzo de 1591,” AGNM, Indios 5, exp. 268, 141-141v.

⁹⁴¹ “Al gobernador del Tlaxcala, para que se proteja a los indios alistados para la colonización chichimeca que han tenido cuentas y hecho asientos con españoles y otras personas, las cuales los pretenderán detener y quitar de la lista para impedirles ir adelante en el intento; México, 9 de marzo de 1591,” AGNM, Indios 5, exp. 271, 142.

⁹⁴² “Al gobernador de Tlaxcala, para que cumpliendo Miguel Tlaquitl con su condena en el obraje se le deje libremente acompañar a los indios a la pacificación de los chichimecas; México, 12 de marzo de 1591,” AGNM, Indios 5, exp. 282, 145.

⁹⁴³ “Al gobernador de Tlaxcala, para que ampare a los indios que fueron a las poblaciones a reducir a los indios Chichimecas en lo que les perteneciere de casas, terrenos, etc.; México, 9 de marzo de 1591,” AGNM, Indios 5, exp. 270, 142.

Zárate.⁹⁴⁴ It was 345 marriages, more than half of them childless, covering a total of 932 people accompanied by 53 singles, 2 widowers, 103 boys and 84 girls.⁹⁴⁵ When they arrived in early August to the garrison and town of Cuicillo, located about 35 kms southeast of Zacatecas, the column was divided in order to distribute them in three outlying districts: Zacatecas, San Luis Potosi and New Vizcaya in the vicinity of Saltillo villa.⁹⁴⁶ They were well received in Zacatecas by the local population, settling in San Andrés del Teul and San Luis de Colotlán on the Great Chichimeca western edge. In the district of San Luis Potosi, next to numerous Guachichiles settlements, they built San Miguel de Mexquitic and San Sebastián Agua del Venado. In New Vizcaya, near the Spanish town of Santiago del Saltillo, they rose San Esteban de Nueva Tlaxcala, the most northerly congregation.⁹⁴⁷

The selection of some of these locations was a result of its strategic position as defensive points of major populations or mining production centers. Such was the case of San Esteban de Nueva Tlaxcala, located near Santiago del Saltillo in order to avoid its total abandonment as a result of the constant nomadic attacks; or San Andrés del Teul, expected to serve as a bulwark against the depredations plaguing the surrounding miners seats. At the same time, the viceroy wanted to avoid that during his tenure the details that struck the Otomi settlements established decades ago in various parts of New Galicia were replicated. The Chichimeca bands' attacks reluctant to be reduced were a threat that had numerous precedents, which meant in the referred case the flight of Otomi, Mexicans and even Chichimeca Indians who had agreed to undergo in those early days of colonial occupation. Thus, it was tried that some settlements were not far from a military post to ensure its protection against the unpredictable raids.

The final constitution of villages San Miguel de Mexquitic and San Sebastián Agua del Venado gives us the opportunity to learn how initial relations between Chichimecas and Tlaxcalans were established, as well as about the success of this type of peacemaking. Regarding the first, when the expedition arrived to Mexquitic, the newcomers were feted by

⁹⁴⁴ Torquemada, *Monarquía indiana*, Book V, ch. XXXV, 669.

⁹⁴⁵ "Cuenta por sus nombres de los indios de Tlaxcala que vinieron a poblar entre los chichimecas; río de San Juan, 6 de julio de 1591," in Velázquez, *Colección de documentos para la historia de San Luis Potosí*, 184-203. Also Montejano y Aguiñaga, "La evolución de los tlaxcaltecas en San Luis Potosí," 80.

⁹⁴⁶ Simmons, "Tlascalans in the Spanish Borderlands," 102-3.

⁹⁴⁷ The most detailed description of the Tlaxcalan colonies establishing in Chichimeca lands is due to Eugene Segó, *Aliados y adversarios*, ch. III to VII, 67-232. See also Martínez Baracs, "Colonizaciones tlaxcaltecas," 221.

Guachichiles. The Chichimeca leader Juan Tenso, Miguel Caldera's friend, welcomed them, and on behalf of all offered the “half of all their lands, mountains and pastures and watering holes, sources of lime and ranches, and of any other exploitations they could take the half of everything.”⁹⁴⁸ Having made this statement, the mestizo captain Diego Muñoz Camargo⁹⁴⁹ proceeded to allocate the valley’s farmlands to Chichimecas and Tlaxcalans, each group in its own half. The beneficiaries solemnized the act by performing their inaugural ceremonies, for which “ripped grass and threw stones.”⁹⁵⁰ A little further north, in San Juan Agua del Venado, the loyalty of the Chichimeca leaders permanently consolidated by delivering “dresses and some meat and corn at the expense of His Majesty,” achieving in less than two decades their total submission thanks that new generations were raised in “doctrine, and in meek and Christian treatment.”⁹⁵¹

Thereafter, and once consolidated their staying in that portion of the Great Chichimeca, Tlaxcalans became into the cornerstone in many colonization enterprises in northern viceroyalty, contributing to the pacification of nomadic Indians who roamed the surrounding regions. This colonizing incursion was one of the first examples of what has been called the “Indian conquest of America,”⁹⁵² that is, the essential support provided to Europeans by various native communities for conquering geographies and cultures. For example, the settlers of San Luis de Colotlán were often required to contain insurgencies in remote areas, as occurred with Chichimecas in the neighboring jurisdiction of Durango around 1600.⁹⁵³ Throughout the colonial period the Tlaxcalans acted as active members in the *entradas* focused to contain the rebel groups, made tasks to protect the villages, mines and ranches, contributed to the rescue of goods and persons captured by Chichimecas, and helped to spread Christian cultural norms in order to ensure the pacification of the outlying

⁹⁴⁸ “Asiento y congregación de los indios en San Miguel Mexquitic y Tlaxcalilla, 1617: relación de San Miguel Mexquitic; Nueva Galicia, 2 de noviembre de 1591,” in Velázquez, *Colección de documentos para la historia de San Luis Potosí*, 220.

⁹⁴⁹ The soldier and chronicler Diego Muñoz Camargo was the son of a conquistador and an Indian of Tlaxcala; see Monroy Castillo, “La vida cotidiana con los tlaxcaltecas. Una aportación a la historiografía de Tlaxcala,” 71.

⁹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 221.

⁹⁵¹ Mota y Escobar, *Descripción geográfica*, 72.

⁹⁵² Bannon, *The Spanish borderlands frontier*, 30.

⁹⁵³ Sego, *Aliados y adversarios*, 138.

areas.⁹⁵⁴ Their settlements worked as military posts, sites for agricultural development, and diffusers centers of civilization and Christianization in the northern natives.⁹⁵⁵

It is particularly striking that from this moment scholars focus on the events surrounding the life of settlers native from Tlaxcala, virtually ignoring the participation of Chichimecas reduced in congregations. Kieran McCarty, for instance, criticized Robert Ricard who in his classic work *The spiritual conquest of Mexico* limited to study missionary work in the highly developed sedentary groups, doing only concise statements about the northwest nomadic tribes.⁹⁵⁶ A similar judgment could be made on the equally important book by Charles Gibson *Tlaxcala in the Sixteenth Century*. However, criticism can not extend too much, as archival research shows that from this point begins a growing documentary silence around the reduced Chichimecas. It seems that pacification of the New Galicia and surrounding areas put on a priority place the immigrants Christianized in detriment of nomads newly sedentarised. A simple scrutiny of the capitulations agreed by the viceroy and Tlaxcalans reveals that there was no place in congregations for a symmetrical relationship between southern and northern Indians. Points 1, 3, 8 and 9 are the most decisive: it was exclusive Tlaxcalan privileges that they and their descendants had the noblemen status, that in the new settlements they would keep the royalties held in their native land, they could carry up weapons and horseback riding, and most importantly, they would live apart from the Chichimecas, each group managing their own lands, pastures, forests, rivers, salt mines and mills, “that in no time can those Indians enter in the belongings of the other ones.”⁹⁵⁷

Given this picture of inequality one may wonder what was the real success of the recently founded congregations. Did it mean an insurmountable problem the discrimination suffered by Chichimecas? The Franciscans assigned to each of the reductions worked hard at converting nomads, and had fresh resources guaranteed by the constant attention of viceroy Luis de Velasco II⁹⁵⁸ and his immediate successor, viceroy Gaspar de Zúñiga y Acevedo,

⁹⁵⁴ Sheridan, “‘Indios Madrineros’. Colonizadores tlaxcaltecas en el noreste novohispano,” 29.

⁹⁵⁵ McEnroe, *From Colony to Nationhood in Mexico*, 39.

⁹⁵⁶ McCarty, “Los franciscanos en la frontera chichimeca,” 322-3.

⁹⁵⁷ “Capitulaciones del virrey Velasco con la ciudad de Tlaxcala para el envío de cuatrocientas familias a poblar en tierra de chichimecas,” in Velázquez, *Colección de documentos para la historia de San Luis Potosí*, 180.

⁹⁵⁸ “El virrey Luis de Velasco dice al rey que la paz con los indios chichimecas salteadores va continuándose, y aunque no cesan los gastos que son precisos para conservar y entretener a estos indios son mucho menos que los de guerra. Dice que ha enviado a todas las naciones religiosos de la orden de San Francisco, buscando que se reduzcan a poblaciones con lo que será más cierta su quietud; México, 5 de junio de 1590,” in Paso y Troncoso, *Epistolario de Nueva España*, XII, 185.

Count of Monterrey (1595-1603). A document by frontier captain Juan Morlete gives account of the high cost that reductions meant for the royal treasury in the period 1590-1598: corn, beans, cattle, beef, salt, gunpowder, materials for building construction, tools and clothing, were part of the goods delivered for preserving peace.⁹⁵⁹ Sometimes the demand for goods was of such proportions that the military leaders had to incur in expenditure at their own expense, spending “from their estates a great number of pesos by giving them gifts, clothes and bread for they keep in peace and do not make harm to Spanish.”⁹⁶⁰ But everything demonstrated that the strong expenditures were more than offset by the incomes generated in the mining industry, where production and distribution were rarely interrupted by Chichimeca assailant bands: through diplomacy deployed in the last years, both the extraction lodes as well as the caravans transporting silver to Mexico City enjoyed a tranquility never seen before. What is more, the decline of the military contingent stationed on the frontier and the dismantling of some garrisons had already meant a relief to the treasury. Thus Luis de Velasco II advised his successor to continue supplying the missions regardless the costs involved, as spending was becoming lower everyday “and it should be given without limitation, because never the spending for peace will match those for war.”⁹⁶¹

Some subsequent events showed, however, that the region was not completely pacified. The missions experienced onslaughts of untamed nomads, and none more so than San Andres de Teul, which in April 1592,⁹⁶² just six months after the Tlaxcalans arrival, was the target of an uprising that brought together Zacatecos, Tepeques and Huicholes who “killed many Spaniards and almost all Tlaxcalan Indians living there.”⁹⁶³ A tragedy of such magnitude did nothing but confirm the fray Jeronimo de Mendieta's apprehensions, who

⁹⁵⁹ “Cuenta del capitán Juan Morlete de lo que recibió y distribuyó con los indios guachichiles desde el año de 1590 hasta fin del de 1598; Río Grande, haciendas del capitán Francisco de Urdiñola, 9 de marzo de 1603,” in Naylor & Polzer, *The Presidio and Militia*, 91-6. Another example is that of the Proveedor General Juan de Montalvo; see Powell, “Peacemaking on North America’s first frontier,” 231-2.

⁹⁶⁰ “Testimonio de Gaspar Duarte, vecino de Mazapil, sobre lo que el capitán Juan Morlete recibió y distribuyó con los indios guachichiles desde el año de 1590 hasta fin del de 1598; Río Grande, haciendas del capitán Francisco de Urdiñola, 5 de marzo de 1603,” in *Ibid.*, 97.

⁹⁶¹ “Advertimientos que el virrey don Luis de Velasco dejó al Conde de Monterrey para el gobierno de la Nueva España; México, 1595,” in Torre Villar & Navarro de Anda, *Instrucciones y Memorias*, 314-5.

⁹⁶² “Carta del virrey Luis del Velasco al rey; México, 2 de junio de 1592,” AHSLP, Fondo Powell A.02.737, 1.

⁹⁶³ “Información de los conventos, doctrinas y conversiones que se han fundado en la Provincia de Zacatecas; convento de San Antonio de Cuencamé, 26 de diciembre de 1622: testimonio de fray Francisco Santos,” in Velázquez, *Colección de documentos para la historia de San Luis Potosí*, 136.

protested to viceroy Velasco by this tragic event.⁹⁶⁴ Survivors took refuge in the nearby town of Chalchihuites, where built Santa María de la Paz Nueva de Tlaxcala.⁹⁶⁵ Despite the voices who clamored for a strong measure of punishment, the viceroy stood firm in his non-belligose posture, and instructed Miguel Caldera to pacify the rebels by resorting to dialogue, because “peace is so important that it must do everything possible to preserve it, giving gifts to Chichimecas, treating them with kindness, and even ignoring their faults and weaknesses, or any other thing for not encourage them to destroy the peace.”⁹⁶⁶ In a brief but effective campaign, the mestizo captain managed to pacify the rebels, which showed that reason was on the ruler side ⁹⁶⁷.

We believe that success of the appeasement policy carried out by New Spain’s viceroys from 1585 was forged in their strict adherence to a non-violence relationship. With a demography decimated to some extent by diseases inadvertently brought by Spaniards, with wildlife resources increasingly depleted by the destruction of forests and water pollution as a consequence of mining activity, and overwhelmed by internecine disputes for the scarce supply areas that still remained, many Chichimeca groups found in congregations a space of refuge where they had secured livelihood.⁹⁶⁸ Less privileges in relation to Tlaxcalans were a lesser evil and of a minimum sense considering that they were egalitarian societies in whose minds the hierarchical symbolism had no place. Until not disturbing their economic base to the point of jeopardizing their livelihood, and while they were not molested by coercive means and hard jobs, such as slavery or personal service, the rest was not of great significance.

As expected, the integration between the two groups was not as fluid in the early stages, consigning few marriages. It is quite possible that the Tlaxcalans desire for preserving exclusively their political and economic privileges led them to avoid mingling with neighbors

⁹⁶⁴ “Códice Mendieta. Carta para el virrey don Luis de Velasco, sobre el alzamiento de unos chichimecos, y sobre los cuatro reales que quieren añadir a cada indio; Xuchimilco, 4 de mayo de 1592,” in García Icazbalceta, *Nueva colección de documentos*, V, 114-5.

⁹⁶⁵ Sego, *Aliados y adversarios*, 110.

⁹⁶⁶ “Carta del virrey Luis del Velasco al rey; México, 2 de junio de 1592,” AHSLP, Fondo Powell A.02.737, 1v.

⁹⁶⁷ Powell, “Caldera of New Spain,” 336.

⁹⁶⁸ In the early reduction years the illnesses affected in greater degree to the Chichimecas, since the Tlaxcalans took decades adapting their immunological system to the European diseases. In this way, the madrinero Indians acted as involuntary carriers of Spanish ailments.

Chichimecas.⁹⁶⁹ In other words, Tlaxcalans had an elitist attitude towards their indigenous counterparts, because as noted fray Juan de Torquemada, “although Chichimecas have populated along with Tlaxcalan Indians, they do not marry or cohabit each other, because neither one of them want it.”⁹⁷⁰ In Sean McEnroe’s words, “in the beginning, Tlaxcalan settlers were willing to fight, to lead, or instruct northerners, but not to integrate with them.”⁹⁷¹ There was extreme situations born from the Tlaxcalan's ambition for hoarding more areas of agricultural land that were barely worked by Chichimecas, more cattle, pasture and water, causing leakage of some of these.⁹⁷² This reticent attitude was not, however, irreconcilable with the establishment of symbiotic relationships between the two cultures, at least during the missions' early stages of life. It is true that the immigrant ethnic group brought with it a broad range of technical and agricultural knowledge which transferred to native Indians, also serving as an example with its forms of organization and adherence to Christian life's norms, but it can not be ignored that the Chichimecas knew better than anyone how to survive in a semiarid environment characterized by critical months of drought affecting even the oasis where the missions settled. Their conversion into sedentary societies did not deprive them of those so necessary ancient knowledges which allowed to complement agricultural production with the tasks of gathering fruits and hunting of wild species for both food and medicinal purposes.⁹⁷³ Later, over time it caused that conflict situations were lessening in favor of Chichimecas integration under a process of "tlaxcalization" bounded by absorption and unification dynamics into the more complex society.⁹⁷⁴

From every point of view, the pacification policy had satisfactory results in the medium term. The mission, supported by the *Indios madrineros* and some garrisons, was the institution that transformed the oasisamerican native lives, settling them in stable communities with an agricultural economic base, and promoting them cultural changes such as the introduction of Catholic religion and the essential rules of Spanish way of life.⁹⁷⁵ The pacification achievements allowed to add seven new Franciscan convents in 1593 to those

⁹⁶⁹ Martínez Baracs, “Colonizaciones tlaxcaltecas,” 231.

⁹⁷⁰ Torquemada, *Monarquía Indiana*, Book V, ch. XXXV, 669.

⁹⁷¹ McEnroe, *From Colony to Nationhood in Mexico*, 40.

⁹⁷² Rivera Villanueva, “La influencia tlaxcalteca en la vida política de los pueblos indios,” 101.

⁹⁷³ Fortanelli Martínez, Carlin Castelán & Loza León, “Sistemas agrícolas de regadío de origen tlaxcalteca en San Luis Potosí,” 112-3.

⁹⁷⁴ Martínez Baracs, “Colonizaciones tlaxcaltecas,” 237.

⁹⁷⁵ López Castillo, *El poblamiento en tierra de indios cahitas*, 29.

ten established around 1584⁹⁷⁶ in New Galicia, reaching by 1598 a total of 24 monasteries,⁹⁷⁷ demonstrating the success of missionary work. Moreover, bishop Alonso de la Mota y Escobar reported that by 1604 the villages, towns and cities of New Galicia, New Vizcaya and the Kingdom of Nuevo Leon harbored approximately 32,645 individuals, of which 7,659 were tributary Indians. All of them went to the 45 doctrines of clerics and the convents of Franciscan (47, with annexed doctrines), Jesuit (15 with doctrines), Augustinian (5 with doctrines) and Dominican friars (2 without doctrines) that were distributed in the three territories.⁹⁷⁸

Although it is an exaggeration the Tomas Martinez Saldana's statement regarding that the pacification measures were so successful that by 1630 almost no one talked in New Galicia about the Chichimeca danger,⁹⁷⁹ the truth is that fear of assaults had become a sporadic sensation. In missions the Tlaxcalan presence allowed friars achieve the longed desire of imposing a lingua franca among Chichimecas, further contributing to dissolve the main features of their culture. Reductions represented a synthesis of Great Chichimeca's linguistic richness and complexity: San Andrés del Teúl sheltered Zacateco and Huichol Indians, San Luis de Colotlán received Huichol and Cora Indians, San Luis de Mexquitic housed Guachichil family groups, ethnic branch also present in San Sebastián Agua del Venado. Thanks to the "madrinero Indians" Nahuatl language definitively became into the language of conversion in northern Mexico. Many booklets in Castilian, Latin and Mexican language were distributed in missions to teach reading and writing to younger Chichimecas.⁹⁸⁰

More than half a century had to pass to end the Chichimeca War in the New Spain central plain. The pacification established from San Juan del Rio to Durango and from Guadalajara to Saltillo,⁹⁸¹ meant an innovation in the imperial policy since the few fruits harvested by steel gave way to some fruitful interactions and commitments settled on non-violent means. Great Chichimeca laid the basis for other peacemaking projects on the continent. Sinaloa, where Jesuits followed the example of Franciscans, was only the second

⁹⁷⁶ Jiménez Moreno, "Los orígenes de la Provincia Franciscana de Zacatecas," 144-5.

⁹⁷⁷ Román Gutiérrez, *Sociedad y evangelización*, 423.

⁹⁷⁸ Mota y Escobar, *Descripción geográfica*, 92-4.

⁹⁷⁹ Martínez Saldaña, "Teúles y peñoles en chichimecatlapán," 223.

⁹⁸⁰ Powell, "Peacemaking on North America's first frontier," 242-3 (footnote 52).

⁹⁸¹ Osante, "El septentrion novohispano," 54.

link in a long chain of conversions and appeasements in which religious men sought to transform the New World inhabitants without the mediation of the sword.

Conclusion

With the celebration of the Third Mexican Provincial Council, the prerogatives granted in the Ordinances of 1573 to the missionaries in the pacification of the natives were strengthened, especially in the frontier territories. The support of mestizos from the north – heirs of a hybrid culture that allowed them to transit between the Spaniards and the Chichimecas – and of complex indigenous societies already Christianized were fundamental factors in the success of the pacification project carried out by the Franciscans.

The neogalician experience was not an isolated event and its result was not indifferent to other preclear minds facing similar challenges in other regions of the continent. Undoubtedly, the successful pacification project deployed in northern Mexico was nourished by previous experiences that occurred at the continental level (pioneering pacification projects that failed to reach a successful conclusion either by the siege of the natives or by the various slaving interests carried out by Spaniards) as local (the reductional attempts carried out in the Chiapa region by Bartolomé de las Casas, or the hospital-towns built by Vasco de Quiroga in Michoacán). But it is also true that the good result of the Franciscan project was an inspiration to achieve peace in other equally turbulent regions, such as southern Chile.

Chapter 5:

A Jesuit attempt of borderland peacemaking: the Defensive War project in Chile

Chapter five explores the transfer of the Chichimec experience to southern Chile at the hands of the Society of Jesus. The context in which this transfer took place was the great *Mapuche* rebellion initiated in 1598. In this way, the conditions in which the formula of the Defensive War was applied in Chile were very similar to those existing in New Galicia when the Franciscans promoted the pacification policy: both were the scenes of long and bloody conflicts. However, there were two major elements differentiating them. First, the Mapuches did not experienced a Franciscan systematic missionary activity in the decades prior to the Jesuits arrival, which was an important obstacle for the San Ignacio de Loyola' sons, since the *Mapuches* considered the Spaniards as one unity, without knowing the internal divisions or the diverse agendas that their actors handled regarding the relationship with the indigenous world. Secondly, as we saw in chapter two, the *Mapuches* did not experience major resource crises such as the *Chichimecs* as a result of mining work. In this way, although they experienced a population decline throughout the sixteenth century as a result of European diseases, they always had a relatively high demography, which allowed to consolidate military alliances to contain the Spanish advance.

Now, the fight for the *Mapuche* rights did not begin with the arrival of the Society of Jesus. Religious of other orders raised their voices throughout the sixteenth century to denounce the abuses of *encomenderos*, soldiers and miners, who used slavery to keep the economic system running. However, it is interesting to note that in Chile the same contradictions that we had seen in the New Galicia were experienced: some Franciscans speaking in favor of the Indians and others approving the use of violence. The Jesuits, as we shall see in the following lines, experienced the same situation.

Along with analyzing the foundations that guided the Jesuits missionary work, we propose to evaluate the evidence supporting the hypothesis that the *Chichimec* experience was the most important reference for the implementation of the Defensive War Project proposed by the Jesuit priest Luis de Valdivia. In the same way, when studying the materialization of the project, we will try to explain the reasons for its failure, both by factors of the Spanish side and the Indian side.

The struggle for indigenous rights in the Kingdom of Chile: pre-Jesuit initiatives

Traditionally, colonial historiography has characterized the Kingdom of Chile as a territory of war in which the sword and the spear were engaged in a prolonged conflict that lasted for two and a half centuries. The first epic poem written in and about the American lands, *La Araucana* by Alonso de Ercilla, contributed enormously to consolidate this imaginary, an issue strengthened by the portrait of blood and violence that drew most of the

chronicles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, many of which analogized the southern conflict with the Flanders War.⁹⁸² The authors, in general, praised the warrior qualities of the Mapuches,⁹⁸³ being the first the conqueror Pedro de Valdivia, who after the battle of Andalién reported that “it has been thirty years that I fight with different nations and never such tenacity I have seen in the fight as these had against us. They were so strong that within three hours I could not break a squadron with a hundred soldiers on horseback.”⁹⁸⁴ In an epistle to the king written on the same date he said that “I have fought against many nations, and I have never seen such a tenacity of people in the fighting as these Indians had against us, that in a lapse of four hours I could not penetrate with a hundred soldiers on horseback to the enemy squadron, and when we occasionally could enter, it was so many the people of armed weapons and mallets, that the Christians could not face the Indians with their horses.”⁹⁸⁵ Such was the admiration that the courage of the Indians aroused in the conqueror, that he even compared them to one of the most brave groups of Saxony when they affirmed that they fought “like *tudescos*.”⁹⁸⁶

However, when accounting for the difficulty of subjecting Indians so skilled in the art of war, flattery acted as a discursive resource aimed at justifying the use of violence. Following Tamar Herzog, it is common to discover in chronicles, letters and reports of the continent’s most conflictive areas the existence of a proportion between the warlike weight of the Indians and the tendency to consider their territories as an object of legitimate expansion. In other words, the more the natives resisted, the more their territories were portrayed as infinite, anti-Christian, uncivilized and hostile spaces, making their transformation necessary.⁹⁸⁷

As is well known, the Spanish expansion of the sixteenth century, with minor exceptions, had been mainly economic and missionary.⁹⁸⁸ The Spanish trade of that century was based mainly on the export of raw materials against the import of manufactured goods,

⁹⁸² Baraibar, “Chile como un ‘Flandes indiano’ en las crónicas de los siglos XVI y XVII.”

⁹⁸³ See Latcham, “La capacidad guerrera de los araucanos: sus armas y métodos militares.”

⁹⁸⁴ “Instrucciones de lo que han de pedir y suplicar a S.M. y a los señores Presidente y Oidores de su Real Consejo de Indias en nombre de Pedro de Valdivia, gobernador e capitán general en su cesáreo nombre en estas provincias dichas y nombradas por él de la Nueva Extremadura...; Concepción, 15 de octubre de 1550,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 9, 64.

⁹⁸⁵ “Carta de Pedro de Valdivia al emperador Carlos V; Concepción, 15 de octubre de 1550,” in Medina, *Cartas de Pedro de Valdivia*, 202.

⁹⁸⁶ “Carta de Pedro de Valdivia a sus Apoderados en la Corte; Concepción, 15 de octubre de 1550,” in *Ibid*, 113.

⁹⁸⁷ Herzog, *Frontiers of possession*, 126.

⁹⁸⁸ Bolton, “Defensive Spanish expansion and the significance of the borderlands,” 13.

the New World fulfilling the important role of supplier of precious metals whose coinage largely sustained the mercantilism that prevailed in Europe at that time.⁹⁸⁹ As the basis of the Spanish imperial economy in America rested in the mining exploitation, the use of the aboriginal labor in mines and gold panning sites determined that the native population was defined from the economic function, located in a relationship of political, social and cultural subordination with regard to the Hispanic population.⁹⁹⁰ The profitability of the mining work demanded a large amount of perfectly organized labor with the necessary technical knowledge for an efficient extractive activity, in addition to a direct supervision that in many occasions identified with the slaving practice, however much the legislation prohibited it. The labor system of *encomienda* was the institution that most clearly embodied the contradiction of the American conquest: although it was inspired by the theological-juridical principle that the Indians were free men with full rights, in practice it became a system of personal service in which the situation of the natives was at the discretion of the *encomenderos*. As a consequence of its practice, there was the structural disintegration of indigenous societies, the destruction of their economic foundations and the creation of a *sociedad señorial* (estately society) in which the conquerors prioritized their aspirations by satisfying the ambitions of glory and wealth.⁹⁹¹

From 1550, once the Spanish power in central Chile was consolidated, a series of cities and fortresses began to rise in the southern region, from the margins of the Biobío river to the Callecalle one: Concepción, La Imperial, Valdivia, Villarrica and Angol were the settlements in which the beneficiaries with *encomienda* titles installed, while the Arauco, Tucapel and Puren forts were strategically located to protect the Quilacoya mines and contain the Mapuche populations reluctant to the Spanish presence. In order to consolidate the first of these enclaves, which would act as the spearhead of the Spanish penetration in the southern lands, Pedro de Valdivia ordered the caciques to deliver their children to the *encomenderos* “so that they would be Christians and get the true knowledge of the Creator of everything.”⁹⁹² Only two chroniclers of the 18th century, the field marshal Pedro de Córdoba and

⁹⁸⁹ Vázquez de Prada, *Aportaciones a la historia económica y social: España y Europa, siglos XVI-XVIII*, 140-1.

⁹⁹⁰ Roldán, “La categoría social de indio: etnocentrismo y conciencia étnica,” 52.

⁹⁹¹ Villalobos, *Historia del Pueblo Chileno*, I, 145-65.

⁹⁹² “Carta del Cabildo, Justicia y Regimiento de la ciudad de la Concepción de Chile, al Príncipe don Felipe; Concepción, 15 de octubre de 1550,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 9, 116.

Figuerola,⁹⁹³ and the Jesuit Miguel de Olivares,⁹⁹⁴ pointed out that Pedro de Valdivia's harsh treatment to the Indians meant the reprimand of the Franciscans Juan de Torralba, Juan de la Tower and Cristóbal de Rabaneda,⁹⁹⁵ amending his later conduct. The Valdivian colonizing project, however, kept within it the germ of its own destruction, since the priority given to areas of greater density and that hold the metal wealth gave rise to a dispersed foundational pattern, with cities of difficult communication among each other. This is what the historian Rolando Mellafe called the open border territorial occupation system.⁹⁹⁶ In effect, after only three years of difficult staying in the southern latitudes of the Kingdom of Chile, the Spanish settlements were falling one after another under the fire of an indigenous rebellion initiated with the governor's death in battle in the last month of 1553. The turbulent waters just began to quiet down in 1557 with the arrival of Governor García Hurtado de Mendoza at the head of a large and well-equipped host, which resulted in the refoundation of the cities and forts razed by the Indians, in addition to the erection of new towns such as Cañete and Osorno.

Temporarily coincide with this governor, who was the son of the viceroy of Peru Andrés Hurtado de Mendoza, one of the first and most angry denunciations in favor of the border Indians, as well as the first official attempts to improve their situation. He was accompanied by the Dominican priest Gil González de San Nicolás as a counselor on matters of religious ethics, who had already been appointed in 1552 as protector of the Indians and vicar general.⁹⁹⁷ The clergy was preceded by a well-earned reputation as a just man, because he had won recognition in Lima as a defender of the Indians,⁹⁹⁸ so from the beginning he adopted a stand favorable to the Mapuches, disapproving the use of violence and threatening the soldiers that incurred in abuses, warning them insistently that they would be condemned to hell "if they killed Indians [...] because the Indians defended a just cause, that was their freedom, houses and haciendas; because Valdivia had not entered the conquest as the Church

⁹⁹³ Córdoba y Figuerola, *Historia de Chile (1492-1717)*, book 2, ch. X, 80.

⁹⁹⁴ Olivares, *Historia militar, civil y sagrada de Chile*, book 2, ch. XX, 155.

⁹⁹⁵ The ecclesiastical historian Crescente Errázuriz corrects the chroniclers, who wrongly considers that Cristóbal de Rabaneda was a Mercedarian friar; see Errázuriz, *Los orígenes de la Iglesia chilena, 1540-1603*, 106.

⁹⁹⁶ Mellafe, "Las primeras crisis coloniales, formas de asentamiento y el origen de la sociedad chilena," 256-7.

⁹⁹⁷ Korth, *Spanish policy in colonial Chile*, 40.

⁹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 41.

commands, admonishing and requiring the natives through words and deeds.”⁹⁹⁹ The death of Spaniards in such a bloody war was only a consequence of their excessive greed, since the Indians used the right to defend themselves “from the aggressions and violence that continually make them.”¹⁰⁰⁰ The soldier-chronicler Alonso de Góngora Marmolejo, who witnessed the exhortations of Fray Gil González, says that “his words were spoken with such force that they made a great impression on the spirits of the captains and soldiers.”¹⁰⁰¹ Seeking to avoid the resumption of military actions, he tried to convince Hurtado de Mendoza not to enter the territory of war with strong-arm, before they had to be offered a peaceful solution, for which he encouraged the governor to dispatch a messenger to the rebellious Indians in order to attract them through agreements, offering himself as ambassador to the native leaders.¹⁰⁰² Surely Fray Gil Gonzalez was fully aware of the courageous efforts of his fellow Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas, who had already made public his theological and moral stance in some of his writings as well as in the resounding controversy of Valladolid held just five years before. For the same reason, the concordance of both positions is not striking, both in terms of content and the tenacity with which they were defended.

It is no wonder either the openly contrary position of the Franciscan Juan Gallegos, who supported the claim of García Hurtado de Mendoza to trespass the boundaries of the Biobío making lawful war by blood and fire.¹⁰⁰³ From the pulpit of the church of La Serena, being in full homily on Pentecost Sunday of 1557, he encouraged the parishioners to stop the rebellion of the Indians with the force of arms, and that in case of not having enough soldiers the seraphic brothers would take the arquebuses to fulfill that mission.¹⁰⁰⁴ As will be recalled from the previous chapters, the Franciscan Order lacked for a long time a uniform indigenist policy, dividing its members into opposing positions ranging from open violence to peaceful rapprochement. Chile, of course, was not alien to this: Pedro de Valdivia had been rebuked a few years earlier by clerics of the brown robe, and barely twelve years had elapsed since

⁹⁹⁹ Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile, desde su descubrimiento hasta el año de 1575*, ch. XXXIV, 143.

¹⁰⁰⁰ González de San Nicolás, *Relación de los agravios que los indios de las provincias de Chile padecen*, 461.

¹⁰⁰¹ Góngora Marmolejo, *Historia de Chile, desde su descubrimiento hasta el año de 1575*, ch. XXXIV, 143.

¹⁰⁰² “Carta de fray Gil González de San Nicolás al Presidente y oidores del Consejo de Indias; ciudad de Los Reyes, 26 de abril de 1559,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 28, 277. See also Korth, *Spanish policy in colonial Chile*, 42.

¹⁰⁰³ *Ibid.*, 278.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Zapater, *La búsqueda de la paz en la Guerra de Arauco: padre Luis de Valdivia*, 49.

the conquistador's death when Governor Melchor Bravo de Saravia informed his Majesty that

The friars, mostly those of the San Francisco Order, help us little because they not only say that these Indians cannot be warred due to the bad treatments they have gotten and that is unjust what is done to them, but neither want to absolve the soldiers nor even hear their confessions. Ask yourself, Your Majesty, with what intention and will the soldier will be in this kingdom if there is not any reward for him. And so many of those who get ready for war get into monasteries and churches and flee to the mountains.¹⁰⁰⁵

This conciliatory and protective position on the natives did not projected, however, to the missionary terrain beyond the frontier line, since as we had pointed out in an earlier chapter, the Franciscans of Chile did not venture beyond the security provided by the cities located in Mapuche land, an attitude that contrasted markedly with the determined missionary spirit of their coreligionists of the New Galicia.

Now, the private nature of the *conquest companies* determined that the political and labor integration of the Indians was prior to their religious conversion.¹⁰⁰⁶ This reflects the fact that the economic dimension on which the institution of the *encomienda* was based superimposed on the evangelizing ideal that also defined it. This situation, valid for practically the entire American Spanish Empire, became more acute in the borderlands where the institutions devoted to apply the forms of governmental control were much more precarious, and consequently the officials in charge of ensuring compliance with the laws were easily bribed or even took advantage of their positions for personal benefit, since the relative isolation allowed the development of autonomous forms of power. In the same way, the monarchy manifested in the sixteenth century an erratic disposition regarding indigenous politics, and the case of Chile is a good example. In this way, we verify that in 1554 the king ordered to governor to suppress the personal services of the *encomiendas*, to appraise the tributes, prevent the war entries into the Mapuche territory, to prohibit the work of the Indians of *encomienda* in the mines and to use them as porters and, in everything, to ensure their

¹⁰⁰⁵ “Carta del doctor Melchor Bravo de Saravia a S.M. advirtiéndole de las causas de la duración de la guerra, reformas que conviene introducir en la administración y necesidad de nuevos refuerzos militares; Talcamávida, 27 de diciembre de 1569,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 1 (second series), 252-3.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Goicovich, “La Etapa de la Conquista (1536-1598): origen y desarrollo del ‘Estado Indómito’,” 71.

freedom.¹⁰⁰⁷ The protest of the encomenderos of the central and northern zone of Chile came swiftly, who argued that in such a poor territory the mining works were the only ones that could generate profits for themselves and for the Crown. Thus, the Monarchy slightly modified its general policy in 1555, allowing the Indians of *encomienda* work in the mining tasks, but provided that it was done with their full consent.¹⁰⁰⁸ Just a year later the encomenderos were authorized to use Indian labor coercively in the mining exploitations, trying “that all the profit that could be had and taken out, come to these kingdoms as quickly as possible, for help cover the needs that I have.”¹⁰⁰⁹ The economic constraints of the Crown, then engaged in a war with France, made it imperative to increase the productivity of mines and accelerate the shipment of the *quinto real* to the metropolis.¹⁰¹⁰ In this way, although in the document was explicit that “Indians must not be compelled,”¹⁰¹¹ the immediate result was that the workload increased as well as the discontent of those affected. It was of little use, therefore, that García Hurtado de Mendoza had the gesture of imprisoning captains Francisco de Villagra and Francisco de Aguirre to show the Indians that the main responsible for abuses against them were punished, seeking with this means that “more easily [were] reduced and pacified,”¹⁰¹² since the criminalization of the transgressors did not finish the arbitrariness.

¹⁰⁰⁷ “Real Cédula dirigida a Pedro de Valdivia, encargándole el buen tratamiento de los indios; Valladolid, 10 de mayo de 1554,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 13, 445-6. See also Meza Villalobos, *Política indígena en los orígenes de la sociedad chilena*, 15-6.

¹⁰⁰⁸ “Real Cédula comunicada al adelantado don Jerónimo de Alderete, gobernador de Chile, sobre beneficiar las minas de aquella provincia; Valladolid, 4 de septiembre de 1555,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 28, 22-5.

¹⁰⁰⁹ “Real Cédula dirigida a Jerónimo de Alderete, gobernador de Chile, sobre obtener mayor beneficio de las minas de oro y plata pertenecientes al Fisco; s/f (¿1556?),” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 13, 470-1.

¹⁰¹⁰ Unfortunately for the Crown’s aims, the insistence on sending gold and silver to the metropolis was not satisfied by the governor García Hurtado de Mendoza, who was overwhelmed by the economic demands of the Arauco War. In the middle of 1559 he tried to justify himself before the Consejo de Indias (Council of the Indies) in this way: “[...] although I had great desire to send S.M. some help to the great and continuous expenses, and I have tried to do it in all possible ways, it has not been possible to gather anything, because with some expenses that have become present in the population and pacification of the territory, and being the natives and Spaniards without food, it has not been possible in these two years since I entered more than settle them and to make sementeras, houses and estates in the towns of Spaniards and in implementing the demora, which starts in the next two months; and also the quintos and rents of His Majesty, after I entered this land they worth half less.” See the “Carta de don García Hurtado de Mendoza al Presidente del Consejo de Indias; Arauco, 30 de agosto de 1559,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 28, 320.

¹⁰¹¹ “Real Cédula dirigida a Jerónimo de Alderete, gobernador de Chile, sobre obtener mayor beneficio de las minas de oro y plata pertenecientes al Fisco; s/f (¿1556?),” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 13, 471.

¹⁰¹² “Relación de lo que el licenciado Fernando de Santillán, oidor de la Audiencia de Lima, proveyó para el buen gobierno, pacificación y defensa del reino de Chile; Valparaíso, 4 de junio de 1559,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 28, 285.

In the process of reconquest of the territories devastated by the indigenous rebellion, Governor Hurtado de Mendoza commissioned the lawyer Hernando de Santillán y Figueroa, *oidor* of the *Real Audiencia* (High Court) of Lima, the elaboration of a body of provisions designed to regulate the indigenous work. Santillán arrived in Chile as part of the governor entourage, and as soon as he was entrusted with the mission, he set out to internalize the situation that the natives underwent in the *encomienda* system. In this way, he went “to the city of Santiago to visit the land and put the Indians in order by making instructions and ordinances.”¹⁰¹³ The objective was to improve the working conditions of the natives to avoid future disorders in the north and central zone of the country, as well as to appease the southern Indians once the rebellion centers were appeased. The *Ordenanzas de Santillán* (Ordinances of Santillán) –also called Tasa de Santillán– intended to lessen the harmful effects that the *encomienda* caused by regulating the relations between encomenderos and Indians: it was sought to regulate the age (adult men between 18 and 50 years old) and number of Indians placed at the service of the *encomendero*. Making use of a pre-Columbian institution, it was arranged that the Indians should apply to the mining and agricultural tasks by shifts of work, the *mita* system. The annual work period or *demora* involved eight months, from December to July in the cities of the south, and from February to September in Santiago and La Serena.¹⁰¹⁴ Until then the Indians were obliged to procure their own food by cultivating the land in the months the *demora* was suspended, but from now on it was arranged that the workers were maintained by their masters, ordering that they get meat three times a week and that they were also provided with the tools for the job.¹⁰¹⁵ To encourage their incorporation into the colonial economy, the Indians who worked in mines were granted one sixth of the extracted metals, particularly gold, known as the right of *sesmo*; the farmers and shepherds would have the right to clothes, and the last, in addition, to animals.¹⁰¹⁶ Santillán, finally, insisted on the duties of the *encomenderos*, who should promote the evangelization of the Indians and protect them from diseases.

¹⁰¹³ Mariño de Lovera, *Crónica del Reino de Chile*, book 2, ch. IX, 389.

¹⁰¹⁴ Villalobos, *Historia del Pueblo Chileno*, II, 70.

¹⁰¹⁵ Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, II, 169.

¹⁰¹⁶ Eyzaguirre, *Historia de Chile*, 108.

The *encomenderos* class showed its disagreement soon, especially with regard to the payment of sesmo to the Indians.¹⁰¹⁷ Besides that its application would mean a decrease in the income of the ruling group, Álvaro Jara has made it clear that, ultimately, the Santillán tax hid a civilizing and transforming intention, since the *sesmos* would have become a formula for accumulation and basis of future wealth: “The Indians would be rich, they would live in order, they would become accustomed to the work of raising cattle, the work of producing wool, and savings and foresight habits would be created, and all this taking advantage of the social system of the indigenous community.”¹⁰¹⁸ The regulation of work also did not stop the excesses, and it is that the provisions, although they meant an advance in the way of implementing the Indian work, ended up consolidating the system of personal service; Hernando de Santillán estimated that its maintenance was indispensable to consolidate Spanish rule in Chile.¹⁰¹⁹ In effect, the lawyer considered the institution of the *encomienda* as a fair and deserved prize to the meritorious Spaniards of the Indies, so that his amendments to the system did not imply a significant structural change.¹⁰²⁰ Moreover, the historian Guillermo Feliú Cruz considers that provisions of the Tasa de Santillán contravened what was then stipulated in the Royal Decrees, which pointed precisely in the opposite direction of ending the personal service of the *encomiendas* in America in favor of a tribute in products. Santillán considered this possibility unviable since the low organizational level of the Indians of Chile convinced him that personal service was the only possibility to insert them into the Spanish productive system. In this way, “Santillán understood the impossibility of abolishing personal service and tried to reconcile the royal ordinances with the nature of the country vassals. The *tasa* was of services. Santillán says that he had to appraise the work in that way because there is no other kind of profit in it.”¹⁰²¹

The precepts of the rate were never accepted or fulfilled by the *encomenderos*, always opposing a tenacious resistance.¹⁰²² Later rulers, more interested in increasing their own profits and those of their closest ones, limited the scope of some provisions and relaxed the

¹⁰¹⁷ “Relación de lo que el licenciado Fernando de Santillán, oidor de la Audiencia de Lima, proveyó para el buen gobierno, pacificación y defensa del reino de Chile; Valparaíso, 4 de junio de 1559,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 28, 293.

¹⁰¹⁸ Jara, *Trabajo y salario indígena, siglo XVI*, 102-3.

¹⁰¹⁹ Eyzaguirre, *Historia de Chile*, 108.

¹⁰²⁰ Contreras Cruces, *Oro, tierras e indios*, 300.

¹⁰²¹ Feliú Cruz, *Las Encomiendas según tasas y ordenanzas*, 102.

¹⁰²² *Ibid.*, 103-4.

vigilance in complying with the protective regulations of the Indians.¹⁰²³ For example, while he was in Lima because of the extradition imposed by García Hurtado de Mendoza, Captain Francisco de Villagra was notified of his election as governor of Chile by the king. Once in office, he issued some Mining Ordinances in 1561, by which diminished the sixth part of the mining production that had to be reserved to the Indians to only the eighth part. This and other measures were criticized by religious who interpreted them as a return to the old forms of ignominy, pointing out that in “Chile there are many complaints to Governor Villagrán,”¹⁰²⁴ and alleging that some indigenous provinces had rebelled because of these motifs.

When Pedro de Villagra assumed temporarily the government of the Kingdom on June 29, 1563, by death of his predecessor and relative, part of his actions were aimed at containing, unsuccessfully, the rebellious Indians of southern the Biobío river, who put at risk the stability of the forts and cities built by García Hurtado de Mendoza; but he also set out to strengthen the Ordinances of Santillán, restoring the *sesmo* for the Indians, and complementing them with a series of regulations for the mining tasks, highlighting the reduction of the demora to only six months, that is, two less than disposed by the *oidor* of the *Real Audiencia* of Lima.¹⁰²⁵ His administration lasted just two years after being deposed by the military and *encomendero* Rodrigo de Quiroga, who led an uprising promoted by those affected by the implementation of the Ordinances:¹⁰²⁶ Quiroga and his supporters were staunch defenders of the personal service of the Indians. It worked in his own favor the arrival of a military contingent of just over two hundred men sent from Lima, with which he got some victories against the Mapuches, which brought some calm to the inhabitants of the governorate, thus earning an important quota of legitimacy in the face of the great mass of non-encomenderos settled in the territory.

The regency of Quiroga, however, experienced a hiatus between 1567 and 1573, when Felipe II ordered the creation in Concepción of a *Real Audiencia* in charge of the

¹⁰²³ Meza Villalobos, *Política indígena en los orígenes de la sociedad chilena*, 22-3.

¹⁰²⁴ “Carta de los franciscanos fray Luis Zapata y fray Antonio de San Miguel sobre algunos particulares del gobierno espiritual y temporal de Chile; Ciudad de Los Reyes, 2 de agosto de 1562,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 29, 150.

¹⁰²⁵ “Ordenanzas que hizo Pedro de Villagra, gobernador de Chile, aprobando las del licenciado Hernando de Santillán en favor de los indios de Chile; Concepción, 12 de diciembre de 1563,” in *Ibíd.*, 293-8.

¹⁰²⁶ Feliú Cruz, *Las Encomiendas según tasas y ordenanzas*, 108.

administration of justice, and of the civil and military government of Chile. The preference given to the main civil and military bastion of the south of the Kingdom to the detriment of the capital, Santiago, can only be explained by the importance that the Mapuche conflict had acquired within the political spheres of Spain. The royal judge Egas Venegas assumed his post in August 1567,¹⁰²⁷ and his colleague Juan Torres de Vera y Aragón in 1568.¹⁰²⁸ They both tried to verify if the *tasas* approved until that moment were met, for which they assumed the role of visitors for the southern cities (Venegas) and the north-central ones (Torres de Vera), verifying in a short time that the ordinances were nothing more than a dead letter: many *encomenderos* were fined for this omission, and in order to ensure compliance they “appointed *corregidores* in all cities.”¹⁰²⁹ The president of the *Real Audiencia*, Dr. Melchor Bravo de Saravia, resident in Lima, assumed his office once arrived in Chile in the second half of 1568. Inspired initially by the same conciliatory policy as that of the royal judges who supported him, he believed that it was possible to attract the Indians by peaceful means using religious as intermediaries, offering them a good treatment and the forgiveness of their crimes.¹⁰³⁰ But his attempt in favor of peace did not reap the expected results, so he soon engaged in a series of military campaigns against rebellious groups, but with so unflattering results, that the forts of Cañete and Arauco were evacuated in the last year of the decade.¹⁰³¹ Bravo de Saravia, facing such a discouraging start, did not need much time to realize that the inefficient *sistema de ejército vecinal* (neighborhood army system) explained to a large extent the military failures experienced by him and his predecessors. In the first place, it could not be expected too much of a troop composed essentially by *encomenderos* with scarce military preparation, who were constantly reluctant to integrate the contingents for entering into the war territory in the summer time. Along with this, the Arauco War imposed high expenses every year that exceeded the economic capacity of the cities, generating the dissatisfaction of taxpayers. Therefore, the neighborhood army lacked professional organization, military training, adequate equipment and resources. All this forced the

¹⁰²⁷ Medina, *Diccionario biográfico colonial de Chile*, 942.

¹⁰²⁸ *Ibid.*, 873.

¹⁰²⁹ “Carta de Bravo de Sarabia al rey de España; Concepción, 8 de mayo de 1569,” in Gay, *Historia Física y Política de Chile; documentos sobre la historia, la estadística y la geografía*, 105.

¹⁰³⁰ “Carta del doctor Melchor Bravo de Saravia a S.M. advirtiéndole de las causas de la duración de la guerra, reformas que conviene introducir en la administración y necesidad de nuevos refuerzos militares; Talcamávida, 27 de diciembre de 1569,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 1 (second series), 252.

¹⁰³¹ Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, II, 299-300.

governor to draw on funds from the *Real Hacienda* (Royal Treasury) to form a semi-permanent salaried army, which by 1571 was made up of about 200 men.¹⁰³² However, the effectiveness of this corps of fighters was limited, since the soldiers requested permission from the governor in winter to return to their respective cities. The impossibility of sustaining such an intense war with such an army motivated the lawyer Juan de Herrera to propose that the people participating in it “be paid and of free will,”¹⁰³³ thus outlining the idea of creating a permanent military body maintained by the State, yearning to be fulfilled in 1604.

The chroniclers agree that the Spanish assaults in the rebellious indigenous territory in the days of Bravo de Saravia identified with an increasing capture and uprooting of Mapuches who were transferred to the regions beyond the Biobío.¹⁰³⁴ This, in addition to the continuity of the abuses on the natives, generated the dissatisfaction of the bishop of Santiago, Fray Diego de Medellín, who denounced the abuses committed assiduously, such as subjecting the Indians to “excessive working hours and periods, they did not give them the corresponding payment, they treated them like beasts of burden and sexually abused their women.”¹⁰³⁵ As a consequence of these arbitrariness, he attributed to the encomenderos the responsibility that in Chile there were “very few Indians of peace, and these very badly treated.”¹⁰³⁶ The bishop of La Imperial, Fray Antonio de San Miguel, went even further. He claimed to the king notifying the iniquities committed by the Governor Melchor Bravo de Saravia, which motivated Felipe II to dispatch the Real Decree of July 17, 1572,¹⁰³⁷ in which he expressly ordered that Indian tributes should be assessed, trying they pay a moderate *tasa* on money, putting an end to personal work. A year later San Miguel revived his protest,

¹⁰³² Meza Villalobos, “Régimen jurídico de la Conquista y de la Guerra de Arauco,” 154-5.

¹⁰³³ Herrera, *Relación de las cosas de Chile, dada por el licenciado Juan de Herrera*, 253.

¹⁰³⁴ Jara, *Guerra y sociedad en Chile*, 151.

¹⁰³⁵ Rehbein, “Diego de Medellín,” 142.

¹⁰³⁶ “Carta del Ilustrísimo Fray Diego de Medellín al rey, en que pide los dos novenos para invertirlos en paramentos para la Catedral de Santiago, y deplora el mal tratamiento de los indios; Santiago, 6 de marzo de 1569,” in Lizana, *Colección de documentos históricos recopilados del Archivo del Arzobispado de Santiago*, 4.

¹⁰³⁷ “Real Cédula en que se ordena que se haga la tasación de los tributos que deben pagar los indios del obispado de La Imperial; Madrid, 17 de julio de 1572,” in Jara & Pinto, *Fuentes para la historia del trabajo en el Reino de Chile*, 226.

accusing the governor of not applying the *tasa* that protected the Indians,¹⁰³⁸ despite the fact that it had the royal approval.¹⁰³⁹

King Felipe II, impelled by the meager results in the pacification of the borderland, not only resolved to replace Melchor Bravo de Saravia by a military and nobleman who already had experience in the office, Rodrigo de Quiroga, since he also decided to suppress the *Real Audiencia* of Concepción in 1575. The Spanish population of the Kingdom hoped that the southern conflict would finally be ended by carrying out a war by blood and fire, especially considering that the new regent was a staunch defender of the Indians personal service system.¹⁰⁴⁰ However, the governor had a first disappointment when, in mid-1576, 330 undisciplined and poorly equipped men sent from Spain arrived in Chile to reinforce the southern cities. Except for a few swords and arquebuses, “the most arrived without any kind of weapons.”¹⁰⁴¹ Although he felt frustrated in his claim to enter the land of war from a position of strength, he soon saw his deficiencies partially compensated by the support of the *encomenderos* of Santiago and La Serena, who were aware of a Royal Decree authorizing the capture of war Indians for the mining work.¹⁰⁴² From some time ago the encomienda Indians of the center and north of the Kingdom had been experiencing a drastic demographic decline due to diseases and flees, so it became imperative to replace them with new labor to keep the economic system of these regions working. With this problem in mind, the lawyer Juan de Torres de Vera wrote to viceroy Toledo proposing to transfer the Indians captured in war action to the gold veins of Coquimbo (La Serena), adding them as labor force so that the revenues allow a better support to the garrisons’ soldiers.¹⁰⁴³ The ruler of Peru, as recorded

¹⁰³⁸ “Carta de fray Antonio de San Miguel al Rey, sobre que no han querido publicar la tasa de tributos de indios y arbitrariedad de Bravo de Saravia; Valdivia, 14 de diciembre de 1573,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 2 (second series), 55-6.

¹⁰³⁹ Errázuriz, *Los orígenes de la Iglesia chilena, 1540-1603*, 228-9.

¹⁰⁴⁰ In a letter to King, Rodrigo de Quiroga pointed out the futility of replacing the personal service of the Indians with tributation in products, “because these Indians are naked and beastly people who do not live in towns together nor according to natural law, and among they there is no any order of justice, nor political life nor do they have haciendas or raise cattle in sufficient quantity to support themselves and give their tributes, and so it will be convenient that the *tasa* be of personal tribute.” See the “Carta de Rodrigo de Quiroga al Rey dando cuenta de su gobierno y del estado del reino; Santiago, 2 de enero de 1577,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 2 (second series), 311.

¹⁰⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 310.

¹⁰⁴² “Real Cédula para que no se maten ni destronquen los indios tomados en la guerra, sino que se destierren y se hagan mitimaes; Madrid, 13 de enero de 1575,” in Jara & Pinto, *Fuentes para la historia del trabajo en el Reino de Chile*, 228.

¹⁰⁴³ “Carta de don Francisco de Toledo al licenciado Torres de Vera, oidor de la Audiencia de Chile, sobre asuntos de gobierno y guerra; 1574,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 2 (second series), 74.

in a document of 1573, had advised the Spanish monarch that with the forced ascription of rebellious Indians to the gold mines the war could be sustained,¹⁰⁴⁴ which most likely convinced him to write the Decree of 1575. Toledo thought that with the capture of 600 or 700 Indians destined to the Coquimbo mines, *desgobnándolos*¹⁰⁴⁵ of a foot to avoid their escape, would be obtained annually about 30,000 pesos of gold.¹⁰⁴⁶ The system of workforce's strained deportation and ascription was immediately set in motion, so that within a few years Rodrigo de Quiroga informed the Spanish sovereign that after a rebellion of the indigenous provinces of Catiray, Mareguano, Talcamávida and Gualqui, he ordered that the prisoners “were taken to the city of La Serena and that there they will cut a foot to each one, and they will work in the gold mines to support the cost of the war, while the caciques should be taken to the visorrey of Peru.”¹⁰⁴⁷ The capture and transfer of Indians settled in such a way on the Spanish side, that Melchor Calderón proposed the removal of the peaceful and unchristianized Indians from Chiloé to La Serena “so that they extract gold and have doctrine.”¹⁰⁴⁸ Providing an overview of the Governor Rodrigo de Quiroga’s indigenous politics, the historian Álvaro Jara says that “his government was distinguished by the violence of the punishments imposed on the war Indians, taking advantage of them at the same time, once prisoners and authorized by Viceroy Toledo, as labor for the mines.”¹⁰⁴⁹

The historian Néstor Meza Villalobos defined correctly the Governor Quiroga as a man who “moved within the circle of interests and ideas of the *encomenderos*.”¹⁰⁵⁰ In fact, the lawyer Melchor Calderón had grounds to denounce him as “the main *encomendero* and

¹⁰⁴⁴ “Fragmento de carta de don Francisco de Toledo, virrey del Perú, a S.M. opinando sobre las personas y forma en que debe ser dirigida la guerra de Arauco; Potosí, 20 de marzo de 1573,” in *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁰⁴⁵ *Desgobnandar* was a practice used a lot with slaves trying to escape. It consisted in the amputation of the anterior part of a foot, shortly before the birth of the fingers with a sharp machete and hitting with a hammer, thus hindering the ability to run. See Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, II, 336.

¹⁰⁴⁶ “Provisiones que envió a Chile el virrey del Perú don Francisco de Toledo, nombrando capitán general a Rodrigo de Quiroga, su teniente a Martín Ruiz de Gamboa y por maestro de campo a Lorenzo Bernal de Mercado para la pacificación de los indios de Chile; La Plata, 6 de marzo de 1574,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 2 (second series), 122.

¹⁰⁴⁷ “Carta de Rodrigo de Quiroga a Su Majestad acerca de la guerra de Arauco, asuntos administrativos y cuestiones eclesiásticas; Coyuncos, 26 de enero de 1578,” in *Ibid.*, 357.

¹⁰⁴⁸ “Carta del licenciado M. Calderón al virrey del Perú sobre la residencia de la Real Audiencia, el refuerzo que trae Losada y parecer de trasladar parte de la población indígena de Chiloé a La Serena; 13 de noviembre de 1575,” in *Ibid.*, 202.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Jara, *Guerra y sociedad en Chile*, 152.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Meza Villalobos, *Política indígena en los orígenes de la sociedad chilena*, 34.

the one that favors others,”¹⁰⁵¹ being all subject to his will. If in the Kingdom of Chile the Royal Decrees that demanded to replace the personal service for a tribute were not applied, it was for the economic system of mining extraction and exportation¹⁰⁵² that prevailed in all regions of the territory: in the first place, the powerful *encomendero* group felt more comfortable with the current regime from which they obtained lucrative profits, and secondly, because the great expenses demanded by the Mapuche conflict made unthinkable the continuation of colonization on the basis of a working system different from personal service of the indigenous. When coinciding a borderland conflict of the magnitude of the Arauco War with a *encomendero* class sufficiently empowered by a leader of its own stamp, the slaving business could not have had a better fertilized ground for its proliferation.

Aware that this activity threatened peaceful coexistence, hindering any attempt for a future conversion, the Franciscans Fray Juan de Torralba and Fray Cristóbal de Rabaneda raised a complaint with the king, arguing that with such a harmful war it was understandable that the Indians did not want to be pacify, because they preferred “to die fighting than to serve the Spaniards.”¹⁰⁵³ With the personal service and the forced transfer to the mines, said the clergymen, they will feel the loss of a freedom that allowed them to arrange for their exchanges of cattle and clothes, their games and dances, and to concertate their marriages, so that facing so disastrous conditions they will prefer to die in defense of that autonomy that they were losing at the hands of the Spaniards. In other words, the forced uprooting that began to massify will act as a fuel that will keep the flame of war burning. They asked the monarch to “have compassion on this land and the natives of it and provide a government that in peace times keep them in justice and in war times if some escape from the present cruelties there is a Christian route to pacify them.”¹⁰⁵⁴

While Rodrigo de Quiroga was in full preparations for a new military campaign he died suddenly at an advanced age in February 1580. The reins of the governorship were assumed temporarily by his son-in-law, Marshal Martin Ruiz de Gamboa, who had a better

¹⁰⁵¹ “Carta del licenciado M. Calderón a Su Majestad sobre el desempeño de su cargo en la administración de justiciar; Santiago, 17 de octubre de 1576,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 2 (second series), 285.

¹⁰⁵² Salazar, *Historia de la acumulación capitalista en Chile*, 37.

¹⁰⁵³ “Carta de los franciscanos fray Juan de Torralba y fray Cristóbal de Rabaneda al Rey dándole cuenta de la falta de orden en el servicio personal de los indios; Santiago, 5 de marzo de 1578,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 2 (second series), 370.

¹⁰⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

disposition to comply with the numerous decrees of the Crown that ordered to assess the tribute of the Indians, thus putting an end to the disastrous consequences of the personal service. In this task he was supported by the Bishop of Santiago, Fray Diego de Medellín,¹⁰⁵⁵ a continuator of the jusnaturalism of Fray Antonio de San Miguel.¹⁰⁵⁶ It is surprising that Ruiz de Gamboa had affirmed in 1584, when he was no longer governor, that “from the thirty-three years of experience that I have been in this land I have seen that the natives uprisings hve been caused for not respecting justice,”¹⁰⁵⁷ considering that almost a year after assuming, in April 1579, he recommended to Rodrigo de Quiroga that the soldiers be granted the possession of the Indian-men and Indian-women captured in the military campaigns, who should extract gold in the mines of the north to economically support the borderland soldiers.¹⁰⁵⁸ It is very probable that this transformation in his position towards the Indians was the result of a reasoned political calculation to ingratiate himself with the Crown in order to obtain promptly the royal confirmation as governor of Chile, since he would have the merit of having been the first to apply a official policy long postponed by the regents who preceded him. It was not random, therefore, that he asked the king his confirmation as governor of Chile just one month after the death of Quiroga¹⁰⁵⁹ and that the application of the *tasa* was just in the following month, May 7, 1580.¹⁰⁶⁰

The document trascended in the history with the name of *Tasa de Gamboa*, a set of provisions with which it was unsuccessfully tried to substitute personal service for a tribute in gold or species, besides instructing the reduction of the native population in Indian towns. The reduction project, which sought to educate the Indians politically and facilitate their

¹⁰⁵⁵ “Carta de fray Diego de Medellín al Rey sobre la condición y tasa de los indios; Santiago, 4 de junio de 1580,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 3 (second series), 70-1. The prelate, after verifying the abuses committed in his diocese, arranged that no *encomendero* be received in the sacrament of confession as long as they did not submit to the tax *tasación* of his Indians.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Feliú Cruz, *Las Encomiendas según tasas y ordenanzas*, 113-4.

¹⁰⁵⁷ “Carta de Martín Ruiz de Gamboa al Rey sobre sus servicios como gobernador y entrega del Reino a Alonso de Sotomayor; Santiago, 1 de noviembre de 1584,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 3 (second series), 223.

¹⁰⁵⁸ “Carta de Martín Ruiz de Gamboa al virrey del Perú sobre la guerra de Arauco; Santiago, 1 de abril de 1579,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 2 (second series), 395.

¹⁰⁵⁹ “Carta de Martín Ruiz de Gamboa al Rey sobre haber tomado el mando después de la muerte de Rodrigo de Quiroga; 31 de marzo de 1580,” In *Ibid.*, 477-8. Unfortunately for the Ruiz de Gamboa’s pretension, his request came to the Court when the king had already appointed a new governor, without having yet news of the Quiroga’s death.

¹⁰⁶⁰ “Tasa y ordenanza para los indios hecha por Martín Ruiz de Gamboa; Santiago, 7 de mayo de 1580,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 3 (second series), 57-68.

indoctrination, had as a reference the systematic foundation of Indian towns carried forward in those days by Viceroy Francisco de Toledo in the Peruvian lands. In order to safeguard the integrity of indigenous men and women, the encomenderos were forbidden to enter the towns, “under penalty of losing his encomienda of Indians anyone who do not obey, and any other right to the tributes and lose more than half of his goods for the chamber and treasury of His Majesty.”¹⁰⁶¹ The cease of the obligatory work of the Indians was arranged, and in future the encomenderos would receive an annual tribute of eight pesos gold, payable in gold and in species.¹⁰⁶² This contribution was levied on the Indians of “more than seventeen years of age and less than fifty years of age and who do not suffer from illness that prevents them from working.”¹⁰⁶³ Once completed the tribute payment, the surpluses should be destined to the *cajas de comunidad* (community funds), which could be used for the benefit of the Indians themselves. In this context it is worth noting that the administration of the goods of the Indians passed from the *encomenderos* hands to a mixed management composed of the *corregidor*, the doctrinaire and the cacique of the town. From this it follows that the ordinances established the most complex bureaucratic body known in Chile until then for the protection of the Indians, including administrators for each of the Indian towns, and *corregidores* assigned to various districts under the authority of a *protector de naturales* (protector of natives). These officials would act as intermediaries between the Indians of the communities and the neighbors of the cities. Álvaro Jara says that “the purpose pursued by Governor Martín Ruiz de Gamboa was the suppression of personal service provided by the Indians to their encomenderos, and therefore transform the relationship between the two in a real pecuniary tribute.”¹⁰⁶⁴

It is not difficult to imagine that the discontent generated by the *tasa* among the encomenderos provoked an active opposition tending to obtain its repeal. A handful of clerics

¹⁰⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 62.

¹⁰⁶² One of the main criticisms to the Tasa de Gamboa was the high tribute imposed on the Indians. Bishop Diego de Medellín, who participated in its elaboration, justified this by arguing that “although by now the tribute paid by the Indians seems somewhat greater [than] what was convenient, this was done for placating the encomenderos.” Those who tried to promote this labor and economic reform did not ignore the gravitating power of the neighborhood class, so they were forced to grant a taxation attractive enough to satisfy their ambition for wealth, although hoping that the value of the tribute decrease over time. See the “Carta de fray Diego de Medellín al Rey sobre la condición y tasa de los indios; Santiago, 4 de junio de 1580,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 3 (second series), 71.

¹⁰⁶³ “Tasa y ordenanza para los indios hecha por Martín Ruiz de Gamboa; Santiago, 7 de mayo de 1580,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 3 (second series), 60.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Jara, *Trabajo y salario indígena, siglo XVI*, 106.

also contributed to thin the spirits against the reforms, as the Mercedarian Friar Juan Zamora, who claimed that the opinion of the oldest religious in the Kingdom was not considered,¹⁰⁶⁵ and the Dominican Friar Bernardo Becerril, who claimed for the rights that the *encomenderos* were losing.¹⁰⁶⁶ The opportunism of the most affected took advantage of this annoyance that crossed more than one class of society to demand the annulment of the ordinances. Their angry requests were echoed by Alonso de Sotomayor, ruler chosen by the king who arrived in Chile in September 1583, who took advantage of the climate of discontent to attract the confidence of the most powerful economic, political and social group in the Kingdom. In this way, to satisfy his aim of ending promptly the Mapuche conflict that bled Spanish military pride, Sotomayor sought the cooperation of the cities, repealing Gamboa's *tasa* the same year he took command.¹⁰⁶⁷ This is a good example of how *encomiendas* were a gravitating instrument in early colonial politics: maintaining advantageous conditions for those who held them meant getting a circle of loyalists who saw the usefulness of supporting rulers who perpetuated their privileges, regardless of whether these measures violated the rights of the Indians and the laws of the Crown. The father of the ordinances, being affected in his pride and disappointed in his political ambitions, informed the king his dissatisfaction with the measures of his successor, arguing that Alonso de Sotomayor "has removed the *tasa*, which has been of great damage, and it will be of great restlessness for the natives and the Spaniards in the future."¹⁰⁶⁸ The *corregidores* of Indians were suppressed, transferring part of their functions to the *corregidores* of the cities, whose wages were remunerated partially at the expense of the Indians. He eliminated the protectorías in favor of a centralized institutionalization focused on the *Protector General*, whose salary would be paid with charge to the goods of Indians. Finally, the *administradores* were suppressed in many parts, keeping some only in those places where their functions were really necessary for the

¹⁰⁶⁵ "Carta de fray Juan Zamora, mercedario, dando noticias del reino y pronunciándose en contra de la tasa de Gamboa," in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 3 (second series), 90-1.

¹⁰⁶⁶ "Apuntamientos sobre la tasa de Chile. Lo que me parece a mí, fray Berbarado Becerril, acerca de la tasa que Martín Ruiz de Gamboa, Mariscal y gobernadora de este reino de Chile, ha dado en esta ciudad de Santiago a los naturales de ella, es lo siguiente, lo cual digo por parecerme así convenir al provenir del reino; s/f," in *Ibid.*, 121-4.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Meza Villalobos, "Régimen jurídico de la Conquista y de la Guerra de Arauco," 159.

¹⁰⁶⁸ "Carta de Martín Ruiz de Gamboa al Rey sobre sus servicios como gobernador y entrega del Reino a Alonso de Sotomayor; Santiago, 1 de noviembre de 1584," in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 3 (second series), 223.

functioning of the Indian towns.¹⁰⁶⁹ With the elimination of these charges or the limitation of their functions, since they represented an onerous burden for the repartimientos, everything was once again in the hands of the encomenderos.

The position of the new ruler meant a return to the old practices, since by suppressing most of the tasa de Gamboa' provisions, he managed to reinstate forced labor as a Indians taxation way. Violent actions in the territory of war did not wait. While the chronicles of the sixteenth century do not record a single reference to prisoners of war made by Martin Ruiz de Gamboa during his three years of regency,¹⁰⁷⁰ Alonso de Sotomayor launched an intense war by blood and fire with open slavery aims, in which he had the encomenderos' financial support, especially for his campaigns of 1584 and 1590-91.¹⁰⁷¹ This attitude of the *vecinal* class contrasted markedly with the reluctance to sustain the war expeditions that only a few years ago the governors Rodrigo de Quiroga and Martín Ruiz de Gamboa had led. This last one tried to impel a *derrama*¹⁰⁷² among the merchants of Santiago in 1581, facing a bitter resistance that frustrated his aspirations.¹⁰⁷³ By revoking the Gamboa's labor provisions and implementing a new tasa highly beneficial to the *encomenderos*, since now the proportion of Indians destined to the gold washings increased considerably, Sotomayor showed to be a functional ruler to the interests of the most privileged group of Chilean society. From the encomenderos point of view, backing Sotomayor meant keeping their perks in the midst of a legal current driven by the monarchy that was not favorable for them. Issues such as this show that the Hispanic-Indian relationship in the American context cannot be studied solely from exclusively legislative parameters, since the norms set forth by the Crown were often

¹⁰⁶⁹ Meza Villalobos, *Política indígena en los orígenes de la sociedad chilena*, 41.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Only a late chronicler, the Jesuit Diego de Rosales, *Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes Indiano*, I, book 4, ch. XLVIII, 605, register in his chronicle the capture of Indians on the Gayete island, near Valdivia, by Ruiz de Gamboa. For the connoisseurs in the Rosales' work is not a mystery that he sometimes incurs in errors when narrating sixteenth century events, being his work historically more rigorous in the description of the century that he had to live.

A contemporary author to Ruiz de Gamboa, Captain Pedro Mariño de Lovera, describes slaving incursions carried out by third parties during his regency, without indicating his direct participation, although admitting that Gamboa led punitive attacks on rebel territories. See Mariño de Lovera, *Crónica del Reino de Chile*, book 3, part 2, ch. XXV, 524 and ch. XXVI, 527.

¹⁰⁷¹ Meza Villalobos, "Régimen jurídico de la Conquista y de la Guerra de Arauco," 159.

¹⁰⁷² The *derramas* were organized by the governor in his condition of maximum military chief of the Kingdom. The number of *encomenderos* that should be incorporated and the means they had to contribute were fixed. Although the *derramas* should be exceptional, in Chile they became a very recurrent modality, causing the annoyance of the *encomenderos*. The documentation of the time often attributes the poverty of the Kingdom to the recurrent use that the governors made of the *derramas*. See Concha Monardes, *El Reino de Chile*, 68-9.

¹⁰⁷³ Mariño de Lovera, *Crónica del Reino de Chile*, book III, part 2, ch. XXVI, 528.

ignored whenever the royal officials gave priority to the advantages they could obtain in a relationship of mutual interest with the local ruling classes. The relative isolation of Chile, of difficult and slow communication with Lima, facilitated the development and perpetuation of these vices, keeping the southernmost government of the Spanish Empire in the New World in a situation of labor and legal stagnation. While in the heart of the Andean world the Toledo's reforms established a tax on money from 1572, which had to be paid to the *corregidor* and his agents,¹⁰⁷⁴ by the end of the century in Chile the taxation in labor and species was still directly delivered to the *encomendero*.

Missionary foundations of the Society of Jesus

The Spaniards considered that the true religion was the one promoted by the Catholic Church, led by the vicar of Christ and successor of St. Peter, the only one capable of guiding souls towards human perfection and eternal salvation. The war of Reconquista in the south of the Iberian Peninsula led by the Catholic Kings, first, and the strengthening of the principles and dogmas advocated by the Roman Pontiff as a result of the Counter-Reformation promoted in the time of Charles V, later, made Spain the bulwark of Catholicism in the Old World. In both historical events an important role played the conviction that one fought against enemies that threatened both the existence and the fundamental principles of Christianity, and that confrontation fought in the field of weapons and ideas was a powerful force in the construction of the Spanish unity and identity. The discovery of the New World was a parallel stimulus that gave strength to this Hispanic crusade, a task in which the Indies were seen as a reward for the efforts of Isabel de Castilla and her successors of the Golden Age.¹⁰⁷⁵ In this way, in the late sixteenth century and throughout the seventeenth century Christianity was an expansive ideal carried forward with the encouragement of Spanish Catholicism.¹⁰⁷⁶

¹⁰⁷⁴ Trelles, "Los grupos étnicos andinos y su integración forzada al sistema colonial temprano," 40-2.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Borges, "El sentido trascendente del descubrimiento y conversión de Indias," 153-5.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Greer & Mills, "A Catholic Atlantic," 10.

The Society of Jesus emerged in the mission field in the 1540s¹⁰⁷⁷ as an innovative order, both for its organization and its methods.¹⁰⁷⁸ Its purpose according to the *Constituciones* (Constitutions), the founding document of the Order, “is not only to attend to the salvation and perfection of our souls with divine grace, but intensely pursuit to help the salvation and perfection of those of our neighbors.”¹⁰⁷⁹ Indeed, from the beginning it was established by the founder that the purpose of the Order was, above all, “to pay attention mainly to the defense and propagation of the faith, and to the benefit of souls in Christian life and doctrine through public preaching, lessons, and all other ministry of the word of God, of spiritual exercises, and of the education in Christianity of children and ignorant ones.”¹⁰⁸⁰ Since the spread of the God’s word pursued as the ultimate goal the salvation of souls by incorporating them into the flock of Christ, and honoring the vow of obedience, by which they were obliged to execute without any excuse whatever commanded them “the Romans Pontiffs, the present and his successors, as regards the benefit of souls and the propagation of the faith,”¹⁰⁸¹ the Jesuits were ready to go wherever the pope sent them, “among the faithful or among infidels, without excuses and without demanding any viaticum, for things that concern the divine worship and good of the Christian religion.”¹⁰⁸² The mission, as an expression of the fourth vow pronounced by the Jesuits, proclaimed their apostolic mobility and, as a pastoral strategy, showed the universality of their apostolate. The missionary vocation impelled them to be always ready to work in the most remote and unknown regions of a world that, at that time, was opening up to the knowledge of Western Europe, an exercise of exploration and reasoning in which the men in black robe played the most preponderant role of all religious congregations: besides being agents of the Church they operated as efficient officials of the Empire, transmitting knowledge that involved all areas of learning, highlighting those linked to geography, ethnography and the study of languages.

¹⁰⁷⁷ The foundation of the Society of Jesus dates from 1534, but it was able to undertake missionary tasks after the approval of Pope Paul III in September 1539, and later by the *Bull Regimini Militantis Ecclesiae*, of September 27, 1540. Subsequently, the Society was confirmed by Pope Julius III in the *Bull Exposcit Debitum* on July 21, 1550.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Rubiés, “The concept of cultural dialogue and the jesuit method of accommodation,” 263.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Loyola, “Constituciones: Primero Examen y general que se ha de proponer a todos los que pidieren ser admitidos en la Compañía de Jesús,” 370-1.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Loyola, “Fórmula del Instituto,” 30.

¹⁰⁸¹ *Ibid*, 33.

¹⁰⁸² Loyola, “Constituciones: Primero Examen y general que se ha de proponer a todos los que pidieren ser admitidos en la Compañía de Jesús,” 371.

As it was the most recent Order within the wide range of Catholic institutes, the members of the Society of Jesus were open to internalize other evangelizing experiences rehearsed both inside and outside the newly discovered continent. Dominicans, Franciscans, Mercedarians and Augustinians were the initiators of the Gospel in America,¹⁰⁸³ so the followers of Ignatius of Loyola had to draw on the knowledge accumulated by their brothers of faith in chronicles, letters and reports written during the first decades of missionary work. The Dominican action in Chiapa, the Franciscan one in the heart of Mexico, and the hospitals erected by the secular priest and Bishop Vasco de Quiroga in the Michoacán region, were some of the main references for the early Jesuit work in American lands.¹⁰⁸⁴ Perhaps the most telling example is the work carried out in Paraguay, specifically in the regions of Guayrá, Itatín, Tapé and in the Iguazú-Acaray, where the Jesuit evangelization's first steps were made on the route already traced by their Franciscan predecessors. Along with this, there is a consensus that the Paraguayan case was a synthesis of previous experiences of the same Jesuit Order in other regions, especially in the viceroyalty of Peru, as in Huarochirí, the Cercado de Lima and Juli.¹⁰⁸⁵

The founders of the Society of Jesus drank from various sources when creating the community. The Constitutions, the master text on the ways a Jesuit had to follow in his formation and procedure, required a prolonged elaboration based on materials collected from other religious orders.¹⁰⁸⁶ As a consequence, and taking into consideration the common denominator of the Christian ideal that linked them, it is not a coincidence that the Ignatians shared different positions around the missionary activity with the rest of the mendicant orders, especially the Franciscans. We have already mentioned in the previous chapters the ideal of spreading the faith, a precept inspired not only by the mandate of Christ to his Apostles, since Franciscans and Jesuits had their own referents in the unfolding of spiritual work; In the same way that Saint Francis of Assisi was the mirror in which the former reflected their work, the latter had in Francisco Javier (canonized by Pope Gregory XV in 1622 with Ignacio de Loyola) the model of missionary whose methods used in the Portuguese India (in Goa he learned the language of the natives and devoted to study their customs) were

¹⁰⁸³ Lopetegui, *El Padre José de Acosta y las misiones*, 85-6.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Moreno Jeria, "Metodología misional jesuita en la periferia austral de América," 240.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Wilde, "Las misiones jesuitas de Paraguay: imaginarios políticos, etnogénesis y agencia indígena," 184.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Burrieza Sánchez, "Retrato del jesuita," 36.

a footpath to follow. The letters in which Francisco Javier reported his experiences and gave an account of the advances in evangelization “became the chief recruitment tool for Jesuit missionaries.”¹⁰⁸⁷ In this evangelizing crusade both Orders shared, equally, the valuation of stoicism as the most worthy way to face the hardships of missionary work, and the consideration of martyrdom as the greatest way in which a missionary could give his soul to God. In his *Spiritual Exercises*, Ignacio de Loyola stressed the desire of every Jesuit to imitate the commitment of Jesus Christ, willing to “endure any insults and any vituperation and any poverty, both earthly and spiritual.”¹⁰⁸⁸ The martyrdom of the religious was an unequivocal sign of the total Jesuit commitment to the divine word in order to attain the greater glory of God (*Ad maiorem Dei gloriam*). The American soil was made up of many territories occupied by diverse cultures, in each of which the commitment of the black robe men was put to the test with the Formulas and Constitutions that laid the doctrinal foundations of the Society of Jesus.

Special mention deserves the conceptualization of work with indigenous people. In the Juntas de Valladolid (1550-1551) and the Council of Trent (1545-1563) it was established that the salvation of the natives was an achievable aspiration, especially considering that in 1537 Pope Paul III, with the *Bull Sublimis Deus*, placed the Indians within the human race by describing them as “true men ... [who] are not only capable of the Christian faith, but (as we know) they approach to it with much desire.”¹⁰⁸⁹ It is true that in the Europe of those days paganism was the most inclusive and unequivocal category of otherness,¹⁰⁹⁰ but this was not an obstacle for most of the regular priests to consider the New World natives as worthy of salvation. The Jesuits, for instance, managed to defend theological and philosophical positions that defined the American Indian as fundamentally human and naturally theistic.¹⁰⁹¹ José de Acosta stated as a central argument of his writings the capacity of Indians to be partakers of salvation.¹⁰⁹² Furthermore, his work *De Procuranda Indorum Salute* (Preaching of the Gospel in the Indies) was a guide for missionary work among pagans: aimed at pastors

¹⁰⁸⁷ Cushner, *Why have you come here?*, 22.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Loyola, “Ejercicios Espirituales,” 180. See also Ruiz Jurado, “Espíritu misional de la Compañía de Jesús,” 21.

¹⁰⁸⁹ “Bula de Su Santidad el Papa Paulo III; Roma, 2 de junio de 1537,” in Cuevas, *Documentos inéditos del siglo XVI*, 85.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Ryan, “Assimilating new worlds in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,” 525.

¹⁰⁹¹ Cushner, *Why have you come here?*, 19.

¹⁰⁹² Sievernich, “La misión en la Compañía de Jesús: inculturación y proceso,” 283.

and teachers, the treaty was an attempt to establish an ethical and universal basis for the integral promotion of the American Indian.¹⁰⁹³ It was an extraordinary missiological manual published in 1588, but written around 1576, which gathered the central discussions of the Second Council of Lima: the theme of the universalism of salvation and the discussions about the capacity of the Indians for the sacraments fill its pages.¹⁰⁹⁴

It goes without saying that the circle of specialists has not yet reached a full consensus regarding the principles underlying the evangelizing activity of the Society of Jesus. The researchers, in general lines, have divided their positions in relation to the real valuation of the Jesuits around the indigenous world. For the historian Nicholas Cushner, the Jesuit pretension to equate the natives with the Spaniards in the spiritual plane did not have a correlate in the social dimension: when being baptized the Indians were integrated into the great Christian family, but even so they were always considered as inferior to the Spanish, the *gente de razón* (people of reason).¹⁰⁹⁵ Behind the veil of evangelization was hidden the assumption that the missionaries were the bearers and representatives of a superior culture, which made all others irremediably inferior. From our perspective, it is true that in the ethnological evaluation of most of the Jesuits the natives of America were located in lower social, political and economic rungs than that of the European nations, but Cushner errs by placing the rationale of natives at the core of his analysis. On the contrary, we agree with Daniel Reef when he states that

The Jesuits went further than many of their European contemporaries in grasping the rational basis of Indian culture, and it was precisely this understanding of the “other” that helped them to reconstitute Indian productive and organizational strategies. [...] the Jesuits were predisposed to view the Indian as a rational being; it was centuries of isolation from the Old World and an ignorance of the word of God –not a lack of reason– that accounted for the Native Americans “backwardness.”¹⁰⁹⁶

¹⁰⁹³ García Castellón, “De Procuranda Indorum Salute,” 5.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Saranyana, *Teología en América Latina*, 157.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Cushner, *Why have you come here?*, 65.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Reef, “The Jesuit mission frontier in comparative perspective,” 28.

It was not the lack of rationality¹⁰⁹⁷ that sustained the subalternity of the Amerindians as their long history of isolation from the Christian world, a confinement that degenerated into vices and practices that were at odds with the morals taught in the book of books. The physical distance from the centers of preaching and discussion of the divine word gave rise to superstitions, the foundations of idolatry, of demonic teachings such as divination, and of deviant behaviors.¹⁰⁹⁸ Consequently, it was not a coincidence that José de Acosta equated the word Indian with that of barbarian when he said that “we call Indians all the barbarians who in our age have been discovered by the Spaniards and Portuguese, who are all deprived of the light of the gospel and ignoring the human order.”¹⁰⁹⁹ The Jesuits, therefore, positioned themselves as the main agents of a *mission civilizatrice* (civilizing mission) committed to expanding the Christian vision of the world in order to establish the Kingdom of God on earth.¹¹⁰⁰ In this they did not distance themselves from the position of other religious Orders that, at that time, operated on the great American scene. What differentiated them from their congeners was the epistemological principle that the natives were not a *tabula rasa* on which the knowledge and practices that would make them participants in the political and confessional life of the Spaniards could be recorded: the centuries of living apart beyond the *Mar Oceana* had shaped a history that could not be unknown or erased overnight, since it would have meant applying an unnecessary level of violence that would only hinder the process of religious conversion.

The erudition of José de Acosta, based on a vast knowledge of the missionary activity carried out by different Orders throughout the globe, allowed him to compare methods, experiences and results, concluding that the accommodation (*accommodatio*) or missionary adaptation was the key that would allow to open the door of the native societies: by respecting languages, customs and institutions that do not defy the basic principles of Catholic morality, the Indians’ wall of suspicion could be broken down to enter into their hearts. The Jesuit weighed the contrariety that would represent the imposition of the Hispanic habitus among the indigenous communities, since “striving to change immediately the customs and way of

¹⁰⁹⁷ It must not be forgotten that the rational and moral capacities of the natives had been questioned by the theologian Ginés de Sepúlveda, defended by Las Casas and, finally, recognized by the pope; see Lara Cisneros, “La idolatría de los indios americanos: ¿el enemigo invencible?,” 43.

¹⁰⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 34.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Acosta, *De Procuranda Indorum Salute*, Proem, 391-2.

¹¹⁰⁰ Cushner, *Why have you come here?*, 107.

being of the people and want to accommodate them suddenly to new laws, not only is not easy, but also unsure, because it is something that requires a lot of time and prolonged effort [...] For which many things have to be disguised, others praised; and those that are more rooted and do more damage must be replaced with skill by good ones.”¹¹⁰¹ The accommodation involved combining the political and cultural analysis of each context, carefully nuancing the Christian content in order to avoid conflicting situations that put at risk the missionary task. Consequently, tolerance and adaptation were two essential pillars of the Ignatian *modus operandi* not only on American soil, but also in the distant lands of the East. We had already pointed out in previous sections that this approach was not exclusive to the Society of Jesus,¹¹⁰² at least during the initial stages of interethnic contact, which was due, in particular, to the precariousness of the Spanish situation due to the small number of religious and military workers, overwhelmed by the immense demographic superiority of the natives. As the Spaniards established alliances with friendly Indians, taking advantage of the internal conflicts among indigenous –precarious agreements that were always characterized by instability–, and while new Christian contingents integrated to the Conquest as time progressed, Europeans consolidated a growing position of force, reversing that initial accommodation to gradually transform into an imposition of institutions and rules. The particularity of the Jesuits was that they never renounced tolerance as a strategy of incorporation and transformation of otherness, even when their evangelizing activity had gained much ground among the native communities; the case of Paraguay is the most illustrative example. In the words of James Moore

The fathers were willing on the one hand to adapt their didactic methods and much of Catholic observance to Indian life and custom, and exhibited on the other hand a pervading willingness to adapt, for their own purposes, the institutions and customs found in native tradition. The father’s, willingly and skillfully, adapted native oratory, dancing, gift-giving (the Indian means of transacting social compacts), the Indian concept of the “feasts,” and the ceremony of “resuscitation” into their and their converts’ experience of Christianity.¹¹⁰³

¹¹⁰¹ Acosta, *De Procuranda Indorum Salute*, book III, ch. 24, 502.

¹¹⁰² Rubiés, “¿Diálogo religioso, mediación cultural o cálculo maquiavélico?, 40-1.

¹¹⁰³ Moore, *Indian and Jesuit. A seventeenth-century encounter*, 163.

The Jesuit methodology did not seek cultural destruction but to introduce into native societies a form of Christianity that they hoped would be assimilated, propagated and practiced within the aboriginal cultural context.¹¹⁰⁴ The search for a fluid and lasting communication impelled them to establish compatibility with the native entities in which they introduced their missionary action. It is true that the typology established by Acosta at the time of classifying societies –monarchies, behetries and savages¹¹⁰⁵– sought to establish the most efficient way to evangelize each group, but it is no less true that his proposal raised a common substrate in the way of treating with the pagans. Thus, for all types of mission, three principles would govern: nonviolence, that customs be coherent with faith, and the need for religious workers to master indigenous languages to evangelize in the vernacular tongue.¹¹⁰⁶

The irrevocable attachment that every Jesuit should have to the Spiritual Exercises, the Constitutions and the essential norms of the Catholic faith makes it clear that in each evangelizing context the most important thing was not the quantity but the quality of the missionaries. Ignacio de Loyola identified virtue with study, a combination that led to an ideal formation whose subsequent result was efficiency in catechetical tasks.¹¹⁰⁷ For the sake of this yearning for perfection, the missionaries had to enter the social, political and especially cultural fabric of the civilizations, tribes or bands in which they carried out their pastoral activity. An indispensable requirement to achieve full knowledge of their flock and reach their hearts was to master their languages, which was foreseen and advised by Loyola as it would allow gaining authority among the neophytes, as well as learning “stories, cosmography, tropes and talking ways.”¹¹⁰⁸ Jose de Acosta recommended priests from Spain to put all their efforts into “learn with careful study the language [of the Indians] and after they know it to exercise it,”¹¹⁰⁹ which would benefit the missionary work. This aspiration, which required patient and persevering work, was framed by the precepts defined in the

¹¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 161.

¹¹⁰⁵ Acosta, *Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias*, book VI, ch. 11, 198-9.

¹¹⁰⁶ Sievernich, “La misión en la Compañía de Jesús: inculturación y proceso,” 284.

¹¹⁰⁷ Burrieza Sánchez, “Los ministerios de la Compañía,” 108-9.

¹¹⁰⁸ “Carta de Ignacio de Loyola al padre Diego Laínez; Roma, 21 de mayo de 1547,” in Iparraquirre, *Obras Completas de San Ignacio de Loyola*, 734.

¹¹⁰⁹ Acosta, *De Procuranda Indorum Salute*, book IV, ch. 9, 519.

Second¹¹¹⁰ (1557) and Third Council of Lima¹¹¹¹ (1582-1583). In fact, at the initiative of the Jesuits, the chair of Quechua language was created at the University of San Marcos in Lima, which was sanctioned by Royal Decree of Felipe II, signed in Badajoz on September 19, 1580,¹¹¹² and therefore it should not be surprising that the first and only Mapuche language dictionary in the seventeenth century was the fruit of a member of the Order, Father Luis de Valdivia.¹¹¹³

The challenge of knowing cultures with unknown languages in the Age of Discovery was a central theme for the goal of conversion.¹¹¹⁴ Although Dominicans and Franciscans were the first to elaborate *Artes y gramáticas de la lengua* (Arts and grammars of the language) in the New World, in addition to *Catecismos* (Catechisms), *Sermonarios* (Sermonaries) and *Confesionarios* (Confessionals), the Jesuits, who arrived later, would become into the best pupils of their predecessors, being responsible for setting up the printing press in various corners of the continent. Just after the Third Council of Lima, Jose de Acosta composed the Castilian text of the three catechisms and played a leading role in the writing of the confessional and the sermons that were to be translated into the native languages.¹¹¹⁵ Traditionally, historiography has argued that through the elaboration and dissemination of these texts it was sought to standardize the vernacular languages and incorporate concepts and definitions of Christianity in the indigenous linguistic corpus, prioritizing those more spatially extended and with a greater number of speakers in each of the Ecclesiastical Provinces. Although this is undoubtedly true, it is necessary to point out that many missionaries committed to the cause of the Indians also used these works as a way of demonstrating the conceptual, cultural and even moral richness of their proteges, making it clear that they were not mere brutes forgotten by God, but human beings similar to Europeans.¹¹¹⁶

¹¹¹⁰ The Second Council of Lima established a series of sanctions for those priests who were negligent in learning the indigenous languages; see Castro & Hidalgo, “Las políticas de la lengua imperial y su recepción en la Audiencia de Charcas (siglos XVI-XVIII),” 186.

¹¹¹¹ It was agreed that the Indians should be instructed in their own language so they can understand the doctrine, for which no one would henceforth be “compelled to learn in Latin the prayers or booklets, for it is enough for them and it is still better to know and say it in their own tongue;” see Vargas Ugarte, *Concilios Limenses (1551-1772)*, 325.

¹¹¹² Millé. *Derrotero de la Compañía de Jesús en la conquista del Perú, Tucumán y Paraguay*, 12.

¹¹¹³ Valdivia, *Arte general de la lengua que corre en todo el Reyno de Chile*.

¹¹¹⁴ Hovdhaugen, “Missionary Grammars. An attempt of defining a field of research,” 13-4.

¹¹¹⁵ Vázquez, “Pensadores eclesiásticos americanos,” 411.

¹¹¹⁶ Hovdhaugen, “Missionary Grammars. An attempt of defining a field of research,” 15-6.

In general, the Jesuit catechetical procedures were very homogeneous in America,¹¹¹⁷ and in many aspects they nearly did not differ from the methods used by the rest of the Regular Orders. In the same way as the Franciscans, they made of painting, theater and music a pedagogical trilogy to educate the Indians' souls and minds, and to a large extent they were debtors of the experiences and achievements of those. For example, Serge Gruzinski states that the Franciscans often used painted cloths to represent the apostles, the Ten Commandments or the seven deadly sins. The procedure proved to be so fruitful “that it was submitted to the Council of the Indies and used by other religious.”¹¹¹⁸ But while the visual images were used both in the reductions and in the circular missions, the theater could be deployed almost exclusively in the former, being forbidden to regions where it was impossible to congregate the natives, such as southern Chile. In the contexts in which the Jesuits deployed these representations, these became an effective device for the acquisition of knowledge. The moralizing dramatic representations (autos sacramentales, colloquia and dialogues) were very popular in the Colegio San Miguel de Santiago.¹¹¹⁹ This method was so widespread among the members of the Society of Jesus scattered throughout the world, that there were enthusiasts who claimed that from a good theater play one could obtain as many spiritual benefits as from a sermon.¹¹²⁰

Special mention deserves the use of music, which also played an important role since in the words of Johannes Meier “the *applicatio sesuum*, the instrumentalization of the senses and the imagination, is a typical element of the Jesuit mission method.”¹¹²¹ The recourse of music was one of the most seductive methods to attract the natives,¹¹²² advising in the Ordinances of 1573 that to capture attention of the infidels it would be convenient “to use the music of singers and minstrels high and low, to encourage the Indians to get together.”¹¹²³ A decade later, in the Third Council of Lima, reference was made to the use of singing as a pedagogical element in the evangelization of the natives, highlighting the benefit that it would mean for the divine cult that were founded “school and chapel of singers and music

¹¹¹⁷ Rondón, “Música jesuita en Chile en los siglos XVII y XVIII: primera aproximación,” 27.

¹¹¹⁸ Gruzinski, *La guerra de las imágenes. De Cristóbal Colón a 'Blade Runner' (1492-2019)*, 76.

¹¹¹⁹ Rondón, “Música jesuita en Chile en los siglos XVII y XVIII: primera aproximación,” 28.

¹¹²⁰ Burrieza Sánchez, “Las glorias del segundo siglo (1622-1700),” 161.

¹¹²¹ Meier, “La importancia de la música en las misiones de los jesuitas,” 73.

¹¹²² Guarda Geywitz, “Metodología misional en Chile. Siglos XVI-XVIII,” 135.

¹¹²³ *Ibid.*

of flutes and chirimias and other instruments in the churches.”¹¹²⁴ There are references that give an account of the musical environment that surrounded the liturgical celebrations and certain festivities such as Corpus, Christmas, the day of the Virgin and the local festivities.¹¹²⁵ However, as Leonardo Waisman affirms, the scenarios of musical persuasion chosen by the Jesuits, in which they tried to instill in the Indians values such as the temporal discipline¹¹²⁶ (singing the Ave Maria every morning, the choirs in the Sunday mass, etc.) and the spatial discipline¹¹²⁷ (the urban design of the Jesuit missions included a central plaza, a cemetery and an organized separation of public and religious spaces, thereby introducing the natives to one of the essential pillars of policy life), were the reductions and urban spaces, something that could not materialize in the troubled Mapuche territory.

In fact, just as the semi-desert region of northern Mexico was for the Franciscans, the southern lands of Chile also meant a tough challenge for the reductionist aspirations of the Jesuits. The will of adapting to the difficulties of each context led them to adopt the system of circular missions,¹¹²⁸ characterized by its spatial and temporal limitations. It is true that this mobility opposed to the missionary sedentary lifestyle imposed by the institutionalization of the Order and the parochial context of the Indian evangelization imposed by the Patronato Real of the Church. But the geographical and cultural peculiarities of southern Chile turned this ideal into a utopia, since the Mapuche society was composed of numerous segmental groups, politically autonomous and lacking a central authority. The Mapuches recognized the weak leadership of the *lonkos* who represented each *rewe*, and in them the Jesuits focused their apostolic tasks in order to turn them into bridges for the conversion of the rest of the community. It was a simplified form of the *evangelización vertical* (vertical evangelization) used in other regions of the continent and favored by the *Ordinances of Discovery and New Population*,¹¹²⁹ which prioritized catechetical work with those who held some degree of

¹¹²⁴ Vargas Ugarte, *Concilios Limenses (1551-1772)*, 374. See also Matte Varas, “En torno al Tercer Concilio Limense (1582-1583) y su proyección en Chile,” 88.

¹¹²⁵ Meier, “La importancia de la música en las misiones de los jesuitas,” 73.

¹¹²⁶ Waisman, “Urban music in the wilderness,” 214-5.

¹¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹²⁸ The historian Aliocha Maldavsky points out that “in the records of the first Provincial Congregation of 1576 four ways of working for the salvation of the Indians were detailed (*salutem indigenorum procurare*): the healing of souls, the ‘circular’ missions, the foundations in the cities of Spaniards, and the *colegios para hijos de caciques*.” See Maldavsky, “Ser o no ser misioneros,” 165. The text “Actas de la Primera Congregación Provincial de Perú; Cuzco, 11 de diciembre de 1576,” in Antonio de Egaña, ed. *Monumenta Peruana*, 57.

¹¹²⁹ The Ordinances required the discoverers “to be informed of the diversity of nations, languages and sects and groups of natives that exist in the province, and of the lords to whom they obey. And through trade and

authority or community recognition, no matter how small.¹¹³⁰ Usually, the work of the missionaries went beyond the merely spiritual, trying to generate transformations in the socio-political fabric of the natives. In egalitarian societies with ephemeral leadership they tried to introduce ritual or symbolic elements of power among previously chosen subjects within family lineages, all with the aim of creating permanent and inheritable leaderships in order to dispose in the present and future with groups of kinship loyal to the missionaries and the Spanish monarchy. With this purpose, the children of the caciques were always a priority objective in the evangelizing work; in the regions where the reductionist ideal materialized, this task was carried out in the *Colegios de Nobles o de Caciques*, as was the case of the *Santiago del Cercado de Lima* doctrine.¹¹³¹ The arrival of the viceroy Francisco de Toledo in 1569 meant the erection of schools in all the Indian reductions¹¹³² along the great Peruvian space; thanks to these schools the future Christian generation of the Indies was prepared, whose students not only became instructors to teach reading and writing in the towns, but also invaluable assistants of the missionaries in the catechetical task and in the diffusion of the gospe.¹¹³³ But on the Chilean borderland the instruction process of these infants was much more precarious because it was impossible to congregate the natives. In other words, the Jesuit project was at the same time evangelizing and reorganizing, since it sought to generate transformations in the logic of tribal power, in such a way that what was previously obtained by personal merit (being a good warrior, a generous leader, etc.) would now be achieved through heritability of blood. The Guarani missions of Paraguay are a clear example of the success of this evangelizing strategy,¹¹³⁴ while in the Mapuche society it never went from being an unfinished project.

gifts seek friendship with them, treating them much love and caressing them, and giving them some gifts they get addicted to, and showing no greed for their things. Establish friendship and alliance with the lords and principals who seem to be more supporters for the pacification of the land;” see the “Ordenanzas sobre descubrimiento nuevo y población; Bosque de Segovia, 13 de julio de 1573,” in Torres de Mendoza, *Colección de Documentos inéditos*, 531.

¹¹³⁰ Alden, “Changing Jesuit perceptions of the Brasis during the sixteenth century,” 212-13.

¹¹³¹ Borja Medina, “Métodos misionales de la Compañía de Jesús en América Hispana y Filipinas,” 186.

¹¹³² In general, the most recent historiography agrees that the Toledan reforms increased the Indian exploitation, since the process of reduction into controllable populations banished the aborigine from their natural environment, facilitating their abuse and submission to the tax system. See Lisi, *El Tercer Concilio Limense y la aculturación de los indígenas sudamericanos*, 29.

¹¹³³ Olaechea, “Participación de los indios en la tarea evangélica,” 247-8.

¹¹³⁴ Wilde, “Prestigio indígena y nobleza peninsular: la invención de linajes guaraníes en las misiones del Paraguay.”

Now, the fact that the Jesuits have arrived late to American lands, behind the other mendicant orders and taking advantage of the missionary legacy of their brothers of faith, does not mean that the black robe men operated exclusively on the basis of the principles exposed in the compilation texts written by their brightest minds. Their practical spirit always impelled them to place at one end of the scale the theoretical precepts of the ideal catechetical work, which was impregnated in the pages of various works, contrasting them with the effort implied in their materialization in each context. Just as the Franciscans built their missionary dynamic on the basis of trials that led to failures and successes, the Jesuits also founded their pastoral work on their own experience. In this way, although it is undoubted that *De procuranda indorum salute* laid the foundations of Jesuit missionary work in American lands, it can not be ignored that missionary activity was not only governed by the empire of ink and paper –however much the Acosta’s reflections rest on countless evangelizing experiences–, since the border areas used to put to the test proposals based on theology, formal speculation or extrapolation of other people’s situations. For example, Jose de Acosta was not in favor of the Lascasian method of apostolic preaching, because he considered it extremely risky given that “the barbarians show a nature that seems a mixture of man and fierce, and their customs are such, that more than men they look like men’s monsters; for which reason a deal must be made with them that be partly human and partly fierce.”¹¹³⁵ Instead, he proposed the method of *entradas*, that is, missionary expeditions protected by soldiers, who must carry the "necessary supplies for human life in such long and dangerous expeditions [...] It is necessary that both go together, soldier and priest, as it shows not only the reason, but the experience proved for long time. Therefore, if there is any hope of achieving the conversion of the barbarians, it consists in these expeditions.”¹¹³⁶ However, the subsequent events revealed the danger of being accompanied by soldiers, since years of border conflicts had cultivated a feeling of aversion against the Spanish side, an issue in which religious used to become the main victims. The need to achieve success in missionary work meant that Acosta’s proposal was rectified by the circumstances, so the Jesuits opted for the system of circular missions. The high number of indigenous groups distributed throughout extensive territories made priests carry only the basics and necessary to

¹¹³⁵ Acosta, *De Procuranda Indorum Salute*, book II, ch. 12, 450.

¹¹³⁶ Ibid. Lopetegui, *El Padre José de Acosta y las misiones*, 352.

administer some sacraments, contenting with a brief and superficial catechesis. In a short time the salvationist ideal imposed as a priority in the evangelization tasks, so that particular importance was given to the baptism of natives, especially children, regardless of whether they had not yet internalized the essential precepts of Christianity, an aspect that contravened one of the agreements of the Third Council of Lima regarding the prohibition of baptizing natives who did not know by heart at least the Creed and the Paternoster,¹¹³⁷ which in the future would mean the criticism of the Franciscans, who were not willing to renounce an evangelization founded on proper indoctrination. In this way, in order to ensure the Indians salvation, the Jesuits were open to disregard some conciliar dispositions, as well as to go beyond the exhortations of one of their most recognized members. Evangelization should be done without soldiers, even if it meant multiplying the risks.

The progressive determination of the Jesuits for working directly with the Indian communities without the intervention of third parties was also based on their particular conception of the devil's scope of action. As we noted in previous lines, most of the regular orders –including the Society of Jesus– coincided in the belief that the devil had taken advantage of the Indians ignorance and the absence of the Church to subdue them by means of false religions.¹¹³⁸ But the Jesuits distanced themselves from their peers when they considered that the evil one acted mainly within the Christians, inciting them to avarice, dishonesty and violence¹¹³⁹ to obstruct the approach of the Indians to the true religion. The same José de Acosta recognizes that

[...] the terrible examples and lost customs of the Christians retards a lot the true conversion of many Indians [...] I find no more difficulty than this in the present matter; because as the barbarians do not know our religion, they all believe us equal; and so any crime of one or another results in infamy of all, and what is worse, the Christian name becomes hateful to the infidels.¹¹⁴⁰

¹¹³⁷ Saranyana, *Teología en América Latina*, 172. Also Lopetegui, *El Padre José de Acosta y las misiones*, 295-6.

¹¹³⁸ Lara Cisneros, “La idolatría de los indios americanos: ¿el enemigo invencible?,” 41.

¹¹³⁹ Saranyana, *Teología en América Latina*, 156-7.

¹¹⁴⁰ Acosta, *De Procuranda Indorum Salute*, book II, ch. 18, 457.

This need to move away from the *República de los Españoles* until almost total isolation, was a modality successfully applied in emblematic missions, such as Juli¹¹⁴¹ in the Andean highlands or those dispersed in the jungles of Paraguay, and this is what largely explains the perpetuation of Jesuit work in borderlands.¹¹⁴² They would apply the same policy of isolation in the southern latitudes of the Kingdom of Chile under the Defensive War project, although the results were not so prosperous.

The Defensive War in Chile: heir to the Chichimec pacification?

The Spanish Empire of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was a great political, economic and cultural system composed of kingdoms subordinate to the Royal House of the Habsburgs. In the period of the discoveries, conquest and erection of Spanish settlements in the various corners of the American continent, the operation of this network consisting of numerous and growing geo-administrative units required an efficient circulation of goods and information. The royal officials appointed by the monarchy, the merchants who ensured the interregional flow of raw materials and manufactured goods, and the religious orders spreaded among the cities and borderlands of the governorates, were the main vehicles of experiences and knowledge that allowed the functioning and integration of the imperial apparatus. Chronicles, reports and letters fulfilled the important function of forming a growing reservoir of data of the most diverse nature, which could be used when discussing policies that affect any region of the Empire. The Jesuits, for example, made the *Cartas Annuas* a mechanism for the accumulation and dissemination of knowledge according to their own political or missionary efforts. Along with the chronicles that some members of the order wrote, these letters were the main sources of the Ignatian missionary anthropology, and without which the main works by José de Acosta, *De Procuranda Indorum Salute* and the *Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias*, would not have been possible. Twentieth-century

¹¹⁴¹ According to Cushner, “Juli was declared an Indian town, a *pueblo de los Indios*, which meant that no Spaniard other than a missionary could live there. The anonymous Jesuit chronicler who wrote about Juli in 1600 listed five reasons for keeping Spaniards, the *polilla de los indios* (the parasites of the Indians) he called them, away from the Indians: they take Indians away from their farms; steal their property; abscond with wives and daughters; cheat the Indians; and sell them bad wine, rotten coca, and putrid flour for drunken orgies.” See Cushner, *Why have you come here?*, 82.

¹¹⁴² Brading, *The first America*, 172.

historians such as John Rowe or John Elliot, among others, rightly asserted that the Western capacity for understanding the Indies was largely due to these reports.¹¹⁴³

We maintain that the Defensive War project, promoted by the Jesuit priest Luis de Valdivia in southern Chile, was a consequence, precisely, of this accumulation and circulation of knowledge. With this approach we are in a position opposed to that of the historian Luz María Méndez, who recently proposed that the military Miguel de Olavarría would have been the first in Chile to “make a significant change in Spanish policy towards the installation of forms of peaceful relationship.”¹¹⁴⁴ In a report written around 1598, months before the Spanish disaster in the area of *Curalava* that cost the life of the governor Martín García Óñez de Loyola and the entourage that escorted him, Olavarría proposed a policy of non-violent pacification supported by priests to achieve the evangelization of rebellious Indians, allowing them “to walk and travel through all their lands to preach where anyone wanted to hear them,”¹¹⁴⁵ the installation of the gobernadores de indios in native lands “to administer them and do justice according to their laws,”¹¹⁴⁶ and the creation of an army paid by the Crown. Showing a sharpness that highlighted him from his peers, Olavarría showed that the main causes of the indigenous stubbornness against the white man were the persecution of the religious against polygamy, to avoid personal service due to the constant abuses incurred, and the strenuous work in the gold mines.¹¹⁴⁷ Given this, and hoping to consolidate the Spanish presence in the indomitable southern lands, he proposed a change in the methods of conquest, showing that the weight of events demonstrated that it was already convenient “to try another way to assimilate that land, different of what has been followed until now.”¹¹⁴⁸

The concordance between the approaches by Olavarría and the border policy that would shortly after guide the steps of the Jesuits and the Crown, led Luz Maria Mendez to support the hypothesis that the reflections of the *Informe de 1598* were an orientation that illuminated the decisions and future projects of the monarchy and the Company of Jesus on

¹¹⁴³ Pino Díaz, “Los métodos misionales jesuitas y la cultura de ‘los otros’,” 50.

¹¹⁴⁴ Méndez Beltrán, “Diálogo entre españoles e indígenas en los parlamentos de los siglos XVI y XVII,” 33.

¹¹⁴⁵ “Informe de don Miguel de Olaverría sobre el Reyno de Chile, sus indios y sus guerras; 1598,” in Gay, *Historia Física y Política de Chile: Documentos*, 47.

¹¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 46.

¹¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 43-4.

¹¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 34.

the Chilean stage.¹¹⁴⁹ However, his approach lacks solid support, since in the debates that helped to establish the Defensive War and to configure its essential characteristics, there is never a single mention of the text. Probably, the absence of the author of Chilean territory since 1602 explains, at least in part, this omission.¹¹⁵⁰ We can not affirm categorically that this text was unknown to Jesuits and royal officials, but its total invisibility in the spaces of discussion in which the fate of the Kingdom was decided leads us to postulate that it did not occupy a central place in the debates, and most probably, not even marginal. In this way, how can we justify the similarities between Olavarría's proposals and Luis de Valdivia's pacification project? Even before the writing of the manuscript, the military and the Jesuits coexisted in the Kingdom of Chile for at least five years, during which Olavarría could have internalized some of the Ignatian order's principles and proposals for the pacification of border Indians. However, this does not stop being a mere conjecture because, if it had existed, we do not know the characteristics of that relationship. More plausible is to consider that Miguel de Olavarría had echoed the new pro-indigenous current that was spreading in monarchical circles, which in the legal and theological level had its clearest expression in the *Ordinances of Discovery and New Population* of 1573, and in the protective clauses of the Third Council of Lima of 1582-1583. At that point of the process of expansion in the New World Captain Bernardo de Vargas Machuca had summarized in his *Militia and description of the Indies*, published in Madrid in 1599, the Spanish experience of a century of conquest. He emphasized in it, as a primordial objective of the process of peninsular expansion, the peace making through agreements with the natives, "because underneath them the holy Gospel is preached and under them the Indian gives the vassalage and obedience."¹¹⁵¹ The protocol steps of the agreements and the way to preserve peace between the parties are referred to in detail in the Book 4.¹¹⁵² If at that moment in American history an author who did not integrate the confessional orders had given himself the task of proposing a model on how a treaty of peace with the Indians should be carried out and what objectives should contain, it is because in the imperial agenda the implantation of a diplomatic system with

¹¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 36.

¹¹⁵⁰ In 1602 he was sent to Spain by Governor Alonso de Ribera as his *procurador*, without returning to Chilean soil. See Medina, *Diccionario biográfico colonial de Chile*, 600.

¹¹⁵¹ Vargas Machuca, *Milicia y descripción de las Indias*, book 4, 139.

¹¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 139-56.

indigenous border rebels had become a significant issue.¹¹⁵³ The fragility of the Empire, beset on all sides by menacing European powers anxious of taking a slice of the precious American booty, would largely explain this transformation: the rebellious Indian no longer had to be conquered, he had to be made an ally, and that task was entrusted to the missionaries.¹¹⁵⁴

Returning to the topic that interests us, we must say that, although scarce and fragmentary, the documentary information allows us to maintain that the experience of Franciscan pacification in New Galicia was an important reference for Jesuit activity in the first decades of the 17th century on the Mapuche border. The evidence that supports this hypothesis is of three types: 1) Explicit information giving account of this, 2) Presence of imperial officials in Peru who were aware of the Chichimec pacification in New Galicia, and, 3) Structural similarities between both pacification projects.

In the first group, the earliest information that accounts for the Chichimec referent in the Mapuche pacification project is a letter by the viceroy Juan de Mendoza y Luna, Marqués de Montesclaros, to the monarch written in 1609, in support of the Jesuit Luis de Valdivia, who wanted to end the Mapuche conflict by non-violent means. The viceroy highlighted in the epistle the decision to end the Arauco War “arranging the things of peace in that province and removing the personal service, [besides] of supporting the good treatment of the Indians.”¹¹⁵⁵ In effect, Montesclaros had reinforced the resolution of his predecessor, Gaspar de Acevedo and Zúñiga, Count of Monterrey, to suppress the personal service of the Indians of Chile. In a consultative meeting held in the capital of the Viceroyalty in 1605, in which Father Luis de Valdivia participated, it was decided to opt for this measure, a matter of which the newly appointed governor of Chile, Alonso García Ramón,¹¹⁵⁶ was involved at that time in Lima, and soon to embark to take command of the southern governorship. By eliminating one of the most opprobrious practices to the dignity of the Indians it was expected to gain their confidence and turn them into allies, something that was adopting the character of urgent as the coasts of Chile were becoming a recurring whereabouts of the corsairs: the incursions

¹¹⁵³ Lázaro Ávila, “Conquista, control y convicción: el papel de los Parlamentos indígenas en México, el Chaco y Norteamérica,” 652.

¹¹⁵⁴ Weber, *Bárbaros. Spaniards and their savages in the Age of Enlightenment*, 126.

¹¹⁵⁵ “Lo que el Marqués de Montes Claros escribió a S.M. hecha la conferencia con el gobernador de Chile, a 30 de marzo del año 1609,” in *Vista jeneral de las continuadas guerras: difícil conquista del gran Reino, provincias de Chile*, 49.

¹¹⁵⁶ “Copia de una carta del Padre Luys de Valdivia para el señor Conde de Lemos, Presidente de Indias; Lima, 4 de enero de 1607,” in Medina, *Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena*, 50.

of the English Francis Drake (1578), Thomas Cavendish (1587) and Richard Hawkins (1594), and the Dutch Simón de Cordes (1599), Balthasar de Cordes (1600) and Olivier van Noorth (1600) made it clear that the Pacific had ceased to be an exclusively Spanish ocean. The greatest threat wanted to avoid was the alliances between Indians with the enemies of Europe, becoming the south of Chile in an advanced enclave of the English or Dutch maritime parties against the Viceroyalty of Peru. In this way, one of the poorest territories of the American Spanish Empire had acquired an unprecedented geopolitical importance. The proposal of the Marquis of Montesclaros included pacifying the Mapuche war provinces with the religiousmen help, teaching them and making them allies of the Spanish cause, in such a way that any attempt of *luteranos*¹¹⁵⁷ (Lutherans) disembarkation would be aborted by the Indians action. The role of the religious, therefore, went beyond the merely doctrinal, since the conversion also acted as a State formula of legitimation to claim rights over territories and populations that now hold the status of vassals.¹¹⁵⁸ The viceroy based his confidence in the success that this form of pacification had had in other latitudes, because in his words

This mode of warfare is very well tested in the Indies and particularly in New Spain, where the Chichimecs always worried, until the virrey Marqués de Villa Manrique resolved to reform the fortresses and military companies, using the same means indicated here, and although it was believed that the danger of the roads would increase, because the people who protected them were removed, everything was secured and those barbarians were quiet.¹¹⁵⁹

The viceregal authority spoke with a deep knowledge of the recent history of the other end of the Spanish Empire, since for four years he held the position of viceroy of Mexico (1603-1607), period in which he was one of the architects of the chichimecs pacification. He highlighted the good results of the project of non-violent approach, putting on the table the little confidence that was had in the first phases of implementation in Mexico: if a happy result was obtained there, why it should not the same be expected for Chile?

¹¹⁵⁷ Term commonly used by Spaniards to refer to Protestant nations.

¹¹⁵⁸ Herzog, *Frontiers of possession*, 90. El conflicto territorial entre España y Portugal en la región guaraní entre los siglos XVII y XVIII es, muy probablemente, el mejor ejemplo de cómo la actividad misional de los jesuitas debe ser entendida, también, como actos de soberanía imperial.

¹¹⁵⁹ “Lo que el Marqués de Montes Claros escribió a S.M. hecha la conferencia con el gobernador de Chile, a 30 de marzo del año 1609,” in *Vista jeneral de las continuadas guerras: difícil conquista del gran Reino, provincias de Chile,*” in *Vista jeneral de las continuadas guerras: difícil conquista del gran Reino, provincias de Chile*, 50.

With the support of the Viceroy of Peru and the Audiencia of Lima, but facing the resistance of the Kingdom of Chile's encomendero and military groups, Father Luis de Valdivia traveled to Spain in 1609 to defend his project before King Felipe III. The governor of Chile, Alonso García Ramón, who had rectified his support of four years earlier convinced that the only way to appease the Indians was by means of arms, sent Captain Lorenzo del Salto with the mission of persuading the monarch of the inapplicability and inadmissibility of Luis de Valdivia's ideas. Faced in the Council of the Indies, the detractors, including Alonso de Sotomayor, governor of Chile until 1593 and a staunch defender of the slavery of rebellious Indians, argued that without the use of force the natives would be emboldened when they took it as a sign of Spanish weakness, encouraging themselves to increase the intensity of attacks on the forts and border cities. Moreover, they wondered that "if they were still proud and haughty when having the foot on their necks with the army attacks, raids, and fellings of their fields, what would they do if this things were not done, and they were allowed to sow and have plenty of maintenance to make drunkenness and summon against the Spaniards?"¹¹⁶⁰ The defenders of the Defensive War project, on the other hand, replied that the Indians only sought to defend their lands and their freedom against the greed of the Spaniards, postulating that they should be left in peaceful possession of their territory, appeasing their rebellion only for means of the intervention of religious workers, who would watch over their physical and spiritual well-being. In accordance with the Jesuit thinking about the exclusivity of the missionary action, something that the Order had already applied in Juli (Andean highlands) and that began to spread in the Guarani missions of the Paraguay jungles, the the creation of a limit between the Spanish territory and the indigenous land was proposed, through which only the religious dedicated to the not submitted Indians evangelization could pass, "that this would end once and for all this war, as the Chichimec one ended."¹¹⁶¹ Valdivia's position ended up being imposed after arduous deliberations, receiving the certificates that granted legal validity to his project on December 8, 1610.¹¹⁶² As can be seen from the last quotation, the events of the New Galicia that took place a few decades ago occupied a place in the discussion that led to its final approval.

¹¹⁶⁰ Rosales, *Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes Indiano*, II, book 6, ch. I, 860.

¹¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 861.

¹¹⁶² "Real Cédula para los caciques de la Araucanía, en favor del P. Luis de Valdivia; Madrid, 8 de diciembre de 1610," in Gay, *Historia Física y Política de Chile: Documentos*, 261-3.

Unfortunately for the intentions of Luis de Valdivia, his project of pacification always faced an angry resistance on the part of military, encomenderos and even of religious of other Orders. Shortly after Valdivia placed his feet in Lima, vested with the *cedulas* that authorized the implementation of the peaceful conquest system, the Dominican Father Jerónimo de Hinojosa arrived on behalf of the cities of Chile with the mission of alerting the dangers it would entail that project for the inhabitants of the Kingdom. However, the meeting convened by the viceroy overwhelmingly supported Valdivia, frustrating the claims not only of the Dominican, but also of those he represented. Once in Chile, and despite having a royal ratification of March 29, 1612,¹¹⁶³ Luis de Valdivia earned a growing opposition. The initial support given by the new ruler, the military Alonso de Ribera, changed into an exacerbated antagonism as a result of a series of indigenous attacks against the friendly Indians, and especially after the death of the Fathers Horacio Vechi and Martín de Aranda during a missionary incursion into the lands of Elicura on December 15, 1612. They were the first martyrs of the Society of Jesus in the Kingdom of Chile.

¹¹⁶³ “Real Provisión en que se mandó que la guerra de Chile se cortase, y se publicase la guerra defensiva; Lima, 29 de marzo de 1612,” in Rosales, *Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes Indiano*, II, book 6, ch. IV, 869-73.



Figure 8. Idealized representation of the Fathers Horacio Vechi and Martín de Aranda martyrdom in Elicura. Source: Alonso de Ovalle, *Histórica Relación del Reino de Chile*. (Courtesy Biblioteca Nacional de Chile, Sala Diego Barros Arana).

The project promoted by Luis de Valdivia fell in total disrepute before a good fraction of the Kingdom's inhabitants, and consequently the *Cabildo* sent *procuradores* to the king to request the repeal of the Defensive War and the suspension or modification of the ordinances relating to Indians personal service.¹¹⁶⁴ The Santiago, La Serena and Concepción *Cabildos* wrote memorials to expose before the Court the last time events, and chose a

¹¹⁶⁴ Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, IV, 59.

religious of sounded prestige, Fray Pedro de Sosa, guardian of the convent of San Francisco de Santiago, to present them before the king. The clergy exposed the petitions before Felipe III at the beginning of 1614, arguing that under the protection of the defensive war the rebellious Indians gave feigned peace to take advantage of the carelessness of the Spaniards to commit their misdeeds, that the poverty of the kingdom would end only with the restitution of personal service, and that the turbulence of the war would cease if Governor Alonso de Ribera were allowed to enter with the armed wing into the Indian lands once he had been helped with men and equipment to carry out the campaigns.¹¹⁶⁵ Some time later, in an extensive and erudite memorial, he stated that the “use of clemency with the rebels has been to perpetuate the war.”¹¹⁶⁶ He stressed in the same source that the great difference that made it inappropriate to resort to the Chichimec pacification as a reference to consider for the Mapuche case is that the latter, unlike the former, had been *encomendados* and doctrinated before the rebellion of 1598, so they knew the need that the Spaniards had of the tribute got through personal service very well,¹¹⁶⁷ as well as of the intolerance of Christian faith towards the polygamy.¹¹⁶⁸ Consequently, the barbarians of the north were unaware of the duties implied by vassalage and attachment to the precepts of the Church, which facilitated their reduction. The Mapuches, on the other hand, with a past that had informed them of this, maintained their reluctant position to pacify themselves so as not to serve the Christians again or lose a custom on which part of the prestige of the most prominent men based. By the same token, the pretensions of peaceful approaching did not go beyond being a utopian illusion, since the Mapuches would never accept to return to the conditions previous to *Curalava*. Although Pedro de Sosa does not seem to have a complete knowledge of the process of conquest and pacification of the northwest of Mexico, the truth is that he would have been aware that this experience was playing a gravitating role in the justification and implementation of the Defensive War system in Chile. Paradoxically, it was precisely a member of the Order that carried out the pacification of the Chichimec lands who became one of the most bitter opponents of its execution in the southern lands of the Empire.

¹¹⁶⁵ “Fray Pedro de Sosa, de la orden de San Francisco; guardián del convento de San Francisco de la ciudad de Santiago en el reino de Chile, dice: que el dicho reino le envía á dar cuenta á V. M. del trabajoso estado en que queda, y en virtud del poder que trae, advierte lo siguiente; ¿1614?,” in *Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena*, 135.

¹¹⁶⁶ “Memorial del peligroso estado espiritual y temporal del Reyno de Chile,” in *Ibid.*, 168.

¹¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 174.

¹¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 177.

In sum, the explicit references to the Chichimec pacification are not abundant, but they are convincing enough to affirm that this border experience was an important reference in the discussion about the applicability of the Defensive War in Chile. The evaluation of this historic event, reasoned in some cases or impassioned in others, reveals that it became an arena for debate for the parties in conflict, used as a banner of struggle by supporters of missional pacification, or as a target for criticism by those who defended the armed conquest. Regarding the presence of imperial officials in Peru, it is noteworthy that in the gestation of the Defensive War project, Father Luis de Valdivia got the fundamental support of three viceroys who had previously played same regent function in Mexican lands. Luis de Velasco y Castilla had set in motion, as soon as he assumed the command of New Spain in 1590, the pacification project supported by the gift giving, promise to respect their rights, and the foundation of Chichimec and Tlaxcalan Indian villages, outlined by his predecessor, Álvaro Manrique de Zúñiga. Once in Lima, where he occupied Pizarro's throne for eight years (1596-1604), he showed great interest in the indiofilian ideas of Father Luis de Valdivia, but soon to fulfill his mandate, “corresponded to his successor Gaspar de Zúñiga y Acevedo, Count of Monterrey, to incorporate them to guide the viceregal policy in Chile.”¹¹⁶⁹ The viceroy, of brief regency in Peru (1604-1606) supported the Valdivian plan to establish a series of peace treaties with the Indians of war and the abolition of personal service, “because this personal service was the reason for the uprising and the the continuation of this war.”¹¹⁷⁰ We have already noted the support that Viceroy Juan de Mendoza y Luna (1607-1615) gave to the Defensive War project in 1609 before the Crown, so it was no coincidence that its implementation in 1612 occurred when his administration was still in force. While regents in Mexico, both Gaspar de Zúñiga and Acevedo (1595-1603) and Juan de Mendoza and Luna (1603-1607) set out to consolidate the pacification project initiated by Luis de Velasco and Castilla, converting the Spanish fortresses into points of meeting and communication with the nomadic Indians, transferring this experience to more remote regions such as Sinaloa or New Vizcaya, which would justify the enthusiasm to support the Jesuit priest in Chile. In sum, Luis de Valdivia was supported consecutively by three Peruvian viceroys who had run in New Spain a short time ago.

¹¹⁶⁹ Díaz Blanco, *El alma en la palabra. Escritos inéditos del P. Luis de Valdivia*, 31.

¹¹⁷⁰ “Copia de una carta del Padre Luys de Valdivia para el señor Conde de Lemos, Presidente de Indias; Lima, 4 de enero de 1607,” in Medina, *Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena*, 50.

However, the question of who conceived the Defensive War plan for Chile is still pending. The Spanish historian José Manuel Díaz Blanco discounted the hypothesis held by Jaime Eyzaguirre,¹¹⁷¹ Horacio Zapater¹¹⁷² and Maximiliano Salinas¹¹⁷³ that the original plan had been the brainchild of Juan Villela, oidor of the *Real Audiencia* of Lima, who drew part of the essential guidelines of the project in a letter to the king of 1607,¹¹⁷⁴ noting that merit corresponds rather to Luis de Valdivia himself.¹¹⁷⁵ Neither the one nor the other: the Villela's letter to the king was one of other two that complemented each other in the presentation of the general plan to the sovereign, one of the *Real Audiencia* of Lima and the other signed by Luis de Valdivia, all written between June 3 and 4, 1607.¹¹⁷⁶ Bearing in mind that the essential foundations of the defensive war plan coincided with the pacification project deployed in New Galicia, it is possible to think of two possible explanations. First, that the priest or one of his co-religionists in Peru had learned about it from the *Cartas Annuas* or from another Jesuit source who based their indigenous reduction system on the Franciscan model, achieving equally satisfactory results: in this case, the Jesuits of Sinaloa would be the best candidates. Second, and it is most plausible, that the real source of information was the viceroys, especially Luis de Velasco, the manager of its consolidation in northern Mexico. Zapater himself acknowledges that the viceroys had to inform the Jesuit of the vicissitudes surrounding the Chichimec pacification,¹¹⁷⁷ although in the last instance he attributes, erroneously, the conception of the project to the oidor of the *Real Audiencia* of Lima. This, however, does not rule out the alternative that the priest Luis de Valdivia has delineated the particular features of the pacification project from the information provided by Viceroy Velasco, since he was the only one aware of the peculiarities of the Chilean scenario.

With regard to the structural dimension, a series of coinciding factors in the pacification projects of both borderlands allows us to suppose the existence of a connection that goes beyond mere chance. Both spaces had acquired a fundamental geostrategic importance for the security and preservation of the Spanish Empire in the New World: the

¹¹⁷¹ Eyzaguirre, *Historia de Chile*, 156.

¹¹⁷² Zapater, *La búsqueda de la paz en la Guerra de Arauco: padre Luis de Valdivia*, 60.

¹¹⁷³ Salinas, *Historia del pueblo de Dios en Chile*, 57.

¹¹⁷⁴ Díaz Blanco, *El alma en la palabra. Escritos inéditos del P. Luis de Valdivia*, 34.

¹¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷⁶ "Carta de la Real Audiencia de Lima al rey Felipe III; Lima, 3 de junio de 1607," ANCh, Jesuitas 424, fs. 213-4.

¹¹⁷⁷ Zapater, *La búsqueda de la paz en la Guerra de Arauco: padre Luis de Valdivia*, 53-4.

New Galicia and its surrounding regions as an important source of precious metals, especially silver, needed to supply the always crashing coffers of the Crown; and Chile as the gateway to the Pacific Ocean and line of defense of the Viceroyalty of Peru facing the attacks of English and Dutch corsairs. These factors should not be considered in isolation, but as integral parts of a same inter-ethnic policy applied in two border areas of the American Spanish Empire that had, until that moment, experienced a bloody war between Spaniards and natives. Local factors determined that despite the common substrate, the materialization of this policy inevitably had divergent results in some aspects. The factors are:

- a) Put an end to the forms of subjection that violated the freedom and rights of the Indians, such as personal service and slavery. Luis de Valdivia considered both practices as the first and main causes of the rebellions,¹¹⁷⁸ a common denominator with the critics of the Franciscans to the encomenderos and military of the New Galicia. The Indians encomendados, subjected to exhausting labor days, used to be badly paid, receiving only one dress a year, living in rags.¹¹⁷⁹ In this way, in both borders one of the fundamental pillars for the concrecion of the pacification plan was the abolition of slavery and the end of personal service for the pacified Indians, since in future they would have the protection of the missionaries.
- b) Establish a diplomatic communication with the rebel Indians to negotiate the conditions of peace. Both in New Galicia and in the Kingdom of Chile, those that only yesterday were spearheads of the Spanish military penetration became spaces for convocation and diplomatic meetings: the forts. Although in New Galicia this process was initially carried out by mestizo soldiers, like Miguel Caldera, it was Franciscan priests who consolidated the peace and guaranteed the fulfillment of the agreements. In Chile Luis Valdivia's plan considered that the

¹¹⁷⁸ "El Padre Luys de Valdiuia Viceprouincial de la Compañía de Iesus en el Reyno de Chile. Digo, que la mayor parte de mi vida, he gastado en la conuersión y pacificación del dicho Reyno, adonde fuy embiado por mis superiores 29 años ha, y aprendi y exercite las lenguas que alli corren, y hize Artes por donde los demás las dependiesen, etc.; ¿1622?," in Medina, *Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena*, 222.

¹¹⁷⁹ "Relación que hizo el padre Luys de Valdiuia, lector de Theologia del colegio de Lima [...] sobre agrauios que reciben los indios de paz que ay en Chile, probando ser medio vnico para acabar presto la guerra el poner los indios de paz sin agrauios; Lima, diciembre de 1604," in Díaz Blanco, *El alma en la palabra. Escritos inéditos del P. Luis de Valdivia*, 87.

first approaches would be made in the fortresses that protected the border line of the Biobío, where the Indians would be treated with gifts. It was expected that the Indians would settle in their vicinity where the soldiers would protect them from the attacks of rebellious Indians, as had happened in the fort of Cayuhueno – although its permanence was not very durable–. As will be recalled, many of the reductions founded in the New Galicia were also established at a distance from a military post to ensure their protection against the unpredictable attacks of rebellious Chichimecs. The soldiers of the Chilean forts had to be moved every two months to avoid any conflict with the reduced Indians. The fortresses, in addition, should be located in the spaces with better agricultural lands to encourage the Mapuches to love work. Evangelization, education and, ultimately, the protection of the reduced natives would be in the Jesuits' hands.¹¹⁸⁰ In this, a small difference is made with the Neo-Galician case, since the non-doctrinal instruction of the newly reduced was in the Tlaxcalan' hands.

In this way, it was sought in both borders to put an end to the enterprise of conquest by armed means, and replace it with an approach based on the missionaries action that guaranteed their evangelization and good treatment.

- c) Contact with the Indians was reserved only for the missionaries. Both the Franciscans in Mexico and the Jesuits in Chile knew that one of the keys to the success of both pacification projects was to avoid the friction of the pacified Indians with the other strata of Spanish society, whose vices and bad intentions would put at risk the achievement of the objectives set. This implied in the New Galicia the prohibition to the Spaniards to enter the reductions just founded, and in Chile the exclusivity to the Jesuits to transfer the limit of the Biobío with evangelizing and pacifying intentions. Luis de Valdivia had witnessed in Juli's mission how beneficial it was for the missionary practice to keep the Indians away

¹¹⁸⁰ “El Padre Luys de Valdiuia Viceprovincial de la Compañía de Iesus en el Reyno de Chile. Digo, que la mayor parte de mi vida, he gastado en la conuersión y pacificación del dicho Reyno, adonde fuy embiado por mis superiores 29 años ha, y aprendi y exercite las lenguas que alli corren, y hize Artes por donde los demás las dependiesen, etc.; ¿1622?,” in Medina, *Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena*, 222.

from the most interested strata of the Republic of Spaniards: encomenderos, miners, and soldiers.

- d) Both projects demanded an important institutional support to reach their objectives. The commitment of the monarchy through its viceroys, three of whom exercised the regency in both viceroyalties, was essential for their implementation: Luis de Velasco assured the delivery of resources to the Chichimec reductions for a period of two years,¹¹⁸¹ and Luis de Valdivia obtained from the king the payment of the priests and the goods necessary for the Mapuches pacification,¹¹⁸² for which he counted on the strong support of the Marquis of Montesclaros.

It is true that one of the key elements in the pacification of northern Mexico, the participation of culturally more developed indigenous groups and of proven loyalty to the Crown as the Tlaxcalans, was totally absent in the Luis de Valdivia's defensive war project. In the regions surrounding central and south-central Chile lived ethnic groups of a similar cultural level to the Mapuches, and it would have been difficult to find Indians in Peru willing to move to such remote lands. For the rest, the Tlaxcalans enjoyed a series of privileges from the days of Tenochtitlan conquest, which had no parallel among the ethnic groups of the southern hemisphere of the continent. In this way, the Jesuit trusted that the first Mapuches pacified, Christianized and educated in agriculture and other industries would fulfill the task of collaborating in the pacification of their blood brothers.

The Defensive War in the Kingdom of Chile: a failed pacification project

Luis de Valdivia can not be blamed for the trust he placed in the Defensive War. The Mexican antecedent, added to the support of the king and the viceroys of Peru, were pillars

¹¹⁸¹ "Capitulaciones del virrey Velasco con la ciudad de Tlaxcala para el envío de cuatrocientas familias a poblar en tierra de chichimecas," in Velázquez, *Colección de documentos para la historia de San Luis Potosí*, 181.

¹¹⁸² Rosales, *Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes Indiano*, II, book 6, ch. VII, 891.

sufficient to hope for success. Yes, it can be objected, however, his inability to assume the particularities of the geographical and cultural environment of southern Chile with respect to the neogalician space: in this we agree with the appreciation of Jorge Pinto Rodríguez, who affirms that the failure of the Valdivian pacifying project was due not only to the opposition of the encomenderos, but also to the reaction of the Mapuches.¹¹⁸³ In effect, the Indians could not understand the contradictory discourse of the Spanish side, which they still conceived as a monolithic block: ¿*winkas*¹¹⁸⁴ talking about peace when slavery activity and personal service were at their peak? In a previous work we already alluded to this when saying that

[...]the path of Christianization and pacification of the Reche-Mapuches was not only interrupted by the barriers imposed by the Spaniards, since the reticent attitude of the Indians was also obstacle to overcome [...] the short time lag between the arrival of the Jesuits (1593) and the systematic work they displayed among the Indians (1605, and more decisively from 1612 with the Defensive War) was an adverse factor to their first pretensions: the Indians had not yet internalized the breaks and disputes existing within the Spanish side, conceiving the bearded men as a single undivided unit. Gaining the trust of toquis, lonkos and weichafes was a matter of time [...].¹¹⁸⁵

In some way, the Jesuits were victims of the Franciscans omission, who for four decades expressed their criticism of the abuses committed by the Spaniards only from the pulpit, but without daring to carry out an active missionary work among the war Indians. That role would be fulfilled by the members of the Society of Jesus, who arrived in Chile in 1593.¹¹⁸⁶ Led by the veteran priest Baltazar de Piñas, the group was composed by Luis de Valdivia from Granada, with extensive experience in the mission of Juli, the Cantabrian Luis de Estella and the Toledan Gabriel de la Vega, and the natives of Chile Hernando de Aguilera and Juan de Olivares, who would have an easier approach with the Mapuches since they knew their customs and language.¹¹⁸⁷

¹¹⁸³ Pinto Rodríguez, “Frontera, misiones y misioneros en Chile. La Araucanía, 1600-1900,” 53.

¹¹⁸⁴ Valdivia, *Arte general de la lengua que corre en todo el Reyno de Chile*, translates it as “español.” Febrés, *Arte de la lengua general del Reyno de Chile*, 514, is somewhat more explicit when translated it as “the Spanish, that is, whoever is not Indian.”

¹¹⁸⁵ Goicovich, “Entre la conquista y la consolidación fronteriza,” 319.

¹¹⁸⁶ En verdad, Chile fue uno de los últimos reductos americanos que acogió a los jesuitas, pues ya se habían establecido en Paraguay (1585), Quito (1586), Santa Cruz de la Sierra (1587) y Tucumán (1587).

¹¹⁸⁷ Enrich, *Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en Chile*, 14.

However, its systematic activity beyond the waters of the Biobío River only took place from 1605 with the first peace led by Luis de Valdivia, then in 1608 with the founding of the mission of Arauco, and finally in 1612, fully supported by the monarchy to implement the Defensive War. Between November of 1595 and March of 1597 the Fathers Gabriel de Vega and Hernando de Aguilera carried out a flying mission to the cities and forts of the south, to whom for a short time Luis de Valdivia joined, confirming the idolatry of most of the Indians and the insecurity created by the war situation.¹¹⁸⁸ However, the Jesuits would not tread on Mapuche territory again until a little more than five years after the indigenous rebellion began in *Curalava* in 1598. In the period between his arrival in the governorate (1593) and the start of the great Mapuche uprising (1598), their tasks were mainly focused on Santiago, especially in the school of San Miguel that presided over Luis de Valdivia from 1595 to 1601. It was here where they put into practice much of the experience gained in the altiplanic mission of Juli, with singular success. In fact, in Juli the Indians were gathered every morning, making them repeat the prayers and the Christian doctrine, hearing afterwards the sermon and the sung mass.¹¹⁸⁹ In Chile, Luis de Valdivia devoted himself to the catechization of the Indians captured in war, listening to their confessions and teaching them the doctrine on Sundays, making them in the afternoon an hour of catechism.¹¹⁹⁰

In truth, the lapse of time between the arrival of the Jesuits in Chile in 1593 and the death of the parents Horacio Vechi and Martín de Aranda in Elicura in 1612, is plagued by contradictory and even paradoxical situations that account for the complex forces that would define a large part of the century that had just begun. Thus, for example, after the regency of Alonso de Sotomayor assumed the governorship of the Kingdom of Chile Martín García Oñez de Loyola in October 1592. While his predecessor characterized by a policy of total intolerance to the just causes of the indigenous uprisings, deploying slaving campaigns against the rebellious Indians, the new governor showed almost from the beginning a totally opposite position, since he gave preference to the implementation of protection measures and the consolidation of agreements. We can not ignore, however, the fact that the scarce material resources with which it had to maintain a sustained and lasting war against the rebellious

¹¹⁸⁸ Gaune Corradi, *Escritura y salvación*, 132-5.

¹¹⁸⁹ Burrieza Sánchez, "Los misioneros en la monarquía," in *Los jesuitas en España y en el mundo hispánico*, 98.

¹¹⁹⁰ Enrich, *Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en Chile*, 28.

Indians had played a role, especially considering that the neighbors of Santiago and La Serena had obtained an important privilege from the *Real Audiencia* of Lima in January 1594, which prohibited the governor from demanding *derramas* from the neighbors of the Kingdom.¹¹⁹¹ Thus, defrauded with a measure that had been “given at the worst juncture,” and without external support, the governor resigned himself to initially resorting to less violent ways than those deployed by his predecessors to appease the rebel groups; a chronicler tells us

When the Governor saw the war so hot and how few people had to fight against such a brave and bitter enemy, he determined, after arriving at Concepcion, with the advice of the most knowledgeable, of using a trick and showing no weakness, and beat the enemy more with praise and skill than with force, because the people he had only was to keep or risk the land and not to advance it. And so he informed how he had been sent from the King to make amends to the Indians, and he sent ambassadors to them in various places, inviting them with quiet or war, and that his desire was to give them and make that all treat them very well.¹¹⁹²

The initial results were promising, since in a short time “they came to give peace more than two hundred Indians from Biobio and Gualqui,”¹¹⁹³ guarding in this way the city of Concepción. Following the example of these provinces and after some skirmishes,¹¹⁹⁴ the northern groups of the lower course of the Biobío river were soon reduced. Along with this, the governor sought to improve the situation of the Indians in the cities, for which he issued several provisions to curb injustices: on February 4, 1593, he issued an ordinance that regulated the role of the protectors of Indians, on July 20 of the same year he issued a provision that would guarantee the good treatment of the natives, on November 17 another provision for defending their freedom and stop the old practice of profiting illegally with their sale;¹¹⁹⁵ on March 5, 1594, tried to prevent the denaturalization of the Indians taken in war, a measure that was reinforced on June 15 with the prohibition of shipping them for transfer to the Viceroyalty of Peru.¹¹⁹⁶

¹¹⁹¹ “Acuerdo hecho en la Real Audiencia de los Reyes para el socorro de Chile; 28 de enero de 1594,” in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 4 (second series), 430.

¹¹⁹² Rosales, *Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes Indiano*, II, book 5, ch. I, 662.

¹¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹⁴ “Apuntación del capitán Miguel de Olaverría sobre pedir socorro para Chile al Marqués de Cañete; agosto de 1595,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 98, 139.

¹¹⁹⁵ “Provisión del Gobernador Martín Garda de Oñez y Loyola sobre la libertad de los naturales; Santiago, 17 de noviembre de 1593,” in Jara & Pinto, *Fuentes para la historia del trabajo en el Reino de Chile*, 239-41.

¹¹⁹⁶ All these official papers in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos*, vol. 4 (second series). See the “Instrucción y ordenanza de lo que deben guardar los protectores de indios, dictada por el gobernador Martín

The military and political actions (pacts) undertaken by García Óñez de Loyola began to bear fruit around 1596. In mid-March hit could be considered a true prodigy of his good fortune, considering the scarce resources with which he had counted since the beginning of his administration, having reduced most of the rebellious provinces to peace, although it can not be ignored that many of these agreements of submission were sustained on feet of clay; at that point only the Tucapelinos and Purenes remained with their flags of struggle in the wind.¹¹⁹⁷ And this was, precisely, the ruin of the governor: on December 23, 1598, he fell into an ambush, along with his entourage, at the hands of the Mapuches led by Pelentaro. Paradoxically, the second Spanish governor to die at the hands of the southern Indians was one of those who pushed more for concrete actions in favor of their rights and, also, who preferred the strategy of the pacts rather than use the sword to pacify rebel groups, thus honoring the clauses of the Ordinances of 1573 and the Third Council of Lima. From then on, and until 1605, all the forts and cities of the south of the Biobío were devastated by the force of a rebellion that grew day by day.

In 1600, when the rebellion was at an all time high, interim governor Alonso García Ramón consulted neighbors and refugees in the city of Santiago on whether to enslave the Indians and sell them, shoe them and move them from one province to another. This consultation was only a means to turn the greed of the Spaniards into the coal of the war machine that would allow to face the strenuous Indian resistance. Although only four complete documents of all those who answered the consultation are preserved,¹¹⁹⁸ we know for certain that the attitude was practically unanimous in favor of enslaving the rebellious Indians. One of the signatories was, paradoxically, the Jesuit Luis de Valdivia,¹¹⁹⁹ who in a few years would become the most determined critic of the Indian slavery. The Chilean

García de Óñez y Loyola, 4 de febrero de 1593,” 267-73; “Provisión del gobernador Martín García de Óñez y Loyola acerca del buen tratamiento que se ha de dar a los indios, 20 de junio de 1593,” 333-5; “Provisión del gobernador de Chile Martín García de Óñez y Loyola sobre la libertad de los naturales,” 369-71; “Provisión del gobernador Martín García de Óñez y Loyola para que no se destierren los indios cogidos en la Guerra,” 431-2; and the “Provisión del gobernador Martín García de Óñez y Loyola para que no se embarquen los indios desnaturalizándolos,” 434-6.

¹¹⁹⁷ “Carta del licenciado Pedro de Vizcarra a S.M. el Rey; Santa Cruz, 14 de marzo de 1596,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 97, 182-3.

¹¹⁹⁸ Los cuatro tratados en que se fundamentó la esclavitud de los indios de guerra de Chile, así como el proceso jurídico en que se gestó su legalización, fueron analizados por Jara, *Guerra y sociedad en Chile*, ch. IX, 186-230. El tema también ha sido tratado en profundidad por Hanisch, “Esclavitud y libertad de los indios de Chile, 1608-1696,” 5-65.

¹¹⁹⁹ Jara, *Guerra y sociedad en Chile*, 190.

historian Rafael Gaune Corradi justifies this situation by the social commotion that produced the death of the Chile's political head.¹²⁰⁰ The Spanish historian José Manuel Díaz Blanco provides a more detailed explanation of this situation, pointing out that while Valdivia was the rector of the San Miguel school, he was exposed to a continuous friction with the Santiago's social elite, distancing him from direct contact with the Indians, and diffusing in a good degree his pro-indigenous stance. The proximity to the most powerful groups of the capital, in which encomenderos and miners stood out, made him momentarily embrace currents of thought very contrary to the Indians, which intensified with the death of the governor Martín García Oñez de Loyola in *Curalava*.¹²⁰¹ The paradox is greater considering the poor relationship that the governor maintained with the residents of Santiago almost from the beginning of his term, who, among other things, made it difficult for them to profit from the war Indians slavery. The stance of the most who answered affirmatively the Alonso García Ramón consultation is not something that attracts the attention. The neighbors of the cities of Chile shared a social vision with the majority of the Hispanic-American colonial elites, which underlined the inferiority of the indigenous population, as well as the definition of a prescribed role for the natives in the colonial order: the Indians were to work for the benefit of the Spaniards and pay special taxes for the Crown.¹²⁰² What does make an impression is that a Jesuit priest who had fervently embraced the Lascasian cause of indigenous rights had experienced such a radical transformation..., although momentary. With just a few decades in the New World and, consequently, constantly facing unexpected situations that required immediate decisions, it is fair to suppose that the Jesuits did not always exhibit concordant positions among their members or, even, that their attitudes experienced modifications along time. By 1604, and in Lima, Luis de Valdivia had returned to embrace the Indians cause, upholding the just rights of the Mapuche resistance and informing the viceroy of the need to replace personal service by a moderate *tasa*.¹²⁰³ The Franciscans, perhaps the main missionary references for the Jesuits, continued to go through these disorientations since the first decades of American evangelization.

¹²⁰⁰ Gaune Corradi, *Escritura y salvación*, 137.

¹²⁰¹ Díaz Blanco, *El alma en la palabra. Escritos inéditos del P. Luis de Valdivia*, 30.

¹²⁰² Jackson, *Missions and the frontiers of Spanish America*, 100.

¹²⁰³ "Memorial a Luis de Velasco y el Conde de Monterrey; Lima, 1604," in Díaz Blanco, *El alma en la palabra. Escritos inéditos del P. Luis de Valdivia*, 95.

Luis de Valdivia counted on his pacification tasks with the initial support of two governors, a relationship that in a short time changed into profound disaffection. First, the arrival of Alonso García Ramón on March 19, 1605,¹²⁰⁴ marked the birth of a new spirit in the inter-ethnic relationship orientation: showing the mark of contradiction, the balance of Spanish politics debated between the extremes of the conciliation and excessive violence. In the first place, the protagonism that begins to hold the Ignatian order, led by Father Luis de Valdivia, resulted in the legal abolition of personal service, an institution that some considered as “the total root of this war and the Indian stimulus for it.”¹²⁰⁵ With the aim of publicizing the legal dissolution of this practice, he held a series of conferences with the indigenous provinces next to the Biobío. Luis de Valdivia had the good sense to communicate with the Indians in *Mapudungun* (*Mapuche* language), thus giving a sign of confidence that earned the recognition of the indigenous communities. But at the opposite end of the scale, the evangelizers conciliatory efforts had their antithesis in the drastic measures implemented by Governor Alonso García Ramón, which would be a constant throughout his administration: the war “by blood and fire,” in which the steel did not respect the lives of women and children, would be the ideal means to achieve in a short time the total control of the southern territories, putting an end to a resistance that trampled the Spanish empire’s pride and treasury. In mid-1605 the governor wrote to the king that, because of the hardships and losses generated by the conflict, “justifiably war can be waged by fire and blood,”¹²⁰⁶ a position that had the support of the capital’s neighbors.¹²⁰⁷ A few months later, and with the arrival of a reinforcement of 953 soldiers that came to swell the nascent border army,¹²⁰⁸ the old desire to ravage the land of war with two armies at the same time was brought to life. This dynamic of war, in which the Indians’ sown fields were razed and anyone who fell into

¹²⁰⁴ “Autos de las paces y perdón general hechos por el Gobernador Alonso García Ramón; 1605,” ANCh, Vicuña Mackenna 279, 5.” “Carta del padre Luis de Valdivia para el señor Conde de Lemus; Lima, 4 de enero de 1607,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 111, 28.

¹²⁰⁵ “Carta del padre Luis de Valdivia para el señor Conde de Lemus; Lima, 4 de enero de 1607,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 111, 39.

¹²⁰⁶ “Carta de Alonso García Ramón a Su Majestad el Rey; Concepción, 16 de junio de 1605,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 118, 73.

¹²⁰⁷ “Carta del Cabildo de la ciudad de Santiago a Su Majestad el Rey; 20 de noviembre de 1605,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 118, 143-4.

¹²⁰⁸ “Carta de Antonio Mosquera a Su Majestad el Rey; Lima, 16 de mayo de 1606,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 109, 8.

their hands was captured, lasted for three years. On October 7, 1608¹²⁰⁹ and after systematic incursions, the peace of Conuco was held with the Indians of Conopuylla, Guadava and Coyuncaví,¹²¹⁰ which added to the parleys carried out months before with the Tucapeline *rewes* of Angolmo, Molvilla and Tomelmo. Unlike the parleys led by Father Luis de Valdivia three years earlier, no offer of good intentions was made here, but everything was an imposition by arms.

Tired of the governor's bellicosity, not very eager to the dialogue with the Indians, Luis de Valdivia left the Kingdom to denounce this situation that hindered his pacification plans. While in Lima, he published the grammar and vocabulary of *Mapudungun* in which had been working for some years, to facilitate its learning to other missionaries willing to work in the Kingdom of Chile. Advised by the viceroy, Marqués de Montesclaros, he went to defend his project before the Court, defeating in the debates the representative of the governor of Chile, Captain Lorenzo del Salto. In this way, with the support of both the viceroy of Peru and the general of the Jesuit order, Claudio Aquaviva, Valdivia went to Chile with full powers to materialize his pacification plan. The Superior General of the Society of Jesus even invested him with full autonomy from the provincial of Paraguay, so that he had the greatest freedom to achieve his goals.

When he arrived in Concepción on May 13, 1612,¹²¹¹ the Royal Decree of May 26, 1608¹²¹² authorizing the slavery of the war Indians was in full force. It had been promulgated by Luis Merlo de la Fuente, successor of Alonso García Ramón, in August 1610,¹²¹³ who sought to encourage the inhabitants greed with the aim of engaging men for his military campaigns. With the plan of Defensive War approved by the Crown,¹²¹⁴ slavery was repealed,¹²¹⁵ which earned Luis de Valdivia get a significant number of enemies, involving

¹²⁰⁹ "Información hecha en Conuco por el gobernador Alonso García Ramón sobre el apesamiento y declaraciones de ciertos caciques, 7 de octubre de 1608," BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 110, 121.

¹²¹⁰ "Carta del padre Luis de Valdivia a S.M. el Rey, Concepción, 30 de septiembre de 1612," BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 117, 353.

¹²¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹²¹² "Real Cédula para que los indios de Guerra de las provincias de Chile sean dados por esclavos, no reduciéndose al gremio de la Iglesia antes de venir a manos de las personas que los tomaren," in Jara & Pinto, *Fuentes para la historia del trabajo en el Reino de Chile*, 254-6.

¹²¹³ "Cabildo de 27 de agosto de 1610," in *Actas del Cabildo de Santiago*, 191-8.

¹²¹⁴ "Provisión de Su Majestad en que mandó que la guerra de Chile se cortase, y se publicase la guerra defensiva," in Rosales, *Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes Indiano*, II, book 6, ch. IV, 869-73.

¹²¹⁵ "Provisión del Marqués de Montes Claros, Virrey del Perú, en que se suspende la execucion de la cedula de esclavitud, para que se facilite la Guerra defensiva y la paz de los indios," in *Ibid.*, ch. V, 880-2.

encomenderos and military when he began to implement his project. Convinced that the grievances emanating from personal service were the foundation of the Mapuche rebellion,¹²¹⁶ he devoted himself energetically to his pacification plan, which involved to establish a frontier line in the Biobío river, making missionary work the main mechanism of subjection.

The peaces that Father Valdivia headed in Catiray¹²¹⁷ (May 1612) and Paicavi¹²¹⁸ (December 7 to 11) were a promising start. In order to gain the Mapuches confidence, he was accompanied from Peru by a group of Indians who had been captured in the slaving campaigns of Alonso de Sotomayor and Alonso García Ramón, some of them being transferred to the viceroyalty to work as a hand forced labor in the mines, and others to Concepción and Santiago. Once at the Biobío border, he freed them to give a signal of good will to the war Indians, which allowed peaces to take place. In the parley of Catiray, and making use of the *accommodation* strategy, both Father Valdivia and Governor Alonso de Ribera participated in the formalities that governed the indigenous peace ritual, permitting the sacrifice of the *weke* and receiving the canelo branch bathed with the blood of these animals. In the assembly it was approved that the Indians do not make war to the Spaniards, return the captives, allow the entrance of missionaries to Indian territory, allow the passage of messengers, and warn the

¹²¹⁶ “Carta del padre Luis de Valdivia a S.M. el Rey, Concepción, 30 de septiembre de 1612,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 117, 354-5.

¹²¹⁷ “Carta del padre Luis de Valdivia para el padre provincial Diego de Torres, dando cuenta de cómo ajustó las paces con las provincias de Catiray, Concepción, 2 de junio de 1612,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 110, 167-190. “Interrogatorio de las preguntas por las cuales han de ser examinados los testigos para la información del estado en que encontró el reino de Chile el padre Luis de Valdivia en 13 de mayo de 1612, y del estado en que al presente tiene, 17 de septiembre de 1612,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 111, 42-51; “Información hecha a pedimento del padre Luis de Valdivia del estado en que estaba el reino de Chile en 1612,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 111, 1-21. “Carta del padre Luis de Valdivia a S.M. el Rey, Concepción, 30 de septiembre de 1612,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 117, 353-369. “Certificado de una exposición que hizo Juan Bautista Pinto, intérprete, sobre lo acaecido al padre Valdivia con los indios de Arauco y Tucapel, Buena Esperanza, 27 de febrero de 1614,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 111, 178-182. “Certificado de una exposición que hizo el intérprete Francisco Fris, Buena Esperanza, 6 de marzo de 1614,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 111, 183-185. “Declaraciones que hicieron los intérpretes de los indios sobre el estado de la guerra de Arauco, 1614,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 112, 260-276. Rosales, *Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes Indiano*, II, book 6, ch. VIII-X, 892-905.

¹²¹⁸ “Relación de lo que sucedió en la jornada que hicimos el Señor Presidente Alonso de Ribera, gobernador deste Reino, y yo, desde Arauco a Paicaví, a concluir las paces de Elicura, última regua de Tucapel, y las de Purén y la Imperial, escrita por mí el padre Luis de Valdivia al salir de Paicaví, de vuelta a Lebo; diciembre de 1612,” in Medina, *Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena*, 109-117. “Informe del doctor Luis Merlo de la Fuente sobre la Guerra Defensiva en el reino de Chile; Los Reyes, 12 de enero de 1617,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 119, 74-178. Rosales, *Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes Indiano*, II, book 6, ch. XI, 906-9. An excellent monograph of these parleys in Zapater, “Parlamentos de paz en la Guerra de Arauco (1612-1626),” 47-82.

Spaniards the arrival of English ships.¹²¹⁹ In this way, in addition to an evident desire for pacification and to consolidate reciprocal confidences through the handover of prisoners from both sides, it is evident the inclusion of clauses aimed at satisfying urgent imperial emergencies, as was the need to convert the Indians in allies in the face of the threatening intrusion of ships in Pacific waters.

However, the entry of religious into Indian territory, as one of the agreements established, ended in tragedy. The murder of the Fathers Horacio Vecchi and Martín de Aranda, that Jesuits stories show as an act of reprisal by the betrayal that affected Anganamón due to the kidnapping or flight of some of his wives with the intervention of a Spanish captain,¹²²⁰ ignited again the embers of the war after the parenthesis of Catiray and Paicaví: the indigenous siege materialized, throughout the year of 1613, in 22 entrances to Hispanic lands,¹²²¹ especially affecting the reductions of friendly Indians with the aim of breaking their loyalty to Spanish arms. Losing the support of these Indians would have meant a hard blow for the battered Castilian forces, even more so if we consider that we are in a context in which the concept of “neutrality” was meaningless, because losing an ally meant irremediably winning a new enemy. For this reason, guaranteeing their safety and supporting their vendetas against the grievances of rival groups was a requirement and not an alternative when it came to preserving their status as allies; thus, for example, around 1613 the Araucanians threatened to rise up and join the war Indians, since the harassment they were subjected to by rivals meant that

they diminished every day with the continuous malocas that the enemy did to them, killing them, robbing them and taking away their wives and children. And that they were forbidden to take revenge by making the same in enemy land, taking captives to rescue those who had been taken by them, and we Spaniards did not protect them, we did not defend, we did not persecute the enemies, we did not avenge them, and the enemies were very sure because our people could not cross the line that Your Majesty had fixed. So they wanted to leave where they were sure of *malocas* and other persecutions of the war.¹²²²

¹²¹⁹ Zapater, “Parlamentos de paz en la Guerra de Arauco (1612-1626),” 70.

¹²²⁰ The details of this event are described in Blanco, *Historia documentada de la vida y gloriosa muerte de los padres Martín de Aranda y Horacio Vecchi*.

¹²²¹ Rosales, *Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes Indiano*, II, book 6, ch. XVI, 930.

¹²²² “Carta de Francisco de Villaseñor y Acuña a S.M. el Rey, Concepción, 15 de febrero de 1614,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 116, 167-8.

In this way, and with the permission of Father Luis de Valdivia and Governor Alonso de Ribera, it was agreed to protect friendly Indians by escorting them in their attacks on the rebellious provinces, even though this meant to contravene the fundamental precepts of the Defensive War.¹²²³ At that point, maintaining the security and loyalty of the allied Indians was more important than pacifying the rebels. However, from now on a break between the priest and the ruler was experienced, since the latter considered that the indigenous attacks were the best evidence of the defensive war system failure, so it was necessary to use the sword again. The defense of the friendly Indians will be the perfect excuse for the *encomenderos* to justify indiscriminate attacks against the Mapuche inland. We must not forget that since 1604 there was a professional army paid from the Viceroyalty of Peru, whose functionality had been limited to protecting the Biobío line without the possibility of attacking the *Mapuches* further south of the river course. In addition, the *Real Situado* –the resources destined to maintain the troop–, was an important source of goods and money that no one wanted to lose: the eventual success of the Defensive War would have meant the dismantling of the border army and, consequently, the irremediable loss of the capital that sustained it. It was not a coincidence, therefore, that the main institution that represented the interests of the *encomenderos*, the Cabildo de Santiago, has requested the king “that the war be done by fire and blood, which will be the safest end.”¹²²⁴ The soldier Alonso González de Nájera, giving a clear signal of the men-at-arms point of view, wrote a chronicle encouraging the slavery and even the extermination of the war Indians.¹²²⁵

Without ignoring the opportunism of *encomenderos* and miners, who saw in the maintenance of the war the possibility of profiting from the Indians slavery, it is still true that *Mapuche* attacks on forts and cities were constant over time. The Jesuit Diego de Rosales says in his chronicle that since the priests’ death in Elicura “began to ignite again the war, so vivid and bloody, that lasted without interruption from the year of ‘12 until the forty.”¹²²⁶ As

¹²²³ “Acuerdo del gobernador de Chile, del padre Valdivia y otros capitanes sobre el modo de socorrer a los indios amigos, 14 de febrero de 1613,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 111, 136-8; “Carta del padre Luis de Valdivia a S.M. el Rey, fuerte de la Esperanza, 20 de febrero de 1613,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 111, 113-4; “Informe del doctor Luis Merlo de la Fuente sobre la Guerra Defensiva en el reino de Chile, Los Reyes, 12 de enero de 1617,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 119, 113-4.

¹²²⁴ “Carta del Cabildo de la ciudad de Santiago a S.M. el Rey, fecha en 24 de marzo de 1616,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 115, 111.

¹²²⁵ González de Nájera, *Desengaño y reparo de la guerra de Chile*.

¹²²⁶ Rosales, *Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes Indiano*, II, book 6, ch. XVI, 929-30.

a consequence of that unfortunate event, the historian Diego Barros Arana affirmed that the Luis de Valdivia's pacification plan had fallen in the greater discredit hardly passed a year of its implementation.¹²²⁷ In addition to the governor, many captains, officials or prestigious residents wrote extensive memorials to represent the Court the inconveniences that followed the adoption of that war system. Clerics of other orders joined the criticism, including the bishop of Santiago, the Franciscan Juan Pérez de Espinosa, who had initially supported the project, but changed his mind considering the disastrous events of the last time, telling the king that “His Majesty spends in it [the Kingdom] every year two hundred thousand ducats in the soldiers, and twelve thousand with Father Luis de Valdivia and his companions without any effect.”¹²²⁸ The strongest attack was made between 1613 and 1616, when the La Serena, Santiago and Concepción *Cabildos* sent the Franciscan Pedro de Sosa to Spain to demand the repeal of the project and the return to the offensive war.

During this period the Jesuit priest obtained two important achievements, but he also had to face a substantial setback. First, the representative of Luis de Valdivia to the Court, the Jesuit Gaspar Sobrino,¹²²⁹ prevailed in the allegations getting the monarch to dispatch the Royal Decree of November 21, 1615 that confirmed the continuity of the Defensive War.¹²³⁰ In the second place, the king expressly approved the Father Valdivia conduct in a letter of January 3 of the following year, urging him to continue with his pacification plan without interruption of the local authorities.¹²³¹ Both documents left the Jesuit priest, at least initially, in an advantageous position with respect to his opponents. In addition, Governor Alonso de Ribera died in March 1617, being temporarily replaced by the lawyer Talaverano Gallegos, who complied with the royal dispositions demanding support to Valdivia. The next ruler, Lope de Ulloa y Lemus (1618-1620), was equally solicitous, although his regency was brief. A few years before, in December 1615, the Marquis of Montesclaros was replaced in the Viceroyalty of Peru by Francisco de Borja y Aragón, Prince of Esquilache, a ruler highly

¹²²⁷ Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, IV, 56.

¹²²⁸ “Carta en que el Ilustrísimo Fray Juan Pérez de Espinosa da cuenta al rey de algunos sucesos de trascendencia; 20 de febrero de 1613,” in Lizana, *Colección de documentos históricos recopilados del Archivo del Arzobispado de Santiago*, 98.

¹²²⁹ Tampe, *Catálogo de jesuitas de Chile (1593-1767)*, 239-40.

¹²³⁰ “Real Cédula al virrey del Perú sobre hacer la guerra defensiva solamente, según lo ordenado a Alonso de Rivera, gobernador de Chile; 21 de noviembre de 1615,” in Jara & Pinto, *Fuentes para la historia del trabajo en el Reino de Chile*, 269-70.

¹²³¹ Rosales, *Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes Indiano*, II, book 6, ch. XVII, 940.

addicted to the Society of Jesus. Nothing presaged, therefore, a setback for the plans of the Jesuit. However, Claudio Aquaviva died in early 1615, and his replacement as General Superior of the order, Mucio Vitelleschi, disapproved of Valdivia's implication in the Defensive War, which he considered more political and military than religious in nature.¹²³² In this way, Vitelleschi informed Father Valdivia that he had to move away, little by little, from the Defensive War direction, and with the purpose of subtracting faculties, on April 30, 1616, he deprived him of the independence given by Aquaviva, submitting him in everything to the provincial of Paraguay, to whom the Jesuits of Chile were subjected.¹²³³

Although limited in his attributions and subordinated to the authority of the provincial of Paraguay, Luis de Valdivia did not give up in the efforts to pacify the *Mapuches*. He continued encouraging the release of prisoners in the forts dispersed in the land of war, trying to conclude pacts to consolidate the perpetuation of peace. As early as 1612 there is evidence that Valdivia knew very well the way in which the *Mapuches* were organizing to confront the Spanish invader. The land of war was divided into three great alliances that extended across the geographical floors of the south of the Biobío: coast, central plain and the Andes foothills.¹²³⁴ For the realization of these coalitions played in favor of the *Mapuches* their strong cultural unity and a relatively high population density, because despite having been affected by European epidemics in the sixteenth century (smallpox and typhus), they maintained a fairly high demography at the beginning of the following century: some 250,000 war Indians are estimated between the Itata and Tolten rivers, the most conflictive territory, of which about 50,000 were adult men.¹²³⁵ Indeed, Luis de Valdivia had the sharpness to realize that the southern natives had formed an ethnoterritorial trilogy around warrior leaders who organized the attacks on the Spanish military and civilian settlements. The Jesuit fulfilled in the *Mapuche* territory the same role that the mestizos, like Miguel Caldera, had fulfilled in the *Chichimec* territory, handling not only the linguistic codes of the rivals but also their cultural dynamics. By a document signed by the same Jesuit just a year later, we

¹²³² Amunátegui Solar, "Un apóstol de carne y hueso," 20.

¹²³³ Astrain, *Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la asistencia de España*, 636.

¹²³⁴ "Relación de lo que sucedió en la jornada que hicimos el señor Presidente Alonso de Ribera, Gobernador deste Reino, y yo, desde Arauco á Paicaví, á concluir las paces de Elicura, última regua de Tucapel, y las de Purén y la Imperial, escrita por mí el padre Luis de Valdivia al salir de Paicaví, de vuelta á Lebo, 1612," in Medina, *Biblioteca Hispano-Chilena*, 112.

¹²³⁵ Téllez, "Evolución histórica de la población mapuche del reino de Chile, 1536-1810," 108.

know that such sociopolitical alliances, nonexistent before the Spanish presence, were called *vutanmapus* or “great lands.”¹²³⁶ One of the keys of the Mapuche resistance success was the ability to deploy a sociopolitical dynamic through which they articulated macro alliances involving diverse *rewes* around charismatic leaders, generally of short duration since the vicissitudes of the war turned their destiny in a real Russian roulette. As a good Jesuit, he sought to take the best advantage of this knowledge of the indigenous organization for his pacification plan. In this way, he organized three forts on the same ecological floors to attract the Indians with gifts and exchange prisoners. Thus, by 1618 he affirmed with enthusiasm that the Indians maintained an increasing exchange “in the three frontier forts, Lebo [coast], Cayuhuanu [foothills] and Nacimiento [central plain].”¹²³⁷ A document of 1617 is even more explicit

all the provinces, which are divided into three types, [came to] treat peace. Those of the first type are from the snowy mountain range that is one end of this Kingdom, who has gone to the Cayuhuanu fort. The second type are those from the sea and coast who have come to deal of peace to the Lebo fort. And the third type are those in the middle, such as those of Purén, who have gone to the Nacimiento fort.¹²³⁸

Luis de Valdivia combined from the indigenous war organization with the new functionality that was being given to the forts, which from military outposts had now become points of inter-ethnic convocation to gratify border Indians, exchange prisoners and arrange agreements. For example, the priest informed the king that as a result of the Defensive War good effects, the Indians of the coast sent ambassadors to Concepción in order to exchange prisoners and conclude peace agreements, who represented to one of “three main parts in which the war land is divided, which they call three utanmapus.”¹²³⁹ But the Jesuit exaggerated in his appreciations: wanting to show an idyllic picture of the borderland, he obviated very often in his reports information on the constant indigenous attacks. The

¹²³⁶ “Relación breue de lo sucedido en la pacificación del reyno de Chile por los medios que Su Magestad cometió al Señor Marqués de Montesclaros, Virey del Perú, que llevó a su cargo el padre Luis de Valdivia de la Compañía de Jesús desde 13 de mayo de 1612 hasta primero de nouiembre de 1613 años,” in Díaz Blanco, *El alma en la palabra. Escritos inéditos del P. Luis de Valdivia*, 272.

¹²³⁷ “Carta del padre Luis de Valdivia a S.M. el Rey; Concepción, 31 de enero de 1618,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 120, 10.

¹²³⁸ “Carta del padre Luis de Valdivia a S.M. el Rey, Concepción, 15 de marzo de 1617,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 119, 23-4.

¹²³⁹ “Carta del padre Luis de Valdivia a un consejero de Indias, Concepción, 20 de octubre de 1616,” BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 115, 152.

moments of violence were more numerous than the instances of peace, which were usually nothing more than meetings to exchange prisoners. If his enthusiastic appraisal of border peace had any basis, it could not be explained that between 1613 and 1618 there were just over a hundred indigenous attacks on the Biobío area, adding *malocas* and joint actions of greater amplitude;¹²⁴⁰ to be more precise, from the implantation of the Defensive War system until April of 1621, registers a total of 186 entrances of the *weichafes* into Spanish lands.¹²⁴¹

Overwhelmed by this conflictive reality, crushed by the null support of the *encomenderos*, and indisposed with the Jesuit Pedro de Oñate, provincial of Paraguay, Luis de Valdivia decided to leave the Chilean territory in 1619. From then on, the governors had a lot of scope to apply a war by blood and fire against the *Mapuches*, this despite the fact that the Defensive War had legal validity until 1626, when the Royal Decree of 13 April 1625¹²⁴² was proclaimed, reinstating the offensive war. But the absence of Luis de Valdivia meant that the pacification project lacked its main driver. The Valdivia's exaggerated personalism was something that played against the continuity of his pacification plan: he was not only the mind, but also the soul and body of the Defensive War project. In Mexico, the pacification project was conceived by a religious order, but in its implementation, viceroys and Franciscans of different generations played a preponderant role. In Chile Valdivia "was" the Defensive War, he was the presentation face to the Indians and who made the fundamental decisions. To this is added the reluctance of the Superior General of the Jesuits, Father Mucio Vitelleschi, to that members of the order meddle in matters far from the strictly ecclesiastic, which prevented any of the coreligionists from taking the baton left by the Granadian priest.

However, the failure of the Defensive War project not only obeyed to Spanish side factors. The *Mapuches* not only maintained an intense war against the Spanish border posts, but they were also able to perfect their forms of war organization with the structuring of

¹²⁴⁰ "Relación cierta y verdadera de las entradas que han hecho los enemigos en las reducciones y el daño que han hecho en ellas desde el mes de enero de 1613, Santiago, 1 de mayo de 1619," BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 120, 258-86.

¹²⁴¹ "Carta de Antonio de Río de Soto a S.M. el Rey, Callao, 28 de abril de 1621," BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 122, 226. "Carta de don Luis Merlo de la Fuente a S.M. el Rey; Los Reyes, 2 de mayo de 1621," BNCh, Manuscritos Medina 122, 235v. Rosales, *Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes Indiano*, II, book 6, ch. XXX, 984, says instead that "since the year of 1612, when the defensive war began, until this one of 1621, when this government of Doctor Don Christoval de la Cerda ended [the enemies] have made one hundred and seventy-seven entries in our land."

¹²⁴² "Real Cédula al virrey del Perú en que se manda que la guerra con los indios de Chile sea ofensiva; Aranjuez, 13 de abril de 1625," in Jara & Pinto, *Fuentes para la historia del trabajo en el Reino de Chile*, 275-6.

geopolitical macroalliances. We consider that the work by Luis de Valdivia was, to a certain extent, a victim of the little zeal placed by the Franciscans in the first decades of inter-ethnic contact, since by not implementing a systematic evangelization among the non-subjugated groups, they impeded the Indians to know the diverse and contradictory agendas handled by the different estates that made up the Spanish world. For this it will be necessary some decades until the peace of Quilín in 1641, when the seed planted by the main representative of the Ignatian order in Chile of seventeenth century bears fruit.

Conclusion

The Society of Jesus was a religious order of late foundation, born in the context of the Western Reformation. To fulfill the evangelizing work Jesuits nourished from the experiences of their own missionaries, as well as from the testimonies left by other religious orders. With those, it shared theological and missionary foundations, but also had elements that distinguished from them. The pacification work deployed in Chile is a good example of how they incorporated the experience of another religious order for their own development in the New World: the Franciscan activity in New Galicia was a source of inspiration to achieve the definitive pacification in *Mapuche* territory. Although it is undeniable that throughout the sixteenth century clerics of various orders advocated for the rights of the Indians of Chile, the activity that the Jesuits would systematically deploy from the seventeenth century was unprecedented. And this activity had a fundamental name: Luis de Valdivia, who tried to know the *Mapuches* cultural codes to consolidate an approaching that would lead to peace. He not only mastered the *Mapuche* language (he published the first vocabulary in Lima) and communicated through it in meetings with the *weichafes*, but he also participated in the ritual codes of the Indians.

However, his pacification project, which considered the entrance to war land only of Jesuit missionaries for evangelizing purposes, was perhaps a bit premature. The Society of Jesus, being the first order to deploy a systematic approach with the war Indians, lacked a fertile ground for the flowering of peace. The *Mapuches* were not still prepared to meet with a frontier actor who handled an agenda different from that of all the actors who until then had

used the language of the sword. And this misunderstanding also determined that Jesuits were the first martyrs to die in the land of war while performing missionary work.

It is true that the diplomatic work of Luis de Valdivia did not have the expected results. But his efforts would be subsequently followed by other members of the order. Decades later, when the Defensive War project was totally dismantled, the peace of Quilín of 1641 was a revitalization of the peaceful approach system led by the Granadian priest, a strategy that the Spaniards used from then on throughout the colonial period.

Conclusion

The deployment of Indian pacification policies in the New World was a slow process paved along a sinuous route dotted with blood. In its development, discussions were held about the nature of the Indian and the validity of violence as a means to attract them to the faith and Western Europe ways of life. All the spaces in which the conquerors made their way were ethnographic laboratories in which the conceptualization of the alterity was acquiring new profiles, and that in plural, because the actors who staged the interethnic encounter play were part of social estates that managed agendas not always coincident on how to approach and deal with non-Christians.

The most extreme forms of difference, those that used to occupy the lowest rungs of the social, political and cultural scale delineated by scholars and theologians in their treaties, meant a special challenge for the Spanish expansionist system. The *Chichimecs* from the north of New Spain, and the *Reche-Mapuches* from the forests of southern Chile evidenced military and political agency that allowed them to resist the Spanish initiatives of conquest. By long challenging the attempts to dominate these remote regions of the New World, which since the second half of the sixteenth century became into a coveted booty for European rival monarchies, the Crown was forced to deploy conciliatory policies in which the missionaries were gradually displacing the conquerors as main agents of penetration in non-dominated territories. Although there are antecedents demonstrating that the Crown had practically from the beginning of the New World occupation a concern for the natives' situation, the decisive fact was the promulgation of the *Ordinances of Discovery and New Population* of 1573. Such a legal body meant a new framework that forced to rethink the role of the actors who would lead the approaching to the indomitable frontier societies, meaning for this reason a new method of incorporating the natives into the Imperial system: the clergy with the strategy of peaceful contact, avoiding the interference of the other social components of the *Republic of Spaniards*.

The process, however, was slow and plagued with obstacles. The royal position regarding the Indians nature was often the result of debates and disputes among different social estates that were eagerly seeking to get the sovereign's will: *encomenderos*, soldiers, miners and ranchers on the one hand, and religious on the other, tried assiduously that the king gave legal value to their requests. Basically they wanted their position on otherness to

have an official character, and therefore that monarchical policies endorse their agendas in order to move with ease in the relationship with American alterity. In other words, if the relationship between Europeans and indigenous people was already conflictive, it was not less conflictive the relation among the different Spanish social estates managing opposed agendas.

However, the simplicity of dichotomous analysis usually yields insignificant results. The approach to the indigenous world was a process experienced in a particular way by each religious order, and even by each one of the individuals who integrated them. Only an approximation of this nature allows us to understand the internal contradictions that affected Franciscans and Jesuits –among so many other religious orders– during the evangelizing work. Circumstances determined that sometimes, and especially in the first phases of contact when a missionary policy was still being constructed, each and every one lacked a consensual position on the best way to appease the rebel natives: within the same religious order is verified the existence of opposing positions, and even changes within the same mind, as happened with Father Luis de Valdivia, who after justifying the use of force as a consequence of governor Martín García Óñez de Loyola death in 1598, became the most determined defender of the Indians rights in Chile.

Since a few decades ago the study of the Spanish Empire in America has undergone a transformation. Today, the investigation of its institutional functioning goes beyond the relationship that linked the metropolis to each of the subordinated kingdoms, extending to the relationships that involved these kingdoms with each other. This perspective of more horizontal analysis starts from the principle that the Spanish Empire was a political, economic, social and cultural system through which people, material resources and information circulated. Scholars, such as David Weber, demonstrated the potential of this type of analysis to understand the functioning of the Spanish Empire in the Bourbon era; we do the same in a more early time, in the days that the House of Austria reigned. Applying this conceptual lens to the study of two of the most complex American borderlands has allowed us to discover one of the most interesting aspects of the Spanish Empire functioning in the New World, that is, that the earliest experiences in the search for controlling the native populations were used as an important reference when making decisions in another corner of the continent. The Chichimec War, with results so uncertain for the monarchy, officials in

the north of Mexico, the Spanish inhabitants of those regions, and the Franciscans in charge of evangelizing the Indians, was a laboratory of discussions in which engaged the protagonists of the inter-ethnic relationship lived day by day. In this discussion not only was present the immediate reality of a war that Spanish steel was losing against the arrows and spears of nomadic and semi-nomadic northern groups, as previous pacification projects were also considered, which by different reasons had failed or achieved not entirely satisfactory results in other regions of the continent. If the Franciscans were able to hit the nail with the best way to pacify a land of long and exhausting war, it was partly because they knew how to draw the best lessons from other experiences previously lived by members of the own order or from other religious congregations, such as Dominicans. Shortly thereafter, if the Jesuits implemented a satisfactory reductionist activity with the Sinaloa Indians, it was because they knew how to take and apply the best from the Franciscan experience in the neighboring region of New Galicia. And if the Jesuits led by Luis de Valdivia hoped to pacify the Kingdom of Chile, which by the beginning of the seventeenth century had already been devastated by two major Mapuche rebellions that claimed the lives of the governors Pedro de Valdivia (1553) and Martín García Oñez de Loyola (1598), it was because the flame of religious pacification had been successfully kept on until then: but the Arauco War, unfortunately, would extinguish it, at least momentarily.

Being part of an empire did not nullify the particularities of each region, since ecological and cultural conditions determined unique challenges in each new context. In this way, the previous success of a formula for approaching the indigenous world did not guarantee that the result would be satisfactory again. Chile, in which the Jesuits applied the essential guidelines of the *Chichimec* pacification, is a good example. And this failure involved ecological factors (fertility of the *Mapuche* territory, scarcely affected by the negative ecological impact of the mining activity, so the rebellious Indians had a virtually uninterrupted supply of resources), cultural (*Mapuche* cultural homogeneity, which facilitated the making and continuity of the warlike alliances to resist the Spanish), political (decided opposition of *encomenderos* and soldiers to the implementation of the Defensive War), border (the scarce activity of Franciscan evangelization among the Indians of war in the sixteenth century made difficult the Jesuit tasks, since the rebellious *Mapuches* still conceived the Spaniards as a monolithic entity without internal divisions), and even

psychological (the excessive personalism of Luis de Valdivia, which made the Defensive War project totally dependent on his own person). Therefore, although in most of the Spanish borderlands the pacification activity counted on the support of the Crown and viceroys, materialized in legal dispositions and resources, this did not necessarily mean having a sure trump card. Only by considering the different factors that condition the operation of a borderland is it possible to understand the diversity of results in the application of the same model of political interaction.

A research of this nature invites us to explore other colonial frontiers to study the transmission of knowledge and experiences, to investigate how the historical actors studied here (and others not considered) evolved in contexts different from those analyzed here, and even, to keep an eye on the borderlands already studied to investigate if in their later functioning knowledges from other regions applied: what other references did the Crown and the Jesuits use to put an end to the endless Arauco War? The Spanish Empire was a mosaic in which constantly the variability of its geographical and cultural wealth put to the test the pretensions of political and cultural homogeneity.

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