

Copyright

by

Thomas Ryan Conroy

2018

The Report Committee for Thomas Ryan Conroy certifies that this is the approved version of the following report:

Campaign Funding Strategies: How Political Parties and Private Donors Choose Which Legislators to Invest In

APPROVED BY

SUPERVISING COMMITTEE:

Zachary Elkins, Supervisor

Brian Roberts

Campaign Funding Strategies: How Political Parties and Private Donors Choose Which Legislators to Invest In

by

Thomas Ryan Conroy

REPORT

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

May 2018

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Zachary Elkins, Brian Roberts and Stephen Jessee for their support and guidance during the research and construction of this report. I also am deeply grateful for the help, support and friendship of Christine Bird, Thomas Burt, Lindsay Dun, Roman Hlatky, Josh Landry, Philip Moniz and Peter Russell, along with the rest of my colleagues in the Department of Government.

This research would not have been possible without the financial support provided by the Department of Government and the Center for European Studies.

I thank my parents, Jean and Brian, and my sister Candace for their love, inspiration and encouragement. I thank Stuart and Louise for providing a home away from home, affection and care. Last, and certainly not least, I thank Kari for being my foundation and for her unwavering patience, consistency, and most importantly, love. I would never have gotten this far without these incredible people in my life.

Campaign Funding Strategies: How Political Parties and Private Donors Choose Which Legislators to Invest In

Thomas Ryan Conroy, M.A.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2018

Supervisor: Zachary Elkins

This paper employs a series of hierarchical Bayesian regression models to contribute to the academic discourse on the funding strategies that political parties and private donors employ when deciding which political campaigns to support, either directly by way of campaign contributions or through independent expenditures. After giving a brief overview of the recent campaign finance trends in the United States Senate from 1991 through 2016 and the previous scholarly literature covering this specific subject, several hierarchical Bayesian regression models are estimated to explain campaign finance strategies over the past several decades. The main explanatory variables include electoral competitiveness, party loyalty and legislator ideology and while these particular variables are not new introductions to the campaign finance literature, the way they are implemented is. Due to the changing nature of campaign finance laws and the increasing cost of running campaigns, a hierarchical model is essential for looking at funding strategies during each individual election cycle. To my knowledge, this article is the first, within the campaign finance literature, to leverage Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques to help attain robust findings despite limited sample size and its findings are invaluable to the campaign finance literature for the United States and internationally.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	iv
Abstract	v
List of Tables	vii
List of Figures	viii
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
1.1 Court Rulings and Campaign Finance Regulations	1
1.2 Recent Trends in Political Party Contributions	5
1.3 Recent Trends in Independent Expenditures	8
1.4 Layout of Paper and its Contribution to the Field	10
Chapter 2: Literature Review	12
2.1 Electoral Competitiveness	13
2.2 Party Loyalty	15
2.3 Ideology	18
2.3.1 Spatial Models and Ideal Points	19
2.3.2 Probabilistic Voting	21
2.3.3 Multiple Dimensions	22
2.3.4 Ideal Point Estimation	23
2.3.5 Previous Research on Political Ideology	25
Chapter 3: Hypotheses	28
Chapter 4: Data and Measurement	29
4.1 Electoral Competitiveness	31
4.2 Party Loyalty	33
4.3 Ideology	34
4.4 Control Variables	39
4.5 Models	40
Chapter 5: Results	42
5.1 Political Party Contributions	43
5.2 Independent Expenditures	47
Chapter 6: Conclusions	54
Bibliography	58
Vita	70

List of Tables

Table 1: Republican Party – Electoral Competitiveness and Party Contributions	44
Table 2: Democratic Party – Electoral Competitiveness and Party Contributions	44
Table 3: Both Parties – Electoral Competitiveness and Party Contributions	45
Table 4: Republican Party – Party Loyalty and Party Contributions	46
Table 5: Democratic Party – Party Loyalty and Party Contributions	47
Table 6: Both Parties – Party Loyalty and Party Contributions	47
Table 7: Republican Party – Electoral Competitiveness and Independent Expenditures	48
Table 8: Democratic Party – Electoral Competitiveness and Independent Expenditures	49
Table 9: Both Parties – Electoral Competitiveness and Independent Expenditures	49
Table 10: Republican Party – Ideology (Dimension 1) and Independent Expenditures	50
Table 11: Democratic Party – Ideology (Dimension 1) and Independent Expenditures	50
Table 12: Both Parties – Ideology (Dimension 1) and Independent Expenditures	51
Table 13: Republican Party – Ideology (Dimension 2) and Independent Expenditures	52
Table 14: Democratic Party – Ideology (Dimension 2) and Independent Expenditures	52
Table 15: Both Parties – Ideology (Dimension 2) and Independent Expenditures	53

List of Figures

Figure 1: <i>Average Total Direct Contributions to Candidates</i>	6
Figure 2: <i>Average Total Direct Contributions to Candidates from Political Parties</i>	7
Figure 3: <i>Average Percent of Candidates' Total Contributions from Political Parties</i>	7
Figure 4: <i>Average Independent Expenditures Spent on Behalf of Candidates</i>	9

Chapter 1: Introduction

Political scientists have long been fascinated by legislatures, political parties and individual legislators. Americanists and Comparativists alike have studied and debated about how parties, as a whole, and party members strategize, interact with each other and jockey for favorable outcomes, whether through the passage of legislation or the maintenance of political power.

In order to understand how political parties and party members operate, at least within the context of the United States, understanding the role that campaign finance plays is fundamental. When trying to pass preferred legislation, political parties need to attain and continue to hold enough seats in the legislature. In many countries, including the United States, money is essential to run successful campaigns for (re)election. Political parties have limited monetary resources and understanding how they choose to allocate their funding can shed light on political party priorities and strategies.

1.1 Court Rulings and Campaign Finance Regulations

Most scholarly work on the subject of political party campaign funding strategies was written prior to the Supreme Court ruling in *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* (2010) and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruling in *SpeechNOW.org v. Federal Election Commission* (2010) that shifted the landscape of current political campaign funding and spending. In order to understand the calculations that legislators and political parties must consider today, it is essential to understand the campaign finance

regulations in place before 2010 and why these rulings change the way that scholars must approach this subject in current and future work.

While most American citizens, and frankly political scientists, are under the impression that *Citizens United* completely altered the direction of campaign finance, this is not entirely correct. In fact, it was the ruling in *Buckley v. Valeo* (1976) that laid the groundwork for all contemporary campaign finance law. In short, the most important contributions from *Buckley* were the way that it defined corruption and its decision to make the regulation of campaign finance a free speech issue.

The Court, acknowledging the state interest in quelling corruption or the appearance of corruption, defined this act as a quid pro quo arrangement between donors and legislators. Furthermore, The Court made it very clear in their decision that equalizing the “playing field” for candidates is not a sufficient justification for upholding the constitutionality of campaign finance laws and regulations, only the mitigation of corruption is. While the ability to unequivocally prove that a donation was given with quid pro quo expectations is challenging, the shifting definition of corruption has been an important factor in post-*Buckley* rulings.

The arguably more impactful component of the *Buckley* ruling was the connection it drew between campaign finance and free speech. The Court argued that in order to speak during political campaigns, political actors have to spend money and hence, if the amount of money that can be spent is limited, the amount someone can speak is limited. This lead to the finding that the expenditure limitations set in place by The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (with its 1974 amendments), were unconstitutional; however, the contribution limits set in place by this act remained constitutional. These contribution limits applied to, with different dollar caps, the total amount that individuals could give to separate political entities and that parties could give to

their candidates. Furthermore, while there had never been limits on individual independent expenditures at the federal level, after the expenditure limits set in The Federal Election Campaign Act were struck down as unconstitutional, this right was further entrenched.

As an aside, while not nearly as influential as the rulings on expenditure and contribution limits, The Court also ruled that the Act's provisions on contribution disclosures and recordkeeping were constitutional. This made the collection of campaign finance data utilized in this paper possible.

Fourteen years after the ruling in *Buckley*, the Court ruled in *Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce* (1990) that states had the constitutional right to ban trade union and corporate independent expenditures at the state level. While the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act had made corporate and trade union independent expenditures illegal at the federal level, the ruling in *Austin* upheld the constitutionality of placing these limitations on state level elections.

Austin also changed the *Buckley* definition of corruption. While the ruling in *Buckley* spoke to a concern about legislators being corrupted through quid pro quo arrangements, the *Austin* Court expanded the definition of corruption to include the corruption of voters through a distortion of their views. Essentially, political ads could be used to convince a voter to vote against their own self interests. This change in the working definition of corruption gave the Court the justification to allow the Michigan Campaign Finance Acts prohibition on corporations using treasury funds to make independent expenditures in support or opposition of a political candidate at the state level, stating that the Act did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendment.

In 2002, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (McCain-Feingold Act) was put into effect, placing new limitations on contributions, banning the use of “soft money” and defining and regulating electioneering communications.

These previous rulings and regulations now provide context for the 2010 ruling in *Citizens United*. The 2010 Court did not introduce any new logic to campaign finance law; instead, it reinstated the narrower definition of quid pro quo corruption from *Buckley* and extended its logic to all domestic actors, including corporations and labor unions. The ruling in *Citizens United* stated that independent expenditures did not fall within the quid pro quo definition of corruption and any limitation on them would be unconstitutional, including from corporations or trade unions. As a result of this decision the ruling from *Austin* was thrown out, the Taft-Hartley Act bans on independent expenditures were ruled unconstitutional and the electioneering communications ban in McCain-Feingold was removed. Despite this change in stance on corporate and trade union independent expenditures, and the public outcry about the decision, since *Citizens United*, corporations still have not heavily taken part in independent expenditures; individual citizens still spend far more in this area.

Citizens United while not technically required for the decision in *SpeechNOW.org*, still played a fundamental role in “opening the door” for it by removing any corruption argument from discussion on independent expenditures. The ruling in *SpeechNow.org* established the constitutionality of Super PACs which today constitute an ever more significant percentage of political spending. Super PACs assist large and small individual donors alike by removing some of the logistical burden of deciding where funding should be allocated. This clearly made a difference to donors because while they could always legally make unlimited independent expenditures, the amount of money being spent through independent expenditures skyrocketed

after this ruling. Donors to Super PACs do lose some control over where and how their money is spent; however, they can still coordinate with the heads of these independent expenditure entities.

The last applicable Supreme Court ruling was in *McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission* (2014) which held that aggregate contribution limits were unconstitutional.

Understanding which regulations were in effect for each election is crucial for using and interpreting campaign finance data. As previously stated, the data in this paper ranges from 1991 through 2016. For the entire period observed, there were no limitations on independent expenditures from individuals at the federal level. From 1991 through 2010, corporations and trade unions were not able to take part in independent expenditures at the federal level; however, after 2010, they legally could. Rules and regulations on individual expenditures were consistent throughout the dataset because they were established in 1974 in *Buckley*. Limits on contributions from political parties to their candidates changed with the new limitations set in McCain-Feingold in 2002. These year to year changes in the amount that political parties can contribute and who can take part in independent expenditures reinforces the necessity for studying campaign finance data through a hierarchical model that allows for effects to be observed and studied for each individual election under the particular regulations in effect at the time.

1.2 Recent Trends in Political Party Contributions

By looking at the cost of elections overtime, there is clearly a trend towards more costly campaigns. Below, Figure 1 shows the average total amount that incumbent senators, up for reelection, raised for their campaigns from 1991 through 2016. Because elections for the Senate

are held every two years, each point represents that average total contributions from the year before the election and the year of the election. The average, including both parties, has more than doubled.




Figure 2 demonstrates that, with the exception of the Republican Party in 2016, on average, political parties are contributing less to Senatorial reelection campaigns each election. This trend is dramatically highlighted by the rapidly declining average percent of candidates' total campaign funding that comes from political parties, as seen in Figure 3. While these graphs only represent data averages for incumbent senators who are running for reelection, the pattern over time is stark.

It would be logical to look at these graphs and conclude that political party campaign contributions make up such a small proportion of candidate funding that they are irrelevant and not worth future study. This would be an incorrect deduction for two reasons. First, previous work suggests that party contributions may be used by PACs as a guide for deciding which candidates to fund, creating a kind of "multiplier effect" (Jacobson 1980; Owen and Herrnson 1983). Second, even if party contributions make up a small proportion of total funding, they still

represent a quantifiable indicator of party support and can be a useful tool for assessing what political parties prioritize. Uncovering the factors that lead to different levels of campaign contributions, in essence, speaks to the factors that influence political party strategy and decision making.

Figure 2: Average Total Direct Contributions to Candidates from Political Parties





Figure 3: Average Percent of Candidates' Total Contributions from Political Parties



1.3 Recent Trends in Independent Expenditures


Below, Figure 4 shows the dramatic rise of independent expenditures in recent years spent on behalf of incumbent senators running for reelection. These averages are calculated by adding the total amount of independent expenditures spent in support of a candidate during the general election and the total amount of independent expenditures spent in opposition to that candidate's opponent in the general election. While there is not an immediate drastic jump after 2010, it is clear that the average is rising quickly.

As an aside, the downward trend for Democratic incumbents running for reelection in 2016 stands out against the overall increasing trend in Figure 4. This is because, by chance, of the Democratic incumbent candidates running for reelection 2016, six of the seven were running in highly uncompetitive states and thus did not garner a large financial backing. While Michael Bennet from Colorado only won by a vote share margin of 5.66, and by far garnered the most supportive independent expenditures of the seven, the rest handedly won their elections by as little as 17.97 points and as much as 51.36 points.

Increasingly, the reality of campaign finance is that independent expenditures make up a large portion of total spending during campaigns. Regardless of the fact that these expenditures are not supposed to be coordinated with political campaigns, an increasingly unrealistic regulation given the public nature of campaigns today, isolating the factors that influence how PACs and Super PACs decide to allocate contributions is paramount for understanding contemporary campaign finance. If scholars wish to study campaign finance today and understand the causes and consequences of general spending patterns, independent expenditures cannot be ignored. Data must be analyzed with an understanding that elections are becoming

increasingly expensive each year and an awareness of the campaign finance laws that parties and private donors were operating under at different times.

Figure 4: Average Independent Expenditures Spent on Behalf of Candidates



As indicated several times, this study will focus specifically on campaign finance in the United States and incumbent senators running for reelection. This was done for practical as well as substantively interesting reasons. This paper contends that both party loyalty and legislator ideology have an impact on how political parties and private donors choose to spend their money. In order to assess the degree to which a legislator is loyal to their party and their ideology, roll-call votes are often used as a measurement strategy; this means that the legislator has to already serve in the legislature if these variables are going to be used, which limits the sample pool to incumbents.

Additionally, the majority of work done on political party contributions has focused on races in the House of Representatives (Leyden and Borrelli 1990; Jacobson 1993; Dwyre 1994; Cantor and Herrnson 1997; Damore and Hansford 1999). Senate elections are inherently different than House elections for several reasons and assessing whether trends in the Senate

differ from the House is important. Senate terms are longer and their constituency base is much larger. This tends to lead to more competitive elections than in the House. Two thirds of Senate elections consist of challengers who have held elected office at some point (Jacobson, 2001). Several authors also find that many House members will often run as challengers for Senate seats (Schlesinger, 1966; Black, 1972; Rohde, 1979). These qualifications, in comparison to inexperienced candidates, make a statistically significant difference in incumbent senator's vote shares (Abramowitz and Segal 1992). Understanding how parties and private donors decide to allocate funding, given this increased degree of competitiveness, is an important aspect missing in the campaign finance literature.

1.4 Layout of Paper and its Contribution to the Field

This paper will proceed with a review of how previous literature has conceptualized and measured the main explanatory variables of interest: electoral competitiveness, party loyalty and ideology. Then, hierarchical Bayesian regression models will be constructed in order to test the seven hypotheses contended in this paper – that increases in electoral competitiveness and party loyalty lead to increased political party contributions and that electoral competitiveness and more extreme ideological positions lead to increased private donor funding through independent expenditures.

Previous scholars have explored these topics in the past (Leyden and Borrelli 1990; Canter and Herrnson 1997; Nokken 2003); however, the subject of political party and private donor campaign funding strategies, as previously mentioned, was more thoroughly explored before large changes to campaign finance regulations in 2010. Further, previous work such as

Nokken (2003) has suffered from endogenous variable construction and improper application of previous work.

This paper makes a significant contribution to the campaign finance literature because of its ability to look at trends before and after 2010, but also through the techniques employed. As the previous figures show, there are dramatic overarching campaign finance trends between 1991 and 2016. Looking at data without factoring in a temporal element will misrepresent how political parties and private donors decided to allocate funding under particular regulations. A hierarchical model is critical for looking at effects by Congressional session. Furthermore, due to the fact that this paper is specifically looking at incumbent senators up for reelection, the sample size within each Congressional session is limited. This paper will use Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques in order to overcome this limitation and get a more robust picture of the causal relationships hypothesized, more so than previous authors have. To my knowledge, this is the first application of Bayesian techniques to the subject of party and private donor spending strategies in the campaign finance literature. Furthermore, while the campaign finance literature has explored, at great length, the motivations and effects of direct political contributions from PACs, there has been a lack of attention on independent expenditures specifically which play an increasingly dramatic role in campaign finance today.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Over the past forty years, a sizeable portion of the campaign finance literature has addressed the subjects of direct party committee contributions to political candidates and how the allocation of these funds sheds light on underlying party campaign funding strategies (Leyden and Borrelli 1990; Jacobson, 1993; Dwyre, 1994; Sorauf and Wilson, 1994; Canter and Herrnson, 1997; Bianco, 1999; Damore and Hansford, 1999). Frequently, previous studies have attempted to explain party campaign funding through variables including electoral competitiveness, party loyalty, ideology and in some cases, measurements of how much party members contribute to overall party objectives, such as fundraising. To varying degrees, the overall consensus appears to be that while ideology and party loyalty may matter in some particular circumstances, parties overwhelmingly employ seat-maximizing strategies and prioritize giving campaign funding to candidates in competitive elections.

A related but separate body of work has focused on political action committees (PACs) and what motivates them to invest in candidates directly. Some scholars have depicted PAC expenditures as quid pro quo transactions between interest groups and legislators, describing PAC direct contributions as a way of obtaining legislative services and special access (Denzau and Munger 1986). Several scholars have found that PACs contribute more in support of members of influential committees (Grier and Munger 1991; Grier ,Munger, and Roberts 1994; Romer and Snyder 1994; Milyo 1997) while others determined that PACs focus their funding efforts on candidates with direct influence over specific policies applicable to their particular industry or candidates who have expertise on important industry-relevant policies (Kroszner and Stratmann 1998; Esterling 2007). Other researchers have emphasized electoral factors such as

electoral security (Welch 1980; Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000), the competitiveness of elections (Snyder 1989; Wand 2009) and incumbency (Jacobson 1985; Stratmann 1991). Lastly, several articles have focused on contributions based on majority party status (McCarty and Rothenberg 1996; Cox and Magar 1999).

Other researchers have tried to ascertain what PACs are buying through their donations. Snyder (1992) found that labor and membership-based PACs contribute to candidates in order to sway election outcomes while corporate and trade PACs try to directly influence the legislature through vote buying, premium access to legislators and legislative services.

The body of literature on PACs is growing in breadth; however, as the influence of direct contributions has given way to the magnitude of independent expenditures, work like that conducted in this paper is essential for keeping the campaign finance literature up to date with more contemporary trends.

2.1 Electoral Competitiveness

Electoral competitiveness, more so than the concepts of party loyalty and ideology, is generally conceptualized by scholars at a very low rung on Sartori's famous "ladder of abstraction" (Sartori 1970). Almost unanimously, previous work has understood electoral competitiveness as the distance between candidate vote shares during a democratically held election.

Scholars have conducted extensive research across disciplines on the causes and effects of electoral competitiveness. Mayer and Wilson (1995) found that instituting public funding alone cannot change the level of competitiveness in legislative elections. Daniel and Lott (1997),

when looking at the implementation of term limits in California between 1976 and 1994, found that it led to more electoral competitiveness. More incumbents lost their reelection bids, the vote share between candidates was closer and there were less unopposed candidates. Many scholars have highlighted the electoral advantages that incumbents have within the United States (Erikson 1972; Burnham 1974; Mayhew 1974; Ferejohn 1977; Fiorina 1977; Fiorina 1989). Cox and Katz (1996) attribute the increases in incumbency advantages to the fact that high-quality challengers are less willing to run against incumbents. Competition can also be greatly influenced by the popularity of the president (Tufte 1975) or the way that electoral districts are drawn.

The campaign finance literature has also dedicated a considerable amount of attention to electoral competitiveness. For the purposes of this paper, the relationship between electoral competitiveness and campaign contributions, both directly to campaigns and through independent expenditures, is of particular interest.

The campaign finance literature often speculates and has found confirmatory evidence to suggest that electoral competitiveness is the largest determinant of political party funding (Leyden and Borrelli 1990; Cantor and Herrnson 1997; Bianco 1999; Nokken 2003). This is an intuitive conclusion, if for no other reason, because party members in charge of distributing party funds have explicitly stated that the closeness of an election is the predominant factor deciding the allocation of funding. Senator Mitch McConnell, the former Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee Chair, even stated, “We make the decisions every day by the numbers. I get tracking polls from states where we’re competitive across the country. I have no particular bias in favor or against any of our candidates. The only issue is, how close are you?” (Herrnson 2000, pp. 92).

While, as previously mentioned, some authors have focused on the effects that electoral competitiveness can have on PAC contributions (Welch 1980; Snyder 1989; Ansobalabehere and

Snyder 2000; Wand 2009), previous research, as far as I am aware, has not looked specifically at the effect that electoral competitiveness has on independent expenditures, despite their relatively recent rise in prevalence.

2.2 Party Loyalty

Party loyalty is the degree to which a legislator shows support for their political party and for the ideological positions they advocate for. While loyalty can be expressed through other means, because parties are vote-maximizing (Downs 1957), voting with one's political party is the most common and visible signal of loyalty. Due to this emphasis on voting, the concept of party loyalty is often used interchangeably with party unity, the degree to which legislators in the same political party vote congruently on pieces of divisive legislation (Carson et al. 2010). This paper will follow the same practice.

It is important to emphasize that in order to effectively study party loyalty, it is critical to specifically look at contentious votes. Many authors who have studied party loyalty have stressed that non-competitive pieces of legislation can have a large impact on party loyalty scores and that limiting this influence is essential (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Brady, Cooper and Hurley 1997; Mainwaring and Pérez 1997; Carey 2000; Figueiredo and Limorgi 2000; Carey 2007). Non-competitive pieces of legislation are bills that most legislators can (dis)agree on and are uncontroversial, either garnering an overwhelming vote across parties of approval or disapproval. Including these votes in calculations of party loyalty will skew the data towards higher values. Furthermore, if a vote is non-controversial, a vote against one's political party is not very consequential.

Party loyalty can be caused by party cohesion or party discipline. Party cohesion is when a party votes congruently on a piece of legislation because they have the same preferences on the outcome of the vote. Party discipline is when a party votes congruently on a piece of legislation because they are incentivized to do so by party leaders – either through a threat of punishment or offered reward (Mainwaring and Pérez 1997). While it is reasonable to conclude that legislators may be given some leniency, especially on votes that particularly impact their constituents, if they repeatedly vote against their party, there is a very real risk of the party leadership putting sanctions on them (Cox and McCubbins 2005).

Several authors have proposed explanations for party loyalty. Mainwaring and Pérez (1997) cite three reasons for party unity: the institutional factors that influence how legislators are elected, how resources are controlled by the party, and where the party is positioned on spatial issue spectrums. Carey (2007) theorizes that a wide array of institutional factors impact the degree of party loyalty in countries. He also posits that party control over campaign finance resources could lead to changes in party unity, although he never tests this directly (Carey 2007, pp. 93-94). Cox (1987) and Cox and McCubbins (2005) contend that parliamentary institutions motivate legislators to vote congruently, despite having different policy preferences, because of personal and constituent needs. Further, there is a fair amount of debate in the comparative field over whether or not an option for a vote of no confidence leads to more party unity (Bergman 1993; Huber 1996; Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Carey 2007). Finally, authors have argued that party loyalty is simply the natural result of party members voting together because they have the same preferences (Krehbiel 1993) and that legislators, internalizing the importance of party solidarity, have been socialized to vote together (Crowe 1983; Crowe 1986).

A fair amount of previous work within the campaign finance literature has set out to test whether party campaign funding is used as a means to reward party members for past party loyalty and to induce future party loyalty. The ultimate goal of party members is to pass or block particular legislation. In order to achieve this goal, it is critical for party leaders to be able to build disciplined and cohesive coalitions (Rohde 1991). In order to attain discipline, party leaders must have a mechanism to encourage party members to fall in line with party leaders' preferences (Sinclair 1986). Since the majority of party members' activities revolve around efforts to be reelected, it is fair to conclude that this is the primary goal of party members (Mayhew 1974). Due to the strong connection between campaign resources and the ability to attain reelection, party leaders can use their influence over party campaign contributions to pressure party members to vote along party lines (Damore and Hasnford 1999).

While this proposition is logical and seems reasonable, previous research on this subject has reached mixed results. Leyden and Borrelli (1990) looked at whether parties reward past legislator roll-call loyalty with party contributions and whether party contributions lead to future roll-call loyalty. Their data was for members of the House of Representatives and used 1983 roll-call votes to try to predict 1984 party funding and 1984 party funding to try to predict 1985 roll-call votes. Their results were mixed, if not statistically insignificant. According to their Tobit results, past party loyalty resulted in political parties giving their members more funding within the Democratic Party. When looking at the Republican Party however, there was no statistically significant relationship between previous party loyalty and future political party contributions. Their models predicting party loyalty with past funding do not produce statistically significant results.

In an attempt to address some of the shortcomings of Leyden and Borrelli (1990), Cantor and Herrnson (1997) used House of Representatives data from the 1984 and 1992 elections to test the same two relationships about party contributions and legislator roll-call votes. Using a combination of Ordinary Least Squares, log transformations and transformations that set different cut-off points, they found little evidence to support the notion that parties use their campaign assets to reward members for party unity. They did however find that for the Democratic Party, party spending in 1992 led to more party unity. Further, they found that on particularly important votes, Democrats voted with their party more when general electoral assistance increased in the 1984 and 1992 elections. For the Republican Party, party contributions and assistance did not lead to greater unity in 1984 or 1992, and if anything, the relationship was negative. (Cantor and Herrnson 1997).

2.3 Ideology

Scholars within the fields of political science, psychology and sociology have spent decades attempting to explain political ideology. Jost et al. (2009) provides a very comprehensive summary of academic thought on political ideology and how it should be measured. Erikson and Tedin (2003) define political ideology as “a set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved” (Erikson and Tedin 2003, p. 64). Many authors use a similar definition in their own work (Adorno et al. 1950, Campbell et al. 1960/1965, Kerlinger 1984). Other authors, while retaining a very similar conceptualization of political ideology also emphasize the importance of considering the role that social groups play (Parsons 1951; Denzau and North 1994/2000). Ideologies, in a sense, help to communicate

shared beliefs and values of a particular group or demographic and guide individuals' interpretations of how the world currently is and how it should be (Freeden 2001; Knight 2006; Carson et al. 2010).

One of the largest questions and sources of debate amongst researchers of political ideology is whether ideological positions are cognitively organized on a single dimension or multiple (Eysenck 1954/1999; Kerlinger 1984; Eagly & Chaiken 1998; Duckitt 2001; Feldman 2003; Converse 2006). The majority of researchers contend that ideology is ingrained in the memory as a schema – a learned system of interconnected values and beliefs (Hamill et al. 1985; Judd & Krosnick 1989; Fiske et al. 1990; Kinder 1998; Lau & Redlawsk 2001; Erikson & Tedin 2003). There is still a fair amount of disagreement across the social sciences over whether or not these ideological schema's can be condensed down into a single dimension or if individuals use a multidimensional schema when interacting with the world.

Before discussing what previous scholars, particularly within the campaign finance literature, have discovered about ideology, it is important to cover how political scientists have understood the measurement of ideology: through spatial mapping, ideal point estimation and probabilistic voting.

2.3.1 Spatial Models and Ideal Points

Spatial mapping and ideal point estimation, after the groundbreaking work of Poole and Rosenthal (1991, 1997), has been applied to all fifty state legislatures (Wright and Schaffner 2002; Shor and McCarty 2010), U.S. Presidents (McCarty and Poole 1995; Bailey and Chang 2001; Baily 2007), The U.S. Supreme Court (Bailey and Chang 2001; Martin and Quinn 2002;

Bailey 2007) and to non-U.S. entities including foreign legislatures (Londregan 2000b; Morgenstern 2004), the European Parliament (Hix, Noury and Roland 2006) and the U.N. General Assembly (Voeten 2000).

Much of the fixation on ideal point estimation stems from its close ties to theoretical work on legislative politics and decision making (McCarty 2010). Many of the models and paradigmatic foundations of current decision making are based on a spatial representation of preferences (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987; Krehbiel 1998; Cox and McCubbins 2005).

Understanding ideal point estimation is essential for engaging with the literature on the U.S. legislature (McCarty 2010, pp 1-2).

Spatial models assume that policy alternatives can be represented as points in a geometric space; a line, plane or hyperplane. Legislators then have preferences defined over these alternatives. Almost universally, researchers who use spatial models assume these preferences satisfy two properties. The first is single-peakedness. When alternatives are arranged spatially, legislators cannot rank two policies higher than all adjacent alternatives; for all but one policy, there is a better policy nearby. As a result, the legislator's most preferred outcome is a single point called their “ideal point”. The second property is symmetry. If a and b are alternatives represented by two points that are an equal distance from a legislator's ideal point, the legislator does not have a preference for one over the other (McCarty 2010, pp. 3).

Under the symmetry assumption, every roll-call can be characterized by a “cut point” or “cut line” that divides the ideal points of supporters from those of opponents. If voting is based on the spatial preferences of legislators and there is no random element to vote choice, all voting coalitions can be represented in terms of ideal points and cut lines. These properties are essential

for models of ideal point estimation; however, it is worth noting that symmetry and single-peakedness are strong and not always realistic assumptions (McCarty 2010, pp. 4-5).

The primary underlying assumption of the spatial model is that legislators vote *yea* or *nay* depending on which outcome location is closer to their ideal point. It is certainly plausible that a legislator could make a mistake and depart from the expected outcome due to constituent interests, campaign donor pressures, sudden changes in opinion or pure randomness. That said, if we assume that legislators generally vote on the basis of their spatial preferences and that errors are rare, we can directly estimate legislator ideal points from the hundreds, if not thousands, of roll-call choices that legislators make (McCarty 2010, pp. 15).

It is important to keep in mind that when looking at roll-call votes, there is no clear signal that helps researchers place legislators one way or another ideologically. It is inherently an interpretive exercise carried out by the researcher (McCarty 2010, pp. 16).

Another important issue that researchers must address when studying this subject is unanimous votes. Any ordering of legislators and any designation of cut points exterior to the range of ideal points can rationalize these kinds of votes. Therefore, they are uninformative and should not be used when estimating spatial models (McCarty 2010, pp. 17).

2.3.2 Probabilistic Voting

When looking at roll-call votes, there will sometimes be examples of legislators who vote together on a bill despite generally taking opposite positions. It is entirely reasonable to chalk these up to random factors outside of the model. To account for random or stochastic behavior, estimators for spatial models assume that voting is probabilistic (McCarty 2010, pp. 17).

There is a wide array of ways to generate probabilistic voting in a spatial context; however, the ideal point estimation literature has converged on the random utility model. In this model, legislator i with ideal point x_i is assumed to evaluate alternative z_j according to a utility function $U(x_i, z_j)$ plus error term ε_{ij} . Identification of the ideal points and bill locations is sensitive to the specification of the utility function U and the distribution of error terms. Within the range of modeling assumptions found throughout the literature, the differences in estimates are typically small (McCarty 2010, pp. 17-18).

One of the major advantages of probabilistic specification is that cardinal ideal point measures can be obtained whereas deterministic analysis can only produce an ordinal ranking of ideal points. In the random utility framework, the frequency of deviant votes provides additional information about cardinal values of the ideal points. These estimates of nominal ideal points are sensitive to the specification of random process, but this problem is not unique to ideal point estimation; it is generic to the estimation of discrete choice models (McCarty 2010, pp. 18-19).

2.3.3 Multiple Dimensions

There are sometimes situations when legislators who regularly vote in opposite directions vote congruently on a modest number of similar votes, enough so that it is unlikely that they are simply the result of random utility shocks. An alternative explanation can be that there is another dimension on which these legislators are more closely aligned. This can be factored into the model by estimating ideal points on a second dimension. While expanding the model cannot fully explain all votes in large legislative bodies, it does add some explanatory power. The most pressing questions to consider when adding other dimensions is whether higher dimensions can

both substantially explain more behavior and can be interpreted substantively. If not, it may not be advisable to increase dimensionality (McCarty 2010, pp. 19-20).

2.3.4 Ideal Point Estimation

Now that the basics of spatial models, ideal point estimation and probabilistic voting have been conceptually covered, an explanation of how exactly ideal points are measured follows. The proceeding discussion covers measurement in a one-dimensional model; however, expanding the principles to a two-dimensional model is relatively straightforward (McCarty 2010, pp. 20).

As previously discussed, the common framework is a random utility model where the utilities of voting for a particular outcome are based on a deterministic utility function over the location of the outcome and a random component. Let x_i be legislator i 's ideal point, y_j be the spatial location associated with the *yea* outcome on vote j and n_j be the location of the *nay* outcome. Furthermore, let ε_j^y and ε_j^n be random shocks to the utilities respectively of *yea* and *nay*. Therefore, the utilities for voting *yea* and *nay* can be written as

$$U(x_i, y_j) + \varepsilon_j^y$$

$$U(x_i, n_j) + \varepsilon_j^n$$

where it is assumed that U is decreasing in the distance between a legislator's ideal point and the location of the alternative (McCarty 2010, pp. 20-21).

It is also assumed that the utility functions are Bernoulli functions that satisfy the axioms of the von Neuman-Morgenstern theorem.¹ As a result of this assumption, x_i , y_j and n_j can be rescaled without affecting voting behavior. Specifically, ideal point estimates and bill locations

¹ For more information on this, look at McCarty and Meiowitz (2006, pp. 36-37).

are identified only up to a linear transformation. Formally, $x'_i = \alpha + \beta x_i$, $y'_j = \alpha + \beta y_j$ and $n'_j = \alpha + \beta n_j$ all produce identical behavior as x_i , y_j and n_j . This generates a problem because without common legislators or votes, the ideal point estimates of different chambers differ by unobserved scale factors (McCarty 2010, pp. 21).

With a specification of utility functions, the behavioral assumption is that each legislator votes for the outcome that generates the highest utility. Specifying a functional form for random shocks allows for the derivation of choice probabilities and the likelihood function of the observed votes which can be utilized for maximum likelihood or Bayesian estimation. Formally, the model predicts legislator i votes *yea* on roll-call j if and only if

$$U(x_i, y_j) + \varepsilon_j^y \geq U(x_i, n_j) + \varepsilon_j^n$$

$$U(x_i, y_j) - U(x_i, n_j) \geq \varepsilon_j^n - \varepsilon_j^y$$

Let F be the cumulative distribution function of $\varepsilon_j^n - \varepsilon_j^y$, then the probabilities of voting *yea* or *nay* are as shown below (McCarty 2010, pp. 21-22):

$$\Pr(\text{yea}) = F(U(x_i, y_j) - U(x_i, n_j))$$

$$\Pr(\text{nay}) = 1 - F(U(x_i, y_j) - U(x_i, n_j))$$

With the exception of under fairly restrictive modeling choices and assumptions, the likelihood function will be highly non-linear in its parameters. As a result, estimating ideal point models usually requires alternative procedures (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) or Bayesian simulation (Martin and Quinn 2002; Clinton, Jackman and Rivers 2004). The estimation technique used for this paper will follow the example from Poole and Rosenthal (1997), using their NOMINATE scores (McCarty 2010, pp. 22).

2.3.5 Previous Research on Political Ideology

Using a simple left-right model of ideology has withstood empirical testing and benefits theoretically from its parsimonious structure (Campbell et al. 1960/1965; Tomkins 1963; Fuchs & Klingemann 1990; Jacoby 1991; Knutsen 1995; Bobbio 1996; Knight 1999; Benoit & Laver 2006; Jost 2006; Carney et al. 2008). That said, many other scholars animatedly contend that citizen's use a multidimensional ideological framework and that a loss of parsimony is well worth the validity gained with using a more complicated model (Conover & Feldman 1981; Kerlinger 1984; Peffley & Hurwitz 1985; Kinder 1998).

Previous studies have found evidence that suggests that ideological positions on social and cultural issues are distinctly different than positions on economic issues (Lipset 1960; Shafer & Claggett 1995; Evans et al. 1996; Saucier 2000; Duckitt et al. 2002; Layman & Carsey 2002; Stenner 2005). In some cases, researches have even claimed that social and economic ideological dimensions are essentially orthogonal. For example, it is possible to be on the left on one dimension while simultaneously on the right for the other dimension like populists and libertarians are (Zaller 1992, pp. 27). Other work has demonstrated that both ideological dimensions can drive different demographics towards authoritarian right-wing ideologies (Lipset 1960; Napier and Jost 2008b).

It is important to note however that while social and economic ideological dimensions are distinctly different conceptually, when assessed through factor-analysis, ideological positions on social and economic dimensions do tend to be highly correlated. For instance, research has found that both dimensions were positively correlated in 41 out of 44 countries (Benoit and Laver 2006).

While this paper is not trying to explain legislators' ideological positions, it does contend that ideological positions, as manifested through roll-call votes, is an important tool that private donors use when deciding how to invest their independent expenditures.

Although Nokken (2003) was written before several of the landmark campaign finance cases that adjusted the strategic landscape of money in politics and the prevalence of independent expenditures, it still speaks to the influence that ideology may have on funding strategies. The article set out to determine whether the Republican and Democratic parties prioritize contributing their financial resources to ideologically congruent candidates or candidates in competitive races. While acknowledging that previous work has suggested that competitiveness is the main driver of financial assistance, Nokken wanted to study the possible tension that competing incentives for funding may cause in the Senate. Using Poole's (1998) NOMINATE dimensions of ideology and looking at a subset of Senate candidates from 1990 to 2000, he found that competitiveness was the primary determinant of political party contributions in the Senate; ideology had no impact on party campaign spending.

Despite growing academic interest in independent expenditures, the campaign finance literature has not extensively studied how a legislator's ideological position effects the amount of supportive independent expenditures spent on their behalf, especially after 2010. That said, there has been a large body of work done on the spending habits of political action committees (PACs) that provides a helpful foundation for the relationship that ideology has on PAC spending strategies (Bonica 2013). Some authors have contended that candidates are blank slates and sell their legislative services in exchange for campaign contributions (Baron 1994; Ashworth 2006). This position is countered by several authors who claim that PACs have no intention of influencing legislator's ideological positions and instead give contributions to legislators who

support favorable policies and positions (Austen-Smith 1987; Poole, Romer and Rosenthal 1987; McCarty and Poole 1998).

While Bonica (2013) intentionally excludes independent expenditures from his study, he does create an innovative method for placing candidates and political action committees (PACs) on an ideological spectrum using contribution data. He uses this new ideological measurement to demonstrate that while politician's ideal ideological points are bimodal along party lines, PACs ideal ideological points are in the center. Later in the paper, Bonica creates a table with the expected PAC contribution amounts based on a wide array of legislator characteristics. He finds that as candidates move further from the policy center towards the Democrat or Republican means and then to the extremes of either side, they receive less PAC funding. Based on these findings, a centrist candidate should raise \$45,877 more than an identical candidate at the mean ideological position of the Democratic Party and \$69,325 more than an identical candidate at the mean ideological position of the Republican Party. Candidates with more extreme ideological positions than the party means raise even less (Bonica 2013).

Chapter 3: Hypotheses

There are seven hypotheses proposed in this paper. The first three concern the amount of funding that a political party decides to allocate to an incumbent senator's upcoming reelection campaign and the later four concern the amount of independent expenditures spent on behalf of an incumbent senator for their upcoming reelection campaign.

The first hypothesis is that the more competitive a senator's upcoming general election is, the more funding they will directly receive from their respective political party. The second hypothesis is that parties will contribute more funding to incumbent senators who are more loyal to their party and vote more frequently along party lines. Third, political parties prioritize giving funding more to candidates running in competitive elections than they do to candidates who vote along party lines.

The forth hypothesis, following a similar train of thought as the first hypothesis, predicts that private donors will spend more, through independent expenditures, on senators who are in more competitive general elections. The fifth and sixth hypotheses concern the economic/redistributive and social/racial dimensions of a senator's ideology. Both hypotheses predict that the more ideologically extreme they are on these dimensions, whether on the left or the right, the more independent expenditures will be spent on their behalf. While Bonica (2013) suggests that more extreme ideological positions lead to less funding, it seems unlikely that large donors would not invest heavily in candidates unless they wanted a shift from the status quo, more moderate policies. The seventh and last hypothesis is that private donors, through their independent expenditures, will prioritize giving funding to senators in competitive elections more than they will to senators who are closer to the extremes on either ideological dimension.

Chapter 4: Data and Measurement

The data used for the analyses of the previously proposed hypotheses is time-series cross-sectional. The unit of analysis is an individual senator during a single Congressional session. For hypothesis testing involving political party contributions, the time periods included are from the 102nd through 114th Congress (1991-2016). Between these years, the total number of observations is 342, 169 Democrats and 173 Republicans. The hypothesis tests predicting independent expenditures only include the 108th through 114th Congress (2003-2016). This smaller time frame was chosen because, as seen in Figure 4, there were not any independent expenditures, at least in this dataset, until that point. Within this time period, there are 191 observations, 89 Democrats and 92 Republicans. Senators were only included in the dataset if they were an incumbent and were up for reelection during the most imminent election cycle.

These specifications were used for several reasons. First, the measurements of party loyalty and ideology employed in the paper are both dependent on previous roll-call voting records and are hence impossible to ascertain without a previous appointment as a senator. Second, due to the extended period that senators have in between elections, as compared to members of the Lower House, and the fact that most senators only begin receiving funds – direct or independent expenditures spent on their behalf – immediately leading up to their election, including units not imminently up for election would lead to unnecessary noise. Third, previous literature on legislator voting behavior in close proximity to retirement is mixed. Barro (1973) contends that when a legislator is going to retire, they vote more with their own interests or are more likely to sell their votes to the highest bidder. McArthur however found that the threat of reelection had no bearing on whether or not legislators voted for pay raises, possibly indicating

that the prospect of retirement does not have an effect on voting behavior (McArthur 1989). Finally, work by Lott found that near retirement, legislators vote less frequently altogether (Lott 1987a; Lott 1990). In order to get a clearer picture of how political parties and private donors prioritize which candidates to contribute to, reducing the pool of senators included is necessary and appropriate.

Several reputable data sources were utilized for data gathering. All campaign finance data came from the Federal Election Commission. Data on contributions given directly to senators' campaigns is from the "Candidates for Senate" dataset and data on independent expenditures is from the "Independent Expenditures" dataset. Any information on electoral competitiveness, whether for presidential elections, at the state-level, or Senatorial elections, came from David Leip's "US Election Atlas". Measurements of senator ideology (both dimensions) and party loyalty are from the Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database created by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal. State-level population estimates by year are from the U.S. Census Bureau. In order to establish whether or not a candidate ran for the presidency, internet search engines were used in order to try to find articles about the announcement from reputable major news organizations. If no articles were located, it was assumed that the candidate never announced that they were running for president. Information on a senator's age was found either on their personal website or through online searches. Lastly, Senate and House tenure data is from the official Congress website and data on whether a senator was a party leader or whip is from the Senate's official website.

There are two dependent variables, used in separate models, in this paper: the total amount of funding that a political party contributed directly to a senators' campaign and the total amount of independent expenditures spent on the behalf of a senator. Both variables were

restricted to the two years leading up to a senator's election because overtime, that has consistently been the period when the vast majority of direct and indirect funding occurs. They were also limited to spending during the general election only; all primary election data was excluded. Independent expenditures must be filed as being either in support or opposed to a political candidate. The total amount of independent expenditures spent of the behalf of a senator was calculated by adding up the total amount of independent expenditures spent in support of a senator and the total amount of independent expenditures spent in opposition of a senator's challenger.

There are ten independent variables utilized in this paper. In the models predicting the total amount of funding that a political party contributed directly to a senator, eight independent variables were used. The primary variables of interest are the competitiveness of each senator's election and their degree of party loyalty. The models predicting the total amount of independent expenditures spent on behalf of a senator have nine independent variables. In these models the main variables of interest are the competitiveness of each senator's election and two measurements of ideology. Each set of models contains six control variables that could influence the amount of funding and support a senator receives from their political party or through independent expenditures.

4.1 Electoral Competitiveness

In order to assess the causal effect that electoral competitiveness has on the size of contributions from political parties directly to incumbents and on the amount of independent expenditures spent on behalf of incumbent senators, the models cannot directly use the

competitiveness of the senators' general elections. While the difference in vote share between two Senatorial candidates during an election is a reasonable way to assess how close an election is, and hence how competitive it is, because money donated to campaigns can lead to more campaign activity from incumbents and challengers, it can lead to a more competitive race, potentially causing more money to be spent, leading to a cyclical pattern; in short, there is an endogeneity issue. Consequentially, another measurement of competitiveness must be employed.

Senate elections are statewide and candidates must appeal to a majority of the voting population. While their targeted demographic and expected policy breadth is not identical to that of presidential candidates, it is reasonable to assert that competitiveness in each state during presidential elections will be similar to competitiveness for Senate elections, especially when they coincide. Partisan affiliation generally causes voters to be drawn to candidates from similar parties (Mondak 1993) and if the statewide population is divided over the executive, they are likely to be divided over the positions in the legislature.

Based on this reasoning, this paper uses the absolute value of the logged ratio of the Democratic to Republican presidential vote share in each state, during the closest election, as a proxy for Senatorial electoral competitiveness. The equation is as seen below:

$$\text{abslogratdemtorep}_i = \left| \log \left(\frac{\% \text{ of total votes for Democrat}}{\% \text{ of total votes for Republican}} \right) \right|$$

If a senator's election fell on the same year as a presidential election, the presidential vote share in that state was used. If the senator's election was during a year in between presidential elections, the average of the state vote share from the presidential elections before and after this time period was used. The correlation between the absolute value of the logged ratio of the Democratic to Republican presidential vote share and the absolute value of the logged ratio of the Democratic to Republican Senatorial vote share is 0.355 (p-value = 1.915e-11). This

correlation is far from perfect, but it is valid because of the previously discussed similarities between Senate and presidential state constituencies and is a better option than that used elsewhere in the literature (Cantor and Herrnson 1997; Nokken 2003). For this variable, a score of zero would mean that the vote share was identical and the election was as competitive as possible. Because the absolute value was taken, the further a score positively moves away from zero, the less competitive the election was.

4.2 Party Loyalty

In order to assess the causal relationship between a senator's loyalty to their political party and direct campaign contributions from their political party, party loyalty scores from Voteview were used. They were calculated for each Democrat and Republican senator who voted on at least ten party unity votes in Congress. A party unity vote is defined as "one where at least 50 percent of Democrats vote against at least 50 percent of Republicans" (Poole 2015). The scores are in percentiles, ranging from 0 to 100, and are calculated by dividing the total number of party unity votes that a senator voted in agreement with their party by the total number of party unity votes that they voted on.² A score of 100 indicates that a senator voted with their party on all party unity votes and were as loyal as possible. A score of 0 indicates the opposite. The equation can be seen below:

$$\text{nominatepartloy}_i = \frac{\text{total party unity votes in agreement with party}}{\text{total party unity votes participated in}}$$

² The coding scheme mentioned here is technically for Voteview Party Unity Scores; however, in light of the lack of literature from Voteview explicitly on party loyalty scores, it was assumed that a similar coding scheme was used and the words "unity" and "loyalty" are being used interchangeably.

This would mean that if a senator was absent or chose not to vote, the vote was not held against them. This is important to note because as scholars have pointed out, in some systems, not choosing to participate in a vote can effectively serve as a vote against the party if the method of passing legislation is through reaching a raw threshold of votes (Carey 2007).

This measurement of party loyalty is a valid measurement for this concept because, as previously mentioned, the ultimate goal of parties is to pass favorable policies. If a legislator inhibits a party's ability to obtain its objectives, which this is a direct measurement of, it will view the member in an unfavorable light.

4.3 Ideology

The Americanist literature on ideology frequently uses either Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores or DW-NOMINTE scores. ADA scores are created by looking at roll-call votes for twenty votes that ADA, a left leaning organization, deems important. These scores are constructed by dividing the total number of votes cast by legislators that align with the ADA's views by the total twenty votes. Unfortunately, beyond reducing ideology down to a single dimension, ADA scores do not factor in whether or not a legislator was present for a vote. If they do not vote in favor of one of the twenty votes, they are scored as being more conservative, even if the legislator cannot physically vote because they have died during the Congressional session; this happens during the time period included in this dataset.

After reviewing the previous political ideology literature, this paper falls in line with the perspective that ideological positions are multidimensional and will use the two DW-NOMINATE dimensions in order to test whether more extreme ideological positions lead to

more financial support through independent expenditures. The scores on either dimension range from -1 (most liberal position) to 1 (most conservative position). DW-NOMINATE scores for the economic/redistributive dimension (dimension 1) are highly correlated with ADA scores in the dataset used for the paper (0.959; p-value = <2.2e-16); however, the DW-NOMINATE scores for the social/racial dimension (dimension 2) are almost completely uncorrelated (0.064; p-value = 0.2404).

The steps for creating the DW-NOMIANTE scores are complicated and understanding each is crucial for interpretation of the scores. McCarty (2010) provides a very helpful overview of the construction of the model and his summary will be used extensively for the following discussion.

NOMINATE is a model, created by Poole and Rosenthal (1985), used for estimating legislator ideal points from a probabilistic spatial voting model, concepts covered in Chapter 2. At its earliest and simplest stage, the static version of the model employs a probabilistic voting model. It hinges on the assumption that the utility of an alternative option z for a legislator with an ideal point x can be quantified as follows:

$$U(x, z) = \beta \exp\left[-\frac{(x-z)^2}{2}\right]$$

Further, it assumes that random shocks are distributed in accordance to the Type1 extreme value distribution. β is the “signal-to-noise” ratio or the weight on the deterministic portion of the utility function. Under these previously stated assumptions, $\varepsilon_j^n - \varepsilon_j^y$ is distributed logistically and

$$\text{Pr(yea)} = \frac{\exp[U(x_i, y_j)]}{\exp[U(x_i, y_j)] + \exp[U(x_i, n_j)]}$$

The utility function used in NOMIANTE is bell-shaped, having the same shape as the density of a normal distribution. Poole and Rosenthal (1985) transform the model so the roll-call

parameters y and n are substituted with a cut point parameter $m = \frac{y+n}{2}$ and a distance parameter

$$d = \frac{y-n}{2} \text{ (McCarty 2010, pp. 22-23).}$$

It is important to note that this exponential form would imply that legislators will be essentially indifferent between two alternatives that are very distant from their ideal point; in the tails, the utilities converge to zero. This is very different than the implications of the quadratic utility function that is frequently used in the applied theoretical literature and more recent models for estimating ideal points: $U(x, z) = -(x, z)^2$. When using quadratic functions, the difference in utilities between two alternatives widens at an increasing rate as the alternatives get further from the ideal point. It is not comforting to know that the identification of y and n depends on the choice of function; however, while the estimates of d are not as robust, the cut point m is estimated precisely (McCarty 2010, pp. 23-24).

Later on, Poole and Rosenthal (1997) extended the previously mentioned static model to a dynamic model, D-NOMINATE, and estimate the ideal point of almost every legislator from 1789 to 1986 and the parameters associated with nearly every roll-call. The main leverage used for establishing comparability was that many legislators serve several terms and Congress never turns over fully at one time, creating overlapping cohorts that can be utilized for comparability purposes. Poole and Rosenthal use the assumption that each individual legislator's ideal point moves as a polynomial function of their time served, although they find that a linear trend for each individual senator suffices (McCarty 2010, pp. 24-25).

D-NOMINATE creates a scale for comparison overtime; however, it is crucial to be cautious with how much weight is put on those comparisons. Despite the fact that the model can constrain the movements of individual legislators over time, there is nothing constraining the substance of the policy agenda from moving. Being "liberal" or "conservative" means different

things in different eras so researchers have to interpret NOMINATE scores within each specific policy “era” (McCarty 2010, pp. 25).

Interestingly, Poole and Rosenthal find that overall, legislative voting is explained very well by low dimension spatial models. Outside of two eras, a single dimension explains the majority of legislative voting decisions. Across all Congresses studied, the single dimension model correctly predicts 83% of the vote choices. The authors contend that this dimension can be described as arguments about the role of the federal government, particularly with economic issues (McCarty 2010, pp. 25-26).

A two-dimensional version of the D-NOMINATE model explains 87% of the vote choices, a 4% increase from the one-dimensional model (McCarty 2010, pp. 26). This possibly explains why the economic/redistributive dimension was so highly correlated with the ADA scores, but the social/racial dimension was not. That said, there are particular periods where the social/racial dimension was more salient, specifically from the end of WWII to the 1960s when racial and civil rights issues formed legislator cleavages outside of economic issues (McCarty 2010, pp. 26).

D-NOMINATE assumes that legislators give equal weight to each policy dimension. As a result, the importance of a dimension is reflected by the variation of ideal points and bill locations along said dimension. The variation of ideal points increases with the salience of the dimension. Alternatively, another approach is to fix the variation of ideal points and bill locations, allowing for the weight that legislators put on each dimension to vary; W-NOMINATE does just that (McCarty 2010, pp. 26-27)

Finally, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (1997) created a dynamic version of W-NOMINATE. Beyond the distinct weights for each dimension, DW-NOMINATE differs from

D-NOMINATE in that the stochastic component of the utility function is based on a normal distribution, rather than the Type II extreme value (McCarty 2010, pp. 27).

There are a couple rules that Keith Poole has stressed for proper application and use of his dataset. While DW-NOMINATE scores for one Congress can be directly compared to scores from another Congress, these comparisons should only be made between Congresses that occurred during periods of American history with a stable two-party system (“Description of NOMINATE Data” 2004). Furthermore, DW-NOMINATE scores cannot be compared between the Senate and the House of Representatives.

It is important to note that while the hypothesis tests run for the Republican and Democratic parties separately used the raw DW-NOMIANTE score for each legislator, when conducting hypothesis tests including both parties, the absolute value of a legislator’s DW-NOMINATE scores were used. This was done in order to avoid the possibility that independent expenditures spent along partisan lines would end up skewing the results toward zero and would not lead to any informative conclusions.

DW-NOMINATE scores are a valid measurement for ideology. As demonstrated by McCarty’s (2010) detailed discussion of spatial mapping, ideal point estimation and probabilistic voting in addition to the evolution of NOMIANTE scores, these measurements are both methodologically rigorous and theoretically sound. Furthermore, they are used pervasively throughout the political science literature. As an example of how profoundly influential the work of Poole and Rosenthal is, their 1997 book has 3,367 citations documented by Google Scholar.

4.4 Control Variables

Six control variables are included for models predicting direct political party contributions and independent expenditures spent on behalf of senators. The first is a senator's tenure and the second is the number of years that a senator spent in the House of Representatives. Previous scholars have found that increases in tenure tend to increase name recognition and incumbency advantages, reducing the need for party funding and presumably support through independent expenditures (Erikson 1972; Burnham 1974; Mayhew 1974; Ferejohn 1977; Fiorina 1977; Fiorina 1978; Cox and Katz 1996). This paper predicts that the previously found trends will continue with this data. The third control variable is a dummy variable for whether a senator was the party leader or whip for either the majority or minority party. Following the same logic as the predictions with tenure, this variable will probably lead to political parties and private donors spending less directly or indirectly on a senator because their name recognition will help reduce the level of competitiveness in their elections. While age is often related to the tenure of a legislator, the two are not the same. For this reason, this fourth control variable is necessary. Several scholars have found that contributions and expenditures can be used as a long-term investment in a legislator. This may lead to younger legislators getting more funding and support (Snyder 2002). Another attribute that could impact party funding and supportive independent expenditures is whether a legislator runs for president. Parties and private donors may want to encourage a legislator to run through large amounts of financial support, which can cause legislators, who at some point indicate that they want to make a run for the presidency, to receive more direct or indirect funding. This fifth control is coded as a dummy variable for whether or not a legislator publicly stated that they were going to run for president. The sixth and last

variable is an estimate of the state population when a senator runs for reelection. Previous literature indicates that larger states may make running campaigns more expensive because a larger number of citizens need to be reached and this could skew results (Nokken, 2003).

4.5 Models

In order to test the seven hypotheses contended in this paper, hierarchical Bayesian regression models were utilized. As previously stated, because of the different campaign finance laws in effect throughout the dataset and the rise in campaign spending in general, it is essential to look at results using a hierarchical model so that effects can be observed for each Congress. Due to the limited sample size within each Congressional session, simulation was necessary. A Gibbs sampler, which is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm that obtains observations that are approximated from a specified multivariate probability distribution, was used for this purpose (Link and Eaton 2011). Below are the two models. The first model is identical for predicting political party funding for Democrats, Republicans or both parties combined. It was run with 400,000 iterations, a burn.in of 10,000 and a thinning interval of 20. However, for the second model, as previously stated, the two measurements of ideology (nominatedim1 and nominatedim2) are measured from -1 to 1 when looking at individual parties, but the absolute values of these scores are used when looking at both parties combined. This model was run with 800,000 iterations, a burn.in of 40,000 and a thinning interval of 40.

$$\text{partyfunding}_i = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{abslogratdemtorep}_i + \beta_2 \text{nominatepartloy}_i + \beta_3 \text{senatetenure}_i + \beta_4 \text{housetenure}_i + \beta_5 \text{leadership}_i + \beta_6 \text{agebyend}_i + \beta_7 \text{presidentialcandidate}_i + \beta_8 \text{statepop}_i + E_i$$

$$\text{ietotalsupport}_i = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{abslogratdemtorep}_i + \beta_2 \text{nominatedim1}_i + \beta_3 \text{nominatedim2}_i + \\ \beta_4 \text{senatetenure}_i + \beta_5 \text{housetenure}_i + \beta_6 \text{leadership}_i + \beta_7 \text{agebyend}_i + \\ \beta_8 \text{presidentialcandidate}_i + \beta_9 \text{statepop}_i + E_i$$

Chapter 5: Results

Bayesian results, particularly in a hierarchical model setting, can be difficult to interpret. The following tables will be structured with six headings: congress, mean, sd, odds > 0 , hpd lower and hpd upper. Further, the numbers seen for the mean, sd, hpd lower and hpd upper are all dollar amounts. The column for congress refers to a particular Congressional session. Because these results are hierarchical, the results should be interpreted for each individual session. The column mean shows the posterior mean for the variable of interest. These should be interpreted as the effect that a one-unit change in the independent variable has on the dependent variable, similar to the interpretation seen in regression models with frequentist assumptions. For example, the first row in Table 1 has a posterior mean of -72.26. This means that for the 102nd Congress, a one-unit change in electoral competitiveness (moving from extremely competitive to extremely uncompetitive) will result in the Republican Party giving a candidate \$72.26 less than the “base rate”, which is synonymous with the intercept in a frequentist setting. The sd refers to the standard deviation and because Bayesian frameworks use probabilities instead of p-values, the column odds > 0 shows the probability that the posterior mean in that row is greater than zero. Lastly, again instead of the well known p-value and stars associated with frequentist statistics, in Bayesian statistics, credible intervals are used; in this case specifically Highest Posterior Density Intervals. These provide an upper and lower bound (hpd upper and hpd lower respectively) that are used to determine whether a result can be taken with confidence. If a posterior mean falls between these two values that the researchers calculates based on the percent credible interval they choose, the researcher can be confident that the results are significant. In this case, the

credible interval is set at 95%, meaning that if a posterior mean falls between the hpd upper and hpd lower boundaries, we can interpret the results with 95% confidence.

5.1 Political Party Contributions

Confirming the findings of previous scholars (Leyden and Borrelli 1990; Cantor and Herrnson 1997; Bianco 1999; Nokken 2003), the posterior means for the effect that changes in electoral competitiveness have on the amount of money that a political party contributes to a senator's campaign are much larger than those of non-electoral variables. Tables 1-3 show the posterior means for the effect that a one-unit change in the absolute logged ratio of the Democratic to Republican presidential vote share in the closest election has on how much political parties contribute to Senatorial campaigns. While there are a few exceptions, in general, whether looking at contributions among the Republican Party, Democratic Party or a combination of the two, as elections move towards being more uncompetitive, parties give less funding. As previously mentioned, based on the hypotheses contended in this paper, an increase in the absolute logged ratio of the Democratic to Republican presidential vote share would make the elections less competitive because a value of zero would indicate a tie between presidential candidates. This explains the negative direction of the means.

Despite the fact that these results in Tables 1-3 all fall within the upper and lower bounds of the Highest Posterior Density Intervals and thus should be taken with a high degree of confidence, it is important to note that the magnitude of the effect is not very large. A one-unit change in the logged ratio of the Democratic to Republican presidential vote share would be a massive shift from an extremely competitive election to an extremely uncompetitive election; the

largest value for this variable in the dataset is only 0.469. Furthermore, while the first hypothesis of this paper predicts negative directionality for the posterior means of Tables 1-3, and the results generally reflect that, for some of the negative posterior means, the odds that the value is greater than zero is close to fifty percent.

Table 1: Republican Party – Electoral Competitiveness and Party Contributions

<i>congress</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>odds > 0</i>	<i>hpd lower</i>	<i>hpd upper</i>
102	-72.26	30130.00	0.50	-67584.93	63748.19
103	-474.10	28380.00	0.50	-63457.23	61830.81
104	971.20	30200.00	0.51	-68280.89	64159.17
105	-3880.00	27590.00	0.45	-66669.62	52102.85
106	-4862.00	25680.00	0.44	-64442.14	46185.40
107	-8752.00	27180.00	0.39	-72468.78	39970.84
108	-2631.00	25550.00	0.47	-59616.84	51385.57
109	-6761.00	28860.00	0.42	-75093.03	49897.26
110	-7381.00	29610.00	0.42	-73438.92	51546.30
111	-6018.00	28630.00	0.43	-70914.90	50804.38
112	-2009.00	25900.00	0.47	-58223.04	54546.74
113	-5866.00	26690.00	0.42	-67727.65	47838.09
114	-3864.00	26470.00	0.46	-66524.46	48655.62

Table 2: Democratic Party – Electoral Competitiveness and Party Contributions

<i>congress</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>odds > 0</i>	<i>hpd lower</i>	<i>hpd upper</i>
102	-889.70	26930.00	0.49	-60954.49	54558.11
103	-7623.00	26660.00	0.40	-64246.57	47828.11
104	2246.00	26290.00	0.53	-56659.15	56797.29
105	-13990.00	29250.00	0.33	-79847.13	38372.31
106	-10010.00	26740.00	0.37	-70471.84	39580.67
107	-783.00	23830.00	0.49	-52284.14	49967.78
108	608.70	25670.00	0.51	-55088.99	53743.61
109	1271.00	24980.00	0.52	-52029.44	54190.93
110	-8609.00	25730.00	0.38	-67146.92	40405.83
111	-8015.00	23750.00	0.38	-60831.61	37819.36
112	-29700.00	32340.00	0.15	-97902.62	17322.27
113	3674.00	24860.00	0.56	-47297.20	57662.40
114	-20570.00	29840.00	0.24	-89092.67	25087.96

Table 3: Both Parties – Electoral Competitiveness and Party Contributions

<i>congress</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>odds > 0</i>	<i>hpd lower</i>	<i>hpd upper</i>
102	-634.70	23160.00	0.49	-48019.20	53573.62
103	-2427.00	21670.00	0.47	-50112.51	43018.48
104	893.40	22150.00	0.52	-48207.95	49050.60
105	-5849.00	22300.00	0.41	-57587.63	37250.37
106	-6732.00	20860.00	0.39	-55928.71	31004.43
107	-7764.00	21220.00	0.37	-58414.07	28822.36
108	-3763.00	20030.00	0.44	-48678.82	37947.86
109	-7991.00	22220.00	0.38	-60527.78	31676.23
110	-9868.00	23720.00	0.36	-64135.31	32005.96
111	-6494.00	21170.00	0.40	-55991.74	33945.08
112	-10680.00	22210.00	0.33	-63158.82	25699.93
113	-5076.00	20290.00	0.42	-51754.92	33923.09
114	-7688.00	22110.00	0.39	-58405.81	32586.14

There also does not appear to be a clear difference in trends when comparing posterior means before or after the 2010 rulings, which occurred during the 111th Congress. This would indicate that, based on this data, political parties did not drastically alter their funding strategies in light on new regulations on independent expenditures.

The results for party loyalty are very mixed. Tables 4-6 show that the posterior means for the effect that a one-unit change in party loyalty has on the amount of direct contributions that a political party gives a Senatorial candidate is sometimes positive and sometimes negative with no distinguishable trend over time or by party. These are highly non-intuitive findings. It is not clear why a political party would give a candidate less money for helping them achieve their legislative goals.

Beyond having varied directionality, the effect sizes are also relatively small. For example, when looking at the 102nd Congress for the Republican Party in Table 4, moving from being completely loyal to the Republican Party (a score of 100) to not being loyal at all (a score of zero) would only lead to a total political contribution difference of \$59.00. By the 114th

Congress, the size of the effect has grown much larger, but it still makes up a very small proportion of the total funding senators receive from and outside of their party. All of the results are within the upper and lower bounds of the Highest Posterior Density Intervals.

In addition to varied directionality by Congress, pre and post 2010 trends are mixed. There does appear to be an overall increase in the magnitude of the posterior means starting during the 111th Congress, seen especially when combining parties in Table 6; however, the effect as stated earlier is still small and inconsistent.

Table 4: Republican Party – Party Loyalty and Party Contributions

<i>congress</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>odds > 0</i>	<i>hpd lower</i>	<i>hpd upper</i>
102	-0.59	77.78	0.50	-166.44	171.00
103	8.04	79.11	0.53	-162.31	183.87
104	1.64	75.24	0.51	-169.64	157.70
105	-18.99	78.66	0.41	-198.58	136.73
106	-6.77	73.67	0.47	-175.10	139.57
107	12.47	77.06	0.56	-148.81	182.01
108	-27.67	81.85	0.38	-206.18	134.06
109	7.49	78.46	0.53	-151.43	188.25
110	-0.06	76.95	0.50	-166.64	167.22
111	-16.74	78.80	0.43	-198.83	137.05
112	-11.22	84.21	0.46	-209.68	146.57
113	-22.60	83.42	0.40	-211.97	138.26
114	68.56	102.80	0.76	-81.07	300.23

Table 5: Democratic Party – Party Loyalty and Party Contributions

<i>congress</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>odds > 0</i>	<i>hpd lower</i>	<i>hpd upper</i>
102	0.84	34.53	0.51	-74.97	73.25
103	-2.77	34.11	0.47	-80.49	66.95
104	0.19	36.48	0.50	-78.36	79.40
105	0.83	35.38	0.51	-73.45	81.11
106	-8.83	36.31	0.42	-93.68	58.88
107	3.54	34.04	0.54	-70.34	78.68
108	8.25	35.30	0.58	-60.15	89.94
109	-2.51	35.18	0.48	-82.16	69.46
110	-5.61	36.39	0.45	-87.64	68.20
111	5.10	35.49	0.55	-70.39	80.45
112	-0.50	34.65	0.50	-77.26	73.52
113	-7.75	34.93	0.43	-86.35	61.82
114	-7.48	37.19	0.43	-93.29	63.97

Table 6: Both Parties – Party Loyalty and Party Contributions

<i>congress</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>odds > 0</i>	<i>hpd lower</i>	<i>hpd upper</i>
102	-1.85	46.09	0.50	-103.15	93.74
103	-1.85	46.43	0.49	-101.24	97.04
104	-0.18	46.43	0.50	-102.86	97.62
105	-6.11	46.23	0.46	-110.96	88.22
106	-9.61	47.28	0.43	-116.86	82.28
107	7.23	46.59	0.55	-83.03	114.51
108	-10.75	47.47	0.42	-118.71	82.00
109	-0.44	46.70	0.50	-98.06	105.26
110	-5.32	46.74	0.46	-112.08	90.82
111	-6.38	48.03	0.45	-112.10	92.45
112	-12.44	49.22	0.42	-127.06	80.38
113	-14.87	48.43	0.39	-128.52	71.65
114	39.59	64.29	0.74	-53.14	187.09

5.2 Independent Expenditures

With the exception of one year for Republican Senatorial incumbents, the posterior means shown in Tables 7-9 indicate a very strong relationship between electoral competitiveness

and the amount of independent expenditures spent on senators' behalf. As with Tables 1-3, because the most competitive election possible would result in a value of zero, a one-unit increase would result in a drastically less competitive election, explaining the negative direction. Again, it is important to note that when using the absolute logged ratio of Democratic to Republican presidential vote share, none of the elections in the data set had a score close to one (which would have been extremely uncompetitive). That said, the magnitude of the effect indicated by these posterior means remains very large and all are within the upper and lower bounds of the Highest Posterior Density Intervals. For many of the posterior means, there are very low odds that the effect is greater than zero, providing further support for the fourth hypothesis.

When looking at the posterior means for members of either individual party (Tables 7-8), there does not appear to be any consistent trends before or after the 111th Congress. That said, when looking at the posterior means from the dataset with both parties (Table 9), there is a clear increase in effect size starting in the 112th Congress.

Table 7: Republican Party – Electoral Competitiveness and Independent Expenditures

<i>congress</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>odds > 0</i>	<i>hpd lower</i>	<i>hpd upper</i>
108	-1883000.00	11380000.00	0.43	-24716472.00	21219707.00
109	-6366000.00	13440000.00	0.32	-33801459.00	20533029.00
110	-2951000.00	15260000.00	0.43	-34174972.00	27894739.00
111	1652000.00	14930000.00	0.54	-27452089.00	33612265.00
112	-8417000.00	13540000.00	0.27	-37649094.00	15839529.00
113	-755600.00	13850000.00	0.48	-28535684.00	28134926.00
114	-35610000.00	20140000.00	0.02	-71055575.00	1774528.00

Table 8: Democratic Party – Electoral Competitiveness and Independent Expenditures

<i>congress</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>odds > 0</i>	<i>hpd lower</i>	<i>hpd upper</i>
108	-2233000.00	14130000.00	0.44	-31002730.00	26826718.00
109	-1713000.00	14400000.00	0.45	-31495278.00	27700672.00
110	-2485000.00	14190000.00	0.43	-31859830.00	26158516.00
111	-13150000.00	14400000.00	0.18	-43223542.00	11792540.00
112	-13730000.00	13620000.00	0.15	-41235143.00	10004423.00
113	-31190000.00	22620000.00	0.06	-73703944.00	5221305.00
114	-3549000.00	14270000.00	0.40	-33242907.00	25236191.00

Table 9: Both Parties – Electoral Competitiveness and Independent Expenditures

<i>congress</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>odds > 0</i>	<i>hpd lower</i>	<i>hpd upper</i>
108	-1227000.00	10890000.00	0.45	-22739918.00	19998114.00
109	-8335000.00	12680000.00	0.26	-33536601.00	16245132.00
110	-3037000.00	14430000.00	0.41	-32459432.00	23971319.00
111	-5273000.00	12510000.00	0.34	-29634441.00	19505206.00
112	-16750000.00	11610000.00	0.07	-39868616.00	5846253.00
113	-20370000.00	13680000.00	0.07	-47359143.00	6260212.00
114	-58140000.00	12810000.00	0.00	-82074321.00	-31860884.00

As with party loyalty in Tables 4-6, the results for either dimension of ideology are mixed, if not pointing in the opposite direction than hypothesized. Tables 10-12 show the posterior means for the effect that a one-unit shift in ideological positions on economic and redistributive policies has on the amount of independent expenditures spent on behalf of a senator. When looking at the means within the Republican Party (Table 10), the results are counterintuitive. The ideological scores in DW-NOMINATE are on a scale from -1 to 1, as liberal as possible to most conservative. The results in Table 10 would indicate that as Republican's ideological stances on economic and redistributive policies become more conservative, they generally get less financial support through independent expenditures. The results for the Democratic Party (Table 11) are just as perplexing. The means indicate that as senators become more conservative they generally receive more support through independent

expenditures, not less. The results from the dataset with both political parties (Table 12) are very interesting. Overall, these results would indicate that moving further away from a moderate position, since this specific variable is the absolute value of a senator's economic/redistributive ideological position, leads to less financial support through independent expenditures. Despite the fact that these means are within the upper and lower bounds of the Highest Posterior Density Intervals, the only trend that these results may suggest is that having a more moderate economic/redistributive position leads to more financial support through independent expenditures. These findings and conclusions would support the results of Bonica (2013).

Table 10: Republican Party – Ideology (Dimension 1) and Independent Expenditures

<i>congress</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>odds > 0</i>	<i>hpd lower</i>	<i>hpd upper</i>
108	-1097000.00	5791000.00	0.43	-14728181.00	10156350.00
109	-326300.00	5337000.00	0.48	-12140889.00	11012128.00
110	-1071000.00	5573000.00	0.43	-13592405.00	10333710.00
111	-2250000.00	5568000.00	0.36	-15180020.00	7862639.00
112	1061000.00	4577000.00	0.58	-8547490.00	10891209.00
113	-765100.00	6177000.00	0.46	-14986634.00	11626563.00
114	4691000.00	6086000.00	0.79	-4393619.00	18433768.00

Table 11: Democratic Party – Ideology (Dimension 1) and Independent Expenditures

<i>congress</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>odds > 0</i>	<i>hpd lower</i>	<i>hpd upper</i>
108	1155000.00	7719000.00	0.55	-14981177.00	18610425.00
109	989100.00	6734000.00	0.55	-12980602.00	16080505.00
110	1122000.00	8100000.00	0.55	-16458447.00	18982701.00
111	693300.00	8081000.00	0.52	-16249356.00	18943060.00
112	-1693000.00	6563000.00	0.41	-16595826.00	11268033.00
113	3934000.00	7994000.00	0.67	-9176911.00	23089327.00
114	1476000.00	8014000.00	0.56	-15672350.00	19234328.00

Table 12: Both Parties – Ideology (Dimension 1) and Independent Expenditures

<i>congress</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>odds > 0</i>	<i>hpd lower</i>	<i>hpd upper</i>
108	-2556000.00	7786000.00	0.37	-18551739.00	12919066.00
109	-700600.00	6642000.00	0.46	-14910885.00	12153907.00
110	-2556000.00	7163000.00	0.36	-16539417.00	12422917.00
111	-5522000.00	6762000.00	0.20	-19119119.00	7267613.00
112	2783000.00	7309000.00	0.65	-11807490.00	17667182.00
113	-8453000.00	8062000.00	0.14	-25111187.00	5808169.00
114	13430000.00	7552000.00	0.97	-866809.00	27106484.00

When assessing the effect that ideological positions on social and racial issues have on independent expenditures, the results are just as counterintuitive as those seen in Tables 10-12. Below, the results in Tables 13 would suggest that within the Republican Party, initially, having conservative social and racial views led to higher amounts of independent expenditures; however, starting in the 111th Congress, the direction of the relationship flipped. Interestingly, within the Democratic Party (Table 14), for every session except for one, more conservative ideological positions on social and racial issues led to more independent expenditures. As with the results from the first ideological dimension (Tables 10-12), when looking at data combining both parties in Table 15, it appears that moving further away from moderate positions leads to less supportive uncoordinated expenditures, again reaffirming the conclusion of Bonica (2013). The results were all well within the upper and lower bounds of the Highest Posterior Density Intervals. For many of the posterior means shown in Tables 10-15, the probabilities that the results were greater than zero hovered around the fifty percent mark.

There is not a great deal of evidence that there are pre and post 2010 trends with either ideological dimension. The directionality of the effect of the economic/redistributive dimension shown in Tables 10-12 becomes mixed starting in the 111th Congress and the only pre versus post 2010 change seen with the effect of the social/racial dimension shown in Tables 13-15 is

that for the Republican Party (Table 13) specifically, the directionality reverses starting in the 111th Congress.

While not shown, the posterior means for the control variables were generally in the directions expected, with the exception of the dummy variable for a Senatorial incumbent who runs for president at some point throughout their career. Overall, if a senator ran for president throughout their career, they ended up receiving far fewer direct donations from their political party and much less support through independent expenditures. This is probably due to the fact that if a senator runs for president, they already have the name recognition necessary to create separation between their vote share and their competitor's vote share without the need of large fundraising efforts.

Table 13: Republican Party – Ideology (Dimension 2) and Independent Expenditures

<i>congress</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>odds > 0</i>	<i>hpd lower</i>	<i>hpd upper</i>
108	179000.00	2569000.00	0.52	-5686792.00	5559343.00
109	509700.00	2656000.00	0.57	-4719150.00	6783247.00
110	90310.00	2811000.00	0.51	-6243371.00	6180650.00
111	-638400.00	2776000.00	0.42	-7262627.00	4729937.00
112	-1013000.00	3350000.00	0.40	-8886702.00	5057927.00
113	-207600.00	3037000.00	0.48	-7467379.00	5769144.00
114	-270000.00	2704000.00	0.46	-6306763.00	5416249.00

Table 14: Democratic Party – Ideology (Dimension 2) and Independent Expenditures

<i>congress</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>odds > 0</i>	<i>hpd lower</i>	<i>hpd upper</i>
108	424700.00	3816000.00	0.54	-7016095.00	8544501.00
109	68470.00	3084000.00	0.51	-6080309.00	6225750.00
110	-227800.00	3716000.00	0.48	-7652427.00	7367933.00
111	1763000.00	4035000.00	0.67	-5892319.00	10317781.00
112	787400.00	4326000.00	0.57	-8078656.00	9616143.00
113	9667000.00	5178000.00	0.98	-329918.10	18634659.80
114	770300.00	6292000.00	0.54	-11835920.00	14141750.00

Table 15: Both Parties – Ideology (Dimension 2) and Independent Expenditures

<i>congress</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>sd</i>	<i>odds > 0</i>	<i>hpd lower</i>	<i>hpd upper</i>
108	-360800.00	2545000.00	0.45	-6220261.00	4815594.00
109	-480100.00	2527000.00	0.44	-6245829.00	4753700.00
110	-237000.00	2723000.00	0.47	-6288635.00	5693983.00
111	-50550.00	2585000.00	0.49	-5786222.00	5500630.00
112	-322200.00	3082000.00	0.47	-7700416.00	5760494.00
113	-1249000.00	3024000.00	0.35	-8085741.00	4388402.00
114	948700.00	2939000.00	0.61	-4582756.00	7744872.00

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Overall, these findings support the hypotheses that electoral competitiveness is the main determinant for how political parties allocate their contributions and private donors decide to spend money through independent expenditures. Overwhelmingly, the results in Tables 1-3 and Tables 7-9 suggest that as elections move towards being less competitive, senator's get less financial help. Furthermore, as hypothesized, the size of the effect of competitiveness was larger for political party contributions than party loyalty and was larger for independent expenditures than either dimension of ideology.

The results for party loyalty did not show a clear direction or trend overtime when looking at either individual political party. Only when combining parties into one analysis was there relatively consistent downward directionality. Beyond the surprisingly small effect size, the conclusion that being more loyal to a political party would result in the party financially assisting a senator less is puzzling.

Both dimensions of ideology produced findings that ran counter to my hypotheses. The results in Tables 10-12 would indicate that Republicans receive less independent expenditure support as they become more economically conservative and Democrats receive more support as they become more economically conservative. The results from the combined dataset suggest that economic moderates from both parties receive the most independent expenditure support. Tables 13-15 showed that while being socially/racially conservative used to lead to Republicans garnering more independent expenditure support, for close to the last decade, the trend has reversed. Further, being more socially/racially conservative leads to more independent expenditure support for Democrats. Again, as with economic/redistributive ideological

dimension, it appears that being a moderate leads to more independent expenditure financial support. These findings strongly support Bonica (2013) and his assertion that the ideological position of PACs is very moderate in comparison to most legislators.

Besides the pre and post 2010 posterior mean magnitude changes for the effect that electoral competitiveness has on the total amount of independent expenditures spent in support of a candidate, as seen in Tables 7-9, there were not any overwhelmingly clear differences indicated by the results that support the notion that political parties nor private donors changed their fund allocation strategies in light of the 2010 rulings.

The findings of this paper highlight the importance of using hierarchical models when studying campaign finance. Not only were the tables able to highlight the generally increasing amount of money being spent on political campaigns, they were also able to reveal changes in directionality between Congressional sessions. As with all time-series work, scholars cannot and should not assume that everything remains the same over time; there are often overarching trends that need to be accounted for. Especially, with some of the campaign finance law changes in 2010, future work on this subject needs to take temporal components into account.

Due to the small sample size inherent in studying senators, having a simulation-based model, as used here, can help researchers get a clearer picture of the relationships between variables without having to sacrifice confidence. These techniques may be useful when extending this work to state-level studies or an international setting where governing institutions may be made up of a small number of legislators.

It is important to highlight that while the research and data collection used for this paper was carried out in a consistent and meticulous fashion, with a dataset as large as that within the FEC, there is certainly a possibility that there are data errors, due to my own potential

computational errors or that of the FEC. If future researchers want to use this paper and expand upon it, it is crucial to note that replications will almost certainly not align due to the fact that the results depend on simulation and that the FEC may correct any potential discrepancies within their dataset.

Future work on the subject of political party contributions and independent expenditures should focus on a more theoretical explanation for why non-electoral factors play such a small role in determining where funding and financial support is disbursed. Political scientists, since the work of Downs (1957) have contended and routinely found that electoral factors and the ability to secure seats is the predominant concern of parties. However, without the ability to pass meaningful legislation, whether through party loyalty or by promoting legislators with ideological positions that align with the party leaders', attaining control over legislatures seems to be an unnecessarily demanding task and a waste of resources.

Previous literature has also made use of different measurements of electoral competitiveness that could have lead to different results. While the proxy used in this paper was relatively correlated with the competitiveness of Senate elections, using the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* measurements of seat vulnerability as done by Nokken (2003) or the previous margin of victory as done by Leyden and Borrelli (1990) should be done in the future, with the framework provided in this paper, for a comparison.

Furthermore, there has also been a fair amount of work conducted on roll-call differences based on gender (Swers 1990; Hogan 2008). It would be interesting and substantively important to explore this literature more and how it relates to political funding strategies. Especially in light of the recent push for more female political representation, it will be interesting to see if political parties and donors prioritize funding women and whether parties differ in this regard.

Lastly, as highlighted by Herrnson (1986), it is important to consider how these results fit within a comparative framework. Democracies all across the world use a wide array of different campaign systems with a plethora of rules and regulations regarding campaign fund raising and spending. It is essential that scholars turn their attention to other comparable countries and see if party loyalty and ideology matter more in other settings or if electoral competitiveness remains as the predominant focus of parties. Other institutional differences, such as open and closed list systems, may drastically change the calculation that political parties and private donors make and exploring this arena is essential. While not comparative in nature, hopefully this paper may serve as a foundation for scholars to explore these relationships in a wider array of settings.

Bibliography

- Abramowitz, Alan. I., and Jeffery A. Segal. 1992. *Senate Elections*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Adorno, Theodor. W., Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford. 1950. *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harper.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 2000. "Campaign War Chests in Congressional Elections." *Business and Politics* 2.1 (April): 9–33.
- Ashworth, Scott. 2006. "Campaign Finance and Voter Welfare with Entrenched Incumbents." *American Political Science Review* 100.1 (February): 55–68.
- Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
- Austin-Smith, David. 1987. "Interest Groups, Campaign Contributions, and Probabilistic Voting." *Public Choice* 54.2 (January): 123-139.
- Bailey, Michael. 2007. "Comparable Preference Estimates across Time and Institutions for the Court, Congress and Presidency." *American Journal of Political Science* 51.3 (June): 433-448.
- Bailey, Michael, and Kelly Chang. 2001. "Comparing Presidents, Senators, and Publications Justices: Interinstitutional Preference Estimation." *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 17.2 (October): 477-506.
- Baron, David. P. 1994. "Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters." *American Political Science Review* 88.1 (March): 33–47.
- Barro, Robert. J. 1973. "The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model." *Public Choice* 14 (Spring): 19-42.
- Benoit, Kenneth, and Michael Laver. 2006. *Party Policy in Modern Democracies*. London: Routledge.
- Bergman, Torbjörn. 1993. "Formation rules and minority governments." *European Journal of Political Research* 23.1 (January): 55-66.
- Bianco, William. T. 1999. "Party Campaign Committees and the Distribution of Tally Program Funds." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 24.3 (August): 451-469.

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA, McCain–Feingold Act, Pub.L. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81, enacted March 27, 2002, H.R. 2356).

Black, Gordon. S. 1972. “A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives.” *American Political Science Review* 66.1 (March): 144–159.

Bobbio, Norberto. 1996. *Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bonica, Adam. 2013. “Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace.” *American Journal of Political Science* 57.2 (April): 294–311.

Brady, David. W., Joseph Cooper, and Patricia A. Hurley. 1977. “The Electoral Basis of Party Voting: Patterns and Trends in the U.S. House of Representatives.” In *The Impact of the Electoral Process*, ed. Louis Misel and Joseph Cooper. Beverly Hills: Sage, pp. 133–65.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

Burnham, Walter. D. 1974. “Communication.” *American Political Science Review* 68.3 (September): 207–213

Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960/1965. *The American Voter*. Oxford: Wiley.

Cantor, David. M., and Herrnson, Paul. S. 1997. “Party Campaign Activity and Party Unity in the U.S. House of Representatives.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22.3 (August): 393–415.

Carey, John. 2000. “Party Unity in Legislative Voting.” *For presentation at the American Political Science Associations conference* (September): 1–32.

Carey, John. 2007. “Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51.1 (January): 92–107.

Carney, Dana. R., John T. Jost, Samuel D. Gosling, and Jeff Potter. 2008. “The Secret Lives of Liberals and Conservatives: Personality, Profiles, Interaction Styles, and the Things They Leave Behind.” *Political Psychology* 29.6 (December): 807–840.

Carson, Jamie. L., Gregory Koger, Matthew J. Lebo, and Everett Young. 2010. “The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress.” *American Journal of Political Science* 54.3 (July): 598–616.

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

- Clinton, Joshua. D., Simon D. Jackman, and Douglas Rivers. 2004. "The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data: A Unified Approach." *American Political Science Review* 98.2 (May): 355-370.
- Conover, Pamela. J., and Stanley Feldman. 1981. "The Origins and Meaning of Liberal/Conservative Self-Identifications." *American Journal of Political Science* 25.4 (November): 617-645.
- Converse, Philip. E. 2006. "Democratic theory and electoral reality." *Critical Review* 18.1-3 (March): 297-329.
- Cox, Gary. W. 1987. *The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the development of political parties in Victorian England*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cox, Gary. W., and Eric Magar. 1999. "How Much Is Majority Status in the U.S. Congress Worth?" *American Political Science Review* 93.2 (June): 299–309.
- Cox, Gary. W., and Jonathan N. Katz. 1996. "Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections Grow?" *American Journal of Political Science* 40.2 (May): 478-497.
- Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Crowe, Edward W. 1983. "Consensus and Structure in Legislative Norms: Party Discipline in the House of Commons." *Journal of Politics* 45.4 (November): 487-510.
- Crowe, Edward W. 1986. "The Web of Authority: Party Loyalty and Social Control in the British House of Commons." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 11.2 (May): 161-185.
- Damore, David. F., and Thomas G. Hansford. 1999. "The Allocation of Party Controlled Campaign Resources in the House of Representatives, 1989-1996." *Political Research Quarterly* 52.2 (June): 371-385.
- Daniel, Kermit, and John R. Lott, Jr. 1997. "Term limits and electoral competitiveness: Evidence from California's state legislative races." *Public Choice* 90: 165-184.
- Denzau, Arthur. T., and Douglass C. North. 1994/2000. "Sheared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions." In *Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality*, ed. Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Samuel L. Popkin. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 23-46.

- Denzau, Arthur. T., and Michael C. Munger. 1986. "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented." *American Political Science Review* 80.1 (March): 89–106.
- Diermeier, Daniel and Timothy J. Feddersen. 1998. "Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure." *American Political Science Review* 92.3 (September): 611-621.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. "An Economic Theory of Democracy." *New York: Harper and Row*.
- Duckitt, John. 2001. "A Cognitive-Motivational Theory of Ideology and Prejudice." In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, ed. Mark P. Zanna. San Diego: Academic, pp. 41-113.
- Duckitt, John, Claire Wagner, Ilouize du Plessis, and Ingrid Birum. 2002. "The psychological bases of ideology and prejudice: Testing a dual-process model." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 83.1 (July): 75-93.
- Dwyre, Diana. 1994. "Party Strategy and Political Reality: The Distribution of Congressional Campaign Committee Resources." In *The State of the Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary American Parties*, ed. Daniel M. Shea and John C. Green. Savage: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 175-189.
- Eagly, Alice. H., and Shelly Chaiken. 1998. "Attitude Structure and Function." In *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, ed. Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey. Boston: McGraw-Hill, pp. 269-322.
- Eriskon, Robert. S. 1972. "Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and Party Fortunes in Congressional Elections." *American Political Science Review* 66.4 (December): 1234-1245.
- Erikson, Robert. S., and Kent L. Tedin. 2003. *American Public Opinion*. New York: Longman.
- Esterling, Kevin. M. 2007. "Buying Expertise: Campaign Contributions and Attention to Policy Analysis in Congressional Committees." *American Political Science Review* 101.1 (February): 93-109.
- Evans, Geoffrey, Anthony Health, and Mansur Lalljee. 1996. "Mearing Left-Right and Libertarian-Conservative Attitudes in the British Electorate." *The British Journal of Sociology* 47.1 (March): 93-112.
- Eysenck, Hans. J. 1954/1999. *The Psychology of Politics*. New York: Routledge.
- Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (Pub.L. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, enacted February 7, 1972, 52 U.S.C. § 30101 *et seq.*).

- Feldman, Stanley. 2003. "Values, ideology, and structure of political attitudes." In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, ed. David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 447-508.
- Ferejohn, John. A. 1977. "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections." *American Political Science Review* 71.1 (March): 166-176.
- Figuereido, Argelina Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. "Presidential Power, Legislative Organization, and Party Behavior in Brazil." *Comparative Politics* 32(2):151–70.
- Fiorina, Morris. P. 1977. "The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It." *American Political Science Review* 71.1 (March): 177-181.
- Fiorina, Morris. P. 1989. *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fiske, Susan. T., Richard R. Lau, and Richard A. Smith. 1990. "On the Varieties and Utilities of Political Expertise." *Social Cognition* 8.1: 31-48.
- Freeden, Michael. 2001. *Reassessing Political Ideologies: The durability of dissent*. London: Routledge.
- Fuchs, Dieter, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1990. "The Left-Right Schema." In *Continuities in Political Action: A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in Three Western Democracies*, ed. M. Kent Kenning and Jan W. van Deth. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 203-22
- Gilligan, Thomas. W., and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informal Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations* 3.2 (Autumn): 287-335.
- Grier, Kevin. B., and Michael C. Munger. 1991. "Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions." *Economic Inquiry* 29.1 (January): 24-43.
- Grier, Kevin B., Michael C. Munger, and Brian E. Roberts. 1994. "The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978-1986." *American Political Science Review* 88.4 (December): 911-926.
- Hamil, Ruth, Milton Lodge, and Frederick Blake. 1985. "The Breadth, Depth, and Utility of Class, Partisan, and Ideological Schemata." *American Journal of Political Science* 29.4 (November): 850-870.
- Herrnson, Paul. 1986. "Do Parties Make a Difference? The Role of Party Organizations in Congressional Elections." *Journal of Politics* 48.3 (August): 589-615.
- Herrnson, Paul. S. 2000. *Congressional Elections*. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press.

- Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury, and Gerard Roland. 2006. *Democratic Politics in the European Parliament*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hogan, Robert. E. 2008. "Sex and the Statehouse: The Effect of Gender on Legislative Roll-Call Voting." *Social Science Quarterly* 89.4 (December): 955-968.
- Huber, John D. 1996. "The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 90.2 (June): 269-282.
- Jacobson, Gary. C. 1980. *Money in Congressional Elections*. Boston: Yale University Press.
- Jacobson, Gary. C. 1985. "Money and Votes Reconsidered: Congressional Elections, 1972–1982." *Public Choice* 47.1 (January): 7–62.
- Jacobson, Gary. C. 1993. "The Misallocation of Resources in House Campaigns." In *Congress Reconsidered*, ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, pp. 115-139.
- Jacobson, Gary. C. 2001. *The Politics of Congressional Elections*. New York: Longman.
- Jacoby, William. G. 1991. "Ideological Identification and Issue Attitudes." *American Journal of Political Science* 35.1 (February): 178-205.
- Jost, John. T. 2006. "The end of the end of ideology." *American Psychological Association* 61.7: 651-670.
- Jost, John. T., Christopher M. Federico, and Jamie L. Napier. 2009. "Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities." *Annual Review of Psychology* 60 (January): 307-337.
- Judd, Charles. M., and Jon A. Krosnick. 1989. "The Structural Bases of Consistency Among Political Attitudes: Effects of Expertise and Attitude Importance." In *Attitude Structure and Function*, ed. Anthony R. Pratkanis, Steven J. Breckler, and Anthony G. Greenwald. Hillsdale: Erlbaum, pp. 99-128.
- Kerlinger, Fred. N. 1984. *Liberalism and Conservatism: The Nature and Structure of Social Attitudes*. Hillsdale: Erlbaum.
- Kinder, Donald. R. 1998. "Opinion and action in the realm of politics." In *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, ed. Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey. Boston: McGraw-Hill, pp. 778-867.
- Knight, Kathleen. 1999. "Liberalism and Conservatism." In *Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes*, ed. John P. Robinson, Philip R. Shaver, and Lawrence. S. Wrightsman. San Diego: Academic, pp. 59-158.

- Knight, Kathleen. 2006. "Transformations of the Concept of Ideology in the Twentieth Century." 100.4 (November): 619-626.
- Knutsen, Oddbjørn. 1995. "Left-Right Materialist Value Orientations." In *The Impact of Values*, ed. Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 160-196.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. "Where's the Party?" *British Journal of Political Science* 23.2 (April): 235-266.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kroszner, Randall. S., and Thomas Stratmann. 1998. "Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees." *American Economic Review* 88.5 (December): 1163-1187.
- Lau, Richard. R., and David P. Redlawsk. 2001. "Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision-Making." *American Journal of Political Science* 45.4 (October): 951-971.
- Layman, Geoffrey. C., and Thomas M. Carsey. 2002. "Party Polarization and 'Conflict Extension' in the American Electorate." *American Journal of Political Science* 46.4 (October): 786-802.
- Leip, David. 2016. "United States Presidential Election Results." *US Election Atlas*. <https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/index.html>.
- Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet. 2017. "Realtime NOMINATE Ideology and Related Data." *Voterview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database*. <https://voterview.com/>.
- Leyden, Kevin. M., and Stephen A. Borrelli. 1990. "Party Contributions and Party Unity: Can Loyalty Be Bought?" *The Western Political Quarterly* 43.2 (June): 343-365.
- Link, William. A., and Mitchell J. Eaton. 2011. "On thinning of chains in MCMC." *British Ecological Society* 3.1 (February): 112-115.
- Lipset, Seymour. M. 1960. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Garden City: Doubleday.
- Londregan, John. 2000b. *Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lott, John, Jr. 1987a. "Political Cheating." *Public Choice* 52 (March): 169-187.

- Lott, John, Jr. 1990. "Attendance Rates, Political Shirking, and The Effect of Post-Elective Office Employment." *Economic Inquiry* 28.1 (January): 133-150.
- Mainwaring, Scott, and Aníbal Pérez Liñán. 1997. "Party Discipline in the Brazilian Constitutional Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22.4 (November): 453-483.
- Martin, Andrew, and Kevin Quinn. 2002. "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999." *Political Analysis* 10.2 (Spring): 134-153.
- Mayer, Kenneth. R., and John M. Woods. 1995. "The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral Competitiveness: Evidence from Wisconsin, 1964-1990." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 20.1 (February): 69-88.
- Mayhew, David. 1974. "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals." *Polity* 6.3 (Spring): 295-317.
- McArthur, John. 1989. "Lame-Duck Legislators and Legislative Pay Raises." Claremont Graduate School Working Paper.
- McCarty, Nolan. M. 2010. "Measuring Legislative Preferences." *The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress* (February): 1-56.
- McCarty, Nolan. M., and Adam Meirowitz. 2006. *Political Game Theory: An Introduction*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McCarty, Nolan. M., and Keith T. Poole. 1995. "Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive-Legislative Bargaining from 1961-1986." *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 11.2 (October): 282-312.
- McCarty, Nolan. M., and Keith T. Poole. 1998. "An Empirical Spatial Model of Congressional Campaigns." *Political Analysis* 7: 1–30.
- McCarty, Nolan. M., and Lawrence S. Rothenberg. 1996. "Commitment and the Campaign Contribution Contract." *American Journal of Political Science* 40.3 (August): 872–904.
- McCarty, Nolan. M., Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Income Redistribution and the Realignment of American Politics*. Washington: AEI Press.
- McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. ____ (2010).
- Milyo, Jeffrey. 1997. "Electoral and Financial Effects of Changes in Committee Power: The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Budget Reform, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and the Money Committees in the House." *Journal of Law and Economics* 40.1 (April): 93–112.

- Mondak, Jeffery. J. 1993. "Presidential Coattails and Open Seats: The District-Level Impact of Heuristic Processing." *American Politics Research* 21.3 (July): 307-319.
- Morgenstern, Scott. 2004. *Patterns of Legislative Politics: Roll Call Voting in Latin America and the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Napier, Jamie. L., and John T. Jost. 2008b. "The 'Antidemocratic Personality' Revisited: A Cross-National Investigation of Working-Class Authoritarianism." *Journal of Social Issues* 64.3 (September): 595-617.
- Nokken, Timothy. P. 2003. "Ideological Congruence Versus Electoral Success: Distribution of Party Organization Contributions in Senate Elections, 1990-2000." *American Politics Research* 31.1 (January): 3-26.
- Owen, Diana, and Paul S. Herrnson. 1983. "An Analysis of the Internal Decision-Making Process of Business and Trade Association Political Action Committees: A Case Study of BANKPAC." In *Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago IL*.
- Parsons, Talcott. 1951. *The Social System*. New York: Free Press.
- Peffley, Mark. A., and Jon Hurwitz. 1985. "A Hierarchical Model of Attitude Constraint." *American Journal of Political Science* 29.4 (November): 871-890.
- Poole, Keith. T. 1998. "Recovering a Basic Space From a Set of Issue Scales." *American Journal of Political Science* 42.3 (July): 954-993.
- Poole, Keith. T. 2004. "Description of NOMINATE Data." *Voterview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database*. <https://legacy.voterview.com/page2a.htm>
- Poole, Keith. T. 2015. "Party Unity Scores." *Voterview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database*. https://legacy.voterview.com/Party_Unity.htm.
- Poole, Keith. T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1985. "A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 29.2 (May): 357-384.
- Poole, Keith. T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1991. "Patterns of Congressional Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 35.1 (February): 228-278.
- Poole, Keith. T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A Political Economic History of Rollcall Voting*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Poole, Keith. T., Thomas Romer, and Howard Rosenthal. 1987. "The Revealed Preferences of Political Action Committees." *American Economic Review* 77.2 (May): 298-302.

- Rohde, David. W. 1979. "Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of Members of the United States House of Representatives." *American Journal of Political Science* 23.1 (February): 1-26.
- Rohde, David. W. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Romer, Thomas, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 1994. "An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics of PAC Contributions." *American Journal of Political Science* 38.3 (August): 745–769.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics." *The American Political Science Review* 64.4 (December): 1033-1053.
- Saucier, Gerard. 2000. "Isms and the structure of social attitudes." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 78.2 (February): 366-385.
- Schlesinger, Joseph. 1966. *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Shafer, Byron. E., and William J.M. Claggett. 1995. *The Two Majorities: The Issue Context of American Politics*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Shor, Boris., and Nolan McCarty. 2010. "Ideological Mapping of the American States." University of Chicago Typescript.
- Sinclair, Barbara. 1986. "Party Leadership and Policy Change." In *Congress and Policy Change*, ed. Gerald C. Wright, Leroy N. Rieselbach, and Lawrence C. Dodd. New York: Agathon.
- Snyder, James. M. 1989. "Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources." *Econometrica* 57.3 (May): 637-660.
- Snyder, James. M. 1992. "Long-Term Investing in Politicians; Or, Give Early, Give Often." *Journal of Law and Economics* 35 (April): 15-43.
- Sorauf, Frank. J., and Scott A. Wilson. 1994. "Political Parties and Campaign Finance: Adaptation and Accommodation Toward a Changing Role." In *The Parties Respond: Changes in American Parties and Campaigns*, ed. Louis S. Maisel. Boulder: Westview, pp. 235-253.
- SpeechNOW.org v. Federal Election Commission, 599 F.3d. 674 (2010).
- Stenner, Karen. 2005. *The Authoritarian Dynamic*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Stratmann, Thomas. 1991. "What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects of Money and Votes." *Southern Economic Journal* 57.3 (January): 606-620.

- Swers, Michele. L. 1998. "Are Women More Likely to Vote for Women's Issue Bills than Their Male Colleagues?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 23.3 (August): 435-448.
- Tomkins, Silvan S. "Left and right: a basic dimension of ideology and personality." In *The Study of Lives: Essays on Personality in Honor of Henry A. Murray*, ed. Robert W. White. New York: Atherton, pp. 388-411.
- Tufte, Edward. R. 1975. "Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections." *American Political Science Review* 69.3 (September): 812-826.
- Voeten, Erik. 2000. "Clashes in the Assembly." *International Organization* 54.2 (Spring): 185-215.
- Wand, Jonathan. 2009. "The Allocation of Campaign Contributions by Interest Groups and the Rise of Elite Polarization." Stanford University Working Paper.
- Welch, W. P. 1980. "The Allocation of Political Monies: Economic Interest Groups." *Public Choice* 35.1 (January): 97-120.
- Wright, Gerald. C., and Brian F. Schaffner. 2002. "The Influence of Party: Evidence from the State Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 96.2 (June): 367-379.
- Zaller, John. R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
2017. "Candidates for Senate." *Federal Election Commission*.
https://www.fec.gov/data/candidates/senate/?election_year=2018&cycle=2018&election_full=true.
2017. "Population and Housing Unit Estimates Dataset." *United States Census Bureau*.
<https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/data/data-sets.2000.html>.
2018. "Independent Expenditures." *Federal Election Commission*.
https://www.fec.gov/data/independent-expenditures/?data_type=processed&is_notice=true.
2018. "Majority and Minority Leaders." *United States Senate*.
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Majority_Minority_Leaders.htm.
2018. "Members of the U.S. Congress." *Congress.gov*.
<https://www.congress.gov/members?pageSize=250&q=%7B%22congress%22%3A%5B%22104%22%5D%2C%22chamber%22%3A%22Senate%22%7D>.
2018. "Party Whips". *United States Senate*.
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Party_Whip.htm.

2018. “Voting Records.” *Americans for Democratic Action*.
<http://www.adaction.org/pages/publications/voting-records.php>

Vita

Thomas Ryan Conroy is from Geneva, Illinois. He graduated in 2016 from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign with a B.A., majoring in Political Science and Psychology. Upon completion of his M.A. from the University of Texas at Austin, he will attend the University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy to pursue an M.P.P.

For questions or data requests, feel free to contact me at trconroy94@gmail.com.