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Robert Matthew Gildner

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The Dissertation Committee for Robert Matthew Gildner Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

Indomestizo Modernism: National Development and Indigenous Integration in Postrevolutionary Bolivia, 1952-1964

Committee:

Seth Garfield, Supervisor

Mauricio Tenorio Trillo, Co-Supervisor

Brooke Larson

Virginia Garrard-Burnett

Frank Guridy

Emilio Zamora

**Indomestizo Modernism: National Development and Indigenous
Integration in Postrevolutionary Bolivia, 1952-1964**

by

Robert Matthew Gildner, B.A., M.A.

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Dedication

To Professor William Colby. Thank you.

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Indomestizo Modernism: National Development and Indigenous Integration in Postrevolutionary Bolivia, 1952-1964

Robert Matthew Gildner, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2012

Supervisors: Seth Garfield, Mauricio Tenorio Trillo

This dissertation rethinks postcolonial nation-state formation in Latin America by investigating the cultural politics of the Bolivian Revolution of 1952. At the heart of Latin America's postcolonial predicament were the social hierarchies of the colonial caste system, which persisted into the Republican era despite liberal ideals of legal equality and universal citizenship. This predicament was especially acute in Bolivia. Indians constituted sixty-five percent of the national population yet—still a century after Independence—remained politically excluded and socially marginalized by a European-descendant, or creole, minority. Following the Bolivian Revolution of 1952, a new generation of creole nationalists set out to integrate Indians into a modern nation of their own making. In subsequent years, artists, intellectuals, social scientists, and indigenous activists worked to transform Bolivia from a segregated, multiethnic republic into a unified nation. This study interrogates the dynamic interplay between state and society as these diverse agents negotiated the terms of indigenous inclusion, the content of national culture, and the contractions of postrevolutionary modernity.

My research challenges the prevailing historiographical consensus that the transformative socioeconomic reforms introduced by Bolivia's postrevolutionary government were not accompanied by a parallel cultural initiative. Drawing on new archival sources from Bolivia, Mexico, the Netherlands, and the United States, I reveal that not only did the Bolivian Revolution of 1952 include a cultural element; but that the establishment of a unifying national culture for the integrated republic was one of the primary objectives of the postrevolutionary leadership. Through a burgeoning array of government institutions, officials promoted a new national culture model that celebrated Bolivia's mixed Andean and Hispanic heritage. I argue that despite its inclusive veneer, this effort reproduced racialized identities founded on colonial social hierarchies. With case studies on rural sociology, the revision of national history, the reconstruction of archeological ruins, and the creation of a national folklore, this study demonstrates how the postrevolutionary politics of culture and knowledge operated, in conjunction, to generate novel forms of ethnic exclusion for indigenous Bolivians.

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Introduction

History is hard to know, because of all the hired bullshit, but even without being sure of “history” it seems entirely reasonable to think that every now and then the energy of a whole generation comes to a head in a long fine flash, for reasons that nobody really understands at the time—and which never really explain, in retrospect, what actually happened.

-Hunter S. Thompson, Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas

Una fase revolucionaria es, para las sociedades, lo mismo que un cataclismo para la geográfica. Hay una fase de caos, de incertidumbre e indefinición que es inseparable de tal tipo de acontecimientos.

-René Zavaleta Mercado, 50 años de historia

Popular lore has it that during the Revolution, President Víctor Paz Estenssoro and his entourage always brought DDT along on their frequent trips to the countryside. The President was immensely popular among Bolivia’s rural indigenous majority, symbolizing revolutionary promises of equal citizenship, access to education, and agrarian reform. Women hugged him, children kissed him, and men greeted their *compañero presidente* with the hearty handshake-hug-handshake typical of highland Bolivia. As enthusiastic Aymara and Quechua supporters awaited the President, aides soused them with the toxic insecticide, ridding them of whatever *bichos* they were perceived to be carrying. Even a young Ernesto Guevara reported witnessing such a spectacle while briefly passing through La Paz on his famed motorcycle trip, in 1953; whereupon he subsequently disparaged the Bolivian Revolution of 1952 as the “DDT Revolution.”

Whether this tale is true or just another figment of the popular imagination matters not. As truth, as fiction, it accurately portrays the contradictory logic underlying indigenous-state relations in post-1952 Bolivia: although the government granted legal

citizenship to indigenous Bolivians for the first time, deeply-rooted notions of cultural inferiority remained embedded in state practices and ultimately undermined ethnic equality. This dissertation traces the making of this contradictory logic during the period spanning the April 9, 1952 popular insurrection that triggered the Revolution and the November 3, 1964 military coup that ousted the civilian leadership of the postrevolutionary government.



Illustration 1: President Víctor Paz Estenssoro embracing indigenous man, circa 1952.¹

¹ Photograph from: José Fellman Velarde, *Álbum de la Revolución Nacional: 128 años de lucha por la Independencia de Bolivia* (La Paz: Subsecretaria de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura, 1955).

Yet, as this study also illustrates, the contradictions that characterized indigenous-state relations after 1952 are rooted in longer, deeper historical processes dating to centuries of Spanish colonial rule.² Although Bolivia formerly severed its imperial ties to the Crown in 1825, the racialized social hierarchies of the colonial caste system remained deeply-entrenched well into the republican period. In 1950, on the eve of the Revolution, Indians constituted sixty-five percent of the population. They nevertheless remained politically excluded and socially marginalized by a European-descendant, or creole, minority.

After 1952, a new generation of creole nationalists resolved to break with the colonial past once and for all. They uprooted the entrenched system of ethnic apartheid that characterized pre-revolutionary society and set out to incorporate Indians into a modern nation of their own making. In subsequent years, state bureaucrats, labor militants, social scientists, indigenous activists, faceless technocrats, and career politicians worked to transform Bolivia from a traditional, segregated republic into a modern, integrated nation state. This dissertation chronicles the dynamic interplay between state and society as these diverse agents negotiated the terms of indigenous inclusion, the content of national culture, and the contradictions of postrevolutionary modernity.

The Bolivian Revolution of 1952 followed on a decade marked by the widespread mobilization of civil society vaguely united in their opposition to the oligarchic elite, but espousing divergent and often conflicting opinions of what “revolution” meant. Upon securing its dominant position within the postrevolutionary state, however, the

² Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos: luchas del campesinado aymara y qhechwa de Bolivia, 1900-1980* (La Paz: Hisbol, 1984).

Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, MNR) rapidly consolidated an ad-hoc government and defined the Revolution in terms of national modernization. The MNR was the most moderate of the reform-orientated parties to emerge in the period of sweeping sociopolitical transformation wrought by Bolivia's tragic defeat to Paraguay in the Chaco War (1932-35).³ Drawing from prevailing currents of nationalism, Marxism, indigenismo, and fascism, the party's middle-class leadership singled out Bolivia's landed and mining oligarchy as the primary obstacle to progress. Under the banner of economic nationalism and in the name of national sovereignty, they envisioned a social democracy, one in which the state managed the republic's finite natural resources and served as an instrument of capital accumulation to finance domestic development.

After 1952, the MNR leadership transformed its revolutionary vision into the most ambitious state-led development project in Bolivian history. The centerpiece of this initiative was the nationalization of the "Big Three" tin mines, decreed on October 31, 1952. With the majority of mining revenues now in the rightful hands of the state, officials set out to finance domestic economic development and ensure the wellbeing of the population through expanded government initiatives in education, public health, social welfare, and the arts. Agrarian reform also proved critical to postrevolutionary development. Bolivia had one of the most exploitive and unproductive agrarian economies in the hemisphere. According to the 1950 agrarian census, 6.3 percent of the population owned 91.9 percent of the arable land, yet only two percent of available land

³ Herbert S. Klein, *Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 1880-1952* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

was under cultivation.⁴ Highland haciendas were reliant on a system of coerced labor in which Indians worked the estates in exchange for usufruct right to small parcels of land where they practiced subsistence agriculture. By freeing both land and labor from the unproductive estates, the agrarian reform decree of August 2, 1953 enabled the postrevolutionary government to boost agricultural production, expand the domestic market, and diversify the national economy.

The MNR leadership not only assigned Indians a central role in this ambitious modernization scheme, but its very success depended upon their active participation. Indigenous Bolivians would provide the labor needed to transform the seigniorial economy into a vibrant commercial agricultural sector. The grand majority of indigenous Bolivians practiced subsistence agriculture, lacked basic Spanish literacy skills, and operated largely outside of the formal market economy. The postrevolutionary government sought not only to integrate this population into the social, political and economic structure of the republic, but to transform it into a modernized, integrated peasantry. On July 21, 1952 the government decreed universal suffrage, extending political citizenship to Indians (and women). Yet in order to assume the role imagined for them by postrevolutionary planners, they would have to learn Spanish, the basic arithmetic necessary for market transactions, modern sanitation and health practices, and, perhaps most importantly, to think in terms of a “nation.” Through rural education, the postrevolutionary government set out to create a modernized peasantry who would drive national development through both their production and consumption.

⁴ República de Bolivia, Ministerio de Hacienda y Estadística, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos. *I Censo Agropecuario, 1950* (La Paz, 1950).

As the postrevolutionary government set out to transform indigenous Bolivians into a modernized peasantry, it initiated a parallel project to construct a unifying national culture for the newly-integrated republic. Forging a society in which Indians and creoles enjoyed equal citizenship necessitated the reconceptualization of Bolivia as a nation. Seeking to unify Bolivia's diverse population around a shared national identity, the MNR promoted a new "revolutionary esthetic" that venerated Bolivia's mixed Andean and European heritage.⁵ Historian Carlos Mesa correctly asserts that "no es que el indio o el pasado pre-hispánico fuesen descubierto en 1952."⁶ The Revolution does mark, however, the first time that the government actively moved indigenous popular culture to the center of the national imagination. Historians wrote Indians into the nation by recasting national history as a multiethnic struggle against foreign economic exploitation. Archeologists reconstructed Tiwanaku, identifying in the pre-Hispanic ruins the primordial origins of Bolivian nationhood. Anthropologists studied rural communities, expanding the definition of cultural patrimony to include indigenous art, music, and dance. At the core of this effort, the government promoted a myth of ethnic unity intended to unify all Bolivians as they mobilized for this unprecedented national modernization initiative.

Although the government granted political citizenship to indigenous Bolivians, I argue that it was the cultural politics of revolution that ultimately determined the limits of ethnic inclusion. One of the primary factors that rendered the postrevolutionary modernization initiative imaginable in the first place were new modes of racial thinking that, for their time and place, were quite progressive. Subscribing to ascending currents of cultural relativism, postrevolutionary officials dismissed as "atavistic" and "backwards"

⁵ José Fellman Velarde, "La Revolución Nacional y su transcendencia estética," *Boletín de cultura: revista de difusión cultural*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (11 de febrero de 1954), pp. 1-2.

⁶ Carlos D. Mesa Gisbert, *La aventura del cine boliviano, 1952-1985* (La Paz: Gisbert y CIA, 1985), p. 48.

the biological construction of race that had prevailed since the nineteenth century. They instead explained indigenous backwardness in terms of inherent cultural inferiority, resulting from structural factors—particularly the (neo)colonial domination and agrarian exploitation of the seigniorial economy. As such, the generation of statesmen and intellectuals that came to power in 1952 emphasized, above all, the improbability of the Indian “race.” And as they transformed Bolivia into a modern integrated nation, they set out to remake indigenous Bolivians into a modernized peasant workforce, upon which the dreams of postrevolutionary modernization rested. It is in this seemingly benign, even benevolent modernization initiative where what Silvia Rivera describes as the “violencia invisible” of the Bolivian Revolution of 1952 becomes most salient.⁷

THE 1952 REVOLUTION AND INDIGENOUS-STATE RELATIONS

Did 1952 mark a turning point in Bolivia’s contested history of indigenous-state relations? In the relatively-underdeveloped historiography on the Revolution and its legacy, responses to this question vary widely. In Bolivia, as in all nation-states, the production of historical knowledge has been intimately entwined with local experiences, divergent memories, social movements, and political ideologies. Since 1952, the multi-ethnic society has been wrought by efforts to resolve centuries-old tensions, commonly articulated in terms of race, class, ethnicity, and region. Indeed, recent historiographical developments provide a particularly salient example of how contemporary events shape historical memory. During a moment when the Bolivian state has actively set out to

⁷ Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, “El raíz: colonizadores y colonizados,” in *Violencia encubiertas en Bolivia*, Tomo 1, edited by Xavier Albó and Raúl Barrios, 27-142 (La Paz: CIPCA y Aruwiwiri, 1993), p. 79.

“decolonize” the nation, perhaps no topic within the historiography of modern Bolivia is more historicized than indigenous-state relations.

The first wave of historiography was generally celebratory of the Revolution, championing the moment as a true social revolution that liberated Indians from the coercive haciendas, and set out to integrate them, as equals, into the republic. Much of this work was produced by the revolutionaries themselves—that is, MNR ideologues and nationalist intellectuals affiliated, at one time or another, with the postrevolutionary state.⁸ This body of scholarship is rooted in the work of MNR co-founder, Carlos Montenegro.⁹ Recasting Bolivian history as a struggle between nationalism and neocolonialism, he forged a potent interpretation of the past that cast the MNR as the harbingers of Bolivia’s true independence. This dialectic provided the foundation for a nationalist historiography—whose most prominent contributors were Augusto Céspedes and José Fellman Velarde—which shaped the early scholarship of most foreign observers.¹⁰ Like their nationalist counterparts, foreign scholars such as Robert Alexander, Richard Patch, and Charles Arnade also lauded the MNR for its socioeconomic reforms, citing indigenous integration and rural education as exemplary of Bolivia’s authentic social revolution.¹¹

⁸ This body of scholarship also includes personal accounts from participants in the revolutionary experience. See, for example, Luis Antezana’s multivolume, *Historia Secreto del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (La Paz: Librería Editorial “Juventud”).

⁹ Carlos Montenegro, *Nacionalismo y Coloniaje* (La Paz: Juventud, 2003 [1943]).

¹⁰ See, for example, Augusto Céspedes, *El dicador suicida: 40 años de historia de Bolivia* (La Paz, Juventud, 1995 [1956]); Augusto Céspedes, *El Presidente colgado*; José Fellmann Velarde, *Víctor Paz Estenssoro: el hombre y la revolución* (La Paz, A. Tejerina, 1954). José Fellmann Velarde, *Historia de Bolivia* (La Paz, Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1968); Luis Peñaloza Cordero, *Historia secreto del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario*. Herbert Klein’s early scholarship on the Revolution relied heavily upon the nationalist historians. See, for example: Herbert S. Klein, *Orígenes de la Revolución Nacional Boliviana: la crisis de la generación del Chaco* (La Paz: Editorial “Juventud,” 1968); Herbert S. Klein, *Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 1880-1952* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

¹¹ Robert J. Alexander, *The Bolivian National Revolution* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958).

The revisionism of the 1960s was steeped in class-struggle and shaped the by the prevailing epistemologies of the “new social history” popular at the time. During an epoch defined by military dictatorship, student protest, and identity politics, scholars critically reassessed the Revolution from two distinct ideological positions. On the right, figures such as Jorge Siles, Hugo Roberts, and Edgar Avila—militants of the *Falange Socialista Bolivia* (FSB) or formerly of the MNR right—underscored the economic failures, political violence, and revolutionary excesses of the MNR.¹² On the left, such authors as Guillermo Lora, Sergio Almaraz, Liborio Justo, Jorge Ovando, James Malloy, James Dunkerely, and René Zavaleta muted the celebratory tone of the first wave of historiography.¹³ While the orthodox scholarship had cited indigenous integration as the most salient example of the social change wrought by the Revolution, revisionists advanced a more cynical interpretation of 1952 and its legacies. Shifting the terms of the debate to class relations, they emphasized the MNR’s cooptation of the radical left and the shortcoming of lasting social gains for workers, miners, and indigenous peasants. Theirs was an “uncompleted,” “restrained,” or “defeated” Revolution.”¹⁴

¹² Jorge Siles Salinas, *La aventura y el orden: reflexiones sobre la revolución boliviana* (Santiago de Chile, 1956); Hugo Roberts Barragán, *La revolución del 9 de abril* (La Paz, 1971); Edgar Avila Echazu, *Revolución y cultura en Bolivia* (Tarija: Universidad Autónoma “Juan Misael Saracho,” 1963); Fernando Loayza Beltrán, *Campos de concentración en Bolivia: tres años prisionero de Víctor Paz Estenssoro* (La Paz: E. Burillo, 1966).

¹³ Guillermo Lora’s four volume opus, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano* (La Paz: Amigos del Libro, 1967), which breaks the labor movement into four distinct periods: 1848-1900 (Vol. 1), 1900-1923 (Vol. 2), 1923-1933 (Vol. 3), and 1933-1952 (Vol. 4). Also see the his two-volume, *Contribución a la historia política de Bolivia* (La Paz: Ediciones ISLA, 1978); Liborio Justo, *Bolivia: La Revolución Derrotada* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones ryr, 2010 [1971]); Jorge Alejandro Ovando Sanz, *Sobre el problema nacional y colonial de Bolivia* (La Paz: Juventud, 1984); James Malloy, *Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1970); James Dunkerley, *Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-1982* (London: Verso, 1984); René Zavaleta Mercado, *50 años de historia* (La Paz: Amigos del Libro, 1998); René Zavaleta Mercado, *Lo nacional-popular en Bolivia* (La Paz: Plural, 2008 [1986]); René Zavaleta Mercado, *La caída del MNR y la conjuración de noviembre* (La Paz: Amigos del Libro, 1995 [1970]).

¹⁴ James M. Malloy, *Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970); Richard W. Patch, *Bolivia: The Restrained Revolution* (Madison: Land Tenure Center, University of

Though underscoring the pivotal role of labor militancy in defining the Revolution, the revisionists nevertheless tended to pass off Indians as passive actors, asserting that class consciousness emerged in the countryside only once radicalized by the left. This may not be a surprising interpretation given the fact that most of this scholarship was contemporaneous with the “pacto-militar campesino.”¹⁵ Regardless, during the latter part of the decade, and well into the next, research by Jorge Dandler, Luis Antezana, and Hugo Romero revealed a long history of rural organization and social mobilization that preceded the Revolution.¹⁶ They emphasized, above all, indigenous political agency, while underscoring the mixed legacy of the Revolution process in terms of achieving lasting social change for indigenous Bolivians.

Towards the end of the 1970s, a new wave of revisionist scholarship emerged alongside the radical Indianism of Fausto Reinaga and the ethnic-based political

Wisconsin, 1961); Liborio Justo, *Bolivia: La Revolución Derrotada* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones ryr, 2010 [1971]).

¹⁵ The alliance indigenous Bolivians forged with the military government between 1964 and 1974 to ensure the advance of the agrarian reform. For a detailed discussion of the pacto, see: César Soto S., *Historia del Pacto Militar Campesino* (Cochabamba: Ediciones CERES, 1994); Xavier Albó, "From MNRistas to Kataristas to Katari," *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World: 18th to 20th Centuries*, Steve J. Stern, ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), pp. 379-419.

¹⁶ Dandler carried out research in the Department of Cochabamba, under the auspices of the UN and other national and international development organizations working in Bolivia before pursuing graduate study in sociology at the University of Wisconsin. See: Jorge Dandler, "Local Group, Community, and Nation: a Study of Changing Structure in Ucureña, Bolivia, 1935-1952," (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Wisconsin, 1967); Jorge Dandler, *El sindicalismo campesino en Bolivia: los cambios estructurales en Ucureña* (México: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, 1969). Antezana and Romero carried out their research under the auspices of the Land Tenure Center at the University of Wisconsin. They revealed the history of social organization in the Bolivian countryside, before and during the Revolution. Luis Antezana Ergueta, *Proceso y sentencia a la reforma agraria en Bolivia* (La Paz: Ediciones Puerta del Sol, 1979); Luis Antezana Ergueta and Hugo Romero Bedregal, *Congresos campesinos y estatuto orgánico de la Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia* (Estudio de la Estructura Agraria en Bolivia, LTC/CIDA, 1968); Luis Antezana Ergueta and Hugo Romero Bedregal, *Bosquejo histórico del movimiento sindical campesino en Bolivia, por L. Antezana E* (Estudio de la Estructura Agraria en Bolivia, LTC/CIDA, 1968).

mobilization promoted by the Katarista movement.¹⁷ This scholarship was largely written by “los hijos de la Revolución,” that is, the generation of Aymara and Quechua intellectuals who grew up in the countryside in the 1950s and 1960s and personally experienced the exclusionary politics of the Revolution. Roberto Choque Canqui, the first formally-trained Aymara historian, revealed a long history of resistance to liberal land divestiture policies among Aymara comunarios in the highland province of Jesús de Machaca.¹⁸ Also studying rural Aymara communities was the Catalanian Jesuit Anthropologist, Xavier Albó, who demonstrated more recent political mobilization among Aymara activists in the La Paz province of Omasuyos.¹⁹ It was during this time when sociologist, Silvia Rivera founded the *Taller de Historia Oral Andina* (THOA) with Aymara students at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés in La Paz.²⁰ During the late 1980s, as the Katarista movement emerged as the primary conduit of political participation for indigenous Bolivians, Rivera, along with Esteban Ticona, Javier Hurtado, and others turned to historical questions of power, agency, and representation to critically reassess the Revolution and its legacy.²¹ Though emphasizing class, they

¹⁷ Fausto Reinaga, *La Revolución India*, segunda edición (La Paz: Ediciones Fundación Amaútica “Fausto Reinaga,” 2001 [1970]).

¹⁸ Roberto Choque Canqui, “Sublevación y masacre de los comunarios de Jesús de Machaca,” *Antropología: Revista del Instituto Nacional de Antropología*, Año 1, No. 1 (1er Semestre 1979), pp. 1-31.

¹⁹ Xavier Albó, *Achacachi: medio siglo de lucha campesina* (La Paz: CIPCA, 1979).

²⁰ Recovering Andean history has been the primary mission of the *Taller de Historia Oral Andina* (Andean Oral History Workshop, THOA) since its foundation of 1983. This Aymara NGO has made significant strides in recovering the oral history of highland indigenous communities. In doing so, it has provided an invaluable contribution to the decolonization of historical memory in Bolivia. See: Andean Oral History Workshop (translated by Emma Gawne-Cain), “The Indian Santos Marka T’ula, Chief of the ayllu of Qallapa and General Representative of the Indians Communities of Bolivia,” *History Workshop*, no. 34 (Autumn 1992), pp. 101-118; Kevin Healy, *Llamas, Weavings, and Organic Chocolate: Multicultural Grassroots Development in the Andes and Amazon of Bolivia* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), pp. 86-87; Marcia Stephenson, “Forging an Indigenous Counterpublic Sphere: The Taller de Historia Oral Andina,” *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (2002).

²¹ Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos: luchas del campesinado aymara y qhechwa de Bolivia, 1900-1980* (La Paz: Hisbol, 1984); Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, “El raíz: colonizadores y colonizados.” *Violencia encubiertas en Bolivia, Tomo 1*, Xavier Albó and Raúl Barrios, eds. (La Paz:

privileged ethnicity, arguing that the Revolution produced new modes of creole hegemony and ethnic exclusion. It revealed the discursive practices of postrevolutionary mestizaje, locating them primary in the “campesino” designation that the government assigned rural Bolivians. Yet Indians were not merely cast as passive victims of a monolithic state; in fact, Rivera and her contemporaries explicitly rejected prevailing narratives of indigenous victimization.²²

In the past decade, scholars from multiple disciplines have dug even deeper into the Revolution, producing a more nuanced but equally critical reception of 1952 and its legacy. The power dynamics between state and society, traditionally cast in broader structural terms, were reduced to their component parts and carefully inspected by the social historians of the 1970s, explored through the lens of ethnicity in the 1980s, and armed with novel tools of historical analysis in recent decades. Driven by concerns with discourse, textuality, historicity, temporality, a new generation of historians, sociologists, and anthropologists have begun to reframe traditional questions of power and authority. This emerging wave of scholarship recognizes the exclusionary practices that underlie the Revolution, while allowing for a more subtle analysis of the complex processes that it set into motion.²³ In a recent study, for example, anthropologist Michelle Bigenho affirms

CIPCA y Aruwiyiri, 1993); Javier Hurtado, *El katarismo* (La Paz: Hisbol, 1986); Xavier Albó y Josep M. Barnadas, *La cara India y campesina de nuestra historia*, 3ra. ed. (La Paz: CIPCA, 1990). Roberto Choque Canqui, *Jesús de Machaqa: la marka rebelde* (La Paz, CEDOIN/CIPCA, 1996); Roberto Choque Canqui, *Historia de una lucha desigual: los contenidos ideológicos y políticos de las rebeliones indígenas de la pre-Revolución Nacional* (La Paz: PAKAXA, 2005); Xavier Albó y Josep Barnadas, *La cara india y campesina de nuestra historia*, 3ra. ed. (La Paz: UNITAS/CIPCA, 1990); Esteban Ticona Alejo, *Jesús de Machaqa en el tiempo* (La Paz: Fundación Diálogo, 1998); Leandro Condori Chura, *El escribano de los Caciques Apoderados: Kasikinakan Purirarunakan Qillqiripa* (La Paz: Hisbol/THOA, 1992).

²² Rosanna Barragán, “Bolivia: Bridges and Chiasms,” *A Companion to Latin American Anthropology*, Deborah Poole, ed. (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), pp. 32-55. Thanks to Brooke Larson for passing on this source.

²³ See, for example, Laura Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights: Indigenous Struggles for Land and Justice in Bolivia, 1880-1952* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); Sinclair Thomson, “Revolutionary Memory in Bolivia: Anticolonial and National Projects from 1781 to 1952,” in Merilee Grindle and Pilar

the exclusionary politics of postrevolutionary mestizaje while reminding readers that the Revolution was “also about changing the attitudes of those who held power, and about the breaking down of their racialized views about who ‘belonged’ in what spaces.”²⁴

Indeed it was. And in order to truly understand the Revolution and its legacy, the exclusionary practices of the postrevolutionary state must not only be considered alongside the goals and aspiration of the those behind it—however progressive, inclusive, or utopian they may have seemed at the time—but also contextualized with intellectual and cultural trends of the particular world-historical moment. One of the primary objectives of this study is to examine the rearticulation of social hierarchies after 1952. Did the Revolution mark an authentic moment of social change for indigenous peoples, fundamentally transforming their status as citizens, their political representation in the state, and their place in the nation? Yes, it did. At the same time, however, the revolutionary process consolidated new forms of ethnic exclusion that disparaged the “traditional” customs embraced by indigenous Bolivians, while actively encouraging their assimilations into “modern” society. In addition to this implicit temporal distinction between “traditional” Indians and “modern” nationhood, the prevailing prejudices and ingrained beliefs underlying centuries of racial discrimination remained deeply embedded in the cultural politics and development initiatives of the postrevolutionary state.

Domingo (eds.), *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in a Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Fernando Rios, “Bolero Trios, Mestizo Panpipe Ensembles, and Bolivia’s 1952 Revolution: Urban La Paz Musicians and the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement,” *Ethnomusicology*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 2010), pp. 281-317; “Race and subaltern nationalism: AMP activist-intellectuals in Bolivia, 1921-1964” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University, 2005); José M. Gordillo, *Campesinos revolucionarios en Bolivia: identidad, territorio y sexualidad en el Valle Alto de Cochabamba, 1952-1964* (La Paz: Plural Editores, 2000); *Ibid*, *Arando en la historia: la experiencia política campesina en Cochabamba* (La Paz: Plural Editores, 1998).

²⁴ Michelle Bigenho, “Embodied Matters, *Bolivian Fantasy* and Indigenismo,” *Journal of Latin American Anthropology*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2006), pp. 267-293.

MODERNIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The Bolivian Revolution of 1952 coincided with the rise and consolidation of Third World development paradigms. After triumphing over the forces of totalitarianism in the Second World War, the advanced industrialized democracies of North America and Western Europe set out to remake the world in their own image. Urbanization, industrialization, universal education, and political inclusion stood as the hallmarks for modern society as the exceptional history of western progress became the normative model for republican nationhood. Through infusions of capital, knowledge, and technology, both national governments and international institutions promoted accelerated economic and social change in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, where poverty, inequality, decolonization threatened to destabilize the exiting liberal order.²⁵

To be sure, development was also rooted in geopolitical concerns resulting from the emerging Cold War. Western policymakers saw development as a means to alleviate the socioeconomic inequalities that made Marxist ideology appealing to local populations. By creating the conditions for increased political participation, more equitable distribution of wealth, universal education, and market integration, Western development proponents hoped to inoculate developing nations from the specter of communist subversion. By the 1950s, the U.S., the U.N. were sending armies of social scientists to “underdeveloped” regions to provide specialized expertise in agriculture, education, public health, and economic planning. In this partial world-historical moment—one defined by Cold War brinkmanship, decolonization, and unprecedented

²⁵ Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 4.

advancements in science and technology—reform-minded leaders across the Third World also looked West to articulate their modernization fantasies.

Bolivia's postrevolutionary leadership was no exception, and as they mobilized both state and society for the most ambitious national development initiative in history, they framed their aspirations within a nebulous concept called modernization. Characterized by the exceptional experience of the North Atlantic West, modernization refers to a specific set of values embedded in liberal traditions that included social democracy, free market capitalism, and religious tolerance. Yet, the concept also rested on specific assumptions surrounding the meaning of its necessary opposite, "tradition." As philosopher H.C.F. Mansilla argues, mid-twentieth century development paradigms rested on two fundamental principles: "la idea de que el orden tradicional, rural, y pre-industrial constituirá un sistema político injusto, carente de dinamismo e históricamente superado, y la ilusión de que la modernidad traería consigo simultáneamente el progreso material y la justicia social."²⁶ It was precisely this opinion "acerca de lo negativo del mundo tradicional" that was at the center of postrevolutionary modernization in Bolivia.²⁷

In order to understand what modern nationhood meant to the postrevolutionary leadership, it is perhaps best to start by exploring what it was not. Modern was not being dependent on a tin-based monoculture economy dominated by three private companies. It was not an agricultural economy characterized by a rural seigniorial order dependent on coerced Indian labor. It was not being required to import foreign goods to meet the minimum caloric intake of the population. And it certainly was not Indian. Rather, for the MNR modern meant, first and foremost, an independent and diversified national

²⁶ H.C.F. Mancilla, *La crisis de la identidad nacional y la cultural política: aproximaciones a una teoría crítica de la modernidad* (La Paz: CIMA, 2006), p. 257.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

economy under the responsible, rational, and scientific management of the state. It was a state that ensured the economic and social wellbeing of the national by providing all citizens with education, health care, and social security. It meant having a diversified commercial agriculture sector, worked by a productive peasantry that was integrated—as both consumers and producers—into a vibrant domestic market. It was an integrated, consolidated nation, linked by modern highways, railroads, and airlines. It had a developed national culture, universal in its existence though unique in its particular national manifestation, replete with martyrs, icons, and a proper history.

While the postrevolutionary development initiative responded to local historical circumstances, it was increasingly influenced by the international exchange of ideas. If, as historian Mauricio Tenorio Trillo argues, the Americas served as the laboratory for development, then Bolivia was perhaps its boldest experiment.²⁸ The Mexican Revolution provided American social scientists a laboratory to apply social scientific knowledge to the process of directed socioeconomic change. During the 1920s and 1930s, American and Mexican social scientists developed important applied social scientific theories—Robert Redfield’s diffusionism for instance—that evolved in a host of national and international institutions and small-scale development initiatives during the 1940s.²⁹ After 1952, Bolivia served as a hemispheric laboratory to test the hypothesis that accelerated socioeconomic change could be achieved through the application of social scientific knowledge. Coinciding with the golden age of development, postrevolutionary Bolivia provided the ideal conditions to experiment with

²⁸ Mauricio Tenorio Trillo, “Stereophonic Scientific Modernisms: Social Science between Mexico and the United States, 1880s-1930s,” *The Journal of Latin American History*, Vol. 86, No. 3 (December 1999), pp. 1156-1187.

²⁹ Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, *Anthropological Perspectives on Rural Mexico* (Boston: Routledge, 1984).

socioeconomic planning. Scholarship commonly cites the Cornell-Peru Project at Vicos as the most salient example of Cold War modernization paradigms in action in the central Andes.³⁰ There were four such programs operating in Bolivia by 1955. By the end of the decade, the United States, Mexico, Guatemala, Peru were all sending specialists to Bolivia, not simply to assist with the development effort, but also to gain practical field experience to bring back and implement in their own countries.

Bolivia was the highest recipient of U.S. economic assistance in the Americas. Between 1952 and 1964, the U.S. provided \$150 million dollars in developmental aid—more than any other Latin American nation received during this time—in addition to technical training and military assistance.³¹ Such an outpouring of support to a revolutionary regime in Latin Americas during the height of the red scare was indeed exceptional. As historian Kenneth Lehman points out, Washington’s support of the MNR represented a rare case of “pragmatic anticommunism” motivated by a sincere belief that an injection of development capital would mitigate the communist threat.³² This exceptional policy reflected the faith shared among Cold War policymakers in a novel development paradigm emerging in the U.S. academic and foreign policy establishments called modernization theory.

³⁰ The literature on the Cornell Peruvian Project voluminous literature already literature published on the Vicos project. See: Jason Pribilsky, “Development and the ‘Indian Problem’ in the Cold War Andes: Indigenismo, Science, and Modernization in the Making of the Cornell-Peru Project at Vicos,” *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (June 2009), pp. 405-26; Eric B. Ross, “Vicos as Cold War Strategy: Anthropology, Peasants, and ‘Community Development’,” *Anthropology in Action*, 12 (2005): 21-33; For the most recent scholarship on the subject see Thomas C Greaves, Ralph Bolton, and Florencia Zapata, *Vicos and Beyond: A Half Century of Applying Anthropology in Peru* (Lanham: AltaMira Press, 2011).

³¹ For more on U.S. financial assistance to Bolivia, see James Siekmeier, *The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 1945-present* (Penn State University Press, 2011) and Kenneth Lehman, *Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999).

³² Kenneth Lehman, “Revolutions and Attributions: Making Sense of Eisenhower Administration Policies in Bolivia and Guatemala,” *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Spring 1997): 185-213.

Modernization theory refers to a specific body of knowledge regarding the nature of “traditional” societies and the historical trajectory of “modern” republics. Established by such thinkers as Walt Rostow, Lucien Pye, and Edward Shils, modernization theory posited a theory of state-led socioeconomic development founded on Keynesian economics and social scientific knowledge.³³ During the 1950s, as U.S. aid increased apace with Bolivia’s dependency on foreign economic assistance, policymakers in La Paz increasingly articulated their development strategies in terms of modernization theory. Policies that were historically articulated in terms of class-struggle, dialectical materialism, and national sovereignty, were rearticulated in terms of “underdevelopment” and “take-offs.” By the time the Washington launched the Alliance for Progress in 1962, Bolivia was the testing ground for U.S. modernization schemes. A Kennedy-era policy paper, for example, stated that the “Bolivian experience will be a test case of the thesis that social and political reforms are essential for development” before warning that “a failure of the Bolivian effort would reflect adversely both on the concept of the Alliance and our own ability and seriousness in developmental assistance.”³⁴ As the modernizing hopes of postrevolutionary planners confronted the reality of the rural society and the resilience of its residents, Bolivia would dash the hopes of social scientists, politicians, and diplomats alike.

In exploring how Bolivia’s own development initiatives converged with U.S. modernization paradigms, this study contributes to a growing body of literature seeking to “decenter” modernization theory. In the past decade, historians have explored the

³³ For an intellectual history of modernization theory, see: Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

³⁴ John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA (JFKL), National Security Files, Country Files, Bolivia, Box 10a, Folder: Experimental Policy Paper 7/19/62, “Experimental Policy Paper on Bolivia,” 19 July 1962, p. 18.

intellectual and ideological underpinning of modernization theory as manifest in the Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps, Military Civic Action, and other foreign assistance projects.³⁵ Recent scholarship has adopted a more critical perspective, advocating the study of what Nils Gilman calls “the local experience of development.”³⁶ Development initiatives were not simply implemented in host countries. They were instead melded with an array of ongoing development projects, local political practices, embedded social hierarchies, local forms of knowledge, and cultural politics. By studying the ways in which Bolivian leaders melded their own ideas of national development with foreign modernization theories, this dissertation joins a growing body of literature seeking to “decenter” modernization theory. In so doing, I hope to add nuance to our understanding of the international dynamics of modernization theory while answering David Engerman’s call for a “global history of modernization.”³⁷

Finally, exploring development paradigms during the 1950s and 1960s provides a window onto the profoundly transnational nature of the Revolution. Existing scholarship focuses almost exclusively on U.S.-Bolivian relations—a topic with a well-developed historiography steeped in both U.S. and Bolivian sources. Yet, in addition to providing the intellectual model, Mexico also provided the cultural icon for postrevolutionary Bolivia. José Vasconcelos, Moisés Sáenz, David Alfaro Siqueiros, Manuel Gamio, and other luminaries captured the imagination of postrevolutionary artists and intellectuals, who modeled their own efforts on the murals, monuments, and museums that continue to

³⁵ Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

³⁶ Nils Gilman, “Special Forum: Modernization as a Global Project,” H-Diplo Article Reviews, <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reviews/PDF/AR238-A.pdf> (Published on 7/29/2009).

³⁷ David C. Engerman and Corinna R. Unger, “Towards a Global History of Modernization,” *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 23, no. 3 (June 2009).

characterize the Mexican Revolution in the popular imagination. Diego Rivera visited La Paz in 1953, upon being personally invited by President Paz Estenssoro.³⁸ Julia Elena Fortún, Bolivia's leading postrevolutionary anthropologist, did her postgraduate work in anthropology at UNAM. Mexico's National Directorate of Anthropology trained a generation of Bolivian anthropologists at pilot programs not only in La Paz and Cochabamba, but also in Puebla and Chiapas. Indeed, the Bolivian Revolution of 1952 was deeply-rooted in the particular contours of its own postcolonial republican history. But like all revolutions, it too was shaped by the transnational flows of ideas and broader global-historical processes.

SCIENCE, RACE, AND KNOWLEDGE

In articulating their modernization fantasies and designing their attendant development strategies, the postrevolutionary leadership appealed to modern science. The Bolivian Revolution coincided with the atomic age *and* the space age, the invention of the polio vaccine, and the discovery of the structure of DNA. Pilots exceeded the speed of sound, and Carbon-14 unlocked the mysteries of ancient civilizations. It followed on the greatest atrocity in modern world history; one articulated in terms of "racial purity" and carried out in the name of science by a host of Nazi physicians and scientists. It was a novel moment in world history characterized not only by the Cold War, but a new international body, the United Nations. The charter of UNESCO, the cultural and scientific arm of the UN, reflected the signs of the times, stating "the great

³⁸ José Antonio Arze, "Discurso Pronunciado el 20 de Mayo de 1953, Presentado ante el público de La Paz al Pintor Mexicano Diego Rivera", en *Escritos Literarios*, José Antonio Arze, ed. (La Paz: Ediciones Roalva, 1981), pp. 78-84; Entrevista con Javier Galindo Cueto por el autor, realizada en la ciudad de La Paz el 6 de mayo de 2008; "Sobre el arte revolucionario y su obra pictórica habló Diego Rivera," *La Nación*, 21/5/1953, p. 5; "Diego Rivera habló de la lucha de Nuestros Pueblos," *El Diario*, 21/5/1953, p. 4.

and terrible war which has now ended was a war made possible by the denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men, and by the propagation, in their place, through ignorance and prejudice, of the doctrine of the inequality of men and races." In this emerging new world order, science would undermine race and refashion modernization as synonymous with equality.

Science proved to be the shibboleth of the MNR, a catchword that framed the modernizing aspirations of the postrevolutionary government. Politician, technocrat, and intellectual alike evoked the term whenever possible, citing the scientific bases of the agrarian reform, the scientific bases of the education reform, and, of course, the scientific bases of the Revolution itself.³⁹ For the MNR leadership, ever faithful in the modernizing capacity of the state, science provided the solution to urgent problems of rural modernization, economic planning, and national culture formation. After 1952, an increasing number of social scientists entered public service. They headed the agrarian and educational reforms committees. They served on state planning boards. They staffed state cultural offices. From sociologists and anthropologists to economists and statisticians, social scientists played a central—though largely overlooked—role in the revolutionary process. And as a result of the increasing collaboration between Bolivian academics and the state, social scientific knowledge contributed to processes of racial formation in postrevolutionary Bolivia.

³⁹ The MNR faith in science figures prominently in two of the most famous murals painted by Miguel Alandía Pantoja, "La reforma educativa" y "Nacionalización de las minas"—both of which can today be seen in the Monument to the National Revolution in the La Paz neighborhood of Miraflores. In each painting science is visually represented by the atom. The fact that Alandía Pantoja included this visual representation of science in his visual interpretation of some of the most important reforms introduced by the MNR in itself illustrated the party's modernizing faith in science. For another example of the MNR's faith in science, see President Víctor Paz Estenssoro, "Fundamentos científicos de la Revolución Nacional," *Cultura Política: Órgano oficial del Comando Departamental del MNR* [La Paz], Año 1, No. 1 (April 9, 1952), pp. 56-68. See also the SPIC pamphlet, "Fundamentos científicos de la Revolución Nacional" (La Paz: SPIC, c. 1954).

Race is a social construct that emerged in a particular historical moment marked by the rise of the modern nation-state, industrial revolution, the secularization of knowledge, and European imperial expansion. Michael Omi and Howard Winant employ the term “racial formation” to describe the processes by which individuals or groups are assigned a specific racial identity on account of “markers” such as appearance, skin color, or even cultural attributes such as language, style of dress, or place of residence.⁴⁰ Thomas Holt further points out that “the meaning of race and the nature of racisms articulate with (perhaps even are defined by) the given social formation of a particular historical moment.”⁴¹ Not only does this formulation of race (and racisms) belie the constructed nature of race, but it underscores the historical contingency of racialized identities. Yet as Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper show, however constructed identity may be, the process of naming, classifying, and categorizing are real cultural practices that carry implicit social weight.⁴² Though fictional, though socially constructed, race continues to operate as a language of exclusion.

Social scientific knowledge has historically played a central role in the process of racial formation. Peter Wade argues that “race” must be understood “in the context of a history of ideas, of Western institutionalized knowledge (whether social or natural science).”⁴³ Tracing the history of modern anthropology, George Stocking, Jr. provides a vivid illustration of the interconnected relationship between social scientific thought and

⁴⁰ Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1994)

⁴¹ Thomas C. Holt, *The Problem of Race in the Twenty-first Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 21-22.

⁴² Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity,’” *Theory and Society* 29 (2000), pp. 1-47.

⁴³ Peter Wade, *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America* (London: Pluto Press, 1997), p. 5.

the idea of race.⁴⁴ In recent decades, scholars have set out to explore how the relationship between racialization and the production of scientific knowledge have developed in distinct local, regional, and national contexts across Latin America. Nancy Leys Stepan pioneered research on race and science in Latin America with her study of the eugenics movement, demonstrating not only the spread of European ideas, but how they were interpreted and subsequently deployed according to local-historical contexts. Since then, scholars have built on Stepan's critical approach to the supposed universality of science to underscore the cultural specificity and historical contingency surrounding the construction of both scientific knowledge and social categories of race.⁴⁵ With this dissertation, I hope to contribute to this rich body of literature by demonstrating the role that social scientific knowledge played in the (re)construction of racialized identities in Bolivia.

This study traces two interconnected and often overlapping aspects of racial formation in postrevolutionary Bolivia. The first is *mestizaje*. Generally speaking, *mestizaje* refers to the process by which intellectuals and statesmen across the Americas broke with notions of purity of blood and embraced the mixed cultural and ethnic heritage of their populations as the foundation for a new national identity.⁴⁶ The content

⁴⁴ Nancy Leys Stepan, *The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).

⁴⁵ Alejandra Bronfman, *Measures of Equality: Social Science, Citizenship, and Race in Cuba, 1902-1940* (The University of North Carolina Press, 2004); see also essays in: Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson, and Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, editors, *Race and Nation in Modern Latin America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

⁴⁶ For studies on *mestizaje* see Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson, and Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, editors, *Race and Nation in Modern Latin America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Marisol de la Cadena, *Indigenous Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919-1991* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); Zolia S. Mendoza, *Creating our Own: Folklore, Performance, and Identity in Cusco, Peru* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Jeffrey L. Gould, *To Die in this Way: Nicaraguan Indians and the Myth of Mestizaje, 1880-1965* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); Natividad Gutiérrez, *Nationalist Myths and Ethnic Identities: Indigenous Intellectuals and the Mexican State* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999); Ronald Stutzman, "El Mestizaje: An All-

and meaning of the practice varied across time and space. For instance, Mexico's *raza cósmica* or Brazil's racial democracy differed markedly from the "great American melting pot." But each of these governments pursued the common objective of downplaying ethnic and cultural differences in order to unify diverse societies around shared national identities. Numerous studies have demonstrated the deceptive nature of the concept, which portends inclusion, but operates as "an all-inclusive ideology of exclusion" by promoting homogeneity.⁴⁷

After 1952, Bolivia was declared a race-less society.⁴⁸ Seeking to unite the fragmented nation around a shared national identity, the postrevolutionary state celebrated Bolivia's mixed Andean and Hispanic heritage. Scholarship on the Revolution fixated on the postrevolutionary government's promotion of the term "campesino" to replace the disparaging "indio" in public discourse, arguing that this class-based identity erased ethnic difference. Most English-language scholarship cites a declaration that President Victor Paz Estenssoro purportedly made upon signing the 1952 Agrarian Reform Decree: "From now on you will no longer be Indians, but rather peasants!" Not only is this quote a fabrication, but the postrevolutionary politics of *mestizaje* were more

Inclusive Ideology of Exclusion," in Normal E. Whitten (ed.) *Cultural Transformation and Ethnicity in Modern Ecuador* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1981); Peter Wade, "Rethinking *Mestizaje*: Ideology and Lived Experience." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 37, 239-257 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 254. For studies on *mestizaje* in Bolivia, see Laura Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for our Rights: Indigenous Struggles for Land and Justice in Bolivia, 1880-1952* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), pp. 164-191; Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, "El raíz: colonizadores y colonizados," in Xavier Albó and Raúl Barrios (eds.) *Violencia encubiertas en Bolivia*, Tomo 1, (La Paz: CIPCA y Aruwiyiri, 1993), pp. 27-142; Rossana Barragán, "Identidades indias y mestizas: Una intervención al debate," *Autodeterminación*, No. 10 (Octubre 1992), pp. 17-44.

⁴⁷ Ronald Stutzman, "El *Mestizaje*: An All-Inclusive Ideology of Exclusion," *Cultural Transformations and Ethnicity in Modern Ecuador*, N.E. Whitten, ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1981), pp. 45-94.

⁴⁸ "No hay diferencias raciales para la revolución nacional," *El Diario*, 4/15/1952, p.1.

subtle, complex, and often contradictory than this image presents.⁴⁹ By tracing the reciprocal relationship between national cultural formation and the production of social scientific knowledge, this study deepens our understanding of the postrevolutionary politics of mestizaje. Postrevolutionary mestizaje was founded upon two distinct, mutually-reinforcing images of indigenous Bolivians that were actively cultivated by the government: the “campesino” and the “indio.” The following chapters trace the construction of these mutually reinforcing ideals, their deployment, and how they operated to produce new forms of ethnic exclusion.

The second aspect of postrevolutionary racial formation examined in this dissertation explores the relationship between the construction of social scientific knowledge and shifting perception of indigenous alterity. The Revolution marked a paradigm shift in racial thought. In Bolivia, as in much of the Andean region, constructions of race have historically been framed in cultural terms. Being cast within a distinct racial category such as “Indian” or “cholo,” for example, was not necessarily dependent on skin color or anatomical features. It was instead determined by a multiplicity of cultural “markers” including fashion, personal hygiene habits, rural or urban society, and even market participation.⁵⁰ The postrevolutionary leadership dismissed biological theories of race, embracing instead the nonjudgmental (neutral)

⁴⁹ Scholarship cites Gerrit Huizer, *The Revolutionary Potential of Peasants in Latin America* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1972) in making this claim. There is not such a quote in this work. Víctor Paz Estenssoro gave two speeches on August 2, 1953—one in Urcureña upon signing the decree, the second at the national stadium in Miraflores upon returning to La Paz later that afternoon. On neither occasion did he make such a remark.

⁵⁰ Waskar Ari demonstrates how fashion marked race in Bolivian society. As Marcia Stephenson shows, hygiene and sanitation practices also served as signifiers of race. Cleanliness defined one's social position, while dirtiness was characterized with traditional Indians. Place of residence also determined racial identity. Cities were the centers of creole civilization and the modern western cultural models they venerated, while the countryside was synonymous with Indian-ness. Olivia Harris shows how market participation was also a factor in determining ethnic identity and provided the basis for broader discourse on alterity.

concept of cultural difference. The following chapters demonstrate how social scientific disciplines of sociology, history, anthropology, and archeology provided the “cognitive authority” to reinforce these emerging theories of human difference in postrevolutionary society.⁵¹ Although progressive for their time and place, these new ways of explaining human difference introduced new forms of ethnic exclusion. Cultural relativism displaced racial hierarchies founded on biology, while at the same time reaffirming indigenous inferiority by locating Andean civilization on a lower stage of human cultural evolution.

CULTURAL POLITICS OF REVOLUTION

Another objective of this dissertation is to provide the first comprehensive historical analysis of the cultural politics of the Bolivian Revolution of 1952. When I began this project, I noticed a surprising discrepancy in the literature on modern Bolivia. On the one hand, the general consensus was that the Revolution lacked a cultural component. In his landmark study of the Revolution, for example, James Malloy argues that “aparte de un reducido número de palabras y conceptos básicos, el MNR no creo lenguaje revolucionario alguno.”⁵² James Dunkerley similarly asserts that there was “a remarkable lack of rupture in cultural life and political style” following the Revolution, noting that “neither was there any sudden renaissance in literature or the

⁵¹ Nancy Leys Stepan, *The Hour of Eugenics: Race Gender, and Nation in Latin America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).

⁵² James Malloy, *Bolivia: La revolución inconclusiva*, cited in Marta Lanza Meneses, “La cultura nacional en el proyecto hegemónico del Nacionalismo Revolucionario: Análisis del modelo educativo para los indígenas,” (M.A. Thesis, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, La Paz, 1991), p. 61.

arts.”⁵³ Most recently, Laura Gotkowitz remarks that “the party dreamed up no new civic ceremonies,” and that “the revolutionaries did not forge a novel repertoire of symbols, signals, gestures or words.”⁵⁴ On the other hand, the literature on the Katarista movement cited the cultural practices of the postrevolutionary government as a central factor in motivating indigenous political activism during the 1960s and 1970s.⁵⁵ Citing the homogenizing national culture model promoted by the postrevolutionary state, Aymara activists declared, in 1973, that “Somos extranjeros en nuestro propio país.”⁵⁶

This gap in the historiography prompted my primary research question: What were the cultural practices of the postrevolutionary state, and how did they contribute to the new forms of cultural and ethnic exclusion experienced by indigenous peoples? I set off to Bolivia hoping to find documentary evidence that would allow me to answer this historical puzzle. The quest took me not to the national archives in Sucre, but to the dank closets and forgotten storerooms of state ministries and museums in La Paz. Archives long thought lost began to yield a coherent government project intended to forge a unifying national culture for the postrevolutionary republic. Before long, it became clear that not only did the Revolution include a cultural element (and a substantial one, at that); but that the establishment of a unifying national culture for the integrated republic was one of the primary objectives of the postrevolutionary leadership. A MNR Manifesto dating to 1946, for instance, indicates the privileged location occupied by national culture

⁵³ Dunkerley, *Rebellion in the Veins*, p. 51-52. Marco A. Peñaloza B., “Entrevista a James Dunkerley: Balance historiográfico sobre la Revolución de 1952,” *Data: Revista de Instituto de Estudios Andinos y Amazónicos*, No. 3 (1993), pp. 157-164, p. 163.

⁵⁴ Gotkowitz, “*A Revolution for Our Rights*,” pp. 276-277.

⁵⁵ Hurtado, *El Katarismo*; Rivera, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*.

⁵⁶ Centro de Coordinación y Promoción Campesina Mink’a, Centro Campesino Tupac Katari, Asociación de Estudiantes Campesinos de Bolivia, and Asociación Nacional de Profesores Campesinos, “Manifiesto de Tiwanaku,” La Paz, 30 de julio de 1973 (La Paz: Viceministerio de Descolonización, 2009), p. 1.

formation in the revolutionary imagination. “La Revolución Nacional, como teoría,” reads the document, “es un concepto orgánico completo, que abarca desde la economía del país hasta las más elevadas expresiones de su cultura.”⁵⁷ Establishing an authentic national culture from vernacular expressions of popular culture was one of the primary means through which the MNR leadership pursued national unity after 1952.

Still, such a discrepancy in the scholarship begs the question: Why have the cultural politics of the Revolution remained so misunderstood? The primary explanation lies in a lack of archival evidence.⁵⁸ In the tumultuous politics of the postrevolutionary period, archives were often destroyed as a result of antigovernment revolts, one salient example being in September 1956, when the Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB) initiated an urban revolt in La Paz that culminated in the destruction of the archives of the state propaganda ministry. Other documents have been presumed lost or stolen—victims of Bolivia’s poor institutional memory practices. Another explanation of the “silences” surrounding the cultural politics may be that the military government of the period 1964–82 distorted the historical memory of the Revolution. Finally, it seems that scholars have measured the Bolivian experience against other revolutionary episodes in the Americas, notably Mexico and Cuba, both of which carried out cultural programs exceptional in their scope and organization. Yet, rather than measuring 1952 against cultural specific and historically contingent revolutionary episodes in the Americas, the Bolivian Revolution should be judged within its own historical context.

⁵⁷ International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, the Netherlands (IISH), Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario Collection (MNR), Folletos (1942–1997), ff. 1–2, “Manifiesto del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario frente a la reacción y a la demagogia,” Marzo 1946, pp. 8–9.

⁵⁸ Luis Oporto Ordóñez provides an overview of public memory practices in *Historia de la archivística boliviana* (La Paz: Fundación PIEB, 2006).

Only recently have scholars turned their attention to the cultural politics of the 1952 Revolution.⁵⁹ What is becoming absolutely certain with increased scholarly interest in the topic is that the 1952 Revolution was marked by a massive cultural component, whose breadth and legacy is only now beginning coming to light. The following pages build upon the pioneering research of Martha Lanza Meneses, Pablo Quisbert, Beatriz Rossells, Michelle Bigenho, and Fernando Rios to further reveal the institutional framework and discursive practices underlying the potent national cultural myth fomented by the postrevolutionary leadership. To be sure, the Revolution did not represent an entirely new moment in the cultural history of modern Bolivia. Nevertheless it did mark the consolidation of ascendant intellectual trends and social scientific thought into a distinct state project. State intervention in cultural production was not entirely new either, though it did witness an unprecedented expansion after 1952.

⁵⁹ The most comprehensive treatment of the topic is Beatriz Rossells, "Después de 'Siempre': Sobre las políticas culturales del MNR de 1952," *Historias...*, No. 6 (2003), pp. 171-193. Iris Villegas and Pablo Quisbert, "A la búsqueda del enemigo oligárquico: Arte y cultura durante el periodo revolucionario, 1952-53" in *Visiones de fin de siglo: Bolivia y América Latina en el Siglo XX*, Dora Cajías, Magdalena Cajías, eds. (La Paz: Plural, 2001), pp 721-29. For a comprehensive history of middle-class cultural production in Bolivia, see José Fellman Velarde, *Historia de la cultura boliviana: fundamentos socio-políticos*. (La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro, 1976). For a broad critique of nationalist cultural production, see Edgar Avila Echazu, *Revolucion y cultura en Bolivia* (Tarija, 1963). Other glimpses of cultural production during the revolution can be gleaned from the following works. On film, see Carlos Mesa Gisbert, *La aventura del cine boliviano 1952-85*. On radio, see Cristóbal Coronel Quisbert, *En un estado de coma: Radio Illimani, 1950-1964* (La Paz: El Impresor s.r.l., 2003). On theater, see Michelle Bigenho, "Embodied Matters: Bolivian Fantasy and Indigenismo," *Journal of Latin American Anthropology*, vol. 11, no. 2 (2006), 267-93. On art, sculpture, and murals, see Carlos Salazar Mostajo, *La pintura contemporánea de Bolivia: Ensayo histórico-cultural* (Editorial Juventud: La Paz, 1989); Fernando Rios, "Bolero Trios, Mestizo Panpipe Ensembles, and Bolivia's 1952 Revolution: Urban La Paz Musicians and the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement," *Ethnomusicology*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 2010), pp. 281-317; See also Fernando Emilio Ríos, "Music in Urban La Paz, Bolivian Nationalism, and the Early History of Cosmopolitan Andean music: 1936-1970" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, 2005); Marta Lanza Meneses, "La cultura nacional en el proyecto hegemónico del Nacionalismo Revolucionario: Análisis del modelo educativo para los indígenas," (M.A. Thesis, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, La Paz, 1991).

STRUCTURE

This dissertation consists of seven thematic chapters, which follow a basic linear chronology. Each chapter makes a particular argument while at the same time, contributing to the central, overarching argument of the work. Chapter one locates the 1952 Revolution in longer, deeper local-historical processes rooted to Bolivia's colonial past. Most scholarship tends to situate the Revolution within the specific episodic history of the post-Chaco period. Yet recent historiography on the pre-revolutionary period calls for a critical reassessment of the Revolution and its origins. In 1980, Silvia Rivera identified two distinct historical trajectories within grassroots indigenous struggle for territorial rights and justice: the "short memory" rooted in the post-Chaco syndicalist movement and the "long memory" of anticolonial rebellion forged in the 1781 Túpak Katari Rebellion.⁶⁰ Since then, a generation of scholars have revealed the historical continuity of indigenous struggle. Most recently, Laura Gotkowitz had traced this continuity up to the Revolution, making a provocative argument for the existence of an autonomous "rural revolution" that preceded the predominantly urban-based 1952 Revolution.⁶¹ Taking both "long memory" and "short memory" perspectives into account necessitates situating the Revolution in a much longer historical trajectory. Since the foundation of the Republic, and even before, indigenous-state relations have been contoured as much by state policy as by popular mobilization among Bolivia's rural, indigenous majority. By locating my study as the culmination of longer historical processes, I demonstrate how the experience of both long memory and short memory shaped the revolutionary process and contoured indigenous citizenship.

⁶⁰ Rivera Cusicanqui, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*.

⁶¹ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for our Rights*.

Chapter two explores the process of indigenous integration in postrevolutionary Bolivia. Indigenous integration was founded on three specific reforms introduced during the first years of the Revolution: universal suffrage, agrarian reform, and rural education. To engineer these reforms, the state turned to sociologists, forging a critical relationship between social science and the government which would become a central component of the Revolution. Tracing the economic policies, development strategies, and racialized thinking of policymakers affiliated with the postrevolutionary government, I examine the place of indigenous Bolivians in the revolutionary imagination. Focusing on the making of the agrarian reform law and the rural education initiative, I then examine how that imaginary mapped the place of Indians in the postrevolutionary republic. Indigenous integration was a modernization imperative, and its history cannot be understood apart from the development politics of the postrevolutionary leadership on the one hand, and the prevailing currents of racial thought on the other.

Chapter three examines the contours of postrevolutionary state formation as the government defined the Revolution and set out to mobilize society for the most ambitious state-led modernization initiative in Bolivian history. The celebrated Bolivian social theorist, René Zavaleta Mercado argues that the Revolution marked a new cycle in the historical formation of the Bolivian state.⁶² Before the Revolution, suffrage was limited to literate, property-holding males and framed by a classical liberal nineteenth-century constitution. The Revolution signalled the emergence of a new “national-popular” state characterized by mass political participation and a corporatist welfare state.⁶³ I explore how the postrevolutionary government adapted to this novel relationship between state

⁶² Zavaleta Mercado, *50 años de historia*.

⁶³ Zavaleta Mercado, *Lo nacional-popular en Bolivia*.

and society. I employ the term “popular statecraft” to define the particular way in which the MNR consolidated its position as the most powerful member of the postrevolutionary government and then set out to integrate diverse social movement into the state apparatus by way of their organization into vertical, hierarchized corporate structures such as the MNR and the COB. As state officials set out to distinct urban and rural spaces incorporating groups, it also employed a propaganda campaign that served to project an aura of state power and orientate the revolution for national development. This propaganda effort, which spanned roughly 1952-1956, provided the foundation for the more ambitious and centralized state cultural initiatives of the late 1950s and 1960s.

The revision of national history provided not only the cornerstone of the cultural politics of the state, but also the very foundation for the postrevolutionary republic. Since 1941, MNR ideologues Carlos Montenegro, Juan Cuadros Quiroga, and Augusto Céspedes launched a concerted effort to revise national history. Chapter four examines the construction of this narrative and the postrevolutionary state’s effort to commemorate it. With monuments, murals, and national holidays, the postrevolutionary government infused civic time and space with a narrative of the revolution that reaffirmed its particular reading of the past. In addition to contextualizing the Revolution, this revisionist narrative historicized the myth of national unity by linking middle class professionals, indigenous peasants, urban workers, and miners through a common history of resistance to neo-colonial domination. Although this narrative inserted Indians into the national community, it privileged creole and mestizos as agents of national history while denying Indigenous people an active role in the historical formation of the Bolivian nation. Key moments of indigenous history—the anticolonial rebellions of the 1780s and

the 1899 Federal War, for instance—were either subordinated to creole and mestizo struggles or enveloped in silence.

If the postrevolutionary leadership looked to colonial and republican history to explain the revolutionary present, it was the pre-colonial past that provided a glimpse of the modern future. Just weeks after the Revolution, the government launched an ambitious project to excavate and reconstruct the pre-Hispanic ruins at Tiwanaku. Chapter five examines this project as a lens onto the mutually-constitutive relationship that emerged between constructions of race, knowledge and national identity in postrevolutionary Bolivia. One of the primary objectives of this project was the valorization of the Aymara past. In the creole imagination, the Aymara were the most backward and savage of Bolivia's indigenous population. With carbon-dating and stratigraphic analysis, the postrevolutionary government turned to modern science to dispel prevalent ideas of Aymara inferiority by displacing a more recent, contested history of ethnic resistance with a glorious pre-Hispanic past rooted in Tiwanaku. Yet the Tiwanaku restoration project also affirmed the role assigned to Indians in postrevolutionary national development initiatives. "In Bolivia, archeological research implicitly carries a message of hope" wrote Carlos Ponce Sanginés, the director of the state archeology mission. "If in the past, indigenous people were capable of notable feats, if they could erect buildings and outstanding cities, it is logical that their descendants, the Indians of today, will be able to master modern technology in the future and assist in the transformation of this backward country."⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Carlos Ponce Sanginés, *Centro de Investigaciones Arqueológicas en Tiwanaku: Informe de labores* (La Paz: Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes, 1961), p. 11.

When it came to cultural patrimony, however, state efforts to preserve the Aymara past contradicted its vision of the modern future. Chapter six explored the national and local dynamics of national cultural patrimony formation. The establishment of a strong cultural patrimony regime was central component of postrevolutionary national culture formation. Seeking to valorize long-marginalized expressions of indigenous popular culture, officials expanded the content of the national cultural patrimony to include indigenous dance, music, and art. Yet as the government sought to protect archeological land bordering the Tiwanaku ruins, it came into conflict with Aymara communities that had been waging a fifty-year struggle for territorial restitution. With the 1953 Agrarian reform law, archeological lands that had long been protected by virtue of private ownership were suddenly under the control of Aymara communities. The struggles over land that ensued between state archeologists and indigenous communities not only indicated the divergent perspectives of the meaning of territory, history, and nationhood, but also played an important role in the formation of the postrevolutionary patrimony regime.

Chapter seven examines the new forms of ethnic exclusion generated by the Revolution by tracing the development and institutionalization of anthropology. National development presented postrevolutionary officials with a paradox. Officials feared that the rural modernization initiative was causing the disappearance of the “authentic” indigenous culture that was central to postrevolutionary national identity. In an effort to safeguard Bolivia’s indigenous heritage, the government created the Department of Ethnography and Folklore in 1956. In subsequent years, anthropologists traversed the countryside to observe, record, and then archive indigenous ceremonies, celebrations, and traditions before they vanished as Bolivia transformed from a traditional to modern

society. Yet while modernization was the imperative for the creation of a state folklore mission in the 1950s, by the 1960s modernization became the goal of the anthropology itself. In 1962, the government aligned its development initiatives with the U.S. Alliance for Progress and announced an ambitious ten-year rural development program. Trained by Mexican, Peruvian, and U.S. social scientists, a new generation of Bolivian anthropologists set out to orientate indigenous communities toward extensive agricultural practices. In so doing, it hoped to increase commercial agriculture while diversifying the national economy. Alongside rural teachers, applied anthropologists served on the frontline of state initiatives to assimilate indigenous Bolivians into the modern republic imagined by the postrevolutionary leadership.

In the end, this dissertation makes valuable contributions to several different bodies of knowledge. In terms of Bolivian historiography, it challenges the prevailing consensus that the sweeping socioeconomic reforms introduced by Bolivia's postrevolutionary government were not accompanied by a parallel cultural initiative. Drawing on newly-discovered archival sources from research in Bolivia, Mexico, the Netherlands, and the United States, I demonstrate how the cultural politics of national integration operated to reproduce colonial racial hierarchies. In so doing, I dialog with broader currents on racial formation while underscoring the historical contingency and cultural specificity surrounding the production of social knowledge. While scholarship on the Revolution remains largely confined to national borders, I situate the moment within the transnational flow of ideas. Government officials employed U.S. modernization theory, anthropologists engaged Mexican social science, and indigenous activists evoked postcolonial thinkers like Frantz Fanon and Malcolm X. This approach reveals the contribution of Third World intellectuals to modernization paradigms while

inserting Bolivia into the global decolonization movement. As scholars continue to debate the legacy of Spanish colonial rule in the Americas, this study shows that not only was Latin America's postcolonial predicament manifest in racial discrimination and economic inequality, but it was also deeply embedded in social scientific knowledge and state cultural practices.

Chapter One

Of Postcolonial Predicaments: Mapping the Contours of Indigenous-State Relations, 1825-1952

It seemed to me that the white people live in some fear of the Indians. When the enormous predominance of the native element is considered, such an attitude is by no means unnatural; in fact, a traveler can only regard with astonishment and admiration the manner in which the millions of Indians are actually kept in order by the small white population.

-Sir Martin Conway, upon visiting Bolivia in 1899

En la gran perspectiva de la historia, cuando nosotros hayamos desaparecidos como seres humanos, cuando nuestras luchas se vean en su justa dimensión, lo único que se registrará con valor universal será la incorporación de los indios, de los siervos, de los oprimidos durante siglos a la vida civilizada, a la vida humana.

-President Víctor Paz Estenssoro, 1/5/1955

Postcolonialism is a condition that Latin America shares with Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, where European powers established imperial enterprises between the fifteenth and twentieth centuries. Though Latin America's "postcolonial condition" may not seem a particularly profound discovery in the historiography of the region, it is a relatively recent observation in the broader literature of postcolonial studies.⁶⁵ To be sure, Independence for most Spanish American republics was strictly a political affair. The caste hierarchies that ordered colonial society continued into Republican life, shaping the social practices, economic relationships, and scientific knowledge of the fledgling American nation-states. Societies, long segregated into two distinct *republicas*

⁶⁵ Jorge Klor de Alva negates Latin America's postcolonial status in "The Postcolonization of the (Latin) American Experience: A Reconsideration of 'Colonialism,' 'Postcolonialism,' and 'Mestizaje'", in Gyan Prakash ed., *After Colonialism: Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995): 241-75. Of particular importance, see Mark Thurner's rejoinder: "After Spanish Rule: Writing Another After" in Mark Thurner & Andrés Guerrero, eds., *After Spanish Rule: Postcolonial Predicaments of the Americas* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003); For a justification of Latin America's postcolonial status, see also the forwards in this volume by Shahid Amin and Andrés Guerrero.

and stratified by porous boundaries of caste not only had to “imagine” a nation, but also had to forge a state.⁶⁶ Notions of citizenship, identity, and race became especially salient—and contentious—as elite and popular classes mobilized to define the emerging republics and establish their place within them.

In Bolivia, the primary symptoms of this condition were manifest in indigenous-state relations. At Independence, Indians constituted approximately three quarters of Bolivia’s total population.⁶⁷ Defining the status of this population proved a novel challenge for republican leaders. In the sixteenth century, the Spanish crown had created two separate republics—one Spaniard, the other Indian—as the foundation for colonial governance, endowing each with distinct legal rights, social privileges, and financial obligations.⁶⁸ Indeed, the Crown’s intention of maintaining separate and unequal *republicas* was promptly undermined by miscegenation and the emergence of the *castas*.⁶⁹ Still, by the eighteenth century, after enduring for over three centuries, this institutionalized segregation was the natural order of things, and provided the foundation of the social hierarchies that shaped the republican period. As Mark Thurner, David Nugent, and others point out, however, the colonial laws also provided Indians across

⁶⁶ R. Douglas Cope explores race and social mobility in during the colonial period in *The Limits of Racial Domination: Plebeian Society in Colonial Mexico City, 1660-1720* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994); Similarly, Ann Twinam offers a revealing account of gender, class, and honor in *Public Lives, Private Secrets: Gender, Honor, Sexuality, and Illegitimacy in Colonial Spanish America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). As for national imaginings, see Benedict Anderson’s now classic *Imagining Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1991). On not only imagining, but projecting “nationness” see Mauricio Tenorio Trillo’s “Essaying the History of National Images” in Mark Thurner & Andrés Guerrero, eds., *After Spanish Rule: Postcolonial Predicaments of the Americas* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003): 58-88; See also: Mauricio Tenorio Trillo, *Mexico at the World’s Fairs: Crafting a Modern Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996)

⁶⁷ Herbert Klein, *Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

⁶⁸ Thomas Abercrombie, “To be Indian, to be Bolivian,” *Nation-States and Indians in Latin America*, Greg Urban and Joel Sherzer, eds. (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1991), pp. 95-130

⁶⁹ For more on the colonial caste system, see: See Lewis, *Hall of Mirrors*; Cope, *The Limits of Racial Domination*

the Andes with a language of rights before republican institutions.⁷⁰ Generation after generation of republican leaders—whether presidential creoles or rural apoderados—faced the challenge of abolishing colonial caste hierarchies and merging these distinct and unequal *republicas* into unified nation-states.

True, this challenge was located at the heart of the postcolonial predicament across the Americas; but it was especially acute in Bolivia, which had the highest proportion of indigenous peoples in the hemisphere. What would be the status of Indians in the new republic? Would they enjoy the same rights as European-descendent creoles? How would they fit into republican society? For the ascendant creole elite, indigenous integration necessitated the reconciliation of liberal precepts of universal equality with a colonial legacy of legally sanctioned inequality. Like the postcolonial republics of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, but only earlier, Bolivians too struggled with the enduring tension between ethnic plurality and liberal democracy that lay at the heart of the modern nation-state.

This chapter chronicles the evolution of Indian-state relations from the foundation of the Republic in 1825 to the 1952 Revolution. The Revolution not only resulted from the political transformations and social reform that succeeded the Chaco War (1932-35), but its origins must also be situated in a longer history of interethnic struggle for autonomy, justice, and land. Such a concern with the *longue durée* originates from two historiographical developments. The first is Silvia Rivera's emphasis on the "long memory" of highland indigenous struggle rooted in the anticolonial rebellions of the late

⁷⁰ Mark Thurner, *From Two Republics to One Divided: Contradiction of Postcolonial Nationmaking in Andean Peru* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), pp. 5-6

eighteenth century.⁷¹ The second is Steve Stern's call for the need to "incorporate multiple time scales" in the study of peasant rebellion and its causes.⁷² Indigenous resistance to colonial and republican institutions was a constant and increasingly-coordinated part of this story. To exclude indigenous struggle, or to cast rural communities aside as passive actors or "vanquished victims" in republican history would silence a crucial component of republican nation-state formation.⁷³ Rural resistance defined the terms in indigenous-state relations just as much as government policies, mapping the contours of nation-state formation for the entire period under examination. In order to understand the significance of the Revolution in terms of indigenous-state relations, the moment thus must be situated in deeper processes and longer historical trajectories that predate the foundation of the Republic.

Condensing over a century of Republican history in a single chapter requires a very selective reading of Bolivia's complex national past. My particular intention here is to demonstrate the dynamic interplay between indigenous peoples and the republican state in order to underscore the deeper historical processes that underlie the 1952 Revolution. While tracing the history of these two historically-contingent social groups, I tie the particular political, social, economic, and cultural processes to changes in the global political economy. Complex and messy historical episodes are abridged and situated on a seemingly linear historical trajectory. And though historical processes are

⁷¹ Silvia Rivera, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos, Luchas del campesinado aymara y quechua 1900-1980* (La Paz: Aruwiwiri, 2003 [1984]);

⁷² Steve J. Stern, "New Approaches to the Study of Peasant Rebellion and Consciousness: Implications of the Andean Experience," in Stern, ed., *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries* (Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin, 1987), pp. 3-25, discussion of temporality on pp. 12-13, citation from p. 12.

⁷³ Nathan Wachtel, *La vision des vaincus: les Indiens du Pérou devant la conquête espagnole, 1530-1570* (Paris: Gallimard, 1971).



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Illustration 2: Map of Bolivia.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ Image from: http://images.nationmaster.com/images/motw/americas/bolivia_rel93.jpg

rarely linear, I structure them chronologically for sake of clarity and brevity, examining key moments that that have shaped historical memory and contoured indigenous-state relations. Most of these episodes—for example, the 1781 Tupak Katari rebellion, the 1899 Federal War, the Chaco War—have rich historiographies which I discuss, often too briefly, in the footnotes.

THE FORGING OF INDIAN-STATE RELATIONS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC

On August 6, 1825, representatives from the provinces of Upper Peru declared independence not only from Spain, but from the newly-independent republics of Peru and the United Provinces of Rio de La Plata. Many observers, including Simón Bolívar himself, had expressed doubt as to whether the territory could constitute a legitimate base for an independent republic.⁷⁵ The new republic would be carved from one of the most geographically-diverse and ethnically-fragmented regions in the entire empire. Roughly twice the size of Spain, the territory straddled the rugged, often-impassable ranges of the central Andes before carrying on to the vast, subtropical lowlands to the east. It was predominantly populated by Indians. Transforming Upper Peru into an integrated nation state thus must have seemed a daunting undertaking to republican leaders. In addition to the already burdensome challenges of demography and geography, they had to forge a state after fifteen years of civil war—a task that entailed the establishment of order among a fractured elite, the definition and protection of national borders, and the forging of state institutions that would unite the most diverse nation in the hemisphere.

⁷⁵ Herbert Klein, *Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society*, 2nd Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 98-100. See also: William Lee Lofstrom, “The Promise and Problem of Reform: Attempted Social and Economic Change in the First Years of Bolivian Independence,” Ph.D. Dissertation, (Cornell University, 1972); Charles W. Arnade, *The Emergence of the Republic of Bolivia* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1957).

Overcoming deep-seeded racial hierarchies in order to integrate indigenous people into national life would prove the most significant challenge confronting republican leaders.

In a recent study on nineteenth-century nation-state formation in the Andes, historian Brooke Larson notes the particular spatial challenges facing republican leaders in Bolivia: there were no frontiers. Unlike other nations in the Americas, creoles could not simply turn their back on the Indian population.⁷⁶ Two thirds of Bolivia's total population was concentrated in the western-most part of the country, along a north-south trading axis running from the Lake Titicaca basin to the mining centers of Oruro and Potosí, and also to the lush valleys of the Cordillera Oriental just to the east, home of the vibrant markets of Cochabamba. The frontiers that did exist, particularly those in the eastern lowlands that today border Brazil, were poorly defined, undefended, unexplored, and populated by the Guaraní, Chiriguano, and other native peoples. European advances in the eastern lowlands had been spearheaded by Jesuit and Franciscan missionaries. By the nineteenth century, settlement was limited to commercial hubs of Santa Cruz and Trinidad and smaller outlying towns. In the densely-populated highlands to the west, La Paz, Sucre, Potosí, and other creole centers of trade and administration were surrounded by indigenous communities. Frontiers between the Andean and European populations were thus not defined by demarcated spaces or expanding lines of civilization. Rather they were characterized by porous distinctions between rural and urban whereupon cultural norms—of language, dress, diet, or recreation—distinguished between civilization and barbarity.

⁷⁶ Brooke Larson, *Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810-1910* (New York, Cambridge University Press), p. 204

The racialized hierarchies of the colonial caste system ordered republican society. As Laura Lewis and other colonial historians have demonstrated, the colonial caste system is best understood as a pyramid, in which whiteness was at the top, Indians at the wide base, and blacks, *multatos*, *mestizos* and other *castas* occupying the wide space in between.⁷⁷ According to the first national population estimates, just over one million people lived in Bolivia in 1826. At the top was the creole population, who numbered 200,000. This population included all Bolivians of European descent. Thanks to the legacy of the colonial caste system, they enjoyed social privileges by virtue of *limpieza de sangre*, honor, and virtue. Although the small creole minority may have retained a monopoly on republican political and economic institutions, they were by no means a homogenous lot. At the apex of republican society was the upper crust of the creole elite—large landowners, mine owners, wealthy merchants, and ranking civil and military officials. Below them were middling creoles and *blancooides* who worked as merchants, small- and medium-estate owners, bureaucrats, artisans, lawyers, and soldiers.

Beneath the creoles, occupying the middling sections of this complex, dynamic, and evolving social pyramid, was the *castas*. That is, those of mixed Andean and European heritage who existed in the murky legal space between the two republics. In Bolivia, this group is most commonly referred to as *cholos*, whereas they are categorized as *mestizos* or *ladinos* in other parts of Spanish America. Just as it had during the colonial period, their social position varied widely according to occupation, place of residence, and the degree to which they embraced European language and customs. Even within this social group, there existed a vocabulary of distinction. For example, *Chu'tas*

⁷⁷ Laura Lewis, *Hall of Mirrors: Power, Witchcraft, and Caste in Colonial Mexico* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003) pp. 33-35. See also: R. Douglas Cope, *The Limits of Racial Domination: Plebeian Society in Colonial Mexico City, 1660-1720* (Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994).

were partially acculturated urban Aymara. Across the Andes, race was above all a cultural marker.⁷⁸ Identity was not fixed, and social, economic, and cultural mobility was relatively widespread. Cholos often “passed” as creoles, even ascending to some of the most prominent positions in government.⁷⁹ Nineteenth century patriots like as Pedro Domingo and Andres Santa Cruz were of “mixed parentage,” as was Bolivia’s most notorious caudillo, Mariano Melgarejo.

Located at the wide base of Bolivia’s postcolonial social pyramid was the indigenous population. At independence, indigenous Bolivians numbered some 800,000.⁸⁰ This estimate, which excluded the Guaraní, Chiriguano, and other lowland ethnic groups, reflected the population of the two primary ethno-linguistic groups in Bolivia, the Quechua and Aymara. Anthropologist Thomas Abercrombie urges conderation of the shifting nature of such categories as ethnicity and language, mapping Bolivia’s human geography as a multiplicity of distinct albeit porous “cultural formations” defined in relation to locality before perceived ethnic or linguistic totality.⁸¹ The only distinctions recognized by the Crown, however, were those socioeconomic relationships defined in realtions to the colonial state, such as *comunario*, *yanacona*, *agregado*, *forestero*, and so on. One common aspect of these highland groups was their socioeconomic organization. The cornerstone of the sedentary agricultural societies that characterized Andean civilization was the ayllu. Porous kinship networks associated with

⁷⁸ Waskar T. Ari, “Race and subaltern nationalism: AMP activist-intellectuals in Bolivia, 1921-1964” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University, 2005).

⁷⁹ William Lee Lofstrom, “The Promise and Problem of Reform: Attempted Social and Economic Change in the First Years of Bolivian Independence,” Ph.D. Dissertation, (Cornell University, 1972), pp. 4-5.

⁸⁰ Herbert Klein, *Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 1880-1952*, p. 6, note 3.

⁸¹ Thomas Abercrombie, “To be Indian, to be Bolivian,” *Nation-States and Indians in Latin America*, Greg Urban and Joel Sherzer, eds. (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1991), pp. 95-130, see especially pp. 96-100.

rights to a particular territory, ayllu structured family, community, ritual, and civic practices. They embraced collective land holding and agricultural practices and deeply embedded customs of labor reciprocity and gender complementarity.⁸² Before the

⁸² The ethnographic and historical literature on the ayllu is extensive. In Bolivia, early indigenista writers such as Bautista Saavedra and Manuel Rigoberto Paredes wrote on this basic unit of Andean socioeconomic organization. See: Bautista Saavedra, *El Ayllu* (La Paz: Imp. Artística, Velarde, Aldazosa y ca, 1903). For an overview of Paredes' thought on Andean society, see Sinclair Thomson, "Bolivia's Turn-of-the-Century Indian Problem: The Case of Manuel Rigoberto Paredes (M.A. Thesis, University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1987). A later generation of writers that included French intellectual Louis Baudin, and Belgium social scientist George Rouma sought to identify in the Ayllu organic forms of communist or socialist systems. See: Louis Baudin, *L'empire socialiste des Inka* (Paris, Institut d'ethnologie, 1928); George Rouma *La Civilisation des Incas et leur Communisme autocratique* (Brussels: Médicale et Scientifique, 1924). Another study on the nature of property in Andean society is Hildebrand Castro Pozo, *Del ayllu al corporativismo socialista* (Lima: Mejía, 1936). Such ideas were highly debated in social scientific circles in the Andes, and Bolivian sociologists Jose Antonio Arze y Arze, Ernesto Anaya Mercado, and Arturo Urquidí Mercado each entered the fray. See for example: José Antonio Arze, *Sociografía de inkario: Fué socialista o comunista e imperio inkaiko?* (La Paz: Fénix, 1952). The nature of the ayllu was revisited again in the 1950s by John Murra, and in the 1960s, by Ramiro Condarco Morales. Murra developed his "vertical archipelago" model and Condarco Morales established his theory of "ecosimbiosis interzonal." These ideas revolutionized the way the social sciences understood the socioeconomic organization of pre-Hispanic Andean society and orientated a generation of subsequent research in not just anthropology, but history, archeology, and sociology as well. See: John V. Murra, "The Economic Organization of the Inca State" (Doctoral Dissertation), University of Chicago, 1956; Ramiro Condarco Morales, *Protohistoria andina* (Oruro: Editorial de la Universidad Técnica de Oruro, 1967). For a detailed overview on the thought of Condarco in relation to Murra, see: Ximena Mendinaceli, "Ramiro Condarco y su contribución sobre los pisos ecológicos," in Carmen Beatriz Loza and Esther Ayllón Soria, eds., *Homenaje al escritor Ramiro forjado en los mares de tierra Condarco* (La Paz: Carrera de Historia, Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, 2009), pp. 101-115. Thanks go to Mariela Rodríguez Laguna for passing on this source. More recently, such scholars as Tristan Platt and Thomas Abercrombie have further deepened out knowledge of the history, transformation, and organization of the ayllu with deep ethnographic studies of Ayllu in Potosi and La Paz. See: Tristan Platt, *Estado boliviano y el ayllu andino: Tierra y tributo en el norte de Potosí* (Lima: IEP, 1982). See also: Thomas A. Abercrombie, *Pathways of Memory and Power: Ethnography and History among an Andean People* (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1998). For a discussion of the this scholarship, see Brooke Larson's commanding historiographical overview, "Andean Communities, Political Cultures, and Markets: The Changing Contours of a Field" in Brooke Larson, Olivia Harris, eds., *Ethnicity, Markets and Migration in the Andes: At the Crossroads of History and Anthropology* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995). More recently, Silvia Rivera, Xavier Albó and the Taller de Historia Oral Andina (THOA) have built taken on the historical and contemporary role of the ayllu in Bolivia society. See, for example: Silvia Rivera y equipo THOA, *Proyectos de desarrollo en el norte de Potosí* (La Paz: Aruwiwiri, 1992); Silvia Rivera, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos, Luchas del campesinado aymara y quechua 1900-1980* (La Paz: Aruwiwiri, 2003 [1984]); Silvia Rivera, "La raíz: colonizadores y colonizados," en *Violencias encubiertas en Bolivia*, Xavier Albó y Raúl Barrios, eds. N°1, (1993); Taller de Historia Oral Andina, *Ayllu: Pasado y futuro de los pueblos originarios* (La Paz: Aruwiwiri, 1995). Some of these debates will be explored in the context of revolutionary Bolivia in the chapters that follow.

Spanish conquest, ayllus claimed lands located in distinct climate zones as a means to adapt to the diverse microclimates of the central Andes.⁸³ The spatial logic of the ayllu was nevertheless lost on colonial officials, as the Crown awarded conquistadors grants of indigenous labor called *encomiendas* and transformed disparate rural settlements into settled hamlets called *reducciones* or *concentraciones*.

Quechua-speakers were the larger of the two groups, populating the valleys of the Cordillera Occidental, which spans the departments of Cochabamba, Potosí, Chuquisaca, and parts of Oruro. Their language lays testament to their origins as Inca colonists, or *mitmaes*, originally sent to populate the frontier of the fourth realm of the empire, Kollasuyo. With the conquest, they were subsequently parceled off to *encomenderos*. They worked colonial haciendas as agrarian laborers to meet the demand for goods at the Potosí silver mines to the west.⁸⁴ Others remained in semi-autonomous, tribute-paying communities. Because of both the market and the climate, there was a higher prevalence of hacienda expansion in the central valley to the east of the altiplano, where corn, wheat, and other goods flourished in the temperate environment. It was here where, in the temperate valleys of Cochabamba, where *mestizaje* established its deepest roots in Bolivia.

On the more arid altiplano to the west was the Aymara-speaking population. They populated the Lake Titicaca basin and the altiplano, as well as regions such as the Yungas on the subtropical valleys on the eastern slopes of the Cordillera Real—what are now the

⁸³ John V. Murra, “The Economic Organization of the Inca State” (Doctoral Dissertation: University of Chicago, 1956); Ramiro Condarco Morales, *Protohistoria andina* (Oruro: Editorial de la Universidad Técnica de Oruro, 1967).

⁸⁴ Brooke Larson, *Cochabamba, 1550-1900: Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia*, Expanded Edition (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), chapters 4 and 5.

departments of La Paz, Oruro, and part of Potosí.⁸⁵ Still today, the providence of the Aymara remains a speculative subject in the historical, ethnographic, archeological literature. Many agree that it was the Aymara who originally constructed the




Illustration 3: Map of territories held by preconquest Aymara kindoms.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ The Yungas were also home to Bolivia's small African-descendent population, mostly enslaved until abolition in 1852, and who have since adopted Aymara styles of dress and community organization, melding it with their own tradition and languages as coca farmers and rural merchants.

monumental architecture of Tiwanaku, while others speculate that it was, in fact, the Aymara that conquered the pre-Incan Andean civilization (see chapter five). Under Spanish colonial rule, rural Aymara-speaking communities were increasingly organized into *reducciones* to facilitate the extraction of tribute.

Like the Quechua to the east, Aymara-speaking communities also had to meet royal tribute obligations by serving the mita, the onerous system of draft labor that required indigenous communities to provide workers to meet the constant labor demands of the Potosi silver mines. Ethnohistorian John Murra found that while the Inca state only demanded labor from their subjects, the Spanish also demanded tribute in the forms of goods.⁸⁷ To meet such demands, native Andeans remitted potatoes, barley, quinoa, and/or wool to the local corregidor. Across the region, local ethnic authorities—mallku in Aymara, kuraka in Quechua, cacique in Spanish—became intercultural brokers, as the crown charged them with meeting tribute obligations. Many resisted the labor demands by fleeing their communities. By Independence, members of autonomous communities, commonly referred to as comunarios, greatly outnumbered hacienda Indians or colonos. Foresteros, yanacunas, and others who had abandoned their communities of origin, moved to other communities or migrated to urban centers to become wage laborers.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, as creole republicans reappraised the “Indian problem” through the lens of enlightened liberalism, the memory of the Túpak Katari rebellion of 1780-1782 remained a constant reminder of both the dangers and the necessities of maintaining minority rule. While in Cuzco, Túpak Amaru had led a

⁸⁶ Thérèse Bouysse-Cassagne, *La identidad aymara: aproximación histórica (siglo XV, siglo XVI)* (La Paz: Hisbol – IFEA, 1987).

⁸⁷ John Murra, “Did Tribute and Markets in the Andes Preval before the European Invasion?” *Ethnicity, Markets, and Migration in the Andes: At the Crossroads of History and Anthropology*, Brooke Larson, Olivia Harris, and Enrique Tandeter, eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 57-71.

multiethnic, cross-class alliance of creoles, mestizos, and Indians against the abuses of local colonial administrators in the name of the King, the dynamics of the Túpak Katari rebellion just outside of La Paz were much different.⁸⁸ There, Aymara communities protesting the continued abuse and exploitation of local crown officials devolved into millenarian “caste war” that pitted Andean against European.⁸⁹ Under the leadership of Julian Apasa Nina, who assumed the *nom de guerre* Tupak Katari, Aymara insurgents sought the complete overthrow of the Spanish colonial state, the expulsion of Europeans, and the reestablishment of autonomous leadership, communal autonomy, and social practices. As historian Sinclair Thomson argues, their objective was, above all, self-rule. For six months during 1780 and 1781, Aymara insurgents besieged the city of La Paz from the heights of El Alto. The Spanish ultimately succeeded in suppressing the insurgency, but the memory of the violent insurrection haunted creoles, for it ultimately illustrated the tenuous nature of ethnic minority⁹⁰ In the creole imagination, Túpak Katari came to embody fears of race war—violent reprisal for three-hundred years of colonial rule.

POSTCOLONIAL LEGACIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

It was thus with fears of race war and uncertainty as to how to define the place of Indians in the nation that creole leaders set out to construct the Republic of Bolivia. In

⁸⁸ For the Tupak Amaru rebellion, see Charles Walker, *Smoldering Ashes: Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru, 1780-1840* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); see also Alberto Flores Galindo, *Buscando un Inca: identidad y utopía en los Andes* (Lima: Instituto de Apoyo Agrario, 1987).

⁸⁹ Sinclair Thomson, *We Alone Will Rule: Native Andean Politics in the Age of Insurgency* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002).

⁹⁰ On the place of Katari in the both the creole national imaginations and indigenous social movements, see Silvia Rivera, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos: Luchas del campesinado aymara y qhechwa de Bolivia, 1900-1980* (La Paz: UNRISD, 1984); Sinclair Thomson and Forrest Hylton, *Revolutionary Horizons: Past and Present in Bolivian Politics* (New York: Verso, 2007).

1824 and 1825, as rebel armies waged the final campaigns for independence in the central Andes, Bolívar issued a series of decrees that redefined the relationship between Indians and the state. He banished the mita, abolished tribute, and declared Indians owners of the land they occupied. The August 1825 Declaration of Independence abrogated the colonial system of two republics in favor of universal citizenship and guaranteed the “sacrosanct rights of honor, life, liberty, equality, property, and security” to all Bolivians.⁹¹ Indigenous peoples thus entered into republican life freed from the institutional constraints and legal standing that had long predetermined their inferior social status. The Constitution, ratified the following year, would nevertheless hinder indigenous equality by making literacy an explicit requisite for citizenship. Race was never explicitly articulated as an exclusionary factor, but literacy requirements and subsequent property qualifications on the franchise disproportionately affected indigenous peoples and demonstrated that citizenship, in the strictest sense, would be limited to the exclusive domain of property holding, literate males (women would not be permitted to vote until 1952). For over a century, colonial legacies would remain deeply entrenched despite republican commitments to liberal principals of popular sovereignty, universal citizenship, and legal equality.

If the constitution established the legal status and political rights of indigenous peoples in the new republic, it was ultimately the state’s lack of revenue that defined their social status. The silver mines at Potosí had provided one of the greatest sources of income for the Spanish empire. Yet the progressive decline of silver output beginning in the last quarter of the eighteenth century placed the new national economy in a precarious

⁹¹ Quoted in Herbert Klein, *Parties and Political Change in Bolivia*, p. 1.

position.⁹² Making matters worse, fifteen years of war had resulted in de-capitalization of the mining industry, the flight of both specialists and technology, and depopulation, while new national borders closed important overland trade routes and access to seaports. Cash poor and lacking revenue with no foreseeable source of income in the immediate future, Bolivia's second President, Antonio José de Sucre, reinstated tribute in 1826.⁹³ Levied on indigenous heads of household, tribute provided the primary source of government revenue until the 1900s, accounting for as much as sixty percent of national revenue some years. Anthropologist Tristan Platt argues that tribute obligations provided one side of a "pact of reciprocity" that developed between indigenous communities and the republican state.⁹⁴ Drawing on normative colonial legal precedents, communities expected to retain legal rights to communal lands in exchange for meeting tribute

⁹² For an overview of silver mining in colonial Potosí, see: Federico Ávila, *Bolivia en el concierto del Plata* (México, Editorial Cultura, 1941); John Jay Tepaske, *The Royal Treasuries of the Spanish Empire in America: Peru; Upper Peru* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1982); and Herbert S. Klein, *The American Finances of the Spanish Empire: Royal Income and Expenditures in Colonial Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia, 1860-1809* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998). For more on the declining silver mines and its effect on the agrarian society and economy, see: Erick Langer, *Economic Change and Rural Resistance in Southern Bolivia, 1880-1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989); Brooke Larson, *Cochabamba, 1550-1900: Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia*, Expanded Edition (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); and Herbert Klein, *Haciendas and Ayllus: Rural Society in the Bolivian Andes in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Peter Bakewell, *Silver and Entrepreneurship in Seventeenth-Century Potosí: The Life and Times of Antonio Lopez de Quiroga* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1995). In addition to the micro- and macro-economic aspects of silver mining, labor has also occupied a prominent position in Republican Bolivian and Colonial Andean historiography. Peter Bakewell provides an account of the mita and the colonial economy in *Miners of the Red Mountain: Indian Labor in Potosí, 1545-1650* (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1985); See also: Jeffrey Cole, *The Potosí Mita, 1573-1700: Compulsory Indian Labor in the Andes* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985) and Ann Zulowski, *"They Eat from their Labor": Work and Social Change in Colonial Bolivia* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995).

⁹³ The reinstatement of indigenous tribute was a legal process that took form between 1826 and 1831. See José Flores Moncayo, *Legislación Boliviana del Indio: Recopilación de resoluciones, ordenes, decretos, leyes, decretos supremos y otras disposiciones legales, 1825-1953* (La Paz, 1953).

⁹⁴ Tristan Platt, "Liberalism and Ethnocide in the Southern Andes," *History Workshop*, No. 17 (Spring 1984), pp. 3-18. See also: Tristan Platt, *Estado boliviano y ayllu andino tierra y tributo en el norte de Potosí* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1982).

obligations. In this way, this “pact of reciprocity” served as the tacit recognition of indigenous communal land holding practices in spite of the government’s commitment to establishing a private property regime. It moreover defined the expectations of national citizenship and the obligations of the republican state for indigenous communities.

During the first decades following independence, Bolivia’s republican present thus remained remarkably similar to its colonial past. Indeed, creole elites had won political and economic autonomy from the Spanish Crown, but social revolution did not accompany the changes in political leadership. To be sure, the struggle for independence was a political affair, the result of insurgent creole patriotism and a desire for increased economic autonomy from the Crown, rather than from popular sentiment for social change. This was especially true in the central Andes, where the memory of the Túpak Amaru and Túpak Katari rebellions contributed to enduring creole loyalty to the crown well into the 1820s. However committed to enlightenment precepts of fraternity, equality, and reason they may have been; however much they may have drawn inspiration from the United States and France during this “Age of Democratic Revolutions”; Bolívar, Sucre, and Santa Cruz had to reconcile their liberal principals with economic pragmatism, the need for social order, and perhaps their own racial biases. As such, their own national project, Bolivia, seems to have been unevenly grafted onto Upper Peru—a messy amalgam of republican institutions and colonial practices. And nowhere was this more apparent than in the social hierarchies that were naturalized during the nineteenth century.

With the pact of reciprocity in effect and creole leaders attending to urgent issues of political and economic development, the question of indigenous inclusion remained largely dormant during the mid-nineteenth century. This period, roughly from 1830 to

1860, was marked by caudillo infighting, political rivalry, and gradual economic recovery. It was also during this time that colonial social hierarchies crystallized as normative institutions of republican life. The republican state reaffirmed colonial notions of two republics on several different levels. As Brooke Larson points out, “The strong continuities of the republican state with the colonial policies towards tribute and corporate landholding preserved the ideological underpinnings of traditional state-peasant relations”⁹⁵ Colonial social relations reified the spatial divisions that characterized of republic society and extended in practices of daily life, from modes of production to market participation.⁹⁶

Beginning in the 1860s, economic recovery elevated the issue of indigenous integration to the fore of national debates. In the 1860 budget, indigenous tribute still accounted for thirty-six percent of national revenue, but the discovery of guano and nitrate deposits on the Pacific coast began to shift the burden of taxation away from indigenous tribute and towards new sources of export income.⁹⁷ Given the inability of Bolivian investors to provide the necessary capital to exploit these resources, however, the only way they could generate revenue was to sell concessions to foreign investors. Not just the mines, but related industries of railroads, shipping, and insurance began attracting foreign investment in the 1860s. As British and Chilean capital flowed in, the 1870s was marked by the revival of Potosí silver. At the same time, national leaders began implementing the liberal economic reforms envisioned by Bolívar and Sucre. The

⁹⁵ Brooke Larson, *Cochabamba, 1550-1900: Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), p. 306.

⁹⁶ Olivia Harris, “Ethnic Identity and Market Participation: Indians and Mestizos in the Andes,” *Ethnicity, Markets, and Migration in the Andes: At the Crossroads of History and Anthropology*, Brooke Larson, Olivia Harris, and Enrique Tandeter, eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 351-389.

⁹⁷ Herbert Klein, *Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 132.

period saw easing protective tariffs and ending state monopolies. Integration into the global capitalist economy was slowly undermining the government's dependence on indigenous tribute.

With the recovering mining industry increasing demand for goods, the government began to undo the legal basis for corporate land holding privileges in exchange for a universal private property regime that would enable the expansion of commercial agriculture. In 1866, Bolivia's famed caudillo, Mariano Melgarejo introduced the first effort to repeal communal land holding rights with a law declaring that all Indians must purchase title to their land within sixty days or have it be taken by the state and sold at auction. He passed a second decree in 1868, declaring all communal lands property of the state. Laura Gotkowitz found that between 1866 and 1869, government auctioneers sold the land of 356 communities.⁹⁸ The grand majority of the sales occurred in the densely populated rural provinces of La Paz, in the Aymara heartland of Omasuyos, Pacajes, Sicasica, and Muñecas.⁹⁹

Across the altiplano, comunarios rose up against local government representatives to protest the division of communal lands. In their opposition to the Melgarejo regime, comunarios found an unlikely ally in the traditional landed elite, who not only resented the emergence of new landed class, but also opposed the patronage politics of Melgarejo. The rural insurgents were also joined by provincial mestizos who earned their livelihood collecting tribute.¹⁰⁰ By 1870, this alliance succeeded in deposing the loathed caudillo; but not without a price—government forces massacred at least 1800 Aymara

⁹⁸ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, p. 20.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*; Platt, "Liberalism and Ethnocide in the Southern Andes," p. 9.

comunarios.¹⁰¹ After the conflict, while the creole and mestizo rebels returned to their provincial towns and altiplano estates, indigenous comunarios refused to lay down their arms—or at least they kept them well within reach. The 1866 and 1868 decrees had put comunarios in a defensive position and sparked a protracted movement for land rights and justice that would continue beyond the 1952 Revolution.¹⁰²

Local struggles to retain communal lands—and associated questions of citizenship, rights, and justice—defined the contours of indigenous-state relations for the century to come. At the 1871 constituent assembly (convened after the overthrow of Melgarejo), political leaders swiftly repealed the 1866 and 1868 decrees. The rural uprisings had demonstrated that comunarios would not sit idly by while their way of life was undone by liberal state policy. Yet the agrarian question lingered. To liberal elites seeking to modernize the economy, the ayllus represented retrograde socioeconomic institutions; a hindrance to progress that had to be abolished in order to convert Indians into individual, landowning yeomen. Progress hinged on the end of communal land holding practices, the institutionalization of private property, and the promotion of commercial agriculture. In 1874, liberal elites introduced the legal foundation for the privatization of communal lands with the Ley de Exvinculación (Disentailment Law).

Similar to contemporaneous efforts in Mexico, Peru, and the United States, the Bolivian government abrogated the legal foundation of communal land holding in order to institute a universal private property regime.¹⁰³ Not only would such an effort open up

¹⁰¹ Roberto Choque Canqui, *Historia de una lucha desigual: los contenidos ideológicos y políticos de las rebeliones indígenas de la pre-Revolución Nacional* (La Paz, Bolivia: Unidad de Investigaciones Históricas UNIH-PAKAXA, 2005) p. 25.

¹⁰² *Ibid*; Gotlowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*.

¹⁰³ The status of communal lands was one of the most contested issues of Mexico's mid-nineteenth century *Reforma*. Benito Juárez abolished the legal right of the community with the Ley Lerdo of 1856. For a discussion of the law and its later ramifications, particularly during the Porfiriato, see: Emilio H. Kourí,

lands for commercial agricultural, as Nathaniel Aguirre and other proponents of the law believed, but it would also turn indigenous peasants away from the closed corporate communities and towards increased market participation.¹⁰⁴ The law explicitly forbade collective land rights and ordered the partition of ayllu lands among its current inhabitants. The War of the Pacific delayed the implementation of the law. But once hostilities ceased between Chile and Bolivia in 1880, the government set the law into motion and initiated land surveys, called *revistas*, sending officials to rural provinces to partition communal lands into individual plots. The law stipulated that Indians were required to purchase title to their new allotments. If they were unable or if they refused, their lands would be forfeited to the state.

Thus began the first wave of republican hacienda expansion. Across the countryside, creole investors divested indigenous communities of territory through a mix of legal measures, fraud, and coercion. Confronted with growing rural resistance, the government issued two decrees that blunted the 1874 law. The first, an 1881 presidential resolution, allowed communities the right to a *proindiviso* (undivided) title only if all members of the community agreed. The second, an 1883 supreme decree, declared that communities that could provide *cedulas de composición*—colonial deeds that recognized communal land titles—were immune from the *revistas*.¹⁰⁵ As a result of this provision, comunarios set out for colonial archival repositories in Lima and Buenos Aires—the

"Interpreting the Expropriation of Indian Pueblo Lands in Porfirian Mexico: The Unexamined Legacies of Andrés Molina Enríquez," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 82, No. 1 (2002), pp. 69-117. The United States government issued a similar law in 1887: the Dawes Allotment Act. For a classic historical treatment of the law and its impact on Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole nations, see: Angie Debo, *And Still the Waters Run: The Betrayal of the Five Civilized Tribes* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985 [1940]).

¹⁰⁴ For a discussion of the development of the law, and the ideologies underlying its creation, see Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, pp. 19-42.

¹⁰⁵ Laws discussed in Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, pp. 34-35; Choque Canqui, *Historia de una lucha desigual*, p. 53.

former vice-regal capitals—in search of such titles. Although these decrees attenuated the original law, the number of communities nevertheless continued to decline.

Indian-state relations took a violent turn during the final decades of the century as resistance to land privatization became more organized and widespread. In addition to outlawing communal land rights, the Disentailment Law undermined the legal status of the communities. The measure indicated that communities now had to appoint an authorized legal agent, or *apoderado*, to appeal to government institutions. Across the countryside, communities selected local leaders to represent them before republican legal institutions. Historian Pilar Mendieta found that *apoderados* were chosen for their leadership qualities and, most importantly, Spanish literacy.¹⁰⁶ They worked with local attorneys—often provincial *tinterillos* who lacked formal legal training, but were familiar with the laws—to press their claims, resist *revistas*, and obtain legal guarantees from the state.

Mounting rural unrest coincided with increasing strife between Liberals and Conservatives in the exclusive arena of national politics. Across Latin America, the liberal-conservative split centered on church-state relations, the degree of state intervention in the national economy, and centralized versus federated political systems. In Bolivia, both political grouping initially supported centralism, free-market economic policies, and private property.¹⁰⁷ It was ultimately the question of how to define the

¹⁰⁶ Pilar Mendieta Prada, “Caminantes entre dos mundos: los *apoderados* indígenas en Bolivia (siglo XIX),” *Revista de Indias*, vol. LXVI, no. 238 (2006), pp. 761-82.

¹⁰⁷ The role of the Catholic Church in republican society was not as contested of an issue in Bolivia as it was in say, Mexico, where it had emerged from independence as a potent, social, economic, political, and cultural institution despite Bourbon efforts to undermine its power and influence vis-à-vis the colonial state. In Bolivia, the Church was certainly an important colonial institution, but it did not command the power and influence as it did in other American republics. Restraining the Church thus took second chair to more pressing issues of land and capitalist development. To be sure, Bolivian liberals did confiscate church property, abolish clerical *fueros*, and relegate its role to the spiritual realm yet such reforms were not met with the resistance that such reforms spawned elsewhere. For a broad overview of Church-State relations

peace after the War of the Pacific that distinguished the two ideological tendencies and led to their crystallization into distinct political parties in 1880, the Liberals and the Constitutionals. The conservative Constitutionals, based in Sucre and led by the traditional silver-mining oligarchy, called for a quick peace to reestablish overland trade routes. The La Paz Liberals, on the other hand advocated allying with Peru to regain the coastal territories that Bolivia had lost. As conservatives occupied the presidential palace and dominated parliament during the 1880s and 1890s, deeper distinctions emerged between the parties. Liberals began calling for a decentralized federal government, electoral reform, and social progress.

The emergence of the two-party system coincided with the arrival of new intellectual trends, primarily from Europe. Positivism was undoubtedly the most influential to arrive.¹⁰⁸ The philosophy, developed by French intellectual Auguste Comte, posited that society, just as nature, evolved according to verifiable natural laws. Eschewing metaphysics, superstition, and unverifiable knowledge for scientific rationality, positivism was especially popular among secular-minded liberal intellectuals

in Latin America, see: Anthony James Gill, *Rendering unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America* (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1998). In terms of the role of the Church in colonial Mexico, particularly during the Bourbon reforms, see: David. A. Brading, *Church and State in Bourbon Mexico* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); William B. Taylor, *Magistrates of the Sacred: Parish Priests and Indian Parishioners in Eighteenth-Century Mexico* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). Pablo Mijangos y González provides an intellectual history of liberal legal thought and the changing contours of Church-State relations in nineteenth-century Mexico in "The Lawyer of the Church: Bishop Clemente de Jesus Munguia and the Ecclesiastical Response to the Liberal Revolution in Mexico, 1810-1868" (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 2009). As for Church-State relations in Upper Peru and Bolivia, see: Herbert S. Klein, *Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) and Nicholas A. Robins, *Priest-Indian Conflict in Upper Peru: The Generation of Rebellion, 1750-1780* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2007). Erick Langer examines Franciscan missionaries in Bolivia's eastern lowlands in *Expecting Pears from an Elm Tree: Franciscan Missions on the Chiriguano Frontier in the Heart of South America, 1830-1949* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).

¹⁰⁸ For a broader discussion of positivism and its reception in Latin America, see Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., ed., *Positivism in Latin America, 1850-1900* (New York: D.C. Heath and Company). Charles A. Hale, *Mexican liberalism in the age of Mora, 1821-1853* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

such as Agustín Aspiazu and Benjamín Fernández. And as positivism grew in popularity, science replaced religion as the source of legitimate authority in republican society—as evinced by the rapid proliferation of scientific societies in the last quarter of the century.¹⁰⁹ Historian Marie Danielle Demelas demonstrates that this period also marred the arrival of Darwin’s theory of evolution, but more influential were popular theories of social evolution developed by Herbert Spencer and E.B. Tylor.¹¹⁰ They posited progressive model of human evolution, one beginning with “savagery,” followed by “barbarity,” and culminating in the final stage of human development, “civilization.”¹¹¹ This final stage of human evolution was, of course, synonymous with contemporary Western European and North American civilization, and it was widely understood that the so-called “primitive” peoples of Africa or Latin America occupied an earlier stage of human evolution. These ideas provided the foundation for the scientific theories of race and human difference that would greatly impact creole perceptions of indigenous peoples as Indian-state relations became increasingly strained in the following decades.

In their bid to dislodge the Constitutionalist, Liberals sought to rekindle the indigenous-creole alliance that had been so successful in toppling the Melgarejo regime decades prior. Across the highland departments of La Paz, Potosi, and Oruro, a broad grassroots movement was arising in the countryside as *apoderados* resisted hacienda

¹⁰⁹ Ramiro Condarco Morales, *Historia del saber y la ciencia en Bolivia* (La Paz: Academia Nacional de Ciencia, 1978). See also Qayun, “Creole Imaginings.”

¹¹⁰ Marie Danielle Demelas, “Darwinismo a la criolla: El darwinismo social en Bolivia, 1880-1910,” *Historia Boliviana*, 1 (1981), 55-82; “Notas sobre el Darwinismo a la criolla,” *Historia Boliviana*, 2 (1982), 212-14; “El sentido de la historia a contrapelo: el darwinismo de Gabriel René Moreno (1836-1908),” *Historia Boliviana*, 4 (1984), 65-80. Marta Irurozqui, “Desvío al paraíso: Citizenship and Social Darwinism in Bolivia, 1880-1920,” in Thomas F. Glick and Rosaura Ruiz, eds., *The Reception of Darwinism in the Iberian World: Spain, Spanish America, and Brazil* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers), pp, 205-227.

¹¹¹ George W. Stocking, Jr., *Race, Culture, and Evolution: Essays in the History of Evolution* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968), see especially Chapter 4.

expansion by protesting *revistas*, acquiring colonial titles to disputed lands, and expanding networks of activists.¹¹² One of the most prominent leaders of this movement was Pablo Zárate Willka, a literate Aymara comunario who became a popular and indeed powerful indigenous caudillo. Zárate not only built a following among altiplano comunarios, but he also forged alliances with prominent Liberals, including José Manuel Pando, a popular congressman and leader of the party. Following their electoral defeat in 1896, Liberals realized that the only way to oust the Conservatives would be through military force. Hoping to ensure a decisive victory, Liberal leaders sought an alliance with highland communities—many of which were growing increasingly belligerent in the face of liberal land divestiture policies. Pando appealed to Zárate with a promise to abrogate the land privatization laws of the 1870s and 1880s in exchange for indigenous support in campaign. Seeking to restore communal territories, Aymara communities across the altiplano joined Willka’s militia and fought alongside the Liberal army in the Federal War of 1898-99.

Once the Liberals prevailed in 1899, however, the divergent interests of this interethnic alliance revealed a stark contrast in their visions for social and political change. Liberal leaders reneged on their promise to restore communal properties. The ascendant paceño elite had staked their fortunes on acquisition of communal lands. The shift in the national economy from the Potosí-based silver mines to the Oruro-based tin mines created a new demand for agrarian goods and swung the axis of agricultural

¹¹² Ramiro Condarco Morales, Zárate, el “Temible” Wilka: Historia de la rebelión indígena de 1899 en la República de Bolivia, 2a ed. revisada. (La Paz: Imprenta y Librería Renovación, 1982); See also, Pilar Mendieta and Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, *De Tupac Katari a Zárate Willka: Alianzas, Pactos, Resistencia y Rebelión En Mohoza (1780-1899)* (La Paz: Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, Instituto de Estudios Bolivianos, 2001).; Brooke Larson, *Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810-1910* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

production away from Sucre and towards La Paz. The privatization and subsequent acquisition of communal lands thus offered both wealth and status. To discredit his Indian allies, President Pando accused Zárate and his lieutenants of fomenting race war, citing events in Mohoza, where an Aymara militia massacred a detachment of Liberal soldiers in February 1899.¹¹³ The accusations renewed fears of race war and turned the public against the Aymara militias.¹¹⁴



Illustration 4: Aymara guerrillas who fought alongside the Liberal Army in the 1898-99 Federal War. Zárate Willka may be the figure in the center.¹¹⁵

¹¹³Marta Irurozqui, *La armonía de las desigualdades: Elites y conflictos de poder en Bolivia, 1880-1920* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1994), p. 134.

¹¹⁴ For more on the public response to the Mohoza trials, see: E. Gabrielle Kuenzli, "Acting Inca: The Parameters of National Belonging in Early Twentieth-Century Bolivia," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 90, No. 2 (May 2010).

¹¹⁵ Condarco Morales, *Zárate, el "Temible" Wilka*.

Though the motives underlying the Mohoza massacre remain unclear, the subsequent trail of Zárate and his followers revealed that indigenous participation in the war was motivated by an alternative vision of popular liberalism, one that was incompatible with creole visions of modern nationhood.¹¹⁶ The Bolivian government charged 288 defendants, Zárate principle among them, with various crimes related to the Mohoza massacre. The trial was a public spectacle that dragged on for two years in various venues across the highland departments of La Paz and Oruro. Depositions from the Zárate and other indigenous defendants showed that they were driven not only by territorial restitution, but also by visions of a new federal republic wherein indigenous people enjoyed communal autonomy and social equality. Zárate and his principal lieutenants were found guilty and hanged. The remaining defendants served lengthy prison sentences. But their aspirations lived on in the memory of “el temible Vilka” as the indigenous political movements widened in the twentieth century.¹¹⁷

THE “INDIAN PROBLEM” AND THE CACIQUES APODERADOS, 1899-1932

The first decades of the twentieth century marked a new era of national consolidation and state building during which rising creole anxieties about the so-called “Indian problem” and mounting rural mobilization contoured indigenous-state relations.

¹¹⁶ For more on the trials, see: Brooke Larson, *Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810-1910* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); See also Forrest Hylton, “Reverberations of Insurgency: Indian Communities, the Federal War of 1899, and the Regeneration of Bolivia” (Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 2010). In terms of “popular liberalism” more broadly, see Florencia E. Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) and Guy P. C. Thomson and David G. LaFrance, *Patriotism, Politics, and Popular Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Mexico: Juan Francisco Lucas and the Puebla Sierra* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001).

¹¹⁷ Forrest Hylton, “Reverberations of Insurgency: Indian Communities, the Federal War of 1899, and the Regeneration of Bolivia” (Ph.D. Dissertaion, New York University, 2010).

After the Federal War of 1898-99, Liberals suppressed the apoderados movement with the Mhoza trails and the subsequent execution of Zárate Willka and imprisonment of other highland indigenous leaders. Creole fears of race war nevertheless lingered and, in subsequent decades, increasing rural to urban migration, scientific theories of race, and a marked resurgence of rural resistance only exacerbated those fears. As Marxism, indigenismo, and nationalism arrived in the first decades of the century, reform-minded intellectuals, labor activists, and politicians began to reimagine Bolivian society and role of the Indians in it. By the eve of the Chaco war in 1932, however, society was fragmented by class and ethnicity and the postcolonial order was in crisis.

The liberal era marked an unprecedented period of state consolidation, economic growth, and social reform, carried out first by the Liberal party from 1899 to 1920, and then under the aegis of the Republicans until the 1930s. After the Federal War, Liberals moved the national capital to La Paz where they centralized state power despite their earlier commitments to Federalism. A strong central state was necessary, Pando and others Liberal ideologues reasoned, in order to successfully modernize the country. At the vanguard of the new liberal order was a group of mestizo and creole intellectuals, statesmen, and entrepreneurs who saw themselves as the harbingers of progress. Tin would provide the motor for economic growth and social modernization. They oversaw the construction of railroad lines linking expanding commercial markets to international ports, aggressively promoted land privatization, accelerated hacienda expansion, welcomed foreign investment capital, and abetted the consolidation of the tin-based mono-export economy.

Heralding a new era of export-led growth and social modernization, the Liberals fixated on “Indian problem” as the nexus of broader debates over nationhood, citizenship,

and development. The precise nature of the Indian problem changed over time, ebbing and flowing with evolutions in race science, shifting constructions of indigenous alterity, and demographic change. Enduring at the heart of the issue was how to reconcile a vast indigenous majority perceived as racially inferior and culturally backwards with universal standards of modernity founded upon North Atlantic standards of progress. True, the Indian problem had been a prevalent concern among political leaders since the foundation of the republic. As they set about consolidating a new modernizing state, creole politicians and intellectuals generally identified Indians as an impediment to progress. Commenting on the 1900 census—which reaffirmed Bolivia’s unchanging demographic reality—the prominent liberal intellectual and statesman, Manuel Vicente Ballivian lamented, “if there had been a retarding cause in our civilization, it is due to the indigenous race, essentially refractory to any innovation or to any progress, given that it had refused and refused tenaciously to accept any customs that have not been transmitted by tradition from its remote ancestors.”¹¹⁸

Racial hierarchies, which had long been relatively fluid, hardened in the wake of the Federal War. This was due, in no small part, to the highly-publicized Mohoza trials, which cast the Aymara in particular as a brutal and savage race.¹¹⁹ But it also resulted from the growing influence of European race science. Historian Marta Irurozqui divides early twentieth-century racial thought into two distinct camps.¹²⁰ The first tended to

¹¹⁸ Quoted in Qayum, “Nationalism, Internal Colonialism, and the Spatial Imagination,” p. 292.

¹¹⁹ For a discussion of the view of the Aymara in the national press after the Mohoza trials, see: E. Gabrielle Kuenzli, “Acting Inca: The Parameters of National Belonging in Early Twentieth-Century Bolivia,” *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 90, No. 2 (May 2010), pp. 247-281; For a particularly salient example of the criminal nature of the Aymara, see: Bautista Saavedra, *El Ayllu* (La Paz: Imp. Artística, Velarde, Aldazosa y ca, 1903).

¹²⁰ Marta Irurozqui, *La armonía de las desigualdades: Elites y conflictos de poder en Bolivia, 1880-1920* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1994), pp. 146. See broader discussion, pp. 145-180.



Illustration 5: Example of early twentieth century physical anthropology and racial thought in Bolivia.¹²¹

¹²¹ Arthur Chervin, *Anthropologie Bolivienne, Tome Premier: Ethnologie, Démographie, Photographie Métrique* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1907).

emphasize brutality, ignorance, and criminality as essential characteristics of the Indian race. It included Gabriel René Moreno, David Sanchez Bustamante, Bautista Saavedra, and other intellectuals who came of age in the last decades of the nineteenth century. They tended to subscribe to the classical evolutionary paradigms developed by Herbert Spenser and later E.B. Tylor, which were arriving from Great Britain and Chile. Viewed through the lens of social evolutionism, Indians and mestizos were inherently inferior, occupying a lower level of human evolution.

Another block of creole thinkers eschewed prevailing currents of European race science, locating racial difference not necessarily in biology, but in Bolivia's physical geography. While not disregarding notions of inherent biological difference, they accounted the uncivilized state of the Indians in the Andean landscape and subscribed to theories of racial degeneration and neo-Lamarckian notions of the inheritance of applied characteristics. While biologists, physicians, academics, and policymakers in Europe and the United States had generally accepted natural selection as the dominant evolutionary paradigm by the early twentieth century, Lamarckian perspectives prevailed as an influential evolutionary framework in much of Latin America well into the twentieth century—despite the rediscovery of Mendelian genetics in 1905. In accounting for the failure of Darwinian paradigms to take hold in Latin America, historian Nancy Leys Stepan is quick to point out that science was not ignorant, backward, or naïve.¹²² Rather local biologists, social scientists, and policymakers selectively drew from competing evolutionary paradigms emanating from Western Europe and North America and interpreted them in accordance with their own social, historical, and cultural

¹²² Nancy Leys Stepan, *"The Hour of Eugenics": Race Gender, and Nation in Latin America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp, 32-34, 70.

circumstances. To reform-minded statesmen, politicians, and intellectuals Lamarckian evolutionary paradigms underscored the improbability of the Indians, while at the same time reaffirming their own racial supremacy.

It was Alcides Arguedas and Franz Tamayo, two towering *paceño* intellectuals, who framed the Indian problem most prominently for liberal-minded policymakers. During the first decades of the century, Arguedas and Tamayo produced an influential body of ethnographic and sociological knowledge on Indians and their rural environment that literary scholar, Josefa Salmon argues revealed more about the creoles themselves than the Indians they studied.¹²³ Both situated the Indian problem squarely within the physical geography and specific historical trajectory of the republic. In his most famous work, *Pueblo enfermo*, for example, Arguedas provided a vicious commentary on Bolivian society, employing the metaphor of social illness to account for the country's continued economic backwardness. The book spared no sector of Bolivian society, creoles were cast as corrupt and motivated solely by class interest. Indians, while racially inferior, emerged as a noble savage, which, he explains, suffered at the hands of the worst sector of Bolivian society, rural cholos and urban mestizos. Tamayo similarly rose up in defense of the noble savage, and though he was more merciful on mestizos and cholos, he still cast them as the enemy. As Brooke Larson argues, together, they fashioned a "cult of antimestizaje," disparaging cholos while providing a defense of Indians, situating rural folk in their "natural" environment and mapping their role in the nation as an agrarian workforce.¹²⁴

¹²³ Josefa Salmón, *El espejo indígena: el discurso indigenista en Bolivia, 1900-1956* (La Paz: Plural, 1997).

¹²⁴ Brooke Larson, "Reedeemed Indians, Barbarized Cholos: Crafting Neocolonial Modernity in Liberal Bolivia, 1900-1910," *Political Cultures in the Andes, 1750-1950*, eds. Nils Jacobsen and Cristóbal Aljovín de Losada (Duke University Press Books, 2005), pp. 230-251.

Inspired by such lines of thinking, early twentieth-century Liberal reforms introduced a careful series of measures intended to “improve” and “defend” the “Indian race” while constraining indigenous political participation. President Ismael Montes introduced compulsory military service in 1907. Historian James Dunkerly notes that “the rapid buildup and professionalization of the army was directed primarily toward the repression of the very peasantry which populated its lower ranks.”¹²⁵ Yet undergirding the draft was a civilizing mission, evidenced by the literacy training and primary education courses created for Indian recruits.¹²⁶ The government also introduced the *prestación vital*, a compulsory draft labor project that put Indians to work on road construction and infrastructure projects deemed vital to national development. Yet the most ambitious of Liberal civilizing projects was indigenous education. Tied to a broader commitment to universal education and inspired by the urgent need to transform Indians from “dead weight” into productive albeit unequal members of society, Liberals introduced the first indigenous education initiative in 1905. The foundation of this effort were the *escuelas ambulantes*, mobile teaching teams that traveled to haciendas and communities where they taught Spanish literacy, basic arithmetic, and Christian morality.¹²⁷ Such efforts, the reformers believed, would “civilize” Indians and prepare them for the responsibilities of republican citizenship perhaps someday in the future.

Creole racial anxieties also arose from increasing rural-to-urban migration. The period 1905-1915 marked the second great wave of highland hacienda expansion, brought about by the completion of railroad lines linking Bolivia’s expanding internal

¹²⁵ James Dunkerly, *Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-1982* (London: Verso, 1984), p. 24.

¹²⁶ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, p. 63.

¹²⁷ Roberto Choque Canqui and Cristina Quisbert Quipe, *Educación indigenal en Bolivia: un siglo de ensayos educativos y resistencias patronales* (La Paz: Ibis, 2006), p. 85.

markets to Pacific ports.¹²⁸ Across the altiplano and eastern valleys, creoles began buying up land for commercial agriculture. Most of the buyers hailed from the liberal elite, who used their political power and social clout to acquire communal lands. Among those benefitting from land privatization laws were President Pando and his successor, Ismael Montes, who subsequently became two of the largest land owners in Bolivia.¹²⁹ As hacienda expansion divested peasants of their ancestral lands, some stayed on the haciendas, becoming colonos, while others moved to the highland cities of Oruro, Potosí, and La Paz to try their hand in the free labor market. It was a period of massive rural out-migration and urban growth. Between 1900 and 1930, the population of La Paz more than doubled, from 72,000 to 152,000. Similarly, the population of Oruro increased from 13,600 in 1914 to 45,000 inhabitants by 1937.¹³⁰

Rural migration transformed cities from centers of creole civilization into vibrant hybrid spaces.¹³¹ By 1920, cholos constituted the majority of most highland cities. In La

¹²⁸ For a detailed discussion of railroad construction, see Miguel Urquiola, "La distribución de la población en el siglo XX," in *Bolivia en el siglo XX: La formación de Bolivia contemporánea*, Fernando Campero Prudencio, ed. (La Paz: Harvard Club de Bolivia, 1999), pp. 193-218; See also Qayum, "Nationalism, Internal Colonialism, and the Spatial Imagination," pp. 292-296.

¹²⁹ Klein, *Haciendas and Ayllus*, p. 156; Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, p. 59.

¹³⁰ Asthenio Averanga Mollinedo, *Aspectos generales de la población boliviana* (La Paz: Editorial Argote, 1956); Klein, *Bolivia*, p. 227. For population growth indices for La Paz, see pp. 31-34. It is unclear whether or not he took El Alto into account in this estimate. For a discussion on the rural population of the Department of La Paz, see Klein, *Haciendas and Ayllus*. For Oruro, see Averanga, *Aspectos generales de la población boliviana* pp. 41-44. Both figures exceed the national population growth indices for the period, which Averanga averaged 19.36 percent. See: Averanga, *Aspectos generales de la población boliviana*, p. 8. Robert L. Smale provides a discussion of population growth in Oruro in "*I Sweat the Flavor of Tin*": *Labor Activism in Early Twentieth-Century Bolivia* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2010), pp. 31-32.

¹³¹ Rossana Barragán, *Espacio Urbano y Dinámica Étnica: La Paz en el siglo XIX* (La Paz: HISBOL, 1990); Rossana Barragán, "Más allá de lo mestizo, más allá de lo aymara: organización y representaciones de clase y etnicidad en La Paz," *América latina hoy: Revista de ciencias sociales*, Vol. 43 (2006), pp. 107-130; Fernando Cajías, Rossana Barragán, Magdalena Cajías, and Ximena Medinaceli, eds., *La Paz: historia de contrastes* (La Paz: Fundación Nuevo Norte, 2007). Much of the literature on urbanization has illuminated the gendered dynamics, revealing the important role that women have played, despite their exclusion from the formal political sphere, in defining their place in society, often from subordinated positions of domestic servitude or the commercial marketplace. See Rossana Barragán, Seemin Qayum y

Paz and Oruro, most cholos were of Aymara descent, who since having moved to the city, adopted western styles of dress and learned Spanish. They formed the backbone of the commercial economy and the small but growing manufacturing sector. They worked as artisans, carpenters, shopkeepers, domestic servants, and factory workers. Before long, distinct social hierarchies developed within this growing population as they settled in such neighborhoods as San Pedro, Villa Victoria, Munaypata, and Achachacilla. To be sure, migrants often maintained strong ties to the countryside, returning to their communities to visit friends and relatives and to celebrate *prestes* and other traditional civic and religious festivals. These growing rural-urban linkages provided crucial routes for Marxist and anarchist ideas to spread into the countryside as rural political action mounted in the 1920s and 1930s.¹³²

As cholos and Indians increasingly occupied urban spaces traditionally dominated by the creole elite, government authorities reaffirmed the spatial order of colonial racial hierarchies with segregation laws. Brooke Larson argues that the creoles elite “tried to fashion an informal system of apartheid” during the first decades of the twentieth century, as hacienda expansion continued apace with urban migration and increasing rural mobilization.¹³³ With little exception, racial segregation was not national policy introduced and enforced by the central government; rather it was manifest in various

María Luisa Soux, eds., *De terratenientes a amas de casa: Mujeres de la élite de La Paz en la primera mitad del siglo XX* (La Paz: Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, 1997). For Cochabamba, see Laura Gotkowitz, "Commemorating the Heroínas: Gender and Civic Ritual in Early-Twentieth Century Bolivia," in *Hidden Histories of Gender and the State in Latin America*, Elizabeth Dore and Maxine Molyneux, eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), pp. 215-237. For recent research on the literary and cultural consequences of urban migration, see: Silvia S. Ximena Soruco Sologuren, "The City of Cholos: Bolivia in the 19th and 20th Centuries" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 2006).

¹³² Laura Gotkowitz, "'Under the Dominion of the Indian': Rural Mobilization, The Law, and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia in the 1940s," in *Political Cultures in the Andes, 1750-1950*, Nils Jacobson, Cristóbal Aljovín de Losada, eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), pp. 137-158.

¹³³ Larson, *Trials of Nation Making*, p. 243.

legal and extralegal forms in specific local contexts by municipal ordinances and quotidian social practices. Recent research reveals not only how widespread segregation was during the first decades of the century, but also the divergent ways in which local laws formalized racial apartheid. Historian Waskar Ari found that between 1925 and 1932 municipal, regional, and national authorities introduced no less than thirty-five segregation laws.¹³⁴ In La Paz, for instance, municipal laws forbid Indians from entering public spaces such as parks and plazas, and to board street cars. On the occasion of the centennial celebration in 1925, President Bautista Saavedra prohibited Indians from entering the central plazas of La Paz. In Oruro, the municipal government went as far as to prohibit Indians from entering the city dressed in traditional attire.¹³⁵ Such laws underscore the ways in which both legal codes and cultural practices contributed to the construction of racialized identities.

Municipal authorities also performed spectacular displays of violence to maintain social order. Martin Conway, a British explorer who arrived in Bolivia in 1899 for a mountaineering expedition in the Cordillera Real, was impressed at the creole elite's ability to maintain minority rule. His memoirs reveal that he was particularly struck by the public execution of an Indian convicted of murder. It was not so much the execution that shocked him, but the coordinated effort to sow terror into the urban Indian population that accompanied it. Before the execution, police fanned out across the city to round up all of the Indians they could find, assembled them in the Plaza San Pedro, and forced them to witness the execution. After the firing squad carried out its grisly task, Conway recalled that the "body was left for many hours where it fell, and the Indians were

¹³⁴ Waskar T. Ari, "Race and subaltern nationalism: AMP activist-intellectuals in Bolivia, 1921-1964" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University, 2005), pp. 29-42.

¹³⁵ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, p. 61.

encouraged to go forward to inspect it, the object of the whole ghastly performance being to strike terror into them.”¹³⁶ Such spectacular forms of violence projected creole power while at the same time revealing the weak coercive capacity of the state.

In the countryside, where the vast majority of the population was concentrated, it was hacendados and their majordomos who carried out the quotidian social practices essential to maintaining minority rule. As the hacienda frontier cut across the western highlands at an increasing pace, indigenous communities were swallowed up en masse by the expanding estates. Driven by fraud and coercion, the acquisition of ayllu lands fragmented rural communities. Increasing numbers of comunarios migrated to cities, others stayed on their land, and others still waged campaigns for territorial restitution. Those who chose to stay were granted usufruct rights to their family’s substance plot, or sayaña, in exchange for labor. Colonos were required to till the fields, maintain the crops, tend to livestock, and harvest the crops. They were also required to perform domestic chores in the hacienda house, or in the city, where most large estate owners spent the majority of their time. In addition to labor, colonos were also bound by tribute obligations in the form of goods. They had to remit a proportion of their own harvests, along with wool, meat, and eggs from their livestock. Failure to meet tributary obligations was met with harsh punishment—which was most commonly meted out by cholo majordomos demonized by Arguedas, Tamayo, and other early indigenista writers. In provinces where hacienda expansion was less aggressive, and where free communities remained, authority rested with the provincial corregidor.¹³⁷ In sum, though the precise nature of highland haciendas varied widely, it was an incredibly oppressive seigniorial

¹³⁶ Martin Conway, *The Bolivian Andes: A Record of Climbing and Exploration in the Cordillera Real in the Years 1898 and 1900* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1901), pp. 289-290.

¹³⁷ Choque Canqui, *Historia de una lucha desigual*, p. 80.

regime—perhaps the most exploitive in all of the Americas—and provided the coercive machinery not only to extract labor and goods, but to maintain social order.

Despite their best efforts, Liberals were largely powerless to contain the rural insurgency sparked by the second wave of hacienda expansion. The government had temporarily suppressed rural insurgency with the Mohoza trails, the execution of Zárata Willka, and the imprisonment of highland indigenous leaders. When expanding railroad networks initiated land grabs in previously unaffected regions during the 1910s, however, rural community leaders launched a renewed struggle against land divestiture. The pioneering research of Roberto Choque, Esteban Ticona, and the Taller de Historia Oral Andina (THOA) revealed that Santos Marka T'ula and Nina Quispe, both Aymara community leaders, identified themselves as Caciques Apoderados, and set out to forge a national movement for indigenous rights. Similar to the Apoderados before them, this new movement drew on colonial and republican legal precedents to contest liberal land divestiture policies in republican institutions.¹³⁸ One of the most striking characteristics of the Caciques Apoderados movement was its expansive level of political coordination.¹³⁹ Both Marka T'ula and Quispe forged a national network of indigenous activists that included local leaders from across the highlands. They also benefited from the linkages forged as a result of increasing rural to urban migration.¹⁴⁰ As anarchists, socialist, and syndicalist currents arrived in urban universities and rural mining camps

¹³⁸ Roberto Choque y Esteban Ticona, *Jesús de Machaca: la marka rebelde, Tomo 2: Sublevación y masacre de 1921* (La Paz: CIPCA, 1996).

¹³⁹ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*.

¹⁴⁰ Roberto Choque Canqui underscores the importance of rural-urban linkages as served as avenues for the dissemination of Marxist and Anarchist ideas in the countryside in *Historia de una lucha desigual*: chapters 3 and 4. See also: Laura Gotkowitz, “‘Under the Dominion of the Indian’: Rural Mobilization, The Law, and Revolutionary Nationalism in Bolivia in the 1940s,” in *Political Cultures in the Andes, 1750-1950*, Nils Jacobson, Cristóbal Aljovín de Losada, eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), pp. 137-158

during the first decades of the century, they began to influence indigenous activists. In rural La Paz, the fledgling anarchist labor organization, the Federación Obrero Local (FOL) established relationships with notable cacique apoderados.¹⁴¹ The caciques apoderados also widened their demands, moving beyond land rights to embrace key issues of justice, discrimination, and education.

The Caciques Apoderados tried to stop land divestiture by blocking revistas and sought to reconstitute usurped communal lands on established haciendas by petitioning local, regional, and national officials. Many could read and write, and meticulously studied the law. They no longer relied on scribes, sympathetic urban attorneys, and provincial *tinterillos* to draft their legal petitions. They recognized the power of the written word, and the need to master it in order to contest republican policies. They also actively promoted Indian literacy by establishing schools in rural communities. While the state may have lacked a physical presence in most rural areas, it remained a potentially benevolent guardian of legal rights.¹⁴² Only when legal strategies failed did caciques turn to armed

¹⁴¹ Choque Canqui, *Historia de una lucha desigual*, pp. 79-80; Zulema Lehm y Silvia Rivera, *Los artesanos libertarios y la ética del trabajo* (La Paz: THOA, 1988).

¹⁴² Reliance on the justice system was yet another manifestation of the postcolonial logic of republican rule in the Andes. Just as the Spanish crown had offered communities a channel of legal redress with the colonial justice system, indigenous peoples across the Andes imagined the Republican state playing a similar role. Steve Stern, for example, demonstrated that in the case of colonial Huamanga, the courts in colonial Peru—similar to the law in Republican Peru and Bolivia—meted out justice, but native reliance on them accepted the emerging colonial order, while increasing their dependence on the state and affirming the subordinate positions of Indians in society. See: Steve J. Stern, *Peru's Indian peoples and the challenge of Spanish conquest: Huamanga to 1640* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993). See also: Sergio Serulnikov, *Subverting Colonial Authority: Challenges to Spanish Rule in the Eighteenth-Century Southern Andes* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). For more on how the legal imagination of rural indigenous communities in Republican Peru were shaped by the colonial past, see: Mark Thurner, *From Two Republics to One Divided: Contradiction of Postcolonial Nationmaking in Andean Peru* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997) and David Nugent, *Modernity at the Edge of Empire: State, Individual, and Nation in the Northern Peruvian Andes, 1885-1935* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). For Bolivia, see Tristan Platt, *Estado boliviano y el ayllu andino: Tierra y tributo en el norte de Potosí* (Lima: IEP, 1982) and more recently, Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*.

insurgency, as illustrated by rebellions in Jesus de Machaca in 1921 and in Chayanta in 1927.

The cacique apoderados found tacit support in dissident politicians as rising intra-elite strife weakened Liberal hegemony during the 1910s. In 1914, reform-orientated elites rallied around Bautista Saavedra—the paceño attorney of Mohoza fame who had since become an influential congressman—to found the Partido Unión Republicana. The Republicans differed little from the Liberals. In fact, several members of the new party had formerly been prominent Liberals themselves, including former party boss and President, José Manuel Pando. The Republicans represented the rising frustrations of with Liberal rule in general, and with its free-market economic policies and fraudulent electoral machine in particular. Rather than a new political horizon, the Republicans called for a return to the original goals of the Liberal party, as articulated in its late-nineteenth century charter.¹⁴³ Nevertheless, the party did represent change, and as such, it attracted Bolivia's nascent Marxist left, cholo artisans, and workers. The cacique apoderados also supported the Republican Party. During the late 1910s, Saavedra provided legal counsel to Santos Marka T'ula and other caciques, and he even supported legislation ending the fraudulent sale of communal lands. In July 1920, when Saavedra led the Republican Revolution, ending two decades of Liberal rule, he did so with the support of many highland communities.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ Klein, *Parties and Political Change in Bolivia*, p. 64.

¹⁴⁴ In my own research, I found that several ayllus in the canton of Tiwanaku, Province of Ingavi, Department of La Paz, wrote President Saavedra soon after he seized power, expressing their faith that his government would finally guarantee their rights. See chapter six of this dissertation.

A closer examination of the Republican Era nevertheless reveals that Saavedra's policies were fraught with inconsistencies.¹⁴⁵ Even while introducing a law that limited the ability of creoles to usurp communal lands, he ordered the massacre of upstart indigenous communities in Jesus de Machaca and several other ayllus in the La Paz province of Ingavi in 1921. He recognized the need for indigenous integration while simultaneously enforcing urban segregation laws. He advocated the "cholification" of La Paz's indigenous population, while at the same time subscribing to degenerative theories of racial mixture. Such a posture of coercion and consent, of rapprochement and repression underscores the contradictory logic of Bolivia's evolving postcolonial order. The brutal suppression of rural uprisings at Jesus de Machaca in 1921, and again, at Chayanta in 1927 revealed not simply the limits of Republican sympathy for the caciques apoderados, but the violent nature of creole minority rule as it struggled to contain rural insurgency.

The inconsistent logic of the Republic era became especially salient in creole proposals for indigenous education. Education and literacy were paramount among the demands of the cacique apoderados, who continuously petitioned government authorities for teachers and schools. During the 1920s, with hacienda expansion largely halted by Saavedra, education became the unifying cry of the caciques apoderados. In 1919, Saavedra, still a congressman, sponsored legislation to create separate rural schools for Indians. The proposal differed markedly from earlier Liberal proposals for indigenous education. As part of their pledge of universal education, the Liberals had created teacher training schools (*escuelas normales rurales*) in the countryside to teach Spanish despite

¹⁴⁵ This paragraph builds on Laura Gotkowitz's insights in chapter two of *A Revolution for Our Rights*, pp. 57-68.

opposition from hacendados who feared that education could upset their fragile hold on power. Motivated by the threat of rural insurgency on the one hand, and the need to transform the “dead weight” of the indigenous population into a productive labor force on the other, Saavedra linked education to economic progress by proposing separate Indian boarding schools that eschewed universal education, emphasizing instead agrarian technical training, Spanish literacy, and western civilization.¹⁴⁶ Emphasizing Indians’ natural relationship to the pristine albeit unforgiving altiplano, rural education was intended to civilize Indians and insert them into the nation as agrarian producers while simultaneously maintaining their political exclusion.¹⁴⁷

Rural education fell into a diverse matrix of creole proposals aimed at the resolution of the Indian problem. Many national elites doubted the efficacy of state-led civilization initiatives—particularly those who continued to subscribe to biological theories of race. In one particularly pessimistic example, Agustín Iturricha, a prominent Sucre Liberal, pondered “Como se puede incorporar al indio a la vida de civilización si sociológicamente, psicológicamente y moralmente es imposible?”¹⁴⁸ In addition to education, national elites also promoted European immigration in an effort to “whiten” the population through miscegenation, but the immigrants and their ideal “racial stock” never arrived in the numbers required.¹⁴⁹ Though, in Bolivia, eugenics did not enjoy the

¹⁴⁶ Roberto Choque Canqui y Cristina Quisbert Quipe, *Educación indigenal en Bolivia: un siglo de ensayos educativos y resistencias patronales* (La Paz: Ibis, 2006), pp. 110-116.

¹⁴⁷ Brooke Larson, “Capturing Indian Hearths, Bodies, and Minds: ‘El hogar campesino’ and Rural School Reform in Bolivia, 1920s-1940s,” *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivian in a Comparative Perspective*, Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo, eds. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 183-209.

¹⁴⁸ Agustín Iturricha, *¿Es posible llevar a la civilización al indio? ¿Que puede hacerse en su beneficio?* (La Paz: Imprenta Bolívar, 1932).

¹⁴⁹ During the 1930s, Bolivia was the largest recipient of Jewish immigration in South America, welcoming some 20,000 refugees by decade’s end. This policy, which spawned a wave of anti-Semitism—the MNR being perhaps one of the most vocal opponents to the idea—was in part motivated by creole whitening fantasies. See Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for our Rights*, pp. 173-177. For more on Jewish

widespread popularity among social scientists and statesmen as it did in Argentina and Brazil, the global racial hygiene movement had several adherents by the 1930s.¹⁵⁰ As historian Ann Zulowski demonstrates, however, Bolivia eugenicists fixated on women's health, morality, and reproduction rather than racial improvement.¹⁵¹ This is not to say that Indians were not the focus of eugenics policies, as they certainly were; but it seems that most eugenics-orientated social legislation was primarily directed towards women, the family, and reinforcing traditional gender norms.¹⁵²

As elites continued to debate indigenous education into the 1930s, communities began initiating their own grassroots education efforts across the countryside. The movement started in a remote altiplano village called Warisata, where Avelino Siñani, a self-taught literate Aymara comunario, began teaching his fellow comunarios how to read and write. The effort gained the attention of the progressive creole educator, Elizardo Pérez. One of the first graduates of the National Teachers Academy (founded in 1909), Pérez was inspired by the international indigenista movement and interested in rural education. In 1931 Pérez and Siñani established the escuela unica at Warisata, a radically distinct rural education initiative that emphasized Aymara cultural traditions and social

immigration to Bolivia, see Leo Spitzer, *Hotel Bolivia: The Culture of Memory in a Refuge from Nazism* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1999).

¹⁵⁰ The history of eugenics in Latin America is beautifully traced by Nancy Leys Stepan in *"The Hour of Eugenics": Race Gender, and Nation in Latin America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). Her efforts to situate race in the history of science literature has influenced a generation of scholarship on the topic. For a recent example of the advancements being made in the historiography of race, science, and eugenics in a global context, see Andrés H. Reggiani, "Depopulation, Fascism, and Eugenics in 1930s Argentina," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 90, No. 2 (May 2010), pp. 283-318. A more recent edition of the HAHR is devoted to Stepan: "Science and Medicine in Latin America: Essays in Honor of Nancy Leys Stepan," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 91, No. 3 (August 2011). In terms of race and eugenics, see: Nancy P. Appelbaum and Karin Alejandra Roseblatt, eds., *Race and Nation in Modern Latin America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007) and Richard Graham, ed, *The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870-1940* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990).

¹⁵¹ Ann Zulowski, *Unequal Cures: Public Health and Political Change in Bolivia, 1900-1950* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), pp. 118-156.

¹⁵² Benigno Carrasco, *La Eugenesia en el Ambiente Boliviano* (La Paz: Armando Gamarra & Cia., 1945).

norms. They promoted ethnic rejuvenation through Spanish literacy, valorizing the ayllu, community, and language in the process. This model that emerged at Warisata was soon copied and implemented in other parts of the highlands as *escuelas nucleares rurales*—at Vacas in Cochabamba and Caiza D in Potosí, for example. In subsequent decades, the state would gradually co-opt these grassroots efforts as the foundation for one the most ambitious rural education initiatives in the hemisphere.¹⁵³

It was during this time when a younger generation of reform-minded creoles revisited the Indian problem through the novel lens of critical Marxism. The ideas of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky arrived by way of Argentina, Chile, and Peru during first decades of the twentieth century.¹⁵⁴ They were popular among workers, urban intellectuals, and university students in La Paz, Sucre, and Cochabamba, and in the mining camps around Oruro and Potosi.¹⁵⁵ By the 1920s, Marxism had largely displaced

¹⁵³ There is an abundant and growing literature on rural school during the first half of the twentieth century. One of the best accounts comes from Elizardo Pérez, the first director of Warisata: Elizardo Pérez, *Warista: La escuela-ayllu* (La Paz, HISBOL, 1992 [1962]). See also: Roberto Choque Canqui y Cristina Quisbert Quipe, *Educación indígena en Bolivia: un siglo de ensayos educativos y resistencias patronales* (La Paz: Ibis, 2006). Brooke Larson, "Capturing Indian Bodies, Hearths, and Minds: The Gendered Politics of Rural School Reform in Bolivia, 1910-53," in *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in a Comparative Perspective*, Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo, eds. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 183-212, especially pp. 192-93.

¹⁵⁴ Guillermo Lora, *Formación de la clase obrera boliviana* (La Paz: Ediciones Masas, 1980). Given the central role that labor has played in modern political and social developments in Bolivia, there is a rich and growing literature on the topic. The most comprehensive treatment of Bolivian labor history remains Guillermo Lora's four volume opus, *Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano* (La Paz: Amigos del Libro, 1967-), which breaks the labor movement into four distinct periods: 1848-1900 (Vol. 1), 1900-1923 (Vol. 2), 1923-1933 (Vol. 3), and 1933-1952 (Vol. 4). Also see the his two-volume, *Contribución a la historia política de Bolivia* (La Paz: Ediciones ISLA, 1978). For a more recent interpretation for labor in the tin-mining camps during the first half of the twentieth century, see Robert L. Smale "I Sweat the Flavor of Tin": *Labor Activism in Early Twentieth-Century Bolivia* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2010). For a classic ethnographic study of Bolivian miners, see: June Nash, *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us: Dependency and Exploitation in Bolivian Tin Mines* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). For a detailed history of the important influence of Trotskyism in the mining camps, see: Steven Sandor John, "Permanent revolution on the Altiplano: Bolivian Trotskyism, 1928--2005" (Ph.D. Dissertation: City University of New York, 2006).

¹⁵⁵ The Argentine writer, José Ingenieros had a powerful impact on Bolivian social thought with *Sociología argentina*. For the extent to which the Argentine socialist influenced Bolivian social thought, see, for

the positivism that had hitherto dominated Bolivia social thought. Historian Guillermo Francovich writes, “las obras de Lenin, Bujarin, Plejanov, etc., circulaban por todas partes en ediciones populares hechas en la Argentina y en Chile, recibiendo la misma adhesión que las de Comte, Renán, Spencer, etc., cuarenta años atrás.”¹⁵⁶ Also popular in Bolivia were the works of Argentine Sociologist, Jose Ingenieros, Chilean labor activist, Luis Emilio Recabarren, and Jose Carlos Mariátegui and Victor Haya de la Torre from neighboring Peru.¹⁵⁷ Coupled with prevailing constructions of race founded on telluric and neo-Lamarckian ideas, the structuralism underlying Marxist dialectics offered a new perspective on the Indian problem. Some began to see it not in biological, but in environmental and structural terms.

These concepts were at the center of another ideological current that was growing in influence in Bolivia called indigenismo. A creole ideology that sought the glorification and revitalization of indigenous populations, indigenismo is rooted in the protectionist legal culture of the colonial state.¹⁵⁸ After independence, it emerged in distinct republican contexts as creole leaders embraced positive aspects of pre-Hispanic civilization as unique national symbols.¹⁵⁹ Artists and writers identified Indians as the foundation for distinct national literatures, some even writing in native languages. In

example, Ignacio Prudencio Bustillo, *La duenda de Bolivia al pensamiento de Ingenieros*. See also Francovich, *El Pensamiento Boliviano*, pp. 133-134.

¹⁵⁶ Guillermo Francovich, *El pensamiento boliviano en el siglo XX*, 2ª Edición (La Paz: Amigos de Libro, 1985), p. 135.

¹⁵⁷ Guillermo Francovich, *El pensamiento boliviano en el siglo XX*, 2ª Edición (La Paz: Amigos de Libro, 1985). Illustrating the extent to which Peruvian Marxism influenced Bolivian intellectuals, Herbert Klein demonstrates that APRA temporarily established a cell in Bolivia in 1927. Klein, *Parties and Political Change*, p. 101 f. 3, and pp. 124-136.

¹⁵⁸ For a broad overview of indigenismo, see Henri Favre, *El Indigenismo* (México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1996)

¹⁵⁹ Rebecca Earle, *The Return of the Native: Indians and Myth-Making in Spanish America, 1810-1930* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), pp. 184-212.

Bolivia, literary indigenismo dates to independence with the Quechan poet, Juan Wallparrimachi, and later in the century, with Nataniel Aguirre's *Juan de la Rosas* or Emeterio Villamil de Rada's *Legua de Adan*. The genre grew in the twentieth century, as evidenced by the popularity of Alcides Arguedas' *Raza de Bronce*. It was also during this period that indigenismo began to orientate social scientific knowledge—Bautista Saavedra and Manuel Rigoberto Paredes stand as prominent examples—and pedagogy, demonstrated most saliently by Franz Tamayo and, later, Elizardo Pérez.¹⁶⁰

One of the primary means through which reform-minded creoles entering public life in the turbulent 1920s and 1930s were introduced to the idea was the famed Peruvian Marxist intellectual, José Carlos Mariátegui—particularly his landmark, *Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana* (1928).¹⁶¹ His ideas were popularized in Bolivia by Gustavo Adolfo Navarro who, writing as Tristán Marof, published *La Justicia del Inca* and *La Tragedia del Altiplano* (1934) to bring attention to the plight of the colono. His call for “tierras al indio, minas al estado” precipitated the rising political generation. For many reform-minded intellectuals, indigenismo provided not only a unique symbol of national identity, but a new perspective on the relationship between Indian and the nation.

During the 1920s, these two currents, Marxism and Indigenismo, were also infused with nationalism. Though nationalism and liberalism are not necessarily mutually exclusive ideologies, the former emerged in Bolivia as a reaction to the latter—particularly in the context of the early twentieth century, with the centennial celebrations,

¹⁶⁰ Jesús Lara, *La poesía quechua* (México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1947).

¹⁶¹ For insight into how Bolivian intellectuals were reading Peruvian indigenista writers, see Guillermo Francovich, *El pensamiento boliviano en el siglo XX*, 2ª edición (La Paz: Editorial “Los Amigos del Libro,” 1984). For one example, see Carlos Medinaceli, *Estudios Críticos* (La Paz: Los Amigos de Libro, 1969), pp. 141-145. A Bolivian intellectual and literary critic, Medinaceli critiques the work of Peruvian indigenista, Uriel García.

the Mexican Revolution. Though nationalism was articulated in a variety of ways (indigenismo among them), economic nationalism was the particular thread that emerged in the 1920s and predominated for decades. Economic nationalism represented a rejection of the unfettered free market policies and export led growth model embraced by a generation of liberal statesmen, intellectuals, and entrepreneurs. Particularly when viewed through critical Marxist paradigms, liberal policies had resulted in the concentration of resources, land, and capital in the hands of small elite while the masses suffered poverty, hunger, and destitution. Bolivia's tin-based monoculture economy provides a particular salient example of such a phenomenon. Seventy-five percent of Bolivia's tin—and export revenue—was owned by just three individuals, Félix Avelino Aramayo, Mauricio Hochschild, and Simon Patiño. While all Bolivian citizens, their profits ended up in foreign banks, with very little being remitted to the state thanks to a lax tax code and the enormous influence they commanded of their Liberal, Conservative, and Republican friends and colleagues. To counter the disproportionate influence these individuals exercised on the national government and economy, the emerging nationalists advocated trade protectionism, industrialization, increased attention to social welfare, and the reversion of natural resources to the state.

By the end of the decade, all three of these currents had become manifest in the national political scene, shaping dominant issues of national development and the Indian problem. In 1927, two young radicals from Cochabamba, Augusto Céspedes and Carlos Montenegro joined more seasoned politicians to found the *Partido Nacionalista* (PN). Indicating the rising influence of economic nationalism, they advocated increased government protectionism, incentives for national industry, and agrarian modernization,

and more progressive social policies (though it did not mention the Indian problem).¹⁶² The party attracted a host of reform-minded intellectuals and statesmen from across the ideological spectrum—including Saturnino Rodrigo, Alberto Mendez Lopez, Victor Paz Estenssoro, Ricardo Anaya, and José Antonio Arze—who would fundamentally reshape national politics in succeeding decades.¹⁶³ Meanwhile, the Partido Socialista (PS) attracted more radical social reformers from the left, including Roberto Hinojosa and Gustavo A. Navarro (aka Tristán Marof) who, in the years that followed, would meld Marxist and indigenismo paradigms in their political position.¹⁶⁴ The great depression, which did not hit Bolivia especially hard until 1931, only served to further entrench these ideological currents in Bolivian political life. A new era was indeed dawning, one that would have a profound impact on national development and Indian-state relations in the decades to come.

THE CHACO WAR AND THE RISING TIDE FOR REFORM, 1932-1952

By the 1930s, Bolivia's postcolonial order was teetering on the brink of collapse. Worker and peasant mobilization was mounting. The great depression had revealed the shortcomings of the export-led growth model. And elite hegemony was fracturing with new ideological and political currents. The Chaco War (1932-1935) would push the postcolonial republic into the historical abyss, initiating an unprecedented period of political change, social reform, and grassroots mobilization that would fundamentally

¹⁶² Klein, *Parties and Political Change*, pp. 92-93.

¹⁶³ Klein, *Parties and Political Change*, 90-99. For a succinct summary of the lives and careers of influential politicians from this period, including as Carlos Montenegro, José Antonio Arze, Jose Aguirre Gainsborg, Roberto Hinojosa, see: Valentín Abecia López, *7 políticos bolivianos* (La Paz: Juventud, 1986). Thanks go to Jose Roberto Arze for recommending this helpful source.

¹⁶⁴ Klein, *Parties and Political Change*, pp. 95-96.

transform the status of indigenous Bolivians. Following Bolivia's defeat to Paraguay in 1935, the question of indigenous integration became tied into broader debates over national unity and economic development. Indigenismo, Marxism, and nationalism, which began to influence national politics the previous decades, provided the ideological underpinning for an emerging left. In the post-Chaco era, these new ideological currents would meld to provide the foundation for new political groupings. Between 1932 and 1952, indigenous integration became one of the most pressing issues facing a rising generation of reform-minded politicians. How could the republic modernize without national unity?

The Chaco War marked a major turning point in Bolivian history. Fought with Paraguay over the disputed Chaco Boreal territory, the War proved disastrous for Bolivia. Despite advantages in manpower, armament, resources, and logistics, Bolivia suffered a humiliating defeat. Fifty thousand soldiers were killed and another 21,000 taken prisoner—a total of 61,000 casualties in a country of only three million.¹⁶⁵ Bolivia also lost an eighth of its national territory. Many contemporaries saw the War as nothing more than President Daniel Salamanca's desperate effort to maintain oligarchic privilege. Others perceived it as an imperial conflict between Standard Oil and Royal Dutch Shell over the purportedly oil-rich territory. Regardless of its causes, the War produced a pervasive sense of national disillusionment among Bolivia's small but growing middle class and enflamed growing unrest among workers, miners, and indigenous peasants.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ Klein, *Parties and Political Change*

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

Not only was the Chaco War the most important factor in forging a modern Bolivian nationalism, but it marked the dawn of a new era of political and social reform.¹⁶⁷

The war left an especially contested legacy for indigenous veterans. On the front, the military hierarchy mirrored the caste divisions that characterized postcolonial society. Indians served as the front-line soldiers and subsequently sustained the highest rate of casualties. Most were conscripts who knew little, if any, Spanish. They succumbed to the unforgiving heat of the Chaco, suffering from heat stroke, exhaustion, and, most commonly, disease. With the cessation of hostilities, some veterans returned to their communities or haciendas. Others, refusing to return to the exploitive seigniorial regime, migrated to La Paz or Cochabamba seeking employment.¹⁶⁸ Many brought their firearms with them. Fighting for what had long been an abstract and exclusionary entity called Bolivia, indigenous soldiers developed a sense of nationalism. The reproduction of postcolonial caste hierarchies within the ranks, moreover, had made especially salient their status as second class citizens, confirming for some and revealing for others a condition they shared with other ethnic groups. Many colonos and comunarios felt that their sacrifices in the Chaco entitled them to land, to justice, to citizenship. Their experience would shape their interaction with the state, as a new generation of indigenous activists redoubled the efforts initiated decades prior.

Post-Chaco rural mobilization varied widely. In Cochabamba, syndicalism established its deepest roots. Colonos in Ucureña organized the first rural syndicates as

¹⁶⁷ Roberto Choque, "Nacionalismo Boliviano," en *Visiones de fin de siglo: Bolivia y América Latina en el Siglo XX*, Dora Cajías, Magdalena Cajías, Carmen Johnson, Iris Villegas, eds. (La Paz: IFEA, 2001); Irma Lorini, *El nacionalismo en Bolivia de la pre y posguerra del Chaco, 1910-1945* (La Paz, Bolivia: Plural Editores, 2006).

¹⁶⁸ In the immediate post-Chaco period, Bolivia's urban population rose by at least 30 percent. Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, p. 107.

early as 1936.¹⁶⁹ On the altiplano, colonos and comunarios revived the pre-Chaco networks. Andrés Marka T'ula, son of the prominent Cacique Apoderado, was among those who sought to revive the national network of rural activists that his father had forged before the War.¹⁷⁰ Although he seems to have succeeded, the post-Chaco network paled in comparison to its previous size and coordination. Historian Waskar Ari found that many of those formally involved in the cacique apoderados movement of the 1920s, joined a burgeoning network of Aymara and Quechua activists affiliated with the Alcaldes Mayores Particulares (AMP). The AMP movement was founded in 1936 by Gregorio Titiriku, a literate Aymara activist from the Lake Titicaca region who had participated in the caciques apoderados movement in the 1920s.¹⁷¹ He and his followers promoted ethnic rejuvenation through literacy and spirituality. Drawing on colonial laws of two republics, they sought to establish an independent indigenous nation. A national network consisting of 480 cells, the AMPs participated in the grassroots rural education movement, establishing several escuelas rurales particulares (rural private school) similar to the Warisata model.¹⁷²

Indigenous Bolivians were not alone in their frustration. Appalled at the racialized hierarchy of the military and the disproportionate slaughter of Indians, the workers and middle-class professionals who had served as lower-ranking officers, recognized that they shared much in common with indigenous Bolivians. Furthermore,

¹⁶⁹ Jorge Dandler, *El sindicalismo campesino en Bolivia: los cambios estructurales en Ucareña* (Cochabamba, CERES, 1983). Luís Antezana traces the broader contours of rural syndicalism from 1935-1943 in *Origen, desarrollo y situación actual del sindicalismo campesino en Bolivia*, Primera Parte: "Bosquejo histórico del movimiento sindical campesino en Bolivia, Agosto de 1968." This document is from the archives of the University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center (UWLTC).

¹⁷⁰ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, p.160.

¹⁷¹ Ari, "Race and subaltern nationalism," pp. 162-165

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 172.

the failure in leadership, the enormous casualty count, and the loss of territory to Paraguay caused many who previously supported the traditional parties to question the inherent inequalities of Bolivian society and the nature of national politics. Following the war, a profound sense of malaise settled over a broken and disgraced nation. From this malaise arose an entire generation of reform-minded political activists, intellectuals, and politically-conscious university students—the “Generación del Chaco”—who drew from a variety of ideological currents to remake Bolivia in subsequent decades.¹⁷³

Rising frustration among workers, miners, and the middling sectors of society crystalized in a host of new political grouping in the post-Chaco period. Alongside the veterans, urban merchants, industrial workers, artisans, and university students joined the emerging political parties and labor confederations. The radical left, which had been persecuted and exiled during the war, enjoyed a marked resurgence. In 1934, Tristán Marof—famous for his credo “tierras al indio, minas al estado”—and José Aguirre Gainsborg founded the first revolutionary leftist party of the post-Chaco era, the *Partido Obrero Revolucionario* (Revolutionary Workers Party, POR). Drawing inspiration from the APRA in neighboring Peru, the party advocated “forming a new Bolivia” by nationalizing Bolivia’s natural resources and enacting agrarian reform.¹⁷⁴ Its ranks soon swelled with workers from the recently-organized national labor union, the *Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Bolivia* (CSTB).

The white-collar workers, teachers, attorneys, artisans, and urban professionals of the middle class on the other hand gravitated to a new moderate leftist party, the *Confederación Socialista Boliviana* (Bolivian Socialist Confederation, CSB). Founded in

¹⁷³ Klein, *Parties and Political Change*.

¹⁷⁴ Klein, *Parties and Political Change*, p. 295.

October 1935 by Carlos Montenegro, José Tamayo, and others from the pre-War Partido Nacionalista, the CSB hoped to appeal to the middle-class professionals and veterans. Deriding the traditional parties for their irresponsible management of the national economy and disastrous conduct of the war, they demanded increased state intervention in the economy, the nationalization of the oil fields, and protective tariffs to encourage domestic industry.¹⁷⁵ The party also supported women's suffrage, a labor code, universal education, and public health. Though the CSB advocated indigenous integration and recognized the need to abolish ponguaje, it did not advocate full-scale agrarian reform.¹⁷⁶

The rising tide of reform appealed to a cadre of reform minded military officers who enjoyed popularity as a result of their leadership during the war. In May 1936, following an unprecedented general strike, progressive military reformers ousted civilian interim president, José Tejada Sorzano. Supported by the middle class, labor, and veterans, first Coronel David Toro and then Major Germán Busch launched an unprecedented populist experiment. Military socialism, as its progenitors dubbed it, was advocated for the expansion of the state's role in the national economy and for ensuring the social wellbeing of the population. During their three years in power, they introduced a new labor code, public health initiatives, and social welfare laws. They also nationalized Standard Oil's natural gas and petroleum fields, creating *Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos* (YPFB), a state corporation to ensure that the wealth generated would benefit the nation. They carried out their reformist agenda under the

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

¹⁷⁶ For a summary of the origins of the CSB and its position, see: Klein, *Parties and Political Change*, pp. 213-217. For a detailed study of post-Chaco politics, see especially chapter 8 of Carlos Rey Aramayo, "The Intellectual Origins of the Modern Bolivian Political System, 1918-1943" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 2008), pp. 324-276.

leitmotif of national unity—a concern which hinged to no small extent on the Indian problem and related issues of land, citizenship, and justice.¹⁷⁷

One of the most significant achievements of the military socialists was the 1938 constitutional convention. Seeking to promote more progressive social legislation, political parties, labor unions, and university students all called constitutional reform. Toro's acquiescence to social mobilization reflected not only the military socialists' dedication to moderate reform, but also their desire to channel grassroots demands into orderly, state-led initiatives.¹⁷⁸ Once the convention convened in La Paz in May 1938, the 122 delegates—most representing the reformist political currents of the day—took up a diversity of pressing issues, from state centralization to citizenship. Yet none of the topics were as contested as those that dealt with land and Indians.¹⁷⁹ Through the Indian problem turned up in discussions on citizenship, property rights, and the agrarian economy, it was the question of "Agrarian and Peasant Regime" where the most contentious proposals were deliberated. In line with the idea that property must serve a social function, future MNR leader, Victor Paz Estenssoro called for the partition of large,

¹⁷⁷ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, pp. 114-127. The problem of national unity, a reoccurring theme in the post-Chaco period, was debated by statesmen and intellectuals alike. See for example: Federico Ávila *El problema de la unidad nacional: del caudillismo bárbaro a la restauración nacionalista* (Editorial "Universo," 1938).

¹⁷⁸ The Mexican Constitution of 1917 served as a model of progressive constitutional reform across Latin America. A new legal charter for the postrevolutionary republic, it radically departed from the classical liberal mold within which most nineteenth-century constitutions were cast. One of its most salient features of this reconceived social contract was the role of the state. Where liberal constitutions limited the role of government in society, the new charters charged the state with maintaining the economic and social wellbeing the nation. Property rights were also reconceived. Liberal charters defined property as an inalienable right, whereas social constitutions undermined the inalienability clause while stipulating that property rights depended on social function. Herbert Klein situates Bolivia's 1938 Constitutional Convention in a broader trend of social constitutionalism in Latin American in "'Social Constitutionalism' in Latin America: The Bolivian Experience of 1938," *The Americas*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (January 1966), pp. 258-276. Laura Gotkowitz also situates Bolivia's 1938 charter alongside similar constitutional reform initiatives in Mexico (1917), Cuba (1940), and Guatemala (1945). See: Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, pp. 102-103.

¹⁷⁹ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for our Rights*, pp. 115, 122.

unproductive estates among indigenous peasants and veterans. Walter Guevara Arze, another future MNR leader, took an even more radical position, asserting that unproductive hacienda lands should be returned to indigenous communities. He located the Indian problem not in biology, but in the socioeconomic structures maintained by the landed and mining elite. Providing “backwards” Indians with land, education, and clothing would result in their “improvement” and gradual incorporation into republican nationhood.

Although land reform ultimately failed, delegates did succeed in removing some existing legal barriers to indigenous citizenship. They guaranteed communal land rights, thus overturning the 1874 Ley de Exvinculación. They also outlawed Indian servitude by stipulating that all workers must be paid for their labor.¹⁸⁰ Though it would be decades before such guarantees were actually met, in the end, the 1938 charter provided the legal foundation for a modern welfare state. It established social responsibility of property rights, increased the role of the state in the national economy, and established family, health, and social welfare laws that charged the government with maintaining the social wellbeing of its citizens.¹⁸¹ While the Indian problem would remain unresolved for the time being, the debates surrounding such issues as citizenship and land indicated the rising tide of reform sweeping over the nation and the widespread commitment not necessarily to racial equality, but to economic development and social modernization. Such sentiment perhaps helps explain why Busch ultimately delayed implementation of the constitution and why, after his mysterious suicide in 1939, the charter posed an enduring threat to the power of the landed and mining oligarchy.

¹⁸⁰ Bolivia, Constitución política de 1938, 30 de octubre de 1938, Artículo 165 and Artículo 5.

¹⁸¹ For a succinct discussion of the origin, deliberations, and legacy of the 1938 constitutional convention, see: Luis Antezana, *Bolivia: Historia de las constituyentes* (La Paz, CIMA, 2006), pp. 99-108.

The electoral contest of 1940 revealed the growing sentiment for social and political change in Bolivian society and marked a turning point in the balance of formal political power. To counter the rising tide of reform, the oligarchy established an electoral coalition, *La Concordancia*, from the remnants of the Liberal and Republican parties. This pact “marked the end of the political system which had ruled national life since 1880 and of the traditional intra-class party structure,” observes Herbert Klein, “and the real beginning of the class-oriented and socially disruptive political party structure based on the socio-economic reality of the nation.”¹⁸² The Concordancia backed conservative General Enrique Peñaranda for the presidency, while the left threw their support behind leftist independent and former student radical, José Antonio Arze. Though Arze lost the election, the fact that he won 10,000 votes (in a total electorate of 58,000) startled the traditional elite.¹⁸³ The outcome of the congressional elections was equally alarming, as several new deputies from both the radical and moderate left were elected. Though the radicals and the moderates were united in their commitment to the reforms instituted by Toro and Busch, they remained fundamentally divided on several issues which would distinguish them in the coming years.

The early 1940s witnessed the emergence of the two most powerful popular parties of the era. Energized by the outpouring of electoral support, Arze established the Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (PIR) in July 1940. Not only was the Leninist orientation of the party apparent in its founding manifesto, but the document also revealed an unprecedented proposal for indigenous integration and social uplift

¹⁸² Klein, *Parties and Political Change*, p. 306.

¹⁸³ Klein, *Parties and Political Change*, pp. 331-32.

reminiscent of Mariátegui.¹⁸⁴ The PIR fashioned itself as the representative “of the most oppressed classes” and its plan for bringing about a more just and equitable society consisted of undermining “Yankee imperialism” by nationalizing all natural resources and essential infrastructure; promoting domestic industry; and establishing a state export monopoly.¹⁸⁵ Its social programs advocated gender equality, public health and sanitation initiatives, and universal education. As for the Indian problem, Arze asserted that “the only real solution is Agrarian Revolution.”¹⁸⁶ Once given land and education, indigenous Bolivians would quickly insert themselves into national life.¹⁸⁷ Together with its appeal to the radical left and labor, the PIR soon emerged as the most powerful political party in Bolivia.¹⁸⁸

The second major political force to emerge during this period was the MNR. It was founded in November 1941, by the moderate block of congressional deputies led by Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Carlos Montenegro and Augusto Céspedes, their former colleagues in the PN and the PS who has since gone on to found the popular La Paz daily, *La Calle*.¹⁸⁹ Founding members also included Hernán Siles, Walter Guevara Arze, and Alberto Mendoza López. Montenegro and Céspedes embraced European fascism, manifest in the MNR commitment to establishing a welfare state, their support of the

¹⁸⁴ Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, *Programa y estatutos del Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionario* (La Paz, 1941).

¹⁸⁵ Archivo Privado de José Roberto Arze (Hereafter APJRA), José Antonio Arze, Obras, Tomo 2 (Hereafter JAA 2), José Antonio Arze, “What is the Revolutionary Leftist Party of Bolivia,” lecture given at Williams College, April 1942. Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, *Programa y estatutos del Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionario* (La Paz, 1941).

¹⁸⁶ APJRA, JJ 2, José Antonio Arze, “The Indian in Latin America,” Lecture given in Boston, Massachusetts on 4/25/1942, p. 7.

¹⁸⁷ APJRA, JJ 2, José Antonio Arze, “The Indian in Latin America,” Lecture given in Boston, Massachusetts on 4/25/1942, p. 7-8.

¹⁸⁸ Klein, *Parties and Political Change*, p. 342.

¹⁸⁹ The PIR congressional cell was led by Abelarco Villapando

Axis powers in Europe, and the blatant anti-Semitism that pervaded early MNR manifestos. As some author points out, however, that it was the fascism of Mussolini's Italy not of Hitler's Third Reich.¹⁹⁰ As for ideology, the MNR eschewed the dogmatic Marxism of the Leninist PIR and the Trotskyite POR, arguing that foreign theories in themselves were inadequate to explain Bolivia's national reality. They did not completely disavow Marxist paradigms, however. They adopted a structural interpretation of national history, rooted in Lenin's theory of imperialism, to explaining Bolivia's backwardness as a result of the "superestado mineral" that monopolized both the state and the nation's finite natural resources for their own personal enrichment.

The MNR's concerns with the nation were economic before social and generally reformist rather than revolutionary. While both the PIR and the POR demanded nothing less than the nationalization of the tin mines and agrarian reform, the MNR took a more moderate position. Instead of nationalizing the tin mines, its 1942 manifesto called for "la subordinación absoluta de las grandes empresas que operan con el exterior al Estado Boliviano."¹⁹¹ The party's position on "el problema agrario indígena" was equally moderate. Despite earlier commitments to agrarian reform expressed by Paz, Guevara, and Siles the, party did not officially endorse the measure—an indication of its desire to appeal to the moderate reformers in the middle class. It recognized the need "incorporar a la vida nacional a los millones de campesinos marginados de ella." It nevertheless stopped short of dismantling the socioeconomic system that would break down the barriers to citizenship, advocating instead "una ley que reglamente el trabajo del

¹⁹⁰ Still trying to figure out where I originally read this!

¹⁹¹ José Cuadros Quiroga, *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario: Sus bases y principios de acción inmediata* (La Paz, 1942), p. 43.

campesino” that would guarantee basic rights to hacienda colonos.¹⁹² The MNR’s revolution rested not on the forced redistribution of wealth, but upon expanding the state’s role in both the economy and society.

Alongside the social and political changes that were transpiring during the 1940, were important transformations occurring in social scientific thought that would eventually transform prevailing ideas of racial difference. The biological assumptions underlying indigenous alterity and theories of racial degeneration were slowly under assault by progressive theories of human difference rooted in the culture concept. Resulting from the ethnographic insights of celebrated Austrian-American anthropologist, Franz Boas, cultural relativism provided a novel theory of human difference linked to a rejection of the classical evolution model that was especially prevalent in the English-speaking academy.¹⁹³ Espoused by such thinkers as E.B. Tylor and Herbert Spencer in England and Lewis Henry Morgan in the U.S., it was widely understood that the so-called “primitive” peoples of Africa or Latin America occupied an earlier stage of human evolution. At the heart of Boas rejection of this model was the culture concept itself. As conceived of within the social evolutionists, culture was a singular concept, synonymous with civilization, something to be achieved. As George Stocking shows, Boas reframed the culture concept as intrinsic to all human civilization and thus multiple, arguing that what was understood as different stages of human evolution according to the progressive teleology advocated by the social evolution theory

¹⁹²Ibid., p. 42.

¹⁹³ For a discussion of Tylor situated more broadly in Victorian anthropology, see George W. Stocking, Jr., *Victorian Anthropology* (New York: Free Press, 1987). See also George W. Stocking, Jr., *After Tylor: British Social Anthropology, 1888-1951* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995). For more on the thinking of Lewis Henry Morgan in American Anthropology, see Regna Darnell, *And Along Came Boas: Continuity and Revolution in Americanist Anthropology* (Philadelphia: J. Benjamins, 1998).

were actually distinct, bordered albeit porous “cultural groups” that needed to be studied objectively and ahistorically.¹⁹⁴ Boasian historicism undermined prevailing theories of social evolution and, for students such as Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict, provided a new language to discuss human difference.

Across Latin America, cultural relativism caused a reconsideration of the biological assumptions of social evolutionism, marking what many scholars had identified as the cultural turn of race in the region.¹⁹⁵ Since at least the 1940s, progressive Bolivian intellectuals had been exposed to the concept through their engagement with Mexican and U.S. social science. Popular journals as the *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* and *América Indígena*, which often published Bolivian social thinkers, also featured Manuel Gamio, Moisés Sáenz, Juan Comas and other Mexican academics who interpreted cultural relativism through their own historical-social experience of postrevolutionary nation building. Gamio, who studied anthropology with Boas at Colombia, returned to Mexico with the culture concept, downplaying race for the existence of cultural groups. Sáenz, the celebrated Mexican educator who studied with both Boas and John Dewey at Colombia, also promoted cultural relativism, and was widely read by Bolivian intellectuals.¹⁹⁶ Comas, a Spanish physical anthropologist who had migrated to Mexico during the Spanish Civil War, also integrated cultural relativism into his thinking about race and human difference. During the 1940s, in fact, he had

¹⁹⁴ Stocking, *Race, Culture, and Evolution*, pp. 211-233.

¹⁹⁵ Marisol de la Cadena, *Indigenous Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919-1991* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); Zolia S. Mendoza, *Creating our Own: Folklore, Performance, and Identity in Cusco, Peru* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson, and Karin Alejandra Roseblatt, editors, *Race and Nation in Modern Latin America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

¹⁹⁶ Before his untimely death in 1939, Saenz was working on a study of Bolivia’s indigenous population, which was posthumously published in three parts in *Khana* after the Revolution.

singled out towering Bolivian intellectual, Arturo Posnansky for the racial theories that underlie his anthropological research on Altiplano Indians. Cultural constructions of race slowly emerged in the 1940s within reformist political groupings and would emerge at the core of postrevolutionary Indian policy.

The rising tide for reform became manifest once again in December 1943, when an otherwise obscure reform-minded major, Gualberto Villarroel led a group of junior officers to oust President Peñaranda. Villarroel and his coconspirators were members of *Razón de Patria* (RADEPA). A clandestine military lodge founded by of junior officers while prisoners of war in Paraguay, RADEPA resented the incompetent civilian leadership of the government. After taking power in 1943, Villarroel invited MNR leaders Montenegro, Céspedes, and Paz Estenssoro to occupy key cabinet positions within the new regime. Though retaining fascist sympathies, the Villarroel-MNR government signaled a continuation of the reformist agenda of Busch and Toro. Villarroel's commitment to bettering the life of workers, peasants, and the poor was summed up in his famous declaration: "We are not enemies of the rich, but we are better friends of the poor."¹⁹⁷ The regime increased rights for workers, bolstered the middle-class, and sought the gradual integration of indigenous peasants into national life.¹⁹⁸

The MNR-Villarroel regime continued the pro-labor stance of the military socialists. In 1944, the first national miners congress convened at Huanuni to found the *Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia* (FSTMB). Not only was the FSTMB the largest union, but the central position of tin exports in the national economy made the miners confederation especially powerful. It could shut down the national

¹⁹⁷ Quoted from, Luis Peñaloza Cordero, *Historia secreta del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, 1941-1952* (La Paz: Juventud, 1963), p. 64

¹⁹⁸ Klein, *Parties and Political Change*, p. 378.

economy with work stoppages or strikes. The general secretary of the FSTMB was a popular clerical employee and MNR supporter named Juan Lechín Oquendo. Lechín would prove an indispensable ally for the MNR, providing the party with inroads into the POR dominating mining camps.

Perhaps the most notable achievement of the short-lived Villarroel-MNR coalition was the 1945 National Indigenous Congress. The Chaco War transformed the traditional politics and the framed a new debate in the urban centers predominantly populated by creoles, mestizos, and cholos. It also influenced grassroots political mobilization among colonos and comunarios. True, the war had weakened the caciques apoderados movement, but the growing connections between urban activists and indigenous leaders, provided a generation of rural activists with a new language to frame decades-old demands for land, rights, and justice. The discourse of class-struggle resonated with the growing left as well, providing a common language of rural exploitation and its causes.

¹⁹⁹ While colonos and comunarios in the Cochabamba valley turned to class struggle, in other regions, particularly the Aymara altiplano, they revived the a cacique apoderado network, fractured and broken after the death and dislocation of the Chaco War. If the 1945 indigenous congress represented a radical manifestation of the progressive reform embraced by the Villarroel-MNR government, it also resulted from mounting rural mobilization during the 1930s and 1940s.

Growing rural activism precipitated the May 1945 Indigenous Congress. Labor demands increased for hacienda colonos during the 1930 and 1940s, intensifying communal resistance and culminating in a wave of colono sit-down strikes (*huelgas de brazos caídos*) on haciendas in Cochabamba and Oruro. The intensification of rural

¹⁹⁹ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, p. 132.

mobilization had as much to do with the burgeoning network of rural and urban activists, as with the progressive labor laws introduced by the military socialists. In an effort to channel the energies of increasingly interconnected indigenous movements toward real improvement for Indians within the legal framework of the state, representatives from across the country established the *Comité Indigenal Boliviano* during the late 1930s.²⁰⁰ It was not until the reform-minded Villarroel-MNR regime that they received an official audience.

The congress marked a watershed moment in indigenous-state relations. For a week in May 1945, 1,659 indigenous delegates representing colonos and comunarios from across the nation descended upon La Paz. There, they deliberated with government officials the exploitive seigniorial economy, rural modernization, and indigenous education. Silvia Rivera found that in preparation for the Congress, Villarroel repealed the segregation ordinances introduced during previous decades so Indians could freely walk in the streets and plazas without being harassed by officials.²⁰¹ Official delegates issued surprisingly progressive calls for reform. MNR delegate Hernán Siles Zuazo declared that “the land should belong those who work it.”²⁰² Though rural society would remain unchanged, Villarroel closed the congress with a series of unprecedented legal reforms. The first abolished the personal service obligations of hacienda colonos, stipulating that campesinos must be paid for their labor.²⁰³ The second explicitly abolished “ponguaje and mitanaje,” the exploitive practice of requiring colonos to

²⁰⁰ Choque, *Historia de una lucha desigual*, p. 105.

²⁰¹ Rivera Cusicanqui, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*, p. 100-101, f.21.

²⁰² Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, p. 218

²⁰³ Decreto Supremo de 15 de mayo de 1945, “Supresión de los servicios gratuitos,” in *Legislación boliviana del indio: recopilación de resoluciones, ordenes, decretos, leyes, decretos supremos y otras disposiciones legales, 1825-1935*, José Flores Moncayo, ed. (La Paz, 1953), pp. 419-23.

provide personal service to the landlords.²⁰⁴ The third declared that all haciendas must provide free education to the campesinos employed by and living on their estates.²⁰⁵ Finally, Villarroel ordered the creation of a rural labor code to ensure fair labor practices, establishing in the meantime, maximum labor allowances and minimum salary requirements.²⁰⁶ Though most hacendados disregarded the laws and the weak state remained largely powerless to enforce them, they provided indigenous Bolivians with novel legal channels to press the state for rights.

Despite his popularity among workers, miners, and peasants, Villarroel embodied revolutionary excess to the landed and mining elite, and fascism to the radical left. The 1945 decrees sparked the ire of the rural elite, and the traditional political leaders they backed. Moreover, the regimes' unprecedented use of violence to suppress political opposition had caused even the more progressive blocks of society to oppose the Villarroel-MNR government.²⁰⁷ In early 1946, the traditional political parties allied with the PIR, establishing the Frente Democrática Antifascista (Democratic Antifascist Front, FDA), forging a unified front against the Villarroel-MNR regime. On July 21, 1946, after weeks of growing social unrest and escalating political repression, a mob stormed

²⁰⁴ Decreto Supremo de 15 de mayo de 1945, "Supresión del 'ponguaje y mitanaje'" in *Legislación boliviana del indio*, pp. 424-25.

²⁰⁵ Decreto Supremo de 15 de mayo de 1945, "Creación de escuelas" in *Legislación boliviana del indio*, pp. 425-26.

²⁰⁶ Decreto Supremo de 15 de mayo de 1945, "Derechos y obligaciones de propietarios y colonos" in *Legislación boliviana del indio*, p. 426.

²⁰⁷ The government sanctioned several politically-motivated assassinations during its short tenure in power, the most appalling being the botched attempt at PIR leader José Antonio Arze. For more on state terror during the Villarroel-MNR government, see *Klein, Parties and Political Change*, pp. 369-380. See also: José Antonio Arze, *Bolivia bajo el Terrorismo Nazifascista* (Lima: Empresa Editora Peruana, S.A., 1945). Following the July 1946 coup, several books, many of obvious hostility towards Villarroel-MNR government, were published that highlighted the violence. Alfredo Sanjinés G., *El hombre de piedra y la revolución* (La Paz: Editorial Artística, 1946); Carlos Núñez de Arco A., *Relato grafico de la Revolución del 21 de Julio de 1946: el pueblo en armas* (La Paz: 1946); Preigue Romero, *La cruz de Bolivia: Crónica de la Revolución de Julio 1946* (La Paz: Editorial Renacimiento, 1946).

the presidential palace, lynched Villarroel, and hanged his lifeless body from a lamppost in the Plaza Murillo. The government declared the MNR illegal and issued a general arrest warrant for all party leaders. In subsequent weeks, as the party rank and file were persecuted, the MNR leadership sought political exile. Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Carlos Montenegro, and Augusto Céspedes took refuge in Buenos Aires, where they were granted safe haven by the sympathetic government of Juan Perón. Juan Lechín, Ñuflo Chávez, and others sought exile in Chile. With their ability to organize severely curtailed during these initial years of exile, the MNR fought for its very survival and set out to reconfigure its political strategy.²⁰⁸

The years 1946 to 1952 mark one of the most turbulent periods in Bolivian history. A succession of rightwing civilian and military governments seemed set on reversing the reforms instituted in the previous decade. They discouraged rural labor organization, limited the rights of existing labor organizations, and supported mine owners in their massacre of striking workers. Confronted with the revival of the right, labor militancy markedly increased in the late 1940s. Dominated by the Trotskyite POR, the FSTMB had emerged as the most powerful and militant labor organization in the nation. The PIR, once the strongest party among labor, lost support for conspiring with the oligarchy and began its slow fade into obscurity. As the POR and its leader, Guillermo Lora, tightened their grip on the labor movement, it developed a radical agenda. At the fourth national miner's conference held at Pulacayo in November 1946, Lora identified the miners as the vanguard of the working class, advocating social

²⁰⁸ Luis Antezana E., *Historia secreta del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Tomo VI: 1949-1952 "El Sexenio - II"* (La Paz: Juventud, 1987); José Fellmann Velarde, *Víctor Paz Estenssoro: El hombre y la Revolución* (La Paz: A. Tejerina, 1954).

revolution, co-gobierno of the mines, the creation of armed workers cells.²⁰⁹ Lora's "Thesis of Pulacayo" subsequently became the official ideology of the FSTMB.

Meanwhile, the countryside exploded in violence. Landlords simply refused to implement the 1945 decrees. Perceiving landlord reticence as illegitimate and their continued subjection to ponguaje clearly unlawful, colonos unleashed the most significant wave of grassroots rural mobilization in Bolivian history. In Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí, hacienda colonos waged sit-down strikes, engaged in work stoppages, demanded their right to organize, petitioned government officials for the enforcement of the Villarroel decrees, and employed physical violence, brandishing Chaco-era rifles.²¹⁰ The violence reached its highest point in Ayopaya, the easternmost province of the department of Cochabamba, where some 10,000 armed peasants ran off landowners and razed several estates before government forces violently suppressed the uprising.²¹¹ Despite the concurrence of violence in disparate areas across the countryside in 1947, Silvia Rivera is careful to point out that, that "no se trate de una rebelión organizada bajo mando único, ni ocurre en forma simultanea o coordinada."²¹² Rather, while the episodic conflict may have been rooted in landlord resistance to the 1945 decrees, it exploded in various local contexts and was shaped as much by the particular histories, as by the specific circumstances in which it occurred. And as Laura Gotkowitz has recently demonstrated, "el ciclo rebelde de 1947" was

²⁰⁹ Guillermo Lora, *Contribución a la historia política de Bolivia*, Tomo II (La Paz: Ediciones ISLA, 1978), pp. 61-95. For a detailed history of the POR, the FSTMB, and the Thesis of Pulacayo, see Steven Sandor John, "Permanent revolution on the Altiplano: Bolivian Trotskyism, 1928--2005" (Ph.D. Dissertation: City University of New York, 2006), pp. 162-180.

²¹⁰ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, pp. 234-35.

²¹¹ Rivera, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*, pp. 105-106.

²¹² *Ibid.*, p. 106.

significant not simply for the scope of the conflict, but for the fact that for most rural communities it was rooted in a much longer struggle for lands, rights, and justice.

For the MNR, 1946-1952 represented the nadir of its revolutionary struggle and would be immortalized as the “sexenio” by party propagandists following the Revolution. It was also during this period that the MNR adopted a more radical position and defined its stance on several key issues that it had purposely remained vague in order to retain its traditional middle-class base. James Malloy writes when the MNR “was slowly converting itself from an elite faction oriented toward reform from above into an elite-led movement pursuing revolution from below.”²¹³ The MNR had been trying to expand its base to include workers and, less so, peasants since 1941. But the urgency of incorporating these burgeoning and increasingly militant social movements increased during the late 1940s. As the party refashioned itself, it developed a more radical stance to appeal to a wider base of the population. The pro-MNR leader of the FSTMB, Juan Lechín provided the party with critical inroads into the mining camps, where its popularity grew in the late 1940s as it declared its commitment to nationalization of the tin mines. As labor unrest mounted in the late 1940s, the MNR leadership issued formal proclamations in support of general strikes and work stoppages, while local party apparatchiks provided logistical support for the efforts and organized general strikes in support of them. During the rural violence of 1947, MNR officials organized upstart peasants, creating the first *células campesinas*.²¹⁴

Politics continued to devolve into violent struggle. In May 1949, the MNR launched a coup attempt from its base in Santa Cruz in yet another effort to dislodge the

²¹³ Malloy, *Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution*, p. 137.

²¹⁴ Rivera, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*, p. 108.

oligarchy from power. The effort devolved into a full scale civil war that lasted from May to August 1949. The government narrowly succeeded in suppressing the rebellion. But to all but the most stubborn observers, it had become unmistakably clear that the oligarchy had lost whatever claim to political legitimacy that remained. Late in 1950, President Urriolagoitía announced open elections for May 14, 1951. The MNR nominated party boss and chief ideologue Paz Estenssoro for president and named Hernán Siles Zuazo as the candidate for vice president. Although Paz and Siles received the most votes, they lacked the majority necessary to win the contest free and clear. Instead of convening Congress to resolve the contested election, Urriolagoitía handed over the government to the military. Under the command of General Hugo Ballivian, a military junta annulled the election, declared a state of siege, and declared the MNR illegal. Yet the junta could not maintain power for long.

On April 9, 1952, the MNR, with the assistance of the national police forces and the critical support of the FSTMB, initiated a popular insurrection that toppled the oligarchy. The Bolivian National Revolution had begun. Drawing on their 1951 electoral victory as a source of constitutional legitimacy, the MNR assumed control of the postrevolutionary state, placing Paz Estenssoro in the presidency and Siles the vice-president. But it would have to share power with the powerful radical left which had ensured the success of the Revolution by provided the urban insurrection with critical logistical support and much-needed personnel. While political moderates and the nationalist left backed the MNR, the Trotskyite dominated FSTMB and other radical urban labor groups sought to establish their own block of revolutionary power and ultimately to radicalize the revolution by gradually taking control of the postrevolutionary state. On April 17, 1952, just eleven days after the Revolution, Juan

Lechín, the powerful leader of the FSTMB and newly-appointed Ministro de Minas y Petróleo, convened a national congress of leaders from industrial, artisan, and public sector unions and leftist political parties to found the *Central Obrero Boliviano* (Bolivian Workers' Central, COB).²¹⁵ This new national labor confederation sought to ensure the depth of revolutionary change and to provide an institutional counterweight to balance the more conservative and essentially reformist right-wing of the MNR coalition.

CONCLUSION

The Bolivian Revolution of 1952 represented the culmination of two distinct historical struggles. The first is rooted in the grassroots struggles of indigenous Bolivians for land, justice, and equality, and traces its memory to the anticolonial rebellions of the eighteenth century.²¹⁶ Confronted with increasingly aggressive liberal land privatization laws and subsequent hacienda expansion in the late nineteenth century, Aymara *comunarios* developed new strategies of resistance to protect communal lands and guarantee their rights. Appointing apoderados, rural communities merged colonial and republican legal discourses to press the land claims on the republican state. Following the Liberal Revolution, and the subsequent repression of highland apoderados and other rural leaders, *comunarios* adapted their struggle. The next generation of Caciques Apoderados increasingly recognized the power of the law and republican legal institutions emerged as the primary venue for justice. Though the Chaco War marked a setback for rural mobilization, many veterans returned to their communities and redoubled the struggle for land, justice, and equality. The 1945 Indigenous Congress—

²¹⁵ Alfredo Franco Guachalla, *Así nació la Central Obrera Boliviana* (La Paz, 1983).

²¹⁶ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*; Riviera, *Oprimidos pero no venicidos*; Choque, *Historia de una lucha desigual*.

which resulted, in part, from mounting rural activism—provided indigenous Bolivians with new legal rights and lay at the center of the unprecedented “cycle of violence” that exploded in 1947. By 1952, as Laura Gotkowitz argues, there was already a revolution underway in the countryside that would contour the politics of the postrevolutionary state after 1952.²¹⁷

The second historical struggle underlying the 1952 Revolution is rooted in the social malaise and political transformations that succeeded the Chaco War, and was primarily articulated in terms of class struggle. In the urban centers and mining camps of the western highlands, emerging elements of the radical and moderate left established new political groupings such as the POR, the PIR, and the MNR. Urban professionals, junior military officers, industrial workers, and tin miners increasingly recognized the economic policies of the government as inconsistent with the national interest and the popular aspirations of the Bolivian people. In the Cochabamba countryside, hacienda *pongos* began to organize their own grassroots labor movements. As Silvia Rivera argues, while the highland struggles were rooted in ethnic struggles and territorial rights dating to the late eighteenth century, in Cochabamba class provided the primary language of struggle for peasant mobilization.²¹⁸

The popular insurrection of April 1952 itself belies the conflictive nature and heterogeneous visions embraced by the various forces that confronted the postcolonial republica and ultimately set into motion the Bolivian National Revolution. All revolutionaries were not necessarily *movimentistas* fighting for the MNR as the popular narrative of the Revolution has long asserted. The Revolutionary meant different things

²¹⁷ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*.

²¹⁸ Rivera, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*.

to different people. Commenting in the nature of the revolutionary historiography, sociologist Mario Murillo writes, “acercamiento convencional al 52, no hay espacio para los actores anónimos.”²¹⁹ Yet, as he points out, it was precisely these anonymous actors who made the insurrection successful. They were not *movementists* or *mineros* or *fabriles*, they were veterans of the Chaco, fighting in the streets, some simply “para joder.” Regardless of their aims, the make-up of the forces that ensured the success of the April insurrection belies the divergent actors and different unities that underlie the revolutionary project. It is to that project that we now turn.

²¹⁹ Mario Murillo Aliaga, “El combate en las laderas de La Paz en la insurrección popular de 1952,” Unpublished paper presented at the 2011 Congress of the Bolivian Studies Association (*Nuevas perspectivas de la Revolución Nacional*), June, 2011, Sucre, Bolivia.

Chapter Two

Rearticulating the Indian Problem: National Development, Social Science, and Indigenous Integration

El pensamiento del Gobierno de la revolución nacional es, primero, aumentar la producción y, luego, hacer justicia a los campesinos.

-José Fellman Velarde, 8/8/1953

Exigimos la identificación de todos los bolivianos con los anhelos y necesidades del campesino y proclamamos que la justicia social es inseparable de la redención del indio para la liberación económica y soberana del pueblo de Bolivia.

-MNR Manifiesto, June 1942

No sooner had Víctor Paz Estenssoro settled into the *Palacio Quemado* in April 1952 than he was flooded with petitions from rural indigenous communities. Some wrote to congratulate the President and express their commitment to the Revolution. Others pressed the government to enforce the Villarroel decrees. Still others highlighted their part in the revolutionary struggle. The National Archives in Sucre are filled with such petitions. And despite their disparate origins, all expressed a great deal of hope and certainty that the Revolution represented a true moment of social change. Agapito Vallejos Rocha, “Dirigente Indigenal de Cochabamba,” wrote, “hoy pediremos pan con el mismo derecho que los blancos y tendremos justicia y derecho a todo.”²²⁰ Another petition, from a national network of rural apoderados calling themselves “Los principales caciques de la Republica en representación de la Raza Indígena” urged the President to introduce “leyes favorable a nuestra raza, para así incorporarnos a la sociedad.”²²¹ Santos

²²⁰ ABNB, PR, 1952, Correspondencia, Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos (0765/369), Agapito Vallejos Rocha, Dirigente Indigenal de Cochabamba to Víctor Paz Estenssoro, 8/18/1953, quoted in Presidencia de la Republica to Ñuflo Chávez Ortiz, 9/22/1952.

²²¹ ABNB, PR, 1952, Correspondencia, Oficios Varios, Tomo 7 (0759/366), Los principales caciques de la Republica en representación de la Raza Indígena to Excelentísimo Señor Presidente Constitucional de la Republica, Dr. Víctor Paz Estenssoro, 8/19/1952, p. 3.

Cornejo, “Cacique Principal del Departamento de La Paz” wrote, “esperamos señor Presidente que vele por esta raza indígena.”²²² Mariano Mayta, from Huarina confided in Paz that he understood the Revolution as “la época de la verdadera recuperación de indígena,” assuming him that “la clase indígena persigue siempre la solución del problema, mal llamado del Indio y si de la Nacionalidad misma.”²²³

Presiding over the first, and indeed most radical, phase of the Bolivian National Revolution, Paz, it seems, took such petitions to heart. In July 1952, his government decreed universal adult suffrage, extending voting rights to Indians for the first time. In August 1953, his government institutionalized agrarian reform—a process that was already well underway, albeit extralegally, in large parts of the countryside—definitively ending *colonaje* and providing Indians titles to their lands. The Education Code of 1955 expanded the rural education initiative, ensuring that all Indian children had schools and teachers and all adults had access to Spanish literacy. Not only did the postrevolutionary government break down the legal and institutional barriers to indigenous citizenship, but it also set out to actively incorporate indigenous Bolivians into a modern society of its own making.

Despite the progressive policies embraced by the postrevolutionary government, many indigenous Bolivians continued to feel excluded from the national community. Two decades after the Revolution, indigenous activists could still protest, “somos

²²² ABNB, PR, 1952, Corr, MAC (765/369), Santos Cornejo, Cacique Principal del Departamento de La Paz to Víctor Paz Estenssoro, 10/14/1952.

²²³ ABNB, PR, 1952, Correspondencia, Oficios Varios, Tomo 7 (0759/366), Mariano Mayta, Representante de las Excomunidades de Huarina to Excelentísimo Señor Presidente Constitucional de la Republica, Dr. Víctor Paz Estenssoro, 7/18/1952, p. 1.

extranjeros en nuestro propio país.”²²⁴ The question thus arises, what happened? The postrevolutionary state guaranteed indigenous Bolivians universal citizenship, legal equality, access to education, and legal title to their land—all key demands of rural activists since the eighteenth century. Why then did they continue to feel apart from the nation? This chapter sets out to understand the contested legacy of indigenous citizenship in postrevolutionary Bolivia by examining the underlying logic of national integration. What motivated indigenous integration? Was it simply a manifestation of the postrevolutionary government’s commitment to social justice and participant democracy, or were there deeper motives behind the process?

The search for answers begins in the economic policies, development strategies, and racialized thinking of policymakers affiliated with the postrevolutionary government. Since 1941, the MNR leadership had protested that the export-led growth model and free-market policies of the oligarchic elite perpetuated socioeconomic inequality, inhibited economic development, and undermined national sovereignty. Their goal was to establish a politically sovereign and economically self-sufficient social democracy. To achieve this goal, they advanced a hybrid socialist-capitalist model of state-led national development. They would convert the state into an instrument of capital accumulation that would responsibly manage finite natural resources, ensure the wellbeing of society, and establish an authentic national culture to unify the nation. After 1952, the MNR leadership assumed control of the state and transformed this revolutionary vision into reality with the most ambitious national development program in Bolivian history. With an influx of capital, science, and technology, postrevolutionary officials were confident

²²⁴ Centro de Coordinación y Promoción Campesina Mink’a, Centro Campesino Tupac Katari, Asociación de Estudiantes Campesinos de Bolivia, and Asociación Nacional de Profesores Campesinos “Manifiesto de Tiwanaku,” La Paz, 30 de julio de 1973 (La Paz: Viceministerio de Descolonización, 2009), p. 1.

that, one and for all, they could succeed in transforming Bolivia from a backwater postcolonial republic into a modern, integrated nation state.²²⁵

Postrevolutionary indigenous integration was predicated upon the economic policies of the MNR leadership and carried out according to the developmental strategies of the postrevolutionary state. The MNR identified the seigniorial order as the principal impediment to domestic economic development. Not only did the haciendas monopolize both land and labor in an unproductive, inefficient, and exploitive land tenure system, but they also impeded economic growth by keeping over half the population outside of the monetary economy. Only when Indians were unconstrained producers and consumers in a modern capitalist society would the republic be able to develop its full potential. The agrarian reform created a massive new base of independent consumers and producers free to use their purchasing power and labor to assist in national modernization. As the postrevolutionary government fixated on commercial agriculture as Bolivia's economic salvation, it identified indigenous Bolivians as the motor of national development. It was upon their active participation in national society as producers and consumers that national development rested.

Modern social science rendered postrevolutionary development imaginable. A modernization scheme of the magnitude envisioned by the postrevolutionary government would have been simply unthinkable a half century before, purely on account of the central role it assigned indigenous Bolivians. The oligarchy had long essentialized the Indian as a noble savage, uniquely suited for agricultural labor, yet unprepared for modern nationhood, resistant to market participation, and unfit for republican

²²⁵ Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 4.

citizenship—as if biology and geography had conspired against the republic. The MNR’s generation, on the other hand, generally disentangled the national problem from the Indian problem. They instead identified imperialism as the source of underdevelopment and feudal modes of production as the cause of indigenous backwardness. This structuralist interpretation fundamentally rearticulated the Indian problem—it was no longer the cause of underdevelopment, but its primary effect. In the 1940s, structuralism merged with the novel concept of cultural relativism, which was arriving piecemeal by way of Mexican, Peruvian, and U.S. social science—often through the growing institutional networks of the Inter-American Indigenista movement. If structuralism lifted the burden of biology from the Indian problem, cultural relativism liberated it from geography and hereditary. Positing that centuries of agrarian exploitation had retarded the evolution of Andean civilization, cultural relativism provided the rationale for indigenous “improvability” while simultaneously affirming their alterity. After 1952, as government officials recruited policymakers from an ascendant generation of progressive sociologists to design the central developmental reforms, structuralism and cultural relativism converged in the postrevolutionary imagination to transform the place of the Indian in the nation—from “peso muerto” as hacienda colonos and subsistence-based comunarios into modernized, market-orientated campesinos.

The developmentalist orientation of the MNR leadership and the modernizing agenda of the National Revolution have long preoccupied the scholarship on post-1952 Bolivia.²²⁶ This chapter contributes to this literature by exploring the place of indigenous

²²⁶ See for example: Charles H. Weston Jr., “An Ideology of Modernization: The Case of the Bolivian MNR,” *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Jan., 1968), pp. 85-101; H.C.F. Mancilla, *La crisis de la identidad nacional y la cultural política: aproximaciones a una teoría crítica de la modernidad* (La Paz: CIMA, 2006).

Bolivians in the modernizing imagination of the postrevolutionary leadership. The first section examines the relationship between indigenous integration and domestic economic reform in the thinking of the MNR leadership in the years prior to the Revolution. The next section lays out the legal and institutional measures that the postrevolutionary state introduced to incorporate indigenous Bolivian into the social, political, economic, and cultural structures of the nation, focusing on the universal suffrage and political amnesty laws of July 1952 and the creation of the *Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos* (Ministry of Peasant Affairs, MAC). The remainder of the chapter traces the emergence of the mutually constitutive relationship that developed between the state and social science by exploring collaboration between government officials and national sociologists in the formulation of the agrarian reform and rural education decrees. These were critical measures affecting indigenous citizenship. Designed in accordance with the national development strategy, they mapped the role of the indigenous Bolivians in the postrevolutionary republic.

THE MNR AND INDIGENOUS INTEGRATION

Indigenous integration was a modernization imperative, and its history cannot be understood apart from the MNR's revolutionary imagination on the one hand, and the economic policies embraced by the party leadership on the other. The MNR leadership consisted of Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Walter Guevara Arze, Hernán Siles Zuazo, and several other individuals who occupied ranking positions within the party hierarchy. This first section focuses specifically on these three individuals—and the place of the Indian problem in their revolutionary imagination—for three reasons. For one, they were the principal architects of MNR economic policy in the years prior to the Revolution. Two,

all of them assumed key leadership positions in the postrevolutionary state after 1952—Paz as President, Siles as Vice President, and Guevara as Foreign Minister. Finally, before the Revolution, there was a marked discrepancy between the policies embraced by these individuals and the official party agenda. In order to understand the logic underlying indigenous integration, it is therefore necessary to consider their individual thinking alongside official MNR policy.

The economy loomed large in the MNR's revolutionary imagination. The party fixated on the grand irony that Bolivia possessed great mineral wealth yet remained the poorest republic in the continent. The party located the cause of such irrational impoverishment in the cabal of "antinational" capitalists—called "*La Rosca*" in the post-Chaco political lexicon—which consisted of the "big three" tin interests of Aramayo, Hoschild, and Patiño (who, together controlled over half of tin exports) and the large estate owners who supported them. This oligarchy monopolized not only the nation's finite natural resources, but the mechanisms of state, creating a "superestado mineral" that governed solely in the interests of international capital. The nation's natural resources enriched the oligarchic elite at the expense of Bolivia's national development, as exemplified by the contrast between the highly-industrialized mining sector and the feudal modes of production that characterized the seigniorial order. "El progreso," proclaimed the party's June 1942 founding *manifiesto*, "nos ha hecho daño y no beneficio."²²⁷

²²⁷José Cuadros Quiroga, *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario: Sus bases y principios de acción inmediata* (La Paz, 1942), p. 32. For a detailed description of the MNR's political ideology, see Walter Guevara Arze, *Manifiesto a los campesinos de Ayopaya* (La Paz: SPIC, 1953). This pamphlet, originally published in 1946, discusses the MNR's engagement with democracy, socialism, fascism, and nationalism. In identifying the MNR's nationalism, he makes a distinction between the nationalism that informed National Socialism in Germany and the nationalism emerging in the neocolonial and colonial states of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Paz provided the economic theory behind the MNR's political agenda. In addition to his political career, he was one of the most prominent economic thinkers in Bolivia. Like most economists of his time, he studied law and then gained practical experience in the public sector and private industry.²²⁸ He clerked for Aramayo Mines before assuming a post in the Oficina Nacional de Estadística, and then went on to preside over the Banco Mineral under Busch, and briefly served as the Minister of Economy under Peñaranda.²²⁹ He also taught economics at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés in La Paz. In 1945, while serving as President Villarroel's Minister of Hacienda y Estadística, he published an essay on the economic history of Bolivia which critically examined the export-led growth model's impact on the Bolivian economy.²³⁰ He criticized not only the oligarchy, but also the ruling class for failing to adequately tax the companies. He cited increasing dependence on imports and negative balance of payments as indicative of Bolivia's "semicolonial" status in the international political economy. "Es necesario diversificar la producción boliviana," he argued, in order to strengthen the national economy. "Este planteamiento implica una política proteccionista y de industrialización fomentada por el estado, en oposición a la tesis de los que quieren que Bolivia sea exclusivamente un país minero y que importe todos los productos alimenticios y las manufacturas que requiere para su vida."²³¹

²²⁸ Jorge Balan, "The Social Sciences in Latin America during the Twentieth Century," *The Cambridge History of Science, Vol 7: The Modern Social Sciences*, Theodore M. Porter and Dorothy Ross, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 413-430, see p. 421-422 for a broad discussion of the professionalization of economics in Latin America.

²²⁹ Luis Antezana E., *Víctor Paz Estenssoro* (La Paz: Editorial Abril, 2001); For a less critical perspective, see: José Fellmann Velarde, *Víctor Paz Estenssoro: El hombre y la Revolución* (La Paz: A. Tejerina, 1954).

²³⁰ Víctor Paz Estenssoro, "Bolivia," *El pensamiento económico latinoamericano* (México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1945), pp. 36-69. Thank you to Diego Rodríguez Laguna for providing this source.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

His thinking reflected a broader trend emerging across Latin America. The great depression had made especially salient the disadvantages of the export-led growth model.²³² Decreasing consumer spending and industrial output in Western Europe and North America had resulted in curtailed demand for raw materials and rising import prices, depressing export-oriented economies. Reform-minded leaders across the region implemented more restrictive trade policies and promoted domestic industry in an attempt to substitute foreign imports with domestic manufacturing. Import-substitution industrialization (ISI), as the Keynesian policy came to be known, was intended to increase economic self-sufficiency for non-industrialized resource-rich countries on what influential Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch identified as the “periphery” of a globalized capitalist economy. The model of an industrialized center and a resource-rich periphery provided the foundation for the structural school of economics that Prebisch promoted as head of the UN Economic Council on Latin America after 1948. He cited capital accumulation in the center coupled with rising import prices on the periphery as indicative of the inherent disadvantage of export-dependent growth. His terms-of-trade thesis gained wide influence across the region and provided the economic policy justification for nationalist economic policies such as ISI.²³³

²³² For a broad overview of the impact of the Great Depression in Latin America, see Victor Bulmar Thomas, *The Economic History of Latin America since Independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 189-231; For Bolivia, see: Herbert Klein, “The Crisis of Legitimacy and the Origins of Social Revolution: The Bolivian Experience,” *The Journal of Interamerican Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 1968), p. 103-108; Herbert Klein, *Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 1880-1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 153-54; Laurence Whitehead, “El impacto de la gran depression en Bolivia,” *Desarrollo económico*, No. 45 (April-June 1972), pp. 72-80; Manuel Contreras, “Debts, Taxes and War: The Political Economy of Bolivia, c. 1920-1935,” *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (May 1990).

²³³ Joseph L. Love, “Economic Ideas and Ideologies in Latin America since 1930,” *The Cambridge History of Latin America, Volume VI: Latin America since 1930, Economy, Society and Politics, Part I: Economy and Society*, Leslie Bethell, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 393-462.

During the 1940s, the MNR integrated ISI as the cornerstone of its revolutionary economic policy. The MNR leadership sought to establish national economy that was both sovereign and self-sufficient. Under the banner of economic nationalism and in the name of national sovereignty, they demanded that finite natural resources be exploited to the benefit of all Bolivians, not just a select few. They envisioned transforming the state into an instrument of capital accumulation to finance domestic development. Writing from exile in Buenos Aires in 1947, Paz outlined the MNR's position. "Nuestras fundamentales proposiciones revolucionarias antitéticas de esta política de servidumbre, consisten, fundamentalmente en sostener la necesidad de que las riquezas nacionales se exploten en beneficio de la nación y en elevar el nivel de vida de sus granes masas," he explained.²³⁴ The key was to create a sovereign state, "realmente independiente del Superestado"—that governed in the interests of the population at large. Then, Paz wrote, "hay que diversificar la economía nacional, superando la actual etapa de monoproducción y de simple extracción de materias primarias y desarrollar todas las zonas del país."²³⁵ For Paz and the rest of the MNR leadership Revolution was synonymous with national development.

The MNR's stance on indigenous integration lies tangled within its broad matrix of proscriptive economic reforms and national development proposals. Most scholarship on the Revolution privileges the export sector in examining the economic policies of the MNR leadership, devoting little to the place of the domestic economy in the revolutionary imagination. After all, it was nationalization of the "big three" tin mines that came to symbolize the Revolution and the MNR's nationalist agenda in the popular

²³⁴ Víctor Paz Estenssoro, "Proceso y sentencia contra la oligarquía boliviana," [1947] in *Discurso y mensajes* (Buenos Aires: Talleres Gráficos "Columbia," 1953), pp. 63-150, p. 126.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

imagination. Moreover, the historiography has traditional cast rural society as playing little role in the immediate pre-revolutionary period. Yet it is precisely in their approach to domestic economic reform where the MNR leadership's commitment to indigenous integration lies.

Postrevolutionary indigenous integration was not the result of a single reform. Rather, it constituted a series of measures that included universal suffrage, agrarian reform, and rural education. Universal suffrage—which, by extending political citizenship to indigenous Bolivians for the first time, seems the most drastic measure towards indigenous integration—was rooted in the party's commitment to social justice and participant democracy. A MNR *comunicado* from 1946, for instance, declared “seguramente el máximo problema boliviano es el referente a la incorporación del indio a la Nación.”²³⁶ Hoping to disavow its fascist past in an era marked by liberal-democratic triumphalism, the MNR embraced the cause of social justice, identifying the popular struggles of miners, workers, and indigenous peasants as one with their own. The MNR, moreover, decried the “comedy” of Bolivian democracy and embraced popular political participation as consistent with its vision of modern nationhood.²³⁷ Whereas universal suffrage was motivated by social justice and democracy, agrarian reform and rural education—the two most significant measures that reconfigured the place of indigenous Bolivians in the socioeconomic hierarchy—were motivated by the exigencies of national development.

²³⁶ ABNB, WGA, Reforma Agraria, Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Comando Nacional, “Comunicado No. 1-26,” February 1, 1936, p.1.

²³⁷ This notion of democracy as comedy in Bolivia is apparent in Cuadros Quiroga, *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario: Sus bases y principios de acción inmediata* (p. 36), and was subsequently popularized by Carlos Montenegro in 1943 with the publication of *Nacionalismo y coloniaje*. See chapter four of this dissertation for a discussion of the role of both Cuadros and Montenegro in the construction of the MNR's revolutionary imagination and, particularly, how it shaped interpretations of national history.

It is the question of agrarian reform whereupon the discrepancy between the MNR leadership and the official party position was most marked. Although Paz, Siles, Guevara, and other MNR leaders had advocated agrarian reform since the 1930s, astute political considerations precluded the incorporation of the measure into the official party platform. Agrarian reform was one of the most contested social issues of the era, becoming the point of convergence for social reformers on the left and the right. The issue also seems to have distinguished the radical from the more moderate political forces, with radical leftists parties like the Trotskyite POR and the Leninist PIR demanding land reform. The official party position on agrarian reform in the pre-revolutionary period can be characterized as vague at best. For the MNR during the turbulent 1940s, embracing agrarian reform threatened to undermine its traditional base of middle-class support. Many middle-class members of the party (or their relatives) owned small and medium size estates.²³⁸ While this group of modest landowners distinguished themselves from the landed elite, they too depended on colono labor and jealously guarded their land rights. Official party statements thus demanded indigenous integration while calling for the introduction of new laws to protect agrarian laborers. The MNR divorced indigenous political inclusion from the agrarian question all together.

Independent from the official party position, the MNR leadership firmly supported agrarian reform. As a delegate to the 1938 constitutional convention, Paz

²³⁸ Consider the Méndez Tejada family. Roberto Méndez Tejada, who joined the MNR during the Villarroel government and quickly climbed the ranks of the party leadership. He came from a landholding family in La Paz. Correspondence with his father (who apparently lived on the family's rural estate) indicates that Roberto's position in the MNR government and the passage of the agrarian reform law caused family tensions. The family owned a large estate in the La Paz province of Muñecas that was eventually expropriated under the agrarian reform law. Roberto's father and uncles wrote often asking for special treatment from the government to keep their land. See for example correspondence from the International Institute of Social History (IISH), Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario Collection (MNR), microfiches no. 584-585, "Personales Roberto Mendez Tejada, 1945-1956." Biographical information on Roberto Méndez Tejada from Mitchell, *The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia*, pp. 26-28.

asserted that unproductive estates should be put to productive use by the Indians who worked them. Guevara, who also supported agrarian reform at the 1938 convention, advocated transforming unproductive estates into agricultural cooperatives founded upon existing forms of Andean socioeconomic organization. Their thinking was motivated by their view that property must serve a “social function.” They believed, moreover, that hacienda lands would be more productive under the control of Indians who lived and worked on the land. Indigenous Bolivians, they argued, were biologically predisposed to the harsh highland climate and uniquely suited for agricultural labor—“como la raza inseparable de la tierra” noted the MNR’s 1942 manifesto.²³⁹ This trope situating Indians in their natural environment as agrarian producers enjoyed widespread popularity among the Liberals, providing moral justification for highland hacienda expansion. The MNR deployed the discourse for similar ends.

This discrepancy between the official party line and the position of the MNR leadership on the agrarian reform has been the cause of much debate in the historiography of the Revolution. With little exception, most scholarship casts the MNR leadership as “reluctant revolutionaries” who hesitantly embraced agrarian reform in order to gain indigenous political support, contain rural insurgency, and/or appease the party left and labor militants within the postrevolutionary governing coalition.²⁴⁰ These factors

²³⁹ José Cuadros Quiroga, *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario: Sus bases y principios de acción inmediata* (La Paz, 1942), p. 36.

²⁴⁰ James Malloy, *Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1970), pp. 204-205; Silvia Rivera, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos: luchas del campesinado aymara y qhechwa, 1900-1980*, 3rd edition (La Paz: Arywiyiri, 2003), pp. 118-141; James Dunkerley, *Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-1980* (London: Verso, 1984), pp. 65-66; Waskar Ari, “Race and Subaltern Nationalism: AMP Activist Intellectuals in Bolivia, 1921-1964” (Ph.D. Dissertation: Georgetown University, 2004), pp. 63-64; Forrest Hylton and Sinclair Thomson, *Revolutionary Horizons: Past and Present in Bolivian Politics* (New York: Verso, 2007); Forrest Hylton, “Reverberations of Insurgency: Indian Communities, the Federal War of 1899, and the Regeneration of Bolivia” (Ph.D. Dissertation: New York University, 2010), p 316-17.

certainly contributed to the making of the agrarian reform, yet they do little to underscore its origins. In privileging the sociopolitical dynamics of the postrevolutionary state, moreover, scholarship has tended either to obscure the MNR leadership's position on the matter, or simply to dismiss it all together. While the MNR, as a political institution, may not have embraced the measure during the pre-revolutionary period, the party leadership remained deeply committed to agrarian reform. As James Kohl points out, the MNR sought "the order of agrarian reform," and not the "anarchy of agrarian revolution."²⁴¹ That such sentiment was shared by the MNR leadership was best exemplified by Guevera Arze, who during the height of peasant conflict in 1952 confided in UN technical adviser, Carter Goodrich, "we want to make a Mexican revolution, without ten years of Pancho Villa."²⁴²

The primary factor motivating the MNR leadership's commitment to indigenous integration in general and agrarian reform in particular was domestic economic growth. If the "superestado mineral" had disadvantageously integrated Bolivia into the global capitalist economy, the haciendas constrained the potential for domestic economic growth. The primary problem with the landed estates was that they were grossly unproductive. Since the turn of the century, Bolivia had become increasingly dependent on imports of not only manufactured goods, but also of basic consumption goods.²⁴³ The majority of imports consisted of basic food items traditionally produced domestically

²⁴¹ James V. Kohl, "Peasant and Revolution in Bolivia, April 9, 1952-August 2, 1952," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 58, No. 2 (1978), pp. 238-259.

²⁴² Quote from James M Malloy, *Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970), pp. 234-35.

²⁴³ Juan Antonio Morales y Napoleón Pacheco, "Economía: el retorno de los liberales, in *Visiones de fin de siglo: Bolivia y América Latina en el Siglo XX*, Dora Cajías, Magdalena Cajías, eds. (La Paz: Plural, 2001), pp. 155-192, pp. 158-164; Luis Peñaloza, *Nueva historia económica de Bolivia, Tomo VII: Bolivia en el Siglo XX* (La Paz: Amigos del Libro, 1987).

such as wheat, rice, and sugar. One widely-cited reason for declining domestic production was the fact that given the high costs associated with internal transport, it was cheaper to import goods from neighboring Chile and Argentina.²⁴⁴ Historian Herbert Klein points out that another reason for declining production was that landowners lacked incentive to increase output to meet the rising demand.²⁴⁵ Their narrow profit margin hinged on the free labor that colonos provided in exchange for usufruct rights to estate lands. Increasing agricultural production entailed costly investments in equipment, training, and resources. That most landowners were unwilling to make such investments is evinced by the 1950 agrarian census, which revealed that while 72 percent of the population was engaged in agriculture, the sector only produced 33 percent of the GNP.²⁴⁶

Agrarian reform was not necessarily directed at indigenous Bolivians, but at abolishing the seigniorial order. Guevara argued that the primary reason for agrarian reform was “Liberar la nación del peso muerto que significan los indios.”²⁴⁷ The assertion that agrarian reform would free the nation from the “dead weight” of the indigenous population belies the economic logic underlying the MNR leadership’s approach to the Indian problem. Indians were not the national problem, as the oligarchy had long maintained. Rather, it was the socioeconomic structures imposed on Indians by the hacienda regime that was the primary impediment to national development. Not only

²⁴⁴Juan Demeure V., “Agricultura: de la subsistencia a la competencia internacional,” *Visiones de fin de siglo: Bolivia y América Latina en el Siglo XX*, Dora Cajías, Magdalena Cajías, eds. (La Paz: Plural, 2001), pp. 269-290, see discussion on pp. 268-275.

²⁴⁵ Herbert Klein, *Haciendas and Ayllus: Rural Society in the Bolivian Andes in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 160-166; Luis Antezana E., *Latifundio y minifundio en Bolivia* (La Paz: Plural, 2011), pp. 13-30.

²⁴⁶ Herbert Klein, “Social Change in Bolivia since 1952,” p. 232.

²⁴⁷ ABNB, WGA, RA, untitled memo, c. 1953.

had it impeded national economic development, but it was also responsible for obstructing the natural evolution of Andean civilization. Agrarian reform, following Guevara's thinking, would remove the structural constraints that maintained indigenous Bolivians in the miserable, uncivilized, and pre-Modern condition. By freeing both labor and land from the oppressive seigniorial order, Guevara hoped to awake the vast economic potential of the Indians.

Even more problematic in the eyes of the MNR leadership was the fact that the haciendas intrinsically limited domestic economic growth. Over half the population remained excluded from the market economy because colonos did not receive cash for their labor and most free communities were subsistence based. Richard Thorne estimates that the pre-reform monetary economy "consisted of not more than six hundred thousand persons with a purchasing power of less than that of an American city the size of Charlotte, North Carolina, with a population of one hundred thirty-four thousand persons."²⁴⁸ This is not to say that Indians existed completely apart from the monetary economy, and to be sure, there were great differences between market participation in Cochabamba (with its tradition of *piqueros* and peasant-small holding) on the one hand, and on the altiplano, where latifundio prevailed, on the other. Still, peasant market participation was severely limited.²⁴⁹ Economist Ronald Clark discovered that in many cases, hacendados explicitly restricted peasant market participation fearing loss of labor supply to urban markets.²⁵⁰ Manufactured goods such as cigarettes, alcohol, matches,

²⁴⁸ Richard S. Thorn, "The Economic Transformation," *Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952*, James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn, eds. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), pp. 157-216, p. 158.

²⁴⁹ Brooke Larson, *Cochabamba, 1550-1900: Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia*, Expanded Edition (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*.

²⁵⁰ Ronald James Clark, "Land Reform and Peasant Market Participation on the North Highlands of Bolivia," *Land Economics*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (May, 1968), pp. 153-172.

and cookware were usually bartered, provided by the landlord, or acquired in commercial markets, with the little cash colonos acquired from selling wool and/or mutton.

The MNR publically identified domestic economic stagnation with the haciendas. “El mercado no existe casi por esta exclusión de millones de bolivianos de la vida nacional,” declared the MNR’s 1942 manifiesto. “Así el país se mantiene en el estancamiento.”²⁵¹ Although MNR documents identified the problem of the haciendas in the national economy, official party statements stopped short of providing a tangible solution. Yet Paz’s thinking, seemingly independent from official party policy, reveals the party leadership’s thinking on the matter. Addressing parliament as a congressman representing his home department of Tarija in 1944, Paz declared that “Para solucionar el problema del indio, es necesario, fundamentalmente, encauzar una reforma, una estructura económica-social.”²⁵² He did not advocate the forced redistribution of land. Rather, his vision for agrarian reform rested upon integrating rural laborers into the monetary economy by allowing them to sell their goods to the market instead of remitting them directly to the landowner and subsisting off the land.

The measure was intended to integrate peasants into the market. Campesinos, he argued should “vende su cosecha a quien quiere; con el dinero obtenido por la venta de sus productor paga el canon de arrendamiento.”²⁵³ Thus instead of usufruct right in exchange for tribute in the form of labor and goods—the foundation of the hacienda regime—he advocated making campesinos pay currency to rent the land. “La reforma agraria no implica necesariamente un criterio socialista,” he assured his colleagues, “es un

²⁵¹ José Cuadros Quiroga, *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario: Sus bases y principios de acción inmediata* (La Paz, 1942), p. 36.

²⁵² Víctor Paz Estenssoro, *Discursos Parlamentarios*, (La Paz: Editorial Canata, 1955), p. 304.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 313.

criterio liberal representa salir del régimen feudal.”²⁵⁴ By paying campesinos for their labor in cash, Paz envisioned expanding both the monetary economy and the domestic market while providing incentives for landlord and colono alike to increase production.

INTEGRATING BOLIVIA

Following the April insurrection, the MNR leadership organized a new government and set about mobilizing both state and society for the sweeping reforms necessary to transform Bolivia into a modern nation. Indigenous integration was paramount among this platform of modernizing reforms. Not only was social justice and participant democracy consistent with the MNR leadership’s vision of modern nationhood. But perhaps more importantly, the success of national development was predicated upon the active participation of indigenous Bolivians as both producers and consumers in a vibrant commercial economy fomented by the postrevolutionary government. By integrating Indians into the monetary economy, the MNR leadership sought to double the size of the domestic market, providing employment, goods, and services, while working toward the goal of established a soviergn, self-sufficient national economy. To be sure, national integration was to be a gradual process predicated upon the transformation of the indigenous peasantry into a modernized, commercial orientated class of peasant producers. Social change, to the extent possible, would be channeled by the state toward the particular goals of the postrevolutionary modernization.

Within days of the Revolution, the MNR leadership established both the institutional framework and legal foundation for national integration. On April 12, 1952 the postrevolutionary government created the *Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos*

²⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 313.



Illustration 6: President Víctor Paz Estenssoro dancing with indigenous woman, c. 1952. Historian Laurence Whitehead writes: “President Paz chaired many cabinet meetings and engaged in a lifetime of political intrigues, but one of the greatest shocks to his entourage came shortly after his return from exile, in April 1952, when he instructed his ministers to dance with the *cholitas* who had been invited into the presidential palace from the nearby central market.”²⁵⁵

(Ministry of Peasant Affairs, MAC), a novel government office that would tend specifically to the integration of Indians into the economic, social, and culture fabric of the nation.²⁵⁶ That the MNR dedicated an entire state ministry to rural affairs was in itself

²⁵⁵ Laurence Whitehead, “The Bolivian National Revolution: A Comparison,” in Merilee Grindle and Pilar Domingo (eds.), *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in a Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 45. Photograph from José Fellman Velarde, *Álbum de la Revolución Nacional: 128 años de lucha por la Independencia de Bolivia* (La Paz: Subsecretaría de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura, 1955).

²⁵⁶ “Decreto Supremo de 22 de Mayo de 1952,” *Legislación boliviana del indio: Recopilación de resoluciones, ordenes, decretos, leyes, decretos supremos y otras disposiciones legales, 1825-1953*, José Flores Moncayo, ed. (La Paz, 1953), p. 461.

unprecedented.²⁵⁷ That the creation of the ministry was one of its first measures taken by the government underscores the urgency accorded to the prompt resolution of the Indian problem. The faster that Indians were freed from the feudal economy, the sooner the government could realize its objective of establishing a self-sufficient, sovereign national economy.

The new ministry would oversee the gradual incorporation of indigenous Bolivian into the postrevolutionary republic. The primary objective of MAC, as stated in its original charter, was “incorporar las masas campesinos a la vida económica, política y cultural de la Nación.”²⁵⁸ The additional objectives listed in the charter further underscore the economic imperatives underlying indigenous integration. They included coordinating rural economic policy with national development strategy, researching rural production, identifying the needs of rural workers, and organizing rural society into collective organizations orientated toward national economic production—whether rural sindicatos or agrarian cooperatives.²⁵⁹ Over the course of the next decade, MAC would provide the personnel, knowledge, and planning required to transform subsistence-farming Indians into a modernized agriculture workforce.

²⁵⁷ According to José Flores Moncayo, the first state indigenous office, the Departamento de Trabajo Campesino was founded by Busch in 1938 as part of the new labor code. It was housed in the Ministry of Labor. In 1940, the Peñaranda government transferred all state official dedicated to indigenous affairs to the Ministry of Education, where he created the Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas. It seems that this office managed indigenous-state relations until the creation of MAC in 1952. See José Flores Moncayo, *Legislación boliviana del indio: recopilación de resoluciones, ordenes, decretos, leyes, decretos supremos y otras disposiciones legales, 1825-1953* (La Paz, 1953), pp. 391-393, 400-405.

²⁵⁸ “Decreto Supremo de 22 de Mayo de 1952,” *Legislación boliviana del indio: Recopilación de resoluciones, ordenes, decretos, leyes, decretos supremos y otras disposiciones legales, 1825-1953*, José Flores Moncayo, ed. (La Paz, 1953), p. 461.

²⁵⁹ “Decreto Supremo de 22 de Mayo de 1952,” *Legislación boliviana del indio: Recopilación de resoluciones, ordenes, decretos, leyes, decretos supremos y otras disposiciones legales, 1825-1953*, José Flores Moncayo, ed. (La Paz, 1953), p. 461.

The MAC was a massive state bureaucracy, rivaled in size perhaps only by the Ministries of Government or Education. Aside from the administrative offices, it consisted of four departments.²⁶⁰ The Dirección General de Comunidades y Cooperativas was charged with local agrarian development—including planning, transforming rural communities into agrarian cooperatives, and carrying out statistical studies of agricultural production. The Dirección General de Legislación y Justicia Campesina was in charge of drafting defensive legislation and providing indigenous communities with free legal counsel. The Dirección General de Educación Fundamental took over the rapidly expanding rural education programs from the Ministry of Education. Following the Education Reform of 1955, it would oversee rural education and adult literacy campaigns. Finally, the Instituto Indigenista Boliviano, which was originally created in 1949 as a national branch of the III—yet lacking funds and perhaps initiative, it seems that the office existed in name only.²⁶¹ Now integrated in MAC, it would carry out social scientific research on Bolivia’s indigenous population.

The postrevolutionary leadership appointed Ñuflo Chávez Ortiz to lead the new ministry. From Santa Cruz, Chávez had joined the MNR in 1945 while the party was a junior partner in the Villarroel regime. After the violent overthrow of Villarroel and the exile of the MNR leadership, Chávez laid low in Santa Cruz. He helped orchestrate the failed MNR putsch of August 1949 and was imprisoned during the brief but bloody Civil

²⁶⁰ Bernabe Ledesma, “Fines y objetivos de las direcciones generales del Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos,” *Inti Karka: órgano del movimiento pedagógico indigenista*, 2ª Época, No. 4 (Noviembre-Diciembre 1954), pp. 62-70.

²⁶¹ Archival records indicate that the IIB did not pay its annual dues to the III in Mexico City during the period spanning its creation in 1947 and the 1952 Revolution. ABNB, PR, 1952, Corr, MAC (765/369), Juan Comas, Secretario General de III to Ñuflo Chavez Ortiz, 8/26/1952.

War that followed.²⁶² Inspired by socialism, nationalism, and indigenismo, he was a committed labor activist who, in April 1952, was instrumental in the foundation of the Central Obrero Bolivia (COB). As Minister of Peasant Affairs, he swiftly set bureaucracy in motion. He tasked the Dirección General de Legislación y Justicia Campesina with enforcing the May 1945 laws abolishing ponguaje and establishing wages for rural workers. The department also provided official support for the sit-down strikes and work stoppages occurring across the countryside. He dispatched teams of labor activists to haciendas to organize peasants into rural labor unions affiliated with the state—a measure that would enable the government to gain a modicum of control over the rising unrest in the countryside. He also appointed Félix Eugino Zaballa as director of the IIB, announcing that the office would enjoy a “true and effective boost” (*verdadero y efectivo impulse*) under the new government.²⁶³ According to a circular Chávez sent to all state ministries in June 1952, the IIB “will have the essential function of not only promoting a body of legislation applicable to the Bolivian peasantry, but of uplifting the spiritual and cultural level of the peasant masses, as well as preserve and conserve the treasures of our vernacular culture, that the Bolivian soil possesses.”²⁶⁴

As MAC turned to the social and economic aspects of indigenous integration, postrevolutionary government tuned to the legal foundation for indigenous political exclusion. On July 21, 1952, it introduced the universal suffrage law. One of the most celebrated accomplishments of the revolution, the decree abolished literacy and property

²⁶² Luis Antezana Ergueta, *Historia secreta del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Tomo VI: 1949-1952 “El Sexenio - II”* (La Paz: Juventud, 1987), p. 1545.

²⁶³ ABNB, MNAR, Correspondencia, 1952 (02-323), Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos to Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes, 7/4/1952.

²⁶⁴ ABNB, Presidencia de la Republica (PR), 1952, Correspondencia, Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos (MAC) (756/369), Circular, Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos, June 1952.

qualifications on the franchise and guaranteed voting rights to all adults, regardless of race, class, or gender. As a result of the law, the electorate immediately quintupled from 200,000 to over 1,000,000.²⁶⁵ To ensure widespread political participation—and perhaps



Illustration 7: Aymara woman voting as a result of the 1952 universal suffrage decree.

²⁶⁵ Klein, “Social Change in Bolivia since 1952,” p. 237.

to guarantee the political longevity of the MNR—the law decreed voting compulsory.²⁶⁶ Paz also decreed a general amnesty for all campesinos involved in the rural insurgency of the late 1940s, contending that theirs was a legitimate struggle against the unjust seigniorial economy.²⁶⁷

With MAC attending to urgent social problems of the countryside, government leaders turned their attention to the nationalization of the tin mines. With a succession of supreme decrees issued in 1952, the government placed the nation's mineral wealth in government hands. Though the MNR leadership had only recently come to embrace nationalization—a decision that most historians argue represented a concession to the FSTMB and the COB—the measure was consistent with their nationalist political agenda and compatible with the state-capitalist model. First, on June 2, it announced a state monopoly on mineral exports and granted the government-owned *Banco Mineral* sole authorization to export tin. Then, on October 2, it created the *Corporación Minera de Bolivia* (Mineral Corporation of Bolivia, COMIBOL), the state enterprise that would manage the expropriated tin-mines. Finally, on October 31, the government nationalized the mines owned by Patiño, Aramayo, and Hochschild—the “big three” responsible for half of tin output—and placed them under control of COMIBOL. The act, hailed as the “acto de la independencia económica de Bolivia,” would provide the government with a lucrative source of capital to invest in the development of alternative sectors of the

²⁶⁶ Decreto Supremo de 21 de Julio de 1952, “Instituyendo derecho de sufragio al campesinos,” *Legislación boliviana del indio: Recopilación de resoluciones, ordenes, decretos, leyes, decretos supremos y otras disposiciones legales, 1825-1953*, José Flores Moncayo, ed. (La Paz, 1953), pp. 464-467.

²⁶⁷ Decreto Supremos de 22 de Julio de 1952, “Amnistía para obreros minero y campesinos,” *Legislación boliviana del indio: Recopilación de resoluciones, ordenes, decretos, leyes, decretos supremos y otras disposiciones legales, 1825-1953*, José Flores Moncayo, ed. (La Paz, 1953), pp. 467-469.

economy and for Bolivia to finally become self-sufficient.²⁶⁸ To the chagrin of the left, however, Paz agreed to indemnify the affected parties—an action was necessary for U.S. recognition in the emerging Cold War.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

While MAC provided the institutional framework for national integration and universal suffrage cleared the legal obstacles for indigenous political citizenship, national development mapped the place of indigenous Bolivians in the postrevolutionary republic. The postrevolutionary development strategy was principally designed by Walter Guevara Arze. During the opening months of the Revolution, he began working to translate the MNR leadership's economic objectives into concrete state policy. As he devised the postrevolutionary development strategy, he imagined transforming Bolivia's human and geographic diversity—long recognized as insurmountable obstacles to national progress—into one of the nation's "greatest advantages."²⁶⁹ "Que acaso pueda encontrarse una interpretación mas racional de nuestra geografía," he reasoned in July 1952, "si combinamos su aspecto puramente físico con su contenido humano."²⁷⁰ By aligning population and resources in a rational development strategy, Guevara remained confident that the revolutionary government could once and for all transform Bolivia from a semicolonial republic into a modern, integrated nation-state. Within the

²⁶⁸ Republica de Bolivia, Subsecretaria de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura, *El libro blanco de la independencia económica de Bolivia* (La Paz: 1952).

²⁶⁹ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, p. 156.

²⁷⁰ "Discurso del Dr. Walter Guevara Arze, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto y Delegado de Cochabamba al I Congreso Boliviano de Sociología," *Estatuto Orgánico de la Sociedad Boliviana de Sociología y otros documentos referentes al I Congreso Boliviano de Sociología, celebrado en La Paz, del 9 al 17 de julio de 1952*, Sociedad Boliviana de Sociología, ed. (La Paz: Editorial UMSA, 1952), p. 40.

postrevolutionary imagination, development determined the role on indigenous Bolivian in the newly-integrated republic.

In August 1953, Guevara presented the *Plan de diversificación de la producción*, which was then vetted by national and international experts, and subsequently revised, updated, and expanded as the *Plan inmediata de política económica de la Revolution National* in 1955.²⁷¹ As Richard Thorn points out, in devising his strategy, Guevara drew on recommendations proposed a decade earlier by an U.S. economic mission to Bolivia



Illustration 8: Foreign Minister and State Planner Walter Guevara Arze at the United Nations, December 1953 (UN Multimedia Photo # 122999).

²⁷¹ ABNB, PR, 1953, Correspondencia, Plan diversificación (1784/774), Walter Guevara Arze, “Plan de diversificación de la producción,” 8/1953, p. 5.

headed by Merwin L. Bohan.²⁷² After surveying the economy in 1942, the Bohan Mission had recommended cutting deficit spending by promoting domestic production. The key was to construct a road between Santa Cruz and Cochabamba, thus linking the vast, fertile, and sparsely-populated eastern lowlands—where commercial agriculture could thrive—to the principal centers of trade, population, and consumption in the west. Upon Bohan’s recommendations and with a generous loan from the U.S. Export-Import Bank, the government created the *Corporación Boliviana de Fomento* (CBF, Bolivian Development Corporation), a joint Bolivia-U.S. venture that would oversee the highway construction while promoting migration, settlement, and commercial agriculture in the lowlands. Aside from initiating construction on the road (which did not begin until 1947) and promoting a modest lowland colonization effort, the recommendations were largely disregarded.²⁷³ Guevara integrated the Plan Bohan as the foundation for the most comprehensive state-led development initiative in Bolivian history.

The primary objective of the postrevolutionary development strategy was to establish a sovereign national economy. Reliant upon tin for 97 percent of its foreign exchange, Bolivia’s economy was grievously prone to market vicissitudes. Economic sovereignty thus meant shielding the domestic economy from external shocks by redefining Bolivia’s relationship with the international economy. In this, Guevara turned to export diversification. Because COMIBOL, the fledgling state mining enterprise, provided the majority of foreign exchange, Guevara strove to make the enterprise more profitable by increasing both output and efficiency. He nevertheless placed more emphasis on fostering alternative sources of export income, primarily by increasing

²⁷² Thorn, “The Economic Transformation,” p. 165.

²⁷³ Ibid.

petroleum production. Since President Toro had nationalized the oil industry in 1936, YFPB enjoyed modest output—though never exceeding 1000 barrels in a day.²⁷⁴ Guevara called for a tenfold increase in output at the proven fields at Camiri and large-scale exploration of another field to the south, at Bermejo. Increasing oil production would free up import capital by meeting national consumption levels and generating much-needed revenue.

Economic sovereignty also implied self-sufficiency. Imports represented a constant drain on the balance of payments. By 1951, a quarter of export revenue went to imports.²⁷⁵ That figure doubled with the nationalization decree, however, as the state now had to cover the operating costs of the previously privately-owned mines.²⁷⁶ Not only did imports include manufactured goods, but they increasingly included basic food commodities of domestic origin. “Es cada vez mayor la urgencia de producir en Bolivia en condiciones económicas, los alimentos que el país consume y que hoy se importan con dólares.” Doing so, he warned “se impone como condición de supervivencia organizada.”²⁷⁷ By using export surplus to finance domestic production—from manufacturing and industry to agriculture and artisanry—Guevara envisioned generating new sectors of economic growth capable of meeting national consumption levels. Such an effort would free-up development capital for the state, expand the monetary economy, and provide employment for tens of thousands as rural peasants mobilized for national

²⁷⁴ Cornelius H. Zondag, *The Bolivian Economy, 1952-1965: The Revolution and its Aftermath* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 112.

²⁷⁵ ABNB, PR, 1953, Correspondencia, Plan diversificación (1784/774), Walter Guevara Arze, “Plan de diversificación de la producción,” 8/1953, p. 5

²⁷⁶ Walter Guevara Arze, *Plan inmediato de política económica del gobierno de la Revolución Nacional* (La Paz: Imprenta Editorial “Letras,” 1955), p. 20.

²⁷⁷ ABNB, PR, 1953, Correspondencia, Plan diversificación (1784/774), Walter Guevara Arze, “Plan de diversificación de la producción,” 8/1953, p. 5.

production. The state would do its part. It would coordinate economic planning; rationally manage finite natural resources; build and maintain essential infrastructure; and ensure the security of both individuals and investments. The market would do the rest. It would unleash its modernizing magic, providing widespread economic opportunity and social mobility. What was envisioned by Guevara was nothing short of a market revolution.

If tin served as the engine of economic growth for the pre-revolutionary economy, commercial agriculture would drive postrevolutionary development. In addition to tin and petroleum, land was Bolivia's most abundant natural resources. Commercial agriculture, moreover, would decrease Bolivia's dependence of imports. Guevara found that 35 percent of imports consisted of non-manufactured goods of domestic origin, including sugar, beef, dairy products, rice, wheat, flour, cotton, and vegetable oil.²⁷⁸ By aligning Bolivia's human and physical geography, Guevara sought not only to meet domestic demand, but to produce surplus agriculture for export. Sugar, for example, which accounted for a significant percentage of imports, could be produced in Santa Cruz, where the sparsely-populated plains and long growing seasons provided ideal conditions for commercial agriculture. Corn, which was traditionally produced in Cochabamba, could also be produced in Santa Cruz, along with rice and soy (for vegetable oil). Instead of corn, Guevara would induce Cochabamba farmers to grow wheat and while promoting the light industry necessary to produce milk, butter, and cheese. The large semi-tropical savannahs of Beni were ideal for livestock and could substitute beef imports from Argentina.²⁷⁹

²⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 6-14.

The natural obstacle to this plan was, of course, the seigniorial order, which monopolized both the land and labor necessary for national development. The agrarian reform law, which was in its most advanced stages of planning while Guevara drafted his development strategy, would change that. Designed in accordance with the development objectives of the postrevolutionary government, the measure would redistribute large, unproductive estates to the peasants who worked them. Once the agrarian reform law unshackled land and labor from the unproductive seigniorial order, Guevara proposed boosting production on the altiplano and valleys of the western highlands. This effort, he asserted “tendrán como consecuencia, a la vez que un ahorro de divisa, un cambio favorable en el nivel general de alimentación de pueblo de Bolivia.”²⁸⁰ By introducing modern farming machinery, fertilizers, insecticides, new varieties of seed and livestock, the highlands could provide wheat, barley, and potatoes to La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí.

Yet it was in the eastern lowlands, in the departments of Santa Cruz and Beni where the future of commercial agriculture lie. The traditional centers of population and commerce in the western highlands were generally overcrowded, constituting only 33 percent of the national territory yet holding 72 percent of the population. The lowlands, on the other hand, which constituted 67 percent of the national territory, were scarcely inhabited, having only 28 percent of the population.²⁸¹ Unlike the dry climate, shorter growing seasons, and acidic soils of the altiplano, the lowlands were ideally suited for extensive agriculture: there was abundant land, rich soil, an ideal growing climate, and favorable topography. Guevara estimated that meeting national consumption levels of sugar, rice, dairy, corn and other imported commodities would require about 87,000

²⁸⁰ Guevara Arze, *Plan inmediato de política económica del gobierno de la Revolución Nacional*, p. 127.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*

hectares, or about 336 square miles, of land.²⁸² The Santa Cruz-Cochabamba highway, opened in 1954, finally linked highlands markets and lowland production, making very real the possibility of economic integration. In addition to transporting goods more cheaply and efficiently, the highway would allow the government to realize the lowland colonization in order to meet the burgeoning demand for agricultural workers.

Guevara identified two sources of labor for lowland commercial agriculture. “Se considera conveniente recibirla,” he wrote, “principalmente de países europeos.”²⁸³ Though it remains unclear as to what motivated this statement, European immigration had long been seen as a means to improve Bolivia’s racial stock by “whitening” the predominantly indigenous population. Perhaps realizing the unfeasibility of such an effort, however, Guevara conceded that internal migration would have to suffice. Working with the CBF, he sought to colonize the lowlands with campesinos recently freed from the highland estates. Indian labor would drive large scale commercial agriculture orientated towards national production. The effort would provide labor for ex-colonos and ex-comunarios from the highlands while simultaneously integrating them into the monetary economy. Already in 1953, the government set the CBF to work on internal colonization. The CBF initiated projects to resettle peasants from the La Paz altiplano and the valleys surrounding Cochabamba in agriculturally rich areas in Santa Cruz.²⁸⁴ Lowland colonization would also solve the problem of *minifundio*. As already limited parcels of land were further subdivided by generations of peasants, they would have little land left for cultivation and the economy would continue to stagnate as

²⁸² ABNB, PR, 1953, Correspondencia, Plan diversificación (1784/774), Walter Guevara Arze, “Plan de diversificación de la producción,” 8/1953, p. 12.

²⁸³ Guevara Arze, *Plan inmediato de política económica del gobierno de la Revolución Nacional*, p. 102.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 170-171.

highland production dwindled. Lowland colonization thus offered a socioeconomic release valve. It would redistribute land, people, and goods in postrevolutionary economy that was rationally planned and carefully planned by government technocrats.

The success of postrevolutionary development was ultimately predicated upon the active participation of indigenous Bolivian in the commercial economy. Their labor would drive the commercial agricultural economy, creating self-sufficiency by meeting—and perhaps even exceeding—domestic demand. It was not just their production that would transform the domestic economy, however, but their consumption as well. By freeing 63 percent of the population from the seigniorial order, the agrarian reform would create the labor necessary to realize this goal. More importantly, it would double the size of the domestic market by integrating Indians into the monetary economy. Once indigenous workers received cash for their labor, the government would transform over half the population traditionally marginalized in the national economy, into consumers, thus creating new opportunities for all sectors of the market. If commercial agriculture was Bolivia's economic salvation, then it was indigenous Bolivians who would realize national development. Development thrust indigenous Bolivian into the center of the postrevolutionary imagination and fundamentally reconfigured their role in the nation.

SOCIAL SCIENCE, RACE, AND DEVELOPMENT

The postrevolutionary development strategy was designed according to the economic policy imperatives of the MNR leadership, but it was social science that rendered the entire undertaking credible. Social scientific knowledge was an essential component of the modern development enterprise. Sociology, economics, anthropology, and other academic disciplines related to the study of society offered a rational, ordered,

and indeed scientific approach to applied socioeconomic change. They provided the information necessary to identify national problems, the data needed to measure their severity, and the knowledge required to effectively mitigate them. After April 1952, officials appealed to the revolutionary patriotism of the nation's social scientists, calling on them to assist in postrevolutionary modernization.

Sociology was particularly attractive to postrevolutionary officials. Not only was it the most developed social scientific discipline in Bolivia, but officials also agreed that sociologists were best prepared to confront the challenges posed by rural modernization. The Revolution, moreover, coincided with an on-going effort to professionalize Bolivian sociology by institutionalizing standard of sources, methods, and language in an academic setting. The first national Bolivian Sociology Congress, in the works since March 1952 and planned for July 1952, would mark the beginning of an unprecedented collaboration between the state and sociologists—an important, though largely overlooked, relationship that would play no small part in shaping the Revolution and the role of indigenous Bolivians in the postrevolutionary republic. It is particularly notable as a site where changing ideas of race were both debated and consolidated.

As an academic discipline, sociology was born of nineteenth-century positivism.²⁸⁵ Across Latin America, it emerged in a dynamic era of social change and economic modernization as intellectuals struggled both to understand and to order the increasingly complex societies within which they lived.²⁸⁶ In Bolivia, it was Daniel

²⁸⁵ Humberto Vázquez Machicado, "El Problema de una Sociología Precomtiana en Bolivia," *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Sept-Dec, 1956), pp. 441-460.

²⁸⁶ For a broad overview of the development of social sciences and humanities across Latin America, see Richard M. Morse, "The Multiverse of Latin American Identity, c. 1920-1970," *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, Vol. X: Latin America since 1930: Ideas, Culture and Society, Leslie Bethell, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 1-128. For a succinct treatment of the history of sociology, see: Robert Bannister, "Sociology," *The Cambridge History of Science, Vol 7: The Modern*

Sánchez Bustamante, Bautista Saavedra, and Alcides Arguedas who had shaped the discipline in the crucible of early twentieth century liberal modernization.²⁸⁷ Influenced by Comte, Le Bon, Spencer, as well as lesser-known continental and American thinkers, they applied theories of racial degeneration, moral decay, and social illness to Bolivia's social reality. Ultimately, the body of knowledge they created served to justify creole minority rule by reaffirming the myth of European cultural and racial supremacy grounded in the secular authority of science.

By the 1920s, however, a new generation of sociologists began to eschew positivism for the novel intellectual currents of Marxism and indigenismo. Most notable among this group of young political activists were Arturo Urquidi, Ernesto Ayala Mercado, and José Antonio Arze. They merged their activism with their intellectual curiosity, emerging as important leaders (Arze and Urquidi in the PIR, Ayala in the POR) who, in subsequent years, would bridge social scientific research with their political activism.

Arze was perhaps the most important figure among this emerging generation of Marxist sociologists.²⁸⁸ Born in Cochabamba in 1904, he studied both Letters and Science and Law at the Universidad Mayor de San Simón. He read José Ingenieros, Chilean labor activist, Luis Emilio Recabarren, and Italian-Argentine sociologist Victorio Codovilla.²⁸⁹ Alongside Urquidi, he played a leading role in the university reform

Social Sciences, Theodore M. Porter and Dorothy Ross, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 329-353.

²⁸⁷ Examples of early twentieth century sociological thought include: Daniel Sánchez Bustamante, *Principios de sociología* (La Paz: Imprenta Artística, 1903); Bautista Saavedra, *El Ayllu* (La Paz: Imprenta Artística, 1903); Alcides Arguedas, *Pueblo enfermo* (La Paz: Gisbert & Cia, 1975 [1909]).

²⁸⁸ Ramiro Condarco Morales, *Historia del saber y la ciencia en Bolivia* (La Paz: Academia Nacional de Ciencia, 1978), p. 317.

²⁸⁹ Marcelo Urioste discusses Arze's intellectual genealogy in the prologue to José Antonio Arze, *Escritos literarios: comentarios y semblanzas* (La Paz: Ediciones Roalva, 1981), pp. VII-XXVII.

movement of the 1920s.²⁹⁰ He spent much of the 1930s in Peru and Chile. It was during this time that he translated Louis Baudin's and Georges Rouma's scholarship into Spanish.²⁹¹ Upon returning to Bolivia in 1940, he founded the PIR and also taught sociology at the University of San Francisco Xavier in Sucre. He essayed on a variety of topics, spanning literature, Marxist philosophy, and intellectual history. Exiled once again in the mid-1940s, this time to the U.S., he taught at Williams College in Massachusetts and at the Jefferson School of Social Science, an adult vocational school in New York funded by the U.S. communist party.²⁹² In New York, Columbia University professor, Frank Tannenbaum invited him to participate in his famed Columbia University Seminars. The two established a lasting friendship. Indeed, they shared a similar intellectual trajectory, their academic careers deeply entwined with their political activism—Tannenbaum in U.S. anarcho-syndicalism, Arze in the Bolivian student and labor movement.²⁹³

²⁹⁰ Klein, *Parties and Political Change in Bolivia*, pp. 70-71.

²⁹¹ The nature of pre-conquest Andean society was a popular and highly-contested topic in the Bolivian and Peruvian academies during the 1920s and 1930s. Louis Baudin, *L'empire socialiste des Inka* (Paris, Institut d'ethnologie, 1928). José Antonio Arze translated the work into Spanish and it was subsequently published in Santiago, Chile by Zig-Zag Press in 1943. Arze also translated Georges Rouma's *La Civilisation des Incas et leur Communisme autocratique* (Brussels: Médicale et Scientifique, 1924), which the Lima house, Miranda published in 1926 as *El imperio incaico (breve esquema de su organización económica, política y social)*. Another study on the nature of property in Andean society is Hildebrand Castro Pozo, *Del ayllu al corporativismo socialista* (Lima: Mejía, 1936) José Antonio Arze, *Sociografía de inkario: Fue socialista o comunista e imperio inkaiko?* (La Paz: Fénix, 1952).

²⁹² Archivo Privado de José Roberto Arze (APJRA), José Antonio Arze, Obras, Tomo 4 (JAA 4), "Ficha biográfica de Arze y Arze, José Antonio," 7/21/1952, p. 13; Robert J. Alexander discusses Arze's tenure at the Jefferson School and friendship with Frank Tannenbaum in *A History of Organized Labor in Bolivia* (Westport: Praeger, 2005), p. 38.

²⁹³ Charles A. Hale, "Frank Tannenbaum and the Mexican Revolution," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (May, 1995), pp. 215-246. Tannenbaum's engagement with Bolivian social science dates to the 1930s, when he first visited the country to study the grassroots rural education initiative at Warisata. He had returned several times since, forging lasting relationships with Arze, Guevara, and other prominent social thinkers. See: "Declaraciones del profesor Sr. Frank Tannenbaum sobre tópicos indigenistas," *El Diario*, 8/29/1938. See also: Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, pp. 125-26, 271-72. For Tannenbaum's influence on Latin American social thought more broadly, see: Mauricio Tenorio Trillo, "Stereophonic Scientific Modernisms: Social Science between Mexico and the United States, 1880s-

Professionalizing sociology within the Bolivian academy was Arze's career aspiration. Although most universities had established sociology departments by mid-century, the discipline remained vaguely defined, politically subjective, and theoretical (as opposed to practical) in orientation. Hoping to institutionalize standards of language, knowledge, and methodology, Arze founded the *Instituto de Sociología Boliviano* (IBSO) in Sucre in 1940.²⁹⁴ With Arze absent from Sucre for much of the decade, however, the ISBO disappeared. In March 1952, Arze revived the effort, creating the *Sociedad Boliviana de Sociología* (SBS) at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (UMSA) in La Paz. The SBS would provide the institutional framework necessary to professionalize Bolivian sociology according to standards recently established by the *Asociación Latinoamericana de Sociología* (ALAS).²⁹⁵ In April, just weeks after the Revolution, Arze announced the first national sociology conference to convene in La Paz in mid-July. The event was intended to assemble sociologists from all nine departments of the republic. Their assigned task: identify the subjects of sociological inquiry, develop a set of questions to frame future research, establish a standard university curriculum, determine available resources for research, and to instill objectivity by explicitly detaching scientific inquiry from political persuasion.²⁹⁶

1930s," *The Journal of Latin American History*, Vol. 86, No. 3, The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History: A Special Issue (December 1999), pp. 1156-1187.

²⁹⁴ José Antonio Arze, "Labor inicial del Instituto de Sociología Boliviana," *Revista del Instituto de Sociología Boliviana*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1941), 165-177. Its members included emerging scholars such as Arturo Urquidi and Ernesto Ayala Mercado as well as Carlos Medinaceli, Gunnar Mendoza, and other established intellectuals not formally trained in the discipline, but nevertheless interested in the pressing social problems of their day.

²⁹⁵ Alejandro Blanco, "La Asociación Latinoamericana de Sociología: una historia de sus primeros congresos," *Sociologías*, Vol. 7, No. 14 (July - December 2005), pp. 22-49.

²⁹⁶ Comité Promotor de la Sociedad Boliviana de Sociología, *Reglamento y temario del Primer Congreso Boliviano de Sociología* (La Paz: UMSA, 1952), pp. 4-26.

The fledgling postrevolutionary government enthusiastically supported the congress. President Paz praised the initiative and even provided state funds to finance it. Like other officials, he understood the important role that social science could render to postrevolutionary modernization. “Es deber del Gobierno Nacional fomentar la cultura y actividades científicas particularmente con relación a la realidad social de nuestra país,” Paz explained as he signed the law.²⁹⁷ The government also provided free postal and telegraph services for conference planning and coordination.²⁹⁸ Guevara, himself a sociologist on the SBS board, used his influence as Foreign Minister to secure the attendance of notable foreign scholars, including his former University of Chicago advisor, Louis Wirth; UNAM sociologist, José Medina Echavarría; the ALAS President, Argentine sociologist Alfredo Poviña; and Frank Tannenbaum from Columbia.²⁹⁹ Only Tannenbaum and Poviña were able to attend.

The July 1952 congress inaugurated an era of unprecedented collaboration between social scientists and the state. Attending were government officials, labor leaders, foreign dignitaries, as well as the academic intellectual elite. Notable participants included sociologists Arturo Urquidi Morales and Teddy Hartman, Félix Eguino Zaballa from the IIB, and several others who would go on to work for the postrevolutionary state.³⁰⁰ Walter Guevara Arze opened the event, remarking on the “útil

²⁹⁷ Archivo de La Paz (ALP), Sociedad Boliviana de Sociología (SBS), Caja 2, Carpeta 3, “Resolución Suprema 49843,” 6/10/1952.

²⁹⁸ ALP/SBS, Caja 2, Carpeta 3, Ministro de Obras Publicas y Comunicaciones to José Antonio Arze, 7/3/1952.

²⁹⁹ ALP/SBS, Caja 2, Carpeta 3, Gwen A. Williams to José Antonio Arze, 11/20/1952; ALP/SBS, Caja 2, Carpeta 3, Frank Tannenbaum to José Antonio Arze, 5/28/1952; ALP/SBS, Caja 3, José Antonio Arze to José Medina Echavarría, 6/29/1952; ALP/SBS, Caja 3, José Antonio Arze to Excelentísimo Sr. Presidente de la Republica, Dr. Víctor Paz Estenssoro y señores Ministros de Estado, 6/5/1952.

³⁰⁰ For a list of participats, see: “Anexo no. 2: Breve quien es quien de la personas mencionadas en esta publicación,” *Estatuto Orgánico de la Sociedad Boliviana de Sociología y otros documentos referentes al I*

coincidencia” of its timing before encouraging increased cooperation between sociologists and government officials.³⁰¹ “Las conclusiones a que pueden llegar, con respecto a los problemas de Bolivia, serán útiles al país de un modo general y particularmente en las presentes circunstancias,” he explained. “Es por ello que el Gobierno ha prestado a esta reunión, efectiva ayuda y mira con la mejor voluntad la obra científica en la cual están ustedes empeñados.”³⁰² In such transformative times, “nada más útil al país que una reunión de Profesores de Ciencias Sociales para estudiar tales problemas.”³⁰³

Participants agreed. Arze, in fact, recognized in the Revolution an opportunity to push sociology away from mere description and theory, towards a modern applied science.³⁰⁴ Urquidi felt the same. As rector of the Universidad de San Simón in Cochabamba, he had published several important tracts on the indigenous community since 1940.³⁰⁵ “Hasta hoy en Bolivia... se ha cultivado la sociología solamente en su aspecto teórico,” he observed. “Ahora se trata, al través de las entidades que se vienen formando, de imprimir una función práctica a los principios y normas consagrados por la

Congreso Boliviano de Sociología, celebrado en La Paz, del 9 al 17 de julio de 1952, Sociedad Boliviana de Sociología, ed. (La Paz: Editorial UMSA, 1952), p. 109-116.

³⁰¹ “Discurso del Dr. Walter Guevara Arze, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto y Delegado de Cochabamba al I Congreso Boliviano de Sociología,” *Estatuto Orgánico de la Sociedad Boliviana de Sociología y otros documentos referentes al I Congreso Boliviano de Sociología, celebrado en La Paz, del 9 al 17 de julio de 1952*, Sociedad Boliviana de Sociología, ed. (La Paz: Editorial UMSA, 1952), p. 38.

³⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 39.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁴ “Discurso del Presidente del Primer Congreso Boliviano de Sociología, Dr. José Antonio Arze,” *Estatuto Orgánico de la Sociedad Boliviana de Sociología y otros documentos referentes al I Congreso Boliviano de Sociología, celebrado en La Paz, del 9 al 17 de julio de 1952*, Sociedad Boliviana de Sociología, ed. (La Paz: Editorial UMSA, 1952), pp. 45-57, see especially pp. 54-55.

³⁰⁵ See especially: Arturo Urquidi Morales, *La comunidad indígena: Precedentes sociológicos, vicisitudes históricas* (Cochabamba: Imprenta Universitaria, 1941)

ciencia sociológica.”³⁰⁶ Leading sociologists and government officials both sought to put sociology to the service of the state. They would identify the underlying social problems affecting the republic, study them scientifically, and design prescriptive reforms in accordance with the broader modernizing objectives of the postrevolutionary leadership.

Of all the challenges confronting the postrevolutionary republic, most concurred that it was the question of rural modernization where sociologists could be most helpful. Aside from issues related to the professionalization of sociology, the “Indian problem” was the most widely discussed topics at the congress. In his inaugural address, Guevara had emphasized the issue, reminding the audience that “sobre tres millones y medio de habitantes, algo más de dos millones son indios.” He continued, “su desnutrición, su atraso cultural, su ausencia casi completa del mercado, al menos como consumida constituyan temas que sin duda han de ser planteados y estudiados por ustedes.”³⁰⁷ Josermo Murillo Vacareza, essayist and ex-director of the Universidad Técnica de Oruro, presented several papers, including “El indio, el cholo, y el blanco,” “La higiene mental y le eugenesia en Bolivia,” and “Etiología de las sublevaciones indígnales.” UMSA sociology professor, Teddy Hartman, discussed “El Indio y su complejo de inferioridad.” Frank Tannenbaum presented, “El problema del negro en los Estados Unidos,” the first of

³⁰⁶ “Discurso del Dr. Arturo Urquidí Morales, Rector de la Universidad de San Simón, de Cochabamba, y delegado de este departamento ante el 1er. Congreso Boliviano de Sociología,” *Estatuto Orgánico de la Sociedad Boliviana de Sociología y otros documentos referentes al I Congreso Boliviano de Sociología, celebrado en La Paz, del 9 al 17 de julio de 1952*, Sociedad Boliviana de Sociología, ed. (La Paz: Editorial UMSA, 1952), pp. 60-63, p. 62.

³⁰⁷ “Discurso del Dr. Walter Guevara Arze, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto y Delegado de Cochabamba al I Congreso Boliviano de Sociología,” *Estatuto Orgánico de la Sociedad Boliviana de Sociología y otros documentos referentes al I Congreso Boliviano de Sociología, celebrado en La Paz, del 9 al 17 de julio de 1952*, Sociedad Boliviana de Sociología, ed. (La Paz: Editorial UMSA, 1952), pp. 40-41.

a four part lecture series sponsored by the SBS on comparative race relations in the Americas drawing from his recently-published landmark, *Slave and Citizen*.³⁰⁸

Because several participants would go on to serve as key policymakers for the postrevolutionary state, the SBS congress provides a window onto the prevailing constructions of race in Bolivian social science while revealing the racial ideas that underlie the Revolution itself. Tannenbaum's lectures seems to have disappeared from the historical record, but Arze's discussion of their inherent relevance for postrevolutionary Bolivia provides a glimpse upon the way in which Bolivian intellectuals framed their own problems of interethnic relations in a comparative context. Arze recognized that "el problema de negrismo" existed in Bolivia, but given the small afro-descendent population it was not "un problema de tan vital importancia como lo es, por ejemplo, en el Brasil o algunos países del Caribe." Nevertheless, Arze noted that "para nosotros" Tannenbaum's essay was particularly relevant as the racial tensions in the United States "significación de primer plano el problema de nuestros indios Aymaras y quechuas, que constituyen más de dos tercios de la población total con respecto a los sectores mestizos y blanco." Reviewing the history of race relations in the Americas, Arze argued that "habrá de excitar necesariamente nuestra curiosidad porque si en algunos países con porcentaje de población negra, hay una política de discriminación anti-negrista, en los países que tenemos grueso porcentaje de indios," he pointed out, "hay una similar política de discriminación anti-indianista." Such thinking was "sin duda, incivilizadas y condeables."³⁰⁹

³⁰⁸ Arze notes that the work he presented at the SBS congress and subsequent public events in La Paz was from his famous 1947 monograph, *Slave and Citizen*.

³⁰⁹ APJRA, JAA 4, "El problema del negro en los Estados Unidos," 9/3/1952, p. 3.

Arze's engagement with Tannenbaum also reveals one of the channels through which Bolivian intellectuals began engaging cultural relativism at mid-century. Arze explained to his Bolivian colleagues that Tannenbaum stood alongside "Franz Boaz y Ruth Benedict" as a new generation of progressive social scientists that "negar todo valor científico a aquella teoría racista que pretenden clasificar a los grupos étnicos en superiores e inferiores." Arze melded cultural relativism with his own structural critique of race rooted in dialectical materialism. He stated "la supuesta inferioridad cultural de aquellos grupos étnicos que solemos clasificar de 'inferiores' –como sucede con los negros a juicio de los blancos–, es una inferioridad que deriva de la estructura institucional –y especialmente de la económica– más bien que de presunto coeficientes biológicos o psicológicos atribuidos arbitrariamente a tal o cual raza."³¹⁰ Like other cultural relativists of his day, he saw culture as a bounded and distinct entity, which was determined by the economic and institutional structures of the state.

Cultural relativism provided postrevolutionary intellectuals with a novel language of racial difference rooted in what Nancy Leys Stepan calls the "cognitive authority" of science.³¹¹ Since at least the 1940s, progressive Bolivian intellectuals had been exposed to the concept, primarily through their engagement with Mexican and Peruvian social science. As Arze comments demonstrate, with the Revolution, cultural relativism assumed a central role in devising state policy. The idea eschewed the biological essentialism that had prevailed in Bolivian social thought since the beginning of the century, providing revolutionary leaders with new explanations of race and human difference that reaffirmed postrevolutionary national development and provided the

³¹⁰ APJRA, JAA 4, "El problema del negro en los Estados Unidos," 9/3/1952, p. 3.

³¹¹ Nancy Leys Stepan, *The Hour of Eugenics: Race Gender, and Nation in Latin America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 63.

scientific rationale for indigenous improvableity. The idea, moreover, affirmed the MNR leadership belief in the structural causes of indigenous backwardness and the inherent improvableity of indigenous Bolivians. Yet, while cultural relativism displaced racial hierarchies founded on biology, it simultaneously reaffirmed indigenous inferiority by locating Andean civilization on a lower stage of human cultural evolution.³¹² According to such lines of thought, it followed that by uprooting, or at least reconfiguring such structures, the Revolution would once and for all establish a semblance of racial equality—at least in the legal sense.

The SBS congress marked the beginning of a mutually constitutive relationship between sociology and the postrevolutionary state. As a result of their initiative as well as their high intellectuals standing, state officials increasingly called on social scientists to occupy important posts in the postrevolutionary state. Arturo Urquidi would serve as a leading member of the agrarian reform committee. Arze would chair a committee on the Education Reform Commission. They were but two of several progressive intellectuals, who came of age in the post-Chaco generation of political upheaval and social reform, who would work tirelessly to transform the MNR leadership's revolutionary vision into social policy. Scholarship commonly cites the participation of Urquidi and Arze as an indication of the labor left pressuring the MNR center to radicalize the revolution.³¹³ Yet when explored in the context of Bolivian intellectual history, it becomes clear that Arze and Urquidi were the most established sociologists of their day, who, in some capacity or

³¹² This new “cultural racism” is discussed at length in Marisol de la Cadena, *Indigenous Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919-1991* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); See also Laura Gotkowitz, “Racisms of the Present and the Past in Latin America,” *Histories of Race and Racism: The Andes and Mesoamerica from Colonial Times to the Present* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), pp. 1-56.

³¹³ See, for example, Luis Antezana E., *Proceso y sentencia a la reforma agraria en Bolivia* (La Paz: Puerta del Sol, 1979), p. 76.

another, had been studying “el problem indígena” for decades.³¹⁴ Their incorporation into the revolutionary project was motivated not by ideological struggles within the postrevolutionary leadership, but by a pragmatic recognition that they were the best qualified to attend to the most pressing socioeconomic question of the day. In a personal letter to Minister of Peasant Affairs Ñuflo Chávez, for instance, Arze wrote, “han proyectado invitarnos a integrar la Comisión de la reforma agraria, ha sido en visto de nuestros antecedentes de profesores de Sociología.” He reminded the minister that although “somos comunistas” they were uniquely prepared to “servir el patria”—especially given their training in rural sociology.³¹⁵ In the coming years, as they devised the most important reforms affecting indigenous integration, they would move cultural relativism to the center of state policy, where it would become the pillar of the “raceless” society imagined by the postrevolutionary leadership.

AGRARIAN REFORM

On January 20, 1953, President Paz established the *Comisión de la Reforma Agraria* (Agrarian Reform Commission, CRA) to draft a land reform law consistent with the postrevolutionary national development strategy. Though nominally led by Vice President Hernán Siles, it was Arturo Urquidi Morales and Ernest Anaya Mercado, who carried out the majority of the research necessary to study the problem and prepared the committee’s final recommendations. Their objective: “hacer todo cuanto fuere necesario

³¹⁴ Condarco Morales, *La historia del saber y la ciencia en Bolivia*, p. 317.

³¹⁵ Arze described rural sociology as a discipline that is primarily concerned “en plantear las relaciones de los problemas del campo con los de la ciudad y estudiar las interdependencias entre los problemas netamente agrarios y los que se refieren a otros aspectos de la actividad social, como ser la organización de la vida familiar, del régimen jurídico y político, de la vida cultural, etc.” APJRA, JAA 5, José Antonio Arze to Ñuflo Chávez Ortiz, 1/17/1953, p. 2.

para superar la etapa feudal del agro boliviano, incorporar a las masas campesinos a la vida económica, política, social y cultural de la nación y dirigir mediante planificación la económica agraria.”³¹⁶ In addition to policy statements made by leading government officials, the committee was also guided by historical precedents. CRA officials referenced agrarian reform laws passed in China, Guatemala, Mexico, and the Soviet Union.³¹⁷ Responding to the exigencies of rural modernization, the CRA mapped the critical role of indigenous Bolivians in the postrevolutionary republic. The making of the agrarian reform decree demonstrates how economic policy converged with prevailing currents of cultural relativism to shape one of the most important measures affecting postrevolutionary citizenship for indigenous Bolivians.

In explaining agrarian reform to the public, Paz emphasized the economic benefits that it would bring not only to Indians themselves, but the middle-class. On February 13, 1953, at the opening of the sixth MNR convention, he reasoned that land reform “va a abrir las posibilidades para la burguesía boliviana, crezca y se enriquezca como no ha podido hacerlo bajo el dominio de la rosca.” To demonstrate how, he pointed to Mexico. He related the story of a small theater owner in Torreón who worried that agrarian reform would drive out his customers—members of the local landed class—and destroy his business. Seeking to assuage his concerns, a government official explained that to the contrary, agrarian reform, “iban a crearse condiciones económicas tales que para los hombres de empresas progresistas como el iban a haber mucho mejores posibilidades de hacer negocios en Torreón.” Some years later, when the theater owner ran into the same

³¹⁶ ABNB, WGA, Reforma Agraria, Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos, “Decreto Supremo,” 11/1952, p. 3.

³¹⁷ IISH, MNR, microfiches nos. 771-799: “Reforma agraria proyecto, antecedentes y evaluación.” This appears to be the three volume informe, long presumed lost, that the Comisión de Reforma Agraria submitted to Vice-President Siles.

government official, he thanked him and told him that he now owned four movie theaters. “Y eso sucedió así porque antes de la Reforma Agraria había solamente quince miles habitantes que podían ir al cine en Torreón,” Paz explained. “Con la Reforma Agraria la población había crecido a ciento cincuenta mil habitantes y miles y miles de campesinos tenían ya el suficiente poder adquisitivo como para poder ir al cine.” After applause, the President stated, “Esto es la reforma agraria, compañeros, y de ahí por que no deben asustarse, y mas bien ser grandes partidarios de ella, los campesinos de la clase media, pequeña burguesía y burguesía nacional.”³¹⁸ As Paz and other MNR leaders had been arguing for over a decade, agrarian reform was a necessary measure that was compatible with capitalist development and intended to expand the domestic market.

As head of MAC, Ñuflo Chávez also played a central role in orientating the CRA as they set out on their task. In January 1953, Chávez drafted a policy piece, “El problema indígena en Bolivia,” and circulated it to state ministers, the MNR leadership, the COB leadership, as well as sociologists working with the CRA.³¹⁹ Chávez situated the contemporary Indian problem within a much longer history of the development of Andean civilization, from migration from Asia, through the phases of Tiwanaku, Inca rule, the Spanish Conquest, and finally, the Republican era. The essay provides insight into the way influential MNR policymakers understood the Indian problem, its origins,

³¹⁸ Víctor Paz Estenssoro, *Mensaje a la VI Convención de Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (Buenos Aires: Publicaciones de la Embajada de Bolivia en Buenos Aires, 1953), pp. 22-23.

³¹⁹ ABNB, WGA, Reforma Agraria, Vicente Álvarez Plata, Oficial Mayor de Asuntos Campesinos to Walter Guevara Arze, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, “El problema indígena en Bolivia,” 1/15/1953. That this paper was distributed widely throughout the postrevolutionary government is evidenced by its appearance in different archives in Bolivia and the Netherlands. For evidence that the paper was also sent to prominent sociologists, I found the cover sheet for the paper addressed to José Antonio Arze in the archives of the Sociedad Boliviana de Sociología at the Archivo Histórico de La Paz (ALP/SBS). It was ultimately published in the MAC/IIB publication, *Gaceta Campesina*. See: Ñuflo Chávez Ortiz, “El Problema Indigenista en Bolivia,” *Gaceta Campesina: órgano oficial del Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos*, Año 2, No. 3 (August 1953), pp. 3-10

and its resolution. The essay also provides a vivid example of how the structural and telluric explanations of indigenous alterity merged with cultural relativism in the postrevolutionary imagination to contour ideas of race, development, and nation.

Chávez opened the piece by repudiating an influential body of sociology that had cast the Indian problem in racial terms, which he lamented, had led to “falsas conclusiones de inferioridad racial de nuestros indios.”³²⁰ He eschewed biological difference, articulating race instead in terms of ethnicity and culture. “Es evidente que resulta diferencias étnicas entre grupos humanos,” he ceded. “Pero ellas más que a una relación de inferioridad o superioridad determinada por el color o la morfología, obedecen a una relación de aptitudes por la especialización de funciones configurada por el medio en que viven.”³²¹ In this way, he continued, “la diferencia raciales son solo diferencia de aptitudes, podemos hablar de la particular importancia que tiene el facto étnico en el desarrollo de los pueblos, influye en las diferencias de culturas, determinadas por el medio y los elementos de la técnica que van descubriendo los grupos en el proceso de su desarrollo.”³²² For Chávez, the environment was the primary factor in determining indigenous culture.

True, environmental explanations of indigenous backwardness loomed large in the writings of Saavedra, Sanchez, Arguedas, and other early-twentieth-century social thinkers, who framed the “Indian problem” in telluric and neo-Lamarckian terms. Chávez’s discussion demonstrates how postrevolutionary social thought diverged from earlier official constructions of race. The primary concern of Chávez was not necessarily how the environment shaped people (and how those traits were subsequently passed

³²⁰ ABNB, WGA, Reforma Agraria, Ñuflo Chávez Ortiz, “El problema indígena en Bolivia,” p. 1.

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² Ibid.

down), but rather how it determined technological innovation—that is the level of achieved culture. Thus it was not the effect of climate and geology on human evolution that determined the backward state of Indians, but the ways in which these factors determined the development of Andean culture by way of technology. When humans first settled on the sweeping altiplano—an arid and treeless landscape lacking large mammals such as bison or cattle—agriculture was the only means to sustain themselves. As they adapted to their new sedentary societies, they developed specific technologies determined by the landscape in which they lived. Andean civilization failed to invent the wheel not out of ignorance, Chávez reasoned, but because there were no trees in the region. Indians lived in thatched-roof adobe huts because mud, gravel, and grass were the only things available to construct shelter. The development of Andean society thus had nothing to do with biology and everything to do with culture—that is nurture, as opposed to nature.

Adaptation to sedentary life on the altiplano not only determined the level of achieved culture through the technology available to Indians, but it also determined the socioeconomic organization of Andean civilization. Chávez dismissed the work of Louis Boudin and others who idealized the Andean ayllu as incipient communism characterized by a lack of private property and communal land holding.³²³ Although Andeans may have practiced communal land holding, Chávez demonstrated that notions of private property were firmly embedded in highland socioeconomic practices. Delving into a gendered exploration of Andean family, he asserted that the private property was a natural phenomenon, resulting from a sedentary patriarchal order in which fathers passed

³²³ See, for example: Boudin, *L'empire socialiste des Inka*; Rouma *La Civilisation des Incas et leur Communisme autocratique*; Castro, *Del ayllu al corporativismo socialista*; Arze, *Sociografía de inkario*. Alberto Flores Galindo critically examines this line of thinking in relations to Mariátegui in *Buscando un Inca: Identidad y utopía en los Andes* (Lima: Instituto de Apoyo Agrario, 1987), pp. 266-288.

property to their sons. It was this formative moment that shaped pre-conquest Andean civilization, he argued, stating that “es pues una cultura producto de la tierra y da la falta de técnica.”³²⁴ Understanding this formative period in the development of Andean civilization was, he asserted, absolutely critical to understand the present state of rural social in Bolivia. First the Inca, then the Spanish, and finally the Republican state maintained Indians in a state of backwardness because they were interested in nothing but extracting tribute in the form of goods and labor. Indians never had an opportunity to develop more advanced technologies or cultures because the structures of colonial and neo-colonial rule impeded their evolution.

Chávez concluded the essay by outlining a broad strategy for agrarian reform. “El problema del indio es pues sencillo de fijar en sus raíces,” wrote Chávez.³²⁵ Echoing arguments made by Arze at the SBS conference, he asserted that, “lo complejo es la superestructura creada por la dominación; en sus raíces este problema es el problema de la desposesión de la tierra y de desconocimiento de la rueda.”³²⁶ If Indians were not racially inferior, if the Indian problem was merely the result of technological backwardness rooted in ancient times and maintained by colonial and neocolonial rule, then once freed from the structures of the hacienda regime, Indians were capable of becoming a progressive force of national development. “Plateando así el problema, como problema de dominación feudal, merced a la propiedad de la tierra y el atraso de la técnica, toda reforma agraria en Bolivia, debe tocar ambos aspectos fundamentales.”³²⁷ Only by addressing the root questions of “property” and “technology, could “la

³²⁴ ABNB, WGA, Reforma Agraria, Ñuflo Chávez Ortiz, “El problema indígena en Bolivia,” p. 10.

³²⁵ Ibid.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Ibid., p. 15.

superación de la etapa feudal” be achieved.³²⁸ He advocated reverting ownership of large unproductive haciendas to the state, which would then rent it to the peasants who worked them. While the ayllu had long been dismissed as an atavistic socioeconomic institution that impeded progress, Chávez proclaimed that the land “debe revertir al dominio de estado para ser entregado a los trabajadores con propiedad común.” To return to private property “sería dar un salto atrás,” he argued. “Es preciso ver en las bases de la comunidad, las bases para una posición exploración colectiva con fondos cooperativos que justifique económicamente la inversión de capital en maquinarias para mecanizar el campo y romper al atraso técnico de los Incas que pervive hasta nuestros días.”³²⁹

For five months, from March to July 1953, the CRA worked tirelessly to devise a reform that was consistent with the objectives of national development. As the committee set to work, they were guided not only by Chávez’s policy statement on the Indian problem, but also by statements by Paz and Siles, who emphasized the need to increase domestic production and diversify the economy. “El objetivo primordial de la Reforma agraria,” explained Siles upon his appointment as president of the CRA, “es la emancipación económica y social del campesino para que liberado de las cadenas feudales se incorpore plenamente a la dinámica nacional y concurra como productor en vasta escala.”³³⁰ The goal of the agrarian reform, as imagined by the postrevolutionary leadership, was to transform subsistence-based indigenous communities into producers and consumers in a modern, integrated economy.

³²⁸ Ibid., p. 10.

³²⁹ Ibid., p. 15.

³³⁰ Hernán Siles Zuazo, “Discurso pronunciado por el excelentísimo señor vicepresidente constitucional de la república y presidente de la Comisión de Reforma Agraria Doctor Hernán Siles Zuazo, en el acto de posesión de los miembros de la comisión de la reforma agraria,” *Revista jurídica: órgano oficial de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Cochabamba*, Año XVII, Nos. 63-66 (Marzo-Diciembre de 1953), pp. 16-25, p. 21.

In designing an agrarian reform intended to transform an unproductive and feudal agricultural structure into a modern commercial economy, the CRA was divided on two primary issues. The first was property rights. The MNR leadership remained committed to private property—which it had demonstrated with its willingness to indemnify the mine owners after the nationalization against the objections of the COB and the party left. In terms of land, the guiding principle, enshrined in the 1938 constitution, was that property must serve a “función social.” The CRA agreed, stating “la grandes propiedades rurales, por los sistemas arcaicos ampliados en su explotación y las formas de servidumbre en el trabajo, no han cumplido su función social y se han convertido, más bien, en un obstáculo para el progreso del país.”³³¹ While most seemed generally to agree on what constituted a latifundio, the question was whether or not the property owners should be indemnified, and who—the state or the new owners—should pay for the properties. Ayala argued that the latifundios should be expropriated “sin indemnización” and that the land should be distributed “a los campesinos que la trabajen.”³³² Urquidí disagree, asserting that land owners should be compensated for their lost lands according to the 1950 cadastral survey. Campesinos themselves should be responsible for payment, to instill “un concepto de responsabilidad social y obligarles a que produzcan por encima de sus necesidades y concurren al mercado para abastecer a

³³¹ “Proyecto de decreto fundamental de reforma agraria elevado a consideración del poder ejecutivo por la comisión de la reforma agraria,” *Revista jurídica: órgano oficial de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Cochabamba*, Año XVII, Nos. 63-66 (Marzo-Diciembre de 1953), pp. 117-53, p. 119.

³³² Ernesto Ayala Mercado, “Monografía presentada por el responsable de la sub-comisión histórica, Doctor Ernesto Ayala Mercado,” *Revista jurídica: órgano oficial de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Cochabamba*, Año XVII, Nos. 63-66 (Marzo-Diciembre de 1953), pp. 221-294, p. 293.

los central urbanos.”³³³ Indemnification would teach indigenous Bolivians not only the value of money, but it would instill a sense of financial responsibility within them.

The second issue that divided the CRA was the indigenous community, or ayllu. The committee generally agreed that both the latifundio and the ayllu were pre-capitalist socio-economic institutions incompatible with the commercial agricultural economy imagined by the postrevolutionary leadership. Urquidi studied the historical development of Bolivia agrarian economy drawing from Marx, Engles, Lenin as much as Darwin, Boas, and Durkheim to place the particular experience of rural Indians in universal paradigms of social and economic development. Like Chávez, he argued that first the Inca, then the Spanish, and finally the republican hacienda regime had stunted the historical evolution of Andean civilization. In order “ingresar en un regimen capitalista,” he argued that was necessary to abolish “estas formas arcaicas y feudales de producción.”³³⁴ He remained pragmatic, however; recognizing the impossibility of abolishing the hard-fought legal rights of the community and the important role played by the ayllu in structuring rural social relations. He argued that “la cuestión de las comunidades indígenas tiene que ser encarada con criterio practico y realista, sujeto a los imperativos históricos del momentos.”³³⁵ Rather than abolish the ayllu, he posited that “sus miembros tienen que ser protegidos en su calidad de campesinos, de trabajadores

³³³ Arturo Urquidi Morales, “Monografía presentada por el Dr. Arturo Urquidi Morales a la Comisión de Reforma Agraria como encardado de la sub-comisión sociológica,” *Revista jurídica: órgano oficial de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Cochabamba*, Año XVII, Nos. 63-66 (Marzo-Diciembre de 1953), pp. 154-220, p. 217. Urquidi revised this paper and later published it in the *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, see: Arturo Urquidi, “La comunidad indígena boliviana (su origen, su evolución histórica y las perspectivas de su posible futuro en el proceso de la reforma agraria),” *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (May-August, 1954), pp. 235-61.

³³⁴ Urquidi Morales, “Monografía presentada por el Dr. Arturo Urquidi Morales a la Comisión de Reforma Agraria como encardado de la sub-comisión sociológica, p. 172.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

agrícolas, e incorporados al movimiento de liberación social y nacional en que se halla empañado el pueblo boliviano.”³³⁶ Just as early liberal reformers had proposed decades before, the postrevolutionary government would protect Indians in their natural environment as agricultural workers.

If such a statement resembled earlier sentiments of the liberal reformers who sought to place the Indian in their natural environment, it departed from such views in that he argued that the community could serve as a progressive unit of capitalist development. The solution was to transform rural indigenous communities into agrarian cooperatives, which would “facilitaría en mucho la concesión de créditos, la tecnificación de los cultivos y la acción educativa del Estado sobre la población campesina concentrada en dichas comunidades.”³³⁷ In so doing, the government would orientate the communities “hacia una organización de tipo capitalista, con todas las consecuencias inherentes a este sistema de producción.” He concluded, “ya es tiempo, en efecto, de que estas organizaciones abandonen de una vez su producción de mera subsistencia y se incorporen a una economía francamente mercantil o de cambio.”³³⁸ Anaya similarly argued that the ayllu must be conserved as a unit for rural socioeconomic development, and the postrevolutionary state should take advantage of “su unidad económica y moral, tanto en el trabajo colectivo como en la cooperación de brazo y voluntades que ella entraña.”³³⁹ Like Urquidí, he also argued that the state “debe tenderse a su

³³⁶ Ibid., p. 176.

³³⁷ Ibid., p. 178.

³³⁸ Ibid., p. 176.

³³⁹ Ernesto Ayala Mercado, “Monografía presentada por el responsable de la sub-comisión histórica,” pp. 292-93.

transformación efectiva [sic] bajo el sistema cooperativo, modernizándola y tecnificándola en todos los aspectos.”³⁴⁰

At the same time, however, the committee urged patience. “Naturalmente, no se puede esperar que dicha transformación se apere en forma espontánea,” Urquidi warned, “dada la ignorancia y el espíritu esencialmente conservador del indígena.” Even as officials subscribed to cultural constructions of human difference, they continued to assign indigenous Bolivians essential characteristics associated with biology. National integration would thus take time and the state would have to assume an active role in shepherding indigenous Bolivians into modern society. “Será, pues, indispensable que el Estado se preocupe de elevar las condiciones de existencia y de cultura de estos núcleos aborígenes, a fin de promover, en ellos inquietudes superiores e inculcarles una nueva concepción de la vida, de tal manera que al sentir la presión de necesidades poco habituales, se vean precisados, por sí mismos, a vencer la inercia de sus costumbres y ponerse al ritmo de la marcha social de nuestros días.”³⁴¹ The CRA shared with state officials the belief that the state could not assume a passive role in acculturating Indians as they assumed their new role in the postrevolutionary republic, compelling them to overcome their cultural “*inercia*” in order to embrace western cultural norms and modern technology. “No podemos, en una época en que el mundo utiliza el avión supersónico, la televisión, el radar, seguir trabajando las tierras dentro de un sistema que correspondía a una época anterior a la invención de la imprenta,” Paz had told the CRA as they set to work.³⁴² Agrarian reform would only succeed only if accompanied by technical

³⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 292-93.

³⁴¹ Urquidi Morales, “Monografía presentada por el Dr. Arturo Urquidi Morales a la Comisión de Reforma Agraria como encardado de la sub-comisión sociológica, p. 177.

³⁴² Víctor Paz Estenssoro, “Discurso pronunciado por el excelentísimo Señor Presidente Constitucional de la República, Doctor Víctor Paz Estenssoro, en el acto de posesión de los miembros de la comisión de la

education that emphasized technical agriculture practices, promoted market participation, and encouraged modern forms of socioeconomic organization.

President Paz signed the resultant agrarian reform decree into law on August 2, 1953, before over 100,000 campesino at Urcereña, the site of widespread grassroots peasant mobilization. Paz announced that “Hoy, se abre un periodo absolutamente nuevo en la historia de nuestro país; más que dos millones y medio de campesinos se incorporan a la vida nacional, con una nueva situación económica que les permitirá desarrollar todas las cualidades de la personalidad humana” The decree recognized communal property rights, redistributed large, unproductive estates to the colonos who worked them, and decreed indemnification in the form of twenty-five year bonds.³⁴³ Later that afternoon, Paz returned to La Paz to speak at a popular rally in support of the measure. There, he emphasized the measure as necessary for economic progress. He stated “Hemos levantado de nuestro camino la traba que impedía nuestro progreso, porque el régimen feudal que imperaba en el campo obstaculizaba el desarrollo de nuestra agricultura, limitaba las posibilidades de la industria y, era en fin, la causa del malestar general, de la miseria, del

reforma agraria,” *Revista jurídica: órgano oficial de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Cochabamba*, Año XVII, Nos. 63-66 (Marzo-Diciembre de 1953), pp. 13-16, p. 15.

³⁴³ Edmundo Flores, the Mexican economist who served as a UN technical advisor to the Agrarian Reform Committee along with Carter Goodrich, later commented on the nature of the indemnification. In a 1962 meeting of the Land Tenure Center at the University of Wisconsin, he stated: “I was in Bolivia during the formative stages of the land reform idea. I would warn whoever does research in Bolivia to ‘take with a grain of salt’ the stated objectives of the law. The law was a good piece of political rationalization, a piece that fortunately was influence at the right time by people who felt the duty of helping the Bolivians to project the ‘right issue’ in Washington. The American ambassador, who was there at the time, understood the problem very well. Carter Goodrich, the head of the United Nations mission, and I also knew what was happening. We were very anxious that the Bolivians would not be accused of radicalism, Communism and so forth... We never expected to pay the landlords for their land.” Archives of the University of Wisconsin at Madison, Collection: Land Tenure Center, Series: Research (81/59), Folder: Research Bolivia, miscellaneous contacts, Minutes of the Land Tenure Center Faculty Seminar, “Agrarian Reform in Bolivia,” 12/6/1962, p. 11.

atraso en que vivía el pueblo de Bolivia.”³⁴⁴ Not only would the agrarian reform attend to the postrevolutionary government’s commitment to social justice by granting colonos titles to the lands they worked. But, more importantly, it would free both land and labor from the unproductive haciendas, thus integrating Indians into the monetary economy. It would abolish one of the most entrenched structural obstacles standing between Bolivia and modern nationhood.

RURAL EDUCATION AND INDIGENOUS CITIZENSHIP

While the agrarian reform law reconfigured the relationship between Indians and the national economy, it was rural education that would assure their integration into the republic as the active consumers and producers imagined by the postrevolutionary leadership. Although the government had eliminated the structural barriers of indigenous citizenship, integration would be a gradual process, predicated upon the embrace of so-called “western” civilization. “No es cuestión de pocos años,” responded Félix Eguino Zaballa—who as director of the IIB directly participated in the postrevolutionary rural education initiative) to an inquiry into the social status of indigenous Bolivians after the Revolution. “Pero por medio de los Núcleos de Educación Campesino, y la Dirección General de Educación Fundamental, el indio se irá integrando gradualmente en la masa integra de la nacional espiritualmente.”³⁴⁵ The intent of rural education was to provide the newly-integrated indigenous population with the Spanish literacy, basic arithmetic,

³⁴⁴ Víctor Paz Estenssoro, “Discurso en la gran Concentración Popular realizada en el Estadio La Paz, en la tarde del 2 de agosto de 1952,” quote from Secretaría Ejecutiva de Comité Político Nacional del MNR, *El Pensamiento Revolucionario de Víctor Paz Estenssoro* (La Paz: E. Burillo & Cia., 1954), p. 65.

³⁴⁵ Félix Eguino Zaballa, “Una encuesta importante del Instituto de Cultura Hispánica,” *Gaceta Campesina: órgano oficial del Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos*, Año 3, No. 4 (Agosto 1954), pp. 150-56, p. 154.

and agrarian technical training required for economic development and social modernization. They would have to be shepherded away from subsistence-based communities towards extensive agriculture. Postrevolutionary proposals for rural education provide some of the most striking examples of how progressive conceptions of social difference contributed to new forms of ethnic exclusion.³⁴⁶ Rural curricula, moreover, illuminates the idealized image of the *campesino* within which officials aspired to remake indigenous Bolivians. Rural education served as the primary site of indigenous assimilation into the postrevolutionary republic.

In April 1952, rural education was already well underway. In the reformist atmosphere of the post-Chaco era, the government had supported grassroots education initiatives at Warista, Vacas, Caiza D, where local activists devised a grassroots pedagogy derived from existing forms of rural communities, centered on the ayllu, and respecting indigenous language and culture. During the 1940s, the Villarroel-MNR regime began to co-opt grassroots rural education initiatives, placing them under the official purviews of the Ministry of Education. By the eve of the Revolution, Bolivia had one of the most developed rural education programs in the Americas. Despite such efforts, the national illiteracy rate continued to soar at 68 percent. In the countryside where Spanish was often unknown and Aymara and Quechua remained the dominant

³⁴⁶ For more on rural education in postrevolutionary Bolivia, see: Marta Lanza Meneses, "La cultura nacional en el proyecto hegemónico del Nacionalismo Revolucionario: Análisis del modelo educativo para los indígenas," (M.A. Thesis, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, La Paz, 1991); Roberto Choque Canqui and Cristina Quisbert Quipe, *Educación Indígena en Bolivia: un siglo de ensayos educativos y resistencias patronales* (La Paz: Ibis, 2006); Roberto Choque, et al., eds. *Educación indígena: ¿Ciudadanía o colonización* (La Paz: Aruwiwiri, 1992); Brooke Larson, "Capturing Indian Hearths, Bodies, and Minds: 'El hogar campesino' and Rural School Reform in Bolivia, 1920s-1940s," *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivian in a Comparative Perspective*, Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo, eds. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 183-209; Aurolyn Luykx, *The Citizen Factory: Schooling and Cultural Production in Bolivia* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), see especially the introduction and chapters one through three.

languages, illiteracy was even higher. In La Paz, for example, only 32.7 percent of the population spoke Spanish, in Potosí, that figure decreased to 21.2 percent.³⁴⁷ Asthenio Averanga, Director General de Estadística y Censo for MAC, commented in *El Diario* in 1954 that, “The problem is to transform the 63% of the national population that is indigenous into modern economic types.” He remarked that “This is like repopulating the country.”³⁴⁸ Rural education would provide the means to repopulate Bolivia with a Spanish-speaking and modernized campesino orientated toward national economic production.

Rural education was but one component of the sweeping education reform that the postrevolutionary government introduced in 1955. In line with its broader vision of expanding the role of the state to ensure the well-being of society, the officials saw education not as a privilege reserved for a small creole minority, but as a right to be shared by all citizens. Under the oft-repeated slogan, “en vez de educación de castas, educación de masas,” the government sought to create a national curriculum that would transcend regionalism to unify the postrevolutionary republic, promote nationalism, and prepare a new generation of technical experts to assist in national development. Paz established the *Comisión de Reforma Educativa* (Education Reform Committee, CRE) in July 1953 and appointed Fernando Diez de Medina—essayist, literary critic, and occasional politician—to preside over it. Diez de Medina saw it as his responsibility to

³⁴⁷ Asthenio Averanga Mollinedo, *Aspectos generales de la población boliviana* (La Paz: Editorial Argote, 1956), pp. 86-87.

³⁴⁸ *El Diario*, April 2, 1954. Quoted in Waskar Ari, “Race and Subaltern Nationalism: AMP Activist Intellectuals in Bolivia, 1921-1964” (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 2004), 64. Averanga’s position in MAC (or perhaps the IIB) is noted in Rodolfo Cornejo A., “Consideraciones acerca de la importancia que tiene el estado sobre costo de vida rural y la implantación de salarios en el agro,” *Gaceta campesina: órgano oficial del Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos*, Año 2, No. 3 (Agosto 1953), pp. 157-161. The author of this article, Rodolfo Cornejo A., was Jefe del Departamento de Estudio Socio-Económicas of the IIB. See chapter seven for more on Cornejo and the IIB, and their role in postrevolutionary rural modernization.

prepare a traditional, backward, and fragmented society for a new era of national unity, economic development, and social modernization. The “formación integral del hombre boliviano,” he argued, necessitated the creation of a national education system “de filiación Cristiana, de forma democrática, de contenido nacionalista y revolucionaria”—one that inculcated morality, ethics, aesthetics, responsibility, civic duty, and patriotism.³⁴⁹ Diez de Medina broke the committee into several sub-commissions, assigning rural education reform to Vicente Lema from the Educación Fundamental office of MAC, Lionidas Calvimontes from the Ministry of Education, and José Antonio Arze representing teachers unions.

In devising postrevolutionary rural education reform, the CRE was advised by a host of international assistance missions that had emerged as part of the broader post-war development enterprise. The Servicio Cooperativa Interamericana de Educación (SCIDE) had been working on rural education in Bolivia since the 1940s.³⁵⁰ By the mid-1950s, the UN had partnered with other prominent international bodies, including the Organization of American States (OAS) and the International Labor Organization (ILO), to coordinate developmental assistance programs for Bolivia and other Andean republics. In 1950, it established the Andean Mission to channel social scientific expertise—often lacking in the host countries—and development capital to Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador. “Educación Fundamental” was a central component of this effort. Educación

³⁴⁹ Fernando Diez de Medina, “Formación integral del hombre boliviano,” *Minka: Revista de Estudios Pedagógicos*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2º trimestre 1956), pp. 5-9. Thanks go to Jim Seikmeier for passing on this source. The central role played by Diez de Medina in engineering a postrevolutionary national culture will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5. Beatriz Rossells traces his intellectual, spiritual, and cultural perspectives on postrevolutionary Bolivian society in “Nacionalismo Literario: La ‘mitología’ de Fernando Diez de Medina,” *Historias... de mitos de ayer y hoy*, pp. 95-117.

³⁵⁰ Brooke Larson, “Capturing Indian Bodies, Hearths, and Minds: The Gendered Politics of Rural School Reform in Bolivia, 1910-53,” in *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in a Comparative Perspective*, Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo, eds. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 183-212.

Fundamental encompassed a broad range of prescriptive reforms intended to socially uplift indigenous peoples across the Americas and mobilize them for socioeconomic development.³⁵¹ It worked to improve the lives of indigenous peoples in five key areas: “1) Defensa y mejoramiento de la salud; 2) mejoramiento de la vida económica; 3) mejoramiento del hogar; 4) Recreaciones y mejor empleo del tiempo libre, y 5) conocimientos básicos.”³⁵²

Officials adopted the objectives of Educación Fundamental as the foundation for postrevolutionary indigenous education. Even before the CRE was established, MAC officials set to work with SCIDE and ILO to study the educational needs of the newly integrated indigenous population that would prepare them for their role in economic development. The government revealed its commitment to this effort in May 1952 with the creation of the Dirección de Educación Fundamental within the MAC bureaucracy. Luis Carrasco, director of the new office, observed that with the Revolution, “el problema del indio se ha trasladado de la periferia al centro” of the national consciousness.³⁵³ “Sabían ya,” he continued “que esos seres, no solo precisaban saber leer y escribir, sino que lo más fundamental, era elevar su nivel de vida, mediante práctica de agropecuaria, higiene y convivencia social, para después recién incorporales como miembros activos de la comunidad.”³⁵⁴ Working in conjunction with the III and individual governments, the UN founded the Centro Regional de Educación Fundamental para el Desarrollo de la Comunidad en América Latina (CREFAL) in 1951. It established its headquarters in

³⁵¹ Centro Regional de Educación Fundamental para la América Latina, *Educación fundamental: ideario, principios y orientaciones metodológicas* (Pátzcuaro: UNESCO, 1952).

³⁵² Gonzalo Rubio Orbe, *Educación Fundamental* (Quito: Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana, 1954), p. 19.

³⁵³ Luis Carrasco S., “Acotaciones sobre Educación Fundamental,” *Gaceta Campesina: órgano oficial del Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos*, Año 2, No. 3 (Agosto 1953), pp. 173-175, p. 173.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 174,

Patzcuaro, Michoacán, Mexico, the site of the first Inter-American indigenous congress in 1940 and the emerging epicenter of research into the so-called Indian problem. By focusing on key areas of agricultural technology, rural industry, Spanish literacy, hygiene, sanitation, dress, home maintenance, and alimentation, Educación Fundamental was intended to transform indigenous Bolivians into a modernized and integrated peasantry orientated toward national development.³⁵⁵

Working in conjunction with a host of international specialists, the CRE set out to identify the shortcoming of indigenous education and develop a curriculum particularly suited for rural modernization. Because the goals of rural schooling remained distinct from those of urban education, the CRE decided to maintain a segregated education system. Once the reform was enacted, the MAC's Dirección General de Educación Fundamental would administer rural schools while the Ministerio de Education would oversee urban schooling. Asserting that classical pedagogy was ill-suited for the realities of rural life, rural teachers had, since at least the 1940s, emphasized agrarian technical training, hygiene and sanitation, and basic literacy and arithmetic skills necessary for social uplift and market integration. Yet the schools proved ineffective. In his report to the CRE, for instance, Vicente Lema lamented that despite efforts to reform the curriculum, rural teachers continued to teach “un conjunto insípido, inconexo, teórico y a menudo estéril de ‘conocimientos,’ informaciones o noticias que en muy poco o en nada contribuye a hacer de nuestros niños campesinos mejores niños de los que son y mejores hombres y mujeres de lo que actualmente son sus padres.”³⁵⁶ Despite the advances made

³⁵⁵ “Estatuto Interno de la Dirección General de Educación Fundamental,” *Inti Karka: órgano oficial del Movimiento Pedagógica Indigenista*, Año 2, No. 4 (Nov-Dic, 1954), pp. 71-88.

³⁵⁶ APJRA, Comisión de Reforma Educativa 1954, Tomo I: Conferencias (Hereafter cited as CRE I), Vicente Lema, “Conferencia informativa sobre la educación campesina en Bolivia,” 11/3/1953, pp. 13-14.

in rural education during previous decades, he concluded that “nuestros actuales programas de educación rural no facilitan, en suma, el proceso de liberación cultural, de civilización y de mejoramiento del nivel de vida de nuestra masa mayoritaria de la población nacional, sino que, pro el contrario, lo entrapacen y postergan.”³⁵⁷

The CRE was not so much concerned with devising a new curriculum for rural schools. With its emphasis on modern agricultural methods, basic literacy and arithmetic, hygiene and sanitation, and the domestic household, Educación Fundamental already provided the basic outline for the postrevolutionary government’s modernization fantasies and attended to the goals of indigenous integration. Rather, the CRE had to determine what reforms were necessary to make the system more effective, more efficient, more cost-effective, and to ensure that the program reached every corner of rural society. To this end, in its final report, the sub-committee on rural education recommended increasing the number of teacher training schools (*Escuelas Normales Rurales*), rational geographic distribution of schoolhouses, more effective bureaucratic organization, oversight system to ensure the effectiveness of individual teachers and specific schools, and devising a standardized curriculum for all teacher training colleges.³⁵⁸

The most contentious issue was whether or not Spanish, the official national language, should be the primary language of rural education. The grand majority of the rural population remained monolingual in Aymara and Quechua. Only 36 percent of the total population spoke Spanish. In the highland departments of La Paz and Oruro,

³⁵⁷ APJRA, CRE I, Vicente Lema, “Conferencia informativa sobre la educación campesina en Bolivia,” 11/3/1953, p. 14.

³⁵⁸ APJRA, CRE, Tomo II: Fundamentos y Resoluciones (Hereafter CRE II), Comisión de Reforma Educacional, Sexta sub-comisión: Educación Campesina, Educación Obrera y Alfabetización, “Plan de Recomendaciones y Orientaciones Generales para la Reforma de la Educación Campesina.”

Spanish was spoken by only 30 and 32 percent of the population, respectively. The figures were lower still for the departments of Cochabamba and Potosi, where only 20 percent of the population knew Spanish.³⁵⁹ Lema, for example, advocated monolingual instruction in Spanish. “Utilizar procedimiento pedagógicos lingüísticos que sin disminuir, y si mas bien, exaltar y desarrollar los valores culturales nativos,” he stated, “faciliten una evolución necesariamente rápida del hombre del campo y una asimilación racional de los valores y practicas de la cultura nacional.”³⁶⁰ Only in rare cases where “la escuela funcione en centros donde el castellano aun no tiene un uso funcional apreciable en la población” would instruction in indigenous languages take place.³⁶¹ Lema, however, was apparently overruled. In accordance with the recommendations of the III on the efficacy of bilingual education—particularly in rural primary schools—the final draft of the law advocated teaching in both Spanish and native tongues.

The resultant Education Code of 1955 provided a comprehensive reform for rural education that would prepare indigenous Bolivians for their role as modernized producers and consumers in postrevolutionary society. From Spanish literacy to the basic arithmetic required for market transactions, from hygiene, sanitation, and personal health to maintaining a modern household, rural education would slowly and meticulously teach indigenous children to become modern citizens. The primary objectives outlined by the committee revealed are worth quoting at length:

³⁵⁹ Asthenio Averanga Mollinedo, *Aspectos generales de la población boliviana* (La Paz: Editorial Argote, 1956).

³⁶⁰ APJRA, CRE II, Comisión de Reforma Educacional, Sexta sub-comisión: Educación Campesina, Educación Obrera y Alfabetización, “Plan de Recomendaciones y Orientaciones Generales para la Reforma de la Educación Campesina,” p. 6.

³⁶¹ APJRA, CRE I, Vicente Lema, “Conferencia informativa sobre la educación campesina en Bolivia,” 11/3/1953, p. 27.

1) Desarrollar en el campesinos Buenos hábitos de vida con relación a su alimento, higiene y salud, vivienda, vestuario y conducta personal y social; 2) Alfabetizarlo mediante el empleo funcional y dominio de los instrumentos básico del aprendizaje, la lectura, la escritura y la aritmética; 3) Enseñarle a ser un buen trabajador agropecuario, ejercitándolo en el empleo de sistemas renovadas de cultivos y crianza de animales, y realizando los principios de la educación fundamental; 4) Estimular y desarrollar sus aptitudes vocacionales, ensañándole los fundamentos de las industrias rurales de su región, y capacitándolo para ganarse la vida a través del trabajo manual productivo; 5) Cultivar en el campesinado el amor a las tradiciones y al folklore nacionales. Desarraigar las practicas del alcoholismo, del uso de la coca, las supersticiones y los prejuicios dominantes en el agro, mediante una educación científica; 6) Desarrollar en los campesinos una conciencia cívica que les permita participar activamente en el proceso de emancipación económica y cultural de la comunidad rural.³⁶²

It was nothing short of a utopian social engineering program meant to assimilate indigenous Bolivia and prepare them for their central role in economic development. Adults would also benefit from the expanded Educación Fundamental program, which included an aggressive national literacy campaign that intended to enable rural folk to communicate in Spanish, if only for market transactions. Rural schools would be established to provide night classes for adults to teach proper sanitation and hygiene and, of course, modern agricultural practices.³⁶³

Though not necessarily novel, the postrevolutionary rural education initiative addressed the shortcomings of the existing system. Indeed, universal suffrage and agrarian reform had made rural education reform more urgent than ever, and through expanding the teacher training programs, reforming the existing bureaucracy to be more

³⁶² Ministerio de Educación, *Proyecto de Código de la Educación Boliviana* (Sucre, 1954), p. 15.

³⁶³ For more on adult literacy campaigns in postrevolutionary Bolivia, see: Alfonso Pardo Uzeda, "Alfabetizar es una parte de la educación fundamental," *Gaceta Campesina: Órgano Oficial del Ministerio de Asunto Campesinos*, Año 2, No. 3 (Augusto 1953), pp. 176-77; Gonzalo Rubio Orbe, *Educación Fundamental* (Quito: Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana, 1954), pp. 65-82; Comité Local de Alfabetización, Escuela Nacional de Maestros, Departamento de Primaria, *Así se aprende a leer* (Sucre: Universidad de San Francisco Xavier, 1954); Ministerio de Educación, Dirección General de Educación, *Campaña Nacional de Alfabetización: Guía Didáctica* (La Paz, 1960).

efficient, and a establishing a more rational geographical organization of school, the rural schoolhouse would emerge as the primary site of indigenous assimilation and rural modernization. Education was the key to resolving the indian problem. And as one participant of the CRE noted, “El problema del indio es el problema de la república y su rendición, la rendición nacional.”³⁶⁴ Rural education would provide the postrevolutionary republic the means necessary to overcome the traditional past and to construct a new, modern nation. It also represented the primary site of indigenous acculturation and state-directed social uplift.

CONCLUSION

Returning to the questions that opened this chapter: what were the underlying motivations of indigenous integration? Was it simply a manifestation of the postrevolutionary government’s commitment to social justice and participant democracy, or were there deeper motivations underlying the process? By revising the place that indigenous Bolivians occupied in the economic policies and development imagination of the MNR leadership, how those ideas were put into practices after 1952, and the racial logic underlying them, this chapter reveals that indigenous integration was a modernization imperative. It was motivated by the need to create an integrated and diversified market economy, and ultimately to establish a sovereign, self-sufficient economy, which was, after all, the primary objective of the postrevolutionary development strategy.

³⁶⁴ APJRA, CRE II, “Educación Fundamental: Concurso convocado por el Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos,” La Paz, 1952, p. 1.

After 1952, postrevolutionary officials translated the state-capitalist model imagined by the MNR leadership into the most ambitious national development program in Bolivian history. In designing the strategy, Guevara hoped not simply to overcome traditional obstacles of democracy and geography, but to transform them into an advantage. Aligning population and geography in a rational, state-directed economic development strategy, Guevara staked the success of economic development on lowland commercial agriculture. In so doing, he simultaneously mapped the place of the integrated Indian in the postrevolutionary republic. The making of the agrarian reform and rural education laws—indeed the principal measures attending to indigenous integration—reveals that Indians would not be integration as “Indians,” but rather as a modernized peasantry—*the campesino*—whose production and consumption would drive economic growth and assure postrevolutionary modernization. The postrevolutionary government thus staked the success of postrevolutionary development upon the active participation of indigenous Bolivians.

The modernization fantasies of the postrevolutionary leadership were founded on changing currents of racial thought. In the 1920s, the structural interpretations that would come to characterize the post-Chaco generation, lifted the burden of biology from the Indian problem by locating the source of indigenous backwardness not in biology, nor in geography, but in the socioeconomic structures of the capitalist economy in general and the hacienda regime in particular. In the 1940s, structuralism merged with cultural relativism—which was arriving by way of Mexico and the United States—in the thinking of reformist intellectuals. Instead of racial type rooted in biology, Indians were understood as belonging to distinct cultural formations, each being the result of specific local-historical circumstances. These ideas provided the foundation for the idea of social

uplift that that was central to the successful implementation of the national development strategy. After the revolution, cultural relativism and national development converged in the revolutionary imagination. Cultural relativism displaced racial hierarchies founded on biology, while at the same time reaffirming indigenous inferiority by locating Andean civilization on a lower stage of human cultural evolution.

It was ultimately the relationship between the postrevolutionary government and social scientists that marked the consolidation of novel, though equally exclusive, racial paradigms founded on cultural, rather than biological or environmental, factors. Social scientific knowledge was critical to the post-War development enterprise as it emerged in a new international order. Recognized the important role that sociologists in particular could provide to the national development initiative, state officials sponsored the July 1952 SBS conference. The conference marked the beginning of the collaborative relationship between social scientists and the state, as progressive sociologists such as Arturo Urquidi and José Antonio Arze who became affiliated with the state and would play an important role devising the rural modernization policies of the postrevolutionary state. As the chapters that follow demonstrate, this relationship between social science and the state would play no small part in rearticulating postrevolutionary indigenous identity.

Chapter Three

Popular Statecraft: The Mechanics of Postrevolutionary Nation-State Formation

The first step in liquidating a people is to erase its memory. Destroy its books, its culture, its history. Then you have somebody write new books, manufacture a new culture, invent a new history. Before long the nation will begin to forget what it is and what it was.

-Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting

Si hablamos de educación y revolución cultural en el campo, no existe mejor invento que el de la radio.

-Ministry of Peasant Affairs Official, 1954

A partir de 1952, todo deberá resolverse teniendo en cuenta a los indios, que se vuelven, por vez primera y para siempre, en hombres interiores al marco del estado, hecho que implica una vasta democratización de la sociedad boliviana.

-René Zavaleta Mercado

On September 23, 1956, when the *Falange Socialista Boliviana* (Bolivian Socialist Flange, FSB) attempted, yet again, to overthrow the postrevolutionary government, they chose an unlikely target. The presidential palace, the coveted prize for most anti-government rebellions, was not their objective on this particular Saturday. The FSB instead targeted the mass media and propaganda offices of the postrevolutionary state. Armed right-wing insurgents led an angry mob first to the offices of the official newspaper, *La Nación*, where they sacked the place and destroyed the printing presses. The growing mob then made its way to the headquarters of the Subsecretaría de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura (SPIC), the government propaganda office, where they roughed up employees, destroyed the studios of Radio Illimani, looted the building, and then set fire to the whole mess. In the course of a single afternoon, the FSB destroyed the entire public relations arm of the postrevolutionary state and delivered a debilitating blow to its

governing apparatus.³⁶⁵ Hernán Siles, just recently inaugurated as President, declared a state of siege, the first of the many that would define his conflictive leadership of the postrevolutionary republic.

The FSB recognized something in the postrevolutionary government that continues to elude the historiography of the Bolivian National Revolution: that mass media and propaganda were not just integral to the MNR's governing style and political legitimacy, but they were at the very heart of postrevolutionary statecraft. Following the April insurrection, the MNR leadership inherited a weak state with a limited institutional capacity. To compensate for what it lacked in physical presence, the postrevolutionary leadership turned to propaganda. It was a strategy that the MNR had refined during in the 1940s during its years in opposition and exile and, once it took control of the state, it transformed party politics into government policy. The MNR created a host of state institutions through which it created a virtual state presence through a constant stream of news, information, symbols, slogans, and images. This is not to suggest that the quotidian negotiation of rule between the national and the local was carried out solely on the basis of propaganda. Rather, it was part of a diverse matrix of practices that the MNR leadership employed to consolidate the state and steer a heterogeneous revolution with varying and oftentimes competing goals in the particular direction of national development.

This chapter examines the government's efforts to construct a strong, centralized state between 1952 and 1957, a critical period during which the MNR solidified its

³⁶⁵ "La manifestación de ayer tarde culminó con los asaltos e incendios del diario oficial y la emisora del Estado," *El Diario*, 9/23/1956, p. 1; "El Ministro del Gobierno denunció ante el Parlamento, en la mañana, las violencias planeadas para ayer tarde," *El Diario*, 9/23/1956, p. 5; "Noticias gráficas de los destrozos del Sábado," *El Diario*, 9/24/1956, p. 6.

dominant position within the postrevolutionary state and mobilized society for the boldest national development initiative in Bolivian history. Social theorist, René Zavaleta Mercado posits that the 1952 Revolution initiated a new cycle in the historical formation of the Bolivian state.³⁶⁶ If the pre-Revolutionary state was characterized by the dominance of an oligarchic elite and restricted political participation, the Revolution marked the emergence of a “national-popular” state composed of the diverse social forces that had emerged following the Chaco War. The “Estado de 1952,” as Zavaleta christened it, was typified by the integration of new social classes—specifically, miners and campesinos—into the state apparatus and mass political participation.³⁶⁷ But the most important component of this “nuevo sistema estatal,” he emphasizes, were the “estructuras de mediación” that emerged within it—that is, those individuals who brokered politics between divergent social groups to ensure the success of the coalition government. Building on this work, this chapter examines both the structural and symbolic mechanisms that the postrevolutionary state employed to mediate state-society relations.

I employ the term “popular statecraft” to describe the way in which the MNR leadership consolidated the postrevolutionary state in the aftermath of the Revolution. Popular statecraft rested on two interrelated strategies. The first was structural. It was predicated upon ordering civil society into centralized and hierarchized corporate groups that were not part of the formal state apparatus, but affiliated with it in some degree or another, depending on historical and political circumstances. Following the April

³⁶⁶ For Zavaleta’s thinking on 1952 in the long history of Bolivian state formation, see: *50 años de historia* (La Paz: Amigos del Libro, 1998), pp. 67-90; See also René Zavaleta Mercado, *Lo nacional-popular en Bolivia* (La Paz: Plural, 2008 [1986]), pp. 9-18.

³⁶⁷ Zavaleta Mercado, *Lo nacional-popular en Bolivia*, p. 1.

insurrection, the MNR leadership incorporated the most powerful corporate groups—the MNR and the COB—into the corporatist apparatus. The state projected power downward through the bureaucratic structure of these centralized and hierarchized corporate groups. The second strategy of popular statecraft was symbolic. The MNR utilized mass media and appropriated popular culture like never before in an effort to define the Revolution and to orientate society towards the developmentalist objectives underlying it. These efforts served as the ideological glue between state and society for the first years of the revolution, of the national popular government. By 1957, with party unity fractured and the labor movement divided, an increasingly authoritarian state replaced popular statecraft with centralized bureaucratic power.

Popular statecraft functioned differently in rural and urban areas. In the cities, provincial capitals, and mining camps, where society was, by and large, already organized along corporate lines (labor organizations, political parties, mutual aid societies, veterans' organizations, and the like), was literate, and had ready access to film, radio, and print media, the party emphasized propaganda. The countryside, where seventy percent of the population resided, presented a different set of challenges to the postrevolutionary leadership. For one, it largely lacked the social organizations that prevailed in urban society. It was moreover populated by predominantly illiterate indigenous peasantry that spoke primarily Aymara and Quechua and often retained a rudimentary knowledge of Spanish, the official national language, if any at all. Finally, rural areas were marked by an especially weak state presence and most lacked basic services (running water and electricity) and essential infrastructure. The MNR leadership thus not only had to organize rural society, but to develop specific modes of communication that transcended barriers of language, culture, and geography. In this way,

they set out to incorporate rural folk into the structures of the corporate state, while reminding rural campesinos of their patriotic duty to boost agricultural production and maintain social order.

The propaganda efforts initiated by the MNR leadership during this first phase of revolutionary consolidation provided the foundation the massive state cultural bureaucracy that emerged later in the decade. The Educational Reform Committee, which convened between 1953 and 1955, agreed that the Ministry of Education was better equipped to manage national cultural production than the Office of the Presidency. The head of the commission, Fernando Diez de Medina was not a party insider, and it seems that not only did he resent Fellman, Céspedes, and other MNR leaders, but he felt that they had politicized culture. Thus, as part of the 1955 Education Reform Code, he established the *Oficialía Mayor de Cultura* (OMC) as part of a new and expanded Ministerio de Educación and Bellas Artes (MEBA). After the destruction of the SPIC offices in September 1956, the government never recovered. With the economy beset with skyrocketing inflation and party unity irreparably fractured, the postrevolutionary government had neither the resources nor the mandate to reestablish the office and in 1957, they closed it. President Siles transferred the cultural offices of the SPIC to the MEBA, where Diaz de Medina centralized state cultural production. By the 1960s, the OMC was the main cultural office of the postrevolutionary state, overseeing projects in archeology and anthropology while sponsoring state folklore and popular music festivals. And the new generation of intellectuals, artists, and social scientists that staffed its offices emerged as the architects of the myth of ethnic unity that underlie the Bolivian Revolution of 1952.

THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF POSTREVOLUTIONARY STATE FORMATION

Zavaleta established a basic theoretical foundation for the Estado de 1952, but we know little of its interaction with civil society during the initial phase of national-popular unity that marked the first years of the Revolution. Although he worked out his theory of “lo nacional-popular” in the period of Bolivian history spanning 1825 to 1935, the work was ultimately left unfinished with his untimely death in 1985. Zavaleta’s earlier works show that he understood 1952 as a new phase of socio-political organization in which national politics moved away from exclusionary liberalism and toward a coalition strategy founded upon expanded political participation and a corporatist state. It was a fundamental change in the sociopolitical structure of the nation-state, that expanded the limits of popular participation across this diverse and conflictive society—described by Zavaleta as the “abigarramiento”—and fundamentally transformed political culture. The idea of “lo nacional-popular” has resonated particularly strongly in a new wave of historiography on the revolution, providing a useful framework for studying the relationship between state and society.³⁶⁸ Yet beyond a general theoretical overview, we know little on how the Estado de 1952 was constructed and how it functioned.³⁶⁹

Prevailing interpretations of the postrevolutionary government focus on class struggle and party politics. They are rooted in the work of historian Robert Alexander and were subsequently popularized by political scientist, James Malloy.³⁷⁰ In what has

³⁶⁸ See, for example, Hylton, Forrest and Thomson, Sinclair. *Revolutionary Horizons: Past and Present in Bolivian Politics* (New York: Verso, 2007).

³⁶⁹ See for example: *René Zavaleta Mercado: ensayos, testimonios y re-visiones*, Maya Aguiluz Ibarquien y Norma de los Ríos, eds. (México, D.F.: FLACSO-México, 2006), pp. 213-234; Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, “El raíz: colonizadores y colonizados.” *Violencia encubiertas en Bolivia, Tomo I*, Xavier Albó and Raúl Barrios, eds. (La Paz: CIPCA y Aruwiyiri, 1993); Luis H. Antezana, “Dos conceptos de la obra de René Zavaleta Mercado: Formación abigarrada y democracia como autodeterminación.”

³⁷⁰ Robert J. Alexander, *The Bolivian National Revolution*; James Malloy, *Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1970).

since become the “revisionist” interpretation of 1952, Malloy argues that the state was dominated by a “pragmatic nationalist center” consisting of MNR party leaders like Victor Paz Estenssoro, Hernán Siles, and Walter Guevara Arze who had to balance the demands of the militant labor organizations grouped into the COB, with more conservative middle-class elements within the party core. In the immediate aftermath of the Revolution, the most important aspect of this new power configuration was the strong influence that labor gained via the COB. Through co-gobierno, he argues that the COB pushed the revolution beyond the “national-developmental” paradigm of the MNR core, ensuring the nationalization of the tin mines, workers control, and agrarian reform.³⁷¹ Though a useful model for understanding the political dynamics of postrevolutionary rule, this model nevertheless conflates party and government to a point that it remains unclear what the state was, how it functioned, and who (beyond those in the top leadership positions) occupied it. Leaving out the state as a unit of analysis, we only see party politics, and the conflict is seen within the party, not within broader mediating organizations such as state institutions.

In terms of understanding the mechanics of postrevolutionary state formation, the work of Christopher Mitchell proves more instructive. Like Malloy, Mitchell places the MNR at the center of the postrevolutionary state. Yet where Malloy sees the MNR party bureaucracy as the locus for inter-group conflict and resolution, Mitchell on the other hand sees the state at the site of negotiation between the MNR, as the dominant political force, and other sectors of society—from the massive, miner-dominated COB, to smaller regional and local interests. He describes the government as a “multigroup coalition,” and

³⁷¹ Malloy, *Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution*; See also: James Malloy, “Revolutionary Politics,” *Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952*, James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn, eds. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971).

he explores the way in which the MNR leadership “parceled out” power (in the form of government appointments and weapons) to powerful interest groups to maintain support for the regime. This vision of the postrevolutionary government proves more dynamic than Malloy’s MNR-centered interpretation, for it casts the state as a set of mediating institutions, wherein different groups struggled for control and domination.³⁷²

Recent research on the pre-revolutionary period has created an urgent need to reassess the processes underlying postrevolutionary state formation. If we see the revolution as a heterogeneous and messy historical affair, one made possible by various anti-elite social movements organized in shifting, loosely-aligned political alliances, then we need to reconsider how the MNR leadership integrated these movements into the state apparatus after the revolution and attempted to shape, integrate, or co-opt their political agendas to align with its own goals. A rich and developed historiography of organized labor demonstrates the extent to which the radical left shaped the revolution, but what about indigenous Bolivians? While the historiography has traditionally recognized the role of the peasantry in radicalizing the Revolution in terms of the agrarian reform, it nevertheless fails to draw connections between pre- and -post 1952 rural mobilization. Malloy states, for example, that “Indian peasants played no role in the insurrection of 1952.”³⁷³ Historian Laura Gotkowitz has recently challenged such claims, making a forceful case for a rural revolution that preceded the predominantly urban Revolution of 1952.³⁷⁴ As such, she broadens the dynamics of immediate pre-insurrectionary society and encourages a reconsideration of state-society relations in postrevolutionary Bolivia.

³⁷² Christopher Mitchell, *The Legacy of Populism: From the MNR to Military Rule* (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 5-9, 38-59.

³⁷³ Malloy, *Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution*, p. 164.

³⁷⁴ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*.

Still, her works leads us to question, how did the MNR leadership define the Revolution to these highly politicized rural actors? How were corporate entities formed were none previously existed? How did the government organize rural society into the postrevolutionary state apparatus? How did it strive to impart a unitary goal for heterogeneous groups integrated into the revolutionary coalition?

Recent scholarship has shifted away from studying the state as an identifiable object—that is, as a thing—, seeing it instead as a site of mediation between local, regional, and national actors. In this way, Philip Corrigan points out that “key questions become NOT *who* rules, but *how* rule is accomplished.”³⁷⁵ Although scholarship on postrevolutionary state formation is rich in its detail of party politics and coalition building, we still know little on the mechanics of postrevolutionary nation-state formation. Commenting on the nature of Latin American historiography, Joseph and Nugent assert that “the dynamics of the state’s day to day engagement with grassroots society have been largely ignored.”³⁷⁶ In studying postrevolutionary nation-state formation, we need to go beyond the MNR, for as we will see, many of those individuals who joined the the postrevolutionary state were affiliated neither with the party, nor the COB. In this chapter and those that follow, I hope to illuminate the dynamics of postrevolutionary state formation against the backdrop of changing state-society relations.

³⁷⁵ Philip Corrigan, “State Formation,” *Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico*, Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), pp. xvii-xix, p. xvii. Emphasis in original.

³⁷⁶ Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, “Popular Culture and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico,” *Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico*, Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), pp. 3-23, p. 3.

“EL ESTADO DE 1952” AND POPULAR STATECRAFT

The 1952 Revolution marks a new moment in the development of the Bolivian state. The MNR leadership recognized the urgency of consolidating a strong central state, one that was not only capable of carrying out the sweeping series of reforms necessary for national development, but that could also maintain its legitimacy in a new democratic era marked by widespread political participation. The old order largely deteriorated after the April 1952 insurrection, and along with it went the state apparatus established after the 1899 Federal War.³⁷⁷ The insurrectionaries overhauled the executive branch, created a series of new state ministries, and appointed leaders from the MNR and the COB to lead them.³⁷⁸ Universal adult suffrage undermined the democratic machinery of the liberal rule, while the nationalization of the tin mines and agrarian reform diminished the economic base of oligarchic power. The new government also eviscerated the military, which had long served as the repressive apparatus of liberal-oligarchic state, and distributed arms to peasant and worker militias to serve, at least for the time being, as the revolutionary armed forces. Finally, the postrevolutionary government discarded the 1880 constitution, which had provided the mandate for liberal-oligarchic rule, and reinstated the 1938 constitution as the legal foundation for a new corporatist state.

While the liberal state generally ascribed to a classical liberal doctrine of individual rights, minimal intervention in society, and free-market economic policies, the MNR leadership greatly expanded the role of the state in society. It placed the postrevolutionary government directly in charge of the management of the national

³⁷⁷ Zavaleta, *50 años de historia*.

³⁷⁸ Luis Antezana, *Historia Secreta del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Tomo 8: 1952-1956* (La Paz: Juventud, 1992), pp. 2128-2132.

economy as well as the long-term financial planning of the state, as evident in the creation of COMIBOL, the expanded role of the CBF, and the marked growth of YPFB. The MNR leadership also entrusted the postrevolutionary government with ensuring the well-being of society. During the first years of the revolution, the COB pushed through a series of laws that increased labor rights, raised minimum wage requirements, established society security, and secured health care for workers. With the 1955 education reform, the government expanded the public education system, especially in the countryside.³⁷⁹

The most salient feature of the postrevolutionary government was the dynamic relationship that emerged between state and society. The MNR came to power on the back of general mobilization of civil society that, in the case of rural mobilization dated to the nineteenth century, and in the case of labor activism dates to the immediate post-Chaco period. If the MNR leadership was going to successfully consolidate a postrevolutionary state, it had to incorporate diverse, and often competing sociopolitical agendas of local and national actors into the government, while sustaining its political legitimacy in a new democratic climate marked by mass political participation and wrought by turbulent structural change. Moreover, it had to mobilize society for revolutionary change. In traditional democratic systems, local demands are channeled into the national government through political representation, usually in the form of locally-elected delegates to a national congress. Although the Bolivian government has a bicameral legislature, after the Revolution, congress did not convene until after the first parliamentary elections in 1956. And even then, it convened only sporadically during the

³⁷⁹ For an official summary of the social reforms introduced during the first years of the Revolution, see: Bolivia. Subsecretaría de Prensa, Información y Cultura, *Filosofía de la Revolución Nacional* (La Paz, 1954).

entire twelve year period of civilian rule. Law was dictated not by consensus, but by supreme decrees emanating from the presidential palace.

In lieu of more traditional forms of democratic representation, the link between state and society—between the national and the local—was thus predicated upon corporate groups and the patronage networks that connected them to the state. The two largest, most powerful corporate groups that mediated state-society relations during the twelve year period of MNR leadership were the MNR party apparatus and the COB. Both were centralized and hierarchical structures organized according to a hierarchical structure that spread across the national territory. Both were represented in the central government. And though there was much overlap between the two institutions, and though they were struggling to achieve relatively similar objectives (at least during the initial years of the Revolution), they competed for influence not only within the state, but within society as well.

At the apex of the MNR organization was the *Comité Político Nacional* (National Political Committee, CPN), the primary decision-making apparatus of the party which directed political action, defined the party's position, maintained discipline, and appointed party members to positions in the national government. The nine members of the CPN were nominated by the party leadership and elected by the party base at the biannual national party conventions. Below the CPN, the rank and file of the party was organized into two separate coexisting hierarchal structures. The first was founded on the political geography of the national territory. Underneath the CPN existed *Comandos Departamentales* which represented each of Bolivia's nine departments. Below each *Comando Departamental* were the *Comandos Provinciales*, which were further subdivided into *Comandos Zonales*, which varied according to local population and geography, but

consisted of individual cells organized around specific geographic location. Small provincial capitals may have had only one MNR *comando*, usually run by the local MNR party boss, where larger cities such as La Paz, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba had organized according to neighborhood and street cells. In the countryside, where the MNR was actively recruiting peasants, cells were founded upon communities, cooperatives, unions, or haciendas, and were under the direct authority of the *Comando Provincial*. Leaders of the different commandos were voted in by the rank and file.³⁸⁰

The party also organized thirteen *Comandos Especiales*, which in terms of the vertical structure of the organization, were equal to the *Comandos Departamentales*. The precise nature of these Commando Especiales remains unclear. According to James Dunkerley, there were the “thugs” of the MNR, the *grupos de choque*.³⁸¹ It seems that the *Comandos Especiales* served as the paramilitary apparatus of the party. They were located in frontier regions such as Riberalta and Villazon, but more importantly, in the mining camps—Llallagua, Huanani, and Uyuni. Each Comando Especial was further partitioned into Sub commandos, depending on the particular make-up of the area. The Comando of Llallagua, for example, was subdivided into a three different Subcomandos—Catavi, Siglo XX, and Chayanta—each corresponding to the different mining camps in the area. In addition to boosting the coercive capacity of the postrevolutionary state in these areas, they may have also served a political function by

³⁸⁰ IISH, MNR, Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario. Secretaria Ejecutiva del Comité Político Nacional, *Estatuto orgánico* (La Paz, 1954), pp. 40-55.

³⁸¹ James Dunkerley, *Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-1985* (London: Verso, 1984), p. 92.

strengthening the power of the party (and the state) in key locations of policial, socioeconomic, or geopolitical importance.³⁸²

The MNR also consisted of a parallel party hierarchy organized according to profession called the functional bureaucracy. According to this structure, not only were party members were organized into different cells depending on where they lived, but they were also divided into cells according to their profession. MNR militant José Quiroga Castro explains the dual organization of the party. “Cada miembro del Partido tiene el deber de estar inscrito en su respectivo Comando Zonal, de acuerdo con el lugar de su habitación o vivienda,” he wrote, “pero al mismo tiempo está en la obligación de actuar en una organization funcional, de acuerdo a su lugar de trabajo (celula administrativa o fábrica).”³⁸³ Miners, merchants, peasants, artisans, industrial workers, professional employees, state employees—they were each organized into cells at the local level, which made up a broader national cell. Cement workers in Viacha, for example, were organized into a functional cell that consisted of other industrial workers and tied to the Comando Provincial of the Province of Ingavi. In this way, the party bureaucracy mirrored and often overlapped with organized labor, giving the MNR an advantage of the COB. Just as the COB conspired to take control of the revolutionary state through the *entreguista* strategy, the MNR attempted to outmaneuver the labor movement through the dual structure of the party hierarchy.³⁸⁴

³⁸² IISH, MNR, Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario. Secretaria Ejecutiva del Comité Político Nacional, *Estatuto orgánico* (La Paz, 1954), pp. 40-55.

³⁸³ José Quiroga Castro, “Las Células Funcionales de Trabajadores y los Comandos Zonales,” *Cultura política: órgano oficial de Comando Departamental del MNR*, 4/9/1954, pp. 34-39, p. 36.

³⁸⁴ For a discussion of COB and its strategy vis-à-vis the postrevolutionary state, see: Rene Antonio Mayorga and Stephen M. Gorman, “National-Popular State, State Capitalism and Military Dictatorship in Bolivia: 1952-1975,” *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring, 1978), pp. 89-119.

The second most powerful corporate groups within the postrevolutionary state was the CON. Existed alongside and often overlapping with the MNR party organization, the powerful national labor confederation played a major role in incorporating the voice of the radical left into the revolutionary state. This new national labor confederation—the first of its kind—sought to ensure the depth of revolutionary change and to provide an institutional counterweight to balance the more conservative element on the MNR right.³⁸⁵ Although the COB was not directly part of the MNR, it remained closely affiliated with the party leadership. Incorporating social existing social movements, particularly those orientated around labor, into the hierarchical and centralized structure would provide linkages between the postrevolutionary state and grassroots labor organizations. The COB integrated existing unions from all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country into its rank and file—industrial workers, railroad workers, urban blue-collar professionals, teachers, and peasants. But it was the tin miners, and their labor confederation, the FSTMB, that remained the most powerful element within the organization.

Like the MNR, the COB was organized according to a centralized, hierarchical bureaucratic structure led by an elected governing body, the executive committee. Led by Juan Lechín from its foundation in 1952 until 1987, the executive committee integrated leaders from different sectors of labor—miners, industrial workers, artisans, etc. To be sure, different labor unions enjoyed more degrees of representation and power than others, and the COB was historically dominated by the powerful mining central, the FSTMB. Moreover, the COB was more diverse and flexible in terms of political philosophy than the MNR.

³⁸⁵ Malloy, *Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution*, pp. 184-187.

POSTREVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA

In addition to institutionalizing postrevolutionary society according to a corporate structure, the popular statecraft model also depended on propaganda. In propaganda, I refer to the myriad ways in which the government communicated a specifically crafted message to broad sectors of society—from print media to radio, from theater to film. The postrevolutionary state utilized mass media, publicity, and popular culture as never before to project an aura of state power, national unity, and social benevolence. In the period spanning the foundation of the MNR in 1941 and the April 1952 Revolution, the MNR leadership developed a sophisticated approach to propaganda that it incorporated as a critical component of postrevolutionary statecraft. The party's participation in the Villarroel government and their experience in exile during the creole revolutionary struggle not only played a large role in shaping the populist style of the MNR, but they also determined the strategies underlying postrevolutionary nation building.³⁸⁶ After 1952 the MNR utilized propaganda to project a more able and omnipresent state—an effort that would ultimately provide the institutional framework both to create and manage a specific national culture for postrevolutionary Bolivia.

The MNR's experience as an oppositional party in the 1940s shaped its governing style once the party leadership assumed control of the state following the April Revolution. The founders of the MNR recognized that if they were going to succeed in transforming the economic and political foundations of Bolivian society, they would need to shape public opinion as well. The party leadership proved especially adept at using available means of mass communication to garner support and manage public opinion.

³⁸⁶ For a detailed discussion of the MNR's use of propaganda before the Revolution, see Jerry W. Knudson, *Bolivia: Press and Revolution, 1932-1964* (Latham, MD: University Press of America, 1986). For the MNR's use of radio in particular, see: Cristóbal Coronel Quisbert, *En un estado de coma: Radio Illimani 1950-1964* (La Paz: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, 2003).

After all, half the party founders were professional journalists—the rest were politicians. Historian Jerry Knudson, author of an encyclopedic history of the revolutionary press, even argues that the MNR “started out being propagandists and ended up in the political arena themselves.” Augusto Céspedes, José Cuadros Quiroga, and Carlos Montenegro all worked at *La Calle*, an opposition newspaper founded by Céspedes and Armando Arze in 1936.³⁸⁷ For a short time after the Chaco War, Hernán Siles also worked on the editorial staff of a different newspaper in La Paz. These journalists were joined by parliamentarians Victor Paz Estenssoro and Walter Gueverra Arze, who won support in their home districts of Ayapoya and Tarija, respectively, through their populist politics and impassioned rhetoric.

Between the overthrow of the Villarroel-MNR coalition in 1946 and the 1952 Revolution, propaganda served as the primary means through which the party broadened its popular support inside Bolivia. With much of the MNR leadership exiled during the late 1940s, their ability to organize and communicate with their base was severely curtailed.³⁸⁸ Scattered across the southern cone, the MNR leadership initiated a propaganda campaign to ensure the party’s very survival. Although the MNR leadership directed the propaganda effort from exile, the actual day-to-day management of the effort fell to lower ranking party militants remaining in country. In 1946, the MNR leadership nominated the youth militant, Raul Murillo y Aliaga to oversee the propaganda effort in Bolivia.³⁸⁹ Working with Murillo was another young party militant named José Fellman

³⁸⁷ Jerry Knudson, “La Calle: Un precursor de la Revolución Nacional Boliviana,” *Historia Boliviana*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1982), pp. 109-119.

³⁸⁸ For a detailed account of the repression of the MNR and the exile of its leaders during the period 1946-1949, see Luis Antezana Ergueta, *Historia Secreta del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Tomo V: El sexenio I (1946-1949)*.

³⁸⁹ Knudson, *Bolivia: Press and Revolution*, p. 139.

Velarde.³⁹⁰ Paz, Siles, Lechín, and other party leaders would write messages to the Bolivian people, which Murillo, Fellman, or other junior party militants would distribute in urban centers. Paz, for example, issued several pronouncements from exile in Buenos Aires including “Revolución y contrarrevolución en Bolivia” (1947) “Proceso y sentencia contra la oligarquía” (1948) and “La Última Carta de la Oligarquía” (1949). Most of these were edited by Céspedes, printed in Buenos Aires or Montevideo, and then smuggled across the Argentina-Bolivia border, where they were distributed among the party rank and file.³⁹¹ The party also used *pasquines*, large broadsides that were posted in public spaces, to make party announcements.³⁹²

In designing the slogans, songs, and broadsides of their propaganda campaigns, the MNR selectively drew from existing expressions of Bolivian popular culture. Party leaders realized that in order for their efforts to be successful—for them to have an impact in the general population—they would have to be projected onto existing cultural forms. MNR propagandists drew upon vernacular forms of popular music in composing party odes. Many party songs adapted nationalist lyrics to popular Chaco War marches. One march, written for the occasion of the fourth party convention in January 1948 went: “Nada arredre la noble pujanza/de esta marcha triunfal de la Fé./Movimiento, canción de esperanza, bajo un signo de luz: VILLARROEL.”³⁹³ Another vernacular musical style to which MNR propagandists adapted their lyrics was the *cueca*, a popular creole folk form in three-four meter. The MNR anthem, “Siempre” by Gaston Velasco was a *cueca* for

³⁹⁰ “Nuestra portada: Jose Fellman Velarde,” *Pututu*, Año 2, No. 21 (6/5/1954), p.16

³⁹¹ Knudson, *Bolivia: Press and Revolution*, p. 138.

³⁹² That the MNR resurrected this practice should not be surprising, especially given the fact that a study of Independence broadsides was the subject of the first chapter of Montenegro’s *Nacionalismo y coloniaje*.

³⁹³ IISH, MNR #221, “MNR, Cuarta Convención: Marcha-Canción del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario,” Febrero 1951.

example. Another *cueca* was “Valientes Nacionalitas,” a song composed for the 1951 elections that lamented the shared suffering of nationalist militants and guaranteed a victorious struggle.³⁹⁴

After 1952, the MNR leadership assigned propaganda a central role in postrevolutionary statecraft. Within days of assuming power, they established the Ministerio de Prensa, Propaganda e Información (MPPI). There was immediate need for such an office. The new regime had to provide an anxious public with constant stream of information of its intentions, goals, and accomplishments. But government officials soon discovered that having a separate ministry to control propaganda created too much bureaucracy between decision making and the execution of tasks. It seems that Paz and other officials were unable to direct the actions of the ministry on anything beyond a superficial level. Hugo Roberts Barragán, the individual initially chosen to lead the ministry, proved to be especially problematic. Sympathetic to the right, Roberts had publicly broken with Paz on several key issues, most notably the nationalization of the tin mines.³⁹⁵ Before long, Radio Illimani employees accused Roberts of mismanagement. In a petition to President Paz, they lamented that the ministry leadership purposely excluded state propaganda from its programming schedule.³⁹⁶ Paz promptly requested Roberts’ resignation, abolished the MPPI, and placed its functions under the auspices to the Presidencia de la Republica (PR) until a more permanent solution could be identified.

³⁹⁴ IISH, MNR, “MNR, Comando Zona Churubamba, 5º año de la dominación antibolivianista,” n.d. (c. May 1951), p. 2.

³⁹⁵ Luis Antezana E., *Historia secreta del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario*, Tomo 8 (1952-1956) (La Paz: Juventud, 1992), pp. 2217-2218.

³⁹⁶ ABNB, PR, 1952, Correspondencia, Oficios Varios, Tomo 6 (0758/366), Los suscritos, técnicos, artistas, operadores y locutores de Radio “Illimani” to President Victor Paz Estenssoro, 8/1/1952, p. 3.

The following month, Paz created the Subsecretaría de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura (SPIC) within the PR, thus granting himself, and the party, centralized control over postrevolutionary propaganda.³⁹⁷ The SPIC consisted of four departments (Culture, Arts, Publications, and Outreach), Radio Illimani, and a modest publishing arm that printed official government statements. With this central propaganda office the postrevolutionary government sought to create ideological cohesion among party and government officials, manage the flow of information from state to society, and mold public opinion. Between its foundation in 1952 and its demise in 1957, the SPIC expanded significantly, growing from a presidential office intended to manage public opinion to a multifaceted institution overseeing the cultural politics of nation building.

To direct the new government propaganda apparatus, Paz appointed José Fellman Velarde. Fellman played a key role in party during the insurgent nationalist struggle, managing the MNR's propaganda efforts in Bolivia and from exile. He had also worked closely with Paz in Buenos Aires, where both witnessed the populist political style of Perón. During the first months of the Revolution, he served as Paz's personal secretary. As the brain behind the SPIC's unprecedented propaganda campaign, Fellman soon emerged as the chief party ideologue. His revolutionary consciousness was deeply steeped in the revolutionary nationalist struggle. He studied the previous failures of the MNR, seeking to identify more successful means at not only reaching society at large, but controlling public opinion. The failure of the MNR-Villarroel regime to retain popular support during the period had a significant impact on this thinking.³⁹⁸ He attributed the

³⁹⁷ For the creation of the SPIC, see D.S. 3250 (11/25/1952) and D.S. 3274 (12/12/1952), pages 133 and 168, respectively in *Anales de Legislación Boliviana*, Vol. 15.

³⁹⁸ José Fellman Velarde, "La organización de la lucha clandestina," in *José Fellman Velarde: Trabajos teóricos* (La Paz: Juventud, 1955), pp. 25-29.




Illustration 9: José Fellman Velarde, Director of the SPIC.³⁹⁹

success of the opposition to its increased control over press and radio. With limited access to mass media, the MNR-Villaruel government never succeeded in creating a

³⁹⁹ Photo from *La Nación*, 4/9/1954.

“definitive revolutionary consciousness” among the people.⁴⁰⁰ “Existen bolivianos,” he wrote, “pero no existe el boliviano.” This lack of national unity had undermined the MNR’s revolutionary project in 1946, and Fellman saw it as his historic duty to ensure that it did not happen again.⁴⁰¹ By taking advantage of mass media and limiting the public sphere, he set out to instill “lo boliviano” in the population. At stake was the Revolution itself.

The continued production and widespread diffusion of pro-Revolution, pro-MNR propaganda was the original objective of the SPIC. Fellman sought to ensure that information was indiscriminately conveyed to each and every Bolivian regardless of race, class, or ethnicity. For too long, he lamented, propaganda had catered exclusively to the needs of the creole oligarchy. By using propaganda to project a unifying national culture, Fellman sought to instill a strong sense of nationalism in all Bolivian. The SPIC, he asserted, “tiene como meta fundamental, dar a conocer las realizaciones de la Revolución y dotar si es posible a cada boliviano, de una formación teórica adecuada a fin de que comprenda el contenido del proceso revolucionario que vive el país y lo respalde conscientemente.”⁴⁰² The postrevolutionary leadership subsequently deployed the SPIC to forge a national culture that would ensure both national unity and the longevity of the Revolution

Its experience first in the post-Chaco press, then in the Villarroel government, and finally as an opposition party in exile had demonstrated to the MNR leadership that centralization, planning, and consistency were the keys to waging a successful

⁴⁰⁰ José Fellman Velarde, “La organización de la lucha clandestina,” in *José Fellman Velarde: Trabajos teóricos* (La Paz: Juventud, 1955), pp. 25-29.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁴⁰² Mariano Baptista Gumucio, “La SPIC tiende a la formación teórica de cada boliviano,” *Pututu*, Año 2, No. 21 (6/5/1954), p. 15.

propaganda campaign. It had to be national in scope, but popular in nature. The most effective propaganda efforts, one internal MNR document noted, are those that “les da un contenido de extracción popular, es decir, que provienen del propio pueblo.”⁴⁰³ This was especially true for songs, slogans, and graffiti. Posters and handbills displaying graphic images in radiant colors were deemed most effective for reaching Bolivia’s illiterate majority—that is, those indigenous peasants and miners, “masas cuya cultura es deficiente.”⁴⁰⁴ The content of propaganda depended on the audience, just as the institutional structure linking local to state interested varied throughout the country depending on existing forms of social and political organization. Such distinctions become especially salient when comparing contrasting the rural and urban manifestations of popular statecraft.

POPULAR STATECRAFT IN URBAN SPACES

In urban spaces such as cities, provincial capitals, and mining camps, the postrevolutionary government emphasized the symbolic component of popular statecraft. Almost thirty percent of the population lived in urban areas. Population density was greater, markets were integrated, literacy rates were higher, and the state maintained a constant presence. The urban realm was, moreover, already organized into hierarchal and centralized groups that were easily incorporated into the corporatist structure of the postrevolutionary state. Propaganda was thus the key component of urban popular statecraft. If the corporate structure of the government served as the physical channels between state and society, propaganda defined the Revolution, providing its underlying

⁴⁰³ Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Instituto de Capacitación Política, *Lecciones de Propaganda, organización y agitación* (La Paz: SPIC, 1953), p. 17.

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

meaning to the general public. It was also intended to promote national unity through the establishment of an inclusive national culture. Fellman and others believed that establishing a strong, pervasive sense of nationalism was essential to ensuring the success of the Revolution. Between 1952 and 1957, as the MNR leadership consolidated its dominant position within the state and set the Revolution on a course for national development, it expanded state propaganda in general and the SPIC in particular. By the middle of 1953, the government had set out to monopolize mass media, establishing major outlets in newsprint, radio, and film.

Mediating the national news was one of the first objectives of the MNR government. The MNR leadership recognized the important role that filtering national and international media in the shaping of social consciousness. Since the government shut down *La Calle* in 1946, the party worked to create another media outlet. The most successful of such efforts was the weekly party newspapers, *En Marcha*, which was first published in March 1951. In October 1952, the government replaced *En Marcha* with *La Nación*. Under the leadership of Saturnino Rodrigo and later, Augusto Céspedes, the *paceño* daily became a popular source of daily news and entertainment. The SPIC also oversaw the publication of a wide variety of informative pamphlets, magazines, and books intended to inform the general public of the transformations that the Revolution was introducing in Bolivian society. One such publication, *Boletín de la SPIC* was published twice daily and seems to have been intended for government and party officials for the purpose of establishing a clear and consistent party line. It included the texts of new laws, key speeches of government leaders, and other news for party officials. Another publication, *Pututu*, was intended for public consumption. Under the banner of “Vision de Bolivia para el mundo, vision del mundo para Bolivia,” the biweekly

publication provided a carefully constructed interpretation of national and international events for its readers.

In addition to print media, popular statecraft also took to the airwaves. By the 1940s, radio had become the most widespread form of both entertainment and mass communication in Bolivia.⁴⁰⁵ The government established Radio Illimani in 1935 as the official state radio station and private stations were also established in La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, Santa Cruz, and other urban and mining centers. Indicating the importance that the MNR leadership accorded mass media, the occupation of Radio Illimani had been one of the primary targets of the April insurrection.⁴⁰⁶ After the Revolution, the government charged the SPIC with the management of the station in an effort to maintain an influential voice over national airwaves. Radio was important not only because of the large audience it could reach, but especially because it was the only form of mass communication that could reach the large illiterate majority. During 1953 and 1954, Fellman worked with Carlos Montano Daza, the director of Radio Illimani, to modernize the station, improve its programming, and boost its ratings. To extend the range of the station, the SPIC established radio chains so that those residing in rural communities, mining camps, and more remote parts of the country could tune-in to official programming.⁴⁰⁷ One major problem the governments faced in this effort was a lack of radios. In his study of Radio Illimani, Cristobal Coronel Quisbert found that the government distributed transistors to schools, unions, and party *comandos* to ensure that

⁴⁰⁵ Cristóbal Coronel Quisbert, *En un estado de coma: Radio Illimani 1950-1964* (La Paz: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, 2003).

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-49.

⁴⁰⁷ ABNB, PR, 1953, Corr, Oficios Varios, Tomo 7 (795/383), Prefecto de Cobija to José Fellman Velarde, 9/30/1953

the public could tune in. The SPIC also set up loud speakers in public places such as plazas, rural villages, and at the weekly *ferias francas*.⁴⁰⁸

Regular programming consisted of entertainment, sports, news, and pro-government, pro-Revolution propaganda. In fact all stations were required to reserve a portion of their commercial programming for official state programming. Aside from entertainment, radio's vast potential for civic education and moral uplift was not lost on government officials. Patriotic messages, official information, and public service announcements constituted integral parts of Radio Illimani's daily programming schedule. For example, on August 2, 1952, a date that President Busch declared the "Día del Indio" back in 1937, Radio Illimani dedicated its entire programming schedule to pro-Indian propaganda.⁴⁰⁹ The Revolution, it broadcast, "marca para nuestro hermano indio su incorporación definitiva a la vida nacional que le corresponde con el mayor de los derechos."⁴¹⁰ Underlying this broadcast was a message of national unity, one that linked Indians, mestizos, and creole in a common nationalist struggle. "Radio Illimani, 'La Voz de Bolivia', se adhiere al júbilo de nuestros hermanos indios y en el día que el gobierno de la Revolución Nacional, le brinda su homenaje sincero, saluda con emoción patriótica a esta raza que simboliza la fortaleza inexpugnable del vigor que caracterizan al gobierno de la Revolución Nacional."⁴¹¹

Cinema represented another key component of postrevolutionary propaganda, and the MNR sought to harness this popular form of entertainment as an important tool in

⁴⁰⁸ Coronel Quisbert, *En un estado de coma*, pp. 57-58.

⁴⁰⁹ Freddy Grover Choque, "El 2 de agosto, Día de la Revolución Agraria en Bolivia," *La Prensa*, 8/2/2011.

⁴¹⁰ ABNB, PR, 1952, Corr, OV-6 (758/366), Ministerio de Propaganda e Informaciones, Departamento de Radiodifusión, "Palabras de presentación de la transmisión de los actos del 2 de agosto," 8/2/1952.

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*

fomenting a national culture. By mid-century, a nascent national cinema industry had emerged in Bolivia—though it paled in comparison to contemporary Mexico or the United States.⁴¹² It was during the 1940s, that Jorge Ruiz, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, and others who would take a leading role in post-revolutionary film, launched their careers in writing, directing, and producing. Recognizing the popularity of cinema and the important role that film could play in mass society, the MNR leadership established the *Departamento Cinematográfico Nacional* within the MIIP in April 1952. Yet when the government folded the MIIP in November 1952 to have more control over the direction and management of propaganda, the DCN went along with it. In March 1952, Paz replaced it with the *Instituto Cinematográfico Bolivia* (Bolivian Cinematographic Institute, ICB) and appointed his brother-in-law, Waldo Cerruto, as Director.⁴¹³ Over the course of the subsequent decade, the ICB emerged at the center of the national film industry and would produce such notable directors as Jorge Ruíz and Javier Sanginés.

Cinema could both entertain and educate, and under the direction of Cerruto, the postrevolutionary state sought to tap the pedagogical potential of film to foment a revolutionary consciousness and to shore up support for the regime. In his study of postrevolutionary film, historian Carlos Mesa demonstrates that the IBC was motivated as much by politics as by culture.⁴¹⁴ Rather than long-playing films intended for pure entertainment, Cerruto orientated the ICB's resources to the production of *noticieros*, informative ten-minute shorts that showcased the latest achievements of the Revolution

⁴¹² For an overview of the Bolivian film industry, see: Carlos Mesa Gisbert, *La aventura del cine boliviano 1952-85* (La Paz, Amigos del Libro, 1986).

⁴¹³ Decreto Supremo, No. 3342, 3/20/1953, *Anales de Legislación Boliviana*, Vol. 16, pp. 88-89. For the creation of the ICB, see Carlos Mesa, *La aventura del cine boliviano, 1952-1985* (La Paz: Editorial Gusbart, 1985), pp. 47-53.

⁴¹⁴ Mesa Gisbert, *La aventura del cine boliviano*, p. 47.

and aimed to both build and maintain support for the government. Cerruto himself directed several films during his tenure as director of the ICB between 1952 and 1956, including “Bolivia se libera” and “Estaño, tragedia y gloria,”—both of which showcased the reforms of the revolution, explored pressing social problems, and detailed how the revolutionary government was confronting them.⁴¹⁵ “Por las rutas del progreso,” another noticiero produced by Cerruto, emphasized the developmental goals of the revolution and the socioeconomic improvement that it would soon bring all Bolivians. During this time, the government also sponsored an “indigenista cinema” with such ethnographic films as “Vuelve Sebastiana,” “Amanecer Indio,” and “Juanita sabe leer.” The most influential figure in postrevolutionary indigenista film was Jorge Ruiz, who succeeded Cerruto as director of the ICB.⁴¹⁶ By the end of 1954, the ICB had produced 86 *noticieros* and 21 documentaries.⁴¹⁷

Although the ICB and the SPIC were separate entities within the Presidency, the two offices often cooperated to ensure the widespread diffusion of government film productions. In 1954, there were a total of 146 movie theaters across the country—50 in departmental capitals, 75 in the provinces, and 21 in mining centers.⁴¹⁸ Movie theaters were required to integrate ICB productions into their regular programming schedules, and the SPIC was there to ensure that they followed the letter of the law. As part of the MNR’s continuing effort to centralize propaganda, in May of 1954, the government charged the SPIC with “la supervisión y control de películas para todo el país, en lo que a

⁴¹⁵ Ibid, pp. 255-284.

⁴¹⁶ José Antonio Valdivia, *Testigo de la realidad: Jorge Ruíz, Memorias del cine documental boliviano* (La Paz: CID, 1998).

⁴¹⁷ Mesa Gisbert, *La aventura del cine boliviano*.

⁴¹⁸ Iris Villegas and Pablo Quisbert, “A la búsqueda del enemigo oligárquico: Arte y cultura durante el periodo revolucionario, 1952-53” in *Visiones de fin de siglo: Bolivia y América Latina en el Siglo XX*, Dora Cajías, Magdalena Cajías, eds. (La Paz: Plural, 2001), pp 721-29

su calidad cultural y artística se refiere.”⁴¹⁹ Another law required all film distributors to submit lists of the foreign movies they sought to import for SPIC approval. Of those submitted, the SPIC would select appropriate movies and authorize their importation. Fellman justified the action with a need “proporcionar al pueblo una diversión sana, de alto nivel cultural y de categoría.”⁴²⁰

The government’s tightening control of national cinema was indicative of a broader trend of restricting freedom of expression in order to maintain a state monopoly on the content of mass media. Fearful that opposition press and radio would undermine government support, the SPIC adopted drastic measures to control the flow of information. The MNR closed two major newspapers, *La Razón* and *Los Tiempos*, after the revolution. Owned by tin magnet, Carlos Víctor Aramayo, *La Razón* had long been the most popular newspaper in Bolivia, and its coverage reflected the interests of the oligarchic elite. The MNR silenced the paper almost immediately after the revolution. *Los Tiempos*, a Cochabamba daily that served as the mouthpiece of the landed oligarchy, remained open until November 1953, when it closed after pro-government mobs destroyed its offices. Less notable newspapers suffered similar fates. In May 1955, for example, MNR militants destroyed the office of *La Patria*, an independent daily published in Oruro.⁴²¹ The Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) responded to the government censorship with opprobrium, denouncing the newspapers closures and

⁴¹⁹ Decreto Supremo, No. 3744, 5/27/1954, *Anales de Legislación Boliviana*, Vol. 21, pp. 120-21.

⁴²⁰ “Función Social del Cinematógrafo,” *Pututu*, Año 2, No. 22 (6/12/1954), p. 22.

⁴²¹ ABNB, PR, 1955, Corr, Oficios Varios, Tomo 7 (863/412), PR to SPIC, 5/9/1955.

declaring that Bolivia's lacked freedom of press. The government dismissed such accusations, justifying the closure as a necessary evil to establish national unity.⁴²²

The SPIC's efforts to manage information also raised the concern of the Asociación Interamericana de Radiodifusión (Inter-American Radio Broadcasting Association, AIR). In terms of maintaining political legitimacy and the image of a functioning state on the local level, radio was absolutely crucial and, in 1954, the government began closing radio stations controlled by the opposition. The MNR boss of Oruro reported that recently-closed *Radio Mercurio* had been broadcasting antigovernment propaganda, "en abierta y descarada oposición al régimen popular del MNR."⁴²³ Though party militants had already sacked the station and put it out of commission, the official suggested that expropriating it instead would be "en beneficio de la cultura del pueblo."⁴²⁴ In a similar case, a Sucre union boss justified the closure of *Radio La Plata* on grounds that it had not only refused to play required government programming, but had been broadcasting anti-MNR and pro-FSB propaganda.⁴²⁵ The government received heavy pressure to allow the stations to continue broadcasting not only from AIR, but from the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters in the United States.⁴²⁶ Yet it appears that despite these, and other efforts, the stations

⁴²² "La 'libertad de prensa'; artículo de trapacería reaccionaria," *Pututu*, Año 1, No. 10 (10/27/1953), p. 16; "Código de ética periodística" and "Contra el falso periodismo" both from *Pututu*, Año 1, No. 11 (11/7/1953), p. 15; See also Knudson, *Bolivia: Press and Revolution*, pp. 192-93.

⁴²³ ABNB, PR, 1954, Corr, Oficios Varios, Tomo 8 (827/396), Zenón Barrientos Mamani to Víctor Paz Estenssoro, "Ref: Expropiación Radio Mercurio," 3/4/1954.

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁵ ABNB, PR, 1954, Corr, Oficios Varios, Tomo 9 (832/398), Mariano Baptista Gumucio to Jose Antonio Arze Murillo, 4/21/1954.

⁴²⁶ ABNB, PR, 1954, Corr, Oficios Varios, Tomo 9 (832/398), Presidencia de la Republica to Subsecretario de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura, 6/11/1954; ABNB, PR, 1954, Corr, Oficios Varios, Tomo 9 (832/398), Presidencia de la Republica to Subsecretario de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura, 6/28/1954.

remained closed. Allowing these stations to continue broadcasting seemed a potent threat to the government—especially where its institutional presence was generally lacking.

Officials defended the closures by citing new laws that affected both the management and content of radio, theater, and live musical performances. In February 1954, the government passed the first, and indeed, most sweeping of such laws, declaring that “La protección e intensificación del arte nacional, vigorizada con la Victoria Nacional de Abril, constituye uno de los postulados fundamentales del Gobierno de la Revolución Nacional.” The decree declared that all radio stations must contract enough artists so that at least 25 percent of radio broadcasts were live. Of those artists contracted, no less than sixty percent had to be Bolivian nationals. The law further stipulated that any business authorized to host public entertainment must contract sixty percent of national actors in any live performance.⁴²⁷ The following month, the government issued another law that established a pay scale for “artists,” who the state defined as “aquellas personas cuyo media de vida principal es el arte.” To qualify, painters, musicians, actors and the like had to register with the SPIC and the Oficina de Coordinación Sindical of the Ministerio de Trabajo y Provisión Social.⁴²⁸ Indeed, not only were these laws intended to provide artists steady work, but they were also designed to foment a national culture model founded on vernacular forms, rather than the imitation of foreign culture. By 1956, restaurants, hotel, coffee shops, and bars had to obtain prior authorization from the SPIC in order to host foreign artists. If they failed to gain prior approval, they faced legal sanctions.⁴²⁹

⁴²⁷ Decreto Supremo No. 3653, 2/25/1954, *Anales de Legislación Boliviana*, Vol. 20, pp. 97-98.

⁴²⁸ Decreto Supremo No. 3678, 3/25/1954, *Anales de Legislación Boliviana*, Vol. 20, pp. 136-38.

⁴²⁹ “Comunicado de la Subsecretaria de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura,” *La Nación*, 9/1/1956

While such regulations were intended to control the content of mass media and popular entertainment, they also had the effect of ensuring employment for national musicians, artists, and actors. Recent research by ethnomusicologist, Fernando Rios shows that the postrevolutionary government sought to popularize particular forms of vernacular music styles that emphasized the mixed cultural heritage of the Bolivian nation.⁴³⁰ In nightclubs, in the studios of Radio Illimani, in state-sponsored cultural events, the government eschewed the more popular genre of brass-band marches for what officials identified as “mestizo” music. In their view, mestizo panpipe ensembles from urban, working-class origins—groups such as Los Choclos and Los Cebollitas—were most emblematic of postrevolutionary national culture.

Through these diverse efforts at monopolizing mass media and managing the content of popular entertainment, the MNR sought not only to inform society, but to build its legitimacy. Part of this effort was the creation of a “cult of personality” surrounding MNR leaders. Victor Paz Estenssoro, Hernán Siles, and Juan Lechín were cast as larger than life figures whose very beings embodied the revolutionary nationalist struggle. Exaggerated accounts of their heroism, sacrifice, and nationalism filled the pages of SPIC publications, giving the impression that these creole politicians of middle-class origin were “un gobierno del pueblo y para el pueblo.”⁴³¹ To be sure, MNR leaders remained acutely aware of the perception of their actions and maintained that all state officials must uphold high standards of moral conduct. In May 1952, President Paz sent a circular to all ministries insisting that postrevolutionary officials needed to distinguish themselves from

⁴³⁰ Fernando Rios, “Bolero Trios, Mestizo Panpipe Ensembles, and Bolivia’s 1952 Revolution: Urban La Paz Musicians and the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement,” *Ethnomusicology*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 2010), pp. 281-317.

⁴³¹ “Un gobierno del pueblo y para el pueblo,” *La Nación*, 6/30/1953, p. 2.

the oligarchic governments of the past through their personal conduct. Ministers of State—as well as high party officials—were to serve as a model for postrevolutionary society. “Contrastando con la inmoralidad reinante durante los desgobiernos de la Rosca,” the document reads, “los hombres de la Revolución debieran demostrar un intachable comportamiento.”⁴³² He further stressed that “La ética personal de los hombres de la Revolución debe constituirse en ejemplo, como fue ejemplo su coraje, su desprendimiento y su patriotismo.”⁴³³

The little scholarship that exists on postrevolutionary propaganda faults the MNR for having a vague, or even incoherent cultural program and argues that the party placed politics over aesthetics.⁴³⁴ It seems that these were pragmatic decisions made by the party leadership. Above all it seems recognition of their precarious position as leading a Revolution, replete with diverse goals, needs, and objectives. It had to integrate Indians into postrevolutionary society, carry out land reform, and attend the rights and ever-increasing demands of miners and urban workers—all the while carrying out the most ambitious national development strategy in Bolivian history. Thus in terms of national culture, the party had to delineate a model vague enough to accommodate these groups, while not as vague as to exclude them. But when are cultural revolutions not vague? The Mexican example—indeed the guiding light for the Bolivians as well as the point of reference for contemporary studies on cultural nationalism in twentieth century Latin

⁴³² ABNB, PR, 1952, Corr, Ministerio de Propaganda (765/369), Presidencia de la Republica to Ministro de Estado en el Despacho de Prensa y Propaganda, 5/29/1952.

⁴³³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁴³⁴ See for example, Beatriz Rossells, “Después de ‘Siempre’: Sobre las políticas culturales del MNR de 1952,” *Historias...*, No. 6 (2003), pp. 171-193 and Iris Villegas and Pablo Quisbert, “A la búsqueda del enemigo oligárquico: Arte y cultura durante el periodo revolucionario, 1952-53” in *Visiones de fin de siglo: Bolivia y América Latina en el Siglo XX*, Dora Cajías, Magdalena Cajías, eds. (La Paz: Plural, 2001), pp 721-29.

America—was not that cohesive and directed.⁴³⁵ To be sure, the Mexican state was stronger and more potent than the Bolivian state, and as such, it had more resources to finance efforts of artists and musicians. But ultimately it is artists that make a cultural revolution. The state, operating through a series of bureaucratic institutions, channels those efforts towards the end goal of a national cultural form. It is the individual vision of revolutionary modernization of indigenous peoples, of the past, or the present, of what constitutes a “revolutionary esthetic” that the state selectively appropriates and propagates. Its ability to foment such inspiration is limited. The real power of a state in fomenting a national cultural is limited to its institutional capacity.

POPULAR STATECRAFT IN RURAL SPACES

Extending state power into rural society presented a novel challenge to the postrevolutionary leadership. In 1952, the countryside was home to over 70 percent of the population, the vast majority being impoverished, illiterate indigenous peasants tied to Bolivia’s seigniorial economy. Commonly called *colonos* or *pongos* (depending on the region), they lived on the haciendas, where they exchanged their labor for usufruct rights to their lands. The haciendas existed alongside the remaining free indigenous communities, peasant small-holders, as well as small- and medium-sized estates owned predominantly by rural mestizos. The corporate groups so prevalent in urban society were largely absent the countryside, save landowner associations, indigenous communities, and a handful of rural sindicatos. The MNR leadership adapted popular

⁴³⁵ See, for example: Mauricio Tenorio Trillo, *Mexico at the World’s Fairs: Crafting a Modern Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Rick A. López, *Crafting Mexico: Intellectuals, Artisans, and the State after the Revolution* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis, *The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).

statecraft accordingly. The most urgent priority was to organize rural society into corporate groups affiliated within the postrevolutionary government. Not only would such a measure give them a modicum of control over rural affairs, officials believed, but it would simultaneously incorporate indigenous Bolivians into national society. Once organized, Fellman and the SPIC developed propaganda specifically tailored to a rural audience and devised new and imaginative ways to reach Aymara- and Quechua-speaking peasants.

Before the Revolution, state authority in the countryside rested on appointed local officials—prefectos, subprefectos, and corregidores—as well as alcaldes and other elected municipal authorities. These official government posts existed alongside informal structures of power, which varied widely from region to region depending on such factors as climate, population density, land tenure practices, modes of production, and transportation infrastructure. In regions such as Cochabamba, which had a long tradition of landed estates dating to the colonial era, and the Lake Titicaca region, which experienced the highest rate of republican hacienda expansion, social order depended on rural landowners and hacienda administrators (the notorious cholo majordomo), as well as collaborating ethnic authorities who played the key role of mediator between indigenous workers and the estate administration. Coercion and spectacular acts of violence were not uncommon occurrences on haciendas, and served as the primary mechanisms of social control on the semi-closed estates. In numbers there is strength, and most hacendados built on existing commercial or personal ties to establish strategic relationships with the mestizo and cholo vecinos of neighboring pueblos. Landlords themselves also banded together in provincial, departmental, and national *Sociedades Rurales*, through which they could exert control over the small-holding peasantry and

free communities and, if necessary, meet rural unrest with concerted action. If rural revolt surpassed the coercive capacity of the haciendas, vecinos, and *Sociadades Rurales*, history showed that they could count on the armed forces to help quell upstart Indians.

With the Revolution, this matrix of formal and informal power fragmented across the countryside and a new social order emerged. It is nevertheless important to note that the decline of the old order was by no means uniform, and that what emerged depended a great deal on local and historical circumstances. On the altiplano, for instance, Silvia Rivera found that relationships between landowners and vecinos were deteriorating already before 1952, and with the Revolution, they fractured completely.⁴³⁶ Many rural mestizo officials—subprefects, alcaldes, etc—ended-up joining the MNR, and those who did not, were ousted and replaced with a regime loyalist.⁴³⁷ The estates were left to fend for themselves. In short, the Revolution generated a power vacuum across the countryside. As officials scrambled to reconstitute state authority, the most severe challenge they faced came from grassroots rural mobilization that was challenging not necessarily the formal structures of power as manifest in local government offices, but the informal system of social control represented by the haciendas and, more commonly, their overseers. True, rural government officials could become the target of peasant violence when they were perceived illegitimate. But most often the focus of rural violence was the hacienda administration.

⁴³⁶ Rivera, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*, p. 125.

⁴³⁷ Rivera describes how the Revolution transformed the role of the provincial mestizo across the highlands: “La rápida construcción de estas redes fue facilitada con el reacomodo de los mestizos del pueblo, que abandonaron sus antiguas alianzas oligárquicas y se aprestaron a cumplir una nueva misión civilizadora en el estado del 52 como maestros, autoridades estatales, jefes políticos locales y portadores de la Buena nueva del ‘desarrollo rural.’” From, “La raíz: colonizadores y colonizados,” p. 86.

The immediate response to the Revolution varied widely. Most historical research on rural society in postrevolutionary Bolivia focus on regions such as Cochabamba and Achacachi, where there existed a history of labor organization dating to the previous decades. In these regions, peasants organized themselves into autonomous unions on the local level. A less developed component of the historiography examines the Lake Titicaca basin—the highland region just west of La Paz that experienced the highest rate of republican hacienda expansion and the most coordinated grassroots organization among Aymara communities. While in Cochabamba the action was quick and centrally organized according to peasant unions, across the altiplano, violence was slower to arrive, more localized, and seemingly less coordinated. Only once the agrarian reform was declared law on August 2, 1953, did many local communities rise up to oust landlords and overseers. Others preferred to use legal channels, which perhaps indicated the significant faith that communities continued to place in the law.

The government's approach to organizing the countryside was shaped, to no small extent, by events that transpired in the Cochabamba countryside. As Jorge Dandler and more recently José Gordillo demonstrate, Cochabamba—with its entrenched landed class and history of popular organization—became a hotbed for grassroots peasant syndicates. Immediately after the revolution, colonos working on various estates around Ucureña organized themselves into unions, and under the leadership of POR firebrand, José Rojas established an autonomous peasant syndicate. They unleashed a reign of terror on rural estates in the months immediately following the Revolution, seizing lands, slaughtering livestock, and, in some cases, murdering landlords and overseers—an intense historical episode that historian Herbert Klein likens to the “Great Fear” of the French

Revolution.⁴³⁸ As the government set out to organize rural society in centralized, hierarchical organizations, its efforts to organize and impose a union structure butted up against local, grassroots forms of organization. While the events that transpired in Ucureña proved exceptional, they underscore the challenges state authorities faced as national and local powers clashed. This effort not only underscored the urgency of organization before things got completely out of the control of the government, but also a need to contain the peasant sindicatos by tying them to a broader national union structure.

The postrevolutionary government scrambled to organize the countryside to preempt the creation of further autonomous labor groups that threatened state authority. The objective was first and foremost, to organize local peasant unions and then, to create a national structure to integrate them into the state. In 1952, MAC officials sent teams of labor organizers into the countryside to establish peasant sindicatos. To lead the effort, Ñuflo Chávez chose Severo Oblitas, a labor activist who had cut his teeth in the mining camps in the 1940s. The teams traveled first to the regions where large estates prevailed, to the Department of La Paz, then on to Oruro, Potosí, Sucre, and Tarija.⁴³⁹ As they began their labor, Paz signed a supreme decree declaring “immediate detention” for those extra-legal and unofficial efforts to organize and agitate in the countryside. Only authorized state official were permitted to organize the countryside. They offered local authorities special incentives to form sindicatos. The most popular incentive was “cupos,” discount coupons for basic necessity good at a fraction of their market cost.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁸ Herbert Klein, *Bolivia: Evolution of a Multiethnic Society*, p. 234.

⁴³⁹ University of Wisconsin, Land Tenure Center (here after cites as UW/LTC), *Estudio de la Estructura Agraria en Bolivia*, “Origen, desarrollo y situación actual del sindicalismo campesinos en Bolivia, Primera parte: Bosquejo histórico del movimiento sindical campesino en Bolivia,” by Luis Antezana, La Paz, Augusto de 1968, p. 91

⁴⁴⁰ Antezana discussed cupos on pp. 31-32 of *Bosquejo histórico del movimiento sindical campesino en Bolivia*”; see also Rivera, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos*, p. 124.

They also distributed arms and ammunition to pro-MNR rural militias, and bartered local appointments as *corrigedores* and *sub-prefectos* to local caciques. By distributing goods and access to power as incentives to establish unions, personal patronage formed the bedrock of the client networks linking local authorities and national officials.

In July 1953, as government efforts to establish unions continued apace with the final deliberations of the Agrarian Reform Committee, MAC convened the first national peasant conference in La Paz. The meeting brought together the *dirigentes* of the new agricultural unions in order to found national umbrella organization that linked rural sindicatos to the state. The by-laws of the resultant Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CNTCB) laid out the centralized and vertical nature of the novel association.⁴⁴¹ Local sindicatos, which corresponded with haciendas, ex-haciendas, or free communities, were to organize into *subcentrales* according to cantons, the lowest politico-administrative unit of state (similar to a county in the United States). The *subcentrales* were organized into *centrales* representing each rural province, which were further organized into *Centrales Departamentales* corresponding with each of Bolivia's nine departments. At the apex of the CNTCB structure sat the Dirección de la Confederación de Campesinos, which was initially led by Ñuflo Chávez and included among its leadership prominent members from both the COB and the MNR.⁴⁴² Not only were the unions intended to extend state authority into the countryside, but they would also provide the institutional framework for the agrarian reform. The law privileged the structure of the rural sindicato over local forms of sociopolitical organization, stating "Se reconoce la organización sindical campesina, como un medio de defensa de los derechos

⁴⁴¹ IISH, Bolivia, MNR, Trabajadores Campesinos, 1953-1959 (f. 767-768), "Estatutos de la Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia," 4/3/1957.

⁴⁴² Antezana, "Bosquejo histórico del movimiento sindical campesino en Bolivia," p. 100.

de sus miembros y de la conservación de las conquistas sociales.” It stated, moreover, that “los sindicatos campesinos intervendrán en la ejecución de la Reforma Agraria.”⁴⁴³

While the *sindicato* may have been an organic form of social organization in the Cochabamba valley and isolated parts of the Lake Titicaca region, it was alien to many free Altiplano communities attempting to reconstitute their *ayllus*. Although the agrarian reform decree recognized the legal rights of communal landholding, postrevolutionary officials generally saw the *ayllu* as a traditional socioeconomic institution incompatible with the modern agricultural society that they sought to implement in the countryside.⁴⁴⁴ In May of 1954, the government amended the law with a decree reaffirmed communal land rights—an act that alarmed many. In a letter to Paz dating to June 1954, Arturo Urquidi warned that the reestablishment of *ayllus* would be detrimental to the developmentalist objectives of the Revolution. “Esos resabios de colectivismo primitivo, que se manifiestan en ciertas costumbres indígenas,” he warned, “deben ser vistos con cautela y aprovechados solamente en cuanto pueden servir para ayudar al progreso de la agricultura nacional, pero nunca como antecedentes destinados a consagra y perpetuar una de las formas más atrasada de la propiedad agraria, como la comunidad indígena.”⁴⁴⁵ It was necessary to ensure “el desarrollo progresivo de la agricultura, y no incurrir en una ‘indiófila’ exagerada e insensata.”⁴⁴⁶ Traditional forms of socioeconomic organization on the altiplano were inconsistent with the modernized rural society imagined by the postrevolutionary leadership.

⁴⁴³ Wálter del Castillo Avendaño, ed. *Compilación Legal de la Reforma Agraria en Bolivia* (La Paz, 1955), p. 82.

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁴⁴⁵ ABNB, WGA, Reforma Agraria, Arturo Urquidi to Victor Paz Estenssoro, 6/10/1954, p. 2.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

The government set out to modernize ayllus by transforming them in agricultural cooperatives orientated towards commercial agricultural production and incorporated into the state through MAC's Dirección General de Comunidades y Cooperativas. In this way, officials sought to orientate communities away from traditional modes of subsistence farming and towards extensive agriculture production coordinated by state planners. Only in this way would they incorporate the communities into both the monetary economy and the domestic market and ultimately succeed in modernizing the highland agriculture. Government offered comunarios several incentives to establish Cooperatives. To accelerate rural integration into the monetary economy in general, the government ordered all municipalities to establish "ferias francas"—weekly farmers markets—where peasants could sell their wares.⁴⁴⁷ Not only were Cooperatives exonerated from the small fee required to participate in the weekly markets, but they were also offered freed from departmental and municipal tax burdens.⁴⁴⁸ Despite such incentives, many communities apparently remained disinterested in establishing cooperatives.

With most highland communities reluctant to establish cooperatives, the government adopted alternative strategies intended to incorporate communities into the corporate structure of the postrevolutionary state. Beginning in 1956, it began to subdivide highland provinces into an increasing number of cantons. Cantons are the smallest political-administrative units in Bolivia, resembling counties in the United States. Government authority in the canton rested in the *corregidor* or *intendente*

⁴⁴⁷ Decreto Supremo No. 03501, 9/18/1953, *Compilación Legal de la Reforma Agraria en Bolivia*, pp. 137-138.

⁴⁴⁸ Decreto Supremo No. 03737, 5/20/1954, *Compilación Legal de la Reforma Agraria en Bolivia*, pp. 163-64.

(depending on the region), individuals who were appointed by the sub-prefect. In areas where sindicatos prevailed, local union bosses typically occupied the post of corregidores, intendentes, or even sub-prefects, thus serving to integrate the rest of the union into the state apparatus. In free communities, however, power typically rested with traditional ayllu authorities such as the Mallku, Jilakata and/or the Alcalde del Campo. Between 1956 and 1964, the government created 79 new cantons. A review of the laws indicated that they affected most prominently highland districts such as La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí, where the majority of traditional communities existed. This measure reduced the size of cantons while increasing the number of state authorities in a region. Within the new canton, the government appointed traditional ethnic authorities to occupy the office of the corregedor or intendente. By creating smaller political jurisdictions, the government tied rural communities more intimately into the national governing apparatus, giving officials a modicum of control over rural politics and agricultural production.⁴⁴⁹

Although rural organization was undoubtedly motivated by broader preoccupations with establishing state authority and promoting economic development, the MNR leadership also sought to recruit increasing numbers of peasants into the party. MNR organizers set out to organize *células del campo* on each property, community, cooperative or sindicato and tie them to the Comando Provincial of the party. This effort was motivated, first and foremost, by the changes in political culture effectuated by the 1952 universal suffrage law. It created an entirely new base of rural voters who the MNR would need to win over in order to ensure continued electoral success and political longevity. It was also intended to ensure peasant support of the MNR above the COB or,

⁴⁴⁹ McEwan, *Changing Rural Society*, pp. 379-380.

even worse, the FSB. According to the MNR's official bylaws, the primary duties of these groups was to "divulger la línea política doctrina y programas del partido, estimular la organización del campesinado en las filas del MNR, y realizar activo labor proselitista, procurando el ingreso de nuevos campesinos."⁴⁵⁰ But more importantly, they were to wrest control of the peasants from the COB and ensure their loyalty to the MNR, by "obtener control de las organizaciones sindicales campesinos, procurando que los dirigentes de esas sean los mismos que los del Comando."⁴⁵¹

In addition to organizing rural society into the corporatist hierarchy of the postrevolutionary state, government officials developed propaganda specifically targeted for indigenous Bolivians. Indeed, propaganda was an integral component of popular statecraft in the countryside. Laura Gotkowitz's recent work on rural legal culture had important implications on postrevolutionary state formation. From the local apoderado networks of the late nineteenth century to the cacique apoderado movement of the twentieth, rural activists studied republican laws and saw the state as guarantor of their legal rights. Such a heavy reliance on the law suggests that the countryside was not as stateless as scholarship commonly asserts. While the state may not have existed on an institutional level, it existed as a virtual entity—as an arena for contestation at the very least, and as brutally repressive leviathan at the most. If peasants were so reliant upon the law, then the state implicitly retained a presence in the countryside—perhaps it was an imagined presence, manifest in a multiplicity of ways according to specific historical circumstance—but it was a presence nonetheless. Postrevolutionary rural propaganda operated on this imaginary plane. Unlike urban areas, where the denser and largely-

⁴⁵⁰ IISH, MNR, *Estatuto Orgánico*, p. 55.

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid.*

literate population could be reached through various modes of mass communication, the rural population was illiterate and dispersed over a varied geography that was often to reach even with radio. The content of rural propaganda, moreover, had to be distinct. It had to fashion an image of state benevolence, and more importantly, promote production, efficiency, and development.

Recognizing the particular challenges posed by rural society, Fellman developed distinct methods of mass communication to reach the rural population and a message specifically tailored for indigenous Bolivians. In a 1953 pamphlet intended for MNR militants called “Lecciones de propaganda, organización, y agitación” he pointed out that “el medio de propaganda que tendremos que emplear frecuentemente con nuestras masas indígnales debe ser estudiado cuidadosamente.”⁴⁵² He instructed his readers to observe cultural distinctions, and that care must be taken to differentiate between Altiplano, valley, and lowlands ethnic groups. The SPIC made efforts to create Aymara- and Quechua-language propaganda—especially for radio broadcasts—and when making posters, Fellman instructed party militants to ensure that they were, *sobre todo con colores que impresionaren a nuestro indígena.*⁴⁵³ As for content, he recommended themes like “la representación de lo que va a ser la reforma agraria y el papel que tendrá el campesino en ella, la intensificación de la producción, la evitación de sabotaje y del levantamiento por medios agitadores, el combate de las ramas.”⁴⁵⁴ At base, the government sought to inform campesinos of the latest developments in the Revolution that directly affected the countryside.

⁴⁵² Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Instituto de Capacitación Política, *Lecciones de Propaganda, organización y agitación* (La Paz: SPIC, 1953), p. 22.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.

Propaganda could bolster state legitimacy on the local level by providing rural communities with the latest laws and decrees affecting them. One of the primary roles of the SPIC, for example was “que el campesino introducido a la vida social del país, está en condiciones de conocer y saber que leyes lo defienden y lo protegen, al mismo tiempo que saber cómo defenderse de los demagogos y oportunistas.”⁴⁵⁵ Archival records indicate that colonos and comunarios constantly requested information from the central government, seeking the latest laws, decrees, or news from the urban centers. One group of rural dirigentes representing communities in Potosí, Chuquisaca, and Cochabamba, for instance, wrote President Paz in August 1952 requesting state propaganda. They claimed that local officials “se ignoran... los últimos decretos supremos” and that propaganda would “hacer conocer a los nucleos indígenas de las conquistas que ha venido logrando para ellos el actual gobierno de la Nación.”⁴⁵⁶ Another case involving the Cochabamba community of Yayani underscores how rural folk could benefit from state propaganda. In August 1952, three peasants from Yayani wrote President Paz from the San Sebastián jail, where they had been detained since participating in the widespread peasant insurgency of 1947. The party newspaper, *En Marcha* had informed them of the July 1952 general amnesty law which pardoned all participants in the campesino and worker uprising of the late 1940s. Pointing out that Yayani was one of the uprising specifically mentioned in the decree, they requested that Paz intercede to ensure their release.⁴⁵⁷

The SPIC’s rural propaganda efforts were also intended to remind campesinos of the important role they were accorded in the postrevolutionary national development

⁴⁵⁵ “El arte y la cultura llegan hasta el espíritu del pueblo,” *Pututu*, Año 2, No. 34 (12/1954), p. 30.

⁴⁵⁶ ABNB, PR, 1952, Corr, OV-7 (759/366), Delegados Generales del campesinado de Potosí, Chuquisaca y Cochabamba to President Víctor Paz Estenssoro, 8/8/1952, p. 1.

⁴⁵⁷ ABNB, PR, 1952, Corr, Oficios Varios, Tomo 7 (0759/366), Esteban Cruz, Juan Heredia, and Luis Llanos to Víctor Paz Estenssoro, 8/19/1952.

initiative. Aside from the broadsides and posters already mentioned, the government also used comic books to reach out to campesinos. Published in 1957, *Educación, producción y trabajo: las mejores armas para defender tu revolución y tu tierra* is exemplary of the type of propaganda the MNR was distributing to rural communities. It seems to have been intended for male heads of households.⁴⁵⁸ The story follows a peasant who, thanks to the agrarian reform, obtained title to his land where he can now raise a family, educate his children, and even build a modern house. “Cuando la casa este construida, las tierras trabajadas y rindiendo sus frutos, los hijos sanos y educándose en las escuelas,” it reads, “tendrás la seguridad de una vida mejor para ti y tu familia.” Only then, it concluded, would campesinos feel “el orgullo de ser un ciudadano útil a la patria y al MNR.”

The extent to which this publication was distributed is unknown, and its reception is questionable given the high illiteracy rates in the countryside. But what is certain from the content is informed by subtle undertones of a *quid pro quo* relationship: now that MNR has carried through with the agrarian reform, campesinos had to live up to their end of the agreement and augment production and contribute to national economic development. Indeed, this is a message that government officials stressed again and again. Upon signing the agrarian reform law, Paz proclaimed, “El gobierno de la Revolución Nacional ha cumplido con vosotros ahora, sois vosotros los que también debéis cumplir con la Revolución Nacional, produciendo más y mejor.”⁴⁵⁹ Despite the universal suffrage law, postrevolutionary indigenous citizenship was not necessarily a given fact. It was instead dependent not only on the embrace of “modern” cultural values

⁴⁵⁸ Bolivia, Dirección Nacional de Informaciones de la Presidencia de la Republica, *Educación, producción y trabajo: las mejores armas para defender tu revolución y tu tierra* (La Paz, s.d.).

⁴⁵⁹ Secretaría Ejecutiva de Comité Político Nacional del MNR, *El Pensamiento Revolucionario de Víctor Paz Estenssoro* (La Paz: E. Burillo & Cia., 1954), p. 64.

(Spanish literacy, hygiene and sanitation, etc), but also on participation in the national economy as producers and consumers. Echoing Walter Guevara Arze's commentary on the "peso muerto" of indigenous Bolivians (quoted in chapter two), in order to be simultaneously Indian and Bolivian, one had to be a productive and useful member of postrevolutionary society.

Radio proved the most effect means to reach rural society. One of the original objectives of the Radio Illimani charter was "contactarse con la raza indígena, ya sea en aymara o quechua en su propio idioma, organizando conferencia y enseñanzas apropiadas que serán amenizadas con variados programas musicales."⁴⁶⁰ The importance of radio was not lost on the MNR. Fellman had pushed to create the radio chains in order to ensure broadcasts reached larger portions of the rural society. In a policy paper addressed to Vice President Siles, MAC technocrat Carlos Dujovne commented "prácticamente el gran grueso del campesinado se halla desconectado de los centros urbanos, es decir, de la civilización."⁴⁶¹ As such "los discursos del Presidente de la República o de los Ministros de Asuntos Campesinos y de Agricultura, como los excelentes programas de la Subsecretaría de Información y Prensa, no llegan al campesinado."⁴⁶² Revealing the low opinion that many government officials held of the countryside, he noted, "Tampoco llegan los programas musicales, que tanto ayudarían a dispersar 'la idiotez aldeana', trayendo alegría."⁴⁶³ The official suggested distributing radios to the countryside, commenting, "Si hablamos de educación y revolución cultural en el campo, no existe mejor invento que el de la radio." This "'radioficación' del país,"

⁴⁶⁰ Quoted in Coronel Quisbert, *En un estado de coma*, p. 31.

⁴⁶¹ IISH, Bolivia, MNR, Reforma Agraria 1956, f. 771, Carlos Dujovne to Hernán Siles Zuazo, "Ref: Formación de técnicos medios del y para el ambiente indígena-campesino," 7/29/1954.

⁴⁶² Ibid.

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

he asserted, would “transmitir los discursos oficiales y de los dirigentes del MNR, sirve, sobre todo, para organizar diariamente una buena audición campesina, a base de consejos técnicos-agrícolas, para evitar confusiones en el proceso de la aplicación de reforma agraria, para darles lecciones de higiene, de sanidad, acerca de cómo debe atenderse un parto y alimentar a los lactantes, buena música y todo ello, que es lo más importante, dárselo en sus propios idiomas.”⁴⁶⁴ Not only did radio provided a critical means of mass communication between urban centers of government and rural centers of production, but it also provided the state with an invaluable tool to promote social uplift and civilization.

The government also brought film and theater to rural communities. While movie theaters were prominent in major cities by the 1950s, they were rare in the countryside. As of 1954, there were a total of 75 theaters in all of the provincial cities in the entire country.⁴⁶⁵ In order to extend the reach of film (and the message it contained) to more isolated areas, Pablo Quisbert and Iris Villegas found that the ICB established six mobile teams that traveled to rural communities “para educar a los campesinos en el arte de labrar la tierra.”⁴⁶⁶ After the “ferias francas” were established in 1953, the SPIC began to use the popular weekly markets to serve state propaganda to the rural masses.⁴⁶⁷ ICB documents demonstrate that these mobile teams also traveled to mining centers and that the leadership hoped not only to translate movies into Aymara and Quechua, but to produce them in indigenous languages as well.⁴⁶⁸ Campesinos were perhaps the intended

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid..

⁴⁶⁵ Iris Villegas and Pablo Quisbert, “A la búsqueda del enemigo oligárquico: Arte y cultura durante el periodo revolucionario, 1952-53” in *Visiones de fin de siglo: Bolivia y América Latina en el Siglo XX*, Dora Cajías, Magdalena Cajías, eds. (La Paz: Plural, 2001), pp 721-29

⁴⁶⁶ La Nación quoted in Villegas y Quisbet, , “A la búsqueda del enemigo oligárquico,” p. 725.

⁴⁶⁷ Mariano Baptista Gumucio, “La SPIC tiende a la formación teórica de cada boliviano,” *Pututu*, Vol. 2, No. 21 (6/5/1954), p. 15.

⁴⁶⁸ ABNB, PR, 1954, Corr, Oficios Varios, Tomo 6, (829/396), Enrique Albarracín Crespo to Víctor Paz Estenssoro, 4/1/1954, p. 2

audience for ICB productions like “Amanecer indio” (1953), “Juanito sabe leer” (1954), and “Un poquito de diversificación económica” (1955) and other shorts that emphasized rural progress and economic development.⁴⁶⁹ The SPIC also sent traveling puppet troupes to rural communities. Mariano Baptista Gumucio, Secretary General of the SPIC, commented that “el Teatro de Títeres ha preparado varias obras de carácter bilingüe con objeto de ofrecer las a los campesinos en sus propio lugares de concentración.” He proudly announced that “la primera función en aymara” would soon debut at a popular feria franca in Batallas. Corresponding with Paz, Fellman perhaps revealed the underlying motivation of popular theater. He described the objective of one traveling puppet show as “realizar una gira artística por el interior del país desarrollando al mismo tiempo, labor de propaganda en beneficio del Partido.”⁴⁷⁰

While institutional structures and the personal patronage networks served as the structures linking the state and rural society, propaganda provided the meaning behind those structures and the revolution itself. Propaganda played an important role in rural state formation. The MNR established a specific form of propaganda for rural audiences—one that projected an image of the state where its institutional vestiges were often absent. Projected through print, radio, film, and theater, this virtual state was both benevolent and paternalistic. It ensured that rural folk understood their expanding rights and their new, and indeed important place in the nation—not only as social equals, but as an important new productive force that would guarantee the success of the Revolution. Officials also employed propaganda to provide the knowledge necessary for socially uplift—broadcasting Spanish lessons or sanitation lessons, for example. But most

⁴⁶⁹ Mesa Gisbert, *La aventura del cine boliviano*, pp. 234-35.

⁴⁷⁰ ABNB, PR, 1953, Corr, OV-6 (786/379), Presidencia de la República to José Fellman Velarde, 5/22/1953.

importantly, it provided common peoples with a master narrative that made sense of the broader social changes transpiring across rural Bolivia—from the arid altiplano, to the lush Yungas, to the fertile valleys of Cochabamba and Chuquisaca.

FROM POPULAR STATECRAFT TO CULTURAL POLITICS

In addition to politically-motivated propaganda, Fellman increasingly orientated the SPIC towards fomenting an authentic national culture for the postrevolutionary republic. Fellman, like other MNR officials, believed that national unity was necessary not only to ensure the success of the Revolution, but to sustain the MNR's popular mandate. "Ya pasó el tiempo de fraude cultural," declared Fellman. The Revolution marked a moment of "transcendencia estética" in which the government would "recuperar por medio de la conciencia filosófica, estética, ética y política de una nueva generación, su gran unidad."⁴⁷¹ Already in 1953, Fellman was coordinating with other cultural institutions founded in the wake of the Revolution, especially the General Directorate of Culture of the Municipality of La Paz and the IBC, to selectively appropriate popular culture as representative of the Bolivian pueblo, as well as the postrevolutionary republic. He dismissed those who argued "que el arte es puro, que debe hacerse 'arte por arte mismo,'" asserting that the Revolution marked an exceptional moment in the historical development of republican Bolivia, one in which culture must be put to the service of the people.⁴⁷² With the Revolution, he declared, "el arte pasa a jugar

⁴⁷¹ José Fellman Velarde, "La Revolución Nacional y su transcendencia estética," *Boletín de cultura: revista de difusión cultural*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (February 11, 1954), pp. 1-2.

⁴⁷² Carlos Velarde, "Hacia dónde va la revolución?" *Pututu: órgano oficial de la Subsecretaría de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June 5, 1954), p. 9.

su auténtico rol histórico,” and a unified national culture would “surgen del espíritu de reivindicación social y económica que sacude los cuatro puntos de la tierra boliviana.”⁴⁷³

The primary means through which the SPIC initially sought to foment this unifying national culture model was by sponsoring competitions in literature, poetry, and the visual arts. The first of such efforts occurred in November of 1953, when the SPIC sponsored “los primeros juegos florales revolucionarios,” a poetry competition for university students. The theme of the competition was “liberación nacional,” and participants were asked to “descubrir nuevos valores identificados con las aspiraciones de las grandes mayorías y estimular a los ya consagrados en otros torneos.”⁴⁷⁴ Submissions had to refer to a revolutionary event such as nationalization of the mines, agrarian reform, or universal suffrage.⁴⁷⁵ The SPIC published the three winning poems in 1954 with *Trilogía Poética de la Revolución Nacional*.⁴⁷⁶ That same year it published another volume of revolutionary poetry, *Antología de poemas de la Revolución*.⁴⁷⁷ One example, “Salutación campesina” by Oscar Arze Quintanilla, venerated the new horizons that the agrarian reform opened for Indians: “Hoy dos de agosto,/millones de gritos desmayados,/odios que florecen en la tierra, emanación de brazos seculares/brindan la comunión de tu destino.”⁴⁷⁸ The verse also contained familiar tropes of Indian’s natural relationship to the land: “La tierra al fin, es refugio de tu igualdad secreta,/la tierra al fin,

⁴⁷³ Carlos Velarde, “Hacia dónde va la revolución?” *Pututu*: órgano oficial de la Subsecretaría de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June 5, 1954), p. 9.

⁴⁷⁴ “Juegos Flores Revolucionarios,” *Pututu*, Año 1, No. 9 (10/10/1953), p. 8.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴⁷⁶ Republica de Bolivia, Presidencia de la Republica, Subsecretaría de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura, *Trilogía Poética de la Revolución Nacional* (La Paz: Publicaciones SPIC, 1954).

⁴⁷⁷ Republica de Bolivia, Presidencia de la Republica, Subsecretaría de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura, *Antología de poemas de la revolución* (La Paz: Talleres Gráficos Bolivianos, 1954).

⁴⁷⁸ Oscar Arze Quintanilla, “Salutación campesina,” Bolivia, Presidencia de la Republica, Subsecretaría de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura *Antología de poemas de la revolución* (La Paz: Talleres Gráficos Bolivianos, 1954), pp. 48-51, p. 50.

es multitud de puños, la tierra al fin entrega se vendimia/a su eterno guardián: El Campesino.”⁴⁷⁹

The SPIC also set out to promote a revolutionary literature. Fellman himself published *Un bala en el viento* in 1952, and it stands as one of the only examples of postrevolutionary literature.⁴⁸⁰ What could be deemed “revolutionary literature” had nevertheless actually preceded the revolution with the vibrant social realism of the 1930s and 1940s.⁴⁸¹ Authors such as Tristan Maroff, Carlos Medinaceli, and Augusto Céspedes had taken on rural inequality, agrarian reform, and nationalization of the mines, and in so doing, had helped shaped the political and social consciousness of the revolutionary generation. Under Fellman’s direction, the SPIC sought to reinvigorate national literature—imbibing it was a heavy nationalist spirit and putting it at the service of the Revolution. To this end, the SPIC published an anthology of short stories about Revolutionary struggle in 1954, *Antología de Cuentos de la Revolución*.⁴⁸² Short stories also appeared in the pages of publication such as *Boletín de Cultura* and *Khana*, the cultural journal published by the La Paz municipal government. The Municipality of La Paz also sponsored periodic literary competitions. In 1956, for example, it awarded Mario Guzmán Aspiazu literary honors for *Hombres sin tierra*, another rare example of postrevolutionary literature.⁴⁸³

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 51.

⁴⁸⁰ Jose Fellmann Velarde, *Una bala en el viento: biografía de la Revolución Boliviana* (La Paz: Editorial Fénix, 1952).

⁴⁸¹ Murdo J. Macleod, “The Bolivian Novel, the Chaco War, and the Revolution,” *Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952*, James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn, eds. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), pp. 341-367.

⁴⁸² Republica de Bolivia, Presidencia de la Republica, Subsecretaría de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura, *Antología de cuentos de la revolución* (La Paz: Talleres Gráficos Bolivianos, 1954).

⁴⁸³ Mario Guzmán Aspiazu, *Hombres sin tierra* (La Paz: Alcaldía Municipal, 1956).

Working in conjunction with the Municipality of La Paz, the SPIC also promoted the visual and plastic arts. The SPIC aided in this process through its *Salón de Pintura Revolucionaria*, an art gallery in downtown La Paz. The gallery hosted exhibits sponsored by the COB, the municipality of La Paz, and other social organizations seeking



Illustration 10: “Invierno,” by María Luisa Pacheco (1953) stands as an example of the type of artwork showcased by the postrevolutionary government.

to showcase a generation of new artists who found inspiration in the Revolution. In one of the many exhibitions co-hosted by the COB, the gallery featured the work of René

Reyes Pardo, Zolio Linares, and Raúl Rivas Reyes. With their exhibit they provided a manifesto, “El arte por el pueblo y para el pueblo,” wherein they underscored the transformations in artistic expression engendered by the sociopolitical transformations wrought by the Revolution.⁴⁸⁴ Another notable exhibit hosted by the Salón was the work of German photographer, Gustavo Thorlichen called “El Indio.” The photographs, which the SPIC subsequently published in a book of the same title in 1955, captures stoic highland Indians, portrayed as masters of their natural environment.⁴⁸⁵ The exhibit impressed a young Ernesto Guevara as he passed through La Paz in 1953 on his famed motorcycle trip.⁴⁸⁶

Fellman and the SPIC received the full support of the Paz administration as they set out to foment an authentic national culture for the postrevolutionary republic. In an effort to promote this new “revolutionary esthetic, Paz even signed a supreme decree in March of 1954 that raised the salaries of artists employed by the SPIC and other cultural institutions.⁴⁸⁷ Paz also commissioned several muralists to visually interpret the Revolution in government buildings and public spaces. The two most notable artists that defined their career as revolutionary muralists were Miguel Alandia Pantoja and Walter Solon Romero.⁴⁸⁸ During this time, they put up murals in the *Palacio Quemado*, the Ministry of Foreign Relations, as well as the headquarters of YPF and COMIBOL (the content of their murals are explored in more detail in the following chapter).

⁴⁸⁴ “Pintura—Exposición y manifiesto,” *Pututu*, Año 1, No. 13 (11/30/1953), pp. 19-20.

⁴⁸⁵ “Fotografía—Thorlichen y el indio,” *Pututu*, Año 1, No. 4 (8/22/1953), p. 23. Following the success of the photography exhibit, the SPIC published Thorlichen’s photos, complimented by Victor Paz Estenssoro’s proclamations about Indians, see SPIC, *El Indio* (La Paz, 1955).

⁴⁸⁶ “El alemán que fascinó a Borges,” *Clarín*, 1/21/2001

⁴⁸⁷ Decreto Supremo no. 3678, 3/25/1954.

⁴⁸⁸ Carlos Salazar Mostajo, *La pintura contemporánea de Bolivia: Ensayo histórico-cultural* (Editorial Juventud: La Paz, 1989).

The muralist movement had been the hallmark of the Mexican revolution, and postrevolutionary officials sought not necessarily to imitate the Mexican experience, but definitely to recreate it within Bolivia's own Revolutionary context. In May of 1953, Diego Rivera visited Bolivia, upon the invitation of Victor Paz Estensoro to see with his own eyes the Bolivian national revolution. During his brief stay in La Paz, he visited the Tiwanaku ruins and gave a lecture at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés where he received the diploma of Honorary Member of the Bolivian Society of Sociology, "por sus eminentes servicios desde el campo de la pintura y la literatura, a la interpretación sociológica del Alma Indoamericana."⁴⁸⁹ As can be expected, Rivera was particularly interested in exploring the new artistic expressions produced by the Revolution. The La Paz daily, *El Diario* reported that Rivera had "palabras especiales" for mural that the "pintor revolucionario" Miguel Alandia Pantoja had recently completed in the Palacio del Gobierno.⁴⁹⁰ Responding to journalists questions on his opinion of the Revolution, he responded that "si me hubiese sido posible escoger un lugar de mi nacimiento, hubiese sido Bolivia. Lo más indio del continente." He also shared his thoughts on postrevolutionary aesthetics, telling one audience that "Sólo se puede hacer nacionalidad cuando se actúa con la raíz propia de los pueblos que, en América, es el indio."⁴⁹¹

⁴⁸⁹ José Antonio Arze, "Discurso Pronunciado el 20 de Mayo de 1953, Presentado ante el público de La Paz al Pintor Mexicano Diego Rivera", en *Escritos Literarios*, José Antonio Arze, ed. (La Paz: Ediciones Roalva, 1981), pp. 78-84; Entrevista con Javier Galindo Cueto por el autor, realizada en la ciudad de La Paz el 6 de mayo de 2008.

⁴⁹⁰ "Sobre el arte revolucionario y su obra pictórica habló Diego Rivera", *La Nación*, 21/5/1953, p. 5.

⁴⁹¹ "Diego Rivera habló de la lucha de Nuestros Pueblos," *El Diario*, 21/5/1953, p. 4




Illustration 11: Self portrait drawn by Diego Rivera during his visit to La Paz, May 1953.⁴⁹²

⁴⁹² ALP/SBS (exact location of document withheld for security reasons at the request of the archive staff).

Despite the advances made by the SPIC, declining economic conditions ultimately undermined the cultural revolution envisioned by Fellman, Paz and other postrevolutionary officials. The postrevolutionary development strategy got off to a rocky start. Faced with rising demands from labor, a need to finance COMIBOL, the government began printing more money. Between 1952 and 1956, Bolivia's currency, the boliviano, underwent what Herbert Klein has called "one of the world's most spectacular records of inflation." During these four years, he continued, "the cost of living increased twentyfold, with annual inflation rates over 900 percent." Moreover, decreasing agricultural production, a growing backlog of land reform claims, and a slow start to the lowland colonization initiative stalled import substitution efforts. By 1956, with inflation skyrocketing and the balance of payments slipping ever further into the red, postrevolutionary officials turned the United States and the International Monetary Fund for economic assistance. Following the election of Hernán Siles in 1956, the government implemented an economic stabilization package designed by the economist George Jackson Eder. The plan consisted of curtailing government expenditures by 40 percent and eliminating state subsidies for basic commodities, such as the *cupos*.⁴⁹³ To the chagrin of the left, the United States would increasingly underwrite Bolivia's development effort.

In accordance with the Eder plan, the government cut spending on all but the most necessary components of the national budget. Already by 1955, the SPIC was struggling financially. President Paz had attempted to save the office by exempting it from

⁴⁹³ Richard S. Thorn, "The Economic Transformation," *Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952*, James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn, eds. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), pp. 157-216, p. 184.

taxation.⁴⁹⁴ While this law allowed the SPIC to operate at a lesser cost, it further undermined much-needed state revenue. After 1956, moreover, the Eder plan dictated the abolishment of special tax exemptions that the government had previously granted state ministries.⁴⁹⁵ By year's end, the SPIC could no longer afford to publish cultural publications such as *Pututu* and *Boletín de Cultura*. It could not even publish its commemorative *Album de la Revolución Nacional*, and in order to ensure the release of the book, they had to take money from the central bank.

The implementation of the Eder plan also undermined the precarious unity of the postrevolutionary government coalition and fragmented both the MNR and the COB. Ñuflo Chávez, who was elected as Siles' Vice-president, resigned in June in protest of the stabilization reforms, as did several other progressive cabinet ministers.⁴⁹⁶ Government workers and miners were hit especially hard by the stabilization plan. Siles laid off miners and streamlined the state bureaucracy, shedding unnecessary personnel that had been granted government posts in exchange for their loyalty. The increasing prevalence of strikes underscores the unrest that resulted from the stabilization plan.⁴⁹⁷ Richard Thorn found that while there were 220 and 310 labor strikes in 1956 and 1957, respectively, the figure jumped to 1,570 in 1958, and 1,272 in 1959.⁴⁹⁸ Confronting with rising worker unrest and the fragmentation of the popular coalition that marked Paz' four

⁴⁹⁴ Decreto Supremo No. 3969, 2/25/1955

⁴⁹⁵ ABNB, PR, 1956, Corr, Ministerio de Hacienda (877/419), Departamento Legal del Ministerio de Hacienda to Secretario General de la Presidencia de la Republica, 12/20/1956.

⁴⁹⁶ Ñuflo Chávez Ortiz, *La verdadera renuncio del Vicepresidente* (La Paz, 1957). Thank you to Duña Chávez for sharing this source from her personal collection.

⁴⁹⁷ James Dunkerley, *Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-1982* (London: Verso, 1984), pp. 85-103.

⁴⁹⁸ Richard S. Thorn, "The Economic Transformation," *Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952*, James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn, eds. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), pp. 157-216, see table, p. 187.

years in government, Siles bolstered the coercive capacity of the postrevolutionary state. Not only did he expand Control Politico, the dreaded MNR security apparatus led by Claudio San Ramón, but he also set out to rebuild the military, which had been eviscerated after the revolution. The Siles administration thus marked a turn away from popular statecraft model and toward the centralization of power under an increasingly authoritarian state. In short, Siles put an end to the popular statecraft model that defined the first years of the Revolution, instead opting for a bureaucratic authoritarian model. It was still a national-popular state, but Siles sought to co-opt rather than to cooperate.

The FSB uprising in September 1956 served as the death-knell of the SPIC. The day after the uprising, Fellman purchased ad space in the La Paz daily, *El Diario* to announce his defiance. In accounting for the motivations underlying both the causes and the specific targets of the uprising, he stated “los barbaros necesitan destruir los órganos de expression de la cultura y del pensamiento.”⁴⁹⁹ He vowed that the SPIC will continue working, “porque la cultura y la voz del pueblo son indestructibles.”⁵⁰⁰ The SPIC was finished, however. Bowing to the financial pressures, Siles folded the SPIC in 1957. In its place, he created a more modest *Dirección Nacional de Informaciones*, which was responsible for informing the public of the latest advances of the Revolution. Like the SPIC, it operated directly out of the office of the President. As for the cultural components of nation building, they were partitioned to the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, where the new minister, Fernando Diez de Medina was working to centralize all state cultural efforts.⁵⁰¹ Cultural politics would no longer operate out of the office of

⁴⁹⁹ “SPIC y Radio Illimani Proseguirán la tarea que se les ha confiado,” *El Diario*, 9/24/1956.

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰¹ The Ministerio de Educacion y Bellas Artes, for example integrated the Teatro Nacional de Títeres, see ABNB, PR, 1957, Correspondencia, MEdBA (904/430), Fernando Diez de Medina to Marcial Tamayo, 2/4/1957.

the presidency. And Diez de Medina eschewed politics for aesthetics in his efforts to foment a unifying national culture for the postrevolutionary republic.

CONCLUSION

The 1952 Revolution marked a novel moment in the historical formation of the Bolivian state. Dating to the late nineteenth century, the liberal model of statehood was characterized by restricted suffrage and limited state intervention in the social and economic affairs of the Republic. After 1952, the MNR leadership extended political rights to workers, women, and indigenous peasants—large swaths of society that had long been excluded from the formal political sphere—and incorporated them into a new corporatist state founded upon the 1938 constitution. The MNR leadership greatly expanded the role of the state. It placed the government in charge of the management of the nation's finite natural resources and national economic planning to promote economic diversification and national development. The MNR also expanded the state into the social realm. With the introduction of social security, a labor code, and universal education, the postrevolutionary state would ensure the wellbeing of its citizens. The creation of this “Estado de 1952” marked the beginning of a new political era characterized by national-popular politics.

The consolidation of the postrevolutionary state was predicated upon popular statecraft. It was a strategy devised by the MNR leadership according to their own political struggle and specifically tailored to the prevailing structures of Bolivia society. Popular statecraft was predicated upon two interconnected strategies. The first consisted the organization of society into centralized and hierarchical groups affiliated with the postrevolutionary state such as the MNR and the COB. The second involved the

utilization of mass media to deploy propaganda that not only imparted the meaning of the revolution to everyday citizens, but projected a national culture model that would serve to unify the fragmented society and ensure the success of the Revolution. As it confronted the particular challenges of constituting state authority in rural and urban areas, it adapted the model accordingly. In urban areas—where only 30 percent of the population resided—where but which was already organized into corporate groups easily accommodated into the corporatist state, the propaganda component of popular statecraft was especially strong. In rural areas, where the majority of the population lived, the state had to organize society in order to incorporate it into the structures of the postrevolutionary government. The content of rural propaganda also differed from the urban realm, not only projecting an aura of state benevolence, but it stressed production, efficiency and development—goals that were in line with the developmentalist orientation of the postrevolutionary leadership.

The propaganda component of the popular statecraft strategy provided the foundation for the cultural politics of the Revolution. Fearing that a lack of national unity could undermine their political hegemony, Fellman and other officials set out to foment a national cultural model that would unify the nation. The SPIC ultimately folded because of the economic priorities of the postrevolutionary state. But its efforts to establish a national culture were transferred to the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, where Fernando Diez de Medina was laying the groundwork for a new state cultural bureaucracy detached from the purely political motivation of the Office of the President. As the following chapter demonstrates, nation unity and national cultural formation became more pressing than ever toward the late 1950s. And as the government sought to consolidate the revolutionary present, it would look to the past not only to establish its

legitimacy, but to naturalize the “raceless society” imagined by the postrevolutionary leadership.

Chapter Four

History as National Liberation? Creating a Usable Past for Postrevolutionary Bolivia

¡Gloria al protomártir indo-mestizo Pedro Domingo Murillo!

-MNR pamphlet, 1950

Sabemos que somos víctimas del pasado; pero también que en el presente debemos asumir la responsabilidad del porvenir.

-MNR, *Sus bases y principios de acción inmediata*, 1942

In the absence of history, men create myths which explain the origin of their most sacred beliefs.

-George W. Stocking, Jr. *Race, Culture and Evolution*

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given, and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.

-Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*

“La revisión de la historia es una de las formas de liberación nacional” asserted the popular author and MNR co-founder, Augusto Céspedes.⁵⁰² It was December 1956 and Céspedes was discussing his latest book, *El dictador suicida: 40 años de historia de Bolivia*, the most recent installment of a revisionist historiography being produced by MNR intellectuals and sustained by the postrevolutionary state. The work had been savagely reviewed by several prominent intellectuals—perhaps the most notable being Minister of Education, Fernando Diez de Medina. It was far too subjective and lacked adequate documentation to be considered “History” he argued.⁵⁰³ Critics agreed. Writing from his cozy diplomatic post in Rome, Céspedes was on the defensive. “Como

⁵⁰² Augusto Céspedes, “La revisión de nuestra historia (Comentario a la crítica de Fernando Diez de Medina sobre *El dictador suicida*),” *El Diario*, 12/15/1956.

⁵⁰³ Fernando Diez de Medina, “El libro de bimestre,” *Cordillera*, No. 2 (Septiembre-Octubre de 1956), pp. 76-78.

escritor de esa revolución, he publicado *El dictador suicida* con intención polémica,” he declared, “como aporte de un arma a la batalla nacionalista que libra Bolivia. Actualmente escribir la historia no es un deporte intelectual, es como fundir y templar un arma con la seguridad de que tiene que ser empleada en el combate.”⁵⁰⁴

Céspedes’ candid commentary on the need for the past to serve the present exemplifies the utilitarian purpose that the MNR leadership assigned national history. After co-founding the party in 1941, Céspedes, along with José Cuadros Quiroga and Carlos Montenegro, set out to rewrite national history. All three were journalists who worked at *La Calle*, the La Paz daily that served as the voice of the nationalist opposition.⁵⁰⁵ During the 1940s and 1950s, they applied their quick wit, biting prose, and political agenda to history, publishing in books, pamphlets, and essays a novel interpretation of Bolivia’s contested past. They eschewed the racial essentialism and telluric determinants that framed the prevailing strands of Liberal historiography. They instead cast Bolivia’s historical development in terms of a dialectical struggle between nationalism and colonialism. This revisionist historiography not only provided the MNR with the narrative necessary to contextualize the nationalist struggle and situate itself as the legitimate revolutionary vanguard. It also naturalized the raceless society envisioned by the MNR leadership by linking middle class professionals, indigenous peasants, urban workers, and miners through a common history of resistance to neocolonial domination.

This chapter examines three distinct albeit interrelated cases of the MNR’s use (and/or abuse) of History. It first analyses the production of history. The revision of national history was a deliberate process of reinterpreting and rewriting the past that

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁵ Knutson, *Bolivia: Press and Revolution*.

entailed the selection of specific individuals, groups, and events, and their inscription them with new meaning (and historical significance). By focusing on key texts written by Céspedes, Cuadros, and Montenegro, it explores the political and social content of their historiography and how it was related to the revolutionary imagination of the MNR leadership. Second, the chapter chronicles the commemoration of historical memory. After April 1952, the MNR leadership harnessed the expanding cultural bureaucracy of the postrevolutionary state to commemorate this history, transforming civic time and space with monuments, murals, and national holidays. Finally, it examines the professionalization of history. Nationalist intellectuals maintained that history had long been falsified by the anti-national elite. By institutionalizing epistemic standards of historical proof and objectivity, the MNR set out to ensure that history would, in the future, be scientific, nationalist, and accurate.

History is an integral component of the modern nation-state, providing populations living in a specific demarcated territory a common past that is necessary to collectively imagine a nation.⁵⁰⁶ In recent decades, scholars have labored to detail the relationship between history and the modern nation state. Most studies have focused on this relationship in terms of the philosophy of history, highlighting the problematic nature of the nation in the production of historical narratives. Correspondingly, these scholars have also criticized the nation as the universal subject/object of history, calling for historical inquiry to reach beyond national boundaries. Yet, only recently have scholars begun to detail the practical application of history in the political, social, and cultural

⁵⁰⁶ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (New York: Verso, 1991); See also: Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Tradition" *The Invention of Tradition*, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 1-14.

construction of nations, nationalisms, and national identities.⁵⁰⁷ This chapter attempts to engage these discussions by addressing the following questions: How does history function in a politically divided and ethnically fragmented society? And what consequences can it have on the formation, or in the case of Bolivia, the deformation of that society?

HISTORY AND THE POLITICS OF THE PAST

From *caudillos* to Conservatives, Liberals to Republicans, opposing political parties continually revised national history as they competed for, rose to, and fell from power in Bolivia's tumultuous political landscape. But none utilized the past as successfully, or monopolized it as fully, as the MNR. With the establishment of the MNR in 1941, nationalist intellectuals began a concerted campaign to revise national history. Coming of age in an era of war, political realignment, and social reform, the middle-class attorneys, politicians, and journalists who constituted the MNR vanguard were acutely aware of the power of history. They recognized that at stake in the past was not only the present, but the future as well. For if the MNR was going to succeed in fundamentally realigning the relationship between state, society, and economy, it needed

⁵⁰⁷ In the case of Mexico, for example, Mauricio Tenorio details how Porfirian nation builders revised and commemorated history to accompany their particular vision of modernity. See *Artifugio de la nación moderna: México en las exposiciones universales, 1880-1930*, pp. 103-21. See also Enrique Florescano, *Historia de las historias de la nación mexicana* (México: Taurus, 2002), pp. 268-444. Focusing on modern China, Presinjit Duara demonstrates the tendency for national histories to be totalizing, in that they negate or appropriate alternative narratives of nation-ness. See *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). Yoav Di-Capua illustrates the process by which Egyptian nationalists established a historical precedent for the creation of a secular, modern state in the wake of the 1952 nationalist revolution in "Embodiment of the Revolutionary Spirit: The Mustafa Kamil Mausoleum in Cairo," *History and Memory*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2001), 85-113.

first to provide a specific interpretation of the past that grounded the party, contextualized its reforms, and naturalized its particular vision of postrevolutionary society.

Upon founding the MNR in 1941, nationalist intellectuals confronted a pessimistic and outward-looking national historiography that was largely shaped by the racial anxieties of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century creole elite.⁵⁰⁸ After a half century of frustrated nation building, caudillo rule, internecine conflict, and, in 1880, the loss of Bolivia's costal territory to Chile in the War of the Pacific, a generation of intellectuals affiliated with the oligarchic state set out to explain Bolivia's uneven historical evolution. Never mind the lack of strong institutions, the limited public sphere, and the ambition of military officers; the cause of Bolivia's seemingly perpetual instability was located in the Indians and mestizos that comprised the majority of Bolivia's population.

Creole intellectuals perceived ethnic difference and racial mixture as a threat to political stability and social order and, as such, an impediment to democracy. Drawing from the latest trends in European race science to frame their own telluric understanding of Andean civilization, the governing and intellectual elite saw Indians as unequal, uncivilized, and generally ill-prepared for the responsibilities of republican citizenship. Cholos fared even worse in the creole racial imagination. They were perceived as morally degenerate ethnic hybrids that exhibited the most unflattering characteristics of Hispanic and Andean peoples. The early twentieth century liberal historian Sabino Pinilla

⁵⁰⁸ Marie Danielle Demelas, "Darwinismo a la criolla: El darwinismo social en Bolivia, 1880-1910," *Historia Boliviana*, 1 (1981), 55-82; "Notas sobre el Darwinismo a la criolla," *Historia Boliviana*, 2 (1982), 212-14; "El sentido de la historia a contrapelo: el darwinismo de Gabriel René Moreno (1836-1908)," *Historia Boliviana*, 4 (1984), 65-80. Marta Irurozqui, "Desvío al paraíso: Citizenship and Social Darwinism in Bolivia, 1880-1920," in Thomas F. Glick and Rosaura Ruiz, eds., *The Reception of Darwinism in the Iberian World: Spain, Spanish America, and Brazil* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers), pp, 205-227.

asserted, for instance, “Enológicamente el producto mestizo concurrirá la economía social, por la inoculación bastarda que llevaba en su sangre y porque su regulación no fue atendida por la colonización española, ni siquiera posteriormente por los gobiernos de independencia.”⁵⁰⁹ For Pinilla and other positivist statesmen and intellectuals, cholos represented a threat to the order and progress essential to the success of the Republic.

Bolivia’s towering nineteenth-century historian, Gabriel René Moreno, was perhaps the most outspoken promoter of the need for racial purity in Bolivia’s fledgling democracy, and his prejudices shaped the burgeoning national historiography. Born in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Moreno attended secondary school in Sucre before moving to Santiago to study law at the University of Chile. In Santiago, he distinguished himself as an antiquarian, bibliographer, and historian, and in 1868 he was named director of Chile’s prestigious *Instituto Nacional*. Though residing in Santiago until his death in 1908, Moreno never renounced his Bolivian citizenship and dedicated himself solely to the study of Bolivia’s past, publishing fifteen books and a wide variety of articles and reviews, which remain fundamental texts on Bolivian history to this day.

Throughout this vast body of work, Moreno identified both Indians and mestizos as the principle obstacles to national progress. In a biography of the nineteenth century Santa Cruz intellectual, Nicomedes Antelo, for example, he asserted, “El indio y el mestizo no sirven estrictamente para nada en la evolución de las sociedades modernas hacia el progreso.”⁵¹⁰ Not only did Indians and mestizos represent an impediment to progress, but they also threatened to undermine Bolivian democracy. “Es notoria la

⁵⁰⁹ Sabino Pinilla, *La creación de Bolivia* (Madrid: Editorial América, 1917), p. 56. There is some debate as to whether it was Pinilla, or his contemporary, Jose Rosendo Gutierrez who actually wrote this work. See Abecia Baldivieso, *Historiografía boliviana*, pp. 264-65 for a discussion of the book.

⁵¹⁰ Gabriel René Moreno, *Nicomedes Antelo*, cited in Marie Danielle Demelas, “Darwinismo a la criolla: El darwinismo social en Bolivia, 1880-1910,” pp. 63-64.

tendencia de los mestizos a la pereza, a los litigios, al servilismo, a la intriga, que son gérmenes de escándalo y de ‘caudillaje’” he wrote, “a eso se añade la estupidez y la cobardía del indio incaico, pero perpetuar el despotismo en nuestra sociedad.”⁵¹¹ As such, neither Indians nor mestizo were fit for republican citizenship according to Moreno. Only those belonging to the “pure white race” were capable of participating as moral and responsible citizens.

The racial determination that informed Moreno’s social thought shaped a subsequent generation of Bolivian historiography, which was already influenced to a large degree by positivism and social Darwinism. Alberto Gutiérrez, for example, privileged race as a factor to account for political despotism in *El Melgarejismo: Antes y después de Melgarejo* (1917). For Gutiérrez, Melgarejo was synonymous with the entirety of caudillo rule in Bolivia. He argues for the elevation of Melgarismo as a term to describe the particular brand of tyranny specific to Bolivian caudillos in general and cholos in particular. To understand the nature of Melgarejo, a mestizo from Tarata, Gutiérrez argued that the “clasificación biológica” needed to be examined.⁵¹² Bautista Saavedra also privileged race as a determinant in his *La democracia en nuestra historia* (1921), faulting the temperament of the Hispanic “race” for the shortcoming of Bolivian democracy.⁵¹³

Of the early-twentieth-century creole intelligentsia, the nationalist historians singled out Alcides Arguedas as epitomizing the pessimism and “furiosa autodenigración” that, they maintained, characterized liberal historiography.⁵¹⁴ Arguedas

⁵¹¹ Ibid., p. 62.

⁵¹² Alberto Gutiérrez, *El Melgarejismo: Antes y después de Melgarejo*, 2nd Ed. (La Paz: Editorial “El Siglo,” 1976 [1916]), p. 274.

⁵¹³ Bautista Saavedra, *La democracia en nuestra historia* (La Paz: Imprenta Artística, 1921), see pp. 1-13.

⁵¹⁴ Montenegro, *Nacionalism y Coloniaje*.

graduated in law from the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés in La Paz in 1903, on the heels of the Liberal Party's violent rise to power. For the paceño elite, the Liberal ascendance represented the triumph of modern over tradition—a new era of progress whereupon science, rationality, and order would enable economic growth, political stability, and social improvement. The era was characterized by the consolidation of the tin mining economy, a marked increase in foreign investment, hacienda expansion, unprecedented indigenous land divestiture, urbanization, and railroad construction.⁵¹⁵ Still, to Arguedas and other creole intellectuals who looked to Europe and the United States to define their own standards of progress, Bolivia seemed a failed Republic.

Arguedas, like much of his generation, looked to Europe to model his own expectations for republican society. Arguedas lived in Europe between 1905 and 1915, where he read Gustavo Le Bon and Auguste Comte, and was influenced by the ideas of degeneration of Max Nordau and the pessimism of Spain's generation of 1898.⁵¹⁶ But it was the metaphor of social illness as introduced by the Argentine positivist Carlos Octavio Bunge that seemed to have had the strongest impact on his social thought.⁵¹⁷ While in Paris, Arguedas wrote *Pueblo enfermo*, his most famous, and indeed controversial work. The book relied in the metaphor of social illness to account for the chronic backwardness of Bolivian society. Though he reserved his most severe judgment for Indians and especially cholos, creoles did not escape his bleak assessment

⁵¹⁵ For more on liberalism in Bolivia, see: Marta Irurozqui, *La armonía de la desigualdades: Elites y conflictos de poder en Bolivia, 1880-1920* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1994); Herbert Klein, *Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 1880-1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

⁵¹⁶ Abecia Baldovino, *Historiografía Boliviana*, p. 381.

⁵¹⁷ See Brooke Larson, "Redeemed Indians, Barbarized Cholos: Crafting Neocolonial Modernity in Liberal Bolivia, 1900-1910." In *Political cultures in the Andes, 1750-1950*, Nils Jacobsen and Cristóbal Aljovín de Losada, eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), p. 239. See also Josefa Salmón, *El espejo indígena: el discurso indigenista en Bolivia, 1900-1956* (La Paz: Plural Editores, 1997), pp. 39-58.

of the ills of Bolivian society. In one example of the pessimism that characterized his work, Arguedas, who saw geography as playing a major factor in the formation—or the deformation—of national character, commented “Todo es inmenso en Bolivia, todo, menos el hombre.”⁵¹⁸

Arguedas perceived ethnic diversity and racial hybridity as impediments to social order and political stability. But where he differed from Moreno was that he linked these factors to a narrative of national degradation and social pathology to forge a negative national image. True, he redeemed the Indian in the image of the “noble savage,” a virtuous, albeit inferior, being whose degradation was due to centuries of exploitation at the hands of, first, Spanish colonizers and then, rural mestizos and urban cholos. But assimilation via the harmonious blending of Andean and Hispanic peoples—or *mestizaje*—was not the answer. It was, in fact, the cholos who Arguedas asserted were a threat to society and the primary source of Bolivia’s economic backwardness, social decline, and political chaos. Echoing widely-held fears of racial hybridity and social degeneration, he argued for the maintenance of ethnic difference.⁵¹⁹ Before his death in 1946, Arguedas published many more historical studies, including *La fundación de la República* (1920), *Historia general de Bolivia* (1922), *La dictadura y la anarquía* (1926), *Los caudillos bárbaros* (1929), and *Política y la Guerra del Chaco* (1936). Guillermo Francovich argues that these works “no son sino una ampliación de los cuadros que sobre la historia boliviana había trazado en su *Pueblo enfermo*.”⁵²⁰ The emerging generation of

⁵¹⁸ Alcides Arguedas, *Pueblo enfermo* (La Paz: Gisbert & Cia, 1975 [1909]), p. 145.

⁵¹⁹ For a discussion of Arguedas’ racial thinking, see Larson, “Redeemed Indians, Barbarized Cholos,” pp. 238-46.

⁵²⁰ Francovich, *El pensamiento boliviano en el siglo XX*, p.62.

nationalist intellectuals agreed. To them, this corpus of work served as the intellectual underpinning and provided the moral justification for the liberal-oligarchic state.

NATIONALIST REVISIONISM

It was against this pervasive narrative of racial degeneration and social illness that nationalist intellectuals were writing during the 1930s and 1940s. Indeed, the MNR's particular interpretation of national history had its roots in a critique of early twentieth-century positivism. But that critique was influenced by the milieu of ideological currents, reformist thought, and political opposition that emerged in the first decades of the twentieth century. Revolution in Mexico, the rise of the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA) in Peru, Peronismo, economic nationalism—each of these factors, and the ideologies that either influenced them or were projected by them shaped the burgeoning nationalist historical imagination. The emerging generation of nationalist intellectuals, many of whom had served as officers in the Chaco, no longer negated Bolivia's national experience by measuring it against European or North American standards of progress and national development. Seeking a unique, yet universal national identity, some looked to a glorified pre-Hispanic past to locate the origins of the Bolivian nation. In one example of the emerging currents of historical thought, Federico Avila argued in *Revisión de nuestro pasado* (1936) that by conceiving of national history as beginning with the arrival of Columbus, it remained inaccurate and deformed.⁵²¹ But with the oligarchy entrenched in power, such ideas remained on the margins of the creole historical imagination.

⁵²¹ Federico Avila, *Revisión de nuestro pasado: ensayos de interpretación y crítica historia* (La Paz, Editorial Bolivina, 1936).

During the 1940s, MNR intellectuals began to compose their own interpretation of the past, elaborating what, in the late 1930s, was a disparate critique of Bolivian government and society into a distinct corpus of history. Even before the foundation of the MNR, hints of the structural interpretation of the past that characterized the party's revisionist history were already evident in *La Calle*, the opposition newspaper founded by Céspedes and Armando Arce in 1936 that included among its regular contributors Carlos Montenegro, José Cuadros Quiroga, and other nationalist intellectuals that would become affiliated with the MNR in subsequent years. Glimpses of the economic nationalism and protectionist policies that would define both the party and the Revolution are apparent in Montenegro's early writing, such as *Frente al Derecho del Estado: El oro de la Standard Oil* (1938).⁵²² Similarly, Céspedes offered his view of national history and vision of the MNR's social order with *Sangre de Mestizos* (1936).⁵²³

The first cohesive and identifiable example of the MNR's revisionist history was contained in the party's founding manifesto, "Bases y principios de acción inmediata del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario." Written by Cochabamba-native, José Cuadros Quiroga, and published in June 1942, "Bases y principios" introduced the MNR's nationalist ideology and outlined its reformist agenda.⁵²⁴ It is significant that Cuadros dedicated most of the forty-five page pamphlet not to critiquing the present, nor to shaping the future, but to providing a particular interpretation of the past. He opened by reminding readers that MNR's political and ideological positions "son confirmadas por la historia de nuestra propia Patria," a statement that makes especially salient the

⁵²² Carlos Montenegro, *Frente al derecho del Estado el oro de la Standard Oil* (La Paz: Editorial Trabajo, 1938).

⁵²³ Augusto Céspedes, *Sangre de mestizos: relatos de la guerra del Chaco* (Santiago: Nascimento, 1936).

⁵²⁴ For more on José Cuadros Quiroga, see Mariano Baptista Gumucio, *José Cuadros Quiroga: Inventor del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (La Paz: 2002).

importance that the MNR assigned history in defining its own revolutionary agenda.⁵²⁵ He then went on to survey the entirety of Bolivian history—from the pre-Incan civilization of Tiwanaku to the immediate post-Chaco period.

At the center of the nationalist position was that Bolivia's backwardness was not a result of biology and geography, as Moreno, Saavedra, Arguedas, and others had long maintained. Rather, he blamed it on the mining and landed elite that ascended to power with the Liberal Revolution of 1899, who had since enriched themselves at the expense of the Bolivian nation. Cuadros employed a dialectic, casting Bolivian history as a struggle between the authentic forces of the nation on the one hand, and the oligarchy on the other. He asserted that the "anti-national" elite had enabled the marked acceleration of foreign ownership of Bolivia's extractive resources and essential infrastructure while maintaining a feudal land tenure system that kept the nation's indigenous majority in a state of poverty and backwardness. Instead of progress, the consequence of forty years of liberal-oligarchic rule was the continued impoverishment and political exclusion of the popular classes—that is, workers, miners, and indigenous peasants—who represented the authentic Bolivian nation.

In 1943, Carlos Montenegro subsequently expanded this narrative with *Nacionalismo y coloniaje*. Montenegro was born in Cochabamba in 1903 to upper class parentage. After a mix of public and private schools, he attended the University of San Simón where he studied law.⁵²⁶ Writing and politics was nevertheless where Montenegro's passion lay, and during the 1920s, he contributed opinion pieces to local

⁵²⁵ José Cuadros Quiroga, *Bases y principios de acción inmediata del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (La Paz, 1942), p. 4

⁵²⁶ Valentín Abecia López, *Siete políticos bolivianos* (La Paz: Juventud, 1986), pp. 1-42.

publications under several different pseudonyms.⁵²⁷ In the late 1920s, during the Presidency of Hernando Siles, he had joined the *Partido Nacionalista* along with Cépedes, Paz, Guevara, and others who would redefine national politics during the 1930s and 1940s.⁵²⁸ During the Chaco War, he served as the *Inspector de Propaganda del Estado Mayor*. After the war, he settled in La Paz, where he co-founded the short-lived *Partido Socialista* and worked as a staff-writer for the *La Calle*. He originally wrote *Nacionalismo y coloniaje*, undoubtedly his most popular publication, for an essay competition sponsored by the La Paz Association of Journalism in 1943.⁵²⁹ The submission won the competition and the following year, Universo press in La Paz published the essay.

A history of republican Bolivia from the perspective of the national press, *Nacionalismo y coloniaje* is widely recognized as a turning point in Bolivian historiography.⁵³⁰ Montenegro elaborated the oppositional binary of nation versus anti-nation introduced by Cuadros, establishing the dialectic upon which the nationalist interpretation of the past rested. He recast Bolivian history as a tension between the forces of nationalism and colonialism. The “national” forces of middle-class professionals, workers, miners, and indigenous peasants that represented the authentic Bolivian nation were repressed by the “anti-national” landed and mining elite of the

⁵²⁷ Mariano Baptista Gumucio published an edited collection of Montenegro’s early writing with *Montenegro el desconocido* (Bolivia: Ultima Hora, 1979).

⁵²⁸ Herbert Klein, *Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 1880-1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 94.

⁵²⁹ Rodolfo Salamanca, Prologue to the 2003 edition of *Nacionalismo y Coloniaje* (La Paz: Juventud, 2003).

⁵³⁰ Enrique Finot’s *Nueva historia de Bolivia* is also considered a turning point in Bolivian historiography. Published in 1946, Finot offered a structural critique of national history not dissimilar from that of Montenegro. But unlike the MNR founder, Finot focused his analysis on political institutions, economic trends, and the development of a national culture. The reason I do not include the work in this analysis is because Finot was not part of the MNR.

liberal oligarchy—dubbed “*La Rosca*”—who had enriched themselves at the expense of national development. As the oligarchy monopolized the press and printing houses, they perpetuated a historical metanarrative characterized by the “difundida obra” of Alcides Arguedas.⁵³¹ In the antinacional interpretation of the past, it was the “extranjero,” who “concluye por ser sujeto y objeto exclusiva de la historia de Bolivia, y es él, no el boliviano, que se enaltece, ennoblece y fortalece con ella.”⁵³² This was not history; rather it represented “antihistoria” as it negated Bolivia’s true past and represented not the forward movement of time, but a “marcha hacia atrás.” As a result of this historiography, Montenegro contended “el panorama histórico de Bolivia se [ofrece] sólo como una visión horrible” that negated Bolivia’s national reality.⁵³³ This “historiografía antibolivianista” had grossly distorted the development of a truly national sentiment: “Destruyendo ella las creencias colectivas—particularmente las creencias que en algún modo fortifican el sentimiento de la nacionalidad—descuida en absoluto sustituir lo que ha destruido. Su finalidad—tácitamente cuando menos—parece por lo mismo la de eliminar toda noción histórica en el pueblo.”⁵³⁴

With *Nacionalismo y coloniaje*, Montenegro sought nothing less than to “restablecer la verdad del devenir boliviano.”⁵³⁵ Bolivia’s sixteen-year struggle for Independence proved an especially important historical moment for Montenegro, who was eager to demonstrate precedent for the fledgling MNR’s political position. He cast

⁵³¹ Alcides Arguedas, *Pueblo enfermo* (La Paz: Gisbert & Cia, 1975 [1909]). It is curious that Montenegro exculpates Gabriel René Moreno from this historiographical tradition. His “prejuicios raciales y cuyo resentimiento” were unfortunate, but “no traslucen el afán de negación sistemática y falseamiento nacional imputables a la obra de Arguedas.” Montenegro, *Nacionalismo y Coloniaje*, p. 74, n. 1.

⁵³² Montenegro, *Nacionalismo y Coloniaje*, p. 14.

⁵³³ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 15; For a discusión of the consequences of liberal historiography, see also Mayorga, *El discurso del Nacionalismo Revolucionario*, p. 98.

⁵³⁵ Montenegro, *Nacionalismo y Coloniaje*, p. 13.

independence as a popular and intensely nationalist movement that was frustrated by creole elites. The leaders of Bolivia's Independence movement—the first nationalists, Pedro Domingo Murillo, José Miguel Lanza, and Esteban Arze—were either hanged in 1810 or politically marginalized by the ascendant commercial class once independence was won in 1825. The nascent Bolivian republic was thus hijacked by “anti-national” creole elites—“una aristocracia de descendientes de los conquistadores, de nobles y grandes hacendados”—who maintained the social and economic structure of colonial period for their own financial benefit.⁵³⁶ Montenegro asserts that “la adopción de la estructura social, económica y aun política de coloniaje después de haberse conquistador la independencia produce algo como un ataque de parálisis en el cuerpo de la Republica.”⁵³⁷ In this way, history actually stopped with Independence, only to be reinitiated by the MNR after 1952.

The utility of this narrative was that it established a teleology that provided the MNR with a direct historical link to what was now cast as a frustrated national independence movement. Historian Luis Antezana argues that the MNR fashioned the 1952 Revolution as a “nueva independencia.”⁵³⁸ Yet, there is a subtle, though important distinction to be made. The MNR historicized its struggle not as a new independence, but rather as a continuation of the original independence movement—that is, a second independence. For example, President Paz Estenssoro proclaimed that “La lucha por la Independencia Política, iniciada el 25 de mayo de 1809, es un proceso que tiene otra de sus jornadas decisivas el 9 de Abril 1952 y está todavía en pleno desarrollo hasta que

⁵³⁶ Ibid., p. 67.

⁵³⁷ Ibid., p. 69.

⁵³⁸ Luis H. Antezana, “Sistema y proceso ideológicos en Bolivia,” en *Bolivia, Hoy*, Rene Zavaleta Mercado. Ed. (Mexico, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, SA, 1983), 63-84, p. 66.




Illustration 12: Cover of the first edition of Carlos Montenegro's *Nacionalismo y coloniaje* (1943).

logremos la emancipación económica sin la cual no existe independencia política.”⁵³⁹ By detailing the extent to which national movements had been frustrated by the anti-national interests of the elite throughout Republican history, Montenegro established a revolutionary teleology that legitimized the MNR’s nationalist platform as the realization of national independence.

At the same time, Montenegro also created an anti-national teleology that began with the shortcomings of national independence and culminated in Bolivia’s defeat to Paraguay in the Chaco War. This narrative linked the criollos who had “hijacked” the independence movement with Hilarión Daza’s loss of Bolivia’s coast in the 1880 War of the Pacific, the land-grabbing policies of the infamous caudillo, Mariano Melgarejo with the marked hacienda expansion that occurred under Ismael Montes, the decidedly anti-national economic policies of Liberal President, José Manuel Pando with the authoritarianism of Bautista Saavedra—all culminating in the Chaco War, the nadir of Bolivian history and the most recent memory for many young Bolivians seeking social change.⁵⁴⁰

Another historical moment crucial to the MNR’s self-definition was the period spanning 1899 to 1935, years that marked the ascendance of the liberal party to national government, the consolidation of the landed and mining oligarchy, and the Chaco War. Though the MNR’s historically-constituted legitimacy rested on a specific interpretation of the entirety of the national past, it was precisely the history of this period upon which

⁵³⁹ Secretaría Ejecutiva del Comité Político Nacional del M.N.R., *El Pensamiento Revolucionario de Paz Estenssoro* (La Paz: E. Burillo & Cía, 1955), pp. 15-16.

⁵⁴⁰ For an example of how MNR intellectuals imagined this antinational chronology, see the appendix to Víctor Paz Estenssoro, *Proceso y sentencia contra la oligarquía boliviana* (Buenos Aires, 1948). Entitled “Esquema de la historia de la oligarquía boliviana,” it lists all of the abuses and crimes committed by the oligarchy since the turn of the twentieth century, that is, since the onset of liberal rule in 1899. Paz listed 115.

it could most clearly define its place in history by distinguishing itself from its immediate predecessors. In *Nacionalismo y coloniaje*, Montenegro provides only a peripheral treatment of the twentieth century, devoting the grand majority of his analysis to the press and politics of the nineteenth. Similarly, Cuadros had provided only a rather shallow analysis of the Liberal era to contextualize the MNR's political position. It was Augusto Céspedes who added substance to Cuadros's analysis while bringing Montenegro's dialectic to the present with *El dictador suicida: 40 años de historia de Bolivia*. Published in 1956, it was the first history written exclusively about the Liberal era.

Bookending his study with the Liberal Revolution of 1899 and the formation of the MNR in 1941, Céspedes chronicles the consolidation of oligarchic rule and its consequences on national society and politics. Providing the momentum behind his narrative are the failures and the injustices of the government—the loss of the Acre territory to Brazil in 1904, the formation of the *Banco de la Nación Boliviana* in 1913 and its role in perpetuating the power of the landed and mining elite, the hypocrisy and violence of the Saavedra and Siles regimes, and, of course, the Chaco War. It is telling that he based his thesis on the same logic and historical argumentation that Montenegro employed for *Nacionalismo y coloniaje* over a decade earlier. Not only did he assert that Bolivian history was a dialectic between the nation and anti-nation, “la oposición entre Bolivia y la Anti-Bolivia, la soberanía económica y el capital financiero, el nacionalismo y el coloniaje.”⁵⁴¹ But he also promoted a teleological narrative of nation-ness, casting the MNR as the nationalist vanguard, who “asumen la función de agentes de la dialéctica histórica de Bolivia, rebelándose contra su propio ambiente social e intelectual para

⁵⁴¹ Céspedes, *El dictador suicida*, p. 260

encabezar la rebelión del pueblo.”⁵⁴² In this way, the MNR stands as the inevitable outcome of semicolonial domination at the hands of the antinational oligarchy.

History served a utilitarian purpose in the eyes of the MNR leadership. The revisionist narrative that Cuadros, Montenegro, and Céspedes composed during the 1940s and 50s provided the MNR with a usable past. It supplied the general public with a revolutionary master narrative, a linear historical teleology beginning with the independence struggle and culminating in a modern nation state that the MNR itself would bring to fruition. Most importantly, this usable past provided the MNR with a historically-constituted legitimacy that cast the party and its goals as the realization of national independence. It also provided context for the emergence of the party, enabling it to define itself in contrast to the liberal-oligarchic governments of the first half of the twentieth century.

HISTORICIZING MESTIZAJE

In addition to providing the party with a historically-constituted legitimacy, this revisionist history also naturalized the mestizaje-based social order that the MNR sought to bring to fruition after the Revolution. Liberal historiography cited ethnic hybridity as one of the primary causes of Bolivia’s continued underdevelopment. Venerating ideas of purity of blood during the apogee of scientific racism, late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century intellectuals maintained that mixed races were not only a moral and political threat to the republic, but an impediment to democracy. Intellectuals such as Franz Tamayo disagreed, finding virtue in the cultural and ethnic blending of Europe and the Andes. Although mestizaje as a source of national unity was largely dismissed by ruling

⁵⁴² Ibid., p. 265

elites, during the 1920s and 1930s artists, intellectuals, and writers drew on both indigenous and western traditions to define a new national aesthetic that venerated Bolivia's Andean and Hispanic origins. Literary critic Javier Sanjinés argues that following the Chaco War, a new generation of reform-minded intellectuals and politicians began to “democratize” the idea of *mestizaje*.⁵⁴³

The MNR was part this generation, and their primary contribution to the democratization of *mestizaje* was through the reinterpretation of the national past. Nationalists rejected the biological and geographic determinism of Moreno, Saavedra, and Arguedas, locating Bolivia's national problems instead in the social and economic structures established by the oligarchic elite. After all, the challenges that the MNR confronted were structural—the result of international capitalism and an entrenched oligarchic elite—not biological. In *Nacionalismo y coloniaje*, for example, Montenegro asserts that “ya que tal hegemonía clasista fundada, no tanto en la tradición de sangre ni en el cimientó de los prejuicios, cuanto en la capacidad económica... lo cual da a dicho dominio de clase una consistencia cada vez más creciente y consciente que concluye por adquirir la organicidad característica de una fuerza regulada a sistema.”⁵⁴⁴ In recasting the national past, the MNR sought to rehabilitate the place of Indians and cholos in both national history and the revolutionary imagination.

In addition to discrediting the biological determinants that had defined the positivist historiography, MNR intellectuals gave *mestizaje* social and political form by reconstituting the idea of a Bolivian *pueblo* in national history.⁵⁴⁵ The national/anti-

⁵⁴³ Javier Sanjinés C., *Mestizaje Upside-down: Aesthetic Politics in Modern Bolivia* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004), p. 107-148.

⁵⁴⁴ Montenegro, *Nacionalismo y coloniaje*, p. 192.

⁵⁴⁵ For a discusión of the concept of *pueblo* in the MNR's historical imagination, see Luis H. Antezana, “Sistema y proceso ideológicos en Bolivia,” en *Bolivia, Hoy*, René Zavaleta Mercado. Ed. (Mexico, D.F.:

national dialectic within which MNR intellectuals framed Bolivian history recast the nation as a multi-class, pan-ethnic coalition of middle-class professionals, intellectuals, urban workers, miners, and indigenous peasants united in a common struggle against the oligarchy. In so doing, they historically validated a more inclusive conception of citizenship that placed the popular classes squarely within the national community. In *Bases y principios*, for instance, Cuadros characterized the nation as inherently mestizo, and proudly acknowledged a long history of ethnic and cultural blending. “Llevamos en nuestra sangre la herencia de los hijos del Sol,” he proclaimed.⁵⁴⁶ “Nuestro es la privilegio de la tierra nativa y de la riqueza. Nuestra es la tradición gloriosa de la revolución de la independencia que puso a prueba el talento y el valor del mestizo y del indio.”⁵⁴⁷ He also celebrated Indians as inherent members of the nation with statements like “Levantemos con orgullo los blasones de nuestra estirpe indiana.”⁵⁴⁸ He nevertheless promoted an idealized vision of indigenous Bolivians consistent with their imagined role in national society as producers and consumers. “Exaltemos las virtudes autóctonas del trabajo, la veracidad, la honradez y el culto del deber social” he wrote.⁵⁴⁹

Although MNR intellectuals historically reconstituted the Bolivian people to include Indians, an examination of revisionist texts indicates that the indigenous past occupied an ambivalent space within nationalist historiography. Nationalist interpretations of specific moments of indigenous history demonstrate that the role of

Siglo Veintiuno Editores, SA, 1983), 63-84, pp. 75-83; Fernando Mayorga, *El discurso de nacionalismo revolucionario*; Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, pp. 170-173; Walter Guevara Arze also discusses the concept in Manifiesto a los campesinos de Ayopaya.

⁵⁴⁶ José Cuadros Quiroga, *Bases y principios de acción inmediata del Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario*, p. 39.

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid.

Indians in national history remained shrouded in ambiguity and uncertainty. To be sure, indigenous history figured into the formative texts of the nationalist historiography. Yet it is only particular flashpoints of this history that registered—the Tupak and Tomás Katari rebellions of the 1780s, Zarate Willka’s critical support of the liberal army during the 1898-99 Federal War, uprisings during the 1920s in Chayanta and Jesús de Machaca. Each of these historical episodes represents an exceptional moment in which indigenous mobilization threatened creole hegemony. Nationalist intellectuals struggled to reconcile these diverse, and often autonomous local projects within a historical narrative that privileged the mestizo as the protagonist in the formation of the Bolivian nation state.

MNR intellectuals deployed various strategies to fit indigenous history into a nationalist narrative of the past that privileged mestizos and creoles as the historical agents. One was to place indigenous people alongside mestizos and creoles as integral components of a national *pueblo*. But as historian Laura Gotkowitz notes upon her reading of *Nacionalismo y coloniaje*, “Indians join mestizos and creoles as faceless components of a unified Bolivian *pueblo*, but indigenous political agency is erased.”⁵⁵⁰ A fine example of this strategy is evident in Montenegro’s treatment of the “hermanos Katari” (the only such mention of the major anticolonial rebellions in the book). As Sinclair Thomson illustrates in a recent essay on revolutionary memory in Bolivia, Montenegro conflates the rebellions with the contemporaneous Tupac Amaru rebellion in Cusco—which, in contrast to the Aymara-led rebellions of Tupak and Tomás Katari, enjoyed cross-class and pan-ethnic mobilization among creoles, mestizos, and Indians. In so doing, Montenegro cleanses the Aymara uprising of “the disturbing aspect of ethnic and class polarization”—components of historical memory that did not fit within the

⁵⁵⁰ Laura Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for our Rights*, p. 172.

emerging nationalist historical imagination because they could not be easily accommodated within the MNR's pan-ethnic and cross-class ideology.⁵⁵¹ As Thomson points out, "The late-colonial experience of Indian peasant community mobilization thus posed a challenge to the thesis of a populist multi-class and multiethnic alliance that mestizo and creole *movimentistas* would lead."⁵⁵²

It was into more clearly defined "national" moments that creole intellectuals accommodated these flashpoints of indigenous history within the nationalist interpretation of the past. In the unfolding nationalist teleology, moments such as Independence, the War of the Pacific, and the Federal War became temporal markers that indigenous history culminated in or emanated from. While Montenegro glossed over the Katari rebellions in his narrative, MNR militant and University of San Andrés law professor, Alipicio Valencia Vega folded the rebellions into the independence struggle with *El Indio en la Independencia*.⁵⁵³ The work chronicles the role of indigenous people in Bolivia's sixteen-year independence struggle. The root of indigenous participation in the struggle, he argues was the Katari rebellions.

It this way, the Katari rebellions become precursors to 1809 and are subtly subsumed to the nationalist teleology. This particular interpretation of the Katari rebellion was central to the MNR efforts to valorize the indigenous past in national history. If the fact the *El Indio de la Independencia* was published by the Ministry of Education is not enough to demonstrate the official nature of this narrative, *Boilivia: 10*

⁵⁵¹ Sinclair Thomson, "Revolutionary Memory in Bolivia: Anticolonial and National Projects from 1781 to 1952," in Merilee Grindle and Pilar Domingo (eds.), *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in a Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 117-134, p. 125.

⁵⁵² Sinclair Thomson, "Revolutionary Memory in Bolivia," p. 130.

⁵⁵³ Alipicio Valencia Vega, *El indio en la Independencia* (La Paz: Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes, 1962).

años de la Revolución, a volume published by the government in April 1962 to commemorate the Revolution confirms the particular interpretation of Katari in nationalist historiography. In surveying the revolutionary struggle, the volume identifies the Katari rebellion as the “preludio de la Independencia” and providing an accompanying narrative that casts the rebellion as a legitimate response to colonial domination.⁵⁵⁴ By casting Tupac Katari as a proto-martyr for the nationalist struggle, the revisionist history subsumes the rebellion into the nationalist teleology. In this way, the MNR, as Thompson argues cleansed the Katari rebellion of its problematic ethnic dimensions. This rehabilitated image of Katari was meant for creole consumption in order to valorize the indigenous past. It would not be until decades later that indigenous activists would rehabilitate Katari as a unifying symbol of an alternative Aymara nationalism.

Another strategy that MNR intellectuals employed to integrate indigenous history into the nationalist teleology was the reinterpretation of problematic moments of indigenous history. Nationalist intellectuals stripped flashpoints of indigenous rebellion of their problematic components of ethnic rejuvenation and self-determination, and presented them instead as examples of oligarchic exploitation. The Aymara leader, Zarate Willka makes a brief appearance in *Nacionalismo y coloniaje*, as the “cuadillo de las muchedumbres indígenas adictas” who, after helping the Liberal army triumph over the Constitutionals in the Federal War, was executed by the Liberals.⁵⁵⁵ Similar to his treatment of the Katari rebellions, Montengro overlooks the autonomous local project

⁵⁵⁴ Bolivia, Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, *Bolivia: 10 años de Revolución* (La Paz: Empresa Industrial Grafica E. Burillo, 1962), p. 10.

⁵⁵⁵ Montengro, *Nacionalismo y coloniaje*, p. 231.

underlying Willka's support for General Pando and the Liberal army.⁵⁵⁶ Instead, the moment serves as an example of liberal treachery and indigenous victimization, an interpretation that more appropriately fit within the nationalist historiography. Willka also makes a brief appearance in *El dictador suicida*. Céspedes writes, "El Partido Liberal había alzado la bandera federal y utilizado a los indios para desorganizar al Partido Conservador. Consiguiendo el gobierno, aprobó la Constitución unitaria y el caique india Willca, que recordó sus promesas a los liberales fue fusilado."⁵⁵⁷ Again, the reasons underlying Willka's decision to support the Liberal army in the Federal War, made public in the widely publicized Mohoza trials the 1900s, go unmentioned. Rather he uses the execution of the Aymara leader to provide an example in the litany of crimes perpetrated by the oligarchic elite.

The revision of national history, linked to MNR preoccupations with establishing a historically-constituted political legitimacy and social order had the effect of marginalizing indigenous peoples within the emerging national narrative by subordinating them to a history in which creoles and mestizos were the primary agents. Sinclair Thompson states that "the significance of Montenegro's text is that his aggressive project to decolonize Bolivian historical memory in fact operated to recolonize it on new terms."⁵⁵⁸ Indeed it did. Yet the colonization of historical memory goes far beyond Montenegro. He was but one component of a much broader and intentional project of historical self-fashioning intended to establish not only the legitimacy of the party, but the social order it would bring to fruition. Indigenous people register in this revisionist narrative only as examples of either anti-national injustice, or

⁵⁵⁶ Condarco Morales, *Willka*; Larson, *Trials of Nation Making*;

⁵⁵⁷ Céspedes, *El dictador suicida*, p. 17.

⁵⁵⁸ Sinclair Thomson, "Revolutionary Memory in Bolivia," p. 125.

of the national pueblo to which mestizo—acting in the best interests of the nation (against, of course the anti-nation)—served as the vanguard. There is no autonomous indigenous history. Rather it was subsumed into a narrative of the raceless social order imagined by the MNR leadership.

SUSTAINING THE USABLE PAST

Following the 1952 Revolution, the MNR leadership set out to commemorate the revisionist history that nationalist intellectuals had authored during the preceding decade. With increasingly powerful state institutions, the party assumed an unprecedented command of civic time and space. Between 1952 and 1964, the government christened streets and plazas with the names of nationalist heroes, created national holidays to honor a new pantheon of revolutionary martyrs, revised school textbooks, commissioned murals, and constructed monuments to the Revolution. The commemorative efforts of the postrevolutionary government were so extensive that the Archbishop in La Paz wrote President Paz in 1955, lamenting “los feriados civiles proliferaron exageradamente” and requested that he “reducir los dias feriados.”⁵⁵⁹ The purpose of commemorating national history was to ensure that civic space was infused with particular interpretation of the past that justified the MNR’s position while providing ordinary citizens with a sense of their place in national history.

Commemoration is the primary means by which nation-states perpetuate historical memory. In a much-cited study on the relationship between history, memory, and the nation-state, French historian Pierre Nora argues that modernization—what he

⁵⁵⁹ ABNB, PR, 1955, Corr, OV-7 (863/412), Arzobispado de La Paz to Víctor Paz Estenssoro, 3/8/1955.

loosely defines as the process of change brought about by technological innovation and capitalism—is sweeping away historical memory. In order to retain memories quickly slipping into the oblivion of the past because of the “acceleration of history” that accompanies modern life, societies create “*lieux de mémoire*,” that is, sites of memory. Nora’s *lieux de mémoire* are as subtle as they are all-encompassing, including monuments, archives, textbooks, museums, performances, or any other object, event, or institution that publicly crystallizes a specific historical moment for present and future generations. “Without commemorative vigilance,” Nora contends, “history would soon be swept away.”⁵⁶⁰ Sites of memory are especially important in the construction of modern nation states because they provide the population with a historically-constituted national identity that is at once universal and unique. They cultivate a sense of belonging to the “imagined community” of the nation by imbuing public space with a sense of belonging to a common entity.⁵⁶¹

Ever conscious of the need for “commemorative vigilance,” the MNR began commemorating its revisionist historiography soon after taking power. Carlos Montenegro’s *Nacionalismo y coloniaje* occupied a central position in the MNR’s historical self-definition and after the Revolution, the party went to great lengths to ensure the reprinting and widespread dissemination of the text. It was, in fact, the first work published by the *Biblioteca Paceña*, a series of books republished by the municipality of La Paz in order “hacer resaltar y dar a conocer la transcendental labor de los escritores locales de mentalidad revolucionaria, para que sus libros no queden inéditos en esta hora de profundos transformaciones y para que el pueblo, en especial las clases

⁵⁶⁰ Pierre Nora, “General Introduction: Between Memory and History,” in *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, Vol. 1*, Pierre Nora, ed., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

⁵⁶¹ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

mayoritarias, se nutran de sus verdad cívicas, artísticas y culturales.”⁵⁶² Lauding the new edition of the work, La Paz mayor and ranking MNR official, Juan Luis Gutiérrez Granier proclaimed the importance of *Nacionalismo y coloniaje* in terms of national historiography. Montenegro, he proclaimed, “ha iniciado la revisión de nuestra historia, elevándola sobre la base de la verdad, desde una posición eminentemente dialéctica y polémica para explicar el pasado patrio como lucha del pueblo boliviano en procura de su auténtico y promisor destino.”⁵⁶³ The importance of the work, Gutiérrez continued was that it “enjuicia con claro sentido, en capítulos dramáticos, el rumbo netamente nacionalista que hoy guía y orienta a Bolivia en su conquista de la Independencia económica.”⁵⁶⁴

The commemoration of *Nacionalismo y coloniaje* went hand in hand with the commemoration of Montenegro the individual. Montenegro witnessed the initial triumph of the Revolution, but died of cancer at the age of forty-nine in a New York City hospital in March 1953. *La Nación* eulogized Montenegro as “uno de los creadores de la nueva patria.”⁵⁶⁵ The party newspaper *La Marcha* celebrated him as a patriot and a pioneer of indigenous history: “el primer escritor boliviano que exigió que al hacer la historia de su patria se diera el rol que corresponde al pueblo, y de manera particular al pueblo indio, de cuyas condiciones morfológicas de desprende el valor de los pueblos del Nuevo Mundo.”⁵⁶⁶ His death was a solemn, though very public occasion for the state. Upon receiving his body at the airport in El Alto, his casket was paraded through the streets of

⁵⁶² Alcalde Municipal de La Paz, Ordenanza Municipal No. 00011-53, reprinted in *Khana*, Vol 1, Nos. 1 and 2 (1953), p. 124.

⁵⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 125

⁵⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 125-126.

⁵⁶⁵ “Maestro de una generación,” *La Nación*, 3/12/1953.

⁵⁶⁶ “Carlo Montenegro: El primer escritor boliviano,” *En Marcha*, 3/22/1953.

central La Paz, with President Paz Estenssoro, Augusto Céspedes and other high ranking government and party officials acting as pallbearers. Before being buried, Montenegro's body was placed in the Salón de Honor of the municipality for public viewing. Mayor Gutiérrez issued a municipal ordinance naming a street for the deceased writer and founding member of the MNR.

Yet the postrevolutionary government's commemoration efforts extended far beyond Montenegro. During the first years of the Revolution, the SPIC published several works that reflected the MNR revisionist history more broadly. Among them was *Album de la Revolución Nacional*, a commemorative volume that contextualized the National Revolution in the long history of Bolivia. Written by Fellman, the offers a succinct retelling of Bolivian history. The book retains all of the characteristics of the nationalist historical narrative, establishing the dichotomy of the historical struggle of the nation against the anti-nation. Like Céspedes, Fellman argued that the MNR was the inevitable outcome of this struggle, and would guide the country into economic independence and social modernization. Echoing Montenegro, he argued that national independence was compromised by creole elites seeking to secure their own economic advantage. The revolutionary struggle was nothing less than "La guerra de la segunda independencia de Bolivia." The book also presents the view of the Bolivian *pueblo* that characterized the MNR expanded vision of national citizenship, and provides another example of how nationalist intellectuals subsumed indigenous struggles within the nationalist struggle.⁵⁶⁷

State officials also sought to ensure that the nationalist interpretation of the past was part of primary and secondary school curriculum. In 1954, the Ministry of Education

⁵⁶⁷ José Fellman Velarde, *Album de la Revolución Nacional: 128 años de lucha por la Independencia de Bolivia* (La Paz: Subsecretaria de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura, 1955).

adopted *Sinopsis de historia de Bolivia* as the official text for teacher training colleges.⁵⁶⁸ Written by IIB director, Félix Eguino Zaballa, the book provides a series of lesson plans to guide the teaching of national history. He opened by acknowledging the influence that *Nacionalismo y coloniaje* had on his own historical imagination, and reminded teachers of their enormous responsibility in instructing subsequent generations on Bolivia's true past.⁵⁶⁹ Eguino celebrated mestizaje, writing that the "psicología de nuestros pueblos" was rooted in the cultural and ethnic blending of the Hispanic and Andean worlds following the conquest.⁵⁷⁰ In fact, it was mestizos who served as the "motor" of independence, the "alma de la insurrección y el levantamiento."⁵⁷¹ Like others, he struggled to fit the anticolonial rebellions of the 1780s in his narrative; but he did highlight the ethnic tensions underlying it. "Si bien esta fue una verdadera guerra de razas," he asserted of the Tupak Katari rebellions, "contribuyó con la sangre de los caudillos sacrificados a abonar la tierra donde fructificaría la libertad."⁵⁷² In this way, he makes a tenuous link between the anticolonial rebellions and independence. Finally, his interpretation of the liberal epoch could have been taken straight out of *Bases y principios*. The "special character" of the liberal regimes, he instructed the nation's future teachers, was "de entregar la explotación de nuestras fuentes económicas, a empresas privadas, comprometiendo la soberanía del Estado."⁵⁷³ State financial records indicate

⁵⁶⁸ Ministerio de Educación, Resolución Ministerial, No. 22-54, 1/26/54, included in the preface to Félix Eguino Zaballa, *Sinopsis de historia de Bolivia* (La Paz, 1954), p. 4.

⁵⁶⁹ Félix Eguino Zaballa, *Sinopsis de historia de Bolivia* (La Paz, 1954), pp. 5-6.

⁵⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁵⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁵⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁵⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

that in 1954, MAC purchased 3000 copies of the book, which were presumably destined for rural teacher training programs.⁵⁷⁴

In addition to ensuring the widespread diffusion of nationalist historiography by making its foundational texts both known and readily-available and revising school curriculum, the MNR government also filled public space with a new pantheon of national heroes and martyrs through monuments, murals, and national holidays. Upon taking power in the wake of the April insurrection, the MNR government introduced a revolutionary calendar that honored the selfless struggles of ordinary citizens with the Día de la Fe Nacionalista (May 5). The MNR also renamed streets and plazas after nationalist heroes, Carlos Montenegro, Victor Paz Estenssoro, Germán Busch, Gualberto Villarroel. The La Paz neighborhood of Villa Victoria itself became a commemorative symbol of the crucial role played by working class in the revolutionary struggle. But it was Gualberto Villarroel, the “Presidente Martir” who was at the core of postrevolutionary commemoration efforts, and his person became the very embodiment of the revolutionary nationalist struggle.

In the years following Villarroel’s overthrow and the subsequent persecution or exile of the MNR leadership, party leaders upheld the fallen President as the ultimate symbol of the nation, and the democratic aspirations for workers, peasants, and the poor. His overthrow represented the treachery of the oligarchy, the very embodiment of the antinational antithesis. Writing from exile in Buenos Aires during the late 1940s, Paz Estenssoro had continually defended the actions of the Villarroel regime and bestowed

⁵⁷⁴ ABNB, Contraloría General de la Republica (CGR), Departamento de Contabilidad (DC), Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos (MAC), 1954, p. 23.

the virtues of the deposed martyr.⁵⁷⁵ Emerging victorious in April 1952, the MNR continued to venerate the fallen leaders, referring to the year spanning the fall of Villarroel and the April revolution as “the sexenio.” This was an important rhetorical device that created an unbroken linkage between the reform of the Villarroel-MNR government and the National Revolution. This way, 1946 stands as a counter revolution and the military oligarchic regimes become an interregnum in the inevitable triumph of the nationalist forces on April 9, 1952.

Drawing this direct historical link between Villarroel and the April 1952 insurrection was crucial for the MNR to define itself and demonstrate its political legitimacy. It was a careful device that allowed the MNR to project backwards and subsume all popular struggles within the umbrella of its particular brand of revolutionary nationalism. For example, within weeks of the revolution the MNR enacted a law declaring May 18 “Día del trabajador fabril” that honored worker participation in the revolutionary struggle by commemorating the massacre in Villa Victoria in 1950.⁵⁷⁶ The MNR also issued a general amnesty to all of the peasants and workers who revolted against the oligarchy during the sexenio.⁵⁷⁷ In this way the MNR symbolically incorporated these uprisings into the middle-class led struggles of the party, erasing them of their subversion, and rehabilitating them as national and popular. The law declared that “durante los seis últimos años del régimen oligárquico fueron iniciados varios procesos criminales contra trabajadores del campo y de las minas por actos originados en un estado de malestar social y que por tanto son de carácter político.” It concluded that “es deber

⁵⁷⁵ IISH, MNR, Folletos 1942-97, f. 13-15, Víctor Paz Estenssoro, “Proceso y sentencia contra la oligarquía boliviana,” (Buenos Aires, 1948).

⁵⁷⁶ D.S. 3060, 5/17/1952, *Anales de legislación boliviana*, vol. 14, pp. 20-21.

⁵⁷⁷ D.S. 3129, 7/22/1952, *Anales de legislación boliviana*, vol. 14, pp. 124-25.

del Supremo Gobierno reparar las injusticias de que han sido víctimas los indicados trabajadores para restablecer el imperio de la ley y de la justicia social.”⁵⁷⁸ By retrospectively decriminalizing the popular mobilization, the MNR discursively appropriated the peasant and worker mobilization into its own national popular struggle, while placing themselves on the right side of history as harbingers of social justice.⁵⁷⁹

But it would be a difficult process for the new government. Though Villarroel enjoyed an exalted position in the historical memory of the MNR, his presidency nevertheless continued to occupy a contested position in the national historical imagination. PIR leader, sociologist José Antonio Arze, who was exiled by Villarroel, published several tracts denouncing the regime as the Nazis in the U.S. press.⁵⁸⁰ Upon the fall of Villarroel and the subsequent imprisonment or exile of all of the MNR leaders, FDA supporters cast the MNR-Villarroel regime as Jacobin, and the bloody overthrow of Villarroel as a popular revolution in which freedom and democracy had triumphed over totalitarianism and fascism.⁵⁸¹ Writers such as Alfredo Sanjinés G. equated Villarroel’s overthrow with the Murrillo’s declaration of independence of July 16, 1809.⁵⁸² Carlos Núñez de Arco A. portrayed the event as “la revolución más democrática en la historia de

⁵⁷⁸ Decreto Supremo de 22 de Julio de 1952, “Amnistía para obreros mineros y campesinos,” quoted in *Legislación boliviana del indio: Recopilación de resoluciones, ordenes, decretos, leyes, decretos supremos y otras disposiciones legales, 1825-1953*, José Flores Moncayo, ed. (La Paz, 1953), p. 467-469, quote from p. 468.

⁵⁷⁹ Such a law is important historically, but it also had important historiographical implications, underscoring not only the importance of the rural struggle that preceded and, in many regards, enabled the revolution, but also the MNR’s recognition of that mobilization in the revolutionary process. As such it reaffirms Laura Gotkowitz’s conclusions on the rural roots of the Revolution.

⁵⁸⁰ José Antonio Arze, *Bolivia bajo el terrorismo nazifascista* (Lima: Empresa Editora Peruana, S.A., 1945).

⁵⁸¹ For more on the overthrow of Villarroel, See Klein, *Parties and Political Change*, pp. 369-383; Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for our Rights*, pp. 233-236.

⁵⁸² Alfredo Sanjinés G., *El hombre de piedra y la revolución* (La Paz: Editorial Artística, 1946), pp. 47-52.

Bolivia.”⁵⁸³ Others such as Priegue Romero defended the violence of the mob, justifying Villarroel’s lynching as the “consecuencia de la culminación de un movimiento revolucionario,” rather than “un asesinato perpetrado con premeditación.”⁵⁸⁴ The historical memory of Villarroel’s overthrow had been transformed by intellectuals and journalists who supported the restoration of the oligarchy into an intensely popular and democratic uprising. What was worse was that during the six-year period spanning the overthrow of Villarroel in 1946 and the 1952 Revolution the MNR’s ability to counter that narrative remained limited given the mass exile of the party leaders, increased repression, and government censorship.

Commemorating the martyr to the Revolution thus required a concomitant effort to rehabilitate Villarroel in Bolivian popular memory. Soon after the Revolution, during the days leading up to the date of Villarroel’s murder, July 21, President Paz Estenssoro enacted a series of supreme decrees to commemorate the President. With supreme decree 3123, the government created a new national holiday “El Día de los Mártires de la Revolución Nacional.” With supreme decree 3125, the government posthumously raised the rank of Villarroel and other officers who died that day, and raised the pension for their surviving family members. Finally, supreme decree 3127 officially declared as “heros and mártires de la Revolución Nacional” not only Villarroel, but all who lost their lives on that tragic day in 1946. It is telling that the MNR used the date to announce the universal suffrage law, once again connecting revolutionary past and present.

⁵⁸³ Carlos Núñez de Arco A., *Relato gráfico de la Revolución del 21 de Julio de 1946: el pueblo en armas* (La Paz: 1946), p. 4.

⁵⁸⁴ Priegue Romero, *La cruz de Bolivia: Crónica de la Revolución de Julio 1946* (La Paz: Editorial Renacimiento, 1946). P. 211.

As part of the effort to rehabilitate Villarroel in popular memory, the government deployed the SPIC to redefine his regime as a popular government that governed in the name of the people, only to be overthrown by the oligarchy. In 1954, the propaganda ministry published the pamphlet, *Coronel Gualberto Villarroel: Su vida, su martirio*, to accompany a recent supreme decree creating the Coronel Gualberto Villarroel Military Academy. In a bibliographic essay, Gualberto Olmos portrays Villarroel as a heroic martyr that stood firm until his death, a fine example to “Bolivia y la América toda, lo que es un militar boliviano cuando trata de cumplir con su deber.”⁵⁸⁵ Villarroel had the opportunity to leave the presidential palace on the morning of July 21, Olmos noted, but “con dignidad y hondurez” he instead chose to “permaneció en su puesto para convertirse desde ese momento en símbolo eterno del sacrificio y de la redención de su pueblo.” He dismissed the government’s fascist sympathies as mere propaganda, and emphasized instead its reformist mission. The government, he asserted, “acometió medidas de orden institucional, preocupado únicamente del proceso material y moral del país y de la liberación económica de la nación: creó derechos sociales para los trabajadores y dio impulso a la organización cultural.”⁵⁸⁶

In 1955, the SPIC published two more titles intended to rehabilitate the historical memory of the Villarroel-MNR government. Carlos Montenegro’s *Culpables*, a succinct manuscript left unfinished with the author’s death in March 1953, did even more to rehabilitate the regime as national and popular. Confronting charges of the regimes violent tendencies, he dedicated most of the text to showing the restraint demonstrated by the government in the face of increasingly violent protest. Like Olmos, he showed

⁵⁸⁵ Gualberto Olmos, *Coronel Gualberto Villarroel: Su vida, su martirio* (La Paz: Subsecretaria de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura, 1954), p. 47.

⁵⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 25

Villarroel's bravery in choosing not to abandon the palace. The death of Villarroel, he proclaimed, "es el holocausto ofrecido en salvación y densa del pueblo como lo había sido su vida que empleó en dignificar, elevar, y ennoblecer a las clases populares."⁵⁸⁷

The *Album de la Revolución Nacional*, also published in 1955, capitalize on the visual spectacle of the violent 1946 coup by publishing gory photos of Villarroel's lifeless body hanging from a lamppost in the Plaza Murillo. "Su sangre es el precio para la libertad" reads the accompanying caption.⁵⁸⁸ The *Album* established Villarroel's legacy by situating him as part of a long succession of national leaders that had struggled first for political independence (Murillo and the leaders of the Independence movement) and then economic independence (Villarroel, Paz, Siles). Cast as such, the Villarroel-MNR government represented a moment of authentic nationalist yearning frustrated by antinational violence and the *sexenio* is affirmed as a moment of revolutionary struggle that began with the participation of the MNR in the Villarroel government and culminated in the 1952 Revolution.

The Monument to the National Revolution represented the MNR's most ambitious effort to venerate Villarroel. The MNR decreed the construction of the monument on July 21, 1952 that would celebrate the triumph of Revolution and serve as a mausoleum for the remains of Villarroel. It was "necesario perpetuar" the memory of the revolutionary struggle, Paz Estenssoro declared "como expresión de reconocimiento popular y para ejemplo de las generaciones futuras."⁵⁸⁹ As a site for the monument, the Ministry of Education and the Alcaldia of La Paz decided on the recently-christened

⁵⁸⁷ Carlos Montenegro, *Culpables* (La Paz: Subsecretaria de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura, 1955), p. 29.

⁵⁸⁸ José Fellman Velarde, *Album de la Revolución Nacional: 128 años de lucha por la Independencia de Bolivia* (La Paz: Subsecretaria de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura, 1955).

⁵⁸⁹ Decreto Supremo No 3126 del 21 de Julio de 1952.

Plaza de 9 de Abril at the northwestern edge of the central neighborhood of Miraflores. A design competition was opened in January 1953 and Hugo Almaraz Alaiga won with a truncated pyramid structure with Tiwanaku iconography etched into the exterior facade. The interior consisted of a large open hall with 30 foot ceilings. The large walls were designed to be adorned with murals. Villarroel's remains were to rest solemnly in a basement made of marble. Overseen by the Ministry of Education, construction began in 1954 and a decade later, with massive murals by Miguel Alandia Pantoja and Walter Solon Romero completed, the Monument was open to the public on August 23, 1964 (a date that commemorated the twenty-five year anniversary of the death of President Germán Busch) and the plaza was renamed the Plaza Villarroel.



Illustration 13: Monumento a la Revolución Nacional. The frontspiece reads: “LA VICTORIA NACIONAL DEL 9 DE ABRIL DE 1952 DIO LIBERTAD AL PUEBLO BOLIVIANO” (Photo by author).

Standing as a tribute to both Villarroel and the Revolution, the monument, in all aspects of its design, reflects the nationalist interpretation of the past. The frontispiece is a concrete relief mural designed by Almaraz, barring an Andean condor and an urban mestizo revolutionary in the center. He is flanked to the left and the right, first by industrial and mine workers, and then, on the outer edges, by armed indigenous peasants. Under the relief mural, and across the front of the monument, it reads “La victoria nacional del 9 de abril de 1952 dio libertad al pueblo boliviano.” Once visitors pass through the large metal and stained-glass doors which are adorned with icons depicting Tiwanaku-style pumas, they are surrounded by four giant murals. The north and west walls each have a mural painted by Miguel Alandia Pantoja; the south and east walls, one mural by Walter Solon Romero.

Alandia’s mural’s “Reforma educacional” and “Lucha del pueblo por su liberación” offer a visual interpretation of nationalist historiography. A cross-class, pan-ethnic mass guided by education, justice and science are the protagonists, followed by the literally faceless masses. Where Alandia’s focused on the past, Solon Romero provided a utopic vision of the revolutionary future with his mural, “Historia de la Revolución Nacional.” His mural seems a portrayal of the modernized, mestizo-based social order imagined by MNR intellectuals. Workers, soldiers and the modern family seem the idea representation of the revolution. Indigenous peasants are almost completely absent from the mural. They are literally marginalized on the far left side of the mural, driving tractors and resembling modern agriculturalist rather than pastoralists.



Illustration 14: The mural “Reforma Educativa” by Miguel Alandía Pantoja (1964). Located inside the Monument to the National Revolution (photo by author).

PROFESSIONALIZING HISTORY

In addition to structuring civic time and space to commemorate this emerging nationalist narrative, the MNR leadership sought to professionalize the historical discipline. President Paz asserted that Bolivian history had been “falsificado” according to “los intereses de las clases que dominaron a Bolivia hasta el 9 de abril de 1952.” Seeking to ensure that the revision of history would proceed based on verifiable evidence,

he created the *Comisión Nacional de Historia* (CNH, National Commission on History) in April 1954. By “confrontar la historia escrita con las fuentes documentales auténticas conservadas en los archivos oficiales y particulares,” the CNH would “reconstruir la verdadera Historia de Bolivia para que la ciudadanía conozca su auténtico pasado.”⁵⁹⁰ The CNH’s primary mission was not related to publication. It was instead tasked with facilitating primary source research through the compilation of information on public and private archives, as well as the acquisition and organization of documentation in national repositories. If a lack of available sources had resulted in the distortion of national history, a commitment to a scientific epistemology based on primary source materials and objective detachment would in the very near future vindicate the MNR’s Bolivia.

The generation of intellectuals that rose to power with the MNR and the Revolution invested tremendous stock in the ability of textual documents to reveal a succession of objective facts upon which national history could be reconstructed. The Revolution represented a breaking point in historical epistemology, what Michel Foucault identifies as an “epistemological threshold,” which he describes as “moments that suspend the continuous accumulation of knowledge, interrupt its slow development, and force it to enter a new time, cut off from its empirical origin and its original motivations, [and] cleanse it of its imaginary complicities.”⁵⁹¹ With the creation of the CNH, nationalist intellectuals began working in conjunction with the government to promote and institutionalize what they called “scientific history.” The reconstruction of the past, they asserted, must be based on the scientific method—factual, empirical, and objective. To be sure, it was a repackaging of the same historical positivism Gabriel Rene Moreno

⁵⁹⁰ D.S. 03708 cited in *Anales de Legislación Boliviana*, Vol. 21, (Abril-Junio, 1954).

⁵⁹¹ Michel Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), p. 4

and Alcides Arguedas had strove to achieve a half century before. Yet what Arguedas and other historians lacked in raw data—that is, objective proofs upon which to verify their arguments—the CNH would provide by making the national archival and library systems comprehensible and open to the public.

With the CHN, the postrevolutionary government set out to ensure that national history was created according to scientific methodology and that class and racial prejudice would never again taint historical analysis. To lead the effort, Paz appointed Manuel Frontaura Argandoña, a Sucre-born attorney and diplomat notable for his 1948 historical monograph, *Linares, el presidente civil*.⁵⁹² Aiming to establish a documentary base upon which the new scientific history of Bolivia could be written, the CNH first carried out a national census of archives and libraries. It was an unprecedented process intended to make legible the documentary past by identifying all library holdings and archival repositories in the nation. In order to augment the institutional capacity and to extend the geographical reach of the CNH, in 1955 the Ministry of Education created *Subcomisiones Distritales de Historia* (District Sub-commissions on History, SDH), to be led by a senior history teacher (*Profesor Decano de Historia*) from every school district in the nation.⁵⁹³ Teachers from each subcomisión were required to submit to the Central

⁵⁹² Valentin Abecia Baldivieso, *Historiografía Boliviana* (La Paz: “Juventud,” 1973), pp. 437-38; José Roberto Arze, *Historiadores y cronistas* (La Paz: Amigos de Libro, 1989), pp. 105-106; Eduardo Arze Quiroga, “Don Manuel Frontaura Argandoña (1906-1985),” *Historia Boliviana*, Vol. 5, Nos., 1-2 (1985), p. 173-74.

⁵⁹³ Base de Datos de la Unidad Nacional de Arqueología, La Paz, Bolivia (UNAR), Centro de Investigaciones Arqueológicas en Tiwanaku (CIAT), Correspondencia 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), Ministerio de Educación, “Reglamento de las labores de la Comisión Histórica Nacional,” s.d. (c. 1955), pp. 2-3. The precise date on which the D.S. creating the CNH was amended to also create distinct subcomissions is not noted on the document. Correspondence between Alfredo Romero Téllez, Jefe del Distrito Escolar de Chuquisaca and Gunnar Mendonza dated 8/31/1955 indicates that the function of the CNH was expended between April 1954 and August 1955, see Archivo y Biblioteca Nacionales de Bolivia, Sucre, Bolivia (ABNB), Archivo de la Dirección, Corr. 1954-58, Alfredo Romero Téllez to Gunnar Mendoza Loza, 8/31/1955.

Committee in Sucre not only copies of catalogues from the libraries in their district, but also detailed reports on all private and public archival collections.⁵⁹⁴ With these efforts, the CNH sought to create a national inventory of existing documentation in Bolivia, ultimately to facilitate the revision of the national past.

Beyond national repositories, the CNH also set out to identify foreign archival repositories that held documents pertaining to Bolivian history.⁵⁹⁵ In 1955, the CNH signed onto a joint project carried out by the *Instituto Panamericano de Geografía y Historia* (Pan-American Institute of Geography and History, IPGH) and UNESCO intended to identify documents pertaining to Latin American history in Europe. Though the CNH worked through various Bolivian embassies to take stock of archival repositories in Spain, England, Peru, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, it was documents from university libraries and archives in the United States that were of particular interest. Working with the U.S. embassy in La Paz, the CNH purchased microfilmed copies of all of the correspondence between the U.S. Department of State and its legation in Bolivia between 1848 and 1906 from the U.S. National Archives.⁵⁹⁶ The CNH was also awarded

⁵⁹⁴ UNAR, CIAT, Correspondencia 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), Ministerio de Educación, “Reglamento de las labores de la Comisión Histórica Nacional,” s.d. (c. 1955), pp. 2; ABNB, PR, 1955, Correspondencia, MEDBA (870/415), Manuel Frontaura Argandoña to Federico Alvarez Plata, “Informe relacionado con los actividades de la Comisión de Historia Nacional durante el año 1955,” 12/31/1955, p. 7.

⁵⁹⁵ In doing so, the CNH both institutionalized and expanded a process that was already in motion. During the 1930s and 1940s José Vázquez Machiado traveled to various archival repositories Spain and the United States to catalogue documents and books pertaining to Bolivian history. In 1955, the CNH purchased the unpublished three volume catalogue of documents relating to Bolivian in the archive of the Indies prepared by Vázquez Machiado. Although the volume was not published until 1964, it remained available to researchers at the National Archives, see: José Vázquez Machiado, *Catalogo de documentos referentes a Potosí en el Archivo de Indias de Sevilla* (Potosí, 1964). His brother, Humberto Vasquez Machiado traveled to the U.S. during the 1950s, the result was *Fuentes para la historia de Bolivia en Los Estados Unidos*.

⁵⁹⁶ ABNB, PR, 1955, Correspondencia, MEDBA (870/415), “Informe facilitado por la Embajada de los Estados Unidos de America en La Paz, sobre documentos del Departamento de Estado relacionados con Bolivia,” s.d. [c. 1955].

a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to send Gunnar Mendoza, director of the Bolivian National Archives, to the United States to identify documents pertaining to Bolivia in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. and in the Nettie Lee Benson Collection at the University of Texas at Austin in 1958 and 1959.⁵⁹⁷ With these efforts, the CNH made accessible a wide array of primary source documentation for future researchers.

As part of this unprecedented effort to establish a documentary base for the study and revision of national history, the CNH also promoted the accumulation and systematic organization of primary source materials. Since being appointed director of the National Archives in 1944, Gunnar Mendoza had demonstrated an unprecedented commitment to applying the latest methods of library science to organize the National Library and Archives.⁵⁹⁸ After the Revolution, state support for this effort became manifest in the CNH. Using Ministry of Education funds specifically reserved for the acquisition of historical documentation, the CNH purchased several private libraries and archival collections in 1954 and 1955, and deposited them in the Bolivian National Archives. The indefatigable Mendoza worked tirelessly to catalogue not only the new collections, but existing ones as well. In a 1956, he submitted to Frontaura the first fruit of these efforts,

⁵⁹⁷ For information on which organizations to which the CNH was applying for funding, see: ABNB, PR, 1955, Correspondencia, MEDBA (870/415), Manuel Frontaura Argandoña to Federico Alvarez Plata, "Informe relacionado con los actividades de la Comisión de Historia Nacional durante el año 1955," 12/31/1955, p. 3-5. On Mendoza's work in U.S. archives, see Luis Oporto Ordóñez, *Historia de la archivística boliviana* (La Paz: Fundación PIEB, 2006), pp. 217-218. Between 1963 and 1967, Mendoza worked at the University of Texas at Austin, serving as director of the project "Guía a los documentos ineditos sobre America Latina en los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica." With Lewis Hanke, he published *Guía de los fuentes en Hispanoamerica para el estudio de la administración virreinal española en México y en el Perú, 1535-1700* (Washington, D.C.: Secretaría General, Organización de los Estados Americanos, 1980).

⁵⁹⁸ See for example Gunnar Mendoza Loza, *Problemas de ordenación archivística* (Sucre: Universidad San Francisco Xavier y Archivo Nacional de Bolivia, 1967); See also: Luis Oporto Ordóñez, *Historia de la archivística boliviana* (La Paz: Fundación PIEB, 2006), p. 217; Luis Oporto Ordóñez, *Gunnar Mendoza y la construcción de la archivística boliviana* (La Paz: La Pesada, 2004).

Documentos inéditos para el estudio de la minería colonial en Potosí, 1549-1825, assuring the President of the CNH that “se ha organizado este material en forma sistemática, de suerte que el investigador pueda de inmediato entrar de lleno a su labor de estudio.”⁵⁹⁹ He also reported that “Se he hecho una recopilación de materiales publicados relativos a los diversos aspectos de la evolución nacional cuyos resúmenes catográficos se están ordenando cronológicamente, a fin de orientar la consulta de acuerdo con la sucesión de épocas históricas.”⁶⁰⁰

Another component of the new epistemological practices promoted by the postrevolutionary state was a dedication to scientific objectivity. Objective facts were to be the basis of postrevolutionary history, historical proofs culled from archival repositories and untainted by the social bias or political opinions of the author. The primary source materials uncovered, purchased, and organized by the CNH would provide the foundation for this revisionist historiography. With these documents the past would speak for itself, and Bolivian history would finally be free from the moral judgments and presentist concerns that had distorted it for so long. Frontaura clearly reflected this sentiment in writing Minister of Education, Federico Alvarez Plata in December 1955. “La revisión de la Historia no se hará por el procedimiento polémico, o sea refutando los errores que pudiesen contener las obra sobre historia de Bolivia ya publicadas,” he indicated. Instead, “La Comisión ha preferido adoptar el sistema científico, revisando cuidadosamente las fuentes históricas para registrar los

⁵⁹⁹ ABNB, Colección Gunnar Mendoza Loza (GML), Parte I, Gunnar Mendoza L. to Manuel Frontaura Argandoña, 6/10/1956.

⁶⁰⁰ ABNB, GML, Parte I, Gunnar Mendoza L. to Manuel Frontaura Argandoña, 6/10/1956.

acontecimientos, con la mayor probidad, en sus publicaciones.”⁶⁰¹ In this way, Frontaura demonstrates the Rankean philosophy underlying the mission of the CNH, to furnish documentary evidence in order to present the past “as it really was.”

This emerging commitment to historical objectivity was reflected in the critical response to Céspedes’ *El dicador suicida*. The book was emotional and personal, and Céspedes had done little to mask the political motivations underlying the work. He even included a special preface, a “Guía autocrítica para el lector,” wherein he advises his readers of the “tendenciosa y complicada” nature of the book. He assured his readers, however, that his was “una obra leal con la verdad objetiva.” The “subjetivismo hipercrítico” of the book “no la ha complicado en la falsificación de hechos. Los hechos referidos son verídicos,” he assured his readers.⁶⁰² Yet Céspedes’ revisionism diverged markedly from the scientific epistemology being promoted by the CNH and the Ministry of Education more broadly.

Soon after its publication, Fernando Diez de Medina reviewed *El dictador suicida* in *Corillera*, the bimonthly cultural publication of the Ministry of Education. The new Minister of Education oversaw the CNH and, stood alongside Frontaura in his effort to ensure that the revision of history proceeded in an objective manner based on verifiable historical proof. Reflecting this broader shift occurring in Bolivian historical epistemology, Diez de Medina reminded his readers that history “es una ciencia y un arte a la vez.”⁶⁰³ *El dictador suicida*, he proclaimed to the lettered public, “no es obra de

⁶⁰¹ ABNB, PR, 1955, Correspondencia, MEDBA (870/415), Manuel Frontaura Argandoña to Federico Alvarez Plata, “Informe relacionado con los actividades de la Comisión de Historia Nacional durante el año 1955,” 12/31/1955, p. 1.

⁶⁰² Augusto Céspedes, *El dicador suicida: 40 años de historia de Bolivia* (La Paz, Juventud, 1995 [1956]), pp. 9-10.

⁶⁰³ Fernando Diez de Medina, “El libro de bimestre,” *Cordillera*, No. 2 (Septiembre-Octubre de 1956), pp. 76-78, p. 76.

historia.”⁶⁰⁴ In making such a strong claim against a work of history written by one of the nation’s most celebrated authors, he argued that the book failed to meet basic standards of historical objectivity. Politics had obscured Céspedes’ ability to accurately interpret the past. The result was that “épocas, hombres, hechos aparecen deformados.”⁶⁰⁵ He asserted that “Ni hechos, ni hombres fueron como el los ve.”⁶⁰⁶ He concluded by reminding his readers of the need to remain committed to a historical objectivity grounded in scientific method. “En esta época de confusión de los valores, en que la pasión política nubla el entendimiento y el incienso de los acólitos oscurece el juicio, era necesario restituir a la historia su dignidad de ciencia, de arte de espejo normativo de la sociedad.”⁶⁰⁷

Guillermo Ovando Sanz, the Chilean-trained historian who founded *the Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas* (Historical Research Institute, IIH) at the Universidad Tomás Frías in Potosi in 1956, was also critical of the work. He not only faulted Céspedes for his biases as Diez de Medina had, but he took him to task for not proving a bibliography for the work, making a broader point about the production of national history. “El que escribe sobre historia en Bolivia tiene como obligación, citar las fuentes de información para que éstas sirvan también a otros estudiosos que puedan interpretar los hechos en forma semejante o en forma diferente y aportar a su vez nuevos documentos.”⁶⁰⁸ He even went as far as to list all of the books to which Céspedes made passing reference, and noted others that that he suspected he had used. The critical

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid, p. 77.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 78.

⁶⁰⁸ Guillermo Ovando-Sanz, ed., *Una polémica entre Fernando Diez de Medina y Augusto Céspedes en torno a 40 años de historia de Bolivia* (Potosi: Universidad Tomas Frias, 1957), p. 5.

reception of *El dictador suicida* reflected the broader recognition occurring in academic, political, and intellectual circles of the need to develop a professionalized history with rigorous standards of sources and scientific detachment.

By 1957, with the state financial crunch instituted by the 1956 stabilization plan, the government's efforts to professionalize standards of historical sources and method lost momentum. Already in 1956, for instance, Gunnar Mendoza, who had since replaced Frontaura as director of the CNH, had to petition the Ministry of Education for back pay for the his staff.⁶⁰⁹ By 1962, the CNH disappears from the documentary record. But other institutions stepped in to continue the work that the CNH had begun. The *Academia Boliviana de Historia* which maintained affiliation with the *Real Academia de Historia* in Madrid since its establishment in the 1920s, emerged during this time to play an expanded role in the professionalization of the historical discipline. The *Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas* at the Universidad Tomás Frías, also sought to promote the development of and objective national history founded on the documentary past.⁶¹⁰ Still, it was not until 1966, that the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés in La Paz offered the first degree in history. And in 1971, it founded the first history department in the nation. Its first chair was Manuel Frontaura Argandoña, the original director of the CNH.⁶¹¹

⁶⁰⁹ ABNB, Colección Gunnar Mendoza Loza (GML), Parte I, Gunnar Mendoza L. to Manuel Frontaura Argandoña, 6/10/1956, p. 2; see also; "Gunnar Mendoza informa: Ha recopilado documentos inéditos sobre la minería colonial en Potosí," *Ultima Hora*, 6/28/1956, p. 4.

⁶¹⁰ Guillermo Ovando Sanz, "La fundación del Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas de la Universidad de Potosí," *Khana*, Año VI, Vol. II, Nos. 31 y 32 (Julio de 1958), pp. 88-98.

⁶¹¹ Valentín Abecia Baldvieso, *Entre la historia y la vida: Entrevista de Marcela Inch C.* (Sucre, 2006), p. 93.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has explored the MNR's efforts to revise, commemorate and professionalize national history during the period spanning the foundation of the party in 1941 and onset of the military phase of the Revolution in 1964. In books, pamphlets, and speeches, they recast national history as a dialectical struggle between the anti-national forces of the oligarchic elite on the one side, and the popular forces of the authentic nation on the other. After April 1952, the MNR leadership harnessed the expanding cultural bureaucracy of the postrevolutionary state to commemorate this history and affirm its status as the nationalist vanguard. With monuments, murals, and national holidays, the party transformed civic time and space to reflect a historical memory shaped largely by the MNR. By providing a specific interpretation of past that contextualized the revolutionary present, history did indeed serve a liberating purpose.

In addition to providing necessary context for the Revolution, this revisionist narrative naturalized the raceless society envisioned by the MNR leadership by linking middle class professionals, indigenous peasants, urban workers, and miners through a common history of resistance to neocolonial domination. Indeed, this new national history inserted Indians into the national community. At the same time, however it privileged creole and mestizos as agents of national history while denying Indigenous people an active role in the historical formation of the Bolivian nation. Key moments and figures of indigenous history—the Túpak Katari Rebellion or Zárate Wilka, for example—were either subordinated to creole-mestizo struggles or enveloped in silence. Once subordinated, grassroots indigenous resistance movements against the colonial and republican states were generally cast as proto-nationalist or nationalist events and tied to creole history. The final step in this process was the practice of making history. With

the Revolution emerged a new commitment to epistemic standards of historical proof and objectivity. If the MNR looked to the colonial and republican past to explain the past and the present, it was the pre-colonial past that provided a vision of the future.

Chapter Five

Revolutionary Ruins: Excavating the Politics of Race, Nation, and Knowledge at Tiwanaku

Tengo el agrado de manifestarle que el Centro de Investigaciones Arqueológicas en Tiwanaku está realizando importante labor científica en torno a la cultura prehispánica de nuestro país, contribuyendo bastante a la revalorización de los valores indígenas y nacionales de Bolivia.

-Carlos Ponce Sanginés, 1959

Diachronies, interruptions, and imbalances between ancient ruins and the products of modern technology generate tensions that animate space but make it difficult to decipher.

-Henri Lefebvre, De l'État

Tiwanaku assumed a prominent position in the postrevolutionary imagination.⁶¹² Located twenty kilometers southeast of Lake Titicaca, on the high plateau straddling Peru and Bolivia, Tiwanaku was once the administrative and ceremonial center of an expansive Andean empire. Since its enigmatic downfall sometime after 1000 A.D., all that remained of the great city-state were giant sandstone monoliths, giant terraced mounds, and intricately-carved iconography. The ruins subsequently attracted Inca settlers, Spanish chroniclers, Argentine generals, North American naturalists, and European explorers. Yet the Bolivian government remained largely indifferent to the ruins. Struggling to reconcile North Atlantic standards of modern nationhood with an indigenous majority it perceived as racially inferior, culturally backward, and the primary obstacle to the nation's progress, successive governments left Tiwanaku—and the contested indigenous history it embodied—to a handful of antiquarians and amateur

⁶¹² The spelling of Tiwanaku has varied significantly since the Spanish first discovered the ruins in the sixteenth century. Spanish chroniclers used Tiaguanco. Early republican antiquarians and travel accounts use Tiahuanacu, Tiahuanaco, or Tihuanacu. In accordance with modern standards of written Aymara and recent archeological research, I use Tiwanaku. When quoting sources that use older forms of the word, I have changed the spelling to Tiwanaku for the sake of consistency.

social scientists.⁶¹³ After the 1952 National Revolution, however, the government demonstrated unprecedented interest in Tiwanaku. Just months after the Revolution, officials coordinated an ambitious plan to excavate the site and reconstruct the ruins. Over the course of the next decade, a new generation of nationalist archeologists appealed to modern science to restore Tiwanaku to its imagined splendor.

This chapter examines the Tiwanaku restoration project as a lens onto the processes by which archeological knowledge was shaped by and contributed to novel constructions of race and national identity in postrevolutionary Bolivia. As the postrevolutionary government set out to integrate indigenous Bolivians into the social and economic structures of the nation, it launched a concurrent effort to construct a unifying national culture that proudly embraced the mixed Andean and Hispanic origins of the republic. Commenting on this process, IIB director Félix Eugino Zaballa affirmed that “Bolivia, asimila actualmente al elemento autóctono por imperio de los Postulados de la Revolución Nacional de 9 de abril de 1952.”⁶¹⁴ He cautioned, however, “No quiere permitir en su cultura resabios para razas atrasadas, sino la unidad nacional, en su más amplio sentido.”⁶¹⁵ In their search for a unifying national symbol for the postrevolutionary republic—one that celebrated the mixed cultural heritage of the nation while emphasizing the positive attributes of Bolivia’s indigenous population—officials set their sights on Tiwanaku.

⁶¹³ Carlos Mamani Condori, “History and prehistory in Bolivia: What about the Indians?” *Conflict in the Archaeology of Living Traditions*, R. Layton, ed. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 46-59.

⁶¹⁴ Félix Eguino Zaballa, “Una encuesta importante del Instituto de Cultura Hispánica,” *Gaceta Campesina: órgano oficial del Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos*, Año 3, No. 4 (Agosto 1954), pp. 150-56, p. 153.

⁶¹⁵ *Ibid.*

The ancient ruins provided an ideal symbol for the postrevolutionary republic. For one, they provided a rare glimpse of Andean civilization before colonial domination and agrarian exploitation degenerated indigenous Bolivians. But perhaps more importantly, the political power, social organization, and technological sophistication required to construct the magnificent ruins lay testament to the modernizing potential of indigenous Bolivians. "En Bolivia, los estudios arqueológicos llevan implícito un mensaje de esperanza," Carlos Ponce Sanginés, director of the state archeological mission, wrote in 1957. "Si en el pasado los pueblos aborígenes fueron capaces de notable hazañas, si pudieron erigir edificios y ciudades señeros, es lógico que sus descendientes, los indígenas de hoy, podrán dominar en el futuro la tecnología moderna y ayudaran a transformar el país ahora retrasado."⁶¹⁶

Notwithstanding the restoration of the ruins as a tangible symbol of postrevolutionary national unity, another, more subtle, objective underlay the MNR's desire to excavate and reconstruct Tiwanaku: the valorization of the Aymara past. Constituting approximately twenty-five percent of the population on the eve of the Revolution, the Aymara were the second largest ethnic group in Bolivia, superseded only by the Quechua, who represented thirty-five percent of the population.⁶¹⁷ As Laura Gotkowitz illustrates, the Quechua were more easily incorporated into postrevolutionary constructions of mestizaje—thanks, in part, to a long history of biological and cultural intermingling dating back to the conquest.⁶¹⁸ Yet accommodating the Aymara into this

⁶¹⁶ Carlos Ponce Sanginés, *Centro de Investigaciones Arqueológicas en Tiwanaku: Informe de labores* (La Paz: Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes, 1961), p. 11.

⁶¹⁷ Asthenio Averanga Mollinedo, *Aspectos generales de la población boliviana* (La Paz: Editorial Argote, 1956)

⁶¹⁸ Laura Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, pp. 164-191. On mestizaje in Cochabamba, see Brooke Larson, *Cochabamba, 1550-1900: Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia*, Expanded Edition (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); see also José M. Gordillo, *Campesinos revolucionarios en*

new national ideal proved to be more difficult. The Aymara lacked such a tradition of mestizaje, given their more peripheral position in the colonial socioeconomic order. But perhaps the greatest obstacle confronting postrevolutionary intellectuals was a contested history of ethnic resistance to both colonial and republican rule that included such flashpoints as the 1781 Tupak Katari Rebellion and the 1899 Federal War. Such events had not only molded creole perceptions of the ethnic group as violent and savage, but also shaped a canon of social scientific knowledge that cast the Aymara as backward, insular, and unfit for republican citizenship. After the Revolution, as the MNR transformed Tiwanaku from a contested symbol of the indigenous past into a unifying symbol of the postrevolutionary present, a new generation of nationalist intellectuals sought to rescue the Aymara from history.

Under the leadership of archeologist Carlos Ponce Sanginés, Bolivia's burgeoning state archeological mission turned to modern science to supplant a more recent, contested Aymara past with a glorious, pre-Hispanic history focused on Tiwanaku. With the introduction of stratigraphic analysis and radiocarbon dating, state archeologists confirmed a more recent chronology for Tiwanaku. In so doing, they decreased the temporal distance between the pre-Hispanic past and the national present and substantiated long-marginalized claims of Tiwanaku's Aymara origins. Tiwanaku archeology thus not only provided the postrevolutionary government with proof of the grandiose Aymara past, but also evidenced the future potential of nation's indigenous population as a modernizing force.

Bolivia: identidad, territorio y sexualidad en el Valle Alto de Cochabamba, 1952-1964 (La Paz: Plural Editores, 2000).

REPUBLICAN ANTECEDENTS

Though the Bolivian government remained largely uninterested in Tiwanaku, the site attracted a host of travelers and naturalists who made the arduous journey across the Andes to visit the ancient ruins. During the nineteenth century, these visitors generated an influential body of knowledge on Tiwanaku and the Aymara-speaking peoples who populated the region. At the center of this body of knowledge was an enduring debate over the origins of the ruins. Who had built and populated this once grand city? Was it the descendants of the Aymara? Was it the Inca? Or was it a lost civilization that had since vanished without leaving clues to its existence? As a new generation of La Paz intellectuals rose to prominence in the first decades of the twentieth century, debate over Tiwanaku's origins became deeply enmeshed in broader struggles to define Bolivian national identity and to accommodate the Aymara past within that disputed narrative.

In one of the most influential studies on Tiwanaku published in recent decades, archeologist Alan Kolata shows that nineteenth-century travel literature negated the possibility that the Aymara were the descendants of Tiwanaku's original occupants.⁶¹⁹ Nineteenth-century travelers perceived the Aymara as inferior, backward Indians who lacked the technological sophistication and social organization required to construct Tiwanaku's magnificent ceremonial architecture. As such, they concluded that the ancient city must have been built by a foreign, or even lost, civilization. Francis de Castelnau, a French Count and explorer who visited the ruins in the 1840s, determined that Tiwanaku was a cult of Osiris, transplanted from Egypt by a lost civilization "whose

⁶¹⁹ Alan Kolata, *The Tiwanaku: Portrait of an Andean Civilization* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 11-18.

memory has not been retained by the imbecilic race that inhabits this country today.”⁶²⁰ Peruvian engineer Pablo F. Chalón agreed that Tiwanaku’s origins were foreign, but he reached a more general conclusion than Castelnau. He argued that the architects of the ruins came from somewhere that was “already civilized by the influence of the Old World,” who then disappeared without a trace. He concluded, “We know little of this tradition, except that they were white and bearded men.”⁶²¹ The Marquise of Nadaillac also denied the possibility of Tiwanaku’s Aymara origins. Refuting Castelnau’s Egypt hypothesis and Chalón’s Old World theory, he contended that it was the “Nahua race” of central Mexico that built the ruins. “What is certain,” Nadaillac asserted, “is that such monuments could not be the vestiges of an autochthonous civilization” that developed on the altiplano.⁶²²

Doubts surrounding the Aymara origins of Tiwanaku did not go uncontested, however; and during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, several more scientifically-qualified observers attributed the ruins to the contemporary inhabitants of the region.⁶²³ Bartolomé Mitre—Argentine general, writer, and later president of the republic—became fascinated by Tiwanaku while exiled to Bolivia in 1847-48.⁶²⁴ In a description of the site published in 1879, *Arqueología americana: Las ruinas de*

⁶²⁰ Francis de Castelnau, *La Historia del Viaje* (Edición Paris, 1850-51), excerpt included in *Tiwanaku: Antología de los principales escritos de los cronistas coloniales, americanistas, e historiadores bolivianos*, edited by Gustavo Adolfo Otero (La Paz: Artística, 1939): 55-66, p. 56.

⁶²¹ Pablo E. Chalón, “El arte de construir de los monumentos religiosos y militares de Tihuanacu” and “Antiguos Peruanos y los edificios de Antiguo Perú” both from *Anales de la Escuela de Construcciones Civiles y Militares del Perú* (Lima: Edición Lima, 1882 and 1884) excerpts included in *Tiwanaku: Antología de los principales escritos de los cronistas coloniales, americanistas, e historiadores bolivianos*, edited by Gustavo Adolfo Otero (La Paz: Artística, 1939): 79-87, p. 87.

⁶²² Marqués de Nadaillac, *La América Prehistórica* (Edición Paris, 1883) included in *Tiwanaku: Antología de los principales escritos de los cronistas coloniales, americanistas, e historiadores bolivianos*, edited by Gustavo Adolfo Otero (La Paz: Artística, 1939): 67-76, pp. 75-76.

⁶²³ For a review of this literature, see Kolata, *The Tiwanaku*, pp. 11-18.

⁶²⁴ For a brief discussion of Mitre’s stay in Bolivia, see Qayum, “Creole Imaginings,” p. 228, *f.* 19.

Tiahuanacu (recuerdos de un viaje), he attributed the origins of Tiwanaku to the ancestors of the region's Aymara inhabitants.⁶²⁵ The famed German archeologist Max Uhle also asserted that the Aymara were the descendants of Tiwanaku. Collaborating with Alphons Stübel in 1892, he cited the geographic distribution of the Aymara language as consistent with Tiwanaku's political and cultural expansion.⁶²⁶ Similarly, U.S. anthropologist Adolph Francis Alphonse Bandelier argued in 1911 that the original inhabitants of the ruins could have very well been the Aymara. In making such an assertion, he cited the Pima of Southern Arizona, who had left a similar settlement and abandonment pattern to the Aymara.⁶²⁷

Such varied conclusions surrounding Tiwanaku's origins resulted not only from the racial biases of their authors, but also from the enigmatic nature of the Aymara past in the limited historical and ethnographic literature of the time. In comparison to the Incan and Spanish colonial past, the history of the Aymara remained largely unknown. The history of the Spanish was obvious enough. Pedro Cieza de León, Graciela de la Vega, Bernabé Cobo, and other Spanish chroniclers traversed the arid plains and fertile valleys of the central Andean highlands, compiling detailed information on the diverse peoples that populated them. In doing so, they also inscribed the history of the Inca, but aside from local myths and the contemporary socio-political structure of the twelve Aymara kingdoms of Kollasuyo (the fourth realm of the Incan empire) the provenance of the Aymara remained a mystery. Writing in 1918, for example, the French anthropologist

⁶²⁵ Bartolomé Mitré, *Arqueología Americana: Las ruinas de Tiahuanacu: recuerdos de un viaje* (Buenos Aires: Librería Hachette, 1954 [1879]).

⁶²⁶ Alphons Stübel and Max Uhle, *Die Ruinenstaette von Tiahuanaco im Hochlande des alten Perú: eine kulturgeschichtliche Studie auf grund selbstaendiger Aufnahmen* (Leipzig: Verlag von Karl W. Hiersemann, 1892).

⁶²⁷ Adolph Francis Alphonse Bandelier, *The Ruins at Tiahuanaco* (Worcester: American Antiquarian Society, 1911), p. 9.

Henri Beuchat noted that “de la historia de los aimaras o collas no sabemos nada.”⁶²⁸ Contemporary Bolivian observers remained stumped as well. In 1916, Manuel Rigoberto Paredes, a leading member of the La Paz intelligentsia wondered “where does the mysterious inhabitant of the Andean altiplano come from?”⁶²⁹ It was ultimately upon this shaky foundation of speculative and fragmented knowledge that Bolivian intellectuals began to integrate Tiwanaku—and the disputed indigenous past associated with it—into the emerging pantheon of national symbols.

In the first decades of the twentieth century, a new generation of politicians and intellectuals fixed their gaze on Tiwanaku as part of a broader search for a symbol of Bolivian nationhood. Leading this effort was the La Paz-based Liberal party, which came to power in 1899, after defeating the Sucre-based Conservatives in the internecine Federal War of 1898-1899. Upon taking power, they moved the national capital from Sucre to La Paz—closer to the center of the emerging tin-based economy—and set out on an unprecedented project of social and economic reform. José Manuel Pando, the first liberal President, hailed the era as the “geographic period” of Bolivian history.⁶³⁰ Not only did intellectuals set out to explore, map, and interconnect Bolivia’s vast interior landscape, but they also sought to construct enduring national symbols. It was, after all, the *fin de siècle*, the era of the great nation-state, and Bolivian intellectuals, like their counterparts across Europe and the Americas, sought to both create and project a national

⁶²⁸ Henri Beuchat, *Manual de arqueología Americana*, translated from the original French into Spanish by Domingo Vaca (Madrid: Daniel Jorro, Editor, 1918), p. 559.

⁶²⁹ Manuel Rigoberto Paredes, *El Kollasuyo* (La Paz: Ediciones Isla, 1979[1916]), p. 7.

⁶³⁰ José Manuel Pando, *Circular del Jefe del Partido Liberal a los Directorios Departamentales* (La Paz, 1897), p. 2, quoted in Seemin Qayum, "Nationalism, Internal Colonialism and the Spatial imagination: The Geographic Society of La Paz in Turn-of-the-Century Bolivia" in *Studies in the Formation of the Nation State in Latin America*, ed. James Dunkerley (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 2002), p. 285

identity that was at once universal and unique.⁶³¹ At the vanguard of the new liberal order was a group of mestizo and creole intellectuals, statesmen, and entrepreneurs who saw themselves as the harbingers of Bolivian modernization. As they debated the content and meaning of Bolivian national identity, Tiwanaku emerged as a prominent albeit highly contested national symbol.

In her study of liberal nation-building in early twentieth-century Bolivia, Seemin Qayum demonstrates the important place that Tiwanaku occupied in the creole imagination. She argues that the ruins offered liberal intellectuals a distinctive national symbol by providing an alternative vision of Andean history, “one that was Tiwanaku centered rather than Cuzco-centered.”⁶³² Tiwanaku provided “a glorious, primordial Aymara past” that provided Bolivian statesmen a means to distinguish themselves from the Inca-dominated history that Peruvian nation builders were integrating into their own national artifice.⁶³³ Within the vanguard of paceño intellectuals that rose to national prominence with the liberal revolution, Manuel Rigoberto Paredes—a prominent politician and essayist who wrote widely on regional folklore—stands out as the most vocal proponent of Tiwanaku’s Aymara origins.⁶³⁴ He contended that the Aymara not only built Tiwanaku, but were the ancestors of the Quechua-speaking peoples populating

⁶³¹ Mauricio Tenorio Trillo, *Artilugio de la nación moderna* (Mexico City: El Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1998).

⁶³² Seemin Qayum, *Creole Imaginings: Race, Space, and Gender in the Making of Republican Bolivia*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Goldsmiths College, University of London, 2002, p. 219.

⁶³³ Marisol de la Cadena, *Indigenous Mestizos*; Flores Galindo, *Buscando un Inca*.

⁶³⁴ Manuel Rigoberto Paredes produced a series of studies on the provinces of his home department of La Paz during the first decades of the twentieth century. See, for example: *Provincia de Inquisivi: estudios geográficos, estadísticos y sociales* (La Paz: J. M. Gamarra, 1906); *La altiplanicie; descripción de la Provincia Omasuyos* (La Paz, 1914); *Tiahuanacu y la Provincia de Ingavi* (La Paz: Ediciones Isla, 1956). For his work on folklore, see: *Mitos, supersticiones y supervivencias populares de Bolivia* (La Paz: Arno hermanos, 1920). For a general treatment of his work, see Sinclair Thomson "La cuestión india en Bolivia a principios de siglo," *Autodeterminación*, 2:4 (1987-88): 83-116; see also Thomson's M.A. thesis from the University of Wisconsin at Madison.

Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia as well. Yet, despite his stature among early twentieth century intellectual and statesmen, Paredes' conclusions had little influence on the liberal national imagination.

One of the principal reasons why an Aymara-centered interpretation of Tiwanaku failed to take hold within the liberal imagination was contemporary perceptions of the "Aymara race." During the Federal War, an Aymara militia commanded by Zárate Willka proved to be a critical ally for the liberals in their triumph over the Sucre-based conservatives.⁶³⁵ General José Manuel Pando—the leader of the liberal army—had assured Willka and his followers that in exchange for their support, he would abrogate the land privatization laws of the 1870s and 1880s. Hoping to recover lands lost to the La Paz commercial elite, Aymara communities across the altiplano joined Willka's militia and fought alongside the liberal army. After defeating the conservatives in 1899, however, liberal leaders reneged on their promise. The ascendant liberal elite had a major financial stake in the redistribution of communal lands. The shift in the national economy from the Potosí-based silver mines, to the Oruro-based tin created a new demand for agrarian goods and shifted the axis of agricultural production away from Sucre and towards La Paz. The privatization and subsequent acquisition of communal lands thus offered liberal elites both wealth and status. In an effort to discredit the Aymara militia, President Pando accused them of fomenting race war, citing events in Mohoza, where a detachment of Willka's army massacred liberal soldiers in February 1899. Although the massacre did indeed occur, historian Marta Irurozqui argues that allegations of race war were largely unfounded, invented to justify the state's decision not

⁶³⁵ Condarco Morales, *Zárate, El Temible Wilka*. See also, Mendieta, *De Tupac Katari a Zárate Willka*; Brooke Larson, *Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810-1910* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

to restitute indigenous communal lands.⁶³⁶ Despite their fallaciousness, the allegations resonated in a society living under the specter of indigenous uprising, and after the war, the government prosecuted Willka and other Aymara leaders at the Mohoza and Peñas trails.⁶³⁷

The highly-publicized trials played a critical role in shaping creole perception of the Aymara. As the proceedings dragged on during the 1900s, politicians and the national press vilified the Aymara, drawing on familiar tropes of racial degeneration to explain the intrinsically barbaric, savage, and violent nature of the Aymara population.⁶³⁸ The most authoritative voice to emerge was that of Bautista Saavedra, the La Paz attorney appointed to provide legal counsel for the Aymara defendants in the Mohoza trial.⁶³⁹ In 1903, he published his defense as “La criminalidad Aymara en el proceso Mohoza,” an essay included in his most widely-recognized social scientific tract, *El Ayllu*. As Brooke Larson points out in a recent article, instead of exculpating his defendants, Saavedra’s defense served as a condemnation of the so-called Aymara race.⁶⁴⁰ In constructing his defense, Saavedra drew on contemporary French theories of crowd psychology and positivist criminology to explain the extreme violence and moral degeneration underlying the massacre. But ultimately, Saavedra’s defense rested on pseudoscientific explanations

⁶³⁶ Marta Irurozqui, *La armonía de las desigualdades: Elites y conflictos de poder en Bolivia, 1880-1920* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1994), p. 134.

⁶³⁷ For more on the trials, see: Brooke Larson, *Trials of Nation Making*.

⁶³⁸ For more on how the Aymara uprising was treated by the national press, see: E. Gabrielle Kuenzli, “Acting Inca: The Parameters of National Belonging in Early Twentieth-Century Bolivia,” *Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 90, no. 2 (May 2010): 247-281

⁶³⁹ For an overview of Saavedra and how his ideas fit into broader currents of racial and national thought in early twentieth-century Bolivia, see: Brooke Larson, “Reedeemed Indians, Barbarized Cholos: Crafting Neocolonial Modernity in Liberal Bolivia, 1900-1910,” in *Political Cultures in the Andes, 1750-1950*, eds. Nils Jacobsen and Cristóbal Aljovín de Losada (Duke University Press Books, 2005).

⁶⁴⁰ Brooke Larson, “Reedeemed Indians, Barbarized Cholos.”

of the “condiciones étnicas y psicológicas del indio aymara.”⁶⁴¹ According to Saavedra, his defendants were victims of biology, and the massacre at Mohoza was a “la manifestación de un estallido feroz y salvaje de una raza atrofiada moralmente.”⁶⁴² Throughout the text, he goes to great lengths to explain “la profunda perversión de la sensibilidad moral en los Aymaras” and “la índole cruel e indómita de los aymaras.”⁶⁴³ Despite Saavedra’s efforts to explain the massacre as a result of biology and crowd psychology, Willka and his lieutenants were executed and the net effect of the entire affair was to marginalize the so-called “Aymara race,” recasting them as national enemies.

For this generation of pacheño intellectuals and statesmen, who articulated progress as the triumph of civilization over barbarity, an Aymara-centered interpretation of Tiwanaku thus presented a conundrum. How could the government embrace Tiwanaku as a national symbol, while distancing themselves from the “morally atrophied” Aymara? As historian Gabrielle Kuenzli illustrates, one solution to this problem of national identity was to emphasize the Inca history of Bolivia while silencing the Aymara past.⁶⁴⁴ She argues that in the wake of the Federal War, statesmen and intellectuals alike promoted a glorious Inca past as a means to distance themselves from the Aymara and to demonstrate national progress. That the creole elite privileged an Inca interpretation of Bolivia’s pre-Hispanic past might seem to negate Qayum’s assertion that Tiwanaku provided liberal nation builders with a glorious Aymara past. Rather, it speaks to the multivocal and heterogeneous nature of nationhood in the imagination of early-twentieth

⁶⁴¹ Bautista Saavedra, *El Ayllu* (La Paz: Imp. Artística, Velarde, Aldazosa y ca, 1903), p. 175.

⁶⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 171.

⁶⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 172-173.

⁶⁴⁴ E. Gabrielle Kuenzli, “Acting Inca: The Parameters of National Belonging in Early Twentieth-Century Bolivia,” *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 90, No. 2 (May 2010), pp. 247-281.

century Bolivia nation builders. Yet given the prevalence of Tiwanaku iconography and increased interest in the ruins during the first decades of the twentieth century, it seems implausible that the Inca past retained a lasting place in the creole national imagination—especially given the fact that nation builders sought to distance themselves from Peru. Instead of an Inca past, instead of an Aymara past, early twentieth-century creoles fashioned a new narrative of Tiwanaku that allowed them to aggrandize the pre-Hispanic past while distancing themselves from the Aymara.

Ultimately, the speculative nature of Tiwanaku archeology and the lack of specific, scientifically-grounded information on the Aymara, granted La Paz intellectuals a great deal of interpretive freedom. Arturo Posnansky had the vivid imagination to provide the Bolivian state with the narrative necessary to champion Tiwanaku as a national symbol. An Austrian immigrant turned self-styled anthropologist, Posnansky emerged as the most influential Tiwanaku myth-maker within the political and social circles of the La Paz liberal elite. Especially prolific in both output and imagination, Posnansky published over 130 tracts on Tiwanaku between his first foray in “*Tiahuanacologia*” in 1904 and his death in 1946. His work enjoyed great popularity—not just in Bolivia, but across the Americas and Europe as well. Advancing spectacular theories regarding the origins of the ruins, and the civilization that once populated them, Posnansky’s analysis, similar to those of the European travelers that preceded him, was rife with unfounded racial assumptions that dismissed Tiwanaku’s Aymara origins.

As the title of his 1945 masterwork, *Tiwanaku: El cuño del hombre Americano*, suggests, Posnansky contended that Tiwanaku was the cultural and spiritual birthplace of all pre-Colombian civilizations in the Americas. The book was the culmination of almost half a century of archeological and anthropological research on the Bolivian altiplano

published in various scientific journals and books in the Americas and Europe. His interpretation of Tiwanaku was founded upon telluric notions of geography and climate, and shaped by positivist theories of racial degeneration. Dating Tiwanaku's ceremonial architecture to 12,500 B.C.E., he argued that the site was originally constructed by the Kollas, an "Andean Arian" race that had conquered the Arawak, a racially inferior people that had previously inhabited the region.⁶⁴⁵ He postulated that the altiplano once enjoyed a climate that provided lush vegetation and abundant wildlife, but "climatic aggression" displaced the occupants, forcing them to abandon Tiwanaku for more favorable environments. The Kollas then went on to populate the Americas; they "migrated in part to Brazil, in part to Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia, and from there to Central America, Mexico, and even Northern Arizona."⁶⁴⁶ The Aymara, he concluded, were either a degenerated Kolla or the descendants of the racially-inferior Arawak who did not flee the changing climate. The altiplano, he assured his readers, was not always "inhabited by such inferior races, possessing scant civilization, like those of the Aymara, Quechua, Puquina, Uru, etc."⁶⁴⁷

Posnansky's interpretation of Tiwanaku reflected the dominant paradigms of scientific racism in vogue at the time, and resonated with Bolivia's ruling elite, who were struggling to maintain a racially segregated society. It proved especially convenient to

⁶⁴⁵ For a wonderful essay on the racial thought of Posnansky, see: Pablo Quisbert C., "La gloria de la raza': historia prehispánica, imaginarios e identidades entre 1930 y 1950," *Estudios bolivianos 12: La cultura del pre-52*, Ana Rebeca Prada M., ed (La Paz: CIMA, 2004), pp. 177-121. For a more specific volume on Posnansky's racial thought, and his detailed thinking on the difference between Kollas and Arawaks, see: Arthur Posnansky, *Antropología y sociología de las razas interandinas y de las regiones adyacentes* (La Paz: Instituto Tihuanacu de Antropología, Etnografía y Prehistoria, 1937) and Arturo Posnansky, *Qué es raza?* (La Paz: Instituto "Tihuanacu" de Antropología, Etnografía y Prehistoria, 1943).

⁶⁴⁶ Arturo Posnansky, *Tiwanaku: Cuna del hombre americano* (New Cork: J.J. Augustin, 1945), p. 2.

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 33. For a strong refutation of Posnansky's overt racism, see Juan Comas, "La discriminación racial en América, primera parte," *América Indígena*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1945) : 73-89.

early twentieth-century liberals who sought to transform Tiwanaku into a national symbol by allowing them to project the aggrandized pre-Hispanic past as a symbol of national greatness while simultaneously distancing themselves from the Aymara population that, in their perception, served as a hindrance to prevailing precepts of order and progress. Merging *indigenista* mysticism, Victorian romanticism, German physical anthropology, social evolutionism, and contemporary Bolivian social thought, Posnansky provided a distinct interpretation of Andean civilization destined for elite consumption. Kolata observes that such a rationale regarding Tiwanaku's origins—one that at once exaggerated its importance and underscored the racial inferiority of the indigenous people who inhabited the area—"shored up the intellectual underpinnings supporting the repressive system of patron-client relationships and economic domination that characterized the social relationships between European and Indian" in early-twentieth century Bolivia.⁶⁴⁸

Yet, this interpretation of Tiwanaku did not go uncontested. In 1932, the Bolivian government granted Wendell Bennett from the American Museum of Natural History permission to excavate at Tiwanaku. What was most significant about the expedition was the application, for the first time, of stratigraphic analysis. Developed in the mid-nineteenth century by Austrian and Italian archeologists working in the eastern Mediterranean, stratigraphic analysis provided archeologists with a method to date artifacts and establish relative chronologies of ancient civilizations.⁶⁴⁹ By exploring human refuse in different sediment levels, one could determine a basic cultural-historical sequence. Digging at Tiwanaku and a nearby mound called Chiripa, Bennett identified a

⁶⁴⁸ Kolata, *The Tiwanaku*, p. 15.

⁶⁴⁹ Bruce G. Trigger, *A History of Archeological Thought* (New York: Cambridge, 1989), pp 196-206.

basic chronology of Tiwanaku civilization from pottery shards and other refuse, establishing the first cultural historical sequence of the site. He posited that Tiwanaku civilization existed between 200 C.E. and 1200 C.E. and passed through three distinct stages, which he labeled as Early, Classic, and Decadent. He also notes the existence of a fourth stage, post-Decadent, that coincided with the Inca conquest.⁶⁵⁰ The Bennett excavation was also notable for unearthing a giant monolith measuring seven meters tall and almost two meters wide, which was subsequently named the Bennett Monolith to honor its discoverer. Bennett's excavation represented a scientific revolution in the study of Tiwanaku, and posed a challenge to Posnansky's fantastic reading of the ruins and their origins. Regardless of the scientific foundation of Bennett's conclusions, Posnansky's interpretation nevertheless continued to enjoy widespread popularity in social scientific circles in Bolivia and Europe.

Despite increasing interest in the ruins among prominent *paceño* intellectuals, efforts to promote Tiwanaku as an official national cultural symbol during the first half of the twentieth century ultimately failed. Qayum argues that the project was “compromised by ambivalence over national identity in a racially and ethnically divided society.”⁶⁵¹ As both she and Isabel Scarborough point out, the ambivalence surrounding Tiwanaku's place in the national imagination became especially salient during the 1930s, when Posnansky transferred the massive Bennett monolith from Tiwanaku to La Paz in order to place it in the center of the Plaza Isabella Católica, on Avenida Arce, a major urban

⁶⁵⁰ Wendell C. Bennett, “Excavations at Tiahuanaco,” *Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (1934), pp. 359-491, p. 450.

⁶⁵¹ Qayum, *Creole Imaginings*, p. 219.

thoroughfare.⁶⁵² Protest flared among the city's creole elite and working class mestizos, who saw the monolith as a constant reminder of "Indianness" and a harbinger of bad luck.⁶⁵³ In 1940, mounting public discontent obliged Posnansky to remove the monolith from the city center and place it to the neighborhood of Miraflores. Only after 1952 would this ambivalence subside—at least in terms of government policy. The fact that indigenous people were then, for the first time, granted the full rights of citizenship made very real the possibility that Tiwanaku could become a unifying national symbol.

TIWANAKU AND THE POSTREVOLUTIONARY NATION

"Somos el pueblo que hizo Tiwanaku," proclaimed Víctor Paz Estenssoro, President of Bolivia's fledgling postrevolutionary government, before thousands of cheering miners and campesinos at Haununi, a sprawling mining camp in the department of Oruro. "Somos el pueblo que supo resistir tres cientos años de dominación española y supo sobrevivir con sus instituciones y un día supo triunfar y derrotar a los españoles y establecer la independencia política," he continued. "Somos un pueblo que ha sabido resistir, mucho más de un siglo de la vida republicana, con todas las injusticias que a pesar de la independencia política subsistieron, somos un pueblo que ha sido capaz a través de estos seis largos y duros años, de derrotar a la Rosca en las magníficas jornadas de Abril."⁶⁵⁴ This speech, which President Paz Estenssoro delivered just weeks after the Revolutionary triumph of April 1952, provides a vivid example of the unifying national

⁶⁵² Isabel Scarborough, "The Bennett Monolith: Archaeological Patrimony and Cultural Restitution in Bolivia," *Handbook of South American Archaeology*, edited by Helaine Silverman and William H. Isbell (New York: Springer, 2008), pp. 1089-1101; Qayum, *Creole Imaginings*, p. 242-47.

⁶⁵³ Scarborough, "The Bennett Monolith," p. 1096.

⁶⁵⁴ Secretaría Ejecutiva del Comité Político Nacional del M.N.R., *El Pensamiento Revolucionario de Paz Estenssoro* (La Paz: E. Burillo & Cía, 1955), pp. 174-75. I am grateful to Pablo Quisbert for sharing this source.

discourse of mestizaje that lay at the heart of the Bolivian National Revolution. Seeking to eliminate deep-seated divisions of race and class, the postrevolutionary government set out to create a new, more inclusive national culture that embraced Bolivia's Hispanic and Andean origins. As Paz Estenssoro's speech lucidly illustrated, the notion of *pueblo*—originally elaborated by founding MNR intellectuals José Cuadros Quiroga and Carlos Montenegro—provided the conceptual foundation for the mestizo nation by linking middle class professionals, indigenous peasants, urban workers, and miners through a common history of resistance to colonial domination. In Tiwanaku, the postrevolutionary government recognized a powerful icon of national unity for this new national artifice.

To the intellectuals, politicians, and party stalwarts that assumed positions in the postrevolutionary government, Tiwanaku represented an ideal symbol of national unity. Creating a new national culture that celebrated Bolivia's mixed cultural and ethnic heritage was particularly challenging in a society dominated by a creole minority that generally considered Indians as racially inferior, uncivilized, an unfit for citizenship. For the MNR to succeed in instilling pride in the nation's Andean origins, it needed first to supplant entrenched notions of racial and cultural inferiority with alternative narratives extolling the virtues of indigenous culture. Immediately after the Revolution, officials turned to Tiwanaku in order to fashion that narrative. The ruins served as a testament to a glorious pre-Hispanic past in which an indigenous Andean civilization demonstrated a high-degree of civilization, technological sophistication, and social organization. Tiwanaku thus offered a perfect example of how the indigenous past would ensure the modern, mestizo future.

Ñuflo Chávez Ortiz, the head of the newly-created Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos (Ministry of Peasant Affairs, MAC), took the initiative in promoting

Tiwanaku as a symbol of the postrevolutionary nation. Just two weeks after the Revolution, he set out to improve the Museo Nacional Tiwanaku (Tiwanaku National Museum, MNT)⁶⁵⁵ The MNT was the most popular museum in Bolivia, exhibiting relics from Tiwanaku and other Andean civilizations, and Chávez presumably sought to increase public interest in Bolivia's pre-Hispanic past.⁶⁵⁶ During the previous decades, the government had increased the role of the MNT beyond the exhibition of the pre-Hispanic past, placing its staff in charge of the protection and preservation of the ruins. After the Revolution, Chávez sought to increase their role even further, urging MNT officials to expand their budget in order to take on a role archeological research at Tiwanaku. Manuel Lazarte Liendo, who had served as the director of the MNT since 1950, welcomed the unprecedented government enthusiasm and set out to increase state funding for both the Museum and the archaeological site.

Tiwanaku was the primary focus of a broader state initiative to valorize the indigenous past in general and the Aymara past in particular. Chávez and other MNR officials sought to transform the MNT into the national headquarters for social scientific research on Bolivia's indigenous population. With the creation of MAC in April 1952, the government expanded the IIB, creating within the state indigenista bureau the Departamento de Investigaciones Antropológicas (Department of Anthropological

⁶⁵⁵ UNAR, Centro de Investigaciones Arqueológicas en Tiwanaku (CIAT), Correspondencia, 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), Ñufló Chávez to Manuel Lazarte Liendo 4/28/1952,

⁶⁵⁶ Federico Diez de Medina, *Museos Arqueológicos y colecciones culturales de La Paz* (La Paz: Imprenta Artística, 1954), 7. This small monograph was funded by the Comité Organizador del III Congreso Indigenista Interamericano—which was headed by José Antonio Arze—in preparation for the Third Interamerican Indigenous Congress which convened in La Paz in August 1954. Further information on the museum was found in Archivo y Biblioteca Nacionales de Bolivia (ABNB), Museo Nacional de Arqueología (MNAR), Correspondence, 1958-59 (02-328), Manuel Lazarte Liendo to Jaime Zamorano Crespo, 7/19/1958.

Research, DIA)⁶⁵⁷ To staff the new office, Chávez drew from the MNT staff, and chose Maks Portugal Zamora to direct it. Like his colleagues in the mid-century Bolivian social sciences, Portugal did not have a professional degree in archeology. He had actually studied art, graduating from the prestigious Escuela de Artes Aplicadas of La Paz in 1930.⁶⁵⁸ For most of the following two decades, he worked as Posnansky's assistant, assisting with research, excavations, and field work. Posnansky also served as his mentor as he independently studied archeology and anthropology.⁶⁵⁹ He was soon among the paceño cultural vanguard, occupying the coveted directorship of the MNT from 1936 to 1939. By 1952, he was recognized as one of the nation's leading indigenista intellectuals, and remained closely affiliated with the Museum and its activities.⁶⁶⁰ Given the MNT's similar preoccupation with scientific study of the indigenous past, officials from the Ministries of Education and Peasant Affairs pushed for a high level of coordination between the MNT and the IIB.⁶⁶¹ By July, the IIB staff was split between the offices of MAC and the MNT in downtown La Paz.

The director of the IIB, Félix Eguino Zaballa, began to work in conjunction with Manuel Lazarte and Gregorio Cordero of the MNT to broaden government interest in Tiwanaku. To this end, Eguino organized an official state ceremony at Tiwanaku for

⁶⁵⁷ Oscar A. Bustillos, "Instituto Indigenista Boliviano," *Anuario Indigenista*, Vol. 31 (Diciembre 1971), pp. 99-101; Bernabe Ledesma, "Fines y objetivos de las direcciones generales del Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos," *Inti Karka: órgano del movimiento pedagógico indigenista*, 2ª Época, No. 4 (Noviembre-Diciembre 1954), pp. 62-70, p. 62.

⁶⁵⁸ José Roberto Arze, *Diccionario biográfico boliviano: figuras bolivianas en las ciencias sociales* (La Paz, Cochabamba: Amigos del Libro, 1984), p. 137.

⁶⁵⁹ Max Portugal Ortíz, "Reseña de la obra del Profesor Maks Portugal Zamora," *Nuevos Aportes*, No. 2 (2005), pp. 3-14.

⁶⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶¹ ABNB, MNAR, Correspondencia, 1952 (02-323), Humberto Bilabo la Vieja to Manuel Lazarte Liendo, 7/8/1952; ABNB, MNAR, Correspondencia, 1952 (02-323), Manuel Lazarte Liendo to Mario Diez de Medina, 7/23/1952.

September 21, 1952, which marked Lapaca Pacha, an Aymara celebration of the spring equinox (also called Citua Raymi after the Inca conquest). This cultural tourism was by no means new. During the 1930s, Posnansky and other La Paz elites traveled to Tiwanaku during solstice and equinox celebrations to carry out secretive ceremonies. With the Revolution, however, the celebration was transformed from a cultish gathering among paceño intellectuals into an official celebration of the nation. Eguino contacted the Guaqui-La Paz railroad—which was built in the mid-nineteenth century and stopped at the village of Tiwanaku on its way to and from the Lake Titicaca port town of Guaqui—to arrange for a special transport for the exclusive guests—which President Paz Estenssoro, several state ministers, as well as foreign dignitaries—to Tiwanaku on September 20, and to return after sunrise on the twenty-first. Guests were treated to song and dance from local indigenous communities, speeches by MNR officials, and just as the sun was rising, a Bolivian flag was raised atop the ruins in an unprecedented symbolic gesture.⁶⁶² There was even a popular effort to establish the day as the “primera fecha nacional,” an effort that resulted in historians and antiquarians to review Aymara folk calendars, the early chronicles Bernabe and Lobo, and colonial archives.⁶⁶³ It seemed that was the kind of ‘indiófila’ exagerada e insensata” that Urquidi described to Paz.⁶⁶⁴

In the aftermath of the official celebration of Lapaca Pacha, Eguino convinced MAC officials of the importance of the ruins in the postrevolutionary imagination. In October 1952, Ñuflo Chávez wrote the Minister of Education, Mario Diez de Medina,

⁶⁶² Archivo Central del Ministerio de Desarrollo de Culturas (ACMDC), Papeles de Ismael Sotomayor (IS), Correspondence, 1948-53, Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos, Instituto Indigenista Boliviano, “Celebración del Equinoccio de la Primavera en Tiahuanacu (Citua Raymi), 10/21/1952, p. 3.

⁶⁶³ “La primera fecha nacional,” *Gaceta Campesina: Órgano oficial del Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos*, Año 2, No. 2 (Abril de 1953), p. 63-64.

⁶⁶⁴ ABNB, WGA, Reforma Agraria, Arturo Urquidi to Victor Paz Estenssoro, 6/10/1954, p. 2.

proposing a state project to excavate, reconstruct, and restore the Tiwanaku ruins. “In keeping with the revolutionary ideals of Reconstruction and Restoration of the values that inform our culture,” he urged, “my office believes that it is now time to approach together with the Museum of your honorable ministry the study of a serious official plan for the Reconstruction and Restoration of Tiwanaku.”⁶⁶⁵ If Chávez was unable to appeal to Medina’s nationalist sentiment with patriotic statements regarding the valorization of the indigenous past, he was quick to assure the Minister of Education that the project would also coincide with the MNR’s broader goal of economic diversification by providing a “inexhaustible source of tourism.”⁶⁶⁶ Seeing that the National Tiwanaku Museum operated under the purview of the Ministry of Education, Chávez urged Medina to include in the Ministry’s 1953 budget, five million bolivianos to create a “real excavation plan.”⁶⁶⁷ Over the course of the next five years, the Bolivian state would invest 25 million bolivianos into the project. By 1957, Chávez imagined the construction of an “American archeological park,” where the Bolivian government would “show the American continent one of its grandest accomplishments.”⁶⁶⁸

The Tiwanaku restoration project represented an unprecedented state intervention in national archeology. Marking a distinct break from the cultural politics of the past, it was the first time that the Bolivian government provided material and institutional

⁶⁶⁵ UNAR, CIAT, Correspondence, 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), Ñuflo Chávez Ortiz to Mario Diez de Medina, “Ref. Reconstrucción y Restauración de Tiahuanacu,” 10/9/1952.

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁸ Ibid. Posnansky was the first to propose transforming Tiwanaku into a national park, or reserve. He imagined transforming the entire Tiwanaku valley into a park. The ruins would be the centerpiece, but the indigenous peoples populating the valley would also be an attraction. According to Posnansky, the Aymara speaking Indians were part of the natural environment. In the valley, “mantendrían la pureza racial libre de toda mezcla.” He also suggested transporting Uru families into the park. See *Un “Parque Nacional en Bolivia”* (La Paz: Editorial Renacimiento, 1937), p. 8.

support for archeological research. This shift indicated the cultural colonization of the ruins, their transformation from a contested and indeed ambivalent symbol of the indigenous past into a potent and readily-identifiable symbol of the newly-integrated postrevolutionary republic. The project to excavate and restore Tiwanaku necessitated (and justified) not only the creation of state institutions to manage the effort, but a research agenda that challenged decades of inaccurate, unscientific research and imaginative speculation into the ruins and the indigenous civilization that once populated them.

The establishment of a research agenda for national archeology was the primary objective of the First Round Table on Bolivian Archeology, which convened in La Paz between December 15 and 21, 1953.⁶⁶⁹ Organized by the Municipality of La Paz, it was the first conference to bring together specialists from across the country. Indeed, the meeting in itself attests to the postrevolutionary government's broad interest in Bolivia's pre-Hispanic past. The list of attendees included the new generation of nationalist archeologists, who in subsequent years, would lead a burgeoning state archeological mission and become the architects of the postrevolutionary mestizo nation. The attendees were Gregorio Cordero Miranda, sub-director of the MNT; Maks Portugal, Director of the Casa de Murillo; Jacobo Liberman, president of the Municipal Council of Culture; Dick Iberra Grasso, Director of the Museum of Archeology at the University of San Simón in Cochabamba. Presiding over the event was Juan Luis Gutiérrez Granier, mayor of La Paz and a committed MNR militant.⁶⁷⁰

⁶⁶⁹ Carlos Ponce Sanginés, *Arqueología boliviana* (La Paz: Biblioteca Paceña, 1957), pp. 15-27.

⁶⁷⁰ Carlos Ponce Sanginés, "Infamación Antropológica de Bolivia, 1953-1954" *Boletín Bibliográfico de Antropología Americana*, Vol. XVII (1954), p. 1-2. For an example of Gutiérrez Granier's promotion of a paceño-based national culture model, see early issues of the municipal cultural publication, *Khana*. See

The sub-director of the conference was an aspiring archeologist, nationalist, and MNR militant named Carlos Ponce Sanginés. It was Ponce who, in his capacity as vice president of the La Paz Municipal Council on Culture, was the primary motivating force behind the organization of the conference. And it was Ponce, more than any other figure during this period, who envisioned in Tiwanaku archeology a fundamentally nationalist



Illustration 15: Archeologist Carlos Ponce Sanginés, head of the postrevolutionary archeological mission (Credit: South American Pictures).

mission. Born into a wealthy La Paz family in 1925, Ponce's passion for archeology started when he was a child, exploring on his parent's estate, Hacienda Mollo, in Muñecas, a central province in the department of La Paz. He attended college in the

also Juan Luis Gutiérrez Granier's oficial *memoria* with *Cuatro años de labor municipal, 1953-56* (La Paz: Burillo y CIA, 1956).

Universidad Nacional de Córdoba in Argentina, where he studied archeology under Antonio Serrano.⁶⁷¹ In 1948, at the age of 28, he published his first monograph on national archeology, a study of Tiwanaku ceramics.⁶⁷² Upon his return to La Paz, he joined the MNR, and following the Revolution, he was appointed to his position in the municipal government. With the First Round Table on Bolivian Archeology, Ponce sought to convene the nation's archeologists to discuss the current state of the discipline in Bolivia and to develop a set of questions to frame future research.

What resulted from the conference was a research agenda that attended to the broader nationalist mission of postrevolutionary archeology. The primary objectives of this agenda were to dispel the speculation and mystery surrounding the ruins and to establish a new chronology for Tiwanaku civilization employing the latest scientific methods.⁶⁷³ Fundamentally, it sought to disprove an existing canon of archeological knowledge shaped, above all, by Posnansky. Posnansky's legacy was deeply entrenched in the La Paz intelligentsia, and even resonated in foreign archeological circles as well.⁶⁷⁴ His enduring legacy was even visible on the stationary of the *Sociedad Arqueológica de Bolivia* (Archeological Society of Bolivia, SAB), an independent organization of La Paz scholars, politicians, and antiquarians founded in 1930 by those interested in the study of Bolivian archeology.⁶⁷⁵ Members of the organization included several notable figures in

⁶⁷¹ "Obituario: Carlos Ponce Sanginés (1925-2005)," *Nuevos Aportes*, No. 2 (2005), pp. 77-82.

⁶⁷² Carlos Ponce Sanginés, *Cerámica tiwanacota: Vasos con decoración prosopomorfa* (Buenos Aires: Emecé, 1948).

⁶⁷³ "El Alcalde inauguró la Mesa Redonda de Arqueología Boliviana," *El Diario*, 12/16/1953, p. 1.

⁶⁷⁴ See, for example, Hans S. Bellamy and Peter Allan, *The Calendar of Tiahuanaco: A Disquisition on the Time Measuring System of the Oldest Civilization in the World* (London, Faber & Faber: 1956). Following the publication of this work, Ponce Sanginés dismissed it as "nada más que una enciclopedia de barbaridades." UNAR, CIAT, Correspondence, 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), Carlos Ponce Sanginés, "Excavaciones Arqueológicas en Tiwanaku, Bolivia (suramerica)," June 1959.

⁶⁷⁵ David Browman, "La Sociedad Arqueología de Bolivia y su influencia en el desarrollo de la práctica arqueológica en Bolivia," *Nuevos aportes*, no. 4 (2007), 29-54.

pre- and post-revolutionary Bolivian archeology, including Alberto Laguna Meave and Federico Diez de Medina. Inscribed on the 1954 letterhead of was an explanation of the history of Tiwanaku, stating that the 12,500 year-old ruins were the birthplace of American peoples. The text was taken verbatim from *Tiwanaku: Cradle of American Man*.⁶⁷⁶

At the Round Table, Ponce and other nationalist archeologists asserted that Posnansky's work was problematic on several accounts. First of all, it was racist because it argued for the biological inferiority of Andean peoples in general, and the Aymara in particular. Revealing both the reach of Posnansky's ideas and the race-based theories that underlie them, in 1945 Juan Comas, the Spanish-born Mexican anthropologist, repudiated Posnansky in *América Indígena*, the quarterly publication of the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, to make a broader statement on race and racism in the Americas.⁶⁷⁷ Indeed, nationalist archeologists associated Posnansky's work with a broader canon of national self-denigrating knowledge produced during the liberal era, whose infamous progenitor was none other than Alcides Arguedas. Another problematic aspect that nationalist archeologists identified in Posnansky's research was its chronology. By dating Tiwanaku civilization back 12,500 years, his interpretation of the ruins provided a past too remote to link to the postrevolutionary nation. Nationalist archeologists asserted, moreover, that his methods for arriving at this date were unscientific, the result of a speculative assumptions about Tiwanaku iconography and ancient astronomy rather than modern scientific inquiry.

⁶⁷⁶ UNAR, CIAT, Correspondencia 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), Alberto Laguna Meave, President of the SAB to Federico Álvarez Plata, Minister of Education, 3/10/54.

⁶⁷⁷ Juan Comas, "La discriminación racial en América, primera parte," *América Indígena*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1945): 73-89

While the First Round Table defined a research agenda for postrevolutionary archeology, and while the MNT and IIB began planning the excavation and restoration plans for Tiwanaku, other nationalist intellectuals drew on Posnansky's conclusions to assist in the postrevolutionary objective of valorizing the Aymara past. One particularly salient example is a 1954 essay written by Luis Soria Lens, "Origen, lugar de origen de los Aymaras y su probable expansión de las tres Américas, Dinastías Aymaras."⁶⁷⁸ A linguist by trade and a MNR militant, Soria applied his knowledge of the Aymara language to North American toponymy to challenge Posnansky's infamous assertion that the Aymara were the descendants of the racially inferior Arawak. He asserted that it was the Aymara, not the Kolla, who populated the Americas 12,500 years ago, settling as far north as Alaska. He argued that the Algonquin names of Midwestern states have their roots in the Aymara language. Michigan, for instance, comes from the Aymara phrase "Mitchi hani" which means "without arrow." The word Mexico originated "misikku," the Aymara word for a yellow daisy with six pedals that grows on the Bolivian altiplano, that, he points out, "are also plentiful on the Mexican altiplano." The word Maya, he asserted, came from the Aymara word for the number one, "maya."⁶⁷⁹

With such linguistic and toponymic evidence, Soria Lens presented a provocative case for a hemispheric Aymara diaspora. But his argument was also tied to broader contemporary concerns with indigenous social uplift. He argued that, "If some authors considered the Maya and Aztec as the Greeks of America, and the Inca the Latin people

⁶⁷⁸ The work of Soria Lens—and indeed, Posnansky, as well—may have been influenced by the work of Emeterio Villamil de Rada who in *La lengua de Adán y el hombre de Tihuanaco* (La Paz, 1888) asserted that Tiwanaku was the center of human creation. Similar to Soria Lens, he explores Aymara linguistics, arguing that the language provided the foundation for all other languages in the world.

⁶⁷⁹ Luis Soria Lens, "Origen, lugar de origen de los Aymaras y su probable expansión de las tres Américas, Dinastías Aymaras," *Khana*, Vol. I, nos. 3 y 4 (Julio 1954), pp. 33-52, pp. 35-39.

of this part of the world, the Aymara, who, by the proof that we have provided, are perhaps the predecessors of both civilizations, since they were lucky to possess a superior culture whose relics remain in Tiwanaku.”⁶⁸⁰ But despite similar attempts to advance nationalist archeology upon Posnansky’s claims, Ponce believed that only through the tools offered by modern science could Tiwanaku’s true history be revealed and the contested Aymara past could, one and for all, be valorized.

SCIENCE AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ARCHEOLOGY

If refuting Posnansky was the pillar upon which postrevolutionary archeology was both founded and institutionalized, an uncompromising commitment to modern science enabled nationalist archeologists to achieve their objective. With the First Round Table on Archeology, nationalist intellectuals had distanced themselves from their predecessors by proclaiming a rigid adherence to modern scientific techniques. The Round Table, Ponce asserted, served as the reference point for a new nationalist archeology, and he welcomed the “modifications that the incessant development of science will be able to forge in the future.”⁶⁸¹ To be sure, the standardization of scientific methodology within archeological practice upon was the primary factor motivating the institutionalization of postrevolutionary archeology. And despite the purported universality of science, Tiwanaku archeology and the scientific practices upon which it was founded developed within an increasingly restricted nationalist agenda.⁶⁸²

⁶⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 41.

⁶⁸¹ Carlos Ponce Sanginés, *Arqueología boliviana* (La Paz: Biblioteca Paceña, 1957), p. 17.

⁶⁸² For a broad overview on how universal scientific paradigms were shaped by local circumstances across Latin America, see: Nancy Leys Stepan, *“The Hour of Eugenics”: Race Gender, and Nation in Latin America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).

Having established a research agenda for nationalist archeology at the First Round Table, Ponce set out to ensure that the excavation of Tiwanaku was carried out using stratigraphic analysis and to introduce novel techniques of radiocarbon dating. Although stratigraphic analysis had existed since the nineteenth century, the technique was not introduced in Bolivia until 1932 by Wendell Bennett, who demonstrated its utility by establishing the first cultural historical sequence of Tiwanaku civilization. Yet Bennett's excavation was limited: his analysis was based on only ten pits. By applying stratigraphic analysis to the excavation of the entire site, Ponce hoped not only to test Bennett's conclusions, but also to confirm his dates with new advances in radiocarbon techniques. While stratigraphic analysis provided a relative chronology of ancient civilizations, radiocarbon offered a method to date archeological sites with much more precision. The technique—developed by the University of Chicago chemist, Willard Libby in 1949—was based on the carbon-14 isotope, which is present in all organic materials. Calculating that the carbon-14 isotope had a half-life of 5568 ± 30 years and decayed at a fixed exponential rate, Libby demonstrated that the age of carbon-bearing materials—such as bone or charcoal—could be established by measuring the level of decay of the carbon-14 isotope against its half-life. With such practices, Ponce would establish a definitive history of Tiwanaku, one confirmed by the authority of science.

Ponce and other government officials sought to consolidate the efforts of the IIB, the MNT, and the SAB under a centralized state institution that could properly manage the excavation and reconstruction of Tiwanaku and ensure that project was being carried out in accordance with the latest scientific developments in archeological practice. In order to do so, the Minister of Education, Federico Álvarez Plata, created the *Comisión Arqueológica Boliviana* (Bolivian Archeology Commission, CAB) in February 1954.

Working with the U.S. embassy, Álvarez Plata invited Wendell Bennett (who had since left the American Museum of Natural History to take a position at Yale) to return to Bolivia, head the CAB, and oversee the excavation and restoration project. Bennett was unable to accept the offer; but before his untimely death in September 1953, he recommended the University of Texas anthropologist Richard P. Schaedel to head the program instead.⁶⁸³ While awaiting confirmation from Schaedel in February and March of 1954, Álvarez Plata began recruiting members of the committee. He started by bringing on most of the members of the SAB leadership, including Federico Diez de Medina (Honorary President), Alberto Laguna Meave (President), and Manuel Lazarte (Jefe de Arqueología). He also brought in personnel from both the IIB and the MNT, including Félix Eguino Zaballa, Zacharias Monje Ortiz, Miguel Alandia Pantoja, and Gregorio Cordero. At this time, Ponce, and his wife, the anthropologist Julia Elena Fortún, traveled to Mexico City where they served as the cultural attaché to the Bolivian legation.

As efforts to recruit Bennett and Schaedel illustrate, the CAB sought to bring established foreign specialists to Bolivia in order to ensure that the burgeoning state archeological mission operated in accordance with the most recent developments in archeological research and practice. In 1956, the CAB invited University of Pennsylvania archeologist, Alfred Kidder II to dig at Tiwanaku and at Chiripa, where Wendell Bennett had carried out his excavations in 1932. With the excavation at Chiripa and Tiwanaku, CAB officials hoped to build upon Bennett's research and to reveal more

⁶⁸³ UNAR, CIAT, Correspondence, 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), J. Crawford Brooks to Federico Álvarez Plata, 1/21/53 (the letter is misdated; it is actually from 1/21/1954).

about early Tiwanaku with evidence from pottery and carbon dating.⁶⁸⁴ Working from Mexico City, Ponce arranged for samples of organic materials unearthed during the dig—charcoal and bone—to be sent to laboratories at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor for radiocarbon dating.⁶⁸⁵ In applying for the necessary permission from the Ministry of Education to carry out the project, Jacobo Liberman, General Director of Cultural for the La Paz municipal government, emphasized the way in which archeological research attended to the patriotic duty of valorizing the indigenous past. “We are guided by the intention of helping to clarify the chronology of our proto-history,” he stated, “to rectify mistakes of the past which have slandered the ancient culture of our peasantry.” He reminded Ministry officials that “it falls on us to us to take advantage of technical and more scientific means to extol the merits of our culture.”⁶⁸⁶

In February 1956, after almost two year of coordination, study, and planning, the CAB presented its official plan for the excavation and reconstruction of Tiwanaku. Of the four major monumental structures at Tiwanaku—the Pumapunku temple, the Akapana pyramid, the subterranean temple, and the Kalasasaya acropolis—the CAB decided to begin the excavation and restoration project with Kalasasaya. A sprawling courtyard enclosed by giant granite monoliths protruding from the dry earth, Kalasasaya attracted the attention and captured the imagination of the CAB staff. It was the largest and most mysterious complex in the ruins. Upon visiting the ruins in 1868, E.G. Squire

⁶⁸⁴ Alfred Kidder II, “Digging in the Titicaca Basin,” *The University of Pennsylvania Museum Bulletin*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (September 1956), pp. 17-29, p. 21.

⁶⁸⁵ UNAR, CIAT, Correspondence, 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), Jacobo Liberman to Federico Álvarez Plata, “Solicita: Permiso para realizar sondajes arqueológicos,” 11/11/1955, p. 1.

⁶⁸⁶ UNAR, CIAT, Correspondence, 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), Jacobo Liberman to Federico Álvarez Plata, “Solicita: Permiso para realizar sondajes arqueológicos,” 11/11/1955, p. 1.

had dubbed it the “Stonehenge of South America.”⁶⁸⁷ The courtyard also contained the most emblematic, and indeed, famous symbol of the ruins: the *Puerta del Sol*, a giant stone gateway adorned with elaborately carved iconography. Over the course of five years, and with a government commitment of ten million bolivianos, the CAB sought to survey the site, carry out a scientific excavation, vertically align the granite monoliths, expose the rectangular stone platform at the northeast corner of the platform, expose and reconstruct the walls between the vertical monoliths, and construct a parking lot to accommodate the automobile traffic of visitors.⁶⁸⁸ It was an ambitious project intended not only to reveal Bolivia’s glorious Andean past, but to illustrate the modernizing potential of the Aymara people.

⁶⁸⁷ E.G. Squier, “Among the Andes of Peru and Bolivia,” *Harper’s New Monthly Magazine*, Vol. 36, No. 216 (May 1868), pp. 681-700.

⁶⁸⁸ UNAR, CIAT, Correspondence 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), Comisión Arqueológica Boliviana, “Acta levantada por los miembros de la Comisión Arqueológica Boliviana,” 2/8/1956.




Illustration 16: Overview of Tiwanaku Complex (Javier Escalante, INAR 1988).

Yet with the government beset with a rising economic crisis, the Tiwanaku project sputtered by 1956. With the strict budget cuts outlined in the monetary stabilization plan the Siles administration implemented in December that year, state resources for the effort seemed to dry up. Faced with severe state budget cuts, Fernando Diez de Medina—who had just recently been appointed as Minister of Education—set out in search of alternative sources of capital to fund the first phase of the project, the excavation and reconstruction of Kalasasaya. He turned to the private sector, soliciting both money and materials from Bolivian industry. In a blanket introduction letter, he emphasized the patriotic nature of the project by stating that their donations would not

only contribute to economic diversification with the influx of tourism that would resulted from the effort, but that it would also highlight Bolivia's primordial Andean origins.⁶⁸⁹ Wheelbarrows, buckets, shovels, concrete, and wood were all donated from private Bolivian industry. Even Klaus Barbie, the infamous Nazi known as the "Butcher of Lyon" who was hiding in Bolivia under the name Klaus Altmann, donated wooden boards to the project, from Madera Santa Rosa, his timber company in the Yungas.⁶⁹⁰

As capital and materials rolled in from the private sector, Ministry of Education officials sought to centralize control of the excavation and to standardize science within national archeological practice. To oversee the project and make sure it was being carried out within the boundaries of modern science, Diez de Medina dissolved the CAB, and created the *Comité de Excavaciones* (Excavations Committee, EC) an interim institution that would oversee the project while officials worked to hammer out the details of a permanent state institution within the Ministry of Education.⁶⁹¹ He named Ponce (who had recently returned from his sojourn in Mexico) director, and in July 1957, tasked him with the creation of a legal code that would guarantee the scientific excavation of ruins.⁶⁹² During the following year, Ponce, Julia Elena Fortún and others from the MNT, reached out to research institutions, universities and museums across the globe in order to develop a comprehensive set of regulations for the excavation, reconstruction, and preservation of archeological ruins and artifacts. They obtained laws,

⁶⁸⁹ See for example: UNAR, CIAT, Correspondencia, 1957-59 (02-145), Fernando Diez de Medina to Gerente del Instituto Bioquímico Boliviano, 9/24/1957

⁶⁹⁰ UNAR, CIAT, Correspondence, 1957-59 (02-145), Gregorio Cordero Miranda to Klaus Altmann, 9/24/1957. For more on Klaus Barbie in Bolivia, see: Carlos Soria G., *Barbie-Altmann: de la gestapo a la CIA* (La Paz: Editorial Roalva, 1986).

⁶⁹¹ UNAR, INAR, Correspondence, 1959 (02-149), Carlos Ponce Sanginés, "Algo más acerca de Tiwanaku," 8/10/1959, pp. 2-5.

⁶⁹² ABNB, MNAR, Correspondence 1956-57 (02-326), Resolución Ministerial, 7/4/57.

regulations, and guides from Mexico, Italy, Spain Great Britain, France, India, Japan, Germany, as well as international organizations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).⁶⁹³

What resulted was the *Reglamento de excavaciones arqueológicas*.⁶⁹⁴ Signed into law on June 1, 1958, the *Reglamento* institutionalized scientific methods within the practice of national archeology, stipulating that all researchers—foreign and national—must submit a scientific plan, citing all of the relevant literature; the plan would then be vetted by national archeologists and government officials. Applicants were also required to survey the site, and propose a coordinate system for the excavations pits. The excavations themselves had to be carried out according to specific methodological standards, including stratigraphic analysis. Samples of pottery shards and/or organic matter had to be deposited with the Ministry of Education for carbon dating and further analysis. The *Reglamento de excavaciones arqueológicas* ensured that future excavations would be carried out according to established scientific practices, established strict government oversight over archeological research, and guaranteed that archeological patrimony would not be removed from the country. Ponce boasted that the *Reglamento* represented “el más moderno” government code to guide archeological research “de toda América.”⁶⁹⁵

At the same time, the Ministry of Education transformed the EC into the *Centro de Investigaciones Arqueológicas en Tiwanaku* (Center of Archeological Excavations in

⁶⁹³ For example, see UNAR, CIAT, Correspondence 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), Luther H. Evans, Director General de UNESCO to Ministro de Educación y Bellas Artes, 2/28/1956.

⁶⁹⁴ Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes, Departamento de Arqueología, Etnografía y Folklore, *Reglamento de excavaciones arqueológicas* (La Paz: Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes, 1960).

⁶⁹⁵ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia 1959 (02-149), Carlos Ponce Sanginés, “Algo más acerca de Tiwanaku,” 8/10/1959, p. 6.

Tiwanaku, CIAT), a permanent state institution that, in subsequent decades, would carry out the excavation and restoration project, and protect the site from looters and vandals. Of course, the organization's charter also stipulated that all aspects of the Tiwanaku restoration project must be scientific—which meant the utilization of stratigraphic analysis in all excavations, the registration of artifacts in a central database, and orientating all subsequent research within the existing scientific and archeological literature on Tiwanaku.⁶⁹⁶ With these efforts, the government sought to ensure that modern science would serve as the foundation of postrevolutionary archeology and such practices would glorify Bolivia's pre-Hispanic past.

AYMARA PAST/MESTIZO PRESENT

On September 21, 1957, after almost five years of planning, the government inaugurated the much-anticipated Tiwanaku restoration project with the excavation of the Kalasasaya acropolis. That the inauguration corresponded with Lapaca Pacha, the Aymara celebration of the spring equinox, was no coincidence. Similar to the trip sponsored by the IIB back in 1952, state officials sought to capitalize on the symbolic currency of the date to launch the project. To mark the occasion, the Ministry of Education organized a widely-publicized official ceremony that was covered by the national and international press and filmed by the Bolivian film institute.⁶⁹⁷ Presiding over the ceremony, in addition to Ponce and the state archeological team, was President Siles; the Minister of Education and Fine Arts, Fernando Diez de Medina; the Minister of

⁶⁹⁶ CIAT charter quoted in Carlos Ponce Sanginés, *Tiwanaku: 200 años de investigaciones arqueológicas* (La Paz: CIMA, 1993), pp. 214-15.

⁶⁹⁷ UNAR, CIAT, Correspondence, 1957-59 (02-145), Fernando Diez de Medina to Enrique Albarracín Crespo, 9/10/1957; UNAR, CIAT, Correspondence, 1957-59 (02-145), Enrique Albarracín Crespo to Fernando Diez de Medina, 9/13/1957.

Peasant Affairs, Federico Álvarez Plata; the President of the National Agrarian Reform Council, Adalid Balderrama; foreign dignitaries; and a host of local officials from the municipal government and rural peasant unions.⁶⁹⁸ In addition to celebrating the inauguration of the project, the ceremony represented the transformation of Tiwanaku from an indigenous remnant into a national-cultural symbol. As such, it provided an opportunity for the MNR to celebrate Bolivia's Aymara past and to showcase the postrevolutionary mestizo nation before foreign dignitaries and the national press.

After breaking ground, President Siles gave a brief speech at the most recognizable emblem of the ruins, the *Puerta del Sol*. He officially recognized Tiwanaku as a national symbol that represented the unity of the mestizo nation through its common ancestry, announcing that Tiwanaku “signifies the past of the greatness of *our* race.”⁶⁹⁹ Not only did he evoke the idea that Aymaras, creoles, and mestizos were linked through a shared primordial national past, but he also discursively appropriated indigenous struggles as part of the MNR's national popular project. “Like you, *compañeros*, children of this immense altiplano homestead, we, the current government leaders, have suffered the consequences of injustice,” he proclaimed to the crowd. “Fortunately, the clamor of our glorious forbears and our unified fight against the oppressors enabled us to break the chains that were subduing us and return our rights.”⁷⁰⁰ Tiwanaku provided a symbol that united the population under the nationalist banner of a multiethnic, cross-class struggle in which the Aymara were partnered with the creole-mestizo revolutionary vanguard.

⁶⁹⁸ “Las milenarias tierras de Tiahuanacu han vuelto a sus legítimos poseedores,” *La Nación*, 9/22/1957, p. 1.

⁶⁹⁹ “El Presidente pidió responsabilidad y esfuerzo a los trabajadores campesinos,” *El Diario*, 9/22/1957, p. 7 (my emphasis).

⁷⁰⁰ *Ibid.*




Illustration 17: President Hernán Siles at the Puerta del Sol, inaugurating the Kalasasaya excavation, September 21, 1957.⁷⁰¹

As the Tiwanaku restoration project proceeded into the 1960s, the restoration of Kalasasaya and the neighboring Temple Semisubterráneo gave tangible form to what were previously inchoate ruins, while the attendant excavations provided new clues to the social structure, political organization, and economic base of the ancient civilization.⁷⁰²

⁷⁰¹ “Las milenarias tierras de Tiahuanacu han vuelto a sus legítimos poseedores,” *La Nación*, 9/22/1957, p. 1.

⁷⁰² Carlos Ponce Sanginés, *Tiwanaku: Temple Semisubterráneo* (La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones de la Presidencia de la Republica, 1963).

Under the leadership of Ponce, a CIAT team consisting of Julia Elena Fortún, Gregorio Cordero, and Gregorio Loza unearthed a host of artifacts including mummified human remains, ceramics, metal jewelry, precious stones, instruments made from bone, stone points, finely worked metals, and massive stone monoliths adorned with finely carved iconography. As the excavation team worked tirelessly under the scorching altiplano sun, they were motivated by a strong sense of patriotic duty and the thrill of discovery. Reflecting on the excitement that the CIAT team felt as they excavated Kalasasaya, for example, Fortún recalled that, “Todos participamos en común de la sana alegría del científico, que hace sobrellevar los disgustos, estructurando con patriotismo las líneas fundamentales de la verídica historia de la más grande cultura América, Tiwanaku, y haciendo conocer a Bolivia sus raíces más hondas.”⁷⁰³

The discovery of such a rich array of material-cultural artifacts evidenced the advanced level of cultural production, technological sophistication, and sociopolitical organization achieved at Tiwanaku and enabled Ponce to put forth new interpretations as to the rise and decline of the civilization. With scientifically verifiable dates provided by radiocarbon techniques and a basic chronology resulting from the application of stratigraphic analysis, Ponce drew on Wendell Bennett’s research to elaborate a new cultural-historical sequence for Tiwanaku. Influenced by such thinkers as Arnold Toynbee and Oswald Spengler, he attempted to fit Tiwanaku into universal paradigms of the rise and decline of human civilizations.⁷⁰⁴ Excavations at Kalasasaya revealed

⁷⁰³ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1959 (02-149). Julia Elena Fortún de Ponce “Mi anecdotario de Tiwanaku,” November 1959, pp. 9-10.

⁷⁰⁴ For evidence on the influence of Spengler and Toynbee on Ponce’s interpretation of Tiwanaku, see: UNAR, CIAT, Correspondencia 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), Carlos Ponce Sanginés, “Excavaciones Arqueológicas en Tiwanaku, Bolivia (Suramérica),” June 1959, p. 6; UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1959 (02-149), Carlos Ponce Sanginés, “Algo más acerca de Tiwanaku,” 8/10/1959, p. 3-4.

material-culture artifacts that pre-dated the first phase of Bennett's cultural-historical sequence, thus establishing even deeper roots for Tiwanaku and, in the eyes of Ponce and the nationalist archeological mission, the Bolivian nation. His most notable assertion, however, concerned the historical development of the site. Bennett and others had long contended that Tiwanaku served as the ceremonial center of a broader civilization, but never developed into a densely-populated city. Based on the new data from the CIAT excavations, Ponce identified a new phase in the cultural-historical sequence, "Tiwanaku V," which was marked by an "urban revolution" characterized by increased population density at the site. This, he asserted, was the final epoch of Tiwanaku civilization and he speculated that its downfall ultimately resulted from a shortage of food to supply the rapidly expanding population.

The novel interpretation of Tiwanaku that resulted from the restoration project provided the postrevolutionary government with a glorious Aymara past to supersede a more recent history marked by ethnic resistance and racial inferiority. Elaborate ceramics, metal jewelry, precious stones, finely worked metals, and other material cultural artifacts excavated by the CIAT team revealed the technological sophistication of the ancient Aymara, while the massive stone structures evidenced a high degree of social organization which would have been necessary for their construction. Ponce's "urban revolution" thesis, moreover, demonstrated that Tiwanaku was a highly-developed city-state that retained all of the characteristics of a socially-stratified and politically-organized civilization that equaled, if not surpassed, the great cities of contemporaneous Europe. The Tiwanaku restoration project thus challenged entrenched notions of an uncivilized, savage, backward, and inferior Aymara by revealing a pre-Hispanic past in which the technologically-sophisticated and politically-savvy Andean civilization

constructed a massive city, organized labor, and lorded over an expansive empire surpassed in size and influence only by the Inca.

Eager to reveal this glorious Aymara past and the scientific advancement of Bolivian archeology to the general public, José Felleman Velarde, the recently-appointed Minister of Education and a longtime MNR stalwart, called for the renovation of the Museo Nacional Tiwanaku. In 1960, the Ministry closed the MNT to update the collection with the artifacts unearthed by CIAT and to reorganize its exhibits according to the historical development of pre-Hispanic Andean civilization. The goal was to provide Bolivian citizens and international tourists with a progressive interpretation of Bolivia's past. The new MNAR was organized into six different rooms, organized chronologically to present a linear progression of national development that began with Tiwanaku and culminated in the Bolivian nation-state. "Esta forma de exhibición," the Museum's new director, Gregorio Cordero, remarked, "es fácilmente accesible al conocimiento del público en general y especialmente la niñez."⁷⁰⁵ The Ministry of Education renamed the institution the Museo Nacional de Arqueología (MNA) and opened it to the public on January 31, 1961 with an official inauguration ceremony.

Presiding over the inauguration, Felleman Velarde celebrated the mixed cultural and ethnic heritage of the nation and emphasized the Aymara roots of Bolivian nationhood. He proclaimed that Tiwanaku represented "La Época de Oro de la Cultura Aymara," and the halls of the MNA—displaying the artifacts uncovered by Ponce and the CIAT team—stood as a testament to two thousand years of Aymara culture, "la celula

⁷⁰⁵ ABNB, MNAR, Correspondencia recibida 1963 (02-331), Gregorio Cordero Miranda, "Informe de labores que presenta el Museo Nacional de Arqueología desde el 12 de abril de 1962 a la fecha," 6/18/1963, p. 1.

madre de la Bolivianidad.”⁷⁰⁶ Valorizing the Aymara past while emphasizing the population’s potential as a modernizing force, he declared that the MNA “constituye el orgulloso testimonio de lo que fuimos en el pasado y la base de la esperanza, sobre lo que podemos ser en el futuro.”⁷⁰⁷ In a particularly salient example of the redemptive narrative underlying postrevolutionary archeology, he concluded by stating that “las generaciones bolivianos que transiten por estas salas, hallen en la obra de nuestros antepasados un legítimo motivo de sentirse orgullosos de su sangre india.”⁷⁰⁸

CONCLUSION


The Tiwanaku restoration project was the centerpiece of a broader government initiative to create a more inclusive national identity for postrevolutionary Bolivia. During the 1940s, MNR intellectuals had revised national history, representing the Bolivian nation as a diverse people of middle class professionals, dissident intellectuals, urban workers, miners, and indigenous peasants united in a common struggle against an entrenched oligarchy that governed the country solely in the interests of foreign capital. After the Revolution, the MNR sought to enact this unified vision of Bolivian society by

⁷⁰⁶ José Fellman Velarde, “Cultura Aymara: célula madre de la bolivianidad,” *Arte*, No. 1., Vol. 1 (1961), pp. 22-23, p. 22.

⁷⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁷⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

BOLIVIA



TIWANAKU
puerta del sol
sun door

DIRECCION NACIONAL DE TURISMO

Illustration 18: Tourism poster featuring the *Puerta del Sol* at Tiwanaku, c. 1961.⁷⁰⁹

⁷⁰⁹ ABNB, Bd 1529, “Puerta del Sol.”

promoting a new discourse of nationhood and citizenship founded upon the concept of *mestizaje*. Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Ñuflo Chávez, Félix Eguino Zaballa, and other ranking government officials recognized in Tiwanaku a tangible symbol of postrevolutionary national unity. With the Tiwanaku restoration project, the MNR sought to restore the monumental architecture at the site in order to illuminate Bolivia's glorious pre-Hispanic past and the potential of the postrevolutionary mestizo nation. And through film, radio, speeches, publications, and of course, museum exhibits, the postrevolutionary government popularized Tiwanaku.

While the restored ruins furnished the government with a unifying national symbol, the archeological research that complemented the Tiwanaku restoration project provided a new, scientifically-grounded history of Tiwanaku civilization that served to valorize the Aymara past. If Aymara were going to be part of the new *mestizo* nation—one that proudly embraced both its Andean and Hispanic origins—then the MNR had to displace an entrenched canon of knowledge that cast the population as savage, racially inferior, and unfit for republican life with a new narrative extolling the virtues of Aymara civilization. As historian, Pierre Nora reminds us, nations aggrandize themselves by way of the past. “The greater our origins, the more they magnified our greatness,” he wrote in a much-cited study of the French past.⁷¹⁰ “Through the past, we venerated above all ourselves.”⁷¹¹ Led by the indefatigable Carlos Ponce Sanginés, Bolivia's state archeological mission provided a new chronology of Tiwanaku civilization based on modern scientific practices such as stratigraphic analysis and carbon dating. Narrowing the temporal distance between the Tiwanaku city-state and the Bolivian nation-state, this

⁷¹⁰ Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire,” *Representations*, No. 26 (Spring, 1989), pp. 7-24, p. 16.

⁷¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

interpretation not only affirmed Tiwanaku's Aymara origins, but evinced a socially organized, technologically advanced, politically sophisticated civilization. At the same time, however, this narrative supported a homogenizing discourse of mestizaje that subsumed ethnic identity within a unified national identity.

Chapter Six

Patrimony for Whom? The National and Local Politics of Postrevolutionary Cultural Patrimony Formation

De Tiwanaku poco es lo que queda en pie, visible al ojo curioso de viajero. Sus tesoros habrá que buscarlos en el seno de la tierra, en sus cementerios escondidos, en sus inmediaciones vírgenes o en los faldeos de los apartados cerros, inexplorados aun.

-Salvador Debenedetti, 1910

In December of 1958, Carlos Ponce Sanginés reached his wits' end. The director of Bolivia's burgeoning state archeological mission arrived at Tiwanaku one day to find a herd of cattle grazing on the ruins. There were cows on the lands between the Kalasasaya acropolis and the Templo Semisubterráneo, and, perhaps most appalling, on top of the Akanpana pyramid. Infuriated, Ponce hit three cows with his Jeep before rounding up the rest of the herd and taking it to the police station, just down the road, in the town of Tiwanaku. There, he ordered the arrest of the owner of the cattle, a local *vecino*, or townsman, named Pedro Pizarroso, for trespassing on government property and for violating national cultural patrimony laws.⁷¹² In responding to the complaint that Pizarroso subsequently filed with Ponce's superiors at the Ministry of Education, Ponce dismissed the *vecino* with a racial epithet, as a "típico cholo 'tinterillo,'" before quipping that "para él más importante es que sus vacas revienten de gordas, aunque destruyen todos los monumentos de la cultura prehispánica de Tiwanaku."⁷¹³

Yet it was not just *vecinos* like Pizarroso who valued archeological sites more for their socioeconomic utility than for their importance as national cultural patrimony. Neighboring Aymara communities posed an even more daunting threat to

⁷¹² UNAR, CIAT, Correspondencia 1957-59 (02-145), Pedro Pizarroso to Ministro de Educación y Bellas Artes, "Solicita amparo y garantías que indica," 12/15/1958.

⁷¹³ UNAR, CIAT, Correspondencia 1957-59 (02-145), Carlos Ponce Sanginés, "Informe acerca de la presunta reclamación de Pedro Pizarroso, 12/29/1958, p. 3.

postrevolutionary patrimony. Following the passage of the agrarian reform law in 1953, Aymara communities occupied the land immediately surrounding the Tiwanaku ruins. According to law, the communities had a legitimate claim to the land—land, that in most cases, had been illegally possessed during the great wave of highland hacienda expansion. As the postrevolutionary government increased its commitment to cultural patrimony, however, that claim was threatened by the archeological artifacts that lay under the surface of the contested territory. Government officials wanted to conserve the land in order to preserve the material-cultural evidence of Bolivia's glorious pre-Hispanic past. Certain that farming and grazing would damage the artifacts, they repeatedly ordered the communities not to use the territory. The peasants refused to cooperate, however, insisting on their rights to their ancestral lands. To Ponce, one never short on hyperbole, the use of the land not only violated cultural patrimony laws, but also represented “un atentado contra la cultura del país.”⁷¹⁴

In the wake of the 1952 Revolution, conflict between state archeologists and Aymara peasants became commonplace in the Tiwanaku valley as the MNR expanded the state's role in both the management and the protection of national cultural patrimony. At the root of the conflict was differing perspectives on the meaning of land, history, and patrimony. Local actors and government officials assigned land divergent, and often contradictory, meanings. For Ponce and other officials seeking to preserve the indigenous past as an intrinsic component of the national present, the land surrounding the ruins represented history, containing within it testament to the primordial roots of the Bolivian nation. As such, the government sought to conserve it as national cultural patrimony. For locals, however, land meant much more. For one, it had practical value.

⁷¹⁴ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1959 (02-150), Carlos Ponce Sanginés to Walter Flores, 3/23/1959.

For centuries, vecinos and peasants alike had quarried the ruins for stones to build roads, houses, and churches. Indigenous communities farmed and grazed on archeological lands. And, as the national and international markets for antiquities grew, Tiwanaku became a source of income for locals who plundered the site in search of valuable artifacts. But perhaps more importantly for local Aymara communities, land had sacred value, and was infused with historical memory and communal identity.⁷¹⁵

This chapter explores the politics of national cultural patrimony formation in postrevolutionary Bolivia by examining local struggles over archeological lands surrounding Tiwanaku. In keeping with its nationalist objective of valorizing vernacular culture as an authentic representation of the postrevolutionary republic, the MNR instituted a rigorous cultural patrimony regime. Indeed, during the first half of the twentieth century, the government had introduced laws intended to define and protect patrimony, but as anthropologist Beatriz Rossells points out, they were “insuficientes y aisladas.”⁷¹⁶ The state rarely enforced these laws, trusting instead that individuals and private institutions would act within the established legal framework.⁷¹⁷ As such, the pre-revolutionary patrimony regime remained weak and largely ineffectual. After the Revolution, the MNR placed the management of cultural patrimony firmly in the hands of the state. Doing so required not only the introduction of laws that would expand the content of patrimony and the government’s ability to protect it, but also the creation of state institutions that would enforce the new regulations. Tiwanaku was at the center of

⁷¹⁵ Hans van den Berg, “Religión Aymara,” *La cosmovisión aymara*, Hans van den Berg and Norbert Schiffrers, eds (La Paz: HISBOL/UCB, 1992), pp. 291-308, see especially discussion on pp. 291-301. See also Thomas A. Abercrombie, *Pathways of Memory and Power: Ethnography and History among an Andean People* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998).

⁷¹⁶ Beatriz Rossells, “Después de ‘Siempre’: Sobre las políticas culturales del MNR de 1952,” *historias... Revista de la Coordinadora de Historia*, No. 6 (2003), pp. 171-193, p. 185.

⁷¹⁷ *Ibid.*

this effort. The ruins had been neglected, looted, and damaged for centuries. And as the MNR began to restore Tiwanaku as a unifying national symbol, the need to increase protection of archeological site played a key role in postrevolutionary cultural patrimony formation.

While the government had to protect Tiwanaku from thieves and vandals, it was ultimately neighboring Aymara communities that emerged as the principal threat to the site after 1952. With the Tiwanaku restoration project, the government was laying claim to the pre-Hispanic past as the primordial foundation of the Bolivian nation. Yet laying claim to the past necessitated laying claim to land as well, for it was not just the monumental architecture at the site that required protection under cultural patrimony laws, but the material-cultural artifacts that lay in the subsoil of the territory surrounding the ruins.⁷¹⁸ In order to protect the artifacts, government officials sought to expand the perimeter of the archeological site by expropriating Aymara communal lands. Patrimony thus became a fierce site of contestation at the local level as state archeologists and indigenous communities fought over rights to land. And though the state ultimately remained unsuccessful in its attempt to obtain rights to the lands in question, the enduring conflict proved to be instrumental in the promulgation of the 1961 cultural patrimony law and lay at the core of subsequent efforts to commercialize indigenous popular arts.

Against the backdrop of the legal and institutional measures that the postrevolutionary government introduced to create a stronger cultural patrimony regime, the following pages trace the historical struggles of Achaca, an Aymara ayllu neighboring the Tiwanaku ruins. Given that not ruins, not objects, rather land was at the heart of the

⁷¹⁸ For a discussion of land, artifacts, and patrimony, see Nadia Abu El-Haj, *Facts on the Ground: Archaeological Practice and Territorial Self-fashioning in Israeli Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

controversies that arose as the state sought to protect the site, the chapter explores the long history of Achaca, and how its protracted struggle for land and justice undermined government efforts to obtain archeological lands and contributed to cultural patrimony laws. Achaca was the most litigious and fractured ayllu in the entire Department of La Paz—not necessarily because of the ruins, but because the government’s continued inability to protect archeological lands originated in a parallel struggle within the ayllu over rights to specific plots of land after the 1953 agrarian reform.

In addition to revealing the dynamic interplay between state and society in the formulation of cultural patrimony policy after 1952, this chapter also demonstrates how the institutional objectives of different government ministries shaped postrevolutionary cultural politics. The divergent meanings that Achaca peasants and state archeologists assigned the territory surrounding the Tiwanaku ruins became manifest at the institutional level as the government began to redistribute hacienda lands in accordance with the agrarian reform law. While the Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes (Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, MEBA) had to protect archeological lands in accordance with postrevolutionary state’s commitment to cultural patrimony, the Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria (National Agrarian Reform Service, SNRA) was obligated to grant peasants legal right to the territory they occupied. Land reform was a necessary component of the postrevolutionary initiative to uplift and to integrate Bolivia’s rural indigenous majority, and as such, it conflicted with the state’s desire to protect archeological lands.

ACHACA: SPACE AND AYLLU

In order to understand the postrevolutionary politics of cultural patrimony in Tiwanaku, the space must be situated within a much longer local history of community struggle and hacienda expansion. The disputed space was the Pumapunku temple and the land immediately surrounding it. Located on the eastern side of the Tiwanaku complex, Pumapunku is a massive stone platform 900 meters to the southeast of the Akanpana pyramid. It was constructed during the seventh and eighth centuries C.E., the zenith of Tiwanaku civilization, and remains one of the most impressive—and indeed, mystifying—examples of monumental architecture at site.⁷¹⁹ According to the urban layout of Tiwanaku, which archeologists believe was planned according to the spiritual and cosmological beliefs of the civilization, Pumapunku served as the principal gateway to the city.⁷²⁰ Arriving from Lake Titicaca just to the west, visitors were greeted by the magnificent, snow-capped peaks of Illimani, which aligned perfectly with the eastern-facing doorway of the structure, providing a powerful backdrop for the monumental architecture of the city.

In the centuries since the civilization's enigmatic downfall, however, human settlement greatly transformed Tiwanaku's original urban plan. By the twentieth century, railroad tracks, roads, trails, irrigation ditches, and property lines separated Pumapunku from the other monumental structures at the site. Set apart from the primary Tiwanaku complex, only the actual ruins were protected by the patrimony laws introduced by the

⁷¹⁹ Carlos Ponce Sanginés, "Examen arqueológico de las ruinas precolombinas de Pumapunku," in *Procedencia de las areniscas utilizadas en el templo precolombino de Pumapunku (Tiwanaku)*, Carlos Ponce Sanginés, Arturo Castaños Echazu, Waldo Ávila Salinas y Fernando Urquidi Barrau, eds. (La Paz: Academia Nacional de Ciencias de Bolivia, 1971), pp. 15-205, p. 16.

⁷²⁰ Alexei Vrancich, "The Construction and Reconstruction of Ritual Space at Tiwanaku, Bolivia (A.D. 500-1000)," *Journal of Field Archaeology*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Summer 2006), pp. 121-136; See also, Jean-Pierre Protzen and Stella E. Nair, "On Reconstructing Tiwanaku Architecture," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*, Vol. 59, No. 3 (September 2000), pp. 359-371.

liberal state in the first decades of the twentieth century. The rest of Pumapunku—
massive earthen works such as the ramp of the western entrance—and the




Illustration 19: Pumapunku in relation to the rest of the Tiwanaku ruins.⁷²¹

archeologically-significant lands surrounding it were private property.⁷²² As landlord
power broke down throughout the region in the wake of the 1952 revolution and the 1953

⁷²¹ Alexei Vranich, “Interpreting the Meaning of Ritual Spaces: The Temple Complex of Pumapunku, Tiwanaku, Bolivia” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1999), p. 322.

agrarian reform, state archeologists sought to expropriate the territory surrounding the temple. At stake in protecting the land was the MNR's claim to the nation's primordial past, for as Ponce asserted, the "ruinas milenarias [de Tiwanaku] comprueban las hondas raíces de la nacionalidad misma."⁷²³

At the time of Independence in 1825, the Pumapunku ruins were located on the communal lands of an Aymara ayllu called Achaca—one of the seven ayllus that constituted the indigenous community of Tiwanaku.⁷²⁴ The community had gained title to its lands from the Spanish Crown in 1746, and as the postcolonial tributary regime took form after independence, Achaca, along with the other ayllus of the region, paid tribute in exchange for land rights.⁷²⁵ Records suggest that during the first decades of Republican rule, Achaca and the other ayllus of Tiwanaku lived in relative harmony with the few haciendas that existed in the region. Yet towards the end of the nineteenth century, wealthy creoles, motivated by the tin boom, began eyeing the lands of Achaca and neighboring ayllus. The Tiwanaku valley proved especially appealing to the land-hungry *paceño* elite. It bordered Lake Titicaca, it was close to La Paz and its market, and it was accessible to the expanding railroad network.⁷²⁶ Situated in a valley, moreover, the

⁷²² See Vrancich, "The Construction and Reconstruction of Ritual Space at Tiwanaku" for a discussion of the earthen works that were an integral part of the original Pumapunku temple. See also: Vranich, "Interpreting the Meaning of Ritual Spaces."

⁷²³ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1961 (02-156), Carlos Ponce Sanginés to Víctor Paz Estenssoro, 12/12/1961.

⁷²⁴ Waldo Villamor Michel, "Resumen estadístico de la reforma agraria de Tiwanaku," in *Jornadas Peruano-Bolivianas de estudio científico del Altiplano boliviano y del sur del Perú, Tomo II: Arqueología en Bolivia y Perú* (La Paz: Casa Municipal de Cultura "Franz Tamayo," 1977), 211-223; For a longer history of the community, see Mercado de Peñalosa, P. de, "Relación de la provincia de los Pacajes," in *Relaciones geográficas de indias*, tomo II, edited by M. Jiménez de la Espada (Madrid: Ministerio de Fomento, 1885 [1588-89]), pp. 51-64.

⁷²⁵ INRA-LP (6580/1), Solicitud de amparo administrativo al Prefecto del Departamento de Ingavi por Ildelfonso Cruz, apoderado de la comunidad de Achaca, 9/28/1920, p. 1.

⁷²⁶ Klein, *Haciendas and Ayllus*, pp. 156-57. In terms of the economic diversification of the Bolivia turn-of-the-century liberal elite, see Irozozqui, *La armonía de desigualdades*, pp. 205-212.

area was not exposed to the harsh climate that characterized other parts of the altiplano. Potatoes, barley, and quinoa grew in abundance, as did *pasta brava*, a rich grass well suited for livestock.

Hacienda expansion and the attendant divestiture of ayllu lands varied from department to department, but it was in La Paz where the greatest majority of indigenous communities were disrupted. To give a sense of the scale of land turnover during this period, Herbert Klein estimates that in the Department of La Paz alone, 11,900 sayañas were sold.⁷²⁷ Of those, 71 percent were bought by non-Indians.⁷²⁸ The legal basis for this unprecedented attack on indigenous communal lands was, of course the 1874 Disentailment Law. Most buyers hailed from the burgeoning La Paz elite—who were gaining power and status vis-à-vis the traditional Sucre-based oligarchy. Documentary evidence reveals a striking pattern of land divestiture in the canton of Tiwanaku. After independence, just under half of the farmland in the canton belonged to indigenous communities. In the beginning of the twentieth century, however, this number began to markedly decline. By the 1950 agrarian census, not one free community existed in the entire canton.⁷²⁹

It was during the first great wave of highland hacienda expansion when Achaca and the archeological lands surrounding Pumapunku began the long, contested transformation from ayllu to hacienda. The force behind this transformation was Benedicto Goytia, who began acquiring land within Achaca and the neighboring ayllu of Huancollo in 1882. Part of the emerging La Paz elite, Goytia was an established liberal

⁷²⁷ Klein, *Haciendas and Ayllus*, p. 156.

⁷²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁹ Bolivia, Ministerio de Hacienda y Estadística, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, *I Censo Agropecuario, 1950* (La Paz, 1950).

politician and entrepreneur, serving as a diputado for the province of Lareja in 1885 and 1889 in the national parliament, and owned stake in several tin mining enterprises.⁷³⁰ Like other members of the ascendant liberal elite, Goytia sought to invest in land to turn a profit while diversifying his financial portfolio.⁷³¹ Bolivia's emerging tin-based monoexport economy placed investors at greater risk of world price fluctuations and investing in land would help absorb financial ruin if world tin prices plummeted. The acquisition of land, moreover, provided status and recognition for this emerging class of national elites

Similar to the rest of the region, the acquisition of ayllu lands in Achaca was a piecemeal process that lasted decades and entailed a mix of legal measures, forced sales, and violence. Government agents surveyed, partitioned, and redistributed the ayllu lands as private property in 1882 and 1883. After purchasing title to their *sayañas*, several comunarios voluntarily sold their deeds to Goytia when he began buying tracts of land in Achaca and the neighboring ayllus during the 1880s.⁷³² Those that sold retained the rights to their *sayañas* house plots and enjoyed usufruct rights to the land. In exchange, they were obligated to provide labor, a portion of their harvest, seed, and other necessary implements to tend to the fields and/or livestock. Though some comunarios sold their lands voluntarily, legal disputes filed during the period 1900-1921 allege that Goytia relied heavily upon fraud and coercion to acquire ayllu lands, taking advantage of his

⁷³⁰ Irurozqui, *La armonía de la desigualdades*, p. 207.

⁷³¹ Although agricultural output on altiplano haciendas was lacking in comparison to those of the valleys, they were profitable because of the free labor that came with them. For a comparison of the profitability of highland hacienda versus valley haciendas, see Klein, *Haciendas and Ayllus*, p. 155.

⁷³² INRA-LP (6580/1), Celestino Condori, cacique propietario del aillo Marca Chambi; Gregorio Pérez, propietario del aillo Achutagrande; Francisco Ali, propietario del aillo Guancollo; Jose Limache, agregado del mismo; Mariano Mamani, propietario de Chambigrande; Modesto Mamani, propietario de Achaca; José Quispe, agregado del mismo; Mariano Choque, propietario del aillo Guaraya, y Julio Tonconi, agregado del mismo... originarios de la gran comunidad Tiaguanaco to Ministro de Gobierno, 9/21/1920, pp. 5-6.

political position and economic influence to avoid legal sanctions.⁷³³ According to a petition that illegally divested peasants filed with the prefect of La Paz, Goytia “habia adquirido algunas sayañas en nuestra ex-comunidad y prevalido de su situación oficial ha ejercitado una serie de procedimientos atentatorios e ilegales por medio de sus mayordomos o administradores con el exclusivo objetivo de adueñarse del resto de las tierra que nos pertenece.”⁷³⁴ Another lawsuit underscores Goytia’s reliance on violence to acquire ayllu lands, alleging that he “ha pretendido expoliarnos nuestras tierras de comunidad sin más derecho que la fuerza, valiéndose para ello de agentes desalmados, quienes mediante la astucia, la tortura, el terror y otros medio de extorsión, se ha apropiado de dichas nuestras tierras, sometiendo nuestras personas a una verdadera y vergonzosa esclavitud, con mengua de las leyes de la Republica.”⁷³⁵

As Goytia obtained vast tracts of communal lands in Achaca, peasants adapted existing hierarchies of authority to the new structure of the hacienda. On free communities across the Aymara-speaking altiplano, local political authority rested in the jilakata. After fulfilling a series of community debts and services, jilakatas were chosen by the community to lead the ayllu for one year.⁷³⁶ Herbert Klein found that as the hacienda frontier expanded across the La Paz altiplano, landowners retained the existing hierarchical structure of the communities as they acquired ayllu lands and colono

⁷³³ Archivo del Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (INRA), Departamento de La Paz (LP), Expediente 6580, Cuerpo 1 (6580/1), Ildelfonzo Cruz, apoderado de los excomunarios de Achaca to Bautista Saavedra, Presidente de la Republica, 7/20/1925, p. 2.

⁷³⁴ INRA-LP (6580/1), Ildelfonzo Cruz y José Martín to Prefecto y Comadante General del Departamento, 9/22/1920.

⁷³⁵ INRA-LP (6580/1), Solicitud al Prefecto de Departamento de Ingavi por Mariano Marina, apoderado de los excomunarios de Achaca, 11/18/1920, p.1.

⁷³⁶ For insight into the practice of community leadership, see William E. Carter, *Comunidades Aymaras y reforma agraria en Bolivia* (México, D.F.: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, 1967), pp. 47-63

labor.⁷³⁷ As such, the jilakata became the primary authority on the estate, serving as the mediator between the hacienda administration and the community. Under the hacienda regime, jilakatas cooperated with the *majordomo* (estate manager) to ensure that colonos met labor obligations and provided the necessary portion of their harvest to the landowner. In some cases, the jilakata even served as the hacienda administrator in lieu of a majordomo. With the new circumstances of the hacienda, the role of the jilakata thus changed significantly. Instead of being a rotating position occupied by different individuals according to their fulfillment of community obligations, as was customary, jilacatas could remain in power for years, or even decades. Moreover, rather than being appointed by the community, as was also customary, the jilacata was often chosen by the landlord.⁷³⁸ Given that the jilakata served as the key interlocutor between the hacienda and its labor, landlords often sought to play a key role in the selection of the jilakata and his tenure in power. On Achaca, the landlord appointed Domingo Pati Morales as jilakata sometime during the early 1920s, and it appears that he served until 1952.

Hacienda consolidation on Achaca was a conflict-ridden process that caused lasting divisions within the communities that carried on well into the twentieth century.⁷³⁹ During the first decades of the century, social cohesion within Achaca fractured. As some comunarios voluntarily sold their lands while others refused, ayllu solidarity eroded and internal power hierarchies were rearticulated. Collaboration with the hacienda

⁷³⁷ Klein, *Haciendas and Ayllus*, p. 148

⁷³⁸ INRA-LP (6580/1), Mariano Marin, apoderado de la comunidad de Tiwanaku to Prefecto de La Paz, 8/25/1920.

⁷³⁹ It seems that internal strife was common after the agrarian reform as ex-comunarios and ex-colonos returned to estates after long absences away from the land. See, for example: Edmundo Flores, "Taraco: monografía de un latifundio del altiplano boliviano," *El Trimestre Económico*, Vol. 22, No. 86(2) (Abril-Junio de 1955), pp. 209-229; Lorand D. Schweng examines some of the conflicto that occurred at the Pillapi hacienda, just south of Lake Titicaca in "An Indian Community Development Project in Bolivia, *América Indígena*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Abril 1962), pp. 155-168.

administration undermined the legitimacy of the jilakata and other traditional ayllu authorities in the eyes of those comunarios who refused to sell their sayañas.⁷⁴⁰ They rejected the authority of the jilakata, separated themselves from the colonos, and appointed two apoderados to represent them, Ildelfonzo Cruz and Mariano Marin. Between 1916 and 1928, Cruz and Marin petitioned local, regional, and national officials to protect their sayañas. Apoderados “did not discount the power of the law,” Laura Gotkowitz argues, but rather “they insisted on its enforcement.”⁷⁴¹ Indeed, Cruz and Marin maintained unfaltering faith that the government would uphold their rights as they repeatedly drew on established laws to defend the comunarios’ lands. They sought assistance from local courts to guarantee their rights to lands to which they held legal deed. They also petitioned the government to have local state officials intercede on their behalf to cease maltreatment by the hacienda administrators, the jilakata Domingo Pati, and other colonos on the estate. The state complied and ordered hacienda officials to refrain from levying labor demands and hassling the comunarios. But beyond sending orders, the government could do little else; given the weakness of the Bolivian state and the semi-closed nature of the haciendas, landlords—and more, commonly their administrators—remained the ultimate power brokers on the altiplano.

Tensions peaked in 1921 when Goytia sold the estate—colonos included—to Jorge Zalles, another member of the La Paz elite. Not only did the title that Goytia transfer include the lands that he had legally gained title to—the sayañas that colonos had sold and the aynokas—but the sale also included all of the lands to which the comunarios retained legal title. What made matters worse for the comunarios was that the prefect, the

⁷⁴⁰ INRA-LP (6580/1), Ildelfonzo Cruz, apoderado de la excomunidad de Achaca to Prefecto de La Paz, 12/23/1920.

⁷⁴¹ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*, p. 5

government official that would typically intercede on their behalf, was Elias Zalles, the cousin of the new property owner. Thus, despite the illegal nature of the sale, the apoderados were largely powerless. Only once all legal efforts were exhausted—after they petitioned the prefect, the minister of government, and finally President Saavedra himself—did the comunarios revolt, declaring themselves “sublevación.” However the uprising was manifest, it must have arrived at a level that was threatening to Zalles and other land owners, for the military ultimately intervened. On June 22, 1922, the First Regiment de Abaroa occupied the ayllu. Allegations of rape, arson, and murder soon followed. Cruz, Marin and other local leaders were imprisoned or evicted from the hacienda.⁷⁴²

With the apoderados imprisoned and many comunarios expelled from the hacienda, hostility on Achaca seems to have subsided—at least the document trail runs cold. The last legal petition from Achaca in the *Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria* (National Institute of Agrarian Reform, INRA) archives dates to 1929. Nevertheless, other records provide a glimpse onto the changes that transpired on Achaca during the 1930s and 1940s. At some point—when exactly remains unclear—Zalles sold the hacienda to Juan Perou, another *paceño* who, like both Goytia and Zalles before him, remained an absentee land owner who charged local administrators with the day to day operations of the estate. In the ensuing years, bits and piece of archival documents indicate that some of the expelled comunarios resettled in the burgeoning outskirts of La Paz to try their hand in the free labor market, while others vanished from the historical record.

⁷⁴² INRA-LP (6580/1). f. 68-69 Los indígenas de la comunidad Achaca, Guancollu y otros to Señor Primer Comandante del Regimiento Abaroa, 6/24/1922.

As for the territory surrounding Pumapunku, it now belonged to Juan Perou. It was not long, however, before the government challenged Perou's rights to this archeologically-rich territory. As public interest in Tiwanaku increased during the 1930s with Wendall Bennette's excavations and the widely-read works of Arturo Posnansky, the government introduced new laws to protect the ruins. On June 29, 1933, President Daniel Salamanca enacted a law that called for the "expropiación forzosa" of four zones bordering the Tiwanaku ruins, including nine hectares of land surrounding the Pumapunku ruins.⁷⁴³ Officials affiliated with the Museo Nacional Tiwanaku (MNT) believed that the land contained valuable artifacts and perhaps other structures that would be damaged by planting crops and grazing livestock. Yet, the law remained ineffectual on the lands surrounding Pumapunku. Reflecting the weak cultural patrimony regime of the pre-revolutionary era, the law included a provision that allowed affected landowners to negotiate the terms of the expropriation. Under this provision, Perou retained legal deed to the nine hectares surrounding Pumapunku, but only under the condition that he preserve the land.⁷⁴⁴ This agreement allowed the state to maintain its respect for private property regime while ostensibly protecting the archeological lands.

POSTREVOLUTIONARY CULTURAL PATRIMONY AND TIWANAKU

When the MNR took charge of the national government in April 1952, it inherited a weak and largely ineffective cultural patrimony regime. Previous governments had introduced laws to both define and protect national cultural patrimony, but they rarely enforced them, relying instead on private institutions such as the Sociedad Geográfica de

⁷⁴³ Decreto Supremo de 29 de junio de 1933, *Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia*.

⁷⁴⁴ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1954, Manuel Liendo Lazarte to Federico Álvarez Plata, 3/24/54.

La Paz.⁷⁴⁵ Lacking oversight, pre-Hispanic artifacts, colonial art, rare texts, and other valuable material-cultural objects often ended up in the hands of local collectors and foreign museums. This changed significantly after 1952. Seeking to expand the content of patrimony, to centralize its management, and to ensure its protection, the MNR created the Departamento de Museos y del Monumento Nacional (Department of National Monuments, DMMN) as a dependency of the Ministry of Education in 1952, and charged it with the enforcement of existing cultural patrimony laws. At the same time, the MNR also set out to establish new laws that would provide a more expansive legal framework for the management and protection of national cultural patrimony.

Tiwanaku's location at the center of postrevolutionary patrimony efforts belies the importance that government officials accorded to the pre-Hispanic ruins. Already by September 1952, MAC officials had demonstrated their intent to transform Tiwanaku into a symbol of the postrevolutionary nation—an intention that was most saliently manifest in the state-sponsored Lapaca Pacha celebrations. Similarly, President Paz and other government officials were already citing Tiwanaku in their speeches, exemplifying the ruins as testament to the high levels of culture achieved by the Andean civilization that served as the foundation of the postrevolutionary republic. “Somos el pueblo que hizo Tiwanaku,” President Paz had proclaimed to cheering peasants and miners at Huanuni in August 1952.⁷⁴⁶ The occupation of the lands immediately surrounding this important symbol of postrevolutionary Bolivia thus particularly alarmed government officials—as

⁷⁴⁵ The Ley de 3 de Octubre de 1906, for example, declared that “El ejecutivo podrá encomendar á la respectivas Sociedades Geográficas la conservación y restauración de la ruinas indicadas, así como las excavaciones, que se permitirán también a los particulares, lo que serán indemnizados por los objetos de arte que encuentren. Ley de 3 de Octubre de 1906, *Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia*.

⁷⁴⁶ Secretaría Ejecutiva del Comité Político Nacional del M.N.R., *El Pensamiento Revolucionario de Paz Estenssoro* (La Paz: E. Burillo & Cía, 1955), pp. 174-75.

did the longstanding practice of allowing archeological artifacts to leave the country. The protection of the archeological site and the artifacts it guarded became an urgent national priority. As such, Tiwanaku emerged at the heart of postrevolutionary efforts to centralize the management and to expand the legal framework of national cultural patrimony.

The centralization of cultural patrimony management began in 1954 in order to protect Tiwanaku artifacts. As the director of the DMMN, it was Miguel Alandia Pantoja who oversaw this process. Within a decade, Alandia would be the defining muralist of the Revolution, but in 1954, he was a young artist and idealist, committed to the principles of nationalism and social justice that characterized the post-Chaco generation. He had served on the front in the Chaco, becoming a prisoner of war. Upon returning to Bolivia, he became a social activist, finding resonance in the working-class political mobilization and leftist militancy of the 1930s and 40s.⁷⁴⁷ As the newly-appointed director of the DMMN, he saw the Tiwanaku restoration project as “una de las afirmaciones de la responsabilidad histórica que corresponde a los hombres de la revolución nacional.”⁷⁴⁸ Exemplifying the newfound importance that the postrevolutionary state bestowed on cultural patrimony, he asserted that the Revolution had “creado condiciones para defender positivamente nuestros tesoros arqueológicos, no solo de la exportación, sino para preservarlos también del deterioro y de su destrucción.”⁷⁴⁹ Infused with nationalism and emboldened by a sense of historical importance, Alandia set out to ensure that the postrevolutionary government enforced

⁷⁴⁷ For more on both the life and work of Miguel Alandia Pantoja, see Carlos Salazar Mostajo, *La pintura contemporánea de Bolivia: Ensayo histórico-crítico* (La Paz: Juventud, 1989), pp. 129-50.

⁷⁴⁸ UNAR, CIAT, Correspondencia, 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), Miguel Alandia Pantoja to Ministro de Educación, 8/22/1954, p. 2.

⁷⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

cultural patrimony laws long in existence, but rarely implemented by the MNR's predecessors.

The government's legal review was sparked by a request by Stig Rydén, a Swiss archeologist, to remove Tiwanaku artifacts to Switzerland for further study. After excavating at Chiripa and Tiwanaku in 1952, Rydén had petitioned the National Museum to return to Europe with some of the artifacts he excavated to continue his analysis.⁷⁵⁰ Following the First Round Table on Archeology in December 1953, the Consejo de Cultura of the Municipality of La Paz recommended that the Ministry of Education grant Rydén permission to remove the artifacts from Bolivia for a period of two years.⁷⁵¹ As director of the Consejo, Carlos Ponce Sanginés justified the decision by asserting that the study would have "imponderable valor para el desarrollo de la ciencia arqueológica nacional."⁷⁵² It is perhaps no surprise that in arriving at this conclusion, Ponce struggled to reconcile his own dedication to cultural patrimony with the scientific advancement of national archeology.

The decision initiated conflict between municipal and MEBA officials, and led Alandia to define the postrevolutionary government's stance on cultural patrimony. As such, the incident played an important role in the centralization of postrevolutionary cultural patrimony management. Speaking on behalf of the Ministry, Alandia denied Ryden's petition on grounds of national cultural patrimony laws. In what seemed at once a rejoinder to Ponce Sanginés and a declaration of the government's renewed commitment to the protection of patrimony, he declared that "Lo lamentable es que no

⁷⁵⁰ Rydén also carried out excavations in 1947. See Stig Rydén, *Archeological Research in the Highlands of Bolivia* (Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1947).

⁷⁵¹ "Un voto resolutivo de la Mesa Rotunda de Arqueología Boliviana," *El Diario*, 12/24/1953.

⁷⁵² *Ibid.*

obstante haberse producido un cambio radical en la conciencia política de nuestro pueblo de existir hoy condiciones sociales que permiten la defensa de nuestra cultura y nuestra tradición, todavía existen estudios simulando poses legales que pretenden oponerse a la Ley del Monumento Nacional, que este Ministerio está poniendo en vigencia.”⁷⁵³

In justifying his decision, Alandia drew from a legal precedent that dated to the beginning of the twentieth century. Although the liberal state neither organized nor funded any excavations or restorations projects, it did grant permission to foreign archeological missions. In 1903, the French Scientific Mission lead by Georges de Créqui-Monfort excavated at the subterranean temple, a large submerged courtyard located at the base of the Akapana pyramid.⁷⁵⁴ The primary findings of the French Mission were little documented, but the excavation revealed what many observers had long suspected: that the majority of Tiwanaku’s monumental architecture remained buried, and what was visible was only a fraction of the original site.⁷⁵⁵ The excavation was nevertheless remembered less for what it revealed, than for what it destroyed. In 1904, the Sociedad Geografica de La Paz denounced the French mission for destroying a number of structures during the excavation.

The damage done by the French team had merely added insult to injury. For centuries, the Tiwanaku ruins had been destroyed and looted. Colonial officials, hacienda owners, and indigenous communities alike had carted off stone blocks from the ruins to be used in the construction of roads, walls, and buildings. Upon visiting the town

⁷⁵³ UNAR, CIAT, Correspondencia, 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), Miguel Alandia Pantoja, “Comunicado del Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes,” 9/2/54, p. 5.

⁷⁵⁴ For more on the French Mission and its excavations at Tiwanaku, see Georges de Créqui-Monfort, “Fouilles de la Mission Scientifique Française a Tiahuanaco,” in *Verhandlungen de XIV Internationalalen Amerikanisten Kongresses*, Pt. 2 (Stuttgart, 1906), pp. 531-551.

⁷⁵⁵ Juan V. Albarracín Jordan, *The Archeology of Tiwanaku: The Myths, History, and Science of an Ancient Civilization* (La Paz: Impresión P.A.P., 1994), p. 18.

of Tiwanaku in 1868, for example U.S. naturalist, E.G. Squier commented that “On all sides are vestiges of antiquity from the neighboring ruins, which have been a real quarry, whence have been taken the cut stones not only for Tiwanaku and all the villages and churches in the valley, but for erecting the cathedral of La Paz, the capital of Bolivia.”⁷⁵⁶ This problem was further compounded towards the end of the nineteenth century, as the market for Tiwanaku artifacts blossomed with both local and foreign collectors. While many artifacts were stored at the National Museum in La Paz after its foundation in 1846, many pieces ended up in the private collections of *paceño* elites. What was even more troubling is that foreign archeologists had long removed artifacts for study, but rarely returned them. Most of the artifacts unearthed during the French mission, for instance, became part of the permanent collection of the *Muséum Américaine* in Paris.⁷⁵⁷

Recognizing the historical importance of the ruins and the attendant need to preserve them, President Ismael Montes introduced the first cultural patrimony laws of the republic. In October 1906, Montes introduced a law that declared the Tiwanaku ruins were property of the nation and, as such, protected by the state. It further charged both the state and various geographic societies, such as the SGLP, with care of the ruins.⁷⁵⁸ In 1909, Monte’s successor, Eliodoro Villazón expanded the protections introduced in the 1906 statute. With the Supreme Decree of 11 November 1909, the government specifically addressed the question of excavations, stipulating that digs could only be

⁷⁵⁶ E.G. Squier, “Among the Andes of Peru and Bolivia,” *Harper’s New Monthly Magazine*, Vol. 36, No. 216 (May 1868), pp. 681-700, p. 682. Thanks go to Chris Heaney for sharing this source.

⁷⁵⁷ Qayum, *Creole Imaginings*, p. 219; Arthur Chervin, *Anthropologie Bolivienne, Tome Premier: Ethnologie, Démographie, Photographie Métrique* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1907), pp. vii-ix.

⁷⁵⁸ Ley de 3 de Octubre de 1906, *Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia*.

carried out by the government or interested parties that “present a complete and scientific plan of exploration.”⁷⁵⁹

While Alandia cited both the 1906 and 1909 decrees, the primary law that he drew from in making his case was the *Ley de Monumento Nacional* (National Monument Law).⁷⁶⁰ Promulgated by President Hernando Siles in 1927, the law built on the 1906 and 1909 decrees to define all archeological ruins existing in Bolivian territory as national monuments, and thus protected by the state. The law also expanded the definition of national monuments beyond structures to include material-culture objects such as pottery shards. Highlighting the fact that archeological artifacts were defined as national monuments, Alandia prohibited the export of such items, unless granted permission by the Ministry of Education.⁷⁶¹ In presenting this legal argument, Alandia closed with a narrative of indigenous redemption that identified archeology as a means to valorize the indigenous past for the postrevolutionary present, concluding that “La ley de Monumento Nacional, debe ponerse en practica sin restricciones si queremos conservar nuestra heredad cultural y hacernos dignos de sus creadores y de las generaciones de porvenir.”⁷⁶² The need to ensure the enforcement of existing laws was essential to the valorization of the indigenous past and provided further justification to the centralization of patrimony management.

⁷⁵⁹ Laws reviewed and quoted in Unidad Nacional de Arqueología (National Union of Archeology, La Paz, Bolivia, hereafter cited as UNAR), Centro de Investigaciones Arqueológicas en Tiwanaku (Center of Archeological Investigation in Tiwanaku, hereafter cited as CIAT), Correspondence, 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), Miguel Alandia Pantoja, “Comunicado del Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes,” 2/9/54.

⁷⁶⁰ UNAR, CIAT, Correspondencia, 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), Miguel Alandia Pantoja, “Comunicado del Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes,” 9/2/54, p. 5.

⁷⁶¹ Ley de Monumento Nacional (Ley de 8/5/1927) from *Legislación cultural andina, tomo II – Bolivia*, Edwin R. Harvey, ed. (Bogotá: Editora Guadalupe Ltda., 1981), pp. 149-151.

⁷⁶² UNAR, CIAT, Correspondencia, 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), Miguel Alandia Pantoja, “Comunicado del Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes,” 9/2/54, p. 2.

In addition to inspiring the centralization of patrimony management, the protection of the archeological site also underlie the development of stronger cultural patrimony laws. In 1954, the government placed the Comisión Nacional de Arqueología—the quasi-government institution that organized the Tiwanaku restoration project (see previous chapter)—in charge of revising existing national patrimony laws.⁷⁶³ Although the Comisión seems to have never completed the task, the fact that the government placed it in charge of the effort illustrates the central place that Tiwanaku occupied in the postrevolutionary imagination as the government sought to expand cultural patrimony laws. The influence of state archeologists and the centrality of Tiwanaku in the formulation of cultural patrimony laws would only increase in succeeding years as the state archeological mission confronted new threats to the archeological site with the initiation of the Tiwanaku restoration project.

The primary threat to patrimony that state archeologists confronted in Tiwanaku was not so much the ruins themselves, but the land that surrounded them. As tangible relics of the pre-Hispanic past, the monumental architecture and the material-cultural artifacts from the site were clearly defined by and protected under the 1906 and 1909 decrees, as well as the 1927 National Monument Law. Land was different, however, for it did not reveal as clearly its value as patrimony. Artifacts lay in the subsoil and remained invisible to the untrained eye and the human-made earthworks surrounding the site were often interpreted as natural geologic formations. As such, existing cultural patrimony laws protected only the land directly occupied by the ruins, and the surrounding lands rich in potential archaeological materials remained private property. To be sure, the

⁷⁶³ Bolivia, Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes, *Informe – Resumen de las labores del Ministerio de Educación y B.A., desde el 1° de julio de 1953 hasta el 30 de junio de 1954, Presentado por el Ministro de Educación y B.A., Dr. Federico Álvarez Plata* (La Paz, 1954), p. 27.

Salamanca administration apparently recognized this legal gap and, in 1933, issued the decree that called for the expropriation of territory surrounding the ruins. Yet, in the case of the land surrounding Pumapunku, the government seemed to privilege property rights over cultural patrimony. The landowner, Juan Perou, retained title to the nine hectares of Achaca surrounding the ruins which the government sought to expropriate, under the condition that he would not use them.⁷⁶⁴ The government thus never obtained these lands, and all that protected them was an agreement between MNT officials and Perou—an agreement that would prove to be quite fragile.

Following the Revolution, widespread indigenous mobilization to establish legal ownership of ayllu lands threatened archeological territory, and the national cultural patrimony associated with it. On August 2, 1953, President Víctor Paz Estenssoro signed the agrarian reform into law. The decree called for breaking-up large, unproductive estates and redistributing them to the indigenous peasants that worked them under the guiding principle that property must serve a “función útil.”⁷⁶⁵ Yet in many cases, indigenous communities had already taken the initiative, ousting landlords and hacienda administrators and seizing the land in the months immediately following the April insurrection. In fact, recent scholarship by such authors as Roberto Choque, Silvia Rivera, Pilar Mendieta, and Laura Gotkowitz is beginning to demonstrate both the depth and the continuity of rural mobilization during the entirety of the republican period as indigenous communities sought to reclaim lands and exert their rights.⁷⁶⁶ By the late

⁷⁶⁴ Decreto Supremo de 29 de junio de 1933. *Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia*.

⁷⁶⁵ Decreto Ley No. 03464 from *Compilación legal de la reforma agraria en Bolivia*, Wálter del Castillo Avendaño, ed. (La Paz, 1955), pp. 40-95.

⁷⁶⁶ Since the late 1970s, there has been growing research on indigenous movements in Bolivia, only in recent decades has this scholarship yielding a coherent picture of the depth of indigenous struggle. Roberto Choque, *Historia de una lucha desigual*; Silvia Rivera

1940s and early 1950s, the situation had blossomed into what Laura Gotkowitz has identified as a rural revolution, autonomous from the creole-mestizo revolution led by the MNR.⁷⁶⁷ While the most radical peasant mobilization occurred in the Cochabamba valleys, indigenous mobilization was also widespread on the southern and eastern shores of Lake Titicaca.⁷⁶⁸ In short, the process was already well underway—it had been since at least 1874—and had achieved such a level of dynamism that the MNR had limited control over the expropriation and redistribution of land. And as Achaca colonos struggled to shed the hacienda past during the 1950s, patrimony became a fierce site of contention over land, history, and power.

THE CONTESTED DYNAMICS OF LAND AND PATRIMONY

Once the MNR signed the Agrarian Reform into law in August 1953, Achaca colonos mobilized to evict the hacienda administration, and to obtain legal title to the territory that corresponded with the original ayllu boundaries, including all of the lands immediately bordering the north, west, and south sides of the Pumapunku ruins.⁷⁶⁹ Under the leadership of Juan Mamani Quispe, the colonos established the Sindicato Agrario de Achaca, (SAA) and claimed the land under the auspices of the peasant union. The SAA expelled all those who had closely collaborated with the hacienda administrators—starting with the hated jilacata, Domingo Pati Morales—and established itself as the new

⁷⁶⁷ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for our Rights*.

⁷⁶⁸ William E. Carter, “Revolution and the Agrarian Sector,” in *Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952*, James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorns, eds. (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), pp. 233-68. For news of Cochabamba violence reaching communities on the Altiplano, see pp. 235. Another way in which news traveled was through an extensive national network of indigenous activists that dates to the beginning of the twentieth century.

⁷⁶⁹ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1954, Manuel Liendo Lazarte to Alcalde Municipal de Tiahuanacu, 2/24/54.

authority within the community. Although they did not yet hold legal title to the land, the colonos—who, with the collapse of the hacienda regime, now referred to themselves as ex-colonos—maintained effective control over it and soon began planting and grazing on their individual sayañas. With these actions, the sindicato controlled the territory immediately surrounding Pumapunku, and the 1933 agreement between Perou and the MNT disappeared along with the hacienda administration.⁷⁷⁰ With the archeological territory now in possession of the ex-colonos, Achaca became deeply entangled in the politics of postrevolutionary national cultural patrimony formation.

Given the postrevolutionary government's commitment to the protecting cultural patrimony, MEBA officials grew increasingly concerned with the ex-colonos' occupation and use of the territory surrounding Pumapunku. In February and March 1954, Manuel Liendo Lazarte, Director of the MNT, repeatedly cabled local officials—including the corregidor, the mayor of Tiwanaku, and the guard of the ruins—obliging them to intercede on behalf of the government by ordering the Achaca ex-colonos to desist from planting and grazing on lands bordering the archeological ruins.⁷⁷¹ Yet despite such efforts, peasants insisted on their primordial rights to the land. "Como consecuencia de la Reforma Agraria," Liendo reported to the Minister of Education, Federico Álvarez Plata, "los campesinos de la comunidad de Achaca, pretenden realizar sus faenas agrícolas en todos estos terrenos colindantes con las ruinas de Tiahuanacu, a pesar del hecho que el propietario de la finca mencionada desde hace muchos años no ha utilizado esos terrenos por la circunstancia de que con seguridad en su subsuelo existen enormes

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁷¹ See, for example, UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, Manuel Liendo Lazarte to Alcalde Municipal de Tiahuanacu, 2/24/1954. There are several similar documents within the series, addressed to other local officials.

piedras que son restos arqueológicos de la mayor importancia.”⁷⁷² Liendo lamented that “la utilización de tales terrenos por los campesinos de Achaca que pretenden reivindicar esos terrenos para la comunidad de Achaca, sería altamente perjudicial, incluso para el actual perímetro fiscal de las terrenos donde se exhiben las milenarias ruinas.”⁷⁷³

Fearing that planting and grazing on the land would damage material-cultural relics that lay in the subsoil, Lazarte declared that expanding the perimeter of state lands around Pumapunku was a “necesidad urgente.”⁷⁷⁴ IIB director, Félix Eguino Zabala, was also alarmed by the ex-colonos’ occupation of the territory. After all, it was his institution that, according to its mission statement, was tasked with nothing less than “preservar y conservar los tesoros de la cultura vernacular, que posee al suelo boliviano.”⁷⁷⁵ Frustrated by the community’s intransigence, he sent Liendo a sketch of the ruins that indicated the perimeter around them that required protection. Liendo urged Eguino to contact the Secretary of the Sindicato Agrario de Achaca, Juan Mamani, to communicate “la importancia de las ruinas y la obligación de respetar las leyes existentes del patrimonio nacional.”⁷⁷⁶ Meanwhile, Liendo wrote Álvarez Plata, urging the Minister to promote a supreme decree that would “se amplié el perímetro de la pertenencia fiscal de las ruinas de Tihuanacu, agregando todos los terrenos limítrofes que pertenecían a la Hacienda Achaca.”⁷⁷⁷ Such measures were necessary, he asserted, because “futuras

⁷⁷² UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1954, Manuel Liendo Lazarte to Federico Álvarez Plata, 3/24/54.

⁷⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁴ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1954, Manuel Liendo Lazarte to Federico Álvarez Plata, 3/24/1954.

⁷⁷⁵ ABNB, PR, 1952, Correspondencia, MAC (756/369), Circular, Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos, June 1952

⁷⁷⁶ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1954, Manuel Liendo Lazarte to Félix Eguino Zabala, 4/2/1954.

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid.




Illustration 20: Contour map showing surface features of Pumapunku.⁷⁷⁸




Illustration 21: Surface features of Pumapunku. Acha ex-colonos occupied the “Western Plaza” on the left of the drawing.⁷⁷⁹

⁷⁷⁸ From Vranich, “Interpreting the Meaning of Ritual Spaces,” p. 328.

excavaciones arqueológicas puedan poner en descubierto valiosas reliquias que con seguridad existen en tales terrenos.”⁷⁸⁰

State cultural officials saw the expropriation and preservation of the lands bordering the ruins as the only way to “defend” the cultural patrimony in the face of rising indigenous mobilization to reconstitute ayllu lands. In December 1955, Lazarte wrote Hugo Almaráz, who had since replaced Miguel Alandia Pantoja as Director of the DMMN, pointing out the “necesidad de efectuar algunas expropiaciones de propiedades particulares alrededor de las ruinas.”⁷⁸¹ As peasants continued to insist on their rights to the lands, state efforts to obtain the contested territory became increasingly desperate. In 1956, Almaráz wrote the Minister of Education on behalf of the CAB, recommending that the Ministry contact the Instituto de Geografía Militar “para el levantamiento de un plano topográfico de los terrenos ya adquiridos; es decir de los que corresponden a las ruinas de Puma Punku, la Casa del Inca, y Kalasasaya, siendo esta una de las primeras medidas, previa la completación [sic?] que tiene que efectuarse con la adquisición de los lotes de propiedad particular que se encuentran ubicados dentro del perímetro que encerrara a las indicadas ruinas, pues dentro del plan de trabajos que presento esta Comisión ante el Ministro Dr. Federico Álvarez Plata, se contempla la expropiación de los terrenos particulares.”⁷⁸²

Yet despite the urgency that Liendo, Eguino, Almaraz, and other officials assigned the matter, the government did not issue a supreme decree expropriating the

⁷⁷⁹ From *Ibid.*, p. 406.

⁷⁸⁰ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1954, Manuel Liendo Lazarte to Federico Álvarez Plata, 3/24/1954.

⁷⁸¹ UNAR, CIAT, Correspondencia 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), Manuel Lazarte Liendo to Hugo Almaráz, 12/20/1955, p. 1.

⁷⁸² UNAR, CIAT, Correspondencia 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), Hugo Almaráz to Ministro de Educación y Bellas Artes, “Informe de La Comisión Arqueología Boliviana,” 3/27/1956

lands surrounding Pumapunku. In the face of widespread peasant mobilization and the rural politics of the MNR, it seems that they remained largely powerless. Evidence suggests widespread and growing hostility between state archeological officials and indigenous communities. Achaca was not the only community that was struggling to retain rights to archeological lands. Museum officials also confronted a similar threat to the patrimony on an Aymara ayllu called Acuta (to the southwest of Tiwanaku), as campesinos occupied the lands surrounding another pre-Hispanic archeological site called Khonko Huancane.⁷⁸³ Tensions escalated to such a point that state archeologists began arming themselves for expeditions into Aymara provinces. Beginning in November 1954, budgets for archeological expeditions on the altiplano included rifles, revolvers, and ammunition in addition to the usual shovels, wheelbarrows, and buckets.⁷⁸⁴

Local struggles for land and rights ultimately undermined government efforts to expropriate the territory surrounding Pumapunku in order to preserve it as cultural patrimony. Not only were the ex-colonos struggling with state officials to gain legal title to the contested ayllu lands. But towards the middle of the 1950s, conflicts arose within the ayllu as ex-colonos sought to defend their *sayañas* against the encroachment of returning ex-comunarios, who despite having been expelled from the hacienda decades earlier retained legal title to parcels of ayllu lands. The protracted local struggle that ensued posed a formidable challenge to state efforts to expropriate the archeological lands surrounding Pumapunku.

⁷⁸³ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1954, Manuel Liendo Lazarte to Guarda Ruinas de Khonko Huancane, 2/24/54.

⁷⁸⁴ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1954, Humerto Pando, "Presupuesto para realizar una expedición arqueológica al lugar denominado Jacha Pukara," 11/25/54; see also, UNAR, CIAT, Correspondencia, 1956 y otra antropología (02-144), Hugo Almaraz, Presupuesto, 12/27/1955.

The conflict between ex-colonos and ex-comunarios originated in the land displacement and social changes that occurred on Achaca during the seventy years that had passed since it began the long, contested transformation from ayllu to hacienda. Although the external boundaries of Achaca remained unchanged, land claims within the community had changed significantly. During the first decades of the twentieth century, Goytia and Zalles each expelled those unwilling to forfeit lands and/or submit to hacienda labor obligations. The military assault on Achaca in 1922, the imprisonment of apoderados such as Cruz and Marin, and the expulsion of other comunarios left vacant sayañas that other colonos soon occupied. Further dislocation presumably occurred in the wake of the 1933 supreme decree that expropriated private lands for cultural patrimony, as Perou removed the colonos who occupied the nine hectares surrounding Pumapunku.⁷⁸⁵ As a result, peasants were uprooted from their ancestral lands and either relocated within the hacienda or simply left the community. By the time that the MNR signed the agrarian reform into law in 1953, actual land possession thus differed markedly from the legal titles that many ex-colonos and ex-comunarios held. This became the subject of protracted legal battles, as ex-comunarios returned to Achaca only to find their sayañas occupied by ex-colonos.

The legal conflicts that resulted from such discrepancies between the occupation and possession of ayllu lands were arbitrated within the framework of the 1953 agrarian reform law. Drafted by a state commission dominated by a group of Cochabamba leftist intellectuals that included Arturo Urquidi Morales, Ernesto Ayala Mercado, and Ricardo Anaya, the agrarian reform law privileged usufruct over private property rights. Evoking the popular mantra, “la tierra es para quién la trabaja,” it declared ex-colonos the rightful

⁷⁸⁵ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1954, Manuel Liendo Lazarte to Federico Álvarez Plata, 3/24/1954.

owners of the parcels of land they both occupied and worked on any estate classified as exploitive. What became the most contested aspect of the law were articles 77-92, which established who would be granted preferential treatment in the redistribution of hacienda lands. The law granted ownership rights to those individuals who had occupied the land for a period that dated back two or more years from the passage of the agrarian reform law on August 2, 1953. As such, it legalized the land reallocations that had transpired on the estate under the hacienda regime, and favored ex-colonos at the expense of those ex-comunarios who held legal title to the lands that they had been forcibly expelled from decades earlier.

It was not long before the government recognized the necessity to clarify the decree in order to address rising hostilities on haciendas such as Achaca where ex-comunarios were returning to reclaim sayañas to which they did not possess, but held legal deed. In May 1954, President Paz Estenssoro signed the *Ley de restitución de tierras de las comunidades a los campesinos*, a measure intended to mitigate land disputes between ex-colonos and ex-comunarios. The law reaffirmed the rights of ex-colonos to the lands they occupied, declaring that “no podrán ser despojados bajo ningún concepto por parte de los ex-comunarios.”⁷⁸⁶ At the same time, it invalidated all land titles conferred during the period 1900-1953. Ex-comunarios no longer had a claim to the sayañas to which they held deeds—that is, to a specific parcel of land in the ayllu—but the law guaranteed them legal title to another plot of land of equal value on the estate.

Clashes between ex-colonos and ex-comunarios intensified on Achaca after 1956, as each sought to acquire legal possession of contested ayllu lands. Having expelled the

⁷⁸⁶ Decreto Ley No. 03732, “Restitución de tierras de las comunidades a los campesinos,” from *Compilación legal de la reforma agraria en Bolivia*, Wálter del Castillo Avendaño, ed. (La Paz, 1955), p. 160.

hacienda administration and taken extralegal possession of the lands in the wake of the 1953 Agrarian Reform, ex-colonos banded together under the SAA to initiate formal proceedings to acquire legal title to lands in October 1955.⁷⁸⁷ Under the law, the land was legally theirs. Still, ex-comunarios, whose sayañas were occupied by ex-colonos, filed competing claims and, in some cases, occupied the sayañas to which they held legal title. This group included Esteban Cabrera Cruz, grandson of apoderado Ildelfonzo Cruz, and several others who had been dispossessed of their sayañas during the 1910s and 1920s.⁷⁸⁸ This generated significant conflict within the community, as ex-colonos refused to

⁷⁸⁷ Waldo Villamor Michel, “Resumen estadístico de la reforma agraria de Tiwanaku,” in *Jornadas Peruano-Bolivianas de estudio científico del Altiplano boliviano y del sur del Perú, Tomo II: Arqueología en Bolivia y Perú* (La Paz: Casa Municipal de Cultura “Franz Tamayo,” 1977), 211-223, p. 215. Gaining legal title to land was an arduous process mired by a cumbersome state bureaucracy and paralyzed by the centralization of authority. According to the Agrarian Reform decree, litigants had to submit a claim with the Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria (National Agrarian Reform Service, SNRA). Petitions—either from colonos seeking titles to usurped lands or from owners seeking to retain their lands—then received an initial hearing (audiencia) from a special agrarian reform judge. In the meantime, SNRA topographers surveyed and mapped the disputed territory, and the court collected documents from all parties involved—tax records, receipts, titles, etc. The judge would then make an initial judgment that was in effect until the claim moved up bureaucracy and was reviewed by the Consejo Nacional de Reforma Agraria (National Agrarian Reform Council, CNRA). Once the case was reviewed and CNRA made a final judgment, it was passed on to the President who signed it into law. Then it was passed back down and signed by each party involved before it found its way back into the SNRA archives. The process was further hampered by the sheer volume of claimants. In October 1953—three months after the MNR institutionalized the reform—Minister of Peasant Affairs Ñuflo Chavez remarked that “los campesinos que concurren diariamente en busca de solución a sus problemas [en MAC] es aproximadamente de 1.000.” Fifty percent of those problems, he was sure to point out, dealt with land claims [ABNB, PR, 1953, MAC (803/386), Ñuflo Chavez Ortiz to José Antonio Arze, 21 October 1953]. Anthropologist William Carter commented on the inefficiency of the process in 1971, noting that “out of 15,322 cases initiated between 1953 and 1966, only 7,322 were terminated, leaving approximately 8000 pending.” He found that 4000 of the cases were simply awaiting presidential signature, 3000 were still under review, and the remaining 1000 were in “the initial stages of inquiry” [William E. Carter, “Revolution and the Agrarian Sector,” in *Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952*, James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorns, eds. (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), pp. 233-68, p. 245]. In short, the process could take several years. It was not until January of 1958 when CNRA made an initial decision regarding Achaca.

⁷⁸⁸ INRA-LP (6580/1), f. 61, Esteban Cabrera Cruz to Señor Juez Agrario, 5/12/1956; See also ABNB, PR, 1953, MAC, El Directorio de los Sindicatos Agrarios de las Ex-comunidades de Achaca y Kasa Achuta to Excelentísimo señor Presidente Constitucional de la Republica [Víctor Paz Estenssoro], 24 July 1953, (803/386), a petition from ex-comunario, Fransico Luna Paxipati whose family had been expelled from the hacienda in 1923, and had since settled in Munyapata in the burgeoning outskirts of La Paz.

recognize these land titles, pointing out that the returning ex-comunarios were “artesanos, fabriles ó comerciantes y que por tanto han dejado de ser campesinos estictu-sensu.”⁷⁸⁹ Citing the 1953 agrarian reform decree and the 1954 addendum, they quoted the guiding principle of the law, “la ‘tierra es para quién la trabaja’” and argued that they, the ex-colonos, deserved preference in the redistribution of ayllu lands because they had worked the land.⁷⁹⁰ Only after the state granted title to ex-colonos, they argued, should the ex-comunarios be granted lands on the ayllu.

With the passage of the 1954 law, SNRA had to arbitrate the disputes between ex-colonos and ex-comunarios, and was obligated to accommodate ex-comunarios on equitable lands within the ayllu. Doing so required surveying and redistributing the hacienda lands in order to accommodate both the ex-colonos who already possessed the land, and the ex-comunarios who were guaranteed parcels of land on the ayllu. Yet SNRA faced a difficult task. Not only was there a fixed amount of land to accommodate the ex-comunarios, but the distribution of this land had become incredibly inequitable over the course of the century. According to a 1956 study carried out by SNRA, the total number of ex-colonos on Achaca, including male heads of household, females, and children was 543.⁷⁹¹ This population lived on 143 sayañas that ranged in size from two to fifty-five hectares. SNRA surveys indicate that the 25 largest sayañas comprised 60 percent of the land, while the smallest 20 only owned only six percent.⁷⁹² Further

⁷⁸⁹ INRA-LP (6580/1), f. 99, Mateo Callisaya y Pedro Paxipati to Señores Presidente y VV. del Consejo Nacional de Reforma Agraria, 7/8/1957, p. 1.

⁷⁹⁰ INRA-LP (6580/1), f. 99, Mateo Callisaya y Pedro Paxipati to Señores Presidente y VV. del Consejo Nacional de Reforma Agraria, 7/8/1957, pp. 1-2.

⁷⁹¹ INRA-LP (6580/1), f. 169, “Informe pericial de la ex-comunidad de ‘Achaca’ al Señor Presidente de la Junta Rural de Tihuanaco,” April 1956, p. 1.

⁷⁹² Data compiled from INRA-LP (6580/1), f. 156, Miguel Ángel Barrenechea Guzmán to Señor Presidente y Vocales del Consejo Nacional de Reforma Agraria, “Ref.- Restitución y afectación de la ex-comunidad ‘Achaca’,” 2/22/57, pp. 3-6.

complicating the situation was the fact that there was a limited amount of arable land. The topographer in charge of Achaca's land claim noted that "muchas de las sayañas que actualmente ocupan son de extensión bastante grande, en cambio, restos no son cultivables en toda su extensión."⁷⁹³

Given the lack of arable land, the fertile territory surrounding Pumapunku became an incredibly valuable commodity that SNRA needed in order to accommodate the demands of ex-comunarios. Confronted with this situation, SNRA and MEBA faced conflicting institutional obligations. While MEBA officials sought to expropriate the lands and preserve them as national cultural patrimony, SNRA was legally obliged to attend to peasant demands and accommodate the ex-comunarios on Achaca. Thus, the redistribution of hacienda land and the government's agrarian reform policies took precedence over the need to protect archeological lands as cultural patrimony. In terms of the overall objectives of the postrevolutionary government, its commitment to agrarian reform and national development trumped its dedication to national cultural formation.

In 1956, SNRA sent a team of topographers and lawyers to Achaca to redistribute ayllu lands in order to accommodate the ex-comunarios and resolve the local conflict. After surveying the ayllu, they expropriated portions of the largest sayañas and reallocated communal lands to supply the territory needed to accommodate the thirty-three ex-comunarios demanding restitution. The team completed the task in February 1957, granting each ex-comunario ten hectares of ayllu lands.⁷⁹⁴ With this effort, it seems that local hostilities largely subsided. The calm proved short-lived, however, for soon

⁷⁹³ INRA-LP (6580/1), f. 169, "Informe pericial de la ex-comunidad de 'Achaca' al Señor Presidente de la Junta Rural de Tihuanaco," April 1956, p. 1.

⁷⁹⁴ INRA-LP (6580/1), f. 156, Miguel Ángel Barrenechea Guzmán to Señor Presidente y Vocales del Consejo Nacional de Reforma Agraria, "Ref.- Restitución y afectación de la ex-comunidad 'Achaca'," 2/22/57.

after SNRA redistributed the lands, Domingo Pati Morales, the hated jilakata, initiated legal proceeding to recover not only his sayaña, but also those of other colonos who the SAA had expelled in 1953.⁷⁹⁵ According to the agrarian reform laws, Pati had legal rights to ayllu lands, but given his past, both ex-colonos and ex-comunarios contested his claims. Pati's claim reignited hostilities on the ayllu and undermined SNRA's 1957 redistribution. In the succeeding years, as SNRA set out once again to redistribute the limited amount of land to attend to the contested petition of Pati, local struggles continued to frustrate efforts to protect archeological lands.

NATIONAL PATRIMONY, LOCAL STRUGGLE

As the state archeological mission began excavating and reconstructing the Kalasasaya acropolis in early 1957, they confronted this volatile situation. The Kalasasaya dig marked not only the expansion of the Tiwanaku restoration project, but also the ascendance of Carlos Ponce Sanginés as the head of the state archeological mission. Ponce had spent the previous two years in Mexico, where he and his wife, the anthropologist Julia Elena Fortún, served as cultural attachés in the Bolivian embassy. Upon returning, the Minister of Education, Fernando Diez de Medina, appointed Ponce, first as head of the *Comité de Excavaciones*—the interim institution charged with developing an excavation plan for Tiwanaku—and then as director of the *Centro de Investigaciones Arqueológicas en Tiwanaku* (Center for Archeological Research at Tiwanaku, CIAT), the permanent state office overseeing the Tiwanaku restoration project. With Ponce leading the state archeological mission, the protection of the

⁷⁹⁵ INRA-LP (6580/1), f. 116, Domingo Pati Morales to Vicente Álvarez Plata, Presidente del Consejo Nacional de Reforma Agraria, 7/4/1957.

Tiwanaku ruins would play an even more significant role in postrevolutionary patrimony formation.

The excavation and reconstruction of Kalasasaya also marked the beginning of a permanent presence of state archeologists in the Tiwanaku valley. Since the ruins were about two hours from La Paz by car, and lacked regular railroad service, CIAT personnel stayed at the ruins during the week. In 1957, Ministry of Education officials obtained the old Hotel Refugio Tiwanaku on loan from the fledgling National Directorate of Tourism—who had it on lease from the Prefect of La Paz—to house the archeological staff. In June 1958, President Siles signed a supreme decree, transferring title from the Prefect of La Paz to CIAT to serve as permanent headquarters for archeological research.⁷⁹⁶ The Hotel Refugio became the headquarters of the state archeological staff at Tiwanaku (and the surrounding altiplano), housing the central offices of CIAT, laboratories, and living quarters.⁷⁹⁷

It soon became clear, however, that neither the indigenous communities surrounding the archeological site, nor vecinos from the neighboring village of Tiwanaku welcomed the permanent and expanding presence of state archeologists in the area. In a memoir that Julia Elena Fortún drafted in November 1959 about her participation in the excavation and reconstruction of Kalasasaya, she recounted the hostilities that she and others faced as the state archeological mission settled into the Hotel Refugio and prepared Kalasasaya for excavation. During the initial days of the excavation, she recalled, someone detonated dynamite next to the new headquarters, shattering all the

⁷⁹⁶ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia 1958 (02-148), Hernán Siles Zuazo, Presidente Constitucional de la Republica, Decreto Supremo de 30 de Junio de 1958.

⁷⁹⁷ Carlos Ponce Sanginés, *Centro de Investigaciones Arqueológicas en Tiwanaku: Informe de labores* (La Paz: Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes, 1961), p. 11.

windows, under the pretext of an accident during a party. While detonating dynamite is not an uncommon occurrence during altiplano festivals—especially around the mining centers of Oruro and Potosí—Fortún interpreted the incident as nefarious. Given the broader circumstances, she was probably correct. She also described more severe incidents, one in which state archeologists came under gunfire on two occasions as they surveyed Kalasasaya for excavation in early 1957.⁷⁹⁸

To Fortún and the rest of the excavation team, the hostilities revealed the government's continued inability to adequately safeguard the archeological site and the attendant need to establish new means to protect cultural patrimony at Tiwanaku. In order to do so, they sought to enlist the cooperation of locals to help mitigate local hostility and enforce cultural patrimony laws. In May 1957, the Ministry of Education, sent an official envoy to Tiwanaku to discuss the state archeological project with local authorities. After inspecting the ruins, officials sat down with local officials to discuss the importance of cultural patrimony and what the Tiwanaku restoration project was going to entail. The state envoy included Alberto Laguna Meave, Maks Portugal, and Gregorio Cordero from the Consejo Consultivo de Arqueología, and Julia Elena Fortún as a representative of the Ministry of Education's *Departamento de Arqueología, Etnografía y Folklore* (Department of Archeology, Ethnography, and Folklore, DAEF). They were received by village and peasant leaders, including the head of police, the president of the citizens group, delegates from the rural unions, and the local MNR boss, Walter Fernandez.

⁷⁹⁸ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1959 (02-149). Julia Elena Fortún de Ponce "Mi anecdotario de Tiwanaku," November 1959, p. 6.

Seeking to ensure the protection of both ruins and artifacts, the envoy arrived with two objectives.⁷⁹⁹ First, they wanted to stop *huaquerismo*, clandestine digs carried out by locals seeking to uncover artifacts to sell to collectors and tourists.⁸⁰⁰ Since antiquities emerged as a valuable commodity in the nineteenth century, this practice had provided a lucrative source of income to locals. The postrevolutionary government sought to put an end to this threat to cultural patrimony. Since the 1940s, the MNT had posted a guard at Tiwanaku to protect the site from vandals and prevent *huaquerismo*. The guards were local campesinos who were paid by the Ministry of Education. In order to fortify the site, the postrevolutionary government posted additional guards at the ruins. Yet, despite increased protection of the ruins, *huaquerismo* continued to be a problem. According to officials, the guards were easily bribed with alcohol or money, and prone to look the other way.

To stop *huaquerismo* once and for all, Fortún directed the resources of the DAEF to organize rural artisan cooperatives in the indigenous communities surrounding Tiwanaku.⁸⁰¹ She came up with this idea during her recent sojourn in Mexico where, as historian Rick López shows, the government was promoting rural arts and crafts as authentic representations of a purely Mexican national culture after the Revolution.⁸⁰² Fortún recognized the utility of such an effort in Bolivia—not only would it contribute to the valorization of popular arts, but it could also be useful in terms of cultural patrimony.

⁷⁹⁹ UNAR, CIAT, Correspondencia 1957-58 (02-145), Minutes from meeting in Tiwanaku, 5/17/57, p. 1.

⁸⁰⁰ UNAR, CIAT, Correspondencia 1957-58 (02-145), s.n., “Objetivos inmediatos del viaje a Tiwanaku,” s.d. (ca. May 1957).

⁸⁰¹ That Fortún was inspired by similar efforts by the Mexican government is evident in UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1959 (02-149). Julia Elena Fortún, “Mi anecdotario de Tiwanaku,” November 1959, p. 8.

⁸⁰² Rick A. López, *Crafting Mexico: Intellectuals, Artisans, and the State after the Revolution* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). That Fortún was inspired by similar efforts by the Mexican government is evident in UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1959 (02-149). Julia Elena Fortún de Ponce “Mi anecdotario de Tiwanaku,” November 1959, p. 8.

The creation of rural artisan cooperatives in Tiwanaku, she argued, would protect patrimony by dissuading the practice of *huaquerismo* by offering peasants an alternative source of income. Instead of illegally digging up artifacts to sell on the black market, rural artisans would create replicas of pre-Hispanic artifacts to sell to tourists and collectors.⁸⁰³ The effort would stop *huaquerismo* and protect important artifacts by offering peasants an alternative source of income. Rural artisan cooperatives would also contribute to the Revolution's broader goal of economic diversification by promoting rural industry.⁸⁰⁴

The second objective of the official envoy was to enlist the cooperation of local authorities to dissuade indigenous communities from using archeological lands for planting and grazing. The primary concern continued to be the lands surrounding Pumapunku. Despite government protest, Achaca peasants had continued using the lands surrounding Pumapunku for planting and grazing. Following the May 1957 meeting at Tiwanaku, Fortún reported to Díez de Medina that “el área de arqueológica había sido invadida en gran escala por los campesinos, encontrándose ya roturada la tierra en pleno anfiteatro del Puma Punku.”⁸⁰⁵ With expropriation out of the question because of SNRA's need to resolve the conflict between ex-colonos and ex-comunarios on Achaca, Fortún suggested posting signs that clearly demarcated archeological land and creating “una apariencia mas organizada” of the state archeological mission.⁸⁰⁶ Such efforts proved to have little effect, however.

⁸⁰³ For more on the efforts of the postrevolutionary government to promote a rural artisan class, see Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes, Departamento de Arqueología, Etnografía y Folklore, *Artesanía Popular* (La Paz: Oficial Mayor de Cultura, 1961). See particularly Chapter 2.

⁸⁰⁴ UNAR, CIAT, Correspondencia 1957-58 (02-145), Julia Elena Fortún to Fernando Díez de Medina, 5/23/1957, p. 2-3.

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 2.

As the excavations got underway, the Minister of Peasant Affairs sent a memorandum to all authorities in the canton of Tiwanaku—alcaldes, intendentes, corregidores, and secretarios agrarios—urging cooperation with state archeologists.⁸⁰⁷ The Minister stressed the importance of the restoration project in terms of national cultural patrimony, and requested that locals leave state archeologists to their work.⁸⁰⁸ Yet many refused to comply. Fortún lamented that “Las autoridades se animaron a dar la orden y se enfermaron el momento de la ejecución.”⁸⁰⁹ Correspondence and field reports describe constant disputes between the CIAT team and local authorities. In addition to dynamite and gunshots, Fortún recalled that locals cursed the excavations pits with witchcraft.⁸¹⁰ With these, and other actions, she concluded, locals sought to “run off” archeologists (“*su afan de ‘correr’ a los investigadores*”).⁸¹¹

Fortún looked to the permanent presence of state archeologists to explain the hostility encountered by the archeological team. Explaining the resistance, she stated that, “Indudablemente constituyen esos actos las reacciones de no pocos lugareños, no todos en verdad, derivadas de la incomodidad que les significa el establecimiento de un centro oficial dispuesto a velar por al cumplimiento de las disposiciones jurídicas

⁸⁰⁷ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1957-58 (02-146), Vincente Alvarez Plata to Alcalde, Intendente, Corregidor, y Secretarios Agrarios de Tiwanaku, Memorándum, 10/9/1957.

⁸⁰⁸ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia 1957-58 (02-146), Vincente Alvarez Plata to Alcalde, Intendente, Corregidor, y Secretarios Agrarios de Tiwanaku, Memorándum, 10/9/1957.

⁸⁰⁹ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1959 (02-149). Julia Elena Fortún de Ponce “Mi anecdotario de Tiwanaku,” November 1959, p. 7. Of note, in this short memoire, Fortún reveal that it was her, and not her husband, Carlos Ponce that discovered the monolith that still bears his name today.

⁸¹⁰ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1959 (02-149). Julia Elena Fortún, “Mi anecdotario de Tiwanaku,” November 1959, p. 8. An intellectual who played crucial role in the foundation, institutionalization, and professionalization of the archeological discipline in Bolivia, Fortún saw in these “brujeríos” an opportunity to study indigenous folklore. She states, “...en este caso cabe agradecerles, por haberme brindado un interesante tema de estudio folklórico sobre mágica y superstición.”

⁸¹¹ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1959 (02-149). Julia Elena Fortún, “Mi anecdotario de Tiwanaku,” November 1959, p. 7-8.

concernientes al patrimonio arqueológico.”⁸¹² Speculating as to who was behind the hostilities, Fortún asserted that it was certainly not campesinos. “Hay que puntualizar hidalgamente,” she wrote, “que los obstáculos anotados no proceden de los campesinos, quiénes no exteriorizan ningún tabú o animadversión hacia las excavaciones metódicas.”⁸¹³ Quite to the contrary, she contended that local indigenous communities both supported and benefitted from the Tiwanaku restoration project. Citing the creation of rural artisan cooperatives, she argued that “les proporcionan trabajo y con el incremento del turismo han aumentado sus ingresos en la venta de los ‘monolitos’ o estatuillas que imitan las estelas precolombinas, las cuales han originado el establecimiento de una próspera artesanía rural.”⁸¹⁴ They also understood the project in terms of its potential for social uplift. “Los grupos nativos de la región han empezado a revalorizar lo antiguo, los restos dejados por sus remotos antepasados tiwanakotas.”⁸¹⁵ While exonerating indigenous communities with a narrative that espoused notions of the noble savage, she asserted that it was the local vecinos who were the aggressors.⁸¹⁶

For Ponce, however, the stubborn occupation of archeological lands by local indigenous communities lay at the very heart of the continuing hostilities. Towards the end of the decade, he grew increasingly frustrated by the fact that the ex-colonos and ex-comunarios of Achaca continued to undermine efforts to protect cultural patrimony. The breaking point occurred in December 1958, when Ponce arrived at Tiwanaku to find the vecino, Pedro Pizarroso, grazing his herd of cattle on the ruins. Following this incident, Ponce resolved to obtain title to all the contested lands and to strengthen the

⁸¹² Ibid., p. 7.

⁸¹³ Ibid.

⁸¹⁴ Ibid.

⁸¹⁵ Ibid., p. 7.

⁸¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 5-7.

government's ability to enforce cultural patrimony law. The lands bordering Pumapunku were his primary concern, and he was certain that the territory belonged to the state. Yet, community leaders disagreed. Frustrated, he subsequently cabled the Minister of Peasant Affairs, Walter Flores complaining that "Los campesinos de la comunidad da Achaca expresan que los terrenos que se encuentran sobre el grupo arqueológico de Pumapunku les pertenece." He proclaimed that the occupation of the lands surrounding Pumapunku represented "un atentado contra la cultura del país, deteriorando el mejor grupo de ruinas de Tiwanaku."⁸¹⁷

In March of 1959, Ponce frantically set out to procure the title to the contested lands, cabling the Ministry of Education, the Contraloría General de Republica, and the Ministry of Government. Given the passage of the 1933 supreme decree that called for the expropriation of nine hectares of land surrounding Pumapunku, Ponce was correct in assuming that the contested land was state property. Yet under the weak patrimony regime of the pre-revolutionary state, the hacendado Juan Perou had retained ownership of the land. Following the agrarian reform, the lands fell into the hand of Achaca ex-colonos. On 8 March 1959, he wrote the Minister of Education, lamenting that CIAT "no puede exhibir por tal circunstancia ningún documento que acredite que Pumapunku es propiedad del Estado, ni indicar cuales son los linderos con los terrenos vecinos."⁸¹⁸ In order to "de defender esta parte de las ruinas" he wrote, "es necesario saber si el Estado posee algún título." If the state could not produce a title, he asserted, "habria que dictar de inmediato la expropiación de la extensión que abarque Pumapunku, más o

⁸¹⁷ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1959 (02-150), Carlos Ponce Sanginés to Walter Flores, 3/23/1959.

⁸¹⁸ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1959 (02-149), Carlos Ponce Sanginés to Germán Monroy Block, 3/8/1959.

menos 300 x 150 metros de superficie”⁸¹⁹ In the meantime, he cabled the Minister of Government, requesting that the local police commander order the Secretario General de la Comidad de Achca not to plant in Pumapunku.

Confronted with this renewed attempt to expropriate their lands, the Sindicato Agrario de Achaca turned to the *Dirección General de Legislación y Justicia Campesina* (General Directorate of Rural Legislation and Justice, DJC) for assistance. The government created the DJC as a branch of the Ministry of Peasant Affairs in 1952 “to attend to the legal defense of campesinos.”⁸²⁰ The peasants of Achaca sought to use the DJC to affirm their rights lands. Ponce wrote the Director of DJC, protesting their willingness to hear the case. Not only did he remind the director that it was CIAT’s responsibility to protect the ruins as part of national cultural patrimony, and as such to keep the Achaca peasants from planting on the lands surrounding Pumapunku. But also, he highlighted what he saw as the abusive nature of the Achaca peasants. “Debese señalar,” he wrote, “que dichos campesinos han amezado a los guarderuinias del Centro, funcionarios publicos que cumplen se deber, inclusive amenazado de muerte.”⁸²¹ Ponce Sangines protested that “El CIAT no puede permanecer en silencio ante tan vandálicos actos, que amenazan la cultural del país.”⁸²²

Ponce’s effort to expropriate the lands surrounding Pumapunku ultimately failed. As ex-colonos and ex-comunarios continued to fight over their sayañas, the government

⁸¹⁹ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1959 (02-149), Carlos Ponce Sanginés to Jefe de Departamento de Bienes Nacionales de la Controlaría General de la Republica, 3/23/1959.

⁸²⁰ Decreto Supremo No. 3064, 5/22/52 contained in Universidad Mayor de San Andres, Departamento de Publicaciones de la Escuela de Derecho y Ciencias Políticas, *Anales de legislación boliviana*, Vol. 14 (Mayo-Agosto 1952), pp. 24-27.

⁸²¹ UNAR, INAR, Correspondencia, 1959 (02-149), Carlos Ponce Sanginés to Director General de Legislación y Justicia Campesina, 3/23/59.

⁸²² Ibid.

prioritized agrarian reform over conservation of cultural patrimony. In 1960, SNRA once again redistributed ayllu lands to accommodate the demands of Domingo Pati and other ex-colonos who the Sindicato Agrario de Achaca had expelled in the wake of the agrarian reform.⁸²³ To the dismay of Ponce and other state archeology officials, the Achaca ex-colonos retained legal possession of the lands. The occupation of the Achaca and the permanent presence of state archeologists remained a continual source of tension in the region. In 1961, U.S. anthropologist William Carter briefly stayed at the CIAT headquarters, on his way to the Aymara community Irpa Chico where, under the auspices of the DAEF, he carried out the first ethnographic study of a post-agrarian reform Aymara community. Taking note of the high walls surrounding the state archeological headquarters and the armed guards who protected it, he noted that instead of an official scientific station, CIAT resembled more a military outpost.⁸²⁴ He recalled that, “The guard who was posted at the gate to the center’s compound had orders to shoot anyone who entered or left after 8:00 p.m.”⁸²⁵

TIWANAKU’S LEGACY ON PATRIMONY FORMATION AND CULTURAL POLITICS

Despite the government’s failure to expropriate the archeological lands surrounding Pumapunku, the conflict in the Tiwanaku valley left a lasting legacy on postrevolutionary cultural patrimony formation. Under pressure from Ponce, Fortún, and

⁸²³ INRA-LP (6580/2), f. 321, Julio Navarro C., Sub-Director del Departamento Técnico del SNRA to Sr. Presidente y Vocales del Consejo Nacional de Reforma Agraria, “Ref: Replanteo del ex-fundo Achaca,” Mayo de 1960.

⁸²⁴ William E. Carter, *Comunidades aymaras y reforma agraria en Bolivia* (México, D.F.: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, 1967), p. 4.

⁸²⁵ William E. Carter, “Entering the World of the Aymara,” *Crossing Cultural Boundaries: The Anthropological Experience*, Solon T. Kimball and James B. Watson, eds. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1972), pp. 133-150, p. 135.

other state cultural officials, the Ministry of Education initiated a project to establish a new, more-expansive cultural patrimony law in 1961. Drafted under the direction of the Minister of Education, José Fellman Velarde, and the Oficial Mayor de Cultura, Carlos Serrate Reich, the new law attended to the need to expand both the management and the protection of the canon of objects, texts, structures, and places deemed intrinsic to postrevolutionary national culture. Signed into law on November 6, 1961 by President Paz Estenssoro, Decreto Supremo 05918 represented the most extensive cultural patrimony law in Bolivian history. Superseding the Ley de Monumento Nacional of 1927, which had long served as the primary legal instrument for the protection of patrimony, the 1961 law amplified the content of patrimony, created specific institutions to enforce it, and introduced legal sanctions for violations of the law.⁸²⁶

The law also attended to the postrevolutionary government's long-standing bid to centralize cultural patrimony management. It stipulated that the Dirección Nacional de Cultura, the recently-created cultural arm of the MEBA, had to both create and maintain a detailed inventory of all objects of cultural patrimony in public museums and private collections in the entire nation. In order to ensure enforcement of the decree, Minister Fellman Velarde subsequently issued a resolution declaring that all public and private institutions "que posean obras de arte de las épocas Precolombina, Colonial y Republicana que tengan valor artístico, histórico y arqueológico en el país" must register their possessions with the Direction of Culturas within thirty days or face legal penalty.⁸²⁷ By creating a central catalog of patrimony, the law enabled the state to enforce the protection of patrimony more effectively.

⁸²⁶ Decreto Supremo No. 05918, Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia.

⁸²⁷ Archivo Central del Ministerio de Culturas (ACMC), Dirección General de Cultura (DGC), Catalogo de Exposiciones (1960-1963), Tomo I, "Resolución Ministerial, La Paz, 27 de noviembre de 1961."

Yet the most radical changes introduced by the 1961 law concerned archeological patrimony. As director of CIAT, Ponce wielded considerable power within the state cultural bureaucracy, and as Ministry of Education officials drafted the new patrimony law, he exercised his authority to influence its content. Supreme Decree 05918 significantly expanded the definition of archeological patrimony to include a host of structures and artifacts that had escaped protection under previous laws. In addition to monumental architecture and material-cultural artifacts, the law defined *yacimientos arqueológicos*, trash pits, cemeteries, huacas, textiles, as well as precious metals and stones as cultural patrimony. The expanded definition of patrimony demonstrates the extent to which conflict over the archeological lands surrounding Pumapunku influenced the new law and underscores the state's recognition of the need to include land in the expanded definition of patrimony. By including the specific language “*yacimientos arqueológicos*” in the expanded definition of national cultural patrimony, the law empowered the state to protect land with archeological remnants. In order to ensure that property rights would not undermine the protection of such lands in the future by locals, the law granted the state the right to expropriate patrimony under the condition of indemnification.⁸²⁸

The protection of Tiwanaku played a central role not only in the development of stronger cultural patrimony laws, but also in the creation of rural artisan cooperatives. In 1957, Julia Elena Fortún organized the first cooperatives in Tiwanaku as a strategy to prevent *huerquerismo* by offering rural communities an alternative source of revenue in the form of “pre-Hispanic” artifacts destined for the burgeoning tourist market. Although

⁸²⁸ Decreto Supremo No. 05918, *Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia*.

huerquerismo continued to be a problem, the project proved a success in other regards—it fomented rural industry while providing communities with a source of income.

From its origins in Tiwanaku, the program became the centerpiece of a broader state initiative intended to valorize the popular arts as an authentic expression of national identity. Fortún and other intellectuals affiliated with the postrevolutionary state insisted that the racism and prejudice of pre-revolutionary society had distorted national patrimony by valorizing “lo occidental” while denigrating “authentic” aspects of national culture such as popular arts and indigenous folklore. By directing state resource to promote rural artisanry the government could, in the words of the Oficial Mayor de Cultura, Carlos Serrate Reich, “revalorizar lo auténticamente nuestro.”⁸²⁹ To realize this effort, President Hernán Siles introduced the Ley General de Cooperativas on September 25, 1958. The law created the Dirección Nacional de Cooperativas (National Directorate of Cooperatives, DNC) to administer the project, established regulations for the cooperatives, and introduced mechanisms to provide them with critical access to credit.⁸³⁰ Under the guidance of Fortún and the DAEF, the DNC organized rural artisan cooperatives “en los lugares caracterizados por una reconocida tradición” such as Copacabana, Jesus de Machaca, and Tarabuco.⁸³¹ In addition to valorizing popular art, Fortún affirmed that that the cooperatives would provide rural communities with an “oportunidad de ocupar su tiempo en forma creadora,” while “elevando su nivel cultural”—not to mention establish their economic livelihood.⁸³²

⁸²⁹ Carlos Serrate Reich, “Introducción,” in Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes, Departamento de Arqueología, Etnografía y Folklore, *Artesanía Popular* (La Paz: Oficial Mayor de Cultura, 1961), p. 10.

⁸³⁰ Julia Elena Fortún, “Necesidad de organizar un Museo de Arte Popular,” in Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes, Departamento de Arqueología, Etnografía y Folklore, *Artesanía Popular* (La Paz: Oficial Mayor de Cultura, 1961), pp. 22-23.

⁸³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁸³² *Ibid.*, p. 17.

As the number of cooperatives increased, Fortún began to lay plans for a Museo Nacional de Artes Populares in order to generate public interest in this authentic, though long disregarded, representation of national culture. She envisioned the Museum as a space that would serve to valorize popular arts by exhibiting examples from across the nation. Moreover, by offering artisan goods for sale, it would also help commercialize popular arts. Further underscoring both the transnational nature of the Bolivian Revolution and the enduring influence of the Mexican Revolution on Bolivian intellectuals, Fortún modeled her plans on the Museo Nacional de Artes e Industrias Populares (MNAIP) in Mexico City.⁸³³ Resulting from the initiative of the famed anthropologist and Director of the Instituto Nacional Indigenista, Alfonso Caso, the Mexican government founded the MNAIP in 1951 as a museum for popular arts that also served as a research center and a market rural artisanry.⁸³⁴ Fortún recognized in the MNAIP an “eficaz modelo para la solución del aún inabordable problema de nuestras artes populares.”⁸³⁵ She was especially influenced by the Director of the MNAIP, Daniel F. Rubín de la Borbolla, an anthropologist who had published widely on the subject of popular arts.⁸³⁶ Rubín de la Borbolla had made the MNAIP incredibly profitable by buying directly from rural artisans not only to place on exhibit, but also to sell to Museum visitors.⁸³⁷ Fortún’s effort came to fruition in 1962 with the creation of the Museo Nacional de Arte Popular, which subsequently became the Museo de Etnografía

⁸³³ Ibid., p. 21.

⁸³⁴ López, *Crafting Mexico*, pp. 179-184.

⁸³⁵ Fortún, “Necesidad de organizar un Museo de Arte Popular,” p. 21.

⁸³⁶ Ibid., p. 25, f. 16. See for example, Daniel F. Rubín de la Borbolla, “Supervivencia y fomento de las artes populares indígenas de América,” *América Indígena*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1959).

⁸³⁷ For more on Daniel F. Rubín de la Borbolla and his role as Director of the MNIAP, see López, *Crafting Mexico*, pp. 182-184.

and Folklore.⁸³⁸ Serving as a space that both exhibited and sold rural artisanry, the Museum attended to the objective of valorizing and commercializing popular arts.

As part of its effort to integrate popular arts as an intrinsic component of postrevolutionary national culture, the government expanded cultural patrimony laws during the 1960s to include a multitude of expressions of everyday rural life that the dominant paradigms of western social science defined as indigenous folklore. Julia Elena Fortún and the state anthropological mission stood at the forefront of this effort. In 1961, the government signaled its growing interest in the valorization of indigenous culture by transforming the Departamento de Arqueología, Etnografía y Folklore, a small state institution overseeing disparate efforts in Archeology and Anthropology, into the Dirección Nacional de Antropología (DNA), an office dedicated exclusively to the study of Bolivia's indigenous population. During the 1960s, the DNA sent teams of anthropologists into the countryside to study the customs, rituals, and celebrations of indigenous communities. As a result of these studies, Fortún and the DNA expanded the content of patrimony beyond the popular arts to include indigenous folklore. Yet, as the following chapter will demonstrate, this project left an enduring legacy on constructions of race and ethnicity in postrevolutionary Bolivia.

CONCLUSION

As the MNR elevated Tiwanaku as a unifying national symbol, the need to protect the archeological site and the artifacts that originated from it played a central role in postrevolutionary patrimony formation. Given that nationalism was the principal

⁸³⁸ Beatriz Rossells, "Después de 'Siempre': Sobre las políticas culturales del MNR de 1952," *historias... Revista de la Coordinadora de Historia*, No. 6 (2003), pp. 171-193, p. 190.

ideology motivating the MNR, it should come as no surprise that the party would implement a more rigorous cultural patrimony regime after coming to power in April 1952. By establishing the DMMN in 1952, the MNR promptly demonstrated its commitment to enforcing existing cultural patrimony legislation, and its intent to centralize patrimony management within a single government office. Stig Rydén's efforts to remove Tiwanaku artifacts to Switzerland for further study in 1954 provided the catalyst that transformed policy into practice. Miguel Alandia Pantoja's decision to deny Rydén permission to remove the artifacts proved to be a defining moment in postrevolutionary patrimony formation. It represented the first instance in which the postrevolutionary government demonstrated its commitment to the enforcement of existing cultural patrimony laws. Moreover, by establishing the DMMN as the only state institution legally capable of making such decision, Alandia's decision centralized patrimony management.

Yet it was ultimately local conflicts over archeological lands that had the most decisive impact on postrevolutionary patrimony formation. While the controversy surrounding artifacts defined the role of state institutions in the management and protection of cultural patrimony, efforts to protect the archeological lands surrounding the Tiwanaku ruins influenced both the promulgation and content of the strongest cultural patrimony law in Bolivian history. State archeologists confronted a novel challenge to patrimony as Achaca ex-colonos and ex-comunarios occupied the lands surrounding the Pumapunku ruins in the wake of the 1953 agrarian reform. The MEBA's continued efforts to expropriate the land were undermined by not only by the Achaca peasants themselves, but also by SNRA, which had to use the fertile lands neighboring the ruins to accommodate peasants on a limited amount of ayllu lands. Unable to obtain the lands,

Ponce sought alternative ways to protect archeological territory. Although the promulgation of the 1961 cultural patrimony law did not directly result from the local conflicts in Tiwanaku, the content of the resolution reflected Ponce's desire to expand the definition of cultural patrimony to protect archeological lands. In addition to defining archeological lands as patrimony, the 1961 law also granted the state the right to expropriate private property.

Beyond influencing cultural patrimony formation in postrevolutionary Bolivia, the conflict over the archaeological lands surrounding Tiwanaku raises broader, more important questions regarding the concept of cultural patrimony—namely, patrimony for whom? Why did the ex-colonos and ex-comunarios of Achaca refuse to recognize the importance of the land in terms of national cultural patrimony? Lacking ethnographic studies of the community, it is difficult to arrive at a precise answer to this question. But the available documentation and the contours of the particular historical moment provide some insight. While MEBA officials prized the land for its potential archeological significance, the ex-colonos and ex-comunarios of Achaca valued the land for its socioeconomic function as well as its cultural, historical, and religious significance. They sought to use the territory to plant crops and graze animals. As ex-colonos and ex-comunarios recovered legal titles to their ancestral lands, the territory also acquired a different form of historical resonance. It represented the end of the hacienda regime, triumph in a seventy-year struggle for land and justice, and a hitherto unimaginable future.

But at the core of the issue, aside from land and its varied significance, lies the question of national belonging. The concept of national cultural patrimony only has meaning when there exists a clear sense of citizenship that accompanies it. Without this

sense of citizenship, without a sense of belonging to the “imagined community,” that is the modern nation-state, patrimony becomes an abstract concept, a phrase void of signification—an elite construct and nationalist instrument. Patrimony is thus intimately linked to citizenship. And in order to understand what patrimony meant to the community of Achaca, one must first ask, what did the nation mean to the community? In spite of the postrevolutionary government’s efforts to integrate indigenous peoples and to valorize popular arts and indigenous folklore, the following chapters demonstrate that in Achaca, and other highland communities, Indians still felt apart from the nation.

Chapter Seven

“Por la cultura nacional”: Postrevolutionary Anthropology and the Paradox of Modernization

Though the idea of the corrupting influence of civilization was not a new one—it is, in fact, a continuing theme in Western culture—the idea that such alterations were the necessary price of an indefinite progress was a particular product of nineteenth-century optimism. In the face of the inevitable and necessary changes, in the face of an almost infinite variety of man whose details were essential to a definition of man, the obligation of both scientist and humanist was clear: he must collect and preserve the information and the products of human activity and genius so rapidly being destroyed.

-Jacob W. Gruber, “Ethnographic Salvage and the Shaping of Anthropology”

Approaching the tenth anniversary of the National Revolution, officials could reflect on the cultural achievements of past decade with a true sense of accomplishment. They had forged a unifying culture for the newly-integrated republic—one that reflected the popular aspirations of the Bolivian people while celebrating the mixed Andean and Hispanic heritage of the nation. They had revised national history, reconstructed Tiwanaku, refurbished the National Museum, and expanded cultural patrimony laws to protect archeological ruins and indigenous popular arts. Reflecting on the decade, Oficial Mayor de Cultura Nacional, Reynaldo Urquiso Sossa, wrote “se ha considerado la urgencia de la definición de la cultura nacional en interpretación de nuestro pasado aymara, de dominación quechua, española y de la República hasta el 9 de abril de 1952, fecha esta que marca el camino de la rendición del pueblo boliviano y la liberación de sus clases explotadas.”⁸³⁹ He celebrated the effort as “una política de incorporación definitiva del indígena a la vida la nación que sin perder su esencialidad, se acomode a las ventajas

⁸³⁹ Archivo Central del Ministerio de Culturas, La Paz, Bolivia (ACMC), Dirección General de Cultura (DGC), Informes, 1956-64, Reynaldo Urquiso Sossa, Oficialía Mayor de Cultural Nacional, “Resumen de Labores, Junio 1961-Junio 1962,” p. 1.

del desarrollo de la civilización occidental y la técnica moderna.”⁸⁴⁰ In just ten years, they had established a unifying national culture that celebrated Bolivia’s indigenous heritage while underscoring the modernizing aspirations of the postrevolutionary government.

Social scientists affiliated with the centralized cultural bureau of the Ministry of Education, the *Oficialía Mayor de Cultura Nacional*, were more reserved, however. They were growing increasingly concerned that the rural modernization initiatives of the postrevolutionary government were sweeping away the “authentic” expressions of Aymara and Quechua culture that they had worked so tirelessly to cultivate. Writing in 1961, for instance, Julia Elena Fortún—anthropologist, ranking state cultural official, and director of the recently-created *Dirección Nacional de Antropología* (DNA)—lamented that “es innegable la necesidad de una recolección sistematizada de nuestros temas folklóricos, ya que a partir de pocos años a esta parte se está notando el abandono de interesantísimas especies en el agro boliviano, debido precisamente a que las nuevas reformas político-sociales están creando en el campesino una nueva mentalidad que les hace abandonar sus añejas costumbres y tradiciones.”⁸⁴¹ If preventative measures were not soon instituted, she—and others—warned that the essence of Bolivia’s indigenous heritage would soon be lost forever.

National development posed an enduring paradox to the postrevolutionary leadership. On the one hand, rural modernization was absolutely essential to national development. The success of the postrevolutionary development initiative was predicated upon transforming indigenous Bolivians into a modernized agrarian peasantry—the

⁸⁴⁰ Archivo Central del Ministerio de Culturas, La Paz, Bolivia (ACMC), Dirección General de Cultura (DGC), Informes, 1956-64, Reynaldo Urquiso Sossa, *Oficialía Mayor de Cultura Nacional*, “Resumen de Labores, Junio 1961-Junio 1962,” p. 1.

⁸⁴¹ Julia Elena Fortún, *La danza de los diablos* (La Paz: Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes, 1961).

campesinado—who, as independent producers and consumers, would drive economic diversification and expand the national economy. With universal suffrage, agrarian reform, indigenous education, rural market initiatives, and the national union structure, officials set out to integrate indigenous Bolivians into postrevolutionary society as modernized, market-orientated campesinos. On the other hand, rural modernization threatened to undermine postrevolutionary national culture formation. Transforming Indians into campesinos would extinguish the authentic expressions of indigenous dance, music, art, and tradition recently deemed vital to the national patrimony. As government officials redoubled the national development effort in the early 1960s, they harnessed anthropological knowledge to bridge the contradictory impulses of postrevolutionary modernity.

This chapter examines the institutionalization of anthropology following 1952 as a window onto the new forms of ethnic exclusion created by the National Revolution. Widely recognized as a universal and holistic “science,” the discipline of anthropology was borne of the Enlightenment and consolidated in the crucible of European imperial expansion.⁸⁴² It then evolved within distinct national settings over the course of the twentieth century. Claudio Lomnitz describes these “national anthropologies” as “traditions that have been fostered by educational and cultural institutions for the development of studies of their own nation.”⁸⁴³ Bolivia’s national anthropological tradition developed upon two distinct branches of the discipline—each of which evolved alongside the consolidation of the modern nation-state. The first was applied anthropology. The following pages trace the historical trajectory of applied anthropology

⁸⁴² *Stocking, Race, Culture, and Evolution.*

⁸⁴³ Claudio Lomnitz, *Deep Mexico, Silent Mexico: An Anthropology of Nationalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), p. 228.

over the course of the twentieth century, and how it was consolidated as one of the pillars of Bolivia's fledging national anthropological tradition. The second was folklore. This chapter explores the institutionalization of folklore in Bolivia, focusing on shifting definitions of the discipline and what (or who) constituted its legitimate object of study.

As defined and bordered areas of intellectual inquiry, both applied anthropology and folklore carried embedded assumptions of human difference and, as they were institutionalized within the postrevolutionary state, they left their mark on constructions of race and ethnicity. Each branch of anthropology was orientated towards cultivating a distinct vision of indigenous Bolivians. The objective of applied anthropology was to transform traditional, subsistence-based Indians into the idealized *campesino* imagined by the postrevolutionary leadership. In this way, applied anthropology operated alongside rural education as one of the primary means through which the postrevolutionary government pursued the assimilation of indigenous Bolivians into modern, western society. Folklore created the necessary opposite, upon which the modern *campesino* was defined: the Indian. Where applied anthropology was orientated toward (re)creating modern individuals, folklore set out to create an image of the idealized, traditional Indian that was in accordance with the national cultural model promoted by the postrevolutionary state.

Given the discipline's privileged location at the intersection of racial formation, the construction of knowledge, and nation building in postrevolutionary Bolivia, a study of anthropology is crucial to understanding constructions of race and ethnicity. As a discipline that produces knowledge about the indigenous "Other" under the authority of science, anthropology played a key role in the re-articulation of racial identities during the Revolution. This fact becomes even more salient when one considers the particular

dynamics of internal colonization in Bolivia: a nation overwhelming populated by indigenous peoples, but dominated by a governing creole minority.⁸⁴⁴ Examined against the the paradox of modernity, and placed in the context of the internal colonialism of the postrevolutionary state, anthropology thus serves as a fine example of what anthropologist Renato Rosaldo has termed “imperialist nostalgia.”⁸⁴⁵ Finally, the study of postrevolutionary anthropology reveals that the Revolution consolidated a new form of racism—one that was not founded on biology or environment, but on culture. Moreover, the practices, objectives, and epistemologies embraced by postrevolutionary anthropologists provide a window not only onto changing constructions of indigenous alterity, but prevailing understandings of indigenous Bolivians and their place in the republic

APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Applied anthropology was a vital component of the postrevolutionary modernization enterprise. It proved critical for development planning, providing state ministries overstuffed with eager technocrats with both the qualitative and quantitative data necessary to confront cultural adaption, applied social change, and other urgent problems of rural modernization. Bolivia’s national anthropological tradition, steeped in the French and German polygenist traditions of physical anthropology, had produced little of the ethnographic knowledge on rural Andean society essential to the modern applied anthropologist.⁸⁴⁶ Still into the 1950s, foreign applied anthropologists and rural

⁸⁴⁴ For a discussion of internal colonialism in Bolivia, see: Rivera, “La raíz: colonizadores y colonizados.”

⁸⁴⁵ Renato Rosaldo, “Imperialist Nostalgia,” *Representations*, No. 26, (Spring, 1989), pp. 107-122.

⁸⁴⁶ It was primarily through the French anthropologist, Arthur Chervin and the Austrian-born, self-fashioned Bolivian social scientist Arthur Posnansky that contemporary European race science and the practices of physical anthropology arrived in Bolivia. Chervin, a prominent French anthropologist, served

sociologists working in Bolivia continued to rely upon Bautista Saavedra's 1903 study of the ayllu, José Maria Camacho's population estimates from the 1920s, or *Louis Baudin's utopian socialist of the 1930s*.⁸⁴⁷ Thus as the postrevolutionary government set out to channel applied anthropological knowledge towards the practical problems of national development, it relied on foreign professionals to train national personal. This first section traces the genealogy of applied anthropology as it developed in the first half of the nineteenth century in order to illustrate the underlying assumptions embedded within the technological knowledge provided to Bolivian anthropologists.

Before arriving in postrevolutionary Bolivia, applied anthropology evolved in distinct historical-cultural circumstances in North America and Western Europe. In the United States, applied anthropology is rooted in the diffusionist school established by Franz Boas and his students—A.L. Kroeber, Ruth Benedict, Robert Lowie, Manuel Gamio, Edward Sapir—in the early twentieth century. Boas rejected the teleology implicit in prevailing theories of social evolution espoused by the likes of Henry Lewis Gates and E.B. Tylor. Distinct human civilizations did not all evolve according to the

as the director of anthropological research of the French Scientific Mission to South America, which arrived in La Paz in October 1903. See: Arthur Chervin, *Anthropologie Bolivienne, Tome Premier: Ethnologie, Démographie, Photographie Métrique* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1907); G. de Créqui Monfort, "Exploración en Bolivia," *Boletín de la Sociedad Geográfica de La Paz*, Año 6, Nos. 24, 25 y 26 (1er. Timestre de 1905) pp. 60-74. Posnansky is most commonly recognized for his work on Tiwanaku. But he in fact also devoted considerable intellectual energy to anthropological, ethnographic, and linguistic studies of indigenous Bolivians. Between his first study of craniology, published in Berlin in 1913, and his death in 1946, he authored at least ten anthropological studies, ranging from linguistic research on the Chipaya to ethnographic studies of the Uru. In 1937, he published his capstone anthropological study: Arthur Posnansky, *Antropología y sociología de las razas interandinas y de las regiones adyacentes* (La Paz: Instituto Tihuanacu de Antropología, Etnografía y Prehistoria, 1937). That Posnansky was influenced by the German polygenist tradition is evidenced by the fact that he dedicated this work to his "querido maestro y amigo, Profesor Dr. Félix von Luschan." Another essay, "¿Que es raza?" was dedicated to "su distinguido maestro Prof. Doctor Hans Virchow." Arthur Posnansky, "Que es raza?" *Revista de Antropología de Bolivia*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1942), pp. 17-23, p. 17.

⁸⁴⁷ See, for example, Olen E. Leonard, "Locality and Group Structure in Bolivia," *Rural Sociology*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (September 1949), pp. 250-60.

same fixed pattern, from primitive to civilization; rather, Boas and his students drew on a German ethnographic tradition established by Rudolf Virchow and Adolf Bastian to demonstrate that different “culture areas” had evolved according to distinct local-historical circumstances.⁸⁴⁸ While those working in social evolutionary paradigms generally carried out their work from afar—in scientific societies, colonial offices, and university laboratories stocked with human skulls—the diffusionists privileged ethnographic study of “primitive” societies to examine processes of cultural change.

In the crucible of early twentieth century European imperial expansion, applied anthropology—or “practical anthropology,” as many of its early practitioners called it—portended to facilitate more effective extraction of resources and imperial administration of colonial subjects.⁸⁴⁹ In Great Britain, the tradition developed during the 1920s, as a younger generation of anthropologists began to recognize the practical applications of anthropology from their experience working overseas in the colonial administrative offices. Bronislaw Malinowski and Alfred Radcliff-Brown began to apply Emile Durkheim’s research on social institutions and “primitive” societies to questions of socioeconomic change of non-Western populations.⁸⁵⁰ They established the functionalist school. Where Boas and his students were interested in culture, the functionalists were interested in society, and how it functioned in relation to other aspects of life.

⁸⁴⁸ Stocking, *Race, Culture, Evolution*, pp. 189-223; Matti Bunzl, “From Volksgeist and Nationalcharakter to an Anthropological Concept of Culture,” *Volksgeist as Method and Ethic: Essays on Boasian Ethnography and the German Anthropological Tradition*, George W. Stocking, Jr., ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), pp. 17-78; Benoit Massin, “From Virchow to Fischer: Physical Anthropology and ‘Modern Race Theories’ in Wilhelmine Germany,” in *ibid.*, pp. 79-154.

⁸⁴⁹ Frederick Cooper, “Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept,” *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*, Frederick Cooper and Randall M. Packard, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 64-92.

⁸⁵⁰ Bronislaw Malinowski, “Practical Anthropology,” *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January, 1929), pp. 22-38. On Malinowski and the origins of applied anthropology, see also: Raymond Firth, “Engagement and Detachment: Reflections on Applying Social Anthropology to Social Affairs,” *Human Organization*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1981), pp. 193-201

Malinowski—who is widely recognized as the founder of the field—urged his colleagues to reach beyond the prevailing theoretical orientation of social evolutionary paradigms. Doing so, he explained “would throw an extremely important light upon the theoretical problem of the contact of cultures, transmission of ideas and customs, in short, on the whole problem of diffusion.”⁸⁵¹ During a distinct historical epoch marked by colonial expansion and the consolidation of European powers, applied anthropology would address “the problem of the westernization of the world.”⁸⁵²

Of course, neither of these developments were isolated events, but they occurred in an increasingly globalized network of scholars interested in applying social scientific knowledge to the betterment of modern society. During the 1920s and 1930s, the social, economic, and political transformations initiated by the Mexican Revolution provided western social scientists a laboratory to test the efficacy of social scientific knowledge in bettering the human condition. Mexico’s indigenous population, moreover, served as a unique workshop for emerging theories of directed cultural change and social adaptation.⁸⁵³ Affiliated with U.S. universities (primarily Berkeley and Chicago) and philanthropic organizations (Carnegie, Ford, Rockefeller), a generation of Mexican, U.S. and European social scientists defined their career carrying out fieldwork in rural Mexico.⁸⁵⁴ As anthropologists, sociologists, ethnologists carried out applied social research in Mexico during the 1920s, 30s and 40s, prevailing schools of diffusionism and

⁸⁵¹ Malinowski, “Practical Anthropology,” p. 36.

⁸⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁸⁵³ Mauricio Tenorio Trillo, “Stereophonic Scientific Modernisms: Social Science between Mexico and the United States, 1880s-1930s,” *The Journal of Latin American History*, Vol. 86, No. 3, *The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History: A Special Issue* (December 1999), pp. 1156-1187.

⁸⁵⁴ Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, *Anthropological Perspectives on Rural Mexico* (Boston: Routledge, 1984).

functionalism merged to produce new theories of cultural change. It was in this particular time and place that Robert Redfield produced the theory of diffusionism, that Ralph Beals developed an ethnographic model to study the stages of acculturation, and that Nathan Whetten applied rural sociology to the Mexican countryside.⁸⁵⁵

Applied theories tested in Mexico soon made their way back to the United States where, during the Great Depression, they found support under the state-sponsored social programs of the New Deal. It was during this time when Bureau of Indian Affairs director, John Collier—who was influenced both by Manuel Gamio’s research in Mexico and by Malinowski’s in Africa—began to apply anthropological knowledge to address social problems on U.S. Indian reservations.⁸⁵⁶ Perhaps a more salient development in relation to Bolivia was the “rural extension services” promoted by U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) New Deal initiatives like the Resettlement Administration and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics.⁸⁵⁷ With the depression hitting rural families especially hard, the government turned to rural sociologists to study the problems facing American farmers at the height of the dustbowl. Charles J. Galpin and Charles Loomis, pioneering figures in the field of rural sociology, led a generation of researchers that included Nathan Whetten, T. Lynn Smith, and Olen Leonard to apply sociological research to geographic isolation, economic integration, social mobility, and other

⁸⁵⁵ On Redfield, see Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, *Anthropological Perspectives on Rural Mexico* (Boston: Routledge, 1984), p. 22-27. On Beals, see: Hewitt de Alcántara, *Anthropological Perspectives on Rural Mexico*, pp. 29-32; Ralph L. Beals, “Urbanism, Urbanization, and Acculturation,” *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 53, pp. 1–10; Walter Goldschmidt, “Ralph Leon Beals (1901-1985),” *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 88, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 947-953. On Whetten, see: Hewitt de Alcántara, *Anthropological Perspectives on Rural Mexico*, p. 40-50.

⁸⁵⁶ Laurence M. Hauptman, “Africa View: John Collier, the British Colonial Service, and American Indian Policy, 1933-1945,” *The Historian*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (May, 1986), pp. 359-374.

⁸⁵⁷ Charles J. Galpin “Greetings from Charles Josiah Galpin,” *Rural Sociology*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1936), p. 3.

problems of rural society.⁸⁵⁸ The effort resulted in the professionalization of the sub-discipline and increased its overlap with applied anthropology. Charles Loomis was, in fact, on the board of both the Society for Applied Anthropology and the Society for Rural Sociology, and was a regular contributor to both their journals.

In Latin America, where social scientists immediately recognized the utility of applied anthropology for the resolution of the age-old “Indian problem,” the Instituto Indigenista Interamericano (III) provided the hemispheric headquarters for social scientists seeking to apply anthropological knowledge to fantasies of directed social change. Founded in 1940 upon the initiative of Manuel Gamio and Moisés Sáenz, the III called on American government to study national indigenous populations in order to better facilitate their incorporation into modern society. The first international congress, held in Pátzcuaro, Mexico in 1940, convened a wide array of scholars researching American indigenous populations. Notable participants included Manuel Gamio and Juan Comas from Mexico, John Collier from the U.S., Paul Rivet from France, Alfred Métraux from Switzerland, and Enrique Finot, Eduardo Arze Loureiro, and Elizardo Pérez from Bolivia.⁸⁵⁹ Within the III, emerging applied disciplines were debated, consolidated, and deployed throughout the Americas as modernizing states set out to integrate national indigenous populations.

The final resolutions of the congress underscore the emphasis that the organization and its members placed on applied anthropology to mitigate indigenous

⁸⁵⁸ Alvin L. Bertrand, “Rural Sociological Research in the South: An Historical Perspective,” Paper presented at the Southern Rural Sociological Association Meeting (Nashville, Tennessee, February 1-4, 1987).

⁸⁵⁹ Archivo Histórico del Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, México D.F. (AHIII), Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano (PCII), Primer volumen: Generales, Documento 2, “Lista de los miembros del congreso,” Pátzcuaro, Michoacán, 1940.

poverty, political exclusion, and underdevelopment, while shepherding them into the socioeconomic structures of modern republics. Article ten recommended that “las naciones americanas que al plantear y administrar sus respectivos programas para el bienestar del Indio, exploren y utilicen lo que sobre la material pueda enseñarles la Antropología Aplicada.”⁸⁶⁰ Article eleven obliged governments to incorporate ethnographic methods “en estudios que analicen el proceso histórico de la formación cultural de los núcleos indígenas afectadas y que muestren, mediante este análisis histórico, las fuerzas vivas que en el seno de ellas puedan ayudar a la conclusión de sus problemas.”⁸⁶¹ Finally, article twelve recommended that member countries take full advantage of their higher educational institutions to train anthropologists, and to establish a fund for those which did not, in order to send local specialists abroad for training.”⁸⁶² Throughout the decade, Comas, Gamio, Collier, and several others would promote the use of applied anthropology through III publications, *América Indígena* and *Boletín Indigenista*, as well as English-language journal such as *Applied Anthropologist* and *Rural Sociology*.⁸⁶³

The USDA also proved an early supporter of applied anthropological research in Latin America. After working for the Resettlement Administration during the 1930s, Loomis was appointed as chief of the Division of Extension and Training of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations of the USDA, where he oversaw the extension services program for Latin America. Loomis looked to his former New Deal colleagues to staff

⁸⁶⁰ AHIII, PCII, Primer volumen: Generales, Documento 1, “Acta final del Primer Congreso Indigenista Interamericano,” Patcuaro, Michocan, Mexico, 1940, p. 11.

⁸⁶¹ Ibid., p. 12.

⁸⁶² Ibid.

⁸⁶³ See for example, Juan Comas, “The Teaching of Anthropology and the Role of Anthropologist in Latin America,” *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 52, No. 4, Part 1 (October-December, 1950), pp. 564-568.

the project, sending Nathan Whetten to Mexico, T. Lynn Smith to Brazil, Carl C. Taylor to Argentina, and Olen Leonard to Bolivia.⁸⁶⁴ Their work combined the functionalist assumptions of the British school and the diffusionist principles embraced by the Boasnians to confront poverty and underdevelopment in the region. They took a holistic approach to improving rural life, focusing not just on agrarian production, but on the social institutions, cultural values, and psychological wellbeing of their subject populations. As such, they employed ethnography alongside more traditional statistical methods. In terms of models, they looked to postrevolutionary Mexico, employing strategies developed by the Ministry of Education such as rural cultural brigades.⁸⁶⁵ They also drew from conclusions derived by Loomis, Leonard, and others who had worked on a USDA “village rehabilitation” experiment in El Pueblo, New Mexico from 1933-1941. Not only was the effort intended to test the hypothesis of applied social change to a predominantly indigenous rural society, but it was explicitly intended to provide a model of social change that would be applicable “in our sister American republics.”⁸⁶⁶

Applied anthropology arrived in Bolivia in the 1940s as part of the burgeoning foreign assistance programs sponsored by the United States. Under the banner of the Good Neighbor policy, the Roosevelt administration rejected dollar diplomacy and began channeling economic and technical assistance to Bolivia during the 1940s through the Office of Inter-American Affairs. Multilateral institutions such as the OAS and the ILO also began to promote applied anthropological research through extension programs intended to train Bolivian specialists in rural development at institutions in the United

⁸⁶⁴ “People and Projects,” *Human Organization*, (Fall, 1949), pp. 31-32.

⁸⁶⁵ Charles Loomis, “Extension Work for Latin America,” *Applied Anthropologist*, (July-Sept., 1944), pp. 27-40. For methodology and influences, see discussion on pp. 35-40.

⁸⁶⁶ Charles Loomis and Glen Grisham, “The New Mexican Experiment in Village Rehabilitation,” *Applied Anthropology*, (April-June 1943), pp. 13-37, p. 33.

States and in field work in Mexico, Costa Rica, and Peru. The Rockefeller Foundation launched a public health initiative in Bolivia not only to study tropical disease, but to train local medical professionals.⁸⁶⁷ Even evangelical church groups integrated applied practices into their missionary efforts. Between 1937 and 1942, Canadian Evangelical Baptists at the Lake Titicaca hacienda of Huatajata set out to instill a strong protestant work ethic while emphasizing education, hygiene, and Christian morality.⁸⁶⁸ With the exception of the Huatajata mission, most of these programs were led by rural sociologists and applied anthropologists who had been monitoring closely applied research in Mexico and worked in New Deal programs in the United States during the previous decades.

After the Revolution, state interest in applied anthropology expanded greatly, and the government set out to establish institutions to channel anthropological knowledge toward the objectives of national development in general and rural modernization in particular. Indicating the importance that postrevolutionary officials assigned to anthropology and the inadequacy of their own “national tradition,” archeologist Maks Portugal—who, as head of MAC’s Departamento de Investigaciones Antropológicas, assumed a leading position in the burgeoning state cultural bureaucracy—commented that “Como el tema de Antropología es completamente extenso y abarca investigaciones de las ciencias afines, tendremos que considerar los aspectos de importancia inmediata

⁸⁶⁷ Ann Zulowski, *Unequal Cures: Public Health and Political Change in Bolivia, 1900-1950* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), pp. 86-117.

⁸⁶⁸ For an overview of the Huatajata Mission, see Nacho L., Arturo. "Agrarian Reform in Huatajata: The Peniel Hall Experience", *Bridging Cultures and Hemispheres: The Legacy of Archibald Reekie and Canadian Baptists in Bolivia*, William H. Brackney, ed. (Smyth & Helwys, 1997) pp. 55–74. Charles Loomis noted to his readers that when the missionaries found “their Indians” to be unruly, they resorted to whipping them. “Of course they were able to dispense with whipping as a sense of responsibility and competence in self-government gradually developed among the Indians, but the fact that it was required at first should indicate that there are places in Latin America where the social structure may be characterized as being of the ‘peon-patron’ [sic] type.” Charles P. Loomis, “Extension Work for Latin America,” *Applied Anthropology*, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 27-40, p. 29.

para Bolivia y circunscribir su actividad.”⁸⁶⁹ Not only did he call for increased government support for ethnographic and archeological research, but he also cited the practical application of ethnographic knowledge to urgent problems of indigenous social uplift and national integration.⁸⁷⁰

Applied anthropology provided one of the primary means through which the postrevolutionary government would transform indigenous Bolivia from backwards, traditional Indians into modern campesinos, the motor of the national revolution. Initial efforts to institutionalize the discipline took place within the Ministry of Peasant Affairs—after all, it was MAC that was managing indigenous acculturation and rural modernization initiatives of the postrevolutionary state. As previous chapters have shown, with the creation of the MAC in April and May of 1952, government officials expanded the IIB in order to “levantar el nivel cultural y spiritual de las masas campesinos.”⁸⁷¹ The postrevolutionary IIB was constituted not only of the DIA—which during the first years following the revolution was closely affiliated with the MNT and orientated primarily toward folklore and archeological research—but also a the Departamento de Estudios Socioeconómicos (DES). The government appointed the rural sociologist, Rodolfo Cornejo Álvarez to head the new office. Working alongside him was the Colombia trained statistician, Anestasio Avernganza. The objective of the novel state anthropological office would “encara el problema agrario vinculado a la sociedad y

⁸⁶⁹ Max Portugal, “Acotaciones sobre antropología boliviana,” *Gaceta Campesina: órgano oficial del Ministerio de Asunto Campesinos*, Año 1, No. 1 (Agosto de 1952), pp. 30-33, p. 30.

⁸⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁸⁷¹ Oscar A. Bustillos, “Instituto Indigenista Boliviano,” *Anuario Indigenista*, Vol. 31 (Diciembre 1971), pp. 99-101.

economía en base a estudios exhaustivos de la feudalidad económica.”⁸⁷² It was upon “las recomendaciones fundamentales sobre el régimen jurídico de las tierras y el hombre que la exploras” that would provide the foundation for “acción viva”—in order words, toward formulating state policy toward rural modernization.⁸⁷³

The postrevolutionary government quickly mobilized the new office, tasking it in May 1953 with carrying out a cost-of-living study of Aymara communities in the Lake Titicaca basin. The motivating factor of the study was the agrarian reform. If, as a result of the agrarian reform law, peasants were at last going to be paid for their labor, the government first needed to study patterns of consumption and production on rural estates to determine a realistic minimum wage for agricultural workers. The study would provide the government with “un base más científico que cualquier otra apreciación” as officials planned the ambitious rural modernization initiative.⁸⁷⁴ As for methodology, Conejo and Averganza combined data from the agrarian and population censuses of 1950 with ethnographic data culled from rural markets, personal interviews with campesinos, hacendados, and rural merchants. During October and November 1953, the team carried out its research in the La Paz departments of Omasuyos, Camacho, and Ingavi.

In addition to socioeconomic conditions of rural Aymara populations, the 1953 study was intended to acquire more detailed knowledge on the normative aspects of quotidian rural life. It is here—in the recognition of the scientific utility of applying

⁸⁷² Bernabe Ledesma, “Fines y objetivos de las direcciones generales del Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos,” *Inti Karka: órgano del movimiento pedagógico indigenista*, 2ª Época, No. 4 (Noviembre-Diciembre 1954), pp. 62-70, p. 62.

⁸⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷⁴ “Resolución Ministerial No. 154/53, La Paz, 2 de mayo de 1953,” quoted from Rodolfo Cornejo A., “Consideraciones acerca de la importancia que tiene el estudio sobre costo de vida rural y la implantación de salarios en el agro,” *Gaceta Campesina: órgano oficial del Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos*, Año 2, No. 3 (Agosto de 1953), pp. 157-161, p. 159.

ethnographic knowledge to problems of social change—that postrevolutionary Bolivia’s engagement with applied anthropology becomes most salient. By obtaining detailed information on rural life, state officials were confident that the government, “lograra mejorar su standard [sic] de vida, obteniendo como resultado la radicación del elemento indígena en el campo y por consiguiente su tecnificación agropecuaria.”⁸⁷⁵ Thus, the team acquired not only the socio-economic data required for the cost of living study, but also studied how such consumption patterns were related to local forms of socioeconomic organization; the land tenure practices employed by individual campesino families; rural housing; as well as the clothing, food, and transportation habits of Aymara families. While rural anthropological research had generally been orientated toward documenting the civic and religious festivals and indigenous folklore—that is the symbolic and/or folkloric aspects of indigenous popular culture—, the SBS would provide data on the normative aspects of rural life to facilitate the effective development of the rural development policies of the postrevolutionary state.

In 1953 and 1954, as the postrevolutionary development moved lowland colonization to the center of the national agenda, anthropological knowledge became a critical component of the ambitious social engineering project. Lowland colonization was by far the most ambitious—and perhaps utopian—component of the postrevolutionary development strategy. By aligning people and available resources, Guevara had identified the lowlands as Bolivia’s economic salvation. Yet before the project could be carried out on a national scale, it first required careful scientific study. Citing the high mortality rate from tropical disease among indigenous soldiers in the Chaco, postrevolutionary planners worried how the tropical climate and geography would

⁸⁷⁵ Ibid.

affect the health of highland colonists. The government assigned the CFB the important task to establishing experimental colonies in lowland regions where trained professionals—not only anthropologists, but also physicians, agronomists, and social workers—would monitor the adaption of highland Indians to the tropical lowlands.

With generous assistance from the U.S. Point Four program, the CFB launched project 59, working in coordination with MAC officials to establish experimental colonies at Aroma in the department of Santa Cruz and Reyes in the department of Beni.⁸⁷⁶ Through participant observation and ethnographic study, as well as personal interviews and medical examinations, the staff carefully selected the first wave of colonizers from highland indigenous communities and mining camps, transported them to the lowlands, and then monitored their psychological, social, and biological conditions as they adapted to the new environment.⁸⁷⁷ The efforts at Aroma and Reyes were led by Eduardo Arze Lourreiro and Oscar Arze Quintanilla, respectively—both were rural sociologists from Cochabamba. Before heading the Aroma project, Arze Lourreiro had earned a M.A. in Sociology and Anthropology at Michigan State College of Agriculture and Applied Science (now Michigan State) under Charles Loomis, worked on the Agrarian Reform Commission, and then served as President for the National Agrarian Reform Council. Arze Quintanilla, who studied rural sociology at UMSS and headed the Reyes effort in Beni during the 1950s, would eventually go on to serve as director of the III in Mexico City.

⁸⁷⁶ Walter Guevara Arze, *Plan inmediato de política económica del gobierno de la Revolución Nacional* (La Paz: Imprenta Editorial “Letras,” 1955), pp. 100-123

⁸⁷⁷ Eduardo Arze Loureiro, *Aroma: un modelo de colonización por trasplante de poblaciones* (La Paz, 2004). This is actually a report that Arze submitted to the government in 1957 while head of the CBF colonization project in Aroma.

Their academic training nevertheless proved the exception, rather than the rule. Postrevolutionary officials found themselves lacking the necessary human resources to carry out the anthropological studies necessary for rural modernization. Bolivian universities had not yet created anthropology departments. The closest thing resembling applied anthropology was rural sociology—which was centered at the Universidad de San Simón in the agricultural hub of Cochabamba. Manuel Liendo Lazarte, the director of the National Museum, lamented in 1958, for example that “Existe en nuestro país la urgente necesidad de iniciar la carrera profesional universitaria de los estudios antropológicos, que por su significativo valor social y por el conocimiento que proporcionan sus diversas especialidades son necesarias para solucionar diversidad de situaciones culturales conflictivas.”⁸⁷⁸ Students interested in obtaining degrees in anthropology (in the holistic sense of four fields) had to study abroad. The postrevolutionary government was thus dependent on foreign missions to meet the rising demand for technical specialists.

For the time being, UNESCO provided the postrevolutionary government with the anthropological knowledge necessary for national development. In 1950, the UN partnered with the OAS, the ILO, and the III to coordinate developmental assistance programs for Bolivia and other Andean republics. The Andean Mission, as the ambitious assistance program was called, was intended to channel social scientific expertise and development capital to Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador. By providing social scientific expertise and critical funding, the Mission promoted initiatives in agriculture, public health, and rural education in an effort to overcome the poverty and underdevelopment

⁸⁷⁸ ABNB, MNAR, Correspondencia, 1958-59 (02-328), Manuel Liendo Lazarte to Al Señor Vicerrector de la Universidad Mayor de “San Andrés”, Dr. Casto Pinilla, 2/11/1958, p. 1.

the characterized the Andean republics.⁸⁷⁹ To be sure, the effort drew on over a half century of applied research into rural society carried out by a network of scholars working in Mexico and the United States.

The project that had the most significant impact in Bolivia was the Cornell-Peru Project (CPP), an ambitious experiment in applied anthropology and directed social change carried out jointly by Cornell University and the Peruvian government during the 1950s and early 1960s. In 1952, Cornell leased the Vicos hacienda, a functioning agricultural estate outside the highland city of Huaraz. With it came 2,250 indigenous peasants who remained contractually tied to the estate. Until 1966, when the project ended, Vicos served as a laboratory for U.S. and Peruvian anthropologists seeking to apply the latest trends in American social science to Peru's so-called "Indian problem."⁸⁸⁰ Richard Patch, who worked on Andean Mission projects, carried out fieldwork at Vicos while a doctoral student at Cornell working under Richard Holmberg, the brainchild behind the effort.⁸⁸¹ Most literature on applied anthropology and rural modernization tends to focus on this important project, while overlooking the fact that there were four such projects initiated at the same time in Bolivia. Moreover, many of the personnel working on the CPP effort, would go on to assist the Bolivian effort as well, as the postrevolutionary government set out to transform indians into campesinos.

⁸⁷⁹ UNESCO Online Archive, "Programa Andino, 1959-1964: Anteproyecto de plan sexenal para la integración de las poblaciones indígenas de Bolivia a la vida económica, social y cultural del país." Geneva, 11/7/1956.

⁸⁸⁰ Henry Dobyns, Paul Doughty, and Harold Lasswell, *Peasants, Power, and Applied Social Change: Vicos as a Model* (Beverly Hills, CA: 1964); Eric B. Ross, "Vicos as Cold War Strategy: Anthropology, Peasants, and 'Community Development'," *Anthropology in Action*, 12 (2005): 21-33; William W. Stein, *Deconstructing Development Discourse in Peru: A Meta-Ethnography of the Modernity Project at Vicos* (Latham, MD: 2003).

⁸⁸¹ Jason Pribilsky, "Modernizing Peru: Negotiating Indigenismo, Science, and "The Indian Problem" in the Cornell-Peru Project," *Vicos and Beyond: A Half Century of Applying Anthropology in Peru*, Thomas C Greaves, Ralph Bolton, and Florencia Zapata, eds. (Lanham: AltaMira Press, 2011), pp. 103-128, p. 121.

The director for the Bolivia program was Olen E. Leonard, the rural sociologist who had worked for the U.S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics during the great depression and on early colonization efforts in Cochabamba during the 1940s. Leonard described the Andean Mission as a “technical assistance” program, “designed to further integrate into the national social and economic life, the indigenous populations of the Andean countries of Latin America.”⁸⁸² Launched in 1953, the Andean Mission coordinated with MAC toward three primary objectives: the progressive development of altiplano communities; overseeing the lowland colonization efforts; and training locals in “modern techniques” of applied anthropology with the intent of eventually preparing the Bolivian government to manage the effort. Not only would such a program benefit the Bolivian government in its modernization efforts, but Métraux (who was then affiliated with the IIB), also noted that “the transformation in its [Bolivia’s] economic and social structure make it an exceptional field for experiments.”⁸⁸³ Indeed, the lesson gleaned from rural modernization would be applicable in other countries in the Americas seeking to incorporate national indigenous populations into the socioeconomic structures of modernizing republics.

Perhaps drawing on recent developments in Mexican applied anthropology, the Andean Mission established three “Centros de Rehabilitación Campesina,” in semi-remote indigenous villages in the departments of La Paz (Pillapi), Oruro (Playa Verde) and Potosi (Otavi).⁸⁸⁴ Working in coordination with the IIB and MAC’s rural education office (*Departamento de Educación Fundamental*), the project stressed key areas of

⁸⁸² UNESCO Online Archive, Olen E. Leonard, “Cotoca Centre and Long-Term Planning for Colonisation in Bolivia” 10/18/1957.

⁸⁸³ Alfred Métraux, “The Andean Indians and Technical Assistance of the United Nations,” *Boletín Indigenista*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Marzo de 1955), pp. 6-13, p. 7.

⁸⁸⁴ Hewitt de Alcántara, *Anthropological Perspectives on Rural Mexico*, pp. 46-57.

agricultural technology, rural industry, Spanish literacy, hygiene, sanitation, dress, home maintenance, and alimentation. The effort was primarily directed toward the accelerated implementation of the postrevolutionary rural education initiative. Just as earlier twentieth century reformers had drawn on anthropometric studies to devise rural pedagogy in the 1910s, postrevolutionary officials similarly applied ethnographic knowledge to rural society in order to develop a rural education program better attuned to the material and psychosocial wellbeing of indigenous peasants. Gonzalo Rubio Orbe, the UN specialist who advised the rural education initiative, underscored the critical assistance that applied anthropologists could render to indigenous education and other rural modernization initiatives. He remarked that they, “estudiaron la realidad en todos sus aspectos; buscaron los problemas mas importantes emplearon métodos eficientes alcanzaron la confianza de la comunidad dieron ejemplo de trabajo, puntualidad, honradez, desprendimientos y se trasformaron en verdaderos promotores sociales, a pesar de ser elementos extraños al lugar y al país.”⁸⁸⁵

The Pillapi project, the largest component of the Andean Mission operating in Bolivia, underscores the methodologies deployed by the Bolivian official and their UN counterparts, and the particular assumption regarding Andean civilization embedded within them. Similar to the CCP project at Vicos, the Bolivian government acquired title to the Pillapi hacienda, colonos and all, and promptly handed it over the Andean Mission.⁸⁸⁶ Upon arriving in 1953, the Mission set out to realize its primary objective of “crear las condiciones indispensables para la integración de los indígena a la vida nacional, con el fin de acelerar su desenvolvimiento económico, técnico, social y

⁸⁸⁵ Gonzalo Rubio Orbe, “Aculturaciones de indígenas de los Andes,” *La Nación*, 1/9/1954, p. 3.

⁸⁸⁶ Lorand B. Schweng, “An Indian Community Development Project in Bolivia,” *América Indígena*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (April, 1962), pp. 155-168.

cultural.” The emphasis on basic education, vocation training, hygiene and sanitation, illustrate the important role played by anthropologists in remaking indigenous Bolivian in the image of the modern campesino envisioned by the revolutionary state. The Pillapi estate ultimately served as an experimental station to test prevailing hypothesis of applied cultural change and to measure the processes of acculturation, diffusion, and socioeconomic integration through ethnographic research and participant observation.⁸⁸⁷

Moreover, such acculturation efforts underscore the cultural biases embedded within the national and international rural assistance missions as anthropologists, sociologists and other “technical experts” promoted modern, scientific, secular practices in the Altiplano community. In 1954, Anthropologist Richard Patch, having recently completed his first stint of field research at Vicos, Peru under Richard Holmberg, arrived in Bolivia to begin doctoral research on the agrarian reform process in Cochabamba.⁸⁸⁸ His observations on the Pillapi project underscore not only the staff’s efforts to instill in the community modern forms of medicine, agricultural practices, and hygiene, but the disparagement of local forms of knowledge valued by rural society. Doctors affiliated with the mission attempted to discredit *yatiris* (local healers) while “giving them a modern alternative to traditional curing practices.”⁸⁸⁹ In an effort to modernize the inhabitants of Pillapi, the Mission staff also discouraged coca chewing and alcohol abuse, despite recognition of the role these practices played not only in the quotidian practices of

⁸⁸⁷ UNESCO Online Archive, “Programa Andino, 1959-1964: Anteproyecto de plan sexenal para la integración de las poblaciones indígenas de Bolivia a la vida económica, social y cultural del país.” Geneva, 11/7/1956, p. 2.

⁸⁸⁸ Jason Pribilsky, “Modernizing Peru: Negotiating Indigenismo, Science, and “The Indian Problem” in the Cornell-Peru Project,” *Vicos and Beyond: A Half Century of Applying Anthropology in Peru*, Thomas C Greaves, Ralph Bolton, and Florencia Zapata, eds. (Lanham: AltaMira Press, 2011), pp. 103-128, p. 121.

⁸⁸⁹ Richard W. Patch “The Bolivian Altiplano,” *Institute of Current World Affairs Working Papers*, 2/1/1955, p. 6.

rural life, but their civic-religious significance. In short, the applied anthropologist was on the frontline of postrevolutionary efforts to transform traditional subsistence-based rural communities into the progressive, hardworking *campesino*.

In the decades since its development in European colonial administration, New Deal social programs, and postrevolutionary national integration efforts in Mexico, applied anthropology had arrived in the central Andes to remake indigenous Bolivians into modern peasants. The practice eschewed the social evolutionary paradigm embraced by physical anthropologists. Instead of anthropometric measurements and dolichocephalic indices, the applied anthropologist turned to ethnography as a legitimate source of scientific data on subject populations. As the discipline developed, so too did explanatory models of social and cultural change such as diffusion and acculturation. In the 1950s, professionally-trained, foreign applied anthropologists and rural sociologists arrived in increasing numbers through multilateral foreign assistance missions, providing “technical expertise” and much-needed professional training to a Bolivia’s first generation of professional anthropologists. As they did, these concepts found their way into the lexicon of postrevolutionary development and rural modernization in Bolivia.

POSTREVOLUTIONARY FOLKLORE AND THE PARADOX OF MODERNIZATION

As the postrevolutionary government set out to unify the integrated republic around a new national identity that celebrated Bolivia’s Andean and Hispanic heritage, it moved indigenous popular culture to the center of national folklore. To be sure, Bolivia’s lettered elite had long demonstrated curiosity toward rural dance, music, and other facets of rural Aymara and Quechua culture. During the nineteenth century, for instance, the notable *paceño* letrado, Emeterio Villamil de Rada celebrated Aymara as the “legua de

Adan,” while in Cochabamba, Juan Wallparrimachi composed poetry in Quechua.⁸⁹⁰ Though long an object of scholarly interest and intellectual curiosity for the creole elite, indigenous music, dance, and other manifestations of rural popular culture nevertheless occupied an ambivalent position within the national canon of traditions called folklore. The postrevolutionary government would move indigenous dance and music to the center of national folklore after 1952.⁸⁹¹ In the process, it not only professionalized the discipline, but consolidated new forms of ethnic exclusion within the postrevolutionary republic.

Originating as a branch of anthropology, folklore is a field of academic inquiry that claims the popular traditions and cultural practices distinct to particular regional, class, or ethnic populations as its object of intellectual inquiry.⁸⁹² The discipline traces its roots to nineteenth century Europe—to the romantic *Völkergedanken* of pioneering German ethnologist Adolf Bastian or to the English antiquarian, William J. Thoms, who first coined the term “folklore.”⁸⁹³ It was a time and place marked by the rise of the modern nation-state, and its consolidation as the normative unit of geopolitical

⁸⁹⁰ Emeterio Villamil de Rada, *La Lengua De Adán* (La Paz: Camarlinghi, 1972[1888]); Julio Díaz Arguedas, *Juan Wallparrimachi Sawaraura* (La Paz: Ediciones Isla, 1970).

⁸⁹¹ Beatriz Rossells, “Después de ‘Siempre’: Sobre las políticas culturales del MNR de 1952,” *Historias...*, No. 6 (2003), pp. 171-193; Fernando Ríos, “Bolero Trios, Mestizo Panpipe Ensembles, and Bolivia’s 1952 Revolution: Urban La Paz Musicians and the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement,” *Ethnomusicology*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 2010), pp. 281-317; Fernando Ríos, “Music in Urban La Paz, Bolivian Nationalism, and the Early History of Cosmopolitan Andean Music, 1936-1970 (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, 2005); Michelle Bigenho, “Embodied Matters: *Bolivian Fantasy* and Indigenismo,” *Journal of Latin American Anthropology*, vol. 11, no. 2 (2006), 267-93

⁸⁹² For a brief history of folklore, see Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, “Folklore’s Crisis,” *The Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 111, No. 441 (Summer, 1998), pp. 281-327

⁸⁹³ For more on Bastian, see: Stocking, *Race, Culture, Evolution*, pp. 222-225; Matti Bunzl, “From Volksgeist and Nationalcharakter to an Anthropological Concept of Culture,” *Volksgeist as Method and Ethic: Essays on Boasian Ethnography and the German Anthropological Tradition*, George W. Stocking, Jr., ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), pp. 17-78, pp. 43-55. On Thoms and folklore, see: Zolia S. Mendoza, *Creating our Own: Folklore, Performance, and Identity in Cusco, Peru* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), pp. 3-4.

organization. Leaders of emerging republics identified the music, dance, language, tradition, myths, knowledge—the “folk” elements—rooted in their populations as vernacular, or even primordial, representations of the nation and its people. Folklore provided republican leaders with the “invented traditions” necessary to collectively imagine the nation and consolidate the state.⁸⁹⁴ It appealed to statesmen and intellectuals across Latin America, for not only did folklore provide the foundation for unified national cultures, but it also served as a site for the articulation of local, regional, or ethnic identities.⁸⁹⁵

Establishing a “folklore” is a power-laden process that requires the selection of distinct customs, myths, and knowledge existing within a population, and their placement within a canon of traditions that stand as representative of the soul of a nation or a people—what Bastian called, *Gesellschaftsseele*. “Folklorization,” as the social scientific literature has termed the process, occurred alongside the consolidation of the nation-state in Latin America. Greg Urban and Joel Sherzer’s description of the term as “the relocation of native customs (typically music and dance, but other arts forms as well) from their original contexts to new urban contexts” belies the spatial orientation of folklore in national imaginations—it is typically seen as a bastion of traditional culture embraced by rural peoples.⁸⁹⁶ In addition to such spatial distinctions, there is also a temporal component underlying folklorization. Folklore reconstitutes its subject—which

⁸⁹⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Tradition” *The Invention of Tradition*, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 1-14; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (New York: Verso, 1991).

⁸⁹⁵ Mendoza, *Creating Our Own: Folklore, Performance, and Identity in Cuzco, Peru* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Marisol de la Cadena, *Indigenous Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919-1991* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000).

⁸⁹⁶ Greg Urban and Joel Sherzer, “Introduction: Indians, Nation-States, and Culture,” *Nation-States and Indians in Latin America*, Greg Urban and Joel Sherzer, eds. (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1991), pp. 1-18, quote from p. 10.

is, by definition, “traditional”—as temporally apart from the modern cultures that it claims to represent. In nation states where populations are fragmented by ethnicity, class, race, and/or regionalism, folklore supposedly includes the popular cultures of traditionally marginalized groups. The selective representation can nevertheless result in the exclusion of minority (or majority) populations and/or temporally situating them apart from the nation.⁸⁹⁷ Who defines what distinguishes “folk” from “popular” culture? And what happens when a minority population redefines the popular cultures of a majority population as folklore? The following pages explore these questions within the context of mid-twentieth century Bolivia, as postrevolutionary intellectuals moved indigenous music and dance—traditionally disparaged manifestations of indigenous popular culture—to the center of the canon of nation folklore after 1952.

In Bolivia, academic folklore is rooted in the writings of the prominent early-twentieth-century intellectual, essayist, and politician, Manuel Rigoberto Paredes. His *Mitos, supersticiones y supervivencias populares en Bolivia*, published in 1920, is widely recognized as the foundational study of Bolivian folklore. The work examines the traditions, customs, myths, and quotidian practices of the Aymara world that surrounded his rural estate. In addition to *Mitos*, He also penned several ethnographic studies of the provinces of his home department of La Paz, providing a detailed portrait of a rural society being transformed by hacienda expansion and global market integration.⁸⁹⁸

⁸⁹⁷ Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology makes its Object* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1983).

⁸⁹⁸ See, for example: *Provincia de Inquisivi: estudios geográficos, estadísticos y sociales* (La Paz: J. M. Gamarra, 1906); *La altiplanicie; descripción de la Provincia Omasuyos* (La Paz, 1914); *Tiahuanacu y la Provincia de Ingavi* (La Paz: Ediciones Isla, 1956). For his work on folklore, see: *Mitos, supersticiones y supervivencias populares de Bolivia* (La Paz: Arno hermanos, 1920). For a general treatment of his work, see Sinclair Thomson "La cuestión india en Bolivia a principios de siglo," *Autodeterminación*, 2:4 (1987-88): 83-116; see also Thomson's M.A. thesis from the University of Wisconsin at Madison.

Throughout his life, he sought to move indigenous popular culture to the center of national identity. Yet, his son, Antonio Paredes Candía—one of the most prominent folklorists to emerge in the mid-twentieth century—commented that his scholarship was generally received “con desprecia por el mundo intelectual del país.”⁸⁹⁹ Just as prevailing anti-Indian sentiments undermined efforts to move Tiwanaku to the center of national culture, he argues that racial prejudice precluded embrace indigenous folklore as an authentic representation of Bolivian nationhood.

Folklore nevertheless grew in popularity after the Chaco War, as an ascendant generation of progressive reformers looked to vernacular expressions of popular culture to unify the fragmented republic around a shared national heritage. Ethnomusicologist Fernando Ríos shows that the military socialist governments of Toro and Busch considered indigenous music and dance as intrinsic to national culture. State-sponsored civic festivals of the late 1930s—such as the first national “Día del Indio (August 2, 1937)—featured not only popular creole and mestizo styles of music—such as *cuecas* and *morenadas*, respectively—but also indigenous panpipe ensembles and choreographed dances.⁹⁰⁰ The Villarroel-MNR regime also promoted indigenous music and dance as part of national folklore celebrations. The closing celebration of the May 1945 indigenous congress featured indigenous music, dance, and art, as did the *Concurso Vernacular y Folklórico de 1945* held later that year.⁹⁰¹ These and other efforts underscore what Laura Gotkowitz identifies as early efforts to promote mestizaje as idiom of national unity.⁹⁰²

⁸⁹⁹ Antonio Paredes Candía, “Folclore,” *Diccionario histórico de Bolivia, Tomo I* (Sucre, 2002), p. 874.

⁹⁰⁰ Fernando Ríos, “Music in Urban La Paz, Bolivian Nationalism, and the Early History of Cosmopolitan Andean Music, 1936-1970 (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, 2005), pp. 87-119.

⁹⁰¹ Ríos, “Music in Urban La Paz,” pp. 140-146.

⁹⁰² Laura Gotkowitz, “Commemorating the Heroínas: Gender and Civic Ritual in Early-Twentieth Century Bolivia,” in *Hidden Histories of Gender and the State in Latin America*, Elizabeth Dore and Maxine

The reformists governments of the 1930s and 40s sought to valorize indigenous popular culture as an intrinsic components of Bolivian national identity.

As the post Chaco wave of rural migrants flooded the highland cities of La Paz, Oruro, Potosí and Cochabamba, municipal governments also began to incorporate indigenous dance and music into civic celebrations of national and religious holidays.⁹⁰³ It was during this time, for example, that municipal authorities in Oruro sought to promote the regional Carnival celebration as national folklore. In 1940, moreover, the Mayor of La Paz, Humberto Muñoz Cornejo decreed the integration of indigenous music-dance troupes into municipal Carnival festivities in 1940s. While such efforts undoubtedly appealed to popular sentiment, they were nevertheless disparaged by the city's conservative creole elite. The conservative newspaper, *Ultima Hora* carried the headline, "Debería este año evitarse la indigenizacion del Carnaval" as late as 1945.⁹⁰⁴ "Una cosa es el culto de lo típico y folklórico," the autor noted, "y otra distinta el indigénizar hasta un exceso censurable las fiesta de Carnestolendas."⁹⁰⁵ Still, on the eve of the Revolution, urban, middling *paceños* resented the integration of indigenous popular culture into their folklore.

Prevailing prejudice aside, growing interest in transforming folklore from a popular curiosity into a legitimate field of academic inquiry was manifest in the

Molyneux, eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), pp. 215-237; Laura Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights: Indigenous Struggles for Land and Justice in Bolivia, 1880-1952* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), chapter six.

⁹⁰³ Fernando Rios, "Music in Urban La Paz," pp. 91-96.

⁹⁰⁴ "Debería este año evitarse la indigenizacion del Carnaval," *Ultima Hora*, 1/22/1945, p. 4. Thanks go to Liz Shesko for passing on this source. The author wrote "...lo que inicialmente fue una pintoresca nota propia y de color, fue en años sucesivos convirtiéndose en una indigenización cada vez mas acentuada del Carnaval, hasta ser los dos últimos anos el tradicional corso un mero y grotesco desfile interminable de alcoholizadas masas indígenas, que en su mayor parte no llevaban sino sus trajes habituales, de modo que se presencia no aportaba la exhibición de nada pintoresco ni nuevo, ni otra originalidad que la de se babeante borrachera en calles, plazas y paseos."

⁹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

institutionalization of the discipline. The year 1940 saw the establishment of the *Sociedad de Folklore, Folkvisa y Folkway de Bolivia* in La Paz.⁹⁰⁶ The national society was founded by Ralph Steele Boggs, a renowned Spanish linguist and early pioneer in Latin America folklore who established the discipline as an independent field of study in the U.S. academy.⁹⁰⁷ He and Arthur Posnansky had apparently become friends—perhaps at one of the *Americanista* congresses they frequently attended—and the Sociedad was placed within the Instituto “Tihuanacu” de Antropología, Etnografía y Prehistoria (established by Posnansky and Manuel Ballivian the previous decade). The society’s members included the younger generation of “*las místicas de la tierra*,” the cabal of La Paz *letrados* characterized by intellectual historian Guillermo Francovich by their telluric approach to Andean civilization and their cosmological interpretations of Tiwanaku.⁹⁰⁸ The Sociedad’s vision of folklore would prove just as fantastic and exclusionary as their interpretation of Tiwanaku (see chapter five).

The *Sociedad de Folklore, Folkvisa y Folkway de Bolivia* embraced a particular understanding of folklore that belied the racial prejudice that prevailed among the *místicas*. Posnansky, who authored all of the articles in the new journal, defined folklore

⁹⁰⁶ José Felipe Costas Arguedas, *Diccionario del Folklore Boliviano*, Tomo I (Sucre: Universidad Mayor de San Francisco Xavier de Chuquisaca, 1967), p. 8

⁹⁰⁷ For more on Ralph Steele Boggs and his role in the Latin American folklore, see Stanley L. Robe, “The Ralph Steele Boggs Folklore Collection,” *Western Folklore*, vol. 20, no. 1 (January 1961), pp. 38-40. Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, “Folklore’s Crisis,” *The Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 111, No. 441 (Summer, 1998), pp. 281-327, p. 291.

⁹⁰⁸ Guillermo Francovich, *El pensamiento boliviano en el siglo XX* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1956), pp. 111-13. The first generation of *místicos* included Posnansky as well as Roberto Prudencio. They were the intellectuals vanguard of 1940s La Paz, controlling such influential scientific institutions as the Sociedad Geográfica de La Paz, the fledgling *Instituto de Estudios Bolivianos* (founded at UMSA by Prudencio in 1939), as well as the associations mentioned in the text. The journal, *Kollasuyo* (published from 1939-1953) was their mouthpiece. The membership of the folklore society—which included Albero Laguna Meave, Vicente Donoso Torres, and Antonio Gonzales Bravo—overlapped with the contemporaneous Sociedad Arqueología de Bolivia. See: David Browman, “La Sociedad Arqueología de Bolivia y su influencia en el desarrollo de la práctica arqueológica en Bolivia,” *Nuevos aportes*, no. 4 (2007), 29-54.

as a “ciencia” dedicated to the study of “mitos, tradiciones orales, leyendas, fabulas, hisorietas, cuentos, supersticiones, y otras cosas por el estilo, de caracter netamente populares.”⁹⁰⁹ He made a careful distinction, however, between “espíritu popular e indígena” in relation to national folklore. “No tiene (la palabra folklore) ninguna relación con el concepto de música o con el de bailes populares indígenas,” he wrote. To employ the word to describe these activities, he pointed out, “es impropio.”⁹¹⁰ As Posnansky understood it, folklore was an academic discipline related to ethnographic and anthropometric studies of indigenous Bolivians, not an inclusive practice that celebrated their popular culture as representative of a national essence. Creole traditions were representative of the nation; indigenous culture was an object of scientific inquiry.

Towards the end of the decade, folklorists from the departments of Chuquisaca and Tarija set out to institutionalize a more inclusive and, from their perspective, scientific approach to the study of folklore that eschewed the ethnic compartmentalization embraced by the *místicas*. In 1950, José Felipe Costas Arguedas, Julia Elena Fortún, and Victor Vargas Reyes established the *Sociedad Folklorica de Bolivia* in Sucre.⁹¹¹ Seeking an air of epistemological authority, Costas and Fortún affiliated the SFB with the Circulo Panamericano de Folklore—an inter-American organization that drew together folklore societies from Mexico, Argentina, Peru, and other states.⁹¹² The goal of the SFB was to establish folklore’s status as a legitimate

⁹⁰⁹ Arthur Posnansky, “Folklore, Folkvisa y Folkway,” *Revista de antropología de Bolivia: órgano oficial del Instituto “Tihuanacu” de Antropología, Etnografía y Prehistoria (con anexo del Boletín de Folklore, Folkvisa y Folkway)*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1942), p. 2

⁹¹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹¹ “Acta de fundación de la Sociedad Folklórica de Bolivia,” *Cuaderno de la Sociedad Folklórica de Bolivia*, No. 1 (1952), p. 3.

⁹¹² Frances Gillmor, “Organization of Folklore Study in Mexico,” *The Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 74, No. 294, (Oct. - Dec., 1961), pp. 383-390

science and to professionalize the discipline according to international standards of epistemology and methodology. Doing so first necessitated defining the term folklore. In the first issue of the *Cuaderno de la Sociedad Folklórica de Bolivia* (SFB), Costas Arguedas, the notable Sucre folklorists and first president of the SFB, set out to do just that.

The SBF evidenced a more inclusive understanding of the folklore concept that allowed for the inclusion of rural popular culture. Citing French ethnographer Paul Rivet, Swiss anthropologists Alfred Métraux, and Argentine ethnomusicologist, Carlos Vega, Costas Arguedas identified folklore a “ciencia antropológica” concerned with the study of “lo popular, lo tradicional, lo anónimo, lo regional.”⁹¹³ While Posnansky had explicitly dismissed indigenous dance and music as legitimate objects of folklore, Costas provided a more expansive formulation of the concept that allowed for the inclusion of rural popular culture. As legitimate objects of study, he identified cultural themes instead of racial and/or ethnic groups (or types). Alimentation habits, fashion, work routines, recreation activities, myth, tradition—each of these contributed to the “psicología colectiva” of a people and therefore represented legitimate objects of study.⁹¹⁴ He pointed out that while folklore may share many of the same methodological principals as modern ethnography—participant observation and objective description, among them—it differed markedly in the ends it pursued. Ethnography was dedicated to the objective observation of traditional populations as part of a broader effort to obtain a “holistic”

⁹¹³ José Felipe Costas Arguedas, “Breve noticia sobre la ciencia de folklore,” *Cuaderno de la Sociedad Folklórica de Bolivia*, No. 1 (1952), pp. 4-10, p. 9, 5.

⁹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9. It seems that the SBF only published two issues of this journal. The second features the work of famed *chapaco* folklorists, Víctor Varas Reyes. See: Víctor Varas Reyes, “Invocaciones indígenas y populares bolivianos” *Cuaderno de la Sociedad Folklórica de Bolivia*, No. 2 (Sucre, 1953). It is interesting to note that like Posnansky, Reyes also made a conscious distinction between “popular” folklore and “indigenous” folklore.

understanding of a single cultural group. True, folklore necessarily took on traditional cultures. But the objective of this new national science as articulated by the SBF was the collection and classifications of ethnographic materials towards the goal of documenting the popular consciousness of an entire national population.

After 1952, this more inclusive vision of folklore moved to the center of the national consciousness as the government looked to the SBF to assist in state efforts to promote a postrevolutionary national folklore. The postrevolutionary government demonstrated its intent to move indigenous popular culture to the center of national folklore by sponsoring several folkloric festivals in La Paz in 1953 and 1954, all of which prominently featured indigenous music and dance. Seeking the most “authentic” and “pure” articulation of native folklore, government officials often even sent announcements to rural communities inviting them to participate.⁹¹⁵ Postrevolutionary officials did not necessarily disparage intrinsic components of creole folklore—such as the *cueca* or the waltz—but indigenous popular culture was certainly the primary focus of government-sponsored folklore celebrations after 1952.

In 1954, the government created the Department of Folklore (DF) within the Ministry of Education to manage state folklore festivals and, ostensibly, to carry out the collection of folkloric materials. The influence of the SBF on the DF is indicated by its charter, which stated the primary objective as the “inventory and study of national folkloric elements” and their collection in a “national music archive.” As Costas had originally argued, folklore referred to the practice of documenting and scientifically classifying the entirety of the divergent manifestations of popular culture existing with the national territory to serve as the essence of the republic and its people. To lead the

⁹¹⁵ Fernando Ríos, “Urban Music in La Paz,” p. 223.

new office, officials chose Julia Elena Fortún. Among her colleagues, she had the best professional pedigree. She had majored in pedagogy at San Xavier before enrolling at the *Escuela Nacional de Maestros*, also in Sucre, where she pursued a degree in music education while studying at the *Conservatorio de Música* in La Paz.⁹¹⁶ She went on to study ethnomusicology and folklore under Carlos Vega in Buenos Aires, and upon assuming the directorship of the DF, she had just returned from Spain, where she had completed a doctorate in “historia primitiva” from the University of Madrid.⁹¹⁷ Soon after being appointed director, however, she departed for Mexico City, where between 1954 and 1956, she pursued postdoctoral study in anthropology at UNAM.⁹¹⁸ Despite initial efforts to centralize folklore, state folklore remained inconsistent and decentralized during the early years of the Revolution, with the SPIC, IIC, IIB, and the Municipality of La Paz each sponsoring separate events.⁹¹⁹

Postrevolutionary efforts to move indigenous dance and music into the venerated canon of national folklore became most salient in 1955, with the *Primera Mesa Redonda de Folklore en Música y Danzas*. Sponsored by the Municipality of La Paz’s Directorate of Culture, the event convened prominent folklorists to expound on the place of

⁹¹⁶ Hugo Daniel Ruiz, “Homenaje a la obra de la Señora Julia Elena Fortún, aproximación a su labor científica,” *Etnología: Boletín del Museo Nacional de Etnografía y Folklore*, año XIII, No. 17-18 (1989), 113-127, p. 113. See also, Bolivia, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, *Julia Elena Fortún: Mujer de las Américas, 1964* (La Paz, 1964).

⁹¹⁷ Biblioteca del Museo de Nacional de Etnografía y Folklore (MUSEF), Papeles de Julia Elena Fortún - Fondo 4 (JEF 4), Caja 8980-9073, Document 9059, “Curriculum,” 1987.

⁹¹⁸ Before departing for Mexico, she attempted to establish a national “Calendario Folklórico” that noted all of the different civic and religious festivals held in different regions of Bolivia. Julia Elena Fortún, “Primeros pasos en la organización folklórica de Bolivia, Encuesta No. 1,” *Khana*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Agosto 1954), pp. 91-92.

⁹¹⁹ Ríos argues that “The MNR gave jurisdiction rights over mestizo and indigenous music festival to separate entities. While indigenous festivals mainly under the purview of the Municipal Council of Culture, the MNR entrusted mestizo music concerts to the SPIC and, to a lesser extent, the IBC. This MNR policy, which bifurcates local musical traditions along ethnicized lines, somewhat contradicted the state goal of creating an all-encompassing national culture.” Fernando Ríos, “Bolero Trios, Mestizo Panpipe Ensembles, and Bolivia’s 1952 Revolution,” p. 312, f. 2.

indigenous music and dance in the national canon, and its intrinsic value to the revolutionary process. Yolanda Bendregal, who had helped organize the event, announced its objective as “Buscar la fuente mas profunda e intima de nuestras manifestaciones cultural en el alma y el espíritu del pueblo milenario que sustenta nuestra raza indomestiza.”⁹²⁰ Gonzales Bravo emphasized the pedagogical utility of indigenous music in primary education. He imagined the nation’s children playing traditional rural music on *kenas*, *sicus*, and other “indigenous” wind instruments. Such an effort, would “restauraríamos y enriqueceríamos el acervo folklórico nuestro” while provided an authentic national esthetic. Perhaps realizing the absurdity of such a claim, he rhetorically asked, “¿La parte aún más elevada del Arte Nacional, basada en elementos nativos?”⁹²¹ He went on to assuage any fears by explaining that once the original music was properly documented, it would be reinterpreted “en las formas modernas más convenientes.”⁹²² Max Portugal and Dick Ibarra Grasso noted that indigenous music and dance had been “los aspectos menos estudiados” of national folklore.⁹²³ Underscoring their ethnographic value for revealing Bolivia’s deeper cultural traditions—those from Africa or Asia—hey echoed Costas in calling for the systematic study and scientific classification of indigenous folklore.⁹²⁴

Yet conference participants confronted a more urgent matter. In opening the conference, La Paz mayor Julio Zuazo Cuenca noted that “Los especialistas en esta

⁹²⁰ Yolanda Bendregal de Conitzer, “Palabras de la Señora Yolanda B. de Conitzer,” Maks Portugal y Dick Ibarra Grasso, “Importancia de la música y las danzas en el folklore nativo,” *Khana*, Año III, Vol. IV, Nos. 13-14 (Diciembre 1955), pp. 213-14.

⁹²¹ Antonio Gonzales Bravo, “Utilización del Folklore en la educación y creación artística” *Khana*, Año III, Vol. IV, Nos. 13-14 (Diciembre 1955), pp. 220-21

⁹²² *Ibid.*, p. 221.

⁹²³ Maks Portugal y Dick Ibarra Grasso, “Importancia de la música y las danzas en el folklore nativo,” *Khana*, Año III, Vol. IV, Nos. 13-14 (Diciembre 1955), pp. 214-219, p. 215.

⁹²⁴ *Ibid.*, see discussion, pp. 216-18.

importante rama del conocimiento humano han anotado, y con sobradas razones, que de un tiempo a esta parte la actividad folklórica de nuestros campesinos han venido surgiendo un visible relajamiento y una peligrosa mestización en sus valores tradicionales.”⁹²⁵ He warned that “si dejamos así las cosas sin tomar las necesarias medida para precautelar nuestra enorme riqueza folklórica, que es patrimonio cultural de nuestra Nación, esta deformación desembocara en perdida definitiva.”⁹²⁶ All participants agreed that the primary threat to the nation’s indigenous heritage was rural modernization—all except for Francisco Viscarra. He blamed alcohol and agrarian exploitation, lamenting that authentic musical forms “ha sido y es remplazada por la profana borrachera de llocallas e imillas a causa de la cantidad de bebidas alcohólicas que proporciona el gamonal o de lo contrario el mayordomo.”⁹²⁷

The dangers posed to “traditional” culture by the expansion of “modern” society had long been recognized by Bolivian *letrados* interested in rural popular culture. Such a concern was clearly evident in the charter of the *Sociedad de Folklore, Folkvisa y Folkway*. “Con los sistemas de militarización, alfabetización e industrialización impuestas por la vida moderna,” Posnansky had warned back in 1942, “corren peligro de perderse definitivamente dichas manifestaciones del espíritu popular e indígena.”⁹²⁸ With the Revolution, this threat became more urgent than ever. Not only did it mark the first effort to incorporate indigenous music and dance into national folklore. But state cultural officials and folklorists alike worried that agrarian reform, rural education,

⁹²⁵ Julio Zuazo Cuenca, “Discurso de inauguración de H. Alcalde Municipal,” *Khana*, No. 1

⁹²⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹²⁷ Francisco Viscarra, “Medios para la restauración, conservación y depuración de la música y danzas,” *Khana*, Año III, Vol. IV, Nos. 13-14 (Diciembre 1955), pp. 214-219, see discussion, pp. 222-224.

⁹²⁸ Sociedad de Folklore, Folkvisa y Folkway de Bolivia, “Acta de fundación Sociedad de Folklore, Folkvisa y Folkway de Bolivia, *Boletín de Folklore, Folkvisa y Folkway de Bolivia*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1942), p. 1.

lowland colonization, and other rural modernization initiatives would cause the disappearance or deformation of traditional indigenous dance and music. The final recommendations proposed by the Mesa Rotunda implored the state to intervene in order to “restaurar, conservar y depurar” indigenous music and dance from the contaminating influences of western modernization.⁹²⁹ Only by observing, studying, and classifying folklore according to established scientific methods could its “calidad primitiva” be preserved, in order that this increasingly important national tradition would be safeguarded for future generations.⁹³⁰

Rising concern with the contamination and/or loss of authentic representation of Bolivia’s indigenous heritage proved the primary factor behind both the institutionalization and professionalization of folklore after 1952. Silvia Rivera correctly argues that the primary paradigm motivating postrevolutionary folklore was “antropología de rescate.”⁹³¹ That is, the necessity to collect, document, and archive “traditional” cultures before they disappeared as a result of the homogenizing forces of western modernization. Salvage anthropology cuts to the heart of the contradictions implicit within modernity itself: the pull towards modern life coupled with the melancholy of leaving that which is familiar and natural.⁹³² Anthropologist Joseph Gruber (quoted at the beginning of this chapter) traces the history of early ethnographic research within the British empire, arguing that the contradictory impulses of modernity

⁹²⁹ “Conclusiones de la Primera Mesa Rotunda de Folklore en Música y Danzas Realizada en La Ciudad de La Paz del 20 al 26 de octubre de 1955,” *Khana*, Año III, Vol. IV, Nos. 13-14 (Diciembre 1955), pp. 228-231.

⁹³⁰ “Prospecto del de la Primera Mesa Rotunda de Folklore en Música y Danzas,” *Khana*, Año III, Vol. IV, Nos. 13-14 (Diciembre 1955), pp. 210-11, p. 210.

⁹³¹ Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, “La antropología y arqueología en Bolivia: límites y perspectivas,” *América Indígena*, Vol. XI, no. 2 (abril-junio, 1980), pp. 217-224, p. 219.

⁹³² Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (Penguin, 1988).

have provided anthropology with its *raison d'être* for much of its history, as humans scramble to “collect and preserve the information and the products of human activity and genius so rapidly being destroyed”⁹³³ As the rural modernization effort intensified in the late 1950s and early 1960s, postrevolutionary officials increasingly grappled with the paradox of modernity: the exciting lure of modernism promoted by postrevolutionary development, together with the tragic loss of tradition resulting from rural modernization.

To attend to the paradox of modernization, the government established the Departamento de Arqueología, Etnografía y Folklore (Department of Archeology, Ethnography, and Folklore, DAEF) within the Department of Education in July 1956. Whether this development occurred in response to the Mesa Rotunda remains uncertain. But the creation of the DEAF coincides with two important developments. The first was the centralization of national cultural management that took place under Fernando Diez de Medina's term as Minister of Education (1956-57). Seeking to centralized national culture production, Diaz had proposed creating the *Dirección General de Cultura* while head of the Education Reform Committee. Following the promulgation of the 1955 Education Code, the Ministerio de Educación was transformed into the *Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes* (MEBA) to reflect the central role it would play in national cultural formation.⁹³⁴ The second development that may have contributed to the creation of the DEAF was Julia Elena Fortún's return from Mexico in July 1956.⁹³⁵ Upon her

⁹³³ Jacob W. Gruber, “Ethnographic Salvage and the Shaping of Anthropology,” *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 72, No. 6 (December, 1970), 1289-1299.

⁹³⁴ Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes, *Educación, Cultura, Deportes: Informe 1956-57* (La Paz, 1957), p. 18.

⁹³⁵ ACOMC, DGC, Informes, 1956-1964, Julia Elena Fortún to Fernando Diez de Medina, “Informe del Departamento de Folklore,” 11/30/1956, p. 1.

arrival, both she and her husband, Carlos Ponce Sangines assumed leadership positions within the fledgling *Dirección General de Cultura*.

The creation of the DAEF marked an important step in the professionalization of folklore in postrevolutionary Bolivia, introducing both the institutional structures and legal measures necessary to ensure the conservation of the indigenous music, dance, and other manifestations of rural popular culture under assault by national development. The objective of the new office was “recoger todas las expresiones folklóricas y etnográficas de la Patria, para luego clasificar, comparar, establecer correlaciones y determinar, mediante la interpretación, conclusiones al respecto del origen, del desarrollo de la difusión de estas expresiones, para llegar así al fondo mismo de la alma colectiva y traducir su mensaje.”⁹³⁶ The DAET was subdivided into three offices—Sección de Etnografía Musical, Sección Correográfico, Sección de Literatura Tradicional—each orientated toward the study of distinct folkloric materials. The staff of these offices were directed to travel the countryside in order to collect, observe, and record music, dance, literature, myth and other expressions of rural popular culture without altering their natural form. Once collected, the information would then be classified scientifically and systematically cataloged within an MEBA archive.

The legal measures complementing the institutionalization of national folklore were designed both to safeguard and valorize Bolivia’s indigenous heritage. The DAEF charter announced the expansion of existing cultural patrimony laws, declaring that all music collected by the DAEF would become the intellectual property of the

⁹³⁶ Julia Elena Fortún de Ponce, *Manuel para la recolección de material folklórico* (La Paz: Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes, 1957), p. 13.



Illustration 22: Ministry of Education official recording indigenous music as part of the state folklore initiative.⁹³⁷

government.⁹³⁸ It also declared that “la Orquesta Sinfónica Nacional, los corales polifónicos, conservatorios, radios del estado y demás instituciones oficiales, serán las encargadas de la parte activa de discusión del material folklórico musical escogido por

⁹³⁷ From República de Bolivia, Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes, *Educación, Cultura, Deportes: Informe 1956-57* (La Paz, 1957), p. 30.

⁹³⁸ Banco de Datos de la Unidad Nacional de Antropología, Museo de Arqueología Nacional, La Paz, Bolivia (UNAN), Carpeta TR 821, Departamento de Folklore, “Reglamentación,” Julio de 1956, p. 3.

este Departamento.”⁹³⁹ Another measure obligated the Escuela Nacional de Maestros, the Conservatorio Nacional de Música, as well as all secondary schools to integrate folkloric music into their curriculum, “por la necesidad imperiosa de estudio y valorización de nuestra música en todos los ambientes del territorio patrio.”⁹⁴⁰ Finally, it obliged the Academia Nacional de Danzas not only to require students to intensively study folkloric dance, but also to incorporate traditional indigenous dances into their dance repertoires.⁹⁴¹ In short, it marked significant state intervention in the educational system to ensure the promotion and diffusion of vernacular culture as the base for a more inclusive national culture.

The systematic collection of indigenous folklore would be a national effort. The DAEF’s staff was limited, consisting only of Antonio Gonzales Bravo, Antonio Paredes Candia, and Maks Portugal. They carried out the necessary studies of indigenous music, dance, and literature by traveling to rural communities during national holidays such as Todos Santos, Carnaval, and Christmas, as well as other more localized civic and religious festivals that take place across the countryside. In addition to trained specialists, Fortún looked to the nation’s primary and secondary school teachers in her efforts to collect and catalog the complete national folklore canon. Rural school teachers were especially valuable for the effort. Given their extensive knowledge of the customs and traditions of the communities in which they worked, they would provide essential inroads into the “traditional” cultures often shielded from strangers—especially state officials. Circulars sent to all teachers emphasized their participation as a nationalist duty. They would assist “reestructurar la Cultura Nacional, a base del conocimiento de nuestro

⁹³⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 1.

⁹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 5-6.

propios valores” by observing “nuestras genuinas expresiones tradicionales.”⁹⁴² School teachers, especially rural school teachers, would play a contradictory role in postrevolutionary nation building. They would provide the Spanish literacy, basic arithmetic, and other skills necessary to transform rural communities into the modern, market-orientated campesino integral to the success of national development. At the same time, they would also serve as the front line defense against the homogenizing forces of national modernization by collecting the traditional forms of rural culture that they set out to transform.

To prepare the nation’s rural teaching for this task of paramount national importance, Fortún wrote a textbook, the *Manual para la recolección de materiales folklóricos*. The textbook, published by the MEBA in 1957, was intended to provide “un empeño patriótico y científico guía” to all teachers (and teachers in training) as they assumed their new albeit secondary role as nationalist ethnographers.⁹⁴³ Folklore was not a simple task of haphazardly recording aspects of popular culture. There were careful scientific practices of observation and classification involved. She explained that folklore was, in fact, a branch of cultural anthropology, “una ciencia con material concretos, con un método propio, con una finalidad conocida.”⁹⁴⁴ With the *Manual*, Fortún hoped to provide teachers with the basic instruction necessary to “realizar el inventario sistemático de los materiales de nuestra tradición y estudiarlas metódicamente.”⁹⁴⁵ Perhaps more importantly, however, it would enable them to develop a discerning eye, in order to “escoger aquello que por útil y positivo merezca ser incorporado a nuestro moderno

⁹⁴² UNAN, TR 601, Julia Elena Fortún y Raúl Calderón Soria, “Encuesta dirigida al magisterio nacional,” 5/8/57.

⁹⁴³ Fortún, *Manuel para la recolección de material folklórico*, p. i.

⁹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

caudal de vida.”⁹⁴⁶ Of course, that which was “útil” or “positivo” was relative, and could depend on several factors, not least of which being prevailing assumption of indigenous backwardness.

Beyond its pedagogical utility, the *Manual* also serves as a window onto postrevolutionary folklorización, and his it affected prevailing constructions of indigenous alterity. Efforts to move indigenous popular culture to the center of national folklore extended far beyond music and dance, reaching into normative aspects of everyday life for most Bolivians. Collective labor practices such as ayni and mink’a were cast not as typical of rural Andeans, but as backwards, atavistic relics.⁹⁴⁷ Within the schema developed by Fortún, they constituted “Folklore Material.” The history, myths, and traditions embraced by rural indigenous communities were characterized as of “Folklore Espiritual” within the burgeoning national canon.⁹⁴⁸ Other actions filled with cultural meaning and significance that served to register, recognize, and transmit the past were also defined as folklore, their content considered cultural vestiges of a pre-modern past rather than actual representations of living indigenous cultures. Ritual dance, drink, and music—actions that anthropologist Thomas Abercrombie has shown were filled with cultural meaning and historical significance—were to be observed, collected, and archived in the Ministry of Education or put on display in one of the increasing number of state museums in La Paz.⁹⁴⁹

After 1952, the postrevolutionary government moved indigenous music and dance to the center of national folklore as part of a broader effort to establish a more

⁹⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 25.

⁹⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 20-21, 41, 48-49, 55-56.

⁹⁴⁹ Thomas A. Abercrombie, *Pathways of Memory and Power: Ethnography and History among an Andean People* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998), see especially pp. 116-118 and 190-206.

inclusive national culture comprised of authentic representation of the national essence. Despite its inclusive veneer, the creation of a national folklore that privileged indigenous popular culture contributed to broader process of racial formation underway in postrevolutionary Bolivia. Cast alongside the vision of the idealized modern campesino projected by the postrevolutionary state, the traditional Indian stood as temporally apart from the modern nation. The process of folklorization played on prevailing cultural constructions of race to create new forms of ethnic exclusion by reinforcing direct associations between cultural markers of “Indianness” (language, dress, rural) and a way of life that was traditional, backward, pre-modern, and ill-prepared for inclusion in the modernizing republic. The process served not to reaffirm rural popular culture as vibrant and evolving expressions of Bolivia’s indigenous population, but to redefine these expressions as cultural relics of a time past.

MEXICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

During the 1950s, as government officials worked to institutionalize folklore and applied anthropology within the postrevolutionary state in order to assist in the rural modernization campaign, social scientists affiliated with Mexico’s *Instituto Nacional Indigenista* (INI) were pioneering new approaches to national integration and indigenous social uplift. Founded in 1942, as a national bureau of the III, the INI assumed national leadership in prevailing questions of indigenous integration and rural modernization. INI director, anthropologist Alfonso Caso described the objectives of the institute as “tratar los problemas de las comunidades indígenas en forma integral, conservando y fomentando los aspectos positivos de la cultura de esas comunidades y proporcionando

los medios para elevar el nivel cultural en todos los aspectos de la vida colectiva."⁹⁵⁰ By the time the U.S. announced the Alliance for Progress in 1961, INI had developed a model for indigenous community development that would be exported not only to Bolivia, but throughout the Americas.

Since the 1920s, Mexico's postrevolutionary government had actively pursued the integration of its indigenous population into the political, social, cultural, and economic structures of the republic. Indeed, postrevolutionary Mexico served as the laboratory for applied social sciences during the 1930s and 1940s, hosting Boas, Malowinski, and other international luminaries. With the consolidation of the Inter-American indigenista movement in 1940 and the establishment of the INI in 1942, the latter institution emerged at the forefront of applied indigenista research in Mexico. The INI set out to apply social scientific knowledge in order to develop more effective rural modernization and indigenous acculturation efforts. Miguel León-Portilla, who succeeded Gamio as director of the INI, noted that "Para poder hacer una auténtica planificación es indudable que primero hay que poseer un conocimiento lo mas completo posible de la realidad social y física sobre la que se piensa actuar."⁹⁵¹ Like other intellectuals across the Americas, León-Portilla believed that social scientific knowledge could provide the solution to the age-old Indian problem.

During the 1940s and 1950s, Alfonso Caso, Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán, Julio de la Fuente, and other anthropologists affiliated with the INI began experimenting with new forms of indigenous integration. Eschewing the *national* integration policies pursued since the 1920s by the Ministries of Education and Agriculture, they developed *regional*

⁹⁵⁰ Alfonso Caso, *¿Que es el I. N. I.?* (México, D.F., Instituto Nacional Indigenista, 1955), p. 55.

⁹⁵¹ Miguel León-Portilla, "Algunos tipos de planificación indígena," *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (May – August 1960), pp. 425-432, p. 430.

integration efforts tailored to the specific historical experiences and cultural values of different indigenous populations. The logic underlying this transformation was derived from Aguirre Beltrán and de la Fuente's previous research on inter-ethnic relations between rural Indians and urban mestizos in the Tzeltal Tzotzil region of Chiapas. They posited that indigenous modernization would be more effective by addressing the material and psychological needs of specific ethnic groups as they were integrated into the nation.⁹⁵² By strengthening bonds between rural communities and urban villages, moreover, they not only hypothesized a strengthening of regional market structures, but hoped that the modern cultural values embraced by mestizos would be diffused into the indigenous pueblos.

In 1950, the INI established the first *Centro Coordinador Indigenista* in the city of San Cristóbal de las Casas in Chiapas to implement the regional integration model and test its efficacy. The region was selected for its predominantly-rural indigenous-majority population, as well as the market linkages and social relationships that existed between the town's mestizo population and the surrounding indigenous communities. Employing anthropologists, physicians, agronomists, and sociologists, the project integrated ethnography, statistics, and biometric studies to study the specific needs of the population and how to most effectively—and efficiently—"improve" the standard of living of the inhabitants. Once such data was collected, specialists devised specific programs for the target community and implemented them, seeking to "improvement" in the three key areas of education, economy, and health.⁹⁵³ The effort was deemed a success, and by the

⁹⁵² Hewitt de Alcántara, *Anthropological Perspectives on Rural Mexico*, pp. 46-57.

⁹⁵³ For a detailed description of the INI regional integration effort, see: Miguel León-Portilla, "Algunos tipos de planificación indígena," *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (May – August 1960), pp. 425-432.

end of the decade the INI had established several more coordinating centers in predominantly indigenous regions of the country.⁹⁵⁴

The INI's regional integration initiative soon caught the attention of III director Miguel Leon-Portilla, who recognized its potential in assisting other republics in the Americas grappling with national integration, indigenous social uplift, and rural modernization. "Hay en el Continente American más de treinta millones de indígenas," he wrote, underscoring the scope of the issue. "El Instituto Indigenista Interamericano considera indispensable iniciar proyectos pilotos," he asserted, "fomentarse de manera directa el desarrollo de las comunidades indígenas, conjuntamente con la preparación de técnico que posteriormente pueda colaborar en otros trabajo en favor del desarrollo de comunidades indígenas."⁹⁵⁵ The project could be especially helpful for Bolivia and Guatemala, he noted; which not only had the highest indigenous populations (per capita) in the Americas, but also generally lacked trained specialists and university programs specializing in the practices of applied anthropology. "El problema que plantea esa carencia de técnicos e igualmente de proyectos plenamente adaptados a las características específicas de los grupos indignas, ha movido al Instituto Indigenista Interamericano a iniciar una programa conjunto de acción y adiestramiento en Bolivia y Guatemala."⁹⁵⁶ The election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 would provide the III with an unprecedented source of financial support to export the INI's model of indigenous community development.

⁹⁵⁴ Hewitt de Alcántara, *Anthropological Perspectives on Rural Mexico*, p. 54.

⁹⁵⁵ AHIII, Caja 3, Carpeta: Proyecto 208 (1), "Adiestramiento del personal técnico requerido para los nuevos centros coordinadores indigenistas" s.d., p. 1.

⁹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2

In 1961, Kennedy inaugurated a new era of Inter-American relations with the Alliance for Progress. The Alliance represented a novel effort to promote economic development and political stability throughout Latin America. Invoking the United States' own revolutionary legacy, Kennedy declared in March of 1961 that "our unfulfilled task is to demonstrate to the entire world that man's unsatisfied aspiration for economic progress and social justice can best be achieved by free men working within a framework of democratic institutions."⁹⁵⁷ Through the infusion of economic aid and the support of democratic institutions throughout the region Kennedy planned to frustrate the ability of communists to exploit underdevelopment and political instability, thus avoiding another "Cuba." The Alliance, Kennedy argued, would "improve and strengthen democratic institutions through application of the principle of self-determination by the people" and "accelerate economic and social development, thus bringing about a substantial and steady increase in the average income in order to narrow the gap between the standard of living in Latin American countries and that enjoyed in the industrialized countries."⁹⁵⁸ The OAS adopted the Alliance for Progress charter in August of 1961. In the following months, Washington would pledge \$20 billion to help Latin American nations help themselves and, through these efforts, Alliance planners predicted an annual economic growth rate of 2.5 percent throughout the region.

With the Alliance channeling large sums capital to national development initiatives across Latin America, León-Portilla began coordinating with the OAS to

⁹⁵⁷ "Address by John F. Kennedy at a White House Reception for Members of Congress and for the Diplomatic Corps of the Latin American Republics, 13 March 1961," *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1961* (Washington: GPO, 1962): 170-81, p. 173.

⁹⁵⁸ John F. Kennedy, "Declaration to the Peoples of the Americas" reprinted in Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onís, *The Alliance that Lost its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), Appendix p.

export the indigenous community development model to Bolivia and Guatemala. “El desarrollo socio-económico integral de las comunidades indígenas debe concebirse como formando parte de los planes nacionales de desarrollo de los varios países del hemisferio,” he wrote,” contando con el apoyo de la Alianza para el Progreso, de las varias dependencias gubernamentales y de otros organismos internacionales.”⁹⁵⁹ Using funds procured via the Alliance, the III began planning Project 208, an ambitious indigenous community development program that, in the succeeding decades, would provide Bolivia with both the training and expertise necessary to realize its rural modernization campaign.

RURAL MODERNIZATION AND ETHNOGRAPHIC SALVAGE

Following the re-election of Víctor Paz Estenssoro as President in 1960, ethnographic salvage became a top priority of state cultural officials. Paz moved back into the *Palacio Quemado* vowing to realize the development initiative introduced during his first term as President (1952-1956). The national development strategy designed by Guevara Arze had borne little fruit. The postrevolutionary regime had counted on mining and petroleum to generate the revenue necessary to finance domestic development—principally commercial agriculture. Things did not work out as planners had intended, however. The profitability of the state mining enterprise, COMIBOL, had been undermined by a combination of falling tin prices, decreasing quality of ore, corrupt and inefficient management, and a bloated and poorly-managed labor force. The alternative sectors of economic development identified by Guevara—primarily petroleum and

⁹⁵⁹ AHIII, Caja 3, Carpeta: Programa de desarrollo de comunidades indígenas en Bolivia y Guatemala, Miguel León Portilla, “Programa de Desarrollo Económico-Cultural de comunidades indígenas en Bolivia y Guatemala (información complementaria),” 1/21/1963, p. 1.

commercial agriculture—had actually performed quite well. Still, COMIBOL continued to drain Bolivia's foreign exchange, and as the government scrambled to fund the Revolution, it became increasingly reliant on Washington to finance its ambitious modernization plans.

As a precondition of providing economic assistance, Washington demanded that Bolivia get its house in order. In order to receive the necessary financial assistance, President Siles implemented tough austerity measures designed by the United States and World Bank—decreasing the labor force, cutting social services, and stopping state spending on all but necessary budgetary items.⁹⁶⁰ For almost the entirety of his four-year term, Siles was wracked with mounting labor unrest, fragmenting party unity, and rising economic pressures as he implemented the austerity measures. By the time Paz was reelected in 1960, the Revolution itself seemed to be on the verge of collapse.

In an effort to achieve a semblance of national unity and redouble the national development effort, Paz introduced the *Plan Decenal de Desarrollo Económica y Social* in March 1961. The ambitious ten-year development plan was intended to accelerate the development efforts initiated during his first administration and to bring some results to the struggling Bolivian economy. Its primary objectives were to increase production, create jobs, increase standard of living and social mobility, eliminate illiteracy, and better the health of the population.⁹⁶¹ Rural modernization remained a key objective of the postrevolutionary government. Agricultural production had actually begun to slowly increase after initially falling off during the period 1952-56 because of widespread

⁹⁶⁰ Cornelius H. Zondag, *The Bolivian Economy, 1952-65: The Revolution and its Aftermath* (New York: Praeger, 1966).

⁹⁶¹ Oscar Soria G., Jorge Sanginés y Ricardo Rada, *¿Que es el plan decenal?* (La Paz: E. Burillo, 1963), p. 7.

agrarian unrest and one of the worst droughts on record.⁹⁶² The lowland colonization effort was also much slower to move forward than officials had originally planned. Thus, as part of the ten year plan, Paz assigned Roberto Jordan Pando, his newly-appointed Minister of Peasant Affairs and former Vice President of the National Planning Board, the task of devising a rural modernization strategy to accompany the broader Plan Decenal.⁹⁶³




Illustration 23: Artwork for the *Plan Decenal de Desarrollo Económico y Social*.⁹⁶⁴

⁹⁶² Richard S. Thorn, “The Economic Transformation,” p. 176. See also: Zondag, *The Bolivian Economy, 1952-1965*, pp. 141-52.

⁹⁶³ Roberto Jordán Pando, *Plan decenal: el desarrollo económico y social logrará la liberación nacional* (La Paz, 1962), p. 3

⁹⁶⁴ From Oscar Soria G., Jorge Sanginés y Ricardo Rada, *¿Que es el plan decenal?* (La Paz: E. Burillo, 1963).

Designed over the course of 1961 by an army of technocrats from the Ministries of Peasant Affairs, Agriculture, and Health, and implemented in January 1962, the *Plan Nacional del Desarrollo Rural* (PNDR) was designed to accelerate the process of rural modernization on the altiplano and valleys of the western highlands. Jordán justified the geographic focus of the plan in terms of acculturation, noting that “los campesinos no están en el mismo nivel social, económico y cultural del resto del país, de ahí que la Revolución persigue fundamentalmente nivelar a esa mayoría rezagada.”⁹⁶⁵ The PNDR reaffirmed the pivotal role originally assigned to indigenous Bolivians by the postrevolutionary planners. They would be the motor of the Revolution, contributing to economic diversification and the expansion of the domestic market through their participation in the postrevolutionary economy as independent consumers and producers. By increasing the flow of capital, technology, and expertise to the rural sector, Jordán hoped, once and for all, to uplift the peasantry and realize the revolutionary promises of establishing a sovereign, self-sufficient national economy.

Paz’s commitment to national development soon caught the attention of the Kennedy administration. Washington saw Bolivia’s modernizing revolution as a perfect test case for the Alliance for Progress. In January 1962, Kennedy wrote Paz, stating “I wish to assure you of my continuing personal interest in actions by the United States within the framework of the Alliance for Progress which will help Bolivia in its long-term efforts to bring about significant, self-sustaining development.”⁹⁶⁶ With financial and political support provided by the Alliance, Bolivian officials began working with the

⁹⁶⁵ República de Bolivia, Junta Interministerial, Directiva del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Rural, *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Rural* (La Paz, 1963), p. 5.

⁹⁶⁶ John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA (JFKL), National Security Files, Country Files, Bolivia, Box 10a, Folder: Bolivia General 1/62-7/62, Personal Correspondence, Kennedy to Paz, 1/4/1962, p.2.

OAS, the Pan-American Union, and other multilateral institutions to implement the rural community development model developed by the INI. From the perspective of postrevolutionary policymakers, it would not only accelerate the process of integrating rural society into the economic and social structure of the nation, but it would also attend to the objectives of the ten-year plan by transforming indigenous communities into progressive units of rural socioeconomic development.

The Bolivian government signed on to the indigenous community development initiative in November 1962. The “Programa de desarrollo económico-cultural de comunidades indígenas en Bolivia y Guatemala”—or simply Proyecto 208—was an aggressive rural modernization strategy founded on four key principles, gleaned from a decade of research carried out by the INI at various regional coordinating centers in Mexico. The ground rules for Proyecto 208 stipulated that regional programs must be consistent with the national development goals of the participating states; that the specific methods employed by the project must be consistent with “contexto cultural propio” of the indigenous community where the project was being implemented; that the “técnicos” administering the local program “se encuentran capacitados en los métodos y principios básicos de la antropología social”; and, finally, that the project staff do their best to empower local leaders to participate in the effort.⁹⁶⁷ The INI had developed a model of rural modernization, rooted in applied social scientific practices developed over the course of decades. If postrevolutionary Mexico had served as the laboratory for the development of applied social sciences that would attend to indigenous integration and

⁹⁶⁷ AHIII, Caja 3, Carpeta: Programa de desarrollo de comunidades indígenas en Bolivia y Guatemala, Miguel León Portilla, “Acerca de los principios y métodos del desarrollo de comunidades indígenas,” 1/21/1963.

rural modernization, postrevolutionary Bolivia would provide a laboratory to test the universal efficacy of such practices.

Proyecto 208 was an international program intended not only to promote indigenous integration and rural modernization in Bolivia, but to train social scientists from other American republics which lacked adequate higher education institutions. The III and OAS would manage the effort for the first three years, during which it would prepare Bolivian specialists in the tools of applied anthropology and rural community development. It would then hand over management of the effort to the Instituto Indigenista Boliviano (IIB). Oscar Arze Quintanilla, who had recently been appointed to head the IIB, would lead the effort. He had spent much of the previous decade working on the lowland colonization effort alongside Richard Patch and other anthropologists.⁹⁶⁸ To prepare him to lead this novel approach to rural community development, the III sent him to a nine-month intensive training seminar at the INI Regional Coordinating center in Chiapas, where he and other specialists worked alongside INI director Alfonso Caso on rural community development programs already underway.⁹⁶⁹ In addition to applied anthropology, statistics, and administration, the students also studied earlier “estudios de antropología social” carried out “en Mexico entre diverso organismos oficiales.”⁹⁷⁰

Upon returning to Bolivia, Arze Quintanilla set to work. Project 208 pursued two primary objectives. The first was the planning and implementation of rural community development programs tailored to the particular cultural practices and socioeconomic structures of the target communities. Arze Quintanilla selected the highland Aymara

⁹⁶⁸ AHIII, Caja 3, Carpeta: Programa de desarrollo de comunidades indígenas en Bolivia y Guatemala, Oscar Arze Quintanilla to Miguel León Portilla, 4/20/1962.

⁹⁶⁹ AHIII, Caja 3, Carpeta: Proyecto 208 (1), “Adiestramiento del personal técnico requerido para los nuevos centros coordinadores indigenistas” s.d., p. 4.

⁹⁷⁰ Ibid.

community of Charagas in the Department of Oruro to serve as the pilot program.⁹⁷¹ Isolated, impoverished, mono-lingual in Aymara, and lacking essential infrastructure, the region was ideal to test the efficacy of the foreign program on Bolivian soil. To staff the site, he assembled a team of anthropologists, agronomists, linguists, and medical professionals. After carrying out preliminary ethnographic studies and demographic surveys of the community, the team focused their effort on the four most important area of improvement: the economy, health and sanitation, primary education, and communication.




Illustration 24: Diagram detailing the objectives and methods of Proyecto 208.⁹⁷²

⁹⁷¹ AHIII, Caja 44, Carpeta: Programas e informes del Proyecto 208, “Resumen de actividades realizadas en 1964,” s.d., p. 3.

⁹⁷² AHIII, Caja 3, Carpeta Proyecto 208 (2), “Relación de entrega de materiales del Proyecto 208, 1/11/1965, p. 3.

The second object of Proyecto 208 was training. Not only would the III staff train Bolivian personal, but the field site would also be utilized by the program staff to train specialists from other American republics, so that they could bring the practices of rural community development back to their host countries. The intensive training course lasted one year. The first phase, lasting two month, consisted of coursework at UMSA in La Paz. Students from Bolivia, Peru, and Guatemala studied applied anthropology with the Peruvian anthropologist Alberto Cheng Hurtado and INI director Alfonso Caso; rural sociology with Oscar Arze Quintanilla and Arturo Urquidi; and Bolivian folklore and ethnography with Julia Elena Fortún.⁹⁷³ Students spent the second and third phases at the project site. For nine months, they gained hands-on experience while simultaneously promoting rural community development. The team introduced new techniques for growing potatoes, built bathrooms and clinics to improve healthcare, carried out literacy courses, adult education and vocation training courses to demonstrate modern practices in agriculture and livestock. The final month of the course consisted of round tables to discuss the efficacy of the program and how it could be improved, based on the personal experiences of each participant.⁹⁷⁴

In 1965, the III handed over the effort the Ministry of Agriculture, which managed the project well into the next decade. The effort was staffed by the first generation of Bolivian applied anthropologists, trained at different project centers in Mexico, Guatemala, and Bolivia. By the 1970s, *the Servicio de Desarrollo de las*

⁹⁷³ AHIII, Caja 44, Carpeta: Programas e informes del Proyecto 208, Programa Interamericano de Adiestramiento de Personal en Desarrollo de Comunidades, "Nomina de catedráticos del Proyecto 208 del Programa de Cooperacion Tecnica de O.E.A., Sede: Bolivia," Marzo de 1965.

⁹⁷⁴ AHIII, Caja 3, Carpeta: Programa de desarrollo de comunidades indigena en Bolivian y Guatemala, Miguel León Portilla, "Programa de Desarrollo Económico-Cultural de comunidades indígenas en Bolivia y Guatemala (información complementaria)," 1/21/1963.



Illustration 25: Rural community receives instructions on how to improve agricultural practices.⁹⁷⁵



Illustration 26: North American technician teaching Andean farmer about potatoes.⁹⁷⁶

⁹⁷⁵ From: República de Bolivia, Programa Nacional de Desarrollo de Comunidades, *Informe para los años 1965, 1966, 1967* (La Paz: Ministerio de Agricultura, 1967).

⁹⁷⁶ Ibid.

Comunidades Indigenas had expanded to include some twenty sites across the country, employing not only Bolivian personal, but U.S. Peace Corps volunteers, doctoral students from other countries, and a burgeoning array of development-orientate NGOs.

The acceleration of the rural modernization initiative introduced with the Plan Decenal and Proyecto 208 nevertheless sparked increasing concern among state cultural officials. Although they recognized the need for rural modernization, they saw the process as threatening the pure forms of indigenous popular cultural that the government was valorizing as authentic expressions of Bolivian nationhood. It was during the 1960s, when the salvage component of national folklore became especially urgent. Writing in 1961, Julia Elena Fortún underscored broader fears shared among her colleagues in the DAEF. “Es innegable la necesidad de una recolección sistematizada de nuestros temas folklóricos,” she wrote, “ya que a partir de pocos años a esta parte se está notando el abandono de interesantísimas especies en el agro boliviano, debido precisamente a que las nuevas reformas político-sociales están creando en el campesino una nueva mentalidad que les hace abandonar sus añejas costumbres y tradiciones.”⁹⁷⁷

Seeking to salvage Bolivia’s authentic indigenous heritage before it was swept away by the renewed rural modernization initiative, Fortún set out to strengthen both the legal and institutional capacity of the state to protect rural popular culture. In addition to expanding the protection of archeological ruins, the 1961 Cultural Patrimony Law (see previous chapter) established the *Dirección Nacional de Antropología* (DNA), an autonomous office within the *Dirección Nacional de Cultura* that was exclusively dedicated to the collection, classification, and cataloging of national folklore. It also

⁹⁷⁷ Julia Elena Fortún, *La danza de los diablos* (La Paz: Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes, 1961).




Illustration 27: Transcription of rural music carried out by DNA staff during Todos Santos in Tiwanaku, November 1964.⁹⁷⁸



Illustration 28: DNA official recording rural music in the field. Todos Santos in Tiwanaku, November 1964.⁹⁷⁹

⁹⁷⁸ UNAN, TR 453, "Informe de la fiesta de Todos Santos realizado en Tiwanaku, Los días 2 y 3 de Noviembre de 1964," p. 5.

⁹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

stipulated the creation of an archive within the Ministry of Education to “centralizer los fichero antropológicos de todas las investigaciones realizada y por realizarse.”⁹⁸⁰ Previously Fortún only received a small portion of the budget earmarked for the DAEF—most of the funds went to CIAT and the Tiwanaku restoration project. With the creation of the DNA, Fortún obtained increased funding and government authority to conserve the national canon of indigenous traditions, myths, and popular cultural deemed integral to the national essence yet in danger of being destroyed by the homogenizing forces of rural modernization.

Throughout the decade, Fortún continued in her effort to extend cultural patrimony laws to protect indigenous music and dance. It was not until 1968 that she succeeded, however. Supreme Decree Number 8396 of July 1968 declared that “la música folklórica o sea aquella que tiene las características de tradicionalidad, anonimato y popularidad, así como la music producida en grupos campesinos y ‘folk’ en general” that collected by the DNA became intellectual property of the government.⁹⁸¹ In subsequent years, the DNA ethnographic staff made numerous trips to the highlands and valleys to study rural indigenous communities. They observed the festivals and ceremonies, carefully noting every step of the choreographed dances, and drawing the fine details of the elaborate costumes worn by the dancers. Technicians recorded the music of each and every community they visited, transcribing the songs, note for note. All of this data was then scientifically classified, cataloged, and filed away in an archive in the Ministry of Education, so that when rural modernizing wiped out the last vestiges

⁹⁸⁰ See article 15, section (e) of Decreto Supremo No. 05918, Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia.

⁹⁸¹ Decreto Supremo No. 8396 del 19 de Julio de 1969, Gaceta Oficial de Bolivia.

FICHA COREOGRAFICA (2)

No. de toma

Lugar Compi Compi Manco Kapac La Paz
 (Paraje) (Cantón) (Provincia) (Departamento)

Especie Danza

Categoría "Chunchus"

Intérpretes 10 Mujeres, 12 Hombres, 1 Guía, 1 pareja de padrinos, 6 Musicos.

Esquema de baile	Descripción
<p>1a Fig.-</p>	<p>1a. Fig.- ENTRADA: Ingresan en dos filas indias, hombres a la derecha y mujeres a la izquierda, dirigidos por el Guía y seguidos por los padrinos a cuyo detrás se encuentran los músicos. El paso lo realizan dando un medio d círculo hacia la derecha y otro hacia la izquierda, conforme a la orden del Guía que lo realiza por medio de un piñazo. El paso lo ejecutan en dos tiempos bien marcados y otro en semi-flexión conforme a la música. Para el baile y se ponen frente a frente realizando sus giros en los mismos sitios anteriores, para luego entrar en círculos concéntricos.</p>
<p>2a Fig.-</p>	<p>2a. Fig.- CIRCULOS: Los hombres se sitúan en el círculo pequeño interior, rodeados por el círculo de las mujeres. Estos avanzan en línea recta hacia el centro donde están ubicados los padrinos bailando agarrados de las manos. El Guía se coloca a un costado del centro. Las mujeres giran en sus lugares en pequeños círculos, tanto a la izquierda como a la derecha</p>

Recogida por la Sra. Graciela Urquidí de Azcaranza.

Illustration 29: DNA ficha illustrating the choreography of a rural dance called the "Chunchus" from the Aymara community of Compi (Province of Manco Capac, Department of La Paz).⁹⁸²

⁹⁸² UNAN, Fichas, No. 6.

No.
 Nombre..... CHIRIGUANOS
 Lugar..... Toloma..... Umala..... Aroma..... La Paz.....
 (Paraje) (Cantón) (Provincia) (Departamento)
 Categoría..... Traje extraordinario de Danza.....
 Ocasiones en que se usa..... Para la citada danza para la fiesta del Rosario y 2º de II
 Fichas de referencia..... Musical, Coreográfica y Organográfica
 Descripción del traje y materiales de confección:

(Esquema y fotografía)



A) CAPITANES.-En la cabeza un tocado formado por una copa de plata, calada, llamada "Lluc-k'a", formando las alas del sombrero dos hileras de plumas de loro ("Chojña"). Una chacuña suelta de plata labrada. Encima del pantalón común, la "Gabana" o "Juna" de merino negro, que llega hasta media pantorrilla formando una especie de jubón o abrigo. Lleva esta prenda dos ribeges blancos y adornos de tela blanca en zig-zag. En la parte superior del cuerpo un pochillo corto llamado "K'awa", finamente tejido en lana de llama, de colores oscuros con pocas listas de color. Sobre esta prenda se ponen el "lama", que consisten en dos grandes fajas, de dos metros con 20 cms. por 40.cms. de ancho que, se colocan sobre los hombros y cruzan en la cintura adelante y atrás. Estos lamas están borados en hilos amarillos y de oro, denotan ser muy antiguos, con las casullas sacerdotales es el borado.

Recogida por Julia Elena Fortún

Illustration 30: DNA ficha depicting the costumes worn by dancers in the community of Toloma (Province of Aroma, Department of La Paz).⁹⁸³

⁹⁸³ Ibid.

of tradition Andean culture, the cultural vestiges of the once great Aymara and Quechua civilization, would be preserved as Bolivia's national heritage.

CONCLUSION

As the Revolution entered its tenth year, Bolivia's divergent anthropological traditions seemed to be working in perfect symbiosis. Rural sociologists affiliated with MAC and CBF had been working for the past decade alongside foreign applied anthropologists to transform indigenous Bolivians into the archetype *campesino* imagined by the postrevolutionary leadership. With the introduction of the Plan Decenal in 1962, the Paz administration expanded the applied anthropology initiative with Proyecto 208. Working alongside professional anthropologists from Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, and the United States, Bolivia's first generation of applied anthropologists incorporated ethnographic fieldwork with more traditional statistical methods to study the obstacles to rural modernization and develop specifically tailored social programs oriented toward the social, cultural, and political structure of the rural communities in which they were working. Drawing from knowledge derived from Mexico and the United States, they developed regional integration programs designed to assimilate indigenous Bolivians into the social and economic fabric of modern society.

At the same time, Julia Elena Fortún expanded the institutional capacity and legal framework of the state folklore initiative to ensure the conservation of the "pure" and "authentic" forms of indigenous music, dance, and art that were rapidly being swept away by the rural modernization initiative. With the establishment of the *Dirección Nacional de Antropología* (DNA) in 1961, the government expanded the state folklore initiative to attend to the urgent needs of ethnographic salvage. In subsequent years,

Fortún obtained increased funding and authority to conserve the indigenous popular cultures deemed integral to the national essence yet in danger of being destroyed by the homogenizing forces of rural modernization. Fortún also succeeded in expanding the definition of the national cultural patrimony to protect music and dance alongside ruins, archeological lands, and indigenous popular arts. The fruits of these efforts, though long forgotten, continue occupy the storeroom of the Museo de Etnografía y Folklore (MUSEF) in La Paz, where thousands of fiches, audio recordings, and documents reveal the extent of the postrevolutionary folklore initiative.

While bridging the contradictory impulses of modernity, postrevolutionary anthropology efforts also contributed to broader processes of racial formation already underway in Bolivia. Orientated toward forging the modern campesino imagined by the postrevolutionary leadership, applied anthropology disparaged rural socioeconomic organization, political structure, agricultural practices, and cultural traditions as backward and traditional—as inconsistent with the modernizing orientation of the Revolution. Articulated within the language of science, applied anthropology reaffirmed prevailing notions of indigenous backwardness. At the same time, folklorization contributed to racial formation by creating temporal and spatial distinctions between the modern nation and traditional Indians. It established direct associations with indigenous music and dance and “markers” of pre-modern rural culture.

On the morning of 3 November 1964, rebellious military forces under the command of Vice President René Barrientos Ortuño seized control of Cochabamba. Barrientos, the politically ambitious former head of the Bolivian Air Force, perceived the almost rising discontent with President Paz as his opportunity to seize power, and with the backing of the military and limited popular support, he took it. As the rebellion

spread to Santa Cruz and Potosí, Barrientos cabled the besieged President urging his resignation if he desired to avoid “rivers of blood” flowing through Bolivia.⁹⁸⁴ The following afternoon, as rebellious military forces battled Paz loyalists in central La Paz, Paz boarded an airplane bound for Lima where he would apply for political asylum. Violently ushering out over twelve years of civilian rule under the aegis of the MNR, Barrientos’ “*Revolución dentro de la Revolución*” marked the onset of the military phase of the national revolution.⁹⁸⁵

Despite the changes in the national political leadership, the social scientists leading the cultural offices of the postrevolutionary state nevertheless retained their leadership positions. They would continue in their efforts to centralize the state cultural bureaucracy, eventually establishing the *Instituto de Cultura Boliviana* in 1975. As they deepened their connections in rural society and increasingly turned to University education Aymara and Quechua comunarios for access, they would eventually come to embrace a new vision of national culture that recognized ethnic identity, establishing the multicultural concept that would not prevail until the following decades, before crystalizing into state policy in 1994, as the government revised the constitution to recognize ethnic difference and to extend legal protections to ensure the protection of the many ethnicities that constitute the national population.

⁹⁸⁴ Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library (LBJL), National Security File, Country Files, Bolivia Cables, Vol. 2 (7/64-11/64), 1 of 2, Cable, Henderson to State, 3 November 1964, #473.

⁹⁸⁵ René Barrientos Ortuño, *La verdad contra el engaño* (La Paz, 1965) p. 15.

Conclusion

Nos sentimos económicamente explotados y cultural y políticamente oprimidos. En Bolivia no ha habido una integración de culturas sino una superposición y dominación habiendo permanecido nosotros, en el estrato mas bajo y explotado de esa pirámide.
-Manifiesto de Tiwanaku (1973)

Lucho para que mi hija no sea nunca tu empleada.
-Felipe Quispe, radical Aymara leader of the CSUTCB

As dawn broke over Tiwanaku on September 21, 1973, founding members of the fledging Katarista movement snuck past the *guardaruinas* posted at CIAT headquarters. They were Aymara and Quechua university students, rural school teachers, and intellectuals affiliated with an array of grassroots cultural organizations including the Centro de Coordinación y Promoción Campesina Mink'a, the Centro Campesino Túpac Katari, the Asociación de Estudiantes Campesinos de Bolivia, and the Asociación Nacional de Profesores Campesinos. Two decades earlier, in the immediate aftermath of the 1952 Revolution, the Ministry of Peasant Affairs had capitalized on the symbolic currency of the spring equinox—a ceremonial day in the Aymara agricultural calendar—to promote the Tiwanaku ruins as a unifying symbol of the postrevolutionary republic.⁹⁸⁶ Now, this ascendant generation of rural activists hurried toward the Kalasasaya acropolis to reclaim the reconstructed ruins for themselves—as an icon of an alternative nationalism, one which valorized Bolivia's indigenous present. Tiwanaku would stand alongside the Aymara rebels Túpac Katari and Bartalina Sisa as representative of the traditions, cultures, and histories that, the activists asserted, had been disparaged by the

⁹⁸⁶ Robert Choque Canqui, "El Manifiesto de Tiwanaku (1973) y el inicio de la descolonización," *Fuentes: revista de la biblioteca y archivo histórica de la asamblea legislativa plurinacional*, Año 9, Vol. 4, No. 11 (diciembre de 2010), pp. 11-15.

cultural politics, rural education practices, and developmental strategies of the postrevolutionary state.

Forming a circle around the iconic *Puerta del Sol*, the activists took turns reading aloud from the Manifiesto de Tiwanaku, a radical document they had drafted earlier that winter which would come to symbolize a renewed struggle for territorial rights, cultural recognition, and ethnic plurality. Historian Roberto Choque, who participated in the event as an Aymara university student, reflected on the origins of the movement. “El impacto del proceso política y social de la revolución de 1952 impactó en la intelectualidad indígena,” he recalls, “de la generación de la década 70 del siglo pasado, a preguntarse sobre el porqué de las cosas.”⁹⁸⁷ Despite the sweeping changes introduced by the postrevolutionary government—universal citizenship, legal equality, rural education, and agrarian reform—the Manifiesto demonstrates that many indigenous Bolivians continued to feel excluded from the nation. They expressed “terribles frustraciones” in “la falta de participación real de los campesinos quechuas y aymaras en la vida económica, política y social del país.” They warned “sin un cambio radical en este aspecto será totalmente imposible crear la unidad nacional y un desarrollo económico dinámico, armónico, propio y adecuado a nuestra realidad y necesidades.” With this humble ceremony, they announced their “política liberadora campesina” to the public.⁹⁸⁸

“Somos extranjeros en nuestro propio país,” they announced, denouncing the national culture model promoted by the postrevolutionary state. “No se han respetado

⁹⁸⁷ Robert Choque Canqui, “El Manifiesto de Tiwanaku (1973) y el inicio de la descolonización,” *Fuentes: revista de la biblioteca y archivo histórica de la asamblea legislativa plurinacional*, Año 9, Vol. 4, No. 11 (diciembre de 2010), pp. 11-15.

⁹⁸⁸ Centro de Coordinación y Promoción Campesina Mink’a, Centro Campesino Tupac Katari, Asociación de Estudiantes Campesinos de Bolivia, and Asociación Nacional de Profesores Campesinos, “Manifiesto de Tiwanaku,” La Paz, 30 de julio de 1973 (La Paz: Viceministerio de Descolonización, 2009), p. 1.

nuestra virtudes ni nuestra visión propio del mundo y de la vida,” they explained.⁹⁸⁹ They similarly condemned the rural education initiative, stating that “La escuela rural por sus métodos, por sus programas y por su lengua es ajena a nuestra realidad cultural y no solo busca convertir al indio en un especie de mestizo sin definición ni personalidad, sino que consigue igualmente su asimilación a la cultura occidental y capitalista.”⁹⁹⁰ Finally, they singled out the rural development strategies of the postrevolutionary state as imposing foreign development models that were out of touch with the communitarian values of rural Andean civilization. Although they too recognized the need to “tecnificar y modernizar” agrarian production, they insisted that such efforts be designed in accordance with existing cultural values. “No queremos perder nuestras nobles virtudes ancestrales en aras de un pseudo-desarrollo,” read the document.⁹⁹¹

The Manifiesto de Tiwanaku marked a new era in the political history of modern Bolivia in which ethnicity assumed a position alongside class as legitimate arena for sociopolitical struggle. If the opening anecdote of the “DDT Revolution” illustrates the contradictory logic underlying the integration policies of the postrevolutionary state, then the Manifiesto provides the most salient example of how that logic framed the legacy of the Revolution. The authors of the Manifiesto were predominantly Aymara and Quechua university students—“*los hijos de la revolución*,” per Javier Hurtado—who experienced first-hand the assimilationist practices of the postrevolutionary rural modernization initiative.⁹⁹² At the same time, however, that very project that continued to exclude them had provided them with the very tools needed to contest the postrevolutionary state.

⁹⁸⁹ Manifiesto de Tiwanaku, p. 1.

⁹⁹⁰ Manifiesto de Tiwanaku, p. 5.

⁹⁹¹ Manifiesto de Tiwanaku, p. 1.

⁹⁹² Hurtado, *El Katirismo*.



Illustration 31: Túpac Katari poster from INDICEP publication that is illustrative of the ethnic-based political mobilization promoted by the Katarista movement. The text accompanying the portrait reads: “Túpac Katari, el Aymara rebelde, que tenía sed de dignidad, luchó hasta la muerte para liberar su alma, su territorio invadido y devolver a su pueblo el orgullo de ser Indio.”

SUMMARY

The Bolivian National Revolution represented the culmination of two distinct historical struggles. The first was rooted in the grassroots struggles for land, equality, and justice among rural Aymara and Quechua communities. During the second half of the nineteenth century, *comunarios* confronted increasingly aggressive liberal land privatization laws by appointing local apoderados. Merging colonial and republican discourses of legal rights, apoderados contested liberal land divestiture and hacienda encroachment within the judicial institutions of the republican state. Following the Liberal Revolution of the 1898 and the repression of the apoderados, rural activists forged new national networks of caciques apoderados to stop the wave of highland hacienda expansion that accelerated during the first decades of the twentieth century. Though the Chaco War marked a setback for rural mobilization, the veterans who returned to their communities redoubled their efforts, deepening existing connections with urban labor activists, forging new networks of activists (such as the Alcaldes Mayores Particulares), and introducing grassroots education efforts. The 1945 Indigenous congress, which resulted, in part, from the renewed rural mobilization, provided indigenous Bolivians with new legal rights from which they increasingly drew upon to contest the seigniorial order. By 1952, as Laura Gotkowitz argues, there was already a revolution underway in the countryside that, to small extent, contoured the politics of the Revolution.⁹⁹³

The second historical struggle to culminate in the Revolution was more recent, originating in the crisis of state legitimacy that resulted from the Chaco War and was primarily articulated in terms of class. Following Bolivia's crushing defeat to Paraguay,

⁹⁹³ Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights*.

military officers, urban professionals, industrial workers, and tin miners increasingly saw the social and economic policies of the government as inconsistent not only with the national interest, but also with the popular aspirations of the Bolivian people. Those who had served in the Chaco—many appalled at the racialized hierarchy of the military and the disproportionate number of Indian casualties—returned with a more inclusive sense of nationhood, in addition to bitter resentment of the national political leadership. Widening frustration with the government was manifest in a push for progressive reform among an ascendant generation of middle-class professionals, journalists, university students, labor leaders, and lower-ranking military officers. National politics during the period 1936-1952 was subsequently characterized by progressive reform on the one hand, with the governments of Toro, Busch, and Villarroel, and conservative retrenchment on the other, as Peñaranda, Hertzog, and Urriolagoitía confronted the growing power of organized labor (manifest in the CTSB and the FSTMB). It was also during this period when factions of the radical and moderate left established the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR), the Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (PIR), and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR).

Their generation—the “*Generación del Chaco*”—located the national problem neither in biology nor in geography, but in the socioeconomic structures established by the tin and landed oligarchy. They argued that since ascending to power with the Liberal Revolution of 1898, the “superestado mineral” had not only monopolized the mechanisms of the state, but had also gained control of seventy percent of Bolivia’s foreign exchange and over ninety percent of its arable lands. The POR, PIR, and MNR all agreed on the necessity of revolution; believed that Bolivia’s natural resources should benefit all citizens instead of a handful of robber barons; and actively recruited

indigenous Bolivians (in varying degrees) into their political organizations. Though they were aligned in their opposition to the oligarchy, they nevertheless expressed conflicting views of what “revolution” would mean. Both the Trotskyite POR and the Leninist PIR advocated a dictatorship of the proletariat, workers control of the mines and urban industry, and the nationalization of Bolivia’s natural resources and essential infrastructure. The MNR, the most moderate of the three, eschewed Marxist dogma as a foreign ideology inadequate to address the complexity of Bolivia’s national problems. Drawing from prevailing currents of nationalism, socialism, fascism, and liberalism, they sought to wrest control of the state from the oligarchy to establish a social democracy.⁹⁹⁴ They imagined the state serving as an instrument of capital accumulation that would finance domestic development, ensure the well-being of the population, and establish a national culture to unify the fragmented postcolonial nation.

In the immediate aftermath of the April insurrection, these various political forces vied for control of the state. Citing its victory in the annulled 1951 elections as its claim to constitutional legitimacy, the MNR emerged as the dominant faction within the government. With the establishment of the *Central Obrero Boliviano* (COB), however, the radical left established itself as a powerful bloc within the postrevolutionary leadership. During the initial phase of postrevolutionary unity that marked Víctor Paz Estenssoro’s first term as President, the government employed the popular statecraft strategy to consolidate its rule in urban spaces and to extend state authority into the countryside, where hacienda colonos in rural La Paz and Cochabamba had begun to rise

⁹⁹⁴ For an thorough analysis of the MNR theory of national revolution, see Fernando Mayorga, *El discurso del nacionalismo revolucionario* (Cochabamba, 1985). In terms of MNR documents, see the following: José Cuadros Quiroga, *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario: Sus bases y principios de acción inmediata* (La Paz, 1942); Walter Guevara Arze, *Manifiesto a los campesinos de Ayopaya* (La Paz: SPIC, 1953); Carlos Montenegro, *Nacionalismo y Coloniaje* (La Paz: Juventud, 2003[1943]).

up extralegally against the seigniorial order. By tying civil society into the centralized and hierarchal structures of corporate organizations affiliated with the state—primarily the MNR and the COB, but also including veterans organization, mutual aid societies, and agrarian cooperatives—the postrevolutionary leadership attempted to gain a modicum of control over “lo abigarramiento.”⁹⁹⁵ The government also monopolized mass media—radio, film, print media—to mobilize both state and society behind a unified revolutionary project.

Within the new “national-popular” coalition that characterized the “Estado de 1952,” the moderate MNR leadership embraced a more radical position on several key issues. The most salient of these was the nationalization of the tin mines. Though scholarship (and the MNR propaganda machine) tends to cast the nationalization as one of the original—and indeed defining—reforms embraced by the party leadership, the MNR did not official embrace the measure until March 1951.⁹⁹⁶ On October 31, 1952, it nationalized the big three tin mines, entrusting the management of the nation’s mineral wealth in the new state mining corporation, the Corporación Mineral de Bolivia (COMBOL).⁹⁹⁷ In July of that year, the postrevolutionary government extended political citizenship to indigenous Bolivians (and women) with universal adult suffrage, and issued a general amnesty to all participants in the 1947 cycle of rebellion. On August 2,

⁹⁹⁵ For Zavaleta’s thinking on 1952 in the long history of Bolivian state formation, see: *50 años de historia* (La Paz: Amigos del Libro, 1998), pp. 67-90; See also René Zavaleta Mercado, *Lo nacional-popular en Bolivia* (La Paz: Plural, 2008 [1986]), pp. 9-18. See also Luis Tapia’s discussion of some of Zavaleta most important theoretical contributions in “La producción teórica para pensar América Latina,” René Zavaleta Mercado: ensayos, testimonios y re-visiones, Maya Aguiluz Ibargüen and Norma de los Ríos, eds. (México, D.F.: FLACSO-México, 2006), pp. 213-234.

⁹⁹⁶ “Bolivia contra el superestado,” *En Marcha*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (31 de marzo de 1951), p. 6.

⁹⁹⁷ For a detailed discussion of the nationalization of the mines and the various economic reforms that preceded it, see: Republica de Bolivia, Subsecretaria de Prensa, Informaciones y Cultura, *El libro blanco de la independencia económica de Bolivia* (La Paz: 1952).

1953, the government proclaimed land reform, freeing land and labor from the unproductive seigniorial order, and providing indigenous peasants titles to the lands they worked.

It was also during these initial years of postrevolutionary unity that Walter Guevara Arze established the basic framework for the most ambitious state-directed national development initiative in Bolivian history.⁹⁹⁸ The overarching goal of postrevolutionary development was to establish a sovereign national economy. Reliant upon tin for 97 percent of its foreign exchange, Bolivia's economy was grievously prone to vicissitudes of the global market. Economic sovereignty thus meant shielding the domestic economy from external shocks by promoting alternative export commodities such as petroleum and commercial agriculture. Economic sovereignty also implied self-sufficiency. Imports—thirty five percent of which were domestically produced food commodities such as rice, sugar, and flour—represented a constant drain on the balance of payments.⁹⁹⁹ By aligning population and resources under rational state planning strategy, Guevara envisioned transforming Bolivia from a semicolonial, segregated republic into a modern, integrated nation-state. With both land and labor now freed from the unproductive estates, postrevolutionary officials fixated on commercial agriculture as Bolivia's economic salvation. As such, indigenous Bolivians were thrust to the center of the postrevolutionary imagination—it was their labor that would boost domestic production, while their integration into the monetary economy would create new economic opportunities for the aspiring bourgeoisie.

⁹⁹⁸ ABNB, PR, 1953, Correspondencia, Plan diversificación (1784/774), Walter Guevara Arze, "Plan de diversificación de la producción," 8/1953, p. 5.

⁹⁹⁹ Walter Guevara Arze, *Plan inmediato de política económica del gobierno de la Revolución Nacional* (La Paz: Imprenta Editorial "Letras," 1955),

The postrevolutionary government turned to the nation's social scientists to transform their development imagination into tangible policy, and in so doing, helped not only establish, but institutionalize the modern social scientific disciplines in Bolivia. Sociology, economics, anthropology, and other academic disciplines related to the study of society offered a rational, ordered, and indeed scientific approach to applied socioeconomic change. They provided the information necessary to identify national problems, the data needed to measure their severity, and the knowledge required to effectively mitigate them. Sociologists José Antonio Arze, Arturo Urquidi, and Ernesto Ayala Mercado played a major role in the formulation of both the agrarian reform and rural education initiatives. Rodolfo Cornejo, Asthenio Averanga Mollinedo, Eduardo Arze Loureiro, and Oscar Arze Quintanilla worked with foreign applied anthropologists to carry out the social scientific studies necessary for lowland colonization and agrarian reform. Increasing government interest in applying social scientific knowledge to the problems of rural modernization, indigenous social uplift, and development planning resulted in the professionalization of sociology and applied anthropology within state institutions.

Social scientific knowledge also proved essential to another objective of the postrevolutionary leadership: forging an “authentic” national culture to unify the fragmented nation. The revision of national history served as a key instrument to refashion the Bolivian “*pueblo*” and for the MNR to establish its political legitimacy. José Cuadros Quiroga, Carlos Montenegro, and Augusto Céspedes wrote Indians into the nation by recasting national history as a multiethnic struggle against foreign economic exploitation. Following the Revolution, the state not only commemorated this narrative with martyrs, murals, and national holidays, but it also established the Comisión de

Historia Nacional to ensure that the revision of national history proceeded in a scientific and objective manner. Carlos Ponce Sanginés led a generation of nationalist archeologists in the excavation and reconstruction of Tiwanaku, identifying in the ruins the primordial origins of Bolivian nationhood. The government subsequently established the Centro de Investigaciones Arqueológicas en Tiwanaku (CIAT) to ensure not only the protection of the ruins, but that the excavation and reconstruction efforts were carried out in accordance with modern scientific practices. Julia Elena Fortún, Max Portugal, and other officials affiliated with the Departamento de Folklore—and later, the Dirección Nacional de Antropología—carried out countless ethnographic studies of rural communities, while expanding the definition of cultural patrimony to include indigenous art, music, and dance. If social science provided postrevolutionary officials with objective truths upon which national culture was constructed, the professionalization of these disciplines under the aegis of the state would ensure that they were carried out in accordance with international standards of objectivity and value-free knowledge.

By the time that the civilian leadership of the postrevolutionary state was ousted by the military in November 1964, they had succeeded in constructing a unifying national culture that reflected the popular aspirations of the Bolivian people while celebrating the Andean and Hispanic heritage of the newly-integrated republic. The postrevolutionary leadership had revised national history, reconstructed the Tiwanaku ruins, revealed the glorious primordial roots of the nation, refurbished the National Museum, and expanded cultural patrimony laws to protect archeological ruins and indigenous popular arts. If the first half of the twentieth century was characterized by the secularization of knowledge—as science replaced religion as the only source of legitimate authority—then the Revolution was marked by the institutionalization of the social sciences as the officials

expanded the state bureaucracy to channel social scientific knowledge to the challenges posed by national development.

FINDINGS AND SIGNIFICANCE

The primary objective of this study had been to examine the contradictory logic underlying postrevolutionary integration in light of the contested legacy that the Revolution has cast for indigenous Bolivians. In an effort to investigate the rearticulation of social hierarchies after 1952, I set out to explore the cultural initiatives, development strategies, and politics of knowledge of the politicians, intellectuals, artists, activists, social scientists, and technocrats affiliated with the state during the period spanning the April 1952 insurrection that triggered the Revolution and the November 1964 coup that ousted the civilian leadership of the postrevolutionary government.

The Revolution proved a double-edged sword for indigenous Bolivians. On one hand, the postrevolutionary leadership extended political citizenship to Indians, uprooted the seigniorial order, and provided education, public health, agricultural credit, and other state services that were previously denied to them. It also valorized long-disparaged expressions of indigenous history and popular culture, placing archeological ruins, rural music and dance, and other symbolic components of “Indianness” at the center of national culture. On the other hand, the Revolution created new forms of ethnic exclusion that nevertheless undermined indigenous equality. In their pursuit of national modernization, the postrevolutionary government disparaged the “traditional” customs embraced by indigenous Bolivians, while actively encouraging their assimilation into “modern” society. This study reveals this contradictory process through three principal arguments.

The first argument is that indigenous integration was a modernization imperative. The postrevolutionary leadership set out to “modernize” Bolivia according to a normative model of socioeconomic development predicated on the exceptional model of the North Atlantic West. For the MNR leadership, modernization meant, first and foremost, establishing a sovereign and self-sufficient national economy under the responsible management of the state. It meant a society in which all individuals—regardless of race or gender—were guaranteed political participation. It also signified the creation of a welfare state, in which the government ensured the wellbeing of the population through public health and sanitation programs, expanded education, and social security initiatives. The primary focus of the state’s social welfare initiatives was rural society. Through rural education, adult literacy programs, agricultural extension services, public health initiatives and sanitation campaigns, the postrevolutionary government set out to “improve” indigenous Bolivians and enable them to participate in the economic and social fabric of the modern republic. Integration was not instantaneous. Rather it was managed by the state, and predicated upon the embrace of such “modern” ideals as Spanish literacy, contemporary agricultural practices, and urban standards of hygiene and sanitation, as well as their participation in officially sanctioned socioeconomic organizations such as rural unions and rural agricultural cooperatives.

To be sure, indigenous integration was a gradual process, resulting from a series of measures that included universal suffrage, political amnesty, agrarian reform, and rural education. Universal suffrage—which, by extending political citizenship to indigenous Bolivians for the first time, seems the most drastic measure towards indigenous integration—was rooted in the MNR leadership’s commitment to social justice and participant democracy. Hoping to disavow its fascist past in an era marked by liberal-

democratic triumphalism, the party embraced the cause of social justice, identifying the popular struggles of indigenous peasants as one with their own (a discourse that is perhaps most saliently exemplified in the July 22, 1953 amnesty decree). Whereas universal suffrage was motivated by social justice and democracy, agrarian reform and rural education—the two most significant measures attending to the social and economic integration of indigenous Bolivians—were motivated by the exigencies of national development and orientated toward rural modernization.

The primary factor motivating postrevolutionary indigenous integration in general and agrarian reform in particular was domestic economic growth. If the mining super state had impaired Bolivia's integration into the global capitalist economy, the haciendas constrained the potential for domestic economic growth by locking both land and labor in an unproductive seigniorial order that not only kept Indians apart from the cash economy, but stunted their cultural evolution. Only when Indians were unconstrained producers and consumers in a modern market-based society, the MNR leadership argued, would the republic be able to develop its full economic potential. As the postrevolutionary government fixated on commercial agriculture as Bolivia's economic salvation, it identified indigenous Bolivians as the motor of national development. It was upon their active participation in national society as independent producers and consumers that the success of the modernization initiative rested. And until they embraced the prerequisites for modern citizenship, they would remain apart from the nation.

The second argument advanced by this study is that the Revolution marked a paradigm shift in prevailing constructions of race in Bolivia. Postrevolutionary development was predicated on new conceptions of race which emphasized the improbability of Indians. The structural interpretations that prevailed among the post-

Chaco generation of reformers lifted the burden of biology from the Indian problem by locating the source of indigenous backwardness not in biology, nor in geography, but in the socioeconomic structures of the capitalist economy in general, and the feudal modes of production that characterized the seigniorial order in particular. In the 1940s, structuralism merged with cultural relativism—which was arriving by way of Mexico, Peru, and the United States—in the thinking of reformist intellectuals. Instead of racial type rooted in biology, Indians were understood as belonging to distinct cultural formations, each the result of specific local-historical circumstances. Nevertheless, the cultural practices embraced by Andean civilization—from language to work habits—were largely understood as pre-modern, backwards, and inconsistent with the modernized republic imagined by the postrevolutionary leadership. Such ideas provided the foundation for the notion of indigenous improvability deemed central to the successful implementation of the national development strategy.

In the historiography of modern Latin America, our understanding of the role and reception of racial thought has been largely limited to eugenics and public health. Only recently has scholarship begun to examine the “cultural turn” in racial thought that occurred across the region during the middle of the twentieth century.¹⁰⁰⁰ This dissertation contributes to this literature by demonstrating how “progressive” and seemingly-benign (and even beneficial) modernization initiatives such as rural education and national cultural formation operated to sustain social hierarchies rooted in perceived racial difference. True, cultural relativism displaced racial hierarchies founded on

¹⁰⁰⁰ See for example, see Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. Macpherson, and Karin Alejandra Roseblatt, editors, *Race and Nation in Modern Latin America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Marisol de la Cadena, *Indigenous Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919-1991* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); Zolia S. Mendoza, *Creating our Own: Folklore, Performance, and Identity in Cusco, Peru* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Richard Graham, ed., *The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870-1940* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990)..

biology and organized according to “type.” At the same time, however, it reaffirmed indigenous inferiority by locating Andean civilization on a lower stage of human cultural evolution. Even while dismissing as “backwards” and “atavistic” biological understandings of racial difference, postrevolutionary officials located indigenous Bolivians on a lower rung of cultural evolution.

Finally, this study posits that that it was the cultural politics of Revolution that ultimately determined the limits of ethnic inclusion. Seeking to unify Bolivia’s diverse population around a shared national identity, the government declared Bolivia a race-less society and, through a burgeoning array of state cultural institutions, promoted a “revolutionary esthetic” that celebrated the mixed Andean and European heritage of the republic. Despite the inclusive veneer of this populist esthetic, the cultural politics of postrevolutionary Bolivia emphasized homogeneity while simultaneously reaffirming social hierarchies founded on race.

The Revolution is commonly cast as setting into motion a homogenizing national project, wherein the government valorized mestizaje as an idiom of national unity while expunging the traditions, customs, and culture embraced by most Bolivians. Discarding the pejorative “indio” in official state discourse, the postrevolutionary leadership instead assigned indigenous Bolivians the identity “campesino,” which privileged their class identity and signaled the central role accorded to them in national development. Early critiques of the Revolution leveled by Fausto Reinaga and Herbert Klein criticized the revolution for embracing mestizaje—or “cholaje” as they explicitly refer to the process according to local language of racial hybridity.¹⁰⁰¹ Others have since focused on the

¹⁰⁰¹ Fausto Reinaga, *El indio y el cholaje Boliviano* (La Paz: Ediciones Piakk, 1964); Fausto Reinaga, *La “intelligentsia” del cholaje boliviano* (La Paz: Ediciones PIB (Partido Indio de Bolivia), 1967); Fausto Reinaga, *La Revolución India*, (La Paz: Ediciones Partido Indio de Bolivia, 1969); Herbert S. Klein,

discourse of “campesino,” arguing that the term subsumed ethnic diversity to a solitary class identity.¹⁰⁰² “El paso del ‘indio’ a ‘campesino’ en el vocabulario oficial se estuvo haciendo después del Chaco y quedó también consolidado por el MNR dentro de su terminología,” writes Xavier Albó and Josep Barnadas. “Insistían en convertir al campesino en pleno miembro del país a través de insertarlo plenamente como productor y como consumidor.” More recently, Waskar Ari has labeled the postrevolutionary policies “de-indianization” upon studying the rural union structure that the postrevolutionary government attempted to impose on rural society as part of the popular statecraft strategy.¹⁰⁰³

Indeed, valorizing the mestizo and/or cholo—racialized identities which had long been disparaged in the political, social, and scientific literature of Bolivia—was a central aim of the postrevolutionary leadership’s effort to forge a common history and shared national heritage to unite the fragmented nation. But was the Revolution a mestizo-based project as is commonly asserted? Is the term *mestizaje* appropriate for Bolivia? Were Bolivians using the term? Scholarship often draws from an erroneous source as evidence for this point, the widely-cited (though fabricated) pronouncement made by President Paz Estenssoro on the occasion of the agrarian reform: “From now on you will no longer be Indians, but rather peasants!”¹⁰⁰⁴ While this was certainly the implicit message

Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multi-ethnic Society, 2nd ed., Latin American Histories (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Herbert S. Klein, *Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 1880-1952* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

¹⁰⁰² Xavier Albó y Josep Barnadas, *La cara india y campesina de nuestra historia*. Unitas/CIPCA, La Paz, 1990. See also: Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos: luchas del campesinado aymara y quechwa de Bolivia, 1900-1980* (La Paz: Hisbol, 1984).

¹⁰⁰³ Waskar T. Ari, “Race and subaltern nationalism: AMP activist-intellectuals in Bolivia, 1921-1964” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University, 2005), pp. 48-76.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Scholarship cites Gerrit Huizer, *The Revolutionary Potential of Peasants in Latin America* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1972) in making this claim. There is not such quote in this work. Víctor Paz Estenssoro gave two speeches on August 2, 1953. One in Urcureña upon signing the decree, the second at the national

embraced by the postrevolutionary leadership, it was never so explicitly articulated. The postrevolutionary politics of culture reveal, moreover, that official discourses of mestizaje were more complex, more contradictory, and more subtle than this quote implies.

This study has examined how the postrevolutionary leadership—as well as the intellectuals, artists, and activists affiliated with state institutions—not only articulated the mestizaje concept publicly, but understood it themselves. Commenting on the process of postrevolutionary indigenous integration, IIB director Félix Eguino Zaballa wrote “no se pretende un indigenismo absorbente [sic], sino el acrecentamiento gradual del mestizaje, que como en todas las latitudes de Américas constituye el equilibrio social y político mas conveniente.”¹⁰⁰⁵ It seems that Eguino shared with other officials a general understanding of mestizaje as a necessary component of national integration—it provided the cultural “middle ground” for a national population long fragmented by race, class, and ethnicity. At the same time, however, mestizaje seems too imprecise given the government’s recognition of the unchanging nature of its demographic reality. It would seem that the biological component implicit within the mestizaje ideal may have precluded its application as an accurate term to describe postrevolutionary integration programs.

To be sure, postrevolutionary officials rarely employed the term mestizaje. They instead employed the bifurcated “indo-mestizo” (or simply “indomestizo”—depending on the author) to describe the national population. The MNR’s founding manifesto from

stadium in Miraflores upon returning to La Paz later that afternoon. On neither occasion did he make such a remark.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Félix Eguino Zaballa, “Una encuesta importante del Instituto de Cultura Hispánica,” *Gaceta Campesina: órgano oficial del Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos*, Año 3, No. 4 (Agosto 1954), pp. 150-56, p. 154.

1942 celebrated the “indomestizo” essence of the nation.¹⁰⁰⁶ A 1950 MNR pamphlet cried “¡Gloria al protomártir indo-mestizo Pedro Domingo Murillo!” After 1952, the term provided the biological and cultural glue that would hold together the nation. Yet, as Laura Gotkowitz points out, the hyphenation of the term undermines the very unity that it portends to signify. Through a burgeoning array of state cultural offices, the postrevolutionary state cultivated two distinct, mutually-reinforcing images of indigenous Bolivians in the national imagination—the *campesino* and the *indio*—that transformed this populist discourse into a contradictory reality.

The first, and ideal, image promoted by the postrevolutionary government was the *campesino*—the idealized modern peasant—fashioned as the agent of Bolivian modernization, who through their production and consumption, would ensure the success of national development. Though this “national type” was rooted in the early economic policy prescriptions of the MNR leadership, it ties back to a longer trope of Bolivian cultural and intellectual history that cast Indians as biologically predisposed to agricultural labor and situated them in their natural Andean environment as agrarian producers.¹⁰⁰⁷ The postrevolutionary government cultivated this image through several interrelated processes. The development strategy designed by Walter Guevara Arze mapped the role of Indians in the postrevolutionary republic as agrarian producers and consumers. The Agrarian Reform Committee reaffirmed this ideal as they drafted a legal framework for land redistribution consistent with the modernizing objective of the national development strategy. As historian Wasker Ari points out, the *campesino* ideal was also promoted by

¹⁰⁰⁶ José Cuadros Quiroga, *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario: Sus bases y principios de acción inmediata* (La Paz, 1942), p. 32.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Brooke Larson, “Redeemed Indians, Barbarized Cholos: Crafting Neocolonial Modernity in Liberal Bolivia, 1900-1910,” *Political Cultures in the Andes, 1750-1950*, eds. Nils Jacobsen and Cristóbal Aljovín de Losada (Duke University Press Books, 2005).

organizing peasants into rural unions and agrarian cooperatives.¹⁰⁰⁸ Indeed, the 1953 agrarian reform decreed specifically identified the “*sindicato campesino*” as the principal instrument through which ex-colonos should enact land claims and defend the rights guaranteed to them by the new law.¹⁰⁰⁹ The *campesino* was also central to the imaginary underlying the pedagogy of rural education—one of the most striking examples of how progressive conceptions of social difference rooted in culture (rather than biology) contributed to novel constructions of race and new forms of ethnic exclusion.¹⁰¹⁰ The objective of rural education was to “improve” Indians in five key areas of Spanish literacy and arithmetic, health, sanitation, home improvement, and agrarian technical training. For indigenous Bolivians, becoming *campesino* necessarily entailed abandoning their cultural heritage for the “modern” values promoted by the governing urban creole-mestizo minority.

The idealized image of the *campesino* was not only cultivated by the development strategies of the state, but it was reinforced by postrevolutionary cultural initiatives. The Tiwanaku reconstruction project provides perhaps the most vivid example. In addition to illustrating the glorious primordial origins of the republic, the ambitious project also

¹⁰⁰⁸ Ari, “Race and subaltern nationalism,” pp. 56-74.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Article 132 of the law states: “Se reconoce la organización sindical campesina, como un medio de defensa de los derechos de sus miembros y de la conservación de las conquistas sociales. Los sindicatos campesinos intervendrán en la ejecución de la Reforma Agraria.” Decreto Ley 03464 quoted in Walter del Castillo Avendaño, ed., *Compilación Legal de la Reforma Agraria en Bolivia*, p.83.

¹⁰¹⁰ For more on rural education in postrevolutionary Bolivia, see: Marta Lanza Meneses, “La cultura nacional en el proyecto hegemónico del Nacionalismo Revolucionario: Análisis del modelo educativo para los indígenas,” (M.A. Thesis, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, La Paz, 1991); Roberto Choque Canqui and Cristina Quisbert Quipe, *Educación Indígena en Bolivia: un siglo de ensayos educativos y resistencias patronales* (La Paz: Ibis, 2006); Roberto Choque, et al., eds. *Educación indígena: ¿Ciudadanía o colonización* (La Paz: Aruwiyiri, 1992); Brooke Larson, “Capturing Indian Hearths, Bodies, and Minds: ‘El hogar campesino’ and Rural School Reform in Bolivia, 1920s-1940s,” *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivian in a Comparative Perspective*, Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo, eds. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 183-209; Aurolyn Luykx, *The Citizen Factory: Schooling and Cultural Production in Bolivia* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), see especially the introduction and chapters one through three.

endeavored to emphasize the improvability of indigenous Bolivian in general and the Aymara in particular. “In Bolivia, archeological research implicitly carries a message of hope,” CIAT director, Carlos Ponce Sanginés wrote in 1961. “If in the past, indigenous people were capable of notable feats, if they could erect buildings and outstanding cities, it is logical that their descendants, the Indians of today, will be able to master modern technology in the future and assist in the transformation of this backward country.”¹⁰¹¹ By revealing the political power, social organization, and technological sophistication of Tiwanaku civilization, archeological research demonstrated the modernizing potential of indigenous Bolivians. Yet it was applied anthropology that provided indigenous Bolivians with the training necessary to assume their modernizing role in the postrevolutionary republic. With the introduction of the *Plan Decenal* in 1962, applied anthropologists joined rural school teachers on the frontlines of rural modernization. It is in the assimilationist objectives underlying the creation of the idealized, modern campesino that the “de-indianization” posited by Ari becomes most salient.¹⁰¹²

The second image of indigenous Bolivians promoted by the postrevolutionary government was that of the *indio*. This image provided the foil against which the modern campesino was defined. The campesino embraced Spanish literacy, while the indio was monolingual in Aymara or Quechua. The campesino joined the rural union, while the indio remained wedded to the ayllu. The campesino represented progress, national development, the future of the republic. The indio was cast as a pre-modern being, resistant to progress, and an impediment to national development. Consider Arturo Urquidí’s comments on the ayllu: “Esos resabios de colectivismo primitivo, que se

¹⁰¹¹ Carlos Ponce Sanginés, *Centro de Investigaciones Arqueológicas en Tiwanaku: Informe de labores* (La Paz: Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes, 1961), p. 11.

¹⁰¹² Ari, “Race and subaltern nationalism,” pp. 56-72.

manifiestan en ciertas costumbres indígenas deben ser vistos con cautela y aprovechados solamente en cuanto pueden servir para ayudar al progreso de la agricultura nacional, pero nunca como antecedentes destinados a consagra y perpetuar una de las formas más atrasada de la propiedad agraria, como la comunidad indígena.” In closing, he warned that “una ‘indiófila’ exagerada e insensata” threatened to hinder “el desarrollo progresivo de la agricultura.”¹⁰¹³ In short, the Indian—and the customs they embraced—were inconsistent with the modernizing goals of the Revolution, representing a pre-modern, traditional past to be romanticized.

While disbelieving the capacity of Indians to serve as “útil” members of the modern republic, officials simultaneously romanticized indigenous culture as an integral component of postrevolutionary national identity. State cultural offices constructed an idealized image of the pre-modern Indian as a symbol of Bolivia’s Andean heritage and an icon of the postrevolutionary republic. Noble, virtuous, hard-working, intrinsically tied to the land—the idealized Indian cultivated by state cultural officials provided the moral foundation of the postrevolutionary republic. Their determination to retain their ancient customs and traditions in the face of centuries of colonial and neocolonial domination could serve as an example of resilience and resistance to be embraced by all Bolivians as they constructed a new, modern republic. To be sure, however, it was this idealized image of the Indian—and not the Indian him/herself—that the state worked to cultivate.

Efforts to construct an idealized Indian corresponded with the postrevolutionary folklore initiative. After 1952, the government moved indigenous music, dance, and art to the center of national folklore as part of a broader effort to establish a more inclusive

¹⁰¹³ ABNB, WGA, Reforma Agraria, Arturo Urquidi to Victor Paz Estenssoro, 6/10/1954, p. 2.

national culture. Rural popular culture provided a unique source of national identity for the postrevolutionary republic, one that evidenced the rich cultural heritage of the nation. Working through the an increasingly centralized state folklore official, Julia Elena Fortún and other official traversed the countryside to document, categorize, and archive indigenous music, dance, and art, as well as the myths, traditions, and customs of rural communities. At the same time, officials worked to broaden the definition of the national cultural patrimony to include indigenous popular culture as authentic representations of postrevolutionary nationhood.

Despite its inclusive veneer, the creation of a national folklore that privileged indigenous popular culture contributed to broader process of racial formation underway in postrevolutionary Bolivia. Cast alongside the vision of the modern campesino projected by the postrevolutionary state, the traditional Indian stood as temporally apart from—yet critical for—the modern nation. Folklorization worked with prevailing cultural constructions of race to create new forms of ethnic exclusion. It reinforced direct associations between cultural markers of “Indianness” (language, dress, rural) and a way of life that was traditional, backward, pre-modern, and ill-prepared for inclusion in the modernizing republic. The process served not to reaffirm indigenous popular culture as vibrant expression of Bolivia’s indigenous population, but to redefine these expressions as cultural relics of the present.

Promoting the mutually reinforcing images of the campesino and the Indian was a contradictory process that entailed the simultaneous disparagement and valorization of the traditions, customs, language, and values embraced by indigenous Bolivians. The postrevolutionary government disparaged those components of rural Andean society perceived as obstacles to modernization—indigenous languages, the ayllu, communal

agricultural practices, and traditional medicine, for example. Through rural education, applied anthropology, and other initiatives in directed social change, the state set out to correct such perceived deficiencies and transform indigenous Bolivians into a modern agrarian workforce, integrated into the socioeconomic structures of the postrevolutionary republic. Officials valorized those components of indigenous culture that, according to Julia Elena Fortún, “por útil y positivo merezca ser incorporado a nuestro moderno caudal de vida.”¹⁰¹⁴ Those components of Andean civilization deemed “útil y positive” were nonetheless limited to the cultural realm and valorized solely as symbolic representation of the postrevolutionary republic.

One of the unintended outcomes of the postrevolutionary state’s contradictory approach to indigenous Bolivians was ethnogenesis. The knowledge produced by government social scientists coupled with growing resentment toward the assimilationist policies of the postrevolutionary state resulted in the emergence of ethnicity as a site of sociopolitical mobilization. Continued ethnographic, anthropological, and archeological research carried out by social scientists affiliated with state cultural institutions undermined the postrevolutionary indomestizo ideal by revealing the ethnic diversity of Bolivia’s indigenous population. Though intended for the cultural politics of the postrevolutionary state, the knowledge produced by anthropological research provided an increasing number of literate Indians with scientifically grounded claims to identity, territory, and rights.¹⁰¹⁵ During the 1960s and 1970s, rural activists drew on this knowledge to both define and defend their cultural heritage. As the *Manifiesto de Tiwanaku* demonstrates, by the 1970s, indigenous leaders were not only promoting the

¹⁰¹⁴ Fortún, *Manuel para la recolección de material folklórico*, p. 15.

¹⁰¹⁵ Rosanna Barragán, “Bolivia: Bridges and Chiasms,” *A Companion to Latin American Anthropology*, Deborah Poole, ed. (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), pp. 32-55

valorization of their customs, traditions, and history, but they were also embracing their ethnic identity as a potent source of social pride and political empowerment.

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Vita

Robert Matthew Gildner was born in Cleveland, Ohio. In 1995, he graduated from Middleton High School, in Middleton, Wisconsin. He majored in history at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, graduating with a Bachelor in Arts in 2001. In September 2002, he matriculated at the University of Texas at Austin, where he earned both his M.A. (2004) and Ph.D. (2012) in Latin American History.

Permanent address (or email): gildner@gmail.com

This dissertation was typed by the author.