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2017

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Citizenship Politics: Latino Civic Participation Across Generations

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Citizenship Politics: Latino Civic Participation Across Generations

by

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Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

August 2017

Dedication

For my parents, Victor and Gabriela, whose abilities to face challenges and triumph as immigrants inspired this project.

Para mis padres, Víctor y Gabriela, cuyas habilidades para enfrentar retos y triunfar como inmigrantes en este país inspira mi trabajo.

Acknowledgements

I am proud to say that the University of Texas at Austin was my home for over a decade. I arrived as an undergraduate and continued on into my graduate studies because I knew the university and, more importantly, the Department of Government would work tirelessly to ensure my success.

I extend a deep gratitude to my academic advisor David Leal for the commitment he has shown to all my academic endeavors since I was a student in his undergraduate Latino Politics class. It was his class that sparked my interest in social science research. I was honored to serve as his teaching assistant for that same class a few years later and I hope that I can do my part to repay his efforts in the future as I try to inspire a new generation of students.

I would also like to thank my committee members Daron Shaw, Michael Rivera, Nestor Rodriguez, and Louis DeSipio. Their scholarship and expertise served as an inspiration for my work and their academic support and mentorship helped me transform this project from idea to manuscript. I would like to acknowledge Michael Rivera whose draft deadlines held me accountable and for the valuable advice he provided along the way. I also reserve a special recognition for Jason Casellas who also served as an advisor during my time as a graduate student.

I was fortunate enough to receive the financial resources and institutional support from the Irma Rangel Public Policy Institute (PPI) that helped me complete my

dissertation and actualize my research agenda. The workshop setting of PPI alongside Joe Tafoya, Rachel Navarre, Clare Brock, Jereny Mendoza, Hadill Calderon, Jonathan Lewallen, Joanne Ibarra, Jerrod Patterson, Trey Thomas, and Ken Miller served as a profound learning experience. I was honored to receive the support of Government Department faculty at multiple points along the way including Bryan Jones, Raul Madrid, Terri Givens, Juliet Hooker, Zachary Elkins, and Sean Theriault. I would also like to extend my gratitude to the amazing Government Department staff, especially Annette Park for the care she shows all graduate students.

The Center for Mexican American Studies and Department of Mexican American and Latino Studies served as a home away from home during my time at UT. As I worked toward my graduate certificate in Mexican American and Latino Studies I formed precious friendships with fellow certificate students José Villagrán and Valerie Martinez. I, along with so many others, am indebted to the previous generation of student activists who fought for the establishment of these centers and departments for our communities. Not only was I lucky enough to receive financial support from these institutions, but, more importantly, I met some of the finest people who always brought a smile to my face. I would like to thank Luis Guevara, Richard Flores, John Morán González, Alberto Gonzalez, Perla Delgado, Natasha Saldaña, Katy Buchanan, and Lizzie Choffel. I would also like to thank the faculty and staff of the Teresa Lozano Long Institute of Latin American Studies and the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection Library.

Lastly, I would like to thank a few special people close to my heart. To my dear friend and mentor, Dr. David Oliphant: thank you for taking an interest in my voice as a writer, your belief in me helped me believe in myself. To my fiancé Melissa Adams: thank you for your love and your patience, it sustained me at so many moments. Thank you for treating me to trips to the ice cream parlor every time I reached a milestone on this project—it was the perfect motivation. To my parents, Gabriela and Victor Corral: your unconditional love and sacrifice for my brother and I can hardly be described, much less ever repaid. My only hope is that we try every day to honor your hard work and dedication.

Citizenship Politics: Latino Civic Participation Across Generations

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The University of Texas at Austin, 2017

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The field of Latino politics has traditionally explained relatively low rates of Latino political participation as rooted in several factors—low socio-economic status, a large immigrant share of the population, and nascent levels of acculturation. However, instances of vibrant civic activity among immigrants (many undocumented) abound, from the mass mobilization of the 2006 immigrant rights marches to examples of direct action by immigrant youth. This challenges many of the field's assumptions about civic engagement. As a consequence, this dissertation reexamines the civic integration process from a multi-generational and institutional perspective. The objective of this dissertation project is to address how social institutions foment civic activity among Latinos and how that process differs across generations. I propose an original theory of 'Generational Political Incorporation' as an analytic tool that highlights the way immigrant generation interacts with institutional accessibility to structure pathways to incorporation. I detail how Latino participation in society's major social institutions—churches, schools, the military, labor unions, and political parties—varies according to generational status. I show how limited access to some institutions during the immigrant generation hinders the incorporation process while those with expanded access help spur political engagement. Through a mixture of quantitative and qualitative analysis I find that Latino non-citizens, who have the greatest need for pathways to American civic life, quickly learn that few

American institutions are willing or able to introduce them to supportive networks. As first generation immigrants, their relationship to American civic life is largely structured by the opportunities found in the most accessible institutions, namely churches and the public education system. By contrast, the acculturative experiences of the children of these immigrants are very different; as they enter adulthood and look to engage in civic activities, they are welcomed by the same institutions that were closed to their parents. By the third and subsequent generation, I find that levels of involvement are more dependent on socioeconomic status than their institutional affiliations. The dissertation illustrates how the acculturation process unfolds beyond traditional measures related to the immigrant experience and incorporates the all-important role of civic institutions in the integration process.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Latino populations contain considerable diversity in terms of citizenship and generational status. All Puerto Ricans are citizens, and Cubans are typically citizens or legal permanent residents. Among immigrants from Mexico, Central America, and South America, some have lived in the US for decades as legal permanent residents but not citizens, while many are undocumented. Some Latino newcomers therefore experience the protection of authorized status and the prospect of attaining citizenship, while others must live day-by-day and are vulnerable to deportation.

These differences in citizenship mean that some Latinos have the potential to engage in a greater array of civic behaviors than do others. Non-citizen Latinos are often limited to non-electoral activities while naturalized immigrants and native-born individuals can interact with the political system through both non-electoral and electoral means. This project examines the ways in which Latinos of various citizenship and generational statuses incorporate themselves into the American political system, focusing primarily on patterns of civic participation.

I make the case that to understand immigrant political incorporation we must have a greater appreciation for the role that immigrant generation plays in the formation of civic lives. Whether Latino or Asian, the generation to which one belongs is a starting point for assessing the degree of acculturation the individual and the successive generations of their family will attain. This project will examine the different opportunities and restrictions that each generation faces, particularly in terms of

institutional access. I will show how the limited opportunities of the immigration generation eventually give way to a more expanded array of options for the second and third generations. Such access, in turn, works to increase civic participation in ways that scholars have theorized generally for the American population—but not specifically for immigrants and their descendants.

The settlement process for immigrants is difficult, often filled with challenges for them and their families. At the outset, leaving one's country is a major life course event; many immigrants must wrestle with this decision and do not take it lightly. The field of migration studies has established the importance of push and pull factors in migrants' decisions to leave their country of origin. Push factors are the social, political, and economic forces that drive immigrants to leave their home country, ranging from economic hardship to political persecution to environmental factors. Pull factors, conversely, are the positive attractions of other nations, including economic opportunity and the prospect of free political expression. Many immigrants look to the future in their migration decisions; they are pushed away from home and pulled to another country for the sake of the well-being of not just themselves but also their families. How well the family is able to acculturate is a function of many factors. The migration literature discusses factors such as segmented assimilation, the reception by native-born populations, migrant networks, social and human capital, and the ability to access educational and social services. In this project, I examine how the institutional context is not the same for all members of even the same family, thereby adding another element to

our understanding of whether and how immigrants are able to achieve the American Dream.

The focus on the role of immigrant generation on my part is because, time and again, I have seen how first-generation immigrants struggle to access the social institutions that we know can work to benefit them. Over the course of this dissertation, it will be made clear that immigrant generation structures what I refer to as "institutional accessibility." This means that many of society's main institutions—churches, schools, the military, labor unions, and political parties—vary in the degree to which they are willing and able to incorporate immigrants and thereby advance their individual and group interests. For example, the military and most schools, with the exception of private schools, are branches of the state. Other institutions are far less constrained by governmental rules and regulations that dictate the treatment of unauthorized immigrants, as is the case of with religious institutions.

Research about society's major institutions and their effect on Latino political participation is often dispersed. While work has examined how Latino political participation is affected by political parties, labor unions, religion, the education system, and the military, little, if any, research has treated these different affiliations in tandem, much less through the prism of immigrant generation. By understanding how society's stance toward Latinos alternates according to generational and citizenship status differences, a clearer picture of Latino political inclusion emerges.

My central claim is that immigrant political incorporation follows a general pattern. At first, recent arrivals (or first-generation immigrants) have the greatest need for

pathways to American civic life but find that few institutions are capable of meeting their needs. Their relationship to American civic life is likely structured by the most open institutions—churches and the public education system. By contrast, the acculturative experiences of the native-born children of these immigrants (second generation) are very different; as they enter adulthood and look to engage in civic activities, they are welcomed by the same institutions that were closed to their parents. They may also find some institutions to be particularly attractive pathways to civic incorporation and economic mobility. Third and later generation Latinos also have a full slate of social institutions willing to serve them but are unlikely to display increased levels of participation as a product of their affiliations. Instead, their civic lives are influenced by their socioeconomic status and other general correlates well known to the political science literature.

Therefore, access to institutional resources depends on immigrant generation. For Latinos, the doors to churches, labor unions, political parties, and the military open and shut according to citizenship and generational status. When they arrive in the U.S. from another country, most doors are shut. As a consequence, with little access to supportive networks, some develop feelings of isolation after experiencing discrimination at the personal and institutional level (Chavez 1991, 1994; Portes and Bach 1985). The doors to these institutions open for those that become citizens and those that are born in the U.S. These Latinos can walk through the doors of these institutions and onto a path to enriched civic lives. This forms the basis of what I refer to as the theory of Generational Political Incorporation. The use of this theory will help illustrate how political incorporation

unfolds not only intra-generationally (throughout the course of first-generation immigrants) but also inter-generationally (across generations). Furthermore, it will show how the immigrant experience, social institutions, and individual socioeconomic mobility interact to produce a unique immigration narrative.

The theory of Generational Political Incorporation is proposed as an analytic tool to highlight the ways in which three sociopolitical forces influence Latino civic activity across generations. I use quantitative and qualitative methods to examine: (1) factors relating to the immigration experience, (2) the capacity for political incorporation provided by major social institutions—churches, schools, political parties, the military, and labor unions, and (3) individual variations in socioeconomic status.

The quantitative portion of the study uses surveys such as the Latino National Survey (LNS) of 2006 and the Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) of 2008 to better understand the forces that shape Latino civic participation. First, factors relating to the immigrant experience are examined, as an immigrant's degree of acculturation is expected to shape immigrant engagement in, or abstention from, civic activities. These include their linguistic capabilities in English, the amount of time immigrants have spent in the U.S., and whether they have undergone the naturalization process. Second, the socio-institutional resources provided by churches, schools, political parties, the military, and labor unions are examined in order to learn how and when they operate as avenues for the political incorporation of Latinos. Third, I will examine how economic integration, in the form of socioeconomic status, can also serve as a gateway to political incorporation.

My expectation is that Latino immigrants who display greater levels of acculturation will be more civically engaged than immigrants who are less acculturated. Another expectation is that generational and citizenship status will affect the degree to which these social institutions can offer support to immigrants. As institutional access varies according to generational status, immigrants that gain admission into these networks of schools, churches, the military, labor organizations, and political parties will be in a better position to engage the political system. The second and subsequent generations begin with an advantage compared to the immigrant generation by virtue of their nativity and therefore face fewer barriers to accessing society's major social institutions. This is consequential because those that attach themselves to any one of these institutions are more likely to engage with the political system than those that do not.

With regard to socioeconomic status, I argue that differences in income and educational attainment will occupy a larger role in determining rates of Latino civic participation with each subsequent generation. While socioeconomic status is only one among the many factors that influence the civic participation of first-generation Latino immigrants, there is reason to expect that socioeconomic status plays a predominant role in shaping the levels of civic participation among third and later generation Latinos in much the same way that it does for Anglos. When combined with my expectations regarding institutional access, I hypothesize that institutional affiliations play a key role in shaping civic participation for first and second generation Latinos but recede in

importance among third and later generations, to be replaced by the differences in socioeconomic status.

LATINO POLITICAL INTEGRATION

For a time, Latino peoples occupied a curious place in American political history. Hispanos, Californios, and Tejanos lost their political and economic power in the aftermath of the Mexican American War. This loss of status was so widespread, and their place in the American imagination so small, that historian George I. Sanchez labelled Mexican Americans of the Southwest a 'forgotten people' (Sanchez 1940). For a century, a mixture of geographic concentration and economic and social subjugation minimized their historical role in the development of the American nation. Indeed, Latino history in the United States has a fraught past marked by conquest, dispossession, and displacement. Yet, this history, when synthesized with the dynamics of migration set forth since 1965, means that Latino peoples in the contemporary United States can be characterized as some of the nation's oldest inhabitants and also its latest newcomers (Portes and Rumbaut 2006).

Though the struggles to ensure Latino civil and political rights have been long, the gains in Latino political power and the growth of the Latino population have been notable. As of 2015, the approximately 56.6 million Latinos in the United States constituted 17.6 percent of the population (U.S. Census Bureau 2016). Since the Latino population surpassed that of the Black population over a decade ago, Latinos have been the nation's largest minority group. Latino purchasing power topped $1.3 trillion

annually in 2015, up 167 percent from 2000 (Nielsen Company 2016); this growth has compelled companies large and small to devote greater resources to marketing campaigns targeting Latinos (Davila 2001).

In national politics, the media alternatively portrays the Latino community as celebrated swing voters and a disappointing sleeping giant. In truth, neither characterization approximates the reality of minority politics. Such dichotomies oversimplify the situation the community faces; they are neither swing voters (because they largely parallel trends seen among other groups in a given election) nor have they been decisive in many victories for Democrats so much as a reliable part of a larger coalition. They are neither sleeping (as evidenced by vibrant civic activity across multiple areas of the country around many issues and are not really a giant (as they constitute about 10 percent of voters and 15 percent of all eligible voters). These facts, while more sobering than popular media accounts, are not highlighted to diminish the important role that Latinos currently play (and will continue to play) in U.S. electoral politics, but to counter the caricatures that portray the group, and by extension Latino culture, as a failure. So long as the measures of Latino political success are imposed from outside the community, unrealistic expectations will never be met.

One feature of the development of Latino political power has been the establishment of Latino advocacy organizations that have exerted pressure on the political system from outside the electoral process. Today, contemporary immigrants from Latin America benefit from the infrastructure put in place by the early wave of Latino political group formation that included the League of United Latin American

Citizens (LULAC) and the American GI Forum. Organizations that developed as a consequence of the Chicano Movement included the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (PRLDEF), and the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO). In the case of many of these national Latino advocacy organizations, leaders sprung from the ranks of mainstream social institutions like political parties, the military, labor unions, schools, and churches.

A key reason for studying Latino political participation is because the economic and political futures of this large and growing segment of the population will determine the health of American democracy. Disentangling the points of heterogeneity within the group, particularly according to generational lines, is imperative if the political system is to be made more accessible and responsive to their needs. In order to understand the unique challenges Latinos face, it is important that the community itself and Latino and non-Latino leaders alike appreciate issues of immigration, settlement, and access to the nation's largest social institutions.

Recent estimates show that more than one out of every three Latinos in the United States was born in another country; over 35 percent of U.S. Latinos are first-generation immigrants (Pew 2015). The other two-thirds of U.S. Latinos are U.S. born, but estimating the percentage of Latinos beyond the second generation is a trickier proposition. This is due to the limits of nationally representative samples of the U.S. population. While there is no estimate of the third or later generation population from the American Community Survey's figures, a recent nationally representative sample of U.S.

Latinos by the Pew Research Center found that about 15 percent of all Latinos age 18 and over were born to two U.S. born parents (Pew 2012). Together, these figures suggest that about a third of all Latinos in the U.S are first generation, about half are second generation, and the remaining fifth are third or later generation.

To study generational differences is in no way to deny a range of additional racial, ethnic, and linguistic complexities. Arriving at generalizations about such a multi-faceted group is difficult and filled with exceptions and contingencies. Nonetheless, it is necessary to arrive at some understanding of how the process of Latino political integration unfolds, and this dissertation contributes to the larger, collective enterprise.

There are multiple ways of assessing immigrant integration. Social scientists face the difficult task of measuring a group's 'integration'—a somewhat amorphous concept that varies across disciplines. An immigrant groups' integration has traditionally been judged, rather unfairly, in comparison to the 'mainstream' which is popularly understood as the imagined trajectory of acculturation of immigrants from Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Throughout the nation's history, immigrant groups have been subject to comparison to the dominant white ideal; the Germans were compared to the English in the late 18th and early 19th centuries; the Irish were compared to Anglo-Saxon Protestants during the mid-19th century; and Southern Europeans were compared to Northern Europeans when they arrived in greater numbers following industrialization. Each of these successive immigrant groups was labeled either unfit by a rough, typically unscientific, evaluation that rested on anecdotal evidence of social mobility.

It was not until the 1920s that rigorous methods were applied to the study of immigrant groups that we recognize today as social science. Initial studies of U.S. immigrant incorporation compared the integration of the largest immigrant group from the first half of the 20th century (non-Northern European immigrants from Italy, Poland, and the Jewish diaspora) to the notions of white normativity of the era (which meant WASP individuals). From these studies, the literature sketched out an understanding of immigrant integration that followed assimilation—specifically one that is a linear process (Warner and Srole 1945).

The immigrant groups in the first wave of immigrant assimilation studies shared at least some degree of whiteness—although their whiteness was contested at the time. Alongside the Civil Rights Movement and the juridical changes that followed from the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was also the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. The INA of 1965 dismantled the race-based quota system installed during the 1920s that set in place an era of immigrant restriction in the U.S. for four decades. "New" immigration from Latin America and Asia after 1965 led to a consolidation of whiteness as disputes about racial boundaries diminished among white ethnics in order to create new boundaries that could be applied to these "newcomers".

Since 1965, the four major groups of non-Whites (Asians, Native Americans, Latinos, and Blacks) have been judged against one another and placed in a racial hierarchy. While many Asian and Latino groups have been in the U.S. for many generations, or have indigenous ancestry in the case of many Latinos, the machinations of the racial hierarchy consider Asians and Latinos as immigrant groups. Even those that

undergo the process of naturalization and become U.S. citizens many continue to undergo feelings of exclusion. This perpetual mark of "foreign-ness" in the eyes of the collective white mainstream has led to the characterization of citizenship as being "disenchanted" whereby the "alien" label follows many foreign-born immigrants into citizenhood (Plascencia 2012).

Some scholars have posited that Latino societal integration will unfold linearly, whereby first generation immigrants steadily acculturate and second and third generation family members experience greater gains in education and income than the preceding generation (Gordon 1964). Alternative understandings of Latino incorporation are found in segmented assimilation theories (see Portes and Zhou 1993). These argue that structural racism in the form of systemic educational inequities, differential treatment by the criminal justice system, and work place discrimination complicate the integration process for immigrants. Scholars have also suggested that assimilation for the post-1965 pool of immigrants (Asians and Latinos) will largely parallel that of prior European ethnic groups, albeit delayed (Alba and Nee 1997). Others are more pessimistic, contending that immigrants face the prospect of assimilation only into the lower rungs of society (Gans 1992).[1] Still others are overtly hostile to the notion that Latinos are capable of assimilation at all. Such arguments are xenophobic in nature and cast Latinos as wholly unassimilable on the grounds that their cultural values are irreconcilable with Protestant understandings of the 'American Creed' (Huntington 2004).

The continued practices of exclusion, subjugation, and marginalization directed at Latinos are major factors in the group's ability to adequately integrate. Under the theory

of racial formations, Omi and Winant (1994) argue that Latinos are a minority group that has undergone a long process of racialization. Though not necessarily focused on the prospects of racial and ethnic minorities over generations, Omi and Winant are more concerned with showing how racialization occurs for these groups regardless of generational status; they are subjected to a set of socio-institutional and political processes that perpetuate gaps in outcomes based on race.

Although limited to the experience of Mexican Americans, Telles and Ortiz (2008) contend that the largest Latino ethnic group has witnessed negligible gains in status because they face structural inequalities in access and barriers to resource-building institutions. So salient and entrenched are the forces of racial exclusion that one scholar has argued that American society is undergoing a transformation from a Black/White binary of social hierarchy to a tri-partite formulation with whites as a dominant group in power and non-whites falling into either an intermediate 'honorary white' category or confined to 'collective black' (Bonilla-Silva 2017).

All of these contending theories render the future of Latinos in the United States as precarious. However, with the insights from the theory of Generational Political Incorporation, scholars can focus on the capacity of social institutions to integrate Latinos across generations into the political system.

Scholars can arrive at different conclusions regarding the incorporation of an immigrant group according to their adopted framework. Therefore, the distinction between acculturation and assimilation models is an important one. The assimilation paradigm holds that cultural markers of ethnicity should be shed over time and not

maintained alongside an 'American' identity, something allowed for by the acculturation perspective. The danger of the logic of assimilation is that it can facilitate the tendency to view some immigrant groups as inherently capable of adjustment and others as culturally deficient. Latinos have been subject to the vagaries of such formulations. Strict definitions of assimilation with Anglo-conformity as the natural endpoint, whereby immigrants are expected to shed any and all cultural markers and customs, pose an obstruction to entering American civic life.

This project is informed by the perspective that acculturation is best suited to explain the political integration of Latino immigrants because it reflects the diversity of immigration experiences. Immigrants have a variety of migration experiences, and, as such, the degree of attachment to one's home country may vary considerably from one immigrant to the next. Some immigrants were brought to the U.S. as young children, and, regardless of their immigration status, think of themselves as American. Other immigrants settled in the U.S. at a later stage of their life and have more social and psychological ties to their country of origin. Today, those wishing to maintain ties to their country of origin can do so in many ways. The proliferation of communication technologies has facilitated transnational activity, which means that immigrants can connect with family members and engage with home country politics more easily than migrants from a generation ago. A natural byproduct of this greater degree of interconnectedness is that immigrants can now maintain their attachments in their country of origin while simultaneously developing ties in the U.S.

The immigrants of the post-1965 era have also faced a different "contexts of reception" (Portes and Rumbaut 2006) compared to the immigrant groups that came before. The anti-immigrant political context of the modern era that came to a head with California's anti-Latino propositions in the 1990s was originated and sustained by two major factors. First, the increase in foreign-born individuals following almost a half century of restrictive immigration policies has radically altered the nation's demographics. Although the percentage of the population that is foreign-born declined steadily after a peak of nearly 15 percent in 1910 (Census 2013b), more immigrants arrived in the U.S. during the 1980s than any other decade of the 20th century with the exception of 1901-1910 (Portes and Rumbaut 2006).

This steady increase of foreign-born individuals during in the three decades after the changes instituted by Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 also coincided with the second factor that led to increased hostility towards immigrants. The economic restructuring following the long-term trend of deindustrialization created a situation where American industries favored foreign workers that could offer comparable productivity with lower labor costs; this facilitated the international outsourcing of many manufacturing jobs. This economic shift on a global scale left many working class native-born workers in precarious economic positions.

The political ramifications meant that these workers directed animus toward immigrant groups that were increasingly present in the domestic labor market. In turn, this anti-immigrant rhetoric in California had a mobilizing effect on Latinos in the state. Research would show that increased petitions for naturalizations would translate into

increased turnout among the state's Latino population, an increase driven largely by new citizens (Pantoja et al. 2001).

One way that immigrants, especially Latinos, counteracted these narratives was by taking steps toward further political integration by seeking U.S. citizenship. In 1996 and 1997, the U.S under the Citizenship USA initiative naturalized 1.27 million and 1.41 million immigrants, respectively, marking the only time that naturalizations reached over 1 million immigrants in two consecutive years (DHS 2012). The average number of naturalizations per year has increased with every subsequent decade. According to government statistics, the average annual number of naturalizations was 210,000 during the 1980s, half a million in the 1990s, 680,000 in the 2000s and over 700,000 since 2010-2013 (Lee and Foreman 2014).

Political integration on the part of immigrants and their children is therefore occurring, but my dissertation argues that this process unfolds with the help of major American social institutions. Some of these are more accessible than others, so despite their best intentions, many immigrants who wish to be more politically active are limited by issues of citizenship. Nonetheless, many go on to find support in a few places—namely churches and schools. Other Latinos with fewer citizenship limitations can access a variety of additional social sites. In both cases, Latinos who maintain a range of affiliations can lead more active and participatory political lives.

Civic Institutions

The case of the Citizenship USA campaign described above is emblematic of the U.S.'s approach to immigrant integration, which at its most active can be characterized as episodic but is normally laissez faire (Bloemraad 2006a). Instead, integration, in the form of naturalizations, has occurred concurrent with episodes of anti-immigrant sentiment that are both local (as in California during the mid-1990s) and national (the Sensenbrenner Bill and similar congressional legislation in the mid-2000s). In the case of the Citizenship USA, while it did accomplish some of its goals, the campaign was short-lived. Moreover, the Clinton administration failed to institutionalize the mission of promoting citizenship on a long-term basis. A major shortcoming to this approach was that it was not a regularized process, but a separate, sporadic, and episodic burst of activity attached to an election cycle. So long as campaigns are associated with the political objectives of one administration or party they will face difficulty in achieving the long-term goal of immigrant integration.

It is here that insight from the theory of Generational Political Incorporation can be useful. I argue that by harnessing the power of the naturally occurring civic landscape, whereby social institutions have the potential to familiarize immigrants with the political system, immigrants can increase their rates of political participation. Absent this method of increasing citizenship acquisition, Latino immigrants face an uphill battle when it comes to political integration.

One analysis holds that the post-1965 generation of immigrants characterized by rising immigration from Asia and Latin America has coincided with a period in which civic institutions in America are in decline (DeSipio 2011). Were this trend to continue today's immigrants would face a challenge because the American system has largely relied on institutions outside the state (non-governmental institutions) to incorporate society's newcomers. There are myriad reasons as to why America has adopted a "laissez faire" approach to immigrant incorporation (Bloemraad 2006a), including the power of non-profit organizations and charities, the small-government tradition, and cultural values (like notions of rugged individualism) that would have immigrants be the sole agents of their integration. The passive approach to immigrant integration has other historical antecedents that have set forth a form of inertia in the political system. In the past, newcomers behaved more like migrants than immigrants, meaning that they had migratory patterns that were more transitory, returning to their home country with greater frequency than immigrants do today. Furthermore, for a stretch of four decades (1924-1965) the U.S. greatly diminished the number of admitted immigrants due to a restrictive quota system.

This era of restriction had a long lasting impact on the nation—America simply forgot how to actively integrate its immigrants. The United States' move to a centralized system of immigration in the early 20th century created a uniform process for naturalization thus undercutting the ability of local political actors to actively integrate new immigrants (Bloemraad 2006b). This standardization of naturalization was not accompanied by adequate investment in immigrant integration services (Bloemraad

2005). Therefore, with the exception of refugees, U.S. integration efforts been underfunded and deemphasized while the enforcement and administration of immigration law constituting has been prioritized constituting a system of immigrant incorporation described by one scholar as a “long grey welcome” (North 1987).

This would seem to suggest that today’s immigrants have missed out—the America that was designed to politically integrate immigrants to American civic and public life no longer exists. For example, the ethnic parish model practiced by the Catholic Church of the late 18th and early 19th centuries aided the integration of immigrants during that time period (see Tomasi 1975), but following a wave of “Americanization” campaigns following WWI led to the dissolution of this practice by the Catholic Church (Matovina 1999). Other powerful American social institutions rose to prominence due in part to the absence of immigrant groups and the racial exclusion of African Americans. For example, the halcyon era of labor unions that occurred during the post-war era that produced well-paying blue-collar manufacturing jobs occurred when America’s immigration regime was governed by an exclusionary quota system central to the Immigration Act of 1924 (also known as the Johnson-Reed Act).

Indeed, the organizational strength and capacity of social institutions have attenuated at least since the post-war era. For example, a decline in church attendance (Presser and Stinson 1998; Hofferth and Sandberg 2001; Putnam 2000) along with the rise of religious non-affiliation (Funk and Smith, 2012) has contributed to the public’s perception that religion’s influence in public life is decreasing (Pew Research Center 2014). Similarly, the end of compulsory military service has meant that fewer citizens

experience one of the most powerful socializing forces in civic life (Ford 2001; Wesbrook 1983). Other work has highlighted the decline of civic institutions as an element in understanding the decline of social capital in America (Putnam 1995, 1996, 2000), though any meaningful discussion of non-European immigrants is largely absent.[2] One reason for this oversight is that when churches, schools, political parties, the military, and unions played their largest roles in American civic life, they were either *de jure* or *de facto* segregated institutions. Labor unions are a prime example of an institution that grew via an expanding white middle-class while excluding non-whites in the post-war era.

Today, these institutions are being rejuvenated by ethnic and racial minorities. The leadership of schools, churches, labor unions, political parties, and the military are already witnessing what the growth of the Latino population will mean for their groups. Latino population growth presents problems and opportunities, but for those institutions that find themselves in decline, Latinos in particular have the potential to play a role in their revitalization. This sets the stage for a mutually beneficial relationship in which America's major social institutions can again prosper while ensuring Latinos make strides in political incorporation. Nevertheless, this is a process that social scientists are only beginning to understand.

The following sections illustrate the role that Latinos will play in the future of these five major social institutions. Though some of these social institutions have historically been less than readily accessible, in all cases I document how these social

institutions have, if gradually, become more open to the needs of native-born and immigrant Latinos.

Public Schools

The public education system has felt the effects of Latino population growth for some time. Contrary to popular perceptions, the majority of recent Latino population growth is accounted for by natural increase, which means that even without new migration, the Latino share of the U.S. population is poised to grow. From 2012 to 2013, the Census Bureau estimated that natural increase (births minus deaths) accounted for 78 percent of the increase of the Latino population (Brown 2014). The Latino fertility rate stood at 74.4 percent, which is larger than that for Blacks (65 percent) and non-Hispanic whites (58.6 percent) in 2012 (Center for Disease Control 2012). These figures are reflected in the Latino age distribution, which has an average age of 28 compared to 42 among non-Hispanic whites, 36 for Asians, and 33 for Blacks (Pew Hispanic Center 2015a).

This dynamic is most immediately felt in public schools. In 2011, 12.4 million Latino children were enrolled in Pre-K-12th grade public schools, constituting nearly a quarter (23.9 percent) of all such students, up from 16.7 percent in 2000 (Fry and Lopez 2012). The 2014 school year was the first in which minorities outnumbered whites in public schools (Krogstad and Fry 2014). The fact that one out of every four students in the nation's public schools is Latino, compared to 17.1 percent of the overall population, is indicative of the importance of public schools as an institution for this group.

Immigrants have come to rely on public schools as a primary access point for the social mobility of their children. The greater accessibility of public schools compared to other social institutions is due in large part to the landmark Supreme Court decision *Plyler v. Doe* (1982). The court in Plyler ruled that undocumented immigrant children could not be barred from enrolling in public schools and that they had a constitutionally protected right to a K-12 education. Although undocumented students had been attending U.S. schools long before the Plyler decision, the ruling was important because it forbade school districts from charging these students tuition thus protecting their right to free public school education.

The struggle to maintain access to the public education system is ongoing. Immigrant rights activists have used the *Plyler* decision as a stepping-stone for waging the fight to access institutions of higher education in more recent times. Today, a network of immigrant rights advocates have lobbied state legislatures so that undocumented immigrants that meet state residency requirements can qualify for in-state tuition, which would make higher education more affordable. Currently, eighteen states have some provisions offering undocumented immigrants that graduated from high school the opportunity to attend public universities with in-state tuition rates (National Council of State Legislatures 2015)[3]. Some states go further in accommodating these students by providing tuition assistance because undocumented immigrants are ineligible for federal tuition grants and loans. States that do not consider undocumented students as in-state residents require them to pay an out-of-state tuition rate which often makes their enrollment economically prohibitive.

Education is perennially a top issue within the Latino community, especially among immigrants, many of whom cite better educational opportunities for their children as a primary reason for their immigration to the United States (Pew Research Center 2015b). Accessing institutions of higher education has been a rallying point for much of the immigrant rights movement. Undocumented immigrants that arrived as children and graduated from high school but cannot not access colleges and universities ("DREAMers") argue that they have earned the right to pursue higher levels of education. In fact, in many of high profile protest actions taken by the DREAM 9 and their supporters in 2013, students wore their graduation caps and gowns as a way to highlight their educational successes.

While the image of DREAMers who have attained a degree of educational success and advancement in spite of the difficulties posed by their immigration status embody stories of immigrant 'success' based on the American values of meritocracy, their image has also helped perpetuate a deserving/non-deserving immigrant binary (Gonzales 2013). Indeed, after the passage of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), which granted young undocumented immigrants a temporary reprieve from deportation, many beneficiaries described their situation as bitter-sweet. While they were granted some temporary security from deportation, other members of their family remained vulnerable to the threat of removal. Nonetheless, their identities as students with ties to the education system have formed the basis of the political demands made by these young activists and their supporters. It is evident that because of the initial

accessibility they enjoyed in the public education system, DREAM activists are better equipped to carry out their political actions.

Political Parties

The relationship between American political parties and immigrants has been one of extremes. A century ago, Democratic Party political machines developed close ties to immigrant communities in urban areas; today, the mobilization of immigrants by political parties is more episodic in nature. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, political machines like New York's Tammany Hall set out a welcome mat for the mostly southern and eastern European immigrants that arrived in large numbers. Such efforts to ease the settlement process for immigrants were not done out of benevolence but for political expedience. Others have chronicled how corrupt party bosses provided housing and employment for recently arrived immigrants in exchange for votes (Erie 1990). Progressive Era reforms drastically reduced the power of political machine politics and thereby curtailed their ability to mobilize immigrants. Some suggest that these reforms were instituted precisely to combat the expanding political power of immigrant groups (Murphy 2002).

Today, political parties expend resources as efficiently as possible, in a manner best described as 'selective mobilization' (Wong 2006). This means political parties emphasize securing support among historically active voters, a group of citizens that is disproportionately older, whiter, and highly educated (Rosentone and Hansen 1993). In addition, parties do very little to mobilize new voters, whether they be youth that meet

the voting age requirement or newly naturalized citizens (Wattenberg 2002). Scholars attribute the rise of nonpartisanship and political independence among Latinos to strategies of selective mobilization that neglect immigrant communities (Hajnal and Lee 2011).

Latinos also contend with often unfavorable Electoral College dynamics that leave large swaths of the Latino population marginalized during presidential elections, particularly those that reside in solidly Republican states (Texas) or solidly Democratic states (California, New York, and Illinois). Furthermore, Latinos, and immigrants in particular, receive little attention from political parties because of the long-standing assumption that Latinos are a difficult population to mobilize (Wong 2006; Hero et al. 2000; Tirado 1970; Nelson 1979). This assumption contributes to a vicious cycle in which political parties perennially fail to mobilize Latinos which in turn continues their low rate of political participation (de la Garza and DeSipio 1992).

Despite what has been a pattern of lower participation than the national average, recent elections have illustrated that the growth of the Latino electorate means that neither party can disregard the Latino community. At the time of George W. Bush's re-election campaign Latinos were 8 percent of the electorate, which increased to 9 percent in 2008, and one in ten voters were Latino in the 2012 presidential election. Latest projections estimate that between 2014 and 2030 Latinos will account for 40 percent of the growth of the electorate, nearly doubling the number of Latino eligible voters from 23.7 million to 40 million (Taylor et al. 2012a).

Despite these figures that suggest growing Latino political power in the future, short-term electoral decisions by GOP office-seekers with few Latinos in their districts often do not feel the pressure to adopt more amenable positions on issues important to Latinos, including immigration (Cohn 2014). In 2008, John McCain received 31 percent of the Latino vote, roughly ten percentage points less than Bush in the previous cycle. Four years later, the GOP appeared to double-down on its anti-immigrant strategy when Mitt Romney adopted a platform that consisted of "self-deportation" as the solution to the nation's undocumented immigrant population. Romney's self-deportation policy was poorly received by many Latino voters (Latino Decisions 2012a), because an overwhelming majority of Latinos (86 percent) were in favor of a pathway to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants (Pew Hispanic Center 2010). Not surprisingly, Mitt Romney fared even worse than McCain among Latinos, winning only 27 percent of the Latino vote. In response to their abysmal tally with non-White voters, the RNC published a 100 page internal analysis of the 2012 election that many labeled 'an autopsy' (Walshe 2013). The report recommended that Republicans should "embrace and champion immigration reform" and that failure to do so would mean that the party's appeal would "continue to shrink to its core constituencies only" (RNC Growth and Opportunity Project 2013, 76).

The reluctance on the part of the GOP to moderate their positions in order to win over Latino voters is attributable to many factors, including nature of the primary system, political polarization, and other reasons unrelated to Latinos. Regardless, it helps to explain why Latino influence remains contingent despite the growing Latino share of the electorate. While advocacy groups invested in the increased political participation of

Latinos use the supposed decisiveness of the Latino vote as a tool for motivation and mobilization, in terms of presidential elections, Latinos have only been technically decisive in a handful of states on a couple of occasions (De la Garza, DeSipio, and Leal 2010). The burgeoning importance of the immigrant vote extends beyond Latinos. Asian immigrant voters have also increased their share of the electorate at a rate on par with Latinos – or even exceeding them in some places. The Asian American electorate remains a relatively smaller voting bloc, but faces similar challenges to the Latino electorate in terms of attracting attention from political parties.

While GOP candidates could win presidential elections despite losing minority voters by large margins in the past, population projections suggest that the strategy may soon run its course. White voters were 72 percent of the electorate in 2012, down from 88 percent in 1980. While making predictions about the composition of the electorate is difficult, speculation regarding the Voting Age Population (VAP) can be done with less uncertainty. Non-white U.S. adults over the age of 18 were 33.9 percent of the population in 2012 and are forecast to be a majority (54.8 percent) in 2060 (Taylor and Lopez 2013). Therefore, the increasing share of non-white voters will be an unavoidable dynamic that both parties will have to address.

Labor Unions

Labor unions have played a prominent role in the political integration of Latino immigrants into the American mainstream (Milkman 2006; Shaw 2008). The depletion of labor union ranks due to a confluence of factors has meant that labor unions have had to

attract members from new groups. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 9.4 percent of Latino workers were union members in 2013 while the national average stood at 11.3 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014). Although labor unions have played a prominent role in Chicano history (Ferriss and Sandoval 1998; Gómez-Quiñones 1990), many may be surprised to learn that Latino union membership is lower than the national average. Much of the discrepancy reflects the geographical realities of Latino settlement. States where union membership is high, such as in the Midwest and Northeast, have comparably lower (though growing) Latino populations. Moreover, Texas and Florida's status as right-to-work states means that union membership is less available for the many Latino residents in that state. Nonetheless, Latino union membership is on the rise in other states. California's higher-than-average rate of union membership (18.4 percent) is due in large part to Latino workers (Semuels 2013). In 2012, unions added 156,000 new Latino members at the same time that they lost 547,000 white members (Miles 2013).

Changes in migration flows along with a transformation into an economy dominated by service sector jobs has meant that labor unions have had to adjust their strategies for membership outreach. Adapting their political positions and priorities in accordance with Latino interests has been a central feature. An important turning point for the labor-immigrant relationship came in February 2000 when the executive council of the AFL-CIO, in response to efforts from San Francisco Bay Area leaders of the Labor Immigrant Organizing Network (LION), reversed its long-standing support of employer sanctions for hiring undocumented workers and came out in support of amnesty (Gleeson 2014).

In light of the AFL-CIO's change in policy, the president of the United Farm Workers, Arturo Rodriguez, stated that "We, the labor movement, have to put ourselves in a leadership position in immigrant rights" (Greenhouse 2000). Organized labor expressed its commitment to immigrant rights three years later during the Immigrant Worker Freedom Rides of 2003. The importance of this action is that it strengthened the relationship between unions and community-based organizations devoted to immigrant rights (Shaw 2008). These steps taken by labor unions in recent years suggest that they are turning the page on an era when the needs of immigrant workers were marginal to their agenda (Tichenor 2002). It is clear that one way to stave off lagging union membership is to adjust their recruitment strategies and become more accessible to the large and growing immigrant workforce.

Religious Institutions

The religious landscape of the U.S. has undergone important changes over the last fifty years. The persistence of a dynamic religious landscape, long a feature of American society, has meant that religious institutions are constantly competing for new adherents (Finke and Stark 1992; Lambert 2008). In the post-1965 immigration environment, Latino and Asian immigrants have been fruitful objects of recruitment by churches and parishes across the country. These new immigrants are transforming religion in America while also finding religious institutions an invaluable aid to social integration.

Latinos undergo notable changes in their religious lives across the generations. Survey research finds that Latino first generation immigrants arrive in the U.S. with high

amounts of religiosity. Indeed, while one-in-five native-born Latinos are religiously unaffiliated, only one-in-ten foreign-born Latinos fail to state an affiliation (Taylor et al. 2012b). Native-born Latinos are more likely to be non-Catholic or religiously unaffiliated compared to their foreign-born counterparts. A recent survey found that about a quarter of Latinos that were raised Catholic no longer affiliate with the Catholic Church (Pew 2014, 11). Foreign-born Latinos are the most likely to be Catholic and even they show a decline in Catholic affiliation with greater time in the U.S. Indeed, of the 30 percent of foreign-born Latinos that claimed to have switched faiths since childhood, roughly half (16 percent) said the change occurred after their arrival to the U.S. (Ibid., 12). The growth of the Latino population due to U.S. births, taken with the aforementioned rate of religious switching from first to second generation and from childhood to adulthood, has led to a decline in Catholic affiliation among Latinos.

Estimates differ slightly about the current rate of Catholicism among Latinos, with some placing it as low as 55 percent (Pew Research Center's 2013 National Survey of Latinos and Religion) while others claiming 59 percent (National Study of Catholic Parishes with Hispanic Ministry 2014). Though it is true that Catholic affiliation is decreasing among Latinos, the Latino share of all Catholics in the U.S. is increasing. The Latino share of the U.S. Catholic population today stands at nearly 40 percent, up from 25 percent three decades ago (Ospino 2014, 5). Therefore, the dual trends of non-affiliation among non-Latinos and the growth of the Latino population will produce a Catholic Church that is a predominantly Latino institution in a few decades.

Some work has explored the link between religion and political participation among Latinos. When comparing Blacks and Latinos, two similarly situated groups in terms of socio-economic resources but who show different patterns of political participation, Verba, Brady, and Schlozman (1995) concluded that the Protestant-Catholic divide might account for the turnout gap between the two groups. The authors claimed that the hierarchical nature of the Catholic Church did not allow parishioners to develop the civic skills associated with political participation. Later research indicated that the opposite was true—Catholic Latinos were more likely to participate than Latino Protestants on two measures of civic participation (Jones-Correa and Leal 2001). In that same study, Jones-Correa and Leal emphasized that church attendance, irrespective of denomination, was a more important factor for civic participation.

Indeed, religious institutions have long been a primary means for Latino political incorporation. Work has highlighted the important role that religion, in particular the Catholic Church, has played in the development of Latino political identity in the U.S. (Leal 2010). Religion continues to play a key role for Latino immigrants because churches operate as an anchor for an immigrant family in a new city or neighborhood. Churches provide a source of stability in times of uncertainty, which is why finding a church is one of the first things that immigrants do to set roots in a host country (Hagan and Ebaugh 2003).

One way that religious institutions have maintained themselves as Latino-serving institutions has been by becoming active on the issue of immigrant rights and citizenship. The Catholic Church has been on the forefront of this issue for some time. The sanctuary

movement has been strong within a network of Catholic Churches since the 1980s, with the church reaching a pinnacle of activity with the central role it played in the immigrant rights marches of 2006. Other denominations have followed suit by taking positions on the immigration issue as a way to signal to the Latino community that they are accessible and supportive.

The Military

There is a rich history of Latino service in the U.S. military. One of the most famous Latino rights and advocacy organizations, the American GI Forum, was founded to serve the needs of predominantly Mexican American veterans returning home. Recently, Latinos have played a significant role in the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recent figures estimate that Latino service members were five percent of all casualties in Iraq and four percent of all casualties in Afghanistan (Fischer 2014). Indeed, one of the first U.S. military service members to perish in the Iraq War was Marine Lance Corporal Jose Gutierrez, who was once an undocumented immigrant from Guatemala.

While the propensity of native-born Latinos and immigrant Latinos to serve in the military is notable, a key reason for their enrollment is because the military offers Latinos a pathway to economic mobility. However, among Latin American immigrants that arrived after 1965, fewer have had the opportunity to serve in the military due in part to the end of compulsory service. The era of conscription from 1940-1973 ended just as the rise of Latino and Asian immigration became a new reality. The modern military

characterized by a smaller standing army has meant that the military in American civic life, while still prominent, has decreased in scope.

Latino military service is somewhat undercut by the fact that the military can only recruit immigrants that are either naturalized citizens or legal permanent residents. In 2011, Latino enrollment in the military stood at 12.3 percent, below parity with the size of the Latino portion of the civilian labor force (18-44 year olds) at 18.6 percent (Department of Defense 2011). The military has seen an increase in enlistment in recent years by noncitizens. One reason is for the increase is that under the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest, or MAVNI program, non-citizens who have fluency in languages of interest to the military can serve. There has been a recent controversy over whether immigrants with temporary work permits under DACA can also serve in the military (Kim and Herb 2014).

As a consequence of these steps by the U.S. military to increase its accessibility for native-born and immigrant Latinos, the military continues to be a popular pathway into American civic life. With regard to Latino veterans, they have been found to have higher earnings than Latino non-veterans (Leal, Nichols, and Teigen 2011), and military service has also been shown to increase levels of acculturation among Latinos while at the same time increasing awareness of Latino culture (Leal 2003). Most important for the purposes of this work, research has shown that military service can boost levels of Latino voting and non-electoral participation (Leal 1999). What is missing from this literature is a greater appreciation for the ways that military service might be affected by issues

regarding citizenship and generational status and the attendant ramifications for political integration.

NON-ELECTORAL AND ELECTORAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Latinos are routinely involved in civic groups rooted in social institutions, from churches and schools to the military and political parties. Immigrant involvement in social institutions is important because it is often used as a marker for judging the incorporation of an ethnic group into the American mainstream. In addition, involvement in such institutions can spur participation in political and civic life.

Latinos engage in both electoral and non-electoral forms of politics. Latino political participation may signify a developed sense of group consciousness (Stokes 2003; Sanchez 2006), or, in the case of undocumented immigrants that took part in the immigrant rights marches of 2006, "laying claim to the public realm" (Beltran 2009, 597). Participation in groups need not be explicitly political, and engagement with community issues need not be perceived by an individual as politically motivated for their behavior to be a contribution to measures of political engagement. A major contribution from this project is to show how those Latinos who do enjoy access to social institutions and experience their supportive social and informational networks are more likely to be active participants in politics.

To that end, the project begins by surveying the current state of immigrant political participation and posing a series of central questions. First, how do social institutions foment civic activity among immigrants? Related to this question is a series

of corollary questions. For instance, why do some noncitizens participate in these activities while others choose to refrain? Can the benefits conferred by institutions like the military, the church, labor unions, political parties, and schools compensate for a lack of acculturation in the U.S.? Do the benefits derived from social institutions continue to serve Latinos of later generations or does their role become supplanted by socioeconomic factors?

More broadly, what does it say about the current state of democracy in America when undocumented immigrants are more politically interested and engaged than are many citizens? In particular, how is it that the people political science sees as the least likely to participate—young minorities of lower socioeconomic status—have become a vibrant example of political activism while the nation as a whole has experienced waning levels of civic participation (Brody 1978; Putnam 1995, 1996, 2000)?

This dissertation also has implications for the study of citizenship. Specifically, how does civic participation by undocumented immigrants complicate the traditional practice of citizenship? If immigration policies determine those included and excluded from the circle of citizenry, then a central concern should be how these non-citizens respond to public policies directed at them. Many undocumented immigrants and non-citizens, along with citizen allies, have responded to an increasingly restrictionist immigration enforcement regime[3] with organization and mobilization that is itself the practice of an alternative form of citizenship referred to elsewhere as the "noncitizenship of citizens" (Bosniak 2008) or "activist citizenship" (Isin 2009). The theory of Generational Political Incorporation addresses these issues in Latino political integration

and participation by exploring the relationship between modern immigration policy, civic institutions, and social mobility in the lives of Latino immigrants across multiple generations.

OUTLINE

This dissertation addresses Latino civic and political participation in the following manner. In Chapter 2, I provide an overview of prior literature on the topic of Latino integration from a multidisciplinary perspective, and forward a critique the primary theories that the field of political science has used to understand the political activation process of Latinos. I detail my explanatory mechanism, Generational Political Incorporation Theory, by highlighting how generational and citizenship status determine access to the social sites that provide the necessary social and informational resources to engage with the political system. This critical linkage, which has up until now been unexplored in the literature, constitutes my principle contribution to the field of Latino Politics.

Next, I review the historical connections between Latinos and the five major American social institutions explored in this work—churches, schools, the military, labor unions, and political parties—to explain their relevance to the development of Latino political power. I document how the institutional rules governing each have rendered these social sites either as gateways for or barriers to active civic and political lives among Latinos. I proceed by showing how differential access to these social sites according to generational status differences is manifested in rates of Latino participation

and membership in these spaces. I argue that the importance of generational status has been largely overlooked as a factor for Latino political integration, but, by understanding how generational and citizenship status differences structures the relationships to major social institutions of the United States political science might better appreciate the community's unique pathway to political engagement.

Chapter 3 explores Latino non-electoral political participation by testing three sets of hypotheses. These include my core hypothesis regarding the importance of social institutions in determining political behavior (*Institutional Socialization Hypothesis*), alongside factors measuring the immigrant experience (*Immigrant Acculturation Hypothesis*), as well as economic and educational resources (*Socioeconomic Status Hypothesis*). By testing these hypotheses using bivariate and multivariate analysis I can determine the factors that propel Latinos to participate in civic activities in greater numbers. Moreover, by leveraging the large sample size of the Latino National Survey of 2006 to conduct split sample analysis I can address how factors differ across generational lines. Chapter 3 also includes a qualitative analysis containing insights from the focus group interviews with Latinos that were a part of the Latino National Survey of 2006. This section focuses on the role of religious institutions in the civic lives of native-born and immigrant Latinos.

In Chapter 4 I turn my attention to Latino electoral participation by adopting an expansive view of electoral political behavior beyond registration and voting to include an exploration into the predictors of naturalization among immigrants. Given that citizenship acquisition is the necessary first step to electoral engagement among

immigrants, I argue that identifying the factors that compel immigrants toward naturalization must also be considered. I also use the Latino National Survey of 2006 in this chapter to test the validity of Generational Political Incorporation Theory in explaining Latino electoral political engagement. I show how social institutions alternate in importance along the generational trajectory of Latinos. This chapter also includes insights from LNS focus group interviews that are meant to underscore the significant role that schools in the U.S. play in the lives of children in immigrant households.

In Chapter 5 I shift gears by enlarging the scope of the study to encompass institutional affiliations and their effect on non-electoral and electoral forms of political participation among Blacks, Asian Americans, Whites, as well as Latinos. I use the Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey of 2008, which includes large sample sizes of all four major racial groups, to draw comparisons between groups on multiple political activities. By pinpointing the favored modes of participation among each group it is my hope that scholars and practitioners might better tailor the political outreach strategies they use to reach racial and ethnic minority communities. I maintain a focus on matters of immigrant incorporation by devoting special attention to the immigrant backgrounds of Latinos and Asian Americans in the sample.

Lastly, in Chapter 6 I conclude by reviewing what I believe to be the substantive contributions of the work and highlighting the major findings from the quantitative and qualitative analysis from the empirical chapters. I then explain where it is I believe the theoretical contributions of the work are situated within the field of political science and the opportunities it provides for a dialogue with audiences from other academic

disciplines. I also call attention to the ways that groups outside of academia, particularly political groups and community organizations, might use the insights from this work for their political mobilization and citizen education campaigns in these communities.

I hope this dissertation project can have a positive impact on the treatment of Latinos in future research. For too long Latinos in journalistic accounts, media portrayals, and even works of political science are either absent, or, when present, are discussed without the requisite nuance to be understood properly. This is all the more troubling because these intellectual pursuits miss the opportunity to narrow political inequalities that exist between racial and ethnic minorities and dominant groups, as well as between immigrants and the native-born population. Only by addressing these challenges facing our political system can we create the opportunity for marginalized communities to fulfill their political aspirations.

NOTES

1. There are important distinctions between the terms “assimilation,” “integration,” “incorporation,” and “acculturation” in regards to immigrant adjustment to life in the U.S. The term assimilation is used to describe a process by which immigrants shed many aspects of their cultural background (values, beliefs, and language) and adopt the mainstream values, beliefs, language etc. of the host country. Many scholars today concede that assimilation is a somewhat outdated term for immigrant adaptation to the host country. Insofar as I use assimilation, it is in reference to works that use this language. Scholars like Portes and Zhou (1993) refer to concepts such as “segmented assimilation,” while Gans (1992), is associated with the concept of “downward assimilation.” Acculturation is the process by which immigrant are changed by the culture of the host country and simultaneously change the mainstream culture of the host country by their presence and cultural practices. For this work, I mostly use integration and incorporation because it allows for more cultural maintenance in the form of Spanish retention and a greater degree of ethnic pride.

2. Processes for social capital formation receive very little treatment in arguably the most famous examination of U.S. civic institutions, Robert D. Putnam’s *Bowling Alone* (2000). Latinos are only referenced three times while Asian Americans are referenced only five times, and in all instances they are mentioned in passing.

3. According to the National Council of State Legislatures, “Sixteen states—California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New

Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Texas, Utah and Washington—extend in-state tuition rates to undocumented students through state legislation. Two states—Oklahoma and Rhode Island—allow in-state tuition rates to undocumented students through Board of Regents decisions" ("Undocumented Student Tuition: Overview" 2015).

Chapter 2: Generational Political Incorporation

"I came to Texas 10 years ago from Mexico. It took me a long time, but I am now a U.S. resident and I am studying to become a U.S. citizen. I am walking to help others get the same chance to become a citizen that I now have. I got involved in Dreamers Moms through my church. As a Catholic, I have faith that with the Pope's help we will achieve immigration reform in the United States. I hope that people see us walking and are inspired to join us."

-100 Women, 100 Miles Pilgrimage Marcher (September 2015)

"I wasn't a problem when I was in elementary school, nor when I received a full scholarship to attend a prestigious boarding school in New England. I wasn't a problem when I was accepted to and attended a private liberal arts college in the Midwest. But I became a problem when I joined a group of young undocumented activists five years ago."

-Marco Saavedra, immigration rights activist, member of DREAM 9 (September 2015)

These quotations from two immigrants highlight the way that their respective identities, one as church member and the other as student, form the basis of their political advocacy. The first woman is part of a larger action organized by We Belong Together, a group of women (many of them undocumented or mothers of undocumented children) that engage in advocacy on behalf of immigrant rights. Her personal narrative illustrates how her involvement with an immigrant rights organization originated from a prior connection to her church. The second individual is a member of the DREAM 9, a group of undocumented immigrants that brought attention to the plight of undocumented immigrants by engaging in a border-crossing action at the U.S.-Mexico border in 2013. He explains how his experience as a student instilled within him a sense of membership in the U.S.—a membership he risked by engaging in highly-publicized political actions.

As will be made evident in the pages that follow, these two particular identities are central for many politically active immigrants because churches and schools are the two social sites that immigrants can readily access. The bonds they forged with others and the psychological connections of political membership they made between themselves and the United States were facilitated by these places and led them to engage in political activism even without citizenship.

The Puzzle of Latino Political Participation

A common refrain in political commentary is that Latinos, time and again, fail to match their political potential because a smaller portion of Latino eligible voters turn out compared to other racial-ethnic groups. Such assumptions follow from the belief that demographics, in this case population growth, are they key to understanding a group's political destiny.

Indeed, it is true that Latinos (along with Asians) turn out to vote in presidential elections at a far lower rate than do African Americans and Anglos.[1] Table 2.1 shows that never have a majority of the Latino (or Asian) voter eligible population voted in a presidential election from 1996 to 2012. One silver-lining is that Latino voter turnout has generally increased, albeit gradually, with each subsequent election.[2]

Table 2.1 Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections by Race & Ethnicity (Percent Reported Voting Among Citizens)

	White	Black	Latino	Asian
1996	60.7	53	44	45
2000	61.8	56.8	45.1	43.4
2004	67.2	60	47.2	44.2
2008	66.1	64.7	49.9	47.6
2012	64.1	66.2	48	47.3

Source: Current Population Surveys, United States Census Bureau. Figures for 'White' respondents are those labeled 'White (non-Hispanic)'

Scholars have speculated as to why Latino political participation in general, not just voter turnout, is lower in comparison to that of African Americans and Anglos. One explanation is the large share of immigrants within the Latino population, many of whom participate at lower rates than do their native-born co-ethnics, which depresses aggregate Latino turnout. Furthermore, because immigration from Latin America (both legal and unauthorized) has persisted for so long, any effort to mobilize Latinos must contend with the fact that a large swath of the voting bloc is comprised of recently arrived immigrants. In the case of the Mexican heritage population in the U.S., a constant churn of new immigrants has been a source of 'ethnic replenishment' (Jimenez 2010). The frequent entry of new immigrants allows for the maintenance of a rich cultural identity, but it also poses a challenge to increasing political mobilization. While recent trends in migration have shown a steady decline in immigrants from Mexico to the U.S. since 2005

(Gonzalez-Barrera 2015), thereby altering the ethnic composition of new immigrants from Latin America to include more Central Americans, South Americans, and Caribbean immigrants, the underlying challenge posed by mobilizing newcomers remains.

The second reason for the lower rate of Latino political participation springs directly from this constant entrance of new immigrants. That is, at any given time a large portion of the Latino population is undergoing the acculturation process. Rather than lacking the capacity for acculturation, these individuals are in the process of becoming ‘emergent Americans’—a process that can take many years, even a lifetime, as immigrants come to familiarize themselves with the political system of their country of settlement. Indeed, some scholars have argued that immigrant life-cycle effects, including age and length of residence in the U.S., explain much of the turnout discrepancy (Arvizu and Garcia 1996; Lien 2000).

A third reason is simply that Latinos, as a marginalized ethnic minority group of lower socioeconomic status, participate at lower rates than do individuals who rank higher on these scales (Calvo and Rosenston 1989; Hero and Campbell 1996; Jackson 2003; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Furthermore, because engaging in non-electoral activity is predicated on occupations that permit a certain amount of discretionary time and income, the jobs of Latinos and the immigrant working class allow little flexibility for leisure activities that may include civic participation. Likewise, making political donations to political groups, parties, or candidates is frequently used as a measure of political participation, but this requires some level of disposable income.

For these reasons, we would expect that Latinos should participate less than other groups. However, from time to time, the U.S. political system witnesses a flurry of Latino civic activism, ranging from the immigrant rights marches of 2006 to smaller scale episodes of political actions – like those carried out by the immigrant and labor advocates of the Undocu-bus of 2003, the DREAM 9 in 2013, or the group 100 Women, 100 Miles that walked to greet Pope Francis in 2015 for the cause of immigrant rights. What explains this puzzle of Latino political participation in which social and demographic indicators would suggest that many of these individuals would not participate in politics but sometimes do the opposite? Why do these individuals behave in counter-intuitive ways?

I argue that behind the scenes of such activism, groups of individuals are buttressed by a network of support from social institutions. For example, many of the DREAMer activists rely on the social support afforded to them by their affiliation with the public education system. Likewise, whether in the case of *las grandes marchas* of 2006 or the actions of groups like 100 Women, 100 Miles, it is the supportive network of churches that operate in the background that facilitate the actions we see. Without an appreciation of the organizing work of these social institutions, these events might be mischaracterized as spontaneous or based on individual action. This assumption, in turn, perpetuates the stereotype that inaction is caused by individual apathy or moral failure.

The central argument of this dissertation is that institutional ties to the public school system, places of worship, the military, labor organizations, and political parties are critical to the Latino political integration process. What the literature does not fully

appreciate, and where this project seeks to contribute, is the way in which access to these critical institutions is conditioned by generational status. This is a critical distinction within the Latino community because economic, social, and political needs vary in type and degree according to immigrant generation.

From the general pattern set forth regarding the interplay between generational status and institutional accessibility, I derive the theory of Generational Political Incorporation. In immigrant life, these two seemingly unrelated concepts come together to structure entry into the civic sphere and political action within it. Substantively, the theoretical contribution of the work lies in its ability to explain the lived reality of the newcomers and their families in this country. When and how people choose to engage with the political system has been addressed by many social scientists. The effort to predict when political activity occurs is a perennial topic of interest because a representative democracy requires vibrant participatory engagement. Thus, racial and ethnic diversification of America can challenge the applicability of previous explanations for political participation.

PRIOR APPROACHES

Prior literature has explored why Latinos participate in political activities at lower rates than do most other Americans. I classify these previous explanations into three categories—deficit-based theories of Latino culture, civic skills and social capital theories, and historical-institutional theories. I argue that each of these theoretical approaches is inadequate for a variety of reasons. While the historical-institutional

approach found in Bloemraad (2006a) and DeSipio (2011) offer by far the best hope for a fuller understanding of immigrant integration, I attempt to extend their thinking to encapsulate the integration process beyond the first generation. The theory of Generational Political Incorporation maintains a similar focus on the larger institutional-level rules and processes that structure civic engagement, but it advances the historical-institutional approach by devoting attention to subsequent generations. This intergenerational approach, I contend, offers a more complete narrative of the Latino political experience in the United States.

The first set of theories that were offered as explanations for Latino political capacity are also the earliest. These arguments, frequently post-factum, adopt a deficit orientation toward Latinos and reproduce views of Latino culture as inferior and pathological. Fortunately, scholars of color with intimate understandings of immigrant life and Latino history have responded to these theories with rigor and nuance in order to refute methodological blind-spots and disabuse the literature from misrepresentations found in such work. For example, in their exploration of political and business elites in El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juarez, Mexico D'Antonio and Form (1965) drew conclusions about Mexican and Mexican American organizational culture and their internal motivations for political participation by comparing them to the organizational capacities displayed by ethnic groups found in the northeastern United States. They argued that factors like traditional culture, primary kinship systems, fatalism, apathy, religious traditionalism, and present-time orientation where deeply held traits that explained low rates of participation among "Spanish surname" individuals.

In response, through an extensive survey of Mexican-American organizations, Tirado (1970) refuted D'Antonio and Form's erroneous conclusion that Mexican Americans were a "politically unconcerned" community (1970, 72). Tirado argues that the Mexican American model of political organization-building was to "establish undifferentiated multi-purpose organizations which will serve not only his political needs but also his economic, social and cultural ones as well" (ibid). The community's preference for organizations that took a holistic approach to the community's welfare stood in contrast to the "highly specialized organizations" more common among Anglos that were solely political in nature. Tirado's analysis was an initial instance of Latino politics scholarship refuting claims that cast Latino groups as inferior from perspectives that were deficit-oriented. Tirado's work reminded the literature that cross group comparisons mixed with a lack of cultural awareness can devolve into problematic forms of cultural relativism.

A common problem in first generation studies of Latino political culture was that they were limited to a Latino population in a specific geographic area, but the findings would later take hold as stereotypes that applied to more general understandings of Latino culture. For example, in a study of Latinos (mostly Puerto Ricans and Dominicans in New York) Nelson concluded that these groups suffered from "weak participant political cultures" (1979, 1037). In a later study, Nelson (1982) failed to acknowledge the profoundly different experiences of immigrant groups to the U.S. by stating that "almost all immigrant groups to the United States have begun their American existence at the bottom of the socioeconomic stratification system" (1982, 30). Such a statement

minimizes the overt racial violence experienced by blacks and Latinos in the South and Southwest or the codified exclusion of non-white groups including Asians. Such an equation papers over important differences that, if dutifully acknowledged, would illustrate that the "bottom" of the economic scale for European immigrants was distinct from the "bottom" of the racial hierarchy. Nelson's ideas were later refuted by Garcia and Arce (1988), who found that discrepancies in participation between Chicanos and whites was due to a limited "opportunity structure" (1988, 148). This limited opportunity structure is indicated by a lower density or lesser availability of community sites that offer immigrants the chance to volunteer.

Despite the work of social scientists who explored Latino political life through nuanced analysis and the examination of pioneering datasets like the Chicano Survey of 1979 and the Latino National Political Survey of 1989 (see de la Garza, DeSipio, J. Garcia, F. Garcia, and Falcón 1992; Garcia, Falcón, and de la Garza 1996), cultural deficit theories of Latinos persist. In the wake of anti-immigrant sentiment that swept the country during the 1990s, epitomized by Governor Pete Wilson's campaign to pass Proposition 187 in California and the nativist presidential campaign of Pat Buchanan, Samuel Huntington wrote *The Hispanic Challenge*. Huntington (2004) argued that Latinos, especially Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans, posed an existential threat to the United States. He warned that Americans should not misinterpret the "past success in assimilating millions of immigrants" from Europe because doing so would overlook "the unique characteristics and problems posed by contemporary Hispanic immigration" (2004, 32). Such a view – whereby an entire set of people is written off as

unassimilable – incites the hysteria that undergirds media and political portrayals of Latinos as a "threat" (Chavez 2008).

Many of Huntington's points are characterized by over-generalizations, faulty logic, ahistorical approaches, and methodological oversights. In response, a set of social scientists responded with historical and statistical analysis. Citrin et al. (2007) responded to each of the points levied by Huntington and found that Spanish-language dominance, for example, was exaggerated given that Latinos begin to replace Spanish with English during the second generation. This echoed prior findings that language acculturation among Latinos can be characterized as "English only by the third generation" (Alba et al. 2002). Today, demographic data has shown that English proficiency has steadily increased among Latinos, a trend driven by young, U.S. born segments of the population.[3] The authors also found that with each subsequent generation Latinos embrace various pillars of American identity and values, which had been suggested in a prior study (de la Garza, Falcón, and Garcia 1996). Indeed, Citrin and his colleagues concluded that the traditional pattern of political assimilation "appears to prevail" (2007, 31). Moreover, other scholars highlighted how Huntington's work denies the historical record of Latino exclusion (Fraga and Segura 2006). Thus, the totality of the responses to Huntington's *Hispanic Challenge* suggests that perhaps a more realistic work would document the *American Challenge* faced by Latino immigrants and their children.

The second set of explanations offered by the mainstream political science literature is broadly defined as civic skills and social capital. These theories hold that participation in civil society, including church participation, social clubs, and

neighborhood associations, are important for building community trust which then yields greater investment in community affairs. This development of social trust produces an interest in politics which is an important factor in predicting political engagement. In addition to the formation of community bonds, some of these social sites are important for building the civic skills that are transferable to the political arena. In the case of church involvement, church members that run social programs within the church or organize events also learn a particular skill set that can be used for political organizations.

While I contend that civic skills and social capital theories of political engagement help us understand political participation, the literature should acknowledge that these scholars never thoroughly treated the applicability of their argument to groups outside the white American mainstream. For example, in the case of Robert Putnam's work on social capital, with the exception of religious institutions, the cultural institutions to which he devotes the most focus – fraternal service clubs like the Elks, Kiwanis, Shriner lodges, Rotary, and Lions Clubs and, of course, bowling leagues—are largely cultural touchstones of the white, suburban, middle-class.

In the case of the civic skills model offered by the authors of *Voice and Equality*, they too devote little treatment to immigrant groups (Latinos and Asians) and the bulk of their theory was developed with a Black-White America in mind. To the extent that Verba, Brady, and Schlozman (1995) do examine Latinos, their major contribution was to pin what they perceived as a dearth of civic skills among Latinos on the failure of the Catholic Church to cultivate civic skills development—a characterization that has been contested (see Jones-Correa and Leal 2001).

Together, the theories of social capital and civic skills are not so much inapplicable to the political realities faced by racial, ethnic, and immigrant minorities so much as they are not fully generalizable. Thus, because these two theories are rooted in a sense of white normativity, we should not expect them to fully explain the processes by which racial and ethnic and immigrant minorities engage with a political system that for so long actively excluded their voices.

A third set of theories that might better explain the observed differences in political participation among minority groups are historical-institutional approaches. These more recent efforts have sought to include, to a greater degree, the role of social and governmental institutions in immigrant integration from a historical standpoint. For example, DeSipio (2011) offers a corrective to criticism of the acculturation capacity of contemporary immigrants by noting that post-1965 immigrants have faced an unlucky coincidence of arriving in the U.S. in an era of institutional decline. In lamenting the state of contemporary efforts to organize immigrants, DeSipio (2011) says that immigrants have not been targeted by the state or civil society for incorporation and have instead encountered a host country in an "era of low civic engagement" where the "organizational resources that previously existed to incorporate at least some immigrants have atrophied" (2011, 1192).

DeSipio's (2011) characterization of the contemporary state of civil society echoes what has been described elsewhere as a general pattern of a "laissez faire" approach to immigrant integration in the U.S. Irene Bloemraad's (2006a) comparative case study of immigrant integration in the U.S. and Canada argues that the Canadian

government has a taken a far more active, deliberate, and systematic approach to immigrant integration by promoting citizenship acquisition and subsidizing ethnic organizations that engage in immigrant settlement. I hope to extend the historical-institutional work of Bloemraad (2006a) and DeSipio (2011) but with a renewed focus on the most common social institutions accessed by Latinos, both immigrants and native-born, in public life.

THE PATHWAY TO POLITICS: GENERATIONAL POLITICAL INCORPORATION

The impetus of this project originated in my dissatisfaction with the term acculturation. It has been well established by the literature of immigrant settlement and incorporation that a greater level of acculturation among immigrants is associated with a higher likelihood of engagement with the politics of the country of settlement. What has remained less clear is why this is the case and how the process of political acculturation unfolds. I acknowledge that factors such as the length of residence in the host country, the development of English language skills, and the acquisition of citizenship via the naturalization process are important, but I do not believe such factors can explain the entire story of immigrant political participation. I contend that the missing piece of the puzzle is how access to social institutions can structure entry into civic life. With this piece in place, we can arrive at a richer understanding of what we mean by 'acculturation'.

The study of the political incorporation process of immigrants and their children is imperative now because, for the foreseeable future, these individuals will make up a

growing share of the U.S. population and electorate. For example, the percentage of the United States population that is an immigrant is approximately 14 percent, which marks a return to the historic level reached a century ago, and up from the nadir of 5 percent in 1965 (Pew Research Center 2015).According to population projections, the share of first generation immigrants is expected to rise to nearly one-in-five (18 percent) by 2065 and the number of second-generation Americans is projected to more than double by 2065, to 81 million, or 18 percent of the U.S. population (Cohn 2015). Thus, first generation and second generation individuals will constitute 36 percent of the U.S. population by 2065. This means that in order to understand American civic life in the future we must first understand the civic lives of racial, ethnic, and immigrant minorities in the present.

The reason that differences in generational status is so important when examining the relationship between Latinos and these five major America social institutions is because the latter vary in what I refer to as 'institutional accessibility.' Institutional accessibility is defined as the formal and informal rules regulating entry to social institutions. In the case of Latinos, much of the focus is on the rules regulating entry by citizenship status. Thus, the animating feature of Generational Political Incorporation is the dynamic relationship between institutional accessibility and generational status.

Figure 2.1 Schematic of 'Generational Political Incorporation' Theory

Need (economic, political, social)	Institutional Accessibility		
	Low	Moderate	High
High	1st Generation		
Moderate		2nd Generation	
Low			3rd Generation

Figure 2.1 provides a visual representation of the multidimensionality of the theory of Generational Political Incorporation. Along the vertical (Y) axis is an individual's degree of economic, political, and/or social necessities (labeled broadly as 'need') and along the horizontal X axis is the level of ease with which they can enter and attain membership in the major institutions of civic life. The level of need used here shares some commonalities with prior conceptualizations of the subject. A useful schematic for conceptualizing need the way it is used here among the different Latino generations is the "basic needs" portion of the "hierarchy of needs pyramid" from the field of human developmental psychology (Maslow 1943). For example, Latinos of the immigrant generation struggle to meet some of their most "basic needs" that Maslow would consider physiological like housing, food, safety, and security. Furthermore, immigrants, especially the recently arrived, face the added hurdle of trying to secure these bare necessities in an unfamiliar country. Unfortunately, the very institutions that

can equip them with helpful strategies and information, with the exception of public schools and churches, rarely cater to them as a community.

Latinos of the second and third generation struggle as well, but they do so equipped with greater political and cultural socialization at their disposal derived from a lifetime in the U.S. as well as citizenship. Thus, the schematic holds that first generation immigrants have high levels of need with low institutional accessibility; second-generation individuals have moderate levels of need with moderate levels of accessibility; and third and later-generation individuals have the lowest levels of need but enjoy the highest levels of institutional accessibility.

Figure 2.2 Schematic of Institutional Access for Immigrants in the U.S.



The differing levels of institutional accessibility are displayed in Figure 2.2. The larger width at the top of the inverted pyramid is meant to illustrate greater accessibility for Latinos. Though differences in ordering from top to bottom are not meant to be discrete, the placement of churches and public schools near the top implies that these two social sites pose few barriers to entry for Latinos, especially immigrants. Given that

citizenship and legal status is taken into consideration for military recruitment, for certain unionized jobs, and for political parties who seek to mobilize voters, these institutions populate the bottom and narrower parts of the pyramid.

Sociological studies of immigrant acculturation offer a useful perspective on the dynamic relationship between Latino immigrants and social institutions that unfolds as these sites adjust and reform the rules that govern access. In the realm of social and cultural incorporation, Alba and Nee's (2003) reformulated the traditional, one-way assimilation path to one of two-way acculturation whereby the trajectory of immigrant adaptation is no longer "almost exclusively one-directional." Instead, widespread acculturation on the part of immigrants from many different cultures creates a "composite culture" whereby the "minority changed to make itself more like the majority." In addition, they note the "historical reality that the majority changes too, and that the American mainstream has been continually reshaped by the incorporation of new groups" (2003, 64).

Where does Generational Political Incorporation fit within the literature on Latino political participation? Of the studies that have explored non-electoral forms of political participation among Latinos, few have prioritized the importance of generational status; instead, they focus on national origin differences and socioeconomic status (Hero and Campbell 1996; Wrinkle et al. 1996). Others have focused on the power of citizenship with little regard to for whether that citizenship was attained by naturalization or by birthright. A landmark study by Verba, Brady, and Schlozman (1995) on political participation in America devoted some attention to Latinos. While the authors found that

Latino citizens exhibited higher rates of non-electoral participation than did Latinos writ large, others have pointed out that a more exact approach would have compared non-citizens to citizens (Leal 2002). Verba, Brady, and Schlozman (1995) found that citizenship increased participation in some political behaviors but not others. A subsequent study found that Latino non-citizens did take part in some forms of non-electoral political engagement, but did so less often than did citizen Latinos (Leal 2002). However, these studies did not take into account differences in immigrant generation or the role of associational ties to social institutions.

Despite the growing literature on Latino political participation, only few studies have examined the mobilization of community-level organizations. Prior work has shown how Latinos with organizational ties exhibit greater electoral participation than Latinos without such connections, even if the individual was only nominally associated and not active in the organization (Diaz 1996). Among the two social institutions identified here as offering the greatest access to first-generation immigrants, religious institutions and the public education system are particularly powerful because of two principal features. The first relates to their ability to act as informational centers where leadership, in this case clergy or school administrators and teachers, can exchange information with parishioners, students, and parents about local community issues. For this reason, in her major work on immigrant political incorporation, Wong (2006) found that community-organization strategies are better for the mobilization of immigrant communities because they have greater local embededness. For example, the Catholic Church's parish system largely structures membership based on geography, which means that attendees have

mutual concerns regarding a shared area. One of the vestiges of the system is illustrated by the fact that Catholics have been found to report lower levels of 'church shopping' than Protestants (Putnam and Campbell 2010).

This local knowledge is also important because it allows for immigrants to build political orientations from the grassroots level that can then be transferred to state and national issues. On this point, Andersen (2008, 99-100) articulates that social institutions are immigrants' "first connections" with American civic life and thus help them "learn English, connect them with employers, advise them on their immigration status, provide venues for them to meet local officials and connect them with nonimmigrant neighbors to work on community issues." This ability of social institutions to foment political engagement among the immigrant generation has been described as an "informational bridge between the larger political community and immigrant communities" (Wong 1999, 146).

These sites are crucial because they operate as training grounds for future leaders of community groups. Indeed, in her study of immigrant political incorporation, Anderson (2008, 101) described a pattern in the origin of civic group leaders: "individuals who have had experience as student activists, organizing labor, or working on electoral campaigns" helped provide the "capacity for groups to make explicitly political linkages." Thus, the experiences gained in social institutions are then imported to community organizations. Later discussions in this chapter make clear how individuals enter these mainstream social institutions and later emerge as ethnic group community leaders.

The aim of the Generational Political Incorporation theory is to help forward a new understanding of Latino political participation in the United States. The value of the theory comes from its ability to illustrate how civic integration into these social institutions yields gains in political engagement at a later point in time. For immigrants, the more they leverage the connections found in the accessible institutions of churches and public schools, the greater their chances of becoming active participants in the political processes that shape their daily lives. The informal networks they create within these formal spaces (principally churches and public schools) allow for the information and knowledge-sharing that few first generation immigrants can find elsewhere. For the second-generation, many of whom may not have received a level of political socialization into the U.S. system on par with the children of U.S.-born parents (third and later-generation), their entrance into critical social locations like labor unions and the military, and affiliation with a political party, brings about a greater measure of political skills.

DEFINING IMMIGRANT GENERATIONS

A central feature of this dissertation rests on the distinction between Latinos of different generations. Delineating the limits of one generation from another is a complex process and social scientists have differed in the way that they define generational status. Generally, generational status among immigrants is determined by a mixture of two components—an individual's place of birth and the birthplace of the individual's parents. In most cases, all individuals born outside of the U.S. who now reside in the U.S. are considered first generation immigrants. However, when discussing Latino populations,

America’s colonial past presents complications for determining the generational status of contemporary immigrants. For example, the literature has struggled with how to treat Puerto Ricans, especially those that emigrate from the island and settle in the U.S. Most previous studies of immigrant incorporation when faced with how to categorize Puerto Ricans in the generational scheme have responded by simply excluding them from analysis (Ramakrishnan 2005). In an effort to be as comprehensive as possible, I include island-born Puerto Ricans selectively according to the political behavior in question. I will explain my justification for including island-born Puerto Ricans in the analysis in further detail momentarily.

The second component of determining generational status of immigrants is parental nativity. This issue arises when distinguishing second from third generation immigrants. The difference largely rests with the parentage of U.S. born individuals. In a strict sense, a member of the second generation is a person that is born in the U.S. to two immigrant parents—that is, a native-born person with parents that were born abroad. However, consider the case of a person that is born in the U.S. with parents of different nativity. In an effort to address the nuances of parental nativity, the literature has relied on further gradations beyond the classic first, second, and third generation scheme by including spaces between the first and second generation and also between the second and third generation. There is, for example, what has been deemed the 1.5 generation, which is a category that was first defined by (Rumbaut 2002) for immigrants that came to the U.S. as children.

This study treats second generation Latinos as those individuals that were born in the U.S. to either one or two immigrant parents. This means that second generation Latinos in my scheme are both members of the 2 and 2.5 generations. Third generation immigrants are those individuals that are born in the U.S. and to two U.S. born parents—or rather U.S.-born children of U.S. born individuals. Prior research also classified second, third, and later generation Latinos in this manner (Ramakrishnan 2005). Those categorized as third generation are referred to throughout the project as 'third or later generation' because this group contains Latinos of potentially fourth, fifth, etc. generations. I refrain from distinguishing the fourth generation due in part to the somewhat unclear question regarding the birthplace of the respondent's grandparents contained within the LNS.

In the case of Puerto Ricans, those who live on the island have been considered "non-citizen nationals" since the Supreme Court case *Gonzales v. Williams* (1904), and they do not enjoy the full voting rights and representation of other U.S. citizens. Island residents cannot vote for U.S. president, and the one delegate in the House of Representatives (a resident commissioner) is a non-voting member of the chamber. However, those that live in the continental U.S. can vote in all federal, state, and local elections.

With regard to the treatment of respondents who trace their nativity to the island of Puerto Rico, I group them alongside first-generation immigrants. A useful distinction to recall for the sake of making sense of the Puerto Rican case is that island-born Puerto Ricans who settle in the continental U.S. can be thought of as simultaneously first

generation immigrants and first generation Americans. Since the passage of the Jones Act in 1917, all persons born on the island of Puerto Rico are U.S. citizens. Furthermore, the position in favor of Puerto Rican independence, a position held by a substantial portion of the island population, also signifies that many Puerto Ricans consider themselves to be distinct from Americans writ large. For this reason, I propose that island-born Puerto Ricans living in the continental U.S. can be thought of as 'immigrant citizens.'

While this rich history points to a unique Puerto Rican migration experience, it is also true that they share a great deal with immigrants from other countries. Given the large influence of American culture and the ubiquity of English language use on the island because of its status as a U.S. territory, Puerto Ricans might have more English skills than immigrants from other countries. The analysis presented herein relies on survey data that includes many island-born Puerto Ricans, but because all respondents reside in the U.S. and not on the island, they are treated as first-generation immigrant citizens. Therefore, I consider island-born Puerto Ricans who reside on the continental U.S. to be *first generation* immigrants, but not *foreign-born* immigrants.

My definitions of the different generational statuses begin by outlining who I consider to be a first generation immigrant for the purpose of my analysis. Putting aside the issue of island-born Puerto Ricans for the moment, any respondent that states that he or she was born anywhere other than the fifty U.S. states is considered a first-generation immigrant. This classification is based solely on a respondent's stated place of birth and does not take into account the reported birth place of the respondent's parents. Within this broad category there are non-citizens (a pool that includes both undocumented

immigrants and legal permanent residents) and there are foreign-born individuals that have completed the naturalization process.

While one solution to this issue would be to exclude Puerto Ricans from the analysis, I will show that their inclusion offers valuable insights. After all, they too must contend with similar forces—traveling to a new country, improving their English proficiency, settling in a new city, etc. Puerto Ricans that choose to leave the island face the challenges that come with leaving one's homeland, such as settling in a new location, finding a job, and for those with children, becoming acclimated to the American education system.

Indeed, many island-born Puerto Ricans have a 'leg-up' of sorts on immigrants from Mexico, Central America, and Latin America because of the ease of travel between the island and the mainland, and the prevalence of American influence on the island in terms of economic, social, and cultural ubiquity. In 2014, net migration from Puerto Rico, determined by the number of people settling on the island from the U.S. subtracted from the number of Puerto Ricans that leave to settle in the U.S., was approximately 64,000 (Krogstad 2015). Indeed, many Puerto Ricans enjoy some ease of settlement as a vestige of the historically established communities in places like New York City and Chicago. In terms of their political integration, Puerto Ricans that settle in the continental U.S. do not need to undergo the naturalization process in order to participate in federal, state, or local elections.

For the purpose of examining non-electoral forms of participation (principally in Chapter 3), first generation immigrants include non-citizens, island-born Puerto Ricans,

and naturalized citizens. While these distinctions are important to highlight, it is still the case that all these individuals share the underlying commonality of being born outside of the mainland United States. For the portions of the analysis that focuses on electoral forms of participation (principally in Chapter 4), only naturalized citizens represent first generation respondents because they are, by definition eligible to vote, if registered.

These multiple caveats and conditions serve to illustrate just how complex an effort it is to categorize generational differences for the sake of political integration. Though I recognize that the diversity of migratory patterns and centuries-long issues relating to colonialism and international relations pose a challenge for all scholars who venture into the terrain of Latino politics and migration studies, it is important to acknowledge these issues forthrightly.

GENERATIONAL STATUS OF LATINO NATIONAL SURVEY OF 2006 SAMPLE

For the purposes of this study I use the Latino National Survey (LNS) of 2006. The LNS consists of 8,634 interviews of self-identified Latino/Hispanic residents of the United States conducted between November 17, 2005 and August 4, 2006. Investigators collected data from respondents in thirteen states that have been historically populated by Latinos, including states along the Southwestern border and traditional "gateways" like Florida and New York. Additionally, interviews were conducted with Latinos from four states that have seen substantial Latino population growth, sometimes referred to as New Destination states; these include Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, and North Carolina. In total, the sample includes Latinos from seventeen states and the District of Columbia. The LNS

offers a large sample size which allows for considerable subgroup analysis and boasts a total of 165 questions that asked a variety of questions with regard to the respondents' demographic background as well as their political orientations.

Table 2.2 Latinos by Generational Status (LNS 2006)

	N	%
First Generation Immigrants	6184	71.86
Second Generation Latinos	1465	17.02
Third and Later Generation Latinos	957	11.12
Total	8606	100.00

Following the generational status classification scheme outlined above, I begin by presenting the broadest level of classification, which is the breakdown of respondents into first, second, and third generations. Table 2.2 shows that of 8,606 valid cases there are 6,184 first-generation Latino immigrants in the study, or 71.9 percent of all respondents. There are also 1,465 individuals who are classified as second-generation Latinos (17 percent) and 957 individuals who are classified as third or later generations (11.1).

Table 2.3 Composition of First Generation Respondents (LNS 2006)			
	Cases (N)	Valid Cases (%)	1st generation sub-sample (%)
Non-Citizen	3778	43.9	61.09
Island-born Puerto Rican	531	6.17	8.59
Naturalized Citizen	1875	21.79	30.32
Second Generation Latino	1465	17.02	
Third and Later Generation Latino	957	11.12	
Total	8606	100	100

The varying citizenship statuses that exist among first-generation individuals require further specificity. Table 2.3 displays the proportion of respondents within the first generation that are non-citizens, island-born Puerto Ricans that have birthright citizenship, and immigrants that acquired their U.S. citizenship via naturalization. There are 3,778 individuals who are immigrants residing in the U.S. but have not acquired citizenship. This group of individuals makes up the majority of all first-generation immigrants at 61.1 percent. Immigrants that acquired U.S. citizenship through the naturalization process make up 30.3 percent of the first generation sub-sample, or 1,875 individuals. The 531 individuals that report being born on the island of Puerto Rico constitute 8.59 percent of the first-generation immigrants.

IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION AND 'INSTITUTIONAL ACCESSIBILITY'

My analysis begins by outlining the frequency of participation across generational statuses in the five major social institutions that constitute my primary focus—churches, schools, labor unions, the military, and political parties. Involvement with the military and political parties follows a general pattern of greater affiliation associated with movement away from the immigrant generation. Labor union membership is actually highest among the second generation, which is the only social institution that sees Latino membership peak among the children of immigrants. While the civic incorporation of Latinos is marked by a pattern of generational progression of greater participation and membership levels in these groups, there are instances in which the immigrant generation is more participatory, most notably with religious institutions.

Social institutions operate as a bridge to civic engagement and political inclusion. The development of civic skills, including understanding and communicating political issues, how to organize oneself and others, and to direct a group to carry out one or a set of political actions, can be learned by individuals in the social spaces offered by these institutions. To the degree that political participation varies, one factor is the level of connections to and engagement in social institutions, but because these connections are frequently determined by differences in immigrant generation, understanding the contours of generational differences becomes paramount. The following section describes how religious institutions, schools, the military, labor organizations and political parties

have struggled and succeeded in serving the needs and interests of Latinos, citizens or otherwise.

Religious Institutions & Latinos

Religious institutions have functioned historically as important social and spiritual centers for immigrants from all racial and ethnic backgrounds in the United States (Leonard et al. 2005; Foley and Hodge 2007). Houses of worship and religious communities have provided immigrants with two important needs—a safe space to express their ethnic identities and an institution that links them to their new host country. Research supports the history of a dual role among many groups that were once considered newcomers to the U.S., including Irish and German immigrants (Dolan 1975), Chinese immigrants (Yang 1999; Yang and Ebaugh 2001), and immigrants from the Philippines (Cherry 2013).

Among Latino immigrants, the use of transnational networks connecting churches in their countries of origin with satellite churches set up in host country as a way to transition from one country to another is a common practice (see Ebaugh and Chafetz 2002). These cross-border linkages aid immigrants in the migration process as they choose to settle in areas with established bases of support that allow them to maintain ties to the home country after migration. On the migration trail itself, migrants rely on their faith and spirituality to provide resilience and succor in the course of their sometimes arduous journeys across borders (Hagan and Ebaugh 2003). Upon arrival, however, immigrants can feel beset by a psychological sense of dislocation in the host country. To

fend off the negative effects after migration, Hirschman (2004) argues that immigrants turn to religious institutions to fulfill their needs for the three R's: refuge, respect, and resources. Immigrants seek refuge in their religion after undergoing traumatic events at the initial stage of arrival; they seek the respect accorded to their faith's affirmation of their self-worth; and religion can provide tangible resources for solving practical problems like finding housing, employment, and navigating public bureaucracies. For these and other reasons, it is important to appreciate the religion and migration nexus and how it is that religious institutions affect immigrants at multiple stages of the migration and acculturation processes.

Churches can also step in at the crucial moments when their immigrant members face the punitive consequences associated with their immigration status, such as for the many Central American migrants that sought sanctuary in churches in the 1980s. A generation later, immigrants facing deportations have also reverted to the use of churches as shields from deportation. Most notably, Mexican immigrant Elvira Arellano defied deportation orders and sought shelter with her American-born son Saul for a full year at their neighborhood Methodist Church in Chicago. The actions of Arellano set off an interfaith network of religious groups that support immigrants and the immigrant rights movement nationwide.

At a broader level, Latinos in the U.S. have been historically and popularly understood as a religious people. Throughout the development of Latino political power, churches and religious groups have played both central and supportive roles. Decades

prior to the Chicano Movement, many of the first mutual aid societies (or *mutualistsas*) like the *Alianza Hispano Americano* and the *Sociedad Caballeros de Nuestra Señora Guadalupe* were populated by Catholic lay activists (Espinosa 2007). Cesar Chavez, perhaps the most prominent figure of the Chicano Movement, was a deeply religious man (Dalton 2003).[4] Chavez's religious commitment was nowhere more evident than in his fasts. In these personal sacrifices for the movement, Chavez would pray throughout and end the action by breaking his fast with bread and water alongside other members. Religious imagery in the form of La Virgen de Guadalupe and Catholic social teachings were spiritual guideposts that became intertwined with United Farmworkers Union.[5] As documented by Prouty (2006), Catholic Church leaders also had a hand in UFW efforts in the way that they built a broad base of support for the UFW movement and the critical role they played in ending the grape strike and boycott.

Another prominent Catholic leader during the Chicano Movement was Ricardo Cruz, leader of *Católicos Por La Raza* (CPLR), who criticized the Catholic Church for a lack of responsiveness to the needs of the Chicano community in San Diego and Los Angeles (Garcia 2009). Groups more directly tied to the Catholic Church itself, such as *Las Hermanas* (Latina nuns) fought for Latina political empowerment inside and outside the church (Medina 2004). PADRES (*Padres Asociados para Derechos Religiosos, Educativos y Sociales*, a group of Latino priests) sought to reform the church in favor of more culturally relevant ministry and a commitment to political activism. Scholars have also chronicled how Latino parishes were involved in community organizing, making

possible the efforts of groups such as Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS) and other Alinksy/IAF groups in Texas (Warren 2001; Wood 2005).

With changes brought about by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, non-Christian immigrants from Asia and the Middle East arrived in the U.S. and found less developed religious institutions to meet their needs, but most immigrants from Latin America found a long-established Catholic Church. Nevertheless, the American Catholic Church has faced a set of problems in catering to its Latino congregants—failing to meet the needs of a rising Latino middle class (Greeley 1994) and issues with the representation of Latinos among the Church's leadership positions (Leal 2010). More recently, the Catholic Church has been a vocal advocate on behalf of its Latino congregants on the all-important issue of immigration and immigrant rights. For example, Heredia (2011) documented how the Catholic Church was a key player in the organization of the immigrant rights marches that took place across the country in 2006. This comports with the view offered by Portes and Rumbaut (2006, 304) that churches do not necessarily make policy but can "resist it when seen as inimical to the welfare of its members" and can protect their immigrant members from "the worse consequences of discrimination." The public stance of the Catholic Church in opposition to H.R. 4477 and the support it offered for the spring 2006 immigrant rights marches had ramifications for civic participation levels. One study showed that Latino Catholics were more likely to have taken part in the protests than were Latinos of other denominations (Barreto et al. 2009).

Incursion into political issues on behalf of Latino church members has not been limited to the Catholic Church. Protestant groups have also voiced support for their growing number of Latino congregants, including during the immigrant rights marches (Espinosa 2007). In 2009, the Board of Directors of the National Association of Evangelicals approved a resolution calling for a "sound, equitable process for currently undocumented immigrants who wish to assume the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship to earn legal status" (NAE 2009). Two years later the Southern Baptist Convention followed suit by stating that it disapproved of "any bigotry or harassment against any persons, regardless of their country of origin or legal status" before stating their support for "a just and compassionate path to legal status" for undocumented immigrants (SBC 2011). Given this multi-denominational effort to protect the interests of Latino congregants and parishioners, coupled with the high religiosity of Latinos in comparison to other groups[6] (Perl, Greely, and Gray 2006; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Suro and Lugo 2007; Stark 2008), it appears that religious organizations are well-poised to shape the civic incorporation of Latinos regardless of citizenship status.

If affiliation with religious institutions can motivate Latinos to engage civically and politically, then are Latinos with no ties to religious institutions at a disadvantage? Does the advantage of connections with religious institutions resonate more strongly for immigrant Latinos who need the most help in finding pathways to engagement? Conversely, have Latinos of later generations replaced these connections with other equally beneficial social ties developed from their greater socioeconomic or occupational statuses?

Other work has voiced skepticism about the potential of religious institutions to boost political participation among Latinos, especially among Catholics. A landmark study of political participation argued that the hierarchical and centralized nature of the Catholic Church, the denomination most common among Latinos, served them poorly in terms of developing the civic skills necessary to fully engage with the American political system (Verba, Brady, and Schlozman1995). Later research, however, showed that the key measure was an individual's degree of attachment to their religious institution in the form of church attendance, which led to an increase in political participation among Latinos (DeSipio 2007; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001).

Religious institutions are characterized by a relatively high degree of accessibility for immigrants. For example, immigrants in the 1980s claimed sanctuary in churches as asylum seekers, and the more recent use of sanctuary is by undocumented immigrants seeking protection on spiritual grounds from deportation. For Latinos of later generations, churches continue to play a primary role in promoting civic engagement. Jones-Correa and Leal (2001) state that "…while churches play an important part in American civic life in general, in the absence of other civic associations they play a disproportionate role in the civic and political lives of Latinos" (2001, 763). Indeed, religious institutions along with their attendant groups have been described as "the single most important repository of social capital in America" (Putnam 2000, 66). Moreover, churches often act as political leadership incubators—places where social capital and civic skills are first practiced and developed (Cavendish 2000; Chaves and Higgins 1992; Robnett 1996; Tate 1994; Verba et al. 1993).

Scholars have documented how religious institutions emerge as one of the primary ways that members of the immigrant generation become politically socialized. In documenting this feature of churches, Andersen (2008) found that when Catholic Charities of Fort Collins, Colorado did not have the staff or resources to address an immigration or refugee issue, they could refer immigrants to the Immigration Office at Catholic Charities at the national level. This, she argued, was an example of how local organizations could harness the organizational capacity of their larger, resource-rich national counterparts. In speaking to this larger issue, she stated that immigrant integration can be boosted by "helpful links with larger umbrella groups and with well-positioned individuals and organizations" (2008, 96). One reason they do so is because churches, as a consequence of their roles as community pillars, can operate as hubs for other groups that can provide specialized services outside church capacity.

In addition, churches offer their immigrant members the chance to engage with the political system without explicit intention. By taking care of the routine business religious institutions must do to thrive, members involved in such activities benefit in ways that are unbeknownst to them. In her study of immigrant congregations, Levitt (2008, 778) found that "Even when religious institutions did not have explicit political agendas, people learned about fundraising, organizing and leadership by participating, which they then applied to other settings. Information was disseminated and opinions were formed." Such political learning is made all the more simple for immigrants when non-immigrant co-ethnics are present to help. Immigrants who were a part of congregations with few native-born members, and thus, few people that could serve as

access points to the U.S. political system, were more likely to be isolated, and in the words of Levitt, “on their own” (2008, 780).



In order to understand Latino connection to religious institutions across generations, I begin by showing the rates of church attendance. Regular church-goers are those individuals that report attending church beyond special occasions such as major holidays and weddings/funerals. While there are some differences, we see a general pattern of less frequent church attendance with movement away from the immigrant generation. Figure 2.3 shows the proportion of sample respondents who are classified as regular church-goers across the three generations. A comparison of means test across the three groups reveals that the differences are significant between first-generation immigrants (76.78 percent) and second-generation Latinos (68.41 percent), as well as between first-generation immigrants and third or later generation Latinos (66.49 percent).

These results indicate that the religious practices of first generation immigrants are unique in that the bond between foreign-born Latinos and the American churches they attend is the strongest. These figures also exemplify the way that religious institutions are highly accessible to foreign-born individuals.

The Public School System

Schools have long been a primary way that generations of the nation's immigrants who settled in urban areas have undergone processes of acculturation (Tyack 1974). For immigrant students and their parents, schools offer immigrant families a space where they can familiarize themselves with features of U.S. civic life. Prior work has highlighted the important role that schools play as agents of socialization, which has ramifications for civic engagement (Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 2003) because students experience firsthand the norms of democratic governance and can acquire civic skills (Hochschild and Scovronick 2003). Scholars interested in schools' capacity for immigrant integration have focused on high school civics courses as an obvious point of departure.

Results from prior studies suggest that immigrant students derive more from civics coursework than do their native-born peers, who can acquire this information more readily from other venues. Callahan et al. (2008, 25) explained why this is the case by stating, "In lieu of parental knowledge of the civics system, the social studies curriculum of the schools appears to guide these students' [children of immigrant parents] civic

development.”. Thus, public schools, by way of social studies and civic classes, can fill in the gaps in this subject area for immigrant children and U.S.-born children of immigrants.

This is not to suggest that U.S. schooling alone is a panacea for immigrant students. Indeed, those that are undocumented, despite gaining access to public education, disproportionately attend schools with constrained resources that struggle to provide students a minimum of what they need and rarely can offer them the full educational and social services they deserve (Gonzales et al. 2015). Nonetheless, the results herein strongly suggest that, all else equal, immigrants that have received some U.S. schooling exhibit higher levels of civic and political integration than immigrants that never experienced the U.S. education system.

Like the church participants identified by Levitt (2008) who learned applicable political skills, so too can immigrant parents who take part in the activities of their child’s school. These immigrant parents and students who develop a relationship with the U.S. school system get the chance to engage in political advocacy by osmosis. In paying attention to how school policies affect their children and advocating on the behalf of their child’s well-being in PTAs or by informal discussions with teachers and administrators, individuals who would otherwise consider themselves to be disengaged from politics “become civically engaged without even realizing that they are being ‘political’” (DeSipio 2011, 1191). Parents whose children share a classroom may be tasked with organizing a school event or field trip and in the process develop relationships around mutual interests. These mutual interests that arise from informal social communication may serve as the building blocks for political action, like lobbying the school board or

district administrators on behalf of their school. By coming together informally for issues that are not overtly political, Latino parents become comfortable in exerting their civic voices so that when the time comes to engage in political organizing and advocacy they can do so more easily. In fact, prior work using the LNS has found that when compared to parents of later generations, the highest rate of PTA meeting attendance was found among first-generation parents (Fraga and Frost 2010).

Moreover, schools are places where society molds future leaders, and student groups have frequently been at the center of many political movements. In the past, groups like the United Mexican American Students and the Chicano Youth Organization played a major part during the period of the Chicano Movement. Today, El Movimento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlan (MECHA) remains a force on college campuses across the country since its founding in 1969. In the past, Latino political leaders/ethnic entrepreneurs have used their involvement in student groups as stepping-stones to other organizations. For example, Jose Angel Gutierrez and Mario Compean used the Mexican American Youth Organization (MAYO) as an “apprenticeship training in community-based and campus based politics” (Estrada et al. 1981, 123) and then applied those learned tactics to their strategies for La Raza Unida Party.

The principal reason that the public school system emerges as the social site that offers the greatest amount of institutional accessibility to Latino immigrant families rests on the victories gained through the court system. As a consequence of the decision in *Lau v. Nichols* (1974) mandating services for English-language learners followed by the constitutionally guaranteed right of undocumented students to a K-12 education in *Plyler*

v. Doe (1982), public schools have stood apart in their accessibility for immigrant families. Indeed, public schools are only rivaled by churches and houses of worship in their freedom to serve immigrants with little regard for citizenship status.



Figure 2.4 displays the percentages of first generation immigrant respondents that acquired some education at a school in the U.S. Only about a quarter of all first-generation immigrants reported having attended a school in the U.S. Many immigrants arrive in the U.S. as children brought along by their parents, and disaggregation by a respondent's age of arrival in the U.S. reveals how much more common affiliation with the public school system is among many first generation immigrants. While only a quarter of all first generation immigrants in the sample report having attending school in

the U.S., this is largely a function of the fact that the average age of arrival is 22. Among respondents that arrived at age 12 or younger, 81 percent reported attending a school in the U.S. The rate of U.S. school attendance gradually decreases as the age of arrival increases. The rates of U.S. school attendance among first generation immigrant that arrived as teenagers, whether at 15 or younger or 18 or younger, are lower than those that arrived as younger children—71 percent and 54 percent, respectively.

Upon further disaggregation, it is evident that the frequency of U.S. schooling varies according to citizenship status. While only 13.5 percent of non-citizens have attended a school in the U.S. that number is 44.5 percent among naturalized U.S. citizens and even higher among island-born Puerto Ricans (50.1 percent). These education gaps may result in differential rates of civic participation. Those individuals that attended school in the U.S. are likely at an advantage for civic engagement because they have undergone at least some socialization by the education system.

Unions and Organized Labor

For many reasons, Latinos and labor unions have had a complicated relationship. One reason is that by the time Latinos had grown numerically and were dispersed in enough places throughout the country to warrant attention, labor unions had been decimated by structural changes in the economy and trade liberalization. The most recent figures on unionization in the U.S. shows that the percent of wage and salary workers who were members of unions was 10.7 percent (14.6 million individuals) in 2016, down from 20.1 percent (17.7 million individuals) in 1983 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017).

For their part, Latinos have lower rates of union membership (8.8 percent) than do Blacks (13.0 percent), Whites (10.5 percent), and Asian workers (9.0 percent) (Ibid.).

A second reason for the lack of immigrants in the ranks of organized labor is racial and ethnic segregation of the labor market. The under-representation of immigrants in high skill manufacturing jobs (where unionization is more common) along with their over-representation in service sector and agricultural jobs (where unionization is less common) means that few can access the resources and advantages that accompany unionized workplaces. Moreover, at the time that unions in the U.S. exercised the most power (such as the United Auto Workers and the United Steel Workers), Latinos were largely absent from these manufacturing industries due to discrimination and because relatively few Latinos lived in the Midwest at the time. Instead, the vast majority of the Latino workforce was historically concentrated in the Southwest, where union presence was weak and prominent sectors of the economy were less likely to be unionized, especially agriculture.

Throughout much of the 20th century, the leadership of organized labor not only ignored the task of organizing U.S.-born Latinos or Mexican immigrant workers but at times adopted a hostile posture. The American Federation of Labor, concerned by what it viewed as a worrying increase in Mexican immigrant workers in nonagricultural industries, voted at their 1919 convention to lobby for more restrictive immigration legislation vote. This culminated in the AFL's support of the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act, which instituted restrictive quotas for immigrants based on national origin.

Despite the challenges posed to widespread unionization of Latinos in the Southwest, there were a few notable instances of labor militancy on the part of immigrant workers, oftentimes led by women. This was the case during the ILGWU Dressmakers' Strike in 1933, in which Mexican immigrant women went on strike in downtown Los Angeles, and in San Antonio, where pecan-shellers went on strike led by Emma Tenayuca. While much of the literature in the relationship between Latinos and organized labor has been dominated by the Chicano Movement experience due to the attention focused upon Cesar Chavez and the UFW, labor unions have also helped bring Latinos from other national–origin groups into the political arena. For example, the International Cigar Maker's Union, composed largely of Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Dominicans, represented tobacco-rollers (*torcederos*) and helped them to organize politically in New York and Florida.

Anti-immigrant sentiment within the labor movement continued well into the contemporary era, as evinced by the AFL-CIO's support for the employer sanction provision of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. However, since that time, organized labor has turned a page on the issue of immigration and has gradually sought to make unions more accessible to immigrant workers. Beginning in1989, a group of Latino labor activists protested at the AFL-CIO's convention the union's continued disregard for immigrant workers and a failure to place Latinos in leadership positions. The efforts culminated in the 1995 'New Voices' leadership which included Linda Chavez-Thompson, the first Latina to be a member of the AFL-CIO executive council. With new leadership that was more attuned to the needs and challenges of immigrant workers in

place, the Labor Immigrant Organizing Network (LION) drafted a resolution calling for the AFL-CIO to support amnesty for undocumented workers and the repeal of employer sanctions.

Following the adoption of the resolution, the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO released a statement entitled “Recognizing Our Common Bonds” which stated:

How the union movement reaches out to immigrant workers cuts to the heart of what unions are all about. Many union members, ambivalent and unsure of the AFL-CIOs policy on immigration, are uncertain as to whether the changes they see in their workplaces and in their communities are good for them and their families. In a global economy, in which employers pit workers against each other, the fate of both native-born workers and immigrant workers are linked. Employers that try to exploit immigrant workers are the same ones that fight all workers' rights. The most effective way to counter the strength and financial resources of exploitative employers is through a strong union movement that includes all workers, regardless of where they were born, their race, gender or sexual orientation. Unions can most effectively advocate for working families when we recognize our common bonds and work together to tackle tough issues.

In the wake of this major policy change, episodes of political activism on the part of organized labor on behalf of immigrant rights followed with regularity. A major action was the Immigrant Worker Freedom Rides of the Undocu-Bus in 2003. Importantly, with the support of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and Union of Needle-trades, Industrial and Textile Employees, and the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union (UNITE HERE), a mix of undocumented and citizen workers toured cities across the country to bring awareness to causes for immigrant rights. This action, contends Shaw (2008), laid the foundation for strengthening the relationship between unions and the immigrant rights community. The Freedom Rides mark the first substantial effort by unions to support immigrant rights since the AFL-CIO changed its platform in 2000 to support amnesty for undocumented immigrants.

Since that time, some of the most fervent and successful Latino political efforts have come from service sector unions that cater to immigrant workers. No better example of this new commitment on the part of organized labor exists than the Culinary Workers and Hotel Workers Union whose members staff many of the service jobs in the Las Vegas hotel and casino industry. These unions have not only organized workers but have made them a political force that has shaped national and state politics in powerful ways. Beyond the traditional tasks of ensuring worker safety and fair compensation, these unions provided workers with an education in U.S. politics.

Voter education campaigns during the 2008 presidential race encapsulate the important work that the Culinary Workers Union undertake in order to familiarize immigrant members in U.S. politics. As many union officials were aware, the word caucus had no Spanish translation and posed a challenge for immigrant voter mobilization campaigns. Therefore, unions held Spanish language tutorials that explained the process through mock-caucuses as a way to further increase the probability of turning out on Election Day (Hamburger and Reynolds 2008; Kossan 2008).

Union ties with political organizations aid the political integration and activation process. In echoing this point, Andersen (2008) showed how union activity in Lansing, Michigan benefited immigrant communities by establishing a relationship between the union and the local Democratic Party because immigrants in Lansing were more likely to have links to political parties.

Once Latinos and immigrants gain access to these social institutions and move into leadership roles, they can inflect the purpose or agenda of these groups by bringing

in the knowledge necessary to aid the incorporation of other ethnic group members. For example, social unionism, or promoting activity in the service of a larger social agenda beyond traditional union organizing, has been identified as a unique development of greater Latino involvement in labor organizing (Trumpbour and Bernard 2002). This process by which Latinos reshape, reconfigure, and repurpose organizations in order to reflect a collective agenda has roots in Tirado's (1970) assertion that Mexican Americans had a tendency to create multi-purpose organizations that addressed various needs in order to ensure a holistic, rather than narrow, form of community well-being.



Figure 2.5 illustrates the lack of accessibility faced by first-generation immigrants in attaining union membership. Whereas only 8.5 percent of first-generation immigrant in the LNS report some form of union affiliation (either by their own membership or that of a close family member), the rate for second-generation (23.1 percent) and third or later generation Latinos (22.4) are twice as high.

Union membership among first generation immigrants is lower than that of Latinos of later generations. Access to a unionized job is less common for foreign-born immigrants for a whole host of reasons. One reason is that unionized workplaces are often in the public sector and are therefore frequently available only to U.S. citizens. One example of citizenship requirements for certain federal jobs is the stipulation that airport screeners be citizens as stipulated under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act passed by Congress in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. As a consequence, an estimated 8,000 non-citizen screeners were ordered removed from their jobs (Flaherty 2002). In the months that followed, immigration raids involving multiple federal agencies detained about 800 airport workers under "Operation Tarmac" (Cornelius 2004) and the hiring process instituted afterward diminished the number of immigrant minority workers in the field (Alonso-Zaldivar and Oldham 2002).

The Military

The U.S. Armed Forces have long recognized the need for incorporating America's immigrants into their ranks. A comprehensive report on immigrants in the military published in 2005 stated that roughly 8,000 non-citizens were enlisting every year (Hattiangadi et al. 2005). Beyond the fact that the military in times of war would prefer to draw from as large a pool of potential recruits as possible, senior military officials have supported immigrant enlistment on the grounds of national values. For example, in a hearing titled "Contributions of Immigrants to the United States Armed Forces" held by the Senate Committee on Armed Services on July 10, 2006, Sen. Ted Kennedy asked Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Marine General Peter Pace

about the dependability and courageousness of immigrants in the armed forces. General Pace attested to the quality of their service citing performance and attrition statistics, stating "[Immigrant soldiers and marines] are extremely dependable… some 8, 9, or 10 percent fewer immigrants wash out of our initial training programs than do those who are currently citizens. Some 10 percent or more than those who are currently citizens complete their first initial period of obligated service to the country" (Senate Hearing 109-884).

Non-citizen immigrants have served in the U.S. armed forces in every conflict in the history of the United States. At one point, over 20 percent of the Union Army during the Civil War was foreign-born (Millet and Maslowski 1994; for an overview of the early history of immigrants in the U.S. military see Bredbenner 2012). More recent figures show that foreign-born individuals represent nearly 8 percent of the 1.4 million active duty military personnel and that about 13 percent of them were not citizens (Stock 2009). Additionally, about 20 percent of all recipients of the Congressional Medal of Honor for military service have gone to immigrants (Immigration Policy Center 2003). According to the Hispanic Medal of Honor Society, of the 60 Hispanic recipients, many were born abroad, including six soldiers in Puerto Rico and five in Mexico.[7]

An exemplary case of immigrant participation in the military is that of retired United States Army Lieutenant Colonel Alfred V. Rascon, who was born in Chihuahua, Mexico. In his duties as a medic on March 16, 1966 in Vietnam, then-Specialist Rascon ignored directions to hold his position and placed himself between artillery and explosives and wounded soldiers, shielding multiple soldiers from further injury. Despite

sustaining life-threatening injuries he survived and managed to save the lives of others. For these series of heroic actions Rascon was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor by President Bill Clinton in 2000. Rascon enlisted in the army as a legal permanent resident in 1963 and shortly after being honorably discharged from active duty became a naturalized citizen in 1967 (Kadane 2000). Rascon would later go on to serve as Director of the Selective Service System under President George W. Bush. The courageousness displayed by Rascon highlights the lengths that he and other immigrants were willing to go in order to defend their adopted country regardless of their citizenship status.

Latino veterans have also been a source of leadership in community affairs since the earliest examples of Latino interest group formation. For example, the *Orden de Hijos de America* and LULAC were founded by groups of Latino WWI veterans who returned to home with renewed aspirations to improve the economic and social status of their communities through the political system. So too individuals like Hector P. Garcia, who founded the American GI Forum, a group initially established to fight the denial of services to Mexican American WWII veterans by the Department of Veterans Affairs. The struggle on the part of the group's leaders, many of them veterans themselves, to address veterans' issues served only as a point of departure. In later periods the American GI Forum broadened its mission to include voting rights, equal treatment in the criminal justice system, and campaigns against school desegregation (Allsup 1977).

This deep record of military service has enshrined military service as an important point of distinction within the Latino community. As a consequence, reverence for the Armed Forces is widespread. Studies about Latinos and their views about the military as

an institution has found that, compared to Anglos, Latinos are more likely to encourage young people to enlist in the military (Leal 2005). The current struggle by undocumented immigrants to join the military is yet another example of how the armed services have historically functioned as a way for immigrants to actualize their pro-American sentiments (Jones 1985). More than simply paying homage to this history, military service among Latinos continues to be pursued because it has offered many working class Latinos a path to upward mobility.

Accessibility of the military as a social institution is important for Latino political integration because prior research has highlighted the positive force that military service can play in the civic lives of veterans after completing their service. For example, research has found that, with the exception of Vietnam-era veterans, servicemembers from across different U.S. conflicts were more likely than their civilian counterparts to vote (Teigen 2006). For Latinos specifically, military service is also associated with higher levels of political engagement (Leal 1999).

Immigrant service in the military is governed by a range of statutes, but it is generally the case that branches of the military are limited to recruit only U.S. citizens or Legal Permanent Residents. The Army enlistment statute states that, "In time of peace, no person may be accepted for original enlistment in the Army unless he is a citizen of the United States or has been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence…" (United States Code Sections 3253 and 8253 of Title 10). While there is no specific statute limiting enlistment in the Navy and Marine Corps, in practice these branches adhere to the same rules.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the military has instituted three major initiatives aimed at boosting enlistment by non-citizens. The first of these was Executive Order 13269, which is frequently referred to as the "expedited citizenship" program. Signed on July 3, 2002, it authorized all noncitizens who have served honorably in the U.S. armed forces on or after Sept. 11, 2001, to immediately file for citizenship. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 permanently modified existing immigration law by reducing the peacetime waiting period for citizenship applications from 3 years to 1 year of honorable active-duty service.

Executive Order 13269 also stipulated that family members could apply for posthumous citizenship on behalf of their deceased service members. The death of Lance Corporal Jose Gutierrez showcased this need for further rules regarding non-citizen military participation. At the age of 22, Lance Corporal Gutierrez was one of the first U.S. servicemen killed in the War in Iraq. Gutierrez entered the U.S. as an undocumented immigrant from Guatemala at the age of 14 after the death of both of his parents. Though he received LPR status in 1999, Gutierrez was not yet a citizen when he died. Gutierrez would ultimately go on to receive posthumous citizenship, something that prior to the 2002 Executive Order was granted only through a symbolic act of Congress that carried no benefits for next of kin. Additional provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 extended immigration benefits to the surviving spouse, children, and parents of deceased servicemembers. Since 2001, the military has granted posthumous citizenship to over one hundred military service members (Batalova 2008).

Since the posthumous and expedited citizenship programs at the outset of the War in Iraq, the military has continued to alter military policy related to recruitment of non-citizens. In 2008, the military instituted the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program, which allows the U.S. armed forces to attract and retain foreign nationals with language, medical, and other skills critical to military readiness and national security by expediting their path to citizenship.

Second, the military further streamlined the naturalization process for service members with the Naturalization at Basic Training Initiative (NBTI) in 2009. The program was designed to promote citizenship and expedite processing times for naturalization procedures and even allowed for naturalization ceremonies at basic training locations. Many active duty military personnel have made use of naturalization during their time in service. Between October 2001 and October 2015 109,321 members of the military stationed in the U.S. and abroad had naturalized, with 11,069 of those service members becoming citizens during USCIS naturalization ceremonies in 34 foreign countries (USCIS 2015).

Third, the military has supported the DREAM Act, which would allow unauthorized immigrants brought to the U.S. as young children to enlist in the armed forces and gain citizenship. Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness David S. Chu expressed sympathy with the situation of many young undocumented immigrants in his testimony in support of the DREAM Act components of S.B. 2611. Chu wished to enlist more willing non-citizen immigrants but could not due to regulations regarding the recruitment of individuals with unauthorized status. He stated

that “If their parents are undocumented or in immigration limbo, most of these young people have no mechanism to obtain legal residency even if they have lived most of their lives here. Yet many of these young people may wish to join the military, and have the attributes needed—education, aptitude, fitness, and moral qualifications. In fact, many are high school diploma graduates, and may have fluent language” (Senate Hearing 109-884). Following the changes under the DACA program, those that had completed their temporary adjustment of status and qualified for the requirements of the presidents' deportation reprieve program were eligible to enlist.



The Latino National Survey asked respondents if they have any level of association with the armed services. Although the survey did not distinguish between various ties to the military, Figure 2.6 shows how first-generation immigrants are far less

likely to claim affiliation with the military. Less than one-in-five Latino immigrants (18.53 percent) claim some affiliation to the military compared to majorities of second-generation Latinos (57.41 percent) and third or later generation Latinos (74.29 percent).

Political Parties

The non-citizen vote was a major feature of the American political system from a bygone era that facilitated immigrant incorporation and could be leveraged by political parties. The role of citizenship is important for the study of political participation because only citizens are legally permitted to vote in national elections.[8] However, for nearly 150 years non-citizens were considered part of the electorate in some states (Raskin 1993). The number of states permitting "alien suffrage" peaked in 1875 with twenty-two states (nearly half of all U.S. states at the time) allowing non-citizens to vote. Not until 1926, at the height of anti-immigrant sentiment following the end of WWI and in the immediate aftermath of the national origin quotas instituted by the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, did the last state end alien suffrage (Harper-Ho 2000).

Party identification has been described as the engine driving voting behavior and participation in the United States (Campbell et al. 1960; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976; Abramson and Aldrich 1982). Yet, in spite of their impressive historic capacity to socialize immigrants into American politics, political parties in the modern era have failed to meet the needs of many in the Latino community. For example, in his landmark study of immigrant political integration in New York, Jones-Correa (1998) found that "rather than lowering the costs for marginal political players, the Queens Democratic

Party…raises them…If actors are at the margins of electoral politics, as immigrants are, then they are ignored; if political players rise to the challenge of the machine, they are thwarted. Only if the new political actors succeed in mobilizing themselves on their own does the party organization attempt to bring them into its circle" (1998, 70). This propensity to engage in "selective mobilization" (Wong 2006) is responsible for the creation of a class of 'low-propensity' voters that include young people, the newly naturalized, and the poor or working class voters; it may also contribute to the rise in disaffiliation with political parties (Hajnal and Lee 2011).

Recent campaigns have invested greater funds in the "air-war" of television and radio advertising instead of the "ground game" of door-to-door canvassing and personal phone calls, despite research showing that on-the-ground/door-to-door GOTV efforts are more valuable for increasing turnout, especially among Latinos (Michelson 2005). This has undermined the potential for political parties to act as powerful agents of Latino political integration. As a consequence of these structural developments in modern campaigning, funds are targeted to narrower sets of voters in a limited set of places (battleground states) on a limited basis (election time). Nonetheless, when parties are sufficiently motivated they can concentrate a unique set of resources that help facilitate Latino political integration. Again, returning to the example of Nevada politics, it was well documented prior to the hotly contest 2008 race for president that political parties, notably the Democratic Party, engaged in a series of training sessions in Spanish in order to familiarize many Latino and immigrant partisans about the caucus process (Ball 2007; Hennessey 2007; Montopli 2008).



The insufficient effort by political parties to regularly court immigrants is evident by the level of partisan affiliation within the Latino National Survey sample. While 60.7 percent of first-generation immigrants state that they identify with at least one of the two major political parties, either Republican or Democrat, that figure increases to 64.3 percent among second-generation Latinos and 69.8 percent among third or later-generation Latinos. Indeed, a majority of Latino immigrants affiliate with at least one of the two major political parties but still lag behind the levels of attachment of native-born Latinos.

Hypotheses

While I have argued that institutions – including churches, schools, political parties, the military, and labor unions – play an outsized role within the civic lives of Latinos, it is yet to be seen whether they or individual socio-economic factors (such as

educational attainment, income, and English language proficiency) are more determinative in increasing civic participation.

In order to compare how immigrant generation, social institutions, and socioeconomic status shape Latino political incorporation, this dissertations proposes three hypotheses, each with a corresponding cluster of variables.

The first hypothesis examines factors relating to the immigrant experience and how an immigrant's degree of acculturation can shape civic participation.

H1. Immigrant Acculturation Hypothesis: Among first-generation immigrants, those who have spent a greater percentage of their life in the U.S., possess greater English fluency, and have undergone the naturalization process will be more likely to engage in civic participation—both non-electoral and electoral (among those that are eligible).

The Institutional Socialization Hypothesis is the second hypothesis and it proposes that social institutions operate as important conduits to greater civic participation among Latinos, although their benefits are sometimes conditioned by the immigrant's citizenship or generational status.

H2. Institutional Socialization Hypothesis: Latinos who claim affiliation with one or more of five social institutions (School, Church, Political Parties, Military, and

Labor Unions) will be more likely to engage in civic participation—both non-electoral and electoral (among those that are eligible).

The third hypothesis makes a prediction about how individual-level differences in socio-economic status translate into patterns of civic participation.

H3. Socio-Economic Status Hypothesis: *Those immigrants with greater socioeconomic resources will be more likely to engage in civic participation—both non-electoral and electoral (among those that are eligible).*

This set of hypotheses reframes Latino civic participation into individual-level, institutional-level, and acculturation-level factors as the three determinative spheres of influence on immigrant political incorporation. Through testing these hypotheses, we can better understand the contours of Latino civic participation, specifically whether civic activity among the immigrant generation arises over time (i.e. acculturation), whether it is a matter of interactions with institutions (i.e. schools, churches, organized labor, the military, or political parties), or reflects gains in socioeconomic resource (i.e. income and education). The chapters that follow test the validity of the theory of Generational Political Incorporation and illustrate that the interaction between generational status and institutional accessibility is critical for appreciating the intergenerational process of political integration that unfolds among Latinos.

NOTES

1. According to analysis conducted by Highton and Burris (2002), the average turnout between the six elections from 1976 to 1996 was 49.7% for Latinos compared with 67.3% among Anglos and 59.0% among Blacks. The figures provided by Highton and Burris (2002) with regard to turnout are higher than reported Census figures because they exclude respondents who responded with "do not know" or "not reported" to the turnout question. Census Bureau publications treat these two groups of respondents as nonvoters.

2. While Latino voter turnout decreased from 2008 to 2012, it was also the case that other groups, except for African Americans, witnessed a decrease as well. This was a function of the fact that the 2008 election was a particularly 'high-turnout' election.

3. According to data from the Pew Hispanic Center, in a fourteen year span between 2000 and 2014, the share of Latinos age 5 to 17 years old has increased from 73 percent to 88 percent.

4. Reies Lopez Tijerina, another important figure of the Chicano Movement, was also deeply religious. His personal religious journey is considered more complex than that of Chavez as Tijerina was raised Catholic and converted to Pentecostalism before returning to Catholicism later in his life. See Busto (2005) for a thorough documentation of Tijerina's life, including this unique spiritual and religious journey.

5. The use of religious imagery not only reflected genuine belief in the protection afforded by the figures but also helped prevent the union's opponents from branding them as communists (Garcia 2008).

6. Along with African Americans, Latinos have high levels of affiliation and church attendance in comparison to other groups.

7. Two recipients from the Civil War were also Hispanic immigrants, one from Spain and one from Chile.

8. A few localities, including New York City and Chicago, permit non-citizen parents of schoolchildren to vote for school board members. Also, a few communities in Maryland's Montgomery County do not require voters to be citizens in order to vote in local elections.

Chapter 3: Beyond the Ballot Box: Latino Non-Electoral Participation

An important puzzle in the study of Latino politics, and political behavior more generally, is that Latino civic engagement is both similar to, and different than, that of Anglos and African Americans. The field of Latino politics has traditionally explained relatively low rates of Latino civic participation as rooted in several factors—low socio-economic status, a large immigrant share of the population, and a lack of acculturation. However, instances of vibrant civic activity among immigrants (many undocumented) abound, from the mass mobilization of the 2006 immigrant rights marches to examples of direct action by immigrant youth. This challenges many of the field's assumptions about civic engagement. This chapter explores how Latinos engage with the political system outside of elections from a multi-generational and institutional perspective and in doing so moves the literature on Latino civic incorporation beyond the standard explanations.

This chapter serves to illustrate how the theory of Generational Political Incorporation, explained in the previous chapter, unfolds in terms of non-electoral participation. I argue that the doors to America's socializing and acculturating institutions open and shut for immigrants according to their generational status. Members of the immigrant generation have their needs met by churches and public schools that equip them with the necessary informational and social tools for engaging with the political system. While other social institutions like the military, labor unions, and political parties might also aid them in this process in theory, few can access them due to citizenship and legal status rules. The political incorporation experience for the children of these immigrants is much different. By virtue of their U.S.-born status, second generation

Latinos find that they are welcomed by the social institutions that their parents could not access. By the third and later generation, affiliations with these institutions are less important for their civic health because their rates of participation are determined more by socio-economic status.

The chapter begins by detailing the events of the immigrant rights marches of 2006—the largest demonstration of Latino political mobilization in recent memory. I then trace how immigrant civic activism has evolved in the decade since the marches and how the immigrant rights movement managed to gain concessions from the Obama administration in the area of immigration enforcement. I then explain how Latinos of various generations come to engage with the political system in non-electoral means through bivariate and multivariate tests of three hypotheses—Immigrant Acculturation, Social Institutionalization, and Socioeconomic Status.

LATINO CIVIC PARTICIPATION IN THE DECADE SINCE THE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS MARCHES OF 2006

In March 2014, speaking before the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, Vice President Joe Biden made the case for the passage of comprehensive immigration reform legislation. In his speech, Biden stated that, "These people [undocumented immigrants] are just waiting for a chance to be able to contribute fully. And by that standard, 11 million undocumented aliens are already Americans in my view."

Biden's quote underscores the dual psychological forces felt by many undocumented immigrants—a simultaneous sense of belonging and exclusion. On the

one hand, many undocumented immigrants exhibit many of the qualities that the U.S. claims to value in its citizens, including a strong work ethic and feelings of patriotism. Indeed, many would like to one day become U.S. citizens (Gonzalez-Barrera et al. 2013),[1] and that desire indicates to many that today's immigrants are just as worthy of citizenship as prior generations of immigrants. On the other hand, failure to pass legislation that offers a pathway to citizenship means that undocumented immigrants languish in a form of "denizenship" in which they remain outside the political system despite gains in acculturation and the adoption of American values.

Immigrants contribute to society in a myriad of ways with or without citizenship. They contribute to the economy through their workforce participation and by ensuring their children receive an education so that they too can enter the labor force. Immigrants also contribute to the social fabric of the country by being active in local organizations that strengthen communities. However, implicit in Biden's statement is that without the right to vote, undocumented immigrants with deep roots in the U.S. cannot "contribute fully" and can only hope to practice an incomplete form of citizenship

In the face of exclusion from the ballot-box, many non-citizens have found ways to express their political sentiments in other ways. The civic potential of Latino non-citizens was on full display between March 10 and May 1, 2006 when they took part alongside many Latino citizens in a mass mobilization for the cause of immigrant rights. An estimated 3.5 million people in 120 cities (Bada et al. 2006) participated in one form or another in the protests, making the marches one of the most significant episodes of civic engagement in the community's history. Indeed, the immigrant rights protests in the

spring of 2006 were a major development in the field of Latino politics because the coordination of such an event on a nation-wide scale was a logistical feat that required the cooperation of a diverse network of groups. Latino grassroots activists and the Catholic Church communicated information via Spanish language TV and radio stations to supporters about the times, locations, and expectations of the marches. This mass mobilization showcased the political potential of a group that is often characterized as a 'sleeping giant'[2]; that many of the marchers were immigrants who had never taken part in such an event in the United States made the marches all the more impressive. While some of the undocumented participants may have been apprehensive about engaging in such a public action, research suggests that the cross-generational ties within immigrant families meant that many U.S. born children encouraged their immigrant parents, even if undocumented, to join the demonstration—thus helping them in the political socialization process (Bloemraad and Trost 2011).

The marches were in response to controversial proposals contained in the 2005 Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act (also referred to as the Sensenbrenner Bill), which was passed by the Republican-controlled House of Representatives. Among other provisions, the bill proposed making an unauthorized presence in the country a felony and called for criminalizing the "aiding and abetting" of all "illegal persons," which many immigrant-serving institutions, including churches and charities, perceived as an attack on their work.

A popular chant by protestors during the marches was "hoy marchamos, mañana votamos" or "today we march, tomorrow we vote." That many of the marchers were not

citizens and thus limited to non-electoral forms of civic engagement posed a challenge, as groups would have to promote naturalization first in order to capitalize later at the ballot box. After the marches, churches and other community organizations ran workshops where immigrants could receive English lessons and address their concerns and questions about the immigration bureaucracy (Preston 2007). Democrats and non-partisan organizations also promoted naturalizations, voter registration drives, and mobilization efforts (Ramirez 2011).

In subsequent years, government statistics pointed indicated an increase in citizenship acquisition as petitions filed for naturalization increased from 602,972 in 2005 to 730,642 in 2006 (a 21 percent increase) and then increased by 88 percent to 1.38 million petitions in 2007 (DHS 2012). In 2008, after these petitions made their way through the USCIS processing system, the number of naturalizations granted reached 1.05 million, marking the first time since 1996 that the figure topped 1 million (DHS 2012).

While fractures in immigrant rights coalitions led to a dissipation of the movement's momentum (Heredia 2011; Narro et al. 2007), protesters at rallies commemorating the marches in the following years voiced concerns that retaliatory immigration enforcement policies also caused some immigrants to retreat from the civic sphere (Archibold 2007; O'Connor 2008). In the aftermath of the spring marches, Latino political advocacy organizations and immigrant rights groups seeking to translate the energy in the streets into tangible political power faced an unforeseen challenge to their efforts. Immigration Control and Enforcement (ICE) launched a new interior

enforcement initiative in the summer after the protests, which was partially responsible for the attenuation of the movement. Wang and Winn (2011, 53) contend that increased interior enforcement is partly responsible for the decline in public protest: “Many immigrants who were willing to step forward during the 2006 marches into the public arena have since retreated into the shadows for fear that they or their family members may be targeted for immigration enforcement actions.” At the rallies marking the one year anniversary of the marches, protesters not only gathered to advocate for immigration reform but also to denounce the raids by I.C.E. in the intervening year. One protester remarked that “If we have seen anything since last year, we have seen more families torn apart” (Archibold 2007). These concerns that protesters would be met with retaliation remained a year later; one protester summarized the fear that had gripped the community by stating that “people are scared that if they march, they will be arrested by I.C.E. and taken away from their families” (O’Connor 2008). Others also drew connections to the curious timing of ICE raids in 2006, stating that they “seemed calculated both to strike fear into the hearts of unauthorized immigrants and their families and to placate the xenophobic political constituency within the Republican base” (Milkman 2011, 201).

The Secure Communities program, established in 2008 at the end of the Bush Administration, also exacerbated the sense of fear in the immigrant community. Secure Communities was an immigration enforcement program in which state and local law enforcement officials voluntarily entered into cooperation with federal immigration enforcement authorities, namely ICE, in order to deport undocumented immigrants arrested for crimes. Police and sheriff departments that entered into these cooperative

agreements would run the names of persons in custody through a federal database that verified their immigration status. If the individual was found to have committed an immigration offense, local officials would retain the individual until ICE would arrive to take them into custody and begin the process of removal. Unauthorized Latinos, more so than undocumented immigrants of other racial and ethnic groups, have a particular cause for concern as they bear the disproportionate brunt of deportation policies. Although Latino immigrants make up 77 percent of the pool of undocumented immigrants, with a majority of those (58 percent) being Latinos of Mexican ancestry (Passel and Cohn 2011), they account for 90 percent of removals (Golash-Boza 2012).

With the election of President Obama in 2008, the prospect for a comprehensive immigration reform bill that would address the pool of undocumented immigrants seemed likely. Democrats were in control of the White House and both chambers of Congress, and Obama made an on-camera promise to Latino news anchor Jorge Ramos that he would introduce a bill by the end of his first year in office (Hicks 2012). However, immigration policy reform was crowded out from President Obama's legislative agenda during his first term in office as his administration expended its political capital on passing health care reform. By the time immigration reform reemerged as a legislative priority at the outset of Obama's second term in office, Democrats faced Republican obstruction in the House. In the meantime, the Obama administration pursued a strategy that ramped up both deportations at the border and interior removals, which led to the deportation of an estimated 2 million immigrants mid-way through his second term (Gonzalez-Barrera and Krogstad 2014). Obama's political

strategy largely backfired among political opponents and Latinos alike, as the former's legislative recalcitrance continued despite increased enforcement and the latter grew angry and frustrated at the administration's policies.

As a consequence, by the end of his first term in office, Obama's job approval among Latinos suffered in part from his inaction on immigration reform (Saad 2011) although others attributed it to his administration's rate of deportations at 400,000 thousand a year (Lopez et al. 2011). Fearing that a lack of support among Latinos would adversely affect his reelection chances, the Obama administration granted reprieve from deportation in an administrative directive known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA (Preston 2012). Under DACA, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was instructed to exercise prosecutorial discretion in the deportation of prospective DREAM Act beneficiaries. Those eligible under the guidelines could request deferred action so that they could obtain work permits and drivers' licenses. The predominance of Latinos in the undocumented population is reflected in an examination of DACA applicants; about nine in ten claimed birth in a Latin American country, with three-quarters claiming Mexico (Singer and Svajlenka 2013). The shift in Obama's immigration enforcement policy encapsulated by DACA had a measureable positive effect on his approval among Latinos nationwide (Latino Decisions 2012b).

Following the successful implementation of DACA that saw over 500,000 individuals receive temporary relief in the first year of its implementation (Singer and Svajlenka 2014), the Obama administration proposed another expansion of deportation relief with a set of executive actions in November of 2014. The administration's decision

to expand DACA, implement DAPA (Deferred Action for Parents of Americans), and reformulate Secure Communities as PEP (Priority Enforcement Program) was preceded by a series of high profile actions that exposed the contentious relationship between Latinos and Obama. These included a three-week fast carried out by prominent labor organizer Eliseo Medina in the National Mall and a forceful statement by the head of National Council of La Raza, Janet Murguía, in which she labeled President Obama as "Deporter-in-Chief." Such sustained pressure from immigrant rights activists and national immigrant rights leaders and organizations therefore produced partial relief for some sectors of the undocumented population in lieu of legislative action by Congress.

Following the immigrant rights rallies of 2006, heightened levels of immigration enforcement throughout the Obama administration highlighted the interconnectedness of Latino individuals of different immigration statuses. Indeed, a full nine million people live in what are called "mixed status" families in which at least one undocumented adult is a parent to at least on U.S.-born child (Taylor et al. 2011). This figure illustrates just how the threat of deportation casts a wider net beyond merely unauthorized individuals. As a consequence, for many Latinos, interactions with immigration and other law enforcement officials are commonplace. One study found that one in ten immigrants and citizens reported being stopped by authorities and asked about their immigration status in a 12-month time period (Lopez and Minushkin 2008), and another survey found that a quarter of all Latino adults, regardless of citizenship, said that they personally knew someone who had been either deported or detained by federal immigration authorities in a period that spanned the last year of Obama's first term in office (Lopez and Gonzalez-

Barrera 2012). The decision on the part of some undocumented immigrants to participate in protests, meetings, acts of civil disobedience, or any other form of civic engagement should be viewed within the context of a climate where their actions could have serious repercussions for themselves and their families.

Individuals who develop ties to social institutions that provide important informational and other supportive resources can better navigate the political system around them. If immigrants, and especially non-citizens, cannot access these spaces due to institutional membership rules, then the incomplete struggle for political incorporation among immigrants might reflect these limited options. In the section that follows I highlight how certain social institutions like churches and public schools can bolster the civic participation of immigrants by virtue of their greater accessibility. Other institutions, such as the military, labor unions, and political parties, are better suited for Latinos of the second generation. For Latinos of the third and later generations, affiliation with social institutions play a much smaller role in determining their rates of civic participation, which by that point is driven by the same differences in socio-economic status that generally apply to all Americans.

LATINO GENERATIONAL POLITICAL INCORPORATION—HYPOTHESES

The numerous acts of civil disobedience, ranging from protests at Congressional offices and immigrant detention centers to public hunger strikes conducted by one of the largest DREAMer run organizations, United We Dream, have proven to be an effect tool of political and civic expression (Preston 2014). Due in part to the mounting pressure,

immigrant rights groups have been able to extract concessions from state legislatures and compelled President Obama into taking a set of executive actions.

While immigrant rights organizations, advocates at the grassroots level (Cordero-Guzmán et al. 2008; Wong 2006; Fox and Bada 2011), and elite-level advocacy groups like NALEO and NCLR are an important segment of the Latino civic network, these organizations are not common venues for participation among Latinos. Instead, Latinos are more routinely involved in civic groups rooted nearer to their communities, such as religious institutions, the schools that their children attend, or organizations associated with their place of work. For example, Robert Putnam (2000, 66) stated that faith communities are "arguably the single most important repository of social capital in America." Involvement in social institutions is important because civic participation by an ethnic group's immigrants is often used as a marker for assessing their degree of political incorporation (Diaz 1996; Garcia and Arce 1988; Wong 1999). Likewise, involvement in community groups by immigrants can also signify greater acculturation as well as a motivation to see one's local community prosper. Participation in civic groups need not be explicitly political, and engagement with community issues need not be perceived by the immigrant as politically motivated, for their behavior to be a form of political engagement.

With these considerations in mind, I test a series of hypotheses that allow me to weigh the effects of institutional affiliations, acculturation, and socioeconomic status on Latino propensity to engage in non-electoral civic activities. While I have argued that institutions – including churches, schools, political parties, the military, and labor unions

– play an outsized role within the civic lives of Latinos, I also contend that individual-level differences (including educational attainment, income, and English language proficiency) are important determinants of civic participation.

In order to compare how acculturation differences, social institutions, and socioeconomic status shape Latino political incorporation across all three generations, this chapter proposes three hypotheses, each tested by a corresponding cluster of variables.

The first hypothesis—the Immigrant Acculturation Hypothesis—applies only to the immigrants in the sample because it relates to measures unique to the immigrant experience. It expects that immigrants with increased levels of acculturation and familiarity with the United States will exhibit a greater probability of non-electoral civic engagement.

> *H1. Immigrant Acculturation Hypothesis: Among first-generation immigrants, those who (A) have spent a greater percentage of their life in the U.S.; (B) possess greater English fluency; and (C) have undergone the naturalization process will be more likely to engage in non-electoral forms of civic participation.*

The second hypothesis—the Institutional Socialization Hypothesis—is applied to all three generations of Latinos in the sample. It proposes that social institutions operate as important conduits to greater civic participation among Latinos, although their benefits are sometimes conditioned by the immigrant's citizenship or generational status. While I

argue that all Latinos who belong to or have direct ties with churches, schools, the military, labor organizations, or political parties will be more likely to engage in civic activities, the relative inaccessibility of some institutions compared to others means that those belonging to the immigrant generation (1st generation) are at a disadvantage compared to those of the native-born generations (2nd and 3rd and later).

> *H2. Institutional Socialization Hypothesis: Latinos who claim affiliation with one or more of the five following social institutions—churches, schools, the military, labor organizations, and political parties—will be more likely to engage in non-electoral civic activities.*

The third hypothesis—the Socioeconomic Status Hypothesis—like the Institutional Socialization Hypothesis before it, is applied to all three generations of Latinos. It predicts that individual-level differences in socio-economic status translate to differences in the propensity to engage in civic activities. This follows from an established literature that links increased educational resources, and to a slightly lesser extent financial, to greater political participation (Verba and Nie1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Brady, and Schlozman 1995). Specifically, greater socioeconomic status among Latinos across all generations should lead to increased levels of civic participation.

H3. Socioeconomic Status Hypothesis: Latinos of higher socioeconomic status with (A) greater educational attainment and (B) greater household income will be more likely to engage in non-electoral civic activities.

By testing these three sets of hypotheses, this chapter sets out to determine which set(s) of factors influence immigrant political incorporation. It weighs whether greater civic activity arises over time via gains in acculturation; whether it is a matter of interactions with institutions via affiliations with churches, schools, the military, labor organizations, and political parties; whether it is determined by socioeconomic resources such as income and education; or reflects a unique combination of all three that varies according to generational status.

METHODOLOGY

For the empirical investigation into the nature of civic participation among Latino citizens and non-citizens, I use the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS). The LNS consists of 8,634 interviews of self-identified Latino/Hispanic residents of the United States conducted between November 17, 2005 and August 4, 2006. The survey instrument contains approximately 165 distinct questions including demographics, political opinions, and social attitudes. Moreover, the LNS offers a rich array of measures that capture the experiences of immigrants that differ from traditional surveys that rarely draw from this segment of the population.

The survey was administered by telephone using bilingual interviewers, and all respondents were offered the opportunity to interview in either language. Respondents were drawn from fifteen states and the District of Columbia metropolitan area (including counties and municipalities in Virginia and Maryland). States were first selected based on the overall size of the Latino population. In addition, the survey includes respondents in Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, and North Carolina (four 'New Destination' states) to capture elements of the population residing in places with less established Latino communities. The universe of analysis contains approximately 87.5 percent of the U.S. Latino population.

The measures of non-electoral participation that will be the dependent variables stem from two questions. The first regards participation in a variety of community groups, asking: "Do you participate in the activities of one social, cultural, civic, or political group, more than one such group, or do you not participate in the activities of any such groups?" The second question asks whether the respondent has ever contacted a government official: "Have you ever tried to get government officials to pay attention to something that concerned you, either by calling, writing a letter, or going to a meeting?"

Table 3.1 Participation in Social, Cultural, Civic, or Political Group among all respondents by Generation

	1st Generation	**2nd Generation**	**3rd+ Generation**	**Total**
None (%)	82.76	70.17	65.73	78.65
One Group (%)	10.87	17.95	17.55	12.82
2+ Groups (%)	4.46	10.44	15.26	6.72
D.K./ Ref. (%)	1.91	1.43	1.46	1.81
Total (n)	6184	1465	957	8634

Table 3.1 shows that non-participation characterizes the majority of Latinos, with only about 18 percent reporting membership in at least one organization. When the population is divided along generational lines, however, it becomes apparent that civic participation in groups increases with each generation. Among members of the first generation, only 15 percent report membership in at least one group; that share increases to 29 percent among the children of immigrants and to one-third among third and later generation respondents. The largest gap in participation in civic groups exists between first-generation immigrants and second-generation individuals. Though differences in rates of participation between second and third and later generation are present, they are much smaller than the difference between the immigrant generation and those in the second generation.

This leap in acculturation between the first and second generation comports with previous research that found a similar pattern among Mexicans and Mexican Americans (Junn 1999). While the rate of participation may appear to be low, Latinos of all generations face costs of time and energy when choosing to participate in groups outside

of work and home. Something to keep in mind is that these frequencies might be considered a conservative estimate of Latino civic participation, as prior research suggests that Latinos tend to underreport participatory activities (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes 2006).

There are two immigrant-specific reasons for such gaps, which are related to the nature of organizations that serve the interests of disadvantaged groups. The first is that many of the groups that serve immigrant communities are informal and lack the resources for outreach to potential members. In explaining the challenges faced by immigrant serving community groups, Wong (2006, 9) states that "community organizations, focused on social service, advocacy, or other missions, generally lack the resources to engage in mass political mobilization." They instead opt to recruit "limited numbers to take part in political action, often relating to a specific issue or concern."

The second reason is that many non-citizens, especially the undocumented, are wary of interaction with the political system. Indeed, many undocumented immigrants were reluctant to fill out the 2010 Census form or even open the door to Census officials out of fear that they could become targeted for removal (O'Dowd 2010). At work, the undocumented routinely face pressure by employers and managers with regard to labor issues, as they can be threatened with deportation if, for example, they wish to file a complaint or engage in collective bargaining or strikes (Bernstein 2006; although see Delgado 1993). Even legal permanent residents (LPR) have reason to be mindful of the consequences that participation in common acts of political disobedience can entail. Changes made to immigration law under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act (AEDPA) of 1996 expanded the grounds on which an LPR could be deported. Thus, foreign-born non-citizen Latinos must consider a special set of circumstances, which many native-born or naturalized Latinos do not face, before engaging in civil society.

Table 3.2 Contacted a Government Official via letter, phone call, or meeting about an issue of concern

	1st Generation	**2nd Generation**	**3rd Generation**	**Total**
Yes (%)	25.34	46.83	50.89	31.82
No (%)	72.4	52.56	48.8	66.42
Don't Know (%)	2.26	0.61	0.31	1.76
Total (n)	6184	1465	957	8634

An analysis of the second measure of non-electoral participation (Table 3.2)—whether the respondent has ever contacted a government official—reveals a similar pattern with regard to generational differences. While nearly a third of all respondents report having contacted a government official, an analysis across generations reveals that the rate of contact almost doubles from the first generation to third and later generations. Indeed, among first-generation immigrants, about a quarter personally sought to contact a government official while approximately half of all third and later generation respondents reported doing so. As was the case with participation in community groups, the largest gap in this form of participation is between first generation Latino immigrants and second generation Latinos.

Table 3.3 Contacting an Elected Official among Naturalized Immigrants

	Naturalized	**Not Naturalized**
Yes (%)	37.17	17.2
No (%)	60.64	80.25
Don't Know (%)	2.19	2.54
Total (n)	1875	3778

The more overt political dimension to this form of participation is reflected in the greater degree to which naturalized foreign-born immigrants have engaged a government official to address a concern. While only 25 percent of all first generation immigrants report contacting an elected official, 47 percent of second generations Latinos have done so. That 22 percentage point gap is cut by more than half when comparing naturalized first generation-immigrants to second-generation Latinos (Table 3.3). Naturalization functions as the formal entrance into the electorate as an eligible voter and appears to have some effect in terms of political engagement by shrinking, though not closing, the gap between the foreign born and native born.

What accounts for these differences in civic participation along generational lines? Are there certain factors that can propel immigrants to participate in civic activities in greater numbers? Immigrant Acculturation, Institutional Socialization, and Socioeconomic Status are the three hypotheses to be tested as principle elements of immigrant civic participation. While acculturation and socialization have long been recognized as broad and multi-faceted concepts, the best that social scientists can do is propose a series of variables that approximate these social forces.

RESULTS: BIVARIATE

A. Institutional Socialization

Table 3.4 Mean Participation in a social, cultural, civic or political group (0-2 scale)

	Non-Affiliated	**Affiliated**	**Difference**	**N**
	Not a Military Household	Military Household		
First Generation	.16	.38	.21***	6066
Second Generation	.29	.47	.18***	1444
Third Generation	.38	.53	.15**	943
All Respondents	.18	.45	.27***	8478
	Not a Churchgoer	Churchgoer	Difference	N
First Generation	.17	.21	.04**	5975
Second Generation	.37	.41	.04	1432
Third Generation	.41	.53	.12*	928
All Respondents	.25	.27	.02#	8360
	Not a Union Household	Union Household	Difference	N
First Generation	.18	.43	.25***	5929
Second Generation	.37	.49	.12**	1417
Third Generation	.47	.56	.09	933
All Respondents	.24	.48	.24***	8303
	Not a Partisan	Partisan	Difference	N
First Generation	.14	.29	.15***	6066
Second Generation	.32	.43	.11**	1444
Third Generation	.42	.52	.10#	943
All Respondents	.18	.36	.18	8478
	No U.S. Schooling	Some U.S. Schooling	Difference	N
First Generation	0.13	0.39	.26***	6066
	Not Naturalized	Naturalized	Difference	N
First Generation	.12	.32	0.2***	5541
	Spanish Interview	English Interview		
First Generation	.15	.45	.30***	6066

Table 3.5 Percentage of Respondents contacting a government official

	Non-Affiliated	**Affiliated**	**Difference**	**N**
	Not a Military Household	Military Household		
First Generation	22.39	41.33	18.94***	6044
Second Generation	38.29	53.64	15.36***	1456
Third Generation	38.21	55.51	17.30***	954
All Respondents	24.78	48.76	23.98***	8482
	Not a Churchgoer	Churchgoer	Difference	N
First Generation	24.1	26.56	2.46#	5960
Second Generation	46.39	47.57	1.18	1445
Third Generation	45.86	53.69	5.11*	938
All Respondents	31.86	32.67	0.81	8371
	Not a Union Household	Union Household	Difference	N
First Generation	24.16	48.53	24.36***	5922
Second Generation	43.9	58.91	15.01***	1429
Third Generation	49.45	55.92	6.47#	943
All Respondents	29.7	53.18	23.48***	8321
	Not a Partisan	Partisan	Difference	N
First Generation	19.68	35.45	15.77***	6044
Second Generation	36.8	52.83	16.03***	1456
Third Generation	47.22	52.7	5.48	954
All Respondents	23.46	42.32	18.87***	8482
	No U.S. Schooling	Some U.S. Schooling	Difference	N
First Generation	20.56	40.99	20.44***	6044
	Not Naturalized	Naturalized	Difference	N
First Generation	17.65	38.00	20.35***	5516
	Spanish Interview	English Interview	Difference	N
First Generation	22.38	40.40	18.02***	6044

Note: Two-tailed t-test: #p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Source*:* LNS (2006)

Data from the Latino National Survey of 2006 show a very strong association between institutional affiliation and non-electoral participation among Latinos of various generational statuses (see Tables 3.4 and 3.5). To begin, those respondents in the sample that live in a military household have a mean community group participation score of .45 compared to .18 among those not in a military household. Immigrants that live in a military household also contact a government official at twice the rate of immigrants with no ties to the military—41 percent compared to 22 percent.

Results from a difference in means test among those affiliated and those not affiliated with the military within each immigrant generation show statistically significant differences for both non-electoral participation measures. The differences in community group involvement between those with and without ties to the military are highest among the first generation (.21) and then steadily decrease through to the second (.18) and third generation (.15)—with a similar pattern observed for contacting a government official. Membership levels discussed in the previous chapter found that only 1 in 5 first-generation immigrants live in a military household. Therefore, while immigrants are the least likely to have an affiliation with the military, those that do are positioned to see more community group involvement than second and third generation Latinos with the same associational tie. This is possibly because immigrants have the least access to institutions, so any such ties they do have are particularly important.

With regard to religious affiliation, the difference in means between regular churchgoers and non-churchgoers in terms of community group participation and elected official contact is significant only for first and third and later generation Latinos. In light

of the information presented in the previous chapter that showed church attendance to be highest among the immigrant generation, these results suggest that many immigrants involved with religious houses of worship display greater embeddedness in their communities. While church affiliation does not appear to shape participation among members of the second generation, third and later generation Latinos that regularly attend church are far more likely than non-churchgoers of their same generation to display a greater participation in community groups. Though differences in church attendance between the second and third generation were shown to be negligible in the previous chapter (Figure 2.3), that third-generation Latinos who maintain a strong tie to church are that much more involved in their communities indicates that churches continue to operate as community anchors for non-immigrant Latinos.

Institutional affiliations with labor unions and political parties are also important pathways to civic engagement for Latinos across nearly all generations. Once more, the largest gains in civic engagement accrue to Latino immigrants that claim these associational ties. Immigrant labor union members and partisans reap the largest gains in mean community group involvement over their fellow non-affiliated immigrants in the second and third generation. Differences in rates of contacting a government official between those with and without ties to labor unions are at their lowest among third and later generation Latinos (6.47) and then steadily increase through to the second (15.01) and first generation (24.36). Again, while rates of membership in labor organizations and political parties are lower among immigrants compared to the native-born generations,

immigrants that do manage to attach themselves to these institutions stand to experience greater levels of civic incorporation.

An attachment to a political party means the least among third and later generation Latinos in terms of contacting a government official, as the difference between partisans and non-partisans is not statistically distinct from zero. Latino immigrants and their children have far more to gain from being associated with a political party because partisans among both groups are more likely to report contacting a government official by calling, writing a letter, or attending a meeting than do non-partisans and independents.

Personal attendance at a school in the U.S. was asked only among those of the immigrant generation, as attending a U.S. school is assumed among the native-born. Here, too, I observe the power of social institutions in fomenting civic activity. Though only a quarter of immigrants report acquiring some education in the U.S., those that did so have triple the mean rate of community group participation (.39) of immigrants who did not attend a U.S. school (.13) and double the rate of contacting a government official (40.99 percent compared to 20.56 percent). Admittedly, attending school in the U.S. is more likely among immigrants that arrived as children or adolescents, and that experience places them at an advantage in multiple ways. However, these initial figures suggest the ramifications these differences can have for community embeddedness and civic participation.

In three out of the four institutional affiliations common to Latinos of all generations, I find that levels of community group participation follow a general pattern,

with the gap in community involvement being largest among members of the immigrant generation. For contacting a government official, in two cases (military and labor union household) that pattern is also present. Though in most cases Latino immigrants are less likely to have ties to these institutions due to the issues of accessibility outlined in the previous chapter, these figures show that compared to immigrants without such affiliations, immigrants with these ties see large gains in civic participation. Since associational ties appear to be important for community group participation and engagement with government officials among many Latinos, and especially immigrants, this lends tentative support to the institutional socialization hypothesis.

B. Immigrant Acculturation

At this point I shift attention to matters of acculturation among immigrants. The difference between immigrants that have undergone the naturalization process versus those that remain as non-citizens is significantly distinct from zero for community group participation and contacting a government official. So, too, is the difference between immigrants that requested an English as opposed to a Spanish interview, with the former group having a higher overall mean community group participation and a higher rate of attending a meeting, calling, or writing a letter to discuss an issue with a government official. Along these two indicators, national belonging in the form of citizenship acquisition via naturalization and increased proficiency in English, I find support for the Immigrant Acculturation hypothesis.



Figure 3.1 is a histogram of the percentage of immigrants that belong to at least one community group according to the share of their life spent in the U.S. Fewer than 5 percent of immigrants that have spent less than five years in the U.S. belong to at least one community group. Though we would expect that figure to steadily increase as a larger percentage of an immigrant's life is spent in the U.S., participation in a community group reaches its apex when an immigrant has spent between 50 to 60 percent of her life in the U.S., with 15 percent of that group belonging to at least one group before falling to about 8 percent among those immigrants that have spent nearly their entire lives in the U.S.



Figure 3.2 shows a similar pattern, as the percentage of immigrants contacting an elected official is most common among immigrants that have spent about half of their life in the United States. Therefore, I find mixed support for the immigrant acculturation hypothesis along this one indicator; longer settlement in the U.S. yields gains in community group participation and increased frequency of contacting an elected official, but only to a certain point.

C. Socioeconomic Status





It is also important to see if differences in socioeconomic status, as measured by educational attainment and household income, are associated with greater civic engagement in accordance with the resource model of political participation. Higher levels of educational attainment are important for immigrants of all generations, as those that reach college level have the highest levels of community group participation (Figure 3.3) and contacting an elected official (Figure 3.4). However, the differences between lower levels and higher levels of education are a bit less pronounced in the immigrant generation. In visual terms, the graphs illustrating civic participation among the second and third generation peak at higher levels at the college range of education than among college-education immigrants.


Figure 3.5
Percent pertaining to at least one community group by household income
1st Generation
2nd Generation
3+ Generation
0
10
20
30
40
<15K
15K-25K
25K-35K
35K-45K
45K-55K
55K-65K
>65K
35-K45K
Household Income



It is important to note that the relatively weak relationship between income and community group involvement (Figure 3.5) and contacting a government official (Figure 3.6) is at its weakest in the immigrant generation. Though differences in community group participation between lower income and higher income Latinos are greater than 20 percentage points, the difference between both ends of the income scale among the immigrant generation are more modest (about 5 to 10 percentage points). This is an initial indication that gains in income operate differently according to generation; immigrants with few monetary resources join community groups at rates comparable to their fellow immigrants with more income.

The relationship between income and attending a meeting, calling, or writing a letter to a government official is also less strong among the immigrant generation. In fact, immigrants with household incomes between $15,000 and $35,000 display the highest rates of this form of civic engagement than do fellow immigrants with more financial resources. These results indicate that lower income immigrants likely turn to community groups out of necessity as a way to maximize collective resources and seek out the help of government officials to address issues that matter to them as a way to compensate for their gaps in acculturation. Immigrants of lower economic means are less deterred from civic participation than are their native-born counterparts of similar resources. Members of the immigrant generation may be more regularly compelled to band together as a way to achieve a foothold in the host country when sociocultural familiarity with the political system is in short order.

RESULTS: MULTIVARIATE

Having seen how Latinos across generations that are members of social institutions are more likely to engage in non-electoral activities compared to non-members, it is important to test the effect of these affiliations net of other factors. Table 3.6 displays the first set of multivariate results and shows the socializing potential of civic institutions among Latinos of different generations. The use of split sample analysis offers the ability to determine if certain civic institutions are better suited to foment the non-electoral participation of certain immigrant generations over others. Statistically

significant coefficients indicate that the factor is either positively or negatively associated, in this case, with joining at least one social, cultural, civic, or political group.

One caveat to keep in mind is that immigrants make up slightly more than two-thirds of the weighted pool of LNS respondents. According to the Census' Current Population Survey's estimates, this overestimates the true share of immigrants in the Latino adult population, which it places at 55.4 percent (U.S. Census Bureau 2008). In order to address this issue, I used the revised national-level weight provided by the investigators so that my model estimates are as representative as possible.

A. First Generation Civic Group Participation

Table 3.6 O. Logit Regression Estimates: Participating in social, cultural, civic, or political group

	1st Generation	2nd Generation	3rd Generation
Associational Ties			
Union Household	.324#	.361#	.246
	(.167)	(.194)	(.208)
Church Attendance	.371***	.194**	.063
	(.058)	(.063)	(.071)
Veteran/Military Household	-.005	.468**	.084
	(.138)	(.173)	(.219)
Partisan	.279*	.150	.157
	(.116)	(.171)	(.204)
U.S. Schooling	.457**	--	--
	(.145)	--	--
Demographic Controls			
Age	.007	.004	.008
	(.004)	(.005)	(.006)
Household Income	.039	.097*	.105#
	(.036)	(.049)	(.056)
Missing Income	-.437#	.584*	-.403
	(.227)	(.269)	(.330)
Educational Attainment	.268***	.251***	.155#
	(.035)	(.065)	(.081)
Female	-.222*	.058	.113
	(.113)	(.158)	(.185)
% foreign-born pop.	.000	-.002	.005
	(.003)	(.004)	(.004)
Post-Marches Interview	.199#	-.096	-.078
	(.115)	(.196)	(.195)
Mexican	-.108	-.227	-.276
	(.133)	(.297)	(.365)
Cuban	.119	.505	-.130
	(.194)	(.441)	(1.089)
Puerto Rican	-2.810#	-.457	-.757
	(1.495)	(.332)	(.481)
Immigrant Experience			
% of Life in U.S.	.003	--	--
	(.003)	--	--
Spanish Interview	-.491***	--	--
	(.149)	--	--
Naturalized	.148	--	--
	(.150)	--	--
cut 1	4.108	3.184	2.632
cut 2	5.612	4.469	3.765
Wald Chi2	320.70***	79.25***	25.79*
Pseudo R2	.115	.059	.027
Observations	4704	1340	865

Note: Ordered Logistic regression coefficients presented with standard errors in parenthesis. #p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; Source: LNS (2006)

The results presented in Table 3.6 show ordered logit models exploring the influence of the three clusters of independent variables on civic community group participation. For first-generation immigrants, those that attended schools in the U.S., greater attendance in church, and those with an attachment to one of the major political parties are more likely to join community groups. Immigrants that are union members or live a household with a union member are also more likely to join community groups, although this relationship is significant only at the 90% level of confidence. Only associations with one social institution, the military, failed to predict community group participation.

The degree of institutional accessibility has an effect on the likelihood that an immigrant participates in group activities in their communities. Religious institutions and schools are characterized by their relative openness to serving the immigrant community irrespective of citizenship status. The low barriers of entry into these spaces make them prime avenues for greater civic activity and social connections. Places of worship are known for their degree of openness to believers of their denomination irrespective of immigration status. Furthermore, because first-generation immigrants have the highest rate of religiosity compared to Latinos of other generations (see Table 2.1 in Chapter 2), they are the generation most likely to rely on the associative networks of churches. Along with schools, churches also function as community centers where other groups seek out church members for other purposes. Therefore, because churches operate as a nucleus for communities, they are prime resources for first-generation immigrants.

Like first-generation immigrants that are affiliated with religious institutions, those that report attending a school in the U.S. are more likely to join community groups. This result highlights how schools allow immigrants to develop their initial ties to the community. For immigrant youth, schools offer children the space to develop their friendships and acquaintances. Moreover, many schools operate as an anchor in communities where 'wrap-around' social services can deliver the basic necessities of health care and counseling to children and their families. Colleges and universities offer adult immigrants an initial social network from which to begin their careers.

The positive relationship between partisan affiliation and community group activity among first-generation immigrants is somewhat of a surprise because many immigrants are in the process of developing attachments to American political parties. Yet, affiliating with a political party can be claimed by all persons, despite citizenship status, which means that such an informal association is possible even among the foreign-born. In all, findings with regard to first-generation immigrants lend support for the hypothesis regarding the positive effects of social institutions on civic participation.

It may be the case that differences according to acculturation may provide further explanation for an immigrant's degree of community integration. The immigrant acculturation hypothesis carries the expectation that immigrants with more markers of acculturation would generally be more likely to participate in non-electoral forms of civic activity. However, results from Table 3.6 show that not all measures of acculturation are associated with greater community group participation. Of the three measures of acculturation, only one, Spanish language dominance as captured by a Spanish interview,

has a negative effect on community group participation among the foreign-born. This implies that a lack of comfort with English might undercut an immigrant's potential for engaging in more civic behaviors. One way to interpret this finding would be to argue that continued reliance on Spanish might be indicative of less time in the United States, that these respondents have simply not had the opportunity to gain greater English proficiency. However, greater amount of time in the U.S. is not shown to be an important determinant of the level of civic group activity. It might be the case that certain civic groups fail to accommodate the diverse language needs that many immigrants need to feel welcome. These two findings in conjunction are promising for greater civic incorporation of immigrants because they imply that even immigrants that have not been in the U.S. for very long would join more civic groups if the latter's spaces and programs catered to their language needs.

Another intriguing finding is that foreign-born immigrants that have undergone the citizenship naturalization process are no more likely to join a community group than non-citizens. The previous bivariate analysis showed that a greater portion of naturalized immigrants participate in one or more community groups than do non-naturalized immigrants. However, after controlling for important factors, naturalization in and of itself is not enough to increase group participation. This finding supports extant research that also found naturalization among Latino immigrants did not lead to greater political participation (DeSipio 1996a; Levin 2013).

Of the demographic controls in the analysis, educational attainment is by far the most predictive of community group membership among immigrants. Immigrants that

did not provide an income level for the household (and are likely in a lower income group) are less likely to engage in this form of civic activity. Female immigrant respondents were less likely to report community group participation, all else equal. Immigrant respondents of Puerto Rican ancestry were also less likely than immigrants of other national origins to participate in community groups. Lastly, immigrants that were interviewed after the beginning of the immigrant rights marches during the spring of 2006 were more likely to report community group involvement. Prior research using this same dataset found that respondents interviewed after this period of increased political activity were more likely to have a stronger sense of an American identity (Silber-Mohamed 2013). Results from this study show a similar effect regarding the marches but for increased civic activity, although the effect here is limited only to immigrant Latinos. The flurry of politically-oriented activity at the time manifested itself in terms of increased civic participation. I interpret this result to mean that episodes of mass mobilization can spur civic integration more broadly.

B. Second-Generation Civic Group Participation

Turning to second-generation respondents and the factors that predict their civic group activity, we see that a different set of social institutions aid their political integration. While first generation immigrants were shown to benefit from their associational ties to U.S. schools, churches, political parties, and labor unions, second generation Latinos affiliated with the military and religious institutions are more likely to be involved in civic groups. Those that live in a labor union household are also more

likely to be involved in civic group activities, although the relationship is significant at the 90 percent level of confidence.

Greater church attendance and members of military households can expect a significant boost in their community integration by virtue of these ties. The positive effect of church attendance on community group behavior carries over from the first generation despite the fact that church attendance decreases after the immigrant generation. Military service or familial connections to someone that has served in the armed forces was the only institutional affiliation that did not predict increased civic participation among foreign-born immigrants. The strong increase in the frequency of military connections between first and second generation Latinos translates to increased civic participation for the second generation. The continued benefits from church attendance, combined with increased access to the military, leads to greater instances of group involvement among the children of immigrants.

Organized religion and the military are fruitful avenues for social integration available to native-born children of immigrants. These ties can help families at a time when the household may still be establishing a foothold within their community. To a slightly lesser extent, labor unions are also shown to aid in this process. Though a smaller percentage of second-generation Latinos identify as regular church-goers compared to foreign-born individuals, church attendance continues to pay dividends in terms of greater civic group membership.

Labor unions and the military, two institutions defined by their relationship to employment, can be influential forces for multi-generational immigrant families. It is

likely the case that more first-generation immigrants would have made use of military service if it was an available option, but the rules that regulate entry into the armed forces put membership out of reach for many. However, with the passage of time and educational and economic gains seen between the first and second generation, members of the second generation are better situated to benefit from a different array of social institutions. By virtue of the social mobility that takes place between the first and second generation, those born in the United States are likely to have a life trajectory where entry into either labor unions or the military is a viable option. Along with churches, labor organizations and the military provides the children of immigrants a basis of support from which they can go about addressing community issues. The social network that these institutions provide offers a starting point from which other group activity can sprout.

Demographic controls among second-generation Latinos show education plays an important role in their civic lives, much as it does for immigrants. U.S. born respondents are assumed to have undergone their schooling in the U.S., something that is not necessarily the case for immigrants; educational attainment for both second- and third-generation Latinos therefore operates as a proxy for the extent to which they have prolonged affiliations with educational institutions. Greater education for second-generation Latinos is highly predictive of greater community involvement.

The results for measures of financial resources among second generation Latinos are mixed. Increased household income among the second generation is associated with greater community group participation, an effect not found among the immigrant

generation. However, those respondents that failed to report the household income, a proxy for lower income individuals, were more likely to join community groups. For immigrant respondents, the opposite effect was found. In general, income does not matter very much in American political participation models; education and age are much more important. But for Latino immigrants, income may stand for more than it does for native-born white Americans.

C. Third Generation Civic Group Participation

For third generation Latinos, we see that affiliations with social institutions have little predictive value for determining their group behavior. Unlike members of the first and second generations, third and later generation Latinos derive little by way of their ties to social institutions. Instead, the likelihood that they are a member of a community group is largely explained by socioeconomic status, as only household income and education are positive and significant factors.

D. First Generation Contact with Elected Officials

Table 3.7 Logistic Regression Estimates: Contacting an elected official by calling, writing a letter, or attending a meeting (LNS 2006)

	1st Generation	2nd Generation	3rd Generation
Associational Ties			
Union Household	.509*	.374*	.285
	(.148)	(.178)	(.225)
Church Attendance	.130***	0.041	.114
	(.037)	(.057)	(.073)
Veteran/Military Household	.205*	.279#	.482*
	(.124)	(.156)	(.218)
Partisan	.275**	.546***	.00
	(.093)	(.158)	(.195)
U.S. Schooling	.003	--	**--**
	(.130)		
Demographic Controls			
Age	.004	.014**	.027***
	(.004)	(.004)	(.006)
Household Income	.10***	.115**	.06
	-.028	(.043)	(.053)
Missing Income	-.80***	-.651**	-.995**
	(.188)	(.262)	(.335)
Educational Attainment	.167***	.278***	.221**
	(.027)	(.058)	(.084)
Female	-.097	.331*	.293
	(.092)	(.151)	(.193)
% foreign-born pop.	.002	.00	.00
	(.002)	(.003)	(.004)
Post-Marches Interview	0.22*	-.02	.21
	(.095)	(.175)	(.223)
Mexican	.296**	-.447#	-.012
	(.109)	(.267)	(.420)
Cuban	.255	-.40	-1.028
	(.173)	(.426)	(.724)
Puerto Rican	1.108#	-.47	-.412
	(.683)	(.304)	(.493)
Immigrant Experience			
% of Life in U.S.	.007**	--	--
	(.002)		
Spanish Interview	.0485	--	--
	(.131)		
Naturalized	.440***	--	--
	(.112)		
Constant	-3.591***	-2.837***	-3.30***
	(.334)	(.560)	(.709)
Wald Chi2	302.13***	108.71***	79.96***
Pseudo R2	.095	.100	.111
Observations	4701	1352	873

Note*:* Coefficients from logistic regression (robust standard errors); #p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

The second non-electoral behavior analyzed is whether a respondent has ever contacted an elected official by calling, writing a letter, or attending a meeting. Because contacting an elected official requires a set of skills beyond simply being a member of a group, we might expect that individuals, and especially immigrants, would need greater support in accomplishing this task. The results in Table 3.7 display logit models exploring the baseline characteristics that predict whether a respondent contacted an elected official by phone, letter, or by attending a meeting.

The results illustrate that immigrants with greater institutional affiliations are more likely to carry out this more involved civic behavior. Indeed, those with ties to a religious institution, a labor union, the military, and a political party are all better equipped to articulate their concerns in civic spaces. Among immigrant respondents, having attended school in the U.S. is the only institutional affiliation that had no effect on contacting an elected official. These results constitute strong support for the institutional socialization hypothesis.

Among immigrants, being a union member or living in a union household, greater attachment to a place of worship, and claiming affiliation with a political party are positively associated with contacting an elected official. Church attendance is a significant predictor of contacting an elected official and is thus further evidence that religious institutions are a consistent channel by which immigrants come to integrate themselves into their communities. Organized labor is intimately involved with governmental procedure in the sense that a major part of their efforts target governmental action on behalf of workers. Unions offer immigrants a greater degree of familiarity with

the political system, which means they are also well-suited to introduce the immigrants in their ranks to regular involvement with public affairs.

This analysis differs from the previous civic behavior model in that some degree of affiliation with the military can encourage more direct involvement with the political system. The military itself is a major governmental institution, so it makes sense that an association with it can lead to governmental involvement elsewhere. Also, immigrants that claim an affiliation with a political party are more likely to contact an elected official. This makes intuitive sense because an affiliation with a political party might indicate a general interest in politics and government. The benefits of political party labels as a heuristic might be felt more acutely by immigrants because they lack, to a greater degree, the background information about the American political system that native-born individuals have by virtue of their socialization in the U.S. Therefore, political parties function as sources of political guides for immigrants who might otherwise live in environments characterized by a dearth of political information.

For immigrant acculturation, two of the three measures—a greater percentage of life in the U.S. and citizenship acquisition—are significantly associated with contacting an elected official. This differs from the previous analysis of membership in a community group, which found only Spanish language dominance (as measured by requesting an interview in Spanish) to have an impact on the likelihood of joining a group. The differing results serve to reemphasize the difference between the two dependent variables as we would expect the factors predicting civic involvement to differ somewhat from governmental involvement.

I interpret the importance of greater percentage of life spent in the U.S. for contacting an elected official to mean that immigrants become accustomed to direct political involvement with more time in the U.S. Over the course of settlement in the host country, an immigrant gradually engages with the political system. For an immigrant to contact an elected official about a specific issue likely indicates a greater social embededness in their community.

Individuals who have undergone the naturalization process are also far more likely to contact an elected official than non-citizens. The substantive effect of naturalization on the probability of contacting a government official can be found in a figure in the methodological appendix (Figure A1). Results show that immigrants who are naturalized 9.53 percentage point increase in the predicted probability of contacting a government official. The status as a potential voter might then provide immigrants a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the political system that allows them to formally express their concerns. To the extent that naturalization also captures an immigrant's interest in politics and government, they may be more inclined to involve themselves in political matters. This finding indicates that naturalization may benefit immigrants politically beyond simply voting and may also lead to the public expression of their opinions in a variety of ways. Individuals that diversify their methods of political expression increase the odds that their voices are heard by the political system.

With regard to the socioeconomic status hypothesis, Table 3.7 indicates that the relationship between socioeconomic status and making contact with a government official is positive and significant. Higher levels of educational attainment and income

lead to a greater likelihood that an immigrant decides to contact a political figure. The importance of education relates to the foundational understanding of civic skills. In school, individuals learn the basics of a civics education and acquire the necessary skills to, in this case, write a letter to an elected official that articulates their opinion regarding an issue. These skills are particularly important to immigrants who must overcome the added hurdle of a lack of familiarity with the American political system. While attending a U.S. school was not shown to be significant, educational attainment, no matter where it was acquired, is apparently transferable to American civic and political involvement.

Latino immigrants that report greater household incomes are also more likely to contact an elected official, and the categorical variable for respondents that did not report an income is negatively associated with this civic activity. This finding with regard to socioeconomic resources differs from the community group participation models, where increases in income were not associated with greater activity. Taken together, these results indicate that immigrants with greater financial resources are more likely to engage in some, but not all, types of non-electoral participation.

Of the control variables included in the model, I find that immigrants interviewed after the immigrant rights marches were more likely to have contacted a government official than those interviewed prior to the protests. The substantive effect of having witnessed the marches on the probability of contacting a government official can be found in a figure in the methodological appendix (Figure A1). Results show that immigrants who were interviewed at a date after the immigrant rights marches of 2006 had a 4.19 percentage point increase in the predicted probability of contacting a

government official. This result shows that immigrants were particularly affected by the marches because first generation immigrants are the only generational group that witnessed greater political activity after the marches. This finding substantiates prior research that found anti-immigrant legislation can spur participation among first generation immigrants (Ramakrishnan and Epenshade 2001).[3] The effect of the 2006 marches not only manifested itself in terms of increasing feelings of an 'American' identity among immigrants internally (Silber-Mohamed 2013), but this finding suggests that they also had an effect on the political system externally.

We also see national-origin group differences, as immigrants of Mexican and Puerto Rican descent are shown to be more likely to contact a government official than are immigrants of other ethnic origins. Prior research with regard to national-origin differences and non-electoral participation among immigrants has been lacking. Studies of whether one group has been more or less inclined to participate in activities outside of voting have been limited to citizens (Calvo and Rosenstone 1998; Wrinkle et al. 1996). I find that immigrants of Mexican and Puerto Rican origin are more likely to participate than are Latinos from other backgrounds, which is consistent with other research that suggests Cuban non-citizens are less likely to participate than other non-citizen Latinos (Leal 2002).

E. Second and Third Generation Latino Contact with Elected Officials

With regard to second-generation Latinos, we see that a different set of associational ties affect the likelihood of their civic engagement with political leaders.

First, second-generation Latinos do not benefit from their ties to religious institutions as do first generation immigrants. Instead, second-generation immigrants are more likely to express their concerns to political figures if they have ties to organized labor, the military and political parties. While closer ties to churches were shown to be the primary drivers of non-electoral civic participation among the immigrant generation, results indicate that by the second generation, Latinos have diversified their institutional affiliations beyond the walls of the church and into other avenues of social cohesion.

Table 3.7 shows that only one affiliation with a social institution—the military—is a significant predictor of civic participation for third and later generation Latinos. Though four out of five affiliations and three out of four affiliations were positive and statistically significant for Latino immigrants and second generation Latinos, respectively, such connections do not exist among those of the third generation. By contrast, third- and later generation Latinos participate in non-electoral activities largely on the basis of their socioeconomic resources and less so because of their institutional ties.

The minimal role of social institutions among the third-generation may be due to the fact that their rate of participation along the two measures of civic participation is higher than the two other generational groups. Perhaps the third generation has reached a 'ceiling' of civic participation, whereby any added affiliation with the social institutions in question is unlikely to produce any benefits. The only other variables that attain statistical significance aside from a connection to the military are the age and socioeconomic status indicators. Rather than a reliance on their affiliations with social

institutions, third-generation immigrants' civic lives are largely determined by socioeconomic status and factors relating to the life cycle – as is the case for Americans generally.

Age is only shown to be statistically significant for native-born Latinos in the contact model. Older second and third generation Latinos are more likely to express their concerns via telephone calls, mail, or meetings than younger respondents of those generations. This stands in contrast to the results among immigrant Latinos, in which older Latino immigrants were no more likely to join groups or contact government officials than were younger Latino immigrants.

Gender is only statistically significant among one generational group, as second generation Latinas are more likely to contact government officials than are their male counterparts. This may comport with prior research that has shown Latinas to be more likely to approach politics by way of grassroots organizing and community work than electoral politics (Hardy-Fanta 1993). Latina involvement at the local level, a prime example being their connection to their children's school, further illustrates their continued community-oriented approach to politics.

F. Substantive Effects

For the sake of greater interpretability I conducted a series of statistical exercises in order to provide a visualization of results related to my core hypothesis—the Institutional Socialization Hypothesis. Specifically, I derived the predicted probabilities for participating in at least one community group and for contacting an elected official for

two hypothetical situations. The blue bars on the left for each generational group represent the predicted probability that a respondent will answer that they participate in the activities of at least one community group (Figure 3.6) or that they have contacted a government official (Figure 3.7) under the condition of no ties to the social institutions examined (minimum ties). That is, the respondent is not a church-goer, has no affiliation to the military or a labor union, reports no partisan affiliation, and, in the case of first generation immigrants, did not attend a U.S. school. The red bars on the right for each generational group represent the probability of an affirmative response on the dependent variables under the condition that a respondent reports ties to all of the social institutions examined (maximum ties).



Figure 3.8 Substantive Effects of Affiliations with Social Institutions on Contacting a Government Official (Predicted Probabilities)



I begin by setting the covariates not related to social institutions to either the mode, for dichotomous variables, or the mean, for continuous variables, results in Figure 3.6 show that shifting from a hypothetical respondent with no ties to social institutions to a respondent with maximum ties translates to a 28.32 percentage point increase in predicted probability of participating in a community among first generation Latinos. The difference for between no ties and maximum ties produces a 34.56 and 16.81 percentage point increase in predicted probability second and third generation Latino community group participation, respectively. A similar pattern is observed in Figure 3.7 which displays results for the second dependent variable. In this case, moving from the minimum to the maximum ties in social institutions yields positive increases in predicted probability of 31.38 percentage point increase for first generation immigrant Latinos, 32.79 percentage point increase for second generation Latinos, and a 29.11 percentage

point increase for third generation Latinos. These substantive effects illustrate just how critical affiliations to social institutions are for the development of Latino civic and political engagement.

LNS Focus Group Insights

An important social institution that has stood out in this chapter has been the role of churches in immigrant political integration. By virtue of the institutional accessibility enjoyed by members of the immigrant generation, as evinced by their higher rate of church attendance (Chapter 2), churches are uniquely poised to help immigrants transition to political life in the United States. In an effort to further highlight the way that this particular social institution helps with political incorporation, this section offers insights from the focus group portion of the Latino National Survey of 2006. These qualitative data provide further information about how churches help integrate immigrants into the social and political fabric of the U.S. through co-ethnic bonding capital and cross-racial bridging capital.

In May of 2003, the principal investigators of the Latino National Survey collected interviews with Latinos across the country in order to supplement the quantitative portion of the project. Focus group interviews were conducted with a total of 120 Latino respondents in thirteen states in order to arrive at a mix of individuals across a range of experiences and locations. Of the thirteen groups, ten were conducted in what are referred to as "traditional gateway" cities where Latinos have historically arrived and settled. These cities included Los Angeles, Houston, New York City, Miami, and the

Washington, D.C. metro area. Investigators collected two sets of interviews in each of these cities—an English interview and an interview in Spanish that met the language needs of immigrants so that they could more fully communicate. The remaining three interviews were conducted in what are considered to be "New Destination" locations, places that have historically had small populations of Latinos but have recently begun to see increases in Latino migration to the area. These included two locations in Iowa (Muscatine and West Liberty) and one in Dalton, Georgia. The focus group in Muscatine was conducted in English while those in West Liberty and Dalton were conducted in Spanish.

On the topic of religious institutions in Latino civic life, a recurring theme was that church was a natural point of social gathering for many respondents. An immigrant woman from Nuevo Leon, Mexico residing in Houston, Texas described how she met one of her two friends at church:

> "I have two friends. One I met when I sold tickets for the church for a charity event and we became friends. Now, I see her at my kid's school. The other I met through English school…I mostly meet friends at church or school."
>
> --Respondent #3 (female) Houston, Spanish language focus group

Another respondent stated that her best friend was the godmother of her child. Religious cultural practices of *comadrazgo* and *compadrazgo* are common among Latino Catholics. Many individuals from immigrant backgrounds commonly have substantial

portion of their family in their or their family's country of origin. As a consequence, these practices offer a way to grow a kinship network, in this case through a formal religiously ritual. At first, the facilitator had asked respondents to identify who they considered to be their best friend but stipulated that the individual should be someone other than a family member, the individual (Respondent #7, female), responded with the following:

> "You said no relatives, is a godparent a relative? Would you consider that a relative?
>
> Facilitator: "Would you?"
>
> "No. You made them a part of your family. They were not a family member until you made them a part of your family. My daughter's godmother. We met through a friend of a friend. We have a lot in common, our children, the school where the kids went, same age, same value, same church, same parish.
>
> Facilitator: "Catholic Church?"
>
> "Yes. She is Latin from Cuba."
>
> Facilitator: "Did you have any relatives together? Was she also born in Havana?"
>
> "No, she wasn't a relative. I made her a relative."
>
> --Respondent #7 (female), Miami English-language focus group

The role of churches as places that facilitate the cultivation of co-ethnic social connections is particularly vital in places that have historically had few Latinos. For

example, a Guatemalan immigrant in the New Destination location of Muscatine, Iowa identified the church as the source of all his friends. He stated:

> "Mainly church friends—100% Latinos, I trust in them. I meet people mostly through church. My neighbors don't talk to me and I won't speak unless spoken to. I find it hard to associate with other people that aren't church related because I can't find anything in common to talk about."
> --Respondent #12 (male), Muscatine English-language focus group

Similarly, in West Liberty, Iowa, many Latino immigrants also echoed how church was where they met the people that went on to become their friends:

> Respondent #2 (male): "I have many Americans friends, because my daughters married Americans. There are also many Americans in my church."
>
> Respondent #7 (female): "Also I met many American friends in my church."
>
> Respondent #9 (male): "Not many friends. The majority of our friends are from church."

In addition to the church's role as one of the few places where Latino immigrants can find friends, many felt a general sense of comfort that they could not achieve in other settings. A key feature of church that they greatly enjoyed was the option to practice their faith in Spanish. The following exchange occurred in the Spanish-language focus group conducted among largely Latino immigrants residing in the Washington, D.C., metro area.

> Facilitator: "For those of you who go to church, do you have friends there?"

Woman: "Hispanics, primarily Latinos."

Woman: "I go to church, and they are primarily white Americans, there are not many Latinos."

Man: "Hispanics, they are mainly my parents' friends."

Woman: "My church has primarily Americans, but they do have two different services in Spanish. Sometimes I go to both."

Man: "There is a church here in Alexandria in Spanish, but sometimes I go to the one in English even though the one in Spanish is easier to understand. The Americans that go to church still seem cold, while the Mexicans show they care."

Woman: "I still can't learn the prayers in English."

Man: "I had the same experience. I made my communion over there when I was 17, and all prayers were in Spanish, then I came here and I had to learn them in English, and I can't relate to them, I know them though."

Woman: "I learned them in Spanish, and I came here when I was 24, and I have found it very difficult to learn them or say anything in English. I can't follow the mass in English."

Migration, by its very nature, implies both a literal and figurative distancing from home. More than simply a distancing in the sense of separation from a person's geographic space of belonging, immigrants can feel a sense of isolation from their cultural customs and even alienation from something as personal as their faith. Therefore, the availability of Spanish mass is useful for immigrants in order to bring them closer to the central parts of their identity.

Among participants that from the English-language focus group in the D.C. area, one particular moment during the discussion about people's religious practices illustrates the divide in preferences on the topic. An older gentleman, who emigrated from

Nicaragua as an adult at some point during the country's civil war, stated how he preferred to attend the Spanish mass at his predominantly white Catholic Church because he and his family feel more at ease in Spanish and surrounded by fellow Latinos. He expressed this by saying:

> "It is mostly American. There is Spanish mass and English mass. We go to the Spanish one, even if we could go to the English speaking one, because we feel more at home, with our people. And at the same time the Americans feel better, it's the only church that's Catholic in this area, in Alexandria."
>
> –Respondent #1 (male), Washington, D.C. metro area English-language focus group

In this same group, younger Latinos, including a woman who arrived in the U.S. from Nicaragua at age four and a U.S. born Latino man, feel differently. Given that they are less connected to immigrant social networks, their religious practices are more flexible in terms of language options and even practices outside of Catholicism, the most common faith of Latino immigrants. On these matters, they said the following:

> Facilitator: What about today? Do you go to church?
>
> Respondent #7 (male): I do go to church, but I go to the Unitarian church. It's like all faiths are welcome and stuff like that.
>
> Respondent #4 (female): I go to a unity church and I made that conscious choice and I don't go to a Catholic church, and it's much more white.
>
> Respondent #7 (male): Yeah, it's all white. That's the only thing I don't like about the unity church: posh whiteness. I wish we had some more diversity there, but I like it because it's about all faiths, in common.

Respondent #6 (female): I prefer to go to English mass. My mom and dad would go to Spanish mass, but I can't keep up and I'd just rather go to English mass.

Respondent #1 (male): In Alexandria there is only one Catholic Church for African-Americans. My priest who is from Spain tells me that is his mission. So we tend to be sympathetic towards the African-Americans and get mad at the Americans about this situation that is, somehow, ubiquitous. It shouldn't be that way, we have a culture that doesn't let it become fusioned [sic] and they keep their culture, we keep our culture. We could be in the same church.

Thus, immigrant Latinos and those more closely tied to the immigrant experience expressed their preference for the Catholic Church because of its capacity to maintain bonding capital with fellow co-ethnics and other immigrants. Meanwhile, those Latinos with higher levels of acculturation by virtue of their second-generation status preferred racially integrated settings that allowed them to build bridging capital with individuals from other backgrounds. Language also appears to play an important role.

To this point, Latino participants also mentioned that faith opened doors to establishing relationships with non-Latinos. A respondent in Miami mentioned how having a shared faith provided the necessary common ground between him and his friend, by stating:

"My best friend is American who speaks Spanish. [He] has traveled to South America. Religion is our key that joins us."

--Respondent #9 (male), Miami Spanish-language focus group

A Latino man who was born and raised in Los Angeles met his future wife, an Indonesian woman at church. He stated:

> "She is Asian. She's from Indonesia. I married her because I believe in God—I go to church. God sent her into my life. I don't look at the color of skin.
>
> Facilitator: "Did you meet her at church?"
>
> "…I met her there. I asked her out to dinner. I was persistent. We talked a lot about God. I took her to church, she met the pastor, and then we went out for Thai Food. Our relationship grew over time…"
>
> --Respondent #6 (male), Los Angeles English-language focus group

Thus, religious institutions offer immigrants the space to maintain their bonds with fellow immigrants and co-ethnics or to create ties with members of the community different from themselves which helps to expand their civic connections. These two forms of social capital go on to be critical for the foundation of political activity. The bonding capital works to provide them with the sense of community that creates an interest and investment in local affairs; connections with members of other backgrounds expands their social network which serves to increase the number of access points they have to engage in civic and political life.

DISCUSSION

Affiliation with major social institutions is critical for the political integration of Latinos, especially immigrants or those closely tied to the immigrant community.

Membership in these social sites offer immigrants who often feel politically marginalized the sense of legitimacy to seek their political self-actualization. For example, during the immigrant rights rallies of 2006 in Houston, a Latino protester, 30 year-old Staff Sgt. Jose Soto of the U.S. Marine Corps attended the rally in uniform. The protests occurred between his deployments to Iraq and he explained the juxtaposition between his service and the experience of his parents who came to the country as undocumented immigrants. He said he had fought in Iraq and was in Houston to visit his parents, who came to this country as illegal immigrants: “I've fought for freedom overseas…Now I'm fighting for freedom here” (Swarns 2006).

Sergeant Soto’s expression of why he felt compelled to participate in the immigrant rights marches exemplifies the power of society’s major institutions, in his case the military, to function as a gateway to greater civic incorporation. That he defended the rights of immigrants publicly all the while emphasizing his military service goes to show that social institutions can operate as bridges across generational divides. His close proximity to the immigrant generation means that the plight of immigrants in the U.S. continues to have a special resonance in his life despite his formal citizenship and personal sense of belonging.

This chapter sought to compare the effects of acculturation, involvement with social institutions, and socioeconomic status on Latino non-electoral civic participation. The comparison of civic participation between foreign-born individuals and native-born individuals of the second and third generations reveals a series of important findings. First, while civic participation among foreign-born immigrants lags behind that of second

and later generations, immigrants are present and have a role in civic spaces. That a minority of Latinos across all generations participate in at least one social, civic, or cultural group (33 percent among the third and later generation; 29 percent among the second generation; and 16 percent among immigrants) indicates that all Latinos could stand to benefit from the work of social institutions that foster greater civic participation.

Results regarding associational ties to social institutions show that benefits are contingent on immigrant generation. Given that accessibility to these institutions frequently falls along generational lines, we have seen that some have more potential to provide a base of support for immigrants. Affiliations with four out of the five social institutions were shown to be positive and significant factors for immigrant participation in community groups and contacting an elected official. Similarly, a majority of associational ties (three out of four) are significant for both non-electoral behaviors of second generation Latinos. These results suggest strong support for the institutional socialization hypothesis among immigrant Latinos and the children of immigrants. Since only a connection to the military is significant on one occasion among Latinos of third and later generations, I find little support for the social institutionalization hypothesis among these native-born Latinos of U.S.-born parents.

Results from multivariate analysis show that the level of acculturation and affiliations with social institutions are important to immigrant civic participation, though they each predict different behaviors. Among first-generation immigrants, some markers of acculturation are predictive of greater civic participation. For instance, first-generation respondents that have spent a larger percentage of their life in the U.S. and those that are

naturalized citizens are more likely to contact elected officials by writing letters, calling, or attending meetings. Yet, those two measures of acculturation are not indicative of participation in the activities of civic groups. Therefore, it should not be assumed that recently arrived immigrants or those that lack citizenship are necessarily less likely to take part in the activities of community organizations.

This finding has important ramifications for the political voice of Latinos writ large. It indicates that greater familiarity with the system and formal political membership are significant for engaging the civic sphere that is outside of their communities. These two factors are less important for social embeddedness within their communities. The distinction between types of political behavior echoes that of Junn (1999) who distinguishes between 'system-directed ' behaviors like voting and 'direct' actions like attending protests and other non-electoral activities. My results indicate that civic group activity within Latino communities can commence with or without members being citizens, although groups that have members who are citizens may be better equipped to connect the workings of their group to the larger political system outside their community.

Direct comparison with previous research is difficult given that the dependent variables are somewhat different and that others do not adopt this chapter's focus on the role of institutions, nor do they break down populations according to immigrant generation. However, the findings about how acculturation shapes the immigrant generation do differ from previous research. Whereas Barreto and Muñoz (2003) concluded that percentage of life is not predictive of participation by Mexican immigrants

on their non-electoral participation index, the findings here suggest that the percentage of an immigrant's life spent in the U.S. is a significant predictor of whether a respondent contacts a government official. The difference may reflect the question wording, which asked respondents if they had ever written a letter, called, or attended a meeting for the expressed purpose of communicating a concern to an elected official. This activity could be seen as more burdensome than simply being a member of a wide array of groups. Future work that measures civic participation among immigrants should keep in mind that non-electoral activities are not necessarily apolitical and that communication with government officials often requires civic skills that many immigrants are in the process of developing.

My results regarding the relationship between age and civic participation across immigrant generations corroborate age effects, at least in terms of joining groups, from prior research. Leal (2002) and Barreto and Muñoz (2003) find that younger non-citizens are more likely to participate than older individuals. This finding comports with the reality of immigrant rights activism seen at the moment in which young immigrants, many of them potential DREAM Act and DACA beneficiaries, not only join groups but create their own. Older native-born Latinos, however, are shown to be more willing to engage in civic activities when they are directed at petitioning government officials. Citizen Latinos therefore appear to be similar to mainstream groups in that age is associated with greater likelihood of civic participation.

With regard to the test of the Institutional Socialization Hypothesis, the results suggest that the effect of association with political parties, churches, the armed forces and

organized labor vary according to generation. First-generation immigrants that are frequent church-goers, are themselves or have a family connection to a union member, and that claim affiliation with a political party are more likely to engage in the two civic activities examined. Connections to the military and U.S. schools were each significant for at least one of the non-electoral behaviors as well. Ties to organized labor and the military were consistently predictive of greater participation among the second generation, while the positive effect of church attendance on non-electoral participation was less consistent than it was for immigrants.

These results may be due in part to the differences in the accessibility of these institutions according to generation. Whether or not an associational tie to a social institution encourages civic participation among first-generation immigrants may reflect issues with citizenship status and acculturation. For example, the military is limited in its capacity to spur immigrant political incorporation because the armed services can only recruit immigrants that are either naturalized citizens or legal permanent residents. Another factor may be that foreign-born immigrants, especially those that immigrated to the U.S. at an older age, may be less willing to don the uniform of a country that they do not perceive as their own. Further research should explore whether immigrants that were brought to the U.S. as children, commonly referred to as the 1.5 generation, are more likely to use the military as an avenue for greater political incorporation.

Lastly, among the two components of socioeconomic status, education and income, education appears to be more determinative of increased civic participation for Latinos of all generations. The effect of increased financial resources is less consistent.

Although higher income was significant for contacting a government official to express a concern, economic mobility was not significant for predicting the social and community embeddedness of immigrants. Higher income was positively associated with greater non-electoral participation along both dimensions among Latinos of the second generation and was statistically significant for the community embeddedness of third and later generations. Previous research has emphasized the role that socioeconomic status can have for increasing a host of behaviors among immigrants—from voting (Cho 1999) to naturalization (Jones-Correa 1998) to non-electoral activity (Garcia-Bedolla 2000). The findings here make the case that economic resources operate differently for Latinos of different generations, and thus the need to distinguish between education and income.

The importance of education to the civic lives of Latinos cannot be understated. Latinos as a group have come to understand the centrality of education to socio-economic advancement. Schools often operate as the nucleus of immigrant civic community because they provide opportunities for immigrant parents to gather for the purpose of sharing successful educational strategies with other parents. For immigrant parents especially, schools function as one of the few forums where they can voice concerns important to their community. Furthermore, schools function as social spaces that lower the costs of organization because parents pool informational assets in order to make them available to other parents facing similar conditions. Latinos that manage to be successful in school are more likely to enter adulthood equipped with the necessary civic skills to engage in politics in more ways than simply voting. Results show that they can translate

their education into civic groups and are more likely to express issues important to them through government channels.

In conclusion, without greater access to more of America's social institutions, civic participation among immigrants may not reach its full potential. The addition of a sense of insecurity due to unauthorized status in the face of increased enforcement only further emphasizes the positive role they can play. Prior research has shown that it is important to situate the role of political context within an assessment of immigrant civic behavior. While Pantoja et al. (2001) found that California's anti-immigrant climate spurred some immigrants to naturalize, the climate of fear has since increased and spread beyond California, and deportation and removal policies have been felt to a greater degree nation-wide.

The possibility or threat of deportation might then enter the calculus of noncitizens as they decide whether join civic groups or interact formally with government officials. Richard Trumka, president of the A.F.L-C.I.O., summarized the difficulty undocumented immigrants face when deciding to publicly voice their concerns regarding immigration reform, stating that "Now immigrant communities are feeling under attack. And it's hard for them to focus on trying to win reform, when they're afraid they could be pulled over for running a red light, and get torn away from their families" (Thompson and Cohen 2014). This means that deportation functions as an added cost to noncitizens as they decide whether to participate in non-electoral politics. Nonetheless, in the face of hostile local environments, whether contentious political rhetoric by elected officials or targeted law enforcement strategies, noncitizens do engage in civic participation.

NOTES

1. According the 2012 Pew National Survey of Latinos, 93 percent of Latino immigrants who were not yet naturalized stated they "would" naturalize if they could, with little differences between green-card holders and non-green-card holders. See the Pew Hispanic Center's Report, "The Path Not Taken" (Gonzalez-Barrera et al. 2013), for more detail.
2. See Montoya (1999) for a critique of the use of the sleeping giant metaphor in popular discourse, and Santa Ana (2002) for an analysis of the multiple metaphors applied to Latinos more generally.
3. Ramakrishnan and Epenshade (2001) also find that anti-immigrant legislation encourages political participation among second generation immigrants.

Chapter 4: From Taking the Oath to Casting the Vote: Latino Electoral Participation

The Latino population in the U.S. is steadily becoming a significant feature of American life. Estimates place the Latino population share at 25 to 30 percent by mid-century, and the voting-eligible Latino electorate will grow to twice its current size (to 40 million) in two decades (Pew Hispanic 2012). The community's growing importance to the political landscape is indicated by media accounts during every election cycle which are replete with discussion of the "Latino Vote." This interest reflects a Latino electorate which has been steadily increasing in size. In 2004, Latinos comprised 8 percent of the electorate, which increased to 9 percent in 2008 and 10 percent in 2012. According to figures from the Census Bureau's Current Population Surveys, the voter turnout rate among the eligible Latino population has risen less than one percent from 2004 to 2016 (U.S. Census Bureau 2005; 2009; 2013). This has not been the case among other racial and ethnic minorities; although Black turnout dipped in 2016, it had been rising gradually since 1996, meanwhile Asian American turnout as steadily increased (see Table 4.1).[1]

Table 4.1 Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections by Racial Group (Percent Reported Voting among Citizens)

	White	Black	Latino	Asian
1992	70.2	59.8	51.6	53.9
1996	60.7	53	44	45
2000	61.8	56.8	45.1	43.4
2004	67.2	60	47.2	44.2
2008	66.1	64.7	49.9	47.6
2012	64.1	66.2	48	47.3
2016	65.3	59.4	47.6	49

Note: Figures for whites based on 'white non-Hispanic alone'. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Surveys.

What are we to make of the fact that Latinos exhibit rates of voter turnout lower than Whites and African Americans? The previous chapter showed how ties to social institutions were particularly important for inducing non-electoral forms of political participation among Latino immigrants and the children of immigrants. Does variation in rates of electoral participation (voter registration and turnout) also rest on these associations? I contend that the theory of Generational Political Incorporation can also be applied to the Latino electoral experience.

Research has found that Latinos are, on average, less likely than African Americans and Anglos to participate in electoral politics (Shaw et al. 2000; Verba et al. 1993; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). One traditional explanation of this gap is the group's relatively low socio-economic status, while others argue that low turnout is attributable to the presence of a large number of naturalized immigrants within the Latino electorate still undergoing the acculturation process (Pachon and DeSipio 1994).While both factors undoubtedly play a role, such analyses lack an understanding of the crucial

role of social institutions for Latino electoral participation. It is here that I hope that insights from the theory of Generational Political Incorporation might help academics and practitioners to both understand and narrow this gap.

The central contention of this project is that connections to America's major social institutions are the keys to understanding how Latinos become politically active. The theory of Generational Political Incorporation holds that formal and informal rules governing institutions differentially shape access by citizens and non-citizens. This makes some institutions less viable options for springboards to involvement in American electoral politics, especially first generation immigrants. Thus, institutions that limit access to citizens will hinder the incorporation process of immigrants, while those with expanded access will help spur political engagement by the first generation.

Given the growing importance of Latinos in the U.S. writ large, it is necessary that the contours of their political incorporation be thoroughly explored. Therefore, the primary question of this chapter is 'What factors facilitate the electoral participation of Latinos of various generations?' It also asks a series of more specific corollary questions, including: Do ties to social institutions propel Latinos to register and vote? If so, are the supportive networks associated with some institutions more likely to boost electoral engagement among individuals from specific Latino immigrant generations?

The objective of this chapter is to describe how the nexus of institutional memberships and generational status is critical to understanding Latino electoral participation. This will allow Latino political behaviors to be treated from a multi-generational and institutional perspective that moves beyond the standard explanations.

The previous chapter that analyzed non-electoral participation revealed that immigrants with established ties to certain social institutions displayed a greater likelihood of engaging in civic activities, and the analysis below applies similar tests to see if these institutional ties can spur electoral engagement.

LATINO ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION

Prior research on Latino and Latino immigrant voter turnout has highlighted a constellation of factors that influence the likelihood of turnout. Initial research speculated that low levels of political participation among Latinos were due to certain deficiencies endemic to Latino culture. Whether among Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the border communities of Texas (D'Antonio and Form 1965) or among Latinos from Caribbean countries residing in New York (Nelson 1979), scholars concluded that aspects of Latino culture were responsible for the dearth of Latino civic activity. For example, Nelson (1979, 1037) blamed a "weak participant culture" among the Latinos in his study as the root cause of the community's political and social inequality.

Latino politics scholars sought to disabuse the literature of these problematic assertions that led to the creation of negative stereotypes about Latino political culture. Raphael Tirado (1970) countered D'Antonio and Form's conclusions that Latinos were apathetic by documenting the long history of Mexican American political activity. Meanwhile, John Garcia and Carlos Arce (1988) disputed Nelson's characterization of an inferior Latino political culture by highlighting instead how the group lacked organizational awareness. That is, while many of the Chicanos studied by Garcia and

Arce expressed enthusiasm for participation in accordance with a form of "active citizenship" (1980, 148), which they found to be highest among those of lower socioeconomic status and Mexican-born immigrants, they struggled to perform their desires electorally. Garcia and Arce made an insightful contribution to the literature by revealing the underlying disconnect between positive civic orientations and actual behaviors.

Verba and Nie (1972) were the first to systematically explore the effect of civic organization membership and political participation. Their work suggested that such ties were important to whites and African Americans, but it did not include Americans of other racial-ethnic backgrounds. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) extended the SES model to account for Latinos' lower levels of participation in comparison to Anglos, but even their analysis of Latinos was not extensive (see Affigne 2014 for further discussion). Diaz (1996), in the first study to focus on how wider ties to civic community among Latinos can propel political participation, did not explore how entrance to these organizations is dependent upon factors related to citizenship and generational status.

Among those works that address generational status, they do not explore the effect of social institutions (Ramakrishnan and Epenshade 2001; Santoro and Segura 2011). Santoro and Segura (2011) documented the positive relationship between immigrant generation and electoral participation and found that "the probability of reporting electoral participation goes up with each succeeding generation, ceteris paribus" (2011, 178). However, this study was limited to a sample of Mexican Americans.

One way that this dissertation extends prior work is by including Latinos across national-origin groups. However, I contend that national origin differences are less important for political participation than are the factors I address—connections to social institutions in the context of generational status differences.[2] Furthermore, while other work has documented the importance of certain types of community-level organizations (Diaz 1996; Garcia and Arce 1988; Wong 1999, 2006), analysis that encompasses the range of larger organizations—the military, labor unions, religious institutions, schools, and political parties—remains lacking. I hope to build on such extant work through the analysis that follows so that some of these gaps in understanding Latino electoral participation can be addressed.

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND LATINO ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION

I argue that large social institutions offer immigrants, and Latinos more broadly, a set of benefits that advance their political incorporation in ways that small and exclusively local organizations are often incapable of providing on a consistent basis. In general, social institutions such as the military, labor unions, religious institutions, schools, and the two major political parties can undertake efforts to induce political participation for a few reasons. First, their affiliation with state and national level networks; second, their scale and centralization that allows for undertaking large-scale mobilization or incorporation programs; and third, their role as "hub venues" where smaller groups solicit their services.

The advantages associated with these major social institutions should not obscure the importance of local organizations. Instead, it is meant to illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of organizational type—whether small-local community organizations or large-national organizations. First, such major social institutions can more easily overcome the effects of 'localism,' a focus on solving local issues that hinders both the growth of political organizations and the sustained political activity of members. A counterargument against the capabilities of large social institutions like the military or a national labor union is that because they lack the knowledge and understanding of the immediate context to solve a problem that an immigrant or minority community faces, they are unsuited to solve local issues. However, by virtue of their state-wide or national-level nature, they have the capacity to marshal the resources necessary to mobilize and integrate individuals on a larger scale. For example, individual community schools are a part of a larger school district, and churches, especially in the case of the Catholic Church, are attached to a larger network (diocese) that they can call upon for more informational or financial resources.

Unfortunately, many local Latino ethnic organizations face a disadvantage in terms of their capacity to formalize the membership of participants and impose organizational structures, large, nation-wide institutions. It is because of these sorts of structural advantages that the critical institutions that make up the focus of this study are so powerful. Another advantage of large-scale institutions over smaller, local organizations is that they have already incurred the organizational costs that are associated with social group creation. This feature is related in part to the permanence of

these institutions—the U.S. military and the Republican and Democratic Parties are entrenched parts of American political life. Despite the countervailing forces of privatization and anti-unionization, public schools and organized labor remain civic mainstays. Institutions of organized religion are deeply rooted as well. Though challenged by demographic trends associated with increased secularization, as scholars have pointed out, America remains uniquely religious when compared to other western democracies (Norris and Inglehart 2011).

The role these social institutions occupy as a 'hub venue' is also important. By maintaining a primary association with their church, labor union, or school, immigrants will be the targets of "wrap-around services" by secondary actors and organizations. Community service organizations which specialize in services for immigrants or refugees may recognize which local churches, for examples, have a membership base in need of such services. Likewise, for political matters, local candidates may familiarize themselves with the membership base of a church, union hall, or school and can thus better target their messages and services to meet the community's needs (and thereby attract some votes).

These social sites also function as hubs in informal ways by developing social networks that promote the circulation of valuable information that may not be available from other sources. In terms of government, when one person or family faces a political concern with a certain bureaucracy, they may know a fellow member that has experience with the issue. Such connections and shared knowledge can serve to increase the political capabilities of an institution's members. Similarly, those with a school affiliation

come into contact with other parents or teachers so that the initial associational tie (student or parent of a student) can have a magnifying effect in terms of organizing for policy change.

Such organizations can also serve as a site where other groups seek to educate or offer services to members. Indeed, once larger social institutions attain a certain level of stature and reputability (either over time or by a function of their size) they then attract other smaller service-oriented groups to their sites. For example, in her study of religious institutions that serve the needs of immigrants, Levitt (2008) documented how certain churches, cognizant of the need for greater political education among their immigrant members, held 'Meet the Candidate' nights (2008, 778). This sort of role as host and hub for political leaders and community organizations creates an important efficiency in the knowledge dissemination process; the collection of large numbers of people with similar needs in one place lowers the costs for smaller organizations that have services and information to share but struggle to do so effectively.

With these considerations in mind, I test a series of hypotheses that allow me to weigh the effects of numerous institutional affiliations, levels of acculturation, and socioeconomic status on Latino propensity to engage in electoral activities. While I have argued that institutions – including churches, schools, political parties, the military, and labor unions – play an outsized role within the civic lives of Latinos, I also contend that individual-level differences (including educational attainment, income, and English language proficiency) are important explanatory factors for naturalization and electoral participation. In order to compare how social institutions, acculturation differences, and

socioeconomic status shape Latino political incorporation across all three generations, this chapter proposes three hypotheses.

The first hypothesis—the Immigrant Acculturation Hypothesis—applies only to the immigrants in the sample because it relates to measures unique to the immigrant experience. It expects that immigrants with increased levels of acculturation and familiarity with the United States will exhibit a greater desire to seek naturalization and a greater propensity for electoral engagement.

> *H1. Immigrant Acculturation Hypotheses: Among first-generation immigrants, those who…*
>
> *(A) have spent a greater percentage of their life in the U.S. will be more likely to naturalize and participate in U.S. electoral politics.*
>
> *(B) possess greater English fluency will be more likely to naturalize and participate in U.S. electoral politics.*
>
> *(C) have undergone the naturalization process will be more likely to naturalize and participate in U. S. electoral politics.*

The second hypothesis—the Institutional Socialization Hypotheses—is applied to Latinos across all three generations. It proposes that social institutions operate as important conduits for Latino political integration via citizenship acquisition and participation in electoral politics. While I argue that all Latinos who belong to or have direct ties with churches, schools, the military, labor organizations, and political parties

will be more likely to engage in civic and political activities, the benefits conferred will be conditioned by generational status.

> *H2. Institutional Socialization Hypothesis: Latinos who claim affiliation with one or more of the five following social institutions—churches, schools, the military, labor organizations, and/or political parties—will be more likely to express a desire to naturalize and to engage in U.S. electoral politics.*

The third set of hypotheses—the Socioeconomic Status Hypotheses—like the Institutional Socialization Hypothesis before it, is applied to all three generations of Latinos. It predicts that individual-level differences in socio-economic status translate to differences in desire for U.S. citizenship and for the likelihood of engaging in electoral activities. This follows from an established literature that links increased educational resources, and to a slightly lesser extent income, to greater political participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Brady, and Schlozman 1995). Specifically, greater socioeconomic status should lead to an increased motivation among immigrants to seek out U.S. citizenship. Likewise, higher socioeconomic status should be associated with a higher frequency of electoral participation.

> *H3. Socioeconomic Status Hypothesis: Latinos of higher socioeconomic status with…*

(A) greater educational attainment will be more likely to express a desire to naturalize engage in U.S. electoral politics.

(B) greater household income will be more likely to express a desire to naturalize engage in U.S. electoral politics.

By testing these three sets of hypotheses, this chapter explores which set(s) of factors influence Latino political incorporation by way of engagement with the electoral system. This study contributes to the literature on Latino politics and political behavior by highlighting the contours of Latino electoral participation. It weighs whether greater political activity arises over time via gains in acculturation; whether it is a matter of interactions with institutions; whether it is determined by socioeconomic resources such as income and education; or whether it reflects a unique combination of all three that varies according to generational status.

NATURALIZATION: LATINO IMMIGRANTS AND THE CITIZENSHIP ACQUISITION PROCESS

The naturalization process is an important focus of this chapter because, for the Latino immigrant population, the pathway to electoral participation begins by first acquiring U.S. citizenship. In 2011, of the 39.6 million foreign-born immigrants living in the U.S., 15.5 million (39 percent) were naturalized citizens. Of these, 5 million were Latino naturalized voters within the Latino Voter Eligible Population (VEP) (Pew

Hispanic 2013). While naturalizations increased in the 1990s in part due to the eligibility of many IRCA beneficiaries, two other factors were at work.

The first is that immigrants responded to a rise in anti-immigrant policies and rhetoric by acquiring citizenship as means of ensuring their rights (Ong 2010; Pantoja et al. 2001, 2008; Ueda 1994). Over the last two decades, noncitizens increasingly face conditions that motivate them to begin the first steps on the pathway to citizenship. For example, though legal permanent residents have the right to seek employment and work, they do not have all the rights of U.S. citizens. They are prohibited from voting, barred from holding some elected offices, and are ineligible to work for some federal agencies. In the 1990s Congress further curtailed the rights of noncitizens, making the position of non-citizens (including legal permanent residents) more tenuous. For example, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), also known as welfare reform, barred LPRs who entered the country after August 22, 1996 from receiving food stamps, Supplemental Security Income, and other means-tested forms of government assistance for five years after entry. In that same year, Congress also passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which expanded the grounds on which a legal permanent resident could be detained and deported. The passage of these laws might have spurred some immigrants into completing the naturalization process (Gilbertson and Singer 2003).

These reforms at the federal level also coincided with state-level attempts to prevent undocumented immigrants from accessing public services, including public

education and access to medical care, as exemplified by California's Proposition 187. Though the provisions of Proposition 187 would never be implemented, the anti-immigrant and anti-Latino rhetoric behind the proposal motivated many noncitizens to naturalize as a way to protect themselves from potential punitive measures. Citizenship became a protective mechanism against measures seeking to diminish the rights and security of non-citizens at the federal and state levels.

Another reason for the rise in naturalizations was due to the initiation of a successful, if short-lived, Citizenship USA Program, an effort to reduce the backlog of citizenship petitions at the then INS. Commissioner Doris Meissner instituted the initiative, a yearlong program from the fall of 1995 to the fall of 1996. In 1996 and 1997, the U.S. naturalized 1.27 million and 1.41 million immigrants, respectively, marking the only time that naturalizations reached over 1 million immigrants in two consecutive years (DHS 2012).

The combination of these multiple forces produced notable increases in the rate of naturalization. In California, where anti-immigrant and anti-Latino sentiment was most acute, the rate of increase of naturalization outpaced the rest of the country—naturalizations in the state among eligible immigrants increased from 31 percent to 39 percent, or 500,000 more new citizens (Johnson et al. 1999).

As a consequence of all these motivational factors, government statistics on rates of naturalization suggest that citizenship has indeed become a more sought after status. Rates of naturalization (the share of eligible immigrants in a given year who naturalize) have increased among all immigrants—from 48 percent to 61 percent between 1995 and

2011 (Pew Hispanic 2013). This increase has occurred among immigrants of Mexican ancestry as well as immigrants from Canada, who have historically exhibited the least interest in acquiring U.S. citizenship; the naturalization rate for the latter increased from 20 percent to 36 percent during the same period (Ibid.).[3] Indeed, the average number of naturalizations (per year) has increased with every subsequent decade. According to government statistics, the average annual number of naturalizations was 210,000 during the 1980s, half a million in the 1990s, 680,000 in the 2000s and over 700,000 in 2010-2013 (Lee and Foreman 2014).

Political participation in the electoral arena is only available to immigrants that have undergone the naturalization process. Therefore, any thorough study of political incorporation must explore the citizenship acquisition process as well. Yet, what is less clear for the study of Latino politics is if this interest in U.S. citizenship among the immigrant population will necessarily translate into political participation. If many immigrants are naturalizing for defensive reasons – to avoid deportation or to access social programs – then this may not translate into subsequent political activity.

With this in mind, this project adopts a perspective of immigrant political incorporation that is a multi-stage process that follows an immigrant's trajectory from citizenship acquisition to political participation. In particular, the chapter explores the role of social institutions in promoting electoral participation, including the citizenship acquisition process, which the literature has yet to fully explore. I argue that immigrants with established ties to social institutions should be better equipped with the social capital

necessary to navigate the naturalization process and thereby eventual enter the political arena.

THE NATURALIZATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION LINKAGE

Table 4.2 Latino Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections by Citizenship Status

	Voter Turnout (%)		Registration (%)	
	Naturalized	Native-born	Naturalized	Native-born
1996	52.5	42.2	60.7	58.6
2000	49.6	43.6	57.7	57.2
2004	52.1	45.5	57.1	60
2008	54.2	48.4	59.8	59.3
2012	53.6	46.1	61.3	57.9

Note: 1996 figures found in Bass and Casper (2001) Table 1.
Figures for Latinos derived from cell "Hispanic (of any race)."

According to recent Current Population Surveys, about one out of every four Latino voters is a naturalized citizen. Specifically, Latino naturalized citizens were 27.6 percent of all Latino voters in 2004, and in 2008 and 2012 that figure was 28.2 and 27.3 percent, respectively (see Table 4.2).

At first glance, naturalized voters appear to be more electorally active than their native-born Latino counterparts. Bivariate comparisons from the Census Bureau's Current Population Surveys show a naturalized vs. U.S.-born gap in voter registration and voting in presidential elections. In 2004, naturalized Latinos voted at a self-reported rate of 52.1 percent compared to 45.5 percent for native-born Latinos (U.S. Census Bureau

2005). In 2008, those same figures were 54.2 percent to 48.4 percent, respectively (Census 2009). The most recent available figures show that this gap persisted in 2012, with 53.6 percent of naturalized Latinos voting compared to 46.1 percent of native-born Latinos (Census 2013).

That naturalized voters appear to out-perform their native-born peers may run counter to expectation given that these individuals have spent less time in the U.S. and should thus be less familiar with the political system. An alternative interpretation could be that immigrants who are more interested in politics self-select into the naturalization process. Initial studies exploring rates of participation according to citizenship status found that the observed difference between Latino naturalized and native-born voters was due largely to underlying differences in socioeconomic status. In fact, after controlling for a series of demographic variables, naturalization actually exerted a negative force on voter turnout among Latinos[4] (DeSipio 1996a) and other immigrant groups (Bass and Casper 2001).

Studies from the field of Latino politics exploring the ultimate effect of naturalization on political participation have yielded mixed results. In their study of immigrant political participation, Bass and Casper concluded that "the odds of registering among naturalized citizens are 36 percent lower and the odds of voting are 26 percent lower than those of native-born citizens" (2001, 504). For a time, other scholars suggested that the contextual dynamics of state politics in California, where during the 1990s Latinos were subject to attacks by anti-immigrant politicians and targeted by anti-immigrant policies, fueled a surge in immigrant electoral participation (Pantoja et al.

2001). More recent work has established that naturalization, in and of itself, may not be an effective tool for promoting political participation (Levin 2013).

In his study of Latino political participation, DeSipio (1996b) spoke of three distinct elements within the Latino Voting Age Population (Latino VAP)—the 'reticent,' Latinos that are citizens who are not registered to vote; the 'reluctant,' registered citizens that do not vote; and 'recruits,' Latino immigrants that have yet to acquire citizenship. Two decades later, these distinctions continue to be a relevant way of understanding Latino electoral participation. Moreover, DeSipio's categories can be understood from the perspective of immigrant generations. Native-born Latinos can either be engaged citizens that vote at rates similar to non-Latinos, or they can be less civically engaged, with the reticent being the least likely to vote and the reluctant being somewhat likelier to vote. The recruits are by definition Latino first-generation immigrants that have yet to naturalize, but, if given the opportunity, many would to participate.

We might ask what happens to first-generation Latino immigrants that are successfully 'recruited' into the American political system. Do they vote regularly, or do they fall into the patterns of disengagement alongside the reluctant and reticent native-born co-ethnics? The role of social institutions is argued to be a crucial part of understanding the electoral participation of Latinos. In particular, Latino immigrants with established ties to social institutions should become better equipped with the social capital necessary to navigate the naturalization process and their eventual entrance into politics. Further, native-born Latinos with such ties should also exhibit a greater likelihood of being registered to vote and have a more active voter history. Thus, the

political incorporation of these individuals remains important because the foreign-born and naturalized immigrant population has been, and will continue to be, a substantial portion of the Latino electorate.

METHODOLOGY

For the empirical investigation into the nature of civic and political participation among Latino citizens and non-citizens, I use the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS). The LNS consists of 8,634 interviews of self-identified Latino residents of the United States conducted between November 17, 2005 and August 4, 2006. The survey instrument contains approximately 165 distinct items ranging from demographics, public opinions, and social attitudes. Moreover, the LNS offers a rich array of measures that capture the experiences of immigrants, in contrast to traditional surveys that rarely draw from this segment of the population.

The survey was administered by telephone using bilingual interviewers and all respondents were offered the opportunity to interview in either language. Respondents were drawn from fifteen states and the District of Columbia metropolitan area (including counties and municipalities in Virginia and Maryland). States were first selected based on the overall size of the Latino population. In addition, the survey includes respondents in Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, and North Carolina (four ‘New Destination’ states) to capture elements of the population residing in places with less established Latino communities. The universe of analysis contains approximately 87.5 percent of the U.S. Latino population.

The operative measures of electoral participation that will be the dependent variables for the analysis below stem from three questions. The first is a question posed to non-citizen immigrants regarding their level of interest in attaining naturalization: "Now we would like to ask you about U.S. Citizenship. Are you currently applying for citizenship, planning to apply to citizenship or not planning on becoming a citizen?"

Table 4.3 Desire for Citizenship among Immigrant Non-Citizens (Eligible to Naturalize)

	%	N
Not Planning to Apply	47.59	1117
Current Applying or Planning to Apply for Citizenship	52.41	1230

Source: LNS (2006)

Table 4.3 displays the distribution of responses among the 2,347 immigrants who were eligible to naturalize. Although there were more non-citizens in the sample, in order to arrive at a more accurate measure it is prudent to exclude those respondents that are ineligible for naturalization. As such, the 788 respondents that admitted to being undocumented are dropped from the analysis of citizenship acquisition because they are by definition ineligible for naturalization. The model is also limited to those immigrants that have been in the U.S. for over five years because immigrants only become eligible for naturalization after they have completed the five year residency requirement under legal permanent resident status.

Of those respondents who were determined to be eligible to naturalize, just over half (52 percent) stated that they were currently undergoing the naturalization process or were planning to do so. The remaining respondents stated that they did not yet have the intention to seek out U.S. citizenship. This figure corresponds to national-level statistics that place the rate of naturalization at just over 60 percent for all immigrants during this time (Pew Hispanic Center 2013). That the figure is a bit lower is also to be expected because immigrants from Latin American (as well as Canada) display a lower than average rate of naturalization compared to immigrants from other parts of the world.

Table 4.4 Frequency of Electoral Participation by Generational Status

	Registration		Voted 2004 Presidential Election	
	%	N	%	N
First Generation (Naturalized)	77.47	1434	63.27	1168
Second Generation	83.08	1208	67.49	980
Third + Generation	86.3	819	73.58	699
Total	81.36	3461	67.02	2847

Source: LNS (2006)

All citizens in the sample were asked if they were registered to vote at the time of the interview and whether they cast a ballot in the 2004 presidential election. Table 4.4 shows the response rate of these questions according to generational status. In the case of both registration and voter turnout there is an observable increase in participation with each subsequent generation. Reported registration increases from 77 percent among

naturalized immigrants to 83 percent and 86 percent among the second and third and later generations, respectively. Likewise, we see a ten percentage point gap between levels of reported voter turnout between the naturalized (63 percent) and the third generation73 (percent), with second-generation individuals in between (67 percent).

What accounts for these differences in electoral participation along generational lines? Can certain factors propel immigrants to participate in civic activities in greater numbers? The following bivariate and multivariate analysis sheds light on those two central questions.

Independent Variables

The following section describes the independent variables related to the core hypothesis of Institutional Socialization. I analyze differences in electoral participation among immigrant first-generation respondents along a dichotomous variable (*U.S. schooling*) for individuals that have had some schooling in the U.S. The expectation is that among those eligible for naturalization, experience as students in U.S. schools will increase the desire to naturalize. At the following stage they may also be more likely to be registered and to have voted than those that never received an education in the U.S. The reasoning is that foreign-born voters with histories of meaningful interaction with the American school system should benefit from the corresponding socialization experience. Presumably, schools provide the necessary informational and civic resources to navigate and overcome bureaucratic hurdles that would otherwise complicate successful incorporation.

Also included in the cluster of variables capturing institutional socialization is a measure of church attendance. Prior work has suggested that the high rate of Latino affiliation with the Catholic Church dampens Latino political participation because institutional features of the church fail to impart to their Latino congregants the civic skills that promote participate (Verba, Brady, and Schlozman 1995). Later research indicated that the opposite was true—that Catholics were more likely to participate (Jones-Correa and Leal 2001). In that same study, Jones-Correa and Leal emphasized that church attendance, irrespective of denomination, was a more important factor.

Associational ties to political parties are also used to control for the effects of political identity and the incorporation of immigrants into the civic space. A respondent's identification with a particular political party, along with a respondent's stated level of interest in politics, should indicate a respondent's overall level of attachment to parties as social institutions and their general appetite for political participation.

Dichotomous measures for military service and labor union membership round out the institutional socialization cluster. Those respondents who claim that they or a close family member have served in the military are expected to be more likely to be registered and to have voted. Research by Leal (1999) finds that because Latinos begin with relatively few civic skills, the gains from military service are greater for them than for Anglos. Military service has also been shown to aid the economic mobility of Latino veterans as they reach a higher socioeconomic status than do their non-veteran co-ethnics (Leal et al. 2011).

A dichotomous variable capturing union membership and/or a union household is included to see whether associations with organized labor can boost political incorporation among Latino immigrants. The most extensive study of labor unions as a mobilizing force among Latinos shows that Latinos are more likely to register and to vote if they live in a union household (Francia and Orr 2014).

Political science has long since established a firm linkage between socioeconomic status and voter turnout (Berelson et al. 1954; Burns et al. 2001; Milbrath and Goel 1982; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). The first study to analyze cross-racial comparisons of political participation with a nationally representative sample of Latinos found that low levels of socioeconomic status were the likely reason for the lower rate of participation among Latinos (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). The subsequent question was whether those disparities would disappear once SES differences were taken into account. Calvo and Rosenstone (1989) found that even after controlling for SES, the gap in voting participation between Latinos and non-Latinos remained (see also Hero and Campbell 1996).

RESULTS: BIVARIATE

A. Naturalization

Data from the Latino National Survey of 2006 show a very strong association between institutional affiliation and the desire for U.S. citizenship among Latino non-citizens who are eligible to naturalize (see Table 4.5).

Table 4.5 Percentage of Immigrant Non-Citizens (Eligible to Naturalize) Expressing Desire for U.S. Citizenship by Institutional Affiliations

Affiliation Status		**Difference**	**N**
Not a Military Household	Military Household		
50.19	71.43	21.24***	2345
Not a Churchgoer	Churchgoer		
53.13	52.42	0.71	2313
Not a Union Household	Union Household		
52.22	63.78	11.56*	2283
Not a Partisan	Partisan		
47.35	64.12	16.78***	2345
No U.S. Schooling	Some U.S. Schooling		
48.26	74.86	26.60***	2345

Note: Two-tailed t-test: #p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Source: LNS (2006)

To begin, non-citizens that claim some affiliation with four out of the five major social institutions are more likely to express the desire for U.S. citizenship. The largest difference in stated preference for citizenship is according to U.S. education. While less than half (48.3 percent) of those without some schooling in the U.S. say they are or will be on path toward naturalization, nearly three-quarters (74.9 percent) with some education in U.S. state the same. An affiliation with the military is also highly determinative of whether or not a non-citizen takes steps to initiating the naturalization

process; we see a twenty-one percentage point difference between those that live in a military household and those in a civilian household. Partisans and members of union households are also more likely to be on the path toward citizenship compared to those without such ties. Whether one is a regular church-goer is not shown to be a significant predictor of desiring U.S. citizenship at the bivariate level, however. Taken together, these results provide evidence of the importance of institutional affiliations to the citizenship process.

B. Voter Registration and Turnout

Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show that individuals who claim some affiliation to the military, political parties, schools, labor unions, or churches are generally more likely to be registered than are those without such ties.

Table 4.6 Institutional Affiliations and Rates of Voter Registration by Generational Status (%)

	Not a Military Household	Military Household	Difference	N
Naturalized	75.79	82.06	6.26**	1851
Second Generation	74.76	89.23	14.48***	1454
Third Generation	76.86	89.53	12.67***	949
All Respondents	75.62	87.59	11.97***	4254
	Not a Churchgoer	Churchgoer	Difference	N
Naturalized	78.87	76.67	2.2	1819
Second Generation	83	83.11	0.01	1442
Third Generation	83.39	87.56	4.17#	932
All Respondents	81.63	81.04	0.59	4193
	Not a Union Household	Union Household	Difference	N
Naturalized	76.36	85.43	9.07**	1815
Second Generation	81.13	90.63	9.5***	1428
Third Generation	85.56	89.57	4.02	938
All Respondents	79.88	88.69	8.81***	4181
	Not a Partisan	Partisan	Difference	N
Naturalized	66.95	86.06	19.12***	1851
Second Generation	71.98	89.15	17.16***	1454
Third Generation	74.13	91.55	17.43***	949
All Respondents	69.79	88.56	18.77***	4254
	No U.S. Schooling	Some U.S. Schooling		N
Naturalized	73.54	82.35	8.81***	1851

Note: Two-tailed t-test: #p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Source: LNS (2006)

Table 4.7 Institutional Affiliations and Rates of Voter Turnout by Generational Status (%)

	Not a Military Household	Military Household	Difference	N
Naturalized	61.3	68.61	7.3**	1846
Second Generation	54.13	77.37	23.23***	1452
Third Generation	60.49	78.08	17.58***	950
All Respondents	59.21	75.48	16.27***	4248
	Not a Churchgoer	Churchgoer	Difference	N
Naturalized	64.78	62.76	2.01	1814
Second Generation	67.84	67.24	0.6	1440
Third Generation	68.91	75.85	6.94*	933
All Respondents	67.03	66.94	0.08	4187
	Not a Union Household	Union Household	Difference	N
Naturalized	61.86	75.7	13.84***	1811
Second Generation	64.9	77.04	12.14***	1425
Third Generation	72.25	78.67	6.42#	939
All Respondents	65.08	77.05	11.97***	4175
	Not a Partisan	Partisan	Difference	N
Naturalized	49.28	74.66	25.38***	1846
Second Generation	49.22	77.51	28.28***	1452
Third Generation	60.35	79.25	18.9***	950
All Respondents	51.2	76.84	25.64***	4248
	No U.S. Schooling	Some U.S. Schooling	Difference	N
Naturalized	60.39	66.83	6.44**	1846

Note: Two-tailed t-test: #p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Source: LNS (2006)

In keeping with the theory of Generation Political Incorporation, these bivariate results show that the benefits of these affiliations can vary according to generational differences. For example, as established in Chapter 2, the immigrant generation had the lowest proportion of individuals with ties to the military, yet naturalized immigrants that claim an attachment to the military display a higher rate of voter registration and voter turnout. The positive difference between those affiliated with the military versus those unaffiliated is the highest among second generation respondents. Put another way, the payoff for voter registration and turnout for being associated with the military is highest among those of the second generation (+14.48 and +23.23 percentage points) compared to naturalized immigrants (+6.26 and + 7.3 percentage points) and even those of the third and later generation (+12.67 and 16.27 percentage points). Nonetheless, irrespective of generational differences, it is the case that the difference between those that are and are not affiliated the military are statistically significant at the bivariate level.

As established in Chapter 2, Latino immigrants in the first-generation have the highest share of regular church-goers compared to both second- and third-generation individuals. Yet, in this bivariate analysis the difference between being a church-goer versus not being a church-goer is significant for voter registration and voter turnout only among the third or later generation Latinos (+4.17 and + 6.94 percentage points). This offers an initial indication that places of worship operate as an important community anchor for more acculturated Latinos that manifests itself in greater civic engagement.

Although relatively few members of the immigrant generation claim affiliation to a labor union, the few that do are poised to benefit considerably in comparison to

immigrant workers that are not organized at their workplace; we see a 9 percentage point and nearly 14 percentage point difference between the two for voter registration and turnout, respectively. Rates of union membership were shown to peak among Latinos of the second generation, and it is evident here as well that second-generation Latinos gain from workplace organization; those in a union have a nearly 10 percentage point higher rate of voter registration and a 12 percentage point higher voter turnout than do non-union members of the second generation. While third and later generation Latino union members exhibit relatively high rates of voter registration (89.57 percent versus 85.56 percent), the difference does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance although the 6 percentage point difference in voter turnout is significant. It appears that organized labor, by virtue of its core mission of fomenting collective action and acting as an information resource for workers, translates to the civic lives of some members beyond the workplace.

All Latino partisans, irrespective of generational status, are more likely than their non-partisan counter-parts of their same generation to display higher rates of voter registration and turnout. This is further evidence that the development of party attachments is important for greater political participation. While many would argue that political parties have routinely under-served racial and ethnic minorities—promising but not delivering—it remains the case that non-partisans are far less likely to register to vote and turn out.

Together with places of worship, U.S. schools are unique avenues for first generation immigrants by virtue of their greater accessibility. Immigrants that arrived as

children and attended a U.S. school are at an advantage for completing the voter registration process. Schools are unencumbered by rules and regulations surrounding citizenship and as a consequence are frequently utilized by immigrants as resource hubs. To the extent that individuals receive civics education in schools, they may become more aware of the intricacies of the U.S. voting systems. This explains the 8 percentage point difference in rates of voter registration and a 6 percentage point difference for voter turnout between immigrants who report some U.S. schooling versus those who did not have such an experience.

RESULTS: MULTIVARIATE

A. Naturalization

Multivariate analysis is conducted in a model limited to foreign-born non-citizens that have been deemed eligible to naturalize in order to examine the determinants of naturalization. While not technically considered an electoral behavior, citizenship acquisition among immigrants is a necessary first step to formalized political behavior.

Table 4.8 Predicting Desire for U.S. Citizenship among Non-Citizen Latino Immigrants (Eligible to Naturalize)

Immigrant Acculturation	
Percentage life in U.S.	1.01
	(0.00)
Spanish Interview	0.39***
	(0.10)
Attended a U.S. School	1.81***
	(0.39)
Institutional Socialization	
Church Attendance	1.03
	(0.06)
Military Household	1.74***
	(0.35)
Partisan	1.60***
	(0.22)
Union Household	1.22
	(0.36)
Socioeconomic Status	
Educational Attainment	1.10**
	(0.04)
Household Income	1.08
	(0.05)
Income Not reported	0.57*
	(0.17)
Demographic Controls	
Female	1.22
	(0.16)
Age	1.00
	(0.01)
Mexican	0.78
	(0.12)
Cuban	1.68
	(0.62)
Contextual Variables	
Neighborhood Immigrant Density	0.99**
	(0.00)
Post-Immigrant Rights Marches Interview	1.34**
	(0.17)
Observations	1744

Note: Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios) presented; Standard errors in parentheses; Model is limited to immigrants who have been in the U.S. for over five years and excludes respondents who reported being undocumented. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 4.8 shows results from a logit regression predicting the desire for U.S. citizenship among non-citizens. Two of the three factors related to immigrant socialization are statistically significant; first, respondents that are Spanish-reliant were less likely to report that they are currently in the process of applying for citizenship or will do so in the near future. Given that proof of basic English skills) is a necessary requirement for citizenship, non-citizens that are not yet comfortable enough with their secondary (non-native) language may feel a sense of apprehension about their own readiness for the citizenship process.

Second, attending a U.S. school is an important factor moving non-citizens toward citizenship. Immigrants that attend a school in the U.S. undergo a socialization process in one of America's most important institutions. Schools are important sites of civic and community involvement, as articulated in the preceding chapters, and the model shows they are significant sites of political incorporation. Those that attend school are likely already integrated into social circles with more native-born individuals than are immigrants who attended schools solely in their country of origin. Since the passage of the 26th Amendment that lowered the voting age from 21 to 18 in 1971, high school seniors that will be 18 on Election Day are frequently registered to vote at their schools. Among immigrants that only attend institutions of higher education in the U.S., they may have taken part in campus political activity.

That the percentage of life an immigrant has spent in the U.S. is not significantly associated with a desire for citizenship should help to dispel the notion that recent arrivals hold greater allegiance to their home-country. Thus, even immigrants that have spent as

little as five years in the U.S. may not be any more or less likely to desire citizenship than immigrants with more established roots in the U.S.

The results also show that attachments to two of the four social institutions examined—the military and political parties—increase the likelihood of naturalization among eligible immigrants. Although service in the armed forces can be a difficult experience for those that volunteer and for their families, it may offer an avenue for greater political incorporation. A close attachment to the military has the potential to elicit feelings of national belonging among the servicemember. Indeed, the many milestones associated with the experience—initial recruitment, graduation from basic training, and promotions and honors—can have ripple-effects for members of their extended family who are not yet American citizens. This suggests that military service is accompanied by moments that elicit feelings of accomplishment in the servicemember and pride among family. If these family members are immigrant non-citizens, witnessing the sacrifice by a loved one for the United States can foster the seeds of their own national belonging.

The development of an attachment to or identification with one of the two major political parties is also a positive and significant factor for an immigrant's movement toward naturalization. Thus, partisan affiliation may signal an attachment to American politics more generally and, more specifically, an understanding of the differences between the parties and the implications of elections for their lives in the U.S. Furthermore, because acquiring citizenship is in many ways the first step toward participation in electoral politics for immigrants, expressing the desire for U.S.

citizenship could signal that they wish to exercise their political agency in their new country.

As established by prior research, immigrants with higher levels of educational attainment are more likely to express the desire for U.S. citizenship (Yang 1994). Greater education may be accompanied by a rise in political interest, and likewise, those immigrants with greater education may have a better grasp of the multiple ways that individuals are poised to benefit from U.S. citizenship. Indeed, immigrants with greater education most likely recognize the added benefits beyond voting rights, including the ways in which citizenship affords greater security in the form of legal and civil rights not extended to non-citizens. Thus, immigrants with more education are more favorably situated to undertake the citizenship acquisition process because they have the knowledge and confidence necessary to navigate the immigration bureaucracy.

Respondents that refused to report an income, a proxy for lower financial resources, are less likely to be on a path to naturalization or even wishing to someday naturalize. Lower income respondents may simply feel that the financial costs of naturalization are too high. There are other costs associated with naturalization beyond the application fees, as immigrants may need to pay additional fees in the document-collecting process. For example, immigrant may not have original copies of birth certificates, and the fees associated with acquiring the necessary documents that establish proof of residency may be too high. In addition, taking time off work in order to prepare documents and attend multiple appointments with immigration officials poses a further challenge.

The two contextual variables included in the model also reveal some important spatial and temporal factors that affect whether immigrants choose to naturalize. First, a greater density of other immigrants in a respondent's neighborhood results in a lesser likelihood of naturalization. Residential clustering, in this case by foreign-born status that produces immigrant enclaves, can stifle the political incorporation process. This finding suggests that, at least on this one dimension of political incorporation—naturalization—Latino immigrants living in an immigrant enclave are less inclined to seek out citizenship. This suggests that low levels of spatial assimilation of Latino immigrants is associated with lesser likelihood of naturalization, which substantiates prior work finding a similar negative association between segregation and citizenship acquisition (Pearson-Merkowitz 2012).

The analysis also reveals that respondents who were interviewed at a date after the highly publicized immigrant rights marches were more likely than those interviewed before the marches to express a desire for U.S. citizenship. Given that the aim of the marches was to stop the passage of proposed changes to immigration law that would have criminalized the actions of immigrant-serving communities, the event constituted a unique, mass lesson in political and public affairs for many immigrants. The focus on matters of public policy had the effect of heightening awareness about the importance of immigration law and how becoming a naturalized citizen could offer immigrants an outlet for self-determination and self-defense. The immigrant rights marches were essential for the rise of campaigns promoting citizenship. National immigrant advocacy and Latino groups set goals for nation-wide naturalization drives that sought to capitalize on the

political fervor of the moment. That the event also took place in 2006 offered the rare opportunity to target immigrants for political mobilization that are often seen only during presidential election campaigns. So widespread was the effort that even ostensibly (apolitical) non-political entities like Spanish radio stations also joined the effort and pledged to help naturalize their immigrant listeners (Ramirez 2011).

B. Voter Registration

In accordance with the theory of Generational Political Incorporation, which argues that immigrant generation determines the degree of access to social institutions, I conduct a split-sample analysis according to generational status. This will ascertain whether certain factors drive electoral participation among Latinos of distinct generations.

Table 4.9 Predicting Voter Registration by Generational Status

	1st Generation	2nd Generation	3rd Generation
Immigrant Acculturation			
Percentage Life in U.S.	1.02***		
	(0.00)		
Spanish Interview	1.39		
	(0.29)		
Attended a U.S. School	1.73**		
	(0.38)		
Institutional Socialization			
Church Attendance	0.91	1.11	1.09
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.11)
Military Household	0.79	1.34	1.56
	(0.17)	(0.29)	(0.45)
Partisan	1.84***	1.83***	2.08***
	(0.32)	(0.38)	(0.58)
Union Household	1.09	1.62*	1.06
	(0.28)	(0.45)	(0.37)
Socioeconomic Status			
Educational Attainment	1.23***	1.49***	1.43***
	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.15)
Household Income	1.22***	1.07	1.04
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Income Not Reported	0.40***	0.42**	0.54
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.24)
Demographic Controls			
Female	0.96	1.39	1.52
	(0.17)	(0.28)	(0.42)
Age	1.07***	1.06***	1.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Mexican	0.74	0.61*	1.09
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.44)
Cuban	0.93	5.00*	1.35
	(0.30)	(4.15)	(1.56)
Contextual Variables			
Neighborhood	1.00	1.01	1.01
Immigrant Density	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Post-Immigrant Rights	1.42*	1.20	0.99
Marches Interview	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.33)
Observations	1581	1348	869

Note: Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios) presented; Standard errors in parentheses:
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

In the model restricted only to naturalized immigrants, the results show that some factors unique to the immigrant socialization experience matter for voter registration. In particular, those immigrants that have spent a greater percentage of their life in the United States are more likely to report being registered. Alternatively, as the percentage of life an immigrant has spent in the U.S. increases, so too does the likelihood that she will be registered to vote. Greater levels of acculturation impart a familiarity with the American electoral system.

Results from Table 4.9 also illustrate the critical importance of partisan affiliation to voter registration. The act of claiming a partisan attachment may imply knowledge of party platforms and a statement of preference for one party over another. Research has established partisanship as an important predictor of political participation among groups made up of a large number of immigrants (Lien 1994; Uhlaner 1996).

With the exception of union membership being positively associated with increased voter registration among the children of immigrants, affiliations with organized labor, the military and church attendance are less influential in boosting levels of electoral participation. Instead, the most consistently significant factor in the model predicting voter registration is educational attainment. Greater educational resources are highly associated with rates of Latino voter registration across all three generations. In addition, income is statistically significant in the naturalized model but not relevant for second and third generation respondents.

In the model restricted only to naturalized citizens, we see that the immigrant rights marches served as a catalyst for increased levels of voter registration. This suggests

that the marches may have incited greater political awareness or interest in political issues more broadly. A common challenge faced by groups seeking to mobilize racial and ethnic communities and immigrants is translating interest exhibited in a certain issue area (in this case immigration) to action ("from interest to action") in the political arena. A common refrain during the spring marches was to remind protesters that while "today we may march, tomorrow we vote." Indeed, while this analysis cannot determine whether there is a causal link between participation in the marches and voting at a later date, it does provide evidence that the mass mobilization increased voter registration among naturalized voters.

While demographic factors were included largely as controls, they do reveal some noteworthy findings. First, age is predictive of greater incidence of voter registration across all immigrant generations. This is not a surprise, as age is associated with electoral participation among the general American population. Second, ethnic ancestry among second generation Latinos is important for determining the likelihood of being registered. While the children of Mexican immigrants struggle to complete the voter registration process, holding all other factors constant, children born to Cuban immigrants are more likely to be registered to vote. Results suggest that the preferential treatment received by the Cuban members of the immigrant generation through the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 benefits the civic lives of their children.

C. Voter Turnout

Table 4.10 Predicting Voter Turnout by Generation

	1st Generation	2nd Generation	3rd Generation
Immigrant Acculturation			
Percentage Life in U.S.	1.02***		
	(0.00)		
Spanish Interview	1.45**		
	(0.26)		
Attended a U.S. School	1.06		
	(0.21)		
Institutional Socialization			
Church Attendance	0.94	1.04	1.13
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Military Household	0.73*	1.51**	1.32
	(0.12)	(0.27)	(0.31)
Partisan	1.97***	2.19***	1.72**
	(0.29)	(0.39)	(0.40)
Union Household	1.35	1.23	0.98
	(0.32)	(0.28)	(0.29)
Socioeconomic Status			
Educational Attainment	1.22***	1.55***	1.46***
	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.14)
Household Income	1.13***	1.20***	1.11
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Income not reported	0.45***	0.31***	0.33***
	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Demographic Controls			
Female	1.04	1.09	1.32
	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.30)
Age	1.06***	1.06***	1.07***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Mexican	0.74*	0.55***	0.59
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.21)
Cuban	1.21	0.82	0.83
	(0.33)	(0.46)	(0.85)
Contextual Variables			
Neighborhood Immigrant Density	1.00	1.00	1.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Observations	1579	1346	869

Note: Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios) presented; Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

As was the case with the model predicting voter registration among the naturalized, greater acculturation by way of increased percentage of life in the United States yields a higher likelihood of turning out to vote. Greater reliance on Spanish did not affect voter registration, but among immigrant voters it is a positive factor for voter turnout. This finding is somewhat surprising given that we may expect respondents with less English language skills to struggle to participate politically compared to immigrants with more language acculturation. The finding that Spanish dominant individuals show signs of greater propensity to vote prompts the question: Are Spanish-speaking Latino immigrants at an advantage over immigrant Latinos who are English dominant?

To speculate, recall that the analysis of voter turnout was limited to the Latino VEP, so the immigrants in the sample are all naturalized citizens. Therefore, even Spanish-dominant immigrants likely possess sufficient English skills to have passed the language requirements for naturalization, so they are likely more bilingual than other respondents. These findings point to the possibility that Spanish-dominant immigrant Latinos may have a turnout advantage. Indeed, evidence form experimental studies found that Spanish-dominant Latinos displayed increased turnout after exposure to both English and Spanish GOTV materials, whereas the English-dominant responded only to GOTV materials in English (Abrajano and Panagopulos 2011). Studies examining other surveys of Latinos have also found that Spanish language use, when present with political interest, is associated with greater participation campaign in activities other than voting (Garcia-Rios and Barreto 2016). Among Latinos with high residential stability, those that are Spanish speaking participate at higher rates than do English-speakers (Johnson et al.

2003). One reason for this observed advantage could be that Latino immigrants who remain Spanish dominant, but are likely bilingual, are subject to double the amount of electioneering. There is mounting evidence to suggest that Spanish-dominant Latinos enjoy expanded opportunities for exposure to information sources during elections. Thus, although Spanish language skills may not benefit them for the sake of voter registration, the maintenance of Spanish alongside gains in English may act as an added resource for civic life.

In the cluster of variables that account for affiliations to social institutions, the results show that Latinos across all generations are more likely to turn out if they claim an attachment to one of the major parties. Counter to expectations, naturalized voters with direct ties to the military, whether directly as active duty members or veterans or indirectly by being members of a household with someone who serves or is a veteran, are less likely to turn out to vote. However, second-generation Latinos with an affiliation to the military have a greater likelihood of reporting that they voted. One possible explanation for the negative effect of military status among first-generation individuals could be that they are more likely to be parents of veterans and therefore not themselves veterans or service members. Conversely, why does military service benefit members of the second generation? An explanation for this positive effect could be that they seek out electoral politics as a further visage of their military service. That is, they continue the propensity toward civic duty learned during their military service by becoming engaged with electoral politics.

Differences in socioeconomic status appear to operate similarly for Latinos of all generations, fitting the expectations that greater educational and financial resources are positively associated with voter turnout. In addition, we see a positive relationship with age and voter turnout across all generations. National origin group also affects the likelihood of electoral participation, as Latinos of Mexican ancestry are less likely to turnout compared to all other non-Cuban Latinos. This effect is found among naturalized immigrants and second-generation respondents. The negative relationship disappears during the third generation, suggesting that to the extent there is a pattern of relative electoral disengagement among individuals of Mexican descent, it dissipates over the course of successive generations. In contrast to the voter registration model, Cuban Americans do not appear to vote at unique high rates in any generation.

LNS FOCUS GROUP INSIGHTS

One important finding that emerges from the multivariate analysis in this chapter is that educational institutions are critical to the civic lives of Latinos, especially immigrants. In the previous chapter, insights from the LNS focus groups concentrated on the power of religious institutions as engines of civic integration outside the electoral arena. This section devotes similar attention to schools as purveyors of civic knowledge and as sites of social exchange across racial and ethnic lines that develop bridging forms of social capital.

Extant studies on the role of schools as agents of political socialization have suggested that school settings and context are particularly useful for helping immigrant

students and the U.S.-born children of immigrants familiarize themselves with civic and political life. Given that students from immigrant families cannot rely on their immigrant parents for political information pertaining to the U.S., schools via curricula and personnel (teachers, counselors, coaches, and administrators), can plug these gaps. Moreover, social life in high schools offers useful parallels to U.S. civic life in ways that are beneficial to adolescents from immigrant households. In describing this function, Callahan et al. (2008, 25) explained that "American high schools may provide a microcosm of American society into which immigrant youth initially assimilate while simultaneously receiving their formal education…in effect, the informal realm of schooling provides the practice steps necessary during adolescence for active participation in adult civic society."

For the first generation, experience with U.S. schools is predictive of the desire to seek out citizenship as well as to register to vote. While such educational experience was not associated with voter turnout, educational attainment nevertheless remains important. Insights from the Latino National Survey focus groups reveal how Latinos, especially immigrants, consider education for themselves and their children to be crucial for their civic and political well-being. In particular, many respondents identified an explicit connection between education and politics. On multiple occasions, across geographic settings, and among both immigrant and the native-born, Latinos time and again identified education and the health of the local school system as key. For many of the Latino respondents, education was alpha and omega—the cause and solution to so many of their own and their family's difficulties. For this reason, those that had negative

experiences or opinions about their local schools were all the more frustrated at the problems they encountered.

A series of notable exchanges occurred among the interviewees in the English-language focus group in the New York City area. When asked by the discussion facilitator to identify the most pressing problems in their communities, many came to a shared understanding that education was important. They said:

> "Leadership and acceptance help with the education because as children see Latinos moving into power, the children see that there is something to education."
> --Respondent #10 (male), South Bronx resident

> "I say education because it connects children with leadership and power."
> --Respondent #1(male), Jackson Heights resident

> "I agree with Respondent #1, education is definitely key, because without education, you can't reduce anything on that list and the next thing would be leadership because in order to make any kind of change, you have to have some sort of power and have to be educated."
> --Respondent #4 (female), South Bronx resident

These thoughts illustrate how many Latinos value education beyond the traditional reasons of social and economic mobility. They recognize the far-reaching capacity of education to be a source of community uplift (public good) rather than just an opportunity to improve an individual's social or economic situation (private good). Educational resources may not be sufficient in and of itself to solve all the community's problem, but it is clear that many of these Latino respondents feel that it is a necessary building block for group advancement.

Immigrant respondents in New York City that were interviewed in Spanish also emphasize the importance of education. One respondent explained how Latinos needed to respond to labor market demands by ensuring their educational backgrounds were sufficiently competitive.

> "I feel that now there is more competition in the workplace. Now it feels as if going to college is not enough. You have to have a master's degree or be certified in something to be successful."
> -- Respondent #2(female), Queens resident

Two other respondents from the same session characterized the challenges faced by some Latinos. One respondent acknowledged the historical challenges the community has faced in terms of access to higher education. The other respondent identified his irregular citizenship status (a lack of "papers") as the barrier preventing him from entering college despite his eagerness to enroll. They said:

> "…I'm sure we have a lot of relatives that did not finish high school, and never went to college. Now, more of us are going to college, but still not enough of us are going."
> --Respondent #5(male), North Bronx resident

> "It is difficult because I have only been here 2 years and do not have papers I can't study. I studied in my country, but it is different."
> --Respondent#10 (male), Brooklyn resident

Despite these challenges, one respondent struck a positive note about the current changes in the perception of Latinos in society. He said he noticed that the stereotype of Latinos as predominately manual laborers was diminishing due to gains in education within the group:

"…the Hispanic of today is not the Hispanic of 20 years ago. Now they go to college. The stigma of Hispanics to only do labor work does not exist for me."
--Respondent #4 (male), Puerto Rican, Queens resident

Some respondents suggested that what people learn in schools unlocks unique knowledge. Moreover, some suggested that education allows people to access the playbook that is the political system. One man in the D.C. metropolitan area interviewed in English equated politics with a game, and that to successfully play the game, as opposed to be played by it, people learn the rules through becoming educated. He stated:

"… the more education you have the better your decisions are going to be… and the better you are the better you can inform someone making them understand you and a lot of problems of Latinos now are because they are making the wrong decisions and the community around them actually contributes to that…I'm a very positive figure in where I work and that's not because I'm formed to Americanism but I'm formed to the system, it's all a game…"
--Male respondent, D.C. English-language focus group

Other respondents from the D.C. metro-area focus group also felt that education was a foundational necessity—a wellspring that facilitates success in multiple areas of life. This sentiment is highlighted by the following statements:

"You don't know English you can't get a job, you don't know English then who are you? If you know English then you can defend your rights…"
--Respondent #1 (male), D.C. Spanish-language focus group

"Education, to me it's the foundation of almost everything. If you're educated you're going to learn English and everything else in life."
--Respondent #9 (female), D.C. Spanish-language focus group

Focus group participants also touched upon the unique capacity schools have to foment bridging social capital with peers from other racial and ethnic backgrounds. Many, especially those with children in school, mentioned how schools were the places that facilitated social integration. As a consequence of such diversity, many parents felt that their children developed more progressive views of interracial friendships and social circles. In contrast to their childhoods in another country, or childhoods marked by more acute racial segregation, participants were proud of the fact that their children enjoyed relationships with a diverse set of friends. In speaking to this, a male participant in the Spanish-language focus group in Los Angeles said the following:

Respondent (male): “My oldest daughter used to sing with a lot of girls her age, and I saw how happy she was talking with the other children, and it gave great joy to see her talking with people that are not her same race.”

Facilitator: “Do you think that lifestyle will be better for children of today?”

Respondent (male): “Yes. That is the future that they are forming.”

Facilitator: “Your small children, are they at home all of the time?”

Respondent (male): “Yes. Well, the oldest goes to school. She’s in kindergarten. Like he said she is learning that there are Indian and black little girls in her class, and wants to know about other things. Sometimes one is at fault for not knowing anything about other races.”

Facilitator: “Have you had any contact with any of the parents of those girls?”

Respondent (male): “Yes, one began to talk to me because she has family that works at the same place I do, and that is the Indian. I used to not like them, but now I work with so many, that it does not bother me anymore.”

A Latino immigrant in Houston also expressed how schools were instilling in children the importance of diversity. This appreciation for diversity learned in schools, he believed, would later benefit the students when they join the workforce and must collaborate on projects with co-workers from a variety of backgrounds. He said:

> "…at school…like now we are learning that everything is done in groups like in companies that you need your own group, you need to have one person who can do this, and another for something else, and another…different people. So, the schools are trying to teach us to use everything that we can use, like different people, languages, customs, and cultures, everything, to observe the problem from different angles to be able to know exactly how approach it."
>
> --Respondent #6(male): Spanish-language focus group

CONCLUSION

The empirical analysis in this chapter showed that certain social institutions are more likely to spur electoral participation among Latinos, sometimes according to generational status. First and foremost, experience with U.S. schools among immigrants is an important factor for cultivating a sense of membership and belonging. The knowledge imparted to immigrants by civic education in U.S. schools is put to use come election time as voters navigate voter registration requirements and deadlines (although not with voting itself). Though political socialization in one's country of origin is likely useful for participating in U.S. electoral politics, some of those skills may not be completely transferable, and such individuals will not be familiar with features unique to the U.S. political system. Relatedly, educational attainment was consistently shown to be

a powerful predictor of the desire to naturalize and for registration and voter turnout among Latinos across all generational statuses.

The importance of education as a tool for social mobility and political integration also emerged from the analysis of Latino National Survey focus group interviews. Respondents explained how education was critical for solving problems facing their local communities and Latinos as a group in the United States. Many recognized that social mobility in the form of economic progress and political agency was out of reach without adequate educational attainment. Respondents believed that the knowledge learned in schools in the U.S. was the necessary key to unlock their personal, and by extension, their community's political potential. If the U.S. political system, as one respondent stated pithily, was a "game," then the rules to be a successful player were learned in school.

Additionally, respondents reported that schools offered their children the opportunity to build relationships with peers of different racial and ethnic backgrounds. This development of bridging social capital provided by schools was important for the social adjustment of children. To be sure, the ability to maintain healthy relationships with a diverse set of people is the exact skill necessary for building broad-based networks of support that underpins contemporary forms of cross-racial political coalitions. Parental descriptions of schools as positive forces for initiating cross-racial relationships among their children were often characterized in contrast to their own experiences in childhood, suggesting that such opportunities are indicative of differing generational opportunities.

While schools and political parties are the two social institutions most likely to increase political participation among first generation Latinos, for second-generation

Latinos, the effect of affiliation with social institutions is contingent on the behavior. That is, for second-generation Latinos a connection to unions is positive for voter registration while an affiliation with the military is positive voting. Third- and later-generation Latinos, however, derive little from association with society's major institutions; instead, their electoral activity is explained largely by demographic variables such as education and age.

With regard to the importance of factors related to acculturation and electoral participation among immigrants, a few findings are worth reiterating. First, the percentage of life in the U.S., which was not significant for desiring citizenship, was associated with electoral participation. That the desire for citizenship among non-citizens is present among newly arrived immigrants illustrates the willingness of immigrants to be politically integrated. A common discourse surrounding the presence of Latinos in the U.S., as well as immigrants from other historical eras, involves a suspicion of their national loyalties. While the low rates of naturalization of Latinos might not be seen as inconsistent with this, what we may be observing is more their political and social marginalization and less a rejection of acculturation into the American political system. Instead, that new arrivals desire citizenship at levels similar to those of non-citizens with more time in the U.S., which suggests that U.S. citizenship is generally coveted by over half of all Latino immigrants eligible for naturalization. One challenge is to harness that desire by addressing the two most frequently cited reasons for not naturalizing—cost and the fear of insufficient English language skills. The passing rate of the citizenship test

(upwards of 90 percent) suggests that barriers to entry are most concentrated at the initial stages of the process.

Second, the measure of greater time in the U.S. was associated with voter registration and turnout. When viewed through the lens of patterns in acculturation, differences in turnout across racial groups are reflective of long-term processes as opposed to a hierarchy used to judge democratic or civic values. This suggests that aggregate levels of Latino turnout should increase as naturalized voters, many of whom gained U.S. citizenship within the previous decade's record levels of naturalization, spend more time in the U.S. and witness more elections. This effect should temper the expectations of organizers and advocates that engage in citizenship education programs and naturalization drives, who may be motivated to affect an upcoming election. The results herein suggest that the naturalizing a Latino immigrant creates a prospective voter, even if the likelihood of participation only increases gradually over time. This dynamic also serves to reduce the aggregate level of Latino political participation, but such lower turnout should be seen as a result of long-term, structural, acculturation issues and not a matter of political interest or orientations toward America.

Third, and one of the more notable findings to emerge from the analysis, is the differential impact language according to the electoral behavior examined. Findings did confirm the expectation that Spanish-dominance would function as a hurdle to citizenship acquisition and voter registration. Yet, among naturalized immigrants, the Spanish-dominant were in fact more likely to vote than their English-dominant counterparts. That

these immigrants are at a net advantage after controlling for other important factors should lead scholars to further consider the role of language in electoral contexts.

The results also suggest the continued difficulty of fomenting political participation among Latinos of Mexican ancestry, even after controlling for a wide range of factors. This suggests that historical barriers faced by Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the United States have had lasting electoral consequences. The finding that second-generation Latinos of Mexican descent were less likely to be registered and to vote (along with their first-generation co-ethnics) than were Latinos of other backgrounds indicates that state policies (past and current) have worked to marginalize this community politically. Prior research comparing the immigrant settlement practices between the U.S. and Canada has found that the Canadian model of an active approach yields a more civically engaged immigrant population (Bloemraad 2006). This may have particularly negative implications for Mexican-American political engagement.

In the absence of actively inclusionary policies at the state or federal level toward immigrants, the task of political incorporation falls to social institutions like the churches, schools, the military, unions, and political parties. The case of political parties and Latino integration is illustrative; because the problem faced by political parties of the contemporary period is that they try to politically mobilize individuals that are not socially or civically incorporated. The fact that partisan affiliations is the most consistently significant civic tie in the models – predicting naturalization, registration, and voting – implies that party building activities in immigrant communities, if sustained, help work towards the group's civic integration and political mobilization.

Contextual factors such as residing in an immigrant neighborhood and moments of ethnic activism (such as the immigrant rights marches of 2006) were shown to be particularly important for the electoral engagement of immigrant Latinos. In terms of geographic context, residing in a neighborhood with a greater concentration of immigrants (a common pattern among immigrants) may hurt their chances for political incorporation by hindering citizenship acquisition and voter registration. Given that Spanish language dominance, which is high in neighborhoods with a large density of immigrants, was shown to depress the desire for acquiring citizenship, Latinos living in areas with high concentrations of immigrants may experience isolation from mobilizing institutions that could aid the political integration process. These difficulties may be more acutely felt by Latinos in new destination locations where the population of Latinos is small and compels them to cluster in an area where they can harness the few resources afforded to them by immigrant social networks. State and local policies that incentivize residential integration (i.e. affordable housing) that increase the opportunities for interaction between immigrant and native-born populations may have the added benefit of also facilitating the political incorporation process among immigrant residents.

Lastly, Latino immigrants were shown to be the generational group most impacted by highly salient episodes of ethnic protest. Their increased desire for U.S. citizenship and higher levels of voter registration displayed after the immigrant rights marches offers strong evidence for the mobilizing influence of such episodes. However, nation-wide demonstrations on the order of magnitude on par with those of 2006 have been difficult to recreate. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in this chapter, mass

mobilizations that reach across the country and gain widespread media attention have the potential to affect Latino immigrants' capacity to integrate and engage.

NOTES

1. Asians have experienced a net increase of 3.1 percentage points (44.2 percent to 47.3 percent) and the largest net increase has been among Black voters, 6.2 percentage points (CPS 2013). Though the increase in Black voter turnout between 2004 and 2012 may be attributed, in part, to steadfast support for Barack Obama in his election and re-election, it should be noted that participation rates among the Black VEP was already steadily increasing prior to 2008. Indeed, Black voters were the only group to increase their rate of voter participation with every subsequent presidential election from 1996 to 2012.

2. Nonetheless, ethnic group differences are also controlled for, as prior research has shown that naturalization among Cubans operates as a catalyst for participation (DeSipio 1996a), likely because their refugee status lowers their institutional barriers to naturalization compared to Latinos of other ethnic backgrounds (Menjivar 2000). Other research has reached similar conclusions with regard to Cuban Americans and their greater propensity to vote than Mexicans and Puerto Ricans (Arvizu and Garcia 1996; Calvo and Rosenstone 1989; Hero and Campbell 1996; Wrinkle et al. 1996).

3. Scholars have referred to this as the “reversibility hypothesis” (Bueker 2005; Portes and Mozo 1985; Portes and Rumbaut 2006) whereby immigrants from sending countries that share a border with the receiving country (as do Canada and Mexico with the U.S.) are less likely to naturalize because of a belief that their chance of return is high.

4. DeSipio (1996a), however, found naturalization to be a negative predictor of increased political participation when compared to native-born Latinos. His research also observed

the explanatory power of socioeconomic resources, as increases in education and age trumped any negative naturalization effects.

Chapter 5: Diversity and Democracy: Political Participation in the U.S. Electorate

An important animating narrative of American democracy has been the battle between the forces in favor of extending the right to vote to more members of society vs. those wishing to limit its expansion. At the founding, suffrage was limited to White male propertied elites. For a brief period following the Civil War, statutes and constitutional amendments supporting Reconstruction secured the franchise by non-White men. It was during this small window of time when the first African Americans held elected office, many in Southern states. With end of Reconstruction, legally sanctioned forms of disenfranchisement would suppress the voting rights of African Americans in the Jim Crow South for nearly a century. In the American Southwest, Mexican-Americans also faced discrimination when they sought to vote or run for office, keeping them at the margins of social and civic life and rendering them a political underclass.

The African Americans struggle for civil rights culminated in the passage of the Civil Rights Act 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. As a consequence of these reforms, more racial and ethnic minorities were able to exercise their right to vote, which lead to a radical transformation of American politics. Changes in immigration law in 1965 also contributed to a growing racial, ethnic, and religious diversification of America. Scholars have traced the effects of these transformations in the political realm, particularly in terms of public opinion, political behavior, and elections. Since race has long been a major source of social conflict in America, and immigration a key dividing

line, understanding how different racial and ethnic groups engage with the political system remains a central concern for scholars of American politics.

Table 5.1 The Diversification of the American Electorate (1996-2012)

	Racial Composition of Eligible Voters[1] (%)				Racial Composition of Voting Population[2] (%)			
	White	Black	Latino	Asian	White	Black	Latino	Asian
1996	79.2	11.9	6.1	2.1	82.5	10.8	4.7	1.7
2000	77.7	12.2	7.1	2.5	80.7	11.7	5.4	1.8
2004	75.2	11.9	8.2	3.2	79.2	11.1	6	2.2
2008	73.4	12.1	9.5	3.4	76.3	12.3	7.4	2.6
2012	71.1	12.5	10.8	3.8	73.7	13.4	8.4	2.9

Source: CPS Report. 2013. "The Diversifying Electorate--Voting Rates by Race and Hispanic Origin in 2012 (and Other Recent Elections)".
1. Eligible voters are all citizens (18 and older).
2. Voting population is the number of voting-age citizens who reported casting a ballot according the U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Surveys.

At present, it can be said with some degree of probability that racial and ethnic diversification of America will reach a milestone near 2044. The Census Bureau estimates that the U.S. will become a majority-minority nation by that year (Census Bureau 2015). While similar estimates for the electorate are far more difficult, we can expect that majority-minority electorate will also one day be a reality. Table 5.1 shows

this steady diversification of the U.S. electorate over the past two decades. A consistent pattern from this data emerges with regard to racial and ethnic differences. The general trend is that whites are over-represented in the voting population (votes cast) compared to their share of eligible voters (adult citizens). Conversely, the opposite has been true of Latino and Asian voters, as they are consistently under-represented in the voting population in comparison to their share of the pool of eligible voters. Prior to the presidential election cycles in which Barack Obama was a nominee, African Americans were under-represented in the voting population in a similar pattern to Latino and Asian voters.

Given that political equality among racial groups in the U.S. has posed a significant challenge for American democracy throughout history, the objective of this chapter is to address a series of central questions. First, how do immigrants and minority voters interact with the political system and what factors shape their engagement in both non-electoral and electoral behaviors? Second, as America sets a course for becoming a majority-minority nation within a generation, how can the civic lives of racial, ethnic, and immigrant minorities in the present help us understand the nation's future?

RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS

The role of race in determining many life outcomes is an unavoidable fact of American life. So severe is the disparity between whites and communities of color, especially Blacks and Latinos, that inequalities span nearly all stages of life along a myriad of social indicators.[1] For example, gaps in high school and college graduation

rates translate to lower life-time earnings for racial minorities compared to whites, a phenomenon known as the "racial wealth gap" (Melvin and Shapiro 2006). These social and economic inequalities naturally come to manifest themselves in the political sphere; the availability of, and opportunity to access, "politically relevant" resources (Verba et al. 1993, 458) varies according to race and ethnicity.

For Latinos, the preceding chapters have illustrated how much of the disparity in access to important socializing institutions is structured by generational and citizenship status. Asian Americans also exhibit some of the same patterns that Latinos face in terms of institutional accessibility according to individual or family immigration histories. Likewise, African American access to social institutions has been related to, but different than, that of other racial minorities because of the legacies of slavery and discrimination. Indeed, many of America's major socializing institutions reproduced the dominance of majority groups in certain areas: churches (cultural power); labor unions (economic power); military (police power); schools and political parties (structural advantages). Yet, a major consequence of cultural diversity has been that racial and ethnic groups transformed these social sites from places of exclusion to institutions of political expression. This chapter continues the focus on social institutions and their power to facilitate political participation. Just as generational and citizenship status was shown to be a critical factor in accessing social institutions as outlined in the theory of Generational Political Incorporation, this chapter applies a similar understanding to other racial groups.

Social Institutions and Minority Political Participation

Up to this point of the dissertation, the focus has been set on the role of social institutions in fomenting Latino political participation and how such processes differ for Latinos according to generational status. The following section briefly discusses how social institutions have structured the political activation and mobilization of two other major minority groups in the U.S.—Asian Americans (Section A) and African Americans (Section B). For Asians, I discuss how educational institutions have led to the group's political integration. For African Africans, I explain how religious institutions have amplified the political voices of the community.

A. Asian Americans and the Political System

The moment Latinos surpassed African Americans as the country's largest minority group received plenty of journalistic and scholarly attention. By contrast, the growth of the Asian American population in recent years has been less noted. In 2011, there were an estimated 18.2 million Asians (both native-born and foreign-born) in the U.S.—or 5.8 percent of the total population (Pew 2013, Rise of Asian Americans). This is a profound change from 1965, the year President Johnson signed the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) into law, when the Asian American population stood at less than one percent.

Since the economic downturn of 2008, Asian migration to the U.S. has increased while migration from Latin America has decreased. In 2010, for example, a greater share of immigrants from Asian countries arrived in the U.S. than did immigrants from Latin America. The arrival of 430,000 Asian immigrants comprised 36 percent of all immigrant

newcomers compared to 370,000 (31 percent) for Latinos (Pew 2013). In addition, Asian Americans and Asian immigrants differ from other immigrant groups in that a greater percentage is classified as foreign-born. Of the 17.3 million individuals of Asian descent in the U.S., nearly three-quarters (74.1 percent) were born abroad. The comparable figure for Latinos is much lower—about 35 percent in 2013 (Lopez and Patten 2015). Also, from 2000-2013, the growth of the undocumented immigrant population from Asia outpaced the growth among Mexican immigrants, especially among immigrants from India, South Korea, and China (Migration Policy Institute 2015).

Asian Americans and Latinos are frequently discussed in tandem on a variety of topics because both groups contain a substantial share of immigrants, but an important way Asian Americans differ from other minority groups is in the area of education. Asians lead the way in educational attainment, as a full 49 percent of Asian adults in the United States (age 25 and older) have a bachelor's degree. This is more than 20 percentage points above the 28 percent national average and also higher than the average for whites (31 percent), Blacks (18 percent), and Latinos (13 percent). The promise of educational achievement has meant that Asian American immigrants, to a greater degree than other previous immigrant groups, have a deep connection to institutions of higher education. Indeed, while only about 9 percent of Latino immigrants state that their main reason for migration was to pursue educational opportunities (Pew 2011), the figure among Asian immigrants to the U.S. is 28 percent (Pew 2012).

Indeed, 61 percent of adult Asian immigrants between the ages of 25 to 64 have at least a bachelor's degree, which is twice the rate of non-Asian immigrants (Pew 2013)[2].

Moreover, recent Asian immigrants have much higher rates of educational attainment than do comparable individuals in their countries of origin.[3] This feature of 'hyper-selectivity' of Asian immigrants on the part of the U.S. immigration system sets Asian migration apart from Latin American immigration to the U.S. and is responsible for much of the disparities in educational and economic achievement between the two groups (Lee and Zhou 2015). These factors shaping the Asian American experience have contributed to a unique set of political questions.

For one, scholars have identified the existence of a participation puzzle among Asian Americans whereby the Socioeconomic Resource Model theory (Verba and Nie 1972) fails to explain the group's rate of political participation. Scholars observed that "the high level of education among Asians does not translate into activity" (Uhlaner et al. 1989, 212). Other scholars have subsequently reaffirmed this finding, stating that "APA [Asian Pacific American] voting rates have remained low . . . this seems particularly curious given their high median socioeconomic measures" (Aoki and Nakanishi 2001, 607–8). Furthermore, research shows a plurality (and in some surveys a majority) of Asian Americans have no relationship to a political party, choosing either to identify as an independent or otherwise refusing to self-identify with any partisan category (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Hajnal and Lee 2011). Nonetheless, educational attainment remains an important factor for predicting Asian political participation. Wong et al. (2011) identified high educational attainment as a common characteristic among those Asian American respondents who they identified as 'super participants.'

That the connection between educational attainment and political participation appears to work differently for Asian Americans is all the more surprising because the roots of Asian American political power in the United States developed from the firm connections between Asian immigrants and educational institutions. As a consequence, many Asian American political organizations associated with the Asian American Movement of the 1960s and 1970s, as well as more recent groups, originated in colleges and universities.[4] Thus, further analysis on the subject of educational status and its role in structuring Asian American political participation is warranted.

B. African Americans and the Political System

Racial and ethnic minorities exert control over few institutions in American public life. The one place it can be said that they harness the power of social institutions to respond to community needs is in houses of worship. For that reason, it is common parlance to refer to the Black Church or the Korean Church. For America's immigrant newcomers, places of worship have traditionally fulfilled the dual roles of civic and political integration while also maintaining cultural continuities to countries of origin amid displacement (Cherry 2013; Dolan 1975; Yang 1999; Yang and Ebaugh 2001). African Americans in the United States have long faced challenges in accessing the resources of organizations that provide support for greater political action and in response have founded their own indigenous social institutions. Perhaps most vibrant among these institutions has been the Black Church.

The Black Church played an important role in providing the social and organizational networks necessary for conducting the major mobilization and organizational efforts of the Civil Rights Movement[5] (Calhoun-Brown 1996; Harris 1999; Harris-Lacewell 2007; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; Morris 1986). Research has shown African Americans continue to be the most religious racial group in the U.S. along a series of indicators, including church attendance, frequency of prayer, belief in God, and the importance of religion in one's life (Pew Religious Landscape Survey 2014). Many scholars of African American religious life have shown how churches in the Black community operate as the epicenter of political mobilization by providing the opportunities, skills, and networks that make possible collective political action (Harris 1999). Furthermore, individuals who take part in such activities benefit psychologically in terms of efficacy and self-esteem (Calhoun-Brown 1996; Ellison 1993).

The vibrant connection between church membership and Black political mobilization came into full effect for the election and re-election of Barack Obama, when many Black churches throughout the country took part in "souls to the polls" drives. Modeled on the longstanding tradition of organizing the transportation of church members to the polls after church service, these efforts were so successful that in the intervening years Republican-led state legislatures in states such as Ohio and Florida sought to limit availability of early, in person voting—which is used to a greater extent by African Americans (Herron and Smith 2012). More generally, the extant literature has established the positive relationship between church attendance and political participation

across racial groups (Campbell 2004; Cassel 1999; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988, 1990).

A few issues related to the demographic composition of the African American population pose complications for political mobilization. In 2015, government figures estimated that 42.6 million individuals identified as African American, or 13.3 percent of the total U.S. population (U.S. Census Bureau 2017). The relative youth of the African American population vis-à-vis the white population (median ages 33 and 43 years old, respectively) is typically seen as an obstacle to the former reaching levels of voter turnout equal to the latter, as older individuals are more likely to vote.

However, in 2012, African Americans surpassed whites in voter turnout for the first time in over 20 years (Current Population Survey 2012). This increased level of political mobilization among the African American community produced gains in descriptive representation for African Americans nationwide, as evinced by the election of a record 46 African American members of the 115th U.S. Congress. Thus, a concerted effort between Obama's campaign and religious institutions proved to be a successful example of political mobilization in the Black community.

Research Questions

For America's three largest minority groups – African Americans, Asians, and Latinos – social institutions are important tools for building politically vibrant lives. However, due to the unique histories of these groups, each has developed closer ties to particular institutions. On the one hand, African Americans have deeper bonds to

religious institutions than perhaps any other group in the U.S. On the other hand, Blacks and Latinos have longer historical records of service in the US military than Asian Americans, because many were barred from acquiring U.S. citizenship until after WWII. What is more, Asian Americans have developed a firm bond with networks stemming from educational institutions because the nation's immigration policy channeled the immigrant generation's arrival to the U.S. through the doors of colleges and universities.

Although I expect that certain social institutions are better positioned to foment political activity among different racial groups, questions remain as to the nature of these groups' political participation patterns. Thus, the research questions of this chapter include the role that social institutions play in structuring the political behaviors of racial and ethnic minorities. Moreover, do certain racial groups prefer a distinct form of political action as opposed to another?

METHODOLOGY

The empirical analysis for this study is based on the 2008 Collaborate Multi-racial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) (Barreto et al. 2008). The CMPS was selected for its robust samples of self-identified Latinos (n=1,577), Asians (n=919), blacks (n=945), and whites (n=1,122) totaling 4,563 registered voters across multiple states and regions. The telephone survey (landline and cell phone) was fielded between November 9, 2008 and January 5, 2009 and was available in six languages (English, Spanish, Mandarin, Cantonese, Korean, and Vietnamese). Respondents were sampled from a total of eighteen states that included some of the nation's most diverse (CA, TX, NY, FL, IL, and NJ). It also sampled from states containing uniquely large percentages of certain racial groups,

such as Hawaii and Washington for immigrant and native-born Americans, Arizona and New Mexico for immigrant and native-born Latinos, and North Carolina and Georgia for its historically established black communities.

The 2008 CMPS included a battery of questions that queried respondents about their engagement with non-electoral forms of political activity. The seven measures include whether a respondent 1) attended a political meeting or speech in support of a candidate or party; 2) worked as a volunteer on behalf of a candidate or political party; 3) donated money to candidate, party, or political organization; 4) attended a demonstration or protest; 5) tried to convince friends or family members to vote; 6) wrote a letter or email to an elected official; and 7) whether she used the internet or email to learn about politics.

One important detail to note is that each of the seven questions stipulated that the non-electoral behavior must have occurred in the past twelve months. By limiting the non-electoral actions to an election year means that the questions were constructed to measure behavior related to heightened political environment. Furthermore, because the questions restricted political activity to a one year time frame, the rates provided are likely a not a ceiling but a floor, as some individuals may have participated in prior years.

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION ACROSS RACIAL GROUPS

Bivariate Results

Table 5.2 displays the differences in rates of participation along the set of dependent variables. With regard to voter turnout among registered voters, it can be seen

that, African Americans and Whites have a statistically significant higher rate of participation that do Latinos. Turnout among Latinos and Asians is not statistically distinguishable. This is in keeping with trends in voter turnout displayed in Table 5.1 in which Blacks and Whites display similarly high levels of voter turnout while Latinos and Asians track closely to one another at the lower end of the spectrum.

Table 5.2 Political Participation across Racial Groups (difference of means test)

	Latino	Asian	Black	White	Total Sample
Electoral Participation					
Voted in 2008 (%)	89.45	90.26	94.00***	96.97***	95.6
Non-Electoral Participation					
Speech (%)	16.66	14.28	21.93***	19.75	19.51
Volunteered (%)	7.93	8.01	16.76***	10.29	10.8
Protest (%)	9.51	6.68*	7.18	5.4**	6.07
Donated Money (%)	15.74	18.23	23.87***	30.07***	27.42
Convince Others to Vote (%)	68.15	64.8	73.35**	69.9	69.97
Letter (%)	16.52	14.23	14.05	26.97***	23.81
Internet (%)	39.03	37.66	38.2	48.68***	45.97
Additive Non-Electoral Participation Index (0-7)	1.74	1.64	1.95***	2.11***	2.04

Note: $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$. Significance levels indicate difference from the Latino mean rate of participation.
Source: 2008 CMPS. Data are weighted using national-level weight.

With regard to non-electoral behaviors, we see some notable results at the descriptive level. First, in comparison to Latinos, African Americans display higher rates of participation across four non-electoral behaviors (attending a political speech, volunteering, donating money, and convincing others to vote) while Whites do so only on three (donating money, writing a letter, and political use of the internet). The only non-electoral behavior in which Latinos display a relatively high level of engagement vis-à-vis Asians and Whites is protest activity. This result shows that the tradition of protest activity among Latinos is unique compared to other groups and remains a popular avenue for Latino political engagement.

On the whole, as captured by the additive index of the seven non-electoral behaviors, it is the two disproportionately immigrant groups—Asians and Latinos—that are shown to be less participatory. The multivariate analysis below illustrates some of the reasons for why this is the case.

MULTIVARIATE RESULTS

A. Predicting Non-Electoral Behaviors among all Racial Groups

Table 5.3 displays results from logistic regression models on each of the seven non-electoral behaviors for all respondents in the sample. For ease of interpretation, exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios) are presented.[6]

Table 5.3 Predicting Non-Electoral Behaviors among All Groups (logit models)

	Speech	Volunteered	Donated Money	Protest	Convinced Others to Vote	Letter	Internet usage for politics
Church	1.00	0.98	0.91^{**}	0.95	1.07^{*}	0.99	1.01
Attendance	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Military	1.33	1.57^{*}	1.50^{**}	1.08	1.25	1.34	0.88
Household	(0.24)	(0.40)	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.16)
Partisan	1.40^{**}	2.98^{***}	2.15^{***}	1.46	1.17	1.11	0.90
	(0.24)	(0.68)	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.14)
Education	1.22^{***}	1.21^{*}	1.32^{***}	1.42^{***}	0.95	1.30^{***}	1.45^{***}
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Income	1.06	0.98	1.22^{***}	0.95	1.11^{*}	1.12^{*}	1.14^{**}
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Income Not	0.86	1.07	0.38^{***}	0.95	0.52^{**}	0.61^{*}	0.47^{***}
Reported	(0.26)	(0.42)	(0.11)	(0.37)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.14)
Female	1.48^{**}	0.83	1.05	1.11	1.41^{**}	0.80	1.18
	(0.23)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.18)
Age	1.00	0.99	1.01	0.99	0.99^{***}	1.01	0.97^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Latino	1.12	0.96	0.60^{***}	2.09^{***}	0.98	0.71^{*}	0.72^{**}
	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.11)	(0.47)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Asian	0.76	0.87	0.50^{***}	1.01	0.76^{*}	0.44^{***}	0.52^{***}
	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.08)	(0.27)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Black	1.24	1.73^{**}	0.85	1.45	1.10	0.51^{***}	0.64^{***}
	(0.19)	(0.47)	(0.16)	(0.34)	(0.18)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Political	2.31^{***}	3.36^{***}	2.63^{***}	1.68^{**}	1.80^{***}	1.80^{***}	1.41^{**}
Interest	(0.45)	(0.81)	(0.47)	(0.44)	(0.22)	(0.37)	(0.19)
Contacted to	1.33^{*}	1.49^{*}	1.12	1.72^{**}	1.22	1.39^{**}	1.37^{**}
Register	(0.21)	(0.32)	(0.18)	(0.38)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.22)
Battleground	1.41^{**}	1.49^{*}	1.11	0.74	1.14	0.99	0.97
	(0.22)	(0.32)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.15)
Observations	4358	4358	4358	4358	4358	4358	4358

Note: Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios) presented; Standard errors in parentheses. Racial group reference category is White.
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Data are weighted using national-level weight.

First, we see that attachments to American social institutions can be important for predicting non-electoral political behavior, but only in some instances. Only twice is the religious variable statistically significant, efforts to engage friends and/or family to vote and donating money to a group for political purposes, but only for the former does church attendance have an effect in the unexpected direction.

With regard to the effect of religious affiliation, church attendance increases the likelihood that a person will discuss political matters with friends and family in an effort to convince them to vote. Convincing others (specifically friends and/or family) to vote implies a certain degree of sociality in comparison to some of the other behaviors that can be carried out by an individual. Thus, this finding suggests that the social and communal nature of frequent church-going may increase the opportunity for churchgoers to discuss political matters with fellow congregants who are friends and family members.[7]

For many people, churches are a safe space where individuals of common faith share thoughts and ideas. Churches, as important centers of communities, are frequently at the heart of debates surrounding local issues, and their placement as prominent voices in community affairs and local issues may trickle down to members. At the small group level (i.e. prayer groups), political discussions may percolate as sharing a common faith offers many the grounds (safe haven) for broaching political topics that are often avoided in other social settings.

While I expected that attachments to the various social institutions would be associated with an increase in political participation, greater church attendance is actually associated with a lesser propensity of donating money to a political cause (candidate,

political party, or political organization). In the case of this behavior, because donating money is a zero-sum dynamic, greater religiosity among certain individuals may mean that they have less money available to contribute to politics. In sum, churchgoers may prefer to participate politically not by spending money but by sharing their views with friends and family.

In addition, the church attendance measure is statistically insignificant in models for the five other non-electoral behaviors – attending a political speech, volunteering for a political cause, protesting, writing a letter, and using the internet for political purposes. I can only speculate as to why this may be the case in models with all the respondents pooled together, but I believe this further emphasizes the need to disaggregate according to racial group differences as some social institutions are more critical for some groups than others.

Respondents with some affiliation to the military are also more likely to take part in two of the designated behaviors—volunteering for a candidate/political party and donating money. Whether by their own military service or by virtue of living in a household with a service member, such an association serves to increase these types of volunteering behavior. This may be because veterans, due to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, exhibited a greater interest in political affairs, particularly in the area of foreign policy. Members of the extended family of a veteran or service member may be more attuned to politics because decisions to go to war (or use military force) may have had a direct effect on that individual. This corroborates prior research that found that military service increases greater political activity among Latino veterans (Leal 1999)

and that many veterans maintain an interest in public and civic affairs as a continuation of their service (see Teigen 2006).

As with connections to the military, a partisan affiliation is also shown to be important not only for volunteering and donating money but also for attending a speech. Ties to political parties are consequential for these behaviors for many reasons; for example, partisans may be more interested in attending a speech because it allows them the opportunity to see a candidate in person. Volunteering and donating money are also distinct behaviors because they offer partisans the chance to work for the aims of their party and on behalf of a cause directly.

Measures of socioeconomic status are shown to be determinative for participating in a majority of the seven distinct non-electoral actions, but differences in education outperform measures capturing financial resources. Indeed, with the exception of convincing friends and family to vote, greater educational attainment is positively associated with each non-electoral behavior at statistically significant levels.

Increases in income are positively associated with participation in fewer activities -- four out of the seven behaviors. The results indicate a positive effect of income on donating money, convincing others to vote, writing a letter, and using the internet as a tool to learn about politics. Additionally, in accordance with expectations, in each of these four cases the categorical variable for those respondents who chose to not disclose their income were less likely to take part in these behaviors. The fact that financial resources are not significant in predicting participation in non-electoral activities that are oriented toward serving a larger mass of people (mass-oriented), attending a political

meeting or speech, and attending a protest or demonstration, means that these avenues for engagement are more accessible to individuals without regard to financial means. By contrast, behaviors like donating money and usage of technology for politics are precluded or foreclosed for some due to the requirement for discretionary income.

All seven models include controls for Latino, Asian, and Black racial-ethnic backgrounds, thereby rendering non-Latino Whites (Anglos) the reference category. In the previously presented tables, Anglos were shown to display higher rates of non-electoral participation (albeit with a few exceptions). The multivariate models largely correspond to this pattern. For example, Latino and Asian registered voters are far less likely to donate money compared to Anglos. Asian respondents were also less likely to report that they attempted to convince friends or family to vote. In the case of writing a letter and using the internet as a political tool, all three racial minority groups were less likely to engage in such activity compared to Anglos.

However, there were two notable exceptions to this pattern of greater participation by Anglos. Net of other factors, Black registered voters were more likely to volunteer on behalf of a candidate or political party than were their Anglo counterparts, and Latinos exhibited twice the odds of joining in a demonstration than Anglos. In the case of African Americans, their rich history of political participation in the face of repeated efforts to curtail their right to vote is one of many reasons why African Americans exhibit higher rates of political participation above their expected level given their lower socioeconomic status as a group (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). In many ways, the act of working as a volunteer may be the most time consuming and effort-heavy of all seven activities.

In the case of Latinos, although they were shown to be less likely to participate in three of the seven activities than Anglos, their greater propensity to use protesting as a tool of political expression is a testament to the deep roots of the practice stretching back decades to the Chicano Movement and instances of political activism observed among the wider Latino community. This finding pertaining to the uniqueness of protest as a behavior has been touched upon in the past (Junn 1999) but is further supported in this analysis. Her analysis revealed that traditional measures of socioeconomic status failed to predict protest activity, which she argues is an example of 'direct' political action among Latinos, although SES did predict other 'system-directed' behaviors via traditional channels such as contacting an elected official. Junn (1999) states that protests are "a statement of disenfranchisement from and opposition to current institutions and practices." (1999, 1425), so marginalized groups, in this case Latinos, may resort to such activity with greater frequency by necessity.

Political interest is shown by the models to be the most consistent factor, as it is positive and statistically significant across all seven behaviors. The more closely one follows news about the 2008 election, the more likely one is to engage in all behaviors The effect of political interest yields the largest substantive effect for increasing the likelihood of volunteering, which is one of the more costly behaviors of those analyzed. Also, in five of the seven activities analyzed, respondents who had been contacted to register to vote or to vote by a political entity were significantly more likely to report higher levels of that non-electoral activity.

Additionally, the effect of living in a presidential battleground state was limited to increasing speech attendance and volunteering. Women are more likely to attend a public meeting or speech and report more attempts to convince friends or family members to vote than do men. As for age, while older individuals are more likely to vote than the young, age is negatively associated with convincing friends or family to vote and using the internet to learn about politics. This latter finding may be due to the fact that older individuals may be less comfortable using newer forms of electronic media for political engagement.

B. Non-Electoral Political Activity (Index) and Voter Turnout among All Respondents

In order to arrive at a measure that captures the totality of other-than-voting political behaviors, I constructed an additive index of all seven behaviors discussed above. The scale ranges from zero to seven (see Table 5.4), but because for each racial group (and the entire sample) the variance of this dependent variable is greater than the mean, I use negative binomial regression analysis.[8]

Table 5.4 Frequencies of Non-Electoral Participation Index (additive)

	Latino	Asian	Black	White	Total
Mean	1.74	1.64	1.95	2.11	2.04
Variance	2.35	1.9	2.55	2.54	2.51
Median	1	1	2	2	2
	N	N	N	N	N
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
0	337	198	135	150	820
	(21.37)	(21.55)	(14.29)	(13.37)	(17.97)
1	499	316	266	231	1312
	(31.64)	(34.39)	(28.15)	(20.59)	(28.75)
2	316	197	200	265	978
	(20.04)	(21.44)	(21.16)	(23.62)	(21.43)
3	178	122	143	207	650
	(11.29)	(13.28)	(15.13)	(18.45)	(14.25)
4	128	48	93	138	407
	(8.12)	(5.22)	(9.84)	(12.30)	(8.92)
5	56	27	60	68	211
	(3.55)	(2.94)	(6.35)	(6.06)	(4.62)
6	45	5	37	54	141
	(2.85)	(.54)	(3.92)	(4.81)	(3.09)
7	18	6	11	9	44
	(1.14)	(.65)	(1.16)	(.80)	(.96)

Note: Mean, Variance, and Median for each racial group are weighted using corresponding weight for racial group. Mean, Variance, and Median for total sample are weighted using national-level weight.

Table 5.5 Predicting Non-Electoral and Electoral Participation among All Groups

	Non-Electoral Index (negative binomial regression)	Voted in 2008 (logistic)
Church Attendance	1.00	1.21***
	(0.01)	(0.08)
Military Household	1.12**	1.21
	(0.06)	(0.38)
Partisan	1.16***	1.30
	(0.06)	(0.51)
Education	1.12***	1.16
	(0.02)	(0.12)
Income	1.05***	1.28*
	(0.02)	(0.17)
Income Not Reported	0.77***	0.18**
	(0.06)	(0.15)
Female	1.05	0.85
	(0.05)	(0.31)
Age	1.00**	1.02**
	(0.00)	(0.01)
Latino	0.92	0.32***
	(0.04)	(0.10)
Asian	0.77***	0.25***
	(0.04)	(0.09)
Black	0.95	0.54
	(0.05)	(0.21)
Political Interest	1.41***	2.43***
	(0.08)	(0.29)
Contacted to Register	1.16***	0.68
	(0.05)	(0.23)
Battleground	1.05	0.77
	(0.05)	(0.27)
Observations	4358	4358

Note: Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios) presented; Standard errors in parentheses. Whites are excluded racial group (base category).
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Data are weighted using national-level weight.

Table 5.5 presents odds ratios from an ordered logit model for the additive index (left column) and a logit model for voter turnout (right column). Among all respondents, we see that socialization via religious institutions is positive for increasing the likelihood of turning out to vote in the 2008 presidential election. In the previous table, we saw that increased church attendance corresponded to a significant rise in convincing family members and friends to vote; in the new table, we see that greater religious behavior may work to compel greater electoral behavior. Taken together, these results suggest that churchgoers who frequently discuss and communicate the importance of carrying out their civic duty are also ultimately more likely to vote.

Living in a military household and claiming a partisan identity are associated with a rise in the composite measure of non-electoral activity. On the whole, individuals with either a direct or indirect tie to the armed services are poised to engage in a greater array of civic behaviors. The same is true for those that claim membership in a major political party. Compared to those that are politically independent, or estranged from one of the two parties, partisans exhibit higher engagement.

Greater education leads to an increase in an individual's total level of non-electoral participation but not for voting. The former finding means that some voices are heard over others in the political system, as political science has long found. These results also point out the differences between electoral and non-electoral participation, another longstanding finding from the literature.

Turning to racial group differences, results show that African Americans do not have levels of electoral or non-electoral participation that are distinguishable from

Anglos when socio-economic status is taken into account. Latinos, for their part, are less likely to turn out to vote than Anglos. However, while the coefficient for being of Latino ancestry is negative in the model predicting non-electoral participation, it is not statistically significant. Only Asian respondents have significantly lower levels of both non-electoral activity and voter turnout compared to Anglos. These results point to a larger trend in American politics in which the major cleavage between groups and their respective levels of political participation is less between White and non-Whites (as is the case in terms of political power) but instead between groups that contain a large proportion of individuals with more recent immigration experiences (Latinos and Asians) versus those with longer settlement in the U.S. (Blacks and Whites).

The more a respondent reports following election news, the more likely they are to engage in non-electoral participation and to vote. This corresponds to the finding that the politically interested were more likely to participate in each of the seven non-electoral behaviors. Also, being reminded to register to vote by a political entity leads to a significant rise non-electoral activity; however, this does not increase the likelihood of voting. The latter finding may be frustrating to groups seeking to mobilize people by investing the time and resources to contact them individually. However, the former results suggest that even if such efforts may not pay off at the polls, they may be having a positive effect by boosting political engagement in other ways.

Lastly, in keeping with traditional expectations that older individuals are more likely to participate in politics, the variable for age is statistically significant and positive for both electoral and non-electoral behaviors. While results from the previous table

revealed that older individuals are at a disadvantage in terms of some behaviors (such as convincing others to vote and using the internet to acquire political knowledge) older individuals are at a disadvantage, the composite model shows that, by and large, older individuals engage in more non-electoral activities.

C. Predicting Index of Non-Electoral Political Activity and Voter Turnout by Racial Group

Table 5.6 Predicting Non-Electoral Participation by Racial Groups (negative binomial regression models)

	Latino	Asian	Black	White
Church Attendance	0.99	1.02	1.03*	0.99
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Military Household	1.10*	1.10	1.12*	1.12*
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Partisan	1.13**	1.00	1.11	1.19***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Education	1.18***	1.04	1.11***	1.11***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Income	1.07***	1.02	1.08***	1.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Income Not Reported	0.64***	0.76**	0.63***	0.81**
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Female	0.93	1.03	1.03	1.07
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age	0.99***	0.99***	1.00*	1.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Political Interest	1.36***	1.23***	1.25***	1.45***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Contacted to Register	1.28***	1.30***	1.24***	1.13**
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Battleground	0.94	0.98	1.06	1.06
	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Observations	1530	803	920	1105

Note: Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios) presented; Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Data are weighted using national-level weight.

Table 5.6 shows sub-sample analysis of each racial group predicting an index of the seven non-electoral activities. For the sake of comparison across models, there are no controls for immigrant socialization, national origin, or generational status. Three notable results emerge from this analysis at the nexus of social institutions and race. First, the results substantiate that the positive relationship between church attendance and political participation among African Americans discussed at the beginning of the chapter. Furthermore, because the bond between religion and politics is significant only among African Americans, I argue that churches in the Black community are a unique engine for political participation in American politics.

Second, Latinos, Blacks, and Whites each display a positive relationship between connections to the military and non-electoral forms of political participation; only among Asians is this positive relationship not present. Third, Latinos were the only racial minority group in which a partisan identification had a positive effect on non-electoral participation.

Another important finding to emerge from the non-electoral political participation analysis is, as discussed at the outset of the chapter, an SES puzzle among Asian respondents. That is, Asian respondents in the sample are unique because factors like educational attainment and income appear to have no effect. There are two measures that capture some aspects of socioeconomic status that allow for additional analysis. First, Asians who refuse to state their level of income, which is a proxy measure for lower income earners, are less likely to engage in non-electoral activities. In this way, Asians of lesser economic means appear to behave similarly to members of other racial groups.

Second, Asians who reported being contacted to register to vote by a political organization were also more likely to participate in non-electoral activities. In this respect, Asian Americans respond similarly to individuals of other racial groups.

Table 5.7 Predicting Voter Turnout by Racial Groups (logistic regression models)

	Latinos	Asians	Blacks	Whites
Church Attendance	1.06	0.91	1.02	1.41***
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.16)
Military Household	1.01	1.75	1.00	1.49
	(0.28)	(0.89)	(0.54)	(0.88)
Partisan	1.76**	1.46	2.00	0.96
	(0.47)	(0.50)	(0.94)	(0.69)
Education	1.20**	1.44***	0.99	1.22
	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.24)
Income	1.07	1.05	1.75**	1.24
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.38)	(0.25)
Income Not Reported	0.60	0.89	0.02***	0.18
	(0.37)	(0.59)	(0.03)	(0.23)
Female	1.11	1.25	1.68	0.62
	(0.28)	(0.42)	(0.82)	(0.40)
Age	1.02**	1.02	1.03***	1.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Political Interest	2.33***	1.36	2.66***	2.54***
	(0.33)	(0.27)	(0.64)	(0.51)
Contacted to Register	1.23	1.17	0.94	0.48
	(0.36)	(0.41)	(0.50)	(0.28)
Battleground	1.50	1.72	1.54	0.44
	(0.46)	(0.74)	(0.72)	(0.24)
Observations	1530	803	920	1105

Note: Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Data are weighted using national-level weight.

Moving to models of voter turnout, the results in Table 5.7 show that when sub-sample analysis is conducted along each racial group using the same set of covariates, the role of social institutions appears more muted. Although it was expected that church attendance would again be predictive of higher voter turnout among African Americans, the variable fails to meet convention levels of significance. Only among White Americans is church attendance predictive of greater levels of voter turnout. Meanwhile, identification with one of the two major political parties is significant in predicting Latino voting.

Further light is shed on the puzzle of socioeconomic status and voter turnout among racial groups. Asian American registered voters, along with Latinos, are the two groups for whom greater educational attainment is positively associated with increased voter turnout. Therefore, while it is the case that gains in education are not associated with increased non-electoral forms of political participation, this appears to not be the case in regard to voter turnout. African American voter turnout, meanwhile, is particularly responsive to economic resources. That is, they are the only group for which greater income is positively associated with greater turnout (conversely, they are also the only group for which non-response to the income category is predictive of lower probability of turning out to vote).

Social Institutions and Political Participation: the Cases of Latinos and Asian Americans

A. Bivariate Results

Table 5.8 Latinos and Asians by Generational Status (CMPS 2008)

	Latinos		Asians	
	N	%	N	%
First Generation	680	46.99	620	72.26
Second Generation	283	19.56	99	11.54
Third + Generation	484	33.45	139	16.2
Total	1447	100	858	100

Table 5.8 displays the generational status divisions among Latinos and Asians in the CMPS sample. A greater percentage of Asians are first generation, foreign-born immigrants (72 percent) than the share that corresponds to Latinos (47 percent). Also, a third of Latinos in the CMPS sample are third or later generation individuals compared to a much smaller share (16 percent) among Asians. Turning to the analysis in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, we can see how rates of political participation vary according to generational status. It can be seen that in most cases second and third generation Latinos are statistically more likely to participate in many non-electoral activities than are first generation Latinos.

Table 5.9 Political Participation across Latino Generations (difference of means tests)

	1st Generation	2nd Generation	3rd Generation	Total Latino
Electoral Participation				
Voted in 2008 (%)	90.25	87.57	90.05	89.45
Non-Electoral Participation				
Speech (%)	11.24	19.46**	22.33***	16.66
Volunteered (%)	7.21	6.68	10.06	7.93
Protest (%)	9.61	11	6.81	9.51
Donated Money (%)	11.88	14.6	24.24***	15.74
Convinced Others to Vote (%)	62.77	69.5	74.20***	68.15
Letter (%)	12.13	15.67	22.65***	16.52
Internet (%)	27.96	54.92***	42.1***	39.03
Additive Non-Electoral Participation Index (0-7 scale)	1.43	1.91***	2.02***	1.74

Note: Note: $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$. Significance levels indicate difference from 1st generation rate of participation.
Source: 2008 CMPS. Data are weighted using national-level weight.

Table 5.10 Political Participation Across Asian Generations (difference of means test)

	1st Generation	2nd Generation	3rd Generation	Total Asian
Electoral Participation				
Voted in 2008 (%)	91.19	88.33	92.97	90.26
Non-Electoral Participation				
Speech (%)	10.95	22.62**	19.84**	14.28
Volunteered (%)	5.76	12.81*	13.51**	8.01
Protest (%)	5.83	13.55	4.19	6.68
Donated Money (%)	15.87	25.69*	24.17*	18.23
Convinced Others to Vote (%)	65.51	71.53	57.49	64.8
Letter (%)	12.14	13.42	27.19***	14.23
Internet (%)	31.23	65.23***	50.02***	37.66
Additive Non-Electoral Participation Index (0-7 scale)	1.47	2.25***	1.96***	1.64

Note: $^{*}p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$. Significance levels indicate difference from first-generation mean rate of participation.
Source: 2008 CMPS. Data are weighted using national-level weight.

As far as differences between Latinos and Asians, the bivariate results in Tables 5.9 and 5.10 show that the participation index scores between both sets of immigrants are

virtually indistinguishable, 1.47 for Asian immigrants compared to 1.43 among Latino immigrants. However, a more useful comparison would be to evaluate the gaps between the generations of each racial group. For example, the gap in participation between Latino immigrants and second-generation individuals (1.91-1.43=.48) is somewhat smaller than the gap between first generation and third-generation Latinos (2.02-1.43=.59). Also, the gap between Asian first generation immigrants and second generation Asians is (2.25-1.47=.78) is .30 points larger than the comparable gap in those same generations of Latinos, but the difference between first and third generation Asians is smaller (1.96-1.47=.49) than the disparity between corresponding Latino generations. Substantively, this means that while Asian immigrants have a slightly higher average score on the participation index (1.47) than Latino immigrants (1.43), the observable disparities in participation are larger within the generations of each racial group than between the racial groups.

B. Multivariate Results

The following section presents an analysis of Latino and Asian registered voters in order to better explore issues of immigration and acculturation that are less relevant among Black and White voters. One set of results (Table 5.11) predicts the index measure of all seven non-electoral behaviors as well as voter turnout among all Latinos and Asians (native-born and immigrants), while a second set of results is limited to immigrant respondents (Table 5.12).

Table 5.11 Predicting Non-Electoral and Electoral Activities among Latinos and Asians

	Latinos		Asians	
	Non-Electoral Index (N.B.R[1])	Voted in 2008 (Logistic)	Non-Electoral Index (N.B.R.[1])	Voted in 2008 (Logistic)
Church Attendance	0.99	1.07	1.03	0.91
	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.07)
Military Household	1.08	1.03	1.18**	1.44
	(0.07)	(0.29)	(0.10)	(0.71)
Partisan	1.14**	1.73**	0.98	1.41
	(0.07)	(0.48)	(0.07)	(0.49)
Education	1.17***	1.18*	1.04	1.53***
	(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.19)
Income	1.07***	1.11	1.01	1.05
	(0.02)	(0.13)	(0.02)	(0.14)
Income Not Reported	0.66***	0.50	0.84	1.09
	(0.07)	(0.34)	(0.10)	(0.75)
Female	0.94	1.03	0.97	1.27
	(0.05)	(0.28)	(0.07)	(0.46)
Age	1.00**	1.02*	0.99***	1.02*
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Political Interest	1.35***	2.31***	1.25***	1.43*
	(0.08)	(0.36)	(0.07)	(0.29)
Contacted to Register	1.29***	1.25	1.32***	1.09
	(0.07)	(0.39)	(0.10)	(0.37)
Battleground	0.94	1.54	1.07	1.34
	(0.05)	(0.49)	(0.09)	(0.54)
Non-English Survey	0.92	1.09	0.86*	1.00
	(0.07)	(0.40)	(0.08)	(0.38)
2nd Generation	1.12	0.96	1.30***	1.16
	(0.09)	(0.37)	(0.13)	(0.59)
3rd Generation	1.07	0.68	1.32***	0.94
	(0.08)	(0.25)	(0.12)	(0.43)
Cuban	0.89	1.20	--	--
	(0.12)	(1.27)		
Chinese	--	--	0.62***	0.91
			(0.07)	(0.34)

Table 5.11 Continued

Observations	1414	1414	763	763

Note: Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios) presented; Standard errors in parentheses; Generational reference category is first generation immigrants

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Data are weighted using national-level weight.

1. Negative Binomial Regression

Table 5.12 Predicting Non-Electoral and Electoral Participation among Latino and Asian Immigrants

	Latino Immigrants		Asian Immigrants	
	Non-Electoral Index (N.B.R.[1])	Voted in 2008	Non-Electoral Index (N.B.R.[1])	Voted in 2008
Church Attendance	1.01	1.20*	1.04*	0.91
	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.02)	(0.09)
Military Household	1.13	1.66	1.04	2.04
	(0.11)	(0.87)	(0.12)	(1.11)
Partisan	1.37***	1.15	1.07	2.77**
	(0.14)	(0.52)	(0.10)	(1.17)
Education	1.12***	1.11	1.06	1.18
	(0.04)	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.15)
Income	1.07**	1.10	1.02	1.34*
	(0.03)	(0.22)	(0.03)	(0.23)
Income Not Reported	0.64**	0.51	0.72**	0.33
	(0.12)	(0.64)	(0.10)	(0.29)
Female	0.94	1.35	0.89	1.17
	(0.09)	(0.53)	(0.08)	(0.53)
Age	0.99***	1.02	0.99**	0.99
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.02)
Political Interest	1.38***	2.13***	1.27***	1.42
	(0.10)	(0.44)	(0.08)	(0.33)
Contacted to Register	1.33***	1.85	1.33***	0.73
	(0.12)	(0.87)	(0.12)	(0.26)
Battleground	1.04	0.95	1.04	0.89
	(0.10)	(0.44)	(0.10)	(0.39)
Percentage life in	1.00	0.99	1.00**	1.00
U.S.	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Non-English Survey	0.80**	0.99	0.84*	0.99
	(0.08)	(0.51)	(0.08)	(0.41)
Cuban	1.07	1.66	--	--
	(0.16)	(1.90)		
Chinese	--	--	0.55***	0.90
			(0.09)	(0.39)
Observations	628	628	536	536

Note: Exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios) presented; Standard errors in parentheses. Voter turnout model predicted using logistic regression.
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Data are weighted using national-level weight.
1. Negative Binomial Regression

Both tables show important distinctions between Latinos and Asians writ large compared to their immigrant counterparts in terms of the effect of institutional affiliations. First, though church attendance fails to shape participation among all Latinos and Asians, it does have an effect among the immigrant subsamples of each. Among Latino immigrants, greater church attendance prompted a greater likelihood of casting a ballot for president in 2008. This result points to the fact that joining a church community grants Latino immigrants the social foothold that facilitates their political voices. For Asian immigrants, church attendance is a significant predictor of an increased likelihood of non-electoral participation.

Each respective finding has some basis in prior literature, as such work has found evidence of increased levels of Latino electoral participation from church attendance (DeSipio 2007; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001) and a link between churchgoing and Asian electoral participation (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Wong et al. 2011) and civic engagement more generally (Wong 2006; Wong, Rim, and Perez 2008). It appears that Latinos and Asians, and in particular the immigrants among them, depend on the communities provided by churches as way to gain the access, knowledge, and opportunities necessary for greater political participation. For these two immigrant groups, getting ahead in terms of civic participation may be less about what a person knows and rather who a person knows. For many immigrants, who they know are the members of their religious community.

Ties to the military appear to be somewhat less determinative, although it promotes non-electoral participation among all Asians (native-born and immigrants). In

fact, of the three social institutions examined among the sample of all Asians, only the military shapes non-electoral participation. Why a military affiliation is significant in the Asian but not the Latino models is unclear, but it does provide additional evidence in favor of the importance of institutions to minority communities.

With regard to partisan affiliation, the results show it is more significant for Latinos than for Asians. Among Latinos writ large, being a partisan is positive and significant for increasing both non-electoral participation and voter turnout (Table 5.11). While being a partisan has no effect on turnout in the Latino immigrant model, the strength of the positive relationship for non-electoral participation (Table 5.12) suggests that the development of a partisan identity and taking part in a litany of civic behaviors are tightly associated. The development of partisan affiliation, while not significant in the model for all Asians does increase the likelihood of voting among Asian immigrants.

Tables 5.11 and 5.12 reveal a more consistently positive relationship between education and political participation among Latinos than among Asians. With the exception of Latino immigrants and voting in the 2008 election, increased education levels produce a statistically significant and directionally positive increase in the likelihood of engaging in non-electoral participation. Only in the model that groups all Asian Americans together (Table 5.11) is education a significant predictor of voter turnout (although not for non-electoral participation). Furthermore, in the model that includes all Asian Americans (immigrant and native-born) none of the variables for income appear to yield significant results. Only among Asian immigrants do results show

a positive relationship between income and voter turnout and a negative relationship between those that did not disclose their income and non-electoral participation.

These results suggest that the SES puzzle among Asian Americans requires greater nuance involving the distinctions between foreign-born and native-born status. For one, levels of educational attainment matter for voter turnout among the group writ large and the level of financial resources at one's disposal weighs heavily on the political participation of Asian immigrants. Greater financial resources produce a significant increase in the odds that an Asian immigrant will turn out to vote as well as a significant increase in the odds of non-electoral participation among those that preferred to not disclose incomes.

Nevertheless, if socioeconomic status is a less consistent predictor and thereby challenges many of the field's assumptions about political participation, what may be a more fruitful avenue for fomenting greater political participation among this group? I contend that the analysis below suggests that factors related to the acculturation process embedded in the Asian American immigrant experience may better explain the underlying mechanisms animating political integration.

A cluster of variables related to acculturation were included in both sets of models for Asians and Latinos in order to capture the various effects stemming from greater familiarity with U.S. political culture. The models share many, but not all, independent variables. Both sets of models account for language acculturation by a proxy measure for whether a respondent requested a non-English survey. Each table also includes measures for national-origin differences with a control for Cuban ancestry in the models among

Latinos and one for Chinese ancestry in the models for Asian Americans, as each have been shown to display disproportionately higher and lower levels of political participation, respectively (Calvo and Rosenstone 1989; Lien 2003). In Table 5.11, I included a measures for generational status (second and third generation) in order to compare each to the level of participation displayed by the immigrant generation (reference category). The models restricted solely to immigrants (Table 5.12) includes a measure for the percentage of life an immigrant has spent in the U.S., which was constructed by calculating the number of years an immigrant has spent in the U.S. as a proportion of their age.

The results show that individuals with a greater reliance on a native language other than English appear to have more difficulty engaging with the U.S. political system. Greater ease with the English language helps immigrants engage in an array of civic activities, but the effect does not appear to extend to electoral politics for Latino and Asian registered voters. The lack of a significant effect for language acculturation on voting is less surprising considering that foreign-born registered voters have already attained a higher level of political incorporation than other co-ethnics who are either non-citizens or perhaps un-registered citizens.

Although generational status is shown to be unrelated to voter turnout among both Asian Americans and Latinos net of other factors, differences in generational status do emerge as critical for levels of non-electoral engagement among Asian Americans. Table 5.11 shows that second and third-generation Asian Americans have statistically significant higher rates of non-electoral participation than do foreign-born Asian

Americans. This finding suggests that intergenerational political incorporation, or the differences in participation between the immigrant generations, explains a significant portion of the discrepancy in the rates of political participation between foreign-born and native-born Asians.

We also see a differential effect for national-origin group between Latinos and Asian Americans. Although prior research had identified Latinos of Cuban ancestry to be more politically active than Latinos of other backgrounds, the analysis does not support this claim. However, among Asian Americans, individuals of Chinese ancestry display a significantly lower likelihood of engaging in non-electoral forms of political participation than do Asians of non-Chinese background. This negative relationship is found in the models including all Asians in the sample as well as the model limited solely to Asian immigrants.

Table 5.12 highlights aspects specific to the immigrant experience that may spur political participation among Latino and Asian immigrants. Among Latino immigrants, those respondents who remain dominant in Spanish are less likely to engage in non-electoral forms of political participation, which suggests that English language acculturation is an important factor for political engagement. While Asian American with immigrant backgrounds were also less likely to participate if they were native-language dominant, only among Asian immigrants was the percentage of life in the U.S. significant. This factor was not significant in the model among Latino immigrants, which suggests that the development of familiarity with American electoral politics gained through greater time in the U.S. is more critical for immigrants from Asian countries.

The preceding sections examined the underlying factors driving Latino and Asian American political participation. Although both groups exhibited a general trend of increased political participation, for Latinos, much of the discrepancies in non-electoral participation levels disappeared once factors like the partisan attachments and socioeconomic status were taken into account. Factors related to acculturation and intergenerational progression appeared to hold greater explanatory potential among Asian Americans than among Latinos. Asian Americans of the second and third generation were consistently shown to be more likely to engage in non-electoral forms of political participation than their immigrant counterparts. The importance of immigrant acculturation for Asian Americans was further emphasized by results showing that time spent in the U.S. were positively related and lower levels of English skills were negatively related to political participation.

Both groups benefited in some way from their association with religious institutions, their levels of political interest, and contact from political groups. The development of political interest is all the more important for future efforts aimed at increasing rates of Asian American political participation given that increased socioeconomic resources, a common facilitator of political engagement among other groups, did not necessarily translate to greater engagement.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has sought to identify the impact of social institutions on the political engagement of U.S. racial minorities. By expanding the analysis to groups other than

Latinos, the hope was to derive further insights about methods for increasing political engagement. In addition to conducting comparisons of propensities to engage in certain forms of electoral and non-electoral political participation, I arrived at a few conclusions that may help scholars and practitioners alike to narrow the gaps in political engagement between racial groups. Doing so will hopefully make for a fairer and more equitable political system in which historically marginalized voices can begin to exert greater influence.

The first major finding to emerge from cross-group analysis of descriptive statistics is that the divide is less between whites and non-whites and more between Blacks and Whites who are generally higher propensity participants and Latinos and Asians who are positioned, for a variety of reasons, on the low propensity end of the political participation spectrum. A more equitable and representative system would need to address the chasm between groups that contain a large proportion of individuals with more recent immigration experiences (Latinos and Asians) versus those with longer settlement in the U.S. (Blacks and Whites).

Citizens can engage with the political system in a variety of ways, and the analysis of a series of different non-electoral behaviors identifies a few methods of engagement favored by members of specific racial minority groups. For one, Whites were the most likely to participate by donating money, writing letters to elected officials, and using the internet for political reasons. Many of these acts require the civic skills and economic resources achieved by greater access to educational opportunities.

On the other hand, while Latinos and Asians were the least likely to report taking part in such behaviors, Latinos were the most likely to report attending a political protest. African Americans were the racial group most likely to attend a political speech, volunteer for a political organization, and emphasize the importance of voting to their immediate social circles. Once intervening factors were accounted for through multivariate analysis, African Americans were no more likely to attend a speech or discuss politics with friends or family than were whites, but they did remain significantly more likely to volunteer for a political organization.

In an effort to unpack these results, I suggest that the marginalization of immigrant minorities by the two major political parties explains why Latinos were more likely to circumvent official channels and direct their political energies via protest. Although protests can serve as a tool for challenging the core aspects of political systems (Meyer 2007), sometimes such activity, when carried out by immigrants, is indicative of other emotions. Writing about the use of protest among immigrant minorities in the U.S., Jane Junn argued that it "does not necessarily require working with and within current institutions of existing democracy. Instead, marching in the streets—the most readily available weapon of the weak—is often the only avenue by which the marginalized and disenfranchised can make their voices heard" (1999, 1424-25). She continued by stating that sometimes immigrants, who are "concerned with political matters in their home countries…find it easier to march in a demonstration to express their sentiments rather than write a letter in English to a U.S. government official" (Ibid, 1425).

That Latinos are the group most likely to engage in protest today is indicative of the shifts in the political strategies occurring in minority politics. Protest efforts and other forms of direct action were perfected and popularized by Black activists during the Civil Rights Movement but, perhaps, as a consequence of the political successes achieved by the Black community, political energies may be directed through different channels today. Indeed, research has found that over the course of nearly five decades African American political opportunities expanded by way of increased representation in Congress, levels of voting went up while the incidence of protest went down (Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone 2003). Thus, while it could be said that African Americans have completed the proverbial path 'from protest to politics,' (Tate 1994) Latinos in the U.S. may still be on that road.

One reason why African American political engagement is at or near parity with that of white Americans despite the large differences in socioeconomic status is related to the community's use of social institutions. In particular, the organizational and social resources afforded by places of worship help provide the group with opportunities for the exercise of political energies. Some sectors of the Latino and Asian American communities have learned this lesson; the results in this chapter showed that Latino and Asian immigrants who attend church more often enjoy higher rates of turnout and non-electoral participation, respectively (Table 5.12). Indeed, by engaging more closely with religious networks, immigrant groups may find that they propel their rates of civic engagement. Scholars have suggested that in the absence of a social institution willing to cater to immigrants, churches have come to play an outsized role in the civic lives of

Latinos (Jones-Correa and Leal 2001) and that Asian American communities also lean on places of worship and their attendant social networks out of necessity for their social and political integration (Min 1992; Bankston and Zhou 1995; Hurh and Kim 1990).

Lastly, the analysis examined the curious case of socioeconomic status and political participation among Asian Americans. The Asian American political participation puzzle is the idea that Asian Americans, despite being a highly educated group, exhibit lower rates of political participation relative to Whites and African Americans. This was reaffirmed in the analysis but with an important caveat for future scholarship to consider. While increased education was largely unrelated to rates of Asian American political participation, economic resources did appear to be significant in determining the frequency of political behaviors. Moreover, given that politically interested Asian Americans were consistently shown to be politically active, an attribute that becomes more common with greater education, then perhaps educational resources can be said to operate more indirectly for members of this group.

English language acculturation may be a more important factor for Latino immigrant political integration than it is among Asian immigrants. Instead, among Asian immigrants, greater familiarity afforded by longer settlement periods in the U.S. may be the key for greater political participation. Insight from Pei-te Lien's (2004) interviews with Chinese immigrants in the U.S. is particularly illustrative for interpreting results from my analysis. She found that Chinese immigrants felt that the lack of political activity in the community was because of less contact with matters associated with the American mainstream and that only the most assimilated were politically active.

One way to increase political participation among Asian Americans would be to consider an alternative pathway; specifically, concentrating on the development of political interest among this population. Perhaps gains in descriptive representation may be the answer to the Asian American political participation conundrum. To be sure, Lien's participants were characterized as being "unanimously enthusiastic about the future direction of political participation and prospect of empowerment for the community. Many agree that more Chinese would vote if there were more Chinese candidates in the campaigns or even just in the population" (2004, 101). Thus, with the election of more Asian Americans to public office, this population may express further interest in politics as the political system exhibits responsiveness to their interests and offers a reflection of their increasing presence.

Despite progress in terms of increased levels of descriptive representation at all levels of government, minority office-holding falls well short of parity with the proportion of minorities in the voting population—much less the population writ large. One consequence is that the task of mobilizing racial and ethnic minorities can be made more challenging. An unfortunate side effect of this reality is that American social institutions may continue their lackluster attempts at politically integrating these communities, especially immigrants, rather than make earnest attempts at mobilization. This produces a vicious cycle whereby immigrant groups fall short of expectations and are castigated, largely on cultural grounds, for failing to meet their own civic potential. This chapter has emphasized that religious institutions, schools, political parties, and the

military have to power to challenge these patterns because racial and ethnic minorities are currently benefiting from one or a combination of these community pillars.

NOTES

1. Blacks have the highest rate of child mortality (Kaiser Family Foundation 2015) and shortest average lifespans of any group (CDC 2016), while Latinos have the lowest rate of college completion (Pew Research Center 2016) and lowest median hourly wage (Patten 2016). For Asian Americans, the struggles with poverty and educational attainment among Hmong, Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese communities belie the myth of the "model minority" (Teranishi 2008). The economic consequences of such disparities yield lower life-time earnings for non-whites, a phenomenon known as the "racial wealth gap" (Melvin and Shapiro 2006).

2. According to the Pew Research Center's 2013 report "The Rise of Asian Americans," a "recent immigrant" is a person who arrived within the previous 3 years (2007-2010). The 61 percent statistic is derived from the 2010 American Community Survey.

3. For example, about 27 percent of adults (25-64) in South Korea have a bachelor's degree or higher, compared to nearly 70 percent of recent South Korean immigrants to the U.S (Pew 2013). The same is true for Japanese immigrants, about 70 percent of whom have at least a bachelor's degree compared to only 25 percent among Japanese non-emigres (Ibid.)

4. Groups like the Philippine American College Endeavor (PACE) and Intercollegiate Chinese for Social Action (CISA) were some of the first groups to engage in political activism on behalf of the Asian American community. The work of the Asian American Political Alliance (AAPA), a group that formed the Third World Liberation Front (TWLF), a coalition of Asian American, Black, Latino, and Native American students,

conducted a student-led strike at SFSU in 1968 which led to the establishment of the college of ethnic studies. Today, groups like ASPIRE (San Francisco), UPLIFT (Los Angeles), RAISE (New York City) are populated by a large contingent of young people and students around the issues of social justice for Asian undocumented immigrants and non-citizens

5. Even the strategies of direct action from student groups like the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) worked closely with church leaders associated with Rev. Dr. Marin Luther King Jr.'s Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC).

6. Significant values above one indicate a greater likelihood of the event occurring (similar to a positive coefficient) while values below one operate similarly to a negative coefficient.

7. It is important to note that the question only asks respondents if they convinced or tried to convince friends and family to vote and did not specify that in the conversation a person did so for the sake of compelling an individual to vote for a particular party or candidate

8. Count variables can be modeled as Poisson processes, but because Poisson regression makes the assumption of equidispersion (the variance equals the mean) which is seldom the case, negative binomial regression is used.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

The goal of this project was to provide a new narrative of immigrant acculturation from an intra- and inter-generational perspective. In doing so, the project contributes to our understanding of the political incorporation of the Latino community and the ramifications for U.S. politics. The major contribution of the project was to introduce to the field of political science my theory of Generational Political Incorporation, which holds that differences in generational and citizenship status structure the Latino community's relationship with America's major social institutions—churches, schools, the military, labor unions, and political parties. The literature agrees that these social institutions are critical for the development of the civic skills and social capital that facilitate political engagement, but access is often determined by an individual's generational or citizenship status.

My central claim is that immigrant political incorporation follows a general pattern. Given that the social institutions examined adopt formal and informal rules that govern entry (institutional accessibility), many first-generation non-citizens are excluded from access. For example, the military is limited to the recruitment of U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents; a substantial share of unionized jobs are in the federal workforce which are often limited to citizens; and political parties concentrate their resources on contacting voters and are thus less interested in forging connections non-citizens. These structural limitations impede many immigrants from pathways to civic incorporation. By contrast, public schools and religious institutions operate under looser rules regarding entry and, therefore can and do cater to the needs of first-generation

immigrants. Since church membership is open to non-citizens and access to a K-12 education is a constitutionally protected right, many immigrants come to rely on the social and informational resources of these institutions. Thus, the doors of many of America's most important socializing institutions (and thus access to their attendant resources), open and shut according to generational differences.

SUMMARY

The dissertation began with an overview of prior approaches to understanding Latino political participation. This section included a critique of deficit-oriented perspectives (D'Antonio and Form 1965; Nelson 1979, 1982) on Latino politics which reproduced stereotypes of Latinos as apolitical, disinterested, and inactive compared to other groups. In response, I highlighted works by Latino politics scholars (Tirado 1970; Garcia and Arce 1988) who incorporated into their analysis an appreciation and knowledge for the alternative ways that Latino grassroots political organizations have envisioned their mission. I also critiqued social capital (Putnam 2000) and civic skills (Verba, Brady, and Schlozman 1995) approaches to political participation for their limited generalizability to groups outside the White normative experience. Though I acknowledge the important and useful theoretical contributions of these works, these theoretical lenses are incomplete explanations for the experiences of racial and immigrant minorities. Instead, I sought to situate my theory of Generational Political Incorporation within the historical-institutional literature. Exemplars of this approach to immigrant political incorporation (Bloemraad 2006; and DeSipio 2011) foreground the importance of civil society but do so with an understanding of the historical context of immigrant

groups in the U.S. By highlighting how each of the social institutions have or have not helped shape the trajectory of Latino political incorporation, this project covers new theoretical terrain in the field of racial and ethnic politics.

In Chapter 2, I elaborated upon my main theoretical contribution, Generational Political Incorporation (GPI). The crux of the argument animating GPI is the relationship between the level of need (conceptualized as political, economic, and social necessities) felt by an individual along the generational trajectory and the level of 'institutional accessibility' they are afforded according to citizenship and generational differences. Using the case of Latinos in the United States, I illustrated how this process unfolds. Recent arrivals (first-generation immigrants) have the greatest need for pathways to American civic life but find few institutions capable of meeting their needs. Their entrance into American civic life is undertaken by accessing the most open institutions—churches and the public education system. By contrast, the children of these immigrants (second-generation) are often welcomed by the same institutions that were closed to their parents. I showed how Latino participation in each of the social institutions examined (schools, churches, the military, labor unions, and political parties) increases with each subsequent generation. From this basis, I derived a series of hypotheses; my primary hypothesis was that affiliation with one or more of these social institutions were expected to foment higher rates of non-electoral and electoral political participation (*Institutional Socialization Hypothesis*). The positive effects of such institutional affiliations would contend with forces related to socioeconomic status (*Socioeconomic Status Hypothesis*)

and the immigration experience among immigrants (*Immigrant Acculturation Hypothesis*) as predictors for civic behaviors.

In Chapter 3, I used the Latino National Survey of 2006 to conduct a series of bivariate and multivariate analyses to test the Institutional Socialization, Immigrant Acculturation, and Socioeconomic Status Hypotheses. I found that affiliation with these major social institutions is critical for the political integration of Latinos, especially immigrants or those closely tied to the immigrant community. Membership in these social sites offers immigrants, who often display feelings of political marginalization and isolation, the tools to exercise their political voices.

The results suggest strong support for the institutional socialization hypothesis among immigrant Latinos and the children of immigrants. First-generation immigrants who are frequent church-goers, are themselves or have a family connection to a union member, and who claim affiliation with a political party are more likely to engage in the two measures of non-electoral political engagement—civic involvement and governmental participation. Connections to the military and U.S. schools among immigrants were associated with greater participation in at least one of the non-electoral behaviors as well. Ties to organized labor and the military were consistently predictive of greater participation among the second generation. Yet, unlike members of the first and second generations, third and later generation Latinos derive little by way of their ties to social institutions. Instead, the likelihood of their community group membership is largely explained by socioeconomic status, as only household income and education are directionally positive and statistically significant factors.

Among first-generation immigrants, some markers of acculturation are predictive of greater civic participation. For instance, first-generation respondents who spent a larger percentage of their life in the U.S. and those who are naturalized citizens are more likely to report contact with an elected official. This implies that more overtly political activities might require citizenship status and greater familiarity with American society. Also, the survey allowed a 'natural experiment,' as some respondents were interviewed before, and others after, the immigrant rights marches of the spring of 2006. This provided the chance to see if such examples of mass mobilization lead to increased political participation. Indeed, I found evidence to suggest that immigrants who witnessed this event were more likely to have contacted an elected official.

An important institutional player among the immigrant generation that emerges from the analysis in Chapter 3 was religion, which has a unique ability to foment political integration among parishioners and members. I pursued this theme with qualitative analysis using insights from the LNS focus group interviews. With direct quotations from Latino participants, I was able to illustrate how religious settings offer Latino immigrants the opportunity to develop both bonding social capital (connectedness to fellow immigrants, many of whom share their ethnic background) and bridging social capital (connections with individuals across racial and ethnic lines). Bonding social capital is important because, in lieu of political and economic resources, immigrants rely on their immediate immigrant network. They do so in order to maintain cultural practices and leverage a collective group capacity to exert political influence. Bridging social capital is also important because it allows immigrants to make additional political and economic

advances. Through membership at certain types of churches, immigrants can better forge connections with non-immigrants and thereby expand their networks and knowledge.

I also made use of the Latino National Survey in Chapter 4, in which I extended my analysis to electoral forms of political participation. This includes the formal entry to political membership (predicting desire for U.S. citizenship among immigrant non-citizens eligible for citizenship) and rates of voter registration and voter turnout. The major takeaway from this Chapter was the centrality of U.S. schools, and education more broadly, in cultivating a sense of membership and belonging among immigrants. The knowledge imparted to immigrants by the civics education received in a U.S. school, along with more general acculturation and network effects, has profound effects later in their political lives.

The important role of schools and education was echoed forcefully among LNS focus group participants. They believed that knowledge gained in U.S. schools was the necessary key to unlock their personal, and by extension, their community's political potential. If the U.S. political system, as one respondent stated concisely, was a "game," then learning the rules to be a successful player is achieved in school. Additionally, respondents expressed that schools offered their children the opportunity to build relationships with peers of different racial and ethnic backgrounds. This form of bridging social capital should have political payoffs in the future. The ability to maintain healthy relationships with a diverse set of people is a useful skill for building broad-based networks of support that underpins contemporary forms of cross-racial political coalitions. Parental descriptions of schools as venues for initiating cross-racial

relationships among their children were often characterized in contrast to their childhood experiences, suggesting these changes are indicative of differing generational opportunities.

Factors related to the acculturation process, including language and time spent in the U.S., also played a role in shaping immigrant political integration. Immigrants were particularly affected by the marches for immigrant rights which occurred during the spring of 2006. Specifically, those who witnessed these nationwide events were more likely to express a desire for U.S. citizenship and to be registered to vote. Thus, these high profile instances of popular social protest can have positive ripple effects among participants swept up in such episodes of direct action.

Native-born Latinos exhibited other pathways to electoral engagement. For their part, second-generation Latinos' affiliations with the military and unions are fruitful avenues for registration and voter turnout, respectively. Compared to first-generation immigrants, third- and later-generation Latinos derive fewer benefits from association with society's major institutions. Instead, their levels of electoral activity are determined by the factors that research has shown generally influence political engagement, such as socioeconomic status and demographic factors such as age.

In Chapter 5, I expanded the scope of my analysis to groups other than Latinos in order to arrive at insights about fomenting political engagement among other racial minorities. I compared propensities to engage in certain forms of non-electoral and electoral political participation using the Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) of 2008. First, cross-group analysis at the aggregate level revealed that the

dividing line between low- and high-propensity political participants is not between Whites and non-Whites; it is between Blacks and Whites who are generally high-propensity participants and Latinos and Asians who are positioned, for a variety of reasons, on the low-propensity end of the political participation spectrum.

One reason why African American political engagement is at or near aggregate level parity with that of White Americans, despite differences in socioeconomic status between them, is related to the community's strategic use of social institutions. In particular, the organizational and social resources afforded by places of worship help provide African Americans with opportunities for the exercise of political energies. Latino and Asian immigrants were also shown to use religious resources for political purposes, as those who attend church display higher rates of political activity than do non-church-goers. This comports with extant literature which suggests that in the absence of other social institution willing to include immigrants, churches have come to play an outsized role in the civic lives of the nation's immigrant minorities.

Whites were the most likely to participate in forms of non-electoral activity that required greater socioeconomic resources, such as donating money, writing letters to elected officials, and use of the internet for political reasons. While Latinos and Asians were the least likely to report taking part in such behaviors, once intervening factors were accounted for through multivariate analysis, Latinos were most likely to report attending a political protest and African Americans were the group most likely to volunteer for a political organization.

The results showed that factors related to acculturation held greater explanatory potential among Asian Americans than among Latinos in the sample. Although both Latino and Asian American immigrants with a greater reliance on their native language had difficulty engaging in non-electoral forms of participation, only among Asian immigrants was the percentage of life in the U.S. positively correlated with increased civic participation. This suggests that English language fluency continues to be critical for immigrant political engagement in activities beyond voting; and the familiarity with American electoral politics that is gained with greater time in the U.S. is also critical for immigrants from Asian countries.

That factors related to the Asian American immigrant experience explain a large share of the group's civic practices has implications for the 'socioeconomic status paradox' (or 'SES puzzle') among Asian American respondents. Consistent with that literature, Asian Americans in the sample are the only racial group for whom greater educational attainment and income are not statistically significant and in the expected direction. From this analysis, I concluded that the pathway to political incorporation for Asian American is non-traditional. It appears that educational and economic resources are less consequential for Asian Americans. Instead the fulcrum point for this community appears to be the development of political interest in American politics, which can only be attained with more time in their new country of residence and greater mastery of English. These are gradual processes that can take a lifetime, but there is no substitute for the familiarity bred from the acculturation experience.

The civic health of the U.S. faces a challenge from political inequality between the nation's immigrant and the native-born populations. That is, participation in the American civic sphere is characterized by a chasm; native-born populations occupy a privileged vantage point while the nation's immigrants are situated across the vast expanse where they struggle to affect the polity. This project has helped to illustrate that the most reliable recourse for immigrants hoping to engage in politics is to gain access to some of society's major social institutions. Those wishing to ensure a more equitable and representative system for immigrant minorities should reconsider citizenship requirements for entry that create structural disadvantages at the institutional level.

CONTRIBUTIONS

While this dissertation primarily contributes to the political science literature, the theoretical contributions and the quantitative and qualitative analyses are of an interdisciplinary nature. The findings should be of interest to researchers studying immigrant incorporation regardless of discipline. There has been a long-running debate regarding the acculturation trajectory of the nation's immigrant groups, with some voicing concerns that the post-1965 immigrant cohort, especially many Latino groups, does not display levels of social mobility or political incorporation befitting traditional theories of linear assimilation (Gans 1992; Portes and Zhou 1993). A broad generalization of this debate positions some scholars as either pessimistic or optimistic about the future of Latino immigrant incorporation. I believe that the story that emerges from this work is, on the whole, optimistic. While I described the various ways in which many immigrants face barriers to accessing some social institutions as a function of their

citizenship or generational status, I also traced how many of these social sites—especially the military and labor unions—are gradually adjusting their formal and informal norms and practices to be more inclusive of Latinos and immigrants.

Today, many social institutions that had exclusionary policies toward immigrants and non-citizens have been rejuvenated thanks to the racial and immigrant minorities that now populate their ranks. For example, leaders in the military and labor unions have responded to the country's diversification by reformulating certain policies. While the military has made recent attempts to facilitate the recruitment and citizenship process for non-citizen servicemembers, organized labor has attempted to organize sectors of the labor force populated by immigrant workers. These social sites have made these alterations in order to ensure their organizational viability in a future where the U.S. is characterized by greater racial and ethnic diversity as well as more immigrants. These changes will likely be accompanied by some difficulties, but they will also provide opportunities for a mutually beneficial relationship whereby the nation's immigrants and minorities make strides in incorporation and the vitality of social institutions is preserved by new members.

Some of the project's conclusions may help scholars and practitioners narrow the political engagement gaps between racial-ethnic groups. For practitioners engaged in political mobilization or voter education campaigns, insights from this project would suggest a particular course of action. First, groups seeking to mobilize Latinos (or immigrants more broadly) should ask: "What is the profile of the community I am serving? Is it mostly immigrant, native-born, or a mixture?" Once the general

demographics about a certain political community or constituency are determined, I would recommend mobilization strategies tailored according citizenship and generational differences. For example, the best option for mobilizing Latino immigrants would likely be to focus resources in places of worship and schools because these sites are viewed as refuges within immigrant civil society which rarely exclude individuals on the basis of citizenship status. Religious institutions and schools are characterized by their relative openness to serving immigrant communities irrespective of citizenship status. The low barriers of entry into these spaces make them prime avenues for greater civic activity and social connections.

Moreover, by initiating contact with these social institutions, groups have the added benefit of striking a connection with an entire family unit. Many Latino families are considered 'mixed status' in which some members (often children) are U.S. citizens while others (often parents) are non-citizen. Thus, the political activation of Latino youth could rouse the political interest of parents, as U.S.-born children often act as information brokers in the political socialization process of their immigrant parents (Orellana et al. 2003; Terriquez and Kwon 2015). Meanwhile, the better options for mobilizing Latino citizens would likely be found by identifying local labor organizations, veterans groups, and neighborhood-based political parties.

In conclusion, the project focused on immigrant civic participation because it is often used as a marker for assessing their degree of political incorporation (Diaz 1996; Garcia and Arce 1988; Wong 1999). Analysis from the Latino National Survey in Chapter 3 showed that a minority of Latinos across all generations participate in at least

one social, civic, or cultural group. This indicates that all Latinos, not just immigrants, could stand to benefit from the work of social institutions that foster greater civic participation. Without greater access to more of America's social institutions, civic participation among immigrants may not reach its full potential. So long as the literature fails to appreciate the connection between institutional access and generational and citizenship status, answers to the political challenges facing Latinos and immigrant groups will remain incomplete.

EPILOGUE

I would like to end by drawing a connection between the insights from this project and two troubling trends for the future of Latino political incorporation and civic participation—draconian deportation policies and attacks on voting rights. First, throughout this work, it has been argued that the public education system and religious institutions occupy a special role in the lives of Latino immigrants because access to these sites is largely guaranteed regardless of citizenship. Immigrant rights activists and advocacy organizations have noted that these places function as a refuge for the undocumented. Immigration enforcement agencies have also recognized the privileged position of these sites within immigrant communities and have treated these sites differently. Indeed, for a time under the Obama administration, per an executive memoranda (Morton 2011), immigration enforcement agencies identified schools and churches (along with hospitals) as "sensitive locations" and that enforcement actions in these places should, as a matter of policy, generally be avoided (Ibid.)

However, expanded deportation powers under an executive order signed by President Trump in the first days of his administration restructured administrative priorities for deportation from a focus on the removal of immigrants with serious criminal records to a wider net, which now includes immigrants with minor offenses (Medina 2017). Now, these once protected sites are vulnerable to targeting by immigration enforcement authorities (Carey 2017; Castillo 2017). In the immediate aftermath of these changes, the immigrant community witnessed a “chilling effect” that led to increased absences from school in immigrant neighborhoods as well as a ‘shutting-in’ phenomenon whereby immigrants receded from the public sphere (Bever 2017).

Increased political marginalization of immigrant communities could also manifest itself in other ways. For one, research on the attitudinal and psychological dispositions of Latinos has found that Mexican immigrants exhibited higher levels of trust than native-born Mexican Americans. Michelson (2003) argued that as immigrants spent greater time in the U.S. they also experienced life-long racialization processes that led to the erosion of trust in government. Now, a counter-narrative could be emerging whereby the increased marginalization of immigrant communities as a consequence of immigration enforcement practices could lead to a sense of nihilism among immigrants. Evidence suggests that deportation raids at the outset of the Trump Administration caused a decrease in emergency distress calls to police departments (Bever 2017) and fewer immigrants accessing social programs out of fear that contact with government officials would put them or family members in danger of deportation (Lowery 2017). Thus, these

emerging signs of civic abstention and disaffection, along with decreased interactions with government, could deepen social problems afflicting these communities.

The second development that causes alarm for the future civic health of Latino and immigrant communities is the nationwide increase in restrictive voting laws. Prior research has found that some (though not all) of the discrepancy in voter turnout between the U.S. and other western democracies is attributable to electoral rules and procedures, especially onerous registration requirements (Powell 1986). Latinos, along with other ethnic and immigrant minorities, may be particularly hard hit by arcane electoral rules regarding registration. Some states have moved in the direction of imposing a greater litany of restrictions on voting, most notably the requirement for various forms of identification to be presented at the polls on Election Day. Proponents of stricter voting requirements frequently cite immigrants as likely violators of election law, and many of the states that have moved in the direction of restriction also happen to be states with large immigrant populations. The enactment of such tools for the purposes of voter suppression has been facilitated by the Supreme Court's decision in *Shelby County Alabama v. Holder* (2013), which struck down the coverage formula for pre-clearance of such electoral changes under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. On the same day the court handed down the *Shelby* decision, Texas Attorney General Gregg Abbott moved along with the state's plan for a Voter ID law. Meanwhile, studies have shown that Voter ID laws disproportionately harm racial and ethnic minorities (Hajnal et al. 2017). Indeed, the demographic groups most harmed by these laws (young, urban, poor,

immigrant, non-English speaking) are characteristics that describe many in the Latino community.

While immigrant neighborhoods are home to the sorts of cultural assets political science has identified as capable of boosting political participation and civic connectedness, it is also true that many immigrant communities contend with multiple forms of marginalization. Yet, an important narrative that emerges from this work is that Latinos, especially the immigrants among them, are responsible for the rejuvenation of the social institutions that for so long had sought to keep them at bay.

There is a certain preconception that pertains to some of the social institutions discussed herein. The assumption is that though churches, labor unions, the military, public schools, and political parties may have once been the engines of social and economic mobility and the springboards of political movements, they are now less effective. Such a characterization might have once been true, but the many examples discussed in this project show institutions adjusting (if gradually) to become more welcoming to immigrants and racial minorities, thus providing evidence to the contrary.

Appendix



Vertical bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. All dichotomous variables set to their modes and continuous variables set to their means.



Vertical bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. All dichotomous variables set to their modes and continuous variables set to their means.



Vertical bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. All dichotomous variables set to their modes and continuous variables set to their means.

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