No. 4737 October 1, 1947 REQUIRED ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES By BRUCE ROACH and EDD MILLER Bureau of Public School Service Division of Extension PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AUSTIN Publications of The University of Texas PUBLICATIONS COMMITTEE E. J. MATHEWS A. MOFFIT C. F. ARROWOOD E. S. REDFORD C. D. LEAKE W. P. WEBB A. C. WRIGHT Administrative Publications E. J. MATHEWS F. L. Cox R. C. ANDERSON J. A. FOCHT L. L. CLICK B. GONZALES The University publishes bulletins twice a month, so numbered that the first two digits of the number show the year of issue and the last two the position in the yearly series. (For example, No. 4701 is the first publication of the year 1947.) These bulletins comprise the official publica­tions of the University, publications on humanistic and scientific subjects, and bulletins issued from time to time by various divisions of the University. The following bureaus and divisions distribute publications issued by them; communications concerning publications in these fields should be addressed to The University of Texas, Austin, Texas, care of the bureau or division issuing the publication: Bureau of Business Research, Bureau of Economic Geology, Bureau of Engineering Research, Bu­reau of Industrial Chemistry, Bureau of Public School Service, and Division of Extension. Communications con­cerning all other publications of the University s~ould be addressed to University Publications, The University of Texas, Austin. Additional copies of this publication may be procured from the Bureau of Public School Service, The University of Texas, Austin 12, Texas at 50 cents per copy. ~ THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS PRESS N.:,.' 4737: October 1, 1947 REQUIRED ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES By BRUCE ROACH and EDD MILLER Bureau of Public School Service Division of Extension PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY TWICE A MONTH. ENTERED AS SECOND· CLASS MATTER ON MARCH 12, 1913, AT THE POST OFFICE AT AUSTIN, TEXAS, UNDER THE ACT OF AUGUST 24, 1912 The benefits of education and of useful knowledge, generally diffused through a community, are essential to the preservation of a free govem­ment. Sam Houston Cuitivated mind is the guardian genius of Democracy, and while guided and controlled by virtue, the noblest attribute of.. man. It is the only dictator that freemen acknowledge, and the only security which_ freemen desire. Mirabeau B. Lamar COPYRIGHT, 1947 BY THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Foreword -----------------------------------------·--------------------------------------------------5 State Meet Group Discussion Contest --------------------------------------------------7 Explanation -----------------------------------·----------------------------------------------8 Brief : I. Introduction ---···--------------------------------------------------------------------------10 II. Affirmative Brief ----·-·····-----------·-------------------------------------------------10 III. Negative Brief ----------·-----··--------------------------------------------15 General Reading Material: Labor Lexicon ·······---·------------·----------------------__ _________________ _____ 20 By A. H. Raskin Work Stoppages Caused by Disputes in 1946 ___________,__________ __ _____ 21 From Monthly Labor Review Strike Pay Toll Estimated ------------------------------------------------22 From Austin-American Strikes' Heavy Cost to Labor _______ __-----------------·-----------------23 From United States News What Strikes Are Costing Us -------------------------------______ ___ _ _ ______ 27 From United States News Industrial Relations in Texas --------------------------------------------------------31 By Keith Davis Industrial Warfare ------------------------------------------------------------_____ _ __ __ _ 31 -By Lester Velie Methods of Industrial Peace ---------------------------------------_____ ___ _ ____ _ 37 By Gordon S. Watkins and Paul A. Dodd Unions in Action -------------------------------------------···----···-···---------------------44 By Harold U. Faulkner and Mark Starr The Right to Strike and the Right to Make War ____ __ _____ ______ __ 45 By David Lawrence The Taft-Hartley Law in Action --------------------------------------------------49 From United States News The Gentle Art of Settling Strikes ____ _ _ ____ -------------------------------_ 51 By Irwin Ross Prevalence of A:cbitration Provisions ·---------------------------------------·· 53 From Bureau of Labor Statistics Coal Without Strikes ____ ---------------------------------------------------------------54 By Stephen Raushenbush Affirmative Reading Material : Compulsory Arbitration of All Labor Disputes ___________ ___ 57 By E. G. Shelton Compulsory Arbitration-the Only Answer ____ _ :___ _ ____ __ ___ _ 60 By David Lawrence Why Not Labor Courts? ----------------------------------------------_ _____ ______ 63 By Homer Ferguson Attorney Proposes Compulsory Arbitration __ _______ ____ _ _ ___ _____ 70 From Commonwealth • PAGE Public Policy in Labor Disputes -------------------------------------------------71 By Orme W. Phelps Protection of the Public in Labor Legislation ----------------------------75 By Alexander Wiley Labor and the Law --------------------------------------------------------------------------76 By John C. Knox Arbitration Law in Indiana ----------------------------------------------------------83 From Business Week Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes --------------------------------83 By H enry J. Allen There Is More Than One Group Concerned ------------------------------88 By S. A. Cohagan The Right to Strike ____________________ ------------------------------------------------91 From Christian Science Monitor Labor Legislation ---------------------------------------------------------------------------92 By Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. Observations on the Operations of the WLR____________________________ 93 By Dexter Merriam Keezer Extent of Collective Agreements in Seven European Coun­tries ________________ -----------------______ ______________ __ _ ----------------------------------93 From Monthly Labor Review Negative Reading Material: Compulsory Industrial Arbitration, Reverse Side ___________________ 98 By Samuel B. Pettengill Why Government Labor Courts Must Fail -------------------------------99 By R. C. Hoiles Ways to Industrial Peace --------------------------------------------------------------101 By Lewis B. Schwellenbach Do You Favor Compulsory Arbitration? -----~-----------------------------102 Fl'om United States News Compulsory Arbitration ----------------------------------------------------------------104 From American Federationist Management Looks at Compulsory Arbitration ------------------------106 From Factory Manag.?ment and Maintenance What Management and Labor Leaders Say About Arbitra­ tion ___ ______ _ _ _____________________ __:__________________________________________________________ 109 From Factory Management and Maintenance Can Courts Rule Labor? ------------------------------------------------------------110 By Louis Waldman Approach to Labor Legislation ----------------------------------------------------117 From Washington Post A Balance of Power ---------------------------------------------------------------------117 By Stuart S. Ball The Railway Labor Act"'and Labor Disputes ----------------------------126 By Herbert R. Northrup The Kansas Industrial Court --------------------------------------------------------127 By Domenico GagliardoIndustrial Relations and the Trade Association__________________________ 133 By Clarence G. Stoll . Sixty-two Years of Peace --------------------------------------------------------------133 By Lee W. Minton Bibliography ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------136 FOREWORD THE INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE begins its thirty-eighth year of high­school debates with an expansion of the contest which provides a s~ate championship for Conference B schools. It is hoped that many of the smaller schools which lost interest in debate on account of being forced into competition with Conference A and Conference AA schools will enter and give their pupils the benefits of investigating and discussing a great national problem under the stimulus which fair and equal competition provides. The preparation for debate should begin early in the fall, and should continue as a classroom project in social science throughout the school year. This is the only way to realize one hundred per cent on the time and effort which is necessary in order to put forward creditable representation. Ample aids have been provided. The present bulletin may be used as the foundation of the debate-course, in the sense that any text­book is. In addition to it, the League has on hand for distribution a supply of the NUEA bulletin devoted to the topic, and has also assembled a package of excellent background material. A price-list of these and other publications appears in Appendix IV of the Con­stitution and Rules, copy of which is mailed to any member-school on request. There is probably no more important and debatable question be­fore the American public today than the one which has been chosen as the current query for high-schoot debaters. At bottom it is a struggle over the division of the national income, one group claim­ing that organized labor, or at least certain sections of organized labor, is contending for more than its just share, and another group apparently just as convinced that such is not the case. Not only the economy of this country, but that of the entire world, especially in industrialized regions, has been seriously disrupted and in many cases paralyzed as this dispute has raged between employers and their employees. Is there not some way of settling these disputes without infring­ing on human rights and without permitting one party to the dispute to gain an insuperable advantage over the other? Is there not a way of maintaining a wholesome balance of power in the contro­versy which will operate to improve the efficiency of the national economy as a whole? The query is stated in such a way that pro­posed solutions may be explored and the arguments for and against them developed and their respective merits appraised in open dis­cussion, which is the democratic way of approaching a solution of pressing problems affecting the public welfare. While the information gathered in the preparation for the debate is valuable, since it broadens the outlook and enriches the pupil's store of knowledge upon an important question, it is by no means the most important outcome of participation in this activity. Far more valuable, in our opinion, are the lessons learned in the demo­cratic procedures of discussion and the skills which are acquired in presenting information and arguments effectively before an audience. This is necessary training for living in a democracy and especially for leadership in a democratic society. The creation of a special division in debate for Conference B schools leading to a Conference B state championship is an experiment. There is no way of knowing how many of the smaller schools will avail themselves of this opportunity without putting the. matter to a trial. A close check will be kept during the current year upon the number of schools which participate in this division, with a view to determining whether or not the creation of this division is justified and should be continued. ·~ Director, University Interscholastic League. GROUP DISCUSSION CONTEST IN STATE MEET Group Discussion has proved to be one of the best methods of get­ting the debate squad organized at the beginning of the season. The technique allows for objective study on all aspects of the subject, and encourages all members of a squad to take part in the study. All of the members of the debate teams entered in the State Meet, May 7, 8, 1948, will be eligible to take part in a discussion contest with the exception of the four debaters who make up the State Final Debate. The contest shall consist of the panel type discussion and shall consist of six people to a panel. The places on the panel shall be chosen by lot, and each panel shall elect a chairman from among its members. . The topic for discussion shall be the current debate topic: Should the Federal Government Require Arbitration of Labor ·Disputes in all Basic American Industries? The members shall converse without set speeches, although the members will draw'1 for the affirmative or negative aspect of the ques­tion. The duties of the chairman shall include guiding the discus­sion and adapting to the audience the points brought out through the discussion. At the end of,the discussion period, questions shall be directed to the panel through the chairman from the floor for a specified time. At the end of the session, the judges shall choose the two out­standing members of the group. Members shall enter the Group Discussion Contest on an indi­vidual basis, not a team basis. It is hoped that, through this con­test, the State Meet debaters will benefit from the further practice in using a different technique for presenting ideas. EXPLANATION Strikes, work stoppages, and other labor difficulties in basic Amer­ ican industries, such as coal, steel, transportation, communication, and public utilities, have caused the nation great distress. Because these industrial difficulties have hit the nation where it lives, there is much public sentiment aroused for the government to provide a remedy which will alleviate the hardships caused by recurring in­ dustrial battles. One method proposed for reaching a rational and peaceful settle­ ment in these labor disputes is that of required arbitration. Wide­ spread attention has been given this method in the press and on the radio. Required arbitration has been discussed in several differ­ ent ways: labor courts, compulsory arbitration, government fact­ finding, and award boards, and -so on. The use of the basic arbitration system for settling problems has long found favor in all walks of life. The machinery of arbi­ tration has solved difficulties not only of a national but also of an international character. Especially in our nation, the system known as voluntary arbitration has been used to advantage by both la_bor and management. ­ But when arbitration is shifted from a voluntary to a required basis, representatives of both labor and management have opposed it. They are fearful of further governmental intervention in their affairs. They say that such interference endangers their freedom and rights. These leaders also state that the situation at present would be satisfactory if labor relations were not already weighted down with the heavy impedimenta of governmenal bureaucracy. On the other hand, the suffering public is caught between the bat­tle camps of labor and management; and the harassed public offi­cials, plagued for an answer to the strike situation, are inclined to see in required arbitration a remedy that is necessary, desirable, and workable. The issues involved in this question seem to' be: 1. Has the present system of handling disputes in basic Amer­ican industries failed, and should there be a change? 2. Will the proposed system of required arbitration solve the present difficulties? 3. Even if there is a need for a change, and required arbitra­tion meets that need, is such system desirable, practical, and work­able? Has-it succeeded before? 4. How does required arbitration compare with other proposed plans? Is such a system better than other plans? The Affirmative Team must have the answers to all these issues if they are to present a strong case. The Negative Team, of course, will attack the system of required arbitration, whether or not they admit there is a need for a change, or whether or not they -advance a plan of their own. Recent labor legislation, such as the Taft-Hartley Bill, is causing a shift in industrial relations. Throughout the debate season, there will no doubt be new conditions to consider. The debater must continue to read widely and keep abreast of recent trends. By so doing, he can utilize fresh material in developing his case, and make the debate topic as it should be: a truly live issue of the day. The material in this bulletin is intended merely as the guide to more intensive study of the subject. The editors have tried to present some of the essential points in the required arbitration question; it is left up to the debater to construct his own case, and this should be done without adhering too closely to this bulletin or to briefs found elsewhere. The editors express thanks to· the various publishers who have allowed quotations to be reprinted here. In addition, appreciation is expressed to the many persons who aided in the preparati~n of this bulletin, particularly Mrs. Oletta Williamson, Mrs. Mae Ash­worth, and Martin Todaro. BRUCE ROACH, EDD MILLER. BRIEF Resolved: That the Federal Government Should Require Arbitra­tion of Labor Disputes in All Basic American Industries. INTRODUCTION I. The question of required arbitration of labor disputes in basic American industries is a very important one. A. Labor disputes have been much before the public during the last quarter century. B. Industrial peace and hl!rmony are vital to the proper func­tioning of our economy. C. Labor disputes and strife cause much hardship, and harm the well-being of the nation. II. Definitions: A. The Federal Government: The Government of the United States. B. Should Require: By Federal law, arbitration should be made the compulsory method of handling labor disputes. C. Arbitration: A process of settling labor disputes where the dispute is submitted to an impartial board, whose decision on the dispute is binding. D. Labor Disputes: Conflicts or_ disagreements between man­agement and labor, or between different factions of labor. E. Basic American industries: Industries on which all the rest of industry and the public in general are dependent, such as coal, steel, public utilities, communication, and trans­portation. III. Admitted Matter. A. Both sides will admit that industrial peace is an essential to our economy, as long as it is a peace fair to both labor and management. B. Both sides will admit that full production and full employ­ment are essential to oµr standard of living. IV. Irrelevant Matter : A. The constitutionality of. the proposal is irrelevant. B. Whether or not the proposal c.ould be adopted (i.e., whether Congress would pass such an act) is irrelevant. AFFIRMATIVE BRIEF I. Conditions arising from present labor disputes in basic indus­tries have made a change .necessary. A. Strikes, lockouts, and work stoppages are causing tremen­dous damages to the nation. 1. Increasing amounts of time are being lost due to in­dustrial strife. a. 4,985 work stoppages occurred in 1946 arising out of labor-management controversies. b. 116 million man-days were lost in 1946 (triple the 38 million man-days lost in 1945). 2. Anti-democratic principles are being fostered. a. Violence, bloodshed, and death are the results in many strikes. b. Invasion of property rights, class hatred, and creation of mob spirit often come out of this economic warfare. 3. Waste occurs in many instances. a. Food is destroyed or allowed to rot. b. Machinery and industrial plants are destroyed or damaged. c. Half-finished products are scrapped. 4. The thousands of workers involved are seriously affected. a. The economic loss to the worker is more than he can make .back by new contracts after a strike. ( 1) The General Motors strike cost the workers 113 million dollars (approximately $650 per worker). (2) The worker must spend his savings or borrow· money to live on during the work stoppage. b. The worker's morale is affected. (1) The worker is often forced into other jobs. for which he is not suited. (2) Striking workers often lose the skill of their trade through idleness. (3) Social conditions become worse during work stop­pages, seriously affecting the health and wel­fare of the worker. 5. Strikes and lockouts cause industry to suffer. a. Industry bears a tremendous economic -loss. ( 1) General Motors lost production on 400,000 trucks and automobiles having a retail value of 500 million dollars. (2) Industries involved in strikes lost a substantial part of their markets. (3) Many industries are forced to close because of the economic loss. ( 4) Stockholders lose on their investments because of strikes. (a) Repairs to idle plants are expensive. (b) Lack of production cuts down the margin of profit. 6. Work stoppages cause the general public to suffer. a. Strikes involving only small numbers Of workers can endanger the welfare of the entire nation. (1) The telephone strike interfered with the free flow of business. (2) The railroad strike caused acute shortages all over the nation. (3) The coal strike held up fuel when it was most needed. ( 4) Lack of production cuts corporation taxes, thus affecting Government revenue. ( 5) Loss of pay from the nearly 5,000 work stop­pages in 1946 reduced the buying power of mil­lions of workers all over the nation. B. Present laws do not place the government in an impartial position concerning labor-management relationships. 1. The employer is subjected to unfair practices. a. The employer is helpless while minority unions upset production and fight among themselves for the ad­vantage of being the collective bargaining agent. b. The employer's genuine interest in the welfare of his workers is hampered. (I) Unions outlaw-recreational and welfare facilities furnished by industry on the ground that these facilities are being used as bribes to influence the workers against the unions. (2) The union-labor relationship on an impersonal basis discourages cooperative human relation­ships between the employer and his employees. c. The employer's right to hire and fire is restricted. ( 1) The employer is often forced to rehire inefficient or negligent discharged workers, since the union claims they were discharged because of union membership or activities. (2) He must foster union membership. (a) Non-union workers cannot work in a union shop. (b) Workers are often forced to join the union against their will. d. The employer's right of free speech is restricted. (1) He cannot try to persuade workers to stay on the job. (2) In a dispute he cannot present his side of the the case directly to the workers. (a) He is forced to work through the union. (b) He is helpless in government-held union elections in his plant. 2. The inequality of present labor laws does not produce fair and just administration. a. Present laws designed to prevent or reduce strikes have become effective instruments for producing them. b. Many unfair practices are common in union dealings. ( 1) Contracts can be broken by the union without sufficient reason. (2) Bare majority votes in an industry can decide the collective bargaining unit for the whole group of workers. (a) Voting lists can be juggled so that a favored union can win. (b) Minority groups have no voice in labor­management dealings. ( c) Sit-down strikes and other illegalities are not condemned by the government. II. Required arbitration of labor disputes in basic industries is the most desirable and workable plan for future industrial rela­tions. A.· Required arbitration is the only method which is effective for eliminating strikes and lockouts during the entire process of settlement. 1. Conciliation does not prevent strikes and lockouts before, during or after the period labor-management talks. 2. Mediation does not eliminate work stoppage. a. Practically all major strikes of recent months have taken place while mediation was in progress, b. Mediation is often not employed until after the strike or lockout has taken place. c. The prolonged period of mediation often causes a strike to drag on and on. 3. Voluntary arbitration cannot solve industrial disputes. a. Both parties must agree to use this method. b. There is nothing voluntary arbitration can do to pre­vent a strike at the beginning of a dispute. c. Voluntary arbitration is often used after mediation has failed and a strike or lockout is in progress. 4. Compulsory fact-finding committees prevent strikes only at the beginning of a dispute and during the investiga­tion. A strike or lockout can still occur after the facts are presented. 5. Required· arbitration is the only means in which indus­trial disputes can be handled without a work stoppage at the beginning of the procedure, during the settle­ment, and after the award has been made. a. Strike practices by union leaders _and unwarranted actions by union are stopped. (1) The right of the individual to quit work is not affected. (2) Dictatorial powers are taken away from unscrup­ulous leaders. b. The award of the arbitration board or court is final. c. Required arbitration eliminates the present unsatis­factory conditions in labor disputes. (1) It eliminates loss of wages, loss of production, loss of man-hours, and general economic loss to the nation. (2) It restores the proper balance of power under the law between labor and management. B. Arbitration provides for intervention in disputes by fair and unprejudiced men who have the welfare of labor, man­agement, and the nation in mind. 1. The U.S. Conciliation Service has shown that the govern­ment has available experts in industrial relations. 2. The NLRB does good work in spite of the restrictions of present labor laws. , 3. Arbitration follows the democratic principle of settling differences between an impartial judge or judges just as other differences are ,settled in our nation. 4. Arbitrators will see that the principle of collective bar­gaining are honestly and fairly administered. a. They will see that the rights of employer, employees, union, non-union, and the public are protected. b. They will give impartial decisions not based on present restrictive laws. C. Required arbitration will work. 1. It has succeeded in various situations in this country. a. It succeeded in Kansas until the Supreme Court out­lawed the Industrial Court on a minor charge. b. The War Industries Board kept industrial peace dur­ing World War I. , c. The Railway Labor Disputes Act worked until present labor legislation weakened the act. 2. It has succeeded in foreign countries. a. Canada, Australia, England, New Zealand have found such procedure successful. Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes ..1 b. Norway and Denmark have successful arbitration laws. •III. Therefore, since labor disputes are causing serious damage to the democratic way of life of the nation and since the present laws are not adequate to cope with this situation, the most desirable and workable solution to the present labor difficulti~s is required arbitration of labor disputes in basic American industries. NEGATIVE BRIEF ,I. There is no need for compulsory arbitration of labor disputes in basic American industries. A. Strikes and work stoppages are not a serious problem. 1. The number of man-days lost in strikes is insignificant in comparison with the number of man-days worked in 1946. 2. A very small percentage of America's laboring forces are engaged in strikes in any one year. 3. The management-controlled press has exaggerated the seriousness of strikes. a. Strikes are seldom called without strong provocation. (1) Labor cannot afford to strike without sufficient reason. (2) Frequently only the management side of a labor dispute is presented to the 'public. 4. Strikes will probably decrease in number in the next few years. .a. Most basic differences between labor and manage­ ment have already been ironed out in recent strikes. (1) Grievances accumulated during the war have, for the most part, been solved. (2) Problems arising out of reconversion have, for the most part, been solved. b. Existing provisions for solving labor disputes have reduced, and will reduce further, the number of strikes. ( 1) Conciliation and mediation services will solve many disputes before strikes are called. (2) The Taft-Hartley Act makes strikes more diffi­cult to call. 5. Strikes and work stoppages these days are usually peace­ful and lack violence and bloodshed. 6. Strikes remain-and always will-as labor's only really effective weapon against the abuses of management. a. Depriving labor of its basic right to strike will seri­ously affect the morale of the workingman. B. Present-day facilities for solving labor disputes are ade­quate. 1. Many labor disputes are solved through the regular chan­nels of collective bargaining and negotiations between labor and management. a. The public is inadequately informed on the number of potential work stoppages solved before the strike stage is reached. b. Collective bargaining has nothing inherently wrong with it. ( 1) It has worked successfully for many years. (2) Minor flaws in collective bargaining procedures can be solved without the extreme of compul­sory arbitration. ( 3) Both m~nagement and labor prefer present col­lective bargaining procedures to any form of compulsory arbitration. 2. The U.S. Conciliation Service provides ·assistance in set­tling labor disputes. a. The Conciliation Service handles thousands of cases a year. b. The record of success of the U.S. Conciliation Serv­ice is very impressive. c. The -Conciliation Service can be used even more widely than it is today. 3. Mediation and voluntary arbitration have proved very successful. a. Many utilities have gone for twenty or thirty years without strikes because of provisions for voluntary arbitration. b. Mediation has been used on voluntary basis quite successfully in many basic industries. c. Provisions for voluntary arbitration are written into many labor-management contracts. C. Recent labor laws make compulsory arbitration unnecessary. I. The Taft-Hartley Bill has many provisions cutting down on the need for compulsory arbitration. · a. Strikes of many kinds are outlawed. b. Many possible causes for work stoppages are elim­inated. 2. State laws dealing with labor problems have eliminated causes for many work stoppages. II. Compulsory arbitration of labor disputes is not a desirable or workable plan for future industrial relations. A. Compulsory arbitration would attempt to deprive the worker of his basic right to strike. 1. The strike is labor's only effective weapon against the abuses of capital. 2. The right to strike is a fundamental right of labor. a. The law and the courts have always recognized labor's right to strike. b. In a democracy, the right to strike is as fundamental as freedom of speech. B. Compulsory Arbitration would be undemocratic. 1. Neither labor nor management would have any voice in solving their disputes. a. Actually\ the third party, the government, would be the deciding factor in solving disputes. b. Free and open discussions and negotiations between capital and labor would be impossible. 2. Compulsory arbitration would give . the government too much power. a. Government regulation of both labor and management would be a logical next step after arbitration. b. Government arbitrators who are biased in attitude could make decisions harmful to either labor or capital. 3. Compulsion is not in keeping with American democratic procedure. C. Compulsory arbitration would not be a workable plan. 1. It would be hard for arbitration boards to secure coop­eration from either capital or labor. a. Labor is overwhelmingly opposed to compulsory arbi­tration. b. Leaders of management and industry are also op­posed to compulsory arbitration. 2. Compulsory arbitration has failed when it has been tried. a. It failed to stop strikes and work stoppage in Aus­tralia and New Zealand. b. Strikes actually increased in Kansas when a system of compulsory arbitration was tried. c. There are no instances of the unqualified success of compulsory arbitration. 3. Compulsory arbitration would be costly and ineffective. a. Such a plan would mean a tremendous increase in the number of government employees. b. New boards and offices supported by tax money would have to be set up. · c. Compulsory .arbitration would be time-consuming and therefore ineffective in solving labor disputes quickly. d. A high degree of skill on the part of the abitrators would be necessary and few men today possess this essential skill. e. Existing prejudices and biases on the part of arbi­trators would make arbitration decisions unfair. ( 1) Few arbitrators would be completely objective and unprejudiced. (2) Experience has shown that prejudices influence the decisions of arbitrators. 4. Compulsory arbitration would lead to very undesirable conditions. a. Hard feelings between capital and labor would not be eliminated. (1) Decisions in labor disputes would be more un­fair than when labor and capital work out agree­ment by unified consent. b. Strikes and work stoppages would not necessarily be reduced. c. Compulsory arbitration would probably lead to more drastic controls over both labor and management. d. Industrial unrest would probably increase. (1) Both labor and management would be dissatis­fied with compulsory arbitration. III. Other methods of dealing with labor disputes would be more satisfactory than compulsory arbitration. A. Present-day collective bargaining is better than compulsory arbitration. 1. Collective bargaining is fair to both capital and labor. 2. Both sides have equal voice in working out problems. 3. Strikes are still permitted as a last resort. B. Conciliation is better than compulsory arbitration. 1. The U.S. Conciliation Service has done ·a remarkable job in securing industrial peace. 2. Conciliation is a voluntary method and hence very dem­ocratic. C. Voluntary arbitration is better than compulsory arbitration. 1. It is more democratic. 2. Decisions by a board appointed for a specific case are apt to be more fair than decisions by a permanent gov­ernment board. D. Even State arbitration would be superior to arbitration by the Federal Government. 1. State arbitrators would be more familiar with the de­tails of a given case. 2. State arbitration would not lead to too much govern­ment control. IV. Therefore, since there is no need for a change from our present system, and since arbitration of labor is not desirable and not workable, and is too drastic a step for solving the few minor difficulties present in today's labor situation, there is no need for the Federal Government to require arbiration of labor dis­putes in all basic American industries. GENERAL READING MATERIAL LABOR LEXICON By A.H. RASKIN (Reprinted from The New Yorlc Times Magazine, April 20, 1947, pp. 14-15.) Congress has been spending much time debating labor issues. In the process, members of both houses are bandying about terms that are not always clear to the public and perhaps not even clear to the Congressmen. Here are a few such terms and their meanings: Arbitration.-The process whereby a union and an employer vol­untarily agree to let an umpire decide their quarrel. Both sides present their arguments to the arbitrator, and his decision is bind­ing. Closed Shop.-A shop in which all employees, old and new, must belong to the union. This applies to workers being hired, as well as those already on the pay roll. Closed Union.-A union that accepts no new members or that establishes prohibitively high entrance standards. Such unions are found primarily in industries having the closed shop. Compulsory Arbitration.-A Government-imposed requirement that all disputes that cannot be settled through direct negotiation be resolved through arbitration. Conciliation.-lntroduction of a third party, usually a Govern­ment representative, into direct negotiations between management and labor. The conciliator tries to help the parties to reach an agreement but has no power to compel a settlement or to set forth terms binding on either side. Fact-Finding.-An attempt by an outside board of citizens or Government representatives to determine the basic facts underlying a labor-management controversy. Their findings, usually accompanied by recommendations for settlement, are published for the guidance of the public and the parties. Acceptance of the recommendations is not mandatory unless both sides have signified in advance their willingness to be bound by the panel's report. Impartial Chairman.-An arbitrator selected by labor and man­agement, usually on a permanent basis, to assist in administering a contract. His role as arbitrator is almost always limited to dis­putes arising out of the contract. .When the contract expires, he has no authority to decide what should go into a new agreement. Industry-Wide Bargaini.ng.-The carryi'ng on of union-employer negotiations simultaneously for all companies and all workers in an industry. In some cases, such as coal and men's clothing, all employers are directly represented in the negotiations. In others, like steel, separate negotiations are held with each company, but all are expected to conform to a single master pattern, usually set in negotiations with the largest unit in the industry. Jurisdictional Strike.-A strike growing out of a row between two or more unions, each of which claims the right to do a partic­ular type of work. Maintenance of Membership.-A contract provision requiring that workers who belong to the union on a certain date must stay in good standing to hold their jobs. Employees who do not belong to the union or who withdraw from membership before the speci­fied date are not required to join. New employees are similarly free to join or stay out of the union. Mediation.-This is essentially the same as conciliation. The mediator may nag, bluster, or cajole in the effort to produce an accord, but he cannot force acceptance of his own ideas on how the dispute should be settled. Open Shop.-A shop in which no worker is obliged to belong to the union as a condition of employment. Secondary Boycott.-Refusal of workers in other plants to handle or work o·n products made by an employer who has a labor dispute in his plant or who is involved in jurisdictional difficulties. Sympathy Strike.-A walk-out by workers in other crafts or in­dustries to help a striking union win its demands. Union Shop.-A shop in which non-union workers may be hired with the proviso that they must· join the union within a stated period. All regular employees must belong to the union. Union Security.-Any contract provision establishing protection for the union against Joss of members. This would include mainte­nance of membership, union shop, and closed shop. WORK STOPPAGES CAUSED BY LABOR-MANAGE­ MENT DISPUTES IN 1946 (Reprinted from Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 64, No. 5, May, 1947, pp. 780-782). The 4,985 work stoppages arising out of labor-management con­troveries in 1946 exceeded the previous year's total of 4,750; the number was also slightly greater than the former peak in 1944, when 4,956. stoppages were recorded by the Bureau of Labor Statis­tics. Approximately 4.6 million workers were directly involved in the stoppages which began in 1946-a larger number than in any previous year on record. Idleness at the plants or establishments directly affected by stoppages aggregated 116 million man-days, or triple the time lost in 1945 (38 million man-days). The average duration of a strike in 1946 was approximately 24 calendar days, or about four times as long as during the war period. Wages were a major issue in most controversies. Protection of workers' "take-home" pay was emphasized in many of the earlier reconversion wage disputes, but later in the year, after' the easing and subsequent abandonment of price controls, demands for pay in­creases to match rising living costs became more frequent. Work Stoppages Thirty-one large work stoppages, involving 10,000 or more work­ers each, began in 1946. They affected 2,925,000 workers, or about two-thirds of the total involved during the year. Including the 6 stoppages of 10,000 or more workers which began in late 1945 and continued until the early months of 1946, idleness resulting from these large stoppages accounted for nearly 82 million of the 116 million man-days of idleness reported for all work stoppages dur­ing the year. The time lost from stoppages in 1946 amounted to 1.4 per cent of the estimated working time of that portion of the country's labor force which might have become engaged in labor conflicts. Total production in 1946, as measured by the Federal Reserve Board's index, climbed to successive record peacetime levels during the year. ~mployment in nonagricultural establishments likewise averaged higher than in prewar years and was about a third larger than in 1939. Historically, 1946 is most comparable to 1919, the first full year following World War I, when rising prices and union recognition or security were among the major problems confronting A,merican industry and wage earners. The 3,630 strikes in 1919 involved well over 4.1 million workers. Information on time lost is not avail­able for years prior to 1927, but incomplete records indicate that there was less idlessness in 1919 than in 1946. The number of workers directly involved in work stoppages, however, represented a larger proportion of that part of the labor force which might have been affected by strikes in 1919 than was the case in 1946­about 21 per cent as again~t 141h per cent. STRIKE PAY TOLL ESTIMATED AT $998,640,000 (Reprinted from Austin American, December 19, 1946.) The American Foundation estimated in a report Wednesday that American workers lost $998,640,000 in wages through strikes from September, 1945, to September, 1946. The Foundation reached the figure on the basis of an eight-hour day at $1 an hour. It said that 124,830,000 man-days were lost by 5,292,000 strikers. The cost of lost production, it added, was incalculable. Five major post-war walkouts were analyzed by the Foundat'.on, which said, however, that these five accounted for only one-third · of the man-days idle because of strikes. Numerous other work stop­pages were included in the total reported wage loss of $998,640,000, it said. 145 Million from Miners Lost production cost the mining industry $2,000,000,000 during the work stoppage last spring, the Foundatio'n said, while it esti­ mated that the soft coal miners themselves lost $145,000,000 in wages. The other four major strikes analyzed by the Foundation included that of the United Automobile Workers, from November 21, 1945, to March 14, 1946, which it said cost $262,070,470 in wages and 109,810,314 in man-hours. Electric Loss Heavy / The United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers strike from January 15 to May 9, the Foundation said, cost Westinghouse alone $133,000,000 in sales. It added that 200,000 workers idled at West­ inghouse, General Electric and General Motors lost, at an average $1 hourly wage, approximately $87,200,000. The other two analyzed were the United Steel Workers' strike, January 21 to February 15, estimated to have cost $155,250,000 in wages and 12,000,000 tons of finished steel, and the United Farm Equipment, and Metal Workers strike, January 21 to April 15, esti­ mated to have cost $14,760,000 in wages. STRIKES' HEAVY COST TO LABOR: POST-WAR DROP IN REAL EARNINGS (Reprinted from United States News, December 20, 1946.) A tally of gain and loss for workers from 1945 and 1946 strikes is turning up a heavy red figure. Most workers, strikers and non-strik­ ers alike, are ending this year less well off than they were at the end of the war. The balance sheet shows this: Direct loss in wages to strikers for the postwar period from Sep­ tember, 1945, through November, 1946, was about $1,206,000,000. That was the wage cost of the 1,025,000,000 man-hours of work lost by strikers alone. It is based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics figures. It does not include losses to non-strikers from shutdowns or slowdowns caused by strikes, an amount that probably approaches the loss to strikers themselves. Coal miners, for example, just before Christmas lost more than $150 apiece without compensating gain of any kind. That is a straight out-of-pocket loss. Indirect Loss Indirect loss to strikers and non-strikers appear, on the record, to be even larger. Wage increases and strikes admittedly were a major cause of the breakdown of price control. Thus, prices now average about 16 per cent higher than when the strike wave started. Result is that workers who gained a ·few dollars after losing pay in strikes find that those dollars do not go so far. At the same time, workers, along with all other consu_mers, lost 2,000,000 cars that they might have had if there had been no strikes. They lost lumber for 100,000 homes. Lost, too, was more than 12,000,000 tons of steel, with all of the goods into which this steel might have been fabricated. Altogether, the value of goods lost through strikes would run into the billions of dollars. Actual Gains Gains from ·strikes came in wage increases of 10 to 20 cents an hour. But in most instances employers had offered increases to be had without strikes, increases that in many cases were only 3 to 5 cents less than the gain forced by long strikes. Hence, many of the additional increases won by strikes were much smaller than the settlements indicated. And these dollar gains then were turned into real losses by increases in consumer prices. Or, to put it another way: Hourly earnings of the average factory worker in September, 1946, were up considerably from those of July, 1945, last full month of 'Yar production. For workers in durable-goods industries, this gain in dollar earnings averaged nearly 7 per cent, for nondurable-goods worker, 16 per cent. Consumer prices, in the same 14 months, jumped an average of nearly 13 per cent, at least partly as a result of strikes and wage increases. They have risen even faster since this 14-month period ended in September. Real earnings, the worker's purchasing-power dollars, thus have shrunk in these 14 months. The average factory worker's real in­come was less in September, 1946, than in July, 1945. For durable­goods workers, real hourly earnings averaged 6 per cent less. Non­durable-goods workers, in the same 14 months, made a real gain of nearly 3 per cent. But, with the end of price control, even these latter gains were wiped out by October and November price in­creases. Industry by industry, the record offers pretty much the same story. Losses by Industries Coal miners lost a total of about $810 each in three strikes in the period. And they lost to United States and other countries some 148,000,000 tons of coal. Only one of these strikes won a wage in­crease. This 18.5-cent raise was about what the operators had offered, although the miners did get a health and welfare fund, too. Result of this pay raise was that in September the average miner's hourly earnings were 18 per cent higher than in July, 1945. His real earnings, however, were up less than 5 per cent, and most or all of this gain was eaten up by price increases in October and No­vember. These price rises, in turn, had been forced in part by gen­eral wage increases. Steelworkers lost $195 each in wages during their month-long strike. That strike netted them .3.5 cents an hour, in addition to the industry offer of 15 cents. At that 3.5 cents, the steelworkers would require two and a half years to make up their strike losses. At the same time, their walkout, together with the coal strikes, cost the country well over 12,000,000 tons of steel. Net resu1t, in terms of purchasing power, was an actual drop in the steelworker's hourly earnings in this 14-month period. And further losses came in October and November. That tells the stor.y of the outcome of major strikes in the basic industries. It is a story of heavy sacrifices by wage earners for no real economic gain. As for workers in consumer-goods industries: Auto workers, at General Motors plants, lost $85(}.apiece in their four-month strike. And they lost another $90 each in the 13.5-cent increase they could have had during that four months. With the additi«?nal 5-cent raise they won by striking, they would require nine years to regain their lost pay. Moreover, this and other strikes reduced auto output 2,000,000 units. Pay Raises Evaluated This pay raise, and other increases for which it set the industry pattern, meant that hourly earnings of the auto-industry worker rose 9 per cent in the 14 months. His dollar earnings in relation to living costs, on the other hand, dropped nearly 4 per cent. Electrical workers, whose strikes lasted as long as four months, lost well over $50,000,000 in wages. Too, they lost to the country a heavy volume of electrical equipment, radios and phonographs, and communications equipment. For these costs, the electrical work­ers won 5 to 6 cents an hour over and above the offers by employers. These and other increases meant a 12 per cent raise in dollar earnings for the electrical-machinery worker over 'the 14-month period. What they meant in real hourly earnings was an actual drop. Farm-machinery workers staged some of the longest strikes in the period. Their Allis-Chalmers strike was settled at three plants, after several months, at the company's prestrike offer of 13.5 cents. The strike still continues eight months later at the fourth plant. The year-long strike at the J. I. Case plant at Rockford, Ill., won an 18-cent raise. Similarly, International Harvester workers settled a four-month strike for 1 cent more than the company's prestrike offer of 17 cents. These and other strikes in the non-electrical-machinery industry helped raise hourly earnings in this industry by a tenth in this 14-month period. Still, real hourly earnings of workers in this group, in the same period, fell nearly 3 per cent. Nonferrous-metal workers obtained wage increases-with or with­out strikes-that raised their dollar earnings 12 per cent in the 14 months. Still, the average worker in the nonferrous-metals in­dustry ended the period with smaller real earnings than he had before. Only in nondurable goods have any substantial gains in worker-buy­ing power been achieved. Biggest increases were made by textile-mill workers and clothing workers, whose real hourly earnings.rose almost a tenth by September. But most of these increases were granted without strikes. And, even so, these real gains were largely, per­haps entirely, wiped out by October .and November price jumps. Labor's Income This is the picture for consumer-goods industries. It differs lit­tle from the experience in the basic industries. To put all this still another way, using U.S. Department of Commerce data: Labor's share of the national income has dropped sharply since the war ended. In the second quarter of 1945, wage and salary earners got 69.3 per cent of the national income. During 1946, they have received 65.1 per cent of the total. That still leaves labor with a share slightly larger than the 1935-1939 average of 63 per cent. But the most costly strikes in history have been unable to prevent the shrinkage of labor's share back to about its prewar size. In summary, the attempt by labor to carve out a larger share of the nation's income for itself by means of strikes added up this way: Cost of strikes in this postwar period comes to $1,206,000,000 in direct wages lost and other billions of dollars' worth of goods that workers and others could have enjoyed. Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes Dollar earnings of the average factory worker, on an hourly basis, rose a little more than 9 per cent in the first 14 postwar months. Real hourly earnings for the average factory worker fell nearly 4 per cent in the same period. This real loss came about through a 13 per cent consumer-price increase that resulted, at least partly, from the wage increases themselves. Thus, what labor really demonstrated in this strike wave was• the validity of the old axiom that wage earners seldom can make real gains in a period of price inflation. As usually happens in such a period, strikes were unable to keep wages rising as rapidly as prices. WHAT STRIKES ARE COSTING U.S.: LOSSES OF OUTPUT AND WAGES (Reprinted from United States News, March 1, 1946, pp. 38-40.) The United States now can add up the bill for postwar strikes thus far and get. some measure of the cost to strikers and workers, to industry and to the consuming public generally. The accounting for the first six .months of peace shows : production lost 63,000,000 man-days of labor, workers in struck industries lost $560,000,000, in direct wages; the cost to others in unemployment and higher prices ultimately will reach many times that figure. The strike wave had about a million men idle last week, despite some settlements, and big strikes are still to come. In the offing are potential coal walkouts, strikes in metal mining, in West Coast shipping, in the chemical industry, and others. Production of goods already is three or more months behind schedule. That applies to automobiles, to home construction, to build­ing supplies and fixtures, to clothing and many other urgently needed items. Industrial output has dropped. 14 per cent for Feb­ruary, when figured against the 1935-1939 average. Profits are to take a sharp drop for the first quarter of 1946. That drop will be felt all the way from the producer to the neighborhood retailer. The Government is to lose an uncalculated amount of tax income be­cause of stalled production. And, in the ·end, prices are to go up, boosting the living costs for everyone. Coat to Worker The wages lost through 3,675,000 man-days of idleness due to strikes last September amounted to $30,000,000. By February the loss in man-days of work had gone up to 18,000,000 and the loss in wages to $145,000,000. The story of actual loss to the individual worker varies with the industry in which he is employed. Auto Workers The General Motors strike proves to be the most costly to the individual worker and his family. Before the strike the company offered the union an increase of 10 per cent, or about 13.5 cents per hour. The union agreed to accept 19.5 cents an hour increase. Thus the strike actually involved six cents an hour, on the average. The first 13 weeks of the strike cost each worker about $650. At six cents an hour more pay, the amount sought by the strike, it will take him five years and three months to make up the money already lost in wages. The figure excludes retroactive pay and future overtime, which he would have worked anyway. Meanwhile, workers in other automobile plants got increases with­out striking. The suggestion has been made that they share a part of their increase with General Motors strikers and thus help foot the bill of winning a general increase in the industry. Steel Workers The comparatively brief steel strike was settled for a wage in­crease of 18.5 cents an hour. Before the strike, the United States Steel offered a 15-cents-per-hour increase. Thus, the month-long work stoppage netted each striker a wage boost of three cents an hour. Now, even with the1'-9.25-cents-per-hour restroactive raise, each steel worker will need more than two and a half years to make up the $195 he lost in wages during the strike. Other workers have lost these amounts of wages due to strike idleness since September: electrical workers, $53,000,000; bituminous coal, $30,000,000; lumber and meat packing, $19,000,000 each; AFL machinists in the San Francisco Bay area, $35,000,000; glass-indus­try workers, $9,000,000. Cost to Industry The exact amount of industry profits lost because of strikes cannot be calculated yet. However, in terms of the Federal Reserve Board index of production, work stoppages since the end of war have re­duced factory output an average of 5 per cent. From a compara­tively insignificant drop in production in September, the loss in out­put rose sharply to 14 per cent so far in February. Man-days of work lost through strikes has mounted steadily since the end of war. In January and the first half of February alone the cost in man-days was 38,000,000. That exceeds the loss for any full year reported since 1927, when data on man-days of idleness be­came available. The production declines vary among industries, depending on the length and severity of strike: Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes • Steel strikes have been the most costly from all angles, because their effects reach into all steel-consuming industries. Since the war ended, the industry has lost 6,000,000 tons of ingots because of work stoppages. Iron and steel output, as measured by Federal Reserve Board fig­ures, was 50 per cent lower during January and February than it would have been had no strike been called. At the low point dur­ing the shutdown, output of the mills was 'less than 5 per cent capacity. Automobile Strikes Strikes have 'been almost as costly to the automobile industry as to steel, because of the long General Motors walkout. Production has been cut an average of 28 per cent since October as the direct result of strikes. Man-days of work lost so far are estimated at 15,000,000. Automobile output has been hampered further by strikes • slowing production of glass and other materials and parts. The possibility of a strike is in the offing. Brief stoppages since the end of the war already have taken a toll in mine output. Pro­duction was reduced 3 per cent in September and 30 per cent in October. The total loss in coal output exceeded 13,000,000 tons. Electrical-industry strikes from September to the present have cost 6,500,000 man-days of plant output. No figures are available to show the total in direct losses which strikes cost all involved companies. For some, the loss would be limited to potential profit not realized. For others, losses represent actual cost, such as overhead, some wages, and salaries not com­pensated for by income. In either case, many companies will be compensated in part by future rebates on excess-profits taxes paid during the war. Costs to consumers, many of them intangible, run into figures that cannot be accurately calculated. They involve such things as these: . Production Retarded Where strikes have slowed production, needed new goods cannot be obtained. Money is spent, instead, to patch up and repair worn­out products which could be replaced more economically. This is particularly true in automobiles. Many cars have been repaired and overhauled. Such repairs frequently are temporary, and the cost will be lost when the vehicles are traded in for new automobiles. Customers, unable to buy the exact items they need, are forced to buy substitutes, which often are more costly. In most cases such substitutes will be replaced by the genuine article as soon as it becomes available, thus causing a double cost. Prices are to go higher for everybody. In some cases the higher costs are here now. Real estate and home prices, for example, are up and going higher because new-home construction cannot meet the demand for housing. Result is that the price of finished houses is forced steadily upward. Income declines in many cases because of the direct or indirect impact of strikes. For strikers, the decline is swift and real in wages lost while they are off the job. In other cases, the loss comes indirectly. Office workers, not on strike, are laid off because of plant shutdowns. Commission salesmen lose because they cannot get goods to sell. These are only two examples. Others are income drops for transit companies and taxicabs, restaurants, food stores, and luxury services in the area of struck plants. Consumers Affected Consumers, generally, feel strikes and the resultant price in­creases, in varying degrees. Wage earners who receive an increase through strikes get the added income to meet a rise in prices. Salaried workers and those on fixed incomes lag behind wage earn­ers. Thus when price increases are granted to compensate manage­ment for higher wages, these people actually take a cut in income because of reduced purchasing power. Labor leaders argue that any wage increase produced by a strike is a gain for labor, regardless of the time it takes the individual workers to earn back the income lost through idleness. Their posi­tion is that any strike-induced increase in earnings represents wages that could not be obtained by any other means. The long-range objective is to get for wage earners a grea~r share of the national income. That share is limited, however, when management is granted price increases to compensate for higher pay rolls. Thus, wages, between 1935 and 1943, rose 80 per cent on the average. When adjusted to increased living costs, the gain in real income amounted to 42.8 per cent. Yet the relative posi­tion of workers earning wages or salaries in pr'ivate industry re­mained almost unchanged. In 1935, the workers' share of the na­tional income was 54.9 per cent. In 1943 it was 53.5 per cent. Over-All Strike Costs Over-all strike costs at long range, as shown by the record, far outrun the immediate gains of workers. A part of the intangible long-range cost is the bitterness engendered between labor and management, which affects future collective bargaining relationships even after the strikes are settled. In addition, the benefits from strikes are partly nullified when prices go up to compensate man­agement for strike-won wage increases. In effect, that passes more of the strike cost back to the strikers and thus helps to set the stage for future strikes. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS-TEXAS (Excerpt from article by Keith Davis in Texas Personnel Review, April, 1947, p. 12. ) Problems of labor-management relations were greater in Texas during 1946 than in any previous year; however, both labor dis­putes and labor violence were less evident in Texas than in many other regions of the United States. Some strikes, such as the steel and railroad strikes, were of national origin; others were of re-' gional and local origin. (According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, there were 113,000,000 man-days lost as a direct result of strikes in 1946 in the United States, which was 1.5% of esti­mated total working time.) There were many reasons for this era of employee unrest. Some unrest was brought about by normal industrial readjustment and by a release of pent-up employee sentiments following the war. Another upsetting factor was the confused National labor policy and a soaring cost of living. Further, workers who were not in the large wage increases, stood to lose their relative wage position unless they, too, asked and fought for wage increases. The A.F. of L. Southern organizing campaign and the C.1.0. "Operation Dixie" caused still more unrest among employees. The organizing campaigns did not make the astronomical progress antic­ipated by their supporters, but they did progress. As early as October, 1946, C.1.0. State headquarters announced it had won 36 elections in its "Operation Texas" during the previous four months. INDUSTRIAL WARFARE By LESTER VELIE (Reprinted from Collier's Magazine, March 2, 1946. ) On a late November day in 1940 two men met secretly at Dear­ born, Michigan. One was Henry Ford, as unpredictable at 77 as he was at 40. The other was Philip Murray, union leader. It was agreement at first sight. Within a few minutes Ford dumped into the lap of the astounded Murray a closed shop for the CIO's United Automobile Workers Union, an agreement to col­ lect the CIO's dues, a commitment to match the highest wage paid by any competitor. Everything Murray could have asked, and more. But when Murray regained his voice, he said: "Your name on a union contract is fine, Mr. Ford. But will our bargain work? Your people have been trained for years to fight unions, to spy on organizers, to fire and blacklist them. It's in your people's bones. And your police organization, Mr. Ford. If this thing's going to work, the police organization must go, and your people must be taught to live with and deal with the union." Murray's suspicion was symptomatic of an attitude shared by management and labor throughout the automobile industry. Today, more than five years later , it is obvious that the 1940 agreement failed to bring lasting peace and harmony. Why? What happened? There has been no time to train responsible men on both sides in the give and take of collective bargaining, men who could have made the contract work. Industrial peace, the Ford Company and its workers found, begins in the shop. Anti-strike laws alone can't make it. Compulsory arbitration alone can't make it. And the gov­ernment alone can't make it for you. What happened on the River Rouge happened in automobiles at Detroit, in steel at Pittsburgh and in rubber at Akron. Jerry-built boss and worker relationships, erected hastily and en masse dur­ing the late 1930's, creaked, groaned and collapsed under the eco­nomic tremblors of peacetime readjustment. Both sides had their just grievances. · For labor, John L. Lewis put it this way : "Industry was given generous cost-plus contracts, generous allowances for depreciation of plant. But what about the depreciation of the worker's plant, his body? What allowance was made for that besides overtime?" Phil Murray charged that in steel and in automobiles, employers were refusing to bargain. For management, Ira Mosher, former president of the National Association of Manufacturers, replied: "We haven't had collective bargaining for years. We've had col­lective demanding." "Sure, sure," said another management spokesman, "I know the Wagner Act married us to the unions, and we've got to live with them but don't forget it was a shotgun wedding." Grievances on Both Sides Shotgun wedding made restive bedfellows. As soon as the war's end permitted, the fighting began. But this new country-wide epi­demic of paralyzing industrial strikes was different. Obsessed by the fears of remembered joblessness, workers pressed their leaders to take the offensive, win higher pay and greater security through a voice in management. Harboring resentments over lost discipline and reduced efficiency during the war, managers took a firm stand. Required Arbitration of Labo1· Disputes Thus in a period of reconversion to peacetime production, there began an ordeal for both management and labor. It was not a static battle. Partial solutions might be quickly found. Truces might be achieved. But the important thing was that this winter marked a new era in the relations between. the American worker and his boss. Looking back, it can be seen that a significant period of indus­trial relations ended with the war, or more accurately with the death of FrankI:n D. Roosevelt, the true father of the great indus­trial unions in the basic industries. Under F.D.R. the American workers' right to organize was recognized by the government,* and union membership quadrupled, leaping from 3,000,000 to 12,000,000 dues-payers. Unions became social and economic powerhouses, capa­ble of matching the strength of their industrial adversaries. Number One Question How then can the corporate and union titans, now evenly matched, be prevented from slugging each other and the country for a ten count? This is the Number One economic question of our time, be­cause the answer involves jobs for ,workers and elbow room for man­agement to use initiative. For all of us, it involves the ability to make our system of capitalism and democracy work. The answer to this question will be sought long after the cur­rent reconversion slugfest is over. For it must be found the hard. way by Joe Smith, the guy on the belt, speaking through his union, and by his boss, speaking through trained industrial-relations men. What chance have they to find the answer? First, let's look at the conflict in attitudes that is involved. In the simplest terms, Joe Smith wants the kind of steady job that means security for himself, his wife and children. He also wants to be something -more than a badge number that marches in dail~, with thousands cf other Joes, but never talks to the boss or even knows who the plant martager is. Being an American, Joe wants to be somebody, to be treated as somebody and to do some shoving himself when he's pushed around. Today, for the first time, mass industry unions in auto, steel, oil, meat packing and tires have banded Joe together with other Joes, and thus have given him a voice in matters over which he once had no control. This right to such a voice or the way he exercises the right may be debated. But the fact is there. He expects his union to do something about the cut in take-home pay he took on V-J Day, and about the further cuts he's taking as peactime down­ *The National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act stated, "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United Stat€s to encourage the practice . . . of collective bargaining and to protect the exercise by workers of full fre€dom of as8ociation and self-organization." Provisions of the act have been frequently criticized as he­ing biased in favor of labor, and many attempts to change it have been made. So far none has succeeded. • 34 · The University of Texas grades' him to lower-paying jobs. He expects his union to do some­thing about those butterfly wings he feels in his stomach as he sees the wartime demand for hands ebb. Again in simplified terms, John Greene, executive, finds he must now take the union contract into consideration, must consult the union, thresh things out in debate. Perhaps he makes every effort to adjust himself to conditions, but often he can't help but regard his unionized workers as ingrates, lured from loyalty to him and the company by union promises. Above all he fears the union wants to rwi his business or to prevent him from doing his job efficiently. Unions Have Internal Weaknesses But on top of these headaches was still another real trouble­maker-the internal weakness and power politics within some of the unions themselves. That means trouble for management as well as for responsible labor. In the U.A.W.-the ultimate in union democracy-rank-and-file members battle their leaders with the same enthusiasm they devote to fighting the companies. , "You flannel-mouthed gravy-train rider!" rank-and-filers some­times yell at the sweating R. J. Thomas, their president, as he seeks to address them. "Do you call yourself a union leader?" In the U.A.W. there is no single strong ftgure. President Thomas' energies are often devoted to keeping peace between Walter Reuther and George Addes, the secretary-treasurer. A last year's U.A.W. convention Thomas and Addes tried unsuccessfully to oust Reuther. Strong leadership for the U.A.W. is lost in the shuffle of union politics. Employers object even more to the U.A.W.'s "labor statesman­ship," which has union officials interesting themselves in the prices of cars the companies make, in the profits the employer earns, in the way the employer reconverts to peace. Government Steps In At this point a third party-government---comes in. Although wage demands are inevitable after a war, and management and labor have been flexing their muscles in public for months, the Tru­man Administration prepared for the contest by scuttling the War Labor Board, which had largely succeeded in keeping the adver­saries from coming to open blows during the war. Truman, how­ever, retained his war powers, including that of plant seizure in labor disputes, and has used it on occasion. The reconversion wage yardstick which the War Labor Board had prudently developed in anticipation of union demands, was junked. Labor and industry were left to fight it out. And to make matters worse, the anticipated strengthening of the Labor Depart­ment did not develop. Capable Advisers Neglected In one of the gravest labor-relations crises in our history, the Department of Labor-except for ineffectual conciliation efforts­had reduced itself to the role of innocent onlooker. That left labor and capital standing toe to toe as equal heavyweight contenders., ready to prove they could stop not only each other but the entire economic set-up as well. What can we do about it? There ought to be a law, is everyone's first impulse. Why not simply bar strikes and compel both sides to take their differences to government arbitrators who will decide for them? Why not? Because it just doesn't work in a democracy, and the boss is just as opposed to compulsory arbitration as the worker. "The right to strike is inalienable!" declared a delegate to the recent management-labor conference. "To deprive men of the right to quit work is to deprive them of their personal liberty." A labor orator sounding off? No, it was M. W. Clement, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad. When the House Labor qommittee sought John L. Lewis' opin­ion, they got it. "Compulsory arbitration," he intoned, "would thrust the knife of absolutism into the heart of free America. Take away my liberty, and I will fight you. Attempt it at your own peril." Australia, New Zealand and our own Kansas have tried compul­sory arbitration. Australians and New Zealanders continue to strike anyway. Kansans did, too, and the state law was dropped. In democ­racies, men don't observe unpopular laws, as our own prohibition days taught us. Eric Johnston, president of the United States Cham­ber of Commerce, testifying on 'President Truman's "cooling-off" and "fact-finding legislation," urged Congress itself to cool off, avoid hasty legislation. "GoodJabor relations can't be legislated," he warned. A Long and Bitter Battle As for amending the anti-trust laws and the Wagner Act to re­strict union activities, labor leaders point out that ever since 1868, when New Hampshire limited the work day to 10 hours, on through the fight for the Clayton Act, the labor provisions of the N.R.A., and the Wagner Act, it's been a bitter fight to raise the workers' bargaining power to that of the employer. And they won't stand idle if attacks are made on these gains. "We're no different from the laboring men of Great Britain," the usually mild Bill Green, president of the A.F. of L., stormed at a group of congressmen. "When driven to desperation, we'll turn to the left." Even such seemingly moderate proposals as fact-finding legisla­ tion drove Phil Murray, the C.1.0.'s president, to say: "It can be but the first step for even more savage legislative repression. . .. The C.1.0. will mobilize its entire membership and the American people to defeat this measure and all attempts directed against iabor." In this manner, the lines are drawn. Is a constant succession of strikes, lockouts, turmoil in Congress ·culminating in government strait jackets for both sides inevitable? No. There are ways to keep peace, but there is no magic formula. Strong unions of employers to deal with strong unions of employ­ ees is one way. Impartial umpires chosen by both sides to settle disputes arising from interpretations of a contract is another. It can be done with communiy-wide mediation machinery; with con­ ciliation ("Help us decide" as against the "Decide for us" of arbi­ tration) provided by government .experts. Clothing Workers Found Solution The Amalgamated Clothing Workers' Union, which embraces 90 per cent· of the industry's workers, deals with associations of em­ployers in New York, Philadelphia, Rochester, Baltimore, and Chi­cago. Contracts negotiated every two or three years bar strikes and provide machinery for settling disputes. Ultimate preservers of clothing-industry peace are the impartial chairmen hired jointly by local employers' associations and unions to interpret the agreement and enforce their own decisions. Once swamped with disputes, im­partial chairmen now have relatively little to do since accumulated decisions over the years have fo11med a body of "common law" to guide industry-employee relations. To the clothing worker, collective bargaining has brought security, protection against capricious discharge by employers. He has been protected by unemployment insurance since 1923, dismissal wages since 1926. The union has provided cooperative housing, dental care, sickness benefits, savings and investment facilities, and life insurance. Equally important, it has given the worker a sense of dignity and of "belonging.'' To the clothing-industry employer, collective bargaining has brought freedom from strikes, savings in recruiting and training labor. To the public, it has meant freedom from the turmoil which once kept whole communities in an uproar. To the present indus­ trial conflict, it has a special meaning. Clothing workers and em­ ployers made a go of it through self-rule and without government intervention. Umpire Scheme Works But industrial peace need not wait until whole communities or industries organize for bargaining. The impartial umpire scheme has worked for individual companies, too, when the umpire deals with the biggest troublemaker-disputes as to what was actually agreed to in the contract. In Philadelphia, Toledo, Boston, and other communities a grass­roots approach to industrial peace is being tried. Worker, boss and public have set up local mediation boa~ds (their decisions are ad­visory only) whose services are available to employers and unions who ~ant to use them. It is voluntary mediation, and it works. Supplementing these is the government's plan to train high-cali­ ber conciliators, at salaries up to $8,700, to help employers and em­ ployees settle their difficulties. So the pattern of labor peace emerges. But the resort to a vari­ ety of methods such as industry-wide bargaining, impartial um­ pires, city-wide mediation and government concilation proves that it cannot be cut from a single cloth. Nor does everybody agree that the resulting garment is such a bargain. But laws, in any case, are not the real answer. The answer lies first in jobs for men who want work, for even the threat of idle­ ness is a temblor that sends shocks through the industrial sys­ tem. With work assured, peace lies also in the employer's accept­ ance of true collective bargaining as a means of helping him do a better production job, as well as improving the condition of the worker. · Equally important for peace is the need for the capital and labor behemoths to use restraint, to go easy on the vast economic power they command. When they work out checks on their own powers, no outside force by government will have to be imposed on them. Justice Louis Brandeis once summed it up. "Democracy," he said, "is the substi­ tution of internal for external restraint." METHODS OF INDUSTRIAL PEACE By GORDON S. WATKINS AND PAUL A. DODD (Excerpt from Chapter 27, "Methods of Industrial Peace," in book, Labor Prob­ lems, third edition. 'New York. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1940, pp. 851-858). Advantages and Disadvantages of Mediation and Arbitration.­ In no country have mediation, compulsory investigation, and arbi­tration been an unqualified success. Strikes and lockouts are still frequently resorted to in industrial disputes. Such measures, how­ever, have made a significant contribution to the movement for in­dustrial peace. In Great Britain the most successful method of set­tlement has been found in conciliation and mediation. Compulsory investigation has achieved some desirable results in Canada and Colorado and in the railway industry of the United States. It is not unlikely that compulsory investigation will increase in importance if serious industrial conflicts persist. The case fQr investigation, conciliation, and voluntary arbitration rests mainly on two facts. These methods eliminate the necessity for resort to industrial war­fare by substituting a system of judicial procedure and examina­tion, and they afford that measure of publicity which is an essen­tial safeguard to those public interests so frequently unrecQWnized in joint conferences between employers and employees. Compulsory arbitration rests upon more debatable grounds. It is commonly believed that compulsory arbitration functions chiefly in the interests of those who constitute the dominant economic and political power. In Australasian countries, in which a strong labor party is often in active control of the government and is always a powerful opposition when not actually in control, the nrnch"nery of compulsory arbitration is not likely to prove disadvantageous to the workers. Australasian workers have little or nothing to fear from immigration, since its chief source is the British Isles and the im­migrants have standards of living comparable to those prevailing in the colonies. Experience with compulsory arbitration abroad, therefore, is no guarantee that similar methods will succeed in the United States where there is no labor party and low-standard im­migrants are admitted. However, it remains to be proved that such a method would not succeed in this country. Objections to Compulsory Arbitration Several important objections are urged against campulsory arbi­tration. It deprives the workers of the only means they possess of making effective their collective action-the strike. "Strikes are the natural expression of the working people against injustice, against tyranny, against a deterioration in their condition."1 · It is objected that compulsory arbitration laws take away the right to strike but leave unrestricted the employer's right to discharge, thus giving the latter a marked advantage in bargaining power. The prevention of strikes is practically impossible, since an individual cannot be forced to work against his will. Despite the compulsory investigation and compulsory arbitration features of their laws, 1Samuel Gompers. Address on the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations (Wash­ ington, American Federation of Labor, 1920), P. 18. communities where these laws have been tried have not been free from strikes. In the United States, the constitutionality of compulsory arbitra­tion laws is uncertain. In basic industries directly affecting the public welfare and safety, such laws would probably be sustained, but their general application is viewed as undue interference with the constilutional guarantee against-involuntary servitude. The right to organize and to bargain collectively, as well as to enforce labor's demands with peaceful strikes and other methods, is gener­ally recognized as valid, and any contravention of that right. is difficult to justify. The effect of compulsory arbitration is to weaken the power and threaten the permanence of labor organiza­tions, since the general tendency is to rely upon law rather than organization. "The only real effect is to weaken the power and effectiveness of trade unions; to make wage earners dependent upon a political agency to carry industrial problems into politics."2 Compulsory arbitration delegates authority to an outside party who is unfamiliar with the conditions that cause the dispute and who frequently fails to appreciate the points at issue. The decisions and awards of arbitrators are often influenced by favoritism and prejudice. Workers claim that arbitrators are almost invariably men of extremely conservative points of view, unable to understand the progressive demands of labor. Employers, on the other hand, complain that arbitration boards frequently manifest radicalism in granting the demands of labor. Review of Compulsory Arbitration Compulsory Arbitration.-We may now turn to a brief review of the ways in which the principle of compulsory arbitration oper­·ates in actual practice in different parts of the world where it has been applied. In taking up this analysis it must be remembered that many factors, including the background of the workers affected, political philosophy, number of industries and employees coming within the scope of the law, the period of its enforcement, and the mechanisms and techniques employed in its administration, help to determine the degree of successful application. Compulsory Arbitration in New Zealand For many years Australasian countries have had a policy of ad­justing labor controversies either by ·courts of arbitration or by wage boards. The principle of compulsory arbitration has been widely accepted by both the state and the commonwealth. New Zealand's development illustrates the tendency. Under the authority of the Industrial CQnciliation and Arbitration Act of New Zealand, 2ldem., Labor and the Employer (E. P. Dutton, 1920), p. 270. adopted in 1894, district boards of conciliation and a court of arbi­tration were created. The boards of conciliation comprise an equal number of representatives of employers and of employees selected from persons nominated by registered organizations of these two groups. Under the original provisions an impartial chairman was chosen by these representatives, but since 1908 district commission­ers of conciliation, who are salaried officials, have been appointed. The Court of Arbitration of New Zealand, which has jurisdiction over the entire colony, consists of three members appointed by the governor. One of these members is chosen from a list submitted by registered trade unions, one from nominations made by regis­tered associations of employers, and the third, the president of the court, from the justices of the Supreme Court. Registration is purely voluntary. Strikes are illegal for registered unions, but not for un­registered unions. The machinery of conciliation or arbitration may be set in motion upon application of either party to the con­troversy. The Court of f\rbitration possesses powers of compul­sory investigations and may compel the attendance of witnesses, the submission of documentary evidence, and other information affect­ing the ~ontroversy. Awards may be made applicable to the entire industry. Competitive conditions in a given industry are thus equal­ized, and protection is afforded to registered employers and em­ployees from destructive competition by those who are not registered. Decisions Remain in Force Unless unions cancel their registration, the decisions, agreements, and awards made under the act remain in ·force until superseded by new agreements or awards. The award continues for three years even though cancellation of registration takes plac.e. Where unions have strong organization prior to the dispute the court usually gives preference to the unions, and an employer is required to discharge a non-union man in favor of an unemployed union man. This amounts to the enforcement of a closed shop. Because of the unfavorable economic conditions existing in 1932, the rigid standards provided in the Act were lowered by dropping the requirement that labor disputes be submitted to compulsory arbitration. Another provision of the law, that providing for the establishment by the Court of Arbitration of minimum wage levels for all workers, was also amended at this time by leaving basic wages to voluntary agreement. With a return to the Labor govern­ment in 1935, however, arbitration of labor disputes again became obligatory. The 1936 amendment returned to the industrial court power to fix basic wages after proper consideration of family needs. The forty-hour maximum week was established in industry except when employers show cause for exemption. Union membership was Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes required of all workers eighteen years of age or over, or of any worker under eighteen who received adult minimum wages in work covered by a trade agreement. Although New Zealand has not achieved industrial peace, this return to the principle of compulsory arbitration in 1936 after sev­eral years of abandonment lends strong support to the observation that there is a general disposition on the part of all political par­ties except socialists and syndicalists to accept it as an important approach to labor problems.3 But the system is not without its faults. Much difficulty has been encountered from time to time in the enforcement of penalties for illegal strikes and lockouts, and nonregistered unions oppose the Court of Arbitration. Many are convinced that this system of arbitration is deficient chiefly in being applicable only to registered u·nions. Yet it has enjoyed a life of al­most half a century. Arbitration Act of Australia Like New Zealand, the Commonwealth of Australia fqr many years has been a pioneer in the field of compulsory arbitration. When the commonwealth was formed in 1901, the constitution contained a clause granting to the federal government the duty of "concili­ation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of in­dustrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one state" (XXXV). As is the case in the United States, all powers not spe­cifically granted to the central government are reserved to the Australian states. Thus the commonwealth is empowered to deal with interstate labor disputes only, although difficulties which are bound to arise out of uncertainties of jurisdiction have been greatly minimized by the policy followed by the state tribunals in basing awards in labor disputes on those established by the Com­monwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court. Decisions of the High Court of Australia since 1904 have established the principle that the commonwealth itself has jurisdiction over disputes or potential disputes which occur simultaneously in two or more states. The Conciliation and Arbitration Act was drawn up in 1904 un­der the stimulus of this federal jurisdiction in labor disputes. Since that time it has been amended on numerous occasions, the last time being in 1934. The primary object of the act is to "pre­vent lockouts and strikes in relation to industrial disputes." Work­ers engaged in interstate commerce are not compelled to join a labor union, although unionization is encouraged, as is organization of employer groups. An Amendment to the Act in 1930 deleted all reference to lockouts and strikes, although three provisions rela­ 3For a full description of the present labor program in New Zealand, see Monthly Labor Review. Vol. 43, November, 1936, pp. 1172-5; and International Labor Re­t'icw, Vol. 38, July, 1938, pp. 83-95. tive to the legality of strikes still remain in the law. Employees are forbidden to cease work because their employers belong to an organization or because the employers gained benefits under an award. Secondly, the refusal to accept employment by a "substan­ tial part" of the recipients of an award is prohibited. Finally, the officials of an organization are forbidden to "advise, encourage, or incite" the members of an agreement to refrain from working in accordance with the terms of an award. Any strike resulting from these prohibited acts become illegal.4 The Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration is the chief creation of the act of 1904. This court has all the judicial powers usually exercised by courts of law and equity and is charged with broad powers of settling labor disputes over which its juris­diction extends. In completion of thi~ task the court has exercised the power of establishing minimum wages since 1907, and of chang­ing the working hours and conditions. The High Court has held that a decision rendered by the court in the settlement of a labor dispute is equivalent to a law of the commonwealth, although ap­peals may be taken by the aggrieved parties to the High Court for review if the issues involve questions relating to the actual exist­ence of an alleged dispute or if they .challenge the power of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration itself. Conciliation Committees As now constituted, the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration consists of a chief judge and three judges. Any member may act for the court in all matters except those involving an alteration in hours or wages under an award or agreement, in which case consideration must be given by the chief judge and not less than two of the other judges. In addition to this central court, the law makes provision for the appointment of three conciliation commis­sioners, each of whom can exercise the power of a judge of the arbitration court, but whose decision can be appealed before the court if matters of wages, hours, or conditions of employment have been dealt with. The law also provides for the appointment of con­ciliation committees, made up of an equal number of employer and worker representatives with a conciliation commissioner acting as chairman. 'These committees consider specific local disputes and ex­ercise jurisdiction over all issues arising in any single industry. The law stipulates that the decisions of these conciliation committees shall have the same force as the awards of the court, but the High Court has invalidated this transfer of power on grounds of uncon­stitutionality. •For a full discussion of the Australian system of arbitration and conciliation. see Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 47, December, 1938, pp. 1287-94; and lnternationaJ Labor R eview, Vol. 37, March, 1938, pp. 314-37. Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes Under the Australian system many disputes are settled peacefully outside the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration or its agents. Provided that either the employer or the employees belong to a registered organization, these two parties may enter into a work­ing agreement calling for the prevention and settlement of labor disputes by conciliation and arbitration upon a voluntary basis. If such an agreement is filed with the Industrial Registrar, however, its terms are binding on all its signatories and may be enforced by law. In no case is such a contract to be enforceable for more than five years, the average term being between two and three years. A total of forty-seven of these agreements were in force at the first of the year 1938. Two types of cases come under the jurisdiction of the court. The first involves workers in industries or o~cupations where no trade agreement or award exists, where all disputants are not parties to the same award, or where the period of the award bas expired. Under these conditions, when a dispute arises the claims are laid before the employer. If the employer voluntarily makes an accept-. able adjustment the case is dropped. If the employer rejects the claims in whole or in part, a judge of the court intervenes, acting only in a conciliatory capacity at first. If he summons the dis­putants to a conference, they are obliged by law to attend. During this conference the discussion is quite informal, and if an agree­ment is voluntarily reached by the two parties to the dispute it is certified by the attending judge and then filed with the Indus­trial Registrar where it has the force of an award. But if the case is not settled here, it is passed on to the Court of Concilia­tion and Arbitration for settlement. The decision of this body, as noted above, is final and binding for a period of five years unless otherwise stipulated. If neither party is a member of an organi­zation or union, then the issue may be brought directly before the courts by the Registrar or by a state industrial authority if the fed­eral government bas jurisdiction in the matter. Board of References The second type of case involves a situation where all parties to the dispute are bound by the same unexpired award. The proce­dure here, again, is for the court to seek an adjustment through conciliation first. Since the awards of the court often take the form of -a compromise, modifications of objectionable provisions are sought, and interpretation, suspension, and cancellation of the award are requested. If conciliatory efforts fail, these objections are placed before a specially created Board of Reference consisting of a chair­man who represents the court, and an equal number of employee and employer members. This board is authorized to make interpre­tntions and niinor modifications in the terms of the existing award. Appeal may be made from the decisions of this board directly to the court. The procedure followed in hearing cases of appeal is similar to all others. When the court finds good cause to do so, it may modify the decision as it sees fit. UNIONS IN ACTION By HAROLD U. FAULKNER AND MARK STARR (The following is reprinted from Chapter XI, "Unions in Action," of the book. Labor in America, New York. Harper & Borothers, 1944, pp. 256-258). In order to prevent lockouts and stoppages, the U.S. Department of Labor operates a Conciliation Service in addition to its main job of compiling authoritative statistics and making them available to Congress and the people of the United States. Within recent years the National Labor Relations Board has been set up to reg­ulate collective bargaining by conducting elections to determine what union shall represent the workers. ·The employer must nego­tiate with the union certified by the NLRB. The Department of Labor, established in 1913, is represented in the Presidential cabinet by its Secretary. It has subdivisions in the form of bureaus for labor statistics, women, children, labor standards, unemployment registration, enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Conciliation Service. The staff of the Con­ciliation ·Service have no power to intervene or compel the accept­ance of their findings; they must be called in either by the em­ployers, employees, or members of the general public affected by' a trade dispute. Reports show that from 1929 onward the Concilia­tion Service handled 500 to 600 disputes yearly. For the railroads there is a special Board of Mediation authorized in 1926 by the Railroad Labor Act. This settles most of the disputes which arise or refers them to arbitration. Agencies for Preventing Strikes The National War Labor Board, most recent agency for the pre­vention of strikes, was established by executive order of President Roosevelt in .Tanuary, 1942. It is composed of twelve members, four each representing the public, the employers, and the .employ­ees, and all named by the President. It operates from Washington and from ten regional' offices, and has power to make final settle­ment of all disputes. By an order of October, 1942, no increase in wage rates or in salary rates under $5,000 yearly can be made without the approval of the War Labor Board. Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes Its predecessor, the National Mediation Board, had foundered upon the controversy over the closed shop. The War Labor Board has accepted a compromise, "the union maintenance clause," which provides that all employees who are members of the union when the contract is made must maintain their membership during the duration of the contract. The W.L.B. succeeded in eliminating strikes save in exceptional cases of outlaw disputes. The United Mine Workers, however, in 1943, refused for a while to bring before the W.L.B. its deadlock with the employers over making a new con­tract. After two short mine stoppages, the government took over the mines, as it did in the smaller case of the Federal Shipbuild­ing Company. The W.L.B. applied the "Little Steel" formula, which in general limited all wage increases to 15 per cent above those rates paid in January, 1941, altlwugh the unions asserted that the cost of living had gone up much higher than that and that their mem­bers were suffering a cut in real ·wages. To meet this argument the government tried to roll back prices and stabilize the cost of living. Disputes which deal with wage claims are certified to the W.L.B. by the U.S. Department of Labor for settlement. The Chairman of the War Labo'r Board, William H. Davis, co~menting upon the twelve regional boards established and the many difficult problems adjusted, forecast in V-ictory (January 27, 1943.) that these activi­ties will "leave behind them, as a permanent contribution, a new way of settling old differences and a bond of mutual trust be­tween labor and industry apt to play a large part in building that future America of which our fellow countrymen in uniform dream when there is a lull in the fighting overseas." THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND THE RIGHT TO MAKE WAR By DAVID LAWRENCE (Reprinted from United S tates News. May 300 1947.) After two world wars of disastrous proportions, public sentiment favors the abolition of any historical right to make wars for self-. ish purposes. Opinions differ as to how such a principle can be enforced and what steps of physical coercion must be used to keep the peace, but there is no difference of opinion on the broad premise that the right to make war for selfish reasons is aggression and that the only way war can ever be sanctioned is a war of defense. The whole world today favors some method of keeping the peace by moral suasion, by the full use of publicity, and by the persist­ ent application of the powers of reason. Neither economic coercion utilized in behalf of an aggressive or selfish program nor physical compulsion is approved-we all believe in peaceful methods of main­ taining peace. ­ But can we ever achieve the goal when in domestic disputes we do not taboo violence and war? How can we expect the powers of reason to function internationally when we are so indifferent to the use of those same powers in our domestic conflicts particularly in labor-management controversies? Strikes may be defensive: Let us not assume even in domestic affairs that "war" or the "right to strike"-which are in a sense synonymous-are always pursued for selfish or aggressive reasons. We must concede that the right to strike is often exercised on a purely defensive basis-,-as a defense against organized greed that refuses to pay a living wage or that imposes working conditions which are well-night intolfrable. Under such extreme provocation it is illogical to insist that the right to strike shall not be exer­cised or that individuals must quit work only as individuals and not in concert with those fellow workers who can be persuaded to do likewise. Right to Strike Inherent It is clearly established now that the right to strike is an inher­ent right of employees. For a long time the laws of the states and of the Federal Government, as well as the decisions of the highest courts in both, have been gradually laying down the principle that there "is a right to strike and that it is closely allied to individual liberty in a democracy. , But to grant the right to 'strike without qualification, to say that it may be exercised at any time and under any pretext is to say that war is always justified whether by the aggressor or the de­fender against aggression. World opinion today does not sustain that thesis. Instead, world opinion draws a distinction between a just and an unjust war. So may we insist that there must be a distinction drawn between a just and an unjust strike. This requires, of course, careful defi­nition, and it is obvious that the definition cannot be so broad as to be left to an individual or a private organization to apply at the drop of a hat and in changing circumstances. To do so would be to delegate the law-making power to units that are not respon­sible to the electorate. Regulation follows when self-restraint fails: Legislative compul­sion is not necessarily a confession that the force of reason has Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes been proved ineffective or futile. For, though organized government must pass laws to restrain or regulate the few who insist on action contrary to the public interest, human society will not cease to work for the day when self-discipline will make unnecessary much af the regulation we now find so essential to an ordered existence. This is but another way of saying that if we appear today to be limiting or qualifying more and more the right to strike, it is only because of irresponsible and indiscriminate use of the revolutionary principle imbedded in the right to strike. No one denies the existence of a right to revolution. Our fore­fathers exercised it and we revere them for it. When in the course of human events tyranny becomes intolerable, men properly exer­cise their inalienable right to set themselves free. Public Enters Dispute When workers find working conditions intolerable, they have a right to defend themselves against abuse or economic power by employers. This did not damage the public interest so much when strikes were confined to small groups or local areas. 'Vhen, how­ever, nationwide corporations were organized and nationwide unions came into existence, a party of the third part-the public-rightly entered the dispute. The question then turned not on whether a group of workers were fighting a just war of defense against mis­guided employers but on whether the economic damage caused by the dispute itself could be tolerated by the public as a whole. Obviously to forbid all strikes where the public interest is consid­ably damaged is not to solve the problem. Such a prohihition must carry with it as an alternative some means of securing justice for the workers who give up or are deprived of the right to strike. This means regulation in the public interest. ItJ is as logical as it is inevitable. In a complex economic society, rights must be sacrificed to the general interest and the law-making body must offset those losses of rights with prope1· means of adjustment of conflicting interests. Thus there would have been consternation among our forebears if someone had told them that some day the city would come along and forbid a man to park his horse and buggy in front of his own house or corner store. To regulate vehicular traffic, however, we all recognize today, is to conserve human life. To regulate the aber­rations of economic traffic is to preserve peace and insure economic stability for us all. Right to speak should be unqualified: We must refuse to believe, for example, that the telephone workers could not have obtained thP increases they have just won except by a nationwide strike. Full and free discussion would have prevented a strike. Companies now­adays, however, have been forbidden to use effectively the rule of reason-to talk frankly and openly to their employees. The Wagner Act, interpreted narrowly by the National Labor Relations Board and upheld by the courts, construes any such discussion as likely to be "intimidation" or an "unfair labor practice." The bill passed by the Senate amending the Wagner Act does nqt remedy this defect and, unless the conference committee bill per­mits full and free discussion between employers and employees at all times without qualification, we are in for an era of more misunderstanding and disputes. Let each side make its threats or its offers: A threat to strike is a form of intimidation, yet unions are not penalized for it. Why should an employer be penalized for explaining what he might be compelled to do by way of curtailing his operations if his costs are forced up to a point where he can no longer hope to produce at a profit with the personnel in his employ? Free Speech Must Be Protected If either employer or employee union representatives misuse this r 'ght of free speech, the common sense of the people who observe the dispute-the stockholders of the corporations and the workers in the unions-can be relied on in the final analysis to bring about correction of such mistatements. If we limit or qualify the right to speak, if we circumscribe the powers of reasoning, we merely inflame the citizens and cause them to reach out for methods of economic and even physical violence. One must wonder sometimes why mass picketing has grown so in­tense in recent years. The provocation must indeed be extreme or else the "facts" set before the workers must be so misrepresented that the workers crusade and fight at times with the zeal of revo­lutionists. Thoughtful labor union leadership cannot condone mass picketing. Rule of reason must apply: Must we admit that we in this great democracy cannot reason with each other in our domestic disputes? Must we concede that man must fight man and that law-making agencies and governmental bodies to which we delegate power can­not regulate the affairs of men so that justice can be meted out without resort to domestic war? The path of enlightened liberalism lies ahead. We in the British and American democracies and the people in the democracies through­out the world that look to us for leadership must prove in our in­ternal ways of life that we can live under a system of law and order. Such a system means that the individual agrees to let the right of revolution lie dormant whilst the State, by the encourage­ment of the processes of reason and mediat'.on, develops in behalf of all the citizens a rule of justice. We must apply such a rule of reason now without discrimination to all classes alike lest our eco­nomic society be wrecked by class feeling an& class war. TAFT-HARTLEY LAW IN ACTION (Reprinted from United States News, July 11, 1947. ) No rush to sma'sh. unions is developing as a result of new pow­ers won by employers in the Taft-Hartley law. On the contrary, there is evidence that most employers are planning to use these powers sparingly, at least for the time being. There has been no rush to court, for example, to file suits for damages caused by secondary boycotts, illegal strikes or contract violations. Employers now are free to file such suits. Neither has there been any indication that employers are busily at work build­ing up cases to try out rights that will become available to them when changes in the Wagner Act become effective August 22. Already, however, the new law is having an effect on contracts under negotiation. Dues ·checkoff on a compulsory basis, banned by the new law, already has been bost by CIO United Auto Workers at the Ford Motor Co. plants, by CIO Shipbuilding Workers in some shipyards and by John L. Lewis in the soft-coal mines. Contracts no longer can be renewed with mandatory checkoff provisions. Employers are forbidden to deduct union dues from pay checks except where an individual worker signs an authorization. A union-shop clause contained in some shipbuilding contracts, as well as in the Ford and coal agreements, however, can be rein­stated up to August 22 without an employee election, provided the companies are willing. On and after that date, union shops must be approved by a majority of the workers involved. Net effect in some current negotiations is expected to be a union shop plus voluntary checkoff. Where a union shop exists, workers ,. must continue to pay dues to keep their jobs. They have a choice of paying through the checkoff or directly to union stewards; but they must pay. ­ A foremen's union on strike at the Ford company was told last '\veek that Ford no longer recognizes the union as bargaining agent for its supervisory employees. The company and union canceled their old contract before the walkout began. As of August 22, NLRB will not be able to order a comp'any to bargain with its foremen. In many ways, employers are finding that the new law brings them new powers and new responsibilities. Some Government aids are open for the first time to employers who want assistance in labor relations. The Labor Board will be available to the employer, starting August 22. Formerly the NL~ issued orders against employers, but now it will have power to get court injunctions against unions as well. A complaint may be taken to NLRB by an employer if a union stages an illegal strike, such as a jurisdictional walkout; if it con­ducts a secondary boycott or if it is guilty of any of the other un­fair labor practices listed in the law. Regional offices of NLRB, located in 24 cities, will accept these complaints. The General Counsel of the Board will decide whether the complaint has sufficient basis to warrant a "trial" before the Board itself. Restraining Orders Mandatory Restraining orders are made mandatory, however, in certain cases. Regional NLRB officials are required by the law to seek immedi­ately a temporary court order against a secondary boycott or cer­tain illegal strikes such as a union attempt to compel a firm to bargain when another union has been certified by the NLRB. NLRB decisions also can be enforced by court order, against em­ployers or unions. Court review of these decisions may be obtained through the ap­propriate circuit court of appeals and possibly in the Supreme Court. Mediation procedures set up in the law provide new duties for employers. · A notice must be filed by the employer who proposes to change any terms of his union contract. Often where a union demands changes, the employer counters with his own proposed amendments. The side asking for changes must notify the other party to the agreement 60 days before the contract deadline. Another notice must be given to the Federal Government at least • 30 days prior to the contract deadline, if the dispute remains un­settled. If the employer is seeking changes, he must file this notice. In some States, which have their own mediation boards, the new federal law also requires that employers or unions ' file notice with the State agency at least 30 days before the end of the 60-day wait­ing period, if the dispute continues. Conciliation Service of the Labor Department now is accepting notices from unions or employers who wish to file as a precaution­ary measure. Effective date of this section of the law is August 2:2. It is not clear, however, whether the law requires 60 and 30-day notices to be filed in advance of that date, where a contract will expire soon after August 22. To be on the safe side, some unions are filing notices now. Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes A new agency will take over the functions of the Conciliation Service on August 22. This is to be the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service operating as an independent agency with no ties to the Labor Department. Mediators will be assigned to eve1·y major dispute that might affect interstate commerce, from now on. This is mandatory under the law, which means that some firms that preferred to deal with unions without the help of federal conciliators now will find the Government intervening in their disputes. Smaller disputes, however, are to be turned over to State media­tion agencies or ignored, under terms of the law. Thus, some em­ployers who have requested the aid of federal conciliators in the past no longer will receive it. Federal courts now are open to an employer who can show that he has lost money because of a secondary boycott, jurisdictional strike or violation of contract. The union can be sued for damages in a Unied States district court. Justice Department attorneys will have the duty of prosecuting any union leader who has affiliations with the Communist Party, but who signs an affidavit denying such connections. Union officials must file these affidavits with NLRB before their union can obtain action from NLRB, on or after August 22. An employer or anyone else may complain to the Justice Department if he believes a Com­munist union leader has signed a false affidavit. THE GENTLE ART OF SETTLING STRIKES By IRWIN ROSS (Reprinted from Coronet Magazine, November, 1946.) A strike has been agitating your home town for two weeks. Clashes on the picket line, mass meetings in public, angry state­ ments in the newspapers-all the paraphernalia and b,!!dlam of mod­ ern industrial strife. By this time, you know both union leader and employer pretty well: you've seen their pictures and heard their harangues. But despite all the noise and talk, nothing seems to happen. 'Then suddenly, in the third week of the strike, a settlement is reached. Both sides come to seemingly miraculous agreement on wages, hours, and union security. Workers file back to their benches. Union and employer alike issue a statement: "We wish to express appreciation for the good offices of John..c. Roe, Commissioner of Conciliation, U.S. Department of Labor. Without his efforts, a set­ tie:ment would have been indefinitely delayed." How a Conciliator Works This introduces a new name. Who is this Roe, and what did he do? Roe arrived in town after the strike had been in progress a week. He discovered an ugly situation: both union and manage­ ment were so angry they would no longer negotiate. But Roe, no novice at industrial peacemaking, found a way. He arranged separate conferences with union and employer at a downtown hotel. He met the two groups in adjoining rooms-a fact of which they were initially -unaware. After giving each a heartwarm­ ing talk on the wisdom of adjusting differences, he threw open the intervening door and they confronted each other-face to face. There was a little embarrassment at first, but within 10 minutes negotiations began. Roe left them together for 10 hours, until they had hammered out a settlement, point by point. Then he packed his bag and left town. Roe, the itinerant peacemaker, is one of some 300 Commissioners of Conciliation employed by the Labor Department. Stationed in offices throughout the country, they are ready-literally at a mo­ment's notice-to jump into the middle of any labor fray in their area and try to patch things up. Only a few of these disputes are the big strikes that make head­lines. No more than a handful of such major crises occur a year. Most strikes-in peace and war, in good times and bad-are merely of local significance. And yet their prompt settlement makes the difference between harmony and turmoil throughout industrial America. A commissioner has a frenzied, informal, highly specialized job. It demands a unique combination of the talents of domestic rela­tions judge, efficiency expert, boxing referee, and statesman. Few men can make the grade. In the whole country there are no more than 400 experienced, full-time conciliators and mediators (the terms an, interchangeable) employed by either the Conciliation Service or the State Mediation Boards. In addition, there are a few free-lance mediators employed by no government agency. The public sees little of their activities, knows few of their names; their work is highly confidential. Typical Mediator The typical mediator is middle-aged, a mellow, experienced, un­ruffled gentleman who was originally a lawyer, labor leader, per­sonnel manager, economist, college teacher, or businessman. As such, he has usually spent yeal'.1S studying or engaging in some phase of labor relations. He comes to his new job a partisan of neither capi· tal nor labor, but with considerable knowledge of labor laws and Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes regulations, some grounding in trade-union history, a~ an infi­nite capacity-demonstrated before he is hired-for pulling a quick compromise out of his hat. His success depends entirely on.his per­suasiveness and ingenuity. He has no legal powers to compel a set­tlement-mediation is a wmpletely voluntary process. John Roe, our average, composite mediator, is a man of 55-a doughty, black-haired character whose appearance would be for­bidding were it not for a mild and quizzical manner and a temper that can seldom be roused. He is in the "self-made" American tra­dition-he knows the life of the industrial wage-earner from inti­mate association, and he can be sympathetic to the problems of the businessman because has has been one. Roe, who has worked since he was 14, has been a farm hand, dishwasher, construction worker, and truck driver. For years he was a local official in the teamsters' union. Later, he returned to his hometown and opened a diner. It flourished and he established a small chain. Then he went into politics, served two terms as mayor. Over the years he had a hand in a number of strikes that broke out in his town. His fame as an unofficial mediator spread and soon he began to be called into labor cases throughout the state. Dur­ ing the war, when the Conciliation Service urgently needed more manpower, Roe was taken on the staff. He has been commissioner ever since. For salaries ranging from $4,900 to $7,100, the conciliators serv­ ices are on tap 24 hours a day. It is not only a strenuous life, but one demanding adherence to a complicated social code. To succeed in his mission, the mediator must not say or do anything indicating partiality towards either side. On the other hand, he must enjoy the friendliest relations with both sides. Thus he is constantly walk­ ing a rope. And yet the job has its compensations. The U.S. Conciliation Serv­ ice has piled up an enviable record. From its establishment in 1913, it has handled more than 126,.000 cases-strikes, lockouts, threat­ ened strikes and threatened lockouts ,as well as other minor disputes. During the war and after, its staff nearly tripled. As for the State mediation boards, it is impossible to estimate the number of cases handled, but they run into the thousands. PREVALENCE OF ARBITRATION PROVISIONS (Reprinted from Bulletin No. 780 of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.) Three out of four union agreements in 14 important industries, covering about 83 per cent of the workers under the agreements analyzed, provide for arbitration as the terminal point in the griev­ance machinery.* *This study of arbitration provisions is based on an ana]ysis of 1,254 agreements, all. of which were in effect in January, 1944. In some .industries almost all the agreements provide for the ar­ bitration of disputes arising during the terms of the agreements; in other• industries this means of settling grievances is less com­ mon. In the petroleum production and refining, steel (blast fur­ naces and rolling mills), and textile industries, over 90 per cent of the agreements provide arbitration, whereas such provisions are contained in only about 40 per cent of the agreements covering auto­ mobile and parts plants and in about 60 per cent of the agreements covering plants manufacturing machinery (other than electrical). Between 60 and 70 per cent of the agreements in the aluminum, rubber, and steel products industries and between 75 and 85 per cent of the agreements in aircraft, industrial chemicals, electrical machinery, and meat-packing industries have arbitration provisions. On the whole, agreements with large companies tend to have arbi­ tration provisions more frequently than agreements covering smaller plants. COAL WITHOUT STRIKES By STEPHEN RAUSHENBUSH (Excerpts from article in Harper's Magazine, June, 1947. ) During the war our coal industry performed like a robust giant. It turned out plenty of fuel for the greatest industrial effort ever attempted by any nation. Production, prices and profits all went up. The old miners in the mountain towns hobbled and coughed out of retirement to take their sons' places in the pits. Company doctors stopped asking whether a miner's heart was good; they sim­ply asked whether it would beat. Take-home pay increased impres­sively. This gigantic job led many of us to forget that coal is really our old industrial woman with too many children. It suffered from too much production for a long time before the war. With a small recession and a drop in the abnormal foreign demand, the industry will again be packing the children off to bed without quite enough supper. Before the industry reluctantly starts to retrace its troubled past and a considerable segment of our economy begins to break up like rotten ice under our feet, I would like to make a thoughtfully brash assertion. There is no necessity either for a return to the old prac­tice of periodic strikes · or for another complete collapse of the ir..dustry. If the operators and miners are willing to consider a new approach to their mutual difficulties, a long peace for coal is pos­sible. Price stability also is possible. After all, tougher problems than those presented by coal have been mastered by the human mind before this. Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes Proposal for Avoiding Strikes The proposal is simply that the industry stop living on shock treatments, administered on a year-to-year basis, and start to work out a long-term program for living together and liking it. The pro­posal outlines one way to avoid both bankruptcy for operators and wage losses for miners. It ties the problems of overcapacity, low prices, and wages together in one bundle, and suggests that an advance agreement can be made for handling all of them which will hold .for n or even twenty years. This new kind of approach need not be limited to coal alone. All of our basic industries desperately need some alternative to the shock of frequent industrial warfare, with all its attendant hard­ship on innocent bystanders. One of the most resented penalties of modern life is that we have become more and more dependent upon fewer and smaller groups. Stoppages in a few key places­tugboats, trucking, rapid transit lines, or power houses-can endan­ger the health and jobs of all of us. A few weeks' cont:nuation of the coal dispute last fall, when many companies were caught with­out stocks, would have thrown us out of work by the millions in­stead of by the thousands. It would have nicked the national in­come by billions instead of millions. Its shadow would have black­ened our foreign policy all over Europe. If the coal industry, with all this capacity for trouble, can find some more reasonable solution, we may hope that in time the other key parts of our economy will do the same. Each critical industry has its own special problems, which will have to be solved sepa­rately and on a voluntary basis. Most industries-includfog coal­are quite capable of tackling these problems themselves. If they fail to pitch into the job promptly, however, perhaps the President's new Council of Economic Advisers might do well to nudge them into action. In coal especially the crisis is so close at hand that some outside agency, which is willing o respect the difficulties facing all groups in the industry, might be justified in laying a few sugges­tions before them. Details of Program The first part of my proposal is that a long-term labor contract should be voluntarily negotiated, which definitely specifies that wages will follow some cost-of-living index up or down from some base year, perhaps 1945. The second part of the proposal is that the operators should tie the rest of their stabilization problems into the long-term labor contract. The final part of my proposal is that the industry should get advance approval from Congress for its entire labor and stabiliza­ tion plan, and that in return it should give Congress certain guaran­tees to protect the public interest. These guarantees would be writ­ten into law and into the long-term contract. They should provide that: 1. There will be no monopoly or discrimination. 2. Newcomers will be free to enter the industry, provided they accept the terms of the contract. 3. The industry will reduce prices whenever its average over-all profit reaches certain specified limits. These ceP;r.gs would, of course, have to be considered reasonable by Congress and also be acceptable to the industry. In order to encourage efficiency, they should be scaled upward as costs are brought down. 4. The moment any of the guarantees is broken, the whole con­tract will be automatically suspended ; and it will stay suspended until it is reauthorized by Congress. AFFIRMATIVE READING MATERIAL COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF ALL LABOR DISPUTES AFFIRMATIVE SPEECH By E. G. SHELTON (Debate of The University of Texas versus The University of Kansas during annual tournament of the Missouri Valley Forensic League, March ZS-30, 1946, at I The University of Texas. Univer.y Debaters' Annual, 1946, pp. 271-279. H. W. Wilson Company, New Y<>rk.) There is no doubt that in the last few years labor disputes re­sulting in strikes, lockouts, and other unfair practices have led to loss in production and have been on the increase. From 1931 to 1937, sixteen million dwys a year on an average were lost by laborers. In 1945, that had gone up to thirty-five mil-. lion man-days lost due to strikes. In January, 1946, one month, nine­million man-days were lost due to strikes and nearly two 111illio11. workers were out on strikes. · · And in April, the month that is coming up, we have a threatened coal strike aiid many other strikes are threatened which will be a great detriment to our nation and to our people. Therefore, it is appropriate that we discuss today the question, "Resolved: That Congress should enact legislation requiring compulsory arbitration in all labor disputes." Arbitration Defined We think this statement of the question is very clear except for one or two terms. By "arbitration," we mean arbitration by an administrative tribunal before which the parties in the d'.spute ap­pear and place their contentions. The administrative tribunal, an unbiased tribunal, finds its decisions and hands down its award. This award may be in favor of either or both parties. This award is then imposed upon the participants in the dispute. They are compelled to abide by it. By "all labor disputes" we mean all those that are not settled by voluntary means, which threaten to develop into strikes and lockouts, and we mean by the wording of the ques­tion that we should adopt this now, in view of conditions today. It is the agreed policy of the United States, and I think both the Affirmative and Negative will agree with this, that any practice which retards the free flow of commerce and the free flow of goods in production is a detriment to our nation. Our Congress and our people have declared that to be our policy, to foster the free flow of commerce and free flow of goods from "raw materials ino fin­ished products." Therefore, any disputes which result in work stop­pages, that interfere with that commerce, that interfere with that policy constitute a need for a change, because such disputes which result in strikes, lockouts, and other unfair practices injure the nation, the public, the stockholders, and the workers. Now how does it injure the nation? National Economy Damaged In the first place, the situation as we have it today results in open economic warfare. The ¥tuation results in riots, mobs, class hatred, and in many cases in assault and murder. Death has oc­curred in many strikes-the Pullman strike, the Vultee aircraft strike, the New York railroad strike, the Ford strike, and the milk strike. Can that be justified-can death be justified? Waste has occurred-waste in a hungry world ; hungry for food, hungry for materials, hungry for finished products. We all know of instances where food has spoiled on the track because it could not be shipped due to a strike. We all know of instances where oranges, apples, and other foods have rotted when people wanted them. And in the Pennsylvania: coal strike, machinery was destroyed, another_great destruction; and in the Tennessee railroatl strike, roll­ing stock was destroyed; and in the Petrillo activities with the musicians' union, he has threatened to destroy an entire industry. Can that be justified today? And third, the nation is hurt because there is danger to secu­rity through strikes and lockouts. We all know that our nation, with its highly integrated industry, is subject to bottlenecks, wherein a strike in one small plant may start a chain reaction which may go through every industry. One small strike may hold up produc­tion in many other plants. It is obvious that a communication strike would tie up the whole country, a strike involving only a few thousand workers. The wheel strike recently tied up production of automobiles and in the war the Allis Chalmers strike tied up produc­tion in the Ford aircraft plant, the Bendix aircraft plant, and the Ingersoll Rand aircraft plant. Work on twenty-five destroyers was stopped and work in two aluminum plants was stopped. Can this be justified'! And fourth, the nation suffers through loss of potential output. Two hundred billion dollars a year was our average production dur­ing the war, which is four times -our national income of 1932, twice as much as we have ever produced before. Why cannot we do this in peace? Why must we do this only in war? Can this be justified ·in our civilized society today? Stockholders Suffer In addition to the nation's suffering, stockholders suffer also, be­cause through decreased production, they have decreased profits. In a Republic steel strike of 1937, there were certain practices which resulted in the stockholders suing that corporat'.on for over twelve million dollars. The corporation had spent money, it seemed, to hire strikebreakers and to buy munitions. The stockholders had to sue for that money. Not only that, but idle machinery in plants during strikes had to be repaired and renovated. And we all know of the Higgins Boat case where an entire industry had to close down and men were thrown out of work ~nd there were fewer jobs because of a jurisdictional strike between two unions. Can that be justified in America today? Workers Suffer And third, workers suffer today, in addition to stockholders and the nation. The theory of the strike is to give more to the workers. And yet we find that in actual practice, workers get less because of their strikes. The American Federation of Labor in a recent survey has said that in one of their recent strikes, in which they were striking for 6 cents an hour increase, it will take three years to make up the losses in wages due to that strike if they get this 6 cents increase; and, if an OPA ceiling price is broken because of that, those workers' savings and insurance will be greatly endan­gered. In the General Motors strike which occurred just recently, it will take the workers· seven years to make up the income that they lost with their increases. In 1945, $250,000,000 in wages was lost by labor. In the Ford strike, .during the war, $900,000 a day was lost by labor. Not only this, but labor also sutlers through the present situation because racketeers and selfish interests within labor can make the most of strife and strikes and other practices to the detriment of labor. We all know that in the recent General Motors strike it all boiled down into a contest between Reuther and Thomas as to who was to be President of the United Automobile Workers. Workers in many cases resort to the jurisdictional strike and sym­pathy strikes, such as the recent Bell Telephone strike, a strike where none of their interests were directly involved. And some labor leaders, very few I might say, but some, actually advocate the adoption of acceleration of misery. Public Inconvenienced And who also suffers? The public suffers. Why must the public be inconvenienced .by these actions of the few? And their transpor­ tation held up, their coal held up, and their necessities of life held up; ice boxes, refrigerators, automobiles! Why must they be actu­ally harmed in the case of coal strikes where men have to go cold in the winer? And in the case of a milk strike where they don't have their needed milk? Why should small business men be ruined by a decrease in output and farmers ruined by truckers' unions who refuse to unload their goods? Why should the public have to pay all the cost of public relief due to strikes which always happens when a strike occurs? Why should the public have to pay the $160,­000,000 in taxes that was refunded to General Motors, due to strikes last year when their production went down? Why all this power in the hands of so few? Why should the public, the workers, and the stockholders of the nation suffer? Because the present system is not working and be­cause the present system of mediation, conciliation and collective bargaining sometimes leads, itself, to strikes? We are not anti­labor; we are not anti-capitalistic; we don't place the blame for strikes on one or the other. We place the blame on the strike itself, no matter who caused it. It is the strike in the individual field and in the international field. All we intend to do is extend it to the economic field. Voluntary arbitration today settles 95 per cent of our strikes but it does not settle the big strikes. The other 5 per cent we pro­vose to make compulsory, to make them arbitrate in order to settle those so that the public will not suffer. If we can show you how compulsory arbitration will remedy the evils that we have pointed out, I think that you will agree with us that we should adopt compulsory arbitration in the United States today. COMPULSORY ARBITRATION-THE ONLY ANSWER i3y DAVID LAWRENCE (Reprinted from United States N ews, May 31, 1946.) The right of an individual to quit work is inviolate but the right of one or more persons to influence a whole group to quit is not unlimited. Big unionism is just as much subject to regulation in the public interest as big business. The ?'ight of the people to be secure in their employment and in the distribution of the necessities of life tra1).Scends the right of any grouv to obstruct such employment or such distribution. These are basic truths inherent in the right of the people to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. To deprive the people of these rights by economic force is to assert a right of rebellion. Rebellion cannot be tolerated by the majority. A railroad strike is rebellion. Eighteen brotherhoods promptly accepted th!\ President's proposals but two unions employed in the same transportation business did not. In a sense a vote of 18 to 2 favored the settlement, but the ·minority had it in its power to rebel and tie up the nation's economic system. 'This power has come about through the grant of monopoly priv­ileges to unions. As long as those privileges were not abused, they were called "rights" and were respected by the people as perhaps a desirable way to secure for labor needful changes in wages and working conditions. But the "right" to concerted action is forfeited when it becomes an effort to damage the public as a whole. Courageous Leadership Needed The problem before the country is not at all complicated. It sim­ply requfres a courageous leadership, as is always the case when a nation faces rebellion. . .. . . . It is important not to penalize the many law-abiding citi­ zens who have banded themselves into labor unions which have not struck and which have adopted the right of reason and compro­ mise. The right to bargain collectively should not be weakened. There should, on the other hand, be equal responsibility imposed on unions and management to bargain in good faith and to com­ ply with contracts and agreements. This, however, is not enough. A failure of collective bargaining leads to strikes or lockouts as a means of enforcing demands. Neither strikes nor lockouts which damage or threaten to damage the public interest should be lawful. Public utilities and govern­ ment agencies, federal, state and city, cannot be permitted to stop functioning. Certain industries essential to public health and safety must be kept in operation, • To settle labor disputes in these essential businesses, ·a system of compulsory arbitration must be established. Congress by law au­thorizes the Interstate Commerce Commission to fix freight and pas­senger rates, ~nd thus the income of the railroads is regulated by the government. Why shouldn't the outgo of the railroads be sim­ilarly regulated when unions and management cannot agree? The existing Railway Labor Act, which has been on the statute books for years, provides an elaborate machinery for settling dis­ putes in the transportation business. The law has worked in the sense that its restraints upon immediate work stoppages have been effective and the railroad unions and carriers have gone through the process of mediation and acceptance of fact-finding board rec­ommendations. While there has been a limitation as to the time when a strike could be called, the right to strike was not prohib­ited. Hence the fact that labor and management have gotten along and neither has gone the limit heretofore in stopping overation has been taken to mean that ·the law -..yas a success. Today, however, even the machinery of the Railway Labor Act has failed to prevent a strike and Congress must go a step further. It must provide that an impartial tribunal shall be set up with a system of umpires, and that both sides must accept the award of such arbitration body or subject themselves to the penalties of in­junction and governmental power. Congress Is Agent for Public The principle of compulsory arbitration, is, of course, a limita­tion on the freedom of both parties but such limitation is essential to protect the public interest. There are no rights which supersede those of the public as a whole, and the Congress must act as the representative agent of the American people and not any small seg­ment of it. Coal, for instance, is an essential business. Without it, the lights go out and electric power is stopped. The miners' union is a mo­nopoly. The Congress should never allow "closed shops" to exist. They are as much a restraint on the freedom of individuals as the concerted action of corporations in monopolizing a market of com­modities. Wagner Act Not the Answer The Wagner Act was passed in order to cut down j;he number of strikes. It has not done so. It has protected labor's rights but labor unions of the larger type in the automobile, steel, coal and rail­road industries now have such big memberships and such political strength that they behave as if they constituted a whole system of government above the federal power. They rely on their voting strength at the polk to command Congress and the President. Ac­tually they constiute a minority of the voters but the rest of the vcters-the victims-have never been aroused sufficiently to put this minority in its place. Repeal of the Wagner Act was, a few months ago, thought im­possible. Today the movement to amend it has grown to the point where substantial changes are being proposed in Congress. When any organization of labor or management acquires power that is· greater than that of government itself and can actually paralyze the nation's economic system at will, it is time for the representatives of the people in the national legislature to protect the public interest. Action by Congress has long b_een overdue. WHY NOT LABOR COURTS? By HOMER FERGUSON U.S. Senator from Michigan (Reprinted from The American M~gazine, February, 1947.) Four times within the past year our nation has come perilously close to complete paralysis because certain of our industrial and labor captains could not settle their disputes peaceably. During the steel strike, during the railroad strike, and during two different coal strikes 140,000,000 Americans stood by helplessly as our magnificent industrial system began grinding to a stop. The last coal strike marks the eighth time in five years that a private citizen has threatened to deprive his nation of its major source of industrial power. During each of these eight times at least 25,000,000 American workers, aside from miners, have faced the prospect of unemployment. Even more discouraging, we have seen, during these seemingly innumerable industrial crises, the spectacle of the President of our nation trying to intervene to bring peace, only to be defied or abused for his efforts. As far as industrial disputes are concerned we are in a state of near-anarchy. Our government, in this area, has·lost. its power to govern. This situation has become intolerable. We cannot afford a na­tional paralysis every few months, simply because labor and indus­trial managers cannot agree on a contract, or on £he interpreta­tion of one made by them. As a former judge, it does not make sense to me that modern­day America should have to endure public brawling, even if the brawling is done by sovereign giants of capital and labor. Courts the Answer to Disputes Labor disputes should be settled where all our other domestic dis­putes are settled-in court. When two private citizens, a landlord and a tenant, for example, fall into disagreement over the terms of a lease, they are not permitted to fight it out in the public streets. If they did, they would be jailed for disturbing the peace or for disorderly conduct. Instead, they take their problems to court. And when the judge pronounces the decision they llbide by it. Justice has spoken. Why are labor-management disputes any different from tenant­landlord disputes except that the issues are bigger, more people are involved, and the economic security of the nation is endanger~d? Basically, they are the same. The difference is in the handling of the issues. Industrial disputes are still settled on the basis of eco­nomic power. Which side can outstrangle the other in a showdown? And nowadays these strangle holds cover such wide areas that the public's 'neck is usually included. The time has come to sett!J! these disputes on the basis of jus­tice instead of on the basis of strangle holds. I think we should subject industrial disputes, along with all other disputes, to the legal discipline of a civilized society. Plan Evolved for Court System After talking with representatives of both labor and management and with representatives of both major political parties, I have worked out a plan to set up a system of American Labor Courts. These courts would parallel our regular federal courts, and wou!'.I judge every dispute on the basis of justice. All labor contracts affecting interstate commerce would be filed with these courts, and whenever disagreements arose concerning the terms set down, the judges would help the parties arrive at a settlement. If they failed to arrive at such a settlement the court would hold public hearing as in any other case, and then make a decision which would be binding on all parties to the contract. Furthermore, where basi~ industries or interstate public utilities were involved, and the parties were unable to reach an agreement on a c9ntract to start with, the courts would resolve the matter and the decis"ons of the court-would be final. Compulsory Arbitration for Basic Industries This amounts to compulsory arbitration in these basic industries. I see no other remedy when the nation is faced with a monopoly, either of labor or of management, which can paralyze the indus­trial life of the country. Such drastic penalties would be available to ensure enforcement that neither party would seriously consider defying the labor courts, just as today contestants never consider defying the decisions of any of our other courts. I believe that such a system of labor courts offers a fair, sane, and sensible solution to one of the two big problems facing the nation today; recurrent industrial crises. It took two horrible wars to convince the world that wars are outdated and must be outlawed. Similarly, it took the recent series of catastrophic strikes to convince the American public that strikes in basic industries are as outdated as wars, and must somehow be outlawed. Strikes, like wars, have become too expensive. And just as inno­cent civilians are now the main victims of wars, they are the main victims of strikes. Most people will grant that strikes once had their proper role in our economy, but that time is rapidly passing. Today, our economy is so intermeshed, and both unions and industries have grown so big, that a single strike can paralyze the nation. A strike in the steel industry (or a lockout by management) not only affects the steel workers and their families, but it also affects every one of the literally thousands of industries that use steel in their products, whether automobiles, toy trains, or fence posts. And it no longer takes a big strike to paralyze a large section of our nation. The more than 7,000,000 residents of New York City, for example, found that a strike of a mere 6,000 tugboat operators could, and did, bring them to their knees. They were put under virtual martial law as churches, schools, theaters, and business houses were instructed to close. Or again, when truck drivers entering their city with food and supplies went on strike, they were deprived of fresh vegetables, meats, fruits, and medicines. The trucking tie-up affected virtuallly every shop and business in the city and caused losses of business running literally into billions of dollars. Yet the dispute was be­ tween the ·trucks' drivers and owners! Who's to Blame? We do not have to decide that either union leaders or industrial­ ists are to "blame" for the series of strikes we have had to suffer in order to decide that we need a forum and machinery with which to settle labor disputes. The blame rests on us as a whole for allowing unions and in­. dustries to exist in our midst as sovereign powers. Given such sovereignty and such conflicting interests, strikes prob­ ably are inevitable, just as wars are inevitable when there are no laws that nations abide by. Both capital and labor want to get all they can, and, lacking restraints, will do so. If recently labor has been more to blame than capital, it is be­ cause labor has come up to, if not surpassed, capital in the eco­ nomic power it can wield in a showdown. For years capital was ruthless and domineering. It formed monopolies and it exploited labor. Since 1929, however, labor has been on the ascendant, and now has its own monopolies and its own domineering attitude among some of its leaders. It, too, has its lobbies, and powerful ones, in Washington. Lacking any standard for judging issues except force, labor has become increasingly aggressive. Rival unions raid one another, and their leaders often compete with one another to see which can force the largest concessions from management. Every aggressive union leader who demonstrates that he can "get away with" a crippling strike which forces new concession·s from management sets a prec­edent that rival leaders feel they must imitate, or perish. Some leaders demonstrate admirable restraint and awareness of their new responsibilities, but some do not. I have heard. it argued by those who oppose any change in the present voluntary system of handling strikes that everything will work out all right once we have an aroused public interest. Frankly, I don't think that an aroused public interest "fazes" the Petrillos or the Bridgesses in the least. Public opinion is aroused. In fact, it is close to the boiling point. Opinion is so aroused that it may force through punitive laws that may throttle labor so completely that capital will again have the upper hand. Punitive Laws Not Solution But that is not the solution. We would start building toward the same economic war all over again. What we need is a sane pro­gram fair to both sides that will still give the long-suffering public a break, and let the country get on with its reconversion. Lately I've been hearing a great many proposals to curb labor by prohibiting this or that. I hear, for example: "Pass a law forbidding monopoly in labor." "Pass a law prohibiting the closed shop." "Pass a law outlawing secondary boycotts." "Pass a law prohibiting coercion of individual workers by vio­ lence through mass picketing." Some of these have merit, but if passed there would be no ma­chinery with which to carry them out. Passing such laws will not get at the basic problem, which is to provide the machinery and a forum where disputes can be settled decisively short of conflict. Such a machinery is available in the labor courts which I sug­gest. The appealing thing about a court system, to me, is that it is sim­ple, clear-cut, understandable-and, most of all, fair. It is neither anti-labor nor anti-management, but rather is pro-everybody. Our courts have long been admired as symbols of impartial justice, and I believe that the labor courts would soon likewise become such symbols. The labor-court system, incidentally, has been tried in such coun­tries as Australia, New Zealand, and France, and has worked out very well for all concerned. Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes Here briefly, is how the labor-court system might work: There would be district labor courts, circuit courts of appeal, and finally a supreme court of labor. The judges would be appointed by the Presi­dent and approved by the Senate. They would receive up to $15,000 a year. There would be three judges in each district court, five or seven in each circuit court of appeals, and nine in the supreme court. In all these, the lay judges would always outnumber the legal judges by one, because of the many questions of fact that would come be­fore the labor courts. And in all cases they would be selected fo1· their fair-mindedness. Any representative of labor or management, whether he was a lawyer or not, could appear before this bar. Unions and management would still negotiate their contracts by collective bargaining, just as they do today. If they can arrive at mutually agreeable contracts without help, fine. When they can't, they can call upon the judges to act as conciliators or arbitrators, or they can call in outside _intermediaries. No Strikes 'in Basic lndystries The main thing is that they arrive at some agreement. It is hoped that all negotiators will be able to arrive at agreement, with the help of such machinery. But if a basic industry engaged in inter­state commerce or interstate public utility is involved, a contract must be reached. There can be no strikes in such industries. If the parties cannot agree on terms of the contract, then the courts will arbitrate, and the decisions of the court will be final. What industries should be subject to such compulsory arbitra­tion? I believe congressional hearings should be held to decide whicn ones to include. However, I believe that at least these eight should be included: Basic steel, coal, oil, gas (when crossing State lines), all maritime shipping, railroads, electric power, telephone and tele­graph. Perhaps, eventually, the court system will work out so well that the public will want all industries to come under this compulsory arbitration. The reason I make a division is that it might put too much of a load on the courts at the start to make them responsible for peace on the whole industrial front. So we should start where strikes have the most devastating effect on our economy. However, once a contract is made, in whatever industry engaged in interstate commerce, it must be filed with the courts. And once it is filed, any future disputes about changing the contract or about it.c; interpretation must be argued before the court. And the deci­sion of the judges must be final. Thus, if John L. Lewis became dissatified with his contract, as he did recently, he would have to establish before the courts that he had a legal right to cancel the contract. If the courts decided the contract could not be canceled without the operators' consent, that would be the end of it. 'The enforcement provisions available to the courts would insure that. There would be no defiance---at least, not if he wanted to continue to be a labor leader. Law without enforcement is a mockery. Any representative of labor or industry who defied the verdicts of the court would be prohibited from appearing before the courts in the future. He would have taken from him the right to negotiate any contracts. In short, he would be disbarred, just as a lawyer guilty of malpractice may be disbarred. Furthermore, the courts would be empowered to levy heavy fines against corporations or unions that refused to abide by their decrees. In order that undue hardship would not be inflicted on either side in a dispute, provision should be made that the courts be required to pass down a decision within a few days of the time a case is filed with them. Speedy justice is essential. Little Strikes Eliminated To a lot of people, including industrialists and workingmen alike, one great appeal of the court system is that it would end the cur­rent flood of little pesky strikes arising from differing interpreta­tions of contract. I talked recently to a taxicab driver in my home town of Detroit who said he quit a higher-paying job with a big auto-making com­pany because the men in his department were continually being called out on strike. Perhaps a man would be discharged for shoot­ing dice in the washroom. So out the whole department would go on strike until he was reinstated. These 3-day strikes add up. If the courts were available to rule on the justice of the discharge there would be no necessity for strikes. Again, men are often called out on strike in a jurisdictional dis­pute with another union. Perhaps a steamfitters' union and a car­penter's union both feel they should fasten a certain pipe to a wall. Let the courts decide which, instead of the men sulking on strike. There will be those who say that the scheme is impracticable because no court composed of human beings is capable of arriving at just decisions involving such complex matters as arise in indus­trial disputes. I can say to this that during my 14 years 'on the bench I was required to reach decisions on all types of cases, in­cluding labor disputes-and found the latter no more difficult than many of the others. Some labo_r people may be apprehensive of the proposal I have outlined because it interferes, as far as persons in basic industries are concerned, with their right to strike. They consider this right to strike as sacred. It would be if they have no other means of getting a fair deal, as is true at present. But if they are assured of justice through the courts, they should be delighted to adopt this less expensive substitute, which will be their guarantee of eco­nomic security. Furthermore, this would not prevent any man or woman frcim quitting his or her job. I shall have to acknowledge that the court set-up would take away some of the labor leader's glory in mapping strike strategy and in talking tough to management and to government. But he would have an even greater opportunity to serve his constituents constructively. The courts would give him a better forum than he now has for presenting his case to the public. His task would be to present the best possible case for his men to the courts. To my mind, there is no question that workers should organize and be rep­resented by spokesmen of their own choosing-as management should represent the stockholders in the industry. Court Encouragement to Unions In a sense, the court structure would be an encouragement to unionism because the courts would not _function except where the employees of a company had a spokesman empowered to represent their collective interests. Sanctity of contract through decisions of a labor court would enhance the security of both labor and indus­ try and also protect the interests of the general public. And management should like the court set-up if for no other reason than that it would permit its leaders to plan better for the future if they were assured that production would not be inter­ rupted periodically by strikes. I have a suspicion that if the labor-court plan is put into prac­ tice we shall see a great reduction in the bickering and feuding between capital and labor. They both will no longer need to have chips on their shoulders to protect their interests, because they will know that their rights are assured by the presence in the back­ ground of the labor courts. Furthermore, both sides will know that if they have to state their case in a public forum before the court they will not raise issues unless they know they have a good case. And they will know, further, that they will not be able to becloud the issues by emotional appeals, as they often can now. The great principle which has shaped America's growth for a century and a half is that of equal justice under law. I believe . The University of Texas that if we are to fulfill our destiny as a people it is time we broaden application of the principle to include labor-management relations. Let justice, and not power politics, reign in our workshops. ATTORNEY PROPOSES COMPULSORY ARBITRA­ TION FOR COAL, UTILITIES (Reprinted from The Commonwealth, December 23, 1946, page 350.) Compulsory arbitration for public utilities and related industries was proposed before the Economics Section recently by Irving S. Rosenblatt, Jr., attorney. Included in such industries, Rosenblatt said, would be "telephone, railroads, coal mining, as well as possibly oil and steel." Tracing the history of regulatory laws, he pointed out that both employer and labor groups had at times favored "government inter­ference"-but for different purposes. "Bearing in mind that pretty much all law and regulation con­ sists of forbidding men to do something they want to do, we can see, generally speaking, that we favor regulations that directly help us and fight regulations that directly limit our conduct," he said. "No law limiting liberty of contract ought to go beyond neces­ sity. We have no right to force compulsory arbitration in all dis­ putes on the employer, bec~use it results in a material interference with the right to run his business as he sees fit; or on labor, be­ cause it would mean the giving up of their great economic weapon, the strike, without which they feel they would be frozen into a 'status quo' relationship." Unfortunately, the recent prohibitions against work stoppages have been directed against business taken over by the United States government. I have always considered the shiboleth of government ownership or management as the wrong criteria of whether work stoppages should be prohibited. The detriment to the public at large does not depend at all upon the question of who is running the enterprise. For instance, bad as a police strike might be, the consequences would be far less serious than a railroad strike or the shutting down of coal mines whether they are run by the government or not. It is entirely feasible to swear in citizens as auxiliary police. Price of Strikes A general strike on the railroads means starvation and death to the great cities. A nationwide coal strike means freezing to death the populations of our northern states and the shutdown of a major portion of American industry within a very few weeks. Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes In view of these facts, I believe compulsory arbitration laws should be enacted, as soon as Congress meets, covering units so large that a cessation of operation will seriously injure the public generally, and that state legislation should be passed requiring com­pulsory arbitration of industrial disputes concerning units, even though local in character, if their continued operation is of vital importance to the public in one locality. Labor courts should be set up with full-time experienced arbitra­tors receiving salaries sufficiently high and with sufficiently secure tenure so that the arbitrator will be removed from influence by the contending factions. There are certain criteria the arbitrator should be guided by, such as prevailing price levels, the going wage for similar work in industries not covered by compulsory arbitration, and the profits (past, present and anticipated) of the company involved. · Continuation of our present course can lead only to the collapse of industry and unemployment, with an enraged public demanding restrictive, punitive legislation which will take away from labor those rights and privileges to which it is entitled. PUBLIC POLICY IN LABOR DISPUTES: THE CRISIS OF 1946 By ORME W. PHELPS (Reprinted from The Journal of Political E conomy, Vol. LV, No. 3, June, 1947 ; the following is a:n excerpt from pages 194-197.) Compulsory arbitration has long been the bete noire of both or­ganized labor and management. There can be no doubt about the opposition of union and management groups considered broadly rep­resentative of their constituencies. An example of unanimity in this respect was reported in the CIO News for December 24, 1946, which contained a "warning that compulsory arbitration or 'super machin­ery' for disposition of labor-employer disputes 'may frustrate rather than foster industrial peace.' " The warning was issued by an eight-man advisory committee to the United States Conciliation Service, composed of four members chosen by the C.1.0. and the A. F. of L. and four chosen by the United States Chamber of Com­merce and the National Association of Manufacturers.1s The case lBCommitte members were: Clinton S. Golden and Richard T. Leonard (C.I.0.), Frank P. Fenton and Boris Shiskin (A.F. of L .,) and V. P. Ahearn, Louis Ruthen­berg, C. 0. Skinner, and H . W. Steinkraus (representing industry). The essence of the committee's position was that "it believes free collective bargaining can work and that government's role in negotiatio·ns should be limited to voluntary mediation through the U .S. Conciliation Service. To supplement the work of conciliators, the committee recommended panels of conci1iators, tripartite arbitra... tion of a voluntary basis, and emergency fact...finding boards. The University of Texas against compulsory adjudication of "industrial disputes is also but­tressed by the opposition of an impressive list of qualified students of the problem, some of whom have had extensive experience in labor affairs. An extreme example of adhere~ce to the principle of volunteerism by members of this group is a "Letter to the Times,"rn supporting the establishment of a five-man Federal Mediation Board with limited powers,20 and rejecting the Case Bill. The letter was signed by thirty-two economists, political scientists, and other edu­cators. Its thesis was as follows: We urge that free collective bargaining is the ultimate basis upon which sound labor relations must be built. . . . Government inter­vention can destroy the process of free collective bargaining if it takes the form of a declaration to American workers that they are not free to take strike action even if the prohibition is ostensibly for a limited period of time. . . . Great as may be the incon reni­ence to the American public in any given strike action, fa1" gre(tter is its direct impact on the union workers who by their voluntary action c.ut off their earnings in a joint effort to improve their work­ing conditions.21 Other writers have been equally positive about the subject.22 However, there are dissenters,-and, while not so numerous, they are equally experienced and influential. Our only living former President has a ic w, Vol. 64. No. 6. June, 1946, pp. lOla-1020 and 1026-102~. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. ) At the outbreak of World War II collective agreements between labor unions and employers' associations had gained wide acceptance as a method of regulating conditions of work and terms of em­ployment in Great Britain, Belgium, Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, and France. These agreements were sometimes negotiated on an industry-wide basis, a practice which has increased since 1939. The governments of these countries had encouraged the negotia­tion of collective agreements during the interwar period, by assist­ing the formation of joint councils of employers and employees; by providing legal methods and procedures for enforcing agreements; .and in some cases by giving the voluntary agreements greater force and wider coverage through legal extension. Decisions as to what standards an agreement should contain, and if indeed there should be an agreement, were left to the parties themselves. The war brought no sharp break in the development of collective agreements in Great Britain and Sweden. In the other countries here reviewed, collective agreements were subjected to government controls as a result of the war years and the German occupation. Upon liberation, efforts were made to restore the pre-war patterns, although the war and its economic and political aftermath produced some alterations. By 1946, agreements had in general greater legal force, greater uniformity, and wider coverage than in 1939. At the same time, however, agreements lost some of their voluntary character and flex­ibility, at least for the time being. ·During the emergency period, 1939-1940, the extension of government controls to wage stabiliza­tion generally modified the contents of the agreements in each of the countries under review. This was, however, accompanied by in­creased consultation of the government with the central federations of employers and employees. Governmental control regarding the form, contents, and scope of collective agreements also increased, notably in France. Information on the extent of collective agreements is fragmen­tary because in most of these countries there is no central agency, governmental or otherwise, with which collective agreements must be filed. For many years, Norwegian legislation has required that collective agreements be filed with the government mediator who reports on their extent and coverage. In France, since 1936, copies of agreements have had to be filed with the Ministry of Labor, as well as with the local "probiviral" courts. In Great Britain the Ministry of Labor and in Sweden the Social Board obtain informa­tion concerning changes in wages and hours negotiated by employ­ers' and workers' organizations through voluntary reporting and from reports of tbe governmental agencies connected with the set­tlement in industrial disputes. In Belgium and Denmark there does not appear to be any reporting system. Collective Agreements in Nationalized Industries The principle of collective agreements has been preserved in na­tionalized industries of France and Great Britain. In both coun­tries, the coal mines were nationalized in 1946. In France, a Min­ers' Charter, covering most of the conditions usually stipulated in a collective agreement, was promulgated by decree in June, 1946, after consultation with the most representative trade-unions of the industry. On the points covered, the decree takes the place of a collective agreement. In Great Britain, the National Coal Board, which manages the nationalized mines and ancillary enterprises, has two trade-union members, one of whom, a former secretary of the mine workers' union, handles negotiations with the union. The Coal Board, in December, 1946, entered into an agreement with the union, contin­uing in effect the 1943 national conciliation scheme, as well as existing agreements on wages and working conditions, and taking over the employers' responsibilities under those agreements. Methods of Enforcing Collective Agreements Even after unions had established the right to act in furtherance of their members' economic interest, the courts were generally re­luctant to accord the same status to agreements entered into be­tween unions and employers as to individual contracts of employ­ment. By gradual stages, however, and by different processes in the seyeral countries, the collective agreements came tQ be accepted as valid contracts. Thus, France, the Netherlands, and the Scandina­vian countries have defined by legislation the form and content of a legally binding collective agreement and have presented the meth­ods of enforcing it. In Great Britain and Belgium, the parties are able to enter into collective agreements without legal impediment, but there is no specific legislation for aiding the enforcement of such agreements. The Scandinavian countries have provided special labor courts to hear and decide disputes arising out of the appli­cation and interpretation of collective agreements. Countries without court en/orcement.-'The development of collec­tive agreements was hampered in certain countries because unions were held to be combinations in restraint.of trade. In Great Britain the Trade Union Act of 1871 removed this disability; but the Trades Disputes Act of 1906 provided that action against either a trade­union or an employers' association, arising out of a trade dispute, shall not be entertained in any court. Observance of the agree­ments rests upon the good faith of the parties, and upon their abil­ity to require observance by members of their associations. Strikes, lockouts, and other forms of direct action to enforce collective agree­ments are legal. Such actions are, however, seldom resorted to dur­ing the life of an agreement, by either side. Since 1940, refusal to observe the "recognized" terms and conditions of employment may constitute violation of a government regulation. Belgium, like Great Britain, has withheld the sanction of the damage suit for breach of agreement. In both countries, the collec­tive agreement has juridical force only through the individual agree­ment in which its terms have been incorporated. In spite of this, collective agreements are widely used and respected in both Belgium and Great Britain. Countries using regular courts.-The Netherlands and France have given legal sanction through the regular court procedures to collec­tive agreements and have endowed the associations with the right to sue for damages. In the Netherlands, . incorporated associations of employees and employers may, by a 1927 law, enter into legally valid agreements with each other, regulating conditions of employ­ment. Such agreements may be enforced by suits in the regular courts. The French laws of 1919 and 1946 provide similar resort b the civil courts. In case of a violation, by an association or one of its members, in both the Netherlands and France, the opposing association may bring suit for damages for the loss incurred by itself 01~ by one of its members. The associations are obligated to endeavor to insure observance of the agreement by their members. but unless the agreement so provides, an association is -not liable for the actions of its members. Under the Netherlands law, the members of an association who have bound themselves by a col~ec­tive agreement must abide by its terms even if they withdraw from the association; but they are not bound by amendments to the orig­inal agreement adopted subsequent to their withdrawal. Netherlands Prohibits Closed Shop In the Netherlands, collective-agreements clauses which bind an employer to employ, or not to employ, persons who belong to a particular union, party, or religious donomination are declared null and void by law. This prohibits closed shop or "yellow dog" clauses in agreements, but the law also requires employers to give non-union employees the same terms of employment as those specified in the collective agreement. Countries with labor courts.-In the three Scandinavian countries, collective agreements are enforceable in specially constituted labor courts. These have existed in Denmark since 1910, in Norway since 1915, and in Sweden since 1929. In Denmark, the scope of the court's authority is based on an agreement between the central federations of employers and unions, who are also permitted to appoint the members of the court. The law itself specifies only a few legal directives. Originally estab­ lished for the settlement of disputes arising out of the interpreta­ tion of the basic agreement between the central federations, the work of the court has been extended to interpret all collective agree­ ments between employers and unions. Only organizations, not indi­ viduals, may bring cases before the court. In Norway, also, individuals are precluded from bringing cases before the Labor Court. Furthermore, local questions arising out of the interpretation and application of agreements are referred in the first instance to the regular courts. 'The Labor Court is thus reserved for questions of national scope or for appeals. In other Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes respects the legislation in Norway and Sweden are substantially similar. Swedish law regulates in some detail the form and content of collective agreements and provides for the liability of the parties. A collective agreement entered into by an association is binding on the members of the association; a member who leaves the asso­ciation does not cease to be bound on that account. The terms of the agreement supersede the terms of individual contract and can­not be altered by 'such contracts, except as permitted by the collec­tive agreement. Hostile actions by either party (including lockout, strike, blockade, or. boycott) are prohibited during the term of the agreement in disputes concerning interpretation or application of the agreement, or in disputes for the purpose of altering terms of the agreement. An association which is bound by a collective con­tracl must endeavor under the Swedish·law to prevent its members from committing unlawful hostile actions. Breach of the agreement, or failure to carry out the obligations imposed, renders the offend­ing party (whether employer, employee, union or association) liable to damages for loss incurred. Damages imposed on an individual employer may not exceed 200 kronor. Cases may be brought before the Swedish Labor Court by an association or individual, but a member may not bring action un­less he shows that the association has refused to take action on his behalf. The Labor Court is precluded from considering a case until after such negotiations as may be required by the agreement have taken place. If the parties prefer, they may refer disputes to outside arbitrators. NEGATIVE READING MATERIAL COMPULSORY INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION, REVERSE SIDE By SAMUEL B. PETTENGILL (Reprinted from Dallas News, June 22, 1947.) Labo1· courts, or compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes, are much discussed these days. A lot of fine people are for them. They look at our courts of justice. They say, "To these courts we sub­mit the most disputes involving property, contracts, liberty, life itself. Why then should there not be similar courts to settle these disputes between labor and capital, the wage earner and the wage saver?" On the surface, the argument is persuasive. It seems simple and just. But it is not so simple, nor do I believe it just. There is a vital difference between applying the judicial power to our custom­ary suits at law and applying them to the problems of industry. The difference is this. In the customary case, judges deal with events that have already taken place. They deal with contracts already entered into by the free will of the parties. If the con­tract has been broken, a court or jury tells the man who broke it, how much damages he must pay. In other cases, a court may interpret a contract for the future guidance of the parties. But it is still dealing with a contract already freely agreed to. In either case, the court writes no new contract to take effect in the future. It is not the business of courts to write contracts. But that is what compulsory arbitration aims to do. It is designed to fix wages and working conditions of the future. 'To the extent that compulsory arbitration is effective it takes mutual consent out of contracts. And that is something new-and dangerous-subtracted from the American system. To illustrate: Jones has a house for sale. He ask $10,000 for it. Smith wants to buy it and offers $8,000. Jones won't come down. Smith won't go up. But along comes the law. Let us sup­pose it sets up a compulsory arbitration court with jurisdiction over real estate bargaining. The court hears the case and decides that the price shall be $9,000. The house cannot be sold for either more or Jess to anyone. Is that right? I don't think so. And I see no difference in prin­ciple between a price fixed by law for a man's house or price fixed by law for his time, which is part of his life. So on this question, I agree with the opposition expressed by organized labor and by the majority of business managers. When we get away from free contracts, we are entering on dangerous ground. To me, it is an entering wedge for Fascism, whose major definition is the control of all business by govern­ment. This is nothing against arbitration. I believe in arbitration when the parties cannot agree. But the agreement to arbitrate must be voluntary, not compulsory. You may ask, "But what do we do when strikes occur in vitally important public service industries, electric light and power, or rail­roads, or coal mining?" Well, while the right to quit one's job is is in the Constitution (no involuntary servitude), the right to strike and still maintain the status of an employee is not in the Consti­tution. That is the p.rivilege conferred by law. In essential indus­tries, society can protect itself in many ways. It can withdraw the privileges conferred by the Wagner Act from those who starve or freeze the public to coerce the making of a contract. Coercion is not bargaining. The compulsory arbitraticn, or contracts by the coercion of the law, is wrong in principle. It is equally wrong to coerce the in­nocent public by violence and strikes in essential industries. WHY GOVERNMENT LABOR COURTS MUST FAIL By R. C. HOILES Bucyrus Telegraph-Forum (Reprinted in the Congressional Record, January, 1947.) Many people think that the labor problem can be solved by gov­ ernment labor courts. If the word "compulsory" were used in dis­ cussing these labor courts, most people would not believe in them. But government labor courts would either have to have authority to enforce their decisions, and thus be compulsory, or else be only advisory. In either case, that is not the solution. If a labor court is to be simply advisory it invariably will side with the party that has the most votes in order to keep its job as advisor. The consumer is the best voluntary counsel for labor disputes. But let's consider what it would be if it were compulsory. Be­ cause we have courts to settle disagreement, many people think we can have courts to settle labor disputes. But the case is not at all parallel. At present courts attempt only to interpret agree­ ments that· have already been made. They never attempt to tell two people they must make an agreement. Let us suppose that an individual has a written agreement with his automobile dealer. He deems that the dealer has transgressed the agreement and takes it to court. The court interprets the agree­ment and tells what each party must do to comply with the agree­ment. But the judge does not and would not attempt to say, in the ab­sence of any prior commitment, what the automobile dealer should do in the absence of any agreement. The judge would not say that the individual must continue to patronize the automobile dealer or that th~ dealer must continue to do business with the individual, if there had been no agreement. Compulsory Arbitration Forces Unpleasant Relationship But compulsory arbitration on labor matters would do exactly that. It would attempt to force two parties to continue a relationship which they might not want to continue. If there is a labor dis­pute the labor court would come in. It hands down its decision, and the workers, although dissatisfied, must keep on working. They very likely would not keep on working, but we will assume they did. They probably would come to work but lay down on the job, so that the employer would not even want them there. But suppose that the employees do continue their services· under a decision unsatisfactory to them. After a year the arbitrators would call again. This time suppose the award is more satisfac­tory to the workers but the employer says he cannot abide by it and still continue in business. Would he be privileged to close down his shop? Or would the workers have a right to say that since they were forced to accept a distasteful situation a year before, it is poor justice that does not also compel the employer to accept a decision unsatisfactory to him? Hardly any contract is completely satisfactory to both sides. Both would like to have a better contract but it is the best they can get. So instead of either one quitting or striking, both of them agree. Then we have no strikes. Then we have continued produc­tion. Then everybody, including the customers, workers, and employ­ers, benefits more than if there was no agreements, even if not completely satisfactory to each side. The Government has no magical way of making agreements sat­isfactory to both sides. The Government is only force. Compul­sion or force is always distasteful or obnoxious to those on whom it is used. The only way strikes can be avoided is by agreement. The only way we can have voluntary agreements, and all real agreements are voluntary, is to have each party realize that he never can get all he wants and that all he is entitled to is the right to make a Requirro A1·bitration of Labor Disputes 101 bargain with anyone in the world who will give him the best bar­ gain. That is all either the employer or worker is entitled to. Any­ thing else takes away from some person his God-given right to ex­ change his services with the person who will give him the most. If the Government interferes with free exchanges it is not an impartial government, it is a government of men rather than a government of law. Unless we can get people to believe that no man, no matter how poor, and no firm, no matter how rich, has a right to have protection from competition, we will continue to have labor troubles. Our production will be restricted, friction will grow, and our standard of living will be less than it would be, and un­less we are careful, we will wind up with a dictator who will tell us all how we shall trade. WAYS TO INDUSTRIAL PEACE By LEWIS B. SCHWELLENBACH Secretary of Labor (Reprinted from Cong,.essional Record, Vol. 93, No. 93, Friday, May 16, 1947, PP-A2457. This is an excerpt from Mr. Schwellenbach's address.) Concerning the vital subject of mediation, I am definitely against the creation of a mediation board because I do not believe that device will promote industrial peace. . Here are some of the reasons for my conclusion. The creation of such a board is bound to interfere with and dis­rupt not only the voluntary mediation of the Conciliation Service but a much larger area of successful collective bargaining between management and labor. This would tend to undermine that broad foundation which the twentieth-century fund report finds so essen­tial for our ecoonmic well-being and for the cause of industrial peace. Given a mediation board, both sides would tend to carry impor­tant issues straight to the board without making any real effort to reach a voluntary agreement among themselves. We saw this per­fectly natural human tendency at work during the war. Time and time again, real negotiations between the parties practically came to a standstill 'while the principals got ready for the big show in Washington. Those who know the work of the Conciliation Service realize that last year our Commissioners aided in the peaceful settlement of 13,000 industrial disputes. What's more, in 9 cases out of 10 where commissioners were called in before the work had halted, no stop­page occurred. Last year our conciliators also helped to settle 3,400 strikes. Nearly two-thirds of these had begun before either side called upon the Conciliation Service. In my view, we would be very ill-advised to upset or by-pass this highly useful machinery through the establishment of a medi­ation board. And now a word or two about compulsory arbitration. To a good many people this looks like an easy answer to the strike problem. But they•overlook the fact that if compulsory arbitration is to suc­ceed in eliminating walkouts and lockouts, it must at the same time abolish or restrict the right to contract. Thus the principle of compulsory arbitration does violence to our whole Anglo-Saxon concept of law. For it must be realized that if an arbitrator writes a contract which through a wage in­crease or any other provision, increases the cost to the employer, it will then become necessary for the arbitrator or some Govern­ment agency to look into or determine what the manufacturer may charge for his product. There is no escaping this chain of events. That is~ why both labor and management are so opposed to such controls. They know that we cannot preserve our free econqmy if Government is to dictate the terms of labor-management agree­ments. Such a process does not lend itself to a little compulsion­it forecasts the end of freedom to contract. QUESTION OF THE WEEK COLUMN OF THE UNITED STATES NEWS, DECEMBER 27, 1946 Do you favor compulsory arbitration of labor disputes where work stoppages jeopardizes the nation's industries? Answers: 1. Lewis B. Schwellenbach, Secretary of Labor, former United States Senator from Washington State; former U.S. District Judge, Eastern District of Washington. "Proposals for compulsory arbitration overlook the crucial fact that industrial strife is a by-product of basic economic maladjust­ments. There is no assurance that compulsory settlements would correct these maladjustments and there is a real danger that com­pulsion might impede or cripple the process of free collective bar­gaining. This could result in renewed demands for still more com­pulsion. _ "Legislation designed to strengthen and encourage collective bar­gaining will prove most effective if it is coupled 'with legislation designed to enhance the security and well-being of all the people." 2. Edgar L. Warren, Director, U.S. Conciliation Service; Econo­mist, Wage and Hour Division, Department of Labor, 1938-1942; former chairman, Regional War Labor Board, Chicago, Ill. "No. A system under which the Government decides every vital dispute between ·management and labor, in the long run, will in­terfere with the efficient operation of industry more than the threat of an occasional stoppage. Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes 103 "We have just emerged from a period of arbitrary controls over collective bargaining. Management and labor both have had some difficulty in learning to use their postwar freedom. I believe that the next few months will show that both sides ate relearning the art of peaceful bargaining." 3. Tyler S. Rogers, Toledo, Ohio; President Producers' Council, Inc. "Compulsory arbitration by law is appropriate to government services-federal, state and municipal-and to regulated monopolies, like public utilities. Wherever government manages or controls in­dustries in the public interest, it must similarly control the action of labor employed therein. Compulsory arbitration of labor dis­putes is not appropriate in private industry. Its enforcement would lead inevitably to government intervention in both labor and manage­ment policies, with political expediency often dominating its third­party decisions. Compulsory Arbitration Unnecessary "Compulsory arbitration in private industry would have to be­come·universal because all work stoppages jeopardize other employ­ment and ultimately victimize the public. The implied extension of government authority is unworkable and unnecessary. Better roads to industrial peace are open." 4. Donald Cameron, Milwaukee, Wis., National Secretary, Asso­ciated Unions of America. "Associated Unions of America reaffirms its opposition to com­ pulsory arbitration. Compulsory arbitration attempts to force set­ tlement of a dispute, merely the symptom of an economic ill, and leaves the basic causes of the dispute untouched. In this way com­ pulsory arbitration can become an obstacle to labor peace. "AUA advocates voluntary arbitration in many cases and encour­ages its locals to provide for voluntary arbitration of disputes aris­' ing during the term of the contract. "Compulsory arbitration in 'vital disputes' soon would tend to spread to all terms on all labor and industry. Arbitration boards would be open to political domination and corruption. "The Government, however, can and does help solve disputes through mediation and conciliation. Fact-finding boards can foster settlement of vital disputes by making public recommendations when opposing sides agree to fact find." 5. James D. Francis, Huntington, W.Va., President, Island Creek Coal Co. "No. I oppose compulsory arbitration in any form. If adopted, it would destroy collective bargaining and substitute arbitrary wage fixing by a third party having no responsibility and acting with­ out any controlling standards and lead, inevitably, to authoritarian government under which all wages and prices would be fixed and free enterprise and democracy destroyed. "I favor legal limitation upon monopolistic power and practices of unions so that their rights will stop short of invasion of rights of the public. The law prohibiting public nuisances should be ap­applied to unions." COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (Reprinted from Anierican Federationist, Vol. 54, No. 4, April, 1947, p . 13.) Organized labor is as unalterably opposed to compulsory arbi­tration as are the leading spokesmen of industry. Our reasons are many and clear. Compulsory arbitration is the very antithesis of collective bargaining, and collective bargaining is the vel'y corner­stone of economic and political democracy. It was for that fundamental reason, essentially, that the Supreme Court of the United States declared a Kansas compulsory arbitra­tion law repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu­tfon. ·The Court said: "It curtailed the right of the employer, on the one hand, and of the employee on the other, to contract about his affairs." It is clear beyond doubt that compulsory arbitration ·will not work in this country or, indeed, in any country with a strong tra­dition of democracy. Austrlia, for example, has had compulsory arbitration for forty years and yet it has been the most strike­ridden country in the world. In proportion to population, it has had almost twice as many strikes as the United States, and since V-J Day the number of strikes there has reached an all-time high. The experience in New Zealand and elsewhere is similar. Compulsion vs. Voluntarism To the American trade unionist the great issue of the recent war was compulsion versus voluntarism. Organized labor . immedi­ -ately recognized and willingly accepted the challenge of whether the free American worker could outproduce the forced labor of the enemy. The record speaks for itself. No one can deny that Amer­ican labor, in successfully meeting that challenge, achieved a mag­nificent victory. There was no law during the war compelling men to work or compelling them to submit their differences with em­ployers to the coercive determination of others. As in any other crisis in our national history, organized labor voluntarily gave up its basic rights for the period of the crisis. American labor will always do far more on a voluntary basis than any law devised by man can force American labor to do. Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes 105 Let us look, as we must if we are realistically and intelligently to legislate, not at the rare an\f occasional exception but at the general rule and the over-all picture. The established fact is that the great majority of collective agreements entered into voluntarily provide for arbitration as a means of avoiding and resolving dis­putes, agreements that have more than proved their worth and which would be nullified by laws imposing compulsory arbitration. Particularly significant is the extent of voluntary arbitration in public utilities. Informal conferences of labor and management representatives in public utilities were recently convened by the U.S. Conciliation Service at the suggestion of the Labor-Management Advisory Com­mittee. Union and management representatives of light and power, gas and transit utilities, widely representative of each industry, have made it emphatically clear that voluntary arbitration is the established procedure for the final settlement of disputes in almost all cases where collective bargaining relations are maintained. To inject compulsory arbitration into the pattern of voluntary rela­tions established in these public utilities would wreck the exist­ing voluntary machinery and inevitably promote disputes, strife, and unrest. Extent of Voluntary Arbitration Streetcar and motor coach transit in most of our sizable com­munities is covered by collective bargaining agreements maintained with the local transit systems by the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. All of the affili­ates of the Amalgamated must provide for voluntary arbitration. The requirement for voluntary arbitration is provided in the Amal­gamated Association's national constitution. Collective bargaining relations with the majority of light and power utilities throughout the nation are maintained by the Inter­national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, A.F. of L. Practically all of the agreements between the Brotherhood and utility com­panies provide for voluntary arbitration as the final step in set­tling matters in dispute. Experience of the past twenty-eight years has proved this to be the most effective means for the settlement of differences and a thorough safeguard against work stoppages and interruption of service. In addition to voluntary arbitration, l.B.E.W. contracts with pub­lic utilities contain no-strike clauses. The no-strike clause and the voluntary arbitration procedure are directly related. It is plain that imposition of. compulsory arbitration would promptly invali­date the union's voluntary no-strike agreement and the legal and moral commitment the union has assumed to stand by as a guardian • of uninterrupted service to the public. A Congressional enactment im­ posing compulsory arbitration would reduce to shambles the long­ established structure of harmonious labor-management relations in the vital public utility field and bring to an abrupt end the twenty­ eight-year no strike record of the union. Industrial peace will not be secured by the establishment of com­ pulsory arbitration. Only upon the full acceptance of free collec­ _tive bargaining, as an instrument of reason and equity and not of force, rests our hope for the maintenance of industrial peace. MANAGEMENT LOOKS AT COMPULSORY ARBITRATION (Reprinted from Factory Managenwmt and Maintenance, Vol. 105, No. 3, March, 1947, pp. 66-67, 70.) In considering compulsory arbitration as a method of settling labor-management disputes, Congress is moving in an area where feelings run high. Management and labor men oppose compulsion on grounds rang­ing from "totalitarian" to "impractical-it would mean free collec­tive bargaining." But a FACTORY survey of 100 top executives in 100 plants ·shows that if Congress does require arbitration as a method of settling disputes, it might work if its use is definitely restricted. Arbitration of disputes over the meaning, of terms in existing contracts would be practicable if Congress should require it, say 89 per cent of the executives. But arbitration of wage structure questions or to decide terms other than wages of new contracts would not work, say overwhelm­ing majorities. Similarly, if Congress should adopt a proposal to require that all collective bargaining contracts provide arbitration as a terminal point for disputes, it might work in limited applications, Factory's survey shows. Totals Shown Sixty-five per cent of the executives polled in the survey believe a law requiring contracts to provide arbitration would be prac­ticable if it were limited to arbitration at the direction of either party on only the issues which existing labor contracts provide ta be arbitrable. Forty-eight per cent agree that requiring arbitration by niutual agreement on any issue arising under a contract would be prac­ticable. Forty-eight per "cent of those polled, less than a majority, say that it would be practicable to require arbitration by mutual agree­ment on issues arising during negotiation of a new contract. Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes 107 For Limited Use Only If Congress requires that management and labor negotiators write arbitration procedure into all contracts; the arbitration might work reasonably well if it were limited to the situations above. Re­qu1rmg arbitration at the direction of either party on any issue arising under the contract would not be practicable, say 75 per cent of the executi~es. And requiring arbitration at the direction of either party on any issue a1·ising during negotiation of a new contract would be impractical, according to 89 per cent. A limited number of labor leaders, queries by Factory on the same questions at the same time, agreed with the management representatives that arbitration might work if Congress sharply limited the applications in which it would be required. Comment of both groups, however, showed that although arbitra­tion within limits might work if Congress requires it, they would far rather see voluntary arbitration extended. Many in both groups new have contracts that provide for voluntary arbitration. Analysis of the opinions of the management representatives by the size of the companies they represent show a sharp difference between the thinking of executives in smaller plants and those in larger plants. Only 9 per cent of the executives from plants with more than 250 workers-as contrasted to 35 per cent of the smaller plant men­think that requiring arbitration of questions concerning wage struc­tures would work. Similarly, only 11 per cent of the big-plant executives would like to see the terms other than wages ill new contracts submitted to arbitration. -But almost one-half, 45 per cent, of the smaller­plant group approve arbitration of such questions. When .it comes to the administration of arbitration boards, the largest single group of executives answering the questions approves a three-man board, selected by mutual agreement of the company and union, and acting only in the dispute for which it was named. Comment on the three-man arbitration board shows that many believe the most practical method of selecting the board is to h'ave management and the union each select one arbitrator, and the two chosen arbitrators name the third man. Three-man boards, whether all arbitrators are neutral or one is a specialist from management, a second from labor, and the third neutral or representing the pub­ lic, are particularly favored for disputes over terms of new contracts. Mutual Selection Favored Selection by mutual agreement or by a method mutually agreed on is overwhelmingly favored. Eighty-four per cent of the execu­tives believe the two parties should mutually agree on the selec­ tion of arbitrators for disputes arising under a contract. If the two parties cannot agree, then the U.S. Conciliation Service, the De­partment of Labor, a state board, or the American Arbitration Association should break the deadlock, the executives say. A large majority, 73 per cent, say the arbitration board should act only on the dispute for which it was selected. Formation of a permanent board to act on all questions arising under a contract or in negotiation -of a new contract is favored by less than 25 per cent of each group. The tendency of smaller-plant men to be more liberal on arbi­tration is shown in this group of questions. Higher percentages of the smaller-plant group answer the section of each question dealing with disputes arising from contract negotiations. Many of the larger-plant group, on the other hand, show their disapproval of proposals to arbitrate terms of a new contract by refusing to answer this part of the questions. Congress will also have a problem in semantics in considering compulsory arbitration in any form. There are so many facets to the arbitration question that it is hard to get agreement on even the terms used. Some persons dealing with labor questions, for .in­stance, think that arbitration is "compulsory" if bargainers on the other side of the table succeed in writing into the contract any provision for arbitration of grievance disputes. Many a proposal, too, would require that "essential" industries submit their disputes to arbitration. Just what is an "essential" industry and what are the limits on "disputes"? Other Results Survey results clearly show: If Congress is to make arbitration compulsory in any form, it should be limited to disputes involving interpretation of existing contracts. Legislation requiring arbitration of wage questions or terms of new contracts will meet widespread opposition. If such arbitration is to be accepted, it should be required only on the issues which contracts provide to be arbitrable or by mutual agreement "of both parties on issues arising under the contract. Whether the boards consist of one man or three men, they should be selected by mutual agreement of the parties and they should act only on the disputes for which they were selected. Finally the Factory survey reveals, much of management feels that voluntary arbitration is a still-developing technique. It is working well as a method of settling 'many disputes, but it is open to abuse. Many management men feel that !Ilanagement is usually the defendant in arbitration proceedings, that arbitrators may tend to seek compromises which will not displease either party rather Required Arbitration of Labor Disvutes 109 than ruling on the principle involved, !ind that it is difficult to hold the parties to arbitration decisions. But, executives stressed, voluntary arbitartion holds much prom­ise. It should be extended and improved. They are opposed, how­ever, to any compulsion or governmental regulation which might weaken collective bargaining and discredit voluntary arbitrat:on. WHAT MANAGEMENT AND LABOR LE,ADERS SAY ABOUT ARBITRATION (Reprinted from Factory ManagcmtJnt and Maintenan ce. Vol. 105, No. :3 , March, 1947, p. 70.) "Fifty years of experience has shown us that many labor dis­putes can be settled by arbitration if freely resorted to but never if compulsion to arbitrate is attempted." -President, Telegraphers' Union. "What do you mean by arbitration? Something like the Supreme Court? I presume so and therefore vote 'no' on all counts." -Vice-President, Manufacturing Company. "We do not believe that compulsory arbitration is or can be effec­tive. Our union has many contracts . . . and each agreement pro­vides for arbitration of disputes so there can be no question as to our faith in voluntary arbitration." -President, Utility Union. "Until unions are required to accept the responsibility of a contract entered into in good faith on their part, we do not care to have an arbitrator's judgment substituted for our own." , -President, Midwest Manufacturing Company. "Arbitration should only be used in the. event that a strike in the industry would seriously affect the common good." -President, Communications Union. "The American Federation of Labor is opposed to compulsory ar­bitration of any kind. This attitude on the part of the American Federation of Labor is based upon experience in dealing with human relations in industry covering more than half a century. Workers and management both resent force and compulsion in labor and man­agement relationship of any kind. Besides, force and compulsion are contradictory to the principles of democracy, freedom, liberty, and our free enterprise system. "On the other hand, the American Federation of Labor favors and endorses voluntary arbitration, arbitration accepted voluntarily by labor and management. "It is my opinion voluntary arbitration could be applied to dis­putes about wage structures, deciding terms other than wages or new contracts and disputes over the interpretation and meaning of terms in existing contracts." -William Green, President, Arnerican Federation of Labor. CAN COURTS RULE LABOR? By LOUIS WALDMAN (Reprinted from The American Mercury, July, 1946.) Judge John C. Knox's suggestion that all quarrels between capi­tal and labor, even among labor groups themselves, be decided by the courts boils down to compulsory arbitration. Other plans under discus­sion in Congress envisage the same practice-or what amounts to it-by special government-appointed boards. Both sets of propos­als would mean labor relations by judicial decree or by a board's fiat. Would this be wise? President Truman, in his dramatic appearance before Congress on May 25, went even further. He asked for emergency legislation which would virtually force workers to stay on their jobs at the point of a bayonet. For himself he asked far greater powers than were ever granted to any President in times of war or peace. Un­der these powers, whenever a strike occurred, he could, at his un­controlled discretion, seize an industry and proclaim an emergency. He could then confiscate the profits, jail the labor leaders for dis­obedience, cancel the workers' seniority and other rights and order them back to work at pay and working conditions fixed by him. If the workers refused, he could conscript them all into the Army and as soldiers, subject them to military law and make them work at privates' pay. If they still refused, they would presumably be court­martialed and, I assume, would either be shot or put in concentra­tion camps. Apart from constitutional considerations, are these proposals wise or sound? Would they minimize strikes or would they, like the Smith-Connally Act, increase rather than decrease strikes? Would they not create more problems than they would solve? Courts Not the Answer In modern society not all the disputes that arise can or should be settled by the courts or any other governmental agency armed with coercive powers. Consider the following case. John Nolan is in love with Jane Smith. _She is disposed to accept his proposal of marriage, but difficulties have arisen. He has two grown children by a previous marriage; she has an invalid mother ·to whom she is deeply devoted. John wants the children to continue living at his home, to which Jane objects, as he objects to her mother liv­ing with them. John and Jane can reach no settlement of this dispute. Would anyone suggest that John should be given the right to take his dispute with Jane into court on the ground that since the state need citizens and soldiers, therefore, in the public interest, a judge should be empowered to decide whether or not Jane should marry John and to prescribe' the terms of the marriage contract? Should such a dispute be referred to compulsory arbitration? The marriage contract is regarded today in civilized society as one that must never be subject to compulsion, even by parents. Yet in times past it has been, and in Nazi Germany women were forced to bear children "in the interest of the state." We believe John and Jane must be free to settle this dispute themselves. Contract Should Not Be Forced To consider another case: James Brown owns a thousand fertile acres. He is a business man, a bachelor who maintains his country estate merely for pleasure. William Jones is a competent farmer who covets his neighbor's acres; his rented farm is not large enough to support his growing family. He makes an offer to buy Brown's farm. -Brown answers that his place is worth double what Jones offers, and besides he doesn't want to sell. Should Jones have the right to bring this dispute with Brown into court on the ground that he needs the farm while Brown does not, that the nation needs to increase the production of food, and that millions are starving in Europe while here are a thousand acres going to waste? Though it is in the public interest that those acres be planted, this most people would agree, is another of the numerous categories of disputes which should not be adjudi­cated by the courts. Jones and Brown must be free to make or not to make their contract. If William Foley were hired, as an individual, by General Motors and after a few years he asked-again as an individual-for an increase in pay, for shorter hours and other terms which the cor­poration refused to grant, few would grant him the right to take his dispute with General Motors to court and let a judge decide the amount of his wages, ' the length of his hours, etc. Employer­employee relations, we know, are a matter of contract. There are many more kinds of disputes in which the courts should not intervene, even though they involve the public welfare. I cite these three extreme examples to reduce to absurdity the proposi­tion that all disputes which involve the making of a contract should be subject to compulsory arbitration, or judicial decision. It is ob­vious that state interventon in all conflicts, including those which can only be resolved by the free will of people to agree or not to agree, would lead toward totalitarianism-the police state. The above illustrations concern the freedom of contract for such individuals as John Nolan, Jane Smith, James Brown, William Jones-and William Foley and his employer, General Motors. It is universally accepted that a dispute between such individuals, as to thE· marriage contract, the business ccmtract, or the labor contract, should not be subject to compulsory arbitration or judicial deci­sion. It is argued, however, that if Foley joins with many other individuals in an association to deal with General Motors, a differ­ent situation presents itself. But that is not so. The collective, like the individual bargain, is based on contract. Need for Freedom of Contract One of the basic freedoms is the freedom of contract. Of course, it is not absolute freed01n--but we should never allow limitations to destroy the basic. right. Freedom of contract is worth more to society than it costs. When Foley was not a member of a union, he could only bar­gain individually, which meant that he would have to take the job on the terms offered by General Motors, or quit. The company could not compel him to work. No one would maintain that Gen­eral Motors or the courts should have that power. Yet what one has a right to do alone he has the right to do in free association with others. If General Motors and Foley's union can't agree, the workers have a right to quit, to strike. In my view, when the state intervenes in disputes between capi­tal and labor to impose compulsory arbitration or judicially-made contracts upon both parties, there arise the dangers of involuntary servitude, government by decree and total regulations of all per­sonal and social and industrial relationships and controversies. Un­der any form, compulsory arbitration is a threat to the free demo­cratic system which we cherish. The New York Court of Appeals, in the case of the National Pro­ tective Association vs. Cumming, decided forty-four years ago, said: It is not the duty of one man to work for another unless he has agreed to, and if he has so agreed but for no fixed period, either may end the contract whenever he chooses. The one may work, or refuse to work, at will, and the other may hire or discharge at will. The terms of employment are subject to mutual agreement, without let or hindrance from any one. If the terms do not suit, or the employer does not please, the right to quit is absolute, and no one may demand a reason therefor. Whatever one man may do alone, he may do in combinat on with others, provided they have no unlawful object in view. Mere numbers do not ordinarily affect the quality of the act. Workingmen have the right to organize for the purpose of securing higher wages, shorter hours of labor or improving their relations with their employers. They have the right to strike; that is, to cease working in a body by pre-arrangement until a grievance is redressed, provided the object is not to gratify malice or inflict injury upon others, but to secure better terms of em­ployment for themselves. A, peaceable and orderly strike, not to harm others, but to improve their own condition, is not in violation of law. The highest court in New York laid down in those words the basic principles of labor relations which in subsequent years have been generally accepted throughout the nation. These principles should be read and reread by judges, congressmen, senators, editors, and others, even those who call themselves liberal. These principles were sound yesterday, and they are sound today. No Short-Cut to Industrial Peace So far no employer, no labor leader, no congressman, Republican or Democrat, no judge, and no President, has offered any final solu­tion of the problems arising from industrial disputes-no panacea. There is no easy formula that can be advanced, for the problem is as complex as life itself. Management hardly less than labor has traditionally opposed state intervention into business, including labor relations. Admitting that as business grows bigger and labor stronger, the public must be protected against abuses of power by either, the need for some kind of governmental action also grows. But how should the federal gov­ernment intervene, and for what purpose? And is not education even more important just now than government action? First we must take a long look at the varying nature of the labor dispute. The advocates of compulsory arbitration or of the judicial labor decree lump all labor disputes together, as though they were all susceptible to identical treatment. Actually many of the disputes concern the making of contracts, while others have to do with the interpretation and application of existing agreements. There are three main categories of disputes between labor and man­agement. 1. The first category of labor disputes concerns the day-to-day interpretations and application of the numerous classes of labor contracts. There are some 50,000 contracts governing labor rela­tions, the lives of which run from one to five years; the average is two years. Comparatively few of them were arrived at as a re­sult of strikes. Over 15,000,000 workers are directly affected, and with their families the total reaches about 40,000,000. Millions more are affected indirectly, for every ti.me a union contract is signed it influences the wages and hours of unorganized workers. 114 The type of government action that can be supported by those who seek sincerely for industrial peace is not anti-labor legislation (which compulsory arbitration measures always are), but laws and policies which will encourage, strengthen and extend to all indus­ tries such voluntary machinery of arbitration on adjudication of con­ troversies. We need such a nation-wide system of industrial courts in which labor and management appear as equals, and in which the interpretation and enforcement of contracts can be secured in orderly fashion. But such courts, and industrial peace and cooper­ ation, are possible only if industrialists generally will accept the principle of collective bargaining, and if labor is equally willing to recognize the rights of management. There is no easy short-cut to decent, civilized industrial relations; like every other value in democratic society, it can be achieved only through evolution. 2. Different by far is the second type of labor dispute, which arises as the collective contract approaches termination. Both the union and management frequently desire changes in the expiring contract. Even where neither side distrusts the other, where both have Jong engaged in collective bargaining, differences develop, par­ticularly when conditions in the national economy are rapidly chang­iug. If patience, good will and common sense prevail, compromises are reached, If not, there is a strike or lockout. If they can agree, a free and voluntary contract results. If they cannot, how can a judge be called upon to decree wage rates, hours, and conditions of labor, arbitrarily? On what basis shall he make his decisions? Upon what established principles, laws, or precedents is he to rest his judgment? Coercion Wrong Approach Management and labor cannot be coerced into cooperation with­out losing more than is gained. To surrender to the courts the power to decree the terms under which men work-which is a leg­islative not a judicial act-will not lead to industrial democracy but to industrial autocracy, if not a totalitarian system akin to communism or fascism. All past experience shows that whenever a governmental body, which can dictate terms of labor contracts, is set up, both employ­ers and employees lose the basic incentive to bargain collectively and reach agreements; they throw the argument into the lap of the board, commission, or court. And when labor relations are gov­erned by administrative or court decree, not only collective bar­gaining, but the independence of the union is lost. One step will lead to further steps, until the trade unions are either "company unions" or part of the apparatus of the state. Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes 115 As one of the effects of compulsory arbitration, incidentally, such a flood of litigation would be loosed that unions could engage in no other activity, and their treasuries would be exhausted. 3. Compulsory arbitration or judicial decision is even less possi­ble or desirable in the third category of disputes, that involving unions in the throes of growing up. When unions are still rela­tively young and weak, they nearly always have a bitter struggle for survival, and are forced to resort to a strike or the threat of a stike to get the employer to agree to a contract, no matter how modest the demands. Management almost invariably regards the union as a threat to its own prerogatives, and yields to the neces­sity of collective bargaining very reluctantly. Besi's book, University of Kansas Publications. Social Science Stu.dies, 1941, Lawrence, Kansas, pp. 229-235.) The Industrial Court was an instrument designed to carve out in Kansas a "new province for law and order." Those who con­ceived and created it and many. other serious students of labor prob­lems expected far-reaching and beneficial results to flow .from its operations. Their hopes are well expressed in that part of Gov­ernor Allen's message to the legislature in which he enumerated the results the court was expected to accomplish. These were: 1. To make strikes, lockouts, boycotts and blacklists unnecessary and impossible, by giving labor as well as capital an able and just tribunal in which to litigate all controversies. 2. To insure to the people of this state, at all times, an adequate supply of those prod­ucts which are absolutely necessary to the sustaining of the life of civilized peoples. 3. That by stabilizing production of those nec­essaries we will also, to a great extent, stabilize the prices to the producer as well as to the consumer. 4. That we will insure to labor steadier employment, at a fairer wage, under better working conditions. 5. That we will prevent the colossal economic waste which always attends industrial d;sturbances. 6. That we will make the law respected, and discourage and ultimately abolish intimida­tion and violence as a means for the settlement of industrial dis­putes.1 To what extent were these hopes realized? It is perhaps ·impos­sible to answer this question satisfactorily. Although the court was in operation for five years, only a small number of disputes were settled by it. Most of these were disposed of in the first two years of the court's existence, for during its last three years the court scarcely functioned as a tribunal for settling industrial disputes. Changes in the court's personnel introduced different conceptions Jffo11.<.ie Journal. Special Session. 1920. of the nature and scope of the Jaw, and this made the development of a uniform policy impossible. Political ambitions led various per­son; with power to use the court law to further their own designs, and this also introduced a confusing factor. Yet on the basis of the available information, an answer to the question will be attempted. Success of Court Questioned 'There is some difference of opinion as to whether the Industrial Ccurt reduced the number of strikes in Kansas. For the most part the controversy centers about the number of strikes in the coal fields. It was maintained by Governor Allen that in the thirty­tl:.ree months from April, 1916, to January, 1918, there were 364 strikes in the coal fields, an average of eleven per month.2 He used data supplied by Mr. Ira B. Clemens, president of the Southwest­ern Coal Operators' Association. Mr. Harry Sharp, Secretary of the Associated Industries of Kansas, claimed that in the forty-five months before December, 1919, there were 705 strikes, an average of almost sixteen per month.3 Opponents of the court asserted that it did not diminish, but rather fomented strikes. Mr. Harry Sharp said that in 1920, after the court was established, there were 377 strikes.4 A pamphlet is­sued by the Southwestern Coal Operators' Association lists 1,128 strikes in the Kansas coal fields between January 1, 1920, and December 31, 1921. Mr. Ira Clemens, president of that associatioJ!, was quoted as saying that there had been 228 strikes in the first six months of 1921, an average of thirty-eight per month.;; Union officials in Kansas and elsewhere consistently maintained that strikes had not been eliminated or even reduced in number by the court. Spokesmen for the court, on the other hand, continually insisted that there were fewer strikes. The view is well summarized by Gov­ernor Allen's statements that "since the creation of the industrial court a year ago the Pittsburg district has had almost absolute in­dustrial peace," and that the "miners were enabled to work 30 per cent more than the year before.. . . "6 Governor Allen maintained that the Clemens figures shov.iing more strikes since the establish­ment of the Industrial Court were "misleading and unfair" because they included all cases of men quitting work and not merely "called" strikes..7 The figures were, however, compiled in the same manner as those previously quoted by Mr. Allen to show the need for a court. Later still, the Governor could say that since the industrial court was established, there have been only four or five strikes.s •Ibid., J anuary 11, 1922. "Nation. February 22, 1922, p. 212. 3Ne111 Yorlc Times, February 25, 1922. •Ibid. "Topeka State Journal, November 10, 1921. 0 New York Times, February 8 and July 27, 1921. 'Tope/ca State Journal, November 10, 1921. Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes 129 Statistics Not Conclusive No credence can be given to either proponents or opponents. The figures given by opponents of the court are vitiated by the prac­tice of including among strikes all stoppages, whatever the cause. For example, there was in the contract between miners and oper­ators a provision to the effect that unless enough empty railroad cars to last for two hours were present at the beginning of the shift, the men would not enter the mine. It was the purpose of this provision to prevent short shifts, and it was generally consid­ered to be reasonable. But all "stoppages" due to this cause were usually called "strikes." Furthermore, in some of the statistics at least, stoppages involving two or more mines of one company and having the same cause were listed as one strike for each mine. All of these figures are therefore absolutely useless as indicating the number of strikes, either before or after the Industrial Court was set up. NUMBER OF LABOR D ISPUTES BEGINNING IN SPECIFIED AREAS FROM 1919 TO 1927• West of Year Kan. Okla. Colo. Neb. Mo. Miss. U.S. 1919 45 32 31 17 69 594 3,571 1920 14 24 22 12 63 623 3,291 1921 21 29 27 11 54 569 2,381 1922 4 9 7 3 26 155 1,088 1923 5 2 3 1 27 210 1,553 1924 6 6 5 2 35 163 1,240 1925 1926 12 2 10 2 10 5 2 1 11 9 146 89 1,300 1,032 1927 1 3 5 2 14 92 734 *United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review, Vol. XXX, No. 6, p. 1330. A good picture of the strike situation in Kansas is presented in data published by the United States Department of Labor. These figures do not include all stoppages, nor even all strikes, but they do include all major stoppages resulting from labor troubles. The figures are given in the table and show the number of disputes be­ginning in Kansas and surrounding states, in the area west of the Mississippi River, and in the United States as a whole, for a period of nine years. The mo;;;t striking conclusion to be drawn from this table is that the movement of disputes in Kansas was, in general, the same as in the bordering states, in the area west of the Mississippi, and in the United States as a whole. With minor differences, this was true during the years immediately preceding the establishment of the Industrial Court, during the years of its existence, and dur­ing the years immediately following its abolition. Such uniform movements would seem to be the results of general economic and industrial conditions. Minor forces would account for the minor variations, but in general these were of small importance in Kan­sas and the bordering states. Although the number of strikes de­creased more rapidly in Kansas than in the surrounding states in 1920, the year the court was established, it increased more rapidly in 1921, and again in 1925, the year the court was abolished, and it decreased more rapidly again in 1926. On the basis of these facts, therefore, the conclusion would seem to be inevitable that the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations had no appreciable effect in reducing the number of industrial disputes in Kansas, and that 011 the other hand it was not, as some have maintained, a fomenter of strikes. 'There were only a few demonstrations, in the coal fields, against the act. Most of these were sporadic and relatively insig­nificant disturbances involving few men and few mines. Only one strike covering the entire Kansas coal field was called as a protest against the court law. Anti-Picketing Brought Into Play But there is another important aspect of the problem. The num­ ber of strikes was not appreciably affected, but their outcome in some instances might well have been affected. The anti-picketing and anti-intimidation provisions of the act were brought into play in several strikes, particularly in those of the railroad shopmen and of the packing-house employees, although this was done by the reg­ularly constituted peace officers rather than by the court itself. Of course, it is probable that both of these strikes would have been lost by the workers in any event, especially the packing-house strike which was called by the union leaders "with reckless neglect of the interest of thejr following, who never had the slightest chance of winning it."9 Yet police authorities did help to break some strikes by hunting down those who transmitted strike orders and by preventing picketing~ Indeed, the anti-picketing and anti­.intimidation provisions were considered by Mr. Huggins as the most essential part of the act.10 It is fair to say that the Industrial Court Law was regarded by its makers as a strike-breaking de­vice of the first order, although it must be added that they also believed that it made strikes unnecessary and therefore unjustifi­able. No cases involving lockouts, boycotts, or blacklists were ever brought before the court. The hope that the court would stabilize production and thereby to some extent stabilize prices to producer and consumer was vain, •Herbert Feis, Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, 1923, p. 719. '""The Kansas Industrial Court Law Down to Date," JO'Urnal of tlul Kafl8118 BM' Association, August, 1937, pp. 7-17. Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes 131 being based on a conception of Kansas as an independent economic unit. Nor did it require long for the court to realize that stability of production for most products was dependent upon forces over which it had no control, a realization brought home to it with great force by the facts developed in the flour milling investigation. With this inability to stabilize production went the inability to stabilize prices to the producer and consumer, which in truth was never seriously considered to be possible. And with it also went the noble hope that labor would secure steadier employment. On not one occasion did the court, in order to prevent workers from being thrown out of employment, refuse to permit an employer to reduce his operations or even shut down his plant altogether. It was sug­gested, to be sure, that "skilled and faithful" employees 1;houlor and Dem-0cracy, pp. 116-117. 1'~G. V. Portus, in the American Ecorwmic Revie'u·, March, 1929, p. 59. Required ArbitratiQn of Labor Disputes 133 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE TRADE ASSOCIATION By CLARENCE G. STOLL Vice-President of W estern Electric Company (Excerpt from article appearin::r in J>ractical lurlu$trial Relations, Personnel Series, Number 26 <>f the American Management Association. New York. The Association. 1937. !'P· 8-H.l We don't want and we don't need standardized industrial rela­tions policies and practices. While the philosophy underlying the ~arious elements of a good industrial relations policy may be univer­saliy applicable, the variations in conditions existing in different busi­nesses of the same type and in different types of business must of necessity call for variations in industrial relations practices. Vari­ations to fit the locale and to reflect the personality and character of the particular management are desirable. Standardization would be just as impracticable in. industrial relations practices as it would be in the manufacturing or accounting procedures of different busi­nesses. SIXTY-TWO YEARS OF PEACE By LEE W. MINTON President, Glass Bottle Blowers' Association of the United States and Canada (Reprinted from The American Federationist, May, 1947) One of the mysteries of our modern age is why the problems of labor-management relations should throw our entire nation into a dither and churn up such a commotion in Congress over crackpot legislation which would do far more harm than good. Frankly, I can't see what the fuss is all about. For the prob­lt>ms of labor-management relations are essentially simple and can be easily solved through the application of good sense and good will by both sides. No new laws are needed. I know. I know because the union of which I am president and the industry which it serves have enjoyed peaceful and cooperative relations without a break since 1885-that's over sixty years, a long enough stretch to prove to any fair-minded citizen that we've got the right answer. Collective Bargaining the Answer What is this answer? Nothing more or less than true collective bargaining. The glass container industry and the Glass Bottle Blowers' Asso­ciation of the United States and Canada have practiced true collec­tive bargaining on an industry-wide level since 1885. The results have been almost miraculous. The employers are gratified, the mem­bers of our union are well satisfied and the public is getting a real break through the record-breaking production of high-grade glass containers at reasonable prices. Seldom, anywhere in the world, can there be found a more sin­cere and trusting and constructive degree of collaboration than ex­ists between the owners and managers of the glass container indus­try and the union representing their employees. We have been meeting together in annual conference ever since 1885, and we have grown to like and respect each other increas­ingly. Here's how our collective bargaining machinery works: During the month of July each year, the representatives of the union and management meet in Atlantic City to discuss and settle mutual problems for the coming contract year. These conferences last from three to five days. Proposals are presented to the con­ference by both sides thirty days in advance, so that the partici­pants can be fully prepared to meet and negotiate all issues. By common consent, the conferences are conducted along good business lines, with a minimum of bitterness and a time-saving absence of tirades. The main idea of both sides is to get together, rather than to keep apart. Wage rates and working conditions, once agreed upon, apply to workers in all sections of the country. In our industry we have succeeded in killing the economic curse of geographical differentials. Simple Contract Kept The contract itself is kept simple, so that it can be easily read and understood by all members. One of its most important provi­sions is that which lends stability to its terms. The pres dent of the union and the secretary of the manufacturers' group are em­powered to adjust any dispute that may arise between conferences. When they agree on a settlement, their decision becomes final and binding unless revoked by a future conference. The same principle is applied to local disputes which fail of solu­tion at the local level. On motion of either side, the :matter is re­ferred to the president of the national union and the manufactur­ers' secretary for investigation and disposition. During this period the plant remains in operation and working conditions are not changed. If the two referees are unable to reach agreement, the dispute goes for final determination to the next conference, where a vote is taken on whether to uphold or reject the complaint. Required Arbitration of Labor Disputes 135 Sounds easy, doesn't it? Well, it is easy, provided both sides are willing to forego distrust and bitterness and learn to have confi­dence in the other fellow's fairness and good will. That is what is most required in order to make collective bargaining effective. And our lawmakers in Congress should please note, before irreparable damage is done, that true and effective collective bargaining, with a full degree of free enterprise for both sides, is the only Ameri­can way to preserve the American way of life. BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS An asterisk preceding any item in this bibliography indicates that the material appears in this bulletin. American Arbitration Association, Labo·r Arbitration in Wartime, Industrial Arbitration Tribunal, The Association, N.Y., 1942. American Federation of Labor, American Federation of Labor, A.F. of L. Bldg., Washington, D.C., October, 1942. American Forum of the Air, How Can We Achieve Industrial Peace? Ransdell, Inc., 810 Rhode Island Ave., Washington, D.C., Vol. III, No. 6, February 19, 1946. American Iron and Steel Institute, The Steel Strike, The Institute, 350 Fifth Ave., N.Y. American Management Association, Annual Wages and Employment Stabilization Techniques, The Association, N.Y., 1945. Employer Associations in Collective Bargaining (Personnel Series, No. 37), The Association, 330 W. 42d St., N.Y., 1939. Arbitration Provisions in Union Agreements, Bulletin No. 780, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Atkins, Willard E., and Laswell, Harold D., Labor Attitudes and Problems, Prentice-Hall, 70 Fifth Ave., N.Y., 1924. Bankers Trust Co., N.Y., 188 Retirement Plans, 1946. Bowman, D.O., Public Control of Labor Relations, The Macmillan Co., Dallas, 1942. Bowers, John H., Kan.sas Com'f of Industi·ial Relations, A. C. Mc­Clurg & Co., Chicago, Ill., 1922. Braun, Kurt, The Settlement of Industrial Disputes, The Bl!lkiston Co., Philadelphia, Pa., 1944. Building America, Labor and Management, Vol. IX No. 6, Ameri­cana Corporation, 2 W. 45th St., N.Y., 1943-44'. Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Collective Bargaining Contracts, The Bureau, Washington, D.C., 1941. Carnes, Cecil, John L. Lewis, Leader of Labor Robert Speller Pub­lishing Corporation, N.Y., 1936. ' Carskadon, Thomas R., Workers and Bosses Are Human (Public Affairs Pamphlet, No. 76), Public Affairs Committee, Inc., 30 Rockefeller Plaza, N. Y., 1943. Chernick, Jack, and Hellickson, George C., Guaranteed Annual Wages, University of Minnesota, M.nneapolis, Minn., 1945. City Club of New York, Report on Certain Aspects of Labor Union Responsibility and Control, Committee on Legislation, City Club of New York, N.Y. Committee for Industrial Organization, Case for Industrial Organ­ization (Publication No. 4), 'The Committee, Washington, D.C., 1936. Cooke, Morris L., and Murray, Phillip, Organized Labor and Pro­duction, Harper & Bros., 49 E. 33d St., N.Y., 1946. Conover, Helen F., Bibliography of Bibliographies of Trade Unions, Division of Bibliography, Library of Congress, Washington D.C., 1937. Daugherty, Carroll R., Labor Problems in American Industry, Hough­ton Mifflin Co., 2 Park St., Boston, Mass., 1933. Dickason, D. E., Labor Relations on the Campus, Bulletin of Associ­ation of American Colleges, 19 West 44th St., N.Y., 32:419-22, Octqbert 1946. Dickinson, Z. Clark, Collective Wage Determination, The Ronald Press., 15 E. 26th St., N.Y., 1941. Dunn, Stephen F., Management Rights in Labor Relations, Woodbeck Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, Mich., 1946. Economic and Business Foundation, American Labor Policies, The Foundation, New Wilmington, Pa., 1945. Ells, Ralph W., Salary and Wage Administration, McGraw-Hill Boo:K Co., Inc., 330 W. 42d St., N.Y., 1945. Estey, J. A., Labor Problems, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 330 W. 42d St., N.Y., 1928. Fabian Society, Labor Control and De-Control, The Society, Eco­nomics Committee, London, 1946. *Factory Management and Maintenance, Management Looks at Com­pulsory Arbitration, Vol. 105, No. 3, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 330 W. 42d St., N.Y., pp. 66-70, March, 1947. *Faukner, Harold U., and Starr, Mark, Labor in America, Harper & Bros., 49 E. 33d St., N.Y., 1944, pp. 256-58. Feldman, Herman, Stabilizing Jobs and Wages Through Better Busi­-ness Management, Harper & Bros., N.Y., 1940. First, Edythe W., Industry and Labor Advisory Committees in the National Defense Advisory Commission and the Office of Pro­duction Management, May, 1940, to January 1942, Civilian Pro­ duction Administration, Washington, D.C., 1946. Fitzpatrick, B. H., Understanding Labor, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 330 W. 42d St., N.Y., 1945. Foster, W. Z., Organized Labor Faces the New World, New Century Publications, N.Y., 1945. Problerns of Organized Labor Today, New Century Publications, N.Y., 1946. *Gagliardo, Domenico, The Kansas Industrial Court; An E xperiment in Compulsory Arbitration, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kan., pp. 229-235, 1941. Garland, J. V., "Federal Regulation of Labor Unions," The Refer­ence Shelf, Vol. 15, No. 3, The H. W. Wilson Co., 950 Univer­sity Ave., N.Y., 1941. Gemmill Paul Fleming, Collective Bwrgaining by Actors, U.S. Bur~au of Labor Statistics, Washington, D.C., 402:1-102, Feb­ruary, 1926. Golden, Clinton S., and Ruttenberg, Harold J., The Dynamics of In­dustrial Democracy, Harper & Bros., 49 E. 33d St., N.Y., 1942. Gompers, Samuel, American Labor Movement; Its Makftc Up, Achieve­ments and Aspirations, American Federation of Labor, A.F. of L., Bldg., Washington, D.C., 1914. Gregory, C. 0., Labor and the Law, Norton Publishing Co., N.Y., 1946. 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Industrial Service of the National Council of the Y.M.C.A., Pro­moting Constructive Relations in Industry, The Council, 347 Madison Ave., N.Y., 1938. Johnsen, Julia E., "Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes," Ref­erence Shelf, The H. W. Wilson Co., 950 University Ave., N.Y., 1945. "Industrial versus Craft Unionism," Reference Shelf, Vol. 11, No. 3, The H. W. Wilson Co., N.Y., 1937. "Trade Unions and the Anti-·Trust Laws," Reference Shelf, Vol. 13, No. 10, The H. W. Wilson Co., N.Y., 1940. Kellor, Frances, Arbitration in Action, Harper & Bros., 49 E. 33d St., N.Y., 1941. . Labor Research Association, Labo1· Fact Book Vols. 1-3 and 7 In­ ternational Publishers Co., N.Y., 1931, 1934, 1936, 1945. ' Lapp, John A., Labor Arbitration, National Foremen's Institute Deep River, Conn. ' League for Industrial Democracy, The Forward Marek of American Labor, The League, 112 E. 19th St., N.Y., 1945. League for Industrial Rights, Struggle for Industrial Liberty (In­dustrial Liberty Series, No. 2), The League, N.Y., 1922. Levenstein, A., Labor Today and Tomorrow, Alfred A. Knopf Pub. Co., 501 Madison Ave., N.Y., 1945. Lewis, John L., Industrial Democracy (Publication No. 9), Commit­tee for Industrial Organization, Washington, D.C., 1937. Lincoln, James F., Lincoln's Incentive System, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 330 W. 42d St., N.Y., 1946. Marguiles, H. D., Worker and the Law, Workman's Benefit Fund, N.Y., 1946. Merritt, Walter Gordon, Are the Present Aims and Methods of Or­ganized Labor Contrary to Public Policy, More Particularly from a Legal Standpoint? State Bar Association of Wisconsin, Report of the Proceedings, 1916-18; Madison, Wis., pp. 315-32, 1918. Metz, Harold W., Labor Polic.y, 'The Brookings Institution, Washing­ton, D.C., 1945. Metz, Harold W., and Jacobstein, Meyer R., A National Labor Pol­icy, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1947. Millis, H. A., and Montgomery, R. E., Organized Labor, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 330 W. 42d St., N.Y., 1945. Montague, Gilbert H., "O'Mahoney Anti-Trust Bill Sharply Criti­cized; Report of the Merchants' Association of New York Com­mittee on Federal Trade Commission and Anti-Trust Laws,'' Greater New York; 26:4-7, October 26, 1939. Morris, R. B., Government and Labor in Early America, Columbia University Press, N.Y., 1946. National Association of Manufacturers, Collective Bargaining, Na­tional Association of Manufacturers, N.Y., November, 1943. The Public and Industrial Peace, National Association of Manu­facturers, N.Y. ­National Foremen's Institute, Pitfalls to Avoid in Labor Arbitration, The Institute, Deep River, Conn., 1946. National Industrial Conference Board, Should Trade Unions and Em­ployers' Associations Be Made Legally Responsible? The Board, N.Y., 1920. New York Labor Relations Institute, Practical Way to Handle Grievances, The Institute, N.Y., 1946. 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