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version of the following dissertation:**

**CONSUMING KOREANNESS IN CONTEMPORARY TAIWAN:  
INTER-ASIA REFERENCING IN THE POST-COLD WAR EAST ASIA**

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**Consuming Koreanness in Contemporary Taiwan:  
Inter-Asia Referencing in The Post-Cold War East Asia**

**by**

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# **Consuming Koreanness in Contemporary Taiwan: Inter-Asia Referencing in Post-Cold War East Asia**

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The University of Texas at Austin, 2016

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This dissertation sets out to study the ascendance of South Korea, which shifted from a peripheral to a prominent position in Taiwanese people's imaginary geography in the twenty-first century. The study investigated the perceptions and sentiments Taiwanese people held against Korea and argued that a body of knowledge regarding Korea has been generated in the Taiwanese society. The research analyzed academic literature, media representations, and viewer/reader reception about the rise of Korea. Complementing on existing Korean Wave studies which focused on the pop cultural flow exported from South Korea, this dissertation studied the socio-economic conditions that produce the flow. The research found that Taiwanese nationalism arose in response to changing regional relations in a post-Cold War East Asia. The rivalry between Taiwan and South Korea exemplified the tension among East Asian nations that has been heightened in an increasingly inter-dependent East Asia. By contrast to the print capitalism Benedict Anderson proposed in *Imagined Communities*, this dissertation discussed the "electronic capitalism" which media scholarship has just begun to explore. Due to the compression of time and space accelerated by electronic technologies, Taiwan and other East Asian nations have been incorporated in a highly competitive capitalist culture. The dissertation investigated three industries to

probe into Taiwan-South Korea encounters in particular contexts, including the electronics industry, the news media industry, and the media sports industry.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

This dissertation sets out to explore the rise of South Korea and its impact on Taiwanese people's perceptions of the Korean nation in the context of a post-Cold War East Asia. In *Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism* (2002), Koichi Iwabuchi discussed how the circulation of Japanese products challenged the America-centered cultural globalization of the previous century. In today's Taiwan, the consumer lifestyle has become even more complicated than what Iwabuchi described because of intense regionalization occurring over the past couple of decades. South Korea has emerged as another thriving economic and cultural power in the region, and becomes a major reference point through which Taiwan assesses its power and constructs its identity. The contemporary Taiwanese society has not only experienced a popular cultural "Korean Wave" in its everyday life, but is also influenced by the cultural and economic flow from Korea on a greater scale.

This dissertation investigates the production, the circulation, and the consumption of Koreanness in Taiwan. The media landscape in Taiwan has been fraught with imported content and nationalist responses. The advancement of technologies and media liberalization in the post-martial law Taiwan paved the way for the inflow of Korean popular culture and the fervor to consume Korean products. At the same time, various perceptions of Korea have been produced in the Taiwanese society, encompassing the positive and the negative. Since existing Korean scholarship has examined the positive changes in Korea's national image in fan studies much more extensively (Jung, 2011; Mori, 2008; Pease, 2006; Yoon & Jin, 2016), this dissertation focuses on the negative perceptions in order to probe into the contentious relationship between Taiwan and South Korea. I argue that the enmity towards Korea was created in an advanced capitalist logic of

electronic media when the abrupt rise of South Korea's economic and cultural power caught the Taiwanese psychologically unprepared.

An antagonistic relationship between Taiwan and South Korea may seem surprising to other observers of Asia at first glance since these two nations do not have a history of conflict; however, the intense interdependence of global capitalism has made the Taiwanese highly self-conscious of their unstable identity and uncertain future. Taiwan has undergone a phase of rapid progress and is now experiencing a period of economic stagnation, which is in contrast to neighboring nations—China and South Korea in particular—that seem to be experiencing high growth rates. The emergence of a pop culture Korean Wave in the media landscape has not only informed people about the rise of Korea, it has also reminded the Taiwanese that this is a race with both winners and losers. In this context, South Korea's pop culture is a form of soft power which has both potentials and limitations in the ways it influences the nation's image. The analysis provided in this dissertation shows that Korea's soft power and Taiwan's identity have been contending with each other by increasing and decreasing each other's national interests. Today's Taiwan and South Korea have advanced from postwar countries receiving American aid to forerunning global competitors in electronics and even in cultural production as the case of Korean Wave demonstrates. These nations are no longer tied to each other by their relationship with the U.S., but become rivals to each other when the Taiwanese citizens are highly aware of their competing interests with South Korean conglomerates.

The post-Cold War relationships in Northeast Asia have complicated the relationship between Taiwan and South Korea. Economically, the Cold War has incubated the developmental states in Taiwan and South Korea with American aid and reduced international competition. The economic growths during this period of time built the foundation for their contemporary competition in the electronics and cultural industries.

Politically, the re-integration of China in the region has deepened the insecurities of the Taiwanese whose sovereignty is not officially recognized by its neighbors. Culturally, the media landscape has been liberalized and the East Asian polities have recentered American cultural dominance with localized content. In short, this study investigates an inter-Asia movement which was made possible in the post-Cold War East Asia. This dissertation illustrates the transnational encounters and clashes which occurred during capitalist expansion in the region.

### **INTER-ASIA AS A METHOD: FROM INTER-ASIA CULTURAL STUDIES TO INTER-ASIA REFERENCING**

Scholarship in inter-Asian research has emerged since the 1990s, corresponding to the economic rise of Asia. This section reviews the literature of inter-Asia cultural studies and Korean Wave as a discourse of regionalism. Such academic regionalism is a response to the regional consciousness that was formed within the past few decades. The economic miracles of East Asia were featured by the “flying geese pattern” of the developmental states: Japan and the “four little dragons” of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea have impressed the world by their rapid economic growths. Throughout the most recent decades, the region has experienced further transformation in its industries. East Asian countries are now also known as exporters of media and cultural products to other corners of the world. Movies from Hong Kong, animation from Japan, and Korean dramas or pop music have been circulated worldwide, to name a few examples. The following paragraphs examine the intellectual movement of “inter-Asia cultural studies” and the discourse of the Korean Wave to discuss the influence of media regionalization in Asian studies. While the spread of East Asian popular culture grasped the attention of regional scholars, some scholars have pointed to the theoretical and methodological significance of “inter-Asia referencing” (Iwabuchi, 2013). The idea of using one’s Asian counterpart as an

intellectual and academic reference point in Asian studies is an initiative to shift the discussions from a West-centric perspective to a “de-colonial” and “de-imperial” (Chen, 2010) project which places Asia at its center. This dissertation builds on the existing media and cultural studies within inter-Asian studies and explores the contemporary regional relations between Taiwan and South Korea.

### **Inter-Asia Cultural Studies**

Two cultural studies conferences were held in Taiwan in 1992 and 1995 and became “the Trajectories Project” which subsequently turned into a journal of continuing publication on inter-Asian research. These conferences were said to be “the first cultural studies conferences that took place outside the English speaking world” (Chen, 1998, p. xv). The journal *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* was founded in 2000 as a product of the Trajectories Project. Kuang-hsing Chen stated at the preface of *Trajectories: Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* that “perhaps, it was not a historical accident that the Trajectories Project was initiated from the geo-political space of Taiwan,” given “the shifting of gravity of the global economy towards the Asian continent, heralded by Japan in the 1980s, [and] later amplified by the ... four Tigers: Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore” (p. xiii). In the logic of global capitalism, a number of small players has generated impressive performances, among which the little tigers—three of them island economies—have become some of highest ranked world trading polities from the late 20th century. While Kuang-hsing Chen from Taiwan became one of the leading figures in inter-Asian cultural studies through his participation in founding journals and international conferences, Beng Huat Chua from the National University of Singapore was another key figure and headed the Asia Research Institute, which established a concentration of “Cultural Studies in Asia.” Hong Kong University Press has also published several seminal anthologies of trans-Asian cultural studies—from Japanese dramas and the Korean Wave, to the cultural

industries of Northeast Asia.<sup>1</sup> Through organizing conferences, establishing journals, and publishing books, the island societies endeavored to institutionalize cultural studies in Asia.

This inter-Asia movement in academia is both a response to and a critique of the “rise of Asia” discourse, which scholars associate with post-colonial triumphalism. “Since the 1980s, a pervasive rhetoric of the ‘rise of Asia’ has come to mean more than the concentrated flow of capital into and out of the region. ...Historically, this feeling of the ‘rise of Asia’ is complicated by the region’s colonial past” (Editorial, 2000, p. 5). While the scholars were discontent with the cultural-essentialist sense of triumphalist rhetoric regarding East Asia’s economic success, they agreed on a post-colonial aspiration which resists oppression from the inside and out. On the one hand, they were critical of the Euro-American-centric dominance in knowledge production; on the other hand, they condemned different forms of inequalities within modern East Asian societies, from gender politics to social mobility, migration, and post-coloniality. In order to achieve these goals, *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* has been promoting an Asian identity and has maintained a critical edge to the formation of Asianness.

As the introduction in *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*’ first issue highlighted by reviewing Ge Sun’s article, “How Does Asia Mean,” the region has operated within different conceptual frameworks, including: “an abstract entity countering the ‘west’/ Europe,” “a concrete geographical zone,” “a physical space and an imaginary sign,” “a mind set or a mood,” “a unified civilization and non-unified sub-regions,” “a location to

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<sup>1</sup> Hong Kong University Press has published a series of books titled “TransAsia: Screen Cultures.” The book series examined issues of trans-Asia cultural flows, as well as regional and national cultural industries.

be conquered,” and “a method of constructing cultural identity” (2000, p. 9). According to these definitions, Asia not only has a physical existence but also functions as a sign. It has geographical and cultural connotations and is able to cohere and mobilize people. Furthermore, it can be conquered and exists as a contrast to “the West” or “the European.” These approaches to Asia are helpful for subsequent researchers to conduct cultural and discursive analysis of the region.

The early phase of inter-Asia cultural studies highlighted a shared political drive to “de-Westernize” and “de-colonize” the region, and not its intrinsic characteristics (Chen, 2010). Scholarship during this phase criticized the celebration of modernization and Asian modernities by investigating the problems of developmentalism, especially after the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The economic successes attributed to “Asian modernities” and “alternative modernities,” therefore, became failures in the midst of the crisis (Cho, 1997). South Korean scholar, Kyung-sup Chang, for example, pointed out the problems of turbo capitalism and the compressed modernity in South Korea, where “a highly collapse-prone economic, political and social system” led to the economic and bureaucratic breakdown in 1997, as well as to the collapse of the Seongsu Grand Bridge over the Han River—which was among the crumbling of other large-scale urban structures in the 1990s in Seoul (1999, p. 31). As the first phase of inter-Asian cultural studies problematized the developmentalist modernity, a subsequent phase of inter-Asian studies turned its attention to media and cultural traffic derived from the region.

A transnational empire of Japanese pop culture emerged near the end of the millennium, producing a consciousness of East Asian pop culture and the subsequent scholarship in the early 2000s. Japanese manga, novels, and TV dramas were eagerly consumed in East Asia despite historical animosity in the region. *Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism* (Iwabuchi, 2002), *Rogue*

*Flows: Trans-Asian Cultural Traffic* (Iwabuchi & Thomas, 2004), and *Feeling Asian Modernities: Transnational Consumption of Japanese TV Dramas* (Iwabuchi, 2004) are some of the scholarship that views Asia as one region of cultural geography. The success of the media industries in Asia resulted in another round of discussions on modernity. Among the studies, Koichi Iwabuchi is one of the most pioneering and seminal scholars who connected the idea of modernity temporalities to the circulation of pop culture in East Asia. This approach illustrates a linear temporality, with a yearning for the advanced, nostalgia for the lost past, or a “coevalness” sensed by the audience between the production and reception societies. Viewers were said to be attracted to transnational media products in either of the above situation, depending on whether they were more advanced or behind in their development of modernization. In Iwabuchi's analysis, he concluded that the Taiwanese audience felt a coevalness with the world through viewing Japanese trendy dramas (2002).

In addition, Iwabuchi elaborated on the idea of “cultural proximity” proposed by American scholars Joseph Straubhaar, John Sinclair, Elizabeth Jacka, and Stuart Cunningham to illustrate the decrease in the global dominance of United States’ pop culture and the rise of regional influences. The scholars of cultural proximity demonstrated the significance of emerging geo-cultural markets whose regional television programs have been enjoying higher viewing ratings. Building on the theory of “cultural proximity,” Iwabuchi argued for the favorable reading of Japanese dramas over their American counterparts in Asia. This comparative approach positioned the research within the framework of globalization, and maintained that American leadership in offering images of modernity—such as “romance, freedom and affluence” (Iwabuchi, 2002, p. 152)—has been replaced by Japanese products with modest Asian sensibilities. Iwabuchi’s reception research in Taiwan demonstrates that a sense of cultural resonance struck between the

Japanese dramas and their viewers. Japan has become a better alternative than the United States. Noting this shift of cultural gravity, the introductory chapter in *Feeling Asian Modernities: Transnational Consumption of Japanese TV Dramas* (2004) problematized the cultural imperialism thesis through investigating the trajectory of the diffused cultural flows in Asia (p. 5).

### **Korean Wave in Asian Studies**

The Korean Wave ensued the spread of Japanese popular culture in the region and encouraged both national and regional consciousness. The Korean Wave phenomenon refers to the transnational circulation of South Korean media products. Due to the development of a communication infrastructure in the region, South Korea's popular culture has spread—first to East Asia and subsequently to other regions. The term “Korean Wave” was said to be coined by the Taiwanese media and quickly picked up by its neighbors who either shared the same writing system or whose morphemes were rooted in Chinese characters. Be it traditional Chinese, “韩流(hanliu);” simplified Chinese “韩流(hanliu);” Japanese Kanji “韩流(kanryu);” or Korean hangul, “한류(hallyu);” the two syllables in different languages all refer to the Korean nation and a flow or a wave. The massive and intensive media coverage of the Korean Wave portrayed the phenomenon as a spectacle for observers all over the region (Jung, 2011), including the news media and area scholars.

The body of Korean Wave research can be divided into three approaches which emerged successively along with the evolution of the Korean Wave movement: the discovery, the “bandwagon” (Lee, 2008), and that of the regional relations. Haejoang Cho described in “Reading the Korean Wave' as a Sign of Global Shift” (2005) that the Korean Wave first started as a surprise to observers in South Korea. Cho illustrated the discovery as a moment of celebration to the “cultural nationalists,” who view the Korean Wave as

“the victory of Korean culture and Asian pride” (p. 153). Cho’s poignant critique highlights the nation’s confidence generated by its successful cultural exports.

Building on Cho’s (2006) arguments, Keehyeung Lee (2008) suggested that there was a boom in discourses about the Korean Wave and contended that it was a “highly publicized” transnational phenomenon. Chinese media in mainland China and Taiwan were the first to use the term “Korean Wave” in the late 1990s to capture the pop cultural flows from South Korea—especially its pop music and TV dramas (2008). Subsequently, the phenomenal success of the drama *Winter Sonata* received much media—and very soon scholarly—attention. The massive amounts of Bae Yong-joon’s fans showing up at Japan’s Haneda airport or the Japanese prime minister Junichiro Kizumi’s speech about his wishing to be as popular as the actor (Jung, 2011, p. 36), are some of the most repeatedly reported Korean Wave stories televised for the transnational audience. The “discovery” of the Korean Wave took place domestically and transnationally after the Wave caught people’s attention by surprise. *Winter Sonata* was a starting point for the Japanese discovery of the Korean Wave, while subsequent studies of other popular cultural exports, e.g., research on the Korean female idol group *Girl’s Generation* in Japan, were produced extensively. These studies appeared in panels and conferences, as well as academic journals, and jumped on “the bandwagon of the Korean Wave” (Lee, 2008).

The “Korean Wave bandwagon” refers to a mass of Korean Wave literature that explored and even capitalized on the phenomenon—an expression created by Keehyeung Lee in his article “Mapping Out the Cultural Politics of ‘the Korean Wave’ in Contemporary South Korea” (2008). Although the concept of a “Korean Wave bandwagon” in my dissertation is inspired by Lee, the phenomenon I discuss here expands on the scope of his analysis. Lee discussed how South Korean governmental agencies, local communities, and businesses rode “the Hanryu bandwagon” (p. 179). These different

interest groups utilized the Korean Wave phenomenon to procure resources, brand their projects, and make profits. To elaborate on Lee's observation, I argue that such a bandwagon exists transculturally, through which much international media coverage and scholarship are produced. This transnational bandwagon is observable in international conferences as well as academic literature, which study the cultural products without much in-depth discussion of the greater context in which the Korean Wave occurred.

There is a third approach in contrast with the two approaches introduced previously: This approach is self-reflexive and able to position the researcher and the objects of analyses in historical contexts. Cho (2006) and Lee's (2008) articles are examples of the self-reflexive approach pertaining to the Korean Wave discourse(s) generated in South Korea. At the end of Cho's article, she highlights several contemporary conditions to consider: "globalization, (post)modernity, (post)coloniality, and neoliberalism in Asia" (p. 173). She revisits the classical discussions on mass culture and the cultural industry, and reviews the spread of advanced capitalism and the emerging middle-class in Asia in order to historicize the Korean Wave. In addition, Lee suggests that astute observers of the Korean Wave should pay attention to "the 'hybrid' [nature]...of Korean popular culture as an ensemble of heterogeneous elements," instead of arguing for "the 'superiority' of modern Korean popular culture" (p. 182). Lee's critique is against what he termed as the "mainstream" approaches to the Korean Wave within the South Korean society. These two authors demonstrate the problems of a nationalist approach and attempt to contextualize the Korean Wave in a larger framework of regional and global capitalism.

### **Asia as a Method**

Regional observers found that the advent of the Korean Wave at the turn of the 21st century reinforced the trend of regionalism and regionalization. Beng Huat Chua as well used the approach of modernity and temporalities to illustrate the regional circulation of

Korean dramas in “Structure of Identification and Distancing in Watching East Asian Television Drama” (2008). In his analysis, intra-Asia cultural flows display a capitalist modernity driven by consumerism. Perceiving the vibrant cultural exchanges among different Chinese-speaking sub-regions, he proposed the emergence of a “pop culture China,” a term he coined to explain the movements of regional dialects, the circulation of pop cultural products, and the heterogeneous identities in regional polities. The sub-regions of the “pop culture China” share some common cultural heritages, such as the Chinese writing system and Confucianism. He situates the Korean Wave phenomenon in this framework and suggests a real-time pan-Asian identification among the audience he studied. Chua demonstrates the difference between Korean and Japanese dramas in the eyes of a Singaporean viewer, who considered the Korean dramas more Asian and more “like us.” This pan-Asian identity occurred along with a sense of non-Asian-ness that was implied beneath the “we are Asian” response (2008, p. 84) as an identification/Othering mechanism.

Compared to what *Decentering Globalization* illustrated in 2002, the sentiment of surprise was probably even greater when regional observers noticed that the Japanese regional power had been decentered again by the ensuing Korean Wave. When observers “discovered” the Korean Wave, they encountered the rise of Asia at the same time. Witnessing the intense regional flows, Beng Huat Chua illustrated a history of East Asian popular culture (2007) by suggesting that the contemporary flows of pop culture could not be explained by a Confucian East Asia, which implied shared cultural virtues and the solidarity of the region. Chua argued that pop culture was “a sphere of capitalist activities” that was better examined with the “marketing, distribution, promotion and circulation of the products and their economics” (2007). In this vein of thought, the idea of “being Asian” is no longer cultural-essentialist, but, instead, methodological.

“Asia as a method” was originally proposed by Japanese thinker Yoshimi Takeuchi in the early 1960s and is an idea that both Kuang-hsing Chen (2010) and Koichi Iwabuchi (2013) built upon and advocated in their proposition of “inter-Asia referencing.” As Iwabuchi argues, the “under-explored intra-regional or inter-Asian comparison is considered highly meaningful for understanding modern trajectories of Asian countries in a new critical light, as it is based on shared experiences of ‘forced’ modernization and less hierarchical relationships than a prevailing West-Asia comparison based on assumed temporal distance between them” (2013, p. 44). While inspired and well-intentioned scholars have been looking forward to more dialogues and mutual understandings (Iwabuchi, p. 49), this dissertation offers an example of “misunderstandings” in the context of intense regionalization. Nationalism among different Asian societies has been growing despite everyday encounters with inter-Asian cultural products. Territorial disputes between Japan and its neighbors, anti-Korean movements in Japan, and the growing Taiwanese nationalism which was liberated at the end of its martial law period, are some of the examples of the current nationalist movements in East Asia. Mutual understanding cannot be produced without deeper investigation into the tension and conflicts in existing inter-Asia relations.

A survey of inter-Asia cultural studies reveals that, especially during the second phase of the scholarship, media regionalization has been highlighted, whereas the changes in perceptions—of oneself and others—are less explored. For instance, inspired by Weiming Tu’s proposal of a “cultural China,” which included different Chinese polities as a cultural geographical bloc, Beng Huat Chua suggests that there is a “pop culture China” as well as an “East Asian pop culture sphere” (2007). Chua points out that China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the U.S., Japan, and Korea all participate as cultural centers in this “pop culture sphere.” In this thread of discussions, the circulation of pop cultural products has

been the primary focus of the cultural traffic. My research design seeks to fill the gap to incorporate the economic, the cultural, and the socio-psychological to highlight the process of collective identity construction in Taiwan during its encounters with South Korea.

## **METHODOLOGY**

In this dissertation, I explore the discourses that are generated in response to the transnational movement of an observable “Korean wave” in Taiwan. I maintain that a broadly conceived “Korean wave” study is different from an uppercase “Korean Wave” analysis. The former highlights the rise of Korea and the socio-economic relations between an exporter Korea and other importer societies. The latter refers to the Korean Wave scholarship which mainly focuses on pop culture and have been extensively discussed in existing literature (Chua & Iwabuchi, 2008; Jung, 2010; D. Kim & S. Kim, 2011; Y. Kim, 2013). While a popular cultural Korean Wave has shed light on the intense regional movement of commodities and visual images, this study presses on to explore the socio-psychological changes of Taiwanese people in their understanding of Korea as a nation.

The rise of Korea has produced a transnational discourse of Koreanness circulated both within and without Taiwan. My research echoes the recent call of Asian studies scholars who find discursive analyses in digital cultures indispensable when studying today’s Asia. One example is the studies of “digital nationalism” in China (Qiu, 2015; Schneider, 2013). Being a founding editor of the nascent journal *Asiascape: Digital Asia* and a leading organizer of the Digital Asia conferences, Schneider argues that discourse analysis is particularly useful in studying virtual and political communication in an Asia which continues to be reshaped by digital technologies (2013b). In this dissertation, four types of discourses are analyzed to investigate the rise of Korea and its impact on Taiwan. I study the academic and media literature that covers the Korean Wave phenomenon, news reports and rumors about Korea, viewer response, and consumers’ lived experience of

cross-cultural consumption. Studying the variety of discourses enables me to produce a multi-dimensional portrayal of Taiwanese people's encounters with Korea.

The design of this study complicates the idea of audience within existing Korean Wave studies. Previous scholarship has primarily focused on the production, reception, and the content of the media products; by contrast, this research considers the Taiwanese as a national audience and a community of consumers of Korea's (cultural) exports. Korean studies scholars have explored the changes within Korean media industries, such as beneficial government policies (Shim, 2006), institutional modernization and liberalization,<sup>2</sup> and well-developed star-manufacturing procedures (Willoughby, 2006)—to name a few. International scholars from different corners of the world have taken advantage of their knowledge of local languages and cultures to study the reception communities in their native countries. Other studies analyzed the program contents—such as music, TV dramas, or films. As a bridge between the first and the second group of studies, this dissertation uses discursive analyses to reflect the relationship between the cultural exporter and the host society.

Reception research in Korean Wave literature, in particular, has primarily focused on fan communities (Jung, 2011; Mori, 2008; Pease, 2006; Yoon & Jin, 2016). However, noting that fandom is a partial component of the national consumer community, this

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<sup>2</sup> South Korea film industry is an example of media culture's institutional modernization and liberalization (Packet, 2009; Robinson, 2005). Film schools and film production programs were not established in Korea until the 1980s. Previously, directors are trained by apprenticeship, through which they receive training at the production sites. The later generations of directors receive western education of film production in universities and are better exposed to a liberalized environment after several amendments of the Motion Picture Law.

dissertation sought to study the national audience and the variety of responses they generate in relation to the Korean wave discourse. The idea of audience and community has been complicated during the development of Korean Wave literature. Beng Huat Chua (2009) broadened the scope of inter-Asian media studies in his conceptual framework of the different “layers of audience communities.” In addition to the much more active and visible fan community, he suggests that there is a group of passive consumers, who are usually invisible from the public but can gather together when there is a special event—such as a concert. Chua highlighted that the less visible but occasional consumers might view a Korean drama on TV or listen to K pop without engaging in interactive consumption activities observable to the public. My research departs from this argument to include consumers who might not even intentionally consume the products. These people might have never purchased any Korean product in their lives and only encountered some of the Korean media contents randomly through television or word of mouth. These people were targeted as potential consumers, who were as well the national audience that was exposed to mass media and advertisements. The benefit of studying the national audience, rather than a specific group of Korean product consumers, is to explore a variety of attitudes towards Korea in Taiwan—from the favorable to the hostile.

## **RESEARCH DESIGN**

In order to explore these cross-cultural experiences with both breadth and depth, the research design adopts different methodologies, including literature review and analysis of media texts and media events, as well as conducting survey and in-depth interviews. Fieldwork was conducted from 2013 to 2015 to collect survey and interview results. The purpose of the fieldwork was to provide a thicker description of the Taiwanese consumption practices. It explores how informants receive information and interpret experience, as well as whether the information or the experience affects their behaviors in

any manner. Data collection was divided into two phases. The first phase began in spring to summer, 2013 (March to August), when I distributed an electronic survey through snowball sampling. The survey served as a pilot research that examined people's general perceptions of Korea. The second phase was in the ensuing summers in 2014 and 2015 when face-to-face in-depth interviews were conducted.

The survey consists of ten sets of questions, which include open-ended and multiple choice questions. The first questions probe into Taiwanese people's use of two terms: 1) Korea—*hanguo*—as a society, and 2) Koreans—*hanguoren*—as a community.<sup>3</sup> I explore how each individual came across stories and images of Korea. The survey collects people's general impressions on Korea by asking them to jot down their knowledge of the country, including how they received such information and how they responded to it. I also inquired into their consumption practices to see whether they owned any Korean products—in order to review the correlation between their consumption practices and their attitudes to Korea. At the end, I asked respondents if they were content with the current Taiwan-Korea relationship and to explain why or why not. By asking respondents to describe the Korea they knew of, as well as name the sources of information they used to form these perceptions, I was able to study people's attitudes toward Korea and how the media has shaped their views.

The survey was electronic and available to the public. Any individual with Internet access was able to participate. It was distributed through a snowballing process starting from my personal network, in which most of the respondents were located in Northern Taiwan—particularly Hsinchu City. Hsinchu City is an important hub for the Taiwanese

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<sup>3</sup> *Hanguo* in Mandarin Chinese is literally “the Korean-nation.” In Taiwan, this is usually referred to as a contraction of the Republic of Korea or South Korea; *Hanguoren* is literally the “Korean-nation-people”.

electronic industry. The government planned an area, named the Hsinchu Science Park, which hosts a constellation of related enterprises. Since Taiwan and South Korea have adopted similar paths in their export economies, they have been competing for the electronics market in cell phones and computers, as well as other electronic devices and the components in them. These Taiwanese respondents, especially those who work in the “3C product” industries (a Taiwanese phrase which abbreviates “computer, communication, and consumer” products), interacted with the Korean wave in ways previous reception studies could not demonstrate.

Respondents include men and women whose ages are primarily between their 20s to 40s. This age range consists of individuals who are most adept with the new media and are more likely to participate in contemporary media culture. These viewers/Internet users are also the group of people whose present and future careers are in most immediate danger from the fierce business competition between Taiwan and South Korea. In earlier scholarship, gender and ethnicity have been considered some of the most important markers for interpreting the popularity of Korean products. For instance, Singaporean women experienced sexual freedom through consuming Korean products in a society whose mainstream culture was conservative (Jung, 2011), and diasporic Korean communities reinforced their immigrant identities through their shared interests in Korean pop culture in their host societies (Park, 2013). In contrast with studies of these marked audiences, my dissertation fills the gap between the devoted consumers and the comparatively uninterested consumers by focusing on the latter’s responses to a Korean wave. The interviews that took place during the second phase of data collection deepened the researcher’s understanding of the data retrieved from the survey. The interviewees consisted of 10 men and 10 women selected to present a variety of views on Korea—from those who have more experience of purchasing and viewing Korean products to those who

hold comparatively negative views or are negligent of Korea. The first interviewees were selected from the survey respondents. Subsequent interviewees were referred by the earlier informants to show complementary views of Korea. These interviewees were recruited in a selective snowball sampling method in order to display different personal experiences and opinions.

The interview questions were semi-structured. Participants were asked 1) to recount their experience of encountering Korean culture, 2) to comment on selected news reports and rumors about South Korea, and 3) to rate their overall experience with Korea by choosing a number according to the Likert Scale—from the *very negative* (rated 1), the *somewhat negative* (2), the *neutral* (3), the *somewhat positive* (4), to the *very positive* (5). An interview would begin with the participants' reflection of their encounters with Korea in their lifetime. Participants were given a sheet of blank paper, on which they drew a graph indicating their positive and negative experiences with Korean culture through the use of a curve on a timeline (see Appendix B). Unstructured questions were then asked to clarify and specify their experiences. The timeline question of the interview is able to reveal shifting, rather than fixed, attitudes of the informants at different moments of encounters along with the progression of their lifetime. Consequently, the researcher received more details about the informants' thoughts and feelings in a given situation. In addition, I used sample stories and rumors to inquire into their reception experience with information provided by the mass media. At the end of the interview, I asked the informants to summarize their views of Korea according to a Likert Scale. The use of a scale is not to quantify people's views of Korea but to assist the researcher in understanding the informants' attitudes towards the nation when their factual statements did not necessarily reflect their emotional responses.

## **KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN THE AGE OF ELECTRONIC CAPITALISM**

This study argues that the rivalry between Taiwan and South Korea is produced in the historical context of electronic capitalism. The phenomena examined in this dissertation, including the production of transnational Koreanness and the emergence of anti-Korean sentiments on- and off-line, are tied to the development of global capitalism. Capitalism has been an expansionist and adaptive system which integrated the East Asian nations into a global capitalist network. The historical trajectories of Taiwan and South Korea have demonstrated the evolution of capitalism, which is driven by advancements in electronic technologies nowadays. The capitalist logic nurtured the developmentalism in these two nations throughout the 20th century and has left a legacy of international competition. Being incorporated into an industrial Darwinist ecology of survival and extinction, the Taiwanese and the Korean states, their citizens, and the corporations of these nations all participate in this competitive system.

There are two reasons for the use of electronic capitalism as the key conceptual framework of the dissertation. First, it explains the capitalist system which conditions the economic relations between Taiwan and Korea, as well as between them and other countries. These economic relations have created an inter-national relationship between Taiwan and Korea with tension and even opposition. Second, electronic capitalism is the socio-historical context of Taiwan's contemporary nationalism. Electronic capitalism, as opposed to print capitalism, is found to be conducive to the rise of media and cyber nationalism with their particular aesthetic features, such as extensive use of images, superficiality, and sensationalism. Inasmuch as electronic capitalism has its material base, its structure of production relations, and its particular aesthetic or cultural expressions, the competitive relationship between Taiwan and South Korea also has its material base, and

is manifest in the characteristics of their industrial ecologies and particular aesthetic and cultural expressions.

Materially speaking, the development of computers (including various electronic technologies and the emergence of the Internet) has accelerated the creation and the diffusion of information. The use of computer technologies resulted in massive information flow and is conducive to technological innovation. The intense compression of time and space has created a hyper-competitive culture characterized by short product life cycles and post-Fordist flexible production. Electronic technologies are able to reduce the cost of production in different ways, such as by producing rapid and democratic means of communication and by simplifying machinery adjustments in order to customize and specialize products. Smaller, flexible scale of production has emerged to coexist with mass production. These transformations are changing how nations and individual workers compete and are able to survive in the new system. These different modes of production are manifest in the global information technology (IT) industry which consists of a value chain with high-tech and low-tech sub-industries, from software development to hardware manufacture and raw material production. The lucrative business of computer technologies lies in their expansive ability to cross a variety of industrial boundaries. The Taiwanese and South Korean economies have, respectively, experienced an industrial transformation from a primary focus on low-tech manufacturing to developing electronic industries with skilled labor. This is the economic and industrial base of the Taiwan-Korea relationship which this study will discuss in subsequent chapters.

In addition to the deep involvement of the electronics industries in the Taiwanese and Korean economies, electronic capitalism has conditioned industrial ecologies of other kinds. The mass media industry in Taiwan has become a highly-competitive environment with domestic, transnational, and international participants. Hundreds of television

channels, and print and electronic press, among other forms of digital and multi-media publication, have been competing for the attention of the Taiwanese audience. Like the electronics industry, which was characterized by short product cycles, the mass media has also fallen prey to the demand for immediacy. The media ecology in Taiwan is therefore highly competitive, craving massive and immediate input of information. Furthermore, the spread of advanced communication technologies, especially the use of computers and the Internet amidst the old media infrastructure, has created an intertextual and an interactive media landscape with particular modes of aesthetic and cultural expressions.

The latest communication technologies have enabled a digital media culture of convergence and competition. Convergence take place at two levels—in different forms of texts, as well as within different media platforms. Digital technologies are able to produce written, aural, and visual texts for print media, television, and websites whose contents are referenced by one another. The cultural production under the logic of electronic capitalism, furthermore, features the mundane consumption of static and moving images. The electronic media and the digitalization of information have made the production and the circulation of visual images simpler and more accessible to the public. These images are circulated in a multimedia environment mentioned earlier, and are able to reinforce existing perceptions and sentiments. As a result, the media culture in Taiwan is prone to producing sensational contents filled with emotion and rumor. Such sensationalism can be intensified by the intertextual and participatory culture enabled by the Internet and the Web 2.0 technologies. For example, this study found that the use of Facebook and YouTube can be helpful for disseminating patriotic sentiment and anti-Korean discourse in Taiwan. Users of these platforms refer to other media sources, create links for other media texts, including those produced by professionals and fellow Internet users. In addition, the ferocious competition among the commercial media made the dissemination of sensationalist stories

attractive to the Taiwanese news media. In the same vein, the rise of Korea became one of the heated topics in the Taiwanese mass media. Spectacles of a Korean wave invading Taiwan, the knowledge of the Korean society and history, and stories of Taiwan-Korea confrontations were represented in the forms of news stories, rumors, and user-created contents. A Korean wave, anti-Korean sentiments, and Taiwanese nationalism are tied together under the logic of electronic capitalism, which is conducive to the production of information and sentiments at a scale greater than before.

The relationship between mass media and nationalism has been explored in previous scholarship, advancing from the consumption of print media to that of electronic media. Benedict Anderson (1983) argued for the relationship between print capitalism and nationalism, illustrating how print publication, such as that of newspapers and novels, increased a sense of community: Those who were not able to know their fellow citizens face-to-face enjoyed a coevalness of time and space through the act of reading. Michael Billig (1995) stressed the idea of “banal nationalism” to demonstrate the often understated, yet very powerful, workings of nationalism within routine activities, such as watching television news. Media anthropologists built on existing scholarship and suggested that primetime news could construct a set of routines and form national identities (Lule, 2005). Recent scholarship has probed into other communication technologies and studied the influence of mobile phones (Rheingold, 2003) and social network (Ericson, 2007; Sebastian, 2011) within social movements.

While nationalism and racialization have taken place for centuries, new media is generating contemporary expressions of them due to the logic of electronic capitalism. Appadurai (1996) discussed the impact of the electronic media in demonstrating contemporary global movements and changing the transnational media landscape (p. 8-10). He suggested that electronic media is capable of connecting transnational and

diasporic communities in more flexible forms and with lower costs than the print media. Individuals are connected with their home countries through the consumption of media texts and the use of advanced communication technologies. He argued for the effects of image and video in creating communal identities and indicated the significance of television, video, film, and the Internet. According to Appadurai, these visual forms of representations are able to advocate issues and promoting charismatic figures through a global electronic network (p. 7). While Appadurai highlighted the workings of electronic capitalism in what he referred to as a “postnational” context in transnational and diasporic settings, the present study investigates the relationship between the electronic capitalism and the nationalist movement within Taiwanese society alone.

My dissertation is similar but different from Appadurai’s discussion of electronic capitalism in a few respects. Similar to Appadurai’s work, this dissertation acknowledges the connection between mass media and community formation by arguing that electronic capitalism is particularly conducive to the construction of Koreanness and the nationalist movement in Taiwan. Electronic media is favorable to the spread of visual images as well as for creating the imaginaries (of a nation or of anything). While Appadurai primarily focuses on the significance of image and imagination as well as the movement of people and cultures, this dissertation focused on demonstrating more intrinsic qualities of electronic capitalism. The study examined the industrial ecologies of the electronics and the mass media. The latter, which has now become multimedia and convergent, is different from print media, which is not able to communicate as immediately and democratically. Electronic media encourages rapid and massive information exchange at an unprecedented scale, and is characterized by sensationalism, superficiality, and participation that have existed in the past, but are in a more explosive manner now.

Forge (2000) studied the economy of electronic capitalism and stated that “a large enough quantitative change becomes a qualitative change.” It is in this sense that I juxtaposed the economic and the cultural, namely the capitalist system of economic relations and the logic of cultural production in the system. With an accelerated and flexible process of production and consumption, electronic capitalism has resulted in a precarious lifestyle of a restless race among nations, corporations, and individuals. The players in this system are all competing to catch up or stay ahead. To sum up from previous discussions, electronic capitalism creates hyper-competitive industrial ecologies which are manifest in the electronics and news media industries in Taiwan. As subsequent chapters will demonstrate, the former strives to survive compressed product cycles by continuous innovations and strategic alliances, and the latter is afflicted with poor content quality due to the cutthroat ratings/readership competition.

Appadurai argues that, while today's world consists of global migration of ideas, people, goods, and money which travel along with a massive amount of images and texts, “the lines between the realistic and the fictional landscapes...are blurred” (1996, p. 48). Likewise, the transnational encounters between Taiwanese and Koreans are represented in discursive forms while fictions and reality work hand in hand to shape Taiwanese people's perceptions of and behavior towards Korea. Taiwanese citizens construct their views on Korea by consuming Korean products, watching broadcasts of Korean dramas, viewing international sport competitions, reading news stories about Korea, or viewing blog posts. As a mediated experience, much of the information has gone through a continuing process of intertextual reproduction. The Internet reinforces this process by incorporating all voluntary users into a massive content manufacturer consisting of individual and corporate information producers. This dissertation examines the discourse production and consumption under electronic capitalism, arguing that the confrontations between Taiwan

and South Korea are not only a result of accumulated tension of national competition, but also the result of contemporary technological innovation.

## **CHAPTER OUTLINE**

In order to properly consider the complex relationship between the two nations, this dissertation adopts the following approaches: industrial, technological, historical, and discursive. While all the chapters investigate the Taiwan-Korea relationship from an industrial and technological point of view, Chapter 1 uses a historical approach and Chapters 2 to 4 focus on the discursive. Chapter 1 illustrates the changing regional relations in the post-war Asia-Pacific and the nations' respective positions in the global economy. That chapter surveys Taiwan and Korea's economic development in the twentieth century to pave the way for the content and data analyses in the following chapters. In addition to Taiwan and South Korea's integration into the global capitalist system, the history and the characteristics of a global semiconductor industry are examined. I argue that the historical development of the hard electronics industry serves as an analogy of the chapters to come and demonstrates the features perceivable in the media and cultural landscapes in Taiwan.

Chapter 2 investigates the emerging discourse of Koreanness in Taiwan through in-depth interviews with former and present Hsinchu Science Park employees. The chapter lays out a competitive relationship between the electronic industries of Taiwan and South Korea and explores how this relationship produced the anti-Korean consumer nationalism that emerged within the Taiwanese public. Through the workings of consumer nationalism, the informants equated purchasing Korean products to sponsoring Korean corporations and thus to thwarting the Taiwanese economy.

Chapter 3 discusses the circulation of a series of heritage disputes between Korea and other cultures. I probe into the news media ecology that reproduced the rumors and

demonstrate why and how the post-martial law electronic capitalism of the Taiwanese news media encouraged the production of sensational stories. These news reports were afflicted with sensationalism, visualization, homogenization and partisanship, which explain the spread of unverified anti-Korean rumors in Chinese-language media—particularly in Taiwan. The perception of South Korea as a cultural predator contributed to a body of knowledge of Korea that I described as Koreantalism, which strengthened the Taiwanese identity through the construction of a threatening Other.

Chapter 4 studies how transnational sports viewership is a process through which the Taiwanese audience formed a concerted view of Koreanness. This chapter highlights the idea of “cheating” (zuobi, 作弊), a phrase constantly brought up by my Taiwanese respondents when commenting on international sport games between South Korea and other nations. Respondents recounted their impressions of the World Cup soccer competition in 2002, William Jones Cup (basketball competition) in 2004, as well as the Asian Games in 2009 and 2010 (Taekwondo competition). The accumulated anti-Korean sentiments were mediated via a convergent media culture, in which the public consumed texts from different platforms and contributed to the discourse by sharing the texts and producing user-created content. Due to the advancement of electronic capitalism, an individual may receive information about Korea from either mass or social media, and then spread the news to others through copying or forwarding the information. This chapter illustrates how antagonism against Koreans reached its height at the 2010 Asian Games and revealed the frustrated Taiwanese sovereignty in the region.

The concluding chapter redirects the reader’s attention to the themes discussed in previous chapters and visits the looming question of soft power regarding the rise of Korea’s cultural power. Korea’s ascendance in the region has resulted in Koreantalism as a process of knowledge production of the Taiwanese in response to the impact of a Korean

wave. Koreantalism, on the one hand, reveals the influence of popular culture in forming regional perceptions of the pop cultural Korean Wave; on the other hand, it demonstrates the limitations of Korea's soft power through exploring the negative "national character" my informants associated with Korean culture. The economic rise of East Asia has produced the exports of cultural and media flow of the region, in addition to the material goods of consumer electronics and other everyday commodities. This dissertation demonstrates the ascendance of Korea as a new center of commodity and cultural flow in the imaginary geography of Taiwanese people.

#### **NOTE ON LANGUAGE AND TERMS**

Lastly, here is a note about language usage of the following chapters. South Korea, which is officially the Republic of Korea (ROK), is referred to as Korea most of the time in the dissertation. I choose to refer to the ROK as Korea because this is how the country is usually addressed by the Taiwanese media and the nation's citizens. The study refers to Taiwan instead of to the Republic of China (ROC) since the latter is used more often in formal settings and a Taiwan identity is different from an ROC identity—which I will explain in more detail in Chapter 4. Likewise, I refer to mainland China as China since the People's Republic of China is also used in formal settings and is not a term frequently used by much of the Taiwanese media and public. For the use of personal names, I abide by the English order of first names followed by last names in most cases; however, when historical figures are introduced, I use the Taiwanese order of family names preceding first names, such as Sun Yat-sen. Shu-chun Yang is also an exception, since her disqualification during the Asian Games in 2010 is known in Taiwan as the "Yang Shu-chun incident." I refer to the incident as Yang Shu-chun or the YSC incident and occasionally use the acronym YSC to refer to the athlete to avoid verbal redundancy in Chapter 4.

The names of the interview informants presented in the study are pseudonyms,

whether with Taiwanese names or English names. I use common Taiwanese and English names to identify the informants for my readers. Since English names are frequently used in the workplace and among peers, and some informants chose to use English names during personal communication, I created English pseudonyms for these informants who provided English names.

## **Chapter 2: From Allies to Enemy: A Post-Cold War Perspective of Korea-Taiwan Relationship**

This chapter illustrates the economic development of Taiwan and South Korea in the 20th century to demonstrate the formation of their competitive relationship in the subsequent century. I use the Cold War as a theoretical framework to analyze the changing relationship between Taiwan and South Korea by juxtaposing the two as contestants in the race for capitalist advancement. As members of the liberal camp during the Cold War, these nations share the features of a relatively open system of both dependency and autonomy. The center of the system—the United States—directed international relations in the region and provided the broader economic framework of liberalism, but tolerated an international division of labor in which upward mobility was possible. The mobility, however, had to be earned in hard and smart ways by identifying both the opportunities and the upcoming crises in order to survive the race. At the turn of the century, the nations' anxieties about their competitiveness centered on the semiconductor industries, whose advancement could determine whether they would move forward (or fall behind) in the world economy. Taiwan's fears of being eliminated from the front runners of the electronic capitalist race were intensified by the aggressive nature of the semiconductor economy, as well as by the post-Cold War relations which placed Taiwan in a less advantaged position challenged by the rise of South Korea and China.

This chapter focuses on the latter half of the 20th century to illustrate the changes that took place from the construction of the Cold War order, to the maturation of the nations' modern industrial infrastructures, to their eventual divergence. As the region is entering an age of post-Cold War realignment, the decline of the United States and the rise of China freed Taiwan and South Korea from the similar positions of postwar latecomers. They eventually became rivals contending for leadership as the following chapter

illustrates. However, while this dissertation views the Cold War as the major economic framework which pinned Taiwan and South Korea on particular positions on the map of the world economy, the research does not suggest a complete breakup between a pre-Cold War and a Cold War era East Asia. Bruce Cumings suggested that the Japanese empire in the first half of the 20th century and the United States in the latter half of the century were two hegemonic powers which guided the regional economy (1984). According to Cumings, Taiwan and South Korea's subordinate relationships with the powers explained why they followed comparable economic trajectories in the 20th century and how their successes were not easily replicable in other developing countries. Throughout the century, these two nations were deeply integrated into the global economic system and even moved upward along the global value chain and became international leaders in technologies at the turn of the millennium.

In particular, I look into the development and the ecology of the semiconductor industry, including its significance and its impact on the world and East Asia. I will devote more attention to the Taiwanese economy in this section, which provides the background for the data analyses in the following chapters. As the progression of the chapters unfolds, semiconductor is not only the technology by which the Taiwanese people make money, but can be used as an analogy to explain the approach of my dissertation—that the *hardware* of the communication devices is not negligible when considering the *soft* cultural contents. I argue that semiconductor is not a random industry that happens to become a center of the Taiwanese society, but *the* industry on which the world's development depends. This elucidates why the fight over the market share between Taiwan and Korea leads to their relationship of rivalry in which some Taiwanese people even regard South Korea as an archenemy. This chapter connects the wave of Korean media and consumer products to the technologies (the hardware) that carry the information.

## **INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY IN THE 20TH CENTURY**

In the early twentieth century, modernization and industrialization of Taiwan and Korea were precipitated by the Japanese colonial regimes. The infrastructure of communication and transportation advanced while public education was expanding. The colonies were incorporated as parts of the imperial system: Taiwanese and Korean societies began to form a supply of workers and technicians as well as to develop demands for consumer goods. During this time, Taiwan and Korea were further integrated into the regional and global economies, although, at this point of history, these colonies were at the bottom of the industrial chain. They provided raw materials, agricultural products and labor, while the colonizer dominated the technologies and the capital flows.

During the early phase of Japanese colonization, Taiwan was considered an agricultural sector to meet the demand of Japanese consumers. The production of rice and sugar were quickly commercialized with a series of policy enforcements, such as land reform, technical improvements, and the establishment of farmer's associations (Myers, 1972). From 1895 to 1941, colonial Taiwan's per capita income almost doubled in the agricultural sector (Amsden, 1979, p. 343), and it enjoyed a trade surplus with Japan from the 1910s to the 1930s (Muraoka, 2002, p. 226). Furthermore, as Japan leaned toward militarism in the Asia-Pacific region during the later colonial period, the Japanese government considered Taiwan a potential center of military-industrial production for the greater empire. Several military-related Japanese industries were moved to Taiwan, including the shipbuilding, oil processing, metal working, machine industry, and chemical industries (Muraoka, p. 227). Taiwan's economy thrived under the colonial regime, which enacted agricultural reforms and founded the incipient heavy industries. Likewise, strategic developments also took place on the Korean peninsula, where the south produced rice and the north supplied raw materials and built factories.

In the mid-20th century, Taiwan and Korea entered into a new phase at the end of World War II and the beginning of the “Cold War” (which broke out into real wars in East Asia) brought. The Chinese Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan and continued the regime of the Republic of China on the Taiwanese islands. In 1950, the United States sent the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to stabilize the region and sustain the division of China between the Nationalists and the Communists. Korea was demarcated into North and South, which led to a war between the two and heightened Korea’s geo-political significance internationally. As a result, Taiwan and South Korea were included among the U.S.-centered, anti-Communist security allies who invented a renewed network of economic activities.

The fixture of the Cold War created intimate bilateral relationships between the United States and the two countries. In the early postwar years, both countries had suffered devastated economies and received substantial amounts of financial aid from America. Taiwan had been receiving U.S. aid under the Chiang Kai-shek regime from 1949 to 1965, at the scale of \$425 per capita and \$5.6 billion in total (Cumings, 1984, p. 24). In the case of South Korea, the Rhee Syngman regime signed an economic aid package with the U.S. in 1948. Adding up the military and economic aid, South Korea received approximately \$13 billion—\$600 per capita (Cumings, p. 24). In addition, U.S. economic advisors played significant roles in shaping Taiwan’s and South Korea’s government policies of economic reform.

The states of Taiwan and South Korea had been guiding their economies with a model of developmental state very similar to that in Japan, where, the government directed the private sectors to pursue the nation’s economic growths. This model is particularly beneficial to the later-industrialized countries which aim to catch up, “us[ing] broad policy control over the economy...without the loss of private initiatives and incentives” (Zhu,

2009, p. 14). At the initial postwar phase, the Taiwanese government adopted a policy of import substitution to protect the infant industries. Under the guidance of the Taiwanese technocrats and the American advisors, the Taiwanese state made use of its labor supply and began to mold an export-oriented economy when a plethora of manufacturers started to produce light consumer goods, like textiles, paper products, rubber, among many others. As these light industries were becoming mature, both Taiwan and South Korea made subsequent plans to develop heavy industries such as petro-chemical industries, steel, and shipbuilding to pave way for further economic developments.

In addition, the governments established export processing zones and free trade zones in the late 1960s and early 1970s to stimulate growth, providing legal and fiscal favors to foreign firms and attracting foreign direct investments. The Taiwanese and Korean workers were now participants in the global division of labor, while the trade surplus greatly enhanced the foreign reserves of these countries. To the advantage of developing countries like Taiwan and South Korea, trade flows were intense during the late 1960s and the 1970s (Amsden, 1979, p. 367) while credit and capital from the West were readily available. South Korea became “the world’s third-largest developing debtor nation” under the leadership of the Park Chung Hee government, which subsidized selected companies to develop the nation’s heavy industries, “such as iron and steel, automobiles, and machine tools” (Brazingsky, 2011, p. 256).

Moving ahead to the 1970s, these countries had enjoyed significant economic growths but were in need of another transformation. The rise of the labor costs diminished the competitive edge of the labor-intensive industries in Taiwan and South Korea. Moreover, the oil crises in the 1970s increased the costs of traditional manufacturing industries, prompting the nations to upgrade existing industries to high-tech industries, including telecommunication, computers, and complicated machineries, to name a few.

Globalization created a transnational workforce ranging from unskilled to skilled workers and encouraged the standardization of protocols and products, making production possible with an international division of labor. On the one hand, American and Japanese companies could offshore the manufacturing process to places where cheap labor is available. On the other hand, the industries in the developed countries needed to preserve leading positions in technologies not yet acquired by the latecomers. As a result, the most forerunning companies made profits by transferring technologies which were outdated or of the lower-rung to the latecomers while these same companies redirected their investments to research and development of the latest technologies. Taiwan and South Korea were therefore able to survive by moving upward in the value chain with new technologies transferred from America and Japan and restructured the existing industries.

The Taiwanese industries, in particular, developed a concentration of advanced electronic industries for the export markets in the 1980s, which took up a larger percentage of the GNP than that of South Korea. In the following sections, I survey the history of the global semiconductor industries and the development of a few national industries in the Asia-Pacific region. The semiconductor industry is one of the fastest-growing economies; it shapes not only the lifestyle of those in the 21st century, but also illustrates the socio-economic landscape of Taiwanese people.

## **THE GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY**

The semiconductor is the driving force behind the global connectivity of today's world. This technology was voted by the scientists and historians surveyed by *The Atlantic* to be the fourth-greatest human innovation in history, "just behind the printing press, electricity, and penicillin" ("Semiconductors Are the Engines That Drive Technological Progress and Inspire Innovation," 2014). The application of the semiconductor is to be found in electronic devices, which are used in all walks of life in contemporary society.

Due to the expanding economic prospects of the semiconductor industry, it has created employment opportunities and contributed to the gross domestic product (GDP) of various nations. Moreover, there is an “induced effect” of the industry (which can be labor- and capital-intensive) when its profits are redirected to different economic sectors in the region, such as banking and housing (Oxford Economics, 2013, p. 5).

The contribution of the global semiconductor industry is both colossal and all-encompassing. The Global Semiconductor Alliance commissioned a report on the impact of the semiconductor in contemporary societies from Oxford Economics (2013). The report classified the effects of the technology into the direct, the indirect, and the induced, indicating that the total impact of the industry can be even more remarkable than what are shown in the corporations’ financial statements. According to the report,

The semiconductor industry...enable[s] innovation and competitiveness across nearly every sector of commerce.... The semiconductor industry currently makes a direct contribution to global GDP—the industry’s turnover less its costs, also known as its “value-added”—of \$202 billion while sustaining 1.3 million high-value jobs, and these numbers are expected to continue their rapid growth into the years ahead. (Oxford Economics, 2013, p. 5)

I would like to use the semiconductor as an analogy to explain the theoretical significance of my research. The semiconductor is a medium and a space. When the raw material of the semiconductor—silicon—is processed, it becomes an effective material for transmitting electric currents. It is a highway for electrons to travel and it is a space where vibrant movements of electrons take place (when stimulated by electric charges). In addition to the internal dynamics, proper application of the semiconductor makes a plethora of activities possible, as we can observe in many advanced technologies. By illustrating these features of the semiconductor, I want to point to two features of the media: both as

the technology to transmit information and a space where not only media texts are generated, but a plethora of cultural expressions take place in response to the texts. In this vein of thought, semiconductors symbolize the workings of the media.

I argue that the semiconductor industry and its associated industries are not random ones which affect only the relationship between Taiwan and South Korea; rather, the semiconductor is at the core of today's electronic technology which brought the nations and the world to where they are today. Manufacturing semiconductors was a major step through which the nations accumulated wealth and on which their future prospects depend. Semiconductors, furthermore, quicken the process by which nations and technologies advance. The electronic devices create the digital media, which are conducive to information flow and which generate value-adding profits. A brutal relationship of competition was formed within the context of globalization, where the movements of media texts, people, goods, capital, ideas, and technologies are heightened and where they continue to feed relentlessly into each other for more vibrant cultural expressions. The expressions which are generated from one another's encounters produced the nationalisms which I study, including economic and consumer nationalism, sports nationalism, and media nationalism. The relationships of the states, the industries, and the individuals are changing as the technologies develop, creating the cultural phenomena observable in the Taiwan and South Korea relationship.

In brief, technology engenders capital and knowledge flows, and nurtures talents and cultures. These tiny chips of the electronic devices we use day and night in personal and professional settings—despite being invisible from the outside—condition how information is mediated and shape our lifestyles. Therefore, semiconductors stand for the business, lifestyle, and prospects of the Taiwanese people. The research in this dissertation demonstrates that the memories and the sentiments of an anti-Korean movement are not

independent of the technologies which drive, transmit, and preserve them. Technologies and economies not only provide extrinsic opportunities for Taiwanese people's encounters with Korea, but influence intrinsically how these people think and feel about South Korea.

Although the semiconductor is an industry which has an exceptional impact on the global economy, its value is even greater to the Taiwanese. The semiconductor industry in Taiwan created 180,000 jobs in 2012 (Technews, 2014). According to the Oxford Economics study, the industry's contribution to Taiwan's GDP was \$38 billion (all values herein USD), summing up the direct effect of \$20 billion, the indirect effect \$9 billion, and the induced effect \$9 billion (Oxford Economics, 2013, p. 9). The study shows that Taiwan ranked fifth among the world's semiconductor output in 2013, following the U.S. (\$136 billion), Europe (\$77 billion), Japan (\$57 billion), and China (\$43 billion). The impact on the Taiwanese people is even more impressive if we consider how the figure is divided among a population of approximately 23 million people. By contrast, South Korea's semiconductor industry produces a total of \$29 billion GDP, which is \$9 billion lower than their Taiwanese counterpart. The influence on the livelihood of the Korean people is comparatively minor, taking into account that the Korean population is about double the size of the Taiwanese—although such a contribution is by no means insignificant to the South Korean economy.

The following paragraphs provide an analytical and a historical overview of the global semiconductor industry, with a focus on the following countries: the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. In order to better understand the nature of the industry, I will introduce two concepts that are essential in my analysis of the Taiwan-South Korea rivalry: the value chain and the product cycle. These concepts help us identify the characteristics of the semiconductor industry, including its segmented structure, the extensiveness of the technologies, the necessity of constant innovation, and an

exceptionally competitive culture among the national industries and the corporations. These characteristics are useful in explicating the historical development of the industries in different countries, which experience ups and downs, entries and exits in the global semiconductor market.

The relations of the national semiconductor industries may best be explained with the idea of a value chain, which demonstrates the forward and backward linkages of a segmented industry within the global semiconductor industry. In brief, a value chain can be seen as “a value-adding spectrum” (Cho & Matthews, 2000, p. 37), starting from a process of the design of the integrated circuit (IC) and the management of IC intellectual property. Extending from this process—usually referred to as the upstream industries—involves the midstream manufacturing technologies. The design of IC is etched into multiple layers on the chip, which is made in slices of wafers. Wafers are made of crystalline silicon, which is processed with boron and phosphorus to be molded into a cylinder-shaped object. Next, the cylinder of processed crystalline silicon is sliced into thin pieces, ready for cleaning, texturing, or etching of the IC and waiting to be cut into smaller dice. The downstream industries proceed to do the testing, cutting, and packaging of the chips, which will be inserted into circuit boards to be assembled into other devices, such as a computer (Cho & Matthews, p. 37).

Due to the technical complexity of the production process, semiconductor industries are segmented and specialized. The requirements of technology, capital, and skills differ in each segment. A wafer foundry, for example, is highly capital intensive, whereas a packaging factory is labor intensive and does not require much skill of its laborers. Advanced countries may opt to off-shore the capital-intensive and labor-intensive manufacturing process to regions of cheaper labor, while developing countries may opt to set up original equipment manufacturers (OEM) before they attain enough know-how to

upgrade the industries. As technologies steadily improve and diffuse in time, semiconductor technologies evolve into a global industry marked by a “spatial separation of production process” (Shin, 1996, p. 124).

The semiconductor represents a highly extensive technology which, as a basic supply industry, can be exploited in consumer electronics, computers, telecommunication technologies, and for industrial purposes (Shin, 1996, p. 110). The application of the chips, in addition, generates linkages of other industries as far as media, finance, and services. Therefore, the semiconductor is a value-adding industry, which can be extended to a variety of other industries such as energy or medical science, to improve their efficiencies and bring down costs (Oxford Economics, 2013). Due to the extensiveness of the industry, the demand for semiconductors has been developing since their inception in the 1950s and is still growing. In the United States, the semiconductor industry has “grown more than any other major U.S. manufacturing industry over the last 25 years” (Semiconductor Industry Association, 2014). This is one of the most lucrative industries at present, and it will continue to be so in the foreseeable future.

As a technology-intensive industry, semiconductors have a very short product cycle, in which two or three years is a generation. Innovative research continues to improve the products and/or the manufacturing process to increase yield and quality. For electronic devices, dated products can become obsolete in a few years. The corporations race with each other to develop the latest technologies to outdo their competitors and attract the most product orders. New technologies, furthermore, create new entry points to the market for the latecomers. Despite the complexity of the technologies, the rapid flows of knowledge and talents are conducive for latecomers to catch up once they have enough capital and determination to enter the industry. Nevertheless, such industry is imbued with a sense of uncertainty, especially for the midstream and the downstream segments, whose lower

technology benchmark can be surpassed by ambitious regions which resolve to develop their own semiconductor industries.

To sum up from the previous discussions, the semiconductor industry has an exceptionally competitive culture, in which continuing research and development is necessary in order to survive. Flexibility in strategies to succeed is required to confront challenges internal and external to the industry: Alliances are made among the domestic and international players and partnership is formed between the public and the private sectors inside a country. The production of semiconductors is a time-sensitive industry where the notion of a technology gap is concerned. The latecomers are dedicated to shortening the technology gap, oftentimes by investing more than the forerunners did. Those latecomers who achieve the requisite technological advancement, even if it is merely one segment of the industry, can replace the earlier leaders and dominate the specialized market in a short time. This competitive industry culture can nurture an aggressive overtaking strategy, which goes beyond the desire merely to catch up. Oftentimes, this is a winner-take-all game, and companies that cannot survive may have to give up the industry sector, or even exit the industry altogether.

The industrial rivalry between the United States and Japan in the 1980s is an example of this competitive nature of the semiconductor industry. The United States had been a leader of the industry, which developed along with the country's computer technologies, in the second half of the 20th century, while the rise of Japan challenged the dominance of the U.S. near the end of the century. The success of Japan's overtaking strategy in the 1980s is a combined result of government support, a financial policy of incremental investment, and an industrial strategy of specialization (Shin, 1996, p. 117). As a latecomer to the industry, Japan was able to focus on one segment of the technologies: memory, a capital-intensive industry with lower technological requirements. Compared to

the United States, the Japanese industry cooperated with the government to increase investments in the 1970s with five more percent of the average ratio of capital spending to sale, even amidst the oil crisis. The attempt was so successful that the U.S. market share of memory plummeted from 75% in 1980 to approximately 25% in 1986, whereas Japan's market share rose from 24% to 65% during the same period (Brown and Lindon, 2009, p. 17).

The result was severe but the U.S. managed to turn the crisis into a transformation of the industry, and eventually regained its leading position in technology innovation. U.S. producers of memory exited the market in 1986, when the global memory industry experienced an overcapacity and the market demand shrunk. The losses included nearly \$2 billion and the discharge of 25,000 workers. The U.S. corporations responded inwardly and outwardly. On the one hand, they adjusted their industrial concentration to focus on microprocessors and logic when, at the same time, they improved the quality control which Japan had surpassed. On the other hand, the corporations resorted to legal and political means to protect the domestic industry by filing lawsuits over property rights and lobbying the government to renew trade agreements to reduce Japanese economic protectionism (Brown & Lindon, 2009). In the end, the U.S. corporations were able to excel in the more upstream industries of design and microprocessors, and Japan complied by further liberalizing the domestic market to allow U.S. products to compete with their own (Brown & Lindon, p. 19-20). Although the U.S. corporations ceded a segment of the semiconductor industry to the latecomers, they successfully secured some of the most advanced technologies at the top of the value chain, which commanded higher profit margins.

The international competition over market share and technological leadership continued as South Korea and Taiwan subsequently entered the memory production industry. Due to the intermediary nature of the memory industry, developing countries who

had accumulated enough capital aspired to develop the technology, “utilising [their] relative strength in capital mobilisation and mass production, and then extend[ing] its catching-up gradually into more sophisticated products and technologies” (Shin, 1996, p. 117). The story between Taiwan and South Korea’s competition over the dynamic random access memory (DRAM) approximates that between Japan and the United States, which I will discuss in detail in Chapter 2.

### **THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY IN TAIWAN**

Taiwan is a latecomer to the semiconductor industry whose history can be traced to the late 1950s, when institutions of higher education resumed after the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan. The development of the electronic industries in Taiwan in their early years focused on the cultivation of talents and technologies. For example, the Institute of Electronics at the National Chiao Tung University (NCTU) was established in Taiwan in 1958, and its Semiconductor Laboratory was founded in 1964. NCTU is an academic institution best known for its computer sciences and electrical engineering departments. The university has been an incubator for technology leaders in the Hsinchu Science Park (HSP) since its establishment. The Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), a national institute founded by the government, is another institute whose research lays out the foundation of the subsequent IT companies in the HSP. It established an Electronic Research Development Center (currently named the Electronic Research and Service Organization) for developing the nation’s IC technologies in 1974. In 1976, ITRI started a research manufacturing plant and has ever since been transferring its technologies to the industry (Hsieh, Wang, & Yuan, 2006). Since that time, NCTU and ITRI, along with other universities and vocational colleges in the greater Hsinchu area, have been providing the necessary skilled workers and leading technologies to Taiwan’s electronic industries.

ITRI, in addition, provided a model of spin-off companies which represented the particular business model in Taiwan's economic development—an example of cooperation between the public and private sectors. Two of the most successful semiconductor companies were United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC). The former is the first commercial IC company whose technology was transferred by ITRI since 1980 and the first to enter the Hsinchu Science Park, which later became a hub of the latest technologies in Taiwan. At the beginning, UMC was small and only able to produce “simple LSI chips for consumer product applications such as toys, watches and greeting cards” (Cho & Matthews, 2000, p. 157). Yet with the collaboration of the public and private resources, UMC was able to narrow the technology gap between itself and the American and Japanese predecessors. The history of the company reflects that of the greater electronics industry in Taiwan. It managed to invest continually in talents and technologies, and took advantage of multiple linkages it had with nearby institutions in the science park. Consequently, UMC became the first IT company to list on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (UMC, 2010-2015), and its success attracted venture capital for investments in the emerging IC companies in Taiwan (Hsieh et al., 2006).

TSMC, founded in 1987, is the most successful example of an ITRI spin-off and is the largest semiconductor foundry in Taiwan today. It represents an unprecedented creation of a corporation which dedicated itself entirely to silicon foundry (Cho & Matthews, 2000, p. 160). Even today, TSMC is still one of the largest wafer foundries in the world, dominating a midstream market segment along the semiconductor value chain. An industry of PC and IC companies was eventually established along with a hierarchy of upstream, midstream, and downstream companies were set up. The “competitive and cooperative

relationships” of these companies generate a thriving economy of high-tech industries in Taiwan. (Hsieh et al., 2006).

The founding and the expansion of UMC and TSMC reflect the development of the Hsinchu Science Park. The establishment of the park was a government initiative which aimed at enhancing the national economic competitiveness. The organization of Hsinchu Science Park (HSP) is that of “cluster industries,” which refers to a “geographic concentration of interconnected businesses, suppliers, service providers, and associated institutions” (Hu, 2011). The science park consists of a major campus in Hsinchu City, which straddles the city and Hsinchu County. It is located amidst several research centers, including the ITRI and two leading universities, National Tsinghua University and National Chiao Tung University. The idea behind the park is to provide a place where the linkages of manpower, capital, and technology are closely woven into a web.

Hsinchu Science Park is one of the largest contributors to Taiwan’s economy; it had created 1.43 million jobs up to the year 2013 (Chen, Chien, & Lai, 2013). “The contribution of the sales revenues of HSP to the national GDP has grown since 1991, and has reached its first peak at 9.12% in 2000” when “total sales of the industries in HSP has reached \$30.9 billion” (Chen et al., 2013). It is especially known for its IT products, 11 of which “ranked No.1 in the world in terms of global market share” (Hu, 2011). The success of the park signifies a new phase of the Taiwanese economy, shifting from pure export-oriented manufacturing to the inclusion of knowledge-intensive high-tech industries.

There are six spheres of related industries in the science park, including semiconductors, computer peripherals, communications, opto-electronics, biotechnology, and precision machinery. Among them, the semiconductor industry is the largest cash cow; it has extended to different segments of the IC production process from IC design, to wafer foundry, to cutting and packaging. The strengths of the Taiwanese semiconductor industry

include a comprehensive community with up- and downstream industries, quality but low-wage human resources, good yield rate and efficiency, and well-known brand names, such as TSMC and UMC (Hsieh et al., 2006).

In short, the success of the Hsinchu Science Park—a closely linked community of research institutes, education programs, and corporations—made Taiwan a global leader in the IC wafer manufacturing industry in the early 2000s. In 2006, the market share of Taiwan’s IC design industry was approximately 19%, ranking second globally, behind that of the United States (Oxford Economics, 2013). In 2013, 13% of the global semiconductor workforce is located in Taiwan (Oxford Economics). While Taiwan became a leader mostly in original equipment manufacturers (OEM) who work as contract manufacturer for other companies’ end products, there have been more original brand manufacturers (OBM) in the areas of cell phones, computers, and IC design.

#### **THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY IN SOUTH KOREA**

The phases of the development of the semiconductor industry in South Korea are a microcosm of the nation’s economic history over the past few decades. The country went through an initial phase of import substitution, export orientation, high-tech advancement, and eventually the establishment of international brand names. South Korea’s semiconductor industry started as “a pure export industry through foreign direct investment (FDI) and state initiative” (Shin, 1996, p. 112) and advanced to become an industry mainly driven by the private sector. Chaebols (Korean conglomerates) invested heavily in the semiconductor industry, and the industry eventually outperformed the research institutions set up by the government. In the early stages, both the raw materials and the manufacturing equipment were imported, due to the “extreme backwardness” of the semiconductor industry in Korea (Shin). From the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, the state was able to develop the infrastructure for its light and heavy industries. In addition, in the 1970s, free

trade zones financed by investors from Japan were established, to build manufacturing and assembly factories for the electronic industry.

The success of the Korean economy in the first few postwar decades was mostly initiated by the state. With an early trajectory very much like Taiwan's, South Korea took advantage of its cheap labor, suppressed the formation of workers' union, and accumulated foreign reserves from its export-oriented economy. On the one hand, the state used the protectionist strategy of import substitution to develop infant industries; on the other hand, once the nation's industrial infrastructure was established, the state began to deregulate capital flow and partner with foreign corporations to allow more international exchange. In the 1970s, South Korea confronted an economic conundrum like Taiwan's: the rising labor costs and the emerging competitors from less-developed regions. However, South Korean corporations coped with the crisis with strong internal initiatives, and the government played a supportive role, providing an environment by the establishment of the institutions which are conducive to technological upgrade and innovation (Shin, 1996).

In the 1980s, chaebols had evolved into a significant driving force of the Korean economy. With an aggressive strategy to expand their capacities, the chaebols started to invest in the semiconductor as a basic industry on which other industries could build (Shin, 1996, p. 113). The corporations selected the dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) industry as an entry strategy, similar to that of Japanese corporations in the 1970s. Thanks to the international value chain, these Korean corporations were able to choose one narrow segment of the semiconductor industry, and began concentrating on developing competitive DRAMs (Shin, p.136). The results proved to be highly successful; in the 2000s, Korea had advanced into a major producer of DRAM and defeated Taiwanese competitors during the 2008 financial crisis.

## CONCLUSION

Since the Opium War and the opening of Japan by Commodore Matthew Perry, Northeast Asia has been afflicted with aggressive capitalist expansion. The Cold War brought two small and peripheral countries, the Republic of China on the Taiwanese islands, and the Republic of Korea in the southern Korean peninsula, to the forefront of the war in containing Communism. These countries took advantage of their intermediary geopolitical positions to accumulate capital and invest it in their industries, which outstand the global economy with an average GNP growth of more than 10% from the 1970s to the early 1980s. Local industries, under the guidance of the respective authoritarian regimes in Taiwan and South Korea, profited from the U.S. endeavors to fight the psychological war against the Communists.

Throughout the history of the late 20th century, we witnessed the success of the Taiwanese economy in the broader framework of the Cold War market economy. Economists argued that under “relevant framework conditions,” such as “macroeconomic stability, well-functioning product market, factor market (labor and financial markets), education systems, and physical, institutional and judicial infrastructure,” a country can thrive and sustain an effective infrastructure for economic growth (Lin, Sun, & Tseng, 2009). However, as the global conditions are changing, Taiwan’s economic growth has engendered opportunities and threats from within and without, including speculation on the stock market, skyrocketing land prices, dependency on the international market, an uncertain political climate, and competitors rising from other countries.

Likewise, the breakdown of the original Cold War order creates new opportunities and new threats, including changing strategic alliances among the nations. Japan normalized its relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1972, while the American president Richard Nixon visited Beijing for the signing of the Joint

Communiqué. Japanese investments in the PRC ensued in the late 1970s, in the form of the Official Direct Assistance (ODA) with billions of loan aid, grant aid, and in supporting technical cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015). South Korea's conglomerates found new markets and investment opportunities in the PRC, which encouraged greater political interaction between the two nations (Brazinsky, 2011, p. 258). Even the Taiwanese find themselves caught between a love-hate relationship with the mainland, which acts both as an economic minor to cooperate with and to take advantage of when it first opened its market. China, nevertheless, has become a frightening rival in the twenty-first century.

Although Taiwan and South Korea found their edges as early players of the market and developed high-tech economies in the region, competitors arose from countries like China and India, which have cheaper production costs and aspire to catch up with the latest technologies. The Taiwan-PRC relationship has been changing in the past decade. The industrial backwardness of mainland China makes it a region in which Taiwan can build factories with cheaper labor and a market to exploit. The semiconductor products are divided by a spectrum of effectiveness, which manifests in the hierarchical production relationship between the island and the mainland. The higher end consumer electronics require more powerful chips made at higher cost, whereas lower-priced products use the less powerful semiconductors. The Chinese market had been one of the largest consumers of the lower-rung Taiwanese chips for China's OBM cell phones. However, today's Chinese industry is upgrading and expanding rapidly, as the case of Qinghua Unigroup exemplifies. With the research and development support of the Qinghua University in China, the conglomerate went through a series of mergers of domestic and international high-tech companies and vowed to venture into the semiconductor industry with a 10 billion renminbi (RMB) government subsidy (Li, 2015).

Taiwan and its global counterparts are in an age of connectivity and interdependence. While many of the East Asian nations experienced industrialization and modernization and have been able to make a fortune through their integration into the global economic system, the economy has also become a source of anxiety to the nations. These nations and their citizens are struggling between liberalization and protectionism, hoping to identify and maintain their advantages in the rapidly changing global economy. In a Bourdieusian framework of the economic, media, and cultural fields of production, the relationship of Taiwan and South Korean demonstrates contemporary landscapes of the fields. On the one hand, nations compete with one another for profits in the field of economic production. On the other hand, the field of media production manifests the capitalization of national anxieties through cost-effective means of storytelling and rumor recycling. The following chapters discuss the formation, distribution, and reception of these Taiwanese (Chinese language) stories of Korea with the images of a cultural invader and an economic predator.

### **Chapter 3: The Worker-Consumer: When Shopping Becomes Patriotic**

This chapter discusses my interview informants' views of Korea as mediated by their roles as Taiwanese workers and consumers. I present the findings of the in-depth interviews I conducted in the summers of 2014 and 2015, exploring how the informants' professional backgrounds affected their perceptions and feelings toward Korea. I interviewed skilled workers who were employed in the Hsinchu Science Park (HSP) in Taiwan. Stories of their encounters with South Korea, as well as the flux of the semiconductor industry, demonstrate why and how their perceptions of Korea formed in particular ways. I will explain how the workers in the science park responded to the rise of Korea when Korean firms were overtaking substantial amounts of Taiwanese firms' global market share. Eventually, these informants demonstrated a cognitive process of reflection and self-critique as their investigation of Korean business practices coevolved with their evaluation of Taiwan's economic development.

This chapter consists of three parts. First, I will explain the methodological framework by introducing the location and the subjects of my interviews. I probe the idea of the Hsinchu region—especially the park's approximate area—as a community where the people exchange and share knowledge regarding the prospects of the semiconductor industry and the national economy. I explore the interviewees' socio-economic identity as engineers in Taiwan to demonstrate the formation of South Korea's images by the employees in the science park. The second part is a discursive analysis of the interviews, in which the informants provided specific examples of their encounters with Korea. Last, I conclude the chapter by discussing the workings of economic and consumer nationalism. The latter, in particular, demonstrates the complex global conditions which the Taiwanese and Korean electronics industries are facing in the twenty-first century.

## **HSINCHU SCIENCE PARK AND ITS WORKERS: A COMMUNITY BASED ON ECONOMIC INTERESTS**

In this chapter, informants' encounters with Korea are found in different types: mass-mediated, physical, communal, and professional. The first type refers to the informants' consumption of media texts, including those from the mass media and those recycled from the mass media into social media, or vice versa. During my interviews, television and the internet are identified as two major media channels through which informants received information regarding Korea. The impact of contemporary media ecology in Taiwan will be examined more extensively in Chapter 3 and 4. The second type is through a physical form of contact, such as meeting a Korean person, using a product made in Korea, or taking a trip to Korea. In other words, the physical contacts required someone to be physically present, i.e., *person-to-person*, *person-to-object*, or being a *person at the site*. The third form of contact is through communal relations—for example, by receiving information from friends, neighbors, and family (through word of mouth). The personal stories of those around the informants could influence the way they perceived Korea. For instance, a close friend of theirs studying abroad is a way through which my informants gained detailed knowledge about Korea. Last, I propose a particular mode of encounter in the world of the professionals. These workers' points of contact with Korea were created by their positions in the electronic industries, which were further conditioned by the global division of labor and the global value chain.

The workers' views of Korea are formed through a variety of experiences and influenced more or less by the first-hand and the second-hand encounters with Korea, while each person manifested a unique life trajectory. The last mode of encounter, the professional, is one of the least explored areas among Korean (Wave) studies, however. This chapter will therefore lay out a centrifugal analysis of the informants' professional contact with Korea and discuss how their identity as laborers and consumers forms their

understanding of Korea's "national character." I conducted 14 interviews with current and former employees of the companies in the Hsinchu Science Park. Their views of Korea were formed through their experiences working and living in the HSP community, in addition to their individual life histories before they moved to Hsinchu.

Hsinchu Science Park was established with the idea of an industrial cluster, which was designed to improve the national competitiveness of Taiwan. The success of this first science park influenced the establishment of other science parks in Taiwan, most of which are in satellite regions of Hsinchu. The companies in the science parks are part of an extended value chain in which they compete and cooperate with each other. Harvard Business School economist Michael Porter (1998) defined the clusters as geographically concentrated locations, which produce competitive advantages for an industry, such as "entertainment in Hollywood, finance in Wall Street," or high-tech industries in Silicon Valley (p. 78). Porter's theory stressed the economic strength of the "business environment *outside* the companies" (italics in original text), which had not been carefully studied, as opposed to the competitive advantages *within* the companies (p. 78). I begin my analysis of the HSP workers as those of an industrial cluster for two reasons: first, the Hsinchu region and the workers of the Hsinchu Science Park being a community, and second, the intimate relationship between the nation's competitiveness and the semiconductor industry, which gradually becomes a symbol of the Taiwanese economic identity.

The workers of the semiconductor industry in the Hsinchu region, along with the residents whose lives are closely related to the industry, created a community characterized by shared socio-economic interests and even a sense of belonging in the region. As Chapter 1 illustrates, the technologies developed by the education and research centers in the region were transferred to the Hsinchu Science Park, which subsequently became a major GDP contributor in Taiwan. The economic ecology of Hsinchu is an amalgam of students (most

of them majoring in sciences or engineering), scholars, engineers, production and assembly line workers, and other workers from extended industries providing services and necessities to meet the demands of local residents. These people exchange information and sentiments regarding their job prospects and career crises, in addition to how they view the nation and its rival(s).

My informants gather firsthand and secondhand information not only from the media, but also from their coworkers, (former) classmates, or neighbors regarding the current development of the industries. These communal networks are able to reinforce or alter the informants' views about Korea. For example, Mei-chun had been working at a prosperous wafer foundry in Taiwan when a financial crisis occurred in 2008. Her experience of anxiety and antagonism toward South Korea during the financial crisis was reinforced by her boyfriend (her husband at the time of the interview) and her colleagues, when the former dissuaded her from using a Samsung cell phone and the latter chatted during lunchtime about "how Korea deliberately harmed [the Taiwanese industry]." In order to explain to me the harm done to the Taiwanese industry, Mei-chun added an example given by her mother-in-law, who had been babysitting a child of her neighbors. From the neighbors, Mei-chun's mother-in-law heard that their company had closed due to Korea's allegedly malicious business strategy in 2008. According to Mei-chun, the information she received from those around her was a significant influence on how she viewed Korea. Their opinions served as negative reinforcements to her growing antagonism against Korea, especially during the financial crisis.

By contrast, the informants who heard about positive experiences with Korea from his or her social network was likely to shift to a more favorable attitude toward Korea. Chia-fen had cultivated negative views of Korea since she was in high school; however, one of her close friends was enthusiastic about Korean culture and went to Seoul for

working holidays. Chia-fen said that the positive stories from her friend improved her image of Korea and encouraged her to visit the country in the future. In summary, those who worked in the science parks existed in an intricate network of friends, family, and former classmates. The mixture of personal and professional relationships was conducive to forming a Taiwanese identity against a threatening foreign other as a cohesive community bonded against external forces at a time of crisis.

Furthermore, many of the interviewees are engineers who received higher education and entered what should have been a promising career in the Hsinchu Science Park. These engineers in the high-tech industries have been called “the new technological elites” (*keji xingui*, 科技新貴). Mai, an accountant who relocated from Taipei to Hsinchu for her husband’s new job, pointed out that she had been excited to find a job at HSP in one of the high-tech companies. Although she found later that the experience was disappointing, her early impression of the “new technological elites” was exemplary of the glamorous image of these engineers and the electronics industry. The elitist status of these engineers refers to a time when they had handsome salaries (including stock holdings and dividends), bright job prospects, and the sleek image of technologically savvy white-collar workers. The success stories of start-up firms and their skyrocketing stock prices, especially in the 1990s and 2000s, attributed to their social status. After Mai witnessed the poor performance of the Ph.D. graduates who were hired by the company through government sponsorship, as well as the bureaucratic conflicts among the managers, staff, and researchers, she exclaimed, “I do not find hope in Taiwan’s future!” In this vein of thought, the performance of these engineers is associated with the prospect of the Taiwanese economy, and their failure implies the likely decline of the economy.

Most of the engineers I interviewed in Hsinchu, especially those who worked in the field of research and development (R&D), were eloquent in expressing their opinions about

the industry and the national economy. Working in a knowledge-based economy with rapid technological advancement, these skilled workers were usually well educated, with master's degrees. Taiwan is one of the best-educated countries in the world: about 5% of the population (a little over 900,000 people between the ages of 15 and 64) hold master's and doctoral degrees, according to Taiwan's Ministry of Education (Ministry of Education, 2014). The approximately 150,000 workers in the Hsinchu Science Park make up a significant percentage of this highly educated segment of the Taiwanese population. With their knowledge of specialized semiconductor technologies, as well as their personal networks with those who work along the extended value chain, these engineers are expressive in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of Taiwan's economy.

The following sections are a series of discussions on the Taiwan-South Korea relationship, centering on three topics: Korea's "national character," the rivalry between Taiwan and Korea, and consumers' responses to this inter-national antagonism. I begin the discussion with the cognitive generalization my informants referred to as "national character" (*mingzuxing*, 民族性), illustrating how the Taiwanese made sense of the Korea(ns) they knew of by cultural and racial essentialization. While the informants were encouraged to describe their experiences by marking important moments on a timeline, many tended to use a discursive system of the "nation" (*minzu*, 民族), in addition to recounting the specifics of the scenarios (whether the concept of a "nation" is mentioned explicitly, or as "the Koreans"). My analysis shows that rather than corporate culture or individual behaviors, ethnicity was the predominant marker through which the informants rationalized their encounters with Korea(ns).

The idea of "national character" is used to pave the way for subsequent discussion of the relationship between Taiwan and South Korea, which my informants often described as "competing rivals" (*jingzheng duishou*, 競爭對手). I analyze a set of phrases associated

with the “competition” (*jingzheng*, 競爭), including “competition” in different parts of speech (*to compete*, *competitive*, and *competition*), to illustrate the perceptive frameworks of the Taiwanese informants when they define the Taiwan-Korea relationship. Last, I probe the idea of “fairness,” an evaluative term which suggests a sense of right and wrong when my informants examined Korean business practices. This notion not only generated emotional responses from the Taiwanese consumers, but also translated into behavioral patterns, such as supporting domestic products and boycotting Korean products.

The comments made by the interviewees demonstrated a juxtaposition of observation, analysis, supposition, and judgment, all of which led to a constellation of Korea’s national images in their minds. The findings of the research reveal the informants’ responses to the rise of Korea, ranging from rational calculations to psychological defensiveness. After their analyses of the strengths and weaknesses of the self and the other, many informants demonstrated a process of reflexive thinking and directed the discussion of Koreanness into an assessment of Taiwan’s economic development.

#### **“NATIONAL CHARACTER”**

“[Koreans] are of the character (*xing*, 性) of wolves, compared to Taiwanese, who are like sheep.” (Chen-hung, interview)

My research design was to ask the informants to reflect on their past encounters with Korea until the time of our meeting, and then during our meeting, to summarize how they thought of Korea in general. Much of the information they provided contains a cognitive process of interpretation, although the interviews started with specific examples by which the informants recounted the who, what, when, how, and why of a specific experience—such as when they met their first Korean colleagues or when they purchased a Korean brand-name cell phone. They inferred from their personal experiences and hearsay to make explanatory, evaluative, and reflexive comments. These different

narratives of the individual inter-national encounters are integrated into an umbrella notion of “national character,” through which the Taiwanese form concerted views of Korea.

The survey and interview results demonstrate that there is a prevalent impression that the Koreans—both the individuals they have seen, and as a nation in general—are aggressive, patriotic, and value solidarity. These descriptions are oftentimes associated with the notion of national character: Out of 14 interviews with the science park workers, the collocation of “national character” and “strong,” or “forceful” (*qiang*, 強), appeared five times in three interviews. The informants provided examples of these descriptors observed in different parts of Korean society, especially in the fields of sports and economy. De-sheng, for instance, went on a few business trips to Korea. Based on his experience visiting LG Electronics during a business trip, he concluded that Korean workers have a “dominant national character” (*mingzuxing qiangshi*, 民族性強勢), that they “work their lives out” (*pinming*, 拼命), and are “demanding in product quality control.” When De-sheng was asked to elaborate on this “dominant” character that he was referring to, he gave an example of the business meetings they had: “Even though [the Korean clients] know they are making unreasonable requests, they ask for 120% [on work performance].” De-sheng added an explanatory comment, “Maybe they were afraid of [getting] 80% if you ask for 100%.” The impression of hardworking and oftentimes overly assertive Koreans was common among different informants with different interpretive frameworks.

The images of hard work and aggressiveness are seen in athletic events when a rival’s desire to win is most apparent. The informants referred to the image of Koreans on the athletic field as a significant point of reference when they encountered Korea at work. Within Taiwan-Korea relationships, sports are an area of dispute, where winning and the means to win are sources of national pride and international controversy. Korean athletes

and judges are perceived as “[desiring victory] regardless of [proper] means” (*buzeshouduan*, 不擇手段). A majority of informants could vividly recount details of how a certain game was played unfairly in their eyes, such as Korean judges’ attitude of favoritism to their players, or malicious attacks by Korean athletes against Taiwanese athletes during the games. Lingering memories of Korea’s performance on the athletic field became supporting evidence of Koreans’ perceived national character. Informants often alluded to stories of Korean people behaving aggressively or unethically at work in conjunction with the Koreans’ performance on the athletic field.

The business rivalry between Taiwan and South Korea aroused discussion of the Korean national character, which was often described in negative tones. Mei-chun commented on Korea’s national character as being “too despicable” (*tai beibi*, 太卑鄙), after hearing from her community network about the aggressive and malicious business measures taken by Korea’s electronic corporations. Mei-chun worked on the production line at a major DRAM (dynamic random access memory) manufacturer in Taiwan; her company had been severely crippled by the economic crisis in 2008 due to the bloody competition between the Korean and Taiwanese corporations. She and some of her colleagues survived the crisis through reduced income and forced unpaid holidays during the worst days. Rumor had it that Korean corporations, like Samsung and LG, placed orders from Taiwanese corporations in the same industry and unexpectedly withdrew the orders on a massive scale, with the goal of monopolizing the market and eliminating the Taiwanese companies. According to Mei-chun, some of the largest DRAM manufacturing companies in Taiwan went bankrupt and many workers had exited the industry since then.

Although Fiona was not affected as directly or acutely, she too portrayed Koreans as “despicable” (*beibi*, 卑鄙) or “petty,” using the phrase several times throughout her interview. The phrase *beibi* consists of two Chinese characters: *bei* and *bi*, both of which

originally referred to being low in height; however, the meaning evolved over time to refer to being low in status and in moral standards. Fiona recalled her high school years when she developed a negative view of South Korea through watching baseball games. The negative image lasted until she started to work in the Hsinchu Science Park, when she heard about “Taiwanese suppliers being bullied [by Korean companies].” Although she started to watch Korean entertainment shows and even became a fan of Korean idol groups a few years ago, she still concluded that her views of Korea were negative and she would not purchase any Korean electronic products.

These descriptors of Korea are often accompanied by an interpretive framework developed by the individual informants, based on their knowledge of Korean society and Korean history. For example, Chen-hung used an overarching concept of “suppression” (*yayi*, 壓抑) to interpret the Korea he had seen and heard of. Having worked for more than ten years in the HSP and interacted with Korean clients multiple times, Chen-hung suggested that the Korean workers were more rigid with what they agreed to in contrast to Taiwanese people: “[A Korean worker] is obligated to accomplish what the company demands unconditionally, even if [the employee] were a young lady.” To Chen-hung, this is because their national character is “obstinate” (*zhizhuo*, 執著) and they need to be recognized for their efforts. Furthermore, Chen-hung shared with me his observations of the gender relations of Korean society. He suggested that due to sexual discrimination, Korean women needed to work harder to be promoted in the workplace, whereas Korean men behaved quite differently (they were “horny,” in his words) when they traveled abroad and were free of social confines. Chen-hung summed up his observations of the Korean nationals by suggesting that “the Korean national character has been dispositioned to be suppressed for a long time.” Chen-hung resorted to Korea’s vulnerable geopolitical position among the great powers to make sense of the “suppressedness” which he was

arguing. With his limited and fragmented observations, Chen-hung formed a personal discursive system of Koreanness to interpret the ethical codes of Korean society at work and in private. All the observations point to an overarching concept of social and historical suppression, which he believes to have prompted the Koreans to strive for success and recognition.

While different individuals formed different interpretive frameworks, most of my informants attempted to explain the drive behind Koreans' desire for success by citing the Koreans' patriotism. The impression of Korean patriotism is often connected to Korean people's willingness to contribute to the nation's interests. Tom, an engineer of an upstream semiconductor company providing IC solutions in the industry, suggested that the Koreans "have a high notion of the nation," and used South Korea's gold donation movement in 1998 as an example. Tom is one of the several informants who mentioned the incident. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Koreans impressed the Taiwanese public by sacrificing personal gains in favor of national goods (Chang, 2013). Tom explained that the Koreans' love for their country might be a result of its geopolitical position in the region. According to Tom, Korea was surrounded by mighty neighbors in East Asia and its independence had been encroached upon by Western powers in modern times, "even leading to the division of Korea eventually." In his viewpoint, the development of Korean history enhanced a national consciousness, which explained both their protectionism, and their patriotism, as expressed in their business practices.

Likewise, South Korea has been known for nationalism in both consumption and productivity. In the eyes of the Taiwanese observers, both the consumer and the economic nationalism contributed to the strengths and the shortcomings of the nation. "Citizens' support [of their nation]" is seen in the parking lots, "where you can only see Kia and Hyundai cars" (De-sheng, interview). To Tom and De-sheng, these examples of Korea's

“national character” demonstrated how personal interests could align with collective interests in the form of national solidarity. These informants rationalized the phenomenon they perceived from Korean society and Korean industry by emphasizing Korea as a “nation” (*minzu*, 民族). Tom suggested that foreign threats throughout modern Korean history might have led to a strong sense of “protectionism to preserve the nation.”

Nonetheless, this pursuit of national interests could make the country “handle issues too aggressively.” Chia-fen, also an engineer who worked in a wafer foundry, suggested that it was this sense of solidarity that made the Korean nation competitive. In addition, some informants praised Korean workers for their diligence and perseverance. De-sheng had gone on a few business trips to Korea; the longest lasted three months. He was impressed by the self-discipline of a Korean engineer who left the company at 12 a.m. and went back to work at 6 a.m. every day. De-sheng believed that this was a lifestyle of many Korean workers and felt that this explained how Korea attained its economic success.

In the previous examples, the informants made generalizations from what they observed at work by resorting to an ethnic marker. They gave descriptive accounts of what happened to them personally, or what they saw and heard elsewhere, accompanied with a simultaneous urge to interpret the phenomenon in cultural essentialist terms. They referred either to the *nation* or to an even more explicit concept of a *national character* during the interviews. Whether or not the informants personally admired these Korean practices, most of them acknowledged the economic advancement of Korea with supporting arguments, looked for explanations for the rise of South Korea, and evaluated the strengths, weaknesses, or risks behind the paths taken by the country.

In sum, these informants who commented on the “national character” of Korea indicated a strong force which united the nation and enhanced competitiveness in Korean industries, despite their perception that Korea acted too aggressively at the same time.

Some of the comments show outright disdain of aggressive behaviors in business and sports when they describe Korea as being “despicable.” Some others evaluated Korea’s national character less emotionally, but still showed an attitude of disapproval by saying that the Taiwanese “wouldn’t be able to do the same thing,” or that they “do not admire [Korea]” (Mei-chun, interview). Nevertheless, some informants approved of the Korean national character, stating that it gave a competitive edge to the nation.

“The Taiwanese can’t work that hard,” Chia-fen said, in a reflexive comment accompanying her observations of South Korean workers. She was a research and development engineer who came across Korea in research papers. She said she was greatly impressed by South Korean research on semiconductors, which had advanced considerably from 2002 to 2006. Viewing the current relationship between Taiwan and South Korea, and evaluating the relative competitiveness of the two, she drew the conclusion that Taiwanese people were different. Chen-hung made a contrast between the (national) *character* of Korea and of Taiwan, arguing that the Koreans were like wolves and the Taiwanese were like sheep in comparison. Korea, in this line of thought, was perceived to be aggressive, and Taiwan passive and gentler. The critiques of Korean corporations and even the “national character” of Korea led to reflexive comments on Taiwan’s competitiveness, such as what Taiwan did wrong to lose the race. Therefore, discussions of the national character offered an opportunity to review the problems within Taiwanese corporations and government policies, in addition to addressing personal frustrations within the stagnant economic situation in today’s Taiwan.

### **“Competition”**

“Competition” (*jingzheng*, 競爭) is one of the keywords which permeates the survey and the interviews. It is used in different parts of speech or as part of a compound noun phrase, such as “to compete,” “competitive,” or “competitiveness” (*jingzhengli*, 競

爭力), all of which define the relationship between Korea and Taiwan. Tai-an described the relationship between the two as “competition between [people] running the same kind of businesses,” referring to their DRAM and flash manufacturers where he himself worked. Tom made detailed observations of the industries and noted that the two nations were “highly similar in their situations and development trajectories.” In the end, the nations and their peoples became rivals to each other, although the story originally started as a competition among corporations.

Tai-an summed up the relationship between Taiwan and South Korea as economic competitors by saying that the Taiwanese “hope to see [Korea’s] ... failure and ... [Taiwan’s] success.” The contrast of a winner and a loser was prevalent among the informants. Yao-yao, who had exited the high-tech industry to work at a traditional industry, illustrated the relationship between the two nations as “direct competitors.” Using examples of her high school classmate who worked in the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), she explained to me how Korean and Taiwanese companies were well aware that they were fighting for the same markets. Yao-yao gave an example of a senior Taiwanese engineer who was recruited by Samsung—a news story distributed by her supervisor to the entire company, reminding them of the severity of business and technology confidentiality. To those who worked at the Hsinchu Science Park, this rivalry was not imaginary; this was the reality of the business world, which affects one’s survival and future prospects.

The relationship between Taiwan and South Korea is so intense that, to many Taiwanese, Korea has been advancing from Taiwan’s rival to Taiwan’s enemy. Four out of 14 HSP interviewees refer to South Korea as a “rival” (*duishou*, 對手), usually in a compound phrase “competition rival” (*jingzheng duishou*, 競爭對手)—namely, a competitor. Even those who did not use this phrase in the interview alluded to the rivalry

in similar language, such as “in a relationship of competition,” while two informants used the phrase “enemy” (*di*, 敵). A sense of industrial Darwinism, and the implication that Korean companies were a threat, were clear in this rhetoric. Kevin confessed that he felt a clear distinction between South Korea and Taiwan as like that between “an enemy and oneself” (*diwo*, 敵我). He considered Korea to be “a great threat” and referred to his position as an engineer in Hsinchu Science Park in contrast to the greater Taiwanese public. Kevin pointed out the gender difference in consumer behaviors, explaining that “the girls [may] find it harmless using Korean products [because] they are not in the [electronics] industry.” Nonetheless, he chose not to buy any Korean products, and disapproved of those who did, even though he said he would not openly condemn such buyers.

The antagonistic relationship between Taiwan and South Korea’s electronic industries may be best illustrated by a Taiwanese article which was published in *Business Today* with the provocative title “Samsung’s Plan to Kill Taiwan” (Hsieh, Lin & Yang, 2013). The article surveyed the past few years of Taiwan’s electronics industry, recounting one case after another, including the 2006 antitrust lawsuit when Samsung escaped legal penalty by disclosing price-fixing behaviors of its Asian counterparts, the financial crisis in 2008 when Taiwan’s DRAM industry was sabotaged by Korean competitors, and the tumble of HTC smartphone shares. The report was spiced up by stories of the internal dynamics of Samsung’s corporate culture, which was said to be “even crueler and more cold-blooded than you think” (Hsieh et al.). It suggested that Samsung’s management style was militaristic and even inhumane, giving examples that a research team could be confined within the building until they made satisfactory progress, and that even high-ranking managers were replaced each year. In addition, the article compared Korea’s business approach to that of the FBI, in that they collected detailed information about their rivals and the talents they wanted to recruit.

This article became such a heated topic of discussion at the time of its publication that all the HSP informants expressed that they had heard about the report and believed that it was somewhat plausible. Samsung was portrayed as an intelligent and frightening Other, and the story was delivered in the language of military and war metaphors. In short, the fact that Samsung had surpassed, or even knocked down, many Taiwanese corporations was portrayed as an act of “planned annihilation” of Taiwanese companies. While some informants may not have agreed with all the details provided by the article, the informants found that the stories corresponded to their impressions of the international rivalry between the Taiwanese and the South Korean electronics industries.

The informants’ experiences in the industry are highly relevant to how they view Korea. Yao-yao disclosed that she did not realize South Korea was considered such a frightening rival until she entered the industry. Amongst the informants, however, no one was more indignant about Korea than Mei-chun, who had been through the DRAM industry’s downfall in Taiwan in 2008. Mei-chun recalled the days when she and her colleagues were forced to take unpaid leaves: “Every time [we] went to work we talked about [Korea], more or less. And [I assume that] every table at lunch or dinnertime must have talked about how obnoxious Korea was.” The global financial crisis in 2008 affected the semiconductor industry such that demand was shrinking and all industries were under pressure. At this critical moment, according to Mei-chun, Korean corporations would place large orders to Taiwanese companies, but after the manufacturing started, the Koreans deliberately withdrew the orders. In order to survive the grim circumstance, the Taiwanese companies brought down the prices to almost production costs, so that they “lost money with the manufacturing of each die [on a wafer slice]” (Mei-chun, interview). Some of the factories went bankrupt as a result, driving foreign investors to Korean companies. Mei-chun was one of the few informants who used emotional rhetoric more frequently in

describing her views of Korea; she confessed that she “hated” and felt “fearful” about the country, realizing that the government-sponsored industries of DRAM and LED in Taiwan had been permanently damaged.

To summarize from the stories of *Business Today* and Mei-chun’s personal story, there is a recurrent theme of Korea being a malicious player in the industry. While some of my informants tended to give neutral and factual analyses of competition in the business world, a conspiracy theory with implied or explicit moral judgment emerged from time to time to interpret the crisis Taiwanese industries had been going through. Kevin suggested that he found “Korea’s *image* has always been poor” (this informant used the English word “image” during the conversation) and “Samsung used a variety of means to suppress other corporations with the support of the [Korean] government ... in one way [you could say that they were] bullying Taiwan.” He even suggested he would be very happy if he learned that North Korea bombed the South and blew up Samsung. As someone who had never purchased Korean products, he explained that his psychological “defense [system]” (another English term he used during the conversation) was engaged when he learned that the Korean opponent had been “aiming” (*zhendui*, 針對) at Taiwan—culturally, athletically, and commercially. Among the 14 informants, five expressed that they tried to avoid using Korean products, while one said that he preferred using a Taiwanese brand whenever possible. As Kevin revealed, the competition between South Korea and Taiwan triggered a defense system of those Taiwanese who had an internal moral standard by which to judge the Koreans—with the idea of “fair competition” (*gongping jingzheng*, 公平競爭).

### **“It’s Not Fair”**

Jay Wang defined consumer nationalism as follows, “[Consumer] nationalism refers to consumers’ invocation of collective identities based on their nationality to accept

or reject products or brands from other countries” (2005). Wang further distinguished consumer nationalism from economic nationalism by pointing out the latter’s relationship with the state and the former’s nature as a grassroots movement in which consumers voluntarily make shopping choices based on patriotism and/or based on antagonism toward the nationality of goods. Multinational corporations often became the target of nationalist movement during times of conflict between the consumer nation and the (multi)national corporations. In the case of the Taiwan-South Korea relationship, Samsung was mentioned by most respondents as a rival, a point of reference to Taiwanese firms, and sometimes as an evil player whom a loyal national subject should combat.

Among other informants, Chia-fen was the one most actively resistant to Korean products. She not only boycotted these products herself, but also demanded her family act the same way: “[I] forbade my family to use a Samsung television . . . and told my sisters they can’t use Samsung cell phones.” When tracing her media-viewing history, Chia-fen said that her negative impressions about Korea started in high school, when she watched football games on television. According to her, the Korean players did not play the games fairly, which upset her as a viewer. Her patriotic awareness as a consumer, however, arose when she started working in the electronics industry and had more consumer capacity. When she was able to purchase a cell phone with her own money, she deliberately avoided Korean products, or Samsung’s products in particular. “I made a choice about the brand [of my smartphone], because I don’t like them. . . . I cannot support the products made by [our] rivals.” Chia-fen said that she repudiated those who used Samsung’s products, especially after learning that some Korean employees were industrial “spies” who stole the knowledge and technologies from Apple. She portrayed the Korean corporation as cheaters and believed that this corresponded with their performance on the athletic field.

In this vein of thought, the act of purchasing a Korean product or a domestic product became a moral issue. In the example of Mei-chun, she was compelled to shun Korean products due to the edgy relationship between Korea and Taiwan, especially with the influence of her communal network in the Hsinchu Science Park. In addition to an instance of her boyfriend dissuading her from using a Samsung smartphone, Mei-chun referred to her later experience visiting Korea:

“I found it seemed to be really unfair that they almost always used their own brands of cars and rarely foreign cars. Many commodities, even in the convenience stores, were their own brands. ... It was also due to the influence of my colleagues that I felt it rather unfair that we (the Taiwanese public) were consuming Korean products.”

When Mei-chun reflected in 2015 on her past views of South Korea, she manifested a mixture of perspectives from herself and her sources, including the media, her communal network, and her own experience. Several years ago, she bought a Samsung smartphone because the reviews were good, but those around her criticized her for using the phone. She found these phones symbolized “national and familial animosity” (*guochou jiahen*, 國仇家恨)—a common phrase in Chinese language to express a bitter grudge between nations. Feeling guilty, she gave the phone to her sister and thought she should not use a Korean smartphone despite its good quality; instead, she felt that she “should discover the merits of domestic phones.” When asked about her sources of the anti-Korean information, Mei-chun said that half of the information was from her then-boyfriend (current husband) and the other half from her colleagues, whose arguments were “sensible and not entirely emotional.” Nevertheless, Mei-chun’s views of Korea changed over subsequent years. She confessed that as time went by, she did not hate Korea as much. Moreover, she found “charming points” about Korea whenever she watched Korean dramas, and thought “it

[was] okay to forgive Korea for a while.” When she chanced to visit Korea, she was impressed to meet a middle-aged Korean man who spoke good English. These positive experiences accumulated and softened her views of Korea softened; ultimately, she concluded that “Korea was able to succeed for a reason.”

Anti-Korean sentiments are only a segment of the spectrum of viewpoints, in which more inclusive views are found at the opposite end. Not all informants expressed that they found the competition “unfair.” When I showed Hsiang an article (a blog entry) calling on the Taiwanese to boycott Korean products, he denounced it as “extreme and negative” and said he would “use [Korean products] if they have good performance,” although added that he would support domestic products when possible. He disapproved of the language in the article, such as the “annihilation” (*xiaomie*, 消滅) of Taiwanese industries. Hsiang felt that Taiwan and Korea were in commercial relations, which was supposed to be a game of “fair competition” (*gongping jingzheng*, 公平競爭), and “the opponents [stood out because they] worked harder.” Chen-hung had a similar, but even more positive, perspective in interpreting the rivalry. He thought that Samsung’s business strategy was “smart” in placing orders at the opponents’ factories in order to engage their production capacity in the current market demand while Samsung continued to develop the latest technologies that the Taiwanese ignored.

Most informants demonstrated certain degrees of reflexivity, shifting the focus on Korea-Taiwan relationships to a broader framework of global relations and Taiwan’s position in it. Tai-an interpreted Korean corporations’ takeover strategy in 2008 as a necessary survival skill in the business world: “[Samsung] had to take advantage of the moment to dash forward ... [it] not only [aimed at] the Korean market, but at the whole world.” Tai-an’s perception of South Korea was represented by a neutral 3/5 on the Likert Scale, when he laughingly claimed that he was hoping for the success of Taiwanese

industries and the failure of the opponents since they were competing in the same industries. “There is no moral judgement in the business world,” Wei explained. In a reflexive and a relational framework, the informants were able to evaluate the positions of each national industry and their relationships with other factors, such as political-economic leaders and states.

Leadership was an issue that concerned the informants, especially when the Korean government was praised for supporting indigenous industries and Taiwan was criticized for its lack of leadership. Hsiang was impressed by what he perceived as the “full support of the [Korean] government,” feeling that “Samsung and LG were like state-owned conglomerates.” When Hsiang was about to enter the electronics industry a few years ago, he investigated the decline of many Taiwanese semiconductor corporations in preparation for his job interviews. He came to the conclusion that national policies were critical in sustaining the industry globally. Chen-hung, being a senior engineer in the industry, said that he viewed the nations from the perspective of an investor and studied their historical contexts. He gave an analysis of several Asian leaders during the interview, from Chiang Ching-kuo in Taiwan, Lee Myung-bak in South Korea, to Lee Kuan-yew in Singapore, pointing to the significance of efficient government and long-term planning.

As an example of a reflexive informant, Yu moved into self-critique of the Taiwanese industry. Yu held the most positive perspective about international competition among the HSP informants, while he claimed to view the current Taiwanese industries negatively. He argued that “if Samsung considered Taiwan a rival to be annihilated, it means that Taiwan is competitive enough to be a target to compete with,” and suggested that competition is beneficial to the improvement of domestic businesses by eliminating the uncompetitive ones. In addition, Chen-hung criticized those who “loathed” (*tonghen*, 痛恨) Koreans, suggesting that they did not have real contact with Korea and never

reflected on the problems within the domestic industry, which already “lacked competitiveness.” De-sheng also used the concept of “competitiveness” (*jingzhenli*, 競爭力) to refer to Taiwan’s problem. According to him, Taiwan’s semiconductor industry—and the DRAM segment in particular—had been afflicted by vicious competition domestically. De-sheng suggested that the downfall of the industry in 2008 was a good time for the government to step in and restructure the Taiwanese industry. “Taiwan was no longer competitive,” he went on to explain. “[We] don’t need Korea to wipe [us] out,” pointing out that the Taiwanese electronics industry would have been declining anyway.

These self-critiques can be explicitly associated with the theory of industrial Darwinism, addressing a process of elimination in which the fittest survive. Being a researcher in the semiconductor industry, Chia-fen expressed her concern over Taiwan, which “was likely to be eliminated.” Despite her antipathy toward Korea, she acknowledged the strengths of Korean industry, which “was stronger than [she] thought.” Chia-fen illustrated the difference between Korean and Taiwanese workers, saying that the former were said to “trade their livers for [success],” working day and night and aiming for continual progress, whereas the latter were more content with the status quo. She attributed Korea’s success and Taiwan’s decline to the difference in their national characters, arguing that the latter were “crybabies” and were “not as good as [the Koreans] were and could not give as much effort.”

The informants showed that even patriotic consumers were not entirely biased about the competitiveness of products and their nations of origin. They manifested a reflexive economic and consumer nationalism in Taiwanese society by displaying their understandings of technological developments. Being workers and consumers at the same time, they formed perceptions of ethnicity through discussions of the product performance and the global market shares of different brands of smartphones. The competition between

Samsung and HTC exemplified this association between national identity and cell phone brands. While HTC was once considered “the glory of Taiwan” (*taiwan zhi guang*, 台灣之光) and “the king of the stock market” (*guwang*, 股王), which used to be the world’s largest Android phone manufacturer in 2011 (Camp, 2011), nowadays HTC’s market share is about 2% globally (Beaver, 2015). By contrast, in 2014 Samsung had not only enjoyed the greatest global market share since 2012 (IDC, 2014), but had also outperformed HTC in the Taiwanese market in 2014, when HTC ranked second and Sony ranked third (“Smartphones market share reached 88%,” 2014). While the financial crisis propelled Mei-chun to avoid using Samsung smartphones and to use only HTC phones, her dislike of Korea began to alleviate when her user experience of HTC was not satisfactory: “I thought, ‘No wonder.’ How are we to [compete] if our technologies are behind?” Despite the fact that Hsiang had been using Taiwanese brands, such as HTC and Asus smartphones, he was prompted to reflect on Samsung’s success when he saw Samsung’s series of commercials that featured top Taiwanese singer Jolin Tsai advertising Samsung’s S6 products. Although the nationality of the products was a significant factor in the consumers’ decision-making process, these informants demonstrated that they still kept an observant eye on the performance of the products with a comparative perspective of the self and the other.

## CONCLUSION

This chapter explores the workings of economic nationalism and consumer nationalism in Taiwan. The developmental states in the history of Taiwan and South Korea were a form of economic nationalism: Their economic prowess had been appreciated by the citizenry in previous decades. Contemporary Taiwan, however, has been confronting the serious challenge of whether it can sustain success at this historical juncture in the twenty-first century. This chapter has discussed how Taiwanese workers evaluated the

Taiwanese and the Korean governments, corporations, and individuals, with direct or implied discourse of nationalism. Consumer nationalism can be practiced twofold: On the one hand, the consumers can choose to support products produced by domestic corporations, while on the other hand, consumers can choose to avoid purchasing products produced by foreign nations. Such protectionism and exclusionism are influenced by past and current international relations. In the case of Taiwan and South Korea, these newly industrialized countries played the roles of producers and consumers at the same time.

An analysis of the Taiwanese informants, however, shows that the consumer nationalism is complicated by the worker-consumers who were caught between national and personal interests. Chou confessed that he would want to work at Samsung if he had a chance, because he did not want to “fall with Taiwan,” especially after witnessing how some of his outstanding classmates who worked for HTC eventually quit their jobs. Although some believed that consuming Taiwanese goods and boycotting foreign products represented the convergence of collective and individual interests, other informants show that national pride and personal pleasures can diverge. While most informants endorse nationalism with different degrees of engagement, some chose to prioritize individual pleasures and interests.

The two nations were driven into an increasingly antagonistic relationship over the course of time. The Cold War paved the way for a competitive system of liberal capitalism, and the thawing post-Cold War relationship pulled Taiwan and South Korea even farther from each other politically by the latter’s diplomatic ties with China in 1992. Throughout the discussions of *national character*, *rivalry*, and *fair competition*, there seemed to be no room for discussing a relationship of cooperation between Taiwan and South Korea. Based on an underlying assumption of industrial Darwinism, the informants spent the majority of the interview time explaining why and how Korea succeeded and Taiwan fell behind.

Economists Chen, Chien, and Lai described Taiwan's situation as being in a fierce "Red Sea competition" (2013) that all competitors are fighting for the same market without acknowledging the potentials of other markets. The downfall of Taiwan's DRAM industry is an example of a Red Sea competition, in which Taiwan's previous market share was almost entirely lost to Korean corporations.

The story of consumer nationalism is more complicated than "supporting national products" (*zhichi guohuo*, 支持國貨) and boycotting the *rival's* products—as a result of the Red Sea competition. The idea of "national products" have become a myth in the global capitalist system. Due to the segmentation of the smartphone value chain, the big brand names such as Samsung and Apple are not produced entirely in a single nation. iPhone 6, for example, has two types of chips, from either the Taiwanese TSMC or from the Korean Samsung. Observers have been debating whether Samsung's processors perform more poorly than those of TSMC and whether consumers should request the products with the Taiwanese chips instead (Linxiaoxu, 2015). iPhone is not the only brand which needs to outsource its chips, however. Due to Samsung smartphone's first place in global market share, Samsung, too, uses chips produced by American or Taiwanese firms to meet demand, which it cannot satisfy by itself. As discussed in Chapter 1, TSMC is one of the most advanced chip manufacturers and its technologies have not yet been completely surpassed by those of Samsung. More importantly, due to the OEM (original equipment manufacturer) nature of TSMC, it could survive without competing directly with other international brand-name smartphones. Nevertheless, the success of TSMC is not without potential risks.

There is competitive advantage in Samsung's business structure, as opposed to the Taiwanese companies: Samsung is an electronics empire, which vertically integrated most segments of the industry, whereas a company like TSMC is only a specialized segment of

the industry. As the earlier case of HTC demonstrates, Samsung was able to outperform a forerunner by continuing to invest in the latest technologies, from the lower stream to the upper stream, despite HTC's having taken advantage of the world's market at a time when latecomers had not caught up. The current market share is divided into the higher end companies, where iPhone and Samsung dominate, and the lower end ones, where Chinese latecomers like Huawei and Xiaomi are rising stars. Samsung is an OBM (original brand manufacturer), whereas TSMC is an OEM whose name is not as well known to the public, despite its world-leading technologies. Now TSMC enjoys about 50% of the market share of the world's chips, but it may not be able to sustain its edge permanently if it is not able to advance the technologies faster than others. Intel and Samsung are currently the greatest opponents of TSMC, while Chinese corporations are catching up.

TSMC is an example of the precarious situation of Taiwan's electronic industry about which many Taiwanese people are showing concerns. During the interviews, Chen-hung, De-sheng, Chia-fen, and Hong all mentioned explicitly that they hold negative views of the current Taiwanese electronic industry. With Samsung's monstrous capital and a comprehensive production chain which can endure more temporary losses in a rapidly changing market, the chaebol becomes a frightening giant and even a "threat" to the Taiwanese, as some informants suggested. Furthermore, the competition between TSMC and Samsung is again saddled with fierce business warfare since a senior TSMC executive was found by the Taiwanese Supreme Court to have been leaking information to Samsung. The incident was claimed to significantly reduce Samsung's technology gap with TSMC, and the image of Samsung as an aggressive and unethical player reemerged as it had in earlier news stories (Chen, 2015).

The anti-Korean sentiments in Taiwan's electronics industry are the result of both internal and external factors. Internally, the competitive nature of the electronics industry—

and Taiwan's concentrated economic structure consisting of OEM companies—made the Taiwanese sensitive and anxious about their opponents in Korea. Externally, Taiwan is occupying a precarious position in the context of the global semiconductor value chain. Taiwan is caught in the middle while some of the technologies were still not able to stand out at the far top and many latecomers are catching up. The advantages China and India have are what Taiwan lack: a vast domestic market, a gross scale of economy, and a massive population pool from which to cultivate new talents. This research shows that, the workers of the Hsinchu Science Park had a much more heartfelt sense of urgency, prompting them to make consumer decisions that were pro-Taiwan and anti-South Korea. In sum, anti-Korean sentiment in twenty-first century Taiwan is engendered by the rising anxiety corresponding to Taiwan's internal and external economic pressures, on the one hand. On the other hand, the negative sentiments toward Korea are reinforced by the bitterness generated from consuming the vicious images of Korea accumulated in Taiwanese society over time, as the following chapters will demonstrate.

### **Chapter 3: Taiwan's Koreantalism: Transnational Koreanness in Chinese Language Media**

During a visit to Washington D.C. in June 2010, the Taiwanese Health Minister Chih-liang Yang made a comment about South Korea's health care system and disclosed to the Taiwanese reporters that he "really dislikes Koreans," who he believed to claim Confucius as ethnically Korean (Chen and Shih, 2010). While the Taiwanese media deemed his comment inappropriate, they had actively circulated such rumors about Korea during the previous years. This chapter focuses on a particular discourse of Koreanness that portrays South Korea as a cultural predator who has been claiming the heritages of others to be their own. The chapter explores the relationship between media and the fiction-making process of this anti-Korean discourse. By producing and consuming news, the media and the audience construct a sense of the nation through storytelling.

Scholarship in media anthropology has explored the commonalities between media and religion (Lardellier, 2005; Rothenbuhler, 1998; Thomas, 2005). Among different means of communication, scholars demonstrated that television news in particular serves a ritualistic and myth-making function in contemporary society (Blondheim & Liebes, 2005; Coman, 2005; Lule, 2005). As Benedict Anderson suggests, the public establishes a sense of simultaneous time and space through the intake of news (1983); his argument pertaining to print capitalism extends into the use of new media in modern societies where television and the Internet are also significant means through which nation-states produce nationalism. Particularly, daily news and primetime TV are argued to be most relevant in the formation of nationalism. Thomas, Coman, and Rothenbuhler (2005) suggest that the audience develops a sense of citizenship, witnessing and identifying with the state apparatus through the media's reporting and broadcasting nationalist events, such as the marathon reports of the 9/11 incident. This chapter argues that the circulation of the anti-

Korean discourse in Taiwan’s mass media is one such example of myth-making of the Taiwanese nation and the Korean other. Furthermore, the chapter builds on the idea of mass media and nationalism, suggesting that the news media in Taiwan has advanced from the print capitalism to that of the electronic capitalism.

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#	Answer	Number of Responses	%
1	Travel Experience	34	28%
2	Information on the Internet	65	53%
3	News Reports	93	76%
4	Popular Culture	90	73%
5	Korean Friends	54	44%
6	Sport Games	43	35%
Total Responses		123	100%

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Table 1: Results of Survey Question Two: Which of the Following Sources Contribute to Your Impressions of Korea(ns)? (Check all that apply)

In a National Communications Commission’s survey in 2008, news, sports, and broadcast channels were ranked as the top three most-favored categories of TV channels in Taiwan (“Midterm Report for the *Survey of Television User Behavior and Satisfaction*”). In a multiple choice question from my survey (the respondents could check all those apply),

news reports (76%), popular culture (73%), and the Internet (53%) were the top three sources from which the respondents formed their perceptions of Korea, followed by Korean friends, sport games, and travel (see Table 3.1). In this chapter, I investigate the news media ecology in Taiwan to illustrate how news has served as a primary source for the construction of transnational Koreanness in Taiwan. Advancing from an authoritarian regime to a democratic polity, Taiwan has experienced media liberalization in the past three decades. However, such liberalization has produced a highly competitive media culture in Taiwan where the news has become a commodity to attract viewers, who, in turn, become products to be sold to the advertisers. Journalistic autonomy cannot remain intact during the transition from the “state-run” media to “capital-run” media when freedom of speech is threatened by executive and corporate interests (Kuang, 2011, p. 73). The rising market forces have contributed to sensational reports of homogenous genres. The ideals of independent, informative, and investigative reports are replaced by the reality of timely and entertaining content negligent of public interests. The circulation of the anti-Korean discourse is examined in this context of a hyper-competitive media environment in Taiwan.

The anti-Korean discourse discussed in this chapter is like two flips of one coin, producing knowledge of oneself and the other simultaneously. On the one hand, the myth of Korea is constructed in Taiwan; on the other hand, Taiwanese identity is contested at the crossroads of trans-Asia cultural flows. The collective identity of Taiwanese people, as the study shows, is defined through its contacts with the Other. In *Orientalism* (1994), Edward Said explicates the concept of an "imaginary geography," illustrating how the West imagines the Orient through the construction of an Orientalist discourse. I argue that a discourse about South Korea has emerged in the past two decades while the nation moves from a peripheral position to a prominent one due to its heightened visibilities in the media

sphere. The rise of South Korea contributes to the nation's entrance in the imaginary geography of Taiwanese people: a process I refer to as *Koreantalism*.

Moreover, the discourses illustrated in this chapter should be examined in the context of the electronic capitalism: The Chinese/Korean heritage disputes manufactured and circulated in the mass media are a result of the convergence of traditional and new media—including newspapers, television, and the internet. Although many of the disputes have been proved to be a hoax or misinformation by some media sources, the voluntary dissemination of these stories reflected many citizens' shared impression on Korea's national image. The history of contemporary media ecology in Taiwan is featured by the democratization of information where broadcast, cable, and satellite television and the Internet converge into a participatory culture. As Henry Jenkins suggests in *Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide* (2006), the convergence culture is closely tied to a “participatory culture” and “collective intelligence”. The production of the Koreantalist discourse is resulted from the cooperation of both the Taiwanese media professionals and the Taiwanese audience. Digital technologies are conducive to the information flow by significantly lowering the production costs and increasing access to information, enhancing the competition among different media organizations and media platforms. The production of transnational Koreanness in Taiwan will therefore be viewed in the subsequent section in relation to the logic of capitalism and a competitive media culture.

This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section will introduce the history of media liberalization and illustrate the formation of news media ecology in contemporary Taiwan. The Taiwanese society transitioned from the martial law period to democratization and media deregulation during the late 1980s and the 1990s. Nevertheless, scholars of Taiwanese news media found that the commercialization and commodification

of media has deprived journalists of their freedom of speech and the audience of diverse discourse despite the common expectation that news in democratic countries should serve as a watchdog to “monitor the operation of the ruling government” and serve the public sphere by informing and facilitating discussions of public interests (Hung, 2013, p. 84; Lambert & Wu, 2016; Lin, 2009). The second section discusses the developments that created the series of rumors about Korea’s heritage robbery. I will examine the production and the circulation of the rumors and demonstrate the results explored in my survey and interview conducted in 2014 and 2015. By providing reception experiences of the audience toward the rumors, the field work complements the content analysis of the rumors and an industrial analysis of their production. The reception study enriches the research by demonstrating the complexity of rumor consumption. The informants exposed different responses to the representations of Koreanness provided by Taiwanese media.

## **NEWS MEDIA ECOLOGY IN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY TAIWAN**

### **Media liberalization, 1980s to 1990s**

The development of the current news media ecology in Taiwan should be reviewed since the end of the martial law period, when the freedom of speech was gradually granted and the mass media were deregulated and commercialized. The martial law was imposed after the retreat of the Nationalist government from mainland China to Taiwan in 1949, and a state of emergency was declared by the government through the establishment of the “Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion.” The Cold War framed the relationship between the states across the strait not only as enemies to eliminate but also as renegade regimes whose land and people could be reclaimed by the other when the rightful order resumed. During this period of time, “the right of free speech, assembly, and association, including the formation of new political parties and freedom of

publication,” were deprived (Hung, 2013, p. 85). Mass media was controlled by the party-state, specifically the “party-state-military bloc,” forming what Lee (2000) described as a “patron-client relationship” between the bureaucrats and the media (p. 125). Under tight government control, “only 31 newspapers, 33 radio stations and 3 terrestrial television stations were allowed to operate” (Hung, p. 83).

The democratization and indigenization movement beginning from the 1970s culminated in the late 1980s and the 1990s in Taiwan. Martial law was lifted in 1987 and the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion ended in 1991. The people were granted more freedom of political expressions as a result of democratic and civil movements. A substantial opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party, was established in 1986 when Taiwan was advancing toward a multiparty polity. The Betrayers Punishment Act was lifted in 1991, and the Criminal Code Article 100 was amended in 1992 to state that people would only be prosecuted when conducting anti-state activities “by violence or threats” (*yi qiangbao huo xiepo*, 以強暴或脅迫) in addition to “having the intention” (*yitu*, 意圖) and “take [it] into action” (*zhuoshou zhixing*, 著手執行).<sup>4</sup> The amendment also allowed for the freedom to

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<sup>4</sup> The complete Criminal Code of the Republic of China, Article 100 says: “Any person by violence or threats committing an overt act with intent to destroy the organization of the State, seize State territory, or, using illegal means, change the Constitution or overthrow the Government shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than seven years; the ringleader shall be sentenced to life imprisonment. Any person preparing to commit the offense specified in the preceding paragraph shall be sentenced to imprisonment not less than six months but not more than five years” (Official translation provided by the Ministry of Justice, Retrieved from <http://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawSearchContent.aspx?pc=C0000001&k1=seize+state+territory&k2=by+illegal+means&k3=change+the+Constitution&k4=> , the Laws and Regulations Database of The

demonstrate an independent Taiwan identity distinct from that of an inseparable Chinese state, marking the beginning of further public expressions of an indigenous identity. Subsequently, the first direct presidential election was held in 1996, and Taiwanese people have begun to enjoy comprehensive political and media liberalization.

The lifting of the martial law and the concurrent democratization movements served as a prelude for the ensuing media liberalization in the 1990s. The subsequent decade experienced the legalization and proliferation of multiple forms of the media, including newspaper, radio, and television. Newspaper publication increased from dozens to 2000 (although not all registered newspapers are active and financially viable), the previously active underground radio stations were allowed to operate freely and legally, and cable television was legalized in 1993 (Hsu, 2014). Furthermore, cable television has subsequently become a major source of media intake, enjoying an 80% penetration rate as of 2001 (Li, 2001, p. 272). On the Taiwanese island(s) of twenty-three million, the first decade of the 2000s had produced hundreds of newspapers as well as satellite television systems with more than 200 channels in Taiwan (Lambert & Wu, 2016, p. 37). Liberalization, however, resulted in intense media competition among the news media in Taiwan.

The development of electronic media in Taiwan, including the penetration of cable and satellite television and the Internet, has produced a highly competitive environment of news production that divides the audience's attention with countless options. Today's news media have experienced significant transformation globally due to reduced advertising

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Republic of China). During the discussions within the above paragraph, I offered my literal translation of Article 100 from the original Chinese text in order to better portray the control of speech before its amendment in 1992.

revenues, fragmented audiences, increased competition, and under-investment in news production (Freedman, 2010; Meikle & Redden, 2011, p. 4-5). Consequently, poor quality and ethics have concerned observers of news reports, including scholars, the public, and even journalists themselves. Taiwanese media have likewise demonstrated failures in presenting news with the principles of objectivity, accuracy, fairness, justice, and diversity (Kuang, 2011). Despite media reform campaigns and public outcry, news organizations in Taiwan are still producing news that informs the audience of their nation and the world regardless of quality. In fact, news is the most popular program generating stable ratings in Taiwan (NCC, 2010). In the past decade, seven 24-hour news channels, in addition to news programs on other cable TV channels and those on the five terrestrial television stations (Lin, 2009, p. 135), have been broadcasting the news in Taiwan daily.

### **Commercial news media in the 21st century**

In *Market-Driven Journalism, Let the Citizen Beware* (1994), John McManus compared commercial news production to a “barter system” among the citizens, the news media, advertisers, and investors. According to McManus, money and attention provided by audience are exchanged for news content, which the media produce for advertisers’ revenues. The struggles between media serving commercial interests and media fulfilling social responsibilities have been discussed by scholars over the past few decades (Bogert, 2000; Lin, 2009; Livant, 1979; McChesney, 1999; Smythe, 1977). Since the 1970s, Marxist communication scholars like Livant and Smythe have stressed the “economic base” of media production and argue that “the production and exchanges of audiences” should be considered commodities to be bought and sold (Livant, p. 92). Lin (2009) furthermore, built on the early discussions and highlighted the importance of viewing ratings and their influence on news content in Taiwan.

Lin demonstrated in *Ratings Journalism: The Commodification of Taiwanese Television News* (2009) that A.C. Nielson's monopoly of the viewing ratings measurement has conditioned news organization's decisions on which stories to report. According to Lin, viewing ratings have been falsely objectified as an absolute number by the media and advertisement industries. She illustrates that although viewing ratings have a margin of error, they have been employed as a reliable number by the news organizations and advertisers as sales currency: trivial difference of the ratings number provided by A.C. Nelson could translate into substantial loss of profits. With the use of electronic meters, the ratings company can provide ratings measured in minutes—even down to 15 seconds (Lin, p. 113). In addition, the results are so sophisticated that ratings are produced within two decimal digits and rankings of programs. The executives and the reporters are therefore able to measure their journalistic performance through the rise and fall of the ratings by each news story. Journalists are informed of the ratings which eventually affect their evaluation at the workplace (Lin, p. 138). In her content analysis of four television channels, Lin concluded that the newsrooms arrange the program in relation to the principles of news genre and content—the story (Lin, p. 136). Likewise, online media are prone to “write sensational headlines ...to generate high click-through rates, enabling marketing departments to use artificially boosted viewer ratings to attract advertising dollars” (Lambert & Wu, 2016, p. 44). The commercialization of news has contributed to selective news reporting based on what is believed to be attractive to the audience, such as visual and verbal sensations.

The process of news production, accordingly, is congruent with the demand of media executives and restricted the journalists' professional decisions on the news content. Lambert and Wu (2016) studied the endangered journalistic ethics within Taiwanese media, based on interviews of news media professionals. Their study indicated that the

professionals were pressured at different work stages “from information gathering to reporting to information dissemination” (Lambert & Wu, 2016, p. 42). Their choice of story, writing style, and the commercial interests they could generate affected their evaluation and even their job security. In addition, the journalists avoid in-depth and diverse topics under the pressure of time and cost. Television journalists therefore recycle topics covered by newspapers, while print journalists choose easier and uncontroversial stories. In the latter’s case, in-depth reports are not time and cost-efficient when journalists are paid by the number of Chinese characters (each word) they write (Lambert & Wu, p. 43). Quality is sacrificed at the expense of speed; the faster the journalists complete the story, the more money they can earn. Due to the competitive market across different media genres and the under-investments of media organizations, the capitalistic and bureaucratic production environment has constrained journalists’ choice in creating news content—they eschewed the reports that conflicted with corporate and individual interests.

At the content level of news production, the Taiwanese media demonstrates the following features: infotainment, sensationalism, visual stimuli, sponsored messages, homogenization, and partisanship. Contemporary Taiwanese news has been criticized for a lack of international news and the negligence of public interests (Lin, 2009, p. 130). The pursuit of viewing ratings drove the news agencies to report entertaining stories to create the largest audience. The convergence of information and entertainment is not uniquely Taiwanese, nevertheless; contemporary news has been known for its tabloidization that “appeals to base instincts and public demand for sensationalism” (Bird, 2009, p. 40; Croteau & Hoynes, 2001; Zelizer, 2009). Lin concluded from her empirical studies of four news channels that the content of Taiwanese news has become tabloidized and dramatized. The news content is imbued with crime or gossips stories. Political and financial issues are frequently reported in a personalized style: Politicians and specialists are treated as

celebrities whose personal lives are under scrutiny. In addition to verbally sensational narratives, the media employ visual stimuli to attract viewers. *Apple Daily*, in particular, applied colors and a massive amount of illustrations in its print newspapers and produced animated news available online to dramatize news events in visual forms (Boykoff, 2010). News production in Taiwan has thus become a highly sensual and superficial presentation of the current events.

In addition to an entertaining storytelling style, profits-driven policies of media agencies have pressured the newsrooms to manufacture content which is sponsored and homogenized. News stories were imbued with sponsored messages provided by commercial and political interest groups. Not only can advertisers promote their companies, even the government is able to promote its policies by providing content subsidies to news agencies (Hung, 2013, p. 88; Lambert & Wu, 2016, p. 44). Although a media reform movement has been ongoing since 2000 that has resulted in the passing of amendments as well as a bill outlawing the government and political parties' sponsorship of news programs, "there is no penalty for violation" and "more specific regulations against product placement in media" are wanted (Hung, p. 90). In addition, the stressful competition among different media resulted in the homogenization of news content to avoid their loss of ratings or readership. Lin (2009) interviewed television news professionals about their news editing process and they disclosed the pressure to pursue the same stories rather than diverse ones. Experience told them viewing ratings dropped when their own channel failed to report the same thing—the major headlines other channels were also broadcasting intensely and repetitively (Lin, p. 142). Likewise, Li and Lee (2010) examined Taiwan's mainstream newspapers from 1992 to 2003 and demonstrated that the print media as well are prone to produce similar content at a time when competition is fierce and the market is uncertain.

Lastly, political ties and commercial interests have prompted the Taiwanese media to show partisanship marked by different political orientations between the “China identity media” and the “Taiwan identity media” (Hsu, 2014). In addition to existing political connections and ideological beliefs of the owners, the media discovered their niche markets by exploiting the ideological divide among their audience (Hung, 2013, p. 88). Therefore, news content may show favoritism to particular politicians and policies as well as attack those on the opposite party-line, while even truthfulness can be sacrificed to serve ideological demands. To sum up the features of contemporary Taiwanese news, its content has been gone against the ideals of objectivity and social justice and has pursued profits over quality. Commercial interests—and the pressing need to survive the competitive media market—have been creating the news content that the Taiwanese consume every day.

Contrary to the liberal ideals of non-partial news media, the commercialization of journalism has infringed upon freedom of the press by eschewing issues of public interests while simultaneously bulwarking selected interest groups. Freedom of the speech does not necessarily translate into freedom of the press, which could be manipulated by “subsidies and advertisement purchases” (LaMay, 2001; Lambert & Wu, 2016). In fact, according to Lambert and Wu’s study, the Freedom House indicated the decline of press freedom in Taiwan in the past decade (p. 37). Moreover, media concentration is another factor worthy of concern. The merger of a cable network system into Want Want Group’s media empire is an example of media concentration. Before appealing for the merger, Want Want had owned the *China Times* Group purchased in 2008, other self-established newspapers, magazines—some of which have extensive coverage on financial prospects in mainland China, as well as two TV stations CTV and CtiTV, and a few Internet media organizations. Tsai Eng-Meng’s Wang Want group started as a food company, whose business turned into

a transnational conglomerate and whose financial interests have been dependent on the mainland Chinese market. The financial interests of the company greatly concerned observers in Taiwan. Protests arose in the Taiwanese society when Want Want Group's bid for the second-largest Taiwanese cable system was announced in 2011. A series of public talks and a press conference were held by scholars from the National Taiwan University at the end of the year to raise public and government awareness. In response to the public concerns of media monopolization, the National Communications Commission held several public hearings and eventually ruled that the merger would only be approved if the company met the conditions of reducing shareholdings and undercutting the percentage of news programming to avoid monopolization of public opinions (Chan, 2013).

The vilifying media representation of South Korea in Taiwan should be examined in the context of the local media ecology. The media in post-martial law Taiwan have fallen prey to the manipulation of commercial forces and different political and business interest groups. In the following section, I discuss a particular type of rumors which I summarize as heritage disputes between South Korea and others. In addition to an analysis of the rumors' content, I demonstrate the production, circulation, and reception processes of the rumors. The viewing/reading experience of the rumors show that the audience is aware of the dubious nature of Taiwanese news media. Although the media is still a gateway to information, its purpose to serve for public interests has been discredited by its pursuit of immediate corporate interests.

## CONFUCIUS IS KOREAN? – HERITAGE DISPUTES AMONG KOREA, CHINA, AND TAIWAN

A conspiracy theory about Koreans is widely circulated within the mainland China, Taiwan, and among the Chinese diaspora.<sup>5</sup> This phenomenon may be dubbed as disputes over heritage ownership, and it is based on the belief that Koreans are prone to appropriate heritages of other cultures. The alleged appropriation of Chinese cultural icons ranges from the Dragon Boat Festival, acupuncture, and soy milk, to prominent historical figures and celebrities—such as ancient philosopher Confucius; one of the greatest poets in Chinese history, Li Po; the founding father of the nation, Sun Yat-sen; and Chien-ming Wang, a Taiwanese athlete who previously pitched for the New York Yankees. Even non-Chinese figures, such as Buddha and Jesus, are said to be claimed by Koreans.

The disputes have been circulated so widely in the Chinese language societies that they can be found in a Wikipedia article entitled, “Korean Heritage Argument” (*Hanguo qi yuan lun*, 韓國起源論). The article defined the argument as:

“Some Korean scholars, based on the view of Korean ethnic superiority, [assert] other nations’ cultures to be originated from the Korean peninsula. The view has been expressed through claiming the establishments and discoveries of the Chinese, the Japanese, and other cultures as well as technologies of the world into those of the Korean peninsula. [They also] assert important figures and celebrities of other nations to be Korean (descendants)” (my translation; “Korean Heritage Argument”).

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<sup>5</sup> Examples are found in Internet forums from China and Taiwan. By diasporic Chinese I refer to Chinese descendants in a third country, who post their comments in English and describe their experiences of encountering Koreans in their lives abroad. See <http://udn.com/NEWS/OPINION/OPI4/5852248.shtml> for an example.

The article listed dozens of examples by providing two tables divided by facts and rumors. The sources of the disputes range from scholarship, world heritage applications, examples given from pop cultural texts (such as films), advertisements of companies, and newspaper or magazine articles. For instance, a mythological figure Chiyou in the Chinese classic, the *Classic of Mountains and Seas*, was said to be found in a variety of Korean texts ranging from “scholars[hip], historical novels, comic books, and websites” and had been employed as the cultural icon of the Korean football team during the 2002 World Cup (“Korean Heritage Argument”). Chinese media have been quoting from the Hong Kong press *Wenwaipo*, which asserted the falsity of a popular Korean historical fiction depicting the Chiyou’s defeat of a legendary Chinese emperor Huangdi (or The Yellow Emperor) (Song, 2007). Huangdi is considered the ancestor that the Chinese are descended from. It is narrated in the *Classic of Mountains and Seas* that he defeats Chiyou, contrary to what the Korean historical fiction suggests.

Several incidents covered by the news media as authentic events are now confirmed to be mistaken. These heritage disputes and rumors are circulated via multiple media forms, including news reports in print and on television as well as blog entries on the Internet. The convergence of different media and the blurred boundary between fact and fiction characterized the Korean rumors studied in this chapter. Through the active participation of the news media, the Taiwanese people are well-informed of the cultural disputes discourse, which is reproduced and circulated among individuals. Resentment and complaints toward Koreans have been rampant on the Internet. Discussions were particularly fervent during sporting events or when another rumor emerged. According to an online poll conducted by the *CommonWealth* magazine, the “Confucius is Korean” rumor was ranked as the most absurd event that took place in the first decade of the 2000s in Taiwan (Commonwealth, 2010). A protest group was established on Facebook to assert

the cultural heritage of soymilk, Chinese medicine, and Chien-ming Wang (see Figure 1). Likewise, there have been intellectuals and government officials who shared in this sense of crisis and despised the supposed Korean misconduct (Liu, 2010; Chen and Shih, 2010).



Figure 1. Screenshot of Facebook protest group “Soybean Milk, Wang Chien-ming, and Acupuncture: We Are not from Korea!!”

During the interviews I conducted in the year of 2014 and 2015, the informants have shown distance to the rumors when I showed them a news article about a Korean study on Sun Yat-sen’s Korean lineage. According to the report on Nownews.com, a history professor of Sungkyunkwan University in Seoul was conducting a study that investigated Sun Yat-sen’s ancestry. The narrative demonstrated a professional journalistic writing style, using references from Hong Kong *Wenwaipo*, Korea’s *Chosun Daily*, and classical Chinese literature. The story, nonetheless, ended with two paragraphs of opinion, citing a series of heritage disputes and a note of caution from the Taiwanese bureaucrats who are said to be protecting a local tradition—the sky lanterns—from being claimed by the Koreans. A few of my interview informants disclosed negative sentiments as they read

along the news article; however, more informants questioned the authenticity of the news with investigative interpretations.

Today's news audience in Taiwan has developed varying degrees of critical distance to the information provided by the mass media, including material from the news media as well as Internet rumors. Chou said that he rates this news report as zero percent authentic because claiming Sun Yat-sen as a Korean does not bring any substantial benefits to the Korean society. He believed that this was a rumor produced by the tabloids. Although he was "a little upset at the beginning," upon hearing this series of rumors, he "became more and more suspicious when exposed to more [rumors of the same kind]." He reasoned that "Korea is economically well-off nowadays, and they do not need to tell lies like these." Kevin suggested that "the title [itself] is already nonsensical," but he would probably skim the content. The examples provided by the news article, such as soymilk originated from Korea, was deemed an entertaining joke to be laughed off by Kevin. He concluded that the report was not credible and did not offer enough evidence to convince its reader. Yi-ting stated that she views different media in different standards: If it were television news, she would view it "peacefully and non-judgmentally," and if the information were from the Internet, she would not even take it seriously.

Tom took his observation and interpretation one step further to explicate his understanding of Taiwanese and Korean culture. "Many of such rumors," according to him, "[were] information jokingly distorted by the media." He believed that answers to these heritage disputes were hard to be elucidated, and they were not urgent issues to him. Instead of centering the discussion on the rumors' content, he provided one possible explanation that "Korea is better at branding and marketing so that it creates the false impression of Korea making the same product better and faster [than other nations']. This makes the

Koreans highly confident of themselves.” Instead of passively and uncritically receiving the information, Tom extended the discussion from the heritage dispute to his understanding of the Korean cultural industry.

Despite that most informants cast doubts on the rumors, the reports more or less influenced the audience’s views of Korea. Holly said that the authenticity of the rumors were “half and half” and believed that “there is no smoke without fire.”<sup>6</sup> The negative representations and the hostility disclosed by the opinionated narrative of the journalistic style has the potential to strengthen anti-Korean sentiments. Being one of the most anti-Korean informants, Kevin suggested that his bad impression of Korea resulted from the accumulation of “too many negative *image[s]*.”<sup>7</sup> Mei-chun recalled her media encounters of Korea beginning from the time of the financial crisis when Korean companies were overtaking the Taiwanese market share. She developed the habit of news consumption and has continued it since the crisis by paying closer attention to Korea-related news reports. She found that the journalists “wouldn’t let go of these reports” since they “knew that the Taiwanese nationals have been sensitive to [issues related to] Korea.” Reflecting on the media culture in Taiwan, she said that “perhaps the journalists should be responsible for [Taiwanese people’s] rather negative views of Korea.” She debated by herself nonetheless that “perhaps [the journalists were] reporting based on the truth [since] there are too many negative news stories [about Korea].” Although the informants found some of the rumors ridiculous, they connected the rumors to existing events they have seen or experienced, which altogether formed a coherent and negative view of Korea.

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<sup>6</sup> The saying Holly used in the interview was “no wave without winds” (*wu feng bu qi lang*, 無風不起浪).

<sup>7</sup> The informant used an English word “image” during the interview.

The production and the circulation of the rumors demonstrate the characteristics of contemporary journalism, including their fictionality, transnationality, and how they perform self-references. Some of the news reports pertaining to heritage disputes have been found by the media to be fake but reported as true incidents. On the one hand, reporting on Internet rumors saves time and cost from doing investigative reports; on the other hand, the stories could provoke feelings of resentment and fear on which the commercial media could capitalize. The media, therefore, frequently disseminates rumors, rather than information. Reports on Chien-ming Wang and Sun Yat-sen's Korean heritage exemplify the process of production, circulation, and the subsequent reception of these rumors.

The “Chien-ming Wang is Korean” rumor is a hoax of a Taiwanese netizen, who was unhappy about what he perceived as South Korea's “sour-grape-complex” news coverage of Chien-ming Wang, whose achievements were not properly acknowledged by Korean media (“Wang Chien-Ming is Korean?!” 2007). Ricky, the author of the original story, posted an article about Wang on a public online discussion forum. This entry used a first person narrative to make comments on Wang's victory, referring to him as the second Chan-ho Park—a Korean player who had also achieved 18 wins in the American Major League. The article then explained how Wang has a historic connection with the Korean race. Upon close inspection, the essay is clearly a hoax in which the author used pejorative homonyms to ridicule Korean players of cheating and having “patriotic referees,” a common negative impression on Korean teams' sport ethics circulated within Taiwanese society. The news media, however, reported the rumor without discretion. When interviewed by a digital media a year later, Ricky expressed surprise to see how the original entry was widely circulated and perceived by many civilians as real information—a result beyond his intended mischief (“Wang Chien-Ming is Korean?!”).

The rumor of an athlete-celebrity Chien-ming Wang having Korean lineage is one example that demonstrates how a hoax is first circulated online, covered by newspapers and television as an actual claim made by a Korean scholar, and further disseminated through a variety of public and personal communication network, such as emails, blog entries, and Facebook status updates. In this example, news media and the word-of-mouth (both on- and offline) significantly contribute to the dissemination of the rumor. Eventually the rumor, to the surprise of the hoax's author, was taken as a fact and can still be commented by Internet users today (Nownews, 2007). While the Chien-ming Wang rumor is a Taiwanese example, many other rumors are believed to be produced by PRC netizens and adopted all too quickly by Chinese and Taiwanese news media (Chen, 2008).

The "Sun Yat-sen is Korean" rumor was first covered by the *New Express Daily* in People's Republic of China (Chen & Jia, 2009). On July, 31, 2008, the *New Express Daily* published an article with the previously mentioned Sun Yat-sen rumor and offered a list of existing Korean research on historical figures and cultural heritages.<sup>8</sup> The story was found to be adapted from an article published by an Internet user named, "huhuhu8hu." Guised as news reports on official news media, the rumors espoused offline responses. The Korean ambassador in Beijing responded in an interview that the alleged reference by *Chosun Daily* in the Sun Yat-sen report was untrue and it concerned him to see such rumors circulated on Chinese websites (Chinanews, 2008). Due to the common language and

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<sup>8</sup> The list includes historical and mythological figures, Xishi, Li Shizhen, Yao Ming, Mao Zedong, the Shakyamuni Buddha; inventions of Chinese/Korean medicine, acupuncture, the armillary sphere, and other Chinese cultural icons of the Dragon Boat Festival and panda. See <http://xwjz.eastday.com/eastday/xwjz/node309763/node309765/u1a4076378.html> for the text in original.

shared cultural icons of mainland China and Taiwan, Taiwanese journalists could quote from the Chinese sources and disseminate the rumors to the Taiwanese society.

The sense of threat disclosed by these rumors is felt more concretely by the dispute of the Duanwu Festival and the Danoje Festival. South Korea's Gangneung Danoje Festival and its mask dancing has been designated as an "intangible heritage of human" by UNESCO in 2005. The *CommonWealth* Magazine published an article entitled, "Korea 'Hijacking' the Chinese Duanwu Festival," to illustrate the nation-branding movement of cultural property in East Asia. As one of the three major Chinese traditional festivals, Duanwu refers to the fifth of May on the lunar calendar, combining historical significance and folk traditions. The traditions of having rice dumplings and holding dragon boat races are related to Chinese history and legends dated back to 278 B.C when an official Qu Yuan of the State of Chu showed his loyalty upon the demise of the state by drowning himself in the river. The Danoje Festival at Gangneung, South Korea, was held on the same day and can be translated into the same name of the Chinese Duanwu. The Gangneung Danoje has no relevance with the Chinese festival, however. The Korean festival exhibits indigenous shamanistic and Buddhist traditions as well as other folk activities, such as mask dancing and wrestling. The impression that Korean festival took over the Chinese counterpart on the UNESCO world heritage listing was rampant on the Chinese language media and the public, despite reminders by scholars and professionals that the world heritage is a pride to all mankind and the Chinese government could learn from the assertive attitude of Korea (Xinhuanet, 2005; Chang, 2006).

The Duanwu/Danoje dispute marked the beginning rather than the end of transnational controversies over cultural heritage. The proximate geo-cultural ties among the Asian nations made them competitors in world heritage applications. The filing of *ondol*, an under-floor heating system, and the enlistment of the tug of war in 2015 have

generated bickering among the Chinese netizens (Vietnam News, 2015; Chosun Ilbo, 2014). *Ondol* is compared to the use of *kang* in northern China, where the households build an elevated heated area of the (bed)room. Other rumors include claiming *fengshui*, Korean medicine and acupuncture, originated from Korea. While some rumors have been clarified by media professionals as fictional, others have generated confusion over similar but distinct inventions (“Of What Does the Success of Korean Danoje Remind Us?” 2014). The disputes exemplified the tension between China and Korea as well as other countries of proximate geo-cultural regions. In the case of Taiwan and Korea, negative impressions and sentiments emerged in a similarly competing fashion due to each country’s attempt to capitalize on cultural heritages through nation-branding. Cultural nationalism arises to defend one’s culture in this context and produces the anti-Korean narratives perceivable in Taiwan and China.

Mass media capitalizes on the tension among these cultural heritage competitors and spreads rumors in the form of news stories, social media, and the Internet. Although some news media have pointed out the falsehood of these rumors, due to Internet’s diffused nature of time and space, these stories are circulated and preserved in the original text format or recorded as YouTube video clips online that persist even to this day. Some of them were made into spoof videos and images to mock the rival constructed via the mass media. The heritage disputes develop into a concerted discourse of an aggressive and arrogant South Korea claiming everything to be their own. In the following section, I examine the media representation of Koreanness through a discussion of myth-making, suggesting that the rumors are manufactured to serve the cause of Taiwanese nationalism.

#### **NEWS BROADCAST AS MYTH-MAKING AND NATION-BUILDING MOVEMENT**

[Showed the Sun Yat-sen article to an informant during the interview.]

Me: What do you think of this article?

Fiona: Shameless.

Although South Korea is never completely invisible within Taiwan's cultural imagination, Taiwanese people's exposure to Korean culture has never been as visible as it is today—an individual's consumption of the culture has become a mundane activity. Such visibility and availability of Korean culture has generated public discussions on Koreanness. The circulation of much of these discourses is similar to what Edward Said suggested as Orientalism, an act of voluntary production and circulation of discourses of "the Other." The working of Orientalism is not reflexive; it aims at alienating "the Other," which is distinguished from "us," or "the self," treating the Other as an undifferentiated entity that may be considered as a threat to the Self. Furthermore, the Other is an object to be looked at. Orientalism, thus, produces a highly subjective and one-dimensional representation of the object. The Other is also an object to be studied whereas the purpose of an Orientalist study is not to learn about *the Other*, but to discriminate and to alienate it. Failing to see another culture from a reflexive and indiscriminating approach, Orientalism and the act of Othering often lead to the objectification, the demonization, and the demeaning of another culture. Koreans are therefore considered a "shameless" (*wuchi*, 無恥) people who not only violate the principle of fair competition, but also steals other nations' cultural icons as an act of cultural expansionism.

In addition to survey respondents' emphasis on news reports—where 76% of the respondents chose news reports in contrast to 53% of respondents choosing information on the internet—my interview informants also specified the significance of news reports and television programs in forming their impressions of Korea. Tai-an stated that he has never had strong impressions of Korea and most of his perceptions were derived from the media. He gave the spread of MERS in 2015 as an example: "This is a global village....and the relations among nations are intimate." He explained that the epidemic was severe and

especially fearful to a country like Taiwan, which experienced the spread of SARS a decade ago. He illustrated the marathon reports of the news media which discussed how and why the disease spread rapidly in South Korea by referencing their lifestyles and their views of hygiene. For instance, the Koreans in these reports are said to be take the diseases not seriously, and did not develop the habit of wearing masks in public as a prevention measure. The MERS epidemic is an example of international news reports which are able to disseminate information and portray particular images of Korea.

Lule (2005) examined the narrative of news programs as contemporary myths with archetypical heroes, villains, leaders, and civilians that are good and bad, or right and wrong (p. 102). In this vein of thought, a news report is a story to tell, and the characters in the story are endowed with social meanings for viewers to identify. The news is therefore “informative, instructive,” and, yet, “entertaining” (Lule, p. 105-6). By portraying news stories and illustrating news characters, news can demonstrate good citizenry. News stories instruct on the citizens by identifying misconducts versus normal behaviors. The main characters of the stories to be discussed in this chapter are foreigners, however. The misconducts implied in the rumors occurs in a transnational setting where Koreans are portrayed as cultural thieves and villains who appropriated non-Korean culture as their own product.

The knowledge of Korea at this point in Taiwan has become so concerted that the public shares similar understandings of the nation. In this spoof image of a “world map according to Koreans” (see Figure 2), all the land and ocean territories are considered “ours” in the eyes of Koreans. The Korean peninsula is marked with a sarcastic comment that “[They] claim[ed] to invent the whole world.” This image, however, was in reality an “imaginary world map of the Koreans, *according to the Taiwanese*,” who are positioned at the center of the map as a disproportionately gigantic Taiwan island covered by the colors

and pattern of its national flag. Furthermore, this superficial and sarcastic representation of an arrogant and expansionist Korea can be complemented by more investigative magazine articles and other television programs in addition to news reports.



Figure 2. An imaginary “world map according to Koreans.”<sup>9</sup>

Talk shows and *minzui* (民嘴)—the guest speakers invited to talk shows—are other examples of mass media programs that shape public opinions other than news reports. As one of the most popular TV program types in Taiwan due to its low production costs and ability to generate high ratings (Chu, 2004; Hsu, 2014), talk shows create a sphere of information reproduction through discussion among the host and the guest speakers. While many talk shows began from discussing domestic political issues, they evolved to cover a variety of current events including social issues and foreign affairs. Mei-chun’s interest in Korea was originally more personal, intending to find out whether and how Korean corporations affect the business of Taiwanese corporations. Her experience in the Hsinchu

<sup>9</sup> Retrieved from <http://blog.sina.com.tw/39763/article.php?pbgid=39763&entryid=578436>.

Science Park, as introduced in the previous chapter, motivated her to pay attention to news about Korea since the 2008 financial crisis. According to her observations, international news in Taiwan used to pay more attention to Japan, the U.S. and mainland China, but it has increased coverage of Korea over the years. Her sources of knowledge are varied. In addition to television news, she mentioned obtaining information from the press, magazines, and television talk shows. Using *minzui* as an example, she said she learned from the guest speakers about Korea's financial crisis in 1997, and how the country was able to revive due to the efforts of the citizens and the government. Her observations of Korea are therefore not confined to those made from viewing the news. Other media and cultural products are likewise eager to produce knowledge of Korea for audiences to consume.

Due to the proximity of South Korea and Taiwan's positions in economic and industrial developments, Korea has become an object for rational discussion in addition to that for the emotional consumption. Tom noted that Taiwan's media frequently makes comparative analyses between Korea and Taiwan. He juxtaposed the information obtained from media to that retrieved from the Internet and his personal experience at the Hsinchu Science Park—where the IT industry collaborates and competes with Korean corporations. From time to time, Korea was portrayed by the media as a rival with success stories worth referencing if not emulating. The Korean IT industry is one example and the Korean sports industry is another. The informants discussed the strengths of Korean athletes who have enjoyed long-term and massive financial support of the Korean government. Likewise, Korea's world heritage applications have been referred to by some media and cultural professionals as an example whose respect for traditional culture could inspire the Taiwanese or Chinese governments (Xinjingbao, 2005; Chang, 2006).

## **CONCLUSION: THE NEWS MEDIA ECOLOGY UNDER ELECTRONIC CAPITALISM**

To conclude the chapter, news reports in relation to Korea have to be viewed in the context of a highly competitive and convergent media sphere. The media and the journalist professionals are driven by the logic of profit maximization, oftentimes entailing reducing the cost and neglecting public interests. It is in this context that we witness the use of unconfirmed Internet rumors as news sources that struck the chord of patriotism among the public. The prevalence of the anti-Korean rumors is exemplified by Health Minister Chih-liang Yang's comment on Koreans mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. Invited as a guest speaker at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Washington D.C., Yang suggested in a spontaneous conversation he had with Taiwanese reporters that the Koreans copied the Taiwanese health care system and added later that he really disliked Koreans for claiming Confucius to be Korean (Chen & Shih). Although Yang claimed that the conversation was conducted "in private," the camera was on while spoke, and the reporters were able to record it and broadcast it as primetime news (Chen & Shih, 2010). This incident demonstrates the features of the commercial news media in Taiwan with dramatized, personalized, sensationalized news stories. The story of Yang's impropriety has become another story of anti-Koreanism which the media can capitalize on.

This chapter examines the media representations of Taiwan-South Korea relationship in the context of the Taiwanese news ecology, in which the power relations within the commercialized media industry are structured to strengthen cultural stereotypes. Despite that these stereotypes are read in discount by seasoned audience, the audience is more or less influenced by rumors and their foul sentiments can be carried over time and transnationally through the Internet. The media industry is not a neutral carrier which displays and mediates the relationship between the two nations objectively. At the

professional level, the media produced the sensational stories about Korea to generate immediate profits; at the personal level, individuals utilized emotional charges when leaving comments on official media websites or their personal webpages. Due to the demand of attention economy, anti-Korean rhetoric may even be asserted by journalists in news reports for ratings and readership.

It is worth noting that the representations of an unfriendly Korea are not always read unreflexively. The informants have indicated suspicion over rumors and discredited the authenticity of Taiwanese news reports. The audience, who is well aware of the low quality of the reports, have developed critical views on indigenous media. A spoof world map circulating on the Internet shows the audience's sarcastic view on Taiwanese media, titling "World News According to Taiwanese Media Reports" (see Figure 3). This map exhibits disproportionate world geographies where Taiwan occupies the central position of the picture. The map illustrated the Taiwanese news reports being composed of sensational topics, such as gossip, political scandals, disasters and the uneven development between the rich and the poor. The international news includes a few countries such as the United States where only a few selected themes are covered, such as Hollywood and gossip in larger fonts whereas the American president and entertainment artists are in smaller font—indicating the predominance of the former themes. China occupied a smaller portion than the U.S. with topics of economic prosperity and the Olympics, while a few small characters indicate the scandalous quality of made-in-China products, which are explained by commentary in parenthesis "not seen unless read with magnifiers." There are a few countries grouped in gray at the corner, named "countries other than Euro-America and China" where "only funny news is covered." This figure shows the highly negative impression Taiwanese audience holds against the Taiwanese news coverage. The audience is familiar with this biased news media landscape in their everyday life: International news

is superficial and narrow, while national and local news is filled with sensational stories and stereotypical reports.




Figure 3. “World News According to Taiwanese Media.”<sup>10</sup>

At the turn of the century, East Asia advanced towards a period of post-Cold War political liberalization and media deregulation, which led to increased imports of foreign media products in the region. Hundreds of domestic, regional, and foreign television channels are now available in Taiwan via the cable and satellite TV that was legalized in 1993. Cable and satellite television allowed more quotas of imported programs, which made available the Korean dramas and reality TV shows in Taiwan since the 2000s. The popularization of the Internet further stimulated the circulation of media products from K pop to Korean movies, among other types of entertainment products. Despite the media’s ability to transmit foreign media products, interestingly, the same media have been circulating unconfirmed anti-Korean rumors that conflict with the pop cultural sensations.

<sup>10</sup> Image retrieved from [http://nswklykorean.blogspot.com/2012/12/blog-post\\_3641.html](http://nswklykorean.blogspot.com/2012/12/blog-post_3641.html).

This chapter has centered on one particular type of media representation that viewed Korea as a cultural predator. I argue that the negative representation was aggravated by the competitive media ecology in contemporary societies, particularly in Taiwan where a highly politicized civil society is actively seeking expressions of indigenous identity. Taiwan identity media has enjoyed significant market share in the press and television programs (Hsu, 2014) and nationalism and patriotism have been recognized as effective stories the audience is eager to consume as the heritage disputes of Chapter 3 and the Yang Shu-chun incident of Chapter 4 demonstrate. This chapter recognizes the tension between Taiwan and Korea due to their geo-cultural proximity but stresses that the tension has been intentionally heightened to maximize media corporate interests. Patriotism and sensationalism are effective stimuli to ratings, conforming to the capitalist logic of “ratings journalism” (Lin, 2009).

Studies of media ecologies investigate the “context of how media affect perception, understanding, and values” (Grosswiler, 2012, p. 17). By studying from the production to the consumption of media representations in this chapter, I inquire into the Koreanness constructed in Taiwanese society and the rise of a concerted anti-Korean discourse. I study the perceptions, the understandings, and the values of the Taiwanese regarding Taiwan-South Korea relationship and extend the discussion to grasp the greater regional and global forces driving these movements. The news media ecology in Taiwan is a reflection of the electronic capitalism which Chapter 1 addressed, including the convergence of different media platforms, the prominent use of visual images, a participatory culture, and a hyper-competitive media culture. The news media industries worldwide are struggling to survive, while Taiwan has one of the most competitive media markets given the small size of its population and the vibrant media organizations available to the audience. The pressure of time, space, and technology compression intensified by the electronic capitalism created a

vibrant sphere for producing the participatory anti-Korean discourse that is simultaneously circulated with the Korean Wave discussed in the Introduction.

I have examined the competitive relationship between Taiwan and South Korea on electronic industry and cultural heritage from Chapter 1 to Chapter 3. In the next chapter, I will discuss how Koreanness is constructed during sports events as another form of competition between the two nations. In either case study, I argue that electronic capitalism not only placed the two nations in a competitive relationship, but also intensifies such conflicts through the distribution and preservation of information electronically and digitally within the inter/network among individuals, organizations, and nations. In contrast to this chapter's discussion on media representations and the news industry, Chapter 4 will focus on the media events and the use of social media regarding sports competition between Korea and Taiwan.

## **Chapter 4. Korean Sportsmanship: Sports Viewership and National Audiencehood**

Sport has been one of the most conspicuous spheres contributing to Taiwanese people's views on South Korea. Through the mediation of television broadcasts, consuming information on the Internet, and hearing about the games through word of mouth, Taiwanese people are able to construct their sense of Koreanness—in the interpretive context of universal sportsmanship. This chapter applies different methodological approaches to investigate the process of mediation, reception, and reproduction of information regarding Korea-Taiwan sports' encounters. Through the data triangulation of survey and interview results as well as analysis of the media events and user-created contents, the chapter aims to illustrate a history Taiwan-Korea relationship, which is both diachronic and trans-chronic. On the one hand, the sentiments and interpretations of the informants are the result of historical development; on the other hand, representations of Korea are fused and reconstructed at new historical junctures, a process intensified by the time-transcending computer-mediated communication technologies.

In the following section, I will introduce the research methodology in the order of media events, survey and interviews, and user-created contents. This chapter aims to demonstrate a story of the connections made between the producers, contents, consumers, and distributors. The digitalization of information has made the creation, the storage, and the circulation of contents much more conveniently accessible to individuals and interest groups, whether they are a media corporation, a political party, or a state. As Christine Hine argues in *Virtual Ethnography* (2000), the Internet could be studied both as a culture and a cultural artifact—or a realm of interactions and a collection of texts. In a similar vein of thought, I consider mass media and sports consumption both as a collection of texts and a culture to be analyzed and observed. The heterogeneous data which I will explore are a

creation of the interactions among various transnational and local players, who make sense of the world through media viewership.

Sports media events are an example of the connection between contents and those who make use of them. The transnational sports games—such as the Olympics, the FIFA World Cups, the Asian Games, or the World Baseball Classic—demonstrate the intersection of local, regional and global agents of (trans)national audiences, states, and international organizations. Each agent may interpret the ethics of sporting events in different ways and result in conflict among different agents. Examples are found in the 2002 football World Cup or the Yang Shu-chun incident in the 2010 Asian Games, which I will discuss in this chapter. I examine these events, their relations with the mass media and their consumers by arguing that these media events create significant connections between Taiwanese viewers and their perceptions of Korea. Dayan and Katz (1992) recognized the ceremonial effects of media events with the themes of “contest, conquest, and coronation,” which were able to produce a sense of solidarity and legitimacy for the communities and their authorities. Rothenbuhler (2015) highlighted that recent, media events scholarship has incorporated the events of “conflict and social change” in addition to the “integrative, ceremonial events.” Today’s media event studies have extended from the authoritative events of royal weddings and presidential inaugurations to popular, televised matches and awards as well as the nonstop news coverage of “disaster marathon”<sup>11</sup> (Rothenbuhler; Liebes, 1998). This chapter therefore adopts this broadened

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<sup>11</sup> For more information on media event literature, see Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz’ *Media Event: The Live Broadcasting of History* (1992), Tamar Liebes’s “Television’s Disaster Marathons: A Danger for Democratic Processes?” (1998), and Nick Couldry, Andreas Hepp, and Friedrich Krotz’s *Media Events in a Global Age* (2010).

scope of media events studies to discuss how Korea has been represented and received by the Taiwanese viewers through television broadcasts and the news coverage of global or regional sports games.

In addition to an analysis of the media events, the survey and the interviews are designed to explore the interpretive activities of media sports consumers. The topic of sports constitutes a significant portion of my survey and interview results: roughly one-third of the survey respondents and two-thirds of the interview informants mentioned Korea's performance or attitudes during international competition without the researcher's guidance (not until the second part of the interview when they are given examples of sports competitions to read and comment). The survey results show the informants' general impressions about the events and the nation, providing keywords for further analysis. The in-depth interviews offer more details on the informants' interpretation of particular games and athletes, manifesting their perceptions of Korean sport ethics and a process of interactions between them and the media texts. During these interviews, a few games or sports were brought up most frequently in correspondence to the media events mentioned previously. Overall, the responses demonstrate highly consistent views pertaining to South Korea's image on the athletic field, centering on the ideas of national solidarity, sportsmanship, and cheating. Three of the interview informants mentioned sports leaving the strongest impressions about South Korea on them, while two indicated explicitly that sports gave them the most negative perceptions of the nation. Throughout this chapter, I examine the Koreanness constructed through these events, incidents and stories, as well as their relations with the anti-Korean sentiments manifested in both the media events and the user-generated contents.

In the year 2010, frequent Internet users constituted about half of the total population in Taiwan (Chen, 2011). The ability to use the Internet has not only become a

vital skill in work, school and life in contemporary Taiwan, but also a conduit through which individuals consume entertainment, conduct personal networking, and even form public opinions through the use of social media. Advancements in communication technologies have transformed information consumers into information distributors and producers. Facebook is an example of how social network becomes significant means in forming contemporary nationalism. Facebook rose in popularity as a networking interface, exceeding Google, YouTube, and local blogging and networking enterprise *wretch.com* (無名) to rank as the second most popular web service in Taiwan in 2009 (Sue, 2009). These web 2.0 technologies are significant means to form a grassroots movement of Taiwanese nationalism while constructing Koreanness at the same time. The discussions of this chapter demonstrate how, during the Yang Shu-chun incident, Taiwanese people produced texts, images, and videos to voice their complaints, conducted discussions on the issue, formed support groups, and even hacked into Asian Taekwondo Union and World Taekwondo Federation's websites to protest when they felt that Taiwan received unjust treatment.

The following chapter is organized in three parts. The first part discusses transnational Koreanness revolving around two themes: national solidarity and the pursuit of victory. I analyze a group of keywords provided by the survey and interview informants, including their discussions of Korea's national character and Korean sportsmanship. The second part focuses on a virtual and grassroots anti-Korean movement mediated by the Internet during the 2010 Asian Games, which is also known in Taiwan as the Yang Shu-chun incident (YSC incident onwards). In addition to the media's deep investment in the incident, individuals were able to participate through creative use of multimedia. The third and fourth sections probe into the stories and one of the most well-read blog entries regarding Korea's performance on the athletic field. I examine these user-generated

contents as part of the network which reproduced the patriotic anti-Korean sentiments in Taiwan.

### ENCOUNTERING KOREA ON THE ATHLETIC FIELD

My field work data show that sports has a special place in Taiwanese people's impressions of Korea. In the first question on my survey, the respondents were asked to illustrate their impressions of the Korean nation by writing down any person, event, or object which they associate with the nation. The results of this open-ended question showed that 34 out of 101 respondents literally mentioned sports activities while additional others referred to "competition" without directly relating the phrase with any particular kind of sports, individual athletes, or games. Survey question #1 is further elaborated by question #8 when the respondents were asked to describe Korea as a country or a nation. In this section, I review the most common descriptors of Korea coded from the survey results and investigate how these themes are connected with people's interpretations of a few sporting events. The respondents gave highly consistent results when 38 out of 101 respondents opted to use the phrase "solidarity" or "unity" (*tuanjie*, 團結) to describe Korea. With this neutral descriptor, each individual associated positive and negative characteristics from the behaviors they found within Korea's international exposure.

After solidarity, the most common characteristics of the nation include the following in the order of their prevalence: unprincipled (14), tough (13), patriotic (12), persistent (10), having a strong national character (8), achieving (7), and hard-working (6).<sup>12</sup> These characteristics are positioned on a moral spectrum with positive and negative

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<sup>12</sup> The original phrases in Chinese are as follows, solidarity (*tuanjie*, 團結), unprincipled (*buzeshouduan*, 不擇手段), tough (*qianghan*, 強悍), patriotic (*aiguo*, 愛國), persistent (*jianqiang*, 堅強; *jianren*, 堅忍; *guzhi* 固執; *bu renshu*, 不認輸; *bu fushu*, 不服輸; *you renxing*, 有韌性), having a strong national

traits at different ends with different levels of intensity (e.g. severely negative or mildly negative). Their frequency of usage and their level of severity demonstrate that the negative phrases are more notable than the positive ones. Even among the seemingly neutral descriptors, such as *patriotic*, *persistent*, *achieving*, and *hardworking*, or neutral but stronger terms, such as *tough* and *having a strong national character*, they suggest the likelihood that Koreans may be offensive to the people around them. In short, the above results embody an image of Korea that is characterized by solidarity and patriotism. Even though they are persistent and hard-working—which may allow them to persevere during challenging times and triumph over their opponents, their high-achieving tendency reveals an unprincipled or unscrupulous nature, not worthy of praise or envy.

To many Taiwanese viewers, the football World Cup co-hosted by South Korea and Japan in 2002 is an example of Korea's pursuit of victory regardless of ethical means. The interview informants offered detailed descriptions of their views of the event, corresponded to the impressions provided by the survey respondents. The interview results demonstrate how the football game became a part their memories of transnational sports competition and created the stereotypes associated with Korean sports professionals found online and offline in Taiwan. About one-third of the informants<sup>13</sup> mentioned the 2002 World Cup held in Seoul. Among the informants, two expressed that they were impressed that Korea had been listed among the world's top four, "even defeating the Europeans" (Tom). However, five of them viewed the victory negatively. In addition to the "small

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character (*minzuxing hen qiang*, 民族性很強), achieving (*haosheng* 好勝; *haoqiang*, 好強) and hard-working (*pin*, 拚; *yonggong*, 用功; *haoxue*, 好學; *qinfen*, 勤奮). The numbers inserted in the parentheses are how many times the phrase are used by the respondents in question #8.

<sup>13</sup> Seven out of twenty interviewees approximately equate to one-third of the interview informants.

moves” (*xiao dongzuo*, 小動作), like tripping and injuring opponents, the informants described the event as a problematic victory. Some referred to the controversies as “black whistle incidents,” a Chinese phrase invented to stand for a bad call. To these informants, the victory of the Korean team was not viewed as a success but a scandal.

These interviewees formed their impressions of the game through watching game broadcast, TV news, and the word of mouth. Fiona said that she saw the game on television and felt that the Korean team was favored. Her opinion was supported by discussions with her friends who suspected the referees’ roles in Korea’s victory. Tai-an said that he remembered there was massive news coverage of the football games and used footages he found from YouTube clips to support his argument. He commented that Korea’s entrance to the semi-finals was a result of “very obvious schemes,” meaning that the victory was not earned by hard work but through para-athletic intervention. Regarding the match between Korea and Italy, he said that the match looked “very ridiculous” and—as supporting evidence of the scandal—concluded that “Korea was never able to go thus far in subsequent World Cup games.”

While several years younger, Hsiang’s impressions of the event, which he experienced as a teen, was almost identical with that of Tai-an. Hsiang stated that “one year when South Korea was hosting the Olympics World Cup, there was a black whistle scandal.” When asked to elaborate on the incident, he explained that he “felt that the referees...were favoring Korea.” Although his memories of the event were not completely accurate (these were not the Olympic Games), the story he told revealed the negative impressions resulted from the 2002 World Cup games. He also provided additional examples from the “negative news of [Korean] sports from time to time since [2002].” The football World Cup in 2002, therefore, became an event greater than itself when

connections were made between the World Cup and the subsequent sporting events of Korea, reinforcing negative sentiments against the nation.

Through the idea of solidarity, the respondents connected what they perceived as Korea's relentless pursuit of victory with their strong sense of national pride. This connection was due to the Korean athletes, referees, officials, audience, and their public opinion's complicity in ensuring their victory. This Korean fanaticism over the sports is televised to the world through news coverage as well as entertainment shows. The football World Cup in 2002 created an opportunity for international viewers to experience the "excessive" patriotism in Korea. As an anecdote of Korea's victory at the World Cup, a Taiwanese viewer uploaded a clip of a famous Korean entertainment show, the "Strong Heart," to YouTube (suhenda, 2012). In the show, a comedian recounted his coincidental encounters with the Portuguese players two nights before they met with the Korean team. According to the comedian, the Portuguese were so confident about defeating the Koreans that they believed socializing with the comedian would not hurt their performance. Sensing the arrogance of the players, the comedian volunteered to escort them for two nights in Korea and was covertly hoping to exhaust them with drinks and sleep deprivation. Although the TV show was light-hearted and filled with laughter and jokes, the cheerful patriotism expressed in the entertainment show could be interpreted as offensive by international viewers. Due to the spread of the global media, a program originally designed for a domestic audience was interpreted unfavorably as exemplified by the responses of anti-Korean viewers. The intended message of entertainment and patriotism in the media text was seen by these transnational viewers as evidence the Koreans' exorbitant desire to win the game. Instead of viewing the text passively, a clip of the program was uploaded on YouTube by a proactive Taiwanese viewer to promote anti-Korean sentiments.

In order to interpret the Korean behaviors, the respondents described the Koreans in competition as “achieving”—frequently in the framework of “victory” (*ying*, 贏; or *sheng*, 勝) and “loss” (*shu*, 輸). This idea of achieving is coined in Chinese as “the pursuit of victory” (*qiusheng*, 求勝) or “the love of victory” (*haosheng*, 好勝). When the respondents portrayed the Koreans with phrases of *pursuing victory strongly* or *loving victory greatly*, they could imply that the Koreans as an ethnic group are obsessed with victory. The negativity associated with an “achieving” image is even better disclosed in the Taiwanese phrase “not accepting loss (as a result)” (*bu renshu*, 不認輸; *bu fushu*, 不服輸), which portrayed an allegedly Korean attitude toward loss. The winner/loser mentality exhibited in these phrases culminate in the idea of “cheating,” a term used 21 times in survey question #1. Such a foul view of Korea not only manifested in the 2002 World Cup, but was also present in other media events and emerged in the user-created contents (which I will introduce in the next two sections).

In addition to football, baseball games also demonstrated the intense patriotism of Korean athletes in the eyes of Taiwanese viewers. The athletes caught the attention of the global media and the transnational viewers by planting the Korean flag on the pitcher’s mound after victorious matches with the Japanese team (Baxter, 2009; Liberal Times, 2015). Recalling such behaviors, Chou said that the Koreans are “kind of cocky, [although] it takes competence to be cocky.” While acknowledging the strength of the nation, Chou suggested that “[The Koreans] still have negative components of their national character. If you are the winner, you should keep good manners. It is not proper behavior to plant the national flag on the baseball field when defeating the Japanese team at the World Baseball Classic matches.” Through the global media of sports and news programs, South Korea was known transnationally to be eager to defend their national pride.

To those who watch particular sports games as leisure activities within their everyday lives, the sport serves as a major source to construct their views of the foreign others. Shen, for example, has been a faithful fan of Taiwanese baseball teams. By the time of the interview, he just finished his two-year graduate school education and the one-year compulsory military service. Within his life, baseball represented the most significant form of transnational encounter with Korea, since he could not perceive overlap with the country in other areas of his life. Drawing from his experience, the images of Korea constructed through the games could range from the relatively benign to the unfavorable, including their outstanding performance from the 2008 Olympics and the bitter rivalry between the Taiwanese and the Korean teams at the 2013 World Baseball Classic. He mentioned the 2008 Olympic baseball games in which the Korean team won the gold medal with seven consecutive wins, which he considered an impressive achievement but did not offset the negative sentiments left from other vicious competition between Taiwan and Korea. He further recalled the 2013 World Baseball Classic when the Chinese Taipei team and the South Korean team met. Due to the accumulated tension between the two nations, the Taiwanese audience and the coach, according to Shen, desperately wanted to see the defeat of the Korean team. He expressed a feeling of reluctance to learn that the Taiwanese team eventually lost to Korea by 2-3. Shen added at the end of the conversation that he was “not very fond of Korean players [because] the way [they] play is not clean,” and he “does not view them highly.” Shen’s encounter with Korea was therefore more prone to the negative than the positive.

Baseball is one of the most popular sports in Taiwan and has become a symbol of the Republic of China (ROC) and Taiwanese nationalism (Morris, 2011).<sup>14</sup> Six out of twenty interview informants mentioned baseball games when they thought about Korea. From the colonial era to contemporary Taiwan, baseball has not only served as a sport of personal leisure and media entertainment, but also as a source of national pride and indigenous identity. Radio and television broadcasts of Taiwanese teams and athletes participating in international games have been a conduit for the national audience to gather, participate, and celebrate. Famous teams and distinguished players, such as the Maple Leaf in the 1960s, Ming-tsu Lu employed in the Yomiuri Giants in Japan in 1988-1992, and Chien-ming Wang in the American Major and Minor League from the 2000s through the present, have all become Taiwanese cultural icons and considered the pride for the nation.

Gradually, Korean baseball teams became a major rival of the Taiwanese teams in the past couple of decades, which Hsiang and Kevin reveal in their life histories. In his mid-twenties, Hsiang recalled his past baseball viewing experience since he was a high school student. He stated that Japan had been the major opponent of the Chunghwa Team—or Chinese Taipei team (CT)—and the rankings of the two were proximate until Korea was able to catch up as one of the best baseball teams in Asia. Kevin indicated the shifting geopolitical status of Korea in his mental world map with a radical metaphor: “Before the Asian Baseball Championship in 2003, Korea was just like Saudi Arabia, which did not make any special impressions on me. [But] I started to watch [international] sport competitions since [2003].” This unfinished argument illustrated the formation of Korea as

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<sup>14</sup> It is worth noting here that an ROC nationalism and a Taiwanese nationalism can be distinguished from each other. The latter can represent an identity independent of the former, which is associated with the pro-mainland Nationalist regime the latter wishes to dissociate from.

a country through the international games; like a form given flesh, the country was given a much more tangible contour in his imaginary world map. Sports have been so significant in his personal life that he still remembered vividly the details of 2003. Being a college student in 2003, Kevin skipped classes to watch the match in which Taiwan caught up to the leading Korean team in the tenth inning and turned a loss into a compelling victory with a score of 5-4. The victory made CT the silver medalist of the championship and positioned the team as one of the two representatives of Asia to attend the Olympic Games in Athens in the next year. These two examples demonstrate that the image of Korea as a country and a rival worth giving one's attention began from baseball viewership at a younger age.

In Taiwan's cultural and media landscapes, baseball is a significant point of contact between the Taiwanese audience and Korea. Given a vibrant baseball viewing culture in Taiwan, observers can glimpse the Korea-Taiwan relationship by examining the baseball matches between the two countries. The viewing ratings of the 2013 World Baseball Classic (WBC) were record-breaking in the history of Taiwanese sports broadcast—as Shen stated. The meeting between the Taiwanese team and the Korean team not only enjoyed the greatest turnout among other World Baseball Classic matches held in Taichung Intercontinental Baseball Stadium in Taiwan but also a significant average TV viewing rating of 12.17%, meaning that about one third of the population (approximately seven million Taiwanese viewers) were watching the game (“Battle between Taiwan and Korea in World Baseball Classics,” 2013). The viewing rating was much higher than the previous matches against the Dutch team and the Australian team, whose ratings were 5.99 and 4.38 respectively (“Battle between Taiwan and Korea in World Baseball Classics”). The fierce rivalry was best illustrated by the dramatic response of the commentator, Chan-yuan Hsu, who shed tears when commenting live on the loss of the Taiwanese team. A video clip of

his commentary was uploaded to YouTube and said to receive 500,000 hits within one day after the upload (THEmaton19748, 2013). Viewers were able to experience the emotional moment through the clip when the commentator burst into tears, groaning: “[I] really want [to see Taiwan] defeat Korea!” (*haoxiang ying hanguo*, 好想贏韓國). This phrase went viral and was cited over and over on subsequent occasions of Taiwan-Korea rivalry, demonstrating the desire shared by many Taiwanese to overcome the Koreans on the sports field and elsewhere.

The live broadcast of television gives the audience a feeling of authenticity to justify their views about Korea. Yao-yao is another regular baseball game viewer and she indicated in the interview that sports had been a major source of her negative sentiments against Korea. Using baseball games as an example, she said that she knew the rules and could judge for herself whether the games were played fairly or not. “When I watch a baseball game and [realized that] a Korean umpire makes unfair calls, I feel like smashing my TV!” When I presented her with a list of Korea’s misconducts in sports competitions circulated on the internet and asked her to evaluate the truthfulness of the events, she said that the authenticity of the events can go above 90% if the games were able to be viewed through live broadcasts.

The advancement of contemporary communication technologies greatly contributes to trans/national media events that are able to influence public opinion and even produce a grassroots nationalist movement. The next section discusses a media event created through the interactions among live broadcasts, news media, and the Internet. The Yang Shu-chun incident which happened during the 2010 Asian Games is a media event not only because of the nature of transnational sports viewership, but also because of the acute sense of crisis it generated for the Taiwanese public at the time. The following discussions explore how a media event leads to an anti-Korean movement resulting in the

boycott of Korean products and protests against the country. The anti-Korean sentiments expressed during the incident will serve as connection between the Koreanness the sports audience experienced in the preceding section and the Koreanness reproduced by the patriotic Taiwanese Internet users in the subsequent section.

### **NETWORKED NATIONALISM**

The 2010 Asian Games triggered the largest anti-Korean movement in Taiwan's history. The Asian Games are different from the football World Cup games which—despite its large transnational audience base—are international games that did not include Taiwan. The abrupt disqualification of a promising Taiwanese athlete Shu-chun Yang—pronounced Yang Shu-chun (YSC) in Chinese—upset the Taiwanese audience and resulted in an anti-Korean movement online and offline. In addition to expressions of anti-Korean sentiments within mass and social media, there were also physical (as opposed to virtual) responses from agitated citizens. For instance, the news media reported cases of a Taiwanese fruit shop posting a sign forbidding Koreans' entrance, electronic retailers refusing to provide Korean products, and the burning of Korean flags by local politicians running for the coming election, just to name a few examples (“Smash LED Screen,” 2010; “Boycott Korean Products and Smash in Pieces to Vent Rage!” 2010). Through the news and social media, the event extended from the consumption of media sport to that of a national crisis, in which the media and the individuals were eager to participate. A few years after the incident, six out of the twenty interview informants mentioned the Taekwondo dispute as an event forming their perceptions of Korea.

Recollecting the disqualification memories of 2011<sup>15</sup>, Pei-lin said that “many people were abhorred by the incident,” and although she was never a fan of Taekwondo games, she was influenced by her mother who informed her about the details. After she looked up the news herself, she realized that the incident was “unfair” (*bu gongping*, 不公平) and felt that the officials involved were “overbearing” (*badao*, 霸道). The incident became the most negative point in her life regarding her perceptions of Korea (see Figure 4). Kevin, likewise, was exposed to the incident from the news media and the Internet. He explained to me that “Yang Shu-chun represents Taiwan and, in other words, [it means that Korea] did something to [our] nation.” According to him, Yang was a very promising athlete and “obviously a candidate for the gold medalist.” He interpreted the disqualification to be “intentionally” against Taiwan and “felt indignant” about the incident. Being a celebrity referred to as the “Taekwondo babe”<sup>16</sup>, YSC was cast as an attractive heroine when she set off for her expedition to the 2008 Olympic Games. Her achievements represented the pride of the nation among the Taiwanese while, conversely, allegations against her were perceived as an international injustice inflicted against the Taiwanese people.

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<sup>15</sup> The disqualification took place on Nov. 13, 2010 but the dispute and the anti-Korean movement lasted for a couple of months until the 2011. The informant was referring to a vague timespan of the incident.

<sup>16</sup> Shu-chun Yang was referred to as “pretty babe” (*piaoliang baobei*, 漂亮寶貝) in the field of Taekwondo by the Taiwanese mass media. I condensed the descriptions of Yang into a “Taekwondo babe” for the convenience of writing.




Figure 4. Field note created by Pei-lin and the researcher. This figure explains the changes of her perceptions of Korea overtime her perceptions plummeted in 2011 but improved subsequently.

As the cases of Pei-lin and Kevin demonstrate, television and the Internet are significant platforms that mediated the YSC incident. Immediately after the live broadcast of the Asian Games, the Taiwanese public was able to review video footages of the athlete taking a 9-0 lead and her abrupt disqualification. The public was immersed in the intense broadcast of images and videos with Yang bursting into tears and protesting at the center of the court. The situation was further intensified by news reports that the World Taekwondo Federation’s(WTF) general secretary Jin-suk Yang—a Republic of Korea national—was not able to offer a convincing explanation of the disqualification to the Taiwanese public. Jin-suk Yang and a few other officials within international Taekwondo organizations were portrayed as liars who produced false accusations against the YSC (Fan & Fan, 2010; “Lies! Demand Explanations from WTF and ATU,” 2010).

The dispute centered on the use of electronic sensors attached to or inserted in the socks for scoring athletes’ performance. The socks under dispute are a new electronic scoring system invented a few years ago and are still undergoing improvements to retrieve

the most accurate results. On the first day of the incident, the Taiwanese media reported that YSC, according to the WTF secretary general, used a pair of dated socks which were already banned earlier in the year. The explanation given by the secretary general was refuted subsequently by the Taiwanese agency which purchased the socks from the Korean manufacturer Lajust. The agency issued a statement and held a press conference to explain to the public that the socks were authorized to be valid until 2012. On the next day, Korean official Jing-suk Yang and a Chinese (PRC) official Lei Zhao gave the most controversial explanation about the disqualification, arguing that the athlete was wearing unauthorized sensors until a Korean Philippine technical official demanded to take them off and called off the match. Recorded video of the live broadcast, however, showed that Yang had already taken off the sensors by request during a pre-match test. The media and the public questioned the plausibility of such ruling since the athlete had passed a pre-match equipment screening to participate the match. It seemed that an abrupt halt in the middle of the match—after the athlete had apparently been leading—very well suited a conspiracy theory of the corrupted PRC and Korean officials working together to rob the promising athlete of her gold medal. Rumors speculated that Shu-chun Yang could have been a threatening opponent against Jingyu Wu, another competitive athlete from PRC.

Due to the digitalization of the information, the Taiwanese media and the audience could scrutinize the case with recorded evidence, using the latest computer-mediated communication technologies. The news reports found the entire process particularly controversial since the WTF's secretary general Jin-suk Yang delivered three different explanations in three days. The explanations—or the accusations as the Taiwanese might perceive them to be—contradicted with other evidence the media and the public found. The athlete's alleged attachment of the “unauthorized” sensors was argued by the Taekwondo officials at the Asian Games as a ploy to manipulate her scores. As *Taipei*

*Times* suggested, many viewers wonder if such accusation was valid: Why would an already achieving athlete cheat in such a visible and “disingenuous” manner, attaching the black and silver gilded sensors on the heels when the referees and the public could perceive them so easily (“Sockgate,” 2010). The Chinese official Lei Zhao at the Asian Taekwondo Union (ATU) and the WTF secretary general Jin-suk Yang therefore were seen as liars who were attacking the YSC maliciously—although the latter claimed that he was “only relaying the information from the initial investigation” and not intending to slander the athlete.

The Taiwanese were outraged by what they saw as an unjust process due to the officials’ use of phrases, such as “unauthorized,” “illegal,” and “manipulative” to describe the case (TWmm4u, 2010). Furthermore, an online article was published on the ATU website with a provocative title—Shocking Act of Deceptions by Chinese Taipei—right after the Taiwanese athlete’s disqualification. While the article was withdrawn soon after protests from Taiwan, it had caught the attention of the media: the sentiments of slandering and injustice felt by the Taiwanese extended the incident beyond a debate over a regional sporting event. The YSC incident was transformed into a case of Taiwanese integrity that is in immediate need of national defense.

Following the broadcast of Yang’s disqualification in Guangzhou, Facebook users formed dozens of support groups for her. In addition to individual discussions through their own network, users also went to support pages to participate in a mass-mediated nationalist movement. “Yang Shu-Chun, We Support You ‘Til the End” was one of the most popular Facebook pages with 15,370 members. Members could post the most updated information of domestic and international news coverage on the “Timeline” and the “Discussions” pages offered a forum for users to talk about specific issues within the incident. While Facebook is mostly known for its role in personal networking, the YSC incident revealed

that the platform can be a potential venue for nationalist expressions and a stage for civil society. Individual users exchange information through updating personal status, posting comments (in response to others' actions), publishing notes, and pasting links to news articles and videos. Users can extend discussions on social issues they receive from news reports as an organized public where individuals can offer immediate information and opinions as well as comment with other users—although the information exchanged by users on Facebook may be buried quickly by the constant pasting of new contents.

In addition to verbal articulations of support and attack, images were uploaded, distributed and produced to express personal discontents (see Figure 5). The images ranged from defensive ones with specific arguments, to satirical and offensive ones which represented the emotional frustrations of many Taiwanese. Some images were simply used to show support to YSC, such as a snapshot of her crying on the court or of her fighting in motion. Other images were defensive and argumentative and were produced as evidence of Yang's innocence. For instance, supporters of Yang used media footage to produce static images explaining how the athlete had not been wearing the sensors all the time, thus refuting the charges presented by the previously mentioned Korean and PRC officials. Provocative images found online were used to ridicule or insult the individuals and the nations who were believed to be involved in YSC's disqualification. For instance, hackers posted on Asian Taekwondo Union's (ATU) website an image of a fist with a middle finger sticking up, foregrounded against the national flags of the Republic of Korea and People's Republic of China. This image was accompanied by statements written in Chinese, English, and Korean. The statements proclaimed that Yang is a "No.1 player" who deserved the gold medal and condemned ATU as a group of "assholes" (in English), "dogs" (in Korean), and discredited the institution's decision of disqualifying Shu-chun Yang by exclaiming "shame on you" (in English) at the bottom of the page (see Figure 6).




Figure 5. Images uploaded for “Yang Shu-Chun, We Support You ‘Til the End” support group. Photo retrieved from personal computer.



Figure 6. Taiwanese hackers at ATU website. Image retrieved from downloaded FTV news footage on personal computer.

Along with rational discussions to defend Shu-chun Yang, much of the discussions were emotional and aggressive. The largest support groups were able to mobilize thousands

of supporters, many of whom left name-calling comments condemning Korea. Some of the YSC support groups focused specifically on anti-Korean sentiments and were smaller in scale, ranging from hundreds to only a few supporters. A survey of these group titles demonstrates their anti-Korean nature, such as “Boycott Korea: Demand Justice for Yang Shu-chun,” “In Support of Yang—Protest to Korean Dogs,” and “Saving Yang and Resisting Korea. Koreans Are Hateful. Boycott Korean Products. Taiwan with Love and Righteousness.”<sup>17</sup>

The anti-Korean movement during the 2010 Asian Games was not entirely nascent and was built on sentiments generated by earlier incidents. Within the last decade, rumors, diplomatic confrontations, and sports rivalries led to the popular belief that Koreans are—oftentimes excessively—patriotic and aggressive. Earlier in 2010, these sentiments were already rather prevalent when another Taiwanese Taekwondo player, Ching-hsiang Tseng, was hurt during a match with a South Korean rival. Tseng was said to lose consciousness after being hit in the throat while his rival won the championship. Although there was a debate about whether the attack was proper offense within the confines of Taekwondo regulations, the majority of the Taiwanese public believed that the incident was yet another deliberate offense typical of the Koreans.

While the media event was prominent at the time, their impressions of Korea had improved in the following years—as the graphs of the informants illustrate (see Figure 4. and Appendix B). Fiona claimed that her memories of the YSC incident had become dim by the time of her interview in 2014. Pei-lin indicated that her perceptions of Korea were

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<sup>17</sup> These examples were drawn from searches of “楊淑君” Facebook pages. They were translated from “抵制韓國 為楊淑君討公道,” “力挺 楊淑君 抗議 韓國 狗,” “抗韓救淑君 韓國人很討厭 拒用韓貨 台灣有情義.”

not as negative in 2012, a year after the incident. From a reflexive perspective, Yao-yao used the phrase “one-day sports fan” (*yiri qiumi*, 一日球迷) to criticize a group of Taiwanese audience who are “like a swarm of bees” participating heated events in conformity without deeper understanding of the sport nor long-term engagement. The phrase “one-day sports fan” was not invented by Yao-yao and had been circulated by the mass media to describe the emergence of a group of fans during prominent national or international games, such as the World Baseball Classic and the World Cup football games (Guo, 2014). Some of the fans were said to watch the games only for the good-looking athletes and were made fun of for their ignorance of sports regulations and histories. The media events have been spectacular, emotional, and participatory. They are co-produced by mass media and the public and can generate a national fandom. The fandom, however, had never been a homogenous group of people. According to the definition of the “one-day sports fan,” fans can be divided into two kinds: the hardcores—those who truly love the sports—and the amateurs whose sincerity is questioned. The “one-day fans” have been known for superficiality, patriotism, and being prone to give negative responses (Camerabay TV, 2015).

The phenomenon of the “one-day sports fandom” in Taiwan has drawn debates between the seasoned fans and the novel fans, who are often considered ephemeral and insincere despite their potential to become serious fans afterwards. Experienced fans who are savvy about the rules and the athletes’ capacity complain about the novel fans’ ignorant and harsh comments. For example, a Taiwanese player Dai-kang Yang was blamed for his team’s loss at the 2015 World Baseball Softball Confederation’s Premier 12 (an international baseball championship). Such critiques outraged the experienced fans who felt that the player was wrongly defamed (“The Twelve: Do not scorn the one-day fans,” 2015). Being considered the national pride of Taiwan for his internationally outstanding

skills and enjoying a massive fan base, the baseball player asked the upset audience to tolerate the novice fans since “which one of us did not begin from a ‘one-day sports fan?’” (“Don’t Scorn the One-Day Fans”).

Referring oneself as a “one-day sports fan” of the 2002 football World Cup or the 2010 Asian Games, the informant could shift the focus of discussion from the Koreans to the Taiwanese. Yao-yao and Kevin were both highly critical of Taiwanese media’s tendency to be unreliable and terribly sensational. They lowered their credibility as information providers by acknowledging their positions as *one-day sports fans*. Yao-yao suggested that “Taiwan should be reflexive of itself” when the media was capable of defaming Korea and the viewers would influence each other’s opinions.” Kevin stressed that the audience should “look for evidence and doubt,” since “it is...wrong to be led by the media by viewing [their information].” He described the public as a group which “loses [the ability of] rational thinking by viewing [the news on television].” These informants’ critique of the news media and the public showed their distance to the media texts. Moreover, they recognized themselves as independent thinkers whose judgments were based on their own evaluation of the sports and the evidence accumulated in time.

It is worth noting that there have always been alternative perspectives from serious sports viewers despite purely patriotic sentiments. The Facebook page, JTV LIVE Broadcast Station,<sup>18</sup> created an “SOP Flow Chart of Taiwan Sports Competition Subsequent to Prize Winning” to mock the failure of Taiwanese sports industries (see Figure 7). The flow chart illustrates how different interest groups are able to capitalize on the attention bestowed upon prize winning players. The chart states that after these players return to Taiwan from international games, they are showered with attention from the “one-day fans”, the long-time fans, online public figures, the news media, politicians, and the

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<sup>18</sup> JTV LIVE Broadcast Station is a literal translation of “JTV LIVE轉播台” in Chinese.

president. Following the public frenzy of the athlete(s) will be discussions of institutional and industrial policies when all the previous parties will voice their demand or vow for devotion. Nevertheless, these figures will subsequently move on to other subjects, leaving the athletes to struggle for survival until the next prize winner emerges and the cycle repeats itself. The Facebook fan page of “JTV LIVE Broadcast Station” is an example of civilian journalism that a group of ordinary people are discontent with the mainstream media and aspire to deliver the social issues—mostly sports in this fan page—in their own ways. Having received approximately 190,000 page likes on Facebook, this page has enjoyed a considerable scale of viewers who are at least interested in, if not completely endorse, the editors’ comments on sports and other popular events. With a few editors updating photos and comments on the latest sports professionals, athletes, and games, they express a devotion to the development of Taiwanese sports industry as the flow chart demonstrates.

### 台灣運動競技比賽得獎後流程SOP圖



製婁:JTVLIVE轉播台

Figure 7. SOP Flow Chart of Taiwan Sports Competition Subsequent to Prize Winning. The figure illustrates the process through which athletes receive public attention after winning prizes at international games but are forgotten after the temporary fervor. Retrieved from <https://www.facebook.com/matrixchannel/photos/a.124333607603998.9173.113196715384354/432986973405325/?type=3&theater>

The vibrant Internet culture in Taiwan is observable in the abundance of user-created contents—among which the JTV LIVE Broadcast Station is an example. Amidst the anti-Korean sentiments accompanying the sports games, there have also been reflections of domestic media, domestic politics, Internet cultures and the sports industries in Taiwan. Although this dissertation is not able to exhaust all the heterogeneous views the Taiwanese hold towards Korea, it is worth noting that alternative and reflexive views reside alongside the offensive and patriotic sentiments. This section has discussed the workings of media events when prominent athletes aroused a sense of nationalism. In the following sections, I illustrate the Taiwanese perceptions of Korea in relation to their views on sportsmanship, a term used by the informants to make moral claims about the Koreans. I argue that the idea of sports ethics is applied to evaluate the rights and wrongs of Korean behaviors and to justify their anti-Korean sentiments. Following a discussion of “sportsmanship” and the acts of “cheating” as perceived by the Taiwanese, I then examine the user-created contents—or stories—about Korea. These stories demonstrate how Taiwanese users of the Internet express nationalist sentiments online when the ROC or Taiwanese identity experienced frustrations at international games.

#### **KOREANNESS IN SPORTSMANSHIP: VICTORY VS ETHICS**

“I think that [Korean players] were going too far. They make small moves like elbowing [rival players]. They have very poor sportsmanship.” (Chia-fen, interview)

The survey and interview results not only show a mass amount of comments about Koreans' athletic performance in international games, the comments are also often morally-charged. In the first question on the survey, the acts of "cheating" (*zuobi*, 作弊) was brought up 21 times by 19 respondents and the phrase "small moves" (*xiao dongzuo*, 小動作) was used by 6 respondents. Making "small moves" refers to malicious attacks on an opponent to prevent others from scoring, such as elbowing or tripping others. Similarly, three respondents mentioned "unfair" or "unjust" (*bu gongping*, 不公平; *bu gongzheng*, 不公正) judges favoring Korean players or discriminating against Taiwanese players. One respondent listed "violating the rules during sports games" (*qiusai fangui*, 球賽犯規) as one of the images of Korea s/he has. These phrases—cheating, small moves, unfair/unjust, or rule violation—along with the persons or events mentioned by the respondents, demonstrate the concepts through which the sports competition against Korea is understood by the Taiwanese.

The majority of informants in the in-depth interviews expressed that sports have shaped their views on Korea more or less. 13 out of 20 informants mentioned viewing—or having been exposed to others' comments about—Taiwan and Korea's competition on the sports fields. These perceptions are almost unanimously unfavorable. In the coordinate graphs where the informants were asked to pinpoint their positive and negative views of Korea, the valleys are resulted primarily from sports competition (see Appendix B). In order to probe into the hostility Taiwanese people generated against Korea, I will begin with a framework of sport ethics, or sportsmanship, which these informants hold as the moral standard to judge Korean athletes and referees.

The "sportsmanship" (*yundongjia jingshen*, 運動家精神) to be discussed here is by no means uniquely Taiwanese. It is a transnational code of conducts as the results of cultural imperialism (Dyreson, 1997) and globalization, as well as a product of local

interpretations and should be examined in particular historical and geopolitical contexts. In addition to the sporting contestants' pursuit of victory, they are expected to achieve excellence through proper means, such as hard work, good skills and respect to others. The Korean sportsmanship illustrated by the informants of my survey and interview, however, showed a mixture of strengths and shortcomings—a sportsmanship known for solidarity and efforts along with unduly desires of victory and scrupulous measures. To the informants, such behaviors are considered unethical, worthy of their condemnation, and can be used to justify their dislike for Korea.

Chen-hung's impression of Koreans at sporting events is that they have "poor sportsmanship," despite their good athletic skills. According to Chen-hung, Korean athletes have their strengths and should be able to win the games "without using the side doors and strayed ways" (*pangmen zuodao*, 旁門左道) to manipulate the games in dishonest ways. He gave examples of Korean players and audiences to demonstrate issues he found with the Koreans. He recalled a basketball game he watched on television when he was in primary school, "finding it strange to see [a Korean player] *fake death* (*zhuangsi*, 裝死) after being hit and lied still on the ground although his team had been leading the game by quite a few points." In addition, he referred to a baseball game he watched on television in high school when one of the best known Taiwanese baseball players, Ming-tsu Lu, hit a homerun but was booed and hurled with water bottle(s) by the Korean audience. Chen-hung suggested that there are many more examples similar to the ones referenced.

The critiques of Korea's sportsmanship and Taiwanese people's negative sentiments against the nation brood overtime, as testified by Chia-fen's life history. Having watched TV and sports games since her childhood, Chia-fen said that she had accumulated negative feelings about Korean teams. She used the 2002 World Cup games as an example

of Korea's "lack of sportsmanship," believing that the Korean players had "gone too far" (*tai guofen*, 太過分)—a phrase which she stated repeatedly during the interview. According to her, she had maintained a rather negative view of Korea because of her sports viewing experience and felt that "they (the Koreans) are the bad guys." As an adult, she said that she is able to view the Korean team from a different perspective now, seeing that the players "have a strong will for victory" and they are patriotic—although she still condemned their misbehaviors, such as injuring their opponents. Chia-fen juxtaposed the two ends of concepts regarding sport ethics. On the one hand, an athlete was praiseworthy for their will for victory and their loyalty to the nation, whereas on the other hand, it was disrespectful to attack opponents physically. She justified her dislike of Korea through her observations on television, which were confirmed through sport commentaries on live broadcasts and her discussions with friends. Although Chia-fen's negative views on Korea veered at a later phase of her life when she gained new experiences and found more strengths of the nation in other aspects—such as tourism and technological advancements—her early experience as a sports game viewer formed her initial impressions on South Korea and lasted for a decade.

The antipathy of Taiwanese viewers originated from athletic performance can be extended to their view of the entire ethnic group as the case of Kevin demonstrates. He, likewise, commented on the 2002 World Cup football games, in which he believed that Korea took advantage of hosting the games to influence the referees in favor of the Korean team. Kevin derived his conclusion from television news and found the referees' judgment "apparently problematic." Finding fault with the players and the referees, he concluded that "the entire [Korean] nation is like this. I don't like their national character." Overall, Kevin rated a 2/5 on the Likert Scale to represent his negative views of Korea, which he "somewhat dislikes." Believing that the Korean team, and perhaps even the entire nation

“lack of sportsmanship,” Kevin was able to discredit their victory in the games. “I felt that they were very happy to get the medals but I don’t find them laudable this way.” Using condemnatory language, Kevin expressed that he found the victory shameful and crazy. The sentiments generated from sports competition are strong enough for viewers to condemn a nation for moral transgressions.

Views that are similar to Chen-hung, Chia-fen, and Kevin’s interview results are found in online search results with much greater verbal intensity. The impression of Korea’s misbehaviors has been so strong that Internet users collected lists of incidents to be circulated online. A Google search of “Korea,” “sports games,” and “records” in Chinese show a plethora of articles where enthusiastic authors present the incidents they deemed unethical.<sup>19</sup> The titles of the articles often use highly emotional language with condemning rhetoric, such as “shameless,” “dirty,” and “cheating.”<sup>20</sup> Bloggers who published the lists compile them by narrating the incidents from memories or paraphrasing news stories. Oftentimes, the lists are compiled with information from multiple sources, sometimes by directly copying and pasting information gathered from elsewhere without citing the original source. Some of the contents are multi-media, including written texts and video clips, and contain foreign sources in English or Japanese. To the authors and viewers, links to a variety of multi-media sources serve as supporting evidence to present

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<sup>19</sup> It is worth noting that while more results are from Taiwanese sources, some PRC webpages incorporate these results as evidence of South Korea’s violation of sport ethics at international games.

<sup>20</sup> Examples include “A Survey of the Records of Korea Cheating at International Games” (my translation), retrieved from <http://szmanda.pixnet.net/blog/post/25497465>, and “Complete Records of Korea’s Petty and Shameful [Behaviors]” (my translation), retrieved from <http://home.gamer.com.tw/creationDetail.php?sn=1390774>.

objective truth when athletic injustice is found. In brief, the electronic dissemination of anti-Korean information that manifest in sports competition is multi-media, intertextual, and transnational, but the authenticity and the accuracy of the events may not be verifiable. The authenticity of Internet information is disputable since it is easy to edit by tech-savvy users and therefore blurs the boundary between fact and fiction. The word of mouth of the users paraphrasing and reminiscing the events often disclosed erroneous details and were imbued with subjective interpretations.

### **ELECTRONIC WORD-OF-MOUTH: FACTS, FICTION, AND PATRIOTISM**

In order to study how Koreanness is mediated by television and the Internet contents, I showed a condensed list of sports disputes to my interviewees and asked them to speak out their responses. I asked if they had heard about these incidents, how they would evaluate their authenticity, and how they felt when they read it. The list contains different kinds of sports, including basketball games, e-sports, baseball games, Taekwondo matches, a cycling race, and a bowling game, dated from the late 1980s to 2011. The incidents in the list share the following themes: physical aggression, abuse of authority, and the infringement of Taiwanese sovereignty. These themes are found in other media events beyond the confine of the list and have served as some of the most effective triggers of anti-Korean and pro-Taiwanese sentiments.

An example of physical aggression is that of the World Cup games in 2002, when Korean players' slide tackles were criticized for their lack of proper respect for and consideration of opponents. A slide tackle is a defensive technique that players perform to prevent their opponents from scoring. However, due to the aggressive nature of the action, the tackle can also be applied—or interpreted—as malicious act to trip an opponent. The story of South Korea's football performance on the list suggests that their players are “very violent,” “seldom help others get up when the opponents are tripped to the ground,” and

“never kick the ball out of bounds so that the game is timed-out and the injured opponents lying on the ground [could be helped].” Violation of these football manners leads to implicit condemnation of the Korean players. While emotionally-charged rhetoric may not be used in the article’s narrative, antagonistic responses are prevalent in the “comment” section of the webpages, often with strong verbal aggression such as calling names, using curse words, and condemning the Korean nation as evil and hateful.

Abuse of authority is one of the most recurrent themes that viewers had issues in relation to South Korean sportsmanship. The list gave several examples of South Korea favoring its own athletes when it serves as the host country of the games, including the 1997 (recited mistakenly as 1998 by the author/s) East Asian Games at Busan, the first World Cyber Games held in Seoul in 2001, and one bowling ball game and two Taekwondo games at the 2002 Asian Games in Busan. These stories were recounted to demonstrate the corrupt referees who were either Koreans or foreigners, or to expose the officials and the staff for making exceptions and changing rules to favor victory for Korean athletes. These stories share a conspiracy theory that foreign athletes leading the games can have their victories ripped-off when Korea is the host—sometimes in a rather dramatic and ridiculous manner. For example, one of the stories discloses in a video and in verbal narratives that the staff of the East Asian Games at Busan in 1997 sneaked time for the Korean team. The video revealed that the timer was adjusted to give the Korean team more time to catch up in a game where the opposing Taiwanese team was winning.

The perception of undeserved victories for the South Koreans coincides with images of theft and cheating at the international games. Another story on the list portrays a Korean athlete stealing a bronze medal at a cycling race in Taiwan. According to the

author/s,<sup>21</sup> a crowd was waiting for the arrival of the Taiwanese president during the award ceremony of the 2001 Asian Cycling Championships, which distracted the staff on this hectic occasion. The narrative goes: “It has truly been never heard of that awards could actually be gained by pickpocketing. Fortunately, after the theft happened, a staff member recalled seeing the contestant roaming around the podium and took the medal back.” With exclamatory and judgmental language like “truly” (*zhenshi*, 真是), “never heard of” (*wen suo wei wen*, 聞所未聞), “actually” (*jing*, 竟), and “fortunately” (*xinghao*, 幸好), the suspect was depicted as a dishonest and laughable perpetrator who went as far as stealing a medal—matching the image of the Koreans desiring victories regardless of means. The story was later investigated by the reporter(s) of NOWnews and remade into a story in which the Korean team was in fact the biggest winner of the games with several golds, silvers, and bronzes but preserved the part of medal theft, quoting the comment of a staff member: “Perhaps they had too many golds so that they wanted a bronze.” While the second story modified and improved the image of South Korea from a more hostile perspective to a less hostile one, the reporter(s) still adopted a pejorative tone throughout the story.

Both stories, either the one composed by Internet “produser(s)” or the news report written by the professional journalist(s), were produced in the cultural context of existing anti-Korean sentiments in Taiwan. The first story—an example of user-created content—demonstrates what Axel Bruns (2008) refers to as the “produsage” of these web users with

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<sup>21</sup> The list which I provided to my interviewees is a condensed version edited by unknown web user(s). Among other articles written by identifiable bloggers, this version does not contain a link to the original site of publication and may have been through a few changes made by different Internet users. The content, however, is almost identical among the articles on Korean sportsmanship.

overlapping roles as the producer and the consumer. Despite the different contexts of production, both the producers and the journalists are well-aware of the existence of their potential viewers. The former inform and mobilize the viewers as patriotic Taiwanese citizens while the latter targets the viewers as consumers of sensational stories. Each story, coupled with factual details (although some dates and names were proven incorrect) and spiced up with a storyline of injustice, provided room for the readers to share the emotional moments that the mass media could capitalize on. Some of the passages were directly quoted from news stories, blurring the boundaries between the personalized writing of these “producers” and that of journalistic reports. In addition, the stories were often reproduced intertextually when the authors provide links to news stories and broadcast footage. With a production style similar to citizen journalism and through the collaborative participation of the producer-authors, their viewers, and the distributors (by sharing the links, forwarding the messages, or simply “liking” the posts), xenophobic and patriotic sentiments criticizing Korea were widely circulated while a defensive identity of the Taiwanese was promoted.

The third theme of misconduct is insults to Taiwan’s national identity, which could be represented by an athlete, the sports team’s title, or the national flag. For instance, a Republic of China flag waved by a seventeen-year-old Taiwanese gold medalist at the first World Cyber Games (WCG) in Seoul in 2001 was said to be “confiscated” by the Korean host. According to a Taiwanese gaming news website GNN, the flag was provided by the Taiwanese gaming corporation, which sponsored the fourteen-member team they sent to Korea. It is said that the young gold medalist Jeng-cheng Tseng exclaimed “Taiwan number 1!” at the award ceremony while his teammates waved the flag along with the winner to celebrate the exciting moment of victory (“Taiwan No.1,” 2001). However, not only was his victory and the patriotic act broadcasted and reported by the news media, the

Korean staff's handling of the flag also became a news headline. Due to the political tension between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan, the use of a Taiwanese flag is deemed provocative and against the one-China policy the mainlanders wished to promote. After the PRC team protested against the flag, the WCG officials issued a warning to the Taiwanese team and the Taiwanese team leader agreed to submit to "the same requirement of the Olympic games" and recalled the flags. WCG then published an official apology on its website in the name of the Taiwanese delegates. The organization's pro-PRC policy upset the Taiwanese citizens who found their national sovereignty being trampled by a forged apology and the "confiscation" of the national flag ("I Will Starve by Continue to Play," 2012).

Behind the dissemination of such adverse information—be it physical aggression, abuse of authority, or insults to Taiwanese sovereignty—is an urge to defend one's nation by two groups of people, including the original authors and those who circulated the messages with minor or no changes. The above list which circulated online is an excerpt from the work of one or several bloggers and/or bulletin board system (BBS) account holders, copied and pasted by disseminators without references. This condensed list is different from those who shared the link with others while keeping track of the original author. The following paragraphs, by contrast, will examine an author whose work is one of the most influential, evidenced by its number of viewer visits (913,537) and comments (1,556). While I already examined the themes of such information, investigation of a work from an original author reveals greater details of the patriotism of a citizen with three identities: an Internet user, a nationalist, and a consumer. Compared to those who simply circulate existing information, the author demonstrates stronger motivation by taking the time and efforts to gather and present his findings.

In “The Complete Records of Korea’s Despicable and Shameless [Acts],” a blogger with the screen-name, “Passionate Taiwanese Soul,” compiled a long list of examples in which he found fault with South Korea (2011). In the list, the author offered dozens of examples from five areas: politics, economy, entertainment, sports, and the miscellaneous to expose an uneven relationship he found between Taiwan and South Korea. The author argued that although sports had been a reason to make some Taiwanese dislike Korea, the severity of the issue was far greater than the few corrupted referees and ill-mannered sportsmen could suggest. In the politics section, the author reviewed a brief diplomatic history between the two nations to portray a story of ungrateful Koreans. It was said that during the World War II, the exiled Koreans established its government in China with the support of the ROC government on the mainland. However, the author highlighted in red in the multi-media text to stress that the Koreans not only broke ties with ROC, but “transferred Republic of China’s assets to People’s Republic of China free of charge, and expelled the [Taiwanese] embassy staff.” The author appropriated the historical details to revive the traumatic memories of Taiwan’s international relations in 1993, illustrating an image of Korea which the author concluded to be “full of hostility” towards Taiwan.

Written in 2011 in response to the Yang Shu-chun incident, which had outraged the Taiwanese who saw the incident as a case of transnational injustice, the author brought the reader’s attention to a variety of issues to elevate the dispute into the level of national defense. The sports section includes a plethora of incidents which can be divided into themes of physical aggression, abuse of authority, in addition to other miscellaneous misconducts, such as irrational patriotism—which led to an instance of physical attacks against a referee from New Zealand in the 1988 Olympics Games as well as a case of an organized electronic mob whose protests against FIFA’s ruling of the Korea-Switzerland match froze the FIFA website in 2006. In total, the author sketched 19 incidents in the

sports section to exemplify the injustices Korea has inflicted on Taiwan and other nations. Additionally, the author used incidents in other areas to reinforce his argument of a threatening Korea against which Taiwan should defend itself. In the economy section, Korea was portrayed to be deliberately thwarting the Taiwanese electronic industry with aggressive measures that aimed to monopolize the market. Towards the end of the article, the author summarized an uneven trade relationship between the two nations by presenting a timeline of trade deficits over the past decade to argue for alertness of the Taiwanese nationals from further consumption of Korean products.

Throughout the article, the author created a sense of consumer nationalism that is in dialogue with those Taiwanese nationals who are either already consuming Korean products or may consider to do so. The article presents several examples of the victimized Taiwanese consumers, from purchases of defective transportation vehicles, tourists who suffered discrimination, to K pop fans whose letters and gifts to the stars were discarded in trash cans. By juxtaposing these consumer experiences, the author demonstrated an uneven, unworthy, and unpleasant Taiwan-Korea trade relationship. Furthermore, a group of people were marked as “Koreaphiles” (*hahanzu*, 哈韓族) by the author. In the story of a Korean idol group, Girls Generation, who allegedly disposed of fans’ gifts, the author addressed the fans with a second person narrative: “This is the Girls Generations that *you* admire, who do not respect their fans at all” (my italics). Similar stories like this portray K pop stars as self-centered moneymakers unworthy of adoration, culminating at the author’s impeachment to K pop consumers: “[And] these are the idols that the Koreaphiles adore?”

The author educated the readers about consumer nationalism by arguing that the consumption of Korean products equals to sponsorship to Taiwan’s enemy. He addressed those individuals who might hold a gentler viewpoint by “suggesting that [we] should not target all the Korean people for their performance on the athletic field, [and] we should

focus on those referees or athletes.” He argued that because Korean public opinion failed to decry those who “cheated,” the Taiwanese could condemn the entire Korean nation, justifying an ethno-essentializing perspective. According to his inference, the cheaters reflect the low moral standard of the nation, which “desires victory without proper means.” With a dialogic and interrogative writing style, such as “Have you ever thought about...,” the author concluded that any purchase of a Korean product would lead to sponsorship of the government and the conglomerates who sponsored the biased referees, the aggressive athletes, and the rival electronic industry in Korea. With a font in red, the author left an ending remark to warn the readers: “And you would be indirectly helping the Koreans beat the Taiwanese.”

In this article, the author spoke to his target audience—the Taiwanese people—as a community of shared interests. He spelled out his objective at the beginning of the article by stating he wanted to “let more people know about the information [regarding South Korea]” and appeal for the boycott of Korean products. He inserted a photo of Chiang Wei-shui, a leader of the resistance movement against Japanese colonization in Taiwan in the 1920s to represent the nationalist spirit he wished to promote in the article. The author quoted Chiang’s motto: “The folksmen must be united, and [Our] union will be truly powerful” (*tongbao xu tuanjie, tuanjie zhen you li*, 同胞須團結, 團結真有力) With a self-endowed mission to enlighten the Taiwanese, “Passionate Taiwanese Soul” identified himself as a member of the national community and demarcated the boundary between Taiwan and its neighboring countries. Furthermore, South Korea was believed to be the greatest threat among Taiwan’s neighbors. The author considered PRC and Japan as being Taiwan’s anti-Korean comrades that the Taiwanese were collaborating with economically. He viewed these two countries as “neither friends nor enemies” and criticized the Taiwanese who found fault with the nations. In short, for the cause of national survival and

national defense, the author proposed with consistent arguments and copious supporting materials that Korea is Taiwan's archenemy and people should boycott their products.

The influence of the article is observable from the number of likes and comments it received. With approximately 200,000 Facebook likes and more than 1,500 comments, the article showed its potential to strike a chord among the hearts of Taiwanese Internet users. The nationalist sentiments in the article are clear with both rational and emotional rhetorics. In addition to the hard evidence, including numerical data of trade deficits, stories, photos copied from newspapers, and video clips of television sports and news programs, the author invoked sentimental and indignant feelings expressed in songs and iconic cultural symbols. The author inserted a video of "Orphan of Asia," a film soundtrack from 1990, to illustrate Taiwan's marginalized position in international relations. The music video presented clips of a hit film *A Home Too Far* (1990), in which an ROC army was trapped in the remote region of the border between Southwest China and the north of Thailand after the Chinese Communists took control of the mainland and the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan. The author exclaimed that "Taiwan is just like the abandoned army in an alienated region as the movie illustrates, while South Korea is just like the persistent Communists aiming to eliminate you."

Referencing the iconic novel, "Orphan of Asia" (Wu, 1946), whose author construed a story of a Taiwanese young man who could not find his identity and acceptance either from the Japanese colonizer or from the Republican China, "Passionate Taiwanese Soul" associated the sentiments of isolation and frustration the Taiwanese felt in the late 1940s, the 1970s, and contemporarily. Lo Ta-yu, one of the most influential popular musician in the late twentieth century in Taiwan, adapted the metaphor into the theme of his folk rock song with the same title "Orphan of Asia" in 1983. The song was later selected as one of the theme songs of the movie *A Home Too Far*. Written under the time of the

martial law, the author composed the lyrics with a myriad of political symbols to allude to a precarious Taiwan:

“Orphan of Asia, crying in the winds.

Red dirt on your yellow face;

White terror in your black eyes.

...

Orphan of Asia, crying in the winds,

No one wants to play a fair game with you,

And everyone wants your favorite toy.

Dear child, why are you crying?” (my translation, lyrics of Orphan of Asia).

Be it the yellow, the red, the black and the white, in addition to metaphors of the orphan and a fair game, the audience could easily grasp the historical weight of the message: the conundrum of the Taiwanese trapped in the power struggle among the ROC Nationalist, the PRC Communist, and the apathetic international players. “Passionate Taiwan Soul,” thus, constructs a struggling Taiwanese and/or ROC identity by connecting the moments of national crises: be it a contemporary Taiwan when the nation did not enjoy formal recognition during international games, the traumatic moment of the 1970s when the U.S. and Taiwan broke formal diplomatic ties, the PRC’s replacement of ROC in the United Nations, or flashing the memories all the way to the past of colonization and an abrupt return to a new Chinese Republican regime which has never ruled over the Taiwanese soil until Japan’s defeat in World War II.

## CONCLUSION

This chapter deals with transnational Koreanness mediated by sports viewership in the particular socio-historical context of Taiwan in the past two decades. Due to the

prevalence of media sports, news consumption, and the social media culture in Taiwanese society, the Taiwanese public is conveniently incorporated in the (re)production of Koreanness. The rise of global media has brought South Korea under the scrutiny of a transnational audience. The above discussions have focused on the unfavorable views of Korea through transnational sports viewership, an area which has not been extensively explored in Korean studies. This nascent antipathy among the Taiwanese demonstrates an international relationship which is not a result of historical enmity of the early twentieth century as the continuing conflicts between Japan and Korea or Japan and Taiwan. The conflicts between Korea and Taiwan lie within the clashes of political and economic interests primarily in the post-Cold War East Asia. Politically, the acknowledgement of Taiwan's sovereignty was not favored by international organizations in which South Korea is a player. Economically, Taiwanese citizens are anxious to see a risen Korea against which they enjoy trade deficits.

## **Chapter 5. Conclusion**

This dissertation has set out to explore the perceptions Taiwanese people have towards South Korea in the twenty-first century—in the context of the rise of the nation and the pop cultural Korean Wave. The project has demonstrated South Korea's unique place within East Asia's experience of globalization—a competitive process which continues to shift its cultural and economic gravities among regional players. While South Korea used to occupy a peripheral position in the global imaginary geography of the Taiwanese people, it has now become a significant point of reference for the Taiwanese to evaluate their own performance in the global arena both economically and culturally. I investigated the cultural, economic, and physical movements within and beyond East Asia

and studied the rise of Korea and its implications on the changes of regional relations during a post-Cold War period.

I found from the survey and interview results, along with examples of media representations (i.e., rumors and media events), that Taiwanese people have a variety of responses towards the rise of Korea. The informants who received my in-depth interviews, in particular, showed a mixture of positive and negative perceptions of Korea. Moreover, their views changed when new experiences emerged and old experiences faded away. In the frameworks of “trans-Asian cultural traffic” and “inter-Asia referencing” (Iwabuchi, 2013), I argued for the significance of studying a lower case “Korean wave” by taking one step backward to analyze the context that contributed to the rise of Korea, and one step forward to research the construction of transnational Koreanness in Taiwan.

Utilizing a methodology of discourse analysis enabled me to examine Korean Wave literature as a discourse and reflexively position my research in the greater context of inter and intra-Asia relations. I particularly focused on the spread of electronic capitalism in conditioning the regional and global economic relations as well as producing the cultural expressions I examined from Chapter 2 to Chapter 4. The contemporary Taiwan-Korea relationship demonstrated in this research has, therefore, gone beyond a story of active Taiwanese consumers who realized individual identities at a coeval time of regional modernization as suggested by the “trans-Asia cultural traffic” literature. While different aspects of the Korean Wave were fascinating in many regards, this research project studied the reception of the general Taiwanese consumers—most of whom are not committed Korean pop culture consumers. My dissertation considers the consumers as both Taiwanese citizens of a national identity and workers of a particular industry. This approach situates the audience and the consumers in their particular contexts both domestically and globally.

In the conclusion, I will first review the key findings of my research, including the Koreantism—particularly through discussions of “national character” (*minzu xing*, 民族性), the Taiwanese nationalist movement in response to the rise of Korea, and the reflexivity of the informants being interviewed. Subsequently, I will discuss the theoretical implications of this dissertation in three aspects. First, I use electronic capitalism as the overarching conceptual framework in this research and summarize the capitalist logic underlying the phenomena discussed in this dissertation. Second, I address how the rise of the Korean cultural power and the ensuing anti-Korean movement can be an example of limited soft power. Third, I consider the dissertation an “inter-Asia referencing” project in the historical moment of a post-Cold War Asia, highlighting the study’s significance within the greater regional movement. Finally, I conclude by situating Taiwanese and South Koreans in the regional relations of the twenty-first century Northeast Asia.

### **Koreantism as a Reflexive Nationalist Movement in Taiwan**

This dissertation argues that, due to the rise of Korea—or the “Korean wave,” a body of knowledge has been generated in relation to the transnational Koreanness discussed in this study. I refer to this process of knowledge construction as “Koreantism” in order to highlight the emergence of Korea into an “imaginary geography” in the consciousness of Taiwanese people. Edward Said (1994) suggests in *Orientalism* that “the geographic boundaries accompany the social, ethnic, and cultural ones in expected ways.... All kinds of suppositions, associations, and fictions appear to crowd the unfamiliar space outside one’s own” (p. 54). The imaginary geography is able to distinguish between “us” and “they,” the civilized and the barbaric. While Taiwan and Korea are not in a hierarchical power relationship of domination, a similar process of distinction and knowledge production is present in Taiwan-Korea relationship. My dissertation studies the production,

reproduction, circulation, and the consumption of Koreanness in Taiwan. As a result, this research views the Korean wave as a regional phenomenon—as opposed to a national project of the South Korean entertainment industry—in which different Asian countries experienced coevally. The pop culture Korean Wave literature has explored the more tangible product and program flows as well as reception studies in the receiving societies. Such scholarship has contributed in fan studies which highlight the consumer agency of the Korean Wave fans. By contrast, my research uses Taiwan-Korea relationship as a case study to discuss how these increased flows have made an impact on the international relations that are experienced in consumers’ everyday life beyond the realm of pop culture.

In the previous chapters, I examined discussions of Korea’s “national character” (*minzuxing*, 民族性) as a discourse of Koreanness circulated in Taiwan. Through keyword analyses of my field work data, I found a few predominant themes in the Taiwan-Korea relationship, including competition, achievements, solidarity, fairness, and ethics (reflected in the discussion of “cheating”). I investigated how Koreanness was understood in competing economic relations, while the discontents of Korea-China and Korea-Taiwan relationships produced and reproduced the rumors disseminated by news media and the Internet. The Taiwanese audience consumed the rumors and their perceptions of Korea became more or less influenced by the rumors. At the same time, their personal experiences and previous knowledge helped shape their individual interpretations of the rumors. Among the audience, active responses to these rumors include the creation of anti-Korean images as well as articles on the Internet. These Internet users comment on the competitive relationship between Taiwan and Korea, and generated creative contents in response to the media events and the rumors.

In the context of global capitalist movements, contemporary nationalisms arose in the 21st century Northeast Asia. This dissertation has explored economic and consumer

nationalism, sports nationalism, and examined the nationalism circulated through electronic media. These forms of nationalism correspond to the idea of an imagined community in the age of the print capitalism (Anderson, 1983), but have now been conditioned by “electronic capitalism” (Appadurai, 1996). The nationalism produced in the context of the latter is a highly connective and inter-referencing world supported through the use of electronic media. My study expands on the original use of electronic capitalism that has been applied to media studies of television, film, and advanced communication technologies in forming nationalism (Bociurkiw, 2011, p.41; Fujita, 2009, p. 147; Lopes, 2014, p. 86-87). In addition to examining the nationalist expressions in Taiwanese mass media, I probe into the capitalist logic behind the industrial ecologies which—under the pressure of survival—not only intensified nationalism, but also capitalized on the nationalist sentiments in media viewership.

In the context of the electronic capitalism, my dissertation discussed a variety of forms and platforms through which nationalism and anti-Korean rhetoric were produced. I gave examples of news reports, magazine articles, and talk shows, along with multimedia texts circulated on the Internet. In Chapter 3, I discussed how nationalism in the news media was demonstrated through storytelling and myth-making of the Self and the Other. The news media in a democratic and neoliberal society was able to depict the foreign Other as success stories or threats to the local society during transnational encounters the same way they produce the archetypes of heroes and villains in domestic settings (Lule, 2005). In addition, not only are the news media significant in the nation-making movement in Taiwan, but the Internet is also particularly effective in forming a bottom-up nationalism that is able to swing mainstream public opinion and influence news coverage. In contemporary society, on-line practices have become an essential means through which civilians express themselves through socio-linguistic practices. In the offline world, by

contrast, they make consumer decisions based on the patriotism they hold towards Taiwan and South Korea, like some of my informants disclosed. These informants illustrated why they chose to use Taiwanese products and deliberately eschewed the Korean products.

It is worth noting that, the informants were reflexive subjects—with several identities within one individual—amidst the anti-Korean movement. Despite the defensive attitudes many informants shared as a community of Taiwanese citizens, they found the Taiwanese state, the leadership, the industries, and the media culture problematic. Chapter 2 to 4 investigated a group of informants who were viewers, workers, and consumers with a national identity. As Taiwanese, they evaluated their fellow countrymen, their fellow businesses and media in contrast with those of Korea. These informants demonstrated a critical distance to Taiwanese media, products, and industries. While anti-Korean sentiments have been present—and were fervently produced and consumed in the Taiwanese society—the informants were not necessarily anti-Korea and pro-Taiwan. Their perceptions of Korea are a dialogic process constantly negotiated, and they were concerned about the prospect of Taiwan at a time of economic and political uncertainty.

#### **CONTEMPORARY CULTURES IN ELECTRONIC CAPITALISM**

This dissertation argues that the phenomenon of Koreantalism in Taiwan is a product of electronic capitalism. The politics of developmental productivity in the twentieth century East Asia has left the nations a legacy to strive and compete with each other in the race of global capitalism. The capitalist system of flexible accumulation was further enabled by the advancement in electronic technologies towards the turn of the millennium. As one of the fastest growing industry, the semiconductor could be applied to devices of all kinds—from medical science, mobile industry, or the media industry, just to name a few. The competitive relationship that Korea and Taiwan experience in the electronics industry is not unique as Chapter 1 has discussed: The compression of time and

space which was accelerated by electronic capitalism has taken place within the context of economic competition with other global players—such as Japan and the U.S. The effects of global electronic capitalism are not only perceivable within international relations, but also found in domestic industrial ecologies and individual lifestyles, and has continued to mold the relationship between Taiwan and Korea.

Both the industrial and the cultural aspects of the electronic capitalism are explored in the dissertation. Chapter 1 discussed the economic conditions of the electronic capitalism in the example of the semiconductor industry. The semiconductor value chain could be segmented into different production processes from upstream to downstream industries across national boundaries. Disparate industrial segments require various levels of skills, capital, and different scales of labor. Late-coming but ambitious states and corporations can take advantage of the compressed time gap to find entry points to the industries. This has created a globally competitive semiconductor industry in which workers, especially those from midstream industries, are conscious of their unsettling future.

While my dissertation cannot exhaust the definition of electronic capitalism, I point to a few features of its cultural expressions for analysis. Combining the research in Chapter 2 to Chapter 4, I touched on the work culture of Hsinchu Science Park, the news media ecology in Taiwan, and the consumption of transnational media sports. The characteristics of electronic capitalism in these studies are hyper-competitive, participatory, image-oriented, and intertextual. Chapter 1 and 2 discussed the international tension within corporate competition over market shares, which fluctuate rapidly over a few years. Be it the industrial ecology of the electronics industry or the Taiwanese news media examined in Chapter 3, they were both featured by immediacy and competitiveness. They struggled to survive within much shorter product cycles than before and were afflicted with more international and domestic competition.

The cultures of electronic capitalism explored in this dissertation are intertextual, imagerial, and participatory—thanks to the development of digital communication technologies. Media convergence of print and electronic media, as well as applications of the web 2.0 technologies, are able to produce exponential cultural expressions of any issue concerned. Chapter 3 and 4 demonstrated how industrial and non-professional media exploit each other’s contents as materials for reproduction. The contents could be multimedia and visualized with extensive usage of images and videos. These materials could serve as hard evidence supporting a patriotic cause, or as emotional responses to show the prosumers (Toffler, 1980) or produsers’ (Bruns, 2008) discontents with Taiwan’s diplomatic predicament. Chapter 4 examined the media events produced by mass media and their users as well as the user-created contents regarding Korea’s sportsmanship and the anti-Korean movement in Taiwan in 2010. These examples demonstrate the convergence of the public and the private spheres and a more interactive media culture in contemporary Taiwan.

The contemporary media landscape in Taiwan is an interactive and participatory environment with the merging of the roles between producers and consumers and has shifted from industrialized production<sup>22</sup> to intertextual reproduction. As Axel Bruns

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<sup>22</sup> Bruns (2007, 2008) made the distinction between the industrial production and produsage in his research. He classified traditional production—the professional and commercialized production—as the industrial. Produsage, on the other hand, refers to the consumers who are as well producers to create contents of their interests. The idea of “industrial production” and “produsage” are helpful in explaining the phenomena I observed in Taiwan. However, his discussions of produsage centered more on collaborative content creation such as that of the Wikipedia and the open source software, are more proactive and may have more commercial values than the user-created content discussed in my dissertation.

(2007) argued, in the post-industrial information age, a new model of “produsage” has emerged to be distinct from the traditional model of industrial production which transforms the raw material into mass-produced end products. Bruns has discussed the constant revision of the “produced” artifacts—such as the Wikipedia and open source software. In my dissertation, I discussed another aspect of produsage: the intertextuality of the production process. In this model, news coverage, the social media, and the media events demonstrate constant recycling of information. Original media production has seemed to become an unfavorable option for the under-invested but information-hungry media industry. Instead, the endless cycle of reproduction and intertextuality is a popular model of contemporary information construction. The heritage disputes discussed in Chapter 3 is one of the examples of the inter-referencing media culture. Not only do the news media refer to user-created contents as stories to cover and vice versa, they also refer to their previous contents or repeat the same stories to fulfill the time slots and avoid potential loss of viewer/readership. My dissertation suggests that Taiwan-Korea relationship has to be viewed in the context of electronic capitalism both economically and culturally and argues that such media culture is conducive to circulating antagonistic sentiments towards Korea.

### **KOREAN WAVE AND ITS SOFT POWER**

A study on the Taiwanese perceptions of Korea is able to shed light on the influence of South Korea’s soft power. This research reveals the limitations of Korean pop culture in improving its national image—responding to the triumphalism easily implied in some Korean Wave studies when the researchers only focuses on the material exchanges and the commercial profits. My dissertation examined the backlashes against the Korean Wave while leaving the positive influence of Korea’s soft power to existing and future scholarship. As discussed in Chapter 3, news reports (76%) and pop culture (73%) are the largest sources from which my survey respondents formed their impressions of Korea (see

Table 3.1). Although pop culture was ranked high as the survey results showed, the prevalence of Korean pop culture and committed Korean Wave consumers in Taiwanese society could not offset the negative images of Korea formed through other factors. Throughout a comprehensive study of the media representation of Korea along with reception study through in-depth interviews, anti-Korean sentiments were explored in different sectors of the Taiwanese society. In addition to the influence of popular culture, my informants were found to be shaped by other aspects of their personal experiences, such as their encounters with Korean rival corporations at workplace or their interests in media sports.

The Taiwanese perceptions of Korea are divided. Kevin pointed out that gender could affect people's perceptions of Korea. Drawing from his observations, he suggested that "guys"—the engineers—who worked at the Hsinchu Science Park would have more negative sentiments against Korea than the "girls," who are more interested in pop culture and shopping. Hsiu-chuan, who was an avid fan of a pop idol group during her college years, picked a favorable 4 on the Lickert Scale to represent her perceptions of Korea. She disclosed that she did not have the negative views of Korea like other Taiwanese, "perhaps it was because I did not watch sport games." Hsiu-chuan's comment revealed that she was also aware of the difference between those who had more favorable views and those who were more hostile. Such a divide in the society has been further demonstrated by the article of "Passionate Taiwanese Soul" that I examined in Chapter 4. He addressed the "Koreaphiles" as a group of people to contend with, in order to support his cause to mobilize the Taiwanese to boycott Korean products. My dissertation was not able to delve deeply into the impact of the pop culture Korean Wave on Taiwanese people in general; however, several informants illustrated during the interviews that their contact with Korean popular culture mitigated their previous antagonistic feelings against the nation and raised

their interests in visiting Korea. The positive influence of Korea's pop culture was still very palpable in the research.

In response to existing Korean Wave research, this dissertation argues that “a knowledge of situated audiences and readers” is significant in understanding the cultural traffic in breadth and in depth (Goodwin & Wolff, 1997, p. 142). According to Goodwin and Wolff, studies of television and popular culture have extended from those centered on the text to the situated audience. While they have paid more attention to the use of ethnography in cultural studies, my research incorporates different methodologies of survey, interviews, and textual analyses to enrich understandings of the Korean Wave. Moreover, I study the context of the production and the reception of the Korean Wave, and situate my survey respondents and interview informants in the greater context of a national audience in a consumer society.

#### **INTER-ASIA REFERENCING: IMPEDED REGIONALISM IN A POST-COLD WAR CONTEXT**

This dissertation corresponds to Asian scholars' efforts to construct a knowledge of Asia based on regional perspectives. These scholars suggest that due to the similar geopolitical experiences in the region—such as colonization and the Cold War—Asian cultures should consider each other as significant reference points more than their Euro-American counterparts (Chen, 2010; Iwabuchi, 2013). I consider my research treading the same path of such scholarship from the initial academic inquiries of inter-Asian cultural studies from the late 1990s as well as the trans-Asian cultural traffic in the mid-2000s, to inter-Asia referencing beyond the 2010s. I use Taiwan-Korea relationship as a case study to investigate the shifting imaginary geography of the Taiwanese people. This study has touched on the perceptual changes resulted from the complicated currents of cultural, economic, and physical movements within and beyond East Asia. I explored the encounters and clashes between global, regional, national, and individual actors. Today's Asia is a

region of interdependent communities with opportunities and conflicts; however, nationalist backlashes arose in response to regionalization although the connectivity among the nations has also generated certain levels of cooperation and increased cross-cultural knowledge.

As an academic regionalism, inter-Asia studies were initiated with intentions to increase understanding in the region by promoting harmony in domestic society (i.e. to criticize discrimination against Korean Japanese in Japan; Iwabuchi, 2013) or internationally (i.e. to problematize the antipathy between the two Koreas and Japan; *ibid*). This thread of scholarship suggests that regional harmony has been impeded by unresolved tension and the lack of a shared vision among political leaders and citizens. As previously discussed, although popular culture has seemed to encourage transnational cultural understanding in some studies (Mori, 2008; Noh, 2011), soft power is incapable of relieving the regional tension illustrated in this dissertation. My survey and interview informants produced very little discussion about transnational cooperation—although it has been common in business practices between Taiwanese and Korean industries. As Chapter 1 and 2 discussed, the relationship between Taiwan and Korea was more similar to opponents racing to get ahead of one another, instead of partners or fellow participants.

This dissertation, by studying the emergence of anti-Korean sentiments in Taiwan, aspires to increase the understanding between South Korea and Taiwan, as well as that of the greater global relations in the framework of electronic capitalism. My research design on the national audience (as individuals and as opposed to Korean Wave fandom) identifies the deeper conflicts between Taiwanese worker-consumers and the Korean competitor-manufacturers. I therefore argue that inter-Asia relations cannot be understood without probing into domestic political and economic ecologies. This dissertation contextualized the anti-Korean movement in Taiwan's particular position in regional politics and global

economic conditions. Furthermore, I maintain that the contemporary inter-Asian relationships should be examined in a post-Cold War context. I argue that the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific generates the rivalry between South Korea and Taiwan in two regards: the rise of South Korean and Taiwanese economies, and the rise of China. While this study has foregrounded the first factor—the Taiwanese and Korean economies—I also consider the China factor as the background of the anti-Korean sentiments.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has played a significant role in stimulating Taiwanese nationalism. As a legacy of the Cold War, the rivalry between the mainland and the island(s) still remains. Nevertheless, when the world is entering a new phase of post-Cold War order, the U.S. and other Asian countries have established formal diplomatic ties with China. China has been successfully re-integrated into the global capitalist system, and been recognized as a significant regional player in economics as well as politics. The rise of China has diminished Taiwan’s—officially the Republic of China (ROC)—international recognition. ROC has been losing official diplomatic relations from the height of 68 countries in 1969 to mere 22 countries in 2016 (Aima, 2013).

Kuang-hsing Chen (2010) suggested that Asia is still undergoing a process of decolonization, de-Cold War, and de-imperialization. According to Chen, these experiences have shaped particular “structure of sentiments” of the Taiwanese. The connection Chen made between the region’s past and the present is still valid when considering the antagonistic sentiments these nations and their sub-regions hold against each other. While South Korea has “changed camps” from the anti-Communist to pro-Communist (pro-PRC), Taiwan has developed a new relationship with the country. Examples of frustrated Taiwanese identity are found in international events in sports competitions, film awards, and other transnational disputes, as Chapter 4 discussed). The anti-Korean sentiments are therefore a newly emerging phenomenon, rather than a residual

problem. The sentiments of threat and victimhood are intensified by the economic and political rise of the People's Republic of China. With the PRC as a looming power that is able to threaten the independence and the sovereignty of the ROC in Taiwan, the Taiwanese citizens have expressed anxieties and protests against other international players who neglected the decency of Taiwanese de facto independence.

A post-Cold War framework, as a result, does not refer to a complete breakdown of previous Cold War rivalries but refers to the rearrangement of relations. The idea of the "post-" Cold War implies the connection between the Cold War rivalry and contemporary regional relations. As the region has become more interdependent in the current capitalist system, conflicts have arisen from time to time, corresponding to historical memories. Shin and Sneider (2007) examined the possibility of regionalism in Northeast Asia and suggested that these nations "must move beyond nation-state-oriented, binary victim/aggressor concepts and approaches" (p. 29). They argued that "the region has not seen any visionary leader...committed to cultivating regional reconciliation and cooperation," while, instead, "many leaders in Northeast Asia have often politicized the history problem for domestic nationalist consumption" (p. 30). Indeed, regionalism has been impeded by memories of previous and current conflicts among regional players, while the politicians take advantage of these opportunities to garner domestic support through patriotic sentiments.

The clashes of interests between Taiwan and South Korea have been intensified by the traumatic memories of the "victim/aggressor" relations which some Taiwanese citizens still preserve. These memories can further serve as significant means of identity formation. The sentiments of humiliation and insecurity that the nations experienced throughout the twentieth century have contributed to the emergence of nationalism in the region. The metaphor of the "orphan of Asia" that concluded Chapter 4 demonstrated the Taiwanese'

frustrations which arise periodically during international sports competitions. The emergence of anti-Korean movement was therefore closely connected to the surge of Taiwanese nationalism. In short, the rise of China explains the heightened tension between Taiwan and South Korea relationship in the post-Cold War Asia.

#### **NORTHEAST ASIA AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY**

Media Globalization at the turn of the millennium has developed into the emergence of new centers coexisting with the previous ones when signs of regionalization become prominent. The spread of Spanish-speaking telenovela in America and the Korean Wave in East Asia are examples of media regionalization. Scholars of global media have discussed the audience's preference over content that enjoy better cultural proximity than foreign content (Straubhaar, 2007). For example, through the "Korean Wave," people in Taiwan have been exposed to the imports of Korean culture and products in their everyday life—such as TV dramas, pop music, electronics, and food. Taiwanese media has reported on this phenomenon fervently, covering entertainment news of Korean celebrities, fan activities of Korean idol groups, success stories of the Korean industries, and, even, rumors about Korea. The media, as illustrated in this dissertation, is a conduit through which both the Korean Wave and the anti-Korean discourse are disseminated. In my research, I study Korea's national images in Taiwan; namely, how and what meanings are associated with Korea in the eyes of Taiwanese people. The research project focuses on transnational production, circulation, and the consumption of Koreanness. I study how a nation entered the imaginary geography of the Taiwanese people while they defined themselves against the foreign other.

Towards the end of the millennium, Asia has been fully integrated into the global economy and the world politics. Asia enjoyed rapid postwar developments, evident by the fact that its economic power advanced from a mere 5 percent in 1960 to 30 percent of world

GNP in early 2000s—equaling that of North America and Europe (Zhu, 2009). In particular, East Asia experienced economic and media liberalization in the latter half of the twentieth century, along with several cases of “economic miracles,” Japan, the little dragons—Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan—and China. Since the Cold War period, the capitalist camp has impressed the world with their economic achievements and has continued with the opening of China. International relations and economic relations affect each other mutually and rearranged the bilateral alliances made by the United States and its allies during and after the Cold War; however, observers found that the intense regionalization not only increased opportunities for international encounters but also enhanced antipathy in the Asia-Pacific (Jager & Mitter, 2007).

In East Asia, the end of the Cold War freed the opposing sides of the Cold War camps from previous alliances and prompted the nations to reflect on their imperial relationships with the U.S. as well as Japan, creating new relationships of cooperation and opposition. In this context, we see normalized Chinese-Japanese relations and rising anti-Korean sentiments in Taiwan—among other examples. Anxieties of the nations are a result of the uncertainties of the age when opportunities and risks are generated in a rapidly changing and densely interacting world.

This study aims to show that the politics of developmental productivity in the twentieth century East Asia left the nations a legacy to strive and compete with each other in the race of global electronic capitalism. I have explored the formation of the current South Korea and Taiwan relationship and the construction of Koreanness at this particular historical juncture. Given the rise of South Korea in its economic and media prowess, I study the interplay between globalization, regionalization, and nationalist backlashes in the Taiwanese society. As East Asia entered the post-Cold War era, Taiwan and South Korea’s relationship was complicated by the rise of China—a country of love-hate relationship with

Taiwan. The global economy conditions an international division of labor that results in new relationships and sentiments which overlap with the historical memories of war and imperialism among the nations. The logic of electronic capitalism has affected the global workers who live with an uncertain future when technology leaders are only a few steps ahead of the latecomers. The Taiwanese workers, as my dissertation informants revealed, are concerned about the competitive advantages of their national economy. They expressed the significance of productivity—whether one is willing to work hard and long enough for the national good. The dissertation has demonstrated how the construction of Koreanness manifested in my informants' everyday life, corresponding to their career struggles and a consumer lifestyle. The informants' contact with Korea allowed a peek into their life stories, including how they have worked, shopped, and viewed media context. These views are further a reflection of how Taiwanese have experienced and expressed insecurity in a precarious Taiwan in the early twenty-first century. I argue that the Taiwanese and Koreans are living in an era of electronic capitalism that produces the particular economic conditions and the cultural expressions of their time.

## Appendices

### Appendix A. Survey of Korea's National Image in Taiwan

The following is a translation of the electronic questionnaire I published in Chinese. It was not circulated and was only used for the purpose of IRB review. The questionnaire begins below:

Greetings! This is a survey of (your) views on Korea(ns). There are nine questions in total. Thank you for your participation.

*The survey is created by Tien-wen Lin, a doctoral student of the University of Texas at Austin. The purpose of research is to discuss the international relationship between Taiwan and Korea and Taiwanese people's use patterns of the media. Participants are not required to offer their names, and may leave personal information selectively for the use of data analysis. The results of research will be published in the form of dissertation or other academic means. If you have questions or suggestions, please send them to [twasianstudies@utexas.edu](mailto:twasianstudies@utexas.edu).*

1. What are your impressions on Korea(ns)? When you think of "Korea" or "Koreans", what persons, issues, or objects (things) will come to your mind? Are there any particular events that come to your mind?

2. Through what channels were your impressions on Korea(ns) from?  
(multiple choices are acceptable)

- Popular culture
- Travel experience
- Information circulates the internet
- News reports
- Viewing sport games

- Native Korean friends
  - Other. Please explain: \_\_\_
- 

3. a) Have you come across any stories about Korea(ns)? Can you list the stories as well as the means through which you heard about them?

b) Do you believe in the truthfulness of the story? Can you explain why you believe in, or question the truthfulness of the story?

4. a) Do you have any experience purchasing/consuming Korean products (including cultural products, such as media contents)? Please give examples.

b) What is the frequency of your purchase/consumption of Korean products

i. media products:

- regularly
- frequently
- occasionally
- rarely

ii. non-media products:

- regularly
- frequently
- occasionally
- rarely

5. How will you describe Korea, Korean; how will you define Koreaness?

6. When you think of “Korea”, is there a distinction between South Korea and North Korea?

7. Given the above experience, will your impressions on Korea lead to behavioral influences? (For example, consumer decisions, speech and expressions, participation in politics, or your interaction with Koreans.)

8. How would you describe the relation between Korea and Taiwan? What are the influences they brought to each other? Are you content with the relation between the two? Are you content with Korea's impact on Taiwan? What is your opinion?

9. Have you voiced your views on Korea(ns)? What was the contents and the ways through which you gave your opinions?

a) Please briefly describe the contents:

b) What were your means of expression:

- I never made such expressions.
- I forward the information to others through emails or social media.
- I had conversations with others (regarding my views on Korea/ns).
- I left comments on the Internet (e.g. via blogs, discussion forms,

Facebook...etc.)

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*At the end of the survey is for those who volunteer to offer some personal information. The survey is anonymous but you may choose to leave your information selectively. The following data will be conducive to analyzing the survey results; thank you for your participation!*

#### Information of Respondent

Occupation:

Location of your current residence (city and country):

Countries or regions where you have visited (as a resident) and the time span of your stay:

Sex:

Age:

- Below 12
- 12-18
- 18-30

- 31-40
- 41-50
- 51-60
- Above 60

Can you receive an interview regarding your responses to questions of this survey, focusing on issues on Korean culture and Taiwan-Korea relationship? If you do, please leave the email address with which you wish to be contacted: \_\_\_\_\_

**Appendix B. Field Notes Co-Authored by Informants and the Researcher**




Figure 1




Figure 2

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


Figure 5




Figure 6

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


Figure 7




Figure 8

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


Figure 9

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