The Dissertation Committee for Ryan Samuel Lloyd Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

Explaining Resilience in Clientelist Voting

Committee:

Robert Luskin, Supervisor

Zachary Elkins

Michael Findley

Henry Dietz

Robert Wilson

Mathieu Turgeon

Explaining Resilience in Clientelist Voting

by

Ryan Samuel Lloyd, BA; MA

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Dedication

To S. A. P. and J. L. And L. and G.

Acknowledgements

Finally, I thank Simone Lima, along with Lola and Gil. Our little family fills me with love and joy and I cannot wait to see how it grows in the coming years.

Explaining Resilience in Clientelist Voting

Ryan Samuel Lloyd, PhD

The University of Texas at Austin, 2016

Supervisor: Robert Luskin

The central argument of this dissertation is relatively counterintuitive: increases in income do not necessarily cause decreases in clientelist voting. A decline in clientelist voting—voting based on individualized, voluntary, and asymmetric transactions with politicians—requires the presence of another factor: a viable alternative to clientelist politicians. This, in turn, hinges upon institutional factors, particularly the effective number of parties of a given country. In countries with many different parties and candidates, increases in income will not affect levels of clientelist voting.

I draw on a variety of data to support my claim, including non-participant observation and interviews from the 2014 electoral campaign in Brazil, as well as Brazilian survey data, cross-national expert surveys on clientelism, and natural experiments using experimental trials of income transfer programs to pinpoint the effect of income on clientelist voting.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Um deputado está andando tranquilamente quando é atropelado e morre. A alma dele chega ao Paraíso e dá de cara com São Pedro na entrada.

"Bem-vindo ao Paraíso!" diz São Pedro. "Antes que você entre, há um probleminha. Raramente vemos parlamentares por aqui, sabe, então não sabemos bem o que fazer com você.

"Não vejo problema, é só me deixar entrar," diz o antigo deputado.

"Eu bem que gostaria, mas tenho ordens superiores. Vamos fazer o seguinte: você passa um dia no Inferno e um dia no Paraíso. Aí, pode escolher onde quer passar a eternidade.

"Não preciso, já resolvi. Quero ficar no Paraíso," diz o deputado.

"Desculpe, mas temos as nossa regras."

Assim, São Pedro o acompanha até o elevador e ele desce, desce, desce até o Inferno.

A porta se abre e ele se vê no meio de um lindo campo de golfe. Ao fundo o clube onde estão todos os seus amigos e outros políticos com os quais havia trabalhado. Todos muito felizes em traje social. Ele é cumprimentado, abraçado, e eles começam a falar sobre os bons tempos em que ficaram ricos às custas do povo. Jogam uma partida descontraída e depois comem lagosta e caviar. Quem também está presente é o diabo, um cara muito amigável que passa o tempo todo dançando e contando piadas. Eles se divertem tanto que, antes que ele perceba, já é hora de ir embora. Todos se despedem dele com abraços e acenam enquanto o elevador sobe.

Ele sobe, sobe, sobe, e porta se abre outra vez. São Pedro está esperando por ele.

"Agora é a vez de visitar o Paraíso."

Ele passa 24 horas junto a um grupo de almas contentes que andam de nuvem em nuvem, tocando harpas e cantando. Tudo vai muito bem e, antes que ela perceba, o dia se acaba e São Pedro retorna.

"E aí? Você passou um dia no Inferno e um dia no Paraíso. Agora escolha a sua casa eterna."

Ele pensa um minuto e responde:

"Olha, eu nunca pensei...O Paraiso é muito bom, mas eu acho que vou ficar melhor no Inferno."

Então, São Pedro o leva de volta ao elevador e ele desce, desce, desce até o Inferno.

A porta abre e ele se vê no meio de um enorme terreno baldio cheio de lixo. Ele vê todos os amigos com as roupas rasgadas e sujas catando o entulho e colocando em sacos pretos. O diabo vai ao seu encontro e passa o braço pelo ombro do deputado.

"Não estou entendendo," gagueia o deputado. "Ontem mesmo eu estive aqui e havia um campo de golfe, um clube, lagosta, caviar, e nós dançamos e nos divertimos o tempo todo. Agora só vejo esse fim do mundo cheio de lixo e meus amigos arrasados!"

O diabo olha para ele, sorri ironicamente e diz:

"Ontem, estávamos em campanha. Agora, já conseguimos o seu voto."

-Brazilian joke, unattributed

When I went out to the field in Brazil for my dissertation, I had a clear idea of what I expected to see. Much to my surprise, it was not what I saw.

In 2014, I tagged along with Brazilian election campaigns from all across the political spectrum, telling them I wanted to study voter-campaign relations. I would stay in the background, watch what happened, say nothing, and bother no one. That was not completely true. In fact, I was there to study clientelism, and I was to ask a good many questions.

At the time, center-left parties had presided over the national government for a past decade, and overseeing major decreases in poverty thanks to high-profile social programs like *Bolsa Família* (Barrientos 2013b; Barrientos and Santibáñez 2009a; F. V. Soares et al. 2006). Simultaneously, the old clientelist machines of the less-developed Northeast were crumbling. Paulo Souto, the candidate of Antônio Carlos Magalhães, so ubiquitous a presence that no one ever used his full name, just his initials, lost the governorship of Bahia to a leftist challenger in 2006. In Ceará, Tasso Jereissati and the center-right *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira* (Brazilian Social Democracy Party, or PSDB) had 24 years of domination ended by the Gomes brothers in 2006 (Andre Borges 2009). A few days after I arrived, Roseana Sarney, the daughter of ex-President

José, opted not to run for re-election in the Northeastern state of Maranhão, knowing she would lose. The old barons were dropping like flies.

The traditional view of the reasons for clientelism is that the poor sell their votes because they have to eat. Rich candidates buy them because it's cheap, and therefore efficient, to do so. Instead of trying to appeal to middle- and upper-class voters through either large gifts or mass media advertising, they can spend small amounts of money many times and guarantee large numbers of votes (See Banfield and Wilson 1963; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Hicken 2007; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013). But once the poor become less poor, vote buying makes less sense. The price increases, eventually surpassing what byers are willing to pay. Meanwhile, the poor, freed from economic necessity, start to vote based their true preferences.

That's what happened in the U.S. Our mostly forgotten clientelist past was consigned to history by the New Deal, with the government assuming more responsibility for citizens' basic needs and gradually running the old-time bosses out of business.[1] "Attacks upon the patronage system," says Shefter, "and efforts to construct issue-oriented party organizations in the wake of the 1932 realignment were led by New Deal liberals" who wanted the government to play a more active role in society (Shefter 1994,

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[1] It is, however, worth noting that the political machine lasted in some cities up through the 1960s where local politicians were able to coopt federal funds for partisan purposes. As Stave so eloquently put it, "the New Deal brought to Pittsburgh and its Democratic committeemen more than Roosevelt's program for recovery and reform. On the municipal level it brought the beginning of an unbroken Democratic voting tradition that extended at least through the 1960s; it also furnished the patronage that served as the initial lubricant for a continually well-oiled machine. For Pittsburg's Republicans the advent of the New Deal signified 'the Last Hurrah'; for the city's Democrats it sounded 'the First Hallelujah'" (Stave 1970, 182). This, however, was not the norm.

84). Reformers worked to pull the rug out from under the political bosses by obviating the need for their existence.

This was, I imagined, what was happening in Brazil. Clientelist machines were collapsing, and the center-left gaining popularity, because reduced poverty was leaving the poor free to abandon clientelist vote-buyers. Instead they could vote for their true preferences: the redistributive policies of the left.

When I began to shadow the 2014 campaigns, I was prepared to see left-leaning parties ascendant, touting successful anti-poverty policies from their years in power, and to see centrist and right-leaning vote-buying parties struggling to adjust to this new reality.

I quickly began to realize, however, that I had made at least one big mistake. Party had nothing to do with anything. Candidates were bewildered when I looked at my notes and asked them how much their parties dictated to them what to do on the campaign trail. Parties coordinate campaigns? The idea was dumbfounding. It became clear that that virtually no candidates even knew who was in his or her party's coalition. Parties, especially for legislative elections, just didn't matter.

This was a warning, but I still trusted in my instincts. Vote buying should be on its way down. When I followed a campaign that talked about how *other* campaigns bought votes, and the structure of their campaigns, and then, over time, revealed that they had virtually the same structure (while using different names for the positions), I could maybe rationalize that they didn't buy votes. It was a bit more difficult, though, when I saw a candidate's brother handing out money at a rally for people who wanted beer and

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food, but he said it wasn't for their votes. Dubious, but maybe an outlier? And something kept troubling me—lots of people were asking candidates for jobs and money, and they hardly seem coerced.

And then, as I got the hang of innocently asking the right questions, telling the right stories about the States, and staying quiet at the right moments, some politicians and advisors began to open up. The price of a vote was 50 *reais*, or about 15 USD. Funds were easy to come by for everyone, so the system was sustainable, even if expensive. It happened even in big cities, if not to the same extent. So many voters didn't pay attention to or didn't care about the election that you had to protect yourself by trying to buy undecided voters just before the election. Those who didn't learned the hard way how many undecideds there were—it was often more defensive than anything, preventing others from poaching from them; if they got extra, it was profit. They had no way of monitoring or enforcing votes besides seeing how many votes brokers delivered in given areas, and not re-hiring for the next election those who under-deliver. Even so, buying votes without guarantees was worth it. And again—party had nothing to do with it.

This is not to say that everyone I followed bought votes. Some candidates, even for state deputy, were steadfast in not offering money or gifts to voters, no matter the circumstances. They often used programmatic, and even technocratic appeals, promising either competent private-sector-style administration or wide-scale redistribution. One even opened his entire finances book up for me to look at, explaining expenses item by item. Yet the day after the election, when I checked the results to see how the candidates I followed had done, they all had one thing in comment: they had not been elected.

At last, I deleted my old dissertation title: it looked like "Explaining Declines in Clientelist Voting" wasn't going to fit any more.

THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT

The central argument of this dissertation is relatively counterintuitive: increases in income do not necessarily produce decreases in clientelist voting.

Clientelist voting is hardly a recent phenomenon. From Tammany Hall and the 19th-century UK to Ancient Athens and the Roman Republic,[2] clientelism—the exchange of money, goods, or in-kind benefits for votes between politicians and individual voters—has been an important and prominent way of winning votes. What causes people who used to vote clientelistically to stop voting on that basis? And, most importantly, what may cause that to not happen?

There is a tremendous amount of temporal and cross-sectional variation in the prevalence of clientelist voting, and it largely reminds unexplained. Most research on clientelism argues, either explicitly or implicitly, that clientelist voting is a result of poverty, or a deprivation of income and/or economic security (see Banfield and Wilson 1963; Scott 1972 and Hicken 2007 for good overviews; Stokes 2007; Stokes et al. 2013).

It stands to reason, then, that clientelist voting becomes less common as income and economic security increase. This point of view, however, is mistaken. Decreases in poverty can often be a contributing factor for declines in clientelist voting, and clientelist

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[2] In addition to the Roman Republic, there is also evidence that forms of patronage and clientelism were used in Ancient Athens and the Ancient Near East. See, for instance, Westbrook 2005; Yakobson 1999; Finley 1983; Gallant 1991.

voting is indeed much more common in places with lower levels of income, but this macro-correlation has yet to be seriously examined. In fact, declines in clientelist voting are not directly related to increases in income.

It should go without saying that there are many things which move voters' passions, and that politics is not reducible to a conflict over the distribution of economic resources. The affective and symbolic aspects of clientelist voting (ably described by Auyero 1999 and M. Borges 2016, among many others) are certainly relevant, for example. Identity is multifaceted, and voters can be prompted to vote on the basis of descriptive representation, partisan identity, and a host of other factors, regardless of income.

A decrease in poverty is not a sufficient condition for a decline in clientelist voting. This is because a decline in clientelist voting requires the presence of another factor: a viable alternative to clientelist politicians. Even if not particularly satisfied with a status quo of clientelist candidates, I argue that it is difficult for a voter to desire a non-clientelist candidate if such options are not realistically on the table. The demand side of the voting equation is inextricably linked with the supply side. Poverty can decrease indefinitely, but clientelist voting will remain the default behavior for a given voter unless a viable non-clientelist alternative emerges.

The emergence of a viable non-clientelist candidate depends first and foremost on the availability of alternative candidates who are viable and distinguishable from one another. The existence of this condition, in turn, depends on a variety of factors, both at the macro and the individual level. At the macro level, declines in clientelist voting can

only take place within a political system in which voters can easily distinguish candidates from one another. If one cannot identify the ideological positions, political proposals, and personal characteristics of each candidate and moreover, distinguish them from one another, any deviation from the status quo of clientelist voting will be improbable, if not necessarily impossible.

This is a tougher test than it may appear. For voters to become aware of alternative candidates, various social and systemic factors must fall into place. For instance, alternative candidates must have a means to reach voters with their messages. Furthermore, voters only have the willingness and ability to hold a certain amount of information about political candidates. There is a tangible difference between a voter's ability to understand and remember the differences between the policy platforms of two candidates and her ability to do the same for hundreds. As a result, electoral systems also affect voters' ability to identify viable alternatives to clientelist voting.

I aim to build a framework for analyzing the importance of clientelism as a determinant of vote choice in relation to other causal factors. I will then use this framework to explain why voters accustomed to voting clientelistically begin to base their votes on other factors, such as policy or candidate personality. My primary unit of analysis is the individual voter, but given the difficulty of measuring the influence of material benefits at the individual level, I plan to take a multilayered approach, using sub-municipal-level and national-level aggregate data as well.

I supplement my qualitative fieldwork in Brazil with quantitative data. These data include survey data from Brazil, cross-national expert surveys on clientelism, and natural

experiments using experimental trials of income transfer programs to pinpoint the effect of income on clientelist voting. Such measures are not perfect, direct measures of clientelist voting, but they complement each other by bringing different techniques to bear on the same question. And they all come to the same conclusion: decreases in clientelist voting only happen alongside increases in economic security in environments with highly structured information and many cues for voters. In other environments, changes in income are not guaranteed to have any effect.

A ROADMAP

Chapter 2 describes how clientelism has been used to win votes in Brazil since the 19th century, tracing changes over time. I argue that economic development and social policy programs have increased the economic security of a large swath of the Brazilian population, which should have, according to the conventional wisdom, weakened traditional vertical clientelist ties in Brazilian society. This, in turn, should have decreased the frequency of clientelist voting.

Chapter 3 outlines a heuristic theory of clientelist voting. I show that clientelist voting does not necessarily decrease as economic security increases; that the ability to easily and efficiently identify opposition candidates is also necessary. Money can serve as not only a bribe, but also as a voting cue, particularly in low-cue environments with large numbers of candidates. In this environment, it can be easy for voters to become indifferent in regards to which candidate wins, which means that they lose nothing in selling their votes to the highest bidder. As a result, increases in economic security can

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have little effect on clientelist voting in many circumstances—something that has thus far been overlooked by the literature.

Chapter 4 explains where my qualitative and quantitative data came from and how they were collected. The data I gathered myself included my non-participant observation, interviews, and survey data from my fieldwork in Brazil. I also used a cross-national dataset of expert judgments on clientelist activity in 88 different countries, as well as survey and public policy data from several countries who implemented random assignment of money at different geographic levels to test social policies.

Chapter 5 describes how Brazilian clientelism has survived despite increases in economic security for the poorest citizens. While some political changes have indeed taken place, any effect on clientelist voting has been limited. Vertical, long-term clientelism has often been replaced by shorter-term, more *ad hoc* vote buying, if indeed replaced at all.

Chapter 6 reports a natural experiment with data from a social program from Honduras. This program randomly assigned income windfalls to certain districts as trial projects, so I took advantage of that to analyze the effects of income on clientelist voting. I used survey data from the treatment and control districts, and used a diff-in-diff analysis to see how much of an effect the income had on clientelist attitudes and behaviors.[3]

Chapter 7 used data from the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) to test the conventional wisdom and my heuristic theory of clientelist voting.

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[3] I also conducted an analysis on a program from Mexico called, *Progresa/Oportunidades,* which I included in Appendix A.

The DALP is a survey of country experts with questions relating to specific aspects of clientelism. I crossed it with the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) dataset and found, with a linear regression, that increases in income did not affect clientelist voting in countries with a large effective number of political parties, which supported my theory.

Finally, Chapter 8 concludes by reviewing my findings and suggesting future avenues for research on clientelist voting.

Chapter 2: The Old School of Brazilian Clientelism

This chapter describes how clientelism has been used to win votes in Brazil since the 19th century, tracing its evolution over time. I argue that economic development and social policy programs have increased the economic security of a large swath of the Brazilian population, which should, according to conventional wisdom, have weakened traditional vertical clientelist ties in Brazilian society and thereby decreased the frequency of clientelist voting.

O VOTO DE CABRESTO: THE HORSE-COLLAR VOTE

Completely illiterate, or almost so, without healthcare, neither reading newspapers nor magazines, in which he is limited to looking at the illustrations, the rural worker, except in sporadic cases, has the patron as the figure of the benefactor. And it is from him, in all honesty, that he receives the only favors that his obscure existence knows. In his situation, it would be illusory to pretend that this new pariah was aware of his right to a better life and fought for it with civic Independence. The logic is what we witness: in the political plane, he fights with the "colonel" and for the "colonel." Those there are the votos de cabresto, *that result, in great part, from our rural economic organization"* (Nunes Leal 1978).[4]

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[4] My rough translation. The original in Portuguese is "*Completamente analfabeto, ou quase, sem assistência médica, não lendo jornais nem revistas, nas quais se limita a ver as figuras, o trabalhador rural, a não ser em casos esporádicos, tem o patrão na conta de benfeitor. E é dele, na verdade, que recebe os únicos favores que sua obscura existência conhece. Em sua situação, seria ilusório pretender que esse novo pária tivesse consciência do seu direito a uma vida melhor e lutasse por ele com independência cívica. O lógico é o que presenciamos: no plano político, ele luta com o "coronel" e pelo "coronel". Aí estão os votos de cabresto, que resultam, em grande parte, da nossa organização econômica rural.*"

So said Victor Nunes Leal in his classic text about clientelism in Brazil. Rural Brazilians did not vote their patrons' wishes by free will but rather because they were completely dependent on them. From this came the term *voto de cabresto*: the horse-collar vote.

Such domination, argued Nunes Leal, was a result of deeply rooted socioeconomic inequality. Clientelism, or "colonelism,"[5] as Nunes Leal dubbed it, referring to the domination of rural landowners over their clients, was a not a new problem in Brazil in 1948, when he wrote about it. From the age of colonialism on, *caboclos,* or local barons, had been associated with remote isolated areas (Prado Junior 1975, 211). Even in the era of which Nunes Leal wrote was marked by perennial conflict between large rural landowners and the more liberal reformer class, with the latter trying to circumvent the former to implement its reforms.

The Portuguese monarchy, lacking the resources themselves, outsourced the task of claiming what is now Brazil to its richer nobles. As a result, the state never really had dominion over many parts of Brazil—these nobles did what they want, ruling over their remote holdings as they saw fit (Pereira de Queiroz 1969). As so memorably documented by Euclides da Cunha in his classic 1902 book *Os Sertões* (roughly translatable as "the Backcountry"), the state had to send four military expeditions to subdue what it saw as a

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[5] He dubbed it *coronoelismo,* or colonelism, after the rural habit of dubbing a local boss "colonel" regardless of actual rank in the military. As far back as the 19th century, every city had a National Guard unit, and a high position in it was often associated with power. Over time, as Nunes Leal, explains, the distinction between the two became blurred in the *sertanejo* mindset (Nunes Leal 1978, 127).

dangerous rebel city, with the end results being far from ideal for anyone involved (Euclides da Cunha 1984).

These liberal reformers thought they had found the key in 1891 when they succeeded in extending suffrage to the popular classes. This was to be the deathblow for these political bosses; outnumbered by their erstwhile clients, they would soon be forced to yield power to them. Yet by most calculations, full suffrage did not have the desired effect. The large rural landowners remained the popular classes' only source of social and economic support, and as a result, full suffrage probably just gave them more votes (Pereira de Queiroz 1969). The Revolution of 1930 represented another conflict between these same groups, but even then, when the oligarchic Old Republic had been overthrown and the dust had settled, the rural landowners continued dominating politics as they always had (Fausto 1997; Pereira de Queiroz 1969, 85). In a nutshell, their power has proven to be extremely resilient throughout Brazilian history.

This existed in a backdrop of extreme scarcity for the vast majority of people. As Josué de Castro had written two years earlier than Nunes Leal, Brazil could be divided into five regions: two with endemic hunger (the Amazon and the Northeast sugar-producing regions), one of epidemic hunger (the rural Northeast), and two with sub-nutrition (the Center and the South) This was, for him because of the highly unequal distribution of land, to which the vast majority of people had no claim (Castro 1984).

When it came to elections, this meant that arranging support was not necessarily a huge worry for the large landowners. Nunes Leal argued that "without money and without direct interest, the country-dweller would not make the smallest sacrifice" to

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vote. As a result, all the patron had to do was provide lodging, meals, transportation, and documentation, and he'd be happy to vote for him. After all, "it's perfectly understandable that the voter in the backwoods would obey the directions of whoever pays him, and with insistence, to practice an act to which he is completely indifferent" (Nunes Leal, 1978, p. 30-31).

To sum up, political leaders used socioeconomic power to influence elections in Brazil, ensuring that votes that were cast were cast for their preferred candidate (which was often them themselves). This system of clientelism was personalist, based on individuals, not the state or parties. While goods were often exchanged, the tie that bound patrons and clients was not so much a quid-pro-quo exchange as it was domination. One disobeyed the local boss at her peril. And it had deep roots: the historian Richard Graham opined that "clientelism worked for some, if not for others, and it preserved a structure that only a revolution could destroy" (R. Graham 1999, 2).

Nunes Leal attributed this longevity to the fundamental inequality of Brazil's agrarian society at the time. He argued that the unequal distribution of land in rural areas put clients at the mercy of their patrons. "The country-dweller sees in the 'colonel' a rich man, even if he isn't one, in comparison with his unsolvable poverty. (…) The country-dweller appeals to the 'colonel' in moments of need, taking out credit from his store to pay with his harvest, or asking for money, under the same conditions, for other

necessities" (Nunes Leal, 1978, p. 24).[6] Clientelism, then, was the result of structural

socioeconomic factors that put some citizens at the mercy of others; its "decomposition"

would only be complete when there had been a "fundamental alteration of our agrarian

structure" (Nunes Leal 1978, 126). Anything less and the changes would be merely

superficial.

This all sounded quite pessimistic. A fundamental alteration in the economic

structure of a country is not something one should expect to happen quickly. Yet that is

arguably what has happened over the several decades since he published his work. It is

open to interpretation whether the Brazilian socioeconomic landscape has been

fundamentally altered to a degree that would have satisfied Nunes Leal. But altered, and

to a large degree? Without a doubt.

URBANIZATION AND RE-DEMOCRATIZATION

A key process towards the remaking of Brazilian society, however, was already

underway. While Brazil went through a number of social and political changes during the

mid-late 20th century, including the small matter of a military coup in 1964, one of the

most enduring changes has been the urbanization process. In 1940, Brazil's urban

population was 31.3%. By 1991, it was 74.8% (Botega 2007). By 2010, it was 84.36%.[7]

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[6] My rough translation. The original in Portuguese is "*o roceiro vê sempre no "coronel" um homem rico, ainda que não o seja; rico, em comparação com sua pobreza sem remédio.(...) para o próprio "coronel" que o roceiro apela nos momentos de apertura, comprando fiado em seu armazém para pagar com a colheita, ou pedindo dinheiro, nas mesmas condições, para outras necessidades.*"

[7] According to IBGE, Brazil's statistical agency

The first wave of urbanization started in the 1960s and 1970s. This wave of immigration was inter-state, from clearly rural areas to clearly urban areas (Cunha 2005). It was here that Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo became the metropolises that they currently are, with tens of millions of people. The new city of Brasília was also a draw for hundreds of thousands of migrants.

The second wave began in the 1980s, and was primarily intra-regional. In the North and Northeast, traditionally poorer regions of Brazil, capital cities such as Recife, Manaus, and Salvador began to attract more people from the countryside (Cunha 2005). More than that, though, mid-size cities also began to attract more internal migrants from the countryside, partially as a response to the further mechanization of the agribusiness industry and the deepening of Brazil's insertion into the global economy (Elias 2008).

What this meant as that the delimitations between the rural and the urban became increasingly more blurred (Cunha 2005). Some scholars argue that one should not even use the division between urban and rural areas to describe Brazil now—cities and the countryside have bled into one another. Instead, the true division is between "urban Brazil with agricultural areas" and "agricultural Brazil with urban areas" (Elias 2008).

Another important change over the mid-late 20th century was the termination and re-introduction of democracy to Brazil. In 1964, the military led a coup d'etat and subsequently ruled the country until 1985, when legislative elections were held for the first time since the coup. Direct presidential elections were held for the first time in 1989, one year after a Constituent Assembly had finished writing a new constitution.

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The Constitution of 1988 was written by a Constituent Assembly of Congressmen who had been elected in 1986, and it ended up enshrining a variety of rights, among them the right to *habeas corpus,* the right to *habeas data* (the right to know what information exists about one in government data banks), the right to humane treatment in prison, and the right to education. It also enshrined several freedoms, including the freedom of speech, the freedom of religion, the freedom of the press, and the freedom from torture (Rosenn 2011). The actual enforcement of these rights has been uneven in practice, but it nevertheless has made an important impact on Brazilian politics and society.

Among the leaders of the reform movement at the 1988 Constituent Assembly were the *sanitaristas:* health professionals, local health authorities and left-wing health experts. They wanted more focus on universal access and basic preventive medicine, and less focus on expensive curative medicine. In the end, they won, and the 1988 Constitution proclaimed a universal right to health care, as well as the state's obligation to meet it through a free, universalized health system, the *Sistema Único de Saúde* (SUS).

This was a major victory given the paucity of health care for the vast majority of Brazilians up to that point. During the military regime, health coverage was effectively restricted to employees in the formal sector, with half of the population having no health insurance at all (Workman 1997). Curative health care took priority over preventative healthcare, and the system relied on cooperation with the private sector to provide these services, leaving only the upper- and middle-class with access to it (Rogers 1997).

The *sanitaristas'* victory, however, was only partial. They did not get a law passed to nationalize *all* health care. Conservative politicians had opposed this measure

partially because they were afraid it would threaten their clientelist networks (Hunter and Borges Sugiyama 2009), which included selective access to health systems in exchange for political support (Caetano and Potter 2004).

Health policies have been decentralized since 1990, and SUS has been managed locally since 1993 (Arretche 2003), but cities often fought with one another for government funds in the 1990s, especially as more municipalities were created over time and gained more influence, forming direct links with the national government.

In the end, despite public health care's enshrinement in the Constitution, its improvement has been incremental and uneven. Private health care exists alongside the SUS system, and is still the reserve of the middle- and upper-classes. Some of these private hospitals receive federal funds to accept SUS patients while others simply do not, relying only on their own income. Despite its improvements, the poor are stuck with SUS while the middle- and upper-classes have the option to go to the private system, with its higher levels of efficiency and quality (Almeida et al. 2000).

Even so, the improvement over the previous health system has been drastic. Take, for example, the infant mortality rate in the 1940s: Castro cited figures above 300 deaths per 1,000 births (Castro 1984). In the early 1990s, the Northeast still had serious problems with infant mortality—the state of Alagoas had an infant mortality rate of 223 per 1,000 births in 1991 (Rogers 1997). Yet by 2002, the national rate was 30 per 1,000 births (Filho and Rissin 2003).

Another change in the late 20th century were the mechanics behind voting. Monitoring voting became much more difficult with the passage of the *Lei de Eleições*

(Lei 9504/97—the Law of Elections) in 1997. Article 41-A of this law punished vote buying with fines and the annulment of the offending candidate's registration. If the candidate had won the election before he/she was charge, then he/she is to be removed from office. The *Lei de Eleições* prohibits giving, promising, offering, or delivering a good or personal advantage of any kind with the goal of obtaining votes.[8] It also prohibits taking pictures in the polls in order to prevent candidates from requiring voters to provide photos of their votes.[9]

Brazil has a large degree of systemic inequality, especially given the country's overall level of wealth. Before the 1988 Constitution, social assistance was at best residual in Brazil. The state was hands-off with pensions and social insurance, following something approximable to a Bismarckian liberal model (Lewis and Lloyd-Sherlock 2009). Although over 70% of the labor force was covered by social insurance by the end of the 1970s, social assistance was still a regressive policy because it only covered workers in the formal sector and required contributions, which excluded a very large informal sector (Barrientos and Santibáñez 2009b).

In fact, social assistance tended to benefit the middle and upper class, especially government employees. (Hunter and Borges Sugiyama 2009).[10] These pensions tended to

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[8] See http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L9504.htm to see the text of the law in full (in Portuguese).
[9] This, however, has had the side effect of putting some voters eager to show their civic pride by taking voting selfies in hot water. See Fabiano 2014; Martinho 2014.
[10] In fact, this has not really changed. As of 2002, almost half of pension expenditures still go to civil servants, which only get 5% of pensions in terms of raw numbers. It is extremely difficult to reform this because civil servants are organized and powerful, and many presidents have failed to do so (Bonturi 2002). In fact, as of 2003, every government employee, whether *concursado* or *comissionado,* and whether they have ever contributed or not, qualifies for pensions (Hunter and Borges Sugiyama 2009). The current

be excessive and expensive, which meant that scarce government resources were spent on privileged classes rather than the poor. (Bonturi 2002)**.** Furthermore, the Brazilian government has historically been very ineffective in getting resources to poor people; one official once remarked that government resources would have a better chance of actually reaching the poor if simply "dropped from a plane" (quoted in Hunter and Borges Sugiyama 2009).

One exception to this rule was *O Fundo de Assistência ao Trabalhador Rural* (FUNRURAL, or the Rural Worker Assistance Fund), an early non-contributory pension fund for rural workers. However, it was very underfunded until the 1960s, and even when it was relaunched as Pro-Rural in 1971, provided limited benefits (Barrientos 2013a). Between 1970 and 1980, the percentage of the economically active Brazilian population covered by social insurance schemes jumped from 27% to 87%, mostly because of expansion to the FUNRURAL program. Yet FUNRURAL was really the only exception to the liberal Bismarckian contributory scheme Brazil had in place. (Lewis and Lloyd-Sherlock 2009)

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structure of traditional social welfare is still quite generous: the benefits from the *Regime Geral da Previdência Social* is capped at R$3088.99/month. Contributory and retirement benefits can be collected at 65 for men and 60 for women in urban areas and 60 for men and 55 for women in rural areas. Retirement can be collected after 35 years for men and 30 for women. Public servants' Welfare Policies are mandatory and have mandatory retirement at 70 years and 35 years of contribution for men and 30 for women. Complementary Welfare is voluntary and pays out pensions to about 6.5 million people with an average value of $R3,400/month. RGPS covered 65.1% of the employed population in 2007, according to the *Ministério de Previdência Social* (MPS), which was an improvement from recent years. About 90 million people, or 50% of the population, do not participate in any welfare program, and only 44.8 million people contribute to the basic policy (Welfare 2009)**.** The Brazilian pension system has not necessarily gotten more efficient; it is just that other social assistance programs seem to have improved.

The economic problems of the 1980s, however, and the Constituent Assembly of 1988 combined to start a process of innovation regarding social assistance. While the 1988 Constitution paid more attention to old-age poverty than to other problems such as child poverty, it also established a universal right to social assistance and a citizenship component to receiving social assistance (Hall 2008). Meanwhile, market reform and economic problems gave further impetus to finding innovative programs of social assistance on the cheap. Together, these two factors provided a basis for the social assistance programs that were to follow (Barrientos 2013a).

THE TURN OF THE 21ST CENTURY

The last two decades have seen a drastic change in the living conditions of many Brazilians. Reductions in poverty and increases in economic security took place on a large scale, partially down to a variety of social programs enacted during the terms of Presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) and Lula (2003-2010).

And yet, despite an increase in urbanization and a decrease in monitorability, little had changed in the political sphere. Most vote buying, or *troca de favores* (exchange of favors), took place through individual candidates, not centralized parties. Brazilian politicians have the incentive to cultivate personal votes rather than party votes—after all, as Samuels (1999) pointed out, why try to win votes for your party if it only ensures that another politician gets in office? In 1998, one scholar summed up the conventional wisdom of a generation of Brazilianists by lamenting that clientelism that penetrated every aspect of Brazilian politics, leading the government to ignore citizens' demands and turning elections into localized fights over the distribution of spoils (Gay 1998)

Social assistance, or tax-financed programs addressing poverty and inequality, is an essential part of social policy in Brazil, and indeed, has become quite popular in many parts of Latin America. (Barrientos 2011a). In fact, 25% of households are reached by social assistance programs—only health and education programs reach more people (Barrientos 2011b)—but it was not always this way.

One program has received the vast majority of attention, both nationally and internationally, having become a key campaign issue in recent presidential campaigns and also receiving World Bank funding and acclaim. *Bolsa Família* (BF, or Family Grant in English) is a conditional cash transfer program that is a combination and expansion of four previously existing social assistance programs: *Bolsa Escola* (School Grant)*, Cartão Alimentação* (Food Card)*, Auxílio Gás* (Gas Assistance)*,* and *Bolsa Alimentação* (Food Grant).

The component programs of BF stemmed from a number of policy experiments developed by individual municipalities, such as Campinas, in the 1990s. Most of these policies revolved around either establishing guaranteed minimum incomes for all citizens in a given area or transferring cash to the poor as long as they adhered to certain conditionalities. These conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) sought to combine income transfers with the building of human capital (Barrientos and Santibáñez 2009b). Individual states, such as the Federal District under Cristovam Buarque, eventually began to adopt these types of programs, too. The *Programa de Garantia de Renda Mínima* (PGRM), championed by Eduardo Suplicy, and *Bolsa Escola,* (a conditional cash transfer program whose payments were predicated upon school attendance), championed by

Buarque, became national policies in the late 1997 and 2001, respectively, under President Cardoso. From there, though, their paths diverged; the PGRM became law, but has never been implemented in full, whereas *Bolsa Escola* became the predecessor for BF (Coêlho 2013)**.**

One problem with social assistance in the early 2000s was a lack of coordination among government programs and a lack of engagement from beneficiary populations. Social assistance policies were poorly targeted, and did not go to the places with the largest quantities of poor people: Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Norte, and Espírito Santo, for instance, received far more funding than they needed, whereas Bahia received far too few resources. *Bolsa Escola* had already improved this maldistribution, but programs were poorly integrated with another, and there were big differences in accessibility of programs for different poor people. It was not uncommon for a given mother to qualify for employment training, but run into trouble claiming her day care access (Barros and Carvalho 2003). In short, there was very little coordination between municipalities, states, and the national government. Many federal programs were applied the same way to very different regions.

When Lula came to power after the end of Cardoso's term, he remedied these coordination problems by centralizing *Bolsa Escola, Cartão Alimentação, Auxílio Gas,* and *Bolsa Alimentação* under the control of one ministry, the *Ministério de*

Desenvolvimento Social (MDS, or Ministry of Social Development).[11] Much of the administration of BF is municipalized through *Conselhos de Controle Social* (Social Control Councils), whose members are chosen by a given municipality's mayor. Each municipality must use this council to collect their own data, register beneficiaries, and monitor adherence to the conditionalities of the program (Hall 2006). Beneficiaries of are determined by comparing a given citizen's per-capita income to a national poverty line. (Barrientos and Santibáñez 2009b). These data are then uploaded to a central federal registry, the *Cadastro Único*. The federal government then double-checks the selection of beneficiaries and has the final decision (F. V. Soares et al. 2006). In this way, municipalities establish a direct link with the federal government, bypassing the state government. Voters also began to establish a direct link between the national executive and the benefits they received from BF (Andre Borges 2013).

BF targets households in extreme poverty. The main qualifications for entering the program are that one's children maintain a certain level of school attendance and have full immunization schedules. BF provides households with monthly per-capita incomes up to R$170 (US$53) with a per-child stipend of R$39 (US$12), and it provides household with monthly per-capita incomes below R$85 (US$26) with an additional

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[11] The *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT), led by Lula, had been a staunch opponent of programs such as *Bolsa Escola* launched under Cardoso, refusing to negotiate. When Lula came to office, however, he took a centrist position and not only maintained the program but expanded it by creating BF. Lula faced less opposition with his social policy reform and was more successful than Cardoso. This was because other parties were not as organized as the PT, and were therefore more accommodating oppositions; besides, the PSDB had always wanted this type of reform in any case. Furthermore, while neither Lula nor FHC had a majority in Congress after the elections, Lula traded tax reform for governors' support of his reform. (Melo and Anastasia 2005).

monthly stipend of R$85. BF is funded by the federal government and was implemented by municipalities, who find potential applicants and help them get registered for the program (Barrientos 2013a; Beck Fenwick 2009). Benefits are distributed directly through an electronic card that can be used at ATM machines. As of 2013, BF reaches 12.3 million families in Brazil (Barrientos 2013a).

BF seems to have improved the material conditions of the poorest citizens in Brazil, allowing many of them to escape extreme poverty (Beck Fenwick 2009; Dickowick 2006; Andre Borges 2007), and some scholars have estimated that *Bolsa Família* has been responsible for a 12 percent reduction in poverty in Brazil (F. V. Soares, Ribas, and Osorio 2010, 179). While BF has indeed been accused by some, primarily on the right, of being a tool of clientelism, Brazilian voters seem to see it differently; they know that it comes from the federal government and that they will continue to receive benefits from it no matter whom they vote for (Borges Sugiyama and Hunter 2013).

Despite reaching almost 13 million households, or 25% of Brazil, BF only costs 0.4% of Brazil's GDP per year. The 2004 *Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios* (PNAD, or National Study by Household Sample) showed that Brazil's Gini index score fell 4.75% between 1995 and 2004. According to Soares et al., 21% of that drop was due to the effects of BF (32% due to pensions, but pensions also took up far more resources than BF or BPC) (F. V. Soares et al. 2006). Between 2001 and 2005, the income of the poorest ten percent grew 7.9% per year (Hunter and Power, 2007). Its success with long-term capital accumulation, however, has been more mixed, even though receipt of BF

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funds is conditional upon vaccination and school attendance. This is because the monitoring of these conditionalities is not great—only 59% of recipients were monitored for the health conditionality in the second semester of 2008, and 85% were monitored for school attendance (F. V. Soares, Ribas, and Osorio 2010).

BF was an unusually credible program because of how it was implemented. While government programs are often complex and difficult to understand for the average citizen, BF is simple and easy to grasp, even for citizens who may be politically unsophisticated. Municipalities reach out to citizens they think might be eligible for BF and sign them up, integrating them into a single database. This is because municipalities receive grants directly from the federal government, bypassing state governments, which are often focal points of corruption and patronage, and the amount of money that they receive depends on how many people they sign up (Barrientos 2013a; Beck Fenwick 2009; Borges Sugiyama and Hunter 2013). Moreover, the distribution of benefits is remarkably simple: money is distributed to beneficiaries through an ATM card, and benefits are simply withdrawn each month through this card.

BF, however, is not the only large-scale social assistance program that has been influential in reducing poverty. The *Benefício de Prestação Continuada* (Continuing Cash Benefit, or BPC) program is a non-contributory pension that covers elderly and disabled people in extreme poverty. Recipients receive the equivalent of one minimum wage (R$880, or US$276, for 2016) every month as long as they live in a household that makes less than ¼ of the minimum wage and are either disabled or older than 65, and.

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The BPC is financed from the federal budget and covered 3.1 million people as of 2013 (Barrientos 2013a).

Even though it has not received nearly as much scholarly attention as BF, the BPC has also had a strong effect on poverty (F. V. Soares et al. 2006). It is an extension to the military regime's *Renda Mensal Vitalícia* (Lifelong Monthly Income) program, which was implemented in 1996 under the Cardoso administration (Barrientos 2013a). Now, 86.2% of people aged over 65 have pension coverage (Hall 2008). BPC and other pension programs seem to have had strong effects on the reduction of poverty (Barrientos 2013a) and income inequality, with 7% of Brazil's drop in Gini coefficient due to BPC, according to Soares et al. (F. V. Soares et al. 2006). As with BF, is also run by the MDS.

These are not the only programs that have made an impact on life for the poorest Brazilians. *Projeto Minha Casa Minha Vida* (the My Home, My Life Project, or PMCMV) has become a very well-known social program, subsidizing the purchase of homes for low- and middle-income families (families earning up to 10 times the minimum wage). Priority goes to families earning up to R$1600 (US$503/month). Launched in 2009, it had, as of 2016, built 2 million homes, with the construction of 2 million more having already been agreed (Kopper 2016). Determining who receives this subsidized housing has been left up to municipal authorities until recently, with many municipal authorities using a public federal bank to determine recipients through lotteries (Santos and Duarte 2010).

The *Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil* (the Child Labor Eradication Program, or PETI) has been another program aiming to use state resources to provide

basic services for the poor. PETI gave income transfers to poor families (earning at most half the minimum wage) who ensure that their children attended school (and an after-school program) at least 80% of the time. In return, the family would receive amounts ranging from R$25 (US$7) per child per month in rural areas to R$40 (US$12) per child per month in urban areas.[12] It was started in 1996, and by 2002, had reached more than 800,000 children throughout the country (Carvalho 2004). It has, as expected, decreased the rate of child labor, as well as improving the test scores of the children receiving the grant (Yap, Sedlacek, & Orazem, 2002).

TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE?

So what has happened in the 68 years since Nunes Leal wrote about clientelism? Brazil is no longer an agrarian society and it looks far different than the Brazil that Nunes Leal knew when he wrote *Coronelismo.* Have its socioeconomic foundations been fundamentally altered?

Perhaps. On the one hand, Brazil has not solved its inequality problem and eliminated dominant power relations in its rural areas. In fact, rural labor still often works in serf-like circumstances, with labor laws flouted and living conditions feudalistic; the Ministry of Labor and Employment even compiles a list of employers who are caught using labor in slave-like conditions (Sakamoto 2016). Poverty, particularly in rural areas, is still a very relevant problem for Brazil, if not on the average city-dweller's radar.

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[12] Some states had slightly different rules, as it was not completely standardized across states.

On the other hand, there is no denying that Nunes Leal's condition has in large part been fulfilled. The lot of the poor is no longer so desperate. Among other things, extreme poverty and food insecurity has plummeted over the past few decades. The rate of stunted growth among children five years old and under was more than halved between 1975 and 1996 in both rural and urban areas; the rate of underweight women in rural areas decreased over the same period from 11.2% to 7.4% (Batista Filho & Rissin, 2003). In 1976, based on measures of caloric necessities, 42.85% of Brazil's population was poor and 18.42% was extremely poor. By 2014, those figures were 13.29% and 4.2% respectively, according to IPEA, a public Brazilian federal foundation fr economic research.

Brazil is far from a purely agrarian society today. São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro are two of the largest cities in the world, but more than that, secondary cities have grown enormously quickly; urbanization is now higher than 80%. Moreover, local bosses are no longer the only resource for the poor when they are in need, with the government having taken on the mantle of providing basic social services.

But has Brazil done away with clientelism? As we will see in Chapter 5, clientelist voting has far from disappeared in Brazil. Nunes Leal may well have been right—clientelist voting may not have disappeared without fundamental changes in Brazil's agrarian society. But that does not *alone* mean that those changes would necessarily kill off clientelist voting. The deep socioeconomic changes that have taken place in Brazil may have been necessary but insufficient for clientelist voting to decline.

Chapter 3: Theory

In *The Last Hurrah,* a journalist nephew accompanies his uncle on his campaign, marvels at his political skill and efficiency, but is shocked to see him fall to a crushing defeat at the hands of a weak political novice. Afterward, he tries to make sense of it with an older, wiser friend:

> *"'All you have to remember is one name: Roosevelt."*
>
> *Adam stared at him.* "Roosevelt?"
>
> *"Because," Jack said patiently, "he destroyed the old-time boss. He destroyed him by taking away the source of his power… the old boss was strong because simply because he held all the cards. If anybody wanted anything—jobs, favors, cash—he could only go the boss, the local leader. What Roosevelt did was to take the handouts out of the local hands. A few little things like Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, and the like—that's what shifted the gears, sport.'"*
>
> *… "For a moment Adam was silent; then he said slowly, 'Then you think, really, that under these circumstances, almost anybody could have beaten my uncle?'"*
>
> *"Almost anybody did, sport."*
>
> (O'Connor 1956, 374, 376)

Such is the predominant, and plausible, argument about clientelist voting: it is something that poor countries and poor people do. Scott argued in 1969 that the "perhaps the most fundamental quality shared by the mass clientele of machines is poverty" (Scott 1969, 1150)—after all, as Banfield and Wilson noted, "almost without exception, the lower the average income," the more dependable wards were to American political machines (Banfield and Wilson 1963, 118). "It is impossible to survey the qualitative literature on political clientelism," says Stokes (2007, 617), "without concluding that it is a feature disproportionately of poor countries."

As a result, the conventional wisdom is that increasing economic security decreases clientelist voting, and it seems to follow: taking away the main correlate of clientelist voting would seem to nip it in the bud.

This chapter argues that this line of thinking is somewhat, but not entirely, right. Clientelist voting is indeed affected by decreases in political parties' monitoring ability, but it need not decrease as *economic security* increases. This is because money can serve not only as a bribe, but also an information heuristic, in environments with highly unstructured information due to surpluses of candidates. In this environment, voters become demotivated about seeking out information about candidates, and—unless they already have prior party identification—are indifferent about which candidate wins. In these situations, they lose nothing by selling their votes to the highest bidder.

As a result, increases in economic security have little effect on clientelist voting in countries with high numbers of parties—something that has thus far been overlooked by the literature. I argue that, while monitoring ability and party identification do affect the rate of clientelist voting (positively and negatively, respectively), income only affects it in countries with few parties, such as Honduras (my country of interest in Chapter 6), but not in countries with many parties, such as Brazil (my country of interest in Chapter 5). FDR could not have killed off the local bosses if his heirs had numbered in the hundreds, competed against one another, and nobody knew or cared about them.

THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT: EXPLAINING CLIENTELIST VOTING

We know much about many of the influences on voting behavior—candidate characteristics (Fridkin and Kenney 2011; Funk 1996, 1999), retrospective performance

(Fiorina 1981; Key 1966; Kramer 1971; Achen and Bartels 2004; Kiewiet and Rivers 1984), and policies (Downs 1957; Grofman 1985; Jackson 1975; Tomz and Van Houweling 2008), for instance—but not all of them. A neglected but important variable is the individualized benefit at the heart of clientelist politics. What makes some voters weigh such benefits more or less heavily than the appeal of a candidate, his/her past performance, or his/her policies? The short answer is that we do not know.

I define clientelist voting as voting predicated on individualized benefits obtained from voluntary but asymmetric relationships. Individualized benefits are benefits such as money, goods, favors, or in-kind benefits that are given directly to an individual voter in exchange for political support.[13] An essential characteristic of this relationship is its being individualized—voters enter into individual compacts with patrons and are expected to uphold their end of the bargain by voting for their patron, often running the risk of punishment if they do not.

Clientelist voting is voluntary because it is an exchange, not a relationship imposed by fiat; clients enter into agreements with patrons (see Hilgers 2008, 125; Kitschelt 2000, 849). It is also, however, asymmetric (see, for instance, Graziano 1976); the patron inherently has more power by virtue of his/her superior socioeconomic position and/or access to the state, and can therefore offer benefits to others who are less fortunate, threatening punishment if they suspect the client has reneged on the agreement (Kaufman 1974).

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[13] This definition is similar to Susan Stokes' definition of clientelism as "the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that patron uses is simply: did you (will you) support me?" See Stokes 2007, 604–605.

This definition focuses on the voter's side of the equation, and encompasses several different types of related phenomena. It is voting that can be based on "clientelism" in the broadest and most commonly used sense: a long-term, often affective, relationship between patron and client in which the client depends on the patron, living in the same community as her (Hilgers 2011; Kaufman 1974; Lemarchand and Legg 1972, 151). It also can be based on "vote buying," which is generally conceptualized as a short-term transactional arrangement often taking place on the eve of the election (Schaffer 2007). It also can be based on "patronage," or the distribution of public jobs and positions in exchange for votes and political support (Remmer 2007; Robinson and Verdier 2013; Stokes 2007).

All these phenomena are included in my definition of clientelist voting because they share the essential characteristics of individualized benefits (benefits directed to specific people, not to groups of people), voluntariness (clients voting of their own free will, not due to overt coercion), and asymmetry (the patron having more power and socioeconomic influence than the client). This excludes several related concepts, such as pork barrel politics and populist redistribution programs because they are directed to groups of people or districts, not individuals (Hilgers 2008; Stokes 2007).[14]

In several senses, clientelist voting is not all-or-nothing, either ecologically or on an individual level. Ecologically, not all voting is necessarily or typically clientelist even in areas and at times where and when it is prevalent. As a matter of the individual voter's

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[14] *Bolsa Familia* often is criticized by the Brazilian right as being clientelist, but under my definition, it does not count because it is not directed toward individuals specifically, but rather people with a pre-defined set of characteristics.

calculus, some of those swayed by clientelist considerations may also base their votes on policy proximity (voting for the candidate/party whose policy positions are closest to the voter's),[15] candidate factors (voting for the candidate with the most appealing personality or background),[16] or retrospective judgments of the parties or candidates (voting on the basis of the goodness or badness of "the times").[17] Any one vote may reflect all these and other considerations in varying proportions, and the proportions need not be same in every vote cast by a given voter. A voter may base his or her vote for president chiefly on party, his or her vote for governor chiefly on policy, and his or her vote for state-level congressman chiefly on individualized benefits.

Likewise, for the parties and candidates waging campaigns, clientelism often coexists with other strategies.[18] Some may rely more heavily on clientelism to win votes, and others more heavily on policies, charisma, descriptive representation, or other factors. This too is seldom all-or-nothing: candidates using clientelism often also make policy-based appeals, just as more policy-focused parties often make clientelistic ones.

As a result, clientelism needs to be treated just like—and alongside—other determinants of vote choice. Its importance varies from country to country, from voter to voter, and from election to election. It is one explanatory variable, albeit an important one, among many. I attempt to do this here. I estimate a number of effects (not just

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[15] See, for instance, Downs 1957; Grofman 1985; Jackson 1975; Tomz and Van Houweling 2008.

[16] See, for instance, Fridkin and Kenney 2011; Funk 1996, 1999. Some characteristics, such as charisma, remain understudied, however.

[17] Some of the most influential works in this vein include Fiorina 1981; Key 1966; Kramer 1971. Also see Achen and Bartels 2004; Kiewiet and Rivers 1984 for useful reviews of this literature.

[18] Works that take this perspective are relatively rare, but do exist. See, for instance, Lindberg and Morrison 2008, for one example applied to the context of Ghana.

clientelism's) on vote choice, each controlling for others. This analysis will help explain
how and why the importance of individual benefits can decrease significantly and
permanently, as has already happened in many democracies.

THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM

The most common—and often implicit—argument in the clientelist literature is
that increases in economic security will lead to decreases in clientelist voting. Without
sufficient economic security, so the argument goes, voters will feel more pressure to sell
their votes. When they reach a sufficient level of economic security, however, they will
begin to vote on the basis of heretofore latent motivations that they had been sublimating
in the face of economic necessity.

Increases in economic security could be accomplished through general increases
in income for a given population, or through social programs that guarantee access to
essential resources, such as income, food, or education. With the benefits in which
clientelist politicians trade already secured, the overtures that used to work no longer
would. Clientelist voting should therefore decrease as economic security increases.

This could happen because of two reasons that could either act independently or
complementarily. The first is marginal utility. As the President of Mexico's Electoral
Federal institute once noted, "for a lot of people, one kilo of sugar or beans is more
important than a vote. There are unscrupulous political operatives who know these needs

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and will find ways to capitalize on them" (Cornelius 2004, 47).[19] Every dollar (or real) is worth more to someone who makes few of them; a payment of 25 *reais* can be a significant amount of money for a poor peasant making less than a *real* a day, even if it is pocket change for a wealthy politician.

With more economic security, voters may feel free to vote on other bases, like policy preferences or candidate likability. As a voter's economic security increases, a politician may need to pay more to achieve the same electoral effect.

For example, Christmas turkeys and hods of coal were once used quite frequently to buy votes in the United States in the 19th and early 20th century. Such in-kind payments were significant for poor households lacking economic security and served as tokens of a politician's friendship (Banfield and Wilson 1963, 117–18). A comparable gift, however, would be unlikely to impress the average middle-class (or even working-class) American nowadays. To achieve an equivalent effect, a politician may have to do something much grander and more expensive (perhaps help with a mortgage payment?).

These increases in payments, when aggregated, should bankrupt all but the wealthiest politicians.[20] Even if gifts are merely indicators of friendship (and friendship were the real factor affecting one's vote), it would become more expensive to provide

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[19] This quote is also reminiscent of Banfield and Wilson's famous insight on political machines in American politics: "The existence of the machine depends on its ability to control votes. This control becomes possible when people…place a lower value on their votes than they do on the things which the machine can offer in exchange for them" (Banfield and Wilson 1963, 116–17).

[20] Banfield and Wilson, in fact, note that even in the U.S.'s age of clientelism, politicians could not afford to buy *every* vote—they would pick and choose to whom to give tokens of friendship during particular elections, only partaking in this practice because they knew that the reciprocal obligations of the friendship signaled by such a gift would likely last for several elections (Banfield and Wilson 1963).

gifts of substance as voters' economic security increased. Increases in economic security can decrease the value of clientelist payments, which eventually prices out clientelist politicians.

The second reason is a change in values. For an extremely poor person, what matters most is survival. For those without money or food, money and food will win their vote; it is what matters most. For those who are illiterate or who lack access to the state, help in receiving state benefits will win their vote. For those without the means to further their children's education, a letter of recommendation or access to a scholarship can win their vote. The allure of up-front benefits and the promise of future tangible benefits are too strong to pass up.

When these basic needs are met, however, voters begin to want other things. Self-expression, political participation, and the ability to influence policy, for instance, are distinctly secondary desires when one's basic needs have not been met, but these desires can become much more important when these needs are, and they are less tangible and less fungible. When a voter's primary goal regarding politics is representation or participation, not survival, it becomes much more difficult to get him/her to forfeit his/her vote.

As an example, even the notorious *favelas* in Brazil have become home to "a citizen who is ever more demanding with public services," according to Renato Meirelles, a researcher on favelas. "He doesn't want dentures, he wants broadband

internet. He doesn't want a *cesta básica*,[21] but access to universities" (Marsigilia 2014). When access to basic health and food needs is assured, voters begin to want more expensive goods—often those that require extensive public investment. Parties who use clientelism face severe problems when voters' demands begin to evolve in these ways, and must either change their style of politics or wither away.

Theoretically, this hypothesis is consistent with several formal models of how clientelist parties distribute goods and how clientelism prospers (Medina and Stokes 2002; Stokes 2005. Stokes et al. 2013). Empirically, it finds cross-sectional support in a variety of places. In Africa, many voters choose clientelist parties over programmatic ones, figuring that a winning clientelist party will retaliate against those who did not support it, whereas a winning programmatic party will not (van de Walle 2007). In Argentina (Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004; Calvo and Murillo 2004), Nigeria (Omobowale and Olutayo 2010), Italy (Chubb 1981), Mexico (Fox 1994), Latin America generally (Stokes et al. 2013), and the early-20th-century U.S. (Banfield and Wilson 1963), the poor and economically insecure are/were more likely to be part of a clientelist relationship.

A corollary argument in the literature is that the ability to monitor clients' votes has a major effect on clientelist voting. To ensure that clientelist voters are holding up their side of the bargain, clientelist candidates need to monitor who actually votes for them and who does not. Otherwise, cheating—accepting money but then voting for other

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[21] A basket of food staples often distributed by government social welfare programs

parties or candidates—may rise, undermining the utility of clientelism for the parties and candidates.

In a one-shot game in which a party offers a clientelist incentive, the equilibrium will be for no vote-buying to occur. If the voter moves first, the patron will always defect—accept the client's vote, based on a promise of payment, but not pay—leading the client, knowing this, to vote for whomever he/she preferred in the first place (Stokes 2007). Likewise, if the patron moves first, the client will always defect—accept the payment but vote for whomever he/she prefers—leading the patron, knowing this, to forego trying to buy the vote in the first place.

This changes in a repeated game parameterizing the probability that the patron detects a voter's defection. This probability represents the effectiveness of a clientelist party's monitoring system. The "folk theorem" states that a repeated game can have an equilibrium if both players are sufficiently patient because any gains from a one-time defection will amount to less than the gains from cooperation in every future period. The more effective the monitoring, the likelier this type of equilibrium becomes (Stokes 2005, 2007).

Legal inhibitions (notably, the secret ballot) and prohibitions of vote buying, now widely adopted around the world (Schaffer 2007, 6), have made monitoring more difficult. The secret ballot reduces patrons' incentives to engage in clientelism, while criminalizing the practice creates disincentives for patrons and clients alike. Yet regulations are probably not the primary reason for long-term declines in clientelist voting. Regulations outlawing vote buying usually do not make monitoring impossible or

even infeasible; clientelist parties can work around them. (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 43). Many brokers can infer which clients voted for whom. Nearly 80% of party brokers in Argentina (a country with secret ballots) said they would be able to tell if a neighbor voted for an opposing candidate, primarily because of their presence in community networks (Stokes et al. 2013, 100). While they may have economic and psychological motivations to play this ability up to themselves and to an interviewer, it is not altogether impossible for them to make reasonably accurate educated guesses.

Urbanization can make clientelist voting less prevalent. Clientelism is more prevalent in smaller rural areas and ethnic enclaves, both of which tend to consist of residents who have lived there for generations (Stokes et al. 2013). Brokers there, themselves area residents, know about their fellow residents' political sympathies and personal lives. Furthermore, with small numbers of voters in given electoral jurisdictions, electoral brokers could monitor their clients by looking at aggregate vote outcomes and relying on their knowledge of the local community to fill in the blanks (Gingerich and Medina 2013).

The anonymity and transience of city life, by contrast, as well as the increased size of electoral districts, make monitoring much more difficult. Urbanization therefore spelled trouble for clientelist politicians in Britain in the 19th century and the United States in the early/mid-20th century (Stokes et al. 2013; Vicente n.d.). Without the ability to monitor clients, there was no point in paying them because their votes will not be ensured.

In summation, there does seem to be a correlation between poverty and clientelist voting: poor countries have more clientelist voting than middle-income and rich countries, and within those countries, poor individuals seem to vote more clientelistically than the middle and upper classes. As a result, the conventional wisdom argues that a increases in economic security (or decreases in inequality—Hicken 2007; Robinson and Verdier 2013) should explain decreases in clientelist voting. Yet the direct evidence for the central claim here—that increases in economic security lead to decreases in clientelist voting—remains rather thin. These cross-sectional correlations are merely suggestive, and few scholars have made systematic efforts to analyze changes in levels of clientelist voting.

The one major exception is Stokes et al. (2013), who use historical sources to track the decline of clientelism in the U.S. and the U.K. They find that population growth and urbanization, combined with economic development, change relationships between party leaders and brokers. Brokers lose the ability to efficiently monitor voters' choices as electoral districts get larger, and the center of gravity shifts from the poor, who are less demanding of brokers, to the middle class, who want more. As a result, party leaders opt for more programmatic ways of winning votes, reasoning that they are more efficient at reaching many middle-class voters at once, particularly as electoral brokers become less effective at supplying votes (Stokes et al. 2013).

The problem with this analysis is that it has case selection bias. Both the U.S. and U.K. have, and historically have had, first-past-the-post electoral systems, with many elections involving only two viable candidates. This matters because party labels, if there

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are only two or three parties, can be very useful cues, helping voters form attitudes and opinions about candidates (Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Rahn 1993)).

This may help explain one of the main sources of variation for declines in clientelist voting: the number of parties. In Brazil, for example, executive elections (from president to mayor) are majoritarian run-off elections, but lower-house elections use open-list proportional representation. This—along with federalism (André Borges 2015)—leads to high numbers of parties and candidates (André Borges and Lloyd 2016). In 2014, voters in the Federal District (*Distrito Federal,* or DF) had to choose from 127 candidates for federal deputy and 978 for *deputado distrital*[22] out of 35 parties—in addition, of course, to picking a president, a governor, and a senator. This is no easy task, even for a political sophisticate.

A surprisingly large literature suggests that voters, even with limited information, interest, and political sophistication, can use cues like party labels and polls to tell who is a viable candidate (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1985; Zhirnov 2016). Such cues may not fully replace political sophistication or interest in politics, but do provide a crutch for low-information voters.

In fact, most cues may not be as valuable in systems with more parties. With more parties and more candidates, endorsements often become confusing; both candidates and

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[22] *Deputados distritais* are district-level deputies in the DF. The equivalent in other states is the *deputado estadual*, or state deputy.

parties endorse various other candidates and parties, often independently of one another, forming coalitions that vary by state and election.[23] When many candidates are running, polls likely will not be released to the public because a horse-race narrative is less compelling with so many horses (and so many undecided voters), and the candidates with the most votes may not be elected. Ideology is present, but many different candidates—often from the same parties—will try to claim the same banners. Candidate appearance may play a role, but even that is uncertain, given a sizable number of candidates. There are simply too many choices, particularly for "cognitive misers" (Fiske and Taylor 1984) not particularly motivated to seek out information about politics in the first place.

These points are not to say that *all* countries will have all these strikes against them; some countries, after all, might have 9-10 parties with relatively distinct ideological profiles, while others might have regularly disseminated polls for even their most unruly elections. I am instead arguing that the U.K. and U.S. are settings that are unusually generous from a comparative perspective in regards to the electoral cues offered to voters; these cues are both more numerous and more informative. When theories developed in those contexts are applied to contexts like Brazil, their utility becomes more limited.

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[23] Anecdotally, I can say that I met and shadowed various political candidates and advisors who could not remember which parties supported their candidacies, so labyrinthine was the web of endorsements in a given campaign.

A THEORY OF VOTE BUYING

Decreases in clientelist voting may very well require increases in economic security as an antecedent condition, but I argue that they also require something else: the ability to easily and efficiently identify opposition candidates.

Outside first-past-the-post systems, many more parties and candidates typically compete for a given position (Clark 2006; Duverger 1954; Riker 1982). First-past-the-post systems also affect candidates' incentives to pursue a personal vote rather than win votes for their parties (Carey and Shugart 1993; Hicken 2007). This is not to say, as Kitschelt (2000) or Hicken (2007) does, that electoral systems that encourage personalist voting *necessarily* encourage clientelist voting. As Stokes (2007) rightly notes, they are not necessarily the same thing. What it does mean, however, is that countries with large numbers of effective parties—which sometimes, coincidentally, do incentivize a personal vote—offer information structures that are so disorganized that they require personal, face-to-face appeals (such as clientelist offers) to reach voters.

The number of candidates in a political system is extraordinarily important because it complicates the voting environment exponentially, making the use of cognitive heuristics even more imperative for voters. Cognitive heuristics, in turn, matter even more because voters only have the willingness and ability to absorb a certain amount of information (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Downs, 1957; Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida 1994).

In political systems with many candidates, a given candidate's probability of winning becomes extremely difficult to assess ex-ante. Voters become very

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uncomfortable when assessing probabilities (Popkin 1991), particularly vague ones. In open-list proportional representation, these probabilities are nothing if not vague; the winner of a seat can depend on the vote of a multi-party coalition, and then within that coalition, individual candidates' vote totals. But how can the average voter know if a given candidate will: 1) be part of a coalition that will win lots of seats, 2) beat out other hundreds of competitors within that coalition for seats?

This high number of parties leads to a surplus of information and a deficit of information structure. Rennó (2006) refers to this as the "rich man's dilemma": too many options and only one choice. Voters—particularly those in countries where voting is compulsory—are expected to interpret large volumes of information about politics without much in the way of guidance (Power and Garand 2007; Power and Roberts 1995).

This high cognitive load makes it difficult for all but the very most knowledgeable of voters to form on-line judgments of candidates (Bargh and Thein 1985; Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida 1994), and the uncertainty that is part and parcel of such an environment makes it more likely that voters will rely on memory-based candidate evaluation processes (McGraw, Hasecke, and Conger 2003; McGraw, Lodge, and Stroh 1990; Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida 1994; Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992). Memory-based candidate evaluation processes tend to result in weaker attitudes (Bizer et al. 2006) and less reliable judgment (Dijksterhuis and Knippenberg 1995). And the more candidates there are in an election, the less likely voters are to seek out information on them (Lau

and Redlawsk 2001; Rennó 2004, 2006).[24] An overload of unstructured information can lead to paralysis and a lack of preference.

As a result, many voters in systems with highly unstructured information settings head to the polls uninformed or apathetic about the candidates. In Brazil, this can be seen by the large rate of voter error (Nicolau 2015; Zucco Jr. and Nicolau 2016), as well as the high rates of blank and spoilt ballots (Kouba and Lysek 2016). These voters without candidate preferences are the prime targets for election-day vote buying efforts (Lloyd, Turgeon, and Gramacho 2016).

So more "traditional" voting heuristics do not seem to be particularly practical in countries such as Brazil with very high numbers of candidates. That does not, of course, mean that other heuristics aren't developed and used. Candidates, for instance, focus their campaign efforts on certain geographical areas or segments of the population, which, can filter out those who do not campaign in a given area. Yet this is not always a reliable or a consistent heuristic: the number of candidates campaigning in a given area or for a given subset of voters varies by city and by election (Ames 2001; Rennó 2006).

As recent ethnographic work has shown, many low-sophistication voters use something else as a heuristic—and it's not particularly helpful for decreasing clientelist voting: whether the candidate can afford to pay voters or not. If she can, maybe she has a chance. If not, she's not worth the fuss.

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[24] And in the case of Lau and Redlawsk, that was only with increasing the number of candidates from two to four!

In other words, providing money to voters is multipurpose: it not only is used to convince someone to vote for you, but can also increase one's vote totals more indirectly by incentivizing the turnout of voters likely to support you anyway (Nichter 2008) and indicating that you have enough resources to get elected (M. Borges 2016; Kramon 2016; Muñoz 2014). Voters in contexts with unstructured political information use candidates' abilities to buy votes as a voting heuristic and, in the absence of other factors that may determine their votes in environments with more structured information, they often end up voting for those same people.

There is a difference between a voter's ability to understand the differences between two candidates and her ability to do so for 500 or 1,000, and for lower-house legislative elections in Brazil, this number of candidates is normal. For countries like the U.S. and the U.K., political choices arrive at the average voter already organized, as Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991, 28–29) put it, this process is easier because there are generally only two competitive candidates per race. This explains why these countries have seen decreases in clientelist voting arrive relatively quickly after income increased. For others, such as Brazil, however, this is not the case, and they have seen much more uneven changes.

Clientelist voting can survive in these environments because the benefits used to buy votes serve as a voting cue in a cue-scarce environment. This is not just information for information's sake: it signals one's viability as a candidate (Muñoz 2014). For poorer

people, this is crucial information, even with a certain level of economic security. Picking an unviable candidate is a waste of one of the only resources they have: their vote.[25]

As a result, there is no guarantee that clientelist relationships will break down even if clients feel more economically secure because one of the fundamental causes of clientelist voting—this lack of structured information—will still present. Furthermore, even if long-term clientelist relationships do break down, there is no guarantee that voters will not still want to vote clientelistically and sell their vote. Clientelist voting can be resilient. It may start out based on traditional social relationships, which may weaken with development, but it does not necessarily need them to survive. It can still, even if weakened, morph into short-term vote buying.

MODEL SPECIFICATION

The following model reflects this argument:

$$y_i = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 x_{i1} + \gamma_2 x_{i2} + \gamma_3 (x_{i1} * x_{i2}) + \gamma_4 x_{i3} + \gamma_5 x_{i4} + u_i$$

where:

y_i is the dependent variable, a measure of clientelist voting in a given country;

x_{i1} is an income variable;

x_{i2} is the number of parties in the country;

x_{i3} represents the monitoring capacity of parties in the country;

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[25] See Borges 2016.

x_{i4} is the percentage of voters who identified with a political party;

and u_i is an error term.

This model will be directly tested in Chapter 7. I first reproduce the conventional wisdom with a naïve model absent the product term. In this model, I expect γ_1, the coefficient for income, to be negative and its estimate significant, reproducing the findings of the scholars who emphasize the role of income on decreases in clientelist voting.

I then add an interaction term between income and the number of parties to account for my refinements to the conventional wisdom. For this more complete version of the model, I expect the total effects of x_{i1}, accounting for both γ_1 *and* γ_3, the coefficient for the interaction term, to not be statistically significant. Meanwhile, γ_3 itself should be positive and its estimate significant.

γ_2, the coefficient for the number of parties, should be positive, given how it makes voting on other grounds more difficult. γ_4, the coefficient for how well parties can monitor and enforce vote choice, should also be positive. The possibility of retribution should increase clientelist voting.

The coefficient γ_5, however, should be negative. Partisan identity (with any party) should also increase the likelihood that a given voter will have an *a priori* preference for a candidate before receiving any overtures from vote-buying candidates.

The arguments in this chapter also lead to hypotheses in Chapters 5 and 6, when I test the effect of income on clientelist voting in different environments. On the one hand, in Chapter 6, I expect for randomly assigned treatments of income to have tangible

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effects on clientelist voting in Honduras, which has a small effective number of political parties. On the other hand, in Chapter 5, I expect for changes in income or other indicators of economic security (enrollment in government social programs and formal sector jobs) to have no effect on clientelist voting.

In short, the conventional wisdom seems to be limited in terms of explaining why declines in clientelist voting happen. Brazil in particular deviates from expectations, having *more* clientelism than expected given its citizens' recent increases in economic security. Neither changes in income nor changes in monitoring have seemed to have much of an effect on Brazil.

Deviant cases like Brazil's are good for discovering new information about causal pathways connecting the main independent variable with the main dependent variable (Seawright 2015, 107). Accordingly, the next chapter considers how to better explain how political systems with large numbers of voters inhibit the declines in clientelist voting that should come with increases in economic security.

Chapter 4: Data Sources and methods

I shall be using data from a variety of sources. This chapter explains where I got them from and how I am using them.

BRAZIL-CENTRIC DATA

I began my fieldwork by interviewing politicians and campaign workers from variety of parties, styles, and backgrounds about vote buying. I took advantage of the *Câmara dos Deputados'* (Brazilian lower legislative house) location in Brasília to conduct interviews. I did not make much progress this way. No candidate was willing to speak about vote buying—an illicit activity—in an interview, even without myrecording it. Many used the interview for their own purposes, portraying their political enemies in a negative light and complaining about them.[26]

As a result, I changed tack, engaging in participant observation in the spirit of Fenno (1978).[27] I shadowed candidates during ordinary campaign days, watching how they related to voters and what sort of activities they engaged in. In such breaks the action as car rides and lunches, I would often ask questions about what they had done and why.

This strategy was much more effective. While a 30-minute interview was not enough to establish that I was a trustworthy interlocutor, an entire day often was. Eating meals, drinking beers and sharing hotel rooms with campaigners goes a long way to show

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[26] This included one deputy who refused to refer to ex-President Lula as anything other than "Squeed-jee," the Brazilian pronunciation of the English word "squid," which is the literal translation of "*lula*."
[27] I would like to thank Lúcio Rennó for providing me with this initial suggestion.

that one can be trusted, particularly when there is no tape recorder present. This non-participant observation also presented me with many experiences that were outside the candidate's direct control. Voters approached them, even asked for money or jobs. These chance interactions often provided me with the entry point I needed to ask questions. I asked about the interactions ("so what happened there when he came to talk to you?"), framing thm as having been about voters trying to sell votes, not the candidate or campaign trying to buy them. This encouraged more candidates and campaign workers to talk more honestly about clientelist exchanges.

Indeed, some candidates and campaign workers wound up shocking me with their candor about buying votes, volunteering the prices they paid and verbally mapping out their entire vote-buying operation for me. This might well have been because I was a young foreigner, unlikely to pose a political threat. Whatever the reason, these conversations would only happen, as a rule, after several hours together, and only after we had already talked about other subjects. These other subjects could be rather mundane campaign questions, questions about my home and everyday life in the U.S., or questions about politics in the U.S. in relation to Brazilian politics, but they were also necessary. As a rule, vote buying never got discussed before lunch, and rarely before dinner. Even then, it was almost always one-on-one with the candidate or his/her advisor.

Even when candidates did not trust me enough to tell me openly about vote-buying practices, however, I was able to learn about the inner workings of campaigns, and often infer when vote-buying was being prepared. One candidate, for instance, referred to his brokers around me without using the Portuguese word for brokers, instead

preferring to use another word roughly translatable to "point-man." Upon accompanying him for a day, though, it became more and more obvious what these "point-men" were used for, even if they were (at least temporarily) going by a different name.

Candidates were selected for shadowing by availability; if a candidate consented to being shadowed and followed, I jumped at the opportunity. That said, I did make a conscious effort to diversify the targets of my participant observation by party, type of election, and location. I ended up following campaigns working for parties on the left, the right, and indeterminate ideologies. I also shadowed campaigns for every type of election, from president to state deputy, and during both the first and second round.

I was based out of the University of Brasília in the *Distrito Federal* (DF, or Federal District), but I also arranged to follow political campaigns in the *entorno* (periphery) of the DF, in Goiás, as well as the states of Maranhão, Pernambuco, and Sergipe in the Northeast. These locales provided a wide variety of contexts.

As the national capital and home of one of the country's most prestigious universities, the DF is an area whose population is more politically aware, wealthier, and more educated than average. The *entorno,* conversely, is much poorer than the DF, despite being geographically very close to it. It has seen several corruption scandals in recent years. One *município,* in fact, had two mayors removed for corruption over the last term alone, and another had a candidate murdered by a hitman while giving a speech.

Maranhão, Pernambuco, and Sergipe are all states in the Northeast, a region that is generally less-developed and poorer than other regions of the country. Maranhão was on the cusp of a transformation when I went there. The incumbent governor, Roseana

Sarney, a member of the PMDB (*Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*), and her father, ex-President and Senator José Sarney, both retired in 2014. Roseana had just been identified as a key player in a corruption ring (Rangel 2014). Roseana's successor as governor is Flávio Dino, a member of the *Partido Comunista do Brasil* (PCdoB), a small, programmatic leftist party. I followed campaigns in the capital, São Luis, as well as medium-sized and rural cities throughout the state.

Pernambuco was also experiencing an interesting moment, having just lost its popular ex-Governor, Eduardo Campos, to a plane crash as he was running for president. While not a favorite for the presidency, he was a young figure who had helped propel his medium-sized party, the *Partido Socialista Brasileiro* (PSB, or Brazilian Socialist Party) to popularity in his state. This popularity has persisted in the state after his death. I shadowed campaigns in the capital, Recife, as well as a small town several hours away. Sergipe, Pernambuco's neighbor, is the smallest in area of all of Brazil's states. I followed campaigns in its capital, Aracaju, and another medium-sized city, as well as smaller cities along the way.

I also gathered data in Brazil from two other sources. First, I conducted an informal survey of voters on voting day, asking them—with the aid of three confederates—a predetermined series of questions at four different polling places. Because my sampling was not probabilistic, I did not analyze the results statistically. I did, however, use them to efficiently ask voters a variety of different semi-structured questions during a time in which they were keenly paying attention to politics, which

gave me more insight into how Brazilian voters approached different elections.[28] The

data from this endeavor was not used directly in this dissertation, but some insights that I

gained indeed were.

Thanks to Lúcio Rennó of the University of Brasília, I also was able to place

some questions on the 2014 version of the *Brazilian Electoral Panel Study* (BEPS). I

ended up taking four questions from the 2002 *Estudo Eleitoral Brasileiro* (ESEB, or

Brazilian Electoral Study), that were about practical attitudes toward clientelism, and re-

using them in the 2014 BEPS so as to compare these responses over time.[29] These

questions were as follows: [30]

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[28] Until, that is, the observers of one campaign who used vote buying more extensively than the other got nervous about someone asking questions about vote buying and reported me to the local election authority for not having some sort of permit. At that point, I also began to get a deeper insight into Brazilian candidates' systems of monitoring voting booths and the inner workings of state electoral authorities.

[29] They had been withdrawn from the 2006 and 2010 versions of the ESEB for budgetary reasons.

[30] Original translation is as follows:

CLIEN10A [7]. Vamos falar agora sobre algumas situações que às vezes acontecem no Brasil. Um candidato oferece para uma mãe que tem um filho doente dinheiro para o tratamento médico, o que ela DEVERIA fazer?
(1) Aceitar o dinheiro para o tratamento médico e votar no candidato OU
(2) Não aceitar o dinheiro e votar em outro candidato OU
(3) Aceitar o dinheiro e votar em outro candidato?
CLIEN10B [7]. E o que o(a) Sr(a) acha que essa mãe VAI fazer:
(1) Aceitar o dinheiro para o tratamento médico e votar no candidato OU
(2) Não aceitar o dinheiro e votar em outro candidato OU
(3) Aceitar o dinheiro e votar em outro candidato?
CLIEN11A [7]. Um candidato oferece um caminhão de tijolos para várias famílias que precisam acabar de construir suas casas, o que as pessoas dessas famílias DEVERIAM fazer?
(1) Aceitar o caminhão de tijolos e votar no candidato OU
(2) Não aceitar o caminhão de tijolos e votar em outro candidato OU
(3) Aceitar do caminhão de tijolos e votar em outro candidato?
CLIEN11B [7]. E o que o(a) Sr(a) acha que as pessoas dessas famílias VÃO fazer:
(1) Aceitar o caminhão de tijolos e votar no candidato OU
(2) Não aceitar o caminhão de tijolos e votar em outro candidato OU
(3) Aceitar do caminhão de tijolos e votar em outro candidato?

CLIEN10A [7]. Now let's talk about some situations that sometimes happen in Brazil. A candidate offers money for medical treatment to a mother who has a sick child. What SHOULD she do?
(1) Accept the money for the medical treatment and vote for the candidate OR
(2) Not accept the money and vote for another candidate OR
(3) Accept the money and vote for another candidate
CLIEN10B [7]. And what do you think this mother WILL do?
(1) Accept the money for the medical treatment and vote for the candidate OR
(2) Not accept the money and vote for another candidate OR
(3) Accept the money and vote for another candidate
CLIEN11A [7]. A candidate offers a truckload of bricks to several families that need to finish building their houses. What SHOULD the people in these families do?
(1) Accept the truckload of bricks and vote for the candidate OR
(2) Not accept the truckload of bricks and vote for another candidate OR
(3) Accept the truckload of bricks and vote for another candidate
CLIEN11B [7]. And what do you think the people in these families WILL do?
(1) Accept the truckload of bricks and vote for the candidate OR
(2) Not accept the truckload of bricks and vote for another candidate OR
(3) Accept the truckload of bricks and vote for another candidate[31]

The data from these questions were used in Chapter 5.

NATURAL EXPERIMENT DATA

My experimental data in Chapter 6 and Appendix A came from two public policy

field experiments that used money as a randomly administered treatment.

The first took place in Honduras. [32] In 1990, the first iteration of a program called

Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF, Family Allowance Program) sought to

distribute cash subsidies to poor families harmed by macroeconomic adjustment (Glewwe

and Olinto 2004), but it quickly ran into problems with targeting and enforcement

(Galiani and McEwan 2013). Its successor, dubbed PRAF-II, was launched as a

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[31] It is worth noting that there was a slight difference in wording in the 2002 version, which only provided the first and second options.
[32] I am grateful to Patrick McEwan and Paul Glewwe for their guidance with the Honduras data.

conditional cash transfer (CCT) program in 2000 with support from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

PRAF-II consisted of two types of cash transfers: an education subsidy of 800 Lempiras (about 50 USD) for each child aged between 6-12 enrolled in school, and a health transfer of 644 Lempiras (about 40 USD) for children under the age of 3 and pregnant mothers who regularly attended health centers (Galiani and McEwan 2013). They also gave direct investments to health centers and schools along with these cash transfers. These transfers amounted, on average, to 9% of beneficiary families' per-capita consumption in 2000 (Fiszbein and Schady 2009).

PRAF-II is important for my research design because of the way it was implemented: with a randomized evaluation design led by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) from the program's launch until late 2002. An experimental sample was chosen by ordering 298 municipalities by average first-grader height-to-age ratio and picking the 70 lowest.[33] These 70 municipalities were then divided into quintiles, and randomly assigned to one of four different groups: a control group of 20 municipalities, a group of 20 municipalities with CCTs in health and education, a group of 10 municipalities that only received direct transfers to health centers and schools, and a group of 20 municipalities that received both CCTs and direct transfers. Furthermore, there was no evidence of spillover effects (Galiani and McEwan 2013).

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[33] 73 were actually picked, but three were ruled out because of practical concerns regarding delivering the cash transfers there.

I was able to match up control and treatment municipalities with survey responses

from those same municipalities to see if there were statistical significances between them.

If so, the difference would have been due to the experimental treatment. I used

individual-level survey data from the 2004 wave of the Latin American Public Opinion

Project (LAPOP) and the 2002 wave of *Latinobarómetro* to evaluate my hypothesis.[34]

Because both the survey data and the experimental data were aggregated at the municipal

level, I simply found survey data for the municipalities located in the treatment and

control groups and conducted various simple statistical analyses to compare the

differences between them.

The second program took place in Mexico.[35] *Progresa* was perhaps the trailblazer

in CCTs, winning plaudits in the international community after its launch in 1997, and

even the IDB's largest-ever loan, as of 2005, for its expansion (it was rebranded

Oportunidades in 2002; therefore, I refer it from here on as P/O). It was originally

targeted to poor rural villages, and its transfers amounted, on average, to 20% of

beneficiary families' per-capita consumption in June 1999 (Fiszbein and Schady 2009).

P/O had components in three different areas: education, nutrition, and healthcare.

It provided grants from 105-660 pesos (10.50-66 USD) for every child younger than 22

in school between 3rd grade and the third grade of high school, with amounts varying

based on the sex and age of the child. Regarding nutrition, it provided a fixed amount of

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about 155 pesos (15.50 USD) for improved nutrition and nutritional supplements for children. Finally, it also included basic health care for all members of the recipient family. Receipt of these benefits was contingent upon enrollment of all children in school and regular visits to health care facilities, with the money going directly to the female head of household (Parker and Teruel 2005).

In rural areas, target communities were selected on the basis of a marginality index, with potential beneficiaries within those communities being selected if they are judged to be in extreme poverty. After that, the list of beneficiaries is made public and an assembly is arranged where all beneficiaries reach an agreement over the list. In urban areas, potential beneficiaries had to attend a module and afterwards be designated as extremely poor after a home visit (Parker and Teruel 2005).

P/O's evaluation design was also similar to that of PRAF-II in that it was also conducted by the IFPRI and involved random assignment of the treatment. It lasted from 1998 to 2000, and selected 506 communities in seven states—selected by the above method—as an evaluation sample. Within this sample, 320 communities were assigned to the treatment group and 186 to the control group; these groups consisted of more than 24,000 households in total (Parker and Teruel 2005).

The process of matching treatment data to survey data for Mexico was not as straightforward as it was with Honduras. Treatments were randomized at the sub-municipal level, but the relevant survey data were only available at the aggregated (municipal) level. I therefore took an alternative approach, using quasi-experimental methods. The 2000 Mexican Panel Study took place just after the experimental treatment

had ended and control groups had begun to receive cash transfers, but also included questions on whether the recipients had received money from *Progresa*. I was consequently able to use individual-level data to test my hypotheses, while making sure to exclude response from municipalities that were not part of the initial experimental trial. I then used propensity score matching to conduct my analyses.

Granted, the individual-level survey responses may be subject to social desirability bias (Gonzalez-Ocantos, Nickerson, et al. 2012). Many voters, perceiving vote selling as morally objectionable, may be reluctant to admit to having engaged in it (Wantchekon 2003). Vote buying may be under-reported by up to 22%, depending on country, the respondent, and the respondent-interviewer dynamics (Kiewiet de Jonge 2015; see also Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. (2012).

González-Ocantos et al. and Kiewiet de Jonge suggest using list experiments to circumvent social desirability bias, while Gingerich et al. (2016) have championed a crosswise model, which mixes direct questioning about sensitive topics with questions about innocuous ones. There are, however, no surveys about clientelist attitudes or behaviors incorporating these techniques that cover the specific municipalities I am looking at over the time period I am looking at them. In any case, I would argue that one could assume that any bias against reporting vote buying would be constant across surveys of one country at one time, and therefore should not bias the results of my analysis in any specific direction.

CROSS-NATIONAL SURVEY DATA

I used data from the Democratic Accountability Linkages Project (DALP) and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) as the primary sources for my cross-national analysis. The former contains information on the extent of clientelism in countries across the world, whereas the latter has information about political and electoral systems across the world.

DALP is a cross-national survey that was administered in 2008 and 2009 to country experts about the degree to which democratic accountability and clientelist practices are prevalent in given countries. Eighty-eight countries from six continents are included in the dataset, with questions about specific clientelist practices, such as monitoring votes and offering consumer goods to voters in exchange for votes (Kitschelt 2013). Most questions are asked at both the country level—about countries as a whole—and about individual political parties within the country. The measure would have been better for my purposes if it had included changes in the levels of clientelism of parties, but it only collected one wave of data, and no other comparable datasets are available, to my knowledge.

The CSES has had four waves since 1996, and includes a wide variety of micro-level and macro-level data that are collected after elections in a variety of countries (CSES 2015, 2016). I used the third and fourth waves, ranging from 2006-2016, because they included variables on party and electoral systems, such the number of effective parties and the number of per country.

GDP/capita data were taken from the World Bank (World Bank), and Gini data were taken from both the *World Income Inequality Database and Standardized World Income Inequality Database* (and results were compared with one another with no significant differences found). The SWIID was created by Frederick Solt with several adjustments made to ensure the comparability of Gini coefficients across different contexts, and I use its values in the figures and tables displayed in this paper (Solt 2016).

Chapter 5: Continued Clientelism in Brazil

This chapter describes how Brazilian clientelism has survived in spite of increases in economic security for the poorest Brazilians. The evident effects on clientelist voting have been limited. Vertical, long-term clientelism has often simply been replaced by shorter-term *ad hoc* vote buying—when indeed replaced at all.

A FALSE DAWN: VOTE BUYING IN BRAZIL WITH ECONOMIC SECURITY

It was two days before the election, and the candidate whose campaign I was following during the 2014 elections had no ostensible reason to worry: he was ten points up over his nearest rival in the latest poll. The candidate was confident, and he said as much; in fact, he was already discussing his first actions after assuming office with mayors he was meeting. Yet, after another long day of campaigning, one of his advisors was slightly drunk and very worried.

"We have a very big problem," he sighed. There was no money left. Why, he was asked, would you need more money if the election were in only two days? It was for the *boca de urna,* he said. Even though it is illegal to campaign immediately before the election, he explained, it is often a key time for campaigns to win over undecided voters by handing out campaign materials and money. "Good soldiers do not matter if you do not have weapons," he said. "We have good soldiers, but we're fighting with bayonets and knives."

Voting finished two days later at 5 pm. By 6 pm, it was all over. The candidate was behind by 10 points with 80% of the state's results already in, and duly conceded defeat.

Such revelations may shock educated, middle-class Brazilians, evoking the picture of a backwater stuck in feudal times. Living standards for the poor have been rising, and the state has been taking care of its citizens' most basic needs through programs such as *Bolsa Família* (Family Grant)*, Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil* (Child Labor Eradication Program) and *Benefício de Prestação Continuada* (Continuing Cash Benefit). Yet trading votes for cash, beer, food, household appliances, and help with visits to the doctor, government offices, and the notary public remains common.

True, the 2000s brought some very noticeable changes in state- and national-level politics. In the 2000s, state-level political machines began to be dismantled in the Northeast states of Bahia, Maranhão, Rio Grande do Norte, Ceará, and Piauí (Andre Borges 2009). These traditional boss-like figures sat atop large, complex structures meant to deliver votes to them and their supporters, and were being replaced by leaders from the left-leaning *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT, or Workers' Party). Surely if these notorious old-school clientelist politicians were falling, it was a sign that clientelist voting was on the wane?

When I arrived in Brazil, I fully expected to find small cities with crumbling clientelist structures, and the old guard struggling to adapt to a new dawn. That is decidedly not what I found. Even near the biggest, wealthiest urban centers, though, I found highly organized campaigns built around illicit vote buying.

I did find tech-savvy campaigns that, to my knowledge, swore off that sort of campaigning, preferring to use Facebook and WhatsApp to mobilize voters for their

policies during the campaign. These candidates believed wholeheartedly in their ideals; they also did not win their elections.

This was not to say that campaigns were not also based around policy—on the contrary, every campaign I followed had clear policy ideas, or at least clear policy talking points. The candidates who won, and even many who did not, combined policy appeals and tech-savvy mobilization with some sort of vote buying. This vote buying was often both long-term relationships built up before the election, *and* vote buying at the *boca de urna* (literally, at the mouth of the voting machine).

"We thought we had done enough to win last election," said one campaign worker whose candidate was running for re-election as mayor. But they skimped on the money to buy votes at the *boca de urna…*and promptly lost. He vowed not to make that same mistake again. Whatever you got from the *boca de urna,* he said, was profit—but it was also a defensive maneuver. Smart politicians, like smart investors, diversify.

THE BRAZILIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM: A LOW-CUE ENVIRONMENT

To understand why the demand to sell votes has not disappeared over time, we must take a look at the demand side of the question.

Brazil has a hybrid electoral system, in which its executives and senators are elected through a presidential system: presidents, governors and mayors win by majority run-off, while senators are elected by a plurality of the vote. The lower house, however, looks more like a parliamentary system. Lower-house deputies are elected in proportion to the votes that their parties receive across the country, in a proportional representation (PR) system.

Brazil does not use the common closed-list PR system, however. Instead, it uses an open-list system. Brazilian voters have the option to vote for either a party label *(votos em legenda)* or a candidate *(votos nominais)*, and elections not only determine which political parties win seats, but also which candidates within each party win those seats. The long and short of it is that parties in Brazil do not decide who wins the seats that the party is allocated. While seats are awarded in proportion to the votes that each coalition wins, it is a straight-up popularity contest from there on in. This means that political candidates compete against one another to ensure that they rank higher on the party list than their co-partisans.

To get elected, candidates for deputy need votes not just for their party, but specifically for themselves. They need to find ways to stand out among thousands of other candidates in dozens of other parties potentially vying for an electoral district with up to 32 million voters.

As one can imagine, this system does not make for the most robust of political parties. Brazil's are strikingly weak. With the possible exception of the PT, national offices of major parties neither distribute much in the way of money or volunteers (Montero 2014); more than one politician, when asked by the author about their party's campaign strategies, simply responded, "there is none."[36]

Given the expense of running, most politicians are always looking for campaign funds, but their parties cannot afford to help much. As a result, a party that dictates too

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[36] Personal interviews with the author.

much to its deputies pays the price. Since candidates help parties more than the other way around, they aren't necessarily loyal to their parties. Many politicians — particularly those with low national profiles (often referred to as the "*baixo clero*," or "the lower clergy") — change parties constantly, looking either for the highest bidder or a party more inclined to leave them alone. At one point, over a third of all deputies would switch parties *during a legislative session* (Desposato 2006). For voters, it is more difficult to hold politicians accountable (Ames 1995); it is difficult to monitor all the candidates in your district, and given that there can be thousands of candidates running in one state, it can be even tougher to coordinate efforts to defeat those you do not like.

The runoffs in gubernatorial elections add to this lack of party organization. Parties even form alliances during presidential elections. Borges and Lloyd (André Borges and Lloyd 2016) found that this effect does not reduce the number of parties in Brazil because gubernatorial elections provide enough prizes for regional parties to survive without winning presidential elections. Borges (Andre Borges 2015) also argues that these dissimilarities between presidential and gubernatorial coalitions lead to more parties running for legislature.

And they have plenty of options. Brazil currently has 35 political parties, 25 of which have representatives in the lower house (Liderancas e Bancadas n.d.), and 16 of which have representatives in the Senate (Senadores n.d.). Politicians from the vast majority of parties in Brazil do not vote as a bloc and Brazil's peculiar electoral system encourages this behavior. In fact, many candidates cannot even remember who is in their

coalitions. Nobody can be a candidate without being affiliated with a political party, but that party affiliation is often just a formality.

Parties can also take a back seat to *bancadas suprapartidárias*, or supra-party Congressional caucuses. These caucuses are formed by interest groups. Powerful caucuses — like the rural, evangelical and labor union caucuses — often command more loyalty than political parties. They can be true alliances of economic interest, further dividing the loyalties of the 594 members of Congress.

A VENEER OF PROGRAMMATIC VOTING: THE NEW SCHOOL OF BRAZILIAN CLIENTELISM

Therein lies the problem. While it may be plausible that fewer voters are now dominated by rich patrons, that does not mean that they necessarily have strong preferences for candidates, particularly in PR elections. Voting in Brazil takes place in an environment with highly unstructured volumes of information and few political cues to help voters sift through candidates.

The large number of candidates and parties—particularly weak ones—has a number of downstream effects, particularly heuristics based on party cues. Endorsements often complicate matters; both candidates and parties endorse various other candidates and parties, often independently from one another, and the composition of coalitions changes by state.[37] When many candidates are running, polls are unlikely to be released to the public, because a horse-race narrative is not very compelling with many horses

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[37] Anecdotally, I can say that I met and shadowed various political candidates and advisors who could not remember which parties supported their candidacies, so labyrinthine was the web of endorsements in a given campaign.

(and many undecided voters), particularly when the candidates with the most votes do not necessarily get elected. Ideology is present, but many different candidates—often from the same parties—will try to claim the same banners, thereby limiting its use. The only real heuristic from Lau and Redlawsk's (2001) five that could help is candidate appearance, and with so many candidates out there, even that's debatable.

Voters often do not identify with parties—they rarely vote for the same party in more than one election (Baker, Ames, and Rennó 2006), or even for different offices within a single election (Baker, Ames, and Rennó 2009). In fact, five months after Fernando Henrique Cardoso's re-election in 1998, only 36% of Brazilian voters could correctly name his political party (Baker, Ames, and Rennó 2006, 389).

A party system with 35 parties does not make things easy for voters. Elections happen in groups of five at a time; voters must choose one candidate for president, one for governor, one for senator, one for federal deputy, and one for state deputy. The number of candidates can be downright staggering. Voters in two-party systems, such as that of the United States, have difficulties remembering the policy differences between two candidates running for one office. Distinguishing among hundreds can be nearly impossible.

Voting is also compulsory. Everyone between the ages of 18 and 70 is required to vote unless they provide a justification for not voting.[38] The scene that confronts each voter upon entering the polls would shock many people from other countries: only an

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[38] Voting is optional for those between the ages of 16 and 18 and over the age of 70. While the fine for not voting is small, most people do not know this (and in any case, the time required to pay it –as with many bureaucratic processes in Brazil—is not).

electronic voting machine with ten buttons—each with a digit from 0 to 9. Every

candidate for every elected post has a number, and voters must enter this number when

the relevant position appears on the screen in order to vote for this candidate. Yet there is

no list of candidates at the poll from which to choose; voters must either memorize the

numbers of their list of five candidates or bring a pre-prepared list of numbers into the

polls.

Brazil's open-list system—and compulsory voting—ensures that the volume of

undecided voters just before or on the day of the election is consistently very high.

Consider the Senate elections in the state of Bahia in 2014: the day before the election, a

poll from one of Brazil's main polling firms, IBOPE, found that 29% of voters were still

undecided. There are almost always more than enough undecided voters to make a

difference even in winner-takes-all elections, much less open-list PR races.

Not all of these voters make up their minds either. Brazil has an average rate of

33% null and blank votes for elections between 1980 and 2000, the highest rate in Latin

America (Power and Garand 2007). While these rates have decreased to some degree

after the introduction of electronic voting machines in the mid-1990s, Zucco and Nicolau

make a convincing case that null and blank votes have actually been replaced by new

types of voting error (Zucco Jr. and Nicolau 2016). Voting in proportional elections is, in

a word, chaotic.

MONEY: A MOST USEFUL MEMORY AID

Candidates are desperate to stand out from the crowd given this context. Candidates appear borderline obsessed with this at times, looking for the smallest edge. Some candidates do that by using honorifics in their campaign names, such as Doctor, Professor, or Pastor (Boas 2013). Some even go so far as to dress up in costume, particularly during publicly funded TV advertisement time. There is, to a degree, a method to the madness of dressing up as Wolverine or Chapolín.[39]

Another, more common, tactic, however, is considerably more straightforward. Many candidates take to slipping voters a 50- or 100-real bill (equivalent to about 14 and 28 USD, respectively) along with their campaign literature, particularly on the eve of the election. This money would commonly be described by the clientelism literature as a bribe, and it is indeed an illicit payment opting to change their behavior, but it is also something else. As a new literature is beginning to show (Kramon 2016; Muñoz 2014), it is also easy-to-digest information.

Targeting undecided voters has many benefits, one of them being that it sidesteps the central conundrum of the clientelist voting literature: monitoring. The line of reasoning behind monitoring voters is that, without enforcement, they may go and vote their true preferences instead of their patron. During the beginning of my qualitative fieldwork, I asked many candidates how they were sure that people who promised to vote for them would actually vote for them. They often didn't even understand the question.

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[39] For those who'd like to see this themselves, there are a myriad of video compilations of varying quality available on YouTube.

Any answer was given with a shrug, and a relatively unconvincing explanation about monitoring brokers at the aggregate level. Keeping tabs on these voters seemed not to be particularly important to them.

Clientelist candidates love undecided voters because they have no ulterior motive or reason to defect. Targeting swing voters is a fool's errand in such chaotic elections. *Cabos eleitorais* are generally instructed to draft in confederates to pass out campaign material and money either shortly before or during the day of the election. Several candidates whom I accompanied independently said that these employees are explicitly instructed to ask passing voters one question before offering anything: "Do you have a candidate?" If the voter answered "yes," no approach would be made. If no, a *santinho* with a bill under it would be proffered.

These undecided voters may not like or know anything about the candidate who paid them—but without having someone to whom they can run, what will they do? What if these voters have no *true* preference to reveal? In the end, voters who do not have a preference about candidates have no reason to defect.[40]

Monitoring either brokers or voters simply did not appear to be a problem for politicans looking to buy votes. In fact, several candidates I followed were rather blasé about their inability to monitor the voters whose votes they bought. Candidates found it

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[40] While it is indeed a possibility that one can be faking indecision in order to get extra money, and therefore plans to defect on his sale, many people who already have candidates are precisely the same people who—due to education levels, income levels, political sophistication, and political culture—are more likely to find accepting money for their vote distasteful.

worthwhile to use horribly inefficient methods to capture votes on Election Day: carpeting the ground with advertisements and paying friends of friends of friends to illegally hand out campaign advertisements. Campaigns have difficulty even monitoring these workers; one campaign worker admitted that at least 20% of his workers likely do not even distribute his campaign material. They just take the money and run. But he continued to practice the *boca de urna* because the benefits were still worth it, and he lacked any alternative. He was not the only one who felt that way. The ground is often covered by so many *santinhos* on the day of the election that it not only is an eyesore for the community; it even becomes a danger to some voters. Every year, there are multiple reports of elderly citizens slipping on the *santinho*-carpeted ground, resulting in injury or even death (Abdel 2014; Aposentada de 70 anos escorrega em santinhos e fica ferida em São Carlos 2014, Idosa que escorregou em "santinhos" morre por complicações da queda 2012).

Brazil is not the only place where this happens. Similar scattershot efforts to buy support take place in Perú, where Muñoz found that campaigns will indiscriminately shower voters with money, primarily to increase turnout to rallies (Muñoz 2014). The goal, as she found out, was to flaunt the candidate's campaign resources to demonstrate that she would have a chance of winning. It is likely not a coincidence that Perú also has an open-list PR system, compulsory voting, and weak (more accurately non-existent) party labels (Crabtree 2010; Levitsky and Cameron 2003). As Borges (M. Borges 2016) also found, voters can dislike, or even distrust, a candidate paying them money. But that

money can serve as information, conveying a sort of credibility to the candidate. At the very least, they remember the name.

This is to say that clientelist distribution is not necessarily used to convince swing voters to change their vote or loyal voters to turn out. Often, it is used to provide a particularly memorable cue to indifferent voters who might otherwise vote for no one.

SURVEY DATA FROM BRAZIL

Of course, participant observation only goes so far in supporting an argument this wide-ranging. I therefore turn to the four questions on clientelist attitudes and behavior on the 2014 Brazilian Electoral Panel Survey, drawn from a clientelist battery in the 2002 *Estudo Eleitoral Brasileiro* (ESEB). These gave hypothetical situations of clientelist voting and asked respondents separately if the hypothetical vote-buying target *should* and *would* sell their votes. The 2002 survey was just before Lula's big wave of social programs was initiated, and the 2014 one after they had taken hold, so there should presumably have been significant differences in the responses between the two years.[41]

The differences, however, were inconsistent, as one can see below through a series of t-tests. More than 45% of respondents openly said that a family building a house should accept help from a candidate. Roughly 60% said that the mother of a sick child

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[41] One should note, however, that the 2014 survey included three possible categories of answers (accept gift and vote for candidate, accept gift and do not vote for candidate, refuse gift) for added precision whereas the 2002 version only included two categories (accept gift and refuse gift). I conducted analyses with all three categories and combining the three categories into two—the latter in order to make a more direct comparison between the two years. There is, however, the possibility that the assumption of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) could have been violated, thereby making a direct comparison between the two years more difficult. The two years did, however, obtain similar regression results, which lowers the possibility that these comparisons would be affected by IIA.

should do so. Furthermore, while significantly more respondents did think that a mother

with a sick child should refuse to sell their vote in 2014 than in 2002 ($p < .01$), there was

no significant difference between the two years when it came to the hypothetical situation

regarding the house.

Table 1: 2002 vs. 2014, Attitudes about Clientelism, Sick Child

A candidate offers a mother who has a sick child money for medical treatment. What SHOULD this mother do?

Year	2002	2014
Reject	36.95% (929)	41.75% (387)
Accept	63.05% (1585)	58.25% (540)
	N	3441
	P	0.01***
	*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01	

Source: ESEB (2002) and BEPS (2014)

Table 2: 2002 vs. 2014, Attitudes about Clientelism, Bricks

A candidate offers a truckload of bricks to several families that need to finish building their homes. What SHOULD these families do?

Year	2002	2014
Reject	52.35% (1316)	53.6% (499)
Accept	47.65% (1198)	46.4% (432)
	N	3445
	P	0.51
	*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01	

Source: ESEB (2002) and BEPS (2014)

When these same respondents were asked what the voters in question *would* do in those situations, the answers were even more interesting.[42] Even though fewer respondents in 2014 thought that people *should* accept the two clientelist offers, significantly *more* people thought that they actually *would* in both situations ($p < .01$).

Table 3: 2002 vs. 2014, Clientelist Behavior, Sick Child

A candidate offers a mother who has a sick child money for medical treatment. What do you think this mother WILL do?

Year	2002	2014
Reject	13.96% (351)	10.06% (87)
Accept	86.04% (2163)	89.94% (778)
	N	3379
	P	<0.01***
*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01		

Source: ESEB (2002) and BEPS (2014)

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[42] As discussed in Chapter 4, questions were not directly about the respondents' actions in order to sidestep social desirability bias. While list experiments (Gonzalez-Ocantos, Nickerson, et al. 2012) have advantages over this course of action, a list experiment was not feasible given the fact that the survey was administered over telephone and would have been too complicated for respondents to follow over the phone.

Table 4: 2002 vs. 2014, Clientelist Behavior, Bricks

A candidate offers a truckload of bricks to several families that need to finish building their homes. What do you think these families WILL do?

Year	2002	2014
Reject	19.93% (501)	10.62% (94)
Accept	80.07% (2013)	89.38% (791)
	N	3399
	P	<0.01***
*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01		

Source: ESEB (2002) and BEPS (2014)

I then estimated models to see if income or economic stability had effects on either these attitudinal questions or these behavioral questions. Because of the number of parties and the highly unstructured information environment in Brazil, I did not expect either income or economic stability to have any significant effect on any of the attitudinal or behavioral measures of clientelist voting.

While my primary focus was on the effects of income and economic security, I also wanted to check to see if there were any consistent effects for other key variables in my model from Chapter 3. Given the ambiguous results of Tables 1-4, I did not expect any of them to have any consistent significant effects on my four dependent variables, with the possible exception of the question about what the mother with the sick child *should* do. In that case, I had cautious expectations that rural residents—my imperfect analogue for monitoring and enforcement—would be less likely to vote for another candidate, regardless of whether they accepted the money or not. This would be due to

the increased fear of monitoring and enforcement that often is stronger in smaller, rural environments.

Given that the key interactive variable of my model in Chapter 3 involved the effective number of parties, which was not included in the model, I saw no reason not to use a linear additive model. I used the following multinomial logit model for all four of the questions shown above in order to evaluate those hypotheses:

$$Prob(y_i = 1) = Prob(y_i = 0) * e\string^(\gamma_0 + \gamma_1 x_{i1} + \gamma_2 x_{i2} + \gamma_3 x_{i3} + \gamma_4 x_{i4} + \gamma_5 x_{i5} + u_i)$$

$$Prob(y_i = 2) = Prob(y_i = 0) * e\string^(\gamma_0 + \gamma_1 x_{i1} + \gamma_2 x_{i2} + \gamma_3 x_{i3} + \gamma_4 x_{i4} + \gamma_5 x_{i5} + u_i)$$

where:

y_i is the dependent variable, a measure of clientelist voting for the respondent, either attitudinally or behaviorally (with rejecting the offer equaling 0, accepting it and voting for another candidate equaling 1, and accepting the offer and voting for the candidate equaling 2);

x_{i1} is the income of the respondent;

x_{i2} is whether the respondent received funds from a government social program;

x_{i3} represents whether the respondent lived in an urban area;

x_{i4} is whether the respondent identified with a political party;

x_{i5} is the percentage of political knowledge questions the respondent got correct and u_i is an error term.

I used a multinomial logit model because of the structure of the dependent variable, which had three different categories of responses. I opted not to use an ordinal

logit model because I was not completely certain that the three categories followed a logical sequence—a Brant test confirmed this suspicion for three of the four questions by rejecting the null hypothesis that the parallel regression assumption had not been violated.[43] For first difference analyses, I set all other variables at their means.

The 2014 BEPS had data that allowed me to operationalize variables to take into account other sources of economic security as well as income; I created a binary variable with a value of 1 if the respondent had either a job in the formal sector *or* received some sort of aid from government social programs and 0 otherwise. [44] Income was divided into seven categories, with 1 representing the lowest category and 7 the highest.

I also included a political knowledge index and a binary party identification variable (measuring whether the respondent identified with a party or not). The more someone knows about politics, the likelier he or she would be to have a candidate and the unlikelier to accept a bribe. Identifying with a party should have the same effect; I included them both in this model.

In addition, I included a variable about urbanization—1 for urban locations and 0 for rural locations—to operationalize the monitoring hypothesis espoused by such scholars as Gingerich and Medina (2013 and Stokes et al. (2013). With the absence of other information about monitoring in this survey, it was the best approximation of this variable available.

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[43] For comparison, I also operationalized the dependent variable as two different dichotomous variables, whose results I discuss later in this section.

[44] These social programs of which there were questions in the BEPS were BF, BPC, and a subsidy for electricity bills.

Table 5a: Effects of Key Variables on Attitudes about Clientelism, Sick Child

A candidate offers a mother who has a sick child money for medical treatment. What SHOULD this mother do?

Base outcome: Reject	Variable	Coefficient (std. error)	p
Accept and vote for another candidate	Income	0.10 (0.07)	0.18
	Economic Stability	0.09 (0.22)	0.69
	Political Knowledge	0.67 (0.36)	0.06*
	Partisan Identification	-0.34 (0.20)	0.08*
	Urban	0.16 (0.31)	0.61
Accept and vote for the offering candidate	Income	-0.13 (0.09)	0.15
	Economic Stability	0.01(0.23)	0.95
	Political Knowledge	-0.54 (0.40)	0.18
	Partisan Identification	-0.10 (0.20)	0.64
	Urban	0.11 (0.29)	0.71
N		670	
Prob>chi2		.01***	
*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01			

Source: BEPS (2014)

Table 5b: First differences, key independent variables, other variables at means

Variable	Avg Chg	Reject	Accept and vote	Accept and defect
Income				
Min->max	0.13	0.02	-0.18	0.19
+- sd/2	0.03	<0.01	-0.04	0.04
Marginal effect	0.02	<0.01	-0.03	0.03
Economic Stability				
0->1	0.01	0.01	<0.01	0.02

Source: BEPS (2014)

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Table 6a: Effects of Key Variables on Attitudes about Clientelism, Bricks

A candidate offers a truckload of bricks to several families that need to finish building their homes. What SHOULD these families do?

Base outcome: Reject	Variable	Coefficient (std. error)	p
Accept and vote for another candidate	Income	-0.08 (0.12)	0.52
	Economic Stability	-0.06 (0.35)	0.87
	Political Knowledge	-0.04 (0.62)	0.95
	Partisan Identification	-0.16 (0.32)	0.63
	Urban	0.70 (0.43)	0.11
Accept and vote for the offering candidate	Income	-0.02 (0.11)	0.89
	Economic Stability	0.04 (0.33)	0.91
	Political Knowledge	1.03 (0.58)	0.08*
	Partisan Identification	-0.21 (0.30)	0.50
	Urban	0.29 (0.39)	0.45
N		631	
Prob>chi2		0.11	
*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01			

Source: BEPS (2014)

Table 6b: First differences, key independent variables, other variables at means

Variable	Avg Chg	Reject	Accept and vote	Accept and defect
Income				
Min->max	0.05	0.02	0.06	-0.08
+- sd/2	0.01	<0.01	0.01	-0.02
Marginal effect	0.01	<0.01	0.01	-0.01
Economic Stability				
0->1	0.01	-<0.01	0.02	-0.02

Source: BEPS (2014)

Table 7a: Effects of Key Variables on Clientelist Behavior, Sick Child

A candidate offers a mother who has a sick child money for medical treatment. What do you think this mother WILL do?

Base outcome: Reject	Variable	Coefficient (std. error)	P
Accept and vote for another candidate	Income	-0.04 (0.08)	0.63
	Economic Stability	0.10 (0.22)	0.67
	Political Knowledge	0.51 (0.36)	0.16
	Partisan Identification	-0.20(0.20)	0.32
	Urban	-0.01 (0.31)	0.98
Accept and vote for the offering candidate	Income	-0.10(0.09)	0.24
	Economic Stability	-0.02 (0.24)	0.95
	Political Knowledge	-1.0 (0.42)	0.02**
	Partisan Identification	-0.07 (0.21)	0.73
	Urban	-0.26 (0.29)	0.37
N		675	
Prob>chi2		0.05**	
*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01			

Source: BEPS (2014)

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Table 7b: First differences, key independent variables, other variables at means

Variable	Avg Chg	Reject	Accept and vote	Accept and defect
Income				
Min->max	0.06	0.10	-0.09	-0.01
+- sd/2	0.01	0.02	-0.02	-<0.01
Marginal effect	0.01	0.02	-0.02	-<0.01
Economic Stability				
0->1	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.02

Source: BEPS (2014)

Table 8a: Effects of Key Variables on Clientelist Behavior, Bricks

A candidate offers a truckload of bricks to several families that need to finish building their homes. What do you think these families WILL do?

Base outcome: Reject	Variable	Coefficient (std. error)	P
Accept and vote for another candidate	Income	-0.12(0.11)	0.30
	Economic Stability	-0.08 (0.34)	0.81
	Political Knowledge	-0.62 (0.55)	0.26
	Partisan Identification	0.22 (0.29)	0.43
	Urban	0.66 (0.43)	0.12
Accept and vote for the offering candidate	Income	0.02 (0.10)	0.80
	Economic Stability	-0.13 (0.32)	0.69
	Political Knowledge	0.06 (0.51)	0.91
	Partisan Identification	0.19 (0.27)	0.48
	Urban	0.05 (0.38)	0.90
N		646	
Prob>chi2		0.14	
*=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01			

Source: BEPS (2014)

Table 8b: First differences, key independent variables, other variables at means

Variable	Avg Chg	Reject	Accept and vote	Accept and defect
Income				
Min->max	0.11	0.01	0.15	-0.17
+- sd/2	0.03	<0.01	0.04	-0.04
Marginal effect	0.02	<0.01	0.03	-0.03
Economic Stability				
0->1	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.01

Source: BEPS (2014)

As one can see, economic security—income, receiving aid from government social programs, or having a job in the formal sector—has no effect on the response for any model. For all models, the size of the effects for changes in income—and in fact all explanatory variables—are modest at best. The differences rarely reach more than 0.1, even when adjusting income from its minimum to its maximum level.

In fact, I also tried binary logit models, recoding the dependent variable to measure responses about accepting payment and to measure responses about not voting for the vote-buying candidate.[45] In only one binary logit model did either income or economic security reach a significance level of 0.05: the income coefficient did have a

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[45] These results can be obtained upon request from the author.

positive, significant effect on whether the respondent thought the mother with a sick child should *not* vote for the candidate (without regard to whether the money was accepted— $p=0.03$). However, it was difficult to place this in a convincing wider theoretical context because neither the income nor the economic security coefficients had significant ($p<0.05$) effects on any other questions.

Political knowledge did have a significant increase the likelihood that respondents would think the mother of the sick child *would* accept the money and vote for the candidate, as well as the likelihood that respondents would say she *should* accept the money and vote for another candidate. This might indicate that more knowledgeable voters dislike voting more, either because they tend to be more likely to already have preferences about candidates or because they have moral objections to the practice.

These results should not be exaggerated, though. For one, more knowledgeable voters were also more likely to say that families receiving truckloads of bricks *should* accept the bricks and vote for the offering candidate, which does not fit with that logic. Furthermore, there were no results for any variables that were consistent across all models. This is to say that no coefficient had a significant effect for all models about the same question.[46] These findings also held for all different models using 2002 data and a

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[46] For instance, if the political knowledge coefficient had a significant effect on whether the respondent thought the mother would accept money for her sick child, it would not have a significant effect on subsequent questions about defection or the question about the truckload of bricks

pooled dataset including observations from both years,[47] even for a variety of other

hypothetical situations.[48]

To sum up, the results of these models support my model. As expected, given the

high number of parties in Brazil, no explanatory variables had consistent, explainable

effects on clientelist voting behavior or attitude in Brazil, even with large changes in

economic security over the dozen years between Lula's election and 2014. My key

variables of income and economic stability were in particular conspicuously absent when

it came to their effects on these variables.

INDIFFERENCE AS THE ENEMY OF PROGRAMMATIC VOTING

Vote buying in Brazil survives despite increases in economic security primarily

because of voter indifference as to candidates in proportional elections. This is because it

is notoriously difficult to vote in Brazil, particularly on policy in these proportional

elections, because so many candidates run at once.

Therefore, while there might be some change in majoritarian elections such as for

Governor and President, any influence by increases of economic security on proportional

representations have been minimal. In fact, these proportional elections have had a

feedback effect, sustaining a bloc of clientelist politicians in Congress and key ministries.

When these same politicians decide to run for higher, majoritarian positions, they would

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[47] These analyses necessarily had to leave out questions on economic security and urbanization because no questions on those topics were included in the survey. I replaced urbanization questions with dummy variables indicating region that the respondent was from given that different regions have widely different levels of urbanization, and some are historically more associated with clientelism than others.
[48] 2002 data and combined dataset results can be obtained from the author upon request.

not be expected to scrap their political machines; they simply repurpose them. As a result, vote buying still happens, to a degree, in majoritarian elections as well.

In the next chapter, I discuss the results of my experiments. I conducted both a classroom experiment and a natural experiment in which the treatment variables were income. I show that income only has an effect on one's decision to sell her vote when the alternatives are easy to distinguish from one another. In the event of indifference between many ill-defined alternatives, subjects still are willing to sell their votes.

Chapter 6: Evaluating Declines in Clientelism with Natural Experiments

I have already suggested that increasing income has not reduced vote-buying in Brazil. Now let us consider the evidence of relevant natural experiments.

Here I examine data from Honduras. I only speak about Honduras during the time period in which PRAF-II was implemented, which was in the early 2000s. At that time, Honduras was dominated by two parties: the Liberal Party of Honduras (PLH) and the National Party of Honduras (PNH). Since then, however, new parties have emerged (Ruhl 2012).

THE USE OF NATURAL EXPERIMENTS

My hypothesis is difficult to address on a general level with only observational data. The influences on vote choice are numerous and intercorrelated, and endogeneity is a frequent concern. Experiments can help reduce measurement error, control for reverse causality, and account for omitted variable bias, thereby strengthening causal claims (Gallego and Wantchekon 2012).

Conventional experiments may have difficulty capturing income's effect, however. Manipulating subjects' income enough to change voting behavior would be prohibitively expensive and possibly unethical. Simply instructing subjects to imagine having a certain income would likely be ineffective, and asking them how they would behave in that situation would likely produce unreliable answers (Nisbett and Wilson 1977).

One method of overcoming these obstacles is a natural experiment. Natural experiments, while not being the result of the researching actively controlling the assignment of a treatment variable, are the result of a treatment variable being assigned "as if" it was random (Hyde 2011). Like other types of experiments, natural experiments, because they involve the random assignment of increases in economic security, can help reduce measurement error, control for reverse causality, and account for omitted variable bias, thereby improving my ability to directly measure the effect of economic security on clientelist voting. The utility of the natural experiment, as Galiani and Schargrodsky put it, is that it "provides a control group that estimates what *would have happened* to the treated group in the absence of the intervention."[49] The only difference is that nature, or other exogenous forces determine the assignment of the treatment (Galiani and Schargrodsky 2010).

This is the situation I have exploited here, except that the exogenous force is man-made. I am piggybacking on two experiments that were conducted in the past. I found data from two places that used an experimental treatment to randomly assign income and other agents of economic security to certain populations. I then looked at these populations to see if attitudes and behavior regarding clientelist voting were different there from those populations who had not received the treatment. Because of particularities with the data in these two cases, however, I did have to make some adjustments to one analysis, to be detailed in the methods section below.

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[49] Italics mine

The test I use in this chapter is a tough one for my argument. Many clientelism scholars might be uncomfortable with the suggestion that such drastic change would occur after an intervention of only two years because of cultural factors and force of habit, among other things.

Yet these two interventions still present a rare opportunity. It is rare to find data about randomly assigned increases in income, and even more so to find such data on a program with a wide enough scale that one could plausibly predict that it could make a difference on publicly available survey data. Most surveys are generally administered at the national or international level and are unrelated to any type of income windfall, which means that it is extremely difficult to find survey data with enough observations in areas of interest. It is also rare to find data about randomly administered income-transfer programs on a large enough scale to show up on a national-level survey. There was a limited window in which governments implemented wide-scale experimental programs: in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Before this, no one thought about doing experimental pilots of income programs. After that, such pilots were either foregone (with countries deciding to immediately implement the program based on prior research findings) or conducted with randomization at the individual level (Baird et al. 2014; Hall 2006).

In addition, the treatment effect of random cash transfers is far more direct than rises in income usually are. Voters usually must change their behavior in substantial ways to earn 10%-20% more money, if that is even possible (it usually isn't). These alterations to one's daily life, whatever they may be, can introduce confounds to the relation between income and clientelist voting in the real world.

The CCT programs used below in my analysis provided benefits greater than that (the economic security benefits went beyond mere money transfers, including medical and educational benefits) with minimal altering of their daily routine. So while the timeline for these changes in voting behavior and attitude would have to be shorter than normal, the effects of economic security on voting behavior and attitude should also be more direct than they normally would be. As a result, it is not wholly implausible to expect a relatively rapid change in comparison to what is normally seen.

THE PROGRAM: PRAF-II[50]

I leverage a randomly administered government programs as an experimental treatments: *Programa de Asignación Familiar II* (PRAF-II) in Honduras. PRAF-II involved the random assignment of major determinants of economic security, and I discuss them in more detail in Chapter 4.[51]

The *Programa de Asignación Familiar* (PRAF-II, Family Allowance Program) was launched as a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program in 2000, and consisted of two types of cash transfers: an education subsidy of 800 Lempiras (about 50 USD) for each child aged between 6-12 enrolled in school, and a health transfer of 644 Lempiras (about 40 USD) for children under the age of 3 and pregnant mothers who regularly attended health centers (Galiani and McEwan 2013). It also gave direct investments to health centers and schools along with these cash transfers. These transfers amounted, on

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[50] I also analyzed another, program, Progresa/Oportunidades from Mexico, which I included in Appendix A

[51] I am grateful to Patrick McEwan and Paul Glewwe for their guidance with the Honduras data.

average, to 9% of beneficiary families' per-capita consumption in 2000 (Fiszbein and Schady 2009).

PRAF-II was implemented with a randomized evaluation design, ordering 298 municipalities by average height-to-age ratio for first graders from highest to lowest and randomly assigning the 70 lowest to one of four different groups: a control group of 20 municipalities, a group of 20 municipalities with CCTs in health and education, a group of 10 municipalities that only received direct transfers to health centers and schools, and a group of 20 municipalities that received both CCTs and direct transfers[52] (Galiani and McEwan 2013).

This natural experiment serves primarily to isolate the causal effect of one independent variable: income. As the conventional wisdom's key variable, I wanted to isolate it to see if it really had an effect on clientelist voting when stripped of possible confounding factors.

My basic model in this section was therefore the following:

$$y_i = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 x_{i1} + u_i$$

where:

y_i is the dependent variable, a measure of clientelist voting in a given country;

x_{i1} is an income variable;

and u_i is an error term.

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[52] 73 were actually picked, but three were ruled out because of practical concerns regarding delivering the cash transfers there.

At one point, for Tables 10a and 10b, I do add the height-to-age ratio and a product term involving the height-to-age ratio and treatment income to the equation. I then use a logit model to estimate that expanded model.

Because Honduras (at this time) only had between 2-3 effective political parties, I predicted that income's effect on clientelist voting, when isolated in this natural experiment, would be significant and negative, with respondents from municipalities that received the PRAF-II treatment to report significantly less clientelist behavior than those from control municipalities. As for clientelist attitudes, I was more skeptical of whether they would be affected because of the short timeline, but I predicted the same effect: an inverse relationship.

I resolved to use two different types of dependent variables for this analysis: attitudinal and behavioral variables. The rationale for including behavioral variables about clientelist voting was relatively straightforward: my argument focuses on the act of clientelist voting. Yet I was also curious about the attitudinal aspect of the matter: if there was a change in clientelist voting, was it coinciding with attitudinal changes? Or might it be more top-down: the result of supply-side changes that preceded changes in voters' preferences? Further analyzing opinions about clientelist voting and comparing them between treatment and control municipalities was a great way for me to ask these questions, so I took advantage of the situation to do so.

Methods

I used different dependent variables depending on the survey data being used. For *Latinobarómetro* data, I used two questions. The first was a question about attitudes

involved with clientelist voting—whether bribes were justified or not. This is relevant to clientelist voting because it involves the evaluation of an illicit exchange of money for one's private benefit. The second question was about witnessing clientelist voting among other people, thereby asking about the main topic of this dissertation while avoiding some of the social desirability bias problems that a direct question about the interviewee's behavior may bring up.[53]

The first question about clientelist attitudes (*bribe*) asked the respondent, on a scale of 1 to 10, asking whether accepting a bribe was never justified (1), always justified (10), or somewhere in between.

The second was a yes-or-no question about clientelist voting behavior (*bribe*):

Have you seen other people engage in bribery during elections?

Like the *Latinobarómetro* questions, LAPOP also had an attitudinal question, this time about patronage's acceptability. As patronage—more specifically, the use of public resources and jobs for private means, including winning political support—is one of the main components of my definition of clientelist voting, I found it directly relevant to the question at hand.

The question *(patronage)* was phrased as follows:

An unemployed person is the brother-in-law of an important politician, and this politician uses his influence to get him a public job. Do you believe the politician is:

1) *Corrupt, and should be punished?*

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[53] As an example of this, for the direct question in the *Latinobarómetro* data, only two respondents in the control group admitted to selling their votes, despite the responses recorded below about what other people have done.

2) Corrupt, but justified?

3) Not corrupt?

For PRAF-II data, I was able to match up control and treatment municipalities with survey responses (via the 2004 Latin American Public Opinion Project and the 2002 *Latinobarómetro*) from those same municipalities to see if there were statistical significances between them. If so, the difference would have been due to the experimental treatment.

Given the cleanness of the experimental treatment, I was able to use relatively simple models to isolate the effect of the program by comparing the survey responses of individuals who had received these treatments to those who had not. I used a two-group mean-comparison t-test to determine whether these interventions actually led to changes in attitudes toward clientelist voting.[54] To check the robustness of my conclusions, I then used a multinomial logit regression for LAPOP questions on patronage attitudes, a binary logit regression for *Latinobarómetro* questions on vote buying behavior and a linear regression for *Latinobarómetro* attitudes on bribery.

For these regressions, I also modeled the conditions for selection into the treatment group: the mean height-to-age ratio of children for the municipality in question (*har*) and, for LAPOP data, the respondent's number of children (*children*) (Galiani and McEwan 2013). I also included a product term for the treatment and the height-to-age

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[54] While some scholars have pointed out that questions about clientelism are subject to social desirability bias, there is no theoretical reason to suspect that this bias should influence our results in one particular direction. See Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012 and Kiewiet de Jonge 2015.

ratio to test whether respondents in certain municipalities would exhibit stronger reactions than others:

I used a logistic regression to evaluate this model. I predicted that γ_1 would once again have a significant, negative effect on y_1, but also that those in the most marginalized areas would have a weaker reaction to the treatment because the treatment might not be enough to actually make them economically secure. In other words, I expected the total effect of x_1 to be negative and significant, and the total effect of x_2 to be significant and positive.

One difficulty in analyzing PRAF-II was that *Latinobarómetro* did not ask any question about whether the respondents had children. Since having children (or being pregnant) was a necessary condition for receiving the money, it is possible that some respondents who were ineligible for the grant were inadvertently included in the treatment group in my analyses. I would, however, argue that this condition provides a tougher test for my argument because it would include respondents were not impacted as directly by PRAF-II, and therefore would, *a priori,* have fewer reasons to change their attitudes and behavior. The odds should therefore be more stacked against finding a significant relation between the dependent and independent variables.

Results

My theory is largely borne out by my results for my Honduras data. The treatment of income does seem to have a significant effect on clientelist voting. There was a significant difference between the treatment and control groups regarding vote buying during the election.

Table 9: PRAF-II, Likelihood of Seeing Vote Buying by Other People, 2002

Group	N	Mean (std. error)
Control	35	0.34(0.08)
Treatment	80	0.2 (0.05)
Combined	115	0.24(0.04)
Diff		0.14(0.09)
Ha: diff > 0	Pr(T > t) = 0.051*	

*=p<.1, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01
Source: Galiani and McEwan 2013, Latinobarómetro 2002

This also held with a logistic regression, which showed that the coefficient for the treatment variable was significant and negative. Moreover, the height-to-age ratio intensified the relation, also showing a significant negative relationship. As one can see from Table 10b, the first differences for a change in the treatment variable and product term were both quite sizable.

Table 10a: PRAF-II, Likelihood of Seeing Vote Buying by Other People, 2002

Variables	Coefficient (std. error)	P
Treatment	-25.34(10.71)	0.018**
HAR	1.55(2.11)	0.462
HAR*Treatment	-10.14(4.39)	0.021**
N	115	
prob>chi2	0.03**	

*=p<.1, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01
Source: Galiani and McEwan 2013, Latinobarómetro 2002

Table 10b: PRAF-II, First differences, key independent variables (other variables at means)

Variable	Change in probability
Treatment	
0->1	-0.99
HAR	
Min->max	0.11
+-sd/2	0.03
HAR*Treatment	
Min->max	-0.99
+-sd/2	-0.99

Source: Galiani and McEwan 2013, Latinobarómetro 2002

My skepticism, however, about the treatment's effect on attitudes seems to have also been well-founded. For both the 2002 *Latinobarómetro* data and the 2004 LAPOP data, a simple two-group mean-comparison t-test indeed showed that, as I had suspected, the treatment indeed had no effect on respondents' *attitudes* about bribes.

This was not particularly surprising. Social desirability bias is often so strong with such direct questioning that virtually everyone already said it was unacceptable in the control group. Neither of these results changed in with regressions, both alone and with other independent variables.

Table 11: PRAF-II, Acceptability of Bribery, 2002[55]

Group	N	Mean (std. error)
Control	35	1.23 (0.16)
Treatment	81	1.15(0.11)
Combined	116	1.17 (0.09)
Diff		0.08 (0.20)
Ha: diff > 0	Pr(T > t) = 0.3461	
	*=p<.1, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01	

Source: Galiani and McEwan 2013, Latinobarómetro 2002

Table 12: PRAF-II, Acceptability of Patronage, 2004

Group	N	Mean (std. error)
Control	50	1.06(0.03)
Treatment	100	1.11 (0.03)
Combined	150	1.09 (0.24)
Diff		-0.05(0.05)
Ha: diff > 0	Pr(T > t) = 0.84	
	*=p<.1, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01	

Source: Galiani and McEwan 2013, LAPOP 2004

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[55] Regressions and graphics for these models can be obtained upon request from the author.

Discussion

The biggest takeaway is that changes in clientelist behavior can indeed happen, even in a short time period, in countries with few parties. The conventional wisdom certainly seems to have some empirical support.

While these results are not without their ambiguities, I subjected the data to a difficult test and found some positive results. Clientelist voting behavior was shown to have decreased tangibly in Honduras. When the number of parties in a country is low and the information context is more structured, income seems to have an effect on clientelist voting.

It did not, however, have any effect on attitudinal variables about clientelism. This points to an interesting question—what exactly are the mechanisms through which this decrease in clientelist voting works if voters' attitudes towards nearby concepts stay the same? Do voters make substantive differences between patronage and bribery, on one hand, and clientelist voting, on the other?

One possible explanation is that patronage and bribery, just by being described as such, are seen by respondents as different in kind than clientelist voting. M. Borges (2016) makes an important point when she says that many vote sellers do not see themselves as necessary *selling* their vote or participating in bribery when they do—there are justifications and mitigations in their explanations.

A particular behavior described more specifically, such as the questions about clientelist voting, might overcome this problem by removing some of that value judgment. Researchers are by now well-versed in social desirability bias, but this is a

subtly different point: framing questions in ways that emphasize value judgments might add another barrier toward obtaining accurate results. List experiments should help overcome this problem anyhow, but even more subtly worded questions would be useful. Experimental data that coincides with newer, better survey questions might go a way toward avoiding this problem.

Another possible explanation is that, at least in countries with few parties, income-caused declines in clientelist voting might have more to do with supply-side causes than demand-side causes. This dissertation is about the importance voters' preferences for selling their votes, but perhaps party strategies change more quickly than voter preferences in environments with more structured information contexts, thereby leading to many of the changes we see in clientelist voting. The "pricing out" thesis in the conventional wisdom might be a potential explanation for this, as skeptical as I am about it.

The finding that the effect of the treatment was larger for poorer municipalities is an intriguing one, and it went against my predictions. This might very well be due to poorer municipalities having lower starting points, and therefore more room to improve, but it is honestly difficult to say at this point. It might indicate, more generally, a negative exponential relationship between income and clientelist voting in the presence of low number of political parties. From this evidence, it's not entirely clear, particularly because the small number of observations limits the utility of subdividing these results into smaller groups. Reproductions of these results with larger datasets (when they become available) might go some ways to help us.

In summation, while these results have their mysteries, it indeed seems that increases in economic security can lead to changes in clientelist voting, at least in environments with few parties. This is a finding that, to my knowledge, has not been demonstrated anywhere else, and so it deserves further attention from the scholarly community.

Chapter 7: Modeling the Clientelist Vote

Why did changes in income affect clientelist voting in Honduras, but not Brazil? It's difficult to say without a wider variety of data from countries, particularly those with different party systems.

One possibility that I have been pursuing has been data from other countries from other regions, and I have already been able to obtain some data from the Philippines (Chaudhury, Friedman, and Onishi 2013) and Nicaragua (Barham, Macours, and Maluccio 2013), who have both instituted similar randomized CCT trials, but both countries have small numbers of parties. Another possibility includes looking further at Indonesia, another country that has instituted a randomized CCT trial (Baird et al. 2014), but has a party system with more than five effective parties (Golosov 2012). Unfortunately, as far as I know, survey data on clientelist voting in Indonesia simply do not exist.

What do exist, however, are the Democratic Accountability Linkages Project (Kitschelt 2013) and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES 2015, 2016) databases. I use them to, in this chapter, estimate the effect of my key variables on the clientelist vote in accordance with the model I outlined in Chapter 3:

$$y_i = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 x_{i1} + \gamma_2 x_{i2} + \gamma_3 (x_{i1} * x_{i2}) + \gamma_4 x_{i3} + \gamma_5 x_{i4} + u_i$$

where:

y_i is the dependent variable, a measure of clientelist voting in a given country;

x_{i1} is an income variable;

x_{i2} is the number of parties in the country;

x_{i3} represents the monitoring capacity of parties in the country;

x_{i4} is the percentage of voters who identified with a political party;

and u_i is an error term.

NAÏVE AND FULL MODELS

I estimate two models in this chapter. I first estimate a model representing the conventional wisdom with a simple model including income[56] and monitoring ability. The intent of this model was to reproduce the argument predominant in the conventional wisdom with the DALP data to show why so many researchers have independently reached similar conclusions about income's effect on clientelist voting at the macro-level. I then estimate a second model including my other key explanatory variables and a product term, which I argue changes the relationship between income and clientelist voting.[57]

The first model is simply:

$$y_i = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 x_{i1} + \gamma_2 x_{i3} + u_i$$

And the full model is:

$$y_i = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 x_{i1} + \gamma_2 x_{i2} + \gamma_3 (x_{i1} * x_{i2}) + \gamma_4 x_{i3} + \gamma_5 x_{i4} + u_i$$

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[56] I also considered using a cross-national measure of poverty as my key independent variable. I was not, however, assured of the measurement equivalence of the measures I found, and there were important gaps in World Bank poverty data, so I opted to use income data instead.

[57] I also estimated earlier explanatory models as part of the introductory phase of my quantitative analysis, following the advice of Weller and Barnes 2014. This analysis can be found in Appendix B.

where:

y_i is the dependent variable, a measure of the clientelist vote in a given country;

x_{i1} is an income variable that measures the country's GDP/capita;

x_{i2} is the effective number of parties in the country;

x_{i3} represents the monitoring capacity of parties in the country;

x_{i4} is the percentage of voters who identified with a political party;

and u_i was an error term.

I estimated both models with linear regressions and OLS estimation. In the first model, which reproduced the conventional wisdom, I expected γ_1, the income coefficient, to be negative, and γ_2, the monitoring coefficient, to be positive.

My key variable in the full model was x_{i2}, the effective number of parties of each country (Laakso and Taagepera 1979)—the number of parties in a country, accounting for the concentration and fractionalization of votes. I expected the inclusion of a product term multiplying x_{i1} by x_{i2} to nullify the negative effect of x_{i1} seen in the naïve model. This would be because countries with high effective numbers of parties necessarily have complex, unstructured information contexts that make the effective adjudication of candidates very difficult.

This is to say that, for the full model, I expected the total effects of x_{i1}, accounting for both γ_1 *and* γ_3, the coefficient for the interaction term, to not be statistically significant. Meanwhile, the total effects of x_{i2}, the number of parties, should be positive, given how it makes voting on other grounds more difficult, and γ_3 itself, the coefficient for the product term, should be positive and its estimate significant.

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I also expected enforcement capacity to have a positive effect on clientelist voting, although I wasn't sure whether this would be limited by effective number of parties or other conditioning factors. Still, the possibility of retribution should increase clientelist voting, even in this revised model, so γ_4 should be positive and its estimate significant.

Finally, I believed that the degree to which voters identified with parties would also affect clientelist voting, decreasing it. Identifying with a party would make it more likely for voters to have *a priori* preferences regarding candidates, avoiding the type of indifference that I hypothesize leads to a resilience in clientelist voting. Consequently, γ_5 should be negative.

Clientelist voting was measured by experts' judgments on whether individual parties look to win votes by distributing in-kind benefits. These measures ranged from a minimum of 97.4 (Switzerland) to a high of 381.42 (Jamaica). Brazil ranked 29th-highest with a score of 251.28.

Figure 1: Vote Buying Statistic

Income data was measured with natural logarithms of the World Bank's

GDP/capita data. x_{i3}, the monitoring and enforcement capacity of the parties in a country,

was generated from the mean scores of each party to the following question on the

DALP:

If an individual or group of voters promises to vote for the parties but does not deliver on
their promise, can parties assess any consequences to the individual/group?

I took the mean answer for each party, multiplied it by the average number of

votes it had gotten in the last two lower-house legislative elections, and added it together

to get an index of the monitoring ability of parties in that country, as seen below in Figure

2.

Figure 2: Parties' Monitoring Capabilities


Source: Kitschelt 2013

Partisan identification was measured by aggregating the number of CSES respondents in an individual country who answered that they felt close to a particular party. An individual's response of 1 indicated that they did feel close to a party, while 5 indicated that they did not—these figures are country averages of these responses.

Figure 3: Countries' Levels of Party Identification

Source: CSES 2015, 2016

Measures for the effective number of parties were also taken from the CSES and were composed of an average of two separate measures—the effective number of electoral parties in a given country and the effective number of parliamentary parties in that country.[58]

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[58] I also explored the possibility of using the average number of candidates per election as an alternative measure, but could not find an accurate one that excluded uncompetitive candidates—an analogous measure to the *effective* number of parties.

Figure 4: Countries' Effective Numbers of Political Parties

Source: CSES 2015, 2016

I analyzed these models with a linear regression using OLS estimation.

Results

In the naïve model, I found that both enforcement capacity and income do indeed have statistically significant effects on the vote-buying variable. The conventional wisdom does seem to be borne out here. This can be seen below in Table 13 and Figures 1 and 2.

Table 13: Income and Enforcement Capacity, Effects on Vote Buying Statistic

Variables	Coefficient (std. error)	P
Enforcement Capacity	1.522 (0.26)	<0.001***
LnGDP/capita	-23.58 (4.00)	<0.001***
N	87	
F	<0.001***	
R^2	0.60	
*=p<.1, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01		

Source: Kitschelt 2013, World Bank

Figure 5: LnGDP/capita vs. Vote Buying Statistic

Source: Kitschelt 2013, World Bank

Figure 6: Enforcement Capacity vs. Vote Buying Statistic

Source: Kitschelt 2013

The full model showed results in line with my theory in this dissertation.[59]

Clientelist enforcement capability also maintains the significant effect it had in the naïve

model in Table 13 despite the inclusion of other variables, with p holding a value lesser

than 0.01.

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[59] I also, in alternate specifications, used measures for electoral formulas (majoritarian vs. open-list PR vs. closed-list PR), urbanization rates, HDI, district magnitude, purchasing power parity, the Gini coefficient, compulsory voting, the age of the democracy in question, Freedom House and Polity ratings, and literacy rates, but found no significant effects for any of them. There were not sufficient data over the time period I was looking at in the CSES database to evaluate the effect of Internet and cell phone access on vote buying, or the effect of extreme poverty rates. I also created an index from political knowledge questions in the data, and this did indeed have a significant positive effect on the vote buying in some specifications.

Table 14: Key Variables' Effects on Vote Buying Statistic

Variables	Coefficient (std. error)	P
LnGDP/capita	-123.45(38.09)	<0.01***
Effective Number of Parties	-13.31(5.04)	0.01***
LnGDP*ENP	97.89 (35.57)	0.01***
Enforcement Capacity	1.54 (0.46)	<0.01***
Partisan Identity	2.11(12.66)	0.87
N	37	
f-value	<0.01***	
r-squared	0.66	
*=p<.1, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01		

Source: Kitschelt 2013, World Bank, CSES

By the far the most interesting result, though, was the effect of the number of parties on GDP/capita's effect on vote buying. While GDP/capita has a significant effect on the level of vote buying in Table 13, and it maintains it in Table 14 (i.e., when the effective number of parties is assumed to be 0), the inclusion of a product term shows that ENP neutralizes the effect of GDP/capita. The estimates of the total effects of all coefficients on x_{i1} fall well below the level of significance when the product term is

included.[60] This is to say that income only matters when the number of parties is assumed to have no effect on income's effect on the clientelist vote.

Another notable effect is how much of the dependent variable's variance was explained by the introduction of the interactive variable; the R-squared statistic increased considerably (to 0.66) with the product term in Table 14 as opposed to without it (0.59) in Table 13. A partial-f test indicated that the product term significantly affects the model ($p<0.01$).

One unexpected result was that partisan identification does not have a significant negative effect on vote buying. It is also worth noting that the full model did have some heteroskedasticity ($p=0.01$ on the Breusch-Godfrey test), but my final results still held, even when using robust standard errors. Residual diagnostics indicated that the heteroskedasticity did not seem to indicate an omitted variable or misspecification.

DISCUSSION

These data suggest that economic security affects vote buying, but only when options for voters are well-defined. As the number of effective parties increases, income's effect diminishes.

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[60] These results also held when using a more general clientelist summary statistic as the dependent variable. GDP/capita also became insignificant with the introduction of the interactive GDP/capita and ENP product term, although the coefficient for the product term itself was not significant. That said, this measure is less direct when it comes to measuring vote buying specifically; it includes other factors such whether the party in question manipulates regulatory mechanisms to benefit its supporters. While this is not unrelated to clientelism, not every scholar would include it as an essential component of clientelism, and it's not necessarily related directly to clientelist voting. As a result, it makes more sense to put more stock in the original vote-buying dependent variable.

My sample may not be representative of the world at large, but this means that it actually presents a tougher test than it otherwise would have. Countries with large numbers of effective parties were underrepresented in my sample, which made it more difficult for them to have a large effect on the final conclusions. With a more representative sample of countries, the interactive effect I found may have been more pronounced.

One other surprising result is the resilience of enforcement's effect. Monitoring had a significant effect on vote buying regardless of the dependent variable used, and regardless of whether the interactive variable was included as an independent variable. Perhaps this ability to enforce is directly caused by other variables, such as district size (as Gingerich & Medina, 2013 predict) or income, but regardless of the ultimate cause, it does seem to matter.

The key finding relates to the conditional role of income. In environments with small numbers of parties, it does indeed lead to decreases in vote buying, but its effect is neutralized with large numbers of parties. As predicted, economic security might very well be a necessary factor for decreases in clientelist voting to take place, but only when the number of options for voters is sufficiently low for them to distinguish rationally between different options. Income's negative effect on clientelist voting does indeed seem to be limited, in large part, to the type of majoritarian country exemplified by the U.S. and the U.K.

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Chapter 8: Conclusion

Despite increases in economic security, clientelist voting in Brazil has not decreased. This appears not to be an anomaly. Rather, the historical experience of the U.S. and U.K., taken by many (and, at first, by me) as a reference-point is misleading.

I have shown through a mix of methods and data that increases in voters' economic security do not necessarily lead to decreases in clientelist voting when informational contexts are complex and disorganized, which is often the case with countries with many political parties. Decreases in clientelist voting only happen when institutional factors facilitate voters' ability to distinguish candidates from one another and form opinions on them. In some countries with few parties, like Honduras, this can happen. In others, such as Brazil, which has many, any change in clientelist voting ends up being marginal at most.

THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

This research makes contributions to the literatures of both clientelism and comparative political behavior. In the clientelism literature, previous researchers have, as a rule, ignored arguments about what causes clientelist voting to decrease, often using an implicit argument that income should be the key determinant. I show, however, that the impact of income, however, has been overstated because this theory—whether explicit or implicit—has been based on the American and British cases, which had higher-than-average levels of voting cues and small numbers of parties. In countries with more parties, the absence of these institutional factors suppresses income's effect on clientelist voting.

This argument does two things for the clientelism literature. First, I evaluated and modified a common argument that has not received as much scrutiny as it deserved. There is merit to the argument, and a reason it is so intuitive. It, however, overlooks important, relevant information that lead us to a different conclusion than that of the conventional wisdom.

It also makes a more methodological contribution. The tools that comparative political behavior brings to the theoretical questions in play are extremely useful, particularly because clientelist voting is not all-or-nothing. Voters can, at one time, vote on party lines, and at another, vote on policy, and at another, vote based on the individual benefits they receive from selling their votes. They can even have all these factors at play during one election, or even during one vote. The political behavior subfield brings other useful methodological tools that can be suitable for this type of analysis, in addition to those used by the clientelism literature. This dissertation used rather simple analyses within a comparative political behavior framework, but it can serve as an example of how to look at clientelism from another new, exciting perspective. It would be to everyone's benefit to look at more questions about vote buying with a political behavior framework.

Likewise, it also makes a contribution to the comparative political behavior literature. Political behavior, as a rule, seems loath to get involved with areas that are difficult to quantify, and clientelist voting is, at present, certainly one of those areas. However, leaving out any measure of vote buying in many countries is around the world is a big oversight, as it is indeed a major factor in how significant portions of the population vote. Ignoring that biases estimates using other voting motivations,

particularly partisan identity. Just because the U.S., the origin of much voting behavior research, does not find it useful to measure vote buying does not mean that other countries should reach the same conclusion. It is often a relevant factor in elections, and one that cannot afford to be overlooked.

FUTURE RESEARCH

This dissertation represents an entry point to the study of clientelist voting rather than the final word. In fact, it raises a number of questions and avenues for future research.

Perhaps the most pressing relates to the central argument. If highly structured information environments are important for ensuring that increases in economic voting decrease clientelist voting, to what degree are they important? I focused particularly on the number of parties in a country's political system as an indicator of information context structure; is there a tipping point in regards to how many parties washes out the effect of income? If so, what is it?

More specifically, I used the effective number of parties as a measure because it directly affects the usefulness of a number of different voting cues in structuring the information environment: party labels, endorsements, polls, and candidate appearance, for instance (see Lau and Redlawsk 2001). Yet how much does each cue actually matter in and of itself?

With the data available, this is not something we can establish, which is problematic. For more practically oriented researchers interested in affecting the rates of

clientelist voting, it is difficult to know what to do short of change electoral systems or electoral thresholds. That sort of change is not something to be taken lightly, and could have many other unintended effects, aside from being prohibitively unrealistic in many settings. Knowing which cues matter more than others for vote buying, and in what circumstances, could help make it easier for voters to pick candidates without the help of monetary aids.

Another important question is the extent to which symbolic and affective ties are important in maintaining clientelist voting relationships. From my experience, I find this variable relatively unlikely to hold much explanatory power; given the variation in clientelist voting and its decline across time and space, it would seem simplistic to attribute this variation to certain cultures simply being friendlier to clientelist ties than others. More systematic evidence about affective ties and their effects on clientelistic resilience would be useful, however, and would likely center on careful analysis of clients' attitudes toward patrons, controlling for social desirability bias.

It would also be a good idea to probe differences between personalist, candidate-based clientelist voting with other types of clientelism. We often talk about political machines in the context of U.S. politics, and other countries do have more party-centered models of clientelism (see Çarkoğlu and Aytaç 2014). Are party-centered models more vulnerable to changes in income than personalist models? I have not considered this question in this dissertation, but it is certainly worth further thought.

In a line of argument more relevant specifically to Brazil—a country with a mix of different electoral systems—it is also important to determine if, and to what extent,

there exists a "spillover effect" between proportional and majoritarian elections. It is very plausible that the PR system of lower house elections can sustain vote buying in other elections to a degree; people who are brought up in a certain type of political education may take to buying and selling votes for more than one election if it is what they have always done. But how much does this spillover effect actually affect non-PR elections?

One possible way to analyze this is to look at polling error in majoritarian elections, and attempt to establish if there are correlations between them and other factors that we know are related to vote buying (namely, campaign finances, for instance) (Lloyd, Turgeon, and Gramacho 2016). Yet this is necessarily an inexact measure that, among other things, leaves out longer-term forms of clientelist voting. Other methodological innovations would be welcome here.

Another improvement that would facilitate more research into clientelist voting would be the availability of more macro-level cross-national data on clientelism. Herbert Kitschelt's DALP (Kitschelt 2013) is extremely useful, and has found a way around the difficulties of obtaining reliable data on it by asking experts specific standardized questions about clientelist practices and democratic accountability.

Yet these data are not ideal for a variety of reasons. First of all, there are concerns about measurement equivalence (Elkins and Sides 2008; Schaffer 2000)—how can one be sure that clientelism and vote buying mean the same thing in different cultures? Kitschelt, to some degree, gets around this with more specific questions, but not entirely; there are still ambiguities in his questions.

Second, and more importantly, he was only able to do one wave, which means that it is impossible to measure changes in the clientelist activity of parties and countries over time. The best that one can do is look at fluctuations in individual parties' electoral popularity over time, but this is far from ideal because it doesn't take into account the very realistic fact that parties change, too. More time-series data could make a world of difference in the study of clientelist voting and changes in it.

Another avenue for further research would be micro-level measurement of vote buying. Direct questioning about socially undesirable activities, such as vote buying, has been shown to be unreliable in many cases (see Gonzalez-Ocantos, de Jonge, Meléndez, Osorio, & Nickerson, 2012; Kiewiet De Jonge, 2015)—respondents often under-report vote-selling and other clientelist activities. Relying on that alone for measurements can be problematic. Better micro-level measurement about vote buying would go a long way toward helping advance this sub-field.

It is especially difficult to measure the social desirability bias over time—does it vary? Maybe. One possibility is especially troubling for researchers looking into changes in clienteslit voting over time: that, as the rate of vote buying decreases, the social desirability bias also increases. Perhaps, as fewer people sell their votes, fewer people actually selling their votes will want to tell anyone about it. This could exaggerate visible changes in clientelist voting, and cause a researcher to attribute changes in social desirability bias to actual changes in clientelism.

Luckily, this topic has already received some attention. González-Ocantos, Kiewiet de Jonge, and their co-authors have extolled the virtues of list experiments in

reducing social desirability bias, while Gingerich et al. (2016) have proposed a crosswise model for the same purpose. Yet in some ways, these approaches are of only limited use when tracking clientelist voting over time because they simply have not been used often enough for long enough. Unless an enterprising researcher is able to construct an ex-post-facto method for correcting old surveys for social desirability, the only way around this problem will likely be time, encouraging researchers to continue using these new methods to measure clientelist voting in the future.

Another advance in the research would be more bespoke wide-scale surveys that focus specifically on clientelist voting and, if possible, are coordinated to take advantage of situations in which money is randomly assigned in some capacity. When conducting my natural experiments, I began to notice that most surveys simply did not have wide enough coverage to accurately measure differences between sub-municipal units, which are often the units at which experimental interventions vary. As a result, several possibilities of random interventions had to be set aside, and the ones I ended up using yielded very small sample sizes.

What is needed are custom surveys that do collect these types of data at that level, and lots of it. I am already coordinating, with two other scholars interested in the issues, a project of this sort, planning to conduct a survey of recipients of *Minha Casa, Minha Vida* (MCMV, My House, My Life) in Rio de Janeiro. MCMV is a Brazilian program that subsidizes the purchase of a house for poor applicants who make it through a lottery. This type of custom survey will specifically take advantage of the random assignment of

economic security inherent in the design of MCMV to reach firmer conclusions about clientelist voting and income's effect on it.

Finally, another, vastly promising avenue for more study is producing experimental data about clientelist voting, particularly regarding the effect of income. This might seem to be an intimidating problem: how could one get enough money (not to mention IRB approval) to experimentally manipulate income in a laboratory setting with the end of changing vote patterns?

I believe I may have already found a possible answer. Immersive environments with in-game currencies and analogous situations to clientelist voting could circumvent this problem. Long-term, perhaps the solution would be a virtual world such Ted Castronova has proposed and studied (E. Castronova and Falk 2009; Edward Castronova 2001). He has argued that laws of economics do apply in virtual game environments— there is no reason why they should not reproduce political environments as well. A virtual multiplayer virtual world would be manipulable by researchers, re-usable, and efficient, with the ability to accommodate thousands of subjects at one point. The size and cost of the initial undertaking would be considerable, but if successfully established, it could be an extremely valuable resource for experimental research in the social science, particularly about subjects like clientelist voting, which have real difficulties being studied in laboratory settings.

Another attractive alternative is a live-action role-playing game. I have already used this tool with *Reacting to the Past* (RTTP)*,* an educational role-playing game being used in various college campuses across the U.S. RTTP constructs historical simulations

and has students play roles in these situations, complete with character biographies, victory conditions, and various other rules and incentives. This helps them understand the incentives and dynamics behind important historical moments.

These games are immersive affairs lasting anywhere from a few weeks to an entire semester. As grades (and often pride) are based off results in the game, students make every effort to behave in a historically accurate and rational way. These games are much more immersive than other experimental environments habitually involving college students, such as laboratory experiments, which would produce more plausible reactions to randomized interventions.

I already experimentally manipulated two RTTP games for use in my research: one on the reformulation of the USDA's food pyramid and one about Henry VIII's break from the Catholic Church. In both games, there was already some form of vote buying present, so I simply introduced a randomized in-game currency element and measured the difference between the voting behavior of the treatment and control groups.

Unfortunately, I had to contact professors using the RTTP program individually, which reduced coordination among them and the predictability of when I would receive their results. While I have already received the results of three games, the results of these experiments are still trickling in, and will only be available in full in January at the earliest; this made it impossible for me to include them in my dissertation. I anticipate having a total of at least 8 games and a sample size of at least 150 students when the project is over. RTTP, in short, is a useful methodological tool that will yield valuable insights into topics such as clientelist voting.

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Appendix A: Progresa/Oportunidades Study

Progresa was launched in 1997 (it was rebranded *Oportunidades* in 2002; therefore, I refer it from here on out as P/O). [61] It was originally targeted to poor rural villages, and its transfers amounted, on average, to 20% of beneficiary families' per-capita consumption in June 1999 (Fiszbein and Schady 2009). P/O had components in three different areas: education, nutrition, and healthcare. It provided grants from 105-660 pesos (10.50-66 USD) for every child in school between 3rd grade and the third grade of high school, basic health care for all members of the recipient family, and a fixed amount of about 155 pesos (15.50 USD) for improved nutrition and nutritional supplements for children. Receipt of these benefits was contingent upon enrollment of all children in school and regular visits to health care facilities (Parker and Teruel 2005).

The sample of communities was generally selected on the basis of a marginality index, involving 506 communities over seven states. Within this sample, 320 communities were assigned to the treatment group and 186 to the control group (Parker and Teruel 2005). Within these communities, individual families were selected based on income, number of dependents, number of durable goods owned, and whether someone with a disability lived in the house

As with my Honduras data, I primarily sought to isolate the causal effect of income on clientelist voting.

My basic model in this section was therefore the following:

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[61] I am grateful to David Crow and Susan Parker for guidance on the Mexican P/O data.

$$y_1 = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 x_1 + u_1$$

where:

y_1 is the dependent variable, a measure of clientelist voting in a given country;

x_1 is an income variable;

and u_1 is an error term.

Because Mexico only has 3 effective political parties, I also predicted that income's effect on clientelist voting would be significant and negative, with respondents who received *Progresa* being significantly less clientelist behavior than those from control municipalities, but perhaps showing little change in attitudes about clientelist voting.

Methods

For the analysis of my Mexico data, I also resolved to use both attitudinal and behavioral measures, for the same reasons above: the ability to look at attitudinal change as a possible mediator variable in the process of clientelist voting change.

With regards to data, P/O had one big advantage and one big disadvantage over PRAF-II. Its one big advantage is that it was a higher-profile program in a higher-profile country, and, as a consequence, questions about it were included on a national-level survey (the 2000 Mexican Panel Study) conducted immediately after the experiment. This allowed some level of measurement at the individual level.

The disadvantage, however, was that the process of matching treatment data to survey data for Mexico was not as straightforward as it was with Honduras. This was

because treatments were randomized at the sub-municipal level, but the relevant survey data was only available aggregated at the municipal level (Behrman and Todd 1999; Skoufias et al. 2001). As a result, I was not always able to definitively determine which respondents lived in areas that had received the treatment. To make my comparison as accurate as possible, I dropped all observations that were definitively not part of the pilot project. Since the experimental trial took place in the states of Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Puebla, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, and Veracruz (Parker and Teruel 2005), I dropped all survey responses from other states.

The Mexican Panel Study, however, had some inconsistency regarding the level at which observations were identified; there was one category with the label "municipality/locality," which included the names of both municipalities and sub-municipal localities in the same category without distinguishing between them. In addition, the municipality/locality variable did not adhere to the standard geographic identification scheme used by the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía* (INEGI), Mexico's National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI n.d.). [62] As a result, it was not possible to match geographic areas up to the municipalities in the official government evaluation data about monetary transfers with 100% certainty (SEDESOL

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[62] Another problem was that data about control municipalities were not publicly available for rural transfers. While I was able to find some rural municipalities that were treatment municipalities by checking monetary transfer records to individuals in those municipalities, and deducing that those that had some on record were likely treatment municipalities, I was able to verify that some of these results were due to spillover, and that some treatment localities might not have had any program recipients interviewed by the survey. Because of these uncertainties, I opted, in the end, to not include rural transfers in the experimental sample, leaving only urban transfer data.

and Prospera n.d.), and I left all municipalities from the seven states mentioned above in my sample, merging by both municipality and locality name and adjudicating case-by-case whenever there was a conflict.

With 2002 *Latinobarómetro* data, my alternative data source for P/O, the data was indeed accurate at the municipality level, so I was able to drop observations from municipalities that definitively did not participate. The data were not collected at the sub-municipal level, however, so I could not know which localities had received the treatment. As with PRAF-II, there was also no individual-level question about receiving *Progresa* because it was a cross-national survey. As a result, I was still not able to say with complete certainty, in most cases, which survey respondents did and did not live in localities that received the treatment.

I opted to shore up these shortcomings by using quasi-experimental methods. In addition to t-tests, logit models, and linear regressions, I also used propensity score matching (PSM) (using the STATA command psmatch2—Leuven and Sianesi, 2003) with my P/O data to try to further isolate the causal effect of living in a municipality receiving P/O funds. I used nearest-neighbor matching and common support. When balancing was a problem, I also included product terms with my independent variables and radius matching with a caliper of 0.01.

My dependent variables in the *Latinobarómetro* data were the same as for my PRAF-II analyses: one attitudinal variable about bribery (*bribe*) and a behavioral variable about vote buying (*vb*). My dependent variable in the Mexican Panel Study data was a

behavior variable: whether the respondent said that she had received a "gift or other assistance" from a political party during the last few weeks of the campaign (*vb*).

For *Latinobarómetro* data, my key independent variable was whether the municipality of the respondent had a treatment locality in it (*treatment*). For the Mexican Panel Study data, my key independent variable was whether the respondent—or a member of his household—had received any money from *Progresa* (*prog*).

I also included the following independent variables in the regression for the *Latinobarómetro* data: the mean education level (*aged*) and socioeconomic level of the respondent's neighborhood (*sesnb*), the number of dependents in the respondent's household (*dep*) and the monthly income of the respondent (*minc*). For the Mexico Panel Study data, I included independent variables measuring the municipality's average educational level (*aged*), respondent's socioeconomic status (*ses*), subjective income (*sinc*)[63] and the number —out of nine options—of items that the respondent owned (*goods*).[64]

These independent variables were all included to approximate the selection criteria for *Progresa,* which used, according to Parker and Teruel (2005), a marginality index that included measures of socioeconomic community characteristics, and, at the household level, measures of individual marginality, such as the number of dependents in the household, the number of durable goods owned by the household, and the number of

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[63] Whether the respondent found her income sufficient or not.
[64] The goods were a color television (*s10a*), a refrigerator/icebox/freezer (*s10b*), their own home (*s10c*), a washing machine (*s10e*), a telephone (*s10f*), a car (*s10g*), drinking water (*s10i*), hot water (*s10j*), and a sewage system (*s10k*).

disabled people living in the household. I expected for all of these variables, as components of the marginality index, to have negative, significant impacts on the dependent variable.

As with the PRAF-II data, my hypotheses were that clientelist behaviors would be negatively affected by the treatment, but I was once again skeptical that the treatment would produce a significant change in clientelist attitudes.

Results

In contrast to PRAF-II, results for P/O provided weak support, at best, for my hypothesis about clientelist voting behavior or attitudes.

For the behavior measure from the 2000 Mexico Panel Study, signs were initially positive that receiving P/O would make clientelist voting less likely. A two-group mean-comparison t-test showed that those who received *Progresa* were indeed significantly less likely to report vote buying during the campaign.

Table 15: P/O, Likelihood of Receiving Money or Gifts for Votes, 2000

Group	N	Mean (std. error)
Prog=0	133	0.13 (0.3)
Prog=1	44	0.02 (0.02)
Combined	177	0.1 (0.2)
Diff		0.1 (0.05)
Ha: diff > 0	Pr(T > t) = 0.022**	
	*=p<.1, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01*	

Source: SEDESOL and Prospera, Mexican Panel Study 2000

However, when I conducted a logistic regression complete with other variables that would have helped determine which respondents received treatment, these effects got washed out.

Table 16a: P/O, Likelihood of Receiv6ng Money or Gifts for Votes, 2000

Variables	Coefficient (std. error)	p
Prog	-0.87(1.15)	0.451
minc	-0.02 (0.20)	0.93
dep	-0.02 (0.15)	0.92
aged	0.90 (0.57)	0.11
sesnb	0.03 (0.25)	0.89
N	140	
prob>chi2	0.29	
*=p<.1, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01		

Source: SEDESOL and Prospera, Mexican Panel Study 2000

Table 16b: P/O, first differences, key independent variables, other variables at means

Variable	Change in probability
Prog	
0->1	-0.06
Sesnb	
Min->max	0.02
+-sd/2	<0.01
Minc	
Min->max	-0.01
+-sd/2	<0.01

Source: SEDESOL and Prospera, Mexican Panel Study 2000

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To make sure that there was no effect, I also used propensity score matching.[65] While some of the covariates became significant, *prog*—the treatment variable—was not a significant predictor when matching was used.

Table 17: P/O, Propensity Score Matching Model, Likelihood of Receiving Money or Gifts for Votes, 2000

Variables	Coefficient (std. error)		p	
minc	-0.02 (0.20)		0.93	
dep	-0.02 (0.15)		0.92	
aged	0.90 (0.57)		0.11	
sesnb	0.03 (0.25)		0.89	
			Difference (standard	
Sample	Treated	Controls	error)	t-stat
Unmatched	0.03	0.131	-0.101 (0.061)	-1.64
ATT	0.032	0.097	-0.065(0.130)	-0.5
N	140			
prob>chi2	<.001			
*=p<.1, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01				

Source: SEDESOL and Prospera, Mexican Panel Study 2000

For the other behavioral variable—from *Latinobarómetro* data—there was no significant relationship between the treatment variable and the probability of seeing other people selling their votes.

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[65] Other propensity score results and graphics can be obtained upon request from the author, as well as balancing statistics.

Table 18: P/O, Likelihood of Seeing Vote Buying by Other People, 2002

Group	N	Mean (std. error)
Control	40	0.45 (0.08)
Treatment	198	0.43 (0.04)
Combined	238	0.43 (0.03)
Diff		0.02(0.09)
Ha: diff < 0	Pr(T >t)=0.41	
	*=p<.1, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01	

Source: SEDESOL and Prospera, Latinobarómetro 2002

Table 19: P/O, Likelihood of Seeing Vote Buying by Other People, 2002

Variables	Coefficient (std. error)	p
treatment	-0.02(0.60)	0.98
ses	-0.34 (0.29)	0.24
sinc	-0.25 (0.39)	0.52
aged	-0.73 (1.13)	0.52
goods	0.17 (0.21)	0.43
N	65	
prob>chi2	0.85	
	*=p<.1, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01	

Source: SEDESOL and Prospera, Latinobarómetro 2002

When it came to attitudinal variables (also with *Latinobarómetro* data), my results were also not what I expected. In fact, for the acceptability of receiving bribes, the sign of the effect was the opposite of what I expected—being in a municipality with P/O increased the chances of being accepting of receiving bribes.

Table 20: P/O, Acceptability of Bribery, 2002[66]

Group	N	Mean (std. error)
Control	40	1.78 (0.26)
Treatment	202	2.5 (0.19)
Combined	242	2.38 (0.16)
Diff		-0.73(0.44)
Ha: diff > 0	Pr(T < t) = 0.049**	

*=p<.1, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01

Source: SEDESOL and Prospera, Latinobarómetro 2002

When a linear model was estimated with the appropriate covariates, however, this effect was washed out, becoming insignificant.

Table 21: P/O, Acceptability of Bribery, 2002

Variables	Coefficient (std. error)	p
treatment	-0.09(0.62)	0.89
ses	-0.35 (0.28)	0.21
sinc	-0.48 (0.39)	0.23
aged	0.36(1.17)	0.76
goods	0.004 (0.19)	0.98
N	67	
prob>f	0.62	

*=p<.1, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01

Source: SEDESOL and Prospera, Latinobarómetro 2002

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[66] Regressions and graphics for these models can be obtained upon request from the author.

DISCUSSION

Income, then, had no significant effect on either behavioral or attitudinal measures for P/O. While the explanations for the lack of attitudinal results could be similar to those for PRAF-II's, the lack of results for behavioral measures is puzzling. P/O had a larger cash transfer, so it should have been more likely *a priori* to lead to changes in behavior than PRAF-II.

The measurement issues outlined through this chapter might be relevant, but another possible factor is that the Mexican Panel Study asked respondents whether particular campaigns had offered them money or gifts. This could clearly have been subject to social desirability bias, as well as a fear of being found out as having thrown powerful figures under the bus. This still, however, would not explain why the behavioral question from *Latinobarómetro* also showed no results.

Appendix B: Exploratory Model of Clientelist Voting

Following Weller and Barnes's advice regarding multi-method pathway analysis, I began my multi-method research project by estimating and visualizing multivariable regressions to test and reproduce the argument contained in the conventional wisdom (Weller and Barnes 2014). This naïve model is as follows:

$$y_i = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 x_{i1} + \gamma_2 x_{i6} + \gamma_3 x_{i3} + u_i$$

Where y_i is the dependent variable, a measure of the clientelist vote in a given country;

x_{i1} is an income variable that measures the country's GDP/capita;

x_{i6} is the degree of inequality in the country;

x_{i3} represents the monitoring capacity of parties in the country;

and u_i was an error term.

I expected γ_1, the coefficient for income, and γ_2, the coefficient for inequality, to be negative and its estimate significant, reproducing the findings of the scholars who emphasize the role of income and inequality on decreases in clientelist voting. Meanwhile, I expected γ_3 to be positive and its estimate significant, showing how enforcement can intimidate reluctant clients into selling their votes through fear of retribution.

GDP/capita data were obtained from World Bank data, whereas the degree of inequality was measured with a standardized Gini coefficient (Solt 2016).

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As I found no effect from the Gini coefficient in any specification either in this exploratory model or any subsequent ones, I ended up dropping it from what ended up being the final model.

I estimated a linear regression model with GDP/capita and enforcement ability as independent variables. The dependent variable is the sum of five different variables measuring experts' judgments on how much effort, to win votes, candidates and parties in a given country spend: 1) distributing consumer goods; 2) supplying preferential access to public benefits; 3) supplying preferential access to employment in the public sector; 4) supplying preferential access to public contracts; and 5) influencing regulatory proceedings in their supporters' favor. A score of one indicated that the expert felt that political actors in the country made "a negligible effort or none at all," whereas a maximum score of four indicated that political actors made a "major effort."

Scores ranged from a low of 572.91 (Canada) to a high of 1742.27 (Mongolia), with Brazil finishing 21st from the top with 1365.03. I used the average of all the experts' judgments on this variable for each country as the variable.

The results, shown below, indeed do show a significant inverse correlation between income and clientelist behavior.[67]

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[67] GDP/capita data were taken from the World Bank (World Bank), and Gini data were taken from both the *World Income Inequality Database* and *Standardized World Income Inequality Database* (and results were compared with one another with no significant differences found). The SWIID was created by Frederick Solt with several adjustments made to ensure the comparability of Gini coefficients across different contexts, and I use its values in the figures and tables displayed in this paper (Solt 2016).

Table 22: Clientelism Summary Statistic, 2008

Variable	Coefficient	P
GDP/capita	-0.001	<0.001***
Gini coef.	0.015	0.625

Source: Kitschelt 2013, World Bank, Solt 2016

Figure 7: Clientelism Summary Statistic vs. 2008 GDP/capita

Source: Kitschelt 2013, World Bank

Brazil has a slight positive residual, as seen in Figure 3. To further measure the consistency of these judgments, I also constructed a more practical index of clientelism that can, to a degree, measure changes over time. I measured each country's level of clientelism based on experts' estimations of each *party's* level of clientelism.

Since the DALP also had the same summary statistic for every party in the countries in the sample, I took advantage of this to make a more nuanced measure. I multiplied these summary statistics with each party's average electoral returns from the last two lower-house legislative elections. I then added these products together for every party in a given country to construct alternative country-level indexes of clientelism. This index, in other words, measures how clientelist countries are by measuring how clientelist the most popular parties are.[68]

Table 23: Legislative Clientelism Summary Statistic, 2008

| Variable	Coefficient	P
GDP/capita	-0.008	<0.001***
Gini Coefficient	-6.449	0.057
Enforcement Capacity	4.954	<0.001***
*=p<.1, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01		

Source: Kitschelt 2013, World Bank, Solt 2016

As the table above shows, income still has a negative correlation with clientelism, as the argument embedded in the conventional wisdom would predict, but it does not explain everything. It does a good job of showing that wealthier countries tend to elect less clientelist parties, but it has little explanatory power for countries with lower levels

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[68] This measure would be more accurate if it included changes in the levels of clientelism of parties—if the DALP had more waves, in other words. Unfortunately, the DALP only collected one wave of data, and no other comparable datasets are available, to my knowledge.

of income—some of which do have quite low levels of clientelism. Furthermore, it shows

that Brazil is not behaving as one might expect: it is more clientelist than predicted.

Figure 8: Legislative Clientelism Summary Statistic vs. 2008 GDP/capita

The role of monitoring in this equation is a bit puzzling. As a measure of

monitoring ability, I used experts' judgment of parties' enforcement capacity, or ability to

assess consequences to a voter who promises to vote for them and reneges on the

promise. A score of 1 indicated that the party had the ability to do this, whereas a score of

0 indicated that they did not.[69]

Enforcement capacity does seem to have a significant effect on the likelihood of

clientelist voting, but the amount of noise is relatively high. Furthermore Brazil still has a

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[69] The original coding of this variable was 1 (yes) and 2 (no), but I recoded it.

level of clientelism higher than would be predicted by its score on the enforcement variable.

Figure 9: Legislative Clientelism Summary Statistic vs. Enforcement Capacity

As I explained in Chapter 3, Brazil deviates from expectations, overshooting the predicted values on clientelism on both measures when a more precise measure of clientelist parties' popularity is used. Just given its GDP/capita and enforcement ability, it should have a lower score. Even so, the conventional wisdom does seem, at this point, to have some truth to it.

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