TEXAS BUSINESS REVIEW Bureau of Business Research • The University of Texas at Austin January 1973 TEXAS BUSINESS REVIEW VOL. XLVII, No. 1, JANUARY 1973 Editor, Robert H. Ryan Managing Editor, Kathleen Luft Editorial Board: Robert H. Ryan, Chairman; Stanley A. Arbingast; John R. Stockton; Francis B. May; Robert B. Williamson. Kathleen Luft. CONTENTS Articles I: The Business Situation in Texas, by Robert H. Ryan 4: Energy Policy and the Long Run, by James W. McKie 11 : Texas Population in 1970: 5. Trends and Variations in the Populations of Nonmetropolitan Towns, 1950-1970, by Diana DeAre and Dudley L. Pos­ ton, Jr. 16: Texas Construction: Where is the Newest Housing in Texas?, by Robert M. Lockwood Tables 2: Selected Barometers of Texas Business 2: Business-Activity Indexes for Twenty Selected, Texas Cities 3: Hours and Earnings in Texas 5: National Petroleum Council Estimates of Domestic U.S. Production in 1975, 1980, and 1985 7: National Petroleum Council Projections of the Oil Supply/Demand Balance, 1980 and 1985 13: Number and Population of Nonmetropolitan Incor­porated Places: Texas 14: Classification of the Number of Nonmetropolitan Incorporated Places by Size: Texas 15: Percentage Distribution of Places by Population Change, by Size 16: Cotton in Santa Fe States 18: Estimated Values of Building Authorized in Texas 19: Local Business Conditions Barometers of Texas Business (inside back cover) Charts I: Texas Business Activity 2: Crude-Oil Production, Texas 2: Total Nonagricultural Employment, Texas 3: Estimated Personal Income, Texas I 0: Comparison of Consumer Prices and Wholesale Prices, U.S. 13: Rates of Population Increase 15: Proportion of Places Growing, by Size and Location 18: Total Building Authorized, Texas Maps 12: Nonmetropolitan Incorporated Places of Texas: 1970 17: Proportion of Year-Round Housing Units Built in Texas Counties during January 1960-March 1970 BUREAU OF BUSINESS RESEARCH Business Research Council: Vernon M. Briggs, James R. Bright, Robert T. Green, Darwin D. Klingman, George Kozmetsky, George M. Scott, Lee A. Tavis Director: Stanley A. Arbingast Assistant Directors: Florence Escott, David L. Karney Statistician: John R. Stockton Consulting Statistician: Francis B. May Cooperating Faculty: C. P. Blair, Charles T. Clark, Law­ rence L. Crum, Clark C. Gill, Gary L. Holstrum, Robert K. Holz, Lorrin G. Kennamer, Jerry Todd, Ernest W. Walker, Robert B. Williamson Administrative Assistant: Margaret Robb Research Associates: J. Bryan Adair, Charles Adams, Earlene Call, Ida M. Lambeth, Robert M. Lockwood, Kathleen Luft, Robert H. Ryan, Clyde Sommerlatte, Barbara Terrell, Charles P. Zlatkovich Computer Programmer: Marilyn Smith Statistical Associate: Mildred Anderson Statistical Assistant: Constance Cooledge Statistical Technician: Kay Davis Cartographers: James Buchanan, Alice Lo, Charles W. Montfort Librarian: Merle Danz Administrative Secretary: Mary Ann Greatly Administrative Clerks: Armour Goodman, Maureen Meehan Senior Secretary: Clintsy Sturgill Senior Clerk Typists: Christine Fox, Deborah Gozali, Agnes Marie Sullivan Senior Clerks: Robert Jenkins, Salvador B. Macias Offset Press Operators: Robert Dorsett, Daniel P. Rosas Published monthly by the Bureau of Business Research, Graduate School of Business, The Univeraity of Texu at Austin, Austin, Texu 78712. Second-clau poatage paid at Austin, Texas. Content of tbia publication ii not copyrighted and may be reproduced freely, but acknowledgment of source will be appreciated. The views expre1111d by authors are not necessarily thoae of the Bureau of Busineu Research. Subscription, $4.00 a year; individual copies 35 cents. Reprints of feature articles are available from the Bureau at ten cents each. The Bureau of Businea Research ia a member of the Aaociation for University Business and Economic Research. THE BUSINESS SITUATION IN TEXAS Robert H. Ryan Texas' fall business upsurge gave certainty to predictions of a record year in 1972. The Bureau of Business Research Index of Texas Business Activity (charted below) scaled upward by 11 points between October and November to set a year-to-date average l 0.1 percent better than the January­November 1971 average. If the strong upward movement continued into December, the final total for the year will have been about 11 percent better than the 1971 figure. General expansion in Texas business is evidenced by several measures. One of the most significant of these, the index of personal income in the state, rose by 9.7 percent during the first eleven months. The comparable national increase was only 8.5 percent. Though Texans apparently gained more than the average American during 1972, the gain is surely not enough to bring Texas per-family income up to the national level. Personal income statistics also suggest that the Texas economy has contributed to the national inflationary trend. Texas production increases almost surely lagged behind the rise in personal income. Manufacturing output in the state was up in 1972 by 7.5 percent; mineral production increased only 4. 7 percent; and production in other economic sectors, for which measures are not available, may have gained even less. Economic output in the services and distributive activities is difficult to measure because those industries are so diverse that there exist no common denominators of productivity. Many phases of distribution and services, however, resist mechanization and are difficult to make more efficient, as manufacturing often can be through applied technology. Clearly some of the improvement in Texans' income has been canceled out by inflation. Even after adjustment for increased prices, however, Texans were 6.3 percent better off in 1972 than in 1971, according to comparison of the January-November periods. Consumer prices increased less in Dallas than in the nation as a whole (3.0 percent compared with 3.3 percent). Dallas has experienced slightly less price inflation since 1967 than the national average. Price measures for a single city are not necessarily repre­sentative of the state or region, and it is not safe to assume that the pattern seen in Dallas has prevailed throughout Texas. Economists generally expect the rate of inflation to continue between 3.3 percent and 3.5 percent during 1973, but recent sharp increases in wholesale food prices hint that the rate might be even higher. The first month of 1973 brought Texas its first dramatic demonstration of the growing shortage of energy resources and the inadequacy of energy distribution channels. The power crisis has been given such widespread attention that it almost escaped notice that 1972 was the all-time peak year for Texas petroleum production. Through November, the 1972 production level was 6.2 percent above the 1971 level, and the average flow per well was up 6.4 percent. Certainly these gains are no grounds for false optimism; energy consumption is still racing ahead of the development of new supplies. To illustrate the magnitude of the energy pinch, Texas electric-power use was up 9.4 percent for 1971 to 1972 (eleven-month comparison), while Texas oil output, even at a record level, was up only 6.2 percent, and gas production was almost unchanged. (In "Energy Policy and the Long Run," beginning on page 4 of this issue, University of Texas Dean James W. McKie deals with some of the current energy problems.) The energy situation is certain to involve some com­promises between environmental protection and public convenience. Further, U.S. foreign relations will be influ­enced by the pressure for cooperation with oil-rich nations, particularly in the Middle East. Whatever the short-term problems, energy costs seem sure to rise sharply, bringing about some readjustments in Texans' living patterns. In an energy-short economy, the geographic size of Texas and the wide scatter of its population will be serious 1964 1965 1966 1973 SELECTED BAROMETERS Of TEXAS BUSINESS (Indexes-Adjusted for seasonal variation 1967=100) Percent change Year-to­ date Index Nov 1972 Oct 1972 Year-to­date Nov 1972 average from 1972 Oct 1972 average 1972 from 1971 Estimated personal 161.5p 158.0pincome 155.2 2 10 Business activity 181.2 170.2 165.5 6 10 Crude-petroleum 119.8p 119.lpproduction 116.9 1 6 Crude-oil runs to stills 119.2 115.7 116.4 3 3 Total electric-power 159.6p 159.8puse 150.8 •• 9 Industrial electric­ 143.2p 140.6ppower use 137.0 2 8 Bank debits 218.8 204.3 196.6 7 1 5 Urban building permits issued 163.4 173.8 179.0 6 16 New residential 233.9 217.6 206.2 7 17 New nonresidential (unadjusted) 100.8 130.5 157.3 - 23 20 Total industrial production 134.5p 132.9p 130.0 7 Total nonfarm em­ployment 117.7p 117.6p 116.0 •• 3 Manufacturing em­ lll.3p 110.3pployment 108.9 1 1 Total unemployment 124.3 153.7 150.8 - 19 - 10 Insured unemployment 134.1 174.1 168.1 - 23 - 19 Average weekly earn­ 133.8p 131.2p ings-manufacturing 129.6 2 6 Average weekly hours­ 99.8p 98.6pmanufacturing 98.9 P Preliminary. • • Change is less than one half of 1 percent. liabilities. Traveling or shipping goods from Amarillo to Brownsville or from El Paso to Orange will be an increasing burden. Shipment by water will become even more attrac­tive than it is today, and the relative value of coastal industrial locations will give port cities an important advantage. This factor sharpens the need for one or more deep-draft "superports" on the Texas coast capable of berthing the giant tankers that are already bringing fuel to such energy-short nations as Japan. As power prices rise, the heavy dependence on summer air conditioning in most parts of Texas will also become an economic embarrassment, though much of the state will have an offsetting advantage over the North in terms of modest needs for winter space heating. In Texas and 2SO CRUDE-OIL PRODUCTION, TEXAS Index Adjusted for Seasonal Voriolion -1967=100 200 150 100 - /\.. ~ ./\ -./~ ~ ~ ~ 50 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 2 250 I I I I I I TOTAL NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT, TEXAS 200 150 100 so Index Adjusted for Seasonal Voriolion-1967=100 196• 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 throughout the nation the need to conserve heating and cooling power will bring about a strong market for the insulation-materials industry. At the same time, many homes, factories, and business buildings designed with the thought that heating and cooling would always be fairly cheap will become much less desirable as fuel rates go up. Fuel costs will join environmental protection and traffic congestion as a major factor in city planning and urban remodeling. Texas cities, like most relatively new cities across the nation, are particularly resistant to the use of mass transit networks. The geography of Texas cities tends to be extravagant of both energy and space. It is open to question how the new energy economics will affect the suburbs as well as the central city cores. Very likely the neighborhood shopping centers will regain some of their lost business and the suburbs will become increasingly self­sufficient. Downtown districts may continue in the direction they have already taken-toward specialization as centers of financial and administrative functions with decreasing importance as retailing and consumer-service centers. BUSINESS-ACTIVITY INDEXES FOR TIVENTY SELECTED TEXAS CITIES (Adjusted for seasonal variation-1967=100) Percent change Year-to­ date Year-to­date Nov 1972 average 1972 City Nov 1972 Oct 1972 average 1972 from Oct 1972 from 1971 Abilene 128.8 128.6 123.3 •• 10 Amarillo 165.1 176.8 150.9 - 7 16 Austin 227.8 224.1 220.2 2 12 Beaumont 110.4 97.2 99.0 14 2 Corpus Christi Corsicana 169.9 130.1 166.9 120.2 156.1 123.0 2 8 12 4 Dallas 190.1 176.6 173.6 8 7 El Paso Fort Worth 176,5 161.3 161.0 161.3 157.0 156.7 10•• 12 s Galveston 148.2 154.3 121.5 - 4 -1 Houston 189.9 173.0 170.5 10 17 Laredo 175.1 157.9 158.1 11 9 Lubbock 169.0 140.5 136.5 20 9 Port Arthur 112.8 110.l 102.2 2 -14 San Angelo San Antonio 162.6 166.9 155. l 154.8 152.8 152.8 5 8 10 4 Texarkana 110.5 104.6 113.8 6 8 Tyler Waco Wichita Falls 186.2 159.3 130.9 171.1 147.9 131.5 145.6 152.8 124.7 9 8 •• 15 12 9 I I ESTIMATED PERSONAL INCOME, TEXAS Index Adjusted for Seasonal Voriohon-1967=100 I 200 I I 15 0 ; ........ ~ ~ l_,.r-" i.......r. 100 -i..---~ ~ 0 0 196• 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 SOURCE: Quarterly data from the Office of Business Economics, U.S. Deportment of Commerce; intervening monthly data from the Bureau of Business Research . In past years the consumption of electric power in industry has played a major part in Texas' expanding energy use. In 1972, however, domestic and commercial uses of electricity grew faster than industrial consumption. Even so, industrial electric consumption rose more in 1972 (7.8 percent for the first eleven months) than Texas industrial production (6. 7 percent). The production index for all manufactures was up 7.6 percent from 197 1to1972 for the January-November period, with durable manu­factures-such products as machinery and transportation equipme nt-showing greater gains than nondurable manufactures. The latter category includes petroleum re­fining, one of the weakest major Texas industries during 1972. Apart from manufacturing and minerals. Texas' most important production industry is urban building construc­tion. Perhaps the most significant feature of the building picture during the first eleven months of 197 2 was the fact that the value of new housing authorized in Texas was up by 17 percent while the number of housing units increased only 1 percent. In other words, inflation rather than real growth was the key characteristic of the homebuilding industry in the state. One reason for the higher cost per residential unit during 1972 was the shift in emphasis from apartment construction toward the building of single-family houses. Confidence in long-range economic growth of Texas was demonstrated in 1972 by the 20-percent increase in nonresidential building authorizations, led by striking in­creases in authorizations of retail facilities (+78 percent) and hotels and motels (+75 percent) during the first eleven months. The high expenditures projected for stores and hotels are related to the urban sprawl underway in most metropolitan areas, for much of this construction growth is in outlying shopping centers and along expressway corri­dors. HOURS AND EARNINGS IN TEXAS Average weekly earnings Average weekly hours Average hourly earnings Industryt Novp 1972 Oct 1972 Nov 1971 Novp 1972 Oct 1972 Nov 1971 Novp 1972 Oct 1972 Nov 1971 Manufacturing-total $148.99 $146.73 $136.42 41.5 41.1 40.6 $3.59 $3.57 $3.36 Durable goods I 52 .40 149.29 138.24 42.1 41.7 40.9 3.62 3.58 3.38 Lumber and wood products 111.67 111.51 I 04.13 42.3 42.4 42.5 2.64 2.63 2.45 Furniture and fixtures 107.60 105.72 98.75 40.0 39.3 39.5 2.69 2.69 2.50 Stone, clay and glass products 147.22 147.50 136.83 43.3 43.9 43.3 3.40 3.36 3.16 Primary metal industries I 70.96 17 1.38 I 52.47 40.9 41.0 39.5 4.18 4 .1 8 3.86 Fabricated metal products 151.26 I 5 1.06 142.49 41.9 41.5 41.3 3.61 3.64 3.45 Machinery, except electrical 164.26 162.64 143.91 43.0 42.8 41.0 3.82 3.80 3. 5 I Oil-field machinery 185.98 181.66 I 56.70 44.6 44.2 40.7 4.17 4. 11 3.85 Electrical machinery, equipment and supplies 141.20 136.78 131.05 41.9 41.2 40.7 3.37 3.32 3.22 Transportation equipment 184.01 171.80 163.62 42.3 41.1 40.6 4.35 4 . 18 4.03 Aircraft and parts 204.73 191.90 183.50 43.1 41.9 41.8 4.75 4.58 4.39 Other durable goods 128.03 124.12 115.13 41.3 40.3 39.7 3.10 3.08 2.90 Nondurable goods 146.37 144.54 134.27 41.0 40.6 40.2 3.57 3.56 3.34 Food and kindred products 135.98 131.97 120.30 42.1 41.5 41.2 3.23 3.18 2.92 Meat products 145.96 140.06 125.13 43.7 42.7 43.0 3.34 3.28 2.91 Textile-mill products 106.43 105.27 91.03 43.8 43.5 40.1 2.43 2.42 2 .27 A pparel and other finished textile products 85.58 82.08 76.13 38.9 38.0 37.5 2 .20 2.16 2.03 Paper and allied products I 59.42 I 57.92 144.0 1 42.4 42 .0 41.5 3.76 3.76 3.47 Printing, publishing, and allied industries I SO.I 5 149.37 145.49 39.0 39.0 38.9 3.85 3.83 3.74 Chemicals and allied products 2 10.34 209.42 191.82 41.9 41.8 41.7 5.02 5.01 4.60 Petroleum refining and related industries 2 14.53 215.97 197.48 41.9 42.1 41.4 5.12 5.13 4.77 Leather and leather products 86 .58 83.44 76.91 39.0 38.1 36.8 2.22 2.19 2.09 Other nond urable goods 145. 5 I 144.28 141.16 42.3 41.7 43.3 3.44 3.46 3.26 No nmanufact uring Mining 178.08 178.51 167.60 42.1 42.3 41.9 4.23 4.22 4.00 Crude petroleum and natural gas 179.75 180.6 1 169.72 41.9 42.1 41.7 4.29 4.29 4.07 Metal, coal, and other mining 149.77 149.82 130.39 45.8 45.4 44.5 3.27 3.30 2.93 Public utilities 170.94 169.70 I 5 5.14 40.7 40.S 40.4 4.20 4.19 3.84 Wholesale trade 144.00 145.27 142.54 40.0 39.8 41.8 3.60 3.65 3.41 Retail trade 101.29 I 01.48 94.06 36.7 36.9 36.6 2.76 2.75 2.57 Banking 106.58 111.13 I 01.66 36.S 37.8 36.7 2.92 2.94 2.77 JANUARY 197 3 t Data cover wage and salary workers only. p Preliminary, subject to revision upon receipt of additional reports. Source: Texas Employment Commission. By now everyone should be aware that we are on the threshold of an energy crisis. Moreover, many observers have hegun lo express concern that the crisis may become permanent, or at least that our energy predicament will. cause recurrent crises. The long-run welfare of the United States is heavily involved with this question. Energy may not be the most important thing in our lives, but it is hardly less than the third or fourth most important thing; most of the appurtenances and aspects of our daily lives, in this technological culture, depend on it. We have been preoccupied with the "security" question in energy, and specifically in petroleum, where the concern of public policy has focused on the possibility of short-run interruptions in the supply of foreign oil. But behind this short-run security issue is another, and probably graver, long-run problem with ultimate supply of energy in relation to demand. It affects other kinds of energy besides oil, and involves the rest of the world along with the United States. From the standpoint of our own national interest, we want to ensure a supply of energy adequate for our needs. Hence we must consider ( 1) what supplies are likely to be forthcoming in the long run; (2) what is meant by "adequate for our needs;" (3) what policies will help to ensure adequacy. Since the U.S. energy economy is now a petroleum­based economy and is likely to remain so for the next fifteen years, and probably until the end of the century, we shall give our attention principally to the role of oil in the energy balance. !'he Long-Run Lnergv Oullonh Pelrnll'ulll and ils Suhstitules Supply projections for oil are necessarily subject to great uncertainty, especially when we look beyond a decade orso.l Nevertheless, we have to make some guesses. Some long-range questions have been asked; we must try to answer them even though the answers must be speculative. Policy for the future must be based on forecasts as of the present. •Paper presented to the Forum on Energy Resources and Mineral Plant Foods sponsored by the National Materials Policy Commission, Austin, Texas, May IS, 1972. All papers given at the forum will be published in book form by the Bureau of Economic (;eology of The University of Texas at Austin. Portions of "Energy Policy and the Long Run" have been excerpted from the author's "Balancing the Demand and Supply of Oil," in Balancing Supply and Demand for Energy in the United States, edited by J. Schanz, subsidized by the Rocky Mountain Petroleum Economics Institute (Denver, Colorado: University of Denver, 1972). **Professor of economics and dean of the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences, The University of Texas at Austin. The Domestic Supply ofOil The famous DeGolyer and MacNaughton report of 19692 estimated additional recoverable reserves of crude oil in the contiguous United States (including offshore areas) at about 120 billion barrels, of which some 30 billion were then "proved" reserves. Alaskan deposits were estimated at SO billion barrels. To this would be added some 25 billion barrels of recoverable natural gas liquids for the whole country. The total is some 195-200 billion barrels remain­ing recoverable. But even these estimates, after due allow­ance for the considerable uncertainties surrounding them, are subject to additional variations resulting from differ­ences in expected prices. A component of great importance is the recovery ratio, which is not expected to rise above 50 percent of liq4id hydrocarbons in place but which can be pushed up from its present levels averaging less than 35 percent by two factors: improved technology and rising prices which make it possible to cover higher costs of more complete recovery. These two actually go hand in hand: some technology of secondary recovery, etc., is practicable only at higher prices. Increasing recoverability has played a large role in the reserve picture in the past: a considerable part of the increase in "proved reserves" has come from changing recovery ratios in already discovered deposits. Against the present production rate of some 4 billion barrels per year, these reserve projections do not look lavish; on the other hand there is apparently quite a lot still to be developed as recoverable reserves, and no physical impediment to a moderate increase in the domestic rate of production is likely during the next ten or fifteen years. It is a question of economics, and of policy governing the ratio of imports to total domestic demand.3 Physical availability of reserves does not, of course, mean that they have to be produced at any particular minimum rate. According to available estimates, the probable future supply from onshore provinces of the "lower forty-eight" contiguous states will be more restricted than from offshore fields and from Alaska. No doubt some additional fields will be discovered onshore, but we look forward to a continued decline of wildcat exploration and of explora­tory drilling in areas that have been thoroughly worked over. Resort to less and less promising areas and prospects onshore raises some questions of efficiency and cost; it is not in itself a justification of higher prices as long as less costly alternatives are available. Production onshore dur­ing the next fifteen years, then, will come mainly from a further cleanout of known prospects, more intensive working of developed resources, secondary recovery, and other aspects of improved recoverability. I should add the TEXAS BUSINESS REVIEW proviso: barring a major technological breakthrough. A new "seismic revolution" could make all of our projections obsolete, including possibly the DeGolyer-MacNaughton figures, and change altogether the expected cost horizons of the domestic industry. Offshore, likewise barring some unexpected techno­logical transformation, development of reserves will prob­ably follow a cost gradient which results from a mix of opposing influences: the increased cost of moving to deeper water, and the continued increases in productivity resulting from cost-reducing improvements in technique. The latter influence makes it possible to move into deeper water over time with little or no increase in apparent input cost. But will discovery, development, and production also continue at constant marginal rates as the industry moves out to sea? The disappointing experience with some recently explored offshore areas should warn us not to be too optimistic about sustained average returns to offshore exploration. Still, informed opinion holds that major developments will occur, if future prices hold at levels that will cover costs, on the continental shelf and maybe ultimately even in the abyss. We already find the Sigsbee Knolls intriguing. In Alaska and offshore in the Arctic, much the same rule will prevail: we can reach different points on the gradient of supply costs at different prices. It may be that more and bigger Prudhoe Bay fields are in the offing, but the probabilities are against them and in favor of development of supplies of moderate size over a wide area as exploration proceeds. This very likely means high-cost development, in view of the physical conditions. At higher prices to cover somewhat higher costs, and over some time period, the economy might resort to shale oil. It has to be added to potential production to meet demand under certain conditions. Whether it is to be classified as "oil" or a "synthetic" is a matter of semantics; shale oil is a close substitute for crude, and it is no more "synthetic" than natural gas liquids. Under present tech­nology, which involves retort extraction, the potential production of shale oil is limited to a maximum which has been estimated at about 1 million barrels per day. The reason is basically a limited supply of water in the Colorado basin. Probably the attainable production would be much less, even by 1985. This is an energy source in which environmental considerations are bound to be a restraining force. One hesitates to describe the probable reaction of the Sierra Club to a proposal to use Colorado River water to produce shale oil; or to the news that production of 1 million barrels of shale oil per day would require disposi­tion of "used" rock sufficient to cover 400 acres of ground to a depth of one foot-or 50 square miles per year to a depth of 4.5 feet. If the full cost of environmental protection to the degree desired by the wilderness societies were added into the cost of shale oil, it could become very high-cost oil indeed. But then the same thing can be said of offshore production of crude, or of any other type of energy if the case is pushed to extremes. Other "synthetics" such as oil produced by hydrogena­tion of coal probably involve about the same cost zones as shale oil, and would become practicable in limited amounts Table 1 NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL ESTIMATES OF DOMESTIC U.S. PRODUCTION IN 1975, 1980, AND 1985 (Million bbl/day) Category 1975 1980 1985 U.S. production of petroleum liquids, except North Slope 10.5 9.8 9.1 North Slope crude and condensate 0.6 2.0 2.0 Shale oil 0.1 Total 11.1 11.8 11.2 Source: National Petroleum Council, U.S. Energy Outlook: An Appraisal, 1971·1985, Vol. 1, p. 28. at the same prices, but we do not anticipate a wholesale substitution of these synthetics for domestic crude in the next ten or fifteen years. In view of all of these considerations, any estimate of future supply has to be regarded as a central probability estimate with a wide dispersion around it. The most authoritative recent projection is that of the National Petroleum Council (NPC)4 which is based on an assumption of constant real prices for oil in the United States through 1985, no further changes in tax incentives, and a liberal policy toward offshore exploration and production. The NPC estimates are reproduced in Table 1. The NPC is notably pessimistic about domestic offshore production after 1975; it expects it to decline after that date. It also is more pessimistic about North Slope production than some earlier estimates: 2 million bbl/day, its projected maximum under constant real prices, was once thought to be a conservative estimate of delivery from reserves already discovered on the North Slope.5 Substitut­ing the more optimistic projections of these elements on the same assumptions would give us a 1980 supply estimate 1. 7 million bbl/ day higher than the one above. 6 Western Hemisphere Supply National security leads us to distinguish between Eastern and Western Hemisphere sources of possible future imports, and within the Western Hemisphere between Canada and other producing countries. Canada is the most secure foreign source. Hopes have been expressed from time to time that the energy economies of Canada and the United States would become fully integrated, with free access to Canadian supplies by U.S. consumers, with common prices and under a common security policy toward less stable sources. There is no need to recapitulate the arguments on why such arrangements would be to our mutual advantage. Unfortunately, progress toward them has been very slow, and it was almost arrested by the emergency foreign trade policies that went into effect last August. The NPC report estimated that imports from Canada would grow to about 1.9 million bbl/day in 1985, "predicated on successful exploration efforts in the Cana­dian Arctic and Canadian Atlantic offshore and on the development of Canadian tar sands."7 Even allowing for a considerable increase in internal Canadian consumption from Canadian supply, the above figure is substantially lower than what the Canadians themselves were projecting a few years back (assuming that Canadian supply will not be shut in to any large degree and that all exports will go to the U.S. market.)8 The Canadian Petroleum Association in 1969 estimated total potential Canadian reserves of crude oil at about 120 billion barrels, including 12 billion booked as proved reserves at that time.9 The potential total, which did not include tar sands oil, equalled that in the United States excluding Alaska. We do not know how rapidly these deposits could be developed, nor at what cost, but it seems likely that 2 million bbl/day of imports from Canada by 1985 under a constant-real-price assumption is a minimal estimate. South American supply to the United States looks less hopeful than Canadian, except for residual oil. Internal demand north of Natal will doubtless absorb a large part of any increase in production that can be squeezed out of Venezuela, Colombia, or lesser suppliers. Any unexpected large discoveries in Brazil or Argentina would probably be absorbed in their domestic economies, displacing Eastern Hemisphere crude. The NPC study concludes that the export potential of Latin America will probably fall in the absolute by 1985, while even more optimistic estimates do not rule out the possibility; production in Venezuela of conventional crude will probably decline after 1980. Residual oil is another matter. In Venezuela, at least, this product, whose potential demand in the United States is escalating rapidly, does not depend solely on production and refining of conventional crude. Residual oil can be produced directly, with little refining, from the very low-gravity crudes of the established provinces and later from the tar sands of the Orinoco. The NPC estimates include some Orinoco "synthetic" residual oil by 1980. It would seem that in the developed areas production of heavy oil could be rapidly expanded, and that future years can bring an almost indefinite growth in production of Venezuelan residual oil. We must recognize that the production potential itself does not measure costs nor availability. The costs of residual oil from the Orinoco are literally unknown, while the price to the U.S. consumer of the Venezuelan heavy oil would necessarily include a component measuring the cost of removing most of the sulfur. Under environmental restrictions, residual oil is not ever going to be as cheap in the United States as it was in the past. Nor do we know whether prices of Venezuelan oil of any description are going to climb in the way that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countires (OPEC) expects them to. Both the bargaining power of the United States and the possibility of political interruption in any South American supplying country have to be considered when we assess the national welfare and the national security. Yet, even after the Venezuelan concessions expire, that country will probably find it profitable to sell to the United States on a long-term basis, especially if it is given some import preferences to reflect the somewhat superior security of a Western source over many Eastern Hemisphere sources. Security Different policies toward imports will produce different relative price trends in the United States, even though the world price is expected to go up. To decide how much of the total projected domestic demand should be supplied by various foreign sources, we must have some concept of relative security of North American, Western Hemisphere, and Eastern Hemisphere supply, and some estimate of the quantities that can be obtained from relatively secure sources. "Security" here refers not to the economic bargaining power of the United States relative to OPEC, but to the fJOSsibility of short-term interruption of supply from one or another foreign source as a consequence of war or political boycott. Those things can certainly happen, and we should not underestimate the serious effects that can follow from them. But we could probably adopt expedients to safeguard our economy against short-term interruptions even with growing dependence on imports. Interruptions can also occur as a result of occasional stalemates in bargaining on price if negotiations between buyers' blocs and sellers' blocs continue to grow at the expense of a free competitive market. How much protection is necessary? The recent Cabinet Task Force analyzed the question in terms of the probable threats of interruption of various kinds, and the measures we could adopt to deal with short-term interruptions from different combinations of sources. For the longer run it recommended as the anchor of security policy a North American-Western Hemisphere preference system and mutual-security approach, embodied in international energy agreements. Since then we have seen revised estimates of demand and of quantities to be supplied from various secure and insecure areas, but we still should base the policy on an assessment of national security and probable interruption, and not on an a priori prinicple of "minimiz­ing" dependence on imports (no matter what the source) nor on an arbitrary percentage limit. IO One further observation may be pertinent. A policy of relying on a high level of domestic production for its own sake, and not as a consequence of a hard security assessment, means that we will deplete the best domestic reserves first and cause a more rapid rise in costs as development of new domestic supplies encounters diminish­ing returns. To ignore long-term conservation now for the sake of maximum domestic production might exacerbate the security problem for the post-1985 generation, and would very likely worsen their economic problems. I I Other Forms ofEnergy Since other forms of energy are to be reviewed exten­sively by other papers in the forum, I shall give them only brief mention here. 1. Natural gas is perhaps the most desirable of all fuels, especially from the environmental standpoint. Unfortun­ately it is also the one in shortest supply, partly because of TEXAS BUSINESS REVIEW past regulatory policy which kept the ceiling prices too low. But no prospective increase in North American supply, even at higher prices, is likely to satisfy all the potential demand, while imported liquefied natural gas is very high-cost gas and itself involves a security problem. 2. Coal. Though it is the most abundant of our remaining fuels, coal itself has shown a tendency to become a high-cost fuel in recent years. As environmental considera­tions become more significant, this trend will continue; abolition of strip-mining, for example, and stringent desul­furization regulations could easily increase the real deliv­ered cost of energy from coal by SO to l 00 percent during the next decade. 3. Electric power. Electricity generated from coal or oil (chiefly desulfurized residual oil) will itself reflect the higher costs of those fuels, while gas is not a feasible substitute for them. Nuclear power remains the bright hope for the future. By 1985 it is supposed to account for over l S percent of total energy consumption in the United States, and over 25 percent of the "fuel" for electric power-up from less than 2 percent in 1972. These totals are less than the projections we were making a decade ago, but even so they may be overly optimistic. Perfection of nuclear technology seems continually to be delayed, and costs continue to rise above expectations. Attainment of the nuclear power goals for later in the century will depend on practical breeder reactors, the technology for which is still highly experimental; but there is no good alternative in sight. In any event, if all of the environmental costs are added back into the cost of nuclear power, it will not be low-cost power-certainly not nearly as low as was origi­nally expected. And if positive environmental restrictions are imposed on nuclear power development, it could easily fall far short of projected "needs" even if the technology is perfected in time. 4. Minor sources. Water power affords little remaining scope for economical development. Coal hydrogenation, as said above, will provide marginal additions to liquid hydrocarbons, but again at high cost. Geothermal energy will be a trivial source before 2000, while solar power at present is expected to have costs well above the threshold of prices for other sources, even if those prices rise sharply.12 Demand and the Demand/Supply Balance: For Energy in General and Petroleum in Particular As already implied, demand seems to be the dominant variable now in the supply-demand balance. Though our concern is primarily with the United States, we should not neglect the significance of high rates of growth in demand in Western Europe, Japan, and other developed and semideveloped regions of the world. As those regions climb toward U.S. targets in energy use, and as new areas enter the energy economy as significant users, the world energy demand will continue to escalate, and the demand for crude oil along with it. Because of the effects of development along with growth, the demand for oil outside the United Table 2 NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL PROJECTIONS OF THE OIL SUPPLY /DEMAND BALANCE, 1980 AND 1985 (Million bbl/day) Category 1970 1980 1985 Domestic demand 14.7 22.7 26.4 Processing gain,* etc. (net) 0 -0.2 -0.4 Required supply 14.7 22.S 26.0 U.S. production of petroleum liquids, except North Slope 11.3 9.8 9.1 North Slope crude and condensate 0 2.0 2.0 Shale oil 0 0 0.1 Total U.S. production 11.3 11.8 11.2 Imports 3.4 10.7 14.8 Source: National Petroleum Council, U.S. Energy Outlook: An Appraisal, 1971-1985, Vol. 1, p. 28. *Plus exports and stock changes. States is very likely to grow more rapidly than demand within it. The National Petroleum Council, in fact, projects a rate of growth in demand for petroleum of 6.6 percent per annum in the "free world" outside the United States between now and 1985, compared to 3.8 percent within the United S tates.13 Let us note that an annual growth rate of 6.6 percent means a doubling of demand every eleven years; a growth rate of 3.8 percent means a doubling of demand every eighteen years. This is what the world oil industry is expected to do. The projected supply/demand balance of the NPC for 1980 and 1985 is shown in Table 2. By 1985, then, demand for petroleum will have grown to 180 percent of its 1970 level, and imports will supply over half of the demand, if the NPC projections are borne out by events. More optimistic forecasts of U.S. production at constant real prices would reduce the fraction to be imported to about half the projected demand of over 26 million bbl/ day, but to no less than that. After allowing for growth of residual oil from the Western Hemisphere and an optimistic projection of Canadian supplies, at least one­quarter of domestic consumption would have to be supplied from the Eastern Hemisphere in 1985, even under a Western Hemisphere preference system. At present we cannot foresee which Eastern Hemisphere sources would be considered "secure." Under the anticipated circumstances, the domestic price of crude oil can hardly fail to rise. If the real price of domestic crude should increase markedly by 1985, it may stimulate larger domestic output than that embodied in the above projections. How much larger depends on elasticity of supply, about which opinions differ; but I do not think that the supply elasticity is likely to be great enough to lessen dependence on imports drastically by 198 S, if the demand figures projected above turn out to be valid. Nor, conversely, would greater dependence on imports reduce the expected price increases very much, since in my opinion prices are going to go up all over the world. So this price forecast is more or less independent of a national security argument. The era of cheap energy from petroleum in the United States is probably over for more fundamental economic reasons. That is not to say, of course, that different public policies cannot produce somewhat differ­ent relative price trends within this general upward move­ment of petroleum prices. The demand for energy in general will probably parallel that for petroleum, while the electric power component is expected to grow even more rapidly-some projections. assume a compound growth rate of upwards of 8 percent per annum in the United States until the year 2000 at the earliest. These growth rates would transmit into all energy sources the factors now affecting petroleum availability and prices. Promoting Balance in Demand and Supply of Energy in the Long Run As noted at the beginning, behind the national security question (if that is defined as the problem of coping with interruptions of short or medium duration in oil imports) is another, more comprehensive predicament. Crude oil is one facet of it; other kinds of energy are also involved. It is: whether the available energy supplies-both domestic and foreign -are going to be sufficient to sustain growth in demand that is extrapolated on simple technological assumptions, and what effects will flow from rates of growth of that magnitude in both demand and supply. The question goes beyond 1985, and it involves the rest of the world along with the United States. One other facet of the problem is "conservation," if by that we mean concern for an essentially finite stock of energy resources in the face of exponential rates of demand growth. How rapidly should we in the United States expand our production of energy? What are the criteria? Forms of energy are all interrelated. We have fallen into the habit of taking the "demand" for energy as a physical quantity, derived from technology and other determinants of "need," and growing over time according to its own law. Hence our attention has fixed itself on supply-on the ways of meeting the demand. The problem has been conceived as an imperative to provide "enough" to satisfy the demand, which stands out there as if decreed by fate. In the past, demand did indeed .seem to be more or less self-imposed, impervious to price, dominated by economic growth which itself appeared to be a moral imperative for policy. Demand meant "need." Now, however, it may be time for some second thoughts. Should it be our national economic policy to satisfy any demand for energy, prefer­ably at a low price? Could any conceivable combination of policies satisfy for long a compound rate of growth of, say, 7 or 8 percent per year in the demand for energy in general (as in the Eastern Hemisphere) or for electric power (as in the Western Hemisphere)? These growth rates mean a doubling every ten years or so. Should we try to meet a somewhat lower exponential demand growth for crude oil, and even stimulate it, by strenuous redoubled efforts to get more of the world's hydrocarbons above ground and bum them up? Are the projections of demand or "needs" mentioned above and the rates of economic development implied in them to be taken for granted? Let us speculate a little on what this simplistic approach would mean for the future. One attribute of exponential rates of growth should be remembered. They have a way of exploding suddenly, as Professor Jay W. Forrester of M.I.T. has reminded us. The system can go rocking along under an exponential rate for long periods of time with no apparent difficulty, generating confidence that we will be able to meet all requirements indefinitely. But the ultimate capacity to meet them may be subject to certain constraints or limits. Then, in a relatively short period, the system goes from one-eighth of the limit to one-fourth; in the next, from one-fourth to one-half; in the next, from one-half to the limit, and we discover that the infinite expansion inherent in exponential growth rates must crash into a finite barrier. Of course, it doesn't usually happen exactly like that; before the crash occurs, some reactions begin to affect the exponential rates themselves. Nor is the "barrier" a fixed and inelastic quantity. How elastic is it, for example, for crude oil? The API-NPC estimate for the United States shows that we have discovered some 396 billion out of the total of some 727 billion barrels of discoverable oil-in-place-over 50 percent so far; while the DeGolyer-MacNaughton study estimated ultimate recovery of producible petroleum liquids in the United States at 290 billion barrels, of which some 95 billion had been produced as of that date-about one-third. At relatively constant rates of domestic production, that figure will have risen to over 50 percent by 1985. At exponential rates of increase, we would gobble up the total potential reserve supply in no time after that; but (luckily or unluckily, depending on the point of view) the increased rates are going to be deflected onto imports. We will probably be able to sustain constant rates of domestic production into the latter years of the century out of remaining reserves; it is again all a question of costs and prices. The picture for the rest of the world is somewhat brighter: even a rapidly escalating demand on those stocks (from both the United States and the rest of the "free world") will use up by 1985 only a little more than half of the foreign proved reserves existing as of the end of 1970, which in tum were only perhaps 25 percent of the "potentially discoverable and producible" supplies of the rest of the "free world."14 A supply squeeze arising from fundamental limitations of oil resources in the Eastern Hemisphere, if there is to be one, probably will not become visible until after 1985. The Energy Economy and the Entropic Process Economists are in the habit of thinking of the great wheel of production as a circular process. Resources· become available in a never-ending flow; they pass into manufactured goods, services, capital improvements, etc., which are then used in consumption or in further produc­tion; if you want more resources you simply increase the rates of investment and production of resources. There is equivalence of cost and values at every stage of this process, which constantly renews itself. It can grow and develop with enlarged investment flows and improving technology, in which event the circular renewal becomes an upward spiral, involving both renewal and expansion. This view of the matter ignores the constraints imposed by a limited material base.15 It relies on substitution when any important resource becomes more scarce; upon new discovery and renewal; and upon technological develop­ment for new sources and substitutes. And these mecha­nisms have worked pretty well for the last two hundred years of rapid economic growth. We have developed new sources, we have found ways to sustain growth with an expanding material base, and we have never really run out of anything. But now we are becoming aware that some constraints do exist, both actual and potential. These feelings are partly reflected in increased concern for the material base, and for conservation of it; partly in concern for the environment-waste and pollution. Insofar as the great wheel of production generates some external costs in the form of damage to the environment that is not accounted for in the costs and prices of the economic process, to that extent we fail to produce equivalence of values in the system and instead generate a process of deterioration which has to be set against the apparent productivity and growth in the economic process. The fact is that production generates an increase in entropy.16 We do not return to the starting place; we lose something en route in the diffusion of "resources" from organized into unorganized and unavailable form. The problem appears for all material resources, but is especially pronounced for energy itself. Energy cannot be created or destroyed, but it can become unavailable; its very diffusion through use can lead to environmental costs that detract from the apparent value of the national product. We convert low-entropy resources into high-entropy waste. And the conversion in itself is irreversible; that amount of available energy has been irretrievably lost.1 7 As long as the available stock (or incoming flow) of highly organized, low-entropy energy resources is huge relative to the rate of use over a short space of time, and as long as consumption is itself relatively slow-growing and dispersed, the entropy law gives little trouble. It is only the accelerating effects of compound growth rates in demand and self-generating technological development in the later stages that cause concern. Have we reached that point yet? Probably not; but in 1985 it may be a different story. No one can really predict with confidence what will happen much beyond ten or fifteen years; the uncertainties become too great. Very wide zones of dispersion build up around the best estimates. But if we are obliged to make decisions now, we must base them on the trends and forecasts as they look now. And they do not look very promising. The trouble is that similar unfavorable in­ fluences plus some special ones appear in all of the possible substitutes for oil-natural gas, coal, water power, syn­ thetics, and nuclear power (because of environmental costs). As we ultimately move along the chain of highly organized energy sources in our search for substitutes, we eventually run out of available ones, and to substitute other resources for energy resources is like substituting bare feet for shoes. Of course, the ultimate supply of energy reaching the earth from solar radiation is indeed huge relative to our present use of energy . But it is also very much diffused. If we could find some way to concentrate it, use it, and release the entropic effects to outer space again, we would break out of the constraints that now threaten us and embark on a new era of development. That can happen. But so far the technological proposals for concentration and production of solar energy require the input of more energy (including that required for conversion of other resources) than the net output of usable energy (and other values) from the process. Energy Policy If the foregoing has a clear implication for U.S. energy policy, it is this: a low price for energy is no longer in the public interest. The prescription sounds heretical. After all, the country-indeed, the Western industrialized world-has de­veloped its marvelously advanced technological economy partly on the basis of cheap energy. Why should we want high prices for energy now? All one can say in reply is that we are entering-have entered-a new era. The headlong pace of technological advance is in fact part of the problem; it has made us prodigal users of energy, which in turn has generated the supply problem. Rising price has a two-edged effect: it stimulates supply, and it tends to restrict demand. But in this case, part of the increase in price will have to go to pay for external (environmental) costs; not all these increases will reach producers. Hence energy may become more expensive without a fully equivalent stimulus to supply. What about demand? Will price increases curtail demand growth? Should restraint of demand be an objective of policy, and should the price of energy be the means? Demand for energy in general has shown itself to be quite inelastic in the past-insensitive to price variations within certain limits over short periods. Since the price conditions affecting one energy source are likely to affect all, we can expect that crude-oil demand will not be appreciably more elastic than the demand for energy in general. The price increases required to tame a growth rate of 4 to 6 percent per annum (or up to the 7 or 8 percent estimated for electric power) might be very considerable. Nevertheless, at some points in the upward march of prices, certain energy "requirements" may begin to look less like requirements and more like expendable luxuries. Economics usually favors letting price do it. If a rising price can "balance" supply and demand, by rationing the supply, curtailing expansion of use, and stimulating addi­tional supply within the limits of the possible, then perhaps the best policy is to let it do so. The price system, or free-market system, usually works efficiently and imper­sonally to bring about a necessary economic result. Do we need any energy policy affecting supply and demand for oil, among other things, other than a policy of permitting the market to do its work? Some who have misgivings about the efficacy of price are concerned about the sheer magnitude of the job. If the aforementioned projections are valid, or if we should end up in the pessimistic zone of the forecast , we (both in the United States and in the Western world) may be nearing a really profound change in our patterns of energy use, including petroleum. Though an ultimate scarcity does not threaten us in the near future , it may after 1985, and it would be well to prepare long before then to adapt to an impending scarcity of energy. Price can do part of the signalling and inducing changes of use patterns, but auxiliary policies may also be necessary. For example, the rate of population growth has much to do with the rate of growth in demand for energy. Should population be considered as a control variable for energy policy? And will a high price for energy reduce the rate of growth of population? We don't like to think about questions like these, but we may not be able to avoid them. It may be that our economic growth and development patterns, which use huge amounts of energy, which are prodigal of material resources, which are waste-making, gadget-prone, space-using, extensive, mobile, careless, progressive, technocratic are going to give way to a different set of economic and social patterns, more inten­sive in their use of space, more conserving of resources, more static, less imbued with the compulsions of tech­nological development. As far as energy is concerned, a combination of higher energy prices and other policies will surely help to conserve energy and reduce "require­ments" for petroleum fuel relative to what they would otherwise be. For example, large-scale substitution of mass transit for the private automobile could take place­a development which would probably have to be accompanied by a reorganization of the use of space in our cities. Technological development could take the route of miniaturization and substitution of materials requiring less energy to produce. A change of life styles could occur, perhaps ending with our being hot in the summertime, using less glass, aluminum, and steel, taking siestas, learning how to walk again. Even if public policy is not designed to produce these results directly, the indirect effects of a growing scarcity of energy with accompanying higher prices of high-energy-using goods and services, working through all aspects and phases of our complex economic life, can be powerful over the long run. Who knows what the world will look like in 2000? We used to think of the future in terms of science fiction, as a kind of promised land of advanced technology, without considering external costs or asking where the energy was going to come from. Now we have to contemplate the possibility of technological reversal toward energy-saving innovations and the substitution of low-energy-using goods and services in our gross national product; of zero popula­ tion growth, a decline in energy use per capita, preoccupa­ tion with reducing the increment to entropy, retrogression in life styles. Both vistas are speculative; anything is possible. IO It may be that technology will bail us out in the end, and that by the year 2000 we will depend largely on solar energy, on fuel cells using some inexhaustible source of chemical fuel, and on fusion reactors entirely free of external pollution for our power sources, both stationary and mobile. In that event the problem of energy supply will no longer be a major problem for national policy. 1For an example of objective differences of opinion on domestic supply projections, note the lower estimates of supply "elasticity" in the Cabinet Task Force Report of February 1970, in comparison with those offered by the !PAA and others to the House Interior Committee, repro­duced in Public Policy and the Future of the Petroleum Industry, ed. I. J. Pikl, Jr. (Laramie, Wyoming: University of Wyoming, 1970). 2oeGolyer and MacNaughton, "Report on Estimates of Additional Recoverable Reserves of Oil and Gas for the United States and Canada," submitted to the Office of Science and Technology, 1969. 3cf. Minor S. Jameson, Jr., "Present and Future Import Policies," in Public Policy and the Future of the Petroleum Industry, and E. L. Williamson, "A Current Commitment to Explore for Oil and Gas in the United States," in the same volume. 4u.s. Energy Outlook: An Appraisal, 1971-1985, Vols. I and 2. Washington, D.C.: National Petroleum Council, 1971. Scf. The Oil Import Question, Report of the Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), Appendix D, p. 228. 6Ibid., p. 238. 7u.s. Energy Outlook. Vol. I, p. 26. 8The Oil Import Question, p. 45. 9oeGolyer and MacNaughton, "Report," p. 24. IOJ. W. McKie, "Oil Import Policy," in Public Policy and the Future of the Petroleum Industry, ed. I. J. Pikl, Jr. (Laramie, Wyoming: University of Wyoming, 1970). 1 l"Saving U.S. Oil Becomes a Hot Issue", Oil and Gas Journal, November I, 1971, p. 20. 12see the other forum papers for fuller discussion, and in some cases disagreement with the above statements. 13u.s. Energy Outlook, Vol. 2, p. 22. 14Estimated from data given in U.S. Energy Outlook, Vol. 2, Chapter 3. 1SNicholas Georgescu-Roegen, "The Entropy Law and the Economic Problem," printed lecture, Office of Interna­tional Programs, University of Alabama, 1971. 16"Entropy" here is defined simply as a measure of the unavailable energy in a closed system. 17Georgescu, "The Entropy Law and the Economic Problem," pp. 2-3. 196• 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Sta tistics, U.S. Deportment of Labor. TEXAS POPULATION IN 1970: 5. TRENDS AND VARIATIONS IN THE POPULATIONS OF NONMETROPOLITAN TOWNS, 1950-1970* Diana DeAre and Dudley L. Poston, Jr.** The pace of urbanization has increased during the past twenty years in Texas, and researchers here, as elsewhere, have been attempting to analyze the impact of these emerging urbanized regions, as well as searching for means to control growth in many of the already existing areas. Far less attention has been directed to the nonmetropolitan areas, and those few scholars who have made studies of these places have generally assumed that they are "losing out" to the metropolises and gradually dying. This paper will thus focus on the nonmetropolitan incorporated places of Texas and will describe in detail the population changes that have occurred there in the decades 19S0-1960 and 1960-1970; attention will also be given to the effect of selected demographic and spatial variables on population changes. All those cities classified as nonmetropolitan incorpo­rated (NMI) places-all places outside the forty-one Texas counties designated as standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) counties in 19701 -are analyzed in this paper. In 19SO, 479 places were in the NM! category; in 1960, Sl9; in 1970, S72. The population data employed were taken from the decennial censuses;2 rates of change for the two decades were computed from those figures. Signific'ance of i\onmetropolitan Areas Nonmetropolitan incorporated places cons ti tute a pro­portion of the total population of Texas so large, in both absolute and relative terms, that it can hardly be ignored. Although the proportion of the state's population residing in NM! places declined from 18 percent in 19SO to 16 percent in 1970, its absolute size has increased by over 400,000 persons since l 9SO. In 1970 almost 1.8 million Texans lived in NM! places, and those places must be taken into consideration in any planned attempt at influencing future population trends in the state. Further, researchers cannot exclude rural areas from consideration because metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas are interrelated: urban problems of congestion and *This article is the fifth in a series entitled Texas Population in 1970 by members of the staff of the Population Research Center of The University of Texas at Austin. The articles are appearing intermittently in the Texas Business Review. **Ms. DeAre is a research associate of the Population Research Center and a graduate student in the Department of Geography, The University of Texas at Austin. Dr. Poston is associate director of the Population Research Center and assistant profossor of sociology, The University of Texas at Austin. overcrowding can be viewed in part as a result of the inability of the nonmetropolitan areas to attract and retain population. Indeed, stimulation and encouragement of growth have become popular objectives in recent popula­tion-distribution proposals. The descriptive material in this study, in combination with similar analysis of the metro­politan population,3 can help to form the empirical data base needed for a systematic development of demographic policy for Texas counties. Each of the S72 nonmetropolitan incorporated places in Texas in 1970 is indicated by a dot on the accompanying map (Figure I). Clearly, the spatial distribution of the NM! places is uneven. The non-SMSA counties located in the northern and eastern portions of the state have by far the greatest number of incorporated places. The unevenness of the distribution is. to some degree, the result of geographic features such as terrain, climate, and physical accessibility, as well as the historic settlement patterns of the areas. Further consideration of these relationships, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. An overall view of the number and population of NM! places in 19SO, 1960, and 1970 is presented in Table I. Immediately apparent is the growth in both number and population between l9SO and 1970: the number of NM! places in the state increased from 4 79 to S 19, a gain of 19 percent. Population increased by 18.8 percent between l9SO and 1960, by 8. 7 percent from 1960 to 1970, and by 29. 2 percent over the twenty-year period. In comparison with the rates of change for all NM! places in the United States4 in those twenty years, Texas had a higher rate of increase in number of places and a similar rate of population increase. NM! places in Texas, however, showed higher rates of growth than those in the entire United States during the 19SOs, with lower rates during the 1960s. A comparison of the rates of population change in the NMI places of Texas with those both of the Texas metropolitan areas and of the entire state may be made from Figure 2. The growth rates of the NM! places have been much lower than the SMSA rates, and the slowdown in rate of increase of the NM! places during the 1960s was accompanied by an accelerated rate for the SMSA's. The distribution of NM! places by size category is also shown in Table I. The five size classes all tended to increase in both number and population during both decades (see the upper panel of the table), but the nature of the shifts causing the changes is not immediately apparent. Figure 1 INCORPORATED PLACES OF TEXAS 1970NONMETROPOLIT AN Table 1 NUMBER AND POPULATION or 1'/0N,IETROPOUTA.N INCORPORATED PL<\CLS 1EX \S 1970 Size class Number Population Number Population Number Population 19SO 1960 Total 479 1,388,18S Sl9 1,649,262 S72 1,793,186 10,000 and over 24 390,119 38 662,2SS 41 763,869 2,S00-9,999 13S 670,S20 131 64S,370 137 669,448 1,000-2,499 142 227,378 lSl 239,784 161 2S2, 1I6 S00-999 108 76,6S4 91 67,807 91 66,420 Under SOO 70 23,S 14 108 34,046 142 41,333 Percentage distril;iutions Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 10,000 and over s 28 7 40 7 43 2,S00-9,999 28 48 2S 39 24 37 1,000-2,499 30 16 29 IS 28 14 S00-999 23 6 18 4 16 4 Under SOO IS 2 21 2 2S 2 The bottom panel of Table 1 presents percentage distributions for the number and population of the NM! places by size class. The contrast between the two distributions is striking: in 1950 places numbering 10,000 and over represented only 5 percent of the total number of NM! places, yet they contained 28 percent of the total population in these areas; by 1960 this difference widened to 7 percent of the number and 40 percent of the population; and by 1970 to 7 percent and 43 percent. The two smallest size classes, on the other hand, showed a reverse tendency-in 19 50 places under 1,000 represented 38 percent of the total number of places but contained only 8 percent of the total population, whereas by 1970 the corresponding percentages were 41 and 6 percent. In general terms, during the period 1950-1 970, the nonmetropolitan population grew more concentrated in the larger NM! places, while the smaller places, although increasing in number, were becoming relatively less impor­tant with respect to population. And those trends, consider­ably stronger during the 1950-1 960 decade, continued through 1970. The distributions of number and population of NM! plac.es of Texas, in comparison with those of the United States, were quite similar in 1960 and 1970 in the 10,000-and-over size class and showed the same general Figure 2 RATES OF POPULATION INCREASE 100 .g 60 .. c ~ a. ~ 40 ~ c ~ 20 ct Texas Texas Texas Texas Texas Texas Texas Texas SMSA's NMI Places SMSA's NMI Places SMSA's NMI Places tendency toward concentration of people in the larger places. Texas, however, had a much smaller proportion of its NM! population living in places of this size category than did the United States. 5 A detailed examination of the demographic shifts resulting in the changes among NMI size classes between 1950 and 1970 is possible by use of the matrices in Table 2. The first row of each matrix indicates the number of new nonmetropolitan incorporated places during each of the two ten-year periods ( 1950-1 960 and 1960-1970). Between 1950 and 1960, for example, a total of 40 new places appeared, 22 of which were under 500, 11 in the 500-999 class, and 7 in the 1,000-2,499 class. A total of 53 places, however, were added between 1960 and 1970. Shifts occurring during each decade for each size class can be traced easily through these matrices. An examina­tion of the 500-999 size class for the 19 50-1960 decade, located in the third row of the upper matrix ("size in earlier census" is equal to 500-999 in 1950), reveals that, of the 108 places in that size class in 1950, 18, or 17 percent, decreased in population to less than 500 by 1960; 62, or 57 percent, remained in the same class: and 28 places, or 26 percent, shifted to the 1,000-2,499 size class. An analysis of the stability of places, both in overall terms and for particular size categories, reveals that, for example, in the 1950s 79 percent of the 479 NMI places were stable or remained in the category in which they were located at the beginning of the decade, while 13 percent shifted up and 8 percent shifted down one size class. Comparable figures for the 1960-1970 decade were 87 percent, 9 percent, and 4 percent. The tendency toward growth, rather than decline, apparently is stronger in the earlier decade but continues through the 1960s; further, stability increased during the later decade. In overall terms, however, the NM! places in Texas were less stable during the twenty-year period than was the case in the United States.6 Although trends in the stability of NMI places may be somewhat obscured because of the classification system, several are evident. In all size classes in both decades there was a greater tendency for gains than for losses. The 500-999 class showed the least amount of stability, particularly during 1950-1960, when 1 7 percent of the NM! places in that class moved to the lower class and 26 percent to the next higher category. During the 1960s some of the larger places declined and shifted into a lower size class. In sum, the nonmetropolitan incorporated places of Texas are not characterized solely by population decline, as the layman generally believes. Population decline (from one size category to another) is much more the exception than the rule. Variables Associated with Population Change Many factors are associated with the changes in popula­tion size of Texas' nonmetropolitan incorporated places over the twenty-year period between 1950 and 1970, including not only basic demographic processes, but also social and economic factors. The focus in this paper will be on size of place and degree of urban influence as measured by distance from a large urban center. 7 The relationship between size of place and population change is frequently hypothesized as a direct one, that is, the larger the place, the more likely it is to grow. The theoretical basis is provided by central-place theory ,8 which postulates a spatially optimum hierarchy of market centers, i.e., central places. This hierarchy is composed of levels of centers which provide increasingly more specialized goods to consumers. The market areas of the various levels of centers interlock, so a consumer located in a very small town would make frequent purchases in the small center, travel on a less frequent basis to the next largest center, and shop in a higher-level center for very specialized goods. The market area of the highest-level place in the hierarchy would thus encompass the market areas of places in the lower levels. Modern changes in the hierarchy, due to factors such as transportation, highways, and the mechanization of agricul­ture, are expected to result in a thinning out of the central-place pattern. As farm population declines and larger centers become more accessible, the high-level places tend to expand their market areas at the expense of the relatively less important small centers at the bottom of the hierarchy. Therefore in a modern country, larger places are considered more likely to grow, and small places more often are expected to decline. This hypothesis has been supported by a great amount of empirical work. For example, Fuguitt9 showed that in Wisconsin a greater percent of smaller places than larger places lost population from 1950 to 1960. Fuguitt and Thomas, 1 O in an analysis of changes in incorporated places under 10,000 during the 1940-1960 period, found that for the United States as a whole , growth was greater for larger places than for smaller places. The association between size of place and growth is shown in Table 3 by the percentage of places in each size class experiencing gains and losses. The association between size of place and growth during the 1950s is obvious. From the 10,000-and-over size class down to the under-500 class, the percentage of places experiencing losses greater than 10 percent increases continuously. For example, 71 percent of NM! places in the l 0,000-and-over size · class showed population gains greater than 10 percent; conversely, of these places in the under-500 size class, only 10 percent showed gains of 10 percent or more, but 67 percent suffered population decline of the same magnitude. This association was not so clearly evident in the latter decade. In the 1960s the proportion of large places Table 2 CLASSIFICATION OF THE NUMBER OF NONMETROPOLITAN INCORPORATED PLACES BY SIZE: TEXAS Size in later census Size in earlier Total (Per-(Per-(Per-(Per-(Per­census (100 percent) Under SOO cent) S00-999 cent) 1,000-2,499 cent) 2,S00-9,999 ce n t) 10,000+ cent) 19SO 1960 New in 1960 Under SOO S00-999 1,000-2,499 2,S00-9,999 10,000 and over Total 40 70 108 142 13S 24 S19 22 68 18 0 0 0 108 (SS) (97} (1 7} 11 2 62 16 0 0 91 (28} ( 3} (S7} ( 11) 7 0 28 110 6 0 lSl (18} (26} (77} ( 4} 0 0 0 16 llS 0 131 (11) (8S} 0 0 0 0 14 24 38 (10) (100) 1960 1970 New in 1970 Under SOO S00-999 1,000-2,499 2,S00-9,999 10,000 and over Total S3 108 91 lSl 131 38 S72 38 99 s 0 0 0 142 (72} (92) ( S) 10 9 66 6 0 0 91 (19} ( 8} (73} ( 4) 3 0 20 133 s 0 161 ( 6} (22) (88} ( 4) 2 0 0 12­119 4 137 ( 4) ( 8} (91} ( 11) 0 0 0 0 7 34 41 ( 5) (89) Table 3 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBITTION OF PLACES BY POPULATION CHt\NGE, BY SIZE Size of place at beginning of decade Number Loss (percent) 10+ 0-9 (p0-9 Gain ercent) 10+ 1950-1960 All places 10,000 and over 2,500-9,999 1,000-2,499 500-999 Under 500 479 24 135 142 108 70 30 4 17 28 30 67 18 8 16 22 17 19 15 17 23 13 17 4 37 71 44 37 37 10 1960-1970 All places 10,000 and over 2,500-9,999 1,000-2,499 500-999 Under 500 519 38 131 151 91 108 20 16 17 16 23 28 24 26 33 26 15 18 22 18 22 24 16 25 33 39 29 33 45 29 experiencing population losses was greater than during the earlier decade, while the smaller places showed more population gains. The positive association between size of place and growth is much weaker in the 1960-1970 decade, a situation which parallels that for the entire United States. I I The second variable thought to have an impact on population change is urban influence. Theoretically the farther a place is from a large urban center, the less the influence of the center on that place, and thus the more likely the place will lose population. A place located near a large center is likely to have an economic link to the center; it may serve as a place of residence for people employed in the center, or it may attract activities away from the larger center by providing a more economical site due to lower land values, tax benefits, or other factors. Empirical research has supported the hypothesis that a small place located near a large city is more likely to grow than a place located farther away from an urban center. In Wisconsin, for example, only 4 percent of the small towns with fewer than 2,SOO inhabitants located within 30 miles of a center of S0,000 or more declined between l 9SO and 1960, while 62 percent of those towns over 30 miles from a center of 10,000 or more lost population.12 In another study of village population change in the Middle West from l 9SO to 1960, statistical analysis showed that population change had a significant negative correlation with distance to the closest city of 2S,OOO or more.13 In other words, village population grew more slowly at greater distances from a city. In a division of all the NM! places of the entire United States into groups greater and less than SO miles from an SMSA central city, the proportion of places growing was greater within SO miles during both the l 9S 0-1960 and 1960-1970 decades for almost all size classes. I4 The applicability of the hypothesis to Texas is examined by differentiating places according to whether or not they JANUARY 1973 are within SO miles of the nearest SMSA central city. The majority of NM! places are located near SMSA's (See Figure 1). Of the 479 places in 1950, 309 were located within the 50-mile radius and 170 outside; of the total 519 places in 1960, 336 were within and 183 outside. The results are given in Figure 3. During the 19SOs, all size classes located within SO miles of a central city, with the exception of the under-SOO class, had a higher percentage of growing places than those located outside the SO-mile radius. Those places located near large urban centers definitely showed a greater likelihood of growth. The deviation of the smallest places from this trend is not unexpected, since smaller places, especially during the 19SOs, were more likely to decline than to grow. The 1960-1970 decade showed somewhat contrasting trends. All size classes within the SO-mile radius, with the exception of the largest class, showed a greater proportion of places growing than those outside the radius. However, the differences were not as extreme as they were in the earlier decade. The pattern of growth in the 1960s reflects both an overall slow-down in growth and a weakening relationship between size of place and population change. Future Growth and Decline Prediction of which places will grow and which will decline in the future is impossible without a thorough understanding of the process of population change; how­ever, several generalizations concerning the probability of future growth and decline of places are clear. For the most part, size of place is positively related to growth. Although this relationship was not as strong during the 1960s as the 19SOs, it appears quite likely to persist in the 1970s. Urban influence also has a bearing on population change. Places located more than SO miles from an SMSA central city, especially smaller places, showed a distinct growth dis­advantage during the l 9SOs. This relationship also weakened during the 1960s, and location with respect to a central city will probably not be as strong an influence on population change in the next decade. Nonetheless, these Figure 3 PROPORTION OF PLACES GROWING, BY SIZE AND LOCATION .. ~ u .!: :·• c: "' ·~ 0 . . t; !l ill 0:: 0 ~ 20 c ~ ·.I I I III a.. o It ltt ti I ltl 1 ti lft If I 111 II "II ·•• •••• o, 11 •tt .•• •••• . , 0 Size Class D Within 50-mile Rad ius Outside 50-mile Radius of Central City • of Central City 1S towns in Texas are far more stable with respect to population size than they generally have been thought to be. They represent a significant proportion of the total population of the state, and their future does not appear to be one of imminent decline. l1n 1970 Texas had 24 SMSA's, which included 41 counties. An SMSA, or standard metropolitan statistical area, as recognized by the Bureau of the Census, is "a county or group of contiguous counties which contains at least one city of S0,000 inhabitants or more, or 'twin cities' with a combined population of at least S0,000. In addition to the county, or counties, containing such a city or cities, contiguous counties are included in an SMSA if, according to certain criteria, they are socially and economically integrated with the central city." U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population: 1970, NUMBER OF INHABITANTS, Final Report PC(l}-A4S TEXAS, vii. 2u.s. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census ofPopulation: 1970, NUMBER OF INHABITANTS, Final Report PC(l)­A45 TEXAS, 10-17; 1960, NUMBER OF INHABITANTS, Final Report PC(l)-A4S, TEXAS, 36-40. 3see W. Allen Martin and Dudley L. Poston, Jr., "Texas Population in 1970: 7. Metropolitan Trends." Texas Business Review, forthcoming. 4Glenn V. Fuguitt, "The Places Left Behind: Population Trends and Policy for Rural America," Rural Sociology 36 (December 1971}: 4S2. 5Ibid. 6Ibid. 7For a statement relating additional variables to popula­tion change, see Diana DeAre, "Population Change in Nonmetropolitan Texas," master's thesis, Department of Geography, The University of Texas at Austin, forthcoming. 8For a summary of central-place theory and its implica­tions for spatial distributions, see Brian J. L. Berry, Geogra­phy of Market Centers and Retail Distribution, Englewood Cliffs New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967. 9Glenn V. Fuguitt, "The Small Town in Rural Ameri­ca," Journal of Cooperative Extension, Spring 196 S, pp. 19-26. 1 OGlenn V. Fuguitt and Donald W. Thomas, "Small Town Growth in the United States: An Analysis by Size Class and by Place," Demography 3 (1966): Sl3-S27. 11 Fuguitt, "The Places Left Behind," p. 4SS. 12Fuguitt, "The Small Town in Rural America," p. 24. l 3J ohn Fraser Hart and Neil E. Salisbury, "Population Change in Middle Western Villages: A Statistical Approach," Annals of the Association of American Geographers SS (March 1965): 140-160. 14Fuguitt, "The Places Left Behind," p. 4S6. COTTON IN SANTE FE STATES Nov 1 est. 1972 1971 Classification bales bales Texas 4,241,000 2,614,300 California l,6S0,400 1,117,400 Arkansas 1,SS0,000 1,236,000 Louisiana 74S,000 600,000 Arizona Missouri 606,000 S04,000 S08,100 401,000 Oklahoma 310,000 177,000 New Mexico 1S7,000 1S3,300 Total U.S. total 9, 763,400 13,955,100 6,807,100 10,473,000 Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture. TEXAS CONSTRUCTION* WHERE IS THE NEWEST HOUSING IN TEXAS? Robert M. Lockwood Three of every four year-round housing units built in Texas during the sixties are in the twenty-five standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA's), the diffused, forty­two-county region providing homes for more than 8.S million persons. In April 1970, the date of the last Census of Housing, only about six in ten of those housing units erected before 1950 were still standing in the SMSA's. Throughout the state, 31.5 percent of all year-round housing units existing in April 1970 were built during January 1960-March 1970. This proportion rose to 33.3 percent in the twenty-five SMSA's and fell to only 23.S percent in the 212 non-SMSA counties. Throughout Texas, the proportion of April 1970 year-round housing units constructed before 1950 amounted to 42.1 percent. The comparable figures inside and outside the SMSA's were 37.1 percent and 54.6 percent, respectively. As might be expected, the absolute numbers and percentages for urban areas closely approximate the SMSA figures. In rural areas, however, January 1960-March 1970 housing came to 30 percent as of April 1970, and units put up before 1950 amounted to 50.5 percent. Relatively few counties lie at the extremes of newest­housing-units proportions. Only ten counties, for example, were reported by the 1970 Census of Housing as having erected less than 10 percent of April 1970 year-round housing units since 1959. Of those ten, only one, Loving County, reported no units built during the sixties. At the other extreme, only ten counties reflected newest-housing percentages of 40 or higher. Montgomery County, with the highest percentage in the state, reported 10,318 of an existing total of 18,329 year-round housing units, or 56.3 percent. Almost 90 percent of the sixties housing in Montgomery County was classified as rural, a pattern existing in other counties which have enjoyed recent growth related to the proximity of large urban centers or recreational facilities, such as reservoirs. In San Jacinto County, for example, which contributed part of the coastline of Lake Livingston, 35.6 percent of the April 1970 housing units were built after 1959. Every one of those 1,061 units was built in a rural area, although no more than eighty are identified as "occupied rural farm." Henderson, a larger and more populous county than San Jacinto but almost equally dependent on primary economic activities, reported that 4,644 of the 11,308 year-round housing units existing in the spring of 1970-41.1 percent­were built in the sixties. Four out of five of those were in rural areas, but only one in five was on an occupied farm. Two of these counties, Collin and Denton, are the seat of Dallas-Fort Worth bedroom communities. Three adjacent counties with extremely high proportions of new housing PROPORTION OF YEAR-ROUND HOUSING UNITS BUILT IN TEXAS COUNTIES DURING JANUARY 1960-MARCH 1970 (As of April 1970) NOVEMBER BUILDING STATISTICS IN REVIEW Despite the second straight monthly rise in the seasonally adjusted index of residential construction authorized in Texas urban places reporting building­ permit issues, the total index of construction in the state fell off 6 percent in November, depressed by a 23-percen t slump in the index of nonresidential construction. The most significant increases (based on reporting communities) in nonfarm building authorized in Texas SMSA's during January-November l 972 oc­ curred in Laredo, Odessa, San Antonio, Bryan-College Station, and McAllen-Pharr-Edinburg, all of which reported estimated dollar-value gains of more than 50 percent over the first 11 months of 1971. The SMSA's as a whole advanced their estimated permit values during January-November 1972 by 16 percent over those for the same period last year, an increase amounting-in unadjusted dollars-to roughly $403 million. The comparable figure for the nonmetropoli­ tan areas was about $46 million, but the relative gain for these areas over the first l l months of 1971 was l 9 percent overall and 32 percent in the cities of 10,000 to 50,000 persons. are Travis, Burnet, and Llano. This region benefits from the proximity of both the Austin SMSA and the Highland Lakes. In fact, the census county divisions in these three counties which are adjacent to the Highland Lakes ac­counted for almost one seventh of the net population gain experienced by all three counties during the sixties. The ten leading counties in Texas in April 1970, ranked according to their newest-housing percentage, were Mont­gomery, 56.3; Randall, 48.2; Collin 47.9; Llano, 47.2; Aransas, 46.4; Travis, 44.3; Denton, 43.2; Burnet, 42.9; Henderson, 41. l; Bandera, 41.0. Except for Randall, none of these counties is farther west than Bandera, and none is farther east than Montgomery. TOTAL BUILDING AUTHORIZED, TEXAS Inde x Ad1usted lor Seosono/ Yoriotion-1967=100 196• 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 Includes addi tions, alterations, and repairs. The nonresidential component is not seasonally adjusted . l 8 Although most of the forty-two SMSA counties fall in that group of fifty-two in which 30 percent or more of the April 1970 year-round housing was erected after 1959, several SMSA counties are included among 152 counties in which the April 1970 newest housing comprised more than 15 but less than 30 percent of the total number of housing units. Among this second group are the El Paso, San Angelo, Odessa, Midland, Laredo, Beaumont-Port Arthur­Orange, and Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito SMSA's. In a general fashion, those counties in which the last-built increments of housing comprise the smallest percentages are distributed through the western part of the state. Those with the most recent housing are in East Texas. The farthest east of the counties in the last group is Coleman ; the farthest west is Presidio. These ten counties, not listed in order, have a most-recent housing-units share of less than 10 percent of their total: Coleman, Collings­worth, Cottle, Dickens, Knox, Loving, Menard, Motley, Presidio, and Terrell. ESTIMATED VALUES OF BUILDING AUTHORIZED IN TEXAS* Percent change Jan-Nov 1972 Nov Jan-Nov Nov 1972 from 1972 1972 from Jan-Nov Classification (thousands of dollars) Oct 1972 1971 All permits 240,807 3,180,024 -10 16 New construction 216,426 2,878,713 -9 18 Residential (housekeeping) 142,977 1,617,925 1 17 One-family dwellings 77,029 1,027,743 -14 22 Multiple-family dwellings 65,948 590,182 27 16 Nonresidential buildings 73,449 1,260,788 -23 20 Hotels, motels, and tourist courts 3,680 57,294 -35 75 Amusement buildings 490 18,917 -66 -35 Churches 1,629 33,721 -53 11 Industrial l:!uildings 7,543 91,806 -14 -2 Garages (commercial and private) 1,858 37,231 189 11 Service stations 917 12,509 -41 -12 Hospitals and institutions 14,344 98,105 -8 61 Office-bank buildings 12, 190 273,132 -5 -5 Works and utilities 3,368 81,866 -18 35 Educational buildings 5,148 180,544 -9 -2 Stores and mercantile buildings 19,314 329,952 -34 78 Other buildings and structures 2,968 45,711 -49 8 Additions, alterations, and repairs 24,381 301,311 -21 2 SMSA vs. non-SMSA Total SMSAt 218,608 2,896,557 -8 16 Central cities 163,321 2,063,589 -4 18 Outside central cities 5 5,287 832,968 -18 11 Total non-SMSA 22, 199 283,468 -26 19 10,000 to 50,000 population 11,788 162,588 -39 32 Less than 10,000 population 10,411 120,880 -3 6 the incorporated area of a city is included. Federal contracts and public housing are not included. t As defined in 1970 Census. Source: Bureau of Business Research in cooperation with the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. • Only building for which permits were issued within TEXAS BUSINESS REVIEW LOCAL BUSINESS CONDITIONS Statistical data compiled by Mildred Anderson, statistical associate, technician. The indicators of local business conditions in Texas which are included in this section are statistics on bank debits, urban building permits, and employment. The data are reported by metropolitan areas in the first table below and by municipalities within counties in the second table. Standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA's) in Texas are defined by county lines; in the first table the counties included in the area are listed under each SMSA. Since the Longview-Kilgore­Gladewater area is functioning as a significant metropolitan complex in its region, although not officially designated as an SMSA by the Bureau of the Census, data for this area have been included in the table for SMSA's. In both tables the populations shown for the SMSA's and for the counties are the population counts of the I 970 Census. In the second table the population values for individual municipalities are also counts of the I 970 Census, unless otherwise indicated. Population estimates made for municipalities in noncen­sus years are commonly based on utility connections, and these estimates are subject to the errors inherent in a process dependent on base ratios derived in 1960. Constance Coo/edge, statistical assistant, and Kay Davis, statistical The values of urban building permits have been collected from participating municipal authorities by the Bureau of Business Research in cooperation with the Bureau of the Census of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Inasmuch as building permits are not required by county authorities, it must be emphasized that the reported permits reflect construction intentions only in incor­porated places. Permits are reported for residential and nonresiden­tial building only, and do not include public-works projects such as roadways, waterways, or reservoirs ; nor do they include construc­tion let under federal contracts. The values of bank debits for all SMSA's and for most central cities of the SMSA's have been collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Bank debits for the remaining municipalities have been collected from cooperating banks by the Bureau of Business Research. Employment estimates are compiled by the Texas Employment Commission in cooperation with the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor. Footnote symbols are defined on pp. 20 and 28. INDICATORS OF LOCAL BUSINESS CONDITIONS FOR STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS November 1972 Reported area and indicator Nov 1972 Percent change from Oct Nov 1972 1971 Reported area and indicator Nov 1972 Percent change from Oct Nov 1972 1971 ABILENE SMSA Jones and Taylor Counties; population 113,959 Urban building permits (dollars) 1,593,357 Bank debits, seas. adj. ($1,000) 224,534 Nonfarm employment 40,200 Manufacturing employment 5,910 Unemployed (percent) 3.0 AMARILLO SMSA Potter and Randall Counties; population 144,396 Urban building permits (dollars) 1,738,985 Bank debits, seas. adj. ($1,000) 728,365 Nonfarm employment 62,800 Manufacturing employment 8,260 Unemployed (percent) 3.1 AUSTIN SMSA Travis County; population 295,516 Urban building permits (dollars) 10,795,379 Bank debits, seas. adj. (S 1,000) 1, 155,285 Nonfarm employment 147,400 Manufacturing employment 13,760 Unemployed (percent) 2.6 BEAUMONT-PORT ARTHUR-ORANGE SMSA 73 -2 11 -70 6 1 1 7 -28 6 4 Jefferson and Orange Counties; population 315,943 Urban building permits (dollars) 2,470,247 15 Bank debits, seas. adj.($ 1,000) 617,998 2 Nonfarm employment 122,800 -1 Manufacturing employment 37,500 •• Unemployed (percent) 4.6 -2 BROWNSVILLE-HARLINGEN-SAN BENITO SMSA Cameron County; population 140,368 Urban building permits (dollars) 2,745,413 28 Bank debits, seas. adj. ($ 1,000) 221,228 6 Nonfarm employment 44,800 •• Manufacturing employment 8,220 2 Unemployed (percent) 8.1 25 BRYAN-COLLEGE STATION SMSA Brazos County; population 57,978 120 Urban building permits (dollars) 4,506,454 189 361 9 Bank debits, seas. adj.($ 1,000) 117,206 -8 13 2 (Monthly employment reports are not available for the 8 Bryan-College Station SMSA). 30 CORPUS CHRISTI SMSA Nueces and San Patricio Counties; population 284,832 Urban building permits (dollars) 4,805,679 2 Bank debits, seas. adj. ($1,000) 678,353 3 -9 21 Nonfarm employment 100,700 •• Manufacturing employment 11,090 •• Unemployed (percent) 4.6 5 -3 -26 DALLAS SMSA Collin, Dallas, Denton, Ellis, Kaufman, and Rockwall Counties; population 1,555,950 Urban building permits (dollars) 60,737,076 47 -48 Bank debits, seas. adj.($ 1,000) 14,235,062 12 8 Nonfarm employment 759,000 1 4 Manufacturing employment 155,1 SO 1 7 Unemployed (percent) 2.2 8 26 FORT WORTH SMSA Johnson and Tarrant Counties; population 762,086 Urban building permits (dollars) 10,995,100 -49 15 Bank debits, seas. adj.($ 1,000) 2,489,731 1 8 Nonfarm employment 296,800 • • 1 Manufacturing employment 72,250 •• 1 Unemployed (percent) 3.9 11 -12 SOUTHWEST METROPLEX: DALLAS/FORT WORTH Collin, Dallas, Denton, Ellis, Johnson, Kaufman, Rockwall, and Tarrant Counties; population 2,318,036 234 Urbanbuildingpermits(dollars) 71,732,176 14 -5 Bank debits, seas. adj. ($ 1,000) 16,724,793 1o 12 Nonfarm employment 1,05 5,800 • • 29 Manufacturing employment 227,400 6 Unemployed (percent) 2.7 • • -23 5 2 30 19 4 5 -27 -6 20 1 2 -26 23 19 3 4 JANUARY 1973 Percent change Percent change from from Nov Oct Nov Nov Oct Nov Reported area and indicator 1972 1972 1971 Reported area and indicator 1972 1972 1971 EL PASO SMSA Odessa SMSA'S since employment figures for Midland and Ector El Paso County; population 359,291 Counties, composing one labor-market area, are recorded in Urban building permits (dollars) 10,409,745 -33 -26 combined form by the Texas Employment Commission.) Bank debits, seas. adj. ($1,000) 917,625 11 43 Non farm employment 129,300 I 4 ODESSA SMSA Manufacturing employment 28,250 -2 6 Ector County; population 91,805 Unemployed (percent) s.o 11 11 Urban building permits (dollars) 999,281 43S _ 79 Bank debits, seas. adj. ($1,000) I S6,68S •• 1 GALVESTON-TEXAS CITY SMSA Nonfarm employment 60,900 • • _ 2 Galveston County; population 169,812 Manufacturing employment S,S50 2 4 Urban building permits (dollars) l,2S2,293 -62 -41 Unemployed (percent) 3.6 33 _ 12 Bank debits, seas. adj. ($1,000) 299,221 s 21 (Employment data are reported for the combined Midland and Non farm employment 62,SOO l Odessa SMSA's since employment figures for Midland and Ector Manufacturing employment 10,6SO 4 Counties, composing one labor-market area, are recorded in Unemployed (percent) 5.4 •• 8 combined form by the Texas Employment Commission.) SAN ANGELO SMSA HOUSTON SMSA Tom Green County; population 71,047 Brazoria, Fort Bend, Harris, Liberty, and Urban building permits (dollars) 17 Bank debits, seas. adj. ($1,000) 149,604 -2 Montgomery Counties; population 1,985,031 710,323 161 Urban building permits (dollars) 60,914,S69 •• 38 13 Nonfarm employment 24,S50 Bank debits, seas. adj. ($1,000) 12,89 I,S44 7 19 •• 1 Manufacturing employment 4,280 Nonfarm employment 91 S,400 •• 3 I 2 Unemployed (percent) Manufacturing employment ISl,800 •• 2 4.4 -4 10 Unemployed (percent) 3.1 3 9 SAN ANTONIO SMSA KILLEEN-TEMPLE SMSA Bexar and Guadalupe Counties; population 864,014 Bell and Coryell Counties; population 159,794 Urban building permits (dollars) 13,630,908 -48 9 Bank debits, seas. adj. ($1,000) 2,007,302 6 Urban building permits (dollars) 2,270,0S3 -29 -SO 7 Nonfarm employment 309,700 •• Bank debits ($1,000) l S4,7 S9 -4 20 2 Manufacturing employment 36,350 •• (Monthly employment reports are not available for the 3 Killeen-Temple SMSA.) 4.2 -11 Unemployed (percent) 8 SHERMAN-DENISON SMSA Webb County; population 72,859 LAREDO SMSA Grayson County; population 83,225 Urban building permits (dollars) 27S,050 291 -60 Urban building permits (dollars) 2,102,133 36S 193 Bank debits, seas. adj. ($1,000) 108,886 6 14 Bank debits, seas. adj. ($1,000) 108,184 -1 3 Non farm employment 26,0SO •• (Monthly employment reports are not available for the 3 Manufacturing employment 1,610 I 11 Sherman-Denison SMSA.) Unemployed (percent) 10.4 9 -13 TEXARKANA SMSA LONGVIEW-KILGORE-GLADEWATER METROPOLITAN AREA Bowie County, Texas, and Miller County, Arkansas; Gregg County; population 75,929 population 101,198 Urban building permits (dollars) 1,449,787 -21 -23 Urban building permits (dollars) SS0, 128 -S4 -85 Bank debits ($1,000) 144,416 •• 13 Bank debits, seas. adj. ($1,000) 1s1,626 6 8 Nonfarm employment 36,350 * • 2 Nonfarm employment 41,400 2 4 Manufacturing employment 10,720 8 Manufacturing employment 9,7SO 9 8 Unemployed (percent) 4.4 16 17 Unemployed (percent) S.4 23 ** (Building permits and bank debits are included for those portions of (Since the Texarkana SMSA includes Bowie County in Texas and Kilgore and Gladewater in Rusk County and Upshur County.) Miller County in Arkansas, all data, including population, refer to the two-county region.) LUBBOCK SMSA Lubbock County; population 179,295 TYLER SMSA Urban building permits (dollars) 7,184,793 S7 SS Smith County; population 97,096 Bank debits, seas. adj. ($ 1,000) 448,660 9 IS Urban building permits (dollars) 698,990 -4S 13 s Non farm employment 73 300 2 Bank debits, seas. adj. ($1,000) 302,466 9 41 Manufacturing employment 7:860 2 1 Nonfarm employment 41,400 •• s Unemployed (percent) 2.s 9 17 Manufacturing employment 13,200 •• 8 Unemployed (percent) 3.8 3 -s McALLEN-PHARR-EDINBURG SMSA Hidalgo County; population 181,535 WACO SMSA Urban building permits (dollars) 3,S3 l ,874 60 38 McLennan County; population 147,553 Bank debits, seas. adj. ($1,000) 231,732 •• 36 Urban building permits (dollars) 3,844,029 3 19 Nonfarm employment 45,200 •• Bank debits, seas. adj. ($1,000) 339,063 3 6 Manufacturing employment 4,380 12 22 9 Nonfarm employment 60,300 •• 2 Unemployed (percent) 7.9 14 -12 Manufacturing employment 13,430 2 9 Unemployed (percent) 3.S 6 -13 MIDLAND SMSA Midland County; population 65,433 WICHITA FALLS SMSA Urban building permits (dollars) 6S9,842 3S 64 Archer and Wichita Counties; population 127,621 -2 8 843,340 Bank debits, seas. adj. ($1,000) 201,240 Urban building permits (dollars) -32 -82 Nonfarm employment 60,900 •• -2 Bank debits, seas. adj.($ 1,000) 262,200 2 II Manufacturing employment 5,SSO 2 4 Nonfarm employment 43,850 •• I Unemployed (percent) 3.6 8 33 -12 Manufacturing employment S,S80 3 (Employment data are reported for the combined Midland and Unemployed (percent) 3.1 3 •• •• Absolute.c~ange is less than one half of 1 percent. Urban bu1ldmg-perm1t data are preliminary and subject to revision. TEXAS BUSINESS REVIEW INDICATORS OF LOCAL BUSINESS CONDITIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL MUNICIPALITIES November 1972 Urban building permits Bank debits COUNTY City Population Nov 1972 (dollars) Percent change from Oct Nov 1972 1971 Nov 1972 (thousands of dollars) Percent change from Oct Nov 1972 1971 ANDERSON Palestine 27,789 14,525 119,600 -82 -15 24,464 4 13 ANDREWS Andrews 10,372 8,625 8,250 -75 588 9,132 - 9 4 ANGELINA Lufkin 49,349 23,049 400,466 -65 - 6 ARANSAS Aransas Pass 8,902 5,813 89,325 15 96 12,835 - 3 3 ATASCOSA Pleasanton 18,696 5,407 7,007 14 4 AUSTIN Bellville 13,831 2,371 87,000 -49 14 8,098 -24 6 BAILEY Muleshoe 8,487 4,525 15,933 -14 3 BASTROP Smithville 17,297 2,959 57 ,583 26 108 3,197 -2 14 BEE Beeville 22,737 13,506 338,485 375 786 26,256 -4 13 BELL (In Killeen-Temple SMSA) Bartlett Belton Harker Heights Killeen Temple 124,483 1,622 8,696 4,216 35,507 33,431 79,700 205,805 1,047,658 415,410 -39 97 -52 -35 -93 35 4 -78 1,876 48,645 86,571 -13 -7 23 18 23 BEXAR (In San Antonio SMSA) San Antonio 830,460 654,153 13,108,274 -47 15 1,929,236 3 14 BOWIE (In Texarkana SMSA) Texarkana 67,813 52,179 5 12,328 91 -86 127,433 -2 4 BRAZORIA (In Houston SMSA) Angleton Clute Freeport Pearland 108,312 9,770 6,023 11,997 6,444 43,450 1,049,000 6,750 860,999 -60 539 -89 58 -39 729 -95 15 22,059 6,101 39,129 9,128 8 9 -4 8 20 8 32 1 BRAZOS (Constitutes Bryan-College Station SMSA) Bryan College Station 57 ,978 33,719 17,67 6 2, 786,491 l,719,963 399 72 238 95,778 12,852 -15 -14 10 8 BREWSTER Alpine 7,780 5,971 34,190 -51 7,041 12 10 BROWN Brownwood 25,877 17,368 47,500 -59 -98 BURLESON Caldwell 9,999 2,308 5,113 -7 13 BURNET Marble Falls 11,420 2,209 9,047 -10 35 CALDWELL Lockhart 21 , 178 6,489 175,315 65 70 10,739 -18 19 JANUARY 197 3 Urban building permits Bank debits COUNTY City Population Nov 1972 (dollars) Percent change from Oct Nov 1972 1971 Nov 1972 (thousands of dollars) Percent change from Oct Nov 1972 1971 CAMERON (Constitutes Brownsville­Harlingen-San Benito SMSA) Brownsville Harlingen La Feria Los Fresnos Port Isabel San Benito 140,368 52,522 33,503 2,642 1,297 3,067 15, 176 1,109,040 1,390,520 1,500 37,350 206,703 -25 229 -82 -27 41 118 475 -71 303 84,673 93,787 2,881 2,356 5,990 9,930 2 5 9 -23 -13 •• 10 18 17 1 17 29 CASTRO Dimmitt 10,394 4,327 29,486 - 18 14 CHEROKEE Jacksonville 32,008 9,734 21,500 -90 7 31,247 - 8 12 COLEMAN Coleman 10,288 5,608 0 18,885 - 1 - I COLLIN (In Dallas SMSA) McKinney Plano 66,920 15,193 17,872 1,736,500 1,779,470 341 -45 890 -33 20,918 26,761 - 10 9 38 37 COLORADO Eagle Lake 17,638 3,587 7,438 25 43 COMAL New Braunfels 24,165 17,859 1,324,100 146 28,149 - 8 20 COOKE Gainesville Muenster 23,471 13,830 1,411 43,000 22,000 -96 -27 -78 -54 25,321 3,761 - I 15 23 -1 CORYELL (In Killeen-Temple SMSA) Copperas Cove Gatesville 35,311 10,818 4,683 521,430 145 74 6,505 11, 162 -1 -15 40 s CRANE Crane 4,172 3,427 0 4,15 I 36 2 DALLAS (In Dallas SMSA) Carrollton Dallas Farmers Branch Garland Grand Prairie Irving Lancaster Mesquite Richardson Seagoville 1,327,321 13,85 5 844,401 27,492 81,437 50,904 97,260 10,522 55,131 48,582 4,390 1,230,522 32,055,010 2,022,164 5,919,895 3,663,598 981,290 285,545 2,164,405 1,801,222 281,196 -79 97 47 83 57 -63 -42 35 728 -71 64 17 -31 177 -36 118 235 104 281 23,410 12,364,600 25,411 77,254 42,201 105,749 12,201 35,750 90,364 8,341 3 1 5 4 11 1 10 16 23 -12 31 IS 18 s 26 18 27 23 -9 22 DAWSON Lamesa 16,604 11,559 8,000 -59 248 21,732 •• DEAF SMITH Hereford 18,999 13,414 201,800 -25 6 DENTON (In Dallas SMSA) Denton Justin Lewisville Pilot Point 75,633 39,874 741 9,264 1,663 828,383 814,175 -58 102 -44 -64 82, 171 1,689 24,418 4,258 -IS -12 -14 -12 23 JS 30 9 DE WITT Yoakum 18,660 5,755 33,585 -37 -69 14,938 •• 10 EASTLAND Cisco 18,092 4,160 6,843 -12 36 Urban building permits Bank debits COUNTY City Population Nov 1972 (dollars) Percent change from Oct Nov 1972 1971 Nov 1972 (thousands of dollars) Percent change from Oct Nov 1972 1971 ECTOR (Constitutes Odessa SMSA) Odessa 91,80S 78,380 999,281 43S - 79 1S3,61S - 4 4 ELLIS (In Dallas SMSA) Ennis Midlothian Waxahachie 46,638 11,046 2,322 13,4S2 182,000 1,14S,700 103 123 178 18,S40 3,830 27,088 -- 47 8 18 3 Sl 19 EL PASO (Constitutes El Paso SMSA) El Paso 3S9,291 322,261 10,409,74S -33 26 914,180 11 41 ERATH Stephenville 18,191 9,277 736,900 471 433 17,482 - 12 10 FANNIN Bonham 22,70S 7,698 0 17,848 8 13 FAYETTE Schulenburg 17,6SO 2,294 2,800 -96 -80 FORT BEND (In Houston SMSA) Richmond Rosenberg S2 ,314 S,777 12,098 142,4SO 406,800 -37 176 -88 68 13,S69 10,2S6 -- 3 20 16 -4 GAINES Seagraves Seminole 11,S93 2,440 S,007 276,900 30,600 60 3,464 12,291 12 33 29 8 GALVESTON (Constitutes Galveston-Texas City SMSA) Dickinson Galveston La Marque Texas City 169,812 10,776 61,809 16,131 38,908 748,94S SS,038 448,310 -7S 18 -4S 89 -39 16,867 177,422 18,333 3S,Sl6 ---- 2 18 6 18 - 19 18 4 2 GILLESPIE Fredericksburg 10,SS3 S,326 97,s1 s -39 -S8 2S,967 - s 20 GONZALES Nixon 16,37S l,92S 4,200 87 -81 GRAY Pampa 26,949 21,726 202,000 7S 4S,987 - 8 10 GRAYSON (Constitutes Sherman-Denison SMSA) Denison Sherman 83,22S 24,923 29,061 l,2S0,623 8Sl,Sl0 631 203 63S 62 34,974 6S,368 3 1 -2 10 GREGG (Constitutes Longview-Kilgore-Gladewater Metropolitan Area) Gladewater Kilgore Longview 7S,929 S,S74 9,49S 4S,S47 27,387 43S,400 987,000 -87 269 -34 3 646 -4S 7,028 23,064 114,324 - 12 8 2 9 17 13 GUADALUPE (In San Antonio SMSA) Schertz Seguin 33,SS4 4,061 lS,934 228,800 120 - 43 2,042 30,799 2 s 82 -22 HALE Hale Center Plainview 34,137 1,964 19,096 0 38S,6SO 41 SS 71,390 2 14 HARDEMAN Quanah 6,79S 3,948 0 6 ,779 2 - 1 Urban building permits Bank debits COUNTY City Population Nov 1972 (dollars) Percent change from Oct Nov 1972 1971 Nov 1972 (thousands of dollars) Percent change from Oct Nov 1972 1971 HARDIN Silsbee 29,996 7,271 16,029 4 22 HARRIS (In Houston SMSA) Baytown Bellaire Deer Park Houston Humble La Porte Pasadena South Houston Tomball 1,741,912 43,980 19,009 12,773 1,232,802 3,278 7,149 89,277 11,527 2,734 872,452 140,398 509,363 51,982,945 151,000 626,275 1,701,448 98,950 -52 -22 -23 3 ·-55 192 36 -30 -74 -27 -18 47 202 45 57,647 75,753 13,849 11,235,641 13,702 5,118 145,957 24,808 -20 1 -17•• 3 3 5 -17 -23 15 -11 22 14 16 8 47 HARRISON Hallsville Marshall 44,841 1,038 22,937 129,925 -97 -13 1,634 35,189 8 4 43 18 HASKELL Haskell 8,512 3,655 39,000 111 6,324 -4 HAYS San Marcos 27,642 18,860 248,100 -80 157 18,163 - 1 -6 HENDERSON Athens 26,466 9,582 129,700 -19 64 22,691 - 5 16 HIDALGO (Constitutes McAllen-Pharr-Edinburg SMSA) Alamo Donna Edinburg Elsa McAllen Mercedes Mission Pharr San Juan Weslaco 181,535 4,291 7,365 17,163 4,400 37,636 9,355 13,043 15,829 5,070 15,313 9,800 21,514 1,854,600 10,650 1,019,140 76,528 265,305 140,261 134,076 -92 8 322 184 -9 239 45 -32 14 -28 -47 4 27 16 23 4,651 6,722 28,078 6,331 79,329 10,339 24,370 8,608 5,771 21,669 -3 30 -15 3 7 6 8 7 -13 1 23 25 -20 71 50 24 27 24 21 13 HOCKLEY Levelland 20,396 11,445 226,902 - 1 120 26,506 -5 10 HOOD Granbury 6,368 2,473 4,151 -3 20 HOPKINS Sulphur Springs 20,710 10,642 220,600 -80 -51 35,840 •• 11 HOWARD Big Spring 37,796 28,735 83,535 -63 82 63,966 - 5 7 HUNT Greenville 47,948 22,043 236,850 546 40 35,487 - 6 14 HUTCHINSON Borger 24,443 14,195 1,850 -99 -97 JACKSON Edna 12,975 5,332 10,819 -7 -7 JASPER Jasper Kirbyville 24,692 6,251 1,869 128,600 190 533 22,335 4,182 1 7 27 38 JEFFERSON (In Beaumont-Port Arthur-Orange SMSA) Beaumont Groves Nederland Port Arthur Port Neches 244,773 115,919 18,067 16,810 57,371 10,894 1,087,776 202,423 288,960 142,832 249,330 -27 16 392 -27 -29 -29 133 56 -33 17 362,381 20,967 14,915 98,175 19,777 •• 6 7 6 4 12 7 24 IS -3 Urban building permits Bank debits COUNTY City Population Nov 1972 (dollars) Percent change from Oct Nov 1972 1971 Nov 1972 (thousands of dollars) Percent change from Oct Nov 1972 1971 JIM WELLS Alice 33,032 20, 121 227,391 -11 -43 72,971 42 17 JOHNSON (In Fort Worth SMSA) Burleson Cleburne 45,769 7,713 16,015 121,300 133,050 -31 -33 -57 10,185 26,740 3 4 36 8 KARNES Karnes City 13,462 2,926 22,000 -56 18 5,891 - 5 11 KAUFMAN (In Dallas SMSA) Terrell 32,392 14,182 53,075 20 -20 KIMBLE Junction 3,904 2,654 3,878 - 5 17 KLEBERG Kingsville 33,166 28,711 1,121,900 411 35 29,725 - 2 5 LAMAR Paris 36,062 23,441 471,717 200 12 LAMB Littlefield 17,770 6,738 500 - 77 11 ,402 11 14 LAMPASAS Lampasas 9,323 5,922 82,700 -33 -63 15,053 - 10 25 LAVACA Hallettsville Yoakum 17,903 2,712 5,755 250,750 33,585 320 -37 -69 6,808 14,938 - 12•• 29 10 LEE Giddings 8,048 2,783 73,230 69 9,850 - 3 15 LIBERTY (In Houston SMSA) Dayton Liberty 33,014 3,804 5,591 25,040 12,900 116 -94 -26 -71 9,054 17'721 7 2 24 5 LIMESTONE Mexia 18,100 5,943 33,12 5 -27 36 11,274 - 14 11 LLANO Kingsland Llano 6,979 1,262 2,608 40,500 9 286 8,394 10,714 - 17 6 - 1 so LUBBOCK (Constitutes Lubbock SMSA) Lubbock Slaton 179,295 149,101 6,583 7,173,193 11 ,600 57 383 - 57 82 441 ,175 6,435 3 1 - 20 1 LYNN Tahoka 9,107 2,956 0 6,231 28 34 McCULLOCH Brady 8,571 5,557 18,32 5 -22 -70 12,057 - 25 18 McLENNAN (Constitutes Waco SMSA) McGregor Waco 147,553 4,365 95 ,326 0 3,699,179 17 7,772 294,286 4 5 30 10 MATAGORDA Bay City 27,913 11,733 642,9 30 13 28,658 - 2 11 MAVERICK Eagle Pass 18,093 15,364 15,273 - 3 4 MEDINA Castroville Hondo 20,249 1,893 5,487 91 ,320 99 481 1,786 6,536 8 2 17 21 Urban building permits Bank debits COUNTY City Population Nov 1972 (dollars) Percent change from Oct Nov 1972 1971 Nov 1972 (thousands of dollars) Percent change from Oct Nov 1972 1971 MIDLAND (Constitutes Midland SMSA) Midland 65,433 59,463 659,842 35 64 185,128 -8 3 MILAM Cameron Rockdale 20,028 5,546 4,655 49,750 21 -2 10,027 8,769 8 1 5 10 MILLS Goldthwaite 4,212 1,693 6,985 -21 14 MITCHELL Colorado City 9,073 5,227 8,140 6 MONTGOMERY (In Houston SMSA) Conroe 49,479 11,969 360,000 -82 76 61,808 •• 9 MOORE Dumas 14,060 9,771 182,150 33 181 NACOGDOCHES Nacogdoches 36,362 22,544 1,348,564 264 564 43,209 -2 16 NAVARRO Corsicana 31,150 19,972 231,146 6 16 40,983 9 NOLAN Sweetwater 16,220 12,020 9,275 -63 -95 23,905 -16 3 NUECES (In Corpus Christi SMSA) Bishop Corpus Christi Port Aransas Robstown 237,544 3,466 204,525 1,218 11,21 7 3,891,725 91,124 -4 366 -28 -61 3,362 559,951 917 19,321 -8 -4 -18 -17 - •• 11 13 3 ORANGE (In Beaumont-Port Arthur-Orange SMSA) Orange 71,170 24,457 320,746 40 216 65,233 6 6 PALO PINTO Mineral Wells 28,962 18,411 8,340 -87 -82 31,421 5 11 PANOLA Carthage 15,894 5,392 75,500 284 35 6,893 10 PARKER Weatherford 33,888 11,750 39,300 -90 -74 27,732 -9 - 6 PARMER Friona 10,509 3, 111 142,650 353 32,620 -14 12 PECOS Fort Stockton 13,748 8,283 32,999 -70 -17 15,658 -13 13 POTTER (In Amarillo SMSA) Amarillo 90,511 127,010 1,506,730 -73 -16 664,384 -14 16 RANDALL (In Amarillo SMSA) Amarillo (See Potter) Canyon 53,885 8,333 232,255 66 92 14,707 -2 13 REEVES Pecos 16,526 12,682 6,180 -69 129 31,609 10 2 REFUGIO Refugio 9,494 4,340 3,100 -77 -70 9,903 83 23 RUSK Henderson Kilgore 34,102 10,187 9,495 163,350 435,400 13 269 -16 646 2 7,410 23,064 3 8 22 17 Urban building permits Bank debits COUNTY City Population Nov 1972 (dollars) Percent change from Oct Nov 1972 1971 Nov 1972 (thousands of dollars) Percent change from Oct Nov 1972 1971 SAN PATRICIO (In Corpus Christi SMSA) Aransas Pass Sinton 47,288 5,813 5,563 89,325 94,548 15 -62 96 -78 12,835 10,152 -3 -24 3 7 SAN SABA San Saba 5,540 2,555 0 14,038 4 49 SCURRY Snyder 15,760 11,171 153,250 47 40 26,208 9 15 SHACKELFORD Albany 3,323 1,978 50,000 25 3,397 -25 - 8 SHERMAN Stratford 3,657 2,139 14,800 -73 19,642 -15 13 SMITH (Constitutes Tyler SMSA) Tyler 97,096 57,770 991,490 -20 63 274,182 4 42 STEPHENS Breckenridge 8,414 5,944 22,000 69 -34 SUTTON Sonora 3,17 5 2,149 0 3,958 -10 27 TARRANT (In Fort Worth SMSA) Arlington Burleson Euless Fort Worth Grapevine North Richland Hills White Settlement 716,317 90,643 7,713 19,316 393,476 7,023 16,514 13,449 121,300 544,951 5,900,529 262,848 406,180 384,133 -31 -34 -46 -72 -14 546 118 -24 69 -24 631 116,972 10,185 2,141,890 16,289 20,574 8,977 -3 -3 -5 12 -6 -10 7 36 20 60 5 TAYLOR (In Abilene SMSA) Abilene 97,853 89,653 1,592,657 79 120 193,256 6 10 TERRY Brownfield 14,118 9,647 161,000 145 -64 27,770 3 30 TITUS Mount Pleasant 16,702 8,877 208,301 159 103 26,499 -6 TOM GREEN (Constitutes San Angelo SMSA) San Angelo 71,047 63,884 710,323 17 161 142,651 - 5 15 TRAVIS (Constitutes Austin SMSA) Austin 295,516 251,808 10,795,379 -27 -48 1,171,474 10 10 UPSHUR Gladewater 20,976 5,574 27,387 -87 3 7,028 -12 9 UPTON McCamey 4,697 2,647 2 ,300 2 ** UVALDE Uvalde 17,348 10,764 123,446 70 -73 33,668 5 32 VAL VERDE Del Rio 27,471 21,330 29,121 2 14 VICTORIA Victoria 53,766 41,349 696,007 31 75 148,238 6 31 WALKER Huntsville 27,680 17,610 314,803 229 -40 29,711 -13 22 WARD Monahans 13,019 8,333 8,935 123 - 85 15,449 8 31 Urban building permits Bank debits COUNTY City Population Nov 1972 (dollars) Percent change from Oct Nov 1972 1971 Nov 1972 (thousands of dollars) Percent change from Oct 1972 Nov 1971 WASHINGTON 18,842 Brenham 8,922 224,750 -7 72 33,313 -12 27 WEBB 72,859 (Constitutes Laredo SMSA) Laredo 69,024 275,050 291 -60 105,461 6 IS WHARTON 36,729 El Campo 8,563 I 07,545 -6 170 26,237 20 WICHITA 121,862 (In Wichita Falls SMSA) Burkburnett 9,230 2,350 -85 -99 9,918 6 3 Iowa Park 5,796 13,572 -54 -65 4,347 I 6 Wichita Falls 97,564 827,418 -31 -82 226,098 s 13 WILBARGER 15,355 Vernon 11,454 116,200 -47 36,534 20 37 WILLACY l 5,570 Raymondville 7,987 47,800 -so -65 13,919 -10 6 WILLIAMSON 37,305 Bartlett 1,622 1,876 -13 23 Georgetown 6,395 l 50,850 18 -57 13,443 -21 16 Taylor 9,616 43,550 32 -56 17,379 -12 11 WINKLER 9,640 Kermit 7,884 0 WISE 19,687 Decatur 3,240 70,800 52 7,265 6 35 YOUNG l 5,400 Graham 7,477 65,850 -64 -19 19,807 -7 12 Olney 3,624 60,030 -43 8,055 -22 -4 ZAVALA 11,370 Crystal City 8,104 6,800 -86 -78 7,739 3 14 * * Absolute change is less than one half of l percent. No data, or inadequate basis for reporting. Association for University Business and Economic Research BIBLIOGRAPHY OF 1971 PUBLICATIONS OF UNIVERSITY BUREAUS OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH Bureaus of business and economic research, research divisions, manpower research centers, and research institutes affiliated with American colleges and universities are investigating and reporting on an increasing number of subjects. Through books, bulletins, monographs, working papers, and periodicals the bureaus are making available the results of research ranging from the economics of pollution to international trade. The objective of the Bibliography is to act as a reference guide to publications which for one reason or another do not appear in the traditional indexes found in libraries and to bring together in one place related topics of interest to researchers in business and economics. The Bibliography is arranged in three sections. The first lists publications by their institution of origin; the second is a subject index; the third is an author index. The 1971 edition contains 1,593 listings from 61 research bureaus and 43 AACSB schools. 203 pp. $5.00 Make check payable to AUBER and order from Business Research Division University of Colorado Boulder, Colorado 80302 BAROMETERS OF TEXAS BUSINESS (All figures are for Texas unless otherwise indicated.) All indexes are based on the average mo nths for 1967=100 except where other specification is made; all except annual indexes are adjusted for seasonal variation unless o therwise noted. Employment estimates are compiled by the Texas Employment Commission in cooperation with the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor. The symbols used below impose qualifications as indicated here: p-preliminary data subject to revision; r-revised data; *-dollar totals for the fiscal year to date; t -employment data for wage and salary workers only. Year-to-date averageNov Oct Nov 1972 1972 1971 1972 1971 GENERAL BUSINESS ACTIVITY Texas business activity (index) .. ...•.• .. ... ........... ..... .. . 181.2 170.2 161.7 165.5 150.3 Estimates of personal income (millions of dollars, seasonally adjusted) .... .. ...... . ......... . $ 4,04lp $ 3,952p $ 3,669r $ 3,884 $ 3,540 Income payments to individuals in U.S. (billions, at seasonally adjusted annual rate) ......... ........... . . .... ...$ 972,5P $ 963.8p $ 879.4r $ 930.0 $ 857.1 Wholesale prices in U.S. (unadjusted index) •................. .... 120.7 120.0 114.5 118.7 113.8 Consumer prices in Dallas (unadjusted index) ................. . 125.7 122.4 124.9 121.3 Consumer prices in U.S. (unadjusted index) .... .............. .... 126.9 126.6 122.6 125.1 121.l Business failures (number) ................. .. ..... .. ....... . . 68 62 60 Business failures (liabilities, thousands) ....... . .................$ $ 10,294 $ 6,297 $ $ 9,738 Sales of ordinary life insurance (index) ......................... 178.6 165.0 156.3 163.4 146.7 PRODUCTION Total electric-power use (index) ....... . . ....... . ... .... . ...... Industrial electric-power use (index) ... .... ............ .... .... 159.6p 143.2p 159.8p 140.6p 145.5r l 30.8r 150.8 137.0 137.8 127.0 Crude-oil production (index) ................................. l l 9.8p 119.1 p 104.7r 116.9 110.1 Average daily production per oil well (bbl.) •..... .. ...... . .. ..... 18.8 18.8 16.6 18.9 17.7 Crude-oil runs to stills (index) ................................ Industrial production in U.S. (index) •...... ....... ..... . .. .. ... Texas industrial production-total (index) •...................... 119.2 118.5p l 34.5p 115.7 117.2 p 132.9p 114.0 107.4r l 24.6r 116.4 113.6 130.0 112.8 106.6 121.8 Texas industrial production-total manufactures (index) •... ........ l 38.3p l 36.6p l 27.4r 132.3 123.0 Texas industrial production-durable manufactures (index) ......... . 15o.3P 146.3p l 37.6r 142.4 132.5 Texas industrial production-nondurable manufactures (index) ....... l 29.7p 129.6p 120.0r 124.6 116.0 Texas industrial production-mining (index) . . ................... Texas industrial production-utilities (index) .....•..... ....... .. • 122.1 p 146.3p 121.9p 140.4p 112.4r 145.4r 119.1 152.8 113.8 141.5 Urban building permits issued (index) .......................... 163.4 173.8 156.0 179.0 153.8 New residential building authorized (index) .................... 233.9 217.6 197.7 206.2 176.2 New residential units authorized (index) •.. .. •.. . . ...... .. .... . l 79.4p 160.7r 179.3 166.7 164.8 New nonresidential building authorized (unadjusted index) ........ 100.8 130.5 117.0 157.3 131.5 AGRICULTURE Prices received by farmers (unadjusted index, 1910-14=100) ......... 350 349 317 341 308 Prices paid by farmers in U.S. (unadjusted index, 1910-14=100) .. .. .. 444 440 416 431 410 Ratio of Texas farm prices received to U.S. price~ paid by farmers 79 79 76 79 75 FINANCE Bank debits (index) Bank debits, U.S. (index) Bank commercial loans outstanding (index) 218.8 145.3 204.3 204.8 141.4 185.2 190.3 126.1 196.6 133.5 171.1 174.0 124.7 Reporting member banks, Dallas Federal Reserve District Loans (millions) Loans and investments (millions) Adjusted demand deposits (millions) Revenue receipts of the state comptroller (thousands) Federal Internal Revenue collections (thousands) . $ .$ . $ . $ . $ 8,625 12,305 4,250 452,648 704,361 $ 8,487 $ 12,2 54 $ 4,102 $ 307,824 $1,001,086 $ $ $ $ $ 7,138 10,352 3,666 396,297 641,369 $ 7,973 $ 11,581 $ 3,861 $ 361,195 $3,706,929* $ 6,850 $ 9,975 $ 3,559 $ 306,923 $3, 168,326* Securities registrations-original applications Mutual investment companies (thousands) .$ $ 25,832 $ 21,455 $ $ 69,751* All other corporate securities Texas companies (thousands) Other companies (thousands) .$ .$ $ 8,202 $ 18,569 $ $ 6,207 46,455 $ $ $ $ 70,138* 118,633* Securities registration-renewals Mutual investment companies (thousands) .$ $ 51,846 $ 22,694 $ $ 120,261 * Other corporate securities (thousands) .$ $ 0 $ 1,243 $ $ 1,505* LABOR Total nonagricultural employment in Texas (index)t Manufacturing employment in Texas (index)t . Average weekly hours-manufacturing (index)t Average weekly earnings-manufacturing (index)t Total nonagricultural employment (thousands)t . Total manufacturing employment (thousands)t Durable-goods employment (thousands)t .. Nondurable-goods employment (thousands)t 117.7P l l l.3p 99.8p l 33.8p 3,834.0p 734.2p 392.0p 342.2p ll7.6p l 10.3p 98.6p 131.2p 3,822.4p 731.6p 390.7p 340.9p 114.0r 108.3r 97.7r l 22.5r 3,711.8r 714.4r 378.5r 335.9r 116.0 108.9 98.9 129.6 3,770.5 723.4 384.4 339.0 113.0 107.3 97.8 121.9 3,664.7 712.7 378.6 334.1 Percent of total labor force unemployed 3.3 3.2 4.2 3.7 4.2 Total civilian labor force in selected labor-market areas (thousands) 3,647.8 3,623.4 3,543.1 3,611.9 3,518.3 Nonagricultural employment in selected labor-market areas (thousands) 3,444.7 3,430.0 3,327.8 3,392.9 3,291.5 Manufacturing employment in selected labor-market areas (thousands) 615.6 612.0 585.2 602.6 589.9 Total unemployment in selected labor-market areas (thousands) 129.4 122.5 146.1 140.8 148.1 Percent of labor force unemployed in selected labor-market areas 3.5 3.4 4.1 3.9 4.2 BUREAU OF BUSINESS RESEARCH RETURN REQUESTED THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN SECOND-CLASS POSTAGE PAID AT AUSTIN, TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS 78712 TEXAS INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION a supplement to the Directory of Texas Manufacturers This monthly publication lists new and expanded plants in the state during the month preceding each issue. Data are gathered from diverse sources, most notably the chambers of commerce and the daily and weekly newspapers in Texas. After each firm name certain key facts are grouped : address, corporate officer, current status (i.e., new, expansion, merger, change of address), and the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC numbers for the products manufactured or to be manufactured by the company at the location being reported). All subscriptions are on a calendar-year basis. $4.00 per year (Texas residents add $.20 sales tax.) BUILDING CONSTRUCTION IN TEXAS A detailed statistical analysis of building permits issued in Texas cities, Building Construction in Texas appears monthly as a supplement to the Texas Business Review. Tables itemize total estimated values of building, by type, authorized in Texas; building authorized in standard metropolitan statistical areas by total, nonresidential, and new dwelling units; and one-family, two-family, and apartment-building dwelling units author­ized in standard metropolitan statistical areas. A county and city itemization is included for total construction, new nonresidential construction, and new dwelling units. $3.00 per year (Texas residents add $.15 sales tax.) Bureau of Business Research The University of Texas at Austin