Copyright

by

Jonathan Reid Hunt

2013

**The Dissertation Committee for Jonathan Reid Hunt Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:**

# Into the Bargain: The Triumph and Tragedy of Nuclear Internationalism during the Mid-Cold War, 1958-1970

**Committee:**

Henry W. Brands, Supervisor

Mark A. Lawrence, Co-Supervisor

Francis J. Gavin

Bruce J. Hunt

Charters S. Wynn

Jeremi Suri

# Into the Bargain:
# The Triumph and Tragedy of
# Nuclear Internationalism during the mid-Cold War,
# 1958-1970

**by**

**Jonathan Reid Hunt, B.A.**

**Dissertation**

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

**Doctor of Philosophy**

**The University of Texas at Austin**

**December 2013**

# Dedication

To my parents, Thomas and Laurie Hunt, and my brother, Tommy, whom I cherish, and whose unconditional support and passion for learning have lighted my path even when my candle burned low.

Remember your humanity, and forget the rest.
--Russell-Einstein Manifesto, 1955

## Acknowledgements

At this moment, I cannot help but think back to all those who made this work of scholarship possible. I am struck not only by how instrumental they have been, but how they have constantly made this journey as entertaining as it was challenging and rewarding. When I arrived in the Department of History at the University of Texas at Austin, I had only the faintest idea of what I wanted to study, and an even fainter appreciation for what academic history demanded. I was fortunate to find myself among a cohort of passionate fellow graduate students and under the tutelage of a faculty of warm, patient, and dedicated scholars.

Professor H. W. Brands has been a constant ally and inspiration during my coursework and subsequent scholarly peregrinations. He taught me to think critically, speak immaculately, and put pen to paper like a working writer. I joked years ago that I hoped to finish my dissertation before Bill published another five books. I am relieved not to have put any money down on that bet. Professor Mark Atwood Lawrence was on sabbatical my first two years at UT-Austin. I remain thankful that when he returned I took his course on the new international history, which exposed me to a field in the midst of a revolution and inspired me to shift gears from United States domestic history to the history of American foreign relations. Mark was kind enough to serve as my co-advisor and to introduce me to his friend and colleague Professor Francis J. Gavin.

Frank's passion for the international history of nuclear strategy, diplomacy, and statecraft mirror my own. His unflagging encouragement and dependably sound advice helped me to conceptualize how to approach my subjects. His readiness in welcoming me with open arms to the Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Public Policy and the Strauss Center for International Security and Law will not be forgotten. Alas, Professor Jeremi

Suri arrived after I had departed Austin to hide away in various archives around the world. Yet, from the moment I met him at a conference at Oxford, through his on-campus meeting with graduate students, to dropping by his office when I was in town, his enthusiasm has been undeniable and infectious. Professor Bruce Hunt deserves plaudits for putting up with an interloper in the laboratory of the history of science and technology. As for Professor Charters Wynn, he has the honor of having inspired a young undergraduate to pursue history as a career during an unforgettable course on Stalin's Russia at War. The professors who make the Normandy Scholar Program that rare experience capable of transforming how students imagine themselves and their world deserve more than mention. Along with Charters, Professors Michael Stoff, David Crew, Jean-Pierre Cauvin, and François de Backer made the spring semester of my sophomore year a life-changing adventure. I wish I had more time to thank the other professors who took a young doctoral student under their wings and turned him into a scholar of history and a writer capable of short, precise, purposeful sentences. In this hall of merit belong: Robert Abzug, the late Elspeth Rostow, Joan Neuberger, James Sidbury, Laurie Green, David Oshinsky, Steven Hoelscher, Tracy Matysik, Mark Metzler, George Forgie, Wm. Roger Louis, and the inimitable Antony Hopkins. I must also thank Marilyn Lehman for much good advice, many enjoyable conversations, and a willingness to help a remote graduate student deliver his request for an oral examination to the Tower.

The most pleasant surprise I encountered in graduate school was that one learns as much, if not more, from one's fellow graduate students as from one's professors. I was therefore doubly fortunate that our cohort of young scholars of international history and the annals of United States foreign policy was so exceptional and close-knit. Suffice it to say, my sincerest thanks and best wishes in their professional and personal journeys go to: Chris Dietrich, Marc William Palen, Brian McNeil, Tanvi Madan, Michelle Reeves,

Eleanor Douglas, Brett Bennett, Joseph Parrot, Renny Keller, Sean Killen, Trevor Simmons, Helen Pho, Peter Hamilton, John Vurpillat, Megan Reiss, Bob Whitaker, and Aragorn Storm Miller. I have patterned my scholarship and hopefully my career after Chris's example, and learned never to try to outdo Marc when quoting *Arrested Development*, nor stump Brett when it came to French wine. Brian kept me grounded at critical moments, leavening many a stressful time with talk of the comparative demerits (on the football field) of Alabama and Texas A&M. The rest of the community in Garrison Hall, the 40 Acres, and beyond who made my years in Austin memorable included: Benjamin Breen, Rachel Herrmann, Yana Skorobogatov, James Hudson, Cameron Strang, Juandrea Bates, Felipo Cruz, Christopher Heaney, Chesty Miller, Julie Odgen, Claudia Rueda, Mehmet Celik, Lior Sternfeld, Pablo Mijangos, Alexis Harasemovitch-Truax, Michael Schmidt, Angela Smith, Sundara Vadlamudi, Dolph Briscoe, Bill Chriss, Robert Icenhauer-Ramirez, Sarah Steinbock-Pratt, Shannon Nagy, Tom Josephson, Rachel Ozanne, Matt Powers, Kyle Shelton, Jessica Shore, Michelle Brock, John Harney, Dan Wold, Ryan Field, James Jenkins, Amber Abbas, Emily Brownell, Jesse Cromwell, Matt Gildner, Bryan Glass, and Jennifer Hoyt. And all hail the Subalterns.

I was lucky enough to benefit from wide-ranging and consistent support from my department, the university, and external sponsors as well, who together made my dissertation immeasurably better by permitting me to conduct research widely and thoroughly. The department was kind enough to bestow not one, but two, summer dissertation fellowships as well as the John D. Curtis Endowed Graduate Fellowship in American History. The Center for European Studies at the University of Texas afforded me a year of training in French and a year of research in Europe to explore the trans-Atlantic compass of my inquiry. The Society for Historians of American Foreign

Relations saw fit to award me a Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant. The George C. Marshall Foundation's provision of a George C. Marshall/Baruch Research Fellowship rather fittingly funded my research in the William C. Foster papers at the George C. Marshall Library in Lexington, Virginia. Research grants from the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Archives and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Archives brought me to Boston, Massachusetts and Abilene, Kansas for respective stints. The George F. Keenan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars proved the ideal setting in which to refocus my doctoral research on the making of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Finally, the Archer Center Graduate Program in Public Policy in Washington, D.C. gave me the opportunity and the support to spend the summer of 2011 in the nation's capital working for the International Green Cross and familiarizing myself with the inner workings of policy and life inside the Beltway. Paul Walker, the director of the Security and Sustainability Program at the International Green Cross, was a patient mentor for a historian learning how policy is made on a day-to-day basis and re-learning how to meet daily deadlines. He was also the model co-author. Without him, I would never have published my first article in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Sally Lemmon, Don Arbuckle, and Katie Cook Romano were wonderful guides and I will forever cherish my summer spent in the Archer House with Alice Post, Ashley Horton, Ben Sigrin, Brady Franks, Brandon Hunter, Courtney Tyne, Davi Kallmann, Garrett Coles, Jessica Beemer, Kenisha Schuster, Manny Gonzalez, Maria Islam-Meredith, Mauricio Leone, Rian Carkhum, and Zareen Khan.

I was the proud and charmed beneficiary of two dissertation-writing year fellowships. The Dwight D. Eisenhower Institute at Gettysburg College awarded me the Dwight D. Eisenhower/Clifford Roberts Fellowship in 2011-2012, which freed me to

spend my time exclusively writing the requisite chapters. I was also honored with a Nuclear Security Fellowship from the MacArthur Foundation, which afforded me the peerless opportunity to spend a pre-doctoral year in residence at the Center for International Security and Cooperation in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. The senior fellows at CISAC cultivate an intellectual environment that is always warm, always thought-provoking, and profoundly dedicated to the study and refinement of international relations. David Holloway has been a constant beacon, guiding me through the lulls and gales that accompany writing a dissertation. Lynn Eden asks the best questions and I have been as thoroughly challenged to interrogate my hidden assumptions on the fog-wreathed ride back to San Francisco with her as at any seminar. The only trait that Scott Sagan displays more frequently than his scholarly integrity and inspiring work ethic is his generosity of time. Reading over the seminar paper that he splashed with (constructive) red ink was a revelatory experience. Tino Cuellar, Sig Hecker, Amy Zegart, and David Relman have served as constant gardeners of CISAC's mission to promote broadminded, multidisciplinary inquiry into the world's most pressing challenges in the fields of security and international cooperation. Herb Abrams, Martha Crenshaw, Brad Roberts, Drew Endy, Joe Felter, John Lewis, Michael May, Larry Brandt, and Norman Naimark have been unfailingly generous with their time and attention. Barton Bernstein was equally generous with his trenchant critical eye and his lifetime of captivating stories. Henry Rowen of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Ambassador James Goodby of the Hoover Institution, and Mohamed Shaker of the Egyptian Council on Foreign Affairs were kind enough to let me interview them about their respective involvements in subjects of major interest to this dissertation.

The visiting faculty, scholars, and fellows at CISAC have been equally kind and obliging as well as serving as a home-away-from-home in the Bay Area. Francesca Giovannini was a source of friendship, encouragement, and Italian boisterousness from the start. Matt Daniels, David Lasker, Rob Rakove, Rebecca Slayton, Doug McMartin, Rob Forrest, Bekah Davis, Bertel Hansen, James Cameron, Christian Tygesen, Emma Rosengren, Mark "Zulu" Pye, and Ben Lessing were nightlife revealers, brunch companions, hiking buddies, Super Bowl hosts, movie critics, close confidants and much more besides. Most of all, they are friends. They deserve more than a list, but I must thank them somehow: Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Vipin Narang, Timothy Junio, Shiri Krebs, Benoît Pelopidas, Gil-li Vardi, and Andrew Woods. CISAC was kind enough to extend my fellowship for another year and I am looking forward to getting to know our new fellows and affiliates even better now that this albatross is about to flap away: Daniel Altman, Ivanka Barzashka, Rachel Gillum, Elaine Korzak, Neil Narang, Niccolo Petrelli, Jason Reinhardt, and Benjamin Wilson.

There are a few more scholars that I should thank. Toshi Higuchi wrote the (award-winning) dissertation that I had intended to write so well that I switched topics entirely halfway through. Yet, his good cheer and even better advice pointed me in the right direction and helped bring me to CISAC. We're square. Eliza Gheorghe was a welcome archival companion and a source of kind words in the dissertation's final stages. Daniel Blahut and his fiancée Yasmine kept me company whenever I stole away from my desk to pet Miro, watch *The New Girl* or *Breaking Bad*, and eat something. They're my San Francisco family. Kyla Gibboney brought fun and bright conversation into these last two months. Abdel Elouahabi and Anna Shoemaker made my sojourn in Paris unforgettable. London was fun because of the Rebels. Courtney Tyne and Brandon Hunt always make it worth my while to visit to DC. Ben Davis brought the Foster archives to my attention

and kept trying to convince me that he envied my life. The best part of the 2013 SHAFR Summer School on the International History of Nuclear Weapons was getting to know Martin Sherwin and Leopoldo Nuti, who managed to teach me a few things even I did not know about *Dr. Strangelove*. Finally, this dissertation would simply have not been possible without the work done by William Burr of the National Security Archive and Christian Ostermann of the Cold War International History Project.

One of the biggest perks of going to university in your hometown, and then returning there for a Ph.D., is staying near your dearest friends. Todd Embleton has been a constant companion for 25 years and he and his wife Stella welcomed their daughter, Molly, to the world this week. He is going to be a great father. I have known Shane Cleveland just as long and I will never forget that time we ran through Central Park. His fiancée Bree is a sweetheart through and through. I have known Todd and Shane for my whole life, and I hope that never changes. Sue and Chevis Cleveland are my unofficial godparents. Jake Kern has been there through thick and thin and will always lighten the mood. Anthony Daywood has been there for my brother and me since I can recall. Thanks for the memories Adam Carpenter, Farnell Akingabala, Phil Ilgenstein, David Bond, Asheley Landrum, Nathan Stein, Tim Taliaferro, Dom Schmid, Sarah Pesek, and anyone else whom I have overlooked.

My brother Tommy is an accomplished scholar in his own right, but more importantly, he is a devoted husband to Hilary, a loving father to Pierce and Bentsen, and the best older brother a guy could have. I was blessed to grow up with him, regardless of how mercilessly he spun a football, and more blessed with the certainty that he will always be there for me. I simply cannot thank my parents enough. My father's integrity and industry taught me how to strive. His love and support granted me the strength and freedom to find my calling and fight for my beliefs. I got my smile, my laugh, and my

rapture in words and books from my mother. To her, I owe a lifetime of happiness and a priceless sense of perspective. In short, I would be neither the scholar, nor the man, that I am today without them. These are debts that cannot be repaid.

**Into the Bargain: The Triumph and Tragedy of Nuclear Internationalism during the mid-Cold War, 1958-1970**

Jonathan Reid Hunt, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2013

Supervisor: Henry W. Brands
Co-Supervisor: Mark Atwood Lawrence

The making of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) occupied the energy and attention of world powers, great and small, from the Irish Resolution's proposal at the United Nations General Assembly in 1958 to the treaty's entry into force in 1970. Accounts of why the international community fashioned a treaty whose articles and principles embody a tangle of self-contradictory rights, privileges, and obligations point to United States and Soviet hegemony, the rise of Soviet-American détente, or the intrinsic dangers of nuclear weapons. In contrast to these interpretations, this dissertation claims that the negotiation and achievement of the NPT was a contingent event whose course and content were shaped by a jumble of entangled causes: Cold War alliances, domestic politics, decolonization, the Vietnam War, and a schism in internationalist thought.

The common impulse, however, was the perceived need to bring order to the Nuclear Age amid recurrent crises whose outbreak threatened global conflict if the spread of nuclear weapons continued unabated. In the contexts of the Cold War and decolonization, the establishment of a global nuclear order required Soviet-American

cooperation in concert with the involvement of an international community then emerging from decolonization. Both were embodied in the cadre of arms control diplomats then working in Geneva and New York City.

In the final analysis, the Cold War obstructed more than it abetted the treaty's brokering and Soviet-American détente was more the result of international nuclear diplomacy than its cause. The Vietnam War both limited U.S. willingness to contemplate nuclear assurances requested by nuclear have-nots and the underlying reason that U.S. President Lyndon Johnson sacrificed a NATO multilateral nuclear force for the sake of an NPT in an effort to quiet antiwar dissent at home. Soviet-American cooperation was necessary but not sufficient to achieve the treaty. The failure of initial efforts, the international consensus required to legitimate the treaty, and concurrent talks for a Latin American nuclear-free zone allowed nuclear have-nots to inscribe their preferences on the NPT, whose fusion of a nuclear hierarchy and a grand bargain remains an open chapter in the history of nuclear internationalism.

Table of Contents


Introduction | Crisis, Contingency, and Consensus ....1

Description of the Subject of Inquiry....2

Review of the Existing Literature ....6

Summary of the Argument ....14

Summary of the Chapters....23

Prologue: The Irish Resolution....28

Chapter One | The Nonproliferation Treaty That Never Was....46

Introduction: An Approximation of Peace ....46

"A Bureaucratically Independent Conscience" ....50

The Limits of Peaceful Coexistence....61

Window of a Condominium ....72

Falling Angel ....80

Explosives and Elections ....98

Conclusion ....116

Chapter Two | Guaranteeing the World: Internationalizing Nuclear Security .118

Introduction: "A Problem from Hell" ....118

Reading Schelling in New Delhi....121

A Rearguard Action....138

Elements of a Global Nuclear Order....149

"A Vain Dialogue"....154

"The Debacle in Geneva" ....167

Conclusion ....182

Chapter Three | Killing It Softly: The MLF's Demise and Détente's Rise....185

Introduction: Peace, the NPT, and the Cold War....185

Fighting the Middle Ground....188

"A Partnership for Peace"....192

Small Steps in Geneva ....199

"Policing the World"....208

Strangling Germans ....................................................................212
Stabling Horses .........................................................................233
Who Watches the Watchmen? .........................................................245
Conclusion ..................................................................................250

Chapter Four | *"Tall Oaks from Little Acorns Grow:" Making the Treaty of Tlatelolco*..255
Introduction: A Purer Form of Prohibition ......................................255
Brazil, Argentina, and the Idea of a Nuclear-Free Zone ....................258
Alfonso García Robles ..................................................................265
U.S. Anticommunism and Latin American Nuclear Diplomacy ......271
Spoilers and Sponsors ..................................................................280
Freeman's Dissent ........................................................................294
The Afterlives of Tlatelolco...........................................................297
Conclusion ..................................................................................311

Chapter Five | *In Accordance: Safeguards and the International Community* .................314
Introduction: Integration and Inspections .......................................314
Designing Safeguards....................................................................316
Diplomatic Community in Geneva ..................................................332
The Non-Aligned Weigh In............................................................351
Conclusion ..................................................................................367

Chapter Six | "*Upon All Mankind:" Final Negotiations for the NPT*..........................369
Introduction: Power and Prohibition.................................................369
Resolution and Resistance ...........................................................371
End Game.....................................................................................391
Conclusion ..................................................................................414

Conclusion | A Cold War Treaty in a Post-Cold War World ............................419

Bibliography.................................................................................................421

Vita ..........................................................................................................439

## Introduction | Crisis, Contingency, and Consensus

On July 4, 1967, William C. Foster, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), spoke before a crowd of American and Swiss partygoers, who had gathered to celebrate the United States' national holiday on the Champel stadium grounds in Geneva, Switzerland. The afternoon was full of pieces of Americana—gallivanting children, softball games, popcorn, pony rides, even a carousel. The local newspaper reported that the scene seemed more like one out of "Ohio or New Jersey than the city of Calvin."[1] Foster spent much of his year in Geneva serving a co-chairman of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament alongside his Soviet counterpart at the Palais des Nations, the former home of the League of Nations. He joked that his family were akin to the proverbial "man who came to dinner–here we are nine years later," still working at "the slowest-moving enterprise on Earth"—disarmament. The toil of disarmament talks went on in Geneva, he observed, "in spite of Vietnam and the Middle East Crisis." As a result another advance was in the works—"the tabling of a draft treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons." Though an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, the world's two rival superpowers and nuclear colossi, would take another six months to coalesce, Foster's hopeful statement that "it may well make life on Earth less dangerous and open new opportunities for further arms control and disarmament" would not abate. He likened the slow process of building consensus to the fate of his country's founding document:

> I read the other day that after Thomas Jefferson had completed his original draft for the American Declaration of Independence, 86 changes had to be made before it could be adopted. My American colleagues and I can personally testify

[1] "Commémoration de l'Independence Day à Genève, Champel, USA," 5 July 1967, *Journal de Genève*, Archives Historiques, *Le Temps*, http://www.letempsarchives.ch.

> that that number of changes seems small compared to those on our non-proliferation treaty so far.

The lived experience of multilateral diplomacy was doubtlessly tedious, but the onus was equally weighty. With the children laughing and the adults on their second or third cocktail, the fearsome peril of thermonuclear war seemed far off over some unearthly horizon. Foster wished the crowd a "happy anniversary" and left them to enjoy "the *peaceful* explosions of a fireworks display."[2]

## Description of the Subject of Inquiry

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) would not open for signature for another year, on July 1, 1968, following "one of the most complex negotiations in the history of diplomacy extending over a period a four-and-a-half years and involving most of the major countries in the world"[3] In truth, the origins of the treaty went even further back to the first proposal in September 1958 by Irish Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank Aiken of a global arrangement to shutter the doors of the nuclear club. The thirteen paragraphs of its preamble and the eleven articles comprising its operative body inscribed the governing principles of an international body of laws, norms, and institutions that still governs efforts at controlling the military uses of nuclear science and technology around the world. Today, the NPT remains arguably the most consequential, and controversial, agreement of the postwar era in the field of nuclear conflict, security, and peace.

---

[2] William C. Foster, Address, "July 4, 1967," Geneva, Folder 1, Box 18, William C. Foster Papers, George C. Marshall Library, Lexington Virginia, 1-5. Hereinafter, Foster Papers, GCML.

[3] U.S. National Security Council, "History of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," Box 55, National Security Council Histories—Non-Proliferation Treaty, National Security Files, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Archives. Hereinafter, NSF, LBJL.

Present-day discourse on the topic of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the global regime that it inaugurated centering on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are rent by clashing theses in regards to the original understandings ascribed to the treaty. This argument seemingly without end pits the regime's champions against those who criticize it as inherently unfair and hence in need of revision, or, more fatally, at risk of unraveling.[4]

Treaty champions laud its function as a crucial dampener by which to retard and potentially halt, if not reverse, the trend for nuclear weapons to "proliferate" to new nation-states. Since the "ultimate weapon's" invention in 1945, more and more states have indeed acquired the science, technology, and organization necessary to develop a military nuclear capability.[5] The Soviet Union followed the United States in 1949. Great Britain and France tested their first atomic devices in 1952 and 1960, respectively. The detonation of a nuclear explosive by the People's Republic of China seemed to jolt international nuclear diplomacy out of a state of lethargy in 1964. And since the date chosen to divide legitimate nuclear powers from their illegitimate brethren, January 1, 1967, five more countries have joined the nuclear club: Israel around 1968, India in 1974, South Africa around 1977, Pakistan in 1998, and North Korea in 2009. Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan became arguably the ninth, tenth, and eleventh nuclear powers when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, leaving numerous Soviet nuclear-armed missiles on their territory. The NPT has therefore not completely stopped the arrival of new nuclear powers. Treaty champions nevertheless point to, as proof of the regime's efficacy and legitimacy, the decreasing frequency of proliferation, sizable

---

[4] Steven E. Miller, *Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform & the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime* (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2012).

[5] Thomas C. Reed, *The Nuclear Express: a Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation* (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2009).

reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty (CTBT) in 1996, the decisions of Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and South Africa to relinquish their arsenals, and the treaty's near universality.

Treaty critics denounce its discriminatory character, charging that it represents a tool of superpower and, since 1991, United States hegemony. They claim that the nonproliferation regime empowers and even rewards certain states, the "nuclear haves," that possess these weapons of mass destruction, while punishing other states, the "nuclear have-nots," for availing themselves of nuclear activities whose dual-use functions make distinguishing their military potentialities from their peaceful applications at best a dubious and fraught proposition. Moreover, the co-evolution of proliferation strategies and nonproliferation tactics since the regime's establishment have led to additional, non-consensus measures to supplement the regime including supply-side controls such as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group as well as expansions of the IAEA's inspection powers through the voluntary 1997 Additional Protocol.[6] These initiatives, which were not envisaged by the NPT nor all subject to the treaty's amendment process, have prompted disgruntled states in the Global South to accuse nuclear suppliers, mostly advanced industrial states, of forming a "nuclear cartel."[7] The debate is further freighted with postcolonial grievances owing to a general superimposition of the world geography of nuclear haves and have-nots with the old imperial map of former empires and their erstwhile colonies. In this vein, treaty critics

[6] For a description and analysis of the international mechanisms designed to fortify the nonproliferation regime in the aftermath of India's peaceful nuclear test in 1974, read: Joseph Cirincione, *Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
[7] See Jayantha Dhanapala, "The Management of NPT Diplomacy," in American Academy of Arts and Sciences, "The Global Nuclear Future. Volume 2. Volume 2." (2010).

often characterize the discriminatory treaty and regime as antithetical to disarmament (whether nuclear, or general and complete) and tantamount to "nuclear apartheid."[8]

In their ongoing debates over its present legitimacy and future trajectory, champions and critics invoke the history of the nonproliferation treaty to substantiate their claims. The original intents of the treaty's many authors and, correspondingly, the original meanings imprinted in its articles and preamble, as well as the grander original understanding embodied by the treaty itself, are central though somewhat hidden subjects in these debates. Though new histories of nuclear programs in various national contexts have arisen as previously unavailable primary sources came on-line, our comprehension of the NPT's origins are still largely the province of eyewitness accounts, legal exegeses, national and international mythology, and analyses in which the treaty is a corollary rather than a focus of U.S. foreign policy and international efforts.

This dissertation constitutes an early effort at untangling the knot of the treaty's legal and historical characters. Its methods and purpose accordingly draw inspiration from another study of a foundational constitutional moment, albeit it in a context more familiar to Thomas Jefferson than to William Foster, Jack Rakove's *Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution*.[9] In light of the fundamental and abiding dissimilarities between national and international politics, however, the intellectual debt is chiefly one of inspiration rather than argumentation.

---

[8] Shane J. Maddock, *Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).
[9] Jack N Rakove, *Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1997).

### Review of the Existing Literature

The historiography of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and its surrounding international political context began almost as soon as the ink on the first signatures were dry. The U.S. debate over ratification as a result of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the Indian refusal to sign, and the treaty's undeniable importance led a number of international relations experts and diplomatic participants to weigh in on the treaty's merits and possible effects.[10] The likelihood that Brazil or India would sign was a major subject of inquiry.[11] The attitude of Japan and the related commercial impact of international nuclear safeguards also received sustained attention.[12] Articles in law review journals and by diplomats who helped write the treaty, such as George Bunn and E. L. M. Burns, signified early salvoes in the battle to define the NPT's original meanings and understandings. Two books by international relations scholar George Quester were representative of another branch of this initial wave of scholarship, which by contrast focused on explaining the treaty's immediate aftermath and future prospects and whose claims regarding its causes and motives largely extrapolated from the contemporaneous

---

[10] Michael E. Sherman, *Nuclear Proliferation: The Treaty and After*, Contemporary Affairs 40 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968); Hedley Bull, "In Support of the Non-Proliferation Treaty," *Quadrant* 12 (June 1968): 25–29; Mason Willrich, "The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Technology Confronts World Politics," *Yale Law Journal* (July 1968): 1447–1519; *Atoms in Japan* (Tokyo: Japan Industrial Forum, Inc., 1969); E. L. M. Burns, "The Nonproliferation Treaty: Its Negotiation and Prospects," *International Organization* 23, no. 04 (October 1969): 788–807; R. Ramo Rao, "The Non-Proliferation Treaty," *The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal* I (July 1968): 12–29; Alexander Alexeev, "Non-Proliferation Treaty and Security," *International Affairs (Moscow)* (January 1969): 10–14; Alexander Alexeev, "Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Non-Nuclear States," *International Affairs (Moscow)* (March 1969): 9–13; Edwin Brown Firmage, "The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," *The American Journal of International Law* 63, no. 4 (October 1969): 711.

[11] G. G. Mirchandani, *India's Nuclear Dilemma* (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968); Shelton L. Williams, *The U.S., India, and the Bomb* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969); R. Narayanan, "Brazil's Policy Toward Nuclear Disarmament," *The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal* 3 (October 1970): 178–91; H. Jon Rosenbaum and Glenn Cooper, "Brazil and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," *International Affairs* 46 (January 1970): 74–90.

[12] *Atoms in Japan*; Lawrence Scheinman, "Nuclear Safeguards, the Peaceful Atom, and the IAEA," *Interational Conciliation* 572 (March 1969); Imai Ryukichi, "The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Japan," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (May 1969).

state of play.[13] Nonetheless, Quester's work, in particular *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation*, had a global compass of evaluation from which later studies have largely shied away. Robert Chalmer's *The Nuclear Years* also warrants inclusion as a useful primer.[14]

The second wave of interpretations about the treaty focused more narrowly on the development of U.S. nonproliferation policy under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and was written primarily by its authors. This group of works is thus doubly significant because it contains the opinions and recollections of those present at the creation and because it establishes the orthodox interpretation of the NPT. Collectively, these works associate the treaty with the series of U.S. proposals in the field of nuclear diplomacy beginning with the 1946 Baruch Plan and portray the effort as singularly motivated by "the overhanging threat of nuclear holocaust."[15] In the host of the principal architects of U.S. nuclear policy under Kennedy and Johnson who penned works in which the NPT was a central topic stood National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg, and General Counsel to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency George Bunn.[16] Bunn's *Managing Negotiations with the Russians* is an indispensable reference for the activities of the Disarmament Agency whose interactions with Soviet officials constituted the most active channel of Soviet-American contact during the Johnson years. Seaborg's *Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years* makes effective use of the voluminous diary kept religiously

---

[13] George H. Quester and the Harvard University Center for International Affairs, *Nuclear Diplomacy; the First Twenty-five Years*, University Press of Cambridge Series in the Social Sciences (New York: Dunellen Co, 1970); George H. Quester, *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

[14] Robert Chalmers, *The Nuclear Years: The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1945-1970* (New York: Praeger, 1970).

[15] Glenn T. Seaborg, *Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years* (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1987), 5.

[16] McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years*, 1st ed (New York: Random House, 1988); Seaborg, *Stemming the Tide*; George Bunn, *Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the Russians*, Studies in International Security and Arms Control (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1992).

by the AEC chairman. Though light on interpretation, the window it affords on the multiagency and multi-branch policymaking process in Washington is priceless.

Two members of non-aligned delegations to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament also published book-length assessments of its workings and achievements. Seaborg dedicates *Stemming the Tide* to the memory of Alva Myrdal, which testifies to Seaborg's conviction that the NPT was "by its own terms, a treaty on trial," as well as the long shadow cast by her figure. Myrdal was one of the nonproliferation treaty's most formidable critics and a foremost champion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Her *The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race* appeared in 1982, before the outpouring of U.S. quasi-official volumes; however, its arguments belong in a revisionist school of thinking about the treaty and postwar American nuclear policy more broadly.[17] Myrdal's call to disarm was not direct kin to an emerging body of revisionist works critical of the motivations at play in the atom bomb's use against Japan by the United States and in the 1946 Baruch Plan to enact international control of nuclear power.[18] Her judgment that the NPT fell "short of all reasonable expectations as a disarmament measure" and formed a "grossly discriminatory treaty" nonetheless harmonized with revisionism's skeptical tone.[19] Mohamed Shaker's multi-volume *The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation, 1959-1979* cataloged the international proceedings from which the NPT arose. Shaker, a junior member of the

---

[17] Alva Myrdal, *The Game of Disarmament: How the United States & Russia Run the Arms Race*, Rev. and updated ed. – 2nd pbk. ed (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982).

[18] Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam; the Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965); Barton Bernstein, "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946," *The Journal of American History* 60, no. 4 (March 1974): 1003–1044; Barton Bernstein, "Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A Reinterpretation," *Political Science Quarterly* 90, no. 1 (Spring 1975): 23–69; Martin J. Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance*, 1st ed (New York: Knopf : distributed by Random House, 1975); Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950* (New York: Vintage Books, 1982).

[19] Myrdal, *The Game of Disarmament*, 159–207.

United Arab Republic delegation in Geneva, had to rely on published sources; even so, his work has stood the test of time as a foundational text on the treaty's legal history, though Daniel Joyner's *Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty* is an important recent supplement.[20]

Mrydal, Shaker, and Joyner do not concern themselves overmuch with the determinants of various states' nuclear policymaking in relation to the treaty negotiations. The attitudes and policies of key nuclear and near-nuclear states, and international agencies, toward a nonproliferation treaty with reference to latent or active military nuclear programs was the primary focus of scholarly attention in the 1980s and 1990s. The arms control policies of Canada, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and IAEA received sustained treatment.[21] A cottage industry of new national nuclear histories meanwhile shed critical light on the bureaucratic, techno-political, ideological, and geopolitical determinants of nuclear-weapon programs, including India and Pakistan after their back-to-back military tests in 1998.[22] Though only secondarily interested in

---

[20] Mohamed Ibrahim Shaker, *The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation, 1959-1979* (London ; New York: Oceana Publications, 1980); Daniel Joyner, *Interpreting the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[21] Ernie Regehr and Simon Rosenblum, eds., *Canada and the Nuclear Arms Race* (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1983); Albert Legault, *A Diplomacy of Hope: Canada and Disarmament, 1945-1988* (Montréal ; Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992); J. P. G Freeman, *Britain's Nuclear Arms Control Policy in the Context of Anglo-American Relations, 1957-68* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986); R. M. Timerbaev, *Rossii͡a i I͡adernoe Nerasprostranenie: 1945-1968* (Moskva: Nauka, 1999); David Fischer, *Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: The Past and the Prospects* (London ; New York: Routledge, 1992).

[22] David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Margaret Gowing and United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952* (London [etc.]: Macmillan [for the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority], 1974); Gabrielle Hecht, *The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II*, Inside Technology (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998); John Wilson Lewis, *China Builds the Bomb*, ISIS Studies in International Policy (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1988); Itty Abraham, *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State*, Postcolonial Encounters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Feroz Hassan Khan, *Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb* (Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, an imprint of Stanford University Press, 2012); Mark Cioc, *Pax Atomica: The Nuclear Defense Debate in West Germany During the Adenauer Era* (New York: Columbia

international nuclear diplomacy, these works immeasurably expanded our knowledge of the nuclear decision-making process in important states. George Perkovich's *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation* and Feroz Khan's recent *Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb* offer especially fruitful insights into how both South Asian states perceived efforts to negotiate a treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and then responded to its implementation. In fact, the NPT's negotiation and enforcement seems a constant actor always just off stage in both works.

The appearance of such compelling and exhaustive histories of the British, Soviet, French, Chinese, Indian, and, more recently, Pakistani nuclear programs paralleled the track of a new interpretive school in Cold War and nuclear history. The post-revisionist synthesis posited that the Soviet-American conflict's ebbs and flows stemmed from the international balance of power and, more specifically, the German question: the East-West confrontation over the status of the two Germanys and whether and how to normalize their status in the international system. In these reading, nuclear deterrence exerted a moderating influence on superpower relations. The outcome, according to John Lewis Gaddis, Marc Trachtenberg, and others, was a "long peace" based on the balance of terror, an extraterrestrial network of surveillance satellites, and a tacit resolution of the German question with the erection of the Berlin Wall and the fossilization of West Germany's non-nuclear status by virtue of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty.[23] The NPT

---

University Press, 1988); Matthias Küntzel, *Bonn & the Bomb: German Politics and the Nuclear Option* (London ; Boulder, Colo: Pluto Press, 1995).

[23] John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know : Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1998); John Lewis Gaddis, *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment a Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1999).

was accordingly a continuation of the effort to bind Bonn's hands in the nuclear realm and further Soviet-American détente so as to avert thermonuclear conflict. Susanna Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge's *Avoiding Armageddon: Europe, the United States, and the Struggle for Nuclear Proliferation, 1945-1970* exemplifies the usefulness of this analytical lens for discerning the hidden political assumptions at work in trans-Atlantic nuclear diplomacy in the early Cold War.[24]

The investigation of Cold War nuclear diplomacy has increasingly shifted toward the Global South in response to new sources and contemporary interest in how countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America have historically viewed and interacted with the process. The new international history has enriched rather than devalued the post-revisionist consensus. On the one hand, documents from archives in the former Eastern bloc have fortified claims related to Soviet expansionism.[25] On the other hand, new sources have disputed the centrality of the Soviet-American relationship by exploring its connections to other tectonic shifts that took place in world affairs concurrently such as decolonization, international finance, regional rivalries, global governance, and human rights.[26] Efforts to de-center the Cold War have benefited from

---

[24] Susanna Schrafstetter, *Avoiding Armageddon: Europe, the United States, and the Struggle for Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1945-1970* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004).
[25] Gaddis, *We Now Know*; V. M. Zubok, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996); A. A. Fursenko, *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary*, 1st ed (New York: Norton, 2006); Campbell Craig, *The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
[26] Ryan M. Irwin, *Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order*, Oxford Studies in International History (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Francis J. Gavin, *Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958-1971*, The New Cold War History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*, Lawrence Stone Lectures (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010); Sarah B. Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: a Transnational History of the Helsinki Network*, Human Rights in History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

the efforts of scholars and researchers working under the auspices of the Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive, who have unearthed enlightening documents from U.S. archives, those of former Warsaw Pact countries, and those of the wider world. Many scholars of the Cold War have accordingly taken up Tony Smith's injunction to study the epic struggle using a pericentric framework in which "governments of countries such as North Korea and China, East and West Germany, Great Britain and Israel, Egypt and Cuba (as well as movements as different as the PLO and the Sandinistas) … had principal roles to play."[27] Our understanding of the NPT would be equally impoverished if we failed to account for the contributions of these middle and small powers; it was, after all, an Irish foreign minister who first put forward a non-dissemination compact and a Mexican deputy foreign minister who added articles to the NPT calling for disarmament progress and preserving nuclear rights.

Though the study of international nonproliferation diplomacy is amenable to a pericentric framework, the roles played by U.S. presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson, and their national security teams, remain central. Shane Maddock's *Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present* recasts the revisionist thesis by underscoring how habits of thought molded by cultural representations of race, national identity, and technology blinkered U.S. foreign policymakers. Though a weighty new interpretation of the cultural determinants of U.S. nuclear diplomacy, the argument grows less compelling once the breakdown of the bipolar Cold War order in the 1960s curtails the freedom with which American leaders can impose their preferences on the international system. Articles by Hal Brands on the NPT and the multilateral nuclear force, by contrast, capture how alliance relationships

[27] Tony Smith, "New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 4 (Fall 2000): 568.

impeded nuclear cooperation between the superpowers during the Johnson presidency.[28] Scholars have previously examined the complex and dynamic relationship between West Germany, NATO nuclear-sharing, nuclear diplomacy, and Soviet-American détente in which Bonn's pursuit of nuclear assets for security and political ends blocked the convergence of Soviet and American views on nuclear security.[29] However, the question of what cleared the obstruction remains? Francis Gavin's article in *International Security* evaluating the Gilpatric Committee on Nuclear Proliferation conclusively demonstrates how "[u]nder President Lyndon Johnson, the United States transformed its nuclear strategy."[30] His observation raises additional questions though. Why did the Gilpatric committee's findings take so long to influence the decision-making process? Against what, or whom, was the strategy directed: the spread of nuclear weapons as the abstract menace outlined by nuclear strategists or, as Dane Swango has recently argued, chiefly West Germany and India? What do the answers to these questions have to say about Soviet-American détente, the making of the NPT, and the legacy of Johnson's foreign policy? Lastly, the significance of domestic politics, social turmoil, and internationalist principles, which the treaty makers and orthodox writers took for granted, has now vanished from accounts. Jeremi Suri maintains that détente was orchestrated by global elites so as to

---

[28] Hal Brands, "Progress Unseen: U.S. Arms Control Policy and the Origins of Detente, 1963-1968," *Diplomatic History* 30, no. 2 (April 2006): 253–285; Hal Brands, "Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The Superpowers, the MLF, and the NPT," *Cold War History* 7, no. 3 (August 2007): 389–423.

[29] Frank Costigliola, "Lyndon B. Johnson, Germany, and "the End of the Cold War," in Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, eds., *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963-1968* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 173–210; Thomas A. Schwartz, "Lyndon Johnson and Europe: Alliance Politics, Political Economy, and "Growing out of the Cold War," in H. W. Brands, ed., *The Foreign Policies of Lyndon Johnson: Beyond Vietnam*, 1st ed, Foreign Relations and the Presidency no. 1 (College Station, Tex: Texas A&M University Press, 1999), 37–60.

[30] Francis J. Gavin, "Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s," *International Security* 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004): 101.

permit them the latitude to quell internal dissent.[31] How did social change affect the first manifestation of détente—the NPT? Is it possible to understand the signature triumph of postwar nuclear diplomacy without reference to the Vietnam-era peace movement, the social milieu of arms control, or the tenets of liberal internationalism?

## Summary of the Argument

The making of the nonproliferation treaty and the creation of a new global nuclear order was the rare case in which a new international order was founded in peacetime rather than as a result of a major war.[32] Its origins stemmed from an evolving understanding of the relationship between international laws, norms, and institutions and the revolution in strategic space-time brought on by the advent of thermonuclear warheads and ballistic missiles. The endurance of Cold War alliances and interests nonetheless slowed the pace at which Soviet and American policymakers could broker a nonproliferation treaty, while the Vietnam War militated against a U.S. offer of robust security assurances requested by India in exchange for its continued forbearance. The

---

[31] Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2005).

[32] Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1984); G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Brian C. Rathbun, *Trust in International Cooperation: International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and American Multilateralism*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 121 (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Ikenberry postulates that order arises from victorious great powers playing "a more sophisticated power game" in the aftermath of transformative wars. Ikenberry, *After Victory*, xiii. Such a model fails to account for cases of peacetime re-ordering such as that signified by the negotiation of the NPT. Rathbun's hypothesis that trust is the cause rather than the effect of international mechanisms seems closer to the mark and the making of the nuclear nonproliferation regime offers a unique and consequential case study of the social and political determinants of trust-building in international affairs.

concurrent negotiation of a Latin American nuclear-free-zone, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the activities of the international community in Geneva and New York City, and domestic pressures on Johnson to bring his signature peace initiative to fruition supplied the impetus to finalize the treaty. The pull of the Cold War and the combined push of a nascent international community and non-aligned efforts resulted in a the final treaty in whose original meanings Wilsonian tenets such as sovereign equality of states were more clearly enshrined than Soviet or American leaders would otherwise have preferred. In its paradoxical fusion of deterrence and disarmament, however, the treaty set new and meaningful precedents. International policymakers noted from the start that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons authorized an international hierarchy based on the founding principle that distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate nuclear powers were valid and enforceable.

A series of crises with nuclear overtones catalyzed the international effort to bring order to the Nuclear Age. Beginning with the Second Taiwan Straits crisis in August 1958, the international community emerging in the midst of decolonization sought to ward off the risks attending nuclear anarchy through a portfolio of international prohibitions on environmental contamination and limitations on the diffusion of nuclear science, know-how, technology, data, and arms. The antinuclear movement and a dawning recognition among Soviet and American leaders after the Cuban Missile Crisis that regional instability could lead to all-out thermonuclear war lent impetus to negotiations for a nuclear-test ban treaty. However, Soviet unwillingness to open its territory to international inspections combined with both sides' abiding interest in improving their nuclear forces spoke against a comprehensive solution. Instead, the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. brokered a limited nuclear test-ban treaty (LTBT) prohibiting the detonation of nuclear explosives under water, in outer space, or in the global commons.

The settlement displayed a sovereign conception of environmental regulation by specifically banning the release of the harmful radioisotopes that crossed national borders. The compact moreover failed to end nuclear testing. The United States and Soviet Union took their tests underground and China and France conducted them aboveground in defiance of international norms. Nevertheless, the LTBT ushered in a new phase of international nuclear diplomacy during which the superpowers had a concerted interest in staving off the arrival of new nuclear states irrespective of alliance affiliation.

The establishment of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1961 and the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) in 1962 during the presidency of John F. Kennedy added new institutional and social mechanisms for constructive nuclear diplomacy in the United States and the world. Washington's adoption of a new strategic culture in which nuclear scenarios were highly abstracted encouraged a zero-sum approach to nuclear diplomacy. The concept of strategic stability informed U.S. nuclear strategy though it failed to account for the challenges posed by proliferation. Its proponents nevertheless sought to reconcile their belief in the systemic advantages of balanced nuclear threats with the corollary that new states would seek nuclear weapons to assure their own security. The result was a coherent yet self-contradictory way of thinking about nuclear weapons inside the Beltway that fused realist assumptions and internationalist methods and upheld nuclear deterrence while promoting arms control. This strategy of security internationalism owed as much to the thinking of Reinhold Niebuhr as Thomas Schelling and became the polestar of efforts by William Foster and the U.S. Disarmament Agency to broker a nuclear nonproliferation treaty from July 1963 to July 1968.

The Cold War alliance system retarded progress toward a Soviet-American agreement on the content of a nonproliferation treaty. The political implications of

European nuclear security were the crux of the dilemma. In the West, the controversy revolved around a proposal for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) in NATO to soothe West German anxieties in regards to U.S. nuclear commitments in Europe and Bonn's political capital amid European integration. In the East, Warsaw Pact misgivings related to empowering the West Germans in future negotiations to resolve the German question. The Soviet and American co-chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva discussed the merits of an entente with a nonproliferation treaty at its core. However, European relations impinged on the superpowers' freedom and willingness to accept costs in Europe to minimize risks in the Middle East and Asia. The moment of inertia occurred at a pivotal moment when a looming nuclear test by the People's Republic of China (PRC) converged with a commitment to nuclear prohibitions in the Republic of India. This state of affairs opened a window for a more widely adhered to, and qualitatively different, nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The failure to achieve a treaty in 1963 and 1965 thus bore witness to the power of contingency in nuclear diplomacy and the continued pull of European geopolitics during the mid-Cold War.

Soviet and American negotiators redoubled their efforts to orchestrate a treaty after the Chinese test. The effect on Indian nuclear policy was equally consequential. Nuclear prohibitionists at the heights of government barely succeeded in fending off a potent challenge to a longstanding policy of nuclear forbearance. The Chinese feat galvanized the arms control cabal inside the Beltway, whose constituents in the U.S. Congress, Department of State, National Security Council, Department of Defense, Disarmament Agency, and a blue-ribbon committee to advise on the matter sought to elevate the status of nonproliferation, and of nuclear prohibitions more generally, in U.S. grand strategy. Security assurances, either negative (pledges not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states), or positive (promises to aid non-nuclear victims of nuclear

attack or threat), were a major consideration of states contemplating the step of formally renouncing a right to nuclear weapons. Indian nuclear policy remained open to a nonproliferation regime that featured robust security assurances from the superpowers along with a CTBT and a general cut-off in fissile-material production (enriched uranium and plutonium) needed to build nuclear warheads. The Vietnam War lessened the desirability of placing limits of U.S. nuclear choices in the view of military officials though and toughened Soviet attitudes toward cooperating with the United States in Geneva.

By late 1966, the Cold War rivals had largely resolved the question of finessing what forms of NATO nuclear-sharing a settlement would permit. However, the problem of the Indian attitude toward signing a treaty had worsened. Domestic politics in the context of the Vietnam War provided the decisive impulse that persuaded Lyndon Johnson that a nonproliferation treaty was more important and achievable than the MLF, whose support in the United Kingdom had evaporated and whose creation the French had always opposed. With opinion polls reflecting a trust deficit in the U.S. electorate in regards to Johnson's peace credentials, and Robert Kennedy and others identifying themselves with a more dovish outlook, White House political advisers convinced the president to embrace a treaty acceptable to Soviet leaders as a peace gesture before the 1966 mid-term elections. With the Soviets and Americans still deadlocked on the non-acquisition and non-dissemination articles, however, the non-aligned grouping in Geneva orchestrated a United Nations General Assembly resolution calling for a treaty "to embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers."[33]

[33] United Nations, Resolution 2028 (XX), Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its Twentieth Session, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/20/ares20.htm.

The negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty in Washington, Moscow, and Geneva were not the only epicenters of international nuclear diplomacy in the late 1960s. Talks for a treaty to denuclearize Latin American occurred in parallel, both complementing the process and shifting the parameters of global accord. Championed and engineered by Mexican Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs Alfonso García Robles, the movement to cordon off the rest of the Western Hemisphere from the hazards of nuclear weapons demonstrated the global scope of efforts at nuclear prohibition and the significance of memories of the Second World War, the imagined repercussions of nuclear war for the global commons and succeeding generations, and the guidance of internationalist principles. The talks in Mexico in the opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in February 1967, whose content manifested a less adulterated version of nuclear prohibition thanks to the region's lack of nuclear powers and the exemplary tradition promoted by Bolivarian internationalism. U.S. anticommunism, insistence on its nuclear weapons' freedom of transit in the Caribbean and through the Panama Canal, and fear of setting precedents with regard to peaceful nuclear explosives long touted by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission obstructed and nearly upended the hemispheric enterprise.

The Latin American nuclear-free-zone talks had a measurable impact on nonproliferation proceedings in Geneva and New York City. The resumption of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in late February 1967 was nevertheless hampered by continuing disagreement concerning the appropriate formal relationship between the safeguards regimes of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the International Atomic Energy Agency. *Ad referendum* talks benefited from the close personal relationships that had flourished between Soviet and American diplomats in Geneva, helping to bring about the joint tabling of draft treaties by the superpower delegations in August 1967. Moscow and Washington were increasingly disillusioned with

the efficacy of their bilateral safeguards with Cold War allies; however, the fissiparous character of West German politics and Johnson's unwillingness to exacerbate them delayed a final resolution until January 1968.

Non-aligned delegations in Geneva seized on a draft treaty's presentation to offer amendments intended to invest a global nuclear order with an acceptable balance of rights and obligations between nuclear haves and have-nots and industrial and developing countries. The triumph of the Treaty of Tlatelolco illustrated that non-aligned powers, including those in the Global South, could achieve meaningful agreements in the nuclear arena. A Mexican working paper outlined four new articles that envisaged formal rights to peaceful nuclear activities, nuclear explosives supplied by nuclear powers, and provisions that treaty signatories with nuclear weapons take seriously nuclear-free zones, arms control, and disarmament. These amendments would become Articles IV, V, VI, and VII of the treaty with lasting implications for the treaty's character and legitimacy. The Mexican working paper as well as Sweden's continued advocacy of a reference to a CTBT received widespread support from the non-aligned grouping at the ENDC. Soviet and American officials accordingly acquiesced to their incorporation into a full draft treaty. By contrast, Indian pleas for stronger assurances from Moscow, London, Paris, and Washington went unheeded. Superpower disagreement in regards to a non-use pledge's application to Europe and U.S. reservations about expanding its military commitments, or limiting its nuclear options, in the context of the Vietnam War frustrated India's diplomatic outreach.

The Soviet and American co-chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Conference on Disarmament tabled a full draft nonproliferation treaty on January 18, 1968 to widespread astonishment. Numerous allies and non-aligned delegations requested a smattering of revisions to increase its flexibility, authorize periodic review conferences,

and strengthen the enumerated rights and non-binding disarmament provisions. These changes failed to mollify those states whose opposition to a treaty was by then irreconcilable in the absence of more robust security assurances, or an explicit right to indigenous development of peaceful nuclear explosives. Though the ENDC failed to endorse the treaty, U.N. General Assembly resolutions dictated the presentation of a nuclear nonproliferation treaty before the world assembly, which entitled the U.S. and Soviet delegations to table the revised document for consideration.

The climate of opinion in New York City was less hospitable than anticipated, though treaty irreconcilables failed to organize an effective opposition. The superpowers directed their considerable powers of persuasion at near-nuclears and non-aligned states in the Global South while permitting a flurry of last-minute amendments and reassuring regional blocs that key countries such as Israel and South Africa would vote in favor. The result was a sufficiency of support and a treaty that delegations from such countries as Mexico, Sweden, Japan, Italy, and West Germany had for reasons of national interest and basic principle nudged closer to liberal internationalist principles such as the sovereign equality of states. France flirted with vetoing a critical security assurances resolution in the United Nations Security Council on account of its misgivings about discriminating among states based on their legal nuclear status and then empowering permanent members of the Security Council possessing nuclear weapons to enforce those distinctions.

The debates at the United Nations in 1968 thus anticipated the ongoing disputes as to whether the NPT and the nonproliferation regime that it authorized were primarily intended to encapsulate a grand nuclear bargain, or to ward off the further spread of nuclear weapons. They also spoke to the question of whether the preferences inscribed in the treaty were necessary evils or grating injustices. The arc of the nonproliferation

treaty's making substantiated both theses. For those who championed the regime as a crucial skein of international order in an otherwise anarchic world by which to manage these weapons of mass destruction, Foster was right to draw attention to nuclear have-nots' many contributions in inscribing original meanings of their choosing in the treaty's preamble and body. For those who criticized a treaty for authorizing a nuclear cartel, or perpetuating "nuclear apartheid," Soviet-American collaboration was a necessary and undeniable ingredient in the treaty's drafting and achievement.

An acknowledgement of how contingent, how undetermined if not unlikely was the conclusion of the nonproliferation treaty, can illuminate more clearly the original understandings that it represented. A nonproliferation bargain struck in 1963, or 1965, would have looked quite different from the collection of articles and principles at which the international community finally arrived in summer 1968. The superpowers evidently feared descending inadvertently yet ineluctably into an all-out thermonuclear war on account of their global web of alliance commitments. Yet, the *realpolitik* invoked by the German question's resolution and Europe's future more generally were just as consequential. The original intents of non-aligned authors were generally less self-interested, but the positions espoused by Eastern and Western policymakers were often equally principled.

The roles played by Alfonso García Robles and William Foster, for example, who viewed the proceedings from such distant vantage points, were illustrative. Both accepted that an imperfect and self-contradictory regime was preferable to nuclear anarchy. Both regarded the brokering of nuclear prohibitions as part and parcel of a protracted process of consensus-building and tough negotiations. The legitimacy of the global nuclear order depends on the continuation of that debate rather than its exhaustion. If international history bears out one axiom, it is that all things come to an end. The longevity of any

political arrangement that marries power to principle relies fundamentally on the airing of differences so as to build consensus over time.

**Summary of the Chapters**

A prologue recounts the circumstances and purpose of the Irish Resolutions advanced by Irish Foreign Minister Frank Aiken from 1958 to 1961, highlighting the catalytic effect of nuclear crises on his thinking and action. Chapter One discusses the establishment of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the intellectual and political development of a strategy of security internationalism and then explores prospects for a nuclear nonproliferation treaty after the Cuban Missile Crisis and before the first Chinese nuclear test with particular reference to India. The diplomatic middle ground of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament strengthened the hand of non-aligned and non-nuclear states in international nuclear diplomacy. Soviet overtures to embrace a nuclear condominium with the United States came to naught, however, given the preponderant focus assigned to Europe, and West Germany in particular, in 1963 and 1964. The proposal for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) in NATO became the locus of disputes between and within the Eastern and Western blocs regarding the content of a nonproliferation treaty's non-acquisition and non-dissemination articles. The United States seriously contemplated attacks on Chinese nuclear facilities, even reaching out to Soviet officials to request their tacit acquiescence. In the wake of the test, Johnson outlined a vague promise to come to the aid of a nuclear victim; nonetheless, India sought to leverage its non-nuclear status into more credible assurances from both superpowers.

Chapter Two continues the investigation of international nuclear diplomacy in the wake of the Chinese test and explains why the MLF project took precedence over the

NPT in U.S. nuclear policy despite the weight of pro-treaty support. It begins by chronicling the domestic reaction in India to the Chinese test and New Delhi's efforts to make headway with the United States on security assurances and a more comprehensive package of nuclear prohibitions as the White House reviewed its nuclear policies in light of the new Asian security dynamic. The Vietnam War interfered with the provision of robust security assurances by the U.S. as well as Soviet-American cooperation in the field of nuclear diplomacy. Moscow called for a meeting of the hapless United Nations Disarmament Committee on account of the regrettable optics among communist states of treating with Washington amid the Sino-Soviet split and the war in Southeast Asia. European dissension regarding the desirability of a "hardware solution" for NATO's nuclear-sharing dilemmas disrupted the Western common front in Geneva when the ENDC resumed in summer 1965. The ensuing debacle did little to impel forward movement on cooperative nuclear efforts. Track-two diplomacy managed to dampen some of the fallout for Soviet-American relations, but the non-aligned delegations seized the opportunity to pass a United Nations General Assembly resolution highlighting their preferred balance of mutual obligations and rights.

Chapter Three examines how the superpowers brokered a working understanding regarding how to harmonize a nonproliferation treaty's strictures with nuclear-sharing in NATO. By the beginning of 1967, India's attitude toward the NPT rather than that of West Germany was the primary concern of Soviet and American policymakers. The removal of French forces from NATO's integrated command occasioned a revival of the MLF project; however, the Pastore congressional hearings on the nonproliferation treaty in the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy combined with domestic disillusionment with Johnson's lack of peace achievements to push the White House to abandon the scheme and embrace a treaty. The efforts of chief presidential adviser Bill Moyers in drawing the

president's attention to a treaty's electoral benefits proved decisive. Meanwhile, an ingenious non-use formula advanced by Soviet Premier Andrei Kosygin discomfited Washington, while Vietnam limited U.S. willingness to devise guarantees ample enough to satisfy the Indians. A phase of high-level trust-building between the superpowers fostered agreement and enhanced cooperation in Geneva, where the Soviet and American co-chairmen, William Foster and Alexei Roshchin, found an acceptable formula to permit nuclear-sharing and consultations in NATO, but not a joint force, while leaving the future of a European nuclear force open to interpretation.

A hemispheric campaign to keep nuclear weapons out of Latin America occurred alongside nonproliferation talks. Chapter Four explains why and how a multilateral effort to form a nuclear-free zone unfolded in Mexico City. Though the original Brazilian plan preceded the Cuban Missile Crisis, the harrowing episode quickened efforts by Mexican Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs Alfonso García Robles to negotiate a pact. García Robles was an accomplished legal expert and practitioner whose memories of the Second World War, antinuclear outlook, background in United Nations administration, and faith in the region's exemplary tradition of internationalism drove him to orchestrate four years of tough, but ultimately successful negotiations. The U.S. strategy of containment through alliances of necessity, including those with military dictatorships, was a hindrance to the making of a Latin American nuclear-free zone. Headstrong allies in Brasília and Buenos Aires and U.S. demands vis-à-vis Cuba, free transit for its nuclear weapons, and restrictions on peaceful nuclear explosives nearly wrecked the talks. The chapter ends by highlighting U.S. Ambassador Fulton Freeman's roll in salvaging the treaty and calls attention to how the Treaty of Tlatelolco impinged on efforts to enact global prohibitions by setting precedents and producing a second near-nuclear country with irreconcilable views on the NPT—Brazil.

Chapter Five illuminates what happened after Soviet and American officials concurred on nonproliferation language in Articles I and II, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco opened for signature. The outstanding issues in negotiations were now East-West differences regarding the treaty's safeguards and non-aligned demands to preserve their rights and minimize their sacrifices in a new global nuclear order. The legitimacy of a treaty was of mounting importance. The Soviet and American delegations finally resolved the safeguards controversy through clever thinking abetted by increasingly cordial, even friendly, social encounters in Geneva. The social determinants of effective arms control diplomacy are examined through the lenses of the diplomatic community in Geneva and the personalities of George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev. When high-level attempts to foster Soviet-American détente at the Glassboro summit faltered, the international community in Geneva found a route through the impasse by superimposing IAEA oversight on Euratom safeguards. Although the breakthrough in summer 1967 failed to yield immediate dividends in the form of a consensus Article III, Foster and Roshchin tabled identical draft treaties in late August. The presentation of a draft treaty prompted non-aligned representatives, as well as some non-nuclear allies, to request amendments that reflected their interest in a generous and equitable treaty regime. A Mexican working paper outlined initial drafts of Articles IV, V, VI, and VII, eliciting general approval from the non-aligned grouping as well as Western skeptics such as West Germany and Italy. However, Johnson's reluctance to deny West Germany their goal of Euratom autonomy in the context of European integration talks delayed the end of the safeguards controversy until after the New Year.

Chapter Six relates the final phase of negotiations for the NPT at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations. Soviet misgivings about nuclear proliferation on the periphery after the Arab-Israeli crisis the previous June

allowed Foster and Roshchin to present a full draft treaty on January 18, 1968 to the collective astonishment of the international community. The forthcoming Conference of Non-Nuclear States in August set a target date by which the three nuclear powers in Geneva—the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R.—wanted to finalize the treaty. Nevertheless, the imperative of amassing a sufficiency of international support in Geneva and New York City so as to legitimate the regime strengthened the position of treaty skeptics and spoilers. The constellation of interests and demands at the ENDC, which met from mid-January to mid-March, resulted in significant changes to the treaty, most consequentially, the authorization of periodic review conferences to assess its performance and fairness. The drafting process then moved to the United Nations, where the whole universe of nation-states debated its merits in the Political Committee. Soviet-American collaboration was conspicuous once the NPT aroused more opposition than expected. A combination of diplomatic pressure, the isolation of irreconcilables such as India and Brazil, and a new slate of Mexican amendments proposed by García Robles won over the majority of delegations. The chapter concludes by examining the implications of the United Nations General Assembly vote and the source of French and Indian misgivings about a subsequent resolution to vest security assurances in the nuclear-armed members of the United Nations Security Council.

## Prologue: The Irish Resolution

A new approach to the question of how to ease nuclear tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union sprung from an unlikely source in summer 19858 even as the U.S. government danced around the question of whether and, if so, how far to aid French nuclear ambitions. The creation and expansion of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) enabled states of comparatively light geopolitical gravity to leverage their interests and ideals through an international forum increasingly representative of the expanding universe of nation-states. The spreading principles of liberal internationalism had made self-determination the polestar by which anticolonial helmsmen the world over steered.[34] Irish Minister of External Affairs Frank Aiken personified the strange journey on which once colonized nations had traveled since the First World War and the creation of the League of Nations.

A native of Armagh born in 1898, Aiken joined Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army to fight for the cause of the day—the independence of Ireland from British rule—rising in time to chief of staff whose actions included proclaiming the cease fire in 1923 that brought the insurrection to a controversial end. After the declaration, ratification, and recognition of the Republic of Ireland and its addition to the UNGA in 1955 as part of a 16-nation deal struck between the East and West, Ireland modified its wartime position of neutrality in order to pivot toward the West. The appointment of Aiken as Foreign Minister heralded an era of greater independence and anticolonialism reflecting Aiken's own political experience and ideals. This combination of Western orientation and anticolonial identity made possible the four-year process by which Aiken

[34] Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment Self-determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

added nuclear non-dissemination to the lexicon of disarmament.[35] The deeper motivations behind Aiken's decision to adopt this brainchild were rooted in the development of Irish national identity and foreign policy from 1955 to 1961. The UNGA was a "focal point" of Irish statecraft after its admission to the body.[36] Aiken's tenure as Foreign Minister was primarily concerned with enacting a strategy that made use of the UNGA as a platform for Ireland's principles and preferences. His deft use of the General Assembly enhanced his country's sway "out of all proportion" to its size, although its initiatives lived or died according to his ability to build consensus.[37] Irish action at the United Nations from 1955 to 1965 consisted of three strands—Irish national interest, anticolonialism, and the pursuit of an international order in which the rights and privileges for small, postcolonial powers were preserved and expanded. Aiken's years on the front lines of the Irish freedom struggle were representative of his generation and his proposals for nuclear non-dissemination bound up in Irish support for self-determination, which was itself rooted in Ireland's "historical memory" of British colonialism.

On September 9, 1958, Aiken enunciated before the General Assembly his belief that nuclear weapons ought to be restricted to what he termed "the nuclear club."[38] Though the term "nuclear club" was greeted as a neologism, in fact *The New York Times* had printed the term in almost a year before in an editorial by C. L. Sulzberger in which he observed:

---

[35] Glenn Seaborg remarks that Aiken "adopted nonproliferation as a sort of personal specialty." Seaborg, *Stemming the Tide*, 78.

[36] Joseph Morrison Skelly, *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, 1945-1965: National Interests and the International Order* (Dublin ; Portland, Or: Irish Academic Press, 1997), 15–24.

[37] T.D. Williams, "Irish Foreign Policy, 1949-1969," in Joseph Lee, ed., *Ireland 1945-70*, Thomas Davis Lectures (Dublin : New York: Gill and Macmillan ; Barnes & Noble Books, 1979).

[38] "Atom Arms Curb Urged by Ireland," *The New York Times*, 20 September 1958, 5. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

> [T]he Russians hint they are prepared to accept a formula for limiting atomic weapons to the three powers now possessing them—the United States, U.S.S.R., and Britain. What this means is that Washington and London would guarantee neither France nor West Germany could have such armament if Communist China is likewise excluded.[39]

The speech was an important milestone in arms control history. Disarmament talks had previously intimated the desirability of a world free from nuclear dangers, including that of the "Nth-country" eventuality, by highlighting the desirability and practicality of a non-dissemination pledge among other measures. Aiken now implied that the possession of nuclear arsenals by the three existing nuclear powers was legitimate and unlikely to change. The proposal's advancement by a small, neutral, non-nuclear, postcolonial state gave the idea a patina of universal support. Momentously, it distinguished nuclear nonproliferation (as the program would come to be called) from disarmament on procedural rather than normative grounds. Nuclear nonproliferation remained inextricably linked to nuclear disarmament:

> [T]ry to imagine whether, if nuclear war broke out, we would not then regret having failed to make the sacrifices which might have helped to avoid it. … While the 'nuclear stalemate' may have saved us from a third world war, we should leave nothing undone to secure the eventual total abolition of nuclear weapons.[40]

Aiken's remark indicated that his reasoning was neither purely antinuclear, nor chauvinistic, but instead mindful of the manifest paradox of nuclear brinksmanship—the balance of terror was effective yet brittle; bilaterally stable, yet unsustainable over time.

Aiken's pioneering suggestion that the United Nations General Assembly pass a "non-dissemination" resolution did not emerge like Athena from Zeus's head. It was a continuation of earlier efforts that summer to put forward schemes that he felt would help to pacify by means of international legal solutions two regions then in turmoil—Central

---

[39] C. L. Sulzberger, "Foreign Affairs: The Prospects of a New European Entente," 10 February 1958, *The New York Times*, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, 22.
[40] "Atom Arms Curb Urged by Ireland," op. cit., 5.

Europe and the Middle East. The twelve session of the UNGA in 1957 had seen Ireland strike a more autonomous posture relative to the Algerian conflict, Central Europe's demilitarization, and African and Asian decolonization. As a small state, Ireland recognized the UNGA's capacity to amplify its diplomatic influence. By calling for peaceful resolutions to those problem areas where postcolonial territorial disputes and Cold War containment collided, and siding frequently with the non-aligned states, the Emerald Island enhanced its international prestige and accumulated moral capital to expend in furtherance of its national interests. Furthermore, Ireland invested in smoothing over tensions that might lead to general thermonuclear war on account of its proximity to Great Britain. In summer 1958, two events highlighted the potential of regional crises to escalate and exacerbate superpower enmity. Together, they help to explain what truly motivated Aiken to make his non-dissemination appeal.

In July 1958, the Middle East was rocked by the overthrow of the Iraqi Hashemite monarchy by forces sympathetic to the Soviet Union. In response, the U.S. deployed more than 15,000 troops to neighboring Lebanon and the U.K. sent forces to Jordan. Tensions in the Middle East were already fraught after the Suez Crisis showed how combustible was the brew of Nasserism, Israeli adventurism, and Franco-British neocolonialism. Aiken seized on the Iraqi imbroglio to put forward a 10-point plan aimed at easing regional tensions: legitimate Arab unification; recognize Israel as a "historic fact;" resettle and recompense Palestinian refugees; sign a mutual non-aggression pact; safeguard the region's communications, transport, and oil supplies; and establish an equitable process by which to finance any expropriations. The program was all-inclusive and ambitious; however, Aiken chiefly wanted the scheme to form a diplomatic framework on which to build peace talks. The plan had one more item that attested to Aiken's growing interest in restricting nuclear weapons and foreshadowed his impending

non-dissemination proposal: parties to the compact would disavow the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons. In a conversation with Indian diplomats, Aiken observed:

> [T]o tackle the existing problems in such a manner would be much more realistic and fruitful than to concentrate attention, as the west has tended to do, on disarmament. Armaments, after all, are only the manifestations of a lack of mutual confidence, and the real problems are political in character.[41]

At the end of July, Freddy Boland, an Irish diplomat in New York, surveyed Aiken's Middle East peace plan and underlined the presence of two rivalries: East versus West; Arab versus Israeli. Boland viewed regional tensions through the prism of thermonuclear war and, in an "exhaustive" study of Aiken's scheme, asserted that after East-West issues were resolved, "the Arab-Israeli problem, even if it continues unsolved, will certainly not constitute anything like the danger to world peace which exists at present."[42] In regards to nuclear weapons, he placed the onus of non-dissemination on the nuclear powers not to bring atomic weaponry into the volatile region. Boland was more concerned about Sino-Soviet influence along the arc from Algeria to Afghanistan, and convinced Aiken to drop the explicit call for the UN to recognize Israel and its extant borders. In the end, the draft resolution that Aiken submitted at a Emergency Session on August 14 gained approval after being significantly watered down, in particular losing those sections pertaining to regional neutralization or denuclearization.

The outbreak of another crisis in East Asia that August prompted Aiken to expand the denuclearization element of his grand design to yield a method of resolving the internationalization of the nuclear question following the Lucky Dragon Incident in 1954 and the Suez Crisis in 1956. Aiken's Middle East plan evolved into an "areas of

---

[41] Foreign Ministry Papers of National Archive of Ireland 305/173/III, 22 July 1958. Hereinafter DFA. Quoted in Skelly, *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations*, 1945-1965, 153 Skelly notes the memorandum of conversation was circulated to all Irish foreign missions.
[42] DFA 417/205, 30 July 1959. Quoted in ibid., 154.

law" resolution of 1958, which advocated the establishment of a U.N. supervisory quasi-mandate in the Middle East and Central Europe. The overarching thrust of these proposals hinted at the long-term, political objectives to his non-dissemination plan; the scheme would achieve what was possible in order to build confidence for more lasting designs. Communist China began shelling the disputed islands of Quemoy and Matsu on August 23, 1958. The Second Taiwan Straits Crisis brought the U.S., the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the Soviet Union harrowingly close to nuclear conflict. The islands, which had been controlled by Chinese nationalist under the command of Chiang Kai-shek since the Kuomintang's exodus to Formosa and were a locus of tensions between the communist mainland and the U.S.-backed government-in-exile. The predicament posed by Quemoy and Matsu was akin to that posed by Berlin. Quemoy and Matsu lay 103 and 94 miles from Formosa, respectively, but less than ten miles off the coast of Fukien Province in the P.R.C. Consequently, the non-strategic islets made appealing nearby targets for artillery shelling when mainland China wanted to send a message to Formosa and the United States.

Brinksmanship over Quemoy and Matsu occurred at that same moment that cracks in the Communist monolith were appearing. The ascension of Khrushchev to power and his denouncement of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had irked Mao Tse-tung, leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Khrushchev had addressed the CPSU on February 25, 1956, attacking Stalin in a bid to cement his leadership and, it seemed, sincerely address the immorality, mismanagement, and terror of the Stalin's three decades of rule.[43] The First Secretary and newly christened Chairman of the Council of Ministers described his

[43] William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 270-300.

predecessor's "capricious and despotic character," contrasted him unfavorably with Lenin who "used severe methods only in the most necessary cases" during "a civil war," faulted him for "ideological errors," and charged him with "intolerance, brutality and … abuse of power."[44] The Chinese Communist Party's reaction was swift and antagonistic. Notwithstanding his annoyance with Stalin's *realpolitik* and waffling after the Second World War, Mao emulated his cult of personality and Machiavellian tactics, which he saw as integral to the unyielding resistance to capitalist states and extreme measures justified by the logic of dialectical materialism. A rebuttal came quickly in the form of an article in the *People's Daily* published on April 5, 1956, which defended Stalin for having "creatively applied and developed Marxism-Leninism" and "defended Lenin's line on the industrialization of the Soviet Union and the collectivization of agriculture." Rather than slur the dead communist dictator, Mao's mouthpiece declared that "[i]t was … natural that the name of Stalin was greatly honoured throughout the world."[45]

For now, the "honeymoon" period in Sino-Soviet relations endured though Mao himself declared afterwards that Khrushchev's Secret Speech had "created serious cracks" between the allies. The divergent conclusions drawn by the two principals in regards to the nature of modern warfare would pry these cracks open, giving rise to ideological ferment and intramural jockeying in the world communist movement.[46] Mao was affronted by Khrushchev's two foreign policy initiatives: support for peaceful transitions to communism via popular fronts in parliamentary coalitions and cooperation in the nuclear realm. These conciliatory positions stemmed from Khrushchev's

[44] Nikita Khrushchev, Secret Speech, 25 February 1956, http://www.historyguide.org/europe/khrush_speech.html.
[45] The Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, English ed. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), 7. http://www.marx2mao.com/Other/OD63.html#s1.
[46] Zhihua Shen, "The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, De-Stalinization and Its Impact on the Sino-Soviet Relations," *Cold War International History Studies*, No. 1 (2004), 28-70.

conclusion that, despite the general perception that the "correlation of forces" between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. was narrowing after Sputnik's otherworldly triumph in early October 1957, Soviet-American conflict was far-fetched. From this reasoning sprang new Soviet formulations of "peaceful coexistence" and "Soviet-American cooperation for the settlement of world problems." The Moscow International Conference of Communist Parties was the debut for the Soviet Union's new foreign policy. There, twelve principal communist parties and all 64 deputations in attendance endorsed a multi-point "Peace Manifesto;" however, the conference turned on the lessening of trust between the CPSU and the CCP of which Khrushchev and Mao were the undisputed leaders.[47] Considering the recent Soviet offer to supply China with sensitive nuclear assistance after Stalin's death, the truth likely lay somewhere in between.

It was Mao's speech on November 18, however, that stole the show. The CCP chairman began by proclaiming that communist states had gathered the socioeconomic momentum to overtake the capitalist world, dramatized by the recent launch of Sputnik with its economic and military symbolism and encapsulated in his slogan, "[t]he east wind prevails over the west wind." Mao's intent was to underscore his perception that international tensions could not long stymie the spread of communism. In a similar vein, Mao forecast that not only would the Soviet Union catch up to the United States in terms of steel production by 1972, but China would likewise surpass Great Britain. This pronouncement of the Great Leap Forward with its tragic aftermath, in combination with his presumptuous remarks about Khrushchev's recent leadership clash with a "Anti-Party

---

[47] Historians differ regarding whether the conference was call for by the CPSU of the CCP. Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia, "Hidden Currents During the Honeymoon: Mao, Khrushchev, and the 1957 Moscow Conference," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 11, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 74–117. Shen and Xia argue that Mao originally proposed the conference, citing a November 1957 conversation with Polish leader Władysław Gomulka. By contrast, Lorenz Lüthi claims that the conference was initiated by the CPSU. Lorenz M. Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 75.

Group" led by Vyacheslav Molotov, signaled to fellow attendees that Sino-Soviet amity teetered on the brink. Yugoslavian Communist Party leader Edvard Kardelj scrawled in a note that day, "[n]ow begins the struggle between the Russians and the Chinese for the ideological leadership role in the international workers' movement."[48]

By far the most explosive revelation in Mao's address at the Moscow Conference, however, was his remarks about the winnability of nuclear war. Mao's views on the geopolitical and sociopolitical repercussions of a Third World War fought with thermonuclear weapons became an object of dispute in Sino-Soviet polemics from years to come. The Chinese would not publish the verbal record until 1992, though Pravda published a more or less identical text in September 1963 in response to Beijing's refusal to sign the LTBT. According to the *People's Daily*, Mao declared:

> At present another situation has to be taken into account; namely, that the war maniacs may drop atomic and hydrogen bombs everywhere. They drop them, and we do the same. Thus there will be chaos and lives will be lost. The question has to be considered for the worse. The Politburo of our party has held several sessions to discuss this question. If fighting breaks out now, China has only hand grenades and not atomic bombs—which the Soviet Union, however, does possess. Let us imagine, how many people will die if war breaks out? Out of the world's population of 2.7 billion, one-third—or even half—may be lost. It is they and not we who want to fight; but when a fight starts, atomic and hydrogen bombs may be dropped. I debated this question with a foreign statesman. He reckoned that if an atomic war were fought, all of humanity would be annihilated. I said that if worse came to worst and half of mankind died, the other half would remain. Imperialism would be destroyed, and the whole world would become socialist. In a number of years there would be 2.7 billion people again and definitely more. We Chinese have not yet completed our [socialist] construction, and we desire peace. However, if imperialism insists on fighting a war, we will have no alternative but to make up our minds and fight to the finish before proceeding with construction.[49]

---

[48] Zhihua and Xia, "Hidden Currents During the Honeymoon: Mao, Khrushchev, and the 1957 Moscow Conference," 109.
[49] "Statement of Chinese Government Spokesman—Commentary on the Soviet Government Statement of August 21, Renmin ribao, 1 September 1963, p. 1. Cited in ibid., 112.

Though the effect of the crack exposed by Mao's statement would remain latent throughout the nuclear crises of the next five years, in time the rift would widen into a yawning Sino-Soviet split.

Nevertheless, relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chinese Communist Party had stayed in a "honeymoon" phase until the outbreak of the Second Taiwan Straits Crisis. Unbeknownst to Khrushchev and Mao, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) envisaged using nuclear weapons if the crisis escalated. On August 8, 1958, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles met with Undersecretary of State Christian Herter, among others, to discuss US military contingency plans in the event that the P.R.C. tried to seize the islands by force. Dulles worried that President Dwight D. Eisenhower and "responsible officers" might not appreciate that in light of the islands' greater integration with Formosa since the last crisis, "an attack on the Offshore Islands would now constitute an attack on Formosa itself," raising the prospect of a binding U.S. military counterattack. Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles, recently Secretary of the Air Force, reckoned that a determined Chinese incursion could only be stopped if "the Mainland air bases themselves were bombed with atomic weapons." The group agreed that the State Department and Defense Department would draw up a list of eventualities to which the Joint Chiefs would proffer "military planning on an urgent basis."[50]

The Joint Chiefs responded five days later with a memorandum for Herter. In the memorandum, Gerard C. Smith, director of the Policy Planning Council, conveyed the "understanding that current JCS war plans called for nuclear strikes deep into Communist China including military targets in the Shanghai-Hangchow-Nanking and

[50] Memorandum of Meeting, "Taiwan Straits," 8 August 1958, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960*, Vol. XIX, China, Document 28, 46-47. Hereinafter referred to as *FRUS, 1958-1960*.

Canton complexes where population density is extremely high" using "low yield" warheads including "weapons having a yield comparable to 20 KT weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." Smith predicted that "such hostilities" would lead to "millions of non-combatant [deaths]," and set in train Soviet nuclear attacks on Formosa and the U.S. Seventh Fleet "at least," which "under our present strategic concept" of massive retaliation would "signal for general nuclear war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R."[51]

Turmoil in the Middle East and East Asia accordingly represented the geopolitical context in which Aiken presented the Irish resolution. The palpable explosiveness of the Arab-Israeli feud warranted in his eyes the restriction of nuclear weapons from seemingly peripheral areas where superpower interests, alliance networks, postcolonial territorial disputes, and nuclear capabilities increased the likelihood of major armed conflicts. The Second Taiwan Straits crisis, which U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Henry Cabot Lodge described as "appear[ing] at the U.N. to threaten to bring about a general war," dramatized the ability of a rogue state to push the world to the brink of a thermonuclear war whose tragic aftermath its leader had publicly belittled and even affirmed.[52] In his September 1958 speech to the United Nations, Aiken in effect replied to Mao's notorious remarks, stating that "if general war is brought upon the world for any motive, however good or however bad, it will neither democratize nor communize it; it will annihilate it." The differential calculus between developed and underdeveloped states of the imagined post-attack environment was also adumbrated. Communist China again lurked in the background. Countries where urbanization, industrialization, and modern agriculture were far advanced had more to lose, in theory, than developing countries where the

---

[51] Memorandum for Christian Herter, "August 14 Discussion of Taiwan Straits," 13 August 1958, The National Security Archive, George Washington University, http://nsarchive.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/war-with-china1.pdf

[52] Henry Cabot Lodge, United Nations, Telegram to the Department of State, 24 September 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960*, Vol. II, United Nations and International Matters, Document 34, 62-65.

majority of the population subsisted through subsistence farming.[53] Considering the likelihood of regional instability provoking superpower clashes or rogue, underdeveloped states regarding nuclear forces as instruments of attack, rather than deterrence, the nuclear peril did "not merely increase in direct ratio to the number" of nuclear club members, but "in geometric proportion."[54]

After announcing his intention in September to pursue a non-dissemination agreement by means of a United Nations General Assembly resolution, Aiken went about canvassing and cajoling his fellow delegates. The nuclear powers were of course key to shepherding through the resolution. The British and Soviets were noncommittal while the French were openly skeptical because of their active pursuit of a military capability. To assuage French sentiment, Aiken told the French and other delegates that his plan would presume their admittance into the nuclear club.[55] Aiken recognized that U.S. acquiescence was especially pivotal. He spoke to Thomas J. Hamilton of *The New York Times,* who penned a front-page article, "Ireland Would Limit A-Bomb to 4 Nations" based on the interview. Hamilton reported that Aiken repeatedly invoked the example of the Baruch Plan to justify a scheme that would divide the world into nuclear "haves" and "have-nots." He related Bernard Baruch's warning in 1946 "that once the smaller powers had learned to produce nuclear weapons there would be great danger that even a small war would become a nuclear war."[56]

On October 17, Aiken introduced his draft resolution at the Political Committee amid a debate on general disarmament. Disarmament talks at the U.N. had descended

---

[53] Skelly, *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, 1945-1965*, 245.
[54] Aiken, Ireland (1957), 17-18, 29. Cited in ibid.
[55] Ibid., 250.
[56] Thomas J. Hamilton, "Ireland Would Limit A-Bomb to 4 Nations," *The New York Times*, 7 October 1958, 1, 16. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

into a desultory enterprise, where the Soviets and Americans jockeyed to score propaganda points and disagreed over the composition of the U.N. Disarmament Commission to the extent that the U.S.S.R. threatened to boycott the group in April 1958 unless a "parity principle" was established whereby the number of communist states would balance those of neutrals and Western-oriented states. Aiken thus shared a common viewpoint that "while we all wish for complete nuclear disarmament … it is quite vain to expect it in the immediate future." In place of more profitless speeches, Aiken suggested a resolution whose preambular language would read:

> [T]he aim of the United Nations in the field of disarmament is an effective general agreement on the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction which will provide for the cessation of the production of such weapons, the destruction of existing stocks and the progressive limitation of conventional armaments; [and, second,] that the danger now exists that an increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons may occur, aggravating international tension and the difficulty of maintaining world peace and thus rendering more difficult the attainment of the general disarmament agreement envisaged in paragraph one.[57]

To address this danger, Aiken called for the creation of an *ad hoc* committee to evaluate the problems posed by the further spread of nuclear weapons and propose measures to solve them at the next session of the General Assembly.

States from many foreign policy orientations supported the measure. A group of non-aligned countries including Mexico, Ceylon, Burma, the United Arab Emirates, and India lent their voices in the Political Committee. One of the more advanced states without nuclear weapons, Sweden, endorsed the resolution. And a smattering of NATO, SEATO, and Warsaw Pact allies—Poland, Norway, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—spoke positively albeit with conditions. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. were more ambivalent. The Soviet representative exclaimed that a non-dissemination resolution

---

[57] Frank Aiken, *Ireland at the United Nations, 1958* (Dublin: Brún agus Ó Nualláin Teo, 1958), 31–46.

would not deal with the greater issue of disarmament, but he did not dismiss the idea outright. The French, anxious to dispel any legal barrier to their nuclear ambitions, were unappeasable though, and the British and Americans ultimately rejected a non-dissemination agreement owing to doubts in regards to enforcement. Lodge told Aiken that his scheme was "unacceptable" while U.K. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Commander Allan Noble, objected that such a course of action "would be impossible to control." British and, likely, U.S. concerns revolved mainly around China and the question of "control." The Irish delegation's report to Dublin accordingly stressed the "Anglo-American preoccupation with control," a touchstone of perennial discord between the East and West in disarmament negotiations that Western diplomats insisted be enforced with control mechanisms that infringed on Soviet fixation on territorial opacity. Perversely, Aiken's attempt to make an end run around the stasis of disarmament talks by promoting a more limited goal ran aground on the same obstacles then stymieing nuclear test-ban and broader disarmament progress—the question of control. In Noble's telling, a non-dissemination resolution might not be worth the paper on which it would be printed; "more precisely, it would be impossible to keep the Soviet Union from supplying nuclear weapons surreptitiously to the People's Republic of China"—a valid concern in light of contemporaneous Soviets transfers of technology, blueprints, and training to China.[58]

The United States had a second, unspoken reservation foreshadowing a key hurdle that would afflict for nonproliferation negotiations for the next decade—the European security dilemma. Eisenhower and Dulles wanted to guarantee better the security of NATO allies, in particular West Germany, as Soviet advances in nuclear

[58] Skelly, *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, 1945-1965*, 252.

weaponry and ballistic missile technology exposed the continental United States to nuclear attack for the first time. The Soviet launch of the first man-made satellite, *Sputnik 1*, set off a wave of recrimination, national soul-searching, and anxiety in the U.S. and heralded an age of mutual vulnerability. Khrushchev's announcement that year that Soviet missiles would henceforth target West European cities, including Berlin, lessened confidence in the efficacy of the extended U.S. deterrent. To shore up its allies' faith, the Eisenhower administration made plans to stockpile tactical nuclear weapons in central Europe for three purposes. First, the munitions would offset Soviet conventional superiority along the Iron Curtain. Second, the emplacement of nuclear weapons in the FRG would reassure West Germans of U.S. investment in their defense. Finally, the presence of tactical nuclear weapons would symbolize the tip of the U.S. nuclear sword. In the event of a Soviet assault through the Fulda Gap, the use of tactical nukes would predictably escalate to a general thermonuclear war. In effect, the forward positioning of U.S. nuclear assets inextricably bound American security to the inviolability of West German territory.

In the end, Aiken's resolution never came to a full vote because of the opposition of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the Political Committee. U.S. disapproval was the deathblow. Washington was not willing to trust Moscow and doubted that a UNGA resolution would stop it from supplying the P.R.C. with sensitive nuclear technology and know-how. As in disarmament and test-ban negotiations, the lack of a reliable monitoring system proved decisive. Furthermore, the U.S. preferred not to allow any barriers—material or legal—on its extended nuclear posture despite Aiken's pledge that the resolution would not impinge on U.S. plans to install tactical nukes in West Germany. Finally, the U.S. continued to place faith in its own safeguards as codified by the 1954 Atomic Energy Act.

Despite its failure in 1958, Aiken resubmitted his proposed resolution to the United Nations the next three years. His tenacity would bear out his conviction that the assembly was "a body in which the small nations have an influence such as they have never before possessed in their history."[59] The resolution continued to afoul of the U.S., U.S.S.R., and France. Washington was reluctant to bestow the UN's imprimatur on a resolution that might subject its nuclear-sharing arrangements in NATO to unwanted scrutiny. By contrast, Soviet diplomats preferred that a resolution bind the Americans' hands. They may also have feared affirming a principle of which their nuclear assistance to China was then in violation. Aiken's concession that an arrangement to shut the nuclear club's door would grandfather France in failed to win over Paris. He pressed on nevertheless, hoping that nuclear prohibitions would chip away at nuclear threats while bolstering UN authority over matters of war, disarmament, and peace. When he spoke to the Political Committee on December 1, 1960, he warned that the ongoing miniaturization of nuclear warheads brought closer the day when "fanatics" and "revolutionary groups" might acquire them.[60] He proclaimed that the resolution would help to control what former Canadian Foreign Minister Sidney Earle Smith once called "uncontrollable anarchy:"

> It is the duty of statesmen, we submit, to reject all strategic conceptions which imply the spread of nuclear weapons and the risk of nuclear war and to insist that their military planners conform to the first requirement of sane policy in the nuclear age: the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons until we can evolve a system of international order which will enable us to get all these weapons out of national armouries and which will guarantee all nations greater security than their weapons and forces now give them.[61]

---

[59] Frank Aiken, Ireland at the United Nations, 1960 (Dublin: Brún agus Ó Nualláin Teo, 1960).
[60] Ibid., 40.
[61] Ibid., 45–46.

The draft resolution on the prevention of the further dissemination of nuclear weapons therefore did not represent "an end in itself," but an effort to halt the state of play while those present in New York City and their successors worked to ensure that they did not "hand on to our children a much more difficult [disarmament] program than the one which we are forced to face today."

The first French nuclear explosion in February 1960, the cessation of Soviet nuclear assistance to China, and Aiken's success in meeting U.S. concerns about nuclear-sharing in Europe paved the way for the passage of Resolution 1665 (XVI) at the Sixteenth session of the UN General Assembly in 1961. It called upon all states, and in particular those possessing nuclear weapons, to broker a treaty that barred the transfer of control over, or information necessary to the manufacture of nuclear weapons to another state.[62] During the session, the assembly also passed resolutions commending a continued moratorium on nuclear testing, the conclusion of a nuclear test-ban treaty, the merits of a nuclear-free zone in Africa, and a declaration that the use of nuclear or thermonuclear weapons constituted "a crime against humanity and civilization." On the occasion of his long-awaited resolution's passage, Aiken explained his intent when putting it forward:

> Our basic objective was to prevent the danger of nuclear war becoming greater during the period of time it must take to evolve and strengthen a general accepted system of world security based on international law and law enforcement.[63]

Almost seven years would pass before the international community enshrined the basic principle found in Resolution 1665 (XVI) in an international treaty that prohibited the dissemination or acquisition of nuclear weapons. Forty-five years after it opened for signature, a global debate continues as to whether the global nuclear order empowered by

---

[62] United Nations, Resolution 1665 (XVI). Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its Sixteenth Session, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/16/ares16.htm.

[63] Frank Aiken, *Ireland at the United Nations, 1961* (Dublin: Brún agus Ó Nualláin Teo, 1961), 13.

the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has lived up to Aiken's original intent.

# Chapter One | The Nonproliferation Treaty That Never Was

*While we are rather willing and even eager and relieved to agree with a historian's finding that we stumbled into the more shameful events of history, such as war, we are correspondingly unwilling to concede—in fact we find it intolerable to imagine—that our more lofty achievements, such as economic, social or political progress, could have come about by stumbling rather than through careful planning. … Language itself conspires toward this sort of asymmetry: we fall into error, but do not usually speak of falling into truth.*

*Albert O. Hirschman, "The Principle of the Hidden Hand," 1967*

## Introduction: An Approximation of Peace

Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) William Foster stood at the lectern before the World Council of Churches on June 15, 1964 and conjured the words and figure of the Protestant theologian and philosopher Reinhold Niebuhr to explain his job. "In his famous Gifford lectures at Edinburgh in 1939," Foster related, Niebuhr had expressed his belief that "[t]he task of creating community and avoiding anarchy is constantly pitched on broader and broader levels." "That continues to be true in 1964," he noted, "to an ever-increasing degree." The two groups represented that day, he averred, the spiritual community and the nation-state, were both in the business of meeting this expanding challenge:

> We who represent the State are charged with … avoiding anarchy as we attempt to turn the world back from what could be a fatal arms race. You who represent the Church are charged, as the church has always been charged, with the task of creating community. I think the mere fact that we, who have such interrelated and vital tasks set before us, are meeting together today, bodes well for the future of mankind.[64]

Foster described his mission in terms of Niebuhr's conception of an "impossible possibility," and the perpetual quest to attain "a tolerable approximation of this ethic in the form of justice." While Niebuhr had spoken to the quixotic pursuit of an ideal

[64] William Foster, Draft, "Possible Remarks for World Council," 15 June 1964, William C. Foster Papers, George C. Marshall Library, 3. Hereinafter referred to as Foster Papers, GCML.

Christian life, Foster found that his admonition spoke equally to "the field of disarmament" where "we might think of our ultimate goal of GCD [general and complete disarmament] as a difficult – yet – possible possibility." The final object might lie beyond the horizon of sight, and perhaps the lifetimes of those present, but "the negotiating table" and "the various collateral measures," such as a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) and a nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) represented "more readily achievable approximations which will hopefully pave the way for the goal of GCD.[65]

This chapter addresses the simultaneous U.S. pursuit of the MLF in NATO and the NPT. Was a nonproliferation treaty achievable in 1963 or 1964 and, if so, what factors affected its chances of success? Relatedly, why did United States policy give priority to the MLF despite the non-negotiable opposition of Eastern bloc leaders and the tepid support of NATO allies besides West Germany? Lastly, would a nonproliferation treaty have garnered broad international support before or after the Chinese nuclear test in late 1964, in particular from those states most likely to proliferate—the F.R.G., India, and Israel? Soviet-American agreement on the non-dissemination and non-acquisition articles existed, but was stymied by the rebelliousness of East European states amid the Sino-Soviet split, the Euro-centrism of the U.S. State Department (which consistently preferred the MLF to the NPT), the ad-hoc nature of U.S. nonproliferation policy and grand strategy more generally and the onset of election seasons in the U.K. and, more decisively, in the U.S.

There was a window of opportunity in early 1964 to stop nuclear aspirants, particularly India, from moving closer to a military nuclear program with major

[65] Ibid., 1.

implications for international security, proliferation trends, and the final text of the nonproliferation treaty. To support these claims, this chapter begins with an institutional history of the U.S. Disarmament Agency, placing it in the context of a nuclear paradigm of *security internationalism* coalescing around 1963 in which nuclear deterrence and arms control were deemed the chosen means of averting nuclear anarchy. Next, the interrelated history of American nuclear diplomacy, U.S.-F.R.G. and U.S.-Indian relations, Warsaw Pact politics and Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament sessions in 1964 are discussed. The chapter concludes with a brief account of the explosion of a nuclear device on October 16, 1964 at the Lop Nur testing grounds in the Tarim Basin of the Xinjiang region in People's Republic of China's, including the U.S. effort to prevent it by means of a preemptive strike sanctioned by the U.S.S.R. as well as the Indian and world reactions to the event.

The tenability of Soviet-American strategic stability through nuclear deterrence seemed to require a halt to the spread of nuclear weapons. In a 1965 article for *Foreign Affairs*, titled "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament," Foster focused on the proliferation challenge after noting Moscow and Washington's "real progress" on the White House-Kremlin hotline, outer space treaty, fissile material cutbacks and, most notably, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). On the other hand, there was "an increasingly realistic appreciation that agreement on [GCD] will not be achieved early enough … to control the atom."[66] Other means were needed to govern nuclear anarchy. Soviet-American relations had improved since the crisis in Cuba and, though superpower brinksmanship no longer seemed an impending threat, the "time factor" on proliferation was more urgent:

---

[66] William C. Foster, "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament," *Foreign Affairs* 43, no. 4 (July 1965): 588.

> For a decade and a half the Soviet Union has had nuclear weapons; hence the prospect of a delay of, say, a year or two in reducing the capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States to damage each other may not seem terribly critical in itself. But a delay of a year or so, or perhaps even of months, in the implementation of measures bearing on the nuclear-proliferation problem could well mean the difference between failure and success.[67]

Foster's call for urgency in 1965 alluded to the failure to head off China's nuclear blast in October 1964 and the looming threat of an Indian response. The implication was clear. While the Soviet-American nuclear standoff was stable, the spread of nuclear weapons to other regions, including those as volatile as South and East Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America posed significant risks. After acknowledging the case for "limited proliferation" beyond Europe (most likely to India or Japan), he rebutted it on two counts as "implausible and inconsistent with the attitude we have taken with respect to Europe:" proliferation could not be controlled and the U.S. with its "world-wide commitments" would be unavoidably entangled in "any conflict on a scale where nuclear capabilities would be significant."[68] The modernist assumption that states were chiefly defined by their material capabilities skewed his thinking with regard to how non-European leaders' would see nuclear risks. The likelihood of nuclear-weapons use would "almost certainly increase as the number of fingers on the trigger increases," even more so because underdeveloped states like Communist China would have "relatively little to lose." Any nuclear-weapons use meanwhile risked global total war:

> Of course, the use of a few nuclear weapons by any power—even of one such weapon and even with an intent to localize the effect—might lead to their use in large numbers by other powers, with cataclysmic consequences.[69]

The extrapolation from local use to global cataclysm was paradigmatic of the emerging nuclear orthodoxy. Foster inferred that the limits of strategic stability and U.S.

[67] Ibid., 589.
[68] Ibid., 590.
[69] Ibid., 591.

commitments in hot spots accordingly demanded the securitization of peace. The implications were counterintuitive. Disarmament would increase the chances of war. Soviet-American brinksmanship would guarantee the peace. Even so, the Cold War strategy of containment against the U.S.S.R. now called for a supplemental strategy of global nuclear containment to resolve the explosive contradiction of a catalytic nuclear war. Foster and the U.S. Disarmament Agency would act as the institutional fulcrum of that strategy through a program of security internationalism—strategic stability through deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation.

**"A Bureaucratically Independent Conscience"**

The character of William Foster has remained outside the limelight of NPT history in spite of the pivotal role he played in its negotiation. As a result, his personal importance as an ambassador of and driving force behind the treaty has been eclipsed. Bill, as friends, colleagues and politicos called the ACDA's first and longest-serving director, transformed the fledgling agency from the custodian of a "third rail" of US foreign policy into an interdepartmental and international clearinghouse whose activism was instrumental in bringing about the LTBT and NPT.[70] President John F. Kennedy pinched the idea of an arms control agency from his rival for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1960, Hubert Humphrey, whose campaign pledge itself built on steps made by Eisenhower's secretary of state, Christian Herter, to foster "continuity and depth

[70] Lamentably, the ACDA papers housed at the U.S. National Archives have yet to be declassified, organized, and opened for researchers. As a result, the critical intermediary role played by the ACDA and its director have been lost, resulting in a sense that a nonproliferation treaty was always treated as a corollary of the MLF since Foster and the ACDA were the primary holders of the nonproliferation portfolio. An important exception to the general rule is Bunn, *Arms Control by Committee*.

in the review, development, and negotiation of policy" relating to arms control by formalizing the practice.[71]

The proposed agency cried out for an enterprising stepfather. The Disarmament Agency elicited support or skepticism depending on whether the individual was wedded or antagonistic to the notion that conflict among nations and people was governable.[72] Foster was named director in September 1961 when Kennedy signed the inaugural statute and would stay on in that capacity until 1969. He was a businessman with considerable experience in transatlantic diplomacy, a keen sense of civic duty, a sharp eye for public relations, and a reputation as a tireless operator and respected manager. However, he was also an organization man whose insistence on clear channels of communication, decision-making and review disenchanted some experienced nuclear diplomats.[73] Born on April 18, 1897 in Westfield, New Jersey, Foster studied at MIT before serving as a pilot in the US Air Corps in the First World War. After the war ended, he found a job as an engineer for the Packard Motor Company and for Public Service, a New Jersey utility. During the Second World War, Foster joined the government as a consultant for the War Production Board where he rose to the rank of Special Representative to the Secretary of War on aircraft procurement before serving as Undersecretary of Commerce from 1946 to 1948. When Roosevelt's Secretary of State George C. Marshall needed a deputy to help implement the Marshall Plan, he called on Foster to perform the duties of Deputy Special Representative in Europe and,

---

[71] Edmund A. Gullion, Acting Deputy Director, Memorandum for the Kennedy Administration, "United States Arms Control Administration," Department and Agencies, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, President's Office Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-069-016.aspx. Hereinafter POF, JFKL.

[72] Duncan L. Clarke, *Politics of Arms Control: The Role and Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency* (New York: Free Press, 1979).

[73] Interview with James E. Goodby, March 18, 2013, Hoover Institution.

subsequently, Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration itself.[74] Foster also acquired a firm basis in the economics of atomic energy while working for the Nuclear Utilities Corporation. He thus brought a wealth of contacts and experience to his position as Disarmament Agency director.

A key question was how to integrate the Disarmament Agency into the foreign policymaking apparatus. Should the agency report to the secretary of state, or to the president? An independent agency would signal how seriously the Kennedy administration took arms control and disarmament, but might bog down policymaking unnecessarily and make the Disarmament Agency a dwarf among federal giants—the State Department and Defense Department. Edmund A. Gullion, an Eisenhower administration holdover and acting deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Administration (ACDA's predecessor), explored the two possible arrangements in a 1961 memorandum for Kennedy.[75] An executive agency would show the seriousness with which the US took arms control, attract the best minds including the technical experts needed to untangle the knotty problems related to, for instance, a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, foster scientific and strategic ingenuity and, most important, serve as a platform from which to resolve disputes among departments whose parochial interests might impede needful steps towards arms control. Gullion nevertheless preferred the second option of keeping the ACDA under the Department of State's umbrella. He cited factors such as the need to uphold the centrality of Foggy Bottom in foreign policy, tap its institutional memory and its resources, and take advantage of the

[74] "Announcement of William Foster as Director of the ACDA," 26 September 1961, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Department and Agencies, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), POF, JFKL, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-069-016.aspx

[75] Edmund A. Gullion, Memorandum for the Kennedy Administration, "A United States Arms Control Administration," ACDA, Presidential Papers, JFKL, 1.

secretary of state's seniority among presidential lieutenants. He warned though that the agency needed autonomy in legislation, financing, and staffing.[76]

Gullion's biggest concern was that an autonomous agency would bow to the mighty Pentagon on matters of national security.[77] Kennedy's special adviser on disarmament and arms control, John J. McCloy, on the other hand, worried about the State Department. The root problem was the susceptibility of broad agreements, which arms control and disarmament always constituted, of getting lost in the shuffle due to the compartmentalized makeup of Foggy Bottom, where the most influential and experienced bureaucrats worked in offices with regional or bilateral foci. In his Senate testimony, McCloy proclaimed arms control and disarmament too important to be "buried in the State Department," and insisted that the Disarmament Agency possess statutory authority and hence a congressional imprimatur. He urged a reluctant Senator J. William Fulbright, the powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to back this course of action.[78]

Kennedy chose to split the difference on account of Gullion and McCloy's advice. The final legislative act created the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as a semi-autonomous agency reporting to the secretary of state, but enjoying separate statutory authority and its own budget, as well as direct access to the president upon the secretary's notification. This "two-hat" arrangement in which the director would report to the secretary and the president alike, left State in its traditional role as the architect of U.S. foreign policy while satisfying those who wanted an independent agency freed from

---

[76] Ibid., 1.
[77] Quoted in "A Return to Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Process," Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., May 15, 2008, 110th United States Congress, Testimony to the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Government Organization, United States Senate.
[78] John J. McCloy, Letter to Senator J. W. Fulbright, 2 August 1961, ACDA, POF, JFKL, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-069-016.aspx

its infighting. As a result of McCloy's lobbying, the agency would report to Congress semi-annually. Although this would subject it to partisanship, in compensation the statutory mandate allowed Foster and his deputy, Adrian Fisher, to call on congressional support when the executive branch proved recalcitrant.

Elite opinion on the agency was split. Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett worried that the Disarmament Agency would become "a mecca for a wide variety of screwballs," while Kennedy's Secretary of State Dean Rusk asserted that "[d]isarmament is a unique problem … reach[ing] beyond the operational functions the Department [of State] is designed to handle."[79] The agency afforded a partial solution to Eisenhower's farewell warning of an ever more prevalent and pernicious "military-industrial complex" in American politics. With hindsight, the Disarmament Agency's record under Foster would exceed initial expectations.[80] Though it would suffer from partisan rancor afterward, in its heyday it supplanted the State Department's Policy Planning Council as the primary author of U.S. grand strategy. By the end of the decade, the agency had negotiated the LTBT and the NPT, becoming arguably the main driver of strategic thought in the Johnson years with the National Security Council (NSC) preoccupied with Vietnam.[81] The Disarmament Agency's success in harnessing nuclear diplomacy to the goal of a more stable world testified to the messy process by which democratic and bureaucratic states design grand strategy and raised the question of whether, by 1968, Cold War containment referred solely to the Soviet Union.[82]

---

[79] Quoted in Michael Krepon, "Can this agency be saved?," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 5(10) (December 1988), 35-38; Quoted in "A Return to Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Process," Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. testimony.
[80] United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations* (Washington, D.C., 1982).
[81] Andrew Preston, *The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006).
[82] John Lewis Gaddis, *George F. Kennan: An American Life* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011).

Foster's managerial skill and personal steel were indispensable to navigating the thorny maze of the U.S. national security state. Given the *zeitgeist* of Cold War America, where nuclear arms control and disarmament schemes were often smeared as appeasement with analogies drawn readily to Munich, Foster was careful to chart a course between the Scylla of unilateral disarmament and the Charybdis of an unending race for nuclear supremacy.[83] He kept the essence of his worldview tucked cagily away. The job of a government official, he seemed to believe, was to execute policy rather than make it. Even so, Foster worked assiduously behind the scenes to build consensus and outmaneuver bureaucratic rivals by cultivating allies, finessing opponents and using the media and congress to push the US toward constructive engagement on arms control.

Notwithstanding his reputation as a consummate mandarin, Foster's affinity for arms control policy apparently ran deeper. His writings, correspondence, and record in office reveal an abiding faith in the power of a rules-based global order to forestall interstate conflict through dispute settlement, collective security and arms control. Foster seems to have been a pragmatic adherent of the Wilsonian tradition in U.S. foreign relations that originated in the legal utopias of the nineteenth century when European elites foresaw a world where international councils and legal procedures would mend any tears in a patchwork of sovereign nation-states, at least on the European continent.[84] The postwar thrust of US foreign policy fused the idealism and moralism of liberal internationalism with a strategy of containing Soviet power by encircling the U.S.S.R. with military power.[85] It is arguable that the orientation of U.S. foreign policy changed

---

[83] Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, The American Moment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
[84] Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (New York: Penguin Press, 2012).
[85] Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment a Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War*; Westad, *The Global Cold War*.

markedly from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy administration.[86] Nonetheless, the liberal internationalist persuasion was far from unified in 1962; perhaps, it never had been.[87] Harkening back to idealist thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mills and Woodrow Wilson, internationalists differed with respect to how they prioritized various elements of the liberal order: sovereignty, institutions, participation, roles and responsibilities.[88] However, the class of policies under the heading of nuclear nonproliferation belied an easy separation of realism and internationalism, or hard and soft power.[89] The prolonged terror of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which dramatized global fears of the cataclysmic aftermath of thermonuclear war, was the cause of some of the consensus. Related to these fears, however, was the rise of a new paradigm of internationalist thinking in which collective security and strategic stability were increasingly linked in a hybrid type of security internationalism.

---

[86] Brendan Rittenhouse Green, "Two Concepts of Liberty: U.S. Cold War Grand Strategies and the Liberal Tradition," *International Security* 37, no. 2 (October 2012): 9–43. Green distinguishes between a "negative liberalism" with a penchant for "buck-passing" prevalent during the Eisenhower years and a "positive liberalism" more inclined to "balancing" of which the Kennedy administration was an exemplar. This interpretation focuses unduly on administrative styles and overlooks Kennedy's preoccupation with budgetary considerations and the extent to which external changes of circumstance forced Kennedy's hand. Finally, the article seems indifferent to the role of internationalism and diplomacy more generally in explanations of a tradition of liberalism in U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy.

[87] Casper Sylvest, *British Liberal Internationalism, 1880-1930: Making Progress?* (Manchester, U.K.; New York; New York: Manchester University Press ; Distributed in the U.S. by Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Michael C. Pugh, *The Interwar Movement for Peace in Britain*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Duncan Bell, *Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-century Political Thought*, Ideas in Context 86 (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). The leitmotif of recent literature on the origins and complexion of liberal internationalism is the tension between power and principle, hegemony and equality, and imperialism and globalism.

[88] G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011).

[89] As such, the multilateralism inherent in agreements such as the NPT is eclipsed by a Gramscian critique of U.S. hegemony in spite of a full record of consultation, compromise and consent among a host of nations in the drafting history. The concept of hegemony usefully elides the import of hard and soft power, but fails to account for why states voluntarily helped to fashion and chose to join collective security arrangements such as the NPT featuring an unequal arrangement of rights and responsibilities. Andrew Hurrell, "Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be Great Powers?," *International Affairs* 82, no. 1 (January 2006): 1–19.

A 1965 letter from Foster to Professor Louis B. Sohn was revelatory of the new school of internationalist thought. Sohn was a leading expert on the United Nations and international law, then teaching at Harvard Law School. His book, *World Peace through World Law,* co-authored with Grenville Clark, made his reputation and exemplified the internationalist mentality of the early Cold War. Published in 1958, the study spelled out an ambitious U.N. reform agenda in which the parliament would revise its charter, confer member states with votes proportional to their population, replace the U.N. Security Council with a veto-less Executive Council, bring the P.R.C. into the fold, and constitute a world police force in place of defunct national militaries. In the letter, Foster thanked Sohn for sharing a rebuttal he had made of Admiral Arleigh Burke's hostile critique of the Disarmament Agency. Burke was the former Chief of Naval Operations and co-founder of the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University and had pushed for a limited U.S. deterrent reliant on nuclear submarines in the late-1950s. Foster praised the professor for his "penetrating attack" on Burke's "biased presentation," which trivialized the utility of arms control talks. Burke's conclusion that strategic stability ought not be weakened by "idealistic" arms control initiatives was, according to Foster, "vulnerable to the many points that you made."[90] In particular, he noted the notion that the reduction of an enemy's nuclear forces by means of treaty agreements was materially equivalent to their reduction through military action.

Sohn's book and Burke's article were intellectual touchstones by which to triangulate Foster's views. Sohn was among the foremost theorists of international law and global governance. He was also involved in the famed Summer Study on Arms Control put on by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences at MIT in 1960. The

[90] William Foster, Letter to Dr. Louis Sohn, "Critique of Memorandum by the Center for Strategic Studies with Letter to Admiral Arleigh Burke attached," 15 November 1965, Folder 6, Box 14, Foster papers, GCML.

symposium led to a special issue of *Daedalus* on "Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security," as well as Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin's influential *Strategy and Arms Control*. His intellectual fingerprints were on the prefatory note of the *Daedalus* issue penned by editor Gerald Holton, a fellow Harvard professor of the history of science.[91] In the *Daedalus* issue, Holton's introduction began by echoing a common theme in antinuclear discourse; namely, that humankind's scientific and technological achievements had outpaced his capacity for reasoned action. To support his point, he quoted from William James's essay, "The Moral Equivalent of War:"

> When whole nations are the armies, and the science of destruction vies in intellectual refinement with the sciences of production, I see that war becomes absurd and impossible from its own monstrosity. Extravagant ambitions will have to be replaced by reasonable claims, and nations must make common cause against them.[92]

Holton added that whereas war had once served as "an inherent necessity of the social process," it now embodied "an absurd monstrosity." The advent of "nightmarish" nuclear weapons had in the intervening years "propelled us with a most unhistoric speed to a historic discontinuity." The catalytic thrust of that epochal change was the universal abhorrence of thermonuclear war. "Never before in history," Holton observed, "have the opposing commanders themselves openly professed their general revulsion from war." In contrast to Bertrand Russell, Krishna Menon, and Albert Schweitzer's belief that national leaders could not rationally control their nuclear arsenals, Holton suggested that social

---

[91] Paul Doty, a biochemist and founder of the Department of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology at Harvard University and, in 1973, the Center for Science and International Affairs, notes this influence. Doty, "Arms Control: 1960, 1990, 2020," *Daedalus*, Vol. 120(1) (Winter 1991), pp. 33-52. Sohn's schemes for harnessing the stabilizing power of deterrence to a programmatic approach to world disarmament also appeared in David Frisch's *Arms Reductions*.
[92] William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," in *Essays on Faith and Morals* (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1943).

theory was indeed catching up: "the art and science of controlling war have for the first time shown signs of genuine promise."

The preface was illustrative of the volume's tenor, which was itself representative of an emergent nuclear orthodoxy in the American social sciences that attempted to securitize peace through deterrence. Collectively, contributions by nuclear thinkers from a range of disciplines promoted and attempted to reciprocally calibrate nuclear deterrence and arms control. The essay by Thomas Schelling, for example, used concepts and frameworks that would define a generation of international relations and economic thought. The realist school of international relations theory of which Schelling was an author had arisen amid the bipolar structure of the Soviet-American conflict and the arms race. Its intellectual founders, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Schelling sought to make sense of a postwar world where two superpowers with opposing groups of smaller powers arrayed in their orbits eyed each other warily across a planet made smaller and more fragile by intercontinental ballistic missiles and thermonuclear warheads. Morgenthau had proposed the basic realist assumption that states acted as unified rational actors in search of security and power in an anarchic system, while Niebuhr had promoted the need to find imperfect solutions and approach world affairs amorally predicated on the maxim of the "impossible possibility" of moral state behavior.[93] Schelling took Morgenthau's anarchic system and Niebuhr's skewering of pre-war U.S. neutralism and added a sophisticated methodology of game-theoretic modeling and cost-benefit analysis. The irreducible dilemma for these thinkers was the idea of total war in the thermonuclear age.[94]

---

[93] Nicolas Guilhot, *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

[94] Campbell Craig, *Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

Schelling approached nuclear warfare through abstraction and analogy. Whereas the infamous econometric study of Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War*, dwelt expansively and cold-bloodedly on the societal and environmental effects of total war, Schelling accepted its suicidal implications and interpolated state behavior along an continuum of material benefits ranging from mutual advantage to mutual annihilation. Schelling's belief that nuclear war could not be won eventually prevailed over Kahn's optimistic take, helping to stave off, for instance, further investments in civil defense. The denaturalization of nuclear war of course had other corollaries, namely, the marginalization of nuclear weapons effects as a schematic externality. But Schelling's framework suffered from a related omission that troubled Morgenthau and Niebuhr as well: how to deal with the twin problems of extended nuclear deterrence and nuclear proliferation. His models could make bold predictive claims about how two opponents might maneuver toward the least bad outcome amid a crisis with a minimum of communication and transparency. In *Strategy and Arms Control*, Schelling rigorously explained how arms control was a critical component of nuclear strategy by relating it tightly to deterrent postures.[95] Nuclear proliferation was thus the fly in the ointment of the nuclear orthodoxy. Games such as "Prisoners' Dilemma" and "Chicken" on which he based his theories of deterrence and compellence presupposed bipolar relationships of two actors, whether individuals or states. In these bilateral scenarios, Schelling thought that Soviet-American acceptance of the territorial status quo would permit stable deterrence, arms cuts, and possibly incremental disarmament.[96] But what about the

---

[95] Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).

[96] Ibid. For an excellent review of the state of the field in 1961 in the wake of the AAAS study, see J. David Singer, "Arms Control and Beyond: A Review of Thomas C. Schelling and Morton Halperin, 'Strategy and Arms Control and David Frisch, Ed., 'Arms Reduction: Program and Issues"," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 5, no. 3 (September 1961): 311–320.

credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Western Europe, Pierre Gallois's theory for asymmetric deterrence, and the "Nth-country" conundrum? Schelling and Halperin devoted a mere four paragraphs to questions of extended deterrence, nuclear proliferation, and nonproliferation.

## The Limits of Peaceful Coexistence

By the winter of 1964, the conspicuous obstruction to synchronizing Soviet-American views on nonproliferation was the U.S. attempt to institute nuclear sharing through a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) in NATO. The project, which the State Department devised and the F.R.G. seized upon, would have assembled a fleet of surface ships armed with nuclear-tipped Polaris missiles, manned by crews of mixed nationality from three members, and subjected to the integrated command and control of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The U.K., France, the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), Poland, and the Soviet Union opposed the scheme with varying and fluctuating degrees of vigor.[97] By early 1964, the U.S.S.R. and its Warsaw Pact allies in the United Nations Disarmament Committee (UNDC) and the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) had decided the non-dissemination and non-acquisition articles of a prospective treaty ought to prohibit "access to" nuclear weapons explicitly. The preferred U.S. language, which stressed "control of" (i.e. authority to fire) the weapons, was unacceptable. It was surprising that the U.S. supported a collective nuclear force until 1966 in the face of broad and vigorous opposition given that the scheme and the larger question of NATO's stability and future

[97] Craig, *Glimmer of a New Leviathan*.

were chief impediments to an otherwise popular nonproliferation treaty.[98] In actuality, the language specified for Articles I and II has proven among the least contentious, indicating that Soviet-American disagreements over nuclear-sharing in NATO were symptomatic rather than causative. The failure of the Johnson administration to divest itself of the MLF was indicative of a lack of investment, coordination, intelligence, leadership, and imagination in extra-Vietnam foreign affairs in the mid-1960s. The MLF was never acceptable to NATO allies, Warsaw Pact rivals, or the U.S. Congress. Nor was it as popular with the West German public and their leaders as inferred by State Department "theologians." Furthermore, British and American experts deemed the project technically unsound for a variety of reasons. Despite these centripetal forces, key U.S. officials held onto the belief that an ingenious scheme rather than an international regime was the best means of averting proliferation in strategic regions, particularly in Europe. In the final analysis, the MLF would delay a nonproliferation treaty when Soviet-American unity could have yielded a stronger document at a crucial moment when the next round of proliferation to India and Israel was evident and perhaps avertable.

The steady support of the multilateral force by the State Department resulted from two groups with differing but nonetheless interrelated objects. First, theorists in State's Policy Planning Council and Economic and Agricultural Affairs bureau, such as Henry Owen, Robert Bowie, Walt Rostow, and George Ball, saw Jean Monet's quest to

[98] Brands, "Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War," 389–91. Brands contends that ultimate Soviet-American agreement on NATO nuclear sharing arrangements was "the most important" step in NPT negotiations and "decisive in moving the treaty toward a conclusion." Though an excellent account of the MLF from the perspective of key U.S. and Soviet principals in which Brands pays more than passing attention to British, Canadian, and French views, he occupies the same Euro-centric point of view as his subjects and most scholars investigating the NPT's making. He maintains that U.S.-F.R.G. discord on the scope and aegis of safeguards "accounted for the delay between the resolution of the nuclear sharing/non-proliferation debate and the signing of the treaty," which is arguable and ignores the substance of the agreement (footnote 2). Debates over the NPT, MLF, and safeguards coincided with mounting intelligence and evidence of Indian and Israeli nuclear aspirations.

federalize Western Europe as the shape of things to come. Relatedly, these "theologians" along with other key national security experts were concerned that growing Soviet nuclear stockpiles and resulting American vulnerability would wreck the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. France's decision to build nuclear weapons and chart a political course that diverged ever more from NATO confirmed these fears. The rupture with France imperiled the Atlantic alliance as French President Charles de Gaulle openly sought primacy in Europe and courted Bonn with the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship in 1963 and talks for a European Economic Community (EEC). Greater participation by the F.R.G. in NATO's nuclear policy, they believed, would relieve doubts of U.S. credibility after Sputnik and the Cuban Missile Crisis showed the United States mainland was not invulnerable to attack. Only NATO nuclear-sharing in concert with steady West European integration could allay West German insecurity, square them with nuclear Britain and France, keep Bonn out of de Gaulle's sphere of influence, and thereby enable a NATO defense posture that was united and credible.

Second, the prospect that other European countries, in particular the Federal Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, and Italy, might follow the French lead in developing a military nuclear capability led a second United States contingent to support a MLF for its nonproliferation value. The F.R.G. had renounced atomic, biological, and chemical weapons (the ABC agreement) at the London and Paris conferences and the Modified Treaty of Brussels in 1954, which formally ended British, French, and American occupation of West Germany and recognized it as a sovereign state. This had permitted West Germany's entry into NATO, however, the renunciation failed to dispel the fears of neighbors (allies and adversaries) who had twice suffered the bloody consequences of German militarism in the past fifty years. The French nuclear test in 1960 heightened concerns that West Germany would emulate its two historic rivals—Great Britain and

France. Senior members of the Johnson administration, most prominently Secretary of State Rusk, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Attorney General Robert Kennedy shared the belief that proliferation would unfold relative to mathematical trajectories and technological trends rather than political calculations. They consequently saw enhanced NATO nuclear-sharing, perhaps through a collective nuclear force, as the least bad option to preempt more European nuclear powers and, potentially, to rollback the British and French military nuclear programs.

Sputnik had been the catalyst for a "hardware solution," as the multilateral forces and its British cousin, the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF), were called. As the Western hemisphere became more vulnerable to Soviet ICBMs, skepticism among Europeans mounted that American and Canadian leaders would leave their cities and natural resources hostage to peaceful Soviet conduct in the Old World. To counteract these fears, Eisenhower sent large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons to West Germany under the command of NATO Strategic Allied Commander Europe, General Lauris Norstad, and extended the scope of the U.S. nuclear deterrent by promising "massive retaliation" in case of Soviet aggression.[99] Henceforth, U.S. troops armed with atomic artillery and supported by F.R.G. divisions, NATO nuclear-armed fighter-bombers, and Strategic Air Command would reinforce the deterrent's credibility in the eyes of Western Europe and its menacers.

Initially, the Soviet Union was not strongly opposed to a multilateral nuclear force. In the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev wanted to improve relations with Bonn in order to reduce military spending, lessen East-West tensions, and pave the

[99] Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France, and the F.R.G.: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

way for a nonproliferation treaty that might halt, or at least stigmatize, Chinese pursuit of an atom bomb. The Soviet Union would not assume a hardline stance against German access to nuclear weapons until Khrushchev was forced from power and Communist China entered the nuclear club in October 1964.[100] Khrushchev had pursued a dual-track policy toward the F.R.G. throughout the 1950s, seeking to freeze the territorial status quo in Europe and keep nuclear weapons out of German hands.[101] The Sino-Soviet split and frequent clashes between the communist giants for leadership of world communism led the Soviet general secretary to soften his stance toward Bonn, which was growing increasingly vocal in regards to German reunification.

When Khrushchev began talks with the United States on a nonproliferation treaty in October 1963, he suggested that a U.S. pledge that nuclear arms would be kept out of German hands would suffice. He noted that a difference of views existed about "West German revanchists … get[ting] their hands on nuclear weapons," and proposed the U.S.S.R. would announce its willingness to sign an agreement "even in the case that [it] will not contain a statement prohibiting outright the creation of multilateral nuclear forces in NATO." The non-dissemination article "would provide that nuclear weapons would not be transferred directly or indirectly, or through military alliances to the national control of states that do not yet possess such weapons and that these countries would not be assisted in the production of such weapons." In the coming years, the U.S. position would more or less repeat this formula.[102] In return, Washington would declare that Bonn would not obtain "the possibility of being in charge of nuclear weapons."

---

[100] Christoph Bluth, *Britain, Germany, and Western Nuclear Strategy*, Nuclear History Program 3 (Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1995); Susanna Schrafstetter and Steven Twigge, "Trick or Truth? The British ANF Proposal, West Germany and US Nonproliferation Policy, 1964-69," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 11, no. 2 (July 2000): 161–184.

[101] Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*.

[102] Memorandum, October 1963, (Translation from Russian by Douglas Selvage; Gomulka's marginalia, from Polish. AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. 2639, pp. 335-37," cited in Douglas Selvage, *The Warsaw Pact and*

Khrushchev's permissiveness unsettled his allies in Poland and East Germany. The leader of the Polish Communist Party, Wladyslaw Gomulka, was stunned by the Soviet readiness to eschew a clear proscription of the MLF when he read Khrushchev's letter informing him of the position. Where the communiqué emphasized that a nonproliferation treaty would feature an exit clause similar to that of the LTBT so as to afford the Eastern bloc states an escape route if NATO nuclear arrangements developed along impermissible lines, Gomulka wrote pointedly in the margins, "[p]rohibit the creation of multilateral nuclear forces now, and you will not [need to] reserve yourself the right to tear up the treaty!"[103] Gomulka leapt into action, telephoning Khrushchev on October 2, 1963 and following the conversation up with a 4000-word letter six days later in which he conveyed his desire to confer about the "deeply troubling thoughts" he had concerning the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations and Khrushchev's intention to broker a nonproliferation pact with the United States. The Polish leader presumed that Khrushchev's rush to conclude a treaty with the U.S. had its origins in the Sino-Soviet split. As a result, he proposed a conference of the First Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Warsaw Pact states to consider the matters, and the Polish Politburo, responding to Gomulka's summons, agreed unanimously that the country could not support the permissive Soviet position without express limitations on multilateral nuclear forces.

Gomulka laid down four principles in the letter behind Poland's stout opposition to an increased West German role in NATO nuclear arrangements. In time, these principles would harden into pillars of an unyielding wall of Eastern resistance to a

---

*Nuclear Proliferation, 1963-1965*, Working Paper, Cold War International History Project (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, April 2001), 20–21.

[103] Ibid., 21

narrow definition of nuclear proliferation in first and second articles of the NPT. First, any failure to forbid a NATO force in which access to, and control of, nuclear weapons would be shared at the operational and command levels risked being interpreted as "silent consent." Second, the multiplication of so-called "hands on the trigger" subverted "the spirit of the Moscow Treaty," which "proclaims as its main goal the quickest possible achievement of an understanding on universal and complete disarmament." Third, to exhibit flexibility on joint nuclear forces would deprive the socialist camp of a handy whipping boy to help stop the F.R.G. from gaining access to nuclear weapons "in any form"; Gomulka declared this struggle was "a fundamental link in our general political line" and its abdication "would inevitably bring serious harm to the socialist camp." Gomulka intimated that Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership courted defections in the struggle for the leadership of world communism if a treaty was concluded that caused "harm … for our countries and our parties, especially in the case of Poland, and to an even greater degree for the German Democratic Republic." Finally, the Soviet policy of seeking rapprochement with Bonn and the United States would only improve the F.R.G.'s position vis-à-vis its cherished and outspoken campaign to reunify the German nation. The German question loomed large and kowtowing to Washington and Bonn risked strengthening West Germany in NATO and against East Germany, which also raised the prospect of "atomic blackmail against the Warsaw Pact states."[104]

The Sino-Soviet split was foremost in Gomulka's mind. He was loath to watch the havoc that a nonproliferation treaty struck unbeknownst to Beijing would wreak on the international communist movement. Gomulka accordingly did more than reject Khrushchev's policy; he condemned the Soviet program of peaceful coexistence through

[104] Memorandum, October 1963, Translation from Russian by Douglas Selvage; Gomulka's marginalia, from Polish. AAN, KC PZPR, sygn. 2639, 335-37," cited in Selvage, *The Warsaw Pact and Nuclear Proliferation, 1963-1965*, 20–24.

nuclear diplomacy wholesale. West Germany, he specified, was the sole NATO country with an interest in the scheme; the U.K. and France were antagonistic because they did not want more nuclear peers among the "imperialist states." The British displayed serious concerns that a hardware solution would exacerbate world tensions, but its "special relationship" with the U.S. blunted these criticisms for now. As for the U.S., the MLF was a shrewd tactic. By performing an end run on de Gaulle, it would bolster its supremacy in Europe through a reinforced NATO with a stronger West Germany at its heart. Chancellor Adenauer, he acknowledged, had "deftly used … [the] struggle for hegemony in Western Europe" between the U.S. and France "for its policy [of reunification] and its drive to attain nuclear weapons." Gomulka doubted that a united socialist front could halt NATO's momentum toward closer nuclear coordination; nevertheless, a nonproliferation treaty would cause harm even if it lacked an MLF. Soviet-American efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons with the P.R.C. as the primary target would make already deep rifts within the socialist camp cavernous. It was far better, in his opinion, for the Warsaw Pact to exploit the matter and thus raise contradictions among the capitalist states. Arms control talks were a wedge with which to pry the United States and France apart, not a knife with which to slit one's own throat.

The Limited Test Ban Treaty had galvanized Sino-Soviet divisions by exposing the degree to which Moscow denied Beijing a voice in "important international matters;" Gomulka therefore advised that "[a]n understanding with the Chinese Communist Party on the basis of a sensible compromise is thus necessary from every point of view."[105] If an MLF was created, the U.S.S.R. should grant nuclear weapons to the P.R.C., evening the

[105] Ibid., 23-24.

playing field. Gomulka restated that promoting solidarity among the socialist states was key for security against imperialist aggression:

> Without the unity of the socialist camp, there is not and cannot be a true relaxation [of tensions], there is not and cannot be a possibility of curbing imperialism and of safeguarding humanity against the catastrophe of nuclear war.

Gomulka's pushback was determined and thus decisive enough to shape a far tougher Soviet line on the compatibility of multilateral forces with a nonproliferation treaty. The dilemma of trying to appease the nuclear aspirations of West Germany while also pursuing a nonproliferation pact with the Soviet Union bedeviled the United States government struggling to shore up its Atlantic alliances. Meanwhile, Moscow encountered stiffer than expected resistance from its East European allies in its efforts to marginalize the P.R.C. and thwart its quest for nuclear weapons. Scholars of the Cold War have periodized the Soviet-American contest in several ways. They generally portray the years from Stalin's death to Nixon's election as an ambiguous period of both engagement and confrontation with the German question the central object of tug-of-war before superpower détente and China's opening transformed the global arena.[106] The halting pursuit of a nonproliferation treaty, however, attested to how contingent and in fact unstable the whole bipolar structure of the Cold War truly was during these years. While U.S. and Soviet interests, forecasts of nuclear technology trends, and intelligence of likely proliferators aligned, key actors in both of the alliances stymied the movement toward peaceful coexistence with nuclear arms control as its linchpin. Furthermore, the non-aligned movement with Egypt, India, Indonesia, and China in its vanguard began to fracture as regional nuclear dynamics and the Sino-Indian leadership struggle hindered

---

[106] Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*; Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment a Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War*; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, Rev. ed (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1994).

the building of consensus.[107] With these global political processes in mind, the multilateral negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty resembled less a U.S. imposition or a superpower condominium than a collective recasting of the global order to modulate nuclear dangers and lessen the centripetal forces pulling apart the bipolar arrangement of power. In essence, global elites hewed toward international solutions—whether supranational or regional—because a long tradition of resolving contradictions in interstate affairs through such collective arrangements informed it and an increasingly messy international system demanded it.

Soviet officials acknowledged that United States policymakers had originally conceived the multilateral force in order to forestall a situation in which West Germany obtained nuclear weapons independently or through French channels, and as part of Eisenhower and Kennedy's attempts to coax de Gaulle to sacrifice the *force de frappe*. Nonetheless, Gomulka's determined effort to divert Khrushchev from his conciliatory path worked. When Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasilii Kuznetsov met with the Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) of the G.D.R. two weeks later on October 14, he relayed a Soviet position that had been radically revised. Kuznetsov admitted that the U.S.S.R. viewed U.S. support for a collective nuclear force through the lens of nuclear nonproliferation. From 1959 to 1960, "the USA developed the idea … to maintain the unity of NATO and its [nuclear] monopoly in the military alliance … to urge France to give up on nuclear weapons, or, at the very least, to freeze the development of [French] nuclear weapons," he continued, and "to prevent [West Germany] from obtaining nuclear weapons itself." Rusk had accordingly informed Gromyko on August 8, 1962, that a nonproliferation agreement could specify that any "state possessing nuclear

[107] H. W. Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-1960*, Columbia Studies in Contemporary American History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Robert B. Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

weapons will undertake the obligation not to transfer them to third countries," and non-nuclear-weapon states would vow not to make or try to acquire nuclear weapons. Two weeks later, the Soviet Union responded with more stipulations barring "the transfer of nuclear weapons through military alliances" and the transfer of technical data about their production.[108]

United States officials proposed compromise language on April 12, 1963 that inched toward the Soviet position. The conciliatory move led Khrushchev to believe that a nonproliferation regime was viable from which a nuclear-armed P.R.C. would be born estranged. Nuclear-weapon states "would undertake the obligation not to transfer any sort of nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly through military alliances, into the national control of states that do not dispose of such weapons" along with reciprocal pledges from nuclear have-nots to abstain from their pursuit or relevant assistance through the aforementioned channels. After Gomulka's offensive, however, Soviet authorities, now anxious to firm up their remaining comrades in the socialist camp, had seen fit to include language that categorically rejected a nonproliferation treaty consistent with a NATO multilateral nuclear force. "[P]ositive outweighs the negative" in the second U.S. proposal, Kuznetsov admitted, after all, an agreement to outlaw dissemination was better than nuclear anarchy; however, the Soviets thought that a mutually acceptable agreement must bind the German's hands more tightly. Not only could there be no transfer directly or indirectly through military alliances, but also "not into the control of a military unit or individual member of the military," belonging to "the unified armed forces of the military alliance." East German General Secretary Walter Ulbricht asked if these strictures would apply only to the United States. Kuznetsov replied that, if the

---

[108] Excerpts, "Discussion between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasilii Kuznetsov and the SED Politburo," 14 October 1963, in Selvage, *The Warsaw Pact and Nuclear Proliferation, 1963-1965*, 30–35.

Federal Republic acceded, the reciprocal pledge of states without nuclear weapons would bind nuclear powers such as France as well. Ulbricht and Foreign Minister Lothar Bolz registered their support. The Soviet Union, recently so eager to conclude a nonproliferation pact, had deemed a multilateral force irreconcilable with a nonproliferation treaty at the urging of their Polish and East German allies.[109] The battle lines has been drawn.

Following Johnson's unexpected rise to the presidency, the United States undertook a review of the multilateral force, which Kennedy had never fully backed, but to which Johnson felt beholden as an unelected successor. Eisenhower also remained an advocate of the scheme. Johnson met with Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Ball, and Rostow on December 6, 1963 to discuss the matter. They decided that MLF supporters in Foggy Bottom would brief key members of Congress and the group of seven NATO nations meeting in Paris at the North Atlantic Council. In a note to Johnson, Bundy outlined his analysis of the situation, noting that "a tension … [had] existed for many months between MLF advocates in [the] State Department and President Kennedy," who had "wanted to avoid getting pinned to a very complex and difficult treaty." Furthermore, West European support had yet to materialize behind the venture; Bundy echoed Kuznetsov's opinion that "only the German Government [is] clearly and solidly in favor," but suggested that a decision could be postponed until after the presidential elections.[110]

**Window of a Condominium**

As the superpowers revisited their preferences relative to NATO nuclear-sharing, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was set to meet at the beginning of

[109] Ibid.
[110] Quoted in Maddock, *Nuclear Apartheid*, 222. Footnote #11.

1964. Before the first session, East Germany set out a proposal for both German states to renounce nuclear armaments, production, and multilateral forces, which amounted to a strong signal that the Warsaw Pact wanted the MLF demolished. Washington dismissed the East German overture as sheer propaganda; in truth, nuclear abstention was a bitter pill for Erhard to swallow given the conventional superiority of communist forces in central Europe. Rusk and Foster were nonetheless hopeful that a deal was attainable. Even the French were showing signs of life. Ambassador Pelen conveyed his government's heightened interest in happenings at Geneva though "of course, they could not participate."[111] The French felt the West was primed to take the initiative at the ENDC on a package of arms control and nonproliferation measures, such as a fissile-material cutoff treaty (FMCT). However, Alphand reported from New York that Foster was cautious because the two sides were fixating on different issues. "Washington was preoccupied with China and Moscow with the MLF," Foster had related, and "nonproliferation would have to be discussed in a narrow fashion."[112] If the committee were to forge progress, it would begin with limited measures rather than a grand bargain.

Rhetoric had yet to slow down to match the lagging pace of viable agreement. Only seven weeks after Kennedy's assassination, President Johnson voiced commitment to his predecessor's legacy of which nuclear diplomacy was a centerpiece. At his first State of the Union Address on January 8, 1964, Johnson vocally embraced "new proposals at Geneva toward the control and eventual abolition of arms" and a cutback on stateside production of enriched uranium by 25 percent.[113] Rusk was insistent that U.S. deeds in

---

[111] William Foster, Memorandum of Conversation with Pierre Pelen, French Embassy, Box 10, Subject File-Disarmament, National Security Files, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Archive. Hereinafter referred to as SF-Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.

[112] P.O. Alphand, New York, Telegram to Paris, Foster's Views," 15 January 1964, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, Archives du Ministere des Affaires Étrangères de France. Hereinafter referred to as AMAEF.

[113] Lyndon Baines Johnson, "State of the Union," 8 January 1964, The Miller Center, http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3382

Geneva match the president's words. The secretary of state charged Bundy and other officials with national security portfolios to investigate "whether we had anything in the Geneva kit that met the language of the President's State of the Union Address."[114] At a retreat at Camp David the following week, arms control experts from the State Department, Pentagon, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Disarmament Agency held round-table talks to determine how best to put Johnson's words into action. A report issued by the World Council of Churches captured the tenor of the moment—"The Test Ban and Next Steps: From Co-Existence to Co-operation."[115]

Johnson delivered a major address on January 21 over nationwide television and radio, laying out a package of U.S. proposals featuring "collateral measures." The speech highlighted the need for international safeguards without distinguishing between a universal regime administered by the IAEA, preferred by AEC Commissioner Glenn Seaborg, and an ad-hoc system preserving a role for Euratom, which the theologians wanted. Johnson had specified the speech's "main objectives" in a letter to Khrushchev: nonproliferation, a fissile-material cutoff treaty, the redirection of fissile materials to peaceful uses, a comprehensive nuclear test ban, limitations on nuclear weapons systems, and progress toward general and complete disarmament.[116] The letter also presented an ambitious set of concrete proposals formulated at an extraordinary meeting chaired by Johnson and attended by Rusk, McNamara, Fisher, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

---

[114] Dean Rusk, Note to McGeorge Bundy, "Possible More Dramatic Proposals in Geneva," Box 10, SF-Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.

[115] Elfan Rees and O. Frederick Nolde, European Representative and Director, Letter to Foster with attached report, Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches, "Test Ban and Next Steps: From Co-Existence to Co-operation," 20 January 1964, Box 16, Foster Papers, GCML.

[116] President Johnson, Letter to Khrushchev, 18 January1964, in *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, 5. Quoted in Seaborg, *Stemming the Tide*, 7.

Maxwell Taylor, CIA Deputy Director Marshall Carter, and White House aides Bill Moyers and Jack Valenti. The cabinet agreed on a platform comprising the need to ban the use of force to settle international disputes (boilerplate to dispel Khrushchev's attack on "imperialists" as warmongers); produce a verified freeze on offensive and defensive nuclear weapons of strategic types; halt the production of fissile material for weapons work; establish observation posts to prevent an accidental war or surprise attack; and a non-proliferation treaty. The only item that failed to achieve broad consensus was unconditional U.S. support for nuclear-free zones in Latin America and Africa. Though Fisher pushed for their inclusion, Taylor retorted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff feared such a statement might trap the U.S. if a Warsaw Pact country suggested making Europe a nuclear preserve as well. Ultimately, the military argument carried the day. The United States endorsed regional solutions, but the support was contingent on a lack of restraints on its ability to station and transport nuclear weapons at places and times of its choosing.

Johnson was committed to carrying forward Kennedy's drive to improve relations with the Soviet Union. The new president saw arms control diplomacy as a lectern from which to preach "peace" as the ultimate goal of U.S. foreign policy. In his national address, Johnson concluded with the lofty remark that "[d]isarmament is not merely the government's business. … [i]t is everyone's business." According to AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg, however, Johnson's focus on Soviet-American détente by means of nuclear diplomacy was foreshortened by other events in the international field. "The Vietnam War," he stated, had already begun to "consume him."[117] Over the next three years, U.S. efforts to prevent a series of Southeast Asian regimes from falling under the

[117] Ibid., 16.

sway of nationalist forces would jam concurrent efforts to halt the tide of nuclear spread in South Asia.

Foster relayed Johnson's address in Geneva three days later. It was his first speech since Kennedy's death, and he put forward the suite of "collateral measures" as a continuation of his predecessor's legacy and a means by which to break the diplomatic impasse on disarmament. "Each of these proposed steps is important to peace … [none] is impossible of agreement," Foster suggested. He summed up, "[t]he best way to begin disarming is to begin." He compared the measures to the LTBT, "a modest step perhaps, but one which was achievable in today's world."[118] The emphasis on the U.S. side was to avoid being seen by non-aligned nations as indifferent to negotiated settlements and put forward trust-building measures, which Khrushchev called "a policy of reciprocal example." These small steps promised to build confidence and goodwill at minimal risk.

The Soviets submitted their proposals on January 28. The lead Soviet negotiator and ENDC co-chairman, Semyon Tsarapkin, called for the removal of foreign forces from alien territories (a shot across NATO's bow), a reduction in total troop numbers and military budgets, a nonaggression agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the establishment of nuclear-free zones, especially in Europe (the Rapacki Plan), a nonproliferation accord, the destruction of bomber aircraft, and a final consummation of the CTBT. When Foster compared the two packages, he noted the Soviet and American proposals overlapped in two areas: nuclear nonproliferation and a strategic freeze on bomber aircraft. He underlined this overlap in the notes for his forthcoming meeting with Tsarapkin.[119] The Soviets remained adamant, however, that a nonproliferation treaty was

---

[118] Prepared Statement, "Mr. Foster at the 157 Plenary of the ENDC," 24 January 1964, Box 16, Foster Papers, GCML.

[119] William Foster, "Talking Points for Co-Chairmen's Meeting," 29 January 1964, Box 16, Foster Papers, GCML.

impossible until the MLF was scuttled; "non-dissemination is nice," Tsarapkin told a correspondent of the *Agence France-Presse,* "but the chief obstacle is the American push for a multilateral force."[120]

The first tête-à-tête failed to bridge the Soviet-American divide, though nonproliferation was still a priority for both nations looking to head off the P.R.C. at the nuclear pass. Foster delivered his second speech to the ENDC on February 6, when he presented an argument to assign the highest priority to a nonproliferation treaty, citing the transnational and even planetary aftermath of a thermonuclear war, and equivalence between Soviet-American brinksmanship and proliferation:

> Non-nuclear nations have frequently expressed the fear of being caught in the cross fire of a nuclear exchange between the two nuclear sides. Certainly the deadly fallout which would result from such an exchange would not be confined within any particular set of national boundaries. But I think it is equally true that the security of non-nuclear powers will be decreased as among themselves by the wider dissemination of national nuclear weapons capabilities.[121]

The speech concluded with a plea to move forward seriously toward a mutually acceptable pact to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, "a conclusion to which both moral sense and national self-interest lead us." The universal import and global stakes created a concert of interest between East and West. "The interests of both nuclear sides overlap in this area," Foster averred; in addition, he observed that "the interests of the non-nuclear powers overlap with each other and with the existing nuclear powers."[122]

The official Soviet reply to Foster's speech bordered on outright rejection. The next day, Tsarapkin was at his most vociferous, castigating the U.S. for contemplating the

[120] Bernard de Chalvron, Geneva, Telegram to Paris, for the attention of M. Gastambide, "Conference on Disarmament," 23 January 1964, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.
[121] William Foster, "Statement to be made by William C. Foster to the 164th Plenary Meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament," Box 16, Foster Papers, GCML, 4. Underlining in the original.
[122] Ibid., 4. Emphasis in original.

provision of nuclear weapons to the Bundeswehr. The Soviet Union, he (falsely) proclaimed, had never considered such a course of action with the G.D.R., or the P.R.C.[123] He questioned the entire premise of a treaty barring the transfer of nuclear armaments or sensitive expertise, data, or equipment. "It was unnecessary to ask nuclear powers to undertake not to provide nuclear weapons to states without them," he insisted, "since none of them had that intention." De Gaulle would habitually assert such claims in the coming years. The crucial matter was to convince states not then possessing the atom bomb to forgo its development. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. exchanged oratorical blows in the session regarding the G.D.R.'s proposal that both German states publically forsake the military option. Tsarapkin read a lively denunciation of the F.R.G.'s "revanchist and militarist" stance. Foster lamented the "return of the Cold War" to the room, and belittled the call for a nuclear-free Central Europe by East Germany (whose existence the United States did not recognize) "as originating in a nongovernmental organization."[124]

The heated rhetoric made for good theater. Nevertheless, conversations outside of the plenary hall indicated its superficiality, if not downright artifice. Private discussions between Foster and his Soviet and Indian counterparts attested to a broad consensus emerging on nonproliferation in the ENDC in early 1964. The catalyst for this growing harmony between the residents of the East, West, and South was the prospect of a nuclear-armed China The secondary consideration was the constant maneuvering of non-aligned and non-nuclear states to push the superpowers toward a middle ground in the field of nuclear diplomacy. When Tsarapkin attacked Washington for its imperialist adventure in Vietnam, Foster suggested to Rusk in a cable sent on February 11 that the

[123] Bernard de Chalvron, Geneva, Telegram to Paris for Gastambide, "Conference sur le Désarmament," 7 February 1964, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF; Herve Alphand, New York, Telegram to Paris, "ENDC," Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.
[124] Ibid.

purpose of such criticism was perhaps not rank antipathy, or even scoring points with Third World delegations, but instead to "suggest again if [the] U.S. as [the] world's gigantic power and also [the] large Soviet Union were to reach agreements[,] all troubles in [the] world could be readily controlled by us."[125]

In a subsequent dialogue, Tsarapkin assured Foster that his over-heated remarks did not amount to [a] return to [the] Cold War." He cautioned that non-aligned and non-nuclear states, including their allies, were carving out a "middle ground" from which to pit the superpowers against on another:

> [Tsarapkin] [r]eiterated time and again that our two countries are self-sufficient and therefore have … no need to encroach upon each other, that they both bore great responsibility for what went on in [the] world and … they had to pay [the] price for this responsibility. They took line that all other countries, including France, China, India, UAR, … even [the] G.D.R., were playing [the] U.S. and U.S.S.R. against each other and were trying obtain advantage from differences and contradictions between them; they could do it in present circumstances but if U.S. and U.S.S.R. were to agree with each other everybody else would have no choice but to fall in line.[126]

The telegram to Rusk related the Soviet desire to improve relations with the U.S. at a critical moment when alliance fractures, Third World territorial disputes, and the revolution in strategic space-time heightened the risk of a superpower clash. Tsarapkin was speaking in his formal capacity as an ENDC co-chairman and in his informal role as a Soviet interlocutor, not as an architect of Soviet foreign policy. Even so, Soviet diplomats seldom overstepped their orders from the Kremlin. As the U.S. national security community absorbed the impact of Kennedy's death and his replacement by a less internationally minded president, and European theologians in Foggy War contended

---

[125] William Foster, Geneva, "Telegram from U.S. Mission Geneva to Dean Rusk, "Memorandum of Conversation between Foster and Tsarapkin," 11 February 1964, Box 11, SF-Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.
[126] William Foster, Geneva, "Telegram from U.S. Mission Geneva to Dean Rusk, "Memorandum of Conversation between Foster & Tsarapkin [2 of 2]," 11 February 1964, Box 11, SF-Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.

against de Gaulle amid European integration, Moscow seemed ready to embrace Soviet-American partnership in the nuclear realm, beginning with a nonproliferation agreement. At least, this was the assessment of the U.S. delegation in Geneva. At a staff meeting on February 27 to discuss "Mission and Tactics," the need to work with allied and non-aligned delegates was downplayed and the benefits of cozying up to the Soviets emphasized. The drift was that delegations besides that of the Soviet Union were of marginal importance.[127]

**Falling Angel**

Along with the German question, the P.R.C.'s expected entry into the nuclear club and its implications for India's defense policy were key areas of joint Soviet-American interest. The LTBT, the direct Kremlin-White House phone line, and Johnson's pledge to carry Kennedy's torch in foreign affairs made the winds of early 1964 seem favorable. The widespread notion that Communist China would soon test an atomic device raised the stakes. The threat of a Chinese bomb was especially troubling for the Republic of India because it posed a direct challenge to the country's longstanding policies of peaceful coexistence, non-alignment, and antinuclearism with their roots in Gandhian non-violence. Jawaharlal Nehru had elevated these principles into mainstays of Indian foreign policy in the attempt to recast the international system and India's place within it through soft power. Nonetheless, his record in the nuclear field was checkered. On the one hand, he had almost singly swung the non-aligned movement behind nuclear disarmament and arms control in the 1950s, first advancing and then constantly pushing for a nuclear test-ban treaty. There was a stark difference, however, between Nehru, the

[127] "Talking Points for the Staff Meeting on February 27," Folder 18, Box 16, Foster Papers, GCML.

politician, and his spiritual mentor, Mahatma Gandhi. These divergent paths were apparent in a resolution drafted jointly by Gandhi and Nehru and endorsed by the Indian National Congress on August 8, 1942:

> While the All India Congress Committee must primarily be concerned with the independence and defence of India in this our danger, the committee is of [the] opinion that the future peace, security and ordered progress of the world demand a world federation of free nations, and on no other basis can the problems of the modern world be solved. Such a world federation would ensure the freedom of its constituent nations, the prevention of aggression and exploitation by one nation over another, the protection of national minorities, the advancement of all backward areas and peoples, and the pooling of the world's resources for the common good of all.[128]

Gandhi invoked the resolution at the 1945 San Francisco Conference, but in truth he had reservations about its penultimate clause. He was skeptical of Western culture with its unreflective thirst for science and industry, and had doubted whether grafting it onto non-Western societies would result in "the advancement of all backward areas." For him, Hiroshima and Nagasaki illustrated "the most diabolical use of science" and commended the adoption of traditional Indian and Jain Buddhist beliefs by international society, in particular *ahimsa*, or non-violence against living beings.[129] Nehru, by contrast, embraced the logic of development and the value of advanced science and modern industry. He saw them as springboards with which India could overleap the gulf between the industrial and developing worlds—the nation's agrarian past and its glittering future.[130]

Nehru had imbibed Whiggish notions of limitless growth and abundance through scientific discovery and technological exploits, and a related faith in technocratic governance while a student at Cambridge University. Classic liberalism held that human

---

[128] Krishna Menon, *Krishna Menon on Disarmament: Speeches at the United Nations*, ed. E.S. Reedy and A.K. Damodaran, vol. III, III vols., Krishna Menon: Selected Speeches at the United Nations (New Delhi: Sanchar Publishing House, 1994), foreword.
[129] Mahatma Gandhi, "The Atom Bomb," http://www.mkgandhi.org/momgandhi/chap94.htm.
[130] Abraham, *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb*, 1–47.

potential was mainly bound up in the technological stage of advancement; to this precept, Nehru added a critique of colonialism. Nehru believed as many Indians did that the material advantages that European metropoles had wielded over their colonial possessions paved the way for the Age of maritime Empires and the imposition of the British Raj. India could most swiftly bridge the gap between itself and the imperial powers by leapfrogging them via innovative technological platforms. His views about the interaction among science, technology, and society guided how he thought the international system would operate after decolonization.[131]

These foundational ideas were clearly expressed in Nehru's response to skeptics who felt the strict secrecy of the 1948 Atomic Energy Act, which established the Indian Atomic Energy Agency (IAEC), betrayed the ulterior motives of India's supposedly peaceful program:

> [A]tomic energy is a vast source of power that is coming to the world … Consider the past few hundred years of history, the world developed a new source of power, that is steam—the steam engine and the like—and the industrial age came in. India with all her many virtues did not development that source of power. It became a backward country … it became a slave country because of that … Now we are facing the atomic age; we are on the verge of it. And this is obviously something infinitely more powerful than either steam or electricity. … [I]f we are to remain abreast in the world … we must develop this atomic energy quite apart from war—indeed we must develop it … for peaceful purposes. … Of course, if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way. But I do hope that our outlook in regard to this atomic energy is going to be a peaceful one for the development of human life and happiness and not one of war and hatred.[132]

The ghost of the colonial past haunted Nehru's words; in Itty Abraham's phrasing, Nehru located India in world-historical space, "where it [was] one among many, and where the

---

[131] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Essential Writings of Jawaharlal Nehru* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003); Shashi Tharoor, *Nehru: The Invention of India*, 1st ed (New York: Arcade Pub, 2003); V. R. Krishna Iyer, *Nehru and Krishna Menon* (Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1993).
[132] Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, 20.

historical epoch [was] marked by a non-human entity"—the presiding technological regime—the Nuclear Age. The face shown by India to the world should reflect Gandhian moral principles and faith in collective security; even so, if the choice was between an ethical stance and a return to subjugation, the country could ill afford nuclear forbearance. The legacy of British colonialism and the historical myth that India had suffered 150 years of colonization due to a technological gap led Nehru and his Congress Party to support nuclear power reflexively.

The dual-use applications of nuclear facilities, research, scientists, funding, and reactors appeared self-evident to Indian observers in 1948. George Perkovich characterizes Indian nuclear policy as entailing, from the beginning, a secret quest for a nuclear bomb. Such "nuclear ambivalence," he asserts, presented itself in the Atomic Energy Act and found personification in the close relationship between Nehru and Homi Bhabha, the director of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, chairman of the IAEC and, after 1954, and secretary of the Indian Department of Atomic Energy (IDAE). Both men were nationalistic in outlook and objectives, Western in education and self-image, and elitist in upbringing and tastes. Both were reared amid great wealth and power, educated at Cambridge, blessed with superior intelligence, recipients of global acclaim, and besotted with Western culture. The "Nehru-Bhabha relationship," Perkovich asserts, "constituted the only potentially real mechanism to check and balance the nuclear program;" instead, it was hampered by their overly "friendly and symbiotic" dealings.[133]

There was a fundamental contradiction between the global and the national in Nehru's worldview. Implicit in the resolution, for example, was faith in international

[133] Ibid., 21.

institutions such as the United Nations as the ultimate arbiters of interstate affairs. Against this globalist vision stood Indian nationalism coexisting with a historical anticolonialism that associated territory with a national community. Thus, Nehru and his lieutenant, Krishna Menon, the Indian Ambassador to the U.K. and subsequently the U.N., had waged a "crusade" against nuclear weapons testing and armament through 1963. Simultaneously, Nehru superintended the expansion of peaceful nuclear energy, which he saw as key to India's development. He supported the work done by Homi Bhabha and his subordinates at the IAEC and Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, whose exploits would later facilitate a "peaceful" nuclear explosive program. India was ambivalent about its nuclear future in the early 1960s. Whether it would tilt toward acquiring a military capability, or forbear it, hinged on public opinion, regional threats, and the ability of a "strategic enclave" of nuclear scientists to shape policy.[134]

Taking into account the sluggish development of military applications though, India's early nuclear history was driven less by ambiguity than by hedging.[135] Nuclear technology's so-called "dual-use" character means the precise origins of a military program are murky; to specify them is ultimately a matter of interpretation.[136] Though

---

[134] Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*; Abraham, *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb*; Itty Abraham, "The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories," *Osiris* 21, no. 1, Global Power Knowledge: Science and Technology in International Affairs (2006): 49–65; Susanna Schrafstetter, "Preventing the 'Smiling Buddha': British-Indian Nuclear Relations and the Commonwealth Nuclear Force, 1964-68," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 25, no. 3 (September 2002): 87–108.

[135] Here I differ from Itty Abraham, who claims that discourses that privilege nuclear weapons and proliferation have made historians and analysts prone to conflate military intent with technological capability, when nuclearization is not necessarily a foregone conclusion. It seems to me that, in the Indian case as well as others, nuclear options were kept open with changes to the security environment and domestic opinion firmly in mind. Abraham, "The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories."

[136] Perkovich's claim that early Indian nuclear policy displayed ambiguity intimates, for instance, that the policy vacuum belied a conscious effort at deception, which robes external circumstances of their perceptual significance to policymakers. Nehru understood the instrumentality of nuclear technology well: "I know how difficult it is for a line to be drawn between scientific work for peace and for war. This great force — atomic energy — that has suddenly come about through scientific research may be used for war or may be used for peace. We cannot neglect it because it may be used for war … we shall develop it, I hope, in co-operation with the rest of the world and for peaceful purposes. … Science has two faces like Janus: science

they were brethren, Nehru and Bhabha were long dead when Indira Gandhi placed her country's nuclear program on a military footing in 1971. Doubtlessly, Bhabha made decisions when he was India's nuclear superintendent whose motives held military implications, for instance, the promotion of a plutonium-dependent breeder reactor. These decisions had international dimensions as well; Bhabha had succeeded in September 1956, for instance, in preventing the new IAEA safeguard regime from overseeing plutonium reprocessing.[137] Even so, India's nuclear development was conditioned primarily by economic geography and political economy. The subcontinent lacked natural uranium but possessed a wealth of thorium-232; hence, the establishment of a breeder program reliant on plutonium and thorium reflected available domestic resources. On the other hand, the breeder program (ground broke at Trombay on a plutonium reprocessing plant in April 1961) alarmed American onlookers, among others, who were reluctant to permit fuel reprocessing that could surreptitiously yield enough fissile material to sprint to an atomic explosive in short order. Though Bhabha never denied the appeal of nuclear weapons, the choices he made while head of the IAEC were common to most national nuclear programs. Global elites viewed nuclear power as having the ability to spring India into modernity through widespread electrification. Laying the foundation for an advanced nuclear regime had the added benefit of allowing Indian officials to hedge their bets on the military option. They could delay a definitive policy decision with little to no sacrifice in terms of capability. Whether or not Bhahba had in mind peaceful explosives or nuclear weapons in the 1950s, initiating the subcritical

---

has its destructive side and a constructive, creative side. Both have gone on side by side and both still go on. […] Hiroshima became a symbol of this conflict." Quoted in Abraham, *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb*, 43.

[137] Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, 28. Bhabha's attacks on the unfairness of IAEA safeguards that would overly constraint the nuclear programs of developing countries seems to have occasioned the first use of the nuclear "haves" and "have-nots" trope whose utterance would saturate Indian nuclear rhetoric in the subsequent decades.

testing necessary to fabricate a plutonium-based explosive warranted a prime ministerial order.[138] As such, the launching of a military nuclear program needed a political command.

India's staunch opposition to nuclear weapons began to crack with the Sino-Indian War in 1962 and the signing of the LTBT in 1963. On October 20, 1962, at the apex of the Cuban Missile Crisis, a month-long conflict ensued when the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched attacks against Indian military positions in Aksai Chin and across the Nanka Chu River. The conflict was fought over a disputed colonial-era border, the northern McMahon Line, along which the Indian Army had deployed units in a provocative forward line, against the backdrop of Indian encroachment in Tibetan politics and, more broadly, Sino-India rivalry for Afro-Asian leadership. The outcome was a decisive Chinese victory, but ultimately a return to the territorial status quo ante bellum. Though India lost no territory (in a remote, rarified, and rugged region), the military setback was a national embarrassment that led to the sacking of Menon whom Nehru had recently appointed Defense Minister.

The fiery Menon was infamous for his upbraiding of imperialism, his pride in Indian achievement, and his asceticism cloaked in bespoke suits. He incarnated Indian soft power in the post-independence era, fronting rhetorical campaigns for decolonization and disarmament and against imperialist adventures in Suez and nuclear testing's

[138] Evidence of India hedging was exemplified by a note that Ashok Kapur reported Nehru to have scribbled in the margin of a letter from Bhabha that outlined the pertinent details of the Indo-Canadian nuclear deal to construct CANDU: "Apart from building power stations and developing electricity there is always a built-in advantage of defence use if the need should arise." Quoted in ibid., 63.. Perkovich maintains that India began theoretical work on nuclear explosives in late 1967, when Raja Ramanna, the director of the physics group at Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, instructed Rajagopala Chidambaram to derive the equation of state for plutonium, "a study necessary to design a nuclear explosive with a plutonium core." This line of thinking begs the question, however, of at what abstruse point in the study of nuclear physics a bomb-decision has been made. Moreover, the formulation of an equation of state remains academic until the politico-technical decision to initiate sub-critical testing of plutonium or enriched uranium is made. Ibid., 139–144.

environmental effects. His speech to the UNGA on November 2, 1959 on the subject of disarmament exemplified Menon's views and how India sought to leverage its moral capital to establish norms of international behavior:

> We firmly believe that it is possible to disarm this world. … For thousands of years men have talked about turning their weapons into plough-shares. But the time has now come when, if they do not turn them into instruments of peace, they will no longer be here to turn them into anything.[139]

Menon was neither an idealist nor an ideologue. He took a dim view of a U.N. Police Force, narrating it as a farce in which "Field Marshall [Dag] Hammarskjold['s]" would be placed in charge of a "large quantity of arms to convert him into a new Napoleon." "This is going the wrong way," he concluded sardonically.[140] As a U.N. Ambassador, he consistently placed collective security above India's parochial interest. In his final speech to the UNGA in 1962, he endorsed the principle of a non-dissemination treaty as of primary importance and claimed that India lacked the "national ego to possess atomic weapons." He kept these positions as Defence Minister, increasing spending on materiel and troops, but categorically opposing a military nuclear program. Menon's sacrifice in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian War lessened his influence within the government and consequently the status of antinuclear principles in the government. He would nonetheless remain a vocal and respected luminary in the Congress Party, offsetting Bhabhi's pronuclear declarations with fierce yet reasoned appeals for nuclear restraint and Indian moral leadership.[141] This leadership surfaced in the Indian response to the signing of the Moscow Treaty in August 1963. Its longstanding championship of a nuclear-free world and Nehru's legacy as an original author of a test ban led India to sign the LTBT with alacrity.

---

[139] Menon, *Krishna Menon on Disarmament: Speeches at the United Nations*, III: 9.
[140] Ibid., III: 11.
[141] Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, 74, 79, 83, 89, 132.,

Indian nuclear diplomacy began to change once the partial test-ban treaty took the hazard of transnational fallout out of the nuclear equation. The test ban preserved the global commons and was universal; by contrast, a nuclear nonproliferation treaty would formalize differences among states in the sensitive field of national security. At the time, however, a nonproliferation treaty enjoyed broad support from world leaders and other ENDC delegations, including the Indian contingent in Geneva. U.N. Secretary General U Thant sent a message upholding the need for "concrete measures" to improve East-West relations, employing his bully pulpit to push for real achievements. Jawaharlal's cousin, B.K. Nehru, the interim representative to the ENDC on leave from his ambassadorship in Washington, declared in early February 1964, "[t]he next few months are of crucial importance, for if there is a lack of progress in our work the earlier gains may be lost."[142] This urgency stemmed in part from a general sense that Soviet-American détente was necessary and fragile, and in part from the question of whether the international community could embark on a nonproliferation settlement with a Chinese test on the horizon. Nehru castigated China for refusing to sign the LTBT, but his remarks on nonproliferation were affirmative albeit non-committal. He concurred with Thant that "our efforts must be directed to reaching an agreement of general and complete disarmament;" however, he conceded, "it is also vitally important to maintain and strengthen détente." India hoped for collateral measures that could "bring about a further improvement in the international atmosphere;" the first such measure that he mentioned was non-dissemination.[143] Though reserved, the pronouncement was

[142] Final Verbatim Record of the 164th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 6 February 1964, Geneva, ENDC/PV.164, 22-29, quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/
[143] Final Verbatim Record of the 162nd Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 31 January 1964, Geneva, ENDC/PV.162, 8-15.

significant given that it came from a Nehru; nonetheless, the Indian position on a nonproliferation treaty remained clouded.

B. K. Nehru's ambivalence reflected shifting attitudes toward nuclear weapons that foreshadowed shifts in state behavior as well. Early proliferation warnings dwelt excessively on material indicators and postulated that the spread of nuclear weapons would follow a mathematical logic whereby each new member of the club would accelerate a global chain reaction. The reality was that each country evaluated the nuclear option through the lens of its own security interests (often regional), bureaucratic politics, and public declarations.[144] The nuclear orthodoxy resulting from the work of Thomas Schelling, Albert Wohlstetter, and others, had forged a mental space where nuclear deterrents were justifiable as instruments of peace. And a minority discourse associated with Pierre Gallois, a French military officer and strategists, had legitimated the notion that nuclear deterrents were not the sole preserve of the superpowers because their efficacy did not necessarily depend on a symmetry of nuclear forces. McNamara had given an exact accounting on February 19 of what the U.S. nuclear arsenal would comprise in 1969 in order to assure U.S. allies of its prodigious size, commensurate credibility, and total deterrent effect. Canadian diplomats cited this disclosure when they told the French observer in Geneva, Bernard de Chalvron, that they "were looking into the efficacy of a nominal deterrent of 100 missiles"—their own *force de frappe*.[145] Though most governments seized the cheaper option of evaluating a sovereign deterrent's expected costs and benefits, the revelation that Canada had pondered the military option

---

[144] Scott Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (Winter /97 1996): 54–86.

[145] Bernard de Chalvron, Geneva, "Telegram to Gastambide in Paris, "Conference sur le Désarmament," 19 February, 1964, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1.

showed how the stigma had weakened. Might even India, the foremost champion of general and complete disarmament and peaceful co-existence, waver?

How world statesmen viewed and debated general and complete disarmament exemplified the growing normalcy of nuclear deterrence and the corresponding traction of the nuclear orthodoxy. The U.S. deterrent had shielded the Atlantic alliance since 1949. Likewise, the U.S.S.R. relied increasingly on nuclear weapons on top of Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Europe. For years, Soviet diplomats had nonetheless insisted that disarmament was an end best achieved through reciprocal and unverified declarations rather than incremental steps as preferred by the West. Disarmament talks were often disparaged as breeding grounds for propaganda fights, tedious arcana, and outright deception; even so, U.S. officials spent large amounts of time, energy, and thought evaluating how best to disarm.[146] Indian leaders had worked diligently to stigmatize nuclear weapons and push for general and complete disarmament. Now though, they showed greater flexibility in their rhetoric at disarmament forums. In remarks made to the U.N. First Committee on October 30, 1963, Jawaharlal Nehru's sister, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, a major political figure in her own right (her attacks on South African apartheid were legendary), praised Andrei Gromyko's concession that a multi-stage plan would leave "a certain number of missiles by the two great Powers to the end of the last stage of disarmament." "Mr. Gromyko's agreement," she opined, "[was] the most significant development on the disarmament plan this year."[147] This rhetorical shift signaled with what import the international community viewed Soviet-American détente. It showed as well that nuclear deterrence was seen more and more by Indian

---

[146] David Tal, *The American Nuclear Disarmament Dilemma, 1945-1963*, 1st ed, Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution (Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 2008).

[147] A/C.1/PV.1321, 37. Cited in the Final Verbatim Record of the 163rd Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 4 February 1964, Geneva, ENDC/PV.163, 26.

elites, among others, as a stabilizing force rather than a moral evil to be extirpated from the world.

Indian policy on nuclear weapons and nonproliferation was highly malleable in 1964. Indian diplomats and scientists released a number of trial balloons at the U.N., ENDC, and Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, along with bilateral feelers to the U.S. and U.S.S.R., to broadcast their mounting sense of insecurity relative to China and resultant contemplation of nuclear alternatives. The Indian nuclear industry's chief booster and, in the coming months, an increasingly outspoken advocate of an Indian Bomb, Homi Bhabha, delivered one such address in early 1964. Though Bhahba would publically support a military nuclear program later that year, his speech at the Pugwash Conference in Udaipur, India, reflected Indian foreign policy:

> [N]uclear weapons coupled with an adequate delivery system can enable a State to acquire the capacity to destroy more or less totally the cities, industry and all important targets in another state. It is then largely irrelevant whether the State so attacked has greater destructive power at its command. With the help of nuclear weapons, therefore, a State can acquire what we may call a position of absolute deterrence even against another having a many times greater destructive power under its control.[148]

Behind the allusion to asymmetric nuclear deterrence lurked the figure of Gallois. Later in the speech, Bhabha conjured the image of the P.R.C. He warned that "a country with a huge population always present[s] a threat to its smaller neighbors," which "they can meet either by collective security or by recourse to nuclear weapons." He observed that it would require security guarantees from "both the major nuclear powers" to replace the security afforded by a national deterrent. Several states had the technical means and human and financial capital to build nuclear weapons "within the next 5 or 10 years," reflecting the pervasiveness of N$^{th}$-country estimates and implying not too subtly that

[148] Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, 60–61.

India stood among them. Bhabha's private conversations were as candid as his public remarks, and India's capacity to develop a military nuclear capability was common knowledge among international observers. A trio of individuals who would eventually hold the reins of Indian nuclear policy sat in the audience that day: Vikram Sarabhai, future chairman of the IAEC; V.C. Trivedi, India's lead negotiator in nonproliferation talks; and Indira Gandhi, the future prime minister.[149]

The nuclear scientist held back from an insistence on India's right to go nuclear. Instead, he conceded that the further spread of nuclear weapons would heighten global insecurity and imperil superpower détente. Bhabha identified two means by which the superpowers could persuade countries, such as India, to abandon their circumstantial leanings toward nuclear weapons. Either the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could blaze a trail toward nuclear disarmament, or they could issue joint security guarantees to put the minds of jumpy statesmen at ease.[150] The task of preventing a nuclear India would toughen after China's test in October. For now, however, even India's most avid nuclear optimist had conceded that India could forgo a nuclear capability under two conditions. Whether a non-nuclear India was attainable by means of disarmament (a quixotic hope) or Soviet-American nuclear assurances (a singular response to a universal threat) would determine the strength and scope of any nonproliferation treaty. For now, however, a window of opportunity seemed narrowly open.

Comments by B.K. Nehru at the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament in February 1964 expanded upon Bhabha's observations. After again decrying the P.R.C.'s failure to sign the LTBT, Nehru remarked that India considered it insufficient "to rely for international peace-keeping on the limited deterrent in the hands of the two great

---

[149] Ibid., 61.
[150] Ibid., 62.

Powers."[151] He declined to outline how international security could be strengthened without nuclear spread. Days later, Tsarapkin expressed his government's acknowledgement of "an intimate link between the retention and abolition of national nuclear deterrents and the problem of international peace-keeping." This was unsurprising given India's importance as a key non-aligned, left-leaning state on which Moscow bestowed favors, endorsements, and arms sales for purposes of political, ideological, and economic influence.[152] New Delhi's willingness to sign a nonproliferation treaty would depend on the ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to allay its security fears through unilateral or mutual security assurances, or to rid the world of nuclear weapons beginning with the People's Republic of China.

Washington began to reassess its approach to South Asia in light of changing politico-military circumstances. The U.S. had long relied on Pakistan as a regional bulwark against Soviet influence and a staging ground for surveillance in the form of seismic monitoring and U-2 over-flights. Though self-professedly non-aligned, India had tacked toward Washington as soon as the 1962 Sino-Indian War (and Cuban Missile Crisis) broke out, pleading for military aid in the form of twelve squadrons of fighter jets, some B-47 bombers, and light equipment for its infantry. The U.S. also promised to deploy the *USS Enterprise* to the Bay of Bengal to pacify the Indians. The U.S. arms package upset Pakistan, where President Mohammad Ayub Khan would resist domestic pressure to invade Kashmir, but remained unwilling to make "a positive gesture of sympathy and restraint."[153]

---

[151] Final Verbatim Record of the 165th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 11 February 1964, Geneva, ENDC/PV.165, 15.
[152] Final Verbatim Record of the 167th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 18 February 1964, Geneva, ENDC/PV.167, 28.
[153] Khan, *Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb*, 40.

The Johnson administration had sent Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Maxwell Taylor to South Asia to discuss security matters in December 1963. In India, former Finance Minister Morarji Desa answered Taylor's queries about the ramifications of a Chinese nuclear explosion in India with the suggestion that there would be "political pressure on the G[overment] o[f] I[ndia] to produce nuclear weapons, which [it] could attain in a couple of years if it decided to try."[154] Rusk informed the U.S. Embassy in Karachi, where Pakistan was receiving $625 million per year from Washington, to prepare the Pakistani leadership to accept more U.S. support heading to India in order to buttress Indian and Pakistani "self-defense" as an "essential element" in "our subcontinental policy of deterring Chinese Communist expansionism."[155] U.S. policy to India now ran along two axes: military assistance and nuclear nonproliferation. With the U.S. ever more embroiled in Vietnam, and South Asia the feared next front of communist subversion, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations hoped that weapons transfers and low-interest loans would moderate India's socialist leanings. In New Delhi, U.S. Ambassador Chester Bowles lobbied for Washington to urge India to "place reasonable limits on its military forces." In a December 6 telegram, he underlined Taylor's proposal for a three-to-five-year military assistance program including the provision of high performance aircraft. He also proposed assigning a naval task force in the Indian Ocean for part of each year to "ease Asian fears … following detonation [of a] Chicom nuclear device."[156]

[154] Chester Bowles, New Delhi, Telegram to Dean Rusk et al, "Summary of General Taylor's discussion with Indian officials," undated, Box 128, Country File—India, NSF, LBJL, 4. Hereinafter CF-India.
[155] Dean Rusk (written by Assistant Secretary of State Philip Talbot), Telegram to Karachi, cc New Delhi, "Next Steps," December 3, 1963, Box 128, CF-India, NSF, LBJL, 1.
[156] Chester Bowles, New Delhi, Telegram to Washington, cc Karachi, to the President, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Harriman, Talbot, and Bundy, "South Asian policy," 6, December 1963, Box 128, CF-India, NSF, LBJL, 1-2.

Bowles sent a follow-up telegram four days later to reiterate his point. He urged the State Department and White House to recognize that "India … is the only major nation that wholly shares our views in regard to China."[157] The desire to revise U.S. policy in South Asia, tilting toward India and away from Pakistan without alienating Karachi, stemmed in part from a tactical objective of preventing a Soviet sale of MIG-21s to New Delhi against which Bowles and Taylor cited military, financial, and public relations arguments. With Vietnam teetering and China the bête noire in early 1964, Bowles warned that "if Southeast Asia goes under, India with its 450 million people becomes [the] political, economic and military front in conflict with China in Asia." His rationale was geopolitical rather than ideological. With Eisenhower's domino theory regnant and Ngo Dinh Diem dead, "an economically viable, politically stable, Western-oriented India is of absolutely basic importance to US security interests between [the] Sea of Japan and [the] Mediterranean."[158] The result was a U.S. promise of $500 million in a mixture of low-interest financing and grants to assist the Indian military buildup.[159] The resistance of the Pentagon, which feared upsetting relations with Pakistan, stymied a large portion of a planned arms sale to India including a fleet of F-104s. As a result, Prime Minister Lal Badahur Shastri, who had replaced Jawaharlal Nehru after he died from a heart attack in May, reached an agreement with the Soviet Union to supply dozens of MIG-21s together with a factory with which to build hundreds more.

Though Foggy Bottom was excited at the prospect of improving U.S.-Indian relations, Rusk worried that an Indo-Pakistani conventional arms race would lead

---

[157] Chester Bowles, New Delhi, Telegram to Dean Rusk, "Politico-Military Balance in South Asia," Box 128, CF-India, NSF, LBJL, 1.
[158] Chester Bowles, New Delhi, Telegram to Dean Rusk, "U.S. Politico-Military assistance to India," 20 February 1964," Box 128, CF-India, NSF, LBJL, 2.
[159] Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 45. The Johnson administration would hold out the promise of deploying a U.S. carrier group near the subcontinent as a carrot to induce the Shastri government to eschew a military nuclear program.

inexorably to a nuclear arms race. In a conversation with Mexican Foreign Minister Manuel Tello on February 21, 1964, Rusk observed that arms control no longer encompassed the superpowers alone; he spotlighted the South Asian rivals along with Israel and the U.A.R., and Ethiopia and Somalia as the regional powers most likely to engage in arms races. He noted "a coincidence of policy in Moscow, London, Washington and Paris in an effort to achieve nuclear arms control."[160] He could only have meant nonproliferation; it was the only measure then generating traction in Geneva and on which France had a tacit interest. Three days later, Deputy Director of Research George C. Denny, Jr. sent Rusk a memorandum from Foggy Bottom warning him that India was capable of launching a military nuclear program in short order given the political will:

> New information has recently come to hand on the Indian reactor and plutonium separation facilities which suggests that within four to six months India will be able to [and] may intend to produce weapons-grade plutonium free of any safeguards. While we have no other evidence that they are starting a nuclear weapons program, they are now in a position to put together a crude device within 1 to 3 years of the start up of their plutonium facility, scheduled for May of this year.[161]

A report in March from the Department of Energy underscored the spread of technical means of producing fissile material and atom bombs, although it left India out of its forecasts. These findings identified a new threat vector in nuclear acquisition strategies. Where previous forecasts had focused on plutonium generated on the back-end of the fuel cycle as the most likely route along which a country might pursue nuclear weapons, an engineering working group at the Union Carbide Company's Nuclear Division had

---

[160] Memorandum of Conversation between Dean Rusk and Manuel Tello, "Control of Nuclear Weapons & Disarmament," 21 February 1964, CF, Box 59, CF—Latin American-Honduras, NSF, LBJL.
[161] George C. Denny Jr., Intelligence and Research Division, Memorandum to Dean Rusk, "Possible Indian Nuclear Weapons Development," 24 February 1964, Box 128, CF-India, NSF, LBJL.

experimented with gas centrifuges to ascertain how states at various levels of industrial development might obtain sufficient fissile material in the form of highly enriched uranium to outfit an atomic explosive. This enrichment pathway's small footprint lent itself to clandestine operation, the report concluded, and would make it "feasible for the countries described in this report which do not now have a nuclear weapons program to produce enriched uranium."[162] The non-communist countries identified as technically capable of utilizing the enriched uranium pathway were West Germany, England, the Netherlands, and Japan, with Brazil and France on the fringes. Though a technical capacity was a necessary but not sufficient condition for a country to go nuclear, the implications were clear. Additionally, new intelligence (whose sources might have included the Indian leadership) suggested that India, Israel, and Sweden were more nuclear-capable then expected.

Thomas Hughes, director of the State Department's Office of Intelligence and Research, asked CIA Director John McCone to revise the Nth-country forecasts in the agency's National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) by fall 1964.[163] Predictions were therefore multiplying that a nuclear India was in the cards. The NIE published on October 21 concluded that "India, and perhaps Israel and Sweden" were the most likely to develop nuclear weapons, but "there will not be a widespread proliferation … over the next decade." With regard to New Delhi, the decision would boil down to how quickly China's arsenal expanded, what happened in Sino-Soviet relations, and the availability of "outside assurances." With India's current plutonium production capable of fueling a dozen

[162] S.A. Levin, L.R. Powers, E. Von Halle, Union Carbide Corporation Nuclear Division, "Nth Power Evaluation," 4 March 1964, Department of Energy, p. 11. The section treating "other countries" of which Israel and India might have been addressed has been excised from the document.
[163] Thomas Hughes, Director, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, Letter to Director of Central Intelligence John McCone, "Likelihood and Consequence of a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems," Nuclear Proliferation Collection, Cold War International History Project, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115993. Hereinafter NPTC, CWIHP.

Hiroshima-size atom bombs by 1970, "the chances are better than ever that Indian [would] decide to develop nuclear weapons within the next few years."[164]

## Explosives and Elections

With the 1964 U.S. presidential election on the horizon, Foster remained sanguine about Soviet-American agreement on the essence of a nonproliferation treaty. The State Department had strongly recommended that the U.S. distance itself from the Gomulka Proposal for a nuclear-free-zone in Europe owing to its disadvantages for NATO's defense posture.[165] Foster had instead focused his energy on his frequent conversations with his co-chairman, Semyon Tsarapkin. This itinerary went unbroken even when a KGB agent in the Soviet delegation named Yuri Nosenko defected to the CIA in Geneva—a significant diplomatic incident.[166] Foster believed that the "atmosphere [was] good," and the "mutual interests of the United States and the Soviet Union appeared increasingly clear." Moreover, McNamara's disclosure of the country's massive nuclear power had shown the Soviets the wisdom of a nuclear freeze. Finally, he doubted that space-based systems or anti-missile defenses would revolutionize strategic affairs in the near future.

---

[164] CIA National Intelligence Report number 4-2-64, "Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons over the Next Decade," NPTC, CWIHP, 7. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115994.
[165] State Department, Memorandum for the Record, "The Gomulka Proposal," 2 April 1964, Box 10, SF-Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.
[166] Hervé Alphand, Washington, Telegram to Paris, "Interview with one of William Foster's confidants at ACDA," 13 March 1964, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1. Nosenko had been recruited by the CIA in Geneva in 1962 and insisted on his urgent need to defect because of his belief that the KGB had identified him as a turncoat. At his debriefing, he provided information that corroborated Soviet claims they had never recruited Lee Harvey Oswald due to perceived mental issues. Nosenko claimed he had handled the Oswald case himself, but was harshly dealt with in light of American suspicions of Soviet involvement in the Kennedy assassination and the contradictory testimony of another defector. T. H Bagley, *Spy Wars Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).

According to a member of the U.S. delegation at Geneva, Tsarapkin was equally interested in a Soviet-American agreement. He had informed Foster that Soviet intelligence was perfectly aware of the state of talks between the U.S. and the F.R.G. "They have asked you to renounce, after a certain amount of time, your veto rights for the Europeans' sake, or even for them alone," Tsarapkin reportedly said, "and you have not set them straight." Foster informed Tsarapkin that his reservations about the MLF were much ado about nothing; "no promises had been made to the Germans and, regardless, the problem would not arise for a dozen years. "This was more than enough time," Foster concluded, "for us to reach an understanding in this area."[167] On the other hand, Jacob Beam of the Disarmament Agency and Foy Kohler, the U.S. ambassador to the U.S.S.R., were both of the opinion that Soviet action was paralyzed by the Sino-Soviet split; according to Kohler, they were "obligated to filter all foreign policy moves through the litmus of their quarrel with the Chinese."[168] The Soviets appeared to hang in the balance, vacillating between preventing a nuclear P.R.C. from arising and averting defections by their Eastern European allies if they appeared to tack too far toward the United States.

Washington and Moscow still courted the F.R.G., which tied Foster's hands even as he tried to shake those of Tsarapkin on a deal. Though Gomulka had thwarted Khrushchev on the MLF, the Soviet leader had vexed the communist leaderships in both Poland and East Germany. Khrushchev and Ulbricht rebuffed Erhard's attempt to whet their appetites t for reunification with commercial sweeteners for East Germany and the Soviet Union, whose financial and agricultural sectors were in trouble. Khrushchev

[167] Ibid., 3-4.
[168] Hervé Alphand, Washington, Telegram to Paris, "Conversation with M. Beam of ACDA re ENDC," 1 April 1964, Box 768, Cote 517/INVA, AMAEF, 1-2; Foy Kohler, Moscow, Telegram to Dean Rusk, 24 January 1964, *FRUS 1964-1968*, Vol. XV, Germany and Berlin, Document 6, 13-15.

nevertheless invited the chancellor to visit Moscow at the end of March in order to clear the air. Foggy Bottom meanwhile scrutinized relations with the F.R.G. in connection to the MLF. Its diplomats canvassed U.S. allies in NATO, in particular Italy and Great Britain, and organized a demonstration featuring a mixed-manned U.S. destroyer. The White House's position on reconciling NATO nuclear-sharing and nonproliferation language had ossified. In a letter from the President to Erhard on March 4, Johnson noted "little significant progress" in Geneva and touched on the talks primarily in relation to "achiev[ing] a free and reunified Germany." Though he discussed the Cyprus and Vietnam crises and West German help with applying sanctions to Cuba, he failed to mention the multilateral force.[169]

A full accounting of whether the administration should align itself behind a more integrated role for West Germany and other NATO members in nuclear-sharing arrangements or, alternatively, Soviet-American nuclear cooperation occurred in the Oval Office on April 10. The president presided over a late-afternoon meeting attended by Ball, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Thomas Finletter, Foster, Rostow, Bundy, and a few others. Ball began the meeting by "stressing the danger of perpetuating German discrimination" in NATO's nuclear forces, "emphasizing the need for giving the Germans a legitimate role … but 'on a leash.'" He cited the lack of congressional opposition (a questionable claim) and the potential to secure an agreement by the end of the year. Bundy declared that even though there was a "consensus," "serious reservations" existed among U.S. foreign policymakers such as McNamara, Foster, and the Joint Chiefs. That being said, the collective force would preserve the U.S. role in Europe and offer incentives for the British and French to relinquish their atomic arsenals.

[169] Lyndon B. Johnson, Letter to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 4 March 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XV, Germany and Berlin, Document 15, 27-30.

Ball and Finletter framed the question as one of resolve. The British and Italians, they posited, hesitated because they doubted the levels of investment under Kennedy and, then, Johnson. It was mixed U.S. signals, rather than political conditions, that unsettled the allies.[170]

Foster interrupted at this point in the discussion. He called into question the existence of Bundy's "consensus" and pressed home Moscow's "strongly negative view" of the scheme. He warned that the MLF could end up "tying U.S. hands in such [a] way that it could be immobilized in future disarmament and non-dissemination discussions." He directly contradicted a recent memorandum from Foy Kohler in which the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow averred that "Soviet leaders find [the] MLF less objectionable than the kinds of MRBM arrangements that might come about in its absence" and maintained there was "no evidence" that the MLF impeded progress. Foster disagreed categorically, asserting that "[i]t did not coincide with his impressions from his talks" with Tsarapkin in Geneva. Foster stopped short of fully condemning the MLF, but advised that, if it must be policy, it should be completed with "all deliberate speed."[171]

Johnson approved further steps in spite of Foster's dissent. Officials from the State Department would brief members of the key committees on Capitol Hill and emphasize to NATO allies the superiority of the MLF to known alternatives without "trying to shove the project down the[ir] throats." Foster could have hammered his points home more strongly; the MLF was undeniably what obstructed a nonproliferation treaty. However, the deck was stacked against pro-treaty voices before the meeting began. Bundy's impartiality and Rusk's absence were decisive. Rusk held a broad portfolio and was well

---

[170] Memorandum of Discussion at the White House, "MLF," 10 April 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIII, Western Europe Region, Document 16, 35-37.
[171] Ibid.

informed about nuclear-weapon programs in Israel, Sweden, and India. Ball ran the show in his absence, accentuating the positives and repackaging the negatives as further grounds for U.S. commitment.

While the Johnson administration failed to embrace a global treaty, more limited measures such as limiting peaceful nuclear assistance gained traction. That same month, the State Department refused an F.R.G. request for a fast-burst reactor named Triga. Shortly afterward, Johnson and Khrushchev simultaneously announced major cutbacks in the production of enriched uranium, as well as plutonium in the U.S. Though largely immaterial relative to an accelerating nuclear arms race, the joint announcement did signal the superpowers' willingness to cooperate.

Cooperation on nonproliferation by contrast stagnated that summer. Johnson's oral message to Khrushchev on May 1 neglected the matter entirely.[172] The Soviet premier's disarming response and the lack of American follow-up were symptomatic of policy inertia. Khrushchev expressed support for a joint Soviet-American initiative on the desalination of saltwater by means of nuclear power. He also urged greater action and personal engagement in the Geneva talks:

> Now you are in favor of our [disarmament] representatives … being instructed to make a really persistent effort to reach agreement in this important area. Why not? Let them work a little longer, and a little harder; we have to explore every possibility to the end …. We shall give our representative in the Committee of 18 the necessary instructions. And to increase the chances of success, to ensure that the disarmament negotiations do not again sink into routine, let us both follow the work of our representatives more closely; let us prod them a little if that is needed. … I am thinking that sometime soon it might be useful to instruct our ministers of foreign affairs to examine the course of the negotiations[;] … for example, during the XIX Session of the General Assembly of the UN. … Let us see what concrete results can be achieved by our ministers. And then, perhaps, the need will arise for

[172] Lyndon Johnson, Oral Message to Chairman Khrushchev, 1 May 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 26, 54-56.

us to meet. We understand that similar views are current in Washington also. But this is, of course, a matter for the future. We should not run too far ahead.[173]

Khrushchev was right that disarmament talks and especially the most achievable measure—a nonproliferation agreement—were moribund and therefore "matters for the future." In light of American inflexibility on the MLF, it would take a high-level decision to prioritize international arms control in order to untangle the Gordian knot of international nuclear diplomacy. The impasse was partly caused by the complaints against U.S. nonproliferation being leveled by Bonn's representatives. West German obstreperousness came through in a conversation between U.S. Ambassador and Acting Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Llewellyn Thompson and Ambassador Knappstein on August 5. The West German envoy passed along an aide-mémoire conveying "great concern" about how assiduously Foster and his aides worked for a nonproliferation treaty in Geneva. The Germans felt the issue was being "exploited by the Soviets as a welcome means to discredit [them] in the eyes of the world."[174] As a result of West German complaints and U.S. bureaucratic politics, the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament was little closer to a nonproliferation treaty when it recessed on September 17.

The United States and the United Kingdom were poised to elect new governments in October 1964. With Barry Goldwater's defeat of Nelson Rockefeller at the Republican convention, Johnson faced a challenger whose isolationist and unorthodox views on U.S. military power matched his libertarian domestic beliefs in the degree of their nonconformity with the postwar liberal consensus.[175] The candidacy of

[173] Nikita Khrushchev, "Oral Message to President Johnson," 5 June 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc 31, 66-68.
[174] Llewellyn Thompson, Memorandum for Dean Rusk, "ACDA Memorandum on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 46, 112-117, footnote 6.
[175] The foreign policy battlefield of the Johnson-Goldwater contest has been treated as a sideshow in historical treatments that depict a campaign largely fought over the role of federal government and the fate

Goldwater, whose views on nuclear weapons diverged considerably from the nuclear orthodoxy, brought the negotiations in Geneva and New York City to an effective halt.[176] The Soviets had an inkling of what to expect from Lyndon Johnson. By contrast, Barry Goldwater had suggested that selective proliferation to U.S. allies and proxies might be in the country's interests. Soviet delegates in Geneva informed the French that they expected scant progress to occur during the elections.[177]

Goldwater's observations about the strategic advantages of selective proliferation and the military utility of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe or for defoliation purposes in Vietnam contradicted a core tenet of the nuclear orthodoxy—nuclear weapons' sole legitimate use was deterrence and their spread was impermissible. The notion that U.S. commanders should treat them as equivalent to conventional weapons and that their spread could actually enhance national security were so far beyond the norms that they essentially torpedoed Goldwater's presidential chances. Goldwater's undoing came at the hands of a little girl in a field of daisies. The "Daisy Ad" aired only once on national television because of its controversial nature. In it, a young girl was seen picking petals from a daisy and struggling to count them correctly before a male voice replaced hers, ominously intoning the digits from ten to zero, when a fiery mushroom cloud replaced the bucolic scene. The voiceover informed the audience: "These are the stakes, to make a world in which all of God's children can live, or to go into the dark. We must either love each other, or we must die." The campaign advertisement ended with a voice directing the audience to "Vote for President Johnson on November 3rd; the stakes are too high for

---

of the New Deal Rick Perlstein, *Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus*, 1st ed (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001).

[176] Hervé Alphand, Washington, Telegram to Paris, "Soviet views on potential for ENDC progress," 5 May 1964, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

[177] Ibid.

you to stay home."[178] The Daisy ad was significant in numerous respects—the invention of the campaign attack ad, the limits of political discourse, and Johnson's stratospheric victory. In many ways, the little girl in the field foregrounded the constellation of images, fears, and pathos that thermonuclear war evoked: the death of a generation, the obliteration of nature, and the association of peace and love with the heavy burden of paternal political leadership.

The United Kingdom underwent a parliamentary election as well that would vault the Labour Party into Whitehall once more. The Labour Party had more than flirted with unilateral nuclear disarmament when the party's union-backed elements trumped agitators from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament when writing the electoral platform.[179] Harold Wilson's shadow defense minister, Denis Healey, came out against the MLF on whose desirability the Conservative Party had repeatedly equivocated. London had a strong stake in international nuclear diplomacy, which allowed the country to capitalized on its status as a nuclear power and for which the British invoked their national identity as a moral standard.[180] The Conservative government under Macmillan wanted to replicate its key intermediary role in test-ban negotiations. Nuclear proliferation presented a threat to Britain's global prestige based on strong sterling, moral capital, and nuclear power, as well as its status as a major power in Europe. Furthermore, the British Isles' compactness made the country vulnerable to even a small thermonuclear attack. A modern deterrent based on the Polaris missile system gave Britain a seat at the table while massive protests at Aldermaston and London

---

[178] Robert Mann, *Daisy Petals and Mushroom Clouds: LBJ, Barry Goldwater, and the Ad That Changed American Politics* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011).
[179] Tony Southhall and Julian Atkinson, *CND 1958-1963: Lessons of the First Wave* (York: Open Road Printing Co-operative, 1981).
[180] J. Burkett, "Re-defining British Morality: 'Britishness' and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 1958-68," *Twentieth Century British History* 21, no. 2 (March 29, 2010): 184–205, doi:10.1093/tcbh/hwp057.

organized by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament made proactive nuclear diplomacy a political necessity; the country's pursuit of moral capital would appease domestic audiences and burnish its global reputation. U.K. Foreign Minister Richard Austen Butler arrived in Geneva on February 24 in hopes that Gromyko would follow his lead. His primary reason for arriving was not to hasten a nonproliferation treaty, or other measures encompassed by disarmament, but instead not "to allow the opposition [Labour Party] to outstrip [the Conservative Party] in the disarmament field." The ENDC could not be allowed to "interrupt its work."[181]

The United Kingdom's investment in nuclear arms control received a boost when Harold Wilson and the Labour Party won the general parliamentary election on October 16, 1964. Notwithstanding the subtraction of unilateral disarmament from the Labour Party's platform in the leadership contest between George Brown and Wilson in 1963, Wilson felt obliged to lend tangible support to arms control to offset sky-high costs and recurrent controversy attending the country's pursuit of a Polaris submarine fleet. Whether drafted by Conservative or Labour MPs, the U.K. Foreign Ministry viewed a nonproliferation treaty as a continuation of their policy of moral leadership and, after the blast of a Chinese nuclear device on the same day as the election, a means by which to stop the Commonwealth state of India from following in the P.R.C.'s footsteps.[182] Foreign Minister Patrick Gordon Walker, who would leave office after failing to win re-election to Parliament, brought the defence editor at *The Times*, Lord Alun Chalfont, into the Wilson government as the first Minister of Disarmament.[183] For the moment, however, the U.K.

---

[181] Geoffroy Chordon de Courcel, London, Telegram to Paris, "Butler's visit to Geneva," 26 February 1964, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.
[182] Schrafstetter, "Preventing the 'Smiling Buddha': British-Indian Nuclear Relations and the Commonwealth Nuclear Force, 1964-68."
[183] Alun Jones Chalfont, *The Shadow of My Hand* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2000).

played only a bit part in Geneva as the forthcoming parliamentary elections transfixed public attention and hindered government action.

The United States had regarded the People's Republic of China in possession of a nuclear arsenal as the worst case of the Nth-country problem. As a result, its leaders had contemplated a preventive strike against Chinese nuclear facilities. Foster recorded that Kennedy seriously considered sacrificing the MLF to buy Soviet tacit support for an U.S. attack.[184] Under Kennedy's instructions, Bundy explored a range of options to reconnoiter and destroy the Communist Chinese nuclear program, such as U-2 overflights and CIA intelligence gathering, the dispatch of National Chinese commandos, and contingency plans to conduct a decisive bombing raid. The Joint Chiefs began evaluating options for "aborting the ChiCom nuclear capability" in spring 1963 and released a top secret report in April outlining four options. First, the United States could attempt to influence the P.R.C.'s political orientation through international agreements such as a test-ban treaty. Second, the application of sanctions through an embargo mechanism could also modify the communist power's incentives for action. Third, the U.S. could put in place a full-scale blockade of the country. If these three options failed to achieve an end to the P.R.C.'s nuclear ambitions, the Joint Chiefs envisaged destroying its nuclear facilities:

> <u>Fourth Level: Destruction of Nuclear Installations –</u> The fourth level of action thus might be taken either deliberately or in connection with a containment of ChiCom offensive action. Jointly conducted U.S.-Soviet air strikes, using conventional rather than nuclear weapons, would destroy a selected minimum complex of installations in China that would together constitute the actual or

[184] William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Whether to 'Strangle the Baby in the Cradle:' The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64"," *International Security* 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000): 2; Gordon H. Chang, "JFK, China, and the Bomb," *The Journal of American History* 74, no. 4 (March 1998): 1287–1310.

potential nuclear capability. This action would not involve invasion or land combat in China."[185]

Acting Chairman of the Joints Chief Curtis LeMay nevertheless advised that it was "unrealistic to use overt military force" because a bombing strike was operationally difficult and either a unilateral blockade or a bombing raid could prove counterproductive without the tacit or public Soviet acquiescence. The action would appear illegitimate to the international community and risk retaliation or escalation in East Asia without Soviet backing.

With this goal in mind, Bundy met with Anatoly Dobrynin, the longstanding Soviet ambassador to the United States, on May 17, 1963 to gauge whether Moscow was willing to work with Washington to put an end to Beijing's nuclear program. Dobrynin dismissed the overture by citing the MLF project which the Soviet ambassador complained "did not make it easier for the Soviet Government to deal with the question of Chinese nuclear ambitions," probably because of the tensile forces that both matters exerted on the Soviet relationship with East European allies.[186] Dobrynin refused to address the Chinese nuclear threat while a multilateral nuclear force remained on the table.

The interest of United States policymakers in staving off the P.R.C.'s entry into the nuclear club wavered after Kennedy's death. A review by Robert Johnson of the Policy Planning Council at the State Department downplayed the threat posed to the country by a Chinese nuclear capability. He maintained that the sizable disparity between the vast U.S. arsenal and the nascent P.R.C. force could not justify the level of

[185] Memorandum to the Subcommittee of Deputies from the Working Group No. 4, "Report on the subject of nuclear containment and non-proliferation," U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, TAB H, "JCS Study of Chinese Communist Vulnerability (JCSM-343-63 Top Secret Separately Available), TAB E … Chinese Analysis, "Aborting the Chicom Nuclear Capability," 17 June 1963, Llewellyn Thompson Papers, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
[186] Quoted in Burr and Richelson, "Whether to 'Strangle the Baby in the Cradle'," 17.

consternation among U.S. security experts. "Communist China will try rather to use its nuclear capability," he soothed, "to weaken the will of Asian countries" as well as to undercut U.S. military power in the region and elevate its global prestige.[187] He concluded that Soviet cooperation was "more likely to be tacit than explicit."[188] In a subsequent report, Johnson asserted that a U.S. strike was not justified in light of the threat, would only serve as a spoiler delaying the program by, at most, four or five years, and entail "great political costs or high military risks." The only desirable basis for such a preventive move would be in response to a clear provocation or aggression on the part of the P.R.C. In place of military action, he recommended covert operations and partnership with Khrushchev in marginalizing Mao's China by means of arms control diplomacy and most likely a nonproliferation treaty.[189]

Robert Kennedy's views on the hazards of a nuclear-armed China and the benefits of enhanced Soviet-American cooperation paralleled those of his fallen brother. The attorney general had lunch with Dobynin on July 7:

> "Dobrynin had expressed his concern about the Chinese, who wanted a war in which other societies would be destroyed, while there would be 200 million Chinese left. Khrushchev said that this was building a civilization on a graveyard and the Poles and Russians had asked where such a policy would leave them. But the Chinese had not given any ground. ... The Ambassador had spoken of the dangers of nuclear proliferation and said the Soviet Union was ready to sign an agreement right now if only the United States would give up the MLF. He believed the MLF would not help, and we should reconsider our commitment to it. … The Attorney General asked him what would happen if the Chinese tested a nuclear weapon. The ambassador's answer was that the test would be the first step toward a real delivery system. The Chinese economy was in bad shape and the Ambassador indicated no immediate concern about this danger. The Attorney General then reported to me that he had heard from a reportedly reliable

[187] Robert Johnson, "The Implications of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability," 16 April 1964, Box 237, CF-Communist China, NSF, LBJL, 1
[188] Ibid., 9
[189] "An Exploration of the Possible Bases for Action against the Chinese Communist Nuclear Facilities," 14 April 1964, Department of State, Policy Planning Council, Box 237, CF-China, NSF, LBJL, 1-4.

journalist of the London Observer that Tito in Poland had said that the Soviets were determined not to permit the development of a Chinese nuclear weapon. (This is a separate matter which the Attorney General did not discuss with Dobrynin.)[190]

The conversation bespoke two cardinal considerations in the exploration by the U.S. security establishment of a Soviet-American *modus vivendi* to prevent a nuclear P.R.C. First, they were the recipients of conflicting information, even in a single piece of correspondence. Second, scenario planning may have proceeded without presidential guidance given Johnson's disdain for the Kennedys.[191]

The U.S. Air Force supplied Bundy with intelligence on July 13 that "evidence [was] growing that the Chicoms are making progress in their nuclear program." The report noted the existence of a test site in the Tarim Basin, signs of activity at the Shuang-Ch'eng-Tzu missile test range, and the recent criticality of the Pao-T'ou reactor. The paper concluded that the impact on Asian affairs would be "very large," especially in regards to psychological factors; the P.R.C. would "acquire overnight the stature of a nuclear power in [Asian] minds." Accordingly, the U.S. intelligence community believed that a P.R.C. nuclear test was impending by the end of the summer.[192] However, it was unclear how to stop the program. The military command in the Pacific suggested the covert interception or degradation of critical components for the P.R.C. program, but at this last stage, the odds of success were minimal.[193] Walt Rostow pushed for a presidential

---

[190] I have included a large amount of the record because although Bundy's two feelers to Dobrynin in 1963 and later in 1964 are known, the fact and content of Kennedy's advances are not. "Memorandum for the Record, Attorney General Robert Kennedy's luncheon with Soviet ambassador Dobrynin, 7 July 1964, Box 3, Files of McGeorge Bundy, NSF, LBJL, 1-2.

[191] Robert A. Caro, *The Passage of Power*, 1st ed, The Years of Lyndon Johnson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012).

[192] United States Pacific Command, Telegram for McGeorge Bundy, State, CIA, NSA, and the White House, "Chicom Nuclear Program," 13 July 1964, Box 237, CF-China, NSF, LBJL, 1-2.

[193] United States Pacific Command, Memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Chicom Nuclear Testing Program," July 1964, Box 237, CF-China, NSF, LBJL.

review and a National Security Action Memorandum.[194] When CIA Director McCone briefed the president on July 24, he noted that five facilities associated with the Chinese Atomic Energy program were being assembled or in operation, indicating the P.R.C. had overcome many of the technical hurdles to a nuclear test.[195]

The Gulf of Tonkin incident on August 2 raised the stakes in Asia enormously as Johnson and his national security team readied for escalation in Vietnam. The same month, a National Intelligence Estimate drawing on aerial photography from a U-2 overflight based out of Pakistan captured images of the Lop Nur test site "indicate[d] that the Chinese Communists will detonate their first nuclear device in the next few months."[196] The U.S. assumption that the plutonium pathway represented the most likely method by which a country would generate fissile material sufficient to fuel a bomb led the intelligence estimate to the erroneous conclusion that China probably still lacked enough plutonium; however, it admitted that the P.R.C. could have obtained fissile material from a foreign source or an unknown facility. The report overlooked the likelihood that the Chinese nuclear program would make use of high-enriched uranium.

The imminence of a Chinese nuclear test weighed on Johnson's inner circle of foreign policy advisers. At a Tuesday lunch meeting in Foggy Bottom on September 15, Bundy, McCone, McNamara, and Rusk concurred that military action was inadvisable, but if military action between the two states did break out, they would think seriously about seizing the moment to bombard the facilities. They also held out hope for options involving the Soviet Union as a co-conspirator: warning the Chinese of a test's

---

[194] Robert W. Komer, Note for McGeorge Bundy, "Chicom nuclear issue," 24 March 1964, Box 237, CF-China, NSF, LBJL.
[195] Memorandum for the Record, "John A. McCone's Meeting with the President," 24 July 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XXX, China, Document 38, 70.
[196] National Intelligence Estimate 13-4-64, "The Chances of an Imminent Communist Chinese Nuclear Explosion," 26 August 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XXX, Document 43, 78-81.

consequences, negotiating a comprehensive test ban to stigmatize a Chinese test, and "even a possible agreement to cooperate in preventive military action." They reported their collective position to the President that night, and determined to send Rusk to feel out Dobrynin once more. In the end, it was Bundy who went to see the Soviet consul on September 25. Again, he found it hard to direct Dobyrnin's attention to matters other than NATO nuclear-sharing. Bundy expressed the interest of the Johnson administration to engage the U.S.S.R. in "private and serious talks" concerning what to do about the anticipated Chinese test. Dobrynin replied that his government had "already, in effect, taken [it] for granted." The rise of a nuclear China, he explained, had little bearing on Soviet security and only a "psychological impact in Asia." He acknowledge the "depth and strength" of the rift between the two communist giants, which he attributed to Mao's "megalomania" and bemoaned the deafness of Chinese ears to Soviet technical advice in regards to the Great Leap Forward. When Bundy spoke about the substance of U.S. friction with the P.R.C., Dobrynin "gently remarked" that the alliance treaty between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China still stood.[197] With the Chinese test only two weeks away, Washington had tried to recruit Moscow to cooperate on a preventive military strike, or a diplomatic response, but had elicited only polite refusal. Instead, the White House and the State Department tried to mitigate the ultimate impact by dropping hints in the media and in speeches that a test was only a matter of time.

On October 16, the People's Republic of China tested a nuclear explosive whose residual fallout was quickly registered by U.S. instruments. Khrushchev was deposed as general secretary of the Soviet Union on the same day. Beijing moved quickly to announce the successful event, proclaiming their feat had "broken the superpower

[197] McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum of conversation with Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in which we touched lightly on a large number of topics of only casual interest," 1 October 1964, Box 4, Bundy Files, NSF, LBJL.

monopoly," promising to never fire first, and calling for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. U.S. seismic and electromagnetic stations in the region, and radioisotope readers aboard Air Weather Service flights based in Japan all confirmed the feat. The full U.S. National Security Council met the next day. Rusk pointed out the explosion's effects in Asia were short-term fear of fallout and "serious, long-run effect[s] … in Japan and India."[198]

The White House moved quickly to blunt the impact by enunciating the first pledge of nuclear assurance outside of an alliance framework. Bundy drew up an outline for a presidential speech in which he advised downplaying the revolutionary nature of the "crude device" and emphasized the need to state that "every new aspirant to the 'nuclear club' increase[d] the danger of atmospheric contamination and of nuclear war."[199] In a nationally televised speech on October 18, Johnson reiterated that U.S. authorities had anticipated the Chinese test whose security impact was marginal given that years would pass before the P.R.C. developed a sizable arsenal. He challenged the Soviet Union to collaborate on nonproliferation, which endangered humankind and its environment, and which required abiding superpower cooperation. He then pledged U.S. support for those countries that forwent the nuclear path; "the nations that do not seek nuclear weapons can be sure that if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it."[200]

Though superficially a robust pledge, the language was sufficiently ambiguous to permit multiple interpretations. What did "strong support" entail? What counted as "nuclear blackmail?" Was it an explicit menace, or a regional adversary? These questions

---

[198] "Summary Notes of 543rd NSC meeting," 17 October 1964, Box 18, Bundy File, NSF, LBJL, 1.
[199] "Outline for Possible Presidential Statement," 17 October 1964, Box 4, Bundy File, NSF, LBJL.
[200] Seaborg, *Stemming the Tide*, 115–116.

became increasingly germane as U.S. intelligence indicated that India and Japan alike would reassess their nuclear options in the Chinese test's wake. The detonation at Lop Nur had incited a major political battle over the future of nuclear power in India that would consume the nation's government. Johnson chose a measured response, appointing an expert committee of former government officials to re-evaluate United States nonproliferation policy in a world increasingly fraught with nuclear dangers.[201]

The closing window for Indian acquiescence mirrored the vanishing opening for a hardware solution to NATO nuclear-sharing problems. Thus far, the Soviet Union had only reluctantly bowed to its allies' preferences for the creation of a multilateral nuclear force. On October 7, however, West German Chancellor Erhard took the self-defeating step of intimating that the F.R.G. would form a bilateral nuclear force with the U.S. if other NATO allies, most notably France and the U.K. (whose nuclear options would be reviewed by a nuke-averse Labour Party), refused to go along, noting that "a beginning had to be made."[202] Erhard was more explicit and emphatic three days later when he vowed that West German "soldiers must get all the weapons that our potential enemy has."[203] His comments increased the volume of criticism directed at the MLF from NATO allies. They also deepened East European adversaries' consternation and, when the Chinese *fait accompli* removed the rationale for further concessions by Moscow, the Warsaw Pact rallied against a German finger grower closer to the proverbial nuclear trigger. On November 15, the Soviets declared that they considered the MLF irreconcilable with a nonproliferation pact and, on December 7, Gromyko delivered a

---

[201] Gavin, "Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s."
[202] Arthur J. Olsen, "Action with U.S. on Atomic Fleet Hinted by Erhard," 7 October 1964, *The New York Times*. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
[203] "Erhard Sees Need for New Weapons," 11 October 1964, *The New York Times*. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

strong denunciation of the MLF at the U.N. General Assembly, characterizing the beleaguered fleet as an impediment to German reunification.[204]

Erhard's speech set the stage for a contentious 34th NATO Ministerial Meeting held in Paris from December 15 to 17. De Gaulle informed Rusk at a noon meeting on the first day, where the French president reiterated that German acquisition "either directly or indirectly of nuclear power would not be acceptable to France, nor he felt to any other European country, certainly in the East, nor did he feel in the West." He warned "that the MLF would destroy NATO as we knew it."[205] This forewarning presaged the tone of conversations for the rest of the meeting. The White House shot off National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 322, signed by Johnson, but formulated by Ball, to set down guidelines for the NATO round tables. While Rusk, McNamara and their staffs were not to antagonize either the U.K. or France, or appear to try and circumvent European "consensus," they should urge their allies to take West German viewpoints seriously. As to veto rights, the NSAM specified that a multilateral or Atlantic force "must provide for United States' consent to the firing of the nuclear weapons," while leaving open the possibility of a future European state that could prompt the charter's revision. The memorandum highlighted how a collective force could help to stem, or even reverse, the tide of nuclear proliferation, which reflected the scheme's two longstanding and interwoven objectives—to appease the F.R.G.'s nuclear appetite and potentially to fold the U.K. and French deterrents into a coordinated body. If the desire to "advance the principle and practice of collective strategic defense, as against the proliferation of separate nuclear deterrents," was still unclear, the United States would

---

[204] Selvage, *The Warsaw Pact and Nuclear Proliferation, 1963-1965*, 14–15.

[205] Lyndon Johnson, National Security Action Memorandum No. 322 for Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara, "Guidelines for Discussion on the Nuclear Defense of the Atlantic Alliance," 17 December 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIII, Western Europe Region, Document 65.

"warmly support" the addition of "strong undertakings" in the textual language for "our basic policy" of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.[206]

## Conclusion

After the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Soviet Union and United States envisaged arms control diplomacy as a platform on which to base better relations. A vital area of mutual interest, a nuclear nonproliferation treaty, was quickly seized upon as the most appealing next step to reduce tensions, avert thermonuclear war, and formalize their ascendant positions in the ideological, nuclear, and geopolitical orders. The superpowers found common early ground on the language for the non-dissemination and non-acquisition articles; however, U.S. and Soviet allies as well as non-aligned states established a diplomatic middle ground from which to balance the nuclear giants against one another. Poland and East Germany opposed Khrushchev's decision to tacitly vouchsafe a multilateral nuclear force in NATO that would enhance the F.R.G.'s position in European geopolitics. West Germany and its advocates in the State Department meanwhile impeded U.S. nuclear diplomacy at the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament to ensure that the MLF stayed in play. The result was diplomatic stasis when a nonproliferation treaty elicited support from a sufficiency of key nations.

Alas, one such nation was India whose leadership of the non-aligned movement and espousal of peaceful co-existence through global governance the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict had sorely injured and the signing of the LTBT depleted. Though the Indian position on a nuclear nonproliferation treaty remained pliable, Homi Bhabha was quick to point out to domestic and international audiences that India possessed the means by

---

[206] Ibid.

which to nuclearize in short order, and might require either general and complete disarmament, or an unprecedented joint guarantee of its nuclear security by both nuclear superpowers. Johnson's decision to go ahead with the MLF lowered the window of opportunity to lock India into a nonproliferation regime. The Chinese test in October 1964 nearly closed it. Henceforth, India's adherence hinged on the realization of two implausible goals—U.S.-Soviet partnership in South Asia, or nuclear abolition.

# Chapter Two | Guaranteeing the World: Internationalizing Nuclear Security

*"First, we are proposing new agreements to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them. Today's uncertain and unsatisfactory balance of terror will be all terror and no balance, if dozens of nations, large and small, have their own nuclear trigger."*

*The White House Remarks of the President over Nationwide Television and Radio on the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, LBL, NSF, SF, Disarmament, Box 13*

## Introduction: "A Problem from Hell"

Soviet Ambassador Semyon Tsarapkin opened the 218th plenary of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) on July 27, 1965 in the Council Chamber of the Palais des Nations in Geneva. Following a welcome speech from United Nations Secretary-General U Thant given by Special Representative Dragoslav Protitch, the Chairman greeted the 17 lead negotiators and their entourages seated around the horseshoe table. Framed by José Maria Sert's baroque murals whose sepia and gold scenes limned the progress of humanity through the ages, Tsarapkin bemoaned the inertia in international nuclear diplomacy since the Moscow Treaty. "The forces of imperialism which opposed disarmament and are against reducing international tension," he claimed, were "stubbornly striving to turn the course of events." This militarism was on display in conflicts "in Viet-Nam, in the Congo and in Latin America," whose peoples were "victims of imperialist aggression."[207] William Foster, the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), rose soon after to lament Tsarapkin's use of the chair's prerogative to inveigh against U.S. foreign policy. "The dangers posed by the arms race, and particularly the threatened proliferation of nuclear weapons," he warned,

---

[207] Final Verbatim Record of the 218th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 27 July 1965, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.218, 7.

would "not wait until the guns are stilled." He carried a message from President Lyndon Baines Johnson:

> The Bible describes 'death' as the fourth horseman of the Apocalypse saying: 'And hell followed after him.' Our genius has changed this from a parable to a possibility. For the wasting power of our weapons is beyond the reach of imagination and language alike. Hell alone can describe the consequences that await their full use.[208]

He noted that one key to bringing order to a world of mounting nuclear arsenals and multiplying nuclear powers was to ensure the security of states without the armaments. Another was to apply international safeguards to the peaceful nuclear activities of all states. To the first end, the United States had assured countries without nuclear weapons the previous October of its "strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail." Long contemplated relative to the Soviet-American standoff, the further spread of nuclear weapons now raised thorny questions with respect to how the international community could afford security on a planetary scale as the superpowers locked horns over an escalating war in Southeast Asia.

The nuclear test conducted by the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) on October 16, 1964 lent new impetus to global efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, in the ensuing fourteen months neither the United States government nor the international community succeeded in outlining a viable treaty. The roots of discord were many and stemmed in part from the Johnson administration's failure to harmonize its thinking on NATO relations, South Asian policy, nuclear diplomacy, and grand strategy. A window of opportunity remained open in 1965 for a nonproliferation treaty with a liberal definition of dissemination and acquisition, a robust inspection regime, United Nations security assurances, and some linkage between vertical

[208] Ibid.,10.

and horizontal proliferation, most likely centering on further limits to nuclear testing. Most relevant U.S. agencies were supportive and an international majority for a just, secure, and robust treaty existed in Geneva and New York City. The United States failed to capitalize due to a focus on U.S.-led European integration, the Vietnam War, and key policymakers' reluctance to embrace cooperative relations with the Soviet Union. The nuclear have-nots found their own coordination upset by a deepening Sino-Indian split in the non-aligned bloc while Moscow calibrated its policies ever more tightly to its own troubled relationship with Beijing. An impasse in efforts to achieve a nonproliferation treaty thus arose even as the capacity and desire for military options in key states grew.

This chapter evaluates the course of international nuclear diplomacy from October 1964 to December 1965. It begins by assessing the Republic of India's reaction to the Chinese test in view of U.S. efforts to mitigate its impact on New Delhi. Powerful members of India's nuclear community proselytized for a Bomb, but the moderating influence of prohibitions in the Congress Party kept policy changes limited to preparatory work on peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs) and pleas for security assurances for nuclear have-nots through the United Nations. In the United States, the creation of a blue-ribbon task force led to a report outlining an internationalist strategy to combat proliferation. The State Department killed the report, though the arms control cabal in Washington eventually publicized its findings through articles, congressional speeches, and press leaks. Sino-Soviet tensions and the arrival of U.S. troops in Vietnam delayed the convention of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. In its place, a conference of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) revealed unity among the nuclear have-nots in support of security assurances, an expanded test ban, and a nonproliferation pact, although differences of opinion arose over China. When the ENDC finally met in July, the Western Four found themselves at odds over nuclear-sharing arrangements and the

merits of non-aligned demands for security assurances and disarmament linkages. The United States and the world thus stumbled in the months following the "test shot heard round the world," failing to devise an effective response to the expected growth of the nuclear club. Nonetheless, the contours of a workable treaty clarified as Washington pondered how to respond to far-flung requests for the internationalization of nuclear security.

**Reading Schelling in New Delhi**

A clash between Indian hawks and doves transpired in late 1964 and 1965. Nuclear science and technology's dual-use potential and the human, political, and financial costs, and prestige benefits of a military capability encouraged policymakers to hedge on nuclear bets.[209] In the Cold War, there was an incentive for states developing their nuclear sector to delay a final decision to place the program on a military footing. The early measures needed to attain the know-how, facilities, materiel, and personnel necessary for a bomb-making capability, such as trained scientists and technicians, uranium or thorium supplies, and power plants capable of yielding kilograms of Pu-239, were largely indistinguishable from those of a peaceful program. Hence, the costs of retaining a military option were lower than those of an irreversible repudiation, which included diplomatic leverage, nuclear fuel-cycle options, and plausible deterrence. Moreover, the establishment of a standby or threshold capacity aided the peaceful program through "technical feasibility, affordability, and political (internal as well as

[209] A superb analysis of the historical dynamics of state proliferation decisions and the predominance of hedging behavior among potential nuclear proliferation is Ariel E. Levite, "Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited," *International Security* 27, no. 3 (January 2003): 59–88 Levite postulates that nuclear hedging is a strategy in the middle of a spectrum ranging from nuclear pursuit and nuclear rollback and draws attention to "the centrality of buying time as the key component of a non-proliferation strategy." This helps make sense of the predominance of cases in which states terminated or rescinded nuclear programs. (p. 59).

external) viability."[210] Governments such as that of India opted to retain a military option and engage in hedging behavior so as to maintain flexibility in the face of unforeseen events in the security environment. In Churchill's apt phrasing, they pursued "the art rather than the article."[211]

New Delhi was a captive audience for China's test. Indian leaders had been equivocal about atomic energy since the twilight of the British Raj. The rift between Mahatma Gandhi's ideal of an Arcadian, rural society and Jawaharlal Nehru's vision of a modern socialist economy arose in part from their divergent backgrounds and outlooks. While a student at Cambridge University, Nehru imbibed Whiggish notions of economic growth and commodity abundance by virtue of scientific and technological discovery and a related faith in technocratic governance. Classic liberalism held that human potential was keyed to the stage of economic development; to this precept, Nehru added his critique of colonialism. He believed that Europe's material advantages had enabled the age of empires. India could surmount the gulf most swiftly by leapfrogging it via innovative technological platforms. His understanding of the interaction among science, technology, and global society guided how Nehru thought the international system would function amid decolonization.[212]

The object of superpower nonproliferation efforts had been to thwart a Chinese military program. Once a Chinese bomb was matter of fact, the likelihood of Soviet-American accord and Indian consent for a rule-based nuclear regime dropped. The Indians were rhetorically entrapped, however, by years of staunch opposition to nuclear war, militarism, and proliferation, and support for arms control, international law, and

[210] Ibid., 67.
[211] Gowing and United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, *Independence and Deterrence*, 406.
[212] Nehru, *The Essential Writings of Jawaharlal Nehru*; Tharoor, *Nehru*; Krishna Iyer, *Nehru and Krishna Menon*.

collective security.[213] B.K. Nehru summoned these time-honored principles in Geneva on September 1, 1964:

> Our approach to this question, I need hardly say, is governed by India's basic policy…. We have taken a firm decision that our nuclear capabilities shall be used only for peaceful purposes. We have always been opposed and continue to be opposed to the manufacture, use, or possession of nuclear weapons.[214]

Nehru acknowledged the prevailing wisdom that responsible "nuclear Powers" with "a good understanding of the situation" recognized the futility of nuclear war and had "tacitly agreed not to use such weapons." He articulated his country's support for collective security rather than bilateral deterrence though by endorsing an Ethiopian proposal to outlaw nuclear-weapon use categorically. Such a stricture subverted nuclear deterrence, which India then upheld only to stabilize the international system in the early stages of general and complete disarmament.

The ambivalence of Indian nuclear diplomacy echoed in elites' voices, many of whom denied that nuclear weapons had redeeming qualities. The desirability of a nuclear umbrella through the final disarmament stage, for instance, elicited censure from staunch prohibitionists. Krishna Menon attacked B.K. Nehru by name in the Lok Sabha for supporting the umbrella, "contend[ing] India should continue to urge elimination [of] all nuclear weapons at [the] beginning of GCD." Menon preferred the Ethiopian resolution. B.K. Nehru's ambivalence was more representative. He split the difference and presented deterrence as tolerable to expedite disarmament. In a September 15 speech to the

---

[213] Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," *International Organization* 55, no. 1 (March 1, 2001): 47–80. See also Nina Tannenwald, *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
[214] Final Verbatim Record of the 212th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 1 September 1965, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.212, 5.

ENDC, he repeated that India was uninterested in nuclear weapons and championed a nonproliferation agreement that addressed the arms race:

> [T]he use – or even contemplated use – of nuclear weapons is nothing short of a crime against humanity[,] … a violation of the United Nations Charter and the rules of nuclear law. It is not enough … to take steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. … [T]he possession of nuclear weapons by some countries is in many ways a temptation for others also to acquire them.[215]

Though his attempt to frame nuclear weapons in terms of human rights fell on deaf ears in the U.S., Foggy Bottom greeted Nehru's public support for a nonproliferation treaty and his rejection of the military option with approval. The affirmation "presented [the U.S.] with [the] opportunity to make any later Indian action to acquire nuclear weapons considerably more difficult."[216] India's moral stance against nuclear weapons would entail significant audience costs if it chose to alter the policy. Foster was among those who welcomed Nehru's speech. His Italian counterpart, Roberto Gaja, warned him that he should not praise the address too loudly though: "no western power should [raise the possibility of joint sponsorship]. "Let the Indians lead."[217]

China's test challenged Indian forbearance and its ambitions to play a starring role in Afro-Asian politics and global nuclear diplomacy. The Indian press and foreign policy circles had to date largely ignored nuclear security questions.[218] While Nehru and Homi Bhabha often noted that India could build atom bombs in a few years, their projections aimed less at extolling the military option than at pointing to the most

---

[215] Final Verbatim Record of the 216th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 15 September 1965, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.216, 28.
[216] Department of State, Outgoing telegram, "Indian resolution to outlaw use of nuclear weapons," 2 September 1964, Box 11, Subject Files–Disarmament, National Security Files, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Archives. Hereinafter SF-Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.
[217] William Foster, Geneva, Telegram to Washington, "Meeting with Italians," 25 November 1964, Box 11, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.
[218] Major foreign policy journals published no articles related to nuclear security between 1959 and 1964. Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, 40.

conspicuous landmark of nuclear prowess. Nehru wanted a thrifty foreign policy based on moral capital rather than brute force so as to conserve resources for import substitution, poverty alleviation, industrial planning, modernization, and democratic stabilization.[219] Nehru's views also sprang from the principles of non-violence and anticolonialism. His loud support for a test-ban treaty and nuclear prohibitions in general limited policy options, but the formula had nonetheless survived India's defeat at China's hands in the 1962. When members of the Jana Sangh Party entreated the prime minister to seek a nuclear deterrent, Nehru asked if India would not show its "utter insincerity" to "go in for doing the very thing which we have repeatedly asked the other powers not to do?"[220]

On the surface, New Delhi appeared calm in the face of a Chinese bomb. Nehru downplayed the repercussions and reckoned "there would be little public impact in India" though other states in the region might be "cowed." Foreign Minister M. J. Desai, on the other hand, admitted that "there would be political pressure … to produce nuclear weapons" and recited the mantra that India "could attain [them] in a couple of years if it decided to try."[221] U.S. observers focused on threats and capabilities rather than declarations though when evaluating Indian nuclear affairs. Recent U.S. intelligence reports confirmed the estimates, warning that Indian engineers were relocating spent fuel rods at an accelerated clip from the Canadian-Indian Research Reactor (CIRUS) to a plutonium recycling facility at Trombay. A follow-up report by the Department of State's Director of Intelligence and Research advised that the Indian nuclear program was "in a position to begin nuclear weapons development if they choose to do so," though "no evidence" existed of a weapons program yet. With "unsafeguarded weapons-grade

---

[219] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
[220] Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, 46.
[221] U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, Telegram to Dean Rusk, "Political-Military Balance in South Asia," 10 December 1963, Box 128, Country File—India, NSF, LBJL, 3-4. Hereinafter CF—India, NSF, LBJL.

plutonium" now on hand though, only a "major political decision" now stood in the way.[222]

Prime Minister Nehru died on May 27. Lal Bahadur Shastri quickly emerged as his successor on account of his Gandhian piety and lack of enemies and seemed disposed to maintain Nehru's forbearance policy in light of his abhorrence of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, a debate began to gather steam that summer over the relationship between Indian security, deterrence, and development. U.S. officials became more concerned as evidence of an impending test in western China mounted. Against this background, Bowles shot off a detailed memorandum on September 16 repeating his call to strengthen the U.S. position on the subcontinent. He listed the three options now facing the Shastri government with regard to China: an ultimatum reminiscent of the Cuban Missile Crisis, a prohibitively expensive nuclear deterrent, or relying on moral capital. Bowles had floated the idea to CIA Director John McCone of providing India with intelligence on China's nuclear program. McCone worried though that more data would drive the Shastri administration further down the nuclear road. Bowles reckoned this a "miscalculation" and requested more dialogue:

> The more opportunity we have to talk to the Indians … the more likely we are to persuade them that the nuclear deterrent that could provide a real threat to Chinese cities was beyond their capacity and that the ultimate solution may be some kind of understanding with us.[223]

In the end, the State Department chose to keep New Delhi informed through official pronouncements rather than backchannel communications. On September 29, U.S.

[222] Department of State, Director of Intelligence & Research, Memorandum for Dean Rusk, "Indian Nuclear Weapons Development," 14 May 1964, Box 128, CF—India, NSF, LBJL.
[223] Chester Bowles, Letter to McGeorge Bundy re "Tactics of handing questions involving nuclear power in India," 16 September 1964, Box 129, CF—India, NSF, LBJL, 2-3.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk announced that China might test its first nuclear explosive "in the near future" in hopes of minimizing the blast's ultimate impact in Asia.

Following the announcement, Indian leaders were most concerned about losing standing in Afro-Asians' eyes and viewed the Sino-Indian nuclear relationship through the prism of non-aligned politics. In early October, B.K. Nehru told Assistant Secretary of State William Talbot that the statement had occasioned "great disquiet" in India. He asked that Rusk make a speech to "praise India's policy against making nuclear weapons and commend it as [an] example to others" before the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations met in Cairo.[224] Such a paean might sway Afro-Asian opinion and thereby "redress the psychological balance to [a] considerable extent."[225] Nehru repeated this message to Foster later that evening.[226] Shastri gave a speech brimming with Gandhian ideals about appropriate technology, nonviolence, and nuclear prohibition at the Non-Aligned Conference. He implored the states gathered in Cairo to turn China off its nuclear path and assured them that Indian nuclear scientists were under orders "not to make a single experiment, not to perfect a single device which is not needed for peaceful uses of atomic energy."[227]

China exploded its first nuclear device at Lop Nur on October 16. The Indian reaction was muted at first by Rusk's forewarnings and news of Khrushchev's ouster the previous day. A clamorous, expansive, yet ultimately inconclusive debate soon erupted about the desirability of nuclear weapons in the Indian public sphere and corridors of power. The contest pit Shastri and his antinuclear allies in the Congress Party against

---

[224] Talbot was Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.
[225] Department of State, Telegram to New Delhi & Cairo, "Indian response to ChiCom nuclear test," 7 October 1964, Box 128, CF—India, NSF, LBJL, 1.
[226] Ibid., 2.
[227] Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, 65; Mirchandani, *India's Nuclear Dilemma*.

Bhabha, partisan rivals, and party hawks. On October 18, Johnson pledged the "strong support" of the United States against "nuclear blackmail;" though non-binding, the soft assurance marked the first time that the superpower had used the threat of force to bolster the security of a non-aligned state. Shastri nonetheless wanted a more tangible response to such a tectonic shift in Asian geopolitics. At a cabinet meeting the next day, he pressed Bhabha "to propose some new and dramatic means [to] demonstrate India's capability in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy."[228] Bhabha proposed a peaceful nuclear explosive program, which Shastri authorized despite its military implications.

United States policymakers wanted to confine a Sino-Indian nuclear rivalry to the realm of symbolism. One tactic was to burnish India's moral capital by "compliment[ing] … its nuclear restraint." National Security Council (NSC) staffer Robert Komer advised National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy that the White House should heed Nehru's plea and praise Shastri for taking the "high road of non-proliferation." American statements should recite the leitmotifs of India's nuclear virtue and scientific prowess "contrapuntally" in accompaniment to New Delhi's quest for leadership of the non-aligned movement. He referenced an attached CIA report on "Indian Government Policy on the Development of Nuclear Weapons," which forecast that India would not launch a military program soon. This analysis contradicted a more alarming National Intelligence Estimate rushed out in the wake of Lop Nur. The evaluation pointed to India as the state most likely to develop a nuclear-weapon capability (Israel and Sweden were next) in the next ten years, placing the odds at "better than even," and assigning the minimum time at "one to three years." The estimate forecast that India could have as many as a dozen Hiroshima-size bombs by 1970 at a modest cost of approximately $220

[228] CIA Intelligence Information Cable, "Indian Government reaction to Chicom Nuclear Explosion," 19 October 1964, Box 128, CF—India, NSF, LBJL.

million, and postulated the decision would hinge on "the scope and pace of the Chinese program, any changes in Sino-Soviet relations, and outside assurances."[229] Bolstering India's reputation as the exemplary non-nuclear-weapon state might help "augment such inhibitions."[230] The report overrated the rapidity and harmony with which the Indian political establishment would proceed; even so, it rightly characterized New Delhi's nuclear calculations as predicated on hedging. Cultivating the requisite human capital and industrial capacity would precede a green light from the prime minister.

Shastri reaffirmed Indian forbearance repeatedly. China's test nevertheless shattered the political consensus in favor of the policy. Media voices ranged the spectrum with English-language newspapers favoring the prohibition and Gujarati- and Marathi-language papers "outspoken" in their appeals to "national interest" rather than "world opinion" in calling for a reappraisal. The shift in press attitudes commenced in September after Rusk's alert. The previous August, the *Statesman* had questioned the fiscal wisdom of a modern deterrent in light of the country's broader economic troubles. However, it reversed course on October 9, waving off objections related to ethics, strategy, and reputation to weigh the financial burden more optimistically. Though monies for military procurement represented a theft from development, the value of security was incalculable.[231] The *Times of India* proposed that the U.N. admit the P.R.C. so that the nuclear powers could settle matters there; more tellingly, the *Indian Express* cataloged the "pros and cons" of a military option and found that, "on balance," security desiderata favored it.

---

[229] "National Intelligence Estimate Number 4-2-64, "Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade"" 21 October 1964, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CIA Mandatory Review Appeal, 7. Obtained and contributed by William Burr, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115994

[230] Robert Komer, Letter to McGeorge Bundy, cc'd to Spurgeon Keeny, "India & nonproliferation," 20 October 1964, Box 128, CF—India, NSF, LBJL.

[231] Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, 65–66.

Elite opinion was split as well. Menon came out against the military option in a speech in Bombay on October 23, decrying an Indian Bomb as "the height of folly" and espousing Indo-Soviet cooperation.[232] However, Menon's star faded and Shastri wanted to improve relations with the U.S. after Khrushchev's fall. Rusk instructed Bowles to solicit Shastri's views in order to learn where concerts of U.S.-Indian interest might exist in arms control diplomacy and, "most important, to reinforce Indians in their decision not to initiate a nuclear weapons program."[233] Cooperating on nuclear diplomacy and furnishing peaceful technological assistance emerged as key U.S. tactics vis-à-vis the Indian nuclear question. The main concern was New Delhi's attitude toward international nuclear diplomacy. Rusk wanted the "the primary impact [of China's test to] be political" rather than security-related and instructed Bowles to portray the Chinese proposal for a world disarmament conference as a ploy by which to distract from the "flouting [of] world hopes that [the] atmosphere would no longer be polluted by nuclear tests." He should also highlight the event's global significance and warn that "limited" nuclear arsenals such as those of France and the PRC did not enhance security but rather increased the "danger of [a] world nuclear war."[234]

While Rusk strove to hold the line, Indian hawks went on the offensive. Defense Ministry officials questioned whether forbearance remained prudent and opined that longstanding nuclear policies were reversible. At a press conference in Bombay, Defense Minister Y.B. Chavan called China's blast a "new factor" to account for when planning for the country's defense. There was "always [the] need for rethinking [a] policy

---

[232] U.S. Consulate in Bombay, Telegram for Dean Rusk, "Official and Press Reactions in India to China's Test," 27 October 1964, Box 128, CF—India, NSF, LBJL, 2-3.
[233] Department of State, Telegram to New Delhi, "Interview with Shastri re their view ramifications Chicom detonation," 28 October 1964, Box 128, CF—India, NSF, LBJL, 1.
[234] Ibid, 5-6.

question," he averred, when faced with a "dynamic political situation."[235] The most significant assault on the status quo came from Bhabha though and bore on the question of affordability.[236] Even though Bhabha lost influence when Nehru died, he was a formidable advocate of the military option.[237] He gave an address on All India Radio on October 24 in which he argued that peaceful and military nuclear explosives were cheap and useful tools with which to shore up national development and security alike. He invoked Gallois's theory of a limited deterrent and his own estimation that India needed one to three years to develop one. He low-balled the project cost by omitting expenditures related to facilities, manpower, fuel reprocessing, and infrastructure, claiming that one ten-kiloton explosive would cost $350,000, and a two-megaton device a mere $600,000. He compared those costs to the $300 million needed to acquire two million tons of TNT in spite of their very different usages. Total spending for an arsenal of 50 A-bombs, or 50 H-bombs, he extrapolated, would require $21, or $31.5 million. Indian and U.S. scientists tried to correct these "grossly misleading" figures, but hawks cited them as gospel when arguing for the military option.

In the face of this dissent, Nehru informed Foster in Geneva on November 3 that after a review his government had "reconfirmed" its forbearance policy. He neglected to mention that Shastri had sanctioned initial studies on peaceful nuclear explosives. Nehru admitted that there was strong pressure for a nuclear test "to offset the genuine psychological advantages which the Chinese had obtained in Southeast Asia by virtue of

[235] U.S. Embassy in Bombay, Telegram to Dean Rusk, "Official and Press Reactions in India to China's Test," 27 October 1964, Box 128, CF—India, NSF, LBJL, 1.

[236] For a description and definition of how India's nuclear establishment functions as a "strategic enclave," read Abraham, *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb*.

[237] One of Bhabha's lieutenants at Trombay, Raj Ramanna, who later led the *Smiling Buddha* test, reported that Bhabha was intent on a nuclear capability from the start, claiming that Bhabha had informed him in the late-1950s that "[w]e must have the capability" and "first prove ourselves" before "talk[ing] of Gandhi, non-violence and a world without nuclear weapons." Raj Chengappa, *Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to Be a Nuclear Power* (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers, India, 2000), 82.

their explosion." The Chinese proposal for a five-power conference was also seen as a challenge to India's position in Asia and the non-aligned world. He expressed doubt though that the soft guarantee that Johnson's had made in October would hold true if Beijing had the support of Moscow in a nuclear action against India.[238]

The controversy was still unresolved when the All India Congress Committee assembled in West Bengal on November 7. Before the meeting, Minister Mehr Chand Khanna had publicly called for India to join the nuclear club. At the conclave, more than 100 delegates requested a closed session to discuss "an independent nuclear deterrent to protect [India] against any possible threat from China."[239] Shastri, Menon, and Desai evoked "the Mahatama's teaching and Nehru's legacy" to uphold the prohibition.[240] Shastri denied the objectivity and accuracy of Bhabha's cost estimates, while Desai warned that if the military budget was already stealing resources from the commonweal, the cost of nuclear arms could prove "crushing." A majority nonetheless backed the military option. By means of appeals and politicking, Shastri and his allies managed to push through a resolution stating that India "would continue to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and … would not enter into a nuclear arms race." The *Hindustan Times* described the outcome as "nothing short of a miracle," though Shastri was forced to imply that forbearance had its limits: "[w]e cannot *at present* think in terms of making atomic bombs in India;" he instead declared that "[w]e must try to eliminate the atomic bombs in the world."[241] The time-bound statement left open the question of how long forbearance could last. In fact, Menon rebuked Shastri for not "know[ing] what … future

[238] Memorandum of Conversation between B. K. Nehru and William Foster, "Chinese Nuclear Explosion," 3 November 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XXV, South Asia, Document 74, 163-166.
[239] Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, 74.
[240] Inder Halhortra, "Shastri gets his way on nuclear policy," *The Indian Express*, 15 October 2012, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/shastri-gets-his-way-on-nuclear-policy/1016715/0
[241] Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, 74. Author's italics.

policy will be on so fundamental an issue."[242] The prime minister meant the tenure of his government, later clarifying that "[s]o long as we are here, we won't make the [B]omb."[243]

American diplomats used a variety of tactics to entrench this mindset. They urged New Delhi to display the country's technological prowess through peaceful ventures and schemed to entrap the non-aligned stalwart rhetorically. Indian decision-making seemed to hinge on security assurances, foreign aid, and arms control. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were loath to offer more than Johnson had pledged in October, deeming a soft guarantee "appropriate" because it "did not commit the United States to any specific military course of action." Furthermore, Chairman Curtis LeMay warned against policies that "could alienate U.S. allies, especially Pakistan."[244] Because of these military reservations related to Cold War alliances, Washington would have to rely on technical assistance. Bowles suggested that a senior official of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) travel to New Delhi to discuss a incentive package: space-based assistance, a subterfuge where India would claim to have furnished the crucial intelligence on the Chinese test, a "Plowshares operation," and a campaign to rally world opinion against nuclear weapons. In the final case, Washington might endorse "by overt and covert means" an Indian resolution at the United Nations calling for nuclear testing to cease in order to bind "Shastri and other world leaders" to "this position as firmly as possible." Bowles even recommended awarding these leaders the Nobel Peace Prize or honorary

---

[242] "Menon Scores Shastri on Atom Policy," 11 January 1965, *The New York Times*, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

[243] *The New York Times* construed "we" as "his Government," in its coverage: "Shastri Appeals on Arms," 21 January 1965, *The New York Times*, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, 4.

[244] Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, "The Indian Nuclear Problem: Proposed Course of Action," 23 October 1964, attached to Robert McNamara, Letter to Dean Rusk, 28 October 1964, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 6, India and Pakistan—On the Nuclear Threshold, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB6/docs/doc02.pdf

degrees to commend their peaceful behavior.[245] The ulterior motive was to "strengthen" Indian resolve in time for April, when the CIA figured Shastri would seal his country's nuclear fate.

Washington adopted blandishments and material aid to Indian science and technology as its cardinal nonproliferation tactic.[246] The White House singled out the peaceful uses of atomic energy and space technology as projects that could "capture the imaginations of Indians and Afro-Asians and conclusively demonstrate the advanced progress of Indian science." Peaceful nuclear explosions were included. The AEC upheld the value of PNEs in a November report that discussed the "merit" of talking to Bhabha about Project Plowshare and its capacity to solve some of India's "basic development problems," such as re-routing rivers. Officials in the AEC believed that Plowshare blasts were possible without violating the LTBT and waved off the danger of such cooperation enabling the military option.[247] As threshold states increasingly insisted on their rights to peaceful nuclear explosives in the coming years, United States authorities continued to justify their utility even as they strove to erect firewalls against the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies.

---

[245] Chester Bowles, New Delhi, Telegram to Washington (Talbot), "India & Nuclear Proliferation Problem," 12 November 1964, US Embassy New Delhi, 1-3

[246] Telegram from Department of State (Ball) to the Embassy in India re "Indian nuclear program," December 12, 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XXV, Document 79.

[247] "[T]here has been a great deal of speculation … that India might elect to embark on [a] Plowshare device development program as a "cover" and rationalization for a nuclear-weapons program. This appears to be a highly remote possibility due to technical and economic considerations as well as the recent statements made by Mr. Shastri …. If, however, there is any truth to this rumor, then it is believed an aggressive program of US assistance to India in this area would deter, rather than encourage, India from embarking on such a program. In particular, if the United States was able to demonstrate convincingly that it would … execute bona fide Plowshare applications in India, it could help deter India from embarking on an independent device development program of its own." Letter from John G. Palfrey, Atomic Energy Commission, to Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, November 23, 1964, with attached report: "Discussion Paper on Prospects for Intensifying Peaceful Atomic Cooperation with India," including one redacted page (CONFIDENTIAL), pp. 3-6. It is interesting to note that the second paragraph on the anticipated effects of PNE assistance on Indian nuclear choices was originally redacted.

American interest in offering technological carrots to discourage nuclear-weapons work led to a high-level mission in January 1965. Johnson sent science adviser Jerome Wiesner to New Delhi at Bowles's behest "to tout Indian scientific prowess and avert proliferation" before Bhabha visited the U.S. in February and the Afro-Asian Conference convened in Algiers in April. Shastri had voiced enthusiasm for scientific promotion, collaboration, and assistance from the U.S.[248] The package's elements now consisted of assistance to India's space program, rocketry, satellites, plutonium and thorium recycling, breeder reactors, and "Plowshare experiments."[249] These carrots were linked to diplomatic calculations regarding whether to back Indian nuclear diplomacy at the ENDC, whose convention was delayed by Soviet-American discord over the relationship between nonproliferation and NATO nuclear-sharing. Wiesner and others fretted that New Delhi would table a stricter treaty precluding the multilateral nuclear force (MLF) or existing transit rights in an effort to stymie or reverse China's nuclear breakout.[250] Other U.S. policymakers regretted the lapse in international nuclear diplomacy, which had foiled an opportunity for India to exercise leadership in the field.[251] Even so, Bowles was instructed to answer vaguely if asked about a nonproliferation treaty's "exact wording," or the likelihood of security assurances from the United States with the Soviet Union, or without it.

---

[248] Chester Bowles, New Delhi, Telegram to Dean Rusk & White House, "Wiesner's visit to India to tout Indian scientific prowess and avert proliferation," 21 December, 1964, Box 129 [1 of 2], CF—India, NSF, LBJL.

[249] Jerome Wiesner, New Delhi, Telegram to the Department of State re "Wiesner's visit," 21 January 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XXV, Document 85.

[250] Chester Bowles, New Delhi, Telegram to Washington et al., "Jerry Weisner's visit to New Dehli," 12 January 1965, Box 129 [1 of 2], CF—India, NSF, LBJL.

[251] Dean Rusk, State Department Telegram for Governor Harriman, 27 February 1965, 1. Subject-Numeric File, 1964-1966; Central Files of the Department of State, Record Group 59; NAII, Washington, D.C. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, India and Pakistan—On the Nuclear Threshold, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB6/docs/doc07.pdf

In Karachi, U.S. diplomats tried to allay President Ayub Khan's fears about India's nuclear controversy. According to Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy, the debate had "no closer or more apprehensive observer than Pakistan," which resented the "looseness" of inspections on the CIRUS reactor.[252] McConaughy worried that beyond its proliferation impulse, an Indian bomb could have the "most profound and potentially adverse impact on [the] delicate balance of strategic forces at play on [the] subcontinent." Pakistani fear of the Indian "colossus" might impel its to pivot toward China and lead to a tendency "to overreact," possibly in the form of preemptive strikes against Indian nuclear facilities, or in Kashmir, or the launch of Pakistan's own nuclear-weapon program. He counseled that Washington enlist Ayub's "understanding … and tacit acquiescence" for US efforts to reassure India up to the point of a "nuclear umbrella."[253]

That winter, Indian leaders strove to improve their diplomatic and security positions and to persuade Washington or Moscow, or both, to extend nuclear assurances. A December U.S. National Intelligence Estimate hypothesized that a green light depended on "the cost of a nuclear weapons program and of a delivery system, the pace and scope of the Chinese program, and the importance the Indians attach to assurances from the U.S. and other nuclear powers."[254] On December 4, Shastri enjoined the nuclear club to "guarantee nonnuclear nations safety from atomic attack," calling the United Nations the "proper forum" for debating the merits of security guarantees and their relationship to nonproliferation.[255] Washington was noncommittal. Britain on the other hand offered its support when Shastri visited London. U.K. Defense Minister Denis

---

[252] U.S. Embassy in Karachi, Telegram to Dean Rusk et al., "Indian Nuclear Program," 8 November 1964, Box 128, CF—India, NSF, LBJL, 1.
[253] Ibid., 2-3.
[254] "National Intelligence Estimate,"10 December 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XXV, Document 78, 169.
[255] "Nuclear Guarantee is Urged by Shastri," 5 December 1964, *The New York Times*, 9. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

Healey backed a "solemn and effective guarantee" from nuclear powers, excepting, China against nuclear blackmail or attack.[256] In an interview with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, Shastri insisted that a universal guarantee was needed so as not to contradict India's non-aligned status. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had reservations though about a joint Soviet-American guarantee, or a specific guarantee to a non-aligned state, if such a pledge was "not offered to all of the allies of the United States."[257] Meanwhile, Llewellyn Thompson complained that Bowles was so keen on a unilateral guarantee that he had exceeded his authority. Bowles had reason to overstep his orders. He related that Indian sources with cabinet-level access had told him that Shastri had instructed Bhahba "to proceed with [the] first stages of producing [the] atomic bomb." The Indian leadership would apparently reassess the decision after a year in light of how nuclear testing raised China's profile and any progress made in reversing China's nuclear gains.[258]

In a press conference at the Trombay reprocessing plant on January 22, Shastri praised Indian efforts at the United Nations to devise a stronger and more balanced approach to nuclear diplomacy. He championed a threefold portfolio comprising nonproliferation and comprehensive test-ban treaties in concert with disarmament talks.[259] To placate India, a nonproliferation treaty should include provisions for security guarantees and a four-environments ban on nuclear testing that would stigmatize further Chinese nuclear testing. Bowles was vexed by Washington's foot-dragging and protested against the "apparent decision … to hold [India] at arm's length on [its] proliferation

---

[256] "Briton Urges Nuclear Power to Joint in Guarantee to the World," 18 December 1964, *The New York Times*, 8. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
[257] Chester Bowles, New Delhi, Telegramto the Department of State, "Indian Cabinet Instructions to Bhabha," 31 December 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1998*, Vol. XXV, Document 82, footnote 3.
[258] Ibid. This assent likely related to a peaceful nuclear explosive, which Bhahba reported assured Shastri could be conducted underground so as not to violate the letter of the LTBT.
[259] "Shastri Warns U.N on Nuclear Menace," 23 January 1965, *The New York Times*, 6. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

resolution." He believed that nonproliferation efforts would receive a boost if India took the "lead position as [a] non-nuclear country that is easily capable of producing [these] weapons," underscoring the optical value of its postcolonial and non-white character as well.[260] He criticized the American affiliation with the Irish Resolution, which risked alienating Shastri when there was a "fifty-fifty opportunity to so commit India to [the] cause of nonproliferation that [they] would hold to its present moderate position."[261] A legitimate sense of Indian leadership in the realm of nuclear diplomacy, Bowles asserted, would afford India the international stature it might seek otherwise from nuclear weapons. Wiesner concurred that the "best of all [constructive actions] would be to support the Indian Resolution," which all non-aligned states in Geneva had then endorsed.[262] For now, however, Foggy Bottom supported only the minor fillip of letting Shastri announce the next Chinese explosion jointly with Rusk.[263]

**A Rearguard Action**

The Chinese test also reignited strategic thinking in the United States about the nuclear question. Johnson authorized "a higher-level, harder look at the problem of nuclear spread" in October for the purpose of formulating "a better policy than we would

---

[260] "If they will take lead position as non-nuclear country that is easily capable of producing weapons, our interests will be far better served than by teaming up with white nation of four million people with no such nuclear potential or political weight." He felt that a decision had been reached in meetings with Johnson, Rusk, Bundy, Komer, and Talbot in Washington in December, but that US interest in backing Indian nuclear diplomacy and security had since faded. Chester Bowles, Telegram to Robert Komer, "Importance of Persuading India not to Produce Nuclear Weapons," 8 January 1965, *FRUS 1964-1968*, Vol. XXV, Document 83.

[261] Chester Bowles, Telegram to Dean Rusk et al., "USG holding India at arm's length on proliferation resolution," 16 January 1965, Box 129 [1 of 2], CF—India, NSF, LBJL, 1.

[262] Jerome Wiesner, New Delhi, Telegram to the Department of State, "Wiesner's visit," 21 January 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XXV, South Asia, Document 85.

[263] Chester Bowles, New Delhi, Telegram to Dean Rusk, "Indian simultaneous statement re Chicom nuclear explosion," 10 February 1965, Box 129 [1 of 2], CF—India, NSF, LBJL.

be able to get by using our interhouse machinery." U.S. nuclear policy had proven ad-hoc, uncoordinated, and patently insufficient to the task. In essence, the administration had failed to harmonize the views of those who regarded nuclear policy through a national lens with those who traced the trend lines with a transnational compass. On November 1, 1964, the White House announced the task force that would assume the name of its chairman, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric. The Gilpatric Committee and its final report were significant less for their immediate impact on U.S. nuclear policy than in illustrating the sources of continuing policy inertia during a critical period of upheaval and opportunity in world affairs.[264]

Llewellyn Thompson was increasingly out of sync with the Disarmament Agency, the Pentagon, and the White House. Foster circulated a memo on December 3 outlining a five-plank disarmament platform to present the new Soviet leaders as they "weigh the competing pulls from Peiping and Washington." The recommendations included "an intensified effort to negotiate a non-proliferation agreement, which clearly commits all parties to halt proliferation in any form," and "the reinstitution of negotiations … [for] a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT)." He warned that a General Assembly debate could prove embarrassing to the U.S. if "arguments over the MLF … so embitter the atmosphere as to preclude the needed early action to prevent nuclear spread."[265] Members of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, including Chairman Chester Holifield (D – CA) had voiced doubts about a collective nuclear force in NATO at an annual meeting of the Atomic Industrial Forum.[266] He thought that the moment

[264] Gavin, "Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s."
[265] William Foster, Memorandum for the Committee of Principals, "Subjects to be discussed with the USSR," 3 December 1964, Box 13, Subject Files—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 1. Hereinafter SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.
[266] Glenn T. Seaborg, *Journals*, Vol. 9, 472.

had arrived for constructive Soviet-American nuclear diplomacy and wanted to "indicate our willingness to include in such an agreement … an assurance that the US will keep its veto."[267]

The memorandum drew a quick response from MLF supporters. In a response one week later, Thompson outlined "a collection of arguments designed to assure that no action will be taken … in the foreseeable future." His mistrust of the Soviets' willingness to abide by the four-environments test ban championed by India struck NSC deputy Spurgeon Keeny as especially troubling. He called the memorandum a "remarkable document that essentially calls into question our entire arms control and non-proliferation policy." Keeny concluded:

> I think it is most important that the Thompson memorandum does not become the State Department's formal position. If it does, the President will be faced with a serious problem that the State Department is effectively preventing the pursuit of his stated policy on arms control and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.[268]

His vexation echoed the depth of discord among key agencies. The State Department and the Disarmament Agency squared off over the priority accorded a nonproliferation treaty at a meeting of the Committee of Principals to discuss Foster's memorandum on December 21.[269] The Gilpatric Committee for which Keeny served as first author was tasked with bridging that gap.

---

[267] The other three were "informal discussion to prevent the spread of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles;" "a proposal to extend our freeze proposal to include reduction of an agreed number of nuclear delivery vehicles and launch sites;" and "an understanding to halt the consultation of any new land-based ICBM launch sites and ABM launch sites after July 1, 1965, while we negotiate limitations on nuclear delivery vehicles." Glenn T. Seaborg, *Journal*, Vol. 9, 529C.
[268] Spurgeon Keeny, Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, "Arms Control Subjects to be Explored with USSR," 16 December 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 57.
[269] Seaborg, *Journal*, Vol. 26, pp. 274-280

The Gilpatric Committee held three meetings between December 1, 1964 and January 8, 1965.[270] It surveyed options, foresaw contingencies, and weighed priorities while others dealt with day-to-day matters. At the second meeting, the cadre discussed an analysis warning "though public opposition may be strong, government-military elite in some countries (e.g., India, Japan) … [could make a] nuclear decision … advanced under the guise of a peaceful program."[271] Even though India and Japan were prime candidates, the document warned that more Asian states—Pakistan, Indonesia, Australia, South Korea, and Taiwan—might follow suit. In the Middle East, U.S. intelligence was monitoring Israel's Dimona reactor, which Egypt watched closely as well; in Europe, Sweden, Switzerland, West Germany, and Italy had the means and the motive; and, among Latin American states, the line-up of suspects featured Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Even allied South Africa was suspect. Averell Harriman interrogated Seaborg in late December about a scheduled delivery of U-235 to the country. Rusk had posited the merits of selective proliferation in a National Security Council meeting in late November, hypothesizing that "the Japanese or Indians might desirably have their own nuclear weapons."[272] Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara reaffirmed that day that there was "no question" that official policy remained to halt nuclear spread. The

[270] Its other members were Arthur Dean, Allen Dulles, Alfred Gruenther, George Kitiaskowsky, John McCloy, James Perkins, Arthur Watson, William Webster, and Herbert York. Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr. served as staff director and primary author.[270] Key personnel from the State Department, Defense Department, NSC, AEC, and ACDA were also consulted, and Raymond Garthoff, Russell Murray, George Rathjens, and Henry Rowen helped to staff the task force.
[271] Russell Murray, "Problems of Nuclear Proliferation outside Europe (Problem 2)," 7 December 1964, Box 5, Committee on Non-Proliferation, NSF, LBJL, 3. Cited in Gavin, "Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s," 106.
[272] Dane Eugene Swango, "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: Constrainer, Screen, or Enabler?" (Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 2009) Swango uses this quotation to substantiate his claim that the U.S. considered allowing India to nuclearize much more seriously than widely understood then or now. The context in which the quotation was made, however, suggests that Rusk was more interested in the option of an Asian MLF to whet Indian and Japanese nuclear appetites.

Gilpatric Committee nevertheless assembled at a critical juncture in the policymaking process.[273]

The group outlined and evaluated four strategies along a continuum that ranged from the devaluation of nonproliferation to its enshrinement as the central pillar of United States foreign policy. The strategies related to six policy issues: European proliferation, extra-European proliferation; existing nuclear powers; U.S. nuclear weapons policy; peaceful uses of atomic energy; and safeguards. The zero option, "selective relaxation of efforts to retard proliferation," expanded upon Rusk's observation that the arrival of some new nuclear powers, such as India or Japan, might enhance U.S. security. In this view, allies might begrudge Washington's interference without modifying their behavior. At the other extreme, option three propounded an "all-out effort to stop and roll back nuclear proliferation," wagering that the long-term value of a highly select nuclear club was worth the short-term costs to bilateral relationships. Options one (present course) and two ("hold the line") embodied strategies that assigned nonproliferation a secondary or high status relative to a willingness to incur "costs and risks" elsewhere.[274] Salient questions—security assurances, multilateral forces, international laws, Soviet-American dialogue, fissile-material cutbacks, technology transfers, and test-bans—were plotted according to these benchmarks.

The task force was independent, but heard the counsel of key officials. State Department Counselor Walt Rostow recounted previous nuclear diplomacy through a Manichean filter, "contrast[ing] Soviet policy since 1956 (overhanging threat of nuclear war, pressure on Berlin as a divisive issue in the West, and maneuvers to get US to start

[273] Memorandum of Conversation, "Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—Course of Action for UNGA—Discussed by the Committee of Principals," 23 November 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 50.
[274] Gavin, "Blasts from the Pasts," p. 109.

conflict) against *successful* U.S. policies of shoring up world security while working to lessen tension."[275] He omitted the period of détente ushered in by the LTBT, advised that nonproliferation should not be pursued "to the exclusion of … other US objectives," stumped for "the need to avoid premature U.S. reinsurance or 'loss of options'" in Asia, and supported a multilateral force in Europe and an "MLF or weapons pool" in Asia. The promotion by U.S. diplomats of nuclear-sharing in Asia akin to that in NATO had evidently outrun the White House's ability to control it. To  wrote Bundy in December to counsel that only a National Security Action Memorandum would stop officials at the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom from praising the concept in front of Asian leaders.[276] Raymond Garthoff's meanwhile remarks illustrated the State Department's institutional unease with multilateralism and preference for "country-to-country" solutions.[277] While Director of Defense Research and Engineering Dr. Harold Brown reported that national detection capabilities would soon allow a total test ban with only two or three inspections, a figure to which Soviet negotiators had acquiesced in May 1963.

Secretary McNamara reduced the issue to a basic binary set. In "Model A," the United States assumed the mission to stave off new members of the nuclear club. In "Model B," the U.S. came to terms with new entrants. He maintained his preference for "Model A" because of his conviction that "the more nuclear power are, the more there are likely to be."[278] Rusk disagreed. He highlighted the troublesome case of India for

[275] "Draft Minutes of Discussion of the Second Meeting of Committee on Nuclear Proliferation," 13-14 December 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 56, 147.
[276] Robert Komer, Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, "Nuclear Sharing in Asia," December 1965, Box 6, Robert Komer papers, NSF, LBJL.
[277] Ibid., 150.
[278] Minutes of Discussion, "Committee on Nuclear Proliferation," 7-8 January 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 60. Testimony of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on Monday, March 7, 1966, to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings on Senate Resolution 179, "Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Eighty-Ninth Congress, Second Session (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1966), 3.

which allied security guarantees did not exist and favored an "Asian nuclear defense community" outfitted from a U.S. nuclear stockpile, or a British "[C]ommonwealth nuclear committee."[279] As for West Germany, Rusk portrayed their nuclear ambitions as a matter of time rather than inclination and warned that Bonn would resort to a nuclear partnership with France, or its own deterrent, without the MLF. McNamara put the scheme's chances at fifty-fifty; however, American policymakers hoped that a joint force might rollback the British and French deterrents. Rusk claimed that Wilson's government would play ball on vetoes, which Assistant Secretary of State George Ball sustained when he contended that a West German signature on a nonproliferation treaty was unthinkable without its participation in "nuclear defense arrangements." Rusk softened the assertion, relating that West German Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein had disclosed to him earlier that day that Bonn's nuclear diplomacy was now more linked to reunification than to nuclear-sharing.

Discussions then turned to the central dilemma of U.S. nuclear diplomacy since the Cuban Missile Crisis; Allen Dulles pressed Rusk "if he would sacrifice a great deal in terms of other policies in order to get non-proliferation." Rusk portrayed the French case as illustrative of the pitfalls of treating nonproliferation as more important than good relations with an ally, though he acknowledged that the threat might become overriding in the Middle East. Gilpatric then hit on the crux: "how we can approach the problem on a case-by-case basis when each case has so much impact on [the] others[?]" Rusk took issue with the premise, replying that "each case is different."[280] Two assumptions figured

---

[279] Rusk also let slip his interpretation (based on high-level dialogue of "extreme sensitivity") that "the French nuclear program is strictly political not military" and "in De Gaulle's view … France must have a special place, and is only safe when Germany is in a secondary position." [2 subsequent lines are not declassified] Memorandum of Conversation, "Secretary's Meeting with the Gilpatric Committee on Non-Proliferation, 7 January 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 59.

[280] By contrast, Rusk would underscore the transnational impulse incited by nuclear proliferation in remarks at the Pastore hearings the next year.

in his answer: his negative assessment of Soviet cooperativeness and his belief that nuclear policies represented a national affair. He doubted the worth or the reliability of a Soviet-American nuclear guarantee as well as Moscow's willingness to consent to any number of inspections to verify a CTBT.[281] Thompson echoed Rusk's skepticism, maintaining that the Soviets were indifferent to proliferation excepting the case of West Germany. In a revealing moment, Rusk let slip that nuclear *aspirants* outside of Europe (e.g. India and Israel) were the most pressing threat. United States nonproliferation efforts thus bore increasingly on the Global South even as the multilateral treaties that would enact and legitimate a global nuclear order risked entangling its European allies.[282]

The Gilpatric Committee deviated from the Cold War orthodoxy to call for a "rearguard action to keep proliferation to the minimum." The conclusion stemmed in part from a consensus that atomic armaments risked a global contagion and in part from a conviction that a world with dozens of nuclear powers was an ignoble legacy for future generations. Gilpatric noted that he found it "impossible" that nuclear weapons could be "compartmentalized, quarantined, or regionalized," and drew an analogy between their catalytic threat and the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. To the communicable and catalytic metaphors were added ecological tropes such as generational justice. The remarks of George Kistiakowsky, Eisenhower's science advisor and a Manhattan Project veteran, were representative:

> Dr. Kistiakowsky felt that for our own lifetime we might prefer to live in a "Model B" world, but his thoughts about his grandchildren have changed his mind and commit him strongly to seek the "Model A." … We must wage a campaign to keep proliferation at a minimum and be prepared to lose individual battles, but

[281] AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg had shown more optimism toward a four-environments treaty that day, when he also upheld the need for a Plowshares loophole and the inclusion of IAEA inspections in the NPT. Seaborg, *Journal*, Vol. 10, p. 21

[282] Memorandum of Conversation, op. cit., "The Secretary's Meeting with the Gilpatric Committee on Non-Proliferation," 7 January 1965, 154-162.

> not the overall war. … He felt the non-European world is at least as important as Europe in the light of growth in population and technological innovations. … He also thought that our own example will be essential and that we should press measures of arms limitation and increasing understanding with the Soviet Union.

The committee supported “Model A” with the caveat that “Model B” remained viable if Model A failed. The committee heeded Gartoff’s entreaties to shield Polaris from strategic arms cuts and that an Atlantic nuclear force presented a unique opportunity to rollback the British deterrent. The Soviet-American balance of terror, on the other hand, went unquestioned. Herbert York captured the general ambivalence about security assurances, speculating that, “in the short run,” American lives should not be used as hostages, though he admitted “nervousness about the long run.” Kistiakowsky added that assurances were “essential,” but not to be given “promiscuously.” The group agreed that a robust nonproliferation strategy could lead to nuclear containment from which the country would reap a “net security advantage.”[283]

Keeny set these judgments down in the final report, which abjured the maximal position, but nonetheless sought to set nonproliferation as a cornerstone of United States grand strategy. The report counseled shoring up the existing framework with a brace of new measures. The core proposal was to encourage more accommodation on longstanding obstacles to multilateral pacts, tighter controls on nuclear exports and technology transfers, threats of economic sanction against suspect nations, and a renewed commitment to ramping down the Soviet-American arms race. Nuclear proliferation was deemed a paramount threat owing to its potential to disrupt the Soviet-American nuclear standoff, siphon resources from development, foment hostility among regional adversaries, and hinder arms control and disarmament. Proliferation also jeopardized the United States’ superpower status because, in time, new nuclear powers would “constitute

[283] Minutes of Discussion, op. cit., “Committee on Nuclear Proliferation,” 7-8 January 1965.

direct military threats," undermine U.S. power and influence, and perhaps occasion a return to isolationism.[284] In response to Rusk's musings that an Indian or Japanese nuclear arsenal might bolster security, the report warned that nuclear spread was uncontrollable. It would trigger a "chain reaction of similar decisions" by countries such as Pakistan, the U.A.R., and Israel, whose nuclearization might unshackle the hands of European states, where the U.S. ought to stop assisting and instead try to rollback the French and British deterrents. In sum, the analysis presumed that nuclear weapons embodied a transnational threat rather than an object of national self-determination.

To ward off these hazards, the U.S. needed an "energetic and comprehensive" policy mix of multilateral pacts to rein in proliferation generally and targeted pressure to solve the hard cases. Citing the "broad support for multilateral measures," such as the Irish Resolution and the LTBT, the committee requested a fresh look at the merits of a hardware solution with the proviso that a nonproliferation treaty "should not wait, or be dependent upon," its resolution. Furthermore, "all members agreed" that software alternatives such as consultative committees merited urgent exploration. In essence, the Gilpatric Committee held that an expeditious treaty was worth more than appeasing West Germany on nuclear-sharing. A CTBT was desirable if new technologies could reconcile Soviet and American inspection quotas, and nuclear-free zones in Latin America, Africa, and even the Middle East deserved flexibility on questions of verification and transit. Respecting bilateral measures, the report dwelt on how best to discourage New Delhi, promoting a "credible assurance" if India was confronted with a nuclear threat and a readiness to take "parallel action" with the U.S.S.R. or the U.K., or both. Scientific help that would not contribute to a military program and "a larger role in the

[284] Report by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, 21 January 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 64, 174.

United Nations" contingent on staying non-nuclear, were also specified as ways to whet India's appetite for increased stature. The findings advanced scientific and prestige "alternatives" for Japan as well, while promoting assurances and compellence relative to the Israel-U.A.R. dyad.

Despite its unanimity, its members' stature, and its moderation, the report was quickly buried. Bundy described the report as "coming down hard on one side of this tough question," even though it certified positions that many agencies had held for years. On the one hand, the result sprang from the majority of arms controllers on the committee and a task force's natural tendency to seek a higher priority for its object of inquiry. On the other hand, it was the opposition of Rusk, whom Bundy depicted as possessing "real doubts about some of the recommendations," which proved fatal.[285] He was resistant to security assurances and invested in hardware solutions for Europe and perhaps Asia. The report's emphasis on Soviet-American cooperation also cut against the grain of the beliefs shared by Rusk and Ball that Soviet animus toward a hardware solution stemmed from an effort to divide the West and that Moscow's attitude would toughen amid the power transfer, the Sino-Soviet split, and the Vietnam War.[286] Gilpatric's membership in the class of New England Brahmins from which Johnson felt estranged may have contributed as well.[287]

In the final analysis, the Gilpatric Committee revealed a continuing disconnect among key United States bureaus and officials whose fondness for either bilateralism or multilateralism in the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs were at odds. The rift resulted from

---

[285] Editorial Note, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 63, 172.
[286] Memorandum of Conversation, "The Secretary's Meeting with the Gilpatric Committee on Non-Proliferation," 7 January 1965, 155.
[287] Robert D. Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy*, Culture, Politics, and the Cold War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001). Need to find relevant chapter(s). Gilpatric, among others, famously dated Jackie Kennedy following the death of her husband.

divergent views of the significance of nuclear weapons: were they subsidiary to Cold War containment, or did the risk of the knowledge and material needed to build them spreading across borders demand a turn to nuclear containment and Cold War moderation? The report held that U.S.-Soviet arms control and nonproliferation were inextricably entwined in view of the need for equity, reciprocity, and legitimacy in multilateral covenants:

> [I]t is unlikely that others can be induced to abstain indefinitely from acquiring nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union and the United States continue in a nuclear arms race. Therefore, lessened emphasis by the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons, and agreements on broader arms control measures must be recognized as important components in the overall program to prevent nuclear proliferation.[288]

The architects of Johnson's foreign policy were aware in early 1965 that the themes of vertical and horizontal proliferation were increasingly linked in international nuclear diplomacy. For now, however, the White House quietly noted its receipt of the report without sanctioning its findings.

### Elements of a Global Nuclear Order

The State Department and the Thompson Committee reviewed the assurance question in March 1965. The CIA had restated during the previous month that "chances [were] better than even that within the next several years India [would] decide to develop nuclear weapons" unless assurances were granted by the U.S., the U.S.S.R., or the U.K., or some combination thereof.[289] Thompson raised an alternative. U.S. officials could persuade India to issue a warning that it would repulse nuclear threats "from anyone"

---

[288] Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Report to the President, Box 55, National Security Council Histories—NPT, NSF, LBJL, 5.

[289] Memorandum to Holders of NIE 4-2-64 and NIE 31-64, "Likelihood of Indian Development of Nuclear Weapons," 25 February 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XXV, Document 90..

and felt "confident" that the other nuclear powers would come to its defense. The U.S. would then declare publicly that a nuclear antagonist would pay a "heavy price," which would toughen Johnson's soft guarantee while still preserving the military's "freedom of action."[290] When Thompson's proposal languished, Keeny became frustrated about the lack of a policy. In a letter to Bundy on March 16, he derided the U.S. position as "disturbingly thin" and Rusk and Thompson as "clearly very loathe [sic] to go very far in offering specific guarantees to India." He admitted that this stemmed in part from Shastri's reluctance "to accept unilateral U.S. guarantees" because they would impinge on his country's non-aligned status; however, neither Rusk nor Thompson thought along the lines of a solitary pledge. He offered two suggestions to "strengthen the package." Washington could convince the Indian government to open its facilities to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in an effort to burnish its peaceful credentials. Second, Johnson could request a joint congressional resolution endorsing his soft guarantee. Keeny penned in the margins that Bundy thought that guarantees through the British Commonwealth bore consideration as well.[291] In truth, the abundance of plans betrayed the lack of one.

In early March, Rusk sent Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman to New Delhi, where the Democratic grandee found himself in broad agreement with Bowles. Harriman was chosen because of his role in securing U.S. military aid during the 1962 Sino-Indian border war and in response to forecasts that China would soon test a second nuclear device. He described the Indian leadership as now more favorably inclined toward the U.S. In an interview with Shastri, the prime minister affirmed the importance of

---

[290] Jerome Wiesner, New Delhi, op. cit., Telegram to the Department of State, "Wiesner's visit," 21 January 1965, footnote 7.
[291] Spurgeon Keeny, Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, "Draft Statement of Assurances for India," 16 March 1965, Box 129 [1 of 2] CF—India, NSF, LBJL.

nonproliferation and the utility of nuclear powers extending security assurances that accorded with non-alignment. He corroborated that Shastri had discussed a nuclear shield with Wilson when he visited London in December; the Indian prime minister believed that "it would be unwise for India, as only one of the non-nuclear powers, to seek a shield for itself alone;" instead, the "Chinese threat" required a nuclear umbrella covering "all non-nuclear states."[292] Harriman sensed that Shastri had over-estimated Soviet willingness to engage on arms control and security guarantees; even so, his correspondence showed an Indian state amenable to U.S. influence and eager for non-nuclear solutions to China's feat. With the United Nations General Assembly and the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament adjourned and U.S. officials uneasy about a joint Soviet-American guarantee, however, Harriman could not envisage a treaty package on which the "Indians, West and Soviets agree[d]."[293]

While United States policymakers debated how to relieve Indian insecurity, Bhabha and other nuclear hawks sounded out American help with peaceful nuclear explosives. Bhabha and B.K. Nehru met with Ball, Robert Anderson and David T. Schneider on February 22 to discuss how the U.S. could assist India with its nuclear ventures. After praising the virtues of nuclear energy when compared to coal plants in much of India, Bhabha adduced the national interest in offsetting prestige gained by China among Afro-Asian states. They could dampen the "noise" put out by the nuclear blast with their own "dramatic 'peaceful' achievement." After emphasizing the help that

[292] U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, Telegram to the Department of State, "Governor Harriman called on Prime Minister Shastri," 5 March 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XXV, Document 91; Averell Harriman, U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, Telegram to the Department of State, "Harriman's Impression of India," 7 March 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XXV, Document 92.
[293] Dean rusk, Telegram for Governor Averell Harriman, 27 February 1965 (SECRET), p. 1. Source: Subject-Numeric File, 1964-1966; Central Files of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives, Washington, D.C. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, India and Pakistan—On the Nuclear Threshold. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB6/docs/doc07.pdf

the P.R.C. had allegedly received from the Soviet Union, he implied the possibility of a technology transfer by estimating that an Indian explosive could take 18 months, or "with a U.S. blueprint … six."[294] The scenario was revisited when Foster spoke to Indian Chargé d'Affaires Avtar Krishna Dar, who related that Bhabha wished to exhibit the scale of Indian scientific and technological achievements. Dar intimated that a "Plowshare project would be very visible" and "the easiest."[295]

In May, the U.S. State Department finally found a potential platform on which to base a nuclear guarantee—the United Nations General Assembly. Bowles was enthusiastic. He encouraged Rusk in late April to urge the Indians to work with the U.S.S.R. or the Irish at the U.N. Disarmament Committee to draft a resolution for a multilateral assurance.[296] Rusk outlined his thinking on May 5, dwelling on the benefits of a guarantee backed by a UNGA Resolution. If tabled by a non-aligned state, the motion would achieve a host of vital and interrelated ends by recording signatories' "intention … to provide or support immediate assistance to" the victim of a nuclear threat. The language would respect non-alignment, hasten a nonproliferation treaty, deter the Chinese from nuclear threats, and be "palatable … to [the] Soviets by being optically directed against China as little as possible." On the final count, the initiative would finesse the "Soviet reluctance to make a clearly defined public choice between India and Peiping."[297] He told Bowles to let Shastri approach the Soviets first to which the

---

[294] U.S. State Department, Memorandum of Conversation between B.K. Nehru, Dr. Homi Bhabha, George Ball, Robert Anderson, and David T. Schneider, "Indian Nuclear Energy Program," 22 February 1965, Box 129 [1 of 2], CF-India, NSF, LBJL , 1-2.
[295] ACDA, Memorandum of Conversation between William Foster and Avtar Kirshna Dar, Indian Chargé d'Affaires, "UNDC and Plowshare Initiative," 8 April 1965, Box 129 [1 of 2], CF-India, NSF, LBJL, 3.
[296] Chester Bowles, New Delhi, Telegram to Dean Rusk, "Working with Indians in developing a resolution providing assurances for non-nuclear powers," 28 April 1965, Box 129 [1 of 2], CF-India, NSF, LBJL.
[297] Chest Bowles, New Delhi, Telegram to Department of State, "Security Assurances to India:" 5 May 1965, Box 129 [1 of 2], CF-India, NSF, LBJL, 1-6.

ambassador responded that New Delhi was preoccupied with a recent exchange of fire with Pakistani troops in the Rann of Kutch. Shastri and Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh raised the subject with Soviet leaders when they visited Moscow from May 12 to 19. Premier Alexei Kosygin tried to soothe them by calling Mao's Bomb "a small toy."[298] However, when Singh inquired about security assurances through the UNGA, their "first reaction" was "an attempt to bury [the] question by suggesting its inclusion in [an] eventual general disarmament agreement." After Singh pushed for a more concrete response, his interlocutor expressed that the Kremlin needed more time to look at the options, which Singh took as a positive sign since the proposal was not rejected out of hand.[299]

United States relations with the subcontinent underwent a major trial that summer, drawing attention away from the nuclear issue at a crucial moment. In mid-April, Johnson chose to postpone visits by Pakistani President Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Shastri in fear that their arrivals would prejudice the congressional review of foreign assistance to both countries. The Pakistani incursion into the Rann of Kutch set off a wave of skirmishes, saber-rattling, and joint mobilizations culminating in a Pakistan thrust into Kashmir on August 5, which in turn triggered an all-out war between India and Pakistan. The conflict was the result of mounting tensions between the regional rivals and illustrated the U.S. quandary of wanting to improve relations with India without alienating Pakistan, which although a member of SEATO and CENTO was gravitating more and more toward Communist China.

---

[298] "Politburo Talk by Zhou Enlai on Receiving a Group of [Central] Military Commission Operational Meeting Comrades," 21 May 1965, Cold War International History Project, Chinese Nuclear History Collection, Dangde wenxian [Party History Documents], vol. 3 (1994), pp. 27-28, translated by Neil Silver. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114363

[299] Chester Bowles, New Delhi, Telegram to Dean Rusk, "Nuclear Assurances," 23 May 1965, Box 129 [1 of 2], CF-India, NSF, LBJL.

The effects on U.S.-Indian nuclear diplomacy were incidental yet unfortunate. Shastri was indignant at his trip's cancellation by Johnson, which he perceived as deflating his political capital and which deprived the leaders of an opportunity to sort out the mess relating to assurances. U.S. neutrality in the conflict succeeded in alienating Islamabad and New Delhi alike. In Bowles's words, India was in a "angry, unreasonable, and indeed irrational mood due to … lingering humiliation from [the] Chinese attack, Chinese prestige gains with [the] nuclear bomb which India could also produce, Indian Army's alleged defeat at [the] hands of [the] Pak[istan] Army in Kutch, and [a] frustrated feeling that [the] US … does not understand their position."[300] Johnson captured his own frustration with South Asia when he groused that he had discovered "over the last few months how little influence we had with the Pak[istanis] or Indians."[301] By the time that Indian and Pakistani diplomats brokered a cease-fire in September with the help of Soviet mediators, the United States had lost much of its own political capital in the region.

**"A Vain Dialogue"**

Tensions between nationalism and internationalism infected the conduct of multilateral nuclear diplomacy in the aftermath of China's explosion and Khrushchev's fall. The French government subscribed to a view of nuclear weapons upholding states' rights to develop them. At first, Pierre Gallois's concept of a "limited deterrent" legitimated the *force de frappe*; afterward, French officials found themselves in the tricky situation of defending nuclear sovereignty while feeling uneasy about the ungoverned

---

[300] Chester Bowles, Telegram to the Department of State, "Shastri in Present Crisis," 10 May 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XXV, Document 119.
[301] Memorandum for the Record, "Meeting with the President on Kashmir," 2 September 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XXV, Document 178.

spread of weapons of mass destruction, especially to West Germany.[302] French philosopher and strategist Raymond Aron was increasingly critical of the *force de frappe*; however, his article, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons," in the January issue of *The Atlantic Monthly*, warned that international measures were ineffectual in the foremost preserve of the national interest—the security sphere.[303] A report by the French Ministry of External Affair's Office of Political Affairs and Disarmament echoed Aron's thinking, maintaining that a nonproliferation treaty was untenable given the sovereign prerogative in security matters and superfluous because it was against nuclear powers' interests to aid other states' military nuclear ambitions. With that said, French policy on multilateral pacts would prove subject to revision once the *force de frappe* was "credible and secure." Although neither the Limited Test Ban Treaty nor a nonproliferation treaty were likely to halt the nuclear revolution in strategic space-time, they might prove effective at delaying it by altering the policy calculus of key states.[304]

The United Kingdom was more heavily invested in nuclear internationalism, and its hard-charging Minister for Disarmament, Lord Chalfont, strove throughout the spring to reconvene the ENDC. After visiting New York City and Washington in late February, Chalfont joined Foreign Minister Michael Stewart in a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at which they pushed for the Geneva talks to resume.[305] On March 31, Chalfont addressed the North Atlantic Council, where he characterized the Chinese test as a "momentous change" and warned that pressure on India to follow suit

---

[302] Marc Trachtenberg, "The de Gaulle Problem," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 14, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 81–92.
[303] Raymond Aron, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 215 (January 1965), 44-50
[304] Direction des Affaires Politiques, Report, Désarmement re "Non dissémination des armes nucléaires," 3 February 1965, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 8. Hereinafter AMAEF.
[305] Chalfont, *The Shadow of My Hand*, 112.

might open the floodgates. He reported on the frostiness of his reception in Moscow, which he attributed to Soviet attacks on U.S. escalation in Vietnam, and that Soviet officials were opting to move negotiations to the rambunctious, 114-nation United Nations Disarmament Committee rather than the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.[306]

The Soviet Union was increasingly critical of the United State presence in Southeast Asia after the launch of Operation Rolling Thunder, the landing of the first US combat troops (3500 Marines) near Na Dang, and the trailblazing use of napalm in March. By the end of 1965, the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam would reach 184,300.[307] Soviet support for Hanoi and the country's reunification under Ho Chi Minh dated back to Stalin's recognition of the Viet Minh in 1950. Though China was the chief purveyor of aid, Moscow refused to take a backseat to Beijing in its rhetorical support for Hanoi, repeatedly haranguing the U.S. for its imperialist aggression against the Vietnamese people.[308] The new chill in Soviet-American relations spread to nuclear diplomacy. The Soviet call for a convention of the United Nations Disarmament Committee signaled an unwillingness to partake in substantive arms control talks.

The session began in New York City on April 26 under the chairmanship of Egyptian diplomat Mohammed El Kony. The proceedings began on a positive note, when the American and Soviet delegations agreed that a minimal ICBM umbrella could abide through the stages of disarmament for purposes of strategic stability.[309] The

---

[306] Pierre de Leusse, Paris, Telegram from NATO to other stations, "Lord Chalfont visit to the NATO Council," 31 March 1965, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 3.

[307] http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam/index-1965.html.

[308] Lien-Hang T Nguyen, *Hanoi's War an International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam.* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 119, 326 (n. 49); Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*, 71–119. "As the Sino-Soviet split increasingly became a zero-sum game, North Vietnam's war effort became a primary battleground in Beijing and Moscow's rivalry for leadership of the communist world." Nguyen, p. 119.

[309] Direction des Affaires Politiques, Note, "Sessions de la Commission du Désarmement (26 avril – 16 juin 1965)," 27 July 1965, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1-8.

paramount subject of discussion, however, was a nuclear nonproliferation treaty to which further curtailments to nuclear testing were now linked. As the embryonic Soviet-American détente calcified in the crucible of Vietnam, the common Western front, already strained by the kerfuffle over nuclear-sharing arrangements and French truculence, showed signs of cracking. Italy plead that disarmament savings go to developmental ends. The nonproliferation package that the Canadian delegate, General E.L.M. Burns, laid out was primarily intended to "make the treaty more palatable to the nonnuclear states."[310] He volunteered that security assurances and arms cuts should offset pledges by the non-nuclear states to quit the field. Furthermore, the treaty should have a limited duration, enter into force only with the ratification of key advanced nuclear states (e.g. Canada, the F.R.G., India, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, and Sweden), and feature an inspections regime monitoring nuclear and non-nuclear countries alike. Since Britain had already backed India on security assurances, the United States appeared out of tune with its European partners as well as the non-aligned bloc.

The non-aligned contingent, whose numbers had swollen thanks to decolonization, was increasingly proactive. French Ambassador Roger Seydoux observed that "Third World interest in progress in disarmament negotiations seemed to parallel a clearer recognition of the role that small powers felt entitled to play in the United Nations."[311] He underscored the "general movement that had arisen in favor of a total ban on nuclear testing, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and Beijing's participation in the disarmament talks." Japan, Sweden, and Algeria, among others, were calling for China and France to send delegations to Geneva. Sweden's disarmament minister, Alva Myrdal, pushed hard for a nonproliferation package that included a fissile-

---

[310] Burns, "The Nonproliferation Treaty," 792.

[311] Direction des Affaires Politiques, op. cit., Note, "Commission du Désarmement," 27 July 1965, 8-9.

material cutoff and a comprehensive test ban. In Geneva, Sweden served more and more as an "interdependent source of expertise as well as spokesman for the other seven less economically developed nonaligned states."[312] Its defunct nuclear-weapon program underlay its "military-scientific expertise" and Myrdal's reputation and personality made her an "honest broker." U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson recapitulated the suite of limited U.S. proposals submitted to the ENDC in January 1964, but also expressed Washington's interest in an expanded test-ban treaty "in the light of new and recent means of detection that we have acquired." He announced that his country supported nuclear-free zone talks in Latin America, but kept silent on the matter of security guarantees beyond reiterating the non-binding soft guarantee from the previous October. Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland vowed that the United States was eager to discuss the merits of stronger guarantees, albeit in Geneva.[313]

Among the non-aligned delegations, Indian diplomats played the "most active role." They sought primarily "to place the issue of nonproliferation within the framework of collective security."[314] B.N. Chakravarty condemned China's second test shot on May 4, before itemizing the five elements of a grand bargain by which the nuclear have-nots could abide. First, the nuclear powers would not supply the weapons to those states without them. Second, they would pledge not to wield them against the have-nots. Third, the have-nots would receive guarantees against nuclear blackmail through the United Nations. Fourth, the international community would bring about a treaty fully banning nuclear tests and freeze the number of existing weapons and delivery systems. Finally, the

---

[312] Quester, *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation*, 128.
[313] "U.S. Weighs Plan for Atomic Curb: Nuclear Powers Would Give Guarantees of Protection to Nations Facing Attack," 15 April 1965, *The New York Times*, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, 1.
[314] Direction des Affaires Politiques, op. cit., Note, "Commission du Désarmement," 27 July 1965, 10. Harlan was Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

nuclear have-nots would pledge not to acquire them.[315] He quoted Singh's recent remarks to the UNGA, where the Indian Foreign Minister had maintained that "[t]he importance of non-proliferation cannot be over-emphasized … [it] is as important as that of banning nuclear tests" warranting treatment "as a matter of highest priority." Evidently, Shastri felt that this speech had not yet received an adequate reply.[316] Seydoux noted that non-aligned states lead by the Indian delegation were increasingly inclined to demand assurances from the nuclear powers in the absence of full disarmament. Cracks in the edifice of non-nuclear solidarity did exist. Israel and Japan, for example, were more interested in retaining the United States nuclear umbrella and in the intrusiveness of safeguards.[317]

On May 12, Irish Foreign Minister Frank Aiken warned that time was short for a treaty to halt nuclear spread whose urgency necessitated action by the international community. Aiken propped up the Western line that proliferation entailed a passage of control over rather than access to nuclear weapons and cited the need for non-nuclear states to welcome inspections. He sounded nonetheless broadly sympathetic to non-aligned positions, whose salience he described as having grown since 1961. These included the necessity of security guarantees and the question of whether the international community could treat nonproliferation separately from disarmament.[318] The foremost champion of nonproliferation sounded increasingly in tune with the Indian campaign to fortify a pact with security guarantees and equalize it through linkages to

[315] Direction des Affaires Politiques, op. cit., Note, "Commission du Désarmement," 27 July 1965, 8-16.
[316] C. Gray Beam, Memorandum for ACDA/IR, "Shastri and Chakravarty comments on nonproliferation treaty," 12 May 1965, William Foster papers, George C. Marshal Library. Hereinafter Foster papers, GCML.
[317] Roger Seydoux, New York, Telegram to Paris, "Commission du Désarmement," 17 June 1965, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 2.
[318] Roger Seydoux, New York, Telegram to Paris, "M. Aiken's views on nonproliferation proceedings," 13 May 1965, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

nuclear arms control and disarmament. Closing the nuclear club's door, though, still took precedence.

As the international community came together around a promising arms control package, the matter was garnering more attention from the chattering classes and legislative branch in the United States. Foster set out to break the stalemate by publishing an article in the July issue of *Foreign Affairs*, "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament." Because he wrote in his official capacity as director of the Disarmament Agency, he solicited comments from key insiders, policy experts, and foreign counterparts. Foster accepted the majority of edits submitted by Rusk, for example, but his decision to clarify two sections rather than excise them illustrated the roots of policy disagreement. The first section touched on the relationship between the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence and security assurances for countries threatened by China:

> One of our difficulties in NATO has been the growing feeling, most notable in France, that the U.S. commitment to NATO was of diminishing credibility as Soviet capacity to damage the U.S. increased. Undoubtedly, with the passage of time a similar erosion of confidence would occur with respect to any assurances designed to counter the Chinese threat too. But we probably do have a number of years during which Chinese nuclear capabilities will be so small relative to those of the U.S. (or of the U.S.S.R.) that American (and/or Soviet) assurances for any country would be credible assuming of course at least some degree of American (and/or Soviet) concern about the viability of the country in question.

Rusk wanted this section removed entirely, but Foster demurred. He quoted French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville instead to the effect that NATO allies lacked confidence in the U.S. deterrent so as to avoid an undocumented claim, and "softened" his argument about the "erosion of … credibility" that would occur as Chinese nuclear power waxed.[319]

---

[319] The final draft read, "With the passage of time a similar erosion of confidence might occur with respect to any assurances designed to counter the Chinese threat." William Foster, Letter to Dean Rusk, "Suggested Changes to forthcoming article in Foreign Affairs," 11 May 1965, Foster Papers, GCML.

The second contention centered on McNamara's recent statement to the House Armed Service Committee that United States and Soviet forces were now so large, diverse, and survivable that a counter-force attack could not bring about a nuclear victory. Rusk doubted that mutual assured destruction now heralded the end of the "strategic nuclear-arms race," or the ability to remove "some strategic capabilities on a reciprocal basis." Foster moreover claimed that U.S.-Soviet arms control was important "in dealing with nuclear proliferation."[320] Not because "of our setting a good example," he clarified, but to dilute the putative worth of nuclear weapons by reversing the arms race and fostering "a world order in which the role of nuclear weapons would be diminished." These acts required Soviet-American entente. In the short-term, the offer of security assurances was critical. In the long-term, without forward progress on arms control, "it is hard to see how … we can hope to put any limits of the membership in the nuclear club."[321] Behind this analysis was a perverse consensus among the Disarmament Agency, the Pentagon, and Soviet diplomats; Tsarapkin was said to have reviewed the article with Foster "word by word."[322]

Foster piece's echoed many of the Gilpatric report's findings; meanwhile, the U.S. Congress began to weigh in. The issue was the disparity in peace efforts between the Kennedy and Johnson years—a sore point for an unelected president who resented the Massachusetts family and found himself mired in a foreign war. When Rusk testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 28, Senator Joe Clark (D-PA) scolded the Johnson administration for "backsliding" since Kennedy's assassination. They started by debating where to draw the line between national sovereignty and "the

---

[320] Foster, "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament," 598.
[321] Ibid.
[322] Arthur Krock, "In the Nation: Priority in the Quest for Peace," 27 June 1965, *The New York Times*, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, E11.

common law of mankind." Rusk stated that international laws and institutions were needed for transnational threats; "there are no such things as sovereignty with respect to epidemic diseases, for example, because disease does not recognize political borders." In the security field of which nuclear policy was a subset though, Rusk questioned whether the U.N. had matured enough to enforce rules and settle disputes. Clark turned to disarmament:

> [S]ince President Johnson went into the White House I have never heard the words general and complete disarmament uttered from his lips, your lips or from anybody else, and my question is have we returned from the position which President Kennedy put us in? … [S]ince the death of President Kennedy the whole steam has gone out of bringing the Russians back and attempting to get together with them and, possibly, to see if we can't bridge the gap between the plans for general disarmament and our own. This seems to have been a casualty from the Kennedy … administration.[323]

Clark thought that the MLF was stymieing progress on "other far more important matters," such as a nonproliferation pact. He disagreed with Rusk's assessment that the U.S.S.R. schemed to weaken NATO and observed that Soviet fears were rational "with a little sense of empathy." "Which do you think is more important," he asked, "coming to a comprehensive talk with Russia or shoring up a NATO organization which shows every sign of disintegrating?"[324] Johnson called Clark's remarks "a great injustice" and demanded an apology.[325] The White House drafted a summary of disarmament efforts to date under Johnson and the State Department entered an aide-mémoire into the congressional record for purposes of damage control; Bundy promised Johnson he would

---

[323] Minutes, Senate Foreign Relations Committee discussion between Senator Clark and Secretary Rusk, 28 April 1965, Box 10, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 38.
[324] Ibid., 41-42.
[325] Spurgeon Keeny, Memorandum with attachments for McGeorge Bundy, "Senator Clark and Disarmament," 29 April 1965, Box 10, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.

"fold both of these documents around a stick and beat Joe Clark over the head with it tomorrow at breakfast."[326]

Johnson soon found himself on the defensive again from a man even more intimately related to his predecessor—Senator Robert Kennedy of New York. In his maiden speech on the Senate floor on June 23, Kennedy warned that U.S. foreign policy had come unglued:

> I rise today to urge action on the most vital issue now facing this nation and the world. This issue is not in the headlines. It is not Vietnam, or the Dominican Republic, or Berlin. It is the question of nuclear proliferation.[327]

He called on the Johnson White House to give "central priority" to nonproliferation and exert "the greatest additional effort." In this vein, he asked that the U.S. contemplate talks with China and adopt the Gilpatric report, whose recommendations matched his own and which White House Press Secretary George Reedy stated was still under review by State, Defense, the AEC, and other agencies. It was clear that Kennedy spoke on behalf of the Disarmament Agency to end the executive-branch "dissension" in regards to the report.[328] He wanted to sacrifice the MLF to hasten a nonproliferation treaty, and backed an expanded test ban, nuclear-free zones in Latin America, Africa, and possibly the Middle East, Soviet-American arms control, more investment in the IAEA, and a shift toward conventional capabilities to dispel the aura of prestige encircling nuclear weapons. Furthermore, he invoked his brother's legacy and the renaissance of liberal internationalism in his final year, when the compass of global security was broadened to

---

[326] McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for Lyndon Johnson, 29 April 1965, Box 10, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.

[327] Text of Senator Kennedy's Speech Urging Pact to Check Nuclear Weapons Spread," 24 June 1965, *The New York Times*, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, 16.

[328] E.W. Kenworthy, "Kennedy Proposes Treaty to Check Nuclear Spread: White House is Cool to Plan to Assign 'Central Priority' to Pact that Would Include Chinese Communist Regime," 24 June 1965, *The New York Times*, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, 1.

accommodate strategic stability and environmental justice, most notably, in the nonproliferation and preservationist functions of the LTBT. The speech spelled out the planetary scope of nuclear threats fourteen times and the duty to future generations of "children" on five occasions.[329]

Johnson was not unschooled in the art of legitimating diplomacy in Cold War America through paternalistic appeals to "our children … and our posterity" so as to dispel the calculus of *realpolitik* and the specter of communism. The president bore a longstanding and mutual grudge against Robert Kennedy, whom he suspected of gunning for the Democratic presidential nod in 1968. His portrayal of nuclear diplomacy as a "moral" issue could burnish his peace credentials against the backdrop of military escalation in Vietnam and a blossoming antiwar movement. Johnson undoubtedly resented the junior senator's attempt to tip the scales in favor of the arms control cabal two days before the president was to deliver a speech commemorating the United Nations' 20th anniversary. Six days later, the *New York Times* reported on the Gilpatric report's counsel that a nonproliferation treaty trumped an Atlantic nuclear force.[330] Given the report's secrecy (only Foster was privy in ACDA), the story likely sprung from a leak made to air the grievance of a nonproliferation treaty supporter in the upper reaches of the Johnson administration.

Cracks were continuing to show in the Western edifice at the nuclear assemblies. China exploded a second device on May 14, exposing new divisions in the non-aligned bloc at the UNDC. India, Japan, Taiwan, and a smattering of Western and Pacific powers condemned the action. However, most non-aligned nations refrained from

---

[329] "Text of Senator Kennedy's Speech, op. cit. 24 June 1965, 16.
[330] "Atom-Curb Panel Stirs U.S. Dispute: Report Said to Urge Putting Arms-Spread Halt Ahead of NATO Nuclear Force," 1 July 1965, *The New York Times*, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, 1.

expressing disapproval. India's delegate in Geneva, V.C. Trivedi, described the blast as "an attack not only on all that we stand for and all the efforts that we are making but … also an attack on all of humanity" because of the genetic and health risks to present and future generations.[331] Foster's article had postulated that a developed China might eventually alter its opposition to nuclear diplomacy following a change in leadership. Chinese Vice Chairman Zhou Enlai agreed that nuclear arms posed different threats according to a country's geography and stage of development. He told the Chinese Politburo in May that "the Americans and the Japanese need to realize that if atomic bombs fall on their heads, their losses will be greater than ours" since "Japan has a population of 100,000,000 concentrated on those not so large islands, and with so much industrial infrastructure." He still fretted that the U.S., or the U.S.S.R., or both, might conduct a "massive strike" against Chinese nuclear facilities.[332] Meanwhile, numerous delegations construed the second test as "the best demonstration of the urgency of a nonproliferation treaty."[333]

The non-aligned now treated the Chinese case as more alarming than the French, though its members disagreed on how best to coax Beijing into the fold. Procedural politics unfolded along the lines of a deepening Sino-India split. On June 4, thirty-three delegations signed a Yugoslavian proposal to convene a world disarmament conference where China would participate, recalling the Cairo Resolution recently issued by the Non-Aligned Conference there that had received widespread support. Meanwhile, five of the eight non-aligned members of the ENDC (Burma, Ethiopia, and the U.A.R.

---

[331] "India and Japan Denounce China: Tell Arms Unit Test Is Peril to Man and Affront to U.N.," 15 May 1965, *The New York Times*, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, 2.
[332] "Politburo Talk by Zhou Enlai on Receiving a Group of [Central] Military Commission Operational Meeting Comrades," op. cit,, 21 May 1965, 27-28.
[333] Roger Seydoux, Telegram to Paris, "Désarmement," 25 May 1965, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 2.

demurred) submitted a competing resolution authored by India calling for a four-environments test ban and security guarantees to accompany a nonproliferation agreement. The proposal received 24 signatures.

For their parts, the superpowers were pulling in opposite directions. The Soviet Union pushed for a quixotic ban on nuclear-weapon use and the elimination of military bases on foreign soil in an attempt to strike at the pillars of NATO defense. Nikolai Fedorenko repeatedly tried to tone down provisions designed to flog China and generally afforded "an honest defense for an absent party."[334] The United States rehashed Johnson's package from January 1964 and sought to limit the agenda to the ENDC. In truth, both sides bided their time. U.S. policymakers expected little and desired less from the cacophonous ensemble. Many delegates attributed Soviet stalling vis-à-vis the ENDC to the Sino-Soviet split, concluding that Tsarapkin and Fedorenko "would not give the go-ahead until July when the Algiers conference could not longer serve as a tribunal for China to denounce a vain dialogue or worse yet a Russo-American collusion."[335]

The United Nations Disarmament Committee closed up shop on June 16. The Yugoslavian resolution advocating a world disarmament conference had passed after minor revisions with 89 votes and 16 abstentions, including the U.S., which instead endorsed the ENDC. The achievement was symbolic rather than concrete since a world conference remained far-fetched while China looked askance at nuclear diplomacy. A second resolution passed on June 15 entrusting the ENDC to meet "as soon as possible" to draft a treaty for general and complete disarmament, study as a priority an extension of the test-ban treaty to underground tests, accord special priority to a nonproliferation

---

[334] Roger Seydoux, Telegram to Paris, "La Commission du Désarmement," 17 June 1965, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 3.
[335] Roger Seydoux, Telegram to Paris, "Commission du Désarmement," 25 May 1965, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 2.

treaty, and embrace the need to assign disarmament savings to Third World development. In sum, the meeting confirmed that Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet split complicated Soviet-American nuclear relations; it attested as well to mounting disharmony among the non-aligned, which were universally in favor of nonproliferation measures but "divided as to their real content according to a cleavage revelatory of their real intentions"—the China question. Notwithstanding the "violence" with which the Soviets and Americans initially clashed over Vietnam and the Federal Republic, their subsequent interactions and private contacts betrayed a readiness to cooperate. U.S. policymakers wanted to identify points of commonality before China engaged more actively in international politics. For now, though, the prevailing mood was that of pessimism with Tsarapkin "gloomy about [the] prospect for a nonproliferation treaty."[336]

**"The Debacle in Geneva"**

West German interlocutors intimated a lessening of interest in a hardware solution in summer 1965. Chancellor Schröder announced on July 2 in an interview in *General Anzeiger* that West Germany would accept a nonproliferation treaty given "some form of nuclear organization," reinforcements to counterbalance the 700 Soviet IRBMs in Europe, and Soviet support for real steps toward reunification.[337] The chancellor's broad categorization implied that solutions other than an MLF were permissible. In conversations with Ambassador Knappstein though, Rusk distanced himself and his department from the mounting congressional criticism. The French government gave the notion of a collective nuclear force the "cold shoulder" that summer. In a July 12

[336] Burns, "The Nonproliferation Treaty," 790.
[337] French Embassy in Washington, Telegram to Paris, "German ambassador to the U.S. meets with Rusk," 8 July 1965, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 2.

conversation with Couve de Murville, Rusk reiterated the need for a collective nuclear force to dissuade the West Germans from building their own nuclear arsenal. De Murville countered that the MLF would only whet Bonn's appetite, which was why the French had backed off a European force. Though de Murville envisaged an Anglo-French joint arrangement in time, he felt that West Germany should "be obliged to accept" a non-nuclear status for the foreseeable future.[338]

The hardware solution would accordingly depended on West Germany. A letter to Bundy from Professor Henry Kissinger of Harvard University, recently returned from sojourns in London, Paris, Rome, The Hague, and Bonn, related that a collective force was untenable given the political climate in European capitals including Bonn. Kissinger concluded that a majority in favor of the MLF did not exist "within the government" of a single state besides the Federal Republic. Even in Bonn, it would be "the subject of acrimonious partisan debate."[339] In place of a hardware solution, he observed that McNamara's consultative committee had been "well received." Kissinger concluded that European divisions and Foggy Bottom's fixation on NATO nuclear-sharing revolved around the de Gaulle challenge. With Italy unwilling to defy French pressure and the U.K. opposed to plans with a larger West German role, the State Department seemed more interested in "us[ing] the Federal Republic as the alibi and the battering ram for its one-sided, almost obsessive, anti-French bias." High-level consultations on nuclear strategy and posture could easily replace the MLF and break the logjam. Even if the idea

---

[338] Thomas Finletter, Letter to Dean Rusk, "Conversation with Couve de Murville re NATO/MLF," 12 July 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIII, Western Europe, Document 96.

[339] Henry Kissinger, Letter to McGeorge Bundy, "Observations from European Journey," 20 July 1965, Box 20, Francis Bator Papers, LBJL, 1. Emphasis in original. Daniel K. Khalessi brought this document to my attention. For more information on the relationship between NATO nuclear sharing arrangements and subsequent legal interpretations of Article I and II in the NPT, see: Khalessi, "The Ambiguity of Nuclear Commitments: The Implications of NATO's Nuclear Sharing Arrangements for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty" (Undergraduate Thesis, Stanford University, 2013).

proved "unsatisfactory," its failure would pave the way for a new structure that would doubtlessly prove superior than "the obsessive reiteration of the old slogans about nuclear control.[340] Proponents of an Atlantic force were undeterred as U.S. officials carried on debating the constitution of global nuclear governance. Seaborg pushed for a robust safeguards regime under the auspices of the IAEA in the *U.S. News & World Report*. He also questioned the hardware solution's appeal, which disquieted West German diplomats. As the resumption of the ENDC loomed, Seaborg was mystified by to "the extent to which the MLF continued to be a sticking point in the formulation of a U.S. negotiating stance."[341]

There were nonetheless points of consensus in Soviet-American views of nonproliferation diplomacy. This became apparent in back-channel talks in June. Paul Doty, a Harvard biochemist and future founder of the Center for Science and International Affairs, landed in Moscow on June 9 with a Dr. Long.[342] They had been invited as "private citizens and as scientists" by Vice President of the Soviet Academy Dr. Mikhail Millionshchikov, who was an "old acquaintance" from Pugwash.[343] Their mission was to allay Soviet fears about the impact of Vietnam on U.S.-Soviet relations. Millionshchikov related that Soviet leaders doubted Johnson's sincerity as a "man of peace" and his interest in "reasonable negotiations." The next day, Millionshchikov and Vladimir Pavilchenko welcomed Doty and Long to the Presidium of the Soviet Academy, where they spoke about Vietnam, détente, and nuclear talks. Doty conveyed the "strong

---

[340] Ibid., 2.

[341] Seaborg, *Stemming the Tide*, 157–158.

[342] William Foster, Draft, "Doty-Long visit to USSR, June 10 and 11, 1965," 16 June 1965, Folder 6, Box 14, Foster Papers, GCML, 3.

[343] Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Metta Spencer, "'Political' Scientists," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 51, no. 4 (August 1995): 62–68. Spencer singles out Millionshchikov as "a very powerful figure in the Soviet Union," who "made especially important contributions in moderating their nation's engagement in the nuclear arms race."

desire" among U.S. policymakers for better relations with Moscow and singled out Geneva as where the superpowers might broker "agreement in the arms control and disarmament area." He assured his Soviet listeners that almost nobody in Washington wanted the multilateral force "with any degree of seriousness," but the Soviets ought not to insist on a "public burial."[344] Millionshchikov was curious about how to square IAEA and Euratom safeguards, and speculated a treaty was feasible "somewhere between the Irish resolution and the more recent Indian proposals."[345] He felt that the nuclear club excepting China needed to help India and acquiesce to nuclear have-nots' requests for them to "now make some explicit contributions." The meetings signaled that détente and a nonproliferation treaty were still on the table; even so, Doty noted the Communist Party accorded the visit little visibility.[346] On the other hand, the participation of Millionshchikov, who had access to military-industrial planning, and that of Pavilchenko, the Soviet commissar at Pugwash, attested the seriousness of official interest.[347]

There were still proponents of nuclear prohibitions at work in the White House. The machinery of U.S. nuclear policymaking began to turn following Kennedy's speech and Doty's visit. Bundy circulated National Security Action Memorandum No. 335 on June 28, which authorized a new look at the arm control and disarmament portfolio, including a treaty to stem the tide of proliferation.[348] The Disarmament Agency was charged with its drafting. Two weeks later, Tsarapkin notified Foster that the U.S.S.R. was ready to convene in Geneva. Bundy attributed the delay to China as well as Soviet

---

[344] William Foster, op. cit., Draft, "Doty-Long visit," 16 June 1965, 3-4.
[345] Ibid., 8-9.
[346] Ibid., 13. Toward the end, the quartet conversed about ABMs' ability to counter a Chinese nuclear threat, Soviet tactics at the UNDC, and Pugwash procedures.
[347] Spencer, "'Political' Scientists," 64.
[348] White House, National Security Action Memorandum No. 335, "Preparation of Arms Control Program," 28 June 1965, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.

power struggles and reminded Johnson of the need "for us to keep in front on the subject of disarmament" on account of the reputational benefits and because "the Soviets may be about to make a real concession;" after all, "[i]n April of 1963, no one would have predicted a test ban treaty."[349] His counsel was inspired by suggestions made by Komer a week before with regard to how to fix the damage caused by Vietnam. After itemizing the many challenges facing Johnson's foreign policy, Komer underscored the difficulty of maintaining goodwill and constructive nuclear diplomacy's potential to help:

> I only recite this catalogue of horrors to make the point that we'll have an especially difficult time ahead in maintaining the Administration's foreign policy momentum … Two elementary ways of doing so come quickly to mind. First, the tougher the line we feel compelled to take in Vietnam and similar crunches, the more we ought to offset their impact by positive and constructive initiative in other fields like disarmament. … Let's face the fact that the things we have to do in Vietnam and elsewhere are a heavy burden for us to bear in the Afro-Asian world as well as Europe.[350]

Averell Harriman was sent to Moscow for consultations while rumors circulated of Israeli nuclear ambitions. Talking with Foster, Arieh Dissentchik, the editor-in-chief of the Israeli newspaper *Ma'ariv*, mentioned that Israel wanted its Arab neighbors to believe that it was "four or five years ahead in know-how in the nuclear field and could quickly take the last steps to make the weapons." These suspicions, he explained, would make them "think twice" and thus constituted "a vitally important deterrent."[351]

In the weeks before the Geneva talks restarted, United States policymakers debated the viability of a test-ban treaty, freezes on nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, and negotiating tactics. The NSC wanted certain measures to keep India, Israel,

[349] McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for Lyndon Johnsonm, "Attached Draft Statement on Disarmament, 13 July 1965, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.
[350] Robert Komer, Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, "A Rounded Foreign Policy Stance," 7 July 1965, Box 6, Robert Komer papers, NSF, LBJL.
[351] ACDA, Memorandum of Conversation between William Foster and Arieh Dissentchik, "Geneva," 13 July 1965, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 3.

and Japan non-nuclear. A nonproliferation treaty was the central focus though. The dissemination and acquisition language and the source and scope of monitoring were sticking points whose answers implicated a host of questions about West Germany, NATO nuclear-sharing, Soviet ploys, and the consequences of positive and negative assurances: protection against external nuclear threats for non-aligned, non-nuclear states and pledges to forswear the use of nuclear weapons against them, respectively.[352] Foster and Tsarapkin met in mid-July to hash out the procedural details.

The Disarmament Agency draft treaty evoked strong opinions from the AEC, the military, and the State Department. Its weak safeguards article made Seaborg "very unhappy."[353] The Joints Chiefs of Staff were of a mind and wanted stronger, on-site inspections on "all peaceful nuclear activities" to the point of opening peaceful U.S. nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection as a "fall-back position." The NSC was lukewarm, though, about the import of safeguards, which Keeny called " nice to have, [but] … certainly not critical."[354] In the end, the U.S. dropped the obligation for non-nuclear states to apply IAEA safeguards on peaceful activities in response to West German pushback. The Joint Chiefs were "strongly opposed" to the commitments for and limits on nuclear-weapon use outlined by the Disarmament Agency draft. Negative assurances in particular "would decrease U.S. power and flexibility for achieving security objectives," "advance a total prohibition against nuclear arms," and stigmatize their battlefield use. Moreover, such a voluntary renunciation could serve as a precedent against the use of

[352] Outline, "ENDC Preparations," undated, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.
[353] Spurgeon Keeny, Memorandum for McGeorge. Bundy, "AEC Protest on IAEA Provisions in Non-Proliferation Treaty," 16 August 1965, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.
[354] Spurgeon Keeny, Note, "Foster's meeting with Schnippenkoetter about Geneva," 5 August 1965, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.

napalm or Agent Orange in Vietnam.[355] They were amenable to a U.N. resolution that was "general in nature" and did not "imply commitments," but they still counseled against pursuing a treaty "aggressively."[356] In the U.K., the Wilson's government was trapped by domestic opinion and its own campaign promises into writing its own, tougher draft treaty.[357] In a preview of coming attractions, the United States, West German, and British delegations traded "fierce exchange[s]," when the Western powers met in Paris for preparatory meetings at the North Atlantic Council.[358]

The Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament opened on July 27 with Tsarapkin launching an attack on United States foreign policy and Foster relaying a presidential message rife with apocalyptic imagery.[359] The doomsday themes suited the fortunes of the Western Four, who had as many positions among them as there were delegations. The U.K. government hoped the proceedings would corroborate Wilson's campaign promise to conduct British foreign policy as a nuclear prohibitionist.[360] Whitehall misread the tealeaves in U.S. domestic politics though and concluded that nonproliferation was finally a major priority; as a result, Wilson oversold a treaty that would rule out a nuclear-armed Germany in perpetuity and address the growing numbers of nuclear aspirants. Sir Paul Gore-Booth intimated to French listeners that Britain was

---

[355] The Joints Chiefs of Staff would later adduce the need to retain the freedom to use nuclear weapons in Vietnam if necessary. Although this rationale may have borne on their conclusion in summer 1965, the evidence is circumstantial (concurrent military escalation in the conflict) and allusive given the sanitized language in the memorandum cited below.

[356] R.C. Bowman, Cover Letter for McGeorge Bundy, "ACDA Position on Nonproliferation with attachment, Earle G. Wheeler, Memorandum for Robert McNamara, "ACDA Memorandum for the Committee of Principals, Position Paper on a Nonproliferation Agreement," 16 July 1965, 5 August 1965, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.

[357] U.S. Department of State, Telegram to London, 13 July 1965, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.

[358] Küntzel, *Bonn & the Bomb*, 45.

[359] Dean Rusk, Telegram to Geneva, "President's message to ENDC," 26 July 1965, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 1.

[360] French Embassy in London, Telegram to Paris, "UK Labour reactions to news of Geneva reset," 14 July 1965, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1.

preoccupied with finding a solution to the spread of nuclear weapons in light of growing Israeli, Egyptian, Indian, and Indonesian interest in them.[361] London was therefore more sensitive to Soviet misgivings and out of sync with Washington, where the State Department had succeeded in thwarting the Disarmament Agency's efforts to inscribe a liberal reading of proliferation to which Moscow might adhere.

The British draft treaty conflicted with the United States version on three counts. First, the dissemination and acquisition articles barred the evolution of NATO nuclear-sharing into a pan-European force ruled by majority, which the F.R.G. desired and the U.S. viewed as a sop to Bonn's nuclear ambitions and as a way to reduce gradually the number of independent arsenals. At first, the British forbade nuclear weapons transfers to, or the establishment of, an "association of States." In response to U.S. protests, Whitehall revised the clause to read "any action which would result in the acquisition, by any state or organization not now possessing it, of an independent power to use nuclear weapons."[362] West German officials worried about British opposition to a European option and the "slow-down" of the MLF. However, the bad press that attended the publication by the *Frankfurter Algeminer Zeitung* of German instructions to its ENDC observer in Bonn to resist a treaty curbed British flexibility. Additionally, the Foreign and Disarmament Ministries were increasingly out of step in Bonn and with Washington. Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröeder wanted a linkage to reunification, while Disarmament Minister Swidbert Schnippenkoetter focused on salvaging a hardware solution. Rusk backed a multilateral force of some kind, but was loath to link nuclear diplomacy to the German question.

---

[361] French Embassy in London, Telegram to Paris, "UK problems with U.S. draft," 20 August 1965, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 2.
[362] "Proposed Formulations of a Non-Proliferation Agreement," 3 August 1965, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 1-3

Second, the British treaty had a clarifying article that defined "nuclear state," "non-nuclear state," and "control," the last of which U.S. policymakers feared would present the Soviets with an easy target for broadsides against the multilateral force. Lastly, the draft treaty possessed an article authorizing inspections by the IAEA of the nuclear facilities of non-nuclear states, which Canada backed and non-nuclear states viewed as "discriminatory." At that stage, Foster wanted to preserve a potential linkage at the bargaining table to security assurances "that the non-aligned would demand in any event", where he could push for a relaxation of non-aligned demands for safeguards or assurances in exchange for better terms on the other. Such "hard bargaining" might occasion the safeguards clause's "scaling down," or the "alternative" of having it cover non-military facilities worldwide. For now, though, he admitted that "we would not allude to this possibility.[363] A reference to IAEA safeguards in the draft Latin American nuclear-free zone treaty indicated that Mexico might argue on the behalf of the IAEA among the non-aligned.[364] However, India and Brazil resisted and Foggy Bottom worried that the United States position that Euratom safeguards were equivalent to those of the IAEA would prove distracting at that time.[365]

Canada aimed to alleviate nuclear have-nots' misgivings about an unequal treaty. Its draft treaty featured security assurances, disarmament linkages, and a withdrawal clause similar to that of the LTBT, which allowed a state party to leave in case of "extraordinary events."[366] After it was nixed, Canadian Counselor Robert Cameron

---

[363] U.S. Mission to Geneva, Telegram to Washington, "Non-Proliferation Treaty," 27 July 1965, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 3.
[364] Dean Rusk, Telegram to Geneva, "IAEA Safeguards and Non-Proliferation," 2 September 1965, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 3.
[365] Dean Rusk, Telegram to Geneva, "Non-Proliferation Treaty, IAEA Safeguards," 9 August 1965, LBJ, NSF, SF, Disarmament, Box 13, 1.
[366] Ibid., 2.

lamented that the Americans had not "gone further in meeting the concerns of the non-aligned."[367] Italy was "perhaps even more stringly [sic] opposed than [the] U.S. to [the] U.K. initiative," but criticized the U.S. draft treaty as well, which was unrevised since April 1963 and "no longer (if ever) acceptable to [the] Third World."[368] Italian Ambassador Francesco Cavalletti proposed the addition a paragraph to the preamble with a hortatory reference to arms control and disarmament.[369] U.S. officials were amenable to a withdrawal clause and a non-binding reference to disarmament. The Italian Foreign Ministry worried about allied disunity if the U.S. and the U.K. tabled separate drafts. Mostly, it had misgivings about a global nuclear order that would discriminate against Italy. Rome had reservations about limits on commercial technology and wanted to hedge its nuclear bets.[370]

The White House wrote British Foreign Minister Stewart in early August to voice its disapproval of British opposition to the European option given the need for unity and expediency in Geneva "in the presence of the Soviet Union, and the Bloc, and non-aligned countries."[371] The State Department could not support the British language lest it permit the multilateral body to dictate NATO policy.[372] A delegation from Bonn meanwhile arrived in Geneva to fight for a hardware solution and against onerous safeguards. In the interest of solidarity, Foster begged Chalfont to pocket his draft treaty

---

[367]ACDA, Memorandum of Conversation with Robert P. Cameron of the Canadian Embassy, "ENDC and Related Matters," 10 August 1965, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 3.
[368] U.S. Mission to Geneva, Telegram to the Department of State, "Non-Proliferation Treaty," 27 July 1965, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.
[369] Dean Rusk, Telegram to Geneva, "Non-Proliferation Treaty," 4 August 1965, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 3-4.
[370] Leopoldo Nuti, "'Me Too, Please': Italy and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, 1945–1975," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 4, no. 1 (March 1993): 114–148.
[371] Draft Letter to Foreign Minister Michael Stewart, "Geneva," 4 August 1965, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 2.
[372] ACDA, Memorandum of Conversation, "ENDC and Related Matters," 10 August 1965.

and instead note British "reservations" with respect to the U.S. version. The Western chorus thus more resembled a graceless cacophony than a compelling concert.

Foster tabled the draft treaty on August 17, valorizing its purpose with lofty words from President Johnson calling on the assembly to reflect on its duty to "[t]he fate of generations yet unborn."[373] Neither Canada, nor Italy, nor the U.K. co-sponsored the motion so as not to draw attention to British misgivings. Chalfont heeded Foster's admonition and indicated his government's concerns with the draft treaty's allowance of a veto-less European force; in truth, the White House shared these qualms, having stated that it would never place nuclear arms under a foreign government's control for all of Foggy Bottom's support for European union.[374] Caught between better relations with the U.S.S.R. on nuclear matters and disquieting its West German ally, the U.S. sent mixed signals that resulted in confusion and distrust. Foster characterized the difference of opinion as "more theoretical than real," and tried to clarify that U.S. acquiescence to a European nuclear force hinged on further deliberations even if such a federation arose.[375] He avoided the worst-case scenario; nonetheless, Western discord weakened his position in Geneva, ensuring that the Soviets dug in their heels, and helping the non-aligned members to promote their agenda.

*Izvestia* published a scathing article on August 4 condemning "German revanchists" for holding up progress in Geneva.[376] Shortly after Foster tabled the draft treaty, Tsarapkin asked if it would ban access to nuclear weapons through a multilateral

---

[373] Office of the White House Press Secretary, "Statement by the President re Draft Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," 17 August 1965, Folder 13, Box 17, Foster papers, GCML.
[374] Bruno de Leusse, Washington, Telegram to Paris, "Discord between the White House and the State Department about MLF and NPT," 17 August 1965, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.
[375] News Release, Statement by William C. Foster before the United Nations Correspondents Association, "British position on NPT draft," 18 August 1965, Folder 10, Box 17, Foster Papers, GCML, 1-2.
[376] Fontaine, Telegram to Paris, "*Izvestia* attack on MLF and West Germany," 5 August 1965, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, GCML.

force. Foster responded obliquely that it would not “preclude” a nuclear power from stationing nuclear weapons on another state’s territory, nor “certain other possible arrangements for participation of our NATO allies in their nuclear defense.”[377] The Kremlin found Foster’s reasoning unpersuasive and rejected the draft treaty because, they argued, states lacking nuclear weapons could still obtain access to them through military alliances. At the final plenary of the conference, Tsarapkin warned against “West German revanchists and militarists who are striving to get their hand on nuclear weapons.”[378] The French observer wondered why the Soviets had agreed to participate, speculating that, like the British, the Soviets had misread the degree of fluidity in U.S. nuclear policy in view of the Gilpatric Report and Kennedy’s speech.[379] Foster wired the State Department to express his uncertainty regarding the thrust of Soviet objectives:

> If the concern expressed by the USSR regarding acqusition [sic] by the FRG of nuclear weapons indirectly through some arrangement within NATO is genuine, that concern should be allayed by the draft treaty. If on the other hand, the real Soviet aim is to divide the NATO alliance, then there is nothing we can do ….[380]

Foggy Bottom answered that although “unlikely,” a veto-less European force had merits, including the ability to subsume the British and French deterrents, which would lessen nuclear risks in Europe and carry with it political advantages for the U.S. position in the Old World.[381] The United States stood pat on a strict definition of proliferation that the Soviets would not stomach for reasons of nuclear security and European political dynamics.

---

[377] William Foster, Telegram to Washington, “Proposed answer to Tsarapkin’s questions of August 17,” 18 August 1965, Box 13, SF-Disramament, NSF, LBJL, 1.
[378] William Foster, Telegram to Washington, “Soviet Rejection,” 21 September 1965, Box 13, NSF, SF-Disarmament, LBJL.
[379] Brune de Leusse, Telegram to Paris, “Soviets come out against MLF at end of ENDC,” 2 August 1965, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.
[380] William Foster, op. cit., “Answers We Propose to Give to Tsarapkin’s Questions,” 18 August 1965.
[381] Dean Rusk, Telegram to Geneva, “Responses to Tsarapkin Queries re MLF and draft nonproliferation treaty,” 19 August 1965, LBJL, NSF, SF, Disarmament, Box 13, 3.

Signs were accordingly mounting that a treaty would prove increasingly difficult and costly. Trivedi complained to Foster that linkage between nonproliferation and nuclear-sharing were "of less interest to India than to [the] Atlantic Community and [the] U.S.S.R." He now called a comprehensive test-ban treaty the "best hope." New Delhi seemed to have lost hope in a nonproliferation pact.[382] Myrdal pushed hard for a CTBT, which she praised for its equality and efficacy, while Swedish newspapers questioned the appeal of an agreement to close the nuclear club that lacked its newest members—France and China. Italy proposed a second alternative—a unilateral non-acquisition declaration. In this scheme, the nuclear have-nots would pledge not to seek or develop nuclear weapons if no new states entered the club and real progress was made in halting the arms race. Foster warned Amintore Fanfani, the proposal's author, that Washington would only countenance such a reference in a speech, or in the preamble, and that the U.S. and West Germany's "initial favorable reaction" would not last if nuclear disarmament was made the "basic premise" of the moratorium's survival.[383] The U.S. would not assent to a nonproliferation accord that was contingent on arms control and disarmament progress. Trivedi demurred as well, though for different reasons. He wanted a "reduction in nuclear weapons stocks" to come first.[384]

The Soviets refused to table a draft treaty in Geneva as a symbol of their dismay. Instead, Tsarapkin presented a document to the United Nations on September 24 that formalized Moscow's intolerance for an expanded West German role in NATO nuclear defense. Two paragraphs barred a variety of means of transferring nuclear weapons "to

---

[382] William Foster, Telegram to Washington, "Courtesy Call by Trivedi on Foster," 4 August 1965, Box 13, NSF, SF-Disarmament, LBJL.
[383] "Draft Unilateral Non-acquisition declaration and Points on Fanfani Proposal and Cavalletti Draft," 25 August 1965, Folder 13, Box 17, Foster papers, GCML.
[384] French Mission in Geneva, Telegram to Paris, "Chalfont questions Soviets," 3 September 1965, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

the ownership or control of States of groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons," including "the transfer of nuclear weapons, control over them or over their emplacement and use," to the armed forces of a non-nuclear power, including "under the command of military alliances." Notwithstanding the formal nails the Soviets were trying to drive in the scheme's coffin, Foster and others remarked upon the document's moderation; it did not rule out creation of the McNamara Committee.[385] The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. still appeared willing to "maintain their dialogue at any price." Peaceful coexistence was needed not only in spite of the Vietnam crisis," but "to prove that the problems caused by the Vietnam War were not insurmountable as long as Washington still spoke to Moscow."[386]

The eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament emerged from the debacle in Geneva more cohesive than before. In answer to the Soviet and American offerings, which failed to meet their priorities or allay their fears concerning a prejudicial global nuclear order, the group came together to introduce a resolution at the United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 2028 (XX) laid out five cardinal principles for a satisfactory nonproliferation treaty. First, it should be "void of any loop-holes." Second, it "should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers." Third, it should move to world closer to general and complete disarmament and, "more particularly, nuclear disarmament." Fourth, there should be "acceptable and workable" mechanisms with which to implement the treaty. Lastly, the treaty should not interfere with the

[385] U.S. Mission in Geneca, Telegram to Washington, 28 August 1965, "Conversation with Swedish delegate re Tsarapkin going to steer a "middle course," Box 13, SF-Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.
[386] Bruno de Leusse, Washington, Telegram to Paris, "Soviets coming out against MLF," 2 August 1965, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 2, 4.

establishment of nuclear-free zones in regions that wanted them. [387] The resolution passed the General Assembly on November 19. The set of principles reflected the tenor of conversations in Geneva, where the non-aligned grouping had taken advantage of the absence of Soviet-American leadership seize the initiative and imprint their preferences in that year's U.N. authorization calling for the committee to forge ahead in its efforts to broker a nonproliferation treaty.

The German question and its links to broader European political trends were the keys to the continuing struggle between the arms control cabal and pro-nuclear voices in the Johnson administration. When the Western Four briefed the North Atlantic Council after the ENDC wound up, the West German representative asserted that nuclear nonproliferation was not an aim in and of itself and that the Western powers ought to safeguard the prospect of a collective nuclear force or a European deterrent.[388] Bonn's position on NATO nuclear-sharing and international nuclear diplomacy was shaped by the internal power struggle in the Christian Democratic Party between Erhard and followers of Konrad Adenauer, who preferred to tack closer to France rather than rely on U.S. goodwill and hopes for an Atlantic force. The elections in the Federal Republic on September 19 widened the gap between Gaullists and Atlanticists in the coalition, which raised troubling questions about the future of U.S.-F.R.G. relations and NATO nuclear-sharing.

The Geneva debacle also seized the attention of the leaders of the elite-based movement for European economic and political integration in which Erhard was a firm believer. Jean Monnet, the French political economist and diplomat, was the chief

---

[387] United Nations, General Assembly Resolutions, 20th Session, UNGA Resolution 2028 (XX), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/20/ares20.htm

[388] Pierre Leusse, NATO, Telegram to Paris, "Geneva," 17 September 1965, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

architect of the campaign for European unity in political and economics affairs. Like Ball, he had come to regard a collective nuclear force in Europe, whether the U.K.-led Atlantic Nuclear Force or the U.S.-led multilateral force, as offering a timely psychological stimulus to integrationist forces. A September letter to Foster outlined the standpoint of his Action Committee for a United Europe:

> Monnet's Action Committee for a United Europe has, of course, been quite discouraged by the halt to progress in Western Europe in the direction of political collaboration and unification. De Gaulle's policies are the chief cause of this … Monnet's chief concern has been to maintain an optimistic psychological atmosphere – one that seems to indicate some momentum. For this reason primarily, he has come to favor the MLF/ANF. In his review, the inter-allied activity associated with the Force's creation and subsequent allied cooperation in managing it can become the nucleus of further political development. He sees defense questions as essentially political and diplomatic problems (as they largely are), and this makes him willing to use a military vehicle to achieve these political objectives.[389]

There was "one sharp latent difference" in the political objectives of the West German foreign ministry, the U.S. State Department, and the Action Committee though. Monnet was chiefly interested in a collective nuclear force as the kernel of a European nuclear force.

## Conclusion

On November 23, 1965, Glenn Seaborg related the conclusions of a study commissioned by US Atomic Energy Commission and undertaken by Union Carbide into how new gas centrifuge technology might facilitate clandestine programs to develop nuclear weapons. The AEC was attempting to firewall information relating to these centrifuges internationally, though West Germany was mounting "strong resistance" to

---

[389] David Mark, Letter for William Foster, "M. van Helmond," 3 September 1965, Folder 14, Box 17, Foster Papers, GCML, 1.

the arm-twisting. The study categorized states according to their stage of development. Group X were the most advanced and included West Germany, Sweden, Japan, the Netherlands, and Italy; Group Y possessed "limited internal industrial activity," for example, Brazil, Israel, India and Yugoslavia; Group Z were far down the industrial scale. Though even the Group X countries would require eight years, or five years with access to US information (the figures were twelve and seven for Group Y), to construct a sufficient number of gas centrifuges and then produce a critical mass of U-235, the relatively small size of the facility (approximately one acre) made its detection and inspection a major intelligence challenge.[390]

By the end of 1965, the United States was facing a transformed security environment in the wake of a Chinese test using an U-235 core, mounting evidence that Israel and India were contemplating seriously a military option, and unsettling news that uranium enrichment had become easier to execute and more difficult to detect. Elements of the United States national security apparatus, including the Disarmament Agency and Congress, were growing less and less patient with the impasse on a nonproliferation treaty. In October, Foster pushed Johnson to acknowledge that a nonproliferation treaty was imperative in light of global trends even if "it would not permit a mixed ownership NATO nuclear force."[391] The next chapter covers the period of international nuclear politics that spanned November 1965 to February 1967, during which the Johnson administration finally sacrificed the MLF and the Soviet Union and the United States

---

[390] "Glenn Seaborg, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Memorandum to McGeorge, Bundy, enclosing summary of 'Nth Country Evaluation'" 23 November 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MDR Request, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security File. Charles Johnson Papers, box 22, Nuclear-Gas Centrifuge Technology. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #7. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115375, p. 4-5.

[391] Maddock, *Nuclear Apartheid*, 254.

began to align their diplomatic postures in the nuclear assemblies, where a grand bargain between the nuclear haves and have-nots began to clarify.

## Chapter Three | Killing It Softly: The MLF's Demise and Détente's Rise

*[Fred Dutton] said it was a combination of declining polls, an unsuccessful legislative program and the need for some fresh initiatives to point to in the next campaign. The combination of these 3 factors, he says, led to the Test Ban Treaty.*

*Fred believes that the President is in serious trouble, that we are going to get clobbered at the polls this fall and that there is a serious need for new initiatives. I did not, of course, mention the Non-proliferation Treaty to him, but this would precisely fill the bill."*

*Hayes Redmon, Memorandum to Bill Moyers, "Fred Dutton and Peace Issue," 9 June 1966, Box 12, Office Files of Bill Moyers, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library*

### Introduction: Peace, the NPT, and the Cold War

A close associate of Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations Nikolai Fedorenko buttonholed French Ambassador Roger Seydoux in New York City on March 30, 1967. The Soviet attaché related to Seydoux that Soviet and American positions on a nonproliferation treaty were "very close right now," and negotiations for a nuclear nonproliferation treaty were headed for "a decisive phase." The biggest hurdle remaining was not "the adhesion of the Federal Republic of Germany [but] the treaty's acceptance by the Indian Government." "Doubtlessly," Seydoux cabled to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "the importance that Moscow accords to Chinese political developments and its effects on neighboring countries were not unrelated."[392] Bonn continued to work for references to disarmament and an "acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations" among nuclear haves and have-nots. West German observers were acutely worried about the "implications of certain treaty clauses on its nuclear industry's development." Soviet officials pressed those of West Germany to cooperate behind closed

[392] Roger Seydoux, Telegram from New York to Paris, "Non Proliferation," 30 March 1967, Box 768 (U.N. Comité des Dix-Huit), Cote 517INVA, Archives du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de France, 3. Hereinafter AMAEF. All translations from French are my own.

doors; even so, the Kremlin's focus pivoted toward Asia. The attaché noted "the implications" that Chinese political instability and nuclear testing held for "all the neighbors."[393] The field of action in world nuclear affairs was tilting from the Industrial North, where West Germany and other advanced industrial powers worked to retain access to the future nuclear emporium, to the Global South, where New Delhi "surged" against the pact with Brasília in tow.

By early 1967, intelligence and rumors of military research in the Indian and Israeli nuclear programs, the domestic political climates in the United States and West Germany, the efforts of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and the behavior of the international community in Geneva produced a narrowing alignment of Soviet and American views regarding the wording of the treaty's nonproliferation and safeguards articles and the end of attempts to fabricate a hardware solution to the German question. On December 16, 1966, U.S. officials presented West German Vice Chancellor Willy Brandt with a compromise draft treaty endorsed by the Soviet Union. The superpower entente ushered in a new phase of international nuclear diplomacy. Indian officials had grown disenchanted with a treaty barring their entry into the nuclear club. Washington's reluctance to offer security guarantees in league with Moscow owing to its military commitments in Southeast Asia meanwhile afforded United States diplomats with scant leverage to change their minds.

This chapter takes account of the winding path of bilateral and multilateral nuclear efforts to broker a nonproliferation treaty from November 1965 to February 1967. Non-aligned solidarity and French unruliness posed challenges to United States interests in a nonproliferation treaty and European predominance. The Federal Republic

[393] Ibid., 1-4.

of Germany (F.R.G.) tried to salvage a hardware solution for its nuclear and diplomatic woes after the United Kingdom abandoned the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) scheme, which Europeanists in Foggy Bottom abetted by safeguarding the NATO multilateral nuclear force (MLF) from Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin's broadsides and mounting scrutiny from the U.S. Joint Committee for Atomic Energy (JCAE) chaired by Senator John Pastore (D – NH). The idea of a Soviet-American "partnership for peace" promoted by the arms control cabal in Washington struck a chord amid the Vietnam War. U.S. dithering though foiled substantive progress at the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) that spring, when Kosygin proposed an ingenious guarantee devised to please neutrals and discredit the West. The Pastore Resolution's unanimous passage, British and Canadian admonitions, growing Soviet-American collusion in Geneva, and Undersecretary of State George Ball's resignation altered the White House's calculus in autumn 1966. The final straw was Bill Moyers's campaign to persuade President Johnson that nuclear statesmanship could yield electoral capital. Johnson chose not to "wring" the Germans' necks, but after a period of high-level trust-building, Disarmament Agency Director William Foster and Soviet diplomat Alexei Roshchin found suitable language for a non-transfer clause blocking a hardware solution.

British Disarmament Minister Lord Chalfont declared the Cold War "outdated" that summer as debates about peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs), international safeguards, and security guarantees unearthed fault lines between the Industrial North and the Global South. These gulfs would only deepen as Pastore's fear that the United States might become the world's policeman began to invest the nonproliferation talks with a significance transcending that of the epic struggle between capitalism and communism.

**Fighting the Middle Ground**

With West German elections over and non-aligned members seizing the initiative in Geneva and New York City, United States and Soviet policymakers began to consult more sincerely on nuclear questions. National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy met Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on November 24, 1965 for "the most candid and cordial conversation of [their] three-year acquaintance."[394] Both men acknowledged the difficulty of either government stating a position on how NATO security arrangements affected nonproliferation talks without knowing the other side's intentions. On the one hand, Soviet statements had been inconsistent, sometimes denouncing only the MLF and at other times separate consultations and existing arrangements as well. On the other hand, the U.S. and NATO were unclear among themselves with respect to the Special Committee's character and divided between "believers in collective weapons systems and believers in consultation." They concurred that private communication of Washington's "real plans and preferences" was needed.

Dobrynin assured Bundy that Soviet policy resulted from unease with proliferation to Europe and Asia rather than a Trojan horse with which to attack NATO. The tidal wave of Chinese criticism of the Soviet Union's nuclear diplomacy "should prove its sincerity." Bundy related his impression to Johnson that the Soviets would countenance nuclear arrangements in NATO that stopped short of a hardware solution for now and "clearly" maintained the status quo insofar as "German access to the nuclear trigger."[395] The ANF or a Special Committee might be feasible. Bundy began to urge the

---

[394] Memorandum of Conversation between President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, "European nuclear arrangements," 24 November 1965, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIII, Western Europe Region, Doc. 111, 271-273. Hereinafter *FRUS, 1964-1968*.
[395] Ibid., 273.

State Department to ease off on the MLF; in a letter to Rusk, he underscored Johnson's decision to let the Germans and British hash out the details and "members of this Government [who] instinctively and insistently press their own preferred tactics [needed to] mak[e] sure they [were] in line with the President's thinking." Likely referencing the debacle in Geneva the previous summer, he groused that "[w]e have had this kind of pulling and hauling before, and we ought to try to avoid it this time.[396]"

The State Department still viewed the MLF as the military centerpiece of a European political framework inclusive of the United States and a means thereby to stave off General Charles de Gaulle's quest for a French renaissance; Assistant Secretary of State George Ball reported from Paris that the nuclear question had grown "so important and symbolic to the Germans" that they wanted to confront the French with a collective force as a "fait accompli." With European discussions proceeding, Ball brooded that the Europeans could be "so afraid of being alone with Germany, so awed by De Gaulle, so doubtful of American constancy, so divided among each other, and so persuaded that a safe deal with the Soviets is possible that they would follow de Gaulle's vision of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals." The apprehension overestimated the general's leverage and Soviet willingness to normalize East-West relations. "I often get frustrated in this job," Ball admitted, "but I don't yet think that Europeans are that dumb."[397] He was right. Unlike Ball and other Europhiles in Foggy Bottom, Bundy was more intrigued by the merits of the Soviet-American establishment of a global nuclear order. "[N]o one now

---

[396] McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 17 January 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIII, Western Europe Region, Doc. 124.

[397] Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the European Communities," 24 November 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIII, Doc. 112.

wants the MLF." Bundy hyperbolized. "I think we may … make some money with Moscow if we tell them privately before we sink it publicly."[398]

President Johnson met West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard on December 20, 1965 in the Oval Office, where Erhard pushed Johnson to support a "multilateral, integrated system" and "closer integration of NATO allies in the nuclear field." The outcome of the September elections widened the rift in the Christian Democratic Party between Erhard's Atlanticists for whom the United States was embraced as the protector of Europe and Konrad Adenhauer's Gaullists for whom the Federal Republic's destiny lay with France and European union.[399] The administration held the line on a hardware solution the previous summer in hopes of aiding Erhard's electoral chances.[400] Now, Erhard was pushing Johnson to take a Europe-first stance, contending that "agreement on non-proliferation presuppose[d] agreement on nuclear sharing." He forewarned that domestic opinion made it "impossible to assume that Germany will go forever without a nuclear deterrent." Moreover, the plunging cost of nuclear technology and ever-expanding diffusion of nuclear know-how meant that many small powers would soon have the wherewithal to acquire them since their costs were light compared to conventional forces. A hardware solution was the sole way to keep the 15 countries in NATO from joining the nuclear club, "the best guarantee of peace," and one that "would also be in the Soviet interest."[401] The political currents ran deeper though. In early 1966, Henry Kissinger reported that, according to Erhard, most German officials outside of the

[398] Bundy, op. cit., "European nuclear arrangements," 24 November 1965, 273.
[399] Joost Kleuters, *Reunification in West German Party Politics from Westbindung to Ostpolitik*, New Perspectives in German Political Studies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 116–121.
[400] Dean Rusk, Telegram to the Department of State, "Secretary's Conversation with NATO," 14 May 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIII, Western Europe Region, Doc. 85.
[401] Memorandum of Conversation between President Lyndon Johnson and Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, "Nuclear Sharing," 20 December 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIII, Document 119, 289-292.

Foreign Office were dubious about a joint force, but he was hesitant to disclaim the option because of the pressure being applied by the State Department.[402]

Johnson was non-committal. Although Europeanists maintained that a hardware solution would help nonproliferation, neither the Eastern bloc nor key NATO allies concurred. Johnson prevaricated, musing the nonproliferation treaty would have to wait for a resolution in Vietnam and that the "best solution" was for the U.K. to disarm unilaterally, leaving the U.S. as the lone guardian of Europe.[403] Erhard handed him a draft plan outlining a variant of a hardware solution that made concessions to British demands to retain veto rights. When West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder met with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Ball that afternoon though, he disparaged the plan, admitting he did not think it could constitute "an adequate basis" for discussions. Having recently visited London, Schröder admitted that he saw Wilson's plan to form an ANF made up of U.K. and U.S. Polaris submarines and British V-bombers as the "cornerstone." He agreed with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that new forces were expendable; they merely wanted a "share" in the "handling" of nuclear weapons.[404]

Johnson wrote Wilson three days later to confess that an ANF solution would "give [him] some problems with Congress, and I am sure [it] will not be easy for you," but it represented the way forward.[405] Wilson was more and more convinced though that the ANF was infeasible for a litany of reasons: domestic opinion, Polaris's cost, French

---

[402] Maddock, *Nuclear Apartheid*, 259.
[403] op. cit., Memorandum of Conversation between Johnson and Erhard, "Nuclear Sharing," 20 December 1965, 289-292.
[404] Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary Dean Rusk and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröeder, "Nuclear Sharing," 20 December 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIII, Document 119, 292-295.
[405] President Lyndon Johnson, Letter to Prime Minister Harold Wilson, "Collective Nuclear Defense," 23 December 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIII, Document 121, 295-296.

rebelliousness, and the technical impracticality of command and control. The Special Committee presented a more attractive option. Wilson backed the ANF when he met Johnson in January. However, he quickly changed tack, endorsing the benefits of a "forum for discussion of nuclear policy, strategy and planning." Days before the ENDC was set to reconvene on January 27, David Bruce, the U.S. Ambassador in London, informed Johnson that Whitehall now opposed West Germany's inclusion in a joint nuclear force.[406] The British seemed ready to abdicate a hardware option while insisting that nuclear powers retain vetoes in perpetuity.

**"A Partnership for Peace"**

The hardware option started to lose traction when ACDA Deputy Director Adrian "Butch" Fisher executed an end-run around the State Department and convinced Senator John Pastore (D – NH) to hold hearings in the JCAE on the state of American nuclear diplomacy.[407] Fisher was on good terms with many congressional Democrats from his days on Capitol Hill.[408] As the committee's chairman, Pastore sat at the nexus of nuclear policy inside the Beltway.[*] Unlike Robert Kennedy, he enjoyed a close relationship with the president, who years before relinquished his own seat on the JCAE to accommodate and perhaps recruit Pastore. A week after the State of the Union address on January 12, 1966, which dwelt on Vietnam and the Great Society, and contained just two paragraphs about nuclear policy, Pastore introduced a resolution commending the

[406] McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum of Conversation between President Lyndon Johnson and Ambassador to the U.K. David Bruce for Dean Rusk, "Atlantic Nuclear Policy," 17 January 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIII, Doc 124.
[407] Bunn, *Arms Control by Committee*, 73.
[408] Author's Interview with Ambassador James Goodby, January 2013, Stanford, CA.
[*] The chair rotated between the senior House and Senate members.

president for his nonproliferation efforts.[409] He touted the relative importance of nuclear threats in his accompanying speech. "[I]f peace were to settle on Vietnam with today's sunset," he admonished, "the night would be filled with an even greater danger … proliferation."

Pastore's definition of proliferation fused its horizontal and vertical dimensions; "the expansion of the nuclear club" and the "amplification of the 'over kill' … in the hands of the titanic two."[410] He portrayed nuclear war chiefly with reference to the cataclysm associated with an all-out thermonuclear exchange, referencing the sobering conclusions of the 1959 hearings on "The Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War." He also linked the Senate's treaty prerogative to the Disarmament Agency's "ultimate goal" of an international system where the rule of force was "subordinated to the rule of law" and where "a changing world" was managed "peacefully."[411] He believed that "rational" sovereignty could be reconciled with "international undertakings" to manage the nuclear weapons that endangered the "Chinese, Russian, American and, indeed, all the peoples of the world."[412] His wanted tougher safeguards, calling for IAEA inspections on nuclear facilities (singling out India's

---

[409] "Transcript of President's State of the Union Message to Joint Session of Congress," 13 January 1966, *New York Times*, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, 14.

[410] Remarks of Senator John O. Pastore on the Floor of the Senate on the Introduction of the Resolution of Non-proliferation of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons, undated, Box 13, Subject File—Disarmament, National Security Files, LBJ Library and Archives, 1. Hereinafter, SF-Disarmament, NSF, LBJL. For the term's genealogy and how it blinkered elite visions of nuclear futures, read Benoît Pelopidas, "The Oracles of Proliferation: How Experts Maintain a Biased Historical Reading That Limits Policy Innovation," *The Nonproliferation Review* 18, no. 1 (March 2011): 297–314. He neglects a sea change though since proliferation at first encompassed the arms race and increases in the number of actors with access to or control over the arms. Pastore's usage did illustrate how the biological analogy presumed a teleological process: "the bearing of offspring—the growth by rapid production of news parts—the spreading of new cells."

[411] Remarks of Senator John O. Pastore on the Floor of the Senate on the Introduction of the Resolution of Non-proliferation of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons, undated, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 3.

[412] In fact, Pastore was a firm proponent of food aid to developing countries afflicted by malnutrition and starvation, such as India, on purely moral and eleemosynary grounds.

reprocessing plant at Trombay) and for nuclear suppliers to apply them on dual-use exports. To set a good example, he advocated that the plutonium separation facility set to open in Buffalo adopt IAEA safeguards. To win over states lacking nuclear weapons, he favored security guarantees and civilian assistance. The resolution saluting the president for his efforts to date and enjoining him to move forward expeditiously to solve "nuclear proliferation problems" attracted the sponsorship of 55 Senators.[413]

Excepting West Germany, the major European powers were dead set against German military forces having a hand in nuclear security. On January 21, British Special Minister on Disarmament Lord Chalfont notified U.S. officials that the U.K. was squarely against a multilateral force and for veto rights. He urged them to show more flexibility on the nonproliferation language. Although he did not reference the Pastore Resolution, he reported that Whitehall would accept a safeguards article specifying IAEA oversight since the new Anglo-American bilateral agreement already entailed such an obligation.[414] In Paris, de Gaulle had repulsed repeated overtures by U.S. officials to comply with a hardware solution. NATO nuclear-sharing ran counter to his vision of a "European Europe" that stretched "from the Atlantic to the Urals" to challenge the bipolar Cold War order.[415] Though he backed German reunification and thirsted for greater autonomy from the United States, his thinking in regards to a German nuclear role had been staunchly negative since 1964. Before then, he had assumed that Germany would eventually develop the weapons and that the MLF was a farce. Hence, for reasons of national pride he refused to place the *force de frappe* under NATO or European command. Now, he dismissed a hardware solution on the grounds that the Germans were

---

[413] "Text of the Pastore Resolution," 18 January 1966, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.
[414] French Embassy in Washington, Telegram to Paris, "Lord Chalfont meets with State Department in Washington," 21 January 1966, Cote 517INVA, Box 768, AMAEF, 2.
[415] Trachtenberg, "The de Gaulle Problem."

a militaristic and untrustworthy people. He had made this view clear to Ball in an August 1965 interview.[416]

A software solution, on the other hand, attracted more and more proponents. The contours of the Special Committee began to take shape at a December meeting of NATO defense ministers in Washington, where the principals established three working groups to iron out the administrative protocols, structures, and procedures. The Soviets were treating the Special Committee as indistinguishable from a hardware option though. In a conversation at the U.N. between Foster and Tsarapkin on January 12, the Soviet envoy underlined his government's opposition to any form of West German access to nuclear weapons including by means of a "Special Committee." More telling though in Foster's judgment was a *Pravda* article published two days before that had revealed continuing Soviet interest in a nonproliferation treaty. Mostly, though, he was relieved that Soviet officials were keeping the lines of communication open. Even so, a Soviet-American consensus on NATO nuclear-sharing and global nonproliferation remained elusive.[417]

Official Soviet and United States' positions were thus still far apart. Kosygin sent a "pen-pal" letter on January 11 taking Johnson to task for his "policy of satisfying step by step the nuclear claims of the Bonn Government." He accused the Federal Republic of trying to acquire nuclear weapons and the U.S. of supplying its German allies with "atomic information," training with nuclear explosives, and artillery "capable of carrying nuclear shells." He even cited a "Western press" report claiming that "West German planes and missiles manned by West German military personnel [had] even [been] equipped with [U.S.] nuclear warheads." In his eyes, Bonn had openly admitted that it

[416] Notes, "Meeting with U.S. Undersecretary of State George Ball," 31 August 1965, *Documents diplomatiques français 1965,* Vol. 2. (Paris: Impr. Nat., 2004), 280-281.
[417] Baron Bruno de Leusse, French mission to NATO, Telegram to Paris, "U.S. permanent delegate information," 12 January 1966, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

would defy a nonproliferation treaty prohibiting a hardware solution and the U.S. had in effect eschewed a nuclear entente with the U.S.S.R. in the interest of giving access to nuclear arms to "West German revanchists." The Kremlin would oppose a "multilateral or an Atlantic nuclear force," or even an "atomic committee." He was "ready to begin businesslike negotiations to prepare ... a non-proliferation treaty."[418] Johnson's foreign policy team thus confronted strong albeit equivocal Soviet opposition to any modifications to NATO defense policy.

Facing British reticence, Soviet vituperation, and a growing domestic peace movement, the Committee of Principals met in the conference room in Foggy Bottom to devise language with which to respond to Kosygin and frame the president's forthcoming message to the ENDC. Johnson's foreign policy team began by discussing Vietnam's impact on the climate for nuclear diplomacy. Foster wanted a sanguine response maintaining Communist attacks on U.S. actions in Vietnam represented cause for greater efforts, which Vice President Hubert Humphrey and Rusk characterized as naïve. "The facts of life" were that "Vietnam was an obstacle to disarmament." As to the Pastore Resolution, Humphrey and Rusk advised Johnson to uphold it lest the omission betray that "the Senate's position ... [w]as contrary to that of the administration."[419] Kosygin's objection to the Special Committee was worrisome. The Eastern bloc had opposed hardware solutions since late-1963; now it was attacking a software option as well, which called into question existing nuclear arrangements in Europe and lessened the prospects for agreement in Geneva. Inertial support in Foggy Bottom kept a hardware solution on the table though. Keeny offered three substitute clauses to replace a muddy obligation not

[418] State Department Circular, "Memorandum from Chairman Alexei Kosygin to President Lyndon Johnson," 11 January 1966, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 2. Reproduced in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 108, 277-281.

[419] Meeting of the Committee of Principals, "Draft of Proposed Presidential Message to the ENDC," 21 January 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 114, 292-295.

to increase “the total number of States and other Organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons,” and thereby reassure the Soviets while still “fully protect[ing] our interest in nuclear arrangements that will keep the Germans with us."[420] The revised text, whose new fourth article defined “control” as the “right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear weapons state,” complied with British views on veto rights but failed to satisfy Soviet concerns about "access.”[421] For now, though, the revisions were held in reserve in case a window for Soviet-American accord opened.

The middle road pleased neither Moscow nor Bonn. Ball’s fingerprints were evident on the non-dissemination clause, which was "a shade more binding" but "consistent with everything we have said to the Germans."[422] Despite the partiality, French Ambassador Roger Seydoux noted that West Germany begrudged the proceedings, which presented Bonn with “a frightful dilemma:” either consent without a *quid pro quo* on reunification, “or refuse and find itself in an intolerable political and psychological position."[423] The National Security Council opted for a low-level approach, instructing Foster to show the revisions to West German Disarmament Minister Swidbert Schnippenkoetter in Geneva and “challenge [him] to make an issue of this wording in the

---

[420] The first read, “each undertakes not to take any other action which would give any association of States or other Organizations independent power to use nuclear weapons.” The second read “or to transfer any nuclear weapons to any association of States where control would not continue to be exercised by an existing nuclear power.” The third, which Bundy preferred should the first prove unacceptable and which mirrored the latest British draft, read, “Each of the nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer any nuclear weapons either directly, or indirectly, through a military alliance, into the control of any non-nuclear State or of any group of association of States.” Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, “Comment on Reply to Kosygin,” 20 January 1966, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 1-2.

[421] “Revised Draft Articles I, II and IV of a Non-Proliferation Treaty,” 20 January 1966, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 3.

[422] McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the President re “Reply to Kosygin's letter on Nonproliferation Treaty," 23 January 1966, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.

[423] Roger Seydoux, Telegram from Bonn to Paris re “German fears of an NPT," January 29, 1966, AMAEF, 517INVA, Box 768, 2.

face of Western Four agreement." Keeny was relieved that the initiative might "contain the possibility of an agreement with the Soviets," though he worried that the White House would not "stand our ground if [the West Germans] object[ed] at a high level."[424] The AEC was in the midst terminating projects to assist the F.R.G. with fast-breeder and plutonium reprocessing technology. In response, the West German nuclear establishment diversified its investment for research and development in nuclear fuel and reprocessing. Though the nuclear powers in Geneva fretted that West German nuclear plans might one day take a military detour, the Erhard government was principally concerned with losing political leverage for reunification and market share in the global nuclear emporium.

The political wrangling over nuclear-sharing and nonproliferation had reached an impasse. Allies and adversaries alike stood their ground against a hardware solution and the new language failed to bridge the gap between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Washington wanted a treaty that inscribed a political definition of proliferation to dissuade new actors from playing the game of deterrence while Soviet leaders strongly resisted new countries, especially West Germany, having military access to nuclear weapons or participating more closely in nuclear planning with their political corollaries. Would the treaty codify a meaning of proliferation based on "control" or "access," and would Soviet officials acquiesce to current nuclear-sharing arrangements perhaps supplemented by more intergovernmental consultation? In essence, what form and depth of nuclear-sharing would Moscow allow in NATO and still go along with a nonproliferation treaty?

Key experts in the White House were pessimistic. The new draft treaty was the product of Foster's *ad referendum* talks in London; ergo, its "principal purpose" was "to appease the British." It was unlikely to be "significantly more acceptable to the

[424] Spurgeon Keeny, Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, "Clearance of Cable to Foster on Non-Proliferation Treaty," 27 January 1966, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 1.

Soviets."[425] Keeny complained the accepted revisions were superficial and advised not to "table it before [the North Atlantic Council] (NAC) and presumably the ENDC," where Soviet-American talks were ongoing. Meanwhile, the CIA concluded that a "significant breakthrough in Geneva appear[ed] doubtful," while acknowledging that "[a]gainst the backdrop of the Vietnam War many would consider even the agreement to resume talks an accomplishment."[426]

**Small Steps in Geneva**

The Eighteen National Committee on Disarmament reconvened on January 27, 1966. Pope Paul VI bestowed his imprimatur on the proceedings, citing Pope John XXIII's speech, "Pacem in Terris," when calling for renewed commitment to disarmament. The U.S. draft treaty predictably failed to foster harmony; nevertheless, the sessions and backroom meetings helped to signal intent, reduce misperceptions, and consolidate Soviet-American détente in the nuclear arena. The eight non-aligned members continued to play the "more significant and influential role" they had assumed the previous year, while the co-chairman endeavored to play down their disagreements.[427] Tsarapkin delivered a long tirade on "German revanchism" and U.S. aggression in Vietnam at the first meeting; however, the Soviet emissary had assured Foster earlier in a tête-à-tête that Vietnam was not an insuperable barrier. When he passed through Paris en route to Geneva, Foster had rendezvoused with French representative at the North Atlantic Council P. O. Alphand. Foster related to him that

---

[425] Spurgeon Keeny, Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, "New NPT Draft," Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.
[426] CIA Special Report, "Disarmament Negotiations Resume in Geneva," 28January 1966, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 8.
[427] Ibid., 8.

Washington was less rigid on the MLF than it seemed. Furthermore, Tsarapkin and he had agreed that Vietnam should not stand in the way of progress in Geneva.[428] Personal diplomacy once again belied and softened the more bellicose public posturing.

Security assurances were at the front of the agenda for non-aligned members. The issue of nuclear assurances, both positive in the form of promises to defend and assist states from nuclear threats, and negative in terms of pledges not to level the weapons against those states lacking them, were becoming more central as states without nuclear weapons weighed in heavily in Geneva and New York City. U.S. officials contemplated negative security assurances, but it was Kosygin who seized the moment to burnish Soviet bona fides, allay non-aligned states' concerns, and discomfit West Germany all in one fell swoop. He declared on February 1 that the U.S.S.R. would honor a promise not to use "nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers, signatories to the treaty, which have no nuclear weapons on their territory."[429] His guarantee implicated Beijing and came on the heels of a polemic in the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, *The People's Daily*, lambasting the Soviet Union for conducting nuclear diplomacy with the U.S. against the backdrop of the Vietnam War.[430] The Western bloc confronted a dilemma because such an assurance would leave countries on whose territories the U.S. stationed nuclear weapons out in the cold. The non-aligned members, on the other hand, met the proposal with enthusiasm; on February 22, Mexican delegate Gomez Robledo called it in "complete concordance" with a proposal by Nigeria the previous year for a "firm

[428] P.O. Alphand, Telegram from Paris, "Meeting with Foster," 26 January 1966, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.
[429] McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum to the White House, "Chairman Kosygin's Message of February 2 to the Geneva Disarmament Conference," 2 February 1966, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.
[430] French Embassy in Peking, Telegram to Paris, "The People's Daily Attacks the Soviets," 31 January 1966, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

undertaking" by nuclear powers "not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Powers under any circumstances whatever, or to threaten to use them."[431]

While those in Washington debated how to deal with the Soviet overture, Foster began the laborious process of explaining and justifying the U.S. position to his Soviet counterpart. Foster request a sit-down from Tsarapkin on February 3 to talk about the recent exchange of letters between Kosygin and Johnson. The Soviet co-chairman had yet to read Johnson's reply, but agreed that a private meeting was "desirable."[432] On February 10, he notified Foster that Moscow had sent word to press on in their bilateral meetings.[433] Foster and Fisher had spoken earlier that day about the president's letter laying out the new line that veto rights were sacrosanct. Fisher relayed that the final product was "a compromise between 1600 [Pennsylvania Ave.] and Ball."[434] Chalfont was hopeful in spite of the nuclear-sharing hurdle and wanted a co-chairmanship for himself, testifying to Britain's desire to maintain its leadership position in international nuclear diplomacy.

Foster met Tsarapkin on February 14 at the Soviet villa, where the Soviet diplomat claimed the letter expressed "no change in U.S. position." Foster protested that the term "access" only sowed "confusion," while the U.S. position got to the heart of the matter: states' abilities to fire nuclear weapons independently. Tsarapkin was unmoved and repeated Moscow's stance that "no ingenious definition" would alter the Soviet Union's antipathy to any form of West German "access" to nuclear arms. Foster pressed

---

[431] "Final Verbatim Record of the 242nd Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 22 February 1966, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.242, 6-7.

[432] Memorandum of Conversation between William Foster and Semyon Tsarapkin, "U.S. Response to private message from Kosygin to Johnson on non-proliferation," 3 February 1966, Folder 10, Box 13, William C. Foster Papers, George C. Marshall Library. Hereinafter Foster Papers, GCML.

[433] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Fisher and Foster re "Conversation between Tsarapkin and Foster," 10 February 1966, Folder 10, Box 13,Foster Papers, GCML.

[434] Memorandum of Conversation via Secure Line between Adrian Fisher and William Foster, "Johnson's letter to Khrushchev," 31 January 1966, Folder 10, Box 13,Foster Papers, GCML, 1-2.

the co-chairman on how he interpreted access and how it related to the various scenarios under review. The previous year, Tsarapkin had asserted that the MLF and the ANF were "obstacle[s];" now, Kosygin added the Special Committee and "Existing Arrangements." Tsarapkin maintained "they all amounted to [the] same thing, access in one form or another and this made it impossible for any progress to be made." Foster expanded on his government's conception of proliferation in relation to hardware and software solutions in NATO; still, "Tsarapkin was unimpressed." Soviet-American differences had actually widened in the past year.[435] The co-chairmen nevertheless concurred that debate on other matters should be wrapped up expeditiously at the conference so that delegations could turn their attention to the nonproliferation quandary.

Dramatic events in India transformed the complexion of the non-aligned grouping in Geneva. India exemplified the deepening North-South fault line in nuclear politics. It was a country whose nascent nuclear industry and mounting conflicts with a nuclear-armed China to the North and an unfriendly Pakistan to the West led observers to worry that it would not long forgo the military option. The U.S. was working behind the scenes to dissuade the leading non-aligned country and longstanding critic of nuclear weapons from a martial course. Betty Goetz Lall, the American wife of Indian diplomat Arthur S. Lall, informed U.S. Ambassador Chester Bowles in New Delhi that India's atomic energy czar, Homi Bhabha, "thought India had an opportunity to extract political concessions from the big powers in return for not going nuclear." Lall quoted him as saying that "India should use its nuclear abstention as leverage to prod the United States and the Soviet Union into agreeing on disarmament measures," which would help Shastri

[435] Memorandum of Conversation between William Foster and Semyon Tsarapkin, "New U.S. draft language," 14 February 1966, Folder 10, Box 13,Foster Papers, GCML, 2.

defy public pressure and "indicate Soviet movement toward the U.S. and away from China." The outcome would "be highly significant for India's basic security interest."[436] Her account may have reflected her and her husband's antinuclear beliefs; nonetheless, the disclosure illuminated how the Sino-Soviet split affected Bhabha and Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's outlooks on international nuclear diplomacy.

At least, that was the thinking until the two men's deaths rocked Indian nuclear policy in January 1966. The Indian delegation had customarily served as ringmaster and rabble-rouser among the non-aligned group, staking its moral prestige on the promotion of equality, university, and common security in global nuclear diplomacy. The end of the Second Kashmir War with the signing of the Treaty of Tashkent rejuvenated Indian energy in the field. Peace on the subcontinent came at a price though. Prime Minister Shastri collapsed and died of an apparent heart attack in the Uzbek capital after the farewell reception on January 11.[437] Two weeks later, Bhabha perished on board Air India Flight 101, when it slammed into Mont Blanc. India's chief nuclear hawk and dove thus both left the diplomatic scene within a two-week span. The British thought the death of the "only Indian atomic scientist of international class" (more reflective of British prejudice than Indian capabilities) would lessen hawks' influence in New Delhi.[438] In actuality, Indian nuclear diplomacy grew more truculent now that V.C. Trivedi, whom British officials described as a "partisan of the tendency to afford India with the atom bomb," operated without "precise instructions" while Indira Gandhi solidified her control

---

[436] Memorandum of Conversation with Mrs. Betty Goetz Lall, "Indian Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons," 14 October 1965, Box 129, Country File—India, NSF, LBJL. Hereinafter CF. Arthur Lall represented India at the U.N. in the 1950s and the ENDC in the early 1960s.
[437] Some suspect he was poisoned.
[438] Andre, French Embassy in London, Telegram to Paris, "Du probleme nucléaire Indien," 16 February 1966, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

over the Congress Party.[439] The French and Americans hoped that the peaceful end of the conflict would ease Indo-Pakistan tensions, while Gandhi's rise could make India more pliable to Soviet influence. For now, though, Trivedi could write Indian nuclear policy from Geneva.

The newfound autonomy and advantageous terms of reference set by UN Resolution 2028 emboldened Trivedi. In a speech on February 15, he upheld the tenets of "non-intervention in the internal affairs of States" and "respect for their independence, integrity and sovereignty," while castigating Beijing for twice defying international norms by testing nuclear explosives in the global commons. He bewailed the lack of progress toward a total test-ban treaty given the global consensus, proliferation corollaries, and planetary ambit. With respect to nonproliferation, he specified three alternatives: Fanfani's moratorium, a "balanced" treaty combatting the horizontal and vertical trend lines, or nuclear deterrence based on alliance blocs. Invoking the non-aligned statement of the previous fall, he rebutted accusations that states lacking nuclear weapons wanted to smuggle general and complete disarmament, or nuclear disarmament, into the package; on the contrary, they only held that "[a] non-proliferation treaty will need to deal with the disease instead of dealing merely with the symptoms."[440] The draft treaties ought to "embody a more comprehensive approach, and a global approach" by addressing the spread and racing of nuclear arms and by avoiding the establishment of three classes of states: nuclear powers, non-nuclear-weapon states, and allies of nuclear powers. This last point defied the U.S. insistence on leeway for a multilateral force in Europe. He ended by

[439] Bernard de Chalvron, French mission to Geneva, Telegram to Paris, "Indian Position," 16 February 1966, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

[440] Final Verbatim Record of the 240th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 15 February 1966, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.240, 13. To this end, he distinguished between proliferation as an increase in the amount of nuclear weapons and dissemination as the provision of them to new states.

reciting the verdict issued by Jawaharlal Nehru from a British prison on August 2, 1933, when he lamented the “[g]reat failure at world efforts at co-operation” at the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva. “No country was prepared to consider the question from a wider international point of view,” Nehru had claimed, because for each “disarmament means that other countries should disarm or lessen their armaments while it kept up its own strength.”[441]

By questioning the proceedings in the former setting of the hapless League of Nations, the speech challenged the Soviet and American co-chairmen, whom Trivedi compared to "a Mogul emperor of India who was a drunkard himself but who prohibited drinking throughout his empire." Though the superpower delegations enjoyed special privileges, the non-aligned members worked constantly and assiduously to delineate a middle ground between them.[442] Thus far in 1966, they had bent their efforts to obtaining either “negative” assurances of nuclear non-aggression, or “positive” pledges of support from the nuclear powers. According to a *Journal de Genève* article of February 11, “the most "capable" do not want to give up arming themselves … without being sure that they will be protected against nuclear attack, wherever it comes from.” They wanted more “than the stabilization of the status quo; they desired a world where security was afforded to all.”[443] Whitehall believed that Trivedi’s address was a play for time owing to the power vacuum in New Delhi. Nonetheless, the fit of pique could not be dismissed in light of India’s status as the presumptive head of the non-aligned movement and the cardinal threshold state. Italian delegate Francesco Cavaletti cautioned the North Atlantic

[441] Ibid., 20.
[442] The non-aligned members were India, Burma, Ethiopia, the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.), Nigeria, Brazil, Sweden, and Mexico.
[443] Bernard de Chalvron, Memorandum to Maurice Couve de Murville, “Conference sur le désarmement le 10 February 1966,” 11 February 1966, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

Council that Trivedi's intervention was symptomatic of neutral repugnance at a prospective treaty regime lacking equal sacrifices from the nuclear powers. He intimated that Italy's proposal for a three-year moratorium, stemming in part from growing Italy's own nuclear ambitions, "had kept its value."[444]

On February 17, Tsarapkin gave a long tirade against Bonn's nuclear pretensions. The speech vexed Foster. When Tsarapkin claimed the Bundeswehr and Erhard were pursuing nuclear weapons and cited an Institute of Strategic Studies report that West German reactors could generate enough plutonium to make 170 atomic bombs per year by 1972, Foster scribbled to ACDA Counselor George Bunn: "I suppose [the] use of "Red Herring" would be *undiplomatic*, although it would be fun." "[E]veryone in this room, including Ts[arapkin] himself," he griped, "knows this is ridiculous" since all West German reactors were under safeguards. The main challenge was still Trivedi's criticisms though. Bunn jotted back that Mexican delegate Tello Macias had advised "just before the meeting … that we not take on Trivedi because that might cause [the] 8 [non-aligned members] to join ranks." "Mexico wants to take him on Tues[day]." "I said you were leaving" (to return to Washington for the JCAE hearings) and it was "difficult for you to follow Mexico, but I would tone down the statement if I could." Bunn made "minor changes," deleting Trivedi's name and adding a reference to Mexican leadership, whose envoys seemed adept at concilating their northern neighbors and their non-aligned counterparts alike.[445]

In spring 1966, the nuclear question flummoxed United States policymakers even as Vietnam preoccupied them. The Committee of Principals met on March 2 to discuss

[444] Telegram from the French Foreign Ministry to embassies abroad, "Cavalletti's address to the North Atlantic Council," 16 February 1966, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.
[445] Hand-written notes, 17 February 1966, Box 17, Foster papers, GCML. Emphasis in original.

Kosygin's offer of assurances for non-aligned, non-nuclear-weapon states. How to guarantee the security of states outside the U.S. alliance system had confounded Washington since before Lop Nur and the non-aligned grouping had heartily welcomed Kosygin's proposal. The limits had heretofore stemmed from fears of watering down the U.S. deterrent, alienating allies, or contradicting non-aligned neutrality. Johnson's foreign policy team resolved once more that, at the "present time," it was not "advisable" to display a willingness to extend security guarantees as part of a grand bargain. The reasoning had altered significantly though. Changing strategic and economic factors now militated against further obligations. In mid-February, the State Department had instructed the U.S. delegation in Geneva to give a "positive indication [of] our readiness [to] support effective assurances for states undertaking [an] obligation not [to] acquire their own nuclear weapons."[446] Now, Foggy Bottom informed Fisher that "[b]ecause of Viet Nam … we do not believe it wise to raise questions of additional commitments."[447] With the U.S. military bogged down in Southeast Asia and the nuclear have-nots outflanking the superpowers in Geneva, Fisher was ordered to coordinate with his Soviet counterpart more closely:

> You should also seek [to] persuade Tsarapkin of [the] wisdom of allowing assurances question [to] simmer with [a] minimum of U.S. and Sov[iet] public comment until key issues in [the] treaty are resolved and we are in [a] better position to assess how best [to] meet [the] joint interests of U.S.S.R. and U.S. on the one hand and [the] needs of non-nuclears on the other.[448]

The co-chairmen's prerogative of setting the agenda let them play for time until a common posture was taken, enabling them to make offers from a position of strength.

---

[446] Dean Rusk, Telegram to Geneva, "Kosygin Letter and Nonproliferation Talks," 15 February 1966, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 1-2.
[447] U.S. Department of State, Outgoing telegram to Adrian Fisher in Geneva, "Kosygin Proposal and Security Assurances," 5 March 1966, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 1.
[448] Ibid., 4-5.

According to Rusk, "premature agitation" on the issue of security assurances "might only encourage non-nuclear powers to seek [a] more extravagant price for their adherence to [the] treaty and to play one nuclear power against one another."

### "Policing the World"

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy called Rusk, Foster, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Glenn Seaborg to testify on the state of United States nuclear diplomacy in February and March 1966. Pastore's resolution energized a "cabal" of nuclear prohibitionists in the administration such as Foster and Seaborg, who subscribed to internationalist mechanisms for addressing transnational and planetary threats, and who judged nuclear weapons primarily through a cataclysmic prism.[449] The State Department, on the other hand, was disposed to lock in the country's balancing role in Europe by way of a multilateral force. Divisions among key nuclear policymakers thus came visibly to the fore at the hearings. As the director of the powerful Pentagon, McNamara represented the critical swing vote.

Rusk with Foster in tow was called as the first witness on February 23. Rusk had testified to the Senator Foreign Relations Committee the previous Friday with regard to Vietnam and the antiwar protests. Pastore greeted the secretary by linking proliferation to U.S. engagement in anticommunist struggles abroad, where a few atom bombs might tip the scales decisively.[450] Rusk acknowledged that the spread of nuclear weapons would dent the preponderance of power held by the U.S., but he worried more about how they

[449] Bunn, *Arms Control by Committee*, 73.
[450] Testimony of Secretary of State Dean Rusk on Wednesday, February 23, 1966, to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings on Senate Resolution 179, "Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Eighty-Ninth Congress, Second Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 3.

could transmute "historic ethnic and territorial disputes" in "the hotter spots of the world" into catalysts of a Soviet-American war. It was a "chain reaction" initiated by a "irresponsible nuclear action by anybody, anywhere" that kept him up at night.[451] Even so, he still believed that the construction of a NATO multilateral nuclear force and U.S. nonproliferation policy were reconcilable. Pastore pushed him on the question of security guarantees, asking if they would make the U.S. a "world policeman?" Rusk cautioned that Moscow might balk at pledging to confront Beijing in case of a Chinese threat and intimated that disarmament rather than guarantees was the main object of non-aligned diplomacy.[452] Pastore asked if a global regime was tenable with both France and China "recalcitrant." Rusk parried that nuclear powers were by nature disinclined to help new states join the club and kept the focus on Europe. Non-aligned acquiescence was imperative, but the "most difficult problems" resided not in the communist camp but in "the free world."[453]

Questions about deterrence, guarantees, and a universal compact were main topics when Foster testified on March 1. He painted a rosy picture of recent progress in Geneva. Instead of rebuffing the U.S. draft treaty and withholding its own, the Soviet Union had submitted a comparable document and proposed an "article-by-article discussion of the two draft treaties."[454] The Soviet-American relationship was thus evolving from polemical dueling and procedural parrying to sustained, constructive, and even concerted dialogue. Foster saw this as proof of Moscow's "serious intent" to work

[451] Ibid., 23.
[452] Ibid., 13.
[453] Ibid., 17.
[454] Testimony of Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency William Foster on Tuesday, March 1, 1966, to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings on Senate Resolution 179, "Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Eighty-Ninth Congress, Second Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 35.

out a treaty, the decisive factors being China's tests and the cheapening and broadening of nuclear technology, both of which increased the odds of catalytic nuclear war. Pastore agreed, noting that "proliferation concerns civilizations, not just governments;" even so, he again warned that guarantees might "place the United States in the role of policing the world."[455] Foster held that Kosygin's recent proposal and the orthodox logic of nuclear threat and counter-threat meant that demands for assurances were "reasonable." When asked about the benefits of a congressional resolution, Foster stated that the hortatory impact on the White House and the positive signal sent to states such as Italy, India, and the Soviet Union that the American people and their government were serious about a treaty would "help very much."[456]

When Seaborg spoke that afternoon, he advocated IAEA safeguards that would afford more "credible assurance" than bilateral arrangements and whose international scope would "take safeguards out of the marketplace," where competition would eventually lead to a "reduction to the lowest common denominator—no safeguards at all."[457] Seaborg was reticent to share his frustration with the lax safeguards article in the current draft treaty; it took steady prodding by Representative Craig Hosmer (D – CA) for him to admit that he "would like to see [the language] stronger."[458] He also indicated that safeguards would work best if applied throughout the fuel-cycle to permit "cross-checks on the flow of materials"[459] He noted that the inclusion of an IAEA safeguards

[455] Ibid., 37.
[456] Ibid., 50.
[457] Testimony of Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Glenn T. Seaborg on Tuesday, March 1, 1966, to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings on Senate Resolution 179, "Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Eighty-Ninth Congress, Second Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 53.
[458] Ibid., 60
[459] Ibid., 61

article in the Latin American nuclear-free zone draft treaty had set an encouraging precedent for the nonproliferation talks in Geneva.

McNamara's testimony the next week was pivotal. The Pentagon had been decisive in the Senate's decision to ratify the LTBT in 1963; its views now rested on the anticipated military impact of a nonproliferation treaty. McNamara depicted nuclear spread as a supreme danger and explained that the U.S. needed to make the international climate inhospitable for such states as India, West Germany, and Japan to deem nuclear weapons in their national interest. He feared that even small wars would spiral out of control since nuclear weapons' effects on strategic space-time shrunk the window for diplomacy and raised the likelihood of a major power intervention that could set in motion an unmanageable sequence of nuclear threats, counter-threats, and volleys.[460] He refused to distinguish among proliferators; Switzerland and Czechoslovakia were interchangeable in his mind. He promoted the multilateral force's original goal—to reassure allies about U.S. credibility—but praised more expansively the North Atlantic Council's progress toward constituting a "Special Committee." He resisted weighing in explicitly, but his testimony implied that consultative mechanisms could achieve the same ends. His support for a nonproliferation treaty was unequivocal:

> I do think that as a nation, we sometimes fail to accept small penalties in order to achieve large gains … there are certain problem associated with the nonproliferation treaty … [b]ut there are many more serious problems associated with a world in which we don't have a nonproliferation treaty.[461]

[460] Testimony of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on Monday, March 7, 1966, to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings on Senate Resolution 179, "Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Eighty-Ninth Congress, Second Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 88.
[461] Ibid., 83.

With nuclear-sharing arrangements in NATO the chief hurdle to Soviet-American accord, the hearings served Fisher and Pastore's purpose of revealing the majority in favor of compromise.

The consensus that nuclear arms were a global threat influenced the committee's decision to recommend their curtailment. McNamara's account of how the Special Committee helped to enlighten European officials about the peril of thermonuclear war, in whose "process the world, in a very literal sense, would be virtually destroyed," illustrated the fear at the resolution's heart.[462] The Federation of American Scientists, United World Federalists, Unitarian Universalist Association, Friends Committee on National Legislation, and the Council for a Livable World endorsed the resolution. It was Hosmer who best captured the normative thrust of proceedings though: "being for proliferation is like being for sin and against motherhood."[463]

**Strangling Germans**

In March 1966, President Charles de Gaulle declared he was removing French forces from NATO integrated military command, calling into doubt the future of the Atlantic defense community. Johnson eschewed heated rhetoric or direct confrontation with the French general, and the multilateral force enjoyed a brief Indian summer as U.S. policymakers sought answers to the French challenge. However, the course of negotiations in Geneva and the Pentagon's inclination to consult rather than form a collective force led McNamara to present a revived MLF to the British in such a way as to nudge Wilson toward the Special Committee and a NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). Johnson's presidency was more and more bound up in Vietnam, and he was

[462] Ibid., 105.
[463] Ibid., 50.

hesitant to issue the MLF's death warrant. National Security Adviser Walt Rostow, who replaced Bundy on April 1, thought Johnson wanted to avoid "wringing the German's necks." His predecessor, Bundy, believed Johnson wanted to soft-pedal nuclear-sharing and nonproliferation so as to keep "the Germans on board."[464] He preferred for events to take their course rather than risk a breach with Bonn while the tensions between the allies mounted over Franco-German rapprochement, balance-of-payment imbalances, and the American desire to draw down conventional forces in Europe on account of Vietnam.[465]

As the United States tried to mitigate the impact of the French exit, the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament continued through May 10. The non-aligned states were adamant that preserving the status quo was not enough and pushed for more than a Soviet non-aggression pledge and a soft U.S. vow to help those facing nuclear threats. Sweden, India, and Mexico concurred that a total ban on nuclear testing was necessary in concert with a nonproliferation treaty.[466] The drive to strengthen the LTBT revealed the prevailing sense among non-aligned states that universal pacts were preferable in nuclear diplomacy and that nuclear testing represented a prolongation of European imperialism. The Ethiopian delegate's statement (made without instructions from Addis Adaba) censuring the French for exploiting the African continent as an "experimental wilderness," when they exploded another nuclear weapon in the Sahara that year,

---

[464] Andrew Priest, "From hardware to software: The end of the MLF and the rise of the Nuclear Planning Group, in Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher, eds. *Transforming NATO in the Cold War challenges beyond deterrence in the 1960s* (London; New York: Routledge, 2007): pp. 154-155. His criticism that Johnson was also loath to "let Bobby [Kennedy] get out ahead of him" was likely the words of a lifelong Kennedy stalwart.

[465] For a pioneering account of how balance-of-payment imbalances affected U.S.-F.R.G. relations during the 1960s, read: Gavin, "Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s."

[466] Bernard de Chalvron, Letter to Couve de Murville, "Conférence sur le désarmement le 10 February 1966 et commentaire en le *Journal de Genève*," 11 February 1966, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1.

illustrated the tenacity of the postcolonial symbolism.[467] With respect to how nonproliferation implicated disarmament, the U.A.R. representative made the consequential comment to Foster that his murkier formulation of "steps for disarmament" might serve as a useful "fallback position" for the United States.[468]

The State Department still held that European stability was a greater priority than a multilateral nonproliferation treaty; however, the tide appeared in the midst of turning. The Policy Planning Council at State touted the treaty as a "moral, legal, and political barrier to proliferation," though it reckoned that India and West Germany's unique geostrategic plights warranted nuclear assurances by means of guarantees and multilateral forces, respectively. As for Israel, the analysts deduced that Washington retained enough "leverage" to enforce its non-nuclear status.[469] In Europe, West Germany and Italy were dismissive of the NPG and fretted about an unequal nuclear order. Schnippenkoetter carped that an acceptable treaty's "prerequisites" were "constantly evaporating" and inquired of French diplomat Bruno de Leusse de Syon whether Paris's "aloofness" from the Geneva talks matched Bonn's own "distrust."[470] Leusse's reply was cryptic. Besides Italy, West Germany was more and more isolated in international nuclear diplomacy.

---

[467] Bernard de Chalvron, French Mission to Geneva, Telegram to Paris, "Ethiopian broadside (M. Aberra) on the occasion of a French underground test in the Sahara and their absence from Geneva," 23 February 1966, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

[468] U.S. Mission in Geneva, Telegram to Washington, "ENDC Liaison Report No. 306," 16 March 1966, Box 13, SF-Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.

[469] U.S. Department of State Policy Planning Council, "The Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Problems for the West," 14 February 1966, National Archives, Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of Policy Planning Council, 1965-1968, Subject, Country and Area Files, Box 384, Atomic Energy-Armaments (2 of 4), NPT Collection, National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc01.pdf.

[470] Matthias Küntzel, *Bonn & the Bomb: German Politics and the Nuclear Option* (London ; Boulder, Colo: Pluto Press, 1995), 51; Bruno de Leusse, Bonn, Telegram to Paris, "Lunch with German rep to NATO, M. Schnippenkoetter," 3 March 1966, 1. "Il voulait peut-être chercher dans quelle mesure la réserve qui est la nôtre coincidait avec la méfiance de son gouvernement [vis-à-vis NPT]. Bonn seemed more upset with London than with Washington.

East-West dialogue in Geneva took one step forward and one step backward that spring. The sessions devoted to nonproliferation resumed on March 22, when Foster offered a number of amendments to facilitate an "article-by-article" comparison of Soviet and U.S. drafts. Keeny had suggested the key amendment in January, which refined the definition of control to mean the "right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear weapon State."[471] Fisher did not present the stronger safeguards article plumped for by the JCAE and the AEC despite Foggy Bottom's desire to submit a full draft treaty in order to divert some attention from questions of nuclear-sharing.[472] The revised, mirrored articles now included prohibitions suggested by the U.S.S.R. against "encouragement or inducement to acquire nuclear weapons."[473] The new language was devised to negate the Soviet arguments that granting "access" to nuclear weapons amounted to dissemination and to preserve the "European option," a joint nuclear force if Europe integrated politically, if either Britain or France chose to place their arsenals in the hands of a continental polity; ergo, the first article barred actions that would "cause an increase in the total number of States and associations of States" with nuclear weapons, rather than the advent of novel entities. Cavalletti outlined the "long-range" stakes of the controversy: "[i]f the possibility of a truly-integrated European association is to be left open … the nuclear weapon country or countries belonging to it would at a given moment become absorbed into that federation."[474]

---

[471] Final Verbatim Record of the 250th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament," 22 March 1965, Geneva, Washington, ENDC/PV.250, 6. Cross-reference with Bundy's memorandum.
[472] Adrian Fisher, Geneva, Telegram to Washington, "US delegation's analysis of next few weeks' activities in non-proliferation negotiations," 10 March 1966, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 2.
[473] Final Verbatim Record of the 250th Meeting of the ENDC, op. cit., 9. The draft treaty was labeled ENDC.152/Addendum.I.
[474] Final Verbatim Record of the 251st Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 24 March 1965, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.251, 11.

The Soviet delegation experienced a major change while Britain and Canada pushed the United States to jettison the hardware option in the interest of an agreement. In early March, the Kremlin recalled Tsarapkin, whom Fisher described before his departure as a "dispirited and worried man."[475] Western participants fretted about the new Soviet co-chairman, Alexei Roshchin, a "mid-level official" with a background in disarmament whose selection might betray "lessened Sov[iet] interest in [the] ENDC."[476] In time, though, Western envoys found Roshchin "more approachable" than his predecessor.[477] Meanwhile, the U.K. made a major push to conciliate the U.S.S.R. Chalfont accompanied Wilson to Moscow from February 22 to 24, where they conferred with Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev, and thence to Bonn, where Chalfont spoke with Tsarapkin about the test-ban and nonproliferation treaties. Rusk begged the British not to let the Soviets use Anglo-American differences concerning Atlantic nuclear policy as leverage.[478] When Chalfont returned to brief the North Atlantic Council, he related that Kosygin had dismissed even "McNamara-type consultations" and had presented the whole array of nuclear-sharing options as an "insuperable" barrier.[479] Chalfont gave "emotional pleas," echoed by Burns, for the West to resolve the issue swiftly and in a manner conducive to a treaty; to wit, they "should not involve [a] hardware solution." If the Federal Republic "didn't like it, it was just too bad," he carped, with "no one to turn to" they had "no political bargaining power."

---

[475] Adrian Fisher, ACDA, Geneva, Telegram to Washington, "Conversation with Cavalletti (Italy) about simultaneous departure of Chalfont and Tsarapkin," 24 March 1966 Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL.

[476] Ibid.

[477] [1.71] Bruno de Leusse, Telegram from NATO headquarters to elsewhere, "Cavaletti report to NATO re Geneva," 11 May 1966, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1.

[478] Dean Rusk, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom," 20 February 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 119.

[479] U.S. Mission to NATO and European Regional Organizations, Telegram to Washington, "NAC, March 2: Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Sharing," 2 March 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Document 121.

Fisher admitted the need for a quick settlement, but objected that the "business" of the negotiations was arms control as [an] aspect of national security, not as [an] end in itself." Cavalletti concurred, but characterized the Federal Republic as "trying to stop [the] non-proliferation effort."[480] Bonn was increasingly reliant on Washington's good graces. Erhard wrote Johnson on February 25 hoping to bring the president around to his viewpoint that recent amendments ruling out a European force with majority voting reduced Atlantic security.[481] Rusk denied the contention though that NATO "must finally solve the Alliance nuclear problem before there can be a treaty."[482] On March 26, Fisher raised the clashing American and Soviet understandings of proliferation in his first co-chairmen meeting with Roshchin, who was critical that the "U.S. was willing to permit indirect proliferation through alliances" and a state without a sovereign nuclear arsenal participating in decision-making on the use of nuclear weapons, both of which he claimed violated the injunction of UNGA Resolution 2028 that a treaty "should be void of any loop-holes."[483] The talks were at a "point of no return" with the Soviets ruling out hardware and software options equally.

Excepting India, the non-aligned took a back seat while the Eastern and Western delegations publicly quarreled and privately consulted. Against the backdrop of Indian combativeness, Fisher broached the issue of floating "mandatory" safeguards to Trivedi; the State Department wanted to delay its tabling until after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi

---

[480] U.S. Mission in Geneva, Telegram to Washington, "ENDC Daily Summary and German obstructionism," 17 March 1966, Box 13, SF-Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 1.
[481] Georg von Lilienfeld, Letter to Lyndon Johnson, "Chancellor Erhard's telegram," *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 120.
[482] Dean Rusk, Telegram to the Embassy in the United Kingdom," 20 February 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 119, 304.
[483] U.S. Mission in Geneva, Telegram to Washington, "Co-chairmen's meeting," 26 March 1966, Box 13, SF-Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 1-2.

left Washington on March 30.[484] In the end, Washington chose not to submit the new language at that session, perhaps because of Italian criticisms of the "discriminatory" character of imposing mandatory safeguards on non-nuclear states' peaceful activities even though Rusk assured Italian Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani that the United States would campaign for treating Euratom measures as equivalent to those of the IAEA.[485] The session concluded with scant progress toward a treaty, although Cavalletti noted at NATO headquarters that "it was necessary to distinguish between the statements made in plenary and remarks exchanged in the hallways." When the Belgian and Greek representatives asked him if the Soviets were ready to accept a *fait accompli* with respect to the organization's nuclear defense, he responded that "it would depend on the nature of the *fait accompli*." Western solidarity for NATO nuclear-sharing was critical.[486]

After the JCAE and Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously passed the Senate Resolution on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, the U.S. Senate approved Pastore's resolution on May 17 with 84 in favor and no dissenting votes. The Johnson administration offered little commentary except to rebut Robert Kennedy's charges that it had needlessly rebuffed China's dubious proposal of a bilateral pledge not to use nuclear weapons first in exchange for a cessation to Beijing's testing program. Perhaps for that reason it took Johnson over two weeks to send Pastore a congratulatory letter, in which he called the resolution as "an overwhelming expression of sentiment" and "an indication of the support of the American people."[487] His letter to Pastore was a

[484] Dean Rusk, Outgoing telegram State to Geneva re "India and expanded IAEA safeguards regime," 25 March 1966, Box 13, SF-Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 2.
[485] Dean Rusk, Outgoing telegram to Geneva, "Non-Proliferation Treaty," 21 March 1966, Box 13, SF-Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 3.
[486] Bruno de Leusse, *op. cit.*, "Cavaletti report to NATO re Geneva," 11 May 1966, 2.
[487] "Suggested Letter to Senator Pastore," p. 1., attached to Benjamin H. Read, Executive Secretary to the Secretary of State re "The President's Response to the Senate Resolution on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (S.Res. 179), June 1, 1966, GCML, Foster Papers, Box 14, Folder 3.

premonition of changes to come rather than an "indication … of Johnson's changed view."[488] The Pastore Resolution indicated that the Senate would greet a nonproliferation treaty preferentially, bestowed a congressional imprimatur on the Geneva talks, and altered the White House's calculus in regards to the bond between global nuclear diplomacy and peace action. The last factor would play a deciding role as the State Department's grip on nuclear policy loosened as the disarmament committee continued to meet that summer.

The second session of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament lasted from June 14 to August 25 and witnessed a minor sea change in Soviet-American nuclear relations. Exploratory meetings at the United Nations in May to discuss a treaty prohibiting the militarization of Outer Space preceded them, testifying to the potential for superpower entente. Furthermore, the Soviets explicitly denied any linkage of Vietnam to Geneva. The Soviet mouthpiece, *Izvestia*, maintained in an article that "Vietnam … has not served and must not serve as an obstacle to reaching an agreement."[489] Foster apprised Rusk that contrary to public and high-level statements disparaging FRG "access," including "political access" via the NPG, "Soviet and Bloc representatives ha[d] now shown awareness of the need to accommodate … continued nuclear consultations." Moreover, Foster's interlocutors related the Soviet Union would not insist on a "formal burial" of the "dead" hardware schemes. Foster underlined the optics of nuclear diplomacy in the domestic and global fields against the backdrop of Vietnam. The United States "badly" needed to "demonstrate its desire to seriously negotiate measures contributing to international security and curbing the nuclear arms

[488] George Bunn quoted in Seaborg, *Stemming the Tide*, 182.
[489] "Atom Pact Proviso Denied by Russians," 22 June 1966, *New York Times*, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, 6.

race."[490] The point of disagreement was increasingly the United States draft's allowance of a "European option," especially one featuring majority voting that the U.K. strenuously opposed as well.

The headwinds behind the treaty strengthened as rumors spread that Middle Eastern and South Asian states were seeking a nuclear capability. President Gamal Abdel Nasser declared on May 8 that the United Arab Republic contemplated a nuclear-weapon program because "Israel [was] working in this field."[491] Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol responded on May 18 with an assurance that Israel would "not be the first to introduce [nuclear weapons] into our region," a claim he and subsequent leaders would reiterate often in an effort to keep Israel's military venture plausibly denied. Inside the Beltway, McNamara took the extraordinary step of writing Rusk directly to argue that proliferation pressures in India necessitated that "we should reconsider our position on the nonproliferation treaty," in particular the clarity with which the draft barred a European force lacking vetoes. He spelled his language preference out to Rusk:

> Each of the nuclear-weapons States party to this treaty undertakes not to transfer nuclear weapons into the control of another nuclear-weapon State, any non-nuclear-weapon State, or any association of States.[492]

The fear that India was tilting toward a military option impelled the White House to ponder ceding a degree of nuclear latitude in Europe to maintain the status quo in Asia.

Johnson and Rostow asserted the need for a rejuvenated nonproliferation effort vis-à-vis India at an NSC meeting on June 9. Foster met the previous day with Dobrynin,

---

[490] William Foster, Memorandum to Dean Rusk, "Key ENDC Developments and Recommendations," 25 May 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 131.

[491] "Nasser Cites Need for Nuclear Arms," 9 May 1966, *New York Times*, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, 8.

[492] Robert McNamara, Letter to Dean Rusk, "US Position on the Nonproliferation Treaty," 7 June 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 135. Before the language specified "any association of non-nuclear-weapon States," leaving open the possibility of an association comprising a mixture of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states, such as a European federation with either the United Kingdom or France.

who indicated that Moscow would move forward if a hardware solution were ditched. Conversely, they "were not concerned with present U.S. weapons in Germany or with the possibility of more substantive consultation."[493] Ball wanted a nonproliferation pact, but favored a threshold or comprehensive nuclear test ban. Reported Soviet unease with offering a guarantee to confront Beijing in case it made a nuclear threat and the end of the payment dispute in the United Nations pointed to the General Assembly as the right body in which to vest security guarantees. Though Vice President Hubert Humphrey promoted a total ban, the consensus held that a threshold treaty was more attainable in light of unbending Soviet resistance to inspections. The resulting report on the merits of a threshold treaty banning underground nuclear tests above a measurable limit held that "India and Israel deserve[d] special consideration," implying these two countries were the chief objects of U.S. concern in mid-1966. The reasoning cited the snowball effect common to proliferation talk: "if these two countries abstain from acquiring nuclear weapons, the nuclear aspirations of other potential Nth countries appear to be controllable for at least several years."[494] With China conducting its third nuclear test that summer, India remained at the focal point of American apprehensions though. At the end of the meeting, Johnson instructed Rusk, McNamara, and Foster to review how Washington could dissuade New Delhi.[495] Foster groused that they would not finish NSAM 351 until July 15, preventing him from offering anything substantively new in Geneva.[496] In the end, the multiagency review reiterated the array of tactics employed to

[493] Spurgeon Keeny, Memorandum for Walt Rostow, "Dobrynin-Foster Meeting," 9 June 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 137.
[494] Position Paper for ENDC Meeting, Geneva, "Threshold Test Ban (TTB) Treaty," June 1966, Box 13, SF—Disarmament, NSF, LBJL, 8.
[495] National Security Action Memorandum 351, "Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem," https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsam-lbj/nsam-351.htm.
[496] Memorandum for the File, "NSC Meeting," 9 June 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 136, 332.

date to delay or discourage an Indian military option: developmental arguments and incentives, intelligence sharing, private security assurances to India, steps to boost India's technological and political prestige, contingency planning if all these failed.[497] The NSAM report could not recommend a "dramatic steps to discourage the Indians from starting a nuclear weapons program," whose costs did not outweigh its benefits.[498] In the context of that summer's deliberations in Geneva, the steps rejected were a hastened nonproliferation treaty and a multilateral security assurance in league with the Soviet Union.

The State Department and key Western allies began to prioritize the arrival of East-West détente by virtue of a nonproliferation treaty over the politico-military equation in Europe. At the first plenary session in Geneva on June 14, Chalfont expressed how the potential spread of nuclear weapons negated the "sterile argument of the cold war – of the traditional military confrontation in central Europe:"

---

[497] Walt Rostow, Memorandum to Lyndon Johnson, "Follow-Up on NSC Discussion of the Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem," 1 August 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, VOL. XXV, South Asia, Document 363.
[498] Dean Rusk, Memorandum to President Johnson re "Report to the President on the Indian Nuclear Weapons Program, July 25, 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XXV, South Asia, Doc. 359. This document and in particular Rusk's admission that it "recommends no dramatic steps" is heavily referenced in the literature on nuclear proliferation and specifically on the Indian case. See: Abraham, *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb*, 127; Andrew Jon Rotter, *Hiroshima: The World's Bomb*, Making of the Modern World (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 297; Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb*, 145, footnote 105. Each of these authors apparently miss the centrality of the NPT negotiations and the contested formulation of U.S. policy in regards to how the treaty's would impinge on other U.S. priorities; namely, the "dramatic steps" primarily related to security assurances (already impaired by the massive U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia) by virtue of a new international framework centering on the NPT whose quick achievement would plainly require the abandonment of a collective nuclear force in NATO with its political corollaries for the U.S. role in West European affairs. Abraham claims that U.S. officials had accepted an Indian bomb as "a *fait accompli*" despite the fact that the report listed a number of tactics to "delay or discourage" the act. Rotter claims the U.S. was "calm in the face of India's nuclear opacity" for reasons of strategic empathy, designs on monazite sands, and mania for PNEs. The final point is germane to the internal U.S. debate in 1966, but it overlooks the concerted and eventually successful achievement of the NPT by the arms control cabal inside the Beltway of which India was a primary target. Finally, Perkovich claims the U.S. national security bureaucracy had yet to prioritize nonproliferation above "increasing and diversifying the United States' own nuclear arsenal." He right about the result, but not the cause, probably in hopes of underscoring the preceding analogy with the 1996 dustup in regards to ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

> In the last quarter of this century the great threats to the peace and prosperity of the world will lie outside Europe, in the turbulent and seething world of Africa and Asia. If we cannot lift our eyes from the River Elbe long enough to recognize the simple facts of life about nuclear proliferation, it is unlikely that we shall find common ground for dealing with the appallingly complicated issues which will confront us all in the great conflicts of race and economic survival that are now taking the place of our outdated and irrelevant cold war in Europe.[499]

Foggy Bottom was less ready to proclaim the end of the Cold War. However, Rusk was more inclined than ever to conciliate the Soviets as international nuclear diplomacy turned increasingly along a North-South axis. When the Committee of Principals met on June 17, he suggested "a simplified Article I that would prohibit the transfer of physical access to nuclear weapons." He now gave credence to Roshchin's claims that existing nuclear arrangements were not the "crux of [the] problem," but rather "physical access" to nuclear weapons by the FRG.[500] Rusk believed that the Soviets were "beginning to move and … prepared to gamble on their estimate that the MLF is dead."[501] New language should meet them halfway. McNamara agreed wholeheartedly.

Other policymakers weighed in. Foster was dubious that a treaty was attainable when he visited Bonn and Berlin from June 30 to July 3. He told Foreign Secretary Karl Carstens that he "doubt[ed] that there will be any actual arrangements agreed to at Geneva," but he hoped that Soviet-American differences would clarify before the General Assembly met that fall.[502] Foster spelled out the dynamics in Geneva when he addressed the Danish Committee on Disarmament in Copenhagen on June 17. He observed that a treaty was so "urgent" because of India's nascent capability and the Soviet Union was

---

[499] Final Verbatim Record of the 265th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 16 June 1966, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.265, 9.
[500] US Mission in Geneva, Telegram to Washington, "Co-chairman talks," 14 June 1966, Box 56, NSC Histories—NPT, NSF, LBJL.
[501] ACDA Records, Meeting of the Committee of Principals, 17 June 1966, Box 56, NSC Histories—NPT, NSF, LBJL.
[502] William Foster, Letter to Dr. Carl Carstens, State Secretary, Foreign Ministry, "Thank you letter," 13 July 1966, Folder 19, Box 8, Foster Papers, GCML.

"really interested" on account of Kosygin and Roshchin's assurances that Vietnam did not represent an insuperable obstacle. He stressed that the Geneva talks assumed their value from the "informal discussions" they enabled. Danish Foreign Secretary General Paul Fischer debriefed Foster about the two disputes holding a treaty back. He agreed with Foster that the object of Soviet resistance to nuclear-sharing in NATO was political in nature. Bonn wanted the "prestige" granted by nuclear weapons and for this reason Johnson had left open the hardware solution. With respect to the European clause, Foster conveyed that Washington was loath to make the goal of a united Europe "more remote."[503] In private letters though, Foster betrayed frustration; he complained to Tsarapkin, whom he saw in Bonn, that the Geneva negotiations "do not appear to be making much progress."[504]

Foster's deputy, Adrian Fisher, endeavored in the meantime to pen a non-dissemination article that could achieve consensus. Fisher sent a letter to the Committee of Principals on June 8 outlining the political relationship of the Soviet standpoint on "physical access" to the German question.[505] In place of the U.S. term of "control," and the Soviet shibboleth of "access," Foster proposed the use of "transfer" in the operative clause so as to outlaw the "transfer [of] nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear weapon state or to any group of states."[506] At a co-chairmen meeting on June 29, Foster inquired of Roshchin whether a solution to the "physical access" could pave the way for a

[503] US Mission in Geneva, Telegram to State Department, "Visit of Ambassador William C. Foster to Copenhagen with minutes of meeting with Danish Committee on Disarmament," 24 June 1966, Folder 19, Box 8, Foster Papers, GCML, 2-3.
[504] William Foster, Letter to Semyon Tsarapkin, Ambassador of the USSR to Germany, "Geneva," 13 July 1966, Folder 19, Box 8, Foster Papers, GCML.
[505] Adrian Fisher, ACDA, Memorandum to the Committee of Principals, "Proposed Revisions of Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty," 8 July 1966, Box 56, NSC Histories—NPT, NSF, LBJL.
[506] Bunn, *Arms Control by Committee*, 75.

nonproliferation treaty in which Washington was "very interested."[507] CIA Director Richard Helms advised Rusk that the new formulation was unlikely to prompt Moscow to cease fulminating against a hardware solution.[508] The AEC warned that a treaty forbidding "physical access" would prevent any variant of a multilateral force.[509] Ball circulated a list of comments on the memorandum laying out the controversy's stakes. Switching the key term to transfer would maintain an emphasis on centers of decision-making, but place greater curbs on hardware options and the possibility of a European force. [510]

The decisive act originated not in the international arena but from the domestic sphere. Antiwar voices and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chaired by J. William Fulbright (D – AR) leveled increasing scrutiny, protest, and criticism at the White House in regards to Vietnam in 1966. Since joining the president's election campaign in 1964, Johnson's chief of staff and political adviser, Bill Moyers, believed that peace could have a magnetic effect on U.S. voters. He was particularly convinced that a blend of symbolism and action in the field of nuclear arms control could win the increasingly critical votes of women and youths as the baby boomers started to cast ballots. Moyers drew Johnson's attention to its political potential on the first anniversary of the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty:

> Underneath all the campaign rhetoric, the peace issue and its converse[,] the nuclear specter that we are hammering away at, remain the principal political

[507] William Foster, Notes, "Co-Chairmen Meeting," 29 June 1966, Folder 18, Box 17, Foster Papers, GCML, p. 2.
[508] Richard Helms, CIA, Letter to Dean Rusk, "Odds of New Language Creating Agreement," 1 July 1966, Box 56, NSC Histories—NPT, NSF, LBJL.
[509] Glenn Seaborg, Letter to Dean Rusk, "Physical Access and the NATO Question," 1 July 1966, Box 56, NSC Histories—NPT, NSF, LBJL.
[510] George Ball, Memoranda to Secretary Rusk, "Comments on the Proposed Revision of the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty," "Proposed Revised Articles of US Non-proliferation Treaty" and "Proposals from Legal Adviser and S&T advisers," 11 July 1966, Box 56, NSC Histories—NPT, NSF, LBJL.

> issue of this decade just as the Depression Issue was in the 1930s and 1940s. We need to keep finding ways to articulate it through visual situations and official actions or reports rather than just more campaign speeches. We particularly think that we need to appeal to the affirmative side of the peace issue, which has a powerful appeal to women and younger voters.[511]

The latent power of nuclear fear was borne out by the guttural reaction to the "Daisy Commercial," which Moyers had approved in 1964, and which helped to assure an unprecedented margin of victory with the president carrying almost every state. Moyers kept religiously abreast of "flash" polls conducted confidentially for the White House by the Gallup organization, beginning with the 1964 campaign. He advised him, for example, that "American pride in the United Nations," which 59 out of 100 Alabamans and 82 out of 100 Bergen County, New Jersey residents supported, meant that international accomplishments were more lasting in their significance than domestic feats.[512]

The Americanization of the Vietnam War and the antiestablishment mood to which it gave rise jeopardized Democratic chances in the 1966 mid-term elections and thus the congressional majority critical to Johnson's Great Society programs. In summer 1966, Vietnam ranked first among pressing issues facing the nation by Americans polled, more important than inflation, racial integration, taxes, or the elderly. Moyers and his assistant Hayes Redmon wanted a major international achievement to boost Johnson's numbers, which had started to dip in June. Polls by Gallup and other survey researchers had "the President in bad shape vis-à-vis his public standing" and concurred that the "slippage" was clearly due to "the Vietnam situation."[513] Political heavyweights outside

---

[511] Bill Moyers, Memorandum to the President, "Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," 23 September 1964, Box 10, Office Files of Bill Moyers, LBJL, 2.
[512] Bill Moyers, Memorandum to the President, "American pride in the U.N.," 21 June 1965, Box 11, Office Files of Bill Moyers, LBJL, 1.
[513] Hayes Redmon, Memorandum to Bill Moyers, "President in Bad Shape," 9 June 1966, Box 12, Office Files of Bill Moyers, LBJL, 1.

the White House also sounded the alarm and identified a breakthrough in nuclear diplomacy as a potential remedy. Democratic power broker and John F. Kennedy's former special assistant, Fred Dutton, who would later run Robert Kennedy's presidential campaign, called attention to how a mixture of three domestic factors—"declining polls, an unsuccessful legislative agenda and the need for some fresh initiatives to point to in the next campaign"—had brought about the LTBT. Dutton noted Johnson's "serious trouble" with regard to the mid-term elections and the commensurately "serious need for new initiatives." Redmon wrote Moyers that "the Non-Proliferation Treaty … would precisely fill the bill."[514] Moyers's assistant had other reasons to support the treaty. He had criticized its slow progress in November 1965, when he noted that a "hardware solution" would force the White House to "bear the brunt of explaining away a confusing policy," which most neutral countries would interpret as proliferation by another name and with which Robert Kennedy "might well have a field day."[515] Improving his approval numbers in time to affect the mid-term election while fending off Kennedy fitted Johnson's political interests and his temperament equally.

The standstill on the treaty because of a small group in Foggy Bottom frustrated Moyers and his deputy. Redmon disparaged the indecisive Committee of Principals meeting in May on the arms control agenda as "a classic case of not seeing the forest for the trees." With "the Indians, Israelis, etc." liable to have less and less interest as time went by, "the basic issue, of course, [was] a non-proliferation treaty and we must move toward this with all possible speed:"

---

[514] Hayes Redmon, Memorandum to Bill Moyers, "Fred Dutton and Peace Issue, June 9, 1966, Box 12, Office Files of Bill Moyers, LBJL.
[515] Hayes Redmon, Memorandum to Bill Moyers, "Some Thoughts on Non-Proliferation," 16 November 1965, Box 11, Office Files of Bill Moyers, LBJL, 1.

> Virtually everyone is for it. That includes the voters, the Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The only people opposed to it are the "theologians" at State. This is because of their desire for a "European clause" and "hardware solution" on the NATO nuclear sharing problem. … [when] an offer by the President certainly puts him on the side of the angels."[516]

With the talks stalled in Geneva, Kennedy courting Eastern liberals, antiwar sentiment threatening the domestic agenda, and a strong majority in favor, the case for a treaty seemed overwhelming.

Moyers wrote the president on July 17 to impart his estimation that with "peace … still the strongest desire of the American people," coming to terms with the Soviets on the NPT would boost Democratic electoral prospects and cement Johnson's legacy as a great president. In a five-page report, Moyers made a case for supporting the treaty on domestic grounds:

> This proposal will be opposed by those at State who keep alive the hope of hardware for Germany. And the German government is not going to jump up and down with joy. But the MLF Club at State and the German government are not the President of the United States.

Moyers reminded him that he was accountable to the *vox populi* and that the American public ranked the treaty fourth among urgent external matters facing the nation. Orchestrating a treaty "would demonstrate statesmanship" while proving that he was "not preoccupied with Vietnam at the expense of other policies." Moyers pointed out that the LTBT buoyed Kennedy's electoral hopes in 1964 and counseled the president to do similary by ditching the hardware solution and phrasing the "European Clause" so ambiguously as to make the issue "a matter of future interpretation or amendment to the Treaty if that ever became necessary."[517] Moyers wanted nuclear diplomacy calibrated to mid-term elections whose successful conclusion he felt now hinged less on Vietnam and

---

[516] Hayes Redmon, Memorandum to Bill Moyers, "Committee of Principals Meetings and Arms Control Agenda," 31 May 1966, Box 12, Office Files of Bill Moyers, LBJL

[517] Küntzel, *Bonn & the Bomb*, 55–56.

more on "large and magnanimous Presidential actions that leave a real imprint on the public mood."[518] In a follow-up memorandum, he compared the theologians to the Japanese who had carried on fighting in Guam long after the war had officially ended. Though "Secretary McNamara and I are going what we can to unsnarl the situation," he promised, some heavy lifting was necessary to counter the "hearty hand of German nuklites" in Foggy Bottom who kept alive an obsolete and "unrealistic dream that not even the Germans really expect," and which kept Johnson from cementing his legacy as the president who ended segregation and then brought a semblance of order to the Nuclear Age.[519]

While Johnson pondered the domestic consequences of his nuclear policies, the international community faced problems of defining and verifying peaceful nuclear activities. Which agency would oversee which types of safeguards? Were nuclear explosives designed for civil engineering purposes qualitatively different than their weaponized cousins? U.S. officials fretted that PNEs, whose utility Edward Teller and Lewis Strauss had long trumpeted, were technically equivalent to warheads. The Latin American talks then underway showed that certain countries wanted a right to PNEs for development purposes. The question also evoked the basic dilemma of differentiating peaceful from military uses whose separation was a matter of semantics and technical sophistication; to wit, a difference in scale and sophistication rather than kind.

By the mid-1960s, nuclear weapons no longer resembled the unwieldy hunks that laid waste to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The knowledge gleaned from two decades of testing and consequent engineering had enabled the miniaturization of nuclear and

---

[518] Bill Moyers, Memorandum to the President, "November elections," 17 July 1966, Box 12, Office Files of Bill Moyers, LBJL, 2.
[519] Bill Moyers, Memorandum to the President, "MLF Club at State," 29 July 1966, Box 12, Office Files of Bill Moyers, LBJL, 2.

thermonuclear warheads and their emplacement on a growing array of missile types. Scientists, weaponeers, and officials in the AEC and the national laboratories at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore had launched Operation Plowshare to study how nuclear explosives might transform civil engineering in ways not witnessed since the invention of dynamite: blasting harbors, carving canals, liberating gas from shale formations, even melting the polar ice caps in order to terraform the Arctic.[520] While Plowshare lost steam after the LTBT banned explosions that released nuclear fallout into the global commons and across borders, the failure of the U.S. to declare PNEs unsafe or illegitimate, or to cancel its program fully, left a gaping hole of technical and legal ambiguity in an accord that for now defined nuclear weapons narrowly rather than universally. McNamara questioned the connotation of "nuclear devices," which "might be used either for peaceful or military purposes." Instead of inscribing ambiguity in a treaty regarding what exactly constituted a nuclear weapon, Fisher proposed defining a nuclear weapon broadly as "any device capable of producing a nuclear explosion."[521]

Canada was pushing for safeguards that were efficacious, non-discriminatory, and unobjectionable to the non-aligned bloc. Most important, they should apply to the Americans and British to forestall any competitive advantage and protect Canadian commercial interests.[522] Since Atoms for Peace, Ottawa in league with uranium miners and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) had become a major supplier of reactors, reprocessing technology, and raw ores. To tap the emerging global nuclear market, Canada developed the CANDU power system and fostered relationships overseas

[520] Scott Kaufman, *Project Plowshare: The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Explosives in Cold War America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).
[521] Adrian Fisher, ACDA, Memorandum to the Committee of Principals, "Proposed Revisions of Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty," 9 July 1966, Box 56, Histories—NPT, NSF, LBJL.
[522] William Foster, Two Handwritten Notes, "Safeguards – Canadian objections," Undated, Folder 19, Box 17, Foster Papers, GCML.

beginning in 1956 with the construction of an NRX-type research reactor known as CIRUS in India as part of the British Commonwealth's Colombo Plan. Soon after, Canada-based companies including Canadian Westinghouse and AECL sold a 125 MW KANUPP power reactor to Pakistan and a 200 MW CANDU power reactor (RAPP-2) to India, both of which were financed by 50-year loans on lenient terms. Meanwhile, Canadian miners were supplying uranium to West Germany, Japan, Sweden, and Euratom. Ottawa had no desire to witness its position in the nuclear market jeopardized by international safeguards whose early purpose was the promotion of atomic energy rather than its policing.[523] When Burns stated Canada's position at the ENDC, Foster worried such non-discriminatory safeguards would hinder the U.S. effort to broker a widely acceptable treaty since none of the nuclear-weapon states then submitted themselves to IAEA safeguards. The Canadian drive to "share [the] sacrifice" brought the West Four "back where we were when we start[ed] considering this provision last year."[524]

Western gaps widened even as the gulf between Soviet and American views narrowed before diverging once more as summer turned to autumn. Seaborg was amenable to placing some U.S. nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, but continued to insist on "a strong article on the acceptance of international safeguards by presently non-nuclear states."[525] McNamara challenged this push for mandatory safeguards in fear that nuclear have-nots would balk. The Canadians listed their suggested revisions on August 18; namely, the establishment of an equitable regime. The West Germans, meanwhile,

---

[523] Gordon Edwards, "Canada's Nuclear Industry and the Myth of the Peaceful Atom," in Ernie Regehr and Simon Rosenblum, eds., *Canada and the Nuclear Arms Race* (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1983).
[524] Foster, op. cit. "Safeguards – Canadian objections," undated.
[525] Glenn Seaborg, AEC, Letter to Rusk, "Physical access and the NATO question," 1 July 1966, Box 56, Histories—NPT, NSF, LBJL.

were dismayed at the growing likelihood of being locked out of a greater share in nuclear politics. And the Italians persisted in advancing the Fanfani proposal for a three-year moratorium as a compelling substitute for a legal prohibition. A time limit on any prohibition was also becoming a polestar of Italian nuclear diplomacy. With Canada, West Germany, and Italy showing signs of revolt against U.S. leadership though, Foster felt impelled to alert Foggy Bottom to the "developing strain on Western unity re [the] non-proliferation issue."[526]

The Moyers memorandum led the White House to reassess its nuclear policies. Johnson publicized his desire to identify an "acceptable compromise" with the Soviet Union on July 5, pointing to a victory for the arms control "cabal." Ball punctured that supposition the next day at a press conference, where he ruled out modifications that "foreclose[d] possible options" to meet "the legitimate interests on the part of the non-nuclear countries in Europe in having a share in the management of their nuclear defense."[527] He eventually succeeded in fusing the terms into an elliptical clause—"the transfer of control"—that failed to bridge the Soviet-American divide. Roshchin was guarded in a co-chairmen meeting with Foster on August 8 concerning the cryptic new wording, but intimated that the NPG was digestible and the European clause soluble.[528] He observed that "the heart of the matter" had "now boiled down to the question of transferring weapons to alliances." Foster outlined his impression of a treaty that the Soviets might tolerate on August 25; most notably, he called for the MLF's final burial

---

[526] DOS cable from Geneva, "Purpose of this cable is to alert dept and addressees to developing strain on Western unity re non-proliferation issue," 10 August 1966, William Foster, "Impressions of a non-proliferation treaty that might be negotiable with the Soviet Union," 25 August 1966, Box 56, Histories—NPT, NSF, LBJL.
[527] John Finney, "Administration is Divided Over Course on a Nuclear Treaty," 7 July 1966, *New York Times*, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, 8.
[528] William Foster, Telegram from Geneva,"Soviets on New Language and the Permissibility of Alliance Nuclear Consultations," undated, Box 56, Histories—NPT, NSF, LBJL.

and purposeful ambiguity relative to a European nuclear force in the distant future.[529] The cabal might count on Ball trying to resuscitate the hardware solution, but his influence was fading fast. In September, he resigned his post as Rusk's lieutenant in Foggy Bottom in protest against the administration's Vietnam policies. The leading champion of a Europe-first approach to United States nuclear diplomacy had left the stage.

## Stabling Horses

As a hardware solution's prospects waned, superpower like-mindedness waxed. With Ball out of the equation, the American position could evolve. Foster and Roshchin opened a window for a compromise that sanctioned the NPG and left the European clause ambiguous. Differences over the permissibility and desirability of a future European nuclear force were clear; however, the scenario was academic enough to warrant equivocation. When George Bunn spoke with Soviet consul Yuli Vorontsov on September 9, he repeated that his government would sacrifice neither existing NATO arrangements nor consultative bodies, but avowed that a *modus vivendi* was possible "during negotiations rather than in the treaty." "[I]t might be necessary to agree as to what each would say publicly about this problem," Bunn suggested, "if we agreed upon treaty language."[530] In essence, the two states would foster a "constructive misunderstanding" by issuing separate and potentially contradictory accounts of the treaty's original meanings. Rusk reaffirmed that his country was "utterly and completely"

---

[529] William Foster, "Impressions of a Non-proliferation treaty that might be negotiable with the Soviet Union," 25 August 1966, Box 56, Histories—NPT, NSF, LBJL.
[530] "Memorandum of Conversation between J. M. Vorontsov, Soviet Embassy, and George Bunn, General Counsel, ACDA, "Difference of opinion on MLF and NPT," 9 September 1966, Box 13, NSF, LBJL.

opposed to nuclear spread in a conversation with Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki on September 23.[531]

The task remained to inform the West German government of the fundamental shift in American nonproliferation views. Erhard and Schröeder were scheduled to sit down with Johnson and Rusk in the White house in late September to discuss offsetting U.S. troops in Europe, who were being deployed to Vietnam, the French challenge in Europe, and how the U.S. would protect the F.R.G. in a world governed by a nonproliferation treaty. The hardware solution was finally on the chopping block. In late August, the U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic, George McGhee, leveled with Foreign Secretary Carstens so that Erhard would not arrive with any misconceptions. Johnson had backed a hardware solution contingent on British acquiescence. Wilson's abandonment of his own ANF proposal revealed how weak was British ardor for the scheme. McGhee cited the congressional curbs on the transfers of nuclear hardware and data, leading Carstens to conclude "that the ambassador was acting under orders from Washington and wanted to make it clear to me that the Americans no longer wanted to pursue a course leading to a joint nuclear force." The apparent renunciation of a hardware solution by the U.S. worried Carstens, who regarded the matter through the lens of West Germany's diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis reunification. He concluded that a "purely consultative solution to the nuclear question [would] not give us enough influence in the long run and thus will not be satisfactory."[532] Erhard was less enamored of the political advantages of a multilateral force. He chose to heed the ambassador's overture. "Nobody was expecting a "hardware solution" any longer," he conceded to Johnson in

[531] Memorandum of Conversation between Dean Rusk and Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in New York City, "European Security (Part II of II)," 23 September 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIII, Document 206, 469-471.
[532] Küntzel, *Bonn & the Bomb*, 52–53.

the Oval Office.[533] Alterations to nuclear arrangements in NATO would now rely on consultative measures.

Erhard's coalition began to splinter on account of the sputtering West German economy and misgivings about Erhard's dependence on U.S. goodwill and support for Johnson's war. A new government under the chancellorship of Kurt Georg Kiesinger and in league with Willy Brandt's Social Democrats emerged victorious from the November elections. Thereafter, Bonn switched from pursuing nuclear privileges and refusing to deal with governments that recognized East Berlin to focusing on improved East-West relations. Bonn continued to weigh in on the treaty, but nuclear-sharing was now a secondary matter as the U.S. took the first steps toward establishing the Special Committee and NPG. When Rusk presented Brandt a joint Soviet-American draft treaty ruling out a hardware solution on December 16, the Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister assured Rusk that his government was "ready to forget 'hardware' and … the European clause." Brandt had convinced numerous NATO officials that "the new German Government will not be bound by the rigid theology of the Adenauer period;" it was ready to seek better relations with Eastern Europe and East Germany.[534] Voices in the West German political arena such as Konrad Adenauer and Franz Strauss continued to rail against the treaty and the Kiesinger government worked to ensure that West Germany was not discriminated against in a global nuclear order. With the ruling coalition "relaxed," however, in regards to the treaty's two main obstacles—the hardware solution and the European options—the German question in international nuclear diplomacy seemed resolvable. Washington could now shepherd NATO through a

[533] Memorandum of Conversation between Ludwig Erhard and Lyndon Johnson re "Offset and Troop Levels," 26 September 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1998*, VOL. XIII, Western Europe Region, Document 207, 472.
[534] Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Department of State re "NATO Meeting," 16 December 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIII, Western Europe Region, Document 229.

"systematic" review of the consultative arrangements while proceeding with the task of drafting a consensus treaty with Moscow.[535]

The terms of the central prohibitions were clearer. Soviet and American officials now set about creating an atmosphere of increased confidence and mutual trust. They cultivated a common outlook by sharing views, swapping assurances, sustaining contact, and stressing commonalities at a series of high-level meetings that fall. U Thant called the UN General Assembly into session on September 20 with a lament that "the relationship between the big powers has dropped to a new low."[536] In fact, the sessions in New York afforded the perfect opportunity to reverse the Secretary General's verdict. Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met at the Waldorf Astoria on September 24. Dobrynin, Roshchin, Arthur Goldberg, Foy Kohler, and Llewellyn Thompson were also in attendance. Gromyko expressed his desire to work out, thanks to the recent "rapprochement," how to word the treaty "precisely and accurately." Rusk insisted that it was "harsh and selfish American policy" not to furnish other countries with nuclear arms no matter the scenario. The Second World War's savage march had left bloody footprints on European as well as Soviet psyches. There was consequently "strong opposition within NATO" to German control over weapons of mass destruction. He assured "that U.S. and Soviet policy on non-proliferation was truly identical," warning that the global threat grew more acute each day while states such as India, Japan, and Israel enhanced their capabilities. He concluded: "It was important and urgent to act … before the horse escaped the stable; then it would be too late to close the door."[537]

---

[535] Telegram from Paris (NATO, European Regional Orgs.) to Department of State, "NATO Ministerial Meeting—summary and appraisal," 17 December 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968,* Vol. XIII, Western Europe Region, Document 236.

[536] Quoted in James Reston, "United Nations: U Thant's Gloomy Conclusion," 21 September 1966, *New York Times*, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, 46.

[537] Memorandum of Conversation between US Secretary of State Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, New York, September 24, 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 153, 375-382.

Gromyko agreed that the two sides were thinking along the same lines in regards to prohibiting transfer through direct, indirect, or alliance channels. He nevertheless caviled that Washington desired closer coordination in the defense of NATO through burden-sharing, strategic consultations, and nuclear emplacements in order to deter Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. Rusk estimated there was "99%" agreement and described the remaining "1%" as "really just a controversy over concepts." Gromyko replied that non-nuclear members should not participate in decisions of "ownership, control and use of nuclear weapons." Earlier that day, a team composed of Foster, Samuel De Palma, and Bunn of ACDA and the duo of Roland Timerbaev and Vladimir Shustov of the Soviet delegation in Geneva worked out alternatives to the first article.[538] Foster was in favor of the most general formulation—to "any recipient whatsoever"—while Gromyko preferred one that might constrain the stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons abroad—"directly, indirectly, to military alliances or groups of states." Rusk specified these legal limitations would apply only in peacetime; in case a calamitous war did occur, "all bets were off." Though Gromyko set aside the matter of consultative mechanisms, he believed there was a "serious misunderstanding" about the "question of not granting access to nuclear weapons," a testament to the depth of Soviet fears that a German state might commandeer them, or benefit geopolitically from their presence. A final agreement remained just out of reach.[539] The frank back-and-forth illustrated how near the two sides had drawn on the cardinal prohibitions. Roshchin's verdict was thus ambiguous when he met Foster four days later: "Considerable progress had been made

---

[538] They read: "not to transfer nuclear weapons" 1) "directly, or indirectly, through military alliances or groups of states," 2) "directly, or indirectly, to military alliances or groups of states;" or 3) "any recipient whatsoever."

[539] op. cit. Memorandum of Conversation between Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, "Non-Proliferation (Part I of II)," 24 September 1966, 375-382.

and a common understanding reached on the most substantive article of the draft treaty, although the Soviet side had not gotten all it wanted and was not really satisfied."[540]

A working group met at Camp David on October 1-2 to prepare for Johnson's meeting with Gromyko the following week. Rusk, Foster, and Rostow agreed to drop an "Atlantic solution" and halt the transfer of nuclear weapons, including those of a tactical classification, though not of delivery vehicles such as Polaris. Rusk nevertheless advised caution.[541] The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, spoke with Gromyko the next day in New York about a trio of issues: the treaty to demilitarize outer space, Vietnam, and nuclear diplomacy. He conveyed the president's assurance that domestic law forbade him from allowing others to launch U.S. nuclear weapons or dictate a nuclear action. Gromyko asked if Washington "was really anxious to conclude a non-proliferation treaty." The ambassador replied "yes," leading Gromyko to repeat that a treaty had to ban dissemination "through the structure of an alliance."[542] The *New York Times* reported the next day that President Eisenhower thought the use of nuclear weapons against Vietnam should not be ruled out.

Johnson gave a speech at the headquarters of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace on the United Nations Plaza in New York City on October 8. The oration was part of a peace offensive that his administration had timed to accompany a cessation of bombing raids against North Vietnam and in hopes of influencing the mid-term elections. His remarks were directed at Europe's division, touching upon German reunification, NATO, and developmental aid before turning to his central theme–East-West détente:

---

[540] Ibid., 382, footnote 3.
[541] Bunn, *Arms Control by Committee*, 78.
[542] Joseph S. Sisco, Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs to Secretary of State Rusk," Washington, 3 October 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 154, 383-384.

> [O]ne great goal of a united West is to heal the wound in Europe which now cuts East from West and brother from brother. ... This will happen only as East and West succeed ... in building a surer foundation of mutual trust. Nothing is more important than peace.

He followed this pronouncement with a series of steps to "build bridges:" a new consular accord, cultural exchanges, most-favored-nation status for communist states in Europe, a civil aviation agreement, reduced export controls, liberalized travel rules, and an executive order authorizing the Export-Import Bank to lend commercial credits to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Johnson ended by reasserting U.S. interest in balancing nonproliferation policy with a "stable military situation in Europe" based on "effective Western deterrence," phraseology that permitted maximum latitude for Johnson's tête-à-tête with Gromyko two days hence.[543]

Reaction in the Eastern bloc to Johnson's overture was cautious but curious. As Johnson and Gromyko prepared to meet in Washington, the Communist leaders of Poland and the Soviet Union, Władisław Gomulka and Leonid Brezhnev, met in Moscow to discuss the state of world affairs. They dwelt on Sino-Soviet affairs, the Vietnam War, Geneva, and the costs and benefits of a world communist conference, where the Chinese and Soviets would surely clash. They rightly sensed that Johnson's peace feelers were a consequence of the U.S. entanglement in Southeast Asia and Chinese quarreling with both superpowers. Gomulka wanted to mend or at least moderate the Sino-Soviet split. "[A] calm tactic bore better results," he cautioned, "than a quarrel eye-for-an-eye." In regards to Johnson's statements, Gomulka warned that the U.S. sought "to strengthen its propaganda position, as well as to in fact get closer to the U.S.S.R." This "rapprochement," he maintained, "serve[d] two purposes:" "[t]o show that despite the war in Vietnam, they are able to come to an understanding with the U.S.S.R. ..." and "to

[543] Transcript, "President's Speech on Improving Relations with Eastern Europe to the National Conference of Editorial Writers," *New York Times*, 8 October 1966, 12.

all the more pit the Chinese against the U.S.S.R." In effect, Gomulka was thinking in familiar black-and-white palate of the Cold War.

Brezhnev was less a captive of the Cold War mentality. He admonished Gomulka for second-guessing Soviet cooperation with the U.S. on common interests such as Vietnam, China, and nuclear threats. He voiced his displeasure at the Vietnamese Workers' Party for disregarding his counsel to accept "sensible negotiations." As to China, the situation "had changed so much" on account of the Cultural Revolution "that we are of the opinion that we should tell our party and the nation everything." Moscow would rather expose and pillory Mao than conciliate and cooperate with him. Finally, Gomulka misapprehended the Soviet standpoint on the ENDC; the conference was "useful" now that a period of Soviet-American bickering had ended.[544] The renewed Soviet willingness to meet the U.S. halfway on nonproliferation reflected an adjustment to tectonic shifts in international affairs. The Sino-Soviet gulf and the rising threat of proliferation in Asia pointed to a world of decreasing Soviet influence and increasingly volatile and perilous regional crises. Cooperation with the United States would help to moderate these negative trends.

Mutually acceptable nonproliferation language beckoned. Johnson welcomed Gromyko to the White House on October 10. The Soviet foreign minister endorsed a nuclear order that would enshrine prohibitions against the transfer of nuclear weapons into the hands of non-nuclear powers or groupings with them. Johnson recapped his package of unilateral measures to enhance East-West relations, alluded to Section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 denying him the right to delegate authority to fire U.S.

---

[544] "The Polish-Soviet Talks in Moscow between Brezhnev and Gomulka, 10-15 October 1966," "Sino-Soviet Relations Document Collection," The Cold War International History Project, in Andrzej Paczkowski, ed. *Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego PRL-ZSRR, 1956-1970* (London: Aneks Publishers, 1996), translated for CWIHP by Malgorzata K. Gnoinska.

nuclear weapons, and called for the two sides to "get our pencils out and work out an agreement."[545] That night, Gromyko and Dobrynin met with Rusk, Foster, Thompson, and Averell Harriman to put pencil to paper. Rusk spoke straightforwardly, swearing that even though his government had no intention of supplying these weapons to friend or foe, the nuclear character of the European balance of power made it imperative that NATO members feel assured of their security. Gromyko replied that he was not chasing "a provision banning consultation;" "he did not intend to discuss it in connection with the treaty." Though the two sides agreed on the "gut" of the compact, Rusk was adamant that the treaty contain no reference to alliances that would possibly subvert the credibility of the U.S. deterrent for NATO members.[546] The participants left the meeting with a palpable sense of progress though the two sides remained wedded to their respective language.

The camps carried on with *ad referendum* talks in New York about the non-transfer clause, safeguards, and the PNE loophole. UN ambassadors Goldberg and Fedorenko met in New York on October 13, when Goldberg apprised Fedorenko that the U.S. would co-sponsor a proposed Soviet resolution appealing to members of the international community to eschew any action hindering the achievement of a nonproliferation treaty. On October 20, Fedorenko announced that a nonproliferation treaty faced no insurmountable obstacles and praised recent "changes for the better" in U.S. policy to which Goldberg reciprocated by praising the "new and promising situation." Notwithstanding the hopeful tone, the emissaries cautioned the body that "concrete

---

[545] Memorandum of Conversation between President Johnson and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, "Non-Proliferation," 10 October 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 157.
[546] Memorandum of Conversation between the Secretary of State Rusk and Gromyko re "Non-Proliferation," 10 October 1966, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 158.

practical deeds" were needed to overcome the "important differences remain[ing]."[547] Meetings between Foster and Roshchin in New York City continued to focus on whether the key clause should read "any recipient whatsoever" or "non-nuclear-weapons states, or groups of non-nuclear-weapons states."

United States and Soviet views on PNEs and safeguards were also at variance. Washington was generally supportive of mandatory international safeguards administered by the IAEA, or an "equivalent" agency (e.g. Euratom). There was enough dissonance among the relevant agencies inside the Beltway though to disrupt a common policy. The Soviet Union characterized the inclusion of "equivalent" as permitting self-inspection; its diplomats conveyed that they would rather have no safeguards than consent to a West European exception. A Czechoslovakian and Polish proposal to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards if West Germany did likewise (rather than rely on Euratom) and U.S. officials' serious consideration of the proposal illustrated the elastic state of play on safeguards. The superpowers were more like-minded with respect to equivalence between "peaceful" and "military" nuclear explosives, though other states had different ideas altogether. Indian Ambassador Trivedi described a prohibition on the making of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes by nuclear have-nots as "tantamount to attempting to stop the dissemination of scientific knowledge and technology," especially in the glittering domain of fusion power. Foster explained his government's position on PNEs and safeguards on November 9 in front of the Political Committee at the UN. Invoking UNGA Resolution 2028 (XX), Foster warned that a license in the

---

[547] "U.N. Told of Gain on Nuclear Pact," 21 October 1966, *New York Times*, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, 1.

treaty for the development of PNEs would embody a "major loophole" because the basic technology was "inseparable" from that of nuclear warheads.[548]

The Soviets acquiesced to the United States position on two counts at the 21st session of the United Nation General Assembly. First, Foster convinced Roshchin by December 5 that barring the transfer of nuclear weapons to "any recipient whatsoever" would preclude the creation of any form of NATO multilateral force. According to Seaborg, this compromise "outlawed the MLF but it did not rub the Germans' nose in it."[549] With respect to the European option, the two sides agreed to disagree by eschewing precision in favor of deliberate ambiguity.[550] Both sides were able to set out their interpretation of the treaty's strictures. Rusk outlined how the U.S. government understood the ways in which the nonproliferation articles bore on NATO nuclear-sharing. The treaty would not affect existing bilateral commitments, the decision of NATO members to wage war, the ability to create a permanent committee for nuclear planning and consultation, nor the prerogative to assign additional Polaris missile-submarines outfitted with U.S. nuclear weapons to the Atlantic alliance. If the treaty entered into force, the option of forming a multilateral entity remained as long as no transfer of "an ownership interest in nuclear weapons" occurred and the U.S. maintained control of its warheads. Finally, in the event that a European federation came into being, the formation of a collective nuclear force was permitted with the caveat that original nuclear powers retain control of their warheads.[551] Brandt received the new joint Soviet-

---

[548] William Foster, "Statement in the First Committee in regards to Peaceful Nuclear Explosions and International Safeguards," 9 November 1966, Folder 17, Box 17, Foster Papers, GCML, 3-4.

[549] Seaborg, *Stemming the Tide*, 195.

[550] Küntzel, *Bonn & the Bomb*, 59. In one scholar estimation, "[t]he heart of the agreement lay in the absence of precision." For an excellent exegesis of the purpose and diplomatic origins of NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements in the Cold War and how they affect contemporary readings of the NPT, read: Khalessi, "The Ambiguity of Nuclear Commitments."

[551] Küntzel, *Bonn & the Bomb*, 60.

American nonproliferation draft treaty on December 16. The communiqué laid to rest the hardware solution and ushered in a new phase of West German policy vis-à-vis the treaty revolving around its implications for peaceful nuclear activities.

The hardware option's demise and the "constructive misunderstanding" on the European clause paved the way for a Soviet-American settlement at the core of a nascent nonproliferation regime. The U.S. deterrent with its basis in nuclear-sharing, training, and automatic transfers in the event of war would continue to shield Western Europe; however, a peacetime firewall would keep German hands off nuclear weapons, which would remain under Washington's direct command and control. Now that Bonn was more keen on political and diplomatic rather than military and nuclear instruments for improving its standing relative to the Eastern bloc, the fault lines in international nuclear diplomacy now ran North and South as much as East and West. The equivalence question with regard to IAEA and Euratom safeguards bore upon the Cold War rivalry. But Soviet and American diplomats could draw inspiration from the warmer atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence.

Matters between nuclear and non-nuclear powers were less amicable. Henceforth, the contested process of locating the elements of a viable grand bargain among the nuclear haves and have-nots became ever more the principal object of international nuclear diplomacy. The eight non-aligned ENDC members pushed the superpowers to amend the nonproliferation resolution to reflect the "acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations" between the nuclear haves and have-nots and its relationship to nuclear, and general and complete, disarmament spelled out in UN Resolution 2028 (XX).[552] The Soviet and American delegations acquiesced, but they

[552] "U.S. and Russia Alter Atom Plea: Accept Neutrals' Draft of Resolution in U.N.," 26 October 1966, *New York Times*, 3. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

faced a second challenge in the form of an additional section to UN Resolution 2153 (XXI) urging the ENDC to assign a "high priority" to a nonproliferation treaty. The Pakistani amendment provided for a "conference of non-nuclear-weapon Powers" to assemble no later than July 1968. If the ENCD failed to broker a compact by then, the buck could pass to an assembly to which no nuclear power would receive an invitation.

**Who Watches the Watchmen?**

With the nonproliferation parameters set, Soviet-American bilateral talks and parallel alliance consultations revolved around the safeguards article. Moscow had been lukewarm toward safeguards before the Soviets made an about-face at the UN that fall in calling for mandatory IAEA safeguards on non-nuclear-weapon states. Mattias Küntzel claims that continuing FRG opposition to IAEA safeguards was rooted in Bonn's desire to keep pathways to the Bomb open via covert routes or collaboration within the European Community.[553] A more plausible explanation for reservations to IAEA preeminence stemmed from commercial interests shared by other nuclear suppliers such as Canada and diplomatic calculations related to reunification. Investment in the West German nuclear sector expanded twofold in 1967 thanks to the lobbying of the domestic nuclear industry, which was eager to export reactors and infrastructure to the developing world and gain some independence from U.S. plutonium.[554] The motives were not just pacific; there were advantages to cultivating a "threshold" capacity akin to India, Sweden, or Japan, such as leverage in negotiations for a European defense community, maximum latitude for research and development, and hedges against further proliferation in the

---

[553] Küntzel, *Bonn & the Bomb*, xvii, 84.
[554] Ibid., 73?; European Atomic Forum, *Atom Information: German National Reports*, Book (Florence: FORATOM, 1973); James Allen Cooney, "The Politics of Technological Choices: Business-State Relations and Nuclear Energy Policy-Making in West Germany" (Dis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982).

neighborhood.[555] Given the Federal Republic's commitment to national strength through industrialization and the assumed centrality of nuclear power to future energy markets, it was rational for West Germany and its Euratom partners would oppose IAEA safeguards in order to preserve a competitive advantage.

By early 1967, German attempts to influence the nonproliferation talks bore on the safeguards article.[556] Kiesinger and Brandt hoped that Bonn's acquiescence to a treaty might at least contribute to reunification though the co-chancellors differed on the merits of East-West détente. U.S. leaders informed their European allies that they agreed with the Soviet clause requiring each non-nuclear power to "accept IAEA safeguards on all its peaceful nuclear activities as soon as practicable."[557] The linguistic placement of 'IAEA' before 'safeguards' implied that the verification of compliance would run through Vienna rather than Brussels, bring inspectors from Eastern Europe into West European nuclear facilities, and eliminate any comparative advantages enjoyed by Western Europe. The French, meanwhile, were stubbornly absent from Geneva and tepid about Euratom, which deprived West Germany and Italy of a key ally.

The nuclear question remained salient in West German politics. Kiesinger and Fran Josef Strauss's Christian Democratic Party distanced itself from the Social Democratic Party when Brandt chose to approve the joint draft treaty. West German luminaries began to draw overheated comparisons to previous occasions of Teutonic humiliation. Former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer pilloried the treaty as a "death sentence" for the F.R.G. and a "Morgenthau Plan raised to the power of two," referring to the scrapped U.S. plan to de-industrialize and dismember Germany after the Second

---

[555] Catherine Kelleher, "German Nuclear Dilemmas, 1955-1965" (Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1967), 655–656; Küntzel quotes Kelleher in Küntzel, *Bonn & the Bomb*, 73.
[556] Bunn, *Arms Control by Committee*, 92.
[557] Ibid.

World War. Former Foreign Minister Franz Josef Strauss warned that a strictly worded NPT would be a "new Versailles of cosmic dimensions."[558] The analogy illustrated in shades of *realpolitik* the West German fear of a treaty that would codify the country's subservient position in Europe in relation to its historic rivals: Britain, France, and Russia.

Foster expounded on the treaty interpretations to West German Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein on January 18, 1967. Foster reassured him that the joint draft treaty's nonproliferation article's featured legal ambiguities whose exact meanings would be set by U.S.-F.R.G. dialogue. The Soviets might not be "enthusiastic," but they had "agreed that those things which were not prohibited were permitted." If the NATO allies concurred on arrangements below the hardware threshold, Soviet officials would acquiesce "if their noses were not rubbed in [it]." If the West demanded that an authorization for the European option was "written in large neon lights, there would be no treaty."[559] The Special Committee and the NPG were safe because the articles did not bar consultations expressly. Moreover, the Soviets had stopped attacking existing plans such as Wehrmacht training and Bonn would retain a veto over the release of nuclear weapons on its territory. Furthermore, the Soviets had not protested the view that "a new United States of Europe would succeed to [the] nuclear assets of [the] U.K. or France." Knappstein asked if the Soviets had "tried to limit peaceful nuclear cooperation other than re[garding] nuclear explosives?" Foster replied that there was no other inhibition: a major concession given the Federal Republic's lead in uranium-enrichment and plutonium-reprocessing technology. Knappstein inquired whether the disarmament statement in the preamble indicated that non-nuclear powers could withdraw if nuclear-

---

[558] *Der Spiegel*, 1967, no. 10.

[559] State Department cable 121338 to US Embassy, Bonn, "Non-Proliferation Treaty," 18 January 1967, National Archives, Record Group 59, DEF 18-6, 1. Made available by Document 2, NPT, NSA, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc02.pdf

weapon states failed to reduce their arsenals after five years. Foster answered vaguely: "some states might take this view."[560] Placing time limits on a treaty was a novel tactic in Bonn's nuclear diplomacy that would soon spread to other treaty skeptics.

Soviet-American talks proceeded alongside allied conversations. Rusk met with Dobrynin on the same day to confer about how to finesse the PNE issue. Rusk hoped that a common position on the subject might steal thunder from India and Brazil's claims. Expedited technical talks might also help to ward off controversy. Dobrynin was hesitant lest consultations prejudge decisions that belonged in the political realm. The two countries were also still at loggerheads on safeguards. The Soviets rejected language "appearing to endorse Euratom safeguards." Their objections ran the gamut from security concerns to alliance equality and included the reasonable warning that a regional approach to safeguards would set a precedent by which the Arab League could form a "Near East safeguards organization." They seemed willing to bend on a "transition period" between the regimes though and cited no rationale for barring overlapping inspections. They went so far as to note their preference for "no safeguards at all" given that Euratom safeguards would operate regardless. Nevertheless, key bureaus in Washington were keen on a global system that could assure regional rivals their neighbors were not carrying on secret work and thereby bolster a treaty's "durability." Rusk typified these views in an aide-memoire circulated among U.S. embassies: "the nonproliferation treaty provides the only foreseeable chance to achieve comprehensive worldwide safeguards."[561] For now, however, the Soviet and American delegations in Geneva were stuck trying to reconcile regional and global regimes.

---

[560] Ibid., 2-8.

[561] Rusk, Cable 127754, "Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Article," 30 January 1967, National Archives, Record Group 59, DEF 18-6, , 2-6, made available by Document 3, NPT, NSA, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc03.pdf

West Germany had come to terms with the emerging consensus. France was more ambivalent. The Kiesinger-Brandt coalition in Bonn faced reality—the future of NATO nuclear-sharing would not include a hardware solution; a surface fleet of Europeans and Americans working side-by-side in the operation of a floating platform of Polaris missiles was the price that the U.S. was willing and the F.R.G. obliged to pay in order to unstick the nonproliferation talks. "Solving the German problem" remained the principal object of West German foreign policy. However, as attested by Brandt in a conversation with Rusk on February 8, West German policy in regards to a nonproliferation treaty focused more now on ensuring that a global regime did not subject states lacking nuclear arms to "discrimination … in the peaceful development of atomic energy." He called attention to a West German firm that was in negotiations to sell a nuclear reactor to another country. An U.S. competitor had called into question European companies' ability "to guarantee an adequate supply of reactor fuel," undercutting its position in the global market. Brandt complained that actions such as this "raised the specter of potential unfair competition."[562]

Rusk assured Brandt that a treaty would not prejudice the burgeoning nuclear market against the Federal Republic's powerful industry. He brought up a recent meeting of the Atomic Industrial Forum where experts had concluded that IAEA safeguards did not pose a danger of exposing commercial nuclear secrets to industrial espionage. He had less certitude on two other matters: security assurances that were a "real problem to nonaligned states such as India" and a strong linkage between horizontal and vertical proliferation. Rusk supposed that an affirmation of disarmament was possible in the preamble; however, Brandt warned that a nonproliferation treaty risked "dividing the

---

[562] Memorandum of Conversation between Rusk and Vice Chancellor Brandt re "NPT," 8 February 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 180.

world into three groups:" the nuclear club minus China and France, those that would sign because they could not construct the weapons, and those, "like Germany," who had the means but would be "inhibited from doing so by the treaty."

The declarations of French elites straddled the issue with regard to their support. Couve de Murville had defended the right of capable states to build a nuclear deterrent. Others had signaled that even though Paris would not join the treaty nor partake in its negotiations it would not discourage others from doing so. De Murville's deputy and Director of Political Affairs, Jacques de Beaumarchais, responded to Canadian request for it to consult with the Western Four in Geneva with a simple formulation; "merely take heed of our attitude of abstention."[563] Rusk contended to Brandt that a treaty was urgently needed because the number would only grow as nuclear energy became more widespread; "the possessor of a high school physics text and an ordinary reactor would soon be able to make a nuclear explosion." Those desirous of an independent nuclear capability should at least be forced to start from scratch. He hoped with Brandt's blessing, however, that "the primary adherence problems should not lie in an East-West context but rather with countries such as India."[564]

## Conclusion

Through winter 1967, the course of international nuclear diplomacy ran through Bonn and Beijing. By largely resolving the German question, the superpowers had designed the basic blueprint of a globe-spanning regime with which to manage the perils

---

[563] Jacques de Beaumarchais, Telegram from Paris to Ottawa, "Canadian request for Paris to rejoin the 4 Western powers in consultations," 13 February 1967, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.
[564] op. cit., Memorandum of Conversation between Rusk and Vice Chancellor Brandt re "NPT," 8 February 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Doc 180.

of nuclear power. The outstanding matters now related to legitimacy and efficacy rather than feasibility and intent. Adrian Fisher of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency spoke to the Notre Dame American Assembly on March 16, 1967. In his remarks, he asked if more countries acquired the knowledge and means to build an atomic bomb "can the political inhibitions which now exist continue to prevent the Federal Republic of Germany from seeking its own national nuclear defense?" The answer could be a global catastrophe:

> If the decision to develop their own nuclear weapons were to be made, we would probably have an international crisis which would make the ten days preceding October 27, 1962 [the height of the Cuban crisis] look like ten relaxed days indeed. This is the thing we are trying to prevent. This is the reason, we — all of us, and I say this on both sides, both the Warsaw Pact powers and the NATO powers — want earnestly to develop a non-proliferation agreement.[565]

The specter of a "German finger on the American trigger" doubtlessly cause many sleepless nights in Eastern Europe. Soviet security adviser and one of the diplomats that helped to broker the NPT, Oleg Grinevsky, reckoned in 1988 that Moscow "primarily designed the whole treaty to close all doors and windows on the possibility of the Federal Republic of Germany having nuclear weapons."[566] The gentlemen's agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the crucial nonproliferation language marked the end of the first stage of nonproliferation diplomacy during which the process unfolded along the familiar fault line of the Cold War running along the Elbe River, through the Fulda Gap, and up the Berlin Wall.

Washington and Moscow looked to the "global commons" for shared spaces at which to engage in global rule-setting and superpower détente. On January 27, 1967 the

---

[565] Adrian S. Fisher, (1967), 'Issues Involved in a Non-Proliferation Agreement,' in S. D. Kertesz (ed.), *Nuclear Proliferation*, London. "Contains the addresses delivered at the Notre Dame American Assembly on 16-18 March 1967.

[566] Küntzel, *Bonn & the Bomb*, 20.

Soviet Union and United States continued a streak of planetary custodianship by signing the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, more commonly referred to as the Outer Space Treaty. The Space Race was closely connected to the nuclear arms race and, among more far-sighted goals, the Outer Space Treaty sought to curtail the extension of military competition into the final frontier.[567] Though neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. had plans, for instance, to weaponize the Moon, the compact helped to seal Soviet-American goodwill on related measures to govern the world through condominium or internationalism, or both.

In the scope of Soviet-American détente and global nuclear diplomacy from November 1965 to February 1967, the Vietnam War had a larger impact than conventionally presumed. It impelled the White House to turn to arms control exploits with the Soviet Union as a peace symbol, drove a wedge deeper into the Sino-Soviet split, and limited the ability of the United States to extend security assurances to nuclear have-nots such as India in exchange for their continued forbearance. It also provoked the resignation of George Ball, the foremost champion of the MLF. Though a nuclear-armed West Germany was the chief terror for Soviet and East European leaders, Soviet fears of proliferation began to turn, like those of the United States, toward the Third World in early 1967. The superpowers knowingly colluded to sideline nuclear aspirants (friend and foe) and non-aligned states by exploiting loopholes and syncing approaches in the ad-hoc arenas where multilateral nuclear diplomacy was waged. Finally, notwithstanding the

[567] Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg before General Assembly Committee I (Political and Security), 17 December 1966, reprinted in 56 *Department of State Bulletin* (1967), p. 80. Quoted in Paul G. Dembling and Daniel M. Arons, "The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty," *Journal of Air Law and Commerce*, Vol. 33 (1967), 419-456, reprinted in *Space Law*, edited by Francis Lyall and Paul B. Larsen (Ashgate, 2007), 151-188.

common front, non-nuclear powers exploited the middle ground that Soviet-American nuclear gamesmanship could only partly overcome.

Although the issues at stake were momentous, it was diplomatic relationships and the community of arms controllers in Geneva and New York that sustained the talks. The human dimensions of nuclear diplomacy and the availability of world forums such as the ENDC and the UNGA were integral to the conduct of international nuclear diplomacy. Alongside efforts to draft a nonproliferation treaty in Geneva and New York City and through Soviet-American bilateral conversations, a matching effort to achieve the denuclearization of Latin America transpired in Mexico City. The next chapter concerns the negotiation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which opened for signature on February 14, 1967, and which prohibited the introduction of nuclear weapons to Latin America. Orchestrated by Mexican Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Alfonso García Robles, the Latin American nuclear-free-zone talks demonstrated the power of an individual guided by humanitarian and internationalist impulses to effect change on a global scale. The attitude of U.S. policymakers toward the Latin American initiative, on the other hand, was a testament to the ways in which strategic interests, anticommunism, and the legacy of United States imperialism in the region disrupted the pursuit of collective security on the Cold War periphery. Latin American nuclear diplomacy had a different purpose that that pursued through global forums. It was meant to showcase the region's fidelity to the rule of law and common security and rejected arguments in favor of strategic stability through nuclear deterrence. Its successful outcome afforded a contrasting template for how to prohibit nuclear weapons, sustained the momentum for international nuclear diplomacy while talks dragged elsewhere, and enhanced the stature of García Robles, who would go on to play a commanding role in the final stages of nonproliferation negotiations. Most fundamental, however, the Treaty of Tlatelolco's negotiation bore

evidence that nuclear prohibitions were not the sole province of the Cold War superpowers during the mid-Cold War.

# Chapter Four | *"Tall Oaks from Little Acorns Grow:" Making the Treaty of Tlatelolco*

*"A familiar proverb points out that tall oaks from little acorns grow. The denuclearization of Latin America may be one of those acorns; it may serve as an example for the denuclearization of other areas of the world … the next step—which has already received encouragement from some nuclear powers—will be to gradually reduce, until totally suspended, intra-national or internal proliferation; that is, what is produced through the steady manufacture of new nuclear weapons by the powers capable of doing so … followed by the gradual reduction of the reserves accumulated by the nuclear powers, which … would constitute a transcendental contribution to hastening the day when general and complete disarmament under effective control may become the reality aspired to by all the peoples of the world."*

*Alfonso García Robles, "Speech Delivered at the Opening Meeting of the Second Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America on 23 August 1965," reproduced in The Denuclearization of Latin America (1967)*

## Introduction: A Purer Form of Prohibition

On February 14, 1967, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America opened for signature in Mexico City thanks in large part to Mexican Undersecretary of Foreign Relations Alfonso García Robles's tireless efforts. More commonly referred to as the Treaty of Tlatelolco in honor of the Aztec name for the capital district wherein the negotiations unfolded, García Roles shepherded the accord through a series of commissions, working groups, and diplomatic imbroglios. Nuclear-weapon-free zone talks in Latin America proceeded sporadically from 1962 to 1967, unfolding along many of the same lines as concurrent efforts to hammer out a nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) in Geneva and New York City. Its ethical impulse and political rhetoric drew on themes and images familiar to antinuclear discourse—transnational fields of reference, comparisons to the Second World War, linkages to modernization, and invocations of generational and planetary justice. The nuclear-free-zone initiative thus arose for reasons of nuclear fear and antinuclear sentiment, while the Cuban Missile Crisis elevated it from a laudable proposal to a pressing imperative. As

such, the denuclearization push in Latin America exemplified an emergent strategy of legal prohibition reliant on collateral measures to pave the way for nuclear disarmament.

Even so, the Treaty of Tlatelolco bore evidence of a clash of dissimilar forms of nuclear prohibition that pitted champions of liberal internationalism against the security internationalism then ascending in Washington and Moscow. Historical readings of the treaty have subordinated the Latin American quest to Soviet-American efforts to manage the risks of nuclear science and technology. This interpretive hierarchy has led scholars to downplay nuclear-free zones in present-day nuclear discourse and statecraft. Historians present the Latin American nuclear-free zone as an outlier in the annals of international nuclear diplomacy rather than as a foundational accord whose original intents and meanings in fact exercised a decisive influence on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the global nuclear order more broadly.[568]

Excavating the guiding principles, lead actors, and power politics in its complex negotiating history unearths how decolonization's aftermath, the twin discourses of nuclear catastrophism and modernization, and U.S. machinations in Latin America during the Cold War engendered a purer model of nuclear prohibition in the form of nuclear-free zones. Latin American talks in Mexico City diverged from those of other nuclear assemblies on two counts. First, the regional initiative was self-consciously exemplary. It was meant to showcase Latin America's fidelity since the Bolivarian revolutions to the rule of law and the preservation of peace through common security.[569]

---

[568] Maddock, *Nuclear Apartheid*; Bunn, *Arms Control by Committee*; Seaborg, *Stemming the Tide*; Shaker, *The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty*.

[569] Quester, *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation*, 156. Quester believes that Mexico upheld nuclear prohibitions for reasons of geopolitics and psychology: "Mexican support for a Latin American nuclear-free zone and for the NPT reflects the same neighbor-of-the-United States syndrome: namely, that if an independent brandishing of such weapons is ludicrous in the shadow of such an enormous neighbor, one can perhaps show independence and moral superiority by making a fetish of renouncing such weapons." This view ignores the intellectual, historical, and regional motives behind Mexico's stance.

Second, its architects discounted the value of strategic stability through deterrence, which brought the proceedings into conflict with U.S. military interests and Cold War geo-strategy. Latin America largely avoided the territorial quarrels that attended decolonization elsewhere. But the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy and Johnson's support for military dictatorships enamored of nuclear power, the logic of modernization, memories of U.S. imperialism, and Washington's desire to decouple colonial issues and preserve its military leeway hindered efforts to establish the zone. The Treaty of Tlatelolco's tangled making thus attested to the international repercussions of U.S. anticommunism on Latin American social democracy; namely, the obstruction of a type of nuclear prohibition rejecting the logic of deterrence and encouraging nuclear disarmament and common security on a regional basis.[570] It also presaged how the stress laid on fissile-material accounting and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) in global nuclear governance mistook capabilities for intent, misconstruing how *raison d'état* would prompt states such as Brazil and Argentina to seek threshold capabilities rather than actual deterrents. The treaty's achievement in early 1967 was accordingly partial. Though neither Brazil nor Argentina chose to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco until the 1990s, the deliberations legitimated and reshaped the NPT. They also kept nuclear weapons out of Latin America and exhibited a purer model of nuclear prohibition.[571]

---

[570] Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

[571] The historical literature on the Treaty of Tlatelolco is sparse, reflecting its non-Western origins, regional ambit, and corresponding subordination to global compacts, most notably the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Alfonso García Robles, *El Tratado de Tlatelolco : Génesis, Alcance y Propósition de La Proscripción de Las Armas Nucleares En La América Latina* (México: El Colegio de México, 1967) is a valuable collection of primary and legal documents relating to the negotiation of the treaty. A useful summary of the treaty in the context of Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relations is John R. Redick, *Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil*, Occasional Paper (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, December 1995), 16–19. The best lengthy English-language treatment of the treaty is a research paper published by the Institute of Latin American Studies in London, Mónica Serrano, *Common Security in Latin America: The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco*, Research Papers / University of London, Institute of Latin American Studies 30 (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1992). For an evaluation of the treaty and the

## Brazil, Argentina, and the Idea of a Nuclear-Free Zone

The idea of a Latin America free of nuclear weapons was first articulated by Melo Franco, the Brazilian representative to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), on September 20, 1962, just weeks before President John F. Kennedy revealed the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba.[572] In 1961, Brazilian support for a UNGA resolution endorsing an African nuclear-free zone raised in protest against French testing in the Sahara prefigured Franco's proposal and signaled greater independence from the United States under socialist President João Goulart.[573] Franco's proposal was meant to assert Brazil's regional leadership and prod the superpowers toward a long-awaited nuclear test-ban treaty. The process of the resolution's amendment foreshadowed how the United States would henceforth try to influence Latin American nuclear diplomacy. The original draft called for limits on the transport of "nuclear weapons or carrying devices" in the zone; however, even such marginal limits on U.S. military prerogatives were dropped "as a result of strong U.S. objections."[574] Argentina's reaction foretold dissonance as well in terms of the inequality inherent to nuclear prohibitions. Although the Argentine delegation eventually backed the resolution, its envoy "strongly cautioned that a nuclear

---

resultant nuclear-free zone with reference to its systemic relationship to nuclear governance in its regional and global manifestations, read Francesca Giovannini, "Cooperating to Compete: The Role of Regional Powers in Global Nuclear Governance (Ph.D., Oxford University, October 2012), pp. 134-188. A Portuguese-language dissertation covers the negotiation, implementation, and development of the LANFZ concept as tied to the treaty: Elias David Morales Martínez, "A Experiéncia de Tlatelolco: Um Estudo do Regime Latino-Americano e Caribenho de Proscrição de Armas Nucleares, 1963-2008" (Dissertation, Universidade de São Paulo, 2008).

[572] Serrano, *Common Security in Latin America*, 18.

[573] Brazil and Cuba were the only Latin American countries that resisted U.S. entreaties to vote against or abstain on the issue of the African nuclear-free zone. Redick, *Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil*, 16.

[574] Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone*, II - Policy and Negotiations, The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency During the Johnson Administration (ACDA, n.d.), 12, CK3100019048, Declassified Documents Reference Service.

weapon-free zone could freeze Latin American states into a permanent state of nuclear inferiority."[575]

As South America's twin giants, Brazilian and Argentinian attitudes would prove decisive for the prospects of a Latin American nuclear-free zone. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Southern Cone heavyweights emerged as strong competitors and strange bedfellows in the nuclear domain. The security threats that might warrant a nuclear option were largely bilateral (though Cuba figured as well); even so, the prospect of regional or global constraints on nuclear options led them to adopt compatible positions on issues of nuclear rights and access, and the corresponding desirability of a Latin America without nuclear weapons. The two programs developed in a negative feedback loop driven less by military stakes than by status competition; the Brazilian-Argentinian nuclear relationship was thus "relatively muted, low key, and non-ideological" in the Cold War context.[576]

The Brazilian nuclear program came first, supplying thorium and uranium ores extracted from monazite sands to the U.S. Manhattan Project during the Second World War. The raw material outflow proceeded through the mid-1950s, when Brazil began to insist on "specific compensation" in exchange for its strategic minerals. Admiral Álvaro Alberto outlined a national nuclear program in a 1947 letter to Brazil's National Security Council (Conselho de Segurança Nacional; CSN) from New York City, where he represented Brazil at the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission amid the Baruch Plan debates.[577] Presided over by President General Eurico Gaspar Dutra, the CSN was

---

[575] UN General Assembly, Official Records, 1335th Meeting, November 13, 1963, 122, paraphrased in Redick, *Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil*, 16.
[576] Ibid., 14.
[577] For purposes of recovering one developing nation's viewpoint on the Baruch Plan, Alberto portrayed the scheme as inevitable and only raised issues regarding how uranium and thorium suppliers would be treated: "Obviously, regarding item a), all nations should cooperate by submitting to general measures of collective interest deemed necessary to an effective international control. … [but] nothing justifies the thesis of a restrictive international policy, capable of summarily depriving nations possessing the raw materials from which nuclear fuels are extracted from the right to utilize them in a peaceful manner, since a similar

positively inclined toward Alberto's proposal for developmental and military reasons. Alberto found the prospect of ceding ownership of Brazil's uranium and thorium mines to a U.N. authority unequal given the country's shortcomings in traditional energy sources; "fair and equitable compensation" was needed to spur industrial development in light of coal scarcity. CSN participants voiced military rationales as well. Colonel Bernardino Corrêa de Matos Netto warned that "it [was] not suitable for Brazil to relinquish [nuclear energy], because it is necessary to prepare the ground for future wars."[578] For the moment, Dutra's government took no decision on whether to launch a government program and lay the human and material foundations of a nuclear program.

Argentina's establishment of a National Commission on Nuclear Energy in 1951 spurred Brazil's nuclear program. To meet the Argentine challenge, President Dutra formed the National Research Council in January 1951. It was President Juan Perón's specious claim in March 1951 that Argentina had achieved thermonuclear fusion in the laboratory of Austrian scientist Ronald Richter though that truly catalyzed the Brazilian effort. Getulio Vargas, who had returned as Brazil's leader on January 31, 1951, pushed for broader collaboration with industrial powers besides the U.S. to cultivate the country's nuclear brainpower and organization. He approached West Germany about acquiring an untested, jet-nozzle centrifuge technology. In 1953, British and American authorities halted the delivery, fearing that Brazil would use the centrifuges to enrich supplies of

---

policy does not apply to other natural sources of hydro energy, also unequally distributed in the several regions of Earth. Minutes of the Tenth Session of the Brazilian National Security Council, "Alvaro Alberto's proposal to establish a Brazilian Atomic Energy Program," 27 August 1947, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archive (Brasilia). Obtained and translated by Fundação Getúlio Vargas. The author has retranslated some phrases.
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116912.

[578] Ibid.

uranium compounds recently provided by France and the U.K.[579] With the German connection severed, Brazil went in search of new atomic patrons.

Domestic political currents in which the state's relationship with the United States was a major factor repeatedly wracked the Brazilian nuclear program. Regular elections, political instability, and military coups upset nuclear policy between 1954 and 1964. First, Vargas's suicide (under duress) on August 24, 1954, and his replacement by Vice-President General Café Filho (1954-1955), and then Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961), brought about greater reliance on the U.S. and its Atoms for Peace program along with Admiral Alberto's resignation. Atoms for Peace furnished the country with two research reactors from whose construction Brazilian scientists and engineers learned enough to build a nearly indigenous research reactor (Argonauta) in 1962, though Brazil would not construct a power reactor (the 626-MW Angra-1 built by Westinghouse) until 1971.[580] Kubitschek's election in 1956 inaugurated an independent phase of Brazilian nuclear policy, entailing a stronger focus on self-reliance and scientific training abroad, together with the National Nuclear Energy Commission's (CNEN) creation under executive oversight. Kubitschek, state ministers, and military chiefs of staff reviewed a study on Brazil's nuclear future from the previous year in a CSN meeting on April 30, 1956. The group discussed how to "counteract" a congressional and media campaign against its nuclear policies by formulating a "suitable and secure" policy conducive to "more dynamic action in the field of atomic energy, for the purpose of overcoming [Brazil's] relative backwardness and [to] spur the development of [its] resources according to the country's best interests." The meeting formed the CNEN, set policy for domestic fuel

[579] Brazil still received a token number of German centrifuges, but they were never used, and the jet-nozzle design was in actuality a technological dead end for uranium enrichment.
[580] Sharon Squassoni and David Fite, "Brazil's Nuclear History," *Arms Control Today*, October 2005, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_10/Oct-Brazil-History.

sources, and reviewed the "advisability of modifying existing international agreements." Motifs of development and dependency were conspicuous with stress laid on the division between industrial powers and raw material suppliers in the global market:

> [D]espite the tremendous contribution offered to all peoples in the dissemination of techno-scientific information in the atomic field, whose historic initial landmark was the 1955 Geneva Conference, no substantial progress will be achieved in any national program in this sector unless the question of our own nuclear fuel production is solved. … While the sale of certain kinds of reactors is free of restrictions, there will be absolute dependence of [sic] nuclear fuel for their operation.

Officials consequently underlined the desirability of ending the country's reliance on foreign states for uranium and thorium enrichment, observing: "it cannot be denied that there is a true monopoly of nuclear fuels in the hands of the big powers."[581]

Thereafter, Brazilian nuclear policy focused on building national capacity. The state sent students abroad for training as scientists, technicians, engineers, and specialists and endeavored to generate nuclear fuel from its uranium and thorium reserves. Although the policy's tenor harmonized with that of Atoms for Peace, omens of future clashes mounted. The CNEN would manage uranium and thorium ore whose export was contingent on "specific compensation, instrumental and technical, with a view to the development of the industrial applications of nuclear energy in the country." These minerals would accordingly only be exported in exchange for industrial reactors and technical knowledge by an "exclusive barter system from Government to Government," once quotas set by the National Nuclear Energy Fund were met. The first result was the cancellation of a shipment of 300 tons of thorium oxide to the United States. The nuclear program would not have a military objective though. The Armed Forces would help to

[581] "Minutes of the Twentieth Session of the Brazilian National Security Council, Second Brazilian Nuclear Plan" August 30, 1956, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archive (Brasilia). Obtained and translated by Fundação Getúlio Vargas. The author has retranslated some sections. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116913.

procure raw materials, but for now the nuclear portfolio rested in civilian hands; a parallel military program would not arise until the late-1970s.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was "the catalyst" for Latin American states to make the denuclearization of the region a major priority.[582] If the superpowers "had peered over the edge of the nuclear precipice" during the crisis and then "edged backward toward détente," the white-knuckled days impelled Latin American states to strike a collective settlement of their nuclear future.[583] The Organization of American States (OAS) proved its ability to address nuclear threats when, at U.S. urging, it passed a resolution on October 23 sanctioning individual and collective action against Cuba. The resolution legitimated a "quarantine" of the island and conferred upon U.S. diplomacy and military action the seal of hemispheric security and approval even though blockades entailed acts of war according to a strict reading of international law. Latin America's denuclearization held out a possible solution to the standoff and a prophylactic against such future confrontations. Brazil pushed their nuclear-free zone concept in Washington and New York City as a peacemaking avenue by which to escape the apocalyptic game of chicken then unfolding in the Caribbean.

The United States reaction to the initiative was mixed. The State Department deemed it a positive development and concluded that it might afford the Cubans a "face-saver to free themselves of the missiles since, as a "bona fide Latin American initiative," it might allow Castro to disengage without outwardly kowtowing to U.S. demands.[584] The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) advised Foggy Bottom to support

---

[582] Serrano, *Common Security in Latin America*, 26.
[583] Graham T Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publ., 1971), 31.
[584] Harlan Cleveland, "Operation Raincoat," 26 October 1962, Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, National Security Archive (NSA); U.S. Department of State, "[Evaluation of Brazilian Denuclearization Proposal]," 26 October 1962, Cuban Missile Crisis, NSA.

nuclear-free zones in Latin America and Africa given a consensus among regional states, robust verification plans, other nuclear powers' acquiescence, and no "limitations on temporary transport or passage [of U.S. nuclear weapons]." The Disarmament Agency paper concluded:

> The establishment of such a zone in Latin America would not only afford an acceptable basis, at least to the United States, for settling the present Cuban problem but would go a long way toward preventing similar problems from arising in that area in the future.[585]

Other elements of the national security bureaucracy were less enthusiastic. The Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence fretted that U.S. support for multilateral solutions might allow the Soviets to temporize. The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected that denuclearization talks would not ensure the missiles' removal, but only limit U.S. nuclear options in the neighborhood; in fact, they would most likely benefit the Soviet Union because it "ha[d] essentially nothing to lose."[586] The Disarmament Agency attributed the Joint Chiefs' views to anti-Castro and pro-nuclear biases, the "pressing need" to "get rid of the missiles," the "long-term goal" of "get(ting) rid of Castro," and an unwillingness to cede the use of "tactical nuclear weapons in support of ground operations." Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze backed the Joint Chiefs though, and Foggy Bottom chose to take the middle course when Secretary of State Dean Rusk met Brazilian Foreign Minister João Augusto de Araujo Castro on September 24, when Rusk stated that Cuban "participation was essential," while reassuring Araujo Castro that U.S. views on the scheme were indeed favorable.[587]

---

585 Administrative History of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Johnson Administration, II—Policy and Negotiations, D-Latin America Nuclear-Free Zone, *Declassified Documents Reference Service*, Doc # CK3100019048, 2-3.
586 Roger Hilsman, "Probable Soviet Attitude Toward Regional Denuclearization Proposals," 26 October 1962, Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, NSA; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Nuclear-Free or Missile-Free Zones," 26 October 1962, Cuban Missile Crisis, NSA.
587 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone*, 4–5.

Melo Franco tabled the motion at the United Nations General Assembly the day after Khrushchev declared the Soviet missiles' withdrawal from Cuba. He claimed that a nuclear-free zone would resolve the crisis and avert its recurrence; for the next five years, the matter of Cuban participation would continually bedevil talks. Franco's speech marked the apex of Brazilian commitment to the project though. Its promotional role would taper off as the country drifted rightward following a U.S.-backed military coup in March 1964. Inter-American cooperation vis-à-vis nuclear weapons risked becoming a victim of U.S. anticommunism and hemispheric supremacy. Henceforth, the treaty's fate would depend increasingly on Mexico's ambassador in Brasília—Alfonso García Robles.

**Alfonso García Robles**

García Robles's fingerprints would fleck both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT. The negotiations for the nuclear-free zone and the global nonproliferation regime were inextricably linked through concurrence, cross-fertilization, common actors, and complementarities. With his European legal education, internationalist outlook, and Third World identity (from Mexico's ambivalent vantage point), García Robles embodied the middle ground on which international nuclear diplomacy would increasingly occur amid decolonization. In retirement, García Robles would look back on the nuclear-free zone treaty as the "most transcendent event … occupy[ing] the place of honor" in his time as Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs from 1964 to 1970.[588] From his stewardship of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and NPT to his leading role in formulating the "Final Document" at a special UN session on Nuclear Disarmament in 1978, no statesperson from the Global South was as synonymous with nuclear arms control.

---

[588] Miguel Marín Bosch, ed., "Alfonso García Robles: Una Entrevista (An Interview) Por: Miguel Marín Bosch," in *Armas Nucleares, Desarme y Carrera Armamentista* (México, D.F.: Ediciones Gernika, 1985), 25.

Born in Zamora, Michoacán in 1911, García Robles earned a law degree at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México in 1934, before finishing his studies in Europe with postgraduate degrees from the University of Paris and the Academy of International Law in The Hague, where he was one of two laureates.[589] As president of the Alumni Association and the Auditors Institute of International Studies, he presided over the First Congress of International Studies at the University of Paris in 1937, which took place alongside the final World Exhibition on the Champs de Mars. Soon after, he published his first scholarly work, "Pan-Americanism and the Good Neighbor Policy," which displayed trademarks of his life's work—hemispheric solidarity, resource nationalism, the rule of law, and anticolonialism.[590] Amid the outbreak of the Second World War, he took a job with the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE) in its Stockholm legation. García Robles developed an expertise there on the expropriation of Mexican oil from foreign, mostly U.S.-based firms, and the "smear campaign" that ensued. He delivered lectures on the subject to his European alma maters, which were then published as *La Question du Pétrole au Mexique et la Droit International*.[591] García Robles's defense of the expropriations would sour opinion towards him in Washington long after the Good Neighbor Policy became a dead letter.

He was promoted when he returned home in 1941 to sub-director of the SRE's General Directorate for Political Affairs, whose functions took him to conferences at Hot Springs in 1943, Dumbarton Oaks in 1944, and San Francisco in 1945, where delegates

---

[589] Biographical information about Alfonso García Robles comes from: Alfonso García Robles and Miguel Marín Bosch, *Armas nucleares, desarme y carrera armamentista: homenaje a Alfonso García Robles* (México, D.F.: Ediciones Gernika, 1985), 15–32; Fernando Solana, *Alfonso García Robles, diplomático ejemplar* (México, D.F: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1990). All translations from Spanish are my own.
[590] Alfonso García Robles, *Le panaméricanisme et la politique de bon voisinage* (Paris: Les Éditions Internationales, 1938).
[591] Alfonso García Robles, *La Question Du Pétrole Au Mexique et Le Droit International* (Paris: Les Éditions Internationales, 1939).

were busy erecting the political framework of the United Nations. These experiences led to his appointment as Director of the Division of Political Affairs of the U.N. Secretariat from where he oversaw the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) against the background of Palestine's partition and Israel's rebirth. He also worked to moderate territorial disputes in Indonesia and Kashmir, observed the OAS's formation, and directed the first U.N. peacekeeping force in Suez after the 1956 crisis. He stayed in New York City for over a decade before returning to Mexico City in March 1957 to serve as the SRE's Director General of Multilateral Policy, guiding Mexico through the Law of the Sea conferences, where he collaborated regularly with Indian counterparts.[592] In October 1961, he received his first assignment overseas since Sweden—the key ambassadorship in Brazil.

It was in Brasília that he encountered the nuclear-free zone idea. The scheme accorded with his background and outlook in three ways. First, it fitted his years of experience at the nexus of multilateral and U.N. diplomacy. Second, it harmonized with his legal training and internationalist worldview. He was a strong admirer of Mexico's nineteenth-century reformer, Supreme Court president, and the inaugural president elected under the 1857 Constitution, Benito Juárez, whose axiom—"among individuals, as among nations, respect for the rights of others is peace"—García Robles often quoted.[593] This principle built on the Bolivarian myth that upheld Latin America as a laboratory for social democracy, constitutionalism, republicanism, pan-Americanism, and anti-imperialism.[594] A third constellation of values guided him—future generations'

[592] The Indo-Mexican proposal would have codified the right of each coastal state to establish a zone of territorial waters out to twelve nautical miles from its coast. This familiarity would pay fewer dividends during the NPT talks.

[593] "Benito Juárez," Encyclopedia of World Biography, http://www.notablebiographies.com/Jo-Ki/Ju-rez-Benito.html.

[594] Two thoroughgoing and clear-eyed studies of Simón Bolivar's political philosophy and its evolution in which legality was a bellwether (see his preoccupation with Montesquieu's *L'esprit des lois*), are Simon

survival, the planetary environment's preservation, and his sense of patriarchal responsibility for both. In the dedication of his study, *El Tratado de Tlatelolco*, he wrote:

> To Juanita … With whom I share the conviction that Alfonso and Fernando [their sons] are entitled to demand that their parents' generation does not endanger the survival of the human race.[595]

He dwelt on the generational and ecological imperatives of nuclear prohibition in the preface of another work when describing thermonuclear war's anticipated aftermath. Beyond the "75 per cent of the population of the country under attack" that would die instantly from blast and heat, or swiftly from radiation, and the "substantial part of the remaining 25 per cent" dispatched by fallout, he depicted the planetary endgame in tropes borrowed from the antinuclear movement:

> The other 20 per cent of the fallout would spread more or less evenly over the world's surface. It has been estimated that between 100 million and 300 million infants would be born dead or with deformities often bordering on the monstrous as the result of a war employing a nuclear explosion of 50,000 megatons … The dangers are of such magnitude that distinguished scientists of several nationalities have predicted that a large-scale nuclear war might change man's plasma in such a way that the human species … could not survive and that the whole earth might eventually become uninhabitable.[596]

For García Robles, this latent cataclysm was more than a horror story. It accounted for the "duty" of Latin Americans living free of nuclear weapons "to strive to make this

---

Collier's "Simón Bolivar as Political Thinker" in *Simón Bolivar: Essays on the Life and Legacy of the Liberator*, David Bushnell and Lester D. Langley, eds. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), pp. 13-35 and the second chapter of John Lynch's impressive biography, *Simón Bolivar: A Life* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 22-39. For how the Bolivarian myth has been interpreted and co-opted in Latin American political thought and propaganda, see the recent translation from German of Michael Zeuske, *Simón Bolivar: History and Myth* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2013).

[595] García Robles, *El Tratado de Tlatelolco : Génesis, Alcance y Propósition de La Proscripción de Las Armas Nucleares En La América Latina*, 13.

[596] Alfonso García Robles, *The Denuclearization of Latin America*, trans. Marjorie Urquidi (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967), xx–xxi.

situation a permanent and immutable one through a multilateral treaty … universally respected."[597]

Like others of his generation, the Second World War's charnel house haunted his efforts to control nuclear weapons. He accordingly located his mission's "gradual genesis" in his 18 months in Sweden:

> … [T]he Second World War was at its apogee, or very close to its lethal apogee. And, perhaps constantly seeing, day after day, in the press and hearing over the radio, the scathing news of mankind's works in the world—the aerial bombings, the use of canons and machines guns, the waves of soldiers invading one country or another and the concentration camps—perhaps all of that, gradually and by natural reaction, inspired me to try to contribute in whatever fashion was in my power so that events such as these would never happen again.[598]

García Robles thus personified a generation of thinkers and leaders whose worldviews had been forged by what Albert Camus lamented in 1957 as "more than twenty years of insane history:"

> These men who were born at the beginning of the First World War, who were twenty when Hitler came to power and the first revolutionary trials were beginning, who were then confronted as a completion of their education with the Spanish Civil War, the Second World War, the world of concentration camps, a Europe of torture and prisons—these men must today rear their sons and create their works in a world threatened by nuclear destruction.[599]

This ethical impulse and García Robles' wartime and postwar experiences made him uniquely suited and inclined to negotiate a Latin America free of nuclear weapons.[600]

García Robles was promoted to Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs after Brazil's military coup and Don José Gorostiza's promotion to Mexican Secretary of Foreign

---

[597] Ibid., xxi.
[598] Marín Bosch, "Alfonso García Robles: Una Entrevista (An Interview) Por: Miguel Marín Bosch," 28.
[599] Albert Camus, "Speech of Acceptance Upon the Award of the Nobel Prize for Literature, Delivered in Stockholm on the Tenth of December, 1957," in *Fifty Years*, ed. Clifton Fadiman (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), 723. Quoted in Ira Katznelson, *Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time.* (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013), 31.
[600] Solana, *Alfonso García Robles, diplomático ejemplar*, 3.

Affairs after Manuel Tello decided to run for congress. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was at first hesitant about the scheme, but eventually heeded García Robles' admonitions to avail itself of a chance to seize the reins of regional leadership in the nuclear arena. Tello had agreed in 1963 for García Robles to bring the idea of a joint declaration calling for a nuclear-free zone to Goulart's government.[601] García Robles also worked to recruit President Adolfo López Mateos to the cause so that he could approach Brazilian Chancellor Hermes Lima with a presidential letter highlighting the "dramatic moment" at hand whose import merited "a resolute and consistent conduct aimed at the preservation of life itself." The proposal endorsed measures committing willing countries not to "manufacture, receive, store, or test nuclear weapons or devices for launching such weapons." Latin America would thereby avoid a nuclear arms race. Five states—Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador—signed the declaration, which was issued on April 29. Bolivian President Victor Paz Estenssoro invoked the Bolivarian myth on the occasion, calling the joint statement evidence of "the peace-loving tradition of the peoples of the hemisphere."[602]

Mexico and Brazil circulated the declaration to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) in Geneva in May. The Burmese representative there likened the scheme to the nonproliferation treaty then garnering attention as a facilitator of "general and complete disarmament," which "must begin by taking all possible steps to prevent the problem from growing in magnitude and complexity through the further spread of nuclear weapons."[603] The remaining members expressed varying levels of

---

[601] Serrano, *Common Security in Latin America*, 23.
[602] Speech Delivered at the 1333rd Meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 11 November 1963," García Robles, *The Denuclearization of Latin America*, 4.
[603] Final Verbatim Record of the 128th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 6 May 1963, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.128, cited in ibid., 9.

support, interest, and engagement. The five Latin American states then met informally in September to discuss next steps and, soon after, six more regional partners joined them to petition the U.N. for technical assistance. In response, United Nations Secretary General U Thant assigned William Epstein as the project's scientific adviser.

In a speech to the U.N. General Assembly on November 11, 1963, García Robles drew attention to the arguments for nuclear forbearance, adducing the "astronomical sums" that avoiding a regional nuclear arms race would save for development and marking out the "incalculable benefit" of peaceful nuclear technology. He also outlined the paramount issues in need of resolution: the geographical extent of the "zone;" nuclear powers' compliance; how to distinguished peaceful and military uses; the relationship between a nuclear-free zone and decolonization; and proper methods of control. A diplomatic triangle between the United States, treaty promoters, and treaty spoilers would soon develop to dispute these issues and thereby determine what form of nuclear prohibition would take shape in the Western Hemisphere.

**U.S. Anticommunism and Latin American Nuclear Diplomacy**

At the time, United States support for nuclear-free zones as stimuli to nonproliferation was under review for the Eighteenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly. U.S. Ambassador Charles C. Stelle declared on October 29, 1963 that support for nuclear-free zones was possible "under appropriate circumstances," most notably, strategic stability, robust verification, and broad participation. However, the U.S. national security bureaucracy was "at best lukewarm" due to the Joint Chiefs' reservations concerning limits on U.S. Navy vessels' nuclear ordnance, the cessation of training exercises embarking from Guantánamo with nuclear "packages", and the risk of

Soviet espionage under cover of verification and inspection.[604] Foggy Bottom instructed embassies in Latin America to point out that a global nonproliferation treaty would attain the same ends, while internal State Department views were likewise cautious:

> [The Department of State] predicted that the problems of Cuban participation, freedom of nuclear transit, and opposition by Latin American governments were such that "its establishment does not seem likely in the near future.[605]

U.S. public diplomacy was more permissive. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson praised the endeavor at the General Assembly in November as "a most constructive contribution to the cause of peace," while stressing that leadership ought to come from "Latin American states themselves."[606]

The U.N. General Assembly blessed the initiative that autumn with Resolution 1911, which passed sans a solitary nay on November 27.[607] The resolution commended the five-power statement, encouraged Latin American states to begin exploring mutually acceptable measures, and asked for technical assistance from the U.N. Secretary-General. The U.S. voted for passage along with 90 other countries. Not all states were favorable though. Cuba in league with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw allies abstained. Cuba insisted on the Panama Canal Zone and Puerto Rico's inclusion and the return of Guantánamo Bay's to Cuban sovereignty in exchange for its acquiescence. García Robles again took the podium to reaffirm the generational and moral imperatives—"the very life

---

[604] JCSM-849-63, "Latin American Nuclear Free Zone (U), 1 November 1963, Secret, cited in Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone*, 5–6.
[605] Circ. agm. CA-5253, 17 November 1963, Confidential, quoted in ibid., 7.
[606] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 582-583.
[607] In this resolution *inter alia* the General Assembly welcomed the initiative of the five Presidents for the military denuclearization of Latin America; expressed the hope that the States of the region would initiate studies "concerning the measures that should be agreed upon with a view to achieving the aims" of the Joint Declaration, and requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to extend to the States of Latin America, at their request, "such technical facilities as they may require in order to achieve the aims set forth in the present resolution". Quoted in Alfonso García Robles, "Nobel Lecture: The Latin American Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone," 11 December 1982, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1982/robles-lecture.html.

of present and future generations of Latin Americans"—warranting such dramatic action.[608] Washington still regarded a Latin American nuclear-free zone chiefly as an enabler of its own nuclear diplomacy though. In a circular issued two days later, the Disarmament Agency noted the impetus for "a universal non-proliferation agreement" given by the Latin American denuclearization project. Questions of Cuban participation, United States dependencies in the prospective zone, and the exact verification regime were still in need of resolution.[609]

Mexican hopes of serving as a "moderating influence" on the region were on a collision course with the Cold War in Latin America. Cuba remained a hurdle long after the October crisis faded. The Disarmament Agency grappled with the Cuban question when it undertook a preliminary study on U.S. policy toward a nuclear-free Latin America. The report endorsed the joint action of the OAS and U.N. agencies, in particular the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and recommended that "a zone with on-site inspection at the cost of Cuban non-participation" was acceptable as long as current forms of surveillance persisted. It also advised that Washington could offer Guantánamo and the Panama Canal Zone as token non-nuclear territories. Interestingly, the five Latin American countries behind the joint statement were also those still maintaining contact with the revolutionary island. Despite repeated Mexican calls on Havana, the questions of whether Cuba would join and what U.S. concessions might secure its adhesion (e.g. the inclusion of Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal, or the return of Guantánamo Bay) went unheeded. Cuba's expulsion from the OAS in July 1964 was a

---

608 " Speech Delivered at the 1265th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 27 November 1963," García Robles, *The Denuclearization of Latin America*, 18–20.

609 Cir. agm. CA-5598, 29 November 1963, Confidential, quoted in Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone*, 8.

contributing factor.[610] And to worsen matters, the OAS, which already had a reputation as a U.S.-influenced body, was tapped as the negotiating venue instead of the U.N. General Assembly, in whose plenaries Cuba still sat.

In November, Mexico invited its fellow Latin American states with the pointed exceptions of Cuba and Venezuela to send their U.N. Permanent Representatives to Mexico City for early talks before the UNGA reconvened in December. García Robles proclaimed that a nuclear free-zone in Latin America would not disturb the post-ICBM strategic balance; on the contrary, it would foster stability if an event akin to the Cuban Missile Crisis recurred while testifying to Latin American independence, neighborliness, and peacefulness.[611] U.S. policy remained fixated on its strategic competition with the Soviet Union though, and Washington would accept Cuban non-participation only on the condition "that the Soviet Union is not installing nuclear weapons in Cuba and that Cuba is not otherwise obtaining such weapons."[612]

United States support for the plan thus remained tepid. Washington officials were suspicious of García Robles' rise to Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs in light of his early defense of oil expropriations and his recent pursuit of a UN resolution in favor of non-intervention.[613] Officials at the U.S. embassy in Mexico City also expressed "concern" about Robles' "long record critical of U.S. motives."[614] On the other hand, Rusk referred

[610] The Soviet Union tried to exert pressure on Cuba to go along with the treaty proceedings, however, Castro refused, perhaps owing to his post-Cuban Missile Crisis grievances regarding Moscow's lack of spine and unwillingness to leave behind tactical nuclear weapons. Gromyko informed Rusk of Cuba's resistance and Rusk in turn informed Mexican Foreign Minister Manuel Tello, see Memorandum of Conversation, February 21, 1964, Box 58, Country Files (CF)—Mexico-Honduras, National Security Files (NSF), Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library (LBJL). Hereinafter, CF—Mexico, NSF, LBJL.
[611] Serrano, *Common Security in Latin America*, 26.
[612] Adrian Fisher, Memorandum to Committee of Principals, "Position Paper on Nuclear Free Zones,(U)," 30 July 1965, quoted in Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone*, 22–23.
[613] Marín Bosch, "Alfonso García Robles: Una Entrevista (An Interview) Por: Miguel Marín Bosch," 24–25.
[614] U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Fulton Freeman, Telegram to Foggy Bottom re "Embassy Comments and Recommendations," 21 May 1964, Box 58, Cables, CF—Mexico, NSF, LBJL.

to Mexico as the "most sincere" with respect to "doing something about disarmament," because Mexico was the only non-aligned participant at the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament in the process of cutting its military budget.[615]

The Chinese nuclear test in October 1964, however, enhanced Washington's interest in nonproliferation of which influential officials deemed a denuclearized Latin America a key component.[616] Although the Pentagon resisted limits on its ability to transfer nuclear weapons across the globe, the Disarmament Agency and Foggy Bottom hoped that the Latin American initiative might counteract the mounting inertia in international nuclear diplomacy. A November 1964 circular from Foggy Bottom passed on the assessment that "the U.S. share[d] the Mexican concern over the increased danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities in view of the Chinese Communist test," which they feared might prompt other developing states to "follow the ChiCom example."[617] The memorandum nevertheless cautioned that a "viable and acceptable" nuclear-free zone "would … have to include Cuba … and meet certain other conditions (e.g. transit rights)." Legally, nuclear-free zones were equivalent to nonproliferation as a "collateral measure" to disarmament. Practically, the initiative was still regarded as a secondary priority; a global treaty took precedence. The State Department again instructed U.S. envoys in Latin America to relate that "an international non-proliferation agreement would attain the essential objective of a nuclear-free zone in L[atin] A[merica] and avoid the [evident] difficulties." U.S. policymakers mostly prayed that the declarations would have a beneficial psychological impact on the desultory ENDC talks

---

[615] "Memorandum of a Conversation re "Recommended Content of a Joint Statement Relating to a Reduction of Military Expenditures—Discussed by the Committee of Principals," August 12, 1964, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Doc 42, pp. 93-96.
[616] Gavin, "Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s."
[617] Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Department of State Airgram Circular to Mexico City re "Meeting Proposed by Mexico to Discuss Denuclearization of Latin America," November 17, 1964, LBJ, NSF, CF: LA-Honduras, Box 58.

in Geneva by furnishing a "new impetus" and "enabl[ing] the 19th [UN]GA to issue an urgent call for an agreement implementing the Irish Resolution." The overtures should be made "on an informal basis," however, so as "to avoid the impression of U.S. interference or pressure," which might compromise the treaty because of the depth of anti-Americanism in the region.[618]

The Gilpatric Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, which Johnson authorized to evaluate the global impact of the Chinese test, tried to softne the preconditions in a presidential report issued on January 21, 1965. The report called for the country to "actively support the establishment of Latin American and African (including, if possible, Israel-UAR) nuclear[-]free zones" without qualifications. It went further than Foggy Bottom on transit rights, verification, and security assurances as well, advising that the U.S. should "be prepared to modify our requirements."[619] The positive development was for naught though; Johnson resented Senator Robert Kennedy's interference and buried the report with Rusk's support. United States policy would thus remain equivocal through 1965.

The Five-Power declaration and subsequent nuclear-free zone talks appealed to traditions of cooperation and dispute settlement among the states of Latin America, "which had so distinguished itself for its valuable contribution to the development of the great principles of law and justice."[620] Generational and environmental imperatives fused with the Bolivarian myth to form the rhetorical plank of the efforts. García Robles opened the Preliminary Meeting of Latin American states on the denuclearization of

[618] Ibid. ACDA, Airgram Circular to Mexico City re "Meeting Proposed by Mexico to Discuss Denuclearization of Latin America," November 17, 1964, LBJ, NSF, CF: LA-Honduras, Box 58.
[619] Roswell Gilpatric, Report to the President by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, January 21, 1965, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 64, pp. 176-177.
[620] Cited from López Mateos's 21 March 1963 letter proposing a joint declaration in "Speech Delivered at the Opening Meeting of the Preliminary Meeting on the Denuclearization of Latin American on 23 November 1964," García Robles, *The Denuclearization of Latin America*, 21.

Latin America on November 27, exactly one year after the passage of UNGA Resolution 1911, by invoking the "vital necessity of sparing present and future generations the scourge of a nuclear war." He quoted a speech by President Kennedy to the UNGA in 1961 to underscore the universal stakes:

> For a nuclear disaster, spread by winds and water and fear, could well engulf the great and the small, the rich and the poor, the committed and the uncommitted alike. Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind. … And we in this Hall shall be remembered either as part of the generation that turned this planet into a flaming funeral pyre or as the generation that met its vow to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". … Together we shall save our planet—or together we shall perish in its flames.[621]

García Robles again deployed the metric of megatons (a "single bomb … equals 25 millions tons of explosives") and the total war analogy ("more than twelve times the total of all the bombings [of] the Second World War, including … Hiroshima and Nagasaki") to frame the menace. He outlined the need to build the region's economic strength by avoiding a "ruinous" arms race.

The task at hand was to formulate a preliminary draft of a multilateral treaty formalizing the region's denuclearization. Some of the debates echoed those of the NPT: security assurances, decolonization, and peaceful nuclear explosives. Others were unique to Latin America: the Cuban question and how to demarcate the zone, especially whether to include dependent territories, foreign military bases, and global shipping lanes. García Robles dissolved the meeting by donning the ideological garb of Bolivarianism by quoting Bolivar's famous oration at the Congress of Panama in 1826:

> One hundred centuries from now, when posterity traces the origin of our public law back to the treaties that shaped its future, it will honor the Isthmus protocols … it will find the design of our future relations with the world. What then will the Isthmus of Corinth be next to that of Panama?

---

[621] "GAOR: 16th Session, 1013rd Plenary Meeting," ibid., 22.

Latin American achievements in the field of common nuclear security, García Robles implied, would exceed and supplant those of the European civilization that had conquered, colonized, and for so long controlled the Western hemisphere. The Final Act established a Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America (COPREDAL) that would convene in Mexico City four times from March 1965 to February 1967 in order to weigh issues of regional participation, legal definitions, extra-continental pledges, and verification and inspection means. Latin America would light the way, instructing the world how best to prohibit nuclear weapons.

Regional power dynamics muddled the outlook for a strict regional approach to nuclear prohibition. Most Latin American countries valued nonproliferation; however, Argentina and Brazil, whose status as regional power brokers underlay their revisionist attitudes, bridled at the seeming injustice of a Soviet-American nuclear duopoly. The tension between collective stability and secure condominium was as taut in Buenos Aires and Brasília as it was in international nuclear forums such as Geneva and New York City. Moreover, the specter of a regional arms race paled in comparison to the nuclear idyll of a developed Latin America. Recent modifications in U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America had further exacerbated troubling trends toward military coups and political reaction, pitching the region's politics decidedly rightward.[622] Inter-American relations grew more politicized and fraught in proportion to the degree of U.S. meddling. The process began with Eisenhower's embrace of covert operations, stable dictatorships, and interventions against Red-tinged governments such as that of Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala.[623] The Latin American left responded by forsaking popular fronts and

---

[622] Serrano, *Common Security in Latin America*, 27.

[623] For an investigation that scrutinizes the influence of anticommunism on the Eisenhower administration's foreign policy toward Latin America and a longitudinal study of the impact of political economy and the Monroe Doctrine on Guatemala from 1878-1978, respectively, see Stephen G Rabe,

meeting state repression and violence in kind. The Cuban Revolution, the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and CIA plots against Castro in Cuba and Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic sped the political centrifuge, while Kennedy's Alliance for Progress (largely aimed at isolating Cuba) could only moderate the rise of anti-Americanism partly.[624] According to one scholar, "[p]erhaps the main influence of the Alliance was the bolstering of the military's self confidence as an institution capable of managing social and economic change."[625] In the Nuclear Age during which socioeconomic progress was envisaged through lenses of megawatts and megatons—nuclear technology was perceived as a major component of this developmental process.

U.S. anticommunism was thus both a cause and consequence of the political tremors then convulsing Latin American society as revolt and reaction fed a vicious cycle of counterinsurgency, covert operations, and Beltway intervention.[626] At a minimum, the covert backing of rightwing forces gave rise to an enlargement of the U.S. military footprint in the region and the buttressing of military regimes besotted with nation-building and nuclear power. Tacit or tactical support for the military coups against President Arturo Frondizi of Argentina in 1962 and President Goulart of Brazil in 1964 brought military or military-backed governments into power in two of Latin America's largest powers. The Kennedy administration had pondered covert, passive, and overt support for a military coup in Brazil. Shortly before General Castelo Branco ousted Goulart in fact, Kennedy avowed that he "would not be averse to the overthrow of the

*Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre*.

[624] Stephen G Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Edwin M Martin, *Kennedy and Latin America* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1994).

[625] Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone*, 5–6, Declassified Documents Reference Service, Doc # CK3100019052.

[626] Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010).

elected Brazilian government by forces more friendly to the United States."[627] This martial inclination was backed by military action when a U.S. fleet embarked "en route [to] Porto Alegre and Rio Grande to blockade exiting ships" and deliver supplies of petroleum to Brazilian military forces.[628] On the one hand, the advent of military dictatorship on March 31 ended the "independent" period of Brazilian foreign policy; the country would henceforth hew more closely to Washington. On the other hand, though, its position on denuclearization stiffened, and the Johnson administration's policy of benign neglect, adopted in awareness of anti-Americanism's depth in the region, robbed Washington of what leverage it might have wielded. The U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic in April 1965, launched against the backdrop of the second COPREDAL meeting, worsened matters. In sum, Cold War thinking inside the Beltway hampered efforts by García Robles and other international prohibitionists to keep nuclear weapons out of Latin America.

**Spoilers and Sponsors**

The Brazilian coup also ended García Robles's tenure as Mexican ambassador to Brazil. He learned of Goulart's downfall upon his return to Brasília on April 1 after vacationing with his wife in Bahia. Days later, he "gleefully" accepted the post of undersecretary of foreign affairs because of "the military coup in Brazil."[629] Argentina and Brazil shortly emerged as the chief spoilers of the nuclear-free zone scheme. The first sign of resistance came at the first COPREDAL session from March 5 to 22, 1965, where Brazil blocked García Robles from starting to formulate the treaty language. Instead, the meeting adopted an Argentinian initiative to break the process into three working groups

[627] Serrano, *Common Security in Latin America*, 28, footnote 84.
[628] Ibid., 28, footnote 86.
[629] Marín Bosch, "Alfonso García Robles: Una Entrevista (An Interview) Por: Miguel Marín Bosch," 24.

under a Coordinating Committee to debate the outstanding issues.[630] Brazil's delegate, José Sette Camara, divulged to U.S. listeners that the "Mexican delegation had originally hoped to initiate at least some substantive work on [the] draft denuclearization treaty; however, García Robles soon recognized this [was] impractical." He was forced to abide by the Argentinian approach, which Sette Camara said conformed better to Brazil's position that "complex problems … could best be approached through medium [to] small working groups located at U.N. headquarters." It was not the last time that Brazil and Argentina would coordinate policy to swing proceedings in their favor. Meanwhile, Cuba ignored Mexican entreaties to join, and Columbia pushed for Puerto Rico's inclusion in the zone—a U.S. red line.[631]

Progress at the COPREDAL thus mainly entailed organizing the working groups. Working Group A would draw a clearer map of what geographical or political area the zone would encompass by corresponding with absent Latin American republics and extraterritorial powers. Working Group B was put in charge of the verification, inspection, and control articles. Finally, Working Group C would coax the nuclear powers into respecting "in all aspects and consequences [the] denuclearization."[632] The delegates took a few concrete steps. Jamaica, Trinidad, and Tobago (former British colonies and now members of the British Commonwealth) received invitations to join the talks. An "unbiased" external authority (most likely the IAEA) would provide inspection and oversight. And talks with foreign states possessing regional dependencies—the U.S., France, U.K., and Netherlands—would have no legal bearing on decolonization.

---

[630] U.S. Embassy Mexico City, Telegram to Foggy Bottom, "Preparatory Commission [PC] on Latin American Denuclearization," 23 March 1965, Box 58, Cables. CF—Mexico, NSF, LBJ, 1-2.
[631] Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone*, 15.
[632] op cit., U.S. Embassy Mexico City, Telegram, "PC on Latin American Denuclearization," 23 March 1965, 1-2.

Significantly, Mexico was placed in Working Group B, whose scope was limited to matters of passing interest to Washington. Mexican Foreign Minister Carrillo Flores made clear to the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Fulton Freeman, the Argentinian and Brazilian tactic of diminishing Mexican and thereby North American influence. Tellingly, while Working Group B would meet in Mexico City, the more contentious Working Groups A and C would convene in New York.[633] García Robles accentuated the positive in his final speech, declaring "as in ancient Greece and in the Olympics of today, we pass the torch to the three working groups."[634]

The United States and Soviet Union cautiously supported the project in official and unofficial spheres. In his inaugural congressional speech on the subject of nonproliferation in July 1964, Senator Robert F. Kennedy remarked that "one of our greatest assets is that there is not one nuclear weapon in all of Latin America or Africa." Nuclear powers could help to preserve this prelapsarian state, Kennedy counseled, by pledging not to emplace nuclear weapons in the regions and through denuclearization pacts that the U.S. "should encourage … in every possible way."[635] On the other hand, a report issued by the Thompson Committee on Nuclear Proliferation was symptomatic of the security internationalism taking hold in Washington. It affirmed that support for nonproliferation and denuclearization was advisable in "regions in the world where nuclear weapons are not part of the essential security framework." Though "major steps in arms control do not seem to be in the cards," the support of the U.S. for such zones in

---

[633] Ibid., 2-3.
[634] "Speech Delivered at the Closing Meeting of the First Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America on 22 March 1965," García Robles, *The Denuclearization of Latin America*, 33–34.
[635] It is important to note that President John F. Kennedy had characterized Latin America as "the most dangerous area in the world" on 30 June 1963, a little more than one year before his brother's maiden congressional speech; Memorandum of Conversation, 30 June 1963, *FRUS 1961-1963*, XII: Document 295, quoted in Brands, *Latin America's Cold War*, 37.

Latin America and Africa had the merit of "making clear that the East-West struggle as it applies to these regions is not a nuclear struggle and need not become one."[636] The Disarmament Agency meanwhile advised the Committee of Principals (a body of deputies charged with reviewing U.S. nuclear policy) to inform Latin American governments privately of Washington's "concern for transit rights for nuclear armed ships and aircraft."[637] Soviet voices echoed these sentiments albeit with fewer qualifications. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, Ambassador Nikolai Federenko declared at the Political Committee of the UNGA that the U.S.S.R. was "prepared to join with the Western Powers in giving the necessary guarantees to keep nuclear weapons out of areas designated nuclear-free zones," whether through regional, multilateral, or bilateral mechanisms.[638] Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had restated this position on December 7, 1964.

As expected, the verification, inspection, and control articles were the easiest to write. Working Group B submitted a preliminary draft of 14 articles at the second COPREDAL from August 23 to September 2. According to García Robles, the main principle when devising the control articles was non-intervention, which he characterized in his concluding remarks as "rightly considered by all Latin American States as the cornerstone of friendly relations among nations." This sly criticism was probably a dig at the recent U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic.[639] The commission adopted some other major decisions beyond the control articles: a declaration of preambular

---

[636] Thompson Committee, Draft Statement, "U.S. Policy on the Denuclearization of Latin America, Africa, the Arab States and Israel," 4 February 1965, Box 3, Spurgeon Keeny Papers, NSF, LBJL.
[637] Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone*, 16.
[638] "Speech Delivered at the Closing Meeting of the First Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America on 22 March 1965," García Robles, *The Denuclearization of Latin America*, 38.
[639] "Speech Delivered at the Opening Meeting of the Second Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America on 23 August 1965," ibid., 36.

principles, the establishment of a Negotiating Committee consisting of García Robles and the chairmen of Workings Groups A and C (to expedite talks ahead of the UNGA's twentieth session), and a final communiqué enjoining the states parties to "redouble their efforts" to conclude the treaty at the next COPREDAL.

The preamble's working language reaffirmed the treaty's three purposes: development, nonproliferation, and disarmament. Latin America's historic affiliation with internationalism was evoked as well:

> That Latin America, faithful to its deep-seated tradition of universality of outlook, must endeavor not only to banish from its homelands the scourge of nuclear war, but also, at the same time, to cooperate in the fulfillment of the ideals of mankind, that is to say in the consolidation of a lasting peace based on equal rights, economic fairness and social justice for all, in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.[640]

More prosaically, the session witnessed the resolution of the knotty question of the zone's scope. Rather than a geographical, linguistic, historical, or political definition, the treaty would employ a legal standard; the zone would "equal the sum of the territories in which the treaty applies by virtue of the will of the governments ratifying the treaty."

The United States began to relax some of its conditions for the treaty by late-1965. In a meeting on August 27, 1965 with First Secretary of the Italian Ministry Antonello Pietromarchi, Disarmament Agency official William Miller observed there existed "considerable interest" among Latin American states for denuclearization even though the "difficult problem" of Cuba remained. When Pietromarchi raised the matter of "whether a [LA]NFZ without Cuban participation would be negotiable or viable," Miller indicated that Cuban participation was not "a *sine qua non* condition for agreement on a LANFZ." Washington was adamant though that transit rights in the Caribbean and

[640] "Resolution 8" cited by Alfonso García Robles in "Speech Delivered at the Closing Meeting of the Second Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America on 2 September 1965," ibid., 43.

through the Panama Canal be respected; it was U.S. policy not to declare if nuclear weapons were present aboard its vessels or aircraft. Miller decline to proffer "a general box score of L[atin] A[merican] views" on the treaty, but singled out Mexico as the sole "possible exception" to the "considerable understanding of U.S. policy on transit rights in recognition of our responsibility for over-all security of the hemisphere."[641] The Disarmament Agency was reticent lest the parties assume that Washington would place its dependencies in the zone. Given the speed with which the British Empire had withdrawn from the Caribbean, U.S. officials were wary of acknowledging that Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands were part of Latin American geography, which might set a dangerous precedent. In a letter to García Robles dated December 10, Disarmament Agency Director William Foster relayed that his government did "not wish to have included in the proposed nuclear free zone the Virgin Islands, since it is United States territory, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, because of its integral relationship with the United States."[642] This position was acceptable to most Latin American states besides Cuba, which wanted more than Guantánamo's inclusion in exchange for its nuclear renunciation.

From 1965 to 1966, the rift between treaty spoilers, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Cuba, and sponsors, such as Mexico, widened. Though Mexican-American relations were historically fraught, Mexico relished its strong bilateral relationship with its northern neighbor and the prestige gained by serving in a leadership position in regional and global arms control efforts. Washington remained encouraging, but Foster started to

---

[641] ACDA, Memorandum of Conversation between Antonello Pietromarchi and William F. Miller, "Latin American Nuclear Free Zone," 27 August 1965, *Declassified Documents Reference System*, Doc # CK3100048888.

[642] Quoted in Dean Rusk, Memorandum for President Lyndon Johnson, "U.S. Adherence to Protocol to Treaty Creating Latin American Nuclear Free Zone," 12 February 1968, *Declassified Documents Reference Service*, Doc # CK3100146716, 1-2.

encounter static from his Brazilian peers at the ENDC in Geneva. Brazilian delegate Carlos Bueno criticized U.S. efforts to "exclude certain areas from [the] region to be denuclearized" and "reservation[s] such as with regard [to] inspection" because of "its [supposed] responsibility for hemispheric security." Foster responded that Washington's unwillingness to include Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands resulted from constitutional desiderata and that U.S. concerns about inspection stemmed from the impossibility of "perfect verification" and the resulting need for more expedient measures.[643] The U.S. position was also guided by the desire to cite the Latin American talks and Mexico's endorsement of IAEA safeguards in support of its own support for their inclusion in a draft nonproliferation treaty in Geneva.[644]

Mexican Foreign Minister Carrillo Flores met with Rusk in New York City on October 7, 1965 during the twentieth session of the U.N. General Assembly. Mexico had sent a special mission to Cuba to relate the "intent and the outcome" of talks in hopes that Castro would opt to participate. Rusk reiterated that Cuba's involvement was "important" and the U.S. would "reserve the right of transit for nuclear-armed and powered weapons through the Panama Canal." The ministers then discussed what effect Cuban support for nuclear-free zone would have on U.S.-Cuban relations:

> [Rusk] replied that it would be recognized as a gesture but would not be enough at the time to assure our acceptance of the Castro regime. The Minister asked what would be enough. [Rusk] replied that Cuba must demonstrate, even though it need not make a public announcement to this effect, that it was withholding its subversive activities in the area. Cuba must also break its military ties with the Soviet Union."

---

[643] From USUN, tel. 5166, June 29, 1965 in Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone*, 16.

[644] Outgoing telegram from State re "IAEA Safeguards, Non-Proliferation, and Mexico," 22 September 1965, 3. "Draft LA nuclear-free zone treaty submitted 23 July 1965 to Preparatory Commission, calls for IAEA safeguards on all nuclear facilities. This draft unanimously approved by six-state working group, in which Mexican officials played leading role."

Sensing that Rusk was not about to revise Cuban policy, Flores asked if the U.S. would view Mexican overtures to Cuba "as an unfriendly gesture," to which Rusk responded that, on the contrary, he welcomed the efforts. He even drew a parallel to his own courtship of "Red Chinese support for our efforts to control nuclear activity." He pledged that Foster would serve as special liaison and intimated that the Panama Canal Zone and Guantánamo could be included if transit rights went unaltered. Finally, Rusk asked Flores about Brazil and Argentina's "attitudes" toward the treaty. Flores replied "their attitude towards the project was 'unfriendly' … [and he] feared that the influence of their military is working against the participation of these two countries."[645]

Meanwhile, U.S. support for a nuclear-free Latin America was gradually solidifying because of its benefits in the region and with regards to nonproliferation talks in Geneva. The Pentagon and Joint Chiefs now agreed that nuclear-free zones were in the "overall security interest of the United States."[646] The Disarmament Agency summarized the prevailing opinion in a "Position Paper on Nuclear Free Zones" drafted ahead of the second COPREDAL. The memorandum outlined the primary limiting criterion—transit rights—in regards to nuclear-free zones in regions beyond Europe and the Far East, where the National Security Council was contemplating nuclear-sharing and feared nuclear-free zones "might tip the balance to Soviet or Chinese Communist advantage:"

> An indigenous prohibition on such production would be an important factor in halting further nuclear proliferation. … the advantages of these zones in restraining proliferation would outweigh any such disadvantage if we can maintain transit rights.

---

[645] Dean Rusk, Memorandum of Conversation with Mexican Foreign Minister Carrillo Flores at 20th-Session of UNGA, New York, September-October 1965," 7 October 1965, Box 58, CF—Mexico, NSF, LBJ, 1

[646] JCSM-263-65, "Possible U.S. Public Statements on Denuclearization of Certain Areas(U)," 9 April 1965, quoted in Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone*, 21.

The Disarmament Agency endorsed a simple, ad-hoc safeguards system under IAEA administration and warned that including the Panama Canal Zone could prove tricky in light of ongoing negotiations with Panama to repatriate the waterway and U.S. Atomic Energy Commission plans to blast a new canal using peaceful nuclear explosives.[647] Rusk approved the Disarmament Agency position paper on November 10 despite military unease about limiting nuclear options in the region in case of war with Cuba. Two weeks later at the Second Special Inter-American conference in Mexico City, Rusk reaffirmed support for a Latin American nuclear-free zone and praised the enterprise as "constructive statesmanship in the best tradition of the hemisphere." On December 10, Foster wrote García Robles to inform him that U.S. backing would prove forthcoming if the criteria laid out for participation, verification, and security were satisfied. The next week, the United States endorsed a UNGA resolution commending Latin American efforts to denuclearize the region.

The talks were still stalled due to Brazilian and Argentinian obstruction. In a December 9 telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, Freeman remarked that Flores had recently told him that "talks with both Argentine and Brazilian [Foreign Ministers] in Rio [had] led him to fear both countries would increasingly resist [the] establishment [of a] Latin America NFZ:"

> He said he [had] received [the] clear impression [that] Argentina expected [to] acquire its own nuclear capability within [a] "few years", and thus purchase its way into [the] nuclear club as [the] only way to exert its influence internationally

[647] Adrian Fisher, Position Paper to Committee of Principals, "Nuclear Free Zones, (U)," 30 July 1965, quoted in ibid., 21–25. When Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara pushed back on the Canal Zone's inclusion, Foster as usual acted as a proponent of internationalist solutions and arms control, responding "[u]nless there are very compelling reasons to warrant reversal of the position which has thus been expressed to both the Latin Americans and the Soviets, we believe that we should continue to take the position that the U.S. could include the Canal Zone. … [else] the Latin Americans would almost certainly conclude … that the attitude of the U.S. towards creation of a zone had altered." Foster to McNamara, 6 December 1965, quoted in Ibid., 29.

> on major discussion[s] [of] world affairs. Carillo Flores expressed deep concern over this apparent reluctance to cooperate in area where Mexico [was] exerting initiative. He opined that each day that passes without [an] agreement on [the] NFZ makes obtaining such [an] agreement all [the] more difficult, particularly since [the] possibilities [of] proliferation to have-not countries [are] increasing daily.[648]

The Mexican government had taken a more global accounting of nuclear risks. In a conversation between President Díaz Ordaz, Ambassador Freeman, and Undersecretary of State Thomas C. Mann on New Year's Eve, Díaz Ordaz opined that Red China represented "the greatest threat to world peace," referencing Mao's infamous statement that "it might welcome war which could reduce its population by two hundred million because this would leave more food for the rest to eat." Díaz Ordaz deplored this notion as "aggressive and irresponsible and ha[ving] no concern for the value of human life."[649] Díaz Ordaz likely crafted the comment for his U.S. audience; even so, Mexican officials appeared sincere in their desire to preserve the hemisphere from nuclear hazards. On some matters though, the Brazilian and Mexican governments were in harmony, for example, the Panama Canal. Foster's reassurances to the Mexican and Brazilian representatives to the ENDC on November 11 that the Canal Zone was on the table elicited a caution signal from Rusk, who wanted to avoid prejudicing the U.S.-Panamanian negotiations to repatriate the waterway.[650]

---

[648] U.S. Embassy Mexico City, Telegram to Foggy Bottom, "Brazilian and Argentinian reluctance to move forward with LANFZ," 9 December 1965, Box 59, CF—Mexico, NSF, LBJ.

[649] Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation between President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, Ambassador Fulton Freeman & Under Secretary Thomas C. Mann, "LANFZ," 31 December 1965, Box 59, CF—Mexico, NSF, LBJ.

[650] Adrian Fisher, Position Paper to Committee of Principals re "Nuclear Free Zones, (U)," 30 July 1965, quoted in Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone*, 21–25; When Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara pushed back on the Canal Zone's inclusion, Foster as usual acted as a proponent of internationalist solutions and arms control, responding "[u]nless there are very compelling reasons to warrant reversal of the position which has thus been expressed to both the Latin Americans and the Soviets, we believe that we should continue to take the position that the U.S. could include the Canal Zone. … [else] the Latin Americans would almost certainly conclude … that the attitude of the U.S. towards creation of a zone had altered." Foster to McNamara, 6 December 1965, quoted in ibid., 29.

The United States was unwilling for reasons of pragmatism and anticommunism to press Brazilian or Argentinian allies to embrace the prospective zone. Either the State Department or the White House could have exerted pressure; however, Washington feared that such attempts might prove harmful for reasons of reverse psychology and linkages to broader nuclear diplomacy. Disarmament Agency Deputy Director Adrian Fisher summed up the danger:

> Attempts on our part to force the hands of governments concerned or to insist upon their conforming to our specifications could backfire, by increasing the resistance to the creation of such zones or by injecting matters in dispute among nuclear powers into regional nuclear-free zone negotiations. The initiative to establish such a zone should be that of the states within the region concerned. Our general observance of this principle is also helpful in warding off Soviet pressure for nuclear-free zones in areas where we and the states concerned oppose them. Further, our premature endorsement of such a zone could have unfortunate results if the zone as finally set up included elements adverse to our interests.[651]

Robert Smith of the Disarmament Agency dismissed such concerns in a State Department circular that concluded there was "no information to substantiate [the] allegation that either Brazil or Argentina [are] able [to] acquire nuclear capability within … [a] few years."[652] He ascribed their prevarications to a desire to survey the "complex issues" fully. Henceforth, Washington would confine itself to "private and even discreet public support to Latin American efforts" rather than direct pressure or dialogue, leaving the ball on the field for Latin America states and in particular Mexico to juggle.[653]

Spoilers and sponsors remained at odds over peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), transit rights, entry-in-force, and treaty reservations in early 1966. In fact, debates that would later affect nonproliferation talks in Geneva and New York City, such as how to

---

[651] Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone*, 24.
[652] Robert Smith, Draft Telegram to Mexico City, Rio de Janerio, Buenos Aires, and New York for Spurgeon Keeny, "LA NFZ," 17 December 1965, Box 3, Spurgeon Keeny Papers, NSF, LBJL, 1.
[653] Op. cit., *Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone*, 24.

distinguish “peaceful” from “non-peaceful” nuclear activities, had their first audience in Mexico City. The Coordinating Committee met in February and March 1966 to formulate a draft treaty with consensus articles on the source and scope of safeguards, the participation of nuclear powers, and the dilemma of peaceful nuclear explosives. The committee delivered a report to the third COPREDAL session occurring from April 19 to May 4, 1966, when its delegates hammered out a preliminary Multilateral Treaty for the Denuclearization of Latin America. The Coordinating Committee report was not the sole document guiding deliberations in Mexico City though. The Brazilian and Colombian delegations submitted a draft as well that laid out their preferred language. Restricted by their observer status, the White House and the State Department found themselves at a loss as to how to counteract the Brazilian attempt to torpedo the treaty. White House official Barber called Deputy National Security Adviser Spurgeon Keeny, Jr., the National Security Council’s factotum on foreign policy issues relating to advance science and technology, to complain that it looked to him “as if the Brazilians are pulling the rug out of the LA NFZ and it looks to me as if ACDA is just sitting there.” Keeny telephoned William Bowdler, the executive liaison officer for Latin American affairs, inquiring whether the State Department was confident of its policy of “playing it very hands-off” toward the treaty negotiations now that Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela had shown their hand and the negotiations appeared “finished unless something happens—like us putting some pressure on these countries.” Although Keeny did not believe that regional proliferation was an “immediate concern,” he speculated, “within the next decade, one of these countries is going to go nuclear.” Furthermore, he had no idea where the Latin America bureau in Foggy Bottom stood on the issue. Bowdler responded that his office considered it a “good idea,” but had not “independently work[ed] with countries who have objected.” Keeny stressed that then was a good time to figure out if it was “do-able;”

"do we just wait and say that is where the ball bounces or are we willing to take another look at it?"[654]

It is unclear if the White House in concert with the State Department and Disarmament Agency chose to apply pressure on its truculent allies. Regardless, the Latin American delegations in Mexico City managed to approve a consensus draft with 26 articles and 2 protocols under the chairmanship of García Robles. Protocol I mandated that nations with dependencies in the region adhere to the treaty's strictures, while Protocol II called on nuclear powers to respect the denuclearized zone, not abet violations by member states, nor "use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the contracting parties." García Robles succeeded in forcing a draft treaty in the face of a dispute in regards to the treaty's entry into force procedures. Spoilers insisted on strict guidelines while sponsors focused on expediency. Brazil listed a slew of conditions: ratification by all of Latin America including extra-territorial powers, assurances from each nuclear power, and the arrangement of IAEA bilaterals for all relevant parties. García Robles, by contrast, wanted the zone to come into force piecemeal, when each state signed and ratified the treaty. The treaty would remain in draft form until this matter was resolved.

With the treaty's outlines drawn, the United States registered points of concern through its Latin American embassies and United Nations and Geneva delegations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff weighed in on August 4, specifying four criteria for acceptance: full participation of Latin American states (meaning Cuba), adequate and effective safeguards, continuance of existing transit rights, and the maintenance of the country's ability to protect the Panama Canal and the hemisphere.[655] Disarmament Agency and

[654] Memorandum of Telephone Conversations among Barber, Keeny, and Bowdler re "LA NFZ," 25-28 April 1966, Box 4, Spurgeon Keeny Papers, NSF, LBJL, 1-2.
[655] Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone*, 31.

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) officials still fretted over the permissiveness toward PNEs in fears that such a gap might open a backdoor for states desirous of a military capability and set a dangerous precedent for the NPT. Of particular concern was the implicit sanction of PNEs in Articles 1, 3, 8, and 13 of the draft treaty, which outlawed "nuclear weapons" but not "nuclear explosives."[656] For years, the AEC had promoted the economic potential of advanced thermonuclear explosives for earthmoving and resource-extraction through Project Plowshare, which harkened back to Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace speech. As negotiations for a global nonproliferation treaty floundered, however, Brazil and Argentina's protestations that developing nations had a right to all types of peaceful nuclear activities threatened the integrity of nuclear prohibitions. The rationale was explained in a State Department circular:

> The development of any nuclear explosive device by [a non-nuclear-weapon state], even if intended for a non-military purpose, would be essentially indistinguishable from a weapons development program and would necessarily provide information directly pertinent for such a program. The effect on triggering further nuclear proliferation by neighbors and potential adversaries would be virtually the same as from building a bomb.[657]

The communiqué also spurned the advances of García Robles, who had asked for assurances from the United States and its nuclear peers to respect the nuclear-free zone by pledging to keep their weapons out of it and refrain from menacing its states parties. Although the U.S. position on the project was evolving, its reluctance to permit contraints on its own nuclear strategy may have deprived García Robles of valuable diplomatic capital as Argentina and Brazil continued to flout the pro-treaty consensus.

Brazilian and United States officials' estrangement on the matter of peaceful nuclear explosives spread from Mexico City to more general debates in Geneva and New

[656] Department of State, Telegram to U.S. Embassy in Mexico City et al., "U.S. government comment re LA NFZ Draft Proposals for García Robles," 28 August 1966, Box 58, CF—Mexico, NSF, LBJ, 2.
[657] Ibid., 4.

York City. The presidential election of Costa e Silva in October 1966 by a docile congress further hardened Brazilian attitudes toward nuclear arms control and made PNEs an "article of faith in Brazilian domestic politics."[658] The Argentine coup bringing General Juan Carlos Onganía into office in August 1966 meanwhile heightened the level of Brazil-Argentine collusion. On December 12, 1966, Brazilian Ambassador Sérgio Corrêa da Costa expressed his government's unwillingness to permit limits on PNE development at the ENDC. He maintained that Argentina shared these reservations and relayed Venezuela and Peru's opposition to a restrictive U.S. view of how far territorial seas extended, challenging transit rights for U.S. nuclear weapons through the region.[659] The PNE language in the treaty was more and more consequential because delegates in Geneva had agreed that the NPT would prohibit "nuclear devices of any kind" (the final language would stipulate "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices"). With this in mind, Foster addressed the delegations at the ENDC to contend that the NPT should outlaw PNE acquisition or development because testing such a device was tantamount to nuclearization. The implications for a Latin American nuclear-free zone were clear. In return for non-nuclear-weapon states renouncing them, Foster pledged that nuclear powers would offer a service that would fund, arrange, and conduct PNE-use for constructive projects at low cost. A treaty lacking such proscriptions ran the risk of the regional and global treaties being born at oods.

**Freeman's Dissent**

The fourth session of the COPREDAL was originally scheduled for August 1966, but after various member states requested postponement (most likely Argentina and

[658] Redick, *Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil*, 17.
[659] Memorandum of Conversation between William Foster and Sérgio Corrêa da Costa, 12 December 1966, cited in Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone*, 33–34.

Brazil owing to the coups) the commission opened its doors on January 31, 1967. The first item of business was to discuss the Coordinating Committee's draft treaty in hopes of finalizing a consensus document that would placate spoilers and sponsors alike. On the second day of meetings, the U.S. issued an aide-mémoire characterizing a nuclear-free zone with a strict definition of nuclear weapons and commensurately loose language on PNEs as "illusory."[660] The circular praised the committee's decision to harmonize the limits of territorial seas with those established by "principles of international law," and promoted a treaty that would allow the U.S. to include only those areas (the Canal Zone and Guantánamo) that it wished. Finally, the message downplayed the importance of nuclear powers signing Protocol II, which would bind nuclear powers to respect the treaty's provision and abstain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against member states, pledging them instead to respect the treaty's provisions and spirit.

The stakes were larger than the denuclearization quest though. The Disarmament Agency was mindful that a U.S. failure to sign Protocol II might compromise Mexican and more generally Latin American support for nonproliferation talks in Geneva and New York City. U.S. officials were thus keen to associate the Latin America scheme more closely with its own arms control agenda. The circular ended with a suggestion that the treaty formalize the nuclear-free zone's relationship to the Organization of American States, the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, and the United Nations. García Robles was intent, however, on securing the nuclear club's acquiescence for the protocols and an "organic relationship to the OAS" might agitate the Soviets given their testy alliance with Cuba.

[660] Circ. tel. 129198, 1 February 1967, Confidential, quoted in ibid., 34–35.

The pace of deliberations in Mexico City was "frenetic." Some proposals conflicted with stated U.S. and Mexican policies in hopes of strengthening the zone, or scuttling it altogether. Ambassador Salcedo de Lima of Venezuela pushed for a ban on nuclear-weapon transit with the support of the Argentine delegate and against the wishes of those of Mexico and Chile. Foggy Bottom objected directly to Caracas, which responded that de Lima had operated without instructions from the capital. With the misunderstanding resolved, the State Department legal adviser, Leonard Meeker, reported that the U.S. position on transit had carried the day, though concerns about the treaty's permissiveness toward PNEs persisted. Washington had held out an international PNE service; however, according to Meeker, Latin American states could not "agree to be dependent on the grace and favor of nuclear states."[661] Brazil and Argentina were especially loath to "forswear nuclear weapons capability on a hemispheric basis alone."

United States officials feared that a liberal precedent set in Mexico City would impede more robust strictures against peaceful nuclear explosives in a nonproliferation treaty. The State Department sent an urgent telegram instructing Ambassador Freeman to caution the COPREDAL that permissive language on PNEs would prejudice Washington's support for the treaty. Freeman was better acquainted with the limits of possible agreement in Mexico City than Foggy Bottom though. He chose to overstep his authority by ignoring the directive in the interest of hemispheric solidarity. He wrote back to his superiors in Washington:

> [T]he view of the U.S. regarding every aspect of this treaty has been explained in the most careful detail, not only to Gracia [sic] Robles, but to all key members of the Preparatory Commission and their respective Governments. … We have been listened to sympathetically; a significant number of our points are reflected in the Treaty; and what has emerged represents the best possible compromise … to make an additional demarche at this point along the lines of the Department's

[661] Leonard Meeker to Dean Rusk, Memorandum, 10 February 1967, Confidential, quoted in ibid., 37.

> telegram, now that final approval has been given [the] treaty by [the] Preparatory Commission, would not only be totally unproductive but deeply resented.[662]

If not for Freeman's decisive non-action, the U.S. government might have wrecked the Treaty of Tlatelolco at the moment of its realization. Instead, the United States endorsed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America when 21 Latin Americans nations signed it on February 14.[663] The treaty's final text comprised numerous preambular declarations, 36 articles, and two protocols. After registering its strict reading of the treaty's articles pertaining to PNEs, Rusk praised the treaty as "a milestone on the road to general and complete disarmament and … the conclusion of a worldwide treaty prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons."[664]

**The Afterlives of Tlatelolco**

The clash of strict versus loose definitions of nuclear explosives persisted during nonproliferation talks in Geneva and New York City. Foster recapitulated the conservative position when the committee reconvened in March, while the Brazilian representative challenged the U.S. opinion and spoke against the inclusion of a ban against all nuclear explosives in the NPT.[665] Meanwhile, a *pas de deux* between U.S. and Mexican officials began as they competed to exploit the matter of an U.S. signature on Protocol II as leverage for stricter language on PNEs in the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, and vice versa. García Robles made a Mexican signature on a nonproliferation

---

[662] U.S. Embassy Mexico City, Telegram to Department of State, tel. 4484 (1), 13 Februrary 1967, Confidential, quoted in ibid., 38.

[663] The "framers" of the Treaty of Tlatelolco were, in alphabetical order: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The first five countries to ratify the treaty were Brazil, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, and Uruguay, with only Brazil having waived some conditions of the treaty.

[664] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, 65.

[665] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, 126-128, 140-143.

treaty contingent on members of the nuclear club signing Protocol II. The Mexican government made the position official on September 11, 1967, intimating that other Latin American state's signatures might prove similarly conditional:

> In fact, Mexican public opinion – and perhaps the same may be said of the other Latin American countries – would find no justification for the Delegation of Mexico to recommend the signature of a draft treaty on nonproliferation which … will continue to be … very inferior to the Treaty of Tlatelolco as far as the rational objectives pursued thereby are concerned, in the event that the present situation respecting Additional Protocol II should still exist.[666]

President Díaz Ordaz insisted on the matter when he came to Washington in late October. Meanwhile, the Disarmament Agency hoped to use the Latin American desire to secure a United States signature on Protocol II to bolster its own position on peaceful nuclear explosions and the fostering of international consensus for the NPT.[667]

The Disarmament Agency directed an inter-agency review of the implications of signing Protocol II from October to early November 1967. The U.S. military was chiefly worried about transit rights and the AEC fretted about the precedent set by the treaty's language on nuclear explosives. In league with Foggy Bottom, the Disarmament Agency formulated a list of five interpretive statements to accompany a U.S. signature: 1) transit rights unchanged; 2) no implications for territorial claims; 3) non-use provision inapplicable if a Latin American state initiated hostilities with a nuclear-armed ally; 4) territories of Protocol I signatories treated comparably; 5) restatement of U.S. interpretation that articles 1 and 5 outlawed PNEs. Before Díaz Ordaz visited, Rusk sent Johnson a letter drawn up by Foster and Deputy Under-Secretary of State Foy Kohler recommending that the president sign Protocol II, but not Protocol I, and issue a

---

[666] Memorandum from the Mexican Government to the U.S. Representative to the ENDC, 11 September 1967, 2, 5. in Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone*, 44.
[667] Adrian Fisher, Memorandum for Dean Rusk, "Adherence of the US to the Protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1 June 1967, in ibid., 43.

statement laying out the country's views on transit, nuclear options if hostilities erupted with a Latin American state supported by a nuclear power (e.g. Cuba flanked by the Soviet Union), and the danger of strict definition of nuclear weapons. The memorandum and Johnson's consent nevertheless marked the first time the United States had accepted limitations on its "freedom of response with nuclear weapons."[668] The assurance remained unofficial though; in public the Johnson administration took the line of giving "very careful and sympathetic consideration to the signing of Protocol II."[669] National Security Adviser Walt Rostow began consultations with congress two weeks later, but Foster preferred to wait until more Latin American states had signed and ratified. Meanwhile, international opinion was mostly behind the treaty. UNGA Resolution 2286 (XXII) passed by a vote of 82 to 0, commending the treaty and requesting that states observe its letter and spirit. Cuba, the lone regional holdout, its Warsaw Pact allies, and France abstained.

The full meanings inscribed in the Treaty of Tlatelolco were clarified by the conclusion of nonproliferation talks in Geneva and New York City. The U.S. Joint Chiefs wanted their preferred language of transit rights and PNEs upheld, while Foster saw the treaty as primarily significant in relation to international nuclear diplomacy, in particular the "necessity of gaining support for the NPT."[670] Disarmament Agency support for the nuclear-free zone on its own merits and vis-à-vis the nonproliferation treaty allayed the Joint Chiefs and Pentagon's concerns by explaining that congress would review Protocol II during the ratification debate and portraying the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

[668] Memorandum to President Lyndon Johnson, "Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty," 26 October 1967, Confidential, quoted in ibid., 47.

[669] U.S. Ambassador Garcia to the First Committee of the UNGA, quoted in *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, 535-538.

[670] JCSM-32-68, "Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, (U)" 16 January 1968, Secret; and Paul Nitze, Letter to William Foster,19 January 1968. Secret, cited and quoted in Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone*, 50.

and Senate Foreign Relations Committee as sensitive to military considerations. The Atomic Energy Commission meanwhile adopted the arms control view that the development of a PNE by a state party to the treaty would entail a violation of the treaty and thereby its annulment.

On February 10, 1968, García Robles queried Fisher about a United States signature on Protocol II. He noted his government's satisfaction with the U.K.'s recent adherence to both protocols and suggesting that such an action would improve a nonproliferation treaty's odds of passage by having "a salutary effect in Latin America." García Robles leaned on the Soviets as well to sign the protocols and intimated that swift U.S. action might prompt the Soviet Union, or even Cuba, to sign. He noted that Soviet officials had "assured" him that they would follow an American lead.[671] In the end, Johnson declared that his government would sign Protocol II on the first anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco's opening for signature. During the announcement, Johnson related the treaty and the nuclear-free zone it inaugurated to a nonproliferation treaty and proclaimed that it was fitting that "this giant step forward should have had its genesis in Latin America, an area which has come to be identified with regional cooperation."[672] In his visit to Mexico City to sign Protocol II on April 1, Vice President Hubert Humphrey reaffirmed the role played in the treaty's making by Latin America's regionalism and internationalism:

> With the successful negotiation of this treaty, the inter-American system, the oldest functioning regional system in the world, has once again demonstrated its capacity to advance the peace and security of the peoples of this hemisphere.[673]

---

[671] Memorandum of Conversation between Mexican Ambassador and Acting ACDA Director Fisher re "U.S. adherence to Protocol II of Treaty of Tlatelolco," February 10, 1968, pp. 1-2, *Declassified Documents Reference Service*, Doc # CK3100079612.
[672] Department of State Bulletin, March 14, 1968, pp. 313-314, quoted in Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone*, 52.
[673] Ibid., 53–54.

The vice presidential visit touched on related matters in Mexican-American affairs—the Alliance for Progress and "other projects that emphasize efforts to promote social advancement."[674]

By October 1967, Brazil and Argentina were among 20 countries (with Jamaica pending) to have signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco. However, the two regional powers had refrained from ratifying, which would have formalized their acceptance of restraints on nuclear activities with military implications. Brazil had tried to place numerous stumbling blocks in the way of a Latin American nuclear-free zone—prohibitions against the transit of nuclear weapons; stringent entry-into-force conditions; the barring of interpretive statements; and a strict definition of nuclear weapons encompassing all atomic explosives. Its reluctance stemmed from disaffection with the international status quo and hopes that PNEs would serve developmental ends. Its policy vis-à-vis the Treaty of Tlatelolco and a nonproliferation treaty thus amounted to the avoidance of international commitments impinging on the autonomous development of its nuclear capacity to the point of a threshold military capability. Accordingly, even though Brasília did not commit itself to a military program during this period, the Costa administration worked to maintain freedom of action in the nuclear field up to and including a military option.

The ambivalence of its nuclear policies was on display at the first CSN meeting of President Costa e Silva's military government on October 4, 1967. The ministerial assembly discussed a "serious and silent study" of Brazilian nuclear policy against the backdrop of the Treaty of Tlatelolco's opening for signature and the nonproliferation talks still in progress. A central matter was how to word the guidelines in order for Brazil to reserve "to itself the right of exclusiveness in what regards the guidance and execution

---

[674] Dean Rusk, Cable to Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, "Signing Ceremony of the Treaty of Tlatelolco," 20 March 1968, 1-2, *Declassified Documents Reference Service*, Doc # CK3100097265.

of all activities in the field of nuclear energy."[675] Three related matters of wording stood out. First, whether the policy should specify what acts the guidelines would sanction, or instead use generalities. Second, and relatedly, how the public and private decrees should employ the phrase "peaceful purposes" so as to associate Brazil's nuclear policies with those sanctioned by international laws, norms, and institutions. Minister of External Affairs José de Magalhães Pinto endorsed this wording in a clause pertaining to the Military Ministries that called for the "formation of personnel and in the development of special techniques and equipment in the sector." To avoid a martial reading, Magalhães Pinto suggested a change to "equipment related to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy." Minister of Mines and Energy José Costa Cavalcanti concurred, observing that "Brazil, through the statement of the President of the Republic, those of the Minister of External Relations and even mine, has been stressing the peaceful applications." Magalhães Pinto wanted language that did not raise the nuclear prohibition for which "peaceful" served as a watchword:

> I have just returned from several international meetings and at all of them this is the prevailing subject, the touchy subject. We know now that the two big nuclear powers arrived at an understanding on the question and that the number of countries that do not possess nuclear energy and want to use it is very large. They need, for this, to organize themselves, decide exactly what they want and advance firmly toward the desired objectives. In several statements made through the Ministry of External Relations, according to your instructions, Brazil has reiterated its wish to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. By the way, the Treaty of Mexico prohibits the use of nuclear energy for military objectives, but authorizes its use for peaceful purposes. The several conversations I have had have been difficult. We are going to have many problems. This is a new field … and the big countries, who are the masters of nuclear energy, because of the development they achieved through it, will not wish to give ground. There is this constant allegation that total knowledge of the matter will result in countries being

[675] "Minutes of the Fortieth Session of the Brazilian National Security Council, 4 October 1967, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archive (Brasília), 5. Obtained and translated by Fundação Getúlio Vargas, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116914.

> easily able to produce an atomic bomb. Despite its peaceful tradition, Brazil has not been understood, no matter how much it repeats this.

The comments attested to Brazil's efforts to retain its nuclear prerogatives while dispelling fears of ulterior military motives. In this vein, the meeting vigorously debated whether to add a clause upholding PNEs as an object of national policy in order to justify a threshold capability.

Peaceful nuclear explosions had become the conceptual nub of efforts to delineate what was legitimate state policy on the spectrum of nuclear science and technology over the course of the nuclear-free zone and nonproliferation talks. Magalhães Pinto accordingly pushed for modifications to a section of the paper directing the bureaucracy "to expand the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in all sectors of national activity." He held that the order should continue with the phrase: "envisaging also domestic manufacture, eventual and future, of peaceful nuclear artifacts to be employed in geographic engineering works, in mining and other activities genuinely for economic development." Even though the justification was economic, the purpose was diplomatic:

> It is imperative that the document includes, among longer-term objectives, one of the forms of application of nuclear energy that the Brazilian Government strives to preserve in international negotiations and to which it attaches special importance. The right to unrestricted research for peaceful purposes is a basic point of the nuclear policy defended by the Costa e Silva Administration.[676]

Costa e Silva himself objected that such an explicit declaration was "redundant and aggressive, [and] without necessity" since the policy definition was a "given" and Brazil had neither agreed nor would it agree to such a curtailment of its rights. Magalhães Pinto nevertheless desired official confirmation of exactly what rights were being preserved, lamenting that Costa e Silva "kn[e]w what [was] happening in Geneva," where the

[676] Ibid., 10.

External Minister was feeling "great pressure from the big powers" to disavow PNEs. His request for rhetorical support appears not to have had a military impulse; rather, he cited the revolutionary narrative of the Nuclear Age. "[T]he world is on the threshold of a great revolution and we should be prepared for it," he cautioned, "We cannot miss it."

Military thinking was not absent though. Minister of Industry and Commerce General Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva summed up the inseparability of nuclear activities with peaceful purposes from those of military interest by analogizing with post-First World War prohibitions against poison gases when he argued against including th phrase, "peaceful purposes":

> [I]t would be the same as saying that the Piquete factory is for peaceful purposes, because what is produces, nitroglycerin, for instance, is a medicine; picric acid, toluol, is a product for the manufacture of solvents; as for ammonium, there are also ammonium explosives. "Peaceful purposes" reminds me of an observation I heard once from the Ministry of External Relations of Yugoslavia, before the bolshevization, in Geneva, where the problem of the use of gases was being discussed. A document was then being elaborated to prohibit the use of gases, and the Minister of External Relations of Yugoslavia said the following: "If a country is attacked, and for its defense it needs to use gases, no document will prevent it from doing it". So, to say that someday Brazil will not make arms with nuclear energy is an illusion. It will not be for our days, we may not wish it, but it may become an imperative of national security.

Macdeo Soares's comments reflected the consensus among members of the Brazilian national security council. Minister of the Army General Auerlio Lira Tavares reflected on his own experiences after the Second World War, when the Nazi regime was shown to have transformed perfume makers into "factories of war instruments." Given that military organizations would stand vigil against "technical surprise[s]," he asserted, "no country … can be unmindful of the evolution of technology." As such, Brazil should be ready to "collaborate" and also to follow developments abroad. Magalhães Pinto repeated the desirability of a threshold capacity by noting that in spite of international compacts and

norms, "in case of any emergency we would be able to use what we already possess." Costa e Silva's reply was crisp: "Obviously."

Magalhães Pinto therefore kept pushing for an explicit reference to Brazil's "sovereign right" to conduct explosions for peaceful purposes. Although the Treaty of Tlatelolco had enshrined proscriptions of nuclear explosives for "war purposes," PNEs remained legitimate. "Even so," he warned, "there is strong international pressure" in Geneva to reverse this precedent in a nonproliferation treaty, and "if we do not emphasize in the document that the use is for peaceful purposes, I have the impression … that we would be under much stronger pressure." Costa e Silva agreed with Magalhães Pinto's interpretation and acknowledged that Tlatelolco "allowed us to go to Geneva and also defend our sovereign right as a country to deal with this subject as an international power without any restriction." Although a final decision was not taken on whether to include "peaceful purposes" with pointed reference to explosive devices, Brazil would reaffirm its express right to PNEs in Geneva and New York City and then base its decision not to sign the nonproliferation treaty on the grounds that its prohibition against them was illegitimate and inequitable.

With the NPT's contours clarifying in Geneva, the matter of mutual commitments to the Latin American nuclear-free zone and the wider nonproliferation regime grew more pressing. Given that the Global South now enjoyed a majority in the UNGA as a result of decolonization flooding the world parliament with a bevy of postcolonial delegations from the Caribbean and Africa, the fate of a nonproliferation treaty was increasingly bound up in the nuclear club respecting the Treaty of Tlatelolco. García Robles's influence had waxed together with his well-earned reputation as the treaty's architect. U.S. diplomats knew that Mexico, the rest of Latin America, and other non-aligned states taking their cues from García Robles, represented a decisive plurality in the

Political Committee and the General Assembly and could therefore insist on a U.S. signature on the two protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as a *quid pro quo* for their votes. Rusk advised Johnson in advance of Mexican President Díaz Ordaz's visit in October 1967 that Mexico and its Latin American confederates "will be observing U.S. action on these protocols closely as an indication of support for the … LANFZ and arms control measures generally." The Mexican government was vexed that eight months had passed since the compact's opening for signature without a nuclear power signing Protocol II. Washington's acquiescence was key. Though the Mexican government was understanding in regards to reservations about Protocol I, which would bring foreign territories into the zone, the U.K., U.S.S.R., and France maintained that "they [would] adhere [to Protocol II] only if the U.S. [took] such action." Rusk worried that Mexico would "have serious problems in signing an NPT until [such] action is taken by the nuclear powers."

United States policymakers thus recognized that the fate of the nonproliferation treaty was intimately connected to their support of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. All of Latin America might withhold their support of the denuclearization treaty "and possibly on other arms control measures such as the NPT" if the U.S. did not sign.[677] Rusk repeated this point as the final phase of nonproliferation negotiations at the UN General Assembly drew near in February 1968:

> The Latin American countries are observing U.S. actions on Protocol II closely as an indication of our support for the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone and arms control measures generally. An early public announcement, prior to signature of the Protocol, would be highly desirable in order to encourage ratification of the

[677] Dean Rusk, Memorandum, "Background on Treaty of Tlatelolco in preparation for Mexican President Ordaz's visit," 27 October 1967, *Declassified Documents Reference System*, Doc # CK3100170489

> Treaty by additional Latin American nations and to obtain their support in the NPT negotiations.[678]

The matter was urgent enough that, when Díaz Ordaz arrived at the White House two days later, Rusk counseled Johnson to inform the Mexican president "that the United States intends to sign Protocol II." The decision had been vetted and approved by Foster, the Joint Chiefs, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke. An interpretive statement that laid out U.S. views on transit rights, PNE proscriptions (shared by all Latin American states excepting Brazil and Argentina), the protocol's territorial scope, and the inclusion of sea and air space would accompany the signing. Rusk nevertheless concluded "that the circumstances present in Latin America are such as to justify a departure from our past policy concerning limitations on our freedom of response with nuclear weapons."[679] Although the administration was not prepared to issue a public announcement that would necessitate congressional debate and reserved the right to contemplate a nuclear response in case of aggression by a Latin American state backed by a nuclear-weapon state, the U.S. for the first time showed its willingness to curtail its nuclear options by signing in the interest of the rule of law and common security among its neighborhoods. When Johnson conveyed his intent to his Mexican counterpart, Díaz Ordaz responded "that the Treaty represented five years of hard work, and that it had begun, as do all realizations, just as a dream." The two executives then turned to another monumental dream—plans for a nuclear desalination plant to supply water to Baja California, Sonora, California, and Arizona.[680]

---

[678] Dean Rusk, Memorandum for President Lyndon Johnson, "U.S. Adherence to Protocol to Treaty Creating Latin American Nuclear Free Zone," 12 February 1968, *Declassified Documents Reference Service*, Doc # CK3100146716, 3.

[679] Dean Rusk, Memorandum for President Lyndon Johnson, "Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty," 26 October 1967, *Declassified Documents Reference Service*, Doc # CK3100446623

[680] Editorial Note, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Vol. XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), Document 360, 762.

García Robles continued to press the nuclear powers to adhere to Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as nonproliferation talks proceeded in Geneva and New York City. The French ambassador in Mexico City noted that, immediately upon his arrival at the United Nation, the Mexican undersecretary had approached Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasilii V. Kuznetsov to remind him that Mexican support for the NPT would hinge on Soviet adherence to Protocol II. The Soviet ambassador in Mexico City told his French counterpart that his country was dissatisfied with elements of the treaty, most notably, U.S. freedom of nuclear transit and the strict definition of nuclear weapons so permissive of PNEs. However, García Robles had made a Soviet signature on Protocol II a *quid pro quo* for Mexican support for the nonproliferation treaty, a bargain whose striking he portrayed as having been made in bad faith.[681] The State Department urged the Soviets to sign Protocol II so as to stymie attempts to postpone action on the nonproliferation treaty because of allegations of "unwillingness [of the] nuclear powers themselves to undertake arms control measures."[682]

Brazil continued to oppose a nonproliferation treaty with a loose definition of nuclear weapons that would outlaw PNEs, though it held back from outright opposition in Geneva and New York City. As the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament finalized the language of a draft treaty to send to the United Nations, Brazil joined Sweden and Romania in criticizing the lack of obligations from the nuclear club to disarm as well as the absence of security guarantees. In the end, the ENDC was incapable of producing a consensus draft due to Brazilian, along with Indian and Italian, objections

---

[681] French Embassy in Mexico City, Telegram to Paris, "M. Garcìa Robles et Soviet-Mexican *quid pro quo*," 18 April 1968, , Box 769, Nations Unies – Organisations internationals, 1965-1969. Cote 517INVA, Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères. Hereinafter AMAEF.
[682] U.S. Department of State Cable 142418 to U.S. Mission United Nations, "NPT and Resumed GA [General Assembly]," 5 April 1968, Document 15, NPT Collection, NSA, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc15.pdf.

even after Soviet and American co-chairmen agreed to add measures urged by non-aligned delegations, such as quinquennial review conferences; stronger preambular references to security assurances and a comprehensive test-ban treaty, territorial respect, and peaceful nuclear rights; and an Article VI stipulating disarmament negotiations in "good faith." The PNE question came to the fore in New York City when the UNGA met to debate the draft treaty. Latin American objections to Washington's position on PNEs were not restricted to Brazil. The Peruvian ambassador remarked to his French counterpart that his government held that a strict definition of nuclear weapons should suffice. Brazil's U.N. Ambassador and former Foreign Minister Araújo Castro had repeated this view in the interlude between the end of ENDC talks and the commencement of U.N. debate, inveighing against the treaty for bestowing on the nuclear club the "lion's share" of benefits and serving as an "instrument of North-American imperialism in the nuclear domain."[683]

Brazil's position on the nonproliferation treaty had further "hardened" by mid-April; nevertheless, the pro-U.S. military government erred on the side of minimizing the diplomatic fallout with its chief ally. On April 16, Magalhães Pinto told U.S. Ambassador to Brazil John W. Tuthill that he would inform Rusk that Brazil would not sign. As a result, he would oppose the nonproliferation treaty at the U.N. because his country could not afford "to impede its [nuclear] development for 25 years while nuclear powers … proliferate nuclear weapons without limitation." U.S. policymakers ascribed the tougher Brazilian attitude to Foreign Minister Magalhães Pinto, surmising that Costa e Silva "undoubtedly regrets opposing the US on so significant an issue," but observing that "domestic support on this highly nationalistic issue" in conjunction with the "considerable

[683] French Embassy in Lima, Telegram to Paris, "Peruvian views on NPT after American pressure applied," 19 April 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 2.

international support" for anti-treaty forces militated against a strong U.S. push to bring Brazil around. The potential to soften Brazilian policy was hampered by the huge domestic popularity of nuclear research and a pervasive anti-American mood so that "any alteration" would be viewed as a "sell-out" to Washington. Meanwhile, Magalhães Pinto hoped that opposition in the international community to the nonproliferation treaty was now general enough that Brazilian resistance in league with West Germany could block the treaty or at worst delegitimize it because of a slim victory margin.[684]

Magalhães Pinto had agreed to parley with Secretary Rusk on May 6. United States arms control negotiators were loath to reproduce in the nonproliferation treaty the "loophole" that now existed in the Treaty of Tlatelolco with reference to nuclear explosives. Foster described the transition from PNEs to nuclear weapons as akin to "exchanging one overcoat for another" because "the person wearing it was the same." Ambassador Araujo downplayed the gap between U.S. and Brazilian views and tried to convince his interlocutors that although the CSE resented a 25-year freeze, Brazilian leaders knew "that an international treaty [was] more important than anything else." He brooded that the nonproliferation treaty and its assurances resolution would "enlarge the responsibilities of the U.N. Charter" and of the Security Council in particular. Ambassador Sette Camara admitted that "there was no doubt that the Resolution would be carried" even with Argentina and Chile in league with Brazil and García Robles "blackmail[ing] the U.S.S.R. into signing Protocol II." Sette Camara asked as well why the Security Council resolution proposed by the superpowers lacked a "no-use" clause, to which Foster responded that unlike Tlatelolco the nonproliferation treaty would apply to zones where nuclear weapons were already stationed. Araujo retorted that "some balance

[684] U.S. State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Note-290, "Brazilian Opposition to NPT Draft Likely to Continue," 19 April 1968, Document 20a, NPT, NSA, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc20a.pdf.

was needed in the NPT about commitments of nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states," but Foster was emphatic that the fusion of arms control and deterrence authorized by the NPT—the securitization of internationalism—was the key to renewing the global nuclear order.

> [T]he treaty cannot be perfect. … The question now simply is: Is there or not to be an NPT? We missed the first chance to regulate nuclear weapons when the Baruch Plan was rejected. Now is the second chance. Perhaps this is the last chance.

Foster reassured Camara and Araujo that only PNEs and not "isotope separation[] plants, chemical separations plants, or nuclear propulsion" were prohibited. He also incorrectly maintained that further amendments to the treaty were unlikely despite García Robles ongoing campaign to win more concessions for the nuclear have-nots in New York City. Rusk and AEC Director Glenn Seaborg promised an expansion of the already sizable U.S. aid program in the nuclear field, including power development, desalination, mineral exploration, and oil shale recovery. The U.S. government hoped that pledges of nuclear assistance might unlock a Brazilian signature on the NPT, and Magalhães Pinto did relay that his government would act "constructive[ly]" in New York City, neither "proselytizing against [n]or obstructing the treaty."[685] Brazilian, Indian, and French abstentions from the final voting at the United Nations were in fact crucial to the treaty's achievement.

**Conclusion**

The decade of the 1960s witnessed the high water mark of nuclear internationalism with the opening for signatures of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the

[685] U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, "Brazil's Attitude on NPT," 6 May 1968, Document 20b, NPT, NSA,. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc20b.pdf

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in the Caribbean and Latin America. By banning nuclear weapons without qualifications from a bounded region, the Treaty of Tlatelolco was simultaneously the most ambitious and most limited of the measures. The scheme was introduced before the Cuban Missile Crisis in order to display the region's leadership and fidelity to internationalist measures to assure security on a common basis. It was the Soviet-American-Cuban standoff in the Caribbean that broadcast the urgency of an agreement. Even so, its consummation required the tireless efforts of Mexican Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Alfonso García Robles, who translated the mooted prohibition into a legal regime. García Robles training as an internationalist jurist, his years in the United Nations, and his outlook as an internationalist concerned with generational justice underlay his professional activism. His efforts were necessary because of the blowback of U.S. anticommunism on the character of Latin American politics in the 1960s, when reactionary governments in Argentina and Brazil turned away from internationalism and toward a nationalistic stance toward nuclear policies. The U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy was slow to acknowledge the truculence of Brasília and Buenos Aires, and it remains unclear whether the U.S. State Department leaned on its allies there to soften their opposition to a nuclear-free Latin America. Foggy Bottom panicked when its promotion of a liberal interpretation of nuclear weapons that included "peaceful" nuclear explosives was imperfectly applied with troubling precedents for nonproliferation proceedings. Thanks to the intervention of the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Fulton Freeman, however, the treaty was permitted to go forward with U.S. support; nevertheless, the episode illustrated the ambivalent and uneven thrust of U.S. policy toward a Latin American nuclear-free zone.

Washington ultimately endorsed the collective measure because of its salutary impulse on international nuclear diplomacy and the making of a nuclear nonproliferation regime. From a greater remove, the tale of the Treaty of Tlatelolco illuminated the equivocal legacy of U.S. nuclear diplomacy during the Kennedy and Johnson years. First, the alacrity with which successive administrations jettisoned the principles of liberal internationalism in favor of a Cold War strategy that embraced right-wing dictatorships for the purpose of disempowering social democrats in the region hampered the establishment of a nuclear-free zone. Second, Washington's fixation on military bases, colonial holdings, and freedom of transit for U.S. nuclear warheads erected numerous roadblocks for the negotiations. Third, the preoccupation with adding a proscription of all nuclear explosives in the treaty nearly upended the consensus behind the compact and anticipated the supreme dilemma of the nuclear nonproliferation regime—how to distinguish between peaceful and military technologies. Finally, the letter and spirit of the Treaty of Tlatelolco demonstrated that the quest to control nuclear weapons went beyond the nation-states of the Industrial North. Members of the Global South could in fact exceed the aspirations of limited or unequal treaties. Excavating the original intents, meanings, and understanding from the origins of the Treaty of Tlatelolco thus unearths the triumph and the tragedy of a global nuclear order arising in the late-1960s. The campaign to bring order to the Nuclear Age was more universal than held by conventional wisdom; even so, its signature achievement paled in comparison to actions elsewhere.

# Chapter Five | *In Accordance: Safeguards and the International Community*

*[B]y the end of my period there … in '68, I had learned how to drive a Volga automobile, and drunk a good deal of vodka with … fellow Soviet negotiators. There was … just a complete change in the attitudes and relationships between the two delegations, starting really with the Cuban missile crisis.*

*George Bunn, Interview, "Have and Have-Nots," in War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, Episode 108, Betacam, 30 November 1986.*

## Introduction: Integration and Inspections

The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) reconvened on February 21, 1967, and met through March 23. A Mexican visitor took the floor following remarks by the plenary chairman, U.S. delegation chief William Foster, and Soviet spokesman Alexi Roshchin. Foster and Roshchin paid "generous tribute" to the "modest contribution" made by Alfonso García Robles to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, for whose submission to the ENDC the Mexican diplomat was in attendance. García Robles touted the features of a nuclear-free zone as "even more ambitious than those of a non-proliferation treaty," lauding it as a model for "guarantee[ing] the complete absence of nuclear weapons in a region inhabited by man." The treaty's scope stemmed in part from the regional absence of nuclear-weapon states and in part from a Bolivarian tradition of protecting Latin American independence by means of mutual respect for the rule of law, non-aggression, and common security. He expressed his hope that the treaty's opening for signature would afford "the necessary stimulus" to finalize a global nonproliferation pact.[686] The triumph buoyed Mexico's reputation as well. With its influence soaring, Mexican delegates could do more than shepherd a treaty through by

[686] Final Verbatim Record of the 287th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 21 February 1967, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.287.

moderating North-South differences. García Robles's presence bore witness to a shift in favor of the non-aligned grouping whose states resided mostly in the Global South.

International nuclear diplomacy in 1967 brought the international community to the threshold of a full draft nonproliferation treaty. With the quandary of NATO nuclear-sharing largely resolved in the language of Articles I and II, East-West nuclear relations centered on the safeguards controversy, while North-South differences emerged most clearly around the matters of security guarantees, peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs), and disarmament linkages. The overarching concern in nonproliferation proceedings, however, was to achieve the consensus needed to make a treaty effective and endow it with lasting legitimacy. The superpowers trusted the effectiveness of bilateral safeguards with their Cold War allies less and less, but failed to harmonize their views on the formal relationship between regional nuclear organizations, most prominently the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and the proposed international nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). West Germany and Italy resisted Euratom's full integration into the IAEA inspectorate on commercial and political grounds, which led to charges of Soviet-American "complicity" from Bonn. India continued to enjoin the nuclear powers to extend nuclear assurances to the non-aligned bloc. Although Washington denied New Delhi's request for reasons of nuclear doctrine and nuclear options in Vietnam and Korea, the fostering of an international community of arms controllers in Geneva helped to conciliate differences in regards to Article III. The Six Days War in the Levant dramatized the perils of nuclear weapons being added to regional powder kegs, and the Arab-Israeli conflict impelled a summit in Glassboro, New Jersey to improve superpower relations.

In the end, though, it was low-level, *ad referendum* talks in Geneva made possible by the social milieu there that afforded a partial solution to the safeguards controversy and

kept open the window for détente. As a result of these efforts, Soviet and American delegations presented common draft treaties with Article III removed on August 24, 1967. A notable sign of progress, the turn of events launched a new phase of nonproliferation diplomacy when the views of non-aligned members increasingly took center stage. A Mexican working paper outlining what would eventually constitute Articles IV, V, VI, and VII of the nonproliferation treaty garnered widespread support among the non-aligned, while Sweden's insistence on special consideration for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty (CTBT) embedded a formal linkage between the two forms of nuclear prohibition. The Indian attitude remained problematic, however, as U.S. and Soviet officials failed to agree on a viable mode of security assurances and Canadian efforts to exert pressure on New Delhi backfired. The Eastern and Western blocs crept toward an agreement on safeguards in the fall, but divisions in the Federal Republic's governing coalition forestalled the presentation of a full consensus draft treaty at year's end.

**Designing Safeguards**

Eastern and Western diplomats still grappled with resolving the salient issues over which the blocs were at odds. Clashing Soviet-American views in regards to the legality of a collective nuclear force in a European federation and the relationship between the safeguards of Euratom and the IAEA succeeded disputes relating to a now defunct NATO multilateral nuclear force. The revision of Articles I and II had largely settled the German question with respect to nuclear security. According to a French summary:

> Bonn would renounce by means of an international treaty any form of military nuclear capability in peacetime, without however having to sacrifice the measures now taken to furnish German units with nuclear weapons in the event of war.[687]

Now, the central question was how the treaty would affect European integration. Specifically, how would Euratom synchronize its safeguards with those of an international regime? And would a treaty recognize a European federation as a *de jure* nuclear power–an atomic confederacy–if the U.K. or France bequeathed to it a nuclear arsenal?[688] One workaround considered by the U.S. Disarmament Agency was to leave the European clause ambiguous. This tactic would preclude an original understanding; however, deliberate ambiguity would allow Moscow to disavow the contingency while allaying West Germany and Italy's misgivings.[689] The objective was therefore "Soviet silence, or no-contradiction, when our allies, and later the United States, state that the treaty would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components."[690]

On February 25, U.S. Disarmament Agency Deputy Director Adrian Fisher apprised Georg von Lilienfeld of the Federal Republic's Foreign Office that Washington's policy was to obtain Moscow's tacit approval. West German Chancellor Kurt Georg

---

[687] Note, "Projet américain de traité sur la non prolifération des armes nucléaires," 10 February1967, Box 768, Nations Unies – Organisations internationals, 1960-1969, Cote 517INVA, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères Français, 4. The French Foreign Ministry Archives will hereinafter be referred to as AMAEF. Translations from the French are the author's own.

[688] Darryl A Howlett, University of Southampton, and Centre for International Policy Studies, *EURATOM and Nuclear Safeguards* (Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with the Centre for International Policy Studies, University of Southampton, 1990); Grégoire Mallard, "The Atomic Confederacy: Europe's Quest for Nuclear Weapons and the Making of the New World Order" (Dissertation, Princeton University, 2008).

[689] Khalessi, "The Ambiguity of Nuclear Commitments," 28–32. Khalessi focuses his analysis on the implications of ambiguities in the NPT's first two articles with reference to nuclear-sharing arrangements in NATO. A tacit agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to agree to disagree on the right of a future European Union to succeed to the nuclear status of the United Kingdom or France upon their political integration therein was equally salient during the nonproliferation negotiations.

[690] Adrian Fisher, Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "Plan of Action for Non-Proliferation Treaty Negotiation," 25 February 1967, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Doc. 183, 445-448. Hereinafter referred to as *FRUS*.

Kiesinger was handed a copy of the draft summary of interpretations as well that Foggy Bottom composed in order to clarify the articles' original meanings with regard to a federal European force in the eyes of Western Europe and the United States.[691] U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk had "grave concern[s]," however, regarding the wisdom of leaving the interpretations "unresolved." The U.S. delegation "would look rather silly" if they tabled a treaty in concert with Soviet officials when the two sides in fact disagreed. Furthermore, such a failure of procedural choreography might hamper efforts of Disarmament Agency officials in Geneva, who were struggling to keep U.S. allies in line. "This would give all those in Germany and Italy who might be looking for a pretext a major point on which to oppose the NPT."[692] The European clause thus loomed over the proceedings that summer, a final vestige of the East-West impasse over what form of NATO nuclear-sharing and European integration the treaty would sanction.

The central object of negotiations swung to matters that had heretofore bubbled beneath the surface of the transfer-clause bottleneck. First, in what agency would the funding, staffing, execution, and oversight of nuclear safeguards reside? Second, how could the three nuclear powers represented in Geneva address the insecurity of states pledging to renounce the military option? Third, what timeframe and means of redress would negotiators embed in the legal text? Fourth, where would the threshold lie between the peaceful and military applications of nuclear technology, and especially of "peaceful"

[691] Ibid., Adrian Fisher, Memorandum to Dean Rusk, "Plan of Action for Non-Proliferation Treaty Negotiation," 25 February 1967, 445-446. The interpretive summary's final paragraph specified that a nonproliferation draft treaty, "does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. A new federated European state would have to control all of its external security functions including defense and all foreign policy matters relating to external security, but would not have to be so centralized as to assume all governmental functions. It would bar, however, transfer (including ownership) of nuclear weapons or control over them to a new multilateral or other entity lacking the attributes of a federated state essential to bring into play the legal doctrine of succession."

[692] Dean Rusk, Telegram to the Mission in Geneva, "False position on NPT," 26 February 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 184, 449.

nuclear explosives? Finally, what bearing would prohibitions on spreading or developing nuclear weapons have on the nuclear arms race? In short, the paramount matters of debate now related to technical, institutional, commercial, and procedural determinations and hinged on two questions related to perception. Would northern states with promising nuclear industries view the proposed global nuclear order and the nuclear emporium it would regulate as open and fair? And would countries in the Global South regard the treaty as legitimate? The nascent international community needed to answer these questions before the treaty opened for signature.

The United Kingdom, Canada, and Italy remained sensitive to the concerns of non-aligned states in Geneva, which hailed mostly from the postcolonial world and hungered for developmental aid. Lord Chalfont underlined the "need for means of redress" if the nuclear powers were unwilling or unable to make progress on arms control.[693] Italian representative Francesco Cavalletti di Oliveto Savino maintained on February 28 that the treaty's "effectiveness" and "equity" were "closely interdependent," since its legitimacy depended on signatories deeming it useful and just. "[T]here could be no universal approbation for a non-proliferation treaty," he warned, "that established a perpetual discrimination between two classes of countries." He held that the compact must function as a "starting-point" for reversing the arms race and controlling nuclear weapons in view of "their gradual elimination."[694] The Canadian representative, E.L.M. Burns, seconded Cavalletti, calling for a legal means for member states to withdraw if they concluded that authorized nuclear powers were not fulfilling their obligations:

---

[693] Final Verbatim Record of the 288th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 23 February 1967, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.288, 5.
[694] Final Verbatim Record of the 289th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 28 February 1967, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.289, 7-8.

> It is neither unnatural nor unreasonable that countries forgoing their option to produce nuclear weapons should wish to ensure that their act of self-denial should in turn lead the nuclear weapon powers to undertake tangible steps to reduce and eliminate their vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. We are therefore of the opinion that nuclear-weapons States signatories to a treaty should be party to a clear and compelling declaration of intent to embark on the process of nuclear arms control.[695]

The European members of NATO represented in Geneva seemed focused on satisfying the demands of non-aligned members, in particular that a treaty codify the equitable balance of obligations and rights outlined in UNGA Resolution 2028 (XX).

The Latin American negotiations alerted United States policymakers to the hazards of a nuclear explosives typology specifying the legality of those of ostensibly non-military design or purpose. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) devised an international service that would control and affordably supply nuclear explosives for earth-shaping work in the Global South. Other NATO members toed the U.S. and Soviet line on the PNE issue, although Italian diplomats admitted to French observers in Geneva that they resented the new proscription.[696] As for the French, a report by the Ministry of External Affairs reviewing developments in nonproliferation talks called attention to the potential of an international PNE service to expand and take control of other peaceful activities, thereby subverting the principle of national sovereignty.[697] It was unclear whether these positions resulted from genuine sympathy, a genuine desire to strengthen the treaty, disarmament hopes, leverage tactics, or structural incentives for middle powers to curb superpower aggrandizement.

---

[695] Ibid. Final Verbatim Record of the 289th Meeting of the Conference of the ENDC, 28 February 1967, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.289, 16.

[696] Telegram from Rome to Paris, "Italian views on Geneva developments,"17 February 1967, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 2.

[697] Op. cit. Note, "Projet américain de traité sur la non prolifération des armes nucléaires," 10 February 1967, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 4.

While the West Europeans reassured the non-aligned states, Soviet-American talks aimed at settling outstanding issues related to Europe. Consultations had always striven to stave off the arrival of new nuclear powers while fending off geopolitical challenges from recent entrants in the nuclear club. In Asia and the Global South more broadly, the paramount contender was Mao's China. In Europe and the Industrial North, de Gaulle's France worked to endow the European political future with a Gallic essence. The broader strategy of subduing China and France by enshrining their exceptional positions as nuclear powers relied on a willingness of European states besides France to accept a nonproliferation regime whose remit was global rather than regional. A public communiqué by the West German government called on those states with nuclear weapons to "take the next steps" in arms control and disarmament: a CTBT, fissile-material cutoff treaty, and a freeze in warhead and delivery vehicle numbers.[698] U.S. and Soviet officials accordingly felt pressure to align their views on the arms race so as to increase their leverage in multilateral nuclear diplomacy. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara met Soviet ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin at McNamara's residence on April 5. There, they endeavored to lay the groundwork for strategic weapons talks and discussed the relationship between nonproliferation and European affairs. McNamara assured Dobrynin that "western European nations, excluding France, would support the Treaty." All that was needed were some "clarifications" on nuclear security, specifically the efficacy of permissive action links on U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and the outcome of U.S.-NATO

[698] "Declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany on the subject of Nuclear Disarmament and a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," in *Documents on Disarmament, 1967* (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of State Historical Office, 1968), 179-182; Telegram from Paris to elsewhere, "German NATO delegations clarifications re Bonn's views on NPT,"30 March 1967, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

consultations revolving around "possible veto[es]" by governments hosting the armaments."[699]

Safeguards were increasingly the focus of Soviet-American bilateral talks. How could the two sides reconcile West European nuclear collaboration through Euratom with superpower intentions to construct a unified regime along global lines administered by the IAEA? France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, West Germany, and Italy were the six founding members of Euratom, which was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The architect of European integration, Jean Monnet, had designed the treaty in parallel with the consolidation of regional markets for the premier dual-use commodities of the Industrial Age–the European Coal and Steel Community. One stimulus was integrationists' conviction that they could avert a third conflict in Europe through regional integration and supranational institutions. The 1956 Suez Crisis and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's resulting embargo of oil exports to Western Europe presented a second economic imperative to coordinate more closely on the development and regulation of nuclear energy and its neighborhood market. Because of the military orientation of its nuclear regime and de Gaulle's atomic nationalism though, France was divesting itself of Euratom. When Euratom Commission President Etienne Hirsh tried to circumvent the French veto by enforcing the qualified majority voting authorized in the originating treaty, de Gaulle successfully supplanted him and reinstituted the customary unanimity principle. As a consequence, Euratom failed to expand research into and development of advanced-centrifuge designs for uranium enrichment, or breeder reactors capable of yielding prodigious amounts of weapons-grade

[699] Walt Rostow, Telegram to President Johnson, in Texas, "Sec. McNamara's account of his talk with Dobrynin," 15 April 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 195, 474-477.

plutonium because of French unwillingness to abide multilateral work.[700] Western diplomats therefore fretted that the French veto could prevent Euratom's subjection to IAEA oversight. The five member states' views were split with West Germany and Italy resistant and the Benelux countries amenable to subordinating regional autonomy to global nonproliferation efforts.[701]

The Soviet Union had become "more Catholic than the pope" in regards to the necessity of international safeguards in response to a nuclear boom in West Germany.[702] Moscow still refused to permit IAEA inspections on its own non-military nuclear facilities though. In a press conference on February 23, Lord Chalfont chattily expanded on Soviet reservations and their implications:

> [The] [p]oint that must be borne in mind is that [the] Soviet Union would regard Euratom safeguards as a form of self-policing, and they'd be reluctant to accept them. If safeguard arrangements acceptable to the Soviet Union can't be devised, there ain't going to be any treaty.[703]

Moscow's reversal stemmed from an almost pathological fear of a secret West German military program. Soviet displeasure with the state of bilateral arrangements may have contributed as well. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were both coming to terms with the proliferation risks attending their peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with allied governments, leading Washington and Moscow to agree independently with Chalfont's claim that "in general … international and multilateral safeguards [were] more valuable

---

[700] Grégoire Mallard, "Can the Euratom Treaty Inspire the Middle East?: The Political Promises of Regional Nuclear Communities," *Nonproliferation Review* 15, no. 3 (November 2008): 459–477.

[701] Howlett and Centre for International Policy Studies, *EURATOM and Nuclear Safeguards*.

[702] Quester, *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation*, 44.

[703] Transcript, "Lord Chalfont's Comment on Safeguards at Press Conference," 23 February 1967, Folder 2, Box 18, William C. Foster Papers, George C. Marshall Library. The transcript seems to have paraphrased and elided stretches of the question and answer. Hereinafter, this archival source will be referred to as, Foster Papers, GCML.

than bilateral."[704] Following a furtive visit by North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung in late-1966, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev welcomed a high-ranking North Korean delegation led by Vice Premier Kim Il to the Soviet Union on February 13, 1967. The Hungarian Ambassador in Moscow reported that Kosygin and Brezhnev rebuffed a North Korean request for a large nuclear reactor because of the opacity with which Pyongyang operated a Soviet research reactor supplied 18 months earlier; "since then the Soviet comrades hardly have any data about its operation."[705] The Soviet nuclear archipelago had heretofore offered reactors unaccompanied by safeguards as long as spent fuel was returned; however, the Kremlin's faith that recipients would not apply atomic largesse to military ends was no breaking.

The White House likewise questioned bilateral contracts with its Cold War allies. The U.S. AEC took a harder look at South Africa's uranium exports and nuclear program in late 1966. The U.S.-South African bilateral agreement was set to expire in summer 1967 and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) and AEC wanted firmer guarantees that "South African policy [was] to take no action which could in any way contribute to the spread of nuclear weapon capability." U.S. authorities were especially concerned that South Africa had supplied uranium ore to France without safeguards, which Washington pressed Pretoria to place under IAEA safeguards as a precondition of continuing the supply of enriched uranium to the Pelindaba research reactor. South Africa resolved in March to await the result of direct talks with

[704] Ibid. Transcript, "Lord Chalfont Comments on Safeguards at Press Conference," 23 February 1967, Folder 2, Box 18, Foster Papers, GCML.
[705] Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 13 March 1967, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1967, 61. doboz, 5, 002126/1967. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110621

Washington and "the outcome of the deliberations … in Geneva."[706] With the talks hinging ever more on Soviet-American harmony on the multifaceted safeguards article, Moscow and Washington's distrust of peripheral allies served as a common motivation.

The U.S. Atomic Energy Agency urged that the treaty authorize an international safeguards framework under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Rusk began referring to the agreement as "Dr. Seaborg's treaty," after AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg successfully parried an initiative by European federalists in Foggy Bottom to modify the language "to provide for IAEA verification of the Euratom safeguard system on a basis to be mutually agreed between the two organizations." He doubted that such an arrangement was feasible given that verification would require "unrestricted access to … facilities and safeguard activities," and challenged whether European states were in fact so implacably opposed to IAEA supremacy following a transition period.[707] Fisher concurred with Seaborg because the U.S.S.R. and indeed most nations wanted "a single uniform and broadly international system."[708] The Disarmament Agency tried to inscribe that preference into language on which Atlantic allies and communist counterparties could agree and then devise tactics to placate both. Fisher consulted West German observers in Geneva, suggesting three revisions that would alleviate their misgivings. First, there would be a "substantial transition period for all undertakings in the article;" namely, three years would pass before the IAEA and Euratom had to determine the exact means of coordination. The "guillotine clause" would oblige

---

[706] South African Department of Foreign Affairs, "Nuclear Proliferation Problem" 18 March 1967, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, South African Foreign Affairs Archives, Brand Fourie, Nuclear Proliferation Problems, F194, 18 May 1967. Obtained and contributed by Anna-Mart van Wyk, Monash South Africa. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114139

[707] Glenn Seaborg, Memorandum to Dean Rusk, "Modifying the United States Approach to Article III of the NPT," in *Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1961-1971*, Vol. 14, January 1 – June 30, 1967 (Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, University of California, 1989), 272-275.

[708] Ibid. Glenn Seaborg, Memorandum to Rusk, "Modifying the United States Approach to Article III of the NPT," in *Journal*, Vol. 14, 274.

Euratom to accept IAEA inspections if a viable alternative eluded the agencies' negotiators. Second, the safeguards would not apply to transfers of "non-nuclear materials and equipment" (i.e. products besides fissionable materials), such as reactors, centrifuges, and reprocessing plants. Finally, the article would state that preventing the "diversion of materials to nuclear weapons manufacture" was its sole aim.[709] These last two changes were significant because they heralded a movement of lasting consequence to orient safeguards toward monitoring flows of uranium, thorium, and plutonium through reactors and reprocessing centers rather than conducting forensic operations vis-à-vis dual-purpose activities and facilities. The revisions were meant to soothe West German officials, who complained that the current language might serve as "a basis for communist espionage, or for interference in peaceful industrial and scientific endeavors."[710] Fisher acknowledged that the Soviets might reject a narrower focus; however, he also pointed out that a concert of interest existed. Neither superpower wanted to legitimate the creation of a Euratom equivalent in Eastern Europe or the Middle East.[711] Russian negotiator Roland Timerbaev underscored this point repeatedly

[709] The modified draft article III read: For the purpose of providing assurance that nuclear materials used or produced in peaceful nuclear facilities are not diverted to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Parties agree upon the following provisions. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to accept, on all its peaceful nuclear activities, the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency or international safeguards the operation of which that Agency accepts and verifies as equally effective. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to provide source or fissionable material for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon State unless the material is subject to such safeguards. The safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be applied as soon as practicable but no later than three years after the entry into force of this Treaty, except with respect to activities or materials to which other international safeguards are being applied that meet the foregoing requirements of acceptance and verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Adrian Fisher, Memorandum to Rusk, "NPT Safeguards Article: Action Memorandum," 4 March 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 188.

[710] Ibid. Adrian Fisher, Memorandum to Rusk, "NPT Safeguards," 4 March 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 188, 454-455.

[711] Dean Rusk, Telegram to William Foster in Geneva, "NPT Safeguards Article," 8 March 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 190. Soviet arms control negotiator describes a document in the LBJ President Library in which "some of the important members of the [N]ational Security Council wrote to Lyndon Johnson that the whole idea [was] no good because the Russian[s] would create SovAtom, and the Arabs

when speaking to Western authorities in Geneva. On March 4, Fisher "strongly" advised Rusk to consult first with the Soviets before conferring further with allies.[712] It would take the rest of the summer though for the Soviet and American delegations in Geneva to find workable language and pitch it successfully to their respective governments.

Whether the International Atomic Energy Agency would oversee nuclear-weapon states' peaceful activities was the second question on whose resolution industrial and developing states' consent turned. The U.S. delegation requested a six-week recess when the ENDC session concluded on March 23 in order to consult allies in Bonn and Tokyo about the safeguards article. The scope of the global nuclear emporium was expanding rapidly in the mid-1960s. According to an IAEA report, the total capacity of new reactors ordered by all countries in 1966 was 23,000 megawatts—nearly three times the amount generated by all nuclear power plants then in operation.[713] Moreover, nuclear power plants' operating costs had dropped below those of coal-fired power plants, though the calculations omitted expenses related to accident liability, research and development, capital subsidies, mining and enrichment, and waste-management, which governments usually footed.[714] Thanks to Seaborg and Fisher's interventions, the U.S. draft Article III floated to European allies outlined a three-year transition period, but not legal equivalence between regional and international agencies. To sweeten the pot against the background of European Economic Community talks and burgeoning competition in the

---

Arabatom." Transcript of Interview with Roland Timerbaev conducted by Rich Hooper and Jenni Rissanen, 14 June 2007, Vienna, Austria.

[712] Adrian Fisher, op. cit., Memorandum to Rusk, "NPT Safeguards," 4 March 1967, 454-455.

[713] "Orders Rose in '66 for Atomic Plants," 11 July 1967, *The New York Times*, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, 8.

[714] One study calculated that reactors whose construction began in 1966 or 1967 whose operating costs were then estimated to entail approximately $560 per kilowatt/hour (in 1990 dollars) actually cost approximately $1,170 per kilowatt/hour (in 1990 dollars). David Schlissel, "The True Cost of Nuclear Power," Friends of the Earth, presentation by Benjamin Schreiber at Global Green USA, Washington, D.C., "The Economic of Nuclear Power," seminar series, "Energy Futures: Nuclear Power, Global Warming, and Nonproliferation."

energy markets, the U.S. Disarmament Agency with AEC support contemplated the merits of offering to place non-military nuclear facilities in the U.S. under IAEA supervision. European officials voiced misgivings about industrial espionage and commercial equity to Foster when he traveled around Western capitals after the ENDC adjourned.[715] Foster believed that the "voluntary cooperation of the U.S. nuclear industry" was forthcoming and passed along that "[t]he British have indicated privately to us … [that] the United Kingdom would do likewise."[716] The Soviet Union was intransigent, however, on the subject of allowing IAEA inspectors to enter its inner nuclear sanctums. On the eve of North Atlantic Council (NAC) meetings to discuss the nonproliferation agenda, U.S. Undersecretary of State Nick Katzenbach begged National Security Adviser Walt Rostow to direct Johnson's attention to the matter. "[O]ur willingness to do this," Katzenbach contended, "may prove the key to solving the Euratom safeguards problem in the NPT context."[717] Canadian officials also "put forward the idea that the Western nuclear powers make unilateral declarations of intent, separate but parallel to the treaty, voluntarily to accept safeguards on their own peaceful programs."[718] Such an offer might unlock the support of West Germany, whose officials worried about nuclear market-share, and the goodwill of the Global South, whose states distrusted all forms of discrimination.

A brewing crisis in United States-West German relations risked upending efforts to invest the treaty with broad and lasting legitimacy. The offer to submit select U.S.

---

[715] William Foster, Memorandum to Johnson, "Offer to Put U.S. Peaceful Nuclear Facilities under IAEA Safeguards," 6 April 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 193.
[716] Ibid. Foster, Memorandum to Johnson, "Offer to Put U.S. Peaceful Nuclear Facilities under IAEA safeguards," 6 April 1967, 472.
[717] Walt Rostow, Memorandum to Johnson, "IAEA Safeguards on Peaceful U.S. Facilities," 8 April 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 194.
[718] Legault, *A Diplomacy of Hope*, 263, Footnote 82.

facilities to IAEA inspection tested Bonn's willingness to aid Washington's quest to build a global nuclear order in league with Moscow. If the Federal Republic's reservations with the treaty were principally commercial under Kiesinger and Brandt, the concession would mean that U.S. firms would operate under the same rules as the rest of the Industrial North. Moreover, the U.S. government would thenceforth be an equal stakeholder in the IAEA. On the other hand, a rejection would reveal if West German resistance camouflaged military designs or geopolitical machinations.

At a press conference on February 27, Kiesinger had lamented Soviet-American "complicity" in pushing for a treaty. When presidential adviser John J. McCloy visited Bonn to arrange trilateral negotiations among the U.S., the U.K., and the F.R.G. for troop offsets in Central Europe, Kiesinger claimed that his remarks were made "smilingly." Even so, the West German chancellor underscored the domestic challenges that his coalition government faced as a result of a treaty that would "ask Germany to enter into a binding agreement with its major adversary, limiting even further its capabilities in the nuclear field."[719] Foster tried to quiet Kiesinger's concerns that a nonproliferation treaty would further disadvantage Bonn at the same moment that the U.S. was reducing its troop levels in Europe to compensate for troop deployments in Southeast Asia, and the U.S. and U.K. were pushing for an increase in West German purchases of military equipment from them in order to set right the lopsided balance-of-payments engendered by NATO troop deployments.[720] With Bonn ever more tempted by the political advantages of European integration along Franco-German lines, Washington could ill afford circumscribing the evolution of a European federation, or, relatedly, the

[719] Walt Rostow, Telegram to President Johnson, in Texas, "McCloy's meeting with Kiesinger—trilateral talks," 6 March 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIII, Western Europe Region, Doc. 239.
[720] Gavin, *Gold, Dollars, and Power*.

viability and autonomy of Euratom. Johnson's promise that an "equitable treaty" would bring security to both countries rested on his ability "to work out formulas which the Federal Republic and our other Allies [would] find acceptable."[721]

West European concerns with the treaty now related primarily to commercial interests, in particular Euratom's legal relationship to the IAEA. However, security and geopolitical considerations continued to reverberate throughout the West German domestic sphere. The governing coalition was split on the matter, but pro-treaty voices held the upper hand given the ambivalence of Chancellor Kiesinger and the support of Social Democratic Party (SDP) chairman Willy Brandt, who controlled the foreign ministry. Brandt had thus far staved off treaty opponents such as Finance Minister Franz Joseph Strauss of the Christian Socialist Union (CSU). On February 17, Brandt decried the "un-objective arguments and exaggerated polemics" of anti-treaty voices in the Bundestag. "The treaty," Brandt proclaimed at a SDP meeting, "should harm no vital German interests and if we sign it after conscientious examination, it will not harm any vital German interest either." The Party presidium issued a statement maintaining that "the rights of non-nuclear nations" rather than "intentional discrimination against West Germany," was the overriding concern."[722] Whether Bonn's point man in the disarmament arena, Ambassador Swidbert Schnippenkoetter shared this view was unclear though. At a working lunch in Washington, Chalmers Roberts of the *Washington Post* interrogated National Security Council staffer Spurgeon Keeny about the White House's reading of Schnippenkoetter's alleged remark that "his mission to the United

---

721 Dean Rusk, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany, "President's Letter to Chancellor Kiesinger," 11 March 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIII, Doc. 241.

722 Spurgeon Keeny, Letter to Francis Bator, "Something good out of Germany for a change," 17 February 1967, Box 6, Keeny papers, NSF, LBJL,attached telegram.

States was to prevent the NPT?" Keeny could only reply that he was "confident" that "U.S.-German relations would survive the NPT."[723]

Capitalist states contemplated the nonproliferation proceedings as members of the Industrial North rather than the Atlantic Community. Senator John Pastore (D – RI) suggested an innovative approach in a congressional speech whereby Euratom would negotiate with the IAEA to "develop equivalent technical safeguards for [its] safeguards system" that the Vienna organization would in turn verify.[724] In light of Pastore's association with prominent members of the arms control cabal in the Johnson administration, members of the Geneva negotiating team likely heard the JCAE chairman's proposed solution. It was certainly remarkable that unofficial conversations between the U.S. and Soviet delegations seized on a two-tier arrangement as a possible key to breaking the impasse, though the final language would avoid any connotation of equivalence.

The viewpoints of nation-states in the Global South were far cloudier. McNamara cautioned Dobrynin that [t]he attitudes of India and certain of the non-European powers" were much less clear.[725] Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi instructed her personal secretary, L. K. Jha, to make inquiries about parallel security assurances for India in Moscow, Paris, London, and Washington. Jha persuaded Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to hand over a tentative promise to require nuclear powers to "act quickly through the Security Council" in case a non-nuclear-weapon state signatory to the treaty faced an "unprovoked nuclear threat or attack." Gromyko had evidently

---

[723] Spurgeon Keeny, Memorandum for Walt Rostow, "Lunch with Messrs. Howard Simons, Chalmers Roberts, and Murrey Marder of the *Washington Post*," 19 April 1967, Box 5, Keeny papers, NSF, LBJL.
[724] U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record*, vol. CXIII, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 5895
[725] Walt Rostow, Telegram to President Johnson, in Texas, "Sec. McNamara's account of his talk with Dobrynin," 15 April 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 195, 474-475.

agreed to add the word "threat" at the Indian envoy's "insistence."[726] When he visited Paris that spring, Gromyko described the Indian request as resulting from a desire "to benefit indirectly from the deterrent power of existing nuclear forces."[727] On April 19, Jha met Johnson to ascertain whether the U.S. would join the U.S.S.R. in issuing "separate but similar declarations." Rostow characterized the language as "not … too onerous, at first glance." Nevertheless, its notification that a nuclear "aggressor" would "not go unpunished" would "clearly preclude us from first use of nuclear weapons in either North Korea or Vietnam."[728] Johnson chose not to commit the U.S. to a particular action; however, his words were studiously encouraging. Yet, even as members of the National Security Council applauded the "major change in the Soviet position … clearly set[ting] Russia apart from China and closer to us in the midst of the Vietnam war," military planning in East Asia continued to work against a viable security guarantee for non-aligned states desirous of them.[729] They remained a key and irreducible variable in the calculus of international nuclear security.

**Diplomatic Community in Geneva**

The resumption of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament was pushed back to May 18 on account of inconclusive triangular diplomacy with respect to Article III among Euratom members, the United States, and Soviet Union. The U.S. and its European allies remained at loggerheads, which necessitated the added delay; Bonn

---

[726] Howard Wriggins, Memorandum for Walt W. Rostow, "Your Meeting with L. K. Jha Saturday, April 15, at noon," 15 April 1967, Box 132 [1 of 2], CF—India, NSF, LBJL, 1.
[727] Direction des Affaires Politiques, Note, "Garanties des non nucléaires. Projet de resolution du Conseil de Sécurityé," 29 March 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 2.
[728] Walt Rostow, Memorandum for the President, "Indian Translation into English of Russian Text of Proposed Soviet Security Declaration regarding NPT," with attachment, "Rough translation of the revised Russian Draft," 19 April 1967, Box 128 [1 of 2], CF—India, NSF, LBJL.
[729] Op. cit. Wriggins, Memorandum for Rostow, "Meeting with Jha," 15 April 1967, 2.

"objected" to Foster's suggestion to table an identical draft treaty with the Soviet delegation that left out the safeguards article. West Germany wanted a draft safeguards article to feature a transition period and formalize equivalence between the two regimes, which Moscow would not condone. The U.S.-Euratom talks collapsed on May 14. Brandt bent on procedural issues; however, Bonn placed two conditions on a Soviet-American joint tabling of draft treaties without Article III.[730] First, the consultations would transpire "privately" and, secondly, Foster would commend the current draft article in the plenary. Although a joint draft treaty was still months away, the concession opened the door for back-channel talks in Geneva that would demonstrate the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament's utility as a diplomatic middle ground.

Soviet and American delegates settled some key points during the intermission. New Year's Day 1967 would mark the date by which a country would need to have detonated an atomic explosive to qualify as a legitimate nuclear-weapon state. Nuclear have-nots among the Western Four and non-aligned groupings agitated for preambular statements enjoining the nuclear haves to "end the nuclear arms race" and spelling out an inalienable right to nuclear "peaceful" research and development, as well as questioning the treaty's duration and means of redress for state parties desirous of future amendments or withdrawal.[731] The non-aligned awaited the submission of a working draft to "put their stamp" on the treaty.

New constellations of affinities among the multiplying states of the world were on display in Geneva. The ENDC embodied a new paradigm of internationalism—the rise of the "international community." Its onset occasioned a diluting and consolidation of

---

[730] Dean Rusk, Memorandum to President Johnson, "Proposed Tabling of a Non-Proliferation Treaty at the ENDC," undated, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 196, 477.
[731] Thomas J. Hamilton, "Pact Still Snagged as Atom Talks Near," May 13, 1967, *The New York Times*, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, 4.

authority in the two-tiered United Nations system and a widening of its circle of jurisdiction to encompass latent threats to international security. These processes would play out in microcosm at the 18-nation committee.

The Geneva negotiations were a foundational moment in the rise of an international community and the renovation of the international order against the background of Cold War fragmentation. The Second World War brought about a twofold postwar settlement. First, Cold War bipolarity hardened by 1947 with the U.S., U.S.S.R., and their respective allies, engaged in a tense standoff in Central Europe and East Asia. Second, international charters drafted during and after the war constituted a galaxy of multilateral organizations and gave rise to a "layer-cake," multi-organ, world-spanning body of global governance.[732] To articulate the institutional sinews of the postwar order, a second-level network of regional and global forums such as the United Nations General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament arose to dictate whether and how the international system would function and evolve in practice.[733] These "middle grounds" worked haphazardly in the immediate postwar owing to diverging superpower interests. The end-around orchestrated by the U.S. to authorize a U.N. police action against North Korean aggression in 1950 when Soviet officials quit the Security Council ushered in a decade of political stalemate, especially in regions considered vital to Cold War containment. Hence, for more than a decade, the locus of U.N. influence resided in the Third World. It was only when the Sino-Soviet split, the French revolt, and postcolonial states' newfound majority in the UNGA threatened their alliances and interests that the superpowers returned to the forlorn system of global

---

[732] G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 163–214.
[733] Akira Iriye, *Global Community the Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.90009.

governance. Nuclear diplomacy was accordingly the cause, the means, and the grounds for détente and the global order's renovation.

It was consequently at these middle grounds that a new global order coalesced in the 1960s. In their political and social function, these nodes comprised the ego and superego of a nascent international community. They were sites where plenipotentiaries formed relationships, obeyed or circumvented rules, spread intelligence, sought advice, aired hypotheticals and alternatives, banded together or split apart, built trust, and brokered agreements. Power politics conditioned the architecture of global governance and its operation through the establishment of prerogatives, principles, and perceptions relating to particular states' influence, trustworthiness, beneficence, vindictiveness, and prestige. The former imperial order bequeathed a suite of ideals and *modus operandi* passing down assumptions about the exemplary history of the Industrial North and legacies of prejudice and subjugation that hardened attitudes in the Global South toward encroachments on state sovereignty. The flurry of new admissions into the UNGA attending decolonization altered the complexion of these deliberative assemblies, making them middle grounds between North and South as well as East and West, and bestowing a seemingly universal imprimatur on its diplomatic products.

The Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament was in many respects the cradle of the emerging international community. Geneva was home of a global network of arms controllers. In an interview with Dan McAuliff of the American Broadcasting Company, William Foster drew attention to the "considerable" influence exerted by the conference "on progress in the arms control and disarmament area." He underlined the committee's contributions to promoting a nuclear test-ban treaty, facilitating joint Soviet-American pledges to cut back on fissile-material production, and calling attention to the "dangers of space becoming a new battlefield." The ENDC functioned as a special place

where communication lines between East and West as well as North and South remained open. It was "the only place where we have a continuing contact with the Soviet Union outside of normal diplomat channels," he opined, as well as "the only place, too, where we can take broad soundings on opinions and ideas of the non-aligned nations." The committee was as a marketplace of ideas and information in formal and informal settings:

> In this connection, more discussions take place outside the formal plenary sessions of the Conference than in them, in meetings between delegations and the Co-Chairman. And the Conference serves as a university in a sense. It has been a citadel of learning for representatives in the ENDC—indeed for all.[734]

Foster again applauded the conference's "invaluable" worth when he addressed the United Nations Society of Berlin in Schlosshotel Gerhus on July 3, 1966. He drew attention to the importance of the social milieu in Geneva, commending the practical value of "co-chairmen [meetings], social gatherings, working lunches, etc." He praised the forum's egalitarianism, which "permit[ted] all voices [to] be heard—large [and] small." Foster also welcomed the salutary influence that highlighting arms control and disarmament issues had on public opinion to which he attributed the final settlement of the Limited Test Ban Treaty.[735] The question remained though as to whether the 17 delegations represented in Geneva could strike a widely acceptable "balance of responsibilities and obligations," when the "lion's share" relating to nonproliferation fell on countries without nuclear weapons and conversely the bulk of sacrifices to "limit and reduce nuclear armaments" fell on the nuclear club.[736]

[734] Memorandum, "Your Interview with Dan McAuliff, ABC," Folder 8, Box 17, Foster Papers, GCML, 2. Underlining in original.
[735] Transcript, "Remarks by Mr. Foster at Lunch given by UN Society of Schlosshotel Gehrhus, 12 Noon Sun., July 3 – Berlin," Folder 18, Box 17, Foster Papers, GCML, 1-2.
[736] Ibid. Transcript, "Remarks by Mr. Foster at Lunch by UN Society of Schlosshotel Gehrhus, 12 Noon Sun., July 3 – Berlin," Folder 18, Box 17, Foster Papers, GCML, 5.

One bright spot was the increasingly warm attitude of Soviet emissaries. Even at the height of Soviet-American teamwork as wartime allies, Iola Nikitchenko, the Soviet member of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, where Nazi leaders were tried on charges of Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity, formed no lasting relationships with Western counterparts. Nikitchenko belonged to a generation of Soviet apparatchiks who had abetted Joseph Stalin's tyrannical rule. He presided over the Military Collegium of the Soviet Supreme Court during the show trials of the Great Terror.[737] Nikitchenko disappeared behind the Iron Curtain after the Nuremberg Trials ended. He either chose never to respond to correspondence from the other arbiters on the tribunal, or had the correspondence intercepted by Soviet censors. The diplomatic cohort that accompanied Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, and Alexei Kosygin into power, on the other hand, witnessed the Secret Speech of 1956, when Khrushchev renounced Stalinism and hinted at the desirability of "peaceful coexistence" with the capitalist world.

In contrast to the postwar years, Soviet and American delegates to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament came to enjoy close, warm, constructive, and abiding relationships. George Bunn was the U.S. Disarmament Agency's general counsel and in summer 1967 the day-to-day negotiator of the nonproliferation treaty. Years later, he recalled the antagonism of early social interaction between the delegations:

> [W]hen I first came to Geneva in 1962, the Cold War seemed to be still on. … [T]he negotiators were very … challenging, hostile, belligerent … even in a cocktail party, … they seemed to be trying to make points against you.[738]

---

[737] Katznelson, *Fear Itself*, 59, 71–83, 92, 95.

[738] George Bunn, Interview, "Have and Have-Nots," in War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, Episode 108, Betacam, 30 November 1986. http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/wpna-ffebb0-interview-with-george-bunn-1986

Over time, common attitudes and shared leisure warmed the social climate. The milieus in Geneva and other middle grounds were conducive to fostering commonalities by means of socialization. The lived experience of the middle ground revolved around interminable plenary sessions, hallway chatter, social gatherings at consulates, boozy lunches, jaunts about town, outdoor recreation, and the occasional yacht cruise on sparkling Lake Geneva nestled amid the white-topped French and Swiss Alps.[739] The city bred an *espirit de corps* among diplomats, including the Soviet and American cadres. Bunn recollected how leisure activities helped to clear the air:

> [B]y the end of my period there … in '68, I had learned how to drive a Volga automobile, and drunk a good deal of vodka with … fellow Soviet negotiators. There was … just a complete change in the attitudes and relationships between the two delegations, starting really with the Cuban missile crisis.[740]

The mounting frequency and fruitfulness of personal contact in Geneva played a vital role in overcoming the Euratom deadlock and progressing with negotiations. Roland Timerbaev was Bunn's Soviet counterpart; he graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Studies in 1949 and then joined the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the occasion of Bunn's passing on April 21, 2013, Timerbaev looked back on the roots of the two's affinity:

> Fortunately, we did not turn into "opposite numbers" representing two rival "superpowers" of the Cold War era, which was typical for that time. Very soon, we realized we were like-minded people. We deeply believed in the vital need to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and we did our utmost to achieve that goal. This was the inherent basis of our close personal friendship that lasted for more than 50 years.[741]

---

[739] Roland Timerbaev mentions the cruises in an interview. Roland Timerbaev, Interview by Rich Hooper and Jenni Rissanen, 14 June 2007, Vienna, Austria, 7.
[740] Op. cit. George Bunn, Interview, "Have and Have-Nots," in War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, Episode 108, Betacam, 30 November 1986.
[741] Roland Timerbaev, "In Memoriam: George Bunn (1925-2013)," *Arms Control Today*, June 2012.

The relationship between Bunn and Timerbaev outlasted the Cold War. It was also the interpersonal conduit through which the superpowers began to bypass the last roadblock to a joint Soviet-American draft treaty.

The safeguards issue garnered negative scrutiny from all sides at the beginning of the summer. The U.S. delegation doubted that elements of the Washington bureaucracy would opt to override concerns emanating from major allies such as West Germany, Italy, and Japan. Bunn recalled that Foggy Bottom and the White House "had less interest … in the nonproliferation treaty" at that juncture, and that Johnson had not "really come around firmly in support" because "he was totally preoccupied with the war in Vietnam."[742] Furthermore, Euratom was divided over its future. Paris was wary lest the nuclear community furnish Bonn with a sanctuary for military research. West Germany desired more organizational autonomy in hopes of integrating the European common nuclear market and preserving advantages for its nuclear firms (and overall nuclear capability) through joint research and development. This prejudiced the views of other industrial powers such as Japan, who wanted a fair shake in the global nuclear emporium.[743] Tellingly, Foster used the nine days accorded by the postponement of the ENDC in May to consult with Japanese authorities, who indicated that Tokyo might accept a treaty "on the express condition that the civil nuclear installations of the nuclear-weapon States would also be subject to IAEA safeguards."[744]

Brazil and India issued the strongest demands for equality in peaceful uses of atomic energy with a particular focus on nuclear explosives. The real object of their protestations was unclear though. Did they want to retain the right to use nuclear

---

742 George Bunn, Interview by Thomas Shea and Danielle Peterson, 17 February 2006, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA.
743 Quester, *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation*, 173.
744 Legault, *A Diplomacy of Hope*, 246.

explosives to blast harbors and liberate shale oil, or as a backdoor to an atom bomb? Brazilian delegate Sérgio Correa da Costa read a spirited defense of PNEs when the committee reconvened on May 18, ascribing his government's signature on the Treaty of Tlatelolco to a desire "to speed up the peaceful nuclearization of Brazil." He distinguished sharply between the peaceful and military ends to which states could put nuclear technology, lauded its capacity "to eliminate [the] poverty and underdevelopment" at the root of interstate conflict, and championed PNEs' value for "great civil engineering projects" and "an ever-increasing variety of applications that may prove essential to … progress." His words reflected Brasília's stance on the disputed meaning of nuclear weapons in the Latin American treaty, whose peculiar tolerance of a hypothetical type of nuclear explosives unsuited to military use set worrisome precedents for a nonproliferation treaty. He used utopian and postcolonial language to contest the prohibition under review, hailing the ceaseless innovation and "boundless prospects" promised by nuclear science and technology and attacking a PNE ban as tantamount to a "privilege" that would form "an irreparable relationship of dependence."[745] At the next session, Indian delegate V.C. Trivedi repeated a statement by Indira Gandhi that a treaty should not affect nuclear tools whose use could help developing economies in the Global South. Trivedi drew an explicit linkage to neocolonialism: "[t]he civil nuclear Powers can tolerate a nuclear weapons apartheid, but not an atomic apartheid in their economic and peaceful development."[746]

[745] Final Verbatim Record of the 297th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 18 May 1967, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.297, 15.

[746] Final Verbatim Record of the 298th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 23 May 1967, ENDC/PV.298, 10. Shane Maddock draws on this quotation for the title of his book to argue that the nonproliferation treaty was symptomatic of a lengthy United States campaign to leave itself the sole nuclear power. The phrase, "nuclear apartheid," has acquired vernacular status in the nuclear community as shorthand for treaty opposition. Nevertheless, the context in which the quotation was made, as well as its actual content, indicates, however, that Trivedi was referring to peaceful nuclear explosions and productive nuclear undertakings more generally. Maddock, *Nuclear Apartheid*.

The safeguards issue threatened to derail proceedings at a crucial juncture as pressure mounted to table a full draft treaty before the U.N. General Assembly session that fall. Inertia in Soviet-American détente lessened the prospects of a high-level agreement. Arms control and nonproliferation diplomacy had ran on parallel tracks since the Cuban Missile Crisis with a slow yet steady improvement in Soviet-American relations amid the Vietnam War.[747] Alliance tensions, the global compass of U.S. commitments, a resurgent West Germany, and domestic revolts were also strong inducements.[748] U.S.-Soviet détente hinged on the resolution of three outstanding issues: strategic arms talks in light of new anti-ballistic-missile capabilities, nuclear nonproliferation, and the Vietnam War. The interactive relationship among these three matters drove superpower relations in 1967. The Vietnam War constantly threatened to spoil efforts to detoxify the superpower relationship. When the new U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson, attended the signing ceremony for the Outer Space Treaty on January 27, Kosygin fulminated against U.S. bombing raids on North Vietnamese airfields and waved off assurances that Johnson was "earnestly trying to end [the] conflict," by riposting that, if so, the U.S. government "should act differently."[749] Rostow struck a more positive note that day in a meeting with Dobrynin in Washington. He thanked the Soviet ambassador for Moscow's flexibility in regards to nonproliferation, which "had made a deep impression" among U.S. policymakers amid concerns regarding

---

747 Michael R. Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963*, 1st ed (New York, NY: Edward Burlingame Books, 1991); Keith L. Nelson, *The Making of Détente: Soviet-American Relations in the Shadow of Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

748 Thomas A. Schwartz, "Lyndon Johnson and Europe: Alliance Politics, Political Economy, and "Growing Out of the Cold War," in Brands, *The Foreign Policies of Lyndon Johnson*, 37–60; H. W Brands, *The Wages of Globalism Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Frank Costigliola, "Lyndon B. Johnson, Germany, and "the End of the Cold War," in Cohen and Tucker, *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World*, 173–210; Suri, *Power and Protest*.

749 "Editorial Note," *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIV, Soviet Union, Doc. 196, 454.

the effect of anti-ballistic-missile systems (ABM) on strategic stability and state finances.[750] Dobrynin and Rostow went on to discuss how the nuclear arms race impinged on nonproliferation:

> [Rostow] then pointed out to him that it would be harder to get nations to sign a non-proliferation agreement if they saw the United States and the Soviet Union entering another major round in the arms race. [Dobrynin] questioned [Rostow] as to whether I was proposing a specific link between the non-proliferation agreement and the ABM agreement. I said that I was not, but merely underlining the difficulties we might both face if we were urging others to enter a world of non-proliferation while each of us was spending many billions of dollars in bilateral strategic arms race. [Dobrynin] said that he understood and agreed with this view.[751]

Notwithstanding this high-level concurrence, geopolitical interests and strategic nuclear buildups lessened the appetite for bilateral arms control on both sides. Soviet arms supplies to North Vietnam and U.S. intensification of the conflict raised the stakes and the hurdles alike. And incompatible concepts of nuclear strategy worked against common understandings on the repercussions of ballistic missile defense, especially while "[t]he American public's commitment to nuclear superiority remained an article of faith."[752]

Troubling developments in the Middle East and East Asia dramatized both the difficulty of improving Soviet-American relations and the dangers posed by nuclear spread. Israel and her Arab neighbors—Jordan, Syria, the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.), and the Palestinian Liberation Organization—undertook an escalating series of covert operations, mobilizations, and tit-for-tit incursions in the spring. In May, U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser responded to flawed Soviet intelligence of an imminent

---

[750] Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin and W.W. Rostow, "Lunch at the Embassy Residence," 27 January 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIV, Doc. 197, 455.
[751] Ibid. Memorandum of Conversation between Dobrynin and Rostow, "Lunch at the Embassy Residence," 27 January 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIV, Doc. 197, 455-456.
[752] James Cameron, "The Development of United States Anti-Ballistic Missile Policy, 1961-1972" (Dissertation, Cambridge University, 2013), 117–160.

Israeli attack by sending more than 100,000 troops into the Sinai Peninsula and expelling the United Nations Emergency Force stationed there. A preemptive strike by Israeli jets against the Egyptian Air Force triggered the Six Day War, which ended with Israel victorious and newly in control of East Jerusalem, the Sinai, West Bank, Golan Heights, and Gaza Strip.[753] Though short-lived, the conflict illustrated the ability of regional conflicts to metastasize into an all-out thermonuclear war in the event that either superpower intervened to support or protect an ally. Increasing the risks, Israel possessed at least two deliverable atom bombs and Soviet officials were concerned enough about the Israeli research facility at Dimona to authorize reconnaissance flights by Soviet MiG-25 Foxbats before the war.[754]

NATO members found the conflict's nuclear implications unsettling. At a NATO ministerial meeting on June 17, Rusk expressed doubts regarding the ability of a belligerent to forgo a nuclear strike when faced with imminent defeat. Delegations repeated his misgivings widely, including at a press conference by British Foreign Minister George Brown. U.S. Ambassador Harlan Cleveland observed that it was "clear

---

[753] The literature on the Six-Day War is voluminous. The best narrative accounts are: Michael B. Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Tom Segev, *1967: Israel, the War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle East*, 1st U.S. ed (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007); For the reaction of the Johnson administration, read: H. W. Brands, *Into the Labyrinth: The United States and the Middle East, 1945-1993*, America in Crisis (New York: McGraw Hill, 1994); Peter L. Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945*, 1st ed, Issues in the History of American Foreign Relations (Washington, D.C: Potomac Books, Inc, 2005); William B. Quandt, "Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 War: What Color Was the Light?," *Middle East Journal* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 198–228; An excellent new essay collection that updates the state of knowledge about the origins and conduct of the war is: *The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences*, Cambridge Middle East Studies 36 (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[754] Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 237. Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez have recently disinterred the orthodox interpretation that the Soviet Union colluded with Arab allies to provoke an Israeli preemptive strike with one key modification: the principal motive behind the Soviet ploy was to "halt and destroy Israel's nuclear development before it could attain operational atomic weapons." Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, "The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona: The USSR's Motive for Instigating the Six-Day War," *Israel Studies* 11, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 27; Isabella Ginor, *Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).

that [the] Middle East war has forced everybody to think hard about [the] non-European reasons for [the] NPT."[755] Ironically, the People's Republic of China tested its first thermonuclear device on the same day, joining the U.S., U.S.S.R., and U.K. in that select group and refuting claims by U.S. authorities that China lacked the technical sophistication to build an effective deterrent quickly. If the Levantine conflict showed how proliferation might transform regional crises into global powder kegs, the Chinese test illustrated how rapidly developing states could breach the thermonuclear barrier.

The Six Day War afforded an opportunity for high-level Soviet-American talks; however, the discussions failed to move the needle on bilateral arms control. The hostilities sufficiently alarmed Kosygin that he made the first use of the Kremlin-White House "hot line." The two sides communicated throughout the war. Johnson penned a letter to Kosygin in the crisis's early days suggesting that both sides explore "common interests" on three urgent matters—Vietnam, the Middle East, and Cuba—and two targets of opportunity—ICBM and ABM limits and a non-proliferation treaty. When Kosygin visited New York City to address the U.N. on the subject of post-war Arab grievances, Johnson coaxed him into staying for an impromptu sit-down in Glassboro, New Jersey. The president was cautiously optimistic in light of Llewellyn Thompson's efforts to court Kosygin. In a conversation with Senate Majority Leader Everett Dirksen (R – IL), the president revealed his hopes that the summit meeting might take the edge off the Cold War:

> We're hoping that when he gets through talking to us, that he'll see that we're not going to gobble him up… now we don't know that that has any chance, but that's

[755] Harlan Cleveland, Telegram from the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State, "NATO Ministerial Meeting: Evaluation," 17 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIII, Doc. 258, 588.

the best thing that has a chance from what Thompson's been saying to him through the months.[756]

Johnson believed that progress on the entangled matters of Vietnam, the Middle East, and international nuclear diplomacy presupposed a strong rapport between the leaders. "I think I can get on with him all right," he assured Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chariman William Fulbright (D- AR), "I got along with Khrushchev all right."[757]

In actuality, the Glassboro Summit, which transpired from June 23 to 27, demonstrated how divergent notions of arms control at top levels stymied agreement.[758] When Johnson met Kosygin, he likened their countries to "the oldest brother … and the oldest sister," who on account of their seniority shouldered the burden of "avoid[ing] disputes and differences between them so as to set a good example to the other children in the family."[759] His espousal of Soviet-American condominium was true to Johnson's patriarchal grasp of domestic and international politics and the strategic need to lessen superpower tensions as the international order sustained multiple crises. Kosygin was pliable on Southeast Asia, where Soviet influence was negligible; by contrast, Soviet geostrategic interests in the Middle East militated against halting arm shipments to Syria and Egypt, or repudiating Arab states' demands for the return of occupied territories.

The two sides failed to harmonize their views on bilateral arms control as well. Kosygin responded to McNamara's arguments that strategic missile defense was a

---

[756] Lyndon Johnson-Everett Dirksen Telcon, 22:45 22 June 1967, WH6706.02 #11913, RTCM, LBJL. I am indebted to James Cameron from bringing the White House tapes of Johnson's telephone conversations relating to the Glassboro Summit to my attention. His dissertation affords a more thorough account of Soviet-American diplomacy relating to arms control and in particular the challenge of anti-ballistic: Cameron, "The Development of United States Anti-Ballistic Missile Policy, 1961-1972."

[757] Lyndon Johnson-William Fulbright Telcon, 22:57 19 June 1967, WH6706.01 #11908, RTCM, LBJL.

[758] E.L.M. Burns argued without the benefit of declassified documents from the Glassboro summit that the conference "may have set the final seal on the agreement." Burns, "The Nonproliferation Treaty," 797.

[759] Lyndon Johnson-Alexei Kosygin Memcon 11:15-13:30, June 23, 1967, USSR, [Glassboro Memcons] 6/66, Box 295, CF, Addendum (hereafter CF/A), NSF, LBJL. Cited in Cameron, "The Development of United States Anti-Ballistic Missile Policy, 1961-1972," 130.

technical fantasy and an economic black hole with the exclamation, "[d]efense is moral, and aggression is immoral!"[760] U.S. and Soviet officials later attributed Kosygin's outburst to a mismatch in strategic nuclear cultures. Whereas McNamara and Foster, among others, adhered to econometric conceptions of nuclear deterrence and strategic stability, these notions had no traction on Soviet politico-military thought in which the Second World War and Cuban Missile Crisis signified cautionary tales against unpreparedness or strategic overstretch when faced with a superior foe. Furthermore, the vested interest of the powerful Soviet military-industrial complex in arms buildups and its corresponding faith in a winnable nuclear war stiffened the Soviet spine. Moscow was more intent on achieving nuclear parity than on halting the arms race.[761]

A nonproliferation agreement was the lone bright spot at Glassboro. When Thompson treated with Dobrynin in Washington to explore the possibility of a summit, both ambassadors expressed optimism that a treaty was in the cards.[762] Conversations between Rusk and Gromyko in Glassboro were agreeable though inconclusive. Rusk singled out three obstacles beyond Article III: assurances for India, the treaty's duration, and arms control linkages. In regards to the security assurances delivered to New Delhi by Moscow, Rusk intimated that it would be easier for the executive branch to endorse a U.N. Security Council resolution in order to circumvent the Senate. This would also meet an Indian preference for assurances that covered "non-nuclear powers in general." There were more commonalities than dissimilarities in the Soviet and U.S. positions. Both men identified October as a "reasonable" date by which to draft "a common text," testifying

[760] Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986)*, 1st ed (New York: Times Books, Random House, 1995), 165.
[761] Cameron, "The Development of United States Anti-Ballistic Missile Policy, 1961-1972," 128–140.
[762] Memorandum of Conversation between Dobrynin and Thompson, "Kosygin's Visit to the U.S.," 16 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIV, Doc 218.

to the momentum behind the talks. Since the Soviet Union remained unalterably opposed to "family control," Gromyko advocated jointly tabling draft treaties with the safeguards article blank.[763] Glassboro thus revealed a continuity in the relationship between nonproliferation and détente: while the superpowers struggled to agree on regional crises, their concurrence that nuclear weapons should not be introduced into them drove efforts to cooperate on multilateral nuclear diplomacy.

Understandings of East-West détente were as foggy in NATO as between the superpowers. U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of State Foy Kohler emphasized the self-reinforcing "relationship between deterrence and détente" and the "different views" held by NATO members regarding the purpose of easing tensions in Europe, particularly by means of a non-proliferation treaty. Kohler questioned whether the Atlantic community could "have some measure of agreement on what détente means."[764] The French revolt worsened matters. Gromyko noted the French ambivalence toward a treaty when visiting Paris that spring.[765] The European Merger Treaty entered force on July 1, collectively subsuming Euratom, the Economic Community, and the Coal and Steel Community into the European Communities to which the U.K. reapplied with U.S. support. If Euratom facilities, including those in France, went under IAEA safeguards, de Gaulle could disable Euratom with unknown consequences for the federal movement.[766] West Germany and others' reluctance to divest Euratom of self-inspection authority therefore had weighty implications during a period of uncertainty for European integration.

---

[763] Memorandum of Conversation between Rusk and Gromyko, "Non-Proliferation Treaty; Assurances to Non-Nuclear Powers; Latin American Nuclear Free Zone," 23 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 198, 481-486.

[764] Foy Kohler, Letter to British Undersecretary of State (Watson), "Your letter of June 14, 1967," 13 July 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XIII, Doc. 260, 593.

[765] Op. cit. Memorandum of Conversation between Rusk and Gromyko, "Non-Proliferation Treaty," 23 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 198, 483.

[766] Adrian Fisher, Memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk, "Safeguards Article for Non-Proliferation Treaty," 24 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 199.

With high-level consultations stalled, the challenge of finding a solution fell to the United States and Soviet delegations in Geneva. Foster decided to explore a compromise "at the lower level" and "without instruction" from Washington. *Ad referendum* talks thus ensued between second- and third-ranking members of each delegation: Bunn and Culver Gleysteen on the U.S. side, and Timerbaev and Vladimir Shustov on the Soviet. Timerbaev would remark that it was "the first time in Soviet-America[n] arms control that we were able to discuss *ad referendum*," a testament to the newfound rapport at the interpersonal level.[767] The thinking was that by departing from the official script the two sides might alight on mutually acceptable language through "what if … exploratory negotiation[s]," even though Foggy Bottom had instructed the U.S. delegation "not to go further on safeguards than our existing instructions because of disagreements with the Euratom countries."[768] The exploratory negotiations profited from the leisure activities in which the delegations shared. Bunn recounted how long hikes afforded familiarity and an opportunity for brainstorming:

> We had gotten to know each other through originally just working on the two delegations but times had gotten better, relations had gotten better, at least at the delegation level, and we often hiked in the mountains – went together on the weekends – and talked.[769]

The French Alps provided the backdrop when the subordinates took a cable car that June, most likely to the top of Aiguille du Midi, and circled the jagged summit that rose above the Mont Blanc massif. Timerbaev suggested a clever legal and bureaucratic

---

[767] Op. cit. Roland Timerbaev, Interview by Rich Hooper and Jenni Rissanen, Vienna, Austria, 14 June 2007, 7.

[768] Op. cit. George Bunn, Interview, "Have and Have-Nots," in War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, Episode 108, Betacam, 30 November 1986; George Bunn, "Brief History of NPT Safeguards Article," *NPT Negotiating History*, February 2006, 6.

[769] Op. cit. George Bunn, Interview by Thomas Shea and Danielle Peterson, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, 17 February 2006, 7.

escape on the walk back down to the world's highest cable car.[770] According to Bunn, he proposed: "Let's have an agreement to agree, and to negotiate with … what the safeguards will really be, not try and decide all that now." "The Euratom countries would sign not individually, but as a group," Timerbaev continued, "so that Euratom would do the negotiations for all the countries together with the IAEA." The two sides would not "decide everything in this treaty now.[771] There were two precedents for the solution. First, the Treaty of Tlatelolco allowed either individual states or groups of states to negotiate with the IAEA. Second, Bunn referenced the example of "certified public accountants and corporation bookkeepers," when he contributed that Euratom would conduct the physical inspections of which IAEA officials would check the results.[772] The formula would pave the way for a Soviet-American draft treaty with common definitions of dissemination and acquisition and which outlined the broad contours of a global safeguards system with the IAEA at its core.

The language formulated in Geneva still needed Moscow and Washington's endorsement though; in fact, the safeguards controversy would last into December. To win the support of their respective bureaucracies, Soviet and American delegations engaged in an act of collective subterfuge. Each delegation presented the formula to their capitals as representing a new offer by the other side; according to Timerbaev, "the

---

[770] Accounts of these *ad referendum* talks come to us from oral interviews with George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev conducted in 2006 and 2007—forty years after the fact. Owing to the passage of time, these individual recollections should be read with a grain of salt on account of the susceptibility of eye witnesses to recall events differently as personal biases, faulty memories and institutional pressures reshape the self-narratives over time. For example, it is noteworthy and cautionary that although Bunn remembers the confabs occurring during a walk in the mountains, Timerbaev claims that the foursome was off yachting together. Roland Timerbaev, Interview by Rich Hooper and Jenni Rissanen, 14 June 2007, Vienna, Austria, 7.

[771] Op. cit. George Bunn, Interview, "Have and Have-Nots," in War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, Episode 108, Betacam, 30November 1986.

[772] Op. cit. George Bunn, Interview by Thomas Shea and Danielle Peterson, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, 17 February 2006, 8.

agreed formula was presented to Washington as the Soviet formula, and … to Moscow as an American formula."[773] Fisher spoke to Rusk via scramble telephone on June 23, filling the secretary in on the arrangement before Glassboro. In a follow-up telegram, Fisher alluded to an "informal suggestion" put forward by the Soviet delegation and described the concept as providing for the establishment of "bilateral or multilateral agreements with the IAEA." He cited the Treaty of Tlatelolco as a precedent. Given the persistence of German intransigence and the U.S. agreement not to depart from the NATO formulation, Fisher advised that Rusk explore the prospect of a joint Soviet-American pledge to subject certain of their non-military nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards in order to "eliminate the Euratom arguments."[774]

The concert of high-level and low-level Soviet-American summitry that summer illustrated the potential and limits of détente. Though Kosygin and Johnson failed to achieve much at Glassboro, the emergence of an international community of arms controllers in Geneva found a route by which to circumvent the safeguards controversy. The necessity of backchannel talks retarded a final agreement though. According to Bunn, when later that summer Llewellyn Thompson remarked to Gromyko about the new "Soviet proposal," the Soviet foreign minister was taken aback: "What do you mean, Soviet delegation proposal? I thought that was an American delegation proposal[!]"[775] Despite the miscommunication, the Soviets agreed to table identical draft treaties with the safeguards language missing. The phase of negotiations driven by bilateral Soviet-American diplomacy was coming to an end. Rostow wrote Johnson on August 10 to

[773] Op. cit. Roland Timerbaev, Interview by Rich Hooper and Jenni Rissanen, 14 June 2007, Vienna, Austria, 7.
[774] Adrian Fisher, Memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk, "Safeguards Article for Non-Proliferation Treaty," 24 June 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 199, 487-492.
[775] Op. cit. George Bunn, Interview, "Have and Have-Nots," in War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, Episode 108, Betacam, 30 November 1986.

inform him of the drafting agreement. In the memorandum, he observed that a turning point had indeed occurred: "Now the game will move to the non-nuclear powers; and some months of negotiations lie ahead. But it is something of an event."[776]

## The Non-Aligned Weigh In

The Soviet and U.S. delegations announced the simultaneous tabling of identical draft treaties at 3:00 p.m. on August 24, 1967 in the Council Chambers of the Palais des Nations, the White House, and the Kremlin. The British Ambassador in Geneva, Edward E. Tomkins, had called Fisher the day before. Fisher acknowledged that despite lacking a safeguards article, the treaty "might cause the F.R.G. some pain." However, the United States had succeeded in modifying the amendment procedures in Article V to allow members states of the IAEA Board of Directors to veto objectionable modifications. Kiesinger protested against the draft treaty's unlimited duration, but when Rusk relayed the objection to Gromyko, it elicited "a rather dour 'no.'" Despite Soviet resistance, Fisher remarked that the duration "may be something we will have to compromise on" in order for nuclear have-nots to acquiesce, particularly those in the Global South as the repercussions on European security mattered less and less in comparison to those for global nuclear trade, regional security dynamics, and the treaty's legitimacy.[777]

The features of a nonproliferation treaty bearing on states in the Global South were increasingly salient. Tomkins inquired if the Disarmament Agency "expected that other nations [would] now come out with all their reservations;" "[a]re we now in for a free-for-all[?]" The negotiating process had already weathered the disruptive efforts of the

[776] Walt Rostow, Memorandum to President Johnson, "NPT," 10 August 1967, *FRUS,* Vol. XI, Doc. 201, 494-495.
[777] ACDA, Memorandum of Conversation between Edward E. Tomkins, Adrian S. Fisher, et al., "Non-Proliferation Treaty," 23 August 1967, Document 5a, (NPT) Collection, National Security Archive (NSA), http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc05a.pdf.

"Germans and the Italians," Fisher assured him, and with the orchestration of Soviet-American harmony, "the dangers of objecting to [the NPT] are also greater."[778] Nonaligned participants repeatedly upheld the virtue of tailoring the treaty to meet developmental and disarmament ends that seemed marginal to the treaty's core function. The Brazilian delegation, for example, wanted disarmament savings directed to economic development in the Global South.[779] Though the proposal went nowhere, such thinking registered in non-aligned demands in Geneva and New York City for more nuclear assistance and legal entitlements to constructive nuclear technology. The fourth article of the new draft treaty accordingly spelled out "the inalienable right" of states parties "to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information for, and to contribute, alone or in cooperation with other States" and "to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (in conformity with the nonproliferation articles)."[780] According to a U.S. aide-memoire, "the idea for such an article was originally derived from the Treaty of Tlatelolco." Mexico pushed to strengthen the language that fall. When coupled with the preambular statements, the "principle" encompassed "not only modern reactor technology and the like," but also "any technological by-products" of nuclear explosives necessary for future innovations such as fusion reactors.[781]

---

[778] Ibid. ACDA, Memorandum of Conversation between Edward E. Tomkins, Adrian S. Fisher, et al., "Non-Proliferation Treaty," 23 August 1967, Document 5a, NPT, NSA.

[779] Final Verbatim Record of the 293rd Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 14 March 1967, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.293, 11.

[780] State Department, Circular Telegram, "Aide-Memoire on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)," 24 August 1967, Document 5b, NPT, NSA, 6-7, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc05b.pdf. The precise wording was: "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty, as well as the right of the Parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information for, and to contribute, alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

[781] Ibid. State Department, Circular Telegram, "Aide-Memoire on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)," 24 August 1967, Document 5b, NPT, NSA, 6-7, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc05b.pdf

The identical Soviet and American draft treaties, an impending United Nations General Assembly session, and Conference of Non-Nuclear States authorized by UNGA Resolution 2153(XXI) lent impetus for neutral states to "play their role as first responders."[782] A nonproliferation treaty was inherently discriminatory; nonetheless, neutral states such as Sweden, Mexico, Brazil, and India invoked UNGA Resolution 2028(XX) when arguing that a treaty ought to strike a balance of rights and obligations in order to achieve a more equitable understanding less inimical to their national interests. Various non-aligned delegations accordingly took the rostrum that September to call for alterations relating to safeguards, technical assistance, peaceful explosives, treaty loopholes, security assurances, and nuclear disarmament.

The most impactful presentation was the Mexican working paper circulated by Jorge Castañeda on September 19. The Mexican delegate acknowledged that the treaty's "general features" were reasonable given "present-day political realities," but singled out various preambular statements that merited inscription as "true legal obligations." He advanced two changes to Article IV's language. First, the article should mandate that advanced nuclear powers had a "duty" to supply those states denied nuclear weapons by the treaty with technical assistance rather than merely granting a negative guarantee that there was an "inalienable right" to productive nuclear artifacts. If some states had to renounce certain types of science and technology, it was incumbent upon privileged states to set the imbalance right. Second, the admonition extended to PNEs. Though "nothing other than nuclear bombs," these devices held "enormous economic potential … for instance in the execution of vast engineering projects." Since a renunciation of the right to possess or conduct nuclear explosions ought not to signify a renunciation of these

[782] Note, "Les non alignés de Genève et la non proliferation," 20 October 1967, Box 769 – Nations Unies – Organisations Internationals 1965-1969 2. Conseil de Sécurité : 4.2 Désarmement; Nonprolifération Des armes nucléaires, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 6-7.

potential benefits, an international service was warranted.[783] In addition, he called for the incorporation in the treaty's body of the preambular note that a nonproliferation treaty would not infringe on nuclear-free zones. Finally, Castañeda urged that a treaty contain a stronger injunction for disarmament and called for a "solemn recognition" in the treaty itself "of the special responsibility of the nuclear Powers:"

> In short, the nuclear Powers cannot actually undertake to conclude future disarmament agreements among themselves; but they certainly can undertake to endeavor to do so; that is, they can certainly undertake to initiate and pursue negotiations in good faith in order to conclude such agreements. … Doubtless it would be an imperfect obligation, since it would not be accompanied by sanctions, but it would be more than a statement of intention.[784]

Alva Myrdal likened the proposed article to a "promissory note," passing over its limitations as a non-binding pledge with the term's use in contract law to specify under what conditions a contract was voided.[785] Washington was increasingly disposed to heed Latin American suggestions since their assistance had proven so critical in the UNGA after the Middle East crisis. U.S. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg had extolled their importance to Johnson and his cabinet at an August post-mortem: "Latin American

---

[783] Final Verbatim Record of the 331st Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 19 September 1967, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.331, 4-11.

[784] Ibid. 331st Meeting of the Conference of the ENDC, 19 September 1967, 9-10. The operative paragraph read: Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith, with all speed and perseverance, to arrive at further agreements regarding the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of their existing stockpiles, the elimination of nuclear arsenals, of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, as well as to reach agreement on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, 394-395; George Bunn, R. M Timerbaev, and James F Leonard, *Nuclear Disarmament : How Much Have the Five Nuclear Powers Promised in the Non-Proliferation Treaty?* (Washington, D.C.: The Lawyers Alliance for World Security, the Committee for National Security, and the Washington Council on Non-Proliferation, 1994), 18.

[785] Spurgeon Keeny, Memorandum for Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "Report on the ENDC," 1 April 1969, Box 5, Files of Spurgeon Keeny, NSF, LBJL.

solidarity was important," he observed: "The more Latin Americans countries can be involved in world affairs, the better."[786]

Myrdal vocally championed a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) and patiently beseeched her fellow delegates to make its achievement a precondition or corollary of a nonproliferation pact. She invoked Jawaharlal Nehru's 1954 proposal of a ban on all nuclear testing to petition the assembly on June 29 to reconsider the merits of a total test ban in light of advances in seismology, the advent of large sensor arrays, and increasing data exchange among nations. She characterized such an accord together with fissile-material cut-off and nonproliferation treaties "as parts of one comprehensive pattern."[787] Foster found himself on the defensive. He had called a CTBT the previous November "the most significant step we could take to supplement … a non-proliferation treaty."[788] The longstanding U.S. stance was that on-site inspections were essential to verify a treaty, while the U.S.S.R. held that "national means of detection and verification," namely seismographs and radiological detectors, would suffice. Foster gave an affirmative reply on July 11. The Disarmament Agency wanted to avoid the impression of having "lost interest in the CTB[T] because failure to do so would have a very adverse effect on our position on the NPT negotiations."[789] However, Seaborg advised that the AEC and the Pentagon wanted latitude to test a "new generation of weapons for the strategic offensive forces" and conduct "development and proof tests" for

[786] Tom Johnson, Notes, "Cabinet Meeting on August 2, 1967, 12:09 p.m. to 1:50 p.m.," 2 August 1967, Box 1, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, LBJL, 7-8.
[787] Final Verbatim Record of the 309th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 29 June 1967, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.309, 4.
[788] Ibid., 309th Meeting of the Conference of the ENDC, 29 June 1967, 6.
[789] Charles Johnson, Memorandum for National Security Adviser Walt Rostow, "Foster's proposed draft response to Mrs. Myrdal's statement," Box 6, Vol. III, Agency File—ACDA, NSF, LBJL. Cited in *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 200, footnote 2.

them as well as the new "Spartan 6 MT, "hot" X-ray ABM warhead."[790] These "defense requirements" created a schism between the Disarmament Agency, and the AEC and Department of Defense, preventing Foster from endorsing a comprehensive test-ban treaty "given adequate inspection."[791]

The United Arab Republic, India, Burma, Sweden, Brazil, and Romania threw their rhetorical support behind the Mexican working paper. The Indian and Brazilian representatives went further, commending measures to combat "vertical proliferation," such as bans on nuclear testing and fissile-material production for military purposes.[792] The Soviet-American failure to put forward a consensus Article III permitted Myrdal to submit a Swedish variant that authorized IAEA oversight on all transfers of nuclear materials regardless of the treaty status of either importer or exporter. The Swedish draft article also authorized the progressive application of IAEA safeguards on the peaceful nuclear activities of nuclear-weapon states. Neutral consensus behind the Mexican amendments confronted the superpower blocs with a collective effort to embed technical assistance, universal safeguards, and disarmament commitments in the treaty. Even Japan, which had so far kept its distance, began to weigh in. Foreign Minister Takeo Miki suggested to the UNGA on September 22 that periodic five-year conferences should review the treaty's efficacy and legitimacy.[793]

Indian nuclear policy had meanwhile "undergone gradual radicalization," according to Soviet ministers. Foreign Minister M.C. Chagla issued a "categorical" statement in the Lok Sahba that New Delhi would not sign the treaty as drafted. A Soviet

---

[790] Ibid. Glenn Seaborg, Letter to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "Our Attitude toward a Comprehensive Test Ban," 4 August 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 200, 492-494.
[791] Ibid., 492.
[792] Op. cit. Note re "Les non alignés de Genève et la non proliferation," 20 October 1967, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 2-3.
[793] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 413-415.

expert on South Asia chalked the Indian attitude up to its quest to promote itself as leader of the non-aligned world by "bring[ing] the so-called common problems of several Third World countries to the forefront" of the negotiations. Soviet authorities held out hope that joint or separate guarantees from the superpowers could manage the security threat that China posed to India.[794] Collectively, India and Brazil's more exacting demands and West Germany's ambivalence augured the rise of a fifth sub-set in the Venn diagram of international nuclear diplomacy—the irreconcilables.

Brazil's attitude was paradigmatic of the relationship between regional powers in the Global South and the embryonic nonproliferation regime. The country had chosen to keep open its peaceful and military nuclear options while maintaining a reputation for good behavior in the international community and its neighborhood. Brasília and Buenos Aires had been the principal spoilers of a Latin American nuclear-free zone before acquiescing on the condition that the compact not close all routes to a military option, namely PNEs, and limit the zone's boundaries to those states that signed and ratified.[795] This calculus remained operative when the Brazilian National Security Council debated the merits of a nonproliferation treaty and the content of the country's nuclear policy on October 4. A central matter was how to word the guidelines so that Brazil could reserve "to itself the right of exclusiveness in what regards the guidance and execution of all activities in the field of nuclear energy."[796] The ministers discussed whether the public and private decrees should employ the phrase "peaceful purposes" so as to associate

---

[794] Report, Embassy of Hungary in the Soviet Union to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, "Indian foreign policy," 2 June 1967, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Hungarian National Archives (Magyar Országos Levéltár, MOL). XIX-J-1-j India, 1967, 44. doboz, 60-10, 001059/2/1967. Obtained and translated for NPIHP by Balazs Szalontai. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112883.
[795] See Chapter 5 of this dissertation.
[796] "Minutes of the Fortieth Session of the Brazilian National Security Council, 4 October 1967, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archive (Brasília), p. 5. Obtained and translated by Fundação Getúlio Vargas. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116914

Brazil's nuclear policies with international norms. Minister of External Affairs José de Magalhães Pinto endorsed this wording in a clause pertaining to the Military Ministries that called for the "formation of personnel and in the development of special techniques and equipment in the sector." To avert a martial tone, however, Magalhães Pinto suggested changing the clause to read, "equipment related to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy." Magalhães Pinto believed that "peaceful" was a watchword of legitimate nuclear activities at international meetings where there was "a constant allegation" that "total knowledge … will result in countries being easily able to produce an atomic bomb:"

> We know now that the two big nuclear powers arrived at an understanding on the question and that the number of countries that do not possess nuclear energy and want to use it is very large. They need, for this, to organize themselves, decide exactly what they want and advance firmly toward the desired objectives. In several statements made through the Ministry of External Relations, according to your instructions, Brazil has reiterated its wish to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. By the way, the Treaty of Mexico prohibits the use of nuclear energy for military objectives, but authorizes its use for peaceful purposes.

The exchange testified to Brazil's efforts to retain its nuclear prerogatives by allying with like-minded states while dispelling fears of ulterior military motives. In this vein, the meeting debated whether to add a clause upholding PNEs as an object of national policy.

Peaceful nuclear explosions were the nub of controversy regarding what constituted legitimate nuclear technology. Magalhães Pinto pushed for modifications to a section of the paper directing the bureaucracy "to expand the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in all sectors of national activity." He held that the command should promote the "domestic manufacture, eventual and future, of peaceful nuclear artifacts … [in] activities genuinely for economic development." Though the justification was economic, the objectives were diplomatic:

> It is imperative that the document includes, among longer-term objectives, one of the forms of application of nuclear energy that the Brazilian Government strives

> to preserve in international negotiations and to which it attaches special importance.[797]

President Costa e Silva objected that such an explicit declaration was "redundant and aggressive, [and] without necessity" since the policy definition was a "given" and Brazil neither agreed nor would agree to such curtailments on its rights. Magalhães Pinto nonetheless desired official confirmation of exactly what rights were preserved, lamenting that the president "kn[e]w what [was] happening in Geneva," where Brazil was feeling "great pressure from the big powers." His request was not made on military grounds; rather, he recited the prevailing narrative of the Nuclear Age. "[T]he world is on the threshold of a great revolution," he cautioned,;"[w]e cannot miss it."

Military thinking was not absent though. General Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva summed up the inseparability of nuclear activities with peaceful purposes from those of military import by analogizing with prohibitions against poison gases after the First World War to argue against including "peaceful purposes:"

> "Peaceful purposes" reminds me of an observation I heard once from the Ministry of External Relations of Yugoslavia, before the bolshevization, in Geneva, where the problem of the use of gases was being discussed. A document was then being elaborated to prohibit the use of gases, and the Minister of External Relations of Yugoslavia said the following: "If a country is attacked, and for its defense it needs to use gases, no document will prevent it from doing it."

He accordingly concluded that forswearing the military option was "an illusion;" "[i]t will not be for our days … but it may become an imperative of national security." Macedo Soares's opinion was the consensus in the council. Army Minister General Auerlio Lira Tavares reflected on his own experiences after the Second World War, when the Nazi regime was shown to have transformed perfume makers into "factories of war instruments." Given that military organizations must stand vigilant against "technical

[797] Ibid., p. 10.

surprise[s]," he asserted, "no country … can be unmindful of the evolution of technology." Magalhães Pinto supported a threshold capacity, noting that "in case of any emergency we would be able to use what we already possess." President Costa e Silva's reply was crisp: "Obviously."

Magalhães Pinto therefore pushed for an explicit reference to Brazil's "sovereign right" to conduct explosions for peaceful purposes. Although the Treaty of Tlatelolco contained a prohibition of nuclear explosives for "war purposes," PNEs were technically legal. "Even so," he warned, "there is strong international pressure" in Geneva to reverse the precedent in the nonproliferation treaty and a failure to imbed a reference in Brazilian nuclear policy would subject his diplomats to "much stronger pressure." Costa e Silva agreed, acknowledging that the Treaty of Tlatelolco had "allowed us to go to Geneva and also defend our sovereign right as a country to deal with this subject as an international power without any restriction." Although a final decision was not taken at the meeting, Brazil continually reaffirmed a right to peaceful explosives in Geneva and New York City.

As governments around the world debated their position on various provisions in a nonproliferation treaty, the safeguards controversy wended its way through the United States, Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, NATO, and Euratom. A co-chairmen's' meeting in Geneva on September 1 between Foster and Roshchin demonstrated that the Gordian knot of Article III still required untangling. Roshchin praised the "informal meetings" of Bunn and Timerbaev that had enabled the Soviet delegation to put forward a new Article III more palatable to the U.S. and its Euratom allies because it permitted states to negotiate with the IAEA "individually or together with others states." Nevertheless, a litany of concerns remained: the stated purpose, a reference to Euratom, whether safeguards would apply to facilities or "source or special fissionable

materials," protections for technological development and nuclear trade, and whether the guillotine clause would fall after 18 or 36 months."[798] The Soviet version was more ambitious regarding the scope of safeguards, authorizing the IAEA to oversee "all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out by it anywhere."[799] An explicit legal reference to Euratom was still anathema to the Eastern bloc. In private conversations with Bernard de Chalvron, the French observer in Geneva, an East German minister fulminated against Euratom since it "contained only members of NATO and constituted an association under Bonn's firm control."[800] Members of the Disarmament Agency, Seaborg, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff pushed Bunn to finalize the safeguards language before the Political Committee of the UNGA met in November.[801]

The European Community's Council of Ministers met in Brussels on October 2 and 3. Foster was anxious for a consensus on safeguards and security assurances lest non-aligned states exploit a blank slate in New York City. He worried that awaiting a final decision would impede the co-chairmen's ability to broker a compromise.[802] With France neutral, the remaining five Euratom members failed to formulate their own safeguards article. West German officials found the European Communities less supportive than hoped. Italian representatives were like-minded and Belgian officials cooperative, but neither was willing to derail negotiations. The remaining members wanted a treaty more

[798] William Foster, Telegram from the Mission in Geneva to Dean Rusk and Adrian Fisher, "Co-Chairmen's Meeting—Soviet Recommendation on Article III," 1 September 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 205, 503-504.
[799] A full draft of the Soviet Article III was reproduced in Telegram from the Mission in Geneva to Department of State, "Draft Article III," 1 September 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 206, 505-506.
[800] Bernard de Chalvron, Telegram to Paris, "Désarmement et Pankow Declaration à l'egard de Article III," 10 October 1967, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.
[801] Bunn, *Arms Control by Committee*, 101.
[802] William Foster, Letter to President Lyndon Johnson, "Article III of the NPT," 2 October 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 211, 515-516.

than an unfettered Euratom.[803] The inauguration of the Nuclear Planning Group may have been responsible; McNamara inferred that whereas European allies once pled for more nuclear emplacements, they had now arrived at "the opposite extreme;" "[t]hey are scared to death of the use of nuclear weapons."[804] Instead, the European Communities issued an aide-mémoire listing five principles. First, NPT safeguards would apply to "source and special fissionable material and not to facilities." Second, Euratom and the IAEA would conclude an agreement on safeguard implementation directly. Third, existing supply agreements between Euratom, or its member states, and second parties (most importantly the U.S.) would not be affected in the interim. Fourth, the international agency would verify the safeguards administered by Euratom rather than apply its own. Finally, the conclusion of negotiations should not conform to a deadline.[805]

White House officials feared unleashing a nationalistic backlash if the article deviated excessively from the principles fought for by West Germany. While the Social Democrats (SDP) downplayed the impact of a nonproliferation accord on West German interests, leaders of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU) parties were staunchly opposed. Finance Minister Strauss denounced a treaty as "a U.S.-Soviet "deal" made behind Germany's back and at her expense."[806] Rostow warned Johnson that they needed to persuade the Soviets to acquiesce to a role for Euratom in a future safeguard regime so as not to "give the Germans an excuse for rejecting the Treaty," which would "seriously damage our relations with them." Failure to achieve

---

[803] Dean Rusk, Memorandum to President Lyndon Johnson, "Status of NPT Negotiations," undated, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 218, 534.
[804] Tom Johnson, Notes, "President's Meeting with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, Helms, and Christian," 3 October 1967, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, LBJL, 3.
[805] Dean Rusk, Telegram from the Department of State to Certain Posts, "Status US-Soviet NPT Safeguards Negotiations," 11 November 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 216, 524-529.
[806] Walt Rostow, Memorandum to President Lyndon Johnson, "Germany and the N.P.T.," 7 November 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 215, 523.

consensus with Soviet officials, on the other hand, risked the General Assembly session intervening, which could delay a treaty by as much as a year, if not kill it outright."[807] The United States thus walked a tightrope between West German fears of its marginalization and Soviet resolve to close backdoors to nuclearization in Europe.

The co-chairmen's ability to control the nuclear agenda hinged on the resolution of the safeguard controversy. Foster and Dobrynin exchanged views on the acceptability of neutral amendments in early October. Though they deemed the majority impractical and Dobrynin waved aside any changes to treaty's duration or its amendment procedures, some of the Mexican proposals were "possibly acceptable."[808] On November 2, Foster explained to Dobrynin that Soviet willingness to accept safeguards on their own peaceful activities might secure the goodwill of European parties. He then presented a version of the *ad referendum* formula for Soviet review that West German officials had accepted that day. The refined language dismantled the guillotine clause and kept Euratom safeguards, but made the IAEA the final arbiter of compliance through an adversarial system of inspections of the flow of fissile materials. Time was running out before the Political Committee met to review issues relating to disarmament. Pushing the agenda back would give neutral states an opening to push for more amendments in Geneva and at the upcoming Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapons States sponsored by Pakistan. Foster nevertheless would not compromise on "IAEA safeguards," nor would Dobrynin budge on duration or amendment.[809] However, Soviet interest was genuine because of a nonproliferation treaty's stabilizing effects in the developing world. Dobrynin

---

[807] Ibid. Walt Rostow, Memorandum to President Lyndon Johnson, "Germany and the N.P.T.," 7 November 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 215, 523-524.
[808] Memorandum of Conversation between Anatoly Dobrynin and William Foster, "Non-Proliferation Treaty and ABMs," 4 October 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 212, 517.
[809] Memorandum of Conversation between Anatoly Dobrynin and William Foster, "Non-Proliferation Treaty," 2 November 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 214, 520-522.

wondered if "Indian and Brazil would go along with the NPT." Foster was uncertain, but suggested that security assurances were probably the best hope.[810]

Alas, the Indian position had hardened alongside that of Brazil. Canadian High Commissioner James George called on Indian authorities in early December, leaning on them to accept a treaty lest they jeopardize Canadian aid and nuclear assistance. The coercion and Indian elites' reactions were symptomatic of growing North-South tensions in the nuclear realm. When George delivered an ultimatum to R. Jaipal, the Indian joint secretary wryly asked, "[a]m I to assume the Americans will be in to see me on Monday and the Russians immediately after them?" Foreign Secretary Dayal's response was meanwhile so cantankerous that George called it "shocking." Brushing aside the threat of aid suspension, Dayal reportedly avowed that "India would never give up an iota of its hard-fought independence by signing the NPT." Prime Minister Gandhi was less prickly but equally frank. She maintained that the Chinese and Pakistani threats were reason enough to keep her options open and questioned the real worth of security assurances:

> If the Americans want to come to our aid against an attack by the Chinese they will, even if they don't sign the NPT. And if they don't want to come to our aid, they won't even if we do sign the treaty.

George surmised that Indian Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, whom he characterized as a "nationalist first and scientist second," was "the primary architect of [the Indian government's] position on [the] NPT." Sarabhai evidently visited Gandhi weekly and spoke to her via telephone many times a day.[811] George's judgment of the chairman's "emotional and somewhat irrational position on [the] NPT" teemed with the feminized adjectives typical of Western prejudices against

---

[810] Ibid. Memorandum of Conversation between Anatoly Dobrynin and William Foster, "Non-Proliferation Treaty," 2 November 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 214, 522.
[811] Gandhi's relationship with Sarabhai may have been more than professional.

Asian men. In truth, Sarabhai would more likely have agreed with Dayal's rationale: "India's political leaders held in sacred patrimony the freedom of future generations."[812]

As India rebuffed George's threats, Soviet and U.S. officials tried to bypass the safeguards obstruction, but continued to founder on the shoals of West Germany. Foster cautioned Washington from his vantage "as a Co-Chairman," that "we are now being asked to fight mainly for the interests of only one of our allies, as against our own national interests and those of the most of the rest of our allies and most of the rest of the world."[813] Neither West Germany nor Italy would acquiesce to a formulation that made the IAEA the regime's sole watchdog and regular meetings of the NAC failed to break the impasse.[814] Rusk believed that preserving Euratom's prerogatives was not in the country's "long range interest … as far as the countries outside of Euratom are concerned."[815] However, the European variable complicated the global calculus: to contain nuclear weapons, the country jeopardized its strategy of Soviet containment centering on Berlin.

On December 2, Johnson offered to place the nation's non-military nuclear facilities under international safeguards, which Brandt lauded as a "significant step." On the same day, the president sent a letter to Kiesinger urging the chancellor to display flexibility and accept the November 2 formulation whose substance the Soviets had accepted with the lone exception of a desired reference to "IAEA safeguards." In a White

---

[812] Chester Bowles, Telegram from New Delhi to Washington et al., "Canadians Warn GOI on NPT," 1 December 1967, Document 7, NPT, NSA, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc07.pdf

[813] Op. cit. Dean Rusk, Memorandum to President Lyndon Johnson, "Status of NPT Negotiations," undated, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 218, 533, footnote 2.

[814] E.g. "IAEA safeguards" as opposed to "safeguards in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system." Dean Rusk, Telegram from the Department of State to Harlan Cleveland of the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NPT," 5 December 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 219; Adrian Fisher, Letter to President Lyndon Johnson, "Article III and the North Atlantic Council," 5 December 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 220.

[815] Op. cit. Dean Rusk, Memorandum to President Lyndon Johnson, "Status of NPT Negotiations," undated, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 218, 535.

House meeting on December 5, Rusk expressed "doubts" that progress was possible since the safeguards article caused Bonn such "political problems."[816] George McGhee, the U.S. Ambassador in Bonn, echoed these misgivings. He feared that political dissension within the governing coalition could have disastrous results and warned that Johnson might have to choose "between the NPT and keeping Germany as an ally."[817] Though Kiesinger refrained from sending "a stiff letter on the NPT," the letter that arrived on December 8 made clear that the Soviet wording was unacceptable. The president did not press the matter. The ball was now firmly in the Soviet court.

The superpowers temporized in Geneva and New York City in hopes that a solution would materialize. In early November, Foster noted that disarmament hearings would occupy the Political Committee for some time, but contended that a Soviet draft convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons would only exacerbate Soviet-American differences.[818] In the end, the convention hearing occupied the Political Committee through mid-December, when the ENDC dissolved without a consensus treaty and the UNGA commenced debates on how to break the deadlock. Soviet Ambassador Vasilii Kuznetsov leaned on Indian and U.A.R. representatives at the U.N. to co-sponsor a resolution with the U.S. and U.S.S.R. requesting that the ENDC present a full draft treaty to the General Assembly in the spring. The French ambassador noted that neither Arab nor socialist states "could fully explain the Soviet delegation's insistence on concluding this project in accordance with the U.S. delegation."[819] Soviet officials

---

[816] Tom Johnson, Notes of the President's Tuesday lunch group on December 5 in the Mansion from 1:18 p.m. to 2:37 p.m.," 5 December 1967, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, LBJL.

[817] Walt Rostow, Letter to President Lyndon Johnson, "Our Negotiations on Article III of the NPT," 5 December 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 221, 539.

[818] Op. cit. Memorandum of Conversation between Anatoly Dobrynin and William Foster, "Non-Proliferation Treaty," 2 November 1967, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Doc. 214, 522.

[819] Alphand Bernard, Telegram from New York to Paris re "Non-Prolifération," 14 December 1967, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 2.

seemed chastened by a "gang-up" of non-nuclear states against the superpowers in the UNGA.[820] The General Assembly nonetheless passed Resolution 2346 A (XXII) requesting submission of a full report by March 15, 1968. With the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapons States postponed until August, the superpowers had barely managed to retain control over the proceedings. Soviet officials warned though that "endless negotiations" had formed "more opponents than supporters of the treaty." The Soviet counselor in the Washington embassy estimated that only a couple of months remained during which a successful outcome for the treaty remained viable; "after that it might be too late."

**Conclusion**

Even though the course of negotiations in 1967 failed to resolve the safeguards controversy, the contours of a widely acceptable nonproliferation treaty had emerged. The safeguards controversy was a barometer of improving Soviet-American relations amid the Vietnam War thanks to greater trust through dialogue and fraternization at the diplomatic middle ground in Geneva. The Six Day War exemplified fears that the introduction of nuclear weapons into postcolonial battlegrounds where containment was increasingly under threat would draw the superpowers into a general war whose escalation might occasion the strategic-level use of weapons of mass destruction. Eastern and Western policymakers were less successful in allaying India's security anxieties in the context of China's growing capabilities. In the absence of a Soviet-American accord on a mutually acceptable Article III, the non-aligned members of the ENDC, and in particular

[820] ACDA, Memorandum of Conversation between Yuly M. Vorontsov and Lawrence Weiler, "Article III NPT Impasse," 16 December 1967, Document 8a, NPT, NSA, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc08a.pdf

the Mexican delegation, succeeded in proffering new amendments to nudge the compact under consideration in the direction of a more equitable undertaking reflecting traditional conceptions of liberal international based on sovereign equality. The nonproliferation draft treaty would ultimately reflect these efforts, which proved critical to winning the support of the greater international community at the United Nations in 1968.

The next chapter concludes the history of the making of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The Soviet and American delegations tabled a comprehensive draft together on January 18, 1968, ushering in a frantic and fateful stage of negotiations at the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament and, subsequently, the United Nations Political Committee and General Assembly. The views of potential irreconcilables among the nuclear have-nots such as Brazil and India were in tension with the superpowers' self-imposed constraints in regards to security assurances and their unwillingness to permit the indigenous development of peaceful nuclear explosives. The battle to guide resolutions through the General Assembly and the Security Council to endorse the draft treaty and obligate the nuclear-armed members of the council to tackle nuclear threats in an expedient manner, respectively, met significant resistance from Latin American and African states. The French attitude toward the legal precedents set by the treaty and the related assurances resolution was potentially decisive in view of its veto on the Security Council. The fate of the treaty and the global nuclear order it authorized thus hinged on French and non-aligned misgivings about a legal regime empowered to discriminate among nation-states according to their status as legitimate or illegitimate nuclear powers.

## Chapter Six | "*Upon All Mankind:" Final Negotiations for the NPT*

*"The Secretary added that there are few people who truly understand the real meaning of nuclear war – perhaps not more than 25 or 30 in the U.S.. Kuznetsov said that the Soviet Union understood it very well. The NPT had been under the highest consideration in the USSR which had concluded that the NPT negotiations were of the highest importance and the only way to stop proliferation. He returned to the importance of solidarity between the US and Soviet Union…"*

*U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Soviet Ambassador Vasilii Kuznetsov, 17 May 1968, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 239, 602.*

### Introduction: Power and Prohibition

International negotiations for a nonproliferation treaty had accelerated once the MLF roadblock was removed. The diplomatic lines of action now ran increasingly along North-South lines as the two superpowers strove to ward off the arrival of nuclear weapons in Cold War hot spots while appeasing allies whose interests were diverging from postwar patrons as the specter of superpower conflict faded and their nuclear sectors expanded. The implicit compromise in the draft treaty's non-dissemination and non-acquisition articles allowed consultative arrangements in NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, but scrapped a multilateral nuclear force and equivocated about a united European deterrent. These articles thus largely settled questions relating to Cold War nuclear security and the German question. A fusion of nuclear deterrence, international organizations, and arms control would preserve the peace by replacing common security with a delicate alloy of nuclear terror and prohibition. The negotiation of issues relating to a nonproliferation treaty now centered less on the East-West standoff and more on security assurances for states that forwent the military option, a level playing field for nuclear exporters and importers, and the fairness of what would inevitably be a discriminatory order of nuclear privileges. These matters necessitated a more attentive

hearing of the views of non-aligned states from the Global South and, in the end, the resolution of how an elegantly imperfect treaty could be made universal, durable, and just.

The Soviet and U.S. delegations tabled a full draft treaty on January 18, 1968, inaugurating a final eventful phase of international efforts to shape a global nuclear order. The feat elicited widespread astonishment at the depth of Soviet-American cooperation and ran into trouble as soon as it was formalized. With a Conference of Non-Nuclear State set to begin in late summer, the superpower needed to stay on the same page as allied and non-aligned states sought to modify or thwart a treaty's composition. Among Western powers, Japan, Italy, and West Germany voiced concerns, making requests for greater "flexibility" in the treaty's procedures and regular conferences to review its performance. In the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, non-aligned delegations won changes to Articles IV, V, and VI, together with review conferences to occur every five years. These revisions failed to dispel criticisms of irreconcilables such as India and Brazil, whose demands for a formal right to develop peaceful nuclear explosives and for binding security assurances went unmet. Soviet and United States leaders anticipated Indian and Brazilian opposition at a special session of the United Nations General Assembly in April and planned to "isolate" near-nuclears in New York City. Brazil, India, and West Germany failed to assure the critical mass needed to delay or foil the proceedings. Nevertheless, the skepticism of large Latin American and African blocs in the UNGA called into doubt whether a resolution endorsing the draft treaty could receive enough favorable votes to signify international consensus.

The United States and the Soviet Union offered guarantees and revisions while exerting considerable pressure on recalcitrant states to ensure a successful vote in the Political Committee and General Assembly. Mexican acquiescence was the key to Latin

American votes. Its procurement required the adoption of a new set of textual changes advocated by Mexican Deputy Secretary Alfonso García Robles that reaffirmed the U.N. Charter's principles of peaceful conflict resolution and the rule of law while also expediting and expanding rights to peaceful nuclear technology. The African bloc conditioned their backing on a renewed U.N. debate on the issue of South African interference in South West Africa, but settled for assurances that Pretoria would vote in favor of the resolution. The Soviet ambassador brought the U.A.R. and the rest of the Arab world on board by making similar pledges in regards to Israel. The Soviet-American strategy was to hold the line against further amendments. However, it nearly fell apart when U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk acceded to West German requests to delay the vote until after the Conference of Non-Nuclear States. U.S. Disarmament Agency Director William Foster's threat to resign in protest compelled Rusk to walk back the concession. The Soviets and Americans were still obliged to weaken the resolution, altering it to commend rather than endorse the treaty, in order to persuade three-fourths of the assembly to vote in favor. The UNGA resolution paved the way for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to open for signature on July 1, 1968, though not before irreconcilables had one last chance to voice their displeasure. A debate over placing nuclear security assurances under the aegis of the Security Council called attention to the Pandora's box that might open by empowering permanent members with nuclear arsenals to preside over a global order founded on nuclear prohibitions.

### Resolution and Resistance

With the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament set to reconvene in Geneva on January 18, 1968, the superpowers worked full-heartedly for an agreement. The Kremlin had concluded that nuclear risks in Asia and the opportunity to bind West

Germany more tightly to its non-nuclear status made an imperfect deal better than none at all, or one further weakened by neutralist influence. The key non-nuclear players—Brazil, India, and West Germany—seemed increasing aligned against a treaty and Soviet-American clout risked evaporating on account of a growing affinity among nuclear have-nots, exemplified by the Conference of Non-Nuclear States scheduled for August. As a consequence, the two Cold War rivals worked to coordinate their negotiating strategies. Washington started to believe that Moscow was more intent on global nonproliferation that on weakening NATO. Though the East-West conflict remained operative, China's nuclearization and the Six Day War had reoriented Soviet focus from a "parochial concern" with West Germany to "a broader view" to "minimize on [a] global basis prospects for hostilities involving nuclear weapons … by halting [the] further spread of nuclear weapons into possible contentious areas." Moscow was accordingly ready to accept a treaty "largely on [U.S.] terms."[821]

The final resolution of the safeguards controversy occurred after the New Year. The Soviet Foreign Ministry felt that U.S. insistence on the November 2 version entailed an "ultimatum," though U.S. Disarmament Agency officials evidently convinced their Soviet interlocutors that they "did not envisage merely paper verifications."[822] Soviet diplomats in Washington and Geneva thus worked to soothe the Moscow's fears that Washington's line was in truth a "pressure play." Vuli Vorontsov of the Soviet embassy in Washington served as a go-between in early 1968. He advised Disarmament Agency

---

[821] R. H. Kranich and Adrian Fisher, ACDA, State Department cable 107235 to U.S. Embassy Bonn, "Soviet Motivation on NPT," 30 January 1968, Document 11, NPT, NSA. Location of original and most other documents provided by the Natoinal Security Archives: National Archives, Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State, 1967-1969 Subject-Numeric Files, DEF 18-6: http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc11.pdf.

[822] Op cit. ACDA, Memorandum of Conversation between Yuly Vorontsov and Lawrence Weiler, "Article III NPT impasse," 16 December 1967, Document 8a, NPT, NSA, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc08a.pdf

Assistant Director Samuel De Palma that Moscow was amenable to capping the treaty's duration at 25 years and clarifying that amendments would bind only those states parties accepting them. By contrast, Soviet policy vis-à-vis the Japanese suggestion of periodic review conferences remained unsettled. The Politburo would decide the Soviet position on Article III, though, according to Vorontsov, its political preoccupations would make it "exceedingly difficult to deal with an essentially technical question."[823]

Japanese attitudes toward the safeguards article were as crucial as they were complex. Tokyo played a double game so that any exemptions won by Euratom would redound to its benefit, while striving to ward off an eventuality in which Western Europe gained the upper hand over the Japanese nuclear industry.[824] Presidential adviser John J. McCloy worried in a letter to Foster, who was convalescing in a Maryland hospital after a cardiac episode, that a settlement of the pivotal article would prove impossible. Working out its "complexities" and assigning "the proper relationship between the IAEA, Euratom, the Japanese, and other non-European non-nuclears," McCloy confessed, was going to be a "close-run thing."[825]

In fact, a final agreement remained in doubt on the morning that the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament was set to resume. However the Politburo made its decision, the Soviet delegation in Geneva received instructions early on January 18 to inform their U.S. counterparts that Moscow had accepted the November 2 version of the safeguards article. The delay was deliberate so that Johnson could not report the coup

[823] ACDA, Memorandum of Conversation between Yuly Vorontsov and Samuel DePalma, "Soviet Views on NPT," 3 January 1968, Document 8b,NSA, NPT, 1-2, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc08b.pdf

[824] Quester, *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation*, 108.

[825] John J. McCloy, Letter to William (Bill) Foster, "Foster's hospitalization and GAC views on NPT advancement," 10 January 1968, Folder 19, Box 15, Foster Papers, GCML, 2.

during his State of the Union address to Congress.[826] Nevertheless, after months of squabbling, the superpowers had agreed on a four-paragraph construction that made the IAEA the superintendent of global nuclear activities. A Soviet colleague wrote Foster in the hospital to proclaim his sentiment that "this was the greatest achievement between the Soviet Union and the United States which had taken place since World War II." Foster was "inclined to agree."[827] The article did not specify "IAEA safeguards;" rather, the fourth paragraph specified the conclusion of agreements with the IAEA by states parties, "individually or together with other states," in accordance with the agency's statute. The formulation allowed Euratom to devise in consultation with the Vienna watchdog an adversarial program of audits of fissile-material accounting and external inspection in case of discrepancy.

There were also changes to articles and clauses that pertained to the amendment procedure, duration, review conferences, and withdrawal terms of the treaty. At the behest of NATO allies, the U.S. had curtailed the power of treaty amendments by making adherence voluntary, setting the duration at 25 years, and mandating a review conference five years after the treaty went into force. The Soviets had not budged on periodic review conferences though and in recompense for their concessions had stripped out the withdrawal clause.[828] Robert Kranich of the U.S. Disarmament Agency believed that the compromise had worked out in the West's favor. In a Washington sit-down, he informed West German embassy official Adolph von Wagner that the U.S.S.R. had been persuaded by U.S. resolve, the broad and vocal "dissatisfaction of the non-nuclear

---

[826] Charles Lucet, Telegram from Washington to Paris, "Projet de traité de non-prolifération," January 20, 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1.

[827] William Foster, Letter to Mr. Goldthwaite H. Dorr, "Your Good Letter of January 26," 2 February 1968, Folder 1, Box 13, Foster Papers, GCML, 1.

[828] US Mission NATO cable 1393 to State Department, "NAC January 18—Draft NPT, 18 January 1968, Document 9c, NPT, NSA, 1-6, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc09c.pdf

countries as expressed during the last [UN]GA" and appreciation for the need to conclude a treaty speedily "because of the possibility of proliferation elsewhere in the world." According to von Wagner, the F.R.G. was reluctant to pledge their signature on and ratification of the treaty before the Euratom-IAEA relationship clarified further following bilateral talks. Kranich reminded von Wagner that deliberations were not finished yet and Washington would continue to press for security assurances, protections for peaceful applications of nuclear energy, as well as regular conferences to review the treaty's efficacy and legitimacy.[829]

In Brussels, U.S. Ambassador Harlan Cleveland briefed the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on the turn of events. Reviewing the document "article by article," Cleveland underscored that "easy access to peaceful nuclear technology … [and] steps to halt [the] nuclear arms race … were of special interest to non-nuclear-weapons states," neglecting the signficance of security assurances. Mexico's interventions had been pivotal in adding "Articles IV, … V, VI, and VII" to the joint draft treaty. The fourth article elevated the statement in the preamble "concerning freedom of access to peaceful nuclear technology" to a binding commitment, which he claimed had received "broad NAC support;" the next three articles, including "Article VI," which similarly "reiterated [the] preambular idea of ending [the] nuclear arms race and working towards disarmament," had also "not been controversial in [the] NAC." The "major change," though, was limiting the treaty's lifespan to 25 years. Though a comparatively faraway terminus for an international treaty, the U.S. had wanted an unlimited duration before it "had been induced … [by] wide-spread support among [their] allies" to accept the quarter-century

---

[829] US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Memorandum of Conversation re Non-Proliferation Treaty," 18 January 1968, Document 9b, NPT, NSA, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc09b.pdf.

mark.[830] The joint Soviet-American draft thus entailed a largely complete document. Canadian ambassador Ross Campbell rose to comment that even though new modifications should receive "full consideration," those "favored by few should be treated accordingly."[831]

The West German and Italian ambassadors, Wilhelm Grewe and Baron Carol de Ferrariis Salzano, were handed the document before the meeting in order to allow them to solicit their capitals' views. In contrast to Campbell, Grewe implored that the views of the non-aligned "be weighted and not counted," a testament to the growing alignment of F.R.G. interests with those of non-aligned skeptics. Cleveland nonetheless adjudged the German reaction "comparatively forthcoming;" the "comparatively upbeat" response by de Ferrariis, on the other hand, was a "solo flight." Just the day before, the Italians had submitted a raft of new measures. Although they portrayed them as designed to address the conjoined quandaries of "credibility" and alleged nuclear "imperialism," they were tailor-made to delay the NPT: a requirement that 80 rather than 40 states ratify before entry into force, lower barriers to entry for new amendments, and the exclusion of IAEA officials from the review conference.[832] De Ferrariis let slip that the Italian Foreign Ministry had received news of the "sudden tabling … "in [a] state of shock," auguring a continuing struggle among U.S. allies and non-aligned states that could endanger the international consensus behind a treaty.[833]

---

[830] US Mission NATO cable 1393 to State Department, "NAC January 18—Draft NPT, 18 January 1968, Document 9c, NPT, NSA, 1-6, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc09c.pdf

[831] Ibid. US Mission NATO cable 1393 to State Department, "NAC January 18—Draft NPT, 18 January 1968, Document 9c, NPT, NSA, 5-6, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc09c.pdf

[832] Telegram Bruxelles to Paris, "Italian proposals re NPT at NATO," 17 January 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

[833] US Mission NATO cable 1393 to State Department, "NAC January 18—Draft NPT, 18 January 1968, Document 9c, NPT, NSA, 8, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc09c.pdf

The time had now come for non-aligned states to weigh in at Geneva and New York City. The tabling of the joint Soviet-American draft nonproliferation treaty on January 18, 1968, inaugurated an eventful phase of multilateral nuclear diplomacy. The divergent views of nuclear "haves" and "have-nots" (allied and nonaligned) were now the most important divide in the plenary debates with the March 15 deadline looming. From his hospital room, Foster sent a letter congratulating the Geneva negotiating team and the Disarmament Agency more generally for the achievement. He deemed them "more directly responsible for getting the draft actually approved than any other element."[834] After five years of orchestrating a viable treaty with U.S. bureaucrats, NATO allies, communist rivals, and non-aligned states, such plaudits were well-earned. Now, the U.S. delegation in Geneva faced the challenge of endowing the nonproliferation pact with the global legitimacy that only the participation of a broad and representative segment of international society could confer. Unfortunately, "the many influences which appeared to be directed toward holding [a treaty] back" were now fully roused. The Italians were not the only ones stunned by the breakthrough. French observer Bernard de Chalvron noted a fraught tone when neutral and non-nuclear delegates spoke in the corridors of the Palais des Nations, writing to Paris that "the news caused some astonishment among [those] who do not share the two co-presidents' optimism."[835] Foster also noted a climate of disquiet in a letter to Samuel De Palma in which he expressed the hope that treaty skeptics, including "our 'principal' partners here (Italy and West Germany)," were "feeling an increasing sense of isolation." He divulged that the "approach of our 'friends'

---

[834] William Foster, Letter to Colleagues, "Joint NPT Draft Tabling," 22 January 1968, Folder 1, Box 13, Foster papers, GCML.

[835] Bernard Guillier de Chalvron, Telegram from Geneva to Paris," U.S.-Soviet Joint Nonproliferation Treaty Draft," January 18, 1968, AMAEF, Cote 517INVA, Box 768.

to the south (Mexico and Brazil)" was "one of the great puzzles and disappointments to me;" nevertheless, he expected they would "eventually come around."[836]

The committee had less than two months to discuss and revise the draft before the United Nations General Assembly subjected it to collective scrutiny. U.N. Secretary General U Thant addressed a message to the opening plenary urging the deliberative body swiftly to conclude a treaty, which signified "an indispensable first step towards further progress on disarmament."[837] Notwithstanding the U.N.'s imprimatur, the first proposal of a complete draft treaty marked neither the end of inter-alliance strife, nor the capitulation of non-aligned states and nuclear have-nots. De Chalvron spoke with the West German spokesman that day. Though West Germany was satisfied "with progress to date," the Frenchman likened the suggestion that the treaty still needed improvements to "delaying tactics." Moreover, de Chalvron noted that Euratom's "hopes" of assuring some measure of nuclear autonomy meant that Bonn and Rome would continue to prevail upon Paris to eschew its veto in the European Communities.[838]

The Kiesinger government was in fact riven by discord among its top ministers. Foreign Minister Brandt and the Social Democrats regarded a treaty as a disarmament instrument consonant with an incipient policy of *Ostpolitik* to widen contacts with Eastern Europe in order to improve relations with the communist world. Conversely, Finance Minister Strauss, whose Christian Democrats were equally crucial to the governing coalition, continued his vociferous attacks against the treaty. According to de Chalvron, the Soviet-American settlement had astounded West German officials. Apparently, Bonn

---

[836] William Foster, Letter to Samuel De Palma, "Your good letter of the 19th," 22 January 1968, Folder 1, Box 13, Foster Papers, GCML, 1.

[837] Final Verbatim Record of the 357th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 18 January 1968, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.357, 4-5.

[838] Bernard Guillier de Chalvron, Note, "Projet de Traité Américano-Soviétique sur la non prolifération des armes nucléaires du 18 janvier 1968," 22 January 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 5-6.

had originally agreed to the November 2 formulation in fear of losing its credibility on *Ostpolitik* and in expectation of a refusal by Moscow.[839] The mood was accordingly "heavy and despondent" when the Federal Republic's National Defense Council met on January 22. Kiesinger and Brandt resolved that the government would support the treaty publically so as to "prove not only its support for non-proliferation but [also] that it is a good ally." Strauss, on the other hand, "forcefully" called for the government to reject the NPT, but he was in the minority; Kiesinger preferred to focus on maximizing a treaty's "flexibility" with reference to periodic review conferences, limited duration, and tough standards for renewal.[840] Bonn still suspected Moscow's motives though, even in regards to its alteration the revision procedures, whose implications should have pleased the West Germans. In a conversation with French Ambassador François Seydoux, West German Disarmament Minister Schnippenkoetter wondered aloud at the Soviets' intentions, surmising that their acquiescence to a 25-year horizon was merely a ploy to blunt the criticism of troublesome allies such as Romania.[841]

The specter of a French veto in Euratom or the United Nations Security Council loomed. In regards to the merits of a nonproliferation treaty, French rhetoric and *raison d'état* pointed in opposite directions. De Gaulle did not want a German state (against which France had fought twice that century) to acquire the ultimate weapon. Far better that Paris possess the sole *force de frappe* on the continent, leaving Bonn the junior partner in European politics and security. De Gaulle's governing principles were at odds with his regional interests though. The Gaullist "grand design" valorized the myth of French

---

[839] Bernard Guillier de Chalvron, Telegram from Washington to Paris, "Project de traité de non-prolifération," 20 January 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 2.
[840] U.S. Embassy Bonn cable 7557 to Department of State, "FRG Defense Council Meeting on NPT," 23 January 1968, Document 10a, NPT, NSA, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc10a.pdf
[841] Francois Seydoux, Telegram from Bonn to Paris, "West Germans reactions to nonproliferation developments especially re Article III," 25 January 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 2-4.

*grandeur* while expounding a universal theory of world politics based on a "European Europe" and sovereign autonomy in matters of state and especially nuclear and defense policy.[842] The Delphic auguries emanating from Paris puzzled Europe watchers in Washington. They worried that de Gaulle wanted to "wreck the NPT," "or at least try to prevent German adherence to it." Defense Minister Pierre Messmer and de Gaulle had recently issued proclamations casting the treaty as irrelevant to disarmament and inimical to nuclear have-nots' interests because it would only force them "to tie themselves closer to the nuclear powers." French Gaullists evidently feared that a "new Yalta" would arise from Soviet-American détente after the Six Days' War.

De Gaulle delivered a speech to the French War College on January 27 that encapsulated his pessimistic views on the likelihood of stemming nuclear spread. He predicted that Japan would soon shift from an economic focus to enhancing its political capital by pursuing "commensurate military power," including the construction of a nuclear deterrent.[843] De Gaulle's ambivalence toward a new global nuclear order was apparent when the Quai d'Orsay circulated a telegram to its embassies in ENDC member states on February 3. In it, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlined current French thinking. Counter to U.S. assumptions, it portrayed the German question in NATO as largely settled, but nonetheless criticized the prospect of a Soviet-American condominium in the nuclear domain. The circular reiterated the Gaullist maxim that

[842] The "De Gaulle Problem," namely the difficulty of reconciling his grandiloquent pronouncements of French nationalism with his professed "grand design" of rebalancing East-West relations by means of a "European Europe" with France rising like a phoenix from the ashes of its empire into the newborn sun of its nuclear power, continues to perplex scholars of international history. A thoroughgoing and reasonable well-supported, though lacking in French archival documents, analysis is Trachtenberg, "The de Gaulle Problem."

[843] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Note-88, "Does de Gaulle Want to Torpedo the NPT?" 1 February 1968, Document 12, NPT, NSA, 2. Though President de Gaulle did not specify nuclear weapons in his War College speech, he later informed Ambassador Chip Bohlen "that he had meant that Japan would one day want nuclear weapons, largely because of its proximity to Communist China."

each country was free to determine its own defensive arrangements and international commitments. Having transgressed international norms to build their own nuclear arsenal, the French were loath to infringe on state sovereignty lest they seem hypocritical:

> It is in this spirit that we scrupulously abstain from participation in the ongoing discussions, irrespective of the body in which they unfold, being understood that the treaty could have no relevance to our policy.[844]

The political implications, however, belied the anti-treaty rhetoric. Abstention was in fact tantamount to acquiescence since the policy barred the use of the French veto. And, in truth, French authorities reassured Soviet diplomats visiting Paris that they were working "behind the scenes to get Germany to sign," and had no intention of otherwise obstructing the proceedings.[845] In bilateral talks, Paris had made it "abundantly clear" to Bonn that it was expected to sign the treaty.[846] The Quai d'Orsay would nevertheless review its position as talks edged toward a denouement.

Momentum had started to build at the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament for some amendments as non-aligned and non-nuclear members sought a fairer bargain. On February 8, Alva Myrdal of Sweden took the rostrum to discuss the question of how a nonproliferation treaty ought to relate to broader concerns about the nuclear arms race:

> How can we—the non-nuclear-weapon States—be expected to enter into an interminable obligation to remain non-nuclear if the nuclear-weapon States are engaged in an interminable nuclear escalation? This question is really not one, as has sometimes been said rather reproachfully, of seeking any quid pro quo. It is a

---

[844] Hervé Alphand, Circular Telegram from Paris to ENDC capitals, "French position on nonproliferation treaty," 3 February 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1-2

[845] U.S. State Department, Memorandum of Conversation between George Bunn and Yuli Vorontsov, "NPT," 15 February 1968, Document 12, NPT, NSA, 1-2.

[846] Schoenborn, *La mésentente approvoisée*, 316; and Klaiber to Auswärtige Amt, February 1, 1968, in *Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Vol. 1, 147, cited in Trachtenberg, "The de Gaulle Problem," 89.

> question of the whole atmosphere, of perspective; and it cannot be concealed that the atmosphere of confidence was greater two years ago than it is today.[847]

Though most non-nuclear delegates expressed their pleasure upon seeing the inclusion of Article VI, whose language Mexico had proposed the previous fall, Myrdal pointed out that the Soviet and American authors had redacted key clauses, for example, "with all speed and perseverance," "to arrive at further agreements," and to seek "the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests." She proposed more modest replacements. The words "at an early date," should "introduc[e] once more the sense of urgency which we all feel presses for further measures to halt the nuclear arms race." In addition, to include the word "nuclear" before "disarmament" would underline the paramount hazard posed by such cataclysmic weapons. Finally, she urged that the committee add a new paragraph referencing a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) to the preamble. The majority of nuclear have-nots endorsed the Swedish amendments. Bunn accordingly believed that Myrdal's amendments ought to be integrated in the final text in order to ease the accession of Sweden whose lead other non-aligned states might follow.[848]

The attitudes of many nuclear have-nots were still murky. There was of course considerable variation among the seventeen delegations in Geneva. In the Ethiopian delegate's phrasing, there seemed "as many ways of looking at this treaty as there are member nations." Nevertheless, the nuclear have-nots increasingly besieged the haves.[849] Bunn and Vorontsov spoke on February 15 in an effort to resolve the variance between the Kosygin proposal and the U.S. preference for a broader non-use pledge in a treaty, which would provide for nuclear guarantees to those states lacking nuclear weapons as

---

847 Final Verbatim Record of the 363rd Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 8 February 1968, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.363, 4-12.

848 U.S. State Department, Memorandum of Conversation, "NPT," 15 February 1968, Document 13, NPT, NSA, 2, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc13.pdf

849 Final Verbatim Record of the 364th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 13 February 1968, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.371.

well as the military assistance of a nuclear-weapon state. The prominent stage afforded "disgruntled ENDC members," and most frustratingly Romania, from which to express their grievances irked Vorontsov, who went so far as to suggest that the major players' foreign ministers fly in to finish the work. The Romanians had recently broken Warsaw Pact ranks to lament the absence of security assurances and "legal obligations" for disarmament. U.S. negotiators had their own problem allies. The NAC meeting on February 14 to discuss the Italian proposals of the previous month was the most intense to date.[850] Afterward, Rome seemed chastened and, a week later, its representative outlined four relatively modest and constructive amendments: a right to fissile materials, quinquennial review conferences, clearer language with reference to the treaty's 25-year duration, and a six-month waiting period upon notification of withdrawal.

After the Italian address, the non-aligned grouping met to discuss how "to hasten the work" and "clear out the underbrush" for a final draft.[851] Indian diplomats were hard at work in and out of Geneva trying to marshal a "non-signing bloc" of West Germany, Japan, Sweden, and Italy "that swapped arguments against the treaty and regularly consulted at a high level on what stands to take."[852] Close coordination was of course still occurring between the Soviet and American delegations, who consulted on how to achieve a consensus draft treaty with minimal revisions. Vorontsov preferred "to finish the text in Geneva and oppose any changes at the UNGA," but Bunn was more cautious.

---

[850] Telegram from Brussels to Paris, "Responses to Italian proposals of January 17," 14 February 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.
[851] Bernard de Chalvron, Telegram from Geneva to Paris, "Italian address and the Non-Aligned Bloc meeting," 20 February 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 2.
[852] Quester, *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation*, 75. Quester goes on to claim that "[i]n the spring of 1968, perhaps at great-power behest, New Delhi apparently decided to avoid agitating against the treaty rather than simply to state its own unwillingness to sign." The telegraphic correspondence of the French ENDC observer and its UN ambassador, however, indicate that India along with other NPT skeptics continued to seek out backchannels and consult in the hallways in Geneva and New York City about how to impede progress toward an NPT.

Though he concurred that such a tactic fitted Soviet and U.S. interests, it was improbable that a draft treaty would come through New York City without alterations.[853]

Security guarantees were the crux of negotiations and ultimately the grounds for Indian disavowal. British Disarmament Minister Fred Mulley confessed in an early plenary that the conspicuous lacuna of security assurances epitomized the many unresolved issues of particular importance to the Global South.[854] The granting of security guarantees, whether positive in terms of pledging support in case of nuclear threat, or negative in terms of eschewing the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear signatories, were critical to Indian acceptance. They also split Western opinion with respect to the basis on which the treaty could win the most support. The U.S. could ill afford more military commitments with its forces increasingly mired in Vietnam. Nor would the Pentagon accept the Kosygin proposal, which would leave those European territories, most alarmingly West Germany, that hosted U.S. nuclear weapons uncovered. De Palma informed Roshchin on February 19 that his government would not acquiesce to a non-use pledge that left its NATO allies so exposed.

Time and indoctrination had caused Indian strategic nuclear culture to mature and harden, which made weak assurances decreasingly viable. In 1968, the "great-power military strategic jargon" of "assured second-strike capability[s]" and "credible first-strike scenario[s]" were on the lips of educated elites in Bombay and New Delhi, who increasingly doubted that the U.S., or the U.S.S.R., would come to India's aid in the event of a nuclear-tipped clash with Mao's China. According to an American visitor, Indian elites then regularly invoked the cautionary lessons of West European insecurity

---

853 U.S. State Department, Memorandum of Conversation, "NPT," 15 February 1968, Document 13, NPT, NSA, 2, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc13.pdf

854 Final Verbatim Record of the 358th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 23 January 1968, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.358, 12.

during the Berlin and Cuban crises as well as French nuclear strategist Pierre Gallois's strategic axioms:

> Conjoined with this [nuclear faddishness] is the great popularity of the power-political abstractions of Pierre Gallois. … for example, the assurance of many American writers in the late 1950s that the United States could never rationally go to World War III in defense of Europe. Late in 1968 one Indian government official after another could be found commenting in almost identical terms that "no nation ever helps another except out of its own selfish interest;" that is, the United States would never retaliate against anyone that dropped a nuclear explosive on New Delhi.[855]

The impossibility of a non-use pledge because of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff's reluctance to sacrifice nuclear options in Vietnam and Korea, and negative assurances because of nuclear emplacements in Central Europe, winnowed the inducements of which U.S. diplomats could avail themselves to secure India's signature, especially since Indira Gandhi and Vikram Sarabhai had already repulsed Canadian threats to cut off economic and military assistance. The Indian delegate to the ENDC declared on February 27 that the "urge to seek greater security … by acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be curbed by a prohibition applied only to those that do not already possess them." His ensuing criticisms of nearly every article and clause of the draft treaty made "clear where exactly India st[ood]."[856] The Indian representative was "instructed not to take a stand on the draft treaty for the time being;" nonetheless, his call to "impose equal obligations on all" was hard to reconcile with an immanently discriminatory compact.[857]

---

[855] Quester, *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation*, 71–72.

[856] Final Verbatim Report of the 370th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 27 February 1968, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.370, 4-14

[857] Ambassador Dr. Péter Kós, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry Report, 30 March 1968, Source: Hungarian National Archives (Magyar Országos Levéltár, MOL). XIX-J-1-j Multilateral international treaties, 1968, 107. Doboz, 00617/18/1968, obtained and translated by Balazs Szalontai, Cold War International History Project, http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/va2/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseact ion=home.document&identifier= 4CA94443-AA26-F607-1520E0094B3220AE&sort=collection&item= Nuclear

The Indian broadside echoed the mounting discontent of various non-aligned states as well as Eastern and Western bloc members. De Chalvron reported that encounters with various emissaries in the hallway, including officials from Sweden, Brazil, and West Germany, disclosed "irritation at Soviet-American collusion." The Romanian emissary, for instance, complained that recent developments belied the committee's mandate to "deal with disarmament."[858] The frequent Romanian diatribes against the treaty led Foster to characterize the negotiations as "an innocent bystander in the fraternal battle" between the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. Brazil's attitude was also enigmatic, although Foster, now returned to Geneva, "felt somewhat better about the reaction of our Southern hemispheric colleague."[859] Meanwhile, West German diplomats applied constant pressure on U.S. officials to shorten the treaty's duration, institutionalize review conferences, harmonize regional and international safeguards, add security guarantees, and mandate disarmament steps. Foster claimed that he did not intend to renegotiate these matters with Roshchin; however, Bonn held out hope that Washington might wring some "improvements" out of Moscow. Indeed, Foster was curious on March 1 about the "response from our friends from the East as to [their] acceptance of certain suggested changes."[860] The political rifts in the communist bloc were undeniable once Bucharest refused to join six fellow communist governments in signing the Sofia declaration in support of the treaty's prompt conclusion. Romania's rebelliousness seemed an offshoot of positioning itself betwixt Moscow and Beijing in the Sino-Soviet

[858] Bernard de Chalvron, Telegram from Geneva to Paris, "Disarmament," 29 February 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.
[859] William Foster, Letter to Adrian Fisher, "Customary State of Uncertainty in Geneva," 1 March 1968, Folder 1, Box 13, Foster Papers, GCML, 1.
[860] Ibid., William Foster, Letter to Adrian Fisher, "State of Uncertainty," 1 March 1968, 1; Bernard de Chalvron, Telegram from Geneva to Paris, "FRG representative applying pressure on resistant U.S. representative," 6 March 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF; Bernard De Chalvron, Telegram from Geneva to Paris, "Disarmament," 8 March 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1-3.

split. On March 11, just days before the United Nations deadline, the Romanian envoy advanced a proposal for eleven burdensome amendments in an attempt to throw a wrench in the whole negotiating works.

The draft treaty came through two months of frenetic debate in Geneva (the plenary met everyday toward the end) with a few revisions and a new initiative to develop security guarantees under the aegis of the United Nations Security Council. In response to nuclear have-nots, Foster and Roshchin presented a revised text on March 11 that incorporated most of Myrdal's amendments. It mandated quinquennial conferences to review compliance with the body and preamble of the treaty, added a statement in the preamble favoring a CTBT, and reworded Article VI to read:

> Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effectives measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.[861]

The new language formalized the significance of expeditious action in the disarmament field to the treaty's future legitimacy as well as the particular gravity of further nuclear prohibitions. These changes met the concerns of Sweden and other pro-treaty, non-aligned states as well as the wishes of Italy and West Germany for more "flexibility."

The revised language nevertheless failed to address the demands of potential irreconcilables, such as India and Brazil, whose grievances bore on PNEs and security assurances. The co-chairmen refused to inscribe a stricter definition of nuclear weapons akin to that outlined by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. On March 7, however, the three nuclear powers represented in Geneva advanced a new way of resolving the security dilemma inherent to the treaty. The proposal called for a United Nations Security Council

[861] Final Verbatim Record of the 376th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, 11 February 1968, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.376, 11-16.

resolution that would vest in that body the duty and authority to take "immediate action" on behalf of a signatory facing a nuclear threat or attack.[862] This would of course necessitate France assuming the same obligation as a permanent member of the council. At an afternoon press conference, Foster suggested that even though a "procedural debate" might occur before the council authorized the use of force, Article 51 of the U.N. Charter sanctioned individual or collective action to defend a member state from aggression or a "threat of aggression," a term that originated in nuclear strategy rather than the charter's actual text. The primary object was to convince New Delhi that a nonproliferation regime was in its best interests. U.S. authorities also hoped that "if China altered its point of view in regards to the U.N. … it could easily accept the resolution's tenor."[863] Alas, these two objectives were badly mismatched since the People's Republic would not abjure its right to a seat on the Security Council and remained the sole nuclear threat to the Republic of India. Foster nevertheless declared that he had "not conceded that India [would] not sign the nonproliferation treaty."[864]

The Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament agreed to report the new draft to the General Assembly on March 14. However, the draft treaty failed to garner a majority of votes in the plenary to endorse it, let alone the unanimity needed to bestow the committee's imprimatur on the document. Brazil, India, and Romania even abstained on the seemingly innocuous question of whether to report the draft treaty to the United

---

[862] The draft resolution read: 1) Recognize that nuclear aggression or menace toward a NNWS is a situation in which the Security Council and above all its NWS permanent members would have to act immediately conforming to their UN Charter obligations 2) Agree with the intention of certain states that immediate aid be given to a NNWS the victim of an act of nuclear aggression 3) Affirm again the inalienable right recognized by Article 51 of the UN Charter of a legitimate right to defense against an act of military aggression, individual or collective, in a case in which a UN member is attack, until the UN Security Council can take the necessary steps to maintain international peace & security.

[863] Charles Lucet, Telegram from Washington to Paris, "Project de Résolution de Garantie des Puissances Non-Nucléaires," 9 March 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

[864] William Foster, Transcript, "Press Conference after the 375th Meeting," 7 March 1968, Folder 9, Box 18, Foster Papers, GCML, 3.

Nations General Assembly. In all, eleven delegations voted against affixing the seal of committee approval. Only Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, and Poland (the superpowers' closest allies) joined the superpowers in voting in favor. The Romanian refusal to sign the Sofia declaration was especially "unprecedented," compelling Moscow to vent its spleen at Bucharest in *Ivestiya* and *Pravda*.[865] Following the votes, de Chalvron found the Brazilian delegate ambivalent and the Indian envoy malcontent. He concluded that the have-nots would press to rework the treaty in New York City since the co-chairmen had failed to alleviate fully their concerns in Geneva.[866]

The committee report included two annexes: a draft nonproliferation treaty and a draft assurances resolution. In his departure statement, Foster characterized the latter as "a step of major historical significance."[867] The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs concurred albeit on different grounds. The Bureau of Political Affairs in the Quai d'Orsay scrutinized the proposed resolution's implications for international jurisprudence, singling out the reference to "threats of aggression" as signifying a foreboding new element for the U.N. Charter:

> It could be dangerous to incorporate the "threat of aggression" with "aggression" as grounds for recourse to action by the nuclear powers. One thus risks in fact justifying the initiation of a preventive war. One could believe that it was for this reason that the Charter's authors eliminated this concept.[868]

---

[865] Olivier Wormser, Telegram from Moscow to Paris, "Soviet newspapers react to end of ENDC session," 16 March 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF; Op. cit. Note pour la Direction des Affairs Étrangères – Désarmement, "Traité de Non-prolifération, Projet de resolution relative à la garantie des Pays non nucléaires," 18 March 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 4.

[866] Bernard de Chalvron, Telegram from Geneva to Paris, "Overall reaction to the end of the ENDC's work," 14 March 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

[867] William Foster, "Geneva Airport Statement by head of U.S. Delegation to the ENDC, on Saturday at 11:15 a.m.," 16 March 1968, Folder 9, Box 18, Foster Papers, GCML.

[868] Op. cit. Note pour la Direction des Affairs Étrangères – Désarmement, "Traité de Non-prolifération, Projet de resolution relative à la garantie des Pays non nucléaires," 18 March 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1-2.

The evaluation suggested moving the reference to Article 51 from the legal apparatus to the preamble to avoid a reading subject to future abuse. It also challenged the value of establishing a new category of state—"permanent members of the Security Council possessing nuclear armaments"—that left out Communist China. In sum, the report concluded, the resolution would afford nuclear have-nots with little extra security because the "Anglo-Saxons and Soviets" would retain "freedom of action as far as what measures they choose to adopt." Notwithstanding these reservations with the resolution, the author counseled that France abstain when it came to a vote, even though inaction would not prevent its passage.[869] With states lacking nuclear weapons "unable to hide their disillusionment with a treaty whose discriminatory character was ever more apparent," the French were stuck between a rock and a hard place. Romania and Japan had already asked French diplomats if their government would address the UNGA on the matter.[870] A memorandum to French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville equivocated:

> The juridical reasons are there to fight against a project that, in its letter if not its spirit, constitutes a revision of the Charter: it discriminates among non-nuclears to the advantage of treaty signatories; it hierarchizes forms of aggression and introduces the ambiguous concept of "threat of aggression;" it distinguishes among the permanent members those which possess nuclear arms and invests thereby the present situation with an anti-Chinese character that Beijing does not fail to note. Finally, it departs from the established jurisdiction of the Security Council, whose decisions have always applied to specific problems.[871]

To veto a resolution whose "practical consequences for us" were nil was nonetheless "inconvenient" since Paris had nothing to offer in recompense. With talks entering their

---

[869] Ibid. Note pour la Direction des Affairs Étrangères – Désarmement, "Traité de Non-prolifération, Projet de resolution relative à la garantie des Pays non nucléaires," 18 March 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 3-6.
[870] Op. cit. Note for Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, "Le traité de non proliferation des armes nucléaire – etat de la negotiation," 19 March 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 5-7.
[871] Ibid. Note for Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, "Le traité de non proliferation des armes nucléaire – etat de la negotiation," 19 March 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 7-8.

final chapter in New York City, however, the "great Power unanimity" principle enshrined in the United Nations Charter empowered de Gaulle to determine the fate of the fledgling new global order.

**End Game**

The nonproliferation treaty's submission before a special session of the United Nations General Assembly represented an opportunity and a danger. The world parliament's approval was indispensable for the treaty to have lasting legitimacy. Nevertheless, the cosmopolitan and often cacophonous atmosphere of the 124-nation gathering, where matters relating to South African sovereignty over South West Africa festered, posed a challenge to international nuclear diplomacy that Washington in particular had thus far striven to avoid—opening the deliberations to the entire "international community." Whereas in Geneva the diplomatic community and the ENDC's intimacy helped to soften disagreements and thereby foster consensus, the failure of the U.N. Disarmament Committee in 1966 testified to a general debate's drawbacks. The concept of nuclear nonproliferation had elicited wide approval from the Irish Resolution of 1958, the Indian proposal of 1964, and the joint draft treaty unveiled that January. Though the mostly "non-nuclear" states of the world would find it hard "to repudiate the approval they had always given in principal to the quest" to end nuclear spread, the possibility of a negative or inconclusive outcome was quite real.[872]

The prospect of a French veto was not lost on Foster, who expressed to French Ambassador Charles Lucet in Washington on March 27 that he hoped "France would

[872] Ibid. Note for Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, "Le traité de non proliferation des armes nucléaire – etat de la negotiation," 19 March 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 5.

not veto the proposal when the Security Council deliberated."[873] Lucet assured him that France's policy of abstention and neutrality still obtained; however, in fact, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in the midst of a review. The Bureau of Political Affairs again challenged whether a "menace of aggression by means of nuclear weapons" signified "a qualitatively new situation," and lambasted the measure's toothlessness, its anti-Chinese tenor, and its discriminatory nature. In a refinement of earlier fears of legitimating "preventive war," the analysis warned against classifying states as licensed or unlicensed nuclear powers and then conferring upon the Security Council and its nuclear-armed members the power to enforce their "respective positions in the nuclear pecking order."[874] In short, the resolution might make nuclear-armed permanent members of the Security Council the world's policemen. The report nonetheless counseled that France should not use its veto. The reasoning was doctrinal. Mexico had asked France and the remaining nuclear powers to sign Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco barring use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against signatories. To employ the veto would oblige France "to explain its policy" of uninhibited nuclear-weapon use to counterbalance its weakness in conventional forces "unless we are ready on this point as it concerns us to fulfill the wishes of the ("vast majority") of nuclear have-nots … in the direction of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons."[875] Other considerations abounded as well, most disturbingly the triumph of "a common Soviet-American quest in spite of the world's vicissitudes to place global stability under their dual mandate:"

---

[873] Charles Lucet, Telegram from Washington to Paris, "Conversation with William Foster," 27 March 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 3.

[874] Note for the Bureau of Political Affairs, "Garanties des non nucléaires, Projet de resolution du Conseil de Sécurité," 29 March 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 3-4.

[875] Ibid., Note for the Bureau of Political Affairs, "Garanties des non nucléaires, Projet de resolution du Conseil de Sécurité," 29 March 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF. 1, 6; Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 2nd ed (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), Chapter 21.

> It is the aspect conferred on the whole affair by the two greatest nuclear powers that constitutes the principal reason for French reserve. We refused in effect to participate in a venture that, while not representing a real disarmament measure, seeks to establish for the benefit of the two biggest powers a regime consolidating their nuclear monopolies and legalizing discrimination among states.[876]

Unwilling to abet a Soviet-American entente yet unable to make a viable counteroffer, or draw the ire of nuclear have-nots, for now Paris maintained that policy of reserve.

The climate of opinion among the near-nuclear states felt inhospitable. Between March 15, when the ENDC adjourned, and April 24, when the UNGA was set to convene, U.S. and Soviet representatives struggled to address their concerns and, failing that, to convince them not to interfere. On the day the ENDC commended the draft treaty, Indira Gandhi proclaimed her government's dissatisfaction and unwillingness to sign.[877] The attitude of Indian AEC Chairman Sarabhai appeared somewhat warmer in early April. He informed a U.S. AEC official that Indian assent might be forthcoming if the superpowers froze their nuclear assets, orchestrated a comprehensive test ban, permitted either "all nations … to design and manufacture PNEs, or none," and made security assurances into a veritable extended deterrent because in the event of hostilities between nuclear haves and have-nots the "threat of use of nuclear weapons [was] implicit."[878] Elsewhere on the subcontinent a Japanese ambassador confirmed that Pakistan "would definitely not sign the Treaty unless India did."[879]

Brazil focused its diplomatic energies on preserving rights to peaceful nuclear explosions. Members of the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations continued to request

---

[876] Direction des Affaires Politiques, Note, "La question de la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires," 3 April 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 16-18.
[877] "Nuclear Draft Accepted at Geneva, Even as French Reservations Arise," 15 March 1968, *The Washington Post*, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, A3.
[878] U.S. Mission to Geneva Cable 3048 to State Department, "Luncheon Conversation with Sarabhai," 3 April 1968, Document 14, NPT, NSA, 1-2.
[879] U.S. Embassy Rawalpindi cable 4412 to Department of State, "Non-Proliferation Treaty," 8 April 1968, Document 17, NPT, NSA, 1.

a strict definition of nuclear weapons akin to that in the Treaty of Tlatelolco and consonant with the Costa e Silva administration's desire to pursue PNEs for massive earthworks and for hedging its nuclear bets by acquiring a world-class program. Postcolonial resentments colored Brazilian official's language in diplomatic conversations and ministerial deliberations. Ambassador João Augusto de Araújo Castro, Brazil's representative in the ENDC, the U.N., and the U.S., condemned the treaty's embargo of PNEs as symptomatic of a "*leonine*" treaty (a French juridical term for "unconscionable contract") in which the U.S. had taken the "lion's share." He denounced the treaty "as an instrument of North American imperialism in the atomic domain."[880] U.S. diplomats were leaning on Latin American governments on account of their collective sway in the UNGA, of whose 121 states, 25 hailed from the region. Alas, Brasília's attitude had only hardened. Magalhães Pinto informed the U.S. Ambassador in Brasília on April 16 that his government would not sign the current draft treaty. The U.S. ally was even prepared to inveigh against it in New York City. Foggy Bottom inferred from the nationalistic sentiment on the Brazilian street that the NPT signified "an affront to Brazilian sovereignty" militating against compromise. More distressing, Magalhães Pinto was convinced that Brazil had enough support among have-nots to thwart the treaty or, at worst, shrink the majority to the point of illegitimacy.[881]

Even the Federal Republic balked at the idea of joining the treaty. Foster reported that Bonn was "exploring every option to defer the debate till better days" (most likely after the Conference of Non-Nuclear States) and to that end West German observers

---

[880] Telegram from Lima to Paris, "Peruvian and Brazilian views on NPT after American pressure applied," 19 April 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1-2.
[881] U.S. State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Intelligence Note-290, "Brazilian Opposition to NPT Draft Likely to Continue," 19 April 1968, Document 20a, NPT, NSA, 1-2, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc20a.pdf.

sounded out African delegates in New York City.[882] Kiesinger's coalition was still riven by internal discord and its emissaries conveyed a banquet of discontents about the course of negotiations. The treaty might pave the way for the denuclearized Central Europe envisaged by the Rapacki Plan.[883] It could weaken West Germany's position in the Nuclear Planning Group. It could impair Euratom's operations. Bonn continued to petition Paris to involve itself on that last score. Schnippenkoetter explained to McGhee in Bonn that "a well-prepared signature debate in the Bundestag" was vital to averting a "disastrous" internecine battle between Strauss's Christian Social Union and Brandt's Social Democratic Party.[884] Kiesinger in all likelihood simply wished that the treaty would go away.

The views of other U.S. allies were equally foggy. Since Tel Aviv had shown a "favorable but passive attitude toward the NPT," Rusk appealed to Johnson to send a presidential letter to Levi Eshkol urging the Israeli prime minister to endorse the treaty in the General Assembly and then sign the accord. But the president opted not to send a personal missive; instead, the overture was made at the ministerial level.[885] There were also rumors that Israel wanted a *quid pro quo* from the U.S.S.R. In exchange for its signature, Tel Aviv had reported asked that the Soviet Embassy, closed since the Six Day War, reopen as a symbol of Moscow's recognition of Israel's right to exist.[886] Even Australian leaders articulated "a battery of reservations about the non-proliferation

---

[882] Charles Lucet, Telegram from Washington, "Conversation with William Foster," 1 April 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1-2.
[883] Op. cit. Direction des Affaires Politiques, Note, "La question de la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires," 3 April 1968, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 7.
[884] U.S. Embassy Bonn Cable 10869 to State Department, "Schnippenkoetter Comments on German Signature," 10 April 1968, Document 19, NPT, NSA, 1-2.
[885] Dean Rusk, Memorandum to the President, "Letter to Prime Minister Eshkol on NPT," 19 April 1968, Document 21, NPT, NSA.
[886] Quester, *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation*, 83.

treaty." In Canberra, Prime Minister John Gorton's skepticism, which "almost sounded like de Gaulle," took Rusk aback.[887] The temptation of advanced nuclear states to develop threshold capabilities was evident in Australia, where members of the Atomic Energy Commission feared that constraints on advanced work such as uranium enrichment would impair "their ability to manufacture a nuclear weapon … on very short notice."[888] With a staunch U.S. ally taking such a "cautious and reserved view" of the forthcoming deliberations, the treaty's fate seemed to hinge on dispelling the misgivings of various skeptical governments.[889]

The tide of negative opinion impelled Washington and Moscow to maintain a common front. Johnson's announcement on March 30 that he would not stand for reelection amid plummeting domestic support after the Tet Offensive in Vietnam had an equivocal effect on U.S. nuclear diplomacy. On the one hand, it jeopardized the coherence and continuity of U.S. policy after Johnson's term in office ended. On the other hand, Johnson's legacy was now fully bound up in the fate of his signature peace initiative. With the special UNGA session looming, U.S. Disarmament Agency and State Department functionaries set guidelines for tactics and strategy. Prior experience indicated that smaller states afforded their permanent UN representatives substantial leeway, which resulted in regional voting patterns. A policy workshop singled out the assistance of key states such as Canada, Japan, Mexico, Ethiopia, and the U.A.R (whose Ismail Fahmy would serve as the Political Committee's president) as critical to isolating the "few near-nuclears from [the] overwhelming majority [of] countries having no

[887] U.S. Embassy Canberra cable 4842 to Department of State, 6 April 1968, Document 16a, NPT, NSA, 1.
[888] ACDA Memorandum of Conversation, "Consultations with Australians on NPT and Status of Interpretations on Articles I and II," 24 April 1968, Document 16d, NPT, NSA, 1.
[889] Op. cit. U.S. Embassy Canberra cable 4842 to Department of State, 6 April 1968, Document 16a, NPT, NSA, 2.

prospect of developing nuclear weapons," whose security the nonproliferation treaty would enhance. Soviet emissaries were expected to make inroads with their friends in the non-aligned bloc and Soviet adherence to Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco might win Mexico's support, always a bellwether of the critical Latin American vote. An affirmative Security Council vote on assurances could for its part facilitate a positive referendum on the NPT. Washington could stomach minor amendments of a hortatory nature, but it was hoped that the importance ascribed to Soviet-American détente by the international community would allow the superpowers to keep their roles as maestros.[890]

The Soviets were pressing their Warsaw Pact allies to back their pro-treaty stance. The Romanian, Yugoslavian, and Soviet mission secretaries sat down in New York City to discuss the treaty before the UNGA session. The Romanian attendee relayed Bucharest's continued belief that the treaty was improvable and cast doubts on whether key states, such as India, Pakistan, Japan, Israel, or Egypt would adhere. Yugoslavia's attitude was vital to Soviet outreach to neutral states in light of Belgrade's leadership position in the non-aligned movement. Its secretary commiserated with Soviet "haste" to open the treaty for signature before U.S. elections given that "the majority of the so-called near-nuclear states [were] Western countries." According to the Soviet interlocutor, Gennady Stashevsky, Washington's fear of "being drawn into a nuclear conflict" and Johnson's desire "to occupy a place in history by signing the treaty" ensured U.S. fidelity to the NPT and the concept of nonproliferation more broadly. Concurrent discussions about the status of South African claims in South West Africa would complicate debate in the Political Committee. Already, various African countries worked to forge a link between that issue and their positions on the treaty. Facing such obstacles,

[890] U.S. Department of State Cable 142418 to U.S. Mission United Nations, "NPT and Resumed GA [General Assembly]", 5 April 1968, Document 15, NPT, NSA, 1-8.

Stashevsky enjoined his Yugoslavian counterpart for Bucharest not to remain indifferent but "rather assist them in persuading the non-aligned countries."[891] García Robles had intimated to Soviet ambassador Vladimir Kuznetsov at the United Nations that Mexican support might only prove forthcoming if the U.S.S.R. signed Protocol II.[892] Given that Moscow was reticent to commit itself to a non-use pledge, the Soviet delegation could use all the assistance that it could muster.

The Political Committee began discussing the draft nonproliferation treaty on April 26, when U.S. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg and Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Kuznetsov gave speeches explaining and espousing the draft treaty. Though assembly members were struck by the newfound harmony in the Soviet and American performances (one joked that "the only thing they didn't do was hold hands"), a meaningful and lasting note of discord rang out in the speeches.[893] Goldberg highlighted the treaty's "three major purposes." First, it would reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons spreading to new states and thereby increasing the risks of atomic conflict. Second, a regime centered on the IAEA would promote fair and equitable access "to the peaceful blessings of nuclear energy." Third, the compact's letter and spirit enjoined all countries to advance toward nuclear and general and complete disarmament. On the last point, Goldberg singled out the periodic review conferences as the primary means of

---

[891] Endre Zádor, Permanent Mission of Hungary to the U.N., Memorandum of Conversation for the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, "NPT Proceedings at UNGA," 12 April 1968, Source: Hungarian National Archives (Magyar Országos Levéltár, MOL). XIX-J-1-j Multilateral international treaties, 1968, 107. doboz, 00617/26/1968, Cold War International History Project, Nuclear Proliferation Collection, Obtained and translated for NPIHP by Balazs Szalontai,
http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/va2/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=home.document&identifier=4CACEF3A-B114-20BD-2DE465668816381A &sort=collection&item=Nuclear%20Proliferation&print=true.
[892] Telegram from Mexico to Paris, "M. García Robles et Soviet-Mexican *quid pro quo*," 18 April 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.
[893] "Appeals by U.S. and Soviet Open U.N. Atom Debate: Approval of a Treaty to Ban Spread of Nuclear Weapons Linked to Survival of World," 27 April 1968, *The New York Times*, p 1.

enforcement.[894] He depicted the compact's legitimacy as connected inextricably to further arms control and disarmament:

> My country believes that the permanent viability of this treaty will depend in large measure on our success in the further negotiations contemplated by Article VI. … Following the conclusion of this treaty, my government will, in the spirit of Article VI … pursue further disarmament negotiations with redoubled zeal and hope and with promptness.[895]

Though his speech was regrettably tarnished by an ill-timed and large U.S. underground nuclear test in Nevada that same day, the U.S. ambassador presented the treaty as resting on a foundation of three coequal pillars. Kuznetsov, by contrast, underscored "[t]he uppermost and in our opinion the predominant feature of the draft," which he described as "closing all channels, both direct and indirect, leading to the possession of mass destruction weapons." Kuznetsov's emphasis on nonproliferation reflected the Soviet's chief intent in keeping such weapons out of German hands. Goldberg's tripartite rendering, on the other hand, was sketched for the multinational audience of the United Nations General Assembly hall. It framed the treaty as the result of multilateral talks—"the creation of all nations, large and small."[896] These two interpretations—the nonproliferation treaty as a grand bargain or as chiefly an instrument to stem the nuclear tide—would henceforth dominate thinking and discussion about the treaty's founding principles.

Concordant Soviet and American views were a necessary but not sufficient condition for a treaty's success though. The irreconcilables were casting about for a viable plurality with which to disrupt the proceedings in hopes of delaying matters until the Conference of Non-Nuclear States met. The Indian deputy representative informed a

---

[894] ACDA, *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, 230-231.
[895] Bunn, Timerbaev, and Leonard, *Nuclear Disarmament*, 20.
[896] For an exceptional roundtable discussion of contemporary debates about the original intent of the NPT, read: Miller, *Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform & the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime*.

member of the French delegations that his country would not sign the treaty as drafted nor support the Security Council resolution. "All their sympathy rested with the French position," but they would not intervene so as "not to upset openly the United States and the Soviet Union." They were nonetheless taking the temperature of nuclear have-nots to ascertain whether a postponement of the vote was possible. A Brazilian official had apprised the deputy that "besides his country, Chile and Argentina would also support this solution." The Indian delegation now waited to see if a general movement would take shape with "the attitude of African countries still undecided."[897]

Rusk, Seaborg, and Foster met with Brazilian ambassadors Araújo Castro and Sette Camara and Foreign Minister Magalhães Pinto on May 6 to try and quiet criticisms relating to PNEs in particular. Araújo Castro divulged that the Brazilian National Security Council's unwillingness "to be put under a technological freeze for 25 years" ruled out its support. He was equally frank in regards to the climate of opinion in the UNGA, where, according to him, Brazil, India, and others had failed to marshal the numbers needed to thwart the treaty:

> He had no doubt that the present draft would be carried by a wide majority of the [UN]GA. At the same time there was no enthusiasm for the project at the [UN]GA. But there was no organized resistance to it. It was generally recognized that we have no room for significant concessions.[898]

García Robles apparently thought otherwise and kept trying to "blackmail" Moscow into signing Protocol II, while also formulating new amendments together with the Scandinavian delegations.[899] And indeed there was some flexibility in the U.S. position.

---

[897] Armand Berard, Telegram from New York to Paris, "Non-Prolifération : Attitude des pays non nucléaires:" 27 April 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1-2.
[898] Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, "Brazil's Attitude on NPT," 6 May 1968, Document 20b, NPT, NSA, 2, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc20b.pdf
[899] Ibid., Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, "Brazil's Attitude on NPT," May 6, 1968, Document 20b, NPT, NSA, 2.

The Brazilians criticized the decision to have the draft resolution "endorse" rather than "commend" the treaty as well as the absence of non-use guarantees in the assurance resolution. Though Rusk and Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford believed that such an inclusion would not lessen the credibility of the extended U.S. deterrent, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned against setting a "precedent that could lead to further restrictions on U.S. nuclear options." For now, however, the chief policymakers deferred a final decision to include a non-use pledge in the assurance formula.[900]

France's tacit acquiescence buoyed the resolution's chances while non-aligned indifference buffeted them. On Thursday, May 2, French Ambassador Berard proclaimed that even though France "would not sign the nonproliferation treaty, in the future it would comport itself in that domain exactly as those states that chose to adhere to it."[901] At that time, Soviet and U.S. delegates continued to maintain that amendments were unnecessary and unworkable. By the next week, however, they had begun to float the possibility of amendments to bolster support among the non-aligned states in fear of a vote for adjournment after they encountered stiffer than anticipated resistance from African, Latin American, and Asian delegations.[902] Egyptian committee president Fahmy announced on May 6 that his government would co-sponsor a revised draft resolution to endorse the treaty, which incorporated a seemingly minor, but nonetheless consequential, deletion for which the Italian representative had asked. Egyptian Ambassador Mohamed Awad el Kony confided to Berard that Cairo had taken the decision "under strong

---

[900] Benjamin Read, Executive Secretary, U.S. Department of State, Memorandum to Secretary Dean Rusk, "Your Luncheon Meeting with the President Today," 23 April 1968, with State Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff memoranda attached, Document 22, NPT, NSA, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc22.pdf

[901] Telegram from Paris to New York, "French address re nonproliferation," 2 May 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

[902] Armand Berard, Telegram from New York to Paris, "M. Manescu of Romania's Departure, 7 May 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

pressure from Moscow."[903] And according to the Romanian deputy representative, the co-sponsorship was bought with Soviet assurances regarding Israeli's attitude toward the treaty.[904] By deleting a reference to the treaty text drafted and submitted by the ENDC, and winning over the support of the Egyptian delegation, the revised resolution could "open [the] floodgates" to treaty amendments, either helping or wrecking the resolution's passage.[905]

The Latin American and African groupings with 24 and 32 countries, respectively, constituted the most important voting blocs in the United Nations General Assembly. Alone, they counted almost half the delegations among their members, and together with the Western and Eastern bloc more than two-thirds of the available plenary vote. Courting these two groups was thus part and parcel of the superpowers' strategy of isolating near-nuclear powers, including India, whose plenipotentiary had repudiated the draft treaty on May 14 because it "fossilize[d] and legitimate[d] the status quo."[906] There were two obstacles to their support. Brazil had made clear that neither it, nor Argentina, nor Chile, would vote in favor. This made Mexico the key to the other 20 states of Latin America. García Robles continued to press his Soviet counterparts to sign Protocol II and worked with Scandinavian delegations to push for new amendments that would yield a more equitable balance of obligations and rights. In an address to the Political Committee on May 16, he tabled a preambular reference to the U.N. Charter's principle of peaceful

---

[903] Armand Berard, Telegram from New York to Paris, "Non-Prolifération – Revision du Projet de Resolution," 6 May 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF;

[904]Armand Berard, Telegram from New York to Paris, "Non-Prolifération – Attitude de la R.A.U.," 6 May 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

[905] Op. cit. Armand Berard, Telegram from NEw York to Paris, "Non Prolifération – Revision du Projet de Resolution," 6 May 1966, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 2; "Open floodgates" quoted in U.S. State Department cable 161473 to U.S. Mission, United Nations, New York, "NPT: Mexican Amendments," 10 May 1968, Document 23a, NPT, NSA, 1, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc23a.pdf

[906] Charles Lucet, Telegram from Washington to Paris, "West German Ambassador and Conflicting messages from US government re amending the NPT," 16 May 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

conflict resolution, an expansion of Article IV to guarantee rights to equipment and material, a provision in Article V that negotiations to form an international PNE service occur "as soon as possible," and a strengthening of Article VI to specify the cessation of nuclear weapons' "manufacture and perfection." He held the line on a liberal definition of nuclear weapons prohibiting indigenous development of PNEs; nonetheless, the U.S. clung to control over the course of proceedings. To counter his efforts, Washington ordered the U.S. mission in New York City to "hold [the] common front" with their Soviet counterparts lest García Robles "open the floodgates" to a new torrent of amendments.[907]

Ironically, the African bloc was simultaneously the least threatened by nuclear proliferation and the largest key to the treaty's fate. An address by the Ghanaian ambassador in which he decried the draft treaty for not combatting vertical proliferation and for contradicting the Treaty of Tlatelolco in regards to PNEs spooked Western observers.[908] However, the majority of African states and particularly those of central and southern Africa were more intent on wringing concessions out of the U.S. and its allies to censure and punish South Africa for its interference in South West African affairs. Disarmament Agency and State Department authorities were not deluded; amendments might prove necessary. For now, nonetheless, they would await the Political Committee vote before countenancing revisions in the General Assembly.

Perversely, it was the U.S. Secretary of State who came nearest to opening the treaty up for debate and in the process nearly triggered a major crisis of U.S. nuclear diplomacy. In response to Bonn's vocal opposition, Rusk reportedly told Bundestag

---

[907] Ibid. U.S. State Department cable 161473 to U.S. Mission, United Nations, New York, "NPT: Mexican Amendments," 10 May 1968, Document 23a, NSA, NPT, 1-2, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc23a.pdf

[908] Op. cit, Armand Berard, Telegram from New York to Paris, "M. Manescu of Romania:" 7 May 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

deputy and nonproliferation specialist Kurt Birrenbach that, facing an unmanageable number of abstentions, Washington would submit the draft treaty to the ENDC for further study. Birrenbach was a moderate among West German policymakers and the prospect of the NPT's 25-year time span outlasting the end of the NATO alliance concerned him. The following day, Foster received a record of the conversation. He rushed to demand that Rusk immediately and categorically retract his statement and threatened to resign in the middle of the debate in New York City if Rusk failed to do so. French Ambassador Charles Lucet recounted the ensuing sequence of events:

> In an unprecedented gesture, Rusk wrote the West German charge d'affaires, in Knappstein's absence (the West German ambassador to the U.S.) who was in Bonn amid consultations, to tell him that having misunderstood the dossier, he had led Birrenbach in error and that in fact the U.S. position had not changed.[909]

Bonn found the episode disagreeable; Lucet surmised that Vietnam had overwhelmed Rusk and he had badly misjudged the state of negotiations in New York City, where Foster and Roshchin were still confident of success. To allay Birrenbach's anxiety, Washington pledged to reaffirm its NATO allegiance when it signed the treaty.[910]

Rusk and Foster's row was an exception to a pattern of "close collaboration" between Soviet and American leaders.[911] Rusk met with Soviet Ambassador Kuznetsov on May 17 to discuss the state of play. Their attitudes toward amendments were evolving in tandem, though Rusk was comparatively more amenable. The two sides would brook cosmetic changes that could secure "significantly wider adherence." The Africans and Latin Americans, along with France, evoked the most apprehension and Kuznetsov urged

[909] Charles Lucet, Telegram from Washington to Paris, "Debacle among Rusk, Foster, and Birrenbach," 16 May 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1-2.
[910] Dean Rusk, Memorandum for the President, "Reaffirmation of NATO at the Time of Nonproliferation Treaty Signing," 11 June 1968, Document 28, NPT, NSA, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc28.pdf
[911] Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation between Dean Rusk, Vasili Kuznetsov, Anatoly Dobrynin, et al., "Nonproliferation treaty," 17 May 1968, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 239, 598.

Rusk to "make good use of [U.S.] bargaining power." Ghana, Tanzania, and Kenya led the African resistance and Kuznetsov saw two ways to win them over. First, Pretoria's vote was crucial "in swinging the entire African vote." Second, African ministers had resolved at a recent Afro-Asian meeting to link their support to demands relating to South West Africa. Francophone Africans' support was especially suspect, though Kuznetsov believed that the French favored the treaty and would sway their former colonies. As for Latin America, he asked for "U.S. help," especially with García Robles, whom Rusk characterized as "more Mexican than the Mexicans" in his quest to nudge the treaty toward the traditional tenets of internationalism. The Soviets had qualms with García Robles's proposed changes, especially references to the Treaty of Tlatelolco in the resolution and treaty. Moscow was still loath to endorse its non-use protocol and its strict definition of nuclear weapons.[912]

The friendlier tenor of Soviet-American relations was evident when conversation turned to West Germany. Schnippenkoetter had circulated a memorandum the week before lobbying for concrete disarmament steps and had reportedly encouraged other delegations to offer amendments.[913] Kuznetsov gainsaid his action as engendering "uncertainty and doubt about the NPT." Rusk "offer[ed] the Soviet some advice" and warned against applying undue pressure on West Germany in view of the political fissures in Bonn. With powerbrokers such as Birrenbach "troubled," Kiesinger and Brandt wanted domestic cover to dispel the appearance of bending to Soviet pressure. The final matter for which there was "considerable dissatisfaction at the U.N." was security assurances, which nettled Japan and India in particular, since China's feat had most

---

[912] Ibid., Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation between Dean Rusk, Vasili Kuznetsov, Anatoly Dobrynin, et al., "Nonproliferation treaty," 17 May 1968, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 239, 598-600.

[913] "A-Treaty Backers Standing Against Further Revision: Swedish Amendment," 16 May 1968, *The New York Times*, H3. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

directly threatened their security. Rusk identified two interrelated considerations as militating against bolstering the assurances resolution: his government's reluctance to assume new military commitments, and, relatedly, an overriding desire to avoid any new points of friction or uncertainty relative to Soviet nuclear forces. The United States had "enough allies as it [was]."[914] Rusk's comment may have had more than one meaning given that Japan and Italy had called for nuclear non-use pledges and access to nuclear fuel, respectively, that very day.[915]

Soviet-American agreement still fell apart on questions of nuclear doctrine. Foster and Goldberg wanted discretion at the U.N. to outline a U.S. non-use formula if the Soviets once again invoked the Kosygin proposal, or if the drift of debate turned non-use into an unavoidable topic. Before the Political Committee reconvened, Foster, Goldberg, and Clifford requested presidential authorization to note the country's intent "to refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons State, Party to the NPT treaty, that is not engaged in an armed attack assisted by a nuclear-weapon State."[916] However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took issue because they feared such an assurance would dilute U.S. nuclear credibility, limit military options in case of conflict, and set a precedent for more prohibitions.[917] Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John Leddy advised Rusk to rebuff the proposal for now, but reserve the right to choose the circumstances under which the U.S. would enunciate its non-use formula publically. Perhaps more momentous, however, was the readiness of the United States to

---

[914] Ibid., 602.
[915] op. cit., "A-Treaty Backers," 16 May 1968, H3.
[916] Benjamin Read, Executive Secretary, U.S. Department of State, to the Secretary, "Your Luncheon Meeting with the President Today," 23 April 1968, Document 22, NPT, NSA, 2 http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc22.pdf
[917] Ibid., 9.

declare at the height of the Vietnam War a tacit policy of eschewing the use of nuclear weapons against nuclear have-nots.

With new assurances off the table, Soviet and American delegations in the United Nations relied on shrewd bargaining and their political influence to ensure that affirmative resolutions passed the Political Committee and the General Assembly with ample majorities. The acceptance of non-aligned, non-nuclear-weapon states hinged on the credibility with which the superpowers could cast the treaty as a multinational artifact, the expected adherence of key regional powers, such as Japan, Israel and South Africa (Indian and Brazilian intransigence was widely known), and the apparent integrity of Article VI. On the final count, Foster and Rusk urged Johnson to jumpstart Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks.[918] On May 2, the president sent a letter to Kosygin proposing to announce bilateral talks "to limit strategic offensive and defense missiles" at the General Assembly so as "to ensure the successful completion of work on the Non-Proliferation Treaty."[919] Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin relayed that his government would vote for the resolution, which secured the positive attitudes of the Arab countries; however, Tel Aviv did not want to fully "remove the question mark from this issue." Rabin confessed that the possibility of an Israeli bomb furnished leverage in the peace negotiations.[920] In truth, Israel's promise not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the region obfuscated their intention to build an atomic arsenal in secret.[921] Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki meanwhile declined co-sponsoring the resolution

---

[918] Walt Rostow, Memorandum for President Lyndon Johnson, "Letter to Chairman Kosygin," 23 April 1968, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 235, 583-584.

[919] Lyndon Johnson, Letter to Chairman Alexei Kosygin, "Arms Limitation in the Middle East and Offensive and Defensive Ballistic Missiles," 2 May 1968, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, Vol. XI, Document 237, 590-592.

[920] U.S. Department of State cable 17706 to Embassy Tel Aviv, "Rabin's June 4 call on Eugene Rostow," 6 June 1968, Document 25a, NPT, NSA, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc25a.pdf.

[921] Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*.

for fear of furnishing the treaty's domestic opponents with extra ammunition.[922] Pretoria's outlook was of particular consequence since the State Department was unwilling to satisfy postcolonial African states' demands for a political *quid pro quo*. In exchange for their support, they wanted the next session of the General Assembly to discuss South Africa's continued control over South West Africa in defiance of its mandate's termination in 1966.[923]

On May 28, Goldberg and Kuznetsov permitted two significant revisions of the draft resolution. First, rather than endorse the treaty, the resolution would merely commend it, thereby avoiding the impression that affirmative votes signaled the intents of those states voting yes to sign the treaty. Second, the resolution noted the assembly's appreciation of the ENDC's efforts rather than promoting its work unconditionally, which opened a procedural pathway for new amendments.[924] Three days later, the Soviet and U.S. ambassadors tabled a new draft treaty that incorporated most of García Robles' proposed alterations. The preamble reaffirmed the UN Charter's injunction against "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any nation." Article IV now outlined rights to equipment and materials as well as information pertaining to nuclear energy's peaceful applications. Article V specified that signatories would speedily negotiate an agreement to supply PNEs under the auspices of "an appropriate international body," most likely the International Atomic Energy Agency. And Foster and Roshchin agreed to change the preambular reference to arms control and disarmament to endorse that nuclear powers would negotiate effectives measures "as soon

---

922 U.S. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, "Japanese Views on NPT," 6 June 1968, Document 26, NPT, NSA, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc26.pdf.
923 French documents.
924 Armand Berard, French Mission to the UN, Telegram to Paris, "Non-Prolifération," 89 May 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1.

as possible." French Ambassador Berard observed that the revisions would "dispel the reservations of the majority and, at least, those of the Latin American countries.[925]

The Soviet and American negotiating teams had come to terms as to which amendments they could acquiesce in a contingency plan beforehand, permitting the redrafted treaty's speedy presentation.[926] Though García Robles's intervention was crucial in light of the Latin American vote's importance, Goldberg portrayed the new treaty as an embodiment of the efforts and viewpoints of a group of international actors—Nigeria, Italy, Mexico, Chile, Belgium, Yugoslavia, and Japan—to highlight the "good faith and willingness to compromise" that the nuclear powers had displayed. Widespread opinion in Turtle Bay nevertheless held that the new draft treaty was primarily devised to win over Latin American delegations, twelve of which afterward elected to serve as co-sponsors. As for African intransigence, U.S. intermediaries had reassured South Africa that IAEA oversight would not impair its uranium-mining industry. Pretoria's announcement that it supported the resolution, while reserving a final decision with respect to its signature on the treaty, placated most of its neighbors despite their grudges against apartheid and South African revanchism.[927]

Diplomatic outreach, conciliation, reassurance, and outright badgering by Soviet and U.S. representatives were crucial nonetheless. In regards to the turns of events, Berard concluded:

> While these concessions are more apparent than real, they have served as a pretext for a number of delegations, under intense Soviet and U.S. pressure to join the draft resolution, as revised.[928]

---

[925] Ibid., 3.
[926] "The Nuclear Treaty," 6 June 1968, *The New York Times*, 46.
[927] Armand Berard, French Mission to the UN, Telegram to Paris, "Non Prolifération," 3 June 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 2.
[928] Direction des Affaires Politiques, Note pour Ministère des Affairs Étrangères, "Le traté de non proliferation des armes nucléaires," 10 July 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.

The Soviet-American campaign to endow the nonproliferation treaty with lasting legitimacy by orchestrating a near consensus at the United Nations culminated with the resolution's approval in the Political Committee on June 10 by a score of 92 votes in favor and only 4 against. The pro-treaty forces were relieved. By contrast, in Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilian chancellor portrayed the outcome as a victory for anti-treaty forces in view of the number of abstentions, questioning whether many countries did not in fact vote in favor reflexively.[929]

A full plenary of the UNGA nevertheless confirmed the majority two days later when 95 countries voted in favor against 4 nays and 21 abstentions. Berard announced that although France did not intend to sign the treaty, it would nevertheless comport itself like a signatory. President Johnson surprised the United Nations General Assembly with his appearance after the vote. He called on the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament to forge ahead with "the limitation of strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapons" and then praised an international accord to halt the spread of nuclear weapons that "keeps alive and keeps active the impulse toward a safer world."[930]

The Security Council vote was the final puzzle piece, though the success of the General Assembly resolution had lowered the stakes. The French attitude was pivotal as well as cryptic. Pressure from U.S. and Soviet officials on Francophone African states had mounted between the two votes. When the Nigerien representative solicited his opinion, Berard counseled that modifying his prior abstention might prove awkward, indicating that he was reluctant to actively assist the project.[931] Cameroon and Chad would switch

[929] Binoche, French embassy in Brazil, Telegram to Paris, "Speech by Brazilian chancellor," 11 June 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1.
[930] NSA, Documents 29a-c
[931] Armand Berard, French Mission to the UN, Telegram to Paris, "Non-Prolifération," 12 June 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1.

their votes along with Costa Rica from abstention to favorable. Foster, Roshchin, Goldberg, and Kuznetsov hoped that Berard would likewise abstain in the Security Council. Kuznetsov called on the French ambassador after the committee vote to inquire after France's attitude in light of its abstention there. Berard assured him that his government indeed maintained its policy of reserve scrupulously, adducing in support of French disinterest the favorable votes of Francophone African states in comparison to Anglophones, two of which, Tanzania and Zambia, had joined Albania and Cuba in disapproval.[932]

Afterward, Berard transmitted to Paris a message that he had composed for the occasion of the Security Council vote. In it, he reiterated French claims that the nonproliferation treaty was not equivalent to disarmament. The return statement written by the Quai d'Orsay softened the language by bolting on a more constructive final paragraph, which pledged that France was "ready for all initiatives that the other Powers would be disposed to accept with her in this domain.[933] Kuznetsov called on Berard again on June 17 to express his appreciation for France "having done nothing to thwart Moscow and Washington's policies."[934] The two ambassadors then conversed about a recent dispute over Berlin transit, the Paris peace talks to negotiate a settlement in Vietnam, and the Middle East. Their discussion's thrust attested to the limitations of the détente embodied by the treaty as well as the limits of French independence from Cold War politics in Europe:

---

[932] Armand Berard, French Mission to the UN, Telegram to Paris, "Entretien avec M. Kuznetsov," 12 June 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1.
[933] Jacques Delarue Caron de Beaumarchais, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, Telegram to New York, "Le texte de l'intervention que vous devrez prononcer devant le Conseil de Securité," 15 June 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 2.
[934] Armand Berard, French Mission to the UN, Telegram to Paris, "Entretien avec M. Muznetsov," 17 June 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1.

> I told Monseiur Kuznetsov that, as he knew, our positions on the question of Vietnam and on that of the Near East were close cousins of those of his government. It was not the same for Berlin. We could not accept the measures taken by East Germany. We consider them as contrary to agreements and as assigning prejudice to rights which we have recognized in Berlin. Those initiatives could only accentuate on this matter our solidarity with London and Washington and darken our cordial relations that we have been developing with Moscow.[935]

Kuznetsov took the reproach in stride, observing that even though there existed technical matters on which the superpowers shared interests, "it was with France that the U.S.S.R. could hope to realize a constructive politics in the interest of peace."[936] Berard would later underscore Kuznetsov's opinion for the Quai d'Orsay that "fundamental differences would persist between the Soviet Union and the United States."[937]

The French decision not to oppose the security assurance resolution assured its passage through the Security Council. However, the triumph would prove contested given that Algeria, Brazil, Pakistan, and India were present as non-permanent members. The resolution's success in the Security Council would thus set the stage for the debates that would habitually attend the post-NPT arc of international nuclear diplomacy. Representatives from the pro-treaty observer states (Canada, Denmark, Paraguay, Hungary, and Senegal) all endorsed the measure on June 17 with the Paraguayan plenipotentiary underscoring the importance that Latin American states attached to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and their satisfaction at the treaty's revision in that direction. Berard reiterated his statement during the General Assembly debate that the French nuclear arsenal was intended purely for defensive purposes.[938] The following day's debate was livelier. The Indian representative, G. Parthasarathi, had revealed to Berard

[935] Ibid., 2.
[936] Ibid., 3.
[937] Armand Berard, French mission to the UN, Telegram to Paris, "Conseil de Securité Non-Prolifération," 19 June 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 2.
[938] Armand Berard, French mission to the UN, Telegram to Paris, "Conseil de Securité Non-Prolifération," 18 June 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1-2.

the previous night that New Delhi had directed him to insist on a vote by paragraph. He was instructed to reject the first two sub-paragraphs and the final body paragraph referencing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and then to abstain relative to the ensemble. When Berard informed Parthasarathi that he could not follow his lead on account of the French veto, the Indian emissary then managed to obtain authorization from New Delhi overnight to desist from this course so as not "to risk dividing the abstentionists."[939] The debate was heated nonetheless. Algeria denounced the treaty for isolating the People's Republic of China. Brazil complained that certain of the nuclear powers had yet to adhere to Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Pakistan, which was the subject of intense pressure from the U.S. on account of its relative amenability, stated its preference for a vote to occur after the Conference of Non-Nuclear States and challenged why the term "aggression" was used rather than "use or threat of use of nuclear weapons." He summed up the reservations of numerous states when he observed that "declarations of intention" amounted to less than a sure guarantee.

Finally, Ambassador Parthasarathi admonished the direct linkage between the assurances resolution and the nonproliferation treaty, which left those states declining to sign and ratify the discriminatory compact seemingly unprotected:[940]

> The basis for any action by the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security is the Charter of the United Nations. Any linking of the security assurances to the signature of a non-proliferation treaty would be contrary to its provisions because the Charter does not discriminate between those who might adhere to a particular treaty and those who might not do so.[941]

---

[939] Armand Berard, French mission to the UN, Telegram to Paris, "La resolution sur les guaranties," 19 June 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1-2.

[940] Armard Berard, French mission to the UN, Telegram to Paris, "Debat sur les guaranties de securité," 19 June 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1-3.

[941] Quoted in H. R. Vohra, "India and Nuclear Security: The West Perplexed," 12 July 1968, *The Times of India*, 8. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

India's reservations echoed those expressed by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in regards to the potentially dangerous precedents that a nonproliferation treaty and the corresponding assurances resolution would set by creating new classes of states, "which were not found in the U.N. Charter, and whose application could lead to abuses." In fact, the nonproliferation treaty in conjunction with the security assurance resolution arguably established in the law and norms governing the international nuclear arena the notion of a rogue state. The United Nations Security Council nonetheless passed resolution 255 (1968) on June 18 with ten members voting in favor and five abstaining among whose numbers France, India, Brazil, Algeria, and Pakistan were counted. Though Goldberg and Kuznetsov celebrated the accomplishment as a hopeful sign that U.S.-Soviet détente would develop in concert, many key non-aligned states felt alienated by the new global nuclear order, which they regarded as insufficiently responsive "to the concerns of nuclear have-nots and certainly to those without the benefit of the protection of an alliance featuring a nuclear power.[942] Chinese Premier Chou En-lai encapsulated the sentiment of many in the Global South when he denounced the nonproliferation treaty as an attempt to "turn non-nuclear countries into their protectorates and press forward with a new type of colonialism – nuclear colonialism."[943]

## Conclusion

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was deposited in government archives in Moscow, Washington, and London on July 1, 1968. At the ceremony in London at which he signed the compact on behalf of his country, British

[942] Direction des Affaires Politiques, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Note, "Le problem de la sécurité des Etats non nucléaires," 9 July 1968, Box 769, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF.
[943] G. M. Telang, "Chou flays U.S., Russia: "nuclear colonialism," 20 June 1968, *The Times of India*, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

Prime Minister Harold Wilson acclaimed both the Soviet-American fulcrum and the global compass of the accord:

> The Treaty is also proof that in a matter of the highest importance East and West can work together towards the common goal of world security. We all know how much the Treaty owes to the United States and the Soviet Union, whose distinguished representatives have just signed this Treaty. And I pay tribute in particular to the tireless work and skilled diplomacy of Mr. Foster and Mr. Ros[h]chin, the co-Chairmen of the E.N.D.C., who can be rightly proud of the success with which their labours have at last been crowned. …
>
> Your Excellencies, this is not a Treaty for which just two or three countries are responsible. It exists because it reflects and enshrines mankind's universal and fundamental desire for peace and security. Every Government whose representative supported the Treaty in the United Nations General Assembly and voted for the resolution can feel that it has contributed to the Treaty we are signing today; and the many representatives present at this ceremony have the special distinction of demonstrating their support for the Treaty by signing it on the day that it is opened for signature."[944]

All told, representatives of 57 countries inked their signatures on copies of the treaty in the capitals of the three repository governments on that inaugural day. Conspicuously absent, though, were the scripts of the key threshold states—Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Japan, India, and Australia—whose governments pondered whether denying themselves the right to develop the ultimate weapon and its attendant technologies represented a prudent or foolhardy choice. As for the United States, its readiness to ratify the treaty evaporated when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia less than two months later. Though Richard Nixon would not valorize the NPT, his intention to pursue détente with the Soviet Union helped to steer the treaty eventually through the U.S. Senate, where it was signed in 1969. The nonproliferation treaty entered into force on March 5, 1970, when 47 states had deposited their instrument of ratification.

---

[944] Text of Speech to be delivered by the Prime Minister at the Signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1 July 1968, Folder 2, Box 13, Foster Papers, GCML, 1-2.

The long-awaited joint tabling of a nuclear nonproliferation treaty by Foster and Roshchin on January 18 inaugurated a fateful stage of international nuclear diplomacy. The two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, formulated its non-acquisition and non-dissemination articles with East-West exigencies in mind. The safeguards articles sought to balance the efficacy of execution with the equality of market share, while preserving the nuclear dimension of European integration through which West Germany hoped to escape its confinement in the stockade of the Cold War. The Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament had already left its mark on the treaty text in the form of guarantees for provisions of peaceful nuclear science, technology, and explosives, as well as "good faith" negotiations to abate and end the superpower arms race. The final stage of deliberations in Geneva from January 18 to March 14 strengthened many of these provisions in small yet meaningful ways. More consequentially, the phase of negotiations at last dominated by non-nuclear members had embedded procedural mechanisms, most notably periodic review conferences, to review the treaty's legitimacy every five years with regard to whether an equitable balance of rights and responsibilities was still being struck.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty contained in its articles a set of paradoxes that complicated its making and would bedevil its future. Deliberations in the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council in late-spring and early-summer 1968 bore witness to these inner contradictions. Paris kept itself scrupulously detached from the proceedings; however, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs contemplated impeding the negotiations and vetoing a critical assurances resolution to ward off abuses stemming from the establishment of new classes of nation-states based on nuclear status and the empowerment of nuclear-armed members of the Security Council to enforce the status quo. Soviet and U.S. diplomats encountered greater than anticipted resistance in New

York City. Threshold states were loath to abjure the option to write their own nuclear policies in response to security conditions and national pride, but the vast majority of nuclear have-nots at the United Nations were small powers whose immediate welfare relied more on Soviet-American goodwill than unrestricted nuclear choices. The superpowers thus succeeded in leveraging the provisional acquiescence of key threshold states such as Israel and South Africa to win over Arab and African states. By strengthening and clarifying a few key clauses and articles, Foster and Roshchin obtained the endorsement of Mexico's Alfonso García Robles, whose belief in internationalism prompted him to regard the treaty as an imperfect yet improvable vessel. García Robles's support in turn unlocked the affirmation of a majority of Latin American states, whose interests were primarily tied to peaceful nuclear energy and whose support ensured a successful vote in the United Nations Political Committee and General Assembly.

France chose not to veto the assurances resolution despite its many flaws for reasons of prestige and doctrine. The Quay d'Orsay feared upsetting non-aligned opinion when it had nothing to offer in return and would find itself forced to justify its action by admitting that its nuclear doctrine dictated the unreserved right to employ nuclear weapons indiscriminately to offset its conventional weakness in the European theater. Better Soviet-American relations proceeded alongside and largely thanks to the nonproliferation talks, but the limits of détente were readily apparent in New York City. Issues relating to Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Berlin continued to divide them.

The negotiation and opening for signature of the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons thus signalled the start of a new process rather than the end of the Cold War, or of the spread of nuclear weapons. In fact, the making of the NPT reinforced the centrality of nuclear weapons to the imagined prestige and status of great powers. In a report written in the immediate aftermath of the triumph in Turtle Bay,

Richard Rosencrance of the U.S. State Department's Policy Planning Council predicted that the nascent regime would prove less efficacious than members the U.S. Disarmament Agency, among others, had envisaged. States inclined to pursue a military capability would still do so, and even states party to the NPT could "develop their peaceful nuclear progress to the point where a bomb option [could] be exercised in short order." The challenge of such a "nuclear pregnancy" would demand new instruments of surveillance, control, and enforcement not yet integrated into the nonproliferation regime whose construction might unsettle the elegant equilibrium cultivated through years of observation, dialogue, trust-building, and negotiation.

An opinion piece in *The Times of India* by H. R. Vohra exemplified the dilemma facing near-nuclears as well as the perplexity of the regime's architects residing in Moscow, London, and Washington, DC:

> India's position is probably best described as a double denial. India risks denial of the protection offered by the three nuclear powers. India also denies itself self-protection through self-help by creation of its own nuclear deterrent. … Its main gain is that it retains a choice, which, it says, it has no intention of using. What good an unused choice could do intrigues Western minds.[945]

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's order to test a peaceful nuclear explosive would not occur for six more years. Even so, the crux of the matter was clear at the dawn of the new global nuclear order. What good was an unused choice in a world where nuclear power and prohibition were so delicately balanced?

[945] H. R. Vohra, op. cit., "India and Nuclear Security: The West Perplexed," 12 July 1968.

## Conclusion | A Cold War Treaty in a Post-Cold War World

In a interview in 1980, William C. Foster was asked if the word "disarmament" should be dropped from the title of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The interviewer, Ralph Stuart Smith, was himself a veteran of the agency established by President John F. Kennedy in 1961 whose list of accomplishments included the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the 1972 SALT I accord with the U.S.S.R., and the ill-starred 1979 SALT II agreement that foundered after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later that year. Smith questioned if the term gave the wrong impression because it sounded "utopian to a lot of people and causes needless distrust among the military?" Foster replied that it was an idea worth considering, "not because I don't believe in that as an ultimate goal that we should work toward, but because the word has come to be misunderstood:" Foster confessed that although disarmament was almost unimaginable, the United States' commitment to it was vital in order to reach the less distant ends at which the country aimed:

> [W]e have to be concerned about the way people in various parts of the world <u>think</u> about the United States. As a purely practical matter, I believe that besides projecting a picture of strength, we have to project ourselves to the rest of the world as a civilized country, which understands its responsibilities as the world's leading nuclear power. This means that when we have an international obligation, we should try to carry it out."

His admonition was particularly relevant in regards to the legitimacy of the NPT, "the centerpiece of international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons" for whose making no individual was more responsible than him.

During the interview, Foster underscored the importance of achieving a long-delayed comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) whose negotiation the United States had

solemnly vowed to undertake "as expeditiously as possible." The CTBT opened for signature on September 24, 1996, though the United States has still yet to ratify the treaty in November 2013. Nevertheless, Foster's warning retains its gravity. The NPT embodied a moment of global ordering orchestrated by the United States and the Soviet Union that was underwritten by a fusion of their power and their principles. Tectonic shifts in world affairs following the end of the Cold War threaten to crack the foundation of that global order and the nonproliferation regime that is its central bulwark against nuclear anarchy.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 epitomized the triumph and tragedy of Cold War nuclear internationalism. Despite long odds and false starts, the nonproliferation regime centering on the International Atomic Energy Agency and its inspectors accurately gauged the likelihood of an illegal, clandestine military nuclear program under the regime of Saddam Hussein. The original intent of the regime's safeguards were fulfilled as its capabilities and meanings developed over time and in response to new challenges. The regime also worked, however, in the sense of its basic premise that United Nations Security Council permanent members possessing nuclear weapons had a special dispensation to enforce the legitimate nuclear order. Thus far, the blunder of the Iraq War has yet to corrode visibly the treaty and regime's legitimacy. As Foster warned, now over thirty years ago, however, its survival may well hinge on whether the United States can repair and then sustain its reputation for good faith in the international community.

# Bibliography

## Archival and Manuscript Collections

Archivo de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City, Mexico

Alfonso García Robles Papers

Telegraphic Correspondence

Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS

White House Central Files

Ann Whitman File

NSC Series

Administrative Series

    Dulles-Herter Series

    Cabinet Series

    DDE Diary Series

Fales Library and Special Collections, New York University, New York City, New York

Pulp Science Fiction and Detective Periodical Collection, 1940-1983

George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, VA

William C. Foster Papers

Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA

Pierre Gallois Speeches and Writings

International Atomic Energy Agency, Archives, Vienna, Austria

Office of the Director General

Inter-Governmental Organizations, Euratom Documentation

Application of Nuclear Safeguards

Technical Assistance

John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA
President's Office Files
Department and Agencies
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
National Security Files
White House Central Files
Personal Papers of Harlan Cleveland
Personal Papers of Roswell Gipatric
Personal Papers of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
Office of White House Press Secretary

La Bibliotèchque Nationale de France, François Mitterand, Paris, France
Archive of the Revue de Defense Nationale

Les Archives d'histoire contemporaine, Centre d'histoire, Science Po, Paris, France
Personal Papers of Michel Debré

Les Archives diplomatiques du ministère des Affaires étrangères, La Courneuve, France
Direction des Affaires Politiques
Cabinet of the Foreign Minister

Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Canada
Record Group 25, General Records of the Department of Foreign Affairs
Record Group 276, General Records of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Archives, London, UK
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament Papers

Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX

National Security Files

Country Files

China

Mexico

Israel

India

Subject Files

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Name Files

Cabinet Papers

Files of McGeorge Bundy

Files of Spurgeon Keeny

Office Files of Bill Moyers

Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings

National Security Archive

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Collection

Limited Test Ban Treaty Collection

The Nuclear Vault

Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA

Records of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy

U.K. National Archives, Kew, U.K.

Records of the Foreign Office

Records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Records of the Cabinet Office

Records of the Prime Minister's Office

Records of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority

U.S. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
Paul Nitze Papers

U.S. National Archives II, College Park, MA
Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State
Record Group 326, Records of the Atomic Energy Commission
Llewellyn Thompson Papers

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Nuclear Proliferation International History Project

**Interviews**

Mohamed Shaker, April 9, 2013, Washington, D.C.
Henry Rowen, January 25, 2013Stanford University
James Goodby, March 18, 2013, Hoover Institution,
Theodore C. Sorensen, Interviews #1, #2, #3, and #4, March 26, 1964, John F. Kennedy Library
Anthony B. Akers, July 17, 1971, John F. Kennedy Library
Charles E. Bohlen, May 21, 1964, John F. Kennedy Library
Albert Gore, John F. Kennedy Library
Walter Rostow, John F. Kennedy Library
George Kennan, John F. Kennedy Library
James Reston, John F. Kennedy Library
General Lyman L. Lemitzer, John F. Kennedy Library
Lord Paul Gore-Booth, John F. Kennedy Library
William C. Foster, August 5, 1964, John F. Kennedy Library
Francis Bator, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library
Adrian Fisher, Oral History, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library
Roland Timerbaev, by Rich Hooper and Jenni Rissanen, June 14, 2007, Vienna, Austria

George Bunn, "Have and Have-Nots," in *War and Peace in the Nuclear Age*, Episode 108,

November 30, 1986, http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/wpna-ffebb0-interview-with-george-bunn-1986

----------------, by Thomas Shea and Danielle Peterson, February 17, 2006, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA.

**Newspapers**

*The New York Times* (ProQuest Historical Newspapers)

*The Washington Post* (ProQuest Historical Newspapers)

*The Atlantic Monthly*

*The Times of London*

*Le Monde*

*Journal de Genève*

*The Times of India* (ProQuest Historical Newspapers)

*The Indian Express*

**Government Documents**

Declassified Documents Reference Service

*Documents diplomatiques français 1965, Vol. 2.* Paris: Impr. Nat., 2004.

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964.

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968.

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969.

United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations*. Washington, D.C., 1982.

U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. *Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons*. 89th Congress, 2nd sess. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966.

U.S. Congress, *Congressional Record, Vol. CXIII*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume II: United Nations and General International Matters*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XIX: China*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1963-1968, Volume XI: Arms Control and Disarmament*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1963-1968, Volume XIII: Western European Region*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1963-1968, Volume XIV: Soviet Union*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1963-1968, Volume XV: Germany and Berlin*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1963-1968, Volume XXV: South Asia*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1963-1968, Volume XXX: China*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1963-1968, Volume XXXI: South and Central America; Mexico*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004.

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Government Organization, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, *A Return to Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Process*, 110th Congress.

**International Organization Documents**

United Nations, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during its Twentieth Session

Verbatim Records of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Geneva, Switzerland, University of Michigan Digital Library, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/

**Published Primary Sources**

Aiken, Frank. *Ireland at the United Nations, 1958*. Dublin: Brún agus Ó Nualláin Teo, 1958.

———. *Ireland at the United Nations, 1959*. Dublin: Brún agus Ó Nualláin Teo, 1959.

———. *Ireland at the United Nations, 1960*. Dublin: Brún agus Ó Nualláin Teo, 1960.

———. *Ireland at the United Nations, 1961*. Dublin: Brún agus Ó Nualláin Teo, 1961.

Battle, Joyce. *India and Pakistan – On the Nuclear Threshold*. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 6. http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB6/

Camus, Albert. "Speech of Acceptance Upon the Award of the Nobel Prize for Literature, Delivered in Stockholm on the Tenth of December, 1957." In *Fifty Years*, edited by Clifton Fadiman. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965.

Chalfont, Alun Jones. *The Shadow of My Hand*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2000.

Dobrynin, Anatoly. *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986).* 1st ed. New York: Times Books, Random House, 1995.

Foster, William C. "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament." *Foreign Affairs* 43, no. 4 (July 1965): 594–605.

García Robles, Alfonso. *El Tratado de Tlatelolco : Génesis, Alcance y Propósition de La Proscripción de Las Armas Nucleares En La América Latina.* México: El Colegio de México, 1967.

———————. *The Denuclearization of Latin America.* Translated by Marjorie Urquidi. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967.

———————. "Nobel Lecture: The Latin American Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone," December 11, 1982.

*Glenn T. Seaborg, Journal, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1961-1971*. Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, University of California, 1989.

Menon, Krishna. *Krishna Menon on Disarmament: Speeches at the United Nations*. Edited by E.S. Reedy and A.K. Damodaran. Vol. III. III vols. Krishna Menon: Selected Speeches at the United Nations. New Delhi: Sanchar Publishing House, 1994.

Nehru, Jawaharlal. *The Essential Writings of Jawaharlal Nehru*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003.

**Secondary Sources**

Abraham, Itty. "The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories." *Osiris* 21, no. 1. Global Power Knowledge: Science and Technology in International Affairs (2006): 49–65.

———. *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State*. Postcolonial Encounters. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.

Alexeev, Alexander. "Non-Proliferation Treaty and Security." *International Affairs (Moscow)* (January 1969): 10–14.

———. “Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Non-Nuclear States.” *International Affairs (Moscow)* (March 1969): 9–13.

Allison, Graham T. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. 2nd ed. New York: Longman, 1999.

Alperovitz, Gar. *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam; the Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965.

Ayson, Robert. *Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age*. London; New York: F. Cass, 2004.

Bagley, T. H. *Spy Wars Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.

Bell, Duncan. *Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-century Political Thought*. Ideas in Context 86. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Bernstein, Barton. “Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A Reinterpretation.” *Political Science Quarterly* 90, no. 1 (Spring 1975): 23–69.

———. “The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946.” *The Journal of American History* 60, no. 4 (March 1974): 1003–1044.

Beschloss, Michael R. *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963*. 1st ed. New York, NY: Edward Burlingame Books, 1991.

Bluth, Christoph. *Britain, Germany, and Western Nuclear Strategy*. Nuclear History Program 3. Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1995.

Brands, H. W. *Into the Labyrinth: The United States and the Middle East, 1945-1993*. America in Crisis. New York: McGraw Hill, 1994.

———. , ed. *The Foreign Policies of Lyndon Johnson: Beyond Vietnam*. 1st ed. Foreign Relations and the Presidency no. 1. College Station, Tex: Texas A&M University Press, 1999.

———. *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-1960*. Columbia Studies in Contemporary American History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989.

———. *The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Brands, Hal. *Latin America’s Cold War*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010.

———. “Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The Superpowers, the MLF, and the NPT.” *Cold War History* 7, no. 3 (August 2007): 389–423.

———. “Progress Unseen: U.S. Arms Control Policy and the Origins of Detente, 1963-1968.” *Diplomatic History* 30, no. 2 (April 2006): 253–285.

Brown, Judith M. *Nehru: a Political Life*. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 2003.

Bull, Hedley. “In Support of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.” *Quadrant* 12 (June 1968): 25–29.

Bundy, McGeorge. *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years*. 1st ed. New York: Random House, 1988.

Bunn, George. *Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the Russians*. Studies in International Security and Arms Control. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1992.

———. “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.” *Wisconsin Law Review* (1968).

Bunn, George, R. M Timerbaev, and James F Leonard. *Nuclear Disarmament : How Much Have the Five Nuclear Powers Promised in the Non-Proliferation Treaty?* Washington, D.C.: The Lawyers Alliance for World Security, the Committee for National Security, and the Washington Council on Non-Proliferation, 1994.

Burns, E. L. M. “The Nonproliferation Treaty: Its Negotiation and Prospects.” *International Organization* 23, no. 04 (October 1969): 788–807.

Burr, William, and Jeffrey T. Richelson. “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle:’ The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64".” *International Security* 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000): 54–99.

Bushnell, David, and Lester D. Langley, eds. *Simón Bolívar: Essays on the Life and Legacy of the Liberator*. Latin American Silhouettes. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Pub, 2008.

Cameron, James. “The Development of United States Anti-Ballistic Missile Policy, 1961-1972.” Dissertation, Cambridge University, 2013.

Caro, Robert A. *The Passage of Power*. 1st ed. The Years of Lyndon Johnson. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012.

Chalmers, Robert. *The Nuclear Years: The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1945-1970*. New York: Praeger, 1970.

Chang, Gordon H. “JFK, China, and the Bomb.” *The Journal of American History* 74, no. 4 (March 1998): 1287–1310.

Chengappa, Raj. *Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India’s Quest to Be a Nuclear Power*. New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers, India, 2000.

Cioc, Mark. *Pax Atomica: The Nuclear Defense Debate in West Germany During the Adenauer Era*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

Cirincione, Joseph. *Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

Clarke, Duncan L. *Politics of Arms Control: The Role and Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency*. New York: Free Press, 1979.

Cohen, Avner. *Israel and the Bomb*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.

Cohen, Warren I., and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, eds. *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963-1968*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Craig, Campbell. *Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.

———. *The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008.

Dean, Robert D. *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy*. Culture, Politics, and the Cold War. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001.

Doty, Paul. "Arms Control: 1960, 1990, 2020." *Daedalus* 120, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 33–52.

Evangelista, Matthew. *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.

Firmage, Edwin Brown. "The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." *The American Journal of International Law* 63, no. 4 (October 1969): 711.

Fischer, David. *Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: The Past and the Prospects*. London ; New York: Routledge, 1992.

Freedman, Lawrence. *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989.

Freeman, J. P. G. *Britain's Nuclear Arms Control Policy in the Context of Anglo-American Relations, 1957-68*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986.

Fursenko, A. A. *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary*. 1st ed. New York: Norton, 2006.

Gaddis, John Lewis. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

———. *George F. Kennan: An American Life*. New York: Penguin Press, 2011.

———. *Strategies of Containment a Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

———. *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*. Joanna Jackson Goldman Memorial Lecture on American Civilization and Government. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004.

———. *The Cold War: a New History*. New York: Penguin Press, 2005.

———. *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.

———. *We Now Know : Rethinking Cold War History*. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1998.

García Robles, Alfonso. *El Mundo de La Posguerra : de La Carta Del Atlántico a La Conferencia de San Francisco*. 2 vols. México: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1946.

———. *La proscripción de las armas nucleares en la América Latina*. México, D. F.: Colegio Nacional, 1975.

———. *La Question Du Pétrole Au Mexique et Le Droit International*. Paris: Les Éditions Internationales, 1939.

———. *Le panaméricanisme et la politique de bon voisinage*. Paris: Les Éditions Internationales, 1938.

———. *Política internacional de México*. México, 1946.

———. *The Latin America Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone*. Muscatine, Iowa: Stanley Foundation, 1979.

García Robles, Alfonso, and Miguel Marín Bosch. *Alfonso García Robles, México, Nobel de la Paz*. México, D.F.: Secretaría de Educación Pública : Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1984.

Garthoff, Raymond L. *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*. Rev. ed. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1994.

Gavin, Francis J. "Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s." *International Security* 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004): 100–135.

———. *Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958-1971*. The New Cold War History. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.

———. *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2012.

Giovannini, Francesca. "Cooperating to Compete: The Role of Regional Powers in Global Nuclear Governance." Ph.D., Oxford University, October 2012.

Ginor, Isabella. *Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.

Ginor, Isabella, and Gideon Remez. "The Spymaster, the Communist, and Foxbats over Dimona: The USSR's Motive for Instigating the Six-Day War." *Israel Studies* 11, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 88–130.

Gowing, Margaret, and United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952*. London [etc.]: Macmillan [for the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority], 1974.

Grandin, Greg. *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.

Green, Brendan Rittenhouse, "Two Concepts of Liberty: U.S. Cold War Grand Strategies and the Liberal Traditions." *International Security* 37, no 2 (October 2012): 9-43.

Guilhot, Nicolas. *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.

Hahn, Peter L. *Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945*. 1st ed. Issues in the History of American Foreign Relations. Washington, D.C: Potomac Books, Inc, 2005.

Hecht, Gabrielle. *The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II*. Inside Technology. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998.

Herken, Gregg. *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950*. New York: Vintage Books, 1982.

Heuser, Beatrice. *NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

Holloway, David. *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.

Howlett, Darryl A, University of Southampton, and Centre for International Policy Studies. *EURATOM and Nuclear Safeguards*. Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with the Centre for International Policy Studies, University of Southampton, 1990.

Hurrell, Andrew. "Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be Great Powers?" *International Affairs* 82, no. 1 (January 2006): 1–19.

———. *On Global Order : Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Ikenberry, G. John. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

———. *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011.

Iriye, Akira. *Global Community the Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

Irwin, Ryan M. *Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order*. Oxford Studies in International History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

James, William. "The Moral Equivalent of War." In *Essays on Faith and Morals*. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1943.

Joyner, Daniel. *Interpreting the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Katznelson, Ira. *Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time.* New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013.

Kaufman, Scott. *Project Plowshare: The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Explosives in Cold War America*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013.

Khalessi, Daniel K. "The Ambiguity of Nuclear Commitments: The Implications of NATO's Nuclear Sharing Arrangements for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." Undergraduate Thesis, Stanford University, 2013.

Khan, Feroz Hassan. *Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb*. Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, an imprint of Stanford University Press, 2012.

Kleuters, Joost. *Reunification in West German Party Politics from Westbindung to Ostpolitik*. New Perspectives in German Political Studies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Krepon, Michael, "Can this agency be saved?," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 5, no 10 (December 1998).

Krishna Iyer, V. R. *Nehru and Krishna Menon*. Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1993.

Küntzel, Matthias. *Bonn & the Bomb: German Politics and the Nuclear Option*. London ; Boulder, Colo: Pluto Press, 1995.

Lee, Joseph, ed. *Ireland 1945-70*. Thomas Davis Lectures. Dublin : New York: Gill and Macmillan ; Barnes & Noble Books, 1979.

Legault, Albert. *A Diplomacy of Hope: Canada and Disarmament, 1945-1988*. Montréal ; Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992.

Levite, Ariel E. "Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited." *International Security* 27, no. 3 (January 2003): 59–88.

Lewis, John Wilson. *China Builds the Bomb*. ISIS Studies in International Policy. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1988.

Luthi, Lorenz M. *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.

Lynch, John. *Simón Bolívar: a Life*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.

Maddock, Shane J. *Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010.

Mallard, Grégoire. "The Atomic Confederacy: Europe's Quest for Nuclear Weapons and the Making of the New World Order." Dissertation, Princeton University, 2008.

———————. "Can the Euratom Treaty Inspire the Middle East?: The Political Promises of Regional Nuclear Communities." *Nonproliferation Review* 15, no. 3 (November 2008): 459–477.

Manela, Erez. *The Wilsonian Moment Self-determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Mann, Robert. *Daisy Petals and Mushroom Clouds: LBJ, Barry Goldwater, and the Ad That Changed American Politics*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011.

Martin, Edwin M. *Kennedy and Latin America*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1994.

Martínez, Elias David Morales. "A Experiéncia de Tlatelolco: Um Estudo do Regime Latino-Americano e Caribenho de Proscrição de Armas Nucleares, 1963-2008." Dissertation, Universidade de São Paulo, 2008.

Mazower, Mark. *Governing the World: The History of an Idea*. New York: Penguin Press, 2012.

———. *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*. Lawrence Stone Lectures. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Miller, Steven E. *Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform & the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime*. Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2012.

Mirchandani, G. G. *India's Nuclear Dilemma*. New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968.

Moyn, Samuel. *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History*. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010.

Myrdal, Alva. *The Game of Disarmament: How the United States & Russia Run the Arms Race*. Rev. and updated ed. – 2nd pbk. ed. New York: Pantheon Books, 1982.

Narayanan, R. "Brazil's Policy Toward Nuclear Disarmament." *The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal* 3 (October 1970): 178–91.

Nelson, Keith L. *The Making of Détente: Soviet-American Relations in the Shadow of Vietnam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995.

Nguyen, Lien-Hang T. *Hanoi's War an International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012..

Nuti, Leopoldo. "'Me Too, Please': Italy and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, 1945–1975." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 4, no. 1 (March 1993): 114–148.

Oren, Michael B. *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Pelopidas, Benoît. “The Oracles of Proliferation: How Experts Maintain a Biased Historical Reading That Limits Policy Innovation.” *The Nonproliferation Review* 18, no. 1 (March 2011): 297–314.

Perkovich, George. *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

Perlstein, Rick. *Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus*. 1st ed. New York: Hill and Wang, 2001.

Preston, Andrew. *The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006.

Pugh, Michael C. *The Interwar Movement for Peace in Britain*. Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Quandt, William B. “Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 War: What Color Was the Light?” *Middle East Journal* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 198–228.

Quester, George H. *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.

——————— and the Harvard University Center for International Affairs. *Nuclear Diplomacy; the First Twenty-five Years*. University Press of Cambridge Series in the Social Sciences. New York: Dunellen Co, 1970.

Rabe, Stephen G. *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988.

———. *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999.

Rakove, Jack N. *Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution*. New York: Vintage Books, 1997.

Rakove, Robert B. *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Rao, R. Ramo. “The Non-Proliferation Treaty.” *The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal* I (July 1968): 12–29.

Redick, John R. *Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil*. Occasional Paper. Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, December 1995.

Reed, Thomas C. *The Nuclear Express: a Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation*. Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2009.

Regehr, Ernie, and Simon Rosenblum, eds. *Canada and the Nuclear Arms Race*. Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1983.

Rosenbaum, H. Jon, and Glenn Cooper. "Brazil and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." *International Affairs* 46 (January 1970): 74–90.

Rotter, Andrew Jon. *Hiroshima: The World's Bomb*. Making of the Modern World. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Ryukichi, Imai. "The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Japan." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (May 1969).

Sagan, Scott. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: a Debate*. 1st ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 1995.

———. "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb." *International Security* 21, no. 3 (Winter /97 1996): 54–86.

Scheinman, Lawrence. *The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order*. Washington, D.C. : Baltimore: Resources for the Future ; Distributed by the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.

Schelling, Thomas. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University, 1966.

———. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ, 1960.

Schelling, Thomas, and Morton Halperin. *Strategy and Arms Control*. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union." *International Organization* 55, no. 1 (March 1, 2001): 47–80.

Schrafstetter, Susanna. *Avoiding Armageddon: Europe, the United States, and the Struggle for Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1945-1970*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004.

———. "Preventing the 'Smiling Buddha': British-Indian Nuclear Relations and the Commonwealth Nuclear Force, 1964-68." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 25, no. 3 (September 2002): 87–108.

Schrafstetter, Susanna, and Steven Twigge. "Trick or Truth? The British ANF Proposal, West Germany and US Nonproliferation Policy, 1964-69." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 11, no. 2 (July 2000): 161–184.

Seaborg, Glenn T. *Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years*. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1987.

Segev, Tom. *1967: Israel, the War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle East*. 1st U.S. ed. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007.

Selvage, Douglas. *The Warsaw Pact and Nuclear Proliferation, 1963-1965*. Working Paper. Cold War International History Project. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, April 2001.

Serrano, Mónica. *Common Security in Latin America: The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco*. Research Papers / University of London, Institute of Latin American Studies 30. London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1992.

Shaker, Mohamed Ibrahim. *The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation, 1959-1979*. London ; New York: Oceana Publications, 1980.

Sherman, Michael E. *Nuclear Proliferation: The Treaty and After*. Contemporary Affairs 40. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968.

Sherwin, Martin J. *A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance*. 1st ed. New York: Knopf : distributed by Random House, 1975.

Shlaim, Avi, and William Roger Louis, eds. *The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences*. Cambridge Middle East Studies 36. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Singer, J. David. "Arms Control and Beyond: A Review of Thomas C. Schelling and Morton Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* and David Frisch, Ed., *Arms Reduction: Program and Issues*." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 5, no. 3 (September 1961): 311–320.

Skelly, Joseph Morrison. *Irish Diplomacy at the United Nations, 1945-1965: National Interests and the International Order*. Dublin ; Portland, Or: Irish Academic Press, 1997.

Smith, Tony. "New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War." *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 4 (Fall 2000): 567–51.

Snyder, Sarah B. *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: a Transnational History of the Helsinki Network*. Human Rights in History. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Solana, Fernando. *Alfonso García Robles, diplomático ejemplar*. México, D.F: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1990.

Spencer, Metta. "'Political' Scientists." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 51, no. 4 (August 1995): 62–68.

Squassoni, Sharon and David Fite. "Brazil's Nuclear History." *Arms Control Today*, October 2005.

Suri, Jeremi. *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente*. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2005.

Swango, Dane Eugene. "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: Constrainer, Screen, or Enabler?" Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 2009.

Sylvest, Casper. *British Liberal Internationalism, 1880-1930: Making Progress?* Manchester, U.K.; New York; New York: Manchester University Press ; Distributed in the U.S. by Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Tal, David. *The American Nuclear Disarmament Dilemma, 1945-1963*. 1st ed. Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution. Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 2008.

Tharoor, Shashi. *Nehru: The Invention of India*. 1st ed. New York: Arcade Pub, 2003.

Timerbaev, Roland. "In Memoriam: George Bunn (1925-2013)." *Arms Control Today* (June 2012).

———————. *Rossiia︠ i I︠adernoe Nerasprostranenie: 1945-1968*. Moskva: Nauka, 1999.

Trachtenberg, Marc. *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963*. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1999.

———. "The de Gaulle Problem." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 14, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 81–92.

Westad, Odd Arne. *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Wenger, Andreas, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher. *Transforming NATO in the Cold War Challenges Beyond Deterrence in the 1960s*. London; New York: Routledge, 2007.

Whitfield, Stephen J. *The Culture of the Cold War*. The American Moment. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.

Williams, Shelton L. *The U.S., India, and the Bomb*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969.

Willrich, Mason. "The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear Technology Confronts World Politics." *The Yale Law Journal* 77, no. 8 (July 1968): 1447–1519.

Zhihua, Shen, and Yafeng Xia. "Hidden Currents During the Honeymoon: Mao, Khrushchev, and the 1957 Moscow Conference." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 11, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 74–117.

Zubok, V. M. *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996.

## Vita

Jonathan Reid Hunt was born in San Antonio, Texas in 1983 and moved with his family to Austin, Texas when he was six weeks old. He attended the University of Texas at Austin, where he earned a B.A. in Plan II Honors Liberal Arts; History; and Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies. Afterward, he enrolled in its Ph.D. program in History in 2006, becoming the fourth member of his nuclear family to pursue an advanced degree at UT-Austin, and the third to seek a Ph.D. He was an Eisenhower Roberts Fellow from 2012 to 2013 and has been a MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University from 2012 to 2014.

Permanent Address: jonreidhunt@gmail.com

This dissertation was typed by Jonathan Reid Hunt.