...· .• ~ '.:·· , .. : . . .. . .......-~ ~ .....t ;::t< ·~singer:fjmcc · · . ·." .:..S~CREl-NoDIS 4 ... .·. . ·,~ -~-··...... · .·· . '~ ., ··. ~-~ ~DN/!i•I OI" ••ti OJmJ . ( ( : . . . . ..1 _· ..... " ··~ DEPARTMENT OF STATE . . . . q . . ". / MemoranJum ol Conversation DATE: September 23, 1961 SUBJECT: Czech Efforts to Induce Hanoi to be More Flexible on Negotiations PARTICIPANTS: A. Snejdarek, Director, Czecfrnstitute of International Affairs. Prague. July 19-20, 1966 Henry A. Kissinger, Professor of Government, Harvard University COPIES r-. The conversation came about in the followi"ng ·manner: . During -, the Pugwash Conference at Sopot, I had been the member of the U.S. delegation most active in attempting to thwart the attempts of the Soviet delegation to obtain an all-out condemnation of the United States. The Czech group for some reason was most eager to bring abou·i a recommendation for ·a fact-finding body of neutral scientists to visit aaigon and Ha~oi.· I told their secretary that I would not oppof this p;oposal p-rovided he helped secure a resolution which was "objec· tive" and did not load the dice against the United States prior i:o the investigation. He k~pt his side of the bargain checking various dr~ft statements with me and generally using his ·influence to produce a stat?ement which turned out to be so weak as to be unacceptable to the Soviets. The result was that the conference stated that it a:>uld "reach one agreement on Vietnam. • I • • .· ·: . , ... .. .. ~ ( . .. -5ii0RH-M6D!S " 2 ­ . ... But the situation was difficult. Czecnoslovakia had made an unpubli­cized effort to urge ·North Vietnam to negotia~e last February; but it bad been brutally rebuffed. He.did not know whether the Czechoslovak government was prepared to undertake another try. He wanted to know whether the United.States sincerely wanted peace. I replied that though I in no way spoke in an official capacity I was convinced that the United States wanted an honorable settlement based on self-determination for the people of South Vietnam and removir any permanent U.S. military presence from South Vietnain. At the same time, there was no chance that the United States would accept the kind of unilateral settlement urged by the Soviet delegation at the con­ference--all the less so as the military situation was.quite favox-able. Malek said that he felt Czechoslovakia should make another peace effort and that he would try to arrange a meeting with senior foreign office officials while I was in Prague the following week. · I arrived in Prague on Septembe~ 19th accompanied by Doty and Shulman for a discussion of Central European problems with a group of Czech scientists under the auspices of the Czech Institute for World Politics. Snejdarek met us at the airport. I had met Snejdarek in 1964 during the Pugwash conference at Karlovy Vary. I had had many ' extensive conversations with him then and found him fair and reasonablE Immediately following· that conference Snejdarek asked me to give a lecture at his Institute. We have had a lively correspondence since ·primarily acout a discussion group on Central European security Snejdarek is eager to organize. · On the way in from the airport, Snejdarek said that it was essen­tial th~t .he and I talk that evening after a dinner he w~s hosting for the American group. After dinner, Snejdarek made'the following points: The next day-· September 20th--a htgh-level Czech delegation was leaving for Hanoi via Moscow. It included the Prime Minister, several Deputy Prime Ministers, the Secretary of the Central Committee and other leading officials. Snejdarek had been authorized by the Secretary of the Cent1 Comaittee to give me some information and to ask me some questions. He had been chosen as 1nterme4iary because the official party wanted to be able to tell Hanoi that it had had no contact with Americans. The informatim ....... ·. ·<·~:.: ·:· .·:. . . ·.· ·.. .•..;._· .... . : .·. ·.......· . :•. .·.. . : ... ..·. ( ..:.... .· .· . .. ( -Sl!!eM'f•N68lS -3 ­ The information·snejdarek wished to convey was as follows: The Czech delegation was leaving for Hanoi with partially conflicting objectives: (1) To respond to Soviet and North Vietnamese pressures for ·increased aid. (2) To strengthen the Western presence in Hanoi against Communist China. (3) To press as hard as possible for a peaceful solution. This was the reason for the high level of the delegation. To negQtiate an aid agreement would not have required the presence of the. Prime "Minister and so many members of the Central Committee.­Only conversatio·ns at the highest level could, in the Czech judg­ ment, move the Hanoi government towards negotiations. Even so, the Czech delegation was.not optimistic. There were at ."1east two obstacles to successful negotiations: (a) tne Soviet attituc and (b) Hanoi's intransigence. • With respect to the Soviet Union, Snejdarek said.that Czechoslova~ could go only so far in risking Soviet displeasure over Vietnam. Durir the Warsaw pact meetings in Bucharest, Czechoslovakia had got into difficulties· with the USSR by urging restraint over Vietnam. The Czech delegation was stopping in Moscow both coming and going from Hanoi. Anything he told me was subject to a Soviet veto· for Czechoslo­vakia could not risk losing Soviet support in Central Europe over Vietnam. The Czechs were not at all sure that the So"Uiet.s wanted a settlement of the Vietnamese war. A relaxation of tensions might brini .about a loosening of Soviet control in Central Europe which made the ~viets most uneasy. · A for Hanoi, all Czech diplomatic and party reports spoke of tr... intransigence. Moreover, since July the Chinese faction in eems again in the a cendant. To alleviate this the Czech dele­·,11J1t• contalaed 111'1\y individuals who were personally acquainted with 1. Yiettt.. • leader• who had studied in Prague. They were • to ura th• de lrabtlity of peace on their Vietnamese Snejdarek ...: ·.' ..·.· .. ..:.·-. ~ ;:· .; ~· :.~'.:_ :.;_·.· .. .. ··:. ' ': ·...;. > , ·\"\ ;"~~ :.; .·"I!! ·. ··. .... : ·'·~ ... · ( · . . .. ( . . . . Si,RB'f MODIS 4 -. Snejdarek then said that he had been instructed to put three ,questions to me al\d to report my answer to the ·Secretary of the Central Committee in the morning. (The Czech delegation left at 1500 on 20 September.) These were: (1) Was the United States .sincere in seeking peace or were the . peace offers a smokescreen for continued escalation? (2) Was there a role for an intermediary and if so what was it in the American view? (3) What were the actual American terms? I began my answer by stressing my strictly unofficial status. To be sure· I had been in Vietnam but my assignment had concerned primarily internal Vietnamese problems. I was not conversant with the details d. our position and I had no authority whatever to discuss t_his problem. I could, however, give him my private impressions. First, the United States was undoubtedly sincere in seeking an honorable pe~ce. To be sure, the Hanoi proposals were unacceptable-­especially Point #3. The United States would make n~ unilateral con­cessions--all fhe more so as the war was on the whole going well. I urged Snejdarek to tell the Czech delegation not to be too-impressed by North Vietnamese military claims. On the basis of my own experience in Sou-th Vietnam I .could assure him that most North Vietnamese claims were absurd. In fact, the military situation was favorable to the Unite States and improving. If the war continued, escalation was always possible~ ' Still the United States was sincerely interested in an honorable .settlement because it realized that the war would b~ing a great deal of suffering and because it believed that.the vital interests of all parties, including North Vietnam, were not irreconcilable. As to the question of an intennediary I said tNp.t I could see a definite use for such a r~le. Hanoi was so isolated and so much subject to Chinese pressure tha~ the advice of a well-disposed government could be invaluable. Similarly, I was sure we would welcome receiving any iadlcattons of movemen-t in Hanoi1 poal.tion. A to what an lntermediar) e let 4o, thl could u eel 1'• t by coll tclutng the actual issu • lie or e p r • . . ......:.-·-"';'"· '• • • .. ..... •• o:.·• • • .. . : '. _: .. ·.·· ': :·. S!C!E'f N0B:EB 5 ­ I p~inted out that I was in no positicn to give Snejdarek even the outli~es of an American negotiating position. However, I might discuss my personal views about some general principl.es. At least· three issues seemed to me involved in the settlement of the Vietnamese war: (a) an end to U.S. bombing, (b) the withdrawal of troops introduced from outside South Vietnam.and (c) the evolution of political life in South Vietnam on· the basis of self-determination. Each of these issues was very comptex. No serious person could ask the Pres.ident to stop bombing the North while North Vietnam infil­trated troops and supplies at an increasing rate and American soldiers were being killed. If, however, North Vietnam de-escalated the war in the South and/or stopped its infiltration from the North a ·new situation might well arise--as Ane::ican leaders had often pointed out. It.seemed to me less a matter of formal agreements than.of deeds. The withdrawal Qf outside timps was relatively simpler. I was. convinc.ed that the United· States would agree to withdraw its troops within a reasonable time of a satisfactory final settlement provided North Vietnamese troops were also withdrawn. I was confident that the U.S •. desi~ed no permanent bases in South Vietnam. It was easy to test our sincerity on this point by making a negotiable proposal on the whole ·complex ·of the Vietnamese problem.· · The most difficult problem, I continu~d, related to the internal political structure of South Vietnam. No useful purpose would be served by going into details. I did want to make two points, however:.· (a) _ the United States was sincerely concerned with bringing about a broadly based democratic government, and (b) Point #3 of Hanoi's f~ur poin~s · was absolutely unacceptable. Snejdarek said he, too, thought the point unreasonable but would we accept a co~lition government, including the NLF. I replied that without knowing the government position in detail, it seemed· to me out of the question. · Snejdarek took his leave at this point and said. he would report to the Secretary of the .Central Committee first thing in the morning. On September 20th, the first meeting of the Central European discussion group to be chaired by Suejdarek was scheduled for 10:30•. Before the meeting Snejd-.retc. ~ook • aside and said that he had been instructed to ask me tbr e upplementary questions. ·If I agreed to answ tha he woul4 turn over the ct.air to • .coll ape aud r eport to the .. .....~·--. . . >.~::. :·: ·... ·. . ..... . .:·.·.-~ .. ·. . .. .:·.·: .. .. ( . '. "( .: ~ . -SiQRB'f ·110B!S -·6 ­ the ~entral Committee inunediately. The questions were: (a) If North Vietnam agreed to end its infiltration in return for an end of-bombing, what would happen to the United States build-up in South Vie~nam? . (b) What guarante~s other than a coalition government were available to prevent the members of the NLF suffering the fate of the COmmunist party in Indonesia? (c) How could the Czechs communicate the results of their Hanoi trip to the United States? I replied that I was in no position to answer these questions authoritatively. With respect to the American build-up, my personal opinion was that we could not stop resupply and rotation of personnel. Limitations on an increase in the number of troops under the hypothesis outlined by SnejQarek seemed to me an appropriate subj~ct for discussion. On the question of guarantees for the NLF I said that I understood their concern. The United States would in my view certainly agree to international guarantees. The problem was that Wile Hanoi was so obdurate it was difficult to get many people to address this problem. However, I was certain that the United States would be very forthcoming in divising ~chemes.for guarantying the safety of NLF personnel. This seemed.to me an appropriate subject to be explored oy a mediato~. This might be done in the context of a reformulation by H~noi of its Point-#3. As far communicating with us, I suggested contacting our Ambassador Snejdarek said that the Central Conmittee was most reluctant to do so .for two reasons: (a.) it believed that it could be lllQst useful by not playing an official role and (b) the channel of contact for the U.S. in Prague was the·Foreign Ministry. However, the decisions which we were discussing were reserved to the Central Conmdttee and the Foreign Hint.try was not informed in detail. At the same time, the Central 00..U.t~ wauted no offtcial contact with Americans and it wanted these U>n.I kept to the 11eat po sible amaber of people. Snejdarek h--1 an~f4>•itive to report 4 to ti cues i :·~-... ·:: •·=". .. . • ~ •• • : • "·:·.· • • L • •••·.". ',.' ,' • • •• .. . ···:: .... .. .... ~ ..·. . . ... .... ..,., ·.. . " let him in the Snejdarek on October 1st!