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**“FORWARD WITH THE NATION”: ZAMBIA, CHINA, AND THE WEST, 1960-
1970**

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**“FORWARD WITH THE NATION”: ZAMBIA, CHINA, AND THE WEST, 1960-
1970**

by

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DISSERTATION

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Dedication

For my parents.

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Jessica Achberger

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**“FORWARD WITH THE NATION”: ZAMBIA, CHINA, AND THE WEST, 1960-
1970**

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This dissertation examines how Zambia’s international relations, particularly with China, affected its political and economic development in the first decade after independence. Zambian development issues in the 1960s were directly tied to the volatile situation in Southern Africa, and its methods of negotiating this situation were deeply influenced by the Cold War. Regional issues placed land-locked Zambia in a difficult situation politically, economically, and socially. Yet, despite major hurdles to peace and stability, Zambia was an anomaly among newly independent Africa nations. Postcolonial African history is riddled with violent decolonization struggles, civil war, and oppressive dictatorship. The history of these newly independent nations was dramatic and bloody and has garnered much attention from scholars of Africa, identifying causes ranging from inept colonial governance to neo-colonialism, global resource competition, and poor leadership. More recently, scholars have begun to include the Cold War in this postcolonial narrative; however, they have almost exclusively focused on instances of resistance.

It is true that violent conflict unfortunately represents a majority of decolonization struggles, not just in Africa, but in Asia as well. It is also true that these narratives are more dramatic than their peaceful counterparts. It is not true however, that decolonization struggles influenced by the Cold War only manifested in bloodshed. Relatively speaking, the Zambian independence process was deliberate and peaceful. Yet Zambia's political and economic development following independence was directly influenced by the bipolar political situation of the Cold War. The Zambian government's most important communist ally was the People's Republic of China. The reaction of the West to this "mutually beneficial friendship" between Zambia and China was, unsurprisingly, not a positive one. Yet Zambia's staunch commitment to non-alignment was both a reaction to its political and economic situation, as well as the best way of ensuring development. Through trade agreements, pledges of aid, and, most importantly, the negotiation of the TAZARA railway, the Zambian government showed deft political skills at negotiating between the West and China for its continued economic development.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAPC	All-African People's Congress
A.A.P.S.O.	Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization
ANC	African National Congress
BSAC	British South Africa Company
CAF	Central African Federation
CIPEC	Inter-Governmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries
FMAPRC	Foreign Ministry Archives of the People's Republic of China
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LBJ	Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Archives
NAZ	National Archives of Zambia
NPP	National Progress Party (formerly UFP)
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRO	Public Records Office (Great Britain)
TAZARA	Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority
UANC	United African National Council
UFP	United Federal Party
UN	United Nations
UNARMS	United Nations Archives and Records Management
UNIP	United National Independence Party (Archives)

UTUC	United Trade Union Congress
ZANC	Zambian African National Congress
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union

MAP OF ZAMBIA



Source: CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html>.

PROLOGUE

High on the top floor of the library at the University of Zambia are the African history books. Tucked away in on a middle shelf amongst the stacks is a book entitled *The Soviet Bloc China and Africa*, published by the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, in 1964. The University's collections are old, often worn, and not extensive. In fact, there are only three books amongst the history books that address Zambia's relationship with China. Yet while the book is beginning to become unbound and its interpretations long outdated, what is most fascinating about this book lies in the front pages left intentionally blank by the publisher.

Here in a handwritten note from a student, who only signs their name “NB,” is a quiet proclamation: “This book is filled with capitalist ideas intended to discredit the good intentions of Comrade Mao and his Allies- He struggle[s] against Imperialism.” Written below NB’s support of the Chinese is an equally passionate response: “NB. Fucking shit the Chinese are trying to recolonize us. Do not be blinded by blaming everything on capitalism. Boy you may find yourself in a ditch. Watch every foreigner, w[h]ether Chinese or West[ern] critically. Never be prejudiced with a belief that everything socialist is honey.”

These two very conflicting views represent the puzzle that has been, and is, Zambia’s relations with China and the West. For the past decade, China has exponentially increased its presence throughout Africa in a variety of different capacities.

However, China's relationship with all of Africa, including Zambia, dates back further than the past decade, into the 1960s and the time of independence. This is the story of this dissertation.

INTRODUCTION

“Good economics follow good politics; the reverse is not always true.”

- F. M. Mulikita, Zambian Ambassador to the United Nations¹

The Associated Press quickly pointed out that the offer was from “red China, communist China.” The British Broadcasting Corporation also raised concerns that Chinese experts would clash with the British and Canadian survey team. The *People's Daily*, unsurprisingly, heralded the offer as being a landmark gesture in China’s declaration of non-alignment and friendship with the third world.² It was 1965 and the international press was fixated on the negotiations to build the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA). For the two years of the TAZARA railway negotiations, Kenneth Kaunda, the first President of independent Zambia, was forced to negotiate a tenuous Cold War public image at the same time he worked to develop the country. As he argued, “Zambia was not attempting to play off East against West by approaching a number of countries for assistance with the project.”³ Yet it is clear from his negotiations with China and the

¹ NAZ, FA 1-1-135, F. M. Mulikita, “Zambia and Southern Rhodesia (The Possible Cutting of Trade Ties: A Study Prepared by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zambia to the United Nations,” Rhodesia-Political, March 1966.

² UNIP 7/22/8, “President's Press Conference,” Press Releases, September 23, 1965.

³ Kenneth Kaunda, “Opinion-Editorial,” *Times of Zambia*, June 29, 1967.

British that it is exactly what he was doing. And what he was doing quite well. By 1967, however, it was beginning to become difficult to appease both sides.

Argument

In July of 1967 the Republic of Zambia had not yet been an independent nation for three years. However, the young President, Kenneth Kaunda had already negotiated much more than a peaceful independence process. Negotiating economic development for an underdeveloped postcolonial nation was in itself a monumental task. Yet for landlocked Zambia, development was influenced by much more than a colonial legacy. The primary research question of this dissertation is how did the Cold War affect Zambian political and economic development at independence? And, why did it the geopolitical situation of the Cold War matter?

Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to better understand the precarious position in which newly independent Zambia found itself, and how this new nation dealt with powerful external forces when negotiating its political and economic development. Obviously, there is a great deal to be said about domestic politics and leadership in this examination. This has been the concern of several other scholars, of whom this study is indebted to for providing balance and context.⁴ However, while these factors are not

⁴ See, B. J. Phiri, *A Political History of Zambia: from Colonial Rule to the Third Republic, 1890-2001* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2006); Phiri, *Colonial Legacy and the Role of Society in the Creation and Demise of Autocracy in Zambia, 1964-1991* (Lusaka: University of Zambia, 1993); Timothy Shaw, *Dependence and Underdevelopment: the Development of Foreign Policies of Zambia* (Athens, OH: Ohio

ignored, they are not the major interest of this work. Rather, this study asks specifically how Zambian international relations affected its political and economic development in the first decade of independence.

Zambian development issues were directly tied to the volatile situation in Southern Africa, and its methods of negotiating this situation were deeply influenced by the global Cold War. Regional issues—specifically Rhodesian U.D.I., but also Portuguese control of Mozambique and Angola; secession and international competition in the Congo; South African apartheid and control of South-West Africa; and poverty and dictatorship in Malawi—placed land-locked Zambia in a difficult situation politically, economically, and socially. Bordered on almost all sides by violence, the Zambian government was thrown into the position of conflict mediator fighting for the maintenance of peace and stability at its borders and with other nations. Economically, its stability was threatened by limited transport routes for imports and exports and decreased direct trading opportunities with its neighbors. Finally, the social order in Zambia, not just along its borders, but even in the far interior of the country, was endangered by a flood of freedom fighters and refugees.

University, Center for International Studies, Africa Program, 1976); Douglas George Anglin and Timothy Shaw, *Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979); and David C. Mulford, *Zambia: the Politics of Independence, 1957-1964* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

The Zambian government's most important communist ally was the People's Republic of China.⁵ By 1958 China had been a nation for ten years, and Northern Rhodesia was still several years away from being an independent Zambia. Consequently, by the time Zambian leaders began to develop foreign policy, China had already undergone many changes in its policy towards Africa. Chinese relations with African nations today are directly influenced by independence era relations; however, its motivations are very different. Today, economic motivations influence China, namely searching for developing markets for its products and actively and unashamedly participating in resource grabbing all over the continent. Conversely, in the 1950s and 1960s, China was far more influenced by political motivations, particularly diplomatic recognition.

Post-revolution China faced massive domestic and global political problems. As a Communist nation in the post-World War II era, China was immediately placed in the Eastern camp in the eyes of the international community. However, China fought hard to place itself in the third world establishment, using the geo-political strategy of strategic self-depreciation. The most important aspect of China's international recognition was its re-admittance to the United Nations (UN), and particularly, the United Nations Security Council. The UN provided the first truly global governance platform, and the policy of "one nation, one vote" was crucial to China's UN status. Gaining the diplomatic

⁵ Throughout this volume, China will refer to the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the Republic of China will be referred to as Taiwan. This is less a political statement than it is an issue of clarity and common usage.

recognition of newly independent African nations was a key part of China's geo-political strategy, and many countries, including Zambia, proved instrumental.

The reaction of the West to this mutually beneficial friendship between Zambia and China was, unsurprisingly, not a positive one. Yet Zambian leaders' staunch commitment to non-alignment was both a reaction to its political and economic situation, as well as the best way of ensuring development. Through trade agreements, pledges of aid, and, most importantly, the negotiation of the TAZARA railway, the Zambian government showed deft political skills at negotiating between the West and China for its continued economic development.

Sources and Methodology

The study of the political and economic development of Zambia's First Republic has been accomplished solely within Zambia's borders by both political scientists and historians focusing exclusively on domestic archives. These studies are valuable, and there is little doubt that the best sources for understanding Zambia are Zambian. It is with this in mind that this project is at the outset concerned with its contribution to the historiography of Zambia. The major recent focus on Zambian political and economic history has been solely domestic. Excellent work on the political history of Zambia has been done by B. J. Phiri, specifically his 2006 monograph *A Political History of Zambia*:

*from Colonial Rule to the Third Republic, 1890-2001.*⁶ Earlier work focused on foreign relations, including Douglas George Anglin and Timothy Shaw's *Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence*, published in 1979. However, newly available sources allowing for historical interpretation make updating necessary.

The only recent work on bi-lateral relations has been undertaken by Andrew DeRoche on the history of Zambian relations with the United States. In his contribution to the edited volume *The Cold War in Southern Africa*, "Non-Alignment and the Racial Frontier, Zambia and the USA, 1964-1968," DeRoche argues that examining the relationship between Zambia and the United States from bilaterally "provides valuable insights into their often very different perspectives in the midst of the Cold War."⁷ And it is true that the insights that can be gleaned from the Johnson administration and Kenneth Kaunda are useful not only in understanding the relationship between Zambia and the United States, but also Southern Africa and its relationship to the Cold War more generally. Yet this project is just one in a historiography that is wide open in terms of understanding Zambian foreign policy and foreign relations in the 1960s.

The historiography of Zambian economic development is also wide open when considering the First Republic. After the creation of the one-party state in Zambia on

⁶ B. J. Phiri, *A Political History of Zambia: from Colonial Rule to the Third Republic, 1890-2001* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2006). See also Phiri, *Colonial Legacy and the Role of Society in the Creation and Demise of Autocracy in Zambia, 1964-1991* (Lusaka: University of Zambia, 1993).

⁷ Andy DeRoche, "Non-Alignment and the Racial Frontier, Zambia and the USA, 1964-1968," in *Cold War in Southern Africa: white power, black liberation* (London: Routledge, 2009), 130.

December 17, 1972, many industries were nationalized and the economy became more socialist in nature in the new constitution adopted in August of 1973. This has been the focus of the literature regarding economic development, as well as an increasing literature on the Third Republic, which began after the re-institution of multi-party democracy in 1991. Most of this work has been done by social scientists, including political scientists and anthropologists.⁸ There is still room for historical analysis, particularly concerning the First Republic, to which this study contributes.

Secondly, and more broadly, this study contributes to the historiography of African decolonization. The project of African history was directly linked with the process of African decolonization. As colonies within Africa gained their independence, beginning with Ghana in 1957 and continuing through the 1960s, scholarship turned its attention towards the history of these new nations. The consequences of colonization, the process of decolonization, and the political and economic crises in so many new nations have been explored to great lengths and in many contexts throughout the continent.

⁸ On the Second Republic, see, for instance, Jan Pettman, "Zambia's Second Republic: The Establishment of a One-Party State," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 1974):231-244; Cherry J. Gertzel, Carolyn L. Baylies, and Morris Szeftel, *The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia* (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1984). See also Kaunda's manuscript *Zambia's Economic Revolution; Address* (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, 1968) and the Second National Development Plan of Zambia. On the Third Republic see Julius Ihonvbere, *Economic Crisis, Civil Society, and Democratization: The Case of Zambia* (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1996); Catherine Hill and Malcolm F. McPherson, *Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia* (Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2004); and Jeremy Gould, *Left Behind: Rural Zambia in the Third Republic* (Lusaka: Lembani Trust, 2010).

However, there is still the need for new and updated interpretations of post-colonial history, particularly as we begin to understand Africa in the wider context of global politics.

In line with the contribution to African historiography, this project also contributes to the study of the Cold War internationally. While Cold War history is not new, the post-Cold War era openness of archives makes the international study of decolonization and the Cold War not only possible, but necessary. One of the greatest examples of this new literature, and the one to which this study is the most indebted, is Matthew Connelly's 2002 *A Diplomatic Revolution*. Connelly puts together sources from France, the United States, Great Britain, and Algeria to create a clear understanding of a very international independence process. Examining the role of the non-alignment movement in Algeria's independence process, he argues that non-alignment "posed the most direct challenge to the East-West structure of international politics," and that Algeria's role as an inspiration to the movement went directly against the bi-polar political order of the Cold War world.⁹

There are a growing number of other examples, including Lorenz Luthi's *The Sino-Soviet Split*, Sergey Radchenko's *Two Suns in the Heavens*, and several edited volumes.¹⁰ Both Luthi and Radchenko are good examples of not just the

⁹ Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 5.

¹⁰ See, for instance, Joseph M. Gilbert and Daniela Spenser, eds., *In from the Cold: Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,

internationalization of Cold War history, but also the use of newly available sources from formerly, and currently, communist nations. In one of the first truly international examples of Cold War diplomatic history, Luthi researched the Sino-Soviet split on three continents, including in China, Russia, Poland, the former East Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy, and the United States. Wide-ranging research, coupled with the linguistic skills necessary to undertake that research, allow Luthi to provide a global perspective on the split, in turn assisting in answering the question of how the Cold War became global.

In line with this new work, this study relies heavily on Zambian sources, from both the National Archives of Zambia (NAZ) and the United National Independence Party Archives (UNIP), as well as archives from the People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry Archives (FMAPRC), Great Britain's National Archives (PRO), the United States Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library (LBJ), and the United Nations Archives (UNARMS).

Use of the United National Independence Archives, hereafter referred to as “UNIP” in the notes, is necessary to provide supplementation to the National Archives of Zambia (“NAZ”). After the dissolution of Zambia’s Second Republic and the one-party state in Zambia in 1994, the UNIP archives became separate from the National Archives of Zambia. While much of the UNIP archive focuses on the party’s internal documents,

1991) and Sue Onslow, ed., *Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation* (New York: Routledge, 2009).

there are also many documents related to Zambian affairs more generally. Therefore, while the National Archives of Zambia are well organized and accessible, they are not comprehensive. As this study is Zambian focused, these two archives represent the bulk of the primary sources in the analysis.

Secondary is the use of the Foreign Ministry Archives of the People's Republic of China. Recently opened for research, these archives are scholars first glimpse into the inner foreign policy workings of China during the Cold War period. However, they do not come without their difficulties. In particular, it is clear that what has been released comes with an agenda, and, despite their proclaimed accessibility, actual availability is limited. All translations from the Foreign Ministry Archives of the People's Republic of China, hereafter referred to as "FMAPRC" in the notes, are my own.

Archives from the western side include the Public Record's Office, now National Archives, of the United Kingdom. These archives are fully accessible and incredibly comprehensive on all former British colonies, including Zambia. They have been my primary western source of information on pre and postcolonial Zambia, as well as western reactions to Zambia's relations with China. However, I also used archives from the United Nations, which I argue stem from the western perspective on history during this period. These archives were particularly useful in examining China's re-establishment to the United Nations.

Finally, this study also includes documents from the United States. While the role of the United States is tertiary in this examination, documents from the Lyndon B.

Johnson Presidential Archives, hereafter referred to as “LBJ” in the notes, they did provide the original impetus for this study. It was through research on the role of the United States in the Congo crisis that I first came across documents referring to “Chicom”s in the eastern DRC, sparking my interest in further research along these lines.

Therefore, following in the line of scholars of international diplomatic history, this dissertation examines all sides of Zambian international relations, but particularly in terms of its relations with China. This, however, is not just to be studied bilaterally, but rather, internationally, in order to provide a clearer picture on just what these relations were, how they were viewed, and their implications.

While China’s relations with African nations is a growing field of scholarly literature, literally expanding by the day, there is little that examines the historical role of China in Africa, and in particular with Zambia. During the 1960s and 1970s, the focus was on works by political scientists and economists much like the literature produced on China and Africa today. A good example of this is the 1971 publication, *China and Africa 1949-1970: The Foreign Policy of the People’s Republic of China*, by Bruce D. Larkin. However, Larkin’s study focuses on China’s policies towards Africa, with little analysis of Africa’s policies towards China. China loomed much larger than Africa in the eyes of western scholars, who produced much of the work on the subject, and their take on the relationship greatly reflects their Eurocentrism. This weighting towards China remains a problem, but it is less apparent in more contemporary publications, as scholars work to internationalize their projects and create more balanced studies.

The viewpoint largely missing from the Cold War literature on the subject is that of any African scholars, or even western scholars approaching the subject from an African viewpoint. While African scholars are playing a key role in the production of recent literature on the subject, it is very difficult to find Afrocentric accounts of the historical relationship.¹¹ One valuable exception to this is the 1974 publication, *China's Policy in Africa, 1958-71*, by Alaba Ogunsanwo. Although the book is ultimately a study of China's policy in Africa, it manages to keep the objectives and views of the African states in mind. Unlike western accounts of the relationship, which viewed Chinese influence in Africa as being very negative, Ogunsanwo states in his conclusion, "From the African standpoint, relations with China helped to construct a progressive aura of respectability and independence."¹²

Despite the new opportunities for historical study of China and Africa, it remains a topic largely ignored by historians. Only one historical monograph has been published in the past twenty years on the relationship between Africa and China during the Cold War. *Africa's Freedom Railway*, by Jamie Monson, was published in 2009 and provides

¹¹ There are several examples, however, of Sino-centric accounts of this relationship. See, for example, Philip Snow, *The Star Raft : China's Encounter with Africa* (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988).; Alan Hutchison, *China's African Revolution* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976); John K. Cooley, *East Wind over Africa; Red China's African Offensive* (New York: Walker, 1965).; Emmanuel John Hevi, *The Dragon's Embrace; the Chinese Communists and Africa* (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1967).; Harold C. Hinton, *China's Turbulent Quest* (New York: Macmillan, 1970).; Devendra Kaushik, *China and the Third World* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1975).

¹² Alaba Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa, 1958-71* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 266.

an excellent example of African political, economic, and cultural relations with China following the Cultural Revolution—the building of the TAZARA railway.¹³ While this dissertation does focus in part on the building of the TAZARA railway line (specifically, Chapter 5), there are several important differences between Monson’s study and my own. Specifically, Monson focuses on social history, using diplomacy as a background to the actual focus: the people along the rail.

Conversely, this study is, at its heart, an international history, but it is not a history of the United Nations, Great Britain, or even China. Rather, it is study of how interaction with these international actors influenced, both positively and negatively, Zambian political and economic development in the first decade of independence. Therefore, while I am indebted to the work of scholars of the international diplomatic history of the Cold War, as well as to previous scholars of the historical relations between Africa and China, I am in reality telling a much different story. Despite major hurdles to peace and stability, Zambia was an anomaly among newly independent Africa nations. Postcolonial African history is riddled with violent decolonization struggles, civil war, coups, and oppressive dictatorship.

The history of these newly independent nations was dramatic and bloody and has garnered much attention from scholars of Africa—identifying causes ranging from inept colonial governance to neo-colonialism, global resource competition, and poor

¹³ Jamie Monson, *Africa's Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).

leadership. More recently, scholars have begun to include the Cold War in this postcolonial narrative, influenced by scholars such as Orne Arne Westad and his book, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*. Westad's argument is broad: that the Cold War had effects on the developing the third world and the third world also had effects on the Cold War. This is true, he argues, for Latin American, Asian, and African nations, as the Cold War gave the fuel for continued third world resistance against foreign domination.

Westad and other scholars of Africa and the Cold War have almost exclusively focused on these instances of “resistance.”¹⁴ It is true that violent conflict unfortunately represents a majority of decolonization struggles, not just in Africa, but in Asia as well. It is also true that these narratives are more dramatic than their peaceful counterparts. It is not true however, that decolonization struggles influenced by the Cold War only manifested in bloodshed. Relatively speaking, the Zambian independence process was deliberate and peaceful.¹⁵ Therefore, Zambia has spent much of its postcolonial history

¹⁴ A notable exception to this is the edited volume *The Cold War in Southern Africa*, edited by Sue Onslow, which includes a chapter on “Non-alignment on the racial frontier: Zambia and the USA, 1964-1968” by Andy Deroche.

¹⁵ This is not to discount the efforts of Zambian freedom fighters, who were also sent to jail and injured. See, Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar, and Giacomo Macola, eds., *One Zambia, Many Histories: towards a Post-Colonial History of Zambia* (Leiden, Boston, MA: Brill, 2008); Giacomo Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: a Biography of Harry Mwanga Nkumbula* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); and B. S. Krishnamurthy, *Cha, Cha, Cha: Zambia's Struggle for Independence* (Lusaka: Oxford University Press, 1972).

under the radar. Yet Zambian political and economic development following independence was directly influenced by the bi-polar political situation of the Cold War.

Therefore, rather than writing a solely diplomatic history, I have also set out to also write a story of economic development. In this I am indebted to a whole other set of literature on post-colonial development in Africa. Beginning with Walter Rodney's seminal *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, there have been a number of studies focusing on how African economic development was stunted by a number of factors. Yet this literature has not been fully contextualized into the period about which it studies. Domestic economic development in post-independence African nations did not develop independently of the international geo-political situation in which they found themselves. As a newly independent, and peaceful, nation, Zambia dedicated itself to economic development. The story of this development is interwoven in this dissertation with the story of the Cold War in Zambia—in reality the same narrative, but too often separated in the literature. While the methodologies of examining development and diplomacy are different, the intersections within the Zambian story are too frequent, and too important, to ignore.

Dissertation Outline

This dissertation is divided into five chapters, with the first two chapters focusing on the historical and ideological background of Zambia, as well as the People's Republic of China and the West. Chapters 3 lays out the specific context and issues Zambia faced

directly after independence, focusing on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence made by Southern Rhodesia. Finally, in Chapters 4 and 5, I examine the Zambian reaction to this international and regional context, in terms of both planning for economic development, as well as negotiating diplomatically in the context of the Cold War. While not solely chronological, the dual purposes of this study, examining economic development and international relations, are integrated throughout the narrative.

Chapter 1, “A Deliberate Independence,” focuses on the development of the United National Independence Party, logically and ideologically, and the deliberate nature of the Zambian independence process. Before choosing between the competing forces of communism and capitalism, an ideological distinction that was paramount in the political development of decolonizing nations, the future leaders of Zambia first had to negotiate for independence. While the path to independence for Northern Rhodesia was not as violence-ridden as many other African nations, it did hold the undertones of the regional and international conflicts and development struggles to come.

Specifically, this chapter focuses on the demise of the Central African Federation, the major reason behind Zambia’s economic development issues after independence. The close ties developed between Northern and Southern Rhodesia, with the major economic and business benefit being towards the mini metropole in Salisbury, were impossible to simply discard after Southern Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. Yet the independence process went on without the future in mind, as Great Britain’s economic situation caused it to move towards decolonization throughout the

continent. Several years of negotiations in Zambia were not without violence and conflict, but overall the deconstruction of the Central African Federation and the creation of the new state of Zambia went smoothly.

The United National Independence Party (UNIP), clearly set to win the majority at independence, began to develop its ideological foundation. However, as in many other nationalist movements in Africa, the focus had only been on the ideology of anti-colonialism and majority rule, with little attention paid to the development of the political and economic policies to be instituted after independence had been won. UNIP had two choices, a western development ideology or a communist one. However, what developed was a middle-way, through the personal philosophies of the first president, Kenneth Kaunda, known as “humanism.” Humanism influenced not only Zambia’s domestic economic development agenda, but also its foreign policy, focusing on non-alignment through the eradication of all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

Chapter 2, “Developing Diplomacy,” examines the development of international relations for both Zambia and China. Zambian leaders began to develop foreign policy in very practical terms several years prior to the granting of independence, on October 24, 1964. Non-alignment stood out in this early policy, as Kaunda and UNIP did not just develop relations with Great Britain and the West, but also with the controversial communist nation of the People’s Republic of China. China’s leaders in the 1950s also developed a foreign policy that reflected its ideological foundation. This policy, rather than being based on economics, as seen in contemporary relations, centered on politics.

In particular, China developed a foreign policy methodology that focused on strategic self-depreciation in order to align itself with the third world. China through its participation in conferences such as the Bandung Conference of 1955, and in the creation of organizations such as the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (A.A.P.S.O.), demonstrated determination to become a leader of the third world and as a member of the Non-Alignment Movement. Throughout this development motivations were clear: China sought international diplomatic recognition, specifically in the United Nations.

Whether at Bandung or through the A.A.P.S.O, China focused on the issue of Taiwan and the recognition of Peking over Taipei. The same was true in individual interactions with specific nations, including Zambia, beginning in 1962. From the very first visit of a Chinese delegate to Zambia, over two years prior to independence, the emphasis was on the recognition of the People's Republic of China over the Republic of China. For the Zambian government, in 1962, the focus was on the independence process. However, during a return visit of the Chinese delegate in 1964, the focus shifted more towards economic development. Both Zambian and Chinese leaders had distinct goals in mind for relations, which manifested in the years after independence.

It is necessary to look at regional issues in order to better understand the unique context in which Zambian leaders found themselves in the years following independence. Chapter 3 examines the importance of regional issues, and specifically Rhodesian U.D.I., for Zambian development, "The Rhodesian Situation." While Zambian foreign relations covered the scope of the globe, regional relations truly had the most profound impact on

Zambia, politically, economically, and socially. As a landlocked nation surrounded on almost all sides by conflict, the new Zambian government was forced to continually negotiate for and with its neighbors. Violence spilled over from the Congo. Routes for imports and exports were blocked by the Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola. Refugees and freedom fighters sought refuge throughout Zambia. And the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia majorly impacted all aspects of Zambian government and Zambian life.

The most important colonial legacy for Zambia was not, in fact, truly colonial. The Central African Federation ensured the close linkages, politically, economically, and socially, between Northern and Southern Rhodesia. The colonial history of Southern Rhodesia, which was tied more closely to the British South Africa Company and settler rule rather than British colonial administration, ensured that calls for autonomy were replaced by calls for independence from the white minority population. Although the immediate reaction of the British towards U.D.I. was rejection, the Zambian reaction was much more complex, due to its many ties with its southern neighbor.

Socially, Zambia shared ethnic groups and families with Rhodesia. As in the case of all borders in Africa, their innate artificiality created fluidity with little regard for the need for passports or diplomacy to transport medical patients. Politically, the Zambian government attempted to maintain peaceful relations with the Southern Rhodesian government, and in particular the volatile President, Ian Smith, although their support of Zimbabwean freedom fighters made this peace difficult to maintain in the years after

1965. Most important, however, were the economic ties that bound the two former members of the Central African Federation. In terms of both imports and exports, Zambia relied on trade with Southern Rhodesia, as well as Rhodesia Railways as its route out to the sea.

While economic independence was a goal it was not yet a reality for the newly independent nation. Consequently, economic sanctions quickly became a major international political issue, as calls from Great Britain, and then from the United Nations, threatened to put Zambia in a very precarious position. Contingency planning with the British only proved to be mildly helpful, and it was clear that different measures, both politically and economically, would have to be taken by Zambian leaders. The situation in Rhodesia was to continue on throughout the 1960s, and it was up to leaders to determine the best course of action to ensure its economic development.

In Chapter 4, “Trade, Aid, and Non-Alignment,” I examine how the dual policy of seeking and promoting trade and aid was influenced by the Zambian government’s policy of non-alignment, as well as the politics of the Cold War. The regional situation, particularly in Southern Rhodesia, also played an important role in the decisions the Zambian government would make about its economic policy. The Transitional and First National Development Plans laid out the course of action, with a primary concern being import and export control to mitigate the damage caused by U.D.I. Humanism was the guiding ideological premise behind the development plans, drawing ideas from both western and communist philosophies regarding development.

Turning paper-based plans into reality was a different matter. Trade and aid during the Cold War was heavily weighted on political alignment. Yet the nations in the position with the most power to be of assistance required much more than those that identified as non-aligned. Zambian leaders, therefore, turned to the international community for assistance. As a non-aligned nation in the heart of the Cold War, Zambia was forced to be interested not only in its own political struggle, but also that of nations throughout Africa and throughout the world. However, participation in international organizations, such as the United Nations, the Organization for African Unity, and the Non-Alignment Movement, was not just limited to negotiations surrounding political liberation. International organizations also focused on economic development, seen specifically in Zambia's hosting of the 1967 Copper Conference and the creation of the Inter-Governmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC).

Great Britain, the United States, the World Bank, and other smaller nations, such as Japan and the Scandinavian countries, played a role in Zambia's economic development through aid and technical assistance. Trade remained unbalanced, however, and therefore the Zambian government equally sought to develop trade relations with nations outside the western bloc. As well as pursuing opportunities close to home through the Eastern African Economic Community, the government also developed close economic ties through both trade and aid with communist nations, including the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and China. Aid from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia focused on technical assistance and cultural diplomacy. This aid, much like that from the West,

focused heavily on ideology and a concern over the ideological leanings of the Zambian government.

China, on the other hand, played a much more important role in Zambia in terms of economic development, in part because it also focused on trade relations, as well as grants of aid and assistance. Chinese trade agreements, while obviously biased towards ensuring Chinese goals were met, focused more on the political, rather than the economic, objectives of the Chinese government. Yet, while trade delegations and agreements were important, the most important negotiations for Zambian leaders were for the creation of the TAZARA railway.

Chapter 5, “Negotiating TAZARA,” describes the negotiations undertaken by the Zambian government to create a transport route to serve as an alternative to Rhodesia Railways. From independence, a major concern for the government of landlocked Zambia was the creation of transportation routes. With the declaration of U.D.I., it became even more imperative as Zambia lost its route out via Southern Rhodesia. The most obvious alternative was to take goods through Tanzania, as any routes through Portuguese controlled areas were out of the question. President Kaunda began negotiations with Nyerere, who had much different ideas about where to find the finances and support to build a Tanzania-Zambia railway line.

Nyerere, an openly socialist leader, approached the Chinese immediately, but Kaunda kept his previous negotiations with China quiet. However, after the completion of the Maxwell Stamp Report, created from a survey of the proposed line, it became clear

that any hope of receiving the aid from the West was finished. Initial negotiations with the Chinese, still behind closed doors with Zambian leaders, led to an outcry in the western press. However, despite the reaction, a deal was signed between Zambia, Tanzania, and China in Peking in September 1967.

The reaction in the West, as well as in China, demonstrated a new stage of the Cold War in Africa. Rather than focusing on violence and political liberation in decolonizing African nations, which were anything but cold, this was a true example of a cold war. Although the ultimate goals for Zambia were economic, it was forced to use politics to achieve its objective. Likewise, for the Chinese the goals were largely political, but economic aid and technical assistance were the necessary means to achieve its aim. Both nations, however, were successful, and the Zambian government, always committed to non-alignment, maintained relations with the West as well.

CHAPTER ONE: A DELIBERATE INDEPENDENCE

“For a long time I have led my people in their shouts of kwacha [the dawn]. We have been shouting it in the darkness; now there is the grey light of dawn on the horizon and I know that Zambia will be free.”

— Kenneth Kaunda¹

At independence, the new Zambian government was faced with many important decisions. The most important of these decisions, and the decision that would influence all others, was the political ideology that the United National Independence Party, and, in turn, Zambia, would adopt. In the Cold War, political ideology was paramount to how countries negotiated not only their foreign relations, but also how they managed internal politics and economic development. Both the western and communist nations had ideas on how to run their own countries, as well as how the countries of the newly decolonized, developing world should develop.

First, however, Northern Rhodesia had to reach independence, a long process that contained the undertones of the regional and international conflicts and development struggles to come. While colonialism can be blamed on development issues in all African

¹ Kenneth Kaunda, *Zambia Shall Be Free* (London: Heinemann, 1962).

nations,² in Zambia in particular much of the blame can be placed on the creation, administration, and demise of the Central African Federation. More so than in any other British colonies, the white settler population had a profound control on government, disrupting politics, economics, and social life in Northern Rhodesian, and hinting to the future of a Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Rhodesia.

The Influence of the Federation

The creation of the colonial state in Northern Rhodesia, particularly in the early years of the 20th century, looks much like its other British African colonial counterparts. However, there was also a unique nature to its administration that did not just represent British policy.³ Specifically, in early years, Northern Rhodesia was more influenced by Cape Town and the British South Africa Company (BSAC) than it was by the Colonial Office of Great Britain. Like the rest of British southern Africa, there was considerably more white settlement, and consequently, more white influence over political affairs. However, after the Colonial Office took control of Northern Rhodesian affairs in the late 1940s, there was a shift in emphasis, seen notably in the shift from the capital at Livingstone to the new capital of Lusaka. In addition, after World War II, the historical

² See, for instance, Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1981); and A. Adu Boahen, *African Perspectives on Colonialism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).

³ See Richard Hall, *Zambia 1890-1964: The Colonial Period* (London: Longman, 1976), vi-vii.

relationship between the two Rhodesias found new emphasis, and the Central African Federation was created in 1953.⁴

The purpose of the Central African Federation was to create a “partnership” not only between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland, but also to create a partnership between whites and blacks.⁵ The first petitions for federation were made by white civil servants in 1949, particularly from Southern Rhodesia. The overwhelming support was only from the white minority, however, with much African opposition, led by Henry Nkumbula, leader of the African National Congress (ANC) in Northern Rhodesia. This was understandably so, as one of the nominated members for “African Interests,” (intended to be used to represent the African “vote” in the Northern Rhodesian cabinet), John Moffat, claimed, “This is the time, above all others, for us as Europeans to justify our claims to the right of leadership, and to prove our belief in British principles of justice and fair dealing by declaring in the clearest terms our intentions regarding the

⁴ For more on Zambia during the colonial period, see B. J. Phiri, *A Political History of Zambia: From Colonial Rule to the Third Republic, 1890-2001* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2006); Richard Hall, *Zambia* (New York: Praeger, 1966); Eugenia W. Herbert, *Twilight on the Zambezi: Late Colonialism in Central Africa* (Hounds-mills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002); and Martin Chanock, *Law, Custom, and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

⁵ The concept of “partnership” was very much engrained in the rhetoric surrounding the Federation. T. R. M. Creighton explores it at greater length, in particular concerning Southern Rhodesia, in *The Anatomy of Partnership: Southern Rhodesia and the Central African Federation* (London: Faber and Faber, 1960).

Africans among whom we live.”⁶ Nkumbula encouraged the chiefs to adopt a policy of non-cooperation, but the plans became known and the Northern Rhodesian government was quick to take counter-measures. All black civil servants and employees of many large companies had their jobs threatened if they rebelled. Consequently, the “national prayer” rebellion, as it was called by Nkumbula, was not a success in immediate terms, but did pave the way for a greater autonomy for the Northern Rhodesian state in the Federation, as well as the path for independence.⁷

While the political and social situation remained tenuous, the economic situation was strong, with the domestic output of the Federation rising from £265 million in 1953 to £369 million in 1956. This was largely due to copper prices, which, while on the decline, had not yet negatively affected the Federation. Whites especially felt the benefit of this early economic boom, and settlement increased steadily during this period. The federal government was divided into central and territorial governments, with some powers, such as those for education and agriculture, divided between European and African. Federal control also extended to defense, taxation, the postal services, and immigration.

The influence of Southern Rhodesia over the CAF cannot be overemphasized. Salisbury acted as the Federation’s capital and served as a mini metropole for which the

⁶ Hall, *Zambia 1890-1964*, 104.

⁷ An excellent biography of Nkumbula, and a good contextualization of the period, is Giacomo Macola’s *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

entire Federation existed to support. Consequently, Salisbury grew industrially and commercially at a breakneck pace during the CAF years, and many companies, including those from Northern Rhodesia, moved their headquarters there. Furthermore, Southern Rhodesia also received a disproportionate amount of the federal revenue. Tensions ran high, especially concerning the controversial Kariba Dam project, which served as more of a piece de resistance for the Federation rather than the most sound economic and engineering plan.⁸ By 1995, even the politically neutral Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir Arthur Benson, began to complain about Federal control and the closed door, secret politics of the Federal government. Controversies also abounded between Great Britain and the Central African Federation, as the Federation petitioned for greater autonomy and a higher status within the Commonwealth.

Within Northern Rhodesia domestic tensions also continued to increase, with the ANC increasingly upping their protests against white minority rule. Led by Nkumbula, insisting in 1955 that “the fight against Federation is still on,”⁹ these protests, while not

⁸ The Kariba Dam, built from 1955 to 1959, was a major feat of engineering and is still one of the largest dams in the world. However, everything, from the economics, to the engineering, to the displacement of large numbers of people, caused great controversy, historically and today. For more on the dam, see David Armine Howarth, *The Shadow of the Dam* (New York: Macmillan, 1961); and Elizabeth Colson, *The Social Consequences of Resettlement; The Impact of the Kariba Resettlement Upon the Gwembe Tonga* (Manchester: Published on behalf of the Institute for African Studies, University of Zambia by Manchester University Press, 1971).

⁹ Hall, *Zambia 1890-1964*, 124.

always outwardly political, as in the case of labor strikes on the Copperbelt,¹⁰ leading to a state of emergency in September 1956, they did have the undertones of political dissidence. Kenneth Kaunda, the future president of independent Zambia, first came to the spotlight as the ANC was protesting the creation of the Central African Federation.

Kenneth Kaunda was born on April 28, 1924 in the Northern Province of Zambia. The eighth child of schoolteachers, he began his education in a Mission School in Lubwe (where he met his friend and future vice president, Simon Kapwepwe) and completed his secondary education at Munali Secondary School. After completing a teacher training course in Munali, Kaunda returned to Lubwe as a teacher, also serving as an athletic coach and eventual headmaster of the school. In 1946 he married Betty Banda, with whom he raised nine children. After serving briefly as a teacher in Tanganyika (Tanzania), Kaunda returned to the Zambian Copperbelt to teach and serve as a welfare assistant at the Nchanga mine.

Kaunda and Kapwepwe, along with John Sokoni, began a farm in Lubwe in 1949. During this period they became active in the Chinsali African Welfare Association, the local branch of the Northern Rhodesia Africa Congress. Kaunda was elected secretary of the organization in 1950, thus beginning his political career. He served as the district organizer as the Congress became the African National Congress and was eventually elected Organizing Secretary of the whole of Northern Province. Kaunda's political

¹⁰ The Copperbelt region of Zambia is located in the northern part of the country, along the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo. Many mines, including copper but also nickel, cobalt, gold, and other minerals, are located in this resource rich region.

career quickly developed, and he became the Secretary-General of the ANC in August 1953, second only in command to its President, Henry Nkumbula. Two months after his election Kaunda began editing the *Congress News*, for which he was arrested in November 1953. While Kaunda was not imprisoned in 1953, his possession of banned literature in 1955 led to a two month incarceration.¹¹

The failure to stop the creation of Federation and the national prayer rebellion led to a cleaning house of the ANC in Northern Rhodesia. With only Nkumbula remaining, Kenneth Kaunda was elected as a senior official by an overwhelming majority. Nkumbula and Kaunda increased their political control over the ANC and their presence internationally, attending a Commonwealth conference by invitation of the Labour Party in 1957. This journey to London represented a huge landmark for Kaunda personally, being his first time out of Africa, and for Northern Rhodesian independence generally, as Nkumbula began to fall out of favor with both African and those in London, being replaced by the young and charismatic Kaunda.¹²

Kaunda and Nkumbula officially split with the creation of the Zambian African National Congress (ZANC) on October 26, 1958, at Broken Hill. Immediately after its

¹¹ It was during his imprisonment that he began his strict lifestyle of no meat, alcohol, or tobacco, for which he was later famous

¹² A good biography of Kaunda during these early years is Fergus Macpherson's *Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia: The Times and the Man* (Lusaka: Oxford University Press, 1974). On Kaunda personally and as a political figure, see also, Richard Hall, *Kaunda, Founder of Zambia* (London: Longmans, 1965); John Charles Hatch, *Two African Statesmen: Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania* (Chicago: Regnery, 1976); and Kenneth D. Kaunda and Colin Morris, *A Humanist in Africa; Letters to Colin M. Morris from Kenneth D. Kaunda* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1966).

creation, more than 1,000 ANC members traded in their cards to join ZANC and unanimously elected Kaunda their president. Not having any funding, the leaders of the newly formed ZANC, including Simon Kapwepwe as treasurer-general and Munu Sipalo as secretary-general, still managed to gain widespread support throughout the northern and eastern regions, while the European press doubted Kaunda's potential. From 1959, amid the increasing boycotts and protests of the ANC and ZANC, it became clear that the Federation was in its decline. Continual states of emergency kept the Federalists on the defensive, and the dissolution became a matter of timing. Kaunda's appeals for non-violent protest turned into two months of violence following the government dissolution of ZANC, and four Africans were shot dead after wounding the district commissioner and his assistant on Chilbui Island. In the aftermath of the incident, the British government responded by banning UNIP and arresting Kaunda, on March 12, 1959. He was sentenced to nine months in prison in Kabompo, in a remote portion of northwestern Zambia.

With Kaunda in prison in the aftermath of the riots and increasing confusion within ZANC, it was apparent changes had to be made. In June 1959, two new parties were created, the African National Independence Party and the United National Freedom Party, which soon merged into the United National Independence Party (UNIP). Originally, UNIP was led by former ZANC vice president, Paul Kalichini, but Kaunda replaced him after he was released from prison in January 1960. January 1960 also brought greater changes in Africa as Harold Macmillan made his "winds of change"

speech in Capetown at the end of his Africa tour. The process of independence was about to begin.

A Deliberate Independence

After the first national conference of UNIP at the end of 1960, there were a number of issues Kaunda and his party had to address before becoming the majority holder of power in Northern Rhodesia. While UNIP possessed great influence and control in Northern and Luapula provinces, and in particular on the Copperbelt, the ANC still reigned in Southern and Central provinces, and loyalties were divided in Eastern province. Concurrently, while UNIP held the loyalty of the educated elite throughout Northern Rhodesia, they still had to win the support of the chiefs, who were concerned that African nationalism would circumvent their power.

Yet building up support was just one of UNIP's major problems following its creation. The string of violent protests which created it produced an air of tension that Kaunda immediately sought to dissipate. Despite Kaunda's repeated calls for non-violence, the violent attacks continued to escalate. The confusion was exacerbated by the fact that much of the UNIP leadership continued to travel internationally to gain support for the African nationalist cause. However, the combined issues of increasing violence and greater international support led to the announcement that constitutional changes were to take place in Northern Rhodesia. This was a huge victory not just for Africans in Northern Rhodesia, but also for all African nationalist movements. As Kaunda

proclaimed in his autobiography, “For a long time I have led my people in their shots of kwacha [the dawn]. We have been shouting it in the darkness; now there is the grey light of dawn on the horizon and I know that Zambia will be free.”¹³ The African majority had stood up not just to colonial rule, but also to a deeply engrained white settler population. Kaunda’s leadership was strengthened, and calls for “independence by October” began to have real meaning.¹⁴

Independence would in fact come in an October, but not that October, as the constitutional conference in London made slow headway. Outrage from the white community in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, as well as European mine workers on the Copperbelt, led to increasing tensions within the colonial office and Federation government. In addition Africans held protests around the country. By early 1961 military mobilization was initiated by Federation Prime Minister Sir Roy Welensky, who later argued that it was not to fight the British, but rather to ensure security should Congolese president Patrice Lumumba cross the border. Five years before Southern Rhodesia did in fact declare a Unilateral Declaration of Independence it seemed possible that the Central African Federation could as well. However, Welensky was not prepared militarily for such a conflict and tensions died down.

¹³ Kenneth Kaunda, *Zambia Shall Be Free* (London: Heinemann, 1962).

¹⁴ See Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar, and Giacomo Macola, *Living the End of Empire: Politics and Society in Late Colonial Zambia* (Leiden: Brill, 2011); and Robert I. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa; The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

For UNIP and the ANC, it seemed things were going their way, and they began to focus on the new constitution. The primary concern was the balance of seats, which in a parliamentary system, as was adopted in the Federation, could make a huge difference in all aspects of politics. What came out of the Colonial Office in London was complicated and disheartening. The percentages necessary for Africans to have an influence were all but impossible. Welensky whole heartedly agreed with the new constitution, but Africans from both UNIP and the ANC turned to violence, despite Kaunda's continued calls for non-violent protest. Yet violence was again the pressure that the British government needed to give in: on September 13 they issued a statement against the vehement protests of Welensky that it would be willing to compromise on the constitution. African opposition had won yet again.

In turn, UNIP had won again, as more and more Africans saw it as an inevitability that UNIP was to be an integral part of the future of Northern Rhodesia. The party, despite having hundreds of its members in prison from the recent violent protests, boosted a high level of organization and sophistication with a central committee, 24 regional branches (with many local branches), youth's and women's brigades, and numerous international representatives. The party also worked hard to earn the respect and vote of not just Africans, but also Europeans and Asians. Yet the white community remained essentially loyal to the United Federation Party and Welensky, as the UFP campaigned hard to portray UNIP as something to be feared. The party was also running out of money.

UNIP was further challenged when the ANC, under the recently released from prison Nkumbula, teamed up with the UFP. However, after the election, no party won a clear majority and the country was strongly divided geographically. The final counts on November 3rd had UNIP gaining 14 seats, with the UFP gaining 15 and the ANC 5. What was particularly unclear was if the alliance would remain intact between the UFP and the ANC, giving them a majority in the government. However, fundamentally, the two parties had nothing in common.¹⁵ It made much more sense to Nkumbula, and both parties' members, for an alliance to be formed between UNIP and the ANC against their common enemy of the Federation. Nkumbula waited until after the by-elections on December 10, in a hope to gain more seats and therefore a greater majority, before beginning negotiations with Kaunda over the division of power within the new coalition government.

In the new government the ministries were divided between UNIP and the ANC, with a constitutionally dictated two Europeans to serve as ministers. Yet this division of responsibility did not make it any easier for the two parties to get along. Phiri argues that “Nkumbula’s continued flirtations with UFP gave UNIP ammunition to declare him a sell-out to the African cause.”¹⁶ Nkumbula also fought dissension within his own ANC ranks, and the people fought amongst themselves throughout Northern Rhodesia. Kaunda pushed for new elections by the end of 1963, as the Federation collapsed and the British

¹⁵ See Hall, *Zambia 1890-1964*, 167.

¹⁶ Phiri, *A Political History of Zambia*, 114.

seemed increasingly inclined to move Northern Rhodesia towards independence.¹⁷ The collapse of the Central African Federation had very important consequences for UNIP power, as many businessmen saw the need to align themselves with the inevitable majority. It also highlighted the important connections from a business and economic perspective between Northern and Southern Rhodesia, which was to have profound consequences after the declaration of Rhodesian U.D.I.

By the elections of January 1964, these convergent factors ensured the ushering in of Zambia's (as it was quickly becoming commonly called) first all-African cabinet, and Kenneth Kaunda, at the young age of 39, its first premier, on January 23, 1964. Independence was planned for October 24 of that year, and London hosted an independence conference to discuss the process and a new constitution in May.

Developing Ideology

With an eye on independence and a clear majority in government, the time had come for the United National Independence Party to assert its political ideology. Yet, like many other nationalist movements in Africa, the focus had only been on the ideology of anti-colonialism and majority rule, with little attention paid to the development of the political and economic policies to be instituted after independence had been won. For each new Africa leader, very important decisions had to be made about economic and

¹⁷ For more on the collapse of the Central Africa Federation, see Henry Franklin, *Unholy Wedlock; The Failure of the Central African Federation* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1963).

political policy, including not just domestic policy but also international relations. And for almost all African nations, this occurred within the climate of the Cold War.

Therefore, at independence, UNIP, like the other parties throughout Africa, essentially had two distinct ideological tracts to choose from. While this is true at the most basic level, in reality the choices were much more complex, with divisions within both the western and communist ideological camps. Yet to choose one of these ideologies was to choose a foreign policy, an alignment, and a very distinct place in international affairs. What UNIP chose was to have lasting effects on the political development of Zambia, but also in turn the economic development, as will be demonstrated throughout the rest of this work.

No other political institution has had such a profound effect on Zambia as the United National Independence Party (UNIP). From independence in 1964 until the first multi-party democratic elections in 1991, UNIP essentially remained the sole power holder in Zambian politics.¹⁸ And the sole power holder of UNIP was Kenneth Kaunda. Therefore, what was adopted was Kenneth Kaunda's personal philosophy of Humanism. Humanism was influenced by the control of the colonial past, as well as competition amongst the various -isms of the Cold War era. It was, for Kaunda and UNIP, a "guiding

¹⁸ It was not until Zambia's Second Republic, in 1972, that all political parties except UNIP were banned. However, from 1962 onwards, and especially after independence in 1964, UNIP had a vast majority of seats and essentially all political power.

ideology in our revolutionary task of nation-building” and a “standard against which we measure our work, institutions and attitudes.”¹⁹

This humanism was not the humanism the West was familiar with, although there were some common elements. Humanism, in the Renaissance sense of the term, placed value on human beings, much like Kaunda’s version, but also on rational thought above faith. In two books, *A Humanist in Africa* (1966) and *Humanism in Zambia and Its Implementation* (1967), and numerous speeches, Kaunda laid out his philosophy. Kaunda’s Humanism did not the existence or importance of a Christian God, and in fact the Christian religion remained enormously important to him and many Zambian citizens, but rather focused on “man.”

The roots of this philosophy of humanism developed over an extended period, and they truly represented the non-violent, man-centered world view of Kaunda above all else. In 1963, Kaunda was elected President of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa. His concern for liberation, both in Southern Africa and internationally, is reflected in his political ideology. However, in this he emphasized a non-violent approach to liberation, in keeping with the focus on man as the central element in society. In a 1963 speech, Kaunda argued for non-violence, saying, “It is political, economic, social and spiritual. It brings man, as an individual living in society, back into the centre of things. Nothing is more necessary, for we are now in danger of

¹⁹ National Archives of Zambia (NAZ), FA 1-1-389, “Participation in Humanism Radio Discussion Programmes,” *The Nation and Humanism*, July 21, 1972.

getting so wrapped up in machines, organizations and plans that man who is the purpose of it all is treated like an instrument. Man must realize his own importance, both as an individual and as a member of society.”²⁰

Also central to the ideology of Humanism is the government’s responsibility to ensure economic development, and therefore government’s control over key economic industries. While not totally socialist, and rather rooted in Kaunda’s fundamentalist Christian beliefs and indigenous African traditions, it did contain many socialist elements. However, much like Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, whose philosophy of *Ujamaa* dictated Tanzanian political and economic ideology in the immediate postcolonial period, Kaunda’s Humanism critiqued both capitalism and communism.²¹ He also adopted elements of capitalism and communism in the First National Development Plan, as will be discussed further in Chapter 4.

The full fruition of Humanism would not come until several years after Zambian independence, particularly after the creation of the one-party state and Zambia’s Second Republic. It was then that Kaunda’s approach to the Zambian economy took on a more leftist-nationalist stance that was not readily apparent during the early years. However, Humanism, even in its early form, encompassed the whole of political, economic, and social policy for Zambia, and influenced both Zambia’s domestic development agenda, as

²⁰ Macpherson, *Kenneth Kaunda*, 163.

²¹ For a further discussion of Humanism, see Timothy Kandeke, *Fundamentals of Zambian Humanism* (Lusaka: NECZAM, 1977).

well as its foreign policy. The Principles of Zambian Humanism were listed by Kaunda as:

- (i) Recognition of Man as central in all that we think, say and do; as being above institutions and all human activities therefore to centre around Man;
- (ii) Promotion of hard-work, self-reliance and co-operative spirit and provision of equal opportunity for all people in all walks of life;
- (iii) Promotion of efficient production and equitable distribution of the wealth of the country, in the best interest of the people;
- (iv). Working for the eradication of all forms of exploitation of one Man by another;
- (v). Maintenance of fundamental freedoms and human rights;
- (vi). Promotion of worthy Zambian customs and cultures;
- (vii). Abolition of all forms of discrimination and segregation and fight against individualism, tribalism and provincialism;
- (viii). Installing a high spirit of patriotism and the awareness of Zambian nationhood;
- (ix). Eradication of all forms of colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, racialism and fight for African unity;

(x). Recognition of the Party as the main institution in the service of the people.²²

The Zambian government also sought to make it clear that the political ideology governing its foreign policy was that of “Eradication of all forms of colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, racialism,” or, in the terms of the Cold War, non-alignment.²³ This clarity was sought not only in official diplomatic negotiations and in the press, but also in its correspondence with the international public.

An example that exemplifies and elucidates on this ideological link between Humanism and non-alignment is a story from February 1967. Thomas R. Lippert, a high school senior in New Ulm, Minnesota, wrote to Kenneth Kaunda requesting information on Zambia, and in particular its relations with the United States. The Foreign Minister at the time, M. C. Chona, replied, explaining that in Zambia’s short history the United States had supplied experts in various fields to assist in national development, and provided scholarships for students to study in America. However, regarding the Four Year Development Plan that had been recently launched, Chona stated that they had not received any of the support from the United States they had hoped for but that it was too soon to give Lippert a summary of United States aid towards Zambia. Regarding Zambian foreign policy and its international relations, Chona described Zambian policy

²² NAZ, FA 1-1-389, “The Humanism Week,” The Nation and Humanism, October 10, 1972.

²³ Ibid.

as being one of “positive non-alignment and non-interference in the internal affairs of other independent countries.”²⁴ He also emphasized that Zambia was an active member of the international community through their participation in the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and the Organization for African Unity.

Non-alignment did not just apply to political policy, however, but economic policy as well. During a seminar on Humanism in the copper belt town of Kitwe, Kaunda replied to a question on how the ideology of Humanism related to Zambia’s “mixed” political economy. Borrowing from Chapter 5 of his book on Humanism, Kaunda explained that Zambia was “going to borrow good things from both the capitalists and the communists.”²⁵ The President pointed out that in the United States there was state-owned enterprise, and private enterprise in China, as well as a Fiat factory being opened in Russia. To him, “all this showed that although big powers did at times take a strong stand on certain issues they were in fact doing exactly what Zambia was doing by borrowing what is good from east and west.”²⁶

²⁴ NAZ, FA 1-1-88, M. C. Chona, “Letter to Thomas R. Lippert, from Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” April 3, 1967.

²⁵ UNIP, 7/22/5, “President Kaunda Reiterates Zambia's Choice of Mixed Political Economy,” Press Releases, January 10, 1968.

²⁶ Ibid.

Conclusion

Although peaceful and deliberate in comparison to the independence process in many other African nations, the decolonization of Zambia still contained the foundations for its postcolonial development, as well as the undertones of the problems to come. The rise of Kenneth Kaunda to power was humble; however, it was also absolute. Consequently, from the inception of the United National Independence Party until Kaunda was voted out of office in 1991, his ideas and philosophies became synonymous with that of the nation. Specifically, the ideology of Humanism was the guiding force behind the Zambian government's approach to economic development, as well as its foreign policy.

The period prior to 1964 also hinted to the problems that were to come. Zambia's unique colonial legacy, particularly its inclusion in the Central African Federation, greatly influenced its postcolonial development. Rather than existing to benefit the colonial metropole in Whitehall, Zambia existed to benefit the regional metropole of Salisbury. This in and of itself had economic implications after the dissolution of the CAF. However, after the declaration of Rhodesian U.D.I., these implications were to become critical for the Zambian state, especially its economic development. It was through foreign policy and specifically its relations with China, where we now turn, that the Zambian government was able to mitigate damage from U.D.I. and ensure its economic development.

CHAPTER TWO: ESTABLISHING DIPLOMACY

“There is no doubt that this mutual aid and economic co-operation will continuously expand in scope and increase in quantity”

- Zhou En-Lai¹

Concurrently with the development of an economic and political ideological basis, Kenneth Kaunda and the United National Independence Party also sought to develop international relations. Too often in the study of decolonizing Africa and post-independence African nations the focus is on domestic issues, rather than those related to foreign policy. And, when the focus is on international actors, agency is always given to the colonial power, or the neo-colonial aggressor. What Kaunda and UNIP proved, however, is that diplomatic relations could be established on more balanced terms, and that the political parties instigating for nationalism, also focused on the future of international relations for the new nation.

For the Zambian government, the obvious first place to determine a policy for diplomacy was with the West, specifically Great Britain, the United States, and the United Nations. What is more surprising though was the attention paid to the

¹ Zhou En-Lai, *China and the Asian-African Conference: Documents* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1979).

development of relations with the controversial nation of the People's Republic of China. Rather than being economic, as in contemporary relations, China's interest in African nations in the 1960s was largely political. As a communist nation, China also had to determine its own foreign policy in relation to its ideological basis. What developed was a form of strategic self-depreciation, in which China sought to place itself at the level of the third world, so as to negotiate for its international legitimacy, specifically at the United Nations.

The Evolution of Chinese Foreign Policy towards Africa

On October 1, 1949, the new People's Republic of China was faced with a huge domestic agenda. The need for political and economic stability at home did not mean that China could ignore foreign policy, however, with geopolitical concerns immediately becoming a priority. China's foreign policy in its early years, namely from 1949 to 1954, focused on its neighbors and was a much different type of foreign policy than would develop in subsequent years towards Africa. The first major foreign policy concern of China was Korea, with the war in Korea breaking out on June 25, 1950, less than a year after the Communist Party won control of the government.

In his book *Mao's China and the Cold War*, Chen Jian discusses China's role in the Korean War. Chen explains that the impetus for the war lay solely on the shoulders of Kim Il-sung, with the Soviet Union reluctantly providing assistance as Stalin feared a direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States on the Korean

peninsula. Stalin encouraged Kim to request assistance from Beijing so as to share the responsibility, but Mao and the CCP were hesitant. In the end, however, Chen explains that Mao came to Kim's assistance "because Mao and his comrades were eager to revive China's central position on the international scene through supporting revolutionary movements in other countries (especially in East Asia)."²

China's involvement in the Korean War was directly hinged on support from the Soviet Union. However, after the United States became involved, as Stalin had feared they would, Soviet support quickly dwindled. This was the first major test of the Sino-Soviet alliance, a relationship that would continually be tried until the eventual split. In the end though, China's decision to assist Kim gave Stalin a more favorable opinion of Mao's CCP and he "became more willing to commit Soviet financial and technological resources to China's economic reconstruction."³ It is clear that immediate foreign policy concerns for China were directly related to domestic concerns, including fostering its relationship with the Soviet Union for strategic and economic motivations, as well as regional concerns over the stability and support for revolution in East Asia. However, China's early foreign policy did not directly translate into its foreign policy towards the developing world and Africa in particular, although some motivations remained the same.

² Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 54.

³ Ibid., 60.

Strategic Self-Depreciation

The complex geopolitical situation of the Cold War is a poignant example of the importance of self-identification, as for the first time nation-states were categorized into worlds. In 1952, economist and demographer Alfred Sauvy published an article in the French magazine *L'Observateur* coining the term “third world.” Sauvy used the term to refer to those countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America that, as they achieved political independence from colonial powers, had not yet determined a political alignment with the “first world” of the United States and Western Europe or the “second world” of the Soviet Union. This indirect reference to the third estate of the French Revolution implied that the third world was taken advantage of much like the peasantry was in eighteenth century France.

The images that the United States and Soviet Union portrayed to the rest of the world during this time were paramount. Perhaps the best example of this image game can be seen in the “Kitchen Debate” at the opening of the 1959 American National Exhibition in Moscow. Here, the United States strove to be viewed as more progressive than the Soviet Union in an example of the great debate between capitalism versus socialism. No matter what was happening internally in each of these countries, each sought to appear to be more economically viable and politically stable than the other. However, China chose a much different approach in the image game of the Cold War. The situation in the late 1950s and early 1960s was one of newfound importance, which focused on the United States and the west as the enemy, while maintaining a precarious, yet at this point still

largely positive relationship with the Soviet Union. Therefore, in a form of strategic self-depreciation, separate from its desire to once again be a leader in East Asia, China sought to align itself with the developing nations of the third world.

The Bandung Conference of 1955

The new members of the third world did not necessarily want to align themselves politically with the United States or the Soviet Union. The third world self-identified as non-aligned nations, and in April of 1954, Indonesia proposed that a conference of Asian and African nations convene to discuss issues concerning these nations. The Bandung Conference, which took place from the April 18 to April 24, 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia, was the first large scale meeting of Africa and Asian nations, many of which were newly independent and some still under colonial rule. In total, twenty-nine countries sent delegates, many of which represented newly independent nations, such as India and Pakistan, but some of which also represented nations that had not yet gained full independence, such as the Gold Coast, soon to be the independent nation of Ghana.

The agenda of the conference was part of a greater movement culminated in the conference and the subsequent formation of the Non-Alignment Movement. In his description of the proceedings of the conference, Secretary General of the Indian Council for World Affairs A. Appadorai stated the conferences aims as:

- (1) Economic Co-operation- It was understood that this would include a discussion on the peaceful uses of atomic energy;

- (2) Cultural Co-operation;
- (3) Human Rights and Self-Determination- Under this item, the questions of Palestine and racialism would be discussed;
- (4) Problems of Dependent Peoples- This would include a discussion on Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco; and
- (5) Promotion of World Peace and Co-operation- The question of weapons of mass destruction and disarmament would be discussed under this item.⁴

More broadly, the conference had the implicit goals of creating a coalition against imperialism. With the creation of the United Nations charter and the establishment of the principle of “national self-determination,” it seemed inevitable that the colonies of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean would eventually be granted sovereignty. However, the political realities of the Cold War left many of the newly independent nations wary of the role that the United States or the Soviet Union hoped to play in their independence.

Therefore, while the Bandung Conference was deemed a success and a “milestone on the road to peace and progress”⁵ in its achievements of its stated aims, its legacy was the birth of the ideas that eventually formed the Non-Alignment Movement. The idea for the movement came out of speech given by Indian Prime Minister Nehru in New Delhi, in which he laid out the “Pancha Shila,” or Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence for

⁴ A. Appadorai and Affairs Indian Council of World, *The Bandung Conference* (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1955), 6.

⁵ Ibid., 32.

Sino-Indian relations.⁶ Yet, while the Non-Alignment movement, which today has 118 members, was born out of a discussion of the relationship between India and China, it was never signed by the Chinese, and today they still only hold observer status. This sideline participation made China the most curious participant at the conference. Although China was not yet the world power that it would become in the twenty-first century, the Communist Revolution of 1949 meant that much of the world, particularly the West, viewed China as more of a member of the second world, rather than a member of the third world, and of a level of concern similar to that of the Soviet Union. Yet China, with the full backing of Nehru under the auspices of the Pancha Shila, and as an Asian nation not a communist nation, was a key player at the conference.

China's delegate to the conference, Zhou En-Lai,⁷ played a very visible, and at times controversial, role at Bandung. China's attempts to establish a distinct foreign policy are first evidenced in their participation in the 1954 Geneva conference. The conference sought to establish peace in French Indo-China and in Vietnam and was where Zhou En-Lai, as the Chinese delegate, first established himself as "a tough but reasonable negotiator."⁸ During the recess of the conference, he and Nehru established

⁶ Charles Neuhauser, *Third World Politics; China and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, 1957-1967*, Harvard East Asian Monographs, 27 (Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University; distributed by Harvard University Press, 1968), 3.

⁷ "Zhou" is also sometimes spelled "Chou." Zhou En-Lai was the first prime minister of the People's Republic of China, where he served from October 1, 1949 until his death on January 8, 1976. He was also the Foreign Minister from 1949 to 1958 and was a key player in the communist party's rise to power and in the Cultural Revolution.

⁸ Neuhauser, *Third World Politics*.

Pancha Shila. This also was where China's foreign policy towards the third world nations first began to form.

Regarding China's foreign policy towards Africa, there was one issue in particular that the Chinese government felt it could not ignore when considering diplomatic relations: the issue of Taiwan. This issue was first discussed at the Asian Nations Conference, held just prior to Bandung from the April 6 to the April 10, 1955. While the conference was more unofficial and less influential than Bandung, it had the participation of both the Soviet Union and China, and "there can be little doubt that the meetings in India and Indonesia were linked in the sense that the organizers of the New Delhi meeting hoped that its deliberations would influence the forthcoming discussions in Bandung."⁹ Later at Bandung, Zhou showed his diplomatic skill in two speeches that laid the foundation of China's foreign policy towards the third world.

The first speech was originally intended as his keynote speech for the conference but was scrapped for a new speech with the first one handed out in mimeographed form to all of the delegates. This first speech focused on China's commonalities with the other nations of Asia and Africa, particularly in terms of subjection to colonial rule. Zhou's speech stated passionately, "Our voices have been suppressed, our aspirations shattered, and our destiny placed in the hands of others...Suffering from the same cause and struggling for the same aim."¹⁰ The speech went on to emphasize, "The majority of our

⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹⁰ Zhou En-Lai, *China and the Asian-African Conference*, 10.

Asian and African countries, including China, are still very backward economically owing to the long period of colonial domination.”¹¹ China’s reference to itself as a post-colonial nation was controversial, as many felt that China had not been subject to the same level of colonial domination as many of the other nations present. This was particularly significant since China’s only true colonial holdings were Hong Kong and Macau. Yet, more importantly, this was a crucial example of China’s strategy of self-depreciation as the cornerstone of its third world foreign policy.

The skepticism of other delegates about Zhou En-Lai’s first speech and his references to China as a “semi-colonial society”¹² led Zhou to draft a supplementary speech that he gave orally as the first was distributed. This speech took a more definitive stance on China’s role in the Cold War geopolitical situation. Here, Zhou stated:

The Chinese Delegation has come here to seek unity and not to quarrel. We Communists do not hide the fact that we believe in communism and that we consider socialist system a good system. There is no need at this Conference to publicize one’s ideology and the political system of one’s country.¹³

His first speech never mentioned the political ideology of the Chinese government, yet the second speech emphasized the point from the outset. The political realities of the Cold War made China’s unique interpretation of Marxism impossible to ignore.

¹¹ Ibid., 13.

¹² Ibid., 14.

¹³ Ibid., 21.

Additionally, the first speech did not mention the controversy surround Taipei. However, Zhou's less rehearsed second speech makes it obvious that others had pressed him to address the issue. Regarding Taipei, he stated:

As for the tension created solely by the United States in the area of Taiwan, we could have submitted for deliberation by the Conference an item such as the proposal made by the Soviet Union for seeking a settlement through an international conference. The will of the Chinese people to liberate their own territory Taiwan and the coastal islands is a just one. It is entirely a matter of our internal affairs and the exercise of our sovereignty...But we did not do all this, because otherwise our Conference would be dragged into disputes about all of these problems without any solution.¹⁴

This was an important departure from the emphasis that Zhou had placed on Taiwan at the preceding conference. The issue had not even made the agenda of Bandung, as Zhou pointed out, yet he felt pressured to bring it up in his supplementary speech. Despite China's desire to keep the matter an internal issue, Zhou's references at Bandung foreshadow the important role that diplomatic recognition, especially in the United Nations, would play in relations between China and the third world, particularly Africa.

Despite the importance of these two now seemingly unavoidable issues of political ideology and the recognition of Taipei, the original strategy of self-depreciation

¹⁴ Ibid., 22.

remained deeply embedded in the rhetoric of the second speech. Here, Zhou continued to emphasize China's equality with other developing, newly independent nations. He asked of his audience after explaining China's definitive communist stance: "Is there any basis for seeking common ground among us?" His answer went back to the intentions of his first speech. He stated:

Yes, there is. The overwhelming majority of the Asian and African countries and peoples have suffered and are still suffering from the calamities of colonialism. This is acknowledged by all of us. If we seek common ground in doing away with the sufferings and calamities under colonialism, it will be very easy for us to have mutual understanding and respect, mutual sympathy and support, instead of mutual suspicion and fear, mutual exclusion and antagonism.¹⁵

This declaration was coupled with an emphasis that China fully backed the aims and proposals of the conference, and Zhou gave an enthusiastic speech on the successes of the conference at its conclusion.

On the one-year anniversary of Bandung, enthusiasm was still strong among many nations, including China, about the joint project that had begun. In a telegraph from Zhou to the prime minister of Indonesia in April of 1956, Zhou explained:

The Spirit of the Bandung Conference of peaceful coexistence and anti-colonialism has deeply impressed people from all around the world,

¹⁵ Ibid.

especially those from Asian and African countries. The resolutions passed in the conference have reflected the common desire of the Asian and African people to strive for and maintain independence and liberty, uphold world peace and promote friendly cooperation. The influence of these resolutions are now expanding by the joint efforts of the people from Asian and African countries.¹⁶

In honor of the anniversary, nations such as China and Indonesia held a brief ceremony commemorating the previous year's events and foreshadowing the new organization about to be born.

Establishment of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization

The Bandung Conference laid the ground for the future of China's relations with the third world. However, this diplomatic strategy based heavily on the self-identification of its participants was constantly adapting and evolving according to the current political realities of the Cold War and decolonization. The first evidence of this evolution was the 1957 establishment of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (A.A.P.S.O.), in which China, in the face of pressure from the Soviet Union and with continued distrust towards the United States, began to take a more revolutionary stance in its foreign relations. This growing pressure is evidenced both in the shift internally towards more

¹⁶ FMAPRC: 105-00311-02, "Zhou zong lizhi Yin nizong lihan," ("Premier Zhou En-Lai's Letter to the Prime Minister of Indonesia,") April 14, 1956, p. 4-5.

leftist policies in China, which encouraged a more militant stance against the United States, as well as in concern over new Soviet technology. The Soviet Union's first successful earth satellite, Sputnik I, was launched in October of 1957 and its first successful intercontinental ballistic missile was launched in November 1957 and "was regarded by the Chinese as a mark of decisive international change in the balance of forces between 'Socialism' and 'imperialism.'"¹⁷

The A.A.P.S.O. was founded at a conference held in Cairo on December 26, 1957. This gathering of 500 delegates from 43 different entities from various Asian and African nations was the largest gathering of its kind. Unlike Bandung, however, the delegates to the conference in Cairo were not representatives of their country, but rather of specific organizations, which "generally reflected the Communist orientation" of the groups they represented. Despite this orientation, the meeting "while strongly anti-imperialist and anticolonialist as well as generally anti-Western in tone, was not, strictly speaking, a Communist propaganda forum."¹⁸ For while both the Soviet Union and China both had delegations at the conference, the Egyptians also played a prominent role in the meetings.¹⁹

¹⁷ Alaba Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa, 1958-71* (London; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 15.

¹⁸ Neuhauser, *Third World Politics*, 12.

¹⁹ The Philippines, Turkey, and Pakistan boycotted the conference due to their close diplomatic ties with the United States. Washington "took dim view of the meeting," as described by John K. Cooley, *East Wind over Africa; Red China's African Offensive* (New York: Walker, 1965), 15.

To continue the work of the conference and to continue to promote its objectives, the convening delegates founded the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization. The A.A.P.S.O. was not made of countries, but rather individual national organizations, giving countries not yet independent a place to voice their concerns in the international community. The make-up of the A.A.P.S.O. was particularly important for the African organizations that joined as they were often still considered illegal in their country of origin. This also served to downplay the communist nature of the organization, as the main goals of these participants were to promote anticolonial issues, rather than pro-communist ones.²⁰

This change in emphasis highlighted the development of relations between China and African nations. As John Cooley explains, “The main advantage that the Chinese derived was a series of new footholds and new bases for exchanges with Africa...This gave the Chinese an opportunity to catch up with the Soviets, who had maintained regular

²⁰ Much like its concerns with the alignment of the United Nations, Zambia was also concerned with the alignment of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization. One of the primary diplomatic instruments of China in developing its relations with developing nations, the A.A.P.S.O. was not always viewed favorably by some Zambian policy makers. This is particular was related to the fight for supremacy between China and the Soviet Union in their bid to become the de facto leader of the Third World. The most blatant representation of the power struggle happening within the A.A.P.S.O. in the mid-1960s was undoubtedly the 1965 Afro-Asian Conference, held in Algeria. Despite its concerns, Zambia continued to participate in the A.A.P.S.O., still seeing it as one of the better options to boost political leverage and economic development. As one of the more peaceful and stable member states of the organization, Zambia agreed to host the 1970 summit. However, not everyone agreed with hosting the A.A.P.S.O.. Zambia spent a lot of money to run the conference and it became a debate about national priorities in terms of spending.

diplomatic, consular or commercial contacts in some African countries since the 1920s.”²¹ Beyond the A.A.P.S.O., China sought to promote its own form of militant agricultural Marxism, which its promoters believed to be more relevant to the countries of Africa than the urban proletariat uprisings of the Marxism of the Soviet Union. It was through the A.A.P.S.O. that China first began to promote national liberation movements, particularly in nations where it seemed possible for a communist revolution of the agricultural peasantry.

In this promotion of national liberations struggles in Africa, the first state in which China became involved was Egypt. In October of 1956, Britain, France, and Israel attacked the Suez Canal following the July decision of the Egyptian government to nationalize the Canal when the United States and Great Britain decided not to fund the building of the Aswan Dam. The Suez Crisis represented for many African nations the neo-imperialist ambitions of the countries of the first world. Claiming support for Egypt during this time was synonymous with issuing support for the anticolonialist coalition that was gaining prominence through the Non-Alignment Movement. Therefore, China’s open support in the matter was crucial. China’s support of Egypt during the Suez crisis of 1956 also laid the ground for similar instances of support around the continent. This support was not only in rhetoric, however, but also in more tangible assistance. These goods, which included steel as well as monetary support, were the first instances of

²¹ Ibid., 16.

economic aid that would become the trademark of Chinese foreign policy in Africa in the coming years.

Following on the heels of China's support of Egypt was their support of Algeria. The Algerian War of Independence was one of Africa's most important decolonization struggles. Lasting from November 1954 to March of 1962, it was certainly the longest and the bloodiest, with upwards of one million Algerians killed in the fighting. The national liberation struggle in Algeria not only affected the Algerians and their French colonizers, but also had profound implications for decolonization throughout Africa. It served as both an inspiration for other independence movements throughout Africa, as well as a great source of concern for British colonial officials. Because of the Algerian War, the process of decolonization was rushed in many colonies where independence was not in the short-term plans of the colonizers, and was even begun without any prior plan for the allowance of sovereignty and self-governance in the Belgian Congo—a process that proved detrimental to their stability following independence.

Like in its support of Cairo in the Suez Crisis, even prior to the establishment of the A.A.P.S.O. China had showed unwavering support for the liberation struggle in Algeria. Zhou, in his first speech handed out at the Bandung Conference, stated China's support:

we cannot help being aware that the peoples of Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and other dependent peoples who have been fighting for independence have never ceased to be suppressed with violence...One should say that

now the common desire of the awakened countries and peoples of Asia and Africa is to oppose racial discrimination and to demand fundamental human rights, to oppose colonialism and to demand for national independence, to firmly defend their own territorial integrity and sovereignty.²²

China continued to be supportive throughout the Algerians' struggle, and was rewarded with their goal of Algeria's recognition of the government in Peking immediately following their declaration of independence.

The liberation struggle in Algeria inspired a number of similar movements around Africa and had created a sense of fear among colonizers of a similar situation erupting in their colonies. In 1957, the British colony of the Gold Coast became the first sub-Saharan African nation to gain independence in the post-War era. The new nation of Ghana, under the radical leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, who had attended the Bandung Conference even prior to independence, was the first of many decolonization movements across the continent.²³ In 1960, the year referred to as the "year of African independence," seventeen nations achieved sovereignty and the right to self-governance. Therefore, while

²² Zhou, *China and the Asian-African Conference*, 14-15.

²³ Ogunsawo explains in his book *China's Policy in Africa* that on the first anniversary of Ghana's independence in 1958, Zhou En Lai sent a message to Kwame Nkrumah stating that the "Chinese people are very glad to see that new successes have continuously been gained by the people of Ghana during the past year in consolidating national independence and safeguarding state sovereignty" (28). However, while Ghana did not establish diplomatic relations with China until July 5, 1960, it was one of the nations that supported Peking in the United Nations as early as 1957.

Chinese support in the late 1950s tended to focus on North Africa, by the early 1960s China quickly made its presence known in sub-Saharan Africa as well.

This support of independence movements was an important issue in the rhetoric surrounding the establishment of diplomatic relations far past Bandung. In editorials in the nationalist newspapers *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*, the editorial departments published “Apologists of Neo-Colonialism” on October 25, 1963. In the editorial, they stated their support of the newly independent nations of Asian, Africa, and Latin America, emphasizing that “The primary and most urgent task facing these countries is still the further development of the struggle against imperialism, old and new colonialism, and their lackeys.”²⁴ The editorials also described the political nature of the struggle, emphasizing the need for an “armed struggle,” the hallmark of Maoist Marxism. Additionally, foreshadowing the importance of the economic relationship that was developing between China and many African nations, the editorials stated, “It is important for the newly independent countries to develop their independent economy. But this task must never be separated from the struggle against imperialism, old and new colonialism, and their lackeys.”²⁵

However, in reality the relations between China and the third world were becoming increasingly focused on economics. Diplomacy was to go hand in hand with economic aid and investment, first evidenced at the 1958 meeting of the Asian-African

²⁴ Alan Lawrence, *China's Foreign Relations since 1949* (London; Boston: Routledge and K. Paul, 1975), 168.

²⁵ Ibid.

Chamber of Commerce. An off-shoot of the A.A.P.S.O., the Chamber of Commerce was designed to facilitate economic relationships in a mandate by the previous year's conference. The first meeting of the Chamber was held on December 8, 1958 in Karol by the United Arab Chamber of Commerce and other similar bodies from A.A.P.S.O. member countries. In a Chinese Foreign Ministry description of the conference, the major goals were described as:

- (1) To search for a means for the cooperation of Asian-African countries in economics, technology, and finance, and to find ways to avoid vicious competitions in markets;
- (2) To create a solution for the defrayment of difficulties facing the Asian-African countries;
- (3) To discuss the influence of the European markets on Asian countries;
- (4) To issue the permanent joint body of the Asian-African Chamber of Commerce Meeting.²⁶

Although not all members of the A.A.P.S.O. participated in the Chamber, China noted that "the main Asian and African countries like India, Indonesia, Japan, Iraq, Sudan, and Ghana" participated, "as well as countries from the communist camp like the Soviet

²⁶ FMAPRC: 108-00122-05, Nan Hanchen, "Guanyu canjia ya-fei shanghui huiyi huodong fangan de qingshi" ("Request for instructions on the program for participating in the Asian-African Chamber of Commerce meetings," November 4, 1958.

Union, Mongolia, Vietnam, North Korea and China.”²⁷ China was free to note in this internal document that it was in fact in the “communist camp,” despite the public rhetoric of being firmly in the third world establishment.²⁸

The separate goals of the Chinese government were clear. In the same instructional briefing, they explained that while the majority of nations would attend based on their desire to increase international trade and improve their economies, “We think it is of considerate political significance to offer positive support to this purpose so as to get the majority of participant on our side.” The plan was to reveal the weaknesses in “imperial” aid from sources such as the United States and Japan, and then provide an alternative in the form of “selfless aid” that the Chinese government provided “under the principle of equity and mutual benefit.” In language that was becoming familiar and more fine-tuned, they explained, “We will strive for the promotion of economic development of Asian and African countries in the consistent spirit of equity and mutual benefit and friendly cooperation.”²⁹

The memo goes to outline the plan in further detail, explaining that the top priority “will be the establishment of trade amongst Asian and African nations.”³⁰ The trade policy to be adopted was to be one that would be relevant to China’s economic development and the improvement of the Chinese people’s standard of living, but it

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

would also be one that “shows full respect to the needs and will of our partners” and that “will never impose anything on them.”³¹ In contrast to this policy, China sought to emphasize in the Chamber that the “imperialistic exchange” of “plundering,” which included “exporting far more than importing” and “lowering people’s standard of living” in developing countries.³² Although China allowed that there would inevitably be natural competition in markets, it emphasized that uneven competition could be solved “by strengthening economic cooperation and mutual consulting.”³³

Payment terms and conditions were also identified as potential problems for the developing countries of Asia and Africa. The “root cause” of the “paying capacity” of these countries was again the “plundering and exploitation of imperialism.” In response to this problem, China proposed that developing countries be allowed to “gain economic independence first” and then establish an “equal and mutually beneficial economic relationship.” With this mind, China was to adopt a “flexible” payment system for its trading partners.³⁴ China also sought its proposal on the issue of a common market. China rejected the idea of an Asian-African Common Market, because they feared it would “pave the way for Japan to dump its goods.” “Economically backward countries” were also to be assisted in the common market, so as to assist them in “developing their national economies” as well as helping “economically nondependent countries in gaining

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

absolute economic as well as political independence.” The memo argued, “Only when this is realized and Asian and African countries have been economically independent and developed can we consider establishing a common market under the principle of equity and mutual benefit.”³⁵

The Issue of Taiwan

The Chinese government also planned to use its time in Karol to “do some after-meeting activities.” The major goal of these meetings was to “emphatically publicize” China’s position on Taiwan. China’s message on this issue was that “American imperialism” had “invaded” Taiwan, interfering in China’s “internal affairs” and “attempting to make ‘Two Chinas’.”³⁶ The A.A.P.S.O., heavily influenced by the participation of the communist powers China and the Soviet Union, discussed issues similar to those advanced at Bandung, but China placed particular emphasis on UN recognition of the government in Peking over the government in Taipei. The diplomatic recognition of one capital over another would prove to be a crucial culmination of Chinese-African relations in 1971, as African nations played the deciding role in the People’s Republic of China’s establishment as the internationally recognized government of China.³⁷

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Wei Liang-Tsai discusses the importance of this issue in detail in the 1982 book *Peking Versus Taipei in Africa: 1960-1978* (Taipei: Asia and World Institute, 1982). It must be

Zhou En-Lai in Africa, 1963-1964

Before economic objectives could be implemented and the issue of Taiwan finally settled, the Chinese first had to establish the foundation of diplomatic relations. While China's support of the nationalization of Suez, the national liberation struggle in Algeria, and the conflict in the Congo gathered the most international attention, what was truly important to the Chinese at this time was the African nations' recognition of the government in Peking rather than the government in Taipei. Therefore, while the most influential and important event in the first ten years of China's diplomatic relations with the third world was the increasingly economic emphasis through the A.A.P.S.O., the most symbolic was Zhou En-Lai's trip to Africa in 1963.

The face of China's foreign policy, along with the foreign minister Chen Yi and forty other officials, made the three-month long trip from December of 1963 to February of 1964, visiting nine countries, including Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. The purpose of this trip was to establish diplomatic relations with the nations of Africa, as well as to explain China's recent opposition to the nuclear test ban treaty, to encourage the meeting of another Bandung, and to emphasize China's stance on giving economic aid to those countries with which it had strong diplomatic ties. China had already demonstrated that it was in fact a "power

noted, however, that the book was published by The Asia and World Institute of Taiwan, and has a very clear objective and obvious bias in its interpretation. There has not been a non-partisan account of the role of Africa in the recognition of Peking.

relevant to Africa”³⁸ through its participation in the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization, and through its support of Egypt, Algeria, and the Congo. In fact, prior to Zhou En Lai’s trip, Morocco, Algeria, Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and Somalia had already established diplomatic relations with Peking. Therefore, much of the trip was largely symbolic, and little was actually accomplished in the countries the delegation visited.

It is also important to note that these were not the first Chinese delegations to African nations following the Bandung Conference. The period immediately following Bandung “was followed by Chinese efforts to increase diplomatic, economic and cultural contacts.”³⁹ In 1956 alone, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Ethiopia were all recipients of cultural missions from the Chinese government. Additionally, China began to forge economic ties with African nations, beginning with Egypt, purchasing cotton and increasing its economic ties with the nation beyond that of the economic aid given during the Suez crisis. Egypt also represents the first African nation to establish diplomatic relations with China, and in 1956 the first Chinese embassy in Africa was established in Cairo.

However, the trip had “doctrinal importance,” observed in the large amount of rhetoric produced. Speeches were given at every capital visited, often under the title “Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism,” and Peking’s *Foreign Language Press*

³⁸ G. P. Deshpande and H. K. Gupta, *United Front against Imperialism China's Foreign Policy in Africa* (Bombay: Somaiya Publications, 1986), 128.

³⁹ Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa*, 8.

produced a collection of them. Many of them were also reprinted in newspapers in China. The major objectives of the delegation were summarized in a February 6, 1964, editorial in the *People's Daily*. The seven objectives were described as:

- 1) In order to prevent world war, it is necessary to wage an unremitting struggle against imperialist policies of aggression and war;
- 2) The contemporary national liberation movement is an important force in defense of world peace;
- 3) Imperialism and old and new colonialism must be completely liquidated in Africa;
- 4) Asian-African solidarity must be strengthened with the utmost effort;
- 5) ...active preparations should be made for a Second Asian-African Conference;
- 6) Disputes among Asian-African countries should be settled through peaceful negotiations on the basis of Asian-African solidarity;
- 7) National economies should be developed by mainly relying on one's own strength supplemented by foreign assistance.⁴⁰

While these principles were largely reflective of China's aims for the delegation, they did not mention some of the more implicit goals that are easily evidenced from the rhetoric of the speeches given throughout the trip.

⁴⁰ Deshpande and Gupta, *United Front against Imperialism*, 88.

Perhaps the best example of rhetoric is a speech given by Zhou at a rally in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, on February 3, 1964, which was reprinted in the *Peking Review* on February 14. In this speech, known as the “Revolutionary Prospects in Africa Excellent” speech, Zhou returned to the rhetoric of Bandung. He stated, “In each of the African countries we visited, we have deeply felt the African people’s strong desire to promote the unity and solidarity of African countries in order to remove the obstacles caused by the colonialists’ artificial division of Africa.”⁴¹ This return to the cause of anticolonialism re-emphasized its importance as the keystone of China’s foreign policy towards Africa. Zhou also used the opportunity to implicitly implicate the United States in acting as a neo-imperialist in Africa, while criticizing former imperial powers:

The imperialists will of course never be reconciled to their defeat in Africa. They do not like to see the African people standing up and becoming masters of their own house. Nor do they like to see the independent development and prosperity of the African countries. Some old colonialists are continuing their bloody suppression of the African peoples fighting for independence and freedom; others have resorted to neocolonialist tactics in an attempt to maintain their colonial rule; still others have again revealed their ferocious features as old colonialists after their neo-colonialist tactics were seen through by the masses. They are now stepping up their infiltration and expansion in the political, military,

41 Lawrence, *China's Foreign Relations since 1949*, 171.

economic and cultural fields by hypocritical means, trying hard to step into the shoes of the old colonialists and place the new emerging African countries under their control.⁴²

While Zhou never outright mentioned the United States, it is obvious that it was his intention to incriminate them along with the former formal colonial powers.

What is most important about his speech, however, and was the part of the trip that held the most importance for future relations between China and African countries, was his promise of economic assistance to those nations with positive diplomatic ties. This meant that not only was China standing with African nations in their criticism of colonialism and neo-imperialism, but also providing them an alternative when it came to economic aid and assistance. In the same speech, Zhou laid out the eight principles of economic aid practiced by the Chinese government. These principles included the importance of “equality and mutual benefit in providing aid,” China’s respect for “the sovereignty and independence” of the nation receiving the aid, that in giving aid, “the purpose of the Chinese government is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark step by step on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development,” and that when giving any technical assistance, they would not leave until citizens of the country receiving the assistance could “fully master the technique.”⁴³

⁴² Ibid., 172.

⁴³ Ibid., 173-74.

These principles were obviously developed with the problems of colonialism in mind. In them, China sought to alleviate many of the major economic critiques of colonial rule, as well as the new critiques of neo-colonialism. The promotion of economic self-sufficiency had never now included the United States, were anxious to keep them economically dependent. Therefore, while there was little economic interaction between China and the African nations when Zhou gave his speech in Mogadishu, he was correct in stating, “there is no doubt that this mutual aid and economic co-operation will continuously expand in scope and increase in quantity.”⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Ibid., 173.

Table 2.1 African Nations Establishment of Relations with the PRC

Country	Date of Independence	A.A.P.S.O. Member?	Diplomatic Relations Est.
Egypt	28 February 1922	Yes	30 May 1956
Morocco	2 March 1956	Yes	1 November 1958
Algeria	21 September 1958	Yes	20 December 1958
Sudan	1 January 1956	No	4 February 1959
Guinea	2 October 1958	Yes	4 October 1959
Ghana	6 March 1957	Yes	5 July 1960
Mali	22 September 1960	No	27 October 1960
Somalia	1 July 1960	Yes	14 December 1960
Congo (K)	30 June 1960	Yes	20 February 1961
Tanzania	9 December 1961	Yes	December 1961
Uganda	9 October 1962	No	18 October 1962
Zanzibar	10 December 1963	No	11 December 1963
Kenya	12 December 1963	Yes	14 December 1963
Burundi	1 July 1962	No	23 December 1963
Tunisia	20 March 1956	Yes	10 January 1964
Congo (B)	15 August 1960	No	22 February 1964

Table 2.1 Continued

Central African Republic	13 August 1960	No	29 September 1964
Zambia	24 October 1964	Yes	31 October 1964
Benin	1 August 1960	No	12 November 1964
Mauritania	28 November 1960	No	19 July 1965
Equatorial Guinea	12 October 1968	No	15 October 1970
Ethiopia		No	24 November 1970

The Beginnings of Friendship

The goal for China was to begin mutual aid and economic cooperation as soon as a former colony received its independence, assuring diplomatic relations and in turn diplomatic recognition. In order to ensure a smooth turn-over, Chinese government officials began their trips to African countries prior to independence. Although several years away from formal independence, Kaunda received one of these visits on August 24, 1962, from He Ying, a member of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the “informal dinner” between He and Kaunda, described by He in a memo to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China, Kaunda was friendly and thanked China for “the support

offered to the Northern Rhodesian national independence campaign by the Chinese people and government.”⁴⁵

Kaunda also explained to He that the colonists were working to “destroy the struggle of the Northern Rhodesian people” but that they were becoming more “united” in their fight for independence. He explained, “Although faced with great difficulties for the time being, they are optimistic that a promising future is not far away.” It seemed independence was drawing increasingly near, and Kaunda expressed to He that he hoped he could visit China after Northern Rhodesia gained its independence and also looked forward to a future visit from He at that time so that they could have a “deep discussion.”⁴⁶

In April of 1964, He Ying traveled again to Northern Rhodesia to meet with the new members of the soon to be Zambian cabinet. Of the thirteen members of the cabinet, He met with ten, including Kenneth Kaunda. In his telegram report back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, He described his reception by the North Rhodesian government as being full of “warmth, grandeur and friendliness.” There was “great importance” for the soon to be independent Zambian government, and He was received by future President

⁴⁵ FMAPRC, 108-00823-01, He Ying, “Bao He dashi bian yan beiluo lian he minzu duli dang zhuxi qingkuang” (“Report on the Informal Dinner Held by Envoy He in Honor of the Chairman of the Northern Rhodesian United National Independence Party”), August 24, 1962.

⁴⁶ FMAPRC: 108-00563-01, He Ying, “Guanyu He dashi fangwen beiluo de qingkuang,” (“Ambassador He’s Visit to Northern Rhodesia”), June 14, 1964.

Kaunda, as well as ministers from the Department of Transportation, Ministry of Domestic Affairs, and Ministry of Finance, among others.⁴⁷

On the evening of April 10, Kaunda held a banquet in He's honor. In attendance were the ten ministers, as well as vice-chairmen and other high ranking officials of the government. Kaunda gave a speech during the banquet expressing “appreciation for [China’s] support of [the] struggle for national independence” and “emphasizing the friendship between the people of the two countries.” Kaunda expressed his desire to “further develop the friendly cooperative relationship with China” after independence. He also gave a speech offering his “pre-congratulations” on Northern Rhodesian independence and reminded them that China and Northern Rhodesia had faced “similar tribulations” and that the two countries’ “profound friendship” had been developed “in the process of struggle.”⁴⁸ He also sought to emphasize that “After the independence of Northern Rhodesia, the Chinese government is willing to develop a friendly cooperative relationship under the Bandung Spirit and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and would agree to dispatch representatives to participate in their independence ceremony and establish diplomatic relationship with them”⁴⁹ He’s memo also explained, “During the discussion I fully expressed our firm position on the issue of ‘Two Chinas.’”

The rhetoric was predictable, as were the negotiations that followed. The plan was the same as it was with any other country the Chinese sought diplomatic relations with in

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

the 1960s: “In the UN, the Northern Rhodesian representative would support the recovery of the lawful seat of China, and there would be no such problem of ‘Two Chinas’ within the boundary of North Rhodesia.” Kaunda explained that the Northern Rhodesian government had made the decision to accept China previously and assured He that only the PRC would invited to participate in Zambia’s independence ceremony in October, and that “they would not invite representatives of the Chiang group.”⁵⁰

Despite this promise, He spent much of his visit warning the members of the Northern Rhodesian government about the Chiang Kai Shek government. He noted that “during all my conversations with ministers” he spoke out against “Two Chinas.” He learned during his trip that Yang Xikun of the “Chiang group” would be visiting Africa during June of that year. In a meeting the same day with the Minister of Domestic Affairs, soon to be Vice-President, Simon Kapwepwe, and the Minister of Justice, He explained that “the aim of Yang’s visit was to destroy the friendly relationship between China and North Rhodesia, and hoped that they would be careful lest Yang succeeded.” The two ministers replied to He that “although the British government issued entry visa to Yang Xikun, the Chiang group would get nothing from the North Rhodesian government, and would in no case be invited to the independence ceremony.”⁵¹

In return for international recognition, He explained that “The North Rhodesian government hopes that Chinese government would offer aid to the economic construction

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

after its independence.” (Specifically, Kapwepwe asked for an early gift of £20,000 for the “support of local agencies.”) Kaunda also expressed the need for assistance in the “African Liberation Campaign,” because although Northern Rhodesia was set to gain its independence, UNIP was still deeply committed to assisting its neighbors in Southern Africa still under imperial control, including Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, Angola, and South-West Africa. Kaunda regretted that at the moment they were too busy to send a delegation to China, but assured He one would be sent “right after the independence ceremony,” and that Kaunda himself also planned to visit China. He expressed China’s “willingness to offer aid to Northern Rhodesian national economic development,” as long as it was “within our capacity in accordance with the eight principles we hold in terms of foreign aiding.”⁵² A mutually beneficial relationship had seemingly begun.

He reported back to the Chinese Foreign Ministry that, based on his trip, “Given the friendliness of the Northern Rhodesia government to us, its support to our position against ‘Two Chinas’” and, strategically, “its important position (adjoining Angola, Congo and South-West Africa),” Northern Rhodesia would be suitable to be the “base” for China’s work in central and southern Africa. Therefore, He suggested that China participate in Northern Rhodesia’s independence ceremony, begin to send representatives to establish an embassy in Lusaka, arrange for the Xinhua News Agency to send a permanent correspondent, and offer the requested £20,000 to “win the support of the leaders of Northern Rhodesia.” Finally, he noted, regarding the small gift, it would be

⁵² Ibid.

advantageous if “we can give them a reply before Yang Xikun reaches Northern Rhodesia.”⁵³

Although there is no record of the £20,000 ever being received by Kaunda and UNIP, China kept the rest of its promises. In a letter to the new President Kaunda on October 26, 1964, two days after Northern Rhodesia had been given formal independence as the Republic of Zambia, He Ying expressed his congratulations. However, the letter also expressed “that the Chinese government is ready immediately to establish diplomatic relations and exchange diplomatic representative on ambassadorial level with Republic of Zambia.” This was of course contingent that “the Zambian government has the same desire and does not have anything to do with the Chiang Kai-Shek clique.”⁵⁴ Diplomatic relations were quickly established, and in fact China was the first nation to start building its embassy in the capital city of Lusaka.

Conclusion

Such an early start to bilateral relations between Zambia and China has never been previously discussed in the literature. However, this early period was critical as it built a strong foundation for the future of relations in the years to come. The Chinese often began correspondence with the leaders of decolonizing nations prior to the actual declaration of independence. In fact, for both the Soviet Union and China, support of

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ FMAPRC: 108-01381-03, He Ying, “He dashi yu qiao na de tanhua jiyi jian” (“Ambassador He’s Conversation and Comments,”) October 26, 1964.

liberation movements was an important part of foreign policy towards the third world. The Chinese government developed its foreign policy to achieve specific aims, including the support of decolonization and liberation movements, but more critically its need for international diplomatic recognition. The two Chinas question found its way into every public discourse as well as every private engagement.

Although Zambia did not require the monetary and military support of other liberation movements, China still sought out the leaders of UNIP. In these private engagements, which have been lost within the Zambian archives, the conversation always turned to Taiwan and diplomatic recognition of the PRC. Future Zambian leaders, including Kaunda and Kapwepwe, were ready to provide this diplomatic recognition, but not without compensation. Already, Zambian leaders had their eyes turned towards economic development, as well as using a policy of non-alignment to achieve those goals. Yet while international diplomacy provided possibilities for development assistance, it was the regional situation in Southern Africa which created the greatest hurdle for the new Zambian government to overcome.

CHAPTER THREE: THE RHODESIAN SITUATION

“This problem is a very delicate one and it should be handled with care and in such a way that Zambia always appears and is on the defensive. Nothing should be done which could be interpreted as provocation against Mr. Smith.”

- M. Mainza China, National Secretary, UNIP¹

Landlocked and peaceful, Zambia represented an important stronghold in a conflicted Southern Africa. Although not all the countries of the region had a violent independence process, it was still certainly no easy position to be in for any nation, whether newly independent or established. Bordered by eight countries and colonies, the Zambian government and its people were forced to contend with the overflow of violent decolonization struggles, civil wars, and instability. The problems this caused newly independent Zambia cannot be overestimated. The simple threat of violence in Zambian border towns, and even in the interior, severely disrupted Zambian life. On a macro scale the blockages of transport links was a major issue for the developing Zambian economy. In order to provide regional context, this chapter first explores the myriad of regional issues Zambian leaders were forced to contend with in the 1960s and into the 1970s.

¹ NAZ, FA 1-1-36, M. Mainza China, “United National Independence Party, To: All Ministers, Junior Ministers and Members of Parliament,” Rhodesia Political Activities, May 13, 1965.

However, while the combined problems of the bordering nations all contributed to the troubles within the Zambian economy, by far the most disruptive external situation was the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia. By far, Rhodesian U.D.I. created the greatest set of issues Zambia faced in the immediate postcolonial period. Politically, economically, and socially, Zambia was intricately intertwined with Rhodesia. The Central African Federation had ensured that a problem for Rhodesia was to be a problem for Zambia. Consequently, by first understanding the regional context of Zambian development, we can better place an understanding of Zambian foreign relations.

The Regional Context of Development

Not every country surrounding Zambia erupted into violence in the years after 1964. However, each country provided a unique challenge to the Zambian government. The decolonization process, whether messy or relatively clean, caused many problems, particularly related to trade and transport.

Botswana

The most peaceful of Zambia's neighbors, historically and today, is undoubtedly Botswana. Endowed with a rich mineral wealth and a small population, it was and still is an anomaly amongst African nations. Botswana is located to the southwest of Zambia in a narrow border where Botswana, Zambia, Namibia, and Zimbabwe meet along the banks

of the Zambezi River. At the time of Zambian independence, Botswana was still Bechuanaland, a British protectorate originally intended to be a part of the Union of South Africa, a British dominion formed after the Second Boer War.² While by June of 1964 the path to independence was already laid, for the first two years of Zambian independence, including directly after Rhodesian U.D.I., dealing with Botswana meant essentially dealing with Great Britain.³ Rather than negotiating with a neighbor and a potential ally, Zambia simply shared a narrow border with the British.

Malawi

Malawi and Zambia share much of a common colonial history, as Nyasaland was colonized in 1891 by the British, and was one of the three members of the Central African Federation. Located to the east of Zambia, the two countries share a substantial border as well as a common colonial history. During the break-up of the Central African Federation, Malawi was also on the path to independence, gaining autonomy a few

² For more on the history of the Union of South Africa, see Roger B. Beck, *The History of South Africa* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000). For more on the Boer Wars, see Thomas Pakenham, *The Boer War* (New York: Random House, 1979).

³ Although the historical literature on Botswana is scarce compared with other Southern African nations, there is a new book by Ørnulf Gulbrandsen, *The State and the Social: State Formation in Botswana and Its Pre-Colonial and Colonial Genealogies* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), which is by far the best place to go for a historical overview.

months before Zambia, on July 6, 1964.⁴ Formerly elected Prime Minister of Nyasaland in 1963, the new President, Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, faced similar conditions as Zambia being economically underdeveloped and land-locked. However, Malawi was also resource poor, rather than resource rich, and heavily populated. Although political issues would not erupt for several years, there were already hints of what was to come. Malawi was immediately a one-party state, unlike Zambia, which remained multi-party during the First Republic, and Dr. Banda would declare himself “President for Life” in 1970 but began fighting off all political opposition immediately.⁵ Therefore, while relations between Zambia and Malawi remained strong, there was little Malawi could do to off-set the economic needs of Zambia.

DRC

Sharing the greatest stretch of border with Zambia, as well as the longest history of violent conflict, is the Democratic Republic of Congo. Notorious for its colonial history, as a personal mandate of King Leopold II of Belgium, it is most often associated

⁴ For more on the colonial history of Malawi and its independence process, see Martin Chanock, *Law, Custom, and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

⁵ Although there are no recent books on Malawian history, the best of the post-independence era is Bridglal Pachai, *Malawi; the History of the Nation* (London: Longman, 1973).

with pictures of amputations amongst rubber trees.⁶ However, the independence process for the Congo, and its aftermath, is almost equally notorious. Granted a fast independence by Belgium on June 30, 1960, the Congo was unprepared, politically, economically, and socially, to handle the administration of such a large, resource rich country. With only 13 university graduates at the time of independence, there was simply not a large enough population of educated individuals to ensure any sustainable level of development in any area.

One of the few leaders capable of taking on such a challenge was the first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba. As an ardent nationalist and ideological socialist, Lumumba was not in favor with the West. Therefore, when General Joseph Mubutu of the Congolese army instituted a coup against President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba, the West was not only complicit, but also aided in Lumumba's removal from power and subsequent assassination.⁷ The situation in the Congo proved unstable not

⁶ Undoubtedly the best written book on this topic is Adam Hochschild's *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998).

⁷ There are a number of books on the crisis in the Congo and on the assassination of Lumumba, which is increasing as documents are declassified. Not all documents have been declassified by the U.S. Government, however, which has led even more interest to such publications as former CIA Chief of Station Larry Devlin's memoir, which describes his being given poison toothpaste to assassinate Lumumba, *Chief of Station, Congo: A Memoir of 1960-67* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007). On the history, see, for instance, Ludo de Witt, *The Assassination of Lumumba* (London: Verso, 2001); Thomas R. Kanza, *The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba: Conflict in the Congo* (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1979); Ch. Didier Gondola, *The History of Congo* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002); Georges Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo, 1960-64* (New

only to the Congo, but also to the Congo's neighbors, including Zambia. Sharing a border with the Copperbelt region of Zambia, the most mineral rich in both countries, the Congo's militants from the seceded region of Katanga and refugees from throughout the country flowed over into northern Zambia. From 1960 until today, the border region's inhabitants have lived with violence and a scarcity of resources from the conflicts in the Congo.

Angola / Mozambique

The history of the decolonization of Portuguese African colonies is the primary example of how the Cold War became hot in Africa. Unlike the French and the British, the Portuguese were reluctant to put their colonies on the path to independence. The first to establish an Empire, Portugal was, especially after the devastation following the Second World War, not keen to give it up. The two Portuguese colonies sharing a border with Zambia were Angola to the West and Mozambique to the Southeast, both of which had violent paths to independence. Throughout the 1960s, the agitations for independence escalated in both countries, and were supported by the Zambia government.

In Angola, the first calls for independent rule came in the 1950s, with the beginnings of the Non-Alignment Movement. As Portugal had at that point been in Angola for over 500 years, it would not consider giving up this directly ruled territory,

York: Oxford University Press, 1978); and Madeleine G. Kalb, *The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa--from Eisenhower to Kennedy* (New York: Macmillan, 1982).

known as the “Overseas Province of Angola.” The first opposition political party, the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, or MPLA), was founded in 1956, and was followed by the establishment of the *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, or FNLA) in 1961 and the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, or UNITA) in 1966. Together, these parties fought together in a long guerilla war against Portugal, from 1961 until independence was granted in 1975, after a coup overthrew the *Estado Novo* (Second Republic) in April 1974. Were it not for the coup, it cannot be known how long the war would have dragged on.

Immediately following independence, a civil war broke out between the MPLA and UNITA, not ending entirely until 2002. Both wars were heavily influenced by foreign powers, including the United States and Soviet Union, as well as the apartheid government of South Africa.⁸ As such, the war in Angola meant not just violent spillovers and refugees for the Western and Northwestern Provinces of Zambia, but also increased tension in all aspects of foreign relations.⁹ As a decidedly anti-colonialist and

⁸ See, William Minter, *Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique* (BookSurge Pub, 2008); Ernest Harsch and Tony Thomas, *Angola: The Hidden History of Washington's War* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1976); and the edited volume *Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation*, Sue Onslow, ed. (London: Routledge, 2009).

⁹ For an excellent treatment of the local effects of the “Global Cold War,” see Jeffrey A. Engle, *Local Consequences of the Global Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007).

non-aligned nation, but a landlocked nation in need of alternate transport routes, Zambian leaders' dealings with the Portuguese, rebel groups, and other foreign powers were directly related to both the Cold War and domestic economic development.

South Africa / Namibia

Similarly international at the same time it was regional was the decolonization of South-West Africa, now known as Namibia. Namibia was first colonized by Germany in 1884, but its hold on the colony was tenuous, as there were several indigenous uprisings. In addition, the British had already annexed two of the most important assets of the colony, Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands, for the Cape Colony in 1878, which became a part of the Union of South Africa after its independence in 1910. After World War I, the colony was taken from the Germans at the Treaty of Versailles and made a League of Nations mandate territory. As South Africa already held Walvis Bay, it was granted the full administration of the territory of the then South-West Africa.

The issues with this transfer of power were enormous. While technically a UN mandate, South-West Africa was treated by South Africa as a colonial territory. The actions by South Africa led to international outcry, including several cases within the International Criminal Court. The controversy continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s, escalating after the creation of the South West Africa People's Organisaiton (SWAPO) in 1960. The Zambian government supported the independence of South West Africa, and harbored many SWAPO leaders during this critical period. In 1966, United Nations

Resolution 2145 (XXI) terminated the mandate held by South Africa. However, South Africa remained until the United Nations forced its removal from the then Namibia in 1971.

For Zambian officials, sharing a border with Namibia, and assisting SWAPO in its liberation struggle, was one issue. Yet another was with the nation of South Africa itself. Although Zambia and South Africa do not share a border, South Africa's links with the sea provide potential transport routes for Zambian imports and exports. Yet the apartheid, colonist regime in South Africa was not on the list of nations with which Zambia wanted to do business. Frustrations over South Africa were also apparent as Zambians fought the British and Americans over U.D.I. in Southern Rhodesia, as there were sanctions against the latter but not against the former.

Southern Rhodesia

Of all the regional conflicts and situations with which Zambia was forced to contend, the most significant was undeniably the situation in Southern Rhodesia. As one of the most unique independence processes, the Southern Rhodesian case was that of a white minority, rather than a black majority, declaring autonomy and independence from British rule. The origin of the name Rhodesia comes from Cecil Rhodes, the owner of the British South Africa Company (BSAC) and one of the primary figures of British colonial

expansion in the late nineteenth century.¹⁰ The origins of Rhodesia are in fact those of the BSAC, which essentially had control over the territory until 1924.

Rather than using the method of colonial control seen in British colonies such as Nigeria and the Gold Coast (Ghana),¹¹ the BSAC used a version of the South African Cape Colony system, giving voting rights to literate individuals who owned a certain amount of property. Like the voting laws in the United States during the Civil Rights era, this ensured that those empowered with the right to vote were almost exclusively white. Created out of this was a white minority ruled government, racist and strongly independent. Settlers saw themselves as Rhodesian, rather than British, and they concentrated on gaining autonomy for themselves within Rhodesia.

A Unilateral Declaration of Independence

By early 1965, it seemed that the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Southern Rhodesia from Great Britain was inevitable. Rhodesia, since the demise of the Central African Federation, had been agitating for independent rule. As Douglas Anglin explains, a Unilateral Declaration of Independence was a “popular political slogan” for

¹⁰ For more on Cecil Rhodes and the British South Africa Company, see John Galbraith, *Crown and Charter: The Early Years of the British South Africa Company* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

¹¹ On British rule in Nigeria see Toyin Falola, *The History of Nigeria* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1999) and *Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009). On British rule in the Gold Coast see William C. Olsen, “The Empire Strikes Back: Colonial “Discipline” and the Creation of Civil Society in Asante, 1906-1940” *History in Africa* Vol. 30 (2003):223-51.

the white minority settlers in Rhodesia. However, it took the “palace coup” of Ian Smith in 1964 to elevate the threat to a point of seriousness for the international community, including the Zambian government.¹² After the establishment of Smith in power, “Over the next year and a half, a series of carefully orchestrated events occurred with tiresome regularity, creating fears of an imminent U.D.I. The rebellion, when it finally transpired, ended the long suspense.”¹³ Zambian leaders knew that U.D.I. was inevitable; they just did not know how events would transpire once the inevitable occurred.

The law stated that minority ruled Rhodesia could change its constitution with an Act of Parliament, but that “the question of independence rested within the responsibility of the British Government.”¹⁴ However, at a meeting between Zambian Commonwealth Relations Minister, D. C. Mwiinga, and the British High Commissioner, Mwiinga enquired why Great Britain had not convened a constitutional conference on the matter. The High Commissioner replied, “Mr. Smith’s Government had refused to co-operate on the matter.”¹⁵ Arthur Bottomley, the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, visited Rhodesia in March of 1965. During his ten day visit, he met with all former prime ministers, as well as “trade unionists, farmers, [and] representatives of the Asian and

¹² Douglas Anglin, “Zambian Crisis Behaviour: Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1980):585.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 587.

¹⁴ NAZ, FA 1-1-36, D. C. Mwiinga, “ Notes of the Meeting held between the Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs and the British High Commissioner on 26th March, 1965,” Rhodesia Political Activities, 1965.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

coloured communities.”¹⁶ Bottomley reported that 90 percent of the European population favored independence “by unconstitutional means if necessary.” On the other hand, African political leaders, as well as the Asian community, simply wanted “One man, one vote.” The coloured population, however, “seemed to be sitting tight on the fence.”¹⁷ Although Europeans were the minority population in Rhodesia they held the majority of the Parliamentary seats and almost all of the power. Historically, minority rule had been encouraged by the British throughout Eastern and Southern Africa, but Great Britain was finding it increasingly difficult to control the white settler population in Rhodesia.

It is also questionable whether or not British officials believed that a majority could rule Rhodesia, as expressed by Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda in an August 1965 press conference. In a response to a comment by Bottomley that “the country would perish if the white settlers had to leave it,” Kaunda “sharply criticised” the Commonwealth Secretary and emphasized, “Should I learn that the British Government subscribed to this viewpoint...I should have completely to change my attitude.”¹⁸ The international community immediately took sides on the issue. The Chinese Government, in a November 1965 statement, condemned U.D.I. and pledged “support for the just struggle of the Zimbabwe people against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism

¹⁶ NAZ, FA 1-1-36, S. C. Katilunga, “Visit of Secretary for Commonwealth Relations to Rhodesia,” Rhodesia Political Activities, 1965, 1.

¹⁷ Ibid., 1-2.

¹⁸ NAZ, FA 1-1-36, Kenneth Kaunda, “Kaunda’s Press Conference,” Rhodesia Political Activities, 1965.

and for national independence.”¹⁹ The declaration of U.D.I. was also condemned by the Soviet Union, as well as Israel, Tanzania, Malawi, Hungary, Belgium, and many other countries.²⁰

Zambia and Rhodesia

The Zambian government’s stance towards Rhodesia was a much more complex decision, in light of Zambia’s close ties with Rhodesia.²¹ Regarding Zambia’s stand on U.D.I., M. Mainza China, the National Secretary of the United National Independence Party, wrote to all ministers and members of parliament, “He [Kaunda] has said that as little as possible should be said about U.D.I....there is no need for us to throw further rockets at Mr. Smith at this time.” He further emphasized, “This problem is a very delicate one and it should be handled with care and in such a way that Zambia always appears and is on the defensive. Nothing should be done which could be interpreted as provocation against Mr. Smith.”²²

¹⁹ NAZ, FA 1-1-47, “Chinese Government Statement on Southern Rhodesia,” Rhodesia-Political, November 14, 1965.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ On a more positive note, M. C. Chona, Zambia’s Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noted the U.D.I. had the effect of creating unity amongst the Zambian people directly after independence, instead of the factional fighting seen in many newly independent nations. NAZ, FA 1-1-66, Ian Smith, “Personal Message from the Hon., I. D. Smith, M.P., Prime Minister of Rhodesia, to His Excellency Doctor K. D. Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia,” Rhodesia Political Activities, October 21, 1965.

²² NAZ, FA 1-1-36, M. Mainza China, “United National Independence Party, To: All Ministers, Junior Ministers and Members of Parliament,” Rhodesia Political Activities, May 13, 1965.

Socially

As neighboring countries sharing not only a border, but ethnic groups, families, and a long history of trading, Zambia and Rhodesia were not easily separated. In an interview, the Under Secretary of External Affairs for the Rhodesian government, Andrew Parker Bowles, assured officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “that Southern Rhodesia wished in spite of the ideological differences between the two countries to maintain peace between them with no interference in internal affairs.” Therefore, due to the close social and cultural ties between the two countries there was the “necessity for some form of diplomatic or consular relationship between the two countries,”²³ particularly after the border was closed in 1966.

Immigration issues, particularly medical issues, topped the list for early concerns between the two countries. For example, in March of 1966, Rhodesia sent Zambia back 23 mentally ill criminals from Chainama Hills Hospital.²⁴ Non-criminal patients were also an issue, as the lack of adequate medical facilities on both sides had previously created considerable traffic. After U.D.I., patients still often had to be transported, although each separate situation now became a major diplomatic issue. A child with a brain tumor was allowed to travel from Zambia to Rhodesia for treatment and an

²³ NAZ, FA 1-1-16, “Record of Interview between the Permanent Secretary, Foreign Affairs, the Under Secretary, Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Bowles, Under Secretary, External Affairs, Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia,” Relations with S. Rhodesia, March 16, 1965.

²⁴ NAZ, FA 1-1-192, N. P. Maipande, “Letter to Prison Superintendent, Livingstone,” Relations with Southern Rhodesia, March 2, 1966.

American tourist mauled by a lion was allowed to enter Zambia after some delay to receive treatment at Batoka Hospital in Livingstone. However, a Rhodesian Farmer was forbidden to enter Zambia and was instead flown to Bulawayo for treatment. In response to this particular issue, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health, M. M. Nalumango, argued to the Ministries of Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs, "I am sure you will agree with me that such an action does not uphold our principles of humanism."²⁵

Politically

Bilaterally, relations between Zambia and Rhodesia remained peaceful and relatively open during the period of uncertainty in 1965. However, these relations were contingent upon Zambian support of Rhodesia, and therefore it guaranteed strained relations with Great Britain and the Commonwealth. In a private message from Ian Smith, the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, to Kaunda, Smith explained that Rhodesia had no desire to harm Zambia via the two countries' joint enterprises or in terms of Zambia's copper exports: "I would like to assure you again that my Government remains willing and anxious to honour its obligations towards Zambia and to maintain existing trade relations and will do everything possible towards this end in all circumstances." However, these promises came with conditions, as Smith went on to state, "on the

²⁵ NAZ, FA 1-1-192, M. M. Nalumango, "Letter to Permanent Secretaries, Ministries of Home and Foreign Affairs," Relations with Southern Rhodesia, January 29, 1968.

understanding, of course, that Zambia itself does not initiate measure calculated to cause positive harm and damage for political purposes to the economy and stability of Rhodesia.”²⁶

In addition to having political relations and ties to the minority-ruled Rhodesian government, the Zambian government also had ties to the majority opposition parties: the Zimbabwe African Patriotic Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe Africa National Union (ZANU). Originally, ZAPU and ZANU were the same organization, splitting in 1963 to form two separate parties. Although both parties had the same basic goal in mind—freedom from white minority rule—and the same militant approach to achieving this goal, their approaches were different. In particular, the Zambian government hosted a wing of the largely expatriate ZANU in Lusaka, and freedom fighters from both groups found both forced and invited exile within Zambia. These ties increasingly became an issue for the Zambian government, but were initially more socially trying, rather than politically so.

Speaking before the Organization for African Unity Conference, the Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, D. C. Mwiinga, explained that “Zambia did everything possible to try and prevent” the split of ZAPU and ZANU. For Zambia, the issue was one of security as much as it was one of politics, as “their fights in Rhodesia affected Zambia

²⁶ NAZ, FA 1-1-66, Ian Smith, “Personal Message from the Hon., I. D. Smith, M.P., Prime Minister of Rhodesia, to His Excellency Doctor K. D. Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia,” Rhodesia Political Activities, October 21, 1965.

very badly because just as they fought in Rhodesia between themselves, they fought in Zambia between themselves.” Furthermore, Mwiinga added,

I must add my Party and country’s disappointment at the way these two Parties are playing with our country. We have not banned ZANU in Zambia but they are stupid enough, and I repeat stupid enough, to attack my Government and people – in other words biting the hand that feeds them...Are you going to blame us if we ban these blokes? We have a right to preserve our own dignity and sovereignty against anyone who abuses our kindness.²⁷

Zambian leaders did not believe that ZANU was illegitimate; however, it did believe that any group endangering security was not to be supported, whether from the majority or the minority.

The Zambian government also believed that the fighting between ZAPU and ZANU only made it easier for the British government to delay action against Smith. In a letter to Kapwepwe, I. C. Mumpansha, the High Commission in Lagos, Nigeria, described his position explaining the Rhodesian situation to the Nigerian government. Mumpansha believed that “Zambia should be in a position to give a clear understanding of the Rhodesian situation to the rest of the African States and to the world.” Specifically, he sought to make clear that Britain was using disunity between ZAPU and ZANU “as an

²⁷ NAZ, FA 1-1-36, “ Brief Summary on the ZAPU/ZANU Situation and Zambia’s Part Statement at the Organisation for African Unity Conference by Hon. Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs,” Rhodesia Political Activities, August 1965.

excuse for her failure to convince Mr. Ian Smith that Africans have the right to claim for full participation in the government of their country.”²⁸

In reality, ZAPU and ZANU had been banned in Rhodesia since 1963, and politically, a declaration of U.D.I. meant Zambia must review the harboring of banned parties because “any subversive activities which would be carried out by Rhodesians should at least never originate from Zambia or else our country will be strained with fear and uncertainty of life.”²⁹ He was right to be concerned, for in December 1965, just one month after the declaration of U.D.I., Smith wrote a letter to Kaunda regarding concerns that ZAPU and ZANU were being allowed to broadcast over Zambian Broadcasting Corporation Programs. Smith warned, “Such incitement to violence does, I feel, represent the only threat to our common services and I feel sure that you will wish to co-operate in eliminating this unnecessary source of embarrassment to both our Governments.”³⁰

Economically

While there were many social, political, and security concerns for Zambia to deal with regarding Rhodesian U.D.I., the most important issues for Zambia were quickly trade and transport. In 1964, the total domestic exports of Rhodesia totaled £119 million,

²⁸ NAZ, FA 1-1-36, I. C. Mumpansha, “Memorandum ZL/02/65,” Rhodesia Political Activities, August 23, 1965.

²⁹ NAZ, FA 1-1-36, I. C. Mumpansha, “Memorandum ZL/02/65,” Rhodesia Political Activities, August 23, 1965.

³⁰ NAZ, FA 1-1-47, I. D. Smith, “Message to H. E. Dr. Kenneth Kaunda,” Rhodesia-Political, December 3, 1965.

of which £76 million went to Commonwealth countries (See Table 4.1).³¹ Non-Commonwealth nations, including South Africa and the United States, accounted for £35.4 million in trade (See Figure 4.2).³² Rhodesia was the trading hub of Central Africa, as recognized by the British government as a “leave-over” from the colonial days of the Central African Federation.³³ The leading importer of Rhodesian goods was Zambia at £30.8m, with Great Britain importing £30.6m. However, out of the £30,606,000 in total imports into Great Britain from Rhodesia, £20,672,000 was in tobacco.

³¹ NAZ FA 1-1-66, Zambian Government, “Rhodesian Trade with Commonwealth Countries” December 2, 1965.

³² NAZ FA 1-1-66, Zambian Government, “Rhodesian Trade with Commonwealth Countries” December 2, 1965.

³³ PRO DO 209/1, “The Diversion of Zambian Imports from Rhodesia,” Unilateral Declaration of Independence Rhodesia: Steps to Mitigate Economic Damage to Zambia, December 1965.

Table 3.1 Rhodesian Trade with Commonwealth Countries over £1 million

Country	Trade with Rhodesia (1964, in million £)
Zambia	30.8
Britain	30.5
Malawi	5.6
Australia	1.6
Canada	1.4
Bechuanaland	1.1
India	1.1
Malaysia	1.1
Total	73.2

Source: National Archives of Zambia, FA 1-1-66, Zambian Government, “Rhodesian Trade with Commonwealth Countries,” December 2, 1965.

Table 3.2 Rhodesian Trade with Non-Commonwealth Countries over £1 million

Country	Trade with Rhodesia (1964, in million £)
South Africa	8.9
German Federal Republic	7.9
Japan	5.6
United States	4.0
Belgium	2.6
Netherlands	2.3
Congo Republic	1.5
Switzerland	1.4
Italy	1.3
Total	35.4

Source: National Archives of Zambia, FA 1-1-66, Zambian Government, “Rhodesian Trade with Commonwealth Countries,” December 2, 1965.

For Zambia, however, economic ties with Rhodesia represented much more than a single commodity. In 1965, Rhodesia was the largest supplier of Zambian imports at 48.8 percent. In addition, over 90 percent of Zambia’s £65.1 million total imports were transported via Rhodesia, and an even greater percentage of Zambian exports travelled out the same way. Rhodesian imports focused on were “heavy and diverse” with the

greatest percentage of imports in the categories of fuel, manufactures, and capital durables. However, the “most vital element in the trade relations between Zambia and Southern Rhodesia,” was energy, and not just the transport of oil, but coal and hydroelectric power as well.

In the long term, it was better for Zambia to reduce its reliance on Rhodesian exports. However, it was a difficult proposal for the short-term as “Economic independence should always be the main objective after political independence and stability are achieved, but the former invariably involves a long and arduous struggle, and is hardly ever realizable in the absolute.”³⁴ The trade between Zambia and Rhodesia represented an “economic imbalance” between the two countries, with only 3.3 percent of Zambian exports entering Rhodesia (seventh on the list of Zambia’s customers). However, the route through Rhodesia also served as the route for exports to the United Kingdom, German Federal Republic, Japan, Italy, and France, Zambia’s main customers, as well as South Africa, which received 7.1 percent of Zambian exports.³⁵

Zambia and Rhodesia jointly ran and operated the Central Africa Power Board, Central African Airways (with Malawi), and, most importantly, Rhodesia Railways. Rhodesia Railways, in particular, caused a number of problems for Zambia, including the

³⁴ NAZ, FA 1-1-135, F. M. Mulikita, “Zambia and Southern Rhodesia (The Possible Cutting of Trade Ties: A Study Prepared by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zambia to the United Nations),” Rhodesia-Political, March 1966.

³⁵ NAZ, FA 1-1-135, F. M. Mulikita, “Zambia and Southern Rhodesia (The Possible Cutting of Trade Ties: A Study Prepared by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zambia to the United Nations),” Rhodesia-Political, March 1966.

loss of property and the blockage of imports and exports. Furthermore, as described in a 1965 Zambian government report, “Apart from these obvious trade and transport connection, there are innumerable points of ‘invisible’ contact as well. These take the form of dividends, profits or other remittances most of which tend to flow from Zambia towards Rhodesia.”³⁶

Newly independent Zambia was far more intricately intertwined with Rhodesia than any other nation, and was bound to be the most impacted by Rhodesian U.D.I. However, economic independence for Zambia would require a number of important changes and improvements to the current system, including: the development of comprehensive infrastructure; human resource development; the availability of abundant and inexpensive capital and technology; dissolving of the vast subsistence sector; and the development of a sound financial structure.³⁷ All of these development issues were to be addressed in Zambia’s First National Development Plan, to be discussed in Chapter 4.

Economic Sanctions

As early as late 1964, Great Britain was insisting that all members of the Commonwealth participate in sanctions against Rhodesia in order to quell the rising

³⁶ NAZ, FA 1-1-46 “Rhodesia: Economic Sanctions and Zambia,” Rhodesia Political, January 5, 1965.

³⁷ NAZ, FA 1-1-135, F. M. Mulikita, “Zambia and Southern Rhodesia (The Possible Cutting of Trade Ties: A Study Prepared by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zambia to the United Nations,” Rhodesia-Political, March 1966.

rebellion. Prime Minister Harold Wilson's plan was to bring the Smith regime down quickly, within a matter of weeks, through economic sanctions that depended on the cooperation of Zambia. However, Rhodesia did not believe that Great Britain, nor the rest of the international community, would follow through with its threat. Prime Minister Harold Wilson, in a British Information Services Statement on Rhodesia, responded to Rhodesia calling Great Britain's "bluff" by stating:

Her Majesty's Government adhere to the statement issued on 27th October, 1964. It expressed the view that the economic effects of a unilateral declaration would be disastrous to the prosperity and prospects of the people of Rhodesia and that Rhodesia's external trade would be disrupted. Nothing that has happened in the last six months has afforded reasons for modifying this judgment in any way.³⁸

Wilson explained that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers approved sanctions and would not recognize the illegal Rhodesian government. However, this did not take into account the situation that Zambia would be placed in as such sanctions became mandatory.³⁹

Specifically, sanctions for Rhodesia were intended by Great Britain to have three stages of effects. In the first stage, there would be a shortage of consumer goods, which would affect retail shops, and, in particular, the European community. The second stage

³⁸ NAZ, FA 1-1-36, "British Information Services, London Press Service: Mr. Harold Wilson's Statement on Rhodesia," Rhodesia Political Activities, April 30, 1965.

³⁹ NAZ, FA 1-1-36, "British Information Services, London Press Service: Mr. Harold Wilson's Statement on Rhodesia," Rhodesia Political Activities, April 30, 1965.

would have a great effect on the industrial and agricultural sectors, including a lack of raw materials, oil, and spare parts. In the third and final stage, according to British High Commissioner to Zambia, W. L. B. Monson, in an aid memoire to D. C. Mwiinga, the Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, “If the illegal regime hangs on to the bitter end the third stage will be a rapid inflation brought on by grave shortages of consumer goods...This, together with the decline in commercial and industrial activity, will lead to a complete collapse of business confidence and the regime’s economy will cease to be viable.”⁴⁰

The Zambian government paid close attention to the unfolding situation, particularly in terms of economic sanctions. By April 1965, it seemed only a matter of time before Rhodesia declared U.D.I., but no one knew exactly when. Zambian High Commissioner to Great Britain, S. C. Katinlunga, in a meeting with Bottomley, expressed that he believed Smith would not declare U.D.I. until after Rhodesia had sold its tobacco crop (usually sometime between July and September). As Rhodesia’s largest and most important export, Katinlunga argued, Smith would want to ensure that Rhodesia was able to export its tobacco before economic sanctions made it impossible. Bottomley, however, argued that “economic sanctions were economic and would not be confined to tobacco.”⁴¹ While of course Bottomley was correct in stating that economic sanctions

⁴⁰ NAZ, FA 1-1-46, W. L. B. Monson, “Aide Memoire: Economic Sanctions against Rhodesia,” Rhodesia-Political, February 23, 1966.

⁴¹ NAZ, FA 1-1-36, S. C. Katinlunga, “Letter to S. M. Kapwepwe,” Rhodesia Political Activities, April 7, 1965.

would not be limited to tobacco, it was obviously Rhodesia's most significant commodity and had bearing on Smith's decision making regarding U.D.I. Katinlunga argued, "From this account it would be seen that the British approach to the Rhodesia situation is negative, defensive, and full of wishful thinking...My view is that the longer the situation is left as it is, the more organised and consolidated the white Rhodesians become."⁴²

As Terence Ranger argues, Great Britain "under the direction of Dr. David Owen as Foreign Minister, had been keen to devolve the task to a large extent upon third parties, mainly the United States and the United Nations."⁴³ This had its intended effects: The United States, in a memo to the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the U.S. would, as of February 1966, stop all exports to Rhodesia, per the United Nations Security Council Resolution of November 20, 1965 on Southern Rhodesia, which were valued at US\$21 million in 1964.⁴⁴ Specifically, Resolution 216 of November 12, 1965 had condemned U.D.I. and called upon "all States not to recognize this illegal racist minority regime...and to refrain from rendering any assistance."⁴⁵

⁴² NAZ, FA 1-1-36, S. C. Katinlunga, "Letter to S. M. Kapwepwe," Rhodesia Political Activities, April 7, 1965.

⁴³ Xan Smiley, "Zimbabwe, Southern Africa and the Rise of Robert Mugabe," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 5 (Summer, 1980):1066.

⁴⁴ NAZ, FA 1-1-46, Embassy of the United States of America, "No. 55," Rhodesia-Political, February 24, 1966.

⁴⁵ United Nations, UN Security Council Resolutions, "Resolution 216: Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia," November 12, 1965, <http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1965/scres65.htm>.

Great Britain was serious about the enforcement of UN sanctions and wrote several memos to Zambia regarding “Evasion of Sanctions.” In November 1967, the First Secretary of the British High Commission, D. F. B. LeBreton, presented the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with information from “reliable commercial sources” that aircraft spares were sent from Zambia to Rhodesia via Chirundu around September 7 and helicopter spares around September 22.⁴⁶ LeBreton noted that such trade was a violation of the United Nations Security Council “Mandatory Sanctions” Resolution Number 232 of December 1966, and that Zambia “will doubtless wish to make enquiries from the Customs or other appropriate authorities with a view to ascertaining the trust or otherwise of these reports.”⁴⁷ Great Britain’s hard line on sanctions was not only for Zambia, however, and extended to the economic community. In a January 1968 memo, Great Britain listed the Netherlands, Bahrain, Japan, France, Germany, United Kingdom, and Zambia as having countries that had evaded sanctions, with a stern warning even to companies from within the UK.⁴⁸

The actual reality of sanctions was that their effectiveness was questionable. As Anglin explains, “the crunch never came. Britain did little to mobilize the necessary resources and, instead, allowed Wilson’s target date of February 15, 1966 for initiation of

⁴⁶ Chirundu is a town located on the southwest border between Zambia and Zimbabwe.

⁴⁷ NAZ, FA 1-1-227, D. F. B. LeBreton, “Evasion of Sanctions,” Mandatory Sanctions against Rhodesia, November 1, 1967.

⁴⁸ NAZ, FA 1-1-227, British Government, “Evasion of Sanctions,” Mandatory Sanctions against Rhodesia, January 8, 1968.

the cataclysmic confrontation to pass uneventful.”⁴⁹ Every two weeks the British government produced an Intelligence Report for Rhodesia, outlining the effects of economic sanctions. In the report for the period of June 2-15, 1966, the British reported what they believe to be success. It was believed that Rhodesia would not earn more than £5-10 million from tobacco sales and that the cost of living had increased from £107.1 in November 1965 to £109.5 in May 1966. Furthermore, the report noted, from January to March of 1966, there had only been 402 emigrants to Rhodesia, in comparison with the 1343 emigrants out of Rhodesia.⁵⁰ Zambia, however, disagreed with these positive reports, saying that the most important aspects, like the British oil embargo, were not successful. Zambia argued that the effectiveness of the oil embargo was severely limited by not blocking South African ports, since South Africa and Portugal seemed keen to continue supplying Rhodesia.⁵¹

Zambia’s explanation for Great Britain’s lax attitude towards South Africa was evidenced by their “special relationship.” UK investments in South Africa totaled nearly £1,000,000,000, or over half the foreign capital. Out of all the countries in which Great Britain held direct foreign investments, the largest returns came from South Africa and South Africa is Britain’s third largest export market. Furthermore, in 1964, Great

⁴⁹ Douglas Anglin, “Zambian Crisis Behaviour,” 587.

⁵⁰ NAZ, FA 1-1-135, British Government, “ Rhodesia Intelligence Report No. 16, For Period 2 – 15 June, 1966,” Rhodesia-Political.

⁵¹ NAZ, FA 1-1-158, “ Zambian High Commission London Report,” Zambia Mission London Reports, April 15, 1966.

Britain's exports to South Africa had totaled £225,000,000, leaving Great Britain with a very favorable trade balance.⁵² Therefore, despite the fact South Africa had a racist apartheid regime and was still participating in trade with Rhodesia despite economic sanctions, the British did stop its own trade or consider South Africa in its reports.

Contingency Planning

Zambia, therefore, in an attempt to protect its vital economic interests, only agreed to participate in sanctions if Great Britain shouldered the financial costs to Zambia associated with U.D.I. The actual declaration of U.D.I., after so much build-up, was so that “Rhodesia’s illegal declaration of independence translated a hypothetical situation into a concrete challenge and injected a sense of urgency and realism into the discussions on contingency planning.”⁵³ In a report on the “Financial Cost of Action Arising from the Rhodesian Rebellion,” the Zambian government made it clear it believed that “Rhodesia is a British responsibility” and therefore the costs to Zambia were also a British responsibility.⁵⁴ The document further explains that Zambia is willing to comply with a resolution of the United Nations Security Council even if that means hardship for

⁵² NAZ, FA 1-1-158, “Zambian High Commission London Report,” Zambia Mission London Reports, April 15, 1966.

⁵³ Douglas Anglin, “Zambian Crisis Behaviour,” 587.

⁵⁴ NAZ, FA 1-1-66, Republic of Zambia, “Financial Cost of Action Arising from the Rhodesian Rebellion,” Rhodesia Political Activities, November 27, 1965.

Zambian citizens. However, in return, Zambia does “expect such a plan to be integrated with a plan of action to mitigate this damage.”⁵⁵

Great Britain did begin contingency planning for Zambia, but Kaunda and other Zambian government officials were not an easy sell on any front. In a report from A. W. Shelling, a British official reporting on a November 1965 ministerial mission to Zambia, he described “President Kaunda’s present frame of mind” as being closed and even hostile to the British plan.⁵⁶ This was partly to do with the fact that contingency planning for Zambia seemed less focused on Zambia and more focused on Great Britain, as evidenced by a report from the United Kingdom Board of Trade. Sir Norman Kipping, after a mission to Zambia, explained, “As emerges from the report, there was no question of our being able to boost British exports. The Zambians were in no mood to talk about this, and some were suspicious that export promotion was one of our main aims.”⁵⁷

Zambia not only disagreed with the British plans to mitigate economic damage, but fundamentally with the idea of economic sanctions as a policy. Specifically, Rhodesia refused to grant the transport of arms and ammunition to Zambia. In a statement to Zambia regarding the refusal, the Rhodesian government explained that “while

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ PRO DO 209/1, A. W. Shelling, “Ministerial Mission to Zambia,” Unilateral Declaration of Independence Rhodesia: Steps to Mitigate Economic Damage to Zambia, November 30, 1965.

⁵⁷ PRO DO 209/1, C. E. Walker, “Sir Norman Kipping’s Mission to Zambia,” Unilateral Declaration of Independence Rhodesia: Steps to Mitigate Economic Damage to Zambia, December 1965.

recognising its obligation” under the Convention Relative to the Port of Beira and Connected Railways, it would still deny the passage of these goods to Zambia.⁵⁸ More importantly, however, was the threat to Zambia’s energy supply. Zambia depended on Rhodesia, either directly or indirectly through transport, for oil, coal, and hydro-electric power from the shared power station at Kariba Dam. In a November 1965 Press Release, the Zambian government blamed Great Britain for Rhodesia’s breaching of the Beira Convention, as “It is a matter of record that the British government is ultimately responsible for the external affairs of Rhodesia.”⁵⁹

Using the United Nations as a platform, F. M. Mulikita, Zambian Ambassador to the UN, argued that “economic measures have failed to produce the desired political results,” and that the only means of quelling the rebellion would have to be force. He maintained that he did not believe Great Britain “was justified in coming to the Security Council to ask for an endorsement of measure which do not go far enough to meet the situation” and that, if sanctions were to be adopted, “Zambia would be more hurt than Southern Rhodesia.”⁶⁰ For it was true, despite not actively participating in sanctions, the Zambian economy was already feeling the effects of sanctions against Rhodesia. By December of 1965, Zambia went so far as to entertain discussions in the OAU of severing

⁵⁸ UNIP 7/22/8, “Rhodesia: No Passage for Zambian Arms,” October 6, 1965.

⁵⁹ NAZ, FA 1-1-16, “Press Release,” Relations with S. Rhodesia, November 1, 1965.

⁶⁰ NAZ, FA 1-1-46, “Zambian Mission to the United Nations Special Report on Southern Rhodesia,” Rhodesia Political, April 9, 1966.

diplomatic relations with Great Britain in response to safeguarding the Kariba Power Dam.⁶¹

British officials vehemently denied causing damage to the Zambian economy. In a May 10, 1966 letter from British official Harold Wilson to President Kaunda, Wilson stated, “Some remarks which your Foreign Minister...has been making here have, frankly, suggested mistrust of our intentions. The fact is, of course, that at least half our energies over the past six months have been devoted to ensuring that, in the process of bringing the rebellion in Rhodesia to heel, we did not at the same time stifle the economy of Zambia.”⁶² Yet that is exactly what British policy did, putting Zambia in a “precarious position,” both politically and economically.⁶³

The Outcome in Rhodesia

By mid-1969, the negotiations between Great Britain and Rhodesia, as well as those negotiations in the international community, had not yet produced a decision. At the Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference earlier that year, discussions on Rhodesia led to a call by leaders for Great Britain to withdraw the “Fearless” proposals.

⁶¹ UNIP, 7/22/8, “The Government of the Republic of Zambia on U.D.I.,” Press Releases, December 15, 1965.

⁶² NAZ, FA 1-1-36, British Information Services, London Press Service, “Mr. Harold Wilson’s Statement on Rhodesia,” Rhodesia Political Activities, April 30, 1965.

⁶³ NAZ, FA 1-1-66, V. J. Mwaanga, “Letter from the Embassy of the Republic of Zambia (USSR) to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” Rhodesia Political, November 26, 1965.

However, Great Britain wanted to leave the proposals on the table to give Rhodesia an opportunity to make a decision.⁶⁴ In February, Smith published a summary of new constitutional proposals to make the racial division of Rhodesia permanent.⁶⁵

By May, Smith determined that “hopes of a negotiated settlement with Her Majesty’s Government had ended,” and he believed that, through the negotiations, Great Britain had been too “obsessed” with the issue of majority rule.⁶⁶ In a white paper on Rhodesia from the British government regarding talks aboard the HMS “Fearless,” it explained that a “‘Disagreement on fundamental issues’ still remained, and recorded recognition by both sides that ‘a very wide gulf’ still remained between them on certain issues.”⁶⁷ There had been nine full scale meetings between Thomson and Ian Smith and his staff, but still no agreement.

The international community had also not reached a consensus on the continuance of sanctions, with a June 1969 Security Council vote falling one vote short of passing “Afro-Asian demands for more stringent punitive measures.”⁶⁸ Voting in favor of the measures included Algeria, China, Hungary, Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal, the Soviet Union,

⁶⁴ NAZ, FA 1-1-310, “Rhodesia: White Paper,” Rhodesia-Political, June 3, 1969.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ NAZ, FA 1-1-310, “Inward Telegram from Zambian New York to Foreign Lusaka,” Rhodesia-Political, June 25, 1969.

and Zambia.⁶⁹ Abstaining from this vote included Great Britain, the United States, France, Paraguay, Colombia, Finland, and Spain.⁷⁰ Finland was “too close” to Great Britain to be able to take a line, and although Zambia believed it had the support of Spain, because Spain needed the Afro-Asian vote on Gibraltar, they also abstained due to their “neighbourly ties with Portugal.”⁷¹ Regarding the countries of Latin America, the Deputy Permanent Minister to the United Nations, L. S. Muuka, explained, “despite the common sentiments of the so-called third world that we share with them, are extremely unhelpful on African questions. They merely tow the line of the United States.”⁷² The question, however, was whether the Security Council Resolution even mattered. Great Britain had said that it would not use force against Rhodesia, and the opinion of the international community seemed more symbolic than realistic.

At the end of June, 1969, Rhodesia declared itself a republic. In the first republican elections in April 1970, Africans, with a population of 5,000,000, gained a total of 16 seats in parliament. The Europeans, with a population of 250,000, were granted 50 seats.⁷³ However, while the Rhodesians had succeeded in removing the influence of the British government, they were not successful in gaining international

⁶⁹ NAZ, FA 1-1-310, L. S. Muuka, “Letter to Mark C. Chona, Special Assistant to the President,” July 3, 1969.

⁷⁰ NAZ, FA 1-1-310, “Inward Telegram from Zambian New York to Foreign Lusaka,” Rhodesia-Political, June 25, 1969.

⁷¹ NAZ, FA 1-1-310, L. S. Muuka, “Letter to Mark C. Chona, Special Assistant to the President,” July 3, 1969.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ NAZ, FA 1-1-310, “The Rhodesian Elections,” Rhodesia-Political, April 10, 1970.

recognition. Fighting also escalated throughout the 1970s between the Rhodesian government and revolutionary forces ZAPU and ZANU. Finally, in 1978, an agreement was signed by the Rhodesian government and two nationalist parties, a portion of the resident ZANU party and the United African Nation Council (UANC). However, exiled parties, including a large portion of ZANU and ZAPU, and therefore went unrecognized internationally. It was not until December 1979 that Rhodesia had fully participatory, internationally observed and regulated elections. For four months, Rhodesia came back under British control, and was declared the Republic of Zimbabwe in April 1980.

Conclusion

Mitigating the damage caused by Rhodesian U.D.I. was a top priority and a huge pre-occupation for the Zambian government after 1965. While it was clear from the outset that an independent Zambia needed to work towards economic independence from Rhodesia, the situation in Rhodesia simply escalated too quickly. The obvious first place to turn for help in mitigating the damage caused by instability in Rhodesia was Great Britain. However, rather than providing real support for Zambia, British officials pressured the Zambian government to participate in international sanctions against the Smith regime. However, Rhodesia was Zambia's largest trading partner and the route through which most of its exports and imports travelled, making it literally impossible for Zambia to simply cut all economic ties. This caused great strain in relations between

Zambia and Great Britain, providing a greater impetus to turn towards other sources of aid and assistance.

How much had the regional situation harmed the economic development of Zambia? There are many ways to answer this question, one of the most basic being a comparison of gold and foreign reserves of the Northern Rhodesian Central Bank and the Bank of Zambia. In July 1964, just a few months prior to independence, the Total Gold Reserve was £5,320,429 and the Foreign Assets held at £48,973,528.⁷⁴ However, two years later, and after the declaration of U.D.I., the Total Gold Reserve was £1,272,734 and the Foreign Assets held at £27,528,500.⁷⁵ Yet, with both political and economic policies and negotiations to ensure development, these numbers rose by September 1957 to £2,071,300 and £31,918,793, respectively.⁷⁶ What caused it to rise rather than fall? The Zambian economic development agenda was primarily motivated by regional issues particularly in Rhodesia. Yet in the First National Development Plan, discussed in the next chapter, Zambian leaders sought to create an agenda that would ensure economic development.

⁷⁴ PRO, CO 670/36, "Statement of Assets and Liabilities," Northern Rhodesia Gazette, July 10, 1964, p. 538.

⁷⁵ PRO, CO 670/42, "Schedule: Bank of Zambia," Zambia Gazette, September 30, 1966, p. 729.

⁷⁶ PRO, CO 670/45, Bank of Zambia, "Schedule," Zambia Gazette, Zambia Gazette: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, September 8, 1967, p. 614.

CHAPTER FOUR: TRADE, AID, AND NON-ALIGNMENT

“If our advice is not followed God knows we make mistakes.””

- George Woods, President of the World Bank¹

Zambian economic policy was heavily influenced by both the goals of the Transitional and First National Development Plans and the policy of non-alignment. According to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in 1966, the general principle of Zambian trade was to be one of “multilateralism and non-discriminatory treatment.”² For Zambia, the priority was not which countries it would trade with, but rather it would “deal with all countries to the extent to which it suits Zambia to do so,” so long as Zambia was receiving the “maximum advantage.”³ Zambia was not concerned with a bilateral balance with each individual trading partner and it adopted a policy of a single column non-preferential customs tariff.

Specifically, through the policy of its First National Development Plan, Zambia was concerned with implementing a general import and export control to deal with the escalating situation in Rhodesia. The three main goals of this policy were to: (i) prevent stress on transport facilities; (ii) restrict and prohibit Rhodesian goods (at the time only

¹ NAZ, FA 1-1-167, “Notes of the Zambia Delegation to Washington Led by the Hon. R. C. Kamanga, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mid-January, 1968,” World Bank, January 1968.

² NAZ, FA 1-1-199, “Ministry of Commerce and Industry: Trade Policy,” Zambia Trade Policy, January 6, 1966.

³ Ibid.

non-essential items); and (iii) divert imports and exports to alternative routes. However, it was crucial to Zambia that these goals be realized only with respect to the principles of non-preferential, and non-aligned, trading. As a leave-over from the colonial government, Zambia possessed preferential agreements with Portugal and South Africa, which, by 1966, had already been terminated. It was also in the process of cancelling preferential agreements with Bechuanaland (Botswana), Canada, and Australia. In exchange for these preferential agreements, Zambia was considering joining several economic communities, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the East African Common Market. All of these factors were considered as Zambia developed an economic policy that would take into account its own political and economic ideals, as well as the international context in which the new nation found itself.

Zambia's First National Development Plan

Zambian economic development was based on a combination of both western and communist development ideologies, in its unique ideology of humanism. The desire for economic development was reflected in the tagline to the Zambian government owned newspaper, the *Times of Zambia*. Every paper, every day, read “Forward with the Nation.” The question, however, was how to best go about this forward movement. The most nuanced insight into Zambia’s economic development ideology specifically in the 1960s is the First National Development Plan, published and implemented in 1966. Although Zambia had produced a Transitional Development Plan immediately after

independence, the First National Development Plan was much more comprehensive and less influenced by Great Britain and the process of decolonization.

The purpose of the First National Development Plan was to “mobilise available resources and favourable factors, in order to eliminate the obstacles to economic and social development in Zambia and thus establish the conditions for a dynamic and sustained growth of the economy.”⁴ The favorable factors were identified as:

A stable Government;

A substantial source of revenue and of foreign exchange derived from copper mining;

A population desirous for self-improvement and hard work;

A considerable agriculture potential due to abundant soil and water resources and favourable climatic factors;

A large hydro-electric potential;

A basic transport network covering much of the country, though incompletely;

Stable industrial and labour relations.⁵

The unfavorable factors included the geographical position of Zambia and its colonial history, as well as others “which are common to other developing countries.”

The Plan points to the economic, political, and social make-up of the Central African

⁴ NAZ, Office of National Development and Planning, “First National Development Plan,” 1966, 1.

⁵ Ibid.

Federation as being the main reason for an “unfavourable environment” in Zambia after independence. The loss of revenue from the Federation was estimated at £60-70 million, and the concentration of industrial development in Southern Rhodesia ensured further losses, particularly in light of Rhodesian U.D.I. Therefore, it was necessary that Zambia, in its First National Development Plan, lay out a way to guarantee “the utilisation of local materials, the training of local people, and the orientation of industrial production to specifically Zambian needs,” which “has all to be established from scratch.”⁶

With these problems and goals in mind, Zambia laid out the eight objectives of the Plan:

- (i) To diversify the economy so that the copper industry is not the only main employer...and so that a greater proportion of domestic demand is satisfied by domestic production from a large industrial base;
- (ii) To increase employment by at least 100,000 jobs during the course of the plan;
- (iii) To increase average monetary output per head from £61 per annum in 1964 to about £100 per annum in 1970;

⁶ Ibid. An outcome of the transition from the Central African Federation to an independent Zambia also made the availability of pre-1964 difficult to come by for the Office of National Development and Planning. In the section describing “Planning Procedures” it explain, “Resource data is generally inadequate in a developing country and Zambia is no exception. The statistical procedure has been further complicated by the break-up of the Federation so that much basic data is only available after 1st January 1964, on the basis of the former Federal territory” (9). However, the data described in this document is the best that Zambia had, and what Zambia used to determine its economic planning and strategy and is therefore a relevant inclusion in this study.

- (iv) To maintain reasonable price stability;
- (v) To minimise the inherited economic imbalance between the urban and rural sectors with a view to raising the capacity of the latter sector for transforming resources into social and economic growth;
- (vi) To raise rapidly the general levels of education, as well as develop a wide range of specific technical, administrative, executive, professional and management skills in the population;
- (vii) To provide more and better living accommodation as a requisite ingredient of a better standard of living, and to raise the general level of social welfare;
- (viii) To develop new communications, sources of energy, transport and other economic infrastructure for a new economic order.⁷

These changes to the domestic economy would take place against a background of “rapid” population increase (estimated to grow from 3,712,000 in 1965 to 4,364,000 in 1970).⁸ With the increase in population in mind, in real numbers Zambia sought to raise its gross domestic product to approximately £400 million (in 1964 prices), or a real growth rate of 11 percent per annum.⁹

⁷ Ibid., 5.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

Table 4.1 Gross Domestic Product (£m. - 1964 prices)

Industrial Origin	1964	1970	% Increase
Agriculture	9.1	15.6	71
Mining	118.8	193.1	63
Manufacturing	13.1	32.2	146
Construction	10.2	30.3	198
Commerce	22.5	48.8	117
Transport	10.3	19.6	90
Services	34.5	85.1	147
Total	218.5	424.7	94

Source: National Archives of Zambia, Office of National Development and Planning,
“First National Development Plan.

An increase in GDP was also expected to be coupled with an increase in per capita GDP, and therefore also in the level of consumption. Consequently, the new levels of consumption implied “substantial increases in imports” to satisfy domestic demand. The projected outcome of this demand was that “The effect of the rapid import-substitution which will take place as a result of the expected increase in manufacturing output can be seen better in the composition of imports which are more heavily weighted in favour of investment goods, rather than in the absolute level of imports.”¹⁰ The level of exports, on the other hand, depended “almost entirely on the price and output of

¹⁰ Ibid., 6.

copper.”¹¹ Although the first objective of the Plan was “To diversify the economy so that the copper industry is not the only main employer...and so that a greater proportion of domestic demand is satisfied by domestic production from a large industrial base,” in reality, the focus of the economy was still largely on copper. The reduction in copper dependency was seen as a “longer-term objective,” and the 1964 level of copper exports of 92.2 percent was even raised to 92.6 percent of GDP at a rate of increase of real exports of 45 percent (See Table 5.2).¹² While this seems to go against all development ideologies, Zambia believed that “In such a financial position it is important neither to hoard nor to squander the nation’s resources but to use them for productive investment.”¹³ However, Zambia also recognized that “If copper prices falls development would have to be increasingly financed by external borrowing,” which is exactly what was to happen in the 1970s.¹⁴

¹¹ Ibid., 7.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., 13.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Table 4.2 Exports (£m. - 1964 prices)

Export	1964	1970	+ % (1966-1970)
Agriculture	3.5	4.6	31
Minerals	162.1	235.7	45
Tourism	1.9	3.0	58
Others	8.3	11.6	40
Total Foreign Exchange	175.8	254.5	45

Source: National Archives of Zambia, Office of National Development and Planning, “First National Development Plan.”

A “major aim” of the First National Development Plan, was to “substantially” increase the amount of this GDP that was allocated to capital investment. Under the Transitional Development Plan, the proportion of GDP dedicated to capital investment was 20 percent, in what was described as “a high figure compared with many African countries.” However, in 1970, the intention was for the level of capital investment to reach £107.9 million (£55.1 million public and £58.5 million private investment) or approximately 25 percent of the project gross domestic product.¹⁵ Total capital investment for 1966-1970 was £429 million, or £282 million from the public sector and

¹⁵ Ibid., 6.

£147 million from the private sector.¹⁶ This rate was a 100 percent increase from previous expenditure and was explained as “a very large and ambitious increase but justified for two reasons.” The first was that capital investment had fallen since 1957 in Zambia, and the second was that public investment was expected to outweigh private investment in the short term (See Table 5.3).¹⁷

Table 4.3 Capital Investment (£m. - 1964 prices)

Savings and Credit (33.0)	Public Finance (287.8)	Total (620.8)
Self Financing		3.0
Internal Loans		30.0
	External Loans and Foreign	63.0
	Aid	
	Domestic Resources (Public	524.8
	Sector)	

Source: National Archives of Zambia, Office of National Development and Planning, “First National Development Plan.”

First and foremost, capital investment was to be financed by copper production. With this in mind, the Zambian government’s taxation policy was to be guided by two main principles. The first was “the broadening of the tax-base in so far as compatible

¹⁶ Ibid., 11. The private sector investment was estimated from projections from the mining sector.

¹⁷ Ibid.

with equity, in order to assure the maximum participation of the population as well as contributing to the national treasure.” The second described “examining the existing tax rates and opportunities for new taxes.”¹⁸ Specifically, this meant that the government was considering raising the maximum level of personal income tax (then at 45 percent) and increasing excise duties on luxury goods with elastic demand, such as alcohol and tobacco, while giving special preference to imports directly related to development.¹⁹ Taxes, from both copper and from smaller revenues such as income taxes and tariffs, were seen as “the most immediate instrument of stabilization as many commercial banks were controlled externally and still “instinctively respond to the changes in the interest rate of the former metropolitan country.”²⁰

The next largest contributor to capital investment, and of particular concern in the Cold War era, was external loans and foreign aid. In 1966, Zambia received what it described as “negligible quantities of external capital aid compared with that mobilised from domestic resources.” However, it did identify technical and administrative personnel assistance as being a crucial “factor in maintaining the efficient functioning of essential Government services.” While the focus was on maintaining and improving self-sufficiency, particularly through the copper industry, Zambia also recognized the need for further monetary assistance beyond the role of foreign experts. Specifically, Zambia

¹⁸ Ibid., 13.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

identified “long-term infrastructure” projects, such as the Kafue Hydro-Electric Scheme, the University of Zambia, road construction, and the Tanzania-Zambia railway, as projects for which it sought to “seek external finance for some major development projects.” The finance was defined as being mostly external loans (£58.0 million) and much less on foreign aid (£5.0 million).²¹

Zambia recognized the danger of inflation and a running down of the Foreign Exchange Reserve that such a large injection of capital into a self-described “narrowly based economy.” However, the intention was that inflation would be controlled through “the adoption and vigorous application of fiscal and financial policies by government to relate wages to productivity, to control imports, and to regulate and direct the supply of credit.” It was believed that inflation would be “cost-push” inflation, or one related to “wage increases not related to productivity, or of restrictive practices, or inadequate financial control on Government contracts, or supply-bottlenecks, or shortage of skilled personnel.” There was also the potential of “demand-pull” inflation, related to a rising income disparity, supply difficulties, and monopolies.²²

Both “cost-push” and “demand-pull” inflation were supply-determined, which Zambia determined could only be dealt with by “securing a free flow of raw materials and consumer goods against expanding demand.” This, of course, was also the major problem that Zambia faced in light of its regional situation. It seemed unlikely that

²¹ Ibid., 15.

²² Ibid., 12.

Zambia could develop according to its Plan without serious consideration of the situation in southern Africa. The Plan identified four distinct areas that were necessary in combating supply-determined inflation, and in turn the situation in southern Africa, generally and Rhodesia, specifically:

- (i) developing alternative transport routes, especially towards East Africa, to facilitate diversification of sources of supply;
- (ii) development of import-substitution industries for products whose manufacture is economically or technically feasible;
- (iii) the substitution of locally produced for imported raw materials;
- (iv) the employment of outside consultants to advise on improved tendering procedures and practices, as well as the costs of materials in order to forestall undue rise in development costs.²³

For land-locked Zambia, even in the absence of external conflict, a fully functioning economy relied on routes to and from the sea. The Plan notes that “even before the political events of 1965 in Rhodesia, the transport routes to the south were already proving inadequate for the greatly increased traffic consequent on Zambia’s rapid economic development since Independence.”²⁴ As will be discussed further in Chapter 5, the alternative route to Rhodesia Railways, running through Angola and the Congo, had its own problems as well, including Central African Federation restrictions on the use of

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., 39.

railways other than the Rhodesia line, and the reliance of Katanga in the Congo on Benguela, leaving very little opportunity for Zambian use. Consequently, routes out through Tanzania, both railways and roadways, became a crucial part of the First National Development Plan, as it argued, “It is obvious that Zambia cannot freely develop her economic potential unless she can import and export goods, without restriction from the outside.”²⁵

As a leave-over from the colonial era, Zambia was faced with an extreme shortage of skilled and educated manpower. For Zambia, “as long as this scarcity lasts, Independence will be incomplete.”²⁶ Therefore, Zambia set out an ambitious plan to ensure self-sufficiency in skilled labor, one of its major long-term goals. However, until an adequate level of self-sufficiency could be reached, Zambia recognized that “a good deal of recruitment from abroad will be necessary, both in the private sector and in Government.”²⁷ Conditions were set in place to ensure that outside technical and administrative assistance would be enthusiastic, paid at a competitive rate that did not create too large a disparity between the expatriate and local populations, and a “definite plan for training a Zambian replacement for every expatriate recruited from abroad.”²⁸

By the second half of the twentieth century, international organizations were playing a very prominent and influential role in global politics. The creation of the United

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid., 75.

²⁷ Ibid., 77.

²⁸ Ibid.

Nations after the end of the Second World War ushered in a new age of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations. These new organizations would play the role of creating and sustaining international linkages, replacing the linkages created by empires in the period of decolonization. Therefore, as African nations slowly became independent nation states in the 1950s, 60s, 70s, they were immediately thrown into the increasingly growing international community. Organizations such as the United Nations in particular, but also international nongovernmental organizations, such as human rights NGOs and continent specific international organizations such as the Organization for African Unity (OAU), played an important part in determining African nations' roles in the global community.

The newly independent nations of Africa were also able to use these organizations to leverage their political and economic influence. Zambia, in its attempts to remain non-aligned in all aspects of its policy, played an active role in a number of international organizations. Even more important for Zambia, however, was its regional role in Southern and Central Africa. As a landlocked nation, Zambia greatly depended on peaceful borders with the free flow of goods in order to ensure political, economic, and social prosperity. In the 1960s in decolonizing Africa this was too often an elusive dream. Almost all of the eight nations along Zambia's borders were involved in some form of conflict, and this had profound effects on Zambia's stability. It was in part through international organizations that Zambia was able to negotiate these regional conflicts, in

gaining both allies and intermediaries as well as negotiating for continued political and economic development in the face of potential hardship.

Copper Diplomacy

As discussed above, for Zambia the economy meant one thing: copper. Copper represented a huge portion of Zambia's exported commodities in the years directly following independence and therefore required its own dedicated policy and diplomatic efforts. Always the willing and able host, Zambia extended this to its relationship with the copper producing community by hosting the 1967 Copper Conference on the theme of co-operation amongst developing nations. Held from June 1 – 8, 1967, the conference convened delegates from Chile, Congo (Kinshasa), Peru, and Zambia, with Botswana, Uganda, and several special agencies holding observer status.

The conference was labeled as a “historic” event, as the international community believed that the “developing” copper producing countries were “incapable” of reaching their true output potential.²⁹ The participants of the conference denied this belief, choosing rather to believe that “In actuality developing nations have far greater potentialities than they believe to have.”³⁰ Development was defined as requiring

²⁹ NAZ, FA 1-1-202, “A Public Relations Background to the Copper Conference on the Theme of Co-operation among Developing Nations,” Copper Conference Lusaka, 1967, 3-4.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

“sustained initiatives and the readiness to co-operate for concerted effort with the countries similarly placed,” and that, therefore, is what the conference focused on.³¹

The goals of the conference were defined as: (i) to reach a reasonable price level for copper exports; (ii) to achieve a level of short-term and long-term planned production; (iii) price stability; (iv) minimizing substitutions; (v) the development of a marketing machinery that would ensure reasonable prices and stability; and (vi) the development of a marketing strategy that would give governments the geographic and economic control of the sale of copper.³² In order to achieve these goals, the conference delegates created the Inter-Governmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC), a joint-body establishment that was to have its headquarters in Paris. The joint-body was to be made up of a Conference of Ministers (for policy making), a Governing Board of government representatives, and a Copper Information Bureau (to compile and assess past, current, and future marketing trends).³³

The four main delegates of the conference, Zambia, Chile, Peru, and Congo, believed the “magnitude of their contribution to world copper production and trade they are conscious of their responsibility in providing adequate supplies of copper at fair and remunerative prices.”³⁴ This was, in fact, a legitimate assumption and the creation of

³¹ Ibid., 4.

³² Ibid.

³³ NAZ, FA 1-1-202, “Copper Conference Zambia Press Release Number 025: Copper Exporters Set Up Joint Body,” Copper Conference Lusaka, June 15, 1967.

³⁴ Ibid.

CIPEC was taken seriously by the international community. For instance, immediately after CIPEC's formation, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development requested an "exploratory meeting" with the copper organization.³⁵ CIPEC was to play a huge role in the price and marketing of copper globally and it still governs these activities, with the addition of several new members, today.

United Nations

Since the end of the Second World War, certainly the most famous, and infamous, international governmental organization has been the United Nations (UN). Founded in 1945, replacing the defunct League of Nations, the UN was founded to promote peace as well as progress, both economically and socially. By the time of the independence process in Africa in the 1960s, the UN had already faced several internal and external challenges: internal conflict amongst members of the Security Council (including the ousting of the People's Republic of China for the Republic of China in 1946) and numerous external conflicts from the increasingly global Cold War. Although another great war was avoided, the capabilities of the UN were increasingly tested, including in many decolonizing African states.

While many of the member states of the United Nations were advocates of decolonization, and although the overall charter dictated the sovereignty of states,

³⁵ Ibid.

including those in Africa, there was still the necessity for peacekeeping operations. The first UN peacekeeping operation was in 1948, to maintain the ceasefire in the Arab-Israeli War. The need for peacekeeping forces continued as the Cold War escalated and decolonization continued with forces being sent to India and Pakistan, South Korea, the Suez Canal, Cyprus, and, with the culmination of independence movements in Africa, the Congo. The longest peacekeeping operation in UN history, as well as the most notorious, the mission to the Congo was proof to the world of the decidedly western agenda of the United Nations.³⁶

Yet peacekeeping operations, historically and contemporarily speaking, are not the only function of the United Nations. For developing countries, the role is also on development, particularly economic development. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was founded in 1965 through the merger of the United Nations Special Fund and the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance.³⁷ The UNDP, therefore, was then focused on both aid as well as specific technical assistance. For Zambia, the United Nations had influence not through peacekeeping, but rather through the UNDP, which

³⁶ See Georges Abi-Saab, *The United Nations Operation in the Congo, 1960-64* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). On United Nations and peacekeeping operations, see Paul Kennedy, *Parliament of Man: the Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations* (New York: Random House, 2006); Stephen Ryan, *The United Nations and International Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); and Norrie MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960* (London: Longman, 2002).

³⁷ See Stanley Meiser, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995); and Adekeye Adebajo, *From Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa and the United Nations* (Scottsville, South Africa: University of Kwa-Zulu-Natal Press, 2009);

immediately held an important economic role in the development of the country. By April of 1964, six months before independence, the United Nations Technical Assistance Board began developing a presence.³⁸

Immediately following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Rhodesia, the UN played an important role in contingency planning for Zambia. The main foci for the Zambia government, as conveyed to the United Nations Technical Assistance Board representative Gilpin, were import substitution, a flight information center, the use of local materials, and an import distribution center. For the short term, Zambia needed “an expert team who will examine Zambia’s pattern of imports and suggest alternative sources of supply, with particular reference to imports that have been coming in the past from Rhodesia.”³⁹ In the longer term, Zambia needed to establish a flight information center to take over responsibilities from the present one that was located in Salisbury, Rhodesia, as well as stockpile imports since they had to be brought through largely unused routes.⁴⁰

Yet in addition to aid and technical assistance, the Zambian government also used the United Nations as a platform and negotiating tool for its greater interests. The greatest interest for Zambia during the period, both in terms of its domestic stability and its

³⁸ UNIP, 7/22/5, “UN is Officially Here Now,” April 28, 1964.

³⁹ NAZ, FA 1-1-9, “Draft Memorandum for Mr. Gilpin, United Nations Technical Assistance Board Representative, Lusaka,” UN Technical Assistance Board, January 29, 1966.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

international relations, was the situation in Rhodesia. At the UNO Special Commission on Colonialism, which met in Kitwe, Zambia on June 3, 1967, Kaunda spoke of the situation in Rhodesia and what he believed were the failure of economic sanctions. He argued that “Britain has tricked the world and the United Nations into false strategy; a false start in seeking a solution to U.D.I.” and that “We in Zambia have never found an alternative to the use of force...only force can solve the Rhodesian question.”⁴¹

Also high on the international agenda for Kaunda and Zambia was the issue of decolonization, particularly in Southern Africa. He went on, therefore, to discuss both the situation in Portuguese controlled Angola and Mozambique, as well as South-West Africa. He claimed, “In this age of enlightenment, it is inconceivable that a foreign country should subject other people to a rule in which they have no voice in the administration of their affairs.” He was also keen to point out the ideological origins and proclamations of the UN itself, stating “One of the strange ironies of history is that the same countries which were principally instrumental in the formation of the United Nations and in the formulation of its Charter and of the Declaration of Human Rights should today throw to the wind the very principles upon which their solemn affirmations two decades ago rested seems to me most unprincipled.”⁴²

⁴¹ NAZ, “Address by His Excellency the President to the U.N. Committee of Twenty-four Meeting in Kitwe, 3rd June, 1967,” UNO Special Commission on Colonialism (1965-67), 3.

⁴² Ibid., 5.

While the United Nations played an important role in Zambia's economic development, Zambia did not always agree with the political decisions of the member states, and particularly the Security Council, of the UN. Most of the issues centered on the issue of Rhodesia, but also significantly on the re-establishment of China to the United Nation's Security Council. However, much like with Zambian threats to leave the Commonwealth, they always remained threats. Political issues were important to Zambia, but economic development was more so. Therefore, rather than alienate themselves, Zambia continued relations with all parties, including what it saw as an important political platform: the United Nations.

Western Trade and Aid

For any developing country, “the formation of a Development Plan is a statement of intention.” However, “the execution of a Development Plan is a far more complex operation.”⁴³ For Zambia, the complex operation involved dealing with multiple players, from all political ideologies and with all levels of geo-political significance, as well as with its own domestic economic difficulties. On paper, the plan, for the most part, seemed to make sense. There is the obvious gift of hindsight in understanding the major problems the plan had, including the reliance on copper, but it was overall acceptable as

⁴³ Ibid., 17.

an economic development agenda. Turning the plan into reality, however, was something that required not only an economic development plan, but a foreign relations plan as well.

Zambia sent out several delegations in the first years after independence, to a variety of different markets. Even these trips were planned so as to receive the “maximum advantage” at the same time as proving non-alignment in not just the political arena, but the economic one as well. For example, in a 1967 “determined ‘shopping spree,’” Zambia sent a diverse delegation to Europe and the Far East, visiting and signing agreements in Great Britain, Germany, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, China, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia.⁴⁴ There are several examples of such delegations, which always demonstrated Zambia’s commitment to its economic development, as well as the policy of non-alignment.

Small Players

In addition to Great Britain, the United States, and western controlled international governmental organizations, there were several smaller players involved in both trading with, and providing aid to, Zambia. Although not often noted in works on the Cold War, in addition to the great powers, smaller first world nations also played significant roles in the development of new nations. However, just like the western superpowers, and the major international organizations that the superpowers controlled,

⁴⁴ NAZ, FA 1-1-231, G. H. Mutale, “Letter from G. H. Mutale, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” Zambia Trade Missions Abroad, February 13, 1967.

these nations gave aid and participated in trade based on a policy of democratic alignment. These nations were the allies of the United States and Great Britain, including the countries of Europe, particularly Scandinavian countries, as well as Canada and Japan.

A fellow Commonwealth country, Canada was involved in several aspects of the Zambian economy, including providing Zambia with four Caribou aircraft from DeHavilland of Canada, necessary for the air lifts of oil after Rhodesian U.D.I. Kaunda, in a letter to the Prime Minister of Canada, requested that Canada supply Zambia with four more of the Caribou, as well as spares for a year's operation, due to the situation in Rhodesia and the need for further air lifts.⁴⁵ Providing several aircraft was within the capabilities of Canadian aid, but the Canadian government explained that it was only able to assist other countries in the areas of surveys and the training of personnel and air transportation but not in larger projects such as construction.⁴⁶ This was in line with the "Principles of the Canadian Aid Programme in Commonwealth Africa," released in February 1964.

The program was to be a "grant aid programme" that was "responsive" to specific countries' requests. Aid had to be related to the economic or social development of the country and requests had to have a clear and specific objective. Furthermore, the requests

⁴⁵ NAZ, FA 1-1-115, Kenneth Kaunda, "Letter to the Prime Minister of Canada," Technical Assistance from Canada, November 19, 1965.

⁴⁶ NAZ, FA 1-1-115, "Report on Zambian Delegation to Canada, 29-30 May 1966," Technical Assistance from Canada.

“must be within Canadian capabilities” and machines and technical equipment must have been manufactured within Canada. The principles, sent to the newly independent nations of Africa that were members of the Commonwealth, also reminded countries that Canada was itself a “developing country” and could not be counted on for serious investments or aid.⁴⁷

Some of the most longstanding and established players in Zambian aid have been the countries of Scandinavia. Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway provided a range of assistance in the 1960s, on a variety of small-to-medium scale projects. For Denmark, the major areas of assistance were agricultural, as well as providing medical equipment.⁴⁸ Sweden was involved in telecommunications, cooperative associations, and the hydroelectric project at Sioma Falls.⁴⁹ Specifically, the Swedish were involved in providing technical assistance as a form of aid, sending, for example, volunteers to work in agricultural education and “youth activities.”⁵⁰ The Finnish government was mostly interested in forestry, as well as technical assistance and transmission lines.⁵¹ Norway also participated in similar aid and assistance projects.

⁴⁷ NAZ, FA 1-1-115, “Principles of Canadian Aid Programme in Commonwealth Africa,” Technical Assistance from Canada, February 1964.

⁴⁸ NAZ, FA 1-1-164, L. N. Lishomwa, “External Assistance,” Technical Assistance Agreements, June 13, 1968.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ UNIP, 7/22/8, “Zambia-Swedish Aid Pact Signed,” Press Releases, October 6, 1965.

⁵¹ NAZ, FA 1-1-164, L. N. Lishomwa, “External Assistance,” Technical Assistance Agreements, June 13, 1968.

In addition to aid and technical assistance, smaller western players also played an important role in developing and diversifying Zambian trade, such as the nation of Japan. Zambia also realized that favorable trade agreements ensured not only increased trade for Zambia, but new partners in development. In May of 1965, during a Zambian trade delegation to Japan, the Japanese government assured Zambia that the two countries' trade agreement would include full GATT relations once Zambia was accessioned to GATT.⁵² Japan would also encourage private investment in Zambia, particularly in the opening of manufacturing factories. However, Zambia desired not only investment, but also technical cooperation, particularly in the fields of railway transportation, educational television, mass communications, aviation, agriculture, and inland fisheries.⁵³

The main interest of Japan in Zambia in the mid-1960s was tobacco, because Japanese businessmen could no longer purchase tobacco from Rhodesia due to economic sanctions. For Japan, the tobacco trade with Great Britain was deemed "unsatisfactory" because it was not specific on prices and quantities.⁵⁴ Trading in tobacco was a great opportunity for Zambia to diversify its exports, but they had several hurdles to overcome in exporting not only tobacco, but the main export of copper, as well. In a letter from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, they expressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that "the Government of Zambia is making every effort to ensure its international trade is

⁵² NAZ, FA 1-1-84, "Joint Communique," Trade with Japan, May 1965.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ NAZ, FA 1-1-84, E. A. Kashita, "Sale of Tobacco to Japan," Trade with Japan, August 16, 1968.

affected to an absolute minimum by any developments which are likely to occur” regarding Rhodesia.⁵⁵ This, however, was not so easy. Many of Zambia’s trading partners were equally concerned, including Japan. Japan, not having an embassy in Zambia in the 1960s, sent a letter from its embassy in Kenya, expressing that “the government of Japan is deeply concerned over the stoppage of the copper imports from Zambia as an indirect result of Rhodesia’s reiteration against the international sanction.”⁵⁶ Zambian copper accounted for a quarter of Japanese supply and half of their imports of copper, meaning the copper industry in Japan was fully dependent upon copper from Zambia.⁵⁷

World Bank

The World Bank and International Monetary Fund are international financial institutions created at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 for the purpose of assisting countries with economic development through loans and strictly monitored economic progress. For Zambia, the World Bank has played a highly visible role in discussions of economic development. However, in the 1960s, World Bank aid and loans to Zambia were minimal, and very narrowly focused. In 1966, Zambia received its first World Bank loan, for US\$17.6 million for improvements of the Great North and Great East Roads, but

⁵⁵ NAZ, FA 1-1-84, “Letter from Ministry of Commerce and Industry,” Trade with Japan, December 18, 1965.

⁵⁶ NAZ, FA 1-1-84, “Letter from Embassy of Japan, Kenya,” Trade with Japan, December 4, 1965.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

maintenance costs were more than revenue would allow (over US\$1 million more).⁵⁸ Therefore, in October 1966, Zambia sent a delegation of government officials to Washington D.C. to meet with the Vice President of the Bank, Burke Knapp, and the Director of the Africa Department, A. G. El Emery.

In the meeting with Knapp, the Zambian delegation sought to discuss two main projects: Rhodesia Railways and Stage II of the Kariba Power Station. Regarding Rhodesia Railways, Knapp reminded Zambia that the World Bank had been involved in funding the Railway back when it was half Zambia and half Rhodesia. Therefore, Zambia's concern over the break-up of the Railway, Knapp explained, led the Bank to say that they had been involved in keeping it together so they were not sure if they could be involved in breaking it apart.⁵⁹ In a meeting later the same day, Director of the Africa Department Emery laid out what the World Bank considered to be its program for Zambia. Although they would "consider" the Tanzania Zambia railway project as an alternative to Rhodesia Railways, the World Bank was only prepared to commit to finance educational projects from the start of the Four Year Development Plan and to begin a forestry project in November.⁶⁰ The priorities of the World Bank, in order of

⁵⁸ NAZ, FA 1-1-101, "Telegram from Zambians Washington to Foreign Lusaka," Proposed Road Survey Tanzania-Zambia, September 14, 1966.

⁵⁹ NAZ, FA 1-1-167, "Minutes of the Meeting Held in Washington D.C. between the Zambian Delegation and the World Bank Group on 4th October, 1966," World Bank, October 4, 1966.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

important, were made clear: education, forestry, and roads, and then the Kariba Power Station and railways.⁶¹

In mid-January, Zambia sent yet another delegation to Washington D.C., this time to meet with the President of the World Bank, George Woods. Hoping for US\$40 million in loans from the bank, the Zambian delegation, led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs R. C. Kamanga, still focused on the same types of assistance as the meeting in 1966. Woods stated, “there was a cloud over the Zambia-World Bank relations,” particularly in relation to Kariba and Kafue, as the “the basic interest of the Bank was Kariba” while Zambia was focused on the Tan-Zam railway project.⁶² The Bank’s dismissal of the railway project was not acceptable to the Zambian delegation, described by Zambian Ambassador to the United States, Rupiah Banda, as a “formidable group” who “knew their business.”⁶³ However, Woods made it clear that he had nothing to discuss about that

⁶¹ The interest in specific projects went in line with World Bank policy in the pre-1967 era, in which the bank practiced fiscal conservatism. By 1968, the change in the World Bank was evident in its aid to Zambia, eventually culminating in the introduction of a Structural Adjustment Programme for Zambia in the 1980s.

⁶² NAZ, FA 1-1-167, “Notes of the Zambia Delegation to Washington Led by the Hon. R. C. Kamanga, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mid-January, 1968,” World Bank, January 1968.

⁶³ NAZ, FA 1-1-167, “Letter from R. B. Banda, Ambassador to USA to M. C. Chona, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” World Bank, January 30, 1968.

project and wished it known that the Bank had no crusade against it. ‘If our advice is not followed God knows we make mistakes.’”⁶⁴

United States

By the 1960s, the United States had long developed a policy of diplomacy and aid, along, of course, the lines of alignment. In “Non-Alignment and the Racial Frontier, Zambia and the USA, 1964-1968” Zambian historian Andy DeRoche examines how this relationship developed specifically with Zambia. DeRoche argues that examining the relationship between Zambia and the United States from both sides “provides valuable insights into their often very different perspectives in the midst of the Cold War.”⁶⁵ And it is true that the insights that can be gleaned from the Johnson administration and Kenneth Kaunda are useful not only in understanding the relationship between Zambia and the United States, but also Southern Africa and its relationship to the Cold War more generally.

From DeRoche’s research, it becomes clear that “American officials contended that they were dealing with Southern Africa cautiously, but Zambia saw things

⁶⁴ NAZ, FA 1-1-167, “Notes of the Zambia Delegation to Washington Led by the Hon. R. C. Kamanga, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mid-January, 1968,” World Bank, January 1968.

⁶⁵ Andy DeRoche, “Non-Alignment and the Racial Frontier, Zambia and the USA, 1964-1968,” in Sue Onslow, ed., *The Cold War in Southern Africa* (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), 130.

differently.”⁶⁶ For Zambia, it believed that the United States was acting in a policy of non-alignment towards racial issues in Southern Africa, which was as frustrating to Zambia as Zambia’s Cold War non-alignment was to the United States. Zambia’s political non-alignment became a big problem as it sought economic aid and assistance regardless of the political affiliation of a country. United States officials urged Kaunda against dealing with the Chinese in particular, and this “unsolicited advice greatly upset the Zambian president.”⁶⁷ However, despite the differences in opinion, the United States did participate in some aid and assistance in Zambia.

Through USAID, the United States began several small-scale programs in Zambia in the first year after independence. In July of 1965, the Ministry of Agriculture reported that under the “Young Farmers’ Clubs: United States Self-Help Proposal” the American Embassy was proposing a plan to supply 150 farmers’ clubs with gardening tools such as shovels, hoes, and fertilizer. This “self-help” campaign would cost the United States £3053 (US\$8548).⁶⁸ While the Office of National Development and Planning had “no objection” to the offer, it was clear that such aid had little value beyond a very micro level.⁶⁹ American aid was not only insufficiently small-scale, but it was also impractical. In August, USAID committed to undertaking a survey of radio facilities requested by the

⁶⁶ Ibid., 131.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 134.

⁶⁸ NAZ, FA 1-1-88, E. I. L. Willima, “Young Farmers’ Clubs: United States Self-Help Proposal,” Technical Assistance from USA, July 23, 1965.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

Zambian Office of National Development and Planning. However, USAID officer David Alter emphasized, “Washington asked us to make clear that this is a commitment for the survey only and does not constitute a commitment to provide any equipment which the survey may recommend.”⁷⁰ Furthermore, the survey focused on FM radio capabilities, while the Zambia Broadcasting Corporation was only looking to broadcast short and medium wave radio.⁷¹

By the end of 1965 and into 1966, the United States was looking to begin a bit larger, more permanent projects in Zambia. A United States Information Services News Release from July of 1966 reported renewals of USAID specialists in the Ministries of Health, Agriculture, Education, and Information as well as two new grants:

- (i) £82,977 (US\$233,000) to Radio-Television International (an American corporation) to develop higher education courses in journalism for Evelyn Hone College; provide the Ministry of information with two radio engineers; and assist in creating public health broadcasts for the Ministry of Health.
- (ii) £49,145 (US\$138,000) to the University of Connecticut and California State Polytechnic College for the provision of a farm management specialist, an agricultural extension specialist, and an agricultural engineer to the Ministry of Agriculture.

⁷⁰ NAZ, FA 1-1-88, David E. Alter, Jr., “Letter to the Permanent Secretary, Office of National Development and Planning,” Technical Assistance from USA, July 23, 1965.

⁷¹ Ibid.

USAID was also offering courses for the staff of the National Archives. All of this represented now only a renewal, but also an increase, in the amount of aid and assistance offered to Zambia.

Projects also included the founding of several non-profit organizations under the umbrella of USAID. Operations Crossroads Africa was an American non-profit that acted as a sort of short term Peace Corps. Volunteers provided their own fares and Zambia housed them, fed them, and paid for the materials for their projects. In return, USAID offered Zambia operational and advisory staff with lots of paperwork. L. S. Muka explained the Zambian opinion on the project: "I do not associate these crossroaders with any particular skills, they are mainly merry makers, cultural exchange types and their contribution in terms of the receiving countries is pretty minimal."⁷² Ministries that were requested to take volunteers said they had no projects and advised to keep them from being cleared to come to Zambia.⁷³

Although aid was on the increase, trade between the United States and Zambia still remained on a very rudimentary level. The United States Trade Missions Program was set up to send business people and companies to discuss trade and investment opportunities around the world. In December 1966, Zambia was included in one of these

⁷² NAZ, FA 1-1-88, L. S. Muka, "Operation Crossroads Africa, Inc." Technical Assistance from USA, March 3, 1966.

⁷³ Ibid. American assistance abroad has often been the source of controversy, particularly in the way volunteers handled themselves. See, for instance, Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffmann, *All You Need is Love: the Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

trips, in which Americans interested in doing business in Africa spent ten days visiting government agencies, banks, and local chambers of commerce in Ghana, Congo (Kinshasa), and Zambia.⁷⁴ Zambian Ambassador to the United States, Rupiah Banda, encouraged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to continue to use trade as a method of diplomacy. He argued, “I have always maintained that Zambia’s best defence weapon is diplomacy” and specifically good relations should be fostered, in order of importance, between “all” the major powers, neighboring countries, Africa in general, and, finally, all other countries.⁷⁵ Banda saw that the United States seemed pleased with Zambia thus far, particularly in its stand against corruption, and that this relationship should be fostered so as to serve as a buffer due to poor relations with Great Britain over Rhodesia. Banda believed Zambia should focus on American financial opportunities instead of British because the latter was considerably more expensive due to the weak pound, saying he could “enviseage tremendous possibilities for American capital to Zambia.”⁷⁶ He emphasized, again, that what Zambia really needed, from the international community, in general, and America, in particular, was investment and private loans, and not aid.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ NAZ, FA 1-1-88, “Embassy of the United States Aid Memoire,” Technical Assistance from USA, December 12, 1966.

⁷⁵ NAZ, FA 1-1-105, R. B. Banda, “Letter to M. C. Chona, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” USA Relations with Zambia, November 10, 1967.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

Great Britain

Great Britain's financial and technical assistance policy was deemed "an important part" of foreign relations.⁷⁸ For the British, aid and assistance were important not just politically and economically, but from a humanitarian sense as well. Responsibility within Whitehall concerning foreign aid was to lie with the Ministry of Overseas Development, and specifically with those posted overseas. The main form of assistance was to be in the form of loans and grants, to assist with development projects and programs, supporting a budget or balance of payments, assisting in development in the case of natural disasters, loans given in provision with technical assistance agreements, as well as making contributions to international organizations and giving advances from the Exchequer to the Commonwealth Development Corporation under the Overseas Resources Development Act of 1959. The terms of the loan were contingent upon, for the most part, an analysis on the per capita GDP of a recipient country (and Zambia was deemed in the upper bracket in this category).⁷⁹ Although the British did not say so directly, all policies were directed at members of the Commonwealth, although provisions were made for technical assistance agreements outside of the organization.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ PRO, DO 206/1 "Financial and Technical Assistance," UK £10 Million Loan to Zambia, May 1968.

⁷⁹ PRO, DO 206/1, "British Financial Assistance," UK £10 Million Loan to Zambia, June 26, 1968.

⁸⁰ PRO, DO 206/1 "Financial and Technical Assistance," UK £10 Million Loan to Zambia, May 1968.

Banda was correct in saying that relations between Great Britain and Zambia were increasingly strained in the years after independence, largely to do with the situation in Rhodesia. However, as the former colonial power in Zambia, the British knew that they could not simply disappear from Zambia, politically or economically. Directly after independence, Great Britain offered Zambia £11 million loan, for defense or in development, during the period of 1965 to 1970. The British government called this loan “doing the very best we can.”⁸¹ The terms of the loan were to interest given at the Exchequer rate, maturity in 25 years, a two year grace period or repayment on capital with five years of graduated increase, and a waiver of interest for seven years.⁸² The loan was not expected to be disbursed until 1969-1971, due to Britain’s internal financial difficulties, but even as of 1969, Great Britain was having trouble making good on its promise. It seemed unlikely that the British government would be able to give more than £2 million by the end of 1969, which D. F. B. Le Breton recognized as having the potential to “have a near disastrous effect on Anglo-Zambian relations.”⁸³

The remaining £8 million, although the biggest capital injection made by Great Britain into Zambia, was overshadowed by contingency planning. Technical assistance from the United Kingdom revolved around the “maintenance of the Zambian economy in

⁸¹ PRO, DO 206/1, “The Time Factor in Britain's £10 Million Aid for Zambia,” UK £10 Million Loan to Zambia, February 21, 1968.

⁸² PRO, DO 206/1, “Brief for Talks with Zambian Officials,” UK £10 Million Loan to Zambia, June 23, 1968.

⁸³ PRO, DO 206/1, “The Time Factor in Britain's £10 Million Aid for Zambia,” UK £10 Million Loan to Zambia, February 21, 1968.

the circumstances arising from the Rhodesian rebellion.”⁸⁴ In February of 1967, the British government pledged £13.85 million of assistance. The majority of the money was to be used for development of alternative routes to the East (including the port and airfield at Mtwara), the development of Zambian coal mines at Nkandabwe and Siankondobo, and provision of British heavy transport vehicles—all projects related in some way to the economic problems caused by the Rhodesian crisis.⁸⁵ However, despite fairly large pledges of assistance, the British made it clear that they did not desire to continue support for an indefinite period. In a note from the British High Commission the emphasized that “the British authorities fully appreciate that the aim of the Zambian government will be to reduce as quickly as possible the extent of the reliance of the Zambian forces on British Service Personnel.”⁸⁶

Trade was also consistently arranged to be in the favor of Great Britain. One example includes an agreement on the trade in cereals. Specifically, the British argued, “In framing their proposals the Government of the United Kingdom have had in mind their responsibility for maintaining conditions under which a stable and efficient

⁸⁴ NAZ, FA 1-1-163, “Press Release,” Technical Assistance from the United Kingdom, February 1, 1967.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ NAZ, FA 1-1-73, “Note No. 5, British High Commission,” Loaned Defence Agreements, January 17, 1967.

agricultural industry in the United Kingdom can develop its prosperity.”⁸⁷ A minimum price was established through this trade agreement for the price of cereal imports from Great Britain to Zambia. Despite the fact Zambia was a newly independent nation, and despite the fact it was dealing with the issue of Southern Rhodesia, Great Britain was primarily concerned that the balance of trade weighed in their favor. Technical and capital assistance aside, trade truly highlighted the attitude the British took towards its former colony’s development.

Eastern African Economic Community

Despite being bordered by eight countries, Zambia’s immediate regional trading partners in the 1960s were severely limited. As a central African nation, however, Zambia did have the advantage of being able to trade with not only southern Africa, but eastern African as well. Therefore, it was a top priority of the Zambian government that they encourage trade between Zambia and the Eastern African Economic Community. In 1964, Zambian imports with the countries of East Africa, including Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zanzibar, only totaled £356,631 and exports totaled £408,172 (Figure 4.1).⁸⁸ Of the imports, the greatest percentage was in beverages and tobacco (£221,970,

⁸⁷ PRO, CO 670/39, Cledwyn Hughes, “Cereals Agreement between Zambia and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,” *Zambia Government Gazette: Commonwealth Relations Office*, November 20, 1964 [December 18, 1964], p. 153.

⁸⁸ NAZ, FA 1-1-118, “Zambia / East Africa / Bechuanaland Trade Links Conference,” Expansion of Trade between Zambia and East African Territories, April 12-13, 1965. The

or 62%), while the greatest number of domestic exports were in manufactured materials (£274,249, or 67%).

Table 4.4 Zambian Trade with East Africa, 1964 (in 1964 £)

<u>County</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Domestic</u>	<u>Re-Exports</u>	<u>Total Exports</u>
		<u>Exports</u>		
Kenya	£150,433	£191,962	£17,782	£209,744
Uganda	£5,698	£21,572	£31,598	£53,170
Tanzania	£200,000	£128,127	£9,757	£137,844
Zanzibar	£500	£7,414	-----	£7,414

Source: National Archives of Zambia, NAZ, FA 1-1-118, “Zambia / East Africa / Bechuanaland Trade Links Conference,” Expansion of Trade between Zambia and East African Territories, April 12-13, 1965.

Zambia hosted a conference in Lusaka for the countries of East Africa, as well as Bechuanaland (Botswana) in April of 1965, to discuss the possibilities of increasing trade. Proposals included the formation of a free trade area within the region and the establishment of a customs union.⁸⁹ At the meeting, however, Tanzania, in particular, but

Foreign Affairs series of the National Archives of Zambia provides the most comprehensive documents relating to Zambian foreign policy in the 1965 to 1967 period. In particular, these documents focus on Zambian contingency planning in relation to Rhodesian U.D.I., both politically and economically.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

also Kenya and Uganda, were disappointed by Zambian hesitancy to become involved in their trade agreements. The dates for the second conference were postponed due to a lack of information availability on the Zambian side, as well as tense internal relations amongst the East African states.⁹⁰

Kaunda, however, continued to advocate for further inter-African trade for Zambia, making trips to promote trade with Tanzania and Kenya, including a trip to Nairobi for Kenya's Agricultural Show in September 1965. He noted that "one of the greatest challenges young countries must confront is the wide disparity between the developing and the more advanced countries." He believed that mutual trade agreements, like one that could be developed between Zambia and Kenya, would go far to alleviate this problem. However, increased trade relations could only be accomplished if increased communications and transport came first.⁹¹

Communist Trade and Aid

Soviet Union and Yugoslavia

The Soviet Union, involved so deeply in violent Cold War struggles around the world, adopted a much different policy towards diplomatic relations with Zambia.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ UNIP 7/22/8, "Speech by the President of the Republic of Zambia Occasion of the Opening of the 1965 Kenya Agricultural Show," Press Releases, September 29, 1965.

Technical assistance from the U.S.S.R. revolved around more cultural programs and exchanges, in particular the sharing of experts in a variety of different fields. In 1965, for example, cultural exchanges included:

- (i) 25 scholarships for Zambian students to study in the Soviet Union;
- (ii) 20 variety and circus performers to visit from the Soviet Union to raise money for UNZA;
- (iii) the donation of a library of scientific books;
- (iv) provisions for scientific teachers and doctors from the Soviet Union to work in Zambia;
- (v) the showings of programs about life in the U.S.S.R.⁹²

While some of this cultural diplomacy can easily be regarded as propaganda, and not of use to the Zambian people, the Soviet Union did make a considerable contribution to medical care in Zambia in the 1960s. The promised doctors, the first group of many to come to Zambia, included two general surgeons, two anesthesiologists, and two physicians, divided into two teams to be sent to the rural areas of Kasama and Mongu.⁹³ The Soviet Union also contributed 2.5 million doses of the small pox vaccine, which Vice

⁹² NAZ, FA 1-1-195, P. S. Thirsk, "Letter to the Permanent Secretary for National Development and Planning," Technical Assistance from U.S.S.R., February 27, 1965.

⁹³ NAZ, FA 1-1-195, "Recruitment of Medical Officers from U.S.S.R.," Technical Assistance from U.S.S.R., July 21, 1966.

President Kapwepwe wrote to Kaunda had contributed a “great deal to the remarkable reduction in the incidence of small pox in Zambia.”⁹⁴

However, while Kapwepwe and Kaunda were pleased with the technical assistance and aid from the Soviet Union, Kapwepwe explained that a completed review was necessary because “there are certain Ministries who tend to adopt an obscurantist attitude to all offers from the East.”⁹⁵ Because of this uncertainty of accepting aid from a communist country, the teams of doctors had been held up for over a year after they were approved before allowing to begin practicing in Zambia.⁹⁶ Aid from the Soviet Union was also complicated by reactions from Moscow to Zambia’s relationships with Western nations. V. J. Mwaanga, the Zambian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, cautioned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Soviet displays of support were put into jeopardy after Zambia had asked for British assistance in guarding the Kariba dam.⁹⁷ Mwaanga explained, “It is felt in certain circles here that by inviting British troops ‘you are only helping the imperialists in their dirty plot against Africa.’” He described a conversation with the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had asked, “Mr. Ambassador do

⁹⁴ NAZ, FA 1-1-195, S. M. Kapwepwe, “Letter to Kenneth Kaunda,” Technical Assistance from U.S.S.R., July 21, 1966.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ NAZ, FA 1-1-66, V. J. Mwaanga, “Letter from the Embassy of the Republic of Zambia (USSR) to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” Rhodesia Political, December 3, 1965.

you seriously and confidentially think it is in your interest to invite British troops, who after all will defend Smith against you?"⁹⁸

In the case of the Soviet Union, political alignment proved to be continual issue when considering technical assistance agreements. However, the same rules did not apply to the communist nation of Yugoslavia. The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chona, explained to the Office of National Development and Planning that "Generally I assume that in view of the fact that Yugoslavia is on the list of those countries from whom it is not objectionable to seek assistance or receive aid, requests of this nature should automatically be cleared by this Ministry unless there is a greater political objection."⁹⁹ The previous year Zambia had begun preliminary discussions with Yugoslavia to request the assistance of Yugoslavian geological experts to complete mapping, explorations, and economic assessments of coal and iron ore deposits.¹⁰⁰ A Yugoslav team of geologists did come to Zambia in late 1965 to assist with the survey of Zambia's iron ore deposits. In a press release, the Ministry of Mines and Cooperatives

⁹⁸ NAZ, FA 1-1-66, V. J. Mwaanga, "Letter from the Embassy of the Republic of Zambia (USSR) to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Rhodesia Political, December 3, 1965.

⁹⁹ NAZ, FA 1-1-107, M. C. Chona, "Letter to the Permanent Secretary, National Development and Planning," Technical Assistance from Yugoslavia, March 17, 1966.

¹⁰⁰ NAZ, FA 1-1-107, "Mineral Resources: Technical Assistance from Yugoslavia," Technical Assistance from Yugoslavia, March 17, 1966.

explained that the Yugoslav Institute of Geological and Geophysical Research (GEOZAVOD) would be undertaking the work at cost.¹⁰¹

China

Although the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia both played a role in Zambian political and economic development in the 1960s, by far the most important communist influence in Zambia was that of the People's Republic of China. China's trade policy towards the developing nations of Asia and Africa was one based on "bilateral arrangements" and through "direct" payments. More specifically, "directly" meant "that the payment is free of the influence of imperialist countries" and by "bilateral arrangement" meant an "agreement on payment protocols reached by two parties." These protocols could be combined with fixed swap orders or contracts, otherwise known as the "clearance of equal trade." However, some arrangements were not fixed and required cash payments. There was a "wide range" of payment terms for trading partners, including both trade and non-trade items, and currency from the trading partner, as in the case of Chinese trade with India, or from a third party. When a third party currency was used, such as the U.S. dollar or British pound, "to avoid loss caused by the depreciation

¹⁰¹ UNIP, 77/2/8 "Yugoslav Team to Prove Zambian Iron Ore Deposits," Press Releases, October 16, 1965.

of the currency of imperialist countries, some agreements also included warranty clauses for the gold content of the currency used.”¹⁰²

China made it clear, however, that “no matter what” the trading agreement between China and its partner was, it had to be in line with the following principles:

- (i) an equal relationship between the two parties involved in terms of payment;
- (ii) a convenient means for the import and export of the two parties, which is beneficial to their development; and
- (iii) trade independent and free of the interference and infringement of imperialist countries.

China still invoked the spirit of its foreign policy rhetoric, emphasizing that these principles were based on the “spirit of equity and mutual benefit, mutual respect and bilateral satisfaction.”¹⁰³

In an attempt to realize its political goals, China entered into a number of political and economic agreements with African nations, including non-communist nations (see Appendix III). The first agreement signed between China and Zambia was a Cultural Cooperation Agreement, signed in Peking on August 22, 1966. Soon afterwards, on April 28, 1967, the two countries signed a Trade Agreement, followed by an Economic and

¹⁰² FMAPRC 108-00122-06, “‘Guanyu gongtong shichang wenti’ de tiyao” (“Summary of the Common Market”), 19.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

Technical Assistance Agreement on June 23, 1967, both also signed in Peking.¹⁰⁴ The provisions of the Agreement were as follows:

...the Chinese Government shall send technical personnel to the Republic of Zambia to render technical assistance. Details such as the number of technical personnel, time of their dispatch and period of their service in Zambia shall be fixed in the contract to be concluded between the organizations to be designated by the two Governments respectively.¹⁰⁵

Furthermore, the two countries agree that “The traveling expenses of the Chinese technical personnel to and from Zambia shall be borne by the Chinese Government” and that “During their service in Zambia the Chinese technical personnel shall observe the current laws and decrees as promulgated by the Zambian government and shall keep confidential all the documents and date at their command related to their work.” In return, the Zambian government would ensure that “During their service in Zambia the Chinese technical personnel shall be afforded the same protection as is normally afforded to citizens of Zambia.”¹⁰⁶ The loan entitled Zambia to £6,000,000, which could be

¹⁰⁴ NAZ, FA 1-1-267, “Agreements Signed into by PRC,” World Commission - Communist Policy and Tactics, n.d.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ NAZ, FA 1-1-64, “(Provisional) Arrangements on Technical Personnel Between The Government of the People's Republic of China and The Government of the Republic of Zambia for Implementing the Agreement on Economic and Technical Co-operation between China and Zambia,” Communist China-Technical Assistance, n.d.

“supplemented or amended at any time by mutual agreement.”¹⁰⁷ Soon after the signing of the Economic and Technical Assistance Agreement, China agreed to construct a broadcasting transmitting station, covered by the loan provided for in the Agreement.¹⁰⁸

In addition to technical and economic cooperation, Zambia had already begun trading with China. However, trade was not always so easy between what were essentially two very unnatural trading partners. The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Foreign Trade expressed that there were problems “being encountered in the conduct of trade between Zambia and the People’s Republic of China.” Specifically, he complained that the flow of trade with China was not “moving normally” due to “considerable delays.” Furthermore, he expressed distaste with the Chinese including “unnecessary articles in any deal which the National Wholesale Corporation makes.”¹⁰⁹ The Zambian public also had complaints, In July of 1968, China established a commercial section of its embassy in Zambia, largely to deal with these sorts of issues.¹¹⁰

Difficulties in trading were also expressed in a Zambian trade delegation to China, Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, led by the Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Foreign Trade, M. H. Chimba. In attendance were L. S. Muka, an Official from the

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ NAZ, FA 1-1-64, “Chinese Offer,” Communist China - Technical Assistance, n.d.

¹⁰⁹ NAZ, FA 1-1-241, “Untitled,” Trade with China, December 8, 1967.

¹¹⁰ NAZ, FA 1-1-241, “Letter to the Embassy of the PRC from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” Trade with China, July 8, 1968.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and J. Chileshe, an Official from the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Foreign Trade, as well as representatives from the Zambia National Wholesale Corporation and Grain Marketing Board and private businessmen. In China in particular, the Zambian delegation was working for the completion of a maize sale contract, but “it was extremely difficult for both parties to agree on the terms of the contract, a draft of which was provided by the Chinese side who showed no inclination to considering the Zambian draft.” After much deliberation, the Zambian group came away successful, reporting back that “On the whole the contract ultimately agreed upon was a reasonable one” and that they were receiving a higher price for maize than was being given on the world market.¹¹¹

The Zambian delegation was also pleased with the success of the Buying Mission group that was left in Canton to negotiate a “fairly sizable order for the National Wholesale Corporation.” In fact, despite the tough negotiations, Zambia left with the impression that “Indeed one cannot escape the feeling that rather than sending our agricultural extension officers and members of Agricultural Cooperatives to Western countries for training China should be the ideal place for them.”¹¹² However, as soon as December of 1968, Zambia was unable to meet the obligations of its trade agreement with China on providing maize. In a letter to the Embassy of China in Lusaka, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and not the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Foreign

¹¹¹ NAZ, FA 1-1-64, “Observations on the Zambian Trade and Economic Mission,” Communist China - Technical Assistance, April 7, 1967 - May 20, 1967.

¹¹² Ibid.

Trade, Zambia expressed its regret that it was not able to provide the 1.1 million bags of maize it was contracted to give China and it was forced to reduce the exported amount by 10 percent.¹¹³ Trade was not just economic, it was political, and bilaterally with China, it was not always easy.

Conclusion

The Zambian economic development agenda is commendable in its comprehensiveness. There were issues, including a dependency on copper exports, but it was undoubtedly a step in the right direction. Implementation, however, was a much more complicated process. Regional issues created trade and transport issues, and Rhodesian U.D.I. was raised to a level of prominence it would have otherwise not been accorded. Also difficult was the promotion of trade over aid. While both were necessary, trade is more beneficial for sustainable development, as has become accepted in recent years. Yet balanced trade between developed and developing nations was a difficult prospect.

This chapter argues that the Zambian First National Development Plan sought to address these issues. It also argues that addressing these issues kept fully in mind the policy of non-alignment. Zambia was willing to enter economic arrangements with any nation, so long as the outcome was beneficial for development. Trade, aid, and assistance

¹¹³ NAZ, FA 1-1-241, “Letter to Embassy of PRC from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” Trade with China, December 5, 1968.

came from both the West, including Great Britain, the United States, and other smaller actors such as the Scandinavian nations, as well as from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and China. However, while this was the best plan for economic development, it was not always the easiest plan for foreign policy. Western reactions to the Zambian government's willingness to accept aid from and trade with communist nations created a balancing act for Zambian leaders. This balancing act was to reach its climax as Kaunda and the Zambian government began negotiating for their biggest project yet: the TAZARA railway.

CHAPTER FIVE: NEGOTIATING TAZARA

“Quite honestly, I do not know whether to be angry or to laugh at this...Four trips to the West...are not sufficient to make me a capitalist...But only one trip to Peking...will make me a communist”

- Kenneth Kaunda¹

By far the most important negotiations the Zambian government undertook in the immediate postcolonial period were for the funding of the TAZARA railway. This project was not just important economically, although it was undoubtedly the key to Zambia's economic development and future economic success, but it was, more than any other trade or aid negotiations, a political project. However, neither trade nor aid was easy with China, not when the maintenance of relations with the West was concerned. Yet this is exactly what Zambia sought to do, as it faced the negotiations for its most important development project: an alternative transportation route for its imports and exports that bypassed Southern Rhodesia.

The way the Zambian government, and in particular Kaunda, managed reactions from the international community showed political skill and expertise. While Kaunda maintained a public image of non-alignment, he began to enter into negotiations for the building of the railway. The Cold War heavily influenced what was to be constructed,

¹ Kenneth Kaunda, Editorial, *Times of Zambia*, September 1967.

and by whom, and what would be received in return. For both Zambia and China, the outcome was successful, as both achieved what they had set out to.

Alternative Trade Routes

Even prior to the declaration of U.D.I. in Southern Rhodesia, Kaunda had his eye on alternative transportation routes out of Zambia. Transport issues were not just a Zambian problem, but an African one. In a September 1967 meeting of the OAU Transport and Communication Commission, the Council of Ministers reported, “Firstly, it can be said that all African countries are concerned with extending the present trend of industrial development which is now centred in a few isolated urban islands to new regions. Furthermore, the establishment of new industrial centres is faced with serious problems when it comes to the question of the means of the transport of the potential products,” and “Secondly, that economic development requires effective and adequate transportation services is axiomatic and as far as a developing continent like Africa is concerned it is the key sector.”²

The Rhodesian rebellion aside, it was simply not feasible for Zambia to only utilize one railway route for all its imports and exports. Studies were already being proposed by September of 1965, as G. E. Whitehouse, the Permanent Secretary of Transport and Works requested of the Office of National Development and Planning that

² NAZ FA 1-1-18, OAU Council of Ministers, Ninth Ordinary Session, Kinshasa, “Road Transport,” OAU Transport and Communication Commission, September 1967.

“We shall be grateful if you will please make application on our behalf to the British High Commission for a study to be made on the subject of transport links between African countries.”³ The most likely route that took in both political and economic concerns was through Tanzania. What was different about the situation, though, was that transport had become not just an economic issue, but a political one as well. Even as early as April of 1965, Barbara Castle, from the British Ministers of Overseas Development, described that “there was now a growing realisation that it was impossible to judge the project from a purely economic point of view.”⁴

Specifically, Zambia owned 50 percent of Rhodesia Railways, but Rhodesia held 70 percent of the assets. Copper traffic accounted for one-third of the revenue. Rhodesia had, in April 1965, approached the Zambian government to make the Railway two completely separate entities. However, the Ministry of Transport and Works believed “Any division of the present system would present Zambia with further serious difficulties,” particularly with regards to staffing, as the majority of skilled staff were in Rhodesia.⁵ Due to a 1963 Railways Agreement with Rhodesia, the Zambian government was prohibited from even speaking favorably about a rail link with Tanzania. In fact,

³ NAZ, FA 1-1-9, G. E. Whitehouse, “Transport Links between African countries,” UN Technical Assistance Board, September 29, 1965.

⁴ NAZ, FA 1-1-41, “Meeting of Zambian Ministers with the Rt. Hon. Mrs. Barbara Castle, British Ministers of Overseas Development,” Tanzania Rail Link, April 29, 1965.

⁵ NAZ, FA 1-1-41, “Proceedings of the First Meeting, Conference Room, Ministry of Transport and Works, Lusaka,” Tanzania Rail Link, April 12, 1965.

there were numerous legal documents to which Zambia was bound, all of which had been signed prior to independence.

Constitutional documents related to Rhodesia Railways included:

- i) Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Dissolution) Order in Council 1963;
- ii) Agreement between S. Rhodesia and N. Rhodesia, December 10, 1963 (General Notice 2462 of 1963 published in the Northern Rhodesia Gazette);
- iii) Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order in Council 1961; and
- iv) Zambia Independence Order in Council 1964.⁶

All of these documents held Zambia in a variety of ways to the colonial construct of the Railway, and overall “The constitution and manner of running Rhodesia Railways contain[ed] a bias against new projects.”

However, while the government had to remain diplomatic about favorable views towards alternative transport links, it “was nevertheless committed to the rail link in the sense of being convinced that such a link was necessary for the country’s survival in its geographical position and because of surrounding political circumstances.”⁷ At the first Zambia/East Africa Rail Link Conference, in April 1965, Zambia argued that such a link

⁶ NAZ, FA 1-1-41, J. A. Lemkin, “The Government of Zambia Proposed Railway to Tanzania. Memorandum on certain constitutional aspects concerning Rhodesian Railways and proposed new Railway,” Tanzania Rail Link, March 19, 1965.

⁷ NAZ, FA 1-1-41, “Meeting of Zambian Ministers with the Rt. Hon. Mrs. Barbara Castle, British Ministers of Overseas Development,” Tanzania Rail Link, April 29, 1965.

would be most beneficial to the southern region of Tanzania and the northern region of Zambia and would not just be an economic link, but a communications link as well. The railway would be capable of exploiting not only coal deposits, but also iron ore deposits at Liganga (identified as having a minimum of 45 million tons of ore with an average iron content of 49 percent but with a high percentage of titanium bearing minerals), as well as promoting the development of the Kilombero Valley, providing of an outlet for Zambian copper production, and promoting local industry in southern Tanzania using local materials.⁸

⁸ NAZ, FA 1-1-41, "Zambia/East Africa Rail Link Conference," Tanzania Rail Link, April 12, 1965.

Table 5.1 Summary of Mineral Production

Month	1964 Approximate Value (£)	1965 Approximate Value (£)	1966 Approximate Value (£)
Jan.	11,405,834.00	12,772,973.00	16,124,070.00
	10,602,736.00	13,774,009.00	18,250,607.00
	12,059,470.00	13,933,159.00	19,262,655.00
	13,317,636.00	14,333,195.00	11,351,958.00
	12,941,578.00	15,676,287.00	19,078,632.00
	12,232,438.00	14,775,231.00	26,168,444.00
	12,010,118.00	16,492,364.00	26,630,375.00
	10,705,228.00	16,620,548.00	20,897,251.00
	13,947,745.00	13,887,628.00	13,252,738.00
	14,330,553.00	15,576,685.00	19,410,599.00
	12,187,712.00	16,530,938.00	20,091,991.00
	13,049,467.00	17,028,991.00	18,111,965.00
Total	148,790,515.00	181,402,008.00	228,631,285.00

Source: PRO, CO 670/45, “General Summary of Mineral Production, Month of December 1965,” Zambia Gazette, February 11, 1966, p. 110.

At a July 1965 meeting, the Zambia Cabinet determined that it was the responsibility of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to ensure that the route through Congo and Angola remained open in the event of Rhodesia U.D.I. The Cabinet identified relations with Congo, Portugal, and Tanzania as being critical to “economic survival” if access was cut off from Rhodesia Railways. However, there were two issues with this plan. Firstly, “The road link with Dar-es-Salaam would, of course, be available, but this could not be expected to provide anything like adequate transport facilities for heavy commodities.” Secondly, was the establishment of relations with Portugal. No matter

how cordial relations were in 1965, Zambia could not risk establishing formal relations with a colonial power in Africa.⁹

Zambia's relations with Portugal were tricky, especially considering Portugal's good relations with Rhodesia. In a letter from the Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations, F. M. Mulikita, to Chona, he explained that the Portuguese desired at least consular relations with Zambia, despite Zambia's opposition to their policies in Africa. However, Portuguese insistence that there would be no economic effects felt by Zambia due to U.D.I. made it difficult to convince Portugal that Zambia should use the port at Lobito. Mulikita described,

I found it difficult to convince the Portuguese Representative here of the wisdom of diverting our traffic through Lobito...But I emphasized that U.D.I. or no U.D.I., it was my Government's intention to see that a greater volume of our exports and imports were transported on the Benguela railway system...since Portugal and Zambia were on 'talking terms' it was only fair and wise that Zambia's imports and exports should travel through a friendly territory, Angola, without the necessity of going through an unfriendly territory like Southern Rhodesia.¹⁰

The following month, Kaunda explained to the Prime Minister of Portugal that due to the cutting of oil supplies to Zambia by Rhodesia because of the British oil embargo, Zambia

⁹ NAZ, FA 1-1-16, "Secret," Relations with Southern Rhodesia, n.d.

¹⁰ NAZ, FA 1-1-66, F. M. Mulikita, "Letter to M. C. Chona, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs," November 20, 1965.

was unable to meet its oil demand. An airlift had been arranged but this did not meet Zambia's full requirements. Therefore, the Zambian government requested the Portuguese government to allow them the use of Beira Blantyre land route and port facilities at Lobito Bay.

However, even prior to the publication of the statistics, Kaunda did not seem keen on the road alternative. The United States proposed the survey in September 1965, and the proposal was accepted, “PROVIDED IT IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD that by accepting what I consider a very kind offer by A.I.D. to make this road survey WE ARE NOT IN ANY WAY thinking of it as a substitute for our projected railway link between Zambia and East Africa, for we simply cannot accept that.”¹¹ USAID was assisting in the construction of the Great North Road, but when it came to the East Africa link, it seemed for Kaunda the railway was the only option.

With the declaration of U.D.I. in November 1965, the Higher Authority for Rhodesian Railways became inoperative, as there were no Rhodesian ministers appointed to the Authority. Consequently, Zambia was not able to manage administrative issues and bring up problems with the railway board. In a letter to the British High Commissioner in July of 1966, Zambian Foreign Minister Simon Kapwepwe explained, “In recent months the acts of the Rhodesian rebel regime have made it increasingly difficult for the joint railway system to operate in Zambia.” The major problems he noted included the

¹¹ NAZ, FA 1-1-101, Kenneth Kaunda “Letter to R. C. Good, Ambassador for the United States of America,” October 4, 1965.

blocking of arms and ammunition into Zambia, the blocking of railway car movement from Rhodesia to Zambia, the restriction of the free flow of goods between the two countries, and Rhodesian debts on goods consigned from or to Zambia.¹²

It seemed obvious to Zambian officials that the only way to handle the Rhodesia Railways situation was to dissolve the Board and focus on developing an alternative route. For the Zambian Cabinet, there were four main points that were crucial for the dissolution:

- i) the break-up should be “orderly;”
- ii) assets and liabilities should be divided “in proportion of asset disposition in the two countries;”
- iii) the target date for dissolution should be set at June 30, 1967; and
- iv) Great Britain and the World Bank should be invited to attend the negotiations for the dissolution.¹³

The legal representative parties at the negotiations were identified as Zambia and the United Kingdom (because Southern Rhodesia was considered illegal), as well as the

¹² NAZ, FA 1-1-20, Simon Kapwepwe, “Letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zambia to British High Commissioner,” Rhodesia Railways, July 8, 1966.

¹³ NAZ, FA 1-1-226, “Cabinet Minutes: Railways: Division of Rhodesia Railways,” Rhodesia Railways, March 13, 1967.

International Bank for Construction and Development in its concerns over loans granted to the Railway.¹⁴

However, the Zambian Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued, “The reaction of the United Kingdom government to Zambia’s proposals has been one of procrastination and reluctance to become involved in the discharge of its due responsibilities.”¹⁵ Great Britain did not want to participate in the negotiations over the dissolution of Rhodesia Railways because it believed that “the present situation in Rhodesia is likely to continue indefinitely.” Therefore, it argued that negotiations should be postponed “until constitutional rule has been restored in Rhodesia.”¹⁶ Great Britain’s opinion did not, of course, change the course of action for Rhodesia, and as Zambia began planning in March for a June dissolution, Rhodesia responded by raising its transport costs and tariffs.¹⁷

¹⁴ The loan from the Bank was US\$19 million, of which Zambia still had to pay its share, even after the Railway had broken-up. NAZ, FA 1-1-226, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “Letter to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance,” Rhodesia Railways, June 24, 1967.

¹⁵ NAZ, FA 1-1-226, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Division of Rhodesia Railways,” Rhodesia Railways, n.d.

¹⁶ NAZ, FA 1-1-226, “Note No. 84 from the British High Commission in Zambia,” Rhodesia Railways, May 6, 1967.

¹⁷ NAZ, FA 1-1-226, Report of a Meeting of Officials to Discuss the Division of the Rhodesia Railways Held in Salisbury, on Tuesday, 21st March, 1967,” Rhodesia Railways, March 21, 1967.

Negotiating TAZARA

The first step to undertaking the building of a railway through Tanzania and into Zambia was a survey, and so this is where Kaunda and Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere first directed their attention. Zambia, however, did not participate in the first meeting between Nyerere, Bottomley, and Castle. In this July 1965 meeting, Nyerere revealed that the Chinese had offered to survey the Tanzanian part of the line and assist with construction. The British government immediately countered this offer, agreeing to contribute £75,000, or half the total cost of surveying. It was clear, as reported by Zambia, that “there was a danger that this project was becoming involved in East/West power politics.”¹⁸

The plan was to execute a three stage project. The first stage was to be an engineering and economic survey, necessary for both policy decisions and to procure financing. The proposal had to be approved by not only Zambia and Tanzania, but also Uganda and Kenya. Once approved, the second stage involved the detailed engineering and design of the line, and then finally, the railway would be constructed.¹⁹ Financing options in 1965 included the United Nations Special Fund, the United States, and the Kaiser Engineering Corporation. Other private firms tried to bid on various stages of the

¹⁸ Immediately, South African banks also offered loans and Japanese and Ghananian consultants also offered their services. NAZ, FA 1-1-41, “Railways: Zambia/ Tanzania Rail Link: Financial and Economic Aid,” Tanzania Rail Link, April 29, 1965.

¹⁹ FA 1-1-103, M. C. Chona and Davies, “North-East Rail Link,” Tanzania Rail Link, October 9, 1965.

project, including Le Leon Manufacturing Company from Kansas City, Missouri, which tried to obtain a contract with the Zambian government for air freight and a Japanese company with offices in Johannesburg that wanted to do the railway survey.²⁰ In the end, however, it was Great Britain, through the firm Maxwell Stamp and Associates, and Canada who offered the full cost of the first stage, an estimated £150,000, of the “preliminary engineering and economic survey of the proposed Tanzania-Zambia railway.”²¹ Zambia was pleased with this development, and profusely thanked the Canadians and British for what they termed a “splendid example of co-operation between members of the Commonwealth”—no doubt a jab at its threats to leave the organization.²²

The Maxwell Stamp Report was completed in 1966, and paved the way for the completion of negotiations for the railway. The Report firmly established the technical feasibility and “economic viability” of the link and agreed that the estimated cost of construction stood at £126 million. By 1971, the Report stated, 2.559 million tons of traffic would be able to travel on the railway, rising to 4.281 million tons by 1981. This was based on some goods still traveling out through the south, with the majority of exports being metals and general goods. The Report estimated that revenues would

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ NAZ, FA 1-1-41, “Canada and Britain offer the full cost of rail survey,” Tanzania Rail Link, September 18, 1965.

²² NAZ, FA 1-1-103, Kenneth Kaunda, “Letter to Harold Wilson, M. P. and Letter to Lester Person, M. P.,” Tanzania Rail Link, September 24, 1965.

exceed total and interests costs with a rate of return of 9 percent in 1971, rising to 13 percent in 1981. Even with the report, however, Zambia wished to emphasize that the project should be examined in terms of its financial viability and not with a consideration to other southern and western routes that Zambia has deemed unreliable.²³

The Report was released to both the governments and the private sector of several countries, and garnered significant attention. Kaiser Engineers, an Oakland, California based engineering firm, sent a very positive reply to the Zambian government's submission of the report. Earl G. Peacock, the Vice President of Kaiser, called the Stamp Report "a forceful economic and financial justification for the new railway" and that "Zambia would not be risking anything but short-run liquidity by financing" its construction. Although they advised that there be a second, more detailed study prior to construction, Kaiser Engineering was clear in its desire to assist in the building of the new railway. Peacock noted, "It is also important to note that while short-run transport alternatives are important, it is only the existence of the Tan-Zam Railway which will assure the long-run economic growth and viability of Zambia."²⁴

Even prior to the survey and the publication of the Maxwell Stamp Report, the Inter-Governmental Ministerial Committee of Zambia and Tanzania wasted no time in drafting request letters to several governments to cover the cost of the actual building of

²³ NAZ, FA 1-1-103, "Maxwell Stamp Report," Tanzania Rail Link, October 26, 1967.

²⁴ NAZ, FA 1-1-103, Earl G. Peacock, "Letter to Kenneth Kaunda," Tanzania Rail Link, April 28, 1967.

the rail link. The communication was designed so that the names nations could be inserted into blanks:

The purpose of this communication is to appraise the Government
of _____ of what is now taking place, and to enquire whether the
Government of _____ would consider participating in the
provision of finance for the later stages of the project.

This brief letter was to be sent to the governments of Japan, Canada, France, West Germany, and, the only communist nation listed, China.²⁵

It is unsurprising that China would be included on any potential donor list made by Tanzania. As the leader of an openly and ardently socialist nation, President Nyerere made no question of his distaste for the West and his close relationship with the Chinese. Zambia, however, was a different story. The Chinese government recognized the difficult position in which Zambia found itself. In a telegram from the Chinese Embassy in Zambia to the Foreign Ministry in China, the ambassador expressed a keen insight into the possibilities:

To avoid pressure from imperialism and colonialism [Kaunda] wants to get unconditioned aid from the West, but doesn't think the western countries are reliable. He also wants to accept aid from China, but worries about the ensuing imperialistic pressure. The contradiction of his thought

²⁵ NAZ, FA 1-1-41, "Zambia-Tanzania Rail Link," Tanzania Rail Link, September 27, 1965.

is reflected in the discrepancy of his speech. Certainly there is another possibility: he wants to urge the western countries to hurry in honoring their promise of aid by claiming to consider aid from China.²⁶

China seemed unsure of what the Zambian government's next move would be, but it certainly realized the political implications of China giving aid to a former British colony and member of the Commonwealth.

The British also believed that the Zambians were using the Chinese as a playing card against the West. In a report on Chinese Aid to Zambia, A. G. Gilchrist describes what he terms a “reversal” of Zambian policy on relations with China. Gilchrist explains that, in 1965, “Kaunda was concerned at the extent to which....Tanzania was falling under Chinese influence, and he was particularly disquieted about the Chinese offer of assistance to Tanzania for building the Tanzam railway.”²⁷ However, in the press on October 21, 1966, Kaunda had admitted to accepting Chinese aid and considering other offers. Like the Chinese, Gilchrist believed that Kaunda desired “to show Zambia’s disillusionment with Britain by accepting Chinese aid.”²⁸ The question was, really, whether or not Britain would cut off aid to Zambia if they left the Commonwealth and did not participate in sanctions against Rhodesia.

²⁶ FMAPRC, 108-00649, “Youquan ka dui xiu zhu zan-tan tielu di tai du” (“Attitudes on the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway”), August 17, 1965.

²⁷ PRO FO 31/441, Tanzania: Bilateral External: China/Tanzania Relations, 1968.

²⁸ PRO, DO 209/71, A. G. Gilchrist, “Chinese Aid to Zambia,” Political Relations between Zambia and China, October 26, 1966.

The British considered this as they faced the possibility of aid competition in Zambia. Although they believed “the Chinese economy is far from being in a sound state,” they also knew that China was “capable of providing financial and material assistance abroad if the political gains to be expected are important enough.” Areas of assistance identified by Great Britain included transportation infrastructure, including roads (but not mentioning rail links), interest-free commercial credits, and cheap consumer goods. Overall, the British believed that the total aid the Chinese would be able to offer to both Zambia and Tanzania “could be in the order of several million pounds.”²⁹ British officials did not take Chinese aid seriously in 1966, and therefore thought that Zambia would not have the means to leave the Commonwealth if the Rhodesian situation continued.

Zambia also realized the implications of accepting aid from China, for its relationship with China, as well as with its relationship with the West. In a treatise on Chinese Policy on Zambia, the Zambian Foreign Ministry explained, “Nobody can doubt that the Chinese do not like our policy of non-alignment....However, in non-alignment we acknowledge the fact that neither communists nor capitalists are innocent of imperialist aggression.” However, they also stated that “This is to say that the socialist camp has a special place in Chinese foreign policy and any aid from China is aimed at helped nations

²⁹ PRO, DO 209/71, “Chinese Assistance to Zambia/Tanzania,” Political Relations Between Zambia and China, August 12, 1966.

concerned to be economically independent on the basis of self-reliance.”³⁰ And economic independence was not only exactly what Zambian wanted, but what new independent African nations needed as well.

The sensitive political nature of the negotiations ensured that the public version was considerably more cautious than the words expressed behind closed doors. In a press conference immediately after the British and Canadians had agreed to complete the survey, Kaunda hinted that the two nations would also participate in building the new rail line, stating that “I am confident that they will do something when the right time comes.”³¹ However, the foreign press was quick to try and catch him out. A journalist from the BBC questioned Chinese rail experts in Zambia clashing with the soon to be coming British and Canadian team, and the Associated Press questioned the offer of “red China, communist China” of building to Tanzania. Kaunda expertly fielded the journalists questions, explaining that he would only find out about this offer on an upcoming trip to Dar es Salaam and also noted that there was no need for him to “say ‘red’ China” because communist China was “the only China we know, anyway.”³²

In fact, in an interview with Kenneth Kaunda in the *Times of Zambia*³³ on June 29, 1967, two years after privately asking the Chinese to fund the project, he stated:

³⁰ NAZ, FA 1-1-94, “Chinese Policy on Zambia,” Relations with China, n.d.

³¹ UNIP 7/22/8, “President’s Press Conference,” Press Releases, September 23, 1965.

³² Ibid.

³³ The *Times of Zambia* was the leading newspaper in Zambia in the 1960s. It was, and still is, government controlled.

“Zambia was not attempting to play off East against West by approaching a number of countries for assistance with the project.”³⁴ Yet it is clear from his negotiations with China and the Britain that it is exactly what he was doing. And what he was doing quite well. This was just a few months before the final railway deal was signed and two years after Kaunda had privately requested assistance from the Chinese, but it was beginning to become difficult to appease both sides. Two months later, in August, after a July trip to Peking, Kaunda was interviewed again by the *Times of Zambia*, speaking on western allegations that he was moving into the communist camps. He stated, “Quite honestly, I do not know whether to be angry or to laugh at this...Four trips to the West...are not sufficient to make me a capitalist...But only one trip to Peking...will make me a communist.”³⁵ He went on to state that Zambia was considering all offers and had made no decisions regarding who would aid the nation in building the railway.

China was also keeping a close eye on the press, both Zambian and western, to gauge reactions to its proposed aid. On July 1, China noted the *Guardian* in London reported that China was offering Zambia and Tanzania aid. On July 2, it noted the *Times of Zambia* response: publishing individual pictures of Zhou, Nyerere, Kaunda, and Kapwepwe, accompanied by editorials. The Chinese offer of aid was quick to cause a “great sensation,” and China acknowledged Kaunda’s continuing diplomatic attitude. The Chinese Embassy in Zambia reported that Kaunda stated that “China offered no aid to

³⁴ Kenneth Kaunda, “Opinion-Editorial,” *Times of Zambia*, June 29, 1967.

³⁵ Kenneth Kaunda, “Opinion-Editorial,” *Times of Zambia*, August 1967.

Zambia, but it is clear that China has offered aid to Tanzania, and that “that the Zambia-Tanzania railway would be free from the control of eastern or western political forces.” Western reactions, on the other hand, argued that China, because of foreign exchange difficulties, would not be capable of offering such a large loan in pounds.³⁶

However, while it was true that Kaunda was no communist, he was much closer to closing the deal on the railway than he let on to the Zambian public and government officials from the West. During his June trip he signed an Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement between Zambia and China. In a letter to Chinese Prime Minister Zhou En-Lai after he returned from his trip, Kaunda wrote, “The construction of the railway line between Tanzania and Zambia is one area under consideration and no doubt we shall be in contact at the earliest possible opportunity.”³⁷ Kaunda also took the opportunity in the letter to address China’s continuing major concern: United Nations recognition. Kaunda, always the careful diplomat in his writing, expressed, “I still consider your seat in the United Nations as an imperative necessity if only to ensure the participation of each and every independent nation affected directly or indirectly in the resolution of world tensions. I admit the United Nations is not in its best frame to cater

³⁶ FMAPRC, 108-00649-02, Chinese Embassy Lusaka, “Recent reports on our aid to Zambia and Tanzania for the construction of the Zambia-Tanzania Railway - Telegraph to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” July 2, 1967.

³⁷ NAZ, FA 1-1-94, “Letter from Kaunda,” July 6, 1967.

for all our interests, but it is necessary for all nations to participate in reshaping it for the better.”³⁸

On September 5, 1967, Chinese, Zambian, and Tanzanian government officials signed the TAZARA railway deal in Peking. The Zambian delegation included the Minister of Finance, A. N. L. Wina, the Governor Delegate of the Bank of Zambia, Dr. J. Zulu, the Permanent Secretary of the Office of National Development and Planning, M. Lishomwa, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, E. Kasonde, and the Assistant Principle of the Ministry of Finance, M. Mulundika. Noticeably absent from the delegation was President Kaunda, as well as President Nyerere, although Prime Minister Zhou attended the signing. The agreement was signed by the three Ministers of Finance Ali Hseun-Nien (China), A. H. Jamal (Tanzania), and A. J. Soko (Zambia) - for an interest-free loan for the construction of railway and that the Chinese would complete terrain and soil geology hydrology surveys before the technical date of construction was set. In an inward telegram from a Tanzanian representative in Peking to the Foreign Ministry in Lusaka they reported, “The agreement was concluded in an atmosphere of Mutual Friendship and respect and to the complete satisfaction of the three governments. It marks the beginning of an important chapter in the Economic History of this region of Africa.”³⁹

³⁸ NAZ, FA 1-1-94, “Letter from Kaunda,” July 6, 1967.

³⁹ NAZ, FA 1-1-103, “Telegram from Tanzanian Representative Peking to Foreign Lusaka,” Tanzania Rail Link, September 5, 1967.

The Cold War in Zambia

Trading with and receiving technical assistance from China was also not easy for Zambia when dealing with the West. On the same mission of the Zambian trade delegation that produced the maize contract, they visited Japan after leaving China. However, the delegation explained, “The visit to Japan produced very little results...basically because the Japanese Government, so it would appear, foolishly took offence at our having gone to China first.”⁴⁰ Undoubtedly, however, the most negative opinions of China in Africa came from the major western powers, and the United States in particular was adamant against allowing key African nations, in terms of geography, natural resources, or population, to develop a socialist form of government or establish diplomatic or trade relations with communist nations. While the U.S. did not care as much about the political alignment of smaller nations such as Cameroon or Burundi, both considered more “leftist” states immediately following their independence, it did care heavily about the political alignment of nations of geographically strategic nations, such as Zambia. The idea of the “domino effect” was central in United States foreign policy during this period—for example, one need only look to the counties of Southeast Asia—and this was a prime example of such a fear. Foreign policy makers assumed that if a geographically significant nation like Zambia could maintain democratic stability, it would influence its less stable neighbors in a similar direction.

⁴⁰ NAZ, FA 1-1-64, “Observations on the Zambian Trade and Economic Mission,” Communist China - Technical Assistance, April 7, 1967 - May 20, 1967.

Geo-political significance also applied to the central African nation of the Congo, and it is a telling example of U.S. fears in Africa during the Cold War. The communist infiltration in the Congo differed from the United States officials' fear of Soviet influence seen in many international examples. The major concern about the Congo by 1964 actually lay in the fear of Chinese influence. In a research memorandum by Thomas Hughes, the United States Director of Research and Intelligence in the State Department, from August of 1964, he explained, "given the distance of the Congo from the USSR and Soviet reluctance to become involved in direct confrontations with the U.S., we would not expect any direct Soviet intervention in such circumstances."⁴¹ However, while the Soviet Union remained relatively uninterested in the situation in the Congo, the Chinese repeatedly proved their interest.

In a speech made before the Banquet of the International Congress of French-speaking Africa of Georgetown University on August 18, 1964, W. Averell Harriman, the U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, explained to his audience, "Guerrilla handbooks of Chinese origin have been found in the Congo...The tactics used by the rebels show unmistakably Chinese Communist inspiration."⁴² Numerous memos from the State Department and officials in the Congo further reflected the fear of Chinese communist influence on the rebel factions in the Congo. Foreign policy makers raised

⁴¹ LBJ, Thomas L. Hughes, "Research Memorandum to the Secretary of State," National Security Files, Congo Country File, August 7, 1964.

⁴² LBJ, W. Averell Harriman, "Address to the International Congress of French-speaking Africa at Georgetown University," National Security Files, Congo Country File, August 18, 1964.

concerns at the time about the “Chicoms” presence in Congo-Brazzaville and Burundi, as well as concerns that the Chinese were training Congolese rebels, in the Congo and possibly even in China.⁴³ While the truth of these statements is still debated, it was clear that not only was China an increasingly important presence in Africa, but that it also had attracted the attention of the West. The concerns of the U.S. government were also the concerns of Great Britain, and the British were especially focused on Zambia’s geopolitical significance for the situation in Rhodesia.

Therefore, the West immediately jumped into action at the news of the railway agreement signing. Zambian Ambassador to the United States, Rupiah Banda, reported of the deal signing creating “great interest” in Washington. He explained, “There is even talk of possibility of interested American and Japanese firms forming consortium to Finance and construct the Railway.”⁴⁴ The Foreign Ministry in Lusaka was quick to respond, warning Banda, “You must look out for usual imperialist delaying tactics. For your information Zambia and Tanzania already committed but you should avoid at all costs indicating degree of commitment.”⁴⁵ Immediately, however, the Director of Central African Affairs in the United States State Department scheduled a trip to Zambia to see to what extent the rumors of Chinese assistance were true.

⁴³ LBJ, George C. Denney Jr., “Memorandum:’Chinese Communist Involvement in Congolese Insurrections,’ National Security Files, Congo Country File, August 11, 1964.

⁴⁴ NAZ, FA 1-1-103, Rupiah Banda, “Telegram from Zambian Washington to Foreign Lusaka,” Tanzania Rail Link, September 13, 1967.

⁴⁵ NAZ, FA 1-1-103, “Telegram from Foreign Lusaka to Zambians Washington,” Tanzania Rail Link, September 13, 1967.

In a letter from the Zambian Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs he observed, “It is apparent that the Americans and the West in general are very disturbed about the whole railway project.” First, he noted, they put out the World Bank report, then after the Maxwell Stamp Report on the feasibility of rail link they tried to counteract with the “Middle Africa Road Transport Survey.” However, he continued, “The West has nobody else to blame but themselves since offers to build the Tan-Zam Railway were made to all potential candidates and only China has responded positively with a definite and unmistakable document.”⁴⁶ Zambians were concerned that on account of “apprehension on the part of the West,” western nations would retaliate for Zambia’s new commitment to the East, and the Permanent Secretary urged both political and diplomatic initiatives, as well as “military preparedness.” The concern was in particular over the reaction of the United States, which he believed could do “incalculable harm to Zambia.”⁴⁷

Although the Soviet Union was undoubtedly the biggest rival of the United States in the 1960s, the Communist government of China also stayed continually with the U.S. government’s radar. However, China also joined in on the battle, arguing as late as 1969, towards the end of the final railway survey, that “imperialists” and “colonialists” have “invariably attempt to sabotage the constructions of the Tanzania/Zambia railway.” China

⁴⁶ NAZ, FA 1-1-103, “Letter from Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Unknown Minister,” Tanzania Rail Link, September 19, 1967.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

condemned the “rumour-mongering” and “slanderizing” of the West, yet the Chinese government seemed keen to do just that.⁴⁸

The Tanzania-Zambia rail link was to be the third largest construction project in Africa and the Middle East at the time, after the Aswan Dam in the United Arab Emirates and the Volta Dam in Ghana, both projects funded by the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the TanZam line would link the mineral wealth of both Zambia and the Congo with the outside. However, despite what the British had thought about the Chinese ability to provide aid, they were funding TAZARA, which had become “perhaps the most controversial project in Africa today.”⁴⁹ However, the project was controversial not only for the divide between East and West, but also for the divide between China and the Soviet Union. A. M. Chambeshi, the acting High Commissioner to Tanzania, noted that the railway signing “has created an unfriendly atmosphere between us and the so called socialist camps.”⁵⁰

Building the Railway

The Chinese offer of economic assistance did not cover all of the technical aspects necessary to building the railway. The new Chief Executive Officer of the

⁴⁸ NAZ, FA 1-1-286, “Speech by Comrade Kuo Lu, Head of the Railway Delegation of the Government of the People’s Republic of China at the Opening of the Talk,” November 10, 1969.

⁴⁹ NAZ, FA 1-1-286, Davis Mugabe, “Tanzania-Zambia Rail Link Project,” Tanzania Rail Link, January 1968.

⁵⁰ NAZ, FA 1-1-103, A. M. Chambeshi, “Letter to R. C. Kamanga, Minister of Foreign Affairs,” Tanzania Rail Link, September 19, 1967.

Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority, H. L. T. Chopeta, requested from the Ministry of Foreign affairs outside technical assistance to aid in construction and civil engineering matters associated with railway construction and maintenance. When considering which countries to request assistance from, Zambia kept in mind China's controversial position in global affairs. Therefore, nations like Pakistan and Ceylon, which were friendly with China, were identified as possibilities.⁵¹

While working with the Chinese made identifying additional partners difficult, working with the Chinese themselves also sometimes proved to be difficult. P. J. Chisanga, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Power, Transport and Works, expressed as surveys were being conducted, the Chinese seemed to be already preparing for constructing the railway, before the surveys were approved by the three governments.⁵² Chisanga argued, "the Chinese do not seem to practice the Western standards of conducting business and it would appear that they are ignoring the provisions of an Agreement signed in Peking in 1967." However, he did note that Zambia should "exercise caution" and make sure that "the Chinese are not frustrated in their efforts."⁵³

⁵¹ NAZ, FA 1-1-286, H. L. T. Chopeta, "Letter to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Tanzania Rail Link, July 15, 1969.

⁵² NAZ, FA 1-1-286, P. J. Chisanga, "Letter to E. M. Chipimo, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Tanzania Rail Link, August 15, 1969.

⁵³ NAZ, FA 1-1-286, P. J. Chisanga, "Letter to E. B. T. Mbozi, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs," October 3, 1969.

Along the proposed railway line, the Chinese survey team, consisting of early career railway men in their 30s and 40s, Chinese doctors, and other “support staff,” Zambians had their first chance to interact with the citizens of its diplomatic “friend.” And, unsurprisingly, there were immediately concerns that the Chinese were distributing Mao badges and literature and “virtually conducting an indoctrination programme amongst at least some of the workers and the patients they treat.” Although these were just rumors, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argued that “forewarned is forearmed.” He believed that “Any foreign indoctrinations which are not subject to the control of institutions in this country, such as the churches and companies are, could be fertile ground for the seeds of trouble in the future,” and, furthermore, that “If we had a similar situation applying to, say, a group of British or American surveyors preaching the Queen or President Nixon and the wonderful works of their respective national philosophies, I am sure we would share the concern of any possible consequences of this upon the minds of a simple country folk.”⁵⁴ The Chinese were, as always, more political than they claimed to be, but Zambia still held firm to its policy of non-alignment.

According to Jamie Monson, this ideological import was not just for the “socialist” railway, but for the “capitalist” highway being built in parallel and tandem by the United States. She argues, “there was much more at stake in this confrontation than the simple logistics of one rural transportation project accommodating another; the

⁵⁴ NAZ, FA 1-1-286, “Letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs,” March 26, 1969.

disputed terrain was not just physical but ideological.”⁵⁵ Furthermore, the railway had another ideological dimension, being “anti-apartheid.” Overall, however, the Zambians were pleased with the speed and manner in which the survey had taken place. Zambia desired that the railway be completed by 1975, in the event that relations with Rhodesia, as well as Portugal and South Africa, “may deteriorate to the extent that Zambia cannot or does not wish to use their harbours.” After that only the Congo rail/river route and Tanzanian road route would remain, which were not only expensive but had limited carrying capacity. Zambia sought to offer special incentives for finishing the railway quickly, such as limiting the amount of the loan, which also had the reason of a “moral” obligation to not “deprive China of developing their own economy during the period.”⁵⁶

Zambia believed strongly that the loan should also be paid back as quickly as possible, also in the interest of China:

The £100m. interest free loan from China should be amortised in not too long a period in view of the fact that the Chinese Nation, with an income of about £50 per head, is denying itself the goods which it supplies to Tanzania and Zambia although they could produce instead, goods to promote their own development.

⁵⁵ Jaime Monson, *Africa's Freedom Railway* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 2.

⁵⁶ NAZ, FA 1-1-286, “Aide Memoire for the Honorable Minister of Foreign Affairs,” n.d.

Presidential aides suggested that the loan be paid back in 15 years time, which meant that the railway would not only need to cover its own costs, but the costs of paying back the loan in a timely manner as well.⁵⁷

The railway survey, released in early 1970, reported that the total length of the line would be 1,900 kilometers, and contain 350 bridges with a total length of 15,000 meters; 36 tunnels with a length of 12,000 meters; and 2,500 curvets. The earthworks for the permanent project would require the movement of 70,000,000 cubic meters of earth, and the earthworks for provisions projects, such as service sidings and service roads, would require the movement of 30,000,000 cubic meters. The railway route was to traverse “complicated topographical and geological features.” Although the Chinese would be in charge of the construction, it was estimated that 6-7,000 local workers would be needed for construction in 1970, with a target of employing 12,000 workers over the course of construction. The goal was to attempt to reach a wide range of workers, who would be paid K20 per month, plus food and allowances.⁵⁸

Keeping Promises: China and the United Nations

Relations between Zambia and China became increasingly close during the survey and construction of the railway. The Tanzania Zambia railway also opened doors for

⁵⁷ NAZ, FA 1-1-286, "Brief for His Excellency, the President, Concerning the Zambia-Tanzania Railway and the Terminal Harbour of this Railway," August 9, 1969.

⁵⁸ NAZ, FA 1-1-548, "Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority Brief Progress Report," Tanzania Rail Link, March 16, 1970.

better trade relations, including increased staff of the Commercial Office at the Chinese Embassy to provide Zambian traders with information (data, catalogues, samples, etc.).⁵⁹ More importantly, however, was the strengthening of diplomatic ties. Zambia continued to support China's re-admission to the United Nations Security Council. And, once the railway agreement was signed, it supported it in even stronger terms than ever before.

In a statement by J. B. Mwemba, the Zambian Ambassador to the United Nations, he expressed that Zambian "has been and continues to be in favour of the restoration of the rights" for China, and that its exclusion "is contrary to the principles embodied in the Charter of this Organization." This petition, as Mwemba noted, was a continuation of policy, but the rest of his statement spoke to a change in the strength of Zambia's stand. Mwemba argued that Taiwan's legal representation of China "is nothing but mere fiction." Zambia specifically attacked the West on this issue, stating that "My delegation fails to appreciate the attitude of those Western Powers which oppose the admission of China at all costs, and do so on an ideological basis—a basis which is unacceptable in this Organization."⁶⁰

The western "attitude" was argued to be racist, and Mwemba used the rhetoric of Afro-Asian solidarity to convey his appeal:

⁵⁹ NAZ, FA 1-1-548, Chinese Embassy Zambia, "Letter to Ministry of Foreign Affairs," March 19, 1970.

⁶⁰ NAZ, FA 1-1-94, "Statement made by H. E. Mr. J. B. Mwemba Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative of the Republic of Zambia to the United Nations in the General Assembly on the Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations," Relations with China, November 27, 1967.

Western hostility towards China has all the trapping of racism and the African peoples must see it in that way for what it is worth... We see it in their many reference to the Chinese as ‘wards’ or ‘teeming hordes’, or to ‘the ant heap’ and ‘the yellow menace.’ We know those terms...are meant to project the image of an inferior or a sub-human race. Africans also have been given their share of names, and we all know them too well. Those of us who give our votes to this racist scheme of isolating China are in fact supporting racism, which is the scourge of Africa.

Furthermore, Mwemba argued, China did not show the same level of aggression as western nations. Despite having the largest population in the world, “one hears of no Chinese soldiers being outside its borders. One knows of no foreign bases owned by China.”⁶¹ In 1968, Zambia continued its crusade for China’s restoration, noting its concern over the number of African countries that were voting against China’s admission. The plan, therefore, was to canvass support at the next OAU meeting, to be held in Algiers.⁶²

By the twentieth session of the United Nations, in 1965, it seemed likely that the PRC would be re-sat. However, rather than it being the votes of African nations, a shift in United States policy seemed like the most likely reason for the change. African states, previously increasing in their support for the PRC re-establishment, had tapered off due

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² NAZ, FA 1-1-94, Vernon J. Mwaanga, “Admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations,” Relations with China, July 31, 1968.

to a number of domestic factors. Dahomey and the Central African Republic had severed ties with the PRC. Coups in Ghana and Nigeria caused relations to be severed in Nigeria, but not Ghana. Basutoland and Bechuanaland were scheduled to gain their own independence and were likely to establish relations with the Republic of China. A United States policy shift, towards accepting “two Chinas,” was argued to be the most important factor. Even more issues abounded in terms of language and procedure. Rather than being diplomatic, the issue was becoming bureaucratic.⁶³

In the 21st session of the general assembly, Draft resolution L.496, for the immediate seating of the People’s Republic of China, was rejected by 57, with 46 in favor and 17 abstaining. Zambia had voted in favor of the substantive resolution, but against the procedural, a bureaucratic decision. Also voting in the same manner was Tanzania, in a guaranteed show of support for the PRC. However, by this time, “African attitudes by and large hardened against seating the PRC.” Similarly, “with the exception of Cuba, Latin American countries were unanimous against seating at present the PRC.”⁶⁴

The back and forth, however, continued for the next two years, with little profound change by 1969. In the words of the representative from Singapore, it “had achieved near immortality status.”⁶⁵ However, the stance of Zambia in favor of the PRC remained strong and continued to grow. As noted in the report, “One of the speeches that

⁶³ UNARMS, U Thant, S-0881-0002-03, “The China Question,” n.d.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 11.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 1.

reflected most closely the position of the PRC itself was that of the delegation of Zambia.”⁶⁶ The basic points were that the PRC could not be admitted as a new member, as it had been existence as a country for two decades. Furthermore, the Zambian delegation argued, “The accusation that China was not interested in the cause of peace was baseless.” The tensions were created by the argument, rather than being based in reality. Specifically, the United States was creating tensions in the United Nations and towards the PRC by keeping military bases close to the Chinese border. The only real tensions, those of the border dispute between the PRC and Soviet Union, seemed to be moving towards resolution.

The Zambian delegate concluded by stating that “We know that the People’s Republic of China expects to be accorded and will accept its rightful place in this world body on the basis of the principle of equal sovereignty of States. I submit that the exclusion of this most populous State in the world has marred the history of this Organisation for the past twenty years.”⁶⁷ Overall, “attitudes softened” towards the issue, which “took form either by a change in vote or by an unchanged vote accompanied by a speech or explanation making it clear that the representative thought the moment had come for a re-thinking of the problem.”⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Ibid., 8.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 9.

⁶⁸ UNARMS, U Thant, S-0881-0002-05, Political and Security Council Affairs Department, “General Debate: Twenty-fourth Session of the General Assembly,” December 12, 1969, 3.

The debates continued for another two years in a similar manner, with the United States becoming decreasingly rigid on its hard line stance towards the PRC. This, coupled with the increasing votes by both new third world nations and western nations, led to the passing of Resolution 2758 on October 25, 1971. In the vote, 76 countries supported the People's Republic of China, while 35 opposed, 17 abstained, and three nations did not vote. What some argue would have been eventually inevitable, was at the very least speeded up by the support of nations such as Zambia. The "mutually beneficial friendship," almost a decade after its beginning, had indeed shown its mutual advantage.

Conclusion

The negotiations for the building of the TAZARA railway are not the only instance in which the Zambian government used foreign policy for economic development. However, these negotiations do represent the most important and the most well documented example. The global reaction, particularly from the West, is an important indicator broader political and ideological debates within the larger construct of the Cold War.

Yet while the implications were broad, the real impact was local, as Zambia used the TAZARA railway to mitigate the damage from U.D.I., ensure economic independence, and promote development. Moreover, the positive effects of these negotiations were not only for Zambia, but for China as well. Diplomatic recognition was paramount for the Chinese government in its international relations, and the primary

reason it sought opportunities to provide aid and assistance to newly independent, developing economies. The mutually beneficial friendship between Zambia and China is an important example of how the Cold War became more global and how decolonizing nations were able to use a unique political situations to not hinder, but rather further, development.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has examined the political and economic development of a newly independent Zambia in terms of its foreign relations. The development of decolonizing nations did not exist in a vacuum—in any period of history. The political economy of national development exists within a particular historical context. For the many new nations of Africa in the 1960s, the historical context was the Cold War. Consequently, the geopolitical situation was of paramount importance never before seen in history. The Cold War polarized global politics and, critically, economics.

In order to explore these competing influences in Zambia—foreign policy and domestic economic development—I began this study by looking at the unique colonial experience of the nations of the Central African Federation. While Northern Rhodesia was technically a British colony, the most important influence in the decade prior to independence was not London, but rather, was Salisbury. As the capital of the Central African Federation, and of Southern Rhodesia, Salisbury, through the many white settlers of the British South Africa Company, promoted a lopsided development policy that used Northern Rhodesia largely for resource extraction.

Therefore, while, as I explain, the Northern Rhodesian independence process was relatively peaceful and, from the British perspective, deliberate, it still placed a great economic burden on a decolonized and newly independent Zambia. For the United National Independence Party, and its leader, Kenneth Kaunda, this was a primary concern

in the development of an ideology that would ensure both political and economic development for Zambia. Rather than choosing between the competing influences of communism and capitalism, UNIP and Kaunda instead chose a middle-way. The philosophy of humanism was rooted both in the global move of many third world nations towards non-alignment, as well as the unique history, culture, and needs of an African nation.

Similarly, although already a growing power by the time of Zambia's independence in 1964, the People's Republic of China was also creating its ideological place within the geopolitical sphere. Image and propaganda were dominant in this global conversation: the West viewed China as a member of the communist and powerful second world, while China sought to define itself as a member, and leader, of the third world. This strategic self-depreciation was critical for China, as it sought diplomatic recognition, particularly in the United Nations. Through new international initiatives such as the Bandung Conference of 1955, the creation of the Non-Alignment Movement, and new international organizations such as the Afro Asian People's Solidarity Organization, China attempted to place itself for its political benefit.

Individual relations with new African nations differed in many aspects. This was particularly true in the types of assistance China provided, including military assistance in decolonization struggles and economic development assistance. However, the one thread that ran through the entirety of relations was the focus on Republic of China, and the People's Republic of China's re-establishment to the United Nations Security

Council. As early as 1962, two years prior to Zambian independence, the Chinese had already sought an audience with UNIP, and their delegate did not fail to mention the importance of diplomatic recognition.

Yet for Zambia in particular, the issues were not solely international, but also regional. Simply put, regional issues necessitated the need for an advanced foreign relations policy. As a landlocked nation, Zambia faced economic difficulties from the start. However, the volatile situation in Southern Africa created an increased vulnerability, political, economically, and socially. All eight countries bordering Zambia presented some form of difficulty, whether it was violence, instability, or negotiations with colonial powers. Yet despite inherent difficulties, nothing could have prepared any nation, particularly a newly independent one, with the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Southern Rhodesia.

The lasting legacy of the Central African Federation placed Zambia dependent upon its neighbor, Southern Rhodesia. Telecommunications, manufacturing, and, most importantly, transport, were centered in companies and institutions within white controlled Rhodesia. Therefore, when Ian Smith and his minority controlled government declared an independence from Great Britain in 1965, the stakes were particularly great for Zambia. Consequently, Zambian reactions were complex, and assuredly not in line with the view of Great Britain. The single greatest strain between Zambia and its colonial power, both before and after independence, was, undoubtedly, the situation in Rhodesia. The British insisted that Zambia participate in international sanctions; yet the

contingency planning to offset economic damages were half-hearted at best. So, while Zambia still maintained strained but continued relations with the British, it was forced to turn its attention elsewhere.

The widespread attention Zambia placed on its international relations was both a reflection of its dedication to the policy of non-alignment, in line with the philosophy of humanism, as well as a response to its immediate economic needs. The Transitional and First National Development Plans laid out those needs, with the primary concern being transport routes for both imports and exports, related in large part to the situation in Southern Rhodesia. Mitigating damage was difficult, however, as the nations that could provide the most tangible assistance were in fact the most aligned, rather than non-aligned, nations. The Zambian government also turned to international organizations, such as the United Nations and Afro Asian People's Solidarity Organization, for economic development assistance, as well as helping to create new organizations based around economic realities, such as the Inter-Governmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC).

The role played by the West, including Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Scandinavian countries, and Japan, was largely in the arena of economic aid and technical assistance. The most important aspect for Zambian development, however, was not aid, but rather, as new literature has emphasized, in trade. An imbalance of trade with the West, designed to first benefit the more powerful western nations, led Zambia to pursue regional opportunities, including through the Eastern African Economic

Community. International opportunities were not ignored, however, and the Zambian government did not shy away from developing trade and aid relations with communist nations as well. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia both had a particular kind of prominence in Zambian political, economic, and social life, in large part because of the face-to-face roles that those involved in technical assistance and development project played and the importance of ideology in technical assistance projects. Although not as important socially, China played a critical role in Zambia economically and politically. While the focus was domestically and internationally on the negotiations to build the TAZARA railway, the Chinese were in fact involved in Zambian economic development in a variety of different capacities, including trade.

TAZARA, however, is the climax of this story, as it brought to a fruition the political and economic negotiations of the Zambian government since prior to independence. An alternative route for Zambian exports, namely copper, was critical, as was the increasing need for imports that were blocked in transit through Southern Rhodesia. Portuguese control of Angola ensured that a western route was not feasible, and therefore an eastern route was Zambia's only option. Alternative transportation routes had been discuss by Zambia and China as early as 1962. The first public negotiations, however, did not take place until 1965, between Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania.

Openly socialist Nyerere was controversial in the West in his own right, but also because of his close relations with communist nations, in particular China. Kaunda,

alternatively, remained quiet about his initial approaches to the East. After the completion of the Maxwell Stamp Report it became increasingly clear that assistance from the West would not be coming. Yet more open negotiations with the Chinese leading into 1967 led to the outcry of the western press. Both the public and private reaction to the negotiations of TAZARA represented a new level of the Cold War. Rather than be solely political, fought out in proxy wars throughout the developing world, the Cold War had become decidedly economic as well.

Ultimately, every country got what it had set out to from the foregoing. A deal was signed between Zambia, Tanzania, and China to build the railway, and construction was underway by 1970. There are many reasons beyond the purview of this dissertation why this economic development did not progress throughout the 1970s and 1980s. However, the immediate economic goal of Zambia (an alternative transport route) and the immediate political goal of China (re-establishment to the United Nations) were achieved.

Historical and Historiographical Significance

The significance of this study is both within the history and within the historiography. The history of the Cold War in sub-Saharan Africa is incomplete without attention to areas in which there was no violence. The inordinate attention to cases of violence and conflict in Africa does have some justification: lives were lost in ideological and political struggles and their stories deserve to be told. However, the fascination with

instances in which decolonization manifested in violence or democracy failed in Africa has created stereotypes both in the literature and in the public view of the continent. A macro view of history focusing on governments must also write in the histories of those nations that have thus far remained under the radar.

Zambia is an important example of such a nation, as well as an important example of real political skill. The United National Independence Party and Kaunda certainly did make mistakes. In particular, the focus on copper as 95 percent of the export industry was not sound economic policy. However, in the early years of the Kaunda administration, both prior to independence and throughout the First Republic, the deftness of the political negotiations undertaken should not go without recognition. Negotiating the Cold War was not easy, yet there is an alternative history to violent struggle. Therefore, in addition to contributing to the growing historiography on Zambia, and in particular to studies of its foreign relations, this dissertation also contributes to the broader historiography of post-colonial Africa and the history of the Cold War.

In recent years there has been a huge wave of scholarship and other writings produced on the “phenomenon” that is China in Africa. However, what these studies fail to acknowledge is that relations between China and African nations are for the most part not new, and that they do in fact have a historical counterpart. Although this study is not bilateral, it does explore the historical relations between Zambia and China, filling in a gap that exists not just for the historical discipline, but also for the contextualization of contemporary studies of Zambia and China, specifically, or China and Africa, in general.

Finally, and what I believe is most importantly, this study marries two previously disparate fields in Africanist historiography: diplomatic history and economic development. While there are several new examples of literature that take into account economic issues in the Cold War, the agency in these stories is invariably given to the global powers.¹ In particular, these new studies focus on the role of the United States in economic development, but also the role of the Soviet Union and, increasingly, China. One example that attempts to move beyond these paradigms is the chapter by Michael Latham in the *Cambridge History of the Cold War*. The chapter, titled “The Cold War in the Third World, 1963-1975,” examines those nations that chose non-alignment over association with the Soviet Union or the United States. However, rather than focusing on the nations and their leaders, Latham rather focuses on the reaction of the superpowers to this movement within the third world. Therefore, while Latham points the way towards the future of the study of the global Cold War, but there is still much to be done. The agency in these studies must also be given to the individual nations and leaders who

¹ See, for instance, Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), as well as Michael E. Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and Matthew Connolly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

negotiated the Cold War, in turn giving us a broader understanding of international history in this period.

Therefore, understanding Zambian history from a Zambian perspective helps us not just understand Zambia. Rather, it sheds light on both the history and contemporary issues within Africa and globally. More attention is deserved within all of these historiographies as we work to re-construct the history of a critical era. This study pushes forward two critical aspects of this historiography. First, it discusses the global Cold War from the perspective of non-superpower nations, particularly in Africa. Second, it argues that the decolonization and postcolonial history of African nations must be understood in the context of the Cold War, even when there was the absence of violent conflict.

The globalization of historical research and the openness of archives through the western and communist worlds make this research feasible. International research provides the opportunity for a greater perspective and context for individual study. Although this has been a study of the postcolonial development of a particular nation, it is intended to become a part of the broader conversation on the Cold War, as well as China's relations with Africa. It is for this research that this study contributes and hopes to push further forward in the future.

EPILOGUE

September 23, 2011, 12:00AM

Three days had passed since the Zambian people had travelled to the polls to elect their fifth president. The entire country became increasingly tense as they waited to see if Patriotic Front opposition leader Michael Sata beat the incumbent leader of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, Rupiah Banda. However, it was not until after midnight on the 23rd of September that Chief Justice Ernest Sakala announced to the nation that Sata had won, with 41.98 percent of the vote. In only the second democratic transfer of power in Africa, Zambia had demonstrated to the world that it was ready for change. Zambians immediately began to celebrate. All throughout the country, people stayed up all night dancing and cheering in the streets, until making a pilgrimage to see Sata sworn in later that afternoon.²

Zambian citizens were anxious to see if Sata could fulfill his many ambitious campaign promises, including eliminating corruption and working to close the gap between rich and poor. The rest of the world, however, was more interested to see if Sata would fulfill a different campaign promise: sticking to his hard line rhetorical stance against the Chinese. Long known globally as a radical politician, Sata had for almost a decade been a staunch critic of the Chinese in Zambia. However, compared with the anti-

² Portions of this Epilogue are adapted from a 2012 article by the author for *ChinAfrica* magazine. Used with permission.

Chinese rhetoric of his 2006 campaign, by 2011, Sata had already begun to loosen his stance, and he has only continued to do so since his election.

In his 2006 campaign, “King Cobra,” as he is popularly known, spoke out strongly against Chinese investors, even threatening to deport them and any other foreigners found to be violating Zambia’s labor laws. In response, the Chinese government threatened to cut diplomatic ties with Zambia if Sata was elected. Yet in his 2008 and then his 2011 campaign, there was a considerably less hostile slant in his references to China, making it appear that his previous tough rhetoric was simply to create political and media interest. Rather than threatening to kick the Chinese out, in his 2011 campaign, Sata was much more pragmatic. Regardless, many global media outlets continued to focus on his anti-China stance. In reality, Sata focused his campaign on populist economic development and noted that foreign investment would be allowed to continue, so long as it promoted Zambian development and followed Zambian laws and regulations.

There have been many calls on President Sata, particularly from the international community, to take on the “problem” of Chinese investors. Specifically, human rights and media reports focus on the violation of Zambian and international labor laws by Chinese companies, most notably mining companies. By far the most notorious example of labor violations was the October 2010 shooting of Zambia workers by two Chinese managers at the Collum Coal Mine. Eleven Zambian workers on strike were allegedly shot by their bosses, but the charges against the men were later dropped and the men

returned to China. Notably, most stories such as this come out of smaller, privately owned Chinese enterprises, rather than the large state owned operations.

Yet, despite these issues, Chinese Ambassador Zhou Yuxiao was the first diplomat to be entertained by President Sata, on his first day of office. Sata even met in early 2012 with Chinese investors. The fourteen person delegation from Beijing was led by Luo Tao, the General Manager of the China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Company, the largest Chinese investor in Zambia and a Chinese state owned enterprise.

Great Changes in Zambia and China

The changes in both Zambia and China were so profound from the 1970s to the 1990s, that it would be impossible for a simple renewal of the relations of the 1960s. For Zambia, the promise of the First Republic (1964-1972) was replaced with dissolution of multi-party democracy and the nationalization of many key industries, specifically mining. There have been considerable discussions on the reasons for Kaunda's decided turn towards the left. In the early 1970s, many believe it was his meetings with the Chinese, and in particular, with Mao Zedong. However, Kaunda was always wary of Mao and was in fact closer to Nyerere, also socialist in his stance towards the economy. Yet the most likely reason was in large part greed on behalf of the government. The mining industry was booming, and there was great money to be made. When copper prices fell during the global economic crash of the 1970s, the money dried up and the maintenance of so many nationalized projects became impossible.

Chinese changes were equally profound. After the death of Mao in 1976, Chinese leaders began a series of economic reforms, led by Deng Xiaoping. The economic reforms carried out by the Chinese government in the 1970s and 1980s created an increasingly capitalistic market, while remaining communist in politics, with little political freedom given to citizens. The reforms, however, were a huge success, and have transformed China into the economic powerhouse it is today. A growing population coupled with a global manufacturing industry creates an increasing need for raw materials. Cheap credit and questionable currency valuation also give the Chinese government and Chinese owned business a unique advantage in the increasingly global marketplace.

Therefore, while during the era of Deng Xiaoping, China limited its foreign interactions, the twenty-first century has seen a renewal of close ties between Zambia and China. Due to the changes in the Chinese and Zambian economies towards increasing private ownership, many of these connections have taken the form of private sector investments in Zambia, often in the mining industry, but there are also both large and small Chinese aid initiatives. In 2010, for instance, the Chinese government gave the struggling Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority a US\$39 million interest free loan to help rebuild the line and restructure the company.

The Future of Zambia's Relations with China

In his inauguration speech, Sata claimed that “Foreign investment is important to Zambia, as it does not only create jobs but equally contributes to the economic empowerment of Zambians...It’s our hope that Investors will abide by the labour laws of the country ensuring that Zambians are not disadvantaged.” This leaves the potential for Zambian foreign investment policy, and foreign relations, relatively open. More than one year after Sata’s election, there are still many Chinese companies with thousands of Chinese workers, operating successfully and with little interference from the government.

However, there is also the opinion that all this attention is unjustified. The percentage of Chinese investments in Zambia is a fraction compared to those of several western back multi-national corporations. The Australian multi-national mine, First Quantum, is the largest in Zambia and currently constructing the largest open pit mine in Africa. The agricultural company Big Concession has been buying tens of thousands of hectares of farmland throughout Zambia, with little known about its plans for the employment of the citizens in the areas in which it farms.

The reality of Zambia’s relations with China is as complex as the conversation between the students transcribed in the beginning of this study. There is no easy answer to the benevolence or malevolence of the West or China, or any foreign interest for that matter. The point of departure, however, is understandable. With knowledge, there is power. And understanding both the historical and contemporary influence of foreign interests and governments in Zambia is the first step.

APPENDIX I: CHRONOLOGY

1 October 1949	Establishment of the People's Republic of China
14 August 1952	Alfred Sauvy coins the term “third world”
8 May - 21 July 1954	Geneva Conference
June 1954	Establishment of “Pancha Shila,” or the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
1 November 1954	Beginning of the Algerian War for Independence
6-10 April 1955	Asian Nations Conference
18-24 April 1955	Bandung Conference
29 October 1956	Beginning of the Suez Crisis
6 March 1957	The British colony of the Gold Coast declares independence and becomes the independent nation of Ghana.
26 December 1957	Founding of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization
1960	“Year of African Independence.” Seventeen African nations become independent.
December 1963- February 1964	Zhou En Lai’s trip to Africa
24 October 1964	The British colony of Northern Rhodesia becomes the Independent nation of Zambia.
16 May 1966	Launching of the Cultural Revolution in China
1970- 1975	Building of the TAZARA Railway by China from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania to Lusaka, Zambia

25 October 1971

Re-establishment of the People's Republic of China to the
United Nations Security Council

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