SECRET August 22, 1968 
MEMORP...NDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Cz~hoslovakia --Talking Points for Today•s Cabinet Meeting 
You may wish to open today's Cabinet Meeting with. the following -points: 
1. The Cierna meettog indicated we should nQt assume ther-e would be no military intervention by th• Soviets. 
3.3 
(b)(I) --Our-­c-ontinued to s.how Soviet forees 

--For several days p.rior to August 20 there were reports of inefeased tension an.d some indications of preparation .for action. 
--We we:re provided with excellent reporting from Prague and Moscow, including mait fa._mbas sador Thompson's overall evaluation that lithe Soviets will go to great lengths to push the Czechs hack to something close to the pre-January situation';' and the following interesting predic­tion by a Soviet intellectual on August l : ''No matter what our leaders have said at Cierna, or will say at Bratislava, ao.oner or later they will have to crush this thing. " 
-... The Tuesday lu.."llch agenda carried the following item: nsoviet strategy in U.S. -Soviet relations at this stage, including the relationship to possible moves against Czechoslovakia. t1 At the Tuesday l~nich we dis­cussed reports of a Soviet Central Committee meeting and Richard \\.\, Helms reported that this might indicate a definite Soviet deeisio~ to inove. 
2. The Soviets probably decided to move for both foreign and dome'stic reasons. 
--Czechoslovakia protects the flank of Soviet forces in Germany a,nd . the viability of the Soviet position in the heart of Europe hinges on it. Without Czechoslovakia, the Warsaw Pact might well trnxnble. 
--The play-back effect of Czechoslovakia's experhnent in democracy and freedom threatens Comn1.unist stability throughout the Bloc and in the Soviet Union itself. 
SEGR.B'F ­

... 2 ­
3. The events of Tuesday evening: 
-... At 7:05 p. ::n+ Walt Rosto<tv relayed Dobryn.in' s request for a meeting. Secretary Rusk was immediately ill.formed. , 
-... Dob.rynin came to the White House, and read the Soviet statement advish\g u that t:roops were moving in alleged response to external and internal thteah to the Czech Conimunist :regime• 
... ... After hi~ sestJi&-n with. the platfol"m c~ttee • .... durmg whlela. ticker report• o! the iavaei® started comi;na in ... S.ereta•y Rusk retutned to the White Hw••· 
·-The NSC meeting followed. 
4. We believe the~e b no basic disagreement within the United Stat-es Govo:rnment on policy.. 
--We hav$ no commitment to intervene m.Ultarily iu Czech d:efens&. 
--We do not believe an Atnerican military intervention is in our national interest. 
(We also do not believe ouch an itltervention could be in the Czech interest. lnterestingly_t the Czechs were sullidently prepared fott what happened to have isau-ed explieit orders to their ir~li.ta:ry forces noi to reeiet a.n invasion. } 
5.. We must treat the present llituatlon ...... in. all its tl'age-dy •• bl tbe broad conteld of world polities. The Cold War is not over, but we ebould aleo understand that we cat>.not sbnply return to it. A• I said ln my HJ67 Stilte of the Union Mesaage, n0u,.r relations with the Soviet Union and Eastenl Europe are .... bl transitio.nn ...... a transition that la complicatod and dange:roua. The ideological basis for Soviet power is fragmenting, and the Rullsiane are moving toward a mo.re pra.gmatie and normal society ...... but they are still a g:rea.t and jealous nation state. The work we have done in recent years has. contributed to this· · proc-ess. In the long run. it will be vitally important to continue thie work .... although no one can say with any certainty when it will be possible to resume ou.r ef.forts in practical ways. 
W 4 Vl. Rostow