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-&;...u-...-,.._,t-B-+-tt--r-r-ir-··t:' USNAT 0 44 05 CZECHO OVAKIA1 CONVERSATION WITH SIK > REPORIED TO NAC AUGUST 27 FOLLOWING 

UTY PRIMIN SIX TO DANISH A!BASSADCR 
A IK HAD BEEN INFORMED OF 
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~! 02 :Jiikd i.485 2 7221;(£ 
A. SOVIET LEADERS HAD BEEN VICTIMS OF POLITICAL 
lLACKIAlL BY EASE GERMANS AND POLES, WHO COMPLETELY MIS­
INTERPRETED DIFFERENCES AMONG CZECH LEADERSHIP. BASED 
'" ON READIIGS i;tiOll CZECH PARTY CONGRESS AND BRATISLAVA AND ~IERNA llEET Ill$, 6DR Atl> POLISH LEADERS HAD CONCLUDED THERE ERIOOS DISAGREEMENT AMONG C:ZECHS, AND CZECH QUISLINGS lRSEJJ SOVIETS TO INTERVENE ON ASStBPT ION CZECH GOVERNMENT WOt.LD FALL. INSIEAD, PRESSlfiE HAD EFFECT OF WELDINB TOGETHER CZECH POLirICAL AN:> NATIONAL FORCES, AND SOVIET OCCUPATION FORCES TRIED IN VAIN TO FIND · COLLAB~ATORS TO SERVE IN 
PUPPET REG:mE. 
B. EXTENr or SENERAL RESISI'ANCE WAS INDICATED BY 
FACT THAT SOVIETS WERE FORCED TO. USE GDR AND HUN0ARIAN 
ANNOUNCERS ON RADIO SIATIONS IN CZECH AND SLOVAK · 
RiGIORS AS REVEALED BY THEIR ACCENTS. SOME WOULD-BE 
OJLLABORATORS WERE .FORCED TO JOIN RESI&lANCE. . 

C. FACT THAT SOVIET FORCE.S ARE REMAINING WOULD 
LEAD. TO POPULAR EXPLOSION OF . UNFORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES. 
D. ATTACK ON RUIANIA UNLIKELY, BUT COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED. SOVIETS COMMITTED GRAVE . ERROR IN CZECHOSLO• VAXIA WHICH HOLDS RISK OF SIMILAR ERROR IN RUMANIA. ~· 
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