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29 Auguat 1968 
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WHEELER 
GENERAL MCPHERSON (IN TURN) 


SUBJECT: George Kennan'• Views on Czech Intervention 
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1. Excerpts of Kennan's viewa aa expressed during l~cheon conversation with US Embassy Copenhagen officials follow: 
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a. Former Ambaasado~ George Kennan expressed profound conc·ern about irrational Soviet behavior in invading Czechoslovakia.
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Mlacalculatlon raised doubts about Soviet responsibility. The Western 
World will now have to re-think ita political and military atructurea in 

_view of USSRtj.npredlctability. 
b. US Government should be very hesitant to get too thoroughly 
committed to Czech leader• as heroes at the present or to recognize ·.result·a compromise which would involve in effect continued occupation
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Czech. Inconceivable any compromise developed in Moscow between Czechoslovakia and Soviet leaders while Czechoslovakia ia atill occupied 
by Soviet troops could represent free will of Czechoalovaldan people. 
_Occupation should be constantly reemphaaized to the world even to the mttent of US Government making public statement. Soviets should be constantly asked in UN and elsewhere "If you dixl thia to Czechoalov~ia. 
what assurance do we have that you will not make the aame mistake aaain? "-Domestic concern• muat reat at root of decialon. 
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c. Kennan. speculated Soviet aecurlty apparatua principal influence in reaching decision to intervene. Soviets aaw neceaaity not only to inaure close contact between regime leader• but to guarantee penetration Czechoalovakian Government apparatua to inaure control 
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of working level• particularly in apparatua concerned with counter-"-· .. '• intelll1ence agalnat fo~eignera. Soviet• aeemed deeply diaturbed proapect individual freedom which internally could threaten role of 
~ Hcurlty appara&ua In atlre Soviet ayatem. bl:CLASSJnED 
E.o. 12958, Sec. 3., 
~u t?-ISJ II! Wf" .NARADa #-1#-/I 





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difference between situation Rumania and While Rumania abuaed links to Waraaw Pact,. lt 
.· 	maintalned considerable internal rigid control.·. Czechoalovakla ~p~e••ed fiaelity to Warsaw Pact but also loosened internal ccntro18.· Acc~p~ce loose ·internal control• could infect Soviet ayatem. 
. e. Aa circ.umatantial evidence of disagreement in Soviet 
hlaheat councils, Kennan cited.curio~• fact·that ·Foretgn·Mtnlater · 
Gromyko baa been allent. 

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2. Comment: FonMin Gromyko did aign the final .communique .foll~I the Moacow t&lka. Other• mentioned included 9.of 11 Politburo members, Marshal Ore~hko and the other, two Secretaries of the 1CPSU ·, · .. · · that are not member• of the Politburo. 
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HILTON 
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