. ˇ.. 
I . 
5. THERE IS TENUOUS EVIDENCE THAT ELEMENTS OF THE 
SOVIET llTH ARMY WHICH RECENTLY MOVED INTO CENTRAL EAST 
GERMANY AND NORTHWESTERN CZECHOSLOVAKIAˇ FROM THE BALTIC 
AREA WILL REMAIN IN THE FORWARD AREA INDEFINITELY. ON 
29 AUGUST Al [AT A FIELD HEADQUARTERS OF 
THE SOVIET !Sf GUARDS TANK ARMY IN WESTERN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
REFERRED TO THE 1lTH ARMY AS "REMAINING HERE OR ELSE IN

EAsr ˇ GERMANY." . 
6. THE SOVIETS ARE BRINGING AIR SURVEILLANCE RADAR AND REPORTING EQUIPMENT INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THEY PROBABLY 
NEED THIS EQUIPMENT TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS OF THE 
CZECHOSLOVAK AIR DEFENSE REPORT ING NETWOR"K, WHICH 
HAS BEEN SILENT SINCE THE SOVIET INTERVENTION. 

7. THERE IS LITTLE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON T.HE RUMANIAN SITUATION SUBSEQUENT TO THIS MORNING 7 S MEMORANDUM: 
POSSIBLE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT TO RUMANIA. 
8~ THE SOVIET AIR FORCE'S METEOROLOGICAL NETWORK ˇ. HAS BEEN BROADCASTING WEATHER CONDITIONS IN RUMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 28 AUGUST, SUGGESTING THAT FLIGHTS INTO THE BALKANS ARE ANTICIPATED. THE SOVIETS COULD ALSO USE 
THIS INFORMATION FOR FORECASTING IN THE USSR, HOWEVER. WEATHER REPORTING FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAS DIMINISHED
CONSIDERABLY.