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WARSAW MEETING IN JULY, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT, Bur REFUSED AND LATER STATED HE DID NOT ATTEND BECAUSE HE WAS NOT INVITED. THEN AT THE CIERNA MEETING AND AGAIN AT THE BRATISLAVA MEETING, WHICH DUBCEK ATTENDED, · HE WAS INFORMED IN CONCRETE DETAILS CONCERNING COUNTERREVOLUfIONARY ACTIVITIES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1 THE DETAILS OF WHICH WERE NOT PUBLISHED IN 
THE COMMUNIQUES AND STILL CAN NOT BE DISCUSSED. SOME . 
OF THESE DETAILS WERE CONFIR!'JED BY MEMBERS OF THE CZECH­
OSLOVAKIAN COMMUNIST PARTY PRESIDIUM, WHO ATTENDED THE 
MEETINGS. DUBCEK GAVE ASSURANCES THAT HE WOULD CORRECT 
THESE MATTERS BUT FAILED TO MAKE ANY EFFORT TO DO SO 

AND MATTERS GOT _STEADILY WORSE. · IN FACT, DUBCEK EVEN ENTRUSTED SOME DETAILS OF INVESTIGATING THE SITUATION TO JOSEF PAVEL, CZECH MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, WHO THE RUSSIANS HAD WARNED WAS COOPERATING WITH THE RIGHT WING COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES. · CONFIRMATION OF PAVEL•s GUILT IS THE FACf THAT HE DISAPPEARED ON THE DAY OF THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HAS . NOT BEEN SEEN SINCE. 
. THE SOVIET UNION, ITS SOCIALIST ALLIES AND "REAL CX>MMUNISTS" IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA MUST VIEW THIS SITUATION FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE RELATION OF FORCES IN EUROPE AND 
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THE WORLD, AND, THEREFORE, DECIDED THAT ACTION MUST BE TAKEN TO PREVENT CZECHOSLOVAKIA FROM BEING TAKEN FROM THE SOCIALIST CAMP, THUS CHANGING THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD. IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE RIGJIT WING FORCES· WERE PACKING THE ·SEPTEMBER NINE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND IF PERMITTED TO BE HELD, THE REStn..TS OF THIS CONGRESS WOULD BE "HORRIBLE". THE CONGRESS WOULD GIVE LEGALITY. TO BOURGEOIS. DEMOCRACY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA •. ALL REAL COMMUNISTS WOULD BE ELIMINATED. THIS WOULD OPEN THE WESTERN BORDER TO WEST GERMAN REVANCHISTS, AND BECAUSE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA•s STRATEGIC POSITION, WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF ALL WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES • . IN SPITE OF REPEATED WARNINGS, DUBCEK DID NOTHING TO CORRECT THE SITUATION, AND, THEREFORE, THE SOVIET UNION AND ·1TS ALLIES DECIDED TO INTERVENE MILITARILY AT THAT TIME, BECAUSE IF THEY DELAYED UNTIL THE COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY FORCES BECAME ENTRENCHED, IT WOULD BE MANY TIMES MORE DIFFICULT TO DISLODGE THEM. ~~g PAGE TKft!E 
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REACHED PRAGUE, THEY CONFIRMED 

UNCOVERED ARMS CACHES IN THE BASE­MENTS OF ELEVEN GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES, , INCLUDING ANTI TANK GUNS, HEAVY MACHINE GUNS, GRENADE LAUNCHERS, ET CETERA. SOVIET AND ALLIED TROOPS UNCOVERED CACHES OF UNITED STATES AND WEST GERMAN ARMS TOTALLING MORE THAN FORTY THOUSAND AUTOMATIC WEAPONS IN THE MOUNTAINS, NEAR THE BORDERS, IN BRATISLAVA, BRNO, OSTROVA, ET CETERA. THEY FOUND SECRET 
PRINTING SHOPS AND MOBILE RADIO STATIONS MOUNTED ON SPECIAL TRUCKS. · THESE ITEMS MAY SOON BE EXHIBITED IN A PRAGUE SQUARE. THE SOVIETS KNOW WHERE AND HOW SOME OF THESE ITEMS CROSSED THE BORDERS FROM AUSTRIA AND WEST GERMANY AND WHO IS RESPONSIBLE. THEY KNOW THAT THREE HUNDRED ORGANIZERS WERE BROtDHT IN FROM THE WEST TO LEAD 
THE COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES. · OBVIOUSLY, THE CENTRAL Im"ELLIGENCE AGENCY AND WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE DREW MORE CONCLUSIONS FROM THE COUNTERREVOLUTION IN HUNGARY IN 
NINETEEN FIFTY SIX, THAN SOME co·MMUNISTS DREW. THE "ENEMY" IS OBVIOUSLY SMARTER AND, IN THE CASE OF CZECH­
OSLOVAKIA, WAS MORE SOPHISTICATED IN PREPARING THE COUNTERREVOLUTION. 
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AS A RESULT OF THE MOSCOW CONT ACTS WIT.H THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN LEADERSHIP, MEMBERS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN PRESIDIUM SAW THE TRUE SITUATION AND THEMSELVES REQUESTED THAT THE SOVIET TROOPS REMAIN IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA UNTIL THE LEADERSHIP CONSOLIDATES ·ITS POSITION. THEY AGREED THAT THE CLANDESTINE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL BE DECLARED ILLEGAL AND . 5I'EPS WILL BE · TAKEN TO CORRECT THE COUNTERREVOLUTION ARY SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A WIDE STRUGGLE AND THAT THE ENEMY COULD MOBILIZE TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND . PEOPLE TO FIGHT FOR ,THE COUNTERREVOLtrrION, Bl.IT IT IS BELIEVED· THAT THE COUNTERREVOLUTION IS DETERIORATING.· 
THIS SOURCE . ALSO ADVISED THAT THE HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY HAS INFORMED COMMUNIST PARTY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OF SIMILAR INFORMATION INCLUDING THE FACT THAT ITS FIRST SECRETARY, JANOS KADAR, PERSONALLY CALLED DUBCEK AND MET WITH Hii-t NEAR .. THE HUNGARIAN BORDER LAST AUGUST EIGHTEENTH, TWO DAYS BEFORE THE INVASION, AND WARNED HIM THAT IF HE DID NOT DO SOMETHING QUICKLY, THE WARSAW PACT 
NATIONS WOULD  ·HAVE TO  ACT.  HE  PLEADED  WITH DUBCEK TO  NO  
AVAIL  AND THE  INVASION  FOLLOWED.  .  
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