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3 September 	1968 
(oc1-1r 7 './l.i') 
MEMORANDUM 
SUBJECT : 	Additional Thoughts on Western Europe 
Post Czechoslovakia 

1. 
we·st Europe and NATO. NATO's future may be strongly influenced by the rapid Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. The Alliance's present concept of warning time, which presupposes a period of critical consultation by the Allies and military buildup by prospective attackers, 'is being re-evaluated. The West Germans have been particularly insistent on this action, pointing to the massive Soviet forces near Bavaria and to the jamming of the early warning radar system there. The recent trend of force reductions and redeployments within NATO is likely to be halted by a collective pledge to freeze current levels pending a review of the European· security situation. 

2. 
This review process may be completed during September for consideration by Alliance defense ministers at· a special October meeting in Bonn of the Defense Planning Committee -­which includes all members except France; a proposal has also been made by the British to move up the North Atlantic Council ministerial conference to November from the December dates presently scheduled. These sessions would probably satisfy most national reactions to Chancellor Kiesinger's vague reference to the need for a NATO summit meeting. Italy has privately called for a twenty-year extension of the NATO Treaty but may offer a less ambitious proposal that each member, perhaps via parlia~ mentary resolutions, agree not to exercise withdrawal rightsfor a mutually ~greed· period. · · 

3. 
· ·European Unit~. To the majority of West European commentators and officials the Czech cris·is has once more h~ghlighted the need for speedier movement towards political unity in Western Europe --in the interest both of improved security and detente. The obstacles, however, to strengthening 


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SANITIZED 
E.O 13292, Sec. 3.5 


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such as the proposed strategic arms limitation talks and the drafting of the NPT cannot be contemplated in the future. There also are traces of an underlying concern that the us recognizes a de facto Soviet sphere of influence of indefinite extent in Eaitern Europe. This viewpoint coalesces with the oft-expressedfear that Alliance security guarantees may evaporate during the duration of the NPT; both West Germany and Italy are using the Czechoslovak situation as an excuse to postpone signature of the NPT.