11-~'~ ~' ; ..;g,. 9 ~ Intelligence Memorandum Broadcasting in the Czechoslovak Crisis Confidential ­ ER IM 68-118 September 1968 Copy No.' • --GONFIDENTIAb-• CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence September 1968 Broadcasting in the Czechoslovak Crisis Sununary Within a few hours of the movement of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia on 21 August, a Free Czechoslovakia radio network began to broadcast news of the occupation to home and international audiences. Some studios and transmitters were seized, but efforts to silence the network were unsuccessful. The Czechs impro­vised temporary studios and apparently continued to use some of the high-power transmitters of the regular network until Dubcek's return from Moscow. During this time, januning efforts mounted by the Soviet Union against Free Czechoslovakia and Western broadcasts were unsuccessful in blocking out news of the occupation in either Czechoslovakia or the USSR. The failure of the Soviet Union to deal quickly and decisively with Free Czechoslovakia broadcasts suggests that Soviet planners were counting on prompt formation of a cooperative Czech government and had failed to work out detailed contingency plans. Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and was coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and the Foreign BI'oadcast Information Service. -CONFIDEN1'IAL -­ GONFIDENTIAL Czechoslovak Radio and Television 1. Czechoslovakia has one of the most highly developed radio and television broadcasting sys­tems in the Communist world. The Czechoslovak radio network transmits programs on all broadcast bands to a reception base of at least four million radio sets --more than one set per household, which is comparable to that of West European countries. Moreover, about 75 percent of the radio sets in Czechoslovakia are designed for multiple band re­ception which, together with Czechoslovakia's geographic location, enables its citizens to receive international broadcasts from all directions. At the same time, Czechoslovakia originates more than 200 hours per week of international broadcasts in nine languages. In the field of television, broad­ casting is nationwide, and million television sets in there use. are about 2.5 Emergence of Radio Free Cz echoslovakia 2. Within a few hours of the movement of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops into their country, Czech radio workers began broadcasting news of the occupation both to their own countrymen and to for­eign audiences. Prague TV showed Soviet troops occupying the city, and this program was carried into Western Europe by connection with Eurovision. At least three Radio Free Czechoslovakia programs were on the air in the early hours of the occupa­tion, and an emergency radio network, apparently prearranged, began to take form shortly there­after. By 23 August, Radio Free Czechoslovakia was transmitting regularly on long-wave (LW), medium-wave (MW) , and short-wave (SW) to the Czech people and was beaming international broadcasts in English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, and Russian. These broadcasts kept the Czech people and the world apprised of occupation developments, warned the populace against active resistance, and was a prime mover in organizing passive resistance, including several brief general strikes. 3. When regular program studios were seized by the occupation troops, the Czechs began origi­nating radio programs in clandestine studios (prob­ably private dwellings and mobile vans). Regional -2 ­ -GGNF-l-DEW AI, ~FIDENTIAL • programs from at least 15 different locations in Czechoslovakia were broadcast over the national network. This network arrangement continued until 29 August, when Free Czechoslovakia stations began to go off the air following the Moscow agreement and Dubcek's address to the Czech people. At least some TV transmissions were continued throughout the 21-29 August period, but broadcasting arrange­ments are not clear. 4. The clandestine broadcasts were remarkable not only because of their volume and survival but also because they apparently emanated from high­powered transmitters, such as are found only in the regular national network. The main evidence that high-powered transmitters were employed is the fact that most of the broadcasts could be monitored on frequencies normally used by the Czechoslovaks and heard clearly at points quite remote from Czechoslovakia. 5. The principal means of feeding clandestine broadcasts into high-powered transmitters probably was over the mainline communications network (wire, cable, or microwave radio relay lines). An alter­native method could have been the use of low-powered transmitters for local broadcasts which were then retransmitted over the national network by the high­powered transmitters. This procedure may explain the press reports that clandestine radio broadcasts came from small transmitters that skipped from frequency to frequency. The Soviet Response 6. After an initial period of confusion on their part, Soviet troops occupied regular Czecho­slovak program studios and seized or destroyed several transmitters. But they were unable to stop the clandestine broadcastso The failure to halt these broadcasts is an indication that the Soviets were counting on prompt formation of a cooperative Czechoslovak government and had failed to work out detailed contingency plans. The Soviet planners must have known the exact location of all high­powered Czechoslovak transmitters and could not have failed to understand the importance of con­trolling them. Yet Soviet military unit commanders -3 ­ _. CONFIDEN i\L ­ --eQNFIDENTIAL apparently were not provided with complete infor­mation on transmitter locations or with clear instructions to occupy them. 7. Poor Soviet planning is also apparent in the ineffectiveness of Soviet efforts to counter Free Czechoslovakia radio and TV broadcasts. The Soviets employed some of the transmitters they had seized to relay Radio Moscow programs in the Czech and Slovak languages. (As early as May 1968, Radio Moscow had more than doubled its direct broadcasts in Czech and Slovak.) In addition, the Soviets established several new broadcasts, probably from transmitters located in Poland and East Germany, to beam pro-Soviet programs to Czechoslovakia. 8. The Soviets initiated Jamming against the Free Czechoslovakia radiocasts in the early days of the occupation. This effort consisted largely of broadcasting Radio Mayak on the same frequencies as those used by the Free Czechoslovakia trans­mitters. (Mayak, the USSR's second national pro­gram, is similar to a US music and news station.) This type of jamming, and to a lesser extent con­ventional noise jamming, also was employed within the USSR to overlay Czechoslovak broadcasts and those of the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty. The effectiveness of the Soviet jamming effort in Czechoslovakia and in the USSR was spotty. In both the USSR and Czechoslovakia, Western and Free Czechoslovakia broadcasts on some frequencies were effectively blocked, but others came through clearly. Listeners in Czechoslovakia and the USSR who wanted Free Czechoslovakia and Western news about the occupation were able to find it. 9. The Soviet Jamming effort apparently suf­fered from the lack of prior planning and coordi­nation. Jamming of Western broadcasts as a regular practice was discontinued by the USSR in 1963, and Eastern European countries, with the exception of Bulgaria, subsequently followed suit. The exten­sive Soviet network of noise Jammers probably has been largely disbanded, and many of the transmitters probably have been converted to conventional broad­cast use. -4 ­ -C0NFlfi ,N 'fi\:"t-;.J-___,