CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
Directorate of Intelligence 
19 September 1968 
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM 
B 
Military Costs of the Warsaw Pact Invasion 
of Czechoslovakia 

The direct incremental military costs to the Soviet Union of the partial mobilization of Warsaw Pact forces for the invasion of Czechoslovakia is estimated to be on the order of 130 million rubles, the equivalent of $400 million (see Table 1) . Virtually all of these costs may have been borne by the USSR; if not, the combined burden of the East European Communist countries was approximately $20 million to $22 million. In some respects, this operation was comparable to a large-scale Warsaw Pact military exercise because of the lack of re­sistance and geographic proximity of the forces. The $400 million estimate represents an increment of about 2 percent to the total costs currently estimated for Soviet general purpose forces in 196 8. 
The total number o~ men directly involved in the operation is estimated to be about 275,000 (see Table 2). More than 250,000 were associated with the 31 divisions of the ground forces involved in the operation, at least 17 of which actually occupied Czechoslovakia. Another 25,000 personnel were assigned to the force of about 500 tactical fighter and fighter bombers and the 250 medium transports involved in airlift and resupply efforts. 
The expenditure estimate reflects only incre­mental costs to the Soviet Union over and above what it would have cost to maintain these forces under normal circumstances. The major costs were for the ground force units and air support, which together amounted to two-thirds of the total. The mobilization of some 50,000 reserves amounted to about one-fourth of the cost. 
An attempt was made to assess all of the direct cost implications. It has not been possible to quantify the dislocation and other indirect mili­tary costs of the operation. The indirect impact 
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on the Soviet economy of the partial mobilization and occupation of Czechoslovakia was insignificant, however. The additional POL and other materials required undoubtedly were drawn from military stockpiles and can be readily replaced. The diver­sions of trucks from civilian use, notably from agriculture, in the western part of the USSR apparently were not numerous enough to disrupt the harvest or other essential civilian activity. The removal of 50,000 reserves from their civilian occupations also could have had little overall adverse effect on the economy. Even though most of these reservists probably possessed special education and skills, their number is a very small fraction of the total number of such persons in the non-agricultural labor force of about 80 million. 
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SECRE+­
Table 1 
Estimated Direct Incremental Military Costs of Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia 
Costs 

Reserve mobilization Ground force units a/ Naval forces ­Airlift/resupply and 
tactical aircraft 
Total 
Million 1955 Rubles 
32.1 
43.9 
10.2 
46.0 
131.2 
Million 1966 us $ 
135.2 
160.3 
23.0 
88.8 
40?.3 
a. Including costs of operating divisions involved in invasion and lo$s of equipment. 
Table 2 
Warsaw Pact Manpower Involved in Invasion of Czechoslovakia ~/ 
Manpower  Thousand Men  
Ground  forces  254  
Air  23  
Total  2??  

a. No estimate of the naval forces on alert as a result of the invasion was included~ because of the indirect nature of their par­ticipation. 
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• 
Assumptions Made Concerning the Soviet Invasion 
of Czechoslovakia 

The following assumptions were made: 
1. 
The only costs included are those over and above what the Soviets would have incurred had they not invaded Czechoslovakia, including abnormal equipment losses. 

2. 
The incremental costs associated with the operation and maintenance of Hungarian and Polish units were probably borne by the Soviets. If the costs of the Hungarian and Polish units were borne by their governments, the combined burden was $20 million to $22 million. No costs were included to cover the token East German forces. 

3. 
Generally, costs apply to a six-month occupation and include the cost of moving men and equipment to and within East Europe and back to their home base. Naval costs are included for a fleet-wide alert and two months of continued readiness on station. 

4. 
The invasion involved 31 divisions, including four Polish divisions and one Hungarian division. All were at full peacetime strength 


(men and equipment). At least 17 divisions entered Czechoslovakia. Transportation costs are included for 27 divisions that moved within or into East Europe during the operation (four divisions were mobilized, but remained in the USSR). The mobilization involved 50,000 reservists. 
5. 
The invasion also involved deploying approximately 500 fighters and fighter bombers to Czechoslovakia and utilizing one AN-22 Cock and 250 medium transports in airlift and resupply efforts. 

6. 
Twenty thousand vehicles were requisitioned from the civilian economy for use by the invasion forces. Only the operating costs for these vehicles were included, as it was assumed that the vehicles would be returned to the civilian sector as soon as possible, but without reimbursement. 


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