To : The Secretary Through: S/S J1.j From •• INR -Thomas L. Hughes \t/llJ Subject: The Contrary to frequent allegations in the world news media, the condemnation by the Italian Comrntmist Party (PCI) of the Soviet-led military intervention in Czechoslovakia does not constitute a 0 break" with the Soviet Union. The Italian Communists have been very careful to balance their reprobation of the Soviet act with reaffirmation of their "fraternal solidarity" with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The Italian Commtmists' balancing act has been dictated by the necessity of avoiding the possible disaster to the party which might have resulted from either an acquiescence in the invasion of Czechoslovakia or a clearcut "break" with the aggressors. The PCI's reaction was in line with its long-standing "polycentrist" policy, which proclaims the concepts of "unity in diversity" in the international comrnunist movement. Polycentrism has served the PCI well over the years, both domestically and internationally. Now that the "diversity" side of the equation appears to have been brutally challenged by the Soviet repression of the Czechoslovak "new course," the PCI may fear that it will be confronted by the difficult task of having to choose between "unity" and "diversity," particularly if the Soviet Union should attempt to reimpose its hegemonic control over the Moscow-leaning communist parties. Buffeted between its commitments to Moscow and its desire to play an increasing role in Italian political life, and by divisions within the party, the PCI will no doubt attempt to continue its balanci.ng 1111:-. ti P(IJf w.1 p~Sl~ f.d hy thl' Burt·uu ee t "' lnl1•1l11',l'fll'l' .t11d lfr•wa!< h. As1d1·4WIDEN'f!ttL NO FOREIGN DISSEM from norm.ii •;ubst.int1v• t•xchange with oth• r .ir,t'nl'H'S at the working level, 1t hus not hefn coordinated elsewhere. I " -CONFIDENTIAL/NB FOREIGN DISSEM • -2-,. Policentrismo. It was in a talk with the Italian leftwing journal Nuovi Argomenti following the Soviet repression of the Hungarian upri~ing in 1956, that Palmiro Togliatti, the late Secretary General of the Italian Communist Party, formulated a new concept of the interrelationship of the world's connnunist parties and coined the word which was to characterize it ever since, policentrismo, "polycentrism." Although rivers of ink and words have been expended to define its meaning and to fathom its implications, policentrismo simply means that there is more than one way to skin the "imperialist" and "capitalist" cat and to achieve victory for "socialism" in various parts of the globe. As subsequently refined and redefined by Togliatti and his successors, policentrismo has come to mean the abandonment of the principle of the "hegemony" of the Soviet Union and the CPSU over the other "socialist" states and/or connnunist parties, and, conversely, the assertion of the right of the latter to autonomy and independence from the former. In essence, policentrismo claims that every communist party has the inalienable right to design and pursue its own "national road to Socialism" without interference or diktat from other "fraternal" parties, including that of the USSR. The connnon objectives of the world communist movement could best be achieved, in Togliatti's words, through "unity in diversity." The Yalta Memorandtnn. The QOlicentrismo theory was formalized and codified into a doctrine in the Yalta Memorandum, a document prepared by Togliatti a few days before his death in August 1964. The Memorandum was essentially a "talking paper" which Togliatti had written in anticipation of his meeting with Khrushchev. In it, Togliatti argued that every connnunist party or state has the right to follow its own "road to socialism" and warned CONFIDENTIALfNO FOREIGN DISSEM , CONFIDENrfIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM -3 -,. that any attempt by Moscow to "reimpose rigid gen eral f ormulae"--i. e. , di F>C i p 1 ine-­over the "fraternal" parties would result in very serious 11diificulties" not only for the communist parties themselves, but for the very "unity" of the international comi~unist movement. Following Togliatti's death, his successor, Luigi Longo, chose to make of the Yalta Memorandum a "political testament" binding on the whole Italian Communist Party. PCI Ap?lauds Czechoslovak Liberalization. It was no surprise therefore, that when the 11new course" in Czechoslovakia began to surface last winter, the PCI welcomed it with sympRthy. tJ\en the Soviet Union began to apply political pressures on the new Czechoslovak regime in the spring of this year, the PCI went out on a long limb in defending the right of the Czechoslovaks to formulate and implement theiroown "renewal." Prodded by the other political parties during the campaign for the parliamentary elections of May 1968, the PCI became increasingly vociferous in its show of 11solidarity" with the Dubcek regime, and on several occasions sent its leaders to the Soviet Union and other East European states to plead Dubcek's case and to reaffirm the PCI's "confidence" in the ability of the Czechoslovak comrades to resolve their problems and implement their "democratic renewal" within the 11 8ocialist" framework. The greatest PCI accolade for the Czechoslovak "li.beralization'' was expressed in mid-July in an editorial of the party's daily L'UnitA, which went so far as to claim that "in this upsurge of Czechoslovak renovation, which we salute as our own, the thought of Togliatti is at work." Pympathy for the Victim 2 and... The Unith editorial was hardlv a .I month old when lhe Soviet-led military intervention in Czechoslovakia slRpped down both the Czechoslovak "renovation" and Toliatti' s "thought." ... COWF'l&ENTl/\L/t~O FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM • ~ CONFIDENTIALfNO FOREIGN DIS 1 -4 ­ Predictably, the PCI's reaction was swift and meticulously in line both with its "polycentrist" policy and with its attitude toward the new Czechoslovak regime. In rapid succession, the party's Political Office, Directorate~ and Central Connnittee issued connnuniques in which the PC! expressed "grave dissent and reprobation" of the intervention, reaffirmed support for the Czechoslovak regime and its policies, and demanded the withdrawal of the occupation troops from Czechoslovak soil. At the same time, every top PCI leader, from Secretary General Luigi Longo on down the line, publicly condemned the intervention as "unjustified" and a "tragic error", and defended the right of the Czechoslovaks to solve their own internal problems without outside interference. • • • • Fraternal Solidarity with the Aggressor. But, lest there should be any doubt in anyone's mind that the "tragic error" of the Soviet-led inter­vention was anything other than a family affair, the PCI invariably balanced its reprobation of the intervention with reaffirmations of its "profound, fraternal, and sincere solidarity" with the Soviet Union and the CPSU. There was no "break", therefore, with the Soviet Union, as some political observers both here and abroad have incorrectly alleged, but simply a defense of the PCI' s long-standing "polycentrist" policy which sanctifies both "unity" and "diversity." Any other course for the PCI would have been unthinkable, for it might have resulted in a disaster for the party's unity and its long-term hopes in Italian politics. Had the party, for example, acquiesced forin supported the intervention, as it did in the case of Hungary in 1956, it would have certainly caused a very serious schism of its progressive, intellectual elements. On the other hand, had it not placed its condemnation of the intervention within the framework of the "socialist family," its more traditionally Moscow-oriented elements might have been sufficiently antagonized to cause trouble. CONF-IDENT!At/NO FOREIGN DISSEM • t" CONFIDENTIAL/~ FOREIGN DIS. -5 ­ ouo Vndls PCI? 'I1H.~r Js considerable evidence that the PCI's well-balanced act has been very successful thus far. There has not been one case of any major or intermediate leader leaving the party over the Czechoslovak crisis, nor has ther been any significant evidence of rank and file dissatisfaction or revolt over the PCI's stand. Whether or not the Czechoslovak crisis might have had an adverse electoral impact on the PCI had it occurred prior to the May parliamentary elections is now academic. Scattered municipal elections in a handful of cities anci towns this fall can at best give only a partial clue to the magnitude of the impact of the crisis on Conununist electoral fortunes. Nationwide local (municipal, provincial, and regional) elections, involving the near totality of the Italian electorate, will not be held until November 1969, perhaps a bit too late to serve as a reliable yardstick of such an impact on the Italian voter. The crucial problem for the PCI, hrn~ever, is not so much, or primarily, whether or not the Soviet intervention will lose or gain votes for it, but whether or not "polycentrisin" can for long remain a valid and credible PCI policy, in the face of a reimposition of Soviet "rigid general formulae" over the communist states and parties. The PCI's recent statement opposing the convening of the Moscow-sponsored "international conference" of Connnunist parties is one first clear indication that the PC! is most reluctant to submit to a new Soviet diktat. -GONFIDBNTIM./NO FOREIGN DISSEM