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DEC~ARATIQN. AT TIME (MOSC~~; 5~30) THES~ ARTICLES APPEARED Tn BE RESPOf'~SE ro rONTINUiNG POL~1"1Ics rN czEcH pRESs• A~: LATE AS AUGUST 18 ALEXANOROV ARTIC~E APPEARING IN PRAVqA ON TH~T D~Tt SEEMED TO ADOPT A "WAIT A~D SEE" ~Tt1TUDE REGA~Dt~G czEtH LEADERSHIP'S ABILITv ·· ro ESTABLISH coNTROL ovE~: Pf3ESS· . ON ~UGUST 191 HOWEVER, PRA~DA COR~ESPONDE~TS REPO~[ED !N MORE DOUBTFUL VEIN FROM PRAGUE ~O~CERNING _ ABILtTY OF AUTriORITIES 
TO CO NTAIN POLEMICS; sUT T~E.I~ LANGgAGE WAS No~· S~CH AS ; TO SUGGEST INTERVENTION IN OFFH,IG• CLUES IN pRESS AND; OTHER SOVIET MEDIA WERE THEREFOR£ ~ tOT IN THIS lNSTANCE RELIABLY INDIC.A.TIVE o~ CRITICAL LE~DERSHIP oEcisI6Ns~ ·srNCE ~tHIEV~ME~J o~ PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TACTICAL SURPRISE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN JMPOKTANT p~Rt QF SOVI~T AND ALLIED ~LA~NING FOR I~VASioN, IT Is HtG~L~­PRO~ABLE TH~T JOURNALISTS A~D OTH~R§ OPER~TING IN PUB~IC MEDiA wtRE NOT INFORMED OF PLANNED COURSE OF ACTION UNTIL LAST MOMENi• I PEPSONALLY oousr) FOR EXAMPLE# fHAT YURI ZHUKOV1 WHO AUTHORED SEV~RAL OF THESE ARTICLES AND APPEARED AT' RECE?TION . FOR-DEPARilNG EMBASSY OFF!~ER ON AUGUST t61 WAS T8E-.J '. PRIVY TO DECISION. 
3~ MOVEMENTS OF LEADERSHIP CAN SELDOM BE ASCERTAINED W~T~ ANv° ASSURANCE• WE 06 ., HOWEVERJJ HAVE .REPORT FROM RELIABLE OBSERVERS THiT BREZHNEV ANci KOSYGIN WERE SEEN LEA~1NG KREMLI~ ON SUNDAY AUGUST 18~ THERE-ARE ALSO INDIC .ATIONS THiAT '-POL!T8UP0 
MAY : HAVE MET SAME DAY. AND~RSON OF NYT (PROTECT) iNFORMS US R8MORS OF HIGH-LEVE( MEETI~G BEGA~ CiRCU~~TING .ON SUNDAY• EM~ASSY O~F~CER SIGHiED tioZ~N APPR0PRIATELY ' toNFiGURED VI~! L1MOUSINE~ -,• 2125 P•M• ENTERING HOUSE OF RECEPTIONS OF LENIN HILLS FOR G~THERING WHiCH NEVER REPO~TED IN PRESS• ~DDITIONALL~1 . FOR FIRST TIME IN PAST YEAR MOST EMBASSY OFFICERS REPORTED OBVIOUS SURVEILLANCE THAT DAY-OF THEiR ROUTINE . OUTINGS~ THESE OBSERVATIONS SEEM To -us TO RULE OUT EARLIER-REPORTED RUMOR (MOSCOW Si7s> THAT KOs~GiN ~Nb OTHERS CALLED . 8~C~ AUGU~T ~§ TO RATIFY DEcis!ON To I~TERVENE; PART~ CENT~Al COMMITTEE, ACCORDING 0BSERVAT!0NS OF w~stERN EMBASSiES AND JJU~NA~lSTS, COULD HAVE M~T MONDAY AUGU§T 19 AS-INDICATED sTATE 1 22094tt1 P~OBABLY TO ~ECElVE WORD O~ CONTEMPLATED JNVASIONo ~IRE SERVICE STORY TO CONTRARY, THERE IS NO FIR~ EVIDENCE THAT CENTRAL ­
COMMITTEE MET ON TUESDAY A0GUST 20• THESE VARIOUS MEETINGS COULD OF COURSE HA VE BEEN ~ALLEO TO i MPLEMENT DECISIONS· TAKE·, EAR~IER• . 



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4• BEYOND FOREGOING, wE ARE ON HIGHLY SPEcULATIV~-GROUND1 AND NO CONSENSUS HAS YET EMERGED o ~ . . -. -. . . . . . ~ . . Ao AT ONE EXTREME1 Is HYPOTHESIS CREDITED TO A ~RENCH OBSFRV~~ THAf WA~SAW ~EiTER WAS .IN-~FF~~T A~ ULTIM~!UM AND REPRESENTE6 DE c f s I 0 N T 0 !NT ER vENE • TH I~ ~ NT ER~RETA TI 0N s EE Ms ! 0 us . T 0 I G NqRE FACT OF PROLQNGATI9N OF M~~TING A! . ~iERNA AND APPARENTLY GENUINE GIVE ANO TAKE OF THOSE SESSIONSe 
• 
B. ANOTHER HYPOTHESIS HOLDS THAT CIERNA WAS TURNING POINT; 
THAT SOVIET ~OLifs0~o, REcbGNiZING-EXTENT OF soCf6ARIT~ OF 
ciEcH LEADERSHIP BEHIND ouBcEK AND Hrs. oErERMINATiON· fo· PuRsuE 
INTERNAL POLICIES WITH WHICH SOVIETS FUNDAMENTALLY . DISAGREED~ 
DECIDED AT THAT TIME THAT INTERVENTION INEVITABLY .NECESSARY~ 
FOR REASONS OF EXPEDIENCY, .. H0~1EVER; SOVIETS DEEMED! IT DESIRABLE 
+o MOVE TO TE~~ORIZING AND FACE-SAVING FO~MULA OF-BR~rts~A~A .. 
MEETINGo SHO~T DUR~1ION OF TH~T MEETING ~~D ITS CLacHE~RIDDE~ 
DEClARATION CERTAINLY Do NOr.coNT~~brcf THIS INTE~PRETATION._ 

t. THIRD HY~OTHESIS rs ~HAT DECISJON To INTERVENE ; REPRESENTED 
A GENUINE REVERSAL OF BRATISLAVA DECISIONS AND WAS: TRIGGERED sv· SOME DEVELOPMENT INTERVENING BETWEEN AUGUST 6 AND-AUGUST 18, 
L~TTER BEING JUST ABOUT LAST DATE NECESS~R~ DIPLPM~T1C A~D MILITARY ACTIONS couLo HAV~ BEEN COORDINATED wirH ALLIES• , TRIGGE~ING EVENTS COULD PLAUSIBLY . HAVE INCLUDED UNPRECEDENTED PUBLIC ACCLAIM GIVEN TITO DuRING HIS PRAGUE VISIT# wITH ALL · T~A~ IMPLIE6 FOR FUTURE ORfENTATION OF o0~CEK REGIME ~~D REAL S~NTIMENTS O~ CZECH-POPULA!ION1 AND/OR DEMONSTRAT~D INABILITY OR UNWILLING~ESS Or DUBCEK TO MUZZLE ANTI~SOVIET AND PRO­
D~MOCRATIC MEDIA~ .. ·---­

5• WE ARE INtLINED BELIEVE1 ON BASIS AtiMifTEDLY INCONcLusr·vE EVIDENCE1 THAT MAJORITY OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP EMERGED : F'ROM C!ERNA WITH ·tONVIcTtON THAT MILITA~~ I~TERVENTION-~AS ~EtESS~RY~ f t~ro v Is Ir AND CON! I_Nu I NG TREND oF'· DE v ELOPMENrs I NI ci ECHOSLo\i AK 1A.1 COU~LED WITH NEED TO MOVE BEFORE CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY CONGRESS iN . E~RLY SEPTEM~E~, UN~OUBTED~Y CONFi~~ED T~EM IN -BE[llEF ~ROMPT ACT~.ON REQUIREt;) • . WE DOUBT !HAT ULB~ICHT. MEETING WITH : DUBCEK WAS DECtSIVE.,IN THIS RESPE~T SINCE I°F SOViETS HAD 'REAl.,LY WANTED TAKE LAST•MI~UTE SOUNDINGS OF CZECH POSITION THEY WOULD HAV~ USED A sOViET ENVOY1 NoT AN EAST GERMAN OF KND~N ­~RRECONCILAB~E QPpOSITION !o CZECH ._TRENDS~ IF THIS: HY?OTHESIS Is COR~ECT1 DEVELOPMENTS AFTER BRATISLAVA RE.ENFORCED ~A1HER THAN REV~RSEO THE PREVAILING ~UQGM~~T iN THE SOVIET POC~TBURO• 




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6• ~IFFICULT~E~ WHICH SOVIETS HAVE ; EXPERiENCED ~N FINO~NG A POL1TICAL FORMULA FOR RULI~G cZEC~6§~o~A~iA IN pO~T~INVASION PE~ioo SUGGE~T~ EITHER THAT THEY HAD NO t~EARLY DEFINEti PLAN · iN MIND OR THAT iF ·:rHEY HAD oNE 1r ·wAs sAsEo oN FAUurv · INTELLIGENCE AS WELL AS A SERIOUS MISREADING OF POLiTtcAL ' TEMPER.3 IN . 
tZECHQSLOVAKiA~ 0IN-~ITHtR-~VE~T~ ~~~SE oi~FICULTIE~, ~~us 
SETBACKS· USSP HAS RECEIVED -INTERNATIONALLY.1 CANNOt ' BUT REFLECT ADVERSELY ON THOSE iN. LEADERSHIP AND CENTRAL ' cDMMiTTEE WHO WERE STRONG ADVOCATES OF MILITARY ' INTERVENTION• INI THIS-CONNECTION CANADIAN AMB~SSA60R.. (PROTE~Tl-~EC~LLs to us STAT~MENT ~ADE -.. TO HIM BY ALGERiAN AMBASSADOR LAST MAY THAT EVEN AT THAT TIME A MAJORITY OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE FAVORED tNTER~ENTION• OF LEADERSHIP~ KOSYGIN AND susLoV-HAVE MOST caNsIS~ENTLY BEEN REPORTED AS MODERATES1 sur WHETH~R THEY REMAINED RELUCTANT Tb ~MPLOY FO~CE To ~~RY ENq w~ · oo N~T KNOW~ BR~Z~~EV is~ MOST 
• 
FREQUENTLY REPORTED AS VACILLATING WHILE pOQGORNY ANO SHELEST RE:paRrEoLy pusHE o F o R. 1 N r ER vEN t 1 o N • wE HA vE Na F.rRM Ev 1oEN c E HERE oN ATTiruoEs oF MILITARY· -As iN01cATED ouR s2:1s, Pol..rrsuRo 
HAS-THUS FAR OEMONSTRA TED PUBLIC SOL I DAR I TY 1 9UT' UNLESS : TH IS ­OESPERATE ' AcfION pR6VES MO~E ~UCC~SSFU~ iN LONG-RON TH~N ~ow· A~~¢ARS LIKE~Y, SOM~ CHANG~S ~~ L~AciER~Hi~ SEE~ I~Evi~ABLE~ 
SWANK