Another leader who has . emerged in the wake of the invasio'n is Gustav Husak, an aggressive, out­spoken individual who heads the Slovak party. Husak spent most of the 1950s in jail ·on charges of "bourgeois nationalism," and after his release was .poli~ically inactive until.this year. When Dubcek took over, however, Husak was one 'of the first to raise nis voice in support of liberal re~ 
forms. In the present situation, 
Husak has become a centrist and 
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has been lauded in the Soviet press for his realistic attitudes. This publicity led to the specu­lation that Husak might, with Soviet help, replace Dubcek as party first secretary. Husak has not denied this, but has said that the Russians have not demanded a change of leaders. 
The most prominent conserva­tive leader to emerge after the invasion is Lubomir Strougal, a pragmatic party man without scruples. He was given four top party posts at a central commit­tee meeting in November. 

Page 7 SPECIAL REPORT 29 Nov 68 


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support and be in a position to bring other Czechoslovak conserv­atives into positions of power and influence. 
• Elements of Dissension 
Differences among Czechoslo­vak leaders have varied from is­sue to issue, but center on the question of how to deal with the Soviets. Despite his liberal-mod­erate majority in the major party bodies, Dubcek has come under fire from his own supporters. The lib­erals charge he is going too far in making concessions to Moscow. Moderates have joined the liberals who have attacked him for bowing to Soviet desires and allowing conservatives to regain a place in the political spectrt.m. 
There is also increasing concern among Dubcek's support­ers over the fate of the reform program. Conservatives are try­ing to force Dubcek to carry out all of Moscow's demands in let­ter and in spirit, even if it means the abandonment of reforms. The liberals, on the other hand, are seeking to keep intact as many reforms as possible, even though they differ on how far to go in order to satisfy the Soviets. Some ultraliberals, such as Zdenek Mlynar, are de­
jected by concessions to the So­viets. In November, Mlynar re­signed from the party secretariat and presidium rather than be identified with a "compromised" leadership. 
Czechoslovak leaders have disagreed on the status-of-forces agreement. The presidium, for example, applauded the conduct of the Dubcek-Cernik-Husak dele­gation that went to Moscow in early October to negotiate the pact, but it never formally. ap­proved the substance of the agree­ment they brought back. More­over, while Dubcek seemed re­signed to a status-of-forces agreement, Svoboda and Mlynar were vehemently opposed to it. 
There is also considerable disagreement among Czech and Slovak leaders on the issue of federalization. Many Czech of­ficials oppose the plan because it gives the Slovaks greater rights at the expense of preroga­tives formerly reserved to Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia. Some Slovak leaders, on the other hand, have complained that the law will not give them the equal­ity they are seeking but will instead allow the more numerous Czechs to continue to dominate the country on the basis of "ma­jority rule" in the federal gov­ernment. 
Some of the leading liberals and ultraliberals who backed Dub­cek's reform program now fear persecution by the Soviets and have left the country. For ex­ample, Jiri Pelikan, the former chief of Czechoslovak television; Eduard Goldstucker, the former Writers' Union chairman, and Jan Brodsky, the president of the anti­Soviet political group called 


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Page 9 SPECIAL REPORT 29 Nov 68