~,,t.-'_}./'/'"' • -----· BQD-CC 20b December ·9, 1964 ( QUADRIPARTITE DRAFT sm5kt'r PASSPORTS AND VISAS I. General Situation l. Movement of Germans within Germany, i.e. , between the Federal Republic of Germany, West Berlin, the Soviet Zone of Occupation and East Berlin, is considered as domestic German traffic , whieh as a result of the war became subject to regulations established by the occupation powers. Most of these restrictions and arrangements have been suspended in the meantime. However, in the Soviet Zone the original restrictions have been adopted and modified by the authorities in that part of Germany to the effect that travel from the Federal Republic to the Zone and to East Berlin and travel from West Berlin to the Zone and to East Berlin continues to be or has been made subject to special permits. In addition, travel between Berlin (West) and the Federal Republic involves agreements and arrangements between France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union related to the status of Berlin. Except for Allied traffic, formalities in this area are handled by the authorities of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone. 2. Procedures for the entrance into the Soviet Zone and East Berlin and procedures for the Berlin access routes have been compiled in the "factual study of the Quadripartite Group Bonn" (BTF 127 of May 28, 1962) and in the description of all access procedures to and from Berlin as prepared by the quadripartite governments and issued under BQD CC-17. 3. Apart from the rights and responsibilities of the Allied Powers in connection with the status of and the vital interests in Berlin which include unimpeded civilian (German) access there are certain arrangements in connection with the interzonal trade which have a bearing on civilian access to and from Berlin. 4.* There is an average of about 20,000 individual travelers between West Berlin and the Federal Republic per diem, divided into road: 67% air : 22% rail: 11% *Figures for 1962 to be up-dated before the final draft is prepared. DECLASSIFIED S881U5T E.0 13526, ec. 3.5 NLJ I (~~ ,~_..._...,.._ By U NARA, Oate or. Cl~~Qt3 .§FGPeT -2­ In addition, a total of about one million tons of goods is trans­ ported each month divided into road: 42% barges: 32% rail: 26% air: 0. 1% Rail traffic in goods would only be affected if customs requirements were introduced, because East German personnel operate the t rains. Air traffic would not be affected by either passport or visa requirements. II Political assessment of Soviet-zonal passport and visa requirements 1. Soviet/11GDR11 demands in the passport and visa field could be advanced as a general requirement and could cover, or specifically exclude temporarily, Berlin access routes. They could be introduced in relation­ship to access to Berlin or to East Berlin alone. They are conceivable in the context or as a consequence of a separate peace treaty, or in isolation. They could be embodied in new regulations or be put forward as a consequence of a new method of application of already existing regulations in the Soviet Zone and in East Berlin. They could be announced and put into effect in a single, compre­hensive step or they could be implemented step by step, with intervals between the individual steps (announcement of intention, issuance of regulations, partial or full implementation). 2. Given the present state of contingency planning, there are a limited number of concrete measures which the Soviet Union/"GDR" could undertake in the Berlin context which would not directly and immediately involve the Allies. Measures regarding civilian (German) access, and in particular steps in the field of passports and visas, could constitute one of the most favorable fields open to further action by the Soviet Union/"GDR11 involving a minimum of risk to them in default of a speedy Western reaction. Measures in this field would place the Soviet Union/11GDR11 in the advantageous position of being able to proceed in such a manner that its action would appear to the general public to be practically insignificant administrative measures. i i"RFt -3­ 3. Both German civilian traffic and Allied traffic are essential to the viability of Berlin and are interrelated since a deterioration in civilian access procedures, if accepted, could also jeopardize Allied access, i.e. the West might find that subsequent changes in Allied access procedures would be presented by the Soviet Union/"GDR" as being also only of a very formal, administrative nature of the kind already accepted by the Western Powers for civilian traffic that makes up the major part of the total Berlin traffic. In the view of France and the Federal Republic, a deterioration in civilian access if accepted, might encourage the Soviets/11GDR" to proceed with attempts to interfere with Allied military traffic. III General considerations for Western policy 1. In any issue involving passport and visa questions, continuing Western objectives should be (a) to maintain unrestricted access to and from Berlin and [thus]ll to keep civilian traffic to and from Berlin flowing, and (b) to avoid damaging repercussions on such matters as the status of Berlin and the prospect of reunification of Germany. The Western reaction in each of the possible contingencies cannot be described in full detail in advance and with commitment of governments. However, the following is intended to help governments to reach quick decisions about how to respond in the various contingencies. 2. Travel between the Federal Republic and Berlin a. Travel of West Germans to and from Berlin Demands in this field would involve Allied responsibilities and would violate the IZT understanding of December 29, 1960. A distinction can be made between demands for passports and visas. ( 1) Passports There would be no question of f onnal acceptance of a require­ment that passports be shown for travel through the Soviet Zon~. The acceptance of such a requirement could lead the Soviets/"GDR"t-·~o make 11 US/UK reserve. -4­ further demands in the field of travel formalities and would also enhance the appearance of sovereignty of the 11GDR. 11 Attempts should be made to have the Soviets/"GDR'" withdraw the requirement. In the last resort, however11 this requirement al.one· would.!/ [would probably]ll not justify the interruption ·of traffic to Berlin by a refusal to allow de facto acquiescence. ( 2) Visas The introduction and acceptance of visas would strengthen politically as well as legally the East German ability to cause obstruction by giving such steps the appearance of legality and would be another step towards enabling the Soviet Union to abandon its basic responsibilities for access matters. The acceptance of visas would mean from the very beginning or after a certain period of time the acceptance of an E~st German assumption of authority to say who shall or shall not travel. A demand for visas is thus unacceptable. Suitable measures should be taken to induce the other side to withdraw their demand for visas.. b. Travel of West Berliners to and from the Federal Republic (1) Passports This is a direct Allied responsibility. It is the business of the Allies to determine what documents West Berliners need to travel to the Federal Republic. The Allies have agreed that West Berliners may use either a Federal passport or a personal identity card, the form of which has been agreed to by the Allied Kommandatura. If the East Germans refuse to recognise the Federal passport they must accept the identity card. To refuse both and/or to demand a "West Berlin passport11 would mean interference with travel and with the Allied responsibilities in Berlin. It would also mean a violation of the IZT understanding. It would , furthermore, constitute another attempt to create a so-called Free City of West Berlin as a separate international entity. Such a demand would be unacceptable. Suitable measures should be taken to induce the other side to withdraw their demands for passports. ( 2) Visas The same considerations and conclusions apply as in the case of a visa demand affecting West German travel to and from Berlin. 11 US/UK 'l/ FRG/FR SiCREI" -5­ 3. Travel between the Federal Republic and the 11GDR" Demands for passports and/or visas in this field would not directly threaten the viability of West Berlin. The establishment of such procedures in interzonal traffic could, however, be used as a precedent for similar demands in the Berlin context at some future date and could also have disadvantageous repercussions on the German question. Attempts should, therefore, be made to bring about a withdrawal of such demands.~ If such attempts fail, these demands alone would!/ [would probablyJ~/ not justify the interruption of traffic to Berlin by a refusal to allow de facto acquiescence. 4. Entry into East Berlin It is possible that demands be made for passports and/or visas for entry into Eest Berlin. Attempts should be made to bring about a withdrawal of such demand~. If such attempts fail, these demands alone wouldl/ [would probably]21 not justify the interruption of traffic to Berlin by a refusal to allow de facto acquiescence. 5. Demands for acceptance of East German passports It is conceivable that the Soviets/"GDR" make the recognition of travel documents in connection with Berlin traffic and/or interzonal traffic (identity cards/passports/visas) dependent on the recognition of East German passports by the Federal Republic for travelers from the Soviet Zone to the Federal Republic and/or on the abolition of the TTD requirement . . Given the non-recognition of East German passports in domestic German travel and in NATO countries, such demands would raise serious problems, particularly in relation to Berlin traffic. It is felt that this complex question of possible links requires further study. IV Western Responses and Countermeasures 1 Taking into account the possibility that Soviet Union/11GDR11 demands in the field of passport and visa requirements could have important consequences, it is the view of the four governments that plan to meet and deter such demands should be advanced as far as possible. It is also the view of the four governments that, when it is agreed that Soviet/11GDR" actions are imminent, consideration should 1/ US/UK :£_/ FRG/FR -7­ 2) to make maximum use of those civilian transportation channels which are unaffected by the new requirements; 3) to take some part of German traffic to and from Berlin under Allied aegis (a plan for this is under consideration but has not been completed or agreed to). 2. Consultation in NATO The broadest possible support and parallel action on the part of NATO as a whole would be politically desirable since unimpeded access to Berlin is essential to the maintenance of the Western position in Berlin, which in turn is agreed to be a vital interest of the NATO powers. In the event of the need for immediate announcement and implementation of appropriate countermeasures the countries most concerned with this issue (the Federal Republic and the three Allies) would have to proceed while consideration within NATO continued. 3. A list of possible Western responses and countermeasures drawn from earlier documents on this subject is attached as an Arin.ex. Legal and administrative preparations for these measures have been considered within the general context of Berlin contingency planning by governments over the past few years, and with respect to 1, c, 1) above, the Federal Republic will, in all probability, possess sufficient legal power to implement such measures. Conclusions 1. In the context of Berlin traffic and the specific situation of Berlin the crucial issues are: a. Visa requirements for West Germans and West Berliners for travel between Federal Republic and Berlin. b. Passport requirements (special Berlin passports) for West Berliners traveling between the Federal Republic and Berlin. Implementation of such demands would seriously affect civilian Berlin traffic and would derogate from Allied responsibilities for Berlin. Therefore, the pelicy of the West should be designed in such a way as to convince the ~ oviet Union and the Soviet Zonal regime at the earliest that implementation of such demands and regulations would Ssai8RE! -8­ cause a serious crisis and could easily lead into escalation, The viability of Berlin depends on the maintenance of unimpeded access to and from the city, including civilian traffic which, therefore, must not become dependent on formalized East German control through such requirements. It is vital however to remember that our main object is to ensure the viability of Berlin which largely depends upon maintaining the flow of civilian traffic. Thus it is important not to permit a major crisis over civil documentation to arise without first making very strong efforts to avert it by diplomatic, in particular by warning, action. 2. Implementation of the visa and passport requirements listed in paragraph 1, a and b above, or passport requirements (special Berlin passport) for West Berliners in relation to any kind of travel, or passport and visa requirements for interzonal traffic, or similar requirements such as a demand for recognition of East German passports as a condition for continuation of Berlin or lnterzonal traffic, would a l so affect in varying degrees the Western position on the question of Germany. The policy of the West in these matters should be designed to convince the Soviet Union ~and the Soviet-zonal regime promptly that implementation of such requirements could have serious consequences. 3. In recognition of the potentially serious character of situations arising from these contingencies it would be desirable to inform and consult NATO at an early stage of developments. ANNEX Examples of Possible Western Responses and Countermeasures The following list of possible Western responses and countermeasures, drawn largely from previous documents on this subject, is neither comprehensive nor exclusive. It is intended to set forth a variety of possibilities for Western action which could be undertaken by governments as needed. These actions could be employed in varying degrees of severity and extent in accordance with the various stages of development of the situation, such as indications of Soviet Union/"GDR" action, announcement thereof, and partial or complete implementation. I Warning Talks German warning talks (e.g. through IZT channel) and/or Allied warning talks vis-a~vis the Soviets. (No priority or precedence is attached to the order of listing.) Instructions for such talks to be prepared at the time. II Protest Notes to the Soviet Union Texts to be drafted at the time. Specific decision as to a separate German note to be taken at the time. III Public Statements The wording of public statements by the Three Powers and the Federal Republic for possible use in various contingencies would also have to be agreed at the time. 1. For use as a German statement in connection with impending Soviet Union/"GDR11 action in the passport and visa field in September 1962, the German Government prepared the following draft: ''The communist rulers of the Soviet Zone of Occupation have now made travel (optionally) -from and to Berlin -to the SZO -from one part of Germany to the other subject to the requirement of a passport and visa (con­ ditional upon the issuance of a visa). These measures constitute a further violation of the principle of freedom of movement throughout Germany. They are illegal and arbitrary. The Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany, which possesses no independent sovereignty and whose regime, established by the occupying power, iii8It£1 ANNEX 2 ­ cannot lay claim to the consent of the people , will still not become a state by the mere fact that it issues passports and visas and tries to enforce com~ pliance with such arbitrary regulations~ Acting also in the name of the people of East Germany, who are condemned to silence, the Federal Government protests against this renewed violation of law by the communist rulers. The Federal Government and its Allies are not prepared to acquiesce in this renewed disregard of the right of the German people to unity and freedom." 2. In the sarn~ connection the French Government prepared the following draft statement for possible use by the Three Powers: "The French, American, and British governments denounce as illegal the introduction of visa requirements which the Soviet ZonE of Germany, with the consent of the government of the USSR, intends henceforth to impose on civilian travelers corning from the Federal Republic. Following the construction of the Berlin wall, this new violation of the freedom of travel of individuals tends to aggravate and to pErpetuate the division of Germany; it constitutes a direct threat to the freedom of access to Berlin as established since 1945. ttin r eply to this arbitrary move, the Allied governments imm€diately decided upon a certain number of countermeasures aimed particularly at trade with the Soviet Zone of Occupation. New measures would not fail to b€ taken in the event that the Soviet government, which is responsible for the acts of the regime it has established in its zone of occupation, should persist in its attempts to change unilaterally, contrary to its international commit­ments, the state of affairs in Germany." It may be considered des~rabl e to continue preparation of draft statements and notes in quadripartite discussions after adoption of the paper to which this annex is attached. IV Other diplomatic action as may be agreed to be necessary M:!REI • • ANNEX -3­ V Maximum use of unaffected traffic channels I VI Examples of possible countermeasures (no significance should be attached to the order of listing) 1. Issuance of German legal provisions and regulations to facilitate a speedy implementation of countermeasures such as, for instance, the enactment and announcement of the Berl in Freedom Law. 2. Partial application of the Berlin Freedom Law (e.g. surveillance of travelers entering from the Soviet Zone.) 3. Full application of the Berlin Freedom Law. 4. Preparation of appropriate legislative measures by the Allies in Berlin. 5. Announcement of these measures. 6. Impeding travelers from the Soviet Zone to the Federal Republic. 7. Preparation of a sharper TTD ban. 8. Tightening and selective application of the TTD ban. 9. Complete TTD ban. 10. Closure of Soviet-zonal trade offices in NATO countries. 11. Refusal of visas to Soviet citizens (except holders of diplomatic passports.) 12. Preparation of economic countermeasures a) by Federal Republic b) by United State, United Kingdom and France c) by other NATO countries 13. Selective application of countermeasures a) by Federal Republic in the field of Interzonal Trade* b) by the United States, United Kingdom and France against the "GDR * c) by other NATO countries against "GDR"* d) by Federal Republic, United States, United Kingdom and Francl! against .CCMECON countries eJ by other NATO countries against COMECON countries *It is felt that the "GDR" is probably most vulnerable to slowdown or cessation of deliveries of the following categories of goods; non-ferrous metals, rolling mill products, steel tubes, drawn metal products,electrical equipment, machinery, transportation equipment, and fertilizer. Gli£R 5 T &ii8ftf!T ANNEX -4­ 14. More intensive economic countermeasures a) by Federal Republic in lnterzonal Trade b) by France, United Kingdom and United States against "GDR" c) by other NATO countries against "GDR" d) by Federal Republic, France, United Kingdom and United States against COMECON e) by other NATO countries against CCMECON 15. Announcement of Western intentions regarding continuance of civilian ground traffic to Berlin. 16. Allied aegis of German traffic (see BQD CC-10). 17. Quiet military measures. 18. Military countermeasures (as listed in BQD CC-11).