/ INCOMING TELEGRAM Department ofState 3b Action SS Info PP RUEHCR DE RUFHJA 043 08/J330Z _o P 081245LZE.A--_. o o s 2 .2. ~r FM USBER \.BE.R_IJlL) TO RUEHCR/SECST~TE WASHDC INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN RUFLC/CINCEUR PARIS 1964 SEP 8 Mii 10 I 4 RUFPAG/USAREUR HEIDELBERG RUDLSK/USNMR SHAPE PARIS RUFPBW/USAFE WEISBADEN STATE GRNC BT ~C~IgNR~~~~ITY. DEPT~INFO PRlORITY BONN 30~ CINCEUR USAREUR USNMR SHAPE. U.SAFE FROM BERLIN .08 ~EPT 2P-l"j_ L I M D I S SUBJECT: HELICOPTER OVERFLIGHTS OF EAST BERLIN 1 REF: BONNTEL 904 TO DEPT, 264 I TO BERLIN ·1:-ii ._E I FULLY APPRECIATE THE REASONING BEHIND THE REFTEL, AND P~R-IC ARLY T ~ IM PORTANCE OF AVOIDING ANY SERIOUS INCIDENTS P~IOR ... 0 T E AMERICAN ELECTIONS, I WOULD NOT .RECOMMEND POST­ PO EMENT OF FLIGHT UNTIL THAT TIME FOR FOLLOWING. MAlN REASONS: CF 331 300 904 . 264 P GE TWO RUFHJA 043·S E e R E T · l• AN INCIDENT WILL NOT OCCUR UNLESS SOVIETS WANT ONE. ·FORECEFUL ACTION BY SOVIETS COULD ONLY MEAN SHOOTING OR FORCING DOWN OUR HELICOPTER OVER EAST BERLIN. WE RECOGNIZE WE ARE NOT IN BEST POSSIBLE PQSIT!ON TO JUDGE FULL RANGE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS HERE. NEVERTHELESS, WE ARE UNAWARE OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS INDICATING SOVIETS MIGHT TAKE STEPS TO ENGAGE ALLIES DIRECTLY IN MAYOR INCIDENT WHICH WOULD BE CONTRARY TO ·THEIR PAST PRACTICE IN BERLIN AND, AT VERY MINIMUM, WOULD INEVITABLY CAUSE SOURING OF SOVIET-us RELATIONS. ANY ACTION SHORTOF SHOOTING DOWN OUR HELICOPTER, E.G., FLYING CLOSE TO IT OR USE OF THREATS IN BASC,' WOULD CONSTITUTE ONLY A CONTINUATION QF PRESENT SOVIET POLICY OF ATTEMPTING TO REDUCE ALLIED AIR ACTIVITY IN CORRIDOR AND BERLIN CONTROL ZONE CBCZ> AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WITHQUT ACTUAL RESORT TO 'VIOLENCE. REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS ____!i.S:ttSit6i:iiR:ti:E'I.t:::·=----~PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" -S:SCRET -2-331, September 8, 2 PM from Berlin SOVIET PRESSURE HAS ALMOST ALWAYS BEEN EXERTED IN AREAS WHicH THEY MAY JUDGE TO BE OF MARGINAL IMPORTANCE TO ALLIES: ROUND ROBIN FLIGHTs, FLIGHTS OF MULTI-PURPOSE AIRCRAFT CT 39>, FLIGHTS . OF OTHER FIXED WING AIRCRAFT IN BCZ INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS, PRIVATE FLIGHTSCHUGHIE GREEN>, CARRYING ' OF FEDREP OFFICIALS TO BERLIN, AND DEMANDS FOR WHAT THEY MAY , PAGE THREE RUFHJ A 043 -S i C R E T CONSIDER TO BE RELATIVELY MARGINAL PROCEDURAL CHANGES WHICH WOULD, NEVERTHE~ LESS , REPRESENT UNILATERAL SOVIET IMPOSITION OF NEW AND · . RESTRICTIVE PROCEDURES ON ALLIED AIR RIGHTS. y,J OTHER tTORDS WE DO NOT BELIEVE SOVIETS.WILL SHOOT DOWN ONE v: OUR , ~L PTERS IN THE ABSENCE OF MAJOR REVISION OF : so·1 :---_, BERLIN POLICY. I ~o o-SS I PORTANCE, BUT WITH POTENTIALLY TROUBLESOME IMPLICATIONS, ~S ..C! TH T FAILURE TO OVERFLY EAST BERLIN WITHIN ROUGH TIME ;~,;.s o~ .PAST YEAR WILL BE NOTED BY BERLIN POLITICAL LEADERS AND ,--;-.zss. t,;E HAVE FLOWN 11 FLIGHTS FROM JULY 1963 THROUGH AUGUST 1964 r.'. .• ' ER. G: ... 1 .... ERV AL OF 5 WEEKS. GREATEST SINGLE INTERVAL WAS 8 r. :~:s . RO.~ FEBRUARY 7 TO APRIL 6, 1964). ON ~ ~-S P: ST EXPERIENCE, PRESS WILL SPECULATE ON MEANING OF c~ss .TION OF OVERFLIGHTS. SUCH SPECULATION IS LIKELY TO BE IN D!RZCTION UNFAVORABLE TO OUR INTERES.TS HERE, I.E., IN VEIN THAT US . S MADE "DEAL" WITH SOVIETS AT EXPENSE OF GERMAN INTERESTS. WH LE SUCH CONJECTURE CAN POSSIBLY BE STAVED OFF UNTIL ELECTIONS, WE DOUBT THAT THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE AFTER ~ I . PAGE FOUR RUFHJA 043-S EC RE T · THAT TIME. 3.SOVIETS AND GERMANS MIGHT IDENTlFY. POSTPONING FLIGHT AS REFLECTING NEW POLICY AND DIFFERING ATTITUDE ON PART OF NEW COMMANDANT HERE, WITH AT LEAST SOME POTENTIAL THAT SOVIETS • WOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO UNDERTAKE PROB·ING MOVES IN OTHER SENSITIVE AREAS. . SEGRE'f ­ ,. • -3-331, September 8, 2 PM from Berlin . . 4. IT IS DIFFICULT TO REINSTATE DISCONTINUED PRACTICES IN BERLIN• SINCE TO DO SO IS IN EFFECT TO MAKE A wCHANGE" IN PROCEDURES ON THE LOCAL SCENE. WE HAVE . LEARNED THROUGH BITTER EXPERIENCE THAT TO CEASE,EXERCISING A RIGHT AND PRACTICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHEQ PATTERNS TO WHICH SOVS ARE ACCUSTOMED CEVEN IF THEY DON•T LIKE THEM> IS TANTAMOUNT TO FORFEITING THAT RIGHT AND PRACTICE. ~ THE ABOVE DISCUSSION IS DIRECTED PRIMARILY TO THE DISADAVANTAGES OF TEMPORARILY POSTPONING THE NEXT HELICOPTER OVERFLIGHT UNTIL NOVEMBER. I BELIEVE THAT THERE WOULD BE EVEN MORE SERIOUS ?OLITICAL DISADVANTAGES, INCLUDING POSSIBLE ·ADVERSE CONSEQUANCES FOR OUR .GENERAL POSITION ON AIR RIGHTS IN BERLIN, IN THE EVENT OF A PERM ANET CESSATION. OF~ THIS US PRACTICE. IT WOULD, IN BRIEF,~ ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS TO PRESS IN ON OTHER 'ALLIED RIGHTS WHICH ! I PAGE E FHJA 043 "S' E C R ! T lHE" . GHT J~OGE TO BE" MARGINAL TO us· THROUGH. USE OF INCR~ASIN Y STRONG THREATS. PRIOR TO RECEIPT. OF REFTEL USCOB HAD COMPLETED PLANS FOR . ., T'E LEXT HELICOPTER FLIGHT. BASED ON FACT LAST FLIGHT TOOK PLACE OlJ AUGUST 3, THE FLIGHT WAS SCHEDULED FOR THE PER.IOD BETWEEN 14 70 18 SEPTEMBER, INCLUSIVE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STANDING Il-!STRUCTIONS THIS FLIG HT WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE LAUNCHED t:JITKOUT PRIOR NOTIFICATION TO AMEMB BONN, CINCEUR, AND Cii cusr.REUR. EXECUTION OF THE .FLIGHT DURING THIS PERIOD ~OULD BE WITHIN THE TIME FRAME OF SEVENWEEKS SINCE THE PRECEDING ONE AND WITHIN THE TIME FRAME PREFERRED TO ACC0·1PLISH THE BASIC PURPOSES OF ·THE MISSION. ~ • I ·GENERAL FRANKLIN CONCURS WITH FOREGOING AND IS SUBMITTING SEPARATE MESSAGE ON' INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS OF..HELICOPTER FLIGHTS. GP-3. CALHOUN BT . . I ; -~iCBEL.­