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-2-3139, MARCH 4 , t PM, FROM BONN 
3. IF THE SOVS UNEQUIVOCALLY REJECT COMPROMISE OFF~R, AND PERSIST \vITH THEIR DEMAND ON CURTAINS WHILE REJECTING OUR COUNTERDEMAND ON PAINTING, THEN THEY WILL GIVE APPEARAl~CE OF TRYING TO PRECIPITATE A REAL SrtOW DOWN, AND OUR REASONING IN PARA 4 OF REFTEL AS TO THEIR ULTIMATE AIM WILL BECOME MORE 
?AGE 3 RuFDBG 524 C 0 N F ·I D E N T I A L PLAUSIBLE. THIS MAY NOT OCCUR, ~N VIEW OF MODERATE TONE OF SOV MISSION CHIEF. IF THEY ARE LOOKING FOR TROUBLE, WE WOULD DOWN AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME • 
4. EMB WOULD JUDGE THAT P~IMARY AMERICAN INTEREST IS TO KEEP THE MLMS OPERATIVE IN THE ZONE, WITHOUT HOWEVER, PERMITTING SOVS TO IMPOSE MORE DISADVANTAGEOUS CONDITIONS ON US THAN THEY THEMSELVES ENJOY IN FRG•. 
FR 0!1 THIS STANDPOINT WE WELCOMED CINCUSAREUR' S COMPR0:1ISE PROPOSAL, SINCE IT ALSO FURNISHES A HOLDING POSITION FOR DIGGING IN IF SOVS SHOW TENDENCY TO PROLONG E.'E RCISE. ' 
5. 	THE FOLLOWING RESPONSES <THERE MAY BE MORE) WOULD BE . -?E 1 TO US IN CASE JF r:)QV REJECTION OF THE COMPROMISE • 
. J WE DO NOTHING, .AND SIMPLY TELL SOVS THAT WE HAVE MADE T~E~ A NEW OFFER, WHICH DEPENDS ON JOINT ACTION. PENDING -HIS JOINT ACTION ON AN AGREED SET DATE WE WILL WITHHOLD 
OUR PERFORMANCE. WE WILL THAN SEE WHAT HAPPENS. 
B> WE FAIL TO ENFORCE OUR PAINTING ORDER AND PURSUE 
U·JE OF TWO COURSES <PRESUMABLY BUT NOT NECESSARILY WITH 
YIELDING ON CURTAINS>: 
PAGE 4,RUFDBG 524 	N 1 I ~ 
Cl) WE REPAINT OUR MLM VEHICLES IN MUFTI AS OPPOSED TO "APPROPRIATE MILITARY COLORS", ?R 
II. WE CALL ON FRG TO HELP US CLOSELY TO PUPRRSOPUERIAANTDE HARASS EACH SOXMIS CAR EXITING QUARTERS, AND IF A? 
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. -3-	3139, MARCH 4, 17 PM, FROM BONN 
OFF'ER EXPLANATION THAT LACK OF DISTINCTIVE COLOR NECESSITATES CLOSE COVERAGE TO ENSURE IDENTIFICATION EQUIVALENT TO THAT OFFERED BY OUR VEHICLES. NEEDL£SS TO SAY, HARASSMENT COULD 
MOVE THROUGH CONSIDERABLE SCALE. 
, 	. 
c> WE ENFORCE PAINTING ORDER, PERHAPS PRECEDED BY ELIMINATION OF CURTAINS. THIS WILL EFFECTED BY LOCKING UP THREE SOXMIS, PRESUMABLY EXCE?T FOR MISSION CHIEF'S CAR, AND ?REVENTING ANY MOVEMENT EXCEPT IN TERMS OF GENERAL CLARKE'S ORDERS OF MARCH 1962 <I.E•. ONLY NECESSARY MOVEMENT UNDER ARMED ESqORT, ETC>. THIS IS AT ANY RATE FINAL POSITION TO WHICH WE MUST BE PREPARED TO MOVE. 
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6. WE THINK IT WOULD PROBABLY BE UNWISE TO FAIL TO ENFORCE OUR PAINTING ORDER, IF SOVS ENFORCE THEIR CURTAINS ORDER. AS AN INITIAL RESPONSE HOWEVER, WE WOULD PREFER 5 (A), AS IT AFFORDS A GOOD PLATFORM FOR HOLDING UNTIL THE OTHER SIDE GIVES IN. WE WOULD NOT HOWEVER, COMPLETELY 'EXCLUDE THE 
?AGE 5 RUFDBG 524 C E D E T I A L ~ ?R OCEDURE IN 5 <B> 1. EITHER OF THESE COURSES WOULD FORCE SOVS TO TAKE INITIAL ST ,,p TO ENFORCE THEIR DEMANDS AND TO CHANGE T:-E:.: ST ATUS QUO WHICH WE .. WOULD BE PRESERVING IF SOV S REALLY WAtT TO DESTROY STATUS QUO, THEY SHOULD BE OBLIGED TO TAKE AFFIRl-u~TIVE ACTION TO DO SO. 
'.iJE. WOULD ACCORDINGLY MOVE TO STEP 5 CC). ONLY AS A COUNTER:-' MEASURE AGAINST PREVIOUS SOV ACTION. 
7. IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT THESE OR OTHER FINAL CONTINGENCY SOLUTIONS IF THEY SHOULD PROVE NECESSAHY, WOULD REQUIRE THAT THE GER~ANS BE NOTIFIED AT SUFFICIENTLY EARLY STAGE SO THAT T ~ O NOT LEARN ABOUT PROBLEM FROM NEWSPAPER COVERAGE. 
GP-4 	MCGHEE 1-. 
NOT.~: 	ADVANCE DELIVERY TO s/s-o AT 2:35 PM, 3/4/64 
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 2 :50 PM, 3/4/64. 

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