I F.S ;__GPKa11l=a.....n~-­' Ou/tin f!, 0 ffi re and 0 ffica) •.g a....« v-0 Approved in S, 6/3/68 PART I of III DATE: ..May 22._, 1968 TIME : L~ : 0 0 to 5 : 10 p . m. PLACE: Secretary ' s Office lJBJ:SCT: Middle East ROf.:rANIA -Corneliu Manescu, Foreign Minister and UNGA President A TICiPi' N Corneliu Bogdan, Ambassador t o the U. S0 Sergiu Celac, Interpreter UNITED STATES -Secretary Rusk Walter J. Stoessel, Deputy Assistant Secretary f or European Affairs George R. Kaplan , EUR/EE COPIES TO: S/S NE.A-2 BUCHAREST, TEL AVIV; AMMAN, CAIRO S/P EUR G IO INR/OD USUN w1-l , CIA (The Secretary said that he had requested this meeting in order to pursue , jn pre-=1 cise terms, the private pre-dinner discussion on Middle East peace prospects he and Minister H~nescu had had the previous evening at the Romanian Embassy . Hanescu had said that certain Arab representatives were awaiting an answer from the United States as to hoo we proposed to promote peace in the region. In asking Mancscu which countries had put the question, the Secretary said that we were in varying degrees of contact with most of them. He specified Egypt and J ordan as the ones with whom wc we1·e in closest touch; Saucli Arabia, Tunisia, Libya , Morocco and Lebanon as those with whom wc had some contact; and Syria , Iraq and Algeria as the ones wj th \·1hom ·He· had little or no contact . The character of the question therefore depended on which Arab country or countries had asked it . Manescu replied that his most recent discussion, following an earl ier meeting with the Israelis, was with the Egyptians and Jordanians, both of whom knew of his Washington trip. He said that the question to the Secretary had also been coordinated with the Syrians and Iraqis. The Secretary replied that the U. S. attitude toward the November resol ution was well known. We voted for it, fully support it, and have said so in every capit al where we have a representative. This includes Cairo, where our people working in the Spanish Embassy have so informed tl1e Egyptian Foreign Minister . The real question, the Secretary said, is not \vhether we support the November resolution but how it is to be implemented. On specific points such as Jerusalem, our views are not in complete accord with either Israel or the Arab states. _J DECLASSMED L E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5 S-125'1 St te Dept. Guideline~ y_ .~-·NARA,Date ~--t -0 I 2 -yo· . C" E./" l,"'~ The Secretary continued that the primary responsibility for all concerned is to find the basis on which agreement can be found. We hope that Ambassador Jarring will now begin to set aside questions of procedure and begin to work ~n substance with the parties in New York . This will admittedly not be easy, inasmuch as some of the Arab nations have their own ideas of sequence and pri­ority. These get in the way of dealing as a whole with all of the elements in the November resolution . Also, the Israelis are still pressing for direct bilateral discussions with thei£'"' neigfi1)ors . we ao nOt believe that t his is necessary in order to work out a general settlement. ,. ­ For our part, the Secretary said, we ·will support any efforts by Ambassador Jarring to engage the two sides in serious talks. We will stay in close touch with Egypt, Jordan and Israel to see if quiet background work will assist him in his efforts. Our UN Miss ion wil 1 be prepared to furnish more details . One should remember, however, that the Arabs were diplomats 4 , 000 years before the U.S. existed, and they should address themselves with utmost seriousness to the work at hand. Mo. nescu agreed that the Arab governments should expend maximum effort . He said that he would inform them that: ( 1) the U. S . reaffirms its support of the November resolution, (2) we did not feel that the signing of a treaty as such was an absolute prerequisite, and (3 ) the U.S. would continue its efforts in . approp!iate ca piLa ls to get the resolution implemented . Manescu said that the Arabs wondered, and so did he as a Romanian official, whether we really intended to use our substantial influence to bring about Israeli acceptance of the November resolution and of whatever results Jarring might accomplish. It was equally important, Manescu said, that any such in­ fluence also be exerted on the Arabs . Manescu agreed with the Secretary that Jarring should now be getting into substance. He said that he would speak to U T11ant about this and that, although reluctant to do so on grounds that such an approach might be construed as inter­f rence or unwelcome pressure, he would~so talk with Jarring. Manescu asked the Secretary whetl1er the U.S. is prepared to use its influence to get Israel to adopt a more reasonable stand . The Arabs, he said, had asked the same question. In doing so, they had reminded Manescu of the UoS. position of fully ·supporting the November resolution. The Secretary stated that we valued Manescu's discretion as to how to handle Jarring. On the Arabs' general question on the resolution, he said that the resolution was ma ny things to many people. The Arabs, Israelis, Soviets and U.S. all had their own interpretations of it. This is basically Jarring ' s prob­lem. It is a complex matter of shading, timing and sequence. .· 3 r.:'(r)\S L.. I'-..., The question of U.S. influence is equally subject to misunderstandino the Secretary said. Since 1945, we have faced the problem of people exa~~eratina what we can do in someone else's capital. Two examples--the Indian-Pakistan~ differences over Kashmir and the Dutch-Indonesian difficulties 20 years ago-­suffice to illustrate how little actual influence we sometimes have . People always come to us and say "go tell the other capital what to do." They never a.sk us to tell them what to do. If Cairo or Arrtrnan think we have total influence in Israel, they are badly mistaken. We will try to use more influence in Israel t;J1an in Egypt or Jordan, but it may prove ineffective on all three . We did not have enough influence in Cairo to prevent Nasser from closing the Strait of Tiran nor were we ·influential enough to get a cease-fire on June· 5, 1967. A cease-fire that day would have -prevented conflicts between Israel and Jordan and Syria and would have averted the problem of Jerusalem. We thought we had an Israeli commitment not to initiate hostilities; the Soviets thought they had che same from some of the Arabs . We were both very wrong . The Secretary ~aid we would work hard for a solution. He added, however, that we can't reach one if one or two Arab governments think we can tell Israel to do what the Arabs want. Ncting that we are prepared to put history behind us and work energetically for a solution in the area , the Secretary recalled our experience in 1957 when we practically forced Israel to withdraw from Sinai on the basis tha t the Strait of Tiran would be free for passage. President Eisenhower did this in Egypt's behalf, and N~sser kicked us in the teeth a year ago . Hanescu said that, in a diplomatic sense, we are at a final and a starting point. The real problem is to begin implementing the November resolution and, in discus­sions with the Arabs, he would approach this in the same constructive manner the Secretary had used. M.Jncscu pledged that Romania , which is in a special posi­tion with regard to both sides because of the position it has taken toward Israel, would give full assistance to JCl.rring's efforts to implement the resolution. At the same time, 1-hnescu said , the Arabs have been saying that it is Israel which is unwilling to accept the resolution. They claim that no part of the problem is not susceptible of solution and that Israeli obstructionism is the real barrier. The Secretary noted that an overall solution, which Jarring must now seek, has many parts. It is difficult to go to one part without having to become involved in others. For example, the Arabs feel that Israeli withdrawal is the most im­portant problem, but the Israelis say that withdrawal means recognition. With recognition come such sovereign rights as passage through Suez. Nasser, on the other hand, says that a Suez solution depends on a solution of .the problem of refugees. We hope that Jarring can find a way through these spiderwebs . Looking ahead, the Secretary said that h1 the final analysis the two roughest. problems would be Suez and Jerusalem. 4 Manc~c~1 s.:iid that, while Jarring possessed certain professional diplomatic qual1.tics, he appeared reluctnnt to do anything that might jeopardize hi.s contacts. Nanescu predicted that Jarring would tell him that he needs a rc~l rnandntc in order to act more vigorously . J arring would add that he had this from the Arabs but not from the I sraelis . The Secretary replied that this wns in fact almost more technical than sub­ stantive nnd that it would be unfortunate if the exercise degenerated into a debate over the meaning of the J arring formula . Citing the Palais Rose aocnda discussions of 15-16 years ago and the lack of agreement on an agenda in Paris right now, he said that Jarring should dig in on substance ',vith all parties and see what can be done . Hanescu aid that the Jarring formula had been 2.greed to by both sides and that there had been considerable optimism two weeks earl ier . In fact , every­one in i:'ew Yorl' had been waiting for the Foreign Ministers to arrive . Then the agree;ne.nl collapsed . The reason , Nanescu said , was th<:t t Israe1 had in ffcct renounced its acceptance of the formula . Manescu ash~d the Secretary how he felt in these c ircumstances about the present problem of getting discussions going in implementing t~1e November re olution on the basis of the Jarring formu l a . The Secretary replied that he could not speak for Israel or the Arab countries . }1.:lncscu stated that Jarring simply does not know what to do . The Secretary said that Jarring should take account of the fact that he is himself an important political force in the area . If he moves reasonably and strongly, parties \~O ignore him would pay the price of doing so . The Secretary asl-cd if Jcrring was n0\7 in contact hdth lhe parties . 'Mancscu said that he had .'.1sked Kuznetsov aboul this and Kuznetsov had replied that Jarrine did not know \·:hat to do . Hnncscu said that something is clearly wrong. The Arabs, he said, want to kno\v \vhy Israel is um1illing to discuss implementing the Jarring forrnu1a. Hanescu asl·ed what the U. S. proposed to do . The Sccretnry said thlit HC rn.'.1y be in touch with Manescu through our U. N. Mission._ He said that our impression nt present is tlwt all sides are about equidistant from what Jarring had hop d to achieve in terms of the ru1odes discussion . We are syrnpnthctic with Jarring's dilcmrna, as these .:i.rc the most stubborn problems in the world and there is an absence of long-range wisdom on both sides . Mancscu reiterated th3t the U. S. should do some.thing to faci1itate the beginning of discussions under Jarring ' s auspices . 5 -----..-­ Th r l ry snid w djd not disagree with thnt but that the circumstances t m icat · nc u d j f the U.S. had any vH:ws about Jarring reopening the idea of n f rmuL with the partjcs . TI1 r tary said t1 had no objections and suggested that Jarring talk sub­a11c \ ·th appropriate r prcscntatives in New York. 1nn scu r 1lj0d ·11 t J nn :ing wns scared. He fears long, tedious discussions ·n whi h th p:irti s shift ground. He prefers to get written views from the p l" i s. Jarring's fingers have been burned once too often. This may explain h' mpha.is on procedure. Hanescu said that positive action needs to be n; oth rwise, the t1hole issue will drift, and this is dangerous. Th S r tary no cd that Romania enjoys the confidence of both sides and that 1 n scu enjoys personal prestige. Our delegations in New York should stay in touch . It is extremely clif fj cult to get anything out of Jarring. We respect h L wish to be discreet. As a resu1t, we do not know what he is thinking. Mancscu said that in his one meeting with Jarring he had told him that he would Iwvt.; to start tal ing at SOlllC point. Jarring' s react ion i:·:as the only human touch (Nancscu did not characterize the nature of the h displa. eel in the meeting. r action ).