No Foreign Dissem DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Current Internal Problems of the Spanish Government Special Report WEEKLY REVIEW 31 May 1968 SC No. 00772/68B Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-001-204-3-1-3 uth rity..t-1 kS. 001. -z.oLI By , NARA, Oat ~-11-01 SPECIAL REPORTS are supplements to the Current Intelli­gence Weeklies issued by the Office of Current Intelligence. The Special Reports are published separately to permit more comprehensive treatment of a subject. They are prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, tile Office of Economic Re­search, the Office or Strategic R~scarch, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Special Reports are coordinated as appropriate among the Directorates of CIA but, except for the normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, have not been coordinated outside CIA unless specifically indicated. WARNING The SPECIAL REPORT contains classified information affect­ing the national defense of the United States, within the mean­ing of Title 18, sections 793 and 794. of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re­ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. DISSEMINATION CONTROLS THE SPEC£AL REPORT MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS and must be handled within the framework of specific dissemination control provisions of DCID 1/7. GROUP' 1 Excluded from outomotic downgroding and declauificotlon Approved For Release 2000/09/1~ l~~Wf·204-3-1-3 s . No Foreign Dissem CURRENT INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT A sense of unease among informed Spaniards has been evident over the past several months. The usual speculation on impending cabinet changes and other political maneuvering has taken on urgency with rumors of possible pre-emptive action by senior military officers to counter what they consider to be drift at the top. It is widely believed that the 75-year-old Chief of State Franco's health is in a condition of decline which can only hasten his death or result in incapacitation. Without his per­sonal rule, many fear that the regime will no longer be able to face the challenge from mounting economic and social problems. The government, captive of its abhorrence of any change that might weaken its control, has been rigid in the face of demonstrations for reform by student and labor groups. Vice Presi­dent Carrero Blanco has issued a stern warning that the armed forces would be used, if necessary, to put down any attempt to alter the political sys­tem. By such means the regime so far has been able to keep the lid on, but it has not solved its basic problems. Coup Rumors looking toward the post-Franco pe­riod. Speculation about the role of Rumors are circulating a1u0ng the military tension how-informed Spaniards about possible 25X1C military coups. By some accounts, , a 25X1C certain military commanders sup­senior military of­porting the regime may launch a ficers called on Franco in early preventive coup to assure the April to explain that the coup maintenance of the status quo reports were only rumors, to point after the death of Franco. There out the concern of the military are other reports that monarchist about the dangers of certain cur-generals are thinking of a coup. rent problems, and to reaffirm There is no convincing evidence their unconditional and irrevocable that such plans are afoot, how­support for Franco. ever, and it is unlikely that any senior military official Rigidity of the Regime would move against Franco as long as he maintains order in the country. The problem underlying all others in Spain is the rigidity of The coup rumors may well de­the Franco regime's policies. Al­rive from political conversations though the new constitutional law Approved Fop~alie 20~1Ai~204-3-j-l1 May 1968 No Foreign Dissem promulgated in January 1967 af­fords some possibilities for a cautious relaxation of the au­thoritarian controls of the pres­ent system, the regime has not permitted any steps toward lib­eralization. Franco has failed to appoint a chief of government as the new law permits, and no political dialogue is likely in the National Movement, which still takes the place of polit­ical parties. Furthermore, the law to reform the labor syndi­cates and permit separate organi­ zations for workers and manage­ment has been delayed so long that the workers have little hope they will be permitted an official organization to repre­ sent their interests with the government. Labor and Student Protests In the face of the regime's failure to reorganize the offi­cial labor syndicates, the work­ers have formed "workers' com­missions" to promote their in­terests. These ad hoc groups include workers, Catholic labor group members, and Communists organized in individual fac­tories and are associated in a loose confederation on both lo­cal and national levels. The Conununist members play a large but not necessarily dominant role in the conunissions. Al­though these groups are illegal, they have succeeded in function­ing as agents for the workers in presenting grievances to man­agement and in organizing demon­strations. The regime's failure to listen to legitimate griev­ances of the workers has led to demonstrations, most notably on 27 October 1967 and 30 April -1 May of this year. Another protest group is the university students. Their demon­strations began as an effort to gain recognition for student-spon­sored organizations in place of the government-controlled student syndi­cate and to promote university re­forms. As the public protests con­tinued they drew more supporters and were prolonged by the brutal tactics of the police in suppress­ing them. The demonstrations be­came so violent that the govern­ment was forced to close the Uni­versity of Madrid several times dur­ing the current term. It reopened after almost six weeks' closure on 6 May after the appointment of a new education minister and a new rector. 25X1C s u ents app nucleus of the troublemakers at the University of Madrid. Few of these are Communist Party members, but some may be paid party agents. The new rector has warned that if the university has to be closed again, no make-up ex­aminations will be allowed and students will have to repeat the academic year. In the past, such warning has been effective. In the future, however, the example of suc­cessful pressure by students in other countries may tend to stiffen the Spanish students' resolve. In any case, the regime is far from any basic solution of its student problems. The Political Opposition The illegal Spanish Com­munist Party, although still com­paratively weak and divided into Moscow and Peking factions, has shown some ability recently to take advantage of labor and student unrest by infiltrating worker and student groups, but police penetration of the party keeps it under control. The non-Communist opposition groups, which are also illegal, remain disorganized and divided, and serve more as intellectual debating societies than cores of effective political action. The monarchists appear most active in their efforts to round up support for the restoration of the mon­archy in the person of Don Juan de Borbon, son of the last king. Rivalry Among Regime Groups Another problem for the pres­ent regime is the rivalry among the groups in the cabinet. Each faction tries to dominate, and there is some doubt that Franco can provide necessary decisive leadership. Leaders of the Na­tional Movement and some military officers in the cabinet are trying to upset the power of the economic ministers who are linked with the Catholic lay society Opus Dei. These ~inisters are responsible for the present economic program, and their enemies cite present economic difficulties in urging Franco to fire them. The offi­cers especially object to re­cent criticism by Opus Dei -con­trolled newspapers of the regime's refusal to permit liberalization. To date, however, Franco has stood behind his economic ministers, who represent the Opus Dei planners who brought Spain out of its eco­nomic difficulties of the late 1950s. The Franco regime continues to receive support from the hier­archy of the Catholic Church, but many lesser church officials, par­ish priests, and lay workers who feel that the church has responsi­bility for economic and social prob­lems (including labor} are work­ing to divorce the church from its close identification with the Franco regime and support of Franco's pol­icies. Some Catholic university resi­dencies and churches open their doors for opposition meetings and lectures. Some priests have signed protests about police actions in student-labor arrests and have even joined labor-student demonstra­tions and been arrested. Thus the church can no longer be considered a monolithic pillar of support of the Franco regime. Economic Problems The outlook for the Spanish economh is troubled following a year of severe problems brought on in part by the general economic slowdown in Western Europe. Spain devalued the peseta and adopted a long-delayed austerity program last November, but neither of these moves has thus far restored economic confidence or sparked the hoped-for resurgence of economic expansion. Inflation, a serious decline in the rate of investment, continued balance of payments disequilibrium, and unemployment are likely to con­tinue to menace the economy. This situation adds to the unrest in the country. Prospects Against all the protests and efforts to bring about some 8~11111111111.l Approved For ~~se.3200~~IAbi~404-3-1j)_i_ May 1968 SEC kin· No Foreign Dissem liberalization of the system, the Franco regime has maintained a hard line and created an image of a government unwilling to plan for or accept change. By arrests of labor leaders in ad­vance of planned demonstrations, by warnings to workers of penal­ties likely to be inflicted against demonstrators, and by * * massive use of security forces during demonstrations, the regime has succeeded in controlling the situation. Nevertheless, the work­ers and students have accomplished something in making their views known through demonstrations and are likely to. continue this form of pressure . (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) * Approve.d Far Relea5-e 2000/09/11 : NLJ-001-204-3-1 -3 Page 4 SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 1968