I DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Memorandum Military Aspects of RumaniaJs Independent Policy Within the Warsaw Pact p1A review(s) completed) --fnp Secret Approved For Release 2004/06/04 : N LJ-141-014-4-1-8 Approved_F or Release 2004/06/04 : N LJ-141-014-4-1-8 WARNING This rlocunwnl contains classified information nffl'cti11g lht' national .Sl'<'mity of the United Stalvs within the mC'ani11g of tlw t''-j)i1J11a~L' laws. l.JS Code• Title 18, Sectious 19:L 794, and 798. GROUT' I J EXCl.UOEL> ntOM AL"'lOMATlC OC•W.,.OHAOl,..,O AJlll> 01~;4>511-'lCATfOf'\ . Approved For Release 2004/06/04 : N LJ-141-014-4-1-8 Approved For Release 2004/06/0r--------­ .,.... !)Cl \Jr IA CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 25 August 1967 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM Military Aspects of Rumania's Independent Policy Within the Warsaw Pact This spring, a group of military attaches posted in Moscow were wondering who would replace Marshal Grechko as com­mander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces. "If it were up to Rumania," remarked the Rumanian to a colleague, "there would be no one. " Summary During the past three years, Rumania has so sharply reduced its participation in the Warsaw Pact that it cannot now be considered an active member. Bucharest has challenged Moscow's authority to direct the activities of Rumanian troops. The present regime would not willingly commit these troops to a European war begun by Moscow. Despite its objections to the Pact, the Ceausescu government is unlikely to repudiate membership, as the Albanians have done. The regime has publicly committed itself to uphold its Pact obligations so long as NATO exists and to partici­pate in Pact exercises. It intends to see that critical decisions affecting Rumania's armed forces are made in Bucharest, however, rather than in Moscow. In this respect, Rumania's policy now resembles that of Yugoslavia. Note: This memorandum was produced by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research and coordinated with the Office of Current InteZligence and the Office of National Estimates. Approved For Release 2004/061 3 I Background of the Military Differences 1. Important milestones in Rumania's search for political and economic independence from Moscow were achieved in 1954, when the Soviet-Rumanian joint economic enterprises began to be disbanded and in 1958, when Soviet troops were withdrawn f;om the country. Between 1958 and 1964 Rurnania greatly expanded its economic and political contacts in non­ Cornrnunist countries. In April 1964 Bucharest an­ nounced its "declaration of independence," which unequivocally asserted Rumania's right to national autonomy and equality in the Communist world. 2. Rumania's military policy toward the USSR has reflected the economic and political relations between the countries. The Rumanian military establishment did not break with the Soviet military on its own initiative. Rather, the high command has remained loyal to the government and has carried out the policy toward the Warsaw Pact laid down by the regime. Those few senior officers who evidently were unwilling to accept this policy either have been demoted or were released from service in 1965 and 1966. 3. The first change in the Soviet-Rumanian military relationship was detected in 1962-63, when the De j regime persuaded Moscow to recall the Soviet KGB advisers monitoring the activities of the Rumanian intelligence community. Among the organizations from which the Soviets were removed were the military counterintelligence section of the General Directorate of State Security and the Armed Forces Intelligence Directorate. The withdrawal of the Soviets probably l ed to a decline in intelligence exchange between JI Rumanj a and the USSB, I r ~5X10 4. A more serious disruption occurred in Sep­t ember 1966, when the Armed Forces Intelligence -3­ liil3P n a DAIl E'T Approved For Release 2004/06/ __________J Approved For Releas_~ 2g~~~061q I Directorate refused to important Pact intelligence As a result, l the Rumani ans-"""'":w~e~r~e-n'."""o-t~.... in February 1967. The ences was to evaluate discuss procedures for among intelligence organizations, exchange of information during 5. The Armed Forces present activities probably sometime prior to the Soviet, Czechoslovak directed against Rumania. L..r---......,....,.~-~"'T"":'--------------:--:----------:---:­ i niti. ate its own countries." In June of ) I for information on Mediterranean--a further indication that the Rumanians are collecting intelligence on Warsaw Pact forces. Training and Equipment Problems 6. Rumanian officials continue to endorse "col­laboration and joint battle training with the fraternal armies." Many ha.ve complained privately, however, that during some Pact maneuvers the Soviets invented absurd and unrealistic situations involving the simulated use of weapons not even in the inventories of the participating countries. The Rumanians are likely to contribute only token forces at most to future Pact exercises, and then only under direct pressure from Moscow. 8. The types of training emphasized during the past three years suggest greater concern for Rumania's national defense than for potential Pact operations. Bucharest has concentrated on devel­oping the combat effectiveness and esprit of its mountain troops, although these troops would not be useful in the initial stages of Pact offensive or defensive operations. They most likely would be employed against an aggressor who intended to occupy Rurnania for an extended period. 9. The performance of the Rumanian Navy, which could augment Pact forces in the Black Sea, remains conspicuously poor. A high Rumanian of­ficial claimed recently that the navy is to become primarily a training facility for the merchant marine. 10. The Rumanians are taking steps to make themselves less dependent upon the USSR for military equipment. Both party leader Ceausescu and armed forces minister Ionita ~~---stated this year that ~5X1C JRumania will devote greater gsx1c I J, tne party presidium has formulated an ambi­tious plan for the produc­tion of rockets, high~ performance aircraft, ar­tillery, armor, transport vehicles, and sophisticated communications e ui e program is inten e to give Rumania its political gsx1c ) and military independence from the USSR I I gsx1c JIL_________. -5­ attention to the domestic groductiQ~ of armament~ I. --~~~~~~~--, Colonel General IOH IOHITA Rumonion Minister of Armed Forces ~5X1A ) Approved For Release 2004/06/0 L--------­ Approved For Release 2004/0 ~ l _.. \._.,t\...f\J military officers are pressing the regime to provide new military equipment. One purpose of the produc­tion plan, the funding of which appears to be beyond Rumania's present capabilities, may be to solidify military support for the government with a long-terrn promise of improvement. 11. The USSR may have sparked Rumania's deci­sion to reduce its dependence on the Soviets for military equipment. In 1965 both Pact conunander Grechko and party secretary Brezhnev annoyed the Rumanians by urging them to step up equipment pur­chases from the USSR. The Soviets also are reported to have assigned Rumania the task of manufacturing spare parts for obsolescent military hardware. To fulfill the assignment, Rurnania would have had to purchase machinery that could not be used to manu­facture anything else. Evasion of Moscow's Authority 12. Some Rumanian officials have voiced fears of a violent Soviet reaction if Rurnania were formally to renounce its Pact membership. Ceausescu himself ~5X1D I·'. Runtanian Party General Secretary HICOL.AE CEAUSESCU and his Soviet counterpart LEONID BREZHNEV (November 1966) ~sx1A ) .__I___ Approved For Release 2004/06/04 '---------­ ~5X1D :eportedly wa;ned Rumanian foreign office personnel in 196~ that the Russians would crush us if they were g7ven the <;'PPOrtunity." One possible plan, ~nvolving the withdrawal of Rurnania from the Pact in conjunction with the withdrawal of Greece and Turkey from NATO and the signing of a Balkan non­aggression agreement, allegedly was considered in 1964 but dropped as being impractical. 14. Both Ceausescu and Ionita told the Rumanian National Assembly in July that Bucharest will remain in the Pact as long as NATO exists. Even while retaining their membership the Rumanians have been able gradually to erode Moscow's control over the Rumanian military estat·lishment. When Grechko c·omplained in 1965 that the Rumanian repre­sentatives in Pact headquarters had been insubordinate, the Rumanian armed forces minister replied that Bucharest was the proper judge of what Pact orders would be obeyed by the Rumanian armed forces. This response was tantamount to rejection of the Pact chain of co~and established in 1955, under which the East European defense ministers are deputy commanders of the Pact armed forces and thus subject to direct orders of the commander. The Rurnanians are believed to have objected strongly to Soviet efforts made in 1965 and 1966 to expand the number of Rumanian units formally committed to the Pact's Combined Command. It is highly unlikely that Bucharest now considers any of its armed forces so ~ommitted. -7­ 1 1 ~Lp-ro_v_e_d_F_o-=;=~g;i::::o4=c7Fio~s::/:r'QL~----------'I ~jl:l1~r:1;~s~~c~2?J!fio 15. In early 1966 Rumania reportedly circulated a proposal calling for Moscow to consult the other Pact members before making decisions on critical issues. Bucharest also is reported tc have asked that the top Pact command positions be rotated among the East European members, that the East Europeans be charged less for the Soviet troops stationed on their soil, and that the numbers of these troops be reduced. Rurnania already had taken steps in 1964 to cut its own military force mainly by reduc­ing the obligation of conscripts from 24 to 16 months. The Soviets are reported to have been par­ticularly displeased. 16. This year, Rumania's intransigence ap­parently delayed for several months the formal appointment of Soviet Marshal Yakubovskiy to succeed Grechko as Pact commander. Ceausescu's declaration on 17 June that each Pact partner "must possess its own supreme command" was a clear warning that the new cornrnander could expect no more cooperation than his predecessor. 17. The Rumanians believe there is a degree of sympathy for their anti-Soviet stand in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and perhaps even in Hungary and Bulgaria. Only in East Germany is there no warmth for the Rumanian position and no opposition to Moscow. Bucharest apparently recognizes, how­ever, that its East European colleagues are not questioning the usefulness of the Pact, as Rumania does, but only the mechanics of its operation. The Rumanians in Wartime 18. Since embarking on its independent policy, Rumania has revised the legal procedure necessary for it to declare war. The 1965 constitution1 though upholding Rumania's commitment to the.Warsaw Pact, contains an addendum to the 1952 version that ap­pears designed to eliminate an obligation to become involved in an "undesirable" war. Whereas the earlier constitution stated that "obligations of -8­ App:_oved For Rel_~ase 2004/06/Q mutual defense deriving from international treaties" represented a basis for the declaration of war, the new document states that the Rumanian parlia­ ment can declare war " ••• only in the case of armed aggression directed against the Socialist Republic of Rurnania or against another state toward which the Socialist Republic of Rumania has mutual defense obligations arising from international treaties, if such a situation has come about, for which the obligation of declaring a state of war has been laid down." 19. Rumania's behavior prior to or at the out­break of general war in Europe in all likelihood would be based primarily on a calculation of its own interests rather than those of the Pact. Its "so­cialist" outlook might make it initially sympathetic to Moscow, particularly if the causes of the conflict were obscure, but this outlook would not be an overriding factor in the final decision to commit Rumanian armed forces. Rumania probably would try to prevent any attempt by Soviet troops to cross Rumanian territory covertly prior to hostilities and would be tempted to give the West valuable, perhaps critical, early warning. After the outbreak of hostilities, Rumania probably would not permit its troops to be committed outside its borders and might be unwilling to make its oil available to Pact armor. Any sign of NATO military success would stir memories of Rumania's dubious military tradition and its deep distaste for the Soviet­dominated Warsaw Pact alliance. -9­ Approved For Release 2004106104'---------­