• eunfldential c, I() t ,,. --~ 4; t ;i (., w tU!L ~ ff ;ff df .-(~ 11 Tf'-J-g'" ,-/J:c. flt"'-. " ~J 1 -ju, ,,ZJ~/ DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Memorandum Rumania's National Communist Course 6n11fidentral 25 DFCLAS. IFIED 20 November 1967 No. 1397/67 B ~ , NARA~ Date • WARNING This document contains information affecting th<.' national defrns(· of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 784, of the US Code, as amended. Its tran.smi<.;sion or H'V<'lation of it<.; contents to or re­ceipt by an un.u1thorized person h prohibited Ly law. GROUP l EXCLUtn:o FHOM AUTOMATIC r:.ov.. Nt~HAl>lNG ANO lJ1".<..:LAS!';lf"ll.!ATlUl"l • CO!>JJ7181!1<1 I IAL 9 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 20 November 1967 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM Rumania's National Communist Course Summary During the past two years, Rumania's militant policies of independence of both the Communist and non-Communist worlds have been accentuated by the regime's nationalistic Communist leaders. Under the "second generation" Communist leadership of Nicolae Ceausescu, the regime has repeatedly shown its determination to ignore Communist solidarity in pursuit of its national objectives. Bucharest's insistence upon freedom of action in foreign af­fairs and equality of Communist parties in fact as well as in theory has frequently clashed with the policy line adopted by Moscow and its allies. The Rumanians have sought exposure to the West in search of political, economic, and technological benefits. Bucharest has recognized West Germany, remained neutral in the Arab-Israeli crisis, and has maintained a steady stream of visitors to the West, particularly to the US. Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research and with the Office of National Estimates. COfzqfftDEN I h\L • GQ)J:fIDEt>TTIAL 9 Having achieved its major foreign policy goals, the regime probably will avoid further undertakings that would risk possible Russian overreaction. How­ever, as the limits of permissible divergence are extended by practice, the Rumanians can be expected to define in even more independent terms their re­lationship to the Communist and non-Communist worlds. -2­ C8~ffIDE!~TIAL • GOPJFIQJ!91PfIAL 9 National Self-Interest "Generally speaking, only life is the supreme judge, and only practical results can confirm the correctness of a political line or position." Party ideologue Paul Niculescu-Mizil 24 July 1967 1. The success of Rumania's nationalist pol­icies in recent years demonstrates that a small state can exercise considerable leverage in assert­ing its particular interests against the broader, more generalized interests of a great power. Nearly four years ago, in April 1964, the Rumanian regime published its "declaration of independence" against the backdrop of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Ru­manian leaders have since exploited at every oppor­tunity this and other Russian political difficulties to achieve their own ends, showing in the process that it is not necessary to dance to the Soviet tune. The obverse of Bucharest's policies and actions to­ward the USSR is seen in its receptivity to the "bridge-building" polici es of the Western powers. As Rumania has increased its economic and political contacts with Western Europe, it has acquired ad­ditional maneuverabili ty for its efforts to dis­engage from Moscow. Gradually, by providing Bucha­rest with an alternative to dependence on the USSR, these contacts have become one of the mainstays of Bucharest's independent poli cy. "Lif e demonstr ates that a people that i s depri ved of a part of its national prerogatives ceases being free and sovereign, a fact that jeopardizes its very social development. Disregard of this • CQ}Jl2IP3t!I~'fl1\L 9 reality conflicts with the aspira­tions of the peoples, with the ob­jective laws of social development, produces the powerful reaction of the population, and rouses the en­tire nation to fight." Party Chief Ceausescu 24 July 1967 2. The driving force in the recent evolution of Rumanian policy, both foreign and domestic, has been nationalism. The leadership has drawn heavily upon Rumania's traditionally strident brand of this complex of beliefs and myths, and has portrayed it­self as the defender and logical continuer of all that is "best" in that tradition. Ceausescu often resurrects passages from speeches given many years ago at the League of Nations by Rumania's outstand­ing foreign minister after World War I, Nicolea Titulescu, to create a sense of historical conti­nuity. In these references to the past, Ceausescu particularly emphasizes the role of the nation-state and the importance of national sovereignty. By such devices, Ceausescu associates his regime with those Rumanian pre-Communist experiences that were and continue to be popular with the party and the people. The people's Latin heritage, the impor­tance of the nation-state, and the role of small versus large nations in world affairs are three themes that have parallels in both the pre-Commu­nist and the Ceausescu periods. 3. Unlike most other Communist regimes, the Ceausescu regime professes to see no contradiction between these nationalistic themes and those of proletarian internationalism. Indeed, Ceausescu argues that every country building socialism is contributing to socialist and proletarian interna­ tionalism. Rumania's independent initiatives, fore, are ideologically "correct." there­ The Ceausescu Leadership 4. Ceausescu became party chief in March 1965 upon the death of Gheorghiu-Dej. He was Dej's choice, -4­ CO~IVID~WTIAL • Gei~fq~L~ • outside the organized framework" and warned that ":inder such circumstances, each party is fully en­ titled to take e:rery me~s':1re it considers necessary so as to ensure its political and organizational unity, the implementation of its political l i ne 0 " T~e Rum~nian parliament's session last July--the first time all members of the party's elite bodyf the Permanent Presidium, have delivered speeches on the same occasion since July 1965--illustrated this unity as well as the pre-eminence of Ceausescu's appointees vis-a-vis the "old guard." 8. Ceausescu's appointees generally are men of his own generation, outlook, and inclinati on e This appears particularly true in his appointments to top positions in economic or technical areas of responsibility. Ceausescu favors the development of the technocratic and specialist classes o The party's pre-emine~ce in directing the administra­tion of technology, scientific research 8 and the economy is, however, unquestioned. Ceausescu's principal lieutenants will perform a similar role under a proposed economic reform, and a regional territorial reorganization~ However, any such far­reaching proposals are bound to, and indeed prob­ably already have, caused disagreements within the leadership and uncertainty among local officials . 9o Of the numerous supporters Ceausescu has promoted, Ilie Verdet and Paul Niculescu-Mi zil ap­pear especially favored, and both now are Presi dium members. They presumably were placed in that body to counter the weight of the veterans who had risen with Gheorghiu-Dejo Both clearly carry more in­fluence with Ceausescu than any member of the "ol d guard" except Premier Maurer. lOo Maurer ranks second only to Ceausescu in the hierarchy at this time. He seems to have the complete confidence of the party chief as the re­gime's leading foreign policy advocate. At the re­cent parliamentary session, for example, Ceausescu praised Maurer for his meetings with Presidents Johnson and De Gaulle, although he omitted any ref­erence to Maurer's recent "secret" talks with Chinese .... .. . . 'l>·t. . • ~tJPIDFN1JAL • Premier Chou En-lai. The premier's honored position as last to speak at the parliamentary meeting, and th7 pa7ty's recent resolution praising Maurer's con­ tribution to Rumania, further attest to his high standing. Foreign Policy "Certainly, the causes which have led to the present state of affairs are deep and par­ ticularly complex. There is no doubt, however, that a ma­ jor factor in their constant deterioration is that the old practice of interference in the internal affairs of other parties of other socialist states, the tendencies to im­ pose points of view from the outside, name-calling, and re­ sorting to accusations and con­ demnations have not been aban­ doned . " Scinteia editorial 28 February 1967 11. With increasing frequency, Ceausescu's foreign policies have clas~ed with those of Moscow and its allies. Since early this year, the re­gime has been particularly i nsistent upon its free­dom of action in foreign affai rs and has pressed ahead with at least equal vigor in formulating a "new type" of interparty relations. 12 0 The regime's "declaration of independence" in April 1964 has become the cornerstone of its pol­icies. This declaration states that the "principles" of "national independence and sovereignty, equal rights, mutual advantage, comradely assistance, non­interference in internal affairs, observance of ter­ritorial integrity, socialist internationalism.•. form the immutable law• ..ofthe entire world social­ist system" and the "only basis of unity." -7­ '"130!~FlDE~TTIA I. • 13. The pragmatic application of these prin­ciples has become a hallmark of the Ceausescu re­gime, ~ut t~is pr~9matism has been accompanied by emphatic reiterations of the regime's close adherence to Marxist-Leninist doctrineo In so justifying its actions, Bucharest has made it difficult for its al­lies to take it publicly to task for emphasizing its own national interests to the detriment of unity in the Communist camp. 14. In interparty relations, Bucharest has stressed that all national parties are coequal and therefore can not be subjected arbitrarily to gen­eral policy lines. Although this doctrine has been endorsed by all Eastern European capitals and by Moscow--it was embodied in the declarations of the 1957 and 1960 conferences of Communist parties--the Rumanians evidently doubt whether their allies, and especially Moscow, mean what they say. Recent ar­ticles in the Rumanian press have contained thinly veiled references to Soviet attempts to influence Ceausescu's party leadership, and attest to Bucha­rest's mistrust concerning party relations with Mos­ cow~ 15. In evidencing a desire for detente on terms more acceptable to the West than to Moscow, the re­gime has sought to demonstrate that it is not tied to a reliance on Communist solidarity to the extent that its allies are for ensuring its own survival It welcomes exposure to Western ideas in order to gain the political, technological, and scientific benefits of expanded relations with the industrially advanced countries of the non-Communist world. Relations With the Communist World "Unnatural is the fact that meth­ods and practices in contradiction with the standards of equal rights and noninterference in internal affairs, standards deriving from the very nature of socialist inter­nationalism, should occur in rela­tionships between socialist coun­ tries." Premier Maurer, 25 July 1967 -8­ 60?iFIDE?J"TI A-L • COPifIDEN I l~L • . 168 The Rumanian regime's independent foreign policy has won Bucharest grudging admirers but few friends among its European allies. Its relations with Moscow have suffered as Soviet-Rumanian party­state interests have coincided less and less and ' I the leadership seems to have concluded that this trend will continue in the future. Elsewhere, the regime has impaired its relations with Poland and East Germany by its recognition of Bonn and its ob­vious desire to expand this relationship~ East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the other advanced in­dustrial states in the region, are also annoyed by Ruma~ia's increasing efforts to find capital equip­ment and machinery in the West. Its relations with Hungary are vexed by the issue of the Translyvanian irredenta. Only with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, its Balkan neighbors, does Bucharest have good relations. Its relations with Albania vary from correct to cor­ dial, depending on atmospherics in the Comm unist world. 17. In being "reascnably unreasonable" with the Soviet Union, Bucharest has chosen to differ primarily about those issues which offer hope of a resolution favorable to its national interests e The regime has demonstrated this tactic by charac­terizing as anachronisms both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, by establishing diplomatic relations with West Gemany, by remaining neutral in the Arab-Isra­eli war, and by boycotting the all-European Commu­nist parties' conference at Karlovy Vary last April. Each of these policy moves proceeded from a realis­tic evaluation of its potential for success, and each was clearly motivated by national rather than bloc interests a 18 9 The Warsaw Pact, in theory a mutual de­fense organization, increasingly has become a device for political consultation, largely because of Ru­manian insistence o Rumanian dissatisfaction with the pact reached a peak early ~n the ~ummer of 1966 over the issue of Moscow's desire to integrate the various national armies more closely within the pact structure. Bucharest's resistance to this idea -9­ t30'WFiDE~JTI1'iL • C()}JJ2IFJl!I~TIAL • apparently helped thwart Moscow's plans Bucharest 0 has refrained from any open commentary on the is­ sue since then, although it almost certainly also opposed the recent appointment of Soviet General Yakubovsky to command the pact o 19 0 Bucharest's recognition of Bonn last Jan­uary also meant that the Rumanian "deviation" had breached the limits of acceptable behavior for mem­bers of the socialist family on the hypersensitive German question o While the Rumanians could and did argue that Moscow had had its ambassador in Bonn since 1955, this unilateral Rumanian action had such important ramifications for bloc unity that Moscow joined with the East Germans and Poles to delay rec­ognition of Bonn by other East European regimes " 20. Bucharest introduced a new element of di s­cord with its allies by adopting a self-servi ng "neutral" position on the Arab-Israeli war .. Alone of the Eastern European countries, the Rumanian re­gime refused to sign the bloc statement on 9 June following the Moscow meeting which it attended, and would not break diplomatic relations with Israel. 21 .. A chronic irritant in Rumanian-Soviet re­lations periodically inflamed by Bucharest is the Rumanian irredenta of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, now, respectively, a part of Soviet Moldavia and the Ukraine e Bucharest continues to use the ir­redenta as devices with which to embarrass Moscow and to try to keep it off balance politically. 22. Bucharest and Moscow also appear to have differences over renewal of their bilateral mutual friendship and assistance treaty. Signed in Feb­ruary 1948 and slated to be renewed automatically for five years next February unless renegotiated, the treaty contains a mutual military assi stance clause that Bucharest finds excessively restrictive. It appears probable that Bucharest will in time grudgingly renew this treaty in some form . ., • CO!>JFIDE!4"T'IKL 9 "Th ' . ere ~s one correct, sure, prin­cipl~-minded, and efficient way to discuss problems of common in­terest and to exchange views, in­cluding problems containing diver­gencies: This is the way of di­rect contact of party to party, of leadership to leadership. " Scinteia editorial 28 February 1967 23. Despite these conflicts with its European allies, Bucharest continues to engage in frequent bilateral party and state exchanges with them and to give equal attention to Moscow and Peking o Bucha­rest's initial support of Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute has become progressively less evident as the regime has pursued its independent course ~ 24 . Sino-Rumanian relations, for their part, have yet to recover fully from Premier Chou En-lai's attempt to use his visit to Rumania in June 1966 to attack the USSR. Both Peking and Bucharest appear to have exerted considerable effort to paper over their differences. The Rumanian press, for example, has yet to mention the Cultural Revolution, and Pre­mier Maurer has visited China three times during the past year, once shortly after his meetings with Presi­dents Johnson and De Gaulle last summer . 25 . Rumania's relations with North Korea and North Vietnam remain good. Bucharest continues to give only token military support to Hanoi and its handling of the war in its propaganda media is gen­erally in low key. With Pyongyang, Bucharest has shown support for its efforts to enter the United Nations .. Interparty Relations "Unity does not mean reduction to the same denominator • .• it does not mean uniformity . " Scinteia editorial 28 February 1967 -11­ 263 In interparty relations, the Rumanians have repeatedly and publicly stressed the greater utility of bilateral contacts over multilateral ones, particularly since the first of this year~ In defining the conditions necessary for its par­ticipation in multiparty meetings in an article in Scinteia late February, the regime observed that the Rumanian party requires "propitious con­ditions"" which take into "consideration the par­ticularities of the situation and of relations among parties, the existence of a climate of mu­tual trust; esteem, and respect conducive to con­radely and principle-minded talks." 270 Aside from these conditions, the party also is deeply concerned over the potential of multiparty meetings for formalizing the intra­Communist split and for the assertion of Soviet hegemony over the Eastern European Communist states. It particularly objects to what it considers to be the Soviet practice of establishing a general party line through the use of majority rule. The Rumanian party believes instead that all multi­party meetings should from the outset agree to an "exchange of views," and accept as generally bind­ing only those conclusions unanimously agreed to. "Each Communist Party has the legitimate right to participate in an international meeting if it considers it necessary and useful, as it also has the le­gitimate right not to particip­ate. Internationalist solidar­ity is not contingent upon par­ticipation or nonparticipation in a conference . It has a much more profound content, which is manifest in the identity of goals of the Communist parties • . • " Party Chief Ceausescu in Scinteia 7 May 1967 -12­ OfttJUIQENTI~ COlJPIDElITIAt a 32 • . The regime also has very sharply increased the sending of scientists, technicians, and educators t~ the U~. Late last January, for example, the re­gime decided to send 23 ranking economic and indus­trial officials to the US for lengthy study visits. It also has exhibited generally improved cooperat­tion with US officials and has indicated an interest in resuming negotiations for a consular convention in the "not too distant future." Rumania at the United Nations "The concept according to which mankind's destiny lies solely in the hands of the big powers does no longer correspond to the new conditions of social development. Reality demonstrates that the settlement of international dis­putes can no longer be decided only by the big powers, as this depends nowadays on the active coopecation of all states of the world. " "By acting with vigor and mili­tancy in defense of their le­gitimate interests and rights, the middle-sized and small coun­tries can considerably influence the course of eventso o• " Party Chief Ceausescu 24 July 1967 33. Bucharest's quest £or enhanced interna­tional prestige has been assisted by the electi~n of Rumanian Foreign Minister Manescu to the presi­dency of the current United Nations General Assem­bly last September. The firs~ Communist govern-. ment official to hold the office, Manescu began his acceptance speech by stressing that the confidence -14­ CON PI 1'1!I~TIAL '1£1 tt• tt:YhN'l'IAt placed in him was "clearly addressed to his country" and emphasized the role of "small-and medium-sized nations" in international affairs. Although the president never votes in the assembly, the resource­ ful Manescu will be in a good position to initiate new proposals through the Rumanian delegation as well as possibly to in­ fluence events through MANESCU, Corneliu his easy access to Sec­ RUMANIAN MINISTER of FOREIGN AFFAIRS retary General Thant. ond CURRENTLY PRESIDENT of UN GA The Outlook "It is a historic reality, an essential aspect of the entire social development that the na­tion far from having exhausted its possibilities, has an out­standing important role to play in the ascending progress of human society." Leonte Rautu addressing the Rumanian parliament 25 July 196 7 34. Rumania has achieved the major foreign pol­icy goals that it has pursued so avidly since the first of the year. Bucharest probably will now be more concerned with consolidating its advances in ex­ternal affairs, during whi ch period the regime's leaders will probably focus much more attention on domestic policies. There remains, moreover, no ap­parent innovation in foreign policy that Bucharest could contemplate undertakin~with equanimity that would achieve benefits commensurate with the poten­tial political risks of a possible Russian over­reaction . -15­ -cotqfi'lDEt~TIAL ~~1tJFiiltg1f1 il{L 35. In the inunediate future, therefore, Bucha­rest will probably await new opportunities to assert further significant independence within the Conunu­nist world~ Such opportunities may arise in connec­tion with its promotion of the Group of Nine--an infor­mal association of small European states seeking detente and cooperation in Europe--or as the time for re-evaluation of the Warsaw Pact and its rela­tions to NATO (1969) approaches. In the meantime,. the regime will continue gradually to strengthen its relations with the West and attempt to play a lead­ing role in promoting European detente, possibly through the United Nations. 36. Rumania, along with Yugoslavia, is a lead­ing exponent of pragmatic Communism in Eastern Eur­ope . As East-West contacts expand and ideological and political diversity become more pronounced, how­ever, other Communist regimes in Eastern Europe can be expected selectively to adapt to their conditions the-_policies developed by the two Balkan innovators. Gradually, what is now considered revisionist and nonconformist will become the accepted norm. Thus, in time, the stage will be set for Bucharest to ex­ert itself once again to establish new and broader policies redefining in even more independent terms its relationship to the Communi st and non-Communist worlds. -16­ COI~f?IDEtiTllrL .,