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EEA359 00 WTElO DE WTE 3506  II• r  't --~ ,,,,­-· _.  Received:· Washington CommC en !:24 PM EDST Wednesday 28 August 1968  
FROM TO  NAT THE  DAVIS PRESIDENT  Received: LBJ Ranch CcnnCen 3::53 FM CIBT Wednesday 28 August 1968  
CITE  CAP82223  
S !  C R E I  NODIS  
AUGUST  28,  1968  
12:00  P.M.  
SUBJECT:  RUMANIA  
IN  THE  CABLE  WHICH  FOLLOWS  AMBASSADOR  BALL  DESCRIBES  

HIS MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER MANESCU. MANESCU AVOIDED GIVI NG ANY ASSESSMENT OF THE DEGREE OF THREAT TO· RUMANIA 
<AND COUNTERED BY ASKING WHAT WE WOULD DO TO INFLUENCE THIS SITUATION). BALL FOUND MANESCU RELAXED, WITH NO APPARE NT SENSE OF !Mt1INENT THREAT, BUT HIS PRESENCE HERE UNDOUBTEDLY REFLECTS CONCERN. 
OT HER SIGNALS ARE MIXED. 

THAT THE 
UMANIANS HAVE THEMSELVES BEEN TAKING MEASURES TO INCREASE THEIR MILITARY READINESS --AND IT IS NOT CLEAR WHO MAY BE RESPONDING TO WHOM. 
THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS OF SOVIET TROOP MOVEMENTS NEAR THE RUMANIAN BORDER, BUT THESE ARE OF ONLY FAIR RELIABILITY AND NOT CONFIRMED.> 
ON AUGUST 26, THE RUMANIANS ACTED TO MUTE THEIR PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THE SOVIETS. ON THE SAME DAY A MOSCOW TV COMMENTATOR UNLEASHED THE STRONGEST PUBLIC SOVIET ATTACK YET, LINKING RUMANIA'S AND YUGOSLOVIA•s STAND WITH THAT OF THE "ENEMIES" OF THE WEST AND THE MAO TSE-TUNG GROUP. ON AUGUST 27, THE SOVIETS SEEMED TO HAVE MODERATED THEIR PUBLIC ATTACK --PERHAPS IN RESPONSE TO RU~ANIA•s SILENCING OF ITS OWN PRESS • 
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THE TEXT OF AMBASSADOR 3ALL'S TELEGRAM FOLLOWS: 
1. 
_BALL CALLED ON ROMAN IAN FON MIN MANESCU IN HIS MISSION THIS NOON. RO~ANIAN UN REP DIACONESCU A~D BUFRUd ALSO PRESENT. 

2. 
BALL ASKED MANESCU FOR HIS APPRAISAL OF SITUATION AND SAID HE WOULD BE PARTICULARLY PLEASED IF HE WOULD SAY THAT ROMANIA NEED NOT FEAR SORT OF TREATMENT AT SOV HANDS JUST METED OUT TO CZECHS. 

3. 
MANESCU BEGAN REPLY BY RECAPITULATING WELL-KNOWN RO~ANIAN POSITION CRITICIZING INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WAS SATISFIED THAT LEADERS ARE DEDICATED COMMUNISTS AND HAD NO INTENTION OF LEAVING WARSAW PACT; MOREOVER, HE STRESSED THERE WAS NO FOUNDATION TO SOV CLAIM THEY HAD BEEN INVITED IN. MANESCU STRONGLY INTIMATED DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS HAD GONE FASTER THAN WAS WISE BUT FELT THIS WAS DECISION FOR CZECHS TO TAKE WITHOUT OUTSIDE INT£RFERENCE. WITH REGARD TO POSSI3LE SOV ACTION AGAINST ROMANIA, HE RAISED COUNTER QU£STION AS TO WHAT US WLD DO TO INFLUENCE THE SITUATION CHE AVOIDED GIVING ANY ASSESSMENT OF DEGREE OF THREAT TO ROMANIA ALTHOUGH HE REFRAINED FROM COUNTING IT OUT ENTIRELY). 

4. 
BALL TOLD ~ANESCU THAT SECRZTARY HAD TAKEN THIS SU3JECT UP EXPLICITLY WITH DOBRYNIN AND HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT ACTION AGAINST ROMANIA COMING ON TOP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WLD RENDER IT VERY DIFFICULT INDEED FOR US TO GET BACK ON TRACK OF PURSUING WITH RUSSIANS SOLUTION OF PRC3LEMS LIKE DISA RM AME NT WHICH WE CONSIDERED IN OUR MUTUAL NATIONAL I NTEREST <AND WHICH MANESCU STRESSED HE WAS INTERESTED IN SEEH~G PURSUED). 

5. 
PE~HAPS NOT FULLY UNDERSTANDING ROMANIAN TRANSLATOR'S RENDITION OF BALL'S REPLY, MAN£SCU ASKED IF IMPLICATION WAS THAT EVEN IF SOVS HIT ROMANIA TOO, IT WOULD JUST TAKE A BIT LONGER FOR THINGS TO GET BACK ON NORMAL COURSE. BALL SAID MANESCU WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT CPTIONS OPEN TO US IS SE~KING TO DETER ANY SOV MOVES AGAINST ROMANIA WERE LIMITED. FOR EXAMPLE, THREAT OF MILITARY ACTION WOULD CF COURSE OPEN DOOR TO WORLD WAR III; MANESCU AGREED NEITHE~ OF US WANTED THIS. 


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6. 
HE THEN SUGGESTED WE MIGHT USEFULLY TAKE A STAND IN PRINCIPLE AGAINST NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. BALL MADE SURE HE UNDERSTOOD WE HAD DONE THIS VIGOROUSLY AND THAT SECRETARY•s APPROACH TO DOBRYNIN HAD GONE BEYOND THIS BY CONVEYING IN PRACTICAL TERMS DAMAGING CONSEQUENCES TO US-SGV BILATERAL RELATION­SHIPS IF THEY INVADED ROMANIA. 

7. 
THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION MANESCU, IN APPARENT EFFORT TO MAINTAIN BALANCE OF TRUE COMMUNIST STATE, AS HE DESCRI3ED ROMANIA, INTERSPERSED CRITICAL ALLUSIONS TO OUR "INTERVENTION" IN VIETNAM. HE SAID, HOWEVER, SINCE US WAS IMPERIALIST COUNTRY, HE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED THIS FROM US BUT DID NOT EXPECT SOV INTERVENTION IN FRATERNAL COMMUNIST STATE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. 

8. 
BALL ASKED IF HE HAD THOUGH ABOUT GOING TO WASH­I NGTO N TO CALL ON THE SECRETARY, AND HE SAID HE HAD NOT. HOWEVER, HE CO NVEYED HIS WARMEST REGARD TO SECRETARY RUSK AND RECALLED FONDLY THE NUMEROUS CORDIAL EXCHA~GES wITH HIM EVEN THOUGH WE HAD OFTEN BEEN IN DISAGREEMENT ON SUBJECT CONCERNED. 

9. 
BALL FOUND MANESCU APPARENTLY QUITE RELAXED WITH NO SENSE OF IMMINENT THREAT, ALTHOUGH VERY FACT HE IS HERE UNCO U3TEDLY MEANS ROMANIA WANTS TO HOLD ALL OPTIONS OPEN I N CASE SITUATION GOES SOUR AGAIN. HE DID COMMENT THAT IF SOVS SHOULD I NVADE ROMANIA, THEY WOULD MEET WHOLESALE RESISTA NCE. 


3ALL 
DIG 281S24Z AUG 68 
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