µro,,....ccsf; on :individual issuPs, ( e.g., reopening Su.?~, Arab acceptcin.;L of rjrJ1t of p'1SSCI ~e tbru 1gh Straits of Tiran, at 1caf,t lirni t d l ..;r;-,cl i \.lit hclt D\\7 .'11 from occupi0c1 t·crr_i t ory). Should ;inoth r effort be i 1adc thr )U[_,11 the U ? Shoulcl the USG iLsclf take. the Jc~ d jn spon;;oj~jng so11 . ljrnitcd effort tOhC-:~rd acc,·1·1odation? '.J':il] the1:_, be an o)porLunjty for some li11ited collabo-ati(11 \litli the So .iets in br:in<;ing the Arabs and I s i:a c1:i s c] o s r on c111 y o.f t.b c ou t .' t c, n d :i n g i s sue s ? 
1 T. Sov: L Threat. 
Our  ob i  c  ·iv,..,  is  to  cou o t.c r  So vi c t  infl.u c n c C'  in the Near  
East  an(1  Mcclil  err  nC!Dn.  \•l,  cannot  :ivo:i.cl  fac:ing  thf'  quest.Lon  
of  \·Jh  tli  r  w·  are  lo.;jng Lh)  Near  East  to  the Iu<·fdn11s.  

L
c:·1»c>uI) Ex mp · ,<1 f 1 om 'u t:oma L:j c dO\\'ngrac1ing an c1 dC' c 1<..;~•.i f i c.~ t L·i on 


...SE€~ 
2 
Jhe ~~.2.__:i_ 
ssuc is that the Arab defeat in June broadened opportun:U.. ies for Soviet inf] ucncc at o time when o~~ resources .and maneuverahility are increasingly restricted. Wnile . the Soviets are more activc··-lhcdr recent firmer involve-· 1:1ent in Lhe Yemen has larger in1plications for their re] 0tions ~11 the Ar<Jbian Penjnsula, and bcyond--we are for the moment increasingly pass.Lve \vhf·thcr we want to be or nol. The qucslionf; arc hO\J much more> we would 1il·e to do and ho ,7 hard we arc able-­giv=>n otl:c.r pr:Loritics---to fight for Congressional support of a more vigorous effort. 
--We have been consulting Pith our NATO allies on the Soviet threat in the Mediterranean area. We are aiming for some com~on view of the threat and, hopefully, for some useful exc~ange of views on how our policies might be attuned to the common Western interest with hopes of increasing Western European involvement. But progress is slow, and there is some question whether this is not too \·leak a reed to lean on. 
-We are keeping in close touch uith the Governments 
of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Rritain particularly wjth a view to countering Soviet (and Chinese) ambitj_ons in Yemen, South _Yemer, anJ the Persjan Gulf. But without a peace settlem8nt 
our po~ition with the Arabs contin11es to erode, and Lhe British 
seem determined to \·.d_thdrai,;,7 from their position in the Gulf. 
III. Relations with the A·rabs 
-------~------------­
Our __objcctivl: is to retajn our friendly tiE's with the 
Arab moderates at least, and to improve our relations with the 
other Arab states to the extent opportunities and our interests 
perJ11i t . 

The main issue is ho~ actively we should try to reswne 
re] a tions \Jith tf1_e-~-taCes that broke with us last June. On th c 
one hand, there is nruch to be said for a low-~ey diplomatic 
relationship without aid ties to broaden our presence as widely 
as possible. On the other, there is something to be said for 
the arguinPnt thaL a constructive J\rab atlitude Fill not be 
possible until thc·radicals come to their senses and that we 
should concentrate on our moclernte friends and just leave the 
radicals to themselves (and the Soviets for the time being). 

--We must ccrtninly be sensitjvc to the need to i11dicatr· 
our desiie to rfmo.in on good terii1s with the Arab moderates , 
givjng them a clear altern.citivc to ct,stin~ tlieir lot . incr-e~1:ii;gly 
with th0 radjcal states of the area a11d with the Soviets . fhis 
may rE·cruLre actions by ur; i11 tJ.1e poli ~icC:l? economic .and _ 
military supply f:Lcldf;, dcpcnchng on J.ndiv:Ldnn1 requirements . 
Now that Ir;rael sc~ems more conr.cious of the need to block the 
Soviet tllrust, our htnids seen freer, cspeei8lly jn Jordnn : \~hat. 
mor. c3n we do? Should we, for e>x.:.11\)le, sc 1~ <1.. rnor rnPanJug:Lul 
US rni1itary presen··e in the~ Arabic:n1 Sea area? 
-SECRJ:I 

3 

--The question of how to deal uith Nc1ssar stands out as a special problem. On the one hand, it is tempting to argue tha~ the ~ooncr he disappcnrs from the scene, the sooner the 11iddlc Last can get down to constructive reg:i 01.aJ efforts--ond therefore \le should just 1et him sle\·7 iu his opn j1:1ice. On the other, there is sound argument for keeping our lines open to the more reasonable pro-1.vestern elements in the UAR. 
IV . Arms Limitation 
Ou1:~12..i~c._12iy~ is to s lo ·l down or stop tbe Near East arms race. 
The main issue is that an honest try for arms limita­tion \\1illrequir-e~acfc).gged effort to bring the USSR abroad, as 1.1ell perhaps as some parallel effort with the regional states to avoid another round in the arms race. We have a better opportunity than ever to achieve some sort of limitation in Ll1e n'"','L fe\·J months, but if we arc not prepared to make a major effort, we should accept the consequences of a new round. 
We can continue to seek opportunities for multi­lateral agreement to limit shipments , such as by registration with th~ UNSYG as the President has proposed. But we have met little success so far. 
--We can continue a policy of restraint in our own a rms s u l'p1y to the arca , but unless the USSR r cs trains its shipme11ls we will soon have to meet Israel ' s needs. Therefore , we may have a last opportunity this spring to engage the USSR in souic lirnitaLion arrangem2nt. 
-··French decisions on arms supply may well assume increasing importance in the area . It seems doubtful at this point that we can count on influencing the French one way or the other, in the abf.~ence o[ major developments a] so involving SovieL policy. 
-We are cone ·rned over Israel ' s retaining its options to produce nuclear weapons and to procure str~tegic .rnissile~ . Despj tc thcj r inPl e<liate deterrent C>ffort, Israel~L following up on citber of these options would undercut any cl1anees of ljrniting the arms race. We should .press f~r Israel ' s ~dl.1e:::ence to th( NPT at the <1pp:ropriale time, explor1n3 the poss1.bility . of some useful co1laboration with the Soviets in that connection with a viev1 to gencre:-11. rcstrnint. in sup1)1ying arn1s to the region .