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November 29, 1967 
MEMO~.\.NDUM FOR RECORD 
SUBJECT: 	NSC Meeting held 1iovember 29, 1967, at 12: 00 N.:>on in the :'.:abinet Room 
P ~\.RTICIPA.NTS: 	T:!ie :?re3ident The Vice P:-esident Secretary of 3tate, Dean Rusk Secretary of Defense, Robert S. Mc:r-.Tamara Chairman, Joint Chiefs of .Staff, General Earle S. ;vheelc-" 
I:'irector, Central Intelligence Agency, P..ichard H~lm... Director, U. 3. Information Agency, Leonard ~larks I:irector, Office of Emergency Planning, 
Governor Price Daniel ~i\.ssi3tant Secretary of State, Luciu3 D. Battle P~:esident's Special _.:\ssistant i<>l' National 5ecuPity 
Mfairs-, Mr. Walt Rostow Executive Secretary, Mr. Bromley Smith ..lfhite HouJe Press Officer, Tom Johnson Harold I-1. 3a,under!.1 Roha.nd Inlow, Central Intelligence _.\.gency 
Tlle C0uncil covered the two items on the agenda in the following 

I. Cyprus 
----The P resident as:< d ::;.~cretary Ru:.1k to :report on the latest in our efforts. S cr~tary H.u :ik, a.fter saying how fortunate we have been to have .!vi:-. Battle following this crisis hour by hour, asked Mr. Battle to brief the C ouncil on the ure. ent situation. 
L\/Ir. 3attl~ sai we nave made :·astonishing progres3 ·1 largely due to the 5Uuerb efforts of :Nlr. -1-1.nce. w·e now 1ave Sreek-Tur~< .agreement
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on 3. 3t::i.t~ment of principlea which would lead to withdravval of G-reek 'l.nd 
Turkish military :'orces from Cyprus in excess of the levels established in the Nicosia T r eaties of 1960. ·::he :overnments of Greece and Turkey did 
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assert these principles in response to an appeal by the Secretary General. 
.A.ction will be required in the United Nations and the Secretary General 
will have to decide ~11hether he can increase the UN force on Cyprus as 
required by these agreements within his current mandate and without 
another n"leeting of the Security Council. The 3econd problem i3 to win 
~!a~rio3' agreement to these terms. He has argued for total demilitarization 
of Cyprus and :refuses to accept a.ny agreement which would appear to 
reaffirm the London-Zurick agreement. 
Mr. Battle, saying that he had been asked why we need 
~Iakarios at all, pointed out that Makarios has the power to undercut the 
agreement by calling a Security Council meeting, attacking the Turk-':ypriots 
and charging that the Greek Government sold out the Greek people. etc. 
:n sum, Mr. Battle 3aid he was "on the whole optimistic" ! there are 3till problems; but at the minimum l\tI1·. Vance has delayed and we hope aYerted a war. The basic problems 3till remain ~ecause the London-Zurich arrangements are a Rube Goldberg contribution politically and can't work. We hoped we could get out the basic problem through the UN. In any case, ,11e have an opportunity for a new start. 
:Secretary Ru3k added that we have somewhat succeeded in taking the heat off us. The problem of expanding the UN m.andate b~ now between T11rkey and the GN Secretary General. Ii the UN fails to carry out it~ part of the agreement, it may be easier for Turkey to accept the Secretary General's .failure than to accept US or Greek failure to see the agreement successfully implemented. He concluded by saying to the 
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President that it had been of the utmost importance that "you put in your own sta.ke by 3ending Cy Vance. 1 
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The President asked General -vv-heeler to describe the military :3ituation. ':eneral \Vheeler Jaid that "'Nhile there ha3 undoubtedly been 30me relaxation of tension.a in the last fe'\V hours, forces on both side..') remain on alert. Turkey ha3 the advantage in the area and on the ground. Greek J.i::-base3 are too far a.way ;ind T~.::rkey could ea3ily win ~3.ir superiority over Cyprus within 24 hours. Greece has the capability to move airborne forces but would run into Turk air superiority. In the overall balance, G :.~eek sea.power is 3uperiort but in the vi.cinity of Cyprus, Turk air cover again would be decivive. 
In Thrace, ::"urkey has five infantry divisions and one a'XE"i&'dr armored di ..lision. Greece has three infantry divi3ions and o~ tank di·vi.3ion. If 1 co?L.~ict occurred, JCS believes that the Turks could advance as far as 
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:'.)a om..ca. He doubted that would go farther. 
On Cyprus. the Turks have the capability to land a division on the north coast of Cyprus near Kyrenia, and to put three divisions ashore in two or three weeks., He believed that Turkey could control the Island in that 
time. 
;di starting In sumrn3.ry~ G~neral Wheeler 9aid that. if shootings s~g 

air bases to be followed by an invasion of Cypru3.. Ii was problematical whether the Turks would invacbi Thrace. He felt they would 3imply maintain a defensive position there. 

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II. Soviet Defenge, Budget and Economic 
In response to the President' a reque3t, M::-. Helms made the following generalizations which were supported by charts which appear i n the attached :n.ore detailed study from which ~ir. Helms' brief was taken. 
He began by ?Oi.:1ting out the difficultie3 which analyst3 have i:i c reating an acruate picture of the Soviet linion1 s defense position. Ee explained that hi.'3 analysis starts from scratch and, knowing \Vhat the 'USSR haa, l:>uild our e3timate of the Soviet budget, piece by piece, from the bottom u~. 
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L~ a 3<!C~nd step, the resulting ruble factor is ~intocollars in such a way a.s to take account of the unrealistic ofiicia.l rate of exchange and various differences between our econontles, which would distort a direct compari:3on between their budget a.nd our3. 
He pointed out that the $56 billion defense a.nd peace budget,. the highest ever, approximated our3 if we subtract our v:_~tnam cost3. Arid yet {.:\t t..tii. s uoint he
the Soviet Cnion has a.n economy half the 3ize of ours. . .. introduced a chart concerning US 3.nd Soviet defense budgets broken dd\Yn in various functional categories. Generalizing from the facts he presented, 
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he concluded that the Soviet Onion t• maintaining a high level of military readinea1. He h&1 commented that the consumer in the USSR appears b be getting & bigger supply of Soviet reeources. It seema to be Soviet policy to give the Soviet people "both guns and butter. " He aaid finally that an expansion o! the space budget is expected in l 96a, for the misfires, 
there''could be •erloua trouble. ,. 
Secretary Ruak commented that this analysis underscored the importance of trying to engate the USSR in serious discusalon of what goea into the accounting of military budgets. We had tried this two or three yeai-s a.go. If we see Vietnam coming to a close, we ought to try 
again. Because l£ we take out of the aocial elements in the two budgets-­such aa the difference in pay !or soldiers--it would become even more apparent that the USSR is putting even a greater percentage of its GNP into military spending. 

The President asked whether our advanced techniques in production wouldn't largely lower aom. of our costs in comparison with theirs. Do we know whether they get more credibility for their dollar than we do? Secretary McNamara indicated that tiw a a•'•K it waa very ha.rd to compare directly. There are various techniques for trying to make a comparison. For example, it ia possible to price their striking force in term.a of men, in term.a of total destructive capability, or in terms of separate targeted warheads. It ia also poa•ible to meaaure coeta in terms of the percentage of resources or terms o! the amount of total manpower committed to support of strategic foreea. ·••cret= 






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po nt d o t th t th Soviet strategic force ia risiJ:i at a more 


t n our b c us we already had a more substantial base• However, he c 

-t th most important political !act is that our force is not superior h to thr t n them and to turn into political advantage. The reason we h b bl to apply our total military capacity more effectively in situations Cub a. d h Middle East is that we can project our hour and they can not. h mid t of the Middle East crisis, they had no way to reinforce the UAR, nd y i! e h d had to support Israel we could have. There is some c on that the USSR is willing to move in this direction, In any case, upport component in our budget reflects in good part this superior



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c p billty to reach out and apply our course anywhere in the world. Mr. Roetow sked whether the budget figures reflect any substantial reinforcement of its Chinese vorder. Mr. Helms said there was no indiciation. The buildup on tha.t border was larger in terms of improved readiness and a.n additional force which is small in relation to total manpower. 
III. 	~nalItem. The President, in concluding. read from a memo which had 
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been given to him by M r . Zbigniew Brzezinski who returns to Columbia~rom the Policy Planning Council soon. The President was interested in Brzezinski's estiina.te of Chinese and Soviet policies toward Vietnam. The nub of this on China was the warning that if a settlement appeared imminent, there would be conflict in Hanoi with a militant faction to call on the Chinese to stave of! final defeat. In that situation there would be a real possibility that the 
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chine• might gr dually infiltrate enough forces to turn the military tide. On Sovi t int ntion • Brzezinski felt that the advantages of the Vietnam conflict to the Soviet Union outweighed its liabilities. The USSR' s policy i to contain the risks ol war, not the war itself. The Soviet posture is on of being willing to see the prolongation of the war. 
Secretary Rusk said this po nted out the fact that the closer come to tbs success, the more di!ficult it will become for the other 
•id to decide whether it can allord to let Hanoi !ail in the ism•sw South. The meeting adjourned. 
Harold H. Saunders 
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