1967 SEP 3 19 58 17 EEA4~.q ­ r 00 WTE10 I OE WTE 3670 / ' \ I FROM WALT ROSTOW ,I TO THE PRESIDENT CITE CAP82361 . • j • S E C ft E i-SENSIT IVE ·: . , \ I SEPTEMBER 3, 1968 . . . YOU WILL WISH TO READ ABRAMS' LUCID . SUMMARY OF THE MILITARY · f' SITUATION. . t t . A. IT IS BECOMING CLEAR THAT THE ENEMY HAS ATTEMPTED .. i' TO LAUNCH A MAJOR 'OFFENSIVE EFFORTI POSSIBLY HIS GREATEST . , . •' THUS FAR. YOU ARE FAMILIAR 'WITH THE SURGE IN INFILTRATION.·.·. t I 1 • } PRECEDING THE AUGUST EFFORT. IT IS NOTEWORTHY TO ME . 1 ­ ' . ·. 1• THAT THE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND FIRES IN NORTH VIETNAM .· . i ./ . r·· AND SOUTH VIETNAM CAUSED BY TACAIR AND B•52 WERE AS . ... FOLLOWS: 5 APRIL-4 MAY TOTAL 1730 AND 19 JULY-17 AUGUST , . . . .:· " 1 ,,,_ l~ : TOTAL 4772. COMPARING THE PERIOD OF 18-29 AUG 68 TO 5-16 ·. ~· ·· , . ·. ·_. .: ·"= , ·f·'.NAY 68 WE FIND THAT THE ENEMY KIA FOR THE AUGUST PERIOD · . ·, . , . · :. .: .:: __ : !·1 TOT AL ABOUT 8500, WHILE THE ENEMY KIA FOR THE MAY PERIOD , · -. ·~;.. -. ~ ~· RUN TO ABOUT 12,000. ENEMY INITIATED GROUND ASSAULTS AND ·~· .. '. .: .. ,_,;' : • ATTAC KS BY FIRE TOTAL -ALMOST 300 FOR EACH PERIOD. WE SAW •·. 1! , ,· ~ HORE GROUND ASSAULTS IN THE MAY PERIOD AND A -FEW MORE ATTACKS ;. , .· ~ . <~ . :.' .:..>' ·...:, t' BY FIRE IN AOOUST. IN MAR THE ENEMY FIRED AN AVERAGE OF 21~. ROUNDS .. . . :;.. :,.:~ ...(: . I· PER ATTACK BY FIRE "CABF>; .IN AUGUST HE EXPENDED 34 . .. . , -,·: ·1· ••. ,. 1 ROUNDS PER ABF. · -..•~ : ·.' ' ~~ • ..:..; :· ,. .... • • • ,,. ' f '\ ., ..,, ... , • • .. • • '\ '· t ... • , • "!; • • \' .-~ ' • \1, pl' • f • • , • • • ... • ,, .. ..., .. B. EXCEPT FOR. DANANG, HIS OPERATIONS THUS FAR, HAVE · ·: ....:" . :· ... ! '.·i'_:·> . !! ;J .'', BEEN PREPARATORY AND DIVERSIONARY IN NATURE. HE HAS TRIED .. ,:,-_...'..·,. .:. :·, ·..~: '. ··:'·.>:"-.l TO ATTRACT US FROM HIS PRIMARY ·OBJECTIVES. HE SEEKS TO · " .. ,. .._.,.. \: .. ' ·,, ... ·-·· f ATTR!T OUR FORCES ON GROUND OF HIS CHOOSING. ON THE OTHER : ·.' . ., :·: ..;. ·,.-..·:; ,,_· ·· ", -.:"· 1 i. HAND, HE HAS MADE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO GET INTO DANANG. HE .'·'. : ;.: ~ .: ~ ..: ~·" • ,: .·~ · 1 •· FOUGHT HARD AT DANANG AND HAD .AROUND .1200 KILLED IN ACTION '. '. f~·· ''.'.",' ·:.:.·.-.·.,. ·.:I THE RE• , . ,. r . . : : ' • . -: t I ' ·, "' I w • • ~ 1 , I C. '~E HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DISLOCATE HIS PLANS. HE HAD A -: 1 / '. •• '.•. ~ -.' • , • ~ •• I llAJOR ATTACK PLANNED FOR THE DNZ AND THE TRI-THIEN AREA · ; . ' . . . :­ ' I; ~ l "" ON 2 6-27 AUGUST. HE COULD NOT GET IT OFF. HIS DANANG FAILURE · · '. . · 1 >.. ' · PLP.S FORCED HIH TO SHIFT THE 21ST REGIMENT OF THE 2D NVA .. 1 ... : .,.~:' "/ • 1 DI VISION NORTH TO REINFORCE HIS FRONT 4 UNITS. ON THE WAY.· ,·1• • • •• • • ••••~. ~~ORTH THIS REG I~lENT GOT ENTANGLED IN THE FIGHTING WEST or ...~,· : ·;,' . ... ' /TAC KY AND TOOK AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF CASUALTIES. WE I: ·;I .... Kr' OU THAT THE ENEMY HAS HAD TO POSTPONE PLANNED ATTACKS · , ~ .... IN THE DEL.TA AT CAI LAI AND CAN THO. HE HAS LOST OVER 600 ...~:: \ . '! KIA AT DUG LAP t!ITHOUT ATTRACTING A SINGLE FRIENDLY UNIT ....... , .. . ' rno:1 T HE DEFENSE OF BAN ME THOUT. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE"·.-...:~ ...:.. .·.. ' . ~ ORCHESTRATION OF HIS EFFORTS AROUND SAIGON HAVE BEEN .. ~/; .~: .:;:,· · · ". r TI-:ROUN OFF IN TIMING AND RESULTS REQUIRING HIM TO MAKE :~ ,..~·., . · r SIGNIFICANT ADJUSTMENTS TO HIS PLANS. VE HAVE A REPORT ··'-.' .·· ., ', -~ • . · . . , .. ! FR0t1 A VERY RELIABLE PENETRANT AGENT THAT HIGH RANKING ,~ ~·.-. ·~ .t: _'. ' · . ! . CADRZ FROt·l HIS SUB-REGION HEADQUARTERS LEFT ON· 18 AUGUST : '.ir·• ·.'·. ·.. • · ; TO ATTEND A MEETING . AT COSVN. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING "'_;:: 1 : : ; , : • ~ UAS TO RECEIVE ORDERS FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE THIRD .~...:i:~. ..........-='~::.:.-... J.~·-·.. ·• ··-1. • ~ ;, . O~FENSIVE. THIS SAME AGENT STATED. THAT THE. ATTACK ON .'·--;,?·,\ ... .:..·~ -·.:·-. . . · " ' ·· l SA IGOU HAD BEEN POSTPONED AND TKAT· THE· CADRE. WHO·HAD ..:..:·.._ ,'.> ;1·', '.., • «.--, ' ; GONE TO COSVN HAD. NOTj .RETURNED' BY.. '29 AUGUST•.:,·.:",'.· /~· 1·: ••• ::·. :",,::~\ f I : • ' • • 4 I a \., > . • f ~ , .• 1 I ' ' I\ .... 'It I ~ •.. f 1 :t' ~ ': '! '' .. 1' • If'\ { ~\. • l .~ \. ':--f 1\ ' ! .~ t • • t .. ( 'lo ' • ·~ ""... .. ..... ......,._..,. _4'......,. ... .. .,.......,. t ,_;.~~~ 1 ...~,~~~-,..J~~~"·' • .,.,, -....., ifu·+th )4'c ... . . , a ·\·.. rt.. • a .... ..,... D. GENERALLY, THE RVNAF HAVE PERFORMED COMPETENTLY, AND IN SOME CASES, WITH DISTINCTION. THE FRIENDLY OPERATION AT DUC LAP, TO GIVE JUST ONE EXAMPLE, WAS FIRST RATE. RVNAF MORALE IS GOOD, AND ITS CONFIDENCE IS HIGH. ARVN OPERATIONS SINCE JUNE IN THE DELTA HAVE BEEN MOST SUCCESSFUL. THEY I • HAVE KEPT THE ENEMY•s CAPABILITY THERE ON A DECLINING CURVE • . OUR PREEMPTIONS ARE PERHAPS FORCING THE ENEMY TO RECONSIDER HIS CONCEPT FOR THE THIRD OFFENSIVE. IF so, IT SEEMS TO US HE HAS THREE BASIC COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO . HIM. FIRST, HE CAN CARRY FORWARD HIS THIRD OFFENSIVE, .. I ', , LAUNCHING MAJOR ATTACKS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY EITHER SIMULTANEOUSLY OR IN IMMEDIATE TANDEM. SECOND, HE CAN . I • 1• DELAY THE INITIATION OF MAJOR ATTACKS, CREATING ANOTHER· ' ' . "LULL PERIOD", CONCENTRATING HIS EFFORTS AGAINST SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS AND DISTRICT AND PROVINCE CAPITALS, AND , STRETCHING-OUT HIS OFFENSIVE. THIRD, HE CAN CANCEL THE .. THI RD OFFENSIVE. I BELIEVE HE WOULD PREFER TO ADOPT THE . FIRST COURSE OF ACTION. OUR PREErrlPTIONS, HOWEVER, ARE 1, . · i.. GIVI NG HIH r1AJOR PROBLEMS, AND MAY DRIVE HIM INTO THE .;_' . . . ., SECOND COURSE OF ACTION -THE STRETCH OUT. AS OUR FRIEND• ... .. , • LY OPERATIONS CONTINUE, \llE AIM TO SO DISLOCATE HIS . -; I. . •I l. PLANS THAT HE ~ILL CALL OFF THE THIRD OFFENSIVE ·JUST AS HE ...'·,, . r . CANCELLED THE SECOND. OFFENSIVE ON 14 JUNE 68. . .· . .. · · ... ·· .. J ''· THERE IS TO MY MIND ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WHICH WE. SHOULD .. ~ · CONTEMPLATE. AT SO~lE . POINT IN THIS THIRD OFFENSIVE THE ' ENEMY MAY ACCEPT THE FUTILITY OF HIS BLOODY ATTACKS AND ~ THE STERILITY OF THE OFFENSIVE l'1AIN FORCE WAR STRATEGY HE · -..: ·\ ,j HAD ADOPT ED FOR 68. AT THAT POINT, WHILE HE ~TILL HAS SIZ·~ ·...·" .. ·· ABLE FORCES AS BARGAINING POINTS, HE MAY ASK FOR A ":·: .... i CEASEFIRE OR SOME SIMILAR PLOY. IF THIS SHOULD OCCUR, I ··:~;. .~.. .. , ·. i': THINK IT ESSENTIAL THAT t/E REALIZE THAT THE ENEMY IS ··· ·,·.'. ".,,-. :; , ! '. , . • DE AL ING FR OM A POSIT ION OF MIL IT ARY WE AK NESS, WHILE VE ·:· -; .-;:· ·t ••• .. ~. · : ·: '·., .,. / • . 1:i -ARE IN A POSITION OF MILITARY SfRENGTH AND GROWING. . . ·:, 1 . •• ·.'·, . • ·~ ., • • . . , ,/ / .. a • •