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The Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces

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THE SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet and East European general purpose forces through mid-1969, and to estimate general trends in those forces over the next 10 years.[1]

CONCLUSIONS

A. The European orientation of the Soviet general purpose forces will almost certainly persist for the foreseeable future. The Soviets, however, almost certainly are now less concerned than they once were with both the possibility of war with NATO and the strength of the NATO general purpose forces in Europe. At the same time they are showing increased concern regarding their military posture vis-a-vis China.

B. We estimate that the USSR now has 46 combat ready divisions, of which 22 are in East Germany and Poland and 24 are in the USSR. An additional 55 reduced strength divisions in the USSR and four in Hungary could probably be made ready to move out in a week or two. There are also in the USSR some 39 cadre divisions which could be made ready for limited use about 6 weeks after mobilization.

C. There are some 22 combat ready East German, Polish, and Czech divisions; 4–7 Polish and Czech divisions which would probably be made ready to move out in a week or two; and 6–9 Polish and Czech divisions which would take 3 weeks or more to be made ready for use.

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[1] Previous estimates in this series have included a Section on "Capabilities Against the Central Region of NATO." That Section has been omitted from this Estimate because an interagency task group is now engaged in reassessing Soviet capabilities to reinforce the Warsaw Pact forces opposite the Central Region. We plan to issue in February 1968 a Supplement to this Estimate covering Warsaw Pact general purpose force capabilities against the Central Region of NATO.

D. In the southern part of Eastern Europe there are 14 combat ready Hungarian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian divisions; seven other divisions that could probably be made ready to move out in a week or two; and six divisions which would take 3 weeks or more to be made ready for use. Even at full strength, none of these Hungarian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian divisions would be comparable to Soviet or "northern tier" divisions in military effectiveness.

E. We believe that the Soviet and East European ground forces will be maintained at about their present size and composition for several years. Over the longer term we expect to see a trend toward the increased provision of both divisional and nondivisional combat and service support, and perhaps toward a smaller number of divisions. For 1977 we project some 100 Soviet divisions capable of early commitment, as compared with the present 105, and some 20–30 cadre divisions, as compared with the present 39.

F. The modernization of Soviet Tactical Aviation has continued. In the fighter regiments designed primarily for air defense, nearly all of the older aircraft have been replaced by late model Mig-21 all-weather interceptors; more than half of the ground attack regiments are now at least partly equipped with the SU-7 fighter-bomber. Yak-28 light bombers have replaced IL-28s in half of the bomber regiments. There are now about 3,250 combat aircraft in Soviet Tactical Aviation, about 2,000 of them in the six tactical air armies stationed in Eastern Europe and the adjacent military districts of the USSR. In addition, there are more than 2,500 combat aircraft in the East European air forces, but three-fourths of them are older model fighters and light bombers.

G. The modernization of Soviet and East European Tactical Aviation will almost certainly continue. With the introduction of more complex, costly, and capable aircraft, the capabilities of Soviet Tactical Aviation will increase even though its numerical strength may decline somewhat to some 2,600–3,200 aircraft by 1977.

H. The Soviets are well on their way toward developing a large, modern Navy as an instrument for the projection of national power. The main responsibility for action against naval task forces is being assumed by cruise-missile submarines and missile-armed aircraft. The emphasis in new surface ships is on air defense and antisubmarine warfare (ASW). The first units of a new class of nuclear-powered

torpedo-attack submarine and the first of two new helicopter carriers are about to enter service; both of these programs may be intended for ASW, although the carrier could have other roles such as amphibious assault. In addition, we believe that a new long-range ASW patrol plane will soon be operational. These new platforms together with new sensors, ASW weapons, and increased training should improve Soviet ASW capabilities in the ocean approaches to the USSR, but we continue to believe that Soviet capabilities against submarines in the open ocean will remain severely limited for the next several years.

I. Soviet airborne and amphibious forces continue to be designed primarily to support continental operations. The Soviets are developing forces which, over the longer term, will significantly improve their ability to support their political interests in other parts of the world, but we doubt that they intend to develop a capability to engage in distant limited warfare with a major power. As a matter of policy, they prefer to seek their ends in distant areas through the support of indigenous forces.

DISCUSSION

I. GENERAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS [2]

1. Historically, the Soviet general purpose forces have been developed and disposed primarily to cope with a military threat from Europe—in the postwar era, from NATO. This European orientation will almost certainly persist for the foreseeable future. For political reasons, at least, the Soviets will wish to maintain a credible potential threat against Western Europe. Almost certainly, however, they are now less concerned than they once were with both the possibility of a war with NATO and the strength of the NATO general purpose forces in Europe. At the same time they are showing increased concern regarding their military posture vis-a-vis China and a growing interest in military capabilities to support their political interests in other parts of the world.

2. The Soviets once considered it axiomatic that any armed conflict between nuclear powers would automatically escalate into nuclear general war. Almost certainly they still consider it imprudent to incur any serious risk of such a development—they still take care to avoid direct military confrontation with the US—but in recent years Soviet military authorities have increasingly accepted the idea that a nonnuclear or even a limited nuclear conflict between nuclear powers is possible. This change in attitude no doubt reflects both increasing confidence in the deterrent value of their strategic forces and increasing appreciation of the applicability of the concept of flexible response.

3. Despite the boast of one Soviet marshal that the Soviet ground forces could overrun Europe within 60-90 days, in a nonnuclear as well as a nuclear war, it is highly unlikely that the Soviets have any such general offensive in mind when they speak of the possibility of conventional warfare between nuclear powers. Almost certainly they would fear that such a conventional attack would precipitate nuclear general war. But evidently they are now willing to consider the possibility of a limited nonnuclear engagement of short duration in Europe.[3]

4. The Soviets almost certainly consider that the likelihood of any kind of war with NATO has been greatly reduced by the prevailing political mood in West-

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[2] See also NIE 11-4-67, "Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy," dated 20 July 1967, SECRET.

[3] Maj. Gen. Wesley C. Franklin, the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army, believes that the Soviets are not only prepared to fight a major nonnuclear war, but consider this to be an active possibility. As NIE 11-14-63 said, "They realize the advantages to them if an engagement in the European theater can be kept nonnuclear, and the Soviet objective in such a conflict would be to prevent escalation." With the increasing nuclear stalemate, the possibility of future war, to be fought at the nonnuclear level grows. This will not necessarily be small scale or local, any more than nuclear warfare would be. Pact exercises have generally begun at a nonnuclear level and after NATO forces were stopped conventionally, NATO not the Pact, initiated nuclear war. NIE 11-4-67 states, "In authoritative Soviet writings . . . the view is advanced that Soviet Armed Forces should be prepared to meet all kinds of emergencies up to and including large-scale conventional conflicts . . ."

ern Europe. They are unlikely to adopt in Europe an attitude so aggressive that it would reverse this favorable trend and rally NATO. At the same time, the Soviets almost certainly consider that the capabilities of NATO to sustain a conventional conflict have been substantially reduced by the withdrawal of the French forces from NATO command, the disruption of the elaborate NATO infrastructure, and the prospective reductions of British, German, and US forces. In these circumstances, they may eventually find it convenient to reduce their own forces in Germany, but as yet they have made no move in that direction. It is unlikely that they will do so as long as the war continues in Vietnam.

5. Since early 1963 Soviet strength along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia has been gradually augmented. Some acceleration of this process has been noted in the past year. The cumulative effect over the past 4 years has been to raise the combat readiness of Soviet military forces already in the area and to augment them by four or five divisions and one tactical air regiment. During the past year, Soviet combat troops (probably elements of one or two divisions) have joined the military advisers, technicians, and construction units already stationed in Mongolia. Air defenses near the border are also being strengthened, and the Soviet military intelligence collection effort against China has been sharply increased. We regard these developments as primarily precautionary in nature. We doubt that the Soviets expect to become involved in a large-scale war with China in the near future. They are probably apprehensive, however, about the longer term prospects for the growth of China's military power.

6. The USSR is disposed to demand recognition as a power whose views must be taken into account in any part of the world. Soviet military spokesmen now emphasize that the Soviet Armed Forces should be prepared to meet all kinds of contingencies, an idea more inclusive than a simple distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear warfare. The commander in chief of the Soviet Navy has put it in terms including support of "state interests at sea in peacetime." So far, however, the only military force which has served this purpose is the naval squadron maintained in the Mediterranean; it has served to demonstrate a Soviet presence and interest that had to be taken into account. The Soviets are gradually developing the means to support more distant clients, but we doubt that they intend to develop a capability to engage in distant warfare with a major power. As a matter of policy, they prefer to seek their ends in distant areas through the support of indigenous forces.

7. For many years Soviet expenditures for the general purpose forces were held fairly constant while expenditures for military research and development (R&D) and for the strategic forces increased substantially. Thus the share of total military expenditures allocated to the general purpose forces actually declined. We believe that the strategic forces and related R&D will continue to receive priority consideration. Khrushchev's successors, however, appear less likely to constrain the growth of expenditures for the general purpose forces. Consequently, we believe that actual expenditures for the general purpose forces will grow, but that they will not exceed their present share of total military expenditures (about 30 percent).

8. We estimate that during the past year the personnel strength of the general purpose forces has remained steady at about 2,000,000 men: ground forces, 1,400,000; air forces, 200,000; naval forces, 400,000.[4] We believe that the strength of the general purpose forces will be maintained at about this level for the next several years.

II. GENERAL PURPOSE GROUND FORCES

General Characteristics

9. The present structure of the Soviet ground forces is the result of a reorganization carried out in the late 1950's and early 1960's primarily for the purpose of fitting them to operate in the circumstances of a nuclear general war with NATO. The Soviets then envisaged a rapid advance to seize critical objectives before the NATO forces could recover from the disruption and demoralization caused by Soviet nuclear strikes. Other military considerations were subordinated to the achievement of speed and shock effect. Combat strength was organized into a large number of relatively small tank and motorized rifle divisions. The ratio of tanks to infantry was increased, the provision of conventional artillery was reduced, and supporting firepower was augmented by the provision of nuclear-armed rockets and missiles.

10. The current emphasis of Soviet military writers on the importance of capabilities to wage conventional warfare has had no visible effect on the structure of the ground forces. On the contrary, Soviet military authorities assert that those forces, organized as they were 10 years ago for nuclear warfare, have superior capabilities for conventional warfare as well. Their inherent capabilities for such warfare are indeed substantial, but the effectiveness of their supporting rockets and missiles would be greatly reduced by the use of conventional warheads, and the reduced provision of infantry, conventional artillery, and service support would be a considerable handicap in any long-sustained conventional conflict. The Soviets may reckon that any conventional conflict would be local and of short duration, or that if it were prolonged they could bring up more infantry, conventional artillery, and nondivisional support to reinforce the divisions engaged.

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[4] We estimate that the total strength of the Soviet Armed Forces is now about 3.3 million men apportioned approximately as follows:

General Purpose Forces	2,000,000
Strategic Defense Forces	450,000
Strategic Attack Forces	300,000
Command and General Support	550,000

The increase over the estimate in NIE 11-14-66, "Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces," dated 3 November 1966, SECRET, is in Strategic Defense and Command and General Support.

These figures do not include some 225,000 men in militarized security forces not subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and an unknown number of civilians (probably between 500,000 and 1,000,000) employed in the military establishment.

Types, Categories, and Numbers of Line Divisions [5]

11. There are three types of Soviet line divisions: motorized rifle, tank, and airborne.[6] We estimate the table of organization (TO) strength of a motorized rifle division to be 10,600 men; of a tank division, 8,300; of a heavy tank division, 6,700; and of an airborne division, 7,300.

12. Soviet military writings indicate that Soviet military units are maintained at three levels of readiness. Those of the first "operational echelon" are described as being "in a full state of readiness for immediate operations;" those of the second echelon, as capable of being made "ready to proceed to areas of concentration in several days;" those of the third echelon, as being capable of use "only several weeks after the beginning of full mobilization." Units of the second echelon are also described as being at "reduced strength;" units of the third, as "cadre" organizations. These terms, of course, reflect a Soviet concept which may or may not be fulfilled in actuality.

13. For convenience, we describe Soviet divisions as being in Categories I, II, or III, according to our estimate of their level of readiness. We have defined Category I as being composed of divisions maintained at or near full strength and readiness in peacetime; Category II, as being composed of divisions capable of being made ready to move out in a week or two; and Category III as being composed of cadre organizations which could be made ready for limited use about 6 weeks after mobilization.

14. Hitherto we have estimated that all divisions in Categories I and II had a full set of equipment on hand or immediately available. It now appears that this may not be true of many divisions in the USSR, but we are as yet unable to determine with confidence the actual extent of the shortages that may exist. We believe that all Category I and II divisions do have on hand a substantially full set of combat equipment (tanks, artillery, etc.), but that many Category II divisions are short of wheeled vehicles. If need be, these shortages could probably be made up, for the most part, by requisitioning general purpose trucks and engineering equipment from designated sources in the civil economy. That is a stated Soviet intention with respect to nondivisional service support units, but we have not seen the idea applied to organic elements of a division. A division thus equipped could certainly fight. Its availability would be delayed for a short period of mobilization, and it would probably not be as well equipped as we have hitherto supposed that it would be.

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[5] For the estimated number of Soviet line divisions by geographical area, category of readiness, and type, see Table I.

[6] Motorized rifle divisions have three motorized rifle regiments and one tank regiment as maneuver elements; each motorized rifle regiment has an organic tank battalion equipped with medium tanks. There are two types of tank divisions: medium (with three medium tank regiments and a motorized rifle regiment), and heavy (with two heavy and one medium tank regiments, each with a motorized rifle company). Airborne divisions are similar in structure to motorized rifle divisions, but are considerably smaller, having fewer and smaller caliber artillery pieces and no tanks.

15. The 22 Soviet divisions in East Germany and Poland are probably maintained at 90 percent of TO strength or better, and are correspondingly equipped—that is, they are definitely Category I divisions by our definition. Some 24 other divisions in the USSR could also be regarded as Category I. Although probably less ready than the divisions in East Germany, they could probably be made ready to move out in very short order, without detection by Western intelligence. Seven of these are airborne divisions; they are probably much more lightly equipped than we have hitherto supposed. We now estimate that there are 55 Category II divisions in the USSR and four in Hungary. They are at "reduced strength," but within "several days" they could probably be filled up with recently trained reservists. Some of these divisions might be made ready to move out in a week, others might take 2 weeks.

16. We estimate that there are 39 divisions in Category III, but the number may be as low as 33 or as high as 45. This range reflects uncertainty as to whether all of the entities counted are in fact divisions. These units are manned at only 10-30 percent of TO. We believe that full sets of tanks, artillery pieces, and other arms are available for them, but that much of this equipment is composed of superseded models. Most of their personnel and service support equipment would have to be mobilized.

Armies and Fronts

17. There are 19 Soviet ground armies, 10 corps, and a "group of forces" each in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. A Soviet corps is not an intermediate echelon between division and army, but is rather a small special-purpose army. Most Soviet divisions are subordinate to these higher echelons, but 28 divisions (not counting those in Category III) are directly subordinate to military district (MD) headquarters or are of undetermined subordination. Finally, the seven airborne divisions are centrally controlled by a directorate in Moscow.

18. The Soviets maintain two types of ground armies, the divisional composition of which varies according to their mission, the terrain, and the opposing force. The combined-arms army (CAA) usually consists of two to four motorized rifle divisions and one tank division, plus nondivisional combat support and service support troops. At present the three CAAs in the Soviet Group of Forces, Germany (GSFG) have three or four divisions and from 37,000 to 49,000 men. A tank army may consist of three or four tank divisions, and sometimes a motorized rifle division. The two tank armies in the GSFG currently have five divisions each—three tank divisions, a heavy tank division, and a motorized rifle division—and each contains about 50,000 men.

19. In the event of war most Soviet armies would be grouped into *fronts*. The GSFG, with its two tank armies, three CAAs, and tactical air army (TAA), is a virtual wartime *front* in being. *Front* level ground units in the GSFG include more than 13,000 men in combat support and 41,000 in service support and

headquarters units. In the event of war, designated MDs probably would provide the basis for the creation of additional *fronts.*

20. Nondivisional support units for the Soviet divisions in East Germany and Poland are believed to be at or near full strength. We estimate, however, that most army and *front* level combat and service support units located elsewhere are manned at reduced strength in peacetime and that some may be only paper organizations. Soviet planning calls for service support units to be drawn in part from various state-owned civilian service organizations on the outbreak of hostilities.

Land Armaments

21. *Tactical Missiles and Rockets.* Soviet capabilities for nuclear warfare have been enhanced over the past few years by an increase in the number of tactical missile and rocket launchers allocated to the ground forces. These weapons are available at division, army, and *front* level, and can deliver nuclear, chemical, and high explosive warheads. The effectiveness of the latter would be limited, however, by the relative inaccuracy of these weapon systems. In general nuclear war these tactical weapon systems would probably be supplemented by medium- and intermediate-range missiles of the Strategic Rocket Forces; these would be directed against strategic targets of importance to theater forces and some would probably be used specifically in support of theater operations.

22. Allocation of tactical missiles and rockets does not appear to be uniform throughout the USSR or within any one category of divisions. Although some Category I divisions may have four Frog launchers, most Category I and II divisions (except airborne) have three. Some of the Category III divisions have two Frog launchers. The recent sighting at the Moscow air show of three Frog launchers loaded aboard an AN-22 transport aircraft and bearing airborne emblems suggests that Frog may be assigned to Soviet airborne divisions. We estimate that there are up to 70 Frog launchers in the GSFG.

23. A new Frog system (Frog-7) is being deployed with Soviet and some East European forces. The wheeled launch vehicle on which it is mounted has better range and road mobility than the earlier tracked models, and the rocket itself probably has greater range (up to 48 n.m.) and shorter reaction time.

24. Many of the brigades of 160 n.m. Scud ballistic missiles which support ground armies throughout the Soviet ground forces have been significantly augmented during the past 3 years by the addition of a third battalion, making a total of nine launchers per brigade. We estimate that there are about 55 Scud launchers in GSFG. In addition, we believe that there is in GSFG a surface-to-surface cruise missile which may be the 60 n.m. Salish (a modification of the Kennel air-to-surface cruise missile). We do not know, however, the extent to which this weapon system has been deployed.

25. The Scud, the only tactical ballistic missile known to be deployed with Soviet forces in East Germany, has too short a range to support *front* operations throughout the entire depth of the battle zone. A 300 n.m. cruise missile, probably a variant of the Shaddock, has been developed and could be employed in *front* operations; we do not know the extent of its deployment, however. In addition, the Soviets may be deploying the recently developed 450 n.m. SS-12 ballistic missile with *front* forces to extend missile coverage to the full extent of the battle zone.

26. *Other Land Armaments.* The issuance of major items of new land armament usually takes place very gradually over a period of 5 or even 10 years. After 6 years of production, the new T-62 medium tank is found in no more than regimental strength in any division. It is still being deployed in the USSR, but in the GSFG its deployment has apparently ceased after issuance to only about 40 of the 160 tank battalions, which suggests that it is intended as a supplementary rather than replacement vehicle. New model armored personnel carriers (APCs) continue to appear in the GSFG and include all known versions of the eight-wheeled BTR60p. A new 40-round, 115 mm multiple rocket launcher is now in some motorized rifle divisions, and a new 122 mm howitzer has been widely distributed in motorized rifle divisions and in some tank divisions.

Ground Force Training

27. The Soviets do not maintain a large separate basic training establishment. Conscripts are assigned directly to units, are trained almost entirely within those units, and normally remain there for their entire tour of duty. Individual and unit level training is extensive, and professional competence within the officer corps is high. Training is affected, however, by a desire to conserve funds and to avoid wear and tear on the most up-to-date equipment.

28. Hitherto Soviet conscripts have been drafted for a 3-year tour of active duty. The one-third turnover each autumn has caused some drop in combat efficiency from November through April. It has now been announced that the term of service will be reduced to 2 years, with two call-ups each year, in May-June and November-December. This change was probably made by the political leadership for political rather than military reasons. The loss of the third-year men will result in some reduction in overall efficiency. The extra call-up each year will moderate the midwinter decline, but the new system will reduce the level of efficiency previously attained in midsummer.

29. The increasing technical complexity of modern weapons has led the Soviets to make some efforts to induce technically trained enlisted personnel to reenlist, but the inducements offered hitherto have not been such as to ensure a high reenlistment rate. This restraint and the reduction of the term of service suggest that the Soviets are still more interested in maintaining a large mobilization base than in expanding the professional enlisted cadre.

Mobilization Base

30. The Soviets have large numbers of trained reservists who could be used to fill out existing understrength army units or to mobilize new units. The reservists initially called up would be men who had recently completed a 3-year tour in the service. About a million of these reservists would probably be required to fill the current force of about 145 divisions to wartime strength; this would involve fleshing out existing units and mobilizing a large number of additional combat and service support units for armies and *fronts,* as well as providing a proportionate number to man the ground elements of command and general support.

31. The Soviets almost certainly have on hand sufficient stocks of tanks, artillery pieces, and other arms to equip 145 divisions, although the equipment of this sort provided for Category III divisions almost certainly consists mainly of superseded models. The Category III divisions probably do not have sufficient stocks of other equipment; motor transport and engineer items would have to be mobilized in large part from civilian resources.

32. The Soviets have sufficient manpower reserves to field additional divisions, but equipment limitations would almost certainly preclude the formation of anything more than rifle divisions lightly equipped with obsolete or substitute items. In view of the existing structure of their theater forces and of what we know about their concepts and material stocks, we believe that the Soviets would place initial stress on filling out and providing support for their existing units rather than on attempts to create new ones.

Trends to 1977

33. We believe that over the longer term greater attention will be given to the increased provision of both divisional and nondivisional combat and service support units in being. This augmentation of major unit strength may be accompanied by some reduction in the number of divisions. We project about 100 Category I and II divisions in 1977 as compared with the present 105.

34. The cost of maintaining Category III cadre strength divisions is considerable, and they could not be employed in a war of short duration, nuclear or nonnuclear. Soviet experience and doctrine, however, both teach that wars are won by the side with the stronger reserves. We believe that the Soviets will continue to favor maintaining a large number of Category III divisions. Economic and other considerations, however, may result in a decrease to about 30 or perhaps as few as 20 of these cadre units.

35. In numbers of men and equipment, the Western Theater will continue to have priority, but the forces opposite China will probably continue to be strengthened. Improvement in Soviet armored combat strength will probably focus on the medium tank; by 1977 assault guns and heavy tanks will probably have been phased out. Tactical mobility will be improved through the increased use of helicopters and amphibious and air-transportable vehicles.

III. TACTICAL AVIATION AND THEATER AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Tactical Aviation [7]

36. The mission of Soviet Tactical Aviation (which the Soviets call "Aviation of the Front") is to support the ground forces. Each wartime *front* would normally include an integral TAA. The fighter regiments are trained for both air defense and ground attack, but are normally designated for one role or the other. In addition, some of the medium bombers of Soviet Long Range Aviation would probably be employed to supplement Tactical Aviation in support of theater operations.

37. The 13 Soviet TAAs vary greatly in size and composition. By far the largest is that in the GSFG, which has nearly 800 aircraft. The six TAAs in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary, and the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian MDs, contain two-thirds of all the aircraft in Tactical Aviation.

38. We estimate that some 3,250 combat aircraft are now assigned to the operational units of Tactical Aviation.[8] About 2,450 are jet fighters assigned to 65 fighter regiments; nearly 350 are light bombers assigned to 10 bomber regiments; more than 450 are aircraft of various types assigned to reconnaissance units. In addition, there are about 500 older fighters and light bombers co-located with units of Tactical Aviation.

39. The Soviets have retained also a reserve of some 2,250 old model aircraft that could be used as replacements or as a basis for the formation of additional units. We know of no organized air reserve units, however. Tactical Aviation is predominantly a professional force; consequently the number of trained reservists available is likely to be quite limited.

40. Most Soviet tactical fighters were designed as interceptors; their capabilities as fighter bombers are limited by their consequently small payload capacity and short range. Pursuant to a continuing modernization program, nearly all of the older aircraft in the air defense fighter regiments have now been replaced by late model Mig-21 (Fishbed) all-weather interceptors. More than half of the ground attack regiments are now at least partially equipped with the SU-7 (Fitter) fighter bomber. Yak-28 (Brewer) light jet bombers have replaced IL-28s (Beagles) in half of the bomber regiments.

Theater Air Defense

41. Soviet theater air defense is dependent mainly on Tactical Aviation, although surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) play a vital role. Tactical air capabilities are continuing to improve; as noted above,

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[7] For the estimated number and deployment of Soviet tactical aircraft, see Table II.

[8] In addition, nearly 3,500 fighters in the Soviet Air Force are assigned to Fighter Aviation of the Home Air Defense Forces.

most fighter air defense regiments are now fully equipped with late model Mig-21 interceptors. An air defense control system with semiautomatic features has been deployed within the Warsaw Pact area. Within East Germany efforts are being made to improve this system so as to provide better coordination between SAM and fighter defenses.

42. We estimate that Soviet theater forces are equipped with some 400-600 SA-2 missile launchers, most of them in SAM units assigned to the defense of field armies and higher headquarters. This missile system is vulnerable to low-altitude tactics, susceptible to electronic jamming, and not very mobile. The Soviets may have begun to deploy the SA-3 missile system with their forces in East Germany to help reduce the first two of these deficiencies. We believe the Soviets are also deploying the new vehicle-mounted SA-4 (Ganef) to provide mobile SAM coverage for field troops, although positive evidence of deployment is lacking. The SA-2 probably will be retained in the field forces for defense of rear area headquarters and other installations which move only infrequently.

43. Automatic AAA continues to be the main reliance for low-altitude defense, and for protection of rapidly moving troops in the absence of fighter cover. The latest development in AAA is the radar-controlled, quad-mounted 23 mm weapon observed in various military parades; it has not yet been identified in troop units, however. The appearance of a new, vehicle-mounted, "low-altitude" SAM system in the 7 November parade in Moscow is indicative of a continuing Soviet effort to improve theater force defenses against the low altitude air threat. We have no evidence of the development of a system to counter tactical ballistic missiles.

Trends to 1977

44. Concern for contingencies short of general nuclear war will affect both the number and the type of aircraft in Tactical Aviation. Considerable effort will probably be devoted to the development of more versatile aircraft. The Soviets have developed a new twin jet fighter (Foxbat) which we estimate will become operational in interceptor, attack, and reconnaissance roles. We believe that its deployment in Tactical Aviation will begin within the next 2 years. About 1972, we expect the Soviets to begin deployment of a new tactical fighter which is likely to be equipped with variable-geometry wings. A fighter capable of short takeoff and landing may also be deployed in the early 1970's.

45. With the advent of more complex, capable, and costly aircraft, the capabilities of Tactical Aviation will increase, even though its numerical strength may decline somewhat. We estimate that by 1977 the number of aircraft in operational units will fall within the range from 2,600 to 3,200. As is the current practice, a large number of older aircraft will probably be retained in reserve as a hedge against any contingency.

IV. GENERAL PURPOSE NAVAL FORCES

46. The Soviet Navy has emerged from its role as a coast defense force and is well on its way to achieving a capability for operations on the high seas. The Soviets are sending their submarines and surface ships farther to sea in increasing numbers and with greater frequency. Construction programs for new types of submarines and surface ships, better equipped for sustained, long-range operations, are underway, and long-range reconnaissance aircraft are being added to the Soviet naval inventory. New tactics and techniques are being developed to make more effective use of modern weapon systems. In addition, the Soviets are using their fleet in support of foreign policy objectives, especially in the Mediterranean area.

Present Forces[9]

47. *Submarines.* The Soviet general purpose submarine force comprises about 270 torpedo attack submarines and some 55 cruise-missile submarines.[10] All of these have both torpedo attack and minelaying capabilities. The cruise-missile submarines are equipped with the SS-N-3 missile. We estimate that the SS-N-3 can be fired to a maximum range of 450 n.m., but that its likely operational range would be on the order of 250 n.m. The cruise-missile submarines have a primary mission against naval ships, especially carrier task forces. They could also be used against land targets, but we believe that the Soviet requirement for such employment is becoming increasingly marginal.

48. Existing types of Soviet nuclear attack submarines can reach speeds up to 24 knots; the missile submarines are somewhat slower. Diving depth capabilities range from a 650-foot normal operating depth for the older diesel-powered units to an estimated 1,000 feet for the E-II and J-classes. Soviet nuclear submarines are noisy, especially at speeds above 10 or 12 knots. Any new class is likely to be somewhat quieter.

49. *Surface Forces.* Traditional surface ship responsibilities against naval task groups are being largely assumed by cruise-missile-equipped submarines and aircraft. Although new combatant surface ships continue to be equipped with surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) for use against naval vessels, the emphasis in current construction and conversion programs is on air defense and antisubmarine warfare (ASW). Twenty SAM-equipped ships are now in service (six of them also equipped with SSMs) and some seven more SAM or SAM/SSM-equipped ships are being added to the fleet each year from current construction and conversion programs. In addition, the first of two new SAM-equipped helicopter carriers is about to enter service. Twelve older ships are equipped with SSMs, but most of these probably will be converted to fire SAMs. In addition to their missile armament, these ships are equipped with antisubmarine systems

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[9] For the estimated number and deployment of Soviet general purpose ships and submarines by type, see Table III.

[10] Soviet ballistic missile submarines are considered as strategic attack forces.

and antiaircraft guns, in some cases dual-purpose guns. Combatant ships not equipped with missiles include 11 cruisers, 53 destroyers, and about 90 escorts. Six additional cruisers, 24 destroyers, and 11 escorts are in reserve status; the time required to make them ready for sea is very uncertain. The navy also has a large number of smaller combatants and auxiliaries, including almost 150 patrol boats equipped with a 22 n.m. cruise missile, about 350 submarine chasers, and some 400 minewarfare vessels, including the first unit of a new class of sea-going minelayer.

50. *Naval Aviation.* The main missions of Soviet Naval Aviation are reconnaissance, strikes against surface ships, and antisubmarine operations. Naval aircraft can also conduct minelaying missions and strikes against harbors and ports. The force is composed of some 825 combat aircraft, of which more than 500 are jet medium bombers. About 200 of these latter aircraft are equipped with the 100 n.m. AS-2 air-to-surface missile (ASM); about 65 carry the 120 n.m. AS-5, although a few of these may still be equipped with the 55 n.m. AS-1. The force also includes about 30 reconnaissance-configured Bear heavy bombers, 60 jet light bombers, 70 seaplanes or amphibian aircraft, and 150 helicopters. Since the navy has no fighter aircraft, surface forces must rely on their own SAM and AAA capabilities, or on air cover provided by shore-based fighters from other services. The light bombers will probably be phased out by 1970. The heavy bomber inventory probably will increase to about 40 by next year, at which time deployment is likely to cease; the primary mission of these aircraft is to carry out reconnaissance missions and to provide target data to cruise-missile-equipped submarines and surface ships.

51. *Coast Defense.* Near the approaches to Soviet naval complexes are some 30 to 40 naval coast defense sites which employ the Samlet (SSC-2b) cruise missile, the effective range of which varies from 25 to 45 n.m. depending on location of the guidance radar. In addition, we believe that a coast defense version of the 300 n.m. Shaddock cruise missile (the SSC-1b) is operational and assigned to the navy. We estimate that at least one Shaddock battalion (four launchers each) is deployed in each of the four fleet areas.

Capabilities Against Carrier Task Forces and Sea Lines of Communications

52. Soviet naval capabilities to combat carrier task forces and to interdict sea lines of communication are based on missile-equipped medium bombers and the world's largest force of submarines. Missile-equipped surface ships serve to back up those forces. The Soviet naval threat to sea communications is greatest in the northeast Atlantic and northwest Pacific. Of the more than 130 torpedo attack and cruise-missile submarines available in the Northern Fleet, we estimate that a third could be maintained continuously on station in the Atlantic approaches to Europe. Patrols by Soviet submarines beyond local operating areas tripled between 1963 and 1966, and in recent months the number of units at sea at any one time has been twice that of the same period a year ago. Much

of the recent increase has been due to stepped-up operations in the Mediterranean in the wake of the Middle East crisis.

53. The Soviets are still hampered by the necessity of operating their submarines at great distances from home bases. Only a relatively small number could be maintained continuously on patrol off the US mainland for any length of time; we estimate this number at about 15 torpedo attack and cruise-missile submarines in the western Atlantic and about half as many off the US west coast. During the past year, however, the Soviets maintained an afloat logistic support station for submarines in the mid-Atlantic for about 5 months. Use of such a support station would allow a considerable increase in the number of submarines which could be maintained on station and would extend the area of patrol activity.

Capabilities Against Submarines

54. Since the mid-1950's the Soviets have made a major effort in the construction of ASW ships, particularly small coastal types. New detection devices and improved ASW ordnance have appeared, and ASW training has been increasingly emphasized. Despite their concern with the threat from Polaris submarines, however, evidence of Soviet progress toward developing a capability specifically against Polaris submarines remains largely limited to the almost continuous presence of intelligence collection ships off the approaches to Polaris bases since the mid-1960's.

55. We believe that at present the Soviet ability to search for, detect, and identify submerged submarines in the open ocean is extremely limited. Detection potential significantly increases within coastal areas contiguous to major Soviet naval bases. Soviet capabilities to identify and destroy diesel-powered submarines detected within range of an ASW platform are considered good; those against nuclear submarines, poor. We believe that the Soviets will continue to deploy new and improved ASW detection equipment and weapons systems. Present Soviet fixed underwater surveillance systems have a very limited range and detection capability, and are intended for inshore defense. We believe, however, that they are attempting to develop a new, longer range system. With better afloat logistics, ASW surface units will extend their patrols farther seaward and the overall effectiveness of such units probably will improve with experience.

56. We do not yet know the reason for the current Soviet venture into the construction of helicopter-carriers, but one mission could be to carry ASW-configured helicopters.[11] If this is the case, the carriers may be intended to operate with the new Kresta-class guided missile ships, each of which is equipped with a helicopter hangar and modern ASW weapons. The most effective weapon system the Soviets could employ against an enemy submarine, however, probably is another submarine. A new class of nuclear-powered torpedo attack submarine

[11] Another possible mission is discussed under sealift and amphibious assault.

now under construction may be intended for ASW; the first units will probably become operational by mid-1968. In addition, we estimate that a new long-range shore-based ASW patrol plane will become operational by 1970. Production and effective utilization of these new ships, submarines, and aircraft in coordinated ASW operations would improve Soviet antisubmarine capabilities in the ocean approaches to the USSR. Despite these potential improvements, however, we believe that the capabilities of the Soviet Navy to conduct ASW operations in the open ocean will remain severely limited for the next several years.

Capabilities for Sustaining Long-Range Operations

57. Some time ago the Soviets began to develop a system of mobile submarine support bases consisting of groups of auxiliary ships which could be deployed to dispersed coastal locations. More recently they have employed a system of naval auxiliaries and merchant ships to support a naval force in the Mediterranean and submarines in the mid-Atlantic. With their present resources, the Soviets can support limited naval operations on the high seas for extended periods of time, or larger operations for a few weeks. Support capabilities are being improved by the introduction of new types of auxiliaries as well as by improved techniques. Any major increase in long-range operations would require augmentation of existing auxiliary forces, not only with oilers and cargo ships from the merchant fleet, but also with ships designed to provide specialized technical support to naval forces at sea.

Trends to 1977

58. We believe the Soviets intend to increase substantially their capabilities to conduct ASW and sustained long-range naval operations. The present emphasis on air defense in the surface forces will enhance the Soviet capability to conduct wartime naval operations beyond the radius of shore-based fighter cover. The major combatants now entering the fleet have good sea-keeping and ASW capabilities. Present major surface ship construction and conversion programs will continue at least until 1970, and we estimate that about 60 SAM-equipped ships (including 15-18 units also equipped with SSMs) will be in service by mid-1972. Another new class of missile ship may be introduced about that time. Some additional SAM-equipped helicopter carriers may be built, but we have no evidence of further construction. Logistic capabilities will probably be expanded by the steady construction of auxiliary ships throughout the period of the estimate.

59. Construction of F-class diesel attack submarines probably will end shortly, if it has not already ended, and the emphasis in new attack submarine programs will probably be on nuclear propulsion and improved ASW capabilities. We believe that the rate of nuclear submarine construction will increase sharply and reach some 10 to 15 units per year by the early 1970's. The addition of new

attack submarines to the order-of-battle will be more than offset by the retirement of the numerous medium-range units. As a result, the number of torpedo attack submarines will decline by about 25 percent by 1977, but the proportion of nuclear and long-range diesel units probably will increase from less than a third of the current force to nearly two-thirds of the approximately 210 torpedo attack units estimated for that period; of these, some 45 to 60 will probably be new units. We believe ASW capabilities will also be enhanced by the introduction of a new ASW helicopter and a new long-range patrol plane by 1970.

60. The Soviets are probably approaching their force goal in cruise-missile submarines and we believe that production of these units will end by 1970. A new type of cruise missile with increased range, speed, and reliability may be developed for use in these submarines. A new, ASM-equipped jet medium bomber may also be introduced by the mid-1970's to bolster the navy's anti-carrier capabilities.

V. TACTICAL NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

61. *Nuclear Weapons.* We believe that the number of nuclear weapons allocated to general purpose forces has increased considerably in the past few years. Nuclear weapons in a variety of types and yields are available for delivery by tactical rockets, missiles, aircraft, and perhaps a limited number of torpedoes. The Soviet system of command and control over nuclear weapons appears well designed to reserve to the national leadership the decision to initiate the use of these weapons. For reasons of tactical readiness and logistical efficiency, we would expect tactical nuclear weapons to be stored in some GSFG depots, but as yet we have firmly identified nuclear storage sites only in the USSR.

62. *Chemical Weapons.* We believe the Soviets apply the same constraints to the use of toxic chemical warfare (CW) weapons as to the use of nuclear weapons. They would probably authorize the use of CW weapons by theater forces in any situation in which nuclear weapons were employed. The Soviets have an extensive stockpile of various toxic chemical agents and have munitions designed for employment with a variety of tactical ground, air, and naval weapons. We estimate that the Soviet agent stockpile is on the order of 275,000 tons and that it is sufficient to meet the needs of Warsaw Pact forces.

63. *Biological Warfare.* While research continues in the field of offensive biological warfare (BW), most of the Soviet BW effort is directed toward the development of defensive measures. We believe Soviet tactical use of BW to be highly unlikely.

64. *Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defenses.* The Soviets recognize a requirement to be prepared for defense against chemical and biological as well as nuclear weapons in the event of general war, and all elements of Soviet forces stress training for defense against such weapons.

VI. AIR AND SEALIFT

Airlift and Air Assault Capabilities

65. The Soviets continue to add to their military air transport capabilities. There are now more than 800 medium transports assigned to Military Transport Aviation (VTA), of which some 665 are AN-12 Cubs. About 615 of the latter have been allocated to support airborne forces; these could lift the assault elements of one airborne division plus one parachute regiment (about 8,000 men and supporting equipment) to a radius of about 760 n.m. The improved variants of this aircraft, of which there may be some 300, could lift one parachute regiment to a radius of about 1,500 n.m. This limited distant lift capability underlines the importance of the new AN-22 heavy transport which can carry nearly 100,000 pounds of cargo or 300-400 troops to a radius of some 2,800 n.m. or a range of 5,100 n.m. The first of these aircraft should be in service late this year or early next, and we believe that as many as 15 could be operational by mid-1969. With these aircraft the Soviets would be able to airdrop most of the equipment organic to an airborne division or to land heavy equipment such as that assigned to a motorized rifle division. In an emergency, this lift capability could be augmented by other aircraft in VTA or by the nearly 700 medium- and long-range aircraft in the Soviet Civil Air Fleet.

66. In addition to these aircraft, there are some 150 heavy and 500 medium helicopters available to Soviet general purpose forces for either tactical or logistical employment. The most numerous of the heavy helicopters (the MI-6 Hook) can carry 8-9 tons of cargo or 65 troops to a radius of about 150 n.m.

Sealift and Amphibious Assault

67. We estimate that there are about 8,000 men in the Soviet naval infantry, organized into brigade-size units (about 1,500-2,500 men) in each of the four fleet areas. There are probably three infantry battalions and one tank battalion per brigade. The naval infantry's missions are apparently to assist in seizing critical beachheads and to conduct diversionary operations on the seaward flanks of advancing ground forces.

68. The current small number of landing craft limits amphibious operations to battalion or brigade-size landings in each of the fleet areas. New landing ships with greater speed, operating range and capacity are being built, however, and there will probably be a corresponding increase in the size of the naval infantry. In addition, the Soviet's two new helicopter carriers could be utilized in support of vertical assault missions against lightly defended areas.

69. In addition to their military sealift capability, we estimate that the Soviets could, by using their merchant fleet under various loading conditions, move four to eight divisions in the Baltic, Black, or Pacific Fleet areas and two to three divisions in the Northern Fleet area. This lift capacity is being improved by the acquisition of new merchant ships, many of which are characterized by

high speed, long-endurance, large hatches, and heavy boom capacity. Sealift by merchant ships would require the use of ports, however, and could not be adequately protected beyond waters near the USSR.

Trends to 1977

70. Soviet airborne and amphibious assault capabilities are likely to remain oriented toward support of Eurasian operations throughout the period of this estimate. These capabilities will expand markedly during this time, however, with the introduction of very large transport aircraft, continuing expansion of the Soviet merchant fleet, and acquisition of new amphibious ships. Such improvements will not only enable the Soviets quickly and substantially to reinforce key border areas, but will also improve their ability to move military forces to the support of clients in more distant areas. We do not believe that these developments indicate an urgent Soviet program to acquire capabilities for distant military operations against a major power.

VII. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE EAST EUROPEAN FORCES

General Considerations

71. Since about 1960 (that is, since about the time when the Soviets restructured their own ground forces), the USSR has made a special effort to develop the capabilities of the armed forces of its allies in the Warsaw Pact. An evident effect of this program has been to develop capable allied forces already in place in the forward area. In recent years exercises involving both Soviet and East European forces have shown that the Soviets now expect the East European forces to play a substantial role in the event of a war with NATO.

72. Paradoxically, during this same period the East European members of the Warsaw Pact have shown an increasing tendency to assert their national interests in their relations with the USSR. In particular, the USSR has been unable to secure the adoption of an integrated Warsaw Pact command structure which it desired. The Pact would almost certainly prove reliable in circumstances in which its members considered themselves to be threatened, but the USSR could not count on being able to commit its "satellites" to a course of action which they deemed contrary to their national interests. Recently there were signs of strain within the Pact over involvement with the USSR in the Middle East crisis, which was thought by some to incur serious risks without serving any East European national interest.

73. In this connection a distinction should be made between the states of the "northern tier"—East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia—and the others. The northern states share Soviet apprehensions regarding the West German interest in altering the status quo and the consequent possibility of conflict with NATO. Moreover, they are on the main axis of any Soviet operations against the Central Region of NATO and would therefore be involved, whether they wished to be or not. The Soviets have favored them in their East

European rearmament program. Their forces are roughly comparable to those of the USSR in equipment and training.

74. The southern states and their armed forces are in an entirely different class. They do not consider themselves threatened by Germany or NATO and would prefer not to become involved in any German crisis. Rumania is the maverick of the Warsaw Pact; its conduct would be unpredictable in any serious crisis, although the coercion of circumstances might keep it in line. The present governments of Hungary and Bulgaria would be likely to fulfill their Warsaw Pact obligations, but, remembering both the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and the nationalistic military conspiracy in Bulgaria in 1965, the Soviets are not likely to regard the Hungarian and Bulgarian military forces as completely reliable in all circumstances. These considerations, and their distance from the main theater of operations, make it unlikely that the Soviets would plan for the forces of the southern states to do much more than defend their own national territories and air space.

Ground Forces [12]

75. In the "northern tier" there are some 26-29 East European line divisions available for early commitment. These include six East German, nine Polish, and seven Czech divisions that are roughly analogous to Soviet Category I divisions in that they are maintained at or near full strength and readiness in peacetime. One of them is a small Polish airborne division which would be dependent on Soviet resources for combat airlift. There is also a Czech airborne brigade similarly dependent on Soviet airlift. In addition, there are two to five Polish and two Czech divisions that are roughly analogous to Soviet Category II divisions in that they could be made ready to move out in a week or two.

76. In the southern states there are about 21 East European divisions also available for early commitment. These include three Hungarian, five Rumanian, and six Bulgarian divisions roughly analogous to Category I divisions, and two Hungarian, two Rumanian, and three Bulgarian divisions roughly analogous to Category II divisions. Even at full strength, none of these divisions would be comparable in military effectiveness to a Soviet or "northern tier" division. In particular, the motorized rifle divisions lack APCs, the structure of the Rumanian and Bulgarian tank divisions includes one less tank regiment than other East European tank divisions, and there is generally a lower level of support equipment.

77. Most of the 46-49 motorized rifle and tank divisions described above have one organic Frog battalion (two or in some cases three launchers), and each potential East European field army has one Scud brigade (six launchers). We estimate that there are 35-45 Frog battalions and 10-14 Scud brigades in the East European ground forces. During the next few years additional launchers may

[12] For the distribution of East European divisions by country, type, and category, see Table V.

be issued to the Frog battalions and additional Frog and Scud units may be formed.

78. There are 12 to 15 other East European divisions—one to four Polish, five Czech, one Hungarian, two Rumanian, and three Bulgarian—that are inferior to Category II divisions, but considerably more than cadre organizations. They are manned at 40 to 60 percent of their TO and could be filled up with trained reservists in the event of mobilization. Some of these divisions might be made ready for limited use in about 20 days; some others might require 30 days or longer.

Air Forces

79. There have been increasing indications of closer coordination and functional integration between the East European and Soviet Air Forces, particularly in the air defense role. A Soviet air defense control system with semiautomatic features is being deployed within the Warsaw Pact. Further pointing up the stress on air defense, some 170 of the 190 fighters delivered to East European forces during the past year were late model, all-weather Mig-21 interceptors; most of these went to East Germany. Thus East European air forces, particularly those in the "northern tier," are becoming a more effective extension of the Soviet air defense system. Although most fighter units are trained to perform in ground attack missions, most of the aircraft in those units were designed as interceptors; Czechoslovakia and Poland are the only East European countries which have received the SU-7 fighter-bomber, and deliveries of this aircraft have been slower than we expected. The proportion of old model aircraft in East European units remains at about 75 percent of the more than 2,500 combat aircraft now operational.

80. In addition to the 36 SA-2 sites which the Soviets operate in support of their own forces in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary, there are about 130 SA-2 sites in Eastern Europe. The latter have been deployed largely in defense of the capital cities and other key urban-industrial areas. This pattern suggests that 20 to 40 additional sites may be deployed. Defense against low-altitude attacks is provided by light and medium AAA.

Naval Forces

81. East European naval capabilities continue to improve with more operational experience and the acquisition of more modern equipment. As with East European ground and air forces, the "northern tier" naval forces are larger and better equipped. In the Baltic area interfleet coordination has become considerable and the East German and Polish Navies have assumed a larger role in offshore defense and in watching the Danish Straits. In addition, Polish submarines and surface ships have operated both independently and with Soviet units in the North and Norwegian Seas.

Nuclear and Chemical Weapons

82. East European forces are equipped with tactical nuclear delivery systems (Scuds, Frogs, and fighters), but we believe that the nuclear weapons for these systems are under strict Soviet control and would probably remain so even in the event of war. East European forces are also capable of delivering CW agents, and the Czechs and East Germans, at least, have the capability to manufacture such agents. We believe, however, that East European forces would be dependent on the Soviets for most of their chemical munitions in time of war, and that those forces would not employ such agents except upon Soviet direction or authorization.

Trends to 1977

83. We believe that the modernization and improvement of East European forces will continue throughout the period of this estimate. Considerable attention will probably be given to increasing the readiness and equipment levels of combat support units. Improvement will be limited, however, by the reluctance of the East European countries—particularly those in the south—to expend additional resources on their military establishments.

TABLE I

ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET LINE DIVISIONS

	Category I and II Divisions				Category III Divisions		
Area	MRD	TNK	ABN	TOTAL	MRD	TNK	TOTAL
East Germany	10	10	0	20	0	0	0
Poland	0	2	0	2	0	0	0
Hungary	2	2	0	4	0	0	0
Western USSR	14	17	3	34	6–8	1	7–9
Southwestern USSR	2	4	0	6	5–7	1	6–8
Northwestern USSR	4	1	1	6	3–5	0	3–5
Southern USSR	11	3	2	16	10–16	0	10–16
Central USSR	4	1	0	5	3	0	3
Far Eastern USSR	4	7	1	12	4	0	4
TOTAL	51	47	7	105	31–43	2	33–45

TABLE II

ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN OPERATIONAL UNITS BY LOCATION AND TYPE AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1967 [a]

LOCATION	MIG–17 [b] FRESCO	MIG–19 [b] FARMER	MIG–21 FISHBED D/F	YAK–28P FIREBAR	SU–7 FITTER	YAK–27 MANGROVE	IL–28 [b] BEAGLE	YAK–28 BREWER	TOTAL	NEW TACTICAL FIGHTER
East Germany	85	13	330	23	155	12	100	75	795	..
Poland	80	..	125	..	37	30	10	..	280	..
Hungary	13	..	110	..	30	..	55	..	210	..
Baltic	75	..	75	..	12	..	40	32	235	..
Belorussia	100	12	75	..	37	..	32	..	255	..
Carpathian	75	37	110	..	37	32	32	32	355	..
Moscow	12	..	37	..	25	32	..	..	105	..
Leningrad	37	..	..	..	37	..	48	..	120	..
Kiev	13	..	60	..	..	..	..	..	75	..
Odessa	13	12	100	..	37	32	10	..	205	..
Transcaucasus	..	..	110	..	37	..	32	32	210	..
Turkestan	90	..	75	..	..	..	20	..	185	..
Far East	50	..	75	..	37	..	30	..	190	..
Transbaikal	48	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	48	..
TOTAL	690 [c]	75 [d]	1,280 [d]	23 [d]	480 [c]	140 [e]	410	170	3,270 [f]	..
Mid-1968	625–500	50–0	1,300–1,400	25–50	550–625	125–150	400–350	150–200	3,225–3,275	0
Mid-1969	550–425	25–0	1,350–1,475	25–50	550–675	125–150	350–275	150–200	3,125–3,250	0–25

[a] Figures above 50 have been rounded to the nearest increment of five.

[b] These aircraft are no longer in production.

[c] Primary mission of these aircraft is ground attack.

[d] Primary mission of these aircraft is air defense.

[e] These are reconnaissance aircraft.

[f] There are also about 500 older combat aircraft colocated with Tactical Aviation units, and an additional 2,200–2,300 flyable old model aircraft in reserve.

TABLE III

ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE SHIPS AND SUBMARINES BY TYPE, 1 NOVEMBER 1967—BY FLEETS

TYPE	NORTH	BALTIC	BLACK	PACIFIC	TOTAL	MID-1968	MID-1969
Cruise Missile Submarines							
Nuclear (6–8 launchers)	15–16	0	0	15–16	30–32	31–33	33–35
Diesel (most with 4 launchers)	11–13	3	4	5–6	23–26	24–28	26–28
Torpedo Attack Submarines							
Nuclear	9–12	0	0	3	12–15	14–18	17–22
Long Range Diesel	35	12	0	21	68	68–70	68–70
Medium Range Diesel	57	44	27	44	172	170	165
Short Range Diesel	0	10	5	0	15	15	15
TOTAL General Purpose Submarines	127–133	69	36	88–90	320–328	322–334	324–335
Operational Surface Ships							
SAM/SSM Light Cruisers [a]	1	2	1	2	6	8	10
SSM Destroyers	1	4	4	3	12	11	10
SAM Destroyers	3	2	6	2	13	19	24
Cruisers [b]	2	4	4	2	12	11	9
Destroyers	9	7	17	20	53	51	46
Escorts	22	28	19 [c]	22	91	95	96
Helicopter Carriers	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
Reserve Surface Ships							
Cruisers	1	0	2	3	6	6	7
Destroyers	7	7	4	6	24	22	18
Escorts	1	4	4	2	11	10	13
TOTAL Surface Ships	47	58	61	62	228	234	235

[a] The Kynda and the Kresta classes have been redesignated as light cruisers rather than frigates.

[b] Includes one SAM-equipped light cruiser presently assigned to the Black Sea Fleet.

[c] Includes three in the Caspian Sea.

TABLE IV

ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND TYPES OF SOVIET NAVAL AIRCRAFT

	1 November 1967	Mid-1968	Mid-1969
Heavy Bombers			
Bear (Reconnaissance)	30	35–45	35–45
Medium Bombers			
Badger A [a]	195	180–200	170–190
Badger B (2 AS–1/AS–5)	65	60–70	60–70
Badger C (1 AS–2)	205	190–215	190–215
Blinder A	20	20–30	20–40
Blinder B (1 AS–4)	30	30–40	30–50
Light Bombers			
Beagle	60	30–60	20–50
Patrol Aircraft			
Madge	55	55–45	45–30
Mail [b]	15	20–40	40–60
Helicopters			
Heavy	10	10–20	10–20
Medium [c]	140	125–150	125–150

[a] Totals for Badger A include tankers, reconnaissance variants, bombers, and about 15 Badgers used in ASW operations. Some Badgers in this figure may have already been converted to carry an antiship version of the AS–5 missile, which would increase the total number of ASM carriers.

[b] May include a new long-range ASW aircraft by 1969.

[c] Hound and a possible ASW follow-on in 1968–1969. A few additional medium helicopters are used for transport purposes.

TABLE V

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF EAST EUROPEAN WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES

Country [a]	Total Personnel Strength	Combat Ready Divisions	Reduced Strength Divisions	Half Strength Divisions	Total Divisions
East Germany	90,000	4 MRD	..	..	4 MRD
		2 TNK	..	..	2 TNK
Poland	225,000	3 MRD	2–5 MRD [b]	0–3 MRD [b]	8 MRD
		5 TNK	..	..	5 TNK
		1 ABN [c]	..	1 AMPH [c]	2 ABN/AMPH
Czechoslovakia	175,000	4 MRD	1 MRD	5 MRD	10 MRD
		3 TNK	1 TNK	..	4 TNK
Hungary	90,000	2 MRD	2 MRD	1 MRD	5 MRD
		1 TNK	..	..	1 TNK
Rumania	150,000	3 MRD	2 MRD	2 MRD	7 MRD
		2 TNK	..	..	2 TNK
Bulgaria	125,000	4 MRD	2 MRD	2 MRD	8 MRD
		2 TNK	1 TNK	1 TNK	4 TNK
TOTAL	855,000	36	11–14	12–15	62

[a] Hungarian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian divisions are less well equipped than East German, Polish, and Czech divisions.

[b] This range reflects uncertainty as to whether these are reduced strength or half strength divisions.

[c] The Polish airborne and amphibious divisions are dependent on Soviet resources for combat lift.

TABLE VI

ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF EAST EUROPEAN WARSAW PACT AIRCRAFT BY TYPE, 1 NOVEMBER 1967 [a]

	MIG–15, MIG–17 [b] FAGOT/ FRESCO	MIG–19 [b] FARMER	SU–7 FITTER	MIG–21 FISHBED C/E	MIG–21 FISHBED D/F	YAK–27/L–29 MANGROVE/ MAYA	IL–28 [b] BEAGLE	TOTAL
Bulgaria	190	75	..	20	15	..	10	310
Czechoslovakia	240	100	90	50	85	20	25	610
East Germany	110	25	..	75	140 [c]	..	..	350 [c]
Hungary	30	10	..	60	30	..	..	130
Poland	670 [d]	20	15	35	85	..	60 [d]	885 [d]
Rumania	150	25	..	40	10	..	10	235
TOTAL	1,390	255	105	280	365	20	105	2,520
Mid–1968	1,250–1,350	225–250	105–130	275–300	400–475	25–30	90–110	2,370–2,645
Mid–1969	1,150–1,200	200–225	125–150	275–300	430–510	25–35	85–100	2,290–2,520

[a] Figures are rounded to the nearest increment of five.

[b] These aircraft are no longer in production.

[c] Some 60 additional Fishbed D/F aircraft are believed to have been delivered to East Germany, but have not yet been identified in operational units.

[d] Includes 40 fighters and 10 bombers in Polish Naval Air Forces.

TABLE VII

ESTIMATED NUMBER AND DEPLOYMENT OF EAST EUROPEAN NAVAL VESSELS BY TYPE, 1 NOVEMBER 1967, BY COUNTRY

Type	Baltic Sea Area		Black Sea Area	
	East Germany	Poland	Bulgaria	Rumania
Destroyer types	4	3	2	..
Submarines	..	7	2	..
Guided Missile Patrol Boats	12	8	..	5
Patrol and Motor Torpedo Boats	144	37	16	19
Minesweepers	40	55	20	32
Amphibious vessels	18	37	11	8
TOTAL	218	147	51	64

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