

**Copyright**

**by**

**Danilo Antonio Contreras**

**2015**

The Dissertation Committee for Danilo Antonio Contreras Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

**Exit Over Voice in Dominican Ethnoracial Politics**

**Committee:**

---

Raúl Madrid, Supervisor

---

Tasha Philpot

---

Henry Dietz

---

Daniel Brinks

---

James Mahon

**Exit Over Voice in Dominican Ethnoracial Politics**

by

**Danilo Antonio Contreras, B.A.**

**Dissertation**

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School  
of The University of Texas at Austin  
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements  
for the Degree of

**Doctor of Philosophy**

The University of Texas at Austin  
December 2015

## Acknowledgements

I am indebted to many people who saw this project through the end. I owe the most, however, to Raúl Madrid, my dissertation advisor. Raúl listened to my good and bad ideas and entertained them with equal candor. He responded to every email, phone call, and door knock with immediacy and enthusiasm. And he offered constructive and very pointed feedback at every turn. He showed me time and again that great advisors mentor, teach, and nourish—not just supervise. I learned from his example to strive for humility, rigor, and accessibility in my research, writing, and beyond. I was lucky to have worked with him.

Cathy Boone and Henry Dietz, like Raúl, were also committed to my success and well-being throughout my time in Austin. They provided several rounds of formal and informal feedback on this project, especially at its infancy. Dan Brinks, Tse-min Lin, Bob Luskin, Eric McDaniel, and Tasha Philpot, in particular, also provided feedback at key points and were always accessible. I am especially thankful to John Butler and the IC<sup>2</sup> Institute at the McCombs School of Business, which funded much of my fieldwork. I am similarly thankful to Sandra Núñez, Lalito Vargas, and Gary Grullón for their help during my fieldwork in Santo Domingo in 2011.

My friends in Austin helped me to celebrate small victories and picked me up after missteps. I am very grateful to Adam, Bárbara, Daniel, Diego, Gustavo, Hector, Huseyin, Ilana, John I., Kate, Liana, Lucía, Matt B., Matt J., Matt V., Rachel, and Randy for their invaluable friendship.

I am also grateful to have received support from people at other institutions. At Williams, Sam Crane, Michael McDonald, Nicole Mellow, Darel Paul, and Neil Roberts

were invested in my professional development. Candis Smith was a wonderful friend and provided a great sense of community. And Jim Mahon was a terrific mentor and friend. He made every effort to encourage my research and to make me feel at home in the department and in the Berkshires. In my short time at Holy Cross, I have already incurred many debts. Rosa Carrasquillo, Bryan Engelhardt, Robert Green, Vickie Langohr, Jenniefer Lieb, Daniel Klinghard, Nadine Knight, and Melissa Weiner have been incredibly welcoming. Loren Cass has been exceptionally kind and attentive.

I am also indebted to a number of educators and mentors that took an interest in me long before graduate school. Abe Fernández and Justine Stamen demanded that I challenge myself academically every summer beginning in the sixth grade. In high school, Angela Matthews set me on a path to study race and Latin American politics. Neither she nor I could have imagined that one day I would write a dissertation that combined those interests. Veronica Salles-Reese saw something in me in college that I didn't see. And she made me believe in it. Peter DeShazo, Teresita Martínez-Vergne, Maruja Conway, and Emmitt Griffin all pushed me to pursue a doctorate (but kept quiet about how long it might take to finish!).

I am most grateful for my family's support. I have drawn on my dad's advice on many occasions over the past years, and it has served me well. My mom and stepdad have continually braved through the hottest summers and the coldest winters to come visit me. And they have done so with a smile every time. Their pride in me has motivated me enormously. My sister, Lydia, more than anyone, has energized me and has persuaded me to think big and troubleshoot less. She has been a wonderful model of work ethic and discipline. Lastly, my wife has been incredibly gracious, patient, positive, and generous throughout the writing process. She has added a ton of laughter and improvisation to my

life. And she has helped me keep perspective of the starting point and the finish line when both were out of sight. I will return the favor very soon.

# **Exit Over Voice in Dominican Ethnoracial Politics**

by

Danilo Antonio Contreras, PhD

The University of Texas at Austin, 2015

SUPERVISOR: Raúl Madrid

What explains why ethnoracial identity is of low salience in elections in Latin America, particularly in Afro-Latin America? Marginalized individuals in ethnoracially diverse societies, especially stratified ones, would seem most likely to mobilize politically along ethnoracial lines. I argue that, under certain conditions, individuals will deal with ethnoracial discrimination and stratification through exit rather than voice. That is, they will reclassify their way out of marginalized ethnosomatic categories instead of voting for candidates and parties that share their ethnoracial identities. This tends to be the case where ethnoracial group identity is inchoate and group boundaries are permeable. High levels of stratification combined with low degrees of ethnoracial group consolidation will typically prevent the activation of ethnoracial identity in elections. Whereas ethnoracial stratification provides the incentive structure for individuals to switch ethnoracial categories, inchoate ethnoracial group identity and permeable ethnoracial boundaries lower the transaction costs to doing so. I also argue that individuals may emphasize national origin over race or ethnicity where ethnoracial group loyalties are weak and immigration is widespread.

I test my argument against competing approaches using quantitative, qualitative, and experimental evidence from the Dominican Republic. The evidence suggests that the confluence of stratification and inchoate ethnoracial group identity indeed has prevented the activation of ethnoracial cleavages in elections in the DR. This same combination, however, has not impeded the activation of national origin in elections. Rather than

strengthening the salience of ethnoracial cleavages in elections, nationalism has helped to redirect those cleavages.

## Table of Contents

List of Tables .....	xi
List of Figures .....	xiv
Chapter 1: Exit Over Voice.....	1
The Argument in Brief.....	3
Definitions.....	6
Alternative Explanations.....	8
Why Ethnoracial Stratification May Undermine Electoral Preferences .....	19
Theoretical Contributions .....	32
The Case of the Dominican Republic .....	34
Research Design.....	38
Plan of the Dissertation .....	41
Chapter 2: The Determinants of Inchoate Ethnoracial Group Identity.....	43
Racial Mixing.....	45
Cattle Ranching, Poverty, and Depopulation.....	51
Nation-Building .....	57
Inclusive Strategies .....	58
Exclusionary Strategies.....	64
Conclusion .....	81
Chapter 3: Ethnoracial Stratification and Its Effects on Electoral Behavior .....	83
Ethnoracial Stratification .....	85
Ethnoracial Prejudice.....	94
Ethnoracial Classification .....	98
Ethnoracial Identity and Elections .....	104
Conclusion .....	129
Chapter 4: Nation Before Pigmentation.....	131
Data and Methods .....	133
Focus Groups .....	139

Evaluating Competing Approaches .....	142
Nation before pigmentation .....	157
Conclusion .....	166
Chapter 5: Conclusions .....	168
Main Findings .....	168
Theoretical Implications .....	172
Comparative Applications .....	177
Appendix A .....	181
Appendix B .....	185
Interviews .....	185
References .....	189
VITA .....	206

## List of Tables

Table 1.1: Approaches to Understanding the Impact of Ethnoracial Identity on Electoral Behavior in Latin America .....	18
Table 2.1: The Effect of Respondent Characteristics on the Evaluation of Haitians Ordered-Probit Analysis (Standard Errors in Parenthesis) .....	78
Table 3.1: Mean Scores of Socioeconomic Indicators Across Ascribed and Self-Identification Measures, AB 2012 .....	87
Table 3.2: Mean Scores of Socioeconomic Indicators Across Ascribed, Skin Color, and Self-Identification Measures .....	88
Table 3.3: Mean Scores of Political Inclusion Indicators Across Ascribed and Self-Identification Measures, AB 2012 .....	91
Table 3.4: Mean Scores of Political Inclusion Indicators Across Ascribed, Skin Color, and Self-Identification Measures .....	93
Table 3.5: The Distribution of Legislators in the 2006-2010 Congress by Ascribed Ethnoracial Identification and Party Identification.....	109
Table 3.6: The Distribution of Legislators in the 2010-2016 Congress by Ascribed Ethnoracial Identification and Party Identification.....	111
Table 3.7: Afro-descendant Legislators in the provinces of Duarte, Monseñor Nouel, Peravia, Espaillat, La Vega, and Santiago in the 2006-2010 and the 2010-2016 Legislatures.....	117
Table 3.8: The Share of Votes for the PLD and its Allies in the 2004 and 2008 Presidential Elections by “Lighter” Provinces and Municipalities.....	120

Table 3.9: The Share of Votes for the PLD and its Allies in the 2004 and 2008 Presidential Elections by “Darker” Provinces and Municipalities.....	122
Table 3.10: The Percentage of Self-Identified White and Black Respondents that Voted for Leonel Fernández and for Runner-Up Candidates in the 2004 and 2008 Elections.....	124
Table 3.11: References in the 1994 and 1996 Elections about Peña Gómez’s Candidacy Based on Race, Race and National Origin, and National Origin.....	126
Table 3.12: The Share of Votes for the PRD and Allies in the 1994 and 1996 Presidential Elections by “Lighter” Provinces .....	128
Table 4.1: Treatment and Control Group Conditions Across Campaign Sheets .....	137
Table 4.2: Comparison of Means for the Evaluation of Ethnoracial Categories by Respondents’ Self-Identified Ethnoracial Identification .....	143
Table 4.3: Comparison of Means for Respondents’ Ethnoracial Identification by Ethnoracial Category of Candidate Across Evaluation Items.....	145
Table 4.4: Interactions between the Ethnoracial Identification of Candidates and Participants Across Candidate Evaluation Items (Ordered-Probit Analysis).....	147
Table 4.5: Comparison of Means for White, Mixed, and Black Candidate Pairings Across Evaluation Items and Willingness to Vote .....	151
Table 4.6: The Effect of Candidate Ethnoracial Characteristics on Candidate Evaluation Ordered Probit Analysis (Standard Errors in Parenthesis) .....	153

Table 4.7: Comparison of Means for Treatment and Control Groups Across Candidate Evaluation Items and Willingness to Vote.....	159
Table 4.8: Logistic Correlates of the Willingness to Vote for a Dominican Candidate of Haitian Descent.....	161
Table 4.9: The Effect of Explicit and Implicit Haitian Treatments on Candidate Evaluation Ordered Probit Analysis (Standard errors in Parenthesis).....	163
Table 1A: Afro-Descendant Legislators Elected to the 2006-2010 and 2010-2016 Chamber of Deputies from the Province of Santiago .....	181
Table 2A: The Percentage of Self-Identified White Respondents in “Lighter” Provinces, 2004-2012 .....	182
Table 3A: The Percentage of Self-Identified Black Respondents in “Darker” Provinces, 2004-2012 .....	183
Table 4A: Descriptive Statistics of the Survey-Experiment Sample and the DR 2010 Census of Santo Domingo Across Different Indicators .....	184

## List of Figures

Figure 1.1: The Positioning of “Exit Over Voice” in the Literature on Race, Ethnicity, and Politics.....	10
Figure 1.2: Determinants of the Salience of Ethnoracial Identity in Elections.....	20
Figure 1.3: The Causes of the Low Electoral Salience of Ethnoracial Cleavages in Latin America.....	30
Figure 2.1: The Ethnoracial Composition by Percentage of Total Population, 1561-2014.....	48
Figure 3.1: The Ethnoracial Composition of the 2012 AmericasBarometer Survey Sample By Different Measures of Ethnoracial Identity.....	102
Figure 3.2: Criteria for the Ethnoracial Classification of Legislators Along Dimensions of Skin Color, Hair Texture, and Facial Features.....	107
Figure 3.3: The Percentage of Afro-descendant Legislators per Province in the 2006-2010 Congress.....	114
Figure 3.4: The Percentage of Afro-descendant Legislators per Province in the 2010-2016 Congress.....	114
Figure 4.1: Sample Campaign Sheets of Candidates Assigned a High Level of Education.....	135
Figure 4.2: The Ethnoracial Composition of the Sample By Different Measures of Ethnoracial Identity.....	139
Figure 4.3: Comparison of Means for the Evaluation of Ethnoracial Category Pairings Across the Ethnoracial Spectrum.....	149
Figure 4.4: Predicted Probabilities of Willingness to Vote for Candidates.....	164

## Chapter 1: Exit Over Voice

The absence of ethnoracially-based voting behavior in Latin America, especially in predominantly Afro-descendant countries, poses an interesting puzzle. Much of the literature on race and ethnicity outside of Latin America would expect ethnoracial diversity in the region to generate electoral behavior based on ethnoracial identity — and with good reason. Ethnoracial identity plays an important role in elections in many ethnoracially diverse and stratified societies, including South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and in parts of Eastern and Western Europe.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, ethnoracial identity has been historically of low salience in elections in Latin America. Afro-descendants and indigenous peoples remain woefully underrepresented in legislatures across the region, even in countries that have passed constitutional reforms to reserve legislative seats, such as Colombia. Moreover, few ethnic parties have emerged in the region and those that have emerged have typically fared poorly. The success of the Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) in Bolivia since 2002 and its victories in the 2005, 2009, and 2014 presidential elections has been exceptional among political parties that have made explicit ethnoracial appeals, even within Bolivia. Since 1979, only the MAS and (for a short time) the Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik in Ecuador have won more than ten percent of the vote. Outside of Bolivia and Ecuador, ethnoracial-based parties have not won more than 3.3% of the national vote.

Ethnoracial identity has been especially of low salience in elections in Afro-Latin America. Afro-descendant voters in countries such as the Dominican Republic have not supported candidates or mobilized politically on the basis of ethnoracial identity. And candidates seldom have appealed to their own ethnoracial identity during campaigns. Moreover, Afro-descendant-based political parties have been almost entirely absent.

Afro-descendant-based parties emerged at the national level in Cuba, Brazil, and Uruguay in 1908, 1931, and 1936, respectively, but perished relatively soon thereafter. Internal factions, split support among Afro-descendants, and repressive laws that either prohibited race-based political organization or banned all political parties crippled those parties (Andrews 2004).

Contemporary Afro-descendant based parties, similarly to indigenous based political parties, have struggled to overcome resource deficits and low ethnoracial consciousness (Madrid forthcoming). The few Afro-descendant based parties that have emerged have had little success in mobilizing and competing in elections outside of the regional level. The Alianza Social Afrocolombiana, for example, received only 0.1 percent of the national vote in the 2010 presidential elections in Colombia (Madrid 2012, 160).

Although Afro-descendants in major political parties have secured important internal positions, they have typically not fared well as candidates. In Costa Rica, for example, Epsy Campell reached the vice-presidency and presidency of the Citizens Action Party (PAC), but received only 19 percent of the vote in the 2009 national

elections. Despite her popularity, she did not secure her party's nomination in the 2014 primaries.

What explains the low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections in Latin America? Why have Afro-descendant candidates typically eschewed ethnoracial-based appeals and why have Afro-descendant voters on the whole declined to vote for them when they have made such appeals?

I argue that inchoate ethnoracial group identity and ethnoracial stratification help to explain the low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections in Latin America. Weak ethnoracial group identity and high levels of stratification have encouraged individuals to “exit” or reclassify their ethnoracial identification rather than contest or give “voice” to their marginalized condition in elections.

In what follows, I briefly discuss my “exit over voice” argument and its theoretical contributions, define key concepts, and introduce existing theoretical approaches. I then expound on my argument and consider the case of the Dominican Republic. I conclude this chapter by discussing the research design and methods and presenting an overview of the dissertation.

## **THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF**

Studies on the effect of ethnoracial cleavages in elections often assume that individuals who share ethnoracial attributes also share a group identity and formulate collective interests (Loveman 1999). If so, ethnoracial voting would seem most probable in ethnoracially stratified societies, where marginalized individuals stand much to gain

from mobilizing politically along ethnoracial lines. I define ethnoracial-based voting behavior as the practice of routinely voting for a party or candidate that is perceived as representing an individual's ethnoracial identification (Ferree 2006).

Ethnoracial identity, however, is not automatically salient in elections in ethnoracially diverse societies, even those with high levels of stratification. I argue that stratification may, in fact, impede the activation of ethnoracial cleavages. Where ethnoracial group identities are inchoate and ethnoracial boundaries are porous, individuals may shun identification with marginalized ethnosomatic categories and seek to identify with more privileged categories. In Hirschman's (1970) terms, incentives to "exit" reduce the possibility that individuals will "voice" ethnoracial grievances and decrease the likelihood that entrepreneurs activate ethnoracial cleavages in elections. The literature has not considered this possibility because it has not sufficiently relaxed the assumption of groupism (Brubaker 2004). That is, it presumes that individuals who share an ethnoracial category based on common ethnoracial attributes also form part of a bounded, unitary group with collective preferences and political consciousness (ibid).

Ethnoracial identities are inchoate and ethnoracial boundaries are fluid in Latin America in large part because of widespread *mestizaje* (ethnoracial mixing). At the same time, however, the region is characterized by significant ethnoracial stratification and discrimination. Individuals who are predominantly of indigenous and/or African descent tend to be much poorer and less educated than individuals who are mostly of European descent. Whereas ethnoracial stratification provides the incentive structure for individuals

to switch ethnoracial categories, inchoate ethnoracial group identity and fluid ethnoracial boundaries lower the transaction costs to doing so. Moreover, nation-building efforts may obstruct the formation of strong ethnoracial identities and suppress ethnoracial political behavior. The confluence of stratification, weak ethnoracial group identity, and nation-building efforts helps to explain why ethnoracial identity has not been salient in elections in Latin America.

My “exit over voice” argument challenges the assumption that ethnoracial identities are necessarily politically salient in ethnographically diverse societies, especially in ones that are highly stratified. It also provides a more dynamic understanding of ethnoracial electoral politics in the region than prevailing approaches. Much of the literature on race and ethnicity has emphasized institutional and structural constraints to explain the low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections. My argument, however, considers how subaltern sectors strategize to overcome those constraints.

Categorical switching among subaltern sectors accounts for much of the low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections in the Dominican Republic. Dominicans are of mixed descent and tend to identify with multiple and ambiguous ethnoracial categories. Rather than express electoral preferences based on strong ethnoracial group affinities, they tend to identify with lighter-skinned ethnoracial categories as a way to avoid ethnoracial prejudice. This explains the low demand for ethnoracial candidates and political parties in Dominican elections.

## DEFINITIONS

Throughout the dissertation, I employ the terms “ethnoracial” or “ethnosomatic” rather than race or ethnicity, except when referring to those literatures specifically. Typically, race has been understood in the literature on the basis of biological characteristics or somatic features, whereas ethnicity has been associated with a shared bundle of cultural characteristics, including language, history, ancestry, and territory (Hale 2004, Chandra 2006). In practice, however, racial and ethnic classifications are often based on a combination of physical and cultural characteristics.

Although some scholars acknowledge that there are overlaps between race and ethnicity as categories of practice (Wade 1997; Hooker 2012; Paschel 2013), others remain divided over whether it is useful to retain a distinction between race and ethnicity as categories of analysis.<sup>1</sup>

In the Dominican Republic, retaining a strict distinction between race and ethnicity as categories of analysis is inappropriate. Roth (2012, 27) correctly notes that race in the DR is understood closer to what the literature has conceived as ethnicity and is often evoked synonymously with ethnicity and nationality. As is the case with much of Latin America, ethnoracial classification in the DR is not necessarily determined by cultural characteristics, or by visible or ethnoracial attributes (Flores and Telles 2012).

---

<sup>1</sup> See Brubaker (1996) for a distinction between categories of analysis and categories of practice. For contrasting viewpoints on studying race and ethnicity under a singular category of analysis, see the exchange between Winant (2015) and Wimmer (2015).

Social class, nationality, age, education, popular culture, social movements, and occupation may also shape ethnoracial classification.<sup>2</sup>

I define national origin as the perceived homeland of an individual—that is, the country that an individual and his or her recent ancestors feel most affinity with. National origin has more rigid criteria and transmission of membership than race, ethnicity, and even nationality. Nationality can be acquired and relinquished in most cases, though it may be difficult to do.<sup>3</sup> And although national origin shares a family resemblance to ancestry, it may be stickier and more socio-politically consequential than ancestry, which may be unknown even to individuals themselves. National origin is more temporally proximate and retains a greater degree of “unassimilatedness” than ancestry.

Lastly, I define ethnoracial stratification as the uneven access to resources and institutions among members of different ethnoracial groups. The extent and meaning of ethnoracial stratification in the DR is slippery (Howard 2001). High levels of intermixing and elastic ethnoracial boundaries complicate discrete understandings of “white” and “black” social categories. Likewise, treating race or ethnicity in the Dominican Republic as a white-black binary or even a white-mixed-black schema obscures how stratification takes place in a plural ethnoracial order (Bonilla-Silva 2006). Such a white-black binary also risks essentializing or reifying distinctions between “blacks” and “whites” (Loveman 1999). Moreover, it is unclear how varying kinds (i.e. vertical, horizontal) and degrees of

---

<sup>2</sup> See Yashar (2005); Schwartzman (2007); Bailey (2009); Flores and Telles (2012); Paschel (2013).

<sup>3</sup> Brubaker (2004, 81) suggests that differences across these dimensions do not necessarily inscribe race, ethnicity and nation in distinct analytical domains.

stratification should be weighed against each other (Bonilla-Silva 2009). Although stratification in the region constitutes an entire ethnoracial spectrum, I evaluate stratification mostly at the ethnoracial poles. Intermediate ethnoracial categories are more fluid and less reliable markers of stratification.<sup>4</sup>

### **ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS**

Most studies of ethnoracial identity in Latin America have not directly addressed the extent to which ethnoracial identity might affect elections. The few studies that have done so have focused mostly on indigenous electoral mobilization and party politics in the Andes.<sup>5</sup> It is unclear, however, whether findings based on indigenous politics can speak to Afro-Latin America. A few studies of ethnoracial identity and elections have been conducted in Brazil (Mitchell 2009; Dunning 2010; Aguilar-Pariente et al. 2015), but their findings are contradictory.<sup>6</sup>

Studies of the Dominican Republic, meanwhile, seldom engage the intersection between ethnoracial identity and electoral behavior. The literature on elections, institutions, and state formation in the DR has paid greater attention to social class than race,<sup>7</sup> and the vast literature on race in the DR has not primarily focused on electoral

---

<sup>4</sup> For different understandings of stratification in Latin America see the exchange between Sue (2009) and Bonilla Silva (2009).

<sup>5</sup> See Yashar (2005); Van Cott (2002; 2005); Rice and Van Cott (2006); Madrid (2005a; 2005b; 2008; 2011; 2012)

<sup>6</sup> Aguilar-Pariente (2011) has also carried experimental research in Mexico on this subject.

<sup>7</sup> See Espinal (1987); Betances (1995); Tejada Holguín (1997); Hartlyn (1998); Toribio (2005); Espinal et al. (2006).

behavior.<sup>8</sup> An important study by Sagás (2000) is one of the few works in political science to examine the effect of race on politics in the DR, but it does not specifically address electoral behavior. As Mayes (2014, 2-3) states, contemporary scholarship on race in the DR has privileged “the origins of anti-Haitian and anti-black nationalist ideologies...and how (or whether) Dominican elites have managed to impose their ideology beyond their class.”

Despite the paucity of relevant studies, broader approaches can be employed to generate predictions about how perceived ethnoracial identity might affect electoral behavior in Afro-Latin America and the DR in particular. These approaches, however, cannot fully explain why ethnoracial identification is of low salience at the ballot box in countries such as the Dominican Republic. My “exit over voice” argument fills this lacuna. Moreover, as Figure 1.1 illustrates, my argument engages disparate literatures on ethnoracial identity, which do not always interact.

---

<sup>8</sup> See Franco (1969); Tolentino Dipp (1974); Cassá (1976); Dore Cabral (1985); Fennema and Lowenthal (1987); Moya Pons (1992); Coten et al. (1995); Torres-Saillant (1998); Sagás (2000); Howard (2001); Martínez-Vergne (2005); Candelario (2007); Simmons (2009); Hoberman (2010); Mayes (2014).




Figure 1.1: The Positioning of “Exit Over Voice” in the Literature on Race, Ethnicity, and Politics.

*Group Specific Approaches*

Group-specific approaches from the comparative ethnic politics literature and the literature on race in American politics typically emphasize the salience of ethnoracial identity in elections. They presuppose that shared ethnoracial categorization leads to consolidated group identity and that groups hold collective preferences that are expressed at the ballot box. A group of sociologists led by Jenkins (1994), Loveman (1997), Brubaker (2004), Bailey (2009), Wimmer (2013) and others have challenged the assumptions behind these premises.

The comparative ethnic politics literature has suggested that ethnic group identity often structures social behavior.<sup>9</sup> There has been disagreement in the literature between so-called instrumentalists and primordialists over what constitutes ethnic identity and

---

<sup>9</sup> See Hale (2004, 481).

over the degree to which ethnic identification is durable or free to change (Gil-White 1999; Van Evera 2001; Hale 2004; Chandra 2001, 2006). And a few studies on Africa have found evidence of lower than expected levels of ethnic voting.<sup>10</sup>

Nonetheless, much of the literature has suggested that ethnic identity is salient in electoral behavior either as an expression of ethnic identity or as an informational heuristic. The important works of Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) and Horowitz (1985), for instance, assume that vote choice is an expression of ethnic identity and, consequently, that voters engage in ethnic voting. The ethnic outbidding thesis developed by these authors, among others, not only assumed that ethnic voters would support co-ethnics but also that voters would respond to strong ethnic appeals. Such a response to ethnic appeals, in fact, would lead ethnic entrepreneurs to make ever more extreme ethnic appeals in order to outbid their competition. Scholarship on electoral volatility and ethnic party formation by Birnir (2007) and Chandra (2009), for instance, has made similar assumptions about the transmission of group-based preferences. These scholars conceptualized ethnicity as information heuristics that voters would use to identify their electoral preferences.<sup>11</sup>

Although the literature has disagreed over how to measure ethnic identity,<sup>12</sup> datasets that support empirical studies of comparative ethnic politics, such as Bruk and

---

<sup>10</sup> See studies on Ethiopia, Benin, and Mali by Ishiyama (2010), Martin and Seely (2010), and Dunning and Harrison (2010), respectively.

<sup>11</sup> A study on South Africa by Ferree (2006), for instance, finds that party labels function as racialized heuristics or credentials. These racialized party labels also condition beliefs about party performance.

<sup>12</sup> See Laitin and Posner (2001); Wilkinson (2001); Posner (2004); Chandra and Wilkinson (2008).

Apenchenko (1964), Alesina (2003), Fearon (2003), and Minorities at Risk, also take group identity formation as axiomatic. Ethnic groups are the basic unit of analysis in these datasets, which seek to measure the size and other characteristics of ethnic groups.<sup>13</sup>

The American politics literature on race similarly assumes that members of the same racial category tend to favor each other, share a sense of common fate, and give primacy to collective benefits (Tajfel 1981; Dawson 1994). Survey and experiment-based studies of ethnic or racial voting in the U.S have found considerable evidence of racial matching, especially in studies of black and white U.S. voters.<sup>14</sup> The American politics literature on race has also found that politicians, especially black politicians, are “reliably more likely to advance the interests of those who share their personal characteristics...” (Broockman 2013, 1). The assumption that individuals will vote along racial lines in U.S. racial politics is also evident in efforts by political elites to redraw congressional districts in order to take advantage of race-based voting (Tate 2003).

Racial matching or racial voting is far from uniform even in the U.S. electoral context, however. White voters will sometimes support black candidates, and they do not systematically vote against black candidates based on the candidates’ race.<sup>15</sup> This is evident in the 2008 and 2012 U.S. presidential elections (Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2008; Ford 2009; Tesler 2010). And black voters also break with strict race-based voting.

---

<sup>13</sup> See Chandra (2006, 397).

<sup>14</sup> See Sonenshein (1990); Terkildsen (1993); Lublin and Tate (1995); Sigelman et al. (1995); Reeves (1997); Voss and Lublin (2001); Tate (2003); Gay (2004); Herron and Sekhon (2005); Philpot and Walton, Jr. (2007).

<sup>15</sup> See Citrin, Green and Sears (1990); Swain (1993); Hajnal (2001); Howell and Perry (2001).

Indeed, they have historically done so more than white voters.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, even when voters support candidates of their own race, it is not necessarily because of racial considerations.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, there is no consensus in the literature on the extent to which the behavior of Latino and Asian American voters is characterized by racial matching.<sup>18</sup>

Nonetheless, a group-specific approach might expect that *voters will favor candidates who share their ethnoracial identity*.

It is unclear, however, whether the assumptions undergirding group-specific approaches hold sway in the Dominican Republic. The DR, and much of the region, has had a very different type of racialization process—one more closely tied to nation-building (Loveman 2014). Although ethnoracial categories are socially and economically consequential in the DR (as I will show), they were not legally institutionalized. Nor did they help congeal ethnoracial group identity and group consciousness as they did in cases such as the U.S. and South Africa (Verba and Nie 1972; Marx 1999). Most Dominicans are of mixed descent and identify situationally with ambiguous and porous ethnosomatic categories. They also tend to engage in hyperdescent, meaning that they classify themselves as belonging to the more socially dominant of the ethnoracial categories that their ancestors belonged to. Torres-Saillant (1998) has suggested that Dominicans engage

---

<sup>16</sup> For a discussion on black voter's cross-racial voting patterns see Walker's precinct study of mayoral elections in Atlanta in Gurin et al. (1989). For explanations on the historically strong opposition of white voters to black candidates see Key's "Black Threat Theory" and Kinder and Sears (1981) "Symbolic Racism Theory."

<sup>17</sup> See Citrin et al. (1990); Howell and Perry (2004); Highton (2004).

<sup>18</sup> See Alvarez and Bedolla (2003); Pantoja and Segura (2003); McConaughy et al. (2010); Beltran (2010); Casellas (2011); Stokes (2013).

in hyperdescent as a way to manage the historical racial prejudice of elites. Extensive racial mixing has helped to attenuate both the degree of solidarity among in-group members and the degree of conflict with out-group members—two tenets of group-specific approaches.

### *Latin American Approaches to Race and Ethnicity*

Latin American literatures on race, such as the racial democracy thesis and the pigmentocracy literature, may also be used to generate predictions about the effect of perceived ethnoracial identity on elections in the DR. Neither of these approaches was developed to explain voting behavior, however.

Because of the widespread intermixing and porous ethnoracial categories in Latin America, scholars writing in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century often portrayed Latin American countries as racial democracies.<sup>19</sup> These racial democracies purportedly stood in contrast to institutionalized racial domination and categorization in the United States. Latin American countries often promoted the racial democracy thesis because it allowed them to rebut the predictions of pseudo scientific racism and redefine themselves as cradles of egalitarianism, racial harmony, and progress (Helg 1991; De la Fuente 1999; Andrews 2004; Loveman 2014).

Most evidence-based scholars in the region have abandoned claims that Latin America is a racial democracy due to evidence of widespread racial marginalization and inequality in the region. Hernández (2013), for instance, demonstrates that Latin

---

<sup>19</sup> See Pierson (1942); Tannenbaum (1947); Freyre (1951); Harris (1964); Degler (1971).

American states historically enforced unwritten, customary laws to structure race relations and subordinate Afro-descendants. Telles and Bailey (2013) show that most Latin Americans acknowledge discrimination and attribute stratification to structural rather than to individual explanations. They found that this was the case whether individuals self-identified with dominant or subordinate ethnoracial groups. States, too, have turned away from the discourse of racial democracy. In cases such as Brazil, the state has even embraced affirmative action policies since the early 2000s to counter the impact of racism and institutional discrimination on Afro-Brazilian communities (Htun 2004).

A strand of the literature on race in the Dominican Republic led by Núñez (1990) and Henríquez-Gratereaux (1994), among others, has not entirely abandoned the racial democracy thesis.<sup>20</sup> Although these scholars do not directly base their claims on the racial democracy thesis per se, they attribute the absence of social organization and conflict around race to extensive racial mixing patterns.<sup>21</sup>

The racial democracy thesis assumes that *mestizaje* has largely eliminated racial discrimination and that race is relatively inconsequential in the region. Its proponents would presumably expect that *neither the ethnoracial identity of the candidate nor the ethnoracial identity of voters would have much bearing on candidate evaluation.*

---

<sup>20</sup> This strand of the literature in many ways builds on earlier writings by Balaguer (1984) and Pérez (1990).

<sup>21</sup> Other Dominican scholars attribute the perception of racial democracy in the DR to the interracial and interclass alliances that formed during the War of Restoration against Spain in 1865 (See Mayes 2014, 4).

Contrary to the claims of the racial democracy thesis, the literature on colorism or pigmentocracy not only has suggested that there is social inequality in Latin America but also that inequality is stratified by ethnoracial categories and skin color gradations (Telles 2014, 4).<sup>22</sup> Recent survey-based and experimental studies have found evidence of pigmentocracy or a socio-economic hierarchy based on skin color in the region. Sidanius, Peña, and Sawyer (2001), for instance, find clear patterns of group-based hierarchy on the basis of phenotypes in the DR. They conclude that there is a “clear and consensually structured racial hierarchy” (845) in which Dominicans with European phenotypes enjoy greater status and power than Dominicans with African phenotypes. Sawyer (2006) finds evidence of a similar skin color hierarchy in Cuba. Likewise, Telles and his PERLA colleagues (2014) find that skin color closely predicts socioeconomic status in Mexico, Peru, Brazil and Colombia.

The pigmentocracy literature has not examined voting behavior in Latin America, and it has not made specific claims about how ethnoracial categories or skin color are valorized. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to think that pigmentocracies derive from (and are reinforced by) discrimination based on skin color. Nor is it unreasonable to think that discrimination might be present in the electoral arena as well. In essence, the dominant socioeconomic status of “whites” has led individuals to privilege “whiteness” over “blackness” and reinforce the ethnoracial hierarchy. Indeed, various studies have

---

<sup>22</sup> These are important differences between the pigmentocracy literature in Latin American and the colorism literature in the United States. The latter has focused on the valorization of European over African phenotypes within and across ethnoracial categories (see Maddox and Gray 2002; Maddox 2004; Boza-Golash and Darity 2008; Darity, et al. 2011). It has also studied the effect of colorism on candidate evaluation (see Hochschild and Weaver 2007).

shown that individuals in Latin America attach value to whiteness and tend to associate positive attributes with whiteness (Telles and Flores 2013; Sheriff 2001). There is also evidence that dark-skinned individuals in the region have frequently opted to self-identify as white or other superordinate categories rather than as black or other subordinate categories.

The pigmentocracy literature thus yields what I refer to as the colorism thesis, which predicts that all *voters would favor “white” candidates over “mixed” candidates and “mixed” candidates over “black” candidates.*

However, there is also reason to question the extent to which the colorism thesis can speak to the effect of perceived ethnoracial identity on electoral behavior. Although Latin American societies may be pigmentocracies, the masses may reject the pigmentocratic ordering of a society. As a result, European phenotypes might not be preferable at the ballot box. Moreover, while there is evidence that Dominicans impute higher social status and power to lighter racial phenotypes, they may not find these qualities to be similarly desirable in a political candidate. Likewise, while there is evidence that Dominicans impute lower social status and power to darker racial phenotypes, they may not disfavor candidates with dark phenotypes.

In Table 1.1, I depict the main arguments and electoral predictions of existing approaches on race and ethnicity alongside those of my “exit over voice” argument. As the table shows, my argument makes very different predictions about ethnoracial electoral behavior than the group-specific approaches and the colorism thesis. My

approach makes similar predictions to the racial democracy thesis, but for very different reasons. Indeed, my own approach is grounded on the premise that Latin American societies are highly prejudiced and stratified.

Approaches	Argument	Electoral Predictions
Group-Specific Approaches	Voters share in-group preferences, seek to maximize gains and advance group-based interests	Voters are likely to support candidates of their own ethnoracial group
Colorism Thesis	Latin American societies are socially stratified along pigmentocratic lines and valorize “white” phenotypes over “mixed” and “black” phenotypes	Voters are likely to prefer lighter candidates to darker candidates
Racial Democracy Thesis	Latin American societies are not stratified along racial lines; patterns of ethnoracial mixing attenuated ethnoracial differentiation	Voters are unlikely to express ethnoracial-based electoral preferences
<i>Exit Over Voice</i>	In stratified societies, marginalized individuals are more likely to “exit” or reclassify their ethnoracial identification than contest or give “voice” to their marginalized condition in elections	Voters are unlikely to express ethnoracial-based electoral preferences

Table 1.1: Approaches to Understanding the Impact of Ethnoracial Identity on Electoral Behavior in Latin America.

## **WHY ETHNORACIAL STRATIFICATION MAY UNDERMINE ELECTORAL PREFERENCES**

Much of the literature on ethnographically diverse societies predicts that ethnographic identity is consequential in elections. This prediction is based on two key assumptions. The literature assumes that ethnographic cleavages lead to distinct and competing collective interests. It also assumes that collective interests generate demands for ethnographic candidates and parties and in turn produce a supply of ethnographic voters and entrepreneurs. We might expect this reasoning to hold especially in ethnographically stratified societies, where subordinate ethnographic groups have incentives to protest their marginalization by voting for parties or candidates that make ethnographic appeals.

These assumptions are problematic for a couple of reasons, however. First, ethnographic group identity is not always consolidated in ethnographically diverse societies. Where there are high levels of intermixing, for instance, individuals may identify with multiple and overlapping ethnographic classifications. Low feelings of loyalty toward any single ethnographic category both inhibit the development of group identities and the expression of collective interests.

Second, ethnographic stratification does not necessarily encourage individuals to mobilize on the basis of ethnographic grievances. Individuals may not attribute their marginalization to ethnographic stratification or even conceptualize ethnographic stratification as such. This is especially likely where political elites have historically made national and ethnographic identity coterminous (Telles 2014, 19) and disarticulated ethnographic demands.

I contend that ethnoracial differences are not necessarily salient at the ballot box in ethnoracially diverse societies, even those that are highly stratified. The literature seldom considers this possibility because it assumes that there is a direct and linear relationship between ethnoracial stratification and the salience of ethnoracial identity in elections. That is, the salience of ethnoracial identity in elections increases as the level of stratification increases. By contrast, I claim that in some cases ethnoracial stratification may actually discourage the electoral activation of ethnoracial identity.

		Ethnoracial Group Identity	
		Strong	Weak
Ethnoracial Stratification	High	I Salience of ethnoracial identity in elections is <i>most likely</i>	II <b>Salience of ethnoracial identity in elections is <i>unlikely</i></b>
	Low	III Salience of ethnoracial identity in elections is <i>likely</i>	IV Salience of ethnoracial identity in elections is <i>least likely</i>

Figure 1.2: Determinants of the Salience of Ethnoracial Identity in Elections.

As Figure 1.2 indicates, I propose that the level of ethnoracial group identity interacts with the level of ethnoracial stratification to help determine the salience of

ethnoracial identity in elections. Where ethnoracial stratification is high and ethnoracial group identity is strong, as in the United States, race and ethnicity are very likely to be salient in elections, as in quadrant I. In these countries ethnoracial groups are likely to make economic as well as cultural and political demands. Race and ethnicity are also likely to be salient in elections in countries where ethnoracial stratification is low but ethnoracial identity is strong, as in quadrant III. In these countries, such as Belgium, ethnoracial groups are more likely to focus on cultural and political demands. Race and ethnicity are least likely to be salient in elections in countries where ethnoracial stratification is low and ethnoracial identity is weak, as in quadrant IV. In these countries, ethnoracial groups are likely to make neither economic, nor cultural, nor political demands.

Finally, where ethnoracial stratification is high but ethnoracial group identity is weak, as in quadrant II, the salience of ethnoracial identity is also likely to be low. My dissertation aims to explain the cases in this quadrant. It argues that Latin American countries, and especially the Dominican Republic, fall into this quadrant. In these countries, inchoate ethnoracial group identity and high levels of ethnoracial stratification have obstructed ethnoracial politics.

Stratification often generates ethnoracial prejudice and unequal distribution of resources that in turn lead individuals to shun identification with marginalized ethnoracial categories. Rather than protest their marginalization by voting for ethnoracial parties or candidates, marginalized individuals have incentives to eschew identifying with

subordinate ethnoracial categories. Yet individuals are only likely to do this in countries where ethnoracial group identity is weak and ethnic boundaries are porous.

In Latin America, high levels of ethnoracial stratification and prejudice have encouraged marginalized individuals to avoid ethnoracial political mobilization. By most accounts, Latin America is the most unequal region in the world (World Bank 2004; Telles and Bailey 2013). Despite lower levels of wage inequality and an expanded middle class over the past decade (Tsounta and Osueke 2014), an estimated 80 million people in the region live in extreme poverty (World Bank 2013).

Afro-descendants, as well as indigenous people, are on the losing end of inequality.<sup>23</sup> At present, they constitute 40 percent of the region's poor (Hernández 2013). In Colombia and Ecuador, for example, over 80 percent of Afro-descendants live below the poverty line, and the poverty rate among Afro-Peruvians is greater than the national average (Hernández 2013, 76-82).

Afro-descendants in the region also face significant deficits with regard to education. According to figures by Hernández (2013, 75-85), over ten percent of Afro-Ecuadoreans and thirty percent of Afro-Colombians are illiterate. In Brazil, non-whites are illiterate at more than double the rate of whites.

And there is similar evidence of wage disparities. Bailey and his colleagues (2012) find that “blacks” earn less than whites in Brazil. This is true whether using a binary measure of racial classification that collapses “blacks and browns” or a ternary

---

<sup>23</sup> Some Afro-descendant communities along the Pacific coast experience greater rates of infant mortality and childbirth related deaths than their counterparts (IDB 2011).

measure that disaggregates “black” and “brown.” They also find that disparities in wages between whites and non-whites increase at higher deciles of wage distribution (Bailey et al. 2012, 8).

Likewise, Ñopo (2012) finds an ethnic earnings gap of 37.8 percent between minorities (including indigenous people) and non-minorities across seven countries in the region, ranging from 30.6 percent in Bolivia to 67.8 percent in Guatemala. He attributes the ethnic earnings gap, which is larger than the gender gap, to labor market characteristics (i.e. occupational segregation, formality, economic sector) and lower levels of educational attainment.

Of course, other variables such as education and region can mitigate the impact of race and ethnicity on socioeconomic status (Flores and Telles 2012, 486; Bailey, Loveman, and Muniz 2012). Moreover, distinct measures of ethnoracial classification beget different pictures of inequality. Based on the 2002 Brazilian Social Survey (PESB), Bailey and his colleagues (2012) found that the degree of inequality was greater when using an ascribed measure of ethnoracial classification than self-identification. Nonetheless, ample evidence across the region suggests that inequality is structured by skin color.

Discrimination based on skin color contributes to inequality and stratification. In a four-country survey study by Telles and the Project on Race and Ethnicity in Latin America (2014), individuals widely reported experiencing and witnessing color-based discrimination. Those classified as having “medium” and “dark” skin by interviewers

reported experiencing equal or higher levels of discrimination relative to their “light” counterparts in all cases. According to this study, 26, 24, 26, and 36 percent of “dark” classified individuals surveyed in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, respectively, reported experiencing discrimination by color. The percentage of “dark” (as well as “light” and “medium”) classified individuals that reported witnessing discrimination by color was even greater in all four countries.

Although high levels of ethnoracial stratification can provide incentives for individuals to abstain from identifying with marginalized ethnoracial categories, it is not sufficient on its own to explain the low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections. As Figure 1.2 makes clear, high levels of ethnoracial stratification can lead ethnoracial identity to be of high salience in elections, though it can also lead to the opposite.

I argue that ethnoracial stratification is more likely to undermine ethnoracial-based political behavior in societies where ethnoracial group identity is unconsolidated and individuals feel little loyalty to any single ethnoracial category. Inchoate group identity obstructs group consciousness and makes it difficult to organize collectively on the basis of ethnoracial grievances. I employ McClain and colleagues’ (2009, 474) definition of group identity as an attachment to a group “... based on a perception of shared beliefs, feelings, interests, and ideas with other group members.”

If individuals have no possibility of exiting their ethnoracial group, they may respond to prejudice and inequalities by exercising voice. That is, they may organize politically and struggle for greater ethnoracial inclusion. Where ethnoracial identities are

inchoate and ethnic boundaries are fluid, however, individuals may opt for ethnoracial exit. That is, they may shun identification with marginalized ethnoracial groups and seek to identify with more privileged ethnoracial categories. Incentives to “exit” reduce the possibility that individuals will “voice” ethnoracial grievances and decrease the likelihood that ethnoracial entrepreneurs activate ethnoracial cleavages in elections.

Granted, ethnoracial classification is not entirely fluid. Not all individuals have the option to “exit” ethnosomatic categories. State institutions, socio-demographic characteristics, and visible attributes may limit them. Telles and Paschel (2014) point out that ethnoracial classification in Latin America varies widely in the region. In some countries, such as the Dominican Republic, classification is indeterminate and lacks correspondence between external categorization and self-identification. In other countries, such as Panama, classification is “viscous” and is determined by skin color. Despite this wide variation, intermixing has enabled many Latin Americans to identify with multiple and often overlapping ethnosomatic categories, which has facilitated exit.

My argument draws on Hirschman’s (1970) insights about how consumers respond to the decline of organizational performance and quality. Hirschman suggests that exit options reduce the likelihood that customers will voice their dissatisfaction with an organization, particularly in the absence of feelings of loyalty. Specifically, he suggests that it is the most promising consumers and those most likely to rise to leadership who are also most likely to exit. Although Hirschman’s model was intended to apply to transactional (not social) relationships within organizational frameworks (i.e.

client-patron; workers-employers; state-citizens; etc.), it may also shed light on the relationship between ethnoracial identity and political behavior. Indeed, it may well be that the ethnoracial exit option has been especially tempting for ambitious dark-skinned Latin Americans with high leadership potential. This could help explain the dearth of ethnoracial political entrepreneurs in the region.

In Latin America, Afro-descendants have been unlikely to develop a strong sense of ethnoracial loyalty as a result of acute prejudice and disparities in collective rights, access to social services, and economic resources (Hooker 2005). Most Afro-descendants in the region have chosen to not identify as such in hopes of avoiding further marginalization. The absence of loyalty makes “exiting” from marginalized ethnosomatic categories far more appealing and far less costly than the option to “voice” ethnoracial grievances.

I contend that nation-building efforts have obstructed the formation of strong ethnoracial identities and have suppressed ethnoracial political behavior in the region. Nation-building is understood here as inclusive and exclusionary policies that state actors enact to reimagine ethnoracial and national boundaries.

Nation-building processes in the post-independence period in Latin America did much to discourage identification with a primary ethnoracial group identity (Hanchard 1994; Bailey 2009; Telles 2014). They also helped to stymie collective action along ethnoracial lines. In an effort to refute the claims of pseudo race science about racial inferiority and determinism that doomed prospects of modernization, political elites

across the region sought to whiten their nations. Where they could not whiten by recruiting white immigrants and restricting non-white immigration, political elites resorted to lionizing high levels of intermixing and promoting a *mestizaje* ideology. As Loveman (2014) argues, these dual approaches helped reify a sense of national distinctiveness, signal a shift toward whitening, and vindicate their populations' mixed ancestry.

Elites' success and vigor in promoting *mestizaje* varied across the region based on state capacity and racial composition (Telles and Garcia 2013, 133). These nation-state level differences account for varying degrees of support for *mestizaje* across country and ethnoracial categories in the contemporary period. Telles and Garcia report that *mestizaje*, measured as a national development principle or as support for intermarriage of a child to an indigenous or *negro* person, is embraced most in Brazil and Colombia and least in Dominican Republic, Bolivia, and Peru.<sup>24</sup>

High levels of intermixing and pervasive identification with mixed categories, which in part resulted from states' efforts to institutionalize hybridity, make Latin America unique. In the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, at least half of respondents in Ecuador (82%), Mexico (71%), Peru (68%), the Dominican Republic (67%), Guatemala (61%), and Colombia (52%) self-identified as mestizo (or a categorical equivalent)

---

<sup>24</sup> The DR country mean support for mestizaje was 3.8 on a scale from 1 to 7. Telles and Garcia (2013, 147) suggest that the strong rejection of mestizaje and intermarriage in the Dominican Republic can be traced to an anti-black/anti-Haitian process of nation-building and to the absence of multicultural and racial consciousness movements. Current rejection of mestizaje, however, does not diminish the impact of mestizaje or nativist ideology on Dominicans' proclivity to identify with hybrid or lighter ethnoracial categories.

(Telles and Garcia 2013).<sup>25</sup> In Brazil, where the mestizo category has been omitted from censuses, 48 percent of the population self-identified as mulatto/*pardo* in this 2010 survey (Telles and Garcia 2013).

Intermixing, whether real or putative, has allowed individuals to identify situationally with ethnosomatic categories. Hybrid and situational identification has generated ethnoracial boundaries with low degrees of boundedness or social closure, as Weber put it (Loveman 1999, 896-897). Ethnoracial boundaries have not strictly delineated ethnoracial distinctions or determined competition for resources (Wimmer 2008, 976). Nor have they enforced the type of in-group / out-group juxtaposition that Barth (1969) initially theorized. Subaltern groups, in particular, have made strategic use of intermixing. They have exploited the multiple dimensions afforded by their mixed identities to reclassify their way out of marginalization.

In particular, intermixing has depressed identification with Afro-descendant categories and weakened ethnoracial consciousness in the region. No more than 14 percent of individuals self-identified as “black” in any country in the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, including those with significant Afro-descendant populations. Panama had the highest percentage of self-identified blacks (14%), followed by the Dominican Republic (10%), Brazil (10%), Colombia (7%), and Costa Rica (3%) (Telles and Paschel, 2014).

---

<sup>25</sup> Using other measures of ethnoracial classification, including ascription, skin-color, descent rule, and photo comparison, for instance, may potentially yield a very different ethnoracial composition (Bailey et al. 2012, 6).

At the same time that political elites touted intermixing, they also obfuscated ethnoracial representation in order to rescue their populations from racial determinism. In Brazil, for example, they intermittently dropped a racial identification question on the census until 1980. Political elites in Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay, and Venezuela, meanwhile, omitted the racial identification question on the census from the second half of the nineteenth century to the 1990s or 2000s (Hernández 2013; Loveman 2014). In other cases, such as Guatemala, political elites set out to eradicate ethnoracial groups from the nation (Grandin 2000). In the DR, we shall see, the ruling class carried out all of these exclusionary policies during periods of nation-building while also strategically enacting some policies of social integration. Both inclusive and exclusionary policies helped to disarticulate ethnoracial demands and advance elites' interests.

As Figure 1.3 illustrates, the confluence of inchoate group identity and high ethnoracial stratification explains why there is a limited supply of ethnoracial voters and entrepreneurs in Latin America. It also explains why ethnoracial boundaries have been of low electoral salience, especially in predominantly Afro-descendant countries.




Figure 1.3: The Causes of the Low Electoral Salience of Ethnoracial Cleavages in Latin America.

Afro-descendants have been even less likely than indigenous peoples to affirm a group-based ethnorracial identity. One reason is that Afro-descendants have been far less institutionalized since the colonial period. Wade (1997) argues that whereas states have mostly helped preserve and extol indigenous heritage through special recognition and protection, they have aimed to extinguish African cultural symbols through appropriation and dispersion. Given lower levels of institutionalization, Afro-descendants have not benefited from the types of resources and institutional openings, such as pre-existing

networks (Yashar 1998) and constitutional reforms (Van Cott 2002), that have aided indigenous organization and mobilization.

Most Afro-descendants in the region do not identify with a distinct community, “understood as cultural symbols and ethnic distinctiveness and ethnic ancestries” (Bailey 2009, 76). Nor do they identify with a single ethnoracial category. Low category loyalty has hampered their ability to express unified political interests and engage in ethnoracial political behavior.

Afro-descendants in rural and regionally isolated regions have been the exception. Garífunas and Creoles in a few countries in Central America, including Honduras and Nicaragua, have been more likely to consolidate group consciousness, secure land and cultural rights, and mobilize politically (Hooker 2005, 295-296). Communities along the Pacific in the Chocó region of Colombia and in the Esmeraldas region of Ecuador have also consolidated group consciousness and achieved similar gains (Paschel and Sawyer 2008; Paschel 2010).<sup>26</sup> As Hooker argues, these communities “have been able to cast themselves as ‘autochthonous’ groups having an indigenous-like status and distinct cultural identity” (293). Black communities in these countries have also benefited from constitutional reforms that institutionalized indigenous rights and recognition. These communities, however, represent a small percentage of Afro-Latin America (Hooker 2005).<sup>27</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> Afro-descendant communities along the Atlantic in Costa Rica (Limón) and Panama (Colón) have consolidated ethnoracial group identity, but they have not achieved similar rights or electoral success.

<sup>27</sup> Paschel (2013, 8) similarly argues that Afro-Colombians reframed their demands during the constitutional reform processes in the 1990s in ethnic terms.

In sum, I claim that whereas inchoate group identity affords individuals a menu of viable exit options, ethnoracial stratification provides individuals with incentives to eschew identification with marginalized ethnosomatic categories. Weak ethnoracial group identity and high levels of stratification may impede ethnoracial-based candidate evaluation in Afro-Latin America. They do not, however, necessarily prevent candidate evaluation based on other cleavages, such as national origin. I argue that national origin, in fact, may be a more salient cleavage for candidate evaluation than ethnoracial identity where nationalist and ethnoracial cleavages overlap.

#### **THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS**

My argument makes several theoretical contributions. First, it identifies a middle ground in the longstanding debate over how essential ethnoracial identity is to social organization in Latin America by examining the electoral side of social organization.<sup>28</sup> My argument suggests that while ethnoracial markers and identities structure some dimensions of social organization, including the distribution of resources and access to institutions, they do not necessarily structure other dimensions of social organization, such as political behavior. Individuals may be subordinated by ethnoracialized structures and institutions but may not respond by engaging in ethnoracial politics. This makes sense because individuals do not always experience the world – including the political world – in ethnoracial terms, as Brubaker (2004, 13) states.

---

<sup>28</sup> See Bonilla-Silva (1997); Loveman (1999).

Second, my argument suggests that subaltern sectors may also utilize *mestizaje/mulataje* strategically. The race and ethnicity literature on Latin America tends to privilege a top-down understanding of *mestizaje* — and with good reason. Elites have made use of *mestizaje* ideology to prevent subordinate groups from mobilizing along ethnoracial lines (Hernández 2013; Telles and García 2013). But my dissertation shows that subaltern groups have exploited the ethnic fluidity created by *mestizaje* to reclassify their way out of marginalization. Wimmer (2008: 988) refers to this type of strategy as repositioning, where individuals “shift sides” rather than contest the ethnoracial hierarchy. Some scholars have highlighted the distinct strategies that ethnoracial groups have appropriated to make demands (De la Fuente 1999, Grandin 2000, Foote 2006). But they have focused on strategies that are rooted in Liberalism and the myth of racial democracy rather than the strategy of exit that I emphasize here.

Lastly, my argument suggests that national origin can sometimes be a salient consideration for candidate evaluation and that it may help to redirect ethnoracial cleavages. This may be true, for instance, in migrant-recipient countries, where candidates often identify with hyphenated national identities and where nationalism and ethnoracial identity are entwined. In these cases, voters may not primarily care about whether they share a candidate’s ethnoracial identity or programmatic positions. Rather, voters may focus on the national origin of candidates.

## THE CASE OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Inchoate ethnoracial group identity and high levels of ethnoracial stratification help explain why ethnoracial cleavages are of low salience in elections in the Dominican Republic. Extensive black-white admixing and colonial structural conditions discouraged the expression of clear and strong ethnoracial group affinities very early. Structural conditions, in particular, weakened rigid class structures that helped define ethnoracial group identity in other colonies. These conditions include the endurance of subsistence-based cattle ranching (until the return of sugar plantations in the 19<sup>th</sup> century), depopulation, and poverty on the island (Torres-Saillant 1999).

In addition, a mixture of inclusive and exclusionary nation-building policies from the post-independence period in 1844 through the 1930s enabled ruling elites to obstruct black political cohesiveness. At the same, this mixture of policies also enabled elites to appease the political and social anxieties of whites and non-whites alike. Two inclusive policies of nation-building were particularly inimical to the formulation of an Afro-descendant group identity: the immediate incorporation of slaves into the republic, and the eventual social inclusion of black migrant laborers from the West Indies in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Meanwhile, exclusionary policies such as nativism or *Indigenismo* and an ethnoracialized variant of anti-Haitianism, helped to dissociate blackness from the national identity. Ethnoracialized anti-Haitianism, in particular, helped maintain ethnoracial group identity inchoate in the DR.

In concert with inchoate group identity, ethnoracial stratification helps explain the low political salience of ethnoracial cleavages in the Dominican Republic. Various survey-based studies (including my own) have found that “black” Dominicans lag behind “white” Dominicans across a number of socioeconomic indicators, including income, access to food, education, and infrastructure.

Although Dominicans increasingly acknowledge that socioeconomic inequalities are structured along ethnoracial lines, they have not for the most part articulated ethnoracial grievances or demanded ethnoracial parties and candidates. One reason is that most Dominicans do not primarily attribute the struggles of Afro-descendants to ethnoracial discrimination. In a study by Telles and Bailey (2013), a slightly higher percentage of respondents (44.2 percent) attributed the poverty of minority groups to work ethic, intelligence, and culture than to discrimination (42.4 percent). Overall, however, most respondents attributed the poverty of minority groups to structural reasons, such as unfair treatment and low education.

Afro-descendants in the DR have responded to entrenched ethnoracial stratification and prejudice by avoiding identification with marginalized ethnoracial groups. They do not tend to identify as black or affirm a single racial group identity. Instead, they identify with ambiguous, lighter-skinned and hybrid categories, such as *indio*. Low category loyalty has led to weak feelings of linked fate and to low levels of ethnoracial group solidarity. This interaction has impaired the emergence of ethnoracial entrepreneurs and voters.

The case of the Dominican Republic provides a great deal of analytic utility to evaluate the effect of perceived ethnoracial identity on candidate evaluation in Latin America. The DR deviates from the predictions of group-specific approaches. High levels of ethnoracial diversity in the DR have not spawned salient ethnoracial-based cleavages in elections.

The Dominican Republic is typical of cases in Latin America with high levels of stratification and low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections. Candidates have not generally made ethnoracial appeals. And voters have not systematically discriminated against candidates based on their own ethnoracial attributes or those of the candidates (although they have historically discriminated against candidates based on national origin).

Moreover, Afro-descendants in the Dominican Republic do not overwhelmingly identify with a single political party. It is true, as Morgan, Hartlyn, and Espinal (2008) find, that “PRD members are more likely to be black than their counterparts.” But as the authors also suggest, this finding is more likely an artifact of the PRD’s social-democratic and working-class roots than the result of particularly inclusive policies, programmatic positions or internal party rules that favor Afro-descendants.<sup>29</sup> The PRD has not actively promoted Afro-descendant specific issues. Nor has it made targeted efforts to increase black leadership or black membership more than other political parties.

---

<sup>29</sup> The recent splintering of PRD and emergence of the Partido Revolucionario Mayoritario (PRM) could reduce whatever advantage the PRD retains over Afro-descendant supporters.

In fact, there are no major political parties and only very few social justice movements in the Dominican Republic that articulate ethnoracial-based interests specifically. Movements led by Haitian migrants and Dominico-Haitians have come closest to making ethnoracial-based appeals. But they have primarily based their claims on migration status and citizenship rights rather than on ethnoracial identity, specifically. Afro-descendant-specific NGOs have not proliferated in the Dominican Republic to the extent that they have in other parts of Latin America (Hernández 2013, 102).<sup>30</sup>

Although the Dominican Republic exemplifies the low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections, it is also distinct from its peers in ways that provide important variation to this study. Historically fractious relations with neighboring Haiti and anti-Haitianism have shaped a distinct ethnoracial boundary-making dynamic that has not been commonplace between neighbors in the region. The Dominican Republic is the only country in the Americas that gained its independence from a black republic and shares an island with that same country.

In addition, race has not been an insurmountable barrier for Afro-descendant candidates in the Dominican Republic (Silié 2005, 17). As Howard (2001, 59) points out, the Dominican Republic “has had more *negro* or *mulatto* presidents than any other

---

<sup>30</sup> Hernández (183-198) lists only three organizations in the Dominican Republic that articulate Afro-descendant specific interests (two of those organizations articulate Dominico-Haitian interests). Other organizations have either sprung or gained greater prominence since Hernández’s publication. These include Afro-Alianza Dominicana and Plataforma de Afro-descendientes. By contrast, Hernández lists at least nine organizations that articulate Afro-descendant interests in Colombia (33), Brazil (31), Peru (14), Ecuador (13), Panama (12), Uruguay (11), and Honduras (9). Most organizations that articulate Afro-descendant specific interests in the DR, including Reconoci.do, Observatorio Migrantes del Caribe, Solidaridad Fronteriza, and others, primarily articulate the interests of Dominico-Haitian migrants and their descendants.

country in the western hemisphere”—although they have not necessarily identified as such. And despite entrenched ethnoracial prejudice and stratification, Afro-descendants are regularly elected to both houses of Congress and represent majority “black” and “white” municipalities and provinces alike. By contrast, Afro-descendants in countries such as Nicaragua and Costa Rica have been underrepresented in the national assemblies relative to the size of their populations (Hernández 2013).

Given these differences, the Dominican Republic provides a unique opportunity to assess the effect of nationalism and nation-building efforts on ethnoracial politics in Latin America.

## **RESEARCH DESIGN**

I evaluated the effect of ethnoracial identity on electoral behavior in Latin America through a case-study research design based on the Dominican Republic. Because ethnoracial identity is highly contingent and fluid across and within cases in Latin America, a so-called “single-country, single shot” study helped to offset issues of conceptual validity, measurement, and comparability that can bedevil large-*N* studies. Moreover, a single-country study is ideally suited to meet the primary goal of this study: to modify (rather than disconfirm) existing theory on ethnoracial identity and electoral behavior (Gerring 2001, 220-221).

I employed a combination of statistical and non-statistical methods to (1) test the predictions of existing theories against those of my own propositions, (2) specify the casual mechanisms in my argument, and (3) increase the number of observations. A

mixed-method strategy gave me the most leverage in examining the effect of ethnoracial identity on candidate evaluation given the limitations of individual methods.

I conducted a field survey-experiment in the province of Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic in 2011 based on a stratified random sample of 694 adult citizens.<sup>31</sup> Because experiments can manipulate the causal variable under study, they can assess causal relationships and rule out spurious, pre-existing, and systemic factors better than other methods (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott 2009; Gerring 2001). As a result, I was able to ensure that the treatment in my survey-experiment (i.e. the perceived ethnoracial identity of fictitious presidential candidates) accounted for any differences in the responses of participants (Abdelal, et al., 8).

A field survey-experiment also provided some important advantages in studying ethnoracial identity in the Dominican Republic, specifically. It allowed me to overcome the dearth of official data on ethnoracial identification, which was last collected and published in the 1960 census. Additionally, an in-person survey experiment gave me access to a representative sample of people with varying socio-economic (and ethnoracial) backgrounds. A laboratory or internet-based experiment in the Dominican Republic, for instance, would have yielded a sample composed disproportionately of middle and high socio-economic status individuals.

To address issues of external validity that tend to arise in survey-experiment research, I used existing national-level survey data from the AmericasBarometer at the

---

<sup>31</sup> I sampled seven municipalities in the province of Santo Domingo, which is home to over one-quarter of the national population. Funding limitations prevented me from collecting data in the borderlands contiguous to Haiti and in other regions of the country.

Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). Survey data from 2010 and 2012 enabled me to cross-examine public opinion trends on ethnoracial identification, social and ethnoracial preferences, political behavior, and key socio-economic indicators with my own survey data. Similarities on key issues between public opinion trends and results from my survey-experiment provided some indication that my findings were potentially generalizable to the national level. The random selection of participants in my study also helped to address issues of external validity.

I tested pre-experimental treatment conditions and post-experimental survey questions during four two-hour long focus group sessions in Santo Domingo. Focus group sessions allowed me to uncover important and counterintuitive interactions between age, gender, and social class and the effect of perceived ethnoracial identity on candidate evaluation. Moreover, focus group sessions provided me with a more in-depth understanding of the contested process of ethnoracial identity formation. They also gave me greater insights into the parameters of Dominico-Haitian group boundaries than I could extract from mostly closed-ended questions in the survey-experiment.

Given that my focus group research and survey-experiment mostly gave me access to the perceptions of non-elites, I also carried out over 50 semi-structured interviews with political elites and leaders in civil society, academia, and the private sector. Interviews with elites helped both to confirm and challenge my understanding of the influence of elites in mass-level ethnoracial identity and electoral behavior.

Although findings from my survey-experiment, focus group research, and semi-structured interviews confirmed the low salience of ethnoracial identity in electoral behavior in the Dominican Republic, they were less useful for explaining how this came to be. I engaged in historical process-tracing to ascertain how the development of ethnoracial group identity, historical institutions and structural conditions ultimately helped to obstruct the expression of ethnoracial identity in elections.

### **PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION**

The remainder of the dissertation will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 discusses ethno-racial identity formation in the Dominican Republic. I argue that extensive patterns of ethnoracial admixing, structural conditions, and a mix of inclusive and exclusionary nation-building policies, including anti-Haitianism, prevented the consolidation of ethnoracial group identities in the country. As this chapter shows, anti-Haitianism, in particular, has been fundamental to disarticulating ethno-racial identity and elevating the salience of national origin in Dominican politics.

Chapter 3 examines contemporary ethnoracial stratification and prejudice in the Dominican Republic. I draw on a variety of sources to show how high levels of ethnoracial inequality and discrimination have plagued the DR in recent years. I also examine ethnoracial classification in the DR. Based on existing public opinion data and my own survey research, I show that individuals have shunned dark-skinned categories in favor of identifying with hybrid and light-skinned categories. Lastly, I present evidence from a descriptive analysis of the 2006-2010 and 2010-2016 legislatures and from an

analysis of 2004 and 2008 electoral data to support my claim that ethnoracial identity is of low salience in Dominican electoral politics.

Chapter 4 uses original quantitative data from the experimental survey that I carried out in the Dominican Republic in 2011 to test the predictions of the main alternative approaches in the literature against the predictions of my argument. I complement the statistical analyses of experimental and survey data with qualitative evidence from focus group research and semi-formal interviews. The evidence suggests that the confluence of stratification and inchoate ethnoracial group identity indeed has prevented the activation of ethnoracial cleavages in the Dominican Republic. This same combination, however, has not impeded the activation of national origin in elections. Rather than strengthening the salience of ethnoracial cleavages in elections, nationalism has helped to redirect those cleavages.

Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation. I explore how ethnoracial identity has shaped political behavior across the region, including in Afro-Latin America. And I examine the extent to which we can compare ethnoracial voting in Latin America to other regions. I also discuss the theoretical implications of my argument for theories of race and political behavior more generally. The final section lays out broader applications for my argument and suggests an agenda for future research.

## **Chapter 2: The Determinants of Inchoate Ethnoracial Group Identity**

Thus far, I have argued that the salience of ethnoracial identity in elections is likely to be low in countries where ethnoracial boundaries are permeable. Given these conditions, individuals are less likely to identify with marginalized categories and to articulate ethnoracial-based demands.

In this chapter, I consider why individuals have not consolidated an ethnoracial group identity in the Dominican Republic. I contend that extensive intermixing, certain structural conditions, and a mix of inclusive and exclusionary nation-building strategies have impeded the consolidation of an Afro-descendant group identity.

Rapid and extensive patterns of black-white intermixing generated porous ethnoracial boundaries and soft in-category and out-category distinctions. Such elasticity in the boundary-making process muddled criteria for group membership and obstructed category loyalty. Individuals identified with more than one ethnoracial category. The absence of loyalty to a single ethnoracial category helped to foil the development of group consciousness.

Depopulation and poverty during the colonial period, as well as an increased emphasis on cattle ranching, also contributed to inchoate ethnoracial group identity. Cattle ranching relaxed the rigid labor relations that were endemic to the plantation economy. This change led to greater interaction between slaves and masters. It also considerably increased the number of free blacks and mulattos in the colony. Poverty, meanwhile, encouraged the exodus of colonialists and delayed the consolidation of a

landed elite class. Resulting depopulation from this exodus in turn provided greater openings for many free blacks and mulattos to fill positions of power in the colonial bureaucratic apparatus. Greater participation in the bureaucracy gave blacks and mulattos more access to social mobility and discouraged the articulation of ethnoracial-based grievances.

Lastly, I suggest that inclusive and exclusionary strategies of nation-building redirected ethnoracial cleavages and elevated the salience of national origin in Dominican culture. Political elites were committed to the abolition of slavery. They were well-aware that free blacks and mulattos were integral to securing (and later restoring) national independence. Likewise, black migrants from the British West Indies were perceived as vital to reviving the sugar industry and, in time, were socially included (with the exception of Haitians). These inclusive strategies prevented Afro-descendants from organizing around upending slavery or achieving collective rights.

Exclusionary strategies of nation-building, such as nativism and anti-Haitianism, also stymied the development of a “black” group identity by splintering Afro-descendants along lines of national origin. Many Afro-Dominicans adopted prejudices against people of Haitian descent, which prevented the development of a broader black racial consciousness in the Dominican Republic.

Intermixing, structural conditions in the colonial period, and inclusive/exclusionary nation-building strategies also help us better understand why ethnoracial reclassification has been a viable strategy for Afro-descendants to manage

stratification. As I suggest in the next chapter, high levels of stratification have encouraged Afro-descendants to identify with hybrid and lighter categories, such as *indio*, as a way to avoid further marginalization. And an inchoate ethnoracial group identity has made this strategy feasible.

### **RACIAL MIXING**

Extensive patterns of black and white admixing (*mulataje*) in large part explain why individuals have not consolidated ethnoracial group identity in the Dominican Republic. Intermixing between whites and blacks (defined as the population that is exclusively of African-descent) occurred early in the Dominican Republic. *Mulattos* likely first appeared on a mass scale sometime after the government of the Jerónimos, which was composed of a group of Friar delegates in the colony, petitioned for African slaves in 1517 (Larrázabal Blanco 1975). From the earliest days, the process of *mulataje* between African slaves and Spanish colonialists was involuntary and exploitative. It hardly resembled the type of racial democracy that some in the region now believe it to be.

Black and white intermixing was not the first form of hybridity on the island, but it was the most preponderant. The population of *mestizos* (the white-indigenous mixed population) was cut short with the precipitous decline of the aboriginal population in the sixteenth century. From a peak estimate of 100,000 to 300,000 aboriginals, approximately 3,000 remained in 1519 (Moya Pons 1998).

The recruitment of slaves and the rate of black-white admixing in the Spanish colony were accelerated by the boom of the sugar trade in the 1520s. By the time the local gold mining economy collapsed in 1528, slaves and mulattos had largely displaced aboriginals from the workforce (Tolentino Dipp 1974). Black slaves and free mulattos constituted an estimated 69 percent of the total population in 1548 and comprised 89 percent of the population in the first national census of 1606 (Franco 1969; Moya Pons 2008).

Data on the size of the mixed population are mostly unavailable or problematic before national independence in 1844. Official counts of the non-white population during the colonial period were mostly conducted along lines of free status rather than ethnoracial identity. They did not differentiate the mixed population from slaves and free blacks. In addition, existing estimates do not always coincide. Discrepancies in estimates of the ethnoracial composition particularly widened in periods of severe population decline, such as from 1795 to 1809, and in periods of extraordinary population growth, such as from 1739 to 1783 and 1875 to 1899 (Moya Pons 2008).

Nonetheless, the literature agrees that black and white intermixing in the Dominican Republic was extensive. The censuses of 1606 and 1795, for instance, both show large numbers of mulattos. In addition, numerous bureaucratic ordinances and legal codes either proposed or passed by the Spanish Crown between 1528 and 1789 also make clear the extent of intermixing in the colony. These regulations aimed to disrupt the high rates of hybridity and to preserve the colonial caste system. The laws of 1527, 1538, and

1541, in particular, restricted marriage between slaves and non-slaves as a way to reduce the number of mulattos that could claim freedom from intermixing (Derby 2003; Andrews 2004). Although never implemented, the Código Negro Carolino of 1784 also aimed to discourage hybridity by restricting claims of whiteness to sixth generation mulattos (Larrázabal 1975). Ruling elites, in fact, would not embrace ethnoracial hybridity in the Dominican Republic until efforts to lure European immigrants for nearly a century finally abated in the mid twentieth century (Inoa 1999).

Figure 2.1 plots the ethnoracial composition of the Dominican Republic between 1561 and 2014. Data for the period from 1561 to 1960 are based on consistent estimates in the literature. I supplemented missing estimates after 1960 with data from voting registries and national surveys. The 1960 national census is the last census to estimate the ethnoracial composition of the Dominican Republic. As Roth (2012) suggests, however, the same figures have been mistakenly attributed to the 1980 census.

The figure illustrates that whites have never constituted a majority of the national population. According to Tolentino Dipp (1974), mulattos and blacks surpassed whites as early as 1525. The white population began to rebound following national independence from Haiti in 1844 and further recovered with the surge of immigration from Turkey and modern-day Lebanon during the 1880s. Overall, however, the national percentage of whites has remained relatively low.




Figure 2.1: The Ethnoracial Composition by Percentage of Total Population, 1561-2014<sup>32</sup>

But as the figure also shows, blacks have not constituted an outright majority of the national population either—at least not since mulattos and blacks were disaggregated in the data beginning in the late eighteenth century. Blacks did not even become the majority when the country experienced an influx of labor migrants from the British West Indies and Haiti between 1880 and 1930. Indeed, according to census data, blacks constituted only about 25 percent of the population at the peak of this migration from

<sup>32</sup> Percentages for the period 1546-1960 were calculated based on total population estimates listed in the following sources: Pérez Cabral (1967); Franco (1969, 2003); Hoetink (1970); Dipp (1974); Larrázabal (1975); Moya Pons (1992, 2008); Howard (2001); Simmons (2009). Percentages for 1996 are based on voting registries from the Dominican Republic's Junta Central Electoral (JCE) and appear in Moya Pons (2008). Percentages for the period 2004-2014 are based on self-identification survey data collected by the AmericasBarometer surveys in nationally representative samples.

1916 to 1924, when the U.S. occupied the Dominican Republic for the first time (Vega 1993; Inoa 1999). Blacks, as well as whites, however, have each constituted the majority in certain rural and urban regions of the country (Moya Pons 2008).

Estimates of the size of the black population in the Dominican Republic should be viewed skeptically, however. Ruling elites (and Afro-descendants themselves) historically have done a great deal either to obfuscate or understate the size of the black population. For instance, estimates of the black population were distorted during attempts by Buenaventura Báez to annex the nation between 1868 and 1873 and during nation-building efforts by the Trujillo regime from 1930 to 1961. Glaring distortions are particularly notable in the 1950 and 1960 national censuses. A comparison between the 1935 and 1950 censuses shows that, inexplicably, the black population decreased from 19.5 percent to 11.5 percent (Simmons 2009). Nevertheless, immigration patterns, rates of intermixing, and travelers' accounts give little reason to believe that the percentage of "blacks" ever approached a national majority after independence. Survey data from 2004 to the present allows us to get a more reliable estimate of the percentage of the population that self-identifies as black, however.

The mixed population eclipsed whites and blacks early on in the history of the Dominican Republic, and the nation has remained overwhelmingly mulatto ever since, even if only a small fraction of Dominicans refer to themselves using those exact terms. Figure 2.1 illustrates that the percentage of the mixed population has consistently remained two or three times greater than the percentage of "whites" and "blacks" at least

since the late nineteenth century. Contemporary estimates of the number of mulattos typically range from 75 to 90 percent of the total population (Andrews 2004; Torres-Saillant 2005; Sagás 2012).

Early and pronounced patterns of ethnoracial mixing in the Dominican Republic have had important implications for the formation of ethnoracial identity at the individual and group levels. Ethnoracial hybridity generated identification with multiple and overlapping ethnoracial categories. It also made allegedly visible ethnoracial attributes, such as skin color and hair texture, salient membership criteria for ethnoracial classification. As in much of Latin America, however, cultural and descent-based characteristics, social class, nationality, age, education, popular culture, social movements, and occupation continue to influence ethnoracial classification in the DR.

In addition, permeable ethnoracial boundaries stifled feelings of loyalty for any single ethnoracial category. Afro-descendants, for example, have been more likely to form bonds on the basis of social class than on the basis of shared ethnoracial identity. And they do not necessarily identify with the ethnoracial identity of subordinate groups.

High levels of ethnoracial mixing in the Dominican Republic have also helped to sustain a popular myth of racial democracy that conceptualizes race as socially inconsequential. The myth of racial democracy has enabled the state to dismiss prickly questions of ethnoracial classification. It has also depressed the formation of ethnoracial group identities and mobilization based on those identities.

## **CATTLE RANCHING, POVERTY, AND DEPOPULATION**

Certain structural conditions during the colonial period similarly undermined the consolidation of ethnoracial group identity in the Dominican Republic. A shift to cattle ranching, continued abject poverty, and depopulation inverted the highly rigid labor relations of the early colonial period (Torres Saillant 1998; Derby 2003).

Toward the end of the sixteenth century, the Dominican Republic underwent an important transition from sugar to cattle ranching as its leading mode of production. By 1580, the sugar boom had ended and the plantation system was mostly depleted. In addition to the erosion of the plantation system, the contraband of slaves on the northern coast deprived the Spanish monarchy taxes on the import of slaves (Andújar 2006). This gave the monarchy added reason to abandon the island.

Cattle ranching endured for nearly three hundred years in the Dominican Republic—until the appearance of modern sugar factories in the 1870s. It achieved such longevity in large part because it had lower startup costs than the plantation economy. Cattle-ranching was less capital intensive than the sugar industry, required a smaller labor force and less supervision, and was practiced in communal lands or *hatos* (Hoetink 1970; Andrews 2004). In addition, cattle ranching's less structured division of labor made it more adaptable to changing demographic patterns in the colony.

The shift to cattle ranching had far-reaching consequences on the structure of inter-racial relations. Derby (2003) argues that relations between slaves and masters grew more intimate and paternalistic given the dependence of masters on few slaves and the benefits that slaves could accrue from their masters. Moreover, slaves could gradually

become ranchers and purchase their own freedom by selling surplus production (Andrews 2004). By the end of the eighteenth century, freedmen so vastly outnumbered slaves and whites that colonialists petitioned the Spanish monarchy in 1795 to renew the importation of slaves in order to rekindle production.<sup>33</sup>

Cattle ranching by no means cushioned conditions for slaves or quelled slave insurrections. Slaves frequently led armed uprisings in the colony or fled to protest cruel mistreatment, among other reasons. By 1545, there were an estimated seven thousand runaway slaves, many of whom established maroon settlements in the mountains of Maniel and Bahoruco (Franco 1969; Larrázabal 1975; Moya Pons 2008). Nor did cattle ranching lead slaves to acquire sociopolitical rights. Slaves rebelled as late as 1812 in Mendoza and Mojarra to protect their right to Spanish nationality under the 1812 Spanish constitution (Torres-Saillant 1999; Andújar 2006). But cattle ranching, by and large, offered slaves greater freedoms and less structured relations with their masters on a day-to-day basis. This was true even as the Spanish Crown tried to maintain highly stratified relations in the colony.

Poverty and depopulation in the colonial period also allowed patterns of ethnoracial mixing to undermine the formation of ethnoracial group identity. Widespread poverty helped to narrow wealth disparities on the island and attenuated the importance of social class (Torres-Saillant 1999). Depopulation, meanwhile, cleared the way for a

---

<sup>33</sup> “Expediente sobre las mejoras y adelantamiento de la Isla Española de Santo Domingo” in Larrázabal (1975).

number of “blacks” and mulattos to enter the colonial apparatus and to ascend to positions of power.

The Dominican Republic was late to recover from the collapse of sugar production and ensuing poverty at the end of the sixteenth century. Cattle ranching was mostly subsistence based and could not by itself assuage poverty in the colony. And the Spanish Crown funneled most of its resources to colonies that either held geopolitical value or that showed promise in sugar production or gold and silver mining (Gates 2011). Sugar production and gold mining had collapsed in the Dominican Republic by 1580, which meant that it received few resources from the Spanish Crown during the period that followed. Economic depression especially worsened during renewed Spanish control from 1808 to 1821, a period known as *La España Boba* (Hoetink 1970).

Although economic collapse threatened the buoyancy of the colony, it helped to avoid the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few during the colonial period. There were few wealthy landowners in the Dominican Republic, except for some remaining barons in Santiago and Puerto Plata, and land tenure was mostly communal and diffused (Hoetink 1970). There were also few slaveholders. Most settlers could not afford to import slaves.

The contraction of wealth in the colony delayed the formation of social classes, including the development of a bourgeoisie (Bosch 1992).<sup>34</sup> Social classes in the Dominican Republic, in fact, remained largely unstructured until the late nineteenth

---

<sup>34</sup> A different school of thought represented by Howard (2001) and Betances (1995), among others, has suggested that merchant groups in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in fact constituted an early form of bourgeoisie.

century, when sugar producers who fled the U.S. Civil War and the Ten Years' War in Cuba established plantations and modern refineries in the Dominican south (Hoetink 1982; Howard 2001).<sup>35</sup> Rekindled sugar production generated an underclass of unskilled, low-wage black migrants, on the one hand, and a bourgeoisie comprised of foreign sugar producers and merchants, on the other. Derby (2003, 32) refers to this bifurcation as “ethnic labor market segmentation.” The neosultanistic rule of Ulises Heureaux between 1882 and 1899<sup>36</sup> and the United States' occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924 also helped to consolidate the bourgeoisie and accelerated labor segmentation.<sup>37</sup>

Depopulation and demographic instability during the colonial period were compounded by poverty and the neglect of the Crown. The exodus of legions of white settlers, including merchants and landowners, especially devastated the colony financially. From an estimated twelve thousand Spanish colonists in 1506, five thousand remained in 1546 and only 1,304 were counted in 1606 (Moya Pons 2008).

---

<sup>35</sup> Large-scale sugar production in the south surged in the first two decades of the twentieth century, quickly outpacing coffee and tobacco production in the north (Hartlyn 1998; Howard 2001). From a total of 7,000 tons in 1880, sugar exports reached 144,911 tons in 1916 (Cassá 1992; Martínez-Vergne 2005).

<sup>36</sup> Heureaux shielded sugar producers from the drop in sugar prices to protect his investments in the sugar industry. In doing so, he solidified their social position. Meanwhile, Heureaux obstructed the social mobility that had been available to blacks and mulattoes (Hoetink 1982). His centralization of the military and the bureaucracy, for example, reduced opportunities in parallel institutions and in provincial governments.

<sup>37</sup> Howard (2001) states that the bourgeoisie grew interconnected by modern communication and infrastructure and benefited from tariffs on local elites. In addition, patrimonial economic structures and neoliberal market policies following the U.S. occupation produced growth without redistribution and further fomented ethnoracial stratification (Hartlyn 1998).

The Dominican Republic remained sparsely populated until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when the population exploded with the boom of contracted black labor from the British West Indies. The colony lost up to 120,000 settlers between 1795 and 1809 (Moya Pons 1992). In 1844, at the point of independence, the total population of the nation had only reached 126,000—the equivalent of about a fifth of the size of the Haitian population at that time.

Despite its destabilizing effects, depopulation literally opened a space for free blacks and mulattos in the colony. Most free blacks and mulattos became cattle herders and farmers and a significant number were appointed to the bureaucratic apparatus or enlisted in the armed forces (Sagás and Inoa 2003). Free blacks and mulattos, in particular, experienced ascent in the Dominican bureaucracy and the armed forces during Haiti's entrance into Dominican territory in 1801 and during the Haitian unification of the island years later.

The armed forces propelled many blacks and mulattos to positions of power. Two black Dominicans, Gregorio Luperón and Ulises Hereaux (Lilís), for instance, served as high-ranking military officials in the war against Spanish annexation in 1865 before reaching the presidency at the end of the nineteenth century. According to Derby (2003), greater social mobility enabled blacks and mulattos to gradually forge a “black middle sector” prior to the reemergence of sugar production.

Depopulation did not eliminate economic disparities between blacks and whites, however. The Spanish Crown was far too invested in sustaining the colonial caste system

in the Dominican Republic. But depopulation allowed a greater number of blacks and mulattos to improve their socioeconomic status and fill positions of power. The newfound ascent of free blacks and mulattos, coupled with an unconsolidated class structure and sweeping poverty, facilitated greater ethnoracial mixing and put whiteness within closer reach. Free blacks and mulattos could not only inherit levels of whiteness through intermixing but could also afford to purchase privileges that had been reserved for whites through decrees such as “*gracias al sacar*” (Andrews 2004).

Ethnoracial group affinities also became less salient as free blacks and mulattos were inserted into the colonial apparatus and gained greater social mobility. Those appointed to the colonial bureaucracy, for instance, commonly self-identified as “blancos de la tierra” or whites of the land (Fennema and Lowenthal 1987).

There was little sense of in-group solidarity. This was as true for free blacks in the cities as it was for rural black peasants. For example, free blacks fought against slaves in 1810 to help Spain maintain control of the island (Derby 2003). And rural black peasants, known as *monteros*, often colluded with hunters of runaway slaves during the Haitian revolution (Derby 2003).

Taken together, cattle ranching production, poverty and depopulation during the colonial period hindered a sense of group solidarity and consciousness based on ethnoracial identity. These conditions ultimately helped to stunt the articulation of ethnoracial grievances. They also stifled the emergence of ethnoracial entrepreneurs. As I will suggest in the next section, the absence of ethnoracial entrepreneurs made it far

easier for inclusive and exclusionary strategies of nation-building in the nineteenth and twentieth to thwart the consolidation of ethnoracial group identity.

### **NATION-BUILDING**

Inclusive and exclusionary strategies of nation-building also obstructed the consolidation of ethnoracial group identities in the DR.<sup>38</sup> This mix of strategies, which usually followed periods of renewed sovereignty and autonomy between 1844 and 1924, appeased the sociopolitical anxieties of whites and non-whites alike. Whites feared that Haiti would make additional attempts to re-unify the island. They were also wary of the supposedly noxious effects that racial hybridity and African descent might have on the progress of the nation. Free blacks and mulattos, meanwhile, were concerned about the possibility of a return to slavery. They also wanted to escape the racial prejudice of elites, which only deepened with the emergence of modern sugar industries.

In addition, nation-building strategies helped to foment greater unity among ethnoracial groups and to blunt ethnoracial cleavages. For elites, unity (or the perception of it) was essential given recurrent threats to national autonomy and the absence of a modern state. The mix of inclusive and exclusionary nation-building strategies redirected

---

<sup>38</sup> I refer to three specific nation-building periods: post-independence from Haiti, post-Spanish annexation in 1865, and post-U.S. occupation in 1924. These periods did not merely serve as a stage for power contestations between liberal and conservative elites following the acquisition of sovereignty or autonomy. Rather, these periods reimagined the ethnoracial boundaries of nation and citizen. Although Juan Bosch's victory in 1962 aimed to reimagine notions of nation and citizen, his government was overthrown before his 1963 constitution could develop into a nation-building project.

ethnoracial cleavages and elevated the importance of national origin in the construction of Dominican identity.<sup>39</sup>

### ***Inclusive Strategies***

Two inclusive strategies of nation-building in particular forestalled the formation of ethnoracial group identity: the abolition of slavery and the social inclusion of most black immigrant groups, with the exception of Haitians. These strategies impeded blacks and mulattos from organizing group identity around upending slavery or achieving group-based rights.

Dominican political elites, both liberals (pro-independence) and conservatives (Annexationists), demonstrated a strategic commitment to emancipation in the nineteenth century. Realizing the risks of not appeasing the demands of free blacks and mulattos, who constituted a majority in the armed forces and in the national population (Inoa 1999), elites capitulated. Within days of gaining independence from Haiti in 1844, the *Junta Central* or ruling Central Board ratified the abolition of slavery (Torres-Saillant 1999).

Slaves in Dominican territory already had gained freedom in fits and starts prior to final emancipation in 1844. Haitian Governor Louverture abolished slavery in 1801, during the period when Dominican territory was ceded to France. However, the Napoleonic government of Charles Leclerc deposed Louverture in 1802 and Governor Gerrard Ferrand reinstated slavery in 1804 (Hoetink 1970). The Spanish monarchy

---

<sup>39</sup> See Marx (1998, 4) for a discussion on how states encourage loyalty to the national identity to strengthen their “monopoly of legitimacy.”

continued slavery after regaining control of the eastern side of the island in 1808. President Boyer finally reintroduced abolition in Dominican territory during Haitian unification from 1822 to 1844.

Although abolition was not entirely novel in the Dominican Republic in 1844, Dominican independence leaders considered it an important strategy of inclusion. Liberal elites such as Juan Pablo Duarte and some members of the secret society *La Trinitaria* courted popular classes and ethnoracial groups to ensure that freed slaves and mulattos would support national independence.<sup>40</sup>

Freed slaves and mulattos already had shown that their support was necessary to consolidate independence. In 1821 a segment of blacks and mulattos defied the brief, “ephemeral independence” led by José Núñez de Cáceres and instead supported Haitian unification in exchange for protection. They remained wary that independence would not address their concerns over slavery given the close ties between the faction of Núñez de Cáceres and the interests of the Spanish monarchy (Franco 1969, 2003). Moreover, freed slaves had shown in their rebellion at Monte Grande, shortly after independence, that they would contest any continuation of slavery in the new republic. Emancipation allayed the most immediate political anxieties of blacks and mulattos.

---

<sup>40</sup> Abolition in the DR in 1822 and final ratification in 1844 preceded abolition in nations around the region with a similar percentage of Afro-descendants, with the exception of Haiti (1804). Abolition in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Brazil was passed in 1873, 1886, and 1888, respectively. Although abolition in Chile (1823), the Central American Federation (1824), and Mexico (1829) was passed before ratification in the DR, the percentage of slave populations was not as high or as consequential for their respective economies at the time (Andrews 2004).

In the aftermath of independence, efforts to withstand attacks from Haiti heightened the importance of sustaining a commitment to the abolition of slavery. Abolition ensured that freed slaves would remain loyal to the nascent republic in the period between 1844 and 1856, during which the Haitian oligarchy made at least three serious attempts to invade the Dominican Republic and recover lost territory (Moya Pons 1998; Inoa 1999). With abolition at home secured, free slaves had little reason to seek protection from Haiti or to collude with invading Haitian forces. Free slaves also had little reason to organize on the basis of slavery.

Conservative elites led by Pedro Santana also reinforced a strategic commitment to the abolition of slavery during the Spanish annexation from 1861 to 1865, though Santana exiled members of *La Trinitaria*. The St. Thomas Manifesto of 1861, for instance, ensured that Spain would not reinstate slavery on Dominican territory (Torres-Saillant 1999). Conservative elites hoped that maintaining abolition would weaken opposition to Spanish annexation by free blacks and mulattos. Blacks and mulattos feared that Spain would again undermine their rights, as in the period of *La España Boba*, and further displace them from top administrative posts (Hoetink 1970). Santana sought both to mollify blacks and mulattos and to extend annexation, which he argued was necessary to protect the Dominican Republic from future invasion attempts by Haiti.

But rather than weakening opposition to Spanish annexation, abolition strengthened opposition. The mistreatment of blacks and mulattos during annexation, Moya Pons states (1998, 94), encouraged a multi-sector effort to protect abolition and

restore national sovereignty. Nonetheless, a strategic commitment to abolition by elites obstructed the formation of an ethnoracial group identity around upending slavery.

The social inclusion of most black migrants in periods of nation-building also did much to keep a broad black group identity unconsolidated in the Dominican Republic. It helped to dilute racial, ethnic, and linguistic differences among non-white immigrant groups and hindered organization along those lines. It should be noted, however, that despite gaining social inclusion black migrants remained politically marginalized. The state remained under the control of foreign capital or under elite-led exclusionary regimes for much of the twentieth century (Conaghan and Espinal 1990).

For black migrants, inclusion was cyclical rather than linear or gradual. The initial inclusion of black migrants took place early during Haitian unification. In 1824 and 1825, president Boyer incorporated a number of black migrants, including six to thirteen thousand black U.S. Southern Methodists in the cities of Samaná and Puerto Plata (Larrázabal Blanco 1975).<sup>41</sup>

Efforts to integrate black migrants were discontinued in the immediate aftermath of independence from Haiti by ruling elites who sought to whiten the population. Based on pseudo-scientific theories of Herbert Spencer and Count Arthur de Gobineau, among others, elites believed that whitening could rehabilitate the supposed impurity of hybridity and counteract the deficiencies of racial mixture (Skidmore 1990, Loveman

---

<sup>41</sup> Hoetink (1970) notes that free slaves from the U.S. South that specifically settled in the Samaná Peninsula during Haitian occupation did not readily integrate.

2014).<sup>42</sup> They also believed that white immigrants were key to populating the island, reducing the domestic debt, and consolidating nation-building, as Martínez-Vergne suggests (2005, 82-84). And they employed a diverse tool kit to court white immigration, including presidential decrees, legal reforms, and preferential fiscal policies, such as tax exemptions (Hoetink 1970; Martínez-Vergne 2005).

The administrations of Buenaventura Báez in 1852 and Gregorio Luperón in 1880 especially attempted to recruit European immigrants, as did the Trujillo regime. In the 1930s, Trujillo recruited Jewish refugees to the northern side of the Dominican Republic and in 1941 he offered citizenship to an additional ten thousand Jewish refugees (Fennema and Lowenthal 1987). For the most part, however, Trujillo, Luperón, Báez, and others were unable to recruit white migrants at the same rate at which whites had migrated from the Canary Islands in the early 1760s, for instance.

Ruling elites compensated for their failure to attract white immigrants by reducing black immigration in periods when there was either a surplus of black wage laborers or when they wanted to flex national sovereignty. They applied a number of legal reforms to obstruct black immigration and delay the inclusion of black migrants. The Agrarian Law of 1911 during the Cáceres administration, for instance, specifically aimed to curb black immigration and stimulate white migrant labor in the agricultural industry. Likewise, the immigration law of 1912, Executive Order 372 of 1919, and the immigration law of 1932, all attempted to discourage black immigration from the British West Indies and

---

<sup>42</sup> A number of Dominican intellectuals expressed similar pessimism about the effects of hybridity. These included José Ramón López, Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal, Federico García Godoy, Américo Lugo, and Eugenio Moscoso Puello, among others (Howard 2001).

from Haiti. Whereas the first two required black migrants either to seek permission or to hold additional work permits, the latter imposed residential taxes on black migrants (Inoa 1999). Popular classes, too, opposed black migration. In 1914, members of a so-called Propaganda Society railed against black migrants for depressing wages and displacing Dominican laborers (Inoa 1999).

Notwithstanding intermittent opposition from ruling elites and from popular classes, most black migrants were socially integrated and eventually embraced in the Dominican Republic. In the absence of sufficient white immigration, black migrants helped to populate the nation, relieved labor shortages, and worked in perilous conditions for lower wages. Only Haitian migrants remained perpetually marginalized (Martínez-Vergne 2005), even after Haiti no longer posed a military threat and had recognized Dominican sovereignty in the Peace and Commerce Treaty of 1874. Nonetheless, Haitian migrants were vigorously recruited and continued to self-integrate as they had done along the borderlands for generations.

Few migrant groups were as included during nation-building periods that followed Spanish annexation as those from the British West Indies—except, perhaps, for migrants from Turkey and modern-day Lebanon referred to as *Árabes* or Arabs.<sup>43</sup> From the late 1880s to the late 1920s, laborers mostly from St. Kitts and Nevis migrated in mass to cities such as San Pedro de Macorís, Montecristi, and Puerto Plata. They became

---

<sup>43</sup> Migrants from Turkey and modern-day Lebanon were also subject to opposition in the late nineteenth century given their ambulatory commercial practices and their grip over commerce. However, they integrated and were backed by the government (Hoetink 1970).

highly in demand in the sugar industry as the price of sugar dropped and wages in sugar refineries declined.

Migrants from the British West Indies eventually replaced Puerto Rican migrant laborers and Dominican peasants who spurned low wages. Despite their own labor strikes in 1901, 1911, and in the 1920s, West Indians enjoyed protection from their government, the British Crown. This protection stabilized West Indian migration flows until they were eventually displaced by Haitian immigration. An average of five thousand British West Indians migrated annually between 1912 and 1920 and eight thousand laborers resided in the city of San Pedro de Macorís alone by 1924 (Inoa 1999).

The social inclusion of black migrants from the British West Indies helped to foil the development of black group identity. Social inclusion swept away racial and linguistic characteristics that had initially defined black immigrant groups. It also avoided the types of confrontations between blacks and whites that bedeviled plantations in Costa Rica and Honduras, for instance (Andrews 2004). Relations between blacks and whites indeed remained relatively harmonious in the Dominican Republic even as levels of ethnoracial stratification heightened with the return of sugar. Ethnoracial harmony would portend well for legitimizing the myth of racial democracy.

### ***Exclusionary Strategies***

Exclusionary strategies of nation-building also undermined the formulation of ethnoracial group identities. *Indigenismo* and anti-Haitianism, in particular, dissociated blackness from the national identity and diverted attention away from high levels of

stratification. Anti-Haitianism, in particular, divided “black” Dominicans between those who were and those who were not of Haitian descent.

After political elites in much of Latin America failed to attract sufficient white immigration, they began to exalt indigenismo, mestizaje, and ethnoracial hybridity to refute the claims of the eugenics movement (Stepan 1991; Andrews 2004). Gilberto Freyre and José Vasconcelos were two of the most prominent proponents of *mestizaje*. Bonilla-Silva (2010) argues persuasively that elites touted white-indigenous intermixing (*mestizaje*) in part to cushion racial conflict but also as way to keep mixed populations invested in perpetuating castes.

Dominican political elites, too, turned to *mestizaje* and *indigenismo* at the beginning of the 1930s to unite the nation.<sup>44</sup> But unlike nations in the region with predominant *mestizo* and indigenous populations, the Dominican Republic had been overwhelmingly mulatto and devoid of aboriginals since the mid sixteenth century. *Indigenismo* helped political elites to extricate blackness from the national identity.

*Indigenismo* was first institutionalized during the regime of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, though an indigenous literary genre had emerged at the end of the nineteenth century in the Dominican Republic.<sup>45</sup> His regime emphasized the indigenous and Hispanic roots of the nation and sought to play down its blackness. It designated both

---

<sup>44</sup> Indigenismo is understood here as the vindication of indigenous ancestry or nativism, more generally.

<sup>45</sup> The Trujillo regime most notably employed Manuel de Jesús Galván’s *Enriquillo* (1882) to advance nativist claims of indigenismo.

*indio* and *mestizo* as official census categories in 1935 and in 1950 (Simmons 2012).<sup>46</sup> The regime also erected a legal apparatus to protect the hallowed Hispanicity of the nation. Law 319 of 1943, for instance, renamed the names of cities along the border in Spanish and prohibited the practice of Vodou (Inoa 1999).

*Indigenismo*, alongside Hispanicity, resumed historical efforts by ruling elites to differentiate the Dominican Republic from Haiti. Those efforts had been largely interrupted by U.S. occupations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1915 and 1916, respectively. Rather than looking outward, the Trujillo regime turned inward and conjured a long lost aboriginal ancestry to differentiate the Dominican Republic from Haiti. This differed from the strategies employed by ruling elites in the nineteenth century, who attached the nation to Spain, attempted to annex the nation to the U.S., and recruited white immigration.

*Indigenismo* offered a framework through which the Trujillo regime endorsed racialized anti-Haitianism that emerged at the turn of the twentieth century. *Indigenismo* delimited the ethnoracial boundaries of the nation and restored the country's ethnoracial distance from a mostly black Haitian population.<sup>47</sup> That distance had been breached with the influx of Haitian labor migrants after the U.S occupation.

---

<sup>46</sup> Mulato was dropped as a census category during the U.S. occupation and reappeared in 1998 but as a skin color category on the national identification card (Simmons 2012).

<sup>47</sup> Trujillo also sought to demarcate territorial boundaries between the two nations, which had remained murky since the Treaty of Aranjuez in 1777. The 1936 boundary agreement between the Trujillo and Vincent governments was one of few attempts to demarcate clearer borders between the Dominican Republic and Haiti since 1777 (Howard, 2001).

Broad support for *indigenismo* from whites and non-whites alike ensured the endurance of *indigenismo* and dissociated blackness from the national identity. For conservative white elites, *indigenismo* was an effective rhetorical means by which to dilute the nation's blackness without having to import whiteness. For mixed-race Dominicans, *indio* represented an intermediate ethnic category between white and black that was more clearly differentiated from blackness. It also provided a sense of ethnoracial ambiguity and accommodated ethnoracial hybridity. And for "black" Dominicans unable to pass for mixed, identification as *indio* helped to avoid prejudice. By embracing *indigenismo*, however, "blacks" and mulattos inhibited the development of a black group identity.

Anti-Haitianism was similarly detrimental to the formation of ethnoracial group identity in the Dominican Republic. Anti-Haitianism consigned blackness to Haitian migrant labor and, similar to *indigenismo*, dissociated blackness from Dominican national identity. Politically, anti-Haitianism marginalized Dominicans of Haitian descent and subverted potential coalitions among afro-descendants.

Although Dominican nationalism has almost always existed in contraposition to Haiti, anti-Haitianism did not become ethnoracialized until the second decade of the twentieth century. Anti-Haitianism intensified during Haitian unification but it was not entirely ethnoracialized or directed at the popular classes. Most Dominicans opposed the increasingly despotic rule of Jean Pierre Boyer and railed against the decline of

agriculture and the economic crisis of 1843 (Martínez-Vergne 2005; Derby 2003, 2012).<sup>48</sup>

During independence efforts in 1844, anti-Haitianism was grounded on national differentiation more than on ethnoracial differentiation. The Trinitarian Manifesto of 1844 and subsequent decrees, for instance, called for measures to differentiate the Dominican Republic from Haiti by expropriating Haitian-owned goods and by nullifying the Haitian currency (Inoa 1999). Following independence, Dominicans attributed the defeat of Haiti's divided and demoralized military to myths of Dominican tactical and moral superiority. They also directed anti-Haitianism largely at Haitian ruling elites, who made attempts to recover the Dominican Republic until 1856.

An ethnoracialized brand of anti-Haitianism emerged among the popular classes around 1916 when a sharp rise in sugar prices led to a boom of contracted Haitian migration.<sup>49</sup> In the late 1920s, Haitian migrants displaced West Indian labor particularly in the low-wage cane cutting industry (Derby 2003). By 1935, there were 52,657 Haitians registered in the national census (Simmons 2009). The Trujillo regime massacred and repatriated thousands of Haitians and Dominico-Haitian labor migrants in 1937 to stem the flow of Haitian migrants and nationalize the borderlands. The massacre was also part of broader ethno-national differentiation project. It juxtaposed Dominican Hispanicity

---

<sup>48</sup> Despite opposition, Boyer retained support from many free blacks and mulattos as well as small-landowners and merchants in the Cibao region and in the borderlands because he passed reforms that punctured the Spanish caste system. These reforms included land redistribution, the suspension of feudal privileges, and the more egalitarian constitution of 1843.

<sup>49</sup> Ethnoracial distinctions between the two sides of the island were made at the diplomatic level as far back as the early to mid 19<sup>th</sup> century, when U.S. State Department officials deliberated whether the D.R. had the right proportion of whites in its leadership to be recognized an independent republic (Schoultz 1998: 80).

and indigenismo to Haitian blackness and consigned blackness to Haiti (Vega 1993). But anti-Haitianism was not entirely ethnoracialized among elites immediately before or even after the 1937 massacre. Vega (2007), for example, argues that racialized anti-Haitianism emerged during the Trujillo regime only after his relations with Haitian President Élie Lescot soured in the early 1940s.

Ethnoracialized anti-Haitianism also crystallized following the ouster of Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti in 1986. His ouster broke off previous interstate labor agreements reached in 1952, 1959, and 1966, and demilitarized the border. As a result, Haitian migration increased significantly and migrants began to labor outside of sugar enclaves (Cassá 1992; Vega 1993). Although they were recruited by the state, the Haitian migrants that moved into new areas such as construction, service and the informal sectors were blamed for the economic crisis in the Dominican Republic in the early 1990s.

Since the mid to late 1990s, when the Partido Reformista Social Cristiano (PRSC) began its electoral slide and left the right-of-center up for grabs, ruling elites have primarily appealed to ethnoracialized anti-Haitianism. They have evoked anti-Haitianism as a means to glue together ultra-conservative sectors and marginalize a voting segment of the opposition. In addition, anti-Haitianism has allowed elites to play up national sovereignty and signal measured defiance to international actors. This has resonated well across diverse domestic constituencies given the history of foreign transgressions against Dominican sovereignty.

Racialized anti-Haitianism played out most publically in the 1994 and 1996 presidential campaigns of José Francisco Peña Gómez, a presidential candidate of Haitian descent and a leader of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD). In 1996, the incumbent party (PRSC) colluded with segments of the opposition to slow support for Peña Gómez. They waged mudslinging attacks on Peña Gómez's Haitian descent. The alliance also heightened existing anxieties over the threat of Haitian migration to Dominican territorial sovereignty and cultural integrity (Sagás 2000). Peña Gómez, the front-runner in 1994 and in 1996, lost both elections by a narrow margin, though the 1994 elections were sullied by evidence of electoral fraud.

Since the Senate approved the 2004 Migration Law, the ruling PLD party has institutionalized policies that are deleterious for Dominicans of Haitian descent. In 2007, the Central Electoral Board (JCE) issued "Circular 017," an instruction to government officials to confiscate or withhold copies of civil registry documents that contained irregularities (UN General Assembly Report 2008).

Rulings by the Supreme Court in 2005 and 2010 qualified Haitian undocumented migrants and their descendants as "in transit" and denied them citizenship. In September of 2013, the national Constitutional Tribunal applied the 2010 ruling retroactively to 1929. The ruling potentially deprives citizenship to up to four generations of permanent communities of Dominico-Haitians, which represent an estimated population of 210,000

(Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes 2012; Oficina Nacional de Estadística 2012).<sup>50</sup> Efforts in 2014 by the government of Danilo Medina to naturalize or regularize the status of individuals affected by the 2013 ruling are unlikely to benefit the largest and most vulnerable group: Dominican-born Haitian descendants not in the civil registry.

Legal and electoral strategies that aim to disenfranchise Haitian descendants and consolidate the right-of-center electoral bloc have impeded the consolidation of political coalitions between Haitians and dark-skinned Dominicans. For marginalized Dominicans of Afro-descent, the uncertain legal status of Dominico-Haitians dampens the appeal of forging a group identity inclusive of Dominico-Haitians despite similar ethnoracial attributes and common grievances.

The benefits of unregulated migration for both governments, along with various other push and pull factors, have helped to sustain the flow of undocumented Haitian migrants and keep Haitian descendants disenfranchised.<sup>51</sup> The Dominican economy has become dependent on the labor of Haitian migrants. A recent study by the European Union and the United Nations Population Fund found that Haitian migrants contribute 5.4 percent of the value added to the Dominican national economy (Bolívar Díaz 2014). Since the earthquake in 2010, undocumented Haitian migration has increased by nearly 20 percent (García-Peña 2013). In 2012, over 450,000 Haitian migrants resided in the

---

<sup>50</sup> After an initial audit of birth records since 1929, the Central Electoral Board (JCE) determined that 13,672 Haitian descendants had been registered invalidly and would stand to lose Dominican citizenship. The JCE, however, has yet to determine the impact of the ruling on populations that were never registered. The plan set into motion by the state in November 2013 largely aims to regularize descendants who were registered invalidly.

<sup>51</sup> See Báez and Lozano (1992, 2005); Corten and Duarte (1992); Dore (1999); Silié, Segura, et al. (2002); Silié (2003); Wooding and Moseley-Williams (2004).

Dominican Republic (ENI-2012). Haitian migrants constitute slightly over eighty-seven percent of the immigrant population and approximately five percent of the national population. This number could increase in the years ahead. In the 2012 Barometer of the Americas survey of Haiti, 58 percent of interviewees stated that they intended to emigrate—the highest percentage in the region (Espinal and Morgan 2012).

Haitians migrate en masse to the Dominican Republic to escape severe underdevelopment and high levels of inequality. The 2013 United Nations Development Program Report ranked Haiti last in the region and 161 out of 186 nations in terms of human development. On a scale of 0 to 1, in which 0 is low and 1 is high, Haiti had a Human Development Index of 0.456 or 0.273 after adjusting for inequality.<sup>52</sup> The value of remittances to Haiti also encourages Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic and elsewhere. Formal remittances to Haiti in 2010 totaled nearly \$1.5 billion dollars, equivalent to twenty-one percent of Haiti's GDP and greater than virtually all of Haiti's financial inflows (World Bank Development Prospects Group; Migration Policy Institute). Two-thirds of Haitian interviewees in the same Barometers of the Americas survey stated that they received remittances. This placed Haiti first in the region and well above second-place Jamaica (43 percent).

Whereas Haitian emigration relieves overpopulation in Haiti and remittances boost financial inflows, Haitian immigration provides Dominican public and private sectors with a low-wage labor pool. Haitian migrants are recruited incessantly to staff

---

<sup>52</sup> Human Development Index is an aggregate measure of life expectancy, schooling, and income per capita (GNI).

jobs shunned by many Dominicans, and at minimal costs to employers. Most Haitian migrants do not receive guaranteed labor contracts or health insurance (ENI-2012). And given their precarious legal status, many are vulnerable to arbitrary expulsions and massive roundups without a due process that allows them to contest deportations or to collect their wages.

That Haitians are usually phenotypically darker than most Dominicans and that Haitian migrants constitute a poor and unskilled underclass compounds ethnoracialized anti-Haitianism. More than half of Haitian migrants live in homes without running water, cooking gas, or adequate home flooring, and nearly seventy percent either hold no formal education or have completed only primary education (ENI-2012).

In addition to depressing labor wages, Haitian migrants are marginalized in the Dominican Republic because they place further stress on already scant public resources. The Ministry of Health spent ten percent of its budget on Haitian nationals in 2012 (though some estimates put spending closer to 18 percent), and the Ministry of Education spent some two million dollars on pre-university education for Haitian nationals from 2011 to 2012 (Martínez 2013). Although small, these sums are not insignificant. In 2013, the Dominican government invested only 4 percent of its nearly \$64 billion dollar GDP on education and only 2 percent on health (UNDP 2013). In October 2015, the public debt represented 36.2 percent of the national GDP.

Haitian migrants also exacerbate existing developmental challenges in the Dominican Republic. Despite a significant increase from 1990 to 2012 in human

development and, specifically, in per capita income, the Dominican Republic remains below regional averages in both categories.<sup>53</sup> Its Human Development Index placed it thirteenth in the region and 96<sup>th</sup> in the world. The DR also performs below the regional average in terms of education (measured both as average years of schooling and secondary education completed), life expectancy, maternal deaths, adolescent pregnancy, child labor, homicides, and perceptions of public safety (UNDP 2013).

Low wages and highly regressive taxes (as a percentage of wages) have helped to increase levels of inequality since 2002 despite economic growth. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) ranked the Dominican Republic as the third most unequal nation in the region based on the distribution of income between the top and bottom quintiles (Meacham 2013). Whereas the top quintile earned 50 percent of national income in 2012, the bottom quintile merely earned four percent (CEPAL 2013).

Data from the World Bank, CEPAL, and from the Central Bank also point to continuing high levels of poverty and economic inactivity among the population. Only 2 percent of Dominicans were pulled out of poverty over the last decade despite 50 percent growth in the GDP across the same period (World Bank 2014). Over forty percent of the population lived in poverty and 10.4 percent lived in extreme poverty in 2011 and 2012, relative to 32.8 percent and 8.8 percent, respectively, in 2002 (CEPAL 2013; Espinal 2013). In addition, more than 700,000 Dominicans were economically active but

---

<sup>53</sup> The 2013 United Nations Development Program Report listed HDI and income per capita regional averages for Latin America and the Caribbean at 0.741 and 10,300, respectively. The Dominican Republic's HDI and income per capita were 0.702 (up from 0.584 in 1990) and 8,406, respectively.

unemployed (PEAD), and over 800,000 reported that they neither attended school nor formed part of the labor force in the 2013 Labor Force National Survey.

Ethnoracialized economic anxieties over continued Haitian labor migration, and the elites' historical antipathy toward Haiti and Haitian descendants have help spawn anti-Haitian public opinion (Cassá 1992; Moya Pons 1999). Data from a variety of surveys point to continuing high levels of anti-Haitianism. Enduring anti-Haitian public opinion does much to undermine the formation of a cohesive black group racial identity.

Evidence from a 2011 survey that I conducted in Santo Domingo based on a representative sample of 694 voting age Dominicans illustrates the strength of anti-Haitian attitudes. A little over half of respondents expressed either very negative or negative impressions of Haitians relative to some 35 percent of respondents who expressed positive or very positive impressions of Haitians. Very negative or negative evaluations of all other ethnoracial categories, including *morenos*, *mulatos*, *indios*, *jabaos*, and whites, did not surpass 17 percent. One exception was the evaluation of *Cocolos*, descendants from the British West Indies, which reached nearly 42 percent.<sup>54</sup>

Fifty-five percent of self-identified “whites” and 53 percent of *morenos* in my survey expressed very negative or negative impressions of Haitians, more than all other groups. By contrast, 45 percent of self-identified “blacks” expressed positive or very positive impressions of Haitians, more than any other group. An ordered-probit analysis presented in Table 2.1 show, however, that the relationship between the racial identity of

---

<sup>54</sup> This may be a spurious finding, however. Many participants may have misinterpreted the term *Cocolo* as synonymous with Haitians rather than with descendants from the West Indies.

respondents and the evaluation of Haitians was not statistically significant. Only being of Haitian descent and respondents' level of education had a positive and statistically significant relationship with the evaluation of Haitians. This was true irrespective of the measure of ethnoracial identification employed.

Existing survey data lend support to my findings on anti-Haitianism. Over 35 percent of respondents in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey reported having witnessed acts of discrimination against Haitians. And when respondents were asked whether they believed that Haitians faced discrimination in the Dominican Republic, the mean score was 57.3 points on a scale from 0 to 100 (Espinal and Morgan 2012, 237).

	Evaluation of Haitians		
	Ethnoracial Identity Ascribed by Interviewer	Self-Identified Ethnoracial Identity	Self-Identified Skin Color
White	-.090 (.219)	-.152 (.182)	-.085 (.452)
<i>Jabao</i>	-.128 (.129)	-.036 (.145)	-.008 (.124)
Mulatto	-.024 (.119)	.053 (.148)	n/a
<i>Moreno</i>	-.108 (.167)	-.085 (.111)	-.051 (.093)
Black	.011 (.121)	.154 (.156)	.083 (.209)
Haitian Descent	1.06*** (.268)	1.05*** (.266)	1.09*** (.265)
Education	.166*** (.052)	.154*** (.052)	.163*** (.052)
Income	-.060 (.040)	-.060 (.040)	-.061 (.040)
Political Sophistication	-.011 (.057)	-.008 (.057)	-.000 (.057)
Social Desirability	-.002 (.055)	-.003 (.055)	.005 (.055)
Age	.001 (.036)	-.006 (.036)	-.003 (.036)
Male	.032 (.098)	.021 (.097)	.021 (.097)
Observations	681	686	680

\*\*\*p <0.01

Table 2.1: The Effect of Respondent Characteristics on the Evaluation of Haitians  
Ordered-Probit Analysis (Standard Errors in Parenthesis).

Moreover, a relatively low percentage of citizens favor measures that benefit Haitian migrants or Dominicans of Haitian descent. In a report based on data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey, Orces (2013) found that only 41 percent of the sample agreed or strongly agreed that the children of immigrants born in the Dominican Republic should be Dominican citizens, relative to 32 percent that disagreed or strongly disagreed and 27 percent that expressed more neutral attitudes. Respondents who self-identified as black, who were wealthy, or who were high school graduates were more likely to agree that children of immigrants born in the Dominican Republic should be Dominican citizens. Likewise, most Dominicans expressed lukewarm feelings when asked whether the government should provide social services to immigrants (of which 87 percent are Haitian) and give Haitian undocumented migrants work permits.

That a significant segment of the population blames Haitian migrants for displacing Dominican workers helps to perpetuate discrimination against Haitian migrants and their descendants. Over 40 percent of the sample in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey disagreed with the statement that immigrants carry out jobs that Dominicans do not want compared to 60 percent of the sample that agreed with the statement. Wealthier and more educated interviewees were more likely to agree with the statement.

Similar anti-Haitian attitudes are present in early surveys on discrimination against Haitians, even if Dominicans are also aware that Haitians endure treacherous conditions. In a 1982 national survey by Penn and Schoen, 65 percent of interviewees

believed that Haitian laborers suffered from worse working conditions than Dominican laborers and 48 percent agreed that Haitian laborers were treated as slaves in the Dominican Republic (Vega 1993). Surprisingly, however, 65 percent of the sample agreed that Haitians should be repatriated, which increased to 74 percent when Penn and Schoen repeated the survey in 1992. Anti-Haitian attitudes were also evident in a 1994 survey conducted in the city of Santiago by ONE-RESPE. Seventy-five percent of the sample expressed that Dominicans mistreat Haitians and 20 percent of those believed that mistreatment was based on skin color (Badillo and Badillo 1996).

Anti-Haitian public opinion has not only endured in the Dominican Republic but has also permeated across issue domains and social classes. In a 1995 poll by RUMBO-GALLUP, over 51 percent of the sample were unfavorable to a close relative marrying a person of Haitian descent. Only 11 percent of respondents in the sample favored the idea and 36.6 percent expressed ambivalence. Strongest opposition came from the most socially marginalized interviewees. Over 54 percent of interviewees that identified as lower class were unfavorable to the idea relative to 40.2 percent for interviewees that identified as middle class and 32.3 percent of interviewees that identified as upper class. One explanation, as Sagás (2012) suggests, is that lower classes and Afro-descendants, perhaps more than other groups, employ anti-Haitianism to avoid the legal and social implications of being misidentified as Haitian.

Anti-Haitianism in the Dominican Republic has not impeded moments of solidarity between the people of both nations. Indeed, solidarity between Dominicans and

Haitians harken back to the colonial period and extend through the twentieth century.<sup>55</sup> During unification, for instance, Haitian and Dominican liberals allied against the Boyer regime over unpopular policies, such as high tariffs, land privatization, and agrarian reforms. Those policies were intended to increase state revenue and help Haiti pay back its debts to France (Hoetink 1970). Haitian and Dominican forces allied once more during the Spanish annexation over fears that slavery would return to the island (Vega 1993; Franco 2003).

Recently, the Dominican Republic responded with alacrity in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and supplied significant first-aid. In addition, a segment of Dominicans on the island and throughout the Diaspora have opposed the 2013 ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal and stood in solidarity with Haitian migrants.

Bilateral commerce and trade, and educational exchanges also have been largely unaffected by enduring anti-Haitianism. Haiti continues to be the second largest market for the Dominican Republic behind the United States. In 2011, Dominican exports to Haiti totaled over a billion dollars in the formal market and between 250 and 300 million dollars in the informal market (Bolívar Díaz 2013).<sup>56</sup> In addition, middle and upper class Haitians continue to study in Dominican universities. At present, there are 15,000 Haitians registered in the Dominican state university system.

---

<sup>55</sup> In 1678, runaway slaves from the French side of the island founded one of the oldest neighborhoods in the municipality of East Santo Domingo, San Lorenzo de los Minas. The transit of free slaves from the French side to the Spanish side of the island was so pervasive that the return of slaves became a contentious issue during the demarcation of borders in 1777 (Moya Pons 1998; Inoa 1999; Torres-Saillant 1999).

<sup>56</sup> The importance of Haitian markets for Dominican producers was underscored in 2013 when the Haitian government briefly boycotted Dominican livestock and plastics over losses in export taxes.

Despite moments of cooperation, however, racialized and non-racialized variants of anti-Haitianism remain deeply entrenched. In fact, there is some evidence that anti-Haitianism may be on the rise. Recent data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer survey show lower levels of support for the claims (1) that the government should give work permits to undocumented migrants, (2) that immigrants fill the jobs that Dominicans do not want, and (3) that the children of Haitian migrants should be granted citizenship compared to levels in 2008, 2010 and 2012 (Espinal and Morgan 2014, 227). This shift in public opinion likely reflects recent government policies and court rulings that have limited the citizenship rights of Dominico-Haitians.

Public policies and sustained migration flows have made national origin a more salient sociopolitical cleavage than ethnoracial identity. Just as inclusive nation-building policies have prevented the emergence of a black group identity in the Dominican Republic, anti-Haitianism has splintered Afro-descendants along national lines and kept black group consciousness at bay.

## **CONCLUSION**

Extensive patterns of ethnoracial mixing, structural conditions in the colonial period, and a mix of inclusive and exclusionary strategies of nation-building have obstructed the formation of group identity around race and ethnicity. Indeed, nation, not pigmentation, is the most salient sociopolitical cleavage in the Dominican Republic, as I will show.

Patterns of ethnoracial mixing generated an ambiguous notion of race that stifled feelings of loyalty toward ethnoracial categories and that discouraged co-ethnic solidarity. And inclusive and exclusionary nation-building strategies virtually extinguished blackness from the national identity. Anti-Haitianism, in particular, has reinforced prejudiced notions of race and stymied the development of coalitions between Afro-descendants and Dominicans of Haitian descent.

In the absence of robust ethnoracialized affinities around which to articulate ethnoracial-based grievances, Dominicans have managed entrenched ethnoracial prejudice and marginalization by making use of their ethnoracial ambiguity. As I explain in the next chapter, identifying with lighter or hybrid ethnoracial categories has given mixed and dark-skinned Dominicans alike an “escape hatch” from the bottom of the pigmentocracy (Degler 1971).

### **Chapter 3: Ethnoracial Stratification and Its Effects on Electoral Behavior**

In the previous chapter, I provided an argument for what determines inchoate ethnoracial group identity in the Dominican Republic. I suggested that intermixing, economic structural conditions, and nation-building created permeable ethnoracial boundaries. This fluid racial order has enabled Afro-descendants to exploit their multiple ethnoracial identities and pay allegiance to no single ethnoracial identity.

In this chapter, I make a case for why individuals in the Dominican Republic *are encouraged* to reclassify their ethnoracial identification rather than why they are *able to do so*. I posit that individuals in the Dominican Republic reclassify their ethnoracial identification as a way to manage high levels of ethnoracial stratification. Ethnoracial stratification offers individuals incentives to shun marginalized ethnoracial categories and to self-identify with hybrid or lighter categories, such as *indio*. This is a different incentive structure than what is proposed in much of the literature, which assumes that stratification encourages individuals to organize and mobilize politically around ethnoracial identity. The tandem of inchoate group identity and ethnoracial stratification accounts for the low salience of ethnoracial identity in Dominican politics.

In what follows, I provide evidence of ethnoracial stratification in the Dominican Republic. Existing public opinion data and my own data show that black Dominicans tend to lag behind white Dominicans across a number of socioeconomic indicators. Stratification is apparent whether I used self-identification or an ascribed measure of

ethnoracial identification. The data also show evidence of prejudice against Afro-descendants. I claim that ethnoracial prejudice, like stratification, discourages individuals from identifying with categories typically associated with marginalized populations.

Having provided evidence of stratification, I then present evidence that individuals in the Dominican Republic tend to reclassify their ethnoracial identification. This evidence lends support to my claim that ethnoracial stratification and prejudice encourage the practice of hyperdescent (or identification with more socially dominant categories).

Lastly, I show that despite high levels of stratification and prejudice, ethnoracial identity in the Dominican Republic is not salient in elections. Dominicans commonly vote for politicians from other ethnoracial groups. They have elected Afro-descendant presidents, and those presidents have drawn support from provinces where individuals tend to be light-skinned as well as from provinces where individuals tend to be dark-skinned. Dominicans have also elected Afro-descendant legislators, including some who have represented provinces and municipalities where individuals tend to be light-skinned. Moreover, politicians have not typically used ethnoracial appeals in campaigns. The oft-cited Peña Gómez presidential campaigns in the mid 1990s are an obvious exception. I make the case, however, that his electoral popularity casts doubt on just how consequential ethnoracial identity is for candidate evaluation.

## **ETHNORACIAL STRATIFICATION**

The relationship between ethnoracial identity and class in the Dominican Republic is not clear-cut (Howard 2001). Differentiating social classes by ethnoracial identity may not be entirely meaningful given high levels of intermixing and porous ethnoracial boundaries. In addition, whereas ethnoracial stratification in the Dominican Republic may unfold in a bi-racial order on some issues, it may also unfold in a tri-racial or even in a plural racial order on other issues. As Bonilla-Silva (2010) suggests, this is the case for much of Latin America.

Furthermore, it is unclear how high levels of vertical stratification evident in education and income should be weighed against lower levels of horizontal stratification evident in housing, for instance (Bonilla-Silva 2010). Although blacks in the DR tend to reside in the poorest neighborhoods, as Sagás (2012) and others have noted, there is little evidence of systemic residential segregation or discrimination by the state. There is also relatively low popular support for residential segregation. In the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey, for instance, only 3.8 percent of the sample expressed opposition to having a black neighbor. The Dominican Republic ranked in the middle of thirteen Latin American countries on this issue.

Nonetheless, socioeconomic inequalities in the Dominican Republic tend to fall along ethnoracial lines.<sup>57</sup> This is so despite extensive intermixing and some inclusive nation-building efforts. The evidence of ethnoracial stratification challenges

---

<sup>57</sup> See Hoetink (1967, 1970); Pérez Cabral (1967); Howard (2001); Derby (2003); Franco (2003); Mercedes Contreras (2006); Simmons (2012); Sagás (2012).

commonplace assumptions held in the DR that the country is a racial democracy and that ethnoracial distinctions are inconsequential.

Various studies have found that relative to their “white” counterparts, “black” Dominicans have lower levels of wealth and income and have less access to food, social services and infrastructure (Hoetink 1985; Howard 2001; Mercedes 2006). A combined 56 percent of self-identified “black” Dominicans in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey characterized their overall financial situation either as bad or very bad compared to 35 percent of self-identified “whites.”

Table 3.1 presents average scores of socioeconomic indicators across different measures of “black” and “white” identification based on data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer Survey. The scores show that there is a difference of means in levels of wealth and income between self-identified blacks and whites, although the difference was not statistically significant for personal income. The difference of means in levels of income between respondents *ascribed* as white and black was statistically significant, however.<sup>58</sup> Similarly, the relationship between ascribed ethnoracial identity and wealth was also statistically significant in the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey (Morgan and Espinal 2010, 249).

---

<sup>58</sup> The different results for self-identified and ascribed measures may reflect the tendency of dark-skinned individuals to self-identify with lighter-skinned (and intermediate) categories. Ethnoracial self-identification measures in the Dominican Republic typically produce slightly less statistically significant results with respect to income and wealth than do ascriptive measures. The practice of hyperdescent can also obscure levels of stratification in intermediate categories. Comparing ethnoracial categories at the poles can offer a clearer picture of ethnoracial stratification than comparing ethnoracial stratification between intermediate categories.

	Ethnoracial Self-Identification		Ascribed Skin-color Identification	
	White	Black	White	Black
Income	8.20	7.60	9.51**	6.80
Income is Sufficient	2.19**	1.96	2.32**	1.73
Financial Situation	2.76**	2.56	2.82**	2.35
Social Class	2.55**	1.85	2.50**	2.04
Education	9.64	8.98	9.19	8.15
No food at home at any time in past 3 months	.312	.438*	.200	.549**
Indoor Running Water	.763**	.596	.820**	.414
Indoor Bathroom	.741**	.622	.865**	.457
Assaulted	.161	.141	.224	.170
Satisfied with Quality of Health/Medical Care	2.44	2.45	2.37	2.63**

\*\* P<0.05; \*P<0.10

Source: AmericasBarometer Survey 2012

Table 3.1: Mean Scores of Socioeconomic Indicators Across Ascribed and Self-Identification Measures, AB 2012

In addition to having lower levels of wealth, Black Dominicans appear to lag behind non-blacks in access to food and infrastructure. Forty-three percent of self-identified “black” respondents in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey did not have food at home sometime in the last three months compared to 32 percent of *indios*, 31 percent of whites, and 30 percent of self-identified mulattos. Results in Table 3.1 show that the

difference of means between whites and blacks was statistically significant for ascribed and self-identification measures of ethnoracial identity.

Black respondents both in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey and in my own survey also reported less access to infrastructure relative to white respondents. In the AmericasBarometer survey, black respondents had lower average scores for access to indoor running water and indoor bathroom facilities than white respondents. Table 3.1 shows that the difference of means in indoor running water and indoor bathroom facilities was statistically significant across ascribed and self-identification measures of ethnoracial identity. Likewise, as Table 3.2 shows, the difference of means in access to adequate home flooring between “black” and “white” respondents in my survey was statistically significant across all three measures of ethnoracial identity.

	Ascribed Ethnoracial Identification		Ethnoracial Self-Identification		Skin-Color Self-Identification	
	White	Black	White	Black	Very/Somewhat White	Very/Somewhat Black
Income	2.11**	1.50	1.95*	1.55	2.12**	1.67
High Earning Occupation	2.40	2.33	2.42	2.33	2.60*	2.42
Unemployed	.407	.480	.525	.508	.460	.451
Education	3.37**	2.50	3.07*	2.66	3.32**	2.84
Indoor Flooring	3.88**	3.20	3.72**	3.40	3.87**	3.48

\*\* P≤0.05; \*P≤0.10

Table 3.2: Mean Scores of Socioeconomic Indicators Across Ascribed, Skin Color, and Self-Identification Measures

Data from my 2011 survey also suggest that income and education is ethnoracially stratified in the Dominican Republic. Table 3.2 presents average scores of socioeconomic indicators across three different measures of ethnoracial identity. The scores show that respondents ascribed as black had the lowest mean income category (1.50) while white respondents had the highest mean income (2.11). The difference of means between blacks and whites was statistically significant across all three measures. These findings echo a study by Howard (2001) that finds that “*negros/as* and *mulatos/as*... in general, have considerably lower incomes than *blancos/as*, experience less social mobility and are more likely to be in the urban informal market” (50).

In addition, black respondents in my survey had lower scores of schooling than white respondents across all three ethnoracial identification measures. The difference of means, moreover, was statistically significant in all three measures, as Table 3.2 shows. A recent study by Telles and Steele (2012) from Princeton University’s Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America (PERLA) bolster these results. The authors found that dark-skinned Dominicans held lower levels of education. Controlling for class, gender, and urban/rural residence, dark-skinned Dominicans averaged nearly two years of schooling less than their light-skinned counterparts.

Much of the Dominican public acknowledges that Afro-descendants are impacted disproportionately by structural inequalities. In a study by Telles and Bailey (2013), 65.8 percent of the sample attributed Afro-descendant poverty to structural accounts, such as

low access to education and discrimination. College-educated individuals were especially likely to use structural accounts to explain poverty.<sup>59</sup>

Elite attitudes about stratification have not kept pace with changes in public opinion, however. Dominican officials acknowledge that Afro-descendants have unequal access to resources. In a 2007 periodic report to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the government stated that “most Dominicans of African origin are in the lower strata of society” and that “those of African cultural origin are among the main victims of failure to enjoy economic, social and cultural rights” (Diène 2008, 11). But Dominican officials continue to downplay the impact of prejudice and discrimination on inequality.

Although black Dominicans tend to lag behind white Dominicans with respect to socioeconomic indicators and access to social services, they do not necessarily have lower levels of political participation and sense of inclusion than white Dominicans. There is some evidence that black Dominicans are less likely to register to vote than white Dominicans, for example. Thirteen percent of respondents that self-identified as black in the 2012 AmericasBarometer sample were not registered to vote.<sup>60</sup> This was the highest percentage among all racial groups and more than twice as high as respondents who self-identified as white (6 percent). Results from the 2012 AmericasBarometer

---

<sup>59</sup> Perhaps because they are aware that “blacks” in the DR have unequal access to education, a combined 38 percent of respondents in the 2012 AmericasBarometer sample either strongly or very strongly favored affirmative action at the university level. By contrast, a combined 29 percent of respondents either strongly or very strongly rejected affirmative action.

<sup>60</sup> The 2012 AmericasBarometer report found an inverse relationship between high levels of education and electoral participation in the Dominican Republic, except for individuals with post secondary education.

survey in Table 3.3 show that blacks had a lower average score than whites on voting registration for both measures of ethnoracial identity. The difference of means was statistically significant for both measures.

	Ethnoracial Self-Identification		Ascribed Skin-color Identification	
	White	Black	White	Black
Registered Voter	.934**	.867	.931**	.835
Voted in last National Elect.	.612	.689	.662	.723
Interest in Politics	2.41	2.36	2.20	2.26
Persuaded Others to Vote	1.86	1.95	1.69	1.90
Campaigned	.108	.137	.112	.085
Politicians Care About What People Like You Think	3.62	3.27	3.09	3.27
Parties listen to People Like You	3.11	3.01	2.62	2.88

\*\*  $P \leq 0.05$ ; \*  $P \leq 0.10$

Source: AmericasBarometer Survey, 2012

Table 3.3: Mean Scores of Political Inclusion Indicators Across Ascribed and Self-Identification Measures, AB 2012

Additional evidence suggests, however, that blacks in fact may have equal if not higher levels of political engagement than whites in the Dominican Republic. As Table 3.3 shows, black respondents had higher mean scores than white respondents on voting in the last election for both measures of ethnoracial identity, though the difference of means was not statistically significant. Blacks also had higher average scores than whites with

respect to persuading others to vote, though the difference in means was not statistically significant. Likewise, blacks had higher average scores than whites on campaigning in the last election when the self-identification measure was used. The difference of means was also not statistically significant. High levels of clientelism cannot explain these levels of black political engagement in the Dominican Republic. The 2014 AmericasBarometer survey found no statistically significant relationship between skin-color and clientelistic offerings (Espinal and Morgan 2014, 197).

The extent to which black Dominicans have a lower interest in politics, perceive that political parties do not listen to them, and feel that governing officials do not care about what they think is similarly inconclusive. Table 3.3 shows that different measures of ethnoracial identity produce different results. When the self-identification measure was used in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey, black Dominicans had lower mean scores than white Dominicans across these political inclusion questions. When the ascribed skin-color measure was used, however, the reverse was true and blacks had higher average scores than whites across those same questions. The difference of means was not statistically significant for either measure on any of these questions.

In my own survey, the difference of means for questions on political attention, political sophistication, and voting were also mostly statistically insignificant, as Table 3.4 makes clear. Where they were significant, participants who described their own skin color as very dark or somewhat dark actually had significantly higher levels of political

attention than participants who described their own skin color as very light or somewhat light.

	Ascribed Ethnoracial Identification		Ethnoracial Self-Identification		Skin-Color Self-Identification	
	White	Black	White	Black	Very/ Somewhat Light	Very/ Somewhat Dark
Political Attention	3.70	4.03	3.97	4.11	3.97	4.21*
Political Sophistication	1.77	1.48	1.62	1.52	1.76	1.63
Voted in last election (Legislative or National)	.629	.659	.675	.576	.601	.643

\*\* P≤0.05; \*P≤0.10

Table 3.4: Mean Scores of Political Inclusion Indicators Across Ascribed, Skin Color, and Self-Identification Measures

The absence of stark differences between black and white Dominicans with regard to political inclusion may in part account for low levels of inter-ethnic conflict and for asymmetries in feelings of patriotism. Sawyer, Peña, and Sidanius (2004, 109) find that “asymmetries in racial status quo...[do not] reflect asymmetries in national attachment” in the Dominican Republic. In turn, low levels of inter-ethnic conflict and asymmetric patriotism have strengthened the myth of racial democracy.

## ETHNORACIAL PREJUDICE

Although political elites continue to propagate the myth of racial democracy based on political inclusion and high levels of intermixing,<sup>61</sup> prejudice against black ethnoracial attributes persists in the Dominican Republic. This prejudice is partly evident in individuals' attitudes toward their own black attributes. A combined 22 percent of the sample in the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, for example, agreed on some level (from moderate to strong) that they would like their skin color to be lighter.

Prejudice against black ethnoracial attributes is also evident in historical attitudes on black marital partners. Using demographic statistics from 1960 and 1961, Pérez Cabral (1967) found evidence that men contracted interracial marriage with women who were lighter-skinned than they were at higher rates than with women who were darker-skinned than they were. In 1960, there were 734 marriages between men and lighter-skinned women compared to 584 marriages between men and darker-skinned women. The gap widened in 1961. There were 780 marriages between men and lighter-skinned women compared to 513 marriages between men and darker-skinned women.<sup>62</sup>

A 1995 RUMBO-GALLUP survey found similar patterns of prejudice against black marital partners. When asked whether they would prefer that a close relative marry a Dominican of white, *indio*, or black racial makeup, only 2.8 percent of the sample preferred that a close relative marry a black person. Respondents that identified with the

---

<sup>61</sup> Former president Leonel Fernández recently argued that the DR could not be a racist nation given patterns of intermixing. See “Leonel: ‘República Dominicana no puede ser un país racista’” (*Diario Libre*, 15 December 2013).

<sup>62</sup> Computations are mine.

lowest social classes most preferred that a close relative marry a black person. By contrast, nearly 12 percent of the sample preferred that a close relative marry a white person and 26 percent preferred that a close relative marry an *indio* or mixed-race person. Overall, most Dominicans expressed ambivalence on this survey question.

More recently, Telles and Garcia (2013) found lukewarm support for black marital partners. When respondents were asked the extent to which they would agree with their own child marrying a black person, the national sample mean of the Dominican Republic was 4.78 on a scale from 1 to 7 (in which 1 is strong disagreement and 7 is strong agreement). This was the second lowest score in a study of seven countries. The difference of means across racial groups was not statistically significant.

Preferences against black ethnoracial attributes are not exclusive to adults. From 1995 to 1997, Ashindi Maxton studied 320 randomly selected five-year olds in Santo Domingo and Santiago. She found that children based their evaluations of dolls on a somatic valorization of white and black attributes. Whereas most children associated whiteness with beauty, intelligence, and virtuousness, they associated blackness with unattractiveness and with brute and evil characteristics. Girls were especially likely to make those associations (*El Caribe*, 18 July 1997).

Dominicans are aware of the social significance that is attributed to ethnoracial attributes. A combined 68 percent of respondents in my survey believed that skin color mattered either some or a lot in Dominican society relative to a combined 30 percent of respondents who believed that skin color mattered little or not at all. They especially

acknowledge the impact of skin color on social inequality. Sixty-five percent of respondents in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey believed that dark-skinned Dominicans were poorer than other groups because they were treated unfairly, up from 42 percent in 2010. There is also evidence that Dominicans, particularly those who belong to wealthier social classes, acknowledge the disadvantages associated with having dark skin. In semi-formal interviews with 300 residents in three study sites, Howard (2001, 70) found that "...nearly half of the sample believed that to be *negro/a* was a disadvantage in the Dominican Republic, a recognition that increased with social status. Similarly, 46 percent believed a white skin to be advantageous, the highest proportion again being in the upper classes."

Even in the absence of institutionalized discrimination, prejudiced attitudes against Afro-descendant attributes in the Dominican Republic can represent significant impediments to employment and recreation. Afro-descendants are especially vulnerable to social exclusion in the workplace given the absence of a legal framework that specifically sanctions discrimination on the basis of ethnoracial identity.

In 2008, Dominican labor unions filed a claim with the International Labor Organization citing evidence of discrimination in the workplace against dark-skinned nationals and Haitian foreigners. A 2013-14 report by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) expressed similar concerns of ethnoracial discrimination at the workplace.

Social exclusion is also present in recreational venues. In 2013, the Attorney General's office called for legislation to regulate racial discrimination at public entertainment venues after a string of dark-skinned patrons were denied entrance into elite nightclubs of Santo Domingo.

Survey data suggest that Dominicans recognize patterns of racial discrimination, even if they are reticent to share their own experiences of discrimination with interviewers. Telles and Bailey (2013) found that 63 percent of the sample recognized that blacks and mulattos are treated unequally. Individuals who were categorized as belonging to minority groups (blacks and mulattos) were only slightly more likely to recognize discrimination (68.4 to 62.2 percent) than those who were categorized as dominant (whites and *mestizos* or *indios*).

Likewise, the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey found that 54 percent of respondents believed that dark-skinned Dominicans were treated worse than light-skinned Dominicans. And nearly 9 percent believed that dark-skinned Dominicans were treated much worse. Moreover, a combined 42 percent of respondents stated that they had witnessed discrimination based on skin color either many times or some times. Remarkably, however, nearly 90 percent of respondents also expressed that they had never personally experienced discrimination based on skin color.

In sum, evidence from existing public opinion data and my own data show that there is ethnoracial stratification and prejudice in the Dominican Republic. These findings lend support to my claim that dark-skinned Dominicans have incentives to

reclassify their ethnoracial identification. In the next section, I provide evidence that dark-skinned Dominicans indeed tend to reclassify their ethnoracial identification with lighter-skinned or hybrid categories. As I have argued, weak category loyalty and low levels of ethnoracial affirmation help to explain the dearth of ethnoracial voters and entrepreneurs in elections. I will also show, much like the findings on political participation and inclusion indicate, that ethnoracial identity is not very salient in elections. This is true despite ethnoracial stratification and prejudice.

### **ETHNORACIAL CLASSIFICATION**

Dominicans have had little reason to affirm an ethnoracial group identity as their primary form of identity (Torres-Saillant 1999). As I noted in Chapter 2, enduring poverty, depopulation, and a preference for cattle ranching in the colonial period disrupted rigid labor and class relations around which to structure clear ethnoracial boundaries. In addition, inclusive and exclusionary nation-building policies, such as nativism and anti-Haitianism, ultimately encouraged allegiance to the national identity rather than to individual ethnosomatic categories. Ethnoracial stratification and prejudice in the Dominican Republic have further impeded the consolidation of ethnoracial group identity.

Data on affinity toward in-category members and levels of linked-fate help to illustrate that ethnoracial group identity is indeed inchoate in the DR. Only 42 percent of self-identified black respondents in my survey agreed that they “identified most with persons that share their same skin color.” Even fewer (29 percent) agreed with the notion

that “their individual success was linked to the success of persons that share their same race.”

Statistics on black ethnoracial identity in the United States provide some perspective on the weakness of ethnoracial group identity in the Dominican Republic (though statistics on ethnoracial identity are not exactly comparable to statistics on skin color). The General Social Survey (1993-2004) found that 78.9 percent of black respondents in the U.S. “felt close to other blacks” and an even larger proportion of blacks, 87.5 percent, expressed this sentiment in the National Black Politics Study (1993). Moreover, the 1993-1994 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI) found that a little over 70 percent of “black” respondents agreed that their fate was linked to that of other “blacks” (Hochschild and Weaver 2007, 656-658).<sup>63</sup>

My own survey data indicate low levels of ethnoracial solidarity in the Dominican Republic. Individuals were more likely to give significantly higher evaluation marks to in-category members than to out-category members in only three of six ethnoracial categories.

Rather than responding to ethnoracial stratification and prejudice by strengthening ethnoracial group identity and solidarity, Afro-descendants in the Dominican Republic have made use of ethnoracial ambiguity to avoid further marginalization. They have shunned identification with darker ethnoracial categories and migrated toward lighter and hybrid ethnoracial categories. By identifying with hybrid and lighter categories,

---

<sup>63</sup> Hochschild and Weaver (2007) find a statistically significant relationship between high levels of linked fate among African Americans and perceptions of group discrimination.

individuals have avoided being placed at the bottom of the pigmentocracy alongside Dominicans of Haitian descent.

My survey data support the claim that participants across the ethnoracial spectrum avoid identification with dark ethnoracial categories. Cross-tabulations show that only 30.7 percent of respondents who self-identified as white were ascribed as white by interviewers. Interviewers also categorized self-identified white respondents as *jabao* (30.7 percent), *indio* (23 percent), mulatto (12.8 percent), and *moreno* (2.5 percent). Likewise, 48 percent of self-identified *morenos* were categorized as black by interviewers. Similarly, in a study by Telles and Paschel (2014, 883), only 60 percent of the darkest Dominicans self-identified as black.

A similar trend of lightening ethnoracial classification was evident in respondents who self-identified as *indio* in my sample. Of the 47 percent of respondents who self-identified as *indio*, 34 percent of those were ascribed a darker ethnoracial category by interviewers. By contrast, only 14 percent of the 47 percent of respondents who self-identified as *indio* were ascribed a lighter racial category.

Self-identified mulattos were the exception since many of them were lighter-skinned individuals. Of the 9 percent of participants who self-identified as mulatto in my survey, 64 percent were ascribed a lighter ethnoracial category by interviewers compared to only 15 percent who were ascribed a darker ethnoracial category. Howard (2001, 69) found that individuals who self-identify as “mulatto” appear to be more forthcoming about their African descent. Because many self-identified mulattos belonged to middle

and upper classes, Howard suggested that they could absorb the social consequences of identifying with more marginalized categories. These findings echo recent conclusions by Simmons (2009) and by Telles and Paschel (2014). In the case of the Dominican Republic, Telles and Paschel found that “high-educated Dominicans were nearly four times as likely to identify as mulatto when compared to low-educated Dominicans...” (888).

Interviewer error and discrepancies in ethnoracial classifications between interviewers and respondents cannot explain the tendency of participants in my survey to identify with lighter ethnoracial categories. Evidence from the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey also indicates that Dominicans tend to identify with lighter ethnoracial categories. In that survey, interviewers used a more “objective” eleven-point skin color palette to categorize respondents. Figure 3.1 illustrates the ethnoracial composition of the 2012 AB survey sample by self-identification and ascribed skin color measures. The figure shows that nearly three-quarters of participants self-identified as white (12.5) and *indio* (60.4). By contrast, only a little more than half of participants were ascribed skin colors that I coded as “white” and “*indio*.” The percentage of participants that self-identified as white (12.5), in particular, was nearly double the percentage of participants that were ascribed “white” skin colors (5.89).




Figure 3.1: The Ethnoracial Composition of the 2012 AmericasBarometer Survey Sample By Different Measures of Ethnoracial Identity

Despite a proclivity to lighten, Dominicans do not entirely dissociate from blackness or solely identify with whiteness. Just as Dominicans traditionally have consigned blackness to Haitians, they also have consigned whiteness to elites and to invading or occupational forces (Torres-Saillant 1999, 32). Dominicans tend to identify with descriptive categories that denote ethnoracial hybridity, although these categories overstate their degree of whiteness.

In addition to identifying with lighter ethnoracial categories, Afro-descendants have circumnavigated further marginalization by self-identifying as *indio*, a term that suggests Indian or indigenous ancestry. *Indio*, as a hybrid classification, is an example of what Degler (1971) referred to as a “mulatto escape hatch.”

Colloquially, *indio* denotes an “ethnoracial in-betweenness” or ethnoracial hybridity (Torres-Saillant 1999), though it also helps reify a form of ethno-national

identity that was imposed during Trujillo's nation-building period. Through its "grammar of deracialization" (Racusen 2012), the *indio* ethnoracial classification has done much to stymie the development of ethnoracial group identity in the Dominican Republic.

*Indio* is the ethnoracial category of choice for most Dominicans. Sixty-one percent of respondents in the 2012 AmericasBarometer national survey self-identified as *indio*, and nearly half self-identified as *indio* in my own survey, which was based on a representative sample of the province of Santo Domingo. Likewise, over 45 percent of respondents in a closed-ended question in my survey stated that Dominicans mainly belonged to an *indio* ethnoracial group. By contrast, 25 percent of respondents stated that Dominicans were mainly of European descent and 29 percent stated that they were mainly of African descent.

Data from my survey and from the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey similarly show that self-identification with *indio* is negatively correlated with income, although the relationship was not statistically significant in either study. A combined 90 percent of self-identified *indios* in my survey identified with one of the three lowest income groups. And a combined 65 percent of self-identified *indios* in the AmericasBarometer survey identified with one of the two lowest social class groups, with 32 percent identifying as middle class.

Interestingly, the relationship between educational attainment and *indio* self-identification was not negative but was curvilinear both in my own survey and in the AmericasBarometer survey. Respondents at the middle tiers of educational attainment

were most likely to self-identify as *indio* while those at the lowest and highest levels of educational attainment were least likely to self-identify as *indio*. Stratification might help to explain this curvilinear pattern. As I have suggested, individuals in the Dominican Republic who have least access to education are unlikely to pass for *indio* and are more likely to self-identify as black. By contrast, individuals who have most access to education are also most likely to be able to self-identify as “white” and have little incentive to identify as *indio*.

The state’s disproportionate use of *indio* to classify citizens in official documents helps explain the widespread tendency of Dominicans to self-identify as *indio*. Using a convenience sample of 150 adults, Simmons (2009) found that the Central Electoral Board in the province of Santiago overwhelmingly classified citizens as *indio* (125) when issuing *cédulas* or national identification cards. The Central Electoral Board sparingly classified citizens as black (3) or mulatto (12).

#### **ETHNORACIAL IDENTITY AND ELECTIONS**

As I have shown, there is considerable evidence of ethnoracial stratification and prejudice in the Dominican Republic. Ethnoracial identity appears to structure access to resources and to order social attitudes. I argued that high levels of ethnoracial stratification and prejudice help to explain why marginalized individuals identify with hybrid or lighter-skinned ethnoracial categories, such as *indio*.

Despite high levels of ethnoracial stratification and prejudice, ethnoracial identity has not been salient in most elections. There is evidence that Dominicans have elected

numerous Afro-descendant legislators, for example. And some of those legislators have represented provinces where individuals tend to be lighter-skinned as a result of historical patterns of migration and low levels of intermixing.

Using photographs of legislators from (1) electoral campaigns, (2) reports published by the Electoral Central Board (JCE), (3) congressional webpages, and (4) online newspapers, I coded the 2006-2010 and 2010-2016 congresses by ethnoracial category. I compared photographs across multiple sources to control for variation in the images. Dominican legislators tend to be shown having lighter skin in official photographs than in unofficial ones.

Legislators were classified into one of six ethnoracial categories (white, *jabao*, *indio*, mulatto, *moreno*, and black). My criteria for classification combined three types of physical attributes. These were skin color (i.e. light, medium, dark), hair type (i.e. straight or kinky), and facial features, such as nose and lips (i.e. thick/wide or thin). Using a combination of these attributes provided greater leverage than using a single attribute, even if that attribute is skin color. Skin color is a strong predictor of ethnoracial identification in many countries in Latin America (Telles and Paschel 2014). But it is a weaker predictor of ethnoracial identification in the case of the DR, specifically (Telles and Paschel 2014, 884). Moreover, skin color does not necessarily align with other physical attributes. Individuals in the Dominican Republic may have similar skin color but have different hair type and/or facial features.

Figure 3.2 illustrates my criteria for classification along dimensions of skin color, hair type, and facial features. At one end of the ethnoracial spectrum, I coded light-skinned legislators as white if they had straight hair and thin facial features or if they had straight hair and thick facial features. I coded light-skinned legislators as *jabao* if they had thin facial features and kinky hair or if they had thick facial features and kinky hair.

At the middle of the ethnoracial spectrum, I coded “medium” or bronze-skinned (Candelario 2007) legislators as *indio* if they either had straight or kinky hair and thin facial features or if they had straight hair and thick facial features. I coded “medium”-skinned legislators as mulatto if they had kinky hair and thick facial features or if they had dark skin, straight hair, and thin facial features.

At the other end of the ethnoracial spectrum, I coded dark-skinned legislators as *moreno* if they had thick facial features and straight hair or if they had thin facial features and kinky hair. And I coded dark-skinned legislators as black if they had kinky hair and thick facial features.

Given my claim that Dominicans have elected numerous Afro-descendant legislators, I made an effort to classify legislators as lighter (i.e. white, *jabao*, and *indio*) rather than darker classifications (mulatto, *moreno*, and black) when it was difficult to decide between categories. This happened often. Ethnoracial categories in the Dominican Republic are continuous and overlap, and the ethnoracial spectrum is very fine-grained along several dimensions.

		Hair Type			Facial Features
		<i>Straight</i>	<i>Kinky</i>		
Skin-Color	<i>Light</i>	+	White	Jabao	<i>Thin</i>
		,	White	Jabao	<i>Thick</i>
	<i>Medium</i>	+	Indio	Indio	<i>Thin</i>
		,	Indio	Mulatto	<i>Thick</i>
	<i>Dark</i>	+	Mulatto	Moreno	<i>Thin</i>
		,	Moreno	Black	<i>Thick</i>

Figure 3.2: Criteria for the Ethnoracial Classification of Legislators Along Dimensions of Skin Color, Hair Texture, and Facial Features

In my analysis, I refer to legislators whom I coded as mulatto, *moreno*, and black as Afro-descendant (although legislators do not necessarily refer to themselves as such). I do not refer to legislators that I coded as *indio* as Afro-descendant (though all have Afro-

descendant attributes) in order to provide the most conservative estimate of Afro-descendants elected to Congress.

Table 3.5 presents a breakdown of legislators in the 2006-2010 congress by ethnoracial category. The results show that Afro-descendants (legislators I categorized as mulatto, moreno, or black) were well represented in both legislative bodies relative to the percentage of Afro-descendants in the national population (measured by ascribed skin color). Although black legislators accounted for only 6 percent of the Senate, Afro-descendant legislators collectively accounted for almost one-third (31.3%) of the Senate. This percentage was nearly equivalent to the percentage of white legislators (34.3%). Afro-descendant legislators represented almost exactly half of the Senate if we include legislators that I coded as *indio*.

A greater percentage of Afro-descendant legislators were elected to the 2006-2010 Chamber of Deputies (COD) than to the Senate. The COD differs from the Senate in some important ways. There are more legislative seats for each provincial district in the COD than in the Senate.<sup>64</sup> And whereas legislators in the COD are elected through a preferential open-list PR system, legislators in the Senate are elected through a method of plurality.

---

<sup>64</sup> The Senate is comprised of 32 elected members (1 member for each province and 1 member for the National District) and the 2006-2010 COD was comprised of 178 elected members. Five National Deputies and 7 Overseas Deputies were added to the 2010-2016 COD for a total of 190 members. I excluded members elected overseas from my analysis because it is unclear whether voters in the national territory and voters overseas use the same criteria to elect their legislators. Legislators in the 2010-2016 Congress were elected to six-year terms as a way to unify presidential and congressional elections in 2016.

	White	Jabao	Indio	Mulatto	Moreno	Black	N
<hr/>							
2006-2010 Senate							
PLD	8 (36)	4 (18)	3 (13)	2 (9)	3 (13)	2 (9)	22 (100)
PRD	2 (33)	0	2 (33)	2 (33)	0	0	6 (100)
PRSC	1 (25)	1 (25)	1 (25)	0	1 (25)	0	4 (100)
Percent of Total	34.3	15.6	18.7	12.5	12.5	6.3	N=32 (100)
<hr/>							
2006-2010 Chamber of Deputies							
PLD	20 (21)	6 (6)	17 (18)	25 (26)	18 (19)	8 (8)	94 (100)
PRD	9 (21)	5 (11)	10 (23)	4 (9)	9 (21)	5 (12)	42 (100)
PRSC	8 (19)	5 (11)	7 (16)	6 (14)	9 (21)	7 (16)	42 (100)
Percent of Total	20.7	8.98	19.1	19.6	20.2	11.2	N=178 (100)
<hr/>							
Self- Id (% of National Population)^	9.58	-	67.6	11	-	10.1	-
Ascribed (% of National Population) ^	3.87	18.4	38.5	18.2	16.6	4.54	-
<hr/>							

Note: Row Percentages are in parenthesis.

^ Source: AmericasBarometer Survey, 2010 (color-palette groupings and computations for ascribed measure are mine).

Table 3.5: The Distribution of Legislators in the 2006-2010 Congress by Ascribed Ethnoracial Identification and Party Identification

The results show that the percentage of mulatto (19.6) and *moreno* (20.2) legislators in the 2006-2010 COD was nearly identical to the percentage of white legislators (20.7). The percentage of black (11.2) legislators was much lower than that of white legislators. In total, Afro-descendant legislators held half of the seats in the 2006-2010 COD. That percentage increases to 70 percent if we include the legislators that I coded as *indio*. The percentage of black, mulatto, and *moreno* legislators is particularly impressive considering that self-identified mulattos and blacks only account for 21.1 percent of the Dominican population, according to the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey. And members of the darker skinned categories only accounted for 39.3 percent of the Dominican population, according to the same AmericasBarometer survey.<sup>65</sup>

Table 3.6 presents a breakdown of legislators in the 2010-2016 congress by ethnoracial category. The results indicate that Afro-descendant legislators also have a strong presence in the current congress relative to the percentage of Afro-descendants in the national population (measured by ascribed skin color). There were no black legislators elected to the Senate, but Afro-descendants collectively account for nearly one-third (28 percent) of all legislators, just as they did in the 2006-2010 Senate. That percentage increases to nearly 44 percent if we include *indio* legislators.

---

<sup>65</sup> I categorized numbers 9 through 11 on the AmericasBarometer color palette into black, numbers 7 and 8 into *moreno*, and number 6 into mulatto.

	White	Jabao	Indio	Mulatto	Moreno	Black	N
<hr/>							
2010-2016 Senate							
PLD	11 (35)	6 (19)	5 (16)	3 (9)	6 (19)	0	31 (100)
PRD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PRSC	1 (100)	0	0	0	0	0	1 (100)
Percent of Total	37.5	18.7	15.6	9.3	18.7	0	N=32 (100)
<hr/>							
2010-2016 Chamber of Deputies							
PLD	26 (26)	11 (11)	13 (13)	27 (27)	16 (16)	5 (5)	98 (100)
PRD	15 (19)	8 (10)	12 (15)	22 (29)	10 (13)	9 (11)	76 (100)
PRSC	3 (33)	1 (11)	2 (22)	0	3 (33)	0	9 (100)
Percent of Total	24	10.9	14.7	26.7	15.8	7.65	N=183 (100)
<hr/>							
Self-Id (% of National Population)^	13.4	-	58	12.4	-	15.8	-
Ascribed (% of National Population)^	4.27	13.8	41.5	18.5	17.7	4.01	-
<hr/>							

Note: Row Percentages are in parenthesis.

^Source: AmericasBarometer Survey, 2014 (color-palette groupings and computations for ascribed measure are mine).

Table 3.6: The Distribution of Legislators in the 2010-2016 Congress by Ascribed Ethnoracial Identification and Party Identification

As with the previous congress, a higher percentage of Afro-descendant legislators were elected to the 2010-2016 Chamber of Deputies than to the Senate. Afro-descendant legislators in the COD accounted for a little over half of all legislators, just as they did in the 2006-2010 COD. The percentage of white legislators was again higher than the percentage of black legislators (7.65), as was the case in the 2006-2010 COD.

There are some differences between the ethnoracial composition of the 2010-2016 and the 2006-2010 congresses. There is a slightly higher percentage of white legislators and a slightly lower percentage of black legislators in the 2010-2016 Senate and COD.

The results also suggest that Afro-descendant legislators are not restricted to one or two parties. No single political party consistently had the highest percentage of Afro-descendant legislators. In the 2006-2010 COD, 53 percent of legislators in the Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD) were Afro-descendant compared to 51 percent of legislators in the Partido Reformista Social Cristiano (PRSC) and 42 percent of legislators in the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD). In the 2010-2016 COD, by contrast, 53 percent of PRD legislators were Afro-descendant compared to 48 percent of PLD legislators and 33 percent of PRSC legislators.

Afro-descendant legislators also appear to be similarly represented across all three parties in the 2006-2010 Senate. Thirty-one percent of PLD legislators were Afro-descendant compared to 33 percent and 25 percent of legislators in the PRD and the PRSC, respectively.

It is difficult to test the extent to which differences between political parties are statistically significant, however. As the tables illustrate, the cell sizes are very small. For example, the PRD and the PRSC combined have a single legislator in the 2010-2016 Senate, and only 9 legislators of 190 members in the COD represented the PRSC.<sup>66</sup>

In a number of provinces across the country, Afro-descendant legislators are elected to the majority of seats. I calculated the percentage of Afro-descendant legislators in each of the 31 provinces and 1 national district for the 2006-2010 and the 2010-2016 congresses.

The results are plotted in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. The figures show that Afro-descendant legislators were elected to half or more than half of the seats in 12 provinces in the 2006-2010 congress. They also were elected to 40 percent or more of the seats in another five provinces. In the 2010-2016 congress, Afro-descendants were elected to half or more than half of the seats in 17 provinces, which is more than half the total number of provinces.

---

<sup>66</sup> In 2015, a faction of the PRD formed the Partido Revolucionario Moderno (PRM). I did not specify which PRD members now identify with the PRM because of ongoing migration from the PRD to the PRM (and back to the PRD, in some cases). The PRD and the PRSC will ally with the PLD in the next presidential elections and will not run their own candidate. They are likely to continue their electoral decline in future elections.




Figure 3.3: The Percentage of Afro-descendant Legislators per Province in the 2006-2010 Congress




Figure 3.4: The Percentage of Afro-descendant Legislators per Province in the 2010-2016 Congress

These results should not be overstated. About two-thirds of provinces in the DR have five or fewer total legislative seats. In those provinces, 2 or 3 Afro-descendant legislators are enough to account for 40 or 50 percent of all the legislators. Moreover, electoral pacts between political parties in exchange for retaining legislative seats are common in the DR. These pacts can occlude the extent to which voters actually factor race and ethnicity into voting for legislators at the level of provinces.

Nonetheless, the results suggest that Afro-descendant legislators make up an important share of legislative representatives in a number of provinces. Moreover, the presence of Afro-descendant legislators across the country is even greater if we include *indio* legislators.

The results also show that Afro-descendant legislators have been elected in provinces where individuals tend to be lighter-skinned. This is true in the 2006-2010 and in the 2010-2016 legislatures. In the absence of census data on ethnoracial classification in the Dominican Republic, I used the following selection process to identify provinces where individuals tend to be lighter-skinned. First, I selected provinces in which the percentage of self-identified whites was equal to or greater than the percentage of self-identified whites in the sample of the 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 AmericasBarometer (AB) surveys.<sup>67</sup> I then narrowed the list to provinces that met that criterion in at least three of the four surveys.

---

<sup>67</sup> The percentage of respondents who self-identified as white in the AB surveys was 12.78 in 2006, 13.94 in 2008, 9.58 in 2010, and 12.5 in 2012.

Table 3.7 lists the legislators from the provinces of Duarte, Espaillat, La Vega, Monseñor Nouel, Peravia, and Santiago that I coded as Afro-descendant (i.e. mulatto, *moreno*, and black). With the exception of Peravia, these provinces are located in the Cibao region, which historically had higher levels of white migration and a landed elite.<sup>68</sup> The table shows that Afro-descendants were elected either to the Senate or to the COD (or both) in the 2006-2010 and 2010-2016 legislative periods across these provinces, except in Peravia. These Afro-descendant legislators represented all three political parties.

Most Afro-descendant legislators in these provinces were elected to the COD. For example, at least two Afro-descendant legislators in Duarte, La Vega, and Santiago were elected to the 2006-2010 as well as to the 2010-2016 COD. And two Afro-descendant legislators in Monseñor Nouel were elected to the 2006-2010 COD. Moreover, one Afro-descendant legislator in Espaillat was elected to the 2006-2010 as well as to the 2010-2016 COD, and one Afro-descendant legislator in Monseñor Nouel was elected to the 2010-2016 COD.

---

<sup>68</sup> It should be noted, however, that Afro-descendants have settled in the Cibao region likely for as long as whites have settled there.

	Duarte	Monseñor Nouel	Peravia	Espaillat	La Vega	Santiago
2006-2010 Senate	-	Felix Nova (PLD)	-	Porfirio Bautista (PRD)	-	-
2006-2010 COD	Noe M. Mercedes (PRD) Juan Comprés (PLD)	Modesto Díaz (PRD) Jose C. Ramos (PLD)	-	Bernardo Sánchez (PRD)	Aridio Reyes (PLD) Guillermo Ramos (PRSC) Guillermo Galván (PLD)	MC (PRD), AB (PRD), JCV (PLD), DM (PLD), MR (PLD), SR (PLD), AA (PRD)
2010-2016 Senate	-	Felix Nova (PLD)	-	-	-	Julio César Valentín (PLD)
2010-2016 COD	Virgilio Gonzáles (PRD) Juan Comprés (PLD)	Evangelina Sosa (PRD)	-	Olfalida Almonte (PLD)	Aridio Reyes (PLD) Guillermo Ramos (PRSC)	AG (PLD), DM (PLD), FM (PLD), MR (PLD), AB (PRD), JJ (PRD), MM (PRD), FS (PRD), MC (PRSC), CBT (PRD)

Table 3.7: Afro-descendant Legislators in the provinces of Duarte, Monseñor Nouel, Peravia, Espaillat, La Vega, and Santiago in the 2006-2010 and the 2010-2016 Legislatures

The number of Afro-descendant legislators in the province of Santiago was much higher compared to the other provinces. One obvious reason is that Santiago holds 18 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Seven Afro-descendant legislators in Santiago were elected to seats in the 2006-2010 COD and 10 Afro-descendant legislators were elected to seats in the 2010-2016 COD. I provide the full name of these legislators in Table 1A in Appendix A.

Nonetheless, Afro-descendant legislators were also elected to the Senate in three of these provinces. For example, Felix Nova (PLD) from Monseñor Nouel was elected to the 2006-2010 Senate and was re-elected in 2010. Likewise, Porfirio Bautista (PLD) from Espaillat was elected to the 2006-2010 Senate, and Julio César Valentín (PLD) from Santiago was elected to the 2010-2016 Senate (after being elected to the COD in 2006).

In addition to electing Afro-descendant legislators, Dominicans have also elected Afro-descendant presidents. Ulises Hereaux, a man of Haitian and West Indian descent, and Gregorio Luperón were elected in the period known as the Second Republic that followed the restoration of independence from Spain in 1865. Although they shared African ethnoracial attributes, Luperón and Hereaux received very different levels of support. Gregorio Luperón, who presided over a short provisional government in 1879, was revered as a national hero for his leadership in the war of 1865 against Spain (Torres-Saillant 1999). Hereaux, by contrast, was despised for most of his twelve-year neo-sultanistic regime (1887-1899). He enriched himself with state resources and nearly mortgaged away the nation to foreign capital (Hartlyn 1998).

More recently, Dominicans have also elected an Afro-descendant president. Leonel Fernández (PLD) was elected to three presidential terms: 1996-2000, 2004-2008 and 2008-2012. And there is evidence that Fernández drew just as much support from provinces and municipalities where lighter-skinned individuals tend to be more prevalent as he did from other provinces.

Table 3.8 presents the percentage of votes that the PLD (and its allies) received in the 2004 and 2008 elections across provinces where individuals tend to be lighter-skinned. I extended the aforementioned criteria of selection of provinces with a high proportion of light-skinned individuals to the 2004 AmericasBarometer survey. I also selected municipalities that had the largest number of valid votes and that are also known to have a high proportion of light-skinned individuals. Table 2A in Appendix A lists the percentage of self-identified white respondents in these provinces.

The data show that in the 2004 elections the PLD and its allies won in nearly every province and municipality where light-skinned individuals tend to be more prevalent. And it won convincingly in some cases. Over 60 percent of residents in the municipalities of Baní and La Vega voted for Fernández, for instance. He received less than 50 percent of the vote in the 2004 elections in all but one province, Montecristi, which was also the only province that he lost (45.69% to 45.31%) on this list. The PLD received fewer votes across provinces when Fernández ran for re-election in 2008 (with one exception). But the PLD still received more than 50 percent of the votes in most provinces and municipalities and won in all but one province where lighter-skinned individuals are more prevalent. Fernández lost the province of Montecristi again in 2008.

Province	Municipality	PLD & Allies		PLD & Allies	
		% Votes, 2004	Result	% Votes, 2008	Result
Duarte		51.27	Won	49.97	Won
	San Francisco de Macorís	55.21	Won	50.36	Won
Españat		56.23	Won	50.13	Won
	Moca	57.42	Won	49.94	Won
La Vega		59.31	Won	51.13	Won
	La Vega	60.17	Won	52.14	Won
	Jarabacoa	55.19	Won	45.96	Won
Montecristi		45.31	Lost	47.15	Lost
Monseñor Nouel		54.24	Won	50.26	Won
	Bonao*	-	-	50.17	Won
Peravia^		58.75	Won	51.97	Won
	Baní	60.08	Won	52.93	Won
Puerto Plata		53.17	Won	52.57	Won
Salcedo/Hnas. Mirabal		56.06	Won	54.59	Won
Santiago		55.31	Won	49.09	Won
	Santiago de los Caballeros	57.57	Won	50.41	Won
Santiago Rodríguez		51.01	Won	48.91	Won

Source: Junta Central Electoral

\* Township was not considered a municipality in 2004.

^ Peravia was the single “light-skinned” province that also had a prevalence of self-identified Afro-descendants across most AB surveys from 2004-2012.

Table 3.8: The Share of Votes for the PLD and its Allies in the 2004 and 2008 Presidential Elections by “Lighter” Provinces and Municipalities

As Table 3.9 shows, the PLD and its allies received just as much support in provinces where dark-skinned individuals tend to be more prevalent. I used a similar

selection process to identify provinces where individuals tend to be dark-skinned as I did to identify provinces where individuals tend to be light-skinned. I selected provinces in which the percentage of self-identified blacks was equal to or greater than the percentage of self-identified blacks in the sample of the 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 AB surveys.<sup>69</sup> I then narrowed the list to provinces that met that criterion in at least three of the five surveys. I also selected municipalities that had the largest number of valid votes and that are also known to have a high proportion of dark-skinned individuals. Table 3A in Appendix A lists the percentage of self-identified black respondents in these provinces.

The results show that Fernández won each province and municipality in the 2004 elections and received more than 50 percent of the vote in all of them. He was especially supported in La Romana, where he received over 70 percent of the vote. The PLD received fewer votes in the 2008 elections. This was true across provinces where darker-skinned individuals are more prevalent. Nonetheless, the PLD won across those provinces and managed to receive more than 58 percent of the vote in 8 of those provinces.

---

<sup>69</sup> The percentage of respondents who self-identified as black in the AB surveys was 9.58 in 2004, 19.94 in 2006, 17.85 in 2008, 10.18 in 2010, and 15.66 in 2012.

Province	Municipality	PLD & Allies		PLD & Allies	
		% Votes, 2004	Result	% Votes, 2008	Result
El Seibo		53.40	Won	50.65	Won
	Santa Cruz del Seibo	54.28	Won	51.15	Won
Hato Mayor		53.94	Won	56.60	Won
	Hato Mayor del Rey	54.75	Won	58.88	Won
La Romana		70.22	Won	59.86	Won
	La Romana	72.15	Won	61.44	Won
Monte Plata		52.75	Won	53.52	Won
	Monte Plata	54.79	Won	55.46	Won
	Yamasá	55.32	Won	54.27	Won
San Cristobal		59.24	Won	56.69	Won
	Bajos de Haina	58.09	Won	53.57	Won
	San Cristobal	62.57	Won	59.77	Won
Samaná		53.40	Won	49.38	Won
	Samaná	50.55	Won	47.52	Won
San Pedro de Macorís		56.56	Won	56.82	Won
	San Pedro de Macorís	62.39	Won	59.92	Won
Santo Domingo		63.96	Won	58.29	Won
	Boca Chica	53.56	Won	50.43	Won
	Los Alcarrizos*	-	-	61.87	Won
	Pedro Brand*	-	-	56.84	Won
	San Antonio de Guerra*	-	-	50.32	Won
	Santo Domingo Este	64.29	Won	58.10	Won

Source: Junta Central Electoral

\* Township was not considered a municipality in 2004.

Table 3.9: The Share of Votes for the PLD and its Allies in the 2004 and 2008 Presidential Elections by “Darker” Provinces and Municipalities

These data suggest that voters in the Dominican Republic have not typically based their electoral preferences on ethnoracial identity. Dominicans from a variety of different provinces, including provinces that are mostly composed of light-skinned individuals, have elected Afro-descendant legislators. Moreover, provinces with a prevalence of lighter-skinned individuals and those with a prevalence of darker-skinned individuals similarly supported an Afro-descendant candidate, Leonel Fernández, in the 2004 and 2008 elections.

Individual-level voting data from the 2004 and 2008 elections provide further evidence of the low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections in the Dominican Republic. Table 3.10 presents the percentage of self-identified white and black respondents that voted for Leonel Fernández and for runner-up candidates in the 2004 and 2008 elections. The data show that Leonel Fernández received similar levels of support from self-identified whites and self-identified blacks in both elections. In fact, a slightly higher percentage of self-identified white respondents reported voting for Leonel Fernández in the 2004 and 2008 elections. This is was true in the 2006 and 2008 AmericasBarometer surveys that asked about the 2004 elections. It was also true in the 2010 and 2012 AB surveys that asked about the 2008 elections. Moreover, the data show that Leonel Fernández received more than double the level of support from self-identified whites than runner-up candidates in both elections, though Hipólito Mejía and Miguel Vargas Maldonado are both lighter-skinned.

	% Whites		% Blacks	
2004 Elections				
	AB2006	AB2008	AB2006	AB2008
Leonel Fernández	65.3	71.5	63.6	60.6
Hipólito Mejía (Runner-up)	26.2	20.8	28.9	30.9
2008 Elections				
	AB2010	AB2012	AB2010	AB2012
Leonel Fernández	62.7	61.4	57.4	51.6
Miguel Vargas Maldonado (Runner-up)	30.3	31.1	36.3	43.7

Source: AmericasBarometer, 2006-2012

Table 3.10: The Percentage of Self-Identified White and Black Respondents that Voted for Leonel Fernández and for Runner-Up Candidates in the 2004 and 2008 Elections

Politicians have not typically appealed to ethnoracial identity in electoral campaigns either. The 2006 senate race in San Francisco de Macorís between Alejandro Williams and José Hazim Frappier is an oft-cited example of an election that lacked ethnoracial overtones in spite of the stark ethnoracial differences between the candidates. In this election, Williams, a black dentist of *Cocolo* (West Indian) descent, defeated Hazim, a wealthy heir to the founders of the Universidad Central del Este in a race that was largely devoid of ethnoracial appeals.

Campaigns against Peña Gómez during the 1994 and 1996 presidential elections are an important exception in Dominican electoral history. With the support of the incumbent, Joaquín Balaguer, opposition parties used vile political propaganda and negative advertisements to viciously attack Peña Gómez's character, his negroid features, and his purported Haitian origin (Sagás 2000).

Based on the case of Peña Gómez, scholars such as Howard (2001) concluded that “racism plays a fundamental part in Dominican politics” (154). They reasoned, much like Howard did, that “in Dominican politics, race and nation cannot be considered as isolated, unitary terms” (154).

It is true that race and nation have been inextricably linked in the Dominican Republic. But the effect of ethnoracial identity and national origin on electoral behavior should not be presumed to be the same. In the context of the Dominican Republic, decoupling race and nation allows us to see that racism and anti-Haitianism are not necessarily equally salient in electoral politics.

Based on data in Howard (2001) and Sagás (2000), I compiled references specifically about Peña Gómez in the 1994 and 1996 elections. I coded these references dichotomously (0, 1) based on whether the content of these references stressed Peña Gómez's (1) ethnoracial identity only, (2) his ethnoracial identity *and his* national origin, or (3) his national origin only.

Date	Medium	Reference Only to Race	Reference to Race <i>and</i> National/Cultural Origin	Reference Only to National/Cultural Origin
17 July 1992	Hoy Newspaper article	0	1	0
26 July 1995	El Siglo Newspaper article	0	0	1
14 September 1994	Listín Diario Newspaper article	0	0	1
1985	Poll (Álvarez Vega, 1985)	0	1	0
11 June 1996	Rumbo-Gallup Poll	0	1	0
19 June 1996	Rumbo-Gallup Poll	0	0	1
5 May 1994	Anonymous Faxes	0	1	0
n/a	Political Cartoons (8), El Nacional Newspaper	0	1	0
n/a	Aerial leaflet drops	0	1	0
n/a	Videos on state-controlled TV	0	0	1
Total		0	6	4

Sources: Sagás 2000; Howard 2001

Table 3.11: References in the 1994 and 1996 Elections about Peña Gómez's Candidacy Based on Race, Race and National Origin, and National Origin

The results in Table 3.11 suggest that references about Peña Gómez in the 1994 and 1996 campaigns mostly stressed his national origin *and* ethnoracial identity or his national origin alone. There were zero references to Peña Gómez's ethnoracial identity alone in this small sample of newspaper articles, public opinion polls, political cartoons and other media.

Results from a 1985 poll about Peña Gómez lend support to these findings. Citing a study by Alvarez Vega (1985), Sagás (2000, 107) reports that “24.03 percent of the respondents mentioned that the Haitian ancestry of Peña Gómez was his main obstacle as presidential candidate, while another 5.85 percent mentioned that Peña Gómez’s black skin color—and the fact that the Dominican Republic is a racist country—as his main political obstacle.” And we know that ethnoracial identity alone could not have been determining in the case of Peña Gómez. He won the popular vote in 1994 and won the first round in the 1996 elections. These results suggest that in the case of Peña Gómez, national origin was far more salient than ethnoracial identity.

In addition, provincial data on the 1994 and 1996 elections indicate that Peña Gómez in fact won support in light-skinned provinces as well. The data is presented in Table 3.12. In the 1994 elections, Peña Gómez won in six of ten provinces where light-skinned individuals tend to be most prevalent. He did even better across these provinces in the first round of the 1996 elections, in which he won all provinces but two (Santiago and Salcedo). And he also won the provinces that he lost in the 1994 elections, with the exception of Santiago, which he lost across all three contests. The results do show that Peña Gómez lost in eight of ten of these predominantly light-skinned provinces in the second round of the 1996 elections. But given his earlier success in the first round of the 1996 elections (and in the 1994 elections), it is likely that his defeats in the second round were more likely the result of the “patriotic alliance” between the PRSC and the PLD than the result of race alone.

Province	PRD % Votes, 1994	Result	PRD & Allies % Votes, 1996			
			First Round	Result	Second Round	Result
Duarte	46.42	Won	44.32	Won	46.63	Lost
Españolat	43.97	Won	42.02	Won	45.30	Lost
La Vega	46.4	Won	43.52	Won	46.28	Lost
Montecristi	44	Lost	53.23	Won	54.91	Won
Monseñor Nouel	43.73	Won	46.36	Won	49.20	Lost
Peravia	28.92	Lost	46.05	Won	49.19	Lost
Puerto Plata	34.55	Lost	45.67	Won	48.83	Lost
Salcedo	43.81	Won	36.14	Lost	38.87	Lost
Santiago Rodríguez	40.13	Won	48.08	Won	50.04	Won
Santiago	38.10	Lost	40.45	Lost	43.35	Lost

Source: Political Database of the Americas

Note: Calculations are mine.

Table 3.12: The Share of Votes for the PRD and Allies in the 1994 and 1996 Presidential Elections by “Lighter” Provinces

## CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I argued that individuals in the Dominican Republic reclassify their ethnoracial identification as a way to manage high levels of ethnoracial stratification and prejudice. I presented evidence that suggests that there are high levels of stratification and prejudice in the Dominican Republic. This combination is an important incentive structure. Rather than motivate marginalized individuals to mobilize collectively, stratification and prejudice encourage individuals to identify with lighter categories, such as *indio*.

Despite high levels of ethnoracial stratification and prejudice, however, ethnoracial identity has not been salient in elections. Dominicans have elected numerous Afro-descendant legislators, including some who have represented provinces where lighter-skinned individuals are more prevalent. Dominicans have also elected Afro-descendant presidents. At least one of those presidents, Leonel Fernández, was able to draw support from provinces with very different ethnoracial compositions. Moreover, politicians have not typically used racial appeals in campaigns. Even where they have used ethnoracial appeals, they have used them in combination with appeals to national origin, as in the campaigns against Peña Gómez.

In the next chapter, I test the salience of ethnoracial identity and national origin in elections using a combination of qualitative, quantitative, and experimental methods. The survey-experiment, in particular, will enable me to test in a more rigorous manner whether Dominicans use ethnoracial considerations at the ballot box. It also allows me to

test the claims of competing approaches against my own claims. I support my findings from the survey-experiment with results from my focus groups and interviews.

## Chapter 4: Nation Before Pigmentation

Although ethnoracial identity and social class do not neatly overlap in the Dominican Republic, stratification indeed tends to unfold along ethnoracial lines, as I show in Chapter 3. Contrary to the predictions of dominant theoretical approaches on ethnoracial identity and electoral politics, however, stratification and somatic-based prejudice have not axiomatically led to ethnoracial politics. This is evident, for example, in the absence of candidates and political parties in the Dominican Republic that articulate ethnoracial grievances.

Group-based approaches have either downplayed or not considered the crux of my central argument that the degree of ethnoracial group identity also shapes ethnoracial politics. High levels of stratification combined with low degrees of ethnoracial group consolidation will typically lead to outcomes in which ethnoracial identity is *not* salient in elections (see Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1). The literature on race in Latin America has not paid sufficient attention to how ethnoracial mixing and stratification affect electoral behavior.

As I contended in Chapter 2, ethnoracial mixing, structural conditions during the colonial period, and inclusive/exclusionary nation-building policies in the Dominican Republic thwarted the development of a consolidated group identity. Encouraged by de-racializing nation-building policies, blacks and mulattoes in the Dominican Republic have taken advantage of their mixed ethnoracial heritage to reclassify into lighter ethnoracial categories and avoid further marginalization and prejudice. I argue that this

form of “exit” has obstructed the emergence of ethnoracial voters and entrepreneurs and stymied ethnoracial politics.

In this chapter, I present the results of my field survey-experiment and focus groups to adjudicate between the predictions of group-based approaches and the literature on race in Latin America. First, I discuss the design of my survey-experiment, which was fine-tuned in a number of pre-experimental focus group sessions. Second, I test competing approaches individually using bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses to present results with and without controls. Employing both types of analyses circumvents disagreement in the literature on whether it is necessary to add control variables in experiments with randomly assigned treatments.

Third, I examine what evidence exists to support my own argument that ethnoracial voting behavior has failed to emerge in spite of ethnoracial stratification and prejudice in the DR. The results suggest that participants did not consistently support candidates that shared their ethnoracial attributes, but they did slightly favor “white” candidates.

National identity, however, does strongly shape electoral preferences, according to my analyses. Participants in the experiment discriminated against candidates of Haitian origin. And survey respondents as well as focus group participants openly admitted their reluctance to vote for Dominican candidates of Haitian origin. Nevertheless, the anti-Haitian attitudes were not clearly tied to race since the same respondents were willing to support dark-skinned Dominican candidates who were not of Haitian origin.

## DATA AND METHODS

To test my claims and those of competing approaches, I carried out an in-person, randomized survey-experiment in the province of Santo Domingo. Studies on Mexico by Aguilar-Pariente (2011) and on Brazil by Mitchell (2009), Dunning (2010), and Aguilar-Pariente et al. (2015) have employed similar survey-experimental designs to examine the impact of skin color and ethnoracial identity on candidate evaluation. This is the first study, however, to employ such a research design in the case of the Dominican Republic. Moreover, this study improves on those studies because it includes participants from all ethnoracial groups and from rural and urban populations.

I generated a probability sample using a stratified, multi-stage technique. Over 70 neighborhoods were drawn at random across seven municipalities in the province of Santo Domingo, but still reflected the economic strata of the 2010 national census when measured by the type of home flooring.<sup>70</sup> In the absence of recent ethnoracial self-identification census data, economic stratum is a good proxy for ethnoracial identity in the DR. As I have shown, the two are strongly correlated. The selection of municipalities was followed by a randomized selection of streets, households, and adult individuals. A total of 694 voting-age Dominican citizens participated in the study, which represented an 82 percent overall response rate.<sup>71</sup> Figure 4A in the Appendix shows that my sample

---

<sup>70</sup> The 2010 Dominican Republic census did not ask questions about personal or household income, but it did ask questions about different measures of wealth, such as home flooring.

<sup>71</sup> The overall response rate reflects the percentage of participants who completed the study. In most cases, however, there were several failed attempts before interviewing the participants.

overrepresented young adults, women, college-educated, and rural populations of Santo Domingo relative to the 2010 census data.<sup>72</sup>

Through a process of sequential randomization, participants were exposed to a single campaign sheet from a total of twelve fictional campaign sheets or conditions. Each campaign sheet in the treatment group consisted of four items. First, they included the complete name of the candidate. Second, they included one of three different photographs of Brazilian legislators to represent “white,” “mixed,” and “black” ethnoracial candidates. The photograph used to represent the black candidate was also used to represent the candidate of Haitian origin. The distinction was denoted using a French-Creole as opposed to a Spanish surname.

Third, campaign sheets included a short biography in bullet point form, including age, occupation, class, marital status, and education. I only varied the level of education in these biographies (i.e. the sheets either stated that the candidate had completed university-level studies or made no reference to education). Lastly, the sheets included a generic statement about the candidate’s policy position on uncontroversial domestic issues, such as crime, education, electrical shortages, corruption, and employment. Policy positions remained constant across all fictional candidates. I excluded the party membership of candidates from this wave of the experiment to prevent potential associations or previous information from interfering with the evaluation of the campaign

---

<sup>72</sup> For the candidate evaluation questions, I included a probability weight to correct the oversampling of women and to balance experimental conditions. The probability weight did not significantly change the results.

sheets (see Pariente-Aguilar 2008). Sample campaign sheets of candidates with high levels of education are included below in Figure 4.1.



(From left to right, row 1: “black” candidate and “mixed” candidate; row 2: Dominican-Haitian candidate and “white” candidate; row 3: Dominican-Haitian candidate and Spanish-surname control candidate)

Figure 4.1: Sample Campaign Sheets of Candidates Assigned a High Level of Education

The materials used were comparable in design and content to those used by Dominican politicians. Because the experimental campaign sheets would be viewed in one-shot sessions, the material included greater detail about candidate background and policy positions than is the norm. Actual campaigns are more likely to present the same information piecemeal across different media, including television, print, and radio.

The control group, which accounted for four of the twelve campaign sheets, excluded photographs of candidates. In two of the campaign sheets in the control group, however, it was explicitly stated that the candidate was of Haitian origin. Details on the treatment and control groups are provided in Table 4.1.

Respondents answered several candidate evaluation questions, as well as a question about how likely they were to vote for a candidate. Candidate evaluation questions asked about the likelihood that candidates would improve the respondents' economic well-being and about the probability that the candidates would control undocumented Haitian migration. These two candidate evaluation questions and the voting question were coded as discrete variables. They were measured on an ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 4 in which 1 is very unlikely, 2 is somewhat unlikely, 3 is likely, and 4 is very likely. Questions also asked about the capacity, trustworthiness, and physical attractiveness of candidates. These questions were also coded on a scale of 1-4 in which 1 is none, 2 is little, 3 is some, and 4 is a lot.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
<hr/>												
Treatment	<hr/>											
Photo and Implicit Reference to Haitian origin	♦	♦										
Photo of Black candidate			♦	♦								
Photo of Mixed candidate					♦	♦						
Photo of White candidate							♦	♦				
High Education	♦		♦		♦		♦		♦		♦	
No Education Reference		♦		♦		♦		♦		♦		♦
<hr/>												
Control	<hr/>											
No Photograph of Candidate									♦	♦	♦	♦
Explicit Reference to Haitian origin									♦	♦		
Number of Assigned Respondents	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	57	57
<hr/>												

Table 4.1. Treatment and Control Group Conditions Across Campaign Sheets

A 63-item survey section followed the experimental section. It asked a battery of questions about political knowledge, political and racial attitudes, and socio-demographics. The survey section sought to measure the respondent's level of social desirability (or the likelihood that respondents would adjust their answers to conform to social norms) using questions derived from Terkildsen's (1993) study. As I show in the next section, personality scales had very little interaction with the survey questions.

This study employed three different measures of respondents' ethnoracial identity: an ascribed ethnoracial measure, an ethnoracial self-identification measure, and a self-identified skin color measure. The ascribed measure asked interviewers to assign respondents to one of six ethnosomatic categories: (1) white; (2) *jabao*; (3) *indio*; (4) mulatto; (5) *moreno* or (6) black. The ethnoracial self-identification question asked respondents to assign themselves to one of those categories. These categories resembled those used in Sidanius, Peña, and Sawyer's (2001) pigmentocracy study in the Dominican Republic. Figure 4.2 presents the ethnoracial composition of my sample by ascribed and self-identification measures.

Ethnosomatic categories in the Dominican Republic overlap (Telles and Flores 2013). In fact, categories such as mulatto and *indio* cover nearly the entire somatic spectrum because they are not necessarily based on visible or objective markers. There is, however, a loose positioning of categories. For instance, *jabao* is typically viewed as being closer to white, though it includes some African somatic attributes, whereas *moreno* is closer to black, though it includes some non-African somatic characteristics.

Mulatto, like *indio*, is a mixed category but it is typically conceived as somatically darker than *indio*. The intervals between each category are not equally spaced (Sagás 2000).




Figure 4.2: The Ethnoraacial Composition of the Sample By Different Measures of Ethnoraacial Identity

I also included a number of traditional control variables in the analyses, including party identification, age, gender, income, and education. Political sophistication and social desirability were measured as indexes based on pooled questions.

I estimated most of the models presented here using ordered probit, though I also used logistic regressions in some cases. The assumptions of the ordered probit model provide the most accurate method to test ordinal dependent variables, such as the aforementioned candidate evaluation questions (McKelvey and Zavoina 1975).

### *Focus Groups*

I conducted and filmed four two-hour long focus group sessions in Santo Domingo from March 11-13, 2011 to pre-test the experimental conditions and post-

experimental survey questions. These sessions took place at the premises of Emevenca República Dominicana, a market-research firm. Focus groups were comprised of 8 individuals each and varied in age, gender, and social class. The sample was disproportionately well-educated, male, and young relative to the national population. Most participants in the focus group sessions, like most citizens of the DR, self-identified ethn racially as *indio* and reported their skin-color as “neither white nor dark.” Approximately 46 percent of focus groups participants self-identified as *indio*, 16 percent as mulatto, 13 percent as *moreno*, 3 percent as black, and 6 percent as *jabao* and as white. As evident in Figure 4.2, this distribution closely resembled the ethn racial composition of participants in my survey-experiment. It also resembled the ethn racial composition of the 2014 AmericasBarometer national survey. In the 2014 AB survey, 58 percent of participants self-identified as *indio*, 15.8 percent as black, 13.5 percent as white, and 12.4 percent as white. The percentage of focus group participants who self-identified as black was much lower than the percentage of individuals who self-identified as black in my sample and in the 2014 AB sample.

Participants were sorted into the following groups: (1) college-age men and women from all socioeconomic strata; (2) men and women of all ages from lower socioeconomic strata; (3) men of all ages from all socio-economic strata; and (4) women of all ages from all socioeconomic strata. I held separate sessions for men and women, young adults, and individuals from lower socioeconomic strata to minimize any prejudice or deference-related bias that could emerge as a result of differences in age, gender, and socioeconomic status. In addition, these groupings allowed me to control for age and

socioeconomic status, which have been shown to be important sociopolitical cleavages in the Dominican Republic (see Chapter 2).

In each session, participants were first asked to individually complete the survey and experimental sections and to share their responses as a group. They were then probed on the design of the survey-experiment, the data presented in the campaign sheets, and the perceived ethnoracial identity and social status of the fictional candidates. Finally, participants were asked to reflect on questions related to ethnoracial identity and electoral politics in the Dominican Republic.

Focus group sessions improved the uniformity and credibility of the experimental conditions (i.e. campaign sheets). Participants helped to ensure that the photographs selected to represent fictional candidates aligned with Dominican ethnoracial parameters and were comparable across all other dimensions, including friendliness, attractiveness, and experience. For example, participants remarked that the initial fictional subjects used to represent black candidates were too old and unattractive (though the subject ultimately selected to represent the black candidate was also evaluated as unattractive by respondents in the survey-experiment).

Participants also helped to test that the data provided on the candidates' socioeconomic status, educational credentials, experience, and policy proposals were credible and compelling. Several important changes were made to the campaign sheets as a result. For instance, I added data on the candidates' college degree, major, and class rank. I also replaced candidates' policy proposals with more timely and broadly-

appealing agendas, such as subsidizing child care for single mothers, enforcing anti-corruption laws, and bolstering the agricultural sector.

Insights from focus groups also led to changes that improved the function and clarity of the post-experimental survey questions, particularly those related to race and ethnicity. For instance, I modified the wording and order of questions that asked whether light-skinned Dominicans were more intelligent, harder working, and patriotic than dark-skinned Dominicans. This reduced the risk of priming and social desirability bias affecting the results. Similarly, I shortened the number (and reversed the order) of questions that asked participants to evaluate various ethnoracial categories. This change helped to discourage the kind of chain-sequence responses that many participants provided in the focus group.

#### **EVALUATING COMPETING APPROACHES**

I tested the predictions of competing approaches against my own using data gathered from my survey-experiment and focus groups. As I noted in Chapter 1, group-specific approaches would predict that voters in the Dominican Republic would support candidates of their own ethnoracial category, and the colorism thesis would predict that voters would support lighter candidates over darker candidates. By contrast, my argument predicts that voters are unlikely to express any ethnoracial preferences.

I found mixed support for the predictions of group-specific approaches. Table 4.2 presents a comparison of means for in-category and out-category evaluations across participants' ethnoracial self-identification. As group-specific approaches would predict,

participants did consistently express greater affect toward in-category members than toward out-category members. The difference of means was only statistically significant for half of the ethnoracial categories, however. These categories were self-identified whites, *indios*, and *morenos*.

Self-identified Ethnoracial Category of Respondent	Ethnoracial Category of Groupings Evaluated	Average evaluation score
White	Whites	3.92**
White N=40	Non-Whites	3.59
Jabao	Jabaos	4.02
Jabao N=66	Non-Jabaos	3.89
Indio	Indios	3.94**
Indio N=325	Non-Indios	3.75
Mulatto	Mulattos	4.03
Mulatto N=65	Non-Mulattos	3.89
Moreno	Morenos	3.90***
Moreno N=137	Non-Morenos	3.68
Black	Blacks	3.89
Black N=59	Non-Blacks	3.75

\*\*\*P<0.01\*\*P<0.05

Table 4.2: Comparison of Means for the Evaluation of Ethnoracial Categories by Respondents' Self-Identified Ethnoracial Identification

Whereas the results for whites are consistent with the valorization of whiteness in the Dominican Republic, the results for *morenos* and for *indios* are unexpected. Unlike mulattos, *morenos* and *indios* do not affirm their Afro-descent more than other ethnoracial categories. Moreover, they have not developed particularly strong feelings of linked fate or a sense of group consciousness, which are characteristics typically associated with greater levels of affect for in-category members.

As with participants' evaluation of in-category members, there was some support for group-specific approaches with respect to participants' evaluation of in-category candidates. Table 4.3 presents participants' mean scores for their evaluation of in-category and out-category candidates across six evaluation questions. As the results show, self-identified white and *jabao* participants consistently gave higher evaluation scores to in-category candidates than to out-category candidates. But the results also show that support for group-specific approaches was modest. Only in the case of whites was the difference of means statistically significant across evaluation questions. Self-identified *moreno* and *jabao* participants did give in-category candidates statistically significantly higher scores, but only for one question each. Interestingly, they gave in-category members higher scores for the same question (candidates' attractiveness).

As with the previous results, we should not overstate these findings given the small size of some cells. For example, only 4 self-identified white participants evaluated white candidates, and only 6 self-identified black participants evaluated black candidates. Nonetheless, these results taken together provide either mixed or little support for the predictions of group-specific theories.

Self-Identified Ethnoracial Category of Respondent	Ethnoracial Category of Candidate Evaluated	Average Score for Candidate Evaluation Items					
		Likely to Vote for Candidate	Capable	Trustworthy	Likely to Improve Your Economic Well-Being	Likely to Control Undocumented Haitian Migration	Physically Attractive
White	White n=4	3.25**	3.50	3.25*	3.25**	3.50**	3.75**
	Non-White n=22	2.22	3.14	2.04	2.36	1.95	2.45
Jabao	White n=16	2.75	3.18	2.56	2.62	2.50	3.12
	Non-White n= 29	2.72	3.13	2.31	2.24	2.06	2.13***
Indio	Mixed n=57	2.60	3.00	2.39	2.55	2.12	2.61
	Non-Mixed n=164	2.85	3.17	2.48	2.53	2.25	2.65
Mulatto	Mixed n=12	2.50	3.33	2.50	2.42	1.75	2.33
	Non-Mixed n=32	2.62	3.12	2.34	2.19	1.90	2.25
Moreno	Black n=28	2.77	3.07	2.85	2.75	2.64	2.17
	Non-Black n=64	2.78	3.23	2.50	2.54	2.37	2.64*
Black	Black n=6	2.00	3.33	2.67	2.83	2.67	3.17
	Non-Black n=29	2.58	3.03	2.48	2.48	2.00	2.51

\*\*\*P<0.01\*\*P<0.05; \*P<0.10

Table 4.3: Comparison of Means for Respondents' Ethnoracial Identification by Ethnoracial Category of Candidate Across Evaluation Items

Results from multivariate analyses bolster the findings of the simple comparison of means analyses. Ordered probit regressions in Table 4.4 interact the ethnoracial

category ascribed to candidates with the participants' ethnoracial self-identification. The relationship between interaction terms (ethnoracial identification of candidates and participants) was statistically significant and positive for only a few candidate evaluation questions. For example, the interaction term between the white candidate and self-identified white participants had a positive and statistically significant effect on two questions: the trustworthiness of the candidate and the willingness of the candidate to control undocumented Haitian migration. Likewise, the interaction term between the black candidate and self-identified black participants had a positive and statistically significant effect on the candidate's attractiveness.

Overall, however, there is little support for the predictions of group specific approaches. The interaction terms between the ethnoracial identification of candidates and respondents did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance for most candidate evaluation questions and willingness to vote. These results held whether I used interaction terms with ascribed or self-identified measures of ethnoracial identification. One exception was the interaction term between the *indio* candidate and participants ascribed an *indio* identification. That interaction had a statistically significant effect on the willingness to vote for that candidate. The interaction term was negative, however, which suggests that participants ascribed an *indio* identification were less likely to vote for *indio* candidates. This is the opposite of what group-specific approaches would expect.

	Willing to Vote for Candidate	Candidate is Capable	Candidate is Trustworthy	Candidate is Likely to Improve Your Economic Well-Being	Candidate is Likely to Control Undocumented Haitian Migration	Candidate is Physically Attractive
Self-Identified White Respondents * White Candidate	0.58 (0.58)	0.82 (0.65)	1.15* (0.60)	0.92 (0.59)	1.63** (0.66)	0.90 (0.72)
Self-Identified indio Respondents * Ascribed Mixed Candidate	-0.30 (0.17)	-0.46** (0.18)	-0.17 (0.17)	-0.12 (0.17)	-0.12 (0.17)	-0.30 (0.23)
Self-Identified Black Respondents * Ascribed Black Candidate	-0.25 (0.50)	0.56 (0.51)	0.56 (0.48)	0.64 (0.48)	0.49 (0.48)	1.21** (0.51)
Ascribed Black Candidate	-0.10 (0.13)	-0.19 (0.13)	-0.05 (0.13)	0.01 (0.13)	0.15 (0.13)	-0.49** (0.18)
Ascribed White Candidate	0.10 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.13)	0.10 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.13)	0.16 (0.13)	0.44** (0.18)
Dom-Haitian Cand. (Explicit)	-0.49** (0.13)	-0.52** (0.13)	-0.40** (0.13)	-0.25** (0.13)	-0.37** (0.13)	Omitted
Dom-Haitian Cand. (Implicit)	-0.14 (0.13)	-0.40** (0.13)	-0.12 (0.13)	-0.26** (0.13)	-0.25* (0.13)	-0.58** (0.18)
Candidates w/High education	-0.12 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.14 (0.08)	0.05 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.10)
Self-Identified white Participants	-0.43** (0.20)	-0.29 (0.20)	-0.51** (0.20)	-0.26 (0.20)	-0.37 (0.20)	0.17 (0.26)
Self-Identified <i>jabao</i> Participants	-0.04 (0.16)	-0.13 (0.16)	-0.24 (0.16)	-0.16 (0.16)	-0.21 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.20)
Self-Identified <i>indio</i> Participants	0.06 (0.11)	0.04 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.11)	0.03 (0.11)	-0.14 (0.11)	0.22 (0.14)
Self-Identified mulatto Participants	-0.08 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.16)	-0.17 (0.16)	-0.26 (0.16)	-0.44** (0.16)	-0.26 (0.20)
Self-Identified black Participants	-0.42** (0.18)	-0.30 (0.18)	-0.41** (0.17)	-0.29 (0.18)	-0.32 (0.18)	-0.09 (0.23)
Observations	691	692	690	689	692	462

\*\*P<0.05; \*P<0.10

Table 4.4: Interactions between the Ethnoracial Identification of Candidates and Participants Across Candidate Evaluation Items Ordered-Probit Analysis

The colorism thesis might appear more likely than group-specific approaches to shed light on ethnoracial identity and candidate evaluation in the Dominican Republic. It avoids some assumptions of “groupism,” and contends that ethnoracial prejudice and stratification—not shared ethnoracial identification—are the most salient social forces within and across ethnoracial categories.

The colorism literature has not made specific predictions about the effect of ethnoracial identity on electoral behavior in Latin America. It is reasonable to assume, however, that it would expect the valorization of whiteness over blackness to prevail in the electoral arena as much as it does in the social sphere. Specifically, it would expect white candidates to be consistently favored overall, and for black candidates to be consistently disfavored overall.

Results from bivariate analyses provide mixed support for the predictions of the colorism thesis. Figure 4.3 presents the average evaluation scores for different ethnoracial categories and category pairings. Whites (3.84) did receive significantly higher scores than some Afro-descendant categories, such as blacks (3.79) and mulattos (3.72). But the results show no clear indication of a pigmentocratic ordering. For example, whites also received significantly lower scores than *indios* (3.90), and they received the same average scores as *morenos* (3.84). In addition, participants rated *indios*, not whites, most favorably overall.

Lightest	Darkest
Whites.....Jabaos (3.84)*** (3.60)	
Whites.....Indios (3.84) (3.90)**	
Whites.....Mulattos (3.84)*** (3.72)	
Whites.....Morenos (3.84) (3.84)	
Whites.....Blacks (3.84)* (3.79)	
Jabaos.....Indios (3.60) (3.90)***	
Jabaos.....Mulattos (3.60) (3.72)***	
Jabaos.....Morenos (3.60) (3.84)***	
Jabaos.....Blacks (3.60) (3.79)***	
Indios.....Mulattos (3.90)*** (3.72)	
Indios.....Morenos (3.90)** (3.84)	
Indios.....Blacks (3.90)*** (3.79)	
Mulattos... Morenos (3.72) (3.84)***	
Mulattos...Blacks (3.72) (3.79)*	
Morenos...Blacks (3.84)* (3.79)	

\*\*\*P<0.01 \*\*P<0.05; \*P<0.10

Figure 4.3: Comparison of Means for the Evaluation of Ethnoracial Category Pairings Across the Ethnoracial Spectrum

Also contrary to the predictions of the colorism thesis, blacks did not receive the least favorable evaluations overall. In fact, they received significantly higher scores than *jabaos* (3.60), who tend to be only somatically darker than whites. Blacks also received significantly higher evaluation scores than mulattos, who are typically lighter than blacks. As Figure 4.3 makes clear, participants did not necessarily give significantly higher evaluation scores to lighter ethnoraical categories than to darker ethnoraical categories. This was true as true for pairings in which the distance between categories on the spectrum is small as it was for pairings in which the distance between categories is large.

There is greater support for the colorism theory with respect to candidate evaluation. As Table 4.5 shows, participants gave higher evaluation scores to white candidates in four of six evaluation items. They were also significantly more willing to vote for white candidates relative to mixed and black candidates. The evaluations of candidates' attractiveness were also consistent with the predictions of the colorism thesis. Participants rated white candidates as significantly more attractive than mixed candidates, and they rated mixed candidates as significantly more attractive than black candidates.

That participants evaluated white candidates more favorably is in some ways consistent with my argument. I have provided evidence that Dominicans tend to lighten their ethnoraical identification as way to deal with discrimination and stratification. The same logic of "exit" over voice that leads individuals to reclassify their identification with lighter ethnoraical categories also leads them to favor white candidates.

Although the results support some predictions of the colorism thesis, it does not support other predictions. Black candidates did not receive significantly lower scores than mixed candidates—except on attractiveness, and they were evaluated more on par with white candidates than mixed candidates were. Black candidates received significantly lower scores than white candidates in only two of six evaluation questions, attractiveness and willingness to vote, and the difference of means for willingness to vote was at the weakest level of statistical significance ( $p < .10$ ). By contrast, mixed candidates received significantly lower scores than white candidates in four of six evaluations questions.

	Willing to Vote for Candidate	Competence	Trustworthy	Likely to Improve Your Economic Well- Being	Likely to Control Undoc. Haitian Migration	Physically Attractive
White Candidate	2.92**	3.24	2.62*	2.58	2.41*	3.13***
Mixed Candidate	2.61	3.15	2.37	2.51	2.13	2.62
Mixed Candidate	2.61	3.15	2.37	2.51	2.13	2.62**
Black Candidate	2.65	3.18	2.45	2.59	2.36	2.31
Black Candidate	2.65	3.18	2.45	2.59	2.36	2.31
White Candidate	2.92*	3.24	2.62	2.58	2.41	3.13***

\*\*\* $P < 0.01$  \*\* $P < 0.05$ ; \* $P < 0.10$

Table 4.5: Comparison of Means for White, Mixed, and Black Candidate Pairings Across Evaluation Items and Willingness to Vote

The predictions of the colorism thesis received mixed support in the multivariate analysis as well. Table 4.6 presents an ordered probit analysis of the effect of candidates' ethnoracial characteristics on candidate evaluation. Participants were significantly more willing to vote for the white candidate versus the mixed category, but they were not significantly less willing to vote for the black candidate (versus the mixed reference category). Moreover, the sign on the coefficient on the willingness to vote for the black candidate was positive, which is the opposite of what the colorism thesis would expect.

Findings from the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey support the idea that Dominicans do not systematically discriminate against dark-skinned candidates. A combined 84 percent of respondents in this survey agreed or strongly agreed when asked whether dark-skinned individuals make good leaders. Moreover, as Chapter 3 showed, Dominicans consistently elect Afro-descendants to the legislature and have elected an Afro-descendant to the presidency in contemporary elections.

With respect to the other evaluation questions, the results from Table 4.6 also show mixed support for the colorism thesis. Participants did give significantly more favorable evaluations to the white candidate than the mixed reference category in five of six evaluation items. But they also gave black candidates favorable evaluations relative to the mixed-reference category. This was especially the case on the likelihood that the black candidate would control undocumented Haitian migration, which was statistically significant. In addition, the coefficient for the black candidate is negative in only one of six evaluation items (attractiveness), which is evidence against the colorism thesis.

	Willing to Vote for Candidate	Competence	Trustworthy	Likely to Improve Your Economic Well- Being	Likely to Control Undocumented Haitian Migration	Physically Attractive
White Candidate	.370*** (.114)	.214* (.115)	.314*** (.112)	.178 (.113)	.401*** (.113)	.840*** (.128)
Black Candidate	.057 (.114)	.097 (.115)	.113 (.113)	.150 (.113)	.310*** (.112)	-.095 (.124)
Candidate's High Level of Education	-.151* (.083)	.065 (.084)	-.069 (.082)	-.168** (.083)	0.40 (.083)	-.077 (.103)
Male	.239** (.094)	.135 (.096)	.111 (.093)	.075 (.093)	-.031 (.095)	.145 (.117)
Young	.126 (.092)	-.060 (.093)	-.049 (.091)	.299*** (.092)	.123 (.092)	-.193* (.112)
Income	-.050 (.041)	-.141*** (.040)	-.038 (.040)	-.063 (.040)	-.112*** (.041)	-.116** (.051)
Education	.031 (.047)	.113** (.048)	.015 (.046)	-.027 (.047)	-.057 (.047)	-.140** (.060)
PRD Identification	.112 (.095)	.234** (.098)	.185** (.095)	.260*** (.095)	.161* (.095)	.263** (.117)
PRSC Identification	-.105 (.250)	-.060 (.243)	-.331 (.247)	.143 (.246)	.101 (.247)	.027 (.319)
Observations	689	690	688	687	690	462

\*\*\*p <0.01, \*\*p <0.05, \*p<0.10

Table 4.6: The Effect of Candidate Ethnoracial Characteristics on Candidate Evaluation  
Ordered Probit Analysis (Standard Errors in Parenthesis)

As with the bivariate results, participants rated white candidates as significantly more attractive than the mixed candidate reference category. They also rated black candidates as less attractive than the mixed candidate reference category, though not at statistically significant levels. These differing assessments of physical attractiveness did not translate into markedly lower scores for black candidates across evaluation items, however. Indeed, in the survey carried out alongside my experiment, 88 percent of the sample expressed their willingness to vote for a black candidate for president.

These results should not be taken as confirmation of the racial democracy thesis, however. The Dominican Republic hardly resembles a racial democracy. As I showed in Chapter 3, ethnoracial stratification and prejudice are pronounced in the Dominican Republic and a large swath of Dominicans acknowledge as much. Data from my focus groups in Santo Domingo further undermine the racial democracy thesis. Similar to previous studies on racial attitudes and identity in the Dominican Republic (Sidanius, Peña, Sawyer 2001; Simmons 2009), I found considerable evidence of a somatic hierarchy that privileges white over black phenotypes. Despite some differences, participants routinely attributed positive traits such as education, wealth, and attractiveness to whites—even if they expressed disdain toward the privileges afforded to whites. This somatic hierarchy does not appear to markedly shape electoral preferences, however. Remarks from the low-income focus group helps make sense of this finding.

I: What about this white candidate? Would you vote for him?

P1: Actually, I don't quite see him as presidential. I see him more as a Presidential Adviser.

P2: That guy has never seen a blackout in his life. I wouldn't (vote for him).

I: What about his image? Does it inspire greater confidence or trust?

P1: His image is easier to swallow than the “morenito.”

The effects of this somatic hierarchy on ethnoracial attitudes are also less than straightforward. Egalitarian views on race and anti-black prejudice coexist uneasily within the same individuals, leading to seemingly contradictory racial attitudes. Participants in the focus groups who at times denounced anti-black prejudice also succumbed to it. One participant, for instance, both valorized and devalued black phenotypes.

P1: People wear their phenotypes very differently. Some look great with curly hair, others look hideous. There are women who have a wide nose, *but* they’ll carry it well because their face or hair is nicely made-up and it creates a nice balance. (Focus Group, Young Adults)

A tense exchange between participants who were evaluating candidates similarly evinced how the same individual in the Dominican Republic can deplore and nourish anti-black prejudice.

I: Knowing that these candidates have a similar biography and policy proposals, what is your impression of the black, mixed, and white candidates, now?

P1: Twenty years ago, most people would have supported the white candidate because he’s white. In this day and age, it’s not so much race but what they’ve accomplished that matter.

P2: The white candidate looks more presidential than the mixed and black candidates.

P3: I agree. The white candidate looks most presidential. The mixed candidate looks better fit for a municipal post.

P1: But the only reason you’re saying that is because he’s white and looks better. The racism just poured out of you! If you evaluated him against Obama you would probably still say that the white candidate is more competent.

P3: No, no, no! Anyone would agree that the white candidate is a better candidate and looks more presidential. It’s a personal choice.

I: What about the black candidate?

P1: The black candidate would never win.

P4: You just accused us of being racist a moment ago!

P1: It's not racism! It's just that not a single member of the wealthiest five families in the Dominican Republic since Columbus arrived is black. They are people who came from Spain; they are Turkish. None of them are *prieto* (black). (Focus Group, Males)

It is also unclear the extent to which subdominant actors help reproduce the somatic ethnoracial hierarchy. Participants in male and female focus groups, in particular, revealed that Afro-descendants perpetuate anti-black prejudice. I suggested in Chapter 2 that Afro-descendants might privilege *mestizaje* or *indigenismo* over blackness because they seek to secure a place in their nation's imagined community (Anderson 1983). Afro-descendants have carried on historical efforts by Dominican elites to deracialize Dominican national identity and redeem the racial mixing from the fate prescribed by race science. Participants in the male group were quite forthcoming about intra-racial prejudice.

P1: Let me ask you a question, who do you think it is that discriminates most against blacks in this country—whites or other blacks?

P2: The (man in the) mirror!

P3: We do ourselves!

P1: Most Dominicans are Afro-descendant, so any racism in this country must be in part the fault of black people.

I: Would you say that black people discriminate against each other more so than whites discriminate against blacks?

P4: Yes! Black Dominicans discriminate most against other black Dominicans. We have been taught in schools since we were kids that most presidents in our country have been white. We have been taught that most CEOs are white. We have been taught that most bosses are white. This has inculcated in people that whites are more competent than blacks.

Participants in the focus groups did not necessarily say that anti-black social prejudice translated into an electoral handicap for black and mixed candidates. But they

did not support the claims of the racial democracy thesis, either. In fact, as the exchange below suggests, the opposite was true in some cases.

I: Which candidate would you say was most memorable and convincing?

P1. The white candidate (“el blanquito”), of course. He’s been the most convincing. Although I am not racist, color influences a lot in this country. Most Dominicans in this country are racist; it’s the truth.

P2. Appearance matters a lot for Dominicans. (Focus Group, Low Income)

Although alternative approaches on race and ethnicity may be useful for studying other issue areas, my findings suggest they are less helpful for understanding why ethnoracial identity is not salient in candidate evaluation in the Dominican Republic. Contrary to the predictions of alternative approaches, results from my focus groups and survey experiment make clear that most respondents did not favor in-category candidates. Moreover, they did not evaluate candidates strictly based on a somatic hierarchy—though there is evidence that individuals tend to valorize white over black phenotypes.

My approach makes better sense of these findings than alternative approaches. In the Dominican Republic, ethnoracial stratification and prejudice have incentivized individuals to switch ethnoracial categories rather than mobilize collectively along lines of ethnoracial identity. Inchoate ethnoracial group identity helps explain why Afro-descendants have preferred an “exit” strategy to “voicing” their grievances at the ballot box.

#### **NATION BEFORE PIGMENTATION**

I posit that historically fractious relations with neighboring Haiti and the persistence of racialized anti-Haitianism have helped to ensure that a black group identity

in the Dominican Republic remains inchoate and apolitical. In addition, I argue that anti-Haitianism has redirected ethnoracial cleavages and made national origin a salient consideration for candidate evaluation.

Results from my survey-experiment support these claims. Table 4.7 presents a comparison of means for treatment and control groups across candidate evaluation items (tests of significance are in italics). Bivariate results indicate that respondents gave candidates assigned the Haitian treatments lower scores across nearly all evaluation items. Many of these differences were statistically significant.

My experiment on the impact of anti-Haitianism included two separate treatments. In the first treatment, dubbed the explicit treatment, participants were provided with a campaign sheet that included no photograph, but they were told that the candidate was a Dominican of Haitian origin. The control group for this treatment was given the same campaign sheet but was not told that the candidate was of Haitian origin. In the second treatment, dubbed the implicit treatment, participants were given a candidate sheet in which the candidate was assigned a French-creole surname and thus implicitly identified as being of Haitian origin. The control group for this treatment was given the same candidate sheet but the candidate's name was changed to a Spanish surname.

	Likely to Vote for Candidate	Capable	Trustworthy	Likely to Improve Your Economic Well-Being	Likely to Control Undocumented Haitian Migration	Physically Attractive
Explicit Haitian Treatment n=116	2.26	2.88	2.11	2.33	2.13	n/a
Control n=114	2.78	3.22	2.50	2.57	2.18	n/a
z	-3.50***	-2.94***	-2.93***	-1.97**	-2.69***	n/a
Implicit Haitian Treatment n=116	2.67	3.00	2.38	2.34	1.97	2.20
Control n=116	2.65	3.18	2.45	2.59	2.36	2.31
z	0.06	-1.33	-0.63	-1.77*	-2.88***	-0.72

\*\*\*P<0.01; \*\*P<0.05; \*P<0.10

Table 4.7: Comparison of Means for Treatment and Control Groups Across Candidate Evaluation Items and Willingness to Vote

Not surprisingly, the explicit treatment had stronger effects than the implicit treatment. Participants gave the candidate who was explicitly identified as Haitian much lower scores than the control group. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test shows that differences in means were highly statistically significant across all candidate evaluation items with the explicit treatment. Likewise, participants gave the candidate assigned a French-creole surname lower scores than the control group in five of six items, but these differences in means were statistically significant in only two of six items.

Table 4.8 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis of the individual-level correlates of willingness to vote for a Dominican candidate of Haitian descent. Results from my survey suggest that the ethnoracial identity of participants appeared to play little role in determining the willingness to vote for candidates of Haitian origin. This was true irrespective of the measure of ethnoracial identification employed. The fact that self-identified white and light-skinned participants were not significantly less likely (and self-identified black and dark-skinned participants were not significantly more likely) to vote for candidates of Haitian origin suggests that racism is not entirely at the root of this anti-Haitianism.

The only consistently significant determinants of the willingness to vote for candidates of Haitian origin were age, income, and political sophistication. Younger, wealthier, and more politically sophisticated participants were more willing to vote for candidates of Haitian origin. PRD supporters were also significantly more willing to vote for a candidate of Haitian origin in one of the analyses.

Willingness to Vote for a Dominico-Haitian Candidate			
	Ethnoracial Identity Ascribed by Interviewer	Self-Identified Ethnoracial Identity	Self-Identified Skin Color
White	0.08 (0.46) n=27	0.37 (0.39) n=40	0.76 (0.90) n=6
Jabao	-0.12 (0.28) n=98	0.44 (0.31) n=66	0.16 (0.26) n=107
Mulatto	-0.22 (0.26) n=122	0.23 (0.31) n=65	n/a
Moreno	-0.46 (0.41) n=49	0.12 (0.25) n=137	-0.19 (0.21) n=270
Black	-0.22 (0.28) n=129	0.60 (0.34) n=59	0.37 (0.46) n=31
Income	0.22** (0.08)	0.22** (0.08)	0.21** (0.09)
Political Sophistication	0.25** (0.13)	0.25** (0.13)	0.27** (0.13)
Age	-0.27** (0.09)	-0.27** (0.09)	-0.26** (0.09)
Education	0.09 (0.12)	0.11 (0.12)	0.11 (0.12)
Male	0.29 (0.21)	0.27 (0.21)	0.24 (0.21)
PRD Identification	0.44 (0.23)	0.43 (0.23)	0.48** (0.23)
PRSC Identification	0.40 (0.54)	0.39 (0.54)	0.31 (0.55)
Observations	678	682	677

\*\*p <0.05

Table 4.8: Logistic Correlates of the Willingness to Vote for a Dominican Candidate of Haitian Descent

Table 4.9 presents a comprehensive multivariate analysis of the correlates of the various candidate evaluation items. The analyses lend support to my claims that national origin is a more salient consideration than ethnoracial identity in candidate evaluation. Respondents were far more likely to oppose Dominico-Haitian candidates than they were to oppose black candidates. Candidates of Haitian origin fared worse than other candidates on virtually all of the candidate evaluation questions and these differences were statistically significant for the most part, especially for the explicit treatment group.

By contrast, participants were not significantly more or less likely to support white or black candidates, with one exception. The coefficient of the variable for white candidates was statistically significant for willingness to vote for that candidate. Nor did participants give white or black candidates higher scores on the other candidate evaluation questions for the most part. The only exceptions were for white candidates, who were rated as physically more attractive and more likely to control undocumented Haitian immigration.

These results hold whether or not I control for social desirability bias and socio-demographic variables, with two exceptions. After excluding socio-demographic variables, for instance, the likelihood that an implicitly identified Haitian candidate would improve the economic well-being of a respondent and control undocumented migration remained negative but lost significance at conventional levels.

	Willing to Vote for Candidate	Competence	Trustworthy	Likely to Improve Your Economic Well- Being	Likely to Control Undocumented Haitian Migration	Physically Attractive
Explicit Haitian Treatment	-.450** (.128)	-.441** (.128)	-.374** (.127)	-.232* (.126)	-.366** (.130)	n/a
Implicit Haitian Treatment	-.075 (.127)	-.324** (.128)	-.077 (.124)	-.281** (.127)	-.260** (.128)	-.450** (.147)
White Candidate	.223* (.126)	.009 (.129)	.203 (.125)	.057 (.125)	.287** (.125)	.642** (.149)
Black Candidate	-.053 (.127)	-.100 (.129)	.004 (.126)	.039 (.126)	.170 (1.25)	-.298** (.146)
PRD Identification	.003 (.106)	.163 (.109)	.044 (.105)	.159 (.105)	.008 (.106)	.129 (.131)
PRSC identification	-.228 (.259)	-.228 (.253)	-.491** (.257)	-.012 (.253)	-.106 (.255)	-.123 (.329)
Male	.299** (.101)	.241** (.103)	.223** (.100)	.167* (.100)	.098 (.102)	.211* (.125)
Age	-.069* (.038)	.028 (.038)	.046 (.037)	-.112** (.037)	-.004 (.037)	.098** (.048)
Income	-.034 (.041)	-.127** (.041)	-.017 (.041)	-.044 (.042)	-.090** (.043)	-.117** (.053)
Education	-.015 (.053)	.138** (.054)	.055 (.052)	-.002 (.053)	.030 (.053)	-.093 (.068)
Observations	682	682	682	682	682	682

\*\*p <0.05; p<0.10

Table 4.9: The Effect of Explicit and Implicit Haitian Treatments on Candidate Evaluation Ordered Probit Analysis (Standard errors in Parenthesis)

Figure 4.4 presents predicted probabilities of voting for a candidate who was explicitly identified as being of Haitian origin (versus a candidate without any identifiable ethnicity) based on the ordered probit analysis in Table 4.9. As the figure shows, only 18 percent of participants were “very likely” to vote for Dominico-Haitian candidates compared to 32 percent for the control group. By contrast, 33 percent of participants were “very unlikely” to vote for Dominico-Haitian candidates compared to 18 percent for the control group.




Figure 4.4: Predicted Probabilities of Willingness to Vote for Candidates

The implicit treatment yielded somewhat similar results, although they were not as strong. Of particular note is the fact that participants rated the candidate with the

French/creole surname as significantly less physically attractive than the candidate with the same photo but a Spanish surname. Participants, moreover, were quite willing to admit their bias against candidates of Haitian origin. Indeed, in the survey that accompanied the experiment 74 percent of the sample stated that they were unwilling to vote for a candidate of Haitian origin for president. I present a logistic analysis of this survey question in Table 4.8.

To some degree, reluctance to support a candidate of Haitian origin can be attributed to broad antipathy toward Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian origin that is expressed in anti-Haitian public opinion on residential and marital preferences. Based on fifteen focus group sessions in the cities of Santo Domingo and Santiago, Sagás (2000, 79) found that most Dominicans, “even those who lived and worked closely with Haitians, expressed public feelings of dislike and distrust toward Haitians.”

But my own focus group research suggests that there is something specific about a candidate of Haitian origin that generates resistance far beyond that of a candidate with origins in another country. As one focus group participant remarked, the Dominican Republic recently has elected vice-presidents and presidents with origins in other countries or regions, including France, Catalonia, Puerto Rico, and Lebanon (which the participant conflated with Turkey).

I: Do you believe that Dominicans would ever vote for a candidate of a foreign origin?

P1: Yeah! Take the example of Jacobo Majluta, who was Turkish. Although he had a different nationality, he reached the presidency after (the death of President Antonio) Guzmán. (Focus Group, Males)

Interestingly, the Dominican Republic has also elected presidents of Haitian ancestry in the contemporary electoral period. But Rafael Leonidas Trujillo and Joaquín Balaguer both arduously obscured their Haitian ancestry. And as I proposed in Chapter 1, ancestry may be less socio-politically consequential than origin, which retains a greater degree of “unassimilatedness” and is far more temporally proximate and sticky.

Participants in the focus groups and in the experiment perceived candidates of Haitian origin as being significantly more likely to relax migration laws against Haiti and unify the two nations. This perception is reinforced by shopworn but effective scare-tactics that are continually revived by ultra-nationalist sectors of Dominican society. The following exchange from the young adult focus group illustrates that these scare-tactics not only endure in Dominican society but also shape the electoral landscape.

I: How likely is it that a Dominico-Haitian candidate will be elected in the Dominican Republic?

P1: I would say that [a Dominico-Haitian candidate] either has a very remote chance of being elected president in this country or none at all simply for being Haitian. He may be more competent and better connected than his Dominican opponent, but he doesn't stand a chance once the opposition seizes on his Haitian origin.

P2: In truth, it isn't that I am opposed to helping a Haitian on any given moment. They are human beings, after all. I just don't want them leading my country.

P3: A Dominico-Haitian candidate is unlikely to win even against a Dominico-Mexican candidate, not because he's black, but because we are afraid that he might open the border with Haiti.

## CONCLUSION

The results of my experiment and survey must be taken with caution given that it was carried out on a medium-sized sample of the province of Santo Domingo. It is

possible that the estimation of my variance could have been affected by the relatively small cell sizes of the twelve experimental conditions, which included approximately 58 observations each. Research at the national level and a large-sized sample would help further evaluate the strength of my results.

Nevertheless, my findings with respect to candidate evaluation are consistent with those reported by Dore Cabral (1995) twenty years ago based on the aforementioned national survey on marital preferences (Chapter 3). That survey concluded that Dominicans were more anti-Haitian than they were anti-black. My findings also jibe with the electoral history of the Dominican Republic. As Howard (2001, 59) points out, “the Dominican Republic has had more *negro* or *mulatto* presidents than any other country in the western hemisphere,” which suggests that Dominican voters do not consistently oppose black candidates for higher political offices.

My results suggest that national origin can be a more salient electoral cleavage than ethnoracial identity and may help redirect ethnoracial cleavages. In migrant-recipient countries in the region, where candidates often identify with hyphenated national identities, voters may focus on the national origin of candidates more than on their ethnoracial identity or appearance.

## Chapter 5: Conclusions

### MAIN FINDINGS

The low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections in Latin America is surprising. Ethnoracial voting behavior would seem most probable in ethnoracially diverse societies, especially in highly stratified ones such as those found in Latin America. In these societies, members of subordinate ethnoracial groups have incentives to protest their marginalization by voting for parties or candidates that propose to defend the interests of their ethnoracial group and make other types of ethnoracial appeals.

There are few ethnoracial entrepreneurs and voters in the region, however. Candidates have largely eschewed ethnoracial-based appeals and voters on the whole have declined to vote for them when they have made those appeals. This is true even in countries where the state is making efforts to increase the representation of Afro-descendants.

This dissertation provides an argument for why ethnoracial identity is of low salience in elections in Latin America, especially in Afro-Latin America. I have argued that the degree of ethnoracial group identity also shapes electoral behavior. The combination of high levels of stratification and low degrees of ethnoracial group consolidation will typically lead to outcomes in which ethnoracial identity is not salient in elections.

Stratification generates conditions of ethnoracial prejudice and unequal

distribution of resources. Where ethnoracial boundaries are porous and ethnoracial identity is fluid, ethnoracial stratification may actually incentivize individuals to opt for ethnoracial “exit.” That is, individuals may choose to identify with more privileged ethnoracial categories rather than with marginalized ethnoracial categories. I suggested that incentives to “exit” reduce the possibility that individuals will “voice” ethnoracial grievances and decrease the likelihood that ethnoracial entrepreneurs activate ethnoracial cleavages in elections. If individuals have no possibility of exiting their ethnoracial group, however, they may respond to prejudice and inequalities by exercising voice. That is, they may organize politically and struggle for greater ethnoracial inclusion.

My argument provides leverage to understand the low salience of ethnoracial identity in elections in Latin America, in particular. Throughout most of the region, ethnoracial boundaries are permeable and ethnoracial identity is situational. Most individuals hold relatively weak loyalties to ethnoracial categories, except in a few rural and regionally isolated communities. Moreover, Latin America is highly stratified along ethnoracial lines. Afro-descendants and indigenous communities are disproportionately poor, less educated, and subject to discrimination.

The confluence of inchoate ethnoracial group identities and ethnoracial stratification explains the low salience of ethnoracial cleavages in elections in the Dominican Republic. As I argued in Chapter 2, high rates of intermixing, structural conditions during the colonial period, and a mix of inclusive and exclusionary nation-building policies impeded the consolidation of ethnoracial group identity in the DR. Rather than pay allegiance to any single ethnoracial category, individuals in the

Dominican Republic identify with multiple and overlapping ethnoracial categories. Nation-building policies, moreover, have elevated the salience of national origin over ethnoracial identification.

As Chapter 3 showed, the Dominican Republic is socioeconomically stratified by ethnoracial identity. Existing public opinion data and my own data show that “black” Dominicans tend to lag behind “white” Dominicans with respect to various socioeconomic indicators and access to social services. The data also show that black Dominicans tend to be subject to higher levels of prejudice and that Dominicans across all ethnoracial categories acknowledge as much.

I argued that in the absence of robust ethnoracial affinities, Dominicans have managed stratification and prejudice by making use of their ethnoracial ambiguity. As I showed, dark-skinned individuals have tended to identify with hybrid or lighter ethnoracial categories, such as *indio*, rather than with dark-skinned categories, such as *negro* (black) or *moreno* (brown). For dark-skinned individuals, reclassification has helped them to avoid being placed at the bottom of the pigmentocracy alongside Haitian migrants and Dominicans of Haitian descent.

As a result, ethnoracial appeals and voting behavior have been largely absent from elections in spite of high levels of ethnoracial stratification and prejudice. As Chapter 3 showed, Dominicans, including light-skinned Dominicans, have frequently voted across ethnoracial lines. They have elected numerous Afro-descendant legislators and some of those legislators have represented provinces where individuals tend be lighter-skinned. Dominicans have also elected Afro-descendant presidents. In the case of

the most recently elected Afro-descendant president, I show that he drew similar support from provinces and municipalities where lighter-skinned individuals tend to be more prevalent as he did from provinces and municipalities where darker-skinned individuals tend to be more prevalent.

I also presented evidence that politicians have not typically appealed to ethnoracial identity in electoral campaigns. And when they have, as in the 1994 and 1996 elections, they have mostly used such appeals in combination with appeals to national origin. Moreover, ethno-national appeals cannot by themselves explain the 1994 and 1996 electoral results.

In order to explore the extent to which Dominicans use ethnoracial considerations at the ballot box in a more rigorous fashion, I carried out a survey-experiment on a representative sample of the province of Santo Domingo. Overall, the bivariate and multivariate results presented in Chapter 4 lend support to my arguments. Contrary to the predictions of group-specific approaches, most participants did not significantly support candidates whose skin color or ethnoracial identity matched their own, except for self-identified whites.

Moreover, my results partially supported the predictions of the colorism thesis. Participants did give white candidates significantly higher scores on most questions than they gave other candidates, but they did not give black candidates significantly lower scores than they gave mixed candidates—except on attractiveness. As I suggested in Chapter 4, these findings are consistent with my focus group data and with my argument. The same logic that leads individuals to lighten their ethnoracial identification also leads

them to evaluate white candidates most favorably. Just as stratification reinforces a preference for whiteness and white candidates, inchoate ethnoracial group identity encourages the practice of colorism.

Lastly, my results did not support the predictions of the racial democracy thesis since participants did express greater support for white candidates with regard to some questions and they rated the candidates' attractiveness along a pigmentocratic hierarchy.

The results also showed that national origin was a more salient consideration for candidate evaluation than ethnoracial cleavages. Participants gave candidates assigned the Haitian treatments significantly lower scores than the control group. This was especially true when candidates were explicitly identified as Dominico-Haitian. The ethnoracial identity of participants did not have a significant effect on their willingness to vote for Dominico-Haitian candidates. The results also showed that participants were far more likely to oppose candidates of Haitian descent than they were to oppose black candidates. Focus group research and the more than fifty semi-formal interviews that I conducted with political elites lend support to these results.

#### **THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS**

My findings have broader implications for longstanding debates in the study of race and ethnicity. First, they help to situate the debate over the extent to which ethnoracial identity structures social organization in Latin America in a different theoretical terrain, namely ethnoracial voting. Moreover, my findings carve middle

ground in this debate.<sup>73</sup> They suggest that race and ethnicity do structure some dimensions of social organization, including the distribution of resources, access to institutions, and the valorization of phenotypes, as one camp argues. But my findings also suggest that race and ethnicity do not necessarily structure other dimensions of social organization, such as electoral behavior, as another camp argues. Individuals may be subordinated by ethnoracialized structures and institutions but may not respond by engaging in ethnoracial politics.

The Dominican Republic is not exceptional in this regard. Evidence from experimental studies on electoral behavior has found that ethnoracial identity does not always play an important role in electoral behavior even in societies that are otherwise structured by ethnoracial identity. Dunning (2009) found that the race of the candidate had no significant impact on candidate evaluation in Brazil.<sup>74</sup> In the case of Mali, Dunning and Harrison (2010) found that ties along lines of “cousinage” (a crosscutting informal institution based on shared surnames) weakened the association between ethnicity and vote choice.<sup>75</sup>

Recent studies suggest that the link between race and electoral behavior may be weakening even in the United States. A study by Smith (2014), for example, argues that

---

<sup>73</sup> See Bonilla-Silva (1997); Loveman (1999)

<sup>74</sup> Findings on ethnoracial identity and candidate evaluation in Brazil are contradictory, however. In a survey conducted in São Paulo in 2006, Mitchell (2009) found evidence that self-identified dark-skinned respondents were more likely to support black candidates. In a more recent survey-experiment in Brazil, Aguilar-Pariente and colleagues (2015) reached mixed conclusions. They found that whereas self-identified white and brown participants’ support for candidates of their same race was contingent on the size of the ballot, self-identified black participants preferred candidates of their same race irrespective of the size of the ballot.

<sup>75</sup> See Battle and Seely (2010) Ishiyama (2010) for survey-based studies that find little evidence of ethnic voting in Africa.

increased black migration to the United States is diluting black political identity and black voting behavior.<sup>76</sup> Although black migrants and black Americans arguably occupy the same position in the U.S. ethnoracial paradigm (Bonilla-Silva 2006), ethnoracial identity does not appear to similarly structure their electoral behavior.

These findings, as well as my own, suggest that individuals in ethnoracially stratified societies may not always activate ethnoracial identities in elections. As Brubaker (2004, 13) has argued, individuals may experience the world, including the political world, in non-ethnoracial terms. This dissertation attempts to provide an explanation for why many individuals in Latin America do not experience the electoral world in ethnoracial terms. As I have argued, this is in large part due to the combination of permeable ethnoracial boundaries and acute stratification.

Second, my argument contributes to the literatures on *mestizaje* and social movements in Latin America. It suggests that subaltern sectors may also use *mestizaje/mulatez* to their advantage. The race and ethnicity literature on Latin America has privileged studying the ways in which elites employ *mestizaje/mulatez*. They have argued persuasively that elites utilize *mestizaje* to create a false sense of national homogeneity and social equality. This in turn helps to demobilize subordinate groups along ethnoracial lines (Sawyer 2006; Telles and Flores 2013; Hernández 2013). I show, however, that subaltern groups have also exploited the ethnic fluidity created by intermixing. They have done so to reclassify their way out of marginalization. Wimmer

---

<sup>76</sup> Also see Rogers (2006) for a discussion on black migration and pan-black political identity.

(2008, 988) refers to this type of strategy as repositioning, whereby individuals “shift sides” rather than contest the ethnoracial hierarchy.

Scott’s (1985) argument about the ways in which peasants use “everyday forms of resistance” to defy authority when they cannot revolt help us understand the conditions under which minority populations in Latin America are likely to use reclassification strategies. Reclassification may be more likely to occur in the region where states have not adopted multicultural citizenship regimes. Where states have adopted multicultural regimes, such as in Colombia and Nicaragua, minority populations have exploited political openings and mobilized against stratification (Paschel 2010). As others have suggested, populations with consolidated ethnoracial group identities have been especially able to mobilize (Hooker 2005).

Where states have not adopted multicultural regimes, however, minority populations have had few political openings to mobilize against stratification. In these circumstances, I argue that individuals may resort to reclassification strategies as a way to manage stratification. Reclassification, like similar “weapons of the weak,” is an attractive strategy because it: “requires little or no coordination or planning; often represents a form of individual self-help; and typically avoids any direct symbolic confrontation with authority or with elite norms” (Scott 1985, 29). It would appear to be an especially attractive strategy in Latin America because individuals activate multiple identifications.

Conceptualizing re-classification as a “form of commonplace resistance” (Scott, 1985, 29) enriches our understanding of the varied ways in which minority groups in

Latin America challenge stratification. The literature on race in Latin America has typically privileged collective social movements and has focused on the institutional and structural conditions that either facilitate or inhibit their emergence.<sup>77</sup> This emphasis, however, has overlooked less organized and less contentious forms of minority resistance in the region. Studying reclassification strategies helps to expand the universe of cases of minority resistance beyond social movements.

Of course, reclassification does not always represent a form of minority resistance. Individuals that employ a strategy of “exit” by identifying with lighter ethn racial categories may reproduce the very stratified structures that they seek to withdraw from by keeping ethn racial group identity inchoate. Successful Afro-descendant movements in rural and isolated areas of Central America, for example, have benefited tremendously from consolidating a black ethn racial group identity and from exercising voice.

Third, my findings have implications for the debate between Constructivism and Primordialism. Namely, they suggest that constructivist *and* primordial approaches together provide greater leverage to understanding ethn racial identity in societies where ethn racial identity and national origin are entwined than either approach on its own. This is true despite the fact that the two approaches make very different assumptions about the extent to which ethn racial identities endure and are stable once formed (Hale 2004).

---

<sup>77</sup> See Hanchard (1994); Yashar (1998); Hooker (2005); Van Cott (2002); Paschel and Sawyer (2008); and Paschel (2010).

Constructivism or Instrumentalism, for example, can shed light on the strategy of ethnoracial exit that I highlight. Subdominant individuals in the Dominican Republic indeed are able to change their ethnoracial identification. As I suggest, they identify with dominant categories, which is feasible given permeable ethnoracial boundaries, in order to avoid further socioeconomic marginalization. This strategy is consistent with the logic of instrumentalism in Constructivism.

But Primordialism can also help make sense of ethnoracial identification in the Dominican Republic. Individuals with visible African attributes in the Dominican Republic face greater constraints in identifying with more dominant ethnoracial categories.<sup>78</sup> There is evidence that skin-color predicts ethnoracial identity in the Dominican Republic, though not as strongly as in other countries in the region (Telles and Paschel 2013). Moreover, I have shown that ethnoracial stratification and race-based prejudice are deeply entrenched in the Dominican Republic. Dominico-Haitians, in particular, bear the brunt of stratification and prejudice and are more likely to have a constrained ethnoracial exit. For Dominico-Haitians, ethnoracial identity formation may indeed be singular, stable and enduring, as Primordialists contend.

## **COMPARATIVE APPLICATIONS**

Although ethnoracial stratification is widespread in Latin America and ethnoracial identities are often inchoate, the case of the Dominican Republic is unique in some ways. Historically fractious relations with neighboring Haiti and anti-Haitianism have shaped

---

<sup>78</sup> See Chandra (2006) for a discussion on visible attributes.

ethnoracial boundary-making in the Dominican Republic. This boundary-making dynamic has not been commonplace between neighbors in the region. The Dominican Republic is the only country in the Americas that gained its independence from a black republic and that shares an island with that same country. This has led to a distinct understanding of blackness that is closely associated with Haitians and Haitian descendants (Candelario 2007; Simmons 2009; Telles and Bailey 2013).

Although anti-Haitianism makes the Dominican Republic a special case, it also has broader applications. Anti-Haitianism has many parallels in countries where immigrants are viewed negatively because of their darker phenotypes and lower levels of education and where ethnoracial identity and nationalism are interwoven. In the Americas alone, parallel contemporary examples include the following: Haitian migrants in the Bahamas and in Turks and Caicos; Dominican migrants in Puerto Rico; Mexican, Caribbean and Central American migrants in the United States; Central American migrants in Mexico; Nicaraguan migrants in Costa Rica; and migrants from the Andes in the Southern Cone.

These and other parallel examples help illustrate that nationalism, in response to immigration, can harden ethnoracial boundaries in some cases and soften ethnoracial boundaries in others. The effect of nationalism on ethnoracial boundaries perhaps hinges on the strength or weakness of boundaries predating immigration flows. Nationalism may be more likely to harden ethnoracial boundaries where early processes of nation-building produced strong ethnoracial boundaries. In cases like the United States and South Africa, nationalism prevents immigrant groups from upsetting rigid and established ethnoracial

orders. Marx (1998) argues that elites in the United States and South Africa subordinated their black populations to quell intra-white conflict and ensure national unity. Elites constructed systems of racial domination, he suggests, as a way to make nations.

By contrast, nationalism may be more likely to soften ethnoracial boundaries where processes of nation-building produced weak ethnoracial boundaries. In the case of the Dominican Republic, I have argued that intense and early patterns of intermixing, structural conditions during the colonial period, and a mix of inclusive and exclusionary policies of nation-building led to permeable ethnoracial boundaries and to a fluid ethnoracial order. In cases like the Dominican Republic and much of Latin America, nationalism prevents immigrant groups from putting in place foreign racial orders and from consolidating ethnoracial identities and creating rigid ethnoracial orders. Afro-descendants in Latin America may especially support nationalist efforts because they benefit most from weak ethnoracial boundaries. As I have argued, weak ethnoracial boundaries provide Afro-descendants an ethnoracial exit to manage stratification.

The varying effect of nationalism on ethnoracial boundaries that I describe has implications for theories of ethnoracial politics. Ethnoracial identities appear to be least salient and national origin appears to be most salient for electoral behavior in societies with soft or permeable ethnoracial boundaries. In these societies, national origin may help to redirect or counteract ethnoracial cleavages in elections. In migrant-recipient countries in Latin America, where candidates identify with hyphenated national identities, voters may focus on the national origin of candidates more so than on a shared ethnoracial

identity or programmatic position. Future studies would do well to pay greater attention to the role that national origin plays in electoral behavior.

## Appendix A

---

### SANTIAGO

---

#### 2006-2010 COD

Ángel Acosta Félix (PRD)  
Antonio Bernabel Colón (PRD)  
Máximo Castro (PRD)  
Demóstenes Martínez (PLD)  
Magda Rodríguez Azcona (PLD)  
Santiago Rodríguez Peña (PLD)  
Julio César Valentín (PLD)

#### 2010-2016 COD

Carlos Borromeo Terrero (PRD)  
Máximo Castro (PRSC)  
Antonio Bernabel Colón (PRD)  
Altagracia Gonzáles (PLD)  
José Gabriel Jáquez (PRD)  
Francisco Matos (PLD)  
Demóstenes Martínez (PLD)  
María Martínez (PRD)  
Magda Rodríguez Azcona (PLD)  
Francisco Santos Sosa (PRD)

---

Table 1A: Afro-Descendant Legislators Elected to the 2006-2010 and 2010-2016 Chamber of Deputies from the Province of Santiago

Province	AB2004	AB2006	AB2008	AB2010	AB2012
Duarte	10.2	15.9	21.7	17.6	21.1
Españat	16.6	12.8	40	7.14	17.4
La Vega	23.3	40	32	13.2	36.6
Montecristi	11.9	15.1	20	2.44	-
Monseñor Nouel	15.3	21.2	19.4	12	-
Peravia	7.52	14.6	18.9	15.1	25
Puerto Plata	10.3	10.5	14.5	15.1	4.17
Salcedo/Hnas. Mirabal	12.8	8.33	11.7	12.5	12.5
Santiago	11.4	17.4	22.5	16.1	26.2
Santiago Rodríguez	15.6	16.6	41.6	16.6	-
% of Self-Identified Whites in the National Population	9.85	12.7	13.9	9.58	12.5

Sources: AmericasBarometer, 2004-2012

Table 2A: The Percentage of Self-Identified White Respondents in “Lighter” Provinces, 2004-2012

Province	AB2004	AB2006	AB2008	AB2010	AB2012
El Seibo	17.5	12.5	27.2	8.33	25
Hato Mayor	11.4	7.14	25	16.6	-
La Romana	23.4	26.8	31.4	10.8	20.8
Monte Plata	18.3	34	37	15.7	22.9
San Cristobal	17	21.6	32.8	22.5	19.5
Samaná	20.3	-	25.8	13	13
San Pedro de Macorís	8.33	21.1	32.4	20	28.8
Santo Domingo	16	25.6	22.5	14.8	22.6
% of Self-Identified Blacks in the National Population	9.58	19.9	17.8	10.1	15.6

Sources: AmericasBarometer, 2004-2012

Table 3A: The Percentage of Self-Identified Black Respondents in “Darker” Provinces, 2004-2012

	Indicator	2010 DR Census	2011 Survey-Experiment
Population Density	Urban	87.7	66.4
	Rural	12.2	33.5
Gender	Female	50.9	68.2
	Male	49	31.7
Home Flooring	Dirt / Wood	2.55	1.44
	Cement	57.8	55.78
	Mosaic / Ceramic	36.1	31.65
	Granite / Marble	4.14	10.98
Schooling	≥ Pre-School	9.36	3.18
	≥ Elementary	41	29.7
	≥ High School	31.4	34.1
	≥ College	18	32.9
Age	18-39	33.2	55.8
	40-64	21.1	37.4
	65-79	3.53	6.07
	≥ 80	0.93	0.58

Note: Figures represent percentages.

Table 4A: Descriptive Statistics of the Survey-Experiment Sample and the DR 2010 Census of Santo Domingo Across Different Indicators

## Appendix B

### INTERVIEWS

Acevedo, Rafael. President, Gallup Dominicana. Santo Domingo. 4 Mar. 2011.

Adame, Sonia. Former Deputy Director, Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes (SJRM). Santo Domingo. 8 Mar. 2011.

Andújar, Carlos. Anthropologist, Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo (UASD). Santo Domingo. 22 Feb. 2011.

Báez Evertsz, Frank. Sociologist and Head Researcher, Immigrant National Survey (ENI). Santo Domingo. 16 Mar. 2011.

Brea, Ramonina. Director, The University Center for Political and Social Studies (CUEPS) at the Pontificia Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra (PUCMM). Santo Domingo. 21 Feb. 2011.

Cabreja, Javier. Former Director, Participación Ciudadana. Santo Domingo. 18 Mar. 2011.

Cañete, Rosa. Regional Director, Oxfam International. Santo Domingo. 24 Feb. 2011.

Castillo, Pelegrín. Secretary of Energy and Mines. Santo Domingo. 4 Apr. 2011.

De Camps, Hatuey. President, Partido Revolucionario Social Demócrata (PRSD). Santo Domingo. 12 Mar. 2011.

Deive, Carlos Esteban. Historian. Santo Domingo. 18 Feb. 2011.

Díaz, Juan Bolívar. Columnist, Periódico Hoy; Former Director of Press, Teleantillas. Santo Domingo. 24 Feb. 2011.

Estrella, Eduardo. President, Dominicanos por el Cambio (DxC). Santo Domingo. 23 Mar. 2011.

Ferrán, Fernando. Vice President, Grupo Vicini. Santo Domingo. 11 Apr. 2011.

Franco, Franklin. Former Professor, Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo (UASD). Santo Domingo. 15 Feb. 2011.

Heliger, Eli. Columnist, *Diario Libre*. Santo Domingo. 11 Feb. 2011.

Henríquez Gratereaux, Federico. Columnist, *Periódico Hoy*. Santo Domingo. 18 Apr. 2011.

Isa, Pavel. Research Coordinator, Observatorio Dominicano de Comercio Internacional (ODCI). Santo Domingo. 14 Feb. 2011.

Jiménez, Manuel. Congressman, Santo Domingo (PLD). Santo Domingo. 25 Mar. 2011.

Lizardo, Cristina. Senator and President of the Senate (PLD). Santo Domingo. 6 Apr. 2011.

Lora, Huchi. Producer, *Digo:TV* and *Telesistema*. Santo Domingo. 28 Mar. 2011.

Lozano, Wilfredo. Director, Center for Research and Social Studies (CIES) at the Universidad Iberoamericana (UNIBE). Santo Domingo. 28 Feb. 2011.

Mateo, Andrés L. Dean of General Studies, Universidad APEC. Santo Domingo. 7 Apr. 2011.

Melo, Hamlet. Congressman, La Altagracia (PLD). Santo Domingo. 12 Apr. 2011.

Mercedes, Ayacx. Deputy Director for Special Programs, Ministry of the Presidency. Santo Domingo. 11 Mar. 2011.

Mejía, Manuel. Former Deputy Director, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales-República Dominicana (FLACSO-RD). Santo Domingo. 9 Feb. 2011.

Mella, Pablo. Instituto Filosófico Centro Bonó. Santo Domingo. 23 Feb. 2011.

Moya Pons, Frank. President, Dominican Academy of History. Santo Domingo. 17 Mar. 2011.

Núñez, Manuel. Director of Social Sciences, Universidad APEC. Santo Domingo. 23 Feb. 2011.

Pagán, Lilian. President, ASISA Research Group. Santo Domingo. 16 Mar. 2011.

Paulino, Alejandro. Deputy Director, National Archives. Santo Domingo. 1 Mar. 2011.

Peña Guaba, José Francisco. President, Bloque Institucional Social Demócrata (BIS). Santo Domingo. 21 Mar. 2011.

Pierre, Sonia. Former Director, Movimiento de Mujeres Dominicano-Haitianas. Santo Domingo. 18 Apr. 2011.

Pol Emil, Antonio. Councilman (APD); Former Director, Centro Cultural Dominicano Haitiano. Santo Domingo. 22 Mar. 2011.

Puig, Max. President, Alianza por la Democracia (APD). Santo Domingo. 19 Mar. 2011.

Sanz, Flor. Director of Overseas Voting, Junta Central Electoral (JCE). Santo Domingo. 22 Feb. 2011.

Serrano, Mario. Former Director, Centro Bonó. Santo Domingo. 15 Mar. 2011.

Silié, Ruben. Ambassador of the Dominican Republic to the Republic of Haiti. Santo Domingo. 26 Mar. 2011.

Solano, Darío. Director, Fundación Afrocimarrón. Santo Domingo. 12 Apr. 2011.

Tavárez Mirabal, Minou. Congresswoman, Distrito Nacional; President of Opción Democrática (OD). Santo Domingo. 29 Mar. 2011.

Tejada Holguín, Ramón. Director, Information Analysis and Strategic Programming at the Ministry of the Presidency. Santo Domingo. 17 Feb. 2011.

Tolentino Dipp, Hugo. Historian and Congressman, Distrito Nacional (PRM). Santo Domingo. 15 Mar. 2011.

Toribio, Rafaél. Director, Center for Governability and Social Management (CEGES) at the Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo (INTEC). Santo Domingo. 10 Mar. 2011.

Trinidad, Malvil. Executive Director, Centro de Investigación y Promoción Social (CIPROS). Santo Domingo. 8 Apr. 2011.

Valdez, Guadalupe. Congresswoman, National (APD). Santo Domingo. 28 Mar. 2011.

Valentín, Julio César. Senator, Santiago (PLD). Santo Domingo. 23 Mar. 2011.

Vargas, Tahira. Social Anthropologist and Columnist at Acento.com.do. Santo Domingo. 16 Mar. 2011.

Vásquez, Pastor. Minister Counselor at the Embassy of the Dominican Republic in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Santo Domingo. 16 Feb. 2011.

Vicens Bello, Marisol. Partner, Headrick Rizik Alvarez & Fernández. Santo Domingo. 11 Mar. 2011.

Villamán, Marcos. Provost, Instituto Global de Altos Estudios en Ciencias Sociales at the Fundación Global Democracia y Desarrollo (FUNGLODE). Santo Domingo. 10 Mar. 2011.

Wooding, Bridget. Director, Observatorio Migrantes del Caribe (OBMICA). Santo Domingo. 3 Mar. 2011.

## References

- Abdelal, Rawi, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, eds.  
2009 *Measuring Identity: A Guide For Social Scientists*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Aguilar-Pariente, Rosario  
2008 “We Can't Have Racism Here: We Are All Mexicans, Aren't We? The Effect of Phenotypic Prejudice on the Behavior of Voters in Mexico.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association Annual, August 28-31, Boston, MA.  
2011 “Social and Political Consequences of Stereotypes Related to Racial Phenotypes in Mexico.” Working Paper, CIDE DETEP-230. Mexico City: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas.
- Aguilar, Rosario, Saul Cunow, Scott Desposato, and Leonardo Sangali Barone  
2015 “Ballot Structure, Candidate Race, and Vote Choice in Brazil.” *Latin American Research Review* 50 (3).
- Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg  
2003 “Fractionalization.” *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 (2).
- Alvarez, Michael R., and Lisa García Bedolla  
2003 “The Foundations of Latino Voter Partisanship: Evidence from the 2000 Election.” *Journal of Politics* 65 (1).
- Anderson, Benedict  
1983 *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Andújar, Carlos  
2006 *La presencia negra en Santo Domingo*. Santo Domingo: Letra Grafica Breve.
- Andrews, George Reid  
2004 *Afro-Latin America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Aracena, Soraya  
1999 *Apuntes sobre la negritud en República Dominicana*. Santo Domingo: Ediciones El Chango Prieto.
- Báez, Frank and Wilfredo Lozano  
1992 *Migración internacional y económica cafetalera: Estudio sobre la migración estacional de la República Dominicana*. Santo Domingo: CEPAAE.  
2005 *Las cifras de la inmigración Haitiana y sus problemas*. Santo Domingo.
- Badillo, Américo, and Casandra Badillo  
1996 “Qué tan racistas somos?: pelo bueno y pelo malo” *Estudios Sociales* 29 (103).
- Bailey, Stanley R.

- 2004 "Group Dominance and the Myth of Racial Democracy: Antiracism Attitudes in Brazil," *American Sociological Review* 69 (October).
- 2009 *Legacies of Race: Identities, Attitudes, and Politics in Brazil* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press).
- Bailey, Stan, Mara Loveman, and Jeronimo Muniz
- 2012 "Measures of 'Race' and the Analysis of Racial Inequality in Brazil." *Social Science Research* 42 (1).
- Balaguer, Joaquín
- 1984 *La Isla al Revés, Haití y el Destino Dominicano*. Santo Domingo: Editora Librería Dominicana.
- Barth, Fredrik
- 1969 *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Battle, Martin, and Jennifer Seely
- 2010 "It's All Relative: Modeling Candidate Support in Benin," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 16 (1).
- Beltrán, Cristina
- 2010 *The Trouble with Unity: Latino Politics and the Creation of Identity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Betances, Emilio
- 1995 *State and Society in the Dominican Republic*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Birnir, Jóhanna Kristín
- 2007 "Divergence in Diversity? The Dissimilar Effects of Cleavages on Electoral Politics in New Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (3).
- Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo
- 1997 "Rethinking Racism." *American Sociological Review* 62 (3).
- 2006 *Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the USA* (2<sup>nd</sup> edition). New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
- 2009 "Are the Americas 'Sick with Racism' or Is it a Problem at the Poles? A Reply to Cristina A. Sue." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32 (July).
- 2010 "The 2008 Elections and the Future of Anti-racism in 21st Century Amerika or How We Got Drunk with Obama's *Hope Liquor* And Failed To See Reality." *Humanity and Society* 34 (3).
- Bourdieu, Pierre and Loïc Wacquant
- 1999 "On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason." *Theory, Culture & Society* Vol. 16 (1).
- Bosch, Juan
- 1992 *Clases sociales en la República Dominicana*. Santo Domingo: Editora Corripio.
- Boza-Golash, Tanya, and William Darity

- 2008 "Latino Racial Choices: The Effects of Skin Color and Discrimination on Latinos' and Latinas' Racial Self-Identifications." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 31 (5).
- Broockman, David  
2013 "Black Politicians are More Intrinsically Motivated to Advance Blacks' Interests: A Field Experiment Manipulating Political Incentives." *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (3).
- Brubaker, Rogers  
1996 *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
2004 *Ethnicity Without Groups*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bruk, S. I., and V. S. Apenchenko  
1964 "Ethnic Composition of the World's Peoples." In *Atlas of the World's Peoples*. Moscow: Institute of Ethnography.
- Candelario, Ginetta E. B.  
2007 *Black Behind the Ears: Dominican Racial Identity From Museums to Beauty Shops*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Casellas, Jason  
2011 *Latino Representation in State Houses and Congress*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cassá, Roberto  
1976 "El racismo en la ideología de la clase dominante dominicana." *Ciencia* 3.  
1992 *Historia social y económica de la República Dominicana*. Santo Domingo: Alfa y Omega.
- Chandra, Kanchan  
2001 "Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic Politics." *APSA-CP* 12 (1).  
2006 "What is Ethnic Identity and Does It Matter?" *Annual Review of Political Science* (9).  
2009 "Why Voters in Patronage Democracies Split Their Tickets: Strategic Voting for Ethnic Parties." *Electoral Studies* 28 (1).
- Chandra, Kanchan, and Steven Wilkinson  
2008 "Measuring the Effect of 'Ethnicity'." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (4-5).
- Citrin, Jack, Donald Philip Green, and David O. Sears  
1990 "White Reactions to Black Candidates: When Does Race Matter?" *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 54 (Spring).
- Conaghan, Catherine, and Rosario Espinal  
1990 "Unlikely Transitions to Uncertain Regimes? Democracy without Compromise in the Dominican Republic and Ecuador." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 22 (3).
- Corten, Andre, Isis Duarte, Consuelo M. Soto, and Viviana Fridman  
1995 "Five Hundred Thousand Haitians in the Dominican Republic." *Latin American Perspectives* 22 (3).

- Darity Jr., William, Jason Dietrich, and Darrick Hamilton  
 2010 "Bleach in the Rainbow: Latino Ethnicity and Preference for Whiteness." In *The Afro-Latin@ Reader: History and Culture in the United States*, edited by Miriam Jiménez Román and Juan Flores, 485-496. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Dawson, Michael  
 1994 *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African American Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- De Jesús Galván, Manuel  
 1882 *Enriquillo*. Santo Domingo: Imprenta de García Hermanos.
- De La Fuente, Alejandro  
 1999 "Myths of Racial Democracy: Cuba, 1900-1912." *Latin American Research Review* 34 (3).
- Derby, Lauren  
 2003 "National Identity and the Idea of Value in the Dominican Republic." In *Blacks, Coloureds, and National Identity in Nineteenth Century Latin America*, edited by Nancy Priscilla Naro, 5-37. London: University of London Press.  
 2012 "Haitians in the Dominican Republic: Race, Politics, and Neoliberalism." In *Afro-Descendants, Identity, and the Struggle for Development in the Americas*, edited by Bernd Reiter and Kimberly Eison Simmons, 51-66. East Lansing: Michigan State University.
- Degler, Carl N.  
 1971 *Neither Black Nor White*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Díaz, Juan Bolívar  
 1996 *Trauma Electoral* (Segunda Edición). Santo Domingo: Mograf S.A.  
 2013 "Mejores perspectivas de relación con Haití." *Hoy*, July 6.  
 2014 "Exaltación del nacionalismo lleval al aislamineto de RD." *Hoy*, February 2.
- Diene, Doudou and Gay McDougall  
 2008 "Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Doudou Diène, and the independent expert on minority issues, Gay McDougall." Human Rights Council, United Nations General Assembly.
- Dipp, Hugo Tolentio  
 1974 *Raza e Historia en Santo Domingo: Los orígenes del prejuicio racial en América*. Santo Domingo: Editora de la Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo.
- Dore Cabral, Carlos  
 1987 "Los Dominicanos de origen haitiano y la segregación social en la República Dominicana." *Estudios Sociales* 20.  
 1992 "Migración Haitiana y trabajo en la República Dominicana: ¿esclavitud o capitalismo?" In *La cuestión haitiana en Santo Domingo: migración*

- internacional, desarrollo y relaciones inter-estatales entre Haití y República Dominicana*, edited by Wilfredo Lozano. Santo Domingo: FLACSO.
- 1995 “Encuesta Gallup: La población dominicana es mas antihaitiana que racista.” *Rumbo* 29.
- Dunning, Thad  
 2009 “Race, Class, and Voter Preferences in Brazil.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, October 6-10, Toronto, Canada.
- Dunning, Thad, and Lauren Harrison  
 2010 “Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali.” *American Political Science Review* 104 (1).
- Espinal, Rosario  
 1987 *Autoritarismo y democracia en la política dominicana*. San José, Costa Rica: Centro Interamericano de Asesoría y Promoción Electoral.  
 2013 “Pobreza: ¿hay más o menos?” *Hoy*, September 3.
- Espinal, Rosario, Jonathan Hartlyn, and Jana Morgan  
 2006 “Performance Still Matters: Explaining Trust in Government in the Dominican Republic.” *Comparative Political Studies* 39 (2).
- Espinal, Rosario, and Jana Morgan  
 2012 “Political Culture of Democracy in the Dominican Republic and in The Americas, 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity.” In *Americas Barometer: Latin American Public Opinion Project*, edited by Mitchell A. Seligson. Nashville: Vanderbilt University and the United States Agency for International Development.  
 2014 “Political Culture of Democracy in the Dominican Republic and in The Americas, 2014: Democratic Governance Across 10 years of the AmericasBaromter.” In *Americas Barometer: Latin American Public Opinion Project*, edited by Mitchell A. Seligson. Nashville: Vanderbilt University and the United States Agency for International Development.
- Fearon, James  
 2003 “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country.” *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 (2).
- Fennema, Meindert, and Troetje Loewenthal  
 1987 *La construcción de raza y nación en la República Dominicana*. Santo Domingo: Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo.
- Ferree, Karen E.  
 2006 “Explaining South Africa’s Racial Census.” *The Journal of Politics* 68 (4).
- Flores, René, and Edward Telles  
 2012 “Social Stratification in Mexico: Disentangling Color, Ethnicity, and Class.” *American Sociological Review* 77 (3).
- Foote, Nicola

- 2006 "Race, state and nation in early twentieth century Ecuador." *Nations and Nationalism* 12 (2).
- Ford, Richard Thompson  
2009 "Barack is the New Black: Obama and the Promise/Threat of the Post-Civil Rights Era." *Du Bois Review* 6 (1).
- Franco, Franklin J.  
1969 *Los negros, los mulatos, y la nación dominicana*. Santo Domingo: Editora Nacional.  
2003 *Sobre racismo y antiHaitianismo (y otros ensayos)*. Santo Domingo: Sociedad Editorial Dominicana.
- Freyre, Gilberto  
1946 *The Masters and the Slaves: A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- García-Peña, Lorgia  
2013 "Suddenly, Illegal at Home." *The New York Times*, December. 12.
- Gates, Henry Louis  
2011 *Black in Latin America*. New York: New York University Press.
- Gay, Claudine  
2004 "Putting Race in Context: Identifying the Environmental Determinants of Black Racial Attitudes." *American Political Science Review*, 98 (4).
- Gerring, John  
2001 *Social Science Methodology: A Critical Framework*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gil-White, Francisco  
1999 "How Thick is Blood? The Plot Thickens...: If Ethnic Actors Are Primordialists, What Remains of the Circumstantialist/Primordialist Controversy?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22 (5).
- Grandin, Greg  
2000 *The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Gurin, Patricia, S. Hatchett, and K.S. Jackson  
1989 *Hope and Independence: Blacks Response to Electoral and Party Politics*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Gurr, Ted Robert, ed.  
1993 *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Hale, Henry  
2004 "Explaining Ethnicity." *Comparative Political Studies* (37) 4.
- Hanchard, Michael  
1994 *Orpheus and Power: Afro-Brazilian Social Movements in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Brazil, 1945-1988*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

- 2003 "Acts of Misrecognition: Transnational Black Politics, Anti-imperialism and the Ethnocentrism of Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant." *Theory, Culture & Society* 20 (4).
- Harris, Marvin  
1964 *Patterns of Race in the Americas*. New York: Walker and Company.
- Hartlyn, Jonathan  
1998 *The Struggle for Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Helg, Aline  
1990 "Race in Argentina and Cuba, 1880-1930: Theory, Policies, and Popular Reaction." In *The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870-1940*, edited by Richard Graham, 37-61. Austin: University of Texas at Austin.
- Henríquez-Gratereaux, Federico  
1994 *Negros de Mentira y Blancos de Verdad*. Santo Domingo: Editora Taller C. por A.
- Hernández, Tanya Katerí  
2013 *Racial Subordination in Latin America: The Role of the State, Customary Law, and the New Civil Rights Response*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Herron, Michael C., and Jasjeet S. Sekhon  
2005 "Black Candidates and Black Voters: Assessing the Impact of Candidate Race on Uncounted Vote Rates." *Journal of Politics* 67 (1).
- Highton, Benjamin  
2004 "White Voters and African American Candidates for Congress." *Political Behavior* 26 (1).
- Hirschman, Albert O.  
1970 *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Hoberman, Gabriela  
2010 "The Absence of Race in Democratic Politics: The Case of the Dominican Republic." Ph.D. Dissertation, Florida International University.
- Hochschild, Jennifer, and Vesla Weaver  
2007 "The Skin Color Paradox and the American Racial Order." *Social Forces* 86 (2).
- Hoetink, Harry  
1967 *The Two Variants in Caribbean Race Relations: A Contribution to the Sociology of Segmented Societies*. London: Oxford University Press.  
1970 "The Dominican Republic in the Nineteenth Century: Some Notes on Stratification, Immigration, and Race." In *Race and Class in Latin America*, edited by Magnus Mörner, 96-121. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hooker, Juliet

- 2005 "Indigenous Inclusion/Black Exclusion: Race, Ethnicity and Multicultural Citizenship in Latin America." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 37 (2).
- 2012 Negotiating Blackness within the Multicultural State in Latin America: Creole Politics and Identity in Nicaragua." In *Afro-Descendants, Identity, and the Struggle for Development in the Americas*, edited by Bernd Reiter and Kimberly Eison Simmons, 93-108. East Lansing: Michigan State University.
- Horowitz, Donald  
 1985 *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press, Berkeley.
- Howard, David  
 2001 *Coloring the Nation: Race and Ethnicity in the Dominican Republic*. Boulder: Lynne Reinner.
- Howell, Susan, and H.L. Perry  
 2004 "Black Mayors/White Mayors: Explaining their Approval." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 68 (1).
- Htun, Mala  
 2004 "From Racial Democracy to Affirmative Action: Changing State Policy on Race in Brazil." *Latin American Research Review* 39 (1).
- Inoa, Orlando  
 1999 *Azúcar, Árabes, cocos, y haitianos*. Santo Domingo: Editora Cole.
- Inter-American Commission on Human Rights  
 2008 "Right to Education of Afro-Descendant and Indigenous Communities in the Americas." [https://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/news/hrclinic\\_report.pdf](https://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/news/hrclinic_report.pdf).
- Inter-American Development Bank  
 2008 "Outsiders: The Changing Patterns of Exclusion in Latin America and the Caribbean." [http://www.iadb.org/en/research-and-data/publication-details,3169.html?pub\\_id=B-2008](http://www.iadb.org/en/research-and-data/publication-details,3169.html?pub_id=B-2008).
- 2011 "IDB and People of African Descent in Latin America." <http://www.iadb.org/en/news/webstories/2011-11-16/idb-and-the-year-for-people-of-african-descent,9672.html>.
- Ishiyama, John  
 2010 "Ethnic Partisanship in Ethiopia." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 16 (3).
- Jenkins, Richard  
 1994 "Rethinking Ethnicity: Identity, Categorization, and Power." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17 (2).
- Kindler, Donald, and Allison Dale-Riddle  
 2008 *The End of Race?: Obama, 2008, and Racial Politics in America*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Kinder, Donald R., and David O. Sears  
 1981 "Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 40 (3).
- Knight, Alan

- 1990 "Racism, Revolution and *Indigenismo*: Mexico, 1910-1940." In *The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870-1940*, edited by Richard Graham, 71-102. Austin: University of Texas at Austin.
- Knight, Franklin
- 2003 "Blacks and the Forging of National Identity in the Caribbean, 1840-1900. In *Blacks, Coloureds, and National Identity in Nineteenth Century Latin America*, edited by Nancy Priscilla Naro, 81-94. London: University of London.
- Laitin, David, and Daniel Posner
- 2004 "The Implications of Constructivism for Constructing Ethnic Fractionalization Indices." *APSA-CP* 12 (1).
- Larrazábal Blanco, Carlos
- 1975 *Los negros y la esclavitud en Santo Domingo*. Santo Domingo: Editora de Colores, S.A.
- Lawson, Chappell, Gabriel S. Lenz, Andy Baker, and Michael Myers
- 2010 "Looking Like A Winner: Candidate Appearance and Electoral Success in New Democracies." *World Politics* 63 (4).
- Loveman, Mara
- 1999 "Is 'Race' Essential? A comment on Bonilla-Silva." *American Sociological Review* 64 (6).
- 2014 *National Colors: Racial Classification and the State in Latin America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lozano, Wilfredo
- 1992 *La cuestión haitiana en Santo Domingo: migración internacional, desarrollo y relaciones inter-estatales entre Haití y República Dominicana*. Santo Domingo: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales.
- 1995 *Las Relaciones Dominico-Haitianas: Entre la Cooperación y el Conflicto*. Santo Domingo: Fundación Fredrich Ebert.
- Lublin, David, and Katherine Tate
- 1995 "Racial Group Competition in Urban Elections." In *Classifying by Race*, edited by Paul E. Peterson. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Madrid, Raúl
- 2005a "[Ethnic Cleavages and Electoral Volatility in Latin America.](#)" *Comparative Politics* 38 (1).
- 2005b "Indigenous Voters and Party System Fragmentation in Latin America." *Electoral Studies* 24 (4).
- 2008 "The Rise of Ethnopolitism in Latin America." *World Politics* 60 (3).
- 2011 "[Ethnic Proximity And Ethnic Voting In Peru.](#)" *Journal of Latin American Studies* 43 (2).
- 2012 *The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Maddox, Keith

- 2004 "Perspectives on Racial Phenotypicality Bias." *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 8 (4).
- Maddox, Keith, and Stephanie Gray  
2002 "Cognitive Representations of Black Americans: Reexploring the Role of Skin Tone." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 28 (2).
- Martínez, Miguel  
2013 "¿Cuánto gasta el Estado dominicano en la población haitiana en materia de sanidad y educación?" *Hoy*, July 2.
- Martínez, Samuel  
2003 "Not a Cockfight: Rethinking Haitian-Dominican Relations." *Latin American Perspectives* 30 (3).
- Martínez-Vergne, Teresita  
2005 *Nation & Citizen in The Dominican Republic, 1880-1916*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Marx, Anthony  
1998 *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of the United States, South Africa, and Brazil*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Maxton, Ashindi  
1997 "El racismo en la niñez Dominicana." *El Caribe*, July 18.
- Mayes, April  
2014 *The Mulatto Republic*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.
- McConaughy, Corrine, Ismail K. White, David J. Leal, and Jason P. Casellas  
2010. "A Latino on the Ballot: Explaining Coethnic Voting Among Latinos and the Response of White Americans." *Journal of Politics* 72 (4).
- McClain, Paula D., Jessica D. Johnson Carew, Eugene Walton, Jr., and Candis S. Watts  
2009 "Group Membership, Group Identity, and Group Consciousness: Measures of Racial Identity in American Politics?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (1).
- McKelvey, Richard D., and William Zavoina  
1975 "A Statistical Model for the Analysis of Ordinal Level Dependent Variables." *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 4 (1).
- Carl Meacham  
2013 "The Dominican Republic: Becoming a One-Party State?" Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Mercedes Contreras, Ayacx  
2004 "¿Por qué los Dominico-Haitianos están colocados en la base de la estratificación socio-económica de los ciudadanos dominicanos?: Mecanismos de exclusión socio-étnica en una sociedad mulata." *Estudios Sociales* 37 (138).
- Mitchell, Gladys  
2009 "Afro-Brazilian Politicians and Campaign Strategies: A Preliminary Analysis." *Latin American Politics and Society* 51 (3).

- 2010 "Racism and Brazilian Democracy: Two Sides of the Same Coin?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33 (10).
- Morgan, Jana, and Rosario Espinal  
 2010 "Political Culture of Democracy in the Dominican Republic, 2010: Democratic Consolidation in the Americas during Hard Times." In *Americas Barometer: Latin American Public Opinion Project*, edited by Mitchell A. Seligson. Nashville: Vanderbilt University and the United States Agency for International Development.
- Mörner, Magnus  
 1970 *Race and Class in Latin America*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Moya Pons, Frank  
 1972 *La Dominación Haitiana 1822-1844*. Santiago, DR: Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra.  
 1992 *Manual de historia dominicana*. Santo Domingo: Caribbean Publishers.  
 1999 *Breve historia contemporánea de la República Dominicana*. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica.  
 2008 *La Otra Historia Dominicana (Segund Edición)*. Santo Domingo: Editora Búho
- Mylonas, Harris  
 2013 *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Núñez, Manuel  
 1990 *El Ocaso de la Nación Dominicana*. Santo Domingo: Editora Alfa y Omega.
- Ñopo, Hugo  
 2012 *New Century, Old Disparities: Gender And Ethnic Earnings Gaps In Latin America And The Caribbean*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
- Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant  
 1994 *Racial Formation in the United States (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)*. New York: Routledge.
- Orces, Diana  
 2013 "Dominicans or Not? Support for Citizenship of Dominican-born Children of Haitian Immigrants." AmericasBarometer Topical Brief # ITB012. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project.
- Oviedo, José  
 1985 "Cultura y nación: la búsqueda de la identidad." *Ciencia y Sociedad* 10 (1).
- Pantoja, Adrian D. and Gary M. Segura  
 2003 "Does Ethnicity Matter? Descriptive Representation in Legislatures and Political Alienation Among Latinos." *Social Science Quarterly* 84 (2).
- Paschel, Tianna  
 2013 "'The Beautiful Faces of My Black People': Race, Ethnicity and the Politics of Colombia's 2005 Census." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36 (10).

- 2010 "The Right to Difference: Explaining Colombia's Shift from Color-Blindness to the Law of Black Communities." *American Journal of Sociology* 116 (3).
- Paschel, Tianna, and Mark Sawyer  
2008 "Contesting Politics as Usual: Black Social Movements, Globalization, and Race Policy in Latin America." *SOULS Interdisciplinary Journal of Black Politics, Society and Culture* 10:3.
- Pérez, Luis Julián  
1990 *Santo Domingo frente al destino*. Santo Domingo: Editora Taller.
- Pérez, Odalis G.  
2003 *Nacionalismo y cultura en República Dominicana*. Santo Domingo: Editora Manatí.
- Pérez Cabral, Pedro Andres  
1967 *La comunidad mulata: el caso socio-político de la República Dominicana*. Caracas, Venezuela: Gráficas Americana.
- Philpot, Tasha S., and Hanes Walton, Jr.  
2007 "One of Our Own: Black Female Candidates and the Voters Who Support Them." *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (1).
- Philpot, Tasha, Daron Shaw, and Ernest McGowan  
2009 "Winning the Race: Black Voter Turnout in the 2008 Presidential Election." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 73 (5).
- Pierson, Donald  
1942 *Negroes in Brazil: A Study of Race Contact at Bahia*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Rabushka, Alvin, and Kenneth Shepsle  
1972 *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability*. Columbus: Charles E. Merrill.
- Racusen, Seth  
2012 "The Grammar of Color Identity in Brazil." In *Afro-Descendants, Identity, and the Struggle for Development in the Americas*, edited by Bernd Reiter and Kimberly Eison Simmons, 141-175. East Lansing: Michigan State University.
- Reeves, Keith  
1997 *Voting Hopes or Fears?: White Voters, Black Candidates & Racial Politics in America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- República Dominicana Oficina Nacional de Estadística  
2012 "Primera Encuesta Nacional De Inmigrantes En La República Dominicana (Eni-2012)."  
[http://media.onu.org.do/ONU\\_DO\\_web/596/sala\\_prensa\\_publicaciones/docs/0565341001372885891.pdf](http://media.onu.org.do/ONU_DO_web/596/sala_prensa_publicaciones/docs/0565341001372885891.pdf).
- Reskin, Barbara  
2003 "Including Mechanisms in Our Models of Ascriptive Inequality." *American Sociological Review* 68 (1).

- Rice, Roberta, and Donna Lee Van Cott  
 2006 "The Emergence and Performance of Indigenous Peoples' Parties in South America: A Subnational Statistical Analysis." *Comparative Political Studies* 39 (6).
- Roth, Wendy  
 2012 *Race Migrations: Latinos and the Cultural Transformation of Race*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Sagás, Ernesto  
 2000 *Race and Politics in the Dominican Republic*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.  
 2012 "Black But Not Haitian: Color, Class, and Ethnicity in the Dominican Republic." In *Comparative Perspectives on Afro-Latin America*, edited by Kwame Dixon and John Burdick, 323-344. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Sagás, Ernesto, and Orlando Inoa  
 2003 *The Dominican People: A Documentary History*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers.
- Sawyer, Mark  
 2006 *Racial Politics in Post-Revolutionary Cuba*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sawyer, Mark, and Tianna Paschel  
 2007 "We Didn't Cross the Color Line, The Color Line Crossed Us: Immigration and Blackness in Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic and the U.S." *Dubois Review* 4 (2).
- Sawyer, Mark, Yesilernis Peña, and Jim Sidanius  
 2004. "Cuban Exceptionalism: Group-based Hierarchy and the Dynamics of Patriotism in Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba." *The Dubois Review* 1 (1).
- Scheriff, Robin E.  
 2001 *Dreaming Equality: Color, Race, and Racism in Urban Brazil*. Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Schoultz, Lars  
 1998 *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Schwartzman, Luisa Farah  
 2007 "Does Money Whiten? Intergenerational Changes in Racial Classification in Brazil." *American Sociological Review* 72 (6).
- Scott, James C.  
 1985 *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Sidanius, Jim, Yesilernis Peña, and Mark Sawyer  
 2001 "Inclusionary Discrimination: Pigmentocracy and Patriotism in the Dominican Republic." *Political Psychology* 22 (4).

- Sigelman, Carol K., Lee Sigelman, Barbara J. Walkosz, and Michael Nitz  
 1995 "Black Candidates, White Voters: Understanding Racial Bias in Political Perceptions." *American Journal of Political Science* 39 (1).
- Silié, Rubén  
 1989 "Esclavitud y prejuicio de color en Santo Domingo." *Boletín de Antropología Americana* 120.  
 2005 *17 Opiniones Sobre Racismo en La Republica Dominicana*. Santo Domingo: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales.
- Simmons, Kimberly Eison  
 2009 *Reconstructing Racial Identity and the African Past in the Dominican Republic*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.  
 2012 "Navigating the Racial Terrain: Blackness and Mixedness in the United States and the Dominican Republic." In *Afro-Descendants, Identity, and the Struggle for Development in the Americas*, edited by Bernd Reiter and Kimberly Eison Simmons, 67-92. East Lansing: Michigan State University.
- Skidmore, Thomas E.  
 1990 "Racial Ideas and Social Policy in Brazil, 1870-1940." In *The Idea of Race in Latin America*, edited by Richard Graham, 7-36. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Smith, Candis W.  
 2014 *Black Mosaic: The Politics of Black Pan-Ethnic Diversity*. New York: New York University Press.
- Sonenshein, Raphael J.  
 1990 "Can Black Candidates Win Statewide Elections?" *Political Science Quarterly* 105 (2).
- Stepan, Nancy L.  
 1991 *The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Stokes-Brown, Atiya Kai  
 2013 "Race and Latino Public Opinion: Evidence from the 2006 Latino National Survey." In *Ciencia Política: The Scientific Analysis of Latino Politics in the United States*, edited by Tony Affigne, Evelyn Hu-DeHart, and Marion Orr. New York: New York University Press.
- Sue, Christina  
 2009 "A Reply to Eduardo Bonilla-Silva's Latin Americanization Thesis." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32 (6).
- Swain, Carol  
 1993 *Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Tajfel, Henri  
 1981 *Human Groups and Social Categories Studies in Human Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Tannenbaum, Frank  
1947 *Slave and Citizen*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Tate, Katherine  
2003 *Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and the Representativeness in the U.S. Congress*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tejada Holguín, Ramón  
1997 *La Democracia y el Sistema Político en República Dominicana, 1978-1997*. Santo Domingo: Pontificia Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra.
- Telles, Edward  
2004 *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin-Color in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
2014 *Pigmentocracies: Ethnicity, Race, and Color in Latin America*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Telles, Edward, and Stanley Bailey  
2013 “Undertanding Latin American Beliefs About Racial Inequality.” *American Journal of Sociology* 118 (5).
- Telles, Edward, and René Flores  
2013 “More than Just Color: Whiteness, Nation and Status in Latin America.” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 93 (3).
- Telles, Edward, and Denia Garcia  
2013 “Mestizaje and Public Opinion in Latin America.” *Latin American Research Review* 48 (3).
- Telles, Edward, and Tianna Paschel  
2014 “Who is Black, White, or Mixed Race: How Skin Color, Status, and Nation shape Racial Classification in Latin America.” *American Journal of Sociology* 120 (3).
- Telles, Edward, and Lisa Steele  
2012 “Pigmentocracy in the Americas: How is Educational Attainment Related to Skin Color?” In *AmericasBarometer Insights Series: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)*, edited by Amy Erica Smith, Mitchell A. Seligson, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
- Terkildsen, Nayda  
1993 “When White Voters Evaluate Black Candidates: The Processing Implications of Candidate Skin Color, Prejudice, and Self-Monitoring.” *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (4).
- Tesler, Michael, and David O. Sears  
2010 *Obama’s Race: The 2008 Election and the Dream of a Post-Racial America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Tolentino Dipp, Hugo  
1974 *Raza e historia en Santo Domingo*. Santo Domingo: Editora de la Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo.
- Toribio, Rafael

- 2005 “Partidos políticos y sociedad civil: actores complementarios en la democracia.” *Revista Futuros* 3.
- Torres-Saillant, Silvio
- 1998 “The Tribulations of Blackness: Stages in Dominican Racial Identity.” *Latin American Perspectives* 25 (3).
- 1999 “Introduction to Dominican Blackness.” *CUNY Dominican Studies Institute Research Monograph Series*. New York: City University of New York.
- 2005 “Racism and the Latino Scholar.” In *Neither Enemies nor Friends: Latinos, Blacks, Afro-Latinos*, edited by Anani Dzidzienyo and Suzanne Oboler. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Tsounta, Evridiki, and Anayochukwu I. Osueke
- 2014 “What is Behind Latin America’s Declining Income Inequality?” Working Paper #WP14/124. Washington, D.C: International Monetary Fund.
- United Nations Development Program
- 2013 “Informe Sobre Desarrollo Humano 2013.” [http://www.undp.org/content/dam/venezuela/docs/undp\\_ve\\_IDH\\_2013.pdf](http://www.undp.org/content/dam/venezuela/docs/undp_ve_IDH_2013.pdf).
- Van Cott, Donna Lee
- 2002 “Constitutional Reform in the Andes: Redefining Indigenous-State Relations.” In *Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous Rights, Diversity, and Democracy*, edited by Rachel Sieder, 45-69. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- 2005 *From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Evera, Stephen
- 2001 “Primordialism Lives!” *APSA-CP* 12 (1).
- Vega, Bernardo
- 1988 *Trujillo y Haití, Volumen 1, 1930-37*. Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana.
- 1993 “Etnicidad y el futuro de las relaciones dominico-haitianas.” *Estudios Sociales* 26.
- Verba, Sidney, and Norman H. Nie
- 1972 *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. New York: Harper and Row
- Voss, D. Stephen and David Lublin
- 2001 “Black Incumbents, White Districts: An Appraisal of the 1996 Congressional Elections.” *American Politics Research* 29 (March).
- Wade, Peter
- 1997 *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition). London: Pluto.
- 2001 “Racial Identity and Nationalism: A Theoretical View from Latin America.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24 (5).
- Wilkinson, Steven I.
- 2001 “Constructivist Assumption and Ethnic Violence.” *APSA-CP* 12 (1).

Wimmer, Andreas

- 2008 "The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 113 (4).
- 2013 *Ethnic Boundary Making: Institutions, Power, Networks*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- 2015. "Race-centrism: a critique and a research agenda." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38 (13).

Winant, Howard

- 2015 "Race, ethnicity, and social science." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38 (13).
- 2015 "Response to Andreas Wimmer." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38 (13).

Wooding, Bridget, and Richard Moseley-Williams

- 2004 *Needed by Unwanted: Haitian immigrants and their Ascendants in the Dominican Republic*. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations.

World Bank

- 2013 "Shifting Gears To Accelerate Shared Prosperity in Latin America and the Caribbean." [http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/06/17/000333037\\_20130617102900/Rendered/PDF/785070WP0PLB0S00Box377346B00PUBLIC0.pdf](http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/06/17/000333037_20130617102900/Rendered/PDF/785070WP0PLB0S00Box377346B00PUBLIC0.pdf)
- 2014 "Cuando La Prosperidad No Es Compartida." [http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/07/07/000442464\\_20140707102013/Rendered/PDF/857600SPANISH00sm ent0espa00ol00web0.pdf](http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/07/07/000442464_20140707102013/Rendered/PDF/857600SPANISH00sm ent0espa00ol00web0.pdf)

Yashar, Deborah

- 2005 *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Post Liberal Challenge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

## VITA

Danilo Antonio Contreras attended high school at Riverdale Country School in the Bronx, N.Y. He earned a B.A. in Government and Spanish from Georgetown University in 2005. Prior to entering graduate school, he was Program Coordinator in the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). From 2013 to 2015, Danilo Antonio was the Gaius Charles Bolin Dissertation Fellow in Political Science at Williams College. He will be the Postdoctoral Teaching Fellow in the Study of Race and Ethnicity at Holy Cross from 2015 to 2017.

Email: [contreras.danilo@gmail.com](mailto:contreras.danilo@gmail.com)

This manuscript was typed by the author.