54-1212-800-2616 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS No.262 ISSUED FOUR TIMES A MONTH HUMANISTIC SERIES No. 14 JANUARY 8, 1913 Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation BY GEORGE MILLER CALHOUN, Ph. D. Instructor in Greek The University of Texas PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS Entered as second-class mail matter at the postoffice at Austin, Texas PREFATORY NOTE The subject of this study was first suggested by Associate Professor Robert J. Bonner, of the University of Chicago, when I was attending his research course in Greek history. At every stage of the investigation, Professor Bonner's suggestion, criti­cism, and assistance have been generously given and gratefully received, and my indebtedness to his sound scholarship and inspiring teaching cannot be overstated. I wish also to express my gratitude to Professor Paul Shorey, of the University of Chicago, and Dr. Hazel Louise Brown, of Chicago, for their active interest and helpful suggestions; to Professor W.J.Battle, Dr. F. B. Marsh, and Adjunct Professor D. A. Penick, of the University of Texas, for assistance with the proofs, and to Mr. S. G. Sanders, fellow in Greek in the University of Texas, for help in compiling the register of passages and in proof-reading. And lastly, acknowledgment may here be made of the constant encouragement and inspiration which I have received in the course of my work from my parents and from my good friend Dr. J. H. Mills, of Tulane University. GEORGE MILLER CALHOUN. THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, January, 1913. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY ........ . 1 CHAPTER II. THE ORIGIN AND CONDITION OF THE CLUBS 10 Origin and Development-Political Tendencies-Social Features-Basis of Membership-Size-Names-Oaths and Pledges-Initiations-Secrecy-The Bond of Club Membership. CHAPTER III. THE CLUBS IN LITIGATION • . . . . . . . 40 Introductory-Money Contributions-Friendly Prosecu­tions-Counter Suits-Antidosis-Creating Sentiment­Dissuasion of Accusers-Assassination and Violence­Pleading at the Probole-Infiuence upon the Jury-Evi­dence-The Suppression of Evidence-The Pleading of Advocates-The Dissuasion of Advocates-Interest with Officials-Information Regarding Opponent's Case-Mis­cellaneous Expedients-Types of Clubs Represented. CHAPTER IV. THE CLUBS IN THE POLITICAL FIELD . . . . 97 Introductory-Litigation as a Political Weapon-Assas­sination-Deliberative Assemblies-Elections-Ostracism -Foreign Intervention and Prodosia. BIBLIOGRAPHY . 149 INDEX . . .. . 153 REGISTER OF pASSAGES 161 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY Thucydides, describing the extension to Athens of the oligarchic movement which had its inception in Samas in 411, states that Pisander visited the "sworn associations which already existed in the state for the management of lawsuits and elections.," Tos TE ~vvwµocrlas' al7rep ETV"fxavov 7rponpov EV TV 7rOAH oiJcrat E1rl olKalS Kal apxais, 1 and persuaded them to unite for the purpose of overthrow­ing the democracy. This was no slight and insignificant faction which was thus arrayed against the democracy. The formidable political strength comprised in the membership of these clubs is attested by the two occasions on which they were able completely to dominate the state. We know further that individual clubs were at all times factors of the utmost importance in the political and litigious activities of the Athenians. Themistocles, for example, the shrewd and successful politician par excellence, was quick to perceive the tremendous advantage of club affiliations, and his first step toward the accomplishment of his ambitions was enrollment in a hetaery. 2 Aristides, in whom the opposite type of statesman found its consummate expression according to ancient ideals, is cited as the great exception to the common practice of the age, as the one man who attained to political eminence solely by personal worth and integrity, unsupported by club affiliations. For he, according to Plutarch, kept aloof from clubs, believing that the power derived from such associations was an incentive to unjust action. 3 Socrates also was an excep­tion to the general custom. In the Platonic Apology, he affirms that it would have been possible for him to have escaped convic­tion had he been willing to devote himself to those matters which engage the attention of the majority at Athens-finance, the attainment of office, political parties, and clubs.4 This strongly suggests that membership in clubs was not confined to a few, 1Thuc. 8. 54. 4. 2p1ut. Arist. 2. ap}ut. Arist. 2. 436B; cf. infra p. 23. n. 1. ATHENIAN CLUBS but was for the average citizen the necessary and usual means of defense against the attacks of enemies. That it was a prere­quisite of success in the political field may be inferred from the number of great names in Athenian history which are associated with clubs.1 That the hetaeries wielded so powerful an influence in the state and that membership in them was so usual bespeak a tremendous efficiency in the prosecution of the ends for which they existed. To what was this efficiency due? What were the details of their organization? What were the exact methods by which they promoted the interests of their members in politics and aided them in litigation? These are the questions which the words of Thucydides suggest. The answers, if satisfactory answers can be made, should constitute a valuable commentary upon the practical politics and the legal dexterity of the Athenians. Several monographs have dealt with the clubs. In 1814 Hilllmann discussed them briefly in his essay De Atheniensium crvvwµocrlats b·t oiKaLS Kat apxai:s (Konigsb~rg: 1814), in which he attempted to maintain the thesis that they were a sort of ''Bestechungsgesellschaften,'' and accomplished their ends chiefly by bribery.2 Some years later, Wilhelm Vischer published Die oligarchische Partei und die Hewirien in Athen3 (Basel: 1836), which has remained the standard work of reference on the subject. No serious attempt is made to deal with details or methods. This topic is dismissed with a perfunctory page of suggestions, mainly a priori in character, and a cursory allusion to jury bribing and the treasonable tendencies of Greek political clubs in general.4 The study is primarily concerned with general political movements and situations, and is, as was doubtless intended, little more than an enumeration of clubs and a discussion of their relations to the oligarchic party. That this viewpoint should lead to some mis­conceptions in regard to the origin and status of the clubs is but 1For a partial enumeration of prominent men who belonged to clubs, cf. infra pp. 18-19. The tremendous power and importance of the clubs can only be realized at the conclusion of a detailed study; to cite in this introduction all of the instances which lead to this view is of course impracticable. 2Cf. infra p. 69. I have been unable to procure Hiillmann's work, and have been obliged to depend on the reports of his conclusions made by other scholars who have discussed the clubs. Vischer was not able to secure the monograph when he wrote his study in 1836 at Basel. 3Republished in Kleine Sckriften (Leipzig: 1877) I. pp. 153-204. 'Pp. 171-72. INTRODUCTORY natural. But, even were Vischer's conclusions to be accepted in toto, there would still remain much to be done.1 Btittner's Geschichte der politischen H etarieen in A then (Leipzig: 1840), while on certain points it corrects and supplements Vischer's work, makes but a slight advance. Buttner also is concerned chiefly with general tendencies, and his work could more properly be termed a history of political parties than of political clubs. 2 The question of the methods employed by clubs he frankly pro­fesses himself unable to answer.3 In addition to these more pretentious studies, the clubs have been made the subject of numerous brief and somewhat perfunctory discussions by com­mentators upon the Thucydides passage and by historians of the Four Hundred.4 But few of these raise the question of details or methods; none of them affords a treatment which is at all adequate, and the great majority give bare recapitulations of Vischer's more obvious conclusions. Thus a discussion of his treatment is for all practical purposes a sufficient discussion of all that has been written upon the subject. Although nearly a century has elapsed since Htillmann published his study, we are still without a satisfactory account of the ways in which the clubs worked, and Goodhart, commenting upon the Thucydides pass­ 1Vischer completed in a satisfactory manner the work which he pro­posed, a history of the oligarchic party and its clubs; the fault, if fault there be, lies not with him but with those who cite his article for detailed information which it does not profess to give. The present study is not a criticism of, but is intended rather to supplement the work of Vischer. Reservations, and criticisms of his conclusions, will be indicated from time to time in the course of the work. The information contained in the Aristotelian Constitution of Athens would doubtless have affected some of Vischer's views. 2The gravest fault in Btittner's treatment is the failure to distinguish between the clubs and the larger parties or factions which they made up, a distinction which is almost entirely lost sight of. 3P. 77. 4Wattenbach De Quadringentorum Athenis factione (Berlin: 1842) pp. 28, 32 ff.; Rospatt Die politischen Parteien Griechenlands (Trier: 1844) pp. 65 ff.; Schoemann Griechische Alterthilmer (Berlin: 1897) I. pp. 190, 383; Ziebarth Das griechische Vereinswesen (Leipzig: 1896) pp. 92 ff.; Whibley Political Parties at Athens (Cambridge: 1889) pp. 83 ff.; Headlam Election by Lot at Athens (Cambridge: 1891) pp. 33-35; Scheibe Die oligarchische Umwalzung zu Athen (Leipzig: 1841) pp. 4 ff.; de Vos De Sycophantis (Amsterdam: 1868) pp. 49-51; Hermann-Thumser Lehrbuch der griechischen Staatsaltertilmer (Freiburg: 1889) pp. 656,709 ff.; Beloch Die attische Politik seit Perikles (Leipzig: 1884) pp. 12 ff.; Gilbert The Constitutional Antiquities of Athens and Sparta (London: 1895) pp. 141-42, Beitrtige zur innern Geschichte Athens (Leipzig: 1877) pp. 84 ff. and the literature quoted by Hermann-Thumser, loc. cit. ATHENIAN CLUBS age, remarks: "Unfortunately, though we have frequent allu­sions to them (the clubs) in the orators, there is almost no infor­mation as to details."1 The present investigation is but incidentally concerned with the origin or the history of the clubs. It will be necessary to touch upon these questions somewhat in order to correct mis­apprehensions or to call attention to facts that have not hitherto been noted in this connection. But the primary intent of this study is to collect all available information upon the actual workings of the clubs, and to describe as well as may be the pre­cise methods by which they effected their purposes. To do this, it will be necessary not only to consider the actual instances of club activity but also to inquire just what opportunities for in­trigue and machination were offered by the Athenian judicial and political machinery. The discussion is then a two-fold one. It is at once an account of the tactics which hetaeries are known actually to have employed, and a study of practical political and legal method. Therefore the cases which undoubtedly origin­ated with hetaeries are supplemented by a number of others in which no mention is made of clubs, but which are of great value because they help to illustrate more fully the ways in which hetaeries could and doubtless did work. For example, clubs are seen to have made use in litigation of what has been termed the "counter-suit," but the case which is most fully described and which therefore best illustrates the detailed workings of the scheme is not one of those which are known to have originated with hetaeries. It has proved convenient to consider, first, theories of origin and the organization of the clubs; second, their activities in liti­gation; third, their political methods. TERMINOLOGY The terminology which is employed by ancient writers to designate the political clubs is both varied and elastic. The most distinctive appellations for a "club" are eraLpEla and crvvwµoula; for a "clubman" fra'ipos, and, less frequently, crvv­wµor1JS· However, not only are these words found in other 1Thucydides, Book VIII, note to 54. 4. INTRODUCTORY meanings, but clubs are frequently spoken of in more general terms or referred to by implication, especially in the orators. A brief preliminary survey of the terminology will be useful. As early as Homer, f.Taipos is used, in certain passages, of men who are united by a peculiar relationship, distinct from ordinary friendship or mere companionship in arms. 1 In the classic period the word may designate a political adherent or "partisan,"2 and is also firmly fixed in the special meaning of "clubman," "associate in a hetaery."3 ~vvwµor77s, which involves the idea of oath-bound companion­ship, usually occurs in the sense of "conspirator,"4 but is at times employed as a synonym for f.raipos and means "clubman."5 Other words also, which were originally without political significance, are used in this special sense. 'E7rir1]oEws, which was admirably adapted to the requirements of party phrase­ology, 6 may be a synonym for €.Tal,pos. 7 inrapxovcr71> 1TOAt.nlas haZpov Eivat.; Apol. 21A: l:µ6) 7€ ernl.pos ijv EK VEoV Kal vµi;Jv 74} 1TArJ(lH hai.pos (in the two mean­ings of "friend" and "partisan"); Plut. Arist. 2. 1. See also the play on the word in Aristoph. Knights 589-90: NlK11v ?} xopt.Kwv l:crnv E-ralpa To"is r' l:x8po"icrt. µ,e8' T,µ,wv crTacrditH. 3Thuc. 8. 48. 4, 65. 2, 92. 4; And. 1. 54; [4. 4, 14]; fr. or. 2=Plut. Them. 32; Dem. 21. 20; 54. 35, 39; Lys. 12. 43; 13. 19 (cf. infra p. 96 n. 1); Plut. Per. 7, 16; Cimon 17; Arist. 2: ou {3ovMµ,evos crwaOt.Kel.11 roi.> halpois; cf. Plato Rep. 443A; Aristoph. Lysis. 1153; Schol. to Aristoph. Knights 1085. I shall use "associate" as a convenient English equivalent of eraipos in the course of this study. 'Eraipos has also non-political uses. In Homer it may mean "friend," "companion," or "follower," "attend­ant," and is used of the retinue of the Homeric chieftains (cf. infra p. 15. n. 3). As "friend," "comrade," "age-fellow," or "pupil," hat.po) is found in the literature of every period. 4Thuc. 6. 57. 2. 5Lys. 12. 43; [And.] 4. 4; Plut. Solon 12; Aristoph. Knights 257, 452, 628, 862; Wasps 345, 483, 488, 507, 953 (cf. infra p. 8. n. 7). 6Thuc. 8. 48. 2: ~wlcrTacrav re TWll av8pw1TW1' TOUS E1TLT1}0elovs ES ~vvwµ,ocrla.11; 5. 76. 2; 6. 64. 2; cf. aV€1TLTf,oews, Thuc. 8. 65. 2; and E1TLTf,OELOS lnrE~atpe8ijvru, =avEnrfioews, Thuc. 8. 70. 2. 7Isoc. 16. 8; And. 1. 63; Lys. 13. 19 (cf. infra p. 96. n 1). 8lsoc. 16. 8; Thuc. 1. 126. 5; Plut. Lys. 21; Mor. 186A. 9It is now generally admitted that no distinction of meaning between €TaLpEla and erat.pla can be maintained (cf. Liddell & Scott, s. v. Erat.pela and avopela). 'EraLpela is of course not restricted to political clubs. In the Roman period "trade guilds " were sometimes called €ra.LpEZaL. ATHENIAN CLUBS of fraipoL, the bond which united the members of a political club.1 As a concrete noun, it became the customary and definite designation of a club of which the interests were chiefly political, and which was devoted either wholly or in part to the support of its members in politics and litigation. In this sense, it is found in a great many passages.2 'EraLpLKOV, TO eraLpLKOV, are at times synonymous with ha1.pELa. They may refer either to a single club,3 or to a combination of clubs, "the club ele­ment."4 tEraLpucov also occurs in the abstract meaning of the relation fraLpELa. 5 °2;uvwµoula usually means "conspiracy," and is used of tem­porary sworn combinations and cabals which were formed from time to time at Athens and elsewhere, and which might be composed of a few men merely or might include a number of hetaeries.6 But it is also employed, as a synonym for ETa1.pELa, to designate a political club,7 and similarly has the abstract meaning of the club relation or bond.8 1Dem. 29. 22-23; Thuc. 3. 82. 5: rijs TE ermpla.s ~1.a.M1rr1s (this may be the concrete use) ; And. 1. 100 (where b-mpEl.a. is punned on by ,P-alp7Jaas). 'ErmpELa. is also used, especially by the poets, of non-political friend­ships; even here, however, there is often a suggestion of more than f/>i.>..l.a.. It is probably in the abstract sense that the word is used in the newly­discovered ~ijµoL of Eupolis (Iv. line 6: Tijs ermpŁa.s & TOVr"'11 TOVs f/>l:Nws Ec1" ••• • ) , although the interpretation of the passage is very doubtful. The translation of Koerte (Hermes XLVII. p. 298), "von ihrem Klub,"has little to support it. The context suggests a possible play upon b-a.Lp,,cm, somewhat similar to that in the Andocides passage. 2Ar. Com. Ath. 20. 1, 34. 3; Pol. 1305 b 30 ft'., 1313 a 41; Rhet. ad Alex. 1446 b 24; Dem. 21. 139; [58. 42]; Hdt. 5. 71; Isaeus fr. 22. 2 (Scheibe ed. 1899); Plato, Theaet,. 173D; Rep. 365D; !soc. 3. 54; 4. 79; 16.6; Plut. Arist. 2; Per. 14.2; Mor. 186A. The name was applied to political clubs of other cities than Athens, as will be seen from some of the examples cited (cf. also Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 25; Plut. Lys. 13. 3-4, 21). Plutarch uses the word of the clubs which made up the Pythagorean league (Mor. 583A). In some cases, the distinction between "club" and "party" is not closely observed, and ErmpEla seems to be used of the "political following" of a prominent man (cf. Lys. 12. 55; Plut. Pelop. 5; Hell. Oxy. (Ed. O~on.) 12. 2; Diod. Sic. 15. 82). In these cases, however, the reference 1S usually to a definite following, of which the nucleus may well have been a "club." aHyperides 3. 8 (col. 23); Plut. Lys. 5. 4Thuc. 8. 48-49. riThuc. 3. 82. 6. &Thuc. 6. 27, 60. 1, 61; 8. 48-49; Plut. Ale. 18; Ages. 32; cf. also Plut. Cato 22, etc.; Dittenberger Syl. I. G. 461-63. 7Thuc. 8. 54. 4, 81. 2; Plato Rep. 365D; Apol. 36B; Aristoph. Knights476 (cf. infra p. 8. n. 7). SPhotius, s. v. l nva. These phrases are oftentimes used of clubs as well as of close political follow­ings which, while they may or may not have been regularly organized hetaeries, pursued the same objects and accom­plished similar results. 3 In the sense of "political club," €raipela and uvvwµoula appear to be synonymous, and no distinction can be attempted profit­ably.4 TERMINOLOGY OF THE OLIGARCHIC REVOLUTIONS After the revolution of 411, which had been organized and directed by the clubs, eraipos often bore the added implication of "oligarch," and was employed without any qualifying at­tribute to designate the member, not merely of a political club or hetaery, but of an oligarchic club, a "clubbist." The beginnings of this usage are to be seen in Thucydides' account of the revolu­tion. He first tells us that the promoters of the movement organized into a conspiracy those of the army at Samos who were 1cf. Thuc. 8. 66. 2-3: ro ~vvE!TTTJKo;; !soc. 3. 54: uv!TraOf; the clubmen are always referred to as Of.' INTRODUCTORY cerned in the oligarchic conspiracy of 404 as ol Ka°"Aovµevo1, frai.po1,, the "so-called," or "self-styled" associates.1 Itwasto be expected that the suggestion which was thus attached to frai.pos should extend itself, though possibly in less degree, to fra1,pela, and there are indications that this was the case. In the speech On the Mysteries, Andocides uses the word, alluding to an insinuation of his opponent, with this suggestion. 2 In the Constitution of Athens, Aristotle distinguishes two wings of the aristocratic party, the oligarchs, oi µf;v €v rai.s fra1,pela1,s oVTes, and the moderates, ol o'l:v fTaipelq. µEV OVDEµi~ (jLJ'YKaOE(JTWTES· 3 1 12. 43. The employment of KaXovµevor; to indicate a reservation in the use of a word needs no comment; it was used, as here, in quoting party terminology, e. g. Plut. Per. 11: rovr; KaAovr; Ka-ya8ovr; KaAov­µ€vovr; avopa<; • 21. 100 (cf. supra p. 6. n. 1). 334. 3. Cf. infra pp. 21-22. ATHENIAN CLUBS CHAPTER II THE ORIGIN AND STATUS OF THE CLUBS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT No explanation of the origin of these clubs, fra.1.pEia.1. or crovwµ,ouLa.1., is found in ancient literature, and there is no evidence that it was ever attempted.1 The earlier Attic prose writers refer to them as to a fully developed institution, an im­portant and universally recognized feature of Greek, and par­ticularly of Athenian, political and social life. Under these cir­cumstances, any attempt to reconstruct the history of their origin and early development must be largely speculative, and the utmost that can be claimed for any theory which may be for­mulated is that it is a reasonable and justifiable inference from the known facts. Vischer regards the clubs as organized for definite political purposes, both in Athens and elsewhere. After the expulsion of the tyrants in various states by the Spartans, there was in each state an element which the new political order did not satisfy: "Solche Unzufriedene vereinigten sich nun mit Gleichgesinnten zu engeren Genossenschaften, sich mit Rath und That im poli­tischen Leben zu unterstutzen, und auch Manner, die nicht mit dem politischen Zustande unzufrieden waren, aber sich personlich geltend zu machen strebten, folgten oft ihrem Beispiele. " 2 The appearance of the clubs at Athens he puts after the expulsion of Isagoras: ''Und da das (the overthrow of the democracy by foreign aid) nicht mehr offen wie unter Isagoras geschehen konnte, so nahmen diejenigen, welche sich durchaus nicht mit der neuen Ordnung versohnen konnten, ihre Zuflucht zu geheimen Ver­bindungen und Umtrieben, welche Anfangs ohne feste Organisa­tion, am Ende des peloponnesischen Krieges nach einem zusam­menhangenden Plane Athen und die Bundesstadte umgarn­ten und in der Herrschaft der Dreissig ihren kurzen aber 1See Busolt III. p. 822. n. 1: "Ueber die Anfange der Hetairieen fehlt es an N achrichten." 2pp. 155 fl. ORIGIN AND STATUS blutigen Triumph feierten. Dadurch erhalt ihr ganzes W esen den Charakter des V olksfeindlichen und V erratherischen.'' 1 In the time of the Persian war, Vischer finds traces of clubs (mentioned by Isocrates Panegyr. 79), and the first definite in­stance is the club of Themistocles. On the eve of the battle of Plataea, he finds mention of what he terms "eine wirkliche Ver­schworung." 2 Vischer' s theory, then, in so far as it has to do with the clubs at Athens, seems to imply that they were organized by the remnant of the Isagorean party for particular political ends. This was not the case, as I shall endeavor to show. The oligarchic party did not organize clubs to resist the democracy which Clisthenes founded, but merely adapted to the changed conditions an institution of great antiquity which had long before played an important part in the struggles between the rival aristo­cratic factions. The existence of the clubs in Athens at an earlier date than that suggested by Vischer is now conclusively established by Aristotle's account of the contention between Clisthenes and Isagoras for the archonship during the time which preceded the expulsion of the latter from Athens: KaraXv8elcr71s OE rijs rvpavvwos, foracrlatov 7rpOS aXX~Xovs 'lcra-yopaS' 0 TELcrav8pov lXos WJI TWll TVpavvwv' Kal KXetu8€v11s TOU 'YEVOVS WV rwv 'AXKµEWJILOWV. ~rrwµevos Of ·rais EraLpelaLS 0 KXeiu8€v17s 7rpocr17-ya-yero rov oijµov, KTX.3 Let us consider briefly the history of this period. Clisthenes headed the aristocratic faction to which the Alcmeonids belonged; his opponent Isagoras numbered among his supporters the remnant of the Pisistratidean party, by no means inconsiderable.4 Isa­goras was successful, and was elected archon for the year 508/7. 5 It was then that Clisthenes, by advocating a change to more democratic forms of government, obtained the support of the great mass of the people and consequently a preponderance of physical force which Isagoras and his party could meet in but 1P. 159. 2P. 161; cf. infra p. 143. aeons. Ath. 20. 1. 4Although Isagoras seems not to have been a partisan of the tyrant3, those of the Pisistratidean party who remained in the city (Ar. Cons. Ath. 22. 4) supported him in preference to Clisthenes, the avowed foe of the Pisistratids (Ar. Cons. Ath. 20. 1; cf. Busolt II. p. 401.n.2). 5Ar. Cons. Ath. 21. 1-2; cf. Busolt II. p. 402. n. 1. ATHENIAN CLUBS one way, by appeal to Sparta.1 The actual institution of the promised reforms probably took place after the expulsion of Isagoras and the Spartan forces.2 The essential fact to be noted is that the overtures made by Clisthenes to the commons were subsequent to his defeat by Isagoras for the archonship. The conflict alluded to by Aristotle, then, was not between these aristocratic clubs on the one side and the commons on the other, but between the clubs which were supporting Clisthenes and those which took the part of Isagoras, and the expression used by Aristotle (T,rrwµEvos 0Ł ra'is fraipdais) refers to an inter­club struggle in which the party of Clisthenes proved to be the weaker.3 The situation described is not unlike that which existed nearly a hundred years later, when in 411 the moderate wing of the oligarchs, finding themselves the minority in the combination of clubs which was in power, espoused the cause, nominally of the ''Five Thousand,'' in reality of the democ­racy.• It is not impossible that Clisthenes, like Theramenes and his adherents, heard the distant muttering of the storm, and was far-sighted enough to see that democracy was destined to prevail. Aristotle's account, then, shows conclusively that the clubs were not first organized by the oligarchs after the expulsion of Isagoras as a means of secretly resisting the encroachments of the newly established democracy. They had already existed under the old aristocracy and had doubt!~ played their part in the struggles between the factions of the Hill, the Coast, and the Plain.5 Another important fact which the Aristotelian account estab­lishes is that the remaining adherents of the Pisistratids were at this time organized into hetaeries, which constituted so con­siderable a proportion of the clubs that they were able to turn 1Ar. Cons. Ath. 20; Hdt. 5. 66, 69-70; cf. Busolt II. pp. 402 ff. 2Sandys (note to Ar. Cons. Ath. 21. 1). Busolt (II.pp. 402 ff.) believes that the reforms were begun before the expulsion of Isagoras, and com­ pleted afterwards. 3The passage is correctly translated by Kenyon (p. 35). 'Thuc. 8. 89 ff. 5Headlam (pp. 33-34) recognizes the identity of these era.ipEi:aL with the clubs of Thucydides, as does Gilbe~ (Cons. Ant. pp. 141, 142. n. 1, 146. n. 1). The latter, however, falls clearly to distinguish them from the larger factions or parties which they composed. ORIGIN AND STATUS the scale in favor of Isagoras against the strong faction of the Alcmeonids. 1 As the short time which had elapsed since the fall of the tyranny could not have sufficed for any material change in the organization of the Pisistratidean party, it is clear that these clubs were part of the system by which Pisistratus and his sons were enabled to maintain their authority against attacks from within. This confirms the view advanced by Buttner,2 who inferred that Pisistratus and his successors belonged to clubs from the fact that f.raipol of the tyrants are mentioned. 3 The statement of Herodotus that the friends who were asso­ciated with Cylon in his attempts to establish a tyranny consti­tuted a hetaery, can no longer be passed over as the projection of the term fraLp€la back into a period of history which ante­dates the clubs. i In the light of the information contained in Aristotle, it at once assumes great importance as the first appear­ance of a club in Athenian politics. The account of Herodotus is as follows: o~ros (Cylon) hd. rvpavvlOi f.KoµrJcH, 7rp0<1'7rOlrJUa.µH'os 0€ f.ratpTJlTJV TWV ~XlKlWTfWV KaraXa{3t:LV T~V aKp07rO'XlV E1rHp~8TJ, KTA. s. The reference is clearly not to the entire following of Cylon, which was very considerable, 6 but to the comparatively small body of close friends and age-fellows constituting his club, who attached themselves to his person and aided him in supervising and directing the coup d'etat. 7 1The strength of the Clisthenic faction is shown by the fact that Isagoras deemed it necessary to expel no fewer than seven hundred families (Ar. Cons. Ath. 20. 3). 2P. 13. 3Aristoph. Lysis. 1153. 4lt should be noted that Herodotus uses uraui<>, the most usual term for "party"or "faction," where the reference is to the larger divisions, or factions, of which the clubs were parts; for example 1. 59. 55. 71. 6Not only is this expressly stated by Plutarch (Solon 12), but it may be inferred from the success of the measures directed against Megacles and those who were implicated in the violation of sanctuary (cf. Grote History of Greece II. pp. 454-55; Busolt II. p. 208). 7Cf. Busolt I. p. 670. n. 10: "Er bildete eine Hetairie von 'Leuten seines Alters.' " It is unreasonable to suppose that the Cylonian faction was limited to this club of Cylon's age-fellows, which could have been but the nucleus of the party. The associates of Cylon are referred to as rov<> uvvwµorn<> roii K. (Plut. Solon 12); (Thuc. 1. 126. 5); Tov~ µera KvXwvo<> (Ar. Cons. Ath., fr. pr. part. dep. 9 [ed. Blass], where ol 7repl MeyaKXea equals MeyaKAij<> Kal ol uvvapxovrE<> of Plut. Solon 12). Cf. Buttner on this club (p.7), and infra pp. 27, 30, 142. ATHENIAN CLUBS Here, in the earliest period of authentic Athenian history, is found a club, composetl of a comparatively small number of friends and age-fellows, attached to a leader of wealth and social standing by ties of personal friendship, and ready to follow the fortunes of that leader into the political field and even to meet death in the support of his cause. The hetaery is evidently an institution of the greatest antiquity, and it will be worth while to seek further back for traces of its origin. In the club of Cylon we have the hetaery under the aristocracy which succeeded the primitive kingship. The next step will be to seek for traces of such an institution under the kingship, and to examine the status of the Homeric bai.poi. Finsler, in his study of the Homeric kingship,1 has thrown a new light upon the meaning of the word iTaipos in Homer, and has established a number of facts which are of the utmost import­ance for the precise understanding of the relationship which the word denotes. He finds that iTai.pos everywhere involves the fundamental idea of "eines festen Verhaltnisses," and that the application of the word to the soldiery of the leaders is "eine Erweiterung des urspriinglichen Begriff es, der wohl eine Gesell­schaft Gleichstehender, vielleicht Gleichalteriger umfasste."1 Of the relationship of ETai.pos among Achilles and his comrades, he says: "Es ist ein fester Verband, den diese Adeligen bilden, dem der Fiihrer selbst angehort, und der off enbar nicht erst fiir den Feldzug zusammentrat, sondern schon in der Heimat bestand." This same relationship he finds among the nobles of Troy and between Odysseus and certain of his friends in the Odyssey, in­volving the idea of equality in age, and he concludes "dass es in Ithaka wie in Troia und Phthia Adelsverbande gab, die gemein­same Mahlzeiten abhielten und sich zunachst aus Altersgenossen zusammensetzten. Ob sie zu Kriegszwecken gebildet waren, steht dahin; jedenfalls hielten sie im Kriege zusammen."3 That these ETa'ipoL were accustomed to dine together and defray i"Das homerische Koni~um" N eue J ahrbiicher XVII. (1906) pp. 313 ff. The groups of Homeric fraipot, as sketched by Finsler show striking simi~arity to the h~taeries of hi~toric times in a numbe~ of important details,~· g., t~~ social featur~s (infra pp. 24 ff.), and the equality of age and social pos1t1on of the hatpot (infra pp. 27 ff.). This is a strong tes· timonial to the soundness of Finsler's conclusions. 2P. 314. 3P. 315. ORIGIN AND STATUS the cost of the banquet in common, Finsler infers from a number of passages in which these meals of the nobility are mentioned, especially Iliad 4. 257 ff., and he concludes "Abschliessend konnen wir sagen, dass in der Ilias zwei Arten von Gastmahlem des Adels hervortreten: Einladungen des Konigs und Mahlzeiten der traipoi auf gemeinsame Kosten." 1 Among the facts established by Finsler's investigation, it should be particularly noted, first, that f.raipos in its original meaning refers to a clos-e relationship between members of the Homeric nobility; second, that this relationship involved equality of age; third, that the €Tai.poi held banquets. In the club of Cylon are found two of these characteristics; its members were noble2 and of the same age. On the third point, our meagre accounts give no information. We have then in the bands of Homeric Eral.poi the prototypes of Cylon's club, the first hetaery to appear in authentic Athenian history. It remains briefly to glance at the course of development, extending through the changing periods of Athenian constitutional history, by which these primitive groups evolved into the clubs which flourished Under the democracy, the UVVWµOULaL brl, OLKaLS Kat apxais Of Thucydides. In the earliest times, the little settlements which were scattered throughout Attica were ruled by the primitive kings or chieftains, as we see them in Homer, whose respective power and prestige corresponded roughly to the number and rank of the ETai.poi who sat at their boards, followed their leadership in war, and acknowledged their authority in time of peace.3 After the 1P. 318. 2Cf. infra p. 27. n. 4. 3The hat.poi of the kings and tyrants of the fifth and fourth cen­ turies and of the rulers of such large states as Macedon cannot of course strictly be compared with the ha'ipoi of the Homeric chieftains, al­ though they are undoubtedly a survival of the ancient institution (see Bury History of Greece pp. 71 ff.). But a number of interesting anal­ ogies may be noted. The haipoi of the Macedonian kings were feasted in the palace (Spitta De amicorum qui vocantur in M acedonum regno condicione [Berlin: 1875] pp. 9 ff.); many if not all of them followed the kings in battle (Zoe. cit.); they were at times consulted on affairs of state (p. 38). In the treaty of alliance between the people of Erythrae and Hermias, the tyrant of Atarneus, about the middle of the fourth century, the tyrant is not mentioned alone, but as 'Epµla~ Kai ol ha'ipoi., except in the unimportant matter of seeing that the stele bearing the inscription is properly set up at Atarneus; the treaty is said to be between the Erythraeans and 'Epµla~ Kat ol haipoi., and the territory of ATHENIAN CLUBS unification of Attica, these patriarchal rulers and the families of which they were the heads constituted the aristocracy, who shared in the kingly power in much the same way in which we may believe their own Eraipoi had shared in the more primitive community government.1 By a gradual process, extending over a considerable period of time, this powerful class appro­priated to itself the kingly functions, and the state became a formal instead of merely a virtual aristocracy. 2 The new condition engendered rivalry of a more pronounced nature between the great families of the nobility, a rivalry which made doubly im­portant the possession of eraipoi, and which finally developed into the bitter factional strife, already seen in the Cylonian episode, 3 that is the distinctive feature of sixth century Athenian history. 4 Here we have what may roughly be called the second stage in the development of the clubs, their activity under the aristoc­racy, as it is seen in the clubs of Cylon, of the Pisistratids, and those which made up the factions of lsagoras and Clisthenes.5 With the institution of the democracy came a complete change in the conditions of political endeavor, for the sovereign power now rested with the masses. The aristocratic clubs were not, however, discarded by their leaders, but were adapted to the new regime. They became means for influencing the demos at elec­tions and in the law courts. Their efficiency as a means of obtaining office is established, apart from the specific cases which will be studied later, 6 by the predominance of notable names in the lists of archons and generals, before the former office came to be filled by lot and the latter to be quite overshadowed by the growing power of the orators; and by the fact, pointed out by At:1meus is call~d TfJV xwpu rl,11 'Epµlov Ka.l Tc;,11 eralJXAJll (Dittenberger 122; Michel 12; . Hicks 138). Cf. also the statement of Aristotle (Pol.1287 b 30) with Newman's note. 1Cf. Gilbert Cons. Ant. p. 102, with the passages cited inn. 3· Whibley Greek Oligarchies pp. 90-94. n. 21; Busolt II. pp. 93 ff. ' 2Cf. Gilbert Cons. Ant. pp. 110-15, with passages cited; Busolt II. pp. 128 ff. acf. Busolt II. p. 208. •Cf. Gilbert Cons. Ant. pp. 141 ff. 5The establishment of oligarchies in which the offices were filled from ~Tar.pEim, as in Abydus (Ar. Pol. 1305 b 30 ff.), may have been an attempt to imitate these conditions. 6Cf. infra pp. 126 ff. ORIGIN AND STATUS Haussoullier,1 that the deme offices even as late as the time of Demosthenes were filled almost entirely from noble and influential families. The activity in litigation was naturally the last to develop, and assumed importance proportionally as the power and prestige of the popular courts increased and the use of litiga­tion as a political weapon became prevalent. 2 The facts of the organization and political status of the clubs, as known to us from the sources, may now be examined, in order to note how far they are in harmony with the theory which has been advanced. POLITICAL TENDENCIES Vischer's theory that the hetaeries were organized by the remnant of the Isagorean party as a means of secretly resisting the democracy places him under the necessity of regarding them as essentially oligarchic and treasonable,3 and leads him practi­cally to ignore that portion of their activities, by no means slight, which was entirely fair and legitimate. He is accordingly con­strained to explain the clubs of the popular leaders as exceptions, since they will not fit into his scheme. 4 These difficulties, which are inherent in his theory, will be seen to vanish when the polit­ical tendencies of the clubs under the democracy are studied with reference to their earlier history. 1La vie municipale en Attique (Paris: 1884) pp. 60 ff., cf. infra pp. 130-31. 2Cf. infra pp. 98 ff. 3P. 159: "Dadurch erhalt ihr ganzes We3en den Charakter des Volks­feindlichen und Verratherischen." Elsewhere (p. 156) he says: "Meist haben sie oligarchische Tendenz, wiewohl das nicht absolut nothwendig ist; denn auch die Demokraten konnen sich in Hetairien verbtinden und haben es gethan," but here he is speaking of Greece in general, and not of Athens particularly. 40f Themistocles' club, Vischer says (p. 161): "Der Zweck dieser Verbindung war aber durchaus nur die Macht des Themistokles, und insofern diese auf Athens Grosse und Freiheit beruhte, untadelhaft." Pericles, he thinks (pp. 163-64), made use of his club only long enough to break up the opposing clubs of Cimon and Thucydides, and he ex­plains its character as follows: "Sie tragt aber wie die gleich zu erwah­nende des Thukydides und die des Themistokles einen gesetzlichen Char­akter, soweit er bei solchen Verbindungen tiberhaupt moglich ist." Alci­biades he regards (pp. 173-74) as an opportunist with no firm political convictions, whose club affiliations were only a means of forwarding his personal ambitions, and he concludes "dass diese Hetairien keineswegs immer sich gleich blieben, sondern nach Zeit und Verhaltnissen ihre Mitglieder wechselten." ( p. 17 5). ATHENIAN CLUBS Aristotle's account1 of the factional struggles which immediately preceded the establishment of the democracy exhibits the clubs as the dominant element in the old aristocracy, roughly grouped under the two rival leaders, lsagoras and Clisthenes. After the final defeat of lsagoras and the triumph of the new popular party, the clubs which had made up his faction became the party of the opposition. Those whose antipathy toward a popular form of government was most intense adopted the policy which became characteristic of the extreme oligarchs, and embarked upon the bitter struggle with the ascendant democracy which Vischer has described. On the other hand there were the clubs which had sided with Clisthenes, constituting a body of no mean strength. i We must believe that many of these followed their leader in espousing the popular cause, 3 for it is highly improbable that either Clisthenes or the other influential men of his party would discard the hetaeries to which they owed much of their strength, or that the necessity for such organizations would vanish with the change of government. The presence in the new democratic party of this aristocratic element, already organized into clubs, accounts for the existence of hetaeries which supported popular leaders of the fifth century, Themistocles, 4 Pericles,5 Alcibiades.' 1Cons. Ath. 20; cf. supra pp. 11-12. 2 Supra p. 13. n. 1. 3Vischer himself concludes (p. 159): "Die edleren unter diesen (the old aristocracy), und zwar in grosser Zahl, sich bald ginzlich der Demo­kratie anschliessen, bald eine ehrliche und off ene Opposition bilden.." 4For the club of Themistocles, cf .. Plut. Arist. 2: o µEv ovv 0EµWr<»CX-ijs Eis ETQ.l.pdaJ1 Eµ{Ja'N;,v Łavrov ElxE 'lrp/,fJ°AfJµ.a. «al. ~vvaµiv ovK dJKa1acf>1xwqrov, «rX. On the statement which follows regarding his attitude toward his Era.ipcx, cf. Plut. Reip. Ger. 807 AB. Vischer (p. 161) believes that Epicrates of Acharnae, mentioned by Plutarch (Them. 24), was a Eiaipos of Them­istocles, and Buttner (p. 24) includes also the friends mentioned-byThucydides (1. 137). From Plutarch (Them. 3) we learn that Them­istocles was in his youth a member of a convivial club (cf. infra p. 25). See also Busolt II. p. 641. 6For the club of Pericles, cf. especially Plut. Per. 16: Ifo.uwTparLOa.s µEv vf<>vs ToiJs 7rEpl alrrov halpovs «aAoiWTEs, KTA.; Per. 7: rcTh'Aa Oi I.Mus Kai Plfropas ira.Lpovs «a8tds E7rpa1TEJ1. (fraipovs is the reading of the manuscripts. It was emended by Geel to ETEpavs, probably through a failure to note the adjectival use of Eraipos; cf. Plato Gorg. 487D; Phaed. 89D, where we have a superlative Eimp/,TaTos); Plut. Reip. Ger. 811C-F. See Vischer pp. 163-64; Buttner p. 38; infra pp. 119-20. 'For the club of Alcibiades, cf. especially !soc. 16. 6: uvv6.'Yotri/11ETQ.l.pEw, uX.; Plut. Ale. 22, 4, 8; And. 1. 12; cf. [And.] 4. 4, 14. Vischer rightly regards the 1rapaKEAEV rov oiJµov), at least, were practical politicians, whatever may have been their penchant for "soothsaying." And it must be re­membered that the most prominent men at Athens did not hesitate to be governed by oracles and omens (Xen. M em. 1. 1. 7-8). ATHENIAN CLUBS two parties."1 It is clear that at the time of the first oliga~chic lit. 1 views revolution there were many clubs of moderate po ica . ' . . ·d ble proport10n smce the moderates constituted a very cons1 era . of the great revolutionary organization, 2 and this, as Thucydides distinctly states, was made up from the membership of the club~, both at Samos and in Athens.a Had this not been the case, It would have been unnecessary for Pisander so urgently to exhort the clubs to unite and work together,4 for the club~ of the extreme oligarchs seem to have kept up communication Vv1th one a~other and to have followed out a consistent policy. 5 And the lines of the Lysistrata in which Aristophanes describes the clubs and their harmful influence in the state in the very year of the revolution · put the matter almost beyond doubt: 11'"pi:.rrov µiv EXPilv, wa.AO.s arOTLAac..6 Here is no reference to clubs of any particular party, least of all to secret and stealthy conspiracies of the extreme oligarchs, but to all the organizations, both numerous and powerful, which controlled Athenian politics, and did so not merely by furtive plotting but through the normal avenues of political activity, 1Pol. Parties p. 94. On the mixture of parties at this time, cf. Lyaias 25. 9. 2Whibley (op. cit. p. 95) says: "Many men, indeed, who usually acted with this (the middle) party, desired to see a moderate oligarchy estab­lished, and the revolutions of 411 and 404 were both carried out with their help. They did not, however, take sufficient precautions to prevent oppression and secure moderation, and on both occasions they brob from the oligarchs when they saw the character of their governmenL" See also Busolt III. pp. 1459, 1462 fl.; Micheli La rerolulion oligarel&iqll du quatre-cent8 d Atllinu (Geneva: 1893) pp. 5. n. 1, 105-106. J'fhuc. 8. 48. 3: n>U iTcupw>ii T~ rMo.,; Thuc. 8. 54. 4; Goodhart'& nots ad loc. • Thuc. 8. 54. 4. • Cf. Whibley op. cit. pp. 84-85: "It is probable that these aacia· tions (the oligarchic clubs) were kept in communication with one another, and with similar clubs among the allies, by periodical meetings of their leaden to decide on the course of action demanded by circumstanca• • • • "With this network of combination the oligarchs worbd persistently against the constitution." '574-78. Cf. infra p. 127 and the articl• there cited. ORIGIN AND STATUS elective, judicial and legislative assemblies. The "professional politician" of every party, the µox071p6s as well as the Ka"Aos Ka"'{a86s, is here aimed at. In the time of the second revolu­tion, however, the question is complicated by the language in which Aristotle describes the parties at Athens: oi µf.v 871µonKol Ola<:rwS°Hv f.nlpwvTO Tov fi~µov, Twv 8€ "'{vwplµwv oi µev J:v rats halpElaLs ovrEs, Kai Twv v-yafiwv ol µEra T~v Elpf]v71v KaTE"AOovu.s, o"Al -yapxlas E1rE0vµovv' oi fl' EV eTalpElQ. µEv OVDEµlq. y ties of sociability and good fellowship have diverted their· club to the attainment of political ends. The precise ratio of activity in the two directions would of course depend upon the character of the members and upon the necessities and oppor­tunities for political action which might present themselves.4 These social gatherings seem usually to have been held in private houses.5 By no means the least of the advantages which re­ lfb. 1. 2lb. 15. 3Aeschines 1. 58-64; infra pp. 52, 61, 91. 4Grote (VI. p. 246) speaks of "the various political clubs, conspi­racies, or hetaeries, which were habitual and notorious at Athens; asso­ciations, bound together by oath, among the wealthy citizens, partly for purposes of amusement, but chiefly pledging the members to stand by each other in objects of political ambition, in judicial trials, in accu­sation or defense of official men after the period of office had expired,in carrying points through the public assembly," etc. 5A meeting of the club of Alcibiades took place at the house of Puly­tion (lsoc. 16. 6 ff.; cf. supra p. 25); the club of Conon seems to have met at the house, w~ich was n? doubt also the shop, of Pamphilus, the fuller (Dem. 54. 7, with Sandys s note); that of Menecles and Mnesicles (cf. infra pp. 95-96.) seems to have made the house of Boeotus its headquarters (cf. supra p. 25. n. 6). The club of Andocides and Euphiletus set out apparently from a meeting in a private house to mutilate the Hermae (And. 1. 64 : TclS 8Epa7ral11as '€Aa{Jov ol 7rpVTaPm OIJEP opµ./,JµEPOL Taiir' Erolow EKEivoi). ORIGIN AND STATUS suited from this practice was the innocent aspect which was thus given to caucuses of the clubs. 1 BASIS OF MEMBERSHIP Upon what basis were the clubs organized? By what con­sideration was the Athenian citizen led to affiliate himself ·with one group of men rather than "\\~th another, and by what criterion was his own desirability as an associate judged? In the relationship of the Homeric hat.poi, as established by Finsler, we have seen that this basis \Vas two-fold, involving equal­ity in age, and, to a certain extent, community of social position. 2 This standard seems to have been preserved during the time of the aristocracy, for the hetaery of Cylon was made up of men who were his equals in age3 and presumably in social standing. 4 This creates a presumption in favor of a similar standard for the clubs of the democratic period. The only formal definition of haipela which has been pre­served affords an explicit statement on this point. In the Pseudo­Platonic Definitions the relationship is described as i"Ala Kara a"A"Aot, where there are traces of confusion. ~Lys. 10. 1, 12 (Frb); fr. or. 85. 4Lys. 21. 20 5Whibley (p. 84. n. 4) calls attention to this usage: "thus we hear of the hetaeries of Phaeax, Euphiletus, Alcibiades, etc." For the Greek manner of citing clubs and societies, see the names given by Poland (esp. p. 7. n. 3) and Ziebarth. Cf. supra p. 7. 6Plutarch relates that in Miletus, during the period of civil strife that followed the expulsion of the tyrants, the oligarchs and the popular party were each headed by a Era.tpEla., the one named "Ploutis," and the other "Chiromacha." (Mor. 298C; cf. Szanto in Pauly-Wis., s. v. XEipoµaxa.). 34 ATHENIAN CLUBS OATHS AND PLEDGES That the relation of b-a.1.pEla. was confirmed by oath appears from the employment of 01JvwµoCTLa. as a synonym,1 and is explicitly stated by Photius, who defines crv11wµocrla. as 1} µEIJt opKov qn}..la. 2 The oligarchic oath preserved by Aristotle,a. ''I will be evilly disposed toward the demos, and will contrive against it whatever ill I can," is commonly a&S<>ciated with the Athenian clubs.4 But Aristotle is speaking neither of Athens nor of hetaeries in the passage, and there is no evidence that any Athenian club ever required its members to swear such an oath on joining.r> Lysias several times mentions oaths that were sworn by the associates at the time of the oligarchic revolutions, both those which were taken in 411,1 and those which were taken in 404,7 and also alludes to an oath which the informer Theocritus pre­tended to have sworn in common with the generals and taxiarchs whom he accused.8 Probably, however, none of the oaths re­ferred to is the regular "club oath," which would be taken by a member on joining. The oaths of the associates which he men­tions were no doubt the special obligations assumed by members of the clubs which entered the conspiracies on particular occasions. Such an oath, entirely apart from the regular club oath, was. probably taken by the associates when the conspiracy of the Four Hundred was first organized at Samos and again when. Pisander extended the combination to Athens.9 These oaths it was which the law of Demophantus declared null and void.10 1Cf. supra p. 6. 2S. v. C11J11CaJµouLa.. Clearly this definition does not refer to the relation­ ship between mere conspirators. apoz. 1310 a 9. 4Vischer (p. 171. n. 3) seems to imply that such oaths were at some period taken by the Athenian clubs, and this passage is commonly quoted in studies of the clubs at Athens. 60n the other hand, it is not at all improbable that clubs of the ex­treme oligarchs at Athens may have sworn this or a similar oath. 812. 67. 112. 46-47, 77. 813. 21. 9Thuc. 8. 48. 2, 54. 4. 10And. 1. 98. ORIGIN AND STATUS The oath of Theocritus would not be that of a hetaery, but of the alleged conspiracy of which he gave information. From these instances, it seems probable that whenever a num­ber of clubs united for any purpose it was the practice to assume a special obligation for the occasion, in accordance with Greek usage. It is also likely that when smaller circles within a club undertook to carry through a special matter, as for example a lawsuit, they reinforced the bond of club membership by a special oath-bound agreement for the particular occasion, although there is no instance of this. But such special oaths, even in the prosecution of unlawful designs, were not uncommon at Athens.1 When enterprises of unusual importance or danger were on hand, an oath was not always deemed a sufficient assurance of fidelity and good faith. The parties to the undertaking would sometimes bind themselves together still more irrevocably by uniting in the perpetration of some serious outrage, in order that all might be incriminated and might, having thus committed themselves, be prevented from betraying their associates. Such an obligation was termed a 7rl..a.vOavEw tUPWJJDCTLa.s rE Ka.l E.ra.tpda.s ..a.vOavEtv means merely "in order to keep from be­ing found out," and therefore to escape punishment. (cf. Dem. 51. 15: ~ckv µEv MJJwutv, ixEi.v, Aav oE X11fJwu1.v, utrt"f11wµ.11s TVXEiv). 2cf. supra p. 25. n. 2. 8And. 1. 59; cf. ib. 15, 34 ff. •Cf. supra p. 24. n. 4. ATHENIAN CLUBS pledge,1 and every effort must have been made to keep it secret. On the other hand, the travesty on the Mysteries, probably the thoughtless diversion of a drinking party, was not so carefully guarded against the possibility of leaking out. It is even pos­sible that it would not have been regarded so seriously had it not been disclosed at a moment when popular indignation stood at white heat on account of the Hermocopid affair and when the enemies of Alcibiades were industriously fanning the flame.2 At least, other impious and irreligious proceedings, such as the acts of Conon and his companions and the sacrilegious banquets of the "Cacodaemonistae," seem to have been generally known and gossiped about at Athens.3 It is improbable that any more serious attempt was made to keep them secret than is made today to prevent the indiscretions of riotous social gatherings from reaching the public ear. Doubtless, however, greater care was exercised when a club was engaged in political or litigious activity. It is interesting to note in this connection the means which Plutarch says a club in Miletus employed to keep secret its deliberations on important matters. The members of the aristocratic club "Ploutis," after having gained control of the state, used to embark on boats and put out far from the shore, where they would hold their delibera­tions; when these were concluded, they returned to the city.4 THE BOND OF CLUB MEMBEBSIDP The organization of the clubs brought the members into a close relationship. The natural ties of age, congeniality of temperament, and mutual interest acquired the sanction of usage and habit and were confirmed by oaths. The result was an effect­ive bond between the members, at times implicitly recognized and at other times explicitly termed ETa.ipda. and ETa.ipiKov, 5 that constituted an obligation not lightly to be broken. The extremely serious and binding character of this obligation is most forcibly illustrated by the lengths to which associates go in order icf. supra p. 35. 2Cf. infra p. 101. n. 4; Marchant Andocides pp. 5-6. acf. supra p. 36. 4Plut. Mor. 298C. 6Cf. supra p. 6. n. 1, n. 5. ORIGIN AND STATUS to shield their comrades, as will appear in succeeding chapters. But there are several statements regarding its gravity which may be cited here. Aristides felt that the obligations of a club member to his associates were not compatible with justice.1 Plato in the Republic classes the betrayal of an associate in private life or of a state in public life with theft and temple robbery. 2 Andocides, in discussing his connection with the mutilation of the Hennae and the profanation of the Mysteries, feels obliged to make his strongest defense against the imputation of having betrayed his comrades. Before a democratic audience, by whose members those comrades were regarded as having outraged the national religion and conspired against the state, he devotes a considerable part of the De Reditu and over one-eighth of the De Mysteriis to answering the imputation of disloyalty to his associates. And Thucydides gives us a graphic description of the weight which attached to the club bond at the time of the Peloponnesian war, in his chapters on the state of Greece.3 "Reckless daring was held to be loyal (c/>i"'Aha1.pos) courage; * * * the man who took counsel beforehand to have nothing to do with plots was considered as a breaker of the bond (E-raipLa) and one who feared the opponents; * * * the club bond ( ro Era1.piK011) was stronger than blood relationship, because the comrade was more ready to dare without asking why.'' 1Plut. Arist. 2. 2443A: OvKovv Kai LEpouu>...,c;,11 Kal 1..dncr,11 meant the "place where the tax is let," the expression ol rapa.TJ 7ra.pa116µw11, but Leptines was no longer personally liable. 3A somewhat similar proceeding is hinted at in Dem. 23. 96, where the chance for collusion on the part of accusers in procuring an acquittal is mentioned: d n 'YPw/>Ev 'Y' 7) KalJvef>Evrwv rwv Karq'Y6pwv ii p:q ~vJl'J}f)Evrwv µ11~v ~w~at U7rEcpV'YE, KTX. 41nfra p. 58. n. 6. ATHENIAN CLUBS be more conveniently put into the hands of a professional syco­phant than of a friend, especially as the former course woul? be less apt to arouse suspicion of the true character of the suit. While the absence of any such office as that of public prose­cutor left the door open for trickery of this sort, it is probable that friendly prosecutions were never as common in Athens as in Rome where abuses of this kind made necessary the law pro­ ' 1 viding for a diuinatio to determine who was the proper accuser. While no instance in which a club resorted to this means of defeating justice is known, it is not unlikely that there were many cases in which it was available. COUNTER-SIDTS A safer and more effective means of warding off attack than the friendly prosecution was the "counter-suit." This was a suit brought by a friend or hired agent against an accuser or one who was suspected of intending to bring an accusation. The charge would preferably be one which carried with it a civic disability in case of conviction, and which therefore would put a stop to the proceedings. Even if a conviction could not be secured, the counter-suit would cause embarrassment and might result in a compromise. So effective was this mode of procedure, and so easy for a man possessed of wealth or comrades, that it was one of the most common means of defense in litigation. To the man who was familiar with the opportunities afforded by the Athenian judicial system, the counter-suit at once sug­ gested itself as a most effective weapon against his opponents. Thus, when Crito, at the suggestion of the Xenophontic Socrates, won over Archedemus to be his friend and defender against the sycophants who were persecuting him, the latter knew immed­ iately just what course to pursue. He began a public action against one of Crito's persecutors, hunted up all of his past mis­ deeds and knaveries, roused against him all of his enemies, and made it so uncomfortable for him that the man was quite willing to drop his case against Crito and compromise on whatever terms Archedemus was willing to allow. With his shrewd knowledge of the world and his familiarity with the tricks of litigation, he 1Cf. Humbert in D. & S. Diet. Ant. II. p. 319 (s. v. ditJinatio). IN LITIGATION .'Soon freed not only Crito but his friends as well from any annoy­ance on the part of the sycophants, by meeting the latter on their own ground. l The average Athenian was always ready to take advantage of this means for embarrassing an opponent. In the suit for the estate of Nicostratus, the advocate of Hagnon and Hagnotheus says: "Now if they (Hagnon and his brother) were litigiously inclined or like the rest of the citizens, Chariades perchance would not be suing for the money of Nicostratus, but would be defending himself on a capital charge.'' 2 The leading case, which is also the first in point of time, is described in the speech of Antiphon On the Choir Boy, with an abundance and precision of detail seldom met with in the orators. The speaker is a wealthy Athenian who has served as choregus. While the members of the chorus were at his house, one of the boys, Diodotus, was given a draught to improve his voice and died soon afterward.3 Philocrates, brother of the lad, is now prosecuting the speaker on an indictment ~ovAEvuEws.4 The defendant reviews the circumstances as follows: He was engaged, at the time of the boy's death, in prosecuting Aristion, Philinus, Ampelinus, and the under-clerk of the thesmothetes by eisangelia for theft of the public funds; the boule had received the eisangelia and had handed over the matter to the thesmothetes, in whose court the first of the cases was set for trial on the third day after the boy's death.5 At first the relatives had showed no disposition to impute blame to the choregus. But the second day after the death, when the funeral took place, they were persuaded by his enemies (Philinus et al.) and were preparing (rrapE<1KEvasowro) to accuse him. 6 First Philocrates appeared before the court of the thesmothetes7 and made a statement calculated to prejudice the dicasts, who were to sit in the first of the eisangelia cases on the 1Xen. Mem. 2. 9. 5-8. 2Isaeus 4. 30. aAnt. 6. 11 ff. 4M.S.L. pp. 384 ff. Jebb (I. p. 61. n. 3) believes that Philocrates pro­ ceeded on a 'YPa...owL Aa.{JoVTES' TtJIEs uWo-aL UE Kal ~a-ya-yei11 EvlJEJIOE; cf. xen. Apol. 23; Plut. De genio Soc. 581C). Polystratus is on trial for his al­leged connection with the Four Hundred, but the precise charge is uncertain (cf. Harp., s. v. Polystratus). His son delivers the present speech. The allusion is to the previous condemnation of Polystratus when he was accused at his audit. ATHENIAN CLUBS washed' in the logisterium, having persuaded their accusers." In the speech Against Philocrates, who is accused of concealing the confiscated property of Ergocles, the speaker intimates that the defendant could not have got rid of the other accusers if he had not had in his possessionmuch of Ergocles' wealth. 1 When Er­gocles himself was on trial the year before for the embezzlement of public funds, three talents were said to have been pledged to the orators if they would "save him and not accuse him."2 This prac­tice on the part of corrupt officials, of using a portion of the pro­ceeds of their maladministration to buy off accusers, is amusingly parodied by Aristophanes in the Knights.3 Agoracritus accuses Cleon of having ten ill-gotten talents from Potidaea, and the latter promptly offers him one talent to keep silence. Where a financial consideration did not suffice or was not con­venient, pressure could be brought to bear in other ways. The accuser might be persuaded, or coercion and intimidation might be employed. We are told by Demosthenes that Leptines per­suaded one of three men who had indicted him for introducing an illegal measure to drop the prosecution.4 Whether bribery was the means employed, or whether the accuser was made to fear the influence of Leptines and his political adherents, is not stated. Aeschines was charged by Demosthenes with having successfully made use of threats to prevent a number of citizens, who intended to attack him at his audit after the embassy of 346, from bringing their accusations.5 In the speech Against Midias, Demosthenes repeatedly refers. to attempts made by friends and associates of Midias to ha,ve him drop the prosecution.6 He was on several occasions ap­proached with entreaties, offers of bribes, or threats, by friends, who were, in at least one instance, members of the clubs which 1Lys. 29. 1. Ergocles was brought to trial in 389 on a charge of em­ bezzling funds levied fro.m the Asiatic cities, and ~as put to death (2; cf. D~m. 19. 180) and his p;operty confiscated. The preceding oration (Aqainst Ergocles) was delivered a~ that trial. The year following, Ph1locrates was accused of concealing property of Ergocles and this speech was delivered by one of the accusers. ' 2Lys. 29. 6. 3438-39. 4Dem. 20. 145. snem. 19. 2. 621. 3, 151, 215. For the way in which friends acted as agents in these transactions, cf. Isoc. 18. 9 :ff. IN LITIGATION were aiding Midias.1 The success of these tactics is indicated by the fact that he actually did drop the suit.2 The members of the dicing club to which Hegesander and Timarchus belonged, and of which the former appears to have been the leader, endeavored to persuade Pittalacus, whom they had assaulted and outraged, not to bring suit .against Timarchus and Hegesander for the attack.3 The most striking attempt to intimidate a man and prevent him from giving an information or instituting a suit originated with a notorious political club, and is described by Andocides in the speech On the Mysteries. 4 After the members of the club, at the instigation of Euphiletus, had defaced the Hermae, they were in great fear that Andocides would inform against them. Accordingly Euphiletus and Meletus visited him and warned him to keep silent, saying that if he saw fit to hold his peace and keep the matter secret they would be his friends and comrades as before, but that if he did not he would find in them enemies more to be feared than any friends he might gain by such a co\lrse were to be valued. The clubs were particularly qualified to aid in persuading or intimidating an accuser, and the cases in which the clubs of Midias and Andocides were engaged show how they worked. A friend of the defendant might attempt to dissuade an accuser, but the associate had all the influence of his club behind him and could invoke it in his threats, as did Euphiletus and Meletus. The contributions of money made by associates could of course ·be used in buying off accusers when occasion offered. ASSASSINATION Actual violence was at times employed against an opponent when more peaceable measures proved unavailing, and assassin.a­ 11b. 213-6; cf. supra p. 23. n. 2. 2Cf. supra p. 58. n. 6. 3Aeschines 1. 60 ff; cf. supra p. 26. n. 3. This club, of which the chief amusements were dicing and cock-fighting, seems to have met at tl~e house ~f Pittalacus, prior to the quarrel between Hegesander and P1ttalacus, Just as the club of Conon met at the shop of Pamphilus (cf. supra p. 26. n. 5; Sandys's note to Dem. 54. 7). •And. 1. 63 ff.; cf. supra p. 24. n. 4. ATHENIAN CLUBS tion was not unknown as a means of getting rid of an accuser, or an opponent who had a strong case. In the first tetralogy of Antiphon, 1 the presence of this motive for the assassination is made the strongest link in the chain of circumstantial evidence developed by the hypothetical accuser. The situation is worked out logically and in detail. The defendant and the deceased, who had been enemies for many years, had often engaged in litigation, in which the former was invariably worsted. Quite recently he had been indicted by the deceased on a charge of embezzling sacred funds; he was conscious of his guilt and knew the influence of his accuser; there was no hope of acquittal. Fired by a desire for revenge and rendered frantic by the fear of conviction, he murdered his enemy, hoping that he would escape detection and that the crime would result in his acquittal, since the death of his accuser would leave no one to prosecute the charge, and the case would go by default. It is worthy of note that the hypothetical defendant in his reply does not assail the general credibility of the charge, which would have been his strongest line of argument had murder from such reasons been unknown at Athens. Instead he endeavors to show that the circumstances in the particular case do not indicate this motive for the crime. 2 It is striking that in real homicide cases we find exactly the same argument. Euphiletus, on trial for the murder of Eratosthenes, discusses the different motives which might have actuated him and shows that they did not apply in his case: "Neither had he (Eratosthenes) brought vexatious in­dictments against me, nor had he attempted to procure my exile from the city, nor was I engaged in civil litigation with him, nor was he in the possession of knowledge of any wrong which I had done, on account of which I should wish to kill him for fear that he might communicate it to others."3 An assassination of the kind described in these pleas is alluded to in the speech On the Estate of Giron. 4 Diocles, the brother- IAnt. 2a. 5. ff. 2/b. 2{3. 9. 3Lys. 1. 44. •Isae~ 8. 40 ff. . The statement of Harpocration (s. v. KarCf>KoMµfJuo) that D1ocles also killed the husband of the eldest sister seems to be the result of confusion. The passage in which Diocles' treatment of the eldest sister and her husband is described offers many difficulties (cf. Wyse's note to 8. 41. 3). IN LITIGATION in-law of Ciron, had got control of his step-father's estate by alleging a testamentary adoption, and had defrauded his three half-sisters of their rightful property. When the husband of the second sister put in a claim for her share, Diocles procured his assassination at the hands of a slave. He then sent the slave from the country and charged the widow of the slain man with the murder. The speaker does not say whether litigation had actually been begun, or whether a suit was merely threatened, but makes it clear that the assassination was for the purpose of getting rid of the claimant. This object was attained, for Diocles remained in possession of his ill-gotten wealth. In A pollodorus vs. N icostratus, the plaintiff describes an attempt at such a murder of which he was himself the object. He had indicted Arethusius, the brother of Nicostratus, for false-citation, the anacrisis had been held, and the case was about to come to a hearing. Arethusius lay in wait for him at night near a stone­quarry, by which he passed returning from the Piraeus, and when he came by assaulted him, first striking him with his fist, and then attempting to throw him into the quarry. The attempt would have been successful had not some persons been attracted by Apollodorus' cries and come to his aid.1 The motive here was undoubtedly the same as in the other cases, for the attempt at murder took place but a few days before the trial, in which Are­thusius was convicted and narrowly escaped a sentence of death. It is probable that assassination was only resorted to when all other means failed, by desperate men like Arethusius, or by utterly depraved characters such as Diocles is said to have been. But there can be no doubt that it was occasionally employed to get litigants out of the way. There is no mention of clubs in these cases, although wha.t is apparently a temporary cabal is mentioned in the case of Arethusius. 2 However, there can be little doubt that certain types of clubs would lend themselves to such crimes, since clubs were responsible for many political assassinations, 3 and, indeed, the plaintiff in M antitheus vs. Boeotus intimates that the defendant and his associates would not hesitate to poison him to get him out of their way.4 Associates would 1[Dem.] 53. 17. 2Ib. 14. 3Cf. infra pp. 107 ff. 4[Dem.] 40. 57; on this club, cf. infra p. 95. n. 3. ATHENIAN CLUBS be the most trustworthy accomplices, for they would be unlikely to betray a comrade. PLEADING AT THE PROBOLE In cases where an indictment was preceded by a probole in the assembly,1 friends of both parties would address the body and endeavor to influence the vote by their pleas. In Demosthenes vs. M idias, the only case involving pro bole in which an argument has been preserved, this is admirably illus­trated. The plaintiff asserts that when the probole came up in the ecclesia, a number of wealthy friends of Midias, among them Neoptolemus, Mnesarchides and Philippides, members of the clubs which were assisting him, besought the ecclesiasts not to find against him, and even went so far as to address their entreaties to Demosthenes himself in the presence of the ecclesia.2 But in this instance such efforts were of no avail; it was impossible to stem the torrent of public indignation which Demosthenes had aroused, and the probole was voted. It is interesting that this, the only account of a probole, shows the members of Midias' clubs appearing in his behalf. 3 This service was very much like that which associates rendered when they appeared as advocates, 4 but the debate was of course subject to the rules of order which prevailed in the assembly. INFLUENCE UPON THE JURY5 An expedient which would naturally suggest itself to the litigant who desired to manipulate the machinery of justice was. 1The aim of the probole was merely to secure a vote of the assembly in favor of the prosecutor's case; if this was accomplished the matter went to the regular heliastic tribunals. The proceeding w~ limited to a few cla~ses of ?flenses: the violation of certain festivals, sycophancy, an~ d~ce1t practiced upon the demos (cf. Lipsius Das attische Rec1lt {Le1pz1g: 1905-1912] pp. 211 ff.; Goodwin Midias pp. 158 ff.). 2nem. 21. 213 ff., esp. 214. 3Cf. supra p. 23. n. 2. 4Cf. infra pp. 85 ff. ~he practices described ~n the preceding pages have in general aimed at k~epmg cases from c~~mg to a hearing; from this point on will be considered the opporturut1es for concerted action after cases came before a court. IN LITIGATION the persuasion or corruption of the jurors to whom his case was committed. Although this must have been difficult of accom­plishment under the Athenian system of large popular juries, a number of instances testify to its feasibility. Obviously the most satisfactory way to influence the verdict of the court would be so to manipulate the selection of dicasts .as to "pack" the jury with men who were already favorably in­clined toward the defendant1 or had been won over by his sup-­porters. But this would seem to have been a well-nigh hopeless task, both under the fifth century court-system and under that which existed after the archonship of Euclides.2 The only case of a "packed" jury of which we have any record formed a part of the oligarchic intrigues which placed the Thirty in power, when the demagogue Cleophon was condemned and executed on a charge of desertion of post. After the battle of Aegospotami, Cleophon, who had very vigorously opposed the peace with Sparta which provided for the destruction of part of the Long Walls, was marked for "removal" by the oligarchs in the boule.3 During the absence of Theramenes, a charge of desertion of post was trumped up against Cleophon, a jury was "packed" with 1These expedients were of course available for a plaintiff as well as for a defendant; it happens that the cases to be considered are instances in which a defendant is seeking to avoid conviction. 2ln any discussion of the bribery or influencing of juries, it is necessary to keep in mind the changes in the heliastic system which were intro­duced from time to time. The manner of drawing the dicasteries was entirely changed in the archonship of Euclides, and the new system again was modified before the time of the procedure described by Aristotle. It will be sufficient for our purposes to bear in mind the chief distinctions between the fifth century system and the arrangements which prevailed after the archonship of Euclides. In the fifth century, the heliaea con­sisted of 6,000 dicasts, chosen by lot, and divided into ten sections of 600 each (or, as Gilbert believes, 500 each with a reserve of 1,000); each section seems to have been allotted for the entire year to a particular magistrate, who presided in a particular court. After Euclides, all qualified citizens who applied for service were enrolled as dicasts, and the sectiol}s were not assigned to particular courts until the day of trial, making bribery and canvassing much more difficult. Subsequently the system was made still more complicated, and the intricate procedure described by Aristotle (Cons. Ath. 63 :ff.) was instituted. The sections apparently were retained, but were no longer kept intact in filling the different courts, and the most elaborate precautions were observed at every stage of the drawing. On this subject, cf. Gilbert Cons. Ant. pp. 391 :ff.; Lipsius A. R. pp. 134 :ff.; Caillemer, in D. & S. Diet. Ant. 11. pp. 187 ff. (s. v. ~ucanTa.i). 3Lys. 13. 7-12; 30. 10-12. ATHENIAN CLUBS partisans of the oligarchy, and he was condemned and executed.1 The way in which the jury was secured is described by Lysias in the speech Against N icornachus. About this time, it was decided that Athens was to be governed by the "ancestral constitution," and Nicomachus, a man of unscrupulous character, was ap­pointed commissioner to write out the laws of Solon.2 The oligarchic leaders, perceiving that a popular jury would never convict Cleophon, persuaded Nicomachus to produce a fictitious "law of Solon" by the terms of which the senate, which was strongly oligarchic, would sit on the jury which tried the case. Nicomachus, who had no hesitation about altering the laws if offered a reasonable bribe, produced the desired law on the day of the trial. The jury was thus made up for the most part of oligarchic sympathizers, and Cleophon was condemned to death.a Such a proceeding could hardly have been possible except at times of constitutional crises, when some faction or clique was in complete control of the machinery of government and · could set aside law and precedent, as in the instance described. Failing the possession of evidence that the drawing of juries ordinarily afforded opportunity for fraudulent practice, it must be assumed that those who endeavored to tamper with dicasts were in general limited to the chances of corrupting or persuading the members of legally drawn juries. In Athens were many unscrupulous and venal citizens,4 and bribery offered an effective means of winning over such men. The first instance of the bribery of an Athenian court, according to Aristotle, took place when Anytus was indicted for treason after his unsuccessful expedition to Pylos in 409. By bribing the members of the jury which sat in the case, he secured an acquittal.5 If, as Aristotle states, this was really the first case of jury­bribing, the example of Anytus must have been speedily followed 1/b. 13. 12: o"'auri]pwv 7rapauKEVauavns Kal. Ewi>JJovTEs ol {3ovMµ,EVOL oAL'Ya.pxio 1Ca.Taurl,uao{}ai, KTA. · 2/b. 30. 2. 3/b. 30. 10-12. The boule of that year was made up for the most part of oligarchs (Lys. 13. 20; 30. 14). 4Cf. Leisi pp. 114 ff., esp. 116. 6Cons. Ath. 27. 5; cf. Diod. Sic. 13. 64; Plut. Cor. 14; Harp., s. v. oEKaJEiv; Bekker Anec. Gr. 211. 31; 236. 6 (where there is confusion, as in Et. Mag., s. v. oEKateiv). 67 IN LITIGATION and to a considerable extent. Isocrates, in a speech delivered probably in 402,1 tells of a certain Xenotimus who, in addition to other grave offenses against law and order, bribes juries.2 The simple phrase which the speaker employs makes it appear that at this time the word 5EKatEiv and the action which it described were very familiar to the ordinary Athenian audience. This could hardly have been the case if the practice had begun as late as 409. However, the word CTVV5EKatELv, identical in meaning, is used of jurors in the earliest specimen of Attic prose, the treatise of the Pseudo-Xenophon on the Polity of the Athen­ians, which is generally assigned to a date between 430 and 424.3 The author, in his discussion of the court system of Athens, says that if the number of dicasts in each court is de­creased it will be easier to make use of sharp practices and to employ bribery with the smaller juries.4 This shows pretty clearly the incorrectness of the traditional point of view, based upon the statement of Aristotle. The very fact that it was found necessary, when the constitution was revised in the archonship of Euclides, to install a new system of jury selection is in itself convincing evidence that bribery and other forms of tampering with juries must have been practiced to an alarming extent during the fifth century. 6 The improved system, however, failed to do away with the evil, for during the fourth century bribery seems to have been of common occurrence. The serious apprehension which this condition aroused is shown by the strict laws which were enacted against the giving or receiving of bribes and by the extreme penalties provided for offenders in case of conviction. 6 At the 1Jebb II. p. 235. n. 1. 21soc. 18. 11. 3Busolt III. pp. 609 ff. • 4[Xen.] Pol. Ath. 3. 7. "l;vv~acatEt.v is generally accepted, on the sugges­tion of Thieme, for the reading uVPaucatEt.v, which is manifestly corrupt. 6Ari~totle, in his account of the later jury system, repeatedly calls attent10n to the fact that the object in view is to prevent the exertion of improper influence upon dicasts and officials (Cols. 31. 14-15, 32 ff.; 32. 5 ff.; 33. 2-4, 12 ff., 20 ff.; cf. 34. 33 ff.; 35. 2. Cf. Lipsius A. R. I. p.139; Gilbert Cons. Ant. p. 395). 6The second speech Against Stephanus, probably delivered about 851 (See Sa:ndys and P~ley II. pp. xxxviii ff. It is now generally held that this speech, while not the work of Demosthenes, was written by a conte~porary, pos~ibly by Apollodorus himself; the doubt in regard to the precISe authorship does not affect its value as a contemporary ATHENIAN CLUBS trial of Ergocles for the embezzlement of public funds, which came before the court probably in 390 or 389, the defendant and his friends, if we may believe the accuser of Philocrates, openly boasted of having bribed a large number of dicasts.1 Thirty­three years. later, Isocrates states that bribery is practiced in the most open manner and by the most influential men at Athens.2 And in 346/5, Aeschines mentions prosecutions against a number of men who are charged with having undertaken to bribe "the assembly and the courts as well, just as Nicostratus does even now." Some of these cases have been tried and have resulted in the conviction and execution of the defendants; others document.), contains the following law, which includes a specific pro­vision in regard to the bribing of juries: "If anyone enter into a com­bination or join in bribing the Heliaea or any of the courts at Athens or the senate, giving or receiving money for corrupt purposes, or organize a club for the subversion of the democracy, or, in the capacity of advo­cate, receive moneyin privateor publiccases, for anysuch act anindictment shall lie before the thesmothetes." ([Dem.] 46. 26.) Cf. the heliastic oath, as quoted by Demosthenes (24. 149-51). This law is regarded as undoubtedly genuine by Drerup ("Ueber die bei den attischen Rednem eingelegten Urkunden" J ahrb. f. kl. Phil., Supplbd. XXIV. (1898) pp. 304-305), by Staeker (De litis instrumentis, etc. pp. 28 ff.) and by Blass (crit. note to [Dem.} 46. 8). Other laws are quoted at different times which have to do with bribery, but do not make especial mention of jury bribing (Hyp. Eux. 7-8, 30; Dem. 21. (113}). The man who offered or gave a bribe to any official was liable to an indictment 0acaaµ.ov, while the one who received it was indicted &;,""'" or 0wpo0o1el.a.s (Cf. M.S.L. pp. 444 ff.; Pollux 8. 42; Harp. s. v. «i5E1eatwv). Various penalties are cited by the orators:-Death (lsoc. 8. 50; Aeschines 1. 86-87; Lys. 27. 7-8; Dem. 9. 37; Din. 2. 4, 16, 20; 3. 5), fine (Din. 2. 17; 1. 60; Plut. Arist. 26; Vit. X Orat. Dem. 9), confiscation of property (Lys. 21. 11, 25; Din. 3. 5), confiscation with atimia (Lys. 21. 25), atimia (Aeschi­nes 3. 232; Dem. 21. 113; And. 1. 74). Different punishments are mentioned by the same orator, sometimes in the course of a single speech. It is therefore difficult to say with certainty just what the penalty was, or whether any distinction was made between the bribery of jurors and ecclesiasts and of other officials, as Thonissen (Le droit penal p. 216) thinks was the case. According to M.S.L. (p. 445), the penalty was determined by the jury, and the alternative was death with the confiscation of property, or a fine of ten times the amount of the bribe, with accompanying atimia. Caillemer (D. & S. Diet. Ant., s. v. «i5E1Caaµ.ov 'YPa4>"1) accepts this conclusion, and accounts for the apparent ~ivergen!!y of the sources by the. reasonable assumption that the orator ~n p~eadin~ dwelt upon the pa.rtlcular feature of the punishment which 1t swted his P?rpose to emphasize." Lys. 29. 12. 6Gilbert (Cons. Ant. p. 395) believes that at this time there can hardly have been 5,000 qualified dicasts in all. (For the earlier period, cf. Wasps 661 ff. with Starkie's note, and Gilbert Cons. Ant. p. 391. n. 4). IN LITIGATION half of the number which might reasonably be expected to appear on the day of the trial. Thus Ergocles could rely on the vote of nearly half of any jury that might be drawn, and probably counted on having enough friends and sympathizers in addition -to the purchased votes to procure his acquittal. While the figures given are probably exaggerated, the state­ment is exceedingly valuable, for it confirms our conclusions regarding the method which must have been employed to bribe juries at this time. The proceeding offers two difficulties: one, the apparent impossibility of corrupting the great number of dicasts necessary for success; two, the expense involved in such wholesale bribery. As regards objections based on the former difficulty, in the first place we cannot believe that attempts to bribe juries would have continued through the fourth century with such frequency had they proved uniformly unsuccessful. Secondly, the actual work of bribery was accomplished by means of skilled agents, each of whom was responsible for the delivery of a certain number of votes. 1 In the third place, it must be remembered that by no means all of the qualified di casts reported for duty every day. The corrupted jurors were sure to report as a part of their contract, and would constitute a greater percentage of those who reported -0n any particular day than of the total number of dicasts. In the fourth place, the men who habitually reported for jury duty, like the modern "professional juror," would be known and their votes sought; and it is not to be expected that men to whom the fee of three obols was of great importance represented the best and least corruptible element of the citizen body. Further, it must be kept in mind that the rules of order in the Athenian court afforded an interested juror many chances to serve his client. Before and during the trial he could talk to those near .him and attempt to influence them. 2 While the speeches were being made, he could applaud his friends and their advocates and could seriously discomfit their opponents by hissing and shout-' 1Cf. infra pp. 75 ff. • 2U nder the later srstem, an. attempt was made to prevent communica­tion between the d1casts while they were assembling (Ar. Cons. Ath. col. 33. 20 ff.). The appeals of orators to those of the jurors who know ~acts to tel! the m~n near them shows the extent to which they commun­ icated dunng a tnal. ATHENIAN CLUBS ing at them.1 A few lusty fellows in the pay of one or the other of the litigants could produce a considerable effect and materially influence the result. Finally, this difficulty is disposed of by the fact that in the ecclesia, the assembly of all enfranchized citizens, majorities were obtained by bribery.2 As regards the financial difficulty of corrupting a large number of jurors, although the expense was undoubtedly very consider­able, there must have been many cases in which it was well worth trying. For example, to take the case which has just been cited, Ergocles was charged with having embezzled thirty talents of the public money,3 and was said to have offered a bribe of three talents to the orators on condition that they refrain from prose­cuting and so save him.4 Had this sum been employed in purchasing the votes of jurors, it would have been sufficient for wholesale corruption. 5 The off er of a bribe was by no means the only way of ap­proaching dicasts, as there were many considerations of a personal or political nature upon which appeals might be based. At every period of the democracy, litigants and their friends seem to have canvassed the dicasts assiduously. Aristophanes draws a vivid picture of the fifth century juror besieged by throngs of suppliant litigants while on his way to the courtroom where he is to serve. "While I am crawling from bed they are watching for me at the railings of the court, fine six-foot fellows. And then, as soon as I come up he gives me his soft hand, which has filched from the public moneys, and with low bows and piteous wails they beg for 1Dem. 45. 6; Plato Apol. 17D, 20E, 30C; Isoc. 15. 20-22; cf. the very doubtful story (Photius Bib., cod. 61; cf. 264) that Eubulus so in­fluenced the jury which tried Aeschines that they refused to listen to Demosthenes. 2Cf. infra pp. 117-18. 3Lys. 29. 2. 4Cf. supra p. 60. n. 2. 5Had the three talents been employed in the purchase of corrupt jurors, the friends of Ergocles could have offered each of the twenty­one hundred dicast~ who were said to have been corrupted fifty-one obols, or seventeen times the amount of the fee which each would receive from the state. This was no inconsiderable sum for men who lived on their fees as dicasts and ecclesiasts (See Croiset Aristophanes and the Political Parties at Athens p. 102). Or, with the same sum he could have offer~d eigl?-teen _obols, or six times the amou~t.of the jury fee, to every qualified d1cast m Athens. Had he been wilhng to devote half of his ill-gotten wealth to the evasion of punishment, he could have offered every dicast in Athens ninety obols, or thirty times the amount of the fee. 73 IN LITIGATION mercy."1 The satire is ciearly directed at the constant can­vassing of dicasts by litigants and their friends. An attempt to prejudice an entire jury in the court of the thesmothetes is de­scribed by Antiphon, in the speech On the Choir Boy,2 in con­nection with the prosecutions, already mentioned, brought by the choregus against Philinus and three other defendants. As the plaintiff was proceeding by eisangelia, the cases were to come before the court of the thesmothetes.1 The day before the first of them was set for trial, Philocrates, brother of the boy Diodotus who had died at the house of the choregus, appeared before this very court which was to try them and accused the choregus of being responsible for the lad's death. He had been persuaded to do this by Philinus and the other defendants, and his object was to prejudice the jurors against the choregus and to procure the acquittal on the morrow and succeeding days of the men who were being prosecuted.4 It is not remarkable that other instances of attempts to influence juries by other means than bribery during the fifth century have not come do\\'11 to us, since scarcely any records have been preserved from the hundreds of cases which were being tried every year. 5 After the archonship of Euclid es, as has been seen in the study of bribery, any attempt to approach the dicasts chosen for a particular case was a matter of great difficulty. Prejudicial reports might be circulated in the agora and throughout the city previous to the trial, and these would be a means of influencing the whole body of jurors. 6 But the real difficulty would be to contrive a practicable method of canvassing the particular men drawn on the jury. This could best be effected, it would seem, on the day of the trial and in the vicinity of the courtrooms. The consideration here may be limited to such attempts. Demos­thenes twice describes efforts to influence jurors. In the com­mencement of the speech against Aeschines On the False Embassy, 1Aristoph. Wasps 552 ff. 26. 21, 34 ff. 36. 3~; cf. fyLS.L. p. 77; Caillemer, in D. & S. Diet. Ant. II. pp. 498 ff. (s. v. eisangelie). 46. 21. For a more complete account of this case, cf. supra pp. 49 ff.; infra p. 105. n. 5. 5[Xen.] Pol. Ath. 3. 2. 6Cf. supra pp. 56 ff. ATHENIAN CLUBS he asserts that the jurymen are well aware of the intrigue and canvassing which have taken place in connection with the trial, for they have seen what crowds of partisans beset them while they were being drawn for the court. He reminds them that . the entreaties and canvassing of the faction which Aeschines has summoned to his support have for their object the unfair advan­tage of individuals, contrary to the intent of the laws.1 A similar scene must have been enacted at the trial of Midias, if the case came to trial, for Demosthenes says: "The more of you Midias has annoyed with his canvassing-for I saw what he was doing just now before the courtrooms-so much the rather am I hope­ful of securing justice."2 And Aeschines, in the speech Against Ct,esiphon, gives us to understand that the supporters of Demos­thenes were present in force on the occasion of the trial, and canvassed possible members of the jury in the agora before the opening of court. 3 Richardson believes, and not without cause, that this iH a hint at clubs which were supporting Demosthenes in the trial.t In important cases, efforts to influence public sentiment and even personal canvassing no doubt began long before the trial. Then, when the day of the hearing arrived, the supporters of the respective litigants would become ''lobbyists,'' and would assemble 119. 1. 2'll. 4. (The words 'Kp0 Twv ~uca..e'i11 and 7rapa"f"fEAAei11 the di casts, and the proceeding is ref erred to as u7rovo~ and 7rapa·neXla. This language suggests elections and assem­blies, and indicates that the canvassing of a jury was very similar to t~e canvassing of ecclesias~s or electors, which is to be expected in VIew of the fact that the d1casts were also the ecclesiasts and electors. !he resemblance would appear especially in important cases where the Jury was large and in trials of political importance (cf. infra pp. 98 ff). 2Cf. supra p. 23. n. 2. 3It is interesting that the same law forbids the organization of clubs for the overthrow of th~ d~mocrac~ .and the bribery of a jury (cf. supra p. 67. n. 6). The a priori probab1hty of the clubs having made use ofb!'ibery to influence juries is noted byVischer (p.172),andled Hiillmann to identify. them unreservedly with the "Bestechungsgesellschaften"of the schohasts (cf. supra p. 69. n. 5). ATHENIAN CLUBS there, then, men who could deliver "blocks" of votes, in certain courts under the old system, from all the dicasts under the new, and who represented their associates in these corrupt transac­tions? Isocrates describes such a man.1 He is Xenotimus, "the man who corrupts the laws, who bribes the courts, and who outrages the authorities." He is spoken of, not as the man who bribed a jury on some particular occasion, or even on several occasions, but as "the man who bribes juries,"2 that is to say, who makes a practice of it. Aeschines speaks of prosecutions against men who are charged with undertaking to bribe the ecclesia and the courts, "just as Nicostratus does even now."3 Nicostratus is evidently, like Xenotimus, a skillful pettifogger, who makes a specialty of bribing dicasts and ecclesiasts, and whose practices are so notorious that his name can be used as an illustration, to characterize the class of men to which he belongs, with the cer­tainty that the average Athenian citizen will at once recognize the type. These cases show the existence in both the fifth and the fourth centuries of a class of men whom we may describe as "professional bribers." They were undoubtedly in touch with many corrupt jurors, and could each deliver a considerable ''block'' of votes to the man who was willing to pay their price. They were in a position to represent both the purchasable dicasts and the intending purchasers, and to fill both of the needs which have been mentioned. Through their agency any citizen who wished to bribe a jury could reach men who would be willing to accept his money and render a corrupt decision. 4 There must have been a definite understanding between such men as Xenotimus and Nicostratus and their assistants, although it is possible that there was no formal organization. These groups would of course not limit their activities to bribery, and are 1Isoc. 18. 11. 2Loc. cit.: µera 'Zevorlµou TOV TOVS voµous 01,aq,8elpovros Kai Ta Ol.Ka1.>.oi or ufra.Lpoc., and much of the perjury which took place at Athens must have had this cause.• The most important case of perjured testimony introduced by associates to ~a comrade is found in .Ariston vs. Canwv. 3Dem. 39. 13-14, 2. 4[Dem.] 40. 32. For an agreement of this kind, cf. supra p. 45. 6Jsaeus 5. 7-9. 6Loc. cit.: rd.1/tev0ij ciAX~Xoc.s µapropEi.v. IN LITIGATION would give their testimony as a speculation in which the profit was contingent on success assuredly would not hesitate to testify falsely if a sufficient cash consideration were o:ffered. In these clubs we have bands of men who would become, when occasion arose, professional perjurers. Menecles, Mnesicles, and the leaders of other similar clubs could undoubtedly furnish witnesses to anyone who was willing to pay for the service. That much of the false testimony which was introduced in the Athenian courts was purchased is attested not only by numerous passages in the orators which charge the subornation of perjury, 1 but also by the fact that speakers felt obliged to establish in advance the disinterestedness of their own witnesses, by showing that they could not have been bribed. 2 In a state where liti­gation was constantly in progress and where there was a large class of sycophants, it would be remarkable if bribery of witnesses were not of common occurrence. And we are not surprised to learn from Demosthenes that the rich are at no loss for witnesses. 3 It has been noted that the funds given to Aeschines by Philip and to Aphobus by Onetor and Timocrates were used in part to suborn witnesses.4 Thus the usefulness of associates and friends was not limited to the cases in which they actually appeared on the witness stand, but their support might take the form of a cash contribution to be used in hiring witnesses. They could also render assistance in the actual work of procuring witnesses by putting the litigant into communication with men like Melas, Menecles, and Mnesicles. Men were also induced to commit perjury in the hope of in­juring some personal or political enemy, 5 and one of the first moves of a litigant and his friends was to seek out the enemies of the opponent and enlist their support. 6 Here also associates could be of service. Witnesses who could not be induced to testify falsely by any 1E. g. [Dem.] 44. 3; 34. 18; Dem. 19. 216; 29. 28; Aeschines 2. 154-55; Lys. 29. 7; etc. 2Dem. 29. 24; 57. 24, 52. 3Dem. 21. 112. On bribery as a frequent cause of perjury, cf. Leis p. 116. 4Dem. 19. 216; 29. 28; cf. supra p. 45. 5Dem. 29. 22-23; cf. 39. 3. 8Xen. Mem. 2. 9. 5 ff. ATHENIAN CLUBS of the three considerations mentioned by Demosthenes might still yield to intimidation and perjure themselves through fear.t As has been seen, the clubs were most effective agents in coercion." THE SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE In many respects, perjury and the suppression of evidence were closely akin; under certain circumstances, as for example where an oath of disclaimer was taken, the one might involve the other; the motives which prompted and the results attained were similar if not identical in either case. Consequently, where perjury and the manufacturing of evidence were commonly re­sorted to, it was inevitable that there should have been much suppression of evidence. In cases where the introduction of false testimony was not necessary and the desired ends could be obtained by merely suppressing the facts, the latter proceeding was more convenient and attended with less danger. That the suppression of evidence, if extensively practiced, seriously impaired the efficiency of the courts, was of course recognized, and the laws concerning witnesses contained pro­visions for compelling them to testify.3 Nevertheless, there were ways to avoid testifying. 4 Measures to compel witnesses did not originate with the court; the formal summons could not be used against witnesses who refused to appear before an arbitrator; there were exceptions to the compellability of witnesses; and there were schemes by which the law might be evaded, as for example in Lycurgus vs. Leocraies, where witnesses professed forgetfulness of the facts, or were able to find other excuses for not testifying.5 Finally, if the witness was willing to take the solemn oath of disclaimer, he might avoid testifying, for no punishment seems to have been provided for taking this oath falsely.6 The existence among club members of a distinct and definite obligation to testify in one another's behalf has been shown.7 1[Lys.] 20. 18. 2cf. supra p. 61. 3Bonner pp. 41 ff.; Leisi pp. 49 ff. 'Bonner pp. 43 ff. iLyc. in Leocr. 20; cf. [Dem.] 49. 19. 6Bonner p. 91; Leisi p. 69. 7Cf. supra pp. 77 ff. IN LITIGATION That the relation of ETatpEla, which frequently led a comrade to perjure . himself in shielding another, at the same time per­mitted him to testify against a fell ow-member is inconceivable. Therefore it must be believed that an equally definite obligation forbade an associate to testify against his fellows. This pro­hibition would be particularly felt in regard to matters which concerned the hetaery as a whole and acts performed for it. A number of instances attest the unwillingness of club members to testify against one another. Andocides, who informed against his associates in regard to the mutilation of the Hermae, was the object of severe disapproval even on the part of the average democratic citizen for having violated his obligation of i-raipEla. 1 This is amply established . by the elaborate defense that he feels obliged to make on this point before democratic audiences. 2 In emphatic terms he calls attention to the fact that the betrayal of his associates was the only possible means of safety for his father and many near rela­tives and friends who were about to be put to death for a crime of which they were innocent. 3 The associates absolutely refused to testify against Eratos­thenes when he was accused by Lysias. Lysias tells the court that he will introduce as witnesses, to prove that Eratosthenes was one of the "ephors" appointed by the associates, men who have heard the facts from Eratosthenes himself. Those who were associated with Eratosthenes at the time he cannot produce as witnesses, for they refuse to testify in violation of their oaths. 4 This extreme aversion to testifying against an associate is further illustrated by an incident which Lysias narrates. Shortly before the meeting of the assembly which was to ratify the pro­posals of peace brought from Lacedaemon by Theramenes in 404, the oligarchs contrived a plot to get out of the way certain democrats who were preparing to oppose the adoption of the terms. They secured the services of two informers, Theocritus and Agoratus, and introduced the former before the senate in secret session, to give information of an alleged conspiracy. In 1And .. 1. 54; [Lys.] 6. 23; cf. supra p. 39. 21. 54-69; 2. 7-10. 31. 68. 4Lys. 12. 43-4 7. ATHENIAN CLUBS order to give his conduct the appearance of unwillingness and constraint, he refused to give the names of those in the plot, on the ground that he and they had sworn the same oaths.1 While this was, as Lysias says, but a pretense on his part, it was a pre­tense which would have been quite unavailing had not the bond of comradeship been regarded as extremely solemn and sacred, even in a temporary union. Not only did associates shield their comrades by themselves refusing to testify against them, but they also kept other wit­nesses from testifying, by intimidation or other means. The most important case is found in Euxitheus vs. Eu"bulides. Euxitheus, a poor citizen, had testified against Eubulides in a lawsuit some time. previously, with the result that Eubulides failed to receive a fifth part of the votes. The o:ffense was not forgotten, and Eubulides, aided by the members of his club and others, so manip­ulated a deme meeting that he succeeded in getting the name of Euxitheus struck from the rolls, on the ground that he was not entitled to citizenship.2 The latter appealed the case and ap­peared before a jury-court to establish his citizenship. Eubulides and his "gang" of supporters are fighting the case with the utmost vigor ;3 the burden of proof is upon Euxitheus,4 and failure to support his claim will result in his being sold into slavery.5 With such examples as this before their eyes, it is not remarkable that witnesses were reluctant to testify against the wealthy and in­fluential and were often coerced into silence. There are many cases which show the difficulty of securing witnesses against men of wealth and personal influence, 6 notably the experience of Demosthenes in his prosecution of Midias. Those who had suffered wrong at the hands of Midias were un­willing to testify regarding his conduct, since his violent and 1/b. 13. 18-22; cf. supra pp. 34-35 on the oaths mentioned in this and the preceding case. 2Dem. 57. 8 ff.; cf. also infra pp. 113, 116, 121, 124; Kennedy IV. pp. 308-09, and for the club of Eubulides supra p. 23. n. 3. A similar plotis alleged by the speaker in Isaeus 12. 12. 3Cf. supra pp. 57-58; infra pp. 116, 124. 4Dem. 57. 17. 6Hypotheses to Dem. 57 and Isaeus 12; cf. Lipsius A. R. p. 415. 6[Lys.] 20. 18; Lys. 7. 21; Dem. 19. 80-81; Isaeus 8. 42. IN LITIGATION litigious nature and his great resources, his wealth, and his as­sociates caused him to be generally feared. 1 Litigants did not rely solely upon this reluctance to antag­onize men of wealth and power, but approached possible wit­nesses, either in person or through the agency of associates and friends, with definite threats. Thus Theocrines and his comrades are said to have visited the witnesses of his opponent, Epichares, and prevailed upon them by threats and persuasion not to testify.2 Just as men could be induced to perjure themselves bythe offer of bribes, so witnesses could be bought off and induced to refrain from testifying. 3 Club members could render valuable assistance, either by approaching prospective witnesses, or by contributing money. 4 The clubs then were responsible not only for much of the per­jury which took place at Athens, but also for the suppression of much evidence. In many of the cases in which testimony was withheld, the clubs were responsible, either directly by reason of the refusal of the members to testify, or indirectly by inducing others to refuse. THE PLEADING OF ADVOCATES5 An excellent opportunity for the intervention of friends, asso­ciates, or political adherents, was offered by the law which per­mitted the introduction of advocates (uu11~'Yopoi). The original intent of this law appears from a number of passages.6 It was to enable the citizen who was at a disadvantage in handling his case, either from inexperience in legal matters or from inability to speak, to avail himself of the services of friends and thus to have a fair chance before the courts. Friendship7 or relationship8 1Dem. 21. 137, 20; cf. supra p. 40. 2[Dem.] 58. 7; for the club of Theocrines, cf. infra p. 90. n. 1. 3Lyc. in Leocr. 20. 4Cf. supra pp. 43 ff. 5As Professor Bonner has discussed advocacy (pp. 11-12, 82 ff.), it will be sufficient here to emphasize those points which are important to our investigation, and to illustrate the ways in which advocacy was made use of by the clubs. 6E. g. Hyp. 3. 11 ff.; 2. 10-11. 7Isoc. 21. 1; Isaeus 4. 1; 6. 1-2; Aeschines 2. 184; [Lys.] 5. 1. 8Dem. 32. 31-2; Hyp. 2. 19-20. 86-ATHENIAN CLUBS to the litigant, or even hostility toward his opponent, 1 were apparently valid reasons for appearing as an advocate. From the large number of examples that might be cited, two cases, widely separated in point of time, will suffice to show the extent to which Athenians availed themselves of this privilege. Andocides, when prosecuted by Cephisius, was aided by a number of advo­cates in addition to those who had been chosen by his tribe to appear for him.2 Probably more than hall a century later, Polyeuctus demanded ten advocates from his tribe and a number of others besides, to assist him in his defense against Alexander of the deme Oeum. 3 When the practice of introducing advocates had assumed such proportions as this, it is apparent that the Athenian who was engaged in a lawsuit of any importance would lose no time in providing himself with men to plead in his behaH. These he could generally find among his own friends, associates, or rela­tives, or among the personal and political enemies of his opponent. It was of course of the utmost importance that the advocates should be men who would really bring strength to the cause which they supported, and to this end an especial effort was made to secure eloquent and convincing speakers, or men of great political influence and prestige. The latter qualification was especially desirable, and there are a number of cases in which litigants suc­ceeded in obtaining the services of prominent and influential politicians. The speakers who appeared for Eratosthenes, when he was accused by Lysias, appear to have been men of this descrip­tion.4 Andocides was successful in securing political leaders of prominence to appear in his behalf, as is attested by the names of Anytus, Thrasyllus, and Cephalus.5 Among the advocates who assisted Aeschines in the case of the embassy were Eubulus, the leader of his party, and the general Phocion. 6 Demosthenes often appeared in the capacity of advocate, notably in Aeschines vs. Ctesi,phon, in which he delivered his greatest speech. 7 l(Dem.] 58. 4; Lys. 14. 2-3. 2And. 1. 150. 3Hyp. 3. 12. 4Lys. 12. 86. 5And. 1. 150. 6Aeschines 2. 184. 7Demosthenes, although his appearance in the case was formally that of advocate, was virtually the defendant; cf. infra p. 104. IN LITIGATION As political influence often resulted from oratorical ability, in many if not the majority of cases both essential qualifications of an advocate were to be found in one and the same man. The number of such men was limited and their services in demand. Consequently advocacy tended to become a profession, whose members exacted a fee for pleading.1 This was repugnant to the fundamental theory of the Athenian democracy, and the acceptance of remuneration for the performance of an advocate' s duty, in either public or private cases, was expressly forbidden by law.2 While this enactment may have checked the develop­ment of professional advocacy, apparently it could not do away with it. A number of passages in the orators suggest that an opponent's advocates have been suborned, 3 and the statement of Demosthenes that the rich have advocates always ready to plead in their behalf, 4 indicates that it was common for advocates secretiy to receive fees for their services. By virtue of the rules governing the speeches of advocates, the uvv~"'(opos was peculiarly qualified to help the cause of the litigant. Apparently he was not liable, as was a witness, for any false statements he might make, and he could advance with impunity whatever he thought would strengthen the cause of his friend or client and damage that of the opponent.6 He was not required to offer proof of his statements, and was allowed great latitude in subject matter.6 Thus he could make false and slanderous assertions, which, even though unsupported by proof, could not fail to have an effect upon many of the jurors, especially if the speaker was a prominent man. Not infrequently, when a man of influence was pleading, he would urge his own worth and achievements, and ask a favorable verdict in recogni­tion of his own services to the state.7 The rules of procedure followed in certain kinds of suits occasionally made possible 1Cf. Bonner pp. 11-12. 2[Dem.] 46. 26-; cf. supra p. 67. n. 6. 3(Dem.] 44. 3; 48. 36; 7rapElAoL Kal. ~ALKLWTaL) * * * with whom I am intimate and whose manner of life I share.''3 The custom of introducing advocates afforded opportunities for associates to assist also in other ways than by appearing in person. Undoubtedly in many cases they could render far more effective assistance by persuading some prominent man to plead, or by contributing means to secure the services of a skillful pro­fessional advocate. The man who had a strong following of associates would stand a far better chance of getting prominent and capable advocates than the one who was less influential. And so the litigant who belonged to a club or clubs had a great advantage, whether his comrades appeared for him in person or aided him with their influence or wealth to secure advocates. THE DISSUASION OF ADVOCATES Just as witnesses might be induced to refrain from testifying, so influence might be brought to bear on advocates to prevent them from appearing. The services of associates would be val­uable, whether they used their wealth and influence to persuade an advocate, or merely acted as agents in the negotiation. An instance is found in Epichares vs. Theocrines. The plaintiff charges that his advocates have been induced to abandon him 1Dem. 37. 48; cf. supra p. 79. 2Isaeus fr. 22 (ed. Scheibe). 3Aeschines 2. 184; cf. supra pp. 27 ff. ATHENIAN CLUBS by means of the clubs ( ETai.PEi.ai) of the defendant and his friends. 1 Demosthenes and others who were hostile to Theocrines, and who had on that account engaged to appear as advocates for the prose­cution, have availed themselves of the opportunity to reach agreements with the defendant on their own account. In the case of Demosthenes, the consideration was that Theocrines drop the proceedings for proposing illegal measures which had been instituted against him.2 While prominent politicians might be dissuaded from appear­ing as advocates by the settlement of some difficulty or by some concession in political matters, as in this case, paid advocates would probably be approached with the off er of a larger fee. In this event the money contributions made by associates would be useful. INTEREST WITH OFFICIALS There is reason to believe that litigants and their supporters not infrequently found opportunities of approaching the officials who were charged with the administration of the legal machinery and enlisting their aid. The evidence is by no means plentiful and is for the most part too general in its nature to afford a clear insight into the methods which proved successful, but there are instances where bribery or persuasion was employed to procure the connivance of magistrates in improper practices. There were many ways in which such interest with officials might prove ad­ vantageous. Magistrates might be induced to favor a litigant in appointing the time of trials. During the fifth century, according to the Pseudo-Xenophon, the man who had business before the senate or the ecclesia, or a case before one of the courts, and who was willing to employ cash as a means of persuasion, could have his case attended to promptly, notwithstanding the great press of legislative and judicial business. 3 This can only refer to bribery of the higher magistrates who introduced the cases in their re­ spective courts. 4 Officials of all degrees of importance, however, 1[Dem.] 58. 4, 42: rp00Moµ.a.t ~tci Tcis TOVTWV ETa.tpda.s. On these clubs, cf. Leisi p. 119. 2(Dem.] 58. 42 ff.; cf. supra p. 53. n. 1. a[Xen.] Pol. Ath. 3. 1-4. 40n the jurisdiction of the different magistrates, cf. M.S.L. pp. 53 ft. IN LITIGATION seem to have lent themselves to dishonest practice, for Aristotle, in his account of the later court system, describes precautions intended to prevent the corruption of the lesser court function­aries.1 In the fourth century also it was possible to bribe the officials who set the time for trials. The rich, according to Demosthenes, were able to get their cases appointed for any time they desired, and to come before the court only after their offenses had been palliated by the lapse of time, while the common citizen was haled before a tribunal immediately and judged forthwith. 2 While Demosthenes may have had in mind delays such as are secured on technical grounds by shrewd lawyers in our modern courts, it seems more likely, in view of the statement of the Pseudo-Xeno­phon, that he refers to bribery of magistrates. Diopithes, who acted as arbitrator in Pittalacus vs. H egesander and Timarchus, favored his friend Hegesander by putting off the case from time to time, until it was finally dropped by Pittalacus.3 In the case of an arbitrator, attempts might also be made to influence the final decision by bribery or persuasion. In Demos­the'Ms vs. Midias, an action KaK7J'Yoplas, the public arbitrator Straton had given a judgment by default in favor of the plaintiff. Midias endeavored to persuade Straton to change his award and the archons to alter the record in the case, at first trying bribery and then having recourse to threats. When the arbitrator would not listen to him, he carried out his threats in a most efiective manner. On the last day on which charges could be preferred against the arbitrators, he brought an accusation against Straton, and succeeded, with the collusion of the presiding magistrate, in securing a judgment by default, with the result that Straton was disfranchised.4 When officials who declined to favor in­fluential men could be visited with such terrible punishment, it is not likely that many of them showed the courage of Straton, 1Ccms. Ath. cols. 31. 14; 33. 10-15. 2nem. 21. 112. 3Aesehines 1. 63; cf. supra p. 26. n. 3. On delays secured by Midias in a suit for ejeetment brought by Demosthenes, cf. Dem. 21. 81-82. See also Lys. 26. 6 ff. 4Dem. 21. 83 ff. ATHENIAN CLUBS and there must have been many cases where arbitrators were induced improperly to favor litigants. 1 Again, interest with court officials at times afforded an op­portunity for tampering with the records or the documents, or for irregularities in procedure. Callimachus was accused of having brought a second time, with the connivance of the magis­trate, an action which had once already been thrown out of court by a oLaµapr.vpla. The legitimate proceeding would have been to bring a ollc71 1/1Ev0oµaprvplwv against his opponent's wit­ness, but he wished to avoid any chance of incurring the E1fW/3E°'Ala. 2 Nicobulus, in the speech Against Pantaenetus, asserts that one of the items has been stricken out of the rapa'YpacJ>T,; how this was managed it is the part of the jury to consider.3 This is a distinct allegation that his opponent has acted with the collusion of the magistrates who had it in charge.4 A case of irregular procedure, with the connivance of a pre­siding magistrate, is found in the action of Midias against the arbitrator Straton mentioned above. 5 Midia.~ did not present the necessary evidence that the defendant had been summoned · to appear, but got the presiding officer to overlook the irregu­larity and a judgment by default was entered. This of course deprived Straton of an opportunity to appear and defend himself, and he had apparently no means of redress after having become subject to a timia. 6 The choregus who was charged with having caused the death of the boy Diodotus was accused by his opponents of having 1Cf. [Dem.] 34. 21, where an arbitrator will not decide against a friend, and [Dem.] 52. 30-31, where an arbitrator favors a litigant who is his "associate" (14). 2Isoc. 18. 11-12. See M.S.L. p. 844. n. 221. The legal details are obscure. 3Dem. 37. 34. See M.S.L. p. 849. n. 231: "Der Sprecher besehwert sich bier, das ihm in seiner ?rapa'Yptul>iJ etwas ausgestrichen worden sei, und zwar von seinem Gegner, wahrscheinlich jedoch nur auf deslien Veranlassung von der Behorde, bier den Thesmotheten." •Two features in the Herodes case suggest that there may have been improper practice on the part of magistrates but details are not given. The defendant was cited in a ~l1C11 1ea1eovnlai instead of a atxr, q,/J110V (Ant. 5.9), which gave the prosecution an advantage (11 ff.), and was improp­erly refused bail ( 17). 6Cf. supra p. 91. •Dem. 21. 87. IN LITIGATION used his interest with the archon basileus to put a stop to the pro­ceedings connected with a former indictment on the same charge. i In Archestratides vs. Alcibiades, the advocate of the prosecu­tion protests against the action of the generals, who apparently were not preserving the impartiality which they should have displayed as presidents of the court, and were pleading in behalf of the defendant.2 Club affiliations were undoubtedly of great advantage to a litigant in securing interest with officials, whether by bribery or other means, as associates could supply the money for bribes or could assist in persuading or intimidating magistrates. It is therefore extremely probable that both Midias and Pantaenetus were aided by their comrades in the cases of improper practice with which they were concerned.3 INFORMATION REGARDING OPPONENT'S CASE An accurate knowledge of the opponent's case and plan of attack must have been of vital importance to a litigant in pre­paring for trial. When the trial was preceded by a hearing before an arbitrator, the evidence on both sides would of course be dis­closed. But in non-arbitration cases the litigant would have to rely upon the information which he could pick up before the hearing. 4 Any information regarding his opponent's circum­stances and career would be welcome, and especially valuable would be hints of the exact nature of the attack or defense con­templated, the number and standing of the advocates, the nature of the evidence, etc. Obviously, friends and associates could render valuable service by gathering all available information on such points and placing it at the disposal of the litigant. While there are few specific allusions to this proceeding, it can hardly be doubted that it was one of the ways in which the clubs were useful. 6 1Ant. 6. 41. On this case, see supra pp. 49 ff., 73. 2[Lys.] 16. 1 ff. 3Cf. supra p. 23. n. 2; p. 79. n. 5. 4Bonner (pp. 48 ff.) has shown that no considerable part of the evi­dence was brought out at the anacrisis. See also Bonner "Evidence in the Areopagus" Class. Phil. VII. (1912) pp. 451 ff. 5Cf. [Dem.] 53. 14; cf. Dem. 19. 332; 20. 105, which may be merely rhetorical. ATHENIAN CLUBS MISCELLANEOUS EXPEDIENTS In general, the practices which have been described were available in a large class of cases, often in litigation of any kind. But there were undoubtedly other ways in which associates and friends could be of use when the circumstances of particular cases afforded opportunity for concerted action. An interesting example of club activity which does not admit of definite classification is found in Nicobulus vs. Pantaenetus.1 The defendant in the 7rapa"'(pa~ 1rapavoµw11) or an inex­pedient law (voµov µ~ e1rirf,0Eto11 fJEivai) against the speaker who made the objectionable proposal. 5 If the indictment was sustained in court, the obnoxious legislation was conclusively defeated. In many cases, however, proceedings of this char­acter seem to have been intended only to render the measure attacked inoperative until a pronouncement of the courts could be had.6 Threats of an indictment for illegal measures were at times employed to deter speakers. 7 Prosecutions upon other charges also were convenient weapons, and suits or threats of suits could be used to dispose of opposition to a measure.8 Similar tactics were resorted to in order to influence officials, 1E. g. the attack upon Demosthenes in the person of Ctesiphon (Aeschines 3; Dem. 18), and the prosecutions of Phidias, Anaxagoras, and Aspasia, which were really aimed at Pericles (Plut. Per. 31-32; cf. supra p. 101. n. 3; Busolt III. pp. 82 5 ff.). 2This is seen in the slanderous stories about Pericles, which were given wide currency at the trials of himself and his friends (Plut. loc. cit.), as well as in the content of speeches made in political cases (cf. Dem. 18. 9 ff.). Such stories were of course not necessarily untrue. 3Plut. Per. 31: 1rowvµB10t 7rf:ipav EV bruc­rois . . ro Eu7rpoafJ& rov {Jov°'A€VT"lplov 1rAijpes rwv cppovpidv. Cf. Grote VI. p. 471. 4Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 23 ff. Kenyon reconciles this account with that of Ari­stotle (Cons. Ath. 37. 1) by the assumption that the second of the two laws mentioned by Aristotle (one of the 1ea.tvol voµ,oL (51] of Xen.) was proposed by Critias and passed on the spot by the terrified boule (Cf. Kenyon's and Sandys's notes to Ar. Cons. Ath. 37. 1). 5Aristotle (Cons. Ath. 25. 4) quoted by Plutarch (Per. 10 fin.) names Aristodicus of Tanagra as the agent of the assassination. The account of Idomeneus, which accuses Pericles of being responsible, is rejected by Plutarch (loc. cit.) as a slander. The statement of Antiphon (5. 68 ff.) that in his time the identity of the assassins was not known, may be justified on the assumption that no one was ever legally proved to have committed the crime. ATHENIAN CLUBS or some of their party procured his death at the hands of an as­sassin.1 The ancient accounts give no details, and it is imposfilble to determine whether it was the act of a club or clubs, or whether individuals were responsible. There can be no doubt, however, that among the Areopagites were members of oligarchic clubs, 2 and that some of those clubs, like the organizations which engin­eered the later anti-democratic movements, would not shrink from foul play. The assassination of Cimon, the father of Miltiades, by the sons of Pisistratus seems to have been primarily a political move. 3 Whether associates of the tyrants were implicated, it is impossible to say; the language of Herodotus suggests that the actual agents were hired as.5aSSins.4 On one notable occasion, the democrats assailed the oligarchs with their own weapons, and Phrynichus was struck down by the dagger of the assassin.5 The deed had been planned previously at secret meetings of the democratic leaders held in the home of the peripolarch and at other houses.6 These gatherings may have been meetings of a democratic hetaery, or simply a conspiracy enfored into for the time being. In a period of such suspicion and unrest, however, it is unlikely that men who were not known and trusted through previous association would have been admitted as confederates, and the loyal remainder of a democratic club or clubs may well have afforded a nucleus for the conspiracy.7 A number of other assassinations which took place at Athens 1This is clearly implied in the account of Aristotle (loc. cit.), and ex­plicitly stated by Plutarch (Zoe. cit.). See Busolt III. p. 246. For the attacks of Ephialtes on the Areopagus, cf. supra p. 101. n. 2. 2Not only was the Areopagus the last remaining bulwark of the oli­garchs (Ar. Pol. 1273 b 39), but many of the individual members were oligarchs (cf. Busolt III. p. 262. n. 1; Wilamowitz II. p. 93). Vischer (pp. 162 ff.) regards this ~a~ination as the work of oligarchic clubs. 3Hdt. 6. 103: ICTEWoVO"L • • VrEUTCl.VT6 a·1oras. Cimon had long been a polit­ical opponent of the Pisistratids (loc. cit.). •For the clubs of the tyrants, cf. supra p. 13. 5Thuc. 8. 92. 2 ff.; Lys. 13. 71; CIA I. 59; cf. Plut. Ale. 25; Lye. in Leocr. 112. Thrasybulus and Apollodorus apparently were the agents, cf. Gilbert Beitrage pp. 320 ff. 'Thuc., Lys. loci. cit. 7Democratic clubs would have been demoralized and rendered in­active by the extensive desertions to the ranks of the oligarchs (Thuc. 8. 66. 5). IN THE POLITICAL FIELD Ill have elements of political significance, but there is no evidence that clubs were concerned. 1 In a majority of the cases where clubs were responsible, it has been seen that associates actually did the slaying. Their useful­ ness was not, however, limited to these cases, for they might assist by furnishing money to hire assassins, or by finding out men who would be willing to do the deed. It was at times more convenient to employ agents, and particularly men of non-Athenian citizen­ ship, since aliens would feel less reluctance in going into exile than would an Athenian.2 It will be noted that but few of these assassinations were dictated by general political enmity. They were usually to further a definite purpose, and were frequently a means of pre­ venting speakers of the opposition from addressing the ecclesia or boule in regard to legislation. DELIBERATIVE ASSEMBLIES As the political life of Athens centered in the deliberative assemblies and particularly in the ecclesia, which was the supreme authority in all matters of public policy, it is here that the use­fulness of the clubs in the political field is best exemplified. As evidence of this usefulness it is necessary to cite only the two memorable occasions on which they completely controlled the ecclesia and boule, once by perfect organization alone, and again with that organization backed by Spartan arms-the revolutions of 411 and 404. 1. Caucuses.-The first step to be taken by a club or a com­bination of clubs which sought to control an assembly was the holding of a caucus among the members, or leaders who repre­sented them, at which a definite plan of action would be adopted and the instructions for carrying it out imparted. Thucydides describes two such caucuses at Samos when the revolution of 411 was begun by the clubs. The first was held by the oligarchic leaders when they returned from their interview 1The murder of Nicodemus by Aristarchus (Aeschines 1. 172 ff.; 2. 148; Dem. 21. 104; cf. Ulpian to Dem. 21. 104; Athen. 13. 592); of the brother of Theocrines by Demochares ([Dem.] 58. 28 ff.). 2The assassins of Ephialtes and Phrynichus seem to have been non­Athenians (cf. supra 10 9. n. 5; 110. n. 5). ATHENIAN CLUBS with Alcibiades and formed the conspiracy among the ~ociates for the overthrow of the democracy.1 Without doubt it was at this meeting that the form of the statement to the rank and file of the army was fixed and the speakers chosen who were to pre­sent it.2 At the second caucus, not only the leaders but a major­ity of the associates as well were present.3 The proposals of Alcibiades were disc~, it was resolved to proceed with the revolution, and Pisander and others were chosen to visit Athens and address the ecclesia in behalf of the proposed government. 4 'While in Athens, Pisander effected among the clubs in the city an organization similar to that at Samos.5 Whether he addressed entire clubs at meetings or merely conferred with the club leaders is not stated. From that time on, as occasion required, were held caucuses at which the speakers who were to present measures in the boule and ecclesia were chosen and their speeches carefully considered.6 It was probably at these caucuses that plans for influencing the voting, for the ''removal'' of opposing orators, and for carrying out the remainder of the revolutionary program were formulated and instructions given. One of these caucuses must have preceded the coup by which the Four Hundred were installed in the senate house. 7 Again in 404 the ~ociates worked out their plans at secret meetings, but on this occasion a system of organization which made unnecessary large and unwieldly caucuses of all the club­men had been perfected. A central committee composed of five "ephors" was chosen, and this met and deliberated regarding the measures to be passed and the offices to be filled. This board was given a general "power to act."8 The "ephors" in turn appointed lieutenants called "phylarchs," who communicated their decisions and orders to the clubmen.9 When the assembly for the adoption 18. 48. 2. The words aMtc; . . lThuc. 6. 29. 3; Plut. Ale. 19 med. 11Aristotle thinks it worth noting that Ephialtes was /WwpoO/JKTJTot (25. 1). The allegation of bribery in Lysias 13. 72 is confirmed by epi­graphical evidence (CIA I. 59) to the extent that the name of Agoratus is found in the decree (cf. Gilbert Beitri:ige p. 348). Cf. also Dem. 20. 132; 23. 146; 24. 3, 201, 203. 121 IN THE POLITICAL FIELD speakers has been discussed. 1 Intimidation at times proved effective. Both in 411 and 404, when the oligarchic measures were being put through the boule and ecclesia, democratic orators who would normally have raised their voices in opposition were kept silent by fear, 2 but this may have been merely the result of previous acts of violence and not of specific threats. Bribery and persuasion offered a means of silencing opposition which clubs could make use of upon occasion. Speeches and motions sometimes had for their purpose con­sumption of time and the consequent prevention or postpone­ment of the voting upon a measure, a practice in some respects similar to what is now termed "filibustering." 3 In the deme meeting, Eubulides deferred the voting upon the citizenship of Euxitheus until a late hour by "making harangues and intro­ducing resolutions." 4 As it is hardly likely that a presiding officer would have been permitted to take up the whole session with his own speeches and motions, the reference must be in part to speeches made by his associates and confederates, who would be able with his connivance to hold the floor. 6. Interruptions and app"lause.-The more prominent members of the opposition, sitting in the vicinity of the bema, would often attempt to confuse a speaker and destroy the impression he had made by questioning him and offering objections to his arguments. As an example of this, we have the action of Pisander, when he called up the speakers who opposed the proposals of the associates in the ecclesia, questioned them individually, and forced them to admit that they were able to offer no solution of th~ difficulty. 5 In the ecclesia which considered the equipment of the Sicilian expedition, Nicias was challenged in the same way, at the con­clusion of his speech, by a supporter of Alcibiades, 6 Demostratus, as Plutarch states. 7 Whether Demostratus was one of Alcibiades' 1Cf. supra pp. 98 ff.; 107 ff. 2Thuc. 8. 66. 2; Plut. Ale. 26; Lys. 12. 72. 3Webster's International Dictionary, s. v. Filibuster: "To delay legislation or action in an assembly by dilatory motions or other artifices." 4Dem. 57. 9: Ka.TerpŁ1/le Tfiv T,µ,l:pa.v ~17µ,rtyopwv Ka.l 1/J71cpluµaTa "fpawv. 0Thuc. 8. 53. 2. 61b. 6. 25. 1. 7Plut. Nie. 12 fin. The name may be taken, as Busolt thinks (III. p. 1282. n. 3), from Aristoph. Lys. 387 ff. ATHENIAN CLUBS associates we do not know. But he was, like Alcibiades, a man of noble family who had elected to enter public life as a leader of the democracy,1 and may well have belonged to his club, or another of similar character. The way in which these interruptions, at first no doubt pro­posed in an orderly manner, degenerated into the mere abuse and ridicule that are now termed "heckling" is illustrated by several cases. In the ecclesia which received the report of the second embassy to Philip in 346, Demosthenes, when he attempted to answer the speech of Aeschines, became the target for such attacks. Aeschines and Philocrates, standing by the bema, one on one side and one on the other, shouted and jeered at him, until the ecclesiasts, laughing at their witticisms, would not suffer him to speak.2 The following specimen of their ridicule he gives: " 'Athenians,' I said, 'if any of this comes true, be sure you praise and honor and crown these men, and not me; but if it turns out difierently, let them feel your resentment. I am out of it altogether.' 'Don't be out of it now,' said Aeschines interrupting, 'mind you don't want to be in it another time.' 'Certainly,' said I, 'or I should be acting unfairly.' At which Philocrates rose in a flippant manner and said, 'No wonder, men of Athens, that I and Demosthenes agree not in opinion; for he drinks water and I drink wine'-and you laughed.''3 In the Achamians, Dicaeopolis comes to the ecclesia prepared "to shout, to interrupt, to jeer at the orators if anyone speaks on any other topic than peace."4 And throughout the session he interrupts the speakers with comments and mockery strikingly similar, if allowance be made for the comic character of the scene, to the interruptions of Philocrates and Aeschines.5 Praxagora, when she practices for her speech in the ecclesia, is warned to beware of such inter­ruptions and taunts, and promptly demonstrates that she is thoroughly capable of replying in kind.6 An idea of the vul­garity to which such chaffing might attain may be gained from the character of the witticisms indulged in by speakers in the 1Cf. Toeppfer Attische Genealogie p. 148; Gilbert Beitrage p. 249. 2nem. 19. 23. 3Dem. 19. 45-46 (Kennedy). 4Aristoph. Ack. 37-39. 0Jb. 65 ff. &Jb. Eccl. 248 ff. IN THE POLITICAL FIELD ecclesia even in the presence of the Areopagus, as described by Aeschines.1 A number of passages in the orators allude apparent­ly to interruptions and jeers of this kind.2 But it is difficult in many cases to distinguish between interruptions of individuals and the confused applause or uproar for which the entire body of partisans was responsible. It was the constant practice of the Athenians in their assemblies to manifest approval by tumultuous applause, 3 and their dis­approval by an unrestrained uproar of jeering and abuse. 4 Not infrequently speakers were hooted down and compelled to leave the bema without being heard. 5 The crowds of partisans with which, as has been seen, assemblies were "packed" were expected to make themselves useful in this way. The group of 7rapaK°XTJTOL introduced into the ecclesia by Aeschines howled down Demos­thenes when he attempted to voice his opposition to the move­ment against the Amphissians.6 In the Ecclesiazusae, the female conspirators with whom Praxagora "packed" the meeting shouted down the speakers, and greeted the words of their own orator with loud applause, completely drowning the voices of the op­position.7 Demonstrations of this kind, carefully planned in advance, must have contributed to the exaggerated estimates of the oligarchic strength in 411,8 and to the fear which kept silent the democrats in the ecclesia when the Thirty were chosen. 9 7. Voting.-That the bands of associates with which assemb­lies were "packed" voted as a unit and to their full strength, goes without saying. The manner in which this was accomplished is excellently illustrated by the assembly which chose the Thirty. The "ephors" had decided in advance what measures were to 11. 81 ff. 2E. g. [Dem.] 10. 1.1; Dem. 8. 38; 25. 64; [Dem.] 26. 19; 59. 43. Cf. 10. 70: AOLOoplas et TLS xwpl.s EpOLTO, KTA. 3Plato Rep. 492B; Dem. 21. 14; Aristoph. Knights 651, 666; cf. Eccl. 431-33, 213, which suggest the form that applause might take. 4Dem. 25. 95; Aeschines 1. 34; Thuc. 8. 53. 2, 86. 2; Lys. 12. 73; Dem. 18. 143; 19. 15, 45, 113; [13. 3]; Xen. Hell. 1. 7. 12; Plato Apol. 32B; Aristoph. Eccl. 399; Diod. Sic. 13. 101. 6; Plato Rep. loc. cit., etc. 6Dem. 18. 143; 19. 15, 45, 113. 6Dem. 18. 143. 7Aristoph. Eccl. 399 ff., 431 ff. BThuc. 8. 66. 3. 9Lys. 12. 75. ATHENIAN CLUBS be passed, and the clubmen had been instructed how to vote,. probably by the "phylarchs," the lieutenants of the "ephors," before coming into the assembly; when the questions were put they promptly voted as they had been told. 1 In many cases, the voting strength of the associates must have been sufficient to turn the scale. In others, as upon the occasion just mentioned, the impression of overwhelming strength created by their pre­arranged demonstrations caused many of the opponents to re­frain from voting or even to leave the assembly.2 In addition, there were tricks which might be resorted to in order to make votes carry more than their due weight. One way of procuring this result was to watch for an opportunity when the members of the opposition were off their guard, or not present in their full strength, and then to rush a measure through. Thus Eubulides, by reason of his official position, was able to take up the greater part of the deme meeting with speeches and motions, and in this way to def er the vote on the case of his enemy Euxitheus until the majority of the demesmen had left and increasing darkness favored the execution of his plan. 3 Essentially this same de­vice is employed by Praxagora in the Ecdesiazusae, for she fills the ecclesia with the women conspirators early in the morning, the assembly is convened betimes, most of the regular ecclesiasts are barred out, and the revolutionary measure is rushed through without delay.4 Demosthenes apparently has in mind this pro­ceeding when he alludes to the election of Aeschines as Pylaean deputy in 340/39.5 In the case of Eubulides, this manoeuvre was supplemented by actual fraud in the voting. In the dark­ness, Eubulides gave each of his confederates two or three ballots, which they cast into the boxes, so that more than sixty votes were cast, although not more than thirty persons were present. 6 Aeschines charges that proedri, fraudulently seated through the intrigues of a clique, not only announce the results of the tLys. 12. 44, 75-76. 2Lys. 12. 7 5; cf. Thuc. 6. 24. 4. 3Dem. 57. 8-10. 4376 ff. 5Dem. 18. 149; cf. infra pp. 129-30. 6Dem. 57. 13. IN THE POLITICAL FIELD voting falsely, but intimidate their honest colleagues and prevent them from doing their duty. 1 8. Collusfon of offici,als.-In many cases, collusion on the part of officials must have been absolutely essential to the perpe­tration of these frauds; at all times it would be a great advantage. There was always the chance that a club member might be duly and properly chosen among the officials and thus placed in a position to favor his comrades, as in the case of Eubulides. 2 In addition to this chance, there was the possibility of fraudulently seating an associate, or, failing that, of winning over an official or officials who had been honestly chosen. The opportun­ities for such practices seem to have been considerable. There are a number of allusions to trickery in the selection of officials, and Aeschines alleges that the clique which controlled the senate and ecclesia in his time was accustomed to manipulate the lot and thus secure the election of its own members and partisans as presidents. 3 Officials who had been properly selected might be bribed, intimidated, or otherwise persuaded.4 Andocides was charged with having bribed the prytanes to introduce him before the assembly,5 and the Pseudo-Xenophon speaks of bribery of officials, both of the courts and of the deliberative bodies, as common in the fifth century. 6 Midias was succe~ful in bribing even the archon who was to preside at the Dionysia, if we may believe Demosthenes.7 In the Pseudo-Platonic Axiochus, Theramenes and his party are charged with having suborned the proedri . when the generals were condemned.8 Intimidation was also employed. 9 Threats of prosecution as a means of coercing officials have been discussed. 10 This con­nivance of the presiding officials made it possible to promote or 13.3. 2Dem. 57. 8~ Had there been any irregularity in the selection of Eubulides, Euxitheus would not have passed it by. 3Aeschines 3. 62, 73; [Dem.] 58. 29. 4Aeschines 3. 3. 6[Lys.] 6. 29. 6Pol. Ath. 3. 3; cf Aristoph. Thesm. 936-37; Peace 908-09. 7Dem. 21. 17. 8368E. 9Aeschines 3. 3; cf. Dem. 25. 9. 10Cf. supra pp. 104-105. ATHENIAN CLUBS hinder the introduction of business, to regulate debate and the putting of motions, and to perpetrate fraud in the voting.1 9. Miscellaneous expedients.-The efforts of associates to in­fluence the action of assemblies must for the most part have been along the general lines indicated. There were, however, other opportunities open to them which do not come under these heads. A clubman might, for example, employ the proceeding of Dicaeo­polis in the Acharnians, and attempt to prevent the transaction of business to which he was opposed by announcing that he noted unfavorable omens, and by demanding an immediate adjourn­ment.2 As the pronouncement of the proper officials, probably the exegetes, was required, it would seem that a pretended owa.Xas as a reference to the leaders of the clubs. · 3E. g. Baron "La candidature politique chez les Atheniens" Rev. Et. Gr. XIV. pp. 394 ff.; Gilbert Beitrage p. 15; Vischer pp. 171-2; Buttner pp. 77 ff.; Goodhart note to Thuc. 8. 48. 3; Arnold note to Thuc. 8. 54.4; Whibley p. 84, etc. None of these tells how the clubs influenced elections. 'The consideration will be limited to elections under the democracy. Under the aristocracy which preceded the reforms of Clisthenes, the clubs seem to have controlled elections by methods suited to the exist­ing conditions (cf. Cons. Ath. 20. 1; supra pp. 11 ff.). 5Baron pp. 385 ff., esp. 394; Gilbert Beitrage pp. 14-16; on the termin­ology of candidacy, see Gilbert op. cit. p. 14. n. 1, and compare supra p. 75. n. 1. 61. 4. 128 ATHENIAN CLUBS in connection with the part played by social gatherings in the political activities of the clubs.1 After the preliminary campaigning had been performed, the candidate was confronted by the real problem, the problem of getting out his vote in its full strength at the election and of talring advantage of any weakness his opponents might show. How his associates would aid him in meeting this difficulty has not to my knowledge been satisfactorily explained. Now elec­tive offices were filled at assemblies (apxaLpEafo.L) in which the citizens voted by show of hands, and which varied in size from the entire demos to the membership of a tribe or deme, according to the offices which were to be filled. 2 It is obvious that the op­portunities for influencing these elective assemblies would, with some exceptions, 3 be identical with those which existed in con­nection with other assemblies at which a vote was to be taken, and that the clubs would naturally have recourse to the methods which they found successful in getting a favorable vote upon legislation.4 Before the election, caucuses would be held, plans agreed upon, and instructions imparted. The full voting strength which the club or clubs concerned could influence would be intro­duced into the elective assembly. Electors would be personally canv~ed before and, in all probability, even during the voting. Applause and acclamation would play their part. The associates would vote solidly for their candidate. And finally it must be remembered that in many cases the clubs would not stop at legitimate means of carrying the day, but would be on the alert to take advantage of their opponents at every turn, to procure the collusion of officials, or to commit frauds in the voting. In the second oligarchic revolution, we find that the political 1Cf. supra p. 113, esp. n. 7. 20n the election of generals and other important state officers, cf. Gilbert Com. Ant. p. 217. n. 3; Schoemann Griechische Altertilmer pp. 418 ff.; on the tribal elections, cf. Gilbert op. cit. p. 215. n. 1. In addition to the deme offices, some of which were elective and some allotted (Haus­soullier pp. 57 ff.), the demes originally nominated candidates from whose number many offices were filled by lot, but this privilege was taken away from them to a large extent because of bribery in the deme elec­tions (cf. Sandys's note to Ar. Com. Ath. 62. 1). See also D. & S. Diet. Ant., s. v. archaeresiae. •Headlam (p. 25) has called attention to the fact that there is no evidence that speeches were delivered in elections. 4Cf. supra pp. 111 ff. IN THE POLITICAL FIELD machine organized by the clubs was employed not only to control legislation, but also to secure the election of the club candidates for office. The five "ephors" decide what men are to hold office, and give the necessary instructions for their election to the asso­ciates.1 The reference is to a time which antedated the actual establishment of the oligarchy and to manipulation of the existing democratic organs of governmental administration. 2 Demosthenes, in speaking of the election of Midias as epi­melete at the Dionysia in 352/1,3 intimates that pressure was brought to bear in connection with his candidacy. Two different texts have been constituted by editors here. 4 According to one reading, Midias is spoken of as "proposing himself and bidding the people elect him epimelete," according to the other, as "pro­posing and electing himself epimelete.'' Both phrases carry a suggestion of the exercise of undue influence, but we are not told how the election was managed. The fact that Midias was notorious for his club affiliations makes it probable that he was aided by his associates. 6 Another case seems to throw light on the question. Demos­thenes says of the election of Aeschines as pylagorus in 340/39: "No one (I believe) was aware of the thing or attending to it­just as these things are usually done at Athens-Aeschines was proposed for Pylaean deputy, three or four held up their hands for him, and his election was declared.''6 The expression ''three or four" is of course rhetorical exaggeration, but what Demos­thenes is describing is exactly the proceeding which we have already seen used by the clubs in the voting of legislative assem­ 1Lys. 12. 43-44: Ka.l o~anva.s XPEl11 lipXE'" Ta.p/yy"(f>..'Aov (lopo1.). For the workings of this organization in legislative assemblies, cf. supra pp. 112 ff. 2Lys. 1.oc. cit.: 017µ.oKpa.rla.s ~n ofiv, a.XX' h 1rapaa1CEV7js 7rptaµEPOS. Baron has rightly pointed out in regard to Aeschines 1. 106 (p. 376) that these words should not be taken to mean that the usual forms were dispensed with, but merely to indicate improper procedure. ATHENIAN CLUBS may not be true in the particular case; there is no evidence on which to test the statement. But it does indicate that fraudulent manipulation of the lot was a recognized fact. This is supported by other cases. According to the Pseudo-Demosthenes, the brother of Theocrines obtained the office of hieropoius by trickery, not being properly drawn for the office or as alternate.1 And Aeschines alleges that Timarchus was able to secure many allotted offices by bribery, among them that of logist.2 Richardson3 concludes that tampering with the lot was "a common practice." Unfortunately, in none of these cases have we details of the methods followed. But it is obvious that the connivance of the officials entrusted with the supervision of the lot would be neces­sary. And a law cited by Demosthenes4 providing the death penalty for the man whose name appears on more than one ticket, indicates that a means of fraud in drawing was to "stuff" the box with a number of tickets bearing the name of the favored candidate, thus increasing his chances of success. One method seems to have been actually to open the urns from which names were to be drawn, remove the slips which had been de­posited therein, and substitute others. Isocrates describes such a proceeding in the selection of judges for a dramatic or dithy­rambic contest: "For who of you does not know that Pytho­dorus-the 'tenter' they call him-who does and says every­thing at the behest of Pasion, just last year opened the urns and took out the names of the judges, which had been put in by the council? And yet, a man who for a pittance, although the deed involved a capital charge, dared to open those urns, which had been sealed by the prytanes and counter-sealed by the choregi, which were being guarded by the treasurers and lay in the aero­ 1[Dem.] 58. 29. For the selection of the two colleges of hieropoii, cf. Ar. Cons. Ath. 54. 6-7, Vvith Sandys's note; Gilbert Cons. Ant. p. 262. 2Aeschines 1. 106-107. For the two colleges of logists, cf. Ar. Cons. Ath. 48. 3 and 54.1-2; Gilbert Cons. Ant. pp. 223-25. Timarchus was apparently a member of the last named commission. 3Note to Aeschines 3. 3. While Headlam (p. 54) will not admit that the lot was fraudulently administered, he makes no attempt to dispose of the cases cited, save to remark of the charge against Demosthenes that "it is probably nothing but a characteristic method of expressing annoyance that Demosthenes had been fortunate enough to get elected.'' 4Dem. 39. 12. The correct interpretation of this passage is found in Sandys's note ad loc., and in D. & S. Diet. Ant., s. v. archai (I. p. 369). IN THE POLITICAL FIELD polis, why do we wonder," etc.1 It will be noted that bribery is mentioned in connection with several of these fraudulent drawings. This would presumably be bribery of the officials in charge. The possibility of manipulating the lot was then another means of influencing the selection of officers which was open to the clubs, and of which some of them at least would not have hesitated to take advantage, either when associates were in charge of the drawing, or when officials could be won over.2 Demosthenes alludes to a case in which a politician secured the removal by special decree of an allotted officer, alleging mal­feasance, and got himself appointed in his stead. 3 It is easy to see from all this what a valuable asset was the support of a club to the man who was a candidate for office in his own deme, or for membership in the boule, and how the oli­garchic and conservative clubs were able by combining their strength to influence elections for the more important offices, and at times, by taking advantage of a change in public senti­ment, even to control the whole machinery of government and overthrow the democracy. Indeed, Baron concludes that the success of a candidate for elective office was conditional upon his securing the support of the popular leaders on the one side, or of the clubs on the other.4 When the democratic party was in power, he believes, the leading demagogue dictated the election of officials, when the oligarchs were in control, the clubs. Baron, however, is inclined to ascribe to the clubs entirely too much the aspect of a permanent, organized party of the opposition, and to forget here a fact which he elsewhere5 recognizes briefly, that, while many of them were oligarchic in their political tendencies, they followed diverse interests and organized only on exceptional occasions, as is implied in the Thucydides passage. 6 He thus loses sight of their influence upon elections for the great mass of less important offices. 1Isoc. 17. 33-34; cf. Haigh op. cit. p. 31. n. 5. 2For the way in which clubs took advantage of the collusion of of­ficials, cf. supra pp. 90 ff., 125 ff. 3Dem. 22. 48 (with Wayte's note); 24. 160. 4Pp. 390 ff., esp. 396. 6P. 394. Baron appears to forget this statement as he progresses in his argument. 88. 54. 4. 136 ATHENIAN CLUBS Again, while Baron is undoubtedly correct in believing that Pericles and to a certain extent the later demagogues dictated the choice of officials, he speaks as if the pronouncement of the popular leader ipso facto resulted in the election of the favored man. He forgets the great mass of detailed and arduous work which lay between the endorsement of the candidate and his election. He fails to consider the problem which the democratic leaders as well as the clubs had to meet, that of getting out the vote which they could control. We have seen that the early demagogues, Pericles, Themistocles, Clisthenes, had hetaeries with which they could meet this problem, 1 and we must believe that their successors were aided by some organizations which were, if not clubs, similar in aim and methods. OSTRACISM In theory, ostracism may be regarded as the means by which a far-seeing statesman attempted to guard against the establishment of a tyranny, or to protect the state from the dis­astrous consequences of bitter factionalism.2 From the stand­point of practical politics, it is seen to have become an offensive weapon of great efficiency for the party leader whose strength and popular influence sufficed to wield it with impunity. 3 The par­ticular cases in which details are available indicate that the voting was largely partisan in character and that the battle was fought out along much the same lines and by much the same methods as at elections and in the assembly.4 Ostracism, then, offered the clubs another field for political activity. In a number of the cases of ostracism mentioned by ancient writers, details are so completely lacking that we cannot say 1cf. supra p. 18, notes 4-6. 2cf. Carcopino "Histoire de l'ostracisme athenien" Melanges d'his­toire ancienne (Paris: 1909) pp. 212-20; Martin, in D. & S. Diet. Ant., s. v. (IV. pp. 261-2); Grote II. p. 512, III. pp. 373 ff.; Valeton "De ostra­cismo" Mnemosyne N. S. XV. pp. 129-71, 337-55, 357-426; XVI. pp. 1-25, 162-238. JCf. Ar. Pol. 1284 b 22: urnow.unKw'!> EXPWVTo Tot'!> ouTpaK1.uµo'i'!>. 4Jn the ostracism of Aristides (Grote IV. pp. 149 ff.; Busolt II. pp. 651-52), of Cimon (Grote IV. pp. 450-51; Busolt III. pp. 294-95), of Thucydides (Grote IV. p. 505; Busolt III. pp. 495 ff.) of Hyperbolus (cf. infra pp. 137-38), the vote was cast along partisan lines and the parties must have spared no effort to get out their full strength. 137 IN THE POLITICAL FIELD positively whether or not clubs participated. But it is inconceiv­able that the clubs of Clisthenes and Hipparchus remained passive when the latter was ostracised;1 that the associates of Themisto­cles withheld their assistance in the banishment of Aristides, or offered no opposition when Themistocles was himself ostracised ;2 that tlie club of Cimon supinely acquiesced in his overthrow;3 that the hetaeries of Pericles and Thucydides stood idle when a vote of ostracism in 444 brought the opposition between the two leaders to a crisis and resulted in the breaking up of Thucy­dides' club. 4 In the ostracism of Hyperbolus, almost the only instance in which details are available, the intervention of · the clubs of Alcibiades and Nicias, as described by Plutarch, was so effective that the vote was turned against the popular leader himself.5 Carcopino concludes that it was this coup on the part of the clubs which revealed to the Athenians the dangerous pos­ sibilities of ostracism and caused its abandonment. 6 In 418/17,7 the opposition between Nicias and Alcibiades had come to a focus. An ostracism was decided upon. Hyperbolus gave it his strong support, probably in the hope of getting rid of his rival Alcibiades. 8 The latter, according to Plutarch, perceived his danger, "effected a union of the parties, and, having reached an agreement with Nicias, turned the vote of ostracism against Hyperbolus. But, as some say, it was not Nicias but Phaeax with whom he came to terms, and it was the latter's hetaery whose support he received in driving out Hyperbolus."9 Phaeax seems to have been the head of an oligarchic group 10 1Hipparchus was supported by and probably belonged to clubs of the Isagorean faction (Ar. Cons. Ath. 22. 4, 20. 1). On these and the clubs of the Clisthenic party, see supra pp. 11 ff. 2Cf. supra p. 18. n. 4. 3Cf. supra p. 19. n. 1; for the fidelity of Cimon's associates after his banishment, cf. Plut. Cim. 17. 40n the club of Pericles, cf. supra p. 18. n. 5; on that of Thucydides, supra p. 19. n. 2, where a distinction is noted between the club of Thucy­ dides and the larger party organization described by Plutarch (Per.11). 5Cf. infra p. 138 n. 1. 6Pp. 140, 254-56. 70n the chronology, cf. Carcopino pp. 221-24; Busolt III. p. 1257. n.1. 8Plut. Nie. 11; cf. Busolt III. pp. 1256-57. 9Plut. Ale. 13; cf. N ic. 11; Arist. 7. 10Cf. Busolt III. pp. 1258-59; Carcopino (pp. 246-51) makes Phaeax a fol­ 138 ATHENIAN CLUBS which was acting with the moderates at the time. With Alci­biades, Kicias, and Phaeax against him, Hyperbolus faced a com­bination which must have included nearly all of the clubs in Athens, one which he could not hope to overcome.1 How much greater was the activity of the clubs in ostracism than can be realized from these isolated instances, is shown by the statement of the Pseudo-Andocides, \VTiting probably in the early fourth century: "In such proceedings (as ostracism) the men who possess associates and club-fellows have an advantage over those who do not; for the decision does not rest with judges chosen by lot, as in the courts, but in this all the Athenians take part."2 W'bile Carcopino appreciates the importance of the clubs in ostracism, a detailed study of the methods they employ does not fall within the scope of his investigation. 3 Here again the ques­tion to be answered is, how did a club seek to influence a vote of ostracism? By what precise means did the associates of a party leader and of his lieutenants second bis efforts to procure the ostracism of an opponent or to avert a vote against himself? Every year, in the €KKArJ