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Egyptian Nationalism, 1882-1919: Elite Competition, Transnational Networks, Empire, and Independence

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**Egyptian Nationalism, 1882-1919: Elite Competition, Transnational
Networks, Empire, and Independence**

by

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For my mother

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Egyptian Nationalism, 1882-1919: Elite Competition, Transnational Networks, Empire, and Independence

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This thesis studies the formulation and expression of Egyptian nationalism in the period 1882-1919. In particular, it argues that Egyptian nationalism, rather than having the territorial nation-state as the highest form of nationalist expression, was composed of multiple overlapping and contingent identities. Furthermore, this thesis will draw attention to inter-and intra- elite rivalries between power bases within Egypt, including the office of the Khedive, the urban elite, landowners, European powers, and Ottoman representatives; and the way in which these vying groups affected the growth and composition of the Egyptian nationalist movement. This thesis also contends that the policies and ideologies of Egyptian nationalists were both contingent and fluid, as were the self-identities of the Egyptian population. Egyptian nationalism in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries took many of its characteristics and methodologies from the global context of competing imperialisms as well as trans-national anti-colonial movements. Therefore, this thesis seeks to locate Egyptian nationalism in the period 1882-1919 within the global and local context of competing power bases and popular expectations.

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*“The People are asleep my darling”
So she’d tell him;
He, too,
Was careful not to wake the People,
To endure its dreams
Like a kid’s kicks
To ape its slack tongue like a fool,
To crawl before it on all fours
That he might tell it the story of creation...
--Mohab Nasr (translated by Robin Moger)*

Chapter One: Introduction

In the wake of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution that deposed President Hosni Mubarak (President, 1981-2011) and mobilized large and diverse swathes of the Egyptian population, numerous commentators began to compare the Egyptian Revolutions of 1919 and 2011, many making the determination that both revolutions were ultimately failures as a result of the inability of the movements’ leaders to reify popular support into organizational capacity.¹ While certain demands were echoed across class and ideological divisions, both revolutions clearly meant different things to different segments of the population. For example, for some, the revolutions promised increased access to power, while for others, they portended important social and economic reforms. Early comparisons of the 1919 and 2011 revolutions posited 1919 as a “nationalist” revolution and 2011 as a “people’s revolution.”² Because the 1919 Revolution asserted territorial nationalism in the face of British colonialism, rather than deep socio-economic change, 1919 can be considered a nationalist revolution. The early leaders of the 2011

¹ See, for example, Ahmed Naguib Roushdy, “A Tale of Three Revolutions,” *al-Ahram Weekly*, Issue No. 1198 (22 May 2014); Omnia El-Shakry, “Egypt’s Three Revolutions: The Force of History Behind This Popular Uprising,” in Bassam Haddad, Rosie Bsheer, and Ziad Abu-Rish, *The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order?* (London: Pluto Publishing, 2012); and Khaled Fahmy, “The Constitution, the Revolution,” *al-Ahram Weekly*, 20 December 2012.

² El-Shakry, “Egypt’s Three Revolutions,” 8.

uprising proposed not only a change of governmental leadership and organization, but also a fundamental shift in the structure of society, making it, at least initially, a “popular” revolution. Nevertheless, at least from the perspective of the emerging dominant national ruling elements, neither revolution aimed at the radical transformation of the social structure or class relations. In the 1919 Revolution, the Wafd, which previously had a small popular base, stepped into the role of voice of the Revolution, which resulted in a significantly more conservative outcome. However, as the 2011 Revolution has faded further into the past, the similarities to 1919 become clearer. As in the case of the Revolution of 1919, the reason the Egyptian revolution of 2011 failed to fundamentally alter state structures is that it did not fundamentally change the social, political, and economic structure of the country. Too many historically-entrenched centers of power and a multitude of popular loyalties that were never brought together under the umbrella of one movement proved disastrous for the revolutionaries in both 1919 and 2011.

Beyond the slogans of national unity and popular support lay a complex assemblage of forces, each with their own expectations and reasons for joining the nationalist movement. The revolutionary leaders of the period 1882-1919 failed to capitalize on their popularity in order to mobilize popular opinion to build a strong, institutionalized movement. History is replete with examples of political groups that seize power on a wave of mass mobilization, only to revert to the politics of pragmatism and self-interest under the mantle of revolutionary ideals. This, combined with the competing power bases of local elites, was what plagued the early Egyptian nationalists.

This thesis seeks to locate Egyptian nationalism in the period 1881-1919 within the global and local context of competing power bases and distinctive expectations. In particular, Egyptian nationalism will be assessed within both the global context of world-wide empires, as

well as the burgeoning trans-national anti-colonial movement. Furthermore, this thesis will draw attention to inter-and intra- elite rivalries between power bases within Egypt, including the office of the Khedive, the urban elite, landowners, European powers, and Ottoman representatives, and the way in which these vying groups affected the growth and composition of the Egyptian nationalist movement. This framework, then, seeks to draw attention to the context, contingencies, and complexity of Egyptian nationalism, as well as overlapping Egyptian self-identities and self-interests.

Moreover, this thesis attempts to broaden the context of late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century Egyptian nationalism from a singular focus on the particularism of fighting the British to include the power struggles between nationalists, the palace, the Ottoman Empire, competing local elites, transnational groups and loyalties, and changing global norms. There was certainly a clear division between Western imperialism (though European colonialism itself was divided along competing national lines) on the one hand, and various Egyptian rival forces of internal nationalism and independence, on the other. This division was clear, and included all stripes of Egyptian nationalism in the fight for independence from the British. However, this unification of various stakeholders was often undermined by contending local interests. Nationalists, elites, and the position of the Khedivate were often in conflict because of competing local interests, despite their agreement on the importance of Egyptian independence. The meanings of nationalism, anti-colonialism, and independence itself were debated and negotiated between these varying elite bases of power.³ And the different Egyptian movements for

³ Many elites who supported Egyptian independence or expansion of their own power vis-à-vis the British or the Khedive were worried about the cooptation of nationalist and constitutionalist language by certain groups, cooptation which led, for example, to revolts of peasant farmers and revolts in the South. For more on the incongruity between the state-centered Cairene nationalist project and the self-identification and self-interest of subject populations, see Zeinab Abul-Magd, *Imagined Empires: A History of Revolt in Egypt* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013.)

nationalism and independence must be seen within the global context of internal European colonial rivalries, the state of the Ottoman Empire and her relationship with Egypt, and connections with other anti-colonial nationalist movements.

Lost in the attempts to view the Egyptian nationalist movement as a linear progression beginning with the 'Urabi Revolt and ending with, alternately, the 1919 or 1952 Revolutions (or as not having yet found its completion) are the complexity and contingency that consistently defined Egyptian nationalism and the movement for independence. The fluid policies and ideologies of the Egyptian nationalists were, throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, contingent and focused on the group, movement, or transnational identity – the Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi, the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turks, Germany, or European Socialists, for example - that might give them the most leverage and support toward their ultimate goal of independence at any given moment. Furthermore, Watani Party leader Mustafa Kamil and his successors became extremely adept at playing to their audiences: liberal (or secular) nationalism to Europeans and Westernized Egyptians, and conservative adherence to Islamic values to their Ottoman and traditional Egyptian audiences.⁴ Thus, any classification of Kamil or others, or of the movement as a whole, as one specific thing or another is fundamentally flawed. The failure of this strategy was, of course, that it resulted in a movement with little direction and no consistent allies or position, particularly after the Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi was deposed in 1914, and the Ottoman Empire was defeated in the First World War. Furthermore, the nationalist movement in this period was characterized by inter-elite rivalries and alternative definitions of what nationalism and independence would ultimately mean.

⁴ This ideological ambivalence has been developed by Fritz Steppat, *Nationalismus und Islam bei Mustafa Kamil* (Leiden: Brill, 1956.)

Rather than attempting to define Egyptian nationalism as a narrow, singular ideology, it is necessary to view the movement as an essentially self-regarding, locally-centered movement that was not only willing to change strategies, allegiances, and rhetoric to fit the moment, but was also motivated by a collection of various groups, each of which possessed a complex set of loyalties and identities. With the exception of a handful of true ideologues, most supporters of Egyptian nationalism and independence tailored their message around potential patrons, rather than out of an abiding loyalty to one ideology or another, and represented specific vested interests. Viewing late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century social and political movements as representative of contingent and rival interests is much more useful for examining Egyptian nationalism than are frameworks that see the movement in terms of religion or ethnicity.

Cultural critiques of nationalism have tended to valorize an ahistorical notion of indigenous culture while denouncing or ignoring the machinations and cunning of political self-interest.⁵ A more correct understanding of Egyptian nationalism requires that one make a genuine effort to analyze the material through a framework in which Britain, the West, and Western narratives and expectations are not the center of discussion. The assumption that there are enduring ideologies or even an enduring nationalism outside of individual self-interest does not hold up to scrutiny. Instead, it must be acknowledged that various groups have specific concerns and contingent alliances and allegiances.

This thesis also seeks to interrogate the contingent and fluid nature of Egyptian self-identity. Traditional scholarship on Egypt upholds a theorized juxtaposition between Egyptian territorial nationalism and other loyalties, such as Arabism, Islamism, Ottomanism, or Third-Worldism. However, the complex web of personal allegiances and loyalties held by Egyptian

⁵ Yoav Di-Capua, "Embodiment of the Revolutionary Spirit: The Mustafa Kamil Mausoleum in Cairo," *History & Memory*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2001), 97.

individuals, communities, and entrenched interests were significantly more complicated. Egyptians at the time did not generally make distinctions between various loyalties and identities, such as imperial, religious, political, or ethnic; and revolutionary leaders found little difficulty in utilizing any or all of those loyalties as they proved useful to the national project of independence. Like other anti-colonial nationalist movements, Egyptian nationalist leaders were usually content to relax some of their ideological dictates in order to achieve or maintain political autonomy.⁶ Egyptian nationalism was not generally in competition with trans-nationalist ideas and movements. As Dennis Walker notes,

al-Hizb al-Watani's (The National Party) commitment to Egypt's political unity was not nationalism of the exclusive total Western type dividing humanity up into atomistic nation-state units with freedom to fluidly alter associations formed with other nation units as change of interest decrees. [Mustafa] Kamil's Egyptian nation could not gain the singleness of commitment exacted by the European nation because al-Hizb al-Watani's thought imposed a plurality of political communities, the pan-Islamic as well as the nation.⁷

The multi-polarity of the Egyptian nationalist movement, the competing interests of local actors who found their voice in various parties and organizations, and the contingent and fluid self-identity of Egyptians makes a singular narrative of Egyptian nationalism impossible. Instead, the push for Egyptian independence must be seen as a complex web of allegiances and identities, negotiated over time.

Historiography

⁶ It may also be noted that, despite the supposed failures of Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism, and the like, they achieved considerable successes as adjuncts to nationalist liberation movements (and in the political careers of many nationalist leaders.)

⁷ "Mustafa Kamil's Party: Islam, Pan-Islamism, and Nationalism," *Islam in the Modern Age*, Vol. 11 (1980), 230-9 and Vol. 12 (1981), 107; James Alexander, *The Truth about Egypt* (London: Casell Press, 1911), 74-7. See, also, Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid, *Egypt and Cromer* (London: John Murray, 1968), 184.

Although there has been considerable work done on the development of Egyptian nationalism under the British Occupation (1882-1952), most have been imperially-defined political histories, such as that of P.J. Vatikiotis, in which the role of the Great Powers in internal political maneuvering is the central feature.⁸ Comparative works have largely placed the formation of Egyptians' national identity in a regional context in relation to Ottomanism before World War I or Arab nationalism after it. In these works, Egyptians' relationships outside of the Middle East are rarely examined, and the works that do look farther afield tend to do so assuming solidarity based upon Islam.⁹ Likewise, the complicated and overlapping identities of Islamism, Arabism, Ottomanism, and the like across periods are seldom contextualized or appreciated.

Juan Cole's *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East* examines Egyptian motivations during the 1881 'Urabi Revolution; and identifies a "proto-nationalism" arising out of Egyptians' identification of themselves as distinct from both the Turco-Circassian elite, and Europeans and other "foreigners" such as Syrians.¹⁰ This notion of "proto-nationalism," also referred to by scholars such as Nikki Keddie and Elie Kedourie, is somewhat problematic, however. It wrongly privileges loyalty to a territorial nation-state above all other forms of identification, and assumes that loyalties based on any other criteria are not only incomplete, but

⁸ P.J. Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.)

⁹ Noor-Aiman Iftikhar Khan, "The Enemy of My Enemy: Indian Influences on Egyptian Nationalism, 1907-1930," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2006), 17-19.

¹⁰ Juan R.I. Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: The Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt's 'Urabi Revolt* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.) In this work, Juan Cole examines Egyptian sources on the 1881 Revolution and has theorized that the Revolt was largely fueled by resentment of European financial encroachment as well as internal tensions arising from the preponderance of a "Turco-Circassian elite" in the government and military at the expense of native Egyptians. This work contradicted much of the accepted imperial historiography, in which the specter of religious fanaticism play a large role in explaining the 'Urabists' motivations. Historians had also accepted parts of this explanation because of the connections many of the original 'Urabists and other nationalists had with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani.

in direct contradiction to territorial nationalism.¹¹ Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski's two works on the development of Egyptian national identity also examine a wider range of materials than that produced by the political elite and recognize more of the local cultural expressions of Egyptian identity.¹² Gershoni and Jankowski discuss at length the existence of multiple allegiances for Egyptians throughout the twentieth century: Ottoman, Arab, Islamic, Eastern, and "Pharaonic," the latter of which they posit as the most congruous with territorial nationalism. However, the authors see each of these identities as distinct and incapable of coexisting with any other. Rather than framing these various identities as mutually exclusive, this thesis seeks to argue that these loyalties cannot be mutually constitutive of national political identity.

In *Redefining the Egyptian Nation*, the authors equate cultural nationalism with territorial nationalism, and Pharaonism with Egypt, which leads them to consider references to Islam or Arab culture as indicating a nationalist identification beyond Egypt, which they refer to as "supra-Egyptian" forms of identification. This formulation leads them to conclude that, although supra-Egyptianism retained some conception of an Egyptian state, its ideology "served to undermine Egyptian territorial nationalism."¹³ The authors argue that interest in Islam or Arabism, for example, signifies a subordination of feelings of Egyptian primacy to other, larger political identities. In fact, however, no subordination occurred. Certain individuals or groups may identify with Islamic, Arab, or other local or transnational interests and ideologies; nevertheless Egyptian nationalists did not see these various loyalties as competing or mutually exclusive. Gershoni and Jankowski acknowledge that they are dealing with "orientations" that

¹¹ "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1969), 17-28; Elie Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version, and Other Middle-Eastern Studies* (New York: Praeger, 1970.)

¹² Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) and *Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.)

¹³ Gershoni and Jankowski, *Redefining*, 213

are not equivalent to “ideologies”; they admit also that these orientations overlap, and that the same “producers” often held Eastern, Islamic, and Arab loyalties.¹⁴ This thesis will attempt to show that no categorical distinctions existed between these various identities; instead, multiple loyalties and identities coexisted around a core vision of an Egyptian territorial state, whatever the dominant ideology of the moment.

The dominant historiography of modern Egypt has also preferred to see nationalism in Egypt as a purely modern phenomenon. Most scholars have pointed to what they see as a radical discontinuity between a national identity which they posit came to Egyptian intellectuals around the turn of the twentieth century, and earlier forms of Egyptian identity. This argument assumes two things however: firstly, that the specific history of European nationalism is the natural model reproducible elsewhere; and, secondly, that national identity is a teleological phenomenon leading ultimately to identification only with a territorial nation-state. Thus, the significant transition in this view is from a loosely-defined “culturalism” to nationalism, i.e. to the awareness of the nation-state as the ultimate goal of the community.¹⁵ The effort to place nationalism as a distinctively modern phenomenon, however, has tended to fix and objectify what is really a subjective, fluid, and elusive phenomenon, namely the multiple meanings of the nation to citizens of the nation-state. This work will attempt to contextualize Egyptian national identity in the period 1882-1919, with a view less to its distinctiveness than to its changing and fluid relationships to other visions of political and social community.

Two assumptions of the modernization theory of nationalism must be interrogated in order to examine a less static, more contextualized nationalism. The first of these is that national identity is a radically novel form of consciousness. However, as this thesis will show, individual

¹⁴ Ibid., 36

¹⁵ Prasenjit Duara, “Historicizing National Identity, or Who Imagines What and When,” in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, *Becoming National: A Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 153-4.

and community identities and loyalties are never fully subsumed by territorial nationalism and should be considered in their complex relationships to other historical and cultural identities. The second assumption is the privileging of the grand narrative of the nation as a collective historical subject, which essentializes nationalist movements to a deep historical cause rather than practical realities of lived experience. Very specific, very local concerns of Egyptian nationalists, and the various divisions of the population at large informed the course and nature of Egyptian nationalism in the period 1882-1919. Nationalism is rarely the singular identification with the nation-state to the exclusion or subordination of other identities, but rather represents the site where very different views of the nation contest and negotiate with each other.¹⁶

The specter of Pan-Islamism also haunts any discussion of the nature of Egyptian nationalism. Kedourie, Kramer, and others have argued that Egyptian nationalism was at least partially defined by a religious character. However, this framing of the argument is overly simplistic; it does not address the root causes of the nationalist movement, particularly as nationalist leaders repeatedly disclaimed religious motivations. The self-interested use of religious rhetoric is accepted as a utilitarian political discourse when discussing Christian nations; and, thus, it should receive the same analysis in Muslim ones. Nikki Keddie's work on Jamal al-Din al-Afghani demonstrates some connections of what she calls a "proto-nationalist" nature, but the link does not extend beyond Afghani himself.¹⁷ Moreover, the historical connection between Egyptian and Indian nationalists calls into doubt many of the conclusions reached by those who have examined the transnational identity of the Muslim world, and have described many Egyptian-Indian contacts as Pan-Islamic. Works addressing Egyptian

¹⁶ Duara, *Historicising National Identity*, 151-2.

¹⁷ Nikki Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani: A Political Biography* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982) and Nikki Keddie, "Pan Islam as Proto-Nationalism," *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 41 (March 1969.)

nationalism have been largely in a regional context in relation to Egyptians' perceived Ottomanism before the First World War and of Arab nationalism after it. In these works, Egyptians' relationships outside of the Middle East are rarely examined, and the works that do look further afield tend to do so assuming solidarity based on Islam. This, however, is a crucial mistake in studying the history of Egyptian nationalism.

As this study will show, Egyptians found identities based on religion, culture, and the nation-state to be mutually reinforcing rather than competitive. Andersonian theories of nationalism under-represent the ways in which religion, language, ethnicity, and the like underpin many nationalisms in the global South and the manner in which transnational social formations can often be successfully co-opted for nationalist purposes.¹⁸ A more complete explanatory framework would incorporate these alternate forms of identity as mutually reinforcing and often supportive of the nation rather than diametrically opposed to it.¹⁹ Communities were and are variously split by internal feuds and brought together by common purpose in historically contingent ways. For example, Copt and Muslim workers could unite to

¹⁸ The same has historically been true of such transnational ideologies as socialism. Juan R.I. Cole and Deniz Kandiyoti, "Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia: Introduction," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (May 2002), 190-1. Sami Zubaida's essay, "The Fragments Imagine the Nation: The Case of Iraq," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (May 2002), 205-215, suggests the ways in which the case of Iraq poses problems for the Andersonian approach to religion and nationalism.

For a scholarly exchange on the applicability of Anderson's theory on Egyptian nationalism, the role of print culture, and the importance of the secularization of the liturgical language, see Charles D. Smith, "Imagined Identities, Imagined Nationalisms: Print Culture and Egyptian Nationalism in Light of Recent Scholarship," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 29 (1997): 607-22; Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, "Print Culture, Social Change, and the Process of Redefining Imagined Communities in Egypt," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 31 (1999): 81-94. Charles D. Smith, "'Cultural Constructs' and Other Fantasies: Imagined Narratives in Imagined Communities; Surrejoinder to Gershoni and Jankowski's 'Print Culture, Social Change, and the Process of Redefining Imagined Communities in Egypt,'" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 31 (1999): 95-102; Ziad Fahmy, "Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism," 37.

¹⁹ This claim of a radical disjuncture between what Anderson and others consider "pre-modern" identities and "modern nationalism" is exaggerated. Scholars of world systems theory and globalization in all periods have written about the complex networks of trade, pilgrimage, and migration, which linked populations to wider communities and political structures. Moreover, even if the reach of the nation-state is limited, the widespread presence of common cultural ideas link communities to each other and, often, to a concept of a territorial state. This illustrates the fundamental problem of privileging a distinct territorial nationalism over and separate from other forms of identification.

oppose landowners and company supervisors without sacrificing local and communal identities; Egyptians might support the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against Western imperialism, but not as a political sovereign in Egypt. It was possible for an Egyptian nationalist in this period to be a loyal supporter of the Ottoman Empire, a fervent believer in Arabism, and a proponent of an independent Egyptian nation-state, for example. This thesis argues that nationalism in Egypt coexisted and grew symbiotically with its relationship to other forms of political and social community.²⁰ In addition, this thesis will show that not only is there no inherent contradiction between territorial nationalism and loyalties to larger groupings, but also that the nationalists under study never themselves saw any contradiction. They did not articulate an either/or mentality in regards to territorial Egyptian nationalism, loyalty to a transnational Islam, utilitarian bonds with the Ottoman Empire or khedive or foreign governments, and Arab cultural ties. Egyptian nationalist leaders only ever expressed any hesitation at multiple identities was at the thought of a loss of political sovereignty, as displayed in their opposition to any federated Arab political structure. The evidence presented here deliberately complicates the categories that have heretofore been discussed in opposition, or at least in contrast to, the nationalism that sought a territorially sovereign nation-state as its cultural and political goal. Nationalism was not always in competition with trans-nationalist ideas and movements.²¹

This thesis, therefore, disputes the conclusion that supra-Egyptianism “undermined Egyptian territorial nationalism,” causing “Egypt [to be] subsumed into the wider frameworks of identity represented by the Islamic umma or the Arab nation.”²² As Sami Zubeida and Roger Owen have postulated, it is not that “radical Islam or Arabism were meaningless alternatives to,

²⁰ Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, *The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860-1914* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2010), 169.

²¹ Khan, 11-12.

²² *Ibid.*, 213

say, Egyptian Pharaonism, but rather that their imaginings too were subordinated to the model of the territorial nation.”²³ Furthermore, Robert Young’s description of nationalism as a language “in which the power struggle between colonizer and colonized for domination and self-determination operates, functioning as a concept through which a cluster of specific issues and grievances were brought together and politicized” is helpful.²⁴ When nationalism is interpreted as only one of multiple forms of interaction within a community, useful and arguably primary but hardly exclusive or static, the roles of other functions in the interaction become easier to grasp. Identification with other groups can be seen as supplementary, even complementary, to territorial nationalism. Thus, Egyptian nationalism, in its official and unofficial political forms, as well as in its cultural incarnations, communicated its goal of territorial independence in conjunction with Ottomanism, Islamism, Bolshevism, and Arabism, among other transnational ideologies and affiliations, as well as local issues and local elites, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.²⁵ When viewed through the lens of patterns of authority, historical context, class distinction, legitimacy, and religious prerogatives, a seemingly capricious shifting of alliances reappears as pragmatic and thoroughly consistent. Thus, this thesis investigates the agency of Egyptians in constructing and negotiating national identity. This thesis also draws on Prasenjit Duara’s sophisticated treatment of the subject of nationalism in the context of East Asia, which allows for the co-existence of nation-states and transnational, cultural entities, with the latter possibly being absorbed by the former. Academic discourse has often declined to classify trans-national identities as a form of nationalism, although it is difficult to see why,

²³ Gabriel Piterberg, “The Tropes of Stagnation and awakening in Nationalist Historical Consciousness: The Egyptian Case,” Israel Gershoni & James Jankowski (eds.), *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 49. See also, Sami Zubaida, *Beyond Islam: A New Understanding of the Middle East* (London: I.B. Taurus, 2011) and Roger Owen, *State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East* (London: Routledge, 2000.)

²⁴ Robert J.C. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction*, (Oxford; Blackwell, 2001), 173.

²⁵ Khan, 16.

analytically, a form of identity that bases itself on a sense of religious, cultural, or ideological identity is less authentic than secularist, ethnic, or linguistic movements. Insofar as most transnational ideologies are predominately localistic in nature despite their apparent universalism, they can usually be co-opted for nationalist purposes. Nationalism, like any other identity, is a field of contestation rather than a stable essence; and struggles over the definition and place of diverse loyalties and identities can be variably articulated with a national sense of identity that is itself fluid and changing.²⁶ The use of examples such as those of expatriate nationalists, connections between anti-colonial nationalists, the continuation of Ottoman loyalties, the use of nationalist rhetoric by Egyptian elites, as well as contestations between those elites, allows one to demonstrate that there were, in fact, multiple aspects to the formulation of Egyptian nationalism. In this way, it may be shown that phenomena of diverse and transnational loyalties may transgress, but do not necessarily subvert, the nation-state.²⁷

In addition to the multiple overlapping and contested definitions of Egyptian nationalism, this thesis will also address the internal Egyptian rivalries of various elite groups and power bases. What is offered in this thesis is an attempt to engage with Robert Hunter and Khaled Fahmy's arguments on nineteenth-century Egyptian nationalism by applying their analyses to the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.²⁸ In his work, *Egypt under the Khedives*, Robert Hunter argues that the decline and fall of vice-regal absolutism in Egypt was integrally related to changes in Egypt's political and administrative order - in particular, the establishment by key

²⁶ Cole and Kandiyoti, 197.

²⁷ See, for example, T. Brennan, "Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism," in D. Archibugi, ed., *Debating Cosmopolitanism* (London: Verso, 2003), 40-50; Prasenjit Duara, "Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900-1945," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 102, No. 4 (October 1997), 1030-51; P. Cheah, "Given Culture: Rethinking Cosmopolitan Freedom in Transnationalism," *Boundary 2*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Summer 1997), 157-97; Carolien Stolte and Harald Fischer-Tine, "Imaging Asia in India: Nationalism and Internationalism (ca. 1905-1940)," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 54, No. 1 (January 2012), 67.

²⁸ F. Robert Hunter, *Egypt Under the Khedives, 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1999); Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1997.)

members of the ruling elite of ties outside the vice-regal household which weakened their loyalties and attachments to the ruler. This allowed for a mutually-beneficial collaboration between certain elite sectors and European politicians and financiers. European intervention in 1875-79 precipitated the breakup of a ruling group, therefore, which had already been penetrated by “outside” influences. Without the support of collaborating officials bent upon “reform,” European control could not have been established as it was after 1875. The establishment of imperialism in Egypt, then, is seen by Hunter to have been a more complex and subtle phenomenon than is commonly thought – one with profound cultural as well as economic roots, and a strong indigenous base. This thesis attempts to shift framework of the study of the Egyptian nationalism from viewing both British policies and Egyptian nationalism through the lens of imperial politics and simple reactionism, and instead through local contextual politics and social movements.

Similarly, in his monograph, *All the Pasha's Men*, Khaled Fahmy interrogates the nationalist tradition of Egyptian historiography which has posited Mehmed Ali Pasha (r. 1805-1848) and his “national” army as key movers and organizers of a modern Egyptian nation-state. Mehmed Ali Pasha was not, in Fahmy’s view, seeking to divorce Egypt from the Ottoman Empire to create a new, independent nation; but rather to establish his own dynasty within the loose structure of the Ottoman Empire. Fahmy argues against the assumption that any difficulties incurred on the road to national realization were not due to internal factors, but rather were caused by external, malicious forces, particularly the British. The author opposes the distinction between internal and external factors, arguing that all of these forces were inextricably intertwined. In locating Mehmed Ali within an Ottoman context and seeing him as an ambitious ruler determined to secure the rich Egyptian province for himself and his progeny, Fahmy

follows a recent trend in Egyptian historiography, sustained by such scholars as Ehud Toledano and Jane Hathaway, which emphasizes Egypt's adherence to a larger Empire and stresses the Ottoman character of Egyptian elite culture and institutions.²⁹ Moreover, Fahmy criticizes the nationalist version of Egyptian history and its assumption that "Egypt" has always been a unified, self-contained, clearly recognizable identity and that its inhabitants have always realized – through their strong attachment to its soil, and through their conscious links to its history – that they are, and have always been, clearly and exclusively "Egyptian," and that this identity exists outside and apart from various self-identities; and that Egyptians saw themselves as such first and foremost, and not as Muslims or Ottoman subjects, for example. Considering the multitude of conflicts in place between monarchical power and nationalist aspirations which date to well before the 'Urabi Revolution of 1882, the disjuncture in the literature on Egyptian nationalism between periods is problematic. A more viable framework for the study of Egyptian nationalism must take into account the complex processes, dynamics, and disjunctures that characterized Egyptian identities and the Egyptian independence movement in the period 1882-1919.³⁰

Organization

In this dissertation, chapter two offers an historical introduction to power sharing between elites in late nineteenth century Egypt, the 'Urabi Revolution, and the British

²⁹ Ehud R. Toledano, *State and Society in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Egypt* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: the Rise of the Qazdaglis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.)

³⁰ In this work, Fahmy further argues that Muhammad Ali did not aim to achieve independence for "Egypt," but intended to carve out a small empire for himself and for his children after him. It also argued that Great Britain, which is usually taken to have opposed Mehmed Ali ferociously and to have "prevented Egypt from reaping the fruits of her military victories" was not antagonistic to Muhammad Ali's reform policies in Egypt, but was against his empire-building efforts that she saw as challenging and endangering her own possessions in Asia. In short, rather than seeing Mehmed Ali as striving to achieve independence on behalf of the Egyptian nation, and instead of viewing Great Britain as the main obstacle in this endeavor, Fahmy argued that Mehmed Ali was seeking the establishment of a secure personal rule for himself and his household in Egypt.

Occupation of Egypt. Chapter three analyzes the 1919 Revolution and provides a background for discussion of the national movement and its leaders. Chapter four discusses the complex interplay of Egyptian nationalist leaders, the Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi, the Ottoman Empire, Sultan Abdülhamid, and the Young Turks in order to further explore the varieties of national and transnational identities which animated Egyptian nationalists in the period under discussion. Chapter five details the European campaign of Watani Party leaders, as they attempted to galvanize international public opinion behind their quest for independence. In chapter six, the effects of the deposition of the Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi in 1914 and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I on the Egyptian movement, which had supported them, is considered. Chapter seven compares the Egyptian national movement with the two other primary anti-British nationalisms of the period, namely the Indian and Irish. Finally, chapter eight explores the intersection of local concerns, new transnational movements, focusing particularly on the global spread of communism and the new international push for self-determination after the First World War.

Chapter Two: Historical Introduction

The Urabi Revolution of 1881-2 was a socio-political movement that expressed discontent with both foreign control and the continuing presence of the landed Turco-Circassian elite at the highest levels of government and society. The modern Egyptian nationalist movement is often dated from the 'Urabi Revolution; however, the forces that would drive Egyptian nationalism for decades were already in evidence well before 'Urabi's movement.¹ In particular, nineteenth-century Egypt was characterized by a complex mix of competing power centers, including the office of the khedive, the Ottoman Empire, Turco-Circassian elites, European financiers and governments, Egyptian landowners, a new class of urban elites, and an underclass of workers and fellahin. State repression of political freedoms, crippling taxes, class and ethnic discrimination, and a khedive who was perceived as ultimately siding with Europeans over Egyptians, were all part of the mix of issues that contributed to the popular support for the 'Urabi Revolution, and which continued to plague Egypt. Despite having differing interests and visions for the future of Egypt, a diverse cross-section of the Egyptian public participated in and supported 'Urabi's movement.

The web of personal interests that ultimately led to the 'Urabi Revolution, and which would continue to define Egyptian politics for at least the next seventy years, began in the years preceding the Revolution. The turbulent politics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Egypt was the result of a complex set of motivations that included personal rivalries, political ambitions, and support of various national political factions.

¹ The 'Urabi army was the single most important threat to British domination of Egypt, so it was disbanded in 1882. At the time of the Revolution, it had a nominal strength of 11,000 or 12,000 men and effective strength of 8,769, down drastically from 57,000 in 1878. (Alexander Scholch, *Egypt for the Egyptians!: the Socio-political Crisis in Egypt, 1878-1882* (London: Ithaca Press, 1981), 137.) Contemporary observers estimated the army's strength at 12,000 during the revolution. (Muhammad Mahmud al-Saruji, *al-Gaysh al-Misri fi al-Qarn al-Tasi 'Ashar* (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arid, 1967), 385-6.)

Another stimulus to nationalism in late nineteenth-century Egypt was the discontent engendered by growing economic hardship. This was the combined result of poor harvests (the 1877 Nile flood was unusually low); the increasingly heavy tax burden, an undue share of which was borne by the poorest Egyptians; the growth of private indebtedness to foreigners; and the continued deterioration of the Egyptians' position in global trade and manufacturing relative to Levantine and European competition. In 1878, after a low Nile, poor harvests, and rising military outlays, Khedive Isma'il (r. 1863-1879) surrendered much of his authority to a "European cabinet," which was headed by Nubar Nubarian (1825-1899) and included English and French ministers. Ironically, Ismail's reign saw the collapse of the absolute power that he and his predecessors had wielded for three-quarters of a century. In 1875, Europe began a political intervention that led to Ismail's deposition and exile in 1879. In four short years, vice-regal power was dismantled piece by piece until little was left of the edifice of absolutism constructed by Muhammad Ali. After 1879, Egypt's viceroys continued as khedives, but the absolute power symbolized by this title was gone forever. The decline and fall of vice-regal power in Egypt cannot be explained by European intervention alone, but was also related to social and institutional changes in the state system between 1849 and 1874. After 1875, men from within this elite began to separate themselves from the viceroy. Some collaborated with European policymakers and financiers to compel the khedive to surrender his financial resources and a large measure of his power; others, while not breaking with the ruler, began to join the movement of protest against European influence that was developing in the countryside and the capital. In this way, the ruling combination of men grouped around the royal house was broken up, and highly centralized power collapsed. By the 1870s, two new kinds of interests had emerged: a local, rural interest where certain officials possessed social and economic power in

the countryside; and a European interest, where officials pushed “reforms,” helped advance the policies of particular European states, and facilitated the spread of European civilization generally.²

Collaboration with local elites thus ensured European financial and political control without an official occupation. However, the breakup of the combination of forces on which Egypt’s government had previously rested released social forces hostile to Europe; and Ismail, taking advantage of popular resistance, was able to take back a degree of power. Ismail’s return to power forced the Europeans to adopt a tactic that they had long threatened but had always resisted: to bring pressure upon the central government in Istanbul, and in June 1879; Ismail was deposed as viceroy of Egypt. The rapidity with which Ismail lost his power in the years after 1875 can be explained by reference to circumstances that had been building up in the preceding period and which by the mid-1870s had reached a critical point. This same series of issues would plague ‘Abbas Hilmi and his relations with the complicated tangle of power centers in Egypt, including landed elites, the Ottoman Empire, and European governmental officials. Native Egyptian stakeholders would, in addition, have complicated relationships with Egyptian nationalist groups, whose popular support they required, but whose potential for reforming social and political realities was frightening to local elites.

Unfortunately for Ismail, because Britain and France were, by the late nineteenth century, acting in concert to apply pressure on the Khedive over European financial concerns, Ismail was unable to play one European power off against the other; and was forced to acquiesce to European demands. This fact, however, gave rise to resistance from two different quarters: a substantial number of Egyptian elites, as well as the general Egyptian population, vehemently

² F. Robert Hunter, *Egypt Under the Khedives: 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*, 2nd Edition (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1999), 35-6.

denounced Ismail's cooperation with European financiers, viewing this control as tantamount to handing Egypt's administration over to foreigners.³

Among the first reactions to Ismail's acquiescence to European demands came from the Egyptian military. In February 1879, the government had decided to place on half pay a large number of army officers, whose salaries were already deeply in arrears. Unrest within the army was growing, and most officers held Europe and its strict control of Egyptian finances as responsible for their plight. Isma'il initially supported 'Urabi and the Egyptian army officers' movement to gain more power vis-à-vis Turco-Circassian and European elites, with whom the Khedive also had power struggles; and his attempt to manipulate military and clerical dissatisfaction to put an end to direct European representation on the cabinet briefly succeeded.⁴ By March 1879, the public display of grievances by native Egyptian officers who had been put on half-pay led to the resignation of the European cabinet and its replacement by one headed by army officer Muhammad Sharif (1826-1887). European bondholders and their governments suspected that Isma'il had engineered the uprising to regain absolutist rule. Other members of the Egyptian elite, such as the ulema and landholders, took the nationalist protests as an opportunity to offer their support for the Khedive against the European powers with the quid pro quo that Isma'il move toward constitutionalism and parliamentary rule. In June, Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid, acting on the advice of European ambassadors, dismissed Isma'il in favor of the

³ Theodore Rothstein, *Egypt's Ruin* (London: Eifield, 1910), 30. Under agreements reached between the European powers and Ismail, two European controllers were appointed, one to receive and remit revenue pledged to the payment of loans to the Debt Commission, the other to supervise the accounts of government departments. In addition, a board composed of one Egyptian, two English, and two French, representatives to manage the railroads and port of Alexandria was created. Europeans were then in control of vital areas of Egyptian administration; and Egypt was saddled with debt payments amounting to approximately two-thirds of its estimated annual revenue.

⁴ FO 141/128, Borg to Vivian, no. 1, Cairo, 18 February 1879; FO 141/125, Vivian to Salisbury, no. 57, Cairo, 15 February 1879; FO 141/125, Vivian to Salisbury, no. 59, Cairo, 19 February 1879; FO 141/25, Vivian Salisbury, no. 71, 22 February 1879; see Alexander Scholch, *Egypt for the Egyptians!: the Socio-Political Crisis in Egypt, 1878-1882* (London: Ithaca Press, 1981), 66-73; and F. Robert Hunter, *Egypt Under the Khedives: 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*, 2nd Edition (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1999), 215-6; Cole, "Of Crowds and Empires," 118.

latter's son Tawfiq.⁵ But in 1880, discontent with the new khedive began to surface; in addition to the complaints of native Egyptian army officers, the recurring issues of European penetration and high taxes had not dissipated. In fact, Isma'il's deposition in June 1879 did not at all dampen the political unrest among Egyptians. The Assembly demanded expanded power, and Egyptian army officers again asserted claims to play a greater role in political decisions.⁶ The unpopular Khedive Tewfik died in January 1892 and was succeeded by his young son, 'Abbas Hilmi (r. 1892-1914), who quickly clashed with British Consul-General in Egypt Lord Cromer (1883-1907), transforming himself into a unifying national figure around which the divided nation was finally able to rally.⁷

Through 1881, power in Cairo was held by an uneasy coalition of Nationalist officers, constitutionalist civilians, and the Khedive, with pressure from European powers. No parties seemed willing to overthrow or silence the nationalists, however. Sultan Abdülhamid, for example, sent a mission to Egypt in October 1881, but his emissaries, apparently unable to decide whether Egyptian nationalism or European intervention posed the greater threat to Ottoman interests, managed only to encourage both sides to expect the Sultan's support. Neither Britain nor France wanted to see the rise of an extreme Nationalist regime, which might repudiate the state debt or endanger the lives and property of European residents, take power; but

⁵ Tawfiq soon turned against the Nationalists, exiling Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, proroguing the Legislative Assembly, suppressing Nationalist newspapers, reducing the size of the Army, and rejecting proposed constitutions.

⁶ Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "'Abbas Hilmi II: The Khedive and Egypt's Struggle for Independence'" (2 volumes), (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1978), 5-6.

⁷ Also in 1892, British colonial government marked the anniversary of its first decade in Egypt with the publication of Alfred Milner's *England in Egypt* (London: Edward Arnold, 1907), the director-general of Egyptian accounts, which celebrated British accomplishments justifying its continued occupation. When that book was translated into Arabic, it had the opposite effect demonstrating the extent to which the occupation usurped khedival economic and political powers fueling greater support for a khedive led nationalist opposition. (Roger Owen, *Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), 247-8, 269-70.) The anniversary motivated writers, such as Taymur and al-Nadeem, to discuss the negative consequences of colonial modernization.

neither were they, and especially not Britain, willing to intervene militarily.⁸ By the end of 1881, the nationalist unrest was increasingly blamed on the ‘Urabists by European governments; the ‘Urabists, in turn, placed blame on the Khedive; and the Khedive, fearful of the potential power of a Nationalist coalition, asked the British to intervene militarily.⁹ Like the Khedive, the ministers depended upon foreign troops to stay in power.

In June 1882, the British navy bombarded the port of Alexandria at the urging of Egyptian Khedive Tewfik (r. 1879-1892) in an effort to put an end to a revolutionary movement led by Colonel Ahmed ‘Urabi.¹⁰ The ‘Urabi Revolution (1881-2) saw the Egyptian military capitalize on more general societal discontent, which had been brewing for years, in an attempt to usurp the Ottoman-backed Khedive and push forward a more representative government.¹¹ ‘Urabi (1841-1911) rose quickly through the ranks of the military, but his career was stalled under Khedive Isma’il, who favored army officers of Turkish or Circassian origin. After Isma’il’s deposition, ‘Urabi backed the emerging National Party, but his primary loyalty was to the group of discontented ethnic Egyptian officers who began protesting in February 1881 against War Minister ‘Uthman Rifqi’s (1839-1886) perceived favoritism to Turco-Circassian officers. Following a successful push to have Rifqi replaced in the War Ministry on 9 September 1881, and fearing a khedival counterplot, the Nationalist officers surrounded Abdin Palace, confronted Tawfiq, and obliged him to establish a constitutional government headed by Muhammad Sharif (1826-1887) and to enlarge the Egyptian army. Still fearing a betrayal by the

⁸ Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., “The Egyptian Nationalist Party,” (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 1968), 31.

⁹ Mayer, 7-16.

¹⁰ For a detailed overview of the timeline of the Revolt and the composition of the populations involved, see Juan R.I. Cole, “Of Crowds and Empires: Afro-Asian Riots and European Expansion, 1857-1882,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 32, No. 1.

¹¹ The ‘Urabi Revolution was characterized by ‘Urabi’s declaration to Khedive Tawfiq, delivered on 9 September 1881, “In the name of God, other than whom there is no God, we shall no longer be inheritable, and from this day on we shall not be enslaved.”

Khedive, the Nationalists took steps to weaken the Turks and Circassians within the officer corps, also stirring up popular feeling against the European powers.

The 'Urabi Revolution must also be seen in its historic and geographical context. Only one year before, the French had established a protectorate over nearby Tunisia. 'Urabi's popular appeal can partly be explained by the perception that he was standing up to the Europeans, who were increasingly seen as impinging on both Egypt's political sovereignty and financial well-being. In addition, though the Ottoman sultan actually opposed 'Urabi's movement, it did not stop 'Urabi from successfully posing in Egypt as the defender of Ottoman claims to Egypt. The Anglo-French opposition to a leader of 'Urabi's popularity helped create an adverse image of all Europeans and their local allies in Egypt. The multiple poles of support for the 'Urabi Revolt represented a temporary alliance among land owners, constitutionalists, and junior army officers, which emerged as a result of significant forces of change produced during the preceding few decades. Over the course of the nineteenth century, wealthy Egyptians joined with their Turco-Circassian counterparts to exert political pressures on the office of the khedive, and to insure state policies were in the elites' interests and chosen after consultation with them. In addition, a burgeoning constitutionalist movement pushed by the new Egyptian elite was influenced by their desire to be protected from khedival power through a mechanism of government outside the reach of royal prerogatives.

Contributing to the support for the 'Urabist movement and the general social and political turbulence of late nineteenth century Egypt, Egyptians exhibited acute dissatisfaction with the monarchy, which was widely seen by the early 1880s as having allied with representatives of Western governments and financiers. For his part, Tewfik was frightened by the burgeoning popular opposition to Khedival autocracy. When the nationalist agitation grew, he relied ever

more on the representatives of France and Britain to protect him from his politicized subjects who were demanding a democratized regime in which power would be shared with representative institutions. As the crisis deepened to the point of military confrontation, Tewfik sided with the British invasion force that was sent to quell the ‘Urabi Revolution.¹² The Revolution was put down by the British, and Tewfik was reinstated on the throne; from that point on, however, the monarchy remained dependent on British support for its survival, which caused a critical crisis of legitimacy for the monarchy which did not subside over the succeeding decades.¹³ What the nationalized segment of Egyptians appreciated most about ‘Urabi was his defense of the independence of Egyptian (and royal) government and his attempt to restrain international intervention. They faulted Tewfik for policies which they perceived as giving away the interests of the state in exchange for international support for the khedive’s formal right to rule. Once the British entered Cairo, ‘Urabi surrendered, was tried for treason against the khedive, but ultimately spared execution. Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi (1874-1944, r. 1892-1914), son of Khedive Tawfiq who began his reign in 1892 following his father’s unexpected death, allowed ‘Urabi to return to Egypt in 1901; but ‘Urabi did not join the later National Party of Mustafa Kamil.¹⁴ Not only did Tewfik’s support of the major powers that occupied Egypt make him the “most unpopular man in all Egypt” but also assured that he “[would] be written in history as...the prince who brought the English into Egypt.”¹⁵ Tewfik’s loss of legitimacy was clearly expressed in the Official Journal of 25 July 1882:

¹² Mayer, 40.

¹³ Much of the reason for the British support of the monarchy was the belief that a strong centralized state was the most likely means of ensuring financial solvency for European investors.

¹⁴ Far from welcoming back the heroes of the ‘Urabi Revolution with open arms, ‘Abbas Hilmi was bitterly opposed to their return. ‘Abbas was unwilling to forget the disrespect he felt they had shown to the institution of the monarchy and to his father, in particular. (FO 78/4957, Cromer to Salisbury No. 212, 10 December 1898; Mayer, 153-4.)

¹⁵ Muhammad al-Khalif, “Ahmed ‘Urabi, al-Za’im al-Muftra ‘Aliyhi,” in Raja’ al-Naqqash, “Amirat Nabilar,” *Al-Ahram al-Dawli*, 13 February 2003, 378-9.

Every native knows the Khedive has brought ruin upon his country, first, by listening to the advice of the English Representative, and, secondly, by bringing the fleet, which opened fire on the forts of Alexandria...The Khedive, (after the British occupied Alexandria), instead of returning to Cairo to complete the military preparations and to encourage his troops by his presence, took refuge on board the enemy's fleet with his household...the Khedive, who sold the nation and the country to our bitterest foe.¹⁶

Tewfik returned to his throne in Cairo in 1882; and British attempts to calm the situation by showing clemency to the rebels only weakened Tewfik further. According to historian Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot,

In spite of its avowed intentions, every step the British government was to take in the direction of reaffirming the Khedive's power was to have the opposite effect – to weaken it, thereby giving England a firmer hold over Egypt. For example, in its handling of the court martial of the insurgents, the British government made the Khedive look like “a man of straw” to the Egyptians.¹⁷

As evidence of his limited capacity to rule, the khedive's desires to punish the leadership of the revolution were frustrated by the British occupation authorities demanding his weakened political position.

Egyptian elites, European representatives, and the Khedive all feared that, had the 'Urabists succeeded, what emerged would have been indigenous representative government in the hands of the landowning elite in perfect congruence with the local distribution of economic power. The great mass of Egyptians resented the growing influence of Europeans over all aspects of life in Egypt. Many landless and smallholding peasants disliked the growing affluence of the great estate holders and supported those elements around 'Urabi who argued that the land belonged to those who tilled it. When the danger of land seizure by fellahin became obvious to the estate holders who joined 'Urabi out of a desire to forestall European intervention, dislike of the Turks or desire to restore Egyptian power over local economic structures, they abandoned

¹⁶ Extract from the official journal, al-Waqa'ia al-Misriyya, 25 July 1882, English translation enclosed in No. 229, Sir E. Malet to Earl Granville, Alexandria, 9 September 1882, FO 407/23/2879, 101-2.

¹⁷ Afaf Lutfi Sayyid-Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations* (London: Murray, 1968), 109-112.

'Urabi and went over to Tewfik and the British army.¹⁸ Furthermore, it was clear that the reforms of the period in the Ottoman Empire and the similar reforms in Egypt would, if carried to their logical conclusion, have destroyed the independent power of the notables and the modes of political action it made possible. In addition to the more narrow power struggles of Egyptian elites, the 'Urabi Revolution also, then, highlights the class divisions within Egyptian society; these cleavages between urban workers, fellahin, and urban and landholding elites would have deleterious effects on the ability of Egyptian nationalists to create a cohesive movement. Elite interests were threatened by the more radical undercurrents of the Nationalist movement throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, preventing the establishment of an effective nationalist organizational capacity. The bulk of 'Urabi's support came from the Egyptian masses; class was thus at the heart of Egypt's failure to achieve a united national stand against the British.¹⁹ Here, class and national cleavages overlapped so forcefully that workers who rose up against their managers could be seen as 'Urabist heroes.²⁰

In Cairo, the British military occupation of 1882 meant that one of the foreign representatives became, in effect, ruler of Egypt; in uneasy collaboration with the palace. This conferred on the other representatives, in particular that of France, and on the Ottoman high commissioner a new importance as the only possible foci of opposition but it also limited their efficacy, since the presence of a British army gave the British consul-general a power which they could not challenge.²¹ In addition, the British attempted throughout this period to ally with Egyptian elites, who in most areas had interests in common with the British; and European

¹⁸ Jeffrey G Collins, *The Egyptian Elite Under Cromer, 1882-1907* (Berlin: K. Schwarz, 1983), 281.

¹⁹ Amira Sonbol, *The Last Khedive of Egypt: Memoirs of Abbas Hilmi II* (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1998), 18.

²⁰ FO 141/161, Beaman to Malet, no. 46, Cairo, 4 July 1882; Cole, "Of Crowds and Empires," 122-3.

²¹ Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables," in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 64-7.

advisors quickly emerged as a new source of patronage for Egyptian elites opposed to the power of the khedive. But once the monarchy became political, it could no longer serve as a rallying point for all the forces of society. Other members of the Ottoman family, and of the related Egyptian khedival family, began to come forward as points around which loyalty or discontent could crystallize.

Upon his accession, ‘Abbas began a brief and unsuccessful campaign of overt rebellion against British authority that summer (1892). In January of 1893 ‘Abbas dismissed Mustafa Fahmi and appointed Fakhri Pasha as Prime Minister. Before the appointment could be announced, Cromer received authority from the Foreign Office to take any steps necessary short of increasing the British garrison in order to thwart the appointment. ‘Abbas was forced to back down but had gained in popularity by his public opposition to the British.²² After a series of jabs at British authority, the young Khedive discovered that his own government would not back him against Cromer. In January of 1894 the Prime Minister, Riaz Pasha, pleaded with him to apologize for disparaging remarks the Khedive had made about British officers of the Egyptian army.

After this lesson, ‘Abbas adopted a covert policy of opposition through third parties. From 1894 until the summer of 1895, the Khedive directed opposition to approval of the government budget in the General Assembly and Legislative Council. Then in the summer of 1895 the Ottoman Sultan sided with the British against him, so ‘Abbas felt compelled to turn back for some time toward the British for support. He secretly helped to finance the career of the nationalist Mustafa Kamil from 1895 to 1904. The Khedive lent his financial support to several of the political parties that developed around Mustafa Kamil such as the Nationalist Party and the

²² Marsot, 109-112.

Society for the Revival of the Nation (Gam'iyya li-Ihya' al-Watan.)²³ The Khedive also helped finance the popular newspaper, *al-Mu'ayyad*, of Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf. Although 'Abbas Hilmi lost all overt contests for power with the British rulers of Egypt, he played a major role in reviving the Egyptian national movement from 1895 until the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904. He covertly encouraged such Egyptian financial elite members as 'Umar Bey Sultan and Prince Gamil Toussoun to back Nationalist Party publications like Mustafa Kamil's *Egyptian Standard*. Realizing that no major European power would back him against the British after the Entente, 'Abbas moved away from the nationalists and bowed to British authority on 9 November 1904, when he first attended the British parade in Abdin Square on the occasion of Queen Victoria's birthday.²⁴ Like Tewfik before him, 'Abbas was part of the "native screen" behind which the British ruled Egypt. Cromer described this most eloquently.

Broadly speaking, the system of government which now prevails in Egypt involves the interposition of a native screen between the English Government and the Anglo-Egyptian officials on the one hand, and the native population on the other hand. Whether this is in itself a good form of government may be open to question... But so long as this system lasts, it is essential that our native screen should be effective, and that it should fulfill the main objective for which it is intended, that is to say, that it should truly serve to hide from the native population that they are in great degree governed by foreigners.²⁵

The Khedivate was an institution with little power under the British occupation through 1907. Tewfik accepted his role as part of the "native screen" and 'Abbas Hilmi rapidly learned that he could play no other role without the support of his own ministers. Egypt's representative institutions served as a forum for the country's large landowners to add their presence to this screen. Egypt's pseudo-parliamentary institutions under the occupation were designed by the British to have a powerless advisory role. Parliamentary government in general offers a vehicle

²³ Arthur Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party," in P.M. Holt (ed.), *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 313.

²⁴ 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, Mustafa Kamil, *ba'ith al-haraka al-wataniyya (tarikh Misr al-qaumi min 1882 ila 1908)*, 5th Edition (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1984), 183, 249.

²⁵ Cromer to Salisbury, FO No. 138, 26 February 1889.

for stable rule of the middle class. In a semi-colonial context such as that of Egypt at the end of the nineteenth century, the indigenous middle class was too weak to provide stable government and prevent foreign invasion. In an unstable political environment, many elements of the Egyptian political and economic elites welcomed the foreign invasion. Once British troops had defeated organized resistance, the occupying power naturally emasculated local parliamentary institutions and made them into a legitimizing screen for foreign rule.²⁶

In a bid to stabilize power in Egypt to their advantage, the British attempted to strengthen traditional Egyptian ruling institutions and, as much as possible, used those institutions to camouflage their firm control of Egyptian affairs. Restoring khedival authority after it was severely shaken by the ‘Urabi Revolution was by far the most important British policy goal. This, however, was an almost impossible goal to achieve, for the simple reason that Tewfik had been viewed by many as a traitor for siding with the British against the ‘Urabists.²⁷ The end result of the Occupation was to return to something like the *status quo ante*, with the authority of the khedive fully restored, the Law of Liquidation, which governed the distribution of Egyptian state revenue to the Debt Commission, working smoothly, and the British alone filling what had been the Anglo-French role.

Nevertheless, despite his weakness, the Khedive had some room to maneuver because of the ambiguity of England’s position in Egypt. The Occupation was not sanctioned by international law. Egypt was definitely not a British colony. So the British needed the collaboration of the Khedive and other Egyptian figureheads through whom they could

²⁶ Collins, 202-7.

²⁷ Robert L. Tignor, *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 48-50, 66-69; Ziad Fahmy, “Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism: Colloquial Culture and Media Capitalism, 1870-1919,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2007), 123.

administer the country. Britain's indirect government of Egypt through Egyptian pawns came to be known as the Veiled Protectorate.

The Veiled Protectorate

The shock of the Occupation and the introduction of a British administration kept organized opposition to the British from forming within Egypt for over a decade. The British military occupation dissipated the Egyptian revolutionary energies, and Egyptians found themselves having to fight for constitutional rights vis-à-vis the Khedive and Egyptian elites and for independence from the British at the same time. There had been a short-lived secret political group calling itself the Society of Vengeance (Jami'yat al-intiqam) which had plotted to expel the British and punish 'Urabi's "betrayers;" but it was discovered in 1883 and its members were imprisoned.²⁸

The British Occupation may have interrupted Egyptian nationalist agitation, but it also gave the movement a sharper focus. The presence of a foreign power allowed various strains of the Egyptian national movement to unify against a particular goal: opposition to the British. Political alignments began to appear again in the 1890s, although nationalist parties were not officially formed until 1907. From 1892, the British were faced with an ambitious and decidedly anti-British new Khedive, Tawfik's seventeen-year old son 'Abbas II, usually referred to as 'Abbas Hilmi. The new Khedive resented the limits imposed upon him by Lord Cromer and the British administration, and began searching for opportunities to increase his own power by

²⁸ Among them was a young Sa'd Zaghul, who would lead the Wafd almost three decades later. Released and "rehabilitated," he became a favorite of Cromer by 1906; but after World War I, he was one of the most visible critics of the Occupation. (Noor-Aiman Iftikhar Khan, "The Enemy of My Enemy: Indian Influences on Egyptian Nationalism, 1907-1930," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2006), 34-41.)

undermining the Occupation. He also pushed the Sublime Porte to intervene on his behalf, usually unsuccessfully, as the Ottomans had little to gain by antagonizing the British by the early twentieth century.

‘Abbas had a great deal of personal animosity toward Cromer, who had humiliated him in a showdown early on; but the Khedive also remembered the fate of his deposed grandfather Isma’il. So ‘Abbas settled for outward submission and behind-the-scenes opposition through the actions of Mustafa Kamil and others. In an effort to undermine the position of the British, increase his domestic popularity, and gain leverage in his power-plays against the Occupation administration, Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi likely helped fund the first organized anti-Occupation groups and periodicals. Among the earliest efforts along these lines was the paper *al-Mu’ayyad* (“The Supporter”), founded by journalist Shaykh ‘Ali Yusuf (1863-1913) in 1889, which developed a strong following as a religiously-oriented daily and adopted a policy of defending Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi as the rightful ruler of the country upon Tawfiq’s death.²⁹ Soon after ‘Abbas Hilmi took power, *al-Mu’ayyad* included nearly weekly articles praising the Khedive and his devotion to the Egyptian people.³⁰

Beyond the intra-Egyptian rivalries between the Khedive, native elites, and popular nationalists, both Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire competed for power and influence in Egypt. The Great Power rivalries that had kept the “Sick Man of Europe” propped up for the previous few decades had aligned themselves in such a way that the Ottomans were content to let the British control Egypt in return for support against Russian advancement in Ottoman-

²⁹ ‘Ali Yusuf was known primarily for his promotion of traditional values and hostility to the British and was one of the most influential writers of his day, though in the historiography he has often been viewed as little more than a “tool” of ‘Abbas Hilmi.

³⁰ ‘Abbas Hilmi’s friendship with ‘Ali Yusuf became common knowledge in 1904, when the Khedive supported ‘Ali Yusuf’s marriage to the daughter of an important member of the *ashraf* over her father’s objections. This move cost ‘Abbas Hilmi and ‘Ali Yusuf considerable respect in traditional society. This scandal was very public and particularly damaging to *al-Mu’ayyad*, as it was for some time the only Muslim-owned and Islamically-oriented daily paper in Egypt.

controlled territories.³¹ Indeed, in the early years of the Occupation, France turned a more sympathetic ear to those opposing Britain than the Ottoman Empire tended to do. Even this support, however, vanished when the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904 was concluded, allowing Britain a free hand in Egypt in return for French freedom of action in North Africa.³² With this agreement, the Egyptian nationalists lost one of their most powerful potential allies against the British.

Though temporarily stifled by the British Occupation, the nationalist movement in Egypt was given renewed energy by the Dinshawai Incident of 1906.³³ On 13 June 1906, a group of five British officers went pigeon shooting in the village of Dinshawai located in the Nile Delta. The practice was a common sport among Army personnel stationed in the provinces and was resented by villagers, who complained about not being compensated for the birds they had raised and about the damage caused by young men trespassing onto their fields. When some villagers tried to stop the men, an altercation broke out in which between one and four villagers, including a woman, were shot and injured, and an officer fleeing the melee died of heat exhaustion. The Occupation authorities, fearing a “pan-Islamic uprising,” reacted with draconian measures and tried fifty-two villagers for murder in a hastily-called special tribunal.³⁴ Only fifteen days after the incident itself, twelve of the convicted were sentenced to hard labor, eight to public flogging, and four were hanged in an effort to curb any further episodes of “fanaticism” from occurring.³⁵

³¹ The title of the “Sick Man of Europe” was given to the Ottoman Empire by other European countries, as a result of the Empire’s extensive loss of territory, revenue, and relative power.

³² Khan, 43-8.

³³ Dinshawai has been immortalized in Egyptian nationalist history by a number of poems, and to this day remains a synonym for British injustice.

³⁴ An 1883 law allowed attacks on the Army of Occupation to be tried outside of civil courts, and there was no recourse allowed for appealing sentences, which were supposed to be executed expeditiously. As it had always been understood to be aimed at the remnants of ‘Urabi’s sympathizers, the law had not been used since 1895.

³⁵ The many references to “pan-Islamism” and “fanaticism” used in descriptions of the peasants’ motives reveal at the very least a nervous Government, and, at the worst, paranoia and prejudice, in either case causing a reaction divorced from the reality of the case. There was no evidence whatsoever of premeditation or any religious

The campaign around Dinshawai was carried forward by what were then relatively new media: the newspapers, printed pamphlets, and plays as well as songs. This media campaign did not cause the revolution but it certainly helped to spread a sense of revulsion and politically conscious antagonism to the state. In addition other new media were just being deployed such as the telephone and telegraph which, for the first time, made it possible to communicate from Alexandria in the north to Aswan in the south instantaneously.

News of the incident and the disproportionate punishments offended even the most conservative Egyptian opinion and reinforced much of what Nationalist leaders like Mustafa Kamil (1874-1908) had been arguing for years about the tyranny of a foreign occupation. This incident was considered by many Egyptian nationalists to be the watershed of the nationalist revolution, as it quickly galvanized popular attention and drew sharp attention to the British Occupation which heretofore had been somewhat obscured by the figure of the Khedive and the technical suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire.³⁶ Historian Muhammad Rifa'at's *Ta'rikh Misr al-Siyasi fi al-Azmina al-Haditha* isolates the Dinshawai incident of 1906 as a turning point in national history and in the nationalist movement.³⁷ The subsequent resignation of Lord Cromer (1841-1917) as Consul-General in 1907 was "the first victory for the Egyptian nationalist movement since the 'Urabi revolt."³⁸ The long-term significance of the Dinshawai Affair and subsequent executions was that they provided the atrocity needed to catalyze the movement of opposition to British rule in Egypt across class and other divisions. The executions alienated

motivation, unless one was to argue the reaction would have been different if a woman other than imam's wife had been shot. Indeed, there was not even proof of murder, as the army officer had died of heat stroke.

³⁶ Yoav Di-Capua, "Embodiment of the Revolutionary Spirit: The Mustafa Kamil Mausoleum in Cairo," *History & Memory*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2001), 91. Kamil was also keen to publicize the incident in Europe to discredit the British Occupation. Kamil's account in *Le Figaro*, "A la nation anglaise et au monde civilise," caused widespread revulsion among Europeans predisposed to think the worse of British rule in Egypt. (The text of the article, printed 11 July 1906, is reproduced in *L'Angleterre en Egypte* (Paris, 1922), 151-9.)

³⁷ Muhammad Rifa'at, *Tarikh Misr al-Siyasi*, 2 Volumes (Cairo, 1929.)

³⁸ Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Commemorating the Nation: Collective Memory, Public Commemoration, and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Egypt* (Chicago: Middle East Documentation Center, 2004), 194.

many Egyptians who had formerly accepted British rule, including the Coptic population, which had hitherto been suspicious of Kamil's pan-Islamic appeals and devotion to Ottoman interests.³⁹ As a result, in a shift begun in 1892, national representative institutions provided a focal point for moderate nationalist criticism of the occupation after 1906. This growing agitation at the end of Cromer's period of rule resulted in the re-emergence of indigenous political parties whose major goal was greater power for local elites.

Aside from the immediate political benefits acquired by the nationalists, Dinshawai, with the help of the newly emerging mass culture, was quickly and effectively reified into a functional national myth.⁴⁰ Among the positive side effects of the crisis was the fact that it served to restore the identity of the Khedivate as an institution separate from European advisors after years under Tawfiq when it had appeared to merge with the Occupation. Prior to 1906, much of the nationalist agitation had been directed toward the Khedive and native bases of authority; but the Dinshawai trials made direct focus on ridding Egypt of the British Occupation inevitable. So widespread was the importance of the Dinshawai incident and subsequent trial that none of the individuals involved in the prosecution of the Dinshawai villagers escaped unscathed. The judges at the trial included three Englishmen, in addition to the Egyptian judges Butrus Ghali Pasha and Ahmad Fathy Zaghlul.⁴¹ The lawyer for the defense was Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid and the prosecutor was Ibrahim al-Hilbawi.⁴² Lutfi al-Sayyid publicly established his nationalist credentials with his role, while Hilbawi and Zaghlul spent the rest of their lives trying to

³⁹ Salama Musa, *The Education of Salama Musa* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), 29, 31f. The most prominent Copts in the Nationalist Party were two notable lawyers, Marqus Hanna (1872-1934) and Wisa Wasif (d. 1931), both of whom later joined the Wafd. Ahmad Amin, *Hayati* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdah al-Misriyah, 1961), 87-91; Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party," 130-1.

⁴⁰ For example, see *Al-Ahram*, June 28, 1906; Ziad Fahmy, "Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism," 180.

⁴¹ The English judges involved were W.C. Hayter, judicial advisor; W.G. Bond, vice president of the Egyptian court of appeal; and Lt. Colonel Ludlow, Judge Advocate General for the Army of Occupation.

⁴² Ibrahim al-Hilbawi's memoirs have been published by the Egyptian Center for Contemporary History. ('Issam Diya ad-Din (ed.), *Muzakirat Ibrahim al-Hilbawi (tarikh hayat Ibrahim al-Hilbawi Bek, 1858-1940)* (Cairo: Al-haya misriyaa al'amma lil kitab, 1995.))

rehabilitate themselves in public opinion; and Ghali's assassination was intimately connected to his role in Dinshawai.⁴³

With the increase in popular support for nationalism following the Dinshawai trials, several native Egyptian political parties were formed. Though Mustafa Kamil had been the leading nationalist leader in the country for more than a decade, he did not officially organize his movement into a political party until late in 1907. The principles of the new Nationalist Party, al-Hizb al-Watani, were first publicly articulated by Kamil in a 22 October 1907 speech made at the Zizinia Theater in Alexandria.⁴⁴ The Party's three main principles were the immediate evacuation of British forces; the unification of the Nile Valley including the Sudan; and the formation of a constitutional political system. While the Party's demands included both the evacuation of British troops and the adoption of a constitution, as a matter of policy the official line had always been that no negotiations could take place with the British while British troops remained on Egyptian soil, thus making it difficult to work directly with the state apparatus to effect any type of change in the structure of governance until independence was achieved. The initial reluctance of the Nationalist Party to push too hard for a constitution was due to the fact that the Khedive was not in favor of a constitution and was thus likely to withdraw his support if that demand were pushed too hard. In the early years of the Party, the support of the popular Khedive and his financial assistance were particular assets for the Watanists.

⁴³ Khan, 53-5. In 1889 Lutfi entered the School of Law, by far the best choice for an ambitious youth. His colleagues there included future nationalist leader Mustafa Kamil, jurist-to-be 'Abd al-Aziz Fahmi, and three future prime ministers ('Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat, Ismail Sidqi, and Muhammad Tawfiq Nasim.) At the School of Law, Lutfi's new contacts quickly paid off. Mustafa Kamil introduced him to the young Khedive himself. Khedive Abbas was impressed and sent Lutfi, who was only two years his junior, to Switzerland to obtain citizenship there so that he could publish an anti-British paper in Cairo with legal immunity. During his early travels Lutfi met such prominent Muslims as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Saad Zaghlul, Qasim Amin, and Muhammad Abduh. Abduh was emerging as the leading Islamic modernist, and Lutfi quickly became his disciple. Khedive Abbas and Abduh were drifting apart, however; so Abbas ceased to sponsor Lutfi. (Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt, 17.)

⁴⁴ See Mustafa Kamil, *Awraq Mustafa Kamil: al-Khutab* (Cairo: al-Hayi'a al-Misriyya al-'Amma lil-Kitab, 1984), 301-38. The most immediate of the Watani Party demands was the "immediate evacuation of the British" from Egypt.

In addition to the Watani Party, other official parties organized in the first years of the twentieth century. Unlike the more popular Watani Party, the Umma party was comprised mostly of wealthy Pashas and represented the interests of the educated landowning elites. The Umma party was developed in part as a reaction to the more radical nationalists of the Watani Party whose demands included socio-economic policies which would threaten elite interests.⁴⁵ The Umma Party was officially established on 21 September 1907, and favored a more gradual road to independence, advocating the need for consulting with and benefiting from the British whenever possible. Inherent in this policy was an aversion to any change in the stability of the status quo and a general distrust of the masses, who were deemed not ready for political independence.⁴⁶ While the British administration acted against the National Party leaders and institutions and infringed the political rights of the Party's activists, British officials encouraged the Umma Party and strove to co-opt it into the colonial apparatus.⁴⁷ Finally among the new parties was Ali Yusif's Constitutional Reform Party, which had very little to do with constitutions or reforms, and which was primarily funded by the Khedive to support his policies and as such was viewed with suspicion by most Egyptians.

⁴⁵ The leading figures of the Umma Party were Mahmud Sulayman Pasha (president), Ali Sha'rawi Pasha and Hassan 'Abd al-Raziq Pasha (vice presidents), and Lutfi al-Sayyid (secretary). See Ahmad Zakariyah al-Shiliq, *Hizb al-'Umma wa Dawruh fi al-Siyasa al-Misriyya* (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1979), 72-3.

⁴⁶ *Al-Jarida*, 21 September 1907. Ahmad Shafiq, *Mudhakiraati fi nisf qarn, Juz' III, IV, Silsilat tarikh al-Misriyeen*, 2nd Edition (Cairo: Al-Haya Misriyya al-'amma lil Kitab, 1994), Vol. 3, 128-9.

⁴⁷ Members of the Umma Party would later constitute the bulk of the WWI-era Wafd Party.

Chapter Three: The Revolution of 1919

"The revolution was like a beautiful woman. She charmed us, and we fell in love with her and killed the tyrant to marry her, but she was just a trick -- another burden to add to our heavy load, and we are falling out of love."¹

The Revolution of 1919 is celebrated in Egyptian nationalist historiography as a time of unusual solidarity, with students and bureaucrats joining peasants, and the religious leadership of Muslims and Copts supporting one another. Though their respective motives varied, what distinguishes the 1919 Revolution was the participation of all classes of Egyptians to one degree or another in opposition to British authority. Political leaders, students, lawyers, workers, peasants, and Bedouins all played various roles in the Revolution. Further, the Revolution saw a unique union of the main religious communities in Egypt against the British.² Coptic priests delivered fiery speeches in the Azhar, while Muslim leaders spoke in Coptic cathedrals. In addition to this, numerous Egyptian women joined the demonstrators and set forth their demands supporting the Wafd in written petitions, as well as in protest marches in the streets of Cairo on 16 and 20 March.³

¹ Anonymous Egyptian, quoted by Salma Abdelaziz, "Egypt's Revolution: 'We fell in love, but it was a trick,'" CNN, 23 May 2012. <http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/23/opinion/egypt-revolution-heartbreak/>

² The favorite visual representation of the 1919 Revolution to this day is the Egyptian national flag displaying a cross and crescent.

³ On contemporary views on women's involvement, see *The Egyptian Gazette*, 25 March 1919; FO 407/184/145 and 151; al-Rafi'i, *Thawrat 1919*, 185-90, 208; Ahmad Shafiq Pasha, *Hawliyyat Misr al-Siyasiyya I* (Cairo: Ahmad Shafiq, 1926), 260-63, 320; McIntyre, 26-32.

Many women joined these demonstrations, with some leading their own, a story that has been frequently recounted. Whereas the extent of women's participation in the 1919 revolution is debated, the event is considered a pivotal one for women. For the first time in Egyptian history, according to many accounts, women were thrust from the private realm onto the public stage. The revolution is thus often taken as the first expression of nationalist sentiment on the part of women, as well as the crucible of the women's movement. Yet women's participation in the events of 1919 was a continuation and extension of the activities of the previous decades. (For different views of women's roles in the 1919 revolution, see Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, "The Revolutionary Gentlewomen in Egypt," in Louis Beck and Nicki R. Keddie, *Women in the Muslim World* (Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 1978), 261-76; Margot Badran, "Dual Liberation: Feminism and Nationalism in Egypt, 1870s-1925," *Feminist Issues* (Spring 1988): 15-33; Beth Baron, "Mothers, Morality, and Nationalism in Pre-1919 Egypt," in Rashid Khalidi (ed.), *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 271-88.)

Prelude to a Revolution

With the outbreak of World War I, Egypt's anomalous position as a privileged Ottoman province under British military occupation (a status referred to as the "veiled protectorate") became unsustainable when the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers. As a result of their wartime alliance with the Ottoman Empire, the Watani nationalists, who had heretofore been the acknowledged leaders of the Egyptian nationalist movement, found themselves sidelined by Sa'd Zaghlul and the Wafd. As a result of their cooperation with Ottoman efforts directed at Egypt between 1914 and 1918, and the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, Watani Nationalists had limited influence in Egypt after the War. Muhammad Farid's death in November 1919 also removed the most important of the exiled Nationalist leaders from the scene. This allowed the Wafd Party, and Sa'd Zaghlul, to come to the fore as the leading force in Egyptian nationalism. The 1919 Revolution itself, then, was inspired and led by individuals who had been pre-War ideological rivals of the Watanists (members of the Umma Party led intellectually by Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid and politically by Sa'd Zaghlul). While the Wafd co-opted prominent former Watanists into their ranks (Muhammad `Ali `Aluba and Mustafa al-Nahas, for example), they did so on their own terms. Once the new Wafd seized the lead in nationalist demonstrations in the spring of 1919, the exiled nationalists were left outside looking in. The change in leadership at the head of the movement for Egyptian independence from the Watani to the Wafd Party would result in a more conservative revolution, as the Wafd was populated by elite elements unwilling to allow for the realization of the more popularly-based Watani programs. Issues of class, then, were at the heart of Egypt's failure to achieve a united national stand against the British. Even though Egypt's peasants are usually described as passive bystanders who appear in history in sporadic outbursts, their support of the nationalist movement took many forms and was

quite consistent. It is clear that the 1919 Revolution meant different things to different segments of the population; but, at least from the perspective of the emerging dominant elements, the Revolution did not aim at the radical transformation of the social structure or class relations, but rather at the assertion of territorial nationalism in the face of British colonialism.

The Revolution

When popular discontent arose in Egypt after the 1918 Armistice, the British Foreign Office refused to discuss the Egyptian question with either a delegation of nationalist leaders headed by Sa'd Zaghlul or even to receive a deputation of Egyptian ministers, and it became clear Egypt would not be represented or discussed at the Paris Peace Conference.⁴ When the delegation was told that the Government of Egypt would send its own official representatives, they started a public campaign to be declared the official delegation of the Nation. They argued that the British-controlled Government was not representative of the Egyptian people and could not be trusted to place Egyptian interests before those of the British. Egyptians, still not recovered from War-time stresses, and perhaps emboldened by the declaration of the Fourteen Points by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson in January 1918, responded favorably by signing petitions and powers of attorney, and demonstrating against the Occupation. The British decision to exile Zaghlul and other representatives of the Wafd to Malta rather than allow them to attend the Peace Conference in 1919 allowed several distinct Egyptian grievances and demands to coalesce around a single popular issue, namely the removal of the British from Egypt. This, along with the public support of Zaghlul and the Ward, resulted in the Revolution of 1919. The

⁴ Of the officially recognized Arabic newspapers, only *Al-Muqattam* and *Al-Watan* wrote against the demonstrations and called for an immediate return to "public order." (See for example, *Al-Watan*, 10 March 1919; *Al-Muqattam*, 11 March 1919; Ziad Fahmy, "Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism: Colloquial Culture and Media Capitalism, 1870-1919," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2007), 267.

economic and political crises of World War I, the forced conscription of Egyptians, the state appropriation of cotton production, and the forcible provision of supplies for British troops resulted in a crisis of political control.

The immediate cause of the 1919 Revolution was the British refusal to allow the Egyptian delegation to attend the Paris Peace Conference, and the arrest of the group (who would become the Wafd) including Sa'd Zaghlul, who had petitioned the British High Commissioner Wingate to represent Egypt and argue for independence at the Conference. On 8 March 1919, military authorities arrested Sa'd Zaghlul, Ismail Sidqi, Muhammad Mahmud, and Hamad al-Basil; and by 9 March the four were deported to Malta.⁵ The decision to exile Zaghlul and "some of his associates" was predicted by British officials to produce a calming effect and "a temporary reaction" in favor of the British. High Commissioner Reginald Wingate went as far as confidently declaring to the Foreign Office that the exile of Zaghlul "should discourage and discredit the extremists."⁶ On the other hand, Residency advisor Milne Cheetham notified the Foreign Office of these events and commented that he did not believe that the deportations would do anything to dampen the nationalist movement. The initial result, he predicted, would be one of "irritation and sympathy with the deported ringleaders."⁷ As events were soon to demonstrate, Cheetham's prediction was correct, if understated.

In addition to this proximate cause, the Revolution was also rooted in deep and obvious, though varied, political grievances.⁸ Egyptians resented the creation of a British protectorate at the outbreak of World War I and then the introduction of martial law during the course of the

⁵ John D. McIntyre, Jr., *The Boycott of the Milner Mission: A Study in Egyptian Nationalism* (New York: Peter Lang, 1985), 26-32.

⁶ FO 371/3714/39198, Sir Milne Cheetham, "Egyptian Political Situation," 9 March 1919.

⁷ FO 407/184/69, Cheetham to Curzon, 9 March 1919.

⁸ The classic work in Arabic on the 1919 Revolution is 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i's, *Thawrat sanat 1919*, 2 Volumes (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda al-Misriyya, 1946.)

War. Masses of Egyptians suffered when their livestock and then labor were confiscated to aid British military campaigns.⁹ Leading nationalists were also determined to use Woodrow Wilson's seeming endorsement of national self-determination to have this principle applied to Egypt after the War. In addition, just as the First World War and the attendant British military and political programs were seen as an affront to Egyptian national pride, so the War revealed in stark terms the foreign control of the Egyptian economy and the disabilities created by this dependence. Thus, the Revolution included the participation of a wide range of groups with differing interests and ideological orientations which were, nevertheless, coherent and articulate in their demand for an end to the Occupation government.

In the urban context, 1919 represented the consolidation of a labor movement (trade unions, labor activism, nationwide strikes) created by the intersection of national and class issues.¹⁰ Such labor movements were enveloped within the anti-colonial nationalism of the time, while more radical leftist groups were unable to gain a foothold in the context of the Wafd's moderate nationalist platform of removing foreign economic and political exploitation. Further, the mobilization of the peasantry and momentary subversions of the rural order did not in fact materialize into a wide-scale peasant revolution. Some have argued that the nationalist call for "independence, freedom, and justice" could not have held the same meaning for peasants, who

⁹ Latifah Salim subscribes at least in part to this thesis. See Latifah Muhammad Salim, *Misr fi al-Harb al-'Alamiyyal al-Ula, 1914-1918* (Cairo: Al-Haya al-Misriyya al-'amma lil Kitab, 1984), 118. Nathan Brown provides a good picture of the degree to which British control and manipulation of the local market allowed them to succeed in this venture (Nathan J. Brown, *Peasant Politics in Modern Egypt: the Struggle against the State* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 199; Ellis Goldberg, "Peasants in Revolt – Egypt 1919," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 24 (1992), 262. Over one-third of Egypt's peasants were paid laborers, however, and even those in the ambiguous situation of sharecroppers might have sold food crops they received in shares in an inflationary market, thereby losing command over food later. (See Alan Richards, *Egypt's Agricultural Development 1800-1980: Technical and Social Change* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982), p.61-3.)

¹⁰ Numerous workers' groups went on strike during the 1919 Revolution, including workers from government and private printing presses, the Cairo electric company, postal and communications workers, taxi and carriage drivers, and government bureaucrats. The role of workers and workers' syndicates in the Revolution is addressed in Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, *Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882-1954* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987.)

sought to liberate themselves from the colonization of their economic life by landowning interests, as it might have had for the urban intelligentsia.¹¹ However, the mobilization of workers and peasants in support of the Revolution did not result in social or economic benefits for these groups. Instead, as the Wafd continued to consolidate power, it also continued to oscillate between populism and social conservatism. Composed mostly of elite urban *effendiyya* and landowners, the interests of Wafd leaders would not have been served by a wider revolution calling for radical socio-economic change, though that was what was eventually promised by the Watani Party. While both the Watani and Wafd parties were eager to coopt labor movements to support goals of independence, neither party wanted to allow worker and peasant demands to outstrip Party control. And elites, while desirous of national independence, were too fearful of popular revolt to fully support a more thorough socio-economic revolution. So, the revolution that united the urban populace wound up scaring elitist politicians, largely because of the peasant revolts in the south against landowners. Many Wafdist leaders were landowners themselves; and, so, it is not surprising that the new Egyptian majlis would be representative of elite interests and result in a fundamentally conservative outcome. Wafdists sought, primarily, to compel the British to transfer power to the indigenous elite. Had the Wafd leadership wanted to extend the uprising, they might have offered land reform to the peasantry, but for practical and ideological reasons the Wafd generally declined to undertake such steps.

March and April, 1919

¹¹ Omnia El-Shakry, "Egypt's Three Revolutions: The Force of History Behind This Popular Uprising," in Bassam Haddad, Rosie Bsheer, and Ziad Abu-Rish, *The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order?* (London: Pluto Publishing, 2012), 1-3; Reinhard Schulze, "Colonization and Resistance: The Egyptian Peasant Rebellion, 1919" in , J. Waterbury and F. Kazemi (ed.), *Peasants and Politics in the Modern Middle East* (Miami: Florida International Press, 1991); Sayyid Ashmawi, *Al-fellahun wal-sulta* (Cairo: Mirit, 2001); and Ellis Goldberg, "Peasants in Revolt – 1919," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (May 1992), 261-80.

The 1919 Revolution may be divided into two stages: the violent and short period of March 1919, which involved large-scale mobilizations by the peasantry in rural areas that were suppressed by British military action; and the protracted phase beginning in April 1919 which was less violent and more urban, with the large-scale participation of students, workers, lawyers, and other professionals.

On the morning of 9 March 1919, students of the Faculty of Law left their classes and marched into the streets protesting the deportation of the nationalist leaders. These students were also able to persuade others from the Faculties of Agriculture, Commerce, Engineering, and the higher colleges to join them. The demonstrators marched to Qasr al-Aini Hospital and the School of Medicine, where they urged students there to join the protests. Eventually police were able to successfully disperse the crowds, but not before making over 300 arrests. Cheetham played down the significance of the student protests by writing to the Foreign Office that “Sa’d [Zaghlul] was at one time Minister of Education and popular amongst the students, and some manifestation on their part was to be expected.”¹²

The days following 9 March 1919 witnessed the spread of the Egyptian revolutionary movement beyond the students, however. Early on the 10th of March, organized student groups began forming and marched toward central Cairo. On this second day of the protests, students from al-Azhar called for a general strike and joined the student protests.¹³ In addition, transport workers went on strike and protests began in Alexandria, protests which Cheetham described as being composed of the “riff-raff of the town.”¹⁴

¹² FO 407/184/70, Cheetham to Curzon, 10 March 1919; McIntyre, 26-32.

¹³ As ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i observed, “the Azharites were in the front lines of the demonstrators...and were the most numerous of the students in courage and enthusiasm as well as among the strongest of the workers in spreading the spirit of the revolution and spreading strikes among the classes of the people.” (al-Rafi’i, *Thawrat Sanat 1919*, vol. 1, 202-3; McIntyre, 76-7.)

¹⁴ FO 407/184/70, Cheetham to Curzon, 10 March 1919; FO 407/184/151, Cheetham to Curzon, 22 March 1919; FO 371/3714/40278, Cheetham, “Deportation of Egyptian Independence Leaders,” March 10, 1919; see, also, ‘Abd al-

On the 11th, the lawyers of the Egyptian Native Courts in Cairo went on strike; and clerks from the ministries of Public Works and Education walked out of their offices. By the 12th of March, revolutionary protests had spread from Cairo and Alexandria to peripheral cities in the Delta, such as Damanhur and Tanta, in the latter of which British troops opened fire on a crowd of approximately three thousand demonstrators who were attempting to seize the railway station. Eleven were killed and fifty-one wounded.¹⁵ Two days later, soldiers manning an armored car patrolling the Sayida Zeinab quarter of Cairo were attacked and subsequently opened fire on a crowd of Egyptians, killing thirteen and wounding twenty-five. Five looters were caught that morning and summarily shot. The situation appeared increasingly serious, as far as the British authorities were concerned, particularly when reports came in that the provinces were also joining the Revolution.¹⁶

By 15 March, many communications facilities had been destroyed; in Qalyub, railway tracks were pulled up and trains attacked. British military personnel were also assaulted and killed. Women joined the demonstrations on 16 March, carrying banners that read “long live freedom and independence” and “down with the protectorate.”¹⁷ On that same day, the numbers of revolutionaries gathered at al-Azhar to hear speeches given by the Wafd Party reached 80,000. By noon on the 15th, all telegraph and telephone lines north of Cairo, with the exception of the military line to Alexandria, had been cut; at Qalyub, just north of Cairo, crowds stormed the railway station and pulled up the tracks, thus cutting railway communications between Cairo and Alexandria and Port Said. In addition, numerous trains were attacked and sacked, and train

Adhim Ramadan, *Tatawwur al-Haraka al-Wataniyya fi Misr*, vol. 1 (Cairo: Dar al-Katib al-Arabi lil-Tibaa wal-Nashr, 1968), 134; McIntyre, 26-32.

¹⁵ See *Misr*, 12 March 1919; *Al-Muqattam*, 13 March 1919.

¹⁶ FO 407/184/151, Cheetham to Curzon, 22 March 1919; McIntyre, 26-32.

¹⁷ FO 371/3714/41569, Cheetham, “Military Report,” March 15, 1919.

stations were burned.¹⁸ By 19 March, certain provinces were in open revolt: in the Delta and Upper Egypt, crops were destroyed and railway stations were burned. In Zifta, in Upper Egypt, an independent Republic was proclaimed. According to British reports, by mid-March the situation in the Delta was deteriorating fast: “Reports from the provinces show trouble at Damietta and demonstrations at Mansura and attempts are being made to interrupt communications. Telegraph lines have been cut in several places, apparently with the view to isolating Cairo and railway lines from Tanta to Menouf.”¹⁹ Unrest also spread into Upper Egypt with large demonstrations and the cutting of railroad tracks and telegraph wires.²⁰

During the 18th and 19th, the Revolution was perhaps at its height. The provinces of Behera, Gharbia, Munufia, and Daqualia were in a state of open revolt; almost all of the railway stations had been burned and many agricultural roads had been destroyed; and Ottoman flags could be seen flying in some of the delta villages. In addition to the popular protests, a strike of governmental officials which began on 2 April continued to cripple the administration of the various ministries throughout most of April, despite intensive efforts by a new Egyptian cabinet headed by four-time premier Husayn Rushdi Pasha (1863-1928) to persuade the striking officials to return to their posts.

Also at this time, mosques in Cairo, particularly al-Azhar, assumed increasingly important roles as the centers of opposition to the status quo that Great Britain was attempting to maintain in Egypt. This particularly alarmed British officials, as mosques were considered off limits to British authorities and soldiers; and, therefore, especially suited to serve as centers of the Revolution. Al-Azhar University, in particular, played a significant role by providing a safe

¹⁸ FO 407/184/151, Cheetham to Curzon, 22 March 1919; FO 407/184/86, Cheetham to Curzon, 16 March 1919; McIntyre, 26-32.

¹⁹ FO 371/3714/41569, Cheetham, “Military Report,” March 15, 1919.

²⁰ FO 371/3714/40615, Cheetham, “Egyptian Unrest,” March 15, 1919; Ziad Fahmy, “Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism,” 250-1.

house for revolutionary activities, thereby putting nationalists to a certain extent outside the reach of the British authorities. Though the British were careful not to forcibly enter al-Azhar or other mosques, they nonetheless had regular spies who attended many of the meetings and wrote lengthy reports detailing subversive activities.²¹ The mosques of Cairo were also used as centers for communication during the strike of government officials that had been ignited by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Curzon's (1859-1925) praise of the officials' behavior during the March uprising. During part of this strike, which began in early April and lasted for three weeks, the Committee of Government Officials that was directing the strike met each morning and evening to make its decisions. Each morning it would send representatives to different mosques and churches where public servants from various ministries were gathered in order to receive their instructions as to whether they should continue the strike or return to work.²² Further, during the middle of April, British military intelligence reports noted that the employees of each ministry or department had their own mosque for meeting and coordinating revolutionary actions. For example, the employees of the Ministry of Justice reportedly met at the Hanafi mosque; those of the Ministry of Education met at the Shaykh Saleh Mosque; the employees of the Ministry of Waqfs met at Ibn Tulun Mosque; postal employees gathered at the Husayn Mosque; and the employees of the National Printing Press convened at the Awlad Inan Mosque. The delegates for the General Strike Committee were also selected at these local gatherings.²³

Significance

²¹ Ziad Fahmy, "Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism," 263-4.

²² 'Abd al-'Azim Ramadan, *Tatawwur al-harakah al-wataniyah fi Misr min sanat 1918 ila sanat 1936* (Cairo: Kar al-Katib al-Arabi, 1968), 182-3.

²³ FO 141/781/8915, GSI Report, 17 April 1919; McIntyre, 81-2.

Though the 1919 Revolution accomplished the immediate goal of obtaining official independence from Great Britain through the 1922 unilateral granting of independence and is remembered in nationalist historiography as a unique moment of national cohesion, its ultimate significance may still be called into question. Certainly the Revolution did not result in the "complete independence" [al-istiqlal al-tamm] which was its stated goal. The 1922 unilateral British termination of the Protectorate over Egypt, and the accompanying declaration that Egypt was now independent, was fatally compromised in the long run by Britain's reservations and the continuing British military presence on Egyptian soil.²⁴

But from the perspective of the dominant leadership of the time (the Wafd), the Revolution appeared quite successful. Egypt did become an independent parliamentary monarchy, with the Wafd functioning as the dominant nationalist movement for the next thirty years. To be sure, successive monarchs did their best to undermine parliament (often quite successfully), and the Wafd only held ministerial office for approximately eight years between 1924 and 1952. But, from the perspective of the early 1920s, the Wafdist leadership had good reason to present the nationalist movement they led from 1919 to 1922 as a success. In the 1920s, disgruntled Watanists aside, the Egyptian public largely accepted this claim. It was only from the 1930s onwards that large numbers of Egyptians came to question the "success" of the 1919 Revolution in terms of both true political independence and social change. Nevertheless, given both Egypt's social structure in 1919 (a society dominated by the upper classes) and Great

²⁴ The Reserved Points, as they became known, consisted of Britain's control over Imperial communications (including the Suez Canal), protection of minorities and foreign interests, defense, and the Sudan. Protection of "minorities and foreigners" was relinquished with the Montreux Convention and the Constitution of 1936. Despite expressing serious reservations about the conditions of Independence, the Wafd declared itself a political party and won by a landslide in 1924. It continued to own any popular and free elections held in Egypt until World War II, but did not succeed in achieving real sovereignty for Egypt in that the Reserved Points remained in place and Britain retained unofficial veto power over the government, usually enforced indirectly but occasionally coming down to threats of force from the still-present British Armed Forces. Noor-Aiman Iftikhar Khan, "The Enemy of My Enemy: Indian Influences on Egyptian Nationalism, 1907-1930," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2006), 159-60.

Britain's interest and power in Egypt, it is unlikely any Revolution could have been successful in obtaining all of the goals of the nationalist movement.

Sa'd Zaghlul had never belonged to the National Party; and his fellow delegates had, for the most part, supported Hizb al-Umma. But from that time until the 1952 Revolution, the Wafd, first as a popular movement and later as a parliamentary party, was the main standard bearer of Egypt's independence struggle. Although the Watanists no longer occupied the Egyptian spotlight, their role in the 1919 Revolution was significant. They persuaded the Wafd to state as its goal the "complete independence" of Egypt.²⁵ When the Wafd set up its central committee to gather financial contributions and signatures designating the Wafd as the sole spokesman for the Egyptian people, existing Nationalist groups and individuals helped greatly. Examples include the leaders of the Lawyers Syndicate in 1919, Ahmed Lutfi and Muhammad Hafiz Ramadan.²⁶

The expatriate Nationalists backed Zaghlul, despite their doubts about his consistency, and offered what help they could. But for his part, Zaghlul stated that he did not want Farid or any other leading Nationalist in his delegation because of their wartime association with Germany. According to, the Wafd also refused to pay for Farid's medical expenses during his final illness. Essentially, Sa'd Zaghlul had taken over the lead role in the independence movement at a time when the Nationalists had no president ('Ali Fahmi Kamil was exiled in 1921-22) and their newspapers were often banned.²⁷

Meanwhile, the expatriate Nationalists were split into factions. Shaykh Jawish, still based in Berlin, headed a faction that included the former Ottoman ambassador in Berne, Fu'ad Salim,

²⁵ Mahmud Abu al-Fath, *al-Mas'ala al-Misriyya wa'l-ward* (Cairo, n.d), 44; 'Abd al-Rahmad al-Rafi'i, *Thawrat sanat 1919* (Cairo: Dar al-Sha'b edition, 1968,) vol. 1, p. 73.

²⁶ Rafi'i, *Thawrat sanat 1919*, p. 123

²⁷ Sa'd Zaghlul letter to 'Abd al-Rahman Fahmi, Paris, 7 November 1919, in Muhammad Anis, *Dirasdi fi watha'iq thawrat 1919* (Cairo 1963), 238; Rafi'i, *Muhammad Farid*, 370.

the son of Colonel Latif Salim.²⁸ Fu'ad Salim had been a close friend of Mustafa Kamil. He later became secretary of the National Party, and then an Ottoman Foreign Service Officer.²⁹ Its main rival was the "Egyptian Committee," an outgrowth of Muhammad Fahmi's "Young Egypt Congress" movement in Geneva, whose members had broken with the Turks and the Germans early in the War. Then there was also a group around ex-Khedive Abbas, who was still contending for the restoration of his throne, his son's right of succession, and his Egyptian properties.³⁰ All of these groups agitated for Egypt's independence, but with no significant results and no impact on the National Party in Egypt.³¹ Only a few National Party members who had weathered the First World War in Egypt were important in postwar politics. Muhammad Hafiz Ramadan, Muhammad Zaki Ali, and Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i would become cabinet ministers without leaving the National Party.³²

The Milner Mission

Following the outbreak of the 1919 Revolution, the British Government replaced Reginald Wingate with Lord Allenby as Special High Commissioner; and the latter attempted to quiet the country through a combination of military repression and dialogue with the Wafd and the Egyptian Government. The British Government then sent a special Mission of Inquiry to Egypt under Viscount Milner to ascertain "the causes of the late disorders," and was told in 1920

²⁸ FO 371/3717, Acton to Calthorpe, Bern, 2 June 1919; DMI Report, Bern 29 May 1919; Col. Ryder to DMI, Bern, 6 June 1919, transmitting reports by the U.S. consul in Bern and the Egyptian supervisor of students in Geneva.

²⁹ See 'Abd al-'Aziz Hafiz Dunya, *Rasa'il ta'rikhiyya* (Cairo 1969) for detailed biographical information.

³⁰ Ahmad Shafiq, *Mudhakiraati fi nisf qarn*, 2nd Edition (Cairo: Al-Haya Misriyya al-'amma lil Kitab, 1994), Vol. 3, pp. 226-234. Abbas renounced his claim to the throne in 1931.

³¹ FO 371/7745, Secret Intelligence Service to the Foreign Office, Cairo 12 September 1922; Secret Intelligence Service to Foreign Office, Rome, 21 October 1922; Government of Malta to Foreign Office, Colonial Office, 7 November 1922; Secret Intelligence Service to Foreign Office, 23 November 1922; Mansur Rifa'at, *Der Patriotismus bei den Agyptern*, Berlin, June 1923; and *Enthullungen uber die inneren Verhaltnisse Agyptens*, Berlin, July 1923.

³² Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, *Fi a'qab al-thawra al-misriyya*, 3 volumes (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1989), Vol. 1, 122f.

by the six-man commission that the entire country was “solidly Nationalist...and likely to remain so.”³³

The Milner Mission was tasked with determining the causes of the 1919 Revolution and making proposals for the most suitable form of government for Egypt under the Protectorate. Curzon had intended the mission to curtail what he saw as the dangerous radicalism of Lord Allenby, but it was seen by Milner in a different light. Milner favored a move away from direct British control of Egyptian administration, which had become a feature of the wartime situation, and a return to a limited British role in administration, leaving the rest to Egyptians. The Sudan, he believed, must stay under British control and Britain should also control the foreign policy and the defense of Egypt. These ends, he concluded, could best be achieved through an Anglo-Egyptian treaty, and he abandoned the idea of maintaining the protectorate. His proposals, which went beyond his terms of reference, were presented in summary form to Curzon in May 1920.³⁴ The Commission recommended terminating the Protectorate and setting up a bilateral treaty of alliance between the Empire and Egypt, an idea that was supported in principle by both Allenby and Zaghlul.³⁵ To forestall difficult negotiations that would require Egyptian acquiescence to requirements that the British Empire felt were absolutely necessary to its own interests, the British Government issued a unilateral Declaration of Independence for Egypt on February 28, 1922, which reserved a number of points of sovereignty for the Empire but did allow Egypt to declare the Constitution of April 20, 1923, and hold popular elections.

³³ The Milner Report, quoted in John D. McIntyre, Jr., *The Boycott of the Milner Mission: A Study in Egyptian Nationalism* (New York: Peter Lang, 1985), 188.

³⁴ Miles Lampson Killearn and Malcolm Yapp, *Politics and Diplomacy in Egypt: the Diaries of Sir Miles Lampson, 1935-1937* (Oxford: Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 1997), 18.

³⁵ Zaghlul was deported a second time, in 1922, to the Seychelles. PRO: FO 371/7730, p. 45-6. 54-55, reveal that the original plan, to send him to Ceylon, was changed because of concerns that his presence so close to India “would probably lead to disturbances.” In particular, the Viceroy and the Governor of Bombay decided that the “Nationalist Egyptian leader, whose activities have been closely followed in India” must not be allowed to enter Bombay Harbour.

The international dimension of its colonial project colored the British response to Egyptian nationalist activity in several ways. British policy towards Egypt during the period from 1919 through 1922 was shaped by specific political, economic, and strategic considerations. The British believed that whatever decision they made with regard to granting Egypt some form of independence would set a precedent; and that other regions which they administered, such as India and Ireland, or held under a mandate from the League of Nations, such as Palestine or Iraq, would demand equal treatment. British officials were acutely aware that nationalist intellectual and political leaders closely followed political developments around the world and that they possessed the ability to stir up anti-British feelings among the masses. In addition, owing to post-War economic troubles in Great Britain created by a world trade slump and Great Britain's responsibilities elsewhere in the Middle East, the British could ill-afford a disruption of their trade and communications links with and through Egypt; nor could they afford the cost of maintaining a large garrison there. Only the ultra-conservative *Morning Post*, of all London's prestigious dailies, came out against the 1922 agreement, which it regarded as "a sheer surrender":

It would be much simpler to announce Egyptian independence and the dissolution of the Protectorate by Proclamation, and much more graceful than to have it come about as a result of bargaining...it is a direct invitation to the agitators in India to follow in the footsteps of the Egyptian Nationalists and to be content with nothing less than they have secured.³⁶

Internationally, the Egyptian Revolution of March 1919, followed a month later by the Amritsar massacre and its aftermath in India, challenged the stability of the British Empire.³⁷ By the following month the British were at war with Afghanistan, and they were being challenged by Mustafa Kemal's nationalist movement in Turkey. By the end of 1919, also, the Persian

³⁶ *Morning Post*, 24 August 1920.

³⁷ On 13 April 1919, British troops fired on a crowd of unarmed Indian protestors, killing a large number, in what would come to be named the Amritsar Massacre. It left a permanent scar on Indo-British relations, and was the precursor to Mahatma Gandhi's Non-Cooperation Movement of 1920-22.

government had refused to ratify the Anglo-Persian “Agreement” issued by Curzon. In July there was a revolt in Iraq against the new British occupation. In addition, the Syrian Revolution of July 1920 marked the beginning of the French mandate there; and the upheavals of 1919 in the Bashgir and Tatar Republics, the fighting in the 1919-20 in Kirghizstan, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan showed the desire of Russia’s Asian borderlands to escape from her control. Most of the Asian continent was in crisis, and much of this crisis impinged upon British interests.³⁸ In this global moment of flux, the British determined it was in their best interest to strike up an even more solid alliance with Egyptian elites, who could attempt to keep popular discontent under control if the British, in turn, agreed to give the upper classes a certain amount of power and status.

One of the more severe critics of the “Milner-Zaghlul agreement” was then Secretary of State for War Winston Churchill. In a memorandum, Churchill asserted that if the accord were applied to Ireland with “small omissions,” it would constitute an acceptance of the demands of the Irish nationalist leader de Valera. He also stated that Great Britain “should adhere to the broad ideal of full self-government within the Empire and under the Crown for all parts of the King’s Dominions, whether in Egypt, Ireland, or India... [and] all demands to break away from the British Empire and British Crown should be perseveringly withstood.”³⁹ Another cabinet member who opposed the “Milner-Zaghlul agreement” was Secretary of State for India E.S. Montagu. He was appalled that the Milner Mission would negotiate with ‘extremists’ and he similarly likened Zaghlul to Eamon de Valera and Mahatma Gandhi. Montagu stated that any

³⁸ John Gallagher, “Nationalisms and the Crisis of Empire, 1919-1922,” *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 15, no. 3 (July 1981), 358-9.

³⁹ Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War regarding the Egyptian Proposals, 24 August 1920, C.P. 1803 in Cab. 24/111 and Curzon Papers, MSS. Eur. F. 112/260.

concessions granted by the British commission of inquiry in Egypt would serve only to increase difficulties in administering India.

For all the British misgivings surrounding the Milner Mission, Egyptians were also dissatisfied with what they saw as the limited possibilities for independence available under the Commission. The mission, led by Lord Milner, did not arrive in Egypt until December 1919 and was met by a generally successful Egyptian nationalist boycott that strove to force the British to deal only with Sa'd Zaghlul, still in Europe and identified in the popular consciousness as the voice of Egyptian nationalism.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, on the eve of the Mission's arrival in 1919, the newly-appointed Egyptian Ministry under Yusuf Wahbah was resolved, as reported by the High Commissioner, to cooperate loyally with Lord Milner's enquiry.⁴¹ This subservient position, coupled with the stalemate in Paris where the Egyptian Delegation under Sa'd Zaghlul had failed to secure a hearing at the Peace Conference, increased the bitterness of the nationalists in Egypt. A boycott campaign against the Milner Mission, which was ordered by the Wafd Central Committee in Cairo, received overwhelming support from all sections of Egyptian society. This highly organized movement occupied a large segment of the Egyptian nationalist movement

⁴⁰ When a delegation visited al-Azhar's Rector and asked him to declare his opinion on the Milner Mission, he replied that it was necessary to boycott the British group and that he was planning to convene a meeting of the ulema' to protest the Mission's presence in Egypt. At the meeting that convened at al-Azhar on 17 December the Grand Mufti officially endorsed the claim for Egypt's complete independence. (FO. 407/185/407, Allenby to Curzon, 18 December 1919; McIntyre 99.)

⁴¹ A serious challenge to the Muslim-Coptic entente arose in the middle of November when Muhammad Said's ministry resigned over the issue of the imminent arrival of the Milner Mission. Many Egyptians interpreted this event as an attempt by Britain to shatter the unity of the two religious communities and more recent Egyptian historians tend to explain Wahbah's selection similarly. (Muhammad Anis, *Dirasat fi Watha'iq Thawrat 1919* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Anglu al-Misriyya, 1963), 50-1; Tariq al-Bishri, *Al-Muslimun wa al-aqbat fi itar al-jama'a al-wataniyya*, 2nd Edition. (Cairo: Dar ash-Shuruq, 1988), 132; and 'Abd al-'Azim Muhammad Ramadan, *al-Fikr al-thauri fi Misr qabla thawrat 23 yuliyu* (Cairo: al-Jamiyat al-Misriyah lil-Dirasat al-Tarikhiya, 1978), 227-8.) The Copts' decision to accept the office and thereby work under the British protectorate drew a sharp and immediate response from a number of Coptic nationalists, the Central Committee and the press. On 15 December, eight days after the arrival of the Mission in Cairo, a medical student attempted to assassinate Wahbah, who was seen as a traitor to the Nationalist cause. (*The Egyptian Gazette*, 16 December 1919; John D. McIntyre, Jr., *The Boycott of the Milner Mission: A Study in Egyptian Nationalism* (New York: Peter Lang, 1985), 112-3.)

during the several months of the Mission's visit and it solidified the Wafd leadership's hold on power, a fact which was ignored by the Mission until the last moment. According to Foreign Secretary George Curzon,

The agitation continued to grow in intensity until it culminated in serious riots in Alexandria on the 24th and 25th October 1919, and recourse had to be made to the assistance of British troops to restore order. These disorders were repeated a week later, and on the 16th November, were reproduced in Cairo.⁴²

While the Wahbah government was determined to cooperate with the Milner Mission, the remaining members of the Watani Party dismissed the Mission as another British strategy to prevent full Egyptian independence. In an article in the Berlin-published "Aegyptische Korrespondenz: Organ der Agyptischen Nationalpartei in Deutschland", nationalist journalist Sheikh 'Abd al-Aziz Jawish argued against what he saw as the attempts made by Lord Milner to bring the Egyptian representatives 'Adli Yaqaan and Sa'd Zaghlul to a compromise that would weaken the anti-colonial movement in the country. Jawish wrote, "We know the roots of British politics and their final aims. The entire style of Milner's project was unmistakable that there were no difficulties to identify the underlying intention."⁴³

The postponement of the Mission's departure for Egypt may well have diminished its chances for dealing successfully with the situation in Egypt. Though the March 1919 protests had been ended by force, little had been done to address the more fundamental sources of tension and unrest in the country. Allenby's 5 May dispatch reported that the nationalists were urging

⁴² Earl Curzon to the House of Lords, 15 November 1919, FO 407/185, no. 329

⁴³ 'Abd al-'Aziz Shauisch, "Aegypten in den Krallen Britanniens," in *Aegyptische Korrespondenz*, Berlin, no.1, 1921, p. 1. To coordinate the action of the Berlin-resident Egyptians against the new form of colonialism practiced in Egypt after 1922 an "Egyptian National Defense Committee" was established in the summer of 1922. The Secretary-General was the lawyer Yahya Ahmad ad-Dardiri who was closely associated with the National Party and was former vice-president of the Egyptian union of students Sphinx society in Switzerland. In September 1922 the committee convened a National Congress of Egyptians in the Orient Klub, with the participation of delegates from Egypt, Belgium, France, Italy, Austria, and Switzerland, which expressly opposed the sham independence decreed by Great Britain. However, by this point, the German press considered the Zaghlul-led Wafd as the official representative of the Egyptian national movement, whereas the German-based National Party, by now almost without influence in Egypt, spent much time criticizing the Wafd.

strikes to impress Lord Milner's Mission, which according to rumor had already left for Egypt.⁴⁴ By 16 May more evidence to the same effect had been uncovered. Allenby's weekly report to Curzon noted that "... the young extremists were now redoubling their efforts on the matter of the circulation of seditious pamphlets, secret newspapers, etc." He also called attention to a new feature of these efforts by the nationalists, "attacks on prominent individuals, such as *Mudirs*, and *Mamous* [sic], who were accused of being traitors."⁴⁵ Finally he added that plans were being laid "...to organize a great demonstration of protest against the expected Commission of Investigation whenever it should arrive."⁴⁶ To facilitate the Mission's visit to Egypt, the British government used "all possible means of suppression, such as the arrest of the principal notables, of the intelligent and enlightened young men, the internment of the Ulema of al-Azhar University, together with the press censorship and the dispersion of national demonstration with British guns."⁴⁷ All of these measures, admitted Zaghlul, would reduce the number of public demonstrations against the Milner Mission, but would not break the people's resistance to the British Protectorate. A letter published in the Egyptian press further exemplifies the efforts to create a strong consensus vis-à-vis the Milner Mission. Its author suggested that every village should circulate a letter to be signed by the village omdehs, shaykhs, and heads of families. The proposed letter would state, "We the inhabitants of [blank] under the jurisdiction of [blank] province, declare that our only claim is complete independence, and we refuse to answer any question put to us by any authority which denies our right."⁴⁸ The author suggested that one copy

⁴⁴ FO 407/184/289, Allenby to Curzon, 5 May 1919.

⁴⁵ FO 407/184/363, enclosure, Allenby to Curzon, 18 May 1919; McIntyre, 46-7.

⁴⁶ FO 407/184/363, enclosure, Allenby to Curzon, 18 May 1919; McIntyre, 46-7.

⁴⁷ FO 407/185, no. 276, Sa'd Zaghlul to Earl Curzon, 9 December 1919.

⁴⁸ Egyptian Gazette, 20 October 1919; al-Ahram, 18 October 1919; McIntyre, 58.

should be sent to the *mudir* (local governor), while another should be sent to the Central Committee of the Wafd.⁴⁹

Just three days after the Mission's arrival in Egypt, Milner wrote Curzon that much of the Egyptian populace had committed themselves to the idea of "complete independence":

It (the idea) has been passed from mouth to mouth throughout the country, it is a sort of spell of charm, which everybody shouts, chants, sings, mutters, writes, [and] telegraphs...[even] responsible men, the most influential in the country, have let themselves be carried away into joining the outcry.⁵⁰

Indeed, the Egyptians greeted the Mission's arrival with political demonstrations and strikes by students, lawyers, and workers.⁵¹ On 28 December, Milner warned British Prime Minister David Lloyd George that until Egyptian agitation for "complete independence" had subsided, Egypt would "continue to be a thorn in our side...and exercise a disturbing influence on our position in the whole of the Near East and to some extent also in India."⁵² The fact that all elements of the Egyptian population had taken part in both the Revolution of 1919 and the boycott of the Milner Mission, and no element of Egyptian society was willing to ally with the British in the immediate aftermath of 1919, forced the hands of the British in allowing for a measure of independence.

⁴⁹ Egyptian Gazette, 20 October 1919; al-Ahram, 18 October 1919; McIntyre, 58.

⁵⁰ Milner to Curzon, 10 December 1919, FO 848/11; B.L. Carter, *The Copts in Egyptian Politics* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 294.

⁵¹ G.B., Parliamentary Papers, Egypt NO. 1 (1921), Cmd. 1131, p. 4; 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, *Thawrat 1919: tarikh Misr al-qawmi min sanat 1914 ila sanat 1921* (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1987.), Vol. 11, p. 75.

⁵² FO 848/11, Milner to Lloyd George, 28 December 1919.

Chapter Four: Egyptian Nationalism, the Ottoman Empire, and the Young Turk Revolution

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed the rise of internal and international actors which significantly changed the operations of the Ottoman imperial system. The family of Mehmed Ali had effectively wrested control of Egypt from the Ottoman sultan. However, the sultan remained Egypt's nominal suzerain – a status Britain was loath to officially contest, and the Sultan retained significant local popularity in Egypt. Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many Egyptians still expressed affinity to the Ottoman Empire, and not only, or even primarily, out of a sense of loyalty to the Sultan in his role as Caliph. Because the legal status of Egypt as a vassal of the Sublime Porte had been sustained *de jure* but not *de facto* since the British Occupation, arguments against the Occupation often appealed to the Ottoman Empire as a potential savior of the Egyptian people from the hands of the British. In addition, though jealous of his power vis-à-vis the sultan, the Khedive did not want to completely sever ties with the Ottoman Empire, since his legitimacy lay in his position as viceroy of the sultan; and the khedive was well aware that only the Ottoman Empire could protect him from a complete political takeover by the British. For their part, the British supported the Ottoman Empire to a degree, due to their desire to prop up the “Sick Man of Europe” as a bulwark against Russian expansion. At the same time, the British did not want the Ottoman Empire to have extensive control in daily events in Egypt; and they leaned heavily on their ability to control the khedive. The Sultan's status was legally based on the recognition by the European Powers that Egypt was a part of the Ottoman Empire and that the Khedive was the Sultan's vassal, invested by the Sultan with certain rights and powers, and formally exercising those powers in accordance with

the Sultan's firmans.¹ In fact, the British, their hands tied by international law and other powers' interests, were particularly anxious to demonstrate, through various symbolic means, that Egypt remained a nominally Ottoman territory occupied temporarily on behalf of the Sultan. Indeed, the British derived their precarious legitimacy as occupiers of Egypt from their recognition of Ottoman sovereignty over the country.²

The strange tangle of allegiances between Watani nationalists, Umma Party members, the Khedive, the British, and the Ottoman Empire created by the fact of the British Occupation and nominal Ottoman rule resulted in a series of contingent policies and alternating alliances characterizing much of the period 1882-1919. In his first years as Khedive, 'Abbas Hilmi worked vigorously to conciliate the Ottoman Sultan and to win over Ottoman authorities to the idea that their interests in Egypt were jeopardized by the British presence. Nevertheless, Ottoman authorities were not eager to take on the British directly.³ The British intercepted an 1894 communication from Ottoman High Commissioner Ahmad Mukhtar Pasha (1839-1919) to the Porte in which he wrote that 'Abbas Hilmi was very unhappy with the Sultan's advice to the Khedive to stay quiet regarding what he saw as Britain's undue influence, but in which the Sultan also dismissed 'Abbas Hilmi as "a temperamental colt."⁴

The Sultan's position as Caliph (and as the person many saw as the last non-European check on Western imperial powers) and the popular support this position engendered, was the only real power he possessed on the ground in Egypt. Public support for the Ottoman Empire

¹ Beginning in 1892, the Sultan insisted that 'Abbas Hilmi pay him a yearly visit in Istanbul, a gesture purported to stress the formal link between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. (L. Hirszowicz, "The Sultan and the Khedive, 1892-1908," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1972), 292-6; Oded Peri, "Ottoman Symbolism in British-occupied Egypt 1882-1909", in *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 41 (January 2005), 108-9.

² Peri, 108-9.

³ The British were far too important in terms of European power politics and possible military assistance to the Ottoman Empire for the sultan to risk provoking the British Government over the issue of Egypt.

⁴ FO 800/114, Currie Papers No. 101, 9 March 1894. Mukhtar Pasha resided in Cairo from 1887 as High Commissioner, although Cromer claimed that the office had no official status in Egypt.

increased following the 1911 Italian attack on the Ottoman province of Tripolitania. The nationalists were outraged at this new instance of European aggression, and many Egyptians called on their government to intervene on the Ottoman side. The British forced the Egyptian Government to declare its neutrality, however. As a result, the Nationalists took great pleasure in attacking this stand, which contravened Egypt's legal status as a privileged Ottoman province, and they started subscription drives to aid the Ottoman armed forces.⁵

The Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi was perhaps the actor most prone to switching alliances in order to maintain his position, as his power base was heavily contingent on both the Ottoman Empire and the British Government; the khedive had little on which to base any independent legitimacy. To resist the influence of the British, Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi allied himself with pro-Ottoman and Islamist Egyptian nationalists, and courted representatives of Britain's European rivals in the Middle East.⁶ Nevertheless, the Watanists expressed only a tenuous loyalty toward the person of the Khedive; he was a means to Egypt's independence, but they held no loyalty to either his person or the position. According to journalist Salama Musa (1887-1958),

During the first period of his rule, the Khedive Abbas had been the pivot of the Nationalist Party, which he had also helped financially. He was even pushed further in the direction of nationalism by several personal insults made to him by Cromer. Cromer had his political education and training in India, and he treated the Egyptians in the same way as the English had treated the Indians fifty or sixty years ago...It was due to the Nationalist Party, and more in particular to the efforts of the young Mustafa Kamil, that the national movement grew in scope and raised the objects of its aspirations. When Cromer saw that he was unable to win his struggle against it, he resorted to stupid methods of violence, and even of criminal savagery.⁷

'Abbas was at least nominally a nationalist (at least as far as that identity positively impacted his own position) who ardently believed that a nationalist movement would force the

⁵ *al-'Alam*, 9 October 1911; *al-Liwa*, 29 October, 1908; Arthur Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1968), 270-1.

⁶ Amira Sonbol, *The Last Khedive of Egypt: Memoirs of Abbas Hilmi II* (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1998), x. See, for example, J1135/292/6, Allenby (Cairo), 20 April, 1925, "Activities of ex-Khedive," and FO 141/650/1, "Abbas Hilmi Pasha."

⁷ Salama Musa, *The Education of Salama Musa* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), 30-1.

British authorities to grant Egypt some measure of self-rule. That some of the nationalists ended up opposing ‘Abbas Hilmi more than they did the British was due to several reasons which historians have examined: a belief that it was easier to deal through the Ottoman Empire, Egypt’s suzerain, and convince it to help Egypt gain its freedom from an occupation that the Sultan had condoned; a conviction that the British were bound to evacuate Egypt but the Khedive was there to stay and therefore his power needed to be curtailed; and a feeling that by the beginning of the century the Khedive had given up the battle against the British presence. Rightly or wrongly the Khedive and the nationalists eventually parted ways, each convinced that the other was wrong or had sold out.⁸ Despite his financial contributions to nationalist groups, ‘Abbas Hilmi feared the popularity of the Nationalist Party. If the majority of Egyptians became dissatisfied with the status quo, there was always the danger that the public opinion for which Kamil claimed to speak might, like the earlier nationalist movement of ‘Urabi, be turned against the Khedive himself. As proconsuls, both Lord Cromer and Sir Eldon Gorst played on this fear, the latter more effectively. Initially, at least, the Khedive had enjoyed relative popularity with both the general population and the more strident nationalists.⁹

Despite various attempts to court and placate nationalist groups and public opinion, ‘Abbas Hilmi’s commitment to the nationalist cause was questioned by both radical and conservative nationalist groups. The larger issue, however, was that each group which could potentially function as an effective patron for the cause of nationalist independence also had reason to ally themselves against popular nationalism on occasion. On the one hand, there was

⁸ Sonbol, x.

⁹ The journal *Abu Naddara* published a comic in 1893 which attempted to explain the Khedive’s position vis-à-vis the Nationalists and the British. In the comic, though only Wilfrid Blunt, the pro-Egyptian nationalist British activist, and the Egyptian fellahin are actively opposing British rule, ‘Abbas Hilmi is portrayed as concerned by British action and, unlike his father, Khedive Tawfiq, is not shown to be actively supporting it. (*Abu Naddara*, 1 May 1893.)

the new landowning class, which was still finding its way into the political process. Landowners were willing to cooperate with the Khedive, but they were unwilling to anger the British, who imported the cotton on which their livelihood depended. As for the old Turco-Circassian aristocracy, natural allies of the Khedive, the events of the 'Urabi Revolution were something of a rude awakening. Together with the landowning class, the old aristocracy feared the spectacle of an uprising which was as class-oriented as it was nationalistic. Hence the landowners and elites who made up the Umma and Wafd parties were willing to cooperate with the British even while they hoped for the ultimate departure of the latter.¹⁰

The Khedive also engaged in divided and sometimes mutually exclusive alliances in order to shore up his own power base. For example, in order to retain popular legitimacy, his loyalty to the office of the Sultan-Caliph had to be on display, but 'Abbas Hilmi was also jealous of his power vis-à-vis any interference from Istanbul; while his popularity also depended on his publicly rebuking the power of the British, he could not go too far to anger them, as proven by his 1914 deposition; and, while his own interests were served by a conservative independence movement, the popular movement of Mustafa Kamil was a necessary ally in the pursuit of popular legitimacy.¹¹

For 'Abbas, the Khedive's connections with the Sultan and the Ottoman Empire operated as something of a counter-weight for 'Abbas Hilmi to the British Occupation government. As much as the Khedive personally disliked the Sultan, he favored preserving Ottoman prerogatives, as this prevented the British from obtaining an absolute monopoly of power in Egypt.¹² In

¹⁰ Sonbol, 15.

¹¹ The British deposed 'Abbas in December 1914, as a result of the entrance of the Ottoman Empire into World War I on the side of the Central Powers. He was replaced by Husayn Kamil (r. 1914-1917), who was given the title of Sultan.

¹² A particularly odd manifestation of the selective loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan was the 1906 Taba Incident. On this occasion the Khedive supported the British stand since it concerned Egypt's sovereignty over the Sinai. Kamil, on the other hand, supported the Ottoman position and saw no contradiction between the Ottoman government

particular, the more closely the Sultan's prerogatives were linked to religion and his role as caliph, the better able 'Abbas Hilmi was to defend them against British interference, as the British were loath to interfere with religious matters. The British were extremely reluctant to meddle in religious affairs because of their constant fears of arousing the forces of Islamic "fanaticism" and provoking a corresponding popular revolt.

'Abbas Hilmi and Abdülhamid

An important source of friction between the Khedive and Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid (r. 1876-1909) were the activities against the Sultan on Egyptian soil. According to what khedival advisor Ahmad Shafiq had learned, the Sultan's view was that, while he had treated 'Abbas Hilmi like a son, 'Abbas had not acted accordingly; but rather had allowed Young Turks and Armenians to pursue their anti-Hamidian activities in Egypt unhindered.¹³ In 1894, the Sultan protested through Ottoman High Commissioner in Cairo, Mukhtar Pasha, against two Arab weeklies, *al-Mushir* and *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, published by Christian Syrians, which printed articles against the Sultan, the Sublime Porte, and Islam. One of these articles called for a rising against the Sultan and attacks on Muslims, about which Abdülhamid protested in vain. In 1899, he again complained that the Khedive was supporting two Islam-oriented journals, *al-Khawatir* and

wanting to build a railway to Aqaba which, if built, would enable it to intervene militarily in Egypt, and Egypt exercising sovereignty over all of its territories. The British, for their part, were well aware of the inherent contradictions in the positions of the Khedive and the Nationalists, noting in 1908 that "It is interesting to note the first signs of what the nationalists really do want. They certainly don't want the khedive uncontrolled by a parliament any more than they want us. The portion that fan the agitation – newspaper writers and advocates – want the country for themselves..." However, the Khedive's concurrence with the British actions set him against both the great majority of Egyptians who supported the Sultan in the conflict, and prominent Egyptian nationalists who felt that Ottoman support was key to driving the British out of Egypt. (For a thorough study of this affair, see John C. Hurewitz, "Egypt's Eastern Boundary: the Diplomatic Background of the 1906 Demarcation," in Ammon Cohen and Gabriel Baer (eds.), *Egypt and Palestine: A Millennium of Association (868-1948)* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 269-83; Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., "The 1906 Taba Affair," *Al-Abhath*, Vol. 33 (1985), 23-39; Peri, 112.

¹³ Ahmad Shafiq (1860-1940), whose memoirs are a major source for Egyptian politics during 'Abbas' reign, headed the Khedive's Arabic and European Chancery for many years.

Rashid Rida's *al-Manar*, in contradiction of the Sultan's authority. A more serious development was the escape of Murad Bey, one of the Young Turk leaders, to Cairo where he started a journal, *Mizan*, in January 1896.¹⁴ The Sultan demanded that the Khedive arrest Murad Bey, but the British authorities refused to allow the latter's deportation. The British did not fail to note that 'Abbas Hilmi began showing a notably more cooperative attitude to them after his falling out with the Sultan; and Cromer concluded that he would not have to worry about the possibility of the Sultan intervening on 'Abbas' behalf in the near future.¹⁵ Not surprisingly, 'Abbas Hilmi resented Cromer's efforts to increase British control over Egypt's administration. The Khedive's reaction to a series of provocations from Cromer was the encouragement of a more robust nationalist movement directed solely against the British occupation.

A ministerial crisis in 1893 presented the Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi with his first opportunity to openly defy Cromer and the Veiled Protectorate.¹⁶ Among the positive side effects of the crisis was that it served to restore the identity of the Khedivate as a separate institution from the British administration after years under Tewfik when the Khedive's office

¹⁴ For more on the activities of Mirancı Murad in Egypt, see M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi* (İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1981), 191-209. For a content analysis of the issues of *Mizan* published in Cairo, see Birol Emil, *Mirancı Murad Bey: Hayati ve Eserleri* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1979), 143-53.

¹⁵ Cromer, *Abbas II*, 63. The journal *al-Nil*, which received funding from the Sultan, ran articles sharply attacking both the Young Turks and the Khedive for sheltering them. On the other hand, it was reported that the Khedive granted Murad Bey money to publish *Mizan*.

¹⁶ In January 1893, Cromer took the position that the Khedive should govern through his ministers, as required by law. However, this meant that 'Abbas Hilmi would have to govern through individuals who had become accustomed to doing the bidding of the British. 'Abbas Hilmi was not averse to relying on ministers; but, if he had to do so, he wanted ones who would serve his ends, rather than those of the British. In particular, the Khedive wanted to oust the then Prime Minister, Mustafa Fahmi, whom the Khedive believed did nothing but implement Cromer's dictates to the letter. 'Abbas Hilmi was able to replace Fahmi when the latter fell ill in December 1892. Cromer objected to 'Abbas first choice, however, on the grounds that the Khedive's choice was a Christian and his nomination would offend Egyptian sentiment. Cromer's real objection was the candidate's demonstrated hostility to the British. Despite 'Abbas Hilmi's pressure, Fahmi refused to resign. However, 'Abbas had the legal right to dismiss a Prime Minister. In the face of Fahmi's refusal, the Khedive sent Fahmi a letter of resignation, and informed Cromer that Fahmi had resigned and a new Ministry had been formed under Hussain Fakri. 'Abbas Hilmi's response to Cromer's threats was to state that he would rather abdicate than take Fahmi back as Prime Minister. After a series of negotiations, a compromise was reached under which a new Ministry would be formed while 'Abbas Hilmi would sign an agreement for publication indicating his willingness to abide by British advice on all important matters, and state his desire for cordial relations with them. (Mayer, 100-105.)

had appeared to be nothing more than a subsidiary of the Occupation. The early opposition of the Khedive to Cromer also had a dramatic effect on ‘Abbas Hilmi’s prestige within Egypt. Already a popular monarch, ‘Abbas Hilmi became a hero in the eyes of many of his countrymen by virtue of his opposition to Cromer. In the midst of the 1893 crisis, delegations representing all classes of Egyptian society from the provinces as well as from Cairo flocked to his palace. Speeches were delivered expressing admiration for his courage and support for his position. ‘Abbas Hilmi spoke before a delegation representing the native courts, saying that he would defend Egypt’s legal rights without concern for his own person, provoking a storm of applause and prayers for his life. Delegations continued filing in until the evening, the palace courtyard fairly “rippling” with them, in Shafiq’s words. Hundreds of cables of support came in from all parts of the country. A group of young students led by Mustafa Kamil attacked the headquarters of the pro-British *al-Muqattam* in retaliation for the attacks on ‘Abbas Hilmi for inciting nationalism in connection with the ministerial incident.¹⁷

The ministerial crisis was singled out by journalists as a highly significant turning point in relations between the Khedivate and the Occupation. For example, the newspaper *al-Mu’ayyad* discussed the crisis from all possible angles on its front page for many months.¹⁸ By Cromer’s estimate, fully nine-tenths of the Egyptian official class from ‘Abbas downward had turned suddenly hostile. The Proconsul commented bitterly:

For the first time the Egyptian Government, backed by an Assembly, which, although not representative of the whole country does really represent some influential classes, has publicly and officially declared that they want us to go, and all this is done under the inspiration of an inexperienced, headstrong boy of no particular talent.¹⁹

¹⁷ Ahmad Shafiq, *Mudhakiraati fi nisf qarn*, 2nd Edition (Cairo: Al-Haya Misriyya al-‘amma lil Kitab, 1994.) Vol. II, Part I, 69; Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “‘Abbas Hilmi II: The Khedive and Egypt’s Struggle for Independence” (2 volumes), (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1978), 105-7.

¹⁸ See issues of *Al-Mu’ayyad* throughout the spring and summer of 1893; Mayer, 105-7.

¹⁹ FO 633/6, Cromer to Rosebery No. 197, 25 December 1893. See, also, FO 633/7, Cromer to Rosebery No. 334, 19 December 1893; Mayer, 110-1. The “headstrong boy” is Mustafa Kamil.

It also did not escape the attention of the British that support for the Khedive had spread to the Egyptian Army. A nervous Cromer badgered the British government to permit an increase in the British garrison in Egypt in case the support began to bubble over into an open rebellion.²⁰

‘Abbas Hilmi benefited initially from the fact that he had no rival for popular support on the domestic political scene. Though often ineffective, ‘Abbas Hilmi’s moves to assert his independence from Cromer had a galvanizing impact on the attitudes and enthusiasm of young Egyptians. ‘Abbas began his reign with a store of credit and good will which his early confrontations with the British in the first years of his reign had earned him. He took advantage of the momentum of popular support, exerting himself to consolidate his gains and mobilize public opinion behind him. To this end, he heavily subsidized nationalist journalists.²¹ During the honeymoon phase of ‘Abbas Hilmi’s relationship with the nationalists, Mustafa Kamil proclaimed the virtual identity of the Egyptian people and the Khedive, who represented its rights and aspirations. By supporting the Khedive, Kamil stated, Egyptians risked provoking British wrath, for the British were aggravated at the sight of Egyptians’ devotion to their monarch; and the British government was conspiring in every way to alienate the loyalty of ‘Abbas Hilmi’s subjects from him. According to Kamil, he was beloved as no monarch had ever been as the greatest defender of Egypt’s rights.²² Khedival advisor Shafiq explained the renewal of nationalist sentiment after ‘Abbas Hilmi’s accession as follows: “The people saw in him a symbol of their revolt against the intrusiveness of English policy in the era of his father

²⁰ Ibrahim Amin Ghali, *L’Egypte Nationaliste et Liberale, de Moustapha Kamel a Saad Zaghloul (1892-1927)* (La Haye: M. Nijhoff, 1969), 168-9; Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid, *Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations* (London: Murray, 1968), 117.

²¹ Jacques Berque, *L’Egypte, Imperialisme et Revolution* (Paris: Gallimard, 1967), 165; Ahmad Shafiq, *Mudhakkirati*, Vol. II, Parts I and II (Cairo: Matba’at misr, 1932), Part I: 272; Part II: 56-7, 134, 160; Mayer, 141-3.

²² ‘Ali Fahmi Kamil, *Mustafa Kamil fi arba’a wa thalathina rabi’an*, Vol. VI (Cairo, *al-Liwa*, 1908), 73, 117, 120, 121-2; Mayer, 141-3.

(Tewfik).”²³ As a symbol, ‘Abbas Hilmi was effective in his early years; it was later, when he had to function as a leader, that his deficiencies became obvious. Nationalist groups saw no issue with the Khedive so long as their activity was predicated on the removal of the British from Egypt; it was more difficult to maintain a strong bond between the nationalists and the Khedive when discussions turned to constitutional reforms and curbs on royal authority.

As long as the British clamped down on Egyptian political freedoms, ‘Abbas could pay vague tributes to concepts of democracy without having to demonstrate his willingness to share his power with his subjects in practice. For many nationalists, the cause of national independence was bound up with the notion of popular freedom expressed in a parliamentary government, which was seen as a way to remove the power of the British Occupation, the royal household, and the collaborationist elite. The attempts in the last years of Isma’il’s reign and the first years of Tewfik’s reign to establish representative institutions were aimed at curbing the exploitative activities of European power which the khedivate did not resist – where it did not actively collaborate with them. Thus, when ‘Abbas Hilmi stood up to Cromer, it was natural that many Egyptians would infer that he favored the type of governmental reforms that would increase the ability of Egyptians to resist Western incursions, and that he would be in sympathy with the democratization of government. The push for constitutional reforms and increases in representative government had made progress in the decades before the British Occupation and the reestablishment of Khedival absolutism, which in Egypt was a cover for foreign domination of the country.²⁴

Therefore, it was equally important for ‘Abbas to disavow his own absolutist ambitions, as it was for him to publicly oppose the British administration. In a front-page editorial in *al-*

²³ Ahmad Shafiq, *Mudhakkirati*, Vol. III (Cairo: Dar majlati li-t-tab’wa nashr, 1936), 345.

²⁴ Leonard Binder, *In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power and the Second Stratum in Egypt* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 5, 10; Mayer, 144-5.

Mu'ayyad in 1893, Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf, the Khedive's journalistic spokesman, addressed himself to Cromer and denied that 'Abbas Hilmi wanted to rule Egypt in the absolutist manner of his ancestor Isma'il and also disputed Cromer's contention that whereas Tewfik had shown democratic inclinations, 'Abbas Hilmi was a despot.²⁵ That a conservative such as Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf, who appears to have been quite comfortable with the autocratic style of 'Abbas Hilmi, should have felt it necessary to publicly deny charges that 'Abbas Hilmi was an autocrat evinces the awareness in 'Abbas Hilmi's circle that his popularity was conditioned on the assumption that he would favor democratic reform as soon as the Occupation was eliminated. Fortunately for him, 'Abbas Hilmi was not immediately called upon to show his hand. Because it was commonly known that the Veiled Protectorate of the Cromerian regime ran the government, 'Abbas Hilmi could garner support from those who saw him as a monarch of constitutionalist inclinations without these inclinations ever being put to the test.²⁶

The Struggle between the Khedive and Watani Nationalists

Crucial to the Khedive's public image as a legitimate leader of Egypt was his support of the nationalist Watani Party. Indeed, 'Abbas Hilmi provided leadership in his early years and fostered the nationalist movement in practical ways, assisting with the formation of nationalist societies, subsidizing nationalist agitators, and disbursing large endowments to the nationalist press. In the absence of alternative outlets for discussion, such as a parliament or parties, the press gave the nascent nationalist movement and other currents in Egypt a voice in political discussions. There was an explosion of periodicals and newspapers, some of which were financed, alternately, by 'Abbas, the British, the French, or by other personalities and powers.

²⁵ *Al-Mu'ayyad*, 4 March 1893.

²⁶ Mayer, 144-5.

However, the movement that ‘Abbas Hilmi had set in motion soon outstripped him and his conservative policies.²⁷ From being a hero of the resistance to the British Occupation, Abbas came to be seen by an ever larger segment of the Egyptian population as a corrupt tyrant who had no sympathies for the aspirations of his subjects to participate in the government. This view of ‘Abbas Hilmi only increased in the period that followed the Denshawai verdicts in 1906. Despite the public favor certain to be garnered by taking up the cause of those accused in the Denshawai trials, ‘Abbas Hilmi remained awkwardly passive throughout the trials – some indication of his unwillingness to expose himself to Cromer’s wrath by openly taking a stand against the Occupation. Somewhat surprisingly, the Khedive did not try to exploit the groundswell of public opinion in Egypt against the verdict or the critical reaction to the British Occupation that these drastic measures provoked in Europe to shore up his own popularity. Not only did ‘Abbas Hilmi refuse to commute the sentences of the villagers; when he learned that the public executions had been carried out on the basis of an order issued in his name, but regarding which he had not even been consulted, ‘Abbas Hilmi, though furious, did not make a public protest.²⁸ ‘Abbas Hilmi calculated, no doubt, that his hold on power was too precarious at this moment to risk any open confrontation with the British regime.

By 1907, Kamil and increasing numbers of traditional nationalists who had remained loyal to the Khedivate became disillusioned with the person of the khedive. In the face of the Khedive’s more cautious behavior regarding the British, Nationalists viewed his conduct as

²⁷ Nationalist frustration at the actions of the Khedive, Egyptian elites, and the British was encapsulated by a 1904 cartoon published by Mustafa Kamil. It depicted, with the pyramids in the background, a monkey with a whip in hand dressed as an Englishman (likely Cromer), shown training several circus animals (the Egyptian people.) The dogs and cows, being whipped by the “British monkey,” wear a variety of fezzes and turbans. The rhyming colloquial Egyptian textual commentary accompanying the picture begins by declaring: “Here is a tarboush (fez) who is mute, and here is a turban without any action, and here is the Pasha with his useless soldiery...” The animals wearing the tarboush represent the urban *effendiyya* class, while those wearing the turbans were the religious and other traditional elites. (Ziad Fahmy, “Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism,” 162-3.)

²⁸ Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *My Diaries; being a personal narrative of events, 1888-1914* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1932), 577; Mayer, 174-7.

likely to weaken support for their campaign to oust the British and to return the governance of Egypt to the Sultan and his deputy the khedive.²⁹ ‘Abbas Hilmi’s pursuit of his own personal interests had, over time, turned him into something of a liability for the traditionalist faction of the nationalist movement to which Mustafa Kamil belonged. British anti-imperialist Wilfrid Scawen Blunt (1840-1922) records in his diaries a conversation with Mustafa Kamil on 15 July 1906:

Of the Khedive ‘Abbas he tells me precisely what [Muhammad] Abdu always said about him of late years, that he had become corrupted. ‘I knew him well,’ Mustafa said, ‘before he came to his present position, as we are exactly the same age within three months, and I saw much of him while we were both being educated in Europe. He was then charming, and full of patriotic ideas, and I was his devoted adherent, absurdly so, but now he has fallen entirely into the hands of rogues, and thinks of nothing but making money, and he is also in the hands of his Hungarian mistress (Countess Torok). He has in this way lost all his friends and has ended by having no influence whatever in Egypt. If he had any courage he might over and over again have held his own against Cromer and done incalculable good for his country, but he cares nothing now for his country, only for money. He puts up with endless indignities from Cromer, who has a hold over him through the knowledge of his rascalities; and he clings to his £E100,000 a year, his civil list allowance, and makes himself Cromer’s servant.’³⁰

In addition to a general dissatisfaction with ‘Abbas Hilmi, the Khedive was criticized for specific actions, such as his attendance at the King’s Birthday Parade, and more general charges were also brought by implication.³¹ In particular, increasing numbers of Egyptian nationalists began to suspect the Khedive had designs on increasing his personal power, and for this reason was more amenable to the British. The British, in turn, were accused of plotting to establish a counter-Caliphate in the Arab world under their control, presumably with ‘Abbas Hilmi as the anti-

²⁹ Mayer, 167-8.

³⁰ Blunt, *My Diaries*, 564-5.

³¹ Regarding a 1904 scandal over the marriage of ‘Ali Yusuf, Kamil met the Khedive that August in France and remonstrated with him for flying in the face of public opinion; ‘Abbas Hilmi replied that he paid no attention to public opinion; indeed, if he decided to walk around Cairo wearing a hat (which was tantamount to renouncing Islam), he was sure no one would say anything. Kamil left in anger and swore he would have nothing more to do with a ruler who heeded public opinion so little. Muhammad Farid later expressed his fear that the Khedive’s continued Nationalist ties might give Cromer new grounds to deprive him of his rights, at a time when his relations with the British were improving. (Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., (trans.) *The Memoirs and Diaries of Muhammad Farid, an Egyptian Nationalist Leader (1868-1919)* (San Francisco: Mellon University Research Press, 1992), 1; ‘Abd al-Rahman Al-Rafi’i, *Mudhakkirati 1889-1951* (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, 1952), 339-40; Shafiq, Vol. II, Part II, 59f; Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., “The Egyptian Nationalist Party,” (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 1968), 105-6, 109.)

Caliph. The Sultan was reported to be valiantly resisting the imposition of foreign financial controls over the Ottoman Empire (presumably as an implied contrast to Isma'il's behavior in Egypt) and to have said that he would prefer to be the last Caliph rather than a second khedive.³²

Because of Mustafa Kamil's careful courting of popular opinion and his popularity as a spokesman for the nationalist mainstream, his increasing public estrangement from 'Abbas Hilmi was significant; and Mustafa Kamil's public criticisms of 'Abbas Hilmi hurt the latter in nationalist circles. 'Abbas Hilmi also showed a distinct lack of philosophical commitment to the goals of nationalism. In Kamil's devotion to the principles of liberal democracy, he was now more of a threat than a support to the Khedive's domestic authority. By the first decade of the twentieth century, there was more to be gained for the Khedive by throwing his lot in with the British than in clandestine intrigues with the Nationalists against them. As a result, by 1904 the possibility of an anti-British coalition, comprising France and possibly other Continental Powers, the Ottoman Empire, the Palace, and the Nationalists, had foundered because of the weakness and the different goals of the constituent parties.

'Abbas Hilmi's separation from the nationalists was made even more evident by the growing Nationalist consensus surrounding constitutional reform. The tension between the call for a constitution and the need for khedival support would become a recurring theme in nationalist ideology. The increasing nationalist and popular support for a constitution exposed the embarrassingly large gap that separated the Occupation regime, wedded to the khedivate as the lynch-pin of the Veiled Protectorate, from politicized Egyptians, who almost unanimously rejected the old form of government in favor of a more democratic one.³³ In 1900, Kamil had already written his first appeal for a representative system of government, which was to be

³² FO 78/5431, Cromer to Lansdowne No. 132, 9 December 1905; Mayer, 171-3.

³³ Mayer, 249.

guaranteed by a written constitution.³⁴ He then developed the idea of constitutionalism, by which he meant representative government, into one of the main tenets of his party program - a policy hardly consistent with 'Abbas Hilmi's desire to strengthen his own authority.³⁵ Salama Musa described the situation in this way:

I was struck by the new nationalist attitude voiced in *al-Jarida*, which I may briefly indicate as follows: The struggle must be concentrated on the central issue of nationalism, namely, that Egypt is for the Egyptians, and not for any foreign power. The people must govern themselves by means of a constitution so that the Khedive will not be an absolute ruler over the country. This call led to a relapse of the old nationalist party, and also to the Copts embracing the cause of nationalism which had hitherto scared them. The constitutional movement began to spread throughout the people; as to the Khedive 'Abbas, he tried to stem the tide, if not actually oppose it.³⁶

However, Kamil's relations with 'Abbas Hilmi were often strained, particularly between 1904 and 1906, and specifically on the questions of a constitution and public opinion, Kamil continued to be publicly supportive of the Khedive as the legitimate figure of Egyptian sovereignty in the face of the British. Khedival support of the Nationalist Party was still crucial despite fundamental ideological differences.

'Abbas Hilmi and Lord Cromer

In the autumn of 1906, 'Abbas Hilmi made his peace with the nationalists, hoping to get revenge on Cromer, to cover his bets in case the British left, and to steer the Nationalists away from an 'Urabist (i.e. anti-Khedivist) orientation.³⁷ For the Nationalists, palace patronage would set the example for ministers, government functionaries, and notables. It would also provide

³⁴ "al-Hukuma wa al-umma fi Misr," *al-Liwa*, 5 October 1900, cited in al-Rafi'i, 164. See also, articles in *al-Liwa*, 21 May and 16 November 1902 and 9 March 1904.

³⁵ Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party," 105-6.

³⁶ Salama Musa, *The Education of Salama Musa* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), 52.

³⁷ For most of Cromer's tenure, the nationalists, primarily consisting of the petit-bourgeois *effendiyya* class, were aligned with the Khedive ('Abbas Hilmi) who attempted to counterbalance the power of British authority. The British, in turn, especially under Cromer, made tacit alliances with many of the Egyptian economic and intellectual elites. (Cromer and Muhammad 'Abduh, for instance, had a mutually respectful relationship.) There is also evidence to suggest that before his retirement, Cromer encouraged the establishment of a moderate nationalist party, which would later become the Umma Party.

needed financial support for their expanded political and journalistic activities, especially the creation of English and French versions of *al-Liwa*, which Mustafa Kamil had already announced as his means of converting European public opinion to the Egyptian cause.³⁸ Meeting secretly at a mosque near his summer palace, the Khedive made an agreement with Kamil and other leading figures of the nationalist movement to open the Nationalist Party (which had begun ten years earlier as a secret society headed by ‘Abbas) to public membership and to form a corporation, capitalized at £E20,000, to sustain the projected Nationalist dailies, *The Egyptian Standard* and *L’Etendard Egyptian*. Much of the money would be provided by the Khedive, or by wealthy princes and notables acting at his behest.³⁹ For the next year, the Khedive remained in secret contact with the Nationalists while his public position remained necessarily ambiguous.⁴⁰

By late 1906, when ‘Abbas Hilmi had begun to mend his relations with the nationalists out of political necessity, his relations with Cromer were especially strained.⁴¹ In fact, even in his quieter years, ‘Abbas Hilmi was far from being the submissive puppet that the Veiled Protectorate system envisaged. In the spring of 1906, Cromer was still complaining that ‘Abbas was working steadily to inflame what the former considered to be Islamic sentiment. In Cromer’s opinion, ‘Abbas Hilmi invariably discouraged all Egyptians of moderate and reforming tendencies, and paid and encouraged those notable for their “Anglophobia” and “fanaticism.”⁴²

Cromer also charged ‘Abbas with encouraging the Nationalists’ demands for a representative legislative body, which Cromer claimed was playing with fire, as such a body

³⁸ Louis Bouvat, “La presse Egyptienne,” *Revue du Monde Musulman*, I, 2 (December 1906), 280, citing *al-Liwa*, 5, 23, and 30 August 1906; Goldschmidt, “Egyptian Nationalist Party,” 133-5.

³⁹ Goldschmidt, *Memoirs*, 2; Shafiq, Vol. II, Part II, 103. Among the contributors were Princes Gamal Toussoun and Ahmad Midhat Yakan of the Khedivial family; Umar Sultan; Muhammad Farid, who paid £E500; and Mustafa Kamil, who paid £E1000, possibly provided by the Khedive.

⁴⁰ Goldschmidt, “The Egyptian Nationalist Party,” 133-5.

⁴¹ Mayer, 171-3.

⁴² FO 800/46, Cromer to Grey No. 110, 26 May 1906.

would oppose ‘Abbas and expose the Khedivate itself to peril.⁴³ Behind this warning was an apprehension on the part of the British that ‘Abbas Hilmi, in his attempts to win nationalist support and to strengthen his position in Egypt, would recklessly play along with nationalist demands for democratization. The British predicted that ‘Abbas Hilmi would not be able to control these demands for democratization and that they would undermine the khedivate, and, thereby bring down the Veiled Protectorate.⁴⁴ The presence of the khedive remained necessary for the function and appearance of British rule in Egypt; in this way, the khedive’s status was minimally guaranteed. However, there was a chance in these circumstances that the British would retreat, and ‘Abbas Hilmi could not afford to be identified with the British when and if the hoped-for steps toward Egyptian independence were made, lest he find himself like his father, Khedive Tewfik, faced with massive rejection of his legitimacy.

‘Abbas Hilmi and Sir Eldon Gorst

When the Occupation seemed to be gaining a firmer hold on the political situation after Cromer’s departure in 1907, and when it was possible to work out a rapprochement with the British, ‘Abbas Hilmi abandoned his nationalist allies.⁴⁵ Subsequently, Mustafa Kamil began to separate himself from ‘Abbas Hilmi after the beginning of the Khedive’s policies of entente with the Occupation regime under Gorst.⁴⁶ Even before Gorst formally took office, Mustafa Kamil had warned that the Proconsul would try to drive a wedge between ‘Abbas Hilmi and the nationalists by treating ‘Abbas Hilmi well and reaching an understanding with him. Soon after

⁴³ Shafiq, *Mudhakkirati*, Vol. II, Part II, 117-21.

⁴⁴ Mayer, 182-4.

⁴⁵ Mayer, 191.

⁴⁶ Sir Eldon Gorst (1861-1911) served as Consul-General in Egypt from 1907 until 1911. Gorst followed a more lenient policy in Egypt, and his relationship with ‘Abbas in particular was purposefully different from the harsh one maintained by Cromer.

Gorst started his tenure in 1907 and ‘Abbas Hilmi’s collusion with the new Occupation regime had been demonstrated, Mustafa Kamil announced that whether ‘Abbas Hilmi had good relations with the British was a matter of indifference. Sharply departing from the position that he had taken in the early years of ‘Abbas Hilmi’s reign, Kamil announced that the nation should not be bound by ‘Abbas Hilmi’s personal views of the Occupation, and that the khedive alone should not govern the nation. Instead, Kamil emphasized the rights of the Egyptian people and service to the cause of the nation which was above all rulers and all individuals.⁴⁷ The effect of Gorst’s Entente policy on the popularity of the Khedive was illustrated by Salama Musa as follows:

the most important cause that made the public oppose the Khedive was his so-called policy of reconciliation. The English, having seen that Cromer’s policy towards the Khedive had resulted in making the latter a national hero who started intriguing against them, appointed as the new Commissioner in Cairo Sir Eldon Gorst. He befriended the Khedive, and increased his powers; and the Khedive was so much taken in by this change in British policy that he began to oppose the nationalist movement and cooperated with the English, thus embarking upon a policy of reconciliation which was detrimental to the nation’s progress.⁴⁸

The Khedive’s initial support for the constitutionalist trend in Egyptian nationalism had been part of a campaign to portray the Occupation as a force opposed to Egyptian freedom. ‘Abbas Hilmi had welcomed this propaganda in the days of his strained relations with Cromer’s regime, when such advocacy had no political repercussions for him. Cromer’s brusque personality, on top of the Dinshawai trial, had drawn the Palace and most strains of nationalist opinion together into an uneasy alliance. By a gentler approach aimed particularly at winning the Khedive over to his side, Gorst was able with his entente policy to separate these diverse factions of nationalists, which now constituted themselves as separate political parties.⁴⁹ The changed situation under the entente policy with Gorst, therefore, caused ‘Abbas Hilmi to align himself in

⁴⁷ Ahmad Rashad, *Mustafa Kamil* (Cairo: Matba’at al-ada, 1958), 244; Mayer, 202-3.

⁴⁸ Musa, 35.

⁴⁹ Goldschmidt, “Egyptian Nationalist Party,” 137.

opposition to the Majlis and any groups calling for constitutionalism.⁵⁰ After the 1908 Revolution in Turkey led to intensified agitation for an Egyptian Constitution, the Khedive and his advisors, rather than going along with the clamor that Egypt should emulate the Turks and adopt a constitution, produced a counter-demand: Egyptians should be allowed to participate in the new Ottoman Parliament in Constantinople. This notion harmonized well with the Khedive's general policy of Ottoman solidarity, though it was probably intended to distract Egyptians from their demands for internal constitutional reform since there was no real possibility that the Occupation would allow Egyptian membership in the Ottoman Parliament.⁵¹

The policy which Gorst pursued of developing Egypt's representative institutions did not, as was charged by British alarmists, signal a trend toward turning the country over to the Egyptians. Representative institutions in Egypt had only as much power as the central authority was willing to delegate to them, and Gorst had no desire to change this system.⁵² He only wanted to provide malcontents and activists with a forum to criticize the government that could function as a safety valve to reduce the political tensions that had mounted dangerously in Cromer's last years. These representative institutions had no power to check the actions of the Occupation or the Khedive without prior consent, and their role remained merely an advisory one. However, the British also needed to consider their own domestic expectations of the purpose of the Egyptian occupation. Gorst had to take into account British home opinion that demanded the introduction of more effective representative government, as the project of British colonialism was predicated

⁵⁰ Yunan Labib Rizq, *al-Haya al-hizbiyya fi misr fi 'ahd al-ihtilal al-baritani 1892-1914* (Cairo: Maktaba al-anjlu al-misriyya, 1970), 28.

⁵¹ Mayer, 211-12.

⁵² In Gorst's words, "The powers of the representative bodies have not been materially increased, but measures have been adopted to make the discussion of more practical utility and to inspire the members with a greater sense of responsibility." He also noted in a congratulatory vein that, aside from 'Abbas Hilmi and the ministers, no one realized that the recent policy did not represent a diminution of British authority. FO 371/890, Gorst to Grey No. 19674, 22 May 1910.

on the promise of “preparing” subject populations for independence and self-government.⁵³ While British public opinion may have been content with the composition of the Egyptian government, domestic Egyptian opinion was increasingly dissatisfied. Increasingly, popular opinion considered the Egyptian government despotic and tyrannical, as it neither represented the nation, nor was guided by a constitution. One Egyptian was quoted as asking how it was “that the Turkish nation managed to obtain a constitution, notwithstanding that the Egyptians, who [we] re much more intelligent, ha[d] not obtained one.”⁵⁴ Another proposed to use force to obtain a constitution for the country, pointing out that Egypt was no less a nation than France, which had done this during its own revolution. Speeches condemning the rule of a single individual or commending governments that did consult their people were also quite common.⁵⁵

The implication that ‘Abbas Hilmi would not grant Egypt a constitution without prior British approval provoked a negative reaction in articles published in *al-Liwa* and *al-Jarida*. For the Khedive to make the granting of an Egyptian constitution dependent on British approval was tantamount to recognizing the legitimacy of the British position in Egypt. There had already been indications that ‘Abbas Hilmi had no intention of granting a constitution regardless of British willingness to consent to one. The suspicion of *al-Jarida* was that ‘Abbas was looking to expand his own power by cooperating with the British under the entente policy.⁵⁶

While many nationalists believed that the Khedive had shied away from a constitution for his own selfish purposes rather than because of the British, the Khedive was still the only authority to which they could or would appeal. Muhammad Farid insisted in *al-Liwa* that Egyptians would demand a constitution from the Khedive, the legal authority in Egypt, not from

⁵³ Mayer, 206.

⁵⁴ Quoted in Malak Badrawi *Political Violence in Egypt 1910-1925: Secret Societies, Plots, and Assassinations* (London: Curzon, 2000), 1-2.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 1-2.

⁵⁶ FO 371/452, Graham to Grey No. 35053, 3 October 1908; Mayer, 213-4.

Britain which had no right to be in Egypt. Kamil trusted, he asserted, that Gorst's cajolery would not lead 'Abbas Hilmi into making mistakes, and professed not to believe the charges that 'Abbas was just trying to divert the thrust of the constitutionalists' drive from Egypt to London and that the Khedive's advocacy of a constitution had been merely made as a part of an effort in earlier years to get rid of Cromer (though Kamil had no trouble repeating the charges in numerous articles and speeches.) Kamil suggested that 'Abbas Hilmi might be in a situation similar to Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid's, where palace courtiers had become a barrier between the ruler and the people.⁵⁷

The radicalization of Egyptian politics increased dramatically by the end of 1908. Despite attempts to continue to work with 'Abbas Hilmi, matters had reached a stage where the Nationalist Party was openly accusing the Khedive, its former patron, of betraying the nation. Following Kamil's death in 1908, the founder of the Watani Party was replaced by the more radical Muhammad Farid (1868-1919) and 'Abd al-'Aziz Jawish (d.1929), the latter of whom was to prove a particularly determined enemy of the Khedive.⁵⁸ This radicalization was aided by the fact that the Watani Party lacked effective, centralized leadership, which contributed in part

⁵⁷ Mayer, 213-4.

⁵⁸ Shaykh 'Abd al-Aziz Jawish (also sometimes transliterated as Shawish) was born and raised in Alexandria. He studied at Al-Azhar and Dar al-Ulum before being sent to Borough Road Teacher's Training College in England by the Ministry of Education. He also lectured in Arabic at Cambridge University from 1903 to 1906. He returned to Egypt to become an inspector with the Ministry of Education, but also wrote articles for *al-Mu'ayyad* and *al-Liwa*. Chosen by Muhammad Farid to edit *al-Liwa* after Kamil's death, Jawish quickly made himself into one of the most "objectionable characters" on the British Agency's list. Jawish took *al-Liwa* in an even more Ottomanist and Islamist direction, with severe consequences. A British intelligence report referred to him as "the notorious Sheikh Abdel Aziz Shawish," whose hand, the report continues, "can be discerned in almost every occurrence during the past few years which has disturbed the public peace or embarrassed the authorities." (FO 141/492, 3 May 1910, Ronald Graham to Sir Eldon Gorst.) In Gorst's opinion, Shawish was "the most dangerous and fanatical of the whole band." Imprisoned twice in Egypt, Jawish went to Constantinople in 1911 and remained there and in Berlin during the First World War, working on "Pan-Islamic" journals for the Central Powers. Muhammad Farid, *Muhammad Farid, vol. I: Mudhakkirati ba'da al-Hijra, 1904-1919* (Cairo: al-Hay'ah al-Misriyah al-'Ammah lil-Kitab, 1978), 63-5; Rifa'at al-Sa'id, *Muhammad Farid: al-Mawqif wa al-Ma'sa* (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 1978), 142-55; Anwar al-Jundi, *'Abd al-'Aziz Jawish: min Ruwwad al-Tarbiyah wa al-Sihafa wa al-Ijtima'* (Cairo: al-Dar al-Misriyah lil-Ta'lif wa al-Turjumah, 1965), 83-7; Muhammad 'Ali 'Alluba, *Dhikrayyat Ijtima'iyya wa Siyasiyya* (Cairo: al-Markaz al-'Arabi li'l-Baht wa al-Nasr, 1982), 49-52; Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 6-8.

to the radicalization of some of its splinter groups. Moreover, Farid lacked the leadership skills of Kamil, and the party fell to a certain degree under the ideological influence of Jawish.

At the same time, ‘Abbas Hilmi’s ability to control the Nationalist Party had waned considerably by the time of Kamil’s death in 1908. As the attacks on the Khedive grew in the press and reached a point where he was being openly accused of betraying the nation and collaborating with the British against Egypt’s interests, ‘Abbas Hilmi himself started pressing for the revival of the 1881 Press Law.⁵⁹ This, despite an initial rejection of Gorst’s proposal to reinstate the law on the grounds that current laws were sufficient and that application of the 1881 law would be likely to occasion unrest.⁶⁰ According to the memoirs of Ahmad Shafiq, president of the Khedival Council at the time, ‘Abbas Hilmi warmed up to the idea of increasing press censorship, in part because of some pressure from Gorst and mounting attacks by the nationalist press which accused him of betraying his nation to the British. After some consultation with his advisors, the Khedive asked Butrus Ghali (1846-1910), the newly appointed and increasingly unpopular Prime Minister, to reinforce the 1881 Press Law.⁶¹

In the wake of the passage of the Press Law, one of the strongly nationalist newspapers wrote a kind of epitaph for the bond that earlier united the people with the Khedive. Gorst’s politics, it claimed, had divided the nation into two camps, and had detached the mass of the

⁵⁹ The press law of 1881, which was originally enforced from 1881 until 1894, primarily attempted to control all Egyptian periodicals through the forced implementation of a number of regulations. All new and existing newspapers, for instance, were required to register and acquire permission to print from the Department of Interior. The most intriguing clause in the law was article 17: “The Interior Minister (Nazir al-Dakhiliyya) of this government is empowered to outlaw the entry, distribution, and sale of any newspaper or pamphlet printed outside of Egypt’s borders. All who smuggle, distribute, sell, or possess a forbidden newspaper or periodical published outside of Egypt will be fined anywhere from one to twenty-five Egyptian pounds.” (Ziad Fahmy, “Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism,” 115.)

⁶⁰ ‘Abbas Hilmi had found the old laws serviceable. He was, for example, able to have two individuals subjected to harsh sentences for their involvement in the distribution of a hostile poem in 1897. (Mayer, 213-4; Shafiq, Vol. III, 173-4; Ziad Fahmy, “Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism,” 196.)

⁶¹ Shafiq, Vol. III, 173-4; Ziad Fahmy, “Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism,” 196-7.

population from the Khedive, formerly their only powerful ally.⁶² Opposition to the Press Law occasioned the first of many public demonstrations against the Egyptian government itself, as opposed to just the British Occupation, that functioned as expressions of popular repudiation of ‘Abbas Hilmi’s actions.⁶³ ‘Abbas later tried to justify the Press Law as a measure that he was forced to take by the actions of “extremists.”⁶⁴ Of course, it was the Nationalist Party – the most broadly based and representative of all the Egyptian parties – and its newspapers against which the Press Law was primarily directed.⁶⁵

Not surprisingly, the repressive measures which the government was taking had the effect of inciting more bitter and outspoken criticism rather than quieting dissent. The newspaper *Qutr al-Misr* directly attacked ‘Abbas Hilmi and made remarks interpreted as incitement to assassination. At times, the attacks in newspapers were veiled insinuations, as was the case of an article which listed the traits of bad rulers, which corresponded exactly to the faults found by opponents with the Khedive. One article described a bad ruler as one who was hated as a monarch, who had allowed foreigners to dominate his country, and allowed these foreigners to help him to consolidate his throne. The article referenced the ‘Umayyad Caliph Walid II (r. 743-44), who was accused of giving himself up to drink and debauchery, taking a shameless mistress (likely a reference to the Khedive’s mistress, Countess Török), and violating Islamic precepts;

⁶² FO 371/660, Enclosure No. 15677, 17 April 1909. The same paper was later suppressed under the Press Law for an attack on several ministers. FO 371/1115, Kitchener to Grey No. 39144, 16 October 1911. Khalil Mutran (1872-1949) penned the following poem on the 1909 reinstatement of the Press Law: “Disperse her best men by land and sea / Slaughter her free men one by one / The good shall remain good till the end of time / And so shall the evil remain. / Smash all the pens, would that prevent / Hands from engraving the stone? / Cut off the hands, would that restrain / Eyes from looking in anger? / Put out the eyes, would that prevail / Against the fiery breath? / Stop then the breath, for that would be / The utmost you could do to us / We would then be saved from you / And for that we would offer our thanks.” (M.M. Badawi, “Ten Modern Arabic Poems,” *Journal of Arabic Literature* VI (1975), 130-9.)

⁶³ Mayer, 227-8.

⁶⁴ Shafiq, Vol. II, Part II, 173-79.

⁶⁵ Ahmad Rashad, *Mustafa Kamil* (Cairo: Matba’at al-‘Ada, 1958), 57. There were numerous instances of the Nationalist Party’s papers being prosecuted. See, for example, FO 371/894, Cheetham to Grey No. 38356, 21 October 1910; FO 371/1363, Kitchener to Grey No. 21921, 22 May 1912; FO 371/1363, Cheetham to Mallet No. 47501, 9 September 1912; FO 371/1364, Kitchener to Grey No. 52216, 30 November 1912.

and the ‘Abbasid Caliph al-Mu’tasim (r.833-842), who relied on a non-Muslim minister (a reference to Butrus Ghali), and indulged drinking and debauchery. The article blamed sovereigns in general who were greedy, cruel, corrupt, and who had taken on bad associations, all to the detriment of the nation.⁶⁶

Nevertheless, despite the increasing opposition to his authority, and in part because of his forced abdication in 1914, ‘Abbas Hilmi retained a great deal of popularity in Egypt throughout World War I and through the 1919 Revolution. Prominent members of the royal family continued to harbor pronounced pro-Ottoman sympathies even after the Khedive’s deposition, as did a large segment of public opinion.⁶⁷ On the day that Prince Husayn Kamil succeeded ‘Abbas Hilmi as ruler and assumed the new title of Sultan, “in the Cairo Mosques the prayer for the Moslem [sic] Khalifa was repeated three times in succession and each time response was general and loud, whereas [the response] to the prayers for the Sultan of Egypt was feeble or inaudible.”⁶⁸ Meanwhile, in Constantinople, Farid persuaded the Shaykh al-Islam to issue a fatwa that condemned Husayn Kamil to death, on the grounds that he had “violated the authority of the Ottoman Caliphate over the Egyptian province, which was an integral part of the Ottoman Sultanate.”⁶⁹ A few of the popular songs and street chants circulating at the time mentioned the Khedive as a heroic, almost messianic figure who would return from exile and rescue Egypt from

⁶⁶ FO 371/889, Gorst to Grey No. 1614, 8 January 1910; Mayer, 230.

⁶⁷ Ronald Storrs, *The Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs* (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1937), 152; War Office (WO) 157/69, “Intelligence News,” 22 September 1914

⁶⁸ Storrs, *Memoirs*, 153. Husayn Kamil (1853-1917) was Sultan of Egypt from 19 December 1914 until his death in October 1917. When ‘Abbas Hilmi was deposed in 1914, the British named Husayn the first “sultan” of Egypt, and severed the country from the Ottoman Empire. The British appointment of Husayn was intended to weaken both the Nationalists and the pro-Ottoman groups in Egypt. When the Egyptian Protectorate was proclaimed and Husayn Kamil named Sultan, twenty prominent members of the royal family, including the Princes Mehmed ‘Ali and ‘Aziz Pasha, did not accept the installation of the new ruler, and were arrested and subsequently taken out of the country.

⁶⁹ Badrawi, 117.

the British.⁷⁰ Another British intelligence report noted that in the popular areas of Cairo, “street-boys, lower-class natives, seed vendors, etc., have been publicly singing a new song in the vernacular in which open insinuations are made regarding the arrival in Egypt of the ex-Khedive (‘Abbas II) and [Ismail] Enver Pasha,” presumably to deliver Egypt from British rule. This song, the report continued, also contained “uncomplimentary remarks about the [British] G.O.C. (General Officer Commanding.)”⁷¹

The Khedive and the Sultan

By the final years of the nineteenth century, relations between ‘Abbas Hilmi and the Sultan Abdülhamid had reached such a low point that in private ‘Abbas Hilmi voiced his belief that Abdülhamid wanted to depose him.⁷² It came back to ‘Abbas Hilmi that the Sultan had taken to referring to him in terms roughly equivalent to “that crazy kid” (*al-walid al-majnun* in Shafiq’s translation of the Turkish).⁷³ Indeed, by the end of 1897, the Sultan’s disenchantment with ‘Abbas Hilmi had grown to the point that he was reportedly talking about the prospect of replacing the entire Muhammad ‘Ali dynasty with a regular Ottoman governor who would be appointed every five years, expressing a willingness to allow the British Occupation to continue indefinitely.⁷⁴ Abdülhamid had apparently come around to the view that the ambitious Khedive only meant trouble, and that the British had no interest in changing the status quo in Egypt, to the Sultan’s benefit. The Sultan had to consider also that the likely outcome of a successful

⁷⁰ A popular rhyming chant that was often sung in the street declared: “Allah hay ‘Abbas gayi” (God is eternal and ‘Abbas shall return.)

⁷¹ FO 141/781/8915, “Intelligence Report on the Egyptian Situation,” July 31, 1919; Ziad Fahmy, “Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism,” 280. Enver Pasha was the Ottoman Minister of War during the First World War.

⁷² FO 633/6, Cromer to Salisbury No. 287, 19 November 1897.

⁷³ Ahmad Shafiq, *Hawliyyat Misr as-Siyasiyya*, 10 Volumes (Cairo: Matba’at Shafiq Pasha, 1926-1931), Volume I, 268.

⁷⁴ FO 633/6, Cromer to Salisbury No. 290, 11 December 1897.

campaign against the British in Egypt would be the Khedive's resumption of Muhammad 'Ali's anti-Ottoman policy.⁷⁵

At the same time that 'Abbas Hilmi was attempting to placate the Sultan in order to strengthen his own position vis-à-vis the British, he also began to financially support the Young Turks resident in Egypt in an attempt to offset efforts by the Sultan to reassert the Porte's rights of ownership to Egypt. In addition, in 1895 'Abbas Hilmi began to support the idea of replacing the Ottoman caliphate with an Arab one and installing himself as caliph. Steadily until World War I, and less for nationalist than personal and dynastic reasons, 'Abbas Hilmi promoted his and Egypt's claims to leadership of the Arab world, as well as Cairo's suitability as the seat of a new caliphate.⁷⁶ This continued flirtation on the part of the Khedive with ideas about an Arab caliphate with Egypt at its center put him at odds with both the Hamidian regime and the Young Turk government. According to the British Foreign Office, "Although he did not say it in so many words, his Highness expected to replace the Sultan of Turkey as sovereign of these regions."⁷⁷

Kamil, Farid, and the Nationalists Embrace the Sultan

⁷⁵ Adding to the Sultan's existing animus towards 'Abbas Hilmi, a plotter in Yıldız was able to persuade the Sultan that 'Abbas Hilmi's mother was secretly aiding the Young Turks through two other members of the Egyptian royal family. Communications between the Queen Mother and Yıldız went back and forth on this matter until at last the falsity of the plotters' charges was demonstrated to official satisfaction. Shafiq, Vol. I, 309.

⁷⁶ For a discussion of Mehmet 'Ali's supposed nationalism as dynasty building, see Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, his Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt* (New York: American University in Cairo Press, 2002.)

⁷⁷ PRO/FO371/2357/104, Telegram, Grant-Duffs to the Foreign Office, 17 December 1915. Much to the anger of the Young Turks heading the Ottoman government after 1908, the Khedive reportedly established secret contact with various Arab notables, including the Sharif Husayn in the Hijaz, the Senussis in Libya, and the Idrisis in Asir, in pursuit of this goal. (L. Hirszowicz, "The Sultan and the Khedive, 1892-1908," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 8 (1972), p. 303-6; James Jankowski, "Egypt and Early Arab Nationalism, 1908-1922," in Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon, eds., *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York, 1991), p. 246-7.)

Unable to rely on ‘Abbas Hilmi to represent Ottoman interests in Egypt, the Sultan found alternate supporters. Among the most vocal of these was Mustafa Kamil, who remained throughout his life a fervent supporter of the rights of the Sultan vis-à-vis Egypt, primarily because he believed the Ottoman Empire was the surest way for the British to be removed from Egypt.⁷⁸ ‘Abbas Hilmi and Mustafa Kamil initially shared a conviction that the support of the Sultan was the best hope for forcing British evacuation.⁷⁹ They had the support of the Ottoman regime in this endeavor; Constantinople was disseminating pro-Ottoman propaganda by means of subsidized journals in Egypt and was the center for various operations for more or less secret societies promoting the Sultan’s influence.⁸⁰ Whether in declaring that “we love the Ottoman state, because in our character as Muslims we see that it protects Muslims in the East and watches over the venerable, sacred territories,” or in proclaiming that “the support of the Egyptian nation for the Sublime State is a nationalist demonstration against the British Occupation,”⁸¹ Kamil based an Egyptian orientation towards the Ottoman Empire on the grounds of the benefits to Egypt which he believed would proceed from it.⁸²

As early as 1898, Mustafa Kamil had written a study entitled *Al-Mas’ala al-Sharqiyya*, (*The Eastern Question*), warning of the dangers to the Muslim world in the European threat to

⁷⁸ Mustafa Kamil, “al-Islam,” *Majalat al-Liwa*, 15 November 1900, 9-15; Mustafa Kamil, “al-Hukuma wa al-Umma fi Misr,” *ibid.*, 15-17; see also Fritz Steppat, “Nationalismus und Islam bei Mustafa Kamil,” *Die Welt des Islams* 4 (1955-56), 251-66, 281-94.

⁷⁹ In the 1890s, Mustafa Kamil, whether at the behest of the Khedive or on his own, began publicly courting Ottoman support. His means included annual banquets honoring Abdülhamid, at which he would exhort his fellow Muslims to unite to protect the Ottoman Empire against European encroachment; interviews and articles, for both European and domestic consumption, defending Ottoman interests and policies; and well-publicized trips to Constantinople. (‘Ali Fahmi Kamil, *Mustafa Kamil Basha fi 34 Rabi’an*, 9 Volumes (Cairo: Matba’at al-Liwa, 1908-1911), Vol. II, 121-134; Vol. III, 199-204; Vol. V, 86-92; Vol. VI, 90-104; Vol. IX, 14-24.) Kamil also called for an alliance of France, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire against Britain. (“Une alliance qui s’impose; le Sultan et l’Europe,” *La Nouvelle Revue*, XCVII, 2 (15 November 1895), 375-383.) He even went as far as to tell an audience in Alexandria that Muhammad ‘Ali had realized in his last days that he had erred in moving against the Sultan. (‘Ali Fahmi Kamil, Vol. VI, 48; Mustafa Kamil, *Egyptiens et Anglais*, 2nd Edition (Paris: Perrin, 1906), 183.

⁸⁰ FO 78/5024, Rennell Rodd to Salisbury, No. 163, 25 August 1899.

⁸¹ Quoted in Yunan L. Rizq, *Al-Hayat al-Hizbiyya fi Misr fi ‘Ahd al-Ihtilal al-Birtani, 1882-1914* (Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookstore, 1970), 228.

⁸² Jankowski, “Ottomanism and Arabism in Egypt, 1860-1914,” 237.

the Ottoman Empire; denouncing the British in particular for their policies of divide and rule, and for their purported backing of the idea of an Arab Caliphate in order to split the Ottoman state; and concluding with an appeal for all Muslims to support the “sacred Islamic Caliphate” of the Ottomans.⁸³ For his defense of the Empire, Kamil was awarded the titles of “Excellency” in 1899 and “Pasha” in 1904.⁸⁴ In 1907, the *Hizb al-Watani* officially included as part of its program the summons to Egyptians to “strive to strengthen the relations of cordiality, the bonds, and the integral connection between Egypt and the Sublime State.”⁸⁵ Despite the fact that, in many ways, the claim to a universal caliphate was as much a burden as an opportunity for the Ottoman Empire, the prestige of the Ottoman caliphate reached a global peak from the 1880s to 1920s (well beyond the original intentions of the Ottoman government.) A new, racialized notion of the Muslim world increased the caliphate’s religious significance, despite the powerful arguments against the theological validity of the Ottoman claim to the Sunni caliphate.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, by World War I, the legitimacy of the Ottoman caliphate was rarely questioned. This legitimacy, however, was based more on the representation of the Sultan as a final bulwark against colonial encroachment than any genuine religious feeling.⁸⁷

⁸³ Quoted in Husayn Sa’d, *Bayna al-asalah wa-al-taghrīb: fi al-itijāhat al-‘almaniyyah ‘inda ba’d al-mufakkirīn al-‘Arab al-Muslimīn fi Misr, 1900 M/1318 H ila 1964 M/1384 H* (Beirut: al-Muassasah al-Jamiyah lil-Dirasat wa-al-Nashr wa-al-Tawzi, 1993), Vol. I, 8-10, and discussed in Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 203.

⁸⁴ Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., “The Egyptian Nationalist Party, 1892-1919,” in P.M. Hold (ed.), *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 317.

⁸⁵ Quoted in ‘Abd al-‘Azim Ramadan, *Tatawwur al-harakah al-wataniyah fi Misr min sanat 1918 ila sanat 1936* (Cairo: Kar al-Katib al-Arabi, 1968), 34; James Jankowski, “Ottomanism and Arabism in Egypt, 1860-1914,” *Muslim World*, Vol. 70, No. 3/4 (July 1980), 236.

⁸⁶ In this view, the Ottoman Empire stood as a bulwark of Western, colonized populations against European colonizers. Loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph, therefore, was more of an anti-colonial than religious sentiment. Indeed, Mahatma Gandhi joined, and was welcomed, by the Pan-Islamic Khilafat movement in India.

⁸⁷ It also did not escape the attention, particularly of Indian Muslims, that Christian Subjects of the Ottoman Empire had always had more rights and privileges than the Muslim subjects of the British and French Empires. In various Indian Muslim defenses of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman appointment of Greek and Armenian bureaucrats to high-level positions is often compared to limitations for Muslims and Hindus for social mobility within the British Empire. To make this point, Cheragh ‘Ali lists nearly one hundred Christian officers working for the Ottoman Empire in the 1880s. (See Moulavi Cheragh ‘Ali, *The Proposed Political, Legal, and Social Reforms in the Ottoman*

However, while Kamil supported the Ottoman claim to formal sovereignty over Egypt, he by no means wished to see effective Ottoman authority reestablished over the country. In Kamil's words, "We want an 'Egypt for the Egyptians,' and we absolutely reject any foreign yoke, and any foreign domination."⁸⁸ His basic goal was thus an independent Egypt, with a revived Ottoman Empire being seen as useful in the attainment of that aim:

Slanderers have cast it at us that we wish to evict the English from Egypt in order to give her to Turkey [sic] as an ordinary province: that is to say, that what we want is not independence and self-government but a change of rulers...This accusation is an insult to civilization and civilized men, and a judgment on the Egyptian people, that it can never progress or reach the level of other peoples.⁸⁹

Kamil himself located his advocacy for a continued Egyptian connection with the Ottomans in the potential utility of that bond for the liberation of Egypt from the British Occupation.

According to Kamil,

We [Egyptians] are concerned more than others with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, because the integrity of its domains is the foundation upon which our legal rights against the action of the English is based. We must not forget that whatever we demonstrate which has to do with the support of Turkey [sic] is viewed and considered by us as part of the Egyptian cause against the English.⁹⁰

Moreover, Kamil refused to allow his Ottoman orientation to drift into a religiously-based nationalism throughout his tenure as leader of the Watani Party; his consistent position was that both Muslims and Copts in Egypt were "one umma, indeed one family," and that nothing should be allowed to disrupt their national unity.⁹¹ Nor did his pro-Ottoman sentiment extend to his desiring the renewal of effective Ottoman political authority over Egypt; he rejected the

Empire and Other Mohammadan States (Bombay: Education Society's Press, 1883), 40-43; Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, *Global Intellectual History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 171-4.)

⁸⁸ Quoted in Charles Wendell, *The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image; from its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 251.

⁸⁹ Quoted in Hourani, 205; Jankowski, "Ottomanism and Arabism in Egypt, 1860-1914," 237.

⁹⁰ Mustafa Kamil, "al-Dawla wa-'Ulya wa Misr," in 'Ali Fahmi Kamil, *Mustafa Kamil Basha fi 34 Rabi'an*, 9 volumes (Cairo, 1908-1911), Volume VI, 185-93.

⁹¹ Kamil, "al-Dawla wa-'Ulya wa Misr," 185-93.

accusation of his opponents that he wished to expel the British only to restore direct Ottoman rule.⁹² The Watani Party maintained that, after the Anglo-French agreement of April 1904, as they were in need of an international basis for their opposition to British policies, they had nowhere to turn but to the Ottoman Empire.⁹³ Such Ottoman linkages were, therefore, not generated by any real desire for Ottoman or Islamic unity, much less for direct Ottoman rule, but rather generally advocated Ottoman assistance to remove the British occupation, with an eye toward eventual Egyptian independence.

The British Occupation also served to imbue Egypt's connection to the Ottoman Empire with both a nostalgic sheen and a perceived utility that it had not previously possessed. Loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan was one of the few possible avenues of resistance to British domination; and the diplomatic support of the Ottoman state was seen as a potential lever to be used against the British.⁹⁴ The image of the Ottoman sultan as the head of an alternative empire with full and equal diplomatic relations with the European powers was a powerful pull. Both of Egypt's major poets of the period, Ahmad Shawqi and Hafiz Ibrahim, as well as several lesser known figures, such as Ahmad Muharram, Ahmad al-Kashif, Ahmad Nasim, 'Abd al-Halim al-Misri, and 'Ali al-Ghayati, wrote poetry extolling the Ottoman state, its reigning Sultan Abdülhamid II, and calling on Egyptians to continue to be loyal to both. Mounah A. Khouri has summarized the general tenor of their poetry as follows:

They all seemed to maintain that Turkey [sic] was the only outside force which could protect their country from being absorbed into the British Empire. Consequently they laid great emphasis on the importance of keeping Turkey [sic] strong and independent and of preserving the authority of the Ottoman Sultan, who was also the Caliph, and who, as such, was ultimately entitled to the allegiance of all Muslims...The Sultan's victories over his enemies were exalted as glorious

⁹² Hourani, 205; Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 6-8.

⁹³ FO 371/68, No. 36561, 30 October 1906, Letter from Francis Bertie dated 27 October 1906 from Paris to sir E. Grey Bart MP regarding an article in *Le Temps* of the same date.

⁹⁴ See, also, Hisham Sharabi, *Arab Intellectuals and the West: the Formative Years, 1875-1914* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 107.

festivals while his defeats at their hands were portrayed as great tragedies inflicted upon the whole Muslim world.⁹⁵

While there was unquestionable praise for and loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and its Sultan expressed by Egyptian poets in the 1882-1914 period, there was also a goodly dose of pragmatism and defensiveness to be found in their poetry. Thus, while ‘Ali al-Ghayati declared to the Sultan that “O Commander of the Faithful, our hearts wait upon you with great passion,” he immediately stated the operative reason for that loyalty being that Egyptians were “hoping to find in you a savior from our misfortunes.”⁹⁶ Ahmad Shawqi voiced much the same motivation at greater length in his “Ra’y Amir al-Mu’minin”:

Victorious Imam, / We seek thy intercession. / Let thy powerful sword defend us, / For Egypt has need of thee, / O unconquerable Lord of Islam. / Our rulers have betrayed us, / Like grey waterless clouds. / Raise thy voice for our deliverance. / For thou art the only savior of Egypt / And Egypt has need of thee.⁹⁷

Much of the feeling of Egyptian-Ottoman unity was not the result of affection for the Sultan-Caliph in distant Constantinople; but, rather, a manifestation of local nationalistic development and of hostility to foreign domination.⁹⁸ Given this heavily contingent basis for Ottomanism in Egypt, by no means are all those who expressed sentiments of loyalty to the Ottoman Empire to be classified as “religious” nationalists or even Ottomanists. Instead, many of the proponents of the Ottoman bond were largely hoping to use the Empire as an instrument in

⁹⁵ Mounah Abdallah Khouri, *Poetry and the Making of Modern Egypt (1882-1922)* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971), 103. The Egyptian defense of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire is discussed in Husayn Sa’d, Vol. I, 23-9, 29-33, 35-39, 40-44; Jankowski, “Ottomanism and Arabism in Egypt, 1860-1914,” 233-4.

⁹⁶ Quoted in Khouri, 105; Jankowski, “Ottomanism and Arabism in Egypt, 1860-1914,” 233-4.

⁹⁷ Quoted in Jamal Muhammad Ahmad, *The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 60-1; Jankowski, “Ottomanism and Arabism in Egypt, 1860-1914,” 234-5.

⁹⁸ A similar blend of a tactical Ottoman allegiance combined with hostility to any reassertion of genuine Ottoman authority over Egypt characterized the views of other leaders of the Egyptian nationalist movement of the early 1880s. Spokesmen for the ‘Urabi movement several times declared their formal allegiance to the Ottoman state and assured the Ottoman representatives sent to Egypt of their loyalty to the Sublime Porte; but they also resisted the attempts of these Ottoman delegates to assert Ottoman authority over them. (For instances, see Husayn, Vol. I., 1-2; Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *The Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1922), 261-2, 305-9, 363; Evelyn Baring, Earl of Cromer, *Modern Egypt* (New York: Macmillan, 1909), Vol. 1, 194, 198-9, 288-9.)

the achievement of another, more fundamental concern, namely the liberation of Egypt from the British Occupation.⁹⁹ Supporters of the Watani Party pointed out that the Sultan was, *de jure*, Egypt's suzerain, and that his help was needed to remove her *de facto* rulers, the British. As such, Kamil saw his first task as winning European and Ottoman support for the Khedive against Cromer.

Nevertheless, few things made the British in Egypt more uneasy than witnessing the devotion of so many Egyptians to the Sultan's cause. Knowing that they were seen as usurpers of the Sultan's rights, so-called "pan-Islamic feeling" was the continuing obsession of Occupation officials. While British authorities were alarmed at the increasingly close ties between Egyptian nationalists and Constantinople, so long as the Ottoman Empire was officially neutral in the First World War, British authorities could only spy on the agitators of their colonies and hope for the cooperation of their Ottoman hosts in eventually stopping them. Of course, from the perspective of the Ottoman Empire, much more traction could be gained in terms of global power by aiding the efforts of anti-British nationalists than from allying with the British. A good part of the explanation for this position comes from the tendency at the time to view the modern world in terms of two antagonistic camps (East/West, Muslim/Christian), with the former being under assault from the latter, and to assume that Eastern/Muslim survival was contingent upon Eastern/Muslim solidarity.¹⁰⁰ In this worldview, the Sultan was positioned as the most likely leader of a trans-national anti-imperialist, anti-European alliance.

Kamil was somewhat nervous about his closeness with the Sultan, fearing aspersions on his patriotism at home. The marriage of Egyptian nationalism with Ottoman Islamic unity movements was one of convenience, not love, for most Egyptians. Though many Arab and

⁹⁹ Jankowski, "Ottomanism and Arabism in Egypt, 1860-1914," 229.

¹⁰⁰ Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 6-8.

Eastern European nationalists would align themselves against the Ottoman Empire, Egyptian nationalists in the beginning of the twentieth century felt their interests were served more in allying with their weaker, nominal rulers, the Ottomans, against their more powerful occupiers, the British. In general, the Watanists tended to be Ottomanophiles and often used religious rhetoric in their speeches and papers, although the Party always wanted autonomy for Egypt, no matter which empire claimed her. To Kamil's supporters, his espousal of Ottomanism and Islamism was tactically defensible; Egypt's oppressor was Britain, not Turkey. And despite Kamil's continued support of Turkish and Muslim causes, there is no evidence to show that he genuinely expected the Ottoman Empire to liberate its Egyptian province from the British.¹⁰¹ Mustafa Kamil also resolutely rejected the idea of a rapprochement between Britain and the Sublime Porte, as it would mean the end of all hope of Egyptian independence. If the Ottoman Empire waived its right to suzerainty over Egypt, the Egyptian question would be buried.

For his part, 'Abbas Hilmi grew increasingly concerned about Kamil's ties with the Sublime Porte in the first years of the twentieth century.¹⁰² The Khedive's distrust was both a cause and a result of the shifting ideological orientation of Kamil's propaganda. Formerly, Kamil had upheld the Khedive's rights as legitimate ruler of Egypt. To Europeans, Kamil had appealed for national or collective intervention to halt Britain's usurpation of the Khedive's prerogatives.¹⁰³ To Egyptians, he had lauded the Khedive's patriotism, his affection for his people, and his efforts to promote education and revival of the national spirit; and had urged his

¹⁰¹ See 'Ali Fahmi Kamil, 'Ali Fathi Kamil, *Mustafā Kamil Bāshā fī 34 rabī'an : sīratuhu wa-a'māluhu min khuṭab wa-aḥādīth wa-rasā'il siyāsīyah wa-'umrānīyah* (Cairo: Matba'at al-Liwa, 1908-10), Vol. VII, 27-30; the text of Farid's Cairo speech of December 1899 in 'Ali Fahmi Kamil, Vol. IX, 201f; Mustafa Kamil and Juliette Adam, *Egyptiens et Anglais* (Paris: Libr. Academique Didier, 1906), 246f; and *al-Liwa*, 4 January 1900, reprinted in 'Ali Fahmi Kamil, Vol. IX, 215-8; Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian National Party," 89-90.

¹⁰² Shafiq, Vol. II, Part I, 348. No love was lost between the Khedive and the Sultan, nor between the Egyptian Nationalists and the Young Turks, at least until the latter assumed power.

¹⁰³ See, for example, his article in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, written in December 1897, translated in 'Ali Fahmi Kamil, Vol. VI, 117-128.

fellow citizens to unite around their ruler to repel the British enemy.¹⁰⁴ After he founded *al-Liwa'* in 1900, however, Kamil began to attack not only the British themselves, but also the Egyptian ministers who obeyed the orders of their British advisors.¹⁰⁵

Other Egyptian political parties were less enthusiastic about the idea of supporting the power of the Ottoman Empire. The common motto of Umma-affiliated Egyptian nationalists was “We wish the Turks all success – from afar”; and there was no desire to trade the British for a German or Turkish military occupation.¹⁰⁶ Rather than wait for Ottoman aid, members of the Umma party pushed internal reform as the path to Egyptian independence, receiving a boost with the creation of the Legislative Assembly in 1913. Made from a merger of the General Assembly and Legislative Council, the project had been supported by Lord Kitchener, who replaced Gorst after his death in 1911. In *al-Jarida*, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid of the Umma Party rejected the notion of a continuing Egyptian political bond with the Ottoman Empire. Lutfi’s writings are studded with criticisms of what he saw as the pro-Ottoman Islamist trend of the early twentieth century. Lutfi denied any objective reality of the movement, crediting it only to “the brain of *The Times* correspondent in Vienna;” he decried the concept of the entire Muslim world constituting a political unit as “an imperialist principle” useful primarily for facilitating renewed Ottoman domination over other Muslim-majority regions; and he enjoined Egyptians to “repudiate today

¹⁰⁴ Mustafa’s speech on the Khedive’s Accession Day, 8 January 1898, in ‘Ali Fahmi Kamil, Vol. VI, 133-149.

¹⁰⁵ Goldschmidt, “The Egyptian National Party,” 89-90

¹⁰⁶ Sir Ronald Storrs, *Orientalisms* (London: I. Nicholson & Watson, 1937,) 154; ‘Abbas Madmud al- ‘Aqqad, *Sa’d Zaghul: Sira wa Tahiyya* (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, 1963), 183-5. The “People’s Party” was made up mainly of landowners and intelligentsia. Its house organ was the Arabic daily *al-Jarida*, published between 1907 and 1915. Ostensibly the rival of the National Party, it differed little in its devotion to political independence and parliamentary government, except that it argued that these goals could be attained only gradually, and it tended to distance itself more from Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi II and the Ottoman Empire. Its leaders were Hasan Abd al-Raziq and Mahmud Sulayman; Sa’d Zaghul was also a supporter, if not a member. Many Umma Party members later ran for the 1914 Legislative Assembly or joined the Wafd in 1919. Some later became founders of the Constitutional Liberal Party in 1922. It also cannot be overlooked that the distance between the Watani and Umma (and later Wafd) parties was largely a function of class. Most Umma members were landowners, and as such shared a certain sympathy and common cause with the British. They were loath to support any Egyptian nationalist efforts that might promote a larger or more radical revolution of society.

as they have in the past, any accusation of religious bigotry, i.e. ‘Pan-Islamism and fanaticism.’”¹⁰⁷

The Young Turks In Egypt

Another dimension of the complex web of Egyptian nationalist loyalties and alliances was provided by the presence of Young Turk dissidents in Egypt from 1895 until the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. The Young Turks found a significant source of support in the person of the Khedive. Although ‘Abbas Hilmi was not truly an ally of the Young Turks, he occasionally collaborated with them when their activities served a purpose useful to his own cause, even employing some Young Turk members among his private staff. As a result, the Sultan subsequently regarded ‘Abbas Hilmi as an enemy. Nevertheless, ‘Abbas Hilmi had no interest in allowing the Young Turks to operate openly in Egypt and did his best to comply with the Sultan’s orders that they be returned to Constantinople, or at least ousted from Egypt. Some ‘Abbas Hilmi personally arranged to have sent back to the Sultan, and he informed on others.¹⁰⁸ Abdülhamid blamed ‘Abbas Hilmi for not exiling the Young Turks; he refused to accept the Khedive’s excuse that he was unable to go against the British and was not responsible for the toleration shown to Ottoman dissidents in Egypt. But, in this case at least, the Khedive was telling the Sultan the truth; ‘Abbas Hilmi could not move against the Young Turks in Egypt

¹⁰⁷ Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, *Qissat Hayati* (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal 1962), 70; *al-Jarida*, 16 January 1913; *al-Jarida*, 21 October 1911; Gershoni and Jankowski, *Search for Egyptian Nationhood*, 6-8. A memorandum by a group of senior missionaries in Egypt also singled out the “political character” of Islam as a permanent cause of discontent with British rule in Egypt and called attention to the prevalent Muslim slogan: “Hell with the Turks rather than paradise with the British.”

¹⁰⁸ For example, ‘Abbas Hilmi told the Sultan of one Jalal ad-Din, who had fled Anatolia and married into the Egyptian royal family. According to ‘Abbas’ reports, Jalal ad-Din was aiding the Young Turks financially. (Shafiq, *Mudhakkarati*, Vol. II, 151.)

because the laws behind which they took refuge were decided by the Occupation authorities, and any measures ‘Abbas Hilmi took against them would be blocked by Cromer.¹⁰⁹

Young Turk dissidents began arriving in Egypt in large numbers in 1895; by the time of the 1908 coup, the Committee of Union and Progress already had extensive contacts with both the Khedive and other Egyptian nationalists.¹¹⁰ In addition to Young Turk opponents of ‘Abdülhamid’s regime, Egypt was also a haven for Armenian and Syro-Lebanese dissidents. The British allowed critics of the Hamidian regime to publish and meet freely in Egypt. Though much lip service was paid to the English tradition of freedom of political speech and thought, the policy had several political benefits to the British. The Sultan complained intermittently to the British about Young Turk activities in Egypt, but the British were in a position to exact a quid pro quo from him which he was unwilling to give: the suppression of the so-called “Anglophobe” press in Egypt that operated with the participation and financial support of the Sultan and High Commissioner Mukhtar Pasha.¹¹¹

As noted above, a large portion of the ambivalence shown by Abdülhamid toward ‘Abbas Hilmi was a direct result of the many Young Turk publications emanating from Egypt starting in the mid-1890s. The Sultan’s strict press censorship pushed many journalists to emigrate to Europe or Egypt; and the Young Turks resident in Egypt took full advantage of the opportunity to publish more freely.¹¹² Newspapers reached Constantinople from Cairo in greater numbers

¹⁰⁹ Shafiq, Vol. I, 306.

¹¹⁰ The Young Turks also established significant branches in both Paris and Geneva.

¹¹¹ FO 78/4763 Rennell Rodd to Salisbury No. 119, 12 September 1896; FO 78/5023 Cromer to Salisbury No. 73, 11 April 1899; FO 78/5024 Rennell Rodd to Salisbury No. 153, 15 August 1899.

¹¹² For general information on the Young Turk press, see M. Şükrü Hanioglu, “Jön Türk Basını” (The Young Turk Press), in *Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 3 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 844-50; and Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, *The Turks in Egypt and Their Cultural Legacy: An Analytical Study of the Turkish Printed Patrimony in Egypt from the Time of Muhammad ‘Ali with Annotated Bibliographies* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2012.) For detailed lists of Young Turk newspapers, see Paul Fesch, *Abdülhamid’in son günlerinde İstanbul*, trans. Erol Üyepazarcı (İstanbul: Pera Turizm ve Ticaret, 1999). For a detailed list of Young Turk newspapers, see Selim Nüzhet Gerçek, “Jön Türk gazeteleri,” *Akşam Gazetesi*, 19 March 1941, and “Jön Türk

than they did from Europe; and this led to increased influence for Cairo-based Young Turks, such as Mızancı Murad, one of the most prominent of the Young Turks.¹¹³

The premier organ of the Young Turks in Egypt was the journal *Kanun-ı Esasi*, which printed its first edition on 21 December 1896, with a mission statement to enlighten the public and liberate the “sacred homeland” in the name of Shari’a and patriotism.¹¹⁴ An Arabic edition of *Kanun-ı Esasi* was also published in Cairo, in the hope of bringing Arab public opinion to the side of the Young Turks and inspiring it to turn against Sultan Abdülhamid. It was also hoped that, in this way, the Young Turks might be able to capitalize on the idea of Islamic solidarity, which up to this point had been the purview of the Sultan. *Kanun-ı Esasi* appeared weekly and addressed itself to the policies of Sultan Abdülhamid, the issue of the Islamic caliphate, and Islamic world issues.¹¹⁵ *Şura-yı Ümmet*, the main political journal of the İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress), was also published in Cairo (as well as Paris) between 1902 and 1908. It was the most widely circulated and influential opposition tract inside or outside the Ottoman Empire. *Al-Muqattam*, the organ of the British occupation, likewise often printed articles in favor of the Young Turks; the need for reform, the corruption of ‘Abdülhamid, and the necessity of reestablishing the constitution were the most frequent themes.

nesriyati,” *Akşam Gazetesi*, 3 April 1941, Issue 8062; also, Dünder Akünel, “Jon Turk gazeteleri,” *Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 4, 850-6. (See also The Turks in Egypt. Dünder lists 153 newspapers and states that 42 percent of these were published in Cairo (Akünel, “Jon Turk gazeteleri,” 851.) For Young Turk newspapers published in Switzerland, see also Muammer Göçmen, *İsviçre’de Jöntürk Basını ve Turk Siyasal Hayatına Etkileri: 1889-1902* (İstanbul: Kibabevi, 1995.)

¹¹³ A Kurdish-Turkish newspaper, the first of its kind, also appeared in Egypt during the same period. It was named *Kirdostan* (Kurdistan) and its premier issue, edited by Mikdat Midhat Bedirhan, came out on 22 April 1898. Many of the articles sought to awaken and increase the self-awareness of the people of Kurdistan. It also published articles on nationalism and national unity, while devoting the larger part of its pages to denunciations of Sultan Abdülhamid II and calling upon the people to rise up against him. (İhsanoğlu, 264.)

¹¹⁴ “Efkar-ı unumiye-yi milliye-yi tenvir ve vatan-ı mukaddesimizin tahlisini seriat ve hamiyet namına.” (İhsanoğlu, 258.)

¹¹⁵ *Osmanlı*, 15 February 1898, no. 6 (Geneva); İhsanoğlu, 258.

The political climate in Egypt in the early 1890s encouraged opponents of the Hamidian regime to flock there.¹¹⁶ Because of the British presence, the Sultan could not easily persecute or even extradite his critics; it was relatively easy for the Young Turks to publish their newspapers and journals freely; and they often received financial assistance from ‘Abbas Hilmi and princes of the khedival family. The Young Turks were aware and suspicious of the Khedive’s opportunistic policies aimed at strengthening his position vis-à-vis Abdülhamid, but they took advantage of his goodwill whenever possible.¹¹⁷ Some disaffected members of the khedival family joined the ranks of the Young Turks in more active cooperation: for example, Prince Muhammad ‘Ali and, most significantly, Sa’id Halim, the future Ottoman grand vizier, worked with the group surrounding Young Turk dissident Ahmed Riza.¹¹⁸

While the Khedive supported the Young Turks as a bulwark against the power of the Sultan, he also feared the commonality of goals they shared with Egyptian nationalists pushing for a constitution and limits on khedival authority.¹¹⁹ The main reason for ‘Abbas Hilmi’s reluctance to fully support the Young Turks was the group’s appeal to Egyptian nationalists and constitutionalists; khedival power could easily be subjected to the same sorts of attacks from

¹¹⁶ Another cause for Young Turks to be drawn to Cairo was its proximity to Tripoli, a location to which hundreds of critics of the Hamidian regime had been exiled; most of these exiles were students of the Military Academy and the School of Medicine, young officers, and sometimes court officials, who could be crucial to the Young Turk movement. (Ali Fahri, *Emel Yolunda*, 2nd Edition (İstanbul: Müşterek ül-Menfaa Osmanlı Şirket-i Matbaası, 1911), p. 54.)

¹¹⁷ For more on fluctuations in the khedival policy vis-à-vis the Young Turks, see Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895-1908* (Ankara : Türkiye İş Bankası, 1964), 59-65; Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, *İnkılâp tarihimiz ve İttihat ve Terakki* (İstanbul : Tan Matbaası, 1948), 158. The Prince Sabahaddin group contacted the Khedive in 1902 to seek his assistance for an attempt to dethrone Abdülhamid. ‘Abbas Hilmi received the plan favorably, but it did not materialize.

¹¹⁸ Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 45-7. Ahmed Riza served as the leader of a secret political group, formed before 1889 by medical students in Istanbul and named İttihad-i Osmani (Ottoman Union), which served as the nucleus of the most important opposition to Abdülhamid . İttihad-i Osmani remained an underground group in Istanbul until it established contacts with liberal officials of the Hamidian regime and engaged in active opposition from Europe under the new name of the Society of Union and Progress (better known as the Committee of Union and Progress).

¹¹⁹ Shafiq, Vol. 3 (Cairo, 1998), 4.

Egyptian nationalists that the Sultan had received from the Committee of Union and Progress. ‘Abbas Hilmi had good reason to be nervous about the encouragement that the Turkish example could give to the Egyptian nationalists, who were increasingly clamoring for institutional curbs on khedival authority.¹²⁰ Indeed, just as ‘Abbas Hilmi had feared, the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, which forced ‘Abdülhamid to restore the long-suspended Ottoman constitution, breathed new life into the Egyptian constitutionalist movement.¹²¹ Rumors were deliberately circulated in Egypt that ‘Abbas Hilmi was planning to give Egypt a constitution after he returned from his summer visit to Anatolia in September 1908. Actually, when ‘Abbas returned to Egypt he had only the most negative things to say in private to the British about the administrative chaos and corruption that prevailed in Constantinople in the aftermath of the Revolution and professed to believe that it was “absurd to think of granting Egypt a constitution.”¹²² He acknowledged, however, that the movement for a constitution would grow, blaming Sa’d Zaghlul (1859-1927) for the escalating tensions.¹²³

‘Abbas Hilmi criticized the Young Turk revolutionaries for their disrespect for the Sultan and showed no inclination whatsoever to rejoice at Abdülhamid’s tribulations, which might soon become his own, whatever the two men’s past acrimony might have suggested.¹²⁴ In the spring of 1910, the mouthpiece of the Young Turks, *Tanin*, to which ‘Abbas Hilmi was reported to have made handsome contributions earlier, began criticizing Egyptian policy, with the inevitable reflections on ‘Abbas Hilmi. In particular, the journal protested against the criticism of the Young Turk regime in *al-Mu’ayyad*, which was widely recognized to be a palace organ, and

¹²⁰ Goldschmidt, “The Egyptian National Party,” 212-4

¹²¹ FO 371/449, 12 August 1908, Graham to Foreign Office, “Effect of Turkish Constitution of 1908 on Egypt.”

¹²² FO 371/452, Graham to Grey No. 33454, 18 September 1908; Mayer, 209-10.

¹²³ FO 371/452, Graham to Grey No. 33454, 18 September 1908; Mayer, 209-10.

¹²⁴ FO 371/452, Graham to Grey, 18 September 1908.

against the hospitality that it alleged Egypt had shown to refugees from Anatolia who had been connected with Abdülhamid's regime.¹²⁵

Although the Watani Nationalists had generally supported the Sultan and condemned the Committee of Union and Progress, because they saw the Sultan as the party more likely to be able to deliver Egypt from the British Occupation, they quickly switched their allegiances after the 1908 coup.¹²⁶ The Nationalists interpreted the Young Turks' coup of July 1908 as a victory for the constitutionalist principle which they too had begun to espouse, even though the Young Turks showed no immediate concern for Egypt. Egyptian Nationalist leaders were pleased, if skeptical, at the restoration of the Ottoman Constitution, which they hoped would strengthen their own campaign for Egyptian constitutional reforms.¹²⁷ The statement from 'Abbas Hilmi that he would not support an Egyptian constitution caused an irreparable break in his relationship with Muhammad Farid, who subsequently published two articles accusing 'Abbas Hilmi of having supported the Nationalists, not out of true conviction or love for Egypt, but only to get rid of Cromer and enhance his own position.¹²⁸

In 1908, shortly after the Young Turk Revolution, an official wrote to British army general and High Commissioner of Egypt Sir Reginald Wingate, "I quite agree with you that nationalism in Egypt is bound to receive an impetus from recent events in Turkey, and I have no

¹²⁵ FO 371/892, Lowther to Grey, 20 April 1910. *Al-Mu'ayyad* was a daily newspaper officially founded in 1889 and edited by an Azharite sheikh, 'Ali Yusuf (1863-1913.) *Al-Mu'ayyad*'s real founder was probably Prime Minister Riyadh Pasha, who wanted a journal to serve his interests since the newly-founded *al-Muqattam* supported Britain, and *al-Ahram* France. It is highly probable that 'Abbas Hilmi then began subsidizing Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf, who transformed *al-Mu'ayyad* into a Palace organ. (Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian National Party," 61, 71-2.)

¹²⁶ FO 371/449, Ronald Graham to Grey, Alexandria, 12 August 1908.

¹²⁷ Sayyid 'Ali, "Those who Swim in Fantasy," *al-Liwa*, 22 July 1908, criticizing a letter by Rafiq al-'Azm in the 19 July issue describing the Macedonian uprising, which helped spark the CUP coup of the 23rd.

¹²⁸ Muhammad Farid, "Madha Yaqulun" (What they are saying), *al-Liwa*, 28 September 1908. Partial translation in FO 371/452, Graham to Grey, Cairo, 3 October 1908, no. 99; *al-Liwa*, 4 October 1908; Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian National Party," 176-8.

doubt that officers of Turkish origin and sympathies may become unduly slanted.”¹²⁹ The British were, likewise, concerned with the effects of Young Turk thought on Egyptian Nationalists. There was concern that the Young Turk Revolution, proving very popular in Cairo, would have an effect on Egyptian Nationalists; and, most frighteningly for the British, would affect the opinions of army officers.¹³⁰ British officials feared that Egyptian nationalism would receive a considerable boost from the activities of the Young Turks and that “a number of foolish and enthusiastic young officers” would emulate the actions of the Party and attempt to impress their views on the government.¹³¹ The army was seen to be especially vulnerable to infiltration by Young Turk ideas, particularly since there were a “considerable number of officers with Turkish blood and Turkish sympathies.”¹³² In general, it was believed that the Young Turk Revolution would make things considerably more difficult for the British in Egypt.¹³³

The Administration under Herbert Kitchener (1850-1916), therefore, wasted no time in disseminating anti-Young Turk propaganda throughout Egypt. It plainly aimed at fanning racial hatred between Arab and Turkic populations in much the same manner adopted by Gerald Fitzmaurice in his “whispering campaigns” against the Young Turks in Constantinople preceding the 1908 Revolution.¹³⁴ A 1913 *Egyptian Gazette* article declared,

The struggle is between Semitic Mohammedan and Turk Mohammedan...Race is the fundamental fact. And the Turk physically differs from the Arab somewhat as a drayhorse differs from a Derby winner. Greater still is the difference intellectually and spiritually, between the slow, placid, steady, autocratic, materialistic, unspeculative, unaesthetic Turk, and the quick-witted, restless, democratic, political, romantic, artistic, versatile Arab...¹³⁵

¹²⁹ Wingate Papers, 283/3/89-91: Letter from Herbert, 8 August 1908.

¹³⁰ Wingate Papers, 283/4/11-13: Letter, 9 August 1908.

¹³¹ Wingate Papers, 283/2/58-60: Letter to Major Herbert, Cairo, 31 July 1908 from Sir Reginald Wingate.

¹³² Wingate Papers, 283/2/58-60: Letter to Major Herbert, Cairo, 31 July 1908 from Sir Reginald Wingate.

¹³³ Wingate Papers, 283/2/58-60: Letter to Major Herbert, Cairo, 31 July 1908 from Sir Reginald Wingate.

¹³⁴ Fitzmaurice had exerted great effort in stirring up Arab religious and racial hatred for the “Jews and atheists” among the Young Turks. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice served as the Chief Dragoman at the British Embassy in Constantinople, and is best known for his report on massacres in Armenia and his opposition to the Young Turks.

¹³⁵ *Egyptian Gazette*, 22 April 1913, “The Khalifate,” enclosed in Willoughby-Smith to secretary of State, 28 April 1913, Cairo, US, 867.00/535; quoted in Kayali, 179-86

As coincidence would have it, the anti-Young Turk rhetoric conducted by the British in Egypt reached a fever pitch at precisely the same time as Ottoman statesman and four-time Grand Vizier Mehmet Kamil Pasha's (1833-1913) involuntary exile in Cairo in the spring of 1913, an indication of the identity of interests, and of the mutual hatreds, which now bound the British Foreign Office with the "Old Turk" opposition represented by Kamil Pasha.¹³⁶

Arab Dissidents, Young Turks, and Egyptian Nationalists

The Young Turks also found common cause with the Syro-Lebanese population in Egypt; like the Young Turks, they had come to Cairo – by choice or force – because of their opposition to the Sultan and their demands for reform. Some Syrian intellectuals had left their country in the late 1870s, lured by the liberal atmosphere of Cairo under Khedive Isma'il. These authors and journalists were joined by a second wave that arrived during the early years of British occupation. British rule allowed the proponents of Egyptian nationalism, as well as the supporters of the Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi, the British, and the French, to write relatively freely and to openly criticize Ottoman policies.

In the period preceding the First World War, Cairo functioned as a meeting place for both Arab nationalists, exiled from Ottoman territory, and Young Turk activists. Links did exist between the various Arab communities and the Committee of Union and Progress before 1908; however, not surprisingly, those relationships were characterized by mistrust on both sides. For the Young Turks, though the Arabs often expressed themselves in Ottoman terms, the latter were problematically separatist. Criticizing the Ottoman administration and denouncing corruption of

¹³⁶ Gershoni and Jankowski, *Search for Egyptian Nationhood*, 83. Mehmet Kamil Pasha, 1833-1913, was a four-time Ottoman grand vizier. Following the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, he became a leader in the liberal opposition.

Turkish leaders in the Arab provinces, some Arab activists worked for reform along the lines of the Young Turks, but many worked to detach themselves from the Empire.¹³⁷

While there was a natural arena of conflict between Arab nationalists and the Young Turks, Egyptian Nationalists tended to get along well with the members of the Committee of Union and Progress, at least initially. The British occupation made Egyptian Nationalists naturally turn to the Ottoman Empire as a source of potential protection. In addition, at least in the view of Mustafa Kamil, the boundaries between Egyptian nationalism, Ottomanism, and Islamic solidarity, remained poorly defined. In his thinking, Egypt had an Egyptian identity that belonged to a larger Ottoman identity, which in turn was encompassed by a larger Muslim identity. Furthermore, the concept of Arab nationalism was largely absent from Egyptian nationalist thinking; this likely goes far to explain the relative absence of conflict between the Young Turks and Egyptian Nationalists.¹³⁸ Much to the chagrin of the Watanists, however, the Young Turks, who were anxious to protect their newfound power, were not initially disposed to quarrel with Great Britain over the latter's occupation of Egypt, just like the Sultan before them.

Because Great Britain had the ability to help the Young Turk government, the Young Turks in Egypt became increasingly disenchanted with the anti-British Egyptian nationalists. The main reason for the Committee of Union and Progress' change of opinion regarding the Egyptian Nationalists was the Young Turks' growing suspicion of Britain's intentions, particularly after the 1907 British alignment with Russia (which offered a potential for the growth of the Pan-Slavic threat to Ottoman nationalism.) Farid's assurance to the Young Turks that the Nationalists

¹³⁷ See M. Sukru Hanioglu, "The Young Turks and the Arabs Before the Revolution of 1908" in Rashid Khalidi, et al, *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.)

¹³⁸ Gershoni and Jankowski, *Search for Egyptian Nationhood*, 83

would collaborate with the Ottoman Empire against the British in Egypt was, therefore, welcome.¹³⁹

The absence of conflict did not necessarily mean that the Young Turks had a high opinion of Egyptian Nationalists, however. In his memoirs *Mücahede-i ve Milliye Gurbet avdet devirleri*, one of the most prominent Young Turks, Mızancı Murad, says of Mustafa Kamil and Shaykh ‘Ali Yusuf, the first two leaders of the Egyptian Nationalist movement:

Mustafa Kamil is a charlatan, as was Sheikh Ali, who is nothing but an idiot who shines in neither his profession nor his thought. Their opposition to the English is the result of the encouragement and deference of the French. If you ask them, they will explain that their goal is to see the French supplant the English. They are incapable of talking about nationalism or thinking about the independence of Egypt.¹⁴⁰

Therefore, though some Egyptian Nationalists viewed the Committee of Union and Progress’ coup as beneficial for their movement, the Young Turks were initially uninterested in allying with the Egyptian Nationalists.¹⁴¹ Enver Bey, the hero of the 1908 coup, made a speech in September of that year praising Britain’s work in Egypt and disclaiming any ties with the Nationalists. ‘Ali Fahmi Kamil, who went to Constantinople within a month of the coup, failed to obtain any official endorsement of his Nationalist Party’s objectives.¹⁴² According to British Conservative Party member and journalist Leo Amery’s assessment,

The Nationalists are very much down at present; the Young Turks are giving them no encouragement and everyone is turning against them. They are much annoyed with Shauki Bey, the Khedive’s Poet, for having written a few days ago in the *Moayad* [sic] that the Egyptians were

¹³⁹ Egyptian Nationalists, particularly the Young Egyptians, also hoped to ride the coattails of the Young Turks in terms of European popularity. Throughout Europe, the Young Turks were feted for their pro-constitutional, pro-democratic, relatively liberal leanings, and agenda of reform. Egyptians, who hoped to internationalize their own bid for independence, eagerly courted a similar positive image in European circles.

¹⁴⁰ Mızancı Murad, *Mücahede-yi Milliye: Gurbet ve Avdet Devirleri* (İstanbul : Mahmut Bey Matbaası, 1908), 110; Gershoni and Jankowski, *Search for Egyptian Nationhood*, 83.

¹⁴¹ After the Young Turk Revolution, the British reported that ‘Abbas Hilmi was warned by a representative of the new regime that the Ottomans would refuse to intervene in Egyptian affairs and that the issue of British evacuation was not to be raised. (FO 371/452, Graham to Grey, 27 September 1908.)

¹⁴² FO 371/449, Lowther to Grey, Therapia, 28 August 1908, no. 522; FO 371/452, Graham to Grey, Cairo, 27 September 1908, no. 95.

not yet ripe for a constitution, and that in any case the matter rested with England. He could not have written this without the consent of His Highness.¹⁴³

A good portion of the Young Turks also continued to support the British occupation of Egypt. In his memoirs, Veliyyudin Yakın, one of the Young Turks in Egypt, painted a portrait of Cromer as the reformer of Egypt. Yakın also devotes a short chapter of his book to Cromer, in which he compares the latter to Mıdhat Paşa, Namık Kemal, Prince Mustafa Fazıl, and other symbols of Ottoman liberalism, titled “The Reformer of Egypt.”¹⁴⁴ Support of the British Occupation of Egypt was a politically expedient position for the Young Turks, as it essentially cost them nothing and gained them the possibility of British assistance in the more pressing concern of Russian expansion.

While Young Turk opinion of the Egyptian Nationalists tended to be negative, Ali Yusuf and Mustafa Kamil similarly believed the Young Turks to be misguided, particularly in the latter’s willingness to deal with the British.¹⁴⁵ Egyptian Nationalist leaders criticized the Young Turks for their opposition to the Sultan, whom the Nationalists felt was far better placed to be a bulwark against the British. In a similar vein, Nationalist Party leaders mocked the Young Turks for behaving in a way which Watanists believed to be against the interests of the Ottoman Empire. According to the Watanists, the Young Turk belief that a foreign enemy (in this case the British) would come to their aid was foolish at best. A Watani article in *al-Liwa* argued,

Our Turkish Brothers who still dream of friendship with England say it did not become our enemy at this point ...How is it that a healthy mind can imagine that the British state which occupies Egypt by cunning, Sudan by force, urges the Arab nation to revolt against its majesty the great Caliph and pushes Muslims to divide through fear... [will] one day become a sincere and loyal friend of Muslims and Islam?¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ Wingate papers: 283/9/1-2: Letter from Amery, Intelligence Office, Cairo 21 September 1908.

¹⁴⁴ Veliyyuddin Yakın, *Al-ma’lum wa al-madjhul* (Cairo, 1909), 105; Gershoni and Jankowski, *Search for Egyptian Nationhood*, 83.

¹⁴⁵ They never, however, referred to them explicitly as Young Turks, but rather “our Turkish brothers,” “ikhwanouna al-atrak.”

¹⁴⁶ “Ingiltra we al-Islam,” *al-Liwa*, 27 August 1902.

Thus, much as the Nationalists craved the support of Constantinople against the British, they did not immediately benefit from the 1908 coup that brought the Young Turks to power. The Nationalists' past loyalty to Sultan 'Abdülhamid did not endear them to the new regime in Constantinople. This loyalty had arisen partly from Kamil's flirtation with Islamic unity movements, but also from a prudent decision to fight only one foreign oppressor at a time. Britain, not the Ottoman Empire, controlled Egypt after 1882; and Kamil's Nationalists accordingly saw the former as the enemy and the latter as an ally, at least temporarily. Meanwhile, the British, once the defenders of Ottoman territorial integrity, were drifting further from the Ottoman court; and British public opinion had largely turned against Abdülhamid, viewing him as a violent oppressor of Christian minority populations. The Egyptian Nationalists, however, viewed the Ottoman Empire embodied by the Sultan as the enemy of their enemy, the British; and, likewise, viewed the Sultan's domestic enemies, the Young Turks, as the enemies of Egyptian independence.¹⁴⁷ Since the Nationalists had already lost the support of France and the Khedive, they naturally wanted to preserve their ties with the Ottoman Government, the one remaining power center with an interest in opposing a permanent British occupation of Egypt.

There was also considerable tension between Egyptian Nationalists and Syro-Lebanese émigrés working in Egypt. Many Egyptian Nationalists of the pre-War period expressed particular resentment over what they felt to be the privileged position and pro-British attitude of the Syrian community resident in Egypt, characterizing them as intruders. The appearance of the newspaper *al-Muqattam*, published by Syrian émigré Faris Nimr, seemed to send a signal that the Syrians were in collaboration with the British, and hostile to the Egyptian Nationalist cause. In January 1893, a student demonstration led by Mustafa Kamil attacked the offices of *al-*

¹⁴⁷ Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian National Party," 212-4.

Muqattam. Although Kamil had not intended the demonstration to be specifically anti-Syrian, the Syrian population of Egypt reacted angrily. According to Kamil, however,

The Egyptians honoured these people and were good to them, but they returned charity with insult and kindness with evil and proclaimed their enmity to the fatherland and its people. They have opposed every Egyptian who demanded the rights of the country and upheld the honor of his people and fatherland.¹⁴⁸

Both Kamil and Farid shared an attitude of hostility toward the Syrian community in Egypt. The Watani Party press publicly criticized Muhammad Rashid Rida' and other Syrians for their efforts aimed at Ottoman decentralization; in the Watanist view, by weakening and dividing the Ottoman Empire, they would only serve British desires to extend imperialism over the bulk of the Muslim world.¹⁴⁹

The Question of Arab Unity

Arabism offered a potential alternative to an Ottoman affiliation for Egyptian nationalists. However, after 1882, the difference between British imperialism in the Nile Valley and continuing Ottoman rule in Arab Asia presented the peoples of the two regions with fundamentally different political problems. Even in the years immediately prior to World War I, when Arab nationalism emerged as an organized force within the Ottoman Empire, any Egyptian tendency to become associated with it was greatly diminished by the Arab movement's own exclusion of Egypt from its purview.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ *Al-Ahram Weekly*, Issue 788, 30 march-5 April 2006. For more on Egyptian nationalists' disagreements with the Syrian population, see Fritz Steppat, "Nationalismus und Islam bei Muṣṭafa Kamil. Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte der ägyptischen Nationalbewegung," *Die Welt des Islams, New Series*, Vol. 4, Issue 4 (1956), 258-61; Ahmed, *Intellectual Origins*, 82; Wendell, *Egyptian National Image*, 249; and Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party," 315.

¹⁴⁹ See Rifa' at Sa'id, Muhammad Farid, *al-mawqif wa-al-ma'sah* (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 1978), 55, 143-4.

¹⁵⁰ An Egyptian connection with the early Arab nationalist movement was hardly promoted when the chairman of the Arab Congress meeting in Paris in 1913 denied an Egyptian who was present the right to address the assembly or when the same chairman later declared that the Congress was restricted to Arabs from the Arab Ottoman provinces to the East of Egypt.

In 1898, Mustafa Kamil's *The Eastern Question* attacked the idea of an Arab Caliphate as a British-inspired scheme for sowing dissension in the Ottoman Empire, and his antipathy to Arab separatist tendencies, if anything, increased as he came to give greater emphasis to the Ottoman bond as a potential counterweight to the British presence in Egypt.¹⁵¹ Mustafa Kamil's successors at the helm of the Nationalist Party were equally opposed to Arab separatist trends when these appeared more openly in the years after 1908. The Watani Party's publicist, Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz Jawish, throughout his career a vehement advocate of Muslim solidarity and political cooperation, wrote articles attacking Arab political activities that were critical of the Ottoman Empire and called on Arabs to remain loyal to the Sultan-Caliph.¹⁵² In 1911, Muhammad Farid wrote an unflattering account of the new Arab Nationalist movement, attributing the desire for Arab autonomy in the Fertile Crescent in part to the ambitions of the local Arab elite to gain greater access to government office, and in part to British machinations aimed at weakening the Ottoman Empire "so that they can set up an Arab Caliphate in its stead which they would place in the hands of slaves of greed and avarice, [thus] making [British] rule over the Islamic world complete."¹⁵³

The leaders of the Egyptian Revolution of 1919, as nationalist leaders before them, perceived no direct connection between their movement and the parallel nationalisms developing in neighboring Arab territories. The most significant action by Egyptian Nationalist Party leaders concerning the Arab nationalist movement was an explicit rejection by the Party's Administrative Council of the suggestion made by pro-Arab activist 'Aziz 'Ali al-Misri (1879-1965) that the Party support Arab aspirations for autonomy within the Ottoman Empire:

¹⁵¹ 'Ali Fathi Kamil, *Mustafa Kamil Basha fi 34 Rabi'an* (9 volumes) (Cairo: 1908-1911), vol. VII, 27-9; *ibid.*, vol. IX, 200. Mustafa Kamil, *al-mas'alah al-Sharqiyah* (Cairo: Matba'at al-Liwa, 1909).

¹⁵² Anis Sayigh, *al-Fikra al-'Arabiyya fi Misr* (Beirut: 1959), 72.

¹⁵³ Quoted in Sayigh, 55.

according to Muhammad Farid's diary, the Council discussed the suggestion at length, but eventually "we refused to cooperate [with Misri] in his work, after we explained to him the disadvantages of dividing the two races within the state."¹⁵⁴ In order for the Ottoman Empire to have any standing to push for Egypt's independence from Britain, it had to remain strong; from the Egyptian perspective, anything that undermined that possibility, including Arab nationalism, was against their own interests. Members of the Watani Party, fearful of a split between Muslim and Copt nationalists, were also leery of becoming involved with an Arab nationalism they perceived to be sectarian in nature.

Farid's writings leave no doubt as to his fundamentally negative attitude toward an Arab identity framework. As an Egyptian nationalist and a pragmatic Ottoman loyalist, Farid rejected Arabism both as a framework for cultural-historical affiliation and as a political movement. It was with great concern that Farid followed the development of the Arab opposition movement from 1909 to 1918. Arab nationalism, he believed, presented a challenge to the integrity and unity of the Ottoman Empire, which would deny Egypt her best chance of liberation from British occupation. In a state of war, Farid reasoned, Arab nationalists would subvert the Ottoman Empire's very existence, seriously reducing the prospects of waging a successful military campaign to liberate Egypt. The fact that Arab opposition groups were supported by the British

¹⁵⁴ Markaz Watha'iq wa Ta'rikh Misr al Mu'asir, *Awraq Muhammad Farid, vol. 1: Mudhakkirati ba'da al-Hijra, 1904-1919* (Cairo, 1978), 100-1. The involvement of one prominent Egyptian associated with pre-1914 Arab nationalism, 'Aziz 'Ali al-Misri, was of a more committed nature. Of Circassian ancestry but born in Egypt, Misri was an Ottoman army officer who served with distinction in the Yemen and Libyan wars. Possibly one of the founders of the first Arab secret society of the Young Turk period, *al-Qahtaniyya*, he became active in the years immediately prior to World War I in the establishment of a secret society of Arab army officers, *al-'Ahd*. Early in 1914 he was arrested by Ottoman authorities, tried in secret for his involvement in Arab political agitation, and sentenced to death, but eventually released through the intervention of the British. (For information on Misri's prewar involvement in Arab affairs, see Markaz Watha'iq, 99-101, 116; Majid Khadduri, "'Aziz 'Ali al-Misri and the Arab Nationalist Movement," in Albert Hourani (ed.), *Middle Eastern Affairs* (St. Antony's Papers, no. 17) (London, 1965), 140-63.) Within Egypt, however, 'Aziz al-Misri was known for his military role as an Ottoman "hero of Cyrenaica" rather than for his Arab-oriented political philosophies. (Gershoni and Jankowski, *The Search for Egyptian Nationhood*, 19)

made them even more objectionable to Farid; and, on numerous occasions, he accused Arab populations of treason against the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵⁵

Despite his opposition to Arab nationalism, Farid was extremely critical of the persecutions and executions of Arab nationalists in Syria at the hands of Minister of the Ottoman Navy and Triumvirate member Cemal Pasha (1872-1922).¹⁵⁶ This, he was convinced, was a ruinous policy for the Ottoman Empire, as it inflamed Arab public opinion and pushed them toward revolt and secession. Several passages in his memoirs suggest that Farid understood (without accepting) the predicament of the Arab nationalists and their motivation to rebel. The Arabs, like the Egyptians in this matter, were the victims of what they viewed as the Committee of Union and Progress' aggressive Turkification policy.¹⁵⁷ The Ottoman government, according to Farid, should have "come to an agreement with the other Muslim races, maintaining the independence of each race in internal policy."¹⁵⁸ This was the Empire's only hope of survival: by preserving the consensus and solidarity among all its constituent ethnic groups as the foundation of its integrity and unity. In a conversation held with Max von Oppenheim, leader of the German government's Oriental Section, against the background of the Arab Revolt of 1916-1918, Farid stated that "the Ottoman Empire cannot survive unless it reorganizes itself as the Germanic union has done, allowing each nationality its own internal autonomy."¹⁵⁹ Farid utterly rejected the pro-British and anti-Ottoman Arab Revolt. It was, he believed, a disaster for the Ottoman Empire and for Islam, an event which hastened the Ottomans' defeat in the War. When

¹⁵⁵ In particular, Farid made no secret of the fact that he considered Islamic reformer Rashid Rida (1865-1935) a "British spy" and that the latter's reformist Islamic activities were carried out under British aegis. (Goldschmidt, *Memoirs*, 108.)

¹⁵⁶ The Three Pashas (*Üç Paşalar*) consisted of Mehmed Tal'at Pasha, Ismail Enver Pasha and Ahmed Cemal Pasha; who were the leading political figures in the Ottoman Empire leading up to the First World War.

¹⁵⁷ See Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1909-1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) for a critical discussion of the received wisdom regarding the "Turkification policy" of the CUP government.

¹⁵⁸ Quoted in Goldschmidt, *Memoirs*, 365.

¹⁵⁹ Goldschmidt, *Memoirs*, 365.

he learned, in late July 1916, of the Arab revolt in the Hijaz, he condemned it bitterly, not least because he was convinced that it was the result of intrigues between ‘Abbas Hilmi and the Arabs. To Farid, the Revolt was, above all, an act ‘against the Ottoman Empire,’ fomented with the aid of the Khedive and the British, the enemies of Egyptian nationalism.¹⁶⁰ It was Farid’s belief that, in instigating the Arabs, ‘Abbas sought only to fulfill “his ancient project to create the Egyptian sultanate and Arab caliphate to serve the British and himself and get revenge on the Turks.”¹⁶¹

When news of the 1916-1918 Arab Revolt reached Egypt, the local reaction was disappointing to Oriental Secretary Sir Ronald Storrs, who had expected Egyptians to support the Arab uprising against the Ottoman Empire. The Egyptian intelligentsia, he admitted, reacted to the Arab Revolt with “a feeling of stupefaction mingled with uneasiness...the Sharif [Husayn] represented as a rebel and against the Khalifa and the servile instrument of the English...”¹⁶² The marginality of the Arab Revolt to Egypt and Egyptian opinion appears to have persisted for the duration of the War. When the British in late 1916 feared imminent collapse of the Revolt, reports from their officials in Cairo estimated that such a collapse would not influence the British position in Egypt in any significant manner.¹⁶³ A lengthy report on “Egypt and the Arab Movement” in the summer of 1917 estimated that, save for some “Ottoman Arabs” in Egypt who supported the movement and those elements of “Turkish extraction” in the country which were opposed to it, “Moslem [sic] opinion in Egypt as a whole continues to be entirely apathetic to the Arab movement for independence.”¹⁶⁴ By March 1918, a meeting of British officials in Cairo that was devoted to analyzing the situation in the Arabian Peninsula assumed the unpopularity of

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 365.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 366.

¹⁶² Storrs, 163-4.

¹⁶³ “The unofficial diary of Sir Ronald Storrs on a trip to the Hijaz,” FO 141/462, 1198/463 and 1198/468.

¹⁶⁴ “Egypt and the Arab Movement,” 14 August 1917; FO 141/783, 5317/1.

the Arab Revolt in Egypt: as High Commissioner Sir Reginald Wingate summarized Egyptian sentiment in the context of discussing a possible attempt by Sharif Husayn to assume the title of Caliph, any such gambit “would be received coldly in Egypt, where the Sharifian movement has gained little sympathy.”¹⁶⁵

Already during the period 1909-1911, Farid suspected that ‘Abbas Hilmi was abetting Arab nationalist associations and individuals who wanted to establish an “Arab sultanate” or “Arab caliphate.”¹⁶⁶ In July 1913, Farid wrote that ‘Abbas Hilmi’s intrigues lay behind the pro-Arabist activity of ‘Aziz ‘Ali al-Misri. In early 1915, Farid continued to claim that ‘Abbas Hilmi’s “hatred for the Turks is matched only by his plots to get closer to the Arabs. He is still interested in creating an Arab sultanate including Egypt, Syria, and the Arab lands.”¹⁶⁷ The Khedive’s purpose, according to Farid, was to set “the Arabs against the Empire.”¹⁶⁸

The opposition to Arab nationalism was not confined to the Watanists, either. Lutfi al-Sayyid, the leading spokesman of the Umma Party, was equally unsympathetic toward pre-War Arab nationalist currents. In 1911, an article in the Umma Party organ *al-Jarida* addressed “The Arab Question.”¹⁶⁹ While admitting that the Arabs were underrepresented in the Ottoman Parliament, Lutfi al-Sayyid viewed current Arab-Turkish political tensions as an internal Ottoman matter that should be amicably resolved. His disinterested advice on the subject was that, rather than forming parties and undertaking anti-Ottoman agitation, the Arabs should study the Ottoman Constitution and attempt to rectify their grievances within the Ottoman

¹⁶⁵ “Account of a Meeting Held at the Residency,” 23 March 1918, FO 141/430, 5411/17; Gershoni and Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 30.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 88, 94.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 230; FO 12242/86/16, From S.I.S., 13 December 1923, includes a summary of information regarding ‘Abbas Hilmi’s plans to recover the throne and become head of an Arab Federation,” describing contacts with Arab leaders, and “intrigues with [the] French government.”

¹⁶⁸ Goldschmidt, *Memoirs*, 271.

¹⁶⁹ Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, “al-Mas’ala al-‘Arabiyya,” *al-Jarida*, 30 August 1911, as republished in Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, *al-Muntakhabat* (2 volumes) (Cairo: 1945), vol. I, 250-1.

framework.¹⁷⁰ He continued to oppose Egyptian involvement in Arab affairs up until World War I, in 1912 terming both “pan-Islamism” and “Arab unity” as “delusions and fancies,” and in 1913 asking the rhetorical question: “Is not an Egyptian who asserts his affiliation with Arabdom or Turkdom proving that he despises his fatherland and his people?”¹⁷¹ In the same year, when two Syrian notables came to Egypt to promote (in Lutfi’s characterization) “the annexation of Syria to Egypt,” Lutfi was opposed to the idea, characteristically because “[he] did not see it as being in the interests of Egypt.”¹⁷² Thus the two leading political trends in pre-War Egypt were in substantial agreement in seeing Egypt’s interests ill-served by Arab nationalism, and in demonstrating an appreciable reserve about the value of that movement generally, and particularly for Egyptian interests. For Egyptians of the pre-War era, Egypt could be seen either as a national unit completely separate from its neighbors or as one of several national units within a larger Muslim community currently represented by the Ottoman Empire; but, in any case, it was not involved in the emerging Arab nationalist movement – Egyptian problems had no connection with the current problems of the Arabs. The Egyptian nationalist movement that occurred immediately after World War I was thoroughly Egyptianist in its goals and activities; as such, it neither had any links with nor desired any connection with the parallel Arab nationalist movement in Arab Asia.

Though there is a temptation to see the anti-colonial nationalism of Egyptians as a movement that should be sympathetic to the anti-colonial movement of Arab nationalists, the manifestos and declarations of the Umma Party, Wafdists, Watanists, and lesser political parties in the revolutionary period simply ignored any direct relationship between Egypt and the Arab

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ See *al-Jarida*, 2 March 1913, as republished in al-Sayyid, *Ta’ammulat*, 75; *al-Jarida*, 6 January 1913, as republished in Sayyid, *Ta’ammulat*, 70.

¹⁷² Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, *Kissat Hayati* (Cairo: Kitab al-Hilal, 1962), 137.

nationalist movements in the Levant and Arabia. Even writer Taha Husayn (1889-1973), who in the interwar years did much to promote Arabic as a common language, readily accepted that the focus of Arab cultural and linguistic unity should be on Egyptian nationalism rather than pan-Arabism. Similarly, Rashid Rida, enlisted to rationalize the Arab nationalist alliance with England to a largely skeptical audience, had great difficulty in countering the claims of Syrian, pro-Ottoman Druze Amir Shakib Arslan: Arslan's denouncement of the "policy of foreigners who wanted to suggest that there were difficulties between Arabs and Turks and in order to exploit them to their own advantage, take over Ottoman territories, and turn them into colonies," was, for many, an unanswerable indictment of the Arab Revolt, particularly in view of its well-known British sponsorship.¹⁷³

The concept of Arab "unity" was only infrequently discussed in Egyptian political circles in the 1920s; and what little opinion was voiced on the subject tended to both exclude Egypt from the terms of discussion and to be pessimistic concerning the possibilities of Arab unity. Looser ideas of Egyptian-Arab political cooperation for common ends were occasionally put forward, but they were usually phrased in terms of pragmatic approaches that would ultimately benefit Egyptian territorial nationalism. The utility of Arab unity was evident insofar as cultural and educational cooperation went, but its value in political spheres was consistently questioned. Although there were lofty sentiments about Arab brotherhood and the unity of the Arabic language, for many, and especially for Egyptians, Arab nationalism's only appeal lay in what it might deliver for individual nation-states. The substantive proposals promulgated by Egyptian Arabists usually envisaged Arab "unity" as the formal association of Arab regimes in a new federalist structure. The terms used were variously "the Arab alliance" (*al-hilf al-'arabi*), the

¹⁷³ Quoted in William L. Cleveland, *Islam Against the West: Shakib Arslan and the Campaign for Islamic Nationalism* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 24-7.

“Arab bloc” (*al-kutla al-‘arabiyya*), the “league of Arab nations” (*‘usbat al-umam al-‘arabiyya*), “the Arab union” (*al-ittihad al-‘arabi*), or “the Arab league” (*al-jam’a al-‘arabiyya*). Specific proposals for Arab federation generally accepted the internal political autonomy of the separate Arab states, each of which would retain the exclusive right to determine its own domestic policies. The sphere of authority of the league, alliance, or federation was usually defined in terms of interstate cooperation in such non-political areas as finance, commerce, legal matters, and education; the coordination of foreign policy; and the negotiation of inter-Arab defense arrangements. Some Egyptian Arabists occasionally called for “comprehensive Arab unity beginning at the Persian Gulf and ending at the Atlantic Ocean” or for “the formation of a greater Arab nation.”¹⁷⁴ However, calls for complete Arab unity represented a minority view in Egypt.¹⁷⁵ The criteria for any Egyptian-Arab collaboration were functional rather than national, being suggestions for what were, in effect, informal anti-imperialist alliances directed not at the Arabs per se but to all the peoples of “the East” who shared the common problem of resisting the domination of Western imperialism.

Nor were there significant practical links between the Egyptian and Arab nationalist movements after World War I. The Wafdist delegation in Paris in 1919 is reported to have declined to collaborate with an embryonic “Society of Eastern Nations” that was taking shape among non-European delegations to the Peace Conference on the grounds that its own mandate from the Egyptian people related only to the independence of Egypt.¹⁷⁶ In London a year later, Sa’d Zaghlul declined to comment on the situation in Syria and Palestine on the grounds that his own political focus was Egypt alone. The idea of Arabic-speaking peoples forming one

¹⁷⁴ ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Azzam, “Qadiyyat Filastin wa al-Wahda al-‘Arabiyya,” *al-Fath*, 21 Rabi’ al-Awwal 1358, 83.

¹⁷⁵ Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 136-7.

¹⁷⁶ Mahmud ‘Abu al-Fath, *al-Mas’ala al-Misriyya wa al-Wafd* (Cairo, 1921), 199; see, also, FO 407/187 no. 279.

interrelated unit was presented both as an outmoded concept in conflict with the “spirit” of the post-World War I world, with its focus on the nation-state, and an idea “contradictory” to the existence of the modern Egyptian nation-state. In 1925, Sa’d Zaghlul dismissed Arab unity as “no more than the union of the weak with the weak. And what sum will you get by multiplying zero by other zeroes?”¹⁷⁷

Rather than seeing any affiliation between the post-War Egyptian and Arab nationalist movements, leaders of the Wafd, in particular, expressed a definite sense of superiority over Arabs as well as a considerable feeling of resentment over the perceived favorable treatment accorded Arab, as opposed to Egyptian, nationalist aspirations by the Allied Powers in 1918-1919. This was apparent as early as a meeting of Egyptian leaders with High Commissioner Wingate on November 13, 1918, when one of the delegates spoke of Egyptians “consider[ing] themselves far more capable of conducting a well-ordered government than the Arabs, Syria[ns], and Mesopotamians [sic] to whom the Anglo-French governments have granted self-determination.”¹⁷⁸ The complaint was repeated frequently in the following year, when Arab representatives were allowed to proceed to Paris while Egyptian requests to do the same were rejected. Egyptian nationalist leaders considered Egypt “vastly superior” to areas such as the Hijaz, Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon (as well as to Eastern European states such as Greece, Serbia, and Romania), and so certainly more fitted for participation in the Peace Conference.¹⁷⁹ As Sir Ronald Graham described the situation in April 1919, “there is no doubt that Egyptian *amour-propre* has been wounded by the absence of Egyptian representation at the Peace Conference, when India and, still worse, the disliked and despised Bedouin of the Hedjaz have been

¹⁷⁷ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 234-6.

¹⁷⁸ FO 141/773, 7819/3, Wingate to Hardinge, 14 November 1918.

¹⁷⁹ Unsigned letter from Geneva to President Wilson, 24 March 1919, ‘Abbas Hilmi II Papers, file 106.

represented.”¹⁸⁰ Eventually, however, the Egyptian nationalists were able to elevate the preference given the Arabs of Western Asia to one of the causes of the emergence of a strengthened Egyptian nationalist movement after World War I:

Another cause of encouragement to us was the recognition of our brothers of the Hedjaz, who speak the same language as ourselves and are of the same religion as most of us. The Arabs of the Hedjaz did not have before a separate political existence like ourselves. In fact, within a century, they were under our political control...was it illogical for us to expect from the British Government, in view of the oft-repeated assertions of its members, treatment at least as generous as that accorded to the Arabs of the Hedjaz?¹⁸¹

¹⁸⁰ FO 407/184, no. 152, “Memorandum by Sir R. Graham on the Unrest in Egypt,” 9 April 1919.

¹⁸¹ Manifesto “To the Members of the House of Commons” from the Egyptian Delegation in Paris, 13 July 1919; contained in the ‘Abbas Hilmi II Papers, file 35; Gershoni and Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs*, 50-2.

Chapter Five: Nationalists in Europe

The history of colonialism is often portrayed as a black-and-white encounter between colonizers and colonized. The careers of Kamil, Farid, Jawish, and others, however, particularly when their European activities are highlighted, demonstrate the fallaciousness of this simplistic and dichotomous interpretation. In a very real sense, these European-based Egyptian nationalists do not fit in such a rigid colonizer versus colonized paradigm. These activists' education, cultural habits, and linguistic abilities endowed them with a chameleon-like quality to function equally well in either a European or an Egyptian environment. It was this cultural flexibility that facilitated their unprecedented access to European mass-media outlets and enabled them to communicate clearly and sympathetically to a European audience.¹ Watani leaders used the colonial metropolises to further their own independence movements; in addition, they relied on inter-European rivalries, such as that between France and Britain, to further their anti-colonial goals.

Anti-colonialist nationalists, then, had a considerable level of agency in dealing with the various governments that tried to keep them under control. For instance, colonial activists developed their own intricate strategies of smuggling literature across national borders, they misled the authorities about their own location and about the cities where they were printing their journals. When anti-colonialists in one country were confronted with the danger that the local government might hand them over to their "own" empire, they used their contacts in the local press and tried to create public scandals. In so doing, colonial activists were often able to tap into

¹ Ziad Fahmy, "Francophone Egyptian Nationalists, Anti-British Discourse, and European Public Opinion, 1885-1910: The Case of Mustafa Kamil and Ya'qub Sannu'," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2008), 183.

the strong nationalist feelings that continued to exist in most European countries. This did little, of course, to reach domestic audiences in Egypt; and, therefore, achieved few concrete results.

Because of the limited space for formal dissent, or indeed for any discussion of the imperial project within Egypt, the relative freedom of movement afforded by the intermediate spaces of Europe was central to the politics of both the British colonial state and the Egyptian nationalist opposition. Throughout the twentieth century, anti-colonialist nationalists increasingly became active in the cities of Western Europe. New networks created by this mixing of diasporas extended between the major European metropolises. In a newly-emerging pattern, the European continent increasingly became a space in which Egyptian and other anti-colonial nationalists could meet, print, and disseminate political material, and collaborate and coordinate anti-colonial action, seemingly outside the reach of the British police.

From the mid-nineteenth century, there was a steady increase in the number of Egyptians who became politically active in Europe. Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (1838-1897), for example, was active in Britain, France, Germany, and Russia in the 1880s and early 1890s, working together with European anti-colonialists and writing articles against the British occupation of Egypt. Joining this tradition of Egyptian nationalist attempts to turn European publics and governments against the British Occupation, Mustafa Kamil was particularly attendant to advertising the Egyptian position to European audiences, which he believed could be effectively harnessed to force the British out of Egypt. Kamil, who studied law in Egypt and later in France, became involved in politics during his time as a student in Europe. During his trips to Europe, and particularly to France, he became committed to intense lobbying for Egypt's independence.²

² For the first few years, Kamil's European activities were financially supported by the Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi. 'Abbas Hilmi first met with Kamil in an official visit the Khedive made to the Khedival Law School on 28 November 1892. (Ahmad Shafiq, *Mudhakiraati fi nisf qarn*, 2nd Edition (Cairo: Al-Haya Misriyya al-'amma lil Kitab, 1994), Vol. II, Part I, 50.) Noticing the potential usefulness of the young Kamil, 'Abbas Hilmi established a

Very early in his career, Kamil began utilizing an external strategy for swaying European public opinion towards the Egyptian nationalist cause.³ Kamil gave top priority to his campaign abroad, first to remove Cromer as Consul-General, and then to persuade the British to leave Egypt. To these ends he started his European-language newspapers and toured the capitals of Europe, making speeches against the British occupation. In a 5 August 1895 *al-Mu'ayyid* article, Kamil openly described his European propaganda strategy:

The wise among the British have realized the danger of their occupation of Egypt. What they need to know is the true feelings of the Egyptian nation, its fears, hopes, and the truth. This would force their government to evacuate the Nile Valley. The best thing that we Egyptians can do now is to advertise the truth to Europe with as many languages as possible, especially in English and French.⁴

Working toward this goal, Kamil spent every summer between 1895 and 1907 in Europe, publicizing Egyptian nationalist causes. Kamil sought the support of British and French liberals; he visited London for the first time in 1904, and later published a collection of his speeches in Paris.⁵

He spent a great deal of time in France attempting to gain support by publicizing Egypt's plight, and succeeded in gaining the assistance of prominent European socialists. The primary

strong bond with him and supported many of his nationalist efforts. 'Abbas Hilmi sponsored Kamil's continuing law education in Toulouse, where the latter received his law degree in November 1894. Juliette Adam, *L'Angleterre en Egypte* (Paris: Imprimerie du Centre, 1922), 144-5; al-Rafi'i, *Mustafa Kamil*, 51-4; al-Sayyid, *Egypt and Cromer*, 156-7.

³ Kamil's friendship with the renowned French author Juliette Adam was among the most important elements in opening the doors of French society to Kamil. Adam, editor of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, an anti-British French periodical, hosted a literary salon in Paris attended by many prominent French journalists and political figures. These contacts included leading French editors and writers such as Edouard Drumont (editor of *La Libre Parole*), Ernest Judet (editor of *Le Petit Journal* and *L'Eclair*), and Henri Rochefort (founder and editor of *L'Intransigeant*.) See Mustafa Kamil, *Lettres Egyptiennes Francaises adressees a Mme Juliette Adam, 1895-1908* (Cairo: Madrisit Mustafa Kamil, 1909), 16; and Juliette Adam, *L'Angleterre en Egypte* (Paris, 1922), 146-7; Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., "The Egyptian Nationalist Party," (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 1968), 314-5.

⁴ See *al-Mu'ayyid*, 5 April 1895, cited in 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, *Mustafa Kamil, ba'ith al-haraka al-wataniyya (tarikh Misr al-qaoumi min 1882 ila 1908)*, 5th Edition (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1984), 60. See, also, Mustafa Kamil, *Lettres Egyptiennes Francaises adressees a Mme Juliette Adam, 1895-1908* (Cairo: n.p., 1909), 16; and Adam, *L'Angleterre en Egypte*, 146-7.

⁵ Muhammad Farid, *Les Intrigues Anglaises contre l'Islam: Par Mohammed Farid Bey* (Lausanne, 1917), published by Perrin in 1906.

reason for Kamil's insistence on making Europe the forum for debate about British control of Egypt was that he saw the Occupation as an international issue that could only be solved with sufficient diplomatic pressure on Britain. Under Kamil's leadership, the European versions of *Al-Liwa* usually used arguments for Egyptian independence based on European liberal ideas, such as the status of Egypt under international law or the rights of nations.

Kamil's official arrival on the European scene was signaled by his June 1895 presentation of a petition and a symbolic poster to the French Chamber of Deputies.⁶ The poster depicts Kamil, with the Egyptian masses behind him, presenting a written appeal to France asking her to help Egypt in gaining her independence from the British. At the bottom of the picture, a vigilant British soldier with sword in hand closely guards Egypt, portrayed as a handcuffed and kneeling woman.⁷ Kamil printed thousands of copies of this poster and distributed them to major European and even American newspapers.⁸ Less than a month after the French Chamber of Deputies presentation, Kamil delivered his first political speech in Europe. Many journalists and writers attended the event, held in an auditorium at the University of Toulouse on 4 July 1895. Kamil began his speech by declaring the illegality of the British occupation under international law and the mismanagement of Cromer, whom he accused of:

purposefully appointing incapable, indifferent, or traitorous men at the head of Egyptian government ministries and other administrative positions. In this manner he not only manipulates

⁶ Soon after Kamil's return he and the Khedive founded a new anti-British secret society, which included the leading Egyptian and European members of the Palace clique and maintained close contact with the French Consul and several French officials in the Egyptian Government. (Shafiq, *Mudhakkirati*, Vol. II, Part I, 190 mentions among its members himself, Rouiller, Isma'il Shami, Yusuf Siddiq, Mahmud Salim, and Aristide Gavillot. This society may be identical with Jan'iyyah Ihya al-Watan, mentioned in 'Ali Fathi Kamil, *Muṣṭafā Kāmil Bāshā fī 34 rabī'an : sīratuhu wa-a 'māluhu min khuṭab wa-aḥādīth wa-rasā'il siyāsīyah wa-'umrānīyah* (Cairo: Matba'at al-Liwa, 1908-10), Vol. II, 243; Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party," 77-8.)

⁷ al-Rafi'i, *Mustafa Kamil*, 61; Fahmy, "Francophone Egyptian Nationalists, Anti-British Discourse, and European Public Opinion," 176-7.

⁸ See Kamil's 8 June 1895 letter to 'Abd al-Rahim Ahmad (Khedive Abbas's secretary), in Mustafa Kamil, *Awraq Mustafa Kamil: al-murasalat* (Cairo: Al-Haya Misriyya al-'amma lil Kitab, 1982), 28-32; al-Rafi'i, *Mustafa Kamil*, 61-4.

these men like an instrument under his control but he uses the incompetence of these men to attempt to prove to Europe that our country lacks a governing managerial class.⁹

Playing to his audience, Kamil represented the French as benevolent and culturally superior to the English and devoted the second half of his 1895 speech to singing the praises of French culture:

Yes gentlemen, it is France's duty...to interfere and save us...France which has generously awakened Egypt from its profound sleep and has always treated us like its dearest offspring, earning in the process our eternal respect, emanating from the depths of our hearts and souls.¹⁰

Later in the same year he published, in French, a small bulletin outlining the dangers of the British occupation of Egypt, which was then translated into Arabic.¹¹ He also wrote an article for the Viennese press on the same subject and spoke at the French Geographical Society. In 1896, British Prime Minister Gladstone received three open letters from Kamil requesting full British recognition of Egypt's sovereignty.¹² The European publicity of the Egyptian nationalist cause was so important to Kamil that in 1907 he established two new versions of his *Watani al-Liwa* newspaper, in both English (*Egyptian Standard*) and French (*L'Etendard Egyptienne*).¹³

⁹ See Kamil's 4 July 1895 speech presented in Toulouse, reprinted in Kamil, *Egyptiens et Anglais*, 26-7; Ziad Fahmy, "Francophone Egyptian Nationalists," 177.

¹⁰ Kamil, *Egyptiens et Anglais*, 43; Ziad Fahmy, "Francophone Egyptian Nationalists," 177.

¹¹ Mustafa Kamil, *Le peril anglais: Consequence de l'Occupation de l'Egypte par l'Angleterre* (Paris: Imprimerie G. Camproger, 1895; repr., Paris: Imprimerie Albert Lanier, 1899.)

¹² Jack A. Crabbs, *The Writing of History in Nineteenth-Century Egypt: a Study in National Transformation* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1984), 149-50.

¹³ For more on British views of *al-Liwa*, see FO 141/480/18. Similarly, Ya'qub Sannu', who resided in Paris from 1877 until his death in 1912, presented almost weekly lectures to French audiences on a variety of topics related to Egypt and Islam. In his lectures, political cartoons, and articles, Sannu' sang the praises of French culture while baiting the Anglophobia of French readers and audiences with attacks on the British. He was particularly adept at using his own newspapers to lure the mainstream French press into covering stories favorable to Egyptian nationalist goals. For a book-length biography of Sannu', see Irene Gendzier, *The Practical Visions of Ya'qub Sanua* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966.) (Ziad Fahmy, "Francophone Egyptian Nationalists," 170; 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, *Mustafa Kamil: Ba'ath al-haraka al-wattaniyya*, 5th edition (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1985), 26-7.)

It was also in Europe that students from Egypt and other colonies organized under the auspices of nationalist leaders in exile.¹⁴ This development was supported by the already existing, although limited, connections between colony and metropole that had been established for the purposes of education. Most of the early immigrants to Europe were students who were beneficiaries of the campaign to educate Egypt's future lawyers, doctors, and philosophers in European universities, a policy practiced by successive Egyptian governments.¹⁵ While some students came to Europe already active in the nationalist cause, others likely became more interested in nationalist causes due to their exposure to anti-colonialist groups in Europe.¹⁶ In 1912, Consul-General Herbert Kitchener (1850-1916) noted that,

all of these students have a tendency to devote themselves to politics, often of a dangerous and subversive character, and they attend meetings where they openly advocate a revolution in this country...Unless some check is put on these proceedings, I greatly fear that...they may easily become a menace to the maintenance of tranquility and order in this country.¹⁷

In the first decade of the twentieth century, Egyptians were studying abroad in ever-increasing numbers, especially in British, French, and Swiss schools and universities. Whenever the number of Egyptians studying in any city exceeded one dozen, they tended to form their own social club, which usually then took on a political coloring. By 1908, the large students' societies in London,

¹⁴ British authorities had already become aware of this tendency to political awareness in the case of Indian nationalists a few years earlier. (India Office Library: Report of the Departmental Committee on Indian Students, Judicial and Public Department, No. 840/1908.) Upon realizing that Egyptians needed similar "supervision" while studying in Britain, they established a system of student "advising" based on the model already developed for Indian students. In 1912, Inspectors from the Egyptian Ministry of Education were established in London, Paris, and Geneva. FO 371/1363, p. 62-5, 93, Kitchener to Grey. Mellini, 172, notes that supervision of these students included surveillance by Scotland Yard. (Khan, 107; India Office Library: Report of the Departmental Committee on Indian Students, Judicial and Public Dept. No. 840/1908.)

¹⁵ See, for example, FO 10317/1641/16, A.J. Pressland, Confidential, 24 November 1924, "Reports on activities of Egyptian students in Switzerland."

¹⁶ British authorities became even more concerned with Egyptian student agitation in Europe after connections between Ibrahim Wardani, the assassin of Egyptian Prime Minister Butrus Ghali, and student and nationalist groups operating within Europe were discovered.

¹⁷ PRO: FO 371/1363, Kitchener to Grey, p. 93

Paris, and Lyons were essentially Nationalist satellite organizations. For this reason, the British were very concerned that Egyptian students, like their Indian counterparts, be heavily supervised.

Influencing European public opinion regarding the ills of the British occupation and “enlisting sympathy” for Egyptian independence was one of the key objectives of the Egyptian nationalist movement. Kamil contended it was necessary to get Europe interested in the Egyptian liberation movement, and find cooperation and insight in foreign political circles. It was clear to most nationalists that European support was absolutely essential, as Egypt would not be able to force a British military evacuation on its own.¹⁸

Farid held that the power to change Egypt’s system of government ultimately rested in British, not Egyptian, hands. It was, therefore, Paris, London, Vienna, and Berne that provided the main stage on which the Nationalist leaders presented their campaign for Egypt’s independence.¹⁹ In addition, the anti-imperialism of at least segments of the European left were particularly attractive to Egyptian nationalists anxious to win over public opinion in Europe.

In appealing to American and European audiences, nationalists consistently argued that Britain had no right to occupy Egypt militarily in 1882 and should have evacuated the country, together with the Sudan, as soon as possible. By rights, Egypt was a privileged Ottoman province; in no sense did it belong to the British Empire. The khedive and his ministers should not have been obliged to obey the diplomatic representative of Great Britain or any other foreign country. The Nationalists assumed that, if they could just persuade enough governments or enough members of an enlightened European public to listen to their legal case, European governments would be influenced to force the British to withdraw their occupying army.²⁰ At the

¹⁸ Amira Sonbol, *The Last Khedive of Egypt: Memoirs of Abbas Hilmi II* (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1998), 104.

¹⁹ Goldschmidt, “Egyptian Nationalist Party,” 173.

²⁰ Farid, *Awraq*, 11; FO10302/3560/16, Cairo, 23/11/24, containing copy of appeal to Europe and US urging that British demands are contrary to the independence of Egypt (Egypt Association of Great Britain & Ireland.) The

same time, the Egyptians also wished to present themselves in a positive light to the European public, showing, through their behaviors and habits at conferences and in publications, that they were “a calm and peaceful” people, “capable of governing themselves.”²¹

From the signing in 1904 of the Entente Cordiale, which settled a number of disagreements between France and Britain and paved the way for diplomatic cooperation between the two countries against Germany, no European country had endorsed the cause of Egypt’s independence from British rule; but the Nationalists never ceased to hope that a concerted propaganda campaign might sway liberal opinion in their favor, and that ultimately some government would change its course.²² In a letter to Juliette Adam, Kamil referred to the Entente Cordiale as “this ominous Anglo-French accord which will have disastrous results for our poor country and our unhappy Khedive.”²³ Kamil then continued,

My compatriots today detest France more than England itself. I know that it is very cruel to tell you that but is not frankness the base and the soul of all friendship? I suffer doubly for you and myself. Imagine then that France is the first power in Europe which has sanctioned the Occupation by an official act. What a humiliation for Egyptian and French patriots. You have no idea of the English at the present time, they mock us “poor creatures” who have believed in France, and they have reason to mock.²⁴

Kamil’s letters to French writer Juliette Adam (1836-1936), his speeches, and his articles poignantly express his disappointment with France. He noted as early as 1897 that the French were failing to support the Nationalists and the Khedive.²⁵ Saddened by French weakness in the Fashoda Incident, Kamil published an article in *al-Mu’ayyad* asserting that Egypt, even if France

British harbored consistent fears of colonial appeals to European and American supporters. See, for example, FO 141/434/2, “Egypt and America,” which voices concern over the 1922 Senate debate on Egyptian independence, Indian students in the United States, and propaganda efforts on their behalf.

²¹ *Congres National Egyptien. Statuts.*

²² Mustafa Kamil to Juliette Adam, 10 May 1904, from *Letters*, 134-8; Goldschmidt, “Egyptian Nationalist Party,” 83-4.

²³ Mustafa Kamil to Juliette Adam, 10 May 1904, *Letters*, 134-8

²⁴ Kamil, *Egyptian-French Letters*, 135-6.

²⁵ Kamil, *Letters*, 30-6.

abandoned her cause, could still look to Germany and the Ottoman Empire.²⁶ It was to Fashoda that he attributed the Khedive's growing disposition to make peace with the British.²⁷

It was after 1905 that transnational anti-colonialism in Europe developed into a widespread, sustained pattern; and the organizational framework for an Egyptian nationalist propaganda campaign in the cities of Western Europe had coalesced by mid-1908. In many cases, "seditious" actions and writings were punishable in Britain; however the laws governing them were much less severe than in the colonies. This meant that an Egyptian who, for instance, published an anti-colonialist pamphlet in Britain might be punished only relatively lightly, while he might be imprisoned for many years for publishing the same pamphlet in Egypt. It was this contradictory inner division of imperial rule that, for anti-colonialists, seemed to turn the Empires' metropolitan centers into a much safer place for their activities than the territories from which they originated. The British files on the "Activities of Egyptian nationalists abroad" called attention to the creation of missions, financed from nationalist funds, being established in the principal European capitals, "which would probably succeed in keeping the nationalist movement well-advertised."²⁸ The British were also "tolerably certain that they [Egyptians] will be in close contact with Indian revolutionaries and British communists in London, and financial

²⁶ Mustafa Kamil, "Malicious Joy and Intimidation," *al-Mu'ayyad*, 6 November 1898. The Fashoda Incident of 1898 involved a confrontation between the Anglo-Egyptian army commanded by General Kitchener, which had just reconquered northern Sudan, and a French expeditionary force headed by General Marchand, which had crossed from West Africa to the east to take control of the upper Nile. Although Marchand had preceded Kitchener by several months, he lacked the forces on the scene and the support back home that were available to the British. Despite a brief war scare in London and Paris, Marchand agreed to withdraw. France's concession to Britain in the Sudan started the reconciliation between the two countries and led to the Entente Cordiale of 1904.

²⁷ Kamil, *Letters*, 64, 66, 74. The issue of the Fashoda Incident created a division between the Khedive and the Nationalists. The majority of the nationalists supported the French, in hopes of French assistance in driving out the British military occupation; while the Khedive backed the claims of the British, in support of Egypt's own territorial claims over the area.

²⁸ Murray to Foreign Office, 1 May 1922.

aid from Egyptian sources might make the difference between the outbreak or failure of an embarrassing strike by British extremists.”²⁹

In fact, it is not surprising that the first efforts of the fledgling nationalists were directed abroad; they perceived the Occupation as having been inspired more by European issues and power struggles than by events such as the ‘Urabi Revolution. So, they correspondingly expected the solution to come from European intervention, as well. Fathi Radwan, a Nationalist Party spokesman, explained that, “Mustafa Kamil did not believe in negotiations.” Rather,

he believed in the necessity of taking advantage of international conditions. . . In every place, Mustafa Kamil proclaimed that the independence of Egypt was an international interest, and that the achievement of this independence was necessary to guarantee the interests of the various states of the East.³⁰

During the years before the First World War, the links between nationalists of different colonies were strengthened. A new generation of nationalist politicians was keenly aware that they were involved in a complex web of issues which affected the whole of the British Empire, and imperialism more generally, not only their own territories. The rise of international news, the telegraph, and the congregation of young, educated students and activists in London and other European cities provided the context for the increasingly effective connections between diverse anti-colonial nationalists; and Western Europe quickly became the main center of activity for many leading anti-colonialists of the early twentieth century.

Major European cities provided nationalists with avenues to express and organize their programs, a forum for the development of allies, and an area relatively free of censorship or the threat of further exile. Anti-colonialists in Britain and France were often able to make use of this fact in order to protect themselves from persecution in the relatively quiet metropolises of Europe.

²⁹ Murray to Foreign Office, 1 May 1922.

³⁰ Nadwat al-Hilal, “al-Za’im al-Shabb Mustafa Kamil,” HL, February 1948, 27, quoted in Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Commemorating the Nation: Collective Memory, Public Commemoration, and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Egypt* (Chicago: Middle East Documentation Center, 2004), 196-7.

However, while Europe provided nationalist leaders with a relatively safe place from which to operate, it also resulted in these actors becoming caught in a feedback loop of exiled dissidents. While this was, no doubt, beneficial for the growth of nationalist movements and was greatly effective in promoting the cause of independence to sympathetic audiences in Europe, the myopic focus on the metropolises of Western Europe meant that individual nationalist movements had less success in mobilizing prospective domestic constituencies. The mobilization and persuasion techniques perfected in the capitals of Europe were exercised mostly on European publics, rather than constituencies at home. Nationalists like Kamil, Farid, and Jawish focused their attention on interacting with metropolitan political elites in the hopes of gaining concessions toward autonomy at home and eventual independence. Presumably, they assumed that domestic popular support would form when needed, and did not focus the necessary attention on developing institutional and popular capacities in Egypt.

Scholars have explored the influence of European thought on colonial activists from both Egypt and India. What has been less adequately explored is the way in which these nationalists were also exposed to the ideas and ambitions of actors from other colonies, whom they met in the shared capitals of Europe. The existence in London and other European centers of Irish, Indian, and Egyptian migrant communities presented radicals from each country with numerous opportunities to interact and exchange ideas.³¹ However, despite the significance of Mustafa Kamil and others' European activities, historians have only briefly examined these events. Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski's *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs*, the most comprehensive work on

³¹ The alignment of nationalist action in the British capital was not lost on British authorities. This was a time when leaders of the Irish Land League, such as Michael Davitt, supported by English radicals, such as Charles Bradlaugh, were organizing in the capital. The addition of anti-colonial nationalists to this mix resulted in a great deal of concern for British officials.

early Egyptian nationalism, does not cover Egyptian nationalist efforts in Europe.³² Short of a brief mention in their introduction of how Kamil “hoped to use the French as a lever against the British in Egypt,” the authors pay little attention to Kamil’s European campaigns.³³ However, as elite activists fled, or were exiled from, their countries for Europe or America, they found themselves in an arena more conducive to practical collaboration with fellow anti-imperialist nationalists. These relationships proved beneficial to all sides, producing an anti-imperial, nationalist alliance which would continue to worry the British over the next several decades.

Geneva soon became the unofficial nerve-center of Egyptian student politics abroad. Muhammad Fahmi, an instructor in the Law Faculty of the University of Geneva, organized a “Young Egypt” Congress there in September 1908. The participants, mainly students, formed a permanent committee to organize future annual Young Egypt Congresses.³⁴ Fahmi was not a Nationalist, but the Permanent Committee promptly launched a campaign to publicize the projected 1909 meeting. One of the members, ‘Ali al-Shamsi, planted articles in various European newspapers advertising the Congress, visited the other Egyptian student clubs in Europe, and wrote frequently to Muhammad Farid soliciting Nationalist Party endorsements.³⁵ The large Egyptian colony in Geneva established a Nationalist club known as the Sphinx Society (*Jam’iyyat Abu al-Hawl*), which then became the model for similar clubs in other European cities where many Egyptians were studying. In the spring of 1914, Farid personally presided over

³² Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.)

³³ Gershoni and Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, Arabs*, 13. For more recent studies which address the issue of anti-colonial nationalism in Europe, see Daniel Brueckenhaus, “The Transnational Surveillance of Anti-Colonialist Movements in Western Europe, 1905-1945,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 2011) and Noor Kahn, “The Enemy of My Enemy: Indian Influences on Egyptian Nationalism, 1907-1931,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2006.) In order to appeal to European audiences, the Party of Young Egyptians was founded to follow in the example of the Young Turks, with a reform program similar to that of the other nationalist parties. European publics had quickly become enamored of the Young Turks following their deposition of Abdülhamid, resuscitation of the Ottoman Constitution, and recognition of the rights of religious and national minorities.

³⁴ Ali al-Shamsi to Farid, Geneva 22 November 1908 in Muhammad Farid, *Awraq Muhammad Farid* (Cairo: Al-Haya Misriyya al-‘amma lil Kitab, 1978), 64-73.

³⁵ Shamsi to Farid, Geneva, 22 November and 31 December 1908, and 14 February 1909 in Farid, *Awraq*, 64-73.

the inauguration of Sphinx Society chapters in London, Paris, Lyons, Liege, Antwerp, and Brussels.³⁶ After delivering one such speech at a party given in his honor by the Sphinx Society of London in February 1914, Farid wrote in his diary,

This party raised my hopes for the Egyptian youth, for I find among today's young people higher patriotic sentiments and feelings than in the preceding generation. They are closer than before to the idea of forcibly freeing their country, for they spoke with great courage and without caution, declaring their ideas with complete candor, even though they were sure that some of the people there were spies.³⁷

The strength of Egyptians' presence in Europe was demonstrated by the Egyptian National Congress, which was held from 22 to 26 September 1910. The Conference was supposed to have been held in Paris, but the French authorities, acting "entirely on [their] own initiative because [they] did not desire that Paris should become the center of an anti-British crusade," decided to ban it.³⁸ In explaining their sudden about-face, French government officials referred to French obligations toward England under the 1904 treaty that formed the basis of the Entente Cordiale. French officials allegedly told Muhammad Farid that the government could not allow a conference aimed at the expulsion of the British from Egypt to take place on French soil because the French had agreed, in 1904, not to undertake anything against Britain's involvement in Egypt.³⁹ Farid replied that, after all, he had been allowed to take part in a conference of members of "oppressed nations" in London in the previous year. Was it possible "that the French government presented itself as more English than the English government itself?" he asked. Did

³⁶ Farid, *Awraq*, 64, 69-73, 78f; 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, *Muhammad Farid: rams al-ihklas wa tadhiyya (tarikh Misr al-qaumi min 1908 ila 1919)*, 4th Edition (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1984), 309f, 328-334; *Bulletin de la Societe Endjouman Terekki-Islam*, Vol. II, 4-6 (April-June 1914), 222-246, 306-308, 341-349.

³⁷ Goldschmidt, *Memoirs*, 135.

³⁸ FO 371/1364, Kitchener to Grey, 27 October 1912, no. 117; "L'interdiction du congres jeun-egyptien," *Liberte*, 16/17 September 1910.

³⁹ "Le Congres Egyptien interdit: Conversation avec Farid-Bey," *La Parole*, 18 September 1910.

he have to go to “Rome, to Brussels or even to Berlin” for the “right to protest, that France, considered until now the country of liberty par excellence, refuses us?”⁴⁰

To the government’s dismay, much of the French public seemed to agree with Farid’s criticism. France’s left and left-liberal press, stressing the right to free speech, was highly critical of the government’s actions. For instance, the leftist publication *Humanite* pointed to the hypocrisy of the French government, if it outlawed the Egyptians’ meeting but, at the same time, invoked “the modern right of nations to govern themselves when talking about Alsace Lorraine,” which the French were at the time trying to reclaim from Germany.⁴¹ Conservative voices were equally critical of the government’s actions, which they saw as weakening French power, independence, and sovereignty in the face of British demands. A French journalist who interviewed Farid commented that a simple interdiction of the congress would have been acceptable; however, to “admit to foreigners (the Egyptians)” that the French government was obliged to refer to a “neighboring power regarding an internal matter” was unacceptable. It seemed to the interviewer that “we have descended [even] lower than the [tiny] republic of San Marino!”⁴²

In reaction to similar criticism, the French government had already realized the need to bring forward a different line of arguments, according to which the conference had to be outlawed because it was not only directed against Britain, but was also threatening French interests in North Africa. The argument put forth was that the Egyptians did not only pursue a nationalist campaign in a more narrow sense, but were in fact part of a larger movement that included resistance groups in French territories, such as Morocco.⁴³ By appealing to the danger

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ “Le Congrès Egyptien,” *L’Humanite*, 27 September 1910.

⁴² “Le Congrès Egyptien interdit: Conversation avec Farid Bey,” *La Parole*, 18 September 1910.

⁴³ “Au sujet de l’interdiction du congrès égyptien,” *Paris*, 16 September 1910.

to France's standing as an imperial power, the government might not have neutralized the attacks from the left; however, it hoped to bring over the French nationalists to its own side. There was most certainly British pressure in this direction, as well; but there was also the fact that *al-Liwa* had carried out a press campaign against French colonial policy in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria.⁴⁴

Meanwhile, Farid used the international press to convince his readers of the unjust actions of the French against Egyptian activists. In Farid's publication of the incident, he drew attention to the many college students from Egypt who had used up all their resources to travel to Paris for the congress only to learn that to attend they would need to go to Brussels, something which many reportedly could not afford. Farid brought further attention to the fact that many Egyptian activists were stranded in Paris without money after a long voyage that had lost its purpose. Many of the Egyptians who had made it to Brussels, in turn, had arrived at the last minute without having been able to make any arrangements beforehand. They, therefore, had "all the trouble in the world finding a place to stay."⁴⁵ At four o'clock in the morning "one could still see some of them erring around in a lamentable way on their search for a hotel."⁴⁶ For Farid, these images of wandering were symbolic of what the French authorities had done to the Egyptian national cause as a whole. In addition to being something of a media sensation for the Egyptian nationalist cause, the scandal surrounding the Egyptian congress showed the widespread opposition in France to any exaggerated British influence on French internal affairs.

⁴⁴ Blunt writes in his diary that he had received an account by Muhammad Farid and Goma'a of their interview with the Head of the Prime Minister's Cabinet: "He excused the French government by saying 'France was so surrounded by enemies that she could not afford to quarrel with her one friend, England.'" Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *My Diaries; being a personal narrative of events, 1888-1914* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1932), 318.

⁴⁵ "Le congres national egyptien," *Independence Belge*, 23 September 1910.

⁴⁶ "Le congres national egyptien," *Independence Belge*, 23 September 1910.

The strong French public opinion against any hint of cooperation with the British was the very reason Farid concentrated his efforts there.

Despite their concern, British officials noted that it would be fruitless to pressure Belgian authorities to do more than monitor it, as Belgian law allowed for any unarmed gathering.⁴⁷ But prior to their departure for the conference, the Egyptians and Indians met at a party in Paris. There were approximately one-hundred and fifty Egyptian and Indian nationalists, and twenty-five Europeans, mostly French and German journalists, present. The Indians wore badges, and the Egyptians rosettes, of red and white ribbon, the national colors of Egypt.⁴⁸ Muhammad Farid attended the conference in the company of Madame Cama and Sarojini Naidu, an Indian nationalist poet who would become the President of the Indian National Congress, and who was also the sister of Chattopadhyaya. Also in attendance were Aiyar and M.P.T. Acharya.⁴⁹ Chattopadhyaya, Aiyar, and Acharya also took great interest in the preparations for the Congress and had a number of meetings with Farid. Another India House member, Lala Har Dayal, was also there and openly discussed ways to obtain military training for nationalists. The official secretary of the conference, Muhammad Lutfi Goma'a, acknowledged in his memoirs that much

⁴⁷ In another example of the British studiously attempting to work around international laws, when the authorities considered exiling Jawish to Malta in the aftermath of the Dhingra and Dinshawai articles, the Consul-General wrote personally to London to warn, “[H]e must not be sent anywhere where he would have the right to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. According to the enclosed letter from McIlwraith, he would have such a right at Malta. Our Graham is, however, under the impression that Gibraltar is under a special military regime, so that the common law of England would not apply there...it would not do if the Shaykh could regain his liberty under the English law.” (FO 371/892, p. 372, Gorst to Mallen; Khan. 105.)

⁴⁸ Among the Indian attendees were Krishnavarma, S.R. Rana, Nitisen Dwarkadas, Madame Cama, P. Naoroji, C. Naoroji, Chattopadhyaya, Govind Amin, Acharya, Aiyar, Har Dayal, and about six others who were not recognized. (NAI: Home, Political Department, November 1910, Nos. 17-24 B.)

⁴⁹ M.P. Tirumala Acharya (1887-1951) was an editor of the nationalist Tamil weekly *India*, which was printed in Pondicherry in French India, until he left for London in 1908. He became an active member of India House, and at the time of the Dhingra affair was on an assignment to join the Moroccan rebels in order to learn guerrilla warfare. Failing to gain the trust of the rebels, he returned to join his colleagues in Paris. He spent the First World War with the other Indian revo

lutionaries, helping the Central Powers in return for a commitment to free India. He was part of the group that went to Russia afterwards, hoping for Bolshevik support, and subsequently lived in exile in Vienna. He returned to India in 1948.

of the planning for the conference was done in the home of Madame Cama, and the Indians there had helped in the preparations and editing of the speeches.⁵⁰ The Criminal Intelligence Division actually reported during the conference itself that the “Indians had all but overtaken the proceedings.”⁵¹ The main paper, “The Future of Egypt,” read before the Congress by the Secretary al-Ahly, had actually been written by Har Dayal. Another paper, “A Review of the Condition of the Egyptian Army under British Occupation,” read by Dr. Mansur Rifa'at, had been written by Chattopadhyaya.⁵² The speech written by Har Dayal contained a direct reference to India in which the author called upon the Egyptians to prepare for action:

Go to India, see for yourself. India is the eternal and awful warning for all weak and fallen nations. If you wish to observe the effects of British rule, go to India and look around you. May our children never be reduced to such a plight! May they kill themselves nobly and bravely rather than live in Egypt, if Egypt becomes a second India...The failure of the national movement will mean the moral and intellectual death of the nation.⁵³

The 1910 proceedings also included a number of speeches that promoted the growing relationships among anti-British movements. After a speech by Madame Cama, in which she urged Egyptian students to avoid studying in England and go to France or Switzerland instead, India House's Har Dayal is recorded as “causing a stir [by] rising and calling upon all Egyptians to refuse to enter the Egyptian Army.”⁵⁴ However impressed European opinion might have been by the unanimity of Egypt's political parties on the need for national independence, or the seriousness with which they delved into such intriguing questions as “The Evils of the Occupation,” “The Participation of the Army of the Occupation in the Smuggling of Hashish,” and “A Comparison between the Egyptian and Irish Questions;” the most striking feature of the

⁵⁰ Farid, *Awraq*, 378.

⁵¹ *Oeuvres de Congres National Egyptien tenu a Bruxelles le 22,23,24 Septembre 1910*. (Brussels 1910), 101-129; quoted in Horst Kruger, “Indian Nationalist Revolutionaries in Paris before WWI,” *Archiv Orientalni* 45 (1977), 9.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 127

⁵⁴ NAI: Home Department, Political B, November 1910, no. 17-24, Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 18 October 1910, p. 17.

Congress must have been the participation of four members of the British House of Commons.⁵⁵ For example, Kier Hardie attended and delivered a speech in which he warned the delegates about the dangers of Britain's policy of dividing religious and ethnic communities in their colonies.⁵⁶ MP Dillon also weighed in with a promise of Irish Parliamentary support for an Egyptian demand for Home Rule.⁵⁷

At the Brussels Conference, it was decided that close contact would be maintained between the Egyptian, Indian, and Irish national movements. An Irish delegate to the Congress proposed "the formation of an Egyptian, Indian, and Irish congress so as to unite in one gathering the victims of English domination."⁵⁸ A committee of Rifa'at, Dryhurst, and Chatto, representing Egypt, Ireland, and India, respectively, was formed for the purpose. The idea of joint action between the three groups was depicted in a cartoon in *La Patrie Egyptienne*, published in Geneva by Muhammad Farid, which depicts an Irishman putting the corpse of England into a coffin, while Indians and Egyptians dig its grave.⁵⁹

Though Kamil routinely sought French support for Egyptian goals, often appealing to the historical connection between the two nations, he was well aware of the irony of using France's disparaging paternalistic colonial discourse to counter Britain's colonial ambitions, as his 18 September 1895 letter to Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi's secretary shows:

⁵⁵ Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party," 222; A nearly complete list of the papers read by Egyptians at the Congress is provided in 'Abd al-Rahman Al-Rafi'i, *Mudhakkirati 1889-1951* (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, 1952); see, also, reports in *L'éclair*, 22 September 1909, and FO 371/662, Bax-Ironside to Grey, Berne, 29 November 1909, no. 51. No member of the Nationalist Party Administrative Committee addressed the Congress, except Farid, who gave a long speech in French on the evils of British rule in Egypt and the demands of the Nationalist Party. For an Arabic translation, see Rafi'i, 112-6.

⁵⁶ Muhammad Lutfi Goma'a, *Shahid 'ala al-'Asr: mudhakirrat Muhammad Lutfi Goma'a*, Part I, *Silsilat Tarikh al-Misriyeen* (Cairo: Al-Haya Misriyya al-'amma lil Kitab, 2000.), Muhammad Lutfi Goma'a, *Shahid 'ala al-'Asr: mudhakirrat Muhammad Lutfi Goma'a*, Part I, *Silsilat Tarikh al-Misriyeen* (Cairo: Al-Haya Misriyya al-'amma lil Kitab, 2000), 245.

⁵⁷ PRO: FO 371/894, p. 298, Chetham to Grey, 2 October 1910.

⁵⁸ National Archives of India, Home Department, Political B, Nov 1910, nos. 17-24. Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence. October 18, 1910, p 17.

⁵⁹ Report in "Independence Belge," 25 September 1910, quoted in NAI: Home, Political Department, November 1910, Nos. 17-24 B.

Like any realistic person knows, nations only cater to their best interests. The French, just like the English, regardless of how they pretend to be loyal to us, will do whatever is in their best political interests. Therefore through our rapprochement and our amicability toward them we are merely employing a purposeful political maneuver to gain their trust and perhaps, even if it is temporary, we can benefit from them politically.⁶⁰

Working toward this end, throughout his speeches and articles in France, Kamil attempted to stress the commonality of Egyptian and French strategic and political interests, particularly when directed against Great Britain.

At the turn of the twentieth century, France had more economic and cultural capital in Egypt than any other European country, including Great Britain - a reality that the French very much wanted to maintain. Kamil effectively exploited this fact and announced in one of his speeches that Britain was working hard to end the annual Egyptian student missions to France, in order to “bring an end to French influence, which is still very extensive and overly dominant.”⁶¹ Similarly, in an 18 June 1899 speech presented in Juliette Adam’s salon in Paris, he declared to the audience:

The wars which your neighbors from across the English-Channel have been waging against your cultural influence and prestige on the banks of the Nile is without a name. English hate has especially targeted the French language, for they have been zealously and tirelessly attempting to replace their language for yours.⁶²

Kamil even melodramatically declared to his audience that “destroying French influence in Egypt” ranked as the number one British internal policy in Egypt.⁶³

Kamil was especially adept at tapping into the intellectual resources and professional contacts of some of his European friends and acquaintances. Occasionally, he went so far as to

⁶⁰ See Kamil’s 18 September 1895 letter to ‘Abd al-Rahim Ahmad, in Kamil, *Awraq Mustafa Kamil*, 51-2.

⁶¹ Kamil, *Egyptiens et Anglais*, 28.

⁶² Kamil, *Egyptiens et Anglais*, 213, 216.

⁶³ See Kamil’s 18 June 1899 speech presented in Adam’s Paris salon, reprinted in Kamil, *Egyptiens et Anglais*, 213, 216. See also Kamil’s 11 December 1895 speech presented at the Societe de Geographie de Paris, reprinted in Kamil, *Egyptiens et Anglais*, 51. In this early speech, he declared to the audience: “All that England does in Egypt against our interests is in reality directed at France as well.” (Ziad Fahmy, “Francophone Egyptian Nationalists,” 178.)

instruct some of them to write articles and letters on the Egyptian question to the editors of mainstream French newspapers.⁶⁴ In a letter dated 29 May 1904, one week before he was due to deliver a major political speech in Alexandria, Kamil dictated to Juliette Adam a short news dispatch detailing his yet-to-be-delivered speech: “I would be very happy to see a dispatch in *Le Figaro* which reads: ‘Mustafa Kamil, the editor of *al-Liwa* has given a speech yesterday night in Alexandria in front of a large crowd of listeners...the speaker affirmed that the Egyptian people are motivated more than ever before to achieve national independence.’”⁶⁵ In another letter to Adam, dated 21 July 1906, Kamil, incensed over British newspaper articles characterizing Egyptians as religious fanatics, solicited Adam for a response: “I beseech you to write an article in the *Figaro*, the *Gaulois* or even a letter in the *Temps*, to describe the degree of tolerance and hospitality you witnessed when you were in Egypt.”⁶⁶ Publicity campaigns, however, did not take place in a political vacuum. Anti-British sentiment and a growing consensus of the need for British withdrawal from Egypt were already taking root in France. By the mid-1880s the French public was inundated with mainstream French newspapers calling for British withdrawal from Egypt. Many of the articles discussed possible timeframes for the British evacuation of Egypt and stressed the importance of such an evacuation for “engendering France’s ‘benevolent’ secularizing policies in the Orient.”⁶⁷ Anti-colonialists were often able to appeal to German or French populations’ beliefs in granting political asylum to refugees, for example, and to these Europeans’ interest in protecting their national independence against pressure from abroad. Anti-colonial nationalists could thereby create public scandals that severely restricted the possibilities

⁶⁴ See Kamil, *Lettres Egyptiennes Francaises*, 126-8.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 136.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 248; Ziad Fahmy, “Francophone Egyptian Nationalists,” 178.

⁶⁷ See Ella-Rachel Arie, “L’opinion publique en France et la question d’Egypt de 1885 a 1895,” *Orient* 27 (1963), 65-6. See, also, *La Republique Francaise* 14 May 1886 and 14 August 1887; Ziad Fahmy, “Francophone Egyptian Nationalists, Anti-British Discourse, and European Public Opinion, 1885-1910: The Case of Mustafa Kamil and Ya’qub Sannu’,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2008), 183.

for government action against them. Throughout the pre-war and inter-war periods, the fear of negative political repercussions resulting from public scandals, particularly in Europe or the United States, was surprisingly successful in restraining the British government's activities. In this context, it is important to note the strong negative reactions in the French public sphere to any open collaboration between British and French officials against anti-colonialists.

Kamil and, later, Farid were fully aware of the intricacies of British colonial discourse regarding Egyptians' fundamental unsuitability for self-government, and took every opportunity to publicly refute it. As far as the nationalists were concerned, the source of Egypt's problems was not any defective character of its people or its social institutions, but rather British occupation and the policies of the colonial administration. The nationalists obviously had a stake in portraying Egyptians as a mature and civilized people who were, thus, fit for immediate self-government. Egypt was not, Kamil insisted, like the Congo or Somalia, where European colonial rule might be justified by the low level of civilization of the indigenous population.⁶⁸ In a speech presented to the Societe de Geographie de Paris, Kamil denounced the British assertion that "Egyptians are not fit to govern their own country is a calumny, which any reasonable person must refute."⁶⁹ Kamil also addressed the issue in the British press. In a letter to the editor of *The Times*, Kamil announced:

You will tell me, I know, that the Egyptians are not ripe as yet for self-government. It is the old answer, the answer we always get...Our nation has awakened, and nobody will be able to command its sleeping. Instead of crying out at it that it awoke too soon, or that it is dreaming, it is necessary to satisfy its vital necessities.⁷⁰

The Nationalists were, therefore, suspicious when their political opponents published books and articles emphasizing the backwardness and fanaticism of the Egyptian masses, fearing

⁶⁸ Lockman, 170.

⁶⁹ Kamil, *Egyptiens et Anglais*, 72.

⁷⁰ *The Times*, 13 April 1907; Ziad Fahmy, "Francophone Egyptian Nationalists," 179.

such depictions would be used to legitimize British rule. From their perspective, the elimination of British rule rather than its perpetuation was a precondition for social progress. As proof, the nationalists cited the failure of Egypt's British controlled government to spend sufficiently on education. The nationalists, therefore, vigorously denounced suggestions that independence be put off until an inevitably lengthy process of reform had prepared the way. As they saw it, occupation under any pretext meant continued backwardness and subjugation.

Kamil also addressed accusations of Egyptian (and wider Islamic) fanaticism, and announced in one of his speeches that not only had the "English committed an injustice after an injustice, but they have convinced Europe that we are a fanatic people, hostile to all Christians. This is the biggest of all lies! We are not fanatics, or hostile to Christians. We are a wise and hospitable people and the proof is incontestable."⁷¹ To make his case, Kamil mentioned that for thirteen centuries Egyptian Copts and Muslims had lived together like brothers. Concerning Egypt's treatment of Europeans, he declared, "For the last century, we were in direct contact with Europe and especially France, and we were never hostile to anyone. On the contrary, the entire world finds in Egypt the most generous hospitality. If our enemies claim that we are religious fanatics, it is time to put an end to their legendary deceits."⁷² Because the British frequently equated Egyptian nationalism with religious fanaticism and xenophobia (both of which charges would strike a chord with other colonial powers), Kamil coined the slogan "Libre chez nous, hospitaliers por tous" (Free in our country, hospitality to all), which would later become the motto of the English, French, and Arabic versions of *al-Liwa/The Standard*.⁷³

⁷¹ Kamil, *Egyptiens et Anglais*, 36-7.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 36-7.

⁷³ "Ahrar fi balaadina, kuruma li-dhiyufina." Kamil, *Egyptiens et Anglais*, 73; Ziad Fahmy, "Francophone Egyptian Nationalists," 179-80.

Perhaps no other issue did more to promote the cause of Egyptian nationalism in Europe and among European publics than the 1906 Dinshawai trial and subsequent executions. Kamil was keenly aware that in order to maximize the political capital of this incident, arousing the Egyptian masses would not be enough; and so he quickly set out to internationalize the incident.⁷⁴ On 11 July 1906, he wrote a lengthy article to *Le Figaro* titled “A la nation anglaise et au monde civilise,” which publicized and condemned the events.⁷⁵ Kamil’s account of the Denshawai trials caused widespread revulsion in European circles already predisposed to think the worst of British rule in Egypt. According to Kamil, “the Dinshawai affair has certainly produced in England a very painful impression: it has had nevertheless this salutary effect of making everybody understand that the Egyptians do not love the Occupation, contrary to the official assertions, and of drawing more closely their attention to Egypt.”⁷⁶ The *Figaro* article was carefully crafted to shame the British into making political concessions; it caused an instant journalistic sensation throughout continental Europe; and, more importantly for putting pressure on the British government, for the first time some mainstream British newspapers were sympathetically covering Kamil.⁷⁷

Foreign Secretary Edward Grey made an attempt to justify Cromer’s actions regarding the Dinshawai incident by stating in Parliament that “Islamic fanaticism had flared up all over

⁷⁴ Partly because of these events, Cromer detested Kamil and inexplicably left out any direct mention of him in both of his books on Egypt. When Cromer did refer to Kamil, he never mentioned the latter by name, calling him either the “foolish youth” or the “Gallicised Egyptian.” For example, in *Abbas II*, Cromer wrote, “Every feather-headed young Egyptian who thought himself of equal if not of superior mental caliber to his British official superior, rallied around the foolish youth, who – probably without being fully aware of it – had raised the standard of revolt against Western civilization. The Gallicised Egyptian, who posed as a reformer, joined hands with the retrograde pasha.” See Earl of Cromer, *Abbas II* (London, 1915), 34-5; Ziad Fahmy, “Francophone Egyptian Nationalists,” 178-9.

⁷⁵ *Le Figaro*, 11 July 1906. The article is included in Adam, *L’Angleterre en Egypte*, 151-9.

⁷⁶ Kamil, *Letters*, 247-8.

⁷⁷ *The Tribune* even demanded that the Egyptians be given self-rule. See *Tribune* (London), 14 July 1906, quoted in Kamil, *Lettres*, 244.

North Africa, and likewise in Egypt.”⁷⁸ Echoing this, the pro-British *al-Muqattam* published an article under the title: “Fanaticism spreads about and takes violent forms,” in which it was argued that the so-called fanaticism of Egyptian Muslims had to be kept in check by the British Occupation by whatever means necessary. This attempt to cast nationalists as uncivilized fanatics did not have the intended effect on domestic Egyptian audiences, however. According to Salama Musa, “Once I saw some young men buying copies of *al-Muqattam* and tearing them to pieces so that nobody could read them. Even Copts, who had so far shrunk from taking part in the national movement, now became nationalistic-minded and anti-British.”⁷⁹

The British Response

The British were also well aware of the dangers of inciting European public opinion in support of Egypt, according to a 1907 article in *The Times* of London:

If any fresh proof were required that it is somebody’s interest to make mischief between England and France by reviving, if possible, in a new form the Egyptian question, it would be found in the persistent efforts of the Egyptian Nationalists to enlist sympathy for their cause in this country (France) through the medium of the Paris Press. A short time ago the Nationalist agitator Mustapha Kamel (Mustafa Kamil) Pasha ventilated his views in the *Temps*. Today he contributes an article to *Le Figaro*.⁸⁰

Even after the signing of the Entente Cordiale, the British felt threatened by Kamil’s European campaign:

The Egyptian nationalists...seek through last night’s publication in the *Temps* to denounce England to France and to enlist French sympathy for their cause. If successful, they would kill two birds with one stone. They would further their own affairs as well as the policy of Germany so far as it is directed toward undermining the Anglo-French entente.⁸¹

⁷⁸ Zachary Lockman, “Imagining the Working Class: Culture, Nationalism, and Class Formation in Egypt, 1899-1914,” *Poetics Today*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer 1994), “Imagining the Working Class: Culture, Nationalism, and Class Formation in Egypt, 1899-1914,” *Poetics Today*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer 1994), 170.

⁷⁹ Salama Musa, *The Education of Salama Musa* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), 32.

⁸⁰ *The Times* (London), Paris correspondent, 29 April 1907.

⁸¹ *The Times*, 14 January 1907. Kamil was frequently attacked by the *London Times*; see *The Times*, 13 September 1906; 14 and 28 January 1907; 2, 23, and 27 March 1907; 8, 13, and 29 April 1907; and 15, 19, and 27 July 1907; Ziad Fahmy, “Francophone Egyptian Nationalists,” 183.

In what they referred to as “counterblast propaganda,” the British authorities began to launch their own press campaigns in Europe.⁸² Leading papers in France, Italy, and Switzerland were supplied with what the British saw as “full and accurate information as to events in Egypt.”⁸³ One strategy that British officials employed was to make use of the members of the French press to whom they had the most direct access, namely the British correspondents of French newspapers. The hope was that if these correspondents were provided with a pro-British interpretation of events, they would telegraph it back to their papers in Paris and elsewhere in France. There it would work like an anti-body against a possible infection of “seditious” Egyptian thoughts.⁸⁴

Against this background, a major concern of British authorities in Cairo was the foreign press’ criticism of their policy toward Egypt. As Robert Greg, an official on loan to the Egyptian government, wrote in a report to the British residency in Cairo in April 1919, “the foreign colonies here were at the outset far from ill-disposed to the Nationalist Movement, and so far as their letters to Europe have escaped censorship are not likely to contribute to putting our (Great Britain’s) case in a favourable light on the Continent.”⁸⁵ High Commissioner Edmund Allenby (1861-1936) then wrote to the foreign secretary, Lord Curzon, arguing that it was essential for leading European newspapers such as *Le Temps* (Paris), *Journal des Debats* (Paris), *L’Echo de Paris*, *Journal de Geneva*, and *Corriere della Sera* (Milan) to be “supplied with full and accurate information on what is going on [in Egypt.]”⁸⁶ And, as the High Commissioner elaborated, this

⁸² FO 608/213/5, “French Press & Egyptian Nationalist Claims,” 28 April 1919.

⁸³ FO 608/213/5, Cypher telegram to General Allenby (Cairo) to Foreign Office, 24 April 1919.

⁸⁴ FO 608/213/5, Derby to Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., Paris, 25 April 1919; Daniel Brueckenhaus, “The Transnational Surveillance of Anti-Colonial Movements in Western Europe, 1905-1945,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 2011), 231.

⁸⁵ FO 141/522, file no. 9085, part I, Greg to John F.A. Cecil, 13 April 1919.

⁸⁶ FO 608/213/5, Decypher, General Allenby, 17 April 1919.

was especially crucial “in view of (the) propaganda which the Nationalists will certainly carry on abroad and the large sums they will be willing to spend on subsidizing more venal [foreign] newspapers.”⁸⁷

In terms of the press campaign’s content, the central strategy was to counter the Egyptian’s arguments about a unity of interest between the Egyptian population and the French, while British officials tried to argue that the Egyptian’s efforts were not a localized and specific threat to British rule alone but constituted a much more general anti-imperial danger. The British authorities stressed, first of all, that the Egyptians’ activities were undermining the standing of all colonial powers in North Africa. After all, the agitation in Egypt could easily lead to “a nationalist movement with Turkish [sic] sympathies spreading along [the whole of the] North African littoral.”⁸⁸ To this end, Allenby thought it necessary that British officials in Paris, Rome, and Berne be supplied with weekly news telegrams about the situation in Egypt. These telegrams, he added, ought to emphasize the danger of a nationalist movement with Ottoman sympathies spreading from Egypt to the detriment of both French and Italian colonization projects, the growth of a “Bolshevist anarchical spirit” in Egypt, the threat to European property in Egypt, and the potential disruption of trade and menace to foreign interest, business and institutions.⁸⁹

The intense focus on influencing European publics and governments had consequences not only for the Watani Party, but also for Egyptian nationalism, in general. Kamil’s privileging of his campaign abroad, rather than an immediate organization of the Nationalist Party in Egypt, was a critical mistake. Not only did it result in a lack of centralization within the Watani Party, but it allowed for the domestic emergence of the Umma Party with its prestigious membership

⁸⁷ FO 608/213/5, Decypher, General Allenby, 17 April 1919.

⁸⁸ Brueckenhaus, 231.

⁸⁹ FO 141/522, file no. 9085, part I, Allenby to Foreign Office, 17 April 1919, telegram no. 590.

and more moderate program. Moreover, despite the gains Egyptian nationalists made in European circles, their impact within Egypt was significantly less. The relocation of the nationalists to Europe, and their focus on their campaign there, resulted in a generation of radicals who were unable to translate their effectiveness in Europe into a strong, cohesive movement at home, and who largely proved useless following the defeat of the Central Powers.⁹⁰

Active participation in political life within Egypt became increasingly difficult throughout the early twentieth century, thereby pushing leading personalities of the National Party into exile in Europe, from where they then attempted to organize nationalist resistance within Egypt. The repressive measures of successive British Consul-Generals, in addition to internal disputes, weakened the Nationalist Party within Egypt and deprived it of its leaders, which resulted in the shift of its activity to cities outside Egypt. Small groups of expatriates clustered in, for example, Constantinople, where Shaykh Jawish held an influential position editing CUP newspapers; and in Geneva, where Farid took refuge after traveling for several months from one country to another to avoid extradition. With the outbreak of the First World War, the Nationalists outside Egypt, not hampered by government censorship, surveillance, or internment, suddenly found themselves transformed from being a discredited movement of student activists into a valuable appendage of the Turco-German war machine and of the retinue of the exiled Khedive. Because their membership drew on the most radical individuals, who had either been exiled or chose to leave Egypt to avoid jail or other punishment, the cohort of Egyptian nationalists in Western Europe tended to belong to the more radical branches of Watani Party. For example, Egyptian nationalists such as Farid, Jawish, and Rifa'at, as well as Tunisian Salih ash-Sharif, Algerian al-Hajj 'Abdallah, Moroccan Muhammad 'Itabi, and Syrian Shakib

⁹⁰ This may be contrasted with the Indian example, in which the Indian nationalist movement benefited from earlier generations of students studying in England and then returning with the new technologies of mass politics, which they then used to effectively organize a wide portion of the population.

Arslan spent the First World War in exile in Constantinople, Berlin, and Geneva. This concentration of leading nationalists would result in increasing radicalization and collaboration among these activists. However, the absence of Watani leaders from Egypt, combined with their support for the Ottoman Empire during the War, would also result in their increasing inability to influence the domestic nationalist movement.

Chapter Six: Egyptian Nationalists, the Ottoman Empire, and World War I

Because of ‘Abbas Hilmi’s collaboration with the Occupation government under the entente policy with Gorst, in the eyes of many Egyptians he had become a traitor to the nationalist cause, and opposition to his authority grew.¹ Because of the mounting tide of political persecutions in Egypt in the first decade of the twentieth century, an increasing number of ‘Abbas Hilmi’s opponents left Egypt to work abroad, particularly in the friendly environment of the Young Turks’ capital at Constantinople. Whereas Egypt had been a haven for Turkish exiles, the Ottoman Empire after 1908 became a refuge for Egyptian reformers, progressives, and critics of ‘Abbas Hilmi’s regime. Egyptian nationalists welcomed the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and sent a delegation to Constantinople in 1909 to court the possibility of formal Egyptian representation in the restored Ottoman parliament. Eventually, upon the ouster of the Watanist Party’s chief, Muhammad Farid, and its publicist, Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Jawish, from Egypt in 1911, the two Watanist leaders progressed to Constantinople, where they entered into collaboration with the Ottoman regime for the purpose of promoting clandestine opposition to the British presence in Egypt. Farid had decided that the Nationalist Party should adopt a strategy of supporting the Ottoman Empire (and, when the First World War erupted, Germany as well) and assist the Ottomans in the War to the best of its ability. When, for instance, a group of Egyptian students based in London asked for his advice regarding whether one of their manifestos should call for the “total” independence of their home country, Farid urged them to

¹ Eldon Gorst was sent to replace Lord Cromer in 1907 by the new Liberal party government, with instructions to give Egyptians greater responsibility to manage their internal affairs. With his *politique d’entente*, Gorst quickly improved relations with Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi and weakened the National Party. The appointment of Butrus Ghali as prime minister, popularly ascribed to Gorst, angered the Nationalists and many other Muslims, leading to press attacks. Butrus’ subsequent assassination, and the extremely unpopular revival of the Press Law and Gorst’s attempt to extend the Suez Canal concession, caused Gorst to abandon his lenient policy in favor of a harsher one, using the Exceptional Laws and various penal measures to stifle the Nationalists. (Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., *Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 65-6.)

omit the adjective in the question, lest it alienate the Committee of Union and Progress government.²

Moreover, the nationalists found that the Ottoman government was most accommodating in arranging employment for those who found themselves in Europe without monetary support. Egyptian nationalists were shown favor under the Young Turk administration, both because of the Watanists' general willingness to support the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against the British, and the nationalists' increasing animosity toward 'Abbas Hilmi, with whom the Young Turks were also increasingly at odds. In Constantinople, Egyptian nationalists found that the Young Turks were willing to meet with them and allow them freedom to campaign against 'Abbas Hilmi's refusal to relinquish his autocratic power - power that he was now sharing more willingly with the British under the entente that existed between Gorst and the Khedive.

Farid grounded this policy in Egyptian national interests. Egypt, he believed, could liberate itself from British occupation and achieve political independence only through the military strength of the Ottomans and the Germans. Once this was achieved, he hoped that the Ottomans would permit Egyptian autonomy under the aegis of the nationalist movement headed by Farid and the Watani party. Until the fundamental incompatibilities of their visions became clear in the course of the War, Watani Nationalists, almost all of whom were idealistic exiled expatriates with limited resources, were happy to take whatever support they could from the Young Turk government. It was this fundamental difference between Egyptian territorial, anti-colonial nationalism and multi-national Ottomanism that would eventually undermine any Young Turk-Egyptian Nationalist collaboration.

² Ralph M. Coury, *The Making of an Egyptian Arab Nationalist* (Reading, England: Ithaca Press, 1998), 91-2, note 86.

In the period leading up to the First World War, the Ottoman capital served as a safe haven, not only for Watani nationalists, but also for the Khedive himself. In Constantinople, ‘Abbas was pressured to demonstrate his goodwill toward the Young Turks in tangible ways; after his initial resistance, financial “contributions” were exacted from him.³ In an attempt to win friends in the new Ottoman regime, ‘Abbas Hilmi purchased what was described as a sizeable interest in the newspaper *Tanin*, the main Young Turk organ. Of course, ‘Abbas Hilmi faced no easy task in acquiring popularity in Young Turk circles after his long history of harassment of the Young Turks in Egypt at the Sultan’s behest. ‘Abbas Hilmi also had influential enemies in Constantinople, the most important of whom was a prominent member of the Halim branch of the Muhammad ‘Ali dynasty living in Turkey, Prince Sa’id Halim, who was widely suspected of having his own ambitions to become Khedive of Egypt. Nevertheless, ‘Abbas Hilmi did his best to charm important Young Turks by being pleasant and hospitable during his 1909 visit and trying to overlook the differences in political outlook that separated him from the Young Turk regime.⁴

The Young Turks seemed eager to cooperate with Egyptian nationalists against ‘Abbas Hilmi, however. For example, Muhammad Farid was praised in a Turkish newspaper, *Courrier d’Orient*, which, after speaking of Turco-Egyptian fraternity, proceeded to claim that there was virtually no one in Egypt who did not advocate Ottoman solidarity – except for the entourage of the Khedive.⁵ Articles in the Ottoman press similarly advertised that many of the leaders of the Egyptian nationalist movement were now living in Constantinople and that they were insisting that ‘Abbas Hilmi proclaim a constitution similar to the revived Ottoman one.⁶ Nevertheless,

³ FO 800/193, Lowther to Hardinge, 27 July 1909.

⁴ FO 371/662, Lowther to Grey, No. 34192, 7 September 1909.

⁵ FO 371/662, Extract from the *Courrier d’Orient*, 19 July 1909.

⁶ FO 371/661 Lowther to Grey, 15 March 1909.

British Intelligence in Constantinople discovered a secret report, addressed to the Committee of Union and Progress, recommending cooperation with Egypt's Nationalists to enhance the prestige of the Caliphate.⁷ Likewise, a Constantinople weekly, *Sirat-i Mustaqim (The Straight Path)*, eulogized Ibrahim Wardani, the assassin of Butrus Ghali; and the Committee of Union and Progress' Arabic mouthpiece, *Dar al-Khilafa*, was barred from Egypt for printing an anti-British article ascribed to 'Ali al-Ghayati.⁸ The British also knew of other links between the Young Turks and the Nationalists, such as Baha al-Din al-Monastirli in Cairo, and several estranged relatives of the Khedive resident in Constantinople.⁹ Similarly, Egyptian students who were members in nationalist groups were also able to gain admittance to Turkish schools after they had been expelled from Egyptian schools for their association with Wardani or other nationalists.¹⁰

By 1909, then, Constantinople had become the destination for Egyptian nationalists of all stripes, including Egyptian opponents of 'Abbas Hilmi's rule. Nationalist leaders such as Muhammad Farid and Sheikh 'Abdul 'Aziz Jawish found support and encouragement from high ranking persons there and a safe haven from the persecutions to which they were being subjected

⁷ FO 371/893, Lowther to Grey, Therapia, 4 July 1910, no. 443, Secret.

⁸ FO 371/893, Cheetham to Mallet, Cairo, 14 August 1910, private. One of the best known of the early exiles was poet 'Ali al-Ghayati, who fled to Anatolia to escape the sentence which had been issued in absentia as a result of his publication of the nationalist poem, "Wataniyyati," attacking Khedivial despotism. ('Ali al-Ghayati, *Wataniyyati*, 2nd edition (Cairo, 1938). The book contained three introductions, by Muhammad Farid, 'Abd al-'Aziz Jawish, and al-Ghayati himself. Accused of commending al-Ghayati's revolutionary book, both Farid and Jawish were tried in criminal court and sentenced to six and three months, respectively.) Once in Constantinople, al-Ghayati, like the Young Turk exiles in Egypt in the previous era, turned to journalism, working for the newspaper *Dar al-Khilafa*. On 13 September, 1910, he published a poem that insulted 'Abbas Hilmi and called for a revolution. There were subsequent attempts to smuggle the paper into Egypt, at least some of which were thwarted by Egyptian customs. (FO 371/894, Cheetham to Grey No. 35445, 24 September 1910.)

⁹ FO 371/ 893, Cheetham to Grey, Ramleh, 9 September 1910, Private; Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party," 253-4.

¹⁰ In 1909, Wardani himself had been received by the Sultan as a member of a Young Egypt deputation. (FO 371/1892, Lowther to Grey, 10 October 1910.)

in Egypt.¹¹ Just as Egypt in previous years had refused to extradite Turkish political refugees, so now the Turks refused to hand over Egyptian political figures to the Egyptian authorities for prosecution.¹²

Watani member, writer, and editor Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Jawish made his first trip to Constantinople in January 1909, and in April of the same year, Farid arrived.¹³ Farid made a second trip to Constantinople in July of the same year, this time at the head of a large Nationalist delegation to attend the official celebration of the first anniversary of the restoration of the Ottoman Constitution. Included in the delegation were three members of the Watani Party Administrative Committee, and a few younger Nationalists, one of whom was Ibrahim Wardani. One of the delegates also represented the Umma Party. To the considerable annoyance of the Khedive, who was also in Constantinople, the delegation was invited to attend the Committee of Union and Progress banquet held on 23 July at Yıldız Palace. ‘Abbas Hilmi and Ambassador Lowther both complained to the Porte about what they considered favoritism shown toward the Nationalists, and they helped prevent Farid’s delegation from later obtaining an audience with the Sultan.

Muhammad Farid returned to Constantinople in March 1912, fleeing his Egyptian jail sentence for his participation in the publication of al-Ghayati’s book of nationalist poems. He left

¹¹ Jawish was feted in Constantinople, while ‘Abbas’ relations with the Young Turks were in a state of serious disrepair. (FO 371/1113, Cheetham to Grey, No. 17006, 29 April 1911.) Farid also enjoyed a tenuous relationship with the CUP government. In his memoirs, he recorded that Enver Pasha had been enthusiastic in welcoming him, while Tal’at had been reserved and Cemal Pasha had barely concealed his contempt. (Goldschmidt, “Egyptian Nationalist Party,” 308.)

¹² FO 371/893, Cheetham to Foreign Office, 9 September 1910.

¹³ FO 371/659, Lowther to Grey, Constantinople, 8 February 1909, no. 44; Muhammad Farid, *Awraq Muhammad Farid* (Cairo: Al-Haya Misriyya al-‘amma lil Kitab, 1978), 6f. According to Farid, “I stayed in Constantinople until 3 May 1913. While I was there I tried to revive the Egyptian Club, which had been shut down and its members dispersed because of Kamil Pasha’s oppression of the Egyptian nationalists, the arrest of Shaykh Jawish, and his extradition to the Egyptian government in an effort to please the British and the Khedive. It continues to make progress and did take part in the student congress that was held in Geneva from 25 to 30 July 1914, appointing Isma’il Labib to represent it. I think it very likely that Mahmud Mazhar, who fired the bullets at the Khedive on 25 July, was one of its members.” (Muhammad Farid, Arthur Goldschmidt, *The Memoirs and Diaries of Muhammad Farid: An Egyptian Nationalist Leader (1868-1919)* (San Francisco: Mellon University Research Press, 1992), 53.)

again in August when the Young Turk government fell and a pro-British new cabinet took power. During his time there, however, he broke with Jawish as he had with the Khedive, because the former refused to print articles attacking the latter. According to Farid,

Only occasionally would I go to Istanbul to get some articles published in *Le Jeune Turc* or *al-Hilal al-Uthmani* before we quarreled with Shaykh Jawish.¹⁴ One hint of the conflict was his pained look at having to publish my articles against the khedive, leading to his refusal eventually to print them at all.¹⁵

Jawish's position as a paid employee of the Ottomans had made him cautious, particularly in the year that the CUP government was out of power. As a result, Farid then turned to the French paper *La Siècle* and published articles in which he accused 'Abbas Hilmi of aspiring to replace the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph, an accusation which would be repeated much more often in the future.

Well before the advent of the First World War, rifts were already starting to show within the different factions of the Watani Party. Though there were obvious strains between the Watani nationalists and the Khedive himself, there were, likewise, increasing signs of stress within the Party. The Egyptian expats (as well as naturalized Egyptians who did keep their contact with Egypt) in Constantinople were roughly divided into two groups, loosely represented by Jawish, on the one hand, and Farid, on the other.¹⁶ This split between the two major figures in the Watani movement would prove to have serious detrimental effects on the Party's possibility for success. Farid himself was most distrustful of the intentions of the Young Turk regime concerning Egypt, fearing the restoration of "despotic" Ottoman rule over Egypt, and that the Young Turks wished

¹⁴ *Le Jeune Turc* was a morning paper founded by CUP leader Jelal Nuri in 1908. One of Farid's articles was mentioned in a dispatch from Yusuf Siddiq to Khedive Abbas, Chibukle, 7 May 1912 (French), in the Abbas Hilmi papers, Durham, file 85/172, microfilm 25.

¹⁵ Farid, *Awraq*, 47-8.

¹⁶ Farid, *Awraq*, 191, 292-3.

to “eat Egypt.”¹⁷ He demonstrated a typically Egyptian sense of superiority to the Ottoman “Turks,” maintaining that “we [Egyptians] are much more advanced than they [Turks]” and asserting that Egyptians would not accept the re-imposition of any form of autocratic Ottoman rule.¹⁸

By the start of War, Farid was particularly suspicious, bitter, and critical of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Jawish.¹⁹ Their relations, as portrayed in Farid’s diaries, especially between 1912 and 1919, were characterized by resentment and enmity on Farid’s part. Farid and Jawish were at the time widely (and in subsequent historiography) seen as the joint successors of Mustafa Kamil’s nationalist legacy. They shared the experience of being political exiles forced to conduct their nationalist struggle from abroad, as well as offering consistent support for the Ottoman Empire. Despite all this, Farid unfailingly feared the disloyalty, intrigues, and opportunism which he believed Jawish embodied. According to Farid, “The shaykh’s opposition to me became apparent during my political activities when the Khedive came to Istanbul in the summer of 1912, for we had decided, together with the students, to stage a demonstration against him at the train station. The shaykh urged me to call it off and advised the students to stay away.”²⁰ Furthermore, in Farid’s opinion, Jawish had no legitimate place in the leadership of the Nationalist Party. “The man [Jawish] would have fallen into oblivion,” Farid wrote in February 1913, “if the Unionists (the Committee of Union and Progress government) had not given him a job in some matters

¹⁷ Farid, *Awraq*, 192, 280.

¹⁸ Farid, *Awraq*, 280.

¹⁹ Farid and Jawish met at the International Congress of Orientalists in Algiers in April 1905. Farid and Jawish [“Chawiche”] were listed in *Actes du XIVe Congrès International des Orientalistes, Alger, 1905* (Paris: LeRoux, 1906), vol. I. (Farid, *Awraq*, 92.)

²⁰ Farid, *Awraq*, 46. (FO 141/746/1, Ahmed Mukhtar and Sheikh Shawish,”10, 11, 15 September 1912.) Farid went on to comment that “In Istanbul I received the best possible welcome and much willingness on the part of the CUP to help me, but a quarrel arose between Shaykh Jawish and me over the [Egyptian] students, their club, and their political activity without him. [Dr.] Ahmad Fu’ad was aiding his new policy, which called for closing the [students’] club and stopping their political activity. I backed the students. The club continued despite the disdain of the shaykh and his helpers.” (Farid, *Awraq*, 45)

involving the Arabs and education. This is the result of his vacillation and weakness.”²¹ In early 1916, Farid wrote that a high official of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry had told him that Jawish was presenting himself as an official spokesman of the Nationalist Party. Farid answered: “We don’t care what Jawish says because he has no position in our party, because he wasn’t a member of our administrative board or even an ordinary member, just a salaried writer for our newspapers, to write for our benefit, as he now writes for Germany in Berlin.”²² On another occasion, Farid sharply condemned what he perceived to be Jawish’s opportunistic support for the Grand Vizier Sa’id Halim Pasha, Farid’s chief rival in the ruling Ottoman leadership, and someone Farid held in utter contempt; and Jawish’s work with Tal’at Pasha (1874-1921), who was minister of posts and the most influential Committee of Union and Progress member.²³ From Jawish’s perspective, however, the fall out with Farid had been due to Farid’s jealousy as a result of Jawish refusing to publish articles Farid had sent (the two men clearly differed as to why the articles had not been printed), in addition to a spat between the two men’s families.

Farid’s memoirs leave no doubt that the acrimonious relations and deep rifts between the two were severely detrimental to the effectiveness of the Egyptian nationalist struggle as it was waged by the Watani Party from 1912 to 1919. The new pressures generated by the eruption of the First World War and the need to reorganize the Egyptian nationalist struggle led Farid to reach an agreement with Jawish on furthering the “Egyptian question” during the War. It was, apparently, a temporary and shaky accord, however. Farid continued to suspect that Jawish was duplicitous, owing conflicting allegiances to several opposing groups, including to Farid, the Khedive, the Ottomans, and Arab nationalists. Jawish was also suspected of being an “informer”

²¹ Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., (trans.) *The Memoirs and Diaries of Muhammad Farid, an Egyptian Nationalist Leader (1868-1919)* (San Francisco: Mellon University Research Press, 1992), 96.

²² Goldschmidt, *Memoirs*, 339.

²³ Goldschmidt, *Memoirs*, 346.

for the CUP on the activities of Farid and the nationalist exiles.²⁴ It was Jawish, not Farid, who consistently had the ear of the leading Young Turks; so, Farid's three-month stay in Constantinople in 1913 accomplished almost nothing to establish closer ties with the Young Turk government. According to the journal *The Near East*, of 13 October 1913, Farid was actually given 1500 Francs to leave Constantinople, ostensibly because he was fomenting dissension among the Turks. During his stay, Farid had written an article accusing nationalist and khedival advisor Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf of aiding an Arab separatist society in Cairo and had inspired a pamphlet blaming the Khedive for the Ottoman reverses in the first Balkan War of 1912.²⁵

Shaykh Jawish returned to Constantinople in 1912. The former editor of *al-Liwa* had spent most of the previous year smuggling arms to the Ottoman forces defending Libyan Tripoli from Italian attack.²⁶ Returning to his journalistic activity under the aegis of the Sultan and the Committee of Union and Progress, Jawish became the editor of *al-Hilal al-Uthmani* (*The Ottoman Crescent*), which started publishing in March 1912 as a daily; and Constantinople's *al-'Alam al-Islami* (*The Islamic World*), both labeled "Pan-Islamic" by British officials. In editing

²⁴ Farid, *Awraq*, 424.

²⁵ Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian National Party," 288, 288n2. Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf (1863-1913) was a journalist and founder of *al-Muayyad*, the first Muslim paper to challenge and later surpass in popularity the dominant Syrian dailies, *al-Ahram* and *al-Muqattam*. When 'Abbas succeeded to the khedivate, *al-Muayyad* became the Palace organ, often publishing articles by Mustafa Kamil and others hostile to the British occupation. 'Ali later broke with the National Party, as the Khedive became more and more reconciled with the British. He eventually became estranged from the nationalist movement. As 'Abbas drew closer to Gorst, 'Ali espoused collaboration with the British occupation and created a Palace-based political party. He later also distanced himself from the paper he himself had created.

²⁶ The example of Tunisia, which the French had first detached from the Ottoman Empire, and then taken possession of, was a cautionary tale to the Egyptian nationalists. (James Jankowski, "Ottomanism and Arabism in Egypt, 1860-1914," *Muslim World*, Vol. 70, No. 3/4 (July 1980), 232.) Influential figures in Cairo quickly rallied to the Ottoman cause during the 1911-12 war with Italy for control of Libya: Prime Minister Muhammad Sa'id denounced as traitors all those who argued that the conflict offered an opportunity for Egypt to assert its independence from the Empire, while Prince 'Umar Tusun led a public campaign to raise funds to finance the Ottoman war effort. (Afaf Lutfi Sayyid-Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer; a Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1969), 203. See also Jamal Zakariya Qasim, "Mawqif Misr min al-Harb al-Tarabulusiyyah 1911-1914,m" *al-Majallah al-Tarikkiyyah al-Misriyyah* 13 (1967); Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Ashhab, *Barqah al-'Arabiyyah: Ams wal-Yawm* (Cairo: Matba'ah al-Hawari, 1947), 345-349; FO 371/1113, Cheetham to Grey, 29 April 1911.)

al-Hilal, Jawish was assisted by Dr. Ahmad Fu'ad, an ex-member of the Watani Secret Society *Tadamun*, and by 1912 Jawish was employed by the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior.²⁷

Jawish was a particular favorite of the Committee of Union and Progress, as he was a fervent supporter of the Caliph as the bulwark of Islamic sovereignty, and thus, of the Ottoman Empire. He did not see this as incompatible with his Egyptian nationalism, an attitude shared by many Watanists.²⁸ Jawish continued to coordinate intelligence, especially on the activities of al-Hizb al-Watani, as well as the political dimension of the Indo-Egyptian movement during his time in Constantinople. In this context, a British Secret Service report submitted by Wingate to Philippides Bey, the Chief of Secret Police in Cairo, provides valuable insight into the fate of Jawish following the outbreak of the War. According to the report,

At the time of the Tripoli war, Indian Red Crescent parties sent to provide medical aid were fertile sources of recruitment and conspiracy. Several well-known nationalists and anti-British personalities joined forces with Jawish, including the editor of the Delhi Comrade, Muhammad Ali. A number of meetings between Indian and Egyptian student nationalists and Pan-Islamites [sic] had been held in Cairo at the Club des Ecoles Superieures, and in Constantinople there were Indian schools under the direction of Jawish, while in Switzerland and Germany, Egyptian Societies known as the "Sphinx," supplied with money by von Oppenheim's Eastern Bureau, offered a warm welcome to Moslems [sic] of all nationalities and the opportunity to undermine the Allied cause. The Sheikh al-Islam and the Director of Public Security were among the leading members of the Pan-Islam Party in Constantinople, and two newspapers subsidized by the government and the CUP, *Turc Pourdi* and *Al-Hedayat*, circulated widely in Europe, North Africa, Syria, Afghanistan and India. Soldiers in the Egyptian and Indian armies were offered attractive terms to desert to the Turks. In Geneva, *La Patrie Egyptienne*, carried the appeals of Jawish and the Constantinople leaders, and of Abdurrahman al-Riadh their leader in Jerusalem, to Indians who might be tempted by the offer of eventual freedom from "imperialist yoke" in return for support for Germany and Turkey [sic].²⁹

Also in the summer of 1912, not long after the Cairo police had foiled the "Shubra Plot" to kill the Khedive, the Prime Minister, and Consul General Kitchener; Egyptian Customs arrested a young Egyptian enrolled in the Ottoman Military Academy for trying to smuggle into the county a seditious circular named *al-Qasas*, which not only cursed the Egyptian government

²⁷ PRO-FO 141/746/4681. *Process verbal*. Interrogation of Shaykh Jawish. 10-15 Sept. 1912.

²⁸ Khan, 116.

²⁹ H.V.F. Winstone, *The Illicit Adventure: the Story of Political and Military Intelligence in the Middle East from 1898 to 1926* (London: J. Cape, 1982), 166-7.

for accepting the Occupation but also praised Ibrahim Wardani as a true patriot.³⁰ The courier, Ahmad Mukhtar, who had previously studied in France, claimed the pamphlets had been sent by Jawish, who was brought back to Cairo for questioning. The report draws attention to “The Nationalists at Constantinople” (Farid and Jawish) and their receipt of £20 per month from the German Embassy. Mention is also made of nationalist societies throughout Europe, with Constantinople as the central headquarters. According to the report, “The Egyptian Nationalist Party of Constantinople consist now of Fareed [sic], Shaweesh [sic], the employees of the Hilal el-Osmany, some Indians who have a society of their own similar to the Nationalist Party, and some Algerians and Tunisians who have a society which helps the Turkish government by sending arms and ammunition to African Tripoli.”³¹ The Egyptian Government, fearing that the Nationalists might use Constantinople as a base from which to direct revolutionary activities in Egypt, demanded Jawish’s extradition.³² Watani member and editor of *al-Liwa*, Mansur Rifa’at,

³⁰ FO 141/746/1, Cairo, 27 August 1912, “Ahmed Mukhtar and Sheikh Shawish.” The pamphlet smuggled in by Ahmed Mukhtar” was entitled *La Vengeance*, and criticizes the despotism of ‘Abbas, accusing him of putting patriotism second to the English to the detriment of the nation, and notes that “notre redempteur feu Ibrahim el-Wardani.” Goldschmidt, “Egyptian Nationalist Party,” 94.

See Khan, 118-9 for a further explanation of the Shubra Plot. In brief,, an unsuccessful attempt was made on Consul-General Kitchener’s life by a group of young men associated with *al-Liwa*. The then chief of Cairo’s secret police claimed later that the evidence had been concocted, though all of the “conspirators” served their full terms anyway. The leader of the group, Imam Waked, had been a friend of Wardani’s and had met Jawish earlier the same year in Europe, where he had supposedly purchased several guns. According to Ziauddin (p. 243), the group held their first meeting at Wardani’s grave. See Badrawi’s description of the case, Malak Badrawi, *Political Violence in Egypt 1910-1925: Secret Societies, Plots, and Assassinations* (London: Curzon, 2000), 86-92; and PRO documents F.O. 141/430/5334/1. The Shubra plot. 21 August 1917. Note communicated by Sofer Pasha, dated 4 August 1917, FO 371/1363, Kitchener to Grey, No. 28284, 3 July 1912; FO 371/163, Cheetham to Grey, No. 31892, 22 July 1912; FO 371/1363 Cheetham to Grey, No. 35949, 18 August 1912. (Khan, 118-9.)

³¹ FO 141/746/1, Cairo, 27 August 1912, “Ahmed Mukhtar and Sheikh Shawish,” p. 5-6.

³² FO 141/746/1, Cairo, 27 August 1912, “Ahmed Mukhtar and Sheikh Shawish.” Shawish was arrested on 3 September 1912 in Constantinople by Ottoman Forces at the behest of Britain. According to British authorities, by 1910, nationalist activities in Europe were in full vigor and Wardani’s crime was the direct outcome. Specific mention was also made of the fact that Shawish (sic) and Omar Bey Lutfi were also responsible for the establishment of night schools for the ostensible purpose of elementary education, but really intended to spread the principles of Nationalism and Revolution among the lower classes. For the British, then, “the difficulty before us is not the presence of a dangerous political movement, which does not exist, but how to find the means to check the wild ideals of the exalted nationalists from affecting the student class.” FO 371/1363, Cheetham to Grey, Ramleh, 27 August 1912, telegram no. 49.

was also implicated; but he fled to Switzerland.³³ Although Jawish denied any connection to the pamphlet, it was established during the investigation that the Egyptian Students Club in Constantinople was openly anti-British, and supposedly had a portrait of Wardani hanging in its hall.³⁴ The fact that the Club president, Muhammad Kamal al-Khashin, had also belonged to the nationalist secret society *Tadamun* lent credence to these accusations. British authorities were particularly incensed that *al-Qasas* invited readers to refer to the history of India and Ireland to have an idea of the misfortunes, famine, and adversities that befell those countries, and therefore what awaited Egyptians as a result of British occupation. Although they released Jawish, Egyptian authorities instituted increased surveillance on ships coming from Constantinople and on the large Turkish émigré community in Egypt, to prevent further importation of “seditious” materials.

Along with Jawish, Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi also arrived in Constantinople in the summer of 1912. The Khedive had earlier broken with Farid, who resented the former’s abandonment of the Nationalists during Gorst’s tenure as Consul-General, when there had been no real limit placed on ‘Abbas Hilmi’s spending or domestic authority vis-à-vis representative institutions or the Watani Party. Documents coming from Constantinople, which had quickly become the center for extremist agitation against the Egyptian government, intercepted in the summer of 1912 included manifestos calling for the assassination of Egyptian government authorities, glorifying Wardani, and personally attacking the Khedive. In one manifesto, ‘Abbas Hilmi was condemned for abdicating in the face of Kitchener’s power, for declaring Egyptian neutrality in the Turko-Italian War, for visiting the English King (“Your master, but not your Sovereign”), preoccupying

³³ FO 371/1364, Cambon to Grey, London 15 September 1912. Mansour Rifa’at’s brother, Isma’il Labib was the best friend of Muhammad Farid. Rifa’at was also very active in Watani causes until falling out with Jawish at the beginning of World War I and then Farid in 1917. (Khan, 79-80.)

³⁴ Badrawi, 101.

himself with base personal interests at the expense of those of the nation, and associating with evil persons who were a discredit to the nation. In another editorial, ‘Abbas Hilmi was charged with being a vile traitor, an ignoble ruler, dishonest, abject, with no will of his own; controlled by others even in his own purely private affairs; conniving with the English to bring down liberal, nationalist forces; persecuting those who were dedicated to the country’s welfare; turning against patriots so as to obtain what he wanted from the British; letting the British manage the country in their own interests; and removing the serious members of the court while surrounding himself with vile men from the standpoint of decency and honor – men who shared his inclination for libertinism, debauchery, and immorality.³⁵ By 1912, however, the Khedive no longer had a good relationship with the British either, and was seeking rapprochement with the Nationalists.³⁶ During 1916-1917, the Khedive cut back the personal financial support he had granted several nationalist activists who were close to Farid, increasing the latter’s hostility. In the summer of 1917, ‘Abbas returned to Constantinople and made his peace with the CUP in an attempt to maintain the possibility of reclaiming his title. A number of Egyptian personalities tried to revive the contacts between the Khedive and Farid and the Nationalists, as well. However, in October 1917 it was Farid who rebuffed such overtures, declaring “there is no connection between the Khedive and the Nationalist party.”³⁷

Egyptian Nationalists during the First World War

³⁵ FO 371/1363, Cheetham to Grey, NO. 36219, 27 August 1912; FO 371/1363, Cheetham to Grey, No. 37800, 1 September 1912.

³⁶ Indeed, ‘Abbas Hilmi may have suspected that Kitchener would be happy to remove him from the throne given the opportunity; and later in the same year Madame Cama warned Farid that two Indian students were plotting with Egyptian law student Hamid al-Alaily to assassinate Kitchener on the Khedive’s orders. (Farid, *Awraq*, 156)

³⁷ Goldschmidt, *Memoirs*, 446.

Despite the frequent ruptures in their alliances, the outbreak of the First World War resulted in a situation in which Farid, Jawish, ‘Abbas Hilmi, and the Young Turk government saw opportunities in mutual help and alliances. Many of the Watani Party’s luminaries, including Farid, were already in Constantinople or other cities of Europe when the Protectorate was declared in 1914 and were happy for the moral and, more importantly, financial support that the Ottomans and the German Foreign Ministry were willing to provide in return for Egyptian support and help against the British. Farid remained conflicted and skeptical, however, of the motivations of both the governments of the Central Powers, as his diaries made clear. Many of his war-time efforts were as concerned with protecting Egypt from the Ottomans as they were with expelling the British. Farid returned to Constantinople from Geneva in August of 1914 to make peace with the Committee of Union and Progress and discuss Egypt’s future with the Ottoman Triumvirate. At the urging of Baron von Wangenheim, German ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, and in hopes of re-establishing unity among the Egyptian Nationalists, Farid mended fences with the Khedive and Jawish.³⁸ Thus by October 1914, the Watani Party had set up an “Egyptian government in exile” in Europe.

Farid went to Constantinople to make peace with both the Turks and ‘Abbas Hilmi, who was still in Constantinople at the start of the War recovering from an assassination attempt and prevented by both the Ottomans and the British from returning to Egypt from “enemy territory.”³⁹ On 6 August 1914, the Ottomans prevented the Khedive’s return to Egypt, fueling speculation that the Ottoman government hoped to remove Abbas both as Khedive and potential

³⁸ Goldschmidt, “The Egyptian National Party,” 307. It was Farid and his friend Ismail Labib who secured a *fatwa* authorizing the murder of the new Sultan of Egypt, Husayn Kamil, for having accepted the post.

³⁹ The subsequent cavalier manner in which the Porte investigated the incident angered the Khedive and persuaded him that his cousin and Ottoman Grand Vizier, Sa’id Halim, with whom ‘Abbas Hilmi had poor relations and who had ambitions of his own to rule Egypt, either perpetrated or planned the attempt. Egypt was placed under a British Protectorate on 28 December 1914, and the British once again deposed a Khedive, replacing Abbas Hilmi with his elderly cousin Husayn Kamil (1853-1917) and upgrading the latter’s title to that of Sultan to reflect the severance of the ties between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire.

leader of an Arab movement for autonomy.⁴⁰ The British decision to prevent the Khedive from returning to Egypt in December 1914 left the latter willing to once again make common cause with the Turks and the nationalists in order to oust the British from Egypt.⁴¹

With both Farid and the Khedive in Constantinople at the start of the War, Farid hoped that ‘Abbas Hilmi would assist the Nationalist party. As a first step, ‘Abbas Hilmi wanted to coordinate joint political action for Egypt’s liberation from the British with the aid of the Ottomans and the Germans. Thus in August 1914, Farid sent ‘Abbas Hilmi an official letter asking him to head the Egyptian nationalist struggle for the ouster of the British and the restoration of the “autonomy of Egypt,” and urging him to seize the opportunity afforded by the War to demand Egypt’s independence, or at least to press for internal autonomy and constitutional reform.⁴² Farid assured ‘Abbas of the full support of the Nationalist Party and of the “entire Egyptian nation.” Farid then arranged a meeting with ‘Abbas Hilmi in which the two reached an “agreement” which was to serve as the foundation for joint activity between the Nationalists and the Khedive during the War. On the basis of their mistaken assumption in late 1914 and early 1915 that the Ottoman army would conquer Egypt, drive out the British, and restore the Khedive with the assistance of the Nationalists, Farid and ‘Abbas Hilmi cemented their ties. When the Ottoman effort proved ineffective, Farid learned that ‘Abbas Hilmi was secretly developing alternative political options in the form of ties with anti-Ottoman Arab

⁴⁰ FO 371/14638/E11646 “Memorandum on the Deposition of Khedive, Abbas Hilmi Pasha, and the Liquidation of his Property in Egypt,” 15 January 1924.

⁴¹ Farid, *Awraq*, 85f; Shafiq writes in *Mudhakkirati*, Vol. II, Part ii, 344, that he had warned the Khedive, when he came from Cairo in late August, that the British wanted to depose him. Goldschmidt, “The Egyptian National Party,” 306-7.

⁴² Farid to the Khedive, Geneva, 22 August 1914, Farid, *Awraq*, 83-5; Ahmad Shafiq, *Mudhakkiraati fi nisf qarn*, 2nd Edition (Cairo: Al-Haya Misriyya al-‘amma lil Kitab, 1994), Vol. II, Part ii, 36; Farid, *Awraq*, 173-5.

nationalist organizations (relations which antedated the war) and, indeed, with the British as well.⁴³

Once in exile, and particularly after the onset of the war, Farid's Ottoman orientation became even stronger, together with his commitment to Ottoman goals: preserving the integrity of the Empire and defeating Britain in the war. As already mentioned, this policy was a central element in the traditional strategy of the Nationalist Party. Its underlying rationale was that only the Ottoman state, of which Egypt was an integral part, could oust the British and return the country to the Egyptian people. Finally, once the Empire was openly at war with Britain and allied with Germany, old Ottoman hopes of conquering Egypt and expelling the British for the first time seemed realistic. Thus, an immediate common interest was created between the Egyptian Nationalists and the Ottoman Unionists. The now ex-Khedive remained hopeful for some time that his ostensible suzerain would help him regain his throne; but the Ottomans did not trust him much more than the British did, and the Khedive's offers to lead a military campaign to conquer Egypt were ignored. Thus, when World War I began, the Khedive found himself in a precarious situation, thanks to his pre-War anti-British, pro-Arab, pro-German, and Islamist policies.⁴⁴

Recognizing that he was not likely to regain his throne with Grand Vizier Sa'id Halim and Cemal Pasha (1872-1922) in charge in Constantinople, 'Abbas Hilmi moved to Switzerland in the summer of 1915. Perhaps because of the competition from Farid's supporters and the *Terreki Islam* group in Geneva, he set up his own Office Musulman International in Lausanne.

⁴³ 'Abbas Hilmi's contact with the British was orchestrated through the British Embassy in Rome. (Farid, *Awraq*, 280) In time, Farid came to consider 'Abbas Hilmi too shaky a prop for the Nationalists. (Farid, *Awraq*, 230)

⁴⁴ See the extensive report to the ex-Khedive's Austrian confidant, Dr. Rudolf Amster, in Arthur Zimmerman (German undersecretary of state in the AA) to German embassy Constantinople, 26 October 1915, National Archives and Records Administration/T-137/136/0711-13. (Donald M. McKale, "Influence without Power: The Last Khedive of Egypt and the Great Powers, 1914-18," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January 1997), 21)

There, ‘Abbas Hilmi was reported by British intelligence “to have been engaged in efforts to organize a ‘Supreme Oriental Revolutionary Society’ uniting Egyptian, Indian, and Arab Nationalists in a common anti-imperialist front.”⁴⁵ It is unlikely that he had any real success, as his disengagement from the Ottomans meant that he had very little to offer potential allies, other than monetary support.⁴⁶ Throughout January 1915, ‘Abbas Hilmi mobilized pressure on the Ottomans not only to permit him to lead the Egyptian expedition, but also to affirm him publicly as Khedive. He mounted his campaign first through the Egyptian nationalists and then through the German and Austrian governments. At the beginning of January 1915, Farid and fellow nationalist Muhammad Fahmi voiced the ex-Khedive’s demands when they visited the leaders of the German government’s Oriental section, Max von Oppenheim and Otto von Wesendonk in Berlin. A week later, the German government relayed its wishes to the Ottoman government that the latter issue a proclamation placing the ex-Khedive at the head of the Egyptian expedition. Furthermore, news arrived in both Constantinople and Berlin that the Austrian government treated ‘Abbas Hilmi as a head of state, granting him a meeting with the foreign minister, Count Leopold Berchtold, and an audience with the Emperor, Franz Joseph.⁴⁷

Though they were supported by exiled Egyptian nationalists, including Farid, Ottoman War Minister Enver Pasha (1881-1922) rejected ‘Abbas Hilmi’s efforts to convince the Ottomans to return the Khedive as ruler to Egypt. Throughout the remainder of 1915, the German ambassador in Vienna worked unsuccessfully for the rapprochement of the ex-Khedive

⁴⁵ Gershoni and Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs*, 52

⁴⁶ His reputation suffered even more during the “Bolo affair” in 1916, during which it became public that he had pocketed four million marks given to him by Germany to buy control of several leading Paris newspapers in order to influence their editorial policies against the War. Paul Bolo, the Khedive’s financial agent, had been the center of the scheme and was court-martialed and hanged by the French in 1918. The Khedive refused to pay back the money to Germany, and the Watanists threatened to break with him for the sake of their own reputations. (Khan, 142.)

⁴⁷ McKale, 24.

and Egyptian nationalists with the Ottomans.⁴⁸ Enver continued to accuse the ex-Khedive of conspiring to incite Arabs against the Porte.⁴⁹ The Ottoman government, moreover, ignored a request from the German embassy on 25 November 1915 that once Ottoman troops invaded Egypt, the Porte would place the Khedive back in power there. Instead, according to Hans Humann, the naval attaché at the German Embassy in Constantinople, the Ottoman government planned to name either Grand Vizier Sa'id Halim or the Shaykh al-Senussi of Libya as the new Khedive.⁵⁰ In January 1918, the ex-Khedive complained to the German ambassador, Johann Heinrich Count von Bernstorff, that he felt like a 'prisoner' in Constantinople. Ottoman leaders, he said, refused even to discuss Egypt with him. Furthermore, 'Abbas Hilmi found himself the target of anti-Arab elements at the Porte, and particularly of Cemal Pasha, who associated the ex-Khedive with the Arab rebellion. Cemal Pasha's hostility toward 'Abbas Hilmi was so evident that the German government remarked that the former exercised "the utmost caution" in his relations with the ex-Khedive.⁵¹

The amity between the Khedive and the Young Turk government, based on a precarious balance of interests, was soon upset by the Grand Vizier Sa'id Halim, who continued to regard himself as the rightful Khedive.⁵² He openly proposed the creation of a new nationalist group, the "Ottoman Egypt party," to be led by Shaykh Jawish, having as its object the displacement of 'Abbas Hilmi in favor of Sa'id Halim, and the reduction of Egypt's status to that of an ordinary

⁴⁸ The Germans accepted completely the ex-Khedive's claims of his influence in the Middle East and with Britain, in part because Berlin continuously received erroneous reports from Egypt of his popularity there.

⁴⁹ McKale, 26.

⁵⁰ McKale, 21.

⁵¹ McKale, 33.

⁵² This claim was made based on the Ottoman law of succession, followed in Egypt through the reign of Isma'il; it stipulated that the succession should go to the oldest living male member of the dynasty. In fact, though, there were several living members of the Khedivial family older than Sa'id Halim, including Husayn Kamil. Following the resignation of Sa'id Halim as Grand Vizier, it was easier to reconcile the Nationalist factions that had hitherto favored one side or the other. When Jawish and 'Abdul Malik Hamza came to Stockholm to take part in an Ottoman-sponsored Congress of Muslim émigrés, they agreed to accept Farid's leadership and apologized for their past misconduct. Farid, *Awraq*, 263f; Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian National Party," 333-4.

Ottoman province. Sa'id Halim played on the suspicions entertained by many Turks about the Egyptian Nationalists by complaining that Farid's followers were wearing lapel pins with the slogan, "Egypt for the Egyptians," and claiming that they would demand the evacuation of Ottoman troops within twenty-four hours after Egypt's liberation from the British.⁵³ The Watani Party's slogan was unacceptable to Ottomans like Sa'id Halim, who were intolerant of local, national loyalties.⁵⁴ 'Abbas Hilmi gathered that Sa'id Halim was building up a group of Egyptians who would be "nationalists" in the Ottoman sense – that is, willing instruments of Ottoman policy in Egypt – as a counterweight to the al-Hizb al-Watani.⁵⁵ Farid was similarly concerned that the "Anglophile" Sa'id Halim Pasha was "obstructing the Nationalist activities to promote his own claims to the Egyptian khedivate."⁵⁶ Indeed, Sa'id Halim had been trying to woo Jawish away from Farid and the Khedive; and had warned the Young Turk government that the Watanists wanted Egypt for Egyptians, not the "Muslim nation," and would demand an immediate evacuation of Ottoman troops after the War.⁵⁷ Just as Farid and 'Abbas Hilmi feared, Shaykh Jawish was, in fact, working to further Sa'id Halim's candidacy for the Khedivate, but was unable to win support for this position among other Egyptians.

Farid's diaries reiterate another issue that weakened his party. As mentioned above, his firm policy, and, hence its slogan, was "Egypt for Egyptians." Some of his rivals, notably Shaykh Jawish when he was working for the Ottoman government, called instead for Islamic unity.⁵⁸ Farid himself was not averse to using Islamic appeals, including the Ottoman call for a

⁵³ Farid, *Awraq*, 92f; 'Abd ar-Rahman al-Rafi'i, *Muhammad Farid: ramz al-ikhlas wa-'t-tadhiya: Tarih Misr al-qaumi min sanat 1908 ila sanat 1919* (Cairo: Maktabat an-Nahda al-Misriya, 1948), 352f; Shafiq, *Mudhakkirati*, Vol. II, Part ii, 364f; Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian National Party," 309-10.

⁵⁴ Muhammad Farid, "Mudhakkirat Muhammad Farid," ed. Ra'uf 'Abbas, *al-Katib*, No. 111 June, 1970, 159.

⁵⁵ Ahmad Shafiq, *A'mali ba'd mudhakkirati* (Cairo: Matba'at Misr, 1941), 365.

⁵⁶ Quoted in Hamed, "Germany and the Egyptian Nationalist Movement," 22.

⁵⁷ 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, *Muhammad Farid: rams al-ikhlas wa tadhiyya (tarikh Misr al-qaumi min 1908 ila 1919)*, 4th Edition (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1984), 352.

⁵⁸ Farid, *Awraq*, No. 4, p. 132; Raouf Abbas Hamed, "Germany," 24.

jihad against the British and their allies; and he was, after all, editing a magazine called *Terreki-Islam* (“The Progress of Islam”). However, Farid was extremely cautious of anything that hinted at a sectarian cause, as he firmly believed that the success of Egyptian nationalist efforts rested on their ability to appeal to Egyptians of all religions. Although Farid appealed to Germany for support, he refrained from committing himself to German Islamic propaganda when he was approached by the Foreign Ministry to take part in editing *al-Jihad*, a German organ issued in 1915 that appeared in various languages, including Arabic. He believed that Germany sought to control and propagate Islamist ideas to serve her own interests, and warned Tal’at Bey, the Turkish Minister of the Interior, that leaving Pan-Islamic propaganda in the German hands might endanger the Ottoman Empire, unless the latter took the initiative. On various occasions, Farid told the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Arthur Zimmerman, that he was thinking of a Pan-Islamic Union modelled on the same lines as the Pan-Germanic Union, to be founded after the War and led by the Ottomans, but each Muslim country should enjoy autonomy and share equal rights with the Turks. Farid believed that an alliance between the Germanic and Islamic Unions would be the stronghold against imperialist European Powers.⁵⁹ Farid needed Ottoman financial and moral support and he tried to align the Egyptian Nationalists with Muslims of other countries then under British (or French or Russian) imperial rule. But he wanted Copts and other non-Muslim Egyptians to support his party’s policies; and he did not want Egypt, if liberated by the Turks in the War, to be reduced in status to a simple Ottoman province. His fear of Turkish maladministration, stated often in his diaries, was supplemented by a fear that Sa’id Halim would take control of Egypt and persecute or even banish the Nationalists.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Farid, *Awraq*, No 4, p. 132; Hamed, “Germany,” 24.

⁶⁰ Farid, *Awraq*, 12.

For his part, ‘Abbas Hilmi’s position had been a vacillating one for some time, reflecting the division of his entourage into pro-British and pro-Ottoman factions. When the news of his deposition arrived in Constantinople, he was no longer in the Ottoman capital. Moreover, in light of his deposition by the British for collaboration with the enemy, the Khedive was hesitant to be shown to have links with Germany and stayed in Switzerland for two years attempting to not outwardly choose sides. He did, nevertheless, embezzle large sums provided by the Germans to purchase controlling shares in leading Paris newspapers.⁶¹ The Khedive wavered between the British and Ottomans, but finally decided to throw in his lot with the Turks, despite his uncertainty as to the War’s outcome, as this choice at least afforded him some hope of regaining his throne.⁶²

The major issue for Farid throughout the War had, therefore, become defining the line between his Egyptian nationalism and his Ottomanism: the impending War, while welcome in the sense that Britain was being increasingly challenged, was also forcing the issue of what exactly the Egyptians wanted from the Ottomans, or even from their own khedive. The issue of British evacuation had always been uppermost in Watani minds; now that the possibility was becoming more real, Farid was forced to think about what form the future government should take. The fact that ‘Abbas Hilmi had never supported the Watani request for a Constitution was becoming more ominous, as were Ottoman descriptions of Egypt as a “lost province.” Despite Umma accusations to the contrary, the Watanists were not interested in seeing Egypt lose the autonomy she had enjoyed since the days of Muhammad ‘Ali.⁶³ Through discussions with the leading figures of the Committee of Union and Progress government, Farid sensed that they

⁶¹ Goldschmidt, “The Egyptian Nationalist Party 1882-1919” in P.M. Holt (ed.), *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 329.

⁶² Shafiq, *Mudhakkirati*, Vol. III, 154-175; Goldschmidt, “The Egyptian National Party,” 328.

⁶³ Goldschmidt, “The Egyptian National Party,” 257; Khan, 120.

wanted to withdraw the privileges bestowed on Egypt through the firmans of 1841 and 1873 and turn her into a mere province controlled by the Ottoman government from Constantinople.⁶⁴ Such apparent intentions widened the gap between the Young Turk government and the leadership of the Egyptian Nationalist Party and brought the latter closer to Germany, thinking that they might use the German influence in Constantinople to safeguard the autonomous rights of Egypt and that a victorious Germany might help Egyptian nationalist aspirations owing to Germany's interests in the Suez Canal.⁶⁵

Due to Farid's apprehensions about Ottoman intentions towards Egypt, he went specifically to meet with the German ambassador in Vienna in December of 1914, to ask the Germans to instruct the Committee of Union and Progress to issue a statement concerning Egypt's status. Indeed, the group had Jawish write a manifesto which the Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi signed, granting a constitution to Egypt and encouraging Egyptians to support the Ottomans, who would be liberating Egypt from foreign occupation. The Committee of Union and Progress, however, refused to endorse the manifesto and it was never published, thereby confirming many of Farid's suspicions.⁶⁶ It was almost certainly due to Farid's efforts that the Committee of Union and Progress government eventually issued an *irade-i saniyya* (statement of intent) on 12 February 1915, announced by Sultan Mehmet V, confirming Egypt's traditional autonomy

⁶⁴ By virtue of firmans issued on 13 February and 1 June 1841, Muhammad 'Ali surrendered Crete (the governorship of which he was granted in 1821), Syria, and Adana, which reverted to the direct control of the Porte. In compensation, the Sultan granted him hereditary rule of Egypt. A firman of 8 June 1873 replaced all preceding firmans. It confirmed the rules of succession already established by the 1841 firman; provided for a Regency during minority; authorized the Khedive to make laws regarding non-political conventions with foreign powers; authorized the Khedive to contract loans without requiring permission from the Porte; to keep an unlimited number of troops; and to build ships of war, iron-clads excepted. The tribute from Egypt to the Porte remained at 150,000 purses.

⁶⁵ Farid, *Awraq*, (Volume 1: *Mudhakkirati ba'd al-Hijra*), no. 4, 112-3.

⁶⁶ Farid, *Awraq*, 327; Khan, 139-41.

within the Empire, which went some way to assuage Farid's fears about the possibility of an Ottoman takeover of Egypt.⁶⁷

The connections between Farid and the Young Turk government continued to deteriorate throughout the course of the War. When Farid attempted to travel to Germany in November 1916, he found he had to wait two months for a visa, a delay he attributed to the machinations of the Committee of Union and Progress.⁶⁸ In the meanwhile, Jawish was shuttling between Constantinople and Berlin regularly, as he edited *die Islamische Welt*, a German Pan-Islamic weekly published in Berlin from November 1916 to August 1918, while also remaining deeply involved in Enver Pasha's plans. By this point, prominent Nationalist 'Abd al-Malik Hamza had persuaded Jawish to break ties with Farid because of the latter's alliance with the Khedive.⁶⁹ Farid refused to break ties with 'Abbas Hilmi not out of personal loyalty but rather because he saw the pressure to do so as a plot by Sa'id Halim to divide the Egyptians. Indeed, Farid wrote in his diaries in 1916 that he was disappointed to find that "Pan-Islamism" had been "replaced by *tatrik* (turkification);" and, despite often referring to the Arab revolts against the Ottoman Empire as crippling, Farid actually seemed supportive of the Arab Revolt in the Hejaz, pointing out the brutal execution of twenty-two Arab notables, falsely accused of treason, in May 1916. In addition, Farid remained suspicious about the intentions of the Ottomans toward Egypt. "The Turks," he wrote:

don't know administration, as has been observed in Syria and elsewhere. We won't agree to be under their administration under any conditions because we are much more advanced than they are and our country is better organized than [it was] before the British came in. In short, the Turks want to swallow Egypt, but we'll not easily agree to being eaten up. We've opposed the British

⁶⁷ Farid, *Awraq*, Vol. 1 *Mudhakkirati*, no 4, 118; Hamed, 19; and also Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian National Party," 317f. Goldschmidt notes that Mme Viellard (aka Aziza de Rocheburne, Farid's mistress) wrote to Goldschmidt in February 1965 that Farid himself wrote most of the Sultan's statement, but that he did not wish this to become known. Khan, 139-41.

⁶⁸ Farid, *Awraq*, 371.

⁶⁹ Jawish had formerly supported the Khedive when Farid had not, but Jawish increasingly threw his lot in with Sa'id Halim and continued Ottoman presence in Egypt.

and will oppose whoever wants to eat us up, whoever he may be, because we're fighting for independence. The most we'll accept is to be with the Turks as Hungary is with Austria...on the condition that we have equality in laws and complete internal autonomy.⁷⁰

So concerned had Farid grown regarding the intentions of the Ottoman government toward Egypt, he even told some Tunisians in Berlin that he would accept a constitutional regime under British protection in Egypt.⁷¹ The German government continued to offer some support, including an offer to finance an office in Switzerland for mobilizing the Egyptian nationalists who were gathering there, but Farid suspected that they were setting up intelligence bases and refused "to be used by them."⁷² Towards the end of the War, Farid had begun to question the decision to ally with the Central Powers at all. According to Farid,

The Turks have abandoned pan-Islam...except for Enver Pasha...On the other hand, it is hopeless to expect Germany to help us against the Turks, because they need them and do not want to anger them...There is no hope of securing Egypt's liberation through the Turks and the Germans. Indeed, if they did enter Egypt, Turkey would make her an ordinary Ottoman province, or else the Germans would stay, and we would be in the same situation as we are in now. It is better to let the British remain, and to make an agreement with them to obtain the constitution, even if only gradually, than to let the Turks or the Germans take their place.⁷³

In September 1916, Farid directly accused the Young Turk government of holding a "contemptuous view of non-Turks, and estrangement of all other [Muslim] nationalities."⁷⁴ The Unionists, obsessed with making military gains in the "Turkish" areas of Anatolia "are not interested in the Egyptian cause," he argued.⁷⁵ Indeed, "some of them said they would rather have Egypt be British than independent, because if it were independent it would pose a threat to the Empire because of the education, intelligence, and acumen of its people."⁷⁶ The best

⁷⁰ Farid had a penchant of referring to the Ottomans as "Turks" in his more embittered moments. Goldschmidt, *Memoirs*, 331.

⁷¹ Farid, *Awraq*, 387; Khan, 144.

⁷² Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian National Party," 313, 325; Khan, 149; Farid, *Awraq*, 202.

⁷³ Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian National Party," 313, 325; Khan, 149; Farid, *Awraq*, 202.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 376.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 376.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 466.

indication of the instrumentally Ottomanist orientation of Muhammad Farid is that, as the prospect of an Ottoman victory became increasingly unlikely throughout the course of the War, Farid began to think in terms of a rapprochement with the British as long as they would recognize Egyptian internal autonomy and establish a representative regime in the country.⁷⁷

The End of the War

Germany's unconditional surrender in November 1918 dashed the hope of the Nationalists that Egypt might be liberated by Turkish or German arms or by a negotiated peace, and the value of their party as a means of opposing or discrediting British rule in Egypt plummeted. Farid and his followers fled to Switzerland, but they retained little money or influence. The leadership of Egypt's independence struggle was seized by Sa'd Zaghlul and other members of the Umma Party, the Nationalists' pre-War rival.

The defeat of the Ottoman Empire and her allies left stranded the Egyptian Nationalists who had committed their political fortunes to those of the Central powers. and while Watanis were extremely popular, they did not have a power base to rival the Wafd and other entrenched interests. Few of them ever regained any influence in Egypt's political life. The armistice of October 1918 and the obvious defeat of Germany had put an end to the hopes of the Egyptian Nationalists in Germany. The defeat did not only affect Germany, but also the future of the Egyptian Nationalist Party's leadership. In Egypt, they lost ground to the new nationalist leadership of al-Wafd and Sa'd Zaghlul, particularly following the popular uproar over Zaghlul's participation in the Paris Peace Conference. Although the pre-War Nationalists remained active as individuals in Europe and as a party in Egypt, they ceased to constitute an important bloc in

⁷⁷ Farid, *Awraq*, 313; Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 27-8.

Egyptian politics after the rise of the Wafd and the death of Muhammad Farid in 1919.⁷⁸ The main reason that the Nationalists lost their leadership position was, of course, the outcome of World War I; but the Party's decline was hastened by internal dissensions and lack of funds. The departure of both Muhammad Farid and 'Abd al-Aziz Jawish from Egypt between 1911 and 1912, due to fear of more jail time, seriously damaged the party's fortunes in Egypt, as Jawish had been the party's most visible, albeit controversial, spokesperson; and Farid was not only the organizer but also the main financier of party activity.⁷⁹ The leading Nationalists' stand in World War I barred them from public participation in the postwar independence struggle, resulting in the ascendance of the Wafd Party and a significantly more conservative Revolution.

Unlike the Watanists, the Umma Party remained largely pro-British in their statements throughout the War, with Party leader Ahmad Lufti al-Sayyid, as always, rejecting any Ottoman claims on Egypt. He also accepted the British Protectorate, believing formal recognition of Egypt in the Empire would strengthen her bargaining position for autonomy after the War. In his memoir, al-Sayyid claimed to have negotiated with the British for Egypt's direct support in the War effort in exchange for a declaration of independence. The idea was rejected by London, supposedly as they doubted the loyalty of Egyptian troops to the British over the Ottomans.⁸⁰

Unlike most of the high-ranking Watani Party members, almost all of the Umma leaders remained in Egypt under the Protectorate, often in government employment, and were pleased to see the Khedive replaced by a more pro-British, far less autocratic figure in 'Abbas Hilmi's

⁷⁸ Raouf Abbas Hamed, "Germany and the Egyptian Nationalist Movement 1882-1918," in Axel Havemann and Baber Johansen, ed., *Gegenwart als Geschichte: Islamwissenschaftliche Studien* (Leiden: EJ Brill, 1988), 24.

⁷⁹ Khan, 115.

⁸⁰ Ahmad Lutfi Al-Sayyid, *Safahat matwiyah min tarikh al-harakah al-istiqlaliyah fi Misr: min Maris sanat 1907 ila Maris sanat 1909: 'asr al-inqilab al-fikri fi al-siyasah al-watahniyah* (Cairo: Matbaat al-Muqtataf wa-al-Muqattam, 1946.), 164-165.

uncle, Husayn Kamil.⁸¹ The continued residence of Umma Party members in Cairo, combined with their resistance to allying with the Central Powers, meant that the Umma and Wafd Party nationalists would replace Watani nationalists as the official representatives of Egypt's bid for independence. Following the War, the Watani nationalists were very nearly blackballed from Egyptian public and political life, the consequence of having supported the Ottoman Empire and Germany. While former Watanist Muhammad 'Ali Alluba was actually one of the initial members of the Wafd delegation with Zaghlul, most of the other Wafd leadership was from the Umma Party group that the Watanists had seen at best as too cautious in not pushing for immediate independence, and at worst as British collaborators. Muhammad Farid, who still felt he could not return to Egypt at the end of the War, was actually rebuffed by the Wafd when he offered to join or align with them. Zaghlul believed that Farid's support for the Central Powers had undermined his credibility and that the Wafd's negotiations with the British would go more smoothly without the stigma of Farid's support.⁸² According to historian Muhammad Anis,

As for Farid Bey's joining the Wafd, the Wafd has decided not to make him the offer because of the great danger it would pose to the Egyptian Question, which needs the continuing sympathy of the Allies, among whom Farid has become famous-especially with the French-for his collaboration with their enemies and his involvement, together with the Khedive and [Paul] Bolo [Pasha], in activities that have greatly harmed their reputation in Europe. It is no secret to you that the British have accused the Egyptians of not having a spontaneous movement and have alleged it arose out of the intrigues of the Turks and the Germans. Including a man like Muhammad Farid in the Wafd would necessarily support the criticism of our enemies and damage our cause...⁸³

Following the War, the émigré Nationalists grew ever more quarrelsome and split into separate cliques.⁸⁴ None of the Watani-affiliated Egyptians chose to stay in Constantinople after the War, and most did not stay in Europe long either. Only Mansour Rifa'at remained in Berlin,

⁸¹ Khan, 133. FO 371/2353/599, "Proclamation," *Journal Officiel du Gouvernement Egyptien*, 19 December 1914. The Sultan died early in 1917, and was succeeded by his brother, Fu'ad.

⁸² Khan, 165-6.

⁸³ Goldschmidt, "The Egyptian National Party," 354-255, quoting Mohamed Anis, *Dirasat fi watha'iq 1919*, (Cairo: Anglo-Egypt Maktab, 1963), 238; Khan, 166.

⁸⁴ Farid, *Awraq*, 8.

from where he wrote a number of pamphlets and articles, often criticizing his former colleagues for betraying their ideals by returning to Egypt while the British remained there.⁸⁵ Rifa'at never forgave Farid or even his own brother, Ismail Labib, for making peace with Jawish, and became much closer to several Indian nationalists over the course of the War.⁸⁶ At the time of Farid's death, the Egyptian Nationalists still in Europe were divided between the Jawish faction, mainly in Berne and centered around Ottoman Ambassador Fu'ad Salim, and the Egyptian Committee in Geneva. Most of the anti-British nationalists – Egyptian, Indian, or other – soon left Berlin, fearing a possible Allied occupation and extradition to British jurisdiction.⁸⁷ Farid, who had been in Berlin to recover his papers for just that reason, then travelled to a Swiss sanitarium. The “Geneva faction” of the group set up an independent “Egyptian Committee,” which tried to carry on the struggle with a new name; its membership included Ismail Labib, Muhammad Fahmi, ‘Ali Shamsi, and Yahya Dardiri. The group tried to overcome the stigma of the now-discredited Watani-German alliance by barring anyone who spent the War in Berlin from membership. This was particularly ironic given that the core membership included Ismail Labib, Farid's right-hand man who had spent much of the War shuttling between Constantinople and Damascus at Farid's direction, and ‘Ali Shamsi, who had been a paid agent of the Germans when the War began.⁸⁸ Jawish, on the other hand, tried to organize his own following in Berne and declared himself Vice-President of the Watani Party in the absence of Farid. When Jawish had exhausted the funds given him by the Ottoman government in the course of the War, however, he went back to

⁸⁵ On 19 December 1916, Rifa'at was described as the “head of Egyptian malcontents in Berlin” and in communication with the Sultan of Turkey. “Whilst protesting against British dominion in Egypt, Rifa'at cited the case of Poland and expressed the hope that after the war Turkey would abandon its suzerainty and give Egypt to the Egyptians.” Another report relates that, in the posting of Egypt's new constitution, Rifa'at insulted Zaghlul, whom he compared to the “group of powerful traitors in Ireland, who betrayed the Irish nation and now pose as leaders of the free state of Ireland.” (Secret, 9 April 1919, Berne, “Egyptian Nationalists and the Young Turks”; M.M. Rifa'at, *Der Patriotismus bei den Aegyptern* (Silesia, 1923), 8, 11.)

⁸⁶ Khan, 150-1.

⁸⁷ Goldschmidt, “The Egyptian Nationalist Party,” 367.

⁸⁸ Khan, 161-2.

organizing students in Germany for two years, and then returned to Egypt in 1923. While in Germany, however, he remained on the radar of British Intelligence, who believed him to be responsible for the “general exodus of Egyptian students to Berlin.”⁸⁹

Following the War, although ‘Abbas Hilmi remained a nuisance to Britain in Egypt, the British knew that most of the Egyptian nationalists and then Sultan Ahmad Fu’ad (1868-1936, r. 1917-1936) loathed him and consequently what little chance he had of achieving his ambitions. Britain, while steadily continuing to liquidate ‘Abbas Hilmi’s remaining properties in Egypt, and thus eliminating his influence even further, also exploited his machinations as a lever against Fu’ad and, after 1936, Fu’ad’s successor Farouk (r. 1936-1952), and the later Egyptian Nationalists.⁹⁰

The Watani activists found themselves having to define their position on the Wafd’s activities at a time that their own organization was not only divided in different leadership camps but also was split between those who had stayed in Egypt and the many who were only now returning. It is likely also that many of the Nationalists who returned to Egypt resented the fact that those that they had seen as British collaborators before the War, most particularly Zaghlul, were now the heroes of the nation and the independence movement for which many Watanists had faced jail and exile just a few years previously.⁹¹ The Party’s Administrative Committee decided not to work with the Wafd when it accepted the Constitution of 1923 but lost a number of its members as a result. Among these were Jawish’s supporters from the War days ‘Abd al-Malik Hamza and Isma’il Kamil, who had returned to Egypt in 1920 at Watani expense. The Geneva faction’s ‘Ali Shamsi traveled to Paris to join the Wafd while it was still campaigning

⁸⁹ FO 9187/65/16, 11 November 1923, “Activities of Abd al-Aziz Shawish;” FO 371/5021, Allenby to Curzon, Enclosure from RS Patterson, Educational Advisor, 27 March 1920; Khan, 161-2.

⁹⁰ FO 371/11579/J1756, Lord Lloyd (Cairo) to Foreign Office, 15 June 1926; McKale, 33.

⁹¹ Muhammad Fahmi actually remained in Geneva until well after the 1952 Revolution.

there and ran on their ticket for a seat in the Chamber of Deputies. He eventually became Minister of Education and then Director of the Egyptian National Bank. Amin al-Rifa'i joined the Wafd Central Committee in April 1919.⁹²

Other returnees from Europe among the Watanists chose to devote their efforts to civil and cultural organizations, with or without direct access to the political machine that was now dominated by the Wafd. Isma'il Labib set up his own "Egyptian Free Nile Union," while Amin al-Rafa'i founded an influential newspaper, *al-Akhbar*. Jawish and 'Abd al-Hamid Sa'id also ran in the 1924 elections unsuccessfully, although Sa'id would later get a seat in the Chamber of Deputies. Jawish accepted a post in the Department of Primary Education and kept it until his death in 1929; but both he and Sa'id put much of their energy in the 1920s into the Young Men's Muslim Association (YMMA), which maintained a strong relationship with the Watani Party over the following decades.

Post-War Ottoman-Egyptian Relations

British reports occasionally spoke of continuing Ottoman sentiment in Egypt after the War, or of "Young Turk" instigation of anti-British activity. But more considered British evaluations of the Egyptian nationalist movement in late 1918 and early 1919 came to the conclusion that the movement was oriented primarily toward Egyptian rather than Ottoman goals, that it was "national in the full sense of the word," and that it was equally "anti-British, anti-Sultanian, [and] anti-foreign."⁹³ Neither British nor Egyptian sources on the Revolution of 1919 indicate any direct contact between the Wafd and the Ottoman government. In fact, upon the arrival of their delegation in Paris in April 1919, the leaders of the Wafd publicly emphasized

⁹² Khan, 145.

⁹³ For reports of pro-Ottoman sentiment or Young Turk influence, see FO 407/184, nos. 23, 31, 152, 178, 191. For contrary evaluations, see FO 407/184, nos. 87, 92.

the exclusively Egyptian nationalist character of their movement and disavowed any connection with the now-discredited Young Turks.⁹⁴

A similar lack of collaboration seems to have characterized the relationship between the Wafd and the parallel Turkish nationalist movement which emerged in the early 1920s. In 1920, Lord Allenby was unable to find evidence to corroborate press reports of a financial connection between the Egyptian and Turkish nationalist movements; and, in 1922, visits to Ankara by both Wafdist and Watanist delegations were coldly received by the new Turkish government, which refused to support Egyptian admission to the post-War peace talks.⁹⁵

The success of the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923), however, quickly became a model for nationalist movements, more generally. For many nationalists, the Turkish experience in the 1920s seemed to point out the proper path to follow to attain the goals of modernity and nation-building: that of a revolution that would alter all aspects of society suddenly and thoroughly. Kemalist Turkey was also a continuous vindication of the territorial nationalist course that Egyptian intellectuals had chosen.⁹⁶

British reports in late 1922 on the Egyptian reaction to the victories of the nationalist forces led by Mustafa Kemal indicate a general Egyptian sympathy for the Turkish nationalist movement, but no sense of direct Egyptian involvement. Nevertheless, Mustafa Kemal and his movement received considerable public adulation in Egypt; Egyptians sent messages of congratulations to the Turkish nationalists for their victory over the Greeks; committees in support of the Kemalists emerged at al-Azhar; Mustafa Kemal himself was praised in the Egyptian press and by several poets; and in general the British had “no doubt that the greatest

⁹⁴ FO 407/184, no. 210, Derby to Curzon, Paris 21 April 1919.

⁹⁵ Allenby to Curzon, 5 August 1920, FO 141/433; Secret memo on “Turco-Egyptian relations,” 29 December 1922, FO 141/514; Gershoni and Jankowski, *Search for Egyptian Nationhood*, 45-7.

⁹⁶ Gershoni and Jankowski, *Search for Egyptian Nationhood*, 83.

enthusiasm and satisfaction prevails amongst all classes over the Kemalist victories.”⁹⁷ Even after the November 1922 deposition of the Ottoman Sultan, to whom many Egyptians had previously pledged their support, British reports observed that “there is a good deal of pro-Kemalist enthusiasm and propaganda in Egypt.”⁹⁸

It was the victory of the nationalists as Turkish Muslims that was emphasized by many of Egypt’s leading poets; Kemal was compared to the Muslim heroes Khalid ibn al-Walid and Salah al-Din, and Turkish nationalist military victories to the Battle of Badr. When the Kemalists’ struggle against Western domination was contrasted to the collaboration of the Sultan’s regime with the Allies, the virtues of the Turkish nationalists were extolled over the Ottoman regime, and the Sultan’s hostility to the Egyptian nationalists was criticized. British evaluations of the subject also emphasized the expectations some Egyptians entertained that Mustafa Kemal would “liberate Egypt” from Britain. And that religiously inclined Muslim Egyptians called for Egyptian support for the Turkish nationalist movement in 1922.⁹⁹ In one scenario, Mustafa Kemal was expected to follow his successes in Anatolia by reconquering Thrace, liberating Syria from the French, and then invading Egypt and entering as a conqueror. According to some Egyptians, then, “it [was] unnecessary to worry about the election of a Parliament, or about the return of Zaghlul, as Kemal will redeem his promise [sic] to bring Zaghlul back himself.”¹⁰⁰ It seems some Egyptian nationalists had not given up the hope of Ottomans, representing a bulwark against the encroachment of Western empires – an image many then associated with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, delivering Egypt from the British Occupation.

⁹⁷ Allenby to Curzon, 16 September 1922, FO 141/514; memorandum on “Kemalism and Pan-Islamism,” 4 October 1922, FO 141/514; Report on “Kemalist Propaganda,” 23 September 1922; FO 141/514

⁹⁸ Telegram from Allenby to Constantinople, 18 November 1922, FO 141/514.

⁹⁹ “Report on Kemalist Propaganda,” 18 October 1922, FO 141/514, 12390/35.

¹⁰⁰ “Report on Kemalist Propaganda,” 18 October 1922, FO 141/514, 12390/32; Gershoni and Jankowski, *Search for Egyptian Nationhood*, 45-7. See, also, 6 Jan 1914, “Young Turk Intrigue in Egypt” report, 23 March 1926, Secret, Ministry of the Interior, “Recent information regarding Turkish activities in Egypt,” FO 141/514/2: “Turco-Egyptian Intrigues,” and FO 141/515 “Turkish and Kemalist Agents.”

Chapter Seven: Inter-Colonial Connections, 1906-1928

In addition to ties with Ottoman and European state and non-state actors, the Egyptian nationalist movement drew tactical inspiration and a variety of political techniques from a larger, trans-national, anti-colonial movement already in operation in the first decades of the twentieth century. In the early twentieth century, Egyptians saw their national movement as being part of a larger, international, anti-imperial movement. If imperialism was a general source with only local variations, anti-colonial movements would have to be trans-national as well in order to defeat it. Egyptian nationalists shared with other anti-colonial nationalists a struggle for political and economic independence from the same imperial system. This was especially true of Egypt's connection with other countries colonized by Great Britain, particularly Ireland and India, which were natural allies and utilitarian partners in combating the same imperial enemy. In the first half of the twentieth century, British, Indian, Egyptian, and Irish elites alike believed that fundamental parallels existed between the countries' historical experiences, imperial governance, and resistance efforts. For this reason, Egyptians saw anti-colonial cooperation as the best way forward to achieve independence.

By the first decades of the twentieth century, the struggle for autonomy from Britain had become the most immediate element in the nationalist struggle for all three colonies - Egypt, India, and Ireland. This commonality of purpose made their anti-colonial movements and strategies even more similar. British tactics, personalities, and policies, and the nationalist reaction to each, were shared across the British colonies. There was no distinction, certainly not in the minds of Egyptian nationalists themselves, between a commitment to territorial national independence and a larger anti-colonial framework, participation in which would help to ensure

their narrower goals of independence and territorial nationalism.¹ There was a fundamentally utilitarian aspect to most of the nationalists' rhetoric and alliances; keeping this fact in mind allows one to analyze the Egyptian nationalist movement in its entirety.

The tendency to align the goals of specific nationalisms with wider anti-imperialist movements created a space for experimentation and expression among nationalists from different colonies and of a variety of political convictions. Thus, the Egyptian nationalist movement went through a process of engaging with a series of overlapping and occasionally competing definitions of nation that was reflected in their relationships, not only with the British and Ottoman Empires, but also with the movements against these empires. Despite often being anachronistically linked with nationalist movements in the "Middle East," throughout the twentieth century, Egyptian nationalists maintained much stronger ties with other anti-British colonials than they ever did with other regional (or co-religious) actors, as countries occupied by the same imperial power would be able to cultivate more useful and strategic ties than would be possible with unaffiliated colonized nations. With the Indian and Irish independence movements, Egyptian nationalists shared not only a colonial master but concrete ties of communication and collaboration initially forged in the pre-War era by individuals from each of the colonies who grew up in a world dominated by the British Empire. Egyptians very clearly saw their independence movement as part of an anti-British movement; and, while understanding the plight of other Middle Eastern colonies, did not see themselves as having any natural alliance or

¹ Jankowski and Gershoni argue that there was a fundamental shift in Egyptian nationalism in the twentieth century that focused loyalties outward at what they refer to as "supra-nationalist" identities. However, the fact that Egyptians had always had larger loyalties, sometimes in competition with and sometimes in conjunction with Egyptian territorial nationalism, such as Islamism and Ottomanism, must be included in any analysis of nineteenth and twentieth century Egyptian nationalisms. Moreover, none of Egypt's "extra-territorial" affiliations were seen by the nationalists themselves as in any way in contradiction with or superseding their search for Egyptian independence. (Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) and *Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.)

similarities with other groups in the region.² In fact, most Egyptian nationalists viewed Arab anti-Ottoman efforts to be detrimental to their own bid for independence, as the Ottoman Empire was widely seen as a potential counter-weight to British control in Egypt.

Within the general framework of the growing internationalist outlook of the early twentieth century, bilateral contacts between nationalists marked the first step toward solidarity and cooperation. According to John Stuart Mill, “Those Englishmen who know something about India are even now those who understand Ireland best.”³ Ireland and India are most often compared to one another in works on the British Empire, particularly those from the perspective of the Empire. But Egypt, anachronistically grouped with Middle Eastern colonies, also shared much with Ireland and India, in terms of both imperial policy and nationalist resistance. Throughout the period under consideration, British officials as well as Egyptian, Indian, and Irish nationalists placed the three nations within a common classification. Aside from occasional references to what they saw as a “Pan-Islamic” threat, the British themselves never grouped Egypt into discussions of Arab nationalism; nor, crucially, did the Egyptians themselves. Egyptian nationalist Mansur Rifa’at took the connection between the British colonies one step further, arguing, “As long as British imperialism continues to rule our country and to suppress our people, no soldier of our peoples should raise the weapons against his oppressed brothers, i.e. no Indian should fight in the battles of the British in Ireland and no Irish should be prepared to placate the Egyptians.”⁴

² While there certainly was some cultural affinity and sympathy toward other colonized nations, Egyptian nationalists did not see Arab nationalist movements as integral or helpful to their own movement, as discussed in chapter four of this thesis.

³ John Stuart Mill, *England and Ireland* (London, 1868), quoted in C.A. Bayly, “Ireland, India, and the Empire: 1780-1914,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, vol. 10, no. 1 (2000), 377. Irish nationalists also famously sponsored Home Rule Societies in India.

⁴ *Der Neue Orient*, Berlin, nos. 1-2, 1919, p. 33.

The connection between Ireland and India – both in terms of circumstances and leadership connections – has been increasingly validated by scholars.⁵ However, Egypt does not normally enter this discussion; yet Egypt was clearly a part of these broader movements. Egyptians, as well as the Indians and the Irish, placed Egypt within a self-identified group of anti-British, anti-colonial nationals. The growing calls for national self-determination within the Empire were cumulative and mutually reinforcing, and the British themselves viewed the three movements as dangerously interconnected.⁶

For their part, the British, on the other hand, were concerned about the effect the example of any one of the three colonies might have on the others.⁷ The British were certain that concessions in one colony would be demanded in the others; and they clearly saw the occupation of and resistance from the three national groups as intimately interconnected. In the view of the British government, the Egyptian case was closely interlocked with the Irish problem. They saw a step back from anything but full power in Cairo as a warning of a possible retreat in Dublin. Attacking the proposals of the Milner Mission to grant Egypt greater autonomy in 1920, then Minister of Air Winston Churchill wrote: “If we leave out the word ‘Egypt’ ...and substitute the word ‘Ireland,’ it would with very small omissions make perfectly good sense and would

⁵ See, for example, Kate O’Malley, *Ireland, India and Empire: Indo-Irish radical Connections, 1919-1964* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2010); C.A. Bayly, “Ireland, India, and the Empire: 1780-1914,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Sixth Series, Volume 10 (2000), p. 377-397; Michael Silvestri, “‘The Sinn Fein of India’: Irish Nationalism and the Policing of Revolutionary Terrorism in Bengal” *The Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 29, No.4 (October 2000), p. 454-486.

⁶ There was a particularly strong sense of solidarity and exchange of ideas and resistance tactics among regions subjected to the same imperial power, as Anderson has shown in the case of the Spanish Empire with Cuba and the Philippines, and the revolutionary webs connecting them. (Benedict Anderson, *Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination* (London: Verso, 2005.))

⁷ Bayly, “Ireland, India, and the Empire,” 377-8.

constitute a complete acceptance of [Irish nationalist and Sinn Fein leader] Mr. [Eamon] de Valera's demands."⁸

The literature specifically on the issue of Egyptian-Indian connections is scant; and, while the connection between Irish and Indian nationalists has begun to be explored, Egyptian-Irish networks have not until recently begun to receive scholarly attention.⁹ Similarly, with the exception of a few articles written on the role of India-trained British officials in Egypt, most of the works connecting the two regions do so in terms of Pan-Islamism or, much later, the modern Non-Aligned Movement. While several historians of the British Empire have shown that empire-wide "problems" and British reactions to them should be studied in tandem, few have focused their attention on the interconnections between the anti-imperialist nationalists themselves.¹⁰ Roger Owen's article on Lord Cromer's "Indian Experience" and his more recent book on Cromer address the impact of time in service of the British Raj on imperial administrators; and Robert Tignor has argued for the "Indianization" of the Egyptian administration under British authorities.¹¹ These works explore the effect of service in India on British colonial officials in the first years of the Occupation of Egypt, but they are not concerned with the connections between Indian and Egyptian populations. Both Donald Reid and 'Afaf Marsot have also mentioned Cromer's Indian ties in their works, but only Elie Kedourie's and Jacob Landau's works on the

⁸ Churchill, Cabinet Memorandum, "The Egyptian Proposals," 24 May 1920, Montagu Papers; John Gallagher, "Nationalisms and the Crisis of Empire, 1919-1922," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1981), 362.

⁹ For the best of the recent works on this topic, see Kate O'Malley, *Ireland, India and Empire: Indo-Irish Radical Connections, 1919-64* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008) and Noor-Aiman I. Khan, *Egyptian-Indian Nationalist Collaboration and the British Empire* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.)

¹⁰ See, for example, John Gallagher, "Nationalisms and the Crisis of Empire, 1919-1922," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1981.)

¹¹ See Roger Owen, "The Influence of Lord Cromer's Indian experience on British Policy in Egypt, 1883-1907," *St. Antony's Papers*, No. 17 (1965); Robert Tignor, "The 'Indianization' of the Egyptian Administration under British Rule," *American Historical Review* (April 1963); and Roger Owen, *Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

caliphate really draw direct connections between the populations of the two colonies.¹² However, like Martin Kramer, Kedourie and Landau place Indian-Egyptian contacts in a “Pan-Islamic” context, an approach that conceals more than it exposes.¹³ Similarly, the majority of post-World War I scholarship which discusses Indian-Egyptian contacts refers to Pan-Islamism and the Caliphate issue. However, there were other, more significant lines of communication and the reliance on “Islamism” as an explanation distorts the true nature of these alliances.¹⁴

The Example of Ireland

Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, British policy makers and commentators, as well as Egyptians, Indians, and Irish themselves, clearly grouped Egypt within the nexus of an anti-British, anti-colonial, nationalist struggle. As anti-imperialist Wilfrid Scawen Blunt remarked, the Gladstone cabinet, which ordered repression in Ireland, was also the one which crushed the Egyptian national movement.¹⁵ According to Blunt, “the two causes, the Irish and the Egyptian, the Catholic and the Mohammedan [sic], seemed to me to stand on a common footing of enlightened humanity.”¹⁶ Blunt also observed that the “connection of misfortunes between the two countries (Egypt and Ireland) was a fatality, not a little tragical both in the countries themselves and doubly so to English honour.”¹⁷ According to Blunt, there was a

¹² Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islamism: Ideology and Organization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) and Elie Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle-Eastern Studies* (New York: Praeger, 1970); ‘Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt’s Liberal Experiment, 1922-1936* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Donald M. Reid, *Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.)

¹³ Martin Kramer, *Islam Assembled: the Advent of Muslim Congresses* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

¹⁴ Indeed, both of the major Egyptian nationalist parties, as well as the Indian National Congress, consistently defined their aims in terms of secular, territorial nation-states.

¹⁵ For Gladstone’s policy on Ireland, see David George Boyce and Alan O’Day, *Gladstone and Ireland: Politics, Religion, and Nationality in the Victorian Age* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

¹⁶ Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *The Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt: Being a Personal Narrative of Events* (New York: H. Fertig, 1922), 110.

¹⁷ Blunt, *Secret History*, 110.

“curious connection between Egypt and Ireland in the political ideas of the day. His (Irish Peer Lord Miltown, 1835-1890) account of Ireland is singularly like that of Egypt by Egyptian officials.”¹⁸ The trajectories of Egypt and Ireland, in particular, can also be compared because the composition of new national leaderships did, in fact, begin to consolidate within the context of interrelated developments in the British imperial system.¹⁹ At least in the early inter-war period, Egypt and Ireland were arguably more alike than either was to India, as a result of the similar timelines of the 1916 Easter Uprising, the 1919 Egyptian Revolution, and the near simultaneous changes of status for the colonies in 1922.²⁰

As an inspiration and example for other nationalist movements, Irish nationalism is most often associated with Indian nationalism, but its influence can also be identified in Egypt, particularly in the 1919 Egyptian Revolution.²¹ The Nationalist movement in Egypt and the search for a constitutional settlement inevitably drew comparisons with Ireland and the 1916 Uprising. For example, in a 1922 memo, High Commissioner Lord Edmund Allenby (1861-1936) warned that the success of Irish nationalists might encourage Egyptians to follow similar methods. According to Allenby, the Irish settlement would not have much effect except to show Egypt that violence was the shortcut to concessions and that Egyptians would compare the

¹⁸ Blunt, *Secret History*, 220. For a biography of Wilfrid Blunt, see Elizabeth Longford, *A Pilgrimage of Passion: the Life of Wilfrid Scawen Blunt* (New York: Knopf, 1979).

¹⁹ Rifa'at authored a book, published by the Patrie Egyptienne group in Geneva, entitled *Le Probleme de L'Ulster* 1914 criticizing British policy in Ireland. (M.M. Rifa'at, et al, *Le Probleme de l'Ulster: malicieuse attaque dirigee contre la nation Irlandaise* (Geneva: Patrie Egyptienne, 1914).

²⁰ As a result of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, signed 6 December 1921; the Irish Free State created by the Treaty came into force on 6 December 1922 by royal proclamation following the approval of the Irish constitution. While it did not grant Ireland republican status, under the Treaty Ireland became a self-governing dominion with complete independence in domestic affairs, power to levy all taxes, regulate foreign trade, raise an army, and considerable freedom in the realm of foreign policy. A stark difference between Egypt and Ireland, however, is the rise to prominence of the more militant Sinn Fein movement, which displaced the moderate nationalist Irish Parliamentary Party following the Easter Uprising. In Egypt, on the other hand, the more radical Watani Party was replaced by the moderate Wafd Party following World War I and the 1919 Revolution.

²¹ For examples of contemporary commentary drawing attention to the similarities between the situations in Ireland and Egypt, see *The Times*, 19 April 1919 and 20 December 1920.

concessions granted to Ireland with those refused to Egypt.²² In fact, Allenby's analysis was proven to be correct when Egyptian nationalists went on to use the example of the Anglo-Irish agreement of 1921 in their own push for a guarantee of independence in 1922.

Interestingly, while the British government remained concerned about the fraternization of Egyptian and Indian nationalists, it was Egypt and Ireland which they tended to group together in terms of policy. The very similar timelines of the two colonies, and the dual Irish and Egyptian "disasters" following World War I likely account for this. The Whig Party in Parliament, led by Lord Harrington, successfully urged "intervention," in Egypt. Egyptian historian Afaf Lutfi Sayyid-Marsot attributes the internal British division on the issue of the status of Egypt between the more conciliatory and liberal Gladstone and the more hardline Whigs to a similar split on the Irish issue.²³ For example, incidents in Ireland reflected heavily on British policy in Egypt when the brother of Lord Hartington was assassinated.²⁴ In the Egyptian context, one important result of the assassination was Hartington's (and others') hard line against 'Urabi and Egypt. As for the Tory opposition, Sir Edward Hamilton, Private Secretary to Gladstone, remarked in his diary in June 1882 that "Ireland has been up till now the chief course of their violent language; now it is Egypt as well."²⁵ Ireland also featured prominently in the journal *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa*, jointly edited by Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh and widely read by nationalists in Egypt. Under the heading Ireland, they wrote,

²² Archibald Wavell, *Allenby: A Study in Greatness* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1941.)

²³ Afaf Lutfi Sayyid-Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer; a Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1969), 22.

²⁴ On 5 May 1882, Lord Hartington's brother, Lord Frederick Cavendish, who had just been appointed Chief Secretary in Dublin, was, together with his Permanent Secretary, murdered while returning on foot to his official residence. This crime became known as the Phoenix Park Murders. The assassins were associated with the Fenians of the Irish Republican Brotherhood.

²⁵ Sir E.W. Hamilton, D.W.R. Dahlman (ed.), *The Diary 1880-1885* (Oxford, 1972), vol. 1, 292.

Every day the English put forward proof by way of logic and evidence by way of argument that they only went to Egypt with the intention of safeguarding the peace and laying the foundation of justice, but whenever they set up their premises to convince the naïve by their famous judicial arguments, the Irish contradict them with practical proofs which demolish their premises and nullify their result. For hardly a moment passes without their acting to break the power of the English government in Ireland.²⁶

The Egyptians were all too aware of the juxtaposition of British imperial rhetoric, which justified colonization on the basis of a “civilizing mission,” and the reality of Occupation.

Irish nationalists were, likewise, interested in events taking place in Egypt. According to Indian nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose (1897-1945), “outside their own shores the two countries which interested [the Irish] the most were India and Egypt.”²⁷ Among the foremost Irish supporters of Egyptian independence was Lady Gregory (1852-1932), an Irish nationalist who was active in the cause of Egypt and who received what she described as her “education in politics” from her time there.²⁸ With her husband, Sir William Gregory, she travelled to Egypt in 1881; and while there, she “first felt the real excitement of politics, for [she] tumbled into a Revolution.”²⁹ While in Egypt, Lord and Lady Gregory became frequent visitors to Ahmed ‘Urabi’s house in Cairo, and Lady Gregory formed friendships with his wife and mother, as well. In 1882, Lady Gregory published a monograph entitled “Urabi and His Household,” which also appeared serialized in *The Times*. Her aim was to provide a human and personal account of ‘Urabi, counteracting the imperial propaganda, which made him out to be a bloodthirsty militarist, a backward fanatic, or both. ‘Urabi reciprocated her friendship and later presented her

²⁶ *Al-Urwa al-Wuthqa*, Third edition, Beirut, 1351/1933, p. 304-5.

²⁷ Subhas Chandra Bose, *Letters, Articles, Speeches, and Statements, 1933-1937* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), 352.

²⁸ Isabella Augusta Gregory was an Irish writer and folklorist. She co-founded the Irish Literary Theatre and Abbey Theatre with William Butler Yeats and Edward Martyn, and was a critical force in the Irish Literary Revival of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. James L. Pethica, ‘Gregory , (Isabella) Augusta, Lady Gregory (1852–1932),’ *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edition, Oct 2006. [<http://www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/view/article/33554>, accessed 23 Sept 2013]

²⁹ Lady Gregory, *Seventy Years: Being the Autobiography of Lady Gregory* (New York: Macmillan, 1974), 34.

with his portrait, signed and dedicated to her. When the Gregorys returned to London in 1882, they launched a strong campaign against British interference in Egypt.³⁰

The British were also concerned with Irish, and particularly Irish-American, attitudes to British imperial action in Egypt.³¹ Both the Foreign Office and Cairo Embassy catalogued numerous newspaper clippings from Ireland and the United States critical of the British presence in Egypt. Importation of this “seditious” material came first from England and America in the shape of the *Indian Sociologist* of London and occasional articles in *The Gaelic American* of New York. Paris and San Francisco also became centers for the preparation and distribution of revolutionary print to be sent to the colonies, with the appearance of the *Bande Mataram* and the pamphlets of the Ghadr Party, respectively.³²

The Indian Connection

In addition to the Irish influence, the example of India’s nationalist movement was also considerable for Egyptians. Beyond the truism that control of Egypt was crucial to Britain’s

³⁰ Lord and Lady Gregory were closely connected to Wilfred Scawen Blunt and his anti-imperialist activities.

³¹ The British were particularly concerned about the newspaper *The Gaelic American*.

³² James Campbell Ker, *Political Trouble in India* (Delhi: Oriental Publishers, 1973), 64. *The Indian Sociologist: An Organ of Freedom, and Political, Social, and Religious Reform* was edited by Krishnavarma 1905-1914 and then 1920-1922. Originally produced in London, publication moved to Paris in 1907 and remained there until 1914 when Krishnavarma moved to Geneva. While there, Krishnavarma abandoned publication under pressure from Swiss authorities; publication resumed in 1920, and continued until 1922. The stated purpose of *The Indian Sociologist*, as described in its first issue, was to “endeavor to inculcate the great sociological truth that ‘it is impossible to join injustice and brutality abroad with justice and humanity at home.’”

The Gaelic American was a weekly publication under the same ownership as *Irish Nation*. The paper worked together with Indian nationalist organizations in Britain and the United States, including India House in London and its sister organizations in New York. It frequently reprinted articles from *The Indian Sociologist*, and *Gaelic American* editor George Freeman was an associate of Krishnavarma. *The Gaelic American* also developed close cooperation with the nationalist political journal, *Free Hindustan*. (Harold Fischer-Tine, “Indian Nationalism and the “World Forces”: Transnational and Diasporic Dimensions of the Indian Freedom Movement on the Eve of the First World War,” *Journal of Global History*, vol. 2 (2007), 325-344.)

The first edition of *Bande Mataram*, self-described as “a monthly organ of Indian Independence,” is dated Geneva, 10 September 1909, and on the front page it is stated that “all communications should be addressed to Madame Cama, Poste Restante, Geneva, Switzerland.” (Ker, 113)

The Ghadr Party was founded by Punjabi Indians in the United States and Canada with the aim of liberating India from British rule.

control of India, Egyptian nationalists also recognized that Indians had been working against colonial control for a generation longer than they themselves had, and Egyptian activists availed themselves of Indian experience and support from the very beginning of the twentieth century.³³ At international conferences as well as formal and informal meetings, Egyptians met with Indians and many other colonized peoples to discuss their programs, goals, and philosophies. Coverage of Indian affairs in the Egyptian native press also included a great deal of discussion of imperial and nationalist concerns; and the interaction of colonial expatriates, particularly students, in the European metropolises was documented by a number of contemporaries, including the British who remained concerned about the potential alliance.

Cooperation between Indians and Egyptians is evident in the print materials they produced in this period, as well. In July 1909, the Egyptian periodical *al-Hurriya* published a series of articles examining imperialism, and compared the British imperial project in India and Egypt.³⁴ One article bluntly stated that “the aim of imperialists/colonialists is well known: they consider the colony a milking cow to be milked for as long as possible,” and pointed out that Indians were “working towards national liberation more actively than...our brothers...the Egyptians, and establishing schools funded by wealthy Indians,” which were unmatched steps when it came to the liberation of peoples and individuals.³⁵ In their struggle for national liberation the Indians did not content themselves with establishing schools, the article continued, but founded India House, an organization that advocated political assassination as a necessary means for liberation, in London. Political assassination, in that case, was morally and legally

³³ For an explanation of the theory that the British Occupation of Egypt was predicated on controlling access to India, see, for example, *Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism* (London: Macmillan, 1961). For critical analysis of Robinson and Gallagher’s argument, see A.G. Hopkins, “The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882,” *Journal of African History*, vol. 27 (1986)

³⁴ *Al-Hurriya*, 11 July 1909.

³⁵ “Kharijiyya: Shay’ ‘an al-hind: Jihad fi sabil al-Hurriya,” *al-Hurriya*, 24 July 1909, 14.

justifiable, and those who engaged in it “followed the paths of saints.”³⁶ *Al-Hurriya*’s coverage of Indian resistance movements and assassination attempts continued throughout 1909; in each article, the author approved in no uncertain terms of the use of violence for national liberation. Hailing as a hero Madan Lal Dhingra, the student who killed Sir Curzon Wylie in London and was subsequently hanged, the author asserted that Lal Dhingra’s single action was greater than if “a million Indians bore arms to liberate India.”³⁷

The Indian press in Paris repeatedly proclaimed its solidarity with the Egyptian cause. Both sides attempted to create a common discourse of martyrdom, for instance comparing the fate of Madan Lal Dhingra with the execution of the “brave Egyptian martyr” Ibrahim Nassif El-Wardani, who in February of 1910 had killed Prime Minister Butrus Ghali of Egypt in retaliation for his close collaboration with the British occupation.³⁸ In October 1910, the Indian nationalist Shyamji Krishnavarma even offered a “thousand franc prize for an essay on the best means of attaining Egyptian emancipation from the robber rule of England, the common enemy of India and Egypt.”³⁹ The Indian and Egyptian nationalists also exchanged material to be used for publication. In 1914, for instance, Indian activist Bhikaiji (Madame) Cama lent Mansur Rifa’at, editor of the nationalist publication *La Patrie Egyptienne*, blocks of photographs of the Indian “martyr” Dhingra, which were then published in the Egyptian journal.⁴⁰

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

³⁷ “Kharijiyya: Al-Hind ‘Ala tariq al-Istiqlal wa’l-Hurriyya,” *al-Hurriyya*, 7 August 1909, 47; Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, *The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860-1914* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2010), 109-110.

³⁸ Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 27 September 1910, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collection (OIOC), POS 3095.

³⁹ Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 8 November 1910, BL, OIOC, POS 3095.

⁴⁰ Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 5 May 1914, BL, OIOC, POS 3095. For further examples of anti-imperialist nationalist issues addressed in *La Patrie Egyptienne*, see, e.g., issues of 15 February 1914 and 13 July 1914, which focus on Krishnavarma, racism in the United States, Ulster, Har Dayal, the India Committee, and Savarkar.

European Interactions

Before World War I, the significant connections between Egyptian and Indian nationalists centered not in the colonies, but in the metropolises of Europe. At this time, the Egyptian nationalist movement was most coherently organized around the Watani Party and its president after 1908, Muhammad Farid. The Indian counterpart of the Watani Party, the “extremist” or “Tilak” group, while not organized formally as a party at all, was nevertheless the most visibly activist of the Indian nationalist groups both in India and abroad; and it was this group which reached out to Egyptian and other nationalist movements in the first decades of the twentieth century.⁴¹ Connections between Egyptian and the Indian nationalists were forged, then, between the Watanists and the “extremists,” rather than between the “moderates” of each colony that would eventually come to represent the nationalists of the inter-war era.⁴²

Watani leader Mustafa Kamil’s frequent trips abroad put him in contact with European sympathizers as well as other colonial nationalists who were active in European capitals. It was in the cities of Europe – London, Paris, Berne, Berlin, and Vienna – that concrete alliances between Egyptian nationalists and their counterparts from other colonies were solidified; and Egyptian revolutionaries living abroad had numerous, close contacts with Indian nationalists. Not only did Indian nationalists share a common enemy with the Egyptians, both also shared allies among European socialists and Irish revolutionaries. The initial contact between Egyptian and Indian nationalists occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century, when relatively large numbers of Egyptian students began to go abroad for study, mostly to France and Britain but also

⁴¹ Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920) had been convicted of inciting the murder of a British plague inspector in Poona in 1897. He had claimed that the inspector had brought his fate upon himself through his high-handed behavior with natives, and that the only way to make the British leave was through violence. His inspiration, along with that of Bipin Chandra Pal (1858-1932) and Lala Lajpat Rai (1865-1928) led to the identification of the Indian nationalists who demanded a complete break with Britain as the Lal-Bal-Pal group.

⁴² The Wafd and Congress Parties, respectively.

to Germany and Switzerland. Kamil recorded that he met Indian students during his visit to London the summer following Dinshawai (1906), and that the connection was continued on his second trip the following year.⁴³ On 24 July 1907, Kamil attended with W.S. Blunt a reception held by the Pan-Islamic Society in London. ‘Abdallah Suhrawardy, a vice-president of Indian Home Rule Society and Honorary Secretary of the Pan-Islamic Society, welcomed the “Egyptian hero” thus:

Return to your beloved country, and continue your struggle for freedom, and in moments of dejection and despair, remember that you are not quite alone, that henceforth the best wishes and dwellers of the banks of the Rhine and Danube, the Ganges and the Euphrates, accompany the efforts of a son of the valley of the Nile.⁴⁴

The exposure of Egyptians to Indians living or studying in Europe began at approximately the same time that students became active in forming “social” expatriate organizations, which often became political circles as well. Among the most famous of these salons was that of Madame Cama in Paris. In August 1910, Madame Cama received several visits from Mohammad Farid, who in 1908 had become the successor of Mustafa Kamil as the President of the Egyptian National Party.⁴⁵ Farid mentions her warmly in his memoirs, and according to police reports,

⁴³ Mustafa Kamil, *Al-masa’ala as-Sharqiyya*. British anti-imperialists were quick to seize the Dinshawai incident to criticize the actions of Cromer in Egypt. Wilfrid Blunt, who had earlier supported Urabi, now received Kamil for the first time and penned a bitter pamphlet, *Atrocities of Justice under British Rule in Egypt* (London: T.F. Unwin, 1906). Later he and his supporters subscribed over £200 for the construction of a school in Dinshawai. His views found support among such writers as George Bernard Shaw, who described the Dinshawai Incident in his preface to *John Bull’s Other Island* (New York: Brentano, 1907), and were echoed in the House of Commons by the Irish nationalists and the Radical wing of the Liberal Party. Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, was subjected to recurrent and hostile questioning, especially by the Irish MP John Dillon (1851-1927), about British rule in Egypt (*Hansard*, 4th series, House of Commons, CLVII, 1366f; CLIX, 361, 956, 1111, 1133-35, 1411-1414); and a group of Radicals, headed by John M. Robertson, formed the “Egyptian Committee” to investigate conditions in that country. (Arthur Goldschmidt, *The Nationalist Party of Egypt*, PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 1968, p. 131-2)

⁴⁴ Indulal Yajnik, *Shyamaji Krishnavarma, Life and Times of an Indian Revolutionary* (Bombay: Lakshmi Publications, 1950), 208-9.

⁴⁵ Bhikaji Rustom Cama (1861-1936) was posthumously named the “mother of the Indian revolution.” Born to a wealthy Parsi family, Cama went to Paris to recover from the plague in 1901. She spent most of her life in Europe working on behalf of Indian independence, only returning to India, negotiated under certain conditions, in 1935. Muhammad Lutfi Goma’a wrote a moving eulogy to Cama a year after her death, “Wataniyyat al-parsee fil hind wa man takun Madam Cama,” *Muhallat al-Rabita al-‘Arabiyya*, 6 October 1937 (Issue 70), p. 12-15, which was reprinted in M.L. Goma’a, *Mabahith fi al-Tarikh* (Cairo: ‘Alam al-Kutub, 2001).

Farid was introduced to Madame Cama by French Socialist Jean Longuet (1876-1938.)⁴⁶ Both Farid and British Criminal Intelligence noted that Cama's home was a gathering place for activists from India, Egypt, Ireland, and other colonies, as well as members of the early Socialist movement.⁴⁷ Among Madame Cama's many regular visitors, in addition to Farid, were Shayamji Krishnavarma, Jean Longuet, the Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi, and the M.P. of the Socialist Party in Britain, Kier Hardie.⁴⁸

The connections between these anti-British, anti-colonial nationalists became deeper and more comprehensive during the first decade of the twentieth century when nationalist movements in Asia and Europe were becoming more active and garnering more national and international attention. An "Indo-Egyptian Nationalist Association" was founded in London in January 1909, the objectives of which were "to promote social intercourse between Indians and Egyptians, and thus to bring the two nations into contact with each other in order to gain India for the Indians and Egypt for the Egyptians."⁴⁹ The British authorities at the time consoled themselves with the thought that this Indo-Egyptian Association was not closely related to the Egyptian Students Association, the largest Egyptian association in England, "as the majority of

Prior to the 1910 Egyptian Congress, Madame Cama received many visits from a man "who came to her house in a motor car," according to British intelligence. The man was later recognized as Farid. Korshed Adi Sethna, *Madame Bhikhaji Rustom Cama* (New Delhi: Publications Division, Govt. of India, 1987), 81.

⁴⁶ Many of the India House members who later joined Cama's salons in 1909 had decidedly socialist leanings, not in small part because of the considerable support they had been given by the French, and even British, Socialist Parties. They also admired the Russian anti-Tsarists, both for their ideology and their methods. Indeed, Cama had said that "only Russian methods" would free India. In addition, the manual on how to make bombs that Savarkar used and sent to India was procured by Cama from Russian revolutionaries in Paris. (NAI: Foreign Department, Secret Internal, Feb 1910, nos. 56-59, and NAI: Home, Political Department, October 1910, Nos. 1-18 B, quoted in Indulal Yajnik, *Shyamaji Krishnavarma: Life and Times of an Indian Revolutionary* (Bombay: Lakshmi, 1950), 234;)

⁴⁷ Muhammad Farid, *Mudhakirradi ba'ad al-hijra (1904-1919)*, Ed. 'Asim ad-Desuqi, collected in Awraq Muhammad Farid, Vol. I (Cairo: Al-Haya Misriyya al-'amma lil Kitab, 1978), 210-15.

⁴⁸ Shyamji Krishna Varma (1857-1930) was an Indian nationalist, lawyer, and journalist. Krishnavarma founded the Indian Home Rule Society and India House in London in 1905, as well as publishing the influential *Indian Sociologist*. Krishnavarma moved to Paris in 1907, fearing prosecution from British authorities.

James Kier Hardie (1856-1915) was a Scottish socialist and the first independent Labour Member of Parliament. He was active in anti-colonial causes, and was eulogized as the most loved and most hated man in Britain by the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.

⁴⁹ NAI: Home, Political Department, July 1909, No. 19.

Egyptians,” according to the British, “hate Indians.”⁵⁰ Whatever the opinions of the Egyptian Association, the Watani-sympathetic Egyptians cultivated long-term working and personal relationships with Indian nationalists. Watanist ‘Issam Diya al-Din claimed that Muhammad Farid was turned to the use of secret societies and violence directly by his association with Irish and Indian revolutionaries. Diya al-Din noted that Farid’s paper, *al-Liwa*, reported – indeed, celebrated – nationalist violence in India, particularly by students, in at least six articles between May 1908 and January 1909.⁵¹ According to London intelligence, a meeting of Watani nationalists was held at Caxton Hall in London in 1909 to express support for the decision of the Indian nationalists to hold a congress at Nagpur. A noticeable feature of this meeting was the attempt to create an entente with other oppressed nationalities, including Persians, the Young Turk Party, Young Egyptians, and the Irish.⁵²

In addition to the many anti-colonial and nationalist conferences held in Europe in the pre-War period, there is considerable evidence of personal friendships between Indian and Egyptian nationalists. Indian and Egyptian activists in Berlin often worked together. Indian nationalist P.T. Acharya, for instance, thought that his Egyptian friends in Berlin were “better” than his Indian ones. He knew Mansur Rifa’at from the time of Indian-Egyptian cooperation in the context of the Egyptian national Congress held in Brussels in 1910.⁵³ Similarly, Muhammad Farid remembered prominent Indian revolutionary “Chatto” (Virendranath Chattopadhyaya)

⁵⁰ NAI: Home, Political Deposit, April 1909, no. 21-26. The British were particularly wary of the political activities of students in Europe. One can only assume that the British presumed there would be discord between Egyptian and Indian nationalists because of the British government’s own obsession with casting populations in terms of religion.

⁵¹ Issam Diya’ al-Din, *Al-hizb al-watani wa al-nidal al-sirri, 1907-1915* (Cairo: al-Hay’ah al-Misriyal al-Ammah lil-Kitab, 1987), 65. In 1899, Mustafa Kamil bought a printing press in Europe, hired a small Egyptian staff, and published the first issue of *al-Liwa* (The Banner) on 2 January 1900. Although its circulation was modest for the first few years (estimated at 1500-2000 copies per day in 1903), *al-Liwa* was soon recognized as the foremost spokesman for Egyptian nationalism. (Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., “The Egyptian Nationalist Party,” (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 1968), 105).

⁵² Secret DCI, Calcutta, B. February 1909, Nos. 2-11; Secret No. 3, March 1909, Nos. 148-150; FO No. 104620, 9 July 1919, Basil Thompson to R. Graham, Memo on Indian and Egyptian Conspirators in England, Directorate of Intelligence, Special Report No. 3, Confidential.

⁵³ Extract from a letter dated 4 September 1923, Berlin No. 21, from P.T. Acharya, BL, OIOC, L P&J 12 102.

fondly in his memoirs, and the Criminal Intelligence Division reported that Chattopadhyaya moved into the same building as Farid in Paris when his own flat was being remodeled.⁵⁴ Another Indian “said to be an intimate friend of Madan Lal Dhingra” stopped in Egypt on the way back to India from England to visit the Watanist Hamid al-Ahly.⁵⁵ The two had apparently been friends at Oxford; and Har Dayal stayed with one of the members of Nassif al-Wardani’s secret society when he initially went to Constantinople.⁵⁶

Among the most important Indian influences on Egyptian nationalism, and particularly worrying from the perspective of the British government, was the “notorious” Shayamji Krishnavarma.⁵⁷ An accomplished scholar of Sanskrit and the first Indian M.A. from Oxford, Krishnavarma had established the Indian Home Rule Society in London in 1905. He also established a fellowship in honor of his hero Herbert Spencer for Indian students to study in England on condition of not accepting employment in the Indian Government afterwards. His friend Sardarsingh Rewabhai Rana (1878-1957), a merchant in Paris, established three more scholarships the same year with the same conditions. In response to concerns that the Spencer and Shivaji scholars would not be able to find lodging in the colleges, Krishnavarma established

⁵⁴ NAI: Home, Political B, June 1912, no. 37-40, p. 12.

⁵⁵ NAI: Home, Political B, October 1910, no. 1-8, CID Weekly Report, 6 September 1910; PRO: FO 371/894, p. 8-9.

⁵⁶ Lala Har Dayal (1881-1949) gave up his Government of India scholarship to Oxford when he came to the conclusion it was a form of accepting British claims on India. He was one of the foremost Indian revolutionaries and continued his activism from the United States, starting the “Ghadr movement.” By 1918, however, he had changed his mind entirely, and became a supporter of Britain’s role in India. Har Dayal was also a key organizer of one of the major “Pan-Islamic” plots of World War I, a plan to set up a Provisional Government of India in Afghanistan and convince the ruler to join in an attack on northern India. The plot has been examined extensively in the literature on Pan-Islamism, as much of the funding was provided by the Ottomans. However, the group of Indians who went to Afghanistan included Har Dayal’s Ghadr colleague Barakutallah, along with a Hindu prince, Raja Mahendra Pratap, who had contacted Chattopadhyaya through Krishnavarma. Though the group met with Mehmed V, Enver Pasha, and even the Khedive before starting for Afghanistan, the prominence of Hindus in the plan indicates an anti-British alliance even more than “Pan-Islamism.” The Indians did indeed set up a Provisional Government of India and tried to coordinate an uprising in India with an attack from Afghanistan. The discovery of the “Silk Letter Plot” by Criminal Intelligence may have prevented considerable complications for the British during the War. For Har Dayal’s biography, see Emily Brown, *Lala Har Dayal: Hindu Revolutionary and Rationalist* (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1975.)

⁵⁷ “Notorious,” according to *The Times* of London.

a boarding house and cultural center named India House in Highgate.⁵⁸ The house soon became the central headquarters for “revolutionary Indians” and was called the “most dangerous organization outside India.”⁵⁹ India House was shut down by British authorities one month after the assassination of Sir William Curzon-Wylie (1848-1909), although most of the residents relocated to an “Indian Restaurant” at Red Lion Passage.⁶⁰ Most of the India House group left England within the year because of intense police scrutiny, although the group quickly reorganized around Madame Cama in Paris.

Nationalist Journalism in European Metropolises

The decade immediately preceding the First World War witnessed an explosion of nationalist journalism in both Egypt and India. While there has been considerable scholarly interest shown in the effect of these papers on their local readers, their role as avenues of communication across colonies has attracted less attention, except with respect to the alarm about increasing “Pan-Islamism.” However, the horizontal communication provided by these publications was actually more crucial to the unification of nationalist elites from various colonies. These papers shared not only articles, but sometimes mailings, and, occasionally, personnel. In addition, as a result of the circulation of these publications, prominent nationalists were able to share strategies and information. There was considerable interaction between the editors and promoters of these organs, which demonstrates not only the increasing sophistication of the nationalists but also the international character of their movements. However, crucially, these print media were not generally distributed vertically, leaving domestic populations separated from nationalist leaders in Europe. Therefore, these publications helped to create a

⁵⁸ Hugh O’Donnell introduced Mustafa Kamil to India House during his visit to Britain in July 1906.

⁵⁹ Valentine Chirol, *Indian Unrest* (London: Macmillan, 1910), 148; Khan, 61-2.

⁶⁰ HO 144/AI/180952.

trans-national anti-colonial elite without, particularly in the Egyptian case, necessarily motivating or organizing their potential domestic constituency.

Throughout the cities of Europe, anti-colonial nationalists traded and shared publications in attempts to advertise their respective causes and coordinate information and strategies. Among the most well-known nationalist publications was Krishnavarma's *The Indian Sociologist*, which functioned as the official organ of the Indian nationalist Home Rule Society.⁶¹ The banner of the *Sociologist* included a quote from Herbert Spencer, "Resistance to aggression is not simply justifiable but imperative, non-resistance hurts both altruism and egoism."⁶² The publication carried articles on a number of colonial matters, including issues that affected Irish and Egyptian nationalists. For example, in addition to publishing *La Marseillaise* in Urdu, Hindi, Gujarati, Bengali, and Marathi for his readers, Krishnavarma included prominent articles on Ireland and Egypt. Banned in India, notes on the articles and circulation of *The Indian Sociologist* were a regular feature in British Criminal Intelligence Division reports.⁶³ It was institutions like India House and *The Indian Sociologist* which led to the creation of a supervisory office for Indians abroad, who were "liable to drift into bad company."⁶⁴ This "bad company" often included Egyptian students, and a similar office was subsequently created to track Egyptian movements.

The authorities were well aware of the importance of the press in the nationalist movements, as evidenced by the fact that a weekly Report of the Vernacular Press was compiled for the intelligence services of both the Government of India and the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior. The difficulties of controlling the "native presses" of the colonies and their European counterparts were complicated by the multiple jurisdictions the British authorities attempted to

⁶¹ *The Indian Sociologist* was started in London by Krishnavarma in January 1905, and appeared regularly every month until July 1914.

⁶² Emily Brown, *Har Dayal, Hindu Revolutionary and Rationalist* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1975.)

⁶³ Khan, 62-3.

⁶⁴ FO 371/1363; note from India Office to Grey, p. 65.

juggle. The anti-colonial movement extended across the globe, so that British measures to cope with increasing rebellion in their colonies in the early twentieth century had them searching for seditious mailings from the United States, Switzerland, and France, as well as Germany and Russia. According to J.C. Ker of the Indian Civil Service, “The censorship imposed on mails...during World War One...indicated the magnitude of the evil, and the extent to which the measures adopted [by the British government] in times of peace were defective.”⁶⁵

For example, *Al-Liwa* and its European language versions often carried articles from Krishnavarma’s *Indian Sociologist* and Cama’s *Bande Mataram*. Indeed, one of the reasons for the existence of *The Egyptian Standard* and *L’Etendard Egyptienne* (the English and French versions of *al-Liwa*, respectively) was to communicate with sympathizers from other movements, including the Indian and Irish nationalists, as well as Socialists and European sympathizers.⁶⁶ A newspaper funded by Madame Cama was started in Berlin in 1911 as well; the publication *Talvar* was edited by Chattopadhyaya and modeled on *Bande Mataram*, but couched toward a German audience, an idea that Savarkar had pushed before his arrest.⁶⁷ In late 1909, Krishnavarma also printed an article in the *Sociologist*

bringing to the notice of the Indian Nationalists the names of two new allies, *Egypt-Organ of Egyptian Independence* and the *Islamic Fraternity* – an organ devoted to promoting fraternal

⁶⁵ Ker, 64

⁶⁶ *The Standard* was staffed by young Irish nationalists. The successor to William Maloney as Editor of *The Egyptian Standard* was Frederick Ryan, who had been active in the Sinn Fein League. (FO 371/448, J.B. Dinghooly to Grey, Dublin Castle, 21 January 1908. Ryan later worked with Blunt on Egypt and died suddenly while visiting him in April 1913. (Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *My Diaries; being a personal narrative of events, 1888-1914* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1932)824f)) Expatriate Russian socialist, Theodore Rothstein (1871-1953) also worked for *The Standard* and later wrote *Egypt’s Ruin* (London: Eifield, 1910), a critique of Cromer’s claim that he had regenerated Egypt financially. After the Bolshevik Revolution, Rothstein returned to Russia and became Soviet Ambassador to Iran. *The Standard* became a weekly in April 1909 and gradually faded out of existence. Attempts to revive the French version, *l’Etendard*, proved abortive and the Nationalists thereafter adopted a policy of subsidizing Egypt’s numerous independent European newspapers. There was considerable criticism within the Party of Farid’s decision to terminate the European-language papers. (Muhammad Farid, *Awraq Muhammad Farid* (Cairo: Al-Haya Misriyya al-‘amma lil Kitab, 1978), 11f; Goldschmidt “Egyptian Nationalist Party,” 192-3.

⁶⁷ *Talvar*’s inaugural edition in November 1909 carried an article praising Wardani.

feelings among the followers of Islam and those of other sister religions, the former published at Geneva and edited by our friend Mr. Mahomet Loutfi Goumah [sic].⁶⁸

The latter paper referred to by Krishnavarma, *Islamic Fraternity*, was co-edited from Tokyo by an Egyptian named Ahmad Fadli and an Indian national, Mohammad Barakatullah.⁶⁹ According to *The Indian Sociologist*, both new papers contained “articles on subjects of vital interest and importance not only to the followers of the Prophet, but also to all who cherish the idea of National renaissance.”⁷⁰

The crucial problem of these publications, the goal of which was to rouse nationalist feeling, was the difficulty in distributing them to the colonies. Of the papers handed back and forth among the students in Madame Cama’s salon, only *L’Humanite* was fully legal in India. In Egypt, the articles from the “objectionable” papers were re-printed in *al-Liwa* or similar papers, despite regular reprimands and censored sections. Even within Europe, the papers caused trouble for British authorities. The British Socialist publication *Justice* consistently criticized actions taken against Egyptian or Indian activists. Blunt’s *Egypt-Organ of Egyptian Independence* was barred from the country for which it was named in 1912 for its criticism of the new Consul General, Lord Kitchener.⁷¹ And Blunt’s book *India under Ripon* had already been banned by the Government of India, leading to a flurry of articles in the London Press and even a question in

⁶⁸ *Islamic Fraternity* was started in Tokyo, early in 1910, by Muhammad Barakatullah. Ahmed Hafiz Mohammad Barakatullah (1859-1927) was a Bhopal native who had become friends with the India House group while studying in England. He spent most of his life outside of India working to expel the British. Although remembered as a “Pan-Islamist,” he was also instrumental in Indian nationalist organizations in the United States, Germany, and Russia. He was a professor of Urdu in Tokyo for several years before going to the United States. During the First World War, he worked with the Indian Independence Committee in Berlin and then traveled to Afghanistan with other activists to set up a provisional government of India there. After the Armistice, and the withdrawal of Afghani support, Barakatullah returned to Berlin where he worked, with the funding of the Comintern, on Indian nationalist propaganda.

⁶⁹ NAI: Foreign Department, Secret Internal, January 1913, no. 1, Macdonald to Grey, 15 October 1915.

⁷⁰ Yajnik, 285; Khan, 90-93.

⁷¹ PRO 307/1363, Kitchener to Grey, Cairo, 4 April 1912, No. 38.

Parliament.⁷² Of the openly revolutionary pamphlets, *Bande Mataram* and the *Indian Sociologist* were printed in Paris and Geneva. As a result, these, like *Talvar* and *The Gaelic American* were far outside the reach of British authorities. Thus, papers had to be stopped upon entry into the colonies rather than at their source. *The Gaelic American* was only banned in India when customs officials discovered that copies of the *Sociologist*, *Talvar*, and *Bande Mataram* were being wrapped inside it in New York before it was sent on to India.⁷³ Similarly, the Government of India had placed Egyptian papers *al-Liwa* and *al-Mu'ayyad* on a watch list. Of course, none of these papers were illegal in Britain itself; therefore they could be read by correspondents abroad and paraphrased at home. Many Egyptian papers used this method to get information that Reuters was not allowed to cable to them directly; *al-Jarida* occasionally devoted entire articles to such news.

The role of activists of other nationalities in helping the Indians and the Egyptians was also crucial. Both the Egyptian and Indian extremist journals also carried notes from *The Gaelic American*⁷⁴ and the British paper *Justice*. In fact, the *Egyptian Standard* was edited by Irishmen associated with the “Sinn Fein League,” a fact that did not escape the notice of British authorities.⁷⁵ Under the editorship of Frederick Ryan, who served as an editor of Mustafa Kamil’s *al-Liwa* in Cairo, the *Standard* also carried occasional articles from Blunt’s *Egypt*, which Ryan had also previously edited. Furthermore, Barakatullah had founded a “Pan-Aryan Association” in New York with the help of the Indian nationalist S.L. Joshi, George Freeman of

⁷² Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *India under Ripon: a Private Diary* (London: T.F. Unwin, 1909.)

⁷³ NAI, Home Political B, Nov 1910, #17-24, p. 8-10.

⁷⁴ *The Gaelic American* was owned and run out of New York by George Freeman, an Irish nationalist and, according to PRO documents, a Sinn Fein contact. (It should be noted, however, that British authorities tended to name any Irish nationalist activities as connected to “Sinn Fein,” so his association with the party is not clear.)

⁷⁵ William Maloney and then Frederick Ryan ran the *Standard*. See PRO: FO 371/248; file 14376. Cromer to Grey, 27 April 1907, no. 72 and FO 371/448, J.B. Dinghooly to Grey, Dublin Castle, 21 January 1908.

the *Gaelic American*, and John Devay of Clan Na-Gael.⁷⁶ From 1909 to shortly before World War I, Egyptian Watanist Mansour Rifa'at helped edit the *Sociologist* on occasion; and probably served as the unnamed correspondent who sent articles from it and *Bande Mataram* to *al-Liwa*.

However, despite the widespread practice of publishing anti-colonial tracts in Europe, as the First World War loomed, fewer European powers were willing to tolerate these publications within their borders. Fearing increasing repression, Egyptians like Mansur Rifa'at had already made their move to Switzerland before the beginning of the War and began publishing their newspapers there, especially in Geneva. However, it soon turned out that, due to wartime pressures, the Swiss authorities were less willing to tolerate such activities on their territory than Indian and Egyptian nationalists had hoped. The August 1914 edition of Mansur Rifa'at's newspaper, *La Patrie Egyptienne*, in print from January 1914, was confiscated by the authorities at Geneva.⁷⁷ Soon after, the Swiss police seized 1500 copies of a book dedicated to Savarkar and encouraging Indian troops to revolt, for which Rifa'at had written the preface. The author's newspaper, *La Depeche Suisse*, was also outlawed; and Rifa'at was expelled from Switzerland.⁷⁸

Controversy Surrounding the Egyptian National Congress in Paris

Anti-colonial nationalist bonds extended beyond the realm of publishing. From 1909 on, Egyptian activists increasingly attracted the attention of the British political police with British officials first noting the Egyptians in relation to the Indians in France. The police argued that the creation of a spirit of cooperation between the two groups was one of the primary goals of the

⁷⁶ NAI: Foreign Department, Secret Internal, February 1910, nos. 56-59.

⁷⁷ *La Patrie* was the official paper of Rifa'at's brainchild Club des Patriotes Egyptiens in Geneva, which probably shared considerable membership with Farid's own Society for the Progress of Islam, which published *Progress de l'Islam / Terreki Islam* from 1913. (Farid, 101; 'Issam Diya al-Din al-Sayyid Ali Al-Saghir, *al-Hizb al-Watani wa-al-nidal a-sirri 1907-1915* (Cairo: Al-Haya Misriyya al-'amma lil Kitab, 1987), 259.

⁷⁸ Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 15 December 1914; Weekly Reports of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 29 December 1915, BL, OIOC, POS 3095.

Paris Indians.⁷⁹ British officials became particularly concerned when in 1909 a Parisian “Indo-Egyptian Club” was founded.⁸⁰ There, the cooperation between Indian and Egyptian nationalists developed on a broader scale in the course of the preparations for an Egyptian National Congress which was to be held in Paris from 22 to 26 September 1910.⁸¹

Assassination as Politics: Dhingra and al-Wardani

One of the most oft-cited connections between Indian and Egyptian pre-War revolutionary tactics was the similarity between two infamous assassins, Indian nationalist Madan Lal Dhingra (1883-1909) and Egyptian Ibrahim Nassif al-Wardani (1886-1910).⁸² While studying in England, Dhingra assassinated Sir William Curzon-Wylie in July 1909. Wardani, a pharmacology graduate who had just returned to Egypt from Great Britain, assassinated Egyptian Prime Minister Butrus Ghali in February 1910.⁸³

⁷⁹ Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, March 14, 1911, BL, OIOC, POS 3095.

⁸⁰ Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, January 30, 1909; Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, February 27, 1909; Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, March 13, 1909, BL, OIOC, POS 3094.

⁸¹ Indeed, Indian nationalists delayed one of their own conferences in order to have it coincide with the Egyptian meeting. (Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 30 August 1910; Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, 6 September 1910, BL, OIOC, POS 3095.)

In the weeks before the congress, in a symbolic gesture of solidarity, the Indian nationalists Aiyar, Chattopadhyaya, and Acharya began to “wear the fez in imitation of the Egyptians.” (Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, October 11, 1910, BL, OIOC, POS 3095.) The invitations to the Congress had been sent out by Farid’s mistress “Aziza de Rocheburne” and a student named Hamid al-Ahly, noted by the British as an “extreme Egyptian nationalist.” (FO 371/1364, Kitchener to Grey, 27 October 1912, no. 117; “L’interdiction du congrès jeun-egyptien,” *Liberte*, 16/17 September 1910.) The close cooperation between the nationalist liberation movements of India and Egypt abroad was further strengthened in 1910 when Virendranath Chattopadhyaya (1880-1937), V.V.S. Aiyar (1881-1925), and other revolutionaries left London and settled in Paris after the arrest of V.D. Savarkar (1883-1966) by the British police.

⁸² The assassination of Curzon-Wylie by Dhingra deeply affected British authorities, not least because Dhingra’s declared motive was to rouse his countrymen against the British Government of India, which was already under considerable pressure from the uproar surrounding the 1906 partition of the Province of Bengal. (By 1907, there already had been several murders in India, and authorities feared that the unrest was spreading beyond Bengal.) (Khan, 63)

⁸³ Wardani was condemned to be executed for his crime. Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi, who had the option to commute the sentence, did not exercise it. Since the Grand Mufti had issued a decision that the requirements for imposing the death penalty under Islamic law had not been met, ‘Abbas Hilmi’s refusal to pardon Wardani set the Khedive at odds with the religious authorities. (FO 371/890, Gorst to Grey, No. 20991, 4 June 1910.) The Grand Mufti refused

Indian nationalist Krishnavarma was accused by both the press and Dhingra's family of having inspired the crime. In response, Krishnavarma wrote to the *Daily Telegraph* in July 1909 to state "that political assassination is no murder," despite denying his own involvement in the assassination and affirming his personal respect for the victim.⁸⁴ A violent debate was also conducted in *The Times*, the *Daily Telegraph*, and London's broadsides and pamphlets about the moral culpability of the Englishmen who published and distributed the *Sociologist*, as well as those who had argued for clemency for Dhingra or sympathy for his ends, if not his means. In the fallout of the affair, Arthur Horsely and Guy Aldred, the successive printers of the *Indian Sociologist*, became the first Englishmen to be imprisoned for Indian nationalist activities.⁸⁵

Though the Indian reaction to the assassination of Curzon-Wylie was rather muted, the Egyptian response to Dhingra's crime was very much in line with what Dhingra had been trying to accomplish in India.⁸⁶ While the pro-British paper *al-Muqattam* ignored the news about Dhingra entirely, *al-Liwa*, now under the management of Watani Party Secretary Sheikh 'Abd al-'Aziz Jawish, expressed open adulation, according Dhingra the title of hero and then martyr.⁸⁷

to issue a fatwa sanctioning Wardani's execution, and numerous efforts were made to spare his life. Nevertheless, Wardani was hanged in extreme secrecy on 28 June 1910, exactly four years after the Dinshawai executions.

⁸⁴ *Daily Telegraph*, 24 July 1909, p.1; Khan, 71.

⁸⁵ Yajnik, 272; and James Campbell Ker, *Political Trouble in India: 1907-1917* (Delhi: Oriental Publishers, 1973), 175. Horsely was convicted on 23 July 1909, and Aldred on 10 September 1909. The *Sociologist* was subsequently printed in Paris. Guy Aldred (1886-1933) remained a political activist and organized the Savarkar Release Committee two years later. He remained in contact with and helped another India House friend, Har Dayal, as late as the First World War, and he wrote an account of some of these events in *The Golden Echo* (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1954.)

⁸⁶ The British cited Jawish's article in the 17 August 1909 issue of *al-Liwa* as particularly inflammatory. The article, titled "al-Yawm Yuqtal Dhingra" ("Today Dhingra Will be Killed"), was an unapologetic panegyric of Dhingra, who was to be executed that day; and the article was deemed dangerous by the British authorities for its potential to incite copycat assassinations. (FO 141/492, 3 May 1910, Ronald Graham to Sir Eldon Gorst; *al-Liwa*, 17 August 1909. *al-Liwa*, 17 August 1909. For a translation see James Alexander, *The Truth about Egypt* (London: Casell Press, 1911), 264) For this article, in addition to receiving another fine, Jawish was sentenced to prison.

⁸⁷ In addition to often alienating the few Copts who belonged to the Watani Party, Jawish's frequent invectives also bothered the more liberal and secular Muslim segments of Egyptian society. While these groups were the minority of Egypt's population, they were the ones with the most financial and political power, and the main source of funds for the nationalist movement. Despite his popularity with some, Jawish played a key role in the breakdown of the Watani Party, both in terms of its waning local popularity and the decision to support the Central Powers in the First World War. Nevertheless, Jawish's resilience and ability to remain a significant factor in Egyptian civil, if not

The paper received a formal warning from the Egyptian Government on August 25, 1909, after it published an article and a poem glorifying Dhingra.⁸⁸ Placards praising Dhingra were also distributed in Ireland, believed by the British Parliament to be the result of Kier Hardie's influence.⁸⁹ Egyptian poet 'Ali al-Ghayati eulogized Dhingra in the pages of *al-Liwa* in "To Dhingra, after execution:"

How can I eulogize you, Dhingra, in words; the nation alleges it would be a crime to do so. /You were a bold man, jealous of the honor of your country;/ you were free from the blemish of submissiveness and cowardice. /Life impelled you towards death, /so that even the sentence of death and the impending execution did not frighten you. /Then you gave up life rejoicing, and the sentence passed was executed. /You died yesterday, and your death is but another name for life; /your memory will be perpetuated for all time to come. /So greetings to you while tears are flowing; /and greetings while the heart is ablaze with anger. /And greetings to you; you are both alive and dead; /The Nile and the pyramids present their greeting to you. /O young man of India, within the soul is a hidden grief which is excited by pain. /I intended to display it on the day of your death; /But the authorities came in between me and the grief (i.e. fear of the authorities would not permit me to do so). /But it will soon become manifest after some time passed; /And the neglectful nation will know that we are not asleep.⁹⁰

The Foreign Secretary's office authorized the formal government warning to *al-Liwa* from London, writing in the margins of the report, "[T]his seems to be a case in which action should certainly be taken. Otherwise the bad effects of the article may not be confined to Egypt."⁹¹ The Government of India declared that the poem brought "into contempt or hatred the Government established by law in British India or [excited] disaffection towards said Government."⁹² Indeed,

political, society even after World War One (in fact, he was far more successful than many other Watanists in staking out a position following the First World War) has been little appreciated. Upon returning to Egypt following the War, Jawish remained active in religious groups, including being one of the founders of the Young Men's Muslim Association. Although marginalized from nationalist politics after 1919 by the Wafd, Jawish was eulogized at his death by Ahmad Shawqi. (Khan, 57-8.)

⁸⁸ Rather ironically, Prime Minister Butrus Ghali was concerned that "some over-strung student or ignorant peasant of bemused hashash [would] emulate the Indian assassin at the expense of some Egyptian official, conceivably himself." (FO 371/660, letter no. 98, 20 August 1909.)

⁸⁹ *The Parliamentary Debates*, HOC, 10th Volume of session from 30 August to September 1909, column 18.

⁹⁰ Translation of the Government of India in NAI, Home, Political A, October 1910, #81-84A, p. 17; Khan, 74-5. Ali al-Ghayati was an Azharite well known for his poems. He eventually settled in Geneva, where he spent 27 years. While there, he published *Minbar al-Sharq* in Arabic and its French version *La Tribune d'Orient* from 1922 to 1937. He returned to Egypt in 1938 and continued publishing the Arabic version of the paper until his death. The paper's masthead carried the slogan, "The East for Easterners."

⁹¹ NAI, Home, Political A, October 1910, #81-84A, p. 13, quoted in Khan, 75-6.

⁹² *Ibid.*

the poem was included by al-Ghayati in his book *Wataniyati* (My Patriotism) and smuggled into India within the year.⁹³

When Nassif al-Wardani shot Coptic Egyptian Prime Minister Butrus Ghali (1846-1910) on 10 February 1910, nine months after the assassination of Sir Curzon-Wylie, it was also a publicly declared political murder. Wardani was arrested on the spot and questioned by the Parquet. Upon his arrest, Wardani called the killing of Ghali a patriotic act. Ghali had just argued for the extension of the Suez Canal Company's concession, and Wardani was one of a number of nationalists who believed that Ghali was a traitor who served British, rather than Egyptian, interests. In addition to extending the Canal's concession, Wardani claimed that Ghali, by his support for the renewal of the Press Law of 1881, and through his role as a Native Judge in the Dinshawai trials of 1906, had betrayed the country by accepting the portfolio of Prime Minister when no other Egyptian was willing to take it under the conditions imposed by the British.⁹⁴ *The Egyptian Gazette*, the organ of the British community in Egypt, blamed the assassination directly on Nationalist agitation against the Canal project, writing that the Government's decision to include the Assembly in the extension vote had been taken as a sign of Egyptian weakness and had inflamed the peoples' emotions. The article further argued that the assassination should be inducement to the British Foreign Office to take stock of the situation in Egypt brought about by its changes in policy following Cromer's retirement. The paper placed the responsibility for the policy of allowing the Assembly a voice in the Canal vote directly on the Foreign Office, arguing that Gorst would not have advised it; and that, now, perhaps, the Liberal Government in Britain would return to the old policies employed by Cromer.⁹⁵

⁹³ Ironically, al-Ghayati would support Britain during World War I in the pages of his Geneva journal *La Tribune d'Orient*, arousing the ire of the Watanists.

⁹⁴ PRO FO 371/890 Gorst to Grey, Cairo, 24 February 1910, no. 2

⁹⁵ *The Egyptian Gazette*, 21 February 1910, p.3; Carter, *The Copts in Egyptian Politics*, 294.

The assassination of Butrus Ghali also complicated sectarian issues within the nationalist movement and Egypt at large. As a result of the communal politics of a Coptic Prime Minister being assassinated by a Muslim Egyptian, the immediate result of Wardani's crime was not to raise nationalist spirits so much as to exacerbate communal tensions.⁹⁶ Much was made of the fact that Wardani was a Muslim and his victim was a Copt. Unfortunately for the Watani Party, the initial popular belief was that Wardani's motive was a religious one, and this soon overshadowed the non-sectarian nationalist interpretation in the popular consciousness. In fact, the concluding speech of one of Watani's defense lawyers, Ibrahim al-Hilbawi, was so politically charged that the session had to be closed to the public, but it later turned out that the speech had already been printed in the newspapers. Hilbawi was trying to regain the popularity he had lost when he served as prosecuting attorney in the Dinshawai trial. However, Wardani himself never used religious language regarding his victim, and spent his trial discussing his nationalist motivations. Thus, when al-Wardani was asked upon his arrest why he shot the Prime Minister, he unhesitatingly replied: "because he betrayed the nation." However, songs and slogans

⁹⁶ Wary of the dangers sectarianism posed to the nationalist project, the nationalist leadership and the higher-ranking clergies of both religions, used every tool at their disposal to preempt any possible sectarian fissures. The ongoing exchange of clergy, with priests speaking in mosques and shaykhs speaking in churches, coupled with a media blitz emphasizing the unity of the Revolution, achieved overwhelming success. (FO 141/781/8915, "Intelligence Report on the Egyptian Situation," 15 April 1919; Fakhri 'Abd al-Nur and Yunan Labib Rizq, *Mudhakkirat Fakhri 'Abd al-Nur: Thawrat 1919: dawr Sa'ad Zaghlul wa al-Wafd fi al-harakah al-wataniyah* (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1992), 57-60. Fakhri 'Abd al-Nur (1881-1942) was one of the most influential Coptic Christian Wafdist leaders. One of the consummate fears of the nationalists was the threat that communal issues might hamper the development of a cohesive independence movement. They also made certain assumptions, likely from the Ottoman context, that Christian populations were naturally predisposed to allying with European powers, and European governments were likewise adept at exploiting communal tensions for their own benefit. The fear among Egyptian nationalists regarding the possible effects of sectarianism on their movement also influenced their reluctance to participate in Islamic and pan-Arabist movements. Farid, perhaps most of all, maintained an anti-colonial outlook which eschewed communalism, and Jawish actually complained to a member of *Terreki Islam* in Constantinople that Farid was accepting non-Muslims into the Club. (Farid, *Awraq*, 101; Khan, 122)) According to British intelligence reports, at many of the Azhari meetings Copts gave more violent speeches than Muslims. (FO 141/781/8915, "Intelligence Report on the Egyptian Situation," 8 April 1919.) One of the leading and most subversive speakers at al-Azhar was a Coptic priest named Marqus Sergius, who quickly developed a national reputation for his vehement patriotic speeches. One of his more famous sayings was: "As a servant of God my duty is to celebrate marriage and funeral rites, and I long to bury the authority of England and to marry Egypt to liberty and independence." (FO 141/781/8915, "Intelligence Report on the Egyptian Situation," 7 April 1919.)

celebrating the killing of “the Christian” were popular enough in the streets to provoke a storm of protest in Coptic papers, which also interpreted Wardani’s act as a communal one.⁹⁷ Furthermore, the difference between the Watanists and the supporters of the Umma group became clear to all Egyptians, as *al-Jarida* unequivocally condemned any sort of political violence, while the debate within the Watani group was not over the issue of violence, but rather the role of the Palace and the Ottomans within Egyptian nationalism. Watani journalist Jawish continued his attacks on Butrus Ghali, vilifying him as a traitor to the nation, while expanding his attacks on the entire Coptic Egyptian community, accusing them of collaboration with the British.⁹⁸ Some of the more radical Coptic newspapers, such as *al-Watani* and *Misr*, were as

⁹⁷ Groups of Muslim youths marched in the streets, shouting “Wardani, Wardani, illi ‘atal al-Nasrani” [Wardani, Wardani, who killed the Christian]. (Ronald Storrs, *Orientalisms* (London: I. Nicholson & Watson, 1937), 84.) As a result, the guards assigned to Wardani were all Christian, as it was believed that they would be less likely to allow poison to be smuggled in to him; and the Coptic warden tasted all of his food. The lesson of the episode were not lost on the nationalists; fifteen years later, when the target of an assassination being organized by a secret nationalist unit was Christian, the assassin they sent was a Copt. (Tariq al-Bishri, *Al-Muslimun wa al-Awbat fi itar al jama’a al-wataniya* (Cairo: Dar ash-shuruq, 2nd Edition, 1988, 146-50.) In December 1919, an unsuccessful attempt was made on Prime Minister Yousef Wahbah’s life by medical student Iryan Yusuf Sa’d. Iryan had joined a secret society called the Black Hand, but his immediate superiors seemed to be working at the behest of ‘Abd al-Rahman Fahmi. (When Zaghlul formed a cabinet, Iryan was pardoned. Al-Bishri, *al-Katib* 115 (1970), 135; Mustafa Amin, *al-Katib al-Mamnu: Asrar Thawrat 1919*, Vvol. 1 (Cairo: Dar al-Maarif, 1976), 133-4.) Sa’d volunteered for the assassination knowing that if a Muslim killed the Prime Minister, inter-communal problems would result. Wahbah was targeted because he formed a government at a time the nationalists hoped to prevent the formation of the government. (B.L. Carter, *The Copts in Egyptian Politics* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 69.)

⁹⁸ Jawish was sentenced to jail for an earlier Dinshawai article, published 28 June 1909 in *al-Liwa*, which commemorated the Dinshawai incident and in which he not only accused the British of murder, but also held Egyptians, including the then Prime Minister Butrus Ghali, culpable. (*Al-Liwa*, 28 June 1909, “Fi zikra Dinshawai.” ‘Abd al-Rahman Rafi’i, *Muhammad Farid Ramz al-ikhlas wa al-tadhiyah* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdah al-Misriyah, 1948), 123.) Furthermore, both Jawish and Muhammad Farid were prosecuted for having written prefaces for al-Ghayati’s *Wataniyati* a few months later. Jawish served three months in jail and Farid six. Al-Ghayati fled to Constantinople and was sentenced in absentia to a year of hard labor. (Khan, 76-77.) In the article that resulted in Jawish’s jail sentence, entitled “Reminiscences of Dinshawai,” Jawish went on the offensive, particularly attacking Butrus Ghali for his role in the trial, writing, “Hail to those innocent souls which Butrus Ghali Pasha, President of the special tribunal, tore from their bodies as silk is torn from thorns! He took these souls in his hand and offered them as a holocaust to the cruel and oppressive tyrant whose only aim is to destroy us...He (Boutros) belongs to a party among the Egyptians which fears the English more than God – people who only seek fortune and promotion, even though their country is oppressed and their own dignity ‘sacrificed.’” (This excerpt was quoted and translated in FO 141/492, 3 May 1910, Ronald Graham to Sir Eldon Gorst. See also FO 371/664/30776, 16 August 1909.) In an article in *al-Liwa*, 17 June 1908, Jawish argued that only Muslims should hold important political positions in Egypt. (FO 141/492, 3 May 1910, Ronald Graham to Sir Eldon Gorst.)

militant as Jewish in their attacks on Muslims and Islam, prompting scores of accusations and counteraccusations.⁹⁹

Despite Watani attempts to squelch communal divisions within the nationalist movement, the 1910 assassination of Butrus Ghali not only elevated civil strife between Muslims and Copts to new heights, but was an important factor in a repressive governmental policy directed at the Watani Party, leading to the imprisonment or exile of most of its leadership. This suppression was especially intensified with the application of martial law during World War I, leaving a significant leadership vacuum in what was just then becoming an increasingly populist movement. Ironically, the mantle of nationalist leadership was inherited by the elitist and non-populist Sa'd Zaghlul Pasha and many of the original members of the Umma Party, which predominantly consisted of the Egyptian landed elites.¹⁰⁰ This shift from urbanized, Effendi nationalists to a party of landed elites resulted in a new group of nationalists who were more willing to ally with the British when Egyptian popular demands turned too subversive, which would have effects on the extent of popular reforms enacted in the wake of the 1919 Revolution.

The wide-spread belief that Wardani's act was based on religious hatred was particularly ironic given that those most likely to blame violence on "Islamic fanaticism" – the British – acknowledged that there was no evidence of such motivation. According to Sir Eldon Gorst,

The motives of the crime were purely political. The murderer had no personal grudge against the victim, and was not attacking under the influence of religious fanaticism, and in defence of his deed merely repeated the accusations which have, in season and out of season, been alleged

⁹⁹ See *al-Watan*, 15 June 1908.

¹⁰⁰ The Umma Party favored a more gradual road to independence, advocating the need for consulting with and benefiting from the British whenever possible. Inherent in this policy was an aversion to any change in the stability of the status-quo and a general distrust of the masses, who were deemed unfit for political independence. For an official platform of the Party, see *al-Jarida*, 21 September 1907. Many of the leading figures of the Umma Party, like Zaghlul, Mahmud Sulayman Pasha, Ali Sha'rawi Pasha, and Lutfi al-Sayyid would later form the new Wafd Party. See Ahmad Zakariyya al-Shiliq, *Hizb al-Umma wa Dawru fi al-Siyasa al-Misriyya* (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1979), 72-3.

against Boutros Pasha, in violent and threatening language in the columns of the Nationalist Press.¹⁰¹

The British Government in Egypt had been well aware of Ghali's general unpopularity. Butrus Ghali had become so tainted and so unpopular with his countrymen that, outside the Coptic community, few Egyptians mourned him. As a result, Wardani was lionized by many zealous nationalists as a patriot and a martyr. Gorst had no doubts that Boutros had been killed "because he (Butrus) was our instrument."¹⁰² It was further noted that "It [was] odd that the Copts, although sad for Boutros' death as a Copt, do not seem as a party to regret the occurrence."¹⁰³

The assassination, and the public's reaction to it, led Krishnavarma to promote the idea of a Pan-Asian revolutionary society in Paris.¹⁰⁴ When Wardani was sentenced to death, Krishnavarma sent a telegram to the Khedive Abbas Hilmi II: "Your Highness' own interest and humanity, enslaved by England, imperatively demand royal clemency favoring martyr Wardani."¹⁰⁵ The telegram was subsequently published in *l'Humanite*.¹⁰⁶ In addition, Krishnavarma printed Wardani's final statement before his execution in *The Sociologist* (despite British injunctions that no one be present at the execution), along with a translation of al-Ghayati's poem, noting that

there is surely something sublime in the indifference to the terrors of imminent death displayed by this brave Egyptian martyr, who in his last moments upon Earth could, like the Indian martyr Dhingra, turn his thought solely upon the grand destiny of his country and remain utterly indifferent to the cruel fate impending over him.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰¹ FO 371/111; Egypt No. 1 (1910), Sir Eldon Gorst on the dangerous influence of press campaigns in Egypt, p. 528.

¹⁰² FO 800/47, Gorst to Grey, No. 311, 23 April 1910.

¹⁰³ Wingate Papers, 290/2/117, Letter from Phipps, 24 February 1910.

¹⁰⁴ For a discussion of Farid and Rifa' at meeting Krishnavarma in Paris, see FO 371/890, Cheetham dispatch, 10 October 1910.

¹⁰⁵ Yajnik, 281-4.

¹⁰⁶ Yajnik, 281-4.

¹⁰⁷ One telling incident connected to the assassination of Butrus Ghali occurred at the Egyptian National Congress held in Brussels in 1910: Krishnavarma offered a thousand franc prize "as a memorial to martyr Wardani" for the essay best describing "the best means of attaining Egyptian emancipation from the robber rule of England." Because of the terms in which the offer was couched, Farid had to decline the offer as contrary to the Party's principles.

It was partially due to Krishnavarma's propaganda that Dhingra and Wardani were linked in a song by al-Ghayati, who was then punished for sedition by the Egyptian government.¹⁰⁸

Government officials also connected Wardani and Dhingra. The connection of Wardani's crime with Indian nationalists was immediately made in the wake of Ghali's murder. Under the headline announcing Ghali's assassination, British paper *The Egyptian Gazette* printed: "The students of Dhingra?"¹⁰⁹ According to the article,

Of late the Anglophobe native journals have made a specialty of setting before their readers every detail they could get about the unrest in India. The assassinations of officials were gloated over, and when Sir Curzon Wylie was murdered in London last summer, *al Liwa* the official organ of the Nationalist Party published a poem glorifying Dhingra, his murderer.¹¹⁰

The connection between the two assassins may have been closer than even the authorities suspected. According to Ahmad Fouad Nassar, a founding member of the Egyptian Society in Lausanne in 1906, Wardani and Dhingra actually had met when Wardani was in London in 1908 to help Muhammad Farid's student group Young Egypt.¹¹¹ An indication of the close

(Arthur Goldschmidt, *The National Party from Spotlight to Shadow* (Haifa: Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, University of Haifa, 1982), 17; *Oeuvres du Congrès National Egyptien*, Bruges 1911, p. 36f; Khan, 102-3.)

Despite an official ruling that no witnesses be allowed, it is suspected that Muhammad Farid attended the execution and relayed the information to Krishnavarma.

¹⁰⁸ Al-Ghayati's *Wataniyati* was published in July 1910 and lent credence by the introductions written by Muhammad Farid and 'Abd al-Aziz Jawish. Several of the poems glorified Wardani as a national hero, including a poem detailing the day of Wardani's trial; others compared Wardani with Dhingra, or insulted the Khedive and accused him of being a collaborator. According to the Egyptian government, the book broke three penal codes: acting as an apology for a crime; being an affront to the office of the Khedive; and attempting to bring hatred and contempt upon the Government. (FO 141/492, Sir Eldon Gorst to Grey, 17 July 1910; FO 141/492, Gorst to Grey, 11 July 1910; Ziad Fahmy, "Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism: Colloquial Culture and Media Capitalism, 1870-1919," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2007), 204-5.)

Due to his support, Krishnavarma subsequently received a photograph of Wardani, along with a brief note reading, "the friends of Wardani send you a copy of his portrait and his handwriting. Those who give their lives for their native land will never be forgotten." (Yajnik, 285.)

¹⁰⁹ Ahmad Fu'ad Nassar also mentions the role that Dhingra played in exciting the imaginations of young patriots in his memoir published in *Kul Shay wa al-'Alam* on 8 March, 1930 (Issue 226); Khan, 81

¹¹⁰ *Egyptian Gazette*, 21 February 1910, p. 3.

¹¹¹ According to Nassar's account, Wardani, along with Mahmoud Azmi and 'Abd al-Hamad Sa'id, had just set up a Young Egypt branch in Paris and was apparently traveling around Europe on this mission. In London, Dhingra and other "Indian revolutionaries" had met with their Egyptian friends at the home of Ibrahim Ramzi to discuss the Suez

relationship between the Paris-based Indian and Egyptian nationalists is evident from a handwritten manuscript by Chatto, “Some Unpublished Facts on the Egyptian National Movement,” found among his private papers. According to this manuscript, Wardani had assassinated Butrus Ghali Pasha for his alleged intention to sell Egypt’s share in the Suez Canal to Britain and had been inspired by Dhingra’s 1909 assassination in London.

The Egyptian Gazette could have carried the Dhingra-Wardani connection even farther, as some British officials did in confidential Foreign Office papers. Wardani had been sent abroad to study in London, Paris, and Lausanne. Upon his return to Egypt in January 1909, he was active in the Watani movement, holding posts in the labor syndicates and night schools organized by the Party in working class sections of Cairo.¹¹² In these activities, he often collaborated with Jawish, and was undoubtedly well acquainted with the Dhingra case. Furthermore, British officials were convinced that Wardani had been involved not only with Egyptian, but foreign, “extremists” while in France and London.¹¹³ The British authorities were also alarmed to discover that Wardani belonged to the Society of Fraternal Solidarity (*al-Tadamun al-Akhawi*), a cell within the Watani party that included men who would assassinate other Britons in subsequent years. A Foreign Office official noted that “the society originated in 1905 and consisted of seventeen members, some of whom are now living abroad. They mostly belong to the student class, but include some Government officials among their number.”¹¹⁴ Watani Party leaders disclaimed any knowledge of the society, but had to admit that Wardani was a Party member.

Canal concession. Nassar misidentifies Dhingra as the assassin of “Curzon, ruler of India.” (Ahmad Fu’ad Nassar, *Kul Shay wal- ‘Alam*, March 8, 1930 (Issue 226).)

¹¹² FO 141/802, Note from Ronald Graham to Gorst, 30 June 1910, “Imprisonment and Execution of Ibrahim Nassif al-Wardany,” 2.

¹¹³ Malak Badrawi, *Political Violence in Egypt 1910-1925: Secret Societies, Plots, and Assassinations* (London: Curzon, 2000), p. 37.

¹¹⁴ FO 141/802, note of 25 March 1910, draft of note from Gorst to Grey, No. 33.

Police also raided Muhammad Farid's house in hopes of finding ties between Wardani and the Nationalist Party. Farid's papers do include a letter from Wardani, dated 13 July 1909, concerning arrangements with the Ottoman Ministry of Education for the admission of Egyptians into Turkish higher schools. However, Farid may have destroyed his other letters before the Parquet summoned him for questioning about his Party's role in the assassination.¹¹⁵ Although Wardani insisted that he had acted alone, eight other members were booked on charges of conspiracy, but were later released. *Tadamun* members were fortunate that the legal code did not prohibit the formation of secret political societies; but the fact that the authorities had gotten the names of most of them in the course of the Wardani investigation effectively dispersed the Society for several years.¹¹⁶ Some members found themselves unable to continue their studies or work in Egypt due to unofficial sanctions imposed by British supervisors or headmasters; most went abroad to Europe, particularly Constantinople.¹¹⁷ Ironically, then, the efforts of the Egyptian authorities to punish the members made them more dangerous as they put themselves outside of the reach of British authority altogether.¹¹⁸

While the British diligently investigated Wardani's connection to the Watani party in Egypt, it seems they did not follow the leads to his European connections closely enough. It was indeed in Europe that he had met a number of students from Egypt and other colonies who were organizing under the auspices of nationalist leaders in exile; and there he became known as an

¹¹⁵ Goldschmidt, *The Nationalist Party of Egypt*, 230-2, Farid, *Awraq Muhammad Farid*, 246.

¹¹⁶ Khan, 82-4. This legal gap was soon corrected. The following year, the Law of Associations, which was based on a similar Indian law, had a chilling effect on almost all political activity from 1912 onwards.

¹¹⁷ According to the Parquet's investigation, so many of the Society's members were studying in Europe in 1908 that the decision was made not to include them in calculations of how many members would constitute a quorum. (Badrawi, 65.)

¹¹⁸ Among these young men were Ahmad Fu'ad, a medical student who went to Constantinople, and Shafiq Mansur, a fourth year law student who continued his studies in France. Fourteen years later, Mansur would become the leader of the assassins of Sir Lee Stack, the British Sirdar of the Egyptian Army. Ahmad Fu'ad's personal nemesis, the Dean of the School of Medicine, Dr. Keatinge, was also later assassinated. (Khan, 83)

activist.¹¹⁹ Wardani had represented the Lausanne students at the forty day memorial observance for Mustafa Kamil, attended the Geneva Congresses, and participated in the Nationalist delegation to the Ottoman Constitutional celebrations in 1909. British authorities also belatedly discovered that an “Indo-Egyptian Association” had existed during the tenure of both Dhingra and Wardani in London, although the British could never prove the participation of either man in it.¹²⁰ Egyptian nationalist Ahmad Fu’ad Nassar confirmed in 1930 that the two actually did meet in 1908 and that the Indo-Egyptian Association did, in fact, exist.¹²¹ Wardani had also been one of the members of the Egyptian Society in Europe that had openly disavowed the Khedive’s patronage when ‘Abbas Hilmi refused to honor their 1908 request to work toward a Constitution.¹²² The Ottoman Empire did not hesitate to use the case to its advantage, and played on Islamic loyalties in order to stir up popular feeling. Ottoman papers, many of which reached Egypt, portrayed Wardani as a hero and martyr in the cause of Islam and of patriotism. Butrus Ghali was depicted as a traitor, and the Suez Canal Concession extension as a plan to keep Egypt in bondage to European governments and financiers. The Khedive himself was further criticized for seeking money from foreign sources, a practice that would only expose Egypt to continued European interference.¹²³

Inter-colonial Ties in the Post-War World

¹¹⁹ Khan, 90.

¹²⁰ NAI: Foreign Department, External B, January 1911 #549, p. 17-18.

¹²¹ Ahmad Fu’ad Nasser, *Kul Shay wa al-Dunya*, 8 March 1930. This article is the only reference to the Association found in an Egyptian source. There are only three references to it in British documents, though the tone of the references indicates that the existence of the club was well known.

¹²² *Al-Liwa*, 18 June 1908. See also Ahmad Fouad Nassar, “*Kayfa assisat a jamaiyaa misriyya biuruba*,” *Kul shay wa al-‘alam*, Feb 9, 1930 (Issue 222); (Khan, 87.)

¹²³ FO 371/890, Lowther to Grey, No. 14914, 22 April 1910; FO 371/890, Lowther to Grey, No. 26771, 16 July 1910; Cheetham Correspondence, Letter to Mallet, 13 August 1910. The mention of European economic interference would, of course, bring up an unfortunate comparison to Khedive Isma’il.

One of the most important features of the anti-British, Indian, Irish, and Egyptian nationalist movements was their simultaneous rise to prominence in 1919 in the light of the end of the First World War and subsequent international promises of independence and self-determination.¹²⁴ The advent of the Wafd Party of Sa'd Zaghlul in Egypt and the Indian National Congress of Gandhi invoked for the first time a direct confrontation between these leading nationalist organizations and the British government.

The year of 1919 represented a turning point which accelerated the political developments in India, Ireland and Egypt; and the similar circumstances in which the nationalist groups of each found themselves spurred further cooperation between them. Both the Wafd and the Congress developed as modern political parties at approximately the same time after World War I; the main political opponent of both was British imperial policy; and both had to adapt the strategy and tactics of their political resistance to essentially identical colonial practices and institutions. Particularly in the inter-war period, the constellation of problems of the liberation movements in India and Egypt, as well as the immediate reactions to the events in Palestine and elsewhere, were often reflected in the official documents of the Congress and Wafd parties and proved the growing awareness of common tasks and objectives in the struggle against the colonial policy of the British.¹²⁵ The connections between the two groups continued to grow in the interwar period so that, by the end of the 1930s, direct negotiations between representatives of the Indian National Congress and the Wafd Party had begun.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Not only did World War I and the movement for self-determination create expectations among colonized peoples, but the period was a momentous one in Ireland (the beginning of the Irish War for Independence), Egypt (the Egyptian Revolution of 1919), and India (the beginning of the Khilafat movement), specifically.

¹²⁵ In India, Egypt began gradually to be considered an Asian rather than an African country from a political point of view, and was integrated into "Pan-Asiatic" conceptions. Niroslav Krasa, "Relations Between the Indian National Congress and the Wafd Party of Egypt in the Thirties," *Archiv Orientalni* 41 (1973), 213.

¹²⁶ Jawaharlal Nehru, *Jawaharlal Nehru: An Autobiography* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985); B.P. Sitaramayya, *History of the Indian National Congress*, Vol. 22 (Delhi: S. Chand.)

The Irish independence movement also initially kept near simultaneous pace with the developments in Egypt after the First World War.¹²⁷ On 14 November 1921, a meeting was held under the auspices of the Egyptian Independence Society in London and attended by Labour leader George Lansbury (1849-1940), Jack Mills, M.P., Makram 'Ubayd, and "a man named Murphy." Murphy read a message from Irish nationalist Art O'Briain expressing sympathy from the Irish Republic to the Egyptian nationalists and adding that both countries were suffering under the heel of the same tyrannical force, namely the British government. Murphy went on to state that, should the Peace Conference in Lausanne fail, the Irish Republican Army would "take a lot of crushing," and that the young men of Egypt would no doubt emulate the example of Ireland.

It was at this time that Egyptian nationalist Ibrahim Rashad made an extended visit to Ireland, recorded in his book, *An Egyptian in Ireland*, published in 1920.¹²⁸ Rashad regarded Ireland as a first-rate example to Egypt, it being "for the intellectual among the rising generation in every country...to investigate and make known those movements in other lands from which their own people may learn."¹²⁹ He argued that "[Egyptians] must study in progressive community the secret of their (the Irish) advance, so as to help in formulating a policy for the building of a modern Egypt on a sound national basis."¹³⁰ A large part of his admiration for Ireland was based on a sense of common enmity toward the British; and his book is full of bitter criticism of Britain, particularly in his chapters on the history of the Irish national movement. He

¹²⁷ For an excellent analysis of connections between Irish and Indian nationalists within the shared lexicon of the British Empire, see Kate O'Malley, *Ireland, India and Empire: Indo-Irish Radical Connections, 1919-64* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008). For the Irish Nationalist movement, see also Nicholas Mansergh, *The Irish Question 1840-1921: A Commentary on Anglo-Irish Relations and on Social and Political Forces in Ireland in the Age of Reform and Revolution* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975)

¹²⁸ Ibrahim Rashad, *An Egyptian in Ireland* (n.p., 1920). The book also includes writings from Lady Gregory, Yeats, and O'Grady, among others.

¹²⁹ Rashad, 1.

¹³⁰ Rashad, 1.

also directly compares Sinn Fein with Egyptian nationalists, and Sinn Fein founder Arthur Griffith (1872-1922) with Sa'd Zaghlul. Rashad commends them both on their refusal to negotiate with Britain on any grounds other than that of complete independence. Above all, Rashad was impressed by the Labour and Cooperative movements in Ireland; and he devotes five full chapters to agricultural and industrial cooperation, in the hopes of inspiring similar movements in Egypt.¹³¹

A 1921 memorandum on "Sinn Fein and Egyptians" outlined the British concern with the interactions between the two nationalist groups. According to the report, Michael MacWhite, a representative of the Irish Free State in Geneva, met with the Egyptian nationalist Ali Bey Shamsi in Geneva and expressed the opinion that the talks concerning an Anglo-Irish Agreement were bound to fail. MacWhite, furthermore, argued that the English proposals were a way to restore temporary calm to Ireland so that the troops then in that country might be used in Egypt and India. He also stated that films depicting the Irish Republican Army at maneuvers were being shown in England and America, and that their display in India and Egypt would likely have a profound effect, showing the real weakness of British power.

However, following the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, ties between Egyptian and Irish nationalists declined. According to information also obtained from MacWhite, 'Abbas Hilmi had connections with Irish Republicans. Shortly before the Anglo-Irish agreement, 'Abbas Hilmi and 'Aziz Hassan attempted to recruit officers from the Irish Republican Army to organize a rising in Egypt. According to MacWhite, prior to the Anglo-Irish agreement, he had had a secret interview with 'Abbas Hilmi who was staying in Geneva at the hotel *La Residence* under an assumed name. MacWhite withdrew from the talks after the Anglo-Irish agreement and nothing

¹³¹ Rashad later played a leading role in the Egyptian Cooperative Movement and eventually became an Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Social Affairs and a director of the Agricultural and Cooperative Bank, a post he still held in 1952. He also published a book in Arabic on cooperatives, drawing largely from his time in Ireland.

resulted from the plan, except that the Khedive rebuked MacWhite for the “betrayal of the anti-British cause.” Also in 1921, after a rupture of negotiations in London, Sa’d Zaghlul and Makram ‘Ubayd attempted a similar rapprochement with Sinn Fein. They launched plans for getting in touch with the group in both Ireland and the United States. Zaghlul proposed that ‘Ubayd should go first to Ireland and then proceed to the United States to gauge the kind of assistance that might be obtained. However, by this point, according to ‘Ubayd, the “English and Irish [had made] peace;” and the plan was, therefore, called off. From then on, the Irish connection with anti-British Egyptian nationalists was significantly curtailed.

Although Egyptian-Irish connections were largely deflated by the Anglo-Irish agreement, the Egyptian relationship with India, both publicly and politically, only continued to grow in the inter-war period. The depth of Egyptian interest in India during the 1920s can be seen in the press coverage of Indian nationalists. While the activities of Gandhi and the nationalist movement had to compete with major local upheavals for Egyptians’ attentions in the early 1920s, by the middle of the decade, newspapers, books, and organizations were once again hailing their Indian “brothers” in the struggle against colonialism. *Al-Ahram*, for example, followed the Indian delegation sent to prepare for the Caliphate Congresses from February 1925, before it reached Cairo in March, making sure the paper’s readers were aware of the concerns the Indians had, not only about the need for a unified spiritual authority, but for that authority to be truly independent. The Indians made it clear that their respect for Egypt’s Islamic role was so great that they would have supported housing the Caliphate in Egypt were it not for the presence of the British Army and Britain’s “special relationship” with the technically independent state.¹³² The Indian delegation was followed, both by the news-reading public and by the British authorities’ informers, in a way that representatives from other countries were not. Similarly,

¹³² *Al-Ahram*, 11, 12 February 1925, and 9, 14 March 1925.

news about Indian nationalists who had had personal connections with World War I-era Watanists was reported regularly, including articles on Barakatullah in December 1925, the death of Hakim Ajmal Khan in January 1928, and the death of Abu Sayyad in June 1929.

Perhaps most indicative of the attitude of the Egyptians towards the Indian independence movement was the sub-heading of the front-page articles written by *al-Ahram*'s editor-in-chief on 12 and 13 November, 1929 describing India's communal problems as well as its nationalist movement: "He who knows the causes of the illness of another's body can defend better his own."¹³³ The second article, also headlined as "Talk of India," was sub-headed "the gospel of Wilson and the spirituality of Gandhi."¹³⁴ The series was introduced with the argument that India was particularly important for Egyptians to watch "because the affairs of this land are our affairs and we suffer from the same pains as she does."¹³⁵ The paper goes on to describe India's national and nationalist challenges with specific references not only to the way in which Egypt was affected by Indian affairs but also how India's nationalism was sister to the Egyptian. These analogies between Egypt and India were repeatedly emphasized in the local Egyptian press. The *Balagh* of 24 January 1928 pointed out how similar events in India were to what had taken place in Egypt in 1919. On 5 February 1928, the same paper drew connections between the Milner and Simon Commissions and the receptions they had met with in Egypt and India, respectively.¹³⁶

¹³³ *Al-Ahram*, 12-13 November 1929.

¹³⁴ *Al-Ahram*, 12-13 November 1929.

¹³⁵ *Al-Ahram*, 12-13 November 1929.

¹³⁶ Lord Lloyd to Austen Chamberlain, 5 March 1928. The Cairo Residency was subsequently convinced that the refusal of Nahas to cooperate with the British was due at least in part to the support he had received from Nehru during the latter's visit.

The Simon Commission was appointed in November 1927 to report on the working of the Indian constitution established by the Government of India Act of 1919. The commission was boycotted, in part because no Indians were included in the commission, by the Indian National Congress and most other Indian political parties. The report proposed provincial autonomy in India but rejected parliamentary control. It accepted the idea of federalism and sought to retain direct contact between Britain and the Indian states. However, its conclusions were already out-of-date by the time of its publication, as dominion status had already been held to be the goal of the Indian constitutional development in a declaration published October 1929.

While the pre-World War I European-based national leaders from both colonies had been marginalized by local and mass-based national leaders who had emerged from the post-War uprisings, there were still several points of continuity in the interwar period in the relationship between Indian and Egyptian nationalists which were the result of earlier shared activism. Visits of Indian nationalists to Egypt were also greeted with enthusiasm. When Dr. Mukhtar Ahmed Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan arrived in August 1925 for a month-long visit, the press followed the men extensively in a series of articles that included multiple-page spreads of the interviews with Dr. Ansari and included extensive information on the Indian nationalist movement. In an interview on 29 August 1925, Dr. Ansari was asked to give an explanation of Indian nationalist activities and goals, including specific questions on the effectiveness of an economic boycott and the Gandhian principles of cottage industry as a spiritual as well as economic exercise. In addition to relating their many meetings with representatives of al-Azhar, the Society of the Eastern Bond, and the Watani Party, *al-Ahram* described the two men's roles in the Indian nationalist movements at some length, emphasizing their connection to Gandhi and their work towards unity (“*kutla wahida*”) between Muslims and Hindus in the sacred struggle (“*harika muqadasa*”) of nationalism.¹³⁷

¹³⁷ *Al-Ahram*, 12 September 1925. For information on the Eastern Bond Association (jam'iyyat al-rabita al-sharqiyya) and its objects, consult FO 141/585, pp. 41-42; FO 141/795/18375/1; *al-Rabita al-sharqiyya* (Cairo), Vol. 1, no. 1, 15 October 1928, p. 3-11.

Chapter Eight: Local and Global Interactions

“The Egyptian Question is, in Reality, an International One...”¹

The end of the First World War, and the subsequent peace settlement, changed the internal and international situations in colonized nations so radically that nationalist movements began to reinvent not only their logistical operations and communication networks, but also their discourse and methodologies on the international stage. Egypt in 1919 participated in the great wave of nationalist uprisings that had already engulfed India, China, Ireland, and Turkey. The 1919 Egyptian Revolution also took place within the context of both the international growth of communist and socialist movements and the push for national self-determination. Domestic Egyptian issues, such as political and economic suppression at the hands of foreigners, in addition to the disastrous impact of the First World War on the Egyptian economy, made allying with international movements such as communism very attractive for Egyptian nationalists. In addition, the notion of self-determination was gaining increasing legitimacy in the post-War world; and Egyptians began to base much of their argument for independence on this new global norm. Therefore, the discourse and methodologies of Egyptian nationalism can only be accurately viewed in this context of prevailing international norms. Muhammad Farid, for example, argued for both the independence of Egypt and the return of control of the Suez Canal to Egypt with appeals to international norms: "Our demands are based on the natural law, which provides that every state govern itself and develop its own character accordingly."² The motives behind the use of this new discourse went far beyond the desire to satisfy or undermine European

¹ Muhammad Farid, *Die Islamische Welt*, Vol. 2, Berlin (1918) 1, 15.

² Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, *Berlin-Kairo: Damals und Heute: zur Geschichte deutsch-ägyptischer Beziehungen* (Berlin, 1991), 45.

critics, but institutions and governmental arguments based on European models provided powerful ideological ammunition to those resisting direct imperial control.

While scholars have analyzed the interaction between local and global forces in the broader context of British imperialism, they have ignored the impact of these international phenomena on anti-colonial nationalists. This influence was crucially important, however, as it provided nationalists with both new tools and expanded room to maneuver in attempting to draw attention to their movements.

The end of the First World War led to the creation of a novel discursive space within the international arena; this new space presented nationalist leaders with unprecedented opportunities to further their cause and bolster their legitimacy both at home and abroad. The legitimizing language of self-determination, combined with the institutional forums afforded by the Paris Peace Conference, prompted nationalist leaders to change the discourse used to describe their political goals.³ Their goals did not change, but nationalists now used the language of self-determination in presenting these goals. This use of terminology and language recognizable to European audiences allowed anti-colonialists access to a discourse of legitimacy and offered them a voice in the international arena. The conclusion of the Armistice in 1918 on the basis of the Fourteen Points led many in the colonial world to assume that U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and his proclaimed principles would dominate the peace negotiations and shape the postwar settlement. It made sense, therefore, for nationalist leaders to adopt Wilsonian rhetoric to define their group's collective identity and goals vis-à-vis international society.⁴

The quick succession of the 1906 Iranian Constitutional Revolution, the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, the First World War, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the rise to power of

³ Erez Manela, "The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism," (PhD Dissertation, Yale University, 2003), 22.

⁴ Manela, 39.

Ataturk gave birth to a new international political norm. The dual global focus on constitutionalism and self-determination as the markers of the modern nation-state led to a novel way in which nationalists could voice their bids for independence. These benchmarks were initially used as a way to restrain colonized nationalists, but this discourse was turned back on the imperial powers as anti-colonial nationalists began to use these very same barometers to make their argument for independence. The promise of constitutional self-government was predicated on the presence of a particular type of government and a set of established criteria, as laid out by the colonizing powers as the necessary elements of an independent, mature state. Egyptian nationalists used this new normal to repackage their demand for independence into one that mimicked many systems in Europe and could not, therefore, be labelled as exceptional based on a paradigm of racial difference or inferiority. In this way, Egyptians could utilize and contain European influence in service of Egyptian national interests.

Egyptian nationalism and the push for independence were generated domestically; and the use of a new international, European-approved rhetoric, was integral to the efforts of the Egyptian nationalists to consolidate their power and resist European penetration. In this can be seen a continuation of the European publicity campaign launched in the late nineteenth century by Mustafa Kamil. It was, in many ways, the marginal freedom of activity granted by the new transnational norms that made it possible for Egyptian nationalists to create a revolution considered more respectable and acceptable by global publics. However, the invocation of transnational ideologies did not necessarily imply a convergence of interests or goals. Though there were issues in common with other groups and with transnational associations, alliances with communism, socialism, and other anti-colonial groups were never very successful, as the ultimate aims of each group were different and targeted toward distinct goals. Similar problems

existed between Egyptian territorial nationalism and other transnational movements. While sympathy between nationalists pushing for territorial independence and ideologically-defined international groups existed, Egyptian nationalists remained loyal to these larger groups only insofar as transnational groups could guarantee favorable results for Egyptian territorial integrity.

Following the Ottoman Empire's defeat in the First World War, the near simultaneous rise of Bolshevik and Wilsonian internationalism particularly affected the trajectory of the Egyptian nationalist movement. Bolshevik and Wilsonian internationalism provided two viable "western" alternatives to the declining Eurocentric imperial world order and offered Egyptian nationalists new means with which to spread their cause. The new international milieu created by the First World War and its aftermath resulted in an environment where certain modes of conduct and discourse became prevalent. In particular, the new international consensus favoring self-determination and the argument that colonialism was only a temporary stop on the way to "preparing" subject populations for independence and self-government gave anti-colonial nationalists new weapons in their struggle for international recognition and support for their cause. Similarly, the rise of global communism and the birth of the Comintern, in particular, overturned the notion that a nation must Europeanize in order to be considered ready for independence. Instead, internal, domestic issues of class began to come to the forefront, as transnational class movements took over from ideas of liberal internationalism.

As a result of the Allies' wartime rhetoric, the watchwords of independence and self-determination for colonized populations now had to be afforded a legitimacy they had previously been denied in the international arena. According to Egyptian writer Salama Musa,

Of course there was among the Egyptian public much divergence of opinion with regard to these two revolutions, that of Lenin and that of Mustafa Kemal. However, the general feeling was, that the old world was now shattering its chains, and proceeding unhampered on the road to new freedom; and though it was prone to stumbling and falling, it would certainly continue to stand up and keep going. On the whole, therefore, the two revolutions were to us a cause of great optimism,

just as much as they were a cause of concern to the English imperialists.⁵

It was not only the words of Wilson and the Allies, but the triumph of Communism and Kemalism that seemed to truly be ushering in a new international system. Underpinning Egyptian nationalist activities was the continued belief that imperialism, despite local variations in colonial policy and rule, was a single global force; the same essential spirit animated British, French, and Italian imperialism alike. This homogenization of imperialism served an obvious mobilizing function: because Western imperialism was a unitary phenomenon, it could be confronted successfully by a united front of anti-imperial nationalists from diverse colonies.⁶ For Egyptians, this quest for success in numbers would manifest itself through extensive participation in international organizations, collaboration with other anti-British nationalists, and sympathy (though very little, if any, action) with Arab nationalists.⁷ Just as post-colonial scholars have pointed to the truism that, in order to fight against the colonial state, those seeking independence had to embrace the same governmental structures and discourse of their erstwhile masters; so, in an era in which the international system became paramount, anti-colonial nationalists embraced the new legitimacy of international cooperation.

The First World War, and particularly the subsequent promises made regarding a change in the international order, acted as a catalyst in the continued development of anti-colonial

⁵ Salama Musa, *The Education of Salama Musa* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), 111.

⁶ The Muslim Brotherhood (founded in 1928) likewise considered all Western imperialism as springing from the same source. An exposition of the Brotherhood's position on Western imperialism appeared in Salih Mustafa 'Ashmawi's pamphlet "Disbelief is a Single Community and Imperialism a Single Humiliation." 'Ashmawi criticized those who did not view colonialism as one force: "They have forgotten that disbelief is a single community and imperialism a single humiliation, and that [European powers] have but one goal, which is the obliteration of Islam and the humiliation of Muslims."

⁷ In 1926, a letter from the Cairo Residency to the Foreign Office in London listed the local recipients of invitations to the conference planned by the League against Colonial Oppression in Brussels. The list for Egypt was extensive, longer than that of any other country except India, reflecting the familiarity of the conference organizers with political activism in Egypt. Cairo noted that "invitations seem to have been issued in a very catholic spirit, for common ground between e.g. al-Azhar University scholar Sheikh Ahmed Muhammad Shaker, al-Azhar professor Sheikh Abu al-'Uyun, Suleiman Effendi Fawzi, Minister of Agriculture Abbas Pasha Daramalli, and the Publisher of *Kawkab esh-shark* and Wafdist Hafez Bey Awad, is hard to find." It would seem clear that the anti-imperial nature of the Congress was all the common ground needed for the delegates.

nationalism. The notion of self-determination voiced by the European nations themselves provided a legitimacy that nationalist movements could use on the international stage, utilizing the standards and vocabulary of the imperialists themselves. This was evidenced by, for example, the Easter Rising in Ireland in 1916 and the Egyptian Revolution in 1919, both of which aimed at dislodging the British presence and creating a fully independent nation. These revolutions were evidence, not of new goals, but of new methodologies in accordance with a new global recognition of the “rights of nations.” According to the Egyptian delegation at the Peace Conference,

“The right to life and liberty can no longer be confined to certain continents or certain latitudes. We claim the right to have our independence recognized a) because independence is a natural right of nations; b) because Egypt has never ceased to reclaim hers even at the cost of the blood of her sons; c) because she now considers herself freed from the last ties of Turkish sovereignty; d) because she judges the moment to have arrived when she can proclaim the right to full sovereignty justified by her moral and material conditions.”⁸

Both revolutions called on the legitimacy of the modern nation-state, put forward by European imperial powers themselves, to advocate for their independence in international arenas. Both revolutions were suppressed by the British, but both also made the continuation of the existing style of British rule impossible.

One of the ideological justifications for the continuation of Western imperialism was the promise that imperial powers were “preparing” native populations for effective self-governance. There had been an insistence that the white man’s “civilizing mission” was indispensable to the colonial world to such an extent that “after the white man left [it]...seems to have become little more than a nasty mix of tribal chieftains, despotic barbarians, and mindless fundamentalists.”⁹ Arguing against the British designation of Egyptians as barbaric, irrational, and therefore

⁸ Memorandum to the Peace Conference., quoted in Makram ‘Ubayd, *Complete Independence versus the Milner Scheme; or, The Zaghlul-Adly Issue* (London, 1921), 1.

⁹ Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Knopf, 1993), 333.

incapable of self-government, nationalists appealed not only to the Andersonian political lexicon of what constitutes a nation-state, but also the new Wilsonian rhetoric of self-determination to put the demand for Egyptian nationhood in terms shared by the British (and European and American) experience. In this way, the intellectual legitimation for British colonialism was severely undermined by the working of the Allies themselves. Egyptian nationalists, therefore, particularly relied on this shared lexicon when presenting their case to European and American audiences.

Liberal Internationalism and the Rights of Nations

Both Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and the foreign policy of the Russian Bolshevik regime ostensibly endorsed the right of nations to self-determination. Increasing international acceptance of this principle during the following decades contributed to the undermining of the ideology and practice of colonial empire. Though the First World War and the revolutions that followed may have been the end of classical colonialism in one sense, by severing the ties of the more radical nationalists from the mainstream and from each other, the tumult of 1918-1919 may have actually given the British Empire a new lease on life, as the Empire moved from direct imperialism in places like Ireland and Egypt to looser forms of control.

In light of new, raised expectations, it seemed plausible to most Egyptians that the post-War peace conference would decide whether Egypt would become independent or a fully colonial possession. Egyptian nationalist leaders saw Wilsonianism as a means to gain independence and secure a new national state. For them, Wilsonianism was an idealistic vision about the inevitability of population politics, turning away from imperial globalism. However, with the Paris Peace Conference's endorsements of demands by Greek, Armenian, and Kurdish

nationalists, and its rejection of Egyptian, Arab, and Turkish demands, Egyptian nationalist leaders began to search for alternative ideologies.¹⁰ Zaghlul and others came to the conclusion that the “global consensus” on the legitimacy of self-determination had very definite limits. Neither the European Allies nor Wilson ever meant for popular politics to be extended to all populations. Self-determination was to be selectively granted to those populations the Allies felt met the appropriate criteria of “Westernism” or served a purpose for Euro-American global strategy.

During the Peace Conference, Great Britain had secretly proposed to strip Egypt of what remained of her independence, although this was not known to most Egyptians at the time. The plan to integrate Egypt fully into the imperial system proposed by Judicial Advisor to the Government of Egypt, Sir William Brunyate, would have limited the power of Egyptians to affect the decisions of state. Brunyate’s proposal would have given foreign nationals resident in Egypt a veto power in the Senate with which they could override any majority coalition formed by Egyptians.¹¹ British plans to incorporate Egypt fully into the imperial system, despite promises to the contrary, were, thus, becoming clear. Sir Reginald Wingate, in his capacity as High Commissioner (served 1917-1919), spelled out his plan in an interview with Sultan Fu’ad by telling the latter that Allied recognition of the Protectorate had been “the knockout blow” to Egyptian hopes of independence.¹² Thereafter, hope of influencing state policy by electoral means would have been impossible, and the Egyptian social and political elite would have been

¹⁰ Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, *Global Intellectual History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 75-77.

¹¹ The most concise rendition of the history behind Brunyate’s proposal and the terms of the proposal itself are to be found in ‘Abd al-Rahman Rafi’i, *Fi a’qab al-thawrah al-Misriyah: Thawrat sanat 1919* (Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arif, 1987 printing), pp. 71-2.

¹² FO 371/1180. The account is contained in a message from Sir Reginald Wingate to Lord Cromer regarding an interview with the Sultan on 12 December 1918. The message details how Fu’ad “visibly blanched as I told him it was a case of ‘victor’ and ‘vanquished’ and [Fu’ad] remarked that the interests of 14 million Egyptians had to take precedence over those of 150,000 foreigners.”

pushed back toward colonial status. Thus, in early 1919, many who had previously chosen a path of negotiation with the British joined more radical nationalists in challenging the state and demanding immediate independence; their resolve may also have been strengthened by their misperception that the international community, particularly due to the views espoused by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and the focus on self-determination, would come to their aid.¹³

The New World That Never Was: The Promise of Self-Determination

The wartime discourse of the Allies, with its promise of self-determination and national sovereignty, allowed Egyptian and other nationalists to iterate demands for independence and evacuation of occupying powers using the rhetoric of the colonial powers themselves. Public statements on the part of the Allies meant to appease local nationalists at crucial turning points in the War, with assurances of future independence, were transformed into weapons to further the nationalist cause when those promises went unfulfilled. Regardless of the intention of the Allies to keep these promises, their rhetoric became part of the ideological and political milieu of the first half of the twentieth century, and could then be used to legitimize anti-colonial nationalism using the Europeans' own words. In this way, European powers lost control of their own rhetoric; and had to attempt to distance themselves from the very standards for colonial independence they themselves had created.

In addition, the act of turning European arguments about liberal internationalism and the criteria for the modern nation-state back on the imperial powers presented a conundrum for the latter. European governments had told their own populations that colonialism was a civilizing

¹³ Instructive in this regard are the telegrams addressed to Woodrow Wilson in 1919 that make up a large fraction of the White Book published by the Wafd. See, *Egyptian Delegation to the Peace Conference: Collection of Official Correspondence from November 11, 1918 to July 14, 1919* (Paris: Egyptian Delegation, 1919); see, also, Ellis Goldberg, "Peasants in Revolt – Egypt 1919," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 275-6.

mission destined to allow for native self-government, but their post-War actions displayed another reality altogether. This dichotomy between rhetoric and policy would affect not only the methodologies of the nationalists, but also emerging European public opinion. It also influenced nationalist attempts to reach and influence European publics by highlighting the hypocritical nature of imperial policies. Keeping this in mind allows one to place the Egyptian nationalist movement into its larger international context.

A crucial component of the new demands of the nationalists was the use of the promise of self-determination that was to be found in Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. While Allied use of Wilsonian terms certainly had an impact on nationalist demands, scholars who have taken on this issue have often oversold Wilson's own importance, while simultaneously minimizing what colonial nationalists had already been doing.¹⁴ During the first two decades of the twentieth century, the goals and methodologies of the nationalists did not change; only the rhetoric, and, perhaps, more importantly, the expectations were new. What the rhetoric of Wilson, and, at the same time, Lenin, did give anti-colonial nationalists was a target to aim at in their rhetoric, while undoubtedly raising certain expectations.¹⁵ But talk of anticolonial nationalism and a "new world order" had been circulating for years already, focusing on events such as the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906, the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, and the rise of Marxism,

¹⁴ See, for example, Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

¹⁵ The peace proposal publicized in late 1917 by the Bolshevik government in Russia called for the settlement of colonial questions through popular referenda, which likely played a major part in Wilson's decision to explicitly espouse the principle of national self-determination. Indeed, the term "national self-determination," was coined not by Wilson, but by Lenin in the first place. In 1919, on behalf of the Hizb al-Watani, Farid appealed to the participants in the Russian-Central Powers peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk to recognize "the need for the liberation of Egypt in line with the principle of nationality aspired to by all of the powers." (*Berliner Tageblatt*, Berlin, 4 January 1918.) Farid expressly referred to the solemn recognition of the principle of self-determination by the "Soviets in Petersburg," and personally expressed his thanks to Lenin in a telegram. (Muhammad Farid, *Awraq Muhammad Farid*, Vol. 1 (Cairo, 1978), 389.)

Socialism, and Communism. Wilsonian language, then, shaped strategies and the language of appeals, but did not fundamentally alter the nature or aim of the nationalist movement.

Though the idea of national self-government was hardly new to anti-colonial nationalists, Wilson's pronouncements offered a discourse of legitimacy on which to base anticolonial demands. Because nationalist demands were now based on the West's own criteria, many believed colonial powers could not but grant independence to occupied territories. These pronouncements, of course, also raised expectations of achieving national independence in any post-War settlement. As Egyptian historian 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i explained, Wilson's principles had such a "quick and decisive influence on Egyptian public opinion" because they reflected "the feelings that filled the hearts of the educated class in Egypt."¹⁶ Wilson's rhetoric became important because it created a way for anti-colonial nationalists to mold their own arguments within an intra-EuroAmerican discourse on sovereignty and personal freedom. According to Salama Musa,

With this new doctrine, Wilson appeared as if he were a prophet. The world that was groaning under the weight of the British Empire was given a quickening breeze by the proclamation of these new principles that spoke of equality and freedom and self-determination. They stuck in our minds, these principles; we became devoted to them and thought much about ways by which we could profit from them. The English authorities were much annoyed by these principles, but they could not prevent the effect they had, nor repudiate them.¹⁷

Wilson's celebrated arrival in Paris as the champion of self-determination suggested to Egyptian nationalists that the Peace Conference would be the arena in which their voices would finally be heard, and their independent identity, and the rights attendant to it, recognized.¹⁸

¹⁶ 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, *Thawrat 1919: tarikh Misr al-qawmi min sanat 1914 ila sanat 1921* (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1987), 57.

¹⁷ Musa, 99-100. In a similar fashion, Allied rhetoric such as the Atlantic Charter would later be used as potent tools for nationalists in the Middle East. ('Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, *fi a'qab al-thawra al-misriyya*, Vol. 3 (Cairo, 1951), 159-161. Rafi'i compares the influence of the Atlantic Charter and other wartime declarations in Egypt to that of Wilson's declarations during World War I.)

¹⁸ Manela, 25.

The Paris Peace Conference and President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points raised the average Egyptian's expectations for acquiring major concessions from the British, if not complete independence. In the first few months of 1919, the Egyptian streets were filled with hopeful expectations: Woodrow Wilson and the Americans were viewed as literal saviors who would unilaterally grant Egypt its independence. A popular expression coming out of the desire for Wilson's assistance with Egyptian demands for independence asked: "Oh Wilson, we have gathered together and to whom shall we address ourselves? For we have no real newspapers – only those lunatics in the *Muqqatam*."¹⁹ The Wafd, at least initially, also took Wilson's Fourteen Points at face value and had high hopes regarding the possibility of help from the Americans. On 16 February 1919, Sa'd Zaghlul sent a telegram to Woodrow Wilson pleading with him for a hearing at the peace conference. How could the "[peace] conference officially hear the Syrian delegation which was until recently a part of the Turkish Empire," Zaghlul asked, and "refuse to listen to the voice of all Egyptians?" He then reproached Wilson, asking: "Is it reasonable to you that those who were fighting against the Allies have the right to voice their demands and Egypt, which participated in the war on the side of the Allies, is denied this right?" The telegram was intercepted by British censors.²⁰

In fact, appeals to Wilsonian rhetoric had become commonplace among the Egyptian ruling class in the wake of the War. Already in October 1918, Sultan Fu'ad himself told the High Commissioner Sir Reginald Wingate of his desire for "Home Rule for Egypt along the lines of President Wilson's Fourteen Points," and Prince 'Umar Tusun Pasha (1872-1944), a particularly popular member of the royal family who ideologically and financially backed the nationalist movement, claimed that the idea of challenging the protectorate occurred to him "after the

¹⁹ Quoted in Ziad Fahmy, "Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism: Colloquial Culture and Media Capitalism, 1870-1919," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2007), 243.

²⁰ FO 371/ 3714/38763, Cheetham to Curzon, Cairo 23 February 1919.

publication of President Wilson's Fourteen Points."²¹ In various manifestos and petitions composed and distributed during this period, the nationalists justified their demands on Wilsonian grounds: independence was "a natural right of nations," they argued; and since the principle of self-determination prohibited the imposition of foreign rule on a people against its will, Britain had no legal ground for its presence in Egypt.²²

Nationalist activists at the Peace Conference, headed by Sa'd Zaghlul, worked to marshal public support for their demands within Egypt, convening mass rallies, circulating petitions, and launching press campaigns to propagate and advance their cause. At the same time, they appealed for support to the international community, especially, naturally, to President Wilson himself. In a telegram sent to Wilson in December, Zaghlul assured the President that

No people more than the Egyptian people has felt strongly the joyous emotion of the birth of a new era which, thanks to your virile action, is soon going to impose itself upon the universe, and to spread everywhere all the benefits of a peace whose calm and durability will no longer be troubled by the ambitions of hypocrisy or the old-fashioned policy of hegemony and furthering selfish national interests.²³

Zaghlul went on to beseech the President to exercise his influence so that the British would allow the Egyptian nationalists their day in Paris. This, Zaghlul pointed out, was no more than their "natural and sacred right."²⁴ In addition, the Wafd succeeded in reminding European governments of the issue of Egyptian independence by "bombarding" the Paris Peace Conference attendees, as well as the public, with "countless pamphlets and documentary 'white books' giving their version of...Anglo-Egyptian relations and the 'repeated pledges' [of the

²¹ Wingate to Balfour, 17 November 1918, *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*, Part II, Series G, vol. 1, 86.

²² See, for example, 'Ali Shamsi, *An Egyptian Opinion: Egypt and the Right of Nations: An Appeal to the Representatives of the British Nation* (Geneva: Imprimerie Nationale, 1918); M.M. Rifa'at, *L'Angleterre en decadence. Avant-propos de M.M. Rifat. Tome I* (Geneva: 1914); and Mohamed Fahmy, *An Open Letter Address to Mr. Asquith, the British Prime Minister* (Geneva: Permanent Committee of the Young Egyptians in Europe, 1915.)

²³ Zaghlul to Wilson, 27 December 1918, quoted in Manela, 107

²⁴ Ibid.

British]...to withdraw from Egypt.”²⁵ In this they were helped by the many Egyptian organizations already present in Europe, a significant number of these being Sphinx Societies or other Watani-connected groups.²⁶ Similarly, as the 1919 Egyptian Revolution unfolded, a stream of telegrams, letters, and petitions poured into the American diplomatic agency in Cairo. These were sent by members of various organizations, professions, and walks of life within Egyptian society, as well as by Egyptians living abroad. Many of the messages protested the arrest of Zaghlul and his associates ahead of the peace conference; and all decried British oppression and solicited urgent American assistance against it.²⁷

In order to try to pressure the Allies to include Egypt in the peace negotiations, the Egyptian delegation’s members attempted to contact the peace conference delegates in order to provide the latter with manifestos, and they sent information to members of the French parliament.²⁸ In addition, the Egyptians also tried to influence French public opinion as a whole. In publishing their articles, the Egyptians made use of a number of anti-colonialist connections to the press that went back to the pre-War era. They came in contact with the Socialist editor Jean Longuet, who had repeatedly supported Indian anti-colonialists in the past.²⁹ The arguments brought forward by Egyptian nationalists often built on well-established templates. One of their

²⁵ Christina Phelps Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt* (Stanford, CA: The Hoover Institution, 1964), 93.

²⁶ Other Nationalists, however, refused to support the Wafd. At the instigation of Prince ‘Umar Tusun, they formed a rival delegation, al-Wafd al-Watani, with ex-Premier Muhammad Sa’id as its leader. (Muhammad Sa’id and Sa’d Zaghlul having been on bad terms ever since they had been in the Cabinet together.) Most of the members of the Nationalist Delegation belonged to the Watani Party’s Administrative Committee in Cairo: Ahmad Lutfi, Dr. Isma’il Sidqi, Hafiz Ramadan, ‘Abd al-Latif al-Sufani, Ahmad Wajdi, Mustafa al-Shurbaji, and Ahmad Wafiq. The British, probably expecting to split their opposition, gave the Nationalist Delegation permission to leave Egypt. Shortly before its scheduled departure, however, the Nationalists, sensing trouble, dissolved it and sought a reconciliation with the Wafd. Sa’d Zaghlul agreed to admit some representative Nationalists to his delegation, and the Party’s Administrative Committee chose Ahmad Lutfi and Mustafa al-Shurbaji.

²⁷ Memorandum enclosed in Gary to the Secretary of State, 20 April 1919 and Gary to the Secretary of State, 26 March 1919, quoted in Manela, 109.

²⁸ FO 141/828/3, Delegation Egyptienne, Appel au Parlement Francais, 31 July 1919.

²⁹ FO 608/213/5, Peace Congress: British Policy in Egypt, 9 April 1919.

central strategies was to stress the traditional cultural and political connections between Egypt and France.³⁰ As the delegates explained in their appeal,

These relations of friendship continued during the whole course of the last century. They gave a purely French character...to our national education. In addition, our laws are nothing but French laws. All this has created, in the heart of the Egyptians, a trust in France that authorizes them to ask her to raise, in the name of Law and Justice, her voice in... [Egypt's] favor.³¹

Egyptian nationalists distributed their pamphlets in English, French, German, and Italian (Italy being the only country not to have approved the protectorate by 1920.)³²

Throughout the course of the settlement negotiations, the British, in response to the lobbying of Egyptian nationalists, were intent on restraining the Egyptian delegates' activities and public relations campaigns.³³ As a British official noted, it was

most important that apart from information which passes through diplomatic channels between His Majesty's Government and Egypt, we should be kept fully informed of the movements of these persons, of their interviews with officials and others, of their statements and of statements made to them both in France and England.³⁴

In order to achieve this goal, the correspondence between the Egyptian delegation in France and their "friends in Egypt" was intercepted and deciphered. All of the delegation's propaganda material was to be sent to the British authorities in order to allow British spokespersons to "officially" respond to Egyptian descriptions of the British as "harsh," "tyrannical," "brutal," and prone to atrocities. The contacts between the Egyptian delegation and continental communists were to be monitored, as well as possible movements of Egyptians between France and Egypt.³⁵

³⁰ FO 141/828/3, Delegation Egyptienne, Appel au Parlement Francais, 31 July 1919.

³¹ FO 141/828/3, Delegation Egyptienne, Appel au Parlement Francais, 31 July 1919.

³² E14897/1641/16, Allenby to Foreign Office, Pamphlet issued by Gabriele d'Annunzio, Fiume, including one letter from Zaghlul and one report on the position of Egypt, 13 November 1920.

³³ Daniel Brueckenhaus, *The Transnational Surveillance of Anti-Colonialist Movements in Western Europe, 1905-1945* (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Yale University, 2011), 231-2; FO 605/213/5 Decypher, General Allenby (Cairo), 17 April 1919.

³⁴ FO 605/213/5 Secret, from G.H.Q. Egypt to Director of Military Intelligence, 13 April 1919; FO 608/214, decypher, Field Marshal Lord Allenby (Ramleh).

³⁵ FO 605/213/5 Secret, from G.H.Q. Egypt to Director of Military Intelligence, 13 April 1919; FO 608/214, decypher, Field Marshal Lord Allenby (Ramleh). Among the literature being distributed by the Egyptian nationalist

At the behest of the British, French authorities agreed to give directions to the press to cease printing information that had been received from the Egyptian delegation. While the French authorities had no legal means to outlaw such publications, their influence over most newspapers was strong enough to force the papers to acquiesce to governmental demands. In May of 1919, French officials informed the British that the former's censor had been "instructed to prevent [the] publication of information inspired by nationalists or having the character of anti-French or anti-British propaganda in Asia Minor or North Africa."³⁶ The French authorities also agreed to send a notification to the press, reminding them of the fact that the French Government had already recognized in principle, in 1914, the British protectorate over Egypt.³⁷ Following this argument, therefore, a criticism of British actions was implicitly a criticism of the French government, as well. Only the socialist press, which prided itself on its independence from government intrusion, continued to publish "subversive" articles in support of Egyptian nationalism.³⁸

French officials continued to extend their cooperation with the British beyond hindering Zaghlul's delegation. When, in May 1919, some members of the Egyptian National Party in Switzerland voiced their wish to come to Paris, the French informed the British of their application. Similar to Zaghlul's group, the aims of the more radical "Swiss Egyptians" was "to get into contact with the leaders of the [French] Republic, [and] with French public opinion, to make the voice of the Egyptian people heard even to the English nation, [and] to submit...[their] cause to the English delegates and their allies."³⁹ The French authorities asked the British for

delegation was a secret weekly paper, which encouraged Egyptians to "fight until you drive them (the British) out," and described England as the "typhoid of Europe, a plague." (Pamphlet: *Reflections les Affaires Orientales*, 16 August 1921, "Peace Congress – Turkey and the Middle East.")

³⁶ FO 608/214, British Delegation, Paris, May 1919.

³⁷ FO 608/212, No. 9, Paris, 13 May 1919.

³⁸ FO 608/213/5, Derby to Curzon, Paris, 25 April 1919.

³⁹ FO 608/213/5, Bern, Hotel Gurten-Kulm.

their opinions about whether this group should be let into the country. The issue was complicated by the fact that, in their application, the Swiss Egyptian association referred explicitly to the British decision to allow Zaghlul's group to come to France. The Swiss group now demanded to be treated in a similar manner.⁴⁰ Here, the British and French made use of the fact that the Swiss Egyptians had been openly pro-German during the war, while the Zaghlul deputation, whose strategy was to portray themselves as pro-French, had no or few connections to Germany. A French official suggested that this would give the Entente powers a reason to differ in their stance towards the two groups. The Swiss Egyptians were prevented from entering in view of their "continuous pro-German activities."⁴¹

In the meantime, the British were also working behind the scenes to ensure official American recognition of their protectorate over Egypt, playing on their fears regarding transnational anti-colonial groups. In a confidential memorandum dated 17 April 1919, the British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour described the situation in Egypt as "daily becoming more serious."⁴² He added that the "extreme nationalists," whom he described as "chiefly paid agents of the revolutionary party in Turkey and [the] Bolshevists," claim that "President Wilson is definitely supporting" them "in their attempts to stir up a Holy War against the infidels."⁴³ Having thus invoked the specters of revolution, Bolshevism, and Islamic fanaticism all at once, Balfour concluded that it was of the utmost importance that the United States recognize the

⁴⁰ FO 608/213/5, Bern, Hotel Gurten-Kulm.

⁴¹ FO 608/213/5, Bern, Hotel Gurten-Kulm, 5 April 1919; Peace Congress 11 May 1919.

⁴² Balfour to Wiseman, 17 April 1919, quoted in Tareq Y. Ismael and Rifa'at El-Sa'id, *The Communist Movement in Egypt 1920-1988*, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 22-24.

⁴³ Balfour to Wiseman, 17 April 1919. There is no evidence of real cooperation or sympathy between the Wafd and the Bolshevik government, particularly as Zaghlul was careful to avoid staining the Egyptian independence movement with any association with Communism. Nevertheless, a Wafd delegation to Europe in 1919 met with the Russian representatives. According to Dr. Hafidh Affifi Bey, a member of the Wafd delegation, "the Russian Bolshevists promised the Sa'd Delegation simply to help drive the English out of Egypt...by the money they have given to Sa'd...and by the propaganda they are making directly and without our interference in Egypt." (Ismael and El-Sa'id, 22-4.)

protectorate and help “remove from Egyptian politics the dangerous religious and Bolshevist appeal which is now gaining force.”⁴⁴ The British assessment of the situation in Egypt was shared by American officials, as well. Hampson Gary, the American diplomatic agent in Cairo, reported that the disturbances in Egypt were “rapidly developing into Bolshevism” and exhibiting “an animus against all foreigners and their property.”⁴⁵

This generalized fear on the part of Europe and the United States of the spread of Bolshevism underscored the shared colonial and anti-colonial view that imperialism was a global issue with only local variations. British officials tried to argue that the Egyptians’ efforts were not a localized and specific threat to British rule alone but constituted a much more general anti-imperial danger. The British authorities stressed, first of all, that the Egyptians’ activities were undermining the standing of all colonial powers in North Africa. The agitation in Egypt, they said, could easily lead to “a nationalist movement with Turkish sympathies spreading along the North African littoral.”⁴⁶ Secondly, the British argued, any agitation in Egypt would contribute to the growth of a more generalized Bolshevist agitation, which would travel across imperial borders equally easily and would challenge any colonizing country’s economic interests.

In the weeks following the recognition of the protectorate, in addition to repeated official inquiries from Zaghlul, dozens of messages from Egyptians protested the decision to recognize the Protectorate and implored the United States to reverse its decision and aid Egyptians in their struggle against the British.⁴⁷ One such message, signed by seventy-two Egyptian physicians, was among the many that noted the disjuncture that had emerged between Wilson’s rhetoric and

⁴⁴ Balfour to Wiseman, 17 April 1919, in Rifa’at and Sa’id, 22-24.

⁴⁵ Manela 110; Lansing to Wilson, 21 March 1919.

⁴⁶ FO 141/522, file no. 9085, part I, Allenby to Foreign Office, 17 April 1919, telegram no. 590.

⁴⁷ On the day of the Wafd’s arrival in Paris, President Wilson, on whom the Egyptians had pinned their hopes for independence, announced that the United States recognized Britain’s Protectorate, a slight even now remembered in Egypt. (See, for example, Egyptian President Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser’s letter to President Kennedy, Cairo, ca. 1961, published in *al-Ahram*, 21 September 1962; on Wilson’s action, see Rafi’i, *Thawrat 1919*, I, 23-5)

his recent decision, calling upon America to give Egyptians not only “platonic sympathy,” but “real and active help to realize their legitimate national aspirations.”⁴⁸ On the morning of 22 April 1919, the Egyptian papers printed the communique containing President Wilson’s acceptance of the Protectorate, giving the Egyptian nationalists “a very unpleasant and unexpected shock.”⁴⁹ To counter some of the effects of the declaration, within just a few hours, dozens of nationalists “came down to all the bars and Cafes armed with pamphlets, and urged all to take no notice of the proclamation.”⁵⁰ In his memoirs, writer, politician, and lawyer Muhammad Haykal (1888-1956) recalled that Wilson’s decision to recognize the protectorate felt “like a bolt of lightning”:

Here was the man of the Fourteen Points, among them the right to self-determination, denying the Egyptian people its right to self-determination and recognizing the British protectorate over Egypt. And doing all that before the delegation on behalf of the Egyptian people had arrived in Paris to defend its claim, and before President Wilson had heard one word from them! Is this not the ugliest of treacheries?! Is it not the most profound repudiation of principles?!⁵¹

As the U.S. president’s failure to uphold and implement his own principles was quickly becoming apparent, Egyptians’ faith in Wilson, in the United States, and in the new liberal international order that Wilson had championed, began to crumble.⁵² The failure of liberal

⁴⁸ Manela 112-3; Enclosed in vice consul in charge to the secretary of state, 5 May 1919.

⁴⁹ FO 141/781/8915, “Intelligence Report on the Egyptian Situation,” 23 April 1919.

⁵⁰ FO 141/781/8915, “Intelligence Report on the Egyptian Situation,” 23 April 1919.

⁵¹ Muhammad Husayn Haykal, *Mudhakkirat fi al-siyasah al-Misriyah*, Vol. 1 (Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arif, 1978), 81.

⁵² Manela, 112. Egyptians’ earlier hopes for assistance from US President Theodore Roosevelt met with similar disappointment. In 1910, the Egyptian University had asked the ex-president to accept an honorary doctorate. The speech he delivered from its platform stunned the audience. He condemned Ghali’s assassin and those whose words or actions might have incited the killing. He sang the praises of British rule. As related by Muhammad Farid, “They (the students) looked forward to an opportunity of listening to the sage advice of a man who had been one of the successors of Washington, who freed the United States from the English yoke!..His speech at Khartoum was at first disappointment, and cooled their interest in him. He exhorted the Soudanese to accept the English regime, which he represented to them as the most liberal and humanitarian any nation had imagined. He forgot that the Soudan was an Egyptian province and that the English had no more right there than in Egypt...His speech [in Cairo] gave us the impression that he had been primed by the English to advise us to abandon our claims and to accept English rule resignedly, if not joyfully, all hope of a Constitution being deferred for several generations! The speech when it was published at once caused general indignation, and protests were drawn up and sent to Mr. Roosevelt the same evening by our committee of the National party, by the students of the high schools, and by all the political

nationalism, and, in particular, the failure of Wilson to live up to the promises of the Fourteen Points, and of the Allies to honor assurances of self-determination, allowed for the rise of Lenin's star among anti-colonial nationalists, and of Socialism and Bolshevism as alternative international systems. Liberalism in Europe, Egyptian nationalists soon discovered, resolutely failed to amount to liberalism in the colonies. For Egyptians, it was clearly a racially segregated liberalism. As early as 1895, Muhammad Abduh summed up the widespread sentiment when he stated that, "We Egyptians believed once in English liberalism and English sympathy; but we believe no longer, for facts are stronger than words. Your liberalness we see plainly is only for yourselves, and your sympathy with us is that of the wolf for the lamb which he deigns to eat."⁵³

International Bolshevism

Among the most crucial international movements of the post-War period were communism and socialism. In this context, the movements that most closely impacted Egyptian nationalists were the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Turkish War of Independence, and the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movements in India.⁵⁴ That a hiatus of only sixteen months

associations....The sin of our nation in his eyes has been that it seeks to free its territory and demands the natural right to self-government – and this from Mr. Roosevelt, who made war on Spain to oblige the Spaniards to evacuate Cuba and the Philippines! Mr. Roosevelt seems to be one of those who divide the human race into two sections, a superior and an inferior, and would have the one be slave to the other." According to Egyptian nationalists, Roosevelt had "out-Cromered Cromer," (*Egyptian Gazette*, 30 march 1910, 3.) Even Lutfi al-Sayyid made a speech of refutation, wondering if Roosevelt was aware that the British had obstructed the founding at the very university at which he spoke. (*al-Jarida*, Supplement, 29 March 1910.) ("Mr. Roosevelt and Egypt," *Manchester Guardian*, 6 June 1910, reprinted in Muhammad Farid, *Campagne de Muhammad Bey Farid, Chef du Parti National Egyptien: Paris, Lyon, Londres, May-June 1910*, 6th Edition, (Bruges, Belgium: The St. Catherine Press, 1910), 89-92.) All Egyptian dailies covered his trip from early march to mid-April, 1910 (including al-Ahram, al-Mu'ayyad, al-Muqattam, al-Shab, Misr, al-Jarida, and the *Egyptian Gazette*.) See also Ahmad Shafiq, Mudhakkirati II, Part 2: 212-215, and Yunan Labib Rizq, "Tiyudur Ruzafalt wa al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-Misriyya," *al-Siyasa al-Duwaliyya* 9 (October 1973), 98-111.

⁵³ Quoted in Reza Aslan, *No god but God: the Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam* (New York: Random House, 2005), 232; Pankaj Mishra, *From the Ruins of Empire: the Intellectuals who Remade Asia* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012), 261.

⁵⁴ Following the unsuccessful revolutionary attempt in Russia in 1905, a group of Russian fugitives found refuge in Egypt. They founded the Bolshevik Group (Majmu'at al-Balshafik.) Some of the group's members were Jews, the most prominent of whom was Theodore Rothstein, who worked for the newspaper *The Egyptian Standard*, a

separated the Russian Revolution of November 1917 and the Egyptian Revolution of March 1919 gave rise to particular fears within the Government of Egypt, among both British officials and upper class Egyptians, that socialist and communist ideas would infect the nationalist movement in Egypt. The fears mounted as the Egyptian Revolution produced phenomena, such as strikes and sabotage, which the British and some in the Egyptian upper classes considered to be strongly suggestive of Bolshevism.

In some ways, colonial officials were correct in their assessment that communism and socialism had effects on Egyptian nationalism. However, the popularity of these movements had significantly more to do with local conditions than strict allegiance to any transnational ideologies. Egyptians who had suffered from disruptive European financial control and the disastrous effects of the War-time economy found the communist focus on workers' rights and land reform extremely attractive. Salih as-Sharif at-Tunisi, a nationalist who worked out of Berlin and who was in frequent contact with Egyptian nationalists there, voiced the feelings of many anti-colonial nationalists regarding the global importance of the Russian Revolution. According to at-Tunisi,

The Revolution that brought freedom by the Russian nation to the different peoples of this great nation has raised hopes in all oppressed nations for an early liberation. This hope is the more justifiable since the delegates of the Russian workers, soldiers and peasants did not demand freedom only for themselves, yet claimed and supported it in line with the principles of true democracy shared by the free peoples of the other countries. This new breath of democracy has prompted...the community of oppressed nations to join their voices with that of the Russian democracy and to stretch out its hands to go jointly in the direction of this noble and grand aim.⁵⁵

publication of the Watani Party. 'Ali Ahmad Shukri, who translated Rothstein's book, *The Destruction of Egypt*, into Arabic, recounted that during his stay in Egypt, Rothstein maintained close links with Lenin and the Socialist Democratic Party of Russia. During Lenin's exile in France and Switzerland, he often dispatched his missives to the Bolsheviks in Russia via Egypt in order to avoid their falling into the hands of the Tsarist intelligence service. (Rami Ginat, *A History of Egyptian Communism: Jews and their Compatriots in Quest of Revolution* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011), 25.)

⁵⁵ S. Cherif, *Appel du genre humain a la verite* (Berlin, 1919), p. 3.

Similarly, in a telegram to the attendees of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, Farid, officially speaking for the Watani Party, thanked both the Egyptian nationalist party operating in Berlin and the Soviet government for inspiring humanity with freedom and equality. Farid drew particular attention to the public explanation of the promise of self-determination on the part of the new Russian government, and explained that it had awakened among the nations under colonial control “the hope of new life, to a life of happiness, which is based on the liberation from the chains of capitalism.”⁵⁶ In this view, global capitalism was connected to foreign control of the Egyptian economy and to the British occupation. Farid went on to request that the Soviet delegation propose the liberation of Egypt from British occupation as part of the Versailles Peace Treaty, because, as Farid explained, “The Egyptian question is in reality an international one,”⁵⁷ reflecting Farid’s belief that colonialism was a European problem and therefore would find its solution in Europe.

Although neither official communist nor socialist movements were ever popularly established in Egypt in the interwar period, communism was an attractive ideology to many Egyptians, particularly workers, who suffered poor conditions at the hands of their employers, many of which were foreign companies; and *fellahin*, to whom the communist stance on land redistribution was very attractive.⁵⁸ In addition, communism dovetailed with nationalist Egyptian

⁵⁶ Muhammad Farid, *Die Islamische Welt*, Berlin, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1918), 15.

⁵⁷ Muhammad Farid, *Die Islamische Welt*, Berlin, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1918), 15.

⁵⁸ Organized communism first emerged in Egypt in the early 1920s. (For studies of communism in Egypt, see Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, *Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882-1954* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); Selma Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939-1970* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1988); Rami Ginat, *A History of Egyptian Communism: Jews and Their Compatriots in Quest of Revolution* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011); Tareq Y. Ismael and Rifa’at al-Sa’id, *The Communist Movement in Egypt 1920-1988* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990). Rifa’at al-Sa’id may be regarded as the most prominent and productive communist writer, producing extensive studies on the Egyptian Left and the communist movements in Egypt throughout the twentieth century. The Egyptian Communist Party became a member of the Comintern in December 1922. The ties between the Soviet Union and the Egyptian Communist Party were initially established through Egyptianized foreigners who had relations with the Palestinian Communist Party and through a Comrade Heider who was one of those responsible for the Middle East Section of the Comintern. (Selma Botman, “Oppositional Politics in Egypt: the

aspirations of ridding the country of foreign influence, in both the political and economic spheres. Among both the middle and working classes, global and foreign capital, and economic imperialism more generally, triggered fears that were magnified by the perception that the Egyptian state could not protect local interests and economies from foreign penetration. These grievances were compounded by the fact that nearly all of Egypt's major industrial and transport enterprises were owned or managed by foreigners, and that even the middle-and lower-level supervisory personnel with immediate power over the largely Egyptian manual workers were overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, foreigners. Economic deprivation was also accompanied by ethnic, cultural, and religious discrimination, which mirrored the imperial political system. At the same time, many companies explicitly barred Egyptians from promotion to the better-paid, more highly-skilled jobs held by foreigners, thus preserving an ethnic division of labor that worked against the indigenous majority.⁵⁹ Indeed, foreigners were generally paid more than Egyptians even for the same job.

Many in Egypt saw a connection between the economic repression exercised by foreign firms and global capitalism vis-à-vis local economies, on the one hand, and the political repression of British colonialism, on the other. The country's political domination by a foreign occupying power facilitated economic domination by foreign capitalists, resident abroad or in Egypt itself. This dual repression, therefore, created a natural connection between anti-colonial

Communist Movement, 1936-1954," (PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 1984), 158-60.) The political manifesto of the Egyptian Communist Party, which was presented in January 1923, indicated a radical anti-British orientation that called for, among other things, "the nationalization of the Suez Canal, [and] the liberation and unification of Egypt and the Sudan." (Sa'id, 21; Selma Botman, *The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939-1970* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1988), 3; Suliman Bashear, *Communism in the Arab East, 1918-1928* (London: Ithaca Press, 1980), 29-33.) The party platform of the Communist Party, in this way, shared the demands of Egyptian nationalists, demands that would be echoed again later by the Free Officers in 1952, among others. Nevertheless, the Egyptian Communist Party could never constitute a tangible threat or equal contender for popular support to the Wafd Party, which was the indisputable leader of the national struggle for independence after 1919.

⁵⁹ This interconnection of race and foreignness with the ability to claim higher employment status and higher salaries mirrors the causes of the 'Urabi Revolution in 1882.

nationalism and workers' rights groups, if not with communism officially. In July 1919, General Allenby, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, commented in a dispatch to London that "the native working classes have apparently identified in their own minds the Syndicalist [trade union] movement and the Extremist [nationalist] agitation."⁶⁰ The British authorities in Egypt, then, had grasped the extent to which the emerging movement of Egyptian workers had come to be infused with a strong sense of nationalism.⁶¹

The realities of workers' lives also provided concrete reasons for them to see nationalism as a sensible way of understanding their daily financial and political realities. Imperial political and foreign economic penetrations into Egypt were intimately connected; it made sense for workers and artisans to identify their problems and grievances with Egypt's subordination to foreign control. Therefore, it was logical to see their aspirations and struggles for a better life as bound with the cause of national liberation. In the Egyptian case, segments of the urban working population developed links with the nationalist movement early on, found in their own concrete experience reasons to feel themselves a part of that movement, and came to interpret and conceptualize their own concerns in nationalist terms.

Throughout the first decades of the twentieth century, both the Watani and Wafd-Umma Parties also sought to capitalize on the increasing focus on workers' issues and incorporate support for labor issues into their movements. However, there was often also conflict between Egyptian nationalist leaders and leaders of international communism, as Egyptians wanted to be able to harness the workers' movement to assist their own national movement without giving up any power to ideologically communist organizations. There was also little room for the

⁶⁰ FO 407/185/57, Allenby to Curzon, 22 July 1919.

⁶¹ Cheetham described the labor strikes and destruction of railways carried out in protest of wartime economic deprivations as a movement that was "anti-British, anti-Sultanian, and anti-foreign. It has Bolshevik tendency, aims at destruction of property, as well as communications, is organized, and must be paid [sic]. Extraneous influence is strongly suspected." Cheetham to Foreign Office, Cairo, 19 March 1919.

development of a full-fledged communist movement in Egypt. Unlike, for example Vietnam or China in the interwar period, a strong nationalist movement already existed through popular mandate in Egypt; and Egyptian communists were, therefore, unable to assume leadership of the national movement or create popular support for communism by linking the cause of national liberation with the struggle for socio-economic transformation. The connection between independence and improved economic and social conditions had already been made in the minds of many Egyptians; and by 1919 the Wafd was considered the legitimate vehicle for both of these aspirations.

There was good reason for political movements for independence in Egypt to find common cause with those disaffected by the country's twentieth-century economic status. Foreigners directly invested their capital in land companies, established mortgage and credit companies and banks, and gained control of the import and export trade. European banking houses also lent vast sums of money to the Egyptian state, which used most of it to develop the country's infrastructure – irrigation, railroads, and port facilities – in order to facilitate the cultivation and export of cotton. It had been heavy borrowing from abroad which had led to a downward spiral of indebtedness culminating in bankruptcy in 1876 under Isma'il. As has been shown above, foreign financial controls had been imposed on the Egyptian government which in turn stimulated a nationalist reaction and led to Egypt's occupation by British forces in 1882.

Whereas ownership of the land itself was largely in the hands of an Egyptian agrarian bourgeoisie, the country's economy as a whole was largely controlled by foreign interests by 1914. A significant portion of the Egyptian-owned land was mortgaged to European-dominated banks, the most powerful of which was the Credit Foncier Egyptien. In addition, credit, foreign trade, and shipping were almost entirely in non-Egyptian hands. Virtually all of Egypt's

industrial and transport enterprises were either owned or managed by non-Egyptians. And, of course, effective state power was in the hands of Great Britain, whose officials protected the interests of metropolitan capital and of the legally privileged foreigners resident in Egypt. In his close study of the Egyptian economy, A.E. Crouchley estimated that, of the slightly more than £E100,000,000 of paid-up capital in joint-stock companies operating in Egypt in 1914, £E92,000,000 was controlled by foreign interests.⁶² Thus, as Egyptian nationalist aspirations began to be expressed after World War I, it was inevitable that nationalists should call attention to the overweening economic power of the foreign interests and demand a more genuinely national economy.⁶³

Indeed, all of the banks in Egypt were foreign-controlled. In 1898, a National Bank had been established, but this organ was run by leaders of the British community in Egypt and even had a separate London executive committee.⁶⁴ The other banks were either branches of major European firms or banks opened with their headquarters in Egypt but funded and administered from overseas. The main Egyptian export was cotton, and the preparation and movement of this crop from Egypt to Europe was controlled at all levels by foreign interests. Banks played a major role in purchasing the crop for overseas shipment; the ginning firms in Egypt and the export-import houses were also run by Europeans, while a select group of brokers and merchants, called the Alexandria General Produce Association, monopolized the grading and overseas sales of Egyptian exports. Although there had been remarkable growth in the number of joint stock companies operating in Europe during the British occupation, nearly all of these firms were run

⁶² See A.E. Crouchley, *The Investment of Foreign Capital in Egyptian Companies and Public Debt* (Cairo, 1936), 73.

⁶³ Robert L. Tignor, "The Egyptian Revolution of 1919: New Directions in the Egyptian Economy," *Middle Eastern Studies* (1976), 41-67. 46-7.

⁶⁴ This is not to be confused with Tal'at Harb's Bank Misr.

by Europeans.⁶⁵ The stability of the social order of the monarchy, then, including the privileged status of foreigners, ultimately depended on the British military occupation.

Many Egyptian journalists and thinkers echoed the demands for more indigenous Egyptian control of the economy. A favorite argument of the intensely nationalistic newspaper, *al-Akhbar*, was the need for Egypt to create the economic infrastructure necessary for the political independence which it hoped that Zaghlul and the Wafd would soon win.⁶⁶ Egyptian nationalists called for genuinely and purely Egyptian political and financial structures, and were suspicious of foreign influences.⁶⁷ As a co-founder of the Umma Party's newspaper, *al-Jarida*, Tal'at Harb, who would go on to found Bank Misr, made certain that the paper carried articles dealing with economics.⁶⁸ He himself wrote several articles on the subject, one of which contained a plea for creating the economic basis of political independence. While admitting that almost all Egyptians favored complete independence, he reminded readers that Egypt still depended on foreigners as doctors, engineers, merchants, and industrialists. Harb bemoaned the

⁶⁵ Ibid., 46-7.

⁶⁶ See, for example, *al-Akhbar*, 22 February 1920; Tignor, 49.

⁶⁷ See Arnold Wright (ed.), *Twentieth Century Impressions of Egypt, its History, People, Commerce, Industries, and Resources* (London, 1909), p. 439; *L'Informateur*, 10 April 1936 and 23 April 1948; and *Majallat Ghurfa al-Qahira (The Journal of the Cairo Chamber)*, vol. 1, no. 4, April 1936, 3-5; Tignor, 51.

⁶⁸ Another figure crucial to the background of the foundation of Bank Misr and Egyptian economic nationalism more generally is 'Umar Lutfi (1867-1911). ('Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, *Niqabat al-Ta'awun al-Zira'iya* (Agricultural Cooperatives) (Cairo, 1914), p. 159-255.) Like other concerned nationalists, he was alarmed at the weaknesses of the Egyptian economy as revealed by the financial crisis of 1906-7, and began to argue that Egyptians must develop institutional underpinnings if they were to win their political freedom. His overarching concern was the inability of Egyptians to mobilize large amounts of money, hence their dependence on foreign banking and lending institutions. Because foreign firms monopolized the capital available in Egypt, they were able to fix prices for Egyptian exports and expropriate the lion's share of Egypt's foreign trade earnings. Thus, despite the fact that Egypt had a prosperous overseas trade, the country did not retain this wealth. Lutfi made a trip to Italy to study agricultural cooperatives. The so-called father of the Egyptian cooperative movement, 'Umar Lutfi, also championed the idea of 'a big national bank' and he founded an Egyptian Financial Cooperative Company (Sharikat al-Ta'awun al-Maliya) in 1909. (Tignor, 55.) Bank Misr had a number of novel features which reflected its nationalist orientation. All shares had to be owned by Egyptians – a restriction justified on the ground that otherwise foreigners would buy up most of the shares and take control of the bank. The language of the bank was to be Arabic, despite the fact that almost all of Egypt's financial and commercial firms employed French. The nationalist orientations of the bank were elaborated upon in many speeches and press articles. Perhaps the most insightful is Tal'at Harb's speech of 8 May 1920, at the formal opening of the bank. (Tal'at Harb, *Majnu'at Khutab*, vol. 1, 45-63; Tignor, 57.)

absence of factories producing clothing and other articles of consumption, and was angered that foreigners owned the coffee shops and hotels so popular with Egyptians. In concluding this article, he exhorted Egyptians to establish their “domestic independence” first, by becoming good hotel managers, cooks, and builders; from this economic base he expected Egyptians to enter the medical, engineering, and banking professions.⁶⁹

Tal’at Harb continued to display his expertise in economic matters when he published *Qanat al-Suways*, which attacked the British plan to extend the Suez Canal concession for an additional forty years. He argued that, despite having invested huge amounts of labor and capital in the construction of the canal, Egypt had realized trifling gains. Harb also argued that the Suez Canal Company made its huge profits at the expense of the Egyptian people and its government; and that the Egyptian Parliament should not extend the concession unless the company was willing to make far-reaching changes in the distribution of funds between shareholders and the Egyptian people and to allow Egyptians a voice in the company’s administration.⁷⁰

The continuing nationalist push for independence, the specific effects of European economic and political penetration, and the severe economic measures taken by the Egyptian Government during World War I, were all pushing Egyptians toward revolution in 1919. In particular, the requisitioning by the British of livestock and labor, and the shift to increased cotton production for the War effort, negatively affected Egyptian peasants in a disproportionate manner. To cheaply supply its factories, the British kept raw Egyptian cotton prices artificially low, allowing them to reach only 56% of the world market price. This greatly angered the Egyptian landed elites and was certainly one of the motivating factors in the overwhelming

⁶⁹ *Al-Jarida*, 1 October 1907.

⁷⁰ Tignor, 52-3.

support the elites gave to the independence movement.⁷¹ In this context, it is no wonder that rail lines, the symbol of both the British Empire's political supremacy and the loss of Egyptian economic sovereignty, would become the focal point of much of the industrial sabotage in support of socio-political independence.⁷² In addition, the middle classes were increasingly resentful because of the ever expanding number of British bureaucrats employed in large numbers during the War. Most of the urban population was also angered during the First World War, which included tight censorship of all newspapers and the wide application of martial law, which heightened the resentment of all segments of society and contributed to a growing sense of injustice and oppression.⁷³ A popular chant reflected the adverse effects of the British occupation and the particular hardships brought about by the First World War was, "Pardon us oh Wingate! But our country has had enough! You took our camels, donkeys, barley, and wheat aplenty / Now leave us alone!"⁷⁴

By the end of the First World War, then, nearly every segment of Egyptian society had reason to resent British rule and be receptive to renewed nationalist agitation. In addition to political repression and long-standing economic issues, the War had further disrupted the country's economy. Although large landowners had generally benefited from global high cotton prices, they resented official agricultural policies designed to serve British interests rather than their own. The bulk of the peasantry suffered from the requisitioning of their animals and their

⁷¹ Nathan J. Brown, *Peasant politics in Modern Egypt: Struggle Against the State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 200.

⁷² Collective punishment was also used; it became standard British policy to burn the village nearest to any damaged railway tracks.

⁷³ FO 371/3714/39690, Cheetham, "Egyptian Political Situation," March 9, 1919. For a detailed British analysis of what caused the revolt, see Great Britain. Egypt No. 1 (1921), *Report of the Special Mission to Egypt*, 7-12; Ziad Fahmy, "Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism," 244-5.

⁷⁴ Because this song was sung in the streets, there were many simultaneous versions of it, with slightly different lyrics. According to a contemporary, the first verses of the song went: "Pardon us oh Wingate! But our country is ruined (khirbil)...They killed our children, pillaged our country and exiled our leader..." See Mustafa Amin, *Min Wahid li-'Asharah* (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith Lil-Tiba'a wa al-Nashr, 1977), 187; Ziad Fahmy, "Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism," 243.

grain, and, later in the War, from being drafted by the hundreds of thousands for forced labor with the Allied armies in the Middle East and Europe. The temporary weakening of ties with the European economy stimulated significant growth in those industries that produced substitutes for imports unavailable during the War, or which catered to the needs of wealthy Egyptians and the very large Allied forces stationed in Egypt. Low food supplies, largely a result of the shift to the monopoly crop cotton, in addition to inflation, only exacerbated the situation for Egyptian workers and fellahin.

The British attempted to frame worker and fellahin disaffection as reflective of a situation on the brink of Bolshevik catastrophe. Egyptian elites were, likewise, wary of increased activism on the part of the *fellahin*, which was as motivated by anger at local economic conditions as it was by the nationalist movement. Landowners and omdehs generally were reported to be seriously alarmed at the attitude of the fellahin, the damage done to property, cattle theft, danger to the water supply, and the likelihood of further unrest. Landowners also became increasingly angered with Cairo and the *effendi* nationalists to whose activities they attributed their losses. Landowners were uneasy at the appearance among the fellahin of what, from their point of view, they regarded as the worst symptom of Bolshevism, namely the proposal to partition large estates for the benefit of the small holders and landless peasants.⁷⁵

A Bolshevik Fatwa

Due to the fear of international conspiracies that might undermine British imperial power, the British took a particularly close interest and remained very active in studying and attempting

⁷⁵ FO 848/10, "Army General Headquarters Historical Summary of the Revolt," quoted in Goldberg, 274.

to repress what they considered to be a “communist threat” in Egypt.⁷⁶ The activity of small circles of intellectuals, such as Joseph Rosenthal and Salama Musa, reflected a broader public interest in communist ideas, if not Communism itself.⁷⁷ The strong showings of the Bolsheviks on the international stage in the early part of the twentieth century were also widely applauded as defeats for the imperialist powers, including Britain. British authorities sought to counter this by launching an anti-Bolshevik propaganda campaign which included distribution of the 1919 fatwa by the Grand Mufti of Egypt condemning Bolshevism.

While religious elites in Egypt had tended to remain divorced from issues of political or economic imperialism, on 2 July 1919 the then Grand Mufti of Egypt, Shaykh Muhammad Bakhit, issued a fatwa against Bolshevism.⁷⁸ The Sheikh’s opinion identified Bolshevism with

⁷⁶ See, for example, “Bolshevism in Egypt,” Cheetham, 16 October 1919, Confidential, in which Bolsheviks are described as foreign agents, and Bolshevism as a philosophy which appeals to fellahin with promises of distribution of land. He also describes Bolshevism as a “natural and valuable ally of the [nationalist] Extremists.”

⁷⁷ On the history of the early communist movement, discussed here only as it relates to the labor movement, see Rifa’at al-Sa’id, *Ta’rikh al-haraka al-ishtirakiyya fi misr, 1900-1925* (Cairo, 1975); Suliman Bashear, *Communism in the Arab East, 1918-1928* (London, 1980); and Selma Botman, “Political Opposition in Egypt: The Communist Movement, 1936-1954,” Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1984.)

⁷⁸ Law No. 10 of 1911, which among other things signaled the arrival of the Shaykh al-Azhar as the preeminent religious leader of Egypt, made it illegal for the students or ulama’ of al-Azhar to engage in political activities, and set forth the idea that the Supreme Council of al-Azhar would hold the students and the shaykhs responsible for their activities both inside and outside of al-Azhar. Nevertheless, a great deal of political activity centered around Egypt’s mosques throughout the revolutionary period of 1919 and 1920; and they became influential centers of opposition to the British protectorate. Following this, nationalists were less willing to allow the ulema’ to remain passive on issues of national independence. For example, the students of the Alexandria Religious Institute wired the Mufti the following message in Fall 1919: “you have told us your opinion about Bolshevism. Will you tell us what you think of the Milner Commission?” (*The Egyptian Mail*, 22 October 1919.) The author of an editorial comment in *al-Afkar* made a similar suggestion, writing that, as the Grand Mufti Muhammad Bakhit and other leading ulama had taken trouble to express their opinions on many unimportant matters, they should not mind doing the same with respect to the Milner Mission, an issue which concerned the fate of the nation. The author stressed that “those...whose duty it is to give legal opinions have to tell us what religion and Muslim law order us to do with regard to a Commission which proposes to deprive the nation of its natural rights and lead it to recognize the Protectorate and thus come under a foreign power, an eventuality which is forbidden by canon law.” The article ended with an expression of hope “...the Grand Mufti, the Rector of the Azhar and the principal ulama will tell us what Muslim law says on this grave question, so that the nation may know what its duty is.” (*al-Afkar*, quoted in *The Egyptian Mail*, 22 October 1919; John D. McIntyre, Jr., *The Boycott of the Milner Mission: A Study in Egyptian Nationalism* (New York: Peter Lang, 1985), 87-91.) A few days later, when some Azhari students warned the Mufti in the press that “...the nation is in great doubt as to your patriotism as you have not given your opinion regarding the Milner Mission as you did regarding Bolshevism...,” Shaykh Bakhit once again refused to respond.” (*The Egyptian Gazette*, 28 October 1919; also, see an interview between a reporter from al-Ahram and the Mufti in *The Egyptian Mail*, 1 November 1919; McIntyre, 87-91.)

Mardukism and Zoroastrianism in ancient Persia.⁷⁹ Bolshevik communism, warned Shaykh Bakhit,

destroys all divine laws especially the doctrines of Islam, because it recommends what God has considered illegal in His book. It legalizes shedding blood, allows trespassing, treachery, lies, and rape, causing anarchy to spread among the people with regard to their property, their women, children, and inheritance, until they eventually become worse than theists...such people are nothing but apostates, whose “way” demolishes human society, destroys the order of the world, leads to apostasy, threatens the whole world with horrible distress and bitter troubles, and instigates the lower classes against any system founded upon reason, morals, and virtue.⁸⁰

The wording of this fatwa is indicative of the degree to which some of the top level of the ulama’ were committed to maintaining the political, social, and economic status quo in Egypt in the face of increasing nationalist agitation. The fatwa also represented a clear break with the main thrust of the nationalist movement because by 1919 Zaghlul, the Wafdists, and what remained of the Watanis were all deeply involved in the efforts to organize labor and to use syndicates as allies against the British protectorate. In addition, several of those involved in the labor movement in Egypt either identified with Bolshevism themselves or were regarded as Bolshevist by the British authorities in Egypt.⁸¹ This document drawn up by the Mufti is also remarkable for its lack of an appreciation for the conditions in Egypt which made some segments of society predisposed to identify with both nationalist aspirations and the spirit of socialist doctrines prevalent throughout much of the post-War world.⁸²

⁷⁹ Marduk is a Babylonian creator god.

⁸⁰ See the full text of the fatwa in FO 141/779, 9065/8. Two years later, another prominent religious figure attacked the growth of Egyptian socialism. Sheikh Mohammed al-Ghoneimi al-Taftazani quoted the Qur’anic verse, “Allah has preferred some of you upon others in wealth,” and from it argued, “Praise God! As if we have finished all our affairs and as if we have finished building such that nothing remains but demolishing. Oh you who call for the new socialist party, it is enough what the East suffers from horrors and calamities, so do not tear it apart with this terrible Russian disease.” (*Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 24 August 1921; “The Communist Movement in Egypt,” 22-4.)

⁸¹ See the file on Fahmi in FO 141/681/9515, which discusses his involvement in “joint Wafd-Communist activities.” Also Giuseppe Pizzutto, an Italian subject in Egypt who took an important role in encouraging the labor movement in Egypt, spoke of himself as a Bolshevist. See FO 407/185/215, enclosure 1, “Note by Major Courtney, Director of Military Intelligence” and enclosures in FO 407/185/155, Allenby to Curzon, 31 August 1919. Various General Staff Intelligence Reports link other Italians, as well as Egyptian nationalists, to the attempt to spread Bolshevism in Egypt during 1919. See FO 141/68/9572, “Egypt and Italy;” McIntyre, 87-91.

⁸² McIntyre, 87-91.

Shaykh Bakhit's fatwa caused a storm of criticism in the Egyptian press and public debate in Egypt regarding the fatwa's authenticity and timing as well as the causes and factors behind its publication. "An unacceptable fatwa," declared Tewfik Habib in an article published in *al-Akhbar* on 19 August 1919. Habib wrote that the Mufti knew "absolutely nothing about Bolshevism," and accused Bakhit of issuing the fatwa for political reasons, because England and her allies were enemies of transnational Bolshevism.⁸³ Critics of the fatwa endeavored to persuade their readers that if true Bolshevism were adopted in Egypt, the country would be saved. For instance, articles published in the Wafdist paper *Wadi al-Nil* stressed that the aim of Bolshevism was to raise the oppressed majority and take the authority from the tyrannical minority in order to restore equality and make justice prevail among the people.⁸⁴ In fact, most Egyptians saw the fatwa for exactly what it was – an attempt on the part of the British to discredit Bolshevism using incorrect assumptions about Egyptians and Islam.

Despite its clear unpopularity, however, the British were overjoyed with the fatwa's appearance; and made copies available for distribution throughout the Muslim population centers in the British Empire. High Commissioner Allenby sent copies of the fatwa, translated into several languages, to the Viceroy of India, the British political agent in Aden, the Civil Commissioner in Baghdad, the British High Commissioner in Constantinople, and the Governor-General of the Sudan.⁸⁵

It soon became apparent, however, that the fatwa had far from the desired effect. The British campaign to capitalize on the fatwa was so clumsy that it was ridiculed in the press and actually resulted in an increased public interest in communism. The Egyptian population, intensely suspicious of British activities, responded to the heavy-handed move on the part of the

⁸³ *Al-Akhbar*, 19 August 1919; Quoted in FO 407/185/143, Allenby to Curzon, 26 August 1919; Ginat, 14-6.

⁸⁴ See, for example, *Wadi al-Nil*, 20 and 26 August 1919; Ginat, 14-6.

⁸⁵ FO 407/185/81, Allenby to Curzon, 13 July 1919; McIntyre, 87-91.

British with increased interest to the hitherto largely unknown doctrine of communism. Anything the British so disliked, they reasoned, could not be all bad.⁸⁶ According to a British intelligence report, Islamic scholar and reformer Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935) maintained, “Nobody ever knew in Egypt so much about real Bolshevism before the publication of the fatwa, and the newspapers never wrote so much about Bolshevism before this publication.”⁸⁷ A Cairo Secret Police Report of 28 August 1919 likewise indicated that the fatwa “...has probably rendered Bolshevism more popular, especially as seditious workers have been persuading the Muslim public that Bolshevism is not at all contrary to the precepts of the Muslim religion, and that the fatwa in question has been made at the instigation of the English.”⁸⁸ Early in 1920, the Cairo police reported:

It is noteworthy that coffee-house talk of Bolshevism continues to be reported. It is entirely vague, and is probably an indirect result of alarmist leaders in the “Times” rather than of Bolshevikist propaganda. Its general tendency is that the Bolsheviks are coming to take Egypt, and it will be a fine thing for Egypt when they do. Then if a poor man wants money, he will just take it from the rich. Vague as it is, it has its importance as a symptom of economic unrest.⁸⁹

The fatwa was not only unpopular with workers and political activists. Criticism of the fatwa also came from Islamic circles. Rida maintained that from many points of view the fatwa was a mistake on the part of the Mufti as well as “on the part of the British government that asked him to publish it.”⁹⁰ As Rida had observed, public interest in Bolshevism and media attention to it increased as a reaction to British efforts to discredit it. Bakhit, noted Rida, wrote

⁸⁶ FO 141/779, No. 9065. Informant’s Report, Cairo, 26 August, 1919.

⁸⁷ FO 141/779, File 9065. Informant’s Report, Cairo, 26 August, 1919..

⁸⁸ FO 141/779, File 9065. Cairo Secret Police Report, 28 August 1919, in GSI Report, 29 August 1919.

⁸⁹ FO 141/779/9065/2-17; FO 141/779/9065/41, Commandant, Cairo City Police to General Staff Intelligence, General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Forces, 21 February 1920.

⁹⁰ Record of conversation between Rashid Rida and a British agent in Cairo, 26 August 1919, FO 141/779, p. 39-40; Ginat, 14-6. Shaykh Ali Zakaluni of al-Azhar also criticized the “authoritative” opinion of Shaykh Bakhit by stating that according to reasonable people, Bolshevism instead stood for “...the uprising of the oppressed nations against their tyrannical governments and the subjugation of the strong, whose sole intention is to crush the weak and to secure the rights of individuals.” He went on to explain that there is nothing in Bolshevism contrary to the teachings of Islam. (*Wadi al-Nil*, 20 August 1919, quoted in FO 407/185/156, enclosure in Cheetham to Curzon, 4 September 1919. Also see Cairo Secret Police Report for 29 August 1919 in GSI Report of the same date.)

the fatwa in a poor fashion employing weak historical sources to justify his arguments. In Rida's view, the spread of Bolshevism in Egypt was a definite possibility. A person with suitable rhetorical skills could easily spread the idea, if he spoke

to the people in the street and the working classes [for whom] every verse in the Qur'an can be interpreted in favor of Bolshevism. Bolshevism is much akin to many teachings of the Mufassirin in the first period of Islam; Bait al-mal is Bolshevism, and the Hanbali madhhab is Bolshevism itself.⁹¹

The correct way to combat Bolshevism was not "to ask a fatwa from a senile old man like Shaykh Bakhit," Rida continued, "because everybody here believes that Bolshevism is good to make the British leave Egypt, and everybody believes that the fatwa has no value, because it is a fatwa de commande."⁹² Rida stressed that in order to halt the development of Bolshevism it was essential to explain what real Bolshevism was. Bolshevism, stated Rida, was against the principle of proprietorship, and since there were powerful proprietors in Egypt who knew that Bolshevism would deprive them of their land, they would side with the government in order to prevent such a possibility.

In reference to the fatwa and in order to explain his own view of communism, Rashid Rida went on to publish an article on socialism, Bolshevism, and religion in his journal *al-Manar* on 26 August 1919. Bolshevism, he reasoned, was the same as socialism, aiming at the elimination of "the authority of the greedy lords of wealth and their helpers, the rulers who support them, who have imposed their materialist laws that are based on devouring the rights of workers in their own countries and on the colonization of the countries of other, weaker peoples."⁹³ The literal meaning of Bolshevik, explained Rida, was "majority," which meant that real rule among every people should be in the hands of the majority of the nation, and those were

⁹¹ See a record of conversation between Rashid Rida and a British agent in Cairo, 26 August 1919, FO 141/779, p. 39-40; Ginat, 14-6.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Quoted in Ginat, 14-16.

the workers in industry, agriculture, and other fields. That could become possible when the authority of the lords of wealth and their high-ranking partisans was terminated. The Bolsheviks succeeded in Russia; there they overthrew the oppressive tyrannical tsarist state, “the oppression and tyranny of which did not prevent governments that claim to be democratic – the French and British –from allying themselves with it and making agreements with it on how to partition the Ottoman and Persian territories.”⁹⁴ Although not in favor of Bolshevism, Rida sympathized with its struggle to restore justice and to liberate the oppressed:

We are certain that it is inconceivable that their activities and systems would be in accordance with the rules of Islam; and it is not for the Muslims, who observe their religion, to follow them. But this is not something that pertains only to the Bolsheviks; it pertains to all the positivist laws that are followed in Europe and also in the East – such as in Egypt and the Ottoman state, where some regulations violate Islamic law. The Muslims wish for the success of the socialists in eliminating the enslavement of the peoples (all of whom are workers), while they reject their practices – and the practices of everyone else – that violate Islamic law. It is understood that we are anyway not expecting them to implement all the branches of Islamic law, since they are not Muslims.⁹⁵

Global Communism, Local Economies, and the 1919 Revolution

The distinctive mixture of local economic and political grievances with new international philosophies created the conditions for the Egyptian Revolution of 1919 and the subsequent movements by nationalist leaders. The issues that most concerned Egyptians were the social and economic issues they observed on a daily basis, namely increasing inequality, poverty, corruption, and the brutality of occupation, which was itself intimately tied to economic imperialism. Movements, therefore, that tended toward socialist or communist tendencies were always simultaneously about local priorities and trans-local connections. For example, the wave of strikes from March to April 1919 was sparked off by, and can only be understood in the

⁹⁴ Ginat, 14-6.

⁹⁵ Rashid Rida’s article was published in *al-Manar*, 26 August, 1919 (vol. 21, no. 5), p. 252-256; Ginat, 14-6.

context of, the more massive explosion of popular protest against British rule. Strikes which raised economic demands were therefore regarded by strikers, and by the populace in general, as an integral part of the broader struggle of the Egyptian people for independence and as a genuinely nationalist activity.⁹⁶ At the same time, the scale of the popular revolt and the general breakdown of order simultaneously terrified property owners and made it impossible for the British authorities to suppress the strikes.⁹⁷ In addition, the strikers, the British, and the general Egyptian population began to see the strikes as tied to the political Revolution. A good example of this would come in September 1919, during a lengthy strike launched by the Cairo tramwaymen to compel the Cairo Tramway Company to carry out an agreement it had signed with workers in April of that year.⁹⁸

The connection between the Watani movement for independence and striking workers had a decade of history behind it by the time of the 1919 strike. The Nationalist Party had begun to provide open support for worker activism in 1909. In the autumn of 1908 the grievances of the Cairo tramway workers, alluded to earlier, produced a rising tide of agitation, culminating in a strike accompanied by clashes with the police in October. Certainly the nationalist press was strongly supportive of the strikers, who were depicted as subject to both the merciless greed of the foreign (in this case Belgian) monopolists who owned the tram company and the brutal repression of the British-controlled police who were ultimately able to break the strike. In 1909,

⁹⁶ Among the first major Egyptian strikes were the Greek cigarette rollers' strike in 1899, the 1900 Alexandria tramway workers strike, and the 1906 Egyptian State Railways strike.

⁹⁷ Zachary Lockman, "The Social Roots of Nationalism: Workers and the National Movement in Egypt, 1908-1919," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (October 1988), 455.

⁹⁸ Tramworkers were subjected to what they regarded as the arbitrary, absolutist, and abusive authority of the industry's mainly Greek and Italian inspectors, who could summarily impose fines or other disciplinary sanctions. The Egyptian workers also complained that the tram company discriminated against them in promotions to better-paid jobs, which were generally reserved for foreigners. (See, for example, *al-Mu'ayyad*, 18 October 1908.) In 1924, during a subsequent Cairo tram strike, another British official argued that if the strikers won, "their success would not only be considered as a triumph for them, but would also be looked upon by the natives as a defeat of both the employers and the authorities, a fact which will probably encourage the mass of the population to make trouble." (FO 141/781/8915, 18 August 1919.)

the nationalists moved beyond airing workers' grievances and supporting their strikes to directly sponsoring the formation of labor organizations. Early in the year party activists established the Manual Trades Workers' Union (*Niqabat 'Ummal al-Sana'i' al-Yadawiyya*) as a framework within which the growing numbers of workers and artisans with whom links had been forged through popular night schools or by other means could be organized. They thereby joined the broader movement of popular revolt manifested in street demonstrations, clashes with occupation troops, attacks on British and government installations and sabotage of railway lines. This unprecedented upsurge of worker militancy had its roots in economic conditions.⁹⁹ In the case of the Cairo tramway workers, the strike, which originally shut down the tram system, was reinforced by an effective public boycott of the company, so that even when the much-disliked tram company was finally able to run some cars under heavy British guard, there were very few passengers.¹⁰⁰

Offering his own support for the striking workers in 1919, Tal'at Harb, the promoter of Egypt's economic independence who was soon to found Bank Misr, published a series of articles in 1919 on the question of the tramways.¹⁰¹ In these articles, he not only attacked the foreign-

⁹⁹ Zachary Lockman, "The Social Roots of Nationalism: Workers and the National Movement in Egypt, 1908-1919," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 24, No. 4 (1988), 445-59, 450-1, 454-5.

¹⁰⁰ 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, *Thawrat sanat 1919* (Cairo, 1946), I, pp. 117-19. Cairo Tramway Company workers struck in 1908 and 1911; prominent among their grievances was the claim that foreign inspectors and managers abused Egyptian workers.

¹⁰¹ Tal'at Harb's articles originally appeared in *al-Ahram*, ending on September 17, 1919, and were also published in Hafiz Mahmud et al., *Tal'at Harb* (Cairo, 1936), p. 74-82. Bank Misr was founded in May 1920 as an expression of nationalist aspirations amid the ferment of the 1919 Revolution. It aroused nationalist hopes and became a symbol of Egypt's efforts to rid itself of all forms of British domination. Indeed, even before the Bank was founded, nationalists had begun to urge the Egyptian people to boycott British goods and British economic institutions and to patronize only Egyptian merchants. In August 1919 one of the leading Wafdists, Hamid al-Bassil, exhorted Egyptians to withdraw their savings from English banks and to put them in French, Italian, and German banks. He also advocated the creation of an Egyptian bank. (Secret Report of the Egyptian Delegation, August 11, 1919, FO 371/3718 f. 24930) One of the Bank's most staunch champions was Amin al-Rafi'i, editor of the nationalist newspaper, *al-Akhbar*. He ran features on the Bank and carried daily front-page advertisements encouraging all patriotic-minded Egyptians to purchase the Bank's shares and deposit their savings in the Bank. Amin al-Rafi'i's brother, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, wrote an article in *al-Akhbar* on the Polish National Bank, describing it as the economic underpinning of Polish independence and a sponsor of industrial development, and positing it as an example for Egypt to emulate. (*al-Akhbar*, 17 May 1920) (Robert L. Tignor, "Bank Misr and Foreign Capitalism,"

owned concessionary company for its alleged greed and irresponsibility, but also expressed sympathy for the company's workers.¹⁰²

The workers' rights continued to be connected in the popular and official imagination with the Egyptian independence movement. Nevertheless, while the Russian Revolution did serve as an inspiration to several different nationalist groups, the fears of some that the Egyptian nationalist cause was tending toward Bolshevism were greatly embellished.¹⁰³ For the most part, these exaggerations on the part of British officials and upper-class Egyptians were deliberate in order to scare nationalist forces away from the socialists and to intimate that the establishment of a socialist party in Egypt would jeopardize the cause of independence.¹⁰⁴ If the socialist movement in Egypt was smaller than portrayed at the time, the alarm, however unfounded, did affect the revolutionary leadership. There was a profound fear on the part of the leaders of the Wafd of being seen to be in league with Russia, lest that negatively influence negotiations with the British. In a confidential letter from Sa'd Zaghlul to the Wafd Central Committee, dated 23 June 1919, Zaghlul expresses his concern over reports that handbills were being distributed to the effect that Egyptians were relying on German assistance and championed the Bolsheviks. "Such handbills can only benefit our enemies who will claim that the Egyptian movement is in contact with the Germans and the Bolsheviks," he wrote.¹⁰⁵ The increasing distance placed between the former Central Powers and Communist supporters, on the one hand, and Egyptian

International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 8 (1977), 163.) According to Tal'at Harb, an Egyptian bank would free Egypt from its "financial slavery" [al-raqq al-mali] to foreigners. (Tal'at Harb, *'Alaj Misr-al-Iqtisadi* (Cairo, n.d.), p. 29.) For more on Tal'at Harb and the early history of Bank Misr, see Eric Davis, *Challenging Colonialism: Bank Misr and Egyptian Industrialization, 1920-1941* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983.)

¹⁰² Published in *al-Ahram* ending on 17 September 1919; also collected in Hafiz Mahmud et al, *Tal'at Harb* (Cairo, 1936), pp. 74-82.

¹⁰³ For further exploration of this argument, see Tareq Y. Ismael and Rif'at Sa'id, *The Communist Movement in Egypt, 1920-1988* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990.)

¹⁰⁴ Reports on suggested Formation of Egyptian Socialist Party, Berne, 2 June 1917, Sir H. Rumbold, Confidential.

¹⁰⁵ Quoted in Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, *Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882-1954* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 139-40.

nationalists on the other put European-based Watani nationalists at a distinct disadvantage vis-à-vis the Wafd.

The Wafd was right to be concerned about the British reaction to any possible links between Egyptian nationalists and official communism. Despite the lack of evidence of foreign involvement in the 1919 Revolution, some British officials in Egypt had an extremely paranoid and exaggerated notion of the Bolshevik threat and saw evidence everywhere of a perceived Bolshevik-German-pan-Islamic conspiracy poised to engulf the Middle East.¹⁰⁶ In the eyes of the British and French, communism in the colonies, which they were convinced was sponsored by Russia, was the newest and greatest threat to the continuation of their empires.¹⁰⁷ After 1917, Bolshevik Russia had emerged as a new power whose “declared policy,” according to British officials, was to start a revolution in India. According to the British, the fact that the First World War had left behind “immense economic unrest and distress” in the colonies produced a situation “subversives” could exploit easily. The War had not only “made available stores of arms and munitions,” it had “bequeathed to all... [subversive] bodies a large library of literature,” that included both German war-time propaganda and communist writings.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, after the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and especially after the founding of the Communist International in 1919, the British saw a “master conspirator” behind the scenes which was, they believed, providing many anti-colonialists from the British Empire with financial and

¹⁰⁶ Beinin and Lockman, 139-40.

¹⁰⁷ FO 141/779/9065/200, 201; FO 371/J2372/16/16. For example, Shapurji Saklatvala, the communist Member of Parliament for North Battersea, was not even allowed to land in Egypt on his way to India in 1927, and the British embassy in Rome insisted that the Fascist government certify that each Italian worker sent to the Sudan for a dam construction project was free of communist tendencies.

¹⁰⁸ Daniel Brueckenhaus, “The Transnational Surveillance of Anti-Colonial Movements in Western Europe, 1905-1945,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 2011), 225; Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, April 12, 1920, BL, OIOC 32124.

institutional support.¹⁰⁹ In a May 1919 report, Hugh Whittall, the Director of Military Intelligence, wrote:

The victory of the Allies has not, as might have been expected calmed the Anti-British agitation in the Moslem [sic] world, organised by Germany [sic] during the war. On the contrary, recent events in Egypt and India indicate that such intrigues have born tardy but apparently dangerous fruit... It is unwise to take the conspiracy other than somewhat seriously... The Germans and their Moslem friends have found moreover new and powerful allies in the Russian Bolsheviks, whose fear and hatred of England rivals their own, and who likewise plan to undermine British power by rousing the East to rebellion.¹¹⁰

Ronald Graham, head of the Egyptian section at the British foreign office, agreed with Whittall's assessment of foreign involvement in the affairs of Egypt; he believed that Egyptian grievances resulting from measures which Great Britain took during the First World War were "not sufficient to account for the present serious and organised outbreak in which the hand of the Young Turk and even the German agent, is clearly discernible."¹¹¹

Even after the 1919 Revolution, suspicions persisted among some British officials that certain Egyptian nationalists had ties either directly or indirectly to Turkish Kemalists or Russian Bolsheviks. For example, in 1921, general staff intelligence in Egypt sent out copies of a memorandum entitled "Note on the Probable Liaison between the Kemalists, the Pan-Islamists and the Bolsheviks" to the general staff offices in Istanbul, Jerusalem, and Baghdad, the director of military intelligence, the British residency in Cairo, and the British-run department of public

¹⁰⁹ Brueckenhaus, 225. Geneva, 8 April 1919, Secret, Report on "Revival of the Nationalist Movement, Young Turks, Young Egyptians, etc in Switzerland." According to the British report, the "pan-Islamic propaganda bureau" was located in Berlin during the War. Jawish was the director of the "whole Turco-Egyptian movement against England, the head of the national party Farid Bey having no longer any influence at all." "The nationalist movement, Egyptian, Young Turk, Hindu, etc. is certainly still directed by Germany, being at the same time probably in connection with the Russian and Hungarian Bolsheviks," the report continued. The British were convinced that relations with the Bolsheviks had been formed during the war by Farid Bey, Jawish, and others under the patronage of Germany. During the war, Jawish's office edited *L'Egypte* in Geneva, *Die Islamische Welt* at Berlin, and *Al-Alam Al-Islami* at Constantinople.

¹¹⁰ Whittall to Graham, 5 May 1919, report entitled "The Nearer East and the British Empire," FO 141/433, file no. 10770, part I. Whittall noted Farid had met in Zurich with a German agent, Alexander L. Gel'fand, known as Parvus, who had "influence with Swiss Socialists (who are avowed Bolsheviks)... [and] facilitated the frequent journeys of Moslem [sic] emissaries and the transportation of funds to Switzerland..." (Whittall to Graham, 5 May 1919, "The Nearer East and the British Empire.")

¹¹¹ Memo by Graham, 9 April 1919, "Note on the Unrest in Egypt."

security in Cairo (a part of the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior.) This document stated that the Baku Council of Action and Propaganda among the Eastern Peoples was functioning as an instrument for Russian Bolshevik initiatives in the Muslim World and had close contact with “extreme elements” of the Turkish nationalist government in Ankara.¹¹² The report further noted that “Bolshevik” sources were probably responsible for accounts in the “Muslim press” from India to Egypt asserting that Great Britain would soon be bankrupt due to the extent of its commitments throughout the Middle East.¹¹³ A few days after the general staff intelligence report was issued, the acting director of the department of public security in Cairo opined that Turkish, as well as Egyptian and other Arab revolutionaries were “ready and eager to accept Bolshevik assistance to free themselves from British control.”¹¹⁴ Part of the reason for Britain’s insistence on finding the international conspiracy behind Egyptian nationalist agitation was the

¹¹² A Congress of the Peoples of the East was held in Baku on September 1, 1920, which was attended by nearly 2,000 delegates, approximately two-thirds of whom were communists. Thirty-seven nationalities were represented, including delegates from the Caucasus, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Egypt, India, China, Korea, Turkey, and Japan. That same year a Central Asiatic Bureau of the Comintern was established in Tashkent. The idea of staging a Congress in Europe, at which colonial nationalists could meet with their Western sympathizers, was first suggested by the Communist Party of Great Britain during a secret meeting held in Amsterdam on the 11th and 12th July, 1925. Delegates included M.N. Roy, Evelyn Roy, the Dutch communist Henrik Sneevliet and Clemens Dutt who was already engaged in anti-colonialist activities. Those present at the meeting discussed arrangements for an “Oriental Conference,” to which colonial nationalists from India, Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and Morocco would be invited. This conference never materialized, but the idea was carried through by Willi Munzenberg, General Secretary of the Workers’ International Relief, and chief propagandist for the Comintern. (Jean Jones, *The League Against Imperialism* (London: Socialist History Society, 1996), 4) The essential aim of the Baku Congress was to initiate an anti-imperialist platform among “the Eastern nationalities.” The importance of support to national liberation movements such as Mustafa Kemal’s was reiterated many times. The spirit of a united front against “the foreign imperialist yoke” was further strengthened by a declaration by Enver Pasha, and an enthusiastic speech given by the official representative of the Ankara government. The Baku Congress approved in principle the issuing of an “Appeal to the Peoples of the East.” It was directed entirely against Britain, the power regarded by the Comintern as the one great empire that had emerged from the First World War with the strength and intention to dominate the “oppressed peoples of the East.” (Charlotte Weber, “Between Nationalism and Feminism: The Eastern Women’s Congresses of 1930 and 1932,” *Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 85.) In terms of achievements, however, the Baku Congress was far from successful. No other congress of a similar nature ever took place as had been planned. The Council for Propaganda and Action which had been set up was soon abandoned. Among the tangible achievements of the Baku Congress was the establishment of the Institute of Oriental Studies (to replace the Oriental Seminar) in Moscow in 1920, and the Communist University of Toilers of the East in 1921. As a result, the British were, moreover, convinced that there was a “close connection between Orientals [sic] agitating against Great Britain, the Russian Government, and Germany.”

¹¹³ Memorandum by G.S.I., Egypt entitled “Note on the Probable Liaison between the Kemalists, the Pan-Islamists, and the Bolsheviks,” 15 June 1921, GO 141/433, file no. 10770, part II.

¹¹⁴ Beamon to G.S.I., Cairo, 20 June 1921, GO 141/433, file no. 10770, part II.

difficulty the British had in believing that the nationalist, pro-labor movement in Egypt was autochthonous; rather, British authorities were convinced it must have been controlled by, and imported from, Europe. This assumption highlights the fundamental problem in British assessments of the Egyptian nationalist movement. British officials framed their interpretations in terms of European backers or an international Islamism, rather than acknowledging the local causes of the Egyptian nationalist movement and its interrelations (rather than subjective position) with trans-national movements and ideologies.

Despite scant evidence of involvement in Egypt, the Comintern's activities in the 1920s gave an added urgency to British worries.¹¹⁵ The Comintern's leaders promised to provide anti-colonial nationalists with substantial financing, provided nationalists could prove their effectiveness in carrying out their revolutionary programs.¹¹⁶ As a result, the British believed that nationalist activities were coordinated behind the scenes in a "master conspiracy" of the Comintern and international communism more generally, with colonial nationalists as junior partners.¹¹⁷ According to a police report written in August of 1920, "the course of underground history since the Armistice" had been "in the direction of a coalescence of discontent in all countries, whether largely belligerent or allied, into hostility to Great Britain. In this coalescence the most incongruous elements have been or are being assimilated."¹¹⁸ Among the "elements" cited were German reactionaries, Turkish nationalists, pan-Islamists, and communists.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ The Third International, also referred to as the Communist International, abbreviated Comintern, was established in 1919 as an association of national communist parties, and dissolved in 1943. Though its stated purpose was the promotion of world revolution, the Comintern functioned largely as an organ of Soviet control over the international communist movement.

¹¹⁶ Brueckenhaus, 237.

¹¹⁷ Brueckenhaus, 243; Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence, August 9, 2910, BL OIOC, POS 32126. See also, for example, E16050/420/16, 23 December 1920, Director of Military Intelligence, "Ex-Khedive; relations with Bolsheviks."

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ As the prospect of revolution in Western Europe began to fade, greater emphasis was placed on the role of "the oppressed peoples of the East," and attempts were made to recruit colonial nationalists to the Communist cause.

While the British analysis of communist-nationalist intrigues was exaggerated, the international bases of communism did allow Egyptian and other nationalists greater access to finances, publications, and government officials. In the context of anti-colonial nationalism, the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia was most pertinent as a result of the reinvigorated, though not necessarily new, opportunities it created for international cooperation among nationalist groups.¹²⁰ While international socialism certainly had many adherents of various degrees of ideological commitment throughout the twentieth century, the sponsorship of the Comintern during the inter-War period provided nationalists of various colonies access to international audiences, collaborators, and funding. Much the same way as “Pan-Islamism” became an umbrella for more than a religious ideology, and adherents to the “cause” received tangible benefits in terms of support and funding; socialism and communism were also used by nationalists to some degree to attract activists and funding for purposes more narrowly nationalist or philosophically hybrid than the official ideology would allow.¹²¹

This is not to discount completely the power of socialism as an ideology attractive to anti-colonial groups; as Robert Young has pointed out, “For much of the twentieth century, it

¹²⁰ The inaugural Congress of the Communist International, held in March 1919 was attended by representatives of thirty-five organizations from twenty-one different countries. Little attention was devoted to the colonial question at this first meeting, though the Congress did emphasize the need to support the struggle of colonized populations, so as to advance the ultimate overthrow of the imperialist world system. In comparison, the second Comintern Congress in July 1920 gave full prominence to the formulation of colonial policy, including an important debate between Vladimir Lenin and Manabendra Nath Roy, the Indian delegate. Lenin’s “Thesis on the National and Colonial Question,” which was subsequently adopted by the Congress, urged Communists to form temporary alliances with national liberation movements in the colonies. In contrast, Roy’s “Thesis on the Eastern Question” – which was adopted on a supplementary basis – opposed class collaboration with bourgeois-democratic nationalism and argued for the establishment of Communist Parties in the colonial territories in order to incite left-wing revolutions there. (Jean Jones, *The League against Imperialism* (London: Socialist History Society, 1996), 3; Brueckenhaus, 165; Samaren Roy, *M.N. Roy: A Political Biography* (New Delhi: Orient Longman Limited, 1997), 47-53.)

¹²¹ Noor-Aiman Iftikhar Khan, “The Enemy of My Enemy: Indian Influences on Egyptian Nationalism, 1907-1930,” (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2006), 153. For more on “pan-Islamism” as a unifying force in practical terms during the period of the First World War, see Donald M. McKale, *War by Revolution: Germany and Great Britain in the Middle East in the Era of World War I* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1998); Raouf Abbas Hamed, “Germany and the Egyptian Nationalist Movement, 1882-1918,” *Die Welt des Islams*, V. 28, No. 1 (January 1988); Tilman Ludke, *Jihad made in Germany: Ottoman and German Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in the First World War* (London: Global, 2005.)

was Marxism alone which emphasized the effects of the imperialist system and the dominating power structure involved, and in sketching out blueprints for a future free of exploitation most twentieth century anti-colonial writing was inspired by the possibilities of socialism.”¹²² For this reason, communism and socialism shared various goals with various revolutionary nationalist movements; however, the tendency to focus too heavily on official ideologies and foundations belies the myriad utilitarian and local uses for allying with communist organizations or espousing communist ideology. There was certainly overlap in the goals and ideologies of anti-colonial nationalists, on the one hand, and communists and socialists on the other; and some individuals were ardent members of both camps. However, the differences in goals between the two movements would become clear over the subsequent two decades, as the dissimilarities papered over by the initial cooperation bubbled to the surface. <Example> This same phenomenon would come to characterize the relations of Egyptian nationalists with broader, ideological trans-nationalist movements, as the narrow goals of Egyptian independence diverged from or were no longer served by these international associations.

Part of the British belief that foreign powers were pulling the strings of Egyptian nationalists sprung from the fact that, from its inception, Kamil’s nationalist movement had depended heavily on foreign and Palace support. As a result, the critics of Egyptian nationalism saw it as nothing but the product of France’s thwarted imperialist ambitions, Ottoman “Pan-Islamic” intrigues, Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi’s frustrated desire to be a despot, or some combination of these extraneous forces.¹²³ Mustafa Kamil, however, defended the autochthonous nature of the Egyptian nationalist movement from the first. “We declare to the world,” Kamil said, “that the

¹²² Robert J.C. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2001), 6.

¹²³ During the 1919 Revolution, *The New York Times* proclaimed, presumably echoing British directives, “The [1919] demonstrations were the work of Egyptian Nationalists inspired by Turkish agents.” (“800 Native Dead in Egypt’s Rising; 1600 Wounded,” *New York Times*, 25 July 1919.)

Nationalist Party is independent of all states, governments, kings, and princes.”¹²⁴ He observed that “no nation can rise except by itself or regain its freedom except by its own efforts” and exhorted his listeners to join ranks and work to “prove to friends and foes that we are of all the nations the most entitled to the constitution and independence.”¹²⁵ Indeed, if Egyptian nationalism had been only the result of outside forces, it should have disappeared in 1904, following the Entente Cordiale and Kamil’s falling out with the Khedive.¹²⁶ Egyptian nationalism was not the product of external forces seen by British analysts. Instead, it attempted to harness and utilize transnational ideologies and foreign allegiances in a bid for successful independence.

Despite evidence that the Wafd was as interested as the British in suppressing any Bolshevik tendencies in Egypt, British Intelligence appeared to have been most eager to prove the existence of a link between the Wafd Party and Russia.¹²⁷ “Bolshevism in Egypt” was the subject of two lengthy reports drafted by British military intelligence in Egypt and dated 23 August and 8 September 1919. The British Government surmised that Russia had decided to insert itself into the Middle East with the explicit purpose of indoctrinating leftist and nationalist groups there. “It is now reported,” a British security report asserts, “that the Soviet agent at Jaddah [sic] is the principal agent on the Russian side in the attempt to coordinate the activities of the ‘Third International’ with those of the extreme nationalists of Egypt.”¹²⁸ According to British intelligence, “Bolshevist influence is likely to confine itself to fostering any subversive tendencies which it can find ready to hand and to endeavoring to give an anti-British turn to any

¹²⁴ Rafi’i, 494.

¹²⁵ Rafi’i, 467, 495.

¹²⁶ The British assumed that the Nationalists were French-inspired and lacked native support. See, for example, FO 78, Cromer to Salisbury, Cairo, 26 May 1900, enclosing Harry Boyle’s “Report on Moslem [sic] Feeling.”

¹²⁷ Mohammed Nuri El-Amin, “The Role of International Communism in the Muslim World and in Egypt and the Sudan,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (May 1996), 30; FO 141/779 (File No. 9065.), Letter No. 506 dated 16 October 1919, from the Residency, Ramleh to Earl Curzon of Kedleston,

¹²⁸ El-Amin, 30; Sudan Intelligence Report, No. 2, 17 March 1926, in File No. Security 7/1/2 N.A.S. pg. 6.

local discontents.”¹²⁹ Furthermore, British officials surmised that Bolshevist agents in Egypt were “directed to form a temporary alliance with the native exponents of nationalism, while not forgetting their own remoter aim. For, they are reminded, although Egyptian nationalism is a bourgeois movement, yet its trend is favourable to the Bolshevist policy of undermining the position of Great Britain.”¹³⁰ In order to implement these tactics, the British believed that the Bolshevists had entered into a separate alliance with the Wafd and the Nationalist parties.¹³¹ British intelligence reports also suggested that nationalists were distributing money to some striking workers, presumably, the British believed, to raise tensions and foment Revolution.¹³²

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ El-Amin, 27.

¹³² FO 141/781/8915, reports of 28 April, 7 May 1919.

Chapter Nine: Conclusion

In this thesis, I have sought to analyze the multiple contingent alliances and loyalties that defined the Egyptian Nationalist movement in the period 1882-1919, in order to illuminate the construction of both the Egyptian state and Egyptian identity as works in progress. I have focused on several different aspects of this interactivity, between different states as well as between state and society, to illustrate the variety of mechanisms through which Egyptian identity and nationalism were transformed. Though the Egyptian nationalist movement proved popular and capable of galvanizing public opinion, the Watani Party was hampered by their ideological ambivalence, and their indecisiveness regarding strategy and organizational capacity. By the time Eldon Gorst was replaced as Consul General by the more authoritarian Herbert Kitchener in 1911, the Nationalists were too divided and demoralized to mobilize either Palace or popular support against British rule. The Watani nationalists, in particular, were too often concerned with working abroad and courting foreign opinion and potential allies to pay sufficient attention to the creation of a domestic consensus and powerbase within the government. Watanists had, with their technological and linguistic capacities, come to dominate the global debate about Egypt; but, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, they were unable to participate in any meaningful way in the domestic nationalist movement. On the other hand, through their leadership of the nationalist movement and protests in the period 1918-1919, the Wafd party was able to gain legitimacy and dominate internal Egyptian politics despite the Party's heavy membership of landholders and urban elites. Following the Revolution of 1919, the Wafd was presented for the first time with the task of speaking for the populace and governing without the mediating role of a repressive state or foreign occupier to serve as a

galvanizing opposition. The revolutionary movement – splintered and fragmented under the pressure of rebuilding the country – failed to create a unified coalition or a clear post-revolution strategy. The collapse of negotiations with Britain, the assassination of Sirdar Sir Lee Stack, and the ensuing British crackdown drove the Wafd from power and replaced it with Ahmad Ziwari's (1864-1945, Prime Minister 1924-26) palace-dominated cabinet. Elections in the spring produced another Wafdist chamber, which the king immediately prorogued. For their part, hard-liners in England had mistrusted Allenby since the independence declaration, and in May 1925 he was forced out.

Egypt is typically treated as a special case in the historiography of the modern Middle East, and not without reason. For instance, in his classic work on the “evolution of the Egyptian national image,” Charles Wendell argues that the “geographical or territorial factor” – the fact that “Egypt is determinable with unusual ease and little or no dispute” – greatly facilitated the rise of Egyptian national consciousness.¹ At the same time, Ziad Fahmy's recent monograph on Egyptian nationalism seems to take it for granted that Egypt is really only the Nile Valley (though with the caveat that Upper Egypt did retain some cultural distinctiveness): “The topography of Egypt...with most of its inhabitants living in an easily accessible thin strip of land stretching from Aswan to the Mediterranean, has historically facilitated centralization efforts.”² However, one of the major tropes that scholars most commonly fall back on to make the argument for exceptionalism – the notion that Egypt, unlike the other nation-states that would emerge out of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, maintained a distinctive sense of territorial cohesiveness over its several-thousand-year-long history – bears further investigation. The

¹ Charles Wendell, *The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image; from its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.)

² Wendell, 123-4; Ziad Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation through Popular Culture* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 21.

picture one tends to have of Egypt as a relatively continuous and stable geographical unit from time immemorial is in fact belied by the frequent changes in Egyptian definitions of themselves and the various identities and loyalties assumed by different sections of the population. The long-standing historiographical and nationalist assumptions about Egypt's geographical stability since the time of the Pharaohs actually conceal the set of fluid and tentative processes through which Egypt was constituted. This was also true for the makeup of the Egyptian state and the nationalist movement as it was formed in the period 1882-1919.

The major ideological thrust of Egyptian nationalism in the period 1882-1919 was not the defense of the nation's territorial integrity, but rather the assertion of a strong anti-colonial identity. This thesis has attempted to draw attention to the ultimately contingent and fluid nature of Egyptian national identity and the way in which this adaptability impacted the movement for national independence. Historiographical debates have typically arisen between historians emphasizing the role of the educated, urban *effendiyya* class in defining the contours of national identity, on the one hand, and those scholars who critique notions of elite nationalism by shedding light on the contingent identities of large parts of the Egyptian body politic such as the fellahin, on the other.³ However, the various identities and loyalties comprising Egyptian nationalism differed across communities, over time, and even within groups. Egyptians of many stripes articulated their understanding of the wider cultural and political order from their own

³ See, for example, Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Lisa Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation: The Family Politics of Modernizing, Colonizing, and Liberating Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Wilson Chacko Jacob, *Working Out Egypt: Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in Colonial Modernity, 1870-1940* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011). For a prime example of this latter sort of work, see Michael Gasper, *The Power of Representation: Publics, Peasants, and Islam in Egypt* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.) Recent works by Ziad Fahmy and Carmen Gitre offer key revisions to prevailing understandings of national culture by emphasizing vernacular, everyday articulations of Egyptianness. Ziad Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians*; Carmen M.KI. Gitre, "Performing Modernity: Theater and Political Culture in Egypt, 1869-1923," (PhD dissertation, Rutgers University, 2011.) Lucie Ryzova's work provides a similar revision of effendi-dominated analysis, though for the interwar period. Lucie Ryzova, "Efendification: The Rise of Middle-Class Culture in Modern Egypt," (PhD dissertation, University of Oxford, 2008.)

particular perspective; and Egyptians were conscious of their culture and identity at multiple levels. The issue, then, is that the manner in which Egyptian political identities have been contextualized is fundamentally problematic. Individuals and groups identify simultaneously with several communities; these identifications are historically changeable, and often seem internally contradictory.

Territorial nationalism is often considered to override other forms of identification within a society, such as religious, racial, linguistic, class, gender, or even historical ones, in order to encompass these differences in a larger identity. But the relationship among different identities is more complex than this. As a result, it may be possible to speak of different national identities and loyalties, which are not overridden by the nation-state, but actually help to define or constitute it. In place of the homogenous nation, there exists a heterogeneity of identities, overlapping and crisscrossing; contradictory and ambiguous; opposing, affirming, and negotiating their views of the nation. National identities are unstable not only because they are susceptible to splits, but also because most forms of nationalism include a transnational vision – such as pan-Africanism, pan-Arabism, or Socialism.⁴ In order to understand national identity more fully, it must be studied in relation to other identities, as part of the generalized category of political identity. This issue becomes particularly problematic when other universalizing identities are present, as is the case in Egypt. When considered in this way, one can see how the ambiguities, the changeability, the fungibility, and interplay of national identity with other forms of identification can be as subversive of the nation-state as it is supportive. Since the state is never able to eliminate alternative constructions of the nation, we can also ask if national

⁴ Prasenjit Duara, “Historicizing National Identity, or Who Imagines What and When,” in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, *Becoming National: A Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 161-2.

identification is as privileged over others as the nation-state and nationalist leaders like to suggest.⁵

The most easily identifiable expressions of Egyptian nationalism as a fluid identity are the relationships between anti-imperialist movements, and the contingent alliances formed by Egyptian nationalists with a series of state and non-state actors. Watan leader Muhammad Farid and other nationalists believed that it was in the self-interest of the Nationalist Party to join with the Ottoman Sultan against the Khedive, for example, because it provided them with public legitimacy, a powerbase for opposing the British, and potential financial assistance. At other times, the Watanists allied with the Khedive, or with the Young Turk party against the person of the Sultan. When a particular contingent threat receded, it became easy for the nationalists to perceive a threat from precisely those groups with which they had previously cooperated. As a result of their educations, language abilities, and connections to European centers of power, the nationalists were able to utilize their chameleon-like identity, where different identities and loyalties were invoked depending on whether the immediate threat was directed against territorial nationalism, constitutionalism, religious nationalism, or anti-colonial nationalism. The Egyptian nationalist movement went through a process of choosing between the overlapping but occasionally competing definitions of nation that were reflected in their relationships not only with the British and Ottoman Empires but also with the movements against them, without ever coming to a firm conclusion.⁶

In addition, the evidence of the Egyptian nationalist movement problematizes the categories that have traditionally been discussed in opposition to nationalism that sought a territorially sovereign nation-state. Nationalism was not always in competition with trans-

⁵ Ibid., 161.

⁶ Noor-Aiman Iftikhar Khan, "The Enemy of My Enemy: Indian Influences on Egyptian Nationalism, 1907-1930," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2006), 9.

nationalist ideas and movements; in fact, it was often supported and partially defined through them. Despite the supposed “failures” of movements such as Islamism, Pan-Arabism, and Pan-Africanism, they achieved considerable success as adjuncts to nationalist liberation movements. Debating the compatibility (or incompatibility) of Islam, territorial nationalism, Arabism, and liberalism sets up false dilemmas to the extent that these terms remain devoid of utility outside of an understanding of the local concrete, social relations and lived experiences that lend them substance and meaning. More productive answers may be sought in an understanding of how different appropriations of transnational movements by different political actors shape and circumscribe the discursive possibilities and organizing capacities of nationalism. Contestation, moderation, and negotiation between rival states, as well as between the state and rival elites defined the ways in which Egyptian nationalism was theorized and acted upon in this period.

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Misr

Misr al-Fatah

Al-Misri

Al-Muayyad

Al-Muqattam

Al-Rabita al-‘Arabiyya

Al-Rabita as-Sharqiyya

As-Sha’ab

Al-Urwa al-Wuthqa

Al-Ustadh

Wadi al-Nil

Al-Watan

Turkish Language

Anadolu, Constantinople

Dođru söz, Constantinople

Hak, Cairo

Hilal-i Osmani, Constantinople

Jehan-i Islam, Constantinople

Kanun-ı Esasî, Cairo

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Note: in accordance with Egyptian practice, sources in Arabic are alphabetized by first name of author.

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