SOCIETY

In other words, everything above implies very strongly that human beings will always complain. There is no Garden of Eden, there is no paradise, there is no heaven except for a passing moment or two. Whatever satisfactions are given to human beings, it is inconceivable that they should be perfectly content with these. This in itself would be a negation of the highest reaches of human nature because it would imply that no improvements could be made after this point—and this, of course, is nonsense. We cannot conceive of a million years of further development bringing such a perfection to pass. Human beings will always be able to tuck in under their belts whatever gratifications, whatever blessings, whatever good fortune are available. They'll be absolutely delighted with these blessings for a little while. And then, as soon as they get used to them, they'll forget about them and start reaching out into the future for still higher blessings, as they restlessly perceive how things could be even more perfect than they are at this moment. This looks to me like an eternal process going on into the future forever (160).

Therefore, I am concerned to stress this point very heavily because I see in the management literature a considerable amount of disappointment and disillusionment, and an occasional giving up of the whole philosophy of enlightened management and going back to authoritarian management, because the management has been sharply disappointed by the lack of gratitude, by the continuation of complaints when the better conditions came to pass. But we should, according to motivation theory, never expect a cessation of complaints; we should expect only that these complaints will get to be higher and higher complaints, i.e., that they will move from the lower-grumble level to higher-grumble levels and finally to metagrumble levels. This is in accordance in principle with what I have written about human motivation being never-ending and simply proceeding to higher and higher levels all the time as conditions improve. And it also conforms with my concept of frustration levels. That is, I repudiated the simple acceptance of frustration as being always necessarily bad; I assumed that there were hierarchies of frustration and that moving from a low-frustration to a high-frustration level is a sign of blessedness, of good fortune, of good social conditions, and of good personal maturity, etc. To complain about the garden programs in the city where I live, to have committees of women heatedly coming in and complaining

that the rose gardens in the parks are not sufficiently cared for, is in itself a wonderful thing because it indicates the height of life at which the complainers are living. To complain about rose gardens means that your belly is full, that you have a good roof over your head, that your furnace is working, that you're not afraid of bubonic plague, that you're not afraid of assassination, that the police and fire departments work well, that the government is good, that the school system is good, that local politics are good, and many other preconditions are already satisfied. *This is the point: The high-level complaint is not to be taken as simply like any other complaint; it must be used to indicate all the preconditions which have been satisfied in order to make the height of this complaint theoretically possible.*

If an enlightened and intelligent management understands all the above deeply, then such a management will expect that improvement in conditions would raise the complaint level and raise the frustration level as outlined above, *rather than expecting that improved conditions will make all complaints disappear.* There will then be little danger that they will become disillusioned and angry when much trouble and money and effort goes into making some improvements in work conditions and then the complaints continue. What we must learn to look for is, Have these complaints gone up in motivational level? This is the real test and this is, of course, all that can be expected. But furthermore, I suppose this means that we must learn to be very happy about such a thing, not merely to be contented with it.

Some special problems do emerge here. One such problem is the question of what to call justice and injustice. There are certainly going to be many petty complaints about comparisons between others and one's self—maybe that someone has a better light, or a better chair or somewhat better rate of pay or something of this sort. Such things can become extremely petty, with people comparing the size of the desks that they'll have in their offices or whether they'll have two flowers or one flower in the vase and that sort of thing. Frequently, we will have to make an *ad hoc* judgment in the particular sense as to whether this is at the level of justice in the metaneeds or whether it is simply a surface indication of dominance hierarchy and of elbowing forward in this hierarchy, and trying to go up the ladder in terms of prestige. Or even it could be, as in Dalton's book where there are several examples of this sort of thing, that one could tell from the con-