

p. 4 We are even less conscious of the components of thoughts—concepts. When we think, we use an elaborate system of concepts, but we are not usually aware of just what those concepts are like and how they fit together into a system.

p. 4 That is what I study: what, exactly, our unconscious system of concepts is and how we think and talk using that system of concepts. In recent years, my work has centered on two components of conceptual systems: conceptual metaphors and categories, especially radial categories and prototypes.

A conceptual metaphor is a conventional way of conceptualizing one domain of experience in terms of another, often unconsciously. For example, many people may not be aware that we commonly conceptualize morality in terms of financial transactions and accounting. If you do me a big favor, I will be *indebted* to you, I will *owe* you one, and I will be concerned about *repaying* the favor. We not only talk about morality in terms of paying debts, but we also think about morality that way. Concepts like retribution, restitution, revenge, and justice are typically understood in such financial terms. As we shall

see, examples like these are the tip of the iceberg. Much of moral reasoning is metaphorical reasoning, as will become apparent below.

p. 7 One could also have mentioned that is the responsibility of Congress to see that the city is maintained properly and that it lives by a humane standard, indeed that it should set a standard for the country. One could then apply the metaphor of the government as parent to Congress, seeing Congress as a deadbeat dad, refusing to pay for the support of his children, the citizens of Washington, DC. One could then have drawn the moral that deadbeat dad Congress must meet his responsibilities and pay, no matter how tough it is for him. This is just common sense—a different kind of common sense.

p. 12 Conservatism, as we shall see, is based on a Strict Father model, while liberalism is centered around a Nurturant Parent model. These two models of the family give rise to different moral systems and different discourse forms, that is, different choices of words and different modes of reasoning.

p. 12 Once we notice this, a deeper question arises: Can we explain what unifies the collections of liberal and conservative political positions? Do models of the family and family-based moral systems allow one to explain why liberals and conservatives take the

stands they do on particular issues? The problem is a difficult one. Consider conservatism. What does opposition to abortion have to do with opposition to environmentalism? What does either have to do with opposition to affirmative action or gun control or the minimum wage? A model of the conservative mind ought to answer these questions, just as a model of the liberal mind ought to explain why liberals tend to have the cluster of opposing political stands. The question of explanation is paramount. How, precisely, can one explain why conservatives and liberals have the clusters of policies they have?

p. 15 With the end of the cold war and the turn to domestic issues, the country first chose a Nurturant Parent president and then turned to a Strict Father Congress. Again, voters may not be consistent in the use of their models.

p. 16 Because people do not use the same models in all aspects of their lives, a political conservative could very well use the Nurturant Parent model in his family life but not in his political life, just as a political liberal could use Strict Father morality in his family life but the Nurturant Parent model in his political life. Strict fathers can be political liberals and nurturant parents can be political conservatives.

p. 16 For example, blue-collar workers who may previously have voted with liberals because of their union affiliation or economic interests may not, for cultural reasons, identify with conservatives and vote for them, even though it may not be in their economic interest to do so.

p. 17 The very question reveals a misunderstanding of the enterprise. The point is not just to categorize. Classification in itself is relatively boring. The models do many things:

First, they analyze modes of reasoning.

Second, they show how modes of reasoning about different issues fit together.

Third, they show how different forms of, say, conservative reasoning are related to each other in such a way that they are all understood to be instances of conservatism.

Fourth, the models show the links between forms of political reasoning and forms of moral reasoning.

Fifth, the models show how moral reasoning in politics is ultimately based on models of the family.

And sixth, there must be an explanation of why the models fit together as they do—and therefore, why we don't merely have random forms of political reasoning. This is a tall order.

p. 18 Moreover, liberals do not fully comprehend the moral unity of their own politics and the role that the family plays in it. Liberals need to understand that there is an overall, coherent liberal politics which is based on a coherent, well-grounded, and powerful liberal morality. If liberals do not concern themselves very seriously and very quickly with the unity of their own philosophy and with morality and the family, they will not merely continue to lose elections but will as well bear responsibility for the success of conservatives in turning back the clock on progress in America.

p. 19 Conservatives know that politics is not just about policy and interest groups and issue-by-issue debate. They have learned that politics is about family and morality, about myth and metaphor and emotional identification. They have, over twenty-five years, managed to forge conceptual links in the voters' minds between morality and public policy.

They have done this by carefully working out their values, comprehending their myths, and designing a language to fit those values and myths so that they can evoke them with powerful slogans, repeated over and over again, that reinforce those family-morality-policy links, until the connections have come to seem natural to many Americans, including many in the media. As long as liberals ignore the moral, mythic, and emotional dimension of politics, as long as they stick to policy and interest groups and issue-by-issue debate, they

will have no hope of understanding the nature of the political transformation that has overtaken this country and they will have no hope of changing it.

p. 19 I define "classical theoretical liberalism" as the view, which has a long history, that individuals are, or should be, free, autonomous rational actors, each pursuing their own self-interest. On this account, many conservatives and libertarians are classical theoretical liberals.

p. 20 Modern theoretical liberalism, on the other hand, arises primarily from the work of philosopher John Rawls (see References, sec. C3). Rawls sought to modify classic liberalism to include social issues, such as poverty, health, and education. He proposed the following social-contract theory of a just society (presented here in a much oversimplified fashion) to be added on to the classical view of the autonomous rational actor:

1. The Veil of Ignorance: The social contract must be drawn up as if no one knew where they were going to fit into society.
2. The result is that justice is seen as fairness. After all, if you don't know where you are going to fit into a society, you will want that society to be fair. If you were to wind up as low man on the totem pole, you would want that not to be so bad a position to be in.

3. An individual's choices of ends, values, and conceptions of the good are subjective expressions of preference. This makes them literal, rankable, and subject to mathematical theories of preference, utility, decision-making, etc.
4. Accepting this political view does not commit one to any particular moral view.
5. This view is universal and independent of particular cultures and subcultures.

p. 22 As empirical findings, they have a very different status than theoretical speculations, and so should not be confused with political philosophy—for which, incidentally, I have great respect.

p. 23 Overall, the book has a linear structure: First, the questions to be answered. Second, the first step in answering them, namely, the family-based moral systems. Third, the link between the moral systems and politics. Fourth, the politics and the answers to the questions. Fifth, nonideological reasons for choosing between the political worldviews. Sixth, implications for public discourse.

p. 24 Why do conservatives think that virtue and morality should be identified with their *political* agenda and what view of morality do they profess?

p. 26 Conservatives are willing to increase the budgets for the military and for prisons on the grounds that they provide protection. But they want to eliminate regulatory agencies whose job is to protect the public, especially workers and consumers. Conservatives do not conceptualize regulation as a form of protection, only as a form of interference. Why?

p. 28 The job of the cognitive scientist in this instance is to characterize the largely unconscious liberal and conservative worldviews accurately enough so that an analyst can see just why the puzzles for liberals are not puzzles for conservatives, and conversely. Any cognitive scientist who seeks to describe the conservative and liberal worldviews is constrained by at least two adequacy conditions.

p. 31 But where conservatives are relatively aware of how their politics relates to their views of family life and morality, liberals are less aware of the implicit view of morality and the family that organizes their own political beliefs. This lack of conscious awareness of their own political worldview has been devastating to the liberal cause.

p. 37 For example, John Rawl's celebrated theory of liberalism is not an empirical descriptive study but an attempt to characterize a prescriptive theory of justice, from which liberalism follows. As a descriptive account of actual liberal political stands on issues, it is a

failure, as we shall see. My job here is to describe how people do make sense of their politics, not how they should.

p. 41 The most fundamental form of morality concerns promoting the experiential well-being of others and the avoidance and prevention of experiential harm to others or the disruption of the well-being of others.

p. 58 Rights and duties fit together: whenever someone has a right, someone else has a duty, and conversely. If you have a right to an education, someone has a duty to provide it. If you have a right to free speech, others have a duty to protect that speech or refrain from interfering with it. You cannot have a right to breathe clean air unless others have a duty to refrain from polluting it or to guarantee that there is clean air to breathe. In many cases, it falls to government to perform the duties that make rights possible. Where the duty of guaranteeing rights falls to the government, those rights are "purchased" through taxation. Lower taxes may mean fewer rights. If you want rights, somebody's got to pay for them or provide them. Rights and duties don't come into existence out of nothing. They require social, cultural, and political institutions and require at least metaphorical economics and often literal economics.

p. 59 A self-righteous person is someone who carefully keeps his own moral ledger books, who makes sure that, according to his own system of moral accounting, he is morally solvent and that, in his accounting system, his credits always outweigh his debits. A thoroughly self-righteous person knows neither shame nor gratitude, since he has no moral debts, again according to his own method of accounting.

p. 69 If competition is a necessary state in a moral world—necessary for producing the right kind of people—then what kind of a world is a moral world? It is necessarily one in which some people are better off than others, and they deserve to be. It is a meritocracy. It is hierarchical, and the hierarchy is moral. In this hierarchy, some people have authority over others and their authority is legitimate.

p. 83 The idea that the rich have moral authority over the poor fits American Strict Father morality very well. Start with the American Dream, the stereotypic assumption that America is truly a land of opportunity where anyone with self-discipline and talent can, through hard work, climb the ladder of success. It follows that anyone who has been in the country long enough and is not successful has either not worked hard enough or is not talented enough. If he has not worked hard enough, he is slothful and hence morally weak.

If he is not talented enough, then he ranks lower than others in the natural order and hence lower in the moral order.

p. 84 Strict Father morality, with its sharp division between good and evil and its need for the setting of strict standards of behavior, naturally gives priority to the metaphor of Moral Boundaries.

p. 95 Therefore, proposals for the public good that interfere with the pursuit of financial self-interest are commonly seen as immoral by advocates of Strict Father morality. The “do-gooders” are seen as restricting freedom and posing a threat to the moral order. And indeed they are, according to the logic of Strict Father morality.

p. 95 Though Strict Father morality in its American form tends to support laissez-faire capitalism, it does have a long history of constraining how capitalism is to function. Business is not to be directly and overtly immoral, to engage in drug-dealing, prostitution, theft, and so on. Business is supposed to show compassion, for example, to be involved in local charities, to help in disaster relief. Business is supposed to promote wholesome community activities, to sponsor Little League teams, bowling leagues, and the like. Business is supposed to be involved in policing itself for the public interest, say, through

Better Business Bureaus and professional associations. In short, there is a long history in America of Strict Father morality placing moral constraints on capitalism. There may be a legitimate question of how strong or meaningful these constraints have been, but they are traditional and have been a hallmark of American business for a long time. Because they accord with Strict Father morality, such constraints, which function for the public good, have never been attacked as immoral constraints on free market capitalism.

p. 101 Strict Father morality imposes a hierarchical structure on the metaphors we have just discussed. In this hierarchy of metaphors we can see clearly the moral priorities of Strict Father morality. The metaphors with the highest priority form a group: Moral Strength, Moral Authority, Moral Order, Moral Boundaries, Moral Essence, Moral Wholeness, Moral Purity, and Moral Health. Let us call this the Strength Group.

p. 110 Though this model is very different from the Strict Father model, it has one very important thing in common with it. They both assume that the system of childrearing will be reproduced in the child. In the Strict Father model, discipline is incorporated into the child to become, by adulthood, self-discipline and the ability to discipline others. In the Nurturant Parent model, nurturance is incorporated into the child to eventually become self-nurturance (the ability to take care of oneself) and the ability to nurture others.

p. 110 But the mechanism by which this is accomplished is entirely different in this model, which makes different assumptions about the nature of children in particular and human beings in general. The Nurturant Parent model does not assume that children primarily learn through reward and punishment, nor that adults mostly tailor their actions to rewards and punishments.

p. 113 That social responsibility begins with the raising of children. It includes a responsibility to avoid what is harmful. Children should not be brought up by a system of rewards and punishments—and especially not by painful corporal punishment. To a child, corporal punishment is a form of violence, and violence begets violence. If children learn that abuse, punishment, and violence are ways to impose authority and command respect, they will reproduce that behavior and the result will be a violent society. Neglect, the depriving of needed nurturance, has an effect like that of abuse; a child not cared for and respected will not respect and care for others. Cooperation should be stressed rather than competition. Fierce competition brings out aggressive behavior, which will then be duplicated in later life. The nonaggressive side of competition is mastery, which is developed naturally through nurturance and encouragement. Cooperation develops an appreciation for interdependence. An appreciation of pleasure and an aesthetic sense should

be cultivated, so that one can develop one's capacity for happiness and one's ability to give to others the gift of one's own happiness. Asceticism should be avoided. Self-denial makes one more likely to deny and disapprove of the happiness of others.

p. 118 Incidentally, the term "compassion" has two intimately related senses, defined relative to moral empathy and moral nurturance. To "feel compassion" is to experience empathy. To "show compassion" is to act nurturantly on the basis of compassionate feelings. There are, of course, limited forms of compassion that result from the limitations that occur on empathy and on nurturance, as when you limit compassion to those who share your values and those whom you perceive as community members.

p. 119 It is important to distinguish self-nurturance and self-interest. Self-nurturance is necessary for any adequate moral functioning. Self-interest goes considerably further to the satisfaction of desire, most typically the desire for money and power. These are rather different notions. A *selfish* person is one who puts his self-interest ahead of the needs of those he has a duty to nurture or to share with. But someone who simply attends to his most basic needs, who makes self-nurturance a prerequisite to the nurturance of others, is not selfish. Someone who puts the nurturance of others not only ahead of his self-interest but also ahead of his self-nurturance is *selfless*.

p. 119 Selflessness is not always what it seems. Though we are taught that selflessness defines saintly behavior, the reality can be quite different. First, selflessness, by moral accounting, imposes moral debts upon the people that the selfless person takes care of. Second, the selfless person, in putting the nurturance of others above self-nurturance, may suffer a decline in health or other capacities and may, because of his selflessness, ultimately have to be taken care of himself. This may impose a considerable burden on others—especially the people he has previously taken care of. Thus, selflessness may impose a considerable cost on those one is selfless towards.

For these reasons, the Morality As Nurturance metaphor implies that self-nurturance is a moral necessity.

p. 121 This view of the morality of happiness is intuitively understood and widespread among a great many whose moral system is Nurturant Parent morality. Incidentally, it is a long-standing part of the Buddhist tradition. There is a reason, after all, why the Buddha is smiling.

p. 128 To those raised with Strict Father morality, it may not be obvious why these are, respectively, moral weaknesses and strengths—moral flaws and moral virtues. But from the

perspective of nurturance, it is clear. Lack of social responsibility, selfishness, insensitivity to feelings, inconsiderateness, meanness, and dishonesty make it hard to abide by the metaphor of Morality As Nurturance. Incuriosity leads to a lack of knowledge, and since knowledge is needed to be successfully nurturant, the lack of curiosity also limits one's ability for successful nurturance. Self-righteousness and self-centeredness make it difficult to abide by the metaphor of Morality As Empathy. By the logic behind the metaphor of Morality As Happiness, the inability to experience pleasure and aesthetic insensitivity are moral flaws, since they limit the experience of joy and hence limit one's capacity for empathy and one's ability to give joy to others. Uncommunicativeness and uncooperativeness greatly limit one's capacity to nurture social ties. Lack of self-respect makes it difficult to develop one's full potential, which in turn may keep one from developing one's full capacity for nurturance.

p. 129 Many of the sins—the moral weaknesses-of Strict Father morality are not present in Nurturant Parent morality. Given the view of Morality As Happiness, the pleasures of the body take on positive moral value, so long as they don't interfere with nurturance, self-nurturance, and the development of one's potential. Sensuality is a virtue, just as is aesthetic sensitivity. Neither are virtues in Strict Father morality. Sex education is important in Nurturant Parent morality, not just to prevent unwanted pregnancy or the transmission of



sexual diseases, but also to spread knowledge about nurturant sexuality and how to maximize the giving and receiving of sexual pleasure. Sexual activity without marriage is not immoral in itself; it is immoral only if it results in harm to oneself or others.

p. 140 The pragmatic version reverses ends and means. In the pragmatic version, the pursuit of self-interest is the end and nurturance is the means. You can pursue your self-interest better if you are empathetic, take care of others, take care of yourself, develop your potential, protect others, and treat others fairly. In the pragmatic version of the Nurturant Parent model, you nurture your children so that they can pursue their self-interest.

When we apply these models to politics, we will see that all these variations have political correlates.

p. 146 There is much to be said for the cynical liberal response. Much of it is true. Yet it has major flaws and is far from the whole story. First, it is a demonization of conservatives. It assumes that they are either rich, evil, self-serving power-mongers, or their paid agents, or dupes. The conservative ranks may well contain some of each. Yet most conservatives are not rich and see themselves as working for the benefit of the country rather than for their own benefit. There are too many idealistic conservatives of good intentions and moderate means for the demonization theory to be true.

p. 151 Other classic liberal theories focus upon liberty and equality jointly. Rawls, for example, adds to liberty an account of equality in which any inequalities must benefit the most disadvantages members of society. This tells us nothing about why political liberals favor ecology, why they are not anti-abortion, why they defend funding for the arts, and so on. From the abstract realms of liberty and equality, you can't get down to the nitty-gritty of real political stands on issues.

p. 151 Michael Lerner, as noted above, is on the right track when he talks about "the ethos of caring" as being central to liberalism. But he does not spell out just what the details of that ethos are and why it leads to the particular stands that liberals tend to hold. Moreover, conservatives, too, "care" about many things—the morals of their children, the rights of the unborn, what is taught in our schools, the victims of crimes, the effects of our society on sex, drugs, and violence. How does the caring of conservatives differ from the caring of liberals? It is not caring alone that makes the difference.

p. 154 Indeed, an argument regularly used for the balanced-budget amendment is that, just as a family's budget must be balanced, so must a nation's. Any economist, liberal or conservative, knows that there are many crucial differences between a family and a nation

that make the analogy economically ludicrous: a family can't initiate economic stimulus programs, print new currency, or increase tax rates. Yet, despite this, the unconscious and automatic Nation As Family metaphor in our conceptual systems makes the logic seem to be just commonsense to most people.

p. 157 The next question is whether the model accounts for the phenomena. These phenomena were discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. They are of three kinds. First, the model must explain why conservative and liberal political stands group together as they do. Take, for example, opposition to social programs, anti-environmentalism, anti-feminism, harsh penalties for criminals, and support of the right to own assault weapons. Why do they fit together? Second, the model must explain what puzzles liberals about conservatives and conservatives about liberals. It must explain why contradictions for one are obvious truths for the other. Third, it must account for the details of conservative and liberal discourse. It must account for how texts fit together and make sense, and it must account for how metaphorical language is used in those texts. Moreover, the model must be predictive. It must account for the modes of reasoning and metaphorical language in new texts—texts not yet produced. It must account for how conservatives and liberals come down on new issues. And it must account for new puzzles that arise. Getting any cognitive model to do all this is a tall order.

p. 159 This analysis claims that the difference between conservative and liberal worldviews derives from different cognitive models of politics. The most fundamental difference, the analysis claims, the difference from which all other differences spring, is in the use of an idealized, stereotypical model of the family. The conservative model uses a Strict Father model of the family, while the liberal model uses a Nurturant Parent model of the family. Both conservative and liberal models then organize and prioritize common conceptual metaphors for morality so as to fit the family model. The resulting family-based moralities are linked to politics by a common Nation As Family metaphor. The result is two very different political worldviews.

p. 163 Conservative categories of moral action:

1. Promoting Strict Father morality in general.
2. Promoting self-discipline, responsibility, and self-reliance.
3. Upholding the Morality of Reward and Punishment
  - a. Preventing interference with the pursuit of self-interest by self-disciplined, self-reliant people.
  - b. Promoting punishment as a means of upholding authority.
  - c. Insuring punishment for lack of self-discipline.

4. Protecting moral people from external evils.
5. Upholding the Moral Order.

p. 165 Liberals, too, have categories of moral action, and not surprisingly, they look very different from conservative categories.

Liberal categories of moral action:

1. Empathetic behavior and promoting fairness.
2. Helping those who cannot help themselves.
3. Protecting those who cannot protect themselves.
4. Promoting fulfillment in life.
5. Nurturing and strengthening oneself in order to do the above.

p. 168 From the liberal moral perspective, this is a highly moral program. It helps those who cannot help themselves (Category 2). It promotes fulfillment in life in two ways, since education is fulfilling in itself and it permits people to get more fulfilling jobs (Category 4). It strengthens the nation, since it produces a better-educated citizenry and ultimately brings in more tax money (Category 5); and it is empathetic behavior (Category 1) making access to college more fairly distributes (Category 1).

p. 172 These categories are extremely stable and they resist efforts at change. Secretary of Labor Robert Reich found this out shortly after the 1994 elections, when he sought to recategorize the best model citizens of all—large successful corporations and the people who run them. Reich attempted to use the conservative demonization of welfare recipients against the conservative conception of model citizens. He attacked big corporations and the ultrarich for being recipients of “corporate welfare.” Reich pointed out that large corporations owned by the ultrarich receive from the government huge amounts of money that they do not earn: money from inordinately cheap grazing rights, mineral and timber rights, infrastructure development that supports their businesses, agricultural price supports, and hundreds of other kinds of enormous government largesse that come out of the taxpayer’s pocketbook—an amount far exceeding the cost of social programs. If the government eliminated corporate welfare, Reich argues, then it could easily afford social programs to help the poor.

p. 175 In the next chapter, we will begin to use conservative and liberal moral categories, model citizenry, and demonology to answer the questions we started with about the great issues. Why do stands on the great issues cluster as they do, with opponents of gun control also opposed to social programs, progressive taxation, gay rights, multiculturalism, and

abortion, and so on, while proponents of gun control have the opposite views on these issues? What is the logic behind this clustering? And what is the logic that each side uses against the other?

p. 180 Liberals also conceptualize social programs as investments in communities. By putting money into the hands of people who don't have it, the government creates jobs in poor communities. People with those jobs spend money, which creates more jobs, and so on. If this is done wisely, there can be a multiplier effect and the result can be a net creation of wealth for the society as a whole. Here the metaphor is one of investing in communities, instead of, or in addition to, investing in individuals. This too is in moral action Category 5.

p. 181 The myth of American as the Land of Opportunity reinforces this. If anyone, no matter how poor, can discipline himself to climb the ladder of opportunity, then those that don't do so have only themselves to blame. The Ladder-of-Opportunity metaphor is an interesting one. It implies that the ladder is there, that everyone has access to it, and that the only thing involved in becoming successful and being able to take care of oneself is putting out the energy to climb it. If you are not successful, then it is your own fault. You just haven't tried hard enough.

p. 195 Adding three trillion dollars to the deficit actually served a moral purpose for Ronald Reagan. It meant that, sooner or later, the deficit would force an elimination of social programs. He knew perfectly well that the military budget would never be seriously cut, and that a major increase in tax revenues to eliminate the deficit would never be agreed upon. In the long run, the staggering deficit would actually serve Strict Father morality—conservative morality—by forcing Congress to cut social programs. From the perspective of Strict Father morality, Ronald Reagan looks moral and smart, not immoral and dumb as many liberals believe.

p. 197 No topic draws a clearer line between liberals and conservatives than that of violent crime. Strict Father morality sees the cure for violent crime simply as strict punishment. This derives from the Strict Father model of the family that demands that disobedience must be punished, preferably in a painful fashion with an instrument like a belt or a rod. It assumes the Morality of Reward and Punishment, which says that punishment is the moral alternative. And it also assumes a behaviorist theory of human nature that says punishment will work to eliminate violence.