


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Dear Readers,

This issue of *Sagar* is the second in a special two-part series covering the 2006 Asian Studies Graduate Conference (ASCON), which was held at the University of Texas at Austin. The conference was an interdisciplinary undertaking that gave graduate students an opportunity to present their work on South, Southeast, Central and East Asia. In total there were twenty papers given, and two keynote addresses. We are happy to present in this volume the second half of the papers given at the conference. We wish to thank all those who were involved: presenters, organizers, attendees, faculty and staff.

Sincerely,

Ishan Chakrabarti and Justin Fifield

co-editors-in-chief

Sagar

Volume 18, Spring 2008

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Imagining the Poet-King

SRINIVAS REDDY

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In 1565 at the Battle of Talikota in central India, four Muslim sultanates joined forces against the last great Hindu empire of Vijayanagaram. This decisive confrontation proved disastrous for the South Indian empire and thus marked the end of Hindu sovereignty in all of South Asia. This is the standard historical discourse presented by Robert Sewell in his 1900 monograph entitled: *A Forgotten Empire (Vijayanagar): A Contribution to the History of India*. This conceptualization became the foundation for the still dominant narrative of Vijayanagaram's place in South Asian history. Many recent scholars, however, have made strong arguments against this heavily polarized view of two religiously opposed empires. Here I am most specifically referring to the notion of a highly Islamicized culture of Hindu courtly sovereignty as put forth by Philip Wagoner (1996) and Richard Eaton (2005).¹ The evidence presented by these scholars and others² depicts an integrated religio-cultural currency that dominated south-central and Deccani South Asia. Most of the recent scholarly works on Vijayanagaram have attempted to put forward this notion of a multi-cultural milieu, and although the larger subject of my work seeks to address these issues of religious and cultural pluralism, the study at hand focuses on only one individual – none other than the greatest of Vijayanagaram's kings: Sri Krishnadevaraya who ruled the empire at its apex from 1509-1529.

My focus on an individual, on biography is part of a growing trend in scholarly historical writing. Most often histories of empires are written from the perspective of the state, the megalithic, non-personal entity that controls, decides and rules. But by looking at an individual, our study becomes focused, personalized and localized in a body. In constructing a biography of Krishnadevaraya the historian has a variety of available source materials: inscriptions, art and architecture, Persian chronicles of neighboring sultanates, accounts of foreign travelers (Portuguese, Italian and Russian) and Telugu court literature. In addition we may take into account the popular mythic

¹In particular, see Chapter 1 regarding the Kakatiya ruler Pratapa Rudra.

²See also Wagoner (1993) and Talbot (2001).

memory of Krishnadevaraya as well the rich oral tradition that surrounds this king and his magnificent court.

History (or in this case biography), however, is often approached like a court case. A presentation of witnesses and evidence (*i.e.* sources) must be carefully sifted through in order to isolate fact from fiction. After this, all the verifiable historical facts are compiled into a true history. If we were to rank our source materials in terms of chronological accuracy, architecture and epigraphy would most likely come first because they can be easily dated and therefore precisely located in a specific time and place. Telugu literature on the other hand is often spurious in regard to authorship and date of composition. In terms of content there seems to be a distinction as well; inscriptions generally record mundane events such as land grants and food donations, whereas Telugu poetry is often filled with excessively flowery language about mythical gods and demons. Although historians of the past such as Sewell quickly disregarded Telugu poetry as a valid source of historical information, the modern historian is also concerned with historical memory and its construction. In light of this new approach to history, it is my belief that legend, popular myth, poetry and chronicle, as well as epigraphy and architecture, all play a critical role in presenting a full picture of a time, a place, or an individual.

For this study I have chosen to look at Portuguese chronicles and Telugu poems, sources that reveal a strikingly similar quality of awe and reverence, albeit derived from rather different impulses and viewpoints. Two Portuguese merchants, Fernao Nuniz and Domingo Paes, both wrote accounts of their travels to Vijayanagaram. Nuniz's account provides a rather dry dynastic history of the empire beginning from the 14th century, as well as detailed descriptions of Krishnadevaraya's military campaigns in Orissa and Raichur (which he learned of second hand). Paes on the other hand provides us with a vivid first-hand account of Vijayanagaram and Krishnadevaraya himself. Of the two Paes is more useful for providing information about Krishnadevaraya the man.

To properly understand the account of Paes we must situate ourselves in the history of Indo-Portuguese relations. At the close of the 15th century, Vasco de Gama and other European explorers ushered in a new age of East-West relations. Major trade routes were established and maritime commerce became the driving force behind this emerging relationship. Although firearms became increasingly important, warhorses were the main Portuguese commodity for South Asian export. These horses were the most critical component of military success in medieval India: whosoever had the strongest cavalry would prove victorious. The early 16th century proved to be a time when Hindu and Muslim empires were all vying for a piece of the Portuguese

war machine. At the same time Portuguese military men were deftly trying to negotiate which empire to support for long-term success.

In or around 1520, Paes visited Vijayanagaram as part of an entourage accompanying Christovao de Figueiredo, a Portuguese soldier who had earlier provided Krishnadevaraya with musketeers to attack Raichur; a move that proved critical for Krishnadevaraya's success. Now after the battle, Figueiredo and his men (including Paes) were treated to a royal visit to the capital. This episode in which Krishnadevaraya impresses his foreign guests almost reads like a medieval wine-and-dine. The wide-eyed Portuguese merchants are feted with a lavish display of decadent court life. Paes' account reads like a wonder tale: everywhere he is awestruck and amazed at the riches, pomp and spectacle of the South Indian capital. His vivid descriptions of medieval South India are both detailed and charming. Often he is so overtaken by the grandeur that he states:

I cannot possibly describe it all, nor should I be believed if I tried to do so; then to see the horses and the armour that they wear, you would see them so covered with metal plates that I have no words to express what I saw, and some hid from me the sight of others; and to try and tell of all I saw is hopeless, for I went along with my head so often turned from one side to the other that I was almost falling backwards off my horse with my senses lost. ... Truly, I was so carried out with myself that it seemed as if what I saw was a vision, and that I was in a dream. (Sewell 278-9)

As the guests arrived at the capital, we get a feeling for their mutual sense of awe and reverence:

The king received him [Christovao de Figueiredo] very well, and was very complacent to him. The king was as much pleased with him as if he had been one of his own people, so much attention did he evince towards him; and also towards those amongst us who went with him he showed much kindness. We were so close to the king that he touched us all and could not have enough of looking at us. (Sewell 251)

Paes is important to our biographical sketch of Krishnadevaraya because he is one of the few chroniclers that gives us a direct description of the king. Firishtah, the well-known Persian chronicler, does not even mention Krishnadevaraya by name, relinquishing him to the status of a puppet king

(Sewell, *ix*). Paes provides us with this beautiful first hand description of Krishnadevaraya's physical and mental stature:

The king is of medium height, and of fair complexion and good figure, rather fat than thin; he has on his face signs of small-pox. He is the most feared and perfect king that could possibly be, cheerful of disposition and very merry;...so gallant and perfect is he in all things.
(Sewell 246-7)

Paes' account thus provides us with a glowing picture of a mighty king and his court – a rather fitting description for a man whom the Portuguese were about to enter into a large commercial enterprise with. A just, valiant and powerful king makes a good business partner.

If these foreign accounts focus on Krishnadevaraya's military prowess and material splendor, the native Telugu sources revolve around the monarch's image as a brilliant poet and patron of art and literature. In both instances the king is raised high and shining, glorified by each respective group in order to create and build an image of a celebrated monarch. It is interesting to note that the Portuguese accounts nowhere mention court poetry whereas the Telugu sources focus almost exclusively on this very aspect of Krishnadevaraya's persona.

Although he is known as a brilliant general, Telugu sources most often depict him as a man of art and letters. These sources are most definitely related to a growing sense of Telugu identity that Talbot and others trace to the 14th century (Talbot 2001). Tradition ascribes to Krishnadevaraya the legendary *aṣṭa-dig-gajas*, Elephants of the Eight Directions, an entourage of eight celebrated poets who adorned his rich and lively palace in Vijayanagaram. In the great tradition of South Indian panegyrics, these poets composed and sang the glories of their patron, competed amongst themselves in impromptu poetic battles, and generally created an aura of erudition and scholasticism. In essence, the sponsorship of poets in medieval South India was a critical way for a king to elevate his regal persona and public image.

The greatest of these court poets was Allasani Peddana, renowned as *Andhra-kavitā-pitāmaha*, the Grandfather of Telugu Poetry. A *cāṭu*, or orally transmitted verse vividly describes the high status of this court poet as well as his close relationship with the king. The *utpalamāla* verse is said to have been improvised by the poet upon hearing the news of his dear king's demise.

*Edur'aina co tana mada-karIndramu nilpi kelUtay Osagiṅ Ekkincu
kOniyE; kokaTa-grAmAdy-anekAgrahArambul 'aDigina
sImalayandun iccE manucaritramb'andu-kOnu veLa puram'ega*

*pallaki tana kela paTTi EttE; birudaina kavi-gaNDa-
pENDERamunak'IvE tagud'ani tAne pAdamuna tOdigE; Andhra-
kavitA-pitAmaha allasAni pEddana kavIndra ani nannu
pilucunaTTi; kRshNarAyalu-to divik'egaleka bratikiy unnADA
jIvacchavamban agucu.*

When he would see me on the street, he would halt his elephant and help me up with his own hand. For the mere asking, he gave me villages like Kokata, in every region. On the day I dedicated my *Story of Manu* to him, he himself carried the palanquin where I was seated, He told me 'I alone was worthy to wear the anklet of a triumphant poet,' and it was he who tied it on my foot. He called me Master of Telugu Poetry, Allasani Peddana, King of Poets. Now Krishnaraya has died, and I couldn't go with him to heaven. I stay on like the living dead. (Rao and Shulman, 43)

The image we get of Krishnadevaraya is not one of a mighty monarch, but rather a humble man who greatly admired and respected his court poets.

One of the most interesting resources at our disposal is Krishnadevaraya's own *mahākāvyamu* (lyric poem) – *Amukta Malyada*. Here we have autobiographical evidence, the voice of the king himself. In this verse we have a fascinating coming together of the two personality strains that we have previously identified – mighty sovereign as well as a masterful poet. Could it be that the man himself is the best source of his own identity? For the first time we have an image of both the poet and the king is one body.

*idi karnATA-dharA-dhRti-sthira-bhujA-hevAka-labdhebha-rAD-
udayorvI-dhara-tat-pitRvya-kRta-navyopAyanoshNIsha rat-na-dRg-
ancat-pada-kRshNarAya-vasudhAdhyakshoditAmukta-mal-yadan
ASvAsamu hRdya-padyamulan Adyambai mahin pOl'p'agun (I.89)*

This is the first chapter of heartfelt verses in the *Amukta Malyada* of Krishnaraya, Supreme Lord of the Earth. After an intense effort, I won the battle for Udayagiri Fort and seized the Karnata land in my firm arms. And now the jeweled crown that the Gajapati's uncle offered in surrender sparkles at my feet. (author's translation)

As I mentioned earlier, there are a number of sources to draw upon when constructing a biography of the famous king Krishnadevaraya of Vijayanagaram. Western histories have been, and for the most part still are, based on inscriptions and non-South Indian narratives, thus generally

portraying the king as a military genius who subjugated his Muslim rivals. Telugu histories on the other hand usually describe Krishnadevaraya as a great cultural benefactor and are primarily informed by classical Telugu poetry, orally transmitted verses and various folk traditions. The incorporation of these less “historic/factual” native sources has revealed an interesting aspect of Krishnadevaraya's persona. I hope that a broadening of the scholarly world's view of valid historical source materials will enable us to use the rich source materials at hand to construct a deeper and more integrated history of medieval South India and its influential historical figures.

Whether Peddana truly uttered this verse, or whether Krishnadevaraya really composed *Amukta Malyada* is of no concern to us. The fact is that they exist, and as such they must be taken into account, if only to ask: how and why did these sources come into being? As I stated earlier, we are not seeking hard facts to construct an “accurate” biography. Rather, we are surveying sources in order to get a fuller understanding, not of who Krishnadevaraya was per se, but how and why he has become the poet-king that he is known and remembered as today.

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Imperial Insecurity: Burma, the Chinas, and the United States 1949-1953

ARAGORN STORM MILLER

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The relationship between the United States and Burma from 1950 to 1953 illustrates the dynamics of the American quest for security in the early Cold War period, as well as the limits of hegemonic power in East Asia. In order to counter communist influence in the region, the United States pursued a two-pronged approach. On one hand, it sought to strengthen Southeast Asia's underdeveloped nations through economic and humanitarian aid. On the other hand, however, it sought to reinforce the armed forces of the region. While Burma's newly independent government expressed interest in development assistance, it resisted assimilation into the U.S. security bloc. Unable to satisfy both its desires with one partner, the U.S. foreign policy apparatus added a new partner. In this fashion, stragglers from Chiang Kai-Shek's defeated Kuomintang Army, who had retreated into northern Burma at the end of 1949, gained a new lease on life. While the U.S. State Department worked to curry the trust of the Burmese government, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supported an ongoing and ultimately embarrassing guerrilla war along Burma's border with China. Ironically, however, Burma wielded far more power and influence on the "superpower" United States than would be expected in a conventional imperial client relationship.

The interplay of American and Asian actors in the Burmese hinterlands reflects critical themes of national security, imperialism, and international relations in the globalized post-World War II environment. Though these themes have been addressed within a rich body of scholarship, this study explores an episode that has received little attention to this point. Burma was far from the spotlight of the greater Cold War drama of Moscow, London, and Washington. Yet the actions of individuals and groups – both proxies and free agents – influenced the decisions made on the larger stage.

For American policymakers, "imperialism" was a pejorative that implied either the exploitative nineteenth century European international approach, or the array of "captive" nations drawn into the Soviet orbit in 1945. U.S. leaders sought the benefits of empire without the force employed by their forebears,

choosing to scrap the conventional imperial model in which benefits accrued only to the metropole. Benefits would flow toward both metropole and periphery, creating a network of nations willing to share their countries' resources with a U.S.-led world order. U.S. democratic rhetoric advertised America's role as an anti-colonial power seeking to uplift underdeveloped peoples, rather than maintaining a "sustained differentiation between rulers and ruled" (Duara 2006, 48). As much as the United States looked to its client states for raw materials and markets, it also desired these developing states to be contributing partners and allies in a U.S.-led power bloc.

In order to develop this bloc, U.S. policymakers relied on both peaceful and coercive means. The peaceful arm of the American embrace manifested itself in public and private investment through the U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and its "Point Four" program. By encouraging the flow of private and public investment capital, the Economic Cooperation Administration and the Point Four program functioned to win support for U.S. policies from uncommitted nations (The Columbia Encyclopedia 2001-2005).

The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, which made the arming and training of the Burmese military a key U.S. regional goal, represented the coercive aspect of the new American approach. As much as the United States proposed to act as Southeast Asia's champion, it expected its new clients to pull a respectable portion of their weight in the fight against communism.

Despite progress made by the United States in 1949 towards constructing a stable, anti-communist bloc, long-running problems with an old ally would complicate the new U.S. imperialism. President Franklin Roosevelt had supported Chiang Kai-Shek's Chinese Nationalists, or Kuomintang (KMT,) as a means to stabilize East Asia within a pro-Western order. During the late 1940s, however, President Harry Truman and the U.S. State Department harbored grave doubts about the ability of the KMT to govern China or provide benefits for the United States. Chiang proved unable to resist communist leader Mao Tse-Tung in an intensifying civil war, and ultimately relocated his regime to Taiwan. In December 1949, as Mao's forces swept through the southern province of Yunnan, remnants of a KMT Army under the command of General Li Mi crossed the border into northeastern Burma (McCoy 1991, 162-3). Derelicts of a discredited regime, Li Mi and his KMT stragglers soon became central figures in a drama that tested the viability of the new U.S. imperial model.

The considerable geographic and demographic diversity of Burma made the nation an ideal sanctuary for Li Mi, while its fractured economic and political environment posed a continuing problem for the United States. Burma gained its independence in 1948, yet nearly three generations of

British colonial rule had dramatically weakened local institutions. The government in Rangoon administered the southern lowlands, where ethnic Burmese comprised roughly two-thirds of the nation's population (Bunge 1983, xix). Yet in the surrounding mountain country, blending into Burma's border with Thailand, Laos, China, and India, ethnic minorities lived in general autonomy from, and occasional opposition to, the central government (Bunge, xx).

Thakin Nu, the nation's first prime minister, struggled to contain ongoing "political factionalism expressed through armed revolt, chronic lawlessness, [and] racial violence" (Central Intelligence Agency 1949). Core and peripheral industries remained either drastically limited or nonexistent, providing little revenue to offset dangerously large government budget deficits (*Ibid.*). In the opinion of CIA analysts, Burma was "incapable of developing an orderly state by its own efforts" and risked exposure to "Soviet exploitation" (*Ibid.*).

If U.S. policymakers could solve this political discord, the United States would gain easy access to the raw materials of the region – in an environment of local cooperation – as well as deny them to the Soviet Union. As 1950 progressed, the work of the Economic Cooperation Administration and Point Four program cemented closer ties between the United States and Burma. Burmese Prime Minister Nu regarded international aid as a necessity in solving the problems faced by his nation and Southeast Asia, and welcomed U.S. agricultural and technical assistance (Jessup 1976, 231-2). Yet Burmese leaders felt less enthusiastic about U.S. military aid. Under the Mutual Defense Act, the United States appropriated an initial \$10 million outlay for the Burmese military (Department of State 1976a, 5-6). Nu, however, continued to resist U.S. military aid unless there were absolutely no strings attached, believing that within the Cold War context accepting arms from abroad needlessly hazarded the fragile independence of Burma (Jessup 1976, 12; Bunge, 207-8). From the U.S. perspective, such equivocation made Burma appear more like a weak link than a vital member of the new imperial structure.

With the beginning of the Korean War in the summer of 1950, and the intervention of Communist China there in the winter, military security replaced all other considerations with regard to Southeast Asia in general and Burma in particular. As the Truman administration rethought its policies concerning communist containment, it looked to new allies and methods, both overt and underground. While the State Department continued to pursue overt means to strengthen U.S. clients in Asia, the CIA sought secret avenues to weaken Mao's regime in China. In this fashion, American security concerns helped transform the image of Li Mi's Kuomintang remnants from a gaggle of failures to a potentially pivotal asset in the struggle against China.

After clashes with the Burmese Army in July 1950, KMT troops had retreated to the Kengtung area, about 30 miles from the Thai border (Lintner 1999, 114-5). In the fall of 1950 the CIA began rearming and reorganizing these remnants (McCoy, 165-6). Operations against the southern Chinese province of Yunnan, argued CIA planners, would prevent Mao from concentrating on Korea, reactivate Nationalist cells believed to remain in the region, and create an anti-communist salient in southern China (McCoy, 165-6).

In June 1951 the KMT crossed the border into China, advancing about sixty miles across the border (Lintner, 125). No Nationalists materialized within China to assist them, however, and when the Chinese People's Liberation Army counterattacked, the KMT was clearly overmatched. The KMT suffered heavy casualties, including several CIA advisers who had accompanied them. Li Mi and his troops fled back into Burma in general disarray (McCoy, 169). In July, the KMT made another foray into Yunnan. This operation failed quickly as well, and within a week the KMT returned to its Burmese bases.

Undeterred, Li Mi and his American allies set about to rebuilt their striking force. Engineers built larger landing strips to foster more efficient delivery of supplies by air (McCoy, 170). Li Mi flew to Bangkok and Taiwan for an extended meeting with Chiang. In February 1952 Li Mi returned with more troops and better equipment, including heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles, mortars, and anti-aircraft artillery (McCoy, 170).

In August 1952, the KMT initiated a final campaign against Yunnan province. Li Mi again penetrated about sixty miles into China, but suffered heavy losses at the hands of the People's Liberation Army. Short of isolated raids, the KMT ceased their harassment of southern China, and instead plunged into combat against Burmese communists and the Burmese Army, and into alliances with various ethnic nationalist groups (Lintner, 135-6).

At this point, CIA decision makers washed their hands of the KMT (McCoy, 171-2). Yet their covert support had done much damage to the U.S.-Burma relationship without any measurable benefits to U.S. interests. Both Burmese politicians and citizens remained convinced that the United States and its underlings had orchestrated and sustained KMT operations. American diplomats in Rangoon found themselves in the embarrassing situation of denying the existence of activities commonly acknowledged on the Asian street. Finally, these U.S.-sponsored intrigues had not weakened China and in fact invited a Chinese invasion of northern Burma (Department of State 1977b, 97).

Whereas the U.S. government spent 1949 and 1950 reevaluating its relationship with Burma, Burma spent 1951 and 1952 reevaluating its

relationship with the United States. The risks of non-alignment began to appear more attractive than the mixed rewards available as a client of the new U.S. imperialism.

On August 29, 1951 Thakin Nu informed U.S. Ambassador David M. Key that the Burmese army had captured several KMT officers. Based on information gained by interrogation, Nu believed that the KMT boasted approximately 11,000 troops spread across northern Burma, and relied on American arms, ammunition, and rations (Department of State 1977a, 290). In the prime minister's estimation, this situation undermined his government and placed it at the mercy of his disaffected army as well as the communist insurgents in the north. Nu saw little alternative to taking the matter to the UN. The United States managed to avoid the prospect of a UN hearing by promising to make "every effort" to prevent arms smuggling and conduct a full investigation into American involvement in northern Burma (Department of State 1977a, 295). Yet as much as American diplomats worked to put the Kuomintang genie back in its bottle, the KMT presence in Burma substantially reduced U.S. credibility within Southeast Asian diplomatic circles. Burmese foreign officials insisted that the KMT troops were under the command of U.S. officers, and could only be sustained by virtue of aid from foreign powers.

As Burma ratcheted up the pressure, the State Department attempted to reassert control of the American agenda in Southeast Asia, stressing the need to restore the trust of regional allies and to convince Taiwan of the folly of continuing support for the KMT in Burma.

Ironically, this period of chaos came at a time when signs appeared that Burma was strengthening and becoming more amenable to the notion of incorporating itself militarily into the U.S. security sphere. In July 1952 Prime Minister Nu indicated that the strained relations between the United States and Burma could be easily repaired, and that he felt more comfortable receiving U.S. military aid and direction (Department of State 1984i, 9-10).

In November, Lieutenant General of the Burmese Army Ne Win toured West Point and met Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett in Washington, laying the groundwork for increases in military aid to Burma (Department of State 1984d, 35-6). Yet renewed KMT activity threatened these accommodations. Both the State Department and the CIA concurred in "the desirability of an effort to bring about the departure of these troops from Burma and their transportation to Taiwan" (Department of State 1984c, 43-5). Yet Chiang had been in opposition to such a plan since at least October 1951 (Department of State 1984a, 35). The Chinese president insisted that he had limited authority over Li Mi and that, in any case, the withdrawal of such forces would be painful because of the effect on the people of Yunnan who

looked to Li Mi for eventual salvation. Further, Chiang complained that the withdrawal of the KMT would give the communists free reign in northern Burma (Department of State 1984h, 56).

By 1953, Burma had decided that enough was enough. On March 17 the Burmese foreign minister delivered a statement to the American ambassador canceling all aid contact with the United States effective June 30, 1953. Further, Burma pledged to "raise the matter [of the Kuomintang] in aggressive terms in the United Nations" (Department of State 1984f, 74). On March 31, the UN entered the item, "Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Government of the Republic of China," into its agenda for the Seventh Session of its General Assembly.

The Burmese representative, U Myint Thein, detailed the rearming of the Kuomintang and their actions against Yunnan province and the Burmese government (United Nations 1954, 162-3). During this time Li Mi constantly returned to Taipei for instructions and planning. Further evidence of foreign support for the KMT manifested itself in the fact that the force had grown from 1500 lightly armed men to 12,000 troops deploying modern American weaponry, including anti-aircraft artillery used against Burmese air force planes (United Nations 1954, 164).

On April 23, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 707 VII, affirming that foreign aid to the KMT violated the UN Charter, and calling on Burma, China, Taiwan and the United States to pursue the disarmament and withdrawal of the Kuomintang from Burmese territory (United Nations 1954, 162-4). Achieving a neat resolution where Chiang and the KMT were concerned, however, proved difficult. Committees formed and began negotiations, yet evidence indicated that Taiwan was working to purchase American commercial aircraft to re-supply Li Mi's forces. Further, international attention to these machinations increased following the 1953 armistice. After the declaration of a truce in Korea, the international glare on Burma increased (Department of State 1984e, 105).

From the newly unified American point of view, every month the KMT remained in Burma ensured another month of U.S. embarrassment on the world stage. Yet the Kuomintang resisted repatriation and evacuation under anything but ideal circumstances. Only when the United States agreed to pay for chartered aircraft did a serious evacuation begin (Department of State 1984b, 169). By the end of November, about 1000 KMT troops had been evacuated, leading to UN Resolution 717 VIII on December 8, maintaining that all governments concerned should ensure that the evacuation continued and that hostile acts against the Union of Burma should cease (United Nations 1954, 178). Yet there was no neat closure to the affair. In a telegram to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Ambassador William Sebald told of a

sneaking feeling he had that the present evacuation was in fact a “smokescreen for continuing KMT operations in Burma,” predicting “continuing difficulties and serious obstacles [in] our relations...with Burma” (Department of State 1984g, 173).

Between November 1953 and May 1954 some 7000 KMT troops were repatriated to Taiwan. Approximately 5000 refused repatriation and remained in Burma (Central Intelligence Agency May 17, 1963). Some lived as bandits or mercenaries, others simply continued to live among the indigenous population as rice farmers, or opium growers, or both (Central Intelligence Agency July 29, 1961).

Despite the messy conclusion to this episode, some important conclusions can be made about power relationships based on the Burma-China-United States experience of the early 1950's. The United States went to great lengths to fashion Burma into a regional lieutenant, but was frustrated by the fact that this lieutenant acted with an agency at variance with the leader. Limited by its own rhetoric about national self-determination, as well as the incipient nuclear stalemate with the Soviet Union, the United States could not revert to the “harder” form of imperial policy. The New Imperialism, designed to overcome the communist menace, was unable to overcome the fact that the superpower stalemate gave smaller nations greater bargaining power than previously enjoyed (Rostow 1971, 124-6). When Burma brought its complaints to the United Nations, it was able to wield influence in disproportion to its size and power. While Burma did not fundamentally reorder the power balance of East Asia, it did help create a geopolitical environment far different from the nineteenth century “Great Game,” where East Asia functioned more as a chessboard for foreign powers than a region exhibiting its own agency.

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Musicologist and Muslim: Religion, Caste, and the Erasure of the *Ustad*

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One of the most fascinatingly complex traditions in Hindustani music, the music of North India, is the *ganda bandhan* ritual. In it the *ustad* (a Muslim master musician and teacher in North India) or *guru* (generally a Hindu master) ties a thread around the wrist of his student, transforming him from student to *shagird* (disciple). The thread symbolizes the bond of mutual obligation that exists between *ustad* and *shagird*: the *shagird* must submit himself entirely to the *ustad*'s teachings and his will, often performing menial tasks to assist the *ustad*. James Kippen has described how he would frequently transport his master, Afaq Husain, on his motorcycle (Kippen forthcoming, 6), as well as administer "a body massage...which helped him to relax in the evenings" (Kippen 1988, 115). In return, the *ustad* provides daily lessons (at least at the beginning of the relationship), and often feeds and houses the *shagird*, taking on a role akin to surrogate father.

Complicating the ritual are its ambivalent religious implications: while the *ganda bandhan* is traditionally practiced by Muslim *ustads* (as well as Hindu *gurus*), the ritual derives from Hindu practices; certainly it is reminiscent of the thread-tying initiation ceremony for Brahmin boys (Kobayashi 2003, 121). As a hybrid of Hindu and Muslim, high- and low-caste practices, the *ganda bandhan* is an index of the fundamentally syncretic nature of Hindustani music. The ostensibly rigid boundaries between Hindu and Muslim, high-caste Brahmins and the lower castes and casteless "untouchables" have always been far more fluid than they appear. Musicians have always been chameleons and shape-shifters, taking on different religious and caste identities in order to suit their circumstances. As Margaret Walker writes in her dissertation *Kathak Dance: A Critical History*, "Caste is not, and possibly never has been, the immutable system of social barriers it often seems" (Walker 2004, 133). The same can be said of religion.

Nevertheless, there have certainly been attempts to solidify those boundaries, particularly during the last century. In this paper, I shall first discuss the efforts during the early part of the twentieth century of elite

Brahmin nationalist musicologists, among whom Vishnu Narayan Bhatkhande and Vishnu Digambar Paluskar were the most visible figures, to definitively polarize the religious and caste dialectics and to erase the influence of the low-caste Muslim musicians from Hindustani music. Secondly, I shall explore the shifting place of the musician within the respective dialectics prior to this musicological polemic. Finally, I shall look at some case studies of individuals who have used various methods of caste and status mobility that have tested the soft boundaries between castes and religions in post-independence India, in a sense erasing in themselves those aspects of caste and religion that might make them *ustads*.

According to noted Hindustani music scholar James Kippen, Bhatkhande, Paluskar and their cohorts shared a “national – even nationalist – vision of music's power to galvanize the middle classes and steer them towards a more progressive, modern, Hinduized future with strong roots in a glorious, though imagined, Hindu past” (Kippen 2006, 6). For these men a Hindu state with a national music dominated by Muslims was unacceptable. Thus, the musicologists saw it as their duty to reclaim “their” music from the Muslims. Eriko Kobayashi quotes Bhatkhande’s candid explanation of the state of affairs: “Firstly, Hindus have virtually lost this art; it is entirely in Muslim hands. Although at one time it was purely Hindu inheritance, no Hindu can aspire to acquire it unless he is prepared to demean himself before his Muslim masters and do everything he is asked to do” (Kobayashi, 57). Bhatkhande rejects the notion that a Brahmin should be supplicant to a member of a lesser caste, nor should a Muslim be the gatekeeper of a Hindu musical birthright. Elite nationalist discourse thus frequently focused on caste and religion, highlighting ways in which the perceived deterioration of musical life in North India was a result of these aspects of the *ustad’s* identity.

To understand the nature of Bhatkhande’s caste-based critique, we must look at the Hindu caste system. In essence, the caste system functioned as a division of labor: Brahmins, the highest caste, were responsible for intellectual work. Priests, bureaucrats, and musicologists were generally drawn from this caste. Meanwhile, *śūdras* and untouchables (the lowest castes), worked as service providers: they were manual laborers, craftsmen, and musicians. Hence, the musicologists criticized the Muslim *ustads* for being mere artisans, rather than artists, unable to comprehend the subtle nuances of the true, theoretically-grounded art, and unworthy of their role as bearers of India’s proud musical heritage.

This is most evident in the writings of Rabindranath Tagore, the legendary Brahmin poet, playwright, and sometime composer. According to Tagore, “[The *ustad*] boasted dexterous fingers and his approach to teaching, learning and performing was understood as mechanical, repetitive and

mindless. The *ustad's* goal was merely the transmission of a trade" (Neuman 2004, 64). In Tagore's view, the *ustad* was all fingers – all body and no mind. He was able to produce basic sounds, often very effectively, but his performances were entirely devoid of the evocative spirit, *rasa*, with which Hindustani music should be infused (Neuman, 64). Similarly, Bhatkhande regularly spoke and wrote of the "practical" musician, which he set in opposition to the "intellectual" musicologist/theorist. For Tagore and Bhatkhande, the real sound of Hindustani music was enshrined in medieval Sanskrit treatises. The *ustads*, who had neither the capacity nor the desire to read the treatises, had allowed the true art to deteriorate through their ignorant neglect. Bhatkhande establishes a dichotomy between theory and praxis, and posits the former as something that is beyond the scope of the merely physical, practical musician.

At the same time, Paluskar sought to establish (or re-establish) the music's grounding in the Hindu religion through the curriculum at his music schools, the Gandharva Mahavidyalayas (GMVs). Gandharva "refers to the mythological singing and dancing of celestial beings in the heavenly court of the god Indra in Vedic mythology" (Bakhle 2005, 145). Paluskar's curriculum at the GMV had a similarly religious impetus: every morning at the school began with prayers at 7:00am (Bakhle, 160). Bakhle adds that the students' day-to-day routine was interspersed with frequent reminders that "they were involved in a process of *tapasya* in service to the goddess of music." Additionally, according to Kobayashi, the GMV calendar marked "festivals such as *Diwali*, *Basant Panchmi*, and *Shivratri*, among others" (Kobayashi, 115). Notably, they did not observe Ramadan. Given their explicitly Hinduized curriculum and orientation, it is hardly remarkable that there were no Muslim students enrolled at the schools, at least during Paluskar's lifetime. Clearly they would not have found the GMVs particularly inviting.

Thus, in the view of Bhatkhande, Paluskar and their compatriots, Hindustani music should be grounded in a Sanskrit theory, which was inaccessible to anyone but Brahmins, and the Hindu religion, which was inaccessible to Muslims. Since, in their view, the *ustad* was essentialized as both low- or non-caste and Muslim, he would not be able to access music in its new, Hindu conception, and would thus be erased from the past, present and future of Hindustani music.

This view, however, runs counter to the fluidity that has historically characterized the dialectic between the two religions since the beginning of their co-existence in India, and between the high and low castes. Following the 14th-century Muslim annexation of large swaths of North India, many erstwhile Hindus converted to Islam, won over by the teachings of the faith as promulgated by the aggressively proselytizing invaders. However, we must

recall that as the conquerors, Muslims became the primary source of musical patronage; many musicians converted so as to ingratiate themselves to their new patrons.

This religious ambivalence persisted even through the most heated periods of the musicological polemic. Bakhle remarks that, prior to the nationalist movement, Hindus had no particular objection to the majority of musicians being Muslim; indeed, Muslim *ustads* were highly sought after to perform at Hindu religious ceremonies (Bakhle, 124). Kobayashi refers to performances by Ustad Alladiya Khan, a contemporary of Bhatkhande and Paluskar, at Ganapati festivals in honor of the god Ganesh, and at the Navratri festivals, in honor of the goddess Parvati. Hindus, she suggests, never objected. Similarly, Bakhle describes the *ustad* Abdul Karim Khan's singing of the *Gayatri Mantra* (Bakhle, 220) a "particularly sacred verse of the Rig Veda typically recited by Brahmin and Dwija boys" (Bakhle, 309). In fact, she notes that the *ustad's* principal biographer, one of his Brahmin students named Balkrishnabua Kapileshwari, suggested that Abdul Karim Khan sang this sacred Hindu text better than most Brahmins. In light of the noisy declarations by Bhatkhande, Paluskar and the others about the inferiority and debilitating ignorance of the *ustads*, it seems remarkable that a low-caste Muslim *ustad* would have been able to sing the *Gayatri Mantra* at all. That he could sing it better than most Brahmins, and indeed, that the assertion of his genius was made by a Brahmin, would have astonished (and likely appalled) Bhatkhande and Paluskar. Evidently, in addition to being low-caste and Muslim, Abdul Karim Khan and Alladiya Khan were also professionals who executed the task assigned them, regardless of their caste and religion. Indeed, Bakhle proposes that "religious self-definition was by no means the primary identity for musicians" (Bakhle, 274). Seemingly, religion was a non-issue (at least among musicians) until it was problematized by the Brahmin musicologists; even then, as Kobayashi asserts, caste and religion were more problematic in theory than they were in reality.

It is also interesting to observe that, as the balance of power has shifted through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries from Mughal to Brahmin domination, many musicians have gradually altered their low-caste and casteless Muslim identities to better fit into the new hierarchy. This is achieved by adopting elements of the Brahmin habitus, such as wearing the *jadeo* (the sacred thread worn exclusively by Brahmin men), vegetarianism, or asceticism in a process that M.N. Srinivas refers to as Sanskritization (Jaffrelot, 757). Alladiya Khan, for instance, took to wearing a *jadeo* and, according to Bakhle, "referred to himself and was known in the profession as the 'sacred-thread wearing Muslim'; in other words, the Brahmin Muslim" (Bakhle, 273).

Perhaps the most apt example of Sanskritization is the case of the Lucknow *gharana* of *kathak* dancers, as examined by Margaret Walker in her 2003 dissertation (*gharana* refers to an artistic tradition passed down through generations, generally within a single family lineage). *Kathak* has come to be known as the elite, classical dance of North India, in much the same way that Hindustani music has become the elite music. *Kathaks*, as the dancers call themselves, claim to be descended from an ancient Brahmin subcaste of priestly bards called *Kathakas*, who appear in the ancient Hindu epic the *Mahābhārata*. Walker disputes this narrative, however, suggesting that *kathak* is instead a hybrid of Persian and Indian elements that emerged during the 19th century. Their Brahmin-ness is merely an affectation designed to capitalize on the drive by Indian nationalists to identify venerated Hindu art forms.

Walker traces the process of Sanskritization in the *Kathaks* through late 19th-century British censuses. The earliest is by Sherring, who wrote, “[*Kathaks*] affect to be of high caste, equal in fact to the Rajpoots, and nearly equal to the Brahmins; and wear the *jadeo* or sacred cord, which none but men of good caste are allowed to wear. Further west, the *Kathaks* do not make a *salam* in saluting any one ... but give their *ashirbad*, or blessing, like the Brahmins” (Walker 2004, 120). The *Kathaks* were evidently unable to fool Sherring with their elaborate affectations. They had more luck with a later census taker, John Nesfield, who in 1885 mentioned the same elements of the Brahmin habitus observed by Sherring, but proceeded to describe at length how the *kathaks* were a fallen caste who had descended from Brahmin priests, but nevertheless remained “staunch Hindus” (Walker, 121). Finally, she says, by the 1930s, “the dance is plainly associated with a group of Brahmins calling themselves *Kathaks* and the *Kathaks* themselves are described as ‘religious troubadours’ in the census report” (Walker, 135).

The latter day patriarchs of the Lucknow *gharana* have continued to carefully micromanage the *Kathak*’s transformation, principally through their story telling: Birju Maharaj, the present patriarch, deceived James Kippen during his fieldwork in Lucknow in the mid-1980s. In his forthcoming article, “Ustads: Working with the Masters,” Kippen relates Birju Maharaj’s anecdote about the relationship between Bindadin (the first patriarch of the Lucknow *gharana*) and Abid Husain (great-uncle of Kippen’s *ustad*, Afaq Husain):

The three used to practice together a great deal at Bindadin and Kalka Prasad’s house, where Abid Husain was welcomed like a member of the family. They loved to play jokes on each other. For example, Bindadin, a Brahmin, often prepared an exquisite dish of lentils which he served to Abid Husain with a large wooden spoon.

Abid Husain, a Muslim, would purposefully lift his bowl so that it touched the spoon and thus ‘polluted’ the lentils. Consequently, Bindadin and his brother could not themselves partake of the food and were forced to give it all to Abid Husain. (Kippen forthcoming, 10)

According to Walker’s revised historiography, Bindadin would not have been a Brahmin at all, and therefore would have had no reason to pass up delicious lentils simply because Abid Husain’s spoon had touched them. Low-caste pollution would not have been an issue. However, Birju Maharaj is careful to draw attention to Bindadin’s alleged Brahmin status. Thus, when Kippen published the story in his book, *The Tabla of Lucknow*, unaware of Birju Maharaj’s ulterior motive, he inadvertently helped to reify a disputed (and indeed dubious) historical narrative.

There are in fact a number of prominent musicians in Hindustani music with questionable pedigree. “Everyone knows,” as it were, that these musicians are misrepresenting themselves, but no one dares to openly accuse them of it. One example, a world-renowned singer, affects to be a Brahmin Hindu, but in actuality was born an impoverished, low-caste Muslim. James Kippen described a meeting that he witnessed between this individual’s brother and Afaq Husain. Husain respectfully referred to the gentleman as “Khan saheb,” which can be translated roughly as Mr. Khan, a name which clearly implies Muslim heritage. If the singer’s brother is Muslim, the singer himself is very likely Muslim as well. Aside from this revealing incident, the singer’s biography also reveals small hints of his true past: he admits to being born to a poor family of hereditary musicians. Both of these aspects of his story are very unusual: for a Brahmin family to live in the squalor described in the biography is rare, but for them to be hereditary musicians is almost unheard of, especially in the early 20th century. However, these points are mentioned in passing, and are nearly buried beneath his Sanskritizing rhetoric. He talks of having had a visitation from Krishna when he was young, who told him to sing (a common trope in such hagiographies); he makes frequent reference to Hindu principles such as becoming one with the infinite and reincarnation; and he often speaks of the foundation of Hindustani music in the Vedas. Through acts such as these, he disguises his Muslim heritage and perpetuates a false Brahmin identity, presumably to evade being codified as a Muslim hereditary musician, and thus being shunted into an inferior role in the Hindu-dominated state.¹

¹I have elected not to include a citation for this information, so as to avoid revealing the individual’s identity.

A first reaction upon learning of these Sanskritizing practices might be to condemn the individuals in question as disingenuous and unprincipled. However, such shape-shifting is hardly unique to India. Indeed, ethnicity and identity are intrinsically fluid and ever-shifting categories. Following Frederik Barth, the ethnomusicologist Martin Stokes writes, “Ethnicities [and concomitantly, identities] are to be understood in terms of the construction, maintenance and negotiation of boundaries, and not on the putative social ‘essences’ which fill the gaps within them” (Stokes 6). James Kippen thus offers us a choice: “What may be viewed with dismay as a deliberate manipulation of the historical record by some will be accepted by others as just another example of a clever adaptive strategy in a highly competitive world where patronage and opportunity are limited” (Kippen forthcoming, 10). If we accept (as most anthropologists do) Stokes’s and Barth’s characterization of ethnicity as both fluid and a construct, it would seem untenable to impugn these musicians for manipulating ostensibly immutable social categories that were in actuality never fixed to begin with; nor would it be fair to condemn them for compromising some chimerical ethnic integrity that was in fact never actually integral. In this conception, far from being insidious, the *ustads*’ shape-shifting is merely an index of the fluidity and adaptability of religious identity and ethnicity. Moreover, as Kippen has suggested, we cannot necessarily assume that the shape-shifter’s public persona is the same as his private identity. Indeed, the fact that Afaq Husain identified the unnamed singer’s brother as “khan-saheb” may well indicate that his Hindu identity is solely for public consumption. It could be that in private and among his close associates, he retains his Muslim identity. This is of course conjecture, but it is a possibility that is worth bearing in mind.

If this were the case, though, even a cultural theorist who has disregarded Barth’s and Stokes’s concept would find his accusations blunted. In the final analysis, it appears that the Muslim *ustad* has not been erased at all, at least not to the extent that the Brahmins intended. Instead, in many instances he has transmuted himself into a guru or pandit through the social alchemy of Sanskritization so as to evade the Brahmin’s essentializing gaze. To return to Bhatkhande’s analysis, music is no longer exclusively or even primarily in Muslim hands. The music has not changed hands; rather, it is merely the guise of the hands that has changed. Having concealed the stigmas that sullied them in the past, those hands are now free to shape the music of the future.

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Jiajiang Youth and Their Ritual: Seeking Recognition in the Wrong Place

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Bajiajiang,¹ or Eight Generals, is one type of performing troupe that accompanies gods' processions at Taoist festivals in Taiwan. The performers, their faces painted delicately, holding different weapons peculiar to their roles, march with highly stylized steps and complicated dance in the procession. They impersonate the generals who escort the patrolling gods, maintain order, exorcise evil spirits, seize wandering ghosts, and bring good fortune to the community. Paradoxically, such a righteous, powerful role is embodied by teenagers who tend to cut classes and drop out of school. The society as a whole considers these teenage performers of the *jiajiang* troupe, known as *jiajiang* youths, deviant and resistant to the dominant culture in Taiwan.

In this paper, I address two questions. First, why do these teenagers join the *Bajiajiang* troupe? Second, by joining the troupe do *jiajiang* youths intentionally pose a gesture of resistance to the dominant culture as most people assume? Previous literature responding to the first question adopts case studies and explores the issue from a sociological perspective. It is believed that broken families and low academic performance contribute to the participation of teenagers in *jiajiang* troupes. Only Wang Yali² (2002) in her M.A. thesis touches on the relationship between the ritual and the youth, and addresses the second question in the final chapter. Building on her work and case studies in previous literature, I focus on a closer examination of the relationship between the youth and the rituals they perform by applying Victor Turner's theory of ritual. His concepts of ritual liminality and

¹*Bajiajiang*, eight generals, is just a customary denomination. The number of members actually ranges from four to twelve. Therefore, some troupes are called *Shijiajiang*, ten generals, or just *jiajiang* troupe. The generals are minor demigods.

²All names and terms are transliterated using pinyin system unless the alternative spellings are internationally recognized, such as Chiang Kaishek, or are used in the cited text. Where non-pinyin system is used, the pinyin spelling is provided in parentheses. Besides, the names of the Chinese and Taiwanese are presented in the Chinese customary order, with the family name followed by the given name without a comma.

communitas help illuminate how ritual performance empowers and attracts the teenagers. In addition, contrary to the prevailing belief, I argue that *jiajiang* youths reaffirm the established social values instead of resisting them, given the fact that they strongly embrace the identity they gain in the ritual and aspire to win the recognition of the dominant culture through the transformation of identity.

In discussing subculture in Britain, the Birmingham school holds that becoming a deviant or a delinquent is largely the result of being labeled by the hegemonic culture (Epstein 1998, 8). Jonathon Epstein points out that “some groups, because of the oppositional stance they take vis-à-vis society proper, are much more likely to be labeled as such than other less oppositional groups” (Epstein, 7). *Jiajiang* youths, who dismiss learning, prove to be an easy target for such a labeling, especially in a culture that values education tremendously. Instead of doing activities that improve schoolwork, these teenagers, already low academic achievers, join and devote significant time to the *jiajiang* troupes. Sometimes they cut classes when receiving intensive training or performing during the festivals. Many drop out of school after joining the troupe. Unlike their counterparts in Britain, they do not resist the dominant culture through symbolic objects, like choices of music, dress, language, and appearance. Instead, by leaving school, they challenge the institutions and social values assigned to them. According to Louis Althusser, the ruling class maintains its status quo through repressive structures such as courts, prisons, police force, and through ideological state apparatuses (ISA) such as schools, churches, and media. *Jiajiang* youths’ dropping out of school is seen as an act of rebellion, of refusing to be “interpellated,” in Althusser’s term, by one of the dominant ISA.

It is no coincidence that the media, another ISA, play an important role in labeling. As Howard Becker indicates, “it [deviance] is not a quality that lies in behavior itself, but in the interaction between the person who commits an act and those who respond to it” (Becker 1966, 13). In modern society, it is usually the response of the media that defines what is and what is not deviant. The coverage about *jiajiang* youths is mostly negative. If street fighting among teenagers occurs and some of them happen to belong to a *jiajiang* troupe, the headline – *Jiajiang* Youths Fought on the Street – invariably highlights the troupe itself.³ The coverage contributes to the impression that *jiajiang* youths are not only deviants but also juvenile delinquents. Their image is exacerbated by the fact that some gangs set up the Tang, the hall,⁴ just to recruit members. Even though there is some positive coverage of

³See Shangyu 2004. In her M.A. thesis, Kang Cuiting lists the main newspaper coverage of *jiajiang* youths from September 1998 to May 2002. Only two out of the 16 reports were positive (Kang 2001, 17).

jiajiang troupes when they perform abroad in art or religious festivals, *jiajiang* youths are mostly portrayed as a threat to social order. Such fear is reflected in the constant appeal of the public or the council members to prohibit teenagers from participating in the troupe.⁵ The media have continued the practice of labeling the entire *jiajiang* groups as “problems.” The rigid training and performance of most troupes remain ignored.

Besides being the result of labeling, admittedly *jiajiang* youths do possess potential subversiveness that arises from their liminal position and emphasis on comradeship, which may lead them to violate social rules. It is interesting to note how *jiajiang* youths share with the generals they embody and the gods the generals escort these three characteristics: liminal position, rule violation, and emphasis on comradeship.

The gods are mostly Wufudadi, Five Blessing Gods, who are responsible for dispelling plague. The most common myth is that these gods were originally five scholars, who were also “blood brothers.” One night they witnessed (or in one version learned in a dream) that the Ghost of Plague was poisoning the wells in Fuzhou on the order of the highest god, Jade Emperor. To warn people not to drink the water, they left a note and jumped into the wells. Local people built temples for the scholars to show their gratitude. Jade Emperor forgave the scholars and deified them as Wufudadi to protect people from plague (Sutton 1996, 223).⁶ The myth shows that these scholars value comradeship by becoming “sworn brothers,” who never hesitate to fight and die for each other. Besides, like Prometheus these scholars rebel against the highest god to save people from being poisoned.

Dying an unhappy death and emphasis on comradeship also characterize the myths about the generals. Among the eight generals, Fan and Xie are the most well-known and their myth is familiar to people in Taiwan. Fan and Xie were very good friends, close like blood brothers. One day, they were to meet under the bridge. While Fan was waiting under the bridge, suddenly a thunderstorm came. Xie, on his way, returned home to fetch one more umbrella for his friend. Not wanting to leave due to his promise, Fan was submerged by the rising water. When Xie arrived and found his good friend drowned, he hung himself. Fan and Xie exemplify the ideal of comradeship to the extent of sacrificing their lives.

⁴Tang is the place where the head of the troupe lives and where *jiajiang* youths meet and receive training.

⁵See: “How to Manage *Jiajiang* Teenagers,” *Central News*, May 30, 2003. <http://news.pchome.com.tw/life/cna/20030530/index-20030530195722010388.htm>; Shu Shifung, “*Jiajiang* Youths Love Fighting and Councilmen Demand They be Supervised,” *China News*, May 1, 2003. <http://www.ettoday.com/2003/05/21/140-1457946.htm>.

⁶In another version, the emperor of the time granted them the title Wufudadi, in charge of the plague department. See Huang 2000, 49.

As for myths about the other six generals, according to Huang, “the academic and folklorists hold that the generals were originally pirates who surrender to Wufudadi and then put stay in their service” (Huang 2000, 260). In another version, they were bandits who killed themselves after their failure to return on time caused two bailiffs to commit suicide (Sutton 1996, 224). Like the scholar-turned-gods, these bandit-turned-generals are rule violators in different ways. Fortunately, they are redeemed and deified with power arising from their ability to move between this world and the underworld, namely, from their liminal position.

In *The Ritual Process*, Victor Turner, drawing on Arnold van Gennep’s ideas of three phases in *rites de passage*, develops two important concepts: liminality and *communitas*. According to Turner, in the second phase the ritual subjects are in a liminal period: they are “neither here nor there...betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial” (Turner 1969, 95). In this ambiguous zone, stripped of attributes of the past or the future state, the liminal figures are liberated from the constraints and demands of a variety of roles they play in daily life. With the elimination of the distinctions between classes, ranks, and statuses, the liminal figures feel at one with each other, and develop an intense but short-lived sense of comradeship and egalitarianism, called *communitas*.

The experience of liminality and *communitas* attracts *jiajiang* youths in three respects. First, liberation in a liminal state from the obligation of the main role as a good student, which they fail to play as expected, means demolishing the inferior status and the negative identity they gain in society and in school. Second, the liminality *jiajiang* youths experience is similar to what Turner calls the liminality of status reversal formed in cyclical and calendrical ritual. In this type of ritual, “groups or categories of persons who habitually occupy low status positions in the social structure are positively enjoined to exercise ritual authority over their superiors; and they, in their turn, must accept with good will their ritual degradation” (Turner 1969, 167). *Jiajiang* youths, impersonating the generals, are able to exorcise evil spirits for the senior worshipers. These worshipers treat them with awe and sometimes kneel down to show respect mainly for the patrolling gods and for the generals. The status of the worshipers and the teenagers is reversed. The high is made low; the low made high. Finally, the sense of egalitarianism and comradeship is not short-lived; it does not die away with the end of the ritual. After the ritual, spontaneous *communitas* that arises in the performance of the ritual is replaced with normative *communitas*, which Turner defines as “a ‘perduring social system,’ a subculture or group which attempts to foster and maintain relationships or spontaneous *communitas* on a more or less permanent basis” (Turner 1982, 49). The organization of the *jiajiang* troupe

itself is a form of normative *communitas*, to which “something of the original experienced of ‘freedom,’ ‘liberation,’ or ‘love’ adheres....” (Turner 1982, 49). Normative *communitas* holds *jiajiang* youths together and accounts for why they tend to hang out together in the hall even when not receiving training. Moreover, *jiajiang* youths know they can turn to their comrades for help and protection and in return they assist their comrades despite violating social rules. Like the generals, they put comradeship above social norms and community interests. This is exactly what the dominant culture is afraid of and wants to eliminate.

Besides liminality and *communitas*, the experience of a moment of wide freedom by performing *pinzhen* and possession in the ritual attracts *jiajiang* youths. Originally, *pinzhen* represented the mutual bows and precedence given to each other out of courtesy when different troupes encounter. However, such an act of courtesy has developed into competition for momentum through the variety and skill of the martial art and dance they perform. Sometimes the performance is so feverish and wild that it loses control especially when one side is provocative. With the implements in their hands, *jiajiang* youths of one troupe fight with the other, not figuratively and performatively but literally and vehemently. Instead of the benign power of the general, demonic power, which disturbs the social order, is exerted.

Like *pinzhen*, possession can be very violent but is always welcomed by the worshippers. Traditional *jiajiang* troupes usually do not perform possession. It is the commercial troupes that have started to practice possession to indicate the god’s presence since the 1970’s. These troupes hope to arouse more attention from the spectators and thus invite more business. The performers, when possessed, are free to experiment with prescribed patterns of body movements. At other moments, their performance is very rigid, complicated and stylized. Possession, as Donald Sutton argues, proves to be “not only a kind of release, a moment of freedom... from the collective discipline of the troupe, but also a deeper identification with the persona of the spirit represented” (Sutton 1997, 53)

While performing possession and *pinzhen*, along with the experience of liminality and *communitas*, simultaneously revealing the potential subversiveness of the performing troupe, *jiajiang* youths’ perception of the transformed identity in the ritual indicates that they are submissive rather than resistant to the dominant ideology. The identity of *jiajiang* youths in their daily life is undesirable, negative and unfulfilling. In junior high school, students are usually put into different classes based on their academic performance, although the education administration has long made it illegal. Those in the classes of low performance tend to be ignored and regarded as hopeless. Losing interest in studies, these students pay little attention to the

teachers in class. They also tend to break other school rules ranging from being late to school or dying their hair, to cutting classes or being disruptive. Under such circumstances, they can never feel a sense of self-esteem and achievement, but rather feel useless and alienated. It follows that they seek alternative methods to meet their needs. Joining the troupes is a way out.

The ritual *jiajiang* youths perform drastically reverses their identity, although it lasts temporarily. When the teenagers embody the generals who escort gods, maintain order in the procession, and catch the ghosts, they become “super policemen” from the underworld. They are transformed from wrongdoers being hunted in school into the bailiffs chasing the wrongdoers, from the rule-violators into the preservers of the order, and from the deviants being despised to the generals worshiped by the public (Wang 2002, 104). The reversal of identity gives them a sense of personal worth and dignity. *Jiajiang* youths interviewed by Wang Yali say that they are doing something good and beneficial for the whole community and that they hope they can be respected like the generals they embody (Wang, 56). Apparently, *jiajiang* youths identify with the good qualities of the generals and long for the recognition of the dominant culture.

Besides, other *jiajiang* youths interviewed by Kang Cuiting recognize that they can never rely on performing in the ritual for a living and they express the importance of having a stable job in the future. Some of them, having had trouble in finding a job, want to go back to school at some point to get a high school diploma, a basic requirement for many labor jobs (Kang 2001, 117-8). That explains why *jiajiang* youths usually leave the troupe forever after they have to do military service at age twenty. After military service, which symbolically and literally transforms these teenagers into adults, they look for a job to support themselves and thus achieve the identity expected by their parent culture.

On the surface, dropping out of school and joining the troupe appears subversive. Yet their identification with the positive side of the generals – rewarding the good and punishing the bad – as well as their longing for the recognition of the public and their leaving the troupe for a stable job, all reaffirm the established social values. Therefore, joining the troupe is simply a temporary way for *jiajiang* youths to pursue the desired identity; it is not an intentional gesture of resistance as the society sees it. Potential subversiveness arising from *communitas* disappears as soon as *jiajiang* youths leave the troupe for military service. Why, then, do *jiajiang* youths continue to bear the reputation as deviants? To use Turner’s phrase, *jiajiang* youths are not transformed permanently; they are transported in the ritual. With the end of the ritual, the desired identity also disappears. More important, the Tang or the troupe is neither a formal institution nor a state ideological apparatus,

approved by the hegemonic culture, even though Wang Yali details how a Tang might function like a school in terms of domesticating the teenager. Seeking redemption in the wrong place, *jiajiang* youths are doomed to be labeled as deviant and subversive. They will never be redeemed like the generals they embody in the ritual.

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Manufacturing Employment and Production in Japan: Assessing the Impact of Integrated Production and Foreign Direct Investment

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The movement of Japanese production facilities overseas in the wake of the 1985 Plaza Accord and appreciation of the yen raised concerns in Japanese society about the hollowing-out of Japanese industry. Japanese companies expanded their operations in the countries that were the primary markets for their products, but also expanded production in East and Southeast Asia and built products in these countries for export to the American and European markets. Employment and production in Japan increased in the years immediately after the Plaza Accord, but in the 1990's there was stagnating economic growth and a loss of manufacturing employment that raised concerns that Japan's industrial base would be moved overseas and that Japanese industry was hollowing out. Whether overseas investment has actually led to a decrease in manufacturing production and employment has not yet been adequately studied in the literature.

There are two processes occurring in Japan's production in Asia that have an impact on industry and employment in Japan. These processes, examined in more depth below in the automobile and electronics industries, can best be understood in the context of the regional integration of production in Asia. The first process is a further deepening of economic integration in Asia with Japan primarily producing high-tech products and components that are exported to neighboring countries for assembly. At the same time changing production technologies, techniques and requirements have led some Japanese companies to adopt production techniques which lead to production outside of the framework of integrated production. Both processes lead to increased domestic manufacturing production within Japan, but neither is likely to lead to a significant increase in manufacturing employment that will benefit the majority of the Japanese public. Employment gains will probably be restricted to highly skilled and educated workers.

BACKGROUND

As Japan and Japanese industry recovered from World War II, foreign direct investment (FDI) was limited to small amounts of investment designed to increase natural resource extraction and facilitate trade. FDI was constrained by both the weakness of industry and government policies that limited the extent to which companies could invest overseas. During the 1960's manufacturing industries did begin to invest overseas, but this investment remained relatively minor. Following the end of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970's, however, Japanese investment significantly increased. Japanese companies, faced with an increase in the value of the yen and less competitive domestic wages, moved uncompetitive and labor intensive industries such as textiles overseas. The movement of these companies was facilitated by changes in government policies in the 1960's and early 1970's that not only made it easier to move companies overseas, but, as Mireya Solis points out, also facilitated the movement of these industries (Solis 2003; Mason 1999; Komiva and Wakasugi 1991).

Foreign direct investment in the 1970s and early 1980s was relatively insignificant in comparison to the amount that took place in the wake of the Plaza Accord in the early 1980s (see Charts 1 and 2). The revaluation of the yen was the primary factor that led Japanese companies to increase their overseas production, but it was not the only factor. Japanese companies wanted to reduce trade friction with the U.S., and by producing overseas they could continue exporting to the U.S. while reducing the direct trade surplus between Japan and the US and the trade friction related to this surplus. Companies also sought to take advantage of lower labor costs, produce products more cheaply for the domestic market, and increase their access to overseas markets (Hatch and Yamamura 1996; Edgington 1993; Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 2004; Mody, Dasgupta, and Sinha 1999; Nelson 2003).

This has led to an increasing amount of overseas production by Japanese companies. In fact, the percent of all Japanese manufacturing done overseas increased from 6.2% in 1992 to 16.7% in 2001 (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 2004, 134). A recent survey by the Japanese External Trade Organization (JETRO) indicated that 66% of manufacturing companies engage in production overseas (JETRO 2006). Among Japanese manufacturers that have overseas facilities, 40.9% of production is now done overseas. 28.5% of all Japanese enterprises now have an overseas subsidiary and 13% of small and medium enterprises (SME's) have overseas production facilities (METI 2004, 134).

Japanese companies made significant investments in East and Southeast Asia in this period and significant investment continues to occur in countries such as S. Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines (see Chart 3) (Japanese Ministry of Finance, *Foreign Direct Investment*). For small and medium enterprises, 25% of overseas facilities are located in Southeast Asia, 18% in China, and 15% in the newly industrialized economies (Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea) (METI 2004b, 136). An increasing amount of investment is taking place in China and foreign direct investment by all Japanese companies into China more than doubled between 2002 and 2004, though this has merely returned the level of investment to that of the middle of the 1990's (see Chart 4) (Japanese Ministry of Finance, *Outward Direct Investment*). According to a recent JETRO survey, 60% of large companies now engage in production in China, though only 31% of small and medium size enterprises do (JETRO 2006a). Japanese companies are also planning to continue expanding their operations in China. According to the JETRO survey, 73% of manufacturers plan to increase business in or with China (JETRO 2006a).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

The most prominent theory for understanding the economic structure of Japanese production in Asia is the flying-geese theory that was developed by Akamatsu Kaname. This theory was originally used to explain Japan's development in the 1930's, but was reinvigorated by Kaname in the postwar period. It has been modified several times in the postwar period to take into account Japan's influential role in East Asia (Kasahara 2004, 1-2; Kojima 2000, 376; Peng 2000, 180-1).

Kasahara distinguishes between the application of the theory to "intra-industry" development and "inter-industry" development (Kasahara, 3). The intra-industry theory postulates several stages in industrial development for follower countries. In the first stage the follower country imports products from the industrialized country, while in the second stage the country engages in import substitution as the company develops its own industry. In the third stage the country becomes a significant exporter of the product. While this applies to products, a similar pattern can be seen for the country as a whole (the inter-industry model). The follower country will initially be an importer of products, but will gradually develop the technology to manufacture its own products and will begin to take over production from the industrialized country. The follower country will gradually advance up the scale of production into higher and more technologically advanced methods of production (Kasahara, 8; and Kojima, 377-279).

A slightly revised version of this theory was applied to East Asia as a whole. Japan exports to countries in Asia and companies invest a significant amount of money in other economies. As a result of increased trade, investment and other aspects of the growth of capital and transfer of knowledge, these countries gradually gain expertise in the development of these products and form their own industries. At the same time, however, Japan continues to advance and to manufacture more technologically advanced products in which it has a comparative advantage. In the analogy Japan is the lead goose flying in a “V” pattern and continuing to advance, while the other countries fly behind in this V pattern and are pulled along by the lead goose. In this way the whole flock of geese is flying with Japan moving forward and staying continually in the lead (Kasahara, 7-8; Kojima, 382; Dowling and Cheang 2000, 444). It remains one of the dominant paradigms for explaining development in Asia, but empirical tests of the thesis have yielded contradictory results on its applicability to the pattern of development in Asia.¹

Bruce Cummings (1984) argues that the development of Japan, Taiwan and S. Korea cannot be seen in isolation but rather have to be seen as part of a larger process of integration and industrial development in East Asia that is also connected to the United States. He brought together Raymond Vernon’s product cycle and Akamatsu Kaname’s flying-geese theory to explain Taiwan and S. Korea’s rapid development. Taiwan and S. Korea both had strong central governments and both countries utilized inexpensive labor, engaged in import substitution and encouraged exports. In this way their economic development mirrored that of Japan (Cummings 1984). According to Cummings, “[i]n the past century Japan, Korea and Taiwan have also moved fluidly through a classic product cycle industrialization pattern, Korea and Taiwan following in Japan’s wake” (Cummings, 2).

Mitchell Bernard and John Ravenhill (1995) reject the flying-geese analogy and argue that there are regional production networks in East Asia for the production of manufactured goods. These are hierarchical networks of production in which Japan remains the most advanced country that produces the most advanced components. While Korea and Taiwan appear to have advanced technologically, in reality they are still highly dependent on Japanese technology. These countries’ dependence on Japan illustrates the fact that the nature of production in East Asia has changed toward the

¹For example, An-Chi Tung found that while the theory seems to apply at the macro-level, it does not seem to apply to the regional and intra-company trade of components in the electronics industry. Malcolm Dowling and Chia Tien Cheang, on the other hand, analyze data on exports and foreign direct investment and find that the flying geese pattern does, indeed, apply in East and Southeast Asia. See: Tung 2003 and Dowling and Cheang 2000.

production of high technology goods, which are more difficult to begin producing locally. This is compounded by the fact that production has moved away from individual companies producing complete products in one country. In addition, the structure of production differs from that assumed in the fly-geese theory as products are produced for export rather than for the domestic market. For all of these reasons, they argue, the flying-geese theory is no longer valid (Bernard and Ravenhill 1995).

Walter Hatch and Kozo Yamamura (1996) also contend that Japan is building a regional production alliance in East Asia in which manufacturing facilities in East and Southeast Asia produce products as part of a Japanese production network that extends across the region. The Japanese government and Japanese businesses have collaborated to open up countries in Asia through Japanese development assistance, Japanese investment and the building of personal relationships with local leaders. Japanese companies, therefore, have been able to move into these countries more easily than many western multinational corporations. Japanese companies' operations in these countries have been integrated into an international vertical keiretsu network characterized by a high level of intra-firm trade (Hatch and Yamamura 1996).

Hatch and Yamamura contend, however, that the establishment of Japanese companies in these countries has not led to an improvement in the economic situation in these countries. Rather, local companies in this production network are increasingly reliant on Japanese businesses. Local companies are not developing the capability to expand their businesses beyond their relationships with Japanese companies or to move to the production of high technology products. Japanese companies do not engage in significant research and development locally and there is little technology transfer from Japanese companies to local companies. These companies, therefore, remain almost entirely dependent on Japanese technology and Japanese companies buying their products. As a result, Japan's influence is significantly increasing in the region. And concerns about Japan hollowing-out are unfounded as Japan has continued to invest in domestic production and will continue to produce high technology products and engage in research and development within Japan (Hatch and Yamamura 1996).

Since the 1990's, production in Japan and Asia has often been described as a form of integrated production. This was originally used to describe production in the electronics industry, but can be applied to production in other industries as well. In this model components are produced in the countries that have comparative advantages in the production of different types of components. High technology components, therefore, are produced in Japan and the newly industrialized economies (NIE's), while low-technology labor intensive components are produced in ASEAN and China. These

components are then shipped to an assembly plant which is often in a Southeast Asian country or, increasingly, China. Integrated production, therefore, is characterized by a high level of intra-firm trade. Once products are assembled they are sometimes sold in the local market, but more often are exported back to Japan, or to Europe or the United States (Nelson 2003; Gaulier, Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci 2005).

In the model of integrated production Japan will continue to advance and continue to develop and produce the most high tech components, thereby retaining its comparative advantage in these areas and a strong manufacturing base at home (Gaulier, Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci 2005). Patricia Nelson, however, argues that Japanese companies may eventually reach the point where only high-end production, corporate management, and research and development will be based in Japan, though this is not yet a reality (Nelson, 137). According to Nelson, “top firms projected that their only operations left in Japan would be marketing, research and development (R&D), product design, corporate strategy, and coordination. In many cases, however, first production runs of new consumer products and very high-technology production...remained in Japan” (Nelson, 137).

The structure of trade that emerges from integrated production reflects the triangular trade described by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in their 2005 *White Paper on International Economy and Trade*. METI argues that “Japan and the NIEs produce intermediate goods, China and ASEAN import intermediate goods, assemble them into final goods and then export to the United States and Europe as the final consumption markets” (METI 2005).

DEINDUSTRIALIZATION AND HOLLOWING-OUT

This idea of hollowing-out is similar to the theories of deindustrialization that described the loss of manufacturing employment in the United States in the 1970's and 1980's. This theory was a modification of an earlier Canadian theory and was developed and applied to the U.S. by authors such as Bennett Harrison, Barry Bluestone and Robert Kuttner (Krugman 1996, 5; High 2003, 7-8). Bluestone and Harrison argued that:

Underlying the high rates of unemployment, the sluggish growth in the domestic economy, and the failure to successfully compete in the international market is the deindustrialization of America. By *deindustrialization* is meant a widespread, systemic disinvestment in the nation's productive capacity. Controversial as it may be, the essential problem with the U.S. economy can be traced to the way

capital—in the form of financial resources and of real plant and equipment—has been diverted from productive investment in our basic national industries into unproductive speculation, mergers and acquisitions, and foreign investment...The traces of widespread disinvestment show up in an aging capital stock at home and in the diversion of investment resources to American corporate subsidiaries operating abroad. (Bluestone and Harrison 1982, 6)

Bluestone and Harrison trace this diversion of capital to increased competition which led American companies to either withdraw from, or lessen production in, certain industries or to move facilities overseas to reduce labor and regulatory costs (Bluestone and Harrison, 15).

The deindustrialization hypothesis has come under criticism and the economic growth of the 1990's may have changed perceptions of deindustrialization. Paul Krugman, for example, argues that the impact of trade on real wages has been relatively insignificant (Krugman, 18). Estimates of manufacturing employment as a percentage of the workforce seemed to indicate significant decline, but in terms of the number of people employed the impact, until about 1990, seemed much less severe (High, 8). Barry Bluestone, writing the forward to *Beyond the Ruins: The Meanings of Deindustrialization* in 2003, stated that in the 1990s:

While certain manufacturing industries continued to decline, others rapidly increased their sales and the value they added to final production. Consequently there has been a profound shift in the U.S. from traditional manufacturing industries (e.g. instruments, apparel, paper products) to newer manufacturing industries in high-technology products (e.g. electronic equipment), industrial machinery and sophisticated chemical and pharmaceutical products. (Bluestone 2003, xii)

He goes on to qualify his statement by saying that, “technologically driven production is a double-edged sword. While manufacturing is holding its own, manufacturing employment continues to shrink as efficiency gains make it possible to produce more output with fewer workers” (Bluestone, xii).

In Japan the debate over hollowing out in the 1980's and 1990's was similar to that in the U.S. A series of reports seemed to confirm that a process of hollowing out was underway, though many of the reports recommended deregulation as a way to solve the problem. *The Nikkei Weekly* reported on April 17, 1995 that the “Japanese economy is undergoing a hollowing-out process similar to that in the U.S. in the first half of the 1980s, the National

Land Agency said in a report last week. The shift of production overseas comes against the backdrop of the yen's appreciation, high wage levels and the economic recession, the agency said."² One MITI (the precursor to METI) official stated that "[w]e are worrying about hollowing out. The auto and consumer electric industries have long played a leading role in Japan's growth. Now, they are losing strength" (Hidenaka 1993, 1). Jiro Nakayama, chairman of a Keihin Kogyo, a manufacturing company, that had moved some of its production to Asia stated that "Japanese salary levels have risen too much. The manufacturing industry is hollowing out, and we will never see a reverse flow back to Japan."³ In 1994 the Japan Research Institute published a report predicting that from 1993 to 2000 over two million manufacturing jobs would be lost and the unemployment rate would increase to 6.4%, primarily as a result of the movement of manufacturing industries overseas and poor economic performance in general (this prediction of the loss of manufacturing jobs was surprisingly accurate).⁴ The report called for restructuring the economy in order to reduce the hollowing out of industry. A MITI (the precursor to METI) report from the same time period also argued that if the government did not deregulate there would be a significant hollowing out of industry.⁵ Deregulation was the preferred government response and many officials argued that if Japan did deregulate, hollowing-out would not be a concern. *The Nikkei Weekly* reported that:

Some Ministry of International Trade and Industry officials and private-sector economists say the shift of production abroad will eventually make room for value-added products and technical innovation. And a continuous increase in individual incomes will create new markets, they say. Others say the government's enthusiasm for deregulation will also generate new businesses. Efforts to improve productivity in non-tradable sectors such as retail, transportation, financial and communication services, will help lower production costs in the manufacturing sector. But the key is widely seen as concentration on R&D. (Hidenaka 1993)

Concern was felt among the general public and the news media. In a 1996 opinion piece a *Daily Yomiuri* staff writer lamented that "none of this country's political parties have come up with the kind of policies needed to

²"Japan Follows U.S. in Hollowing-Out, Report Warns," *The Nikkei Weekly*, April 17, 1995..

³"The Hollowing-Out of Japan Continues," *Asahi News Service*, December 19, 1994.

⁴"Joblessness to Soar by End of Century, Report Warns," *The Nikkei Weekly*, August 29, 1994: 10.

⁵"Growth Hinges on Reform, Council Warns," *The Nikkei Weekly*, June 20, 1994: 3.

prevent the hollowing out of industry while solving the unemployment problem” (Morimoto 1996, 9). According to a 1995 survey by the *Daily Yomiuri*, 63.1% of respondents felt that “the offshore exodus of industry and jobs will only escalate and that it will be increasingly difficult to find employment in Japan due to stagnant economic conditions.”⁶ The *Mainichi Daily News* reported that “the head of the Japan Federation of Employers Associations (Nikkeiren) urged the government Monday to take steps to stop the so-called "hollowing out" of the nation's industry.”⁷

There are few recent academic studies specifically on the impact of the movement of industries overseas on employment in Japan. Among those that have been done, there hasn't been a consensus on the impact of FDI on employment. Lipsey, et. al. find that Japanese production overseas by Japanese companies is positively correlated with domestic employment and exports by those companies (Lipsey, Ramstetter, Bloomstrom). This study is limited, however, in that the latest data used in the study is from 1992. Mireya Solis discusses a number of studies in the late 1980's and early 1990's that tried to measure the impact of FDI on employment in Japan. All of the studies found some impact of FDI on employment but there was significant variation in the extent of the impact (Solis, 106-7). Yoshihide Ishiyama argues that Japan is not hollowing out and that the danger, instead, is from too much production capacity in Japan and increased exports that could contribute to an appreciation in the value of the yen. He also finds that the share of manufacturing in the domestic economy is declining, but the pace of this decline is slow enough that it is not a concern. As with previous studies, however, his conclusions are limited by the fact that his most recent data is from 1995 (Ishiyama 1999).

ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE MOVEMENT OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES OVERSEAS

While many manufacturing facilities moved overseas in the late 1980's, manufacturing production in the 1990's seemed to reflect general economic trends. The number of manufacturing establishments in Japan decreased from 439,000 in 1985 to 294,000 in 2003 (Ministry of Internal Affairs, “Japan Statistical”). At the same time industrial production, which escalated rapidly immediately after the Plaza Accord, peaked in 1991 and, though cyclical,

⁶Information on the polling method and representativeness of the data was unavailable. See: “Survey: Japanese Fear ‘Hollowing-Out,’” *The Daily Yomiuri*, May 11, 1995: 12.

⁷“Nikkeiren Urges Steps to End 'Hollowing-Out,’” *Mainichi Daily News*, December 13, 1994: 9.

remained below this level throughout the 1990s (see Chart 5) (*Ibid.* and METI 2006).

Over the long term, however, it appears that increased foreign direct investment and movement of production overseas by Japanese industries seems to have had a limited effect on production within Japan. While it is possible that production would have been even higher had Japan not moved its manufacturing industries overseas, manufacturing production in Japan seems to be increasing. Production, after being significantly lower from 2001 to 2003, seems to have recovered and production in Japan since 2004 has been at or above the level of most of the 1980's and 1990's (*Ibid.*). Companies are once again investing a significant amount of money in the construction of new manufacturing facilities. According to a Bank of Japan survey, planned domestic capital spending in 2005 was 22.7% higher than capital spending in 2004 (Development Bank of Japan 2006). A 2005 survey of Japanese companies by *The Nikkei Weekly* concluded that "about 60% of manufacturers...said they have decided to or are considering building new domestic factories."⁸

These trends seem to clearly indicate that Japan is not hollowing out. As discussed below, Japan is growing in high technology sectors or sectors like automobiles in which Japan retains a strong advantage. The growth, however, is taking place in two different forms, each of which is likely to have significant ramifications for manufacturing employment in Japan.

The domestic growth of Japanese manufacturing fits into the framework of integrated production in Asia. Japanese businesses are investing in production both within Japan and overseas. According to a 2005 JETRO survey of manufacturing, trading, and wholesale/retail firms, 66% planned to expand operations overseas in the next three years and 51% planned to expand operations in Japan.⁹ As would be expected, most of the planned overseas expansion of production is taking place in China, but companies are also increasing their investment in countries like Thailand and beginning to invest more in Vietnam. This is part of a strategy of Japanese companies to diversify their investments and avoid the risk associated with investing too heavily in one country.¹⁰

⁸"Six in Ten Japanese Firms Eye New Domestic Factories," *The Nikkei Weekly*, October 31, 2005.

⁹While this survey included non-manufacturing companies, 70% of the businesses in the survey were manufacturing companies. See: JETRO, *FY 2005 Survey of Japanese Firms' International Operations*, pg. 3, 12.

¹⁰Japanese companies have been concerned about focusing too much of their investment on China for a number of reasons including inadequate infrastructure (e.g. electricity), unexpected shortages of labor in key industrial areas, concern over the potential loss of technology, increasing wages and concerns about the value of the yuan. "Electronic Parts Makers Eyeing Vietnam Over

Japanese companies are generally investing more heavily in the expansion of the production of low-technology products overseas and the production of high-technology products in Japan, though some investment does run counter to this trend.¹¹ Of those companies planning to expand operations overseas, 48% are planning to expand the production of “mid- to low-end products” and 23% “high-end products.” Of those planning to expand operations in Japan, 45% are planning to expand the production of high-end products and 16.7% mid to low-end products (JETRO 2006a, 12). Interestingly, for those that do plan to increase high end production, both China and Thailand are important investment locations (*Ibid.*, 13). There is an increasingly integrated approach to auto production as well as electronics production. Automotive production takes place across Asia in countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.¹²

Two of the areas in which Japanese businesses seem to be investing domestically are the production of high-end electronics and the production of automobiles. Planned capital spending in 2005 increased 9.9% for electrical machinery, 3.8% for electrical devices and 30.3% for automobiles (Development Bank of Japan 2006, 14). Production of electrical parts and devices, in terms of value added, has almost doubled since 1998 (see Chart 6) (Ministry of Internal Affairs, “Japan Statistical” and METI 2006). Major companies are continuing to expand. For example, Sharp, Matsushita and Toshiba plan to build new factories to produce LCDs, plasma display screens and flash memory chips, respectively.¹³ The production of transportation equipment remains significantly higher than the level of production in 2000 with companies such as Nissan increasing production (see Chart 6) (*Ibid.*).¹⁴ The increases in production largely reflect global demand.¹⁵

The investment that is taking place in automobile and electronics production involves both the production of high-tech products and the high-tech and automated production of products. Honda’s announced new factory

China” *The Nikkei Weekly*, September 12, 2005; “Machinery, Parts Makers Setting Up Plants in Vietnam,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, December 5, 2005; “Japanese Makers in China Innovate to Cut Costs,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, September 20, 2005; JETRO, *FY 2005 Survey of Japanese Firms’ International Operations*, pg. 13; Japanese Economy Division, JETRO, “Japanese Economy in 2005 and Beyond: Beginning of a Sustained Growth Cycle,” *Japan Economic Monthly* 22 (January 2006). http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/market/trend/jem/index.html/0601_jeme.pdf

¹¹Sony, for example, is going to build a new LCD factory in Korea. Source: “Sony to Build LCD Plant in S. Korea,” *The Asahi Shimbun*, March 30, 2006.

¹²“Southeast Asia Remapping Car Parts Production,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, October 3, 2005.

¹³“Electrical Forms to Boost R&D Spending for 3rd Straight Year,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, May 16, 2005; “Matsushita Electric Plans 5th Plasma Display Plant,” *The Daily Yomiuri*, January 8, 2006; and “Toshiba to Add Another Flash Memory Plant,” *The Asahi Shimbun*, March 13, 2006.

¹⁴“Nissan Spending Big to Overhaul Domestic Plants,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, October 11, 2005.

¹⁵“Electronics Firms Busier as Auto-Related Demand Climbs,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, July 26, 2005.

is expected to produce the highest technology automobile components such as hybrid engine systems.¹⁶ Toyota is integrating the use of robots in all phases of the production process and Nissan has increased automation at some of its facilities.¹⁷

The integrated production discussed by Patricia Nelson in which production of products occurs almost entirely outside of Japan and only research and development and corporate management occurs within Japan has generally not yet occurred. Toyota has moved closer to this model with some types of cars that are manufactured completely outside of Japan. As part of its Innovative International Multipurpose Vehicle (IMV) Project, Toyota now produces vehicles almost entirely overseas for use in local markets or for export. These vehicles were originally intended for export primarily to developing countries but Toyota is now planning on exporting them to Europe as well (Mueller and Weernick 2004, 1 and Lucero 2005).¹⁸ This primarily complements domestic production, however, and Toyota continues to increase production within Japan.¹⁹

While Japan is becoming more integrated with Asia, new production techniques are being used that may, in some cases, be outside the structure of integrated production. Faced with the need to increase the speed with which products can be introduced on the market, companies are developing cheaper production methods that do not involve moving production overseas. As Seiichi Masuyama points out, "there is a new counter-trend in Japan of shifting production of high end products back into Japan from China and elsewhere while investment in China will continue. This is because the businesses of digital product such as mobile phones, digital cameras and flat display TVs, which have short product cycles, need rapid development and production with continuous collaboration with researchers, engineers and suppliers" (Masuyama 2004).

Some Japanese companies are introducing cell style production methods. In cell style production, rather than having an assembly line one employee assembles the product from start to finish. This is not necessarily a new style of production and it has been used by companies outside of Japan. This production method allows companies to produce more products in a given amount of time with less labor. It also allows companies to get new products

¹⁶It should be noted that this plant was not expected to increase production capacity in Japan. See: "Honda Plans Plant for High End Engines," *The Asahi Shimbun*, March 14, 2006.

¹⁷"Worker Shortage Spurs Automation," *The Nikkei Weekly*, February 7, 2005.

¹⁸See also: "What's This IMV Project," *Business Line*, March 27, 2005; and "Toyota's New Plant to Produce 100,000 Vehicles per Year by 2007," *The Nation*, December 10, 2005.

¹⁹Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, *Japan's Motor Vehicle Statistics*. http://www.jama.org/statistics/motorvehicle/production/mv_prod_make.htm

to market more quickly as it is much easier to change production and implement the production of these new products.²⁰ Canon, for example, has moved to a cell style of production and has estimated that during the period from 1998 to 2005 it has, as a result, employed tens of thousands fewer people.²¹ Kenwood Yamagata Corp also introduced cell style production in one of its facilities in Japan. *The Nikkei Weekly* reported that the cell production system at the Kenwood facility “can...react quickly and flexibly to changes in demand, since there is no need to alter the production line. The only thing that needs to change is the component parts to make a different model.”²² Kazuhiro Sato, managing director, told *The Nikkei Weekly* that “[w]e have discarded the misconception that products made in other parts of Asia are cheaper.”

Other companies are expanding automation or, in some cases, moving to completely automated production. This allows companies to produce products with a minimal labor force and, therefore, makes it more cost effective to produce a product domestically. One of Canon’s goals is to completely automate production and they are already moving toward automated production in their factories.²³ Companies such as Casio and Mitsubishi electric are using information technology systems to reduce production time and improve quality.²⁴

Other companies are bringing their research and development and production processes together in one building. This, once again, allows these companies to more rapidly respond to changes in technology and to put them into production more quickly. Bringing the research staff and production staff together makes it easier to get the product into development quickly. *The Nikkei Weekly* reported that one factor “reenergizing domestic factories is their close cooperation with the development and design divisions, which has apparently led to creating more attractive and competitive products as well as enabled them to come up with innovative technologies.”²⁵ In an effort to bring

²⁰“Yamagata Plant Recasts Assembly,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, March 6, 2006; Canon Website. <http://www.canon.com/about/production/>; and Russ Olexa, “When Cells Make Sense,” *Manufacturing Engineering* 128, no. 6 (2002), <http://www.sme.org>.

²¹“Corporate Strategy Conference 2006,” Canon Website. <http://www.canon.com/ir/housin2006/index.html>; and “Canon Production.” Canon Website. <http://www.canon.com/about/production/>.

²²“Yamagata Plant Recasts Assembly,” *The Nikkei Weekly*.

²³“Corporate Strategy Conference 2006,” p. 34; “Canon Seeks Competitive Edge by Automating Production Lines,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, November 29, 2004; “Canon to Spend 80 Billion Yen to Build Japan Cartridge Plant,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, June 20, 2005; and “Domestic Output Boosts Canon’s Vitality,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, October 11, 2005.

²⁴“Makers Look to Automation, IT to Ensure Quality,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, April 3, 2006; and “IT Injects Life into Metal Mold Factory,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, March 6, 2006.

²⁵“Notorious ‘3 Excesses’ Eliminated at Home,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, October 11, 2005.

products to the market more quickly, Sony, for example, is bringing together “product design, product quality management, production line operation and technological development teams.”²⁶

Japanese companies are investing in research and development both overseas and in Japan. The importance of research and development for some Japanese companies was emphasized by Hiroshi Okuda, Toyota Chairman and also currently chairman of the Nippon Keidanren, who stated that “Japan should be a country of science and technology. A major factor behind the economic recovery was that Japanese companies patiently continued research and development activities to boost their competitiveness during the previous lengthy period of economic stagnation.”²⁷ Improving research and technology is an important element of Canon’s long term plan.²⁸ Within Japan investment in research and development has been steadily growing since the mid-1980’s and will probably continue to increase (see Chart 7).²⁹ According to the JETRO survey, of those companies planning to increase operations in Japan, 20% planned to invest in research and development in the area of “basic research” and 42% in the development of new products (JETRO 2006a, 12).

Companies are also increasing overseas investment in research and development. Much of this research and development is on the low-tech end and is part of a process of producing products that are more appealing to consumers in local markets and that can be quickly modified to respond to changes in technology and preferences (Masuyama, 17). *The Nikkei Weekly* reported that the local development of products “shortens the commercialization process in addition to accommodating changes in consumer preferences, thereby boosting customer satisfaction.”³⁰ According to the JETRO survey (2006a), 20% of all companies planning to expand operations overseas planned to increase research and development to adapt products for local markets.

When Nissan started a joint venture to conduct research and development in China, for example, the president of the joint venture stated that “we’ve entered a stage of development to meet the needs of the Chinese market and local production.”³¹ Toyota has seven research and development centers

²⁶“Sony Unit Takes Production Vertical,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, September 20, 2005.

²⁷Kunio Saijo, “Technology Key to Japan’s Future,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, April 17, 2006.

²⁸*Corporate Strategy Conference 2006*, p. 32.

²⁹It is, of course, likely that some of this increase in employment of researchers is the employment of researchers by foreign companies. The Japanese government has, in fact, made some efforts to attract R&D centers. Companies such as IBM, Nokia, Google and Microsoft have research centers in Japan. See: JETRO 2004; and “Google Opens R&D Body in Tokyo to Boost Service,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, April 11, 2005.

³⁰“Nissan, Toyota Boosting China R&D,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, April 3, 2006.

³¹“Nissan, Toyota Boosting China R&D,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, April 3, 2006.

overseas that it uses in the production of products for local markets and it is currently opening an eighth in China.³² Honda plans to focus research and development in China on developing “exterior components, such as headlights and carriers, that reflect local tastes.”³³

Some companies, however, are investing in more advanced research and development overseas. 15% of planned overseas investment is for the development of new products, though probably only a portion of this is high-tech development. *The Nikkei Weekly* reported that “[m]ajor technology firms are increasingly sending software development offshore to China.”³⁴ And at Toray’s operation in China the company “intends to train researchers in cutting edge technology...”³⁵ Other companies have focused on bringing in talented people to overseas research and development centers. Hisashi Machida from NSK Ltd stated that “we intend to learn from people with various cultural backgrounds to create something new.”³⁶

The impact of the movement of manufacturing overseas and the use of new production techniques has had a significant impact on employment in Japan. While manufacturing employment increased even as FDI was increasing in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, manufacturing employment has decreased every year since 1993. Interestingly, while manufacturing employment increased slightly in the U.S. through most of the 1990’s, probably as a result of the growth in the United States during this period, since about 1999 the trend in manufacturing employment has mirrored that of Japan (see Chart 8). Wages in manufacturing for full time employees increased by 16% in the 1990s and by 2.9% from 2000 to 2004 (Ministry of Internal Affairs, “Japan Statistical”). Female part-time employment, which makes up the bulk of all part time employment, varies from year to year and annual increases or decreases generally ranged from about 0 to 7%. Wages for female part-time employees increased significantly from 1990 to 1996 but have been relatively stagnant since, fluctuating annually and only increasing by 2.6% from 1996 to 2004 (*Ibid.*).

While employment in the production of electrical parts and devices decreased significantly from 2001 to 2004, employment in the production of motor vehicles remained relatively constant and was, in fact, greater than the level of employment in 1999, though it was still significantly below that in 1996 (see Chart 9). Wages for the manufacturing of transportation equipment

³²“Nissan, Toyota Boosting China R&D” and “Toyota, China FAW to Set Up R&D Joint Venture this Year,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, February 13, 2006.

³³“Motorcycle Makers Boost R&D Presence in China,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, May 10, 2004.

³⁴“Software R&D Moving to China,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, August 29, 2005.

³⁵“Toray to Beef Up R&D Operations,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, May 2, 2005.

³⁶“Firms Tap Overseas Engineers to Hone Edge,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, January 17, 2005.

increased 4% from 2000 to 2004 (*Ibid.*). Pay scales for workers in the automotive and electronics industries negotiated by unions did not increase from 2001 to 2005, but in 2006 unions did negotiate a pay increase (*Ibid.*). Part of the difference in employment trends may be related to the fact it is still possible to automate more of the production process for electronics than for automobiles.

The decreases or lack of increases in manufacturing employment as production has increased are probably a result of increases in productivity due to automation and other changes in production techniques discussed above. Labor productivity increased 35% between 2000 and 2004 in the production of electrical parts and devices and 17% in the production of transportation equipment (*Ibid.*). Increases in automation and production techniques and increased productivity make it unlikely that continued increases in manufacturing production in Japan will result in a significant recovery in employment in the manufacturing sector. It also means that increases in employment will probably be in the hiring of skilled labor, both to work in these more automated facilities and to replace the generation of elderly workers who are retiring. During the 1990's Japanese manufacturing companies released many of the younger employees and retained older employees. As a result, Japanese companies find themselves with a large number of older employees nearing retirement and a lack of younger employees with the skills to take their place. This may create problems in the next few years as there may actually be a shortage of employees with the skills that companies need. This will probably only help highly skilled job seekers, though.³⁷

In addition, the focus on research and development, production techniques, etc. seems to be creating more opportunities for college graduates. Companies have started hiring larger numbers of college graduates in fields such as engineering. According to an *Asahi Shimbun* survey that was conducted in March 2006, out of 100 companies surveyed, "52 will hire more graduates, mainly in technical fields, while 39 said the recruitment level will remain the same...The increase was especially conspicuous in technical sectors, showing that companies are eager to pass down their expertise to younger generations before the baby-boomers born between 1947 and 1949 start retiring en masse in 2007."³⁸ The *Yomiuri* similarly found that "[g]raduates with degrees in engineering or technology are highly sought after

³⁷"Manufacturers Urged to Offer Regular Jobs to Part-Timers," *The Daily Yomiuri*, April 17, 2006; "Firms Bullish About Spring Hiring but Grads Still Face Hurdles," *The Daily Yomiuri*, March 14, 2006; and "Firms Hungry for Skilled Workers," *The Nikkei Weekly*, October 24, 2005.

³⁸"Most Major Businesses to Increase Recruitment," *The Asahi Shimbun*, March 21, 2006.

by manufacturers.”³⁹ Major companies such as Toshiba, Sony, Sharp and Honda planned to increase the number of graduates that they hired.⁴⁰ Companies are also hiring more mid-career employees.⁴¹ Michio Sato of the Yomiuri Research Institute wrote in *The Daily Yomiuri* that companies “have increased the number of mid-career personnel they take on so as to have employees that will be of immediate benefit.”

The focus on skilled labor means that the benefits of the increase in manufacturing employment will probably not provide employment for individuals without the necessary skills and will not have the impact that previous expansions of manufacturing production had for Japanese society. This may be related to an income gap in Japan that may be widening.⁴² The increased production may, however, have larger effects in society on employment in medium and small enterprises that have not been studied in depth here and may have effects on the service sector of the economy. The service sector of the economy has been growing in Japan and probably benefits from an expansion in manufacturing, but further study in this area is needed.

DISCUSSION

Integrated production remains the best framework within which to understand the majority of Japanese production. The Hatch and Yamamura model undoubtedly captures certain elements of production in Asia, but this theory and the flying-geese theory seem increasingly dated. Japan may still be the most important player in the region economically and may have a disproportionate impact on the economies in the region, but production in the region is rapidly expanding and non-Japanese companies are becoming more advanced. Thailand, for example, is one of the largest producers of automobiles in the world.⁴³ Taiwan and Korea’s technological production capabilities have rapidly expanded. While they remain dependent on Japanese technology in some areas, they are one of the leading countries in the production of semiconductors and three of the top five companies in the production of LCD TVs are Korean or Taiwanese companies (JETRO 2005, 1

³⁹“Firms Bullish About Spring Hiring but Grads Still Face Hurdles.”

⁴⁰“Most Major Businesses to Increase Recruitment.”

⁴¹Michio Sato, “Aggressive Hiring Policies Afoot as Economy Grows,” *The Daily Yomiuri*, March 10, 2006; and “Firms Bullish About Spring Hiring but Grads Still Face Hurdles.”

⁴²“The Haves and Have-Nots,” *The Asahi Shimbun*, February 7, 2006. and Takeshi Sasaki, “Insights into the World: Widening Rich-Poor Gap Threatens Our Democracy,” *The Daily Yomiuri*, April 3, 2006.

⁴³“Thailand to Become World’s 7th Largest Automobile Exporter,” *Xinhua General News Service*, November 4, 2005.

and METI 2005, 252).⁴⁴ Research in key areas like semiconductors is increasingly being done by researchers in other countries in Asia. Following a technology conference *The Nikkei Weekly* argued that the “increasing number of papers presented by Asian participants highlights the growing technological prowess of those countries.”⁴⁵

With trade increasingly taking place in components and manufacturing being done in a variety of countries, the simple picture of the flying-geese theory or the Hatch and Yamamura theory does not seem to apply. Technology is diffused among a number of countries, companies from many of which are engaging in their own foreign direct investment. Taiwanese, South Korean and Singaporean companies were fifth, sixth and seventh in terms of the amount of actual FDI in China in 2002 (Ministry of Commerce 2003). U.S. and European investment in the region is now extensive and this complicates any simple model of Japan leading the way in production. Integrated production seems to be the best way to describe the production that is now taking place in Japan and Asia and many of the companies that invest in Japan are deepening their connections in the region and producing components as part of this model of integrated production.

Other processes are also emerging that are outside the framework of integrated production. The use of these techniques might ultimately require a reevaluation of the model of integrated production, though their use will not be appropriate for all industries. The use of automation and cell style production sometimes results in production that is not integrated since the assembly of components is done in Japan. But this is not the only change that is occurring. Research and development is increasingly being done overseas and products adapted for local conditions. Many of the components come from overseas so this does not negate the concept of integrated production. It might, however, mean increasing local production to meet consumer needs.

Interestingly, it is within the framework of innovation in production and the integrated production model that the most mixed picture emerges for the Japanese economy. Production advances and integration are clearly benefiting Japanese companies and businesses which are making large amounts of money as a result of these advances and relatively strong global demand. But the meaning of the changes for the average employee is unclear. There is little likelihood that manufacturing employment in Japan will significantly recover and the jobs that are created will probably be high skilled positions from which many people are excluded. Further study, therefore, is needed on the impact that manufacturing has on job creation in the service sector and the types of service sector employment that are being created in general. Many of

⁴⁴Shuhei Yamada, “Taiwan’s IT Sector Show’s Buoyancy,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, May 17, 2004

⁴⁵“Asian Chipmakers Showcase Rapid R&D Advances at Meet,” *The Nikkei Weekly*, July 4, 2004.

these positions are temporary positions that do not provide the salary, security and benefits of full-time employment and this could have significant ramifications for Japanese society.

CONCLUSION

Foreign direct investment has not led to a permanent deindustrialization or hollowing out of industry in Japan. Production in the first quarter of 2006 exceeded the previous high in 1991. Rather a system of integrated production has emerged that is being strengthened through the investment of Japanese companies in production both in Japan and overseas. High value products are produced in Japan and low value production and assembly are done overseas. At the same time other production methods have emerged in Japan that are outside of the framework of integrated production. This system has not, and is not likely to lead to a massive increase in manufacturing employment in Japan. The Japanese economy will probably continue moving toward a service sector economy. The implications of this for Japanese workers and Japanese society need to be further studied.

CHART 1
JAPANESE OUTWARD DIRECT INVESTMENT BY REGION⁴⁶





CHART 2
MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT BY REGION⁴⁷



⁴⁶“Japan’s Outward FDI: Country and Region-Wise.” <http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/stats/statistics/>

⁴⁷“Outward Direct Investment: Industry and Region,” Ministry of Finance Japan. <http://www.mof.go.jp/english/e1c008.htm>

CHART 3
JAPANESE 2003/2004 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN ASIA BY COUNTRY⁴⁸






CHART 4
JAPANESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA⁴⁹



⁴⁸“Outward Direct Investment: Industry and Region.”

⁴⁹*Ibid.*

CHART 5
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION⁵⁰




2000=100

Data for 2006 are from the first quarter

⁵⁰*Ibid.*

CHART 6
PRODUCTION OF ELECTRICAL PARTS AND DEVICES AND
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT




2000=100

Data for 2006 is from the first quarter


Data for electronic parts and devices not available prior to 1998

CHART 7
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
BUSINESS EXPENDITURES AND RESEARCHERS EMPLOYED⁵¹




⁵¹Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau. *Japan Statistical Yearbook*.

CHART 8
MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT IN THE U.S. AND JAPAN,
1970-2005⁵²



⁵²U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employment, Hours, and Earnings from the Current Employment Statistics Survey." <http://www.bls.gov/iag/manufacturing.htm>; and Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau. *Japan Statistical Yearbook*.

CHART 9
 EMPLOYMENT IN ELECTRONIC PARTS AND VEHICLE
 ESTABLISHMENTS⁵³



⁵³Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan Statistics Bureau, *Establishment and Enterprise Census*. <http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/jigyoku/index.htm>.

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A Vision of the King: Kim Hong-do's Genre Paintings

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In the history of Korean art, genre paintings featured one of the major artistic movements in the eighteenth-century Korean art scene. In particular, Kim Hong-do's works are often pointed out to be exemplary in defining the pictorial and conceptual nature of eighteenth-century Korean genre paintings. His genre paintings, especially the *Danwon Genre Album* (檀園風俗畫帖), has been the focus of many scholarly discussions. In these studies the historical situation, motivation for production, and patronage circumstances that surrounded the *Danwon Genre Album* were extensively examined. However, their frequent attempts to associate Kim Hong-do's genre painting with the emergence of the middle class, as well as with the True-view culture in eighteenth century Korea make it hard to elucidate King Jeongjo's role in the development and popularity of Kim Hong-do's genre painting.¹

In this paper, Jabidaeryong-hwawon, a special court painting system founded by King Jeongjo, will be addressed as explicit evidence that King Jeongjo himself made a great contribution to the formation of the thematic and ideological features of Kim Hong-do's genre paintings. Through a careful iconographic analysis of this album in relation to King Jeongjo's patronage, a more comprehensive understanding of Kim Hong-do's *Danwon Genre Album* will be attained.

KIM HONG-DO, COURT, AND EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CHOSON DYNASTY

The Choson dynasty (1392-1910) was a neo-Confucian kingdom with political ideals that strongly emphasized the righteousness of government and the morality of individuals. Under the reign of Kings Yongjo (英祖, r. 1724-76) and Jeongjo (正祖, r. 1775-1800), the Choson dynasty heavily

¹There are two comprehensive studies of Kim Hong-do's works of art; Jun-hyeon Jin, *Danwon Kim Hong-do Yeongu (Study on Danwon Kim Hong-do)* (Seoul: Iljisa, 1999); and Chu-seok Oh, *Danwon Kim Hong-do* (Seoul: Yeolhwa dang 2000). For Korean genre painting in general, Pyongmo Chong, *Hanguk ui Pungsokhwa (Korean Genre Painting)* (Seoul: Hangil Art, 2000).

promoted the so-called Choson Confucianism by recognizing itself as the only legitimate Confucian kingdom in East Asia after the fall of Ming dynasty (Chong 1998, 124). This concept is frequently intertwined with a cultural phenomenon, the so called “Jingyeong (眞境 or 眞景) culture” or “True-view culture.”² The notion of “Jingyeong culture” is based on the idea of appreciating Korea’s own cultural and intellectual territory by acknowledging its superiority to Manchurian Qing culture.³

“Genre painting (風俗畫),” illustrating non-specific general figure-types engaged in the labor and play of daily life, came to occupy a great portion of the corpus of paintings in eighteenth-century Korea. Kim Hong-do’s *Danwon Genre Album* is often pointed out as an exemplary artistic expression of the eighteenth-century “True-view culture.” However, before we accept this seemingly legitimate conclusion, some questions still need to be answered. Was the popularity of genre painting in eighteenth-century Korea solely triggered by a sudden awareness of indigenous Korean culture and way of life? Did Kim Hong-do’s *Danwon Genre Album* expose the reality of common people’s life? To solve these puzzling questions, it will be necessary to take a close examination of eighteenth-century Korean court art, the patronage of King Jeongjo, and his cultural policy.

Kim Hong-do (1745-1810?) started his artistic career in the court during the reign of King Yeongjo. He was twenty-eight when he received his first commission from the court. It was a documentary painting to commemorate the forty-year reign of King Yeongjo (Oh 1998, 94). In 1773, Kim Hong-do was appointed as one of the imperial painters for the portraits of King Yeongjo and Crown Prince Jeongjo (Jin 1999, 308). In 1795, King Jeongjo offered Kim Hong-do with a post as magistrate, a post usually held only by the upper literati class (Haboush, 26). This is a good example to demonstrate close relationship between patron and artist.

As stated above, Kim Hong-do was a court painter gifted with the great artistic versatility and the strong artistic patronages of the king. In spite of his artistic flexibility, he generally adopted genre painting as his specialty. The *Danwon Genre Album* contributed to such an artistic fame.⁴

²King Jeongjo ordered officials to write the histories of Song dynasty and Ming dynasty (Chong, 128-130). For more information about “True-view culture,” Pong-hak Yu, “*Kyeonghwa Sachok Ui Sasang Gua Jinkyong Munhak*,” in *Uri Munhwa Ui Hwangkuemki Chinkyong Sidae (True-View Period: Golden Age of Korean Culture)*, Vol. 1, ed. Wan-su Choi (Seoul: Dolbegae, 1998).

³The most comprehensive encyclopedia – *Dongguk Munheon Bigo (Reference Compilation on Korea, 東國文獻備考)* – is a good example to explain this cultural phenomena. It was first undertaken upon King Yeongjo’s order and completed in 1770 (Haboush 1994, 26).

⁴It is generally agreed that the album was likely to have been executed in his mid-thirties, the period in which he had already established his artistic fame in and out of the court. Jun-hyen Jin, Chu-seok Oh, and Tae-ho Yi agree that the album was created at least after the *Journey Genre*

The *Danwon Genre Album* consists of twenty-seven leaves of which twenty-five leaves (28/23.9 cm) portray ordinary people engaged in various labors and daily activities, and the other two portray Taoist immortals. It is done on paper, with slight use of color. When it was purchased by the Royal Yi Museum in 1918, the leaves portraying Taoist immortals were attached to the front and back pages of the album.⁵ However, now these two leaves removed from the album are mounted separately. Because of their different subject matter, one may raise a question about whether these two album leaves of Taoist immortals were created at the same time with the rest of the album leaves. Kim Hong-do's recently discovered album with various subjects including genre scenes, Taoist figures, and bird and flowers, suggests that to arrange different subject matters in the one album is not far from his normal artistic choice.⁶

The lack of any substantial information about this album results in controversial, yet diverse scholarly discussions. First of all, the execution date of this album is still in ongoing discussions. Although most Korean scholars agree that the album was created in Kim Hong-do's thirties, the stylistic discrepancy of brushworks in each album leaf does not allow any definite conclusion. While some of the leaves are done in highly dynamic and articulate brushworks, others are executed in a more reserved manner. Among diverse theories to explain the different quality of brushworks, it is often suggested that less successful brushstrokes are definite evidence that Kim Hong-do created this album for a short time for a middle-class customer who did not hold sophisticated aesthetics.⁷

Scenes (行旅風俗圖), an eight-panel folding screen dating to 1778. Tae-ho Yi suggests even further that the album must have been made around 1781, the same year *Life of Modang* (慕堂平生圖), an eight-panel folding screen was created. According to his observation, a more mature and fluent brushwork employed in the *Danwon Genre Album* is similar to that of *Life of Modang*. Tae-ho Yi's conclusion mainly relies on the brushwork of the twenty-five album leaves. However, I believe that to compare the brushwork of the two album leaves of Taoist immortal to that of the *Eight-panel folding Screen of Taoist Figures* dating to 1776 is of inestimable help in assigning the undated *Danwon Genre Album*. Dynamic and angular brushwork employed to render the drapery and facial expression of Taoist immortals of the *Danwon Genre Album* displays a striking stylistic similarity with the brushwork employed in the 1776 *Taoist Figure screen*. Indeed, the angular, yet articulate brushwork creates a sharp edge between his earlier and later brushwork. It is evident in a later work, *The Star God of Longevity* dating to 1782 that Kim Hong-do's brushwork became much looser and smoother. I believe that the *Danwon Genre Album* must have been made no later than 1778.

⁵The provenance of the album remained unknown until it was purchased from Han-jun Cho by the Royal Yi Museum in 1918.

⁶Kim Hong-do's album was on sale in the Seoul Auction House on July, 2005. It belongs to a Japanese collector.

⁷In explaining the different quality of brushworks, Chu-seok Oh suggests two possibilities. First, Kim Hong-do, as a professional painter whose fame was already widely spread in his earlier

Whomever the patron was, many scholars in one way or another attempt to establish that a significant number of Kim Hong-do's genre paintings were created for middle class customers.⁸ Nevertheless, few scholars provide their definition of "middle class." According to Pierre Bourdieu, both working and middle classes were the victims of cultural and symbolic violence. In other words, these two classes were made to see the educational success or aesthetic taste of upper class as always legitimate. Also, he argues that taste is the practical affirmation of an inevitable difference (Bourdieu 2002, 57).

Pierre Bourdieu's socioeconomic theory might help us to understand Kim Hong-do's genre paintings as both a work of art and an aesthetic taste. It is said that Kim Hong-do's genre paintings were so popular that his house was always full of visitors who wished to acquire his works. Kim Han-tae (金漢泰, 1762-1823), was, in fact among those visitors. He was often mentioned as an explicit example of a middle-class customer. However, Kim Han-tae was a very rich merchant who accumulated enormous fortunes through international trading.⁹ Admitting that Kim Hong-do's genre painting and his fame were widely known throughout eighteenth-century Korea, it is hard to believe that his paintings were purchasable on the streets or stores for random shoppers.

period, might have received too many commissions in a short time to express his best skill. Second, Kim Hong-do might have created this album for middle class customers who did not hold high artistic expectation. On the other hand, Jun-hyeon Jin argues that less confident brushwork and awkward composition might have been done by one of Kim Hong-do's followers when some of the damaged album had to be repaired or replaced.

⁸Chu-seok Oh and Tae-ho Yi regarded the middle-class as the major consumer of genre paintings. Their notion is similar to the notion of Korean historians who defined eighteenth-century Korea as the early modern period. Regarding the economic condition and renovation of late Choson period, Korean and western scholars have different points of views. Western scholars like James Palais and Martina Deuchler argue that Korean literati's moral and ideological aversion to profit-seeking activities persisted, and the elite class and landlords did not promote the rise of mercantile activities. However, Korean scholars like Tae-jin Yi and Ho-chol Han agree that the social advancement of wealthy merchants and technical specialists played an important role in transforming Choson dynasty to an early modern society. Although I do not deny that mercantile activities were more active than previous centuries, I think that agriculture was still more promoted than mercantile activities. I believe that Kim Hong do's album reveals King Jeongjo's conservative economic policy that promoted agriculture while limiting mercantile activities. For further readings about late Choson economy, James Palais, *View on Korean Social Histroy* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1998); and Martina Deuchler, "Social and Economic Developments in Eighteenth-century Korea," in *The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse State of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750-1900*, ed. Anthony Reid (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1997), 317. I am indebted to a comprehensive summary of the two different points of view about eighteenth-century Korean economy to John S Lee's grant proposal, *Merchants as a Reflector of Change in Late Choson Korea, 1600-1876* (2005).

⁹Kim Hong-do painted an album, titled *Ulmyonyeon Album* for Kim Hang-tae on August, 1795 (Jun-hyeon Jin, 106). In fact, the *Ulmyonyeon Album* does not include genre scenes. Most of the album leaves are landscape paintings.

Moreover, it is doubtful that those who only had financial power with no high social status were the leading force of new artistic movements like genre painting. The taste of lower social classes tends to remain conservative rather than exploring new artistic trends. It is evident that a group of middle class painters, the so-called Yeohang painters in the nineteenth century, did not paint genre paintings, but rather landscape paintings in highly conservative manners.

What kinds of paintings were normally purchased by common people? A nineteenth century folk song, titled *Song of Hanyang* may solve this question. Describing a big art market at the Guangtong Bridge, the lyrics of this folk song testify that paintings usually sold in the market were *One Hundred Children*, *Ten Longevity Symbols*, *Eight-Views of Xiao-Xiang River*, and *Tilling and Weaving*. Interestingly enough, there is no mention about genre paintings (Kang 1999, 337-8). Based on its lyrics, it is hard to conclude that commoners were the major consumers of genre paintings.

THE THEMES OF DANWON GENRE ALBUM AND KING JEONGJO'S PATRONAGE

As the title suggests, the *Danwon Genre Album* deals with scenes of every day life. However, it does not necessarily mean that the painter was always directly inspired by the graphic reality of common people's lives. Starting his artistic career in the court, Kim Hong-do was trained to learn pictorial languages favored in the court art scene. Among the favored subjects in the court were Chinese didactic illustrative sources such as *the Pictures of Tilling and Weaving*, and the *Book of Odes* (Yi 1995, 7-8; Jin 1999, 317-27; Chong 2000, 117-148). These were extremely popular subjects in both Chinese and Korean courts for their political overtones.

Only six years after it had been made in the Kangxi court, the *Pictures of Tilling and Weaving* was introduced in 1697 to the Korean court by Cho Seok-jeong (1646-1715) following his visit to Beijing as an envoy (Chong, 131-2). The striking iconographic resemblance between the *Pictures of Tilling and Weaving*, and the *Danwon Genre Album* leaves clearly suggests that Kim Hong-do had multiple opportunities to observe this print set.

The illustration of *Book of Odes* was also highly appreciated in the Korean court for its didactic and narrative nature.¹⁰ Since the *Book of Odes*

¹⁰The *Book of Odes* is the most ancient collection of Chinese poetry, containing 305 pieces that date from the late Shang period to the late seventh century BCE. Composed in different regions of China and collected from various states in the Zhou empire, the poems were compiled into an anthology probably around 600 BCE. It was traditionally believed that Confucius (551-479 BCE) personally selected and edited the 305 poems from a larger group of some three thousand, but

was first introduced in Korea during the Goryeo period, it continued to be appreciated in the Choson court. It is recorded that during the Goryeo dynasty, the *Book of Odes* was illustrated on the folding screen behind the throne. In particular, the Seventh month of *the Odes of Bin* (鬪風七月), one of the three chapters of the Book of Odes, which sings about the life of ordinary people, became the most popular topic among Korean court painters.

King Sejong the Great (r. 1418-1450) ordered court painters to copy the *Ode of Bin*, but to replace Chinese cultural elements with those of Korea in order to reflect the real life of Korean common people and to celebrate their diligence and hard working life (Chong, 125-6). A tradition to transform Chinese literary and visual sources into Korean terms was already conducted in the early Choson court.

King Jeongjo strongly encouraged court painters to revive this tradition. It is evident in his comprehensive essay *Hongjaejeonseo* (弘齋全書).

Although observing everyday life of common people is a beautiful thing to do, it had not been conducted since the fall of Zhu dynasty. However, this great tradition is always conversant with the way of governing. If you want to know whether the governing is successful or not, there is no other way besides observing popular songs of common people.¹¹

In this essay, King Jeongjo asserted that understanding the life of common people was essential for being a good ruler. According to Gwan-sik Kang, this ideology inspired such literati scholars as Yun Du-seo (1668-1715) and Cho

evidence suggests that the anthology already existed of the tunes that originally accompanied the poems, and his enthusiasm for the book unquestionably helped to ensure its survival and subsequent recognition as one of the "Five Confucian Classics" in the Han period. During the burning of Books ordered by Qin Shihuangdi, the self-proclaimed "First Emperor" of China, the original text of the *Book of Odes* was destroyed and subsequently had to be reconstructed from memory. In the early Han period there were four versions of the restored text competing for acceptance among scholars: the Lu, Qi, Han, and Mao editions. However, it was the Mao arrangement, so called because of its association with the Han scholars Mao Heng and Mao Chang, that eventually prevailed to become the official text in the Eastern Han period. Usually referred to simply as the Mao Shi, the Mao arrangement of the *Book of Odes* divided the 305 poems into thirty chapters, grouped in four main sections named for the types of compositions they contained. The first and largest division of the Mao Shi is called the Feng (airs or winds), or guo Feng (Airs from the States). It occupies the first fifteen chapters, most of which are named for the individual states in the Zhou realm from which the poems were presumed to come. See: Julia K Murray, *Ma Hezhi and the Illustration of the Book of Odes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 5.

¹¹ 觀風察俗，卽三代之美制，自周道衰，而法不舉，然聲音之道，與政相通，古之君子入其境，而知其政者，無他在於察謠而。 King Jeongjo, "Ildeukron," *Hongjaejeonseo*.

Yeong-seok (1686-1701) to paint common people's everyday lives (Kang 2001, 577).¹²

King Jeongjo also promoted literati scholars to follow the writing style of *the Book of Ode*. He criticized the writing style of some of the officials such as Park Ji-won (1737-1805) for being 'contaminated' by the writing style of Chinese vernacular novels (Yi, 8). Such novels often deal with the various lives and customs of common people in a rather satirical tone. The so called "Restoration of Writing Style (文體反正)," referring to an incident in which King Jeongjo dismissed officials who had read Chinese vernacular novels during their service in the court, highlights both King Jeongjo's conservative cultural policy as well as his strong conviction to promote the revival of ancient Confucian classics.¹³ When paired with the notion of Korean genre paintings as a reflection of daily life, "Restoration of Writing Style" reveals a contradictory insight to the nature of Kim Hong-do's genre themes, because such a perception immediately contradicts King Jeongjo's conservative cultural policy. "Restoration of Writing Style" demonstrates that King Jeongjo did not promote reality to take over ideal, but rather ideal to take over reality.

In the *Spinning and Weaving* album leaf, Kim Hong-do portrayed a family, mother is spinning, father is weaving a mat, and their son reading a book, likely to be a Chinese classic. A lack of warmth and personal interaction among family members reveals that the primary focus of this leaf is entrenched in a conscious portrayal of cultural assumptions about the exemplary Confucian family.

The *Threshing Grains* and *Plowing* shared a similar iconography with the scenes of the *Picture of Tilling and Weaving*. However, Kim Hong-do modified this Chinese prototype in a humorous tone. In the *Threshing Grains*, on the right upper corner, is portrayed an upper class man reclined on a pile of rice straws, watching idly over his diligent servants. Another album leaf, *Washing Clothes* shows a young aristocrat who is hiding his gaze behind the fan to secretly watch women washing clothes. Some scholars argue that the boy's facial expression is criticizing economic and social discrepancy, and the voyeuristic gaze of a secret observer, as a voice of middle class who realized the hypocrisy of the social elite.

It seems doubtful, however, that Kim Hong-do, a highly recognized court painter with a close relationship with the king made such a bold attempt to criticize social problems. Cho Yong-seok (1686-1761), a prominent aristocratic painter depicted a similar scene in his work entitled the *Picture of*

¹²Cho Yeong-seok is often pointed out as a precursor of Kim Hong-do's genre paintings.

¹³In 1787, Kim Jo-sun and Yi Sang-hwang were taken their official title for reading a Chinese vernacular novel. The novel was immediately put into fire. See: Hyeon-mo Park, *Jengchiga* (Politician the King Jeongjo) (Seoul, Purunyeoksa, 2005), 162.

Plowing. This work shows an upper class man portrayed sitting on the low hill, looking down his servants who works in the field. The similar iconography of these paintings suggests that Cho Yong-seok and Kim Hong-do saw strict social hierarchy as an essential element to shape an ideal society. The strict hierarchical relationship between upper and lower classes is also apparent in works of Kim Deuk-sin (1754-1822), another court painter as well as a follower of Kim Hong-do.

Rather than a serious criticism of society, the boy's facial expression and the young aristocrat's voyeuristic gaze might be understood as a reflection of King Jeongjo's personal taste. According to a historical record, King Jeongjo ordered court painters to depict genre scenes to make everyone laugh (Kang, 260). *Village Classroom* may be a good example of genuine humor, as shows a teacher and his mischievous students. The boy at the center seems to have been scolded by the teacher for not having done his homework. One of his classmates secretly laughs at the boy's embarrassment. This album leaf shares iconographic and stylistic affinities with a Ming Chinese painter, Zhang Hong's work, titled *Village Schoolroom* (1577-after 1600, Allen Memorial Art Museum, Oberlin College).

The iconic and pictorial similarity between Kim's and Zhang's works should not be regarded to be coincidental. The eighteenth-century Korea saw the emergence of prominent art collectors such as Yi Ha-gon, Nam Gong-cheol (1760-1840), and Kim Guang-guk (1727-97) served as an artistic inspiration for eighteenth-century Korean painters. Nam Gong-cheol in his treaties on art entitled "Seohwabalmi (書畫跋尾)," recorded a list of his collections which spanned from Qin and Han rubbing to Qing orchid paintings (*Ibid.*, 305).¹⁴ Since Ming paintings generally occupied a large portion of eighteenth-century collector's collections, it is highly possible that Kim Hong-do saw similar kinds of Ming figure painting as Zang Hong's.

Wherever the pictorial source came from, as stated earlier, Kim Hong-do's humorous representation of genre scenes was certainly related to King Jeongjo's optimistic vision toward his rulership. A special court painter group called, Jabidaeryeong-hwawon (差備待令畫員, Painters-in-waiting) had a full charge of visualizing King's political and cultural policy.

King Jeongjo had Jabidaeryong painters take a special examination, called Nokchwijae (錄取才) in order to assess their artistic ability. Since their painting skill and interpretation of topics given by either the King himself or

¹⁴For account of eighteenth-century art collectors, see Son-pyo Hong, *Choson Sidae hoehwa saron (Discussion on the History of Late Choson Paintings)* (Seoul: Muye chulpansa, 1999), 231-254.

high ranking officials determined salary and reward, Jabidaeryong court painters had to strive to satisfy King's personal taste and preference.¹⁵

In 1789, King Jeongjo ordered court artists to paint the following four themes; Wrestling (山壇角觝), and Public musical performance (句欄設戲), Market place in Jongro (種街互市), on the January examination, and *Luncheon* (稻田午饌) on the June examination (Kang, 253-262). Although Kim Hong-do's album seems to have been created earlier than 1789, this record is still valid in associating the Nockchujae examination with Kim Hong-do's album. Kim Hong-do's high status and King Jeongjo's strong patronage in the court allowed him not to participate in this competitive examination until he was in financial trouble in the end of his life. It might be possible that his album was circulated and copied among court painters who wished to achieve high salary and reward since Kim Hong-do was the most favored court painter at that time. Many of Kim Deuk-sin's genre scenes that shared similar iconographic and stylistic elements with Kim Hong-do's suggest that court painters contemporary to Kim Hong-do closely followed Kim's style and copied his genre scenes.

Another frequently chosen topic in the Nockwijae examination was *The City of Supreme Peace* (Yi 2002, 255).¹⁶ *The City of Supreme Peace* dating to the late eighteenth-century in the National Museum of Korea, is discussed to have been based on the Chinese Ming copies of Qiu Ying's copies of *Peace Reigns over the River* (清明上河圖) (*Ibid.*, 255). Su-mi Yi points out that the details of the *City of Supreme Peace* were replaced with Korean cultural elements.

The iconographic similarity between this theme and Kim Hong-do's album reveals that they shared the same ideological values: to propagate a successful rulership. Happily working people without being concerned about politics illustrated in the *City of Supreme Peace* strongly suggests that Kim Hong-do's genre scenes in the album was intended to display King Jeongjo's successful rulership.

Street Scenes in a Time of Peace dating to 15th-16th century (ink and color on paper, Chicago Art Institute) done by an anonymous Chinese painter also exhibit a similar iconography with the *Danwon Genre Album*. And, two

¹⁵Jabidaeryong-hwawon (Painter-in-waiting) refers to a group of painters selected by examination to take full charge of important drawing and painting activities on royal order. Originally, the court painters of the Choson dynasty belonged to Dohwaseo (Painting Bureau). However Jabidaeryong painters were special court painters who worked in Gyujianggak. Gyujianggak is a royal research institute and library initially founded by King Sukjong (r. 1674-1720), but revived by King Jeonjo. Jabidaeryong-hwawon survived for about 100 years to the end of nineteenth century (Kang, 613).

¹⁶*The City of Supreme Peace* dating to the late eighteenth-century was based on the Chinese Ming copies of Qiu Ying's copies of *Peace Reigns over the River* (清明上河圖).

Qing court paintings such as *Supreme Peace and Happiness* (太平歡樂圖, a handscroll by Dong Qing (1772-1844)) and *Country and City Life* (村市生活圖, a handscroll by Zhou Kun (周鯤), active in 18th century) also portray common people engaged in various labors.

These three Chinese paintings strongly assert that genre scenes symbolized a peaceful and successful reign in both Chinese and Korean courts. In this respect, Kim Hong-do's *Danwon Genre Album* sharing many similar subject matter with this type of Chinese paintings, could be understood as a political vision of King Jeongjo who wished to restore an ideal Confucian kingdom.

There are some album leaves whose iconography cannot be found in either Chinese or Korean pictorial antecedents. These new subjects such as *Fishing at the Seashore*, *Preparing Tobaccos*, *Well*, *Marriage Procession*, *A Game of Pebbles*, and *Collecting Alms* are probably more significant in terms of understanding the dualistic aspects of Kim Hong-do's earlier genre paintings, didactic, yet life-reflecting. The dualistic aspects of Kim's genre themes, in fact mirror King Jeongjo's dualistic cultural policy that emphasized both the revival of ideal Confucianism and the glorification of Korea's own culture.

CONCLUSION

Genre paintings that display a peaceful reign and the care-free lives of common people continued to be painted by court artists throughout the end of nineteenth century, a century that encountered enormous political tensions and conflicts caused by frequent civil upheavals as well as invasions by foreigners. Such an ironic aspect of nineteenth-century Korean genre paintings produced in the court strongly addresses the ideological background of Kim Hong-do's genre themes.

A question regarding to who commissioned the *Danwon Genre Album* still remains unresolved. Although King Jeongjo was the strong patron of Kim Hong-do's genre paintings, there is no possibility that King Jeongjo commissioned this album. Maybe, such a question is not even necessary in terms of understanding the ideological foundation of eighteenth-century Korean genre paintings. The illustration of ancient Confucian classics, Nockwijae examinations, and King Jeongjo's conservative cultural policy are more significant in terms of understanding why Kim Hong-do made certain pictorial and aesthetic choice. As previously mentioned, it is evident that genre paintings were created by and for the court and cultural elites who wished to affirm their legitimate rulership.

The thematic and stylistic features of *Danwon Genre Album* were still influential on the works of later genre painters such as Kim Deuk-shin and Shin Yun-bok. These two later genre painters found Kim's album as their major artistic inspiration, but yet began to depict what they really saw in their surrounding reality, liberating their genre themes from didactic meaning. The thematic change of the nineteenth-century genre paintings reveals that the court was no longer the major patron of genre paintings in that period, which correspondingly saw the significant decline of genre paintings in both quality and quantity.

Kim Hong-do's *Danwon Genre Album* successfully visualized King Jeongjo's political and cultural vision that aimed to establish an ideal Confucian kingdom during his reign. Kim Hong-do's vivid and creative interpretation of Chinese illustrative source and visual antecedents lead us to believe what he depicted in his paintings really happened during King Jeongjo's reign for his successful rulership. In fact, many Korean historians often defined King Jeongjo's reign as the most prosperous era throughout the 500-year history of Choson dynasty.

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What Makes the Head Turn: The Narratives of Kānhaḍade and the Dynamics of Legitimacy in Western India

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This paper is a study of three medieval narratives that emerge from the region that is now known as Rajasthan. Composed over a period of four hundred years, these narratives recount the story of Alauddin Khalji's conquest of a small fort kingdom called Jālor, traditionally ruled by a branch of the Chauhan Rajputs known as the Sonīgarās. Each of these narratives belongs to a different genre and a different time in the history of the region¹. Yet each one tells the same core story with a few additions, omissions and modifications. In tracing the life of this narrative my aim is to understand the manner in which history and literature can interact with one another. How does the memory of an event get transformed through different patronage contexts and literary genres? What do these transformations tell us about the social history of the community or the region to which the narratives belong? In other words, it will be my endeavor to understand how the historical moment to which a piece of literature belongs can shape it in different ways. These differences, in turn, allow us insights into the constitution of the historical moment. In this particular case, the transformations in the narratives reveal an engagement with the historical processes that were at work at the regional and local level, namely, the emergence of regional polities and caste formation. The protagonists of the tale are Kānhaḍade, the Chauhan ruler of Jālor, his son Viramade, Sultan Alauddin Khalji and his daughter. The selections and omissions in each of the variants, as well as the manner in which the characters and their relationships are represented, speak of the ideologies and political dynamics of the times.

¹The three texts, in order of appearance, are: Padmanābh, *Kānhaḍade Prabandha*, ed. K.B. Vyas (Jaipur: Rājasthān Purātattva Mandir, 1953); Nainsī, *Muḥot Nainsī rī Khyāt*, ed. Badriprasad Sakaria (Jodhpur), 1960; and *Viramade Sonīgarā rī Vāt*, ed. and trans. Mahavirsingh Gahlot and Purishottamlal Menaria (Jalor: Shri Mahavir Shodha Sansthan, 1981).

I will begin by giving a brief overview of the major political and social processes that were at work in the subcontinent in general and western India in particular, during the four hundred years period that the texts span. I will then go on to discuss each of the individual narratives and their links with one another.

THE CONTEXT

One important process that was at work in this period was that of the emergence of regional polities. While the Sultans of Delhi did attempt to gain control over various parts of the subcontinent, they did not manage to maintain their hold over peripheral areas such as Bengal and Gujarat. By the fifteenth century most of the territories that they had conquered were emerging as states in their own right, owing nominal or no allegiance to the authority in Delhi. Many, like the Sultanates of Gujarat, Malwa and Deccan came to rival the Delhi Sultanate in prosperity, power and territories while other regions like Bengal, Orissa, Jaunpur and Gondwana in the east and Mewar and Marwar in the west also emerged as flourishing kingdoms. By the mid-fifteenth century these powers came to direct their imperial ambitions against each other and their immediate neighbors. Apart from the emergence of regional states, this period also saw the gradual emergence of a large number of local and sub-regional states in different parts of the subcontinent. Territorial rivalries were thus operative at various levels. The kingdom of Jālor for instance not only lay on the frontiers of the emerging polities of Gujarat and Marwar, it was also faced with local rival groups such as the Lohāni Afghans who were important contestants for the Jālor fort before they migrated to Pālanpur in the seventeenth century.

Another related development was the formation of new caste groups, which converged with the political processes of state formation. Diverse groups began to make claims over an exalted *ksatriya* status and thus a place in the larger *varṇa* hierarchy. In the region comprising Sind, Rajasthan, Gujarat and central India, this process took the form of "Rajputisation." This process was never really complete and often contested. However, from its early stages, the emphasis on descent, real or invented, became a significant factor in this process. In this regard the fabrication of linkages with the formulaic "thirty-six royal clans," other already well-known warrior heroes, the association with the mythical dynasties of the sun and the moon and other Puranic elements assumed significance as the emerging Rajput groups claimed their descent from these. Values such as courage and loyalty to one's clan also became defining elements of the process. More significantly, these values and norms would continuously re-shape and re-assert themselves in

periods when political authority, regional and imperial hierarchies were constantly in flux.

It is against this background of the history of Jālor, located within the wider history of medieval South Asia, that we must explore the relationship of the narratives with their patronage contexts.

THE KĀNHAḌADE PRABANDHA

Let me begin with oldest of the three narratives, the *Kānhaḍade Prabandha*. This text was composed in c.1455 CE (nearly a hundred and fifty years after Khalji's attack on Jālor in c. 1311 CE) by a Nāgar *brāhmaṇa*² poet at the Jālor court, called Padmanābha. The *Kānhaḍade Prabandha* is a typical example of *prabandha-kāvya*, a biographical literary genre prevalent in western India from about the thirteenth century, which seemed to have consciously drawn inspiration from the Puranic tradition. The *prabandhas* were often composed in the languages current in the region, making frequent use of classical idioms. One particularly rich tradition of such narratives comes from the Jains, especially the Śvetambaras, who wrote the biographies of prominent lay patrons of the religion as well as of the *ācāryas*. The *Kānhaḍade Prabandha*, however, belongs to another, rarer tradition of *prabandha* narratives – one that was composed at the courts of the Rajput chieftains by *brāhmaṇa* poets.

The *Kānhaḍade Prabandha*, as noted earlier, tells the story of Alauddin Khalji's conquest of Jālor. It begins with the Khalji conquest of Gujarat and an elaborate description of the destruction of the Somanātha temple, culminating in the capture of the Śiva idol by Ulugh Khan, Alauddin Khalji's general. Prior to sending his army to Gujarat, Alauddin had asked Kānhaḍade of Jālor to allow them peaceful passage through his lands. The latter refused on the ground that it would be against his *dharma* to let an army, notorious for the destruction of *brāhmaṇas*, cows and women, to pass through his territories. Thus, after the victory over Gujarat, an inflated Ulugh Khan decided to take his revenge on Kānhaḍade, who had dared to challenge the Sultan's authority. In the battle that followed, Kānhaḍade managed to gather the support of the "thirty-six royal clans," rescued the idol of Somanātha, and freed all those who had been taken prisoner during Ulugh Khan's siege. While Kānhaḍade was hailed as the incarnation of Kṛṣṇa, the furious Alauddin sent another army to destroy him. When this attempt also failed, the Sultan himself led an army to Jālor. En route they were challenged by Sātal, Kānhaḍade's nephew, who, according to the poet, valiantly defended his fort of Siwānā. He

²The Nāgar *brāhmaṇas* were a group of *brāhmaṇas* who hailed from Vadnagar in Gujarat. A number of poets, scholars and administrators belonged to this caste group and were active in the courts of Gujarat and Rajasthan throughout the medieval period and later.

only lost the battle against the imperial forces because he saw a vision of Alauddin Khalji as an incarnation of Śiva. Despite the realization that killing the Lord himself was impossible, Sātal continued to fight in the true warrior's spirit and refused the emperor's offer of the governorship of Gujarat in lieu of peace.

After the seven-year siege of Siwānā, the armies moved to Jālor. However, the Sultan's daughter Pirojā now decided that she was in love with Viramade, Kānhaḍade's son, and wished to marry him. She explained to her father that she had been his wife for the last six births and had followed her *sati-dharma* or the true path of the virtuous wife. Therefore, she must be allowed to unite with him in this life too. The Sultan was left with no choice but to request Viramade's hand in marriage for his daughter. But this offer was spurned by Viramade on the ground that it was a ruse by the Sultan to gain control over their territories. Viramade vowed that he would never see Pirojā's face again (as she had sinned in her past births). The battle continued with no end in sight. Pirojā also reiterated that Kānhaḍade was an incarnation of Viṣṇu and that the Sultan was an *asura*, or demon. Not particularly alarmed by this suggestion, Alauddin wanted to know when he would be freed from his present birth and she informed him that since he was a devotee of Śiva in his past life, he would now attain heaven. Finally after a series of protracted battles, the Jālor Chauhans and other Rajput allies lost to Alauddin. Kānhaḍade and Viramade died fighting. Viramade's disembodied head was carried in a basket decorated with flowers to Delhi and presented before the princess. But the head turned away, thus keeping to the warrior's word even in death. Pirojā immolated the head and drowned herself in the Yamunā. We are told that the couple was united in heaven. The *prabandha* ends with the poet describing the various *punya*, or other-worldly benefits that those who heard or recited this account would gain. In the other two narratives the basic story remains the same with a number of modifications.

The political scenario in mid-fifteenth century western India, when Padmanābha composed the *Kānhaḍade Prabandha*, was rather volatile. His patron, the Chauhan ruler Akhairāja belonged to a lesser Rajput lineage. Akhairāja was in a precarious position as his branch of the Chauhans faced threats not only from immigrant Afghans, but also from other Rajput ruling houses. Under such circumstances, Akhairāja would have been in need of a number of image-building and legitimating devices in order to assert his authority in a region where both his territories and the pre-eminence of his clan were under threat. The patronizing of "histories" of heroic ancestors to assert one's own superiority was a common practice among the medieval Rajputs. The *Kānhaḍade Prabandha* can be viewed as one such legitimating device that celebrated the patron's virtues by drawing on his heroic ancestry.

In other words, Padmanābha told the story of Kānhaḍade in order to strengthen the position of Akhairāja, who was the former's fifth descendant. Throughout the narrative the poet projects his patron's lineage as being "pure and virtuous." Viramade, like his father before him, embodies the importance of maintaining this purity, which is an essential feature of the Chauhan *kula* or clan. This is exemplified when Viramade's severed head is carried on a platter to the princess who wishes to marry him, it turns away from her. Marrying a *turak*, a term that was often used to refer to Muslims in this period, would bring unprecedented shame to his blemish-free lineage. The rejection, on the other hand, upholds the superiority of the lineage even in death.

For Padmanābha, Kānhaḍade is the ideal king who belongs to this noble lineage. In his kingdom, whose splendor is equal to that of Indra's court, everyone is well provided for and protected (Padmanābha 1953, 167). Kānhaḍade is also an ardent protector of *brāhmaṇas* and cows and thus earns the approval of Padmanābha, himself a *brāhmaṇa*. He interweaves the account of Kānhaḍade's virtuous acts with lengthy explanations of the moral values attached to various brahmanical concepts such as *karma* and *punya* throughout the narrative. This element of didacticism was an essential constituent of the *prabandha* genre. Perhaps, it also served to provide brahmanical sanction to the patron Akhairāja's rule, and to remind him of his duties towards the *brāhmaṇas*. He too, like his ancestor before him, could be an "ideal king" by following the prescribed norm. The choice of *prabandha* as a genre for this narrative also indicates a quest for legitimacy as it was in wide use by the twelfth century in Gujarat and Rajasthan for the purpose of constructing lineages of ideal kings, incorporating both historical and mythical figures (Arai 1998). Following the conventions of the genre, the *Kānhaḍade Prabandha* also draws from the didactic mythological Puranic tradition and attempts to establish the status of its royal patron, his ancestors, and his successors as perfect rulers.

Further, apart from being a zealous protector of the *brāhmaṇas*, Kānhaḍade is also the rescuer of the Somanātha idol from captivity of the *turaks*. The memory of the rescue of Somanātha is particularly significant in this regard; although Vaishnavism had started becoming popular in Gujarat, Somanātha remained an important temple and pilgrimage site in the region. As the rescuer of this important idol, and by implication of Śiva himself, Kānhaḍade also established his sovereignty like many before him. In this role as the rescuer of Somanātha he is therefore granted the status of being an incarnation of Kṛṣṇa or Viṣṇu and has the blessings of his family goddess Aśāpuridevī and the consorts of Somanātha himself. He also has the ability to garner the military aid of the "thirty-six royal clans," who are ardent supporters of the cause, at very short notice. The battles between them and the

turaks are described in great detail as Puranic battles between the Chauhans as the *deva*, or god, and Alauddin and his army as the evil *asuras*.

However, mere achievement of victory over the enemy is not a sufficient guarantee of political legitimacy. Kānhaḍade carves out five idols from the single one that he has rescued and establishes them in different parts of the region (Padmanābha 1953, 62). Thus, as Richard Davis points out, the aim of the reappropriation is only partly to restore Somanātha as an eternal sacred site (Davis 1999, 193). Kānhaḍade appears to be more concerned with borrowing the prestige of Somanātha and gaining Śiva's manifest presence in order to reinforce the autonomy of his own kingdom (*Ibid.*). The episode of the rescue of Somanātha in fact holds a place of great significance in the *Kānhaḍade Prabandha* as it becomes the main cause of the battle between Kānhaḍade, the ruler of a small, local kingdom, and Alauddin, the great Sultan of Delhi. As the descendant of the rescuer of the Somanātha idol, the patron Akhairāja's sovereignty and importance are also established through this episode.

This kind of drawing from the past was a common feature in several texts produced in the lesser Rajput houses that had to deal with intense territorial rivalries and frequent military conflicts in this period. From the mid-fifteenth century onwards, several of the newer Rajput lineages consolidated their power and established their legitimacy by claiming genealogical (and thereby political) descent from the lineages of the past. The use of the memory of these by the bards and court poets thus became a convenient instrument by which the patrons' legitimacy could be reiterated in politically uncertain times.

THE MUNHOT NAINSĪ RĪ KHYĀT

Two hundred years after Padmanābha's composition, c. 1648-1660 CE, the Kānhaḍde story was re-told by Nainsī, but with some variations. A *khyāt* is a clan history including lists of ruler's names, their descendants, and descriptive stories about important events relating to the history of the clan or lineage. Nainsī used both oral and written sources to describe the stories of the different Rajput houses, particularly those of his patrons, the Rathors.

When Nainsī composed his *Khyāt* in the mid-seventeenth century, the Sonigarā Chauhans had accepted the overlordship of the Rathor rulers of Marwar. Similarly, several of the Rathor chieftains had come to accept the service and the overlordship of the Mughals. Thus multiple layers of loyalties were at work here as a local power owed its allegiance (like several others of its kind) to a greater, regional Rajput ruling lineage, which in turn owed

allegiance to the imperial authority at Delhi. The Rajputs were also bound by ties of loyalty to their own clansmen and branches of their own lineage.

By the seventeenth century, the assertion of legitimacy through the genealogical tradition had become a common practice among groups who came to be recognized as Rajputs. Nainsī's account also presents detailed genealogies of several ruling houses of Rajasthan and Gujarat, including the Sonigarā Chauhans. His list, however, lacks the emphasis on the purity of lineage that is articulated by Padmanābh. The latter does not give an elaborate list of his patron's ancestors, but the significance of the *kula* and the preservation of its sanctity are almost an obsession with the fifteenth century court poet. Further, in the *Khyāt*, the unconcealed brahmanical overtones are missing, as its Jain author understandably did not find it necessary to promote these.

Again, while in the *Kānhaḍade Prabandha* the victory of the demon-like Sultan over the godly Rajputs is explained away by the motif of Khilji being an incarnation of Śiva, the Chauhans constantly challenge and defy the enemy despite this other-worldly disadvantage. In the *Khyāt*, on the other hand, we are faced with two contradictory aspects of the Chauhan-Sultan relationship. Nainsī's *Kānhaḍade* is also an incarnation of Viṣṇu in his role as the rescuer of Somanātha. However, this victory is completely forgotten in all his subsequent encounters with the Sultan. The same Sultan who had been defeated during the Somanātha battle now appears formidable in every way, and the Chauhans are at pains to avoid any direct conflict with him. It is only when the latter requests Viramade's hand in marriage for his daughter, thereby posing a threat to the Rajputs' territories, that the relationship deteriorates. Once again, when the Rajput prince is killed, his disembodied head is brought before the princess, who promises to immolate herself on her lover's pyre. This time the head turns towards her, thus accepting her as worthy of being a virtuous Rajput wife, despite being born of a Muslim. Even if the kingdom has perished, the Sultan's daughter's appropriation into the Rajput fold has given the Chauhans the ultimate victory over their imperial enemies.

Despite similarities in the basic narrative, Nainsī's portrayal of *Kānhaḍade*'s story takes on a distinctive form in comparison with the *Kānhaḍade Prabandha*. Thus, against the background of Jālor's political history, the differing authorial concerns are evident. Nainsī's patrons were the Rathor rulers of Marwar, who were by now a significant ruling power in the region. They were also important regional feudatories of the Mughals whose dominance was imposed throughout Rajasthan in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries. Unlike his predecessor, then, Nainsī is cautious about portraying his protagonists as openly challenging rulers of Delhi. The assertion of their own

histories and traditions through the production of texts like Nainsī's *Khyāt* during this period can thus be viewed as a means by which the regional elite adapted to the presence of the powerful imperial authority. The Kānhaḍade story is one of a whole range of such stories of a pantheon of Rajput heroes, whose descendants continued to be prominent rulers themselves, or important feudatories of a major Rajput ruling lineage.³

THE VIRAMADE SONIGARĀ RĪ VĀT

In the *Viramade Sonigarā rī Vāt*, the Kānhaḍade story takes on a far more localized form. The pan-regional motifs of Gujarat, Somanātha and even Siwānā are absent, as are the elaborate genealogical descriptions. The structure of the narrative is also different in that it is interspersed with short, sometimes seemingly disconnected episodes and the constant use of local idioms. Here the key protagonist is Viramade, Kānhaḍade's son. Like so many local heroes of Rajasthan, he is born of a divine being, but there is no reference to him being an incarnation of a Puranic divinity himself. The narrative is reflective of a much more localized political interest, telling the tale of the relationships between different lineages and clans within the region. Similarly, the idea of *vair* or revenge for the blood of one's own kin, which was an important feature of local Rajput politics, is reflected in a number of episodes.

Here too, like in the *Khyāt*, the Chauhans make every effort to dissuade the emperor about the marital alliance before they go on to make elaborate preparations to protect their own, local territories. They also suggest that Alauddin should establish marital ties with the rulers of Rome, Syria and other foreign lands, thus furthering his unquestionable superiority over the Rajputs. This was a period in which Mughal authority had been established all over the region. The negotiations of the regional/local elite with this new structure of authority was marked by acceptance and defiance, as well as a struggle to maintain their own hold over traditionally held territories. The departures in the *Khyāt* and the *Vāt* are revealing in this regard. In keeping with the Rajput code of conduct, the Kānhaḍade of these two narratives is a loyal servant to the imperial authority, so long as the imperial authority does not intrude upon his territorial and political domains.

The *vāt* genre of Rajasthan was an oral story-telling tradition characterised by a considerable amount of fluidity. Entertaining an audience, especially at the village level, appears to be one of the primary aims of the

³See also: Ramya Sreenivasan, "The 'Marriage' of 'Hindu' and 'Turak': Medieval Rajput Histories of Jalor," *The Medieval History Journal* 7, no. 1 (2004): 99.

storyteller, who was often an itinerant bard. He was at liberty to add or subtract from the narrative as he wished. Each *vāt*, therefore, had several authors, who created their own narrative depending upon their particular situations. I have used for this study one such version of the *Viramade Sonigarā rī Vāt*.⁴ It was put to writing sometime towards the end of the eighteenth century. Internal evidence from the *Kānhaḍade Prabandha* also reflects that it was recited before a wide audience, perhaps within the Jālor fort where people of several different castes seemed to have resided.⁵ That the narrative was meant for public rendition is also supported by the fact that it is replete with didactic verses where the poet promises that listening to and reciting the deeds of Kānhaḍade would bring a person a number of this- and other-worldly benefits or *phala*. The transmission contexts of the two narratives thus appear to be similar. Further, the basic narrative itself reflects several similarities with the *Khyāt*, which in turn draws greatly upon the *Prabandha*. The Kānhaḍade story thus seems to have had several levels of transmission with constant exchanges taking place between the oral and the written versions.

Unlike the *Kānhaḍade Prabandha*, *Viramade Sonigarā rī Vāt* lacks a single author as well as a formal courtly patron. Its patrons were the local audiences who had by this period assimilated a certain notion of “Rajput valour and heroism.” Thus, while *Viramade Sonigarā rī Vāt* interacts with more formal narratives of the *Kānhaḍade Prabandha* and the *Muṅhot Nainsī rī Khyāt* in many ways, it eventually appears to serve the needs of *this* patron, that is, an entertainment-seeking audience.

EPILOGUE

Thus, as it moved through different genres and contexts the story of the Chauhan Rajput Kānhaḍade’s encounter with Alauddin Khalji was transformed. It has not been possible to give a more detailed account of these transformations in this brief essay. Suffice it to say, however, that in

⁴It is interesting to note that Mahavirsingh Guhlot, who has written a “personal note” for this version, in fact recalls that he himself had heard an extremely entertaining version of the tale in the late nineteen forties in the Jalor fort itself. The writer of the preface, Omkarsingh, a retired I.A.S. officer, also recalls that he had often heard the story as a child, told by a popular bard who visited his village every few years. Thus, it appears that the tale was told and retold in and around the villages in the Jalor area until quite recently.

⁵In his description of Jalor Padmanābh mentions, in a series of about fifty verses, a whole range of groups that resided in and around the fort, including thirty-six *rājavamsas*, *vāṇiyās* trading in different commodities, craftsmen, religious men (*yatis* and *yogīs*), *bhāts* and *cāraṅs* – people from the “eighteen *varṇas*” (Padmanābha 1953, 164-174).

each case the manner in which the Chauhans and the Sultan are portrayed as interacting with one another, the representation of the destruction and rescue of the Somanātha temple, or the response of the disembodied head to the princess's overtures, are reflective of the conventions of the genre and the world view of the social group to which the particular narrative belonged. In each case the need of the patron was different and therefore the manner in which the story of the event was told was also different.

Narratives such as the *Kānhaḍade Prabandha*, Nainsī's *Khyāt* and the *Vāt* were not composed with the intention of recording "historical facts." They were literary works that spoke of a historical event. Yet if located within their proper historical contexts, it is possible to use these pieces of literature to illuminate the social history of the region, period or community to which they belonged. These particular narratives, for instance, tell us about the strategies which a regional/local power may have used to negotiate the more powerful polities of Delhi. They also give us an insight into the manner in which medieval authors perceived religious and social identities of their patrons, the Rajputs or their so called enemies, the *turaks*/Muslims. The narratives thus closely interact with the historical moment and further the historian's understanding of it.

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