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Southern Political Science Association

Conflict and Harmony in Human Affairs: A Study of Cross-Pressures and Political Behavior.
by Peter W. Sperlich

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The Journal of Politics, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Nov., 1972), pp. 1312-1314

Published by: [Cambridge University Press](#) on behalf of the [Southern Political Science Association](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2128950>

Accessed: 04/02/2014 14:27

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dices provide background on research design, measurement, and models, as well as further details on the Turkish data.)

In short, the Roosees have produced a quite valuable study which throws new light on the dynamics of social and political change in Turkey. Their findings command the attention of students of three major concerns in the discipline: modernization, patterns of elite recruitment and circulation, and organizational behavior.

FRANK TACHAU, *University of Illinois at Chicago Circle*

Conflict and Harmony in Human Affairs: A Study of Cross-Pressures and Political Behavior. By PETER W. SPERLICH. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1971. Pp. xii, 256. \$8.95.)

In the contentious disciplines of the social sciences, much recent intellectual conflict has concerned the subject of conflict. While conflict about conflict, which might for brevity's sake be referred to as conflict², has been of explicit concern to more sociologists than political scientists, this may reflect simply the greater intensity of unconscious and implicit commitment to the so-called consensus model among scholars in the latter discipline.

Comes Péter Sperlich, who argues persuasively that such commitment has not been limited to the devotees of systems analysis and others who clearly think of stasis or equilibrium as the "normal" state of human relations. On the contrary, some of those who have most explicitly recognized the *existence* of conflict have nevertheless refused to consider such conflict acceptable. Their theories have dealt with conflict, to be sure, but only in the hope or expectation of ending or controlling it. Harold Lasswell, David Truman, and Herbert Simon, among others, are so criticized by Sperlich, together with an even longer list of brethren from sociology. An even more apposite case than those cited by the author is that of Karl Marx, who deals explicitly with the phenomenon of class conflict—

but only in order to discuss the means by which such conflict is to end.

But Sperlich is not content to deal with a general problem in general terms and on theoretical grounds. Indeed this portion of his argument is largely confined to an appendix. Drawing on an impressive range of behavioral studies, he concludes that, contrary to traditional views, conflict, cross-pressures, and dissonance may not lead to ineffectiveness, withdrawal, or psychological damage. Rather, conflict can be stimulating and useful and may lead to activity, including political activity, of which the individual would otherwise be incapable.

This reviewer remains skeptical of some of the work in psychology on which the author in part relies. And at times Sperlich allows himself drastically to overstate his case.

Tension-reduction and search for low tension states, far from being the sole law of human behavior, appears [sic] to be a characteristic of "underdeveloped" and "pathological" personalities. . . . [T]he more authoritarian a person, the greater his need for a consistent cognitive system. (Pp. 55-56.)

Despite these defects, the case appears effectively made that "the final elimination of human conflict" and "zero tension growth" are not the slogans of an open society or a sound social science. People differ, probably inevitably, in their interests and in their values, and where such differences exist, conflict exists also. The problem is not how to eliminate conflict but how to use it.

The empirically based revision of the cross-pressure model to which Sperlich devotes several chapters is worth the attention of students of electoral behavior and attitude formation. It certainly deserves further testing. But even if such testing should reveal weaknesses not presently evident in Sperlich's effort to undertake a specific redirection of our thinking on the subject of cross-pressures, this would still be an important book. His incisive criticism of the unthinking acceptance of harmony, equilibrium, and uniformity as universal standards, departure from which is deviant if not evil, constitutes a major contribution to political analysis, not because the argument is so original, but because in its earlier versions the

argument has been neglected by too many political scientists. Hopefully Sperlich's book will help to disrupt that pattern.

MURRAY CLARK HAVENS, *University of Texas at Austin*

French Nuclear Diplomacy. By WILFRED L. KOHL. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. Pp. 384. \$12.50.)

Official public utterances are often ambiguous, have elements of pretense and are usually slanted or altered for political purposes. On the other hand, if policy pronouncements are confirmed by actions taken by a government in relation to the statements of its leaders, then one can feel more confident that the policy goals advanced are actually the true ones.

Wilfred Kohl matches the policy statements of deGaulle with the actions of the French government in nuclear weaponry. A clear picture of Gaullist objectives emerges: French leadership of Western Europe and the restoration of France's power and influence in world affairs. The first could only be achieved by replacing American influence in Europe, and the second could only be achieved by sharing American influence outside of Europe.

Wilfred Kohl argues that there is a basic contradiction between the two visions of de Gaulle: (1) to be the leader of a group of confederate European states that could arbitrate "between the Soviet and Anglo-Saxon camps" and (2) to achieve *grandeur* for France, collaborating on a global scale with the West and the East "without ever accepting a position of dependence." "French nuclear armament was an important element in both of these visions." (P. 128.)

The contradiction shows up in the frustrating efforts of de Gaulle to exploit nuclear weapons in France's diplomacy. To woo Germany, France had to offer the bait of nuclear collaboration. But this de Gaulle was unwilling to do. Hence only hints and deceptions. To demonstrate France's "grandeur" and independence, de