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**Sculpting Turkish Nationalism: Atatürk Monuments in Early
Republican Turkey**

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**Sculpting Turkish Nationalism: Atatürk Monuments in Early
Republican Turkey**

by

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To my mother and father,
In loving memory of Sharon Bařtuđ

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Sculpting Turkish Nationalism: Atatürk Monuments in Early Republican Turkey

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Today every city and town in Turkey has at least one monument of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), the founding father of the Turkish Republic, located in one of its most important public spaces. All private and state primary, middle and high schools have at least one bust of him in front of which students have to line up every Monday morning and Friday evening to chant the national anthem. Apart from statues and busts, his portraits and pictures are hung in every office in state buildings and in most private offices. His name has been bestowed upon boulevards, parks, stadiums, concert halls, bridges, forests, and, more importantly, on educational institutions.

Among these many public expressions, the monumental statues of Atatürk erected before he died exemplify one of the most effective instruments of the elite-driven modernization in early republican Turkey (1923-1938). These monuments reveal the ways in which Atatürk and his political elites attempted to establish a modern and secular sense of identity as well as a new official public culture and official history, mainly constructed through Atatürk's *Nutuk*, the speech which he delivered in 1927.

Nutuk was Atatürk's public defense of his policies during the military and diplomatic struggle for independence in Anatolia between 1919 and 1923. It has not only become a remarkable and extremely influential text both in Turkish and foreign historiographies but also has been the source for visualizing the official interpretation of the struggle for independence in Turkey to the present day. Thus, all the monuments of the early Republic stand for such orthodox interpretations of history, emerging defensive Turkish nationalism and national identity while symbolizing the closure of the predating Ottoman Empire. Codified within this new national identity are the elements of secularization and racial homogenization of the society, a western cult *of* the "Orient" in the Orient, and an effort to control and limit the cultural and religious hegemony of Islam in the official public culture of early republican Turkey.

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INTRODUCTION

Today, in Turkey and around the world, scholars in every discipline are engaged in critically re-examining Turkish modernity from a variety of political and academic perspectives. For example, in 1994 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology held a conference entitled "Rethinking Turkish Modernity," where scholars from many disciplines presented papers assessing Turkey's experience with modernization. In 1997, Sibel Bodogan and Resat Kasaba, two leading Turkish scholars of architectural and political history, edited fourteen of the conference papers. *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* became a cornerstone in the literature of Turkish national identity and modernity.¹ The essays represent a wide range of academic disciplines, from the humanities and social sciences to art, architecture, and cultural studies.

Each of the essays in *Rethinking Modernity* has since become a dissertation or a full-length book, deepening and broadening the analysis of the central issues of the 1994 conference. In addition to making a sizable contribution to the critical analysis of Turkey's modernization, the papers in *Rethinking Modernity* and their subsequent expansions have rapidly accelerated the academic exploration of the relationship between outdoor spaces and national identity in Turkey. For example, Sibel Bozdogan extended her essay, *The Predicament of Modernism in Turkish Architectural Culture: An Overview*,² into a book called *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural*

¹ Bozdogan, Sibel and Kasaba Resat, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997).

² Ibid, 133-156.

*Culture in the Early Republic.*³

Despite this burgeoning interest in the relationship between outdoor spaces and national identity, the role of monumental statuary in the formation of Turkish nationalism has not been well studied. Bozdogan's pioneer work best exemplifies this. A designed environment includes human-made structures in a variety of forms, such as buildings, open spaces, streets, landscape, statues, monuments and parks. Bozdogan provides the reader with a cultural history of early republican Turkish architecture by successfully analyzing each of these forms. Although she includes two pages on the statuary of early republican Turkey at the very end of her book, she does not engage in a spatial and political analysis of the most essential aspect of Turkish republican architecture: the introduction of the figurative statues and monuments of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk).⁴

Perhaps Bozdogan does not pay attention to statuary because architectural history in Turkey does not recognize statuary as a valid subject of interest. Afife Batur, a well-known Turkish architectural historian, argues that statuary never became part of Ottoman architecture (because of Islam's prohibition against representational imagery) and so there is nothing to teach and write about.⁵ Unlike Afife Batur, Ferit Ozen, the director of the department of Painting and Statues at Mimar Sinan University,⁶ argues

³ Ibid.

⁴ Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) is the founding father of Turkish republic. Mustafa Kemal adopted the surname Atatürk, the Father of Turks, after the Surname Law passed in the assembly in June 1934, which made the registration of fixed names mandatory. For the Surname Law and the way in which it was received and mediated by ordinary citizens, see Meltem Türköz, "Looking at State-Society Boundaries through Turkish Family Name Narratives" (Ph.D. diss. Pennsylvania State University, 2005). Hereafter he will be called Mustafa Kemal unless specified.

⁵ From interview with Afife Batur, April 2004.

⁶ The first fine arts university in Turkey establish in 1882 by the famous Ottoman painter Osman Hamdi Bey

that the reason for the absence of statuary in the architectural history in Turkey is that the practice of architecture came to represent only the study of buildings, that is, structures that have interior space.⁷ Gunkut Akin, the chair of the department of the Architectural History at Istanbul Technical University, agrees with Ozen and claims that it has something to do with the way the study of architectural history has changed worldwide. "At the turn of the 20th century," he states, "architects were interested in statues and statue-like buildings such as Einstein's tower in Germany--but not any more. This is the reason why expressionist architecture ended at the turn of the twentieth century in Turkey and in the world, and modern architecture became dominant in both simultaneously."⁸ Statuary is considered ornamental or even 'decorative', and, thus secondary in the order of importance when it comes to the design of a building.

This is the second reason why Bozdogan does not go into a spatial and political analyses of statuary in early republican Turkey. This exclusion led Bozdogan to fail to realize the relatively more important role of statuary in the nation building process of the Kemalist modernization program than the role of changing architectural styles, such as the shift from the National Architecture Renaissance (1908-1927) to the Modern Movement (1931-1938). The first chapter of the present work addresses this very issue, following a brief history of the Turkish experience of modernity in terms of its nation building process, some key ideological fault lines in Turkish society throughout the Republic, and the role of the state in shaping a national Turkish historiography. I argue that even though the Modern Movement was foreign to the people of the Republic

⁷ From interview with Ferit Ozsen, April 2004.

⁸ From interview with Gunkut Akin, April 2004.

because of a lack of reference to Turkified Ottoman forms, the difference between the cultural programs of the regimes before the late 1920s and after was the introduction of the figurative monumental statues of Mustafa Kemal.

The National Architecture Renaissance describes the architectural style that was financially and politically supported by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) during the late Ottoman Empire (1908-1918). The CUP launched economic and cultural reforms and programs and changed architecture in order to nationalize the masses and to make their political power visible. The rule of the CUP lasted a decade. With the collapse of the Empire in 1918, a new political elite emerged led by Mustafa Kemal. Known as Kemalists, they proclaimed the Turkish Republic in 1923. The new political elite continued the reforms and programs of the CUP even though they became political rivals during the early republic. During this transitional period Mustafa Kemal became the complete dictator of the nascent Republic. Thus, the National Architecture Renaissance survived for another decade. After Mustafa Kemal and his elite eliminated the members of the CUP and all other opponents in the mid 1920s, they looked to yet another new architectural style to make their political power visible. The rejection of anything Ottoman became the daily practice of politics in the late 1920s, thus ending the National Architecture Renaissance. The Modern Movement, or "the cubic compositions of European modernism" replaced it.⁹ Those cubic compositions, Bozdoğan states, became one of the most important representations of Kemalist modernization in the

⁹ Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building: The Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic*, (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2001), 47.

1930s.¹⁰ In other words, the architectural shifts alone were not the main differences between the two regimes: *the* difference was the fact that the new elite used figurative statuary.

This difference brought about a new pattern of urban expression in early republican Turkey. Under the Ottoman Empire, in accordance with Islamic law, statues were considered idolatrous signs of paganism, and thus never became urban symbols. The use of statues in public spaces in Turkey as an expression of the relationship between society and the state, as it pushed the newly formed Republic into 'nationhood' under the real and symbolic leadership of its founder, is a dramatic phenomenon that offers rich opportunities for understanding how public space has been used in the nation building process. Thus, the statuary of early republican Turkey has a far-reaching significance. It offers unique insights into the relationships between statuary and nation building, between Islam and Westernization, and between modernization and identity formation.

These urban symbols and landmarks reveal the ways in which Mustafa Kemal and his political elites attempted to establish a modern and secular sense of identity in early republican Turkey during the years 1923 to 1938. For Mustafa Kemal and his followers, all fervent admirers of European institutions and attitudes, the 'official public culture' or, roughly, the relations between state and society had to be shifted from a religious to a secular base in order to foster the growth of secularized authority and social order in the newly born nation state. They considered a "Turkified" nation, based on a more racially and culturally homogenous population, as the first requirement for such secularization. The exchange of populations with Greece in 1923, the first and largest population

¹⁰ Ibi

exchange in history, for instance, and the subsequent suppression of Kurds in 1924 were designed to homogenize the population. The imposition of a script change from Arabic to Latin followed suit to undermine a key of Islamic identification among the masses.

Among these many public expressions, the monumental statues of Mustafa Kemal erected in the years between the two World Wars exemplify one of the most effective instruments of the elite-driven projects of modernity in Turkey. By the time Mustafa Kemal died in 1938, hundreds of statues and monuments of him had been erected in most important public spaces in Ankara, Istanbul and other major cities. Although there were some statues and busts in the Christian churches in Turkey at the time that his monuments and statues began to appear in public spaces, the general Muslim population had had little contact with or knowledge of such forms of art. The second chapter addresses how monumental statues of Mustafa Kemal came to operate in a Muslim society after a fairly silent history of sculpture throughout the Ottoman Empire. All these monuments and statues possess intentional commemorative value to cement the memory of the "War of Independence" led by Mustafa Kemal and other members of the Ottoman military, political, and intellectual elites in the years between 1919 and 1922. I am particularly interested in the first six monumental statues that depict the stages of the War of Independence from Mustafa Kemal's perspective. Chapters three, four and five address how the use of monumental statues played out specifically in the Turkish experience in terms of the visualization of Turkish official historiography of the Turkish War of Independence, which was outlined in *Nutuk*, the speech Mustafa Kemal delivered in 1927.

Virtually no scholarly work has been done to explain the crucial role that statues and monuments of Mustafa Kemal played in Turkey's nation building process. In this dissertation I address the role these statues and monuments played in terms of forming a new official public culture, in transforming the public sphere, and in the reutilization of public spaces, such as the classical Ottoman square where three dimensional human-like structures had never before appeared. They also contributed to the realignment of the social and political hierarchy and the ascendancy of modernizing political and intellectual elite in the early Republic. Political figures, intellectuals, and notables were incorporated into the cultural projects of the new Turkish regime. Essentially I demonstrate the method by which monumental propaganda altered the formation and transformation of the public sphere in the early Republic. By doing so, I offer a political and cultural history of Turkish statuary and its impact on Turkish modernity during the years 1923-1938, the period Mustafa Kemal was in power.

As urban symbols in the newly formed Republic, they represent not only the closure of the predating Ottoman Empire, but the emerging Turkish nationalism and national identity. Codified within this new national identity are a variety of elements, which include: secularization, a western cult *of* the "Orient" in the Orient, and an effort to topple the cultural and religious hegemony of Islam. I argue that they represent an image making process, which was not the result of an intricate and mutual interaction between urbanites and country dwellers but rather a one-sided interaction, amounting to modernization from above.

Chapter 1

Sculpting a Nation: Art, Power, and Politics in Early Republican Turkey

The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief history of the Turkish experience of modernity in terms of its nation building process, and to critically examine the formation of official historiography in the early period of the Republic (1923-1938). I begin with a statement about the character of modernity exercised in Turkey between the two World Wars. I then summarize the formation of official history in Turkey. Finally, I explain the relationship between official history and the history of statuary in the nascent republic—a relationship that became the textual source for the ongoing visualization of Turkish official historiography that has been instrumental in the formation and reproduction of Turkish nationalism since the beginning of the Republic.

The experience of modernity in the early republican Turkey cannot be understood without examining the very idea of international modernization, particularly as experienced in Europe, which, including the Turkish Republic and the Soviet Union, refers to two distinctly different processes between the two World Wars. In Northern Europe, the British Empire, and France, the essence of modernization was individual autonomy. In Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Turkey, on the other hand, the political elites rejected such modernization and employed “collectivity” as the model relationship between state and society.

Governments of these countries believed that collectivity in terms of work, culture, and class would accelerate the process of industrialization and modernization. For this reason, they emerged as the sole guarantors of modernity. Because of the role of the state vis-à-vis modernity, the political elites of these countries advocated the elimination of certain bourgeois elements that aligned with Northern European modes of modernity.¹¹

They, however, considered the elimination of those bourgeois elements insufficient to the realization of a powerful state and society, and thus claimed the right to shape people's political concepts through government possession of cultural production, allowing for the cultivation of a new human subject, one that would idealize the national body in the context of fast-paced modernization.

The cultural and political reforms in early republican Turkey (see below) are some of the best examples of these types of state-sanctioned cultural changes, and led to increased production. A similar process of enforced cultural and artistic nationalism took place in many other countries during the interwar period and also accelerated industrialization. During the interwar period, the Soviet Union in particular had surprising similarities to Republican Turkey in terms of nation-building processes. The political and intellectual elites of those two countries employed distinctly different philosophies regarding the distribution of wealth, mode of governance, and everyday living for the populace, but these differences nevertheless precipitated similarities in the

¹¹ For the Turkish experience of Modernity, see Çağlar Keyder's classic work (printed twenty times in Turkish), *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London & New York: Verso, 1987). For a brief comparative history of the emergence of the modern Middle East, see Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*, (London & New York: Verso, 2000).

"cultural reforms" and/or "revolutions" that took place, particularly in the 1930s.

An interesting comparison might be drawn between Kemalist Turkey and Stalinist Soviet Union, in light of their roughly similar political and social conditions at the turn of the 20th century¹². Both countries had an authoritarian and corporatist nature. In Turkey, this was partly due to the impact of the narodnic movement on the emergence of Turkish nationalism through Yusuf Akçura¹³ and the members of the Kadro Hareketi (Cadre Movement- the movement of the ideology-making elite of the Kemalist regime).¹⁴

¹² The Young Turks' revolution in 1908, for instance, ended with the restriction of Sultan Abdulhamid II's political power and brought about the Ottoman Constituent Assembly. However, the Sultan did not give up on his right to govern the Empire. The Sultan organized a counter-revolution in 1909 to consolidate the political power in his hands but failed. Young Turks replaced him with Sultan Mehmet V who remained president of the assembly until died in July 1918. His brother Vahdettin Efendi ascended the throne as Mehmet VI and stayed as the head of the assembly until the 1923 Revolution of Mustafa Kemal.

¹³ A dedicated Pan-Turkist who came to Istanbul from Russia in 1905 and started publishing *Yurt ve Dünya*, the commanding voice of Pan-Turkism, where most intellectuals of the Republican nationalists wrote about the sociological and historical situation of the Ottoman Empire. Almost all of them adopted first Pan-Turkism then Kemalism. Later, in 1930s, Yusuf Akçura became the director of the Turkish History Foundation, which was established to create the new history of the Turks, culminating in the well-known Sun Language Theory. For a brief history of Pan-Turkism, See Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism From Irredentism to Cooperation* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1995).

¹⁴ Most members of the Kadro Movement were educated in Moscow and inspired from the ongoing social and cultural change in the Soviet Union. It was, if I may say, the *Marxist Kemalists* who came up with a theory of development in the journal *Kadro (The Cadre)* published between 1932 and 1934. Marxist Kemalism evolved into *Kemalism from left* in the 1960s. The new version was disseminated in the 1960s particularly through the monthly journal *Yön (The Direction)*, which argued that during the beginnings of a multi-party system in Turkey after World War Two, the new Democratic Party launched a counter-revolution, putting the Kemalist revolution in danger. This call encouraged the first military intervention of the Republic in 1960, which the leftist Kemalists considered a leftist intervention and thus approved for the sake of the Kemalist revolution. The leading figure of this movement was Doğan Avcıoğlu, who reproduced the premises of Kadro Hareketi his most influential book *Türkiye'nin Düzeni (The Order of Turkey)* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1968). Kadro Hareketi basically argued that Kemalist revolution was a third way between capitalism and communism. The sociological explanation for this according to Kadro intellectuals was that since the Kemalist revolution inherited a classless society after the War of Independence. This, however, which was not true: the social and political policies of the new regime was an authoritarian welfare state whose basic economic policy was etatism. Among the most well-known figures of the Cadre were Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, Vedat Nedim Tör, Şevki Yazman, and Burhan Belge. For a well-written overview of Kadro Hareketi, see Haldun Gülalp, *Gelişme Stratejileri ve Gelişme İdeolojileri (Strategies and Ideologies of Development)* (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1983). Gülalp here compares the Kadro Movement with the strategies and ideologies of development in Latin America. He particularly talks about Andre Gunter Frank's theory of "development of underdevelopment", which resembles the basic premises of Kadro Hareketi.

However, other aspects of the historical background and the ideological premises of these two states were so radically different that the comparison would be hard to sustain.

Therefore, I will focus here specifically on the Turkish experience, and will address the relationship between these two countries during the 1920s and 1930s only when such a comparison can deepen the analysis of the Turkish experience. This applies to other countries as well, particularly Germany and Italy—the two other prominent authoritarian regimes of capitalist development in Europe between the World Wars—which also affected the Turkish political elite in terms of both social and political change in the nascent Republic.¹⁵

THE NEW REGIME, THE NEW NATION, AND THE NEW HUMAN SUBJECT

The last assembly of the Ottoman Empire founded the Republic of Turkey on October 29, 1923. The head of the assembly was Gazi Mustafa Kemal, the commander

¹⁵ For an operational comparison one at least should research both Russian and Turkish primary sources. It is important to stress that little study has been done in Turkey on the relationship between the Turkish Republic and the Soviet Union. All of these works that have been done are nothing but political history, including the most recent publication by Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, a prominent Turkish historian. Kocabaşoğlu's co-authored book, *Bolshevik Revolution and Ottomans* came out in January 2006 from İletişim Yayınları, the leading publisher for alternative histories and historians. The author complains that there is almost no work in Turkish on the impact of the Bolshevik revolution, and that there is a big gap to fill. In order to fill the gap, I argue that the students of Turkish historiography, first, have to find a better way of handling the history of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union than by using non-operational terminologies. Terms such as 'the biggest enemy of the Ottoman Empire' inadequately describe the relationship between the Russian and Ottoman Empires until the end of World War I. Terms like and 'the holy supporter of the newly born republic' are supposed to sum up the good-hearted relationship between Lenin and Mustafa Kemal (which became official by the Turko-Russian treaty of Friendship on 16 March 1921) during the War of Independence, and Mustafa Kemal and Stalin until 1938, but also fail. Secondly, these scholars need to realize that the gap is not only about political history but also social and cultural history. In fact, there is no work that deals with the nation building processes of these two countries in Turkish.

in chief of the “War of Independence” (1919-1922).¹⁶ He was known variously as the *Gazi* (victor in the holy war), the *Kurtarıcı* (El Liberator), the Bolivar of modern Turkish historiography, and the creator and defender of territorial-defensive Turkish nationalism against the expansionists Enver, Talat, and Cemal Paşa¹⁷, the first three leading figures of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) during the World War I.¹⁸ After establishing the Republic in Anatolia, the leftover piece of land in the hands of the Ottoman Empire after the first World War, and just fifteen years after the 1908 Revolution of Young Turks¹⁹ (Mustafa Kemal himself was a prominent Young Turk), the first president of the newly born Republic, Mustafa Kemal and his political and intellectual elites (known as the *Kemalists*, roughly the followers of Mustafa Kemal) announced that not only a new state, but also a new country and a new nation were about to be born from the ashes of

¹⁶ Upon the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the forces of the Allies-The British Empire, France, Italy and Greece-landed in different parts of Anatolia. Greek troops landed in Izmir on May 15, 1919, which resulted in a national resistance movement led by Mustafa Kemal. After the Soviet Union, France, and Italy recognized Mustafa Kemal and his movement in 1921, the war was practically between Turkey and Greece. British Empire supplied the Greek army while the Soviet Union helped Mustafa Kemal to establish a regular army. The nationalist movement lasted until Greek troops left Izmir in September 1922. In Turkish historiography this war is called the War of Independence. Greece was a subject of the Ottoman Empire until 1821 when declared independence.

¹⁷ They were the failures of history for Mustafa Kemal. According to official historiography, they *escaped* from the capital İstanbul in November 1918 upon failure in the World War One. However, their intention was not to escape, especially Enver, who wanted to join the Turkic world with Anatolia to create a Turkish Empire. Enver first went to Germany then to central Asia to establish an army of Turks for his cause but failed.

¹⁸ The students of military medical academy founded the CUP by a secret society in 1889. The students of the academy were part of the Young Turks, a movement with three main groups, one a political community that was exiled to Europe, the second the army officers, and the third university students and professionals who believed that the sultan Abudhamid’s regime was totalitarian and needed to be changed. They demanded the restoration of the constitution of 1876, which they believed would strengthen the state and thus help to establish a way to prevent the Ottoman Empire from collapsing. Eventually Young Turks did the constitutional revolution of 1908. For more information on Young Turks, see Sukru Hanioglu, *Preparation for a revolution: the Young Turks, 1902-1908* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

¹⁹ The Young Turks’ revolution in 1908 ended with the restriction of Sultan Abdulhamid II’s political power and brought about the Ottoman Constituent Assembly. However, the Sultan did not give up on his right to govern the Empire. The Sultan organized a counter-revolution in 1909 to consolidate the political power in his hands but failed. Young Turks replaced him with Sultan Mehmet V who remained president of

the Empire. As the charismatic and most powerful political figure of early Republican Turkey (1923-1938), Mustafa Kemal set about intensifying and accelerating the modernization program that had been launched after the Tanzimat edict of 1839.²⁰

The Kemalists planned to radicalize the country and centralize political power by instituting various structural developments that began almost a hundred years before the Empire collapsed in 1918. The new political and intellectual authority sought to realize a political and a cultural frame that might transform the “old,” “corrupt,” and “rotten” Ottoman Empire into a new nation.

The Kemalist elite derived the theory of this radicalization during discussions of Turkish nationalism that took place in the first quarter of the twentieth century. In these discussions, various intellectual groups debated two main questions: “How can we achieve economic development?” and “How can we protect our culture?”

The most systematic answer came from Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), the prominent theorist and ideologist ideologue of early Turkish nationalism and the most influential intellectual figure of early Republican Turkey. Gökalp is most famous for his *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (The Principles of Turkism) where he attempts to answer the questions posed above.²¹

the assembly until died in July 1918. His brother Vahdettin Efendi ascended the throne as Mehmet VI and stayed as the head of the assembly until the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923.

²⁰ Although the beginning of modernization in the Ottoman Empire dates back to the era of Selim III, 1839 became a symbolic date for the most scholars of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization as beginning the transition to modern statehood and nationhood. For a structural historical analysis of modernization in the 19th and 20th century Turkey; see Kemal H. Karpat’s classic work, *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis* (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1971). For a historical sociological account of the modernization see Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill university Press, 1964). For an interpretation of modernization from a political economy point of view, see Çağlar Keyder, 1987.

²¹ It is ironic that Gökalp was ethnically Kurdish. When it comes to study Turkish nationalism and national identity, all scholars who worked on the political development in the late Ottoman Empire and the

Türkçülüğün Esasları was first published in 1923. Gökalp began by dividing the world of social institutions and practices into two distinct structures: *hars* and *medeniyet*, respectively culture and civilization, the latter of which he defined as technology.²² He then argues that technology is a universal value and should be adopted from Western societies as a "civilizing effect of modernization." He states that culture, however, is not universal but rather specific to each nation. He believed that because the Turkish *hars* (culture) was the structure that constituted nation and national identity, it must be protected²³

After presenting his view of world social institutions, Gökalp employs the concept of "collective representations" that he borrowed from the French sociologist Emile Durkheim in order to explain the idea of a nation. In the first part of his book, he elucidates this notion through examples, rather than definition:

There were also many Turks in our country; but since there was, in their collective consciousness, no concept of 'we are the Turkish nation,' no Turkish nation then existed. In other words, a group is not a social group

early Turkish Republic referred invariably to *Türkçülüğün Esasları*. For Gökalp and his role in the formation of Turkish nationalism, see Taha Parla's well written book, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876-1924*(E.J. Brill, 1985).

²² Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (İstanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1952), 29-42.

²³ Ibid., 37. This dualist conceptualization of the world of social institutions and practices incorporated a static understanding of culture, and was problematic in nature because there was an epistemological ignorance of a possibility of a causal relationship between "hars" and "medeniyet." In the early 1930s, the Cadre (a group of Turkish Marxist intellectuals) criticized Gökalp's definition of culture by arguing that when combined, civilization and culture by definition and as found within the model of "a nation" will include not only "hars," i.e., history, language, and culture but also the economy. For the Cadre, culture is not the essential category in terms of defining the "nation". More importantly, they claimed that Turkey had no distinct culture that defined its identity. For them, there is only one category, the technology that qualifies the world of social institutions and practices. Therefore, following this crude Marxist interpretation of social reality, the Cadre concludes that the nation can only bear the essential marks of national identity by achieving the improvement of the economy, and of science and technology under the principal of a "cadre movement". For more information on the Cadre see, Sevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1968). From the left to the right, all these intellectuals in the 1920s and 1930s tried to construct an ideology of a Turkish Revolution by preparing a theoretical basis for Turkish nationalism in hope that the foundation would be used by Mustafa Kemal.

unless there is a conscious realization of that status in the common consciousness of its individual members.²⁴

Here Gökalp proposes not only the causal relationship between the sociological basis of the formation of a nation and collective representations, but also the political opportunity to forge a nation that Mustafa Kemal represented. This is why Gökalp, in the second part of his book, proposes a “Program of Turkism”—the realization of such an ideal, which outlines the cultural project of a new political order so that the nation and national identity can be defined on the basis of the Ottoman heritage. He hoped that the new political order would pursue a project of social change based on a form of nationalism that would create a national identity while protecting the nation’s sovereignty from the colonialist and imperialist West.²⁵ Therefore, for the sake of the nation’s own domain of sovereignty, Gökalp suggests “conscious manipulation” as the strategy that the political order of the early republic should pursue.²⁶

The Kemalist political and intellectual elite agreed with Gökalp in believing that “conscious manipulation” should be the first step towards creating a collective consciousness that could be instrumental in the emergence of Turkish nationalism and

²⁴ Gökalp, *ibid.* Almost 40 years before Franz Fanon wrote *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove press, 1963) in which he defines and theorizes the notion of nation and national culture, Gökalp saw the operational opportunity in wars and crises for making a nation out of people. However, it was not Gökalp who theorized this. It was the Kadro movement who came up with a theory of nation and nationalism in the early 1930s.

²⁵ From the left to the right, all intellectuals in the 1920s and 1930s tried to construct an ideology of Turkish Revolution (read as Kemalist Revolution) by preparing a theoretical basis for Turkish nationalism; they hoped the foundation would be used by Mustafa Kemal and his political elite.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

national culture.²⁷ The first step in this conscious manipulation was to change the alphabet into a new script based on the Roman characters used by the West. In order to cultivate national support for this linguistic nationalism, it was argued that the new script would simplify writing and reading and, thus, would help introduce literacy to the masses.²⁸

However, the program of creating a new unified cultural identity through measures such as language reform and racial homogeneity—which gave rise to the mass evacuation of Ottoman Armenians in 1915, the population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923, and the suppression of Kurds in 1925—were considered insufficient by the political elite for Turkish-imagined communities. Political strategies had to be visible, and that visibility was crucial to the realization of modernity. Modernity itself had to be

²⁷ Surprisingly, the political and intellectual discourse of the modernist Islamist civil society and political parties in the last two decades in Turkey started to favor Gökalp's dual understanding of the world of social institutions and practices.

²⁸ Benedict Anderson uses this issue in his book *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised Edition ed. (London and New York: Verso, 1991), when he attempts to explain how print-languages constituted the bases for national consciousness in the pages 44 through 46. He states that “The fate of the Turkic-speaking peoples in the zones incorporated into today’s Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and the Soviet Union is especially exemplary: “A family of spoken languages, once everywhere assemble, thus comprehensible, within an Arabic orthography, has lost that unity as a result of conscious manipulations. To heighten Turkish-Turkey’s national consciousness at the expense of any wider Islamic identification, Atatürk imposed compulsory Romanization. The Russian contemporaries followed suit, in a tradition of identity-building language reform that began, first with an anti-Islamic, anti-Persian compulsory Romanization, then, in Stalin’s 1930s, with a Russifying compulsory Cyrillicization.” In general this statement is correct. However, using Latin alphabet was not first formulated by Mustafa Kemal. Anderson suffers from not knowing the language meeting held in Baku in 1926 to which Mustafa Kemal sent two representatives. At the end of the meeting, representatives of the other Turkic countries decided to change whatever script they have to Latin alphabet. When those representatives from Anatolia came back from the meeting they directly reported to Mustafa Kemal. It seems the political elite were not ready to initiate a script change. It only came more than two years after the meeting. Until Stalin forced the Turkic countries to use Cyrillic, for a 5 years or so, Latin alphabet brought about a better assemble than Anderson mentions about the Arabic script since there were different applications of the Arabic script and that the language meeting aimed to produce one single alphabet for all Turkic languages. For more information on the relationship between politics of language and nationalism in Turkey see Hüseyin Sadoğlu, *Türkiye’de Ulusçuluk ve Dil politikaları (Nationalism and Language Politics in Turkey)*, (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003). For the alphabets of Turkic languages, see Atilla Özkırmılı’s

visual, and its visualization had to carry out simple, understandable, unforgettable messages for the masses. Therefore, the formation of a national body necessitated creating a social space where people could absorb these multivalent messages, internalize them as personal values and objectives, and find ideals they could attribute to or associate with their "new" identity. Most importantly, this social space would be a place where the state would have a chance to control this process of personal evolution, ostensibly forming the state's new human subjects.²⁹

Halk Evleri (the People's Houses), culture centers that sprang up in many towns after 1932, became such social spaces. They contained modern, cubic architecture that contrasted with the *Türk Ocakları*³⁰, most of which was built in the style of Ottoman revivalism. The *Halk Evleri* were designed for local cultural activities like folk music and dance, but effectively became spaces to propagate the ideology of early Republican political authority—the Kemalist regime. These houses thus became the social spaces where the new regime could enact a radical cultural shift “from being some sort of inert local substance to being a rather more volatile form of difference.”³¹ In this way, the new human subject could develop positive emotional elements that would draw and hold popular loyalty, while also invoking and internalizing the affirmation of coherency and unity for the sake of the new regime.

recently published book, *Türk Dili: Dil ve Anlatım (Languages of Turks: Language and Expression)* (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006).

²⁹ Considering the idea of the new human subject,, it is not surprising to see that politics of architecture became a source of an discourse. In Turkey, the politics of statuary constituted one of the main instruments to illustrate the politics of the political order since statues were forbidden to be erected in public places in accordance with Islam.

³⁰ *Türk Ocakları* was primarily the culture centers of the CUP. Mustafa Kemal closed them down to eliminate the power of the CUP in the society.

There is no doubt that the Halk Evleri served as the unofficial branches of Mustafa Kemal's Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party-CHP hereafter) during the era of the one-party system.³² Although they remained in principle the meeting places for all members of the nation, women's access was limited during the 1930s. The new political order dealt first with the male body in order to reshape the patriarchal social order by redesigning, in Pierre Bourdieu's terminology, its social, political, and cultural capital.³³ The Halk Evleri ultimately became some of the most significant social spaces for the internalization of political changes, reforms, and revolutions, one example of which was the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code that made polygamy illegal and gave women equal rights in divorce, custody of children, and inheritance.³⁴

Halk Evleri were instrumental in disseminating the reforms, but they were not part of the civil society. Rather, they were—in Henri Lefebvre's terms---dominated

³¹ Brad Weiss, "Thug of Realism: Inhabiting Fantasy in Urban Tanzania," *Cultural Anthropology* 17, no.1 (2002): 93-124.

³² Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi was first called *Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasi*. Firka is an Ottoman word for party. In 1934 the name of the party became Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 11 years after Mustafa Kemal formed the party in 1923. He formed the party because he realized that the four pillars of the War of Independence, who elected him as the leader of the war in 1919, Kazim Karabekir, Rauf Orbay, Refet Bele, and Ali Fuad Cebesoy were planning to form Terakki Perver Cumhuriyet Firkasi (the Republican Progressive Party) which Mustafa Kemal and his fellows abolished in 1924 for the reason that the pillars were threatening the young regime. The Republican People's Party, therefore, was the only party of the political system in Turkey between 1924 and 1945, except for a three-month-trial of democracy in the summer of 1930. Mustafa Kemal directed his close friend Fethi Okyar to form an opposition party called Serbest Firka (The Free Party) in that year. Then after the trial period, Mustafa Kemal directed Fethi Okyar to close the party when he realized that the new party had become the center of attention of those who were against the regime. Remember that Mustafa Kemal was accused of being the dictator of Turkey by democratic regimes of Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. Halide Edip, the prominent nationalist intellectual of the War of Independence, a critic of Mustafa Kemal after the war, called Mustafa Kemal the dictator of Turkey in her book *The Turkish Ordeal* (New York; London: The Century Co., 1928). Also the cover of the January 1923 issue of *L'* illustration depicted Mustafa Kemal as one of the dictators of Europe.

³³ Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge&New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

³⁴ Even today the People's Houses can be found in every district of Turkey as the cultural centers of Local Governments, where people mostly meet for fine arts activities.

spaces.³⁵ The attempt to redesign the male body had to result in an attempt to reach females through males. For the new political order, this meant that the female body (considered the subject of private space) became a focal point of the strategy to reform the rules of public spaces. This strategy gave women a momentous symbolic role in the process of secularization, modernization, and the creation of a new human subject through the rejection of an “irrational” or “depraved” Ottoman worldview that was deemed "Oriental" in favor of a “European” standpoint of rationality, virtue, and maturity.³⁶ As for the new political elite, the female body thus became one of the pawns in modernizing public space by dismantling the theocratic remnants of the empire. The new regime had to imagine, realize, and protect a new sovereign subject by pursuing the project of the Enlightenment through the eyes of Orientalism, unlike what Gökalp suggested in his *Principles of Turkism*.

The Kemalist plan, like the "Orientalist" political order and the Orientalists in the Orient, would be realized through tailoring—first, by removing the fez from the male body in 1924, then by lifting the veil from the female body in the name of liberation. As Meyda Yeğenoğlu argues, the desire to “lift the veil” reflects the historical, cultural, psychic, political, and epistemological obsessions of a political order of Enlightenment.³⁷ This has been true for the regime of Turkish modernity since the foundation of the Republic, whose political elite portrayed a desire to master and reshape the body of the subjects by making them visible.

³⁵ For the categorization of different spaces see Henri Lefebvre’s astonishing work, *The Production of Space* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991).

³⁶ Said Edward, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1979), 40.

However, for the political elite, visibility alone could not create new loyalties. They needed something both to prevent political diversity among the populace and to draw and hold popular loyalty. The state needed something visible and public, but not specifically gendered, to invoke coherence and unity. Among the tactics to bring out such loyalty were new national boundaries (sanctified in the Misak-ı Milli, or National Pact) as well as a new heroic history (the Orthodox interpretation of the War of Independence and the Sun Language Theory).

What Kemalists suggested here is that the political should primarily imply the supremacy of space over time,³⁸ which led the political order of the early Republican Turkey to create innovative symbols of conquest, crushing those symbols previously available in order to foster the realization of the new human subject.³⁹ The regime thus hastened to create new national symbols, including emblems, music, patriotic holidays, paintings, architecture, statues, and monuments. By doing so it hoped to create a distilled essence of culture so that the inherited imperial society would be able to radically

³⁷ Meyda Yeğenoğlu, “Emperyal Özne ve Feminist Söylem (Imperial Subject and Feminist Discourse)”, *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 75 (1997):32.

³⁸ In this picture, time becomes a subordinate of economic and political space. For the relation between time, space and modernity see Lefebvre’s astonishing work *Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (USA: Blackwell, 1991). Perhaps one could see this as a separation of time and space. As Giddens argues in his *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), “the ‘emptying of time’ is in large part the precondition of the ‘emptying of space’ and thus has causal priority over it.” For, as he argues, “coordination across time is the basis of the control of space. Here Giddens suggests that the separation of space from place helps us to understand the control of space (p.18). The idea of locale, “the settings of social activity as situated geographically” Giddens says, is the best starting point to conceptualize “Place.” In pre-modern societies, for most people, “presence” dominated the spatial dimensions of social life. Under this circumstance, Giddens goes on to argue that “the advent of modernity increasingly tears space away from place by fostering relations between ‘absent’ others, locationally distant from any given situation of face to face interaction. In conditions of modernity, place becomes increasingly phantasmagoric: that is to say, locales are thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of social influences quite distant from them. What structures the locale is not simply that which is present on the scene; the ‘visible form’ of the locale conceals the distanced relations which determine its nature (p.19).”

transcend the profane and regain its lost wholeness under a new theory of action: nationalism.

The idea of a distilled essence of culture led the state to look for the medium that was the purest and the most authentic, similar to what Clark states the Russians of the 1910s and 1920s did when seeking radical transformation through a new culture.⁴⁰ The prescription in both cases was for a kind of radical transformation of society. It was “the reutilization of social space that became a common denominator of all prescriptions for realizing this goal.”⁴¹

Although the reutilization of space had similar repercussions in all regimes of modernity that pursued a process of nation-building, I argue that—because modernity had to be realized in a relatively short period of time to catch up with the “developed countries” such as France and England—revolutionary, collectivist, and authoritarian political elites paid more careful attention to the use of architecture and monumental statues in nationalizing the masses. This is partially due to the fact that the masses did not need to be literate to understand the commemorative value of the buildings and figurative structures. Given that statuary never became an instrument of politics, reputation, or symbolic capital in this area until the emergence of the Republic in Turkey, and that 95% of the populace was illiterate, allegorical representations became the scripts of the masses, and thus monumental statues became the locus of the Kemalist victory.

³⁹ The destruction of the monument to Alexander III is a good example of such crushing in the Soviet Union.

⁴⁰ Katerina Clark, *Petersburg: Crucible of Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995), 23.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

Consequently, in Turkey during the late 1920s and particularly in the 1930s, spatial art forms and architecture emerged as what Clark calls “the sites most commonly chosen for factories of the perfect.”⁴² Reutilization of space in early Republican Turkey, therefore, came to represent the order of meanings and values. Architecture in particular held a dominant position in the public life of early Republican Turkey by introducing new patterns of urban expression. Some examples of this include the Republican squares with their monumental statues of Mustafa Kemal in the center and surrounding official buildings, and the new public parks, some of which were opened just to erect statues of Mustafa Kemal. They, as Sibel Bozdoğan argues, represented new patterns of public places with official urban symbols.⁴³

Republican squares were the first primary locations of the National Architecture Renaissance (the Ottoman revivalism between 1908 and 1927), with structures such as the first National Assembly building in Hakimiyet-i Milliye Meydanı in Ankara.⁴⁴ After the rejection of anything Ottoman became the daily practice of politics in the late 1920s,

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Sibel Bozdoğan, “The Predicament of Modernism in Turkish Architectural Culture: An Overview,” *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, ed. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997). In other words, the “new” architecture stood for the desire to have an *infinite* representation of nationalism. By ascribing “infinity” to this architecture, I mean that, architecture, the most concrete and material of all art forms, has the most potential to represent the abstract. When architecture represents the abstract, it becomes architectonic in the sense that it functions no less than the visionary designs as emblems. Some architecture, therefore, can serve as a means to make political space legitimate. This can be a building, a monument statue erected in a public space, a district, or even a whole city. Ankara, for instance, the new capital city of Turkey, best exemplifies this. The new capital of the new regime in 1930s with its new cubic architecture, new modern buildings, wide boulevards, appropriate infrastructure, and statues and monuments of Mustafa Kemal came to symbolize what James Scott calls “high modernism”, as well as the new political and intellectual elites’ most cherished values, “developmentalism,” “secularism,” “reformism”, and “revolutionarism.” The entire city itself simply became the national monument of the early Republic. Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union, was by and large dressed up with neoclassical models as an Imperial style.

⁴⁴ This building is a museum of War of Independence today. Later in the 1990s when using figurative statues and models became a way to visualize the history in indoor official places, the museum started to

bringing Ottoman revivalist style to a halt, the Republican squares started to host the pieces of Yeni Mimari (New Architecture), which were, as Bozdoğan states, “the unadorned cubic compositions of European modernism.”⁴⁵

Those cubic compositions represented the orders of meanings and values that held a dominant position in the public life, and thus they became one of the most important representations of the Kemalist application of modernity in the 1930s. “The new architecture, the “Modern Movement,” stated Bozdoğan, arrived in Ankara “as the official architectural expression of the Kemalist revolution.”⁴⁶

It is important to stress that the new architecture and the National Architecture Renaissance were both part of the project of modernity. Even though they display contrasts in terms of style, they do share similar historical backgrounds. They both “embraced a progressive model of history in which they sought to locate a place and identity for Turkish Architecture.”⁴⁷

The stylistic formal contrast between the two, however, helped the Kemalist elite to visualize their political power. But this is also true for the constitutional regime of the CUP between 1908 and 1918. They modified the Ottoman revivalism to nationalize the masses and make their political power visible. They “Turkified” the Ottoman forms, which engendered the National Architecture Renaissance. Thus, the shift in architectural styles of 1920s and 1930s cannot qualify as the difference between the regime of the

host allegorical representations of Mustafa Kemal and representatives describing a scene of assembly meeting during the War of Independence.

⁴⁵ Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building: The Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic*, (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2001), 47.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 54.

CUP and the Kemalist regime. I argue that even though modern architecture was more foreign to the people of the Republic because of a lack of reference to Turkified Ottoman forms, the operational difference between the cultural program of the CUP and the Kemalist regime was the figurative monumental propaganda of the latter. In other words, the architectural shifts alone were not the main differences between the two regimes; the fact that Kemalists used figurative statuary was a significant difference.

Both regimes considered nationalization a process of visualization of modernization, and modernization a process of nationalization. However, the Kemalist regime did add another quality of visual perception into this formula, which was more operational and instrumental than any construction in any architectural canon: it introduced figurative monumental statuary through the monumental propaganda of Mustafa Kemal.

First of all, compared to buildings, the figurative monuments of the Kemalist regime were easier for people to comprehend. Simply consider a figure of a woman holding a baby, which would resonate with people literally, much more so than having or not having a blue tile on the façade of a building, for example.⁴⁸ Not only were the statues easy to understand, but also they were new to people, since figurative public statuary only began with the monuments of Mustafa Kemal as part of the process of nation building. The history of figurative public statuary in Turkey did not have a chance to evolve from a tradition of allegorical representations of local histories to a modern one

⁴⁷ Ibid., 51. Also see Afife Batur, “To Be Modern: Search For A Republican Architecture”, *Modern Turkish Architecture*, ed. Renata Holod and Ahmet Evin (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 68-93.

⁴⁸ Blue tiles on the façades of buildings are one of the signifiers of the Ottoman Revivalism.

since there was no history of public statuary at any level due to Islamic prohibitions. Therefore, the monumental statues of Mustafa Kemal were that much more instrumental in visualizing a national story for the collective memory.

For this reason, the monumental propaganda of Mustafa Kemal was the only essential difference between the nationalization of the 1910s, 1920s and 1930s, and neither Ottoman revivalist pieces nor the modern constructions erected around republican squares are considered the primary qualifiers of visual Turkish modernity. It was Mustafa Kemal's monuments that determined what a Republican square would look like, and these monuments were integral in terms of producing the most potent visualizations of nationalism. They were easy to reproduce when the state wanted to tell the same story again, and thus were instrumental in disseminating ideals of nationalism in the early Republic.

These statues eventually turned Mustafa Kemal into an icon. As a symbol of the nation, Mustafa Kemal appeared in numerous forms: busts, statues, monuments, and portraits located in every primary, middle, and high school; in every city, in every public place; in stores, businesses, and even homes. They came to be known as *Mustafa Kemal büstü* (bust), *Mustafa Kemal heykeli* (statue), *Mustafa Kemal aniti* (monument), and *Mustafa Kemal resimleri* (portraits), after Mustafa Kemal was given the surname Mustafa Kemal in 1934.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Before Mustafa Kemal received the surname, *Gazi heykeli* and *Gazi büstü* were used to talk about statues both in the national press and in the state decrees Mustafa Kemal signed before 1934.

THE RISE OF POLITICAL ISLAM⁵⁰ AND THE POLITICS OF SYMBOLISM

After Mustafa Kemal died in 1938, the devotion to Mustafa Kemal grew, making him the cult figure of secular modernity. His position as a cult figure has changed over time, but he still holds iconic power, as can be seen in today's ongoing tug-of-war between the political Islamists⁵¹ and the Kemalists, who reached their political peak after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. Delving into the details of this war helps us to understand the source of the ongoing iconization of Mustafa Kemal as late as 1990s.

The politics of the changing practice of everyday life in the 1980s caused the polarization of political parties: the politics of Islamic sensitivity became opposed to the politics of Turkish nationalism. The former was marked by the rise of Necmettin Erbakan's Refah Partisi (Welfare Party), which came into power after the 1994 elections.⁵² For the first time in the history of political parties in Turkey, a religious leader became the head of the coalition government, a fact that alarmed the *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri* (the Turkish General Staff), a traditional supporter of Turkish nationalism.

Erbakan was prime minister of the Republic only for a short period of time. In 1997, the army toppled Erbakan by sending a notice to President Süleyman Demirel, a right-wing secularist, in which the generals made accusatory statements about Erbakan and his party. Following this notice, *Anayasa Mahkemesi* (the Constitutional Court) decided to close down Refah Partisi. Erbakan rushed to establish his new Saadet Partisi

⁵⁰ Here I use political Islam as a political view that incorporates elements of Islam, such as the Islamic law, into a program of social change

⁵¹ Political Islamists refer to those who want to incorporate elements of Islam into a program of social change.

(Party of Happiness). However, the military notice had caused discontent within the party itself. The young generations of the party thus formed AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – the Justice and Development Party) under the leadership of Tayyip Erdoğan, the former mayor of Istanbul who had been sentenced to two years in prison by a local court because of a speech he delivered in 1997 interpreted by court members to be a call for *Şeriat* (Islamic law).

As the charismatic leader of AKP, Erdoğan constantly criticized Erbakan and Saadet Partisi, in order to distinguish the two parties. The difference was that Erdoğan publicly admitted that Turkey is a secular country and will remain so, i.e., his party would be the guarantor of a secular Republic. This distinction allowed him and his party to win the 2002 elections with 34.5 % of the vote, bringing the party two thirds of the seats in the assembly. Except for the Republican People's Party, no other major party had the 10% minimum of the popular vote required to win seats in the assembly. It is important to stress that AKP took advantage of the electoral system, according to which a party has to collect at least 10% of all votes to be represented in the assembly. Although this led the party to exaggerate its political power, it is safe to say that at least one fourth of the populace showed support for Erdoğan and AKP in the elections.

This public support and Erdoğan's extraordinary efforts to get Turkey into the European Union—a position supported by the majority of the populace—led both national and international observers to view his party as a moderate Islamist organization. Erdoğan agreed with public opinion and even went further to claim that his party is the

⁵² Necmettin Erbakan formed this party in 1987 after Kenan Evren, the commander in chief and the leader of the military intervention of 1980 closed his National Salvation Party in 1981.

Republic's first true conservative party, something that reminded the secularists—including the army and CHP—of *Terakki Perver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (The Progressive Republican Party, TPCF hereafter) and the first opposition and conservative party of the Republic.

TPCF was established in November 1924 by Kazım Karabekir, Refet Bele, Rauf Orbay, and Ali Fuat Cebesoy, the prominent conservative-nationalist generals of the War of Independence with whom Mustafa Kemal executed the plan of survival. TPCF declared that the party stood for secular and nationalist policies while opposing the authoritarian tendencies of Mustafa Kemal and CHF. Members of the party strongly supported decentralization and separation of powers by favoring a more evolutionary mode of social and political change in society—something Mustafa Kemal thought would reestablish Ottoman religious and political institutions. According to official historiography, TPCF was closed down in 1925 when the members were accused of conducting *irticai faaliyetler* (reactionary or fundamentalist activities).

Perhaps this explains why, after the 2002 elections, the secularist circles constantly warned that AKP and Erdoğan were practicing *takkiye* (i.e., hiding their true intentions), which, according to the secularist establishment, was nothing but a manipulative strategy to change the secular republic into an Islamic one.

Since then the secularist circles—and particularly the army—have employed official historiography (i.e., references to the activities of TPCF) to remind the public that in the 1920s Mustafa Kemal himself had had to fight against these “*şeriatçılar*” (those who want to establish an Islamic republic whose constitution is the Qur'an and Islamic

law). For this reason, the “true citizens of Turkey” were called to stand behind the secularism of the republic and its hallowed savior, the army.

Establishing this type of correlation between TPCF and AKP demonstrates the extent to which secularist circles and the army consider AKP a threat not only to the system, but also to their own existence (dating back to the beginning of the Republic). Liberal circles and mass media such as the newspaper *Radikal* (the commanding voice of political liberalism in Turkey) considered this reaction an attempt to manipulate the army while keeping a close eye on the activities of AKP.

Erdoğan and AKP members enjoyed national and international public support for two years, even as the secularist establishment intensified their pressure on the government. Beginning in 2004, however, Erdoğan and prominent AKP party members began to criticize the definition of secularism in the constitutional law by referring to the *Başörtüsü Sorunu* (the problem of the head scarf).⁵³ Also, over the last two years, Erdoğan and his political elite have not shied away from stressing the importance of religion—particularly Islam—in the practice of daily life. This has led to some controversial events, both in the assembly and in local government, which the secularist press and establishment have deemed *irtica*, a term used since the beginning of the Republic in Turkey to denote Islamic fundamentalism. These events have made the party seem like a fundamentalist Islamic party rather than a moderate organization, thus upsetting the precarious balance between the Islamist and secularist circles that has prevailed since 2004.

⁵³ According to the constitution of the Republic of Turkey, women cannot wear *başörtüsü* if they are state officials.

This conflict reached its peak after the assassination of the vice president of the judicial high court in May 2006, following his decision on a court case that did not allow a high school teacher to wear *hejab* in school. Secularist circles, CHP, the army and the liberal press publicly blamed AKP, claiming that the party encourages such controversy and that it is dangerous to question the secular character of the regime. CHP did not hesitate to remind Erdoğan of the military interventions and particularly the military notice in 1997. Some marginal parties went even further, calling for a military intervention to preserve the secular republic.

After the assassination, AKP began to announce publicly that the party is indeed a secular party, but that it is sensitive to religion. They rushed to call for unification of the country by stressing that the party exists for everyone, while Erdoğan himself rushed to hang an enormous poster of Mustafa Kemal on the outside wall of his 5-story-house in Ankara to show that he is a supporter of Mustafa Kemal.

In Turkey, it does not matter whether a political group is secular or religious—it must *show* its respect for Mustafa Kemal and loyalty to the state.⁵⁴ For this reason, national symbols—particularly symbols of Mustafa Kemal—have been the most powerful acid test for the different ideologies found in Turkish political culture since the Republic’s inception.

⁵⁴ Every individual representative of the Grand Assembly of Turkey needs to promise the nation in the assembly by repeating a statement derived from the following preamble of the constitution of the Republic of Turkey before they begin to work for the nation. It is important to stress that for the secular regime it is not enough to hear that so-called suspicious representatives of the assembly, nowadays the AKP representatives, swear allegiance in public since they might have potential to do *takkiye*. Therefore, every representative is expected to show their loyalty to the regime in any means. Among the devices to display such loyalty, visiting *Anitkabir* (Atatürk’s mausoleum) on national days is the primary one. Mentioning his name here and there, posing in front of his picture, bust or statue are other prominent ways of proving one’s

This acid test, I argue, constitutes the basis of the political economy of symbolism in all spheres of Turkish society. For example, the tug-of-war between Islamists and secularists has created an economy of symbolism since the very early days of Mustafa Kemal's iconization, particularly through his statues, busts, and monuments in early Republican Turkey.

Understanding how Mustafa Kemal was raised to the level of icon during the early Republican period, therefore, allows us to understand the deep significance of this early national ideological divide. This process also illuminates the role of Mustafa Kemal and his political elites in creating a rift between political Islamists and secularists, and how this rift has been manifest in the public imagination and in public spaces through connections between the politics of statuary and the development of the political culture. Understanding how Mustafa Kemal was made into an icon helps us picture his immortality, which served as an inspiration to the "secular" political elite by transcending his individual death to find eternal life within the continuing "social revolution."

Most importantly, understanding how Kemal became an icon in the early Republic allows us to understand his mental and physical representations in Turkish historiography, and particularly in the formation of official Turkish history. This history was mainly constructed through Mustafa Kemal's *Nutuk* (the speech), which publicly defended his policies during the congress of CHF in October 1927. Without looking at the formation of the official Republican history one cannot comprehend the social and political impact of such immortality in Turkish society.

loyalty to the secular regime. All these have been part of the official public culture of Republican Turkey since the beginning of the monumental propaganda of Mustafa Kemal in the early Republic.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE ORTHODOX INTERPRETATION OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, OR THE OFFICIAL HISTORIOGRAPHY

Mustafa Kemal's *Nutuk* has not only become a remarkable and extremely influential text, both in Turkish and foreign historiographies, but also a primary source for the official interpretation of the War of Independence. In *Nutuk*, Mustafa Kemal describes the Turkish national movement from 1919 to 1927 (although the text ends with the emergence of TPCF in 1924). As Erik J. Zürcher argues, *Nutuk* is "a vindication of the purges of 1925-26, and criticizing the former leaders of the PRP [TPCF] as its main theme." Regarding Kemal, Zürcher goes on to argue that:

In his attempt to disgrace his former colleagues, he presents them throughout as doubters, incompetents and traitors, and depicts himself as the one who led the movement from the outset.⁵⁵

This is why *Nutuk* begins with Mustafa Kemal's landing at Samsun:

"Gentlemen, I landed at Samsun on the 19th of May 1919."⁵⁶

Samsun was an important Ottoman port city in northern Anatolia where Greek communities were encouraged by the Allies to seek independence after the Bulgarian army came to accept that they lost the war in September 1918, which left the Empire with no buffer zone between Istanbul and the allied forces located in Salonica. In the

⁵⁵ Erick J. Zürcher, *Turkey: a Modern History* (London-New York: I.B.Tauris, 2003), 182-183. Also see Zürcher's earlier work, *Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic. The Progressive Republican Party 1924-1925* (Leiden: Brill, 1991).

⁵⁶ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk* (İstanbul: Sürya Sürekli Yayınları, 1995), 9.

following six months, violent conflicts started between the communities of Samsun and its neighboring towns. The Ottoman government appointed Mustafa Kemal to restore law and order in Samsun in May 1919.

He and two army corps departed from Istanbul-Sarayburnu on May 16, 1919, and landed in Samsun on May 19, 1919. For Mustafa Kemal, this landing was the beginning of the War of Independence—a move to undermine previous attempts by Enver, Talat, and Cemal Paşa to start a national resistance movement before they left the country. Enver Paşa, Minister of War during World War I, organized an underground resistance group called *Karakol* (the Guard) whose leader was Kara Kemal, an important member of the CUP and the mayor of Istanbul between 1913 and 1918. Kara Kemal had also established a close relationship with the middle class of the capital before the Empire collapsed. *Karakol* was instrumental in providing military equipment and smuggling Ottoman officers to Anatolia before and during the War of Independence. Although there were various resistance groups in Anatolia, their movement lacked leadership until Kara Kemal approached Mustafa Kemal and offered him leadership of the movement that was already at work.

Mustafa Kemal emerged from the War of Independence as the most powerful figure, not only in the eyes of the public, but also with respect to the four pillars of the war (Kazim Karabekir, Refet Bele, Rauf Orbay, and Ali Fuat Cebesoy—the founders of the TPCF). Mustafa Kemal considered them—as well as various other prominent unionists, such as Cavit Bey, the famous accountant of the CUP—to be traitors, doubters, as they were die-hard opponents of his radical project for social change. For Mustafa Kemal, these opponents were basically the “inner enemy” of *his* Republic, not to mention

rivals capable of removing him from the realm of politics since, like himself, they had gained expertise in underground organizations in the CUP before the 1908 Young Turk Revolution.

UNCHALLENGEABLE NUTUK

The four pillars and the political opposition were not powerful enough to challenge Mustafa Kemal in the political arena from the beginning of the Republic. However, even indirect criticisms became impossible after Mustafa Kemal's *Nutuk*. An example of this repressed criticism is Kazım Karabekir's *İstiklal Harbimiz* (Our War of Independence), which was collected and burned by the Kemalist officials as soon as it was published in 1933.⁵⁷

Karabekir was the general in command of the 9th Army in the east during the War of Independence. *İstiklal Harbimiz* is his account of the war, written to challenge *Nutuk*. Unlike the *Turkish Ordeal*—published first in English in 1928 as a memoir of Halide Edip Adivar, an intellectual eyewitness to all the stages of the war—*İstiklal Harbimiz* is a text similar in style to *Nutuk*. Both texts, for instance, use telegraph messages exchanged between the commanders of the armies during the war to make points about events that happened between the Armistice of Mudros on October 31, 1918 and the end of the war in İzmir in September 1922.

⁵⁷ Kazım Karabekir was born in 1882 as a son of an Ottoman Paşa. He went to the military academy in İstanbul and graduated in 1905 with the highest score. Before he participated in World War I as a talented officer, he joined the CUP.

Karabekir's main message in *İstiklal Harbimiz* is simple: "we did it together", which contradicts Mustafa Kemal's message of "I did it". However, Mustafa Kemal was not ready to accept even a textual challenge to *Nutuk* and the history it represented, despite the fact that all of the pillars and most of the opponents were totally eliminated before 1927.

The elimination of the pillars between 1923 and 1927 helps us understand how *Nutuk* became an unchallengeable text. Their cases exemplify the fate of many who opposed Mustafa Kemal before 1927.

During the War of Independence, Orbay attempted to challenge Mustafa Kemal, first by forming a group in the first assembly (1920-1923) called İkinci Grup (the Second Group), and later in 1924 by establishing TPCF. Mustafa Kemal, perceiving the opposition's intent, founded his own party, CHP, which was used to limit his opponents' political activities.

Mustafa Kemal, as the president of the new Republic and the founding father of the CHP, first utilized the *Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu* (the Law on the Maintenance of Order, initially passed in March 1925 to deal with the Kurdish revolt in eastern Turkey) and *İstiklal Mahkemeleri* (the Independence courts organized in December 1923 to process the related court cases), to destroy all political opposition and press. Then, following an assassination plot in 1926, these two institutions were again employed to crush the opposition. Not surprisingly, Rauf Orbay, Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Cavit Bey, and other prominent members of the CUP were among those identified as suspects in the assassination attempt.

Under the provisions of the *Takrir-i Sükun*, Mustafa Kemal used the courts to purge all his political opponents—many of whom, such as Cavit Bey, were hanged. Because Rauf Orbay was out of the country and Karabekir was backed by İsmet İnönü and Fevzi Çakmak, the commander in chief of the army, they both managed to escape from ten-year imprisonment. Ali Fuat Cebesoy was first arrested then released.

A year later, on October 15, 1927, Mustafa Kemal started his speech (*Nutuk*) in the congress of the CHP. Perhaps the participants did not know that the speech was going to last 36 hours; Kemal delivered its contents over the course of six days. On the 20th of October, when he completed his speech, he may not have foreseen that his speech would become the most influential text of the political culture and that it would be used in different forms as a tool to reproduce the official historiography of the Turkish Republic. *Nutuk* not only became the definitive source of the official Turkish historiography on the War of Independence, but also a holy text of secular forces in the political culture of Turkey.

Only after the third Kemalist military intervention took place on September 12, 1981—along with academic criticisms of positivism and the enlightenment—did some Turkish historians from left-wing political backgrounds, some Islamist scholars, and some Kurdish intellectuals begin publicly to disapprove of the history represented by *Nutuk*, as well as the ideology and the daily practice of politics it advocated.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ It is not easy to measure how much of *Nutuk* has determined how much of the political culture after Mustafa Kemal died but as Taha Parla states in his book, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Atatürk’ün Nutuk’u (The Official Sources of Political Culture in Turkey: Atatürk’s Nutuk)* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), 173, “the careful observers of the Turkish political culture would acknowledge that the lion’s share of the themes, norms, and tendencies mentioned in *Nutuk* has survived to the present day.”

One of the most famous of those dissenters is Mete Tuncay, a leading left-wing historian, who in 1983 published *T.C. 'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi 'nin Kurulması (1923-1931)* (The Foundation of the One-Party Regime in the Turkish Republic). This work is widely regarded as the best historical account of political developments during the early Republic, and it critically examines the emergence of the Kemalist regime.⁵⁹ However, this book did not receive great attention, particularly from those who called themselves Kemalists. Tuncay's 1977 article published in *Toplum ve Bilim* (Society and Science), however, was even more important. In this article, Tuncay criticized the estimation of Mustafa Kemal's role in the history of the early Republic. He begins with the established *sine qua non* of discussing Mustafa Kemal: "If we want to protect Mustafa Kemal's heritage...." He goes on to argue: "we need to look at the facts and stop creating a golden age out of his political career."⁶⁰ Tuncay's article was not an academic text; rather it brainstormed about how to best examine Mustafa Kemal.⁶¹ The response, which was published in the 6 -7th issue of *Toplum ve Bilim*, came from Celil Gürkan, a retired general. Gürkan brutally criticized Tuncay, and accused him of not being fair in his assessment of Mustafa Kemal. Gürkan claimed that Tuncay presented unnecessary conclusions and generalizations. After reviewing Tuncay's article line by line and producing some generalizations regarding what Tuncay called "facts"⁶², Gürkan concluded:

⁵⁹ I mention about Mete Tuncay's book one more time in Chapter 4 when I explain the process of immortalization of Mustafa Kemal.

⁶⁰ Mete Tuncay, "Atatürk'e Nasıl bakmak", *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 4 (1978).

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Here Gürkan's strategy, stressing the facts, to oppose Tuncay, who is an academic historian, reminds me of Mustafa Kemal's comments on history during an interview in 1924 after Mustafa Kemal's memoir came out in 1924, where he criticized the empire and those who stayed in Istanbul and betrayed the nationalists

We wish that Tuncay could produce the above analysis of Mustafa Kemal [the one he produced] but we cannot see it. “How to look at Mustafa Kemal” is a really important issue, but one cannot look at him as such!⁶³

Gürkan’s desire was to undermine any critical account of Mustafa Kemal and his role in Turkish history, which, for him, was nothing but history as related in *Nutuk*—an account that he and many others generally accepted since its publication. Not coincidentally, the retired general wanted from Mete Tuncay exactly what Mustafa Kemal asked from the youths of the newly born nation at the end of his *Nutuk*: the preservation of Turkish national identity. In fact, it is this same message that the principals of private and state pre-university educational institutions in Turkey were made to hang on the front wall of classrooms next to national anthem; the same thing that every pre-university student in Turkey is forced to memorize; the same thing that is consumed in calligraphy more than any verse of Qur’an; the only means through which people in Turkey recognize Mustafa Kemal’s voice from an old record; the same thing that is the verse of, if I may say, the Adam of Turks in the collective representations of Turkish nationalism:

Turkish Youth!...The enemies conspiring against your independence and your republic may have behind them a victory, unprecedented in the annals of the world...those who hold power with the country may be in error, misguided and may even be traitors...Even in such circumstances,

during the War of Independence. “The attempts after this [referring to the events before the beginning of the War of Independence] ... happened because we did not have a substantial national history....” cited in Seyfettin Turan, *Atatürk’te Konular Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1995), 502

⁶³ Gürkan Celil, “Atatürk’e Nasıl bakmak: Bir Yanıt,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 6-7 (1978): 175-182.

it is your duty to save the Turkish independence and republic! The strength you need is already embedded in your noble blood! ⁶⁴

“Ey Türk Gençliği” as known to the people of the Turkish Republic, warns the youth about the possible external and internal enemies who constantly try to destroy the Republic, exactly as the retired general warns the public at the beginning of his response to Tuncay.⁶⁵ The continuity of warnings between 1927, 1977 and the present time reveals the political and social power of the history that Mustafa Kemal produced through *Nutuk*, which has since become the holy text of Turkish experience of modernity, of secular cultural nationalism, and of official Turkish historiography. This is true not only in Turkey and among Turkish scholars such as Niyazi Berkes⁶⁶, but also abroad and among foreign scholars such as Bernard Lewis ⁶⁷ as well as in the mental map of ordinary Turkish citizens.

An ordinary Turkish citizen today generally sees a continuation between the *Nutuk* (particularly its last words, the “Ey Türk Gençliği”) and the official symbols of the Turkish Republic (particularly outdoor monuments and statues, and indoor paintings of

⁶⁴ Atatürk, *Nutuk*, 258. This is not the whole text. I summarized it. This summaray is the essence of the text and enough to support my argument.

⁶⁵ Gürkan Celil, 175.

⁶⁶ Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 1964. Berkes has translated his book into Turkish. In fact, he rewrote it for the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish Republic. In the preface he wrote for the Turkish version, Berkes does not mention even the name of his book in English. Towards the end of the preface he states: “I wrote this book between 1972 and 1973 to contribute to the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the republic.” It is important to stress that most scholars of Turkish modernity did not notice that the Turkish version is almost a new book. The title of the Turkish version is not *Türkiye’de Laikliğin Gelişmesi*, a proper and literary translation of *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. It is *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma* (lit. Contemporization in Turkey). Berkes preferred to use the word *Çağdaşlaşma* since it refers to both *westernization* and *modernization* in the vocabulary of social sciences in Turkey. Also Berkes uses an expressive, strong academic Turkish to stress his positive feelings for the Kemalist Revolution. For this positive discrimination, see Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1973).

⁶⁷ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).

Mustafa Kemal as a form of urban expression). Given the legal dictate that all offices and official buildings must display a Mustafa Kemal portrait, while all courts and educational buildings must have a bust or a statue of Mustafa Kemal, one could argue that no room is available for alternative urban expressions of the history of the Turkish Republic.

As three-dimensional human-like structures, these symbols—particularly statues and monuments of Mustafa Kemal—have been the most powerful official urban symbols since the beginning of the Republic. The reason for this is simple: notwithstanding the fact that some figurative statues and busts existed in churches in the empire, the limited access Muslims had to those spaces meant that familiarity with figurative statues and the art of sculpture in Turkey developed only within the last hundred years.

This is why it is necessary to examine the history of statuary in Turkey before analyzing monuments of Mustafa Kemal erected before his death in 1938. The next chapter will address this topic. I begin with a review of the imperial period, when some initial attempts to introduce figurative public statues were made. I then cover the period before the emergence of three-dimensional human-like statues of Mustafa Kemal, when, between 1914 and 1924, abstract war monuments were erected in Anatolia to commemorate the deaths of unknown soldiers. Finally, I introduce six selected monumental statues of Mustafa Kemal, each of which, I argue, visualizes a stage in the War of Independence from the standpoint of Mustafa Kemal and the official historiography he defined in his *Nutuk*.

Chapter 2

Statuary in the Ottoman Empire and the Early Republic

During the Ottoman Empire, in accordance with Islam, three dimensional, human-like statues were considered idols and therefore signs of paganism. In Islam, the only permissible way for figurative forms to exist was as gravestones in Muslim cemeteries. In the eyes of the Muslim population, the gravestones were not like the figurative statues that Christians—and particularly Armenians—used as grave markers. These Christian graves traditionally included busts or full-scale figurative sculptures of the deceased, something forbidden in Islam.

One can argue that the perception of figurative art forms among the Muslim populace of the Empire and the Republic was not constructed through the definition of the term ‘idol’ provided in the Qur’an or the stories about the crushing of idols in Mecca; rather, it was a result of spatial application of the millet system.⁶⁸ Muslims differed from the Christians and Jews in their spatial expressions of “death” and “immortality”. This spatial differentiation laid the necessary social ground to create the *other* for their identity construction. Artistic expressions, particularly in cemeteries of different religions, for instance, exemplify this best. Figurative or nonfigurative allegorical representation of the

⁶⁸ The religious communities in the Ottoman Empire were called *millet* (*lit. nations*). Each community was given legal autonomy in their internal affairs. The religious leaders of each community were the representatives of community affairs to the state. This is known in Ottoman history as the Millet System. The word millet had only a religious and cultural connotation until the Ottoman reformers of the Tanzimat (1839-1876) introduced some decrees that aimed to establish a secular understanding of citizenship.

deceased, as was the case in gravestones, became a source of inspiration for each community. Instead of using busts and human-like statues in their cemeteries, Muslims, for instance, preferred abstract representations on gravestones, which, as most students of art history in Turkey argue, are abstract statues.

As for the history of non-figurative statuary, wars between the Ottoman Empire and other empires, particularly the Russian Empire in the 19th and early 20th Centuries and the War of Independence, culminated in a tradition of erecting war monuments in important open spaces in cities and battlefields. This was before the appearance of the figurative public monuments of Mustafa Kemal in the late 1920s.

In this chapter, I first discuss the war monument erected to commemorate the official Russo-Turkish Friendship after April 5, 1833, when the Russian Empire landed its troops on Beykoz (on the Asian side of Istanbul) to stop the governor of Egypt's army from marching on Istanbul. Then I talk about the second monument erected in San Stefano (modern Yeşilköy, near the International Mustafa Kemal Airport, only 7 miles from downtown Istanbul), which commemorates the peace between the two empires after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. Before I introduce the monuments of Mustafa Kemal, I mention *Abide-i Hürriyet* (Monument of Freedom) and *Tayyare Şehitleri Abidesi* (Monument to the Airplane Victims), two representations of martyrs.

THE WAR MONUMENTS

In March 1833, Mehmet Ali, a rebel governor according to Turkish historiography, ordered his troops into Ottoman Anatolia and routed the Ottoman forces near Konya.⁶⁹ This was four months before Russian soldiers arrived at Beykoz. During those four months, while Mehmet Ali opened negotiations, the Sultan looked for outside support to stop his advance. As soon as Mehmet Ali realized that he failed in negotiations, his son Ibrahim Paşa began to march on the capital Istanbul. Sultan Mahmut II, who was to imitate this rebel governor by accelerating the idea of modernization, surprisingly asked his enemy, Czar Nicholas I, for help. Since the Czar considered Mehmet Ali a puppet of France, he decided to send his army to stop Ibrahim Paşa.⁷⁰ This was enough for the Ottoman sultan to show the “rebel” governor that he was the commanding voice of the Empire.

Sultan Mahmut II ordered the erection of a war monument in Beykoz where Russian troops waited for Ibrahim Paşa. We find the brief story of the monument in Klaus Kreiser’s article *Public Monuments in Turkey and Egypt 1840-1916*, the first scholarly work on the history of statuary in the Empire, published in 1997 in *Muqarnas*, an annual that focuses on the visual culture of the Islamic world:⁷¹

⁶⁹ Zürcher, *Turkey: A modern History*, 39.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 38-40.

⁷¹ Although this article is the first scholarly work on history of statuary of the imperial period, as the author notices us at the end of the article, it is only a first approach to an unfamiliar subject. However, the article fails to include a discussion on Muslim gravestones. Also, although the author talks about the monument erected in Beykoz, Istanbul in 1833 to commemorate Russo-Turkish Friendship, he does not talk at all about Ayestefenos Monument, a war monument erected in Yesilköy, Istanbul, after the war between the

On one side of it were inscribed distiches composed by the influential statesman and poet Pertev Pasha saying that the Russians had come as *misafir* (guests) to the field of Beykoz; on the reverse was the Russian version of the same text.⁷²

The peace between the Russian and the Ottoman empires lasted almost 40 years, until Russia declared war in April of 1877. By the end of February, Russian troops arrived this time at a village on the European shore of Istanbul, San Stefano. The Ottoman Empire had no choice but to sign a peace treaty in San Stefano on March 3, 1878, which was an unmitigated disaster for it⁷³ and produced a shock effect in Ottoman society. However, what was more shocking was that Russians asked for a memorial to be erected in San Stefano to commemorate the peace. The political and military elite did not want to erect such a degrading monument, but the Russians insisted.⁷⁴

Although Kreiser provides us with the necessary information about the war monument in Beykoz, he does not mention the memorial Russians demanded from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, which Turkish historiography calls *Ayestefenos Abidesi* (Ayestefenos Monument).

The monument was destroyed at the beginning of World War I in 1914. It is worthwhile to mention the destruction of the monument on November 13, 1914 as

Ottoman and Russian Empires in 1887. Both monuments were destroyed in 1914 because of the World War One.

⁷² Klaus Kreiser's, "Public Monuments in Turkey and Egypt 1840-1916," *Muqarnas* 14, (1997), 104. This approximately four-meter-high memorial survived until the First World War, when it was destroyed by students of the nearby İttihad-i Osmani- the first a *cemiyet* (society) established by the students of Military Medical College in 1889, whose aim was to reinstate con. For more information about this committee, see Zürcher, *Turkey*, 91-94.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁷⁴ For the same reason, a monument was erected in a square in Moscow in 1887 to commemorate the Russian soldiers who fought against the Ottoman army and died in the battle of Plevna.

described in narratives published in *Tarih Dünyası* (World of History).⁷⁵ The sixth issue of *Tarih Dünyası*, published July 30, 1950, includes an article written by a retired officer Bahri Doğanay, an eyewitness of the destruction of the monument. According to Doğanay, there was a riot in San Stefenos one day before the monument's destruction. People from the city (İstanbul) and the village itself gathered to destroy the walls of the monument. Their first attempt was not successful; priests living within the monument (which apparently also served as a house) and Russian guards complained about the attempt to the government, and apparently the government ended the riot.

The next day Doğanay and his commander Hamit Fahri took the 27th section of the army—located in Davutpaşa, a nearby town—to San Stefenos to teach the soldiers how to use explosives. The commander ordered the soldiers to use the monument as a training target. Before the destruction of the monument, however, the director of public security, who was apparently inside the monument, rushed out and told the commander that the government did not approve the demolition of the monument.⁷⁶

What Bahri Doğanay does not tell us here is that Enver Paşa actually did approve the demolition; in fact, he went even further by ordering his guards to film the process. This film is thought to be the first movie in the history of motion pictures in Turkey.⁷⁷ So, if Enver Paşa approved the monument's demolition, why did he send guards to prevent the commander of the 27th Division, Hayri Bey, from blowing it up? That question is inextricably tied to the question of when, exactly, the empire entered into World War I.

⁷⁵ This history periodical published some documents and historical accounts on controversial issues in Ottoman-Turkish history in the 1950s.

⁷⁶ Bahri Doğanay, "Ayestefenos'taki Rus Abidesi Nasıl Yıkıldı?" (How was the Russian Monument in Ayestefenos destroyed?), *Tarih Dünyası*, Issue 6 (1950), 245-247, 260.

The 27th division of the army carried out the demolition of the monument on November 14, 1914, three and half months after Sait Halim Paşa (the Grand Vizier), Enver Paşa (the War Minister), and Talat Paşa (President of the Chamber Hall) signed an agreement of defensive alliance with Germany on August 2, 1914, one day after Russia mobilized against both Austria and Germany.⁷⁸

As Zürcher and most Turkish historians argue, this agreement marked a miscalculation by the government. The grand vizier, the war minister, and the president were well aware that the agreement was going to mean declaring war on the Russian Empire. What they did not foresee was that Germany's war strategy of stopping Russian expansionism would rely on the elimination of Russia's ally, France. From the Turks' standpoint, a possible war between Germany and Russia⁷⁹ could potentially help them gain back the territories lost after the war with Russia in 1877. In conclusion, apathy and hatred toward the Russian Empire found solid ground after the agreement, particularly in the military. Military circles encouraged Ottoman officers to destroy *Ayestefenos Abidesi*, as well as the monument in Beykoz, and to propagandize the demolition by filming it. Filming the monument's destruction also proved that the government and Enver Paşa played the good cops against the Russians while the same officials made the Russians believe that the government did not approve the demolition of the monuments.

Enver Paşa knew how important it was to show people a symbolic win, which would motivate them for a possible war between the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire. It was also important to show the members of the CUP as much as the rest of the

⁷⁷ This can be considered The *October* of Turkish movie industry.

⁷⁸ Zürcher, *Türkiye*, 117.

society. Reversing the action of erection of these now negatively perceived monuments turned people's feelings about them into a solid support of the government, a government whose leaders were entering a new war practically right after the end of the Balkan war in 1913.

The demolition of these statues was not the first time Enver Paşa and the other prominent unionists dealt with memorials. They had already learned their lesson on the power of the war monuments and monumentalizing public sentiments when they decided to put up two monuments in Istanbul, Abide-i Hürriyet and Tayyare Şehitleri Abidesi.⁸⁰

Abide-i Hürriyet (The Monument of Freedom) was to commemorate a campaign launched by common soldiers and students of religious schools against the Revolution of Young Turks demanding the restoration of Islamic law. The Third army stationed in Salonika marched on Istanbul and ended the revolt. The government accused Sultan Abdulhamit II of engineering this "counterrevolution" and ended his reign.⁸¹ Thus, the Monument of Freedom came to symbolize not only the Revolution but also the suppression of the counterrevolution and the final end of Abdulhamit's despotic regime that lasted more than 30 years from 1876 to 1909.

As Abide-i Hürriyet was dedicated to the memory of those who died in the revolt, and thus became a *şehitlik* (martyrium), *Tayyare Şehitleri Abidesi* was also built to be a

⁷⁹ Ibid., 116-117.

⁸⁰ Kreiser, *Public Monuments*, 112-113.

⁸¹ William L. Cleveland, *A History of Modern Middle East*, 2nd ed. (The United Kingdom: Westview Press, 2000), 132-133.

martyrium to represent the three Turkish officers who died when their airplanes crashed in 1914. As Kreiser points out, they are “the first Turkish victims of modern aviation.”⁸²

In the eyes of the Muslim populace, both monuments might have looked like a larger version of headless gravestones found in the cemeteries of Muslim notables. This is why ulema in Istanbul did not issue a *fatwa* ruling that these forms were in violation of Islamic law.⁸³

As Kreiser argues, *Abide-i Hürriyet* and *Tayyare Şhitleri Abidesi* did not accelerate the development of statuary in Turkey since the Revolution engendered the creation of only two public monuments between 1908 and 1918 in Istanbul.⁸⁴ However, they were the beginning of erecting abstract monuments in the late Ottoman Empire to commemorate those killed in a war.⁸⁵

The Republican political elite did not remove any of these monuments to destroy the symbols of the former regime. In fact, they continued the practice of erecting such monuments until the erection of statues and monuments of Mustafa Kemal beginning in the late 1920s. Perhaps, like Enver Paşa and the prominent unionists, Kemalists also saw the opportunity to make people feel that they, like the new order, were there for them. The way to show this was to immortalize the Unknown Soldier who died in the War of

⁸² Kreiser, *ibid.* 113

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 112. Here Kreiser also mentions about the *mufti* of Beirut who released a fatwa on November 16, 1910, which did not give permission to the municipality of Basra to put up a figurative statue of Midhat Pasha to commemorate his contribution to the formation of the 1876 constitution of the Empire. The mufti considered this figurative application an idol. For more information on this, see Kreiser, *Public Monument*, 117.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ These column-like memorials were erected in different parts of the empire not only to commemorate soldiers who died in battles but also to memorialize important events. Telgraf Monument in Damascus exemplifies this best. For the details and the figures of this monument, see Kreiser, *Public Monument*, 111-112.

Independence. Thus, Kemalists rushed to erect their first martyrrium of the Republic with expediency.⁸⁶

In 1924, in Afyon, where the Turkish army defeated the Greek troops and forced them to go back to Izmir, the first martyrrium monument of the Republic was opened by Mustafa Kemal himself. In the speech he delivered, he stated that the monument represented the unknown soldiers who died in the battle of Afyon, and that those soldiers were the real heroes of the nation whose blood saved the country.⁸⁷

After the opening of the monument in Afyon, more martyrrium monuments were erected in different parts of the new country, both on and off battlefields. The new regime seemed to enjoy the emergence of national consciousness through these monuments. As stated above, the fact that they were not figurative statues allowed to be accepted readily by the Muslim populace. This was important, considering that except for some Ottoman officials' attempts to introduce figurative sculptures after the proclamation of the Tanzimat in 1839, the Muslim populace outside of Egypt had never seen figurative monuments in public spaces in most cities of the Empire.

The most well-known example of these early attempts is the equestrian statue of Sultan Abdülaziz, sculpted in bronze by Ferdinand von Miller. This statue, however, never appeared in any public place, and it was the first and last human-like statue of an

⁸⁶ Long before the erection of the first martyrrium, the national press reported that the government was planning to commemorate the soldiers who died during the War of Independence through statuary. Some newspapers suggested that the name of the monument should be *Meçhul Asker Aniti* (Monument of the Unknown Soldier) while others considered the name improper since “the soldier is, in fact, known; he is Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa.”

⁸⁷ In saying that, Mustafa Kemal appeared to agree with the newspapers that suggested the name for the monument.

Ottoman sultan.⁸⁸ It was eventually moved to the palace of the sultan's son, Prince Abdulmecit, after the sultan died in 1876. One year after the foundation of the Republic in 1923, the statue was moved to the palace.⁸⁹

A small copy of the statue was also produced at an unknown time, and can be seen today in the palace, which has become an official museum.⁹⁰ Among all the belongings of the royal family, this small statue of an Ottoman sultan surprises the local tourists visiting the palace most, since its existence is not public knowledge. This might be because two items in the museum, the Kaşıkçı Elması and the hair of Prophet Muhammed, are so well known that the statue never became part of public memory.

In some ways, because the full-sized version of the statue of Abdülaziz never appeared in an open public place other than courtyards and storages, it shared the same destiny as its smaller version: neither occupies a celebrated place in the minds of the Turkish people. Since the monument was only a statue of the private sphere, it did not become a figurative representation of the empire's capital, nor did it enter the common consciousness of the public.

This is decidedly unlike the effort to erect some figurative sculptures around Sultanahmet more than hundred years before Sultan Abdulaziz. İbrahim Paşa became *sadrizam* (grand vizier) to Ahmet III one year after he married the sultan's daughter Fatima Sultan. When he went to Hungary for a campaign in the 1720s, he brought some figurative statues and placed them in Sultanahmet Meydanı. The Muslim *ulema* (religious scholars) called him *putperest* (idolater). After rebels of the Patrona Halil Rebellion (one

⁸⁸ For the brief history of this statue see Kreiser, *Public Monuments*, 105-109.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 109.

of the Janissary revolts to stop military reforms in the empire) killed İbrahim Paşa in 1730, the statues were removed.

As Kreiser points out, in contrast to Egypt, there were no figurative public statues or monuments in the capital of the empire.⁹¹ Hence, the statue as figurative art was not able to evolve until the formation of the art academy *Mekteb-i Sanayii Nefise-i Şahane* (Mimar Sinan University) in 1882, as part of late 19th century Westernization in the Ottoman Empire.

FIGURATIVE MONUMENTAL STATUES OF THE EARLY TURKISH REPUBLIC

All the monuments and statues of the early Republican period, as I noted in the previous chapter, commemorate the beginning of Turkish official history as constructed by Mustafa Kemal's *Nutuk*. The strategy in *Nutuk* was to minimize the role of the leading former members of the CUP in launching the nationalist movement. Mustafa Kemal—an important but not a leading unionist as well as a rival of Enver Pasha—was careful to stress that his landing at Samsun on 19 May 1919 started the nationalist movement.⁹²

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid. In this article, Kreiser provides us with a brief history of public monuments in Egypt, where equestrian statues of Muhammad Ali and his son İbrahim Paşa were erected before Sultan Abulaziz died.

⁹² 19 May 1919 was psychologically significant for Mustafa Kemal's understanding of the Independence war. Upon a request from a writer composing a biography for a foreign encyclopedia, he offered May 19 as his birth date, which for him marked the beginning of his life as a savior. He also offered May 19 as the day to celebrate Turkish youth. In 1936 he had his birth date officially changed to 19 May to make his feelings, his ideas and his history congruent to the birth of the nation. Volkan, Vamik, Norman Itzkowitz, *The Immortal Atatürk: A Psychobiography* (Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 1983), 121-127. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri* (Speeches and Statements by Atatürk), 2 vols. (Istanbul: Turk İnkılap Institute, 1952).

Nutuk not only provided a heroic history of an emerging new nation, but also marked Mustafa Kemal and his fellows' full political authority in the newly established Republic. In other words, the text symbolized the suppression of both the CUP and the TPCF. Mustafa Kemal emerged as an unchallengeable leader, not only in reality but also in text. However, text alone did not fully marshal the perception of the people. Mustafa Kemal therefore welcomed and encouraged the new political elite to visualize the new national identity. The new architectural styles and particularly the propaganda of statues and monuments of Mustafa Kemal served best, since 95 percent of the population was illiterate and these three-dimensional structures did not need literacy to notice.

In several public speeches before Nutuk, though, Mustafa Kemal had already emphasized the importance of art (read as Western art) and particularly statuary in the development of a "modern society." His speech on monuments at the Bursa Şark Sinema (Bursa Eastern Movie Theater) in 1923 can be considered the beginning of Kemal's embrace of statuary, which later turned into a monumental propaganda. This public speech demonstrated the importance he attached to statuary in the process of modernization:

When our prophet told his people the laws of God, those people had idols both in their hearts and in their brains. To draw these people to the way of God, he first had to break those stone idols and remove them both from their hearts and their pockets... Thus, it dishonors Islam to assume that those enlightened people are going to believe in the idols again. Our enlightened and devout nation will improve the art of sculpting—which is one of the main motivations behind cultural progress—to its highest point; and every corner of our country will

scream the reminiscences of our ancestors and descendants to the entire world through these magnificent statues.⁹³

The speech also suggested an effort to legitimize sculpture from an Islamic point of view, which indicates Mustafa Kemal's search for ways to proliferate and maintain the order. Lastly, the speech also recognizes this art form as an important tool in achieving the Kemalist national goal, as well as an acid test to determine those who were not in favor of the new regime and those who were eager to be part of it.

Mustafa Kemal's speech was given one year after Winston Churchill's niece, Clara Sheridan, a journalist and sculptor, visited Mustafa Kemal in Izmir. She had sculpted statues of Lenin and Trotsky in 1921 before she came to Turkey to sculpt Mustafa Kemal's bust on September 15, 1922. Sheridan quotes her interview with Mustafa Kemal:

I showed the collection made up of the photographs of my pieces of works and asked his permission to sculpt his bust. He looked at Lenin's bust for a long time...He replied modestly:

'I have no time.'

I said I work fast. I completed Asquith's bust in four hours. Lenin did not even pose. It would be enough for me to look at you when you are working. Now he was in doubt. Finally, he said:

'Maybe, let me think for a while.'⁹⁴

Although, in the end, Mustafa Kemal did not allow Sheridan to sculpt his image into a bust, it is likely that he first began to consider immortalizing himself in statue

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Clara Sheridan, *Mayfair to Moscow: Clare Sheridan's Diary* (New York: Boni and Liverroght Publishers, 1921).

during this meeting. Unlike the case in the Soviet Union, where Stalin made Lenin, and later himself, into a cult figure, Mustafa Kemal welcomed and encouraged only icons of his own image in statues, monuments and portraits in early republican Turkey.

However, considering that the history of statuary in Turkey is limited to the history of Mustafa Kemal's statues and monuments, his acceptance only of statues of himself contradicts the statement he makes in his speech at Bursa Sark Sinemasi. As mentioned above, Kemal argued that the purpose of encouraging sculptors and sending students abroad for training making was to show the world "the reminiscences of ancestors and descendants" through statuary.

Following the meeting at Sark Sinemasi, the Turkish Republic started to support painters and sculptors in order to facilitate the adoption of the new political order by the people, stimulate the awakening of a national consciousness, and meet the goals of its determined founding father. Mekteb-i Sanayi-i Nefise-i Şahane was the institution that enjoyed this state support the most. However, when the Kemalists organized efforts to dress city squares, open spaces, and parks with statues and monuments of Mustafa Kemal, foreign sculptors such as Austrian Heinrich Krippel⁹⁹ and Italian Pietro Canonica¹⁰⁰ were commissioned to construct the statues and monuments of the early

⁹⁹ Heinrich Krippel was born in Vienna in 1883 and graduated from the Faculty of Fine Arts at Vienna. He came to Turkey to participate in an international competition regarding a statue of Mustafa Kemal. He won the first price. He lived thirteen years in Turkey as a visiting artist and died in Vienna 1945 Vienna.

¹⁰⁰ Pietro Canonica was born in Torino in 1869 and died in 1962 in Rome. He was schooled Academia Albertina in Torino. Besides statues of Mustafa Kemal, he sculpted the statue of Alexander II in Leningrad, King Faysal's statue in Baghdad, Iraq and Simon Bolivia's statue in Colombia.

Republican period as early as 1925.¹⁰¹

Local artists and intellectuals, such as Falih Rıfki—a journalist and representative who was very close to Mustafa Kemal— criticized hiring these foreign sculptors, particularly after the appearance of the first foreign-made statue in Sarayburnu.

Opponents of foreign sculptors argued that resources should not be wasted on sculptors such as Krippel and Canonica (who critics considered incapable), and that local artists should be preferred in making statues of the republic. These critics believed that while the statues that local artists make may not be as good as statues European sculptors create, they would at least embody the true spirit and experience of the Republic.


The political elite's answer to this was simple. According to state officials there was no sculptor in Turkey who could produce these important monuments; until Turkish artists sent to Europe for training were ready to produce sculptures, there was no other way but to hire them from without. However, even after those artists came back from Europe in the mid 1930s, the governments and municipalities did not stop hiring foreign sculptors. The public's common criticism was the contradiction between hiring foreign sculptors while promoting a strong Turkish national identity (for more on this discontent, see Chapter 3).

Obviously the concerns of the regime and the public did not coincide in the 1930s. This is possibly because Mustafa Kemal and his associates were well aware that filtering images of the newly born Republic through these European artists would help them resonate with western countries. This was extremely important to Kemal, as he was

¹⁰¹ Nurullah Berk, Huseyin Gezer, *50 yilin Resim ve Heykeli* (Istanbul: Turkiye Isbankasi Yayinlari, 1973), 157-73.

trying to declare that the regime was part of the so-called civilized world, a claim he announced to the nation over and over again in various public speeches. Along those lines, foreign sculptors, painters, and architects were expected to be mediators between the new emerging secular modern Turkish Republic and the European countries through the expression of their art works.

While Mustafa Kemal and the political elite were not open to the criticism about hiring foreign sculptors, they were brutal against those who questioned the urgency of the monumental propaganda itself, especially those who wondered whether the resources it took to create statuary might be applied to more productive investments. The regime showed its seriousness about this when the following cartoon was published in *Yeni Kalem* (New Pen), a weekly comic of the time.



The standing figure in the cartoon represents a villager, the sitting figure is Pierre Canonica. The sub-caption reads:

Villager: Gentleman! Isn't this enough yet?

Canonica: Give me my old man, give me! Not all of it will make it to

my pocket.

When Yusuf Ziya, the editor of *Yeni Kalem*, decided to publish this cartoon, he did not know that the government would consider it a threat to the regime and take court action against him. On January 7, 1928, a year after the cartoon appeared in the journal, Yusuf Ziya stood in front of a judge who asked him a rhetorical question: are you the editor of *Yeni Kalem*? It was the first question of his trial that was to end in two sessions. Yusuf Ziya replied:

I am not the editor of *Kalem*. Without my permission and unbeknownst to me, the issue was signed. In fact, after I realized this situation I informed the Directorate of the Press. For this reason I am not responsible for this cartoon.¹⁰²

After Yusuf Ziya denied responsibility, the judge postponed the case until January 12 to obtain an official statement on the matter from the Directorate of the Press. On the January 11, after the judge announced in the courtroom that Yusuf Ziya was, in fact, the editor of the issue, the judge read the sub-caption of the cartoon. Then the following exchange took place between the judge and Yusuf Ziya:

Judge: If the whole amount is not only for Canonica, then who else will benefit from this?

Ziya: Your Honor! It means that there are other expenses such as transportation of the statue.

Judge: You would not prefer to inform people with this cartoon if this was your real intention. What is your actual goal here?

Ziya: If a foreigner is to sculpt the statue of our president Gazi, then he should be the greatest of all. We do not consider Canonica as

¹⁰² Cumhuriyet, 8 January 1928

such. A local artist, even though he is not as good as a European one, at least could give spirit to the statue. We defend this.

Judge: Well, would everybody reach the same conclusion?

Ziya: I am not everybody. I am myself.

Judge: You are being accused of degrading the government by implying 'corruption' with this cartoon.¹⁰³

After roughly two more hours of this exchange, Yusuf Ziya heard the verdict. He was sentenced to one year in prison, which was a message to the rest of the press: critics of the monuments should not question the financial choices of the government. After this court case, no more criticism appeared in the national press, not about the import of monumental propaganda nor the hiring of foreign sculptors to express the national suffering during the War of Independence.

The issue of foreign sculptors' ability to capture Turkish sentiment, as mentioned above, was not the only concern of the new regime. The mediation these sculptors could provide between Turkey and the Western world seems to be one of the regime's principal concerns, and thus the political elite did not stop hiring foreigners until the end of the single party regime in the 1940s.

This process of mediation started with Heinrich Krippel's monument, erected in 1926 in Sarayburnu—a location that gained significance as Mustafa Kemal's departure point after the occupation of Istanbul by the allied powers in 1920. Although the public and some intellectuals criticized this first monument even before its erection (a subject I address in the next chapter), the regime hired Krippel again to make statues of Mustafa Kemal for Konya, Samsun, Ankara, and Afyon.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

The first representation of Mustafa Kemal in statue form in Sarayburnu (figure 2) today commemorates the birth of a national leader (see chapter 3). He is shown wearing a suit, or “civilian” or “civilizing” clothes, which symbolizes and visualizes a new human subject. The statue depicts the emergence of a national leader with his back to Istanbul, facing Anatolia. His right leg steps forward and his closed fist rests on his waist. This posture evokes the feeling that the statue will move at any moment to start a liberation movement.

The second monument that Krippel designed was erected in Samsun (see Chapter 5). It was dedicated on January 15, 1932, five years after the first monument of the Republic. The monument depicts Mustafa Kemal on a rearing horse. As opposed to the Sarayburnu monument, Kemal now appears in a uniform, looking very determined, and is about to unsheathe his sword. The determination in the figure conveys an image of the beginnings of national struggle, capturing the Mustafa Kemal who leaves Istanbul as a civilian on the 16th of May 1919, and becomes a soldier again in Samsun, three days later on May 19. He exudes the determination of a leader in military uniform (figure 3).

The monuments in Ankara and Konya (both 1927) were the last two Krippel works sculpted for the regime. The monument in Konya was placed in the most important square of the city, the Station Square. In this bronze monument placed on a high base pedestal, Krippel again depicts Mustafa Kemal as the leader in military uniform. The leader stands with his left hand gripping a sword and his right hand holding a bundle of wheat, one of the most important agricultural products of the region. This dominant posture gives the statue the symbolic power to command the entire square. Written on the back of a photograph (figure 4) taken in honor of the inauguration are the words:

Gazi's statue. . . To honor the ceremony. The man with the beard, his hat in his hand, is Hacı Huseyin Aga. He brought a sheep to sacrifice on the day of the ceremony. ¹⁰⁴

Hacı Huseyin represents the rich peasants and local notables with whom the new political order allied itself during the War of Independence. The fact that the opening ceremony included a sacrifice points to an interesting unification of the two groups. The combination of Islamic and modern practices shows us that Kemalism draws on a synthesis of Turkish and Islamic forces, as was implied even in the name of the leader, *Ghazi Mustafa Kemal*.

The monument in Ankara (figure 5) was the largest statue of Mustafa Kemal ever built, according to an article appearing in the journal *Yeni Gün* (New Day) on November 17, 1927.¹⁰⁵ It was erected in the most (and only) important square of the new capital (see Chapter 5). Parliament and several shops surrounded the square.

This statue, as Erdentug notes, “consists of a stone rectangular prism with middle reliefs on its left and right faces depicting scenes from the War of Independence.”¹⁰⁶ One of the scenes shows Mustafa Kemal viewing the Greek Army's loss and withdrawal. Mustafa Kemal is depicted in military uniform on horseback once again. Each side of the main structure has one statue of a Turkish soldier in combat. At the back of the structure, facing the citadel, is another statue of a peasant woman (see chapter 4), representing the

¹⁰⁴ Cited in Elibal, 198.

¹⁰⁵ Aygen, Erdentuğ, Berrak Burçak, “Political Tuning in Ankara, a Capital, as Reflected in its Urban Symbols and Images.” *International Urban and Regional Studies*, (Oxford & Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1988), 593.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

female heroes of the war, carrying a cannon to the battlefield on her back. The statue metaphorically characterizes the battle an effort taken on by the whole nation against the Allied powers. Its imagery reflects a life or death situation for the participants. In the statue, there are two soldiers in the front, the leader on a horse and the peasant woman, and, at the back, a group of people representing one body of determination (see Chapter 5). That is to say, the vision of combat represented by the statue unifies the leader and the people as a collective symbol of a national consciousness. It is important to note that Mustafa Kemal is depicted giving the famous battle order, “Soldiers, your goal is the Mediterranean,” which is inscribed on the relief. The same inscription is also found on the statue in Izmir. However, unlike the statue in Izmir, the leader does not point to the Mediterranean.

The last major monument Krippel sculpted for the regime was erected in 1936 in Afyon (see Chapter 5). Here, the monument illustrates Mustafa Kemal naked and in a very determined posture, with his left fist clenched and his right fist hooked, almost like an eagle’s talon, poised and ready to strike (figure 6). The figure is carved so that the masculine authority of the leader stands out both because of his nakedness. He is naked both literally and figuratively (as in unarmed), but still represents the powerful body of the nation. Below his stout virility the enemy lies in agony. The face of a defeated man at his feet is reminiscent of Greek sculpture.

A Turkish artist, Sadi Barak, states that Mustafa Kemal selected the theme of the reliefs on the sides of the monument. Münir Hayri Egeli confirms this information and

adds that, in a meeting that he witnessed, Krippel presented the plan of the monument to Mustafa Kemal and he altered the conceptual representation of the reliefs.¹⁰⁷

The Italian sculptor Canonica was the second foreign artist invited to Turkey to produce statues and monuments of Mustafa Kemal. Canonica erected his first monument in an open field in front of the Ankara Ethnographical Museum in 1927.¹⁰⁸ It shows Mustafa Kemal on a horse, in his military uniform, staring ahead. That same year, a statue of Mustafa Kemal in his marshal's uniform was erected in Zafer Square in Ankara. In 1928, Canonica unveiled his most famous monument, the monument in Taksim Square, Istanbul (see Chapter 4). A committee was formed to carry out the task of visualizing the concept of "the newly founded Republic" in a single monument. The design was ultimately prepared by Canocina in 1926, and was presented to Mustafa Kemal by this committee. Upon Mustafa Kemal's approval of the design, Canonica was given the task of sculpting the monument.¹⁰⁹

The Izmir monument symbolizes the last step of the Independence War, which Mustafa Kemal started in Samsun on May 19, 1919. This statue reminds us of the views of collective consciousness formed during the War of Independence. During this time, the Turkish people became a national body under one leader, one country, one history, and one culture. Mustafa Kemal's extended index finger, I suggest, conveys the authority that his people, or new human subjects, gave him as the national leader. It symbolize the nation as one country, under one order—Kemal's.

¹⁰⁷ Hayri, E. Mehmet, *Ataturk'ten Bilinmeyen Hatiralar* (Istanbul: Ahmet Yasaroglu Kitapcilik ve Yayıncılık, 1959), 35-36.

¹⁰⁸ After Mustafa Kemal died in 1938, his embalmed body was buried temporarily at this Museum.

Most of the statues and monuments of Mustafa Kemal represent him with stern expressions, either in uniform on his horse or wearing civilian clothes. In most of the statues he is alone or standing as a solitary figure in front of a crowd. The statue sculpted by Canonica in downtown Zafer (Victory) square portrays him in his general's uniform, standing, leaning over his sword and looking ahead, as he was wont to do.

Another statue of Mustafa Kemal by Canonica was erected on a hill overlooking the expanding cityscape of Ankara, the new capital of the country. The pedestal is a rectangular prism of red marble with two small low reliefs on each side. One shows the new capital in ruins, but with sun shining on it. The other is a post-battlefield scene, which contains small, round, low reliefs on the remaining sides, depicting scenes from behind the battle lines, and one showing the downfallen sultan leaving the country.¹¹⁰

The living sultan symbolizes Mustafa Kemal's victory over the old political and military elite in Turkey. It also symbolizes a moral victory in the political battle of resistance against the Allied powers. It represents Kemal's achievement in gaining hegemonic power through the War of Independence. In this image, the sun shining on the ruined capital enlightens his and the nation's own domain of sovereignty. He begins his economic, social, cultural, and political battle by asserting a hegemonic political power that reshapes the world of social institutions and practices.

The sculpting of statues and monuments of Mustafa Kemal in public spaces steadily gained momentum after he died. İnönü, one of the heroes of the War of

¹⁰⁹ Elibal, 205-208.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

Independence and Kemal's closest friend and prime minister during his reign, succeeded him and tried to minimize his symbolic power.

Inönü, however, could not replace Kemal with his own image in terms of national symbols, although there were statues of him sculpted, and his picture was printed on Turkish money. After Turkey was became a multi-party regime in 1946, a new interest group established the Democratic Party (DP) under Celal Bayar, Mustafa Kemal's last prime minister of before his death. DP introduced populism into Turkish politics and won the 1950 elections, gaining two-thirds of the seats in the assembly. The members of CHP considered this to be the counter-revolution, as the leader of the opposition now had to monumentalize Mustafa Kemal's heritage and defend his reforms.

DP, however, was not willing to see CHP benefit from Mustafa Kemal's popularity. After some radical Islamists crushed some statues of Mustafa Kemal following the party's devastating win in the elections of 1950, Celal Bayar, as the founder of DP and the president of Turkey, issued a law to protect Mustafa Kemal's image. By doing so, Bayar started what it is called in Turkish political culture Kemalism from the right (for further information see Chapter 4).

Bayar's attempt to reissue Kemalism as a state ideology was not enough to prove that his party was not counter-revolutionary. He and his prime minister, Adnan Menderes, became scapegoats for this counter-revolutionary discourse and the Turkish army intervened on May 27, 1960. Menderes was hanged along with two other prominent ministers in the following year.

Two years after Menderes was hanged, the newspaper *Milliyet* launched a campaign to inaugurate "Mustafa Kemal statues" in the public squares of all provinces

that lacked one. This resulted in the placement of statues and monuments of Mustafa Kemal in provincial towns such as Bingöl, Tunceli, Van, Bitlis, Mardin, and Muş, most of which were largely populated by Kurdish citizens of the Republic.

After *Milliyet* initiated a new round of monumental propagandizing to show its support for the Kemalist army, Turkey was bombarded with aesthetically poor statues and monuments of Mustafa Kemal, sparked by the secular national press, the secularist circles, and the army—especially after each of Turkey’s military coups in 1971, 1980, and 1997 respectively.

These physical representations of Mustafa Kemal recalled the nation’s mental representation of Kemal as the immortal leader who defeated the world’s evil powers. The belief in immortality reflects the hope for national survival and national unity under the father’s protection. As Pollock argues, “immortality can thus be seen as a personal union with the broader idealized social system-utopia, which lives on ideologically after the individual’s physiological demise.”¹¹¹

¹¹¹ Griselda Pollock, “On Mourning, Immortality, Utopia,” *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 23 (1975), 348.

Chapter 3

The First Monumental Figurative Statue of Mustafa Kemal

Sultanahmet, Beyazit, and Taksim Meydanı are the three most important public places in Istanbul today. Sultanahmet was the most important of the three until the 19th century. It was the center of politics and social life of the city, just as it was for the Byzantine and Roman Empires. Beyazit Meydanı was the first renaissance-style square of the city¹¹². Taksim (lit. distribution) was an open space and a source for water distribution to the city until it became a central zone when Sultan Abdülmecit II moved the royal palace to the west of the city in 1856.

Moving the royal palace to the west changed the seat of political power. The Sublime Port stayed where it was, close to Topkapı palace, until the end of the empire. To go to the new palace, the Dolmabahçe Sarayı, from the sublime port, people needed to pass through the center of commerce, the Galata, which expanded towards Taksim at the end of the 19th century. This political urbanization pushed city dwellers more toward the west of the city. New settlements were opened there, and people were encouraged to move west. At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries two districts, Şişli and Teşvikiye (lit. encouragement), emerged as the new middle class areas.

Taksim was physically in the center of these new neighborhoods, Dolmabahçe (the new royal palace), and the Sublime Port. As the physical center of late 19th and early

¹¹² For Beyazid Meydanı, see Nese Gurallar Yesilkaya, *Transformation of a public space in the nineteenth century Istanbul: Beyazi Meydanı* (Ankara: METU, 2003).

20th century Istanbul, Taksim became the most important open space for the new regime, since it was still an undefined domain. That is to say, it was not recognized as a social and political space or a square yet, even though it was surrounded by the water reservoir, an Ottoman army base across from the reservoir, and some houses. Therefore, when the new regime decided to make itself visible in open spaces, Taksim was a more rational pick than other important places such as Beyazit and Sultanahmet. It might have been the new regime's goal to contrast the old and the new not only in terms of social and political issues but also through art, architecture, and urbanization. In this light, Taksim was a sensible choice for the new regime as a place to represent the new and a venue to exercise its authority on new national holidays.

The new regime's strategy of stressing both the new and the old in terms of urbanization allowed Beyazit Meydani and Sultanahmet Meydani to survive as spatial representations of the empire, anchored in Islam, while Taksim emerged as the place of the new secular and national official public culture. The new regime pursued the same strategy in most Ottoman cities, including Izmir and Samsun, two other important port cities of Anatolia, by opening new republican squares as opposed to using the ones inherited from the empire. This caused a duality in the image-making processes of these Ottoman-Republican cities. As a result, the Republican and Ottoman squares fought against each other for dominance as the symbol of cities in the mental maps of the populace.

For the new regime, Istanbul—the capital city of three empires—was the hardest location to capture in the fight for representation. This was not only because the city was the biggest city in the Republic, but also because its inhabitants played a smaller role in

the Independence War than the people of Anatolia. Residents of Istanbul were suspicious of the new regime since Mustafa Kemal and his fellows founded the Republic in 1923 and made Ankara the new capital, ostensibly ending Istanbul's political power. However, the new regime did not end the commercial role of the city, which helped non-Muslims, who were the business class of the empire, look for ways to show acceptance of the new regime even before the Muslim middle class of the city.

The Union and Progress' creation of economic policies to promote the Muslim Turkish bourgeoisie during World War I (called *Milli İktisat*, or National Economy) sparked the middle class culture of the old capital. The Kemalist regime also pursued this group,¹¹³ of whom they were suspicious because they considered them the supporters of the CUP, particularly Cavit Bey, the leader of big business, and Kara Kemal, the representative of small business. In fact, the suspicion was so deep that Mustafa Kemal did not stop in Istanbul when he first passed the city again in 1924, five years after he left on May 15, 1919. It is possible that he was even afraid of an assassination attempt from the Unionist underground.

Mustafa Kemal did not dare return to Istanbul until he eliminated the prominent Unionists in 1926, just after they attempted to assassinate him in Izmir. Mustafa Kemal's power to purge all his political opponents in one fell swoop made him seem invincible to the opponents of the new regime. At that point, the Muslim middle class in the old capital finally showed signs of accepting the new regime. Once they were sure that Kemalists would retain power and that their commercial relationship with the old Unionists had

¹¹³ For economic policies of the CUP and the details of *Milli İktisat*, see Zafer Toprak, *Milli İktisat* (Ankara: Yurt Yayinlari, 1980).

ended, they started to look for ways to show their admiration and support for the new regime.

The non-Muslim population of the city followed suit in Istanbul as in other cities, especially in İzmir. This group was afraid that the new regime might send them out of the country, much like they did in the population exchange of 1923. Therefore non-Muslim merchants did not hesitate to offer financial support when the new regime added a monumental propaganda program to the agenda after Mustafa Kemal's Şark Sineması speech on statuary.

This was clearly the case when the new regime decided to erect a *cumhuriyet abidesi* (Republican monument) in Taksim that was to represent the emergence of the new regime and its leader, Gazi Mustafa Kemal. Unsurprisingly, 90 percent of the donations for the monument in Taksim came from the non-Muslim population of the city.¹¹⁴

However, even before Taksim became a Republican square featuring a statue of Mustafa Kemal in the center, the Muslim population of Istanbul had already shown their loyalty to the new regime and its leader by erecting a statue of him in Sarayburnu, on October 3, 1926. This was the departure point for Mustafa Kemal when he left for Samsun, one day after the Greek occupation of Izmir on May 15, 1919.

I argue that the statue in Sarayburnu was the result of negotiations between the new regime and the suspicious Muslim middle class of the old capital. The donations for

¹¹⁴ For list of donors for the erection of a statue of Mustafa Kemal in Taksim, see Niyazi Ahmet Banoglu, *Taksim Cumhuriyet Abidesi Şeref Defteri* (Istanbul: Buyuk Istanbul Dernegi Yayini, 1973). This book contains some of the original documents about the statue since the originals and some records regarding the financial issues got rotten when the municipality library moved to a new place in the 1970s.

the statue in Sarayburnu show that, unlike their integral role in the erection of the Taksim statue, non-Muslims were not part of the deal. Therefore, when the statue was opened, it symbolized the old Muslim middle class' recognition of the new regime, which, for Kemalists, also meant the end of Unionist underground influence in the former capital. This is why the mayors of Istanbul, who were appointed by Ankara, paid careful attention to the newly born republic, and especially to the opening ceremony of the first monumental public statue in Istanbul.

THE FIRST MONUMENTAL FIGURATIVE STATUE OF MUSTAFA KEMAL IN ISTANBUL

Immediately after Mustafa Kemal's 1923 public speech in Şark Sineması in Bursa, the Istanbul Municipality was the first local government that campaigned to erect a statue of Gazi Mustafa Kemal. The mayor, Emin Bey, formed a committee in 1924 that commissioned the task to the Austrian sculptor Heinrich Krippel. The committee met on a regular basis, then updated the public about the preparation process through pieces in *Şehir Emaneti Mecmüsü* (the monthly journal of the Istanbul municipality) and various newspapers.¹¹⁵

On August 25, 1925, nearly 13 months before the opening ceremony of the statue, the committee organized a public ceremony to mark the future location of the base pedestal of the statue in Sarayburnu, which was an Imperial tradition. Istanbul deputies of the Turkish Great Assembly, generals of the army bases in Istanbul, members of the

¹¹⁵Ibid., p.9. Today, these periodicals are the only extant committee reports. As I mentioned before the originals were lost or left behind during the relocation of the municipality archives in the 1970s.

Republican People's Party, officials from the Istanbul municipality, and press representatives participated in the ceremony, and all signed a document confirming the greatness of the savior and noting the official opening of the construction site. The mayor himself put the document in a box and buried it in the base stone marker, and later informed Gazi Mustafa Kemal of the ceremony by sending him and the Ministry of the Interior a telegraph message.¹¹⁶ Gazi Mustafa Kemal replied to this message the next day, on August 26, 1925:

I am pleased to see that people of Istanbul became the first to attempt to erect my statue. I thank you for expressing your sincere feelings by putting the first base stone in the construction site.
*President Gazi Mustafa Kemal*¹¹⁷

Nearly six weeks after *Sehir Emaneti Mecmuasi* reported the opening of the construction site, Heinrich Krippel sent a long letter to the journal. He wrote about his meetings with Gazi Mustafa Kemal, his feelings about sculpting the first statue of the Turkish republic, how a sculptor works on his/her subject, and his ideas on how people perceive statues.¹¹⁸

Krippel's letter was the first from a foreign sculptor to the public. He basically aimed to please the public by sending it, since the monumental propaganda of the regime attracted the attention of many competing European sculptors even as late as 1938. One of these hopefuls included the French sculptor Hippolyte Louis Dutheil, who applied to

¹¹⁶ *Sehir Emaneti Mecmuasi*, issue 12, August 1925, 426.

¹¹⁷ *ibid.*

¹¹⁸ *Sehir Emaneti Mecmuasi*, issue 15, November 1925, 113-114.

the consulate of Turkey in France on March 18, 1938 and submitted his “voici du reste mon curriculum vitae.”¹¹⁹

Krippel kept updating the committee about his progress as he finished the job, and the committee kept informing the public accordingly. On March 4, 1926, the daily *Milliyet* informed the public that Krippel had finished sculpting the statue, and had put it on a Viennese train bound for Istanbul along with five busts of Mustafa Kemal. The news also stated that the opening would take place after Krippel’s arrival in Istanbul, and that the statue was to be placed on the base pedestal prepared by the municipality.

Nearly 10 days later, *Milliyet* informed the public of a conflict that had arisen between the committee and Krippel over the base pedestal of the statue. According to the news, Krippel had violated the contract and sculpted a statue that was too big for the base pedestal prepared by the municipality. Krippel criticized the committee, saying that he had sculpted a statue for a 1.51 square meter base pedestal, which he claimed he informed the committee about before he started the job. The committee rejected his argument and reminded him of the figure on the contract that he had signed, which proposed a 94 square centimeter base pedestal. According to *Milliyet*, Krippel did not respond to the committee’s accusation, and the committee had to inform the Egrem Hof museum where Krippel worked that the committee could only approve the job if it complied with the 94 square meter base pedestal specifications.

Some of the committee members met on March 14, 1926 with a representative of the Egrem Hof museum to resolve the problem. After the meeting, Şükrü Ali Bey, the

¹¹⁹ State Decree, Document from the Prime Ministry Archives of the Turkish Republic. Classification number: 030.10.202.377.13.

vice mayor of the city, informed the public in a press briefing that “the committee had decided to wait for the arrival of the statue and see if there was a big problem with the base, and if there was, then the committee would reconsider the situation and act accordingly.”¹²⁰

Ten days later, on March 24, the statue arrived in Istanbul. The statue was held by customs for six days in order to complete the paperwork, since customs requested a tax exemption for the statue from the government.¹²¹ After Mustafa Kemal signed the decree, the statue was stored in a building near Sarayburnu, on March 30.

The committee members arrived to see the statue on April 2, 1926. After they saw the statue they realized that it was obviously too large for the pedestal prepared by the municipality. They decided to move the statue closer to the pedestal to more accurately gauge the disparity. Finally, the committee decided that the pedestal could not be modified to fit the statue and therefore must be changed.¹²²

While the committee was dealing with the base pedestal, discontent over the statue emerged in the national press. On April 5, Falih Rıfkı, the editor of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, the official daily of the Kemalist regime, criticized the Istanbul municipality in his article titled “İstanbul Heykeli” (Istanbul statue). Rıfkı was one of the closest intellectual and political figures to Mustafa Kemal, but he accused the municipality’s committee of spending too much money on the first monumental statue of Turkey, especially since a foreign sculptor benefited from the job. He added that once the municipality of the biggest city in Turkey hired this random foreign sculptor, the Konya and Ankara

¹²⁰ Milliyet, 16 March 1926.

¹²¹ Ibid., 30 March 1926.

municipalities followed Istanbul's example by ordering new Ataturk statues by the same sculptor, whose previous work proved that he was not a good artist. He concluded his article by warning other municipalities not repeat the same mistakes.¹²³

On April 7, 1926, two days after Falih Rifki's critical article broke, the new mayor of Istanbul, Muhittin Bey, went to Ankara to present Mustafa Kemal with pictures of the statue toin hopes that he would approve the final product.¹²⁴ Although the statue did not satisfy the political or intellectual elite in Ankara, the Ministry of the Interior approved the erection of the statue on April 18, 1926. After the approval, the committee finished the new base pedestal on June 28, 1926, and scheduled the opening ceremony for October 3, 1926.

THE OPENING CEREMONY

On September 29, 1926, the Istanbul daily *Yeni Ses* (The New Voice) informed its readers that the municipality planned a groundbreaking opening for the first statue of the Republic, and that Sukru Ali Bey, the vice mayor, was in charge of preparing a program.

The Municipality press published the program on September 30, and sent it to more than 500 hundred notables, among them the deputies, members of the government and the party, municipality officials, members of Istanbul University, high schools, members of Turk Ocagi, Istanbul Commerce, Esnaf Komisyonu (Commission of Small

¹²² Ibid., 2 April 1926.

¹²³ Hakimiyet-i Milliye, 5 April 1926.

¹²⁴ Milliyet, 7 April 1926.

Business) and the public.¹²⁵ The program stated that the Navy Orchestra, along with a large group of military personnel and police forces, were among the participants.

The mayor included representatives of both the civil society and the state institutions in the ceremony. Even though the mayor and the committee made certain to tailor the ceremony to embrace all the city's people, the ceremony had a dress code that made it impossible to attend for those who could not afford the attire. The program stated the dress code clearly:

Those who are going to participate in the opening ceremony have to wear a suit or a dark dress.

The dark dress here symbolized the official character of the ceremony, and the suit represented the discipline of the official public culture of the Republic, unlike the case the culture of the empire. The dress code, almost the only difference between this ceremony and imperial opening ceremonies, was a follow-up to what the new regime called the "Hat Revolution." Mustafa Kemal in 1924 publicly announced the Hat Revolution, which banned the fez, a symbol of the old regime since the reign of Mahmut II. Like Mahmut II, Mustafa Kemal and his elite knew that visually shaping new human subjects was instrumental in exercising political power and generating official public culture.

An important consideration is that this opening was not a ceremony for a new building, a bridge, a park or a street, all of which were familiar to the supporters of the

¹²⁵ Yeni Ses, 1 October 1926

new regime, the officials and the former Ottoman subjects. The opening of a statue—a work forbidden by Islam—was new to both the ordinary people and the officials of the Republic, even though the ritualistic measures taken during the construction of the statue were influenced by Ottoman traditions.

When people gathered for the opening ceremony in Sarayburnu on Sunday, October 3, 1926, they might not have been surprised that another protocol was enforced, this one concerning who stands where. Along with the idea of a dress code, this spatial protocol was a familiar one from the empire.

Officials and notables came to the park in suits and western hats, as demanded. The commander-in-chief of the city's military base was already there with a large group of military personnel and more than a thousand privates, all of whom were in military uniforms, along side uniformed police forces. Then the military band took its reserved place. The crowd surrounded the officials and the notables, standing wherever they could, before the mayor, number one in protocol, showed up.

According to news in *Milliyet*, the mayor came five minutes late and started to deliver his talk without hesitation. He stood directly in front of the statue, which was covered with white fabric as anticipated in the program:

In order to comprehend the essence and the meaning of this event...it is necessary to think first about the history embedded in this statue, then, to look at various stages of the history of the Ottomans...This...would show us from what kind of dark age we have come and now reached happiness... It would be fair to say

that we are an envied generation. I consider this envy as a way to show our gratefulness to our savior. Long live Gazi!¹²⁶

The mayor's speech was not new to the audience or the press. The content was not unexpected. Calling the imperial period a "dark age" and Mustafa Kemal the "savior" were common rhetorical practices in any official talk since the foundation of the Republic. In fact, both the officials and the people considered Mustafa Kemal the savior even before the foundation of the Republic. The wartime press almost unequivocally expressed their perceptions of Mustafa Kemal in text and image (insert a picture) as the determined savior of the country. Even before the beginning of the War of Independence, most of the officials and top generals of the army, including that of Karakol, believed in Kemal's determined personality and military expertise.

However, these same groups did not consider the Ottoman period a dark age at that time. They blamed the members of the royal family for the nation's problems, not the empire. Here, in the mayor's speech, one can see the changing tide of opinion. The mayor talks about the palaces as if they belonged to the royal family, rather than the Ottoman state. One can safely assert that the press and military personnel during the Independence War did not foresee Mustafa Kemal's destruction of the imperial, despite the fact that he explained his intentions to the public both before and during the war.

When the mayor finished his speech, the military band played the Selam Havası, which was another Ottoman tradition. Muhittin Bey picked up a pair of scissors from a

¹²⁶ Yeni Ses, 4 Ekim 1926. Though this translation from Turkish may sound awkward, I tried to keep it as true to the original as possible, so it suffers from the same awkwardness the letter as the untranslated version.

silver plate and cut the red ribbon surrounding the white fabric on the statue, to the audience's applause. The statue was unveiled to even more thunderous applause. The ceremony ended immediately at this point, and the audience left the site.¹²⁷ After the opening, Muhittin Bey sent the following telegraph message to Mustafa Kemal:

We understand the results of your revolution. Today thousands of people who miss you cried with happiness that they were grateful to have the chance to wed your holy representation with their tears... My lord, I am happy to inform you of this.¹²⁸

Mustafa Kemal never attended the opening ceremonies of his own statues. He only sent notes congratulating the artist and the residents of the city. As the first president of the Turkish nation, he sent the following open note to the residents of Istanbul, who erected his first statue in Sarayburnu:

I present my most sincere gratitude to the people of Istanbul for their high appreciation and noble sentiments, which they expressed by erecting my first statue.¹²⁹

The opening of the first monumental statue of Turkey made headlines in the Turkish press as well as some international newspapers and journals. The most prestigious and influential among these was the French news weekly *L'illustration*, a lavishly printed periodical (published between 1843 and 1944). Both *L'illustration* and the national press criticized Krippel for not portraying Mustafa Kemal as brave and determined enough. In a press conference, Krippel responded to these criticisms, stating:

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

In spite of these attacks, I still believe that I was able to give Ghazi the desired brave posture. The critics in Vienna, on the other hand, suggested that the statue embodied a modern *concept* of art.¹³⁰

This defense did not stop the criticism of Krippel and his monument. Moreover, these criticisms began even before the opening of the monument. Falih Rıfki, one of the closest intellectuals to Mustafa Kemal, for instance, wrote the earliest criticism of the monument in the official daily *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* on April 5, 1926, one week after the statue came to Istanbul:

A couple of Krippel's busts and a statue came to Istanbul. This is the first statue of the greatest personality of the Turkish nation! The artist was an unknown person from Vienna. Istanbul Municipality hired this person without questioning...since the municipality of the biggest city hired him, Konya Municipality and the statue commission in Ankara placed more expensive orders...Gazi cannot be represented in this posture and great Istanbul cannot give such a bad artifact to her savior.¹³¹

It seems that although the new political elite welcomed and encouraged monumental propaganda, it did not consider standardization of monuments and statues until Falih Rıfki criticized the local government of Istanbul and warned the others. Considering that Rıfki was very close to Mustafa Kemal, one can assume that they talked about this issue before Rıfki published his article, and that Mustafa Kemal agreed with him about the problem. Thus, one might conclude that they decided to use Rıfki's voice

¹²⁹ cited in Elibal, 194.

¹³⁰ Krippel, 1927:4

¹³¹ Rıfki's criticism also refers to the way in which intellectuals criticized the statues of Mustafa Kemal sculpted by foreign sculptors in the sense that they did not provided aesthetic criticisms directly related to

to advocate standardization to the public.

Even though this assumption is unproven, it is an educated guess considering one of Mustafa Kemal's strategies: communicating with the public by saying things aloud for someone to write down and by dictating ideas to journalists close to him, who then published them as their own. Since it would not have been a good strategy for him to complain about his own statue, I argue that Mustafa Kemal, perhaps in one of his well-known dinner discussions (known as "Mustafa Kemal's table," the equivalent of a "kitchen cabinet"), expressed his own opinion to Rıfkı and others so that they would express it for him.

The Minister of Education, who was probably at Mustafa Kemal's table when the statue business came onto the agenda, was one of those who might have written down what was Kemal said. On the May 24, one and a half months after Rıfkı informed the public that the Ministry of Education had "discovered the way" to stop other cities from repeating the same mistake, the Ministry of Education issued a special ministerial decision. The decision set out objectives and explained certain measures that should be taken regarding statues to the national press and city officials. This decision was the screaming headline news of the official daily *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* on the May 25:

One statue of our savior on horseback in military uniform, one in civilian clothes standing, and a bust will be ordered. For this our ministry is in contact with the most distinguished sculptors...our ministry will mediate between the cities and the artists to use the molds for reproduction. This way a number of cities will have a

the artworks. This was the canon of such criticisms through out the monumental propaganda of the early republic,

chance to decorate their cities with the statues of our national hero and the country's resources will not be wasted.¹³²

The Ministry's public notice allows us to understand better Mustafa Kemal's plans. The introduction of the Ministry's notice includes the exact points Rıfki made in his text, which indicates that Mustafa Kemal, Falih Rıfki and the member(s) of the Ministry must have worked together on the subject.

Obviously, the experience with the first statue forced the new regime to introduce this standardization, not only for aesthetic purposes but also to prevent potential financial problems. The country's economy was not in good shape after the War of Independence, and spending too much money for monumental propaganda would not be a rational choice in the eyes of the public or the political elite. But instead of giving up on the monumental propaganda entirely, the political elite tried to use the financial resources in a productive way. Since aesthetic concerns were not the main issue for them in the first place, they did not see any problems in producing molds for every city. Also, it is likely that the regime took advantage of the situation by inviting more cities and towns to raise monumental propaganda, as one can conclude from the last statement of the ministry's notice.¹³³

What we do know is that even though both the public and state officials criticized the first monumental statue of the republic, Krippel was hired again to erect three more

¹³² *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 25 Mayıs 1926. The official daily ended the news by informing the public that the Ministry of Education was already in contact with "two of the best sculptors of the world," Wilvow from France and Klemike from Germany. I could not find these sculptors in the literature on sculptors because of the misspellings of their names. Oktay Aslanpa, the leading figure of art history in Turkey, wrote a book about Austrian art historians and artists in Turkey in 1993, where there is no name that resembles Klemike. As for the French artists, I could not find any information. However, we know that they were never commissioned since their names do not exist in any official public document.

statues of Mustafa Kemal—two of which are subject to examination in later chapters. Two of these statues were erected after 1932 in cities Rıfki does not mention in his text, which leaves us to wonder why state officials introduced standardization but still let individual cities hire Krippel again. The only plausible reason is again financial, as state officials might not have been able to find a more affordable choice than Krippel, which they would have realized after they invited some well-known sculptors from France, Germany, and Italy. However, there is no official reason for this disparity between practice and stated policy.¹³⁴

In the late 1930s Krippel was criticized once again, this time along with the other foreign sculptors. Critics used Krippel's monument in Sarayburnu along with his other artworks to prove that a foreign sculptor¹³⁵ cannot successfully express the history of the Turkish nation since he does not know the history, culture, and people of the country firsthand. The criticisms, however, were not aesthetic, unlike the debates of the time about architecture, which disapproved of foreign architects' work on a visual level as well as a political one.

Local architects who were in favor of the Ottoman revivalist style, for instance, looked down on the arrival of the Modern movement and its architects, who were mostly foreign. Critics stated that although foreign architects were often talented, they did not know enough about the history of the Republic and were not able to come up with true

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ The documents about monuments and statues of the early Republic are supposed to be in the Prime Ministry Archives of the Turkish Republic which was opened for public use in 1996. When I finished my archival research, the archive was still collecting the records of the municipality archives and there were many boxes of documents that were not even opened. The documents one might need to explore more on this point could be available in the near future.

and sensitive spatial expressions of the Turkish nation. While accusing foreign architects of de-contextualizing the architectural style in the republic, they in fact did talk about the principles of architecture.

Prominent local architects of the time such as Behcet Unsal, Apdullah Ziya, Abidin Mortas, Zeki Sear, Behcet Sari and Bedridden Hamden, in an article titled “Architecture and Turkishness” published in *Mimar* (Architect) in 1934, clearly defined the relationship between the modern movement and national architecture, and provided the basis for a nationalist criticism of architecture in the early republic:¹³⁶

The mother of all architecture is context. Our country needs serious works that respond to...its nature--works that connect with the context and revitalize local feelings in the contemporary world...Local art is both rational and national. Today national architecture can be born only out of rational Turkish works responsive to the locale.¹³⁷

For critics, responsibility to the locale was not simply the art of traditions and motifs. The light, the nature, and the context were also determining factors.¹³⁸ The idea of contextualizing architectural style for prominent local architects established the basis of criticism of both the modern movement and the foreign architects who were hired by the Kemalist regime in the late 1920s to visualize the Kemalist revolution with an architectural style that does not refer to the Ottoman past.

Local architects benefited from the history of architecture in the Ottoman Empire,

¹³⁵ The term “foreign sculptor” is a term that the critics of the time used when they criticized the hiring of European sculptors.

¹³⁶ Bozdogan, 2001, 258.

¹³⁷ Cited in *ibid.*

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

such as the Ottoman revivalism, in the formation of their criticism. Thus, it was easier for them to employ a textual criticism that draws on artistic and aesthetic issues as opposed to political ones, since there was a tradition of architectural critique before the beginning of the modern movement in the Republic.

Using this tradition of architectural critique was handy for those intellectuals who were not architects, but who were eager to express their discontent about the issue. However, some intellectuals could not produce the same level of criticism about these foreign works when it came to foreign sculptors and their artworks. Since statuary did not exist in Turkey until that time period, they did not have a point of departure that was not political and national. In fact, there was no Turkish sculptor to contrast with the foreign sculptors until Zuhtu Muridoglu, Husein Gezer, and Nusret Suman, the first Turkish sculptors who were sent to Europe for training, came back to the country in the mid-1930s.

When these Turkish sculptors returned, they were hard pressed to win the commissions that the regime offered. The regime kept giving the jobs to foreign sculptors, and thus the sculptors of the regime felt left out, and started to express their discontent in writing when they began publishing the journal *Ar* (art) in 1937.

In the fifth issue of the journal they covered what the journal preferred to call “the issue of the monuments,” which included several pictures of statues sculpted by both foreign and local artists. Tellingly, the comparisons drawn between the statues of Turkish and foreign sculptors in the issue were not based on the principles of statuary. Only one point is made about classic aesthetics: a single line accusing Krippel’s statue in Sarayburnu of violating *ahenk kuralalari* (the rules of harmony), but with no explanation

of how and why.¹³⁹ Instead, the writers employed words such as *degersiz* (invaluable) and *serefsiz* (dishonorable), which are not from the vocabulary of statuary, to criticize the works of the foreign artists.¹⁴⁰ Thus the fifth issue of *Ar* does not offer artistic criticism but a political statement on how to build national statuary. The issue states that the only way to do this is to stop hiring foreign sculptors and giving Turkish artists rein over Turkish statuary. It stresses that the foreign sculptors come to the country only to make money, which prevents the Turkish sculptors from pursuing their art and creating a true Turkish expression.¹⁴¹

Ar brought up the issue of foreign sculptors in terms of the political economy of statuary a decade after Falih Rıfkı first criticized Krippel in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* in 1926. The difference between the criticisms in *Ar* and Rıfkı's text is that they draw upon different concerns. Rıfkı was not concerned about Krippel's nationality, but about the quality of his work, whereas *Ar*'s writers were more alarmed about the politics and the questionable national expressions involved in hiring foreign artists for public monuments.

THE MONUMENT AND THE PARK

Even though Krippel was criticized so brutally for his first performances that the state was prompted to introduce new statuary standards, the political elite still allowed the Istanbul municipality to publicly erect the first national monument of the new regime.

¹³⁹ *Ar*, no 5 (March, 1937), 3.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

Perhaps, as I said before, they simply did not want to delay the monumental propaganda, which was expected to produce didactic influence over people.

The monument in Sarayburnu was not only the first monumental statue erected in Turkey, but also the first in a long line of monumental propaganda pieces that the political elite demanded from the notables of the new regime. After Mustafa Kemal's *Sark Sinemasi* speech at Bursa, statuary became an instrumental political tool for different interest groups use in recognizing the new regime. As I mentioned before, the leader and his fellows welcomed this way of reorganization, and encouraged social groups and municipalities to do so.¹⁴²

The monument in Sarayburnu commemorates the birth of a national leader in the public consciousness, as I mentioned in the previous chapter. It clearly symbolizes a liberating movement for the people. I suggest that it combined the imagery surrounding the beginning of an anti-colonial struggle and nationalism into one image. The image epitomized the creation of a nation with its own domain of sovereignty, and did so just before Mustafa Kemal begins his own battle with the Greek troops, who represented the Allied powers. In other words, the statue tells the story of the confrontational Turkish response to the invasion by the Allied powers. It also implies the counter-offensive against the aggression of their former subjects, the Greeks.

As the mayor pointed out in a press conference, Sarayburnu was specifically chosen as the place to erect the statue because, from there, it would be seen by those

¹⁴² However, it is hard to say that it was all planned since the beginning because there is no document that proves it. Even the new regime planned a monumental propaganda right after Mustafa Kemal's speech in Bursa *Sark Sinemasi*, but they soon realized that poorly designed monuments were not expressing the greatness of the emergence of the new Turkish nation and needed to take certain measures such as introducing standards for statues. This standardization remains an unsolved issue in present-day Turkey.

entering the straits and would tell the story of the emergence of a national leader. Today, one cannot see statue from the straits because the oak trees planted in the park in 1926 are quite tall and hide the statue.

Obviously the mayor's intention for the visibility of the statue was victimized by the idea of Republican parks, some of which were only opened to erect more statues and monuments of Mustafa Kemal. The monuments in Samsun and Afyon, for instance, share the same fortune, since the monuments in these parks, which I analyze in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 respectively, are also concealed by the trees.

Parks in Turkey, by definition, were primarily places for flowers and trees, not statues. The Republican parks did not change the qualifying criteria of a park, thus trees and flowers were planted along with the statues and monuments. Republican parks were expected to attract people during their leisure time. Parks were expected to function as important gathering places for people on a daily basis, since Republican squares such as Hakimiyet-i Milliye (modern Ulus, Ankara), Taksim (Istanbul) and Cumhuriyet Meydanı in Izmir already existed as gathering places on national days.

In the case of Sarayburnu, for instance, people were expected to come to watch the straits and look at the first public monument of the Republic. In parks, people were supposed to look at the statues and monuments during their free time, that is to say, they were free to look at a statue, stand by it and examine its details, and talk about it. This is in contrast to the expectation of gatherings in Republican squares, where the new regime implemented the practice of secular collective consciousness on national days through rituals such as chanting the national anthem at the beginning of any ceremony.

Taksim, for instance, deserves special attention here as the Republic's most important square. It is important because it was one of the first squares the regime created, but also because its monument represented a high point in the War of Independence by depicting the events that occurred between May 1919 and October 1923. Moreover, since the city's mostly non-Muslim middle class sponsored both the monument and the construction of the square, we can better understand this segment of the citizenry's reaction to new regime after the population exchange in 1923 (see Chapter 4). This is why I deal with the story of the monument in Taksim in the next chapter, even though it should be the last one in my narrative. My intention in the next chapter is to show that monumental propaganda helps us to understand the politics of notables.

Chapter 4

A Monumental Republic or Monument of the Republic

Taksim Meydanı is the central traffic zone of modern Istanbul, with a newly opened subway and bus stops. It was formerly a branching point in the city's water distribution system, but was turned into a Republican square in the late 1920s. Unlike most Republican squares, however, it only contains one official state building to illustrate the spatiality of the official public culture: the Mustafa Kemal Culture Center, which was built in the 1960s and is located on the northern end of the square.

The square's monument is located at its southern end, where Beyoğlu, the former Grande Rue de Péra (now called İstiklal Caddesi, "Independence Street") starts. In between the monument and the Center is the Marmara Hotel, which faces Taksim Parkı, a former Ottoman artillery barracks. However, the park is separated from the square visually because it features a different kind of design, as well as physically because there are stairs that block the continuity of the space between the park and the square.

Mustafa Kemal died in 1938, and in 1942 the park was chosen as the place to erect the first statue of his successor, İsmet İnönü. Although the base pedestal was fully constructed, the statue—commissioned to the German sculptor Rudolf Belling¹⁴³— never

¹⁴³ Rudolf Belling came to Istanbul because his wife was Jewish, and he did not approve the policies of the Nazi regime. He lived and worked in Istanbul for thirty years as a professor at the Academy of Fine Arts, and re-organized the department of sculpture and gave courses on modern art and sculpture. In 1951, he became a professor at the Department of Architecture at Istanbul Technical University. He was the commanding voice of the sculpture in Turkey until he died in 1966.

made it to the park. There was public concern that the new statue would overshadow the monument already in the square, which is just what İnönü wanted to do.

After Kemal's death, İnönü briefly tried to minimize Mustafa Kemal's iconic power. First, he replaced Mustafa Kemal's pictures on the Turkish Lira with his own. Then, officials started to hang his pictures on the walls of official buildings, including CHF centers and Halkevleri. Nevertheless, İnönü could not totally replace Mustafa Kemal physically or emotionally, and thus he never became an iconic power. This failure on İnönü's part inevitably allowed Mustafa Kemal to become the only untouchable image of the Republic and its irrefutable symbolic leader.

No matter what the political climate, Mustafa Kemal could not be replaced as a political symbol or a proponent of a specific ideology of the state. To understand this, one needs to look at how İnönü managed to succeed Kemal, but failed to replace him as a political or cultural symbol of the nation. Therefore, before I tell the story of the Mustafa Kemal statue in Taksim I provide a brief history of İnönü's succession and the changing political climate after Mustafa Kemal died. I discuss the political conditions during İnönü's succession of Mustafa Kemal. Next, I elaborate upon İnönü's elimination of his rival Celal Bayar. I answer the question why, after Mustafa Kemal died, İnönü called back some of the prominent nationalists Mustafa Kemal eliminated from politics before his death. Next, I analyze Karabekir's last attempt to criticize *Nutuk* in 1939 via an interview published in an İstanbul daily, as well and the problems Karabekir experienced with the publication of his book *İstiklal Harbimiz* in 1959. Lastly, I examine the international and national politics of statuary in terms of the monument in Taksim, whose story parallels Taksim's emergence as the first Republican square.

THE IMMORTAL LEADER

As I mentioned before, CHF officially named Mustafa Kemal *Ebedi Şef* (the eternal leader) a few months after he died in November 1938, and İnönü became *Milli Şef* (the national leader). By accepting that title, İnönü also showed that he recognized Mustafa Kemal as his immortal leader.¹⁴⁴ Considering Mustafa Kemal's popularity and the decades-long history of his iconization İnönü knew that even if he carved a place of iconic power for himself in Turkey, he would not be the only symbolic political power in the country. In other words, İnönü could only share the desired political space with Mustafa Kemal, despite controlling the state and the propaganda machines— including state- and party- supported daily newspapers, weekly and monthly journals—that were instrumental in the iconization of Mustafa Kemal.

After Mustafa Kemal died, these propaganda machines, including municipality journals and the nineteen journals of Halk Evleri, all decreased the number of Mustafa Kemal images and increased images of İnönü. Some of the municipality journals, such as the journal of Ankara Municipality, the commanding voice among municipality journals, even stopped publishing news about new Mustafa Kemal statues. Directly after his death, the Ankara journal cut the section it previously reserved only for news and images of new Mustafa Kemal statues and busts erected around the country . While Mustafa Kemal was alive, the journal published photographs in this section that ordinary people

¹⁴⁴ This reminds me of Stalin who accepted Lenin as such after he died in 1924. In other words, neither İnönü nor Stalin dared to erase the popularity of his predecessor at the begging of his reign. In fact, they used them to seize the political power and claimed that they were the *true followers* of their eternal leaders. A comparison between Lenin-Stalin and Atatürk-İnönü would provide an operational analysis of politics of notables in both countries since there were no such similar parallels in any country but Turkey and Soviet

sent in, generally of Mustafa Kemal statues erected in different regions and of ordinary people in front of Mustafa Kemal statues. The journal aimed to disseminate the monumental propaganda of the Mustafa Kemal era in small towns by using this method to encourage people to visit the monuments and send in photos. Nineteen journals of Halk Evleri followed suit and stopped informing their audience about new Mustafa Kemal statues and busts.

None of these journals, however, reserved a special section to display İnönü's statues and busts as they did for Mustafa Kemal. After İnönü was officially named *Milli Şef* in December 1939 at the first party congress, pictures of his busts and statues did start to appear in state-supported journals, but not in a special section. However, the number of his images of any sort paled in comparison to the number of images of Mustafa Kemal, and the number of İnönü images gradually decreased until the Turkish Republic became a multi-party system in 1946.

One reason for the gradual decrease of public İnönü images is that his desire to be an iconic power was not as strong as Mustafa Kemal's. Another is that, unlike during the Mustafa Kemal years, the international political arena was not conducive to initiating alternative monumental propaganda. İnönü became the new president on the eve of World War II, and he had to use the country's resources to prepare for a possible war with any of several countries. This forced İnönü to take strict political measures in CHF to make the assembly act as one political body. Thus, it would not be rational to pursue an alternative monumental propaganda with the country's resources. A decision like that

Russia between the Two World Wars. However as I said in the first chapter, it is out of scope of the present work.

might also have given İnönü's rivals, particularly Celal Bayar, a chance to launch a campaign against him. They would use monumental propaganda to show that the new president was wasting the country's resources for his own gain.

In the midst of this analysis, one might wonder how İnönü and Bayar became political opponents in the first place. The explanation is simple: after Mustafa Kemal forced İnönü to resign in September 1937 and appointed Bayar as the new prime minister, the two men became political enemies. Their rivalry did not exist only because Mustafa Kemal preferred Bayar to İnönü, but also due to the different economic policies each advocated. Bayar was the minister of economic affairs when İnönü was the prime minister in 1937. Bayar favored relatively liberal economic policies whereas İnönü advocated strict economic nationalism.

For two months after Mustafa Kemal died Bayar remained the prime minister. İnönü wanted to keep him on in order to ease the sentiments of the opposition group in the assembly. However, after the party named him the national leader, İnönü did not hesitate to ask Bayar to resign. The events surrounding this rivalry, which grew over a few months, are significant when trying to understand how these rivals opposed each other in the political arena.

First of all, İnönü did not give up his political career after he was forced to resign in 1937. He implicitly lobbied against the new government in the capital while simultaneously trying to convince Mustafa Kemal that he was there whenever he needed him. İnönü considered his resignation a temporary situation, since Mustafa Kemal made the decision while abusing alcohol—a condition which İnönü believed caused the President's irrational behaviors. However, the new cabinet members and Mustafa

Kemal's dinner table guests kept informing the president that İnönü was lobbying for a possible political revival in Ankara.

Mustafa Kemal did not pay attention to this until the national press reported on İnönü's appearance at a football match, during which the people applauded him loudly. Some cabinet members and notables exaggerated this instance at Mustafa Kemal's dinner table in order to prove that İnönü was staying active in politics. This was the first time Mustafa Kemal took the rumors seriously, and he asked for İnönü to reveal his intentions. İnönü sent Mustafa Kemal a message through Celal Bayar saying it was just a football match and Mustafa Kemal did not have anything to worry about. This was a few months before the political elites became certain that Mustafa Kemal's death was imminent, which would lead the assembly to discuss the question of who would succeed him.

The members of the assembly informally discussed this question behind closed doors, since Mustafa Kemal's illness was treated as a state secret. The majority in the assembly stood behind one of two figures: İnönü and Fezi Çakmak, the chief of general staff. Bayar was the weakest candidate for the presidency. The assembly mostly consisted of İnönü supporters who ruled the country since 1931. They created İnönü's cadre when Mustafa Kemal chose to focus on cultural and social issues and stayed away from involvement in daily state affairs. However, Kemal was still the commanding voice of the Republic both in İnönü's eyes and the eyes of the assembly. Perhaps this is why no one ever publicly criticized Mustafa Kemal when he replaced İnönü with Bayar, even though the majority of the representatives did not support Bayar.

Only a few representatives supported Bayar, and most of them were in his cabinet. He clearly would not have been able to control the assembly. Thus, Bayar and

his cabinet had to look for ways to stop İnönü from succeeding Mustafa Kemal. First they offered him a consul position in a European country. İnönü rejected the offer without hesitation, since he did not want to give up his political career in the assembly. Next, a representative from the minority group threatened to kill İnönü when he planned to visit Mustafa Kemal on his deathbed in October 1938. This representative thought that İnönü might influence Mustafa Kemal and regain power during this visit. İnönü took the threat seriously and canceled his trip to Istanbul several times. As soon as Fezi Çakmak heard that İnönü was under threat, he sent ten soldiers to İnönü's house in Ankara to protect him and his family from a possible plot.

This was not the last move for İnönü's detractors. A few days before Mustafa Kemal died, they disseminated what Zürcher called a "political testament of the president"¹⁴⁵ in order to blemish İnönü's reputation in the assembly. According to this testament, Mustafa Kemal apparently told those who were present at his deathbed that he did not want İnönü to succeed him.¹⁴⁶ While the rumor was circulating, Fevzi Çakmak was offered the second presidency of the Republic. However, he refused and turned his support to İnönü, which ended the political debates on succession and postponed the emergence of a powerful opposition group in the assembly.

On November 10, 1938, one day after Mustafa Kemal died, the assembly gathered and elected İnönü as the second president of Turkey. Only one representative voted for Bayar, as was the case in the presidential elections of 1923 when Mustafa Kemal voted for İnönü to show that İnönü was the second in command. As Mustafa Kemal showed

¹⁴⁵ Zürcher, *Turkey*, 192.

¹⁴⁶ This reminds me of Lenin who apparently gave the same political testament regarding Stalin.

his support for İnönü in the presidential elections of 1923, Bayar voted for İnönü in the assembly to prove that he did not use any illegal tactics to stop him. It was the representative who threatened İnönü who voted for Bayar.

A brief history of these few months shows that, as Sevket Süreyya Aydemir—a prominent Kemalist and founder of the Kadro movement—states in İnönü’s biography, *İkinci Adam* (The Second Man), Mustafa Kemal was the first man of the Republic and İnönü the second. The failed attempts at ending his political career proved that İnönü was certainly the commanding second voice of the Republic, even if he was not as powerful and charismatic as Mustafa Kemal. However, I argue that this disparity in power was the essential difference between the authorities of the two leaders within the state and society.

Mustafa Kemal was an unquestionable, unchallengeable, charismatic leader of the Republic and the primary hero of the War of Independence in the eyes of the populace and the bureaucracy. İnönü benefited from Mustafa Kemal’s support in his political life and thus became a strong statesman, which clearly did not leave enough room for İnönü to launch a new political culture free from Mustafa Kemal or orchestrate a comprehensive campaign of new monumental propaganda. In fact, he had no choice but to embrace Mustafa Kemal and his legacy if he was to survive in politics, especially after Bayar left CHP in 1946 to form a party. However, the question of whether Mustafa Kemal lost his authority over Turkish political culture after he died still needs further elaboration.

By the time İnönü came into power, the first generation of Kemalist youth were eligible to vote. The educational system, the most powerful ideological apparatus of the

new regime, was successful enough to create a new generation of thinking people, particularly in urban areas. These new voters were ready to protect Mustafa Kemal's reputation under any circumstances because they thought themselves to be the defenders of the revolution and of its eternal leader, just as they were taught in school.

The first Kemalist youth made itself visible for the first time when İnönü called three anti-Kemalists back into politics in 1939, despite their outward criticism of Kemal during his reign. Rauf Orbay, Kazım Karabekir, and Halide Edip, who were actively against the iron-fist rule of Mustafa Kemal in the 1920s, could help İnönü minimize the power of the assembly minority, which greatly benefited from Mustafa Kemal toward the end of his life. More importantly İnönü was determined to change the culture of the political structure by refusing to run the country with, as Zürcher nicely puts it, a *kitchen cabinet* (which consisted of Mustafa Kemal's friends and advisors.) He also insisted on leading without a Kadro, or educated bureaucracy, like the one the Kadro movement suggested in the early 1930s.

As Mustafa Kemal strayed away from state affairs, İnönü started the process of enacting this cultural change by supporting an educational program to train state officials. Mustafa Kemal approved of the educational program until İnönü started to criticize his habit of dealing with state affairs by consulting the kitchen cabinet, which İnönü felt made the government look like a puppet show, particularly between 1931 and 1937. Toward the end of his life, Mustafa Kemal increasingly wanted to prove that he was still the commanding voice of the Republic and that he could overrule even the prime

minister. For instance, Kemal asked several cabinet members to resign without letting İnönü know.¹⁴⁷

However, on September 10, 1937 İnönü criticized Mustafa Kemal at the dinner table when the leader requested the resignation of the Minister of Agriculture, who Mustafa Kemal believed was not doing an adequate job. İnönü replied bluntly:

We are taking orders at the dinner table. Decisions are made about my ministers without consulting me, as already happened several times before.¹⁴⁸

The next morning Mustafa Kemal asked İnönü to resign. Turkish historiography does not unequivocally agree that the reason Mustafa Kemal asked İnönü to resign was strictly a pride and power issue. Before Mustafa Kemal asked for İnönü's resignation, he told İnönü that he thought that they had been working together, but that it wasn't the case anymore. One can argue that the political parting of these two prominent leaders and friends was sparked by the differences in the way they ran state affairs. İnönü considered it vital to deal with state affairs according to the hierarchy of the state as explained in the constitution, while Mustafa Kemal, particularly toward the end of his life, wanted to run the state as a dictator would.

In October 1938, Bayar used his role as prime minister to favor relatively liberal economic policies and to support the business class. This was in direct opposition to İnönü's plan, which was to separate business and politics. Bayar's plan was fully supported by Mustafa Kemal, but failed after İnönü became the new president. This is

¹⁴⁷ Zürcher, *Turkey*, 191.

why İnönü forced Bayar to resign and, after his resignation took effect, did not hesitate to reverse Bayar's work by limiting business people's involvement in politics. Using the influence of newcomers Rauf Orbay, Kazım Karabekir and Halide Edip, İnönü worked against Mustafa Kemal's bureaucratic elitism.

Although İnönü asked the newcomers to help him in realizing his goal, he asked them not to seek revenge against Mustafa Kemal. This is because İnönü did not want to see the Kemalist regime suffer from a possible clash of representatives in the assembly, which would make his own authority questionable.

The day before the assembly opened on April 4, 1939, one of the newcomers, Kazım Karabekir, serving as a representative from İstanbul, publicly criticized Mustafa Kemal in an interview published in the daily *Tan* (The Sunset). Looking at this criticism in detail provides us with another example of Mustafa Kemal's role as the only untouchable of the regime:

Everybody knows that those patriots [referring to himself, Rauf Orbay, and Halide Edip] who came up with valuable ideas and put their life in danger were put aside and forgotten. We need to explain the events to the new generation as they happened... Otherwise, we might make the mistake of displaying many of [those] heroes as miserable while valuing unskilled figures... What is certain here is that the services of those [patriots] were erased at once. The past cannot be understood only through one person's account.¹⁴⁹

At this point as Kocak reports that the correspondent from *Tan* asked what some might call the righteous question:

¹⁴⁸ Aydemir, Sevket Sürreyye, *İkinci Adam*, 1.Cilt, (Ankara : Remzi Kitabevi, 1980), 495.

¹⁴⁹ Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Donemi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996) 41-51.

Correspondent: So, according to this point of yours, do the history taught in schools, speeches and talks delivered and even the Lessons of the Revolution need to be changed?¹⁵⁰

Karabekir: “Yes, there is a need...there are unfairness and mistakes that need to be seriously taken into consideration in *Büyük Nutuk* (The Grand Speech)”¹⁵¹

This interview caused uneasiness in the press and among the representatives of the assembly, and incited a riot in İstanbul. Apparently 20 to 30 university students marched to the *Tan* offices on the afternoon of April 4, 1939, the same day the interview appeared in the paper. They asked *Tan* to cut the interview because it degraded Mustafa Kemal’s legacy. The paper promised students that they would not publish the rest of the interview.

The next day, *Tan* kept its promise to the students, and then went even further. Zekeriya Sertel, the editor of the daily, publicly disagreed with Karabekir in an article about the ideas Karabekir mentioned in his interview. Sertel was not only critical of Karabekir, but also of his own newspaper. As Koçak assumes, this may indicate that the daily received a notice from the government,¹⁵² though we do not have any documents to prove Koçak’s suggestion. However, some representatives in the assembly who were irritated with the interview called for an urgent gathering on the same day.

The assembly’s urgency shows that some representatives convinced others that Karabekir’s interview needed immediate resolution. In the meeting, Karabekir was

¹⁵⁰ Recep Peker delivered these lessons in İstanbul University in 1927 to teach the youth the history of the Kemalist revolution. Every university student today has to take these courses (for a total of two semesters) no matter what department they are in.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

criticized brutally and accused of being disrespectful to the eternal leader. After all the criticisms were heard, Karabekir was given a chance to defend himself. In his response he said he had always loved and respected Mustafa Kemal. He also said that he did not want to criticize or degrade the leader, but that in trying to explain some historical facts he was misunderstood.¹⁵³

The assembly found Karabekir's apology to be sincere and accepted it. However, the press kept going after him. Falih Rifkî disparaged Karabekir the most; as a prominent Kemalist and a target of Karabekir's ideals, Rifkî called Karabekir a backward personality in his criticism. In the following days, Karabekir went to İnönü and asked him to talk to the press, and particularly to Falih Rifkî, and request that they stop writing about him.¹⁵⁴

In conclusion, though the discontent about Karabekir eventually ended, so did the potential to be critical of Mustafa Kemal. This contributed greatly to Mustafa Kemal's untouchability. However, this was not the last duel between Karabekir and Mustafa Kemal. Karabekir first tried to challenge Mustafa Kemal in his book *İstiklal Harbimiz*, which was ultimately collected and burned in 1933.

It is possible that Karabekir was planning to republish his book after he came back to politics. However, between the accusations and discontent about the interview, Karabekir probably did not dare to do it. Eleven years after his death in 1948, his family decided to give the master copy of the book, which Karabekir had managed to save by burying it somewhere in his house in 1933 in Istanbul, to a publisher for reprinting.

¹⁵² Kocak, p.50.

¹⁵³ Kocak, 51.

The secretive way by which Karabekir preserved and eventually published the manuscript helps us to understand the extent of Mustafa Kemal's untouchable status in Turkey. As soon as the book came out in 1960, the office of the Republican attorney in Istanbul once again ordered it to be collected. However, the office did not burn the copies this time; they were put into storage instead. The Republican attorney appointed to the case filed a court case charging that the book degraded Mustafa Kemal's legacy and thus violated the Law of Protecting Mustafa Kemal (rule 5816, see below).

The attorney prepared a 60-page-accusation and submitted it to the court on February 6, 1961, almost one year after the book was collected. The court could not resolve the case for five years and in 1966 the judge finally appointed three professors from İstanbul University to prepare a report on the veracity of the Republican's accusations.¹⁵⁵ The professors submitted their report to the court on August 7, 1967, concluding that there were no degrading points in Karabekir's story of the War of Independence. The office of the Republican attorney did not approve the content of this report, and filed another suit in the same year. Finally, on December 28, 1968, the court ruled against the office of the Republican attorney, stating that:

...The book contains criticisms of *Nutuk*. They are not personal or degrading... they are written with the intention of providing all the events of the War of Independence...the case is dismissed ...¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.,

¹⁵⁵ The three professors were from different faculties: Prof. Cemal Tahir and Prof. İbrahim Kafesoğlu were members of Faculty of Literature, and Prof. Öztekin Tosun was from Law Faculty.

¹⁵⁶ *Court Rule (126)*, T.C. İstanbul Basın Toplu Asliye Ceza Mahkemesi, 1968.

The court order required the state attorney to return the collected books. Only then did Karabekir's *İstiklal Harbimiz* come to light in the public. However, it did not receive any attention except from professional historians who either thought Karabekir was a madman or saw his work as an opportunity to revise the official historiography. The latter group did not manage to create a criticism of orthodox historiography until the early 1980s.

Mete Tuncay and Erik Zürcher (a well-informed student of Turkish historiography) were mostly responsible for the revision of orthodox historiography in 1980s. Tuncay's text was his groundbreaking book *T.C.'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması (Yurt Yayınlar, 1983)* and Zürcher's text was *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement* (Leiden: Brill, 1984). Both used Karabekir's account when criticizing *Nutuk*.

Another controversial intellectual, Yalçın Küçük, went one step further in his six-volume book *Thesis on Intellectuals (Tekin yayınevi, 1984)* by publicly announcing what even Karabekir did not want to assert in his account of the war. Küçük argued that the real hero of the War of Independence was not Mustafa Kemal but Kazım Karabekir. He noted that the latter created many military strategies of the war, and that he enabled Kemal's rise, since he did not arrest Mustafa Kemal in Erzurum after the government in Istanbul ordered him to do so. Instead, Karabekir went to Mustafa Kemal's residence in Erzurum and informed him that he was at his service. Moreover, Karabekir blocked a possible Armenian or Russian invasion from the east, and eased the burden of the army in the west. Even though this may not be enough to qualify Karabekir as the real hero of the war, his belief in and full support of Mustafa Kemal's determined personality during the

War of Independence proved that Karabekir was a man of his word. In fact, he spoke his words to Mustafa Kemal in Kemal's residence in Şişli, two days before he departed for Erzurum on April 13, 1919:

Paşam (my commander) I am leaving tomorrow for Erzurum. There is nothing to do here in Istanbul. My plan is simple. We need to establish a national government and keep Armenia, which is planning to invade the eastern front, as hostage for a possible peace. Then, according to the situations we can move to the west...He said "I will try to join with you after I get better"¹⁵⁷

Mustafa Kemal promised Karabekir he would join him, but Karabekir did not believe him, since Mustafa Kemal and other nationalist generals were looking to form a new government and planned to stay in Istanbul. His close friend, İsmet (İnönü), even offered Karabekir the Ministry of Goods and Services, but he refused the position.¹⁵⁸ Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü were not the only ones who did not contribute to Karabekir's plan. Other generals and prominent nationalists also followed in their footsteps. But since Mustafa Kemal does not mention Karabekir's brief visit in *Nutuk*, Karabekir accuses him of hiding the facts and provides us with his own version of the story in *İstiklal Harbimiz*.¹⁵⁹

On April 13, Karabekir departed from İstanbul and traveled by ship along the northern coast of Anatolia, along the route Mustafa Kemal was to follow the following month. Karabekir stopped in the most important cities of the region: Sinop, Samsun and

¹⁵⁷ Karabekir Kazım, *İstiklal Harbimiz* (Istanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1995),108. Mustafa Kemal was sick by the time Karabekir visited him.

¹⁵⁸ The former minister of the Ministry of Good and Services was Kara Kemal who was accused of being part of the İzmir plot in 1926. He killed himself in the same year before the police arrested him.

Trabzon. He stayed in Trabzon until April 30, 1919, then he went to Erzurum on May 3. As soon as he arrived in Erzurum he rushed to prepare the army for a possible war against the Armenians. Twelve days later, the most shocking events of all—even more shocking than Russian army's landing in Ayestefenos—happened. Greek troops invaded Izmir on May 15, 1919, which most generals of the armed forces did not foresee. Perhaps this is why Mustafa Kemal and nationalist generals did not pay attention to what Karabekir offered before he left the capital.¹⁶⁰

As Karabekir expected, the invasion awakened not only his allies, but also the whole nation. His plan finally came together after Mustafa Kemal landed in Samsun on May 19, 1919. Mustafa Kemal was appointed as the general auditor of all the armed forces, including Karabekir's 9th army. On May 21, Kemal sent a telegraph message to Karabekir from Samsun, stating that he wanted to join him as soon as possible, but that he needed to stay there for a couple of days because riots had broken out. Karabekir was pleased to see that Mustafa Kemal had decided to join him, which he believed would lead others in İstanbul to join as well. As Karabekir anticipated, almost all the officers who were forced to go back to Istanbul from different armies of the empire in 1918 started to join the nationalist movement in Anatolia.

Mustafa Kemal arrived in Erzurum on July 3, just before Karabekir organized the first congress of nationalists. When Karabekir greeted him 17 kilometers outside the city,

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ The psychological destruction of the Greek invasion can be found in Halide Edip's famous Sultan Ahmet speech:

Karabekir increased Mustafa Kemal's faith in him by not arresting him as the government in İstanbul had told him to do. The government wanted Kemal arrested because the prime minister Damat Ferit Paşa, son-in-law of the sultan, considered Mustafa Kemal's organization a dangerous nationalist movement that could hurt relations between the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire and lead to the dissolution of the Ottoman state. So even though Karabekir had the chance to eliminate Mustafa Kemal, who was expecting it, he did just the opposite. He told Mustafa Kemal that he would be loyal to him even if he were not military personnel, and suggested that he resign from the army and work for the nationalist movement as a civilian.

Rauf Orbay and other prominent officers followed suit and supported Mustafa Kemal's resignation as well. They all made the same statement, promising to remain loyal to him no matter what the government wanted from them.¹⁶¹ Only then did Mustafa Kemal resign from the army.

Even though Mustafa Kemal resigned from the army, he preferred to keep wearing his military uniform. He believed that people would not respect and accept him if he wore civilian clothes. In fact, his wearing the uniform caused discontent in the first congress assembled to call for a nationalist movement in Erzurum. Karabekir had to lobby to convince congress members that Mustafa Kemal was a promising leader and should not only be a representative but also the head of the congress.¹⁶²

The congress was held on July 23, 1919 and Mustafa Kemal was elected as the leader. The congress ended on August 7, 1919 with a declaration signed by Mustafa

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 222.

¹⁶² Ibid., 226-227.

Kemal, Karabekir, Rauf Orbay, and others. It consisted of ten points, all of which stressed that the government could not save the empire from the enemy and thus a “will to nation” had to be realized in order to save the sultan and the caliphate. The congress managed to unify all the nationalist groups in the east under *Şarkı Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti* (Society for Defence of National Rights of Eastern Anatolia). The declaration also proclaimed that Mustafa Kemal was the leader of the nationalist movement not only in the eye of the army but also the government and the world.

Obviouly, Rauf Orbay and other officers made it possible for Mustafa Kemal to come to power, particularly Kazim Karabekir. One can therefore understand why Karabekir was upset about *Nutuk* and tried twice, once in 1933 and once more after Mustafa Kemal died in 1938, to publicly talk about what really happened during the rise of the nationalist movement.

Nutuk proves that Mustafa Kemal did not want to share the reputation of war hero with anybody else. He used the unconditionally supportive attitude of the prominent nationalists, who in fact were aware of his dictatorial tendencies, to consolidate his power both in the first assembly and in the army. These prominent nationalists cooperated with Mustafa Kemal purely for the sake of the Independence War. They all believed that only Mustafa Kemal’s determined personality could unify the army and the nation. They continued their support during the first assembly and throughout the war, believing that Mustafa Kemal would leave politics after the war. However, after the great offensive in August 1922, they realized that Mustafa Kemal had no intention of retiring as the hero of the war. This is why they formed İkinci Group (the Second Group) in the first assembly: to stop Kemal from becoming dictator. Then they established Terakki Perver Cumhuriyet

Fırkası in 1924, which motivated Mustafa Kemal and led him to look for a way to eliminate all of them at once. Kemal's chance came with the İzmir plot, discussed in Chapter 1.

All Kazım Karabekir's attempts at criticizing *Nutuk* and Mustafa Kemal himself in *İstiklal Harbimiz* and his famous interview made it clear that Mustafa Kemal and *Nutuk* had become the untouchables of the Republic. Kemal's untouchable nature created a new space of political desire in the society and state in terms of the politics of symbolism. This became apparent when Turkey chose to end the single-party regime in 1946. Bayar, Mustafa Kemal's last Prime Minister, established *Demokrat Parti* (Democratic Party—the first rightist secularist party of the political system) in 1946. When the Democratic Party (henceforth DP) won the elections in 1950, they started the era of populism in Turkish politics and opened the doors of the secular state to the influence of religious groups. Moreover, the party cruelly opposed İsmet İnönü and CHP before and after the elections. CHP, as the main opposition party, responded by blaming DP for attracting fundamentalist attention and reversing the Kemalist revolution. This response became especially poignant after some members of *Ticaniler*, an Islamic group, destroyed statues of Mustafa Kemal around the country during DP's first year in power.

President Celal Bayar called his party together to write a law protecting Mustafa Kemal's legacy. The assembly passed the law, named Mustafa Kemal'ü Koruma Kanunu (Law of Protecting Mustafa Kemal), on July 25, 1951 in order to send a message to fundamentalists that his party was loyal to the secular state. In 1953, the President went further and closed down *Millet Partisi* (National Party) because it was involved in *irticai faaliyetler*.

DP's claim to Mustafa Kemal's legacy led to the polarization of Kemalism. DP's view on Mustafa Kemal can be called "Kemalism from the right" and the standpoint of the CHP can be thought of as "Kemalism from the left." The difference between the two was that DP wanted to be the center of the secular, liberal, upper-middle classes as well as the poor peasants. CHP, on the other hand, continued to represent an educated secular bureaucracy, just as they did during the single-party regime. However, it did not matter if you were a Kemalist from the right or from the left; the common dominator was secularism, constructed by Mustafa Kemal during the single-party regime. Therefore, Celal Bayar's views on Mustafa Kemal and CHP's response drew a red line between the multi-party regime and the Turkish state.

This red line turned Mustafa Kemal's status as untouchable into political intangibility which framed the boundaries of political space in Turkey. In this way, the essence of political culture in the secular Republic reproduced itself by transforming politics into symbols of politics, allowing the state and society to manipulate these symbols. They did so for ordinary people, not only from Rightist and Leftist Kemalist groups but also for moderate Islamists. As I mentioned in the first chapter, Prime Minister Erdoğan's symbolic reflex after the assassination of the high court judge exemplifies this best.

In ending this relatively long historical background, I argue that DP's claim over Mustafa Kemal and the destruction of the single-party regime prevented CHP from monopolizing Mustafa Kemal's image. It also prevented CHP from using Taksim Parkı to erect the statue of İnönü in the early 1940s. After the regime became a multiparty system, İnönü never showed much desire to see his statues erected around the country. In the

years between 1950 and 1980, mostly parties of rightist Kemalism were in charge of the country. This is why, only ten years after İnönü died in 1972, his statue, which was to be erected in Taksim Gezisi, was taken out of storage and placed in a park in front of İnönü's house in Teşvikiye. This was part of the monumental propaganda launched by the generals of the military intervention of 1980.

As a result, Taksim remained Mustafa Kemal's place in the mental map of people, as did the name of Cumhuriyet Caddesi (Republic Avenue), which connects the square to Mustafa Kemal's residence in Şişli.¹⁶³ Today, this residence serves as a *İnkılap Müzesi* (Museum of the Revolution), as do other houses around the country where Mustafa Kemal lived or used as headquarters during the War of Independence.¹⁶⁴ Before I go into the details of the monument in Taksim, I will discuss how Mustafa Kemal's residence became a museum, and what it represents in the official Turkish historiography.

THE HOUSE IN ŞİŞLİ AND THE PROMINENT FIGURES IN TAKSİM MONUMENT

¹⁶³ Sisli, once called the "little Manhattan of Istanbul" by a former mayor of the district to publicize the spatial beginning of the developing big business towards far west in the mid 1990s, was one of the first upscale districts of early twentieth century Istanbul, where non-Muslims and high ranking Ottoman officials, such as Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself, lived side by side in either apartments or *Konaks*. Sisli was the upscale district of a well know play *Lüküs Hayat* (luxurious life) in the 1980s. *Lüküs Hayat* was written by Ekrem Reşit Rey and music of the play was composed by his brother Cemal Reşit Rey in 1933. In 1973 Haldun Dormen directed *Lüküs Hayat* for TV and it became one of the most well known plays in Turkey, which depicts and criticizes the luxurious life of the middle class in 1930s Istanbul.

¹⁶⁴ All these Atatürk houses, except for the house in Thessaloniki where Mustafa Kemal was born in 1881, visualize the War of Independence (insert a figure). Even though the house in Thessaloniki is also an Atatürk House today, it is not representative of the war in the mental map of the public. However, the house functions no less than the ones within Turkey as a symbol of Turkish nationalism.

Today the İnkilap Museum represents the first unofficial headquarters in the history of the War of Independence, as it is where Mustafa Kemal and his compatriots planned to launch the national struggle in Anatolia. Therefore, the house is not only a private space but also a place where the destiny of the nation was shaped, as the leader tried to convince high-ranking officials and the intellectual elite that they could save the country under his leadership.¹⁶⁵

This historiography, as visualized through the İnkilap Museum, does not mention that Karakol members—particularly Kazım Karabekir—approached Mustafa Kemal and offered him leadership of the national struggle. They were excluded not only from the text but also from the entire historiography. The museum and the monument in Taksim reveal the same story, which we find in the brochure¹⁶⁶ of the museum:

The house, in which Mustafa Kemal Mustafa Kemal lived while he was planning the struggle for National Independence, has been purchased [incorrect grammar from the original text?] by the city in 1928 and was opened [bad grammar from the original again?], to *publish* [misspelling in the original text] since 1942. The museum contains Mustafa Kemal's personal belongings, military uniforms and decorations, manuscripts, photographs and portraits by some of the leading painters of the period.

There is no document or information showing that Mustafa Kemal ordered the İstanbul Municipality to buy his rental house in Şişli and turn it into a museum. In any case, other municipalities followed suit, and it continued

¹⁶⁵ This radiates an image of Mustafa Kemal as the object of both private and public spaces exactly what his surname Ata-Türk (father-Türk) does. No one else but Atatürk had an opportunity to occupy such a place both in public and privie spaces.

until every single house Mustafa Kemal stayed in during and after the War of Independence became an Mustafa Kemal museum. The Mustafa Kemal museum in Şişli, however, contains original paintings by İbrahim Çallı and Zeki Kocamemi, two prominent nationalist painters. They do not include any of the prominent figures of the War of Independence except for Mustafa Kemal, ordinary people and unknown soldiers.

In contrast to the paintings in the museum, the monument in Taksim includes two other prominent figures. One of the figures drafted the plan for independence in Şişli. İsmet İnönü, who managed to stop the expansion of the Greek army towards Ankara in January 1921,¹⁶⁷ was not excluded from the design of the monument. The second figure was Fevzi Çakmak, who, according to Karabekir, did not evacuate his forces at Sakarya, which forced Greek troops to pull back even though Mustafa Kemal had ordered the Turkish army to withdraw. Mustafa Kemal does not mention this in *Nutuk*, either. Fevzi Çakmak always remained loyal to Mustafa Kemal, unlike İnönü. Also unlike İnönü, Çakmak never showed a desire to be a politician and, as mentioned above, supported İnönü's election campaign to become the new leader of the Republic in 1939. Two years after Çakmak retired from the army in 1944, he joined the Democratic Party and was nominated as the opposition candidate against İnönü in the presidential elections of 1946. However, he lost in the elections and parted ways with the Democrats, thereafter establishing his own party, Millet Partisi (the National Party). It was the most

¹⁶⁶ The brochure is both English and Turkish.

¹⁶⁷ İsmet İnönü as a colonel is the first commander who the eastward expansion of the Greek army during the War of Independence. He managed to push the Greek army twice at İnönü, a small town between Bursa and Eskişehir. After the surname law passed in 1934 Mustafa Kemal gave him the surname İnönü.

conservative party of the time, and was abolished in the 1950s by President Bayar because of its involvement in *irticai faaliyetler*.

Çakmak's conservatism was not new to anybody in the assembly since the beginning of the War of Independence. However, Mustafa Kemal never considered him a rival as he did other similar personalities in the army and the assembly. Çakmak did not show any desire to be in politics, which made him more trustworthy. Mustafa Kemal kept him on as the Chief of General Staff until he died in 1938, and Çakmak stayed loyal to him. İnönü also kept Çakmak on as the chief of general staff until 1944. However, when İnönü was sure that Turkey was close to entering war in 1944, he forced Çakmak to retire since he was as conservative in military issues as in politics, and was accused of not modernizing the army.

As I mentioned before, Çakmak never showed any desire to be a politician while Mustafa Kemal was in power. He assured Mustafa Kemal that the army supported him. To publicly reward this loyalty, Mustafa Kemal included him in the designs of Taksim monument as one of the only prominent figures of the War of Independence, along with İnönü. İnönü and Çakmak were represented with two full figures in the monument, each standing one step behind Mustafa Kemal. Behind them are unknown officers and soldiers, including two Russian soldiers denoting Lenin's financial and political support of the independence movement. Therefore, the monument sums up the way Mustafa Kemal wanted to see the history of War of Independence, as well as the emergence of the Turkish Republic and Turkey's relationship with other countries.

Turkish historiography unequivocally agrees that Mustafa Kemal could never have kept power if Lenin had not been supportive of the nationalist movement and its leader. By

maintaining good relationships with Lenin, Mustafa Kemal showed Britain, Greece, France and Italy that the independence movement was not simply a local movement that was opposed by every country. This good-hearted friendship between countries continued after the war. Friendship was one of the reasons Mustafa Kemal included two Russian soldiers among the figures. The other reason was that Mustafa Kemal wanted to convince the world that Soviet Russia would support Turkey again were any country to invade the newly-born Republic.

The message was certainly clear for Mussolini, who was planning to invade Antalya in 1924, which caused a cold war between the two countries from 1924 to 1928. During these years, Turkey commissioned the monument in Taksim to Pierre Canonica, an Italian and a good friend of Mussolini. Considering the cold war, one needs to explain why Turkey commissioned the monument from Canonica. In order to answer this question, we must now look at the story of the monument in Taksim.

THE TAKSIM MONUMENT

Almost two years before the opening ceremony of the monument in Taksim on August 8, 1928, *Milliyet* informed its readers that the community of Beyoğlu (Péra), made up mostly of non-Muslim business people, wanted to erect a statue of the national leader in the square. The daily also mentioned that Hamit Bey, the mayor of the Beyoğlu

Municipality, had already talked to the mayor of the city, Muhittin Bey, about the issue and that Muhittin Bey informed the Ministry of Education.¹⁶⁸

On April 17, 1925, nearly three weeks after the first news about erecting a statue of Kemal in Taksim, Hamit Bey organized a press conference to inform the public of the details of the project. According to this conference, the municipality asked the Ministry to help by commissioning the German sculptor who had done the statue of Hindenburg in Berlin.

The Ministry's pick, however, was not a German sculptor. It was an Italian, which undoubtedly shocked the public given Turkey's tense relations with Mussolini's Italy in the early 1920s. At that time, Italy occupied southern Turkey, in particular the region around Antalya, which Mustafa Kemal and nationalists considered a continuation of traditional expansionist Italian foreign policy. When Mustafa Kemal and his generals pushed back the Greek army at the battle of Sakarya in 1921 during the War of Independence—sending 40,000 Turkish soldiers up against 100,000 Greeks supplied with better equipment and ammunition—Italy realized that Turkey was a superior military force that would not allow foreign invasion. Thus, Italy decided to withdraw its troops from Antalya, one of the most important port cities controlling the Mediterranean and a gate to the Arab world.

Shortly after the Lausanne Agreement in 1923—proclaiming the Republic of Turkey a sovereign state and transferring some of the islands in the Aegean Sea to Italy—Mussolini, who was at Lausanne in person, showed Italy that he had no intention of

¹⁶⁸ Milliyet, 17 April 1926.

giving up his claim on the Antalya region. The first response the newly formed Republic made to Italy's claim was taking military measures, including moving the army to the southwestern shore of the country. As Barlas points out, Italian diplomatic papers of 1924 and 1925 reveal growing Italian interest in Turkish defensive measures along the western coast.¹⁶⁹

Considering the tension between Turkey and Italy, it is unclear why the Ministry chose an Italian sculptor. Turkey's invitation to Canonica indicated that Mustafa Kemal was willing to open up communication channels with Mussolini, who considered the invitation an affair of the Italian state. We learn this from the interview Canonica gave to *Milliyet* the day after he came to Turkey on October 22, 1926, over two weeks after the monument in Sarayburnu opened:¹⁷⁰

I have not seen Gazi yet. But I see today a conqueror's head, deep powerful eyes; that is Gazi. When I was in Rome Senior Mussolini accepted me in his office and said: "You are going to Turkey to sculpt a statue of a great man. I wish you success. This honor is not only for you but also for Italy and I hope this can be a means to provide honesty in the relations of Turkey and Italy, and that maybe it can be a factor."¹⁷¹

Canonica's visit to Turkey took place a few months after Turkey signed a declaration of friendship with France in May 1926, which Mussolini viewed as the Turks courting the French.¹⁷² The new Turkish regime did, in fact, consider Italy the primary

¹⁶⁹ Barlas, 234.

¹⁷⁰ *Milliyet*, 23 Ekim 1926.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² Dilek Barlas, "Friends or Foes? Diplomatic Relations between Italy and Turkey: 1923-1936," *Int. J. Middle East Studies*, vol. 36 (2004). Also see William Hale for an over view of the history of Turkey's international policies covering the last two centuries even though the author suffers from not including some of the main Works on the issue in Turkish, such as Cemil Kocak's 1000 page history of foreign policy of Turkey between 1938-1945, through which he could come up with a more coherent arguments.

potential enemy, since Mussolini preferred to pursue the expansionist policies of Italy after Lausanne.

Mussolini publicly announced Italy's continuing interest in Anatolia when the Mosul crisis between Great Britain and Turkey broke out in 1924. In the Lausanne Agreement, Turkey and Great Britain disagreed on who would control this oil rich region. The diplomats at Lozan left the Turks and British with nine months of direct negotiations to resolve the issue between them. When the two nations could not come to a resolution, the problem was referred to the council of League of Nations as was decided in Lausanne. In December 1925, the League ruled that the British Mandate in Mosul should continue for the next 25 years. While Turkey was considering the League's offer, Italy attempted to use the clash as an opportunity to carve out a sphere of influence in Anatolia. In this way, Mussolini would realize Italy's colonial dream in Anatolia, since he already expected the disintegration of the Republic of Turkey during the crisis.¹⁷³

A year before the League came up with the solution in January 1925, Italy was looking for a way to inspect the Datça and Mamaris regions for possible landing operations. Therefore, Ankara was already alert to a possible Italian invasion around Antalya. After Turkey realized that the Mosul issue was becoming a problem not only with Britain but also with Italy, Mustafa Kemal rushed to action.¹⁷⁴

Mustafa Kemal reacted in a way Mussolini did not expect. On June 6, 1926, Turkey accepted the League's offer and signed an agreement with Britain. In doing this, Mustafa Kemal proved to Mussolini that he did not intend the newly born Republic to be

¹⁷³ Barlas, 236-7.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

a temporary country. This put a damper on Mussolini's colonial desires, and after the agreement he launched a new strategy. He started seeking a closer relationship with Mustafa Kemal, who reacted to this positively and indicated Turkey's desire to remain friendly. Thus, to encourage this, both regimes welcomed Canonica, a good friend of Mussolini.

We do not know for certain that Canonica was a direct mediator between Mustafa Kemal and Mussolini. We do know, however, that between 1924 and 1928 both countries looked for ways to improve their relationship, which engendered a period of warmth in Italian-Turkish relations between 1928 and 1932.

These were also the years Canonica sculpted his four major statues in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, and the same time that the journal *Ar* classified Canonica as an incompetent third-rate sculptor (in 1937). I argue that the Turkish regime picked Canonica not because of his skills as a sculptor, but because he could serve as a possible mediator between the Turkish and Italian leaders. Canonica served as an olive branch between Mustafa Kemal and Mussolini, and his commissions were almost certainly a political gesture to Italy. Therefore, Canonica's four monumental statues in Turkey, three of which are subject to examination in this dissertation, were the products of international politics.

By hiring foreign sculptors to carry out the monumental propaganda in the early Republic, the new Turkish regime did not only aim to give political and social messages to the new nation but also to the countries of Europe, which Turkey considered suspicious imperial powers because of their attempts to share Anatolia. Thus, Kemalists mostly pursued the accepted foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the

twentieth century, which was based on pursuing alliances with some of the great powers of Europe and remaining in the middle of the power structure. This was the case when the new regime confronted Mussolini's expansionist desires after the War of Independence. When Mussolini explicitly announced that he wanted Antalya, Mustafa Kemal did not hesitate to give Mosul to Britain. This prevented Mussolini from using either the international crisis or any national political crisis (such as the Kurdish uprising that broke out in 1924) to squeeze the new Republic to accept his demands.

Turkey's political maneuver turned Britain against Italy in terms of interests in the Arab world. This resulted in a structural change in Turkish-Italian relations, as I have illustrated above. Mustafa Kemal pursued this strategy of warm relations with Italy, while keeping in mind that Soviet Russia was backing Turkey. In return, it seems he reciprocated to Russia by standing behind it in political issues, but also symbolically by including representations of two Russian soldiers in the design of the Taksim statue.

The side of the monument that represents the emergence of the Turkish Republic has three figures standing in front of a group of military and civil figures. We learn from the rest of Canonica's interview that the artist was not planning to sculpt a monument that would have group figures. However, apparently Mustafa Kemal changed his plan when Canonica visited him in Ankara after the interview:

I will look at him carefully while walking, sitting, and talking; in sum, I will examine him in every position and situation...I will inspect Gazi particularly on horseback. It is the most important issue to examine a conqueror on a reared horse. And I pay attention to this more.

Mustafa Kemal did let Canonica sculpt a statue of him on horseback, but it was put in the courtyard of the Türk Ocağı building in Ankara. The statue's mold of the horse figure is the same mold that Canonica used to sculpt the horse on the statue of King Faysal of Iraq, as well as those of Simon Bolivar and Alexander II (Dortlu Figur). This fact sheds light on the mechanical nature of the (re)production of national symbols, which is in opposition to the ethos of artistic sculpture. In other words, in both Canonica's mind and in the mind of his customers, the purpose of this kind of statuary is not artistic, but political.

Hiring Canonica as a potential political mediator as well as a sculptor shows that Mustafa Kemal saw monumental propaganda as political action. Perhaps this is why they did not stress the artistic elements of the statues, all of which were designed solely to express whatever the political elite wanted people to see and understand. Sculptors, therefore, had to be direct in their methods of sending the political elite's message to the populace, especially considering that when the Republic was born about 95 percent of their audience was illiterate and living in Muslim rural Turkey where there was no tradition of human-like statues. Thus, when Mustafa Kemal and his political elite launched the monumental propaganda after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, they decided that the design of the statues should only include figures of Mustafa Kemal and ordinary people—excluding other political figures—in order to shape the core perception of people.

Canonica's monument in Taksim included two full-sized figures of two other prominent leaders of the War of Independence, as well as two Russian soldiers, as I previously mentioned. This indicates that the design of each Mustafa Kemal statue—over

which Kemal held creative control— can illuminate the currents of both national and international politics at the time it was erected. Therefore, Canonica's monument in Taksim not only reveals information about the international relations of Turkey at the time, but also about internal affairs. These affairs can be analyzed in four constitutive parts.

First of all, design of the monument in Taksim indirectly tells us the story of an emerging Turkish nation under Mustafa Kemal's leadership—from Mustafa Kemal's point of view, of course. Secondly, as I discussed in the previous chapters, the statue helps us to understand the politicians, and how they managed to eliminate some prominent figures of the War of Independence from the history of early Republican Turkey. Next, the design shows us how state officials were directed to carry out the monumental propaganda. Finally, it sheds light on the relationship between the regime and the non-Muslim population of Istanbul.

The mayor of Istanbul seems to have resigned because of the discontent surrounding Krippel and the statue in Sarayburnu. Halil Bey, the director of the archeology museum, who helped commission the statue in Sarayburnu, was also among the group who commissioned the monument in Taksim. To prevent the repetition of mistakes made during the process of the first statue of the Republic, the commission for the Taksim monument sent Halil Bey and İhsan Bey to Rome to examine the statue Canonica was sculpting for Taksim.

Halil Bey and İhsan Bey returned from Rome on January 3, 1928 and went directly to see the mayor and give an oral report about their trip to Italy.¹⁷⁵ Two days later, the Commission for the Taksim Monument had a meeting, and Halil Bey submitted his written report.¹⁷⁶ I could not find this report in any archive in Turkey. However, since the commission informed the press about the meetings on a regular basis, we do find information in the newspapers. According to the news in the national press, the commission approved Canonica's statue and considered the job a success.¹⁷⁷

After the approval of the commission, about 4,125 pounds sterling were deposited into Canonica's account in the Bank of Rome as the second installment of his payment. It seems that the commission used the payment process to check on the sculpture and keep Canonica open to any requests they might have of him. The commission did not want to be considered a failure, as was the case with the commission that oversaw the monument in Sarayburnu. Along those lines, the monument in Taksim was under full control of the commission, and thus of Mustafa Kemal.

The press conference that Halil Bey participated in after the commission meeting on January 5 shows that the commission was strict about the steps taken in the production of the Taksim monument. It also explains why the commission approved the job:

Before we went to see the statue in Torino, we went to Vienna, Milan, Florence and Rome. Our goal was to see the monuments in these cities and have a chance to compare Canonica's monument and these monuments. After careful examination, we reached this conclusion: Canonica's monument is a new and a completely original artwork.

¹⁷⁵ Cumhuriyet, 4 January 1928.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 5 January 1928.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.,

Canonica who is an internationally well-known sculptor did a great job particularly on this one. The main criteria about a monument are figures. Architecture comes second... To sum up, I can say that we saw Canonica's more than 20 statues and monuments in museums and squares. None of them was as beautiful as ours.¹⁷⁸

Halil Bey's press release proves that the commission was being very careful about the final product. What is interesting here is that Halil Bey went to see other works by Canonica after the commission hired him. It seems that the debate over the Sarayburnu monument influenced the commission members for the Taksim monument. Perhaps the reason why this commission was acting so carefully is that they wanted to have a chance to force the artist to heed criticisms and make necessary changes in the monument.

A couple of months after the approval of the monument on March 6, the commission had a chance to exercise its authority over the artist. A disagreement broke out between the commission and the Ministry of Education over one of the figures of Mustafa Kemal in the design of the monument. Canonica sculpted this figure of Mustafa Kemal to represent him as the military leader of the nation during the War of Independence. Here Mustafa Kemal appears in his military uniform. Behind Mustafa Kemal are the people and soldiers following him and his cause. The commission informed the Ministry of Education of its opinion that the figure of Mustafa Kemal, representing his leadership during the war, should wear a hat. The commission informed Canonica about the desired change in the figure. Canonica was not willing to add the hat since he had already sculpted the figure.¹⁷⁹ However, the commission insisted on the

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 8 January 1928.

¹⁷⁹ 7 Mart 1928, Cumhuriyet.

change, and so Canonica had to redesign the figure and added a *kalpak*,¹⁸⁰ a specific hat that nationalists wore during the War of Independence.¹⁸¹

TOWARDS THE FIRST REPUBLICAN SQUARE

While the commission was making sure there were no other reactions to the design of the monument, the municipality was continuing the process of enlarging Taksim that was started on January 19, 1928.¹⁸² This was the turning point in the emergence of a new square that was officially to be called Taksim Cumhuriyet Meydanı (Taksim Republican Square) after the opening of the monument on August 8, 1928.¹⁸³

Even though the municipality started enlarging the square in January, the municipality only used intensive labor to make the square ready for the monument after Canonica sent the following letter to the mayor of İstanbul:

The process of sculpting the monument will be finished soon. It is time to start to reutilize Taksim. I am working hard. I am trying to sculpt an excellent monument. I already wrote to architect Muncerni about building the infrastructure of the monument. He agreed. The commission will talk to Müncerni and he will start building the infrastructure. The light rail company [Şirket-i Hayriye] will remove the railways in the square so that the construction can be done without interruption. Before this the municipality will make the model of the square, which will show the place of the light rail, the monuments and the whole square can be seen.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸⁰ Kalpak was the symbol of nationalists during the war. They were called Kalpaklılar, the ones with the hat. But this hat does not have anything to do with the hat revolution. Kalpak was also forbidden to wear after the hat revolution.

¹⁸¹ 11 Mart 1928, Cumhuriyet.

¹⁸² Ibid., 20 January 1928.

¹⁸³ Ibid., 6 January 1928.

¹⁸⁴ Cumhuriyet, 22 April 1928.

A couple of months before this letter, *Cumhuriyet* had already informed its readers that Taksim would be “Yeni Taksim Meydanı” (The New Taksim Square). Here the stress on “yeni” does not only refer to a physical enlargement of an open space, but in fact to something new in terms of the design environment. That is to say, the word “yeni” marked the beginning of the Republican policy of reutilizing open spaces, which I mentioned in the first chapter.¹⁸⁵

The new Taksim Square was not planned to look like a Renaissance-style square. Rather, it was planned as a big circular traffic zone that distributed people all over the city, which eventually became the urban planning policy of all progressive regimes in the 1920s and 1930s due to the increasing use of automobiles.

Halil ve Ihsan Bey must have seen these so-called traffic squares, as well as Renaissance-style squares in the cities they visited. One would expect them to have talked about alternative square projects. However, we do not know whether the commission debated different square projects when it decided to enlarge Taksim.

It seems that since there was already traffic in Taksim, the commission only preferred to enlarge the open space by moving the road that was connected to Cité de Péra further in order to use the new open space for the monument. To move the road, the municipality had to buy some of the houses and stores surrounding the square to tear them down. Also, the commission had to get rid of the second historical building of the square, the Ottoman army base. According to the plan, the water distribution house would stay intact, while the army base was demolished. This way, Cité de Péra would look like a needle, with the square as its eye, and in the center of the eye would stand the

monument. The square was a circle with a 102 meter radius. The center of the square was higher than the road surrounding it, which would make it look like a little hill.¹⁸⁶

The plan offered a square open to both traffic and pedestrians with a statue in the center. As I mentioned in the first chapter, this new conception of an open space became the basis of all Republican squares. Later, during the reutilization and organization of the Anatolian cities, official buildings were added to the squares, and Mustafa Kemal signed several state decrees naming them Cumhuriyet Meydanı (Republican Square).

In the state decrees, however, the square in Ankara was not called a Cumhuriyet Meydanı. Since it was the spatial witness of the War of Independence and the emergence of the Republic, containing the statue Krippel sculpted of Mustafa Kemal in 1927, it was instead named *Hakimiyet-i Milliye Meydanı* (The Square of National Sovereignty). This name, like the monument, represented how the will of the people was officially realized when the first assembly opened in Ankara on April 23, 1920 and ended the political power of the Ottoman palace and the Sublime Porte in Istanbul.

This leaves the question of why the new order did not call Taksim square “Hakimiyet-i Milliye.” It bears remembering that the new regime considered Istanbul the seat of the defunct empire, even after the foundation of the Republic. To call Taksim “Republican Square” for the new regime was in a sense a way to end the power of a dead order. That is to say, the term “Republic” was used to remove the representation of the term “empire” from the mental map of the people, proving that the will of the people

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 6 January 1928.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

could be realized under any kind of political regime, as was the case in the British Empire.

In fact, Kemalists were sensitive about the theoretical connection between the term “will of the people” and the term “regime”. As the leading figures of the RPP argued, there was no necessary correlation between being a Republic and employing the will of the people. The Republic was announced on October 29, 1923 when Rauf Orbay was in Istanbul, not in the assembly. Rauf Orbay reacted to this announcement in an extreme manner in a press release in Istanbul, stating that using the term “Republic” does not mean that the regime is a democratic body based on the will of the people. Considering that the opposition party did not see ending the empire as a necessary political and social step in realizing the “will of the people,” one can understand why the Kemalists grabbed hold of the term “Republic” first by turning Taksim into the first Republican square of the new regime, beginning a trend for all the cities of Anatolia to follow.

The final point to make before delving into a detailed history of the monument in Taksim is that there is a mutual relationship between the design of the monument in Taksim and the official name of the square, much like the monument in Hakimiyet-i Milliye square (now Ulus Meydanı) in Ankara. First, Canonica sculpted both monuments under the guidance of Mustafa Kemal between 1927 and 1928. The monument in Hakimiyet-i Milliye Meydanı represents a leader who managed to organize a resistance movement using the leftover army of the empire in the name of expressing the will of the people. The political and military order during the War of Independence meant not only

the survival of the empire but also the will of the people under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal.

The assembly gathered in Ankara and on April 23, 1920 passed the law, stating that sovereignty belongs to the people without condition. This was later put into verse and inscribed on the wall behind the seat of the assembly president in the first assembly building in Hakimiyet-I Milliye Meydanı. Thus, the design of the monument (see Chapter 5) and the name of the square established a mutual relationship in terms of a spatial and textual unity. Canonica sculpted the monument in Taksim to represent the emergence of the Republic from the War of Independence, which was depicted on three sides of the monument. It radiates an image that shows the emergence of the Republic on the fourth side of the monument as the natural conclusion to the War of Independence, which delivered people an indirect message that Kemal would force out both the invaders and the country's own imperial order. This correlation was complete when the regime named the monument's square Cumhuriyet Meydanı.

I argue that this correlation addresses two material mistakes that Kemal made. The first is that, during the first assembly (1920-1923), he officially promised to not only bring will to the people, but to save the Ottoman Empire. This was the only reason why nationalists and the majority of the people in Anatolia supported him unconditionally during the War of Independence. The second material mistake is that even though the statue in Taksim was planned to represent the nation's support during the War of Independence, it does not refer to the fact that the people of Istanbul were for the most part not eager to follow the people of Anatolia. As noted earlier, the majority of people in Istanbul only started to negotiate with the new regime after the establishment of the

Republic in 1923, partially through erecting monumental propaganda as a form of recognition.

In Chapter 3 we looked at the history of the first monument of the Republic, erected in Sarayburnu in 1926. I explained that donations for this statue mostly came from the Muslim Turkish bourgeoisie of Istanbul, while non-Muslims financed the Taksim Monument. The list of donors in Taksim *Şeref Defteri* shows that only four Muslim merchants donated money for the Taksim monument (figure 7). Most of the donors were Armenians and Greek Orthodox (Rum) of Beyoğlu, and foreign banks. The *Defter*, however, does not include the donations of some professional associations run mostly by non-Muslims. For example, butchers in Istanbul were predominantly Muslim, and butchers donated 26,700 lira as of March 6, 1928.¹⁸⁷

The commission received donations not only from businesses and professional organizations, but also from individuals. After the press conference on January 6, the commission first informed the public that the municipality needed donations for the cost of the monument in Taksim.¹⁸⁸ Between the press conferences on January 6 and April 25, the municipality managed to collect 126,000 lira.¹⁸⁹ Of this, 12,500 lira was collected before mid-April.¹⁹⁰ The figures here are not reliable since we have no documents to prove them, but all the newspapers agreed on the total cost, which was 165,000 lira and that 126,000 of this was collected before mid-April.

¹⁸⁷ Cumhuriyet, 7 March 1928.

¹⁸⁸ Milliyet, 13 May 1926.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 26 April 1928.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

The rest of the donations were collected between mid-April and April 25, which shows that Muhittin Bey started working hard to fund the monument after he received the letter from Canonica. This indicates that at the beginning of the fund raising effort, the municipality was not successful enough at fund-raising for the project, despite the fact that a commission was formed under Muhittin Bey on November 8, 1926 to develop new ways to collect money.

The Beyoğlu municipality even organized public shows to raise money. These shows, however, were not as efficient as the direct donations method the municipality offered, which involved buying one-lira or hundred-lira donation tickets that the municipality issued and distributed. This method proves that the municipality tried to reach potential donors from all levels of income. However, their target was not Istanbul's poor population, since one-lira tickets mostly targeted people with low incomes such as low-ranking officials and teachers. One hundred lira tickets, on the other hand, were for members of the upper-middle class, such as representatives, merchants, professional associations, and foreign banks.

The list of donors in the *Defter* certainly proves that the state collected money mostly from the upper middle classes, most of whose members were non-Muslims residing in the area between Mustafa Kemal's residence in Şişli and Galata, the center of production in the city.¹⁹¹

As I mentioned above, the non-Muslim upper middle class was trying to please the new regime, and the new regime was trying to use them to establish a nation and

¹⁹¹ *Taksim Cumhuriyet Abidesi Şeref Defteri*, prepared by Niyazi Ahmet Banoğlu, (Istanbul: Büyük İstanbul Deneği Yayını, 1973), 293-303.

nationalism based on Turkishness. This was a reactionary attitude on the regime's part, since the non-Muslim upper middle classes were considered comprador bourgeoisie during the imperial period. Considering that Mustafa Kemal acquired a reputation for being impossible to negotiate with even before 1927, I argue that the non-Muslim middle class of the city acted voluntarily to donate money as they gave the idea of erecting a statue of Mustafa Kemal in Taksim to the municipality.

Why were the non-Muslim middle class of the old capital willing to finance the statue in Taksim? Basically, they feared getting deported. Those who left the country in 1923 were mostly from the İzmir region. A majority of the Rum upper classes did not want to leave İstanbul since they had their business in the city. Even though the War of Independence was essentially a war between the Greek and Turkish armies, one outcome of the war was hatred among the Turkish people toward all foreigners, and particularly the Rum and Armenian people. For the nationalists, though, the real problem was with the Rum, since they assisted the Greek army during the war. Therefore, the Rum became the target of the hatred that was disseminated through the national press all over the country during and after the war.¹⁹²

This hatred was directed primarily against the Rum people of the Aegean region where most of the battles of the war took place. Thus, the primary concern for the new regime was to deport the Rum of this region to Greece, which Greece had agreed to in Lausanne. As a result, 1.6 million Rum from the region had to leave Turkey in 1923. As

¹⁹² Some journalists who were with Mustafa Kemal during the different stages of War of Independence wrote a report on the level of destruction Greek Army caused in Aegean region while Turkish Army was marching towards İzmir in August 1922. Halide Edip (Adivar), Yakup Kadri (Karaqosmanoğlu) and Falih Rıfki were the ones who wrote the report. Later Adivar published her memoir *The Turkish Ordeal* (New

Keyder points out, the upper middle class Rum of İstanbul preferred to stay. However, they never felt secure about the kind of regime they were going to be dealing with. They were aware of the official and popular hatred for them, but they thought that the regime needed them since they were the backbone of capital accumulation. Also, Istanbul had people of various national and religious backgrounds in addition to the Greeks .

The new regime needed to recover from the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, World War I in 1914-18 and the War of Independence in 1920-22, all of which had long-lasting demographic, social, and economic, consequences.¹⁹³ During these wars the agricultural production in Anatolia dropped drastically. The population of Anatolia was about 17-18 million in 1913 and 13 million at the end of 1924,¹⁹⁴ which caused a big labor shortage and a 50 percent decrease in agricultural production.¹⁹⁵ About 1.5 million Armenians were deported, died, or were killed. About 100,000 Armenians stayed, mostly in İstanbul.¹⁹⁶ 1.2 million Greeks fled or were deported,¹⁹⁷ except for those in the community of Thrace (which contained about 400,000 Rum¹⁹⁸) and those in Istanbul.¹⁹⁹

Kemalists were aware that they needed the non-Muslim middle classes for the recovery. However, the pressure from below and a possible war with Greece, Italy or any number of other countries forced the new regime to deport most of the Rum so that nobody could use them to invade the country once again. However, when the Rum were

York; London: The Century Co., 1928.) where she talks about the emergence of this hatred among the Turkish population.

¹⁹³ Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century*, 10-11.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.11.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ Keyder, *Dünya Ekonomisi İçinde Türkiye*, 38.

¹⁹⁸ Zürcher, *Turkey*, 171.

¹⁹⁹ We do not have reliable figures as to whether howmany Rums did not leave Istanbul.

sent away the country lost the majority of its middle class, so the deportation was an economically irrational policy on the part of the new regime. On the other hand, the regime did not touch the upper middle class Rum of the old capital since the provisions of the Treaty of Laussane did not include them. In fact, the regime did not want to eliminate them at all. The Turks welcomed foreign capital until the Great Depression in 1929, and did not show any signs of wanting to expel the Rum from İstanbul.

The new regime was caught between pleasing the new nation and recovering from the extensive destruction caused by the wars between 1912 and 1922 . The leftover non-Muslim population of the old capital recognized this dilemma and wanted to let the regime know they were ready to cooperate. Even though the regime did not feel secure about keeping these upper middle class Rum in business, they did welcome their help. However, this went against the plan to create a Muslim Turkish bourgeoisie that was initiated by the Committee of Union and Progress and later adopted by Kemalists.

Here Mustafa Kemal's pragmatism took over, and he knew that the country was not in a position to defend itself before an economic recovery. Thus, the new regime did not so much show mercy for the upper middle classes of the old capital, but rather chose to cooperate with the middle class until the economic and political structure of the country became stronger. This finally happened in 1929, after the agricultural output doubled twice between 1923 and 1929.²⁰⁰ Considering that no major change in the technology of agricultural production emerged during those years, one can assume that the population in Anatolia greatly increased between 1923 and 1929. In fact, it increased

²⁰⁰ Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, p.16.

at least 7.5 percent.²⁰¹ At that point the regime started to feel politically and economically stronger.

The conflict with Italy proved that the world was not ready for another war between major powers, which helped the new regime become recognized as a middle power. Thus, the regime had enough international political stability to deal with internal affairs, especially that of creating a modern nation state in a Weberian sense, and that of controlling society—which the Kurdish problem of 1925 showed was an issue.

Before the beginning of World War II, Turkey managed to centralize political power and create a modern bureaucracy which was supported by an emerging Turkish Muslim bourgeoisie. The Muslim bourgeoisie accumulated its capital through trade and production during the War of Independence, as well as by taking the confiscated belongings of non-Muslims who had to leave the country between 1912 and 1926. However, this Turkish Muslim bourgeoisie pressed the new regime to help their economic growth during the World War II. This met with increasingly nationalistic feelings from the Kemalist bureaucracy, and resulted in a tax reform called *Varlık Vergisi* (Wealth Tax) in 1942. The tax, unlike Zürcher's claims about it²⁰², targeted mainly the

²⁰¹ Ibid., p.244.

²⁰² Zürcher in *Turkey: a Modern History* argues that although the “main victim” of the *Varlık Vergisi* was the non-Muslim business community, it had caused unrest and suspicion among the Turkish bourgeoisie in general. The tax showed that the Kemalist regime, dominated as it was by bureaucrats and the military, was not an entirely dependable supporter of the interests of this group.” Zürcher does not explain how the application of this tax reform was carried out. We find the story in the second volume of Koçak's *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*. Koçak gives us the necessary narrative through narratives and documents (pp. 475-518), according to which, the government was taxing the Muslim business community as well. However what Zürcher did not notice about Koçak's almost 40-page account is that the reform created a market and forced non-Muslim business community, particularly those of Rums and Armenians, to sell their assets at one-eighth of their market value. They had to do this since the government issued huge taxes and forced those who could not pay to work in mines and on road making. This was a great opportunity for the Muslim business community to buy cheap factories and shops. The tax for the non-Muslim business community worked as if it is a tax on confiscated capital.

non-Muslim business community. This was the economic revenge of the Muslim middle class, since Rum and Armenian big business preferred to stay in Istanbul.

Jewish business circles also were affected by the tax, but for a different reason. Increasing anti-Semitism in Germany influenced the bureaucrats, who thought of Germany as the only country that never intended to invade Turkey. Even though Turkish foreign policy was one of neutrality during the war, the first couple of years the government was closer to Germany than any other country. Thus, the government did not hesitate to go after Jewish big business.

The Varlık Vergisi was not the last attempt to eliminate the Rum and Armenians of Istanbul or Jewish people of Turkey in general. On September 6 and 7, 1954, there was a big riot against the Beyoğlu community. The riot was known to the people of Turkey as *6-7 Eylül olayları* (6 and 7 September events), and aimed to destroy the stores of the non-Muslim people of Beyoğlu after Mustafa Kemal's house in Thessalonica was rumored to have been bombed.

The riot started out in Taksim and emanated out from the Taksim monument. The rebels surrounded the statue and dressed it up with Turkish flags. Then, thousands of people started to march on İstiklal and began to destroy the stores. It is ironic that the rebels used the statue in Taksim as a symbol of their nationalism, since the statue was mostly financed by the non-Muslim population of Beyoğlu community, and these non-Muslims had applauded the new regime.

TOWARD THE OPENING OF THE TAKSİM MONUMENT

On May 3 the Commission for the Taksim Monument gathered in the Beyoğlu municipality.²⁰³ After going over the issue of enlarging the square, the commission talked about the statue, which was expected to arrive on May 15, and officially named it *Cumhuriyet Abidesi* (Monument of the Republic) or in Ottoman *Abide-i Cumhuriyet* (which means both Monument of the Republic and Monumental Republic.)

The Ottoman version linguistically represented the monument's goals better, since the new regime meant the statue to represent a Republic and its official ideology of Kemalism, in a monument that would last forever. This goal is often mentioned in the narratives of official historiography. However the verse once again came from Mustafa Kemal himself. After the assassination attempt in İzmir in 1926, Mustafa Kemal sent a message to his people. The last sentence of this letter read: "My insignificant body will turn into soil one day but the Republic of Turkey will live forever." The Kemalist educational system made sure that this became a verse that even every child of the nation knew.

The commission named the monument *Cumhuriyet Abidesi*, and the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* informed its readers about the name of the monument with a headline that read "Cumhuriyet Abidesi" on May 4. However, it seems that the press could not adopt the name right away. Even the daily *Cumhuriyet* used the name "Taksim Zafer Abidesi" (Taksim Victory Monument) in its July 9 issue, while informing the public of the possible opening date and of Canonica's arrival in İstanbul on July 7.

²⁰³ *Cumhuriyet*, 4 May 1928.

As soon as Canonica came to town he met with the commission members and went to see the construction in Taksim.²⁰⁴ He saw that the municipality used the enlargement plan drafted by Architect Muncerni, and was pleased that the statue would be put up on the base pedestal in no later than a month. Canonica brought Italian experts along with him to help finish the process of putting up the base and the monument.²⁰⁵

The monument and the base pedestal came to Istanbul in several pieces a day after Canonica arrived. A commission went to the port and laid out the pieces of the monument for inspection. After the inspection, all the pieces were moved to Taksim, and the commission approved the third installment of Canonica's payment. Canonica was informed that they would release the last installment after the opening.²⁰⁶

While the pieces of the monument were being moved to Taksim, Canonica gave an interview to the daily *Cumhuriyet* in the Italian consulate. Before discussing the monument, Canonica wanted to address the Turco-Italian relationship:

I am please to see that Turkey and Italy are friends and have signed a friendship agreement. They need each other in terms of political and economic issues. And the daily *Cumhuriyet* is a well-known paper in Italy. The editor Mr. Yunus Nadi has a personality that political circles in Italy admire.²⁰⁷

Cumhuriyet and Yunus Nadi were both anti-Italian, and were suspicious of Italian expansionist foreign policy in 1924 and 1925. Because the paper was under Mustafa Kemal's direct order, I argue that Canonica was trying to send a message of admiration to both the bureaucracy and the ordinary people.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 8 July 1928.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 9 July 1928.

Canonica acted much like an Italian foreign official, even though he was ostensibly hired only as an artist. In that sense, it is important to analyze why Canonica stressed the friendship between the two countries. As I mentioned in a previous chapter, in his first interview with the daily *Milliyet*, Canonica revealed that Mussolini considered the Turkish statue commission a responsibility of the Italian state (see above).

Canonica's sensitivity made sense considering the fact that he was an Italian citizen as well as an artist, and that Mussolini might have chosen him to mediate between the two countries. What Canonica did not reveal in the interviews, however, was that in October 1926 Mussolini also asked him to prepare a report on the geographical, political and economic conditions of the newly born Republic. Canonica replied:

Eccellenza,
I will try to provide you with the information that you asked from me in this short report. I first went to İstanbul and Ankara where I met with high-ranking officers, intellectual elite and prominent journalists. My impression is that other foreign countries have turned the Turks against us. They are suspicious of us...The consulate here tried hard to stop all these destructive affairs and I tried to help him. I would feel happy if I served your Excellency.²⁰⁸

Canonica sent this report to Mussolini while he was still in Turkey in February 1926. The report informs Mussolini not only about the character of the political and intellectual elite but also on the geographical future of the places he visited in Anatolia, ranging from Sivas in the east to Izmir in the west. We do not know whether Mussolini asked him for a second report during his second trip to Turkey in July 1928. However,

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

we do know that Italy dropped the traditional Italian expansionist policies until 1932, and thus Canonica became the olive branch between Mustafa Kemal and Mussolini.

It is important to stress that Canonica's eager reporting indicates that he did not see any ethical problems with sending Mussolini information about Turkey's defensive measures. However, he sincerely seemed to think that this report would be instrumental in establishing good relations between Italy and Turkey. Therefore Canonica tried especially hard to produce a monument that would be symbolic of warmth between the two countries. Moreover, he even came to İstanbul earlier to guide workers and engineers during the preparation period of both the square and the base pedestal. All the newspapers state that Canonica worked hard to finish the preparations.²⁰⁹

The opening date was set for August 8, and Canonica managed to finish the base pedestal and the placement of the monument's pieces in the center of the new square toward the end of July. However, the municipality could not make the square ready in time for the opening. Therefore, on July 26, the commission had a meeting in Beyoğlu Municipality to solve the problem.

Canonica and the architect Muncerni were present at this meeting. The commission decided to enlarge Taksim a little bit more by removing the movie theater Alkazar and the door of an autotopark in the square, but they needed one more month to do it.²¹⁰ The commission and Canonica met one more time on August 2, to check on preparations for the opening. Canonica informed the commission that the placement of

²⁰⁸ Semavi Eyice, *Atatürk ve Pietro Canonica* (İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1986), 38-42. This 50 page book also includes the report in Italian.

²⁰⁹ Cumhuriyet, 26 July 1928.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 27 July 1928.

the monument on the base pedestal would be completed in a few days.²¹¹ The rest of the preparations, such as leveling the square and planting flowers, were left to be finished after the opening.²¹²

All these delays became a problem considering that the opening date was initially set for August 8. At the meeting on August 2, the commission decided not to postpone the opening. However, the press was informed that they would announce the definite date of the opening, which could be August 10, after the commission talked to the “necessary people” on August 3.

The “necessary people” were not “people” at all, but Mustafa Kemal. Kemal was constantly informed of the preparations through direct reports as well as through state decrees regarding property confiscations and tax waivers for the monument to be released from the customs in Istanbul. Mustafa Kemal and the government signed all these state decrees without discussing them in the assembly. Mustafa Kemal must have agreed to allow the date to remain uncertain, since the press was informed that the opening might be on August 8 or August 10, depending on the square’s progress.

The press also stated that the commission had already started to send invitation letters to notables for the opening.²¹³ Since I could not find a copy of the invitation in the archives or in any private collections, I do not know which date was written on the invitations as the official opening date.

On August 7, three days after the commission started to send the letters, the press finally informed its audience that the erection of the monument was completed and the

²¹¹ Ibid., 3 August 1928.

²¹² Ibid., 27 July 1928.

day of opening was “tomorrow” (August 8) at 6 p.m. The press also noted that 2,000 people were officially invited for to opening ²¹⁴ and provided the public with the program.²¹⁵

The program that the press published does not include any information about whether there was a dress code for the ceremony as there was for the monument opening in Sarayburnu. However, the party center in İstanbul sent a message to the press for publication on August 8, stating that all the representatives were invited and that “redingots” (frock coat) or suits should be worn during the ceremony, or, if these two choices were not possible, then a dark “veston” (jacket).²¹⁶

²¹³ Ibid., 4 August 1928.

²¹⁴ Ibid., 7 August 1928.

²¹⁵ Ibid. The party director and the head of the commission [for the Taksim Monument] and reprehensive of İstanbul Hakkı Şinasi Paşa will deliver the opening speech on behalf of the city. Next Necati Bey, the Minister of Education will talk on behalf of the government. A pair of scissors in a silver tray will be given to Necati Bey to cut the ribbon that surrounds the fabric on the statue. Red fabrics will be used to cover the monument (figure). The pictures of the monument will be allowed to taken only after the opening ceremony. Before the opening speeches, the Presidential Orchestra will play the national anthem. The commission will have a rope to mark an area around the monument for only the guests officially invited. The commission will estimate the number of these guests at 2000 and the enrobed area will be big enough to include all the guests. Out side of encircle, Darülfünun (İstanbul University), high school and other schools students will be lined up and those who want to be present at the ceremony will be able to stand after the students. The commission, members of government who are in İstanbul, the millitary circles, representatives, prominent bureaucrats and heads of professional associations and journalists were invited fro the ceremony. In the ceremony, all the students will be present. The director of education in Istanbul let the students and teachers know about the necessity of being present for the ceremony so they all will be ready at the ceremony.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 8 August 1928.

THE OPENING

On the afternoon of August 8, only three hours before the opening, the commission met Canonica at Beyoğlu Municipality to sign the paperwork that concluded his job in Istanbul.²¹⁷ Then they went to the first Republican square of Turkey, where construction was stopped for the opening of the monument. When they approached the square they must have seen thousands people pouring in for the ceremony. According to the newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, about 20,000 people gathered at the square, 2,000 of whom were officially invited.²¹⁸

By 6 o'clock that evening, people took their places around the monument, including all the students and military personnel of the city, the orchestra, Kazım Paşa, the president of the assembly, Hakkı Sinaşi Paşa, the head of the party in İstanbul, Şükrü Ziya, the minister of Interior, Necati Bey, the minister of Education, Tevfik Bey, the secretary of president, Saffet Bey, the secretary of the Party, Muhittin Bey, the mayor, and all the foreign ambassadors.²¹⁹ Strangely, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, was not present for this ceremony as he was for the opening ceremony of İzmir in 1932. As for Mustafa Kemal, he also did not attend, though he came to town one day before the opening. As I mentioned, Mustafa Kemal never attended any opening ceremony for his statues, which was an operational strategy to marshal the populace's perception of him as the father of the nation. Instead, he preferred to send messages to the commissions established in almost every city to erect statues of the leader, expressing his gratitude.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 9 August 1928.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

Since neither Kemal nor İnönü was part of the opening ceremony, Kazim Paşa was first in the protocol. At exactly 6 p.m, when Kazim Paşa cut the ribbon to unveil the cover on the monument, people started to clap. Then Kazim Paşa delivered the opening speech:

On the left and right side of the monument we see today and yesterday. On the right is the heroic warrior of the War of Independence, the secret of the national victory, on the left, the victorious Turkish soldier whose victory was symbolized by the flag... In the front door of the monument is the great Gazi, the great savior who saved İstanbul in Anafarta [a battle of Dardanelle] and the whole country in Sakarya and Dumlupınar (two battles of the War of Independence). On his right is İsmet Paşa the victor of the battles and Mudanya and Lozan [referring to international agreements] the one who signed the war with his gun and the peace with his pen. On his left is Fevzi Paşa, the glorious commander of the War of Independence. And behind them are their friends... This glorious crowd comes out of the door of the past and enters the Republican Square. ²²⁰

Through this description of the monument, Kazim Paşa successfully sums up the story of the War of Independence and Mustafa Kemal's take on the formation of the Republic. As is clear from speeches delivered during the unveiling, the monument tells the story of a new nation born after the War of Independence, but only refers to commanders and battles in Western Anatolia and excludes Kazım Karabekir's successful military operations with the 9th army in the east. Refet Bele and Ali Fuat Cebesoy, two prominent commanders of the western front, were also left out of the design, since they joined the Republican Progressive Party after the war.

Canonica was not in a position to know of all these exclusions, even though he had

²²⁰ Ibid.

examined many photographs related to the war, Mustafa Kemal, and his friends.²²¹ He based his design plan on the inspiration he took from these photographs, which perhaps did not include Rauf Orbay, Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy and Refet Bele. But even if these prominent heroes were in the pictures, their names were left out of the design plan of the monument in Taksim:

One side of the monument depicts the national struggle. On the front is Ghazi, with his soldiers behind him. To the right-hand sight of Ghazi, in front of his feet, is a woman half-veiled. Ghazi asks this woman why she didn't protect herself from the rain with her veil. Silently uncovering the veil, the woman exposes a set of ammunition and replies that she preferred to cover the ammunition rather than herself. On the other side of the gate, the declaration of the Republic is described. Ghazi stands in front of the gate, with his closest friends gathered close behind him. On both sides of the gate are soldiers with Turkish flags.²²²

Still, the names Fevzi Paşa and İsmet İnönü, were also missing, even though they were two of Mustafa Kemal's most loyal generals on the western front. Mustafa Kemal was not willing to admit that these two figures were great assets in the country's salvation.

Saving the country for Mustafa Kemal was a circular journey, which started on May 16, 1919 at Sarayburnu and ended in Istanbul in 1928 when he visited the city one day before the opening of the monument. Therefore, the monument for Mustafa Kemal was a visual summary of his adventure.

Istanbul, once the capital and the most important city of the Ottoman Empire, opened its doors to Mustafa Kemal, who had returned to the city not only after winning a victory for the new nation, saving Anatolia, and giving the city "the kind of government it

²²¹ Selahattin Demirkan, *Istanbul Taksim Cumhuriyet Anıtı Ne Maksatla Yapıldı* (Istanbul: Siralar Matbaası, 1968), 1-4.

deserved.” The eight years that he spent in Anatolia were not just years of struggle for independence, but also for a political revolution. His message regarding his return to Istanbul exemplifies one of the best cases of this psycho-geography:

My Dear Countrymen, eight years ago I left a sorrowful, weeping Istanbul with pain in my heart. There was no one to bid me farewell. Eight years later, with a comforted heart, I have come to a smiling and flourishing Istanbul. Istanbul, located at the point where two great worlds are united, the ornament of the Turkish nation, the treasure of Turkish history, the dearest objects of the Turkish nation, is a city that has place in the hearts of all countrymen.²²³

Ankara, the city Mustafa Kemal left behind, became the new capital city of the new nation. This new city had the highest density of Mustafa Kemal statues. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the monument erected in Hakimiyet-i Milliye Meydanı in 1927 was sculpted by Krippel, and much like the ones in Samsun, Afyon and İzmir, symbolized a turning point in Mustafa Kemal’s circular journey. I will discuss the story of these four monuments in the next chapter. Although the monuments in Samsun and Afyon are significant in Mustafa Kemal’s journey and in his campaign of monumental propaganda, the ones in Ankara and İzmir are more crucial, since the former was the headquarters of the War of Independence and the latter was the under Greek occupation from May 15, 1919 to September 9, 1922. Therefore the next chapter will focus on the monuments in those two cities.

²²² Ibid., 1-4

²²³ Mustafa K. Atatürk, *Nutuk* (Speeches) (Istanbul, 1995), 249.

Chapter 5

Monuments of the Republic in Anatolian Cities

This last chapter covers the four major monuments erected in Samsun, Ankara, Afyon, and Izmir—four cities that marked Mustafa Kemal’s circular journey after his departure from Istanbul in May 1919. The monuments in Samsun and Afyon were sculpted by Krippel in 1932 and 1936, respectively, and the ones in Ankara and Izmir by Canonica in 1927 and 1932, respectively. I pay the closest attention to the monument in Ankara, since there are almost no documents on the statues in Samsun, Afyon, and only a few on the one in İzmir.²²⁴

Before I provide the details of the monument in Ankara, I explain the importance of the monuments in Samsun, Afyon, and İzmir in the narrative of official historiography, so that we can see the whole picture of Kemal’s circular journey. I then discuss why prominent cities in the history of the nationalist movement, such as Erzurum, Sivas and Sakarya, never became sites for monumental propaganda of Mustafa Kemal. Finally, I briefly elaborate on the monument in İzmir—the city where the Greek troops landed and the abandoned under fire—before I finally elaborate upon the monument in Ankara, the headquarters of the War of Independence.

Mustafa Kemal landed in Samsun after a three-day journey on a ship called *Bandırma Vapurı* (Bandırma Steamship). In the narrative of official historiography,

Bandırma was described as an old ship that was in very bad shape. On May 16, the ship departed from Istanbul carrying Kemal—who had drafted the secret plan to save the country in Şişli—and arrived in Samsun after a two-day journey on May 19. Mustafa Kemal landed at the ferry station in the morning, along with a group of officers. In the official historiography, his landing is considered the first step toward independence.

Almost five years later, on September 20, 1924, Mustafa Kemal—this time as Gazi and the first president of the Republic—paid a visit to the city.²²⁵ He went to the newly opened Republican park to make an official inspection, and then Mayor Ibrahim Veysi Bey gave a dinner party in his honor. Mustafa Kemal delivered an opening speech at the party, which clearly stated the perception of Samsun and its people in his mental map, and reminding them that he had a plan to save the country when he landed in Samsun five years earlier:

When I first saw Samsun and the people of Samsun, I once again believed in all my plans regarding the country and the nation. The patriotic feelings and the courage that I observed in the eyes of Samsunites were enough for me to have faith in my hopes and plans.²²⁶

The park Mustafa Kemal inspected before dinner was the intended location of the monument in Samsun. This monument represents Mustafa Kemal's launch of the War of Independence, especially in the eyes of Samsunites who, in the 1970s, erected another

²²⁴ When I went to Samsun, Afyon and Izmir in 2004 to look for documents in the state archives, the officials did not let me to do any research. I also went to the municipality archives of all these cities. I found some records, but they were not enough to come discuss each statue in a separate chapter.

²²⁵ Hasan Yigit, *Samsun ve İlçeleri* (Samsun: Gül Neşriyat, 2003), 18.

²²⁶ The quote is cited in Yigit, 19.

statue of him called İlk Adım (The First Step) that commemorated his landing in Samsun.

The design of İlk Adım sums up the reflection of the official historiography at the city level. Here, the leader not only saves the country from the enemy but also liberates the youth, the future generations, and the new people of the Republic. Samsun, as the city where Kemal took the first step towards independence, has celebrated May 19 as a national day since the 1930s. As the official birthday of Mustafa Kemal and the official date of Turkey's annual youth festival, May 19 became the symbol of the unification of these two functions. However, with its multifunctional theme, İlk Adım never replaced the official symbol of the city, which was the first monument, officially named *19 Mayıs Anıtı* and erected on January 15, 1932.

This is the third monument that Krippel designed for the regime. It was dedicated five years after his first monument appeared in Sarayburnu in 1926. This statue depicts Mustafa Kemal on horseback. Unlike the figure of the Sarayburnu statue, Mustafa Kemal now appears in a uniform, looking very determined, and about to unsheathe his sword. This determination conveys an image of the beginning of the national struggle.

The monument was erected next to the government building in a park that used to be a Muslim cemetery. The cemetery was converted to a park in 1924, the same year Mustafa Kemal officially inspected the location for use as a Republican park. According to Baki Sarısakal, a high school history teacher and a recognized local historian of the

city, the Muslim populace of the city rallied and marched to the cemetery when the regime decided to turn the cemetery into a park.²²⁷

Reutilizing the cemetery in Samsun was not the first act of the Republic regarding public spaces. As I mentioned in the first chapter, reutilizing open spaces provided one of the most important showcases for the Kemalist regime. Since the regime did not turn the Ottoman open spaces and squares into Republican ones for political reasons, they had to look for new spaces that they could reutilize. Non-Muslim cemeteries located in city centers were the first ones that they converted, but soon Muslim cemeteries also became the subject of their urban policies. But none of these reutilizations looked as radical as the one in Afyon, where the regime destroyed a mosque and erected a monument of Mustafa Kemal in remembrance of the Great Offensive of the Turkish army that defeated the Greeks in August 1922.

AFYON AND THE LAST BATTLE OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

As I mentioned in the first chapter, the invasion of Izmir by Greek troops on May 15, 1919, was instrumental in launching a nationalist movement in Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal was the agreed upon leader of the War of Independence as it emerged from this movement between 1921 and 1922. When he departed from Istanbul on May 16, Kazım Karabekir was waiting for him in Erzurum to initiate the process of independence. While

²²⁷ Interview with Baki Sarısakal, June 2004. It would help if I could find the details of this uprising. However, the local government did not allow me to use the state archive of the city, which I anticipated, considering that the officials of the Turkish state have been *info-phobic* since the beginning of the Republic.

Mustafa Kemal and the pillars of the War of Independence were leading the people of Anatolia into war conditions in 1920 and 1921, Greek troops managed to occupy many other cities and towns of western Anatolia. These included Uşak, Kütahya, Afyon, and Eskişehir (see map), where small battles between Greek troops and Turkish forces (mostly militias and some military units) took place before the first big battle of the War of Independence in Sakarya.

The Greek army advanced to the Sakarya River, about 60 miles west of Ankara, in June 1921. When the government in Ankara was informed that the Greek troops were marching on them, the assembly appointed Mustafa Kemal as the commander-in-chief. They also passed the law that gave him dictatorial rights for three months so that he could mobilize the army and the resources of the country to stop the Greek advancement.

Mustafa Kemal prepared the army and moved it to Sakarya in August 1921. The two armies met along the river and fought for about 20 days at the Battle of Sakarya (August 23 - September 13, 1921). The Turkish army forced the Greeks to withdraw from Sakarya. Mustafa Kemal, as the commander-in-chief, did not allow his army to pursue them. The weakened Greek troops retreated to Afyon so that the army could rally for a possible second round, in order to defend the rest of the occupied territories in western Anatolia.

Mustafa Kemal came out of the Battle of Sakarya as the strongest military and political figure, not only among the nationalists in Anatolia, but also in the eyes of the Allies and the Bolsheviks. Lenin, for instance, recognized Mustafa Kemal's authority in the nationalist movement, and cut off the diplomatic relations between Enver Paşa and the Bolsheviks after the battle of Sakarya. Lenin's support for Mustafa Kemal ended the

tug-of-war between Kemalists and Enver supporters in Ankara. Andrew Mango, in his *Mustafa Kemal*, a cautious but still orthodox account of Mustafa Kemal's life, illuminates the importance of the Battle of Sakarya in Kemal's rise to the commanding voice of the nationalist movement:

Deprived of a role in Turkey, Enver traveled to Baku and then on to Central Asia, where, instead of heading a movement against the British in India, he joined the Muslim bands (called Basmachi) who opposed the Bolsheviks. He was killed in present-day Tajikistan in a clash with the Red army on 4 August 1922. He was the last of the CUP triumvirs to die: Talat, had been killed in Berlin in March 1921 and Cemal in Tiflis in July 1922... The disappearance of the old, defeated leaders made it easier for Mustafa Kemal to unite the forces of Turkish nationalism... Now, his unifying role could no longer be questioned. The battle of Sakarya saved Turkey from further Greek encroachment and Mustafa Kemal from the ghosts of a tragic past.²²⁸

With direct support from Lenin and having secured the title of *Gazi* and Marshal in the assembly on September 18, 1921, Mustafa Kemal made France and Italy realize that Treaty of Sèvres²²⁹ was not going to be easy to enforce. In early 1922 they saw that recognizing the emerging regime in Anatolia might be more profitable for them in the long run. Thus, Italian and French troops were removed from Anatolia, and left the Greeks without support in the western shore for the next big battle.

By the end of September 1921, the Greek army retreated to its starting positions at Eskişehir in the northwest and Afyon in the center.²³⁰ The Turkish army finished the

²²⁸ Andrew Mango, *Atatürk: The Birth of the Founder of Modern Turkey* (Woodstock & New York, 1999), 323-324.

²²⁹ A peace treaty signed between the Entente and the allied powers on August 10, 1920, according to which, the land of the Ottoman Empire was practically shared.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 321.

preparations for a possible offense in August 1922. Mustafa Kemal ordered the army to move to Afyon, where the strengthened Greek army was waiting to defend the territory they had occupied since May 15, 1919.

Mustafa Kemal, as the commander in chief, drafted the plan to destroy the Greek army. Fevzi Çakmak and İsmet İnönü executed the plan. On August 26, 1922, the Turkish army started what military history calls *Büyük Taaruz*, or the Great Offense. The Turks caught the Greek army by surprise on the steps of Dumlupınar, a town near Afyon. Turkish soldiers advanced rapidly from there on. The Greek army had to withdraw from Afyon on August 27, while the first Turkish troops entered the city. From that day on, August 27 has been celebrated as the official Independence Day of the city.

In the days following Afyon's capture, Mustafa Kemal and his officers came to the city. They had moved their headquarters to the municipality building near downtown Afyon. On August 30, Mustafa Kemal wanted to be closer to action, and thus moved his headquarters to a hill overlooking the battlefield. There, he directed the disintegration of the encircled Greek troops.²³¹

On the first day of September 1922, Mustafa Kemal, Fevzi Çakmak, and İsmet İnönü had a meeting under a tree on a hill overlooking the battlefield near Afyon. Mustafa Kemal, as the commander-in-chief, gave his written order: "Soldiers, your first goal is the Mediterranean!"

This order simply directed the Turkish troops to follow the Greek troops as they retreated to Izmir. The Greeks destroyed the towns and villages that they passed, and

²³¹ Ibid., 341.

they arrived in Izmir to find ships waiting for them. They departed on September 9, 1922.

In 1924, two years after the Great Offensive, Mustafa Kemal went to Afyon to attend the opening ceremony of a monument dedicated to the war's unknown soldiers (see Chapter 2). The ceremony was held on August 30, a national holiday in Turkey celebrated as the war's Victory Day. Eleven years after the opening of this monument, On June 21, 1934, Mustafa Kemal paid another visit to the city, this time as Mustafa Kemal. Rıza Shah Pahlavi, the ruler of Iran and a great admirer of Mustafa Kemal, went along with him. Two years after this visit, on November 20, 1937, Mustafa Kemal came to Afyon for the last time. This time, he came only to inspect the Zafer Abidesi (The Victory Monument) dedicated on March 24, 1936.²³²

The Zafer Abidesi in Afyon was the most distinct monument of the early Republic, since the figures in the monument are all completely naked. Moreover, it was the only major monument that the national and local press did not describe specifically as a statue of Mustafa Kemal, perhaps because the figure in the monument resembles Mustafa Kemal, but is not obviously recognizable as him.

The figure has a very determined posture, with his left fist clenched and his right fist hooked like an eagle's talon, poised and ready to strike. Today, the official description of the monument calls the figure "a figure of a male Turk."²³³ Below the male

²³² Latif Daşdemir, *Atatürk'ün Afyonkarahisar Ziyareti* (Ankara: Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi Yayını, 2002), p.119. The name *Zafer Abidesi* was used by the national and local daily newspapers before the completion of the monument. The name *Utku Anıtı* (Victory Monument) was used during the opening ceremony because "original Turkish words" was encouraged to replace the Ottoman Words by the political elite since 1934, the begging of the Sun-Language Theory, according to which, all languages were based on the sounds embedded in Turkish.

²³³ *Afyon Yılığ* (Afyon Valiliği Yayınları, Mina Ajans, 2001), 136.

figure, a figure of the enemy lies in agony. The face of the defeated man at Kemal's feet is reminiscent of Greek sculpture. He is not only unclothed but also defenseless. This posture denotes that the Greek army lost the war.

Although the official description of the monument does not recognize the commanding figure as Mustafa Kemal or even recognize the piece as a statue of him, the monument remains a representation of Mustafa Kemal in the mental map of people of Afyon.²³⁴

Zafer Abidesi is not only different from other monuments and statues of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, but it also met a shocking fate after the end of the single-party regime. In 1954, the representatives of DP from Afyon targeted the nakedness of the figures in the monument, catering to anti-Kemalist discontent in the city. The local government in Afyon formed a commission in 1954 to reduce the size of the "male Turk's" penis. There is no record of when the representatives altered the statue or who carried it out. However, a document that I found in the local government archive provides us with a reason for the statue's 'circumcision':

The penis of the statue-[the one that represents the Turk]- was made smaller since it degraded people's morality.²³⁵

As I mentioned in chapter four, DP was under pressure from people who felt oppressed by the Kemalist reforms. DP representatives from the city wanted to

²³⁴ The people I have talked to in Afyon almost univocally told me that it is an "Ataturk monument". As for the commanding figure, it is considered Mustafa Kemal.

²³⁵ *Dogal ve Kulturel Varliklari Koruma Envanteri*, Afyon Valiligi, Envanter no: 03.00.0/1.0. The document was prepared on March 23, 1980.

show that they took up the people's causes, and to show their sincerity they emasculated the statue by minimizing its penis.

THE *OTHER* CITIES

There were other cities between Samsun and Izmir that Mustafa Kemal went to in order to promote himself as the leader of the nationalist movement. These included Sivas and Erzurum, where two national congresses were held, and Sakarya, where the first major war between the Turkish and Greek armies took place.

Even though Sivas, Erzurum, and Sakarya were part of Mustafa Kemal's circular journey, they were not subject to his monumental propaganda. Unfortunately, the documents and secondary sources I have found do not include adequate information to explain why these important cities were not part of Kemal's propaganda campaign. We do know that Canonica went to Sivas when he first came to Turkey in 1926 to design a monument for Mustafa Kemal. However, it did not work out. As for Sakarya and Erzurum, there is not even mention in the newspapers and journals as to whether they were considered targets for monumental propaganda.

One can argue that Mustafa Kemal may have felt it wrong to erect a statue of himself in Sakarya, since the population and press in that city considered Fevzi Çakmak, not Mustafa Kemal, the victorious general of the battle. Along the same lines, one can argue that Sivas and Erzurum did not receive a major statue of Mustafa Kemal because

Karabekir was the commanding voice in these cities.²³⁶ I believe that Mustafa Kemal was not accepted as the real leader in any of these cities, and thus he did not include them in his monumental propaganda campaign. If he had erected a statue and inspired community dissent, it might have clouded his success in other cities and thus made his popularity questionable.

Undoubtedly, Mustafa Kemal was the best Ottoman general to come out of World War I. The war provided him with what Mango calls a “supreme realism”²³⁷ which he used to become the best strategist in military affairs and politics. This supreme realism made it possible for Turks to survive, and helped them topple the empire and romantic, pan-Turkist figures such as Enver Paşa. It seems certain that Mustafa Kemal won the fight for leadership not only because he was successful in the battle of Sakarya, but also because he made it explicitly clear that he was not a pan-Turkist.

Mustafa Kemal was the most popular Turk of the time in both the national and international press. He was on the cover of *Time* magazine twice and on the cover of *L'illustration* once before the end of the war. It is clear that despite his popularity, he did not want to share the spotlight with any major figures of the War of Independence. Kemal grew up in a political culture that was dominated by the CUP, whose political figures believed that dictatorship was necessary in changing society. Mustafa Kemal was a child of the Committee, and learned how to be pragmatic by watching Unionist mistakes during World War I. In the army, he learned that a commander had to be the only voice to win a war. He was given a chance to combine these two pieces of knowledge during the

²³⁶ Later in the 1960s, people of Erzurum erected a statue of Karabekir, which introduces him as the hero of the East.

War of Independence, and he ultimately became a dictator who did not want to share success with the prominent figures who had helped him. As Cemal Kutay proposes²³⁸, in Kemal's perception the War of Independence included only the battles and military divisions in western Anatolia and not those important 9th army units on the eastern front. This theory supports my argument that Kemal excluded Erzurum and Sivas on purpose when launching monumental propaganda.

İzmir, among all these cities, occupies a special place in this geography for different reasons. The fact that it was the first city occupied by the enemy gave it a traumatic air in the popular consciousness. The dates May 15, 1919 and September 9, 1922 are thus tied to each other more than any other important turning points of the War of Independence. Thus, before we dwell on the details of the monument in Ankara, it is necessary to briefly talk about İzmir's place in official historiography.

9 EYLÜL (SEPTEMBER 9) 1922, VICTORY DAY OF İZMİR

I just started strolling through Izmir... I notice though: the only thing I know about her history is September 9, 1922, the date that she was cleansed of the enemy, and I found myself searching the history of the city.²³⁹

September 9 is an official national day that represents the "cleansing" of the motherland from the enemies. Every year it is celebrated as the day Izmir became independent. I was an

²³⁷ Mango, 323.

²³⁸ Camal Kutay, *Tarihin Aydınligi* (Istanbul: Ilkim yayinlari, 2004).

²³⁹ The quote is from "İzmir and her past. Izmir... the Center of Civilization" an article written by Elçin Sarigun, a high school student, for the history competition held among high schools students in December, 2000, in Izmir.

eyewitness to the 9 Eylül celebrations for 18 years, until I went to Ankara for my university education. Between 1984 and 1988 I was a student at İzmir Mustafa Kemal High School, the most prestigious state high school of the city, and I celebrated both the youth festival (May 19) and 9 Eylül. I remember that the September celebration made me feel proud that I was from İzmir, a city whose history I did not actually know much about.

Izmir (Smyrna) was a small Byzantine town until the Ottomans captured the city in 1426. It was the only port city of western Anatolia whose population was mostly non-Muslim. Christians and Jews dominated the social and commercial life of the city. This remained the case until Turkish troops entered the city in pursuit of the worn-out Greek army on September 9, 1922, just one week after the commander in chief Mustafa Kemal Paşa gave his well-known order: “Soldiers! Your first target is the Mediterranean.”

Today, statues exist depicting the moment Mustafa Kemal and two army commanders, İsmet (İnönü) and Fevzi Çakmak, who drafted the order in Kocatepe. These statues are in Harbiye Müzesi, the War Museum, which opened in 1880 and was located only a few blocks from Mustafa Kemal’s residence in Sisli. The administration of this War Museum recently started using statues of the top figures of the war, or “saviors” as many would call them. They use these statues to make it easier for visitors to imagine the war, to refresh their knowledge of the war, and to visualize and sentimentalize the textual knowledge they received about the war.²⁴⁰ Still, there are no statues of those war participants who were on the blacklist that

Izmir Municipality later in 2003 edited the winners’ articles in a book called *İzmir: Liseler Arası Tarih Yarışması (İzmir: High School History Competition)* (İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür Yayını, 2003), 241.

²⁴⁰ Some of these texts were textbooks that were written for “War of Independence” courses that were compulsory for students from primary schools through university education after 1927.

Mustafa Kemal mentioned in *Nutuk*, such as Rauf Orbay.²⁴¹ Just as Orbay and other war heroes were excluded from the official history textbooks on the War of Independence written after 1927, they have not been represented in most Republican museums since then.

On September 15, 1922, only six days after Turkish troops entered Izmir, Clare Sheridan—a British journalist and sculptor and Winston Churchill’s niece—came to the city. The upscale district Alsancak (or Red Flag), where mostly Ottoman Greeks used to live, was burning. However, it was certainly not because of a last battle between the armies, as most foreign journalists thought at the time. Turkish official history blames Greek troops, just as Greek official history blames the Turkish army for the fires. Since then it has been a disputed subject among historians of the region.

Sheridan came to town a couple of days after Mustafa Kemal arrived, and settled in Uşaklızade’s house in Göztepe, one of the hills overlooking downtown Izmir. “The city”, says Sheridan “was still on fire when I got there.”²⁴² She does not accuse anybody. Perhaps she was not surprised to see such a scene since the war was technically still going on.

As a journalist, Sheridan had a chance to interview Kemal, who had been struggling for political power despite his national and international fame. Although Mustafa Kemal was very popular throughout the world, most intellectuals and writers—particularly from Istanbul—and most of the politicians of the first assembly (1920-1923) considered him to be only a war-time leader. They all expected that Kemal would step down to let someone else lead the

²⁴¹ Surprisingly, Kazım Karabekir, the most important war hero after Mustafa Kemal, is part of the representation. However, the administration did not prefer to use a statue of him in presentation. Instead, his uniforms, medals, weapons, and some personal belongings are used to visualize his story. It is important to remember that Kazım Karabekir did not arrest Mustafa Kemal when the palace considered him the most dangerous general and ordered Karabekir, the commander in chief of the only army left from demobilization, to eliminate Mustafa Kemal.

²⁴² Clara Sheridan, *Naked Truth* (London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1928).

peacemaking process. However, Mustafa Kemal shattered those ideas in Izmir, when the well-known nationalist writer Halide Edip (Adivar) asked him “if he was going to retire and rest since the war was over.” Mustafa Kemal replied in no uncertain terms: “The war has just started. We are going to eat each other for political power.”²⁴³

I suspect that Kemal allowed Sheridan to interview him only because she was Winston Churchill’s niece, since Kemal knew that international recognition as a leader would help his chances. Therefore, although Mustafa Kemal had interviewed with leading world press journalists such as John Clayton from the Chicago Tribune,²⁴⁴ he did not hesitate to see this young journalist who appeared at his door with two boxes of clay. Sheridan introduced herself not only as a journalist, but also a sculptor who had sculpted Lenin’s and Trotsky’s statues in the Soviet Union and who wanted to sculpt a bust of Mustafa Kemal.²⁴⁵

Clare Sheridan left Izmir that same day, on a British boat that was waiting for her in the bay of the city. The city was still on fire and Alsancak had burned down. Alsancak was the closest *mahalle* (neighborhood) to Konak Square, which was the political and commercial center of the city and was occupied by a government building across from the Sari Kışla (one of the Ottoman barracks). In between the barracks and the government buildings was the largest open public space, where there was a clock tower erected in 1901 using Abdulhamid II’s donation to the city. The distance between the tower and the closest burning building was about 1 km. In between there were office buildings, banks, malls, restaurants and coffee houses.

²⁴³ Halide Edip Adivar, *Türkün Ateşle İmtihanı* (İstanbul: Atlas Kitap Evi, 1994), 228.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 306.

²⁴⁵ Clara Sheridan, *Mayfair to Moscow: Clare Sheridan’s Diary*. p.135.

As was the case for almost all of the cities after the war, the new regime started to look for places to make spatial distinctions between the Republic and the Empire. They did not think it would be rational to wipe out the imperial character of the cities. As I mentioned in the first chapter, they could only create a dual spatial representation of official public culture.

The new regime was fortunate in Izmir, though. There was no need to turn cemeteries into parks or squares as they did in Samsun, thanks to the “great” fire. The fire left huge open spaces that were an asset for the new regime in rebuilding the city. The fire simply made it possible for the upcoming new regime to reorganize the downtown area and make itself visible.

Most scholars of urban history in Turkey tend not to mention the role of the fire in reshaping the city, as if talking about it would mean accepting the fact that the Turks did it. Therefore, the general attitude towards the urbanization of Izmir aligns with the official Turkish history that blames the Greek troops. No scholars mention that the new regime took advantage of the situation to make itself visible, and used Izmir to highlight the spatial destruction that the Greek troops supposedly caused. Instead, postwar urbanization was touted as proof to the people of Izmir that the new regime could be a father figure. Therefore in the collective consciousness of the people of Izmir, “The father Turk was there to heal the wounded Turks.”

This is why the leading figures of the city rushed to erect a statue of the unknown soldiers who died at the gates of the city in combat with the Greeks in 1922 (IP). Later, after visiting the city in 1924, a representative from the Turkish Great Assembly named Tunali Hilmi Bey sent a letter to the local newspaper *Ahenk*, criticizing the statue. He wrote that the

statue was not a good enough way to thank the soldiers who died to save the city, and that rich people of the city were to blame.²⁴⁶

Tunalı Hilmi Bey's letter started the search for a symbol that would represent the emotional relationship between the people of İzmir and Mustafa Kemal. The response to this critical letter came from Mehmed Şevki Bey, the editor of *Ahenk*, who agreed with Tunalı Hilmi Bey. However, he suggested that only those who made money from scavenging the abandoned buildings and belongings of those who fled the city during the war, as well as those who exported agricultural products such as tobacco and figs, should be assigned blame.²⁴⁷

As Mevlüt Çelebi points out, Mehmet Şevket's accusation did not move the rich people of the city.²⁴⁸ Later in 1925, Zeynel Besim Bey touched upon the issue again, and for the first time Jewish citizens of the city were explicitly addressed.²⁴⁹ However, only after Mustafa Kemal visited the city on June 22, 1926 for the opening of the first congress on the economic structure of the newly born Republic, did discontent over the statue come onto the agenda again.

²⁴⁶ Mevlüt Çelebi, *İzmir Gazi Heykeli* (İzmir: İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür Yayını, 2001), p. 3. This is the first book written on the monument in İzmir. Çelebi relies on the newspaper news and columnist accounts of the national but particularly local newspapers. The book also contains some documents gathered from the archives of the Turkish Consulate in Roma and Municipality archives in İzmir, the one that I went in 2003 and 2004 respectively and did not get permission to work. Çelebi also complains that he did not have full access to the documents in the municipality archive. However Çelebi managed to find the contract signed between the Mayor of İzmir and Pietro Canonica on March 24, 1930.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., p.4.

²⁴⁸ Ibid. Even though Çelebi's book is an asset for the students of urban historians in Turkey in terms of the information it contains, which is a must to be able to write about the monument in İzmir, however, the way the author utilized them is one of the best examples of the orthodox historiography in Turkey. The author provides us with a chronological story of the process of erecting the monument without any account of nationalism or modernity. He reutilized the accounts of the columnist of the local papers of the time with a sense of not contradicting the official ideology Kemalizm. The book basically has no problematic. It is totally a romantic contribution to official historiography by presenting a piece of descriptive history with a *low profile argumentation* such as arguing over the irresponsible behavior of the rich people of the city in the early 1920s but not questioning the fact that it might be a way to understand the relationship between the new regime and the local bourgeoisie.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 12.

One day before the opening of the congress, when Mustafa Kemal was on his way to Izmir, he received a message from the governor of Izmir informing him that a plot to assassinate Mustafa Kemal had been uncovered. However, Mustafa Kemal did not postpone his trip to İzmir. As I mentioned in the first chapter, he used the plot to eliminate his political rivals, particularly those who opposed his desire to change the country radically and quickly.

The assassination attempt was also an opportunity for the elites of Izmir to prove that the city's rich people were loyal to the regime. The hanging of figures such as Cavit Bey—who had nothing to do with the plot, but who was considered the leading figure of the assassination plot by the Independence Courts—must have influenced the local bourgeoisie. This group had natural ties with Cavit Bey, since he was the minister of finance in Enver's government. Although Cavit Bey preferred to stay out of politics after Mustafa Kemal shut down the Republican Progressive Party in 1924, he had close relations with the big businesses in major cities until he was hanged.

It is not by coincidence, then, that all the local newspapers of the city started wondering whether the city proved its loyalty to Mustafa Kemal in the years following his rise.²⁵⁰ The statue commission formed before the assassination plot started meeting more frequently after the executions so as to erect a statue of Mustafa Kemal in İzmir as quickly as possible.

The new governor of İzmir, General Kazım (Dirik), one of the officers who landed in Samsun with Mustafa Kemal on May 19, 1919, became the new head of the commission and

²⁵⁰ Before Mustafa Kemal left the city, a bust of him was erected in the Ziraat Mektebi (the Agriculture School). Mustafa Kemal went to school and first time opened his own bust, which, according to the principle of the school was the first statue of Mustafa Kemal erected in Turkey. The principle made this claim in a letter that he sent to Ahenk. First he complained about a news that he read in daily Hizmet, another local paper, on the statue erected in Sarayburnu-Istanbul. He refused that the statue in Sarayburnu was considered the first statue of Mustafa Kemal and claims that the bust erected in his school should be considered the first statue of the savor. Çelebi, 4-5.

started working on the statue for the city. Kazım Paşa tried to find a sculptor, while the commission members continued to collect donations from the people. In March 1926, three months before the assassination plot, Kazım Paşa even asked the Turkish consul in Berlin (Kemalettin Sami Paşa) to find a sculptor and have him to send a sample for the proposed monument to İzmir.

The consul found a sculptor named Marshall and ordered a model for the monument.²⁵¹ However it did not work out since, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the Ministry of Education issued standardization rules about the statues of Mustafa Kemal in May 1926, and took financial measures to accelerate the ongoing monumental propaganda. As such, Pietro Canonica was also commissioned to do the monument in İzmir.

Canonica came to İzmir from Ankara on November 25, 1926, to talk with the officials of the city and see the location for the monument. As I mentioned before, the area between the clock tower in front of the government building and Alsancak, the burned neighborhood, was picked as the place for the monument. The place was already named *Gazi Meydanı* (Gazi Square), which became the Republican square of the city after the erection of the monument dedicated on July 27, 1932.²⁵²

The monument depicts Mustafa Kemal looking at the Mediterranean Sea with a steady gaze while riding a horse. His right arm is fully extended with his index finger fixed to the horizon. The design is intended to visualize Mustafa Kemal's famous command: "Soldiers, your goal is the Mediterranean." The monument represents the end of the War of Independence, since no other battles occurred before the armistice negotiations in Mudanya on

²⁵¹ Çelebi, 14.

²⁵² Ibid., 62

October 3, 1922 officially ended the war.²⁵³ The monument has the second highest pedestal as compared to the other major Mustafa Kemal statues. Again, as in most of the other statues in coastal towns, Mustafa Kemal is positioned with his back to Anatolia, facing outwards to the Mediterranean as if on guard, waiting and scanning the horizon for a potential invasion. The statue also depicts women carrying bullets and men in combat.

The Izmir monument symbolizes the last step of the War of Independence, which Mustafa Kemal started in Samsun on May 19, 1919. This statue reminds us of the collective consciousness formed during the war. In other words, the Turkish people became a national body under one leader, one country, one history, and one culture. I suggest that Mustafa Kemal's index finger also conveys the authority given to one national leader by his people, or new human subjects, allowing him alone to symbolize the nation.

I also argue that the new regime wanted to remind possible enemies of the events of the War of Independence. Since Mussolini's Italy was considered the enemy in early Republican Turkey, I argue that the monument in Izmir was also a message to Mussolini, since the date of the monument's erection was also the beginning of cold weather in Italian-Turkish relations.

ANKARA: *THE* MONUMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OR *THE* REPUBLIC OF THE MONUMENT

According to Mango "Mustafa Kemal stayed on in İzmir savoring the fruits of his military victory. When the great fire which swept the city on 13 September [1922] threatened his house, he moved to a mansion in the seaside suburb of Göztepe." The burning of İzmir, a

²⁵³ Turkish troops started marching towards İstanbul after İzmir was taken, which, what Mango nicely puts,

city similar to Selanik (Thessalonica), where Mustafa Kemal was born and grew up, made Mustafa Kemal upset. However, as Mango mentions, Kemal never mentioned the great fire of the city in the report he presented to the assembly on November 4, 1922 or in *Nutuk*.²⁵⁴

İzmir was an important city in the geography of the War of Independence. However, as was the case in Samsun and Afyon, it was not of any specific political importance. The centers of the political battles during the nationalist movement were İstanbul, Erzurum, Sivas, and Ankara.

In Mustafa Kemal's perception, Ankara was the most prominent city during the War of Independence. In fact, no narrative of the War of Independence, official or alternative, questions this. Ankara was the center of the struggle for both political and military power, and has never lost its central importance in the Republic since then.

Without looking at Ankara it is impossible to understand the early Republic in terms of political, urban or social history. The next section deals with the emergence of Ankara as the new capital, and how it became the monumental city of Republican Turkey. The focus here is the Zafer Abidesi (the Victory Monument) erected on November 24, 1927 in Hakimiyet-i Milliye Meydani (The Square of the National Sovereignty), the city's only square before the 1930s.

Even though the Turks never won a battle in Ankara during the War of Independence, the monument was considered a victory monument and named accordingly. Yet this contradicts the war message radiating from the monument (see below), perhaps because it was

“caused acute apprehension in London”. Mango, 350.

²⁵⁴ Mango, 346.

intended to stand for the whole process of the war, not only one stage or battle, as was the intention of the victory monument in Afyon.

Chronologically, the victory monument of Ankara was Krippel's second monument and was erected before the ones in Samsun (1932) and Afyon (1936). The monument of Ankara, however, was the most remembered one since it represented the headquarters of the War of Independence and occupied the most strategic spot in the city. This positioning gave it the spatial power to symbolize not only the war but also the emerging new regime and its city. This was not the case for any other monument subjected to analysis in the present work.

Canonica's monument in Taksim, for instance, did not have the potential to represent both a stage of the war and the whole process of the war at the same time. In fact, the monument in Taksim was not even intended to represent a stage of the war. Instead, it stands for the emergence of the Republic and thus is only the last geographical point of the monumental propaganda of the early Republic. Even though the monuments in Sarayburnu, Samsun, Afyon, and İzmir occupy a stage in such geography and in the war, none of them were as powerful as the victory monument of Ankara. The Ankara monument's comprehensiveness was instrumental in the early stages of monumental propaganda in the early Republic. Thus it deserves a detailed analysis.

TOWARD THE OPENING OF THE MONUMENT OF ANKARA

In May 1927, almost eight months after the monument in Sarayburnu was dedicated, the base pedestal of the Zafer Abidesi (the Victory Monument) was erected in Hakimiyet-i

Milliye Meydanı without Krippel's presence.²⁵⁵ About six months after this in October 1927, Canonica arrived in Ankara. He brought two statues and some busts of Mustafa Kemal along with him.

“The best spot in the city went to Krippel,” Canonica must have thought when he passed the only square in the city to go to Çankaya, the presidential house. He was meeting with Mustafa Kemal that afternoon to update him about the ongoing preparation of pedestals for the statues he sculpted, and to talk about the new locations of monumental propaganda for the early Republic.

While Canonica was dealing with the pedestals in October and early November, Krippel went to Ankara to attend the opening ceremony of his most remembered monument, the Zafer Abidesi. For the first and last time the two sculptors who determined the monumental propaganda of early Republican Turkey were in the same city.

There is no official record in the Republican Archives that Mustafa Kemal met them together at his presidential house in Çankaya or anywhere else. Moreover, we do not have any evidence as to whether Canonica and Krippel met in person during their stay in Ankara. If we knew that they met and talked about the ongoing monumental propaganda, it would have been instrumental in helping us understand outsiders' perceptions of Mustafa Kemal's monumental propaganda. However, we will never know if it happened since neither Canonica nor Krippel left a comprehensive interview or memoir behind about the time they spent in Turkey.

The official daily *Hakimiyet-i Milliyet* and other national and local newspapers informed the public of news surrounding the monuments and statues sculpted by Canonica and

²⁵⁵ *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 13 September 1927.

Krippel for Ankara on a regular basis. The news covered their arrivals and the meetings they attended, the developments on constructions of the pedestals of each piece, the possible opening days, and the program of ceremonies. The following short news item appeared in the official daily about one and a half months before the openings in November:

Sculptor Canonica has signed a contract with [Ankara] municipality to construct the base pedestals of the statues. According to the contract, *heykeller* (the statues) said to be ready to be unveiled on October 29, on the day of Cumhuriyet Bayramı (Republic Day). *Heykel* (the statue), sculpted by Krippel that will be erected in Hakimiyet-i Milliye Meydanı...will arrive in a short while. This statue also said to be ready to be proclaimed on the Republic Day.²⁵⁶

Considering that both the monument and the statues of Mustafa Kemal were to be unveiled on Republic Day (October 29), it is surprising that neither the official daily nor the other newspapers reported on the fact that both Canonica and Krippel might have been in Ankara at the same time.

²⁵⁶ Ibid. Here the news employs the word *heykel* for both sculptures without making any categorical distinction. The news, as was the case in all the news on monumental propaganda of the time, reflects no sense of the distinction between a monument and a statue. However, towards the opening day of the statues of Mustafa Kemal done by Canonica, the official daily kept using the word *heykel* (statue) while employing the word “Abide” (monument) for the one to be erected in Hakimiyet-i Milliye Meydanı. The word “abide” was replaced by “anıt” in the early 1930s, when the use of so-called “original Turkish words” was encouraged to replace the Ottoman words. “Anıt” is a noun, and was invented according to the rules of Turkish morphology from the verb “anmak,” to remember. “Anıt” as a noun might be a memorial stone or a building that carries a lasting evidence of remembrance. Interestingly, the word “anıt” appeared in Turkey just as the new Turkish Republic began to form new icons of national identity.

TOWARD THE OPENINGS OF STATUES BY CANONICA IN ANKARA

As I mentioned before, Canonica first came to Ankara on October 22, 1926 to meet with Mustafa Kemal to talk about the monuments the Ministry of Education commissioned to him. During his first visit the national press unequivocally reported that Canonica would start sculpting monuments and statues of the savior after obtaining “Gazi Paşa’s approval”.²⁵⁷ As mentioned before, Mustafa Kemal gave his permission to Canonica to sculpt several monuments and statues of him to be erected in several cities in Turkey. Other than the monument in Taksim, the monument in Izmir (1932), the statue in Yeşil Köy (modern Zafer Çarşısı), and the statue in the courtyard of Türk Ocağı, all Kemal’s statues were done by Canonica.

About one year later in October 1927, Canonica visited Mustafa Kemal a second time in Ankara and brought two statues he sculpted for the Türk Ocağı and Yeşil Köy. Both pieces were to be opened the next day, on the fifth anniversary of the Turkish Republic. These were the statues for which the official daily used the word “heykel” (statue) and informed its audience of on a regular basis.²⁵⁸

Even though these two statues and Krippel’s monument were supposed to be revealed on October 29, 1927, the openings were postponed since the preparation of the locations took longer than expected. The same group of citizens and officials carried out both opening ceremonies on

²⁵⁷ See for instance Milliyet, 14 August 1927

²⁵⁸ Milliyet, 27 October 1927.

November 4th. This was the only case in the history of statuary in Turkey that two statues were unveiled one after another in one hour.

The opening of the statue in Türk Ocağı started at 10:00 am. Ministers, representatives, Asaf Bey, the mayor of Ankara, local government representatives, and ordinary people took their places in the courtyard of the building for the ceremony. Prime Minister İnönü, the number one official figure in protocol during the unveiling of most of the monuments during the early Republican period, came to Türk Ocağı with Kazım Paşa, the president of the assembly, at 10:30 am to deliver his first opening speech.

The Türk Ocağı building (1926-1930), as Bozdoğan puts it, was “among the last paradigmatic works of the National Architecture Renaissance before the switch to European modernism.”²⁵⁹ The National Architecture Renaissance was initiated in 1908 and supported by the Committee of Union and Progress. This style “evoked the more cosmopolitan and imperial feeling of the architecture of the late Empire”²⁶⁰ even though buildings of this style were strongly associated with early Turkish nationalism in Ankara. Here, the statue erected in the court yard of Türk Ocağı and other statues put up inside and outside of similar buildings like the Ministry of Finance and the Ankara Palas, must have lent a hand in to convincing people that the style had nothing to do with the Empire anymore.

Mixed feelings still lingered about how the regime was initiating radical transition from an empirical order to a national one while using the same architectural style. Still, İsmet İnönü and other protocol members stood in front of the statue covered with a Turkish flag and paused a minute while the symphony orchestra played the national anthem. Then Asaf Bey, the mayor,

²⁵⁹ Bozdoğan, *Nation Building*, 39.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

approached the stage and delivered the opening talk. He ended his talk by thanking both Canonica, who was also present at the ceremony, and the Ministry of Education for their sterling efforts. He then asked İsmet İnönü to unveil the statue. Before the unveiling, İnönü did not deliver a prepared speech like he would twenty days later in the opening ceremonies of the monuments in Hakimiyet-i Milliye Meydanı. After he thanked Canonica for his effort and success, he unveiled the statue.²⁶¹

Before the opening of the second statue, guests enjoyed the open buffet prepared for them. Then, the members of the protocol went to the site of the second statue, only a few blocks from Türk Ocağı. This time Kazım Paşa²⁶² unveiled the statue after Emin Bey, the director of the office of Education and Instruction, gave the following opening talk, which was also included words on the statue unveiled an hour earlier: ²⁶³

Dear ladies, gentlemen,
How impossible it is to give shape to all the feelings for the Great Man! Fixed to the new horizons, the eye of the bronze statue sitting on the horse walking towards the rising sun was only one of the thousands of expressions of him. With a self-confident gaze directed to the hill [Çankaya] that gave birth to the ideas of independence and a posture erected over the branches of the victory, this statue in front of us is also one of the feelings that he radiated. When the present generation, the Turkish generation of tomorrow, the Turkish infants of the next centuries look at this statue and the hill together, [they will hear] the voice from that hill that brought together all the strong forces of the nation. That is the voice that saved us from dependence...and it created a new world. That is the voice that shows the path of humanity to the Turkish nation and the nations of the east. It marks a new horizon. The generations that will follow that path will hear the speech coming from this hill for centuries...²⁶⁴

²⁶¹ Milliyet, 5 November 1927.

²⁶² Note that Kazım Pasha is not Kazım Karabekir, who became the president of the assembly after Mustafa Kemal died.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

Emin Bey's speech verbalized the basic messages that most of Kemal's statues were designed to convey. Without exception these two statues also contributed significantly to the visualization of the official historiography of the War of Independence. However, they were not as powerful as the symbolic monument of the new capital, the one that was unveiled only few weeks later in Hakimiyet-i Milliye Meydanı.

This was partly because these two statues were not located in a central place, and their pedestals were not high enough to qualify them as the commanding images of their sites. The one in Turk Ocagi, for instance, cannot be seen easily from a distance, since the building was constructed on a hill above the main road between Hakimiyet-i Milliye Meydanı and Yeşil Köy.²⁶⁵ As for the one in front of Yeşil Köy, it was the most approachable and humanistic effort, even though Mustafa Kemal was depicted in military uniform. This is because it was erected in the middle of a road, on a very low pedestal, which makes it look like Mustafa Kemal stands on the road. Considering that a high pedestal is a necessary criterion to retain the symbolism of war heroics, nation building and leadership, the statue of Mustafa Kemal in Yeşil Köy could never become the definitive symbol of Ankara.

Although these statues and many similar statues of Mustafa Kemal erected in and around Ankara after he died do not qualify as the primary symbol of the city, they contribute to the transformation of this little town into a monumental capital.

The Guvenlik Aniti in Kizilay, which was erected before Mustafa Kemal died, and the monuments in official buildings in the district of Ministries, which opened to construction after

he died, are among those that can be seen easily in the city. Among these secondary symbols of the Republican regime, mostly products of cubic architecture in 1930s and 1940s, Mustafa Kemal's mausoleum on a hill overlooking the city is the most powerful monument of the city. However, it is not a figurative sculpture. There are many statues and allegorical representations of the War of Independence on the walls inside and outside of the mausoleum, all of which depict the official historiography of the War of independence. Thus, the only figurative monument of the city is the Victory Monument in Hakimiyet-i Milliye Meydanı.

THE VICTORY MONUMENT OF ANKARA

The victory monument was opened on the November 24. *Milliyet* started to inform its audience about the details of the monument ten days before it was unveiled. According to *Milliyet*, the site construction was not finished yet²⁶⁶ even though the monument was ready. Two base pedestals were used for the monument. The first one was built for the second base pedestal and the three figures of the monument; the second held the figure of Mustafa Kemal on horseback. There were two wolf heads on the front walls of the first pedestal that represent the Ergenekon and Bozkurt Legends.²⁶⁷

Later in the 1950s when the monument moved back for about ten meters to ease the traffic, the first pedestal was changed and the wolf heads were removed. The new pedestal was

²⁶⁵ Even though it was not easy to reach to the statue, as shown in the picture taken in 1932, it was perceived by some high students a site to be taken pictures. Taking picture in front of 'Atatürk statues' not only became a common daily practice for Turkish citizens but also for tourist visiting Turkey

²⁶⁶ *Milliyet*, 15 November 1927.

²⁶⁷ The former tells the myth of the creation of Gökürks from a female wolf who later showed them how the way out from Ergenekon, a valley surrounded by high mountains.

made of white marble. The two soldiers that represent the formation of the Turkish army replaced the wolves. The second pedestal is the highest of all the monuments of Mustafa Kemal that were erected before he died. Here, Mustafa Kemal was depicted on horseback representing leadership in his military uniform. His posture depicts the preparations of the Turkish army before the battle of Afyon. Behind him there is a female figure carrying a canon, which stands for the Turkish women who were a real asset for the Turkish army during the war. Together, all these figures represent the emergence of the new Turkish army and its preparations for the battles against the Greek army. Unlike the monument in Taksim, this message was also written in Ottoman on the sides of the second base pedestal. On the left side is a sentence that states that the monument was the result of the campaign organized by nationalist local paper *Yeni Gün*, and the contributions from the people. Below this is the following statement:

The Turkish nation has found the best way to express its victorious independence and the War of Independence, and its exceptional modern revolution with a meaningful mark in the real representation above.²⁶⁸

On the right side of the pedestal are two reliefs. One depicts soldiers in combat, the other the leading figures of the war: Mustafa Kemal, Fevzi Çakmak, and İsmet İnönü all in military uniforms. Here Mustafa Kemal points toward the Mediterranean, which represents the order that he drafted in Afyon. On the left is the enemy, greeting the Turkish flag before they withdraw. Below this is a relief that depicts the contribution of the people to the war. On the back of the pedestal is a stump growing from an old tree, which stands for the emergence of

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

the Republic from the “old” and “rotten” Empire. On the front side of the pedestal are several sentences taken from Mustafa Kemal’s speeches during the War of Independence, all of which are carved in Ottoman. The first one is the statement he drafted in Erzurum after the government in İstanbul forced him to resign in July 1919. The second one, to the left of the first, was drafted in Ankara two days after the battle of Sakarya began:

From now on I will be working like a revolutionary among the people.
Erzurum, 8 July 1919

We will certainly strangle the enemy’s army in the heart of our homeland, and be independent.
6 August 1921²⁶⁹

On the 24th of November, those who participated in the opening ceremonies of the statues in Yeşil Köy and in Türk Ocağı, saw the above description of the monument when the Turkish flag was removed. It was erected in *the* square of the city, which was surrounded by the assembly building, the new İşbankasi and some houses and shops.

Since the commission started to send the invitations four days before the opening, the newspapers informed the audience that they expected a good crowd for the ceremony from the city and also from other towns.²⁷⁰ As they expected, all the officials and students came for the ceremony. People poured into the square with their redingotes, suits, or caskets, as mentioned in the opening program published in the local daily newspapers. Kazım Paşa and İsmet (İnönü) came to the square on time for this ceremony. Kazım Paşa went to the monument and stood on the first pedestal. The orchestra played the national anthem as they had done for the statues of

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

Canonica twenty days prior. As soon as the anthem was finished, Kazım Paşa unveiled the monument, and said: “May it survive together with the future and the happiness of the Turkish Nation.”²⁷¹

After the unveiling of the monument, Yunus Nadi, the editor of *Yeni Gün*, delivered the opening talk. The crowd applauded wildly when Nadi mentioned a slogan used by the daily *Milliyet* during the War of Independence²⁷²:

Citizens,
This square, after that first meeting at the Grand National Assembly, became the stage of other gatherings as well. We gathered here to protest the attitudes of those that our country did not deserve. We gathered here to mourn for beautiful İzmir and green Bursa. But, you remember right, we always left this place with the feelings that we were going to break the chain of freedom. A newspaper, a daily from the pages of that extraordinary history, *Yeni Gün* repeated a sentence that represented the feeling and ideas of the nation almost every day: “Greece should be destroyed and will be!” This monument is the expression of transforming the reality that prepared the independence and existence of the nation...into stone and bronze. Citizens, women, men, all of you, those youth, the kids who are the hopes of the future, particularly you will, whenever there is need—no not whenever—*always* pay great attention to the independence and existence of the country. You all and next generations! Do not forget that this is the order of the great commander, of our great guide who is our leader in every way we go.²⁷³

After Yunus Nadi, Mehmet Asım, editor of the daily *Vakit*, gave a speech on behalf of the Turkish press. Mehmet Asım did not make Mustafa Kemal central to the first part of his speech. Referring to the figures of the monument, Mehmet Asım stated that it portrayed the national victory as the collective effort of Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish nation, and the

²⁷⁰ *Milliyet*, 21 November 1927

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 25 November 1927.

²⁷² *Ibid.*

²⁷³ *Ibid.*

army, which was the best way to represent the past. The, during the second part of his talk, Mustafa Kemal became the central subject. Asım concluded:

Not this statue, even if statues are put up every corner of the country, it will not be enough to express the great things he has created. Only one monument can be imagined, which is adequate enough to express thankfulness to the great Gazi. That is the powerful Republic of Turkey, which consisted of 14 million united people.²⁷⁴

Mehmet Asım's point regarding the Republic as the real monument was to become one of the common themes in speeches delivered at monuments openings in the early Republic. However, another common theme in these speeches became avoiding the details of the monuments or statues of the early Republic altogether. This is probably because those who delivered the opening speeches were mostly politicians and intellectuals, not artists. (The sculptors, for instance, were never allowed to deliver opening speeches.) Some of the speeches, though, briefly mentioned the details of the statues and monuments during the ceremonies. The speech that Naşit Hakkı Bey, a representative from Kütahya, delivered after Mehmet Asım, was one of the best examples of this:

...This soldier [pointing one of the male figures on the base pedestal] is Mehmet who...turned the offense of the enemy into the destruction of it in the battles of İnönü and Sakarya. [Now pointing the other male figure] This soldier is the same Mehmet who...is like an eagle attacking the heart of the danger...in whose ears is the powerful echo of the order: "Soldiers Your First goal is Mediterranean!" ...Brothers, the one you see behind [pointing the female figure] is the Turkish woman who is bringing strength, vitality and faith to the battlefields while struggling with the road

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

conditions, the distance, and the time limitation. She holds the ammunition; she sounds her arm around it as if it is her baby...

The figure Naşit Hakkı Bey called Mehmet later became *Mehmetçik*, a common name used for private soldiers in the Turkish army, while the female figure came to be recognized as Elif, who stands for the women of Anatolia who carried ammunitions to battlefields on foot. However, the female figure was also thought to represent Kara (Black) Fatma, a legendary female soldier who fought in the battles of the War of Independence. The essential difference between the two legends is that Elif was not a real person nor a soldier, whereas Kara Fatma was a real female private in the army, whose name became a common name for female soldiers.

The Zafer Abidesi of Ankara, the monument in Taksim, and the statue in İzmir are the only major Mustafa Kemal monuments that recognize the female contribution to the War of Independence. On these monuments, either freestanding figures or allegorical representations in high relief give homage to these women. In the monument at İzmir, for instance, Kara Fatma was represented as the leading figure, a semi-free standing figure in the allegorical representation of the battlefields. In the monument at Taksim, there are two female figures that likely represent both Elif and Kara Fatma. The one behind Mustafa Kemal carrying the pistol is Kara Fatma, standing for the female soldiers of the War of Independence, and the one sitting on the ground by Mustafa Kemal is Elif, depicted as a mother carrying both a child and ammunition. This figure projects the qualities Naşit Hakkı Bey saw in the female figure in the Zafer Abidesi. Here, Elif is depicted as a mother in the rain, who covers and protects the ammunition instead of her own child.

The opening of the Zafer Abidesi ended with a poem called *Mustafa Kemal*, written and recited by the nationalist poet Mehmet Emin. This poem made him a regular at the openings of the major monuments of Mustafa Kemal. After Emin finished reciting his glorifying poem, İsmet Paşa and Kazım Paşa congratulated Krippel, then stepped onto the first pedestal to examine the monument closely.

The daily *Milliyet* informed its audience that the people of Ankara have been visiting the monuments since the opening, while stressing that Gazi Paşa, or Kemal, visited the monument the next day early in the morning. This is not the first monument Mustafa Kemal went to see; he visited all his major monuments on the days following the opening ceremonies. These visits sometimes happened days after the opening ceremonies, and sometimes after a month or so. The monument in Taksim and the Zafer Abidesi were the only ones Kemal visited the next day.

Conclusion

The Middle East has had a long history of attempts to construct the institutional framework of centralization of political and social power. Serif Mardin, a leading scholar of sociological history in Turkey, begins his famous article *Center-Periphery relations: A Key To Turkish Politics* with the following statement:

Here the Ottoman Empire emerges as an outstanding exception. There was, in the Ottoman Empire, a lasting center supported by a sophisticated network of institutions.²⁷⁵

Such a sophisticated network of institutions resulted in a form of Ottoman social engineering that imposed regulations from top to bottom. “The characteristic features of Kemalism,” writes Mardin, “show that this view of society was still preeminent”²⁷⁶ in the early republican Turkey.

Kemalism did pursue the same model, but accelerated the project of modernization that has begun during the reign of Mahmut II (1808-1839). Mustafa Kemal and his political elite, however, could not begin the process of radicalization until they had eliminated those political and military figures who had accepted his leadership in the national movement, but did not share his vision of forging a new modern state and society through accelerated modernization.

²⁷⁵ Serif Mardin, “Center-Periphery relations: A Key To Turkish Politics” *Political participation in Turkey* (Istanbul: Bogazici University publication, 1973), 9.

²⁷⁶ Ibid. 24.

The Kemalists managed to eliminate such opposition during the 1926 Izmir conspiracy, which effectively made Mustafa Kemal dictator of the new republic. While intensifying the formation of a Weberian bureaucracy in the 1920s, the Kemalists did not hesitate to use the social and political symbols of the late Ottoman Empire. Turkism, for example, became canonized in the daily practice of politics. This provided artists and architects with an ideology that was manifest in the Turkification of Ottoman forms in architectural style between 1908 and 1927.

When Kemalists felt secure enough to accelerate the imposition of regulations in 1927, they publicly rejected the social and political heritage of the late Ottoman Empire and began to build new symbols for their regime. In architecture, this shift was represented by modern movements with a cubic style. The most important difference, however, was established through the monumental propaganda campaign based on figurative statues of Mustafa Kemal. This accomplished what no other political figure or regime had dared to do before—bring to an end the custom of forbidding figurative human-like statues in public places.

Mustafa Kemal took the initiative to alter this custom, and was thus able to erect statues and monuments to himself in the squares of cities throughout Turkey. Before he died, he had thus re-visualized the official historiography of the War of Independence as constructed in his *Nutuk*. These statues of Mustafa Kemal were allegorical representations of the war's function in unifying the leader and his people, but they also served as a lasting desire to mechanically reproduce such unification. The six of them that I have analyzed here represent the stages of the

war and a nation's birth in terms of the conscious disassociation of past from present.

War, as a collective effort, was instrumental in the formation of national consciousness and thus national culture. The women, the soldiers, and the determined leader—featured in all such monuments—were essential to building national consciousness. These figures were the allegorical representation of the real people, the Muslim peasants of Anatolia, who participated in the War of Independence. They became the constitutive element of the new nation. As fathers and mothers, they were expected to produce the new human subjects of the new regime. If the war had not given them that instinct, then these monuments would help. The leading figures in the monuments instructed them as to who made the country possible, but also obliged them to follow the leader's program of social change-radical transformation (as against organic, evolutionary change). These statures were thus the visualization of Kemalism's commitment to the peasant, the reissue of an old Ottoman theme: "peasant advancement was to be achieved by integration from the top down, an idea which also had an element of *déjà vu*."²⁷⁷

While the monumental propaganda of the early republic was visualizing a history of the war for the citizens of the new regime, it was also a symbolic mediator between the new Turkish republic and European states. As was the case with the monument in Izmir, Mustafa Kemal sent a message to potential European invaders that he and his people were ready to fight back as they did during the War of Independence. At the same time, he stressed his admiration for western culture

by introducing a western style of living. The monument in Sarayburnu where Mustafa Kemal appears with a civilian expression, for instance, not only refers the time he spent in Istanbul formulating his plan for the War of Independence before departing to Samsun, but also contains a message to Europeans, stating that he departed not only to save his country from *them* but also to bring *their* civilization to Turkey.

It is important to stress that civilization for Mustafa Kemal was not something that could be divided into two, as Ziya Gökalp had suggested in *the Principle of Turkism*. For Mustafa Kemal and his political elite, colonial desires did not imply that the premises of modernity should be questioned.²⁷⁸ After he became the complete dictator of the republic in 1927, he did not hesitate to stress the fact that western culture was an essential part of modernity and that it should thus be used in the socialization of the republic's citizens. Introducing figurative statuary, which to him represented western art, was also a means to communicate with the illiterate masses and to establish a national consciousness.

In constructing such consciousness, Mustafa Kemal turned not only to monuments, but also to a recoding of the design environment by changing the names of the streets, districts, villages, towns, and even cities.²⁷⁹ The name of those Anatolian cities, for instance, where there were a resistance movement between 1918 and 1922 against the invaders, were officially awarded Independence medals

²⁷⁷ Ibid., 25.

²⁷⁸ Notice that modernity for the Kemalists meant *batılilasma* (Westernization).

²⁷⁹ Cite de Pera became İstiklal Caddesi (Independent Street). Tatavla, the district across from Mustafa Kemal's residence in Şişli became Kurtuluş (Independence).

or the title Gazi, either during the War of Independence to encourage the population to struggle against the invaders or afterwards to officially recognize their contribution to independence.²⁸⁰

These heroic cities, however, were not part of Mustafa Kemal's geography of monumental propaganda, for the reasons I discuss in the earlier chapters. Considering that there were no major battle fields in or around these cities, they became nodes of support for the official historiography, and thus were differentiated from cities like Samsun, Afyon, İzmir, and Ankara, which formed a spatial hierarchy according to their role in the official narrative of the War of Independence.

Ankara was foremost in the city hierarchy, and, if all the other cities did not help in terms of mapping the national consciousness, then it alone could do so because it was not only a capital, but also the place of *everything new*. As opposed to the magnificent but rotten past of İstanbul, the new political elite created Ankara as the first planned city of the republic by opening an international competition in 1928. Hermann Jansen, a German urban planner, was the winner of that context.²⁸¹

While suffering heavily from the shortcomings of an underdeveloped economy and the Great Depression, the assembly approved Jansen's plan in

²⁸⁰ People in Antep, a leading city located in Southern Anatolia, for instance, resisted the French troops, hold them up in the city for almost 10 months until February 1921, and slow down their advancement towards Ankara. The Grand Turkish Assembly passed a bill in the same month, which awarded Antep the title of Gazi. Since then the city is known as *Gaziantep*. Another city invaded by the French troops in Southern Anatolia was Maraş. People of Maraş struggled against the troops and forced them to withdraw from the city on February 10, 1920. The assembly awarded the city with an İstiklal Madalyası (Independence Medal) on April 5, 1925, and 50 years alter on February 7, 1975, honored the city with Kahramlık (heroicness). Since then, the city is known *Kahramanmaraş*.

²⁸¹ İlhan Tekeli, *Türkiye'de Kentleşme Yazıları* (Ankara, Turhan Kitapevi, 1982), 62.

July 1932. The Assembly also approved the transfer of savings to the Directorate of Development and Planning in Ankara, which increased the budget of the directorate to almost thirty times the average municipal budget during the years 1934 to 1938.²⁸² With this budget, it was possible for Mustafa Kemal and his political elite to hire modern architects to turn the new capital into a modern city that would represent the Kemalist program. With wide avenues, open squares, and monuments with statues of Mustafa Kemal, the new Ankara became a monument in its own right, and an exemplary republican city of Kemalist secular national socialization. This Kemalist program was then institutionalized through the ritual of national memorial days.

The republican squares marked by the monuments and statues of Mustafa Kemal have been the site of these official memorial days since the inauguration of the Sarayburnu monument in 1926. These monuments of the early republic have occupied the most prominent places, and thus even as these cities continued to receive new statues and monuments of Mustafa Kemal, these did not become places for the national days (although minor exceptions do exist in Ankara and Sarayburnu).

The monument in Sarayburnu, however, never became the site of national day commemorations because the monument in Taksim was erected only about two years later in an open space that had better geographical prominence for the new regime. As for the monument in Hakimiyet-i Milliye Meydanı, it continued to mark

²⁸² Ibid., 63. Inonu and his political elite did not extend Jansen's contract after Mustafa Kemal died.

the place of official celebrations until the opening of the Mustafa Kemal Mausoleum in 1955, which has since that time been the official symbol of the city and the ultimate site for official public culture and celebration of national days in Ankara. In the other major cities of the early Republic, e.g., Bursa and Konya, monuments of Mustafa Kemal (erected in 1926 and 1938, respectively) have kept their determining role with respect to the symbolic celebration of national days.

As for the provincial towns of the early Republic, these celebrated the national days in front of a bust of Mustafa Kemal erected in their most important open spaces, usually the traditional *pazar yeri* (market place) or school yards. However, after the massive urban flight of the late 1950s, 1960s and 1970s²⁸³, the population of provincial towns in Turkey doubled. Many of these towns reached a point that the municipal governments proclaimed them to be new cities, as happened in Bingöl, Tunceli, Van, Bitlis, Mardin, Muş, and Uşak.²⁸⁴

Although these new cities had had open spaces in their downtowns, they had not had a monument to Mustafa Kemal erected in a place that would be considered proper for a republican square. The national press was the first to notice that these cities were missing such monuments. After the post-Kemalist discontent with the Demokrat Parti in the late 1950s had culminated in a military intervention in May 1960, the newspaper *Milliyet* launched a campaign in 1963 to inaugurate statues of Mustafa Kemal in public squares in all new provinces that lacked one,

²⁸³ The mechanization of agricultural sector under the initiative of Marshall Plan in 1947 caused this massive immigration from rural Turkey, which resulted in a rapid urbanization that increased the share of the urban population from 25 per cent to 59 as of 1990. See Table 5.1 in Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, *A History*, 250.

with the result that new monumental statues of Mustafa Kemal were placed in all the new cities mentioned above.

Milliyet's actions jumpstarted the monumental propaganda campaign that had begun during the early republic, but which had steadily lost momentum after the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938. There are two reasons for this: first, İnönü had tried to symbolically replace Mustafa Kemal in the 1940s, but failed. However, he had managed to slow down the iconization of Mustafa Kemal, particularly in terms of public monuments and statues. Second, the Demokrat Parti deployment of a relatively anti-Kemalist discourse of symbolism in the 1950s—an attempt to court those who had suffered under the single party regime and who did not approve the Kemalist reforms. However, this discourse also became *the* symbolic reason for those who considered this party a counter revolutionary party. Eventually the first military intervention of post war Turkey closed it down

Milliyet not only re-activated the monumental propaganda of the early republic, but also marked the beginning of a political tradition, a tradition of bombarding the republic with the monuments and statues of Mustafa Kemal after every military intervention or ultimatum. The 1970s, 1980s and 2000s, therefore, became periods in which cities, towns, and districts were bombarded with the statues and monuments of Mustafa Kemal, all of which were designed to convey a message of national unity. This can be seen in the Missaki Milli (national boundaries, as opposed to stances of the Separatist Kurds), and the reform

²⁸⁴ Becoming a candidate to be a city for provincial towns has been a way to bargain with the political parties since then, and thus the number of cities in Turkey doubled in the last 50 years.

principles of Mustafa Kemal, such as secularism (as opposed to Political Islam). In other words, all the monuments and statues of Mustafa Kemal include a call for a mental representation of Mustafa Kemal as the immortal leader who defeated the world's evil powers during the War of Independence, founded the Republic of Turkey thereafter, and radically transformed Turkish society into a modern secular nation-state. Considering the omnipresence of these monuments and statues of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey today, this dissertation argues that they gratify people's unconscious wish to bring the dead but immortal national leader back to life by maintaining a link with him—a link that was implanted in them while they were in primary, middle, and high school.

Monuments, statues, posters, and small objects of Mustafa Kemal are everywhere in modern Turkey. Their creation has been an important source of income for professional sculptors, and even artisans who are not sculptors. If statuary is accepted in today's Turkey, by which I mean, a shift from the perception of figurative forms as something against the Islamic canon, the statues, monuments, and busts of Mustafa Kemal, and thus the monumental propaganda of the early Republic, have played a central role. However, they also caused every monument, statue or bust in open spaces to be perceived as an image of Mustafa Kemal.

This has prevented city dwellers from constructing local identities through allegorical representations of the local history of their cities. As was the case in the cities of the War of Independence, the national history becomes the local history and because the city dwellers have been forced to not mention non-Turkish history, monuments and statues of Mustafa Kemal remain the only options for creating

urban identities. However, given that Mustafa Kemal is everywhere—his name has been bestowed on boulevards, parks, stadiums, concert halls, bridges, forest, and, more importantly, on educational institutions—the chance of any urban identity that is not nationalist in respect of three dimensional human-like structures is rendered impossible.

The process of making statues and monuments of Mustafa Kemal yet continues, even as tensions increase between Islamists and Kemalists. In the last two decades, more Mustafa Kemal statues and other symbolic objects than ever before have been demanded by the secular bureaucracy and the military personnel, but also by civilians who identify themselves as Mustafa Kemalçü (roughly the follower of Mustafa Kemal).

After all, it is not unusual for a Turkish citizen, like the author of this dissertation, to have graduated from Ataturk Primary School, and then passed by Ataturk Forest every day on his or her way to Ataturk High School. Such a citizen may have lived on Ataturk Boulevard in Ankara for two years and, at least once a week, eaten some of the world's most delicious ice-cream that was produced by the Ataturk Forest Farm. He or she may also have seen performances in an Ataturk Kultur Merkezi (Ataturk Culture Center), such as the one built in Istanbul during the 1970s, located just across from the monument in Taksim. He or she may even have considered the monument dedicated to Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa (the Ottoman Admiral) in 1944 in Beşiktaş, the port of the Ottoman navy, or any public statue with or without a horse in open spaces a statue of Mustafa Kemal.

Appendix

Bibliography

Periodicals Surveyed for 1923-1939

Ar	(Istanbul- 1937-39)
Arkitekt	(Istanbul- 1935-45)
Belediyeler Dergisi	(Ankara- 1935-40)
Hey Ay	(Istanbul- 1938-1939)
Kador	(Istanbul, 1932-35)
La Turquie Kemaliste	(Ankara 1931-1938)
Mimar	(Istanbul 1931-34)
Resimli Ay	(Istanbul, 1924-1926)
Cumhuriyet	(Istanbul- 1924-1939)
Hakkimiyet-I Milliye	(Ankara- 1925-1928)
Milliyet	(Istanbul- 1926-1939)
Vakit	(Istanbul- 1926-1930)
Sehir Emaneti Mecmuasi	(Istanbul 1924-1028)
Yeni Ses	(Istanbul 1926)
Ikdam	(Istanbul 1928)
Son Posta	(1930-1936)
Haber	(1934-1936)
19 Mayıs	(1934-1940)
Ulku	(1934-1940)
Tas Pinar	(1934-1940)

Archives

State Decrees (85 pages)	(The Prime Ministry Archives of the Turkish Republic 1925-1938)
Belediye Defteri	Municipality Archives of Istanbul 1928-1939)
Belediye Defteri	Municipality Archives of Afyon (1932-34)
Belediye Defteri	Municipality Archives of Izmir (1932)
Belediye Defteri	Municipality Archives of Ankara (1932-1938)
Records of Assembly Meetings	(Ankara: The Library of The Turkish Parliament-1920-1945)

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