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The Tanzanian People's Defense Force: an Exercise in Nation-Building

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Dedication

To the women in my life: the mother that started me on this path and my wife who has given me the strength to stay on it.

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This work would not have been possible without the help and support of far too many people to properly acknowledge. In the interest of brevity I would like to thank Dr. Toyin Falola, Dr. Ruramisai Charumbira, Dr. AG Hopkins, Dr. Zoltan Barany, and Dr. Timothy Parsons for taking part in the production of this work. In addition, I must thank the Warfield Center for African and African American Studies, without whose support the primary research for this work could not have been completed. Numerous scholars and groups in Tanzania also supported the creation of this work. Dr. Nestor Luanda offered his guidance, support, and personal archives in support of my labors and Dr. Bertram Mapunda aided me in my search for the Commission of Science and Technology. General Herman Lupogo, General Lilian Kingazi, and General Paul Mela all took the time to discuss the history of their military with me, offering critical insights. Jessica Achberger worked long hours helping proofread the manuscript so it made sense and was properly put together. Finally, I need to thank my wife, Leigh Anne Fagin, who helped me put this work into a logical order and helped me think through some of the more troubling concepts of this work.

The Tanzanian People's Defense Force: an Exercise in Nation-Building

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Following the 1964 Army Mutinies in East Africa, Tanzania alone among the three nations affected recognized the fundamental opposition between the colonial military structure and the post-colonial African state. Acting upon this consideration, Tanzania proceeded to dismantle its current colonial holdover armed forces and instead build a new, nationally representative, non-aligned military that could be integrated effectively into the post-colonial state. This military became the Tanzanian Peoples' Defense Force and its construction remains unique among the African states. This dissertation contends that the TPDF and its innovative construction served as not only a stable and effective military exercise, but also as a nation building exercise, and that the lessons gleaned from its history may be used to combat both the praetorian militaries and weak national identities that continue to afflict Africa.

Table of Contents

Chapter One Introduction	1
Chapter Two: The Nature of the Colonial Military, Part One	36
Chapter Three: The Nature of the Colonial Military, Part Two.....	72
Chapter Four: Nyerere, TANU, and Post-Colonial Tanzania.....	105
Chapter Five: Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa: The National Service.....	148
Chapter Six: A Politicized Military	173
Chapter Seven: The Non-Alignment of Doctrine	189
Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Coda	218
Bibliography	242
Curriculum Vitae	251

Chapter One:

Introduction

September 12, 1964 was a proud day for President Julius Nyerere and his party, the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU). The President watched as the core of Tanzania's new defense force marched by. All 1000 of the new recruits, including 30 young women, were reminded to serve their nation to the best of their abilities. Standing beside Nyerere were his two vice presidents, his cabinet, and the junior ministers, driving home the importance of this day. The defense force, soon to be named the Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF), was being sworn in a mere nine months after the previous armed forces had mutinied. The Tanganyikan Rifles' mutiny on January 20, 1964 had been a black mark on the newly independent nation and the necessity of calling on the British for aid in suppressing it had deeply embarrassed the stridently anti-colonial Nyerere. In response, Nyerere and the ruling party of Tanganyika (soon Tanzania) took radical steps to insure the continued stability of the fragile nation. The Tanganyika Rifles, previously the 6 and 26 Battalions of the King's African Rifles, were disbanded and the rank and file sent home under parole. The government then called upon the TANU Youth League to step forward to fill the ranks of the security force and be the foundation for a new national military. The first recruits from this call were now parading in front of TANU in what was seen as a gamble for national security. However, the TPDF would more than prove its merit. Although it underwent significant evolution and experimentation, the final product of this radical departure from the previous military structures would pay dividends. Over the next fifteen years, the TPDF would provide a

stable military structure that would not only protect Tanzania, but play a key role in building the stability and harmony for which Tanzania has become known.

A Radical Departure

To fully understand the nature of the change made by Tanzania, it is best to examine the alternative paths taken by its neighbors. The January Mutiny not only affected Tanganyika; the former King's African Rifles formations of Kenya and Uganda also violently protested and threw their nations into disarray. While all were put down, the responses of each state would have longstanding effects. As noted, Tanganyika managed to restrain the mutiny with the aid of the British and took the radical step of dismantling their previous military forces. However, Kenya and Uganda responded very differently than Nyerere's Tanganyika.

Kenya reached independence under Jomo Kenyatta and his party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). While Kenyatta had led his country to independence from the British, he eschewed Nyerere's more radical socialist ideology and strident non-alignment. The Kenya Rifles had indeed mutinied, but the Kenyan government saw no reason to dismantle their military. In fact, Britain still saw Kenya as its main ally in the region and as such they were more than willing to extend help and military assistance to Kenya that they were unwilling to send to the more radical Tanganyika or the erratic Uganda. In addition, Kenya, as the former center of British East Africa, had a far larger number of expatriate British officers and officials that were willing to provide continuity in leadership in the Kenyan Rifles. Kenyatta gladly made use of both of these advantages while dealing with the future of his military. With the large amount of military aid and

the expertise of the expatriate British, Kenya managed to reconstruct the professional British model that had persisted throughout the colonial era. Increased pay and prestige kept the soldiery happy while the now reinforced British Model of a professional and apolitical military kept them loyal, all subsidized by Kenya's continuing strategic importance to Britain throughout their retreat from Empire. However, these programs kept the military isolated from society and under the very constraints they fostered the original praetorian behavior; it was only through British aid that the model remained sustainable. This was a price that Nyerere's Tanzania refused to pay.

Uganda under Milton Obote did not have Kenya's strategic relationship with Britain nor Tanzania's strong central government, leaving it with few options. It was further constrained by its geographic location: it shared borders with the Congo and the Sudan, two areas that were wracked with conflict at the time of the mutinies and rebuilding. This left Uganda an unpleasant choice for its continued security. It required a professional military but lacked the time and public stability to build a new one like Tanzania, but could also not afford to remold their previous forces like Kenya. To try and remedy this situation, Obote reached out for other sources of funding and aid. Israel answered the call and began to implement their own military program within Uganda, causing a considerable rift between the remaining British officers and the new Israeli experts. This rift was mirrored within the military as the divisions became politicized along geographic lines; the Northern officers readily accepted the Israeli training methods while the Southerners cleaved to the British. This continued after the British withdrawal in mid-1964 and only accelerated as Obote increasingly favored the Northerners and played into the martial stereotypes that had traditionally driven the army. As the

Southerners became more marginalized, the Northerners increasingly became a vital tool for Obote to maintain order in Uganda. This simply retrenched their isolation from national culture and inherent praetorian tendencies, finally culminating in the 1971 coup d'état that brought General Idi Amin to power.

The response of Nyerere's Tanganyika was predicated on the basic idea that the inherited colonial military was inherently unsuitable for the independent African state. Traditional practices such as ethnically targeted recruiting, apolitical indoctrination, and linkages to an external power were seen as fundamentally opposed to the current process of transforming the state into a self-reliant post-colonial form. As such, dismantling the Tanganyikan Rifles was seen as simply the first step to solving the question of what form the security of the proposed nation would take. In this view, the mutiny of the inherited armed forces would later be seen somewhat as a windfall. President Nyerere himself commented "... [t]he mutiny was a strike of the army people and it went out of control... But every cloud has a silver lining, as the British say. It enabled us to build an army almost from scratch. Many institutions we have inherited, but the army is something we built ourselves."¹ Of course while the first step was obvious, the question remained about how to proceed from the new situation. Some debate was given to the idea that a military was overall unnecessary. Tanganyika had few external enemies and no pressing need to project their military power internationally; why then take on the expense of a military establishment? This was especially pointed as the cost seemed to be tethering oneself to a former colonizing power or at least an international patron. In addition, considering the context of the question, where a military that Nyerere himself had as

¹ William Edgett Smith, *Nyerere of Tanzania* (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1973), 121

recently as 1961 pronounced as unimpeachable mutinied, the idea of questioning the wisdom of maintaining any military at all is certainly understandable.

However, Tanganyika had also approved of the 1963 formation of the Organization of African Unity and was an enthusiastic supporter of the decolonization struggle for Southern Africa. Preparations had even been made for the Tanganyikan Rifles to liaise with the liberation fronts despite the presence of British officers as the commanders of the majority of its formations. Even following the disbandment of the Tanganyikan Rifles, Nyerere and Tanganyika remained committed to the liberation of Southern Africa, including Portuguese-colonized Mozambique to their south. This would require a formal military presence to both safeguard the border and train the expatriate freedom fighters who Tanzania would shelter over the upcoming years of struggle. In addition, even before the mutiny the military was already being pressed as a pillar of nation building. Oscar Kambona, Nyerere's defense minister, had already been experimenting with the possibility of reforming the military along nationalistic lines as early as 1963. While the regime had created the program of National Service and already had mass organizations such as the TANU Youth league, the military offered the possibility of a professional organization that would allow for mass participation while creating stability within the country. As such, it was decided that Tanganyika would have a military as opposed to simply a militia or a gendarmerie.

However, Nyerere and TANU leadership were still well aware of the dangers posed to the state by the military. The new nation had survived one mutiny but another might have proven fatal to the national government. This meant that a premium was placed on the loyalty of the military and several radical and in some cases unique

practices were put into place in the new military to address the possibility of future praetorian behavior. The colonial ideal of an apolitical military was rejected; instead the military was grafted to the central party through political engagement, with commissioned officers participating in governmental positions and the creation of political officers within the ranks. The old system of recruitment concentrating on so-called 'martial races' was explicitly rejected—membership in the TPDF was available only through prior completion of National Service. Even the previous doctrine of the military, derived from the British model and built around imperial needs, was discarded. Instead, military doctrine was collected from First, Second, and Third World states and then melded into a single Tanzanian doctrine, taught at the Tanzanian military academies. These policies were radical departures from both the original colonial model and the client-patron models that were rapidly becoming commonplace with the rise of the Cold War.

Despite the unusual nature of many of its core structures, the Tanzanian People's Defense Force proved to be exceptional. Throughout the first fifteen years of its existence, the TPDF expanded itself from its initial 1000 recruits into a force over ten times that size, trained countless freedom fighters for the liberation struggles of Southern Africa, integrated the armed forces of revolutionary Zanzibar, and waged a successful conventional war against the aggressive forces of Idi Amin. Beyond this, it fulfilled what was seen as its prime purpose as a "People's Army:" despite the rapid and radical social changes going on in Tanzania, the TPDF enforced stability. Over the span of 1964-1979, there were only two attempted incursions against Nyerere's TANU government and both drew a minimum of support from the military and neither managed to fully implement

their schemes. In this regard, the TPDF proved itself a model of civil-military relations for the state of Tanzania.

The TPDF in Scholarship

It is fair to say that the Tanzanian People's Defense Force has not been the focus of much research since its inception. Paradoxically, its lack of praetorian behavior has meant that it has not been an attractive subject for scholars; a pacific military is rarely seen as noteworthy. As such, whereas large states with tumultuous relationships with their militaries, such as Nigeria, have a significant body of research behind them, Tanzania in the post-independence era suffers from a paucity of work on its structures. This is not to say that there is no work on the military of Tanzania, but simply that the work that does exist finds its focus in different periods of history when the relations between the military and its political context was subject to significant outside pressures.

For example, there is a significant amount of work on the militaries of colonial era Tanganyika. Early works, such as Lt. Col. H. Moyse-Barlett's *The King's African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890-1945*² and Ernst Nigmann's *The Imperial Protectorate Force- German East Africa 1891-1911*³ are fairly straightforward histories of their respective units and were the initial regimental histories of their respective forces. Moyse-Bartlett's volume offers a chronologically complete narrative of the construction of the British East African military paradigm and the actions it participated in from its origin until the end of the Second World War. Nigmann's *The Imperial Protectorate Force- German East Africa 1891-1911* serves as a primary and

² Lt.Col. H. Moyse-Bartlett, *The King's African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890-1945* (Aldershot: Gale & Polden Ltd., 1956).

³ Col. Ernst Nigmann, *The Imperial Protectorate Force- German East Africa 1891-1911* (Nashville: Battery Press, 2005).

secondary source for information pertaining to the original structure of the European colonial military in Tanzania. He covers in detail the formation, training, and evolution of the ethnically-privileged mercenary force that became a tool of imperial expansion and domination and set the paradigm that each future colonial force in Tanzania followed.

These original works were joined by several other basic regimental histories, which although they are distinctly separate works, cover very little new ground in terms of the subject.⁴ The next wave of scholarship treats the subjects with a more nuanced approach. Erich Mann's *Mikono wa Damu: Hands of Blood*⁵ examines the German conquest of East Africa as a more complex system of negotiations between the German colonial apparatus, their African soldiers, and the local African powers. Timothy Parson's *The African Rank and File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King's African Rifles, 1902-1964*⁶ goes beyond the drum-and-fife military history of the King's African Rifles (KAR) to instead offer the social structure and context involved in the colonial service of the British East African Soldiers. Finally, the work of Michelle Moyd has begun to explore the motivations behind the service of German East African *askaris* and proposes an honor-base solution to their service. Her article "All People Were

⁴ For the KAR, these included Malcolm Page, *KAR: A History of the King's African Rifles* (London: Leo Cooper, 1998) and Andrew Lloyd-Jones, *K.A.R.: Being an Unofficial Account of The Origin And Activities Of The King's African Rifles* (London: Arrowsmith, 1926). There are no other regimental histories of the Schutztruppe in print, but there are two theses that cover the basic early history of the German colonial forces. One is Michael von Herff "They Walk Through the Fire Like the Blondest German," (MA Thesis, McGill University, 1991) and the other is Michael Bennighof "The German Colonial Soldier," (MA Thesis, University of Alabama, Birmingham, 1989).

⁵ Erich Mann. *Mikono Wa Damu; "Hands of Blood" African Mercenaries and the Politics of Conflict in German East Africa, 1889-1904* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2002).

⁶ Timothy Parsons, *The African Rank and File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King's African Rifles, 1902-1964* (Oxford: James Currey, 1999).

Barbarians to the Askari...’: *Askari* Identity and Honor in the Maji-Maji War, 1905-1907” in Giblin and Monson’s *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War*⁷ offers an exceptional first step in a new wave of studies on the German African soldier, one that focuses on the individual serving as opposed to the regiment served.⁸

Parsons’ and Brown’s accounts end in 1964, expanding the story beyond the existence of Tanganyika as a colony and up to the dissolution of the King’s African Rifles in Tanganyika. The catalyst of this dissolution was the 1964 East African mutinies, which affected Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika in January of that year. Despite the wide-ranging effects of this event, there remains only a fraction of work on the mutinies. Almost immediately after the events, Harvey Glickman published a short work entitled *Some Observations on the Army and Political Unrest in Tanganyika*. Glickman’s thesis that the slow pace of Africanization was to blame would continue to be a thread for the further studies in the causes of the mutinies.⁹ The Tanzanian People’s Defense Force funded the publication of their own history of the events, titled *Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny: January 1964*.¹⁰ Nestor Luanda, who wrote the majority of the volume, argues that a combination of loss of privilege and neocolonial interference by the British led to the widespread violent protest of the Tanganyikan Rifles. While this is the official account

⁷ Michelle Moyd, “‘All People Were Barbarians to the Askari...’: *Askari* Identity and Honor in the Maji-Maji War, 1905-1907,” in James Giblin and Jamie Monson, eds., *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 149-79.

⁸ Another exceptional work on the history of the KAR is Kevin Brown, “The Military and Social Change in Tanganyika, 1919-1964” (PhD Dissertation, Michigan State University, 2001), which, while still a basic account of the history of the KAR, offers a more far-reaching and in-depth look at the history of the East African soldiers in Tanganyika.

⁹ Harvey Glickman, *Some Observations on the Army and Political Unrest in Tanganyika* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, 1964), 6.

¹⁰ Nestor Luanda, *Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny: January 1964* (Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam Press, 1993).

and full of several important interviews, the publication does its best to deflect criticism of TANU and Nyerere in the eventual protest of the military. Sociologist Henry Bienen looked to the structural issues of the praetorian militaries in East Africa and the roles these played in the eventual protest within the East African states. In, “Public Order and the Military in Africa: Mutinies in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika,” Bienen offers a critical viewpoint on the roles of all three countries in helping create the necessary context for a mutiny. In discussing the case of Tanganyika, Bienen traces the slow pace of Africanization and TANU’s isolation of the military from the workings of the state as a precondition for the violent protests.¹¹ Timothy Parsons’ exploration of the 1964 mutiny, *The 1964 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa*, created a new view on the events, building a conceptual framework that placed the colonial military within the category of skilled labor.¹² As such, the mutinies are explained as professional labor striking due to low pay and bad working conditions. He backs these up with testimony, illustrating the consciousness of the soldiers participating in the protests. This account offers a far more nuanced look at the role that the mutineers saw themselves playing within independent East Africa while also offering a complete narrative of the roots of the mutiny, the protests themselves, and the legacies following the suppression of the protests. Finally, a recent work on the Tanganyikan mutinies, McRae and Laurence’s *The Dar Mutiny of 1964, and the Armed Intervention That Ended It*, offers little new

¹¹ Henry Bienen, “Public Order and the Military in Africa: Mutinies in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika” in *Armies and Parties in Africa* (New York: Africana Publishing, 1978), 145.

¹² Timothy Parsons, *The 1964 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2003).

material and is simply a narrative of the events of January 1964 from the British viewpoint.¹³

The Tanganyikan part of the mutiny, as mentioned, ended with the dissolution of the Tanganyikan Rifles and the formation of a new military that would eventually take the name the Tanzanian People's Defense Force. However, despite the positive role that the TPDF has played since its formation, no book length work has been published on it or its characteristics. There have been a number of articles, chapters, white papers, and theses that deal with aspects of the modern TPDF but few, if any, offer a historical analysis of the Tanzanian military. The vast majority of the works offer a brief description of the TPDF and how it came into being before addressing one or more aspects of the force, usually in the context of Tanzania. The first work to adequately offer insight into the structure or even personnel of the Tanzanian People's Defense Force was the journalistic work of Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey. Their book, *War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin*, offered perhaps the first substantive information on the force itself or its history.¹⁴ While admittedly this was in the context of the TPDF's struggles against Idi Amin in the Kagera War of 1978-79, before this most works that addressed the TPDF offered little to no discussion of the actual force.¹⁵ The next substantive work

¹³ Tony Laurence and Christopher McRae, *The Dar Mutiny of 1964, and the Armed Intervention That Ended It* (Brighton, England: Book Guild, 2007). Nestor Luanda maintains that the majority of their material is stolen from his work, but this is still an unfounded accusation.

¹⁴ Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, *War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1982), with specific historical notes scattered throughout Chapter 3, 53-70.

¹⁵ Two pieces guilty of this are Henry Bienen, "Military and Society in East Africa: Thinking Again About Praetorianism," in *Armies and Parties in Africa* (New York: Africana Publishing, 1978), 165-86 and Ali Mazrui, "Anti-Militarism and Political

was not produced until nine years later, Abillah H Omari's "Beyond the Civil-Military Dichotomy in Africa; The Case of Tanzania." Omari offers an excellent breakdown of the structures of the TPDF, including such aspects as the politicization of the officer corps and the use of National Service as an entryway to military service. Omari positions his work as a counterpoint to Mazrui's earlier arguments of the "anti-militarism" of the Tanzanian state, using his structural knowledge of the force to convincingly argue that the political connections formed within the armed forces were meant not to undermine the military but rather to bring it into alignment with the TANU's outlook.¹⁶ Omari would later rework a substantial part of the earlier working paper into a chapter for the edited volume *Ourselves To Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa*, released by the Institute for Security Studies.¹⁷

The next major work discussing the TPDF is Casta Tungareza's chapter in Hutchful and Bathily's *The Military and Militarism in Africa*. This work, entitled, "The Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Tanzania,"¹⁸ remains the most detailed of any existing work on the TPDF at this time. Tungareza covers the formation of the officer

Militancy in Tanzania," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (September, 1968):269-84. In defense of both of these articles, at the time, solid information on the TPDF was scarce.

¹⁶ Abillah H Omari, "Beyond the Civil-Military Dichotomy in Africa: the Case of Tanzania," (Working Paper, Dalhousie University, 1989), 18.

¹⁷ See Abillah Omari, "Civil-Military Relations in Tanzania" in Rocky Williams, Gavin Cawthra, and Diane Abrahams, eds., *Ourselves To Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2003), 89-106.

¹⁸ Casta Tungareza, "The Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Tanzania," in Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily, eds., *The Military and Militarism in Africa* (Dakar: Codesria, 1998).

corps, the popularization of the military, and even the return of traditional forms of local security, such as the *sungusungu*.¹⁹ This was followed by Herman Lupogo's brief 2001 article on the TPDF relating its formation to the political stability within Tanzania. Lupogo carries the story through the mutinies to the formation of the TPDF and includes brief anecdotes from the Kagera War.²⁰ Nestor Luanda then added a pair of contributions in 2005-2006. The first, "A Changing Conception of Defence: a Historical Perspective of the Military in Tanzania," offers a brief history of the formation of the TPDF from the mutiny to the Nyalali Commission of 1991 and was published in the Institute of Security Studies' edited volume *Evolutions and Revolutions: a Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa*.²¹ The second, "A Historical Perspective of Civil-Military Relations: 1964-1990s,"²² covers the same period but focuses more on the interactions of the TPDF with the government. Both cover approximately the same ground and address the organizational struggles of the TPDF through its formation and the alterations brought on by multipartyism.

Civil-Military Relations Theory

¹⁹ The *sungusungu* were traditional forms of local crime prevention and peacekeeping, similar to a citizens' posse, although with local cultural additions. These were eventually codified under Tanzanian law when the prevention of their formation became impossible. See Tungareza, "The Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Tanzania," 307.

²⁰ Herman Lupogo, "Tanzania: Civil-Military Relations and Political Stability," *African Security Review*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2001).

²¹ Nestor Luanda, "A Changing Conception of Defence: a Historical Perspective of the Military in Tanzania" in Martin Rupiya, ed., *Evolutions and Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), 295-310

²² Nestor Luanda, "A Historical Perspective of Civil-Military Relations: 1964-1990s" in Martin Rupiya, Jonathan Lwehabura, and Len Le Roux, eds., *Civil-Security Relations in Tanzania* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2006), 13-30.

The central question of this work is one of civil-military relations between the Tanzanian People's Defense Force and the civil and political state that is Tanzania. As such, for there to be a worthwhile answer to the questions raised, it is necessary for the theories behind the study of civil-military relations to be addressed. As noted by Hounnikpo, "The literature of civil-military relations reflects two sets of concerns: first, the degree of autonomy the military from civilian power and its influence on democratic and civilian control of the military; and second, the propensity of the military to interfere in civilian affairs and stage coups."²³ For both concerns there are distinct bodies of scholarship and these cover both the general theory of civil-military relations and specific case studies that deal with Africa. Both will be reviewed within this section, as the central questions towards the role of the TPDF in the building of Tanzania as a nation concern both the relations of the military with the body politic and the lack of military intervention in the political life of Tanzania.

Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* is the seminal work regarding the first of the two listed concerns. In his 1957 study, Huntington identified three major factors that defined relations between the state and its' military. The first factor that defined the relations was the functional imperative of the military; essentially whether there was an external threat that the military was intended to deal with. The second was the ideology of the government they were serving. Where the state fell on a continuum between liberal and conservative effected overall how both sides judge their relationship. Finally, the structure of the government defined relations between the two. Huntington posited that a parliamentary system that saw majorities running a united government

23 Mathurin C. Hounnikpo, *Guarding the Guardians: Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Governance in Africa* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 49

would have different relations between the state and military than a government where the executive and legislative functions were divided. Each of these factors in turn would influence whether the military was under “subjective” or “objective” control. “Subjective” control was one in which the bodies involved within the government saw the military under their own particular purview and therefore able to be directly controlled by the state. Huntington noted that while this maximized civilian dominance over the military, it also meant that the armed forces were far more likely to be seen as pawns of interest groups within the army. This subjective control also opened the possibility for the opposite effect: that the military could take advantage of this relationship by playing civilian actors against one another, leading to a deterioration of the control the state could exert over the military.

Huntington maintained that the far more desirable relationship was that of “objective control.” Under this system, the military was granted effective autonomy in return for their willingness to embrace the “normal” relationship of apolitical obedience to the civilian state. He theorized that this control would allow for something akin to a “positive feedback loop.” In theory, the military would become more professional due to the autonomy and trust granted, which in turn would lead to greater assumed subservience to the state, leading to more autonomy and trust. As such, the military would happily remain apolitical and maintain loyalty to the state in return for the ability to see to its own affairs. This of course calls upon what was at the time the assumed role of the military, which conflated professionalism with an apolitical identity and Huntington happily embraced that role.

The work of Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* agreed with Huntington on his central point that the normal and desirable relationship between the soldier and state was the obedience of the soldier to the state. However, while Huntington argued that this was implicitly a role of the professional soldier, Janowitz disagreed with Huntington's discussion of the term "professional." Whereas Huntington saw the idea of "professionalism" as one that remained standard since the military revolution brought about professional soldiers serving states, Janowitz argued that the context that the military existed in altered the meaning of the term. In Janowitz's argument, the military must not remain a separate and distinct culture from the civil state it safeguarded, but must instead always reflect the values of the civil society. If a gap developed between the values of the military and those of the civil society, this would inevitably lead to an alienation of the military and a loss of their willingness to be suborned to the state.

It is at this point that the central works of civil-military relations theory begin to address the second issue raised: the catalysts that lead into direct intervention in the political life of the state, ie. Praetorian behavior. Whereas Huntington and Janowitz, as the central early theorists of civil-military relations simply attempted to analyze how to maintain the proper relationship between the military and the state, an improper relationship did not necessarily mean that praetorian behavior would necessarily follow. As such, more work on what factors led to military interventions and outright *coup d'états* was produced to elaborate on the analytical framework that Huntington and Janowitz laid. Some of the follow up work even branched out from the original seminal works and continued along new lines of inquiry.

The first work that directly dealt with the *coup d'etat* military culture was Samuel Finer's *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*.²⁴ Finer argued that the military's intervention had little to do with the structure of the military itself. Instead, the determining factor was the political culture of the state in which the military existed. If a state had a high level of political culture and participation, then the military rarely took action to intervene within the civilian sphere. Meanwhile, in those states where the political culture was weak and lacked developed channels of popular public participation, the levels of praetorian activity were significantly increased. This was seen as the effects of public attachment to the political structures within which the military existed. If the public was strongly attached to the political structures, the possibility of successful military intervention was low and so military action was weak, at best. However, in the absence of popular attachment to the political structures of a state, military intervention was not discouraged, but may in fact be encouraged by the public. This same thesis is generally agreed upon in Huntington's *Political Order and Changing Societies*, where he asserts that the specific role of military intervention is defined by the political development of the state in which the military exists.

Whereas Finer and Huntington focused on the internal relationship between state and military, other works looked from the outside in, specifically at the role that external threats played in the possibility of praetorian behavior. This initially led to two opposing schools of thought on the role of external threats in political incursions from the military. One side argued that a lack of external threats led to a military that was bereft of purpose. In this case, the energies of the military would almost certainly be directed internally to

²⁴ Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 4th Edition (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2006)

create a situation more in the military's own interest.²⁵ The other school of thought posited that the existence of an external threat would logically lead to a more powerful military and therefore one that could and would have more influence in the political and popular sphere. This “garrison state” would become the norm with the civilian control eventually sublimated to the needs of the military in the struggle against an external threat.²⁶ Between these two viewpoints was the work of Michael Desch, who viewed internal dynamics through Huntington’s framework but added the existence of an external threat as an additional factor in his analysis. Desch's holistic approach found that low levels of internal strife and higher levels of external threat generally led to stronger civilian control and less threat of political interventions. In the opposite case, that of high internal strife and weak external threats, civilian primacy was threatened and praetorian behavior became far more common.

Civil-Military Relations in Africa

The central scholars of civil-military relations theory, such as Finer, Huntington, and Janowitz, were writing of the military in a general and universal sense. However, this limited their total applicability to the problems of specific case studies. Given the central difficulty of civil-military relations in Africa, where the first fifty years of independence saw no less than 80 coups, it was inevitable that literature dealing with the problem of civil-military relations on the continent would emerge. As Robin Luckham noted in his article “A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations,” the scholarship emerging during the first decade of independence in Africa was often contradictory and not

25 For the primary work in this school of thought, see Stanislaw Andrzejewski, *Military Organization and Society* (London: Routledge, 1954).

26 The origins of this theory can be traced to Harold Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 46 (1941), 455-68.

adequate to the task of offering worthwhile analysis to the current situations in African states.²⁷ Further work emerged, but due to the very real existence of the civil-military strife in Africa these new works often eschewed extremely theoretical outlooks and attempted to draw conclusions from observed praetorian actions. Ruth First, in her early work on coups in Africa, *The Barrel of a Gun*, made the initial concrete observation that all militaries intervening in the public life of the new African states did so out of their own professional interests.²⁸ This was a universal fact regardless of the political background of the coup itself. Samuel DeCalo made this same argument more forcefully in his own work, where he maintained that underneath all spoken motivations for political incursions, the military had, at its heart, its own professional prerogatives and their protection at the base of their actions.²⁹

In looking at civil-military ruptures, William Gutteridge identified the essential nature of colonial militaries and timing of decolonization amongst the newly independent states as their root. Gutteridge argued that the colonial legacy within the military led to serious difficulties in its relations with the new states: the nationalist politicians saw them as historically oppressive forces, the populace had a legacy of fear towards them, the recruitment of 'martial races' hindered their inclusion in nationalist initiatives, and the slow rate of Africanization in their leadership often meant they were still led by colonial officers.³⁰ When the new governments of the African states took control, this often meant

27 Robin Luckham, "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations," *Government and Opposition*, Vol.6, No. 1 (1970):5.

28 Ruth First, *The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'Etat* (London: Allen Lane, 1970).

29 Samuel DeCalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Motivations and Constraints* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 10 and 20.

30 William Gutteridge, *Military Regimes in Africa* (London: Methuen, 1975), 6.

that the inherited military was far down on its list of priorities. This then led the military to intervene in politics to enforce its own desired outcomes within the states. This again echoed First and DeCalo, offering a more in-depth explanation for the concept that armies intervened for their own professional interests.

More recent work, such as that of Claude Welch Jr. in his “Emerging Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Africa,” continues the typology already established. Specifically, Welch creates a continuum of points that follow the development of militaries in Africa states following their decolonization. Beginning with the idea that all colonial powers used military might to impose and maintain their rule and that this military might was drawn from the colonial populace and officered by metropolitan citizens, Welch then follows the fate of the militaries through their method of decolonization. In the case of a peaceful decolonization, as seen in Tanzania, Nigeria, and Ghana, the military was denied a revolutionary or suppressive role and emerged into independence with their inherent institutional conservatism intact. In the case of states where liberation struggles were waged, naturally enough the former colonial forces were dissolved and replaced with the former guerrilla fronts as the legitimate military.³¹

Kiah and Agbese's edited volume, *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control*, offers two fundamentally different essays on the relations between the military and the state in Africa, although again these address the specific problem of coups against the political bodies of Africa. The first, “Military Coups in Africa: A Framework for Research” by Ebere Onwudiwe,

31 Claude Welch Jr., “Emerging Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Africa,” in Bruce E Arlinghaus, ed., *African Security Issues: Sovereignty, Stability, and Solidarity* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 129.

attempts to sketch out the main frameworks used over the previous decades to understand the motivations of praetorian militaries. Specifically, he identifies the individual motivation viewpoint, the military interest and condition approach, and the foreign influence viewpoint. Onwudiwe rejects the concept of individual interest as a widespread cause for coups, using Ghana's experiences as an example against individual interest as a prevalent cause. Onwudiwe far more supports the idea of corporate military interests being the central driver of military interventions, although he also supports the concept that foreign influence can play a vital role in fomenting military interventions. He specifically notes foreign influence in the case of Ghana's 1966 coup that removed Nkrumah from power.³²

Kieh's essay in the same volume covers much of the same ground in terms of catalysts for military engagement in the political realm, but with a few important differences. Kieh retreads much of the same work on the individual motivation and that of the corporate military interest, but then looks at the Marxist explanation and the manifest destiny model. The manifest destiny model is based off of earlier work by Finer, where the military emerged into the independent African state as one of the few organized and professional sectors of the state. As such, the military tended to see itself as the counterweight to faltering state institutions and later as the only possible savior in cases where the civil structures were deteriorating. The Marxist model sees coups as part and parcel of the trials of underdevelopment: the underdeveloped state's class dialectic leads to harsh struggles for control and privilege. These struggles draw in the military,

32 Ebere Onwudiwe, "Military Coups in Africa: A Framework for Research" in George A Kieh and Pita Ogaba Agbese, eds., *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 23.

which is dependent upon the propertied class, and therefore intervenes to support the status quo. Finally, Kieh posits an integrative model, where no single cause leads to coups but they are instead a mélange of individual and corporate initiatives that cross into the social, cultural, and economic realms, finally culminating into military intervention.³³

While there is a still larger part of scholarship within this realm, it has all shared a common purpose: to try and identify the stimulus that leads to praetorian behavior within African states. However, this remains in the end only half of what the theories behind civil-military relations are intended to address. That there is so much literature on the coup and its causes in Africa is not in the least surprising given the prevalence of military interventions, but there remains little work done on the first issue raised in civil-military relations. The degree of autonomy the military had from civilian power and its influence on democratic and civilian control of the military remains a lesser field within the literature, only having been addressed in recent years as Africa emerged from the Cold War. On this topic, perhaps the most interesting work has been that of Herbert M. Howe in his recent volume, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*. Howe returns to the concept of “professionalism” to define the working relationship between the military and its state. However, as Onwudiwe points out, professionalism has been given many definitions, leading to confusion in the theories supporting it.³⁴ Howe defines professionalism as the sublimation of the military to the state in Weberian terms, marking

33 George Klay Kieh, Jr. “Military Engagement in Politics in Africa” in George A Kieh and Pita Ogaba Agbese, eds., *The Military and Politics in Africa: From Engagement to Democratic and Constitutional Control* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 42-43.

34 Onwudiwe specifically notes that “These definitions range from emphasis on professional skills, corporate loyalty and social responsibility, to the belief in the principle of civilian supremacy over the military.” Onwudiwe, “Military Coups in Africa,” 22.

a division between institutional authority as opposed to charismatic or personalist authority. In this case, to Howe, the professional army “requires an institutionalized system of stable and widely accepted political values that exist independent of a specific regime.”³⁵ This is implicitly an enduring institution that is separate from any individual or ethnic goals and reflects the state itself. Accordingly, Howe seems to embrace both Huntington's thesis that objective controls allow both autonomy and increased “professionalism,” but also Janowitz's theory that the military must reflect the shared values of the society it is meant to safeguard.

Tanzania and Civil-Military Relations

Although this work is at its heart a discussion of the civil-military relations between Tanzania and its military, the TPDF, it is not the first of its kind to engage the subject. Several of the works discussed previously in this chapter offer a greater or lesser degree of discussion of the interaction between the state and its military and they will be addressed in this section. Given his centrality to any study of the TPDF, it is only right to start with a discussion of Nestor Luanda's work. Luanda has in recent years produced the two aforementioned works on the Tanzanian People's Defense Force, “A Changing Conception of Defense: A Historical Perspective of the Military in Tanzania” and “A Historical Perspective of Civil-Military Relations, 1964-1990.” Luanda remains the authority on the topic and offers a great amount of detail on the structures of the TPDF in both. However, while he offers excellent overviews of the political goals of the military

35 Herbert M. Howe, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States* (Boulder: Lynn Rienner, 2001), 9.

and their close relationship with TANU-ASP, he does not directly engage the body of theoretical work behind most examinations of civil-military relations.³⁶

Herman Lupogo also authored a central work on the history of the Tanzanian People's Defense Force. Lupogo is a retired Major General who served in the TPDF for nearly thirty years. Lupogo's work, "Tanzania: Civil-Military Relations and Political Stability" directly addresses the work of Huntington, but diverges from the idea of legislated objective controls. Instead, Lupogo argues that the success of the Tanzanian model must be traced to the links between the TPDF and the regional and local societies in which it served. He then goes on to discuss these connections through the ideology and service of the military to the local level of Tanzanian society. As such, it is a very telling article and one that will play a supporting role in the arguments put forth in this essay.

The work of Abillah Omari engages several theoretical models, diving into the questions of how the military relates to the state. Specifically, in both of his works he identifies four major models that have succeeded³⁷ in the world: the Aristocratic Model, the Liberal Model, the Communist Model, and the Professional Model. However, Omari then notes that none of these common models adequately describe the Tanzanian People's Defense Force. While he admits this means that these models are therefore to be questioned, it is far more the unique structure of the Tanzanian military simple does not fall into any of these particular categories. Instead, he theorizes that "Tanzania has survived neither because of luck nor by following any particular model(s), but essentially due to a coherent and flexible policy, which has been able to adjust to the prevailing

³⁶ In both he does offer short sections citing professionalism as a central concept of military loyalty, but does not pursue it further.

³⁷ By succeeded this work means maintained state dominance over the military through various means.

circumstances.”³⁸ From here, Omari explores the relationship between the military and TANU within the state and several external factors to build his case study. Omari’s two related works are an extremely useful study, but one that this work feels does not state a strong enough thesis in fully explaining the relations between the state and the military throughout the period of 1965-1979 and the effect this had on the military and the nation.

The work of Casta Tungareza, “The Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Tanzania,” is perhaps the most complete work on the civil-military dimensions of Tanzania and the TPDF. Tungareza addresses several of the main points buttressing this work: the politicization of the officer corps, the non-alignment of officer training, and the foundation of a national service and a militia. Tungareza even echoes the findings of this work that “civilian control of the military does not necessarily come from isolating the military from politics, but can be achieved by incorporating it into the general political arena.”³⁹ In all, Tungareza engages the theory, and like Omari discards the majority as unreliable in terms of the Tanzanian model. This dissertation agrees with this argument and will expand upon it significantly.

Finally, one of the most recent works addressing civil-military dimensions in Tanzania is Stefan Lindeman's “Civilian Control of the Military in Tanzania and Zambia: Explaining Persistent Exceptionalism.” Lindeman makes an excellent and incisive argument in terms of the political and economic incentives offered to the officer corps of the TPDF. He traces the rise of officers through their positions attained within the civil administration and draws a correlation to the loyalty they offer the civil authorities. He

38 Omari, “Civil-Military Relations in Tanzania,” 91.

39 Casta Tungareza, “The Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Tanzania,” in Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily, eds., *The Military and Militarism in Africa* (Dakar: Codesria, 1998), 313.

ties these positions to a form of “subjective control” as envisioned by Huntington and then argues that the legitimacy gained through this “elite bargain” has enhanced the regime's ability to gain “objective control” as well.⁴⁰ Lindeman's arguments are excellent and well supported, but ignore both the influence of external actors (or the lack thereof) as well as the idea of a coup from below. Given that African militaries certainly have seen coup attempts from the non-commissioned ranks in the past, his explanation of an elite bargain offers only a partial explanation.⁴¹

The Argument

This central argument of this work is that in the reconstruction of the TPDF, in 1964, Nyerere and TANU set out to create a politicized military on all levels. This had the effect of creating a military that was inextricably connected socially, culturally, and economically with the state of Tanzania and its central party TANU/CCM. This was accomplished by the cooptation of the TPDF officers and enlisted men through party membership and political integration, the incorporation of National Service into the military sphere to tie the TPDF to the national social structures of Tanzania, and the non-alignment of doctrine to avoid any interference from foreign influence on the creation of a unified Tanzanian society. In short, the intentional melding of the state, the party, and the military created a monolithic structure that effectively made large scale military interventions impossible because they were part of the superstructure of the state and in turn fostered the continued national identity of Tanzania. In the case of Tanzania, there

40 Stefan Lindeman, “Civilian Control of the Military in Tanzania and Zambia: Explaining Persistent Exceptionalism” (Working Paper, Crisis States Research Center, 2010), 18.

41 For example, see Samuel Doe in Liberia or even Lindeman's own classification of the 1964 Mutinies as a coup attempt. However, this dissertation disagrees with Lindeman that the Mutiny was a coup in any shape, form, or function.

was essentially no civil-military dichotomy since civil society, the political structure, and the military were all part of the same whole.

In terms of the theoretical foundations of this work, the collapse and mutiny of the Tanganyikan Rifles, the event that created the opportunity for a new military, is easily viewed through existing literature. The structure of the inherited military obviously followed Gutteridge's stated model and followed the pattern given. Their political incursion was, drawing on Timothy Parson's work, one driven by the corporate interests of the colonial model military due to their isolation from the new civil society that existed in Tanzania. It was arguably the fact that Nyerere and TANU recognized the corporate interest and lack of subvention that shaped the form of its successor force.

Regarding the formation of the TPDF, there are several works that form the foundation of the theory of this work. The primary point of agreement is with the initial point of Omari: the Tanzanian model was unique in its creation. To explain this, Tungareza's work is of prime importance: that the answer was not to create a boundary between the military and the state, but to incorporate the two. To support this theory one can then draw in Lupogo's thesis that the social integration at the local level created a firm base as well as Lindeman's argument that an elite bargain created stability. However, neither of these is exactly correct, as they still posit an essential separation between the military, the party, and the state. Instead, as this work will show, these integrations were not simple economic or social interactions, but a full fledged melding of the political, state, and security apparatuses that were consciously formed as part of the ujamaa project and served to bind the Tanzanian People's Defense Force to the nation building efforts of Tanzania from 1965-1979.

Chapter Outline

The central argument of this work is broken down into eight chapters in total. The introduction offers a concise summary of the creation of the Tanzanian People's Defense Force and the evidence and theoretical underpinnings of the overall argument of the project. Given the central role of Civil-Military Relations to the question of the TPDF's stability and nation-building capabilities, a theoretical review is included to offer a foundation to the work. In addition, a brief discussion of the exiting work on the history of the Tanzanian military has been included.

The second chapter, "The Colonial Military Part 1 (1889-1939)," discusses the formation of the colonial militaries in East Africa before the Second World War. It begins with a history of the Deutsch Ost-Afrika Schutztruppe from its inception in 1889 until the First World War. This is continued through a discussion of the experiences of the German East African colonial forces through the War and their eventual dissolution when the colony was withdrawn from their control. The chapter will then offer a history of the King's African Rifles from their incorporation in 1902, through their performance in the First World War, and finally to the development of the force during the inter-War years. This chapter highlights both forces to show their parallel development and flesh out the shared structures of colonial militaries. These shared structures, specifically their shared usage of the "Martial Race" recruiting policies, created a colonial continuity within the forces that endured through the existence of the colonial forces and made the colonial military structure inherently unsuitable for the participatory state that Nyerere envisioned.

Chapter Three, “The Colonial Military Part 2 (1939-1964),” follows the continued experiences and development of the British Colonial forces through the Second World War. The expansion of the King’s African Rifles caused an alteration in the recruiting structure of the force, leading to a potential sea change in the nature of the colonial Tanganyikan military. Instead, in the post-War world the demobilized African soldiers found themselves marginalized still further. The chapter also discussed the loss of the military’s privileged status under first a strained colonial government and then a poor independent Tanganyikan regime. The chapter then links this loss of privilege directly to the 1964 East African Mutinies. The conclusion of the chapter discusses the history of the mutinies and their aftermath for Tanganyika, including the decision by the state that the colonial model military could not serve its function in the post independence period.

The fourth chapter is “Nyerere, TANU, and Post-Colonial Tanzania.” To fully understand the integration the TPDF into the project of nation-building, it is necessary the process of building the nation of Tanzania. This chapter will offer a brief discussion of the rise of nationalism and the emptiness of the nationalist ideology upon the attainment of independence. It will then launch an examination of the new *ujamaa* ideology of Nyerere and TANU to discuss the goals of the new nation-building project of the government and the forms this took. Finally, an examination of the alterations in the political, social, and diplomatic spheres brought on by *ujamaa* will set the foundations for the efforts to bind the military to the new political, social, and diplomatic contexts of the nation of Tanzania.

Chapter Five, “Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa: The National Service,” offers a history of the Tanzanian National Service from its foundation in 1964 until 1979. The chapter will

recount the structure of the National Service, the work it carried out, the political education undertaken, and its relation to the military. It argues that the shared experience of National Service for the Tanzanian populace both offered a melting pot for the diverse peoples and offered political education that defined what Tanzania was and was not in popular understanding. This created a popular consciousness of Tanzanian citizenship that was transferred to the army, removing the old isolation of the “martial races” from the public sphere. In addition, it bound the military to the civil society of the new nation of Tanzania.

The sixth chapter, “A Politicized Military,” explains the permeable barrier between military and political service within the TPDF. The TPDF rejected the colonial model of an apolitical military, feeling that the removal of official political recourse for officers left it with no avenue for redress aside from praetorian action. Instead, all officers were required to be members of TANU and could serve as both TANU officials and elected members of the government. While this required them to set aside their commissions for the duration of their election, it allowed for constructive engagement with the government on the part of officers within the TPDF. The creation of TANU commissars will also be covered in this chapter.

Chapter Seven, “The Non-Alignment of Doctrine,” deals with the creation of the TPDF’s military doctrine within the context of the Cold War. The roots of praetorian behavior did not always reside solely within the threatened state, but often originated in the undue influence of a foreign military. Tanzania understood the dangers posed by excessive foreign intervention and searched for a solution to the problem of needing to rebuild its military but requiring at least a nominal foreign influence. The early military

missions of Canada and China will be discussed as well as their eventual failure. This ties in directly with the creation of the Monduli Military Academy and the Tanzanian's later international efforts to create their own military practice. These efforts were made in the understanding that a domestic doctrine could be created by sending Tanzanian officers abroad to bring back diverse ideologies to their homeland. The latter part of the chapter will cover the locations of Tanzanian training in the First, Second, and Third World and how this approach allowed it to remain non-aligned and thereby avoid any neocolonial entanglements in terms of the military.

Chapter Eight, "Conclusions and Coda" will tie together the disparate threads of the previous chapters. The failures of the colonial military model to coexist with the independent Tanzanian state; the formation of a strong, centralized, non-aligned, and self-reliant unified government in Tanzania; and the adoption of National Service, a politicized officer corps, and the non-aligned doctrine in the new military all built towards a defense force that existed as an extension of the new nation-state of Tanzania. This meant that the TPDF was formed with an explicitly institutional loyalty to Tanzania since it was connected to the nation-building efforts itself at all levels. In addition, a brief summary of the successes of the TPDF model in the Kagera War against Idi Amin's Uganda (1978-1979) will be used as a coda to the overall work.

A Final Question: A History of an African Military or a Military History that happens to be in Africa?

Given the subject of this dissertation it is a fair question to ask what sort of history this is. Given that the subject is an institution within an African state, it is more than right

to question its origins and whether the history that can be produced about it can be called African History at all. While certainly Africans are involved in it, the actual singling out of individuals beyond titans such as Nyerere is rare. The structures of the military, its squads, its companies, its battalions, its regiments, were all of western make. The tanks and planes and rifles and rockets it armed its soldiers with were all from Britain and Canada and China. Its ranks and organization were a legacy of the West even if it was no longer directly the inherited forces of the King's African Rifles. As such, is it possible to call this work African History or is it necessary to look upon it as the history of an army that happens to be in Africa?

I believe the answer to this cannot be found simply by looking at the overt military structure of the TPDF. A central part of the establishment of a western capitalist hegemony over Africa in the age of colonialism was the military power that the West was able to bring to bear on the colonized peoples. This was not simply a technological advantage, as by the time that colonialism had advanced well into Africa many African societies had rifles and other current weaponry, but one of organization, logistics, and strategic function. The European colonizers were professional soldiers who had developed tactical and strategic doctrines to use their technological advances to the fullest. The organization of their forces was formed to take full advantage of the logistical advantages brought about by an industrial economy and international steamship lines. In the few cases where Africans scored notable victories against the colonizers using native military structures it was usually because of the failure of the Europeans to utilize their 'way of war.' Isandlwana was a horrific loss for the British Empire, but one brought on

by the commander's failure to properly establish a firing line and defensive works.⁴² Adowa was a terrible loss for the Italians, but one brought on by the division of Italian forces into five narrow and isolated valleys where they could be attacked in detail by an Ethiopian force armed with modern rifles. And, following the imposition of colonialism, these traditional African formations were dismantled and replaced with colonial military forces.

These new forces, such as the West African Frontier Force, the *Tirailleurs Senegalaise*, and the King's African Rifles were completely European in structure. They were European armies with African manpower. These colonial forces used the same technology and tactics as their metropole brethren and relied on the same form of logistics and social order. As has been noted, this is also theorized to be the root of their praetorian behavior: inherited colonial militaries were built around the needs and capabilities of industrial global empires and were not suited to function as the militaries of independent, and predominantly poor, African nations. However, this still leaves us with the central question of this section: given the fact that the organization, technology, and doctrinal practices of the TPDF are western in origin, does this mean that it is simply a military that happens to be African?

This work argues that the overt military structures of the TPDF (the organization, technology, and doctrinal practices from above) do not make it a *western* army; they make it a *modern* army. Modernity was imposed on Africa in the long process of

⁴² Contrast this with the Battle of Rorke's Drift, which happened on the heels of Isandlwana. A small force of British troops was able to establish their proper tactical formation and inflict a horrific defeat upon a Zulu force that outnumbered them over 20-1. For comparison's sake, it is worth noting that the odds at Isandlwana were only approximately 10-1.

colonization, which saw the social and political structures of Africa replaced with those that matched the needs of the metropolitan power. Therefore, the militaries of Africa simply matched the modern character that was imposed on Africa. However, as could be seen with the praetorian nature of the militaries, the modernity of Europe was not always harmonious with the African state. The society and culture of the new African states was not in a place that had organically developed into modernity, thus making the attempts to follow an accelerated European path to an assumed ‘modernity’ doomed to partial success at best.

Julius Nyerere believed that Africa could achieve modernity, but only on Africa’s terms. This was the theory behind *ujamaa*: the attempt to integrate the advantages of western technology and organization into the context of traditional African culture and values. To borrow a concise definition for the ideology, it was the “synthesis of what was considered to be the best Africa could learn from modern industrialized states and the best traditions of African societies.”⁴³ This combination would see the emergence of an African modernity that would serve the African people. In turn, Nyerere and TANU’s efforts to implement *ujamaa* were inherently an attempt to build a nation, but in the context of the theoretical African modernity that would prove sustainable for the Africans. In the parlance of today’s policy makers, Nyerere and TANU were attempting to “find African Solutions to African Problems,”⁴⁴ placing their efforts decades ahead of the development theory of the present day.

⁴³ Donatus Komba, “Contribution to Rural Development: Ujamaa and Villagization,” in Colin Legum and Geoffrey Mmari, eds., *Mwalimu: The Influence of Nyerere* (London: James Currey, 1995), 36.

⁴⁴ The present idea behind the development of Africa, even in government circles, is the idea of “capacity building,” or, in other words, the finding of traditional African practices

This brings us finally to the Tanzanian People’s Defense Force. The new military of Tanzania was inextricably interwoven with the *ujamaa* project. It was a modern military because the structures of modernity were necessary to function effectively in the context of global modernity. However, it melded these organizational and logistical structures with what they saw as the best traditions of African societies: communal responsibility, political participation, and social awareness that placed the freedom of the African people at a premium. Simply put, the new Tanzanian People’s Defense Force was an expression of Tanzania’s hoped-for African modernity and reflected what it viewed as the essential parts of being African. As such, the TPDF, or in kiSwahili the *Jeshi la Wananchi wa Tanzania*, is one of the few militaries on the continent that to this day can be considered truly African in character at all.

that have worked for the African people and then finding a way to boost the effectiveness or scale of these practices through the application of western technologies or organization. Given the theories behind *ujamaa* and their application through the TPDF, it is hard to argue that these were not attempts at capacity building forty to fifty years before the United States and Europe decided to try it in Africa. These views were brought to the attention of LTC Nancy Jean-Louis, the liaison between USAID and AFRICOM, and found to be of interest. She also is the source of the definition for “capacity building” used in this work. Conversation with LTC Nancy Jean-Louis, November 4, 2011.

Chapter Two:

The Nature Of The Colonial Tanganyikan Military, Part One, 1889-1939

Prior to 1889, there were many organizations that could be considered ‘military’ in East Africa, that year represents a break with the traditional methods of warfare embodied in the arrival of the Deutsch Ost-Afrika Schutztruppe. Up until that point, the military had taken such forms as the age-regiments of the Hehe or the morans of the Maasai. Even the more complex bodies of armed young men in the burgeoning Ruga-Ruga empires of Tippu Tip and Mirambo were still in the early forms of military organization and had not yet taken the organizational hallmark of the modern militaries practices from western capitalist states. As mentioned earlier, the arrival and imposition of modern European methods caused a hegemonic change in the methods of waging war and in doing so also caused a parallel change in the construction of military forces. As such, it is appropriate to start with the imposition of the 'Western Way of War' upon Tanganyika, since that signaled a clean break in the history of the state.

Formative Years of the Tanganyikan Military (1889-1914)

The birth of the Tanganyikan armed forces took place in 1889 under the auspices of Lieutenant Herrman von Wissman of the German Imperial Army. Germany had been a latecomer to the African colonial game, but had played its hand well, laying claim to four distinct colonies at the 1885 Berlin Conference, which sliced up Africa amongst the colony-hungry European powers. At the Conference, Germany was allocated Togo, Kamerun,⁴⁵ German Southwest Africa,⁴⁶ and German East Africa.⁴⁷ Part of the

⁴⁵ Now Cameroon.

agreement reached in Berlin was that colonies would be recognized by the effective occupation of the territories, a term flexible enough to be interpreted in a variety of ways but that required the establishment of colonial authority within the agreed-upon borders. Chancellor Bismarck regarded colonies as a luxury, one Germany could not afford to directly engage while France still burned with revenge to their east. As such, like many of the colonial powers, the establishment of this authority was left to several chartered companies. In the case of Germany's East African possessions, the colonial project was left to the Deutsch Ost-Afrika Gesellschaft (DOAG) under the direction of Karl Peters, the initial architect of Germany's overseas African Empire.

While initially the DOAG only had a mandate to administer the territory of Witu, in 1888 the company got the Sultan of Zanzibar, Khalifa bin Said, to lease them the coastal strip opposite Zanzibar itself. The coastal strip itself was quite wealthy, with a large population of Swahili and Arab notables who had accrued money and power through their connections with the well-established caravan routes that ran from enclaves such as Dar es Salaam and Lindi far into the interior. This network of notables did not take well to the attempted imposition of German authority. The DOAG commissioner for Dar es Salaam, Emil von Zelewski, was particularly abrasive and inflammatory in his behavior towards the locals, and on September 20, 1888, the coastal elites rose in revolt against Germans. Heading this revolt was a local plantation owner, Abushiri ibn Salim al-Harhi. Within a few short weeks, the German presence had been driven back into the cities of Dar es Salaam and Bagamoyo. It was at this point that the Ost Afrika Company appealed to the mother country for aid in retaining their colonial possession.

⁴⁶ Now Namibia.

⁴⁷ Now the mainland portion of Tanzania.

In response, Bismarck commissioned Herrmann von Wissmann to assemble a force to establish stability within the German colony of East Africa and dispatched him with the simple phrase "Siegen Sie."⁴⁸ With a budget of 100,000 Marks and a mandate to repress the slave traders, Wissmann set about organizing what was essentially a mercenary force to reclaim the German territory. The first elements were Sudanese soldiers who had been released from British Service. Despite the difficult demands of both the Egyptian government and the troops themselves,⁴⁹ the Germans managed to recruit 600 of the veterans, who became highly prized. The second element added to the new 'Wissmann Force' was 100 Shangaan⁵⁰ warriors recruited in the Delagoa Bay region of Portuguese Mozambique. While they were not initially held in as high esteem as the Sudanese, the Germans hoped the Shangaan would adapt well to the discipline of military life. The German Non-Commissioned Officers and Officers chosen by Wissmann joined the Sudanese in Aden and then sailed for Bagamoyo where they met the Shangaan, completing the assembly of the first colonial military of Tanzania.

This force marked the introduction of what would essentially be a wholly new military organization in East Africa. The African soldiers were organized into companies under the command and instruction of a European officer.⁵¹ The Sudanese were already

⁴⁸ Translation from the original German: "Go and Win."

⁴⁹ The Egyptian government demanded the Germans also employ 29 unemployed Egyptian Officers and the Sudanese soldiers demanded that their wives and children be transported with them. The Germans acquiesced to both demands. See Erich Mann, *Mikono Wa Damu; "Hands of Blood" African Mercenaries and the Politics of Conflict in German East Africa, 1889-1904* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2002), 48.

⁵⁰ These soldiers were mistakenly called "Zulus" in the official records, but most modern research agrees these troops were Shangaan based on the region of their recruitment. See Mann, *Mikono Wa Damu*, 49.

⁵¹ At this point the companies were divided by race, with six Sudanese companies and one Shangaan company.

familiar with western drill and doctrine, having served in the Anglo-Egyptian Army before beginning service with the Germans. Meanwhile, the Shangaan were drilled under German instruction, with predictable stories emerging in terms of the Shangaan's "War Dance"⁵² and the German instruction in the proper way of war. In each following engagement German doctrine stood to the fore and it was German strategic goals that determined the prosecution of the conflict. However, over the course of the next year, the experience of fighting in Africa and with African soldiers caused Germany to embrace several practices of recruiting and structuring their colonial military forces that essentially paralleled other colonial military structures.

Wissmann's force landed in Bagamoyo in May of 1889 and with only a few days of training and drill, and without standardized uniforms or any real method of identification, the fledgling force was launched against the rebels and scored a crushing victory. The force continued to be concentrated against isolated centers of resistance along the coast for the rest of 1889, gradually gaining greater cohesion as a force and establishing the experimental 'Zulu' company as a steady compatriot to the veteran Sudanese. The heart of the rebellion was finally crushed in December of 1889 with the capture and hanging of Abushiri. Although the Wissmann force was in action until early 1891, defeating smaller pockets of dissent, the danger to the colony was past and the forces were ready for reorganization.

On May 22, 1891, the Schutztruppe was formally incorporated into the Imperial Armed Forces. No longer a "Commissioner's Force," a certain amount of regularity would be imposed by the Imperial Government, which had also formally annexed the

⁵² Col. Ernst Nigmann, *The Imperial Protectorate Force- German East Africa 1891-1911* (Nashville, TN: Battery Press, 2005), 6

colony itself, relieving the struggling German East Africa Company. It was during this period that formal uniforms were issued to the *askaris* and their drill and discipline was properly reinforced. In addition, with the increased financial aid of the government, the force began a slow expansion. Further levies of Sudanese proved unsatisfactory,⁵³ so for the first time Schutztruppe began to experiment with local levies. Their incorporation into the force set the tone for the remainder of the Schutztruppen's existence.

From 1891 to 1905, the Schutztruppe extended German control into the hinterlands of the colony. During this time they perfected their bush craft while fighting the Wanyamwezi, the Wassukuma, and, most notably, the Wahehe. It was the Wahehe that proved the toughest opponent for the Schutztruppen field forces. They annihilated an entire Schutztruppe column in a bloody action at Rugaro after the German commander failed to take proper precautions on the march.⁵⁴ After this first bloody reverse, the Schutztruppe redoubled their efforts at suppression. Full scale warfare followed against the Hehe from 1896 to 1898. With the death of Sultan Mkwawa, the chieftain of the Hehe, most effective resistance in the colony ended. It was at this time, from the ending of hostilities in 1898 until 1905, that the Schutztruppe took on its ultimate form in colonial intervention. The officers, troops, and structure were all in place, marking the peak of efficiency for the protectorate forces.

This peak in efficiency was not a moment too soon, as in 1905 the Maji-Maji revolt swept over the southern half of the colony. Starting as a religious movement, it quickly grew into a violent protest that threw the whole colony into disarray. Entire tribes that had been thought pacified rose up and swept away the German garrisons. In an

⁵³ Col. Ernst Nigmann, *The Imperial Protectorate Force*, 32.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 44.

unlucky coincidence, fully 1123 of the 1900 German troops were in the North of the colony when the trouble erupted. These were quickly shuttled to the South, and at the boma⁵⁵ of Mahenge a rebel column was smashed by the concentrated firepower of the Germans—the tide began to turn. By 1906 the rebellion had been quelled and the colony was finally pacified in early 1907. Although the initial reverses were alarming, the revolt simply demonstrated the strength and quality of the colonial forces at that time. From the end of the rebellion until the beginning of the First World War, the Schutztruppe remained the elite colonial force on the continent.

By 1914 the German colonial forces had become the prototypical colonial military force: officer ranks were filled by professional European officers; doctrine was established as that of light infantry intended for use against local threats who had no firepower greater than aging rifles; and the ranks were filled with soldiers from specific groups who were then isolated and treated as if they were from a distinct caste alien to the local populace.

This separation of tribal identity as soldiers distinct from the rest of the colony was an extension of the practice of ‘martial races,’ which had been pioneered by the British in India. Britain had managed to effectively use Indian sepoys to hold and expand their Indian empire by this division along racial lines. It was a widely held belief that there was a genetic basis for skill at military applications, that fighting was ‘in the blood’ so to speak. In the Indian Army, this idea was used to restrict access to the ranks. The concept was generally seen as a reaction to the mutiny of 1857 and it was not a coincidence that the ‘martial races’ were those who had helped put down the mutiny of the

⁵⁵ Native term for a fort or station.

Bengal army. This was obscured with the rhetoric that the southerner was “enervated,” “timid,” and “unwarlike.”⁵⁶ Instead, recruiting was done among the northern hill peoples, particularly the Dogras, Gurkhas, Sikhs, Pathans, Garhwalis, Rajputs, and Kumaonis.⁵⁷ Britain then proceeded to adopt this doctrine in Africa, with Germany following much the same pattern.

For the Schutztruppe’s part, their concept of martial races was based on one factor only: the race’s ability to adhere to discipline. Initially, the Schutztruppe employed almost exclusively Sudanese troops. The Sudanese had a reputation for being extremely tough fighters with a long martial tradition in both the Egyptian and Anglo-Egyptian armies. They formed the backbone of the German Colonial force and were so highly prized by the Germans that they were offered significantly higher rates of pay than other African troops. In addition to the 30 rupees he made a month (as compared to 20 a month of the average African recruit), the German Sudanese *askari* was given such a vaunted position that other native troops attempted to learn a smattering of Arabic and sometimes even emulate the ritual scars of the Sudanese troops.⁵⁸ However, the Sudanese were a finite and expensive resource to be used by the Colonials. By 1901, a Schutztruppe FeldKompagnie could count itself lucky if it contained 20 veteran Sudanese troops.⁵⁹

As the veteran Sudanese became scarcer, the Germans needed to turn to other sources of manpower. Despite the good combat performance of the ‘Zulus,’ they were

⁵⁶ Byron Farwell, *Armies of the Raj* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1989), 180.

⁵⁷ S. D. Pradhan, *The Indian Army in East Africa, 1914-1918* (New Delhi: National Book Organization, 1991), 4.

⁵⁸ Nigmann, *The Imperial Protectorate Force*, 94..

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 92.

considered to be unsatisfactory in many other respects.⁶⁰ The only other obvious answer was local recruitment. The Manyema had been recruited during the expansion of the force in the 1890s and had proven amenable to German service. In addition, many Wanyamwezi and Wasukuma had originally served as porters with the FeldKompagnies and were later armed and inducted into the forces. These peoples had proven sound and trustworthy as servicemen and became the preferred members of the Protectorate forces. As to the greater warrior peoples of the colony, the Maasai were considered too indolent and made poor soldiers. The Hehe, perhaps the most determined opponents of the Schutztruppe, were considered to make passable soldiers, but they would not serve outside of their homeland, considerably limiting their usefulness. In the end, it was discipline and amenability to German command that determined the 'martial races' of the Schutztruppe.

This concept of allowing or denying military service on racial or tribal lines served a very important purpose. This idea of 'martial races' created a very real gulf between the military and civilians. Philip Mason argues that the British in India consciously tried to "build up an army as distinct as possible from the bulk of the nation...We did build up an army quite out of sympathy with the middle class that was just beginning to grow."⁶¹ Following that lead, the Germans made a conscious effort to "inculcate in the *Askari* a feeling that they are, as it were, members of a distinct and

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Philip Mason, *A Matter of Honour* (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd, 1974), 359.

peculiar tribe, different from, and superior to, the rest of the native population.”⁶² The official history makes certain to note that:

Good pay, good uniforms, and good equipment raised the young soldiers above the level of their tribesman, and soon let them look down upon them with contempt. Also skillful training on the part of their white superiors, and perhaps even more, unconscious mutual influence produced a feeling of camaraderie that brought them together regardless of tribe, and brought them into unconscious opposition to the ordinary native.⁶³

The *Schutztruppe* leadership had made it a tangible goal to create an identity for their soldiers separate from the established tribal system. Those ethnic groups that gained considerable wealth and prestige within the colonial system from their 'martial' characteristics tended to make this a defining point of their identity.⁶⁴ Those serving in the military were then even further segregated from mainstream society by regulations and a conception of duty that was internalized by the troops themselves. This created a completely separate set of class sympathies within the German colonial service as opposed to the social structure from which the soldiery had initially come from. As Michelle Moyd succinctly puts it in her study on the corporate identity of the *Schutztruppen*:

The factors compelling *askari* to fight were multiple and overlapping, and are best understood as having intertwined and mutually reinforcing origins in material incentives, processes of self-identification, and maintenance of group boundaries, and of the particular dynamics set in motion by a military culture at war. All of these factors relate directly to an *askari* code of honor, or ethic, that elevated certain traits over others in the

⁶² Great Britain, Naval Intelligence Division, *A Handbook of German East Africa* (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), 202.

⁶³ Nigmann, *The Imperial Protectorate Force*, 94.

⁶⁴ Timothy Parsons, "East African Soldiers in Britain's Colonial Army: A Social History, 1902-1964" (PhD Dissertation, John Hopkins University, 1996), 17

preservation of *askari* identity and culture, and that ordered group conduct.⁶⁵

This identity and culture produced a self-reinforcing structure that served both the African rank and file and their colonial officers. The effect of this system was that the martial races gained an amount of privilege that they owed to the colonial power, binding them to the Europeans. For their positions to remain advantageous, the native soldiers had a vested interest in seeing the colonial structures continue to thrive. This all but guaranteed the loyalty of the armed forces, even those recruited within the territories currently being exploited. Numerous examples show the effectiveness of this strategy on the part of the colonialists. During the Maji-Maji revolt of 1905-1907, the Schutztruppen fought non-stop for the colonial government to put down a rebellion by nearly half of the colony. The fears of the German officers were finally put to rest by this wide scale revolt as the *askaris* even fought against their own tribes.⁶⁶ However, this loyalty was put to the test in the Great War, which saw East Africa engulfed in a global conflict.

The Schutztruppe and the Great War (1914-1918)

The First World War in East Africa has at times entered into the realm of myth; few studies before the new millennia challenged the given narrative of the brilliant General Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck and his loyal Schutztruppe fighting a doomed but inspired delaying action against the overwhelming forces of the British Empire. Despite his eventual surrender in November of 1918, von Lettow Vorbeck's campaigns are looked upon as marvels of the military art made possible only by his celebrated

⁶⁵ Michelle Moyd, "All People Were Barbarians to the Askari...": *Askari* Identity and Honor in the Maji-Maji War, 1905-1907," in James Giblin and Jamie Monson, eds., *Maji Maji: Lifting the Fog of War* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 155.

⁶⁶ Nigmann, *The Imperial Protectorate Force*, 167.

leadership and the unflagging efforts of his African soldiers.⁶⁷ Recent re-evaluations of the campaign⁶⁸ and the sources behind the earlier history,⁶⁹ however, have offered new perspectives on the War in East Africa and on the abilities of von Lettow-Vorbeck, creating a more nuanced conception of the War. However, the story of the First World War in Africa is at best a tertiary concern to this study; the campaign itself is secondary to understanding the Tanganyikan troops who fought in it and the discussion of the changes and continuities in their service encompassed within the context of the War. As such, only the sparest of space will be used to discuss the actual course of the conflict to provide this context.

When the First World War began in 1914, the Schutztruppe existed as a rather modest formation, far more a colonial gendarmerie than a conventional military. Its total disposition stood at approximately 216 German officers and NCOs and 2,540 *askaris*,⁷⁰ a

⁶⁷ Central examples of this line of narrative are Leonard Mosley, *Duel for Kilimanjaro* (New York: Ballantine, 1963); Charles Miller, *Battle for the Bundu: The First World War in East Africa* (New York: MacMillan, 1974); and MAJ JR Sibley, *Tanganyikan Guerrilla: East African Campaign, 1914-1918* (New York: Ballantine, 1971).

⁶⁸ Recent works on the campaign and its attendant literature include Ross Anderson, *The Forgotten Front: The East African Campaign 1914-1918* (Tempus: London, 2004); Edward Paice, *Tip and Run: the Untold Tragedy of the Great War in Africa* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007); and Bruce Vandervort, "New Light on the East African Theater of the Great War: A Review Essay of English-Language Sources" in Stephen M. Miller, ed., *Soldiers and Settlers in Africa, 1850-1918* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 287-305.

⁶⁹ Notably, one of the central primary sources of the earlier 1960s and 1970s histories was the *War Diary* of Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, the officer who directed the British intelligence efforts against the Germans in East Africa from 1914-1916. The *Diary* was well detailed and offered strong opinions on the abilities of von Lettow, the British Command, and the prosecution of much of the campaign. However, following the publication of a devastating exploration into the veracity of Meinertzhagen's claims, the volume can no longer be held to be a reliable source in any sense of the word. For more information, see Brian Garfield, *The Meinertzhagen Mystery* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007).

⁷⁰ Edward Paice, *World War One: The African Front* (New York: Pegasus Books, 2008), 14.

small number even for its primary role of policing German East Africa,⁷¹ much less taking part in the greater worldwide conflict of the First World War. However, despite the protests of the colonial governor, Dr. Heinrich Schnee, the new commander of the Schutztruppe felt that the interests of Imperial Germany could be best met by aggressive action on the part of the colonial forces:

I considered it our military object to detain enemy... forces if it could by any means be accomplished. This, however, was impossible if we remained neutral. In that case the situation would be that we, who did not command the sea, would have to remain inactive, with a force which, though small at the moment, had behind it a loyal, very efficient population of eight million suitable for military service. England, on the other hand, would have no need to employ a single man in East Africa on our account; it would be able to take away the very last fit *askari*... for employment in other theatres more important than East Africa.⁷²

As such, overriding the call for neutrality emanating from the civilian authorities, von Lettow began to prosecute the conflict he envisioned as having the greatest impact on the War and in early August authorized raids by German reservists into British East Africa.

These raids provoked the response that von Lettow had been hoping for: the British settlers were alarmed by the raids, including a singular raid that came within sight of Nairobi, and demanded protection from German aggression. The British War Office responded by diverting Indian Expeditionary Force B to Mombasa to prepare for the reduction of German East Africa. However, despite the relative size advantage of the British Forces (approximately 8000 strong), they were of decidedly mixed quality, ill-

⁷¹ The German territory at the time consisted of modern Tanganyika, Rwanda, and Burundi and had a total area of approximately 384,000 square miles. See Sibley, *Tanganyikan Guerrilla*, 9-10.

⁷² Gen. Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck, *My Reminiscences of East Africa* (Nashville, TN: Battery Press, 1996), 18-19.

equipped, and led by inexperienced officers.⁷³ The resulting amphibious attack on the German port of Tanga, from November 2-5, 1914, was a debacle. The British Navy gave advance notice that an attack was coming, giving von Lettow time to transfer a large part of his command to the region of the landing.⁷⁴ The British troops were halted within Tanga itself by the Schutztruppe main body and then flanked to the south by von Lettow's reserves. Despite still maintaining a formidable advantage in numbers, the British withdrew after heavy fighting, leaving behind considerable stocks of supplies on the shore.⁷⁵ The first attack had badly damaged the British⁷⁶ and considerably raised the German morale.

In January, von Lettow felt confident enough to again attack the shaken British forces, this time at the small station of Jassin, just north of Tanga. While this attack was successful and the fort was taken from the Indian Army unit defending it on the 18th, the cost in ammunition and men convinced the German forces that a more economical method for pursuing their strategic goals had to be introduced. In response to this realization, the German forces spent the remainder of 1915 sending small raiding forces to damage the vital Uganda railway that ran less than 50 miles from the border for 150 miles of its length.⁷⁷ This not only placed the British on the defensive due to their need to cover an impossibly vulnerable rail-line, but allowed for extremely small forces of

⁷³ Paice, *World War One* 40.

⁷⁴ von Lettow estimated 1000 *askaris* and other combatants were transferred. von Lettow, *My Reminiscences of East Africa*, 44.

⁷⁵ Of greatest note were the approximately 600,000 rounds of ammunition. von Lettow, *My Reminiscences of East Africa*, 45.

⁷⁶ The British lost an estimated 817 dead, wounded, and missing troops, or approximately 15 percent of their force. Paice, *World War One*, 58.

⁷⁷ Miller, *Battle for the Bundu*, 37.

German *askaris* to have outsized effects on the prosecution of the War. However, this balance of power could not last; the Germans had a need to husband their resources and could only attempt to reinforce and supply themselves internally while the British retained all the resources of their vast Empire. By the beginning of 1916, the tide had turned. The final worrisome German commerce raider had been driven from the Indian Ocean⁷⁸ and large numbers of South African troops were pouring into British East Africa, fresh from their conquest of German Southwest Africa.

These reinforcements were paired with the reinforced Indian Expeditionary Force, the local East African Mounted Regiment, and the so-far underused British African formation the King's African Rifles. By February of 1916, the British forces in British East Africa alone were over 27,000 and despite the frantic expansion of the German forces over the past year, they were only opposed by approximately 2,998 Germans and 11,300 Schutztruppe *askaris*.⁷⁹ In addition, the British had Belgian allies readying their own attack and a separate force on Lake Victoria preparing its own offensive. When the British offensive began shortly after, the Germans had no way of halting the attacks. While von Lettow's forces made excellent use of interior lines, they consistently had to retreat before the concentric attacks of the British forces. First the Germans were driven back from their positions by Mount Kilimanjaro, and in April the South Africans captured Kondoa Irangi, a strategic recruiting station halfway to the central railway that divided the colony. The allied drives continued, and by July, Dodoma, a main station on the railway, was in British hands. The Germans maintained a stiff defense across the

⁷⁸ The *Konigsberg* had been driven into the Rufiji Delta in southern German East Africa. Its crew and guns would subsequently become part of von Lettow's forces throughout 1916-1918.

⁷⁹ Paice, *World War One*, 170-71.

front, punishing the South Africans and other allied troops badly throughout the campaign, but could not halt the invasion of the colony until September, when the accumulated casualties, illness, and exhaustion finally ground the South African and allied forces to a halt.⁸⁰ However, before the final curtain fell on the 1916 offensives, the British forces had taken Dar es Salaam, Kilwa, and Lindi, the three remaining strategic ports of German East Africa, and by the end of the year the British forces were firmly in control of the northern half of the German colony. The significance of this was not lost on the German side either; the southern half of the colony had been devastated in the suppression of Maji Maji, leaving them with a very limited supply base to continue their struggles. In addition, most of their *askaris* were recruited from the northern half of the colony; from this point on more of their soldiers would desert or even defect as they found themselves further from both their home regions and any recognizable chance of victory.⁸¹

The first months of 1917 saw the dynamics of the combatants finally make a definitive shift. As the numbers of white casualties due to illness and exhaustion rose throughout the 1916 offensives for the British, a call had gone out for replacement troops that could fight in the tropics. Throughout 1916, black units had begun arriving in the theater, including battalions from the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and the West Indies. By 1917, the wholesale removal of white troops was underway and the manpower differential was being made up for with mass recruitment for the King's African Rifles, the British formation of African soldiers in East Africa. From this point on, the balance of forces

⁸⁰ An estimated 15,000 white troops, including 12,000 South Africans, were sent home due to illness following the 1916 offensives. Miller, *Battle for the Bundu*, 232-33.

⁸¹ Paice, *World War One*, 251.

became East African on both sides, a dynamic supported by the recruitment of former German *askaris* within the new British formations. By February of 1917, the King's African Rifles (KAR) had expanded from six to twenty battalions.

New demands on the British force partly drove this expansion of the KAR. A column of German *askaris* under Lt. Max Wintgens set out across the colony in February, raiding for food, water, and ammunition. A British formation made up almost entirely of newly-raised African troops was sent to track it down.⁸² In addition, a British offensive began from the ports of Kilwa and Lindi, which had been occupied by large forces of the expanded KAR. von Lettow was determined to try and force a battle before surrendering the remainder of the colony and was concentrating the bulk of his remaining forces in the southern town of Mahiwa by the Rovuma River. The struggle that followed was the most apocalyptic of the whole campaign, described as an "equatorial Gettysburg."⁸³ Approximately 4900 British troops, primarily Nigerians and East Africans,⁸⁴ cornered a significant force of *askaris* under von Lettow's subordinate, General Wahle, on October 15, 1917. These *askaris* were joined by von Lettow and his own troops on the first day of the four day conflict, expanding the total German forces to 1500.⁸⁵ Each force battered the other with assaults, trying to edge the other into position of disadvantage. Finally, on October 19, the Germans were forced to blink, falling back after the appearance of a third British column a mere 30 miles away.⁸⁶

⁸² Col G. M. Orr, "A Remarkable Raid: East Africa 1917," *Journal of the United Services Institute*, Vol. LXXI (1926):75.

⁸³ Miller, *Battle for the Bundu*, 283.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 287.

⁸⁵ von Lettow, *My Reminiscences of East Africa*, 211.

⁸⁶ Paice, *World War One*, 331.

The end result of the battle was catastrophic for both sides. British casualties were estimated to be between a half and a third of their initial force. While the Germans had lost a much smaller number of their men, approximately 519, these were men that could not be replaced.⁸⁷ In addition, the capture of nine British machineguns and 200,000 rounds of ammunition could not make up for the 850,000 rounds of ammunition already expended.⁸⁸ The Germans had fallen back to the far southeastern corner of their colony and were now low on men and material to continue their struggle. von Lettow took stock of his situation and met with his senior commanders. Despite criticism, he separated the most able-bodied *askaris* and officers from the remaining body of troops, creating a column of a spare 300 Europeans and 1700 *askaris*,⁸⁹ and plunged ever southward to the border with Mozambique. Although the British pursued, they were unable to halt his column and 1917 ended with the Germans across the Rovuma in Portuguese East Africa and with the British ready to follow.

The final year of the War was a pursuit of the Germans in Portuguese territory. The bitter chase through Mozambique took von Lettow and his British pursuers across the entire colony and lasted until November 1918. The remainder of the Schutztruppe survived off of raiding the plantations of the Portuguese settlers and the bases of the inept Portuguese military. Twice the King's African Rifles almost succeeded in surrounding the remnants of the German force. However, it was not to be, with word of the armistice finally compelling the surrender of the German forces on November 25, 1918.

⁸⁷ Miller, *Battle for the Bundu*, 287.

⁸⁸ Paice, *World War One*, 332.

⁸⁹ von Lettow, *My Reminiscences of East Africa*, 224.

Throughout the conflict, the character of the Schutztruppen remained remarkably consistent with the formation with which it began the War. While the numbers of Africans under arms for the German Empire in East Africa rose to a total of approximately 12,000 by 1916, the organization and ethos behind the colonial forces remained the same. The Feldkompagnie remained the central organizing formation, and the martial ethos of the German colonial soldier remained a central theme to many of the narratives carried home by the Germans. Anecdotes such as that of a Sudanese *askari* in German service defying orders to seek cover while declaring, "...if the Emperor could afford to pay him faithfully for twenty years, he could afford to die for the Emperor in one day...,"⁹⁰ or of the *askari* who upon seeing von Lettow departing for the final time shouted, "Where you go, we will go with you. And if this is not the time, wait until this son of mine grows up to be a warrior—and he will take my place and go with you!"⁹¹ run throughout narratives of the campaigns. While certainly many of these were meant to be self serving for the Germans, their frequency hints that the central relationship between the martial caste and the colonialist still existed.

This is complicated by a revealing passage within Von Lettow's account of the campaign. While he makes certain to discuss the trust and affiliation he personally gains later with his African troops, he makes a significant note early on of their suspicion towards his newness to their force: "In the short period of peace-work that was vouchsafed to me, my endeavors to obtain a thorough grip of all my duties in East Africa could not produce results sufficient to secure me great personal authority among Africans

⁹⁰ Miller, *Battle for the Bundu*, 284.

⁹¹ Leonard Mosley, *Duel for Kilimanjaro* (New York: Ballantine, 1963), 208.

of long standing.”⁹² Simply put, despite the discussions of von Lettow’s military genius or the loyalty the *askaris* in theory had for the German empire, the East Africans serving the Germans still had stringent requirements for the loyalty of their caste. Their institutional loyalty was still to the institution of the Schutztruppe, not to an abstract colonizer at the time. Interestingly enough, reports of this identity even found their way even into the official correspondence of the British, a particular passage of which notes:

The remnants of the force still remain with their masters, to whom their devotion is beyond question. These men, and the thousands taken and still detained as prisoners of war, during their many years of service have to a great extent become detribalized, and were developed by the Germans into a distinct military caste and taught to regard themselves as a race superior to and apart from the ordinary native of the country.⁹³

Of course, despite the removal from German authority following the war, this dynamic was already in the process of being maintained. Even in the later days of the War, as the British forces pushed steadily southward, numerous German *askaris* were captured or deserted from the German columns. The British used these men as the core of a new formation of the King’s African Rifles, the 6th KAR, which formed the postwar military of Tanganyika, ensuring a continuity within the identity of the colonial forces. Beginning in April of 1917, two full battalions of 6th KAR were formed at Morogoro, primarily from prisoner-of-war camps.⁹⁴ These troops served until the end of the War and remain the military forces within the region even as it became a League of Nations mandate under British supervision. However, the King’s African Rifles also had their

⁹² von Lettow, *My Reminiscences of East Africa*, 15-16.

⁹³ *Correspondence Relating to the Wishes of the Natives of the German Colonies as to Their Future Government* (London: HM Stationary Office, 1918), 27.

⁹⁴ Lt. Col. H. Moyse-Bartlett, *The King’s African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890-1945* (Aldershot: Gale & Polden Ltd. 1956), 335.

own traditions and history, one that the German *askaris* accepted and that formed a similar dynamic to their original one over the next 45 years of British supervision.

The King's African Rifles (1902-1918)

The Tanganyikan colonial forces joined a martial tradition that was already in existence within East Africa. As such, this work will devote a small amount of space to explain the King's African Rifles (KAR), to which the Tanganyikan soldiery now found themselves part. The KAR began as three separate forces, each serving the crown in different protectorates. These forces were the Central African Rifles, the Uganda Rifles, and the East African Rifles. The Central African Rifles (CAR), later the Central African Regiment, was founded in Nyasaland in 1888. It was a combination of tribal irregulars (known locally as *ruga-ruga*) and Sikhs, raised by Sir Frederick Lugard to fight against the powerful slavers in the region. For eight years it served as the instrument of the African Lakes Company, destroying the rival authorities in the region with the tacit approval of the British government. In 1896, this irregular force was absorbed into the British dominion along with its territory. The British, recognizing a useful tool, pronounced the troops regulars and began to expand the unit, creating a second battalion in 1899.⁹⁵ The 2nd CAR acted as an overseas force, serving successfully in Mauritius, Gambia, Somaliland, and Ashanti. The 1st and 2nd CAR battalions became the 1st and 2nd KAR when the unit was incorporated in 1902.

The Uganda Rifles' origins lie in the tumultuous Kingdom of Baganda. The British had been trying to make commercial headway within the kingdom, which was divided among Pagan, Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant forces. Once again, Sir Frederick

⁹⁵ Moyse-Bartlett, *The King's African Rifles*, 27.

Lugard rose to the challenge of establishing British influence, arriving in Baganda in 1890 with 70 Sudanese *askaris*.⁹⁶ During the various upheavals, he expanded his force to over 650 troops, gaining a significant advantage for the combined Christian factions. Shortly after, realizing the need for an even larger force, Lugard traveled northward and recruited the remnants of an earlier Egyptian garrison, thereby gaining an additional 2085 Sudanese *askaris*. With these soldiers, the nascent Uganda Rifles were the dominant force in the region and proceeded to defeat rebellions by both the Muslims and the Catholics to become sole arbiters in the Kingdom. The British remained in control until a mutiny involving half of the Sudanese in 1897. The remaining soldiers were bolstered by the East Africa Rifles, which were rushed to the aid of the besieged British and with great difficulty put down the rebellion. Shortly after there was a radical reorganization of the forces, creating a far more regular force out of the troops in the area and stabilizing the region under the newer, more sympathetic troops. The last of the mutineers was put down in 1901, shortly after which the Uganda Rifles became the 4th and 5th KAR.

The East Africa Rifles were initially an irregular force recruited by the Imperial British East Africa Company to guard caravans reaching from the coast to the interior in 1885. By combining native *askaris*, Arabs, and Indian levies, they created a hodgepodge force to safeguard their economic interests. Regardless of the troops' performance, the IBEAC failed in 1895 and their charter was absorbed by the British Government, who set out to reorganize the forces protecting what was now their colony. Their commandant of the time suggested a force of approximately 1000 with a levy of 300 Punjabi sepoys as the core. The treasury responded by providing 300 Punjabis, 100 Sudanese, 300 Swahili,

⁹⁶ Ibid., 49.

and 200 'mixed' troops headed by two officers.⁹⁷ This was altered in 1898, after the Uganda mutiny, to five Sudanese companies and three Swahili companies, each of 110 men led by three officers apiece. The structure of the East African Rifles remained unchanged at conglomeration and formed the basis for the other battalions upon the formation of the King's African Rifles in 1902.

With the joining of the three into the KAR, a new era for the use of the forces began. The varying battalions became standardized and interchangeable. In fact, often companies from one battalion could and would be switched between services to provide aid when needed. It was during the era of 1902-1905 that the first Regulations were made, taking into account all of the lessons learned in the previous 17 years with the African forces. Campaigns such as the Nandi Expedition of 1905 allowed for the trial of the now standardized forces and concepts. This in turn permitted the lessons learned by isolated companies to be shared and expanded.

Recruiting was based upon the presumed 'martial races' of each territory from which they were drawn, much like the armies of the British Raj and the Schutztruppen. With three separate protectorates represented, each battalion had a unique composition throughout its history. The 1st Battalion (Nyasaland) was composed primarily of Yao, Atonga, and Angoni warriors from the beginning, and the 2nd followed suit in 1902 by replacing its primarily Sikh contingent with a similar mix of peoples. The 3rd was 50 percent Sudanese, but as these retired or became casualties they were replaced primarily with the Manyema and Wanyamwezi, who already constituted the other 50 percent of the force. The 4th Battalion was unique in that it was almost entirely composed of the

⁹⁷ Ibid., 102.

Sudanese and their families who were drawn down to Uganda by Frederick Lugard in the 1890s. They had settled in such numbers that they were able to supply their own replacements and therefore remained the vast majority of the unit. The 5th were originally almost entirely Sikhs of the Indian Army, drawn to Uganda to maintain order and counterbalance the Sudanese after their mutiny in 1897.

However, by 1904, the fears of another mutiny had disappeared and as the tours of the Sikhs ended, they were replaced. Following the depletion in 1904, the ranks of the 5th were filled with a mixture of Sudanese, Baganda, and Mnyamwezi. Each of the peoples used to fill the ranks of a battalion were given the status of a 'martial race,' but this was done in a curious fashion. Rather than recruitment being concentrated on the local tribes to which martial qualities were ascribed, martial qualities were often ascribed based on which tribal cultures could be best recruited into the military.⁹⁸ Whereas in the Indian Army, the Sikhs, Baluchis, Pathans and the like had been some of the most effective *opponents* of the British, and therefore were seen as superior races, in this case superior races were those fighting *with* the KAR in larger numbers. Of course, the reasons for this remained the same as those of their German neighbors: the privileging of the 'martial races' created a separate military caste, distinct from and superior to the populace at large.⁹⁹ This practice, although it saw alterations through the years, remained a keystone of the British colonial forces in East Africa.

By 1908 all the characteristics that made the King's African Rifles an ideal force were codified and would maintain the high standards until inevitable change was forced by the First World War. The first major change was the expansion of the KAR to meet

⁹⁸ Parsons, "East African Soldiers in Britain's Colonial Army," 17.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 98.

the demands of the War. Although initially expansion was opposed, as there was a preference to keep the East African campaign a 'white man's war,' the losses sustained by the Indian, South African, British, and Rhodesian troops throughout the campaign necessitated the use of local manpower. However, this was not an easy process. In 1914-1915, the settlers and colonial governments were against expanding the African forces as it was seen as unnecessary for the defense of the colony. Blame for this stance is placed by various sources on the War Office¹⁰⁰ or the BEA government,¹⁰¹ but the reasons are agreed upon. Recruitment was denied on the basis of a lack of language-trained officers and a paucity of suitable recruits. Simply put, the settlers who knew the language could not be asked to leave their all-white units and the Africans that could be trained were not of the proper 'martial' material.

However, the dynamics of the War quickly forced an alteration to this policy. The KAR formations that had taken part in the struggle already had acquitted themselves extremely well. In the first two years of the War they had repelled a German raid on Mombasa¹⁰² and taken part in the occupation of Bukoba¹⁰³. Even in early 1916, KAR detachments served well in the Lake Force (mostly the 4th KAR) and the Nyasaland Force (mainly the 1st KAR). Despite these examples of excellent service, the expansion only began in late 1916 under General Jan Christian Smuts; in mid-1916 Smuts ordered the reconstitution of the previously disbanded 2nd and 5th King's African Rifles.

¹⁰⁰ Lord Cranworth, *Kenya Chronicles* (London: MacMillan & Company, 1939), 186.

¹⁰¹ Richard Meinertzhagen. *Army Diary, 1899-1926* (London: Oliver & Boyd, 1960), 204.

¹⁰² W. E. Wynn, *Ambush* (London: Hutchinson & Company, 1937), 40.

¹⁰³ Meinertzhagen, *Army Diary*, 135.

This was not by any means a recognition of the fighting potential of the African, but rather a measure taken because the South Africans were no more resistant to the diseases of East Africa than the rapidly-wilting Indians. The 9th South African Infantry had arrived in German East Africa in February 1916 with a total of 1,135 men. Eight months later, in October, the number had been reduced to 116.¹⁰⁴ Despite the startling losses, it was not alone in its experience. The 2nd Rhodesian Regiment¹⁰⁵ lost 258 of its 591 members in three weeks in March 1916, with only 60 of those in combat.¹⁰⁶ Simply put, during the 1916 offensive, Smuts had conquered German East Africa to the Rufiji River, but in the process his troops had "...melted like butter in the sun."¹⁰⁷ Although Smuts had managed to secure the services of the Nigerian Brigade and the Gold Coast Regiment during his drive south, they could not fill the gap left by the departure of the whites. It was hoped that by the end of the year, the King's African Rifles could begin to fill the void in manpower.¹⁰⁸ However, to do so, the KAR underwent a rapid expansion that tested the limits of the formation.

While this expansion was begun under General Smuts, shortly after he began the expansion of the King's African Rifles he was called away to take part in the Imperial War Cabinet. Smuts declared the War in German East Africa over and departed, leaving his successor, General Hoskins, with a paucity of men and with lingering questions as to the continued prosecution of the War. This left Hoskins with the sole option of local

¹⁰⁴ Alexander Slidell Neilson, "The Expansion of the KAR 1914-1918: Some Myths and Realities in a Colonial Institution" (M. A. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1966), 12.

¹⁰⁵ The Rhodesian Regiments were units made entirely of white settler volunteers.

¹⁰⁶ Neilson, "The Expansion of the KAR 1914-1918," 13.

¹⁰⁷ Arnold Weinholt, *The Story of a Lion Hunt* (London: Melrose, 1922), 188.

¹⁰⁸ Angus Buchanan, *Three Years of War in East Africa* (London: J. Murray, 1920), 144.

recruiting; that is, expanding the King's African Rifles to the point that the East African troops could fill the gap left by the rapidly departing white and Indian troops. The call was made in February 1917 to expand the KAR to twenty battalions. In April, these troops were joined by the 6th KAR, made primarily of captured German *askaris* that chose to fight for the British with a leavening of members of the prewar 2nd KAR.¹⁰⁹ Finally, in addition to these troops, the British raised a regiment from Zanzibar and the coast and christened it the 7th KAR, although these troops served primarily a garrison purpose. By the end of the campaign, the KAR numbered a total of 22 battalions under the seven formal regiments of the King's African Rifles —a total of 1,193 European officers, 1,497 European non-commissioned officers, and 30,658 East African *askaris* under arms for the British Crown.

The troops would be put to excellent use in the final two years of the war. As noted earlier, it was these KAR formations that were the primary forces involved in tracking down the Wintgen's column during its Northern raid in early 1917. It was also primarily KAR units that formed the striking edge of the offensives from the landings at Lindi and Kilwa in the same year. The new KAR battalions fought hard at Narungombe and Mahiwa, finally breaking the Germans' offensive power and driving them from their colony. It was even the King's African Rifles who primarily forced the surrender of a significant column of German troops trying to link up with their main body.¹¹⁰

Once the Germans crossed into Portuguese territory the British columns had completely divested themselves of white rank-and-file troops. The officers were still

¹⁰⁹ Parsons, "East African Soldiers in Britain's Colonial Army," 120. Moyse-Bartlett maintains these recruits were intended for the 3rd KAR but were added to the 6th to make up the numbers. See Moyse-Bartlett, *The King's African Rifles*, 335.

¹¹⁰ Col. G. M. Orr, "From Rumbo to Rovuma," *Army Quarterly*, Vol. VII (1924):128.

European, but the troops were mostly East Africans, as well as Indians and West Africans. Despite the fears of the East African settlers over arming a large amount of the native population, the King's African Rifles achieved results far beyond any of the other contingents'. Lord Cranworth, who served both with the staff and the King's African Rifles, declared, "I never heard anyone, at all events in the later stages, dispute the statement that the greatest share in the conquest of the colony was that belonging to the King's African Rifles."¹¹¹

The final year of the War was the long and frustrating running to ground of the Germans in Portuguese territory. The only bright spot, according to another intelligence officer, was "Colonel Gifford and the KAR 2nd Column."¹¹² Gifford's force kept the Germans consistently off balance, forcing long marches and abrupt countermarches on the enemy. The KAR kept up their chase, hoping to force a decisive engagement on the flagging German column. However, it was not to be, with von Lettow's forces managing to keep one step ahead in Mozambique, through a brief reentry into German East Africa, and finally their eventual surrender in Northern Rhodesia on November 25, 1918.

By the end of the War, the 6th KAR was already in use in the struggle against the Germans. The policies pursued in the foundation and identity of the King's African Rifles paralleled those of the Schutztruppe. Although the First World War saw an expansion of the roles for the King's African Rifles even as their formations expanded, such as into roles as signalers,¹¹³ the prevailing wisdom was still that they fulfilled a brute force role that required paternal control. Phrases such as "But if he is not much of a shot, he is a

¹¹¹ Cranworth, *Kenya Chronicles*, 146.

¹¹² Weinholt, *The Story of a Lion Hunt*, 237.

¹¹³ Wynn, *Ambush*, 107-8.

magnificent bayonet fighter, as might be expected when it is remembered that he is almost born with a spear in his hand”¹¹⁴ and “He [the African] has the trustingness, the fancies...and the cruelties of a child...”¹¹⁵ are present throughout the memoirs and records left by the officers that served alongside them. Even in more general terms, African soldiers were seen as “lusty, coal black devils, the time of whose life is the wielding of the bayonet.”¹¹⁶ The idea of command was still summed up in simple phrases such as “He will assume, if he troubles to think about it at all... that the *Bwana* knows best.”¹¹⁷ As such, it remained those groups who were separated from urbanized, educated society that remained the 'ideal soldiers.'

Of course this continuity was easy to maintain even as the *askari* transferred from German to British service.¹¹⁸ As has been noted, the initial recruits of the new Tanganyikan regiment of the King’s African Rifles had previously been in German service. Further indications of the mutable nature of the *askari*’s service were given in contemporary memoirs:

Comparatively few African tribes provided good material for the ranks of an organized force. The routine and discipline of a military unit run on modern Western lines did not suit the restless souls of all warriors. The source of good recruits was limited. Before the War the men who had a liking for soldiering would do a tour of service with, say, the Belgians in the Congo, then give the Germans a trial, and finish up with the British.

¹¹⁴ Lt. Com. W. Whittall, *With Botha and Smuts in Africa* (London: Cassell and Company, 1917), 185.

¹¹⁵ Wynn, *Ambush*, 109.

¹¹⁶ Maj. Darnley-Stuart-Stephens, “Our Million Black Army,” *English Review*, Vol. XXXIII (October, 1916):359

¹¹⁷ Whittall, *With Botha and Smuts in Africa*, 185.

¹¹⁸ In 1919 Tanganyika would become a British mandate territory under the League of Nations.

Many *askaris* fighting for the Germans and many on the British side belonged to the same tribe and sometimes came from the same village.¹¹⁹ Wynn continues to offer an explanation towards the bonds that these soldiers felt towards their colonial leaders:

A wounded native soldier from Lake Nyassa was in hospital, where an intelligence officer paid him a visit.

“Why are you fighting for the Wa-Germani?” he was asked
The Invalid looked up wearily. “Bwana,” he said in a tired tone, “the Wa-Germany feed me, clothe me, pay me, and always treat me well. When they order me to fight, I fight.” He gave a friendly smile and added, “I would have fought just as well for the Wa-Angrezi if they had been my masters.”¹²⁰

With service, loyalty, and identity shown as a commonality between the two services, it is not surprising that the King’s African Rifles, the British parallel to the Deutsch Ost Afrika Schutztruppe, managed to pick up where its predecessor left off in maintaining the colonial order in Tanganyika.

The Inter-War Years (1919-1939)

The interwar years brought a host of changes for the King’s African Rifles. For the majority of the formation, the first step that needed to be taken was the demobilization of a large number of the African troops currently under arms. From the 22 battalions that stood at the end of the War, the force was quickly reduced to ten battalions, although this demobilization was complicated by an outbreak of Spanish Influenza.¹²¹ While there had been some concern that the rapid demobilization of a large number of black Africans with military training would cause disturbances within the colonies, the only real dissenting voice was Cranworth’s, who wished a larger proportion

¹¹⁹ Wynn, *Ambush*, 105.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 105.

¹²¹ Neilson, "The Expansion of the KAR 1914-1918," 66.

were kept under arms as a deterrent against any uprisings. However, his warnings were a distinct minority and the demobilization went ahead as planned.

The colonial administration further reduced the establishment of the KAR in April of 1919 and the employment of the Tanganyikan *askaris* was now reduced to four companies of the 1st KAR and four companies of the 6th KAR. They now made up two-thirds of the 1st KAR and the entirety of the 6th.¹²² However, elements of the 1st, 2nd, and 6th KAR were garrisoned within Tanganyika to solidify the new British control over their colonial mandate. It was initially assumed that at least six battalions would be required to maintain control, but the KAR establishment could not support this many, leading to the reduced establishment within the colony. It was initially assumed that the elements of these three battalions would be more than enough to maintain the three military districts, but the quiet nature of Tanganyika under British control led to further reductions in the defense establishment. By 1922, the majority of the Tanganyika garrison was provided solely by the 6th KAR, which the governor had wished to maintain at strength due to it being an indigenous force recruited within the colony.¹²³ It remained at this strength until 1929, when the worldwide financial crisis led to the reappraisal of the overall strength and disposition of the King's African Rifles.

A new scheme was introduced by the Committee of Imperial Defense in 1929, with the KAR formations divided into two brigades depending on the location of their recruitment and garrison. The Northern Division was commanded out of Nairobi and consisted of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th KAR, while the Southern Command was commanded out of Dar es Salaam and oversaw the 1st, 2nd, and 6th. Each battalion was reduced to 442

¹²² Moyses-Bartlett, *The King's African Rifles*, 453.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 458.

Africans, with 16 European officers in charge. However, while reductions were carried out throughout the formations, as late as 1931 the Tanganyikan representation within the regiments remained sizeable, maintaining a total strength of 35 officers and 1,084 *askari*—that is, roughly a third of the total 113 officer and 3,390 enlisted men.¹²⁴ Although bounties were offered for early discharge and placement in the reserves, the Tanganyikan reserve size remained modest at 148.¹²⁵

It was during the reorganizations of the early 1930s that a small but significant change occurred within the structure of the King's African Rifles. Since the establishment of the colonial forces, it had been common for battalions to contain African officers. The Anglo-Sudanese forces had been some of the first to follow this tradition, with the rank of *effendi* marking an African Warrant Officer under British Command. The Germans also maintained this structure, keeping the rank of *effendi* amongst their *askari*, although it began being phased out around the turn of the century.¹²⁶ These officer ranks were seen as a necessary intermediary for the white officers, while at the same time as a reward for the long and loyal service by the *askari*. The Germans discontinued promoting black African soldiers once they felt that they had a personal bond with the soldiers. The British now discontinued these promotions¹²⁷ out of necessity; by 1933 the establishments of the KAR were already smaller than any member preferred, but the funding simply did not exist for the continuance of a larger force and

¹²⁴ Kevin Brown, "The Military and Social Change in Tanganyika, 1919-1964" (PhD Dissertation, Michigan State University, 2001), 119.

¹²⁵ Moyse-Bartlett, 464

¹²⁶ Nigmann, *The Imperial Protectorate Force*, 96.

¹²⁷ The ranks given were Mulazim Tani (Second Lieutenant), Mulazim Awal (Lieutenant), Yuzbasha (Captain), and Bimbashi (Major, although paid as a Captain). See Moyse-Bartlett, *The King's African Rifles*, 465.

native officers were one of the casualties of the cuts. During this difficult time there were even arguments presented that, aside from the turbulent region of northern Kenya, there was no need to maintain the King's African Rifles and that an armed police force would serve the purpose just as well for less than the cost of a military formation. However, the final decision on this matter rested with the Overseas Defense Committee of the Imperial Defense Committee, and this body maintained that the KAR served a distinct and vital purpose within the East African colonies of the British Empire and that the Empire was already stretched too thin to offer immediate reinforcement to Africa if the African formations were abandoned.¹²⁸

The wisdom of this decision would be shown far sooner than imagined, as fascist military aggression manifested itself in Africa far earlier than in Europe. Given Kenya's borders with Abyssinia, Italy's aggression and occupation of Haile Selassie's Empire in 1935-36 led to an alarmed response. This, combined with the strategic location of British and Italian Somaliland along the vital Indian Ocean routes, forced Britain to make preparations to secure their sphere of influence. General Giffard, the Inspector General of the African Colonial Forces, sketched out a reorganization that allowed the KAR to quickly recover from its moribund state via an aggressive system of recruitment and reserves trained in the rear echelons to support the front line battalions of the various KAR regiments. While the Kenyan and Nyasaland regiments were dangerously under strength, the Tangayikan formations were a comparatively robust establishment and so were able to take up their positions at Arusha and Dar es Salaam.¹²⁹ The modernization of the force was also undertaken, as KAR regiments were equipped and trained with

¹²⁸ Brown, "The Military and Social Change in Tanganyika," 123.

¹²⁹ Moyses-Bartlett, *The King's African Rifles*, 469.

modern machineguns, mortars, artillery, and antitank rifles, none of which the light infantry formations had been issued before.¹³⁰ Following these procedures, the KAR was reasonably prepared for the outbreak of hostilities in June of 1940.

However, before this work moves on to the worldwide conflagration of the Second World War and the role of Tanganyikan troops in it, it would be best to more fully discuss the continuities of service for the African soldiers of the Schutztruppe and the King's African Rifles in Tanganyika, as it is the continuities that played a critical role in the future of the military of an independent Tanzania. First, in the direct context of the Tanganyikan formations, the concept of 'martial races' remained strong. In fact, those races recruited within the Tanganyikan mandate territory remained the same as those recruited under German control. The majority of the 6th KAR's rank and file soldiers came from the Wanyamwezi, Wasumuka, Wangoni, and Wahehe, with smaller numbers of other groups such as the Yao and Wafipa.¹³¹ The parallels were also apparent even within their criteria for selection, where the more remote and underdeveloped their home region, the more desirable the group was for military service. This assumption, much like the earlier German ideals, was based on the belief that these groups would have higher endurance in regards to both military movement and privation. Beyond this, some groups were chosen due to their loyalty and service in the German cause against the British,¹³² explicitly illustrating the continuity within colonial service. With this system still in

¹³⁰ Brown, "The Military and Social Change in Tanganyika," 127.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 167.

¹³² The groups cited in this case are the Hehe and Sukuma, both of whom had extensive martial histories in the service of the Germans. See Brown, "The Military and Social Change in Tanganyika," 166.

place, the same loyalties based on the same privileges continued in Tanganyika, albeit under the aegis of the British as opposed to the vanquished Germans.

The privileges remained broadly the same as well. The Germans had allowed the *askari* to live and travel with their wives. They had determined this was a necessary step for keeping the morale of the unit up and also freed the *askari* for purely military duties while his wife took care of the domestic responsibilities of the pair. This practice found its ultimate expression in the final days of the First World War, where upon their invasion of Portuguese East Africa the Schutztruppe brought with them a large number of military wives, despite leaving behind a sizeable number of their own force upon crossing the Rovuma.¹³³ In a memorable passage, von Lettow described the women with his force:

Many Askari had their wives and children with them in the field, and many children were born during the march. Each woman carried her Mali [property], as well as that of her lord, on her head. Often they carried on their backs a small child, his wooly head peeping out of the cloth in which he was wound. The women were kept in order and protected by a European or a trustworthy old non-commissioned officer, assisted by a few askaris. They all liked gay colours, and after an important capture, the convoy, stretching for miles, would look like a carnival procession.¹³⁴

The attachment of the *askari* to his Bibi¹³⁵ remained a strong bond within the martial caste that the KAR sought to maintain. Early on, the KAR determined that the *askaris'* access to their wives or at least a local woman to which he had a liaison was critical to the maintenance of military efficiency and discipline. As such, the officers and NCOs of the force encouraged the *askari* to live with his wife and children within the

¹³³ von Lettow, *My Reminiscences of East Africa*, 225.

¹³⁴ von Lettow, *My Reminiscences of East Africa*, 233-34.

¹³⁵ KiSwahili for bride or wife.

cantonment of the regiment.¹³⁶ This practice had an additional beneficial effect: the placement of the family within the regiment meant that the King's African Rifles remained as much as possible a distinct social unit. With families now becoming contained within the culture of the regiment, the wives and children could be educated in the history, tradition, and social values of the colonial military as well, creating a self-perpetuating unit.

Other benefits set the *askari* apart from general society, whether under German or British rule. Generous pay followed both formations; the German *askari*, even in his early years, earned 20 rupees a month,¹³⁷ and the British KAR *askari* earned 28 shillings a month¹³⁸ in the interwar period, both of which were well above the average of the territory in which they were serving. In terms of the Schutztruppe *askari*, the base pay compared well with that of what was considered a well paying position with the railway at 17-25 rupees a month and the rates only increased with service to the Germans. Lance Corporals could expect a raise to 45 rupees a month and higher ranks saw even higher pay.¹³⁹ In terms of the King's African Rifles, the pay of a private is slightly more problematic, but Parsons offers comparisons in terms of purchasing power. Within the district that supplied the Kamba of Kenya, a pound of maize flour cost half a shilling while a cow cost twenty.¹⁴⁰ This meant that the average KAR *askari*, even judging by his remittances (11.9 shillings per month on average) passed on a significant amount of

¹³⁶ Brown, "The Military and Social Change in Tanganyika," 150.

¹³⁷ Nigmann, *The Imperial Protectorate Force*, 96.

¹³⁸ Parsons, "East African Soldiers in Britain's Colonial Army," 67.

¹³⁹ Michael von Herff, "They Walk Through the Fire Like the Blondest German': African Soldiers Serving the Kaiser in German East Africa (1888-1914)" (M. A. Thesis, McGill University, 1991), 71.

¹⁴⁰ Parsons, "East African Soldiers in Britain's Colonial Army," 290.

purchasing power, especially given his tax-exempt status.¹⁴¹ In either case, there was a significant financial advantage for the colonial *askari*, no matter the colonizing power.

On examination, the service of Tanganyikan *askari* maintained several important continuities in its first fifty years (1889-1939). Bonds of ethnicity, family, and economics connected the *askari* to service with the colonial powers and helped drive his loyalty to first Germany and then Britain. Despite alterations in uniform, doctrine, and the monarch under which they were serving, the *askari* remained a professional soldier and his martial caste kept him separate and distinct from the rest of colonial African society. This separation was both a feature fostered by the colonial states that they served, but would in the future serve as a near fatal flaw for the states that would take sovereign power in East Africa.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 290

Chapter Three

The Nature of The Colonial Tanganyikan Military Part Two, 1939-1964

The King's African Rifles and the Second World War (1939-1945)

The Second World War came early to East Africa. The first skirmishes between the Italian forces in Abyssinia and the King's African Rifles (KAR) occurred on June 10, 1940.¹⁴² The early struggles with Italy proved embarrassing; the lone company from the 6th KAR covering its comrades underperformed and most communications amongst the various units were primitive, to say the least. Further embarrassment followed as Italy managed to occupy British Somaliland in August. The first effective offensive action from the King's African Rifles did not take place until January of 1941, when the East African Command managed to mass together nine brigades of troops with plentiful support.

This force contained units from across Africa, including the Gold Coast,¹⁴³ South Africa, and Nigeria, in addition to the East African units of the KAR. The Tanganyikan forces consisted of a single battalion present, while another joined the forces in the Sudan, which were also forming to deal with the Italians. Over the course of the next eleven months, the East African forces put together an essentially unbroken string of victories. The command formed in Kenya struck north through Italian Somaliland, capturing Mogadishu in the last week of February and Jijiga and Harar in March. By

¹⁴² For comparison's sake, Germany invaded France on the 5th of June and Italy entered the War formally against France on the 10th, the same day the forces clashed in East Africa. This was also, not coincidentally, the day that Italy declared war on Britain.

¹⁴³ Now Ghana.

April, the British force had taken Addis Ababa and inflicted massive casualties on the demoralized and isolated Italian forces. In May, the Tanganyikan troops fought one of their few notable engagements at Colito and the remainder of their campaign was taken up chasing down the rapidly disintegrating Italian forces. These thrusts, combined with simultaneous assaults from the Sudan and across the Red Sea from Aden, broke the back of the massive Italian forces in East Africa, leading to the final surrender of their forces in November of 1941.

Of greater import than the swift and relatively efficient campaign to remove the Italians from East Africa was the rapid mobilization and expansion of the manpower reserves of Tanganyika and East Africa in general. In 1940, with East Africa looking increasingly isolated in terms of reinforcements for its struggles against Mussolini's African Empire, the East African Command called for the recruitment of eight new battalions and for all wartime battalions to have an established strength of 1200 *askari* under arms. In addition, the request went out for technical branches to be created to supplement the infantry that was being rapidly expanded. Formations including artillery sections, supply sections, and signaling sections, as well as other specialties that had previously not been part of the East African military establishment, were formed to support the large scale War effort in the colony. In 1940, the KAR and other East African military establishments reached an estimated strength of 25,000¹⁴⁴ including the addition of five battalions of King's African Rifles¹⁴⁵ infantry. By the end of 1941 this number had more than doubled, with approximately 56,000 men under the East African colonial

¹⁴⁴ Timothy Parsons, "East African Soldiers in Britain's Colonial Army: A Social History, 1902-1964" (PhD Dissertation, John Hopkins University, 1996), 278.

¹⁴⁵ Lt. Col. H. Moyse-Bartlett, *The King's African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890-1945* (Aldershot: Gale & Polden Ltd, 1956), 574.

military.¹⁴⁶ A significant number of this figure were new King's African Rifles formations, with 11 new battalions raised in 1941 under the aegis of the East African Command.¹⁴⁷ The expansion and diversification of the forces caused a massive strain on the territories where recruitment was taking place. The demands of the technical branches meant that there was an increasing need for educated recruits.¹⁴⁸ This need directly contradicted the conventional wisdom that the best martial material were those Africans from less developed regions that had not been educated or 'civilized.' Cracks appeared in the idea of 'martial race' recruiting as the manpower requirements simply could not be met solely by those peoples who had been marked as members of the martial caste.¹⁴⁹ By the end of 1941, the King's African Rifles had already expanded well past the previous limits of its establishment in World War I and the numbers only increased as the British Empire found itself at war in both the West and the East.

This newfound source of military manpower did not go unnoticed in Britain. While a number of the King's African Rifles formations were still required for internal security and for garrisoning the former Italian East African Empire, the soldiery available went well beyond the amount required for these duties. As such, the East African

¹⁴⁶ Parsons, "East African Soldiers in Britain's Colonial Army," 278. It is also important to note that these numbers do not include the large labor contingent that East Africa provided towards the War effort.

¹⁴⁷ Moyse-Bartlett, *The King's African Rifles*, 574.

¹⁴⁸ Kevin Brown, "The Military and Social Change in Tanganyika, 1919-1964" (PhD Dissertation, Michigan State University, 2001), 253.

¹⁴⁹ Parsons specifically makes note of this in "East African Soldiers in Britain's Colonial Army," 132.

Command¹⁵⁰ crossed a new frontier with their East African forces: for the first time in their existence, troops from Tanganyika would serve overseas. Initially two brigades were requested, the 21 EA Brigade and 22 EA Brigade, which were intended for service outside of East Africa. The 22 East Africa Brigade saw service in the liberation of Madagascar from the Vichy French forces, which held it while the 21 East Africa Brigade was sent to Ceylon.¹⁵¹ The 21 Brigade turned into the vanguard of an enormous East African effort in South East Asia, where Japan had shattered British confidence in their Eastern sphere.

In 1942, the Japanese captured the British stronghold of Singapore, long considered an unassailable bastion for the Empire in the East. A string of further British defeats brought the Japanese into British colonized Burma and to the gates of India itself. The British desperation for trained manpower led to the 21 EA Brigade being trained extensively in jungle warfare while on Ceylon. Given the manpower deficiency of the British across all the War fronts, further East African troops were welcome in the far East, leading the East African Command to undertake a more ambitious formation. In February 1943, the 11 East African Division was formed, consisting of three East African infantry brigades and support units. The 11 EA Division, along with two independent infantry brigades, was sent to the East in 1943 to bolster the British defenses against the rapidly advancing Japanese forces and served a vital role in the halting and reversing of

¹⁵⁰ While initially the East African Forces were under the Middle East Command, in 1942 they were placed under a distinct East Africa Command, who coordinated their service from that point on.

¹⁵¹ Brown, "The Military and Social Change in Tanganyika," 241.

the Japanese advance. Overall, the East African forces committed to Southeast Asia would top out at a total of 46,927 Asians and Africans, including 12,817 *askari*.¹⁵²

These forces played an integral role in the fight for Southeast Asia. Following the failed Japanese assault at Imphal and Kohima in 1944, the British began a counteroffensive that included the now fully jungle trained 11 EA Division, which was serving with the 14th Army. The 11 EA Division had been detailed to clear the remaining Japanese forces out of the strategic Kabaw Valley, a geographic region described as a “green, waterlogged hell.”¹⁵³ The struggle for the Valley would last from August to November against increasingly stubborn Japanese resistance and with increasingly unreliable supply lines. By the end of the drive to the Chindwin River in December, the 11 EA Division needed to be withdrawn for resupply and refitting. Their advance had cost them 233 African troops killed, 976 wounded, and 35 missing.¹⁵⁴

With the withdrawal of the 11 EA Division to India, the only remaining East African troops at the front were the 28 EA Brigade and 22 EA Brigade. The 28 EA Brigade contained a significant element of Tanganyikan troops, the 46 KAR,¹⁵⁵ and played a central role in the British fooling the Japanese into thinking a larger African force was still in the theatre, forcing them to try and halt the Africans with a vicious series of counterattacks. This plan cost the 28 EA Brigade the highest casualties of any East African formation, but drew off a large number of Japanese troops desperately

¹⁵² Moyse-Bartlett, *The King's African Rifles*, 575.

¹⁵³ John Nunnely, *Tales From the King's African Rifles: A Last Flourish of Empire* (London: Cassell and Co., 1998), 126.

¹⁵⁴ Moyse-Bartlett, *The King's African Rifles*, 662.

¹⁵⁵ During the reorganization following the East African campaign, the units were renumbered by the removal of the slash in the regiment. So, the 4th battalion of the 6th regiment of the King's African Rifles, previously the 4/6 KAR, now took on the name 46 KAR.

required elsewhere in Burma.¹⁵⁶ Meanwhile, the 22 EA Brigade served in the Mayu and Kaladan Valleys, tying down a number of Japanese troops while the main British forces engaged the weakened Japanese. At the time of the final Japanese surrender in August of 1945, the 22 EA Brigade was still in action and the 28 EA Brigade and the 11 EA Division had both been removed from active service.

While the War may have ended, the prosecution of the War, the expansion of the King's African Rifles, the experience of the *askari* in the world wide conflict, and the process of demobilization all would have important roles to play in the shaping of the postwar identity of the force. The KAR's expansion and experience directly affected to recruitment policies of the formation. In terms of the Tanganyikan Territory units, the opportunity for recruitment opened to almost all ethnicities within the colony. However, this equality of opportunity did not, in the end, mean equality of service. Certain ethnicities were still considered better at certain aspects of service. For example, the Wagogo were considered better sanitary orderlies and the Chaga seen as more educated and therefore suited to roles as drivers or clerks.¹⁵⁷ However, with the expansion of the East African forces, these groups were now found in other roles within the military, albeit in smaller numbers. This of course was also even more evident in the newer technical branches, where the educated groups that had previously been avoided were now cultivated for service in the signaling corps, the mortar sections, and a variety of other roles that required reading, writing, or other more advanced knowledge.

This alteration in the recruitment and education of the African soldiers did not cause a noticeable decline in the *esprit de corps* or cause a change of identity, despite

¹⁵⁶ Moyses-Bartlett, *The King's African Rifles*, 672.

¹⁵⁷ Brown, "The Military and Social Change in Tanganyika," 271.

what the conventional wisdom of the British officers held. The Tanganyikan soldiers instead identified with the territory from which they came, drawing a corporate conception based partially on their place of origin.¹⁵⁸ This was exacerbated by the fact that amongst the East African Brigades that served abroad, there was usually only a single Tanganyikan battalion, fostering competitiveness within the new identity fostered in the formation.¹⁵⁹

Beyond this, despite the new infusion of formerly ‘non-martial’ Africans, the rituals and practices that had formed the foundation of the identity of the KAR within the colonial establishment remained and were passed on to the newcomers. Since the newer formations were always built around a corps of veteran *askari* and native NCOs, there were always the keepers of the identity on hand to initiate the new members into the identity of the KAR *askari*. Rituals such as the "ngoma" welcomed the newer members into the practices that, beyond the normal military drill, defined an *askari*. “Ngoma,” meaning drum or dance, was seen as a party and celebration for the African soldiers. Large quantities of pombe¹⁶⁰ were brewed and a herd of livestock was located for the feast. During the drumming, dancing, feasting, and drinking that went on the *askari* in charge wore mock versions of British officer uniforms and claimed high ranks for themselves.¹⁶¹ The ‘officers’ of the ngoma commanded the order of the party, dispatching runners to cook or brew or gather more wood as needed. The white officers and NCOs were welcome to join, but were expected to leave behind any sign of rank and be good

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 270.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 269.

¹⁶⁰ A native beer.

¹⁶¹ Nunnely, *Tales From the King’s African Rifles*, 64.

guests of the 'officers' in charge.¹⁶² This performance of celebration within a mock military tradition served as a bonding tool and drove home the new martial identity for all *askari*.

This identity of service crossed all boundaries. As long as an African had undergone initial basic training and wore the uniform, he was accepted within the military caste even if he had served as a clerk back in East Africa.¹⁶³ As such, although for the duration of the War the ethnic exclusivity of the KAR fell to the wayside, the separate identity involved with the military practice within Africa remained distinct. These boundaries remained apparent as those that served in the military formations denied this identity to those East Africans that had served within the labor corps. This distinction was drawn on the material basis of their lack of firearms and boots, but also served to maintain the social cache and exclusivity that came with military service even with an expanded military.

The King's African Rifles and the End of Empire (1945-1961)

The end of the War meant the end of a need for an expanded East African military establishment. Britain emerged from the conflict with a drained economy and was not eager to support any large military formations, much less colonial military establishments. However, demobilization needed to be handled carefully. Returning *askari* were now aware of a larger world and larger struggles for independence amongst the territories of the British Empire. While the returning servicemen were not necessarily the revolutionary firebrands earlier scholarship made them into, they were aware of their

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Brown, "The Military and Social Change in Tanganyika," 275.

privilege and wanted to maintain this elevated status at the very time that Britain could not afford to support it. This meant Britain needed to follow a careful path over the next fifteen years, one that would allow for the reduction of the military at the same time it maintained colonial influence over the King's African Rifles and those veterans discharged from the ranks.

The reduction of the ranks, including the units in East Africa and the Middle East, began almost immediately upon the cessation of the War. As Brown notes, by August 1945, the East African units¹⁶⁴ were being disbanded at the pace of approximately 6000 a week.¹⁶⁵ Of course, this did not mean the complete dissolution of all East African forces. Following the War, there were still many uses for the East African military manpower. The most obvious roles for those still employed in the ranks of the KAR were in internal security operations. Growing nationalism in the East African territories, coupled with British anxieties over imperial control in the postwar world meant that the various King's African Rifles formations found ample use in suppressing the demonstrations, strikes, and the general unrest that resulted. However, the *askaris* did not prove ideal in this role since they had little training in nonlethal applications of force.¹⁶⁶

Where far more potential was seen for the King's African Rifles was in a continued role as imperial manpower. Given the promised independence for India and consequent loss of the services of the Indian Army, the British saw a need for a new reservoir of soldiery for imperial conflicts. Due to financial considerations, the KAR

¹⁶⁴ This includes the labor battalions and pioneer companies.

¹⁶⁵ Brown, "The Military and Social Change in Tanganyika," 385.

¹⁶⁶ Parsons, "East African Soldiers in Britain's Colonial Army," 74. However, Parsons also notes that British policy allowed the application of lethal force in select situations and the KAR were seen as effective in these situations, although there was some concern for their loyalty in these cases.

formations were reduced to close to prewar levels but constructed in such a way as to allow rapid reinforcement. Those specialist formations that had been constructed in wartime now existed as skeletal cadres that could also be rebuilt with alacrity in the case of mobilization.¹⁶⁷ As concerns for another war deepened in the later 1940s, this formation was tied strategically to the Middle East to help contain aggression within the region.

By the end of the 1940s, the King's African Rifles had returned to its original establishment, which meant a return to the original practices of recruitment and identity establishment. Ethnic privileging returned to the fore. However, in his discussion of postwar recruiting, Timothy Parsons notes that the recruiting policies became an inversion of their initial policy. Whereas initially the KAR offered a good wage to the chosen martial people, the isolation and lack of development in the home regions of the chosen martial races made them one of the few groups that would actually be enriched by the wages offered.¹⁶⁸ All other technical professions in the developed regions of the colonies had seen their wages rise due to inflation during the War. In combination with the austerity practiced in regard to imperial defense, this led the KAR to increasingly range far into the interior of its colonies to seek out the traditionally 'martial' groups that could and would serve for the now less-than-competitive wages that military service could offer in place of the regional alternative.

Beyond this alteration, the British also now had to deal with large numbers of *askaris* finishing their military service and looking to reap its promised benefits. After the final campaigns in Africa against Vichy France in Madagascar and Italy in Ethiopia and

¹⁶⁷ Parsons, "East African Soldiers in Britain's Colonial Army," 76.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 173-74.

Eritrea, the KAR was retrained in Ceylon for jungle warfare and two complete divisions served in Burma against the Japanese. While there the *askaris* were exposed to broader ideas permeating the colonial forces, such as the Indian Army's drive for the independence of their state after the conflict. The East African Command was acutely aware of these ideas and their possible effect upon the returning soldiers and planned demobilization accordingly. The steps taken towards the resettlement and reintegration of the returning soldiers would serve to both create a distinct separation within the body of veterans and more fully bind the remaining *askaris* of the KAR to the British Colonial Construct.

The initial steps of demobilization were non-controversial. The unit in question would pass each member through a series of exit interviews, whereupon the service and skills of the *askari* were evaluated and recorded. Three traveling interviews by officers moving between depots began the process, followed by a series of further discussions with officers located within the depots where they would be discharged. Their documentation was then presented to them, consisting of an East Africa Forces Certificate of Service, a Last Pay Certificate, a Post Office Savings Bank Declaration, and statement of their medical examination.¹⁶⁹ The Last Pay Certificate (or LPC) confirmed a final payment for their services and could be redeemed at their district commission. Meanwhile, the Post Office Savings Bank statement reflected unpaid remittances and war gratuities that could only be removed gradually to avoid rural inflation.¹⁷⁰ These two sources of wealth represented a considerable amount to any

169 TNA DKM/114/7 1945, "Documentation and Procedure," 4.

170 Timothy Parsons. *The African Rank and File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the KAR, 1902-1964* (Oxford: James Curry, 1999), 237.

African, much less to the generally rural groups from which the British preferred to recruit. Added to this was a clearly delineated list of clothing and equipment the *askari* was allowed to keep from his kit, down to his socks, puttees, boots, and towels.¹⁷¹ As such, in theory an *askari* returning from service and passing through the lengthy demobilization process would in theory emerge with a considerable amount of wealth, and, although there were grievances with this process, this was generally the outcome.

However, wealth alone is finite absent any other capacity and the East Africa Command noted early on that few discharged *askari* had any marketable skills.¹⁷² Therefore, although these men now had what in their homes would be a fortune, few had any capacity to do anything with it but spend it. It was in this regard that the British administration generally hamstrung the efforts of returning *askaris* to fully take advantage of their newfound wealth. Attempts to gain trade and commercial licenses were stymied by the administrations in the colonies, despite these generally coming from groups or cooperatives of ex-servicemen with letters of recommendation coming from their former officers. Vocational training was generally restricted to those who had already shown aptitude within that vocation, something most of the serving *askaris* could not prove. Payment for additional education was only given grudgingly by the colonial authorities. Finally, the ability to purchase or be granted land was not available to the vast majority of *askaris*. As such, the British set up a system where the vast majority of discharged *askari* “will cease to become earners when they return home.”¹⁷³ Some concern was shown for this early on, as a large scale public works program was discussed

171 TNA, DKM/114/7 1945, “Appendix A,” 16.

172 TNA, DKM/114/67 1945, “Reabsorption of Discharged Soldiers.”

173 Ibid.

to help ease these men into civilian life. However, the Tangayikan administration roundly rejected this concept, along with the idea of a concerted Labour Corps, with both ideas panned for their “deflection of the returning flow of labour from the normal channel of absorption.”¹⁷⁴ In the end, the majority of the returning *askari* were left as unskilled labor and forced back into village life or work on large farms owned by whites. In these cases, the pay for manual labor was far less than the 30+ shillings a month they had earned in the army; in fact, most unskilled labor wages had not risen since 1939, leaving these men often little choice but to use their savings to try to supplement their low earnings. This led to their accrued capital simply returning to the East African economy and any collective actions being defused.

Of course, there were those East Africans that either knew a trade or had a more advanced education who served in World War Two. These men, despite colonial mistrust of their abilities, most often found themselves in far more advantageous circumstances at the end of the discharge process. Those who were skilled in trades were given the option of both re-enlisting in the army and continuing to receive pay far in excess of most skilled private employment;¹⁷⁵ or of seeking to sell their skill on the labor market, in which case they received preferential hiring from colonial businesses.¹⁷⁶ Those *askaris* seen to have a higher level of skill or education were also often marked for recruitment into posts in the colonial government itself. Positions as clerks, police officers, lower-level functionaries, and prison guards were made available but were extremely limited.

174 Ibid.

175 Parsons notes a pay of 100+ shillings a month depending on rank, compared with 30 shillings per month for a private mechanic within the colonies. See Parsons, “East African Soldiers in Britain's Colonial Army,” 394.

176 TNA, DKM/114/69, 1945 “Press Communique.”

Although not all these governmental positions required an advanced education, they invariably went to those *askaris* who could demonstrate education or vocational training. As such, the educated tradesman of the KAR had a much easier time finding their own employment upon their discharge. Although this employment did not offer as impressive of a compensation as the military, it was still often far better than that enjoyed by their rural and untrained brethren by the completion of demobilization in 1948.

This division of skilled versus unskilled labor upon demobilization had a dual effect upon the serving and discharged King's African Rifles. The first effect was a simple division of the ranks upon education and skill. Those who were unskilled or under-skilled returned to village life or agricultural labor, while those who had skills or education were re-enlisted, employed, or otherwise accommodated by the colonial system. This had the effect of removing the class of *askaris* who would be natural leaders of any postwar dissent from the populace in general and from veterans in particular. These men were now, by and large, part of the colonial establishment and had a stake in its continuance, while others were barred from the vocations, such as skilled labor, which generally predisposed themselves to unionization or political organization. As such, the British establishment defused a great deal of the danger of unrest following the demobilization of the African soldiers. The second, related, effect was that the remaining military was bound even tighter to the colonial establishment. With grim prospects outside of the King's African Rifles and the still competitive pay offered within its ranks, those remaining *askaris* became inextricably bound to the East African colonies and identified even less with those left outside the military or governmental establishment. While there were some concerns, for the most part the challenges of demobilizing the

King's African Rifles had been addressed. However, despite the efficacy of these measures, the East African armed establishment still elicited concern. By the mid-1950s, Britain entered into a period of colonial crisis, one reflected in their practices towards the King's African Rifles.

The second wave of British and East Africa Command's concerns over the KAR came to a head in 1955, culminating in another series of initiatives to shore up what they saw as increased dangers from their African soldiery. This concern was increased by a number of internal and external factors that altered the local perception of the military forces. The first and most well publicized was the Mau Mau insurgency, waged by the Kikuyu people in central Kenya from 1952-1956. While this crisis saw an expansion of the King's African Rifles to help deal with the threat, it did not escape colonial notice that several members and even leaders of the insurgency had previously served in the KAR. Perhaps the most notable was Mau Mau leader "General China," or Warihu Itote,¹⁷⁷ who had served with distinction in Southeast Asia in the Second World War. While the KAR had remained almost uniformly loyal, the participation of veterans in the insurgency could only be described as troubling. This was compounded by the concurrent final transference of all military costs to the colonies themselves in 1955. Although demobilization ended seven years beforehand, the metropole had continued to help subsidize the colonial forces while gradually extricating themselves to free up cash for more pressing local matters. The completion of this financial withdrawal prompted another reduction in numbers and future recruitment.¹⁷⁸ Under normal circumstances,

¹⁷⁷ Marshall Clough, *Mau Mau Memoirs: History, Memory, and Politics* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishing, 1998), 11.

¹⁷⁸ Parsons, "East African Soldiers in Britain's Colonial Army," 79.

this would not have been as troublesome, but this came during both the Mau Mau insurgency and the continuing rise of nationalist movements within all three East African colonies. While the King's African Rifles were increasingly marginalized following the Templer Report of 1955 and the formation of a single East African Land Forces Organization in 1956, they had still shown their reliability against labor unrest and political rioting in all three East African colonies.¹⁷⁹ However, there was no guarantee this would continue, and therefore the British authorities introduced two major initiatives to maintain the loyalty of their current and former soldiery.

The first of these initiatives was named “The Resettlement of Long-Term *Askari*.” The first mention of this program surfaces in an extract from the agenda of the seventh meeting of the East Africa Defense Working Committee and filed by the Department of Labour on June 11, 1956.¹⁸⁰ The extract begins with the intention of dealing with “the resettlement of time expired soldiers in civilian life,”¹⁸¹ a topic that the working committee freely admitted had not been dealt with yet. It was their hope that a program could be founded to promote the longer service of those *askaris* under arms while offering them assistance in both gaining the qualifications for civilian employment and obtaining employment itself. The administration supported such a program because it “would certainly benefit by any steps which resulted in fostering a class of individuals accustomed to Army discipline and capable of being useful, reliable, and employable members of the community.”¹⁸² The extract ends with a recommendation to form a program that would offer pre-vocational training for any *askari* who had served in the

179 Ibid., 82-85.

180 TNA, Accession 485, 18/62/055/06, “LABORCOM to Humanities,” June 11, 1956.

181 Ibid.

182 Ibid.

East African forces for at least 12 years. The recommended areas of training were the placement of soldiers onto battalion farms, an insertion of *askaris* into civil training courses, and the recognition of Army Trade Tests for their civilian equivalents.

By January of 1957 the EADWC had refined their proposal, which was dovetailed with two other initiatives to encourage long service by the General Headquarters.¹⁸³ By this point they had broken down the targeted *askaris* into three categories: those long servicemen whose army trade had a civilian equivalent, those whose army trade had no civilian equivalent, and those who had no defined trade aside from soldiering. The recommendations offered and analyzed by the GHQ varied for each category. The first and last were assumed to not need complex solutions. Those long service *askaris* who were trained in a trade with a civilian equivalent only required a liaison to channel them into the appropriate civilian employment. This would presumably be both simple and inexpensive as they were desirable employees. The last, those who were unskilled, would be placed onto battalion farms towards the end of their service so that they could learn simple agricultural skills and therefore be channeled to larger farms upon their discharge for employment as simple labor. It was the final category, those of skilled tradesmen with no equivalent in civilian life that were seen as problematic. Obviously these were “intelligent and useful men, though trained in the wrong trades” and they could be useful in government service.¹⁸⁴ However, the retraining of these able individuals would cost a significant amount in a time when all levels of colonial service found their budgets shrinking. As such, the initiative was passed on to the territorial governments for their

183TNA, Accession 485, 18/62/055/10, “Extract from Minutes of the 8th Meeting of the EADWC,” January 16, 1957.

184 Ibid.

own input as they were expected to meet a good portion of the costs associated with this retraining.¹⁸⁵

The scheme continued to move forward in early 1957, with support being reported throughout the East African Commands. All previous correspondence was compiled at the 9th EADWC,¹⁸⁶ and by the 10th meeting in July 1957 a final program was construction. The process for resettlement was established with the Commanding Officers of the regiments interviewing the individual *askari* at the end of their eleventh year of service to find out the *askari's* intentions and place him into one of three newly defined categories.¹⁸⁷ These categories were those qualified for a civil trade, those requiring resettlement training, and those that had no resettlement problems. The first would be aided in finding civilian employment. The third would be left to their own devices. The second, those requiring training, included both the unskilled and those lacking equivalent civilian trades. These *askaris* were to be funneled towards trades that had been determined to have a “practical nature” such as carpentry, maintenance of farm machinery, livestock management, and blacksmithing.¹⁸⁸ Upon the *askari's* selection of a preferred “practical trade” the Commanding Officers would locate an “apprenticeship” with a local tradesman for their soldier's final six months of service. While the tradesman

185 The Police and Labour Commissions of the East African territories were both unable to offer any aid with the final category of the *ex-askari*. The Police noted they had their own equivalents to deal with upon retirement and the Labour Commission asked for clarification of these trades with no civilian equivalents before they could offer any positive comments on the proposal. See TNA, Accession 485, 18/62/055/13 and TNA, Accession 485, 18/62/055/15.

186 TNA, Accession 485, 18/62/055/19, “Extract from Minutes of the 9th Meeting of the EADWC,” April 26, 1957.

187 TNA, Accession 485, 18/62/055/22, “Resettlement of Long Term *Askari*,” July 16, 1957.

188Ibid.

would be responsible for the room and board of the *askari* apprentice, the military would continue paying the *askari* during this period. To aid in these schemes it was also recommended that each battalion should offer craft and animal husbandry courses throughout the *askaris'* careers so that a larger percentage of the establishment would have marketable skills before the final year of their service. The EADWC accepted these proposals and put them forward for adoption following the 1957/58 financial year.¹⁸⁹ In theory, this program offered incentives for *askaris* to serve their government longer and also created an extended family of loyal *askaris* entering the labor force at a tenuous time for the colonial establishment. As such, it benefited both the Colonial Authorities and the King's African Rifles, offering stability for both while minimizing the possibility of another General China or other military disturbance.

A second, contemporary program, named "Friends of the King's African Rifles," was undertaken to keep a paternal eye on the former *askaris* in the colonies. Beginning in early 1956, Brigadier General McNab of the East Africa Command began to circulate a memorandum to every district office and every department within the East African colonies. The first concrete copy of this in Tanganyika was McNab's letter to Lt. Colonel E. J. C. Spanton of the 6th Battalion of the King's African Rifles.¹⁹⁰ McNab requested that the Spanton contact the central government of Tanganyika and acquire "the names of officers in the Administration who have served in the King's African Rifles."¹⁹¹ While McNab did not betray his purpose for these, the title of the letter, "KAR Friends," offered

189 TNA, Accession 485, 18/62/055/24, "Extract from Minutes of the 10th Meeting of the EADWC," July 18, 1957.

190 The 6th Battalion had been the Tanganyikan Battalion since its conquest from the Germans in 1918.

191 TNA, Accession 485, AB 18/62/033, "Letter From Brig. Gen. McNab to Lt. Col. Spanton," April 28, 1956.

an idea to Major E. D. Bright, Spanton's Second-in-Command of the 6th Battalion. Consequently, Bright was able to articulate the end aim for this list of participants: "I know the Brigadier's aim is to have KAR 'friends' throughout East Africa to whom ex-askaris can turn to for advice and guidance."¹⁹² However, the expanded goal of a complete list of previously serving officers in East Africa created the need for a larger operation than Bright had initially anticipated, especially given the limited records of the military secretariat.

As a result, beginning in May 1956, the Chief Secretary in Dar es Salaam began to disseminate a standardized form to all provincial commissioners asking for the information requested. Bright informed McNab of the actions taken and by May 18 the form was on its way to the various district and departmental commands. The form explained:

The Military Authorities wish to arrange a system of K. A. R. "Friends" throughout East Africa to whom ex-Askaris can turn to for advice and guidance, and have asked for a list of the names of all Government officials who have served as officers with the East African Forces... I shall be grateful if District Commissioners can fill in the form below and return two copies...¹⁹³

The form itself asked for the district represented, the province within which the district was found, and the name of the officer, as well as their present appointment, the Unit with which they served, their rank, and finally their date of leave from their present appointment.¹⁹⁴ These forms were duly filled out by the district officers and worked their way back to the central command in Dar Es Salaam. By August 28, 1956, Lt. Col.

192 TNA, Accession 485, AB 18/62/033, "Letter from Maj. Bright to S. R. Tubbs, Esq.," May 3, 1956.

193 TNA, Accession 485, AB 18/62/033, "K.A.R. 'Friends' Saving Telegram," May 18, 1956.

194 Ibid.

Spanton reported that “the information required is now almost complete” and enclosed a draft copy of the compiled list.¹⁹⁵

The establishment of the “Friends of the King's African Rifles” as listed served to create a vast informal network of influence and control over both serving and retired African *askaris*. By continuing to proffer voices from within the colonial structure as the confessors and conscience of ex-servicemen, the British administration almost guaranteed itself a loyal and sympathetic military establishment. This is especially underscored given the returned forms from Mpwapwa and Shinyanga Districts. The form from Mpwapwa District lists two members of the administration with service in the King's African Rifles. E. M. Mundy was an ex-Captain in the East African Artillery serving as an education officer while Ansi Ramadhani was an ex-sergeant in the 6th Battalion KAR (the Tanganyikan Battalion) who was a teacher in the district.¹⁹⁶ The returned names for Shinyanga District also provided a pair of candidates. Robert Selwyn Lloyd served in a variety of posts throughout the 11th East African Division in the Second World War and was now a District Officer. Thomas Chalila was a sergeant serving in the East African General Hospital in 1945 and was then a clerk in the district office.¹⁹⁷ While all four were members of the colonial administration and served in the East African Forces, Mundy and Lloyd's names appear on the final compiled list of “Friends of the KAR” while Chalila and Ramadhani appear nowhere aside from early typed pages listing all returned names. The excising of the names of any non-white colonial ex-servicemen removes all

195 TNA, Accession 485, AB 18/62/033, “Letter from Lt. Col. Spanton,” August 28, 1956.

196 TNA, Accession 485, AB 18/62/033, “KAR Friends Return, Mpwapwa,” 1956

197 TNA, Accession 485, AB 18/62/033, “KAR Friends Return, Shinyanga,” 1956

doubt which voices the British considered necessary for the “advice and guidance” of their ex-servicemen.

Taken together, these two initiatives served to reassert British influence in what was seen as an increasingly troubled area. By both increasing the benefits of the released *askaris* and keeping them socially reliant upon the colonial establishment, the British and East African authorities managed to keep them a separate entity from the general populace but bind them still further to the British Imperial Project, even at a time when the Empire was obviously on the wane. Taken in conjunction with the earlier steps of demobilization that served to divide the veterans along essentially class lines, deny those returning to civilian life widespread economic opportunities while assuring the economic future of those who might serve as future leaders, and wholly isolating the remaining military establishment from the civilian, by the late 1950s the formations of the King's African Rifles were more inextricably attached to the British institutions of colonialism than ever before. There was little chance that they would serve as a threat to the colonial regime and in fact had already served to put down several cases of organized labor unrest in all three East African colonies.¹⁹⁸The King's African Rifles remained a fully professional force with a strong institutional loyalty to the government that provided it with its identity, security, and ideology.

However, the establishment of these programs was completed in 1959, the same year Harold MacMillan would make his “Winds of Change” speech, ushering in the era of decolonization and British retreat from the colonies. As such, the final buttressing of the independent identity of the Tanganyikan military establishment occurred right as the

198 Parsons, “East African Soldiers in Britain's Colonial Army,” 82-85.

colony took its first steps towards independence. Like the vast majority of the British colonial establishment, the rapid pace of the change took the Tanganyikan colonial administration by surprise. Where they had initially planned for a gradual Africanization and decolonization of the Tanganyikan mandate, now they found themselves faced with an accelerated transfer of power. The military was particularly caught in the lurch; the project of gradually introducing African officers over an estimated ten years now needed to be accomplished in two. In addition, the British now found themselves attempting to convince three very different emerging governments that they should continue to share a military establishment. Neither of these plans would come to fruition. Upon independence, the Tanganyikan military still had a large number of British officers seconded to it. In addition, the new President of the independent Republic of Tanganyika, Julius Nyerere, refused to keep his military establishment joined with that of Kenya and Uganda. The King's African Rifles were now sundered, and each regiment would serve the territory where it was raised. The Tanganyikan military establishment now became the Tanganyika Rifles, named in honor of their colonial unit, with the duty to defend their new nation from internal and external threats. As has been noted, they would not fulfill this mandate.

The Tanganyikan Rifles (1961-1964)

In the words of Nestor Luanda, “[m]ore than any other institution left behind by colonialism, the army in Tanganyika was set in the colonial pattern.”¹⁹⁹ At the time of Tanganyika's independence, the Tanganyikan Rifles were still essentially a detachment of the King's African Rifles in form and function. The cost of maintaining these forces

¹⁹⁹ Nestor Luanda, *Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny: January 1964* (Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam Press, 1993), 25.

was still borne by the British government.²⁰⁰ In terms of the leadership of the force, the same officers that had led the 6th King's African Rifles still held their positions in the Tanganyikan Rifles. Brigadier Patrick Sholto Douglas retained his command of the Tanganyikan military, while Lieutenant Colonels Mans and Marston remained in charge of the 1st and 2nd battalions, respectively. Even the cap badge of the 6th KAR was kept on the uniforms, a visible continuity to British control and influence on the military of Tanganyika.²⁰¹ However, there was little alternative to this structure, even for the stridently anti-colonial Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU) government. Despite the small size of its military, Tanganyika had many other priorities and did not want to allocate the funds required to maintain even that establishment. Given the fiscal constraints on the developing state, it was far more convenient to leave the costs of the military to the British. Given the fact that President Nyerere and his cabinet were still not confident they would even maintain a military within their country, this was a sacrifice they were willing to make.

In terms of the officers seconded from the British, the Tanganyikans had even less of a choice. At the time of independence the Tanganyikan forces had a mere handful of African officers either serving or in training for command. As noted, in the 1950s the British had still assumed that they would retain colonial control of their African territories for a decade or more, allowing for a slow pace of Africanization in the militaries. In practice, the pace was even slower than originally anticipated. In 1956, the rank of *effendi* was reintroduced to the King's African Rifles, offering a Warrant Officer

²⁰⁰ According to Parsons, the total was approximately £160,000 per annum. See Timothy Parsons, *The 1964 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2003), 67.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

rank to the Africans serving in the military. However, the number of even veteran non-commissioned officers so elevated was minuscule and even then the effendi could not command any white soldiers. The stopgap measure was not successful, and with decolonization appearing increasingly imminent, the colonial military finally was willing to entertain the idea of professional East African officers.

This process immediately ran into difficulties. The training of these new officers was to be at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, a venerable institution that required a high level of education amongst its cadets. However, those applicants who could claim these accomplishments were almost uniformly from the “non-martial” ethnicities within the colonies and were likely to be both “political” and able to pursue far more lucrative opportunities.²⁰² The extremely low number of graduates produced meant that by 1961, with independence now an accepted and imminent fact, emergency measures had to be adopted. Large numbers of effendis were simply promoted to lieutenants and promising candidates from the effendis and non-commissioned officers were placed at the Mons Defence Officers’ Cadet Training College to rapidly train them as officers.²⁰³ Even with all of these programs in place, it was patently obvious that there would not be enough East African officers to take over control of the East African forces, necessitating the maintenance of the British command structure at independence and beyond.

Finally, the identity of the formation remained the same despite the changes at the onset of independence. The martial ethnicities that had been the backbone of the force

²⁰² Ibid., 53. By political, it is meant that they would be part of nationalist or anticolonial activities, which generally disqualified the applicant from colonial military service.

²⁰³ Ibid., 63.

since its inception remained the primary members. The non-martial ethnicities within the force had generally finished their terms following the Second World War and been demobilized. Without additional wartime demands, recruiting did not generally target these groups and consequently they were not especially prevalent in the ranks of the late colonial and early independence Tanganyikan military formations. The technical branches where the educated often non-martial groups had been found in greater numbers became skeletal to save on costs and now found it difficult to retain trained servicemen since work in the private sector for skilled tradesmen paid far more than the military could in its straightened circumstances. The upshot of these factors was that the rank and file of the Tanganyikan Rifles was filled by the same groups that had served under the Schutztruppe and the King's African Rifles and for the same reasons: these groups were isolated from the majority of the colonial African society and maintained a privileged position within the colonial structure.

However, the maintenance of this colonial structure into the era of independence caused difficulties for the men serving within it. While Nyerere and TANU accepted that the army should remain apolitical as it had historically been,²⁰⁴ the alterations of the political situation meant that the *askaris* and newly-minted officers drew their own conclusions about independence. All indications pointed towards an acceleration of the Africanization of the military and the populist rhetoric of the new ruling government made many soldiers assume that their overall circumstances would improve. This was reinforced with 1962's Tobias Report urging the Africanization of the Civil Service, which the Maswanya Africanization Committee immediately set out to do. The Civil

²⁰⁴ Luanda, *Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny*, 25.

Service, the prisons, and the police underwent swift Africanization that same year, but the military remained essentially static due to its isolation from the majority of civil society.²⁰⁵ The pace of African selections for commissions remained extraordinarily slow, as well as the lack of tangible advancement for the African soldiery. By 1963, there was some idea of the disgruntlement of the Tanganyikan Rifles the TANU government approved a raise of 17.5 percent across the board.²⁰⁶ While the additional funds were appreciated, the rank and file soldiers were increasingly frustrated over the lack of African command after independence. The tension between the British command and the African rank and file came to a head through an initiative of the Tanganyikan Minister of External Affairs, Oscar Kambona.

Kambona shared the frustrations of many of the Tanganyikan officer candidates with the lack of progress of Africanization. The British-created and Nyerere-approved selection process had resulted in a bottleneck that only approved seven applicants for commissions from 1962-1963. Kambona envisioned an end-run around the process, selecting 60 TANU Youth League members for instruction in Israel.²⁰⁷ These youths returned as officer cadets, which created an understandable tension between the established Army and these new cadets of Kambona's. The military establishment uniformly disliked the Israeli Youth League cadets. Following a period of evaluation, the selection board rejected all 60 cadets. By the end of 1963 the military had entered a period of stress and distrust. The conditions the Tanganyika Rifles were living in had deteriorated, their pay was no longer competitive with that of civil society, they had seen

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 27.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 45.

²⁰⁷ Parsons, *The 1964 Army Mutinies*, 69.

almost no prospects for advancement post-independence, and now the central TANU government seemed to be vacillating between ignoring their plight and trying to use the Tanganyikan Rifles in the liberation struggles for Southern Africa.²⁰⁸ No longer the privileged guardians of a colonial order, the African soldiers were now simply separated from a civil society that was composed of all the groups that they had traditionally suppressed and that now held the reins of the nation.

The Mutiny (January 1964)

The frustrations of the military could not be contained forever. With marginalization evident after the budget arguments of 1961-62 and the unacceptably slow pace of African advancement in the military, something was bound to give. On January 19, 1964, the dam finally burst and the Tanganyikan Rifles stationed at the Colito barracks rose up in mutiny. Their officers were captured and detained and the rank and file collected their arms. Although Brigadier Douglas escaped and began to organize a resistance, the mutineers managed to secure the vast majority of the strategic locations around Dar es Salaam, including the police headquarters, the Tanganyikan Broadcasting House, banks, post offices, and the government store.²⁰⁹ A detachment of the mutineers also hastened to the State House, where they narrowly missed capturing President Nyerere and Vice President Kawawa.²¹⁰ Instead, the mutineers were directed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Oscar Kambona, who they encountered on the afternoon of

²⁰⁸ Herman Lupogo, "Tanzania: Civil-Military Relations and Political Stability" in *African Security Review*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2001):4.

²⁰⁹ Nestor Luanda, "The Tanganyika Rifles and the Mutiny of January 1964" in Eboe Hutchful and Adboulaye Bathily, eds., *The Military and Militarism in Africa* (Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA, 1998), 195.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 196.

the 19th. Depending on the narrative, Kambona agreed to meet with them at their barracks and hear their grievances or was seized as the immediately available senior government minister.²¹¹ There the soldiers expressed their anger and frustration at the poor conditions of their service and the lack of opportunities for advancement. The soldiers went so far as to arbitrarily claim the advanced ranks they had so long been denied, naming a new Brigadier and other senior officers.²¹² However, while the situation remained critical and the soldiers remained aggressive, they had at least returned to their barracks and were no longer threatening the metropolitan area of Dar es Salaam as of the 20th. However, this instead left a vacuum in the city that led to several other abuses in the absence of the police the Rifles had neutralized.²¹³

The 1st Battalion in Colito Barracks was not the only formation to mutiny. On the morning of the 20th, the 2nd Battalion at Tabora also seized their officers and abused local authorities. However, these disturbances were minimized by the swift appointment of Captain Sarakikya via telegram as the new commander of the Battalion. While Sarakikya managed to minimize the aggressive actions of the soldiers, there were still instances of drinking, assaults, and the discharging of weapons. However, aside from these actions, the Tabora garrison made few aggressive actions towards the government or the

²¹¹ Luanda uses the more relaxed narrative of the negotiation while Parsons takes the more aggressive stance. Given that later Luanda mentions that Kambona appeared to be held against his will, Parsons' account would appear to be more credible.

²¹² Parsons, *The East African Mutinies*, 111.

²¹³ Specifically rioting against the South Asian and Arab sections of town, which were often attacked and looted. See Parsons, *The East African Mutinies*, 112.

citizenry.²¹⁴ The resolution of the conflict still rested with the actions of the government at Colito barracks.

While Kambona had managed to get the soldiers to return to their barracks on the 20th, the situation still remained tense. On the 21st, some of the long standing grievances of the military were acceded to, pay raises were authorized, and more commissions were promised. Tensions in both Colito and Tabora relaxed so that by the 22nd President Nyerere was comfortable enough to emerge from hiding and take a tour of Dar es Salaam. The President assured the city and nation that the disturbances were over and that normalcy could return. He admitted that the soldiers had legitimate grievances, even if they had not pursued the most acceptable means to negotiate them. However, despite assurances that these grievances would be dealt with, the soldiers remained on strike and began to coordinate with the Tanganyikan Federation of Labor and several disgruntled TANU members. Their announcement for a general strike on the 25th set in motion a course of action that Nyerere had hoped to avoid: the threat had reached the point where the British must be called upon.

The British had taken a great interest in the mutinies in East Africa.²¹⁵ Starting on the 21st they had dispatched the HMS Centaur to the coast off of Dar es Salaam and had placed the carrier and the 45 Royal Marine Commando on board at the disposal of Nyerere. While Nyerere was loathe to invite the British back into Tanganyika after working for over a decade to get them out, the coordinated threat of the striking soldiers

²¹⁴ This is not to say that they took no abusive actions. There are accounts of the abuse of teachers and the police superintendent, but given the overall possibilities involved in the mutiny of an army, these were relatively minor. For the full accounts of these actions, see Parsons, *The East African Mutinies*, 113.

²¹⁵ By the 25th, the former King's African Rifles formations of Uganda and Kenya had also mutinied and were being dealt with by the British.

and the dissident TFL forced his hand. Fearing a strike on the 25th, on the evening of the 24th Nyerere made a formal request that the British intervene.²¹⁶ The 45 Marine Commando immediately began preparations for an operation to take place on the following morning. At 6:15am the helicopters of the 45 Marine Commando descended on Colito Barracks. While the British troops encountered minor resistance, following the firing of a rocket into the guardhouse the will of the Tanganyikan Rifle battalion broke. In the midst of a perfunctory firefight the majority of the battalion surrendered or fled, ending the resistance at Colito. When the 45 Marine Commando arrived at Tabora they found the 2nd Battalion already prepared to surrender, having decided the resistance was senseless following the collapse of the Colito mutineers. The final pockets of the Mutiny at the small post of Nachingwea were mopped up on the 27th with the Tanganyikan soldiers having already surrendered their weapons to the police. The British kept a presence in Dar es Salaam to maintain order and the mutiny was formally at an end.

As for the Tanganyika Rifles personnel, the rank and file were disbanded and remanded to the camps of the new National Service for reeducation.²¹⁷ After this brief period, the men were sent to their home districts and were required to register with their Area Commissioners. Although the government made certain to pay for their fares home and the *askaris* received their remaining wages,²¹⁸ the military was effectively done away with. All that remained were the officers and the support staff, which was retained to

²¹⁶ Luanda, *Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny*, 126.

²¹⁷ British National Archives (BNA), File DO 185.47 Doc. 183A, "Mutiny of the Tanganyikan Rifles," 1964

²¹⁸ TNA Accession M 3.1/21/67, "Balances-Discharged Soldiers," 1964, and TNA Accession M 3.1/21/60, "Balances- Discharged Soldiers," 1964

rebuild the military. The final act was the court martial of the ringleaders in April,²¹⁹ which returned five acquittals and eleven convictions. Despite the fact that the crime of mutiny could carry the death penalty, those convicted were not condemned to death. Instead they received sentences ranging from five to fifteen years in prison.²²⁰ With this final step, the military in Tanganyika entered into a transitional stage.

The defeat of the mutiny was not simply the end of a protest by the Tanganyikan Rifles. The final surrender of the elements, on January 27, 1964, marked the end of 75 years of military tradition in Tanganyika. From the formation of the Deutsche Ost-Afrika Schutztruppe in 1889 until the British intervention, the Tanganyikan military had a shared set of military practices that fostered continuity in military identity, society, and culture. However, the stresses of the Second World War, the decline of the British Empire, and the changes brought on by decolonization rendered the old colonial model unsuited for the new world in which it found itself.²²¹ Tanganyika, soon to be Tanzania, would cast off the model as incompatible with their independence and would build anew. This new model army would represent a radical break from the previous military tradition and would have a very different character and mission. The military that would emerge would be intended to be part of the greater nation-building project that was underway in Tanzania; to be of Tanzanian society as opposed to apart from it. While the mutiny

²¹⁹ BNA, File DO 185.47 Doc. 191, “Mutiny of the Tanganyikan Rifles,” 1964

²²⁰ Parsons, *The East African Mutinies*, 157.

²²¹ The Mutiny would of course be open to a number of interpretations. Luanda, writing as the official historian of the event for the Tanzanian Peoples Defense Force argues for a plot by the British to maintain control in his work. The British initially saw the Mutiny as a coup plot by Oscar Kambona (see BNA, File DO 185.47 Doc. 228 “Mutiny of the Tanganyikan Rifles,” 1964) but a short while later rejected this interpretation. This work agrees with Parsons that the “Mutiny” was a protest by a professional group against deteriorating conditions in the independence era, one that would have significant unintended consequences.

marked the end of 75 years of military tradition, it would prove necessary for this tradition to be abandoned for President Nyerere and TANU's vision for Tanzanian society to become reality.

Chapter Four:

Nyerere, TANU, and Post-Colonial Tanzania

Tanganyika and Independence

Tanganyikan nationalism and the drive for independence developed late compared with other states in Africa, such as Ghana. The first effective organization for Africans within the territory was not formed until 1929, when Sir Donald Cameron, the British governor for the mandate territory,²²² formed the Tanganyikan African Association. The Tanganyikan African Association, or TAA, was “a multiracial socio-political forum of civil servants designed to debate and discuss public issues”²²³ but was not explicitly nationalist in character. Instead, it was social organization that brought together a mixed group to discuss the issues facing the mandate territory. Initially only 120 members strong, it mostly consisted of non-Tanganyikans or more educated African civil servants who were employed in Dar es Salaam.²²⁴ The limited political engagement of the TAA remained one of the sole outlets for protest for the African populace until the years following World War II, when the organization became more radicalized.

As in most African colonies, the Second World War caused a wave of nationalism within Tanganyika. In 1948, the TAA joined in a formal petition to the United Nations—the legislative body of the post World War II era that had taken over supervision of the previous League of Nations mandates—asking for self-governance to be granted to the mandate territory. However, the TAA remained essentially a marginal organization,

²²² Tanganyika was not a colony per se, but was a colonial mandate of the League of Nations overseen by the British. As noted, prior to 1918 it had been a German colony.

²²³ William Duggan and John Cville, *Tanzania and Nyerere: A Study of Ujamaa and Nationhood* (New York: Orbis Books, 1976), 27.

²²⁴ Henry Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 23.

concentrated mostly amongst the urban middle classes and with few connections to the greater rural population. This would not change until 1952, when a young Tanganyikan schoolteacher returned from his studies in England and began to transform the Association.

The young teacher was named Julius Nyerere. Nyerere was born in 1922 as one of the 26 children of Chief Burito Nyerere of the Zanaki, a small ethnic group from Northwestern Tanzania. At age twelve he began his formal schooling at Butiama and successfully passed on to Tabora Secondary School in 1937. He excelled at his studies and six years later was accepted to Makerere University. There he began his political activities, founding the Tanganyikan Students' Association, which agitated for the self-determination of Tanganyika. Two years later he had completed his teaching certificate and returned to Tanganyika to teach at St. Mary's, a missionary school in Tabora. He remained active in politics, making connections amongst the Tanganyikan African Association, an organization with which he would have a storied history in years to come. However, even in the 1940s, the Tanganyikan African Association remained small and relatively exclusive, speaking mainly to the educated Africans of the colony and possessing little popular support. By the time Nyerere departed Tanganyika for a second time in 1948 there remained a significant gap between the organization and the general population of Tanganyika. Between 1948 and 1952, Nyerere pursued studies in economics and history at Edinburgh University. Upon his return to Tanganyika, he joined the TAA and served as the prime catalyst for its transformation.

By the time of his return, the TAA had grown but still lacked a popular base, a problem that Nyerere set out to remedy upon his ascension to the presidency of the

organization in 1953. Feeling that the TAA lacked direction and focus, Nyerere set about changing the structure and in 1954 declared that it was no longer simply an association, but a political party, the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU). The main goal of the newly renamed TANU was political agitation for the independent self-governance of Tanganyika under majority rule. This decision was made on July 7, 1954, marking the beginning of a focused nationalist initiative within the colony. This date, forever after commemorated as “Saba Saba,”²²⁵ served as a holiday for Tanganyika and later Tanzania.

Nyerere, now firmly ensconced as the head of TANU, led the new political party in a series of efforts lobbying the United Nations to take action regarding to Tanganyika’s self-determination. In 1954, Nyerere bypassed the colonial authorities and courted the United Nations fact-finding mission within Tanganyika. When the UN Mission published its report, the TANU demand for a shortened timeline to independent rule was broadcast to the world.²²⁶ Nyerere then appeared in 1955 before the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations to discuss the findings of the Visiting Mission of the previous year. Despite widespread claims of inaccuracies within the Mission’s reports, Nyerere testified:

The Tanganyikan African National Union has sent me here because it was realized soon after the Visiting Mission’s report had been published that the European Press was putting pressure on all communities to reject the report; the outrageous assertion was made that the vast majority of the Territory’s inhabitants were against the major political recommendations of that report. I have been sent here to tell the Council that that claim is unfounded...²²⁷

²²⁵ “Saba Saba” means “Seven Seven” in reference to the date of July 7.

²²⁶ Duggan and Civile, *Tanzania and Nyerere*, 34.

²²⁷ Julius Nyerere, “Oral Hearing at the Trusteeship Council, 1955,” *Freedom and Unity, Uhuru na Umojaa* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1966), 35-36.

This was the first time an African had addressed the Trusteeship Council and consequently raised Nyerere's, and TANU's, profile within the territory. The end result was the support of several African trade unions, such as the Tanganyikan African Government Servants Association and the Tanganyikan Federation of Labor, which proved to be decisive in the initial placement of TANU on firm footing both financially and politically.²²⁸

In 1957 the party continued to grow and by early 1958 the party could claim 134 branches throughout the nation.²²⁹ The widespread support assisted Nyerere's election to the territorial legislature in 1958, as well as the election of TANU candidates for every election they contested. As the formal leader of the opposition, Nyerere and his TANU party continued to agitate for independence while working within the colonial structure to gain more freedom and representation for the Africans of Tanganyika. By 1959, a new Council of Ministers was created, granting TANU more representation at the highest levels of government, although Nyerere declined any ministerial post. The following year their nationalist agitation finally bore fruit. On December 16, 1960, the colonial governor announced that Tanganyika would be granted self rule after new general elections in 1960. With the high profile of the party and its now national organization, TANU swept all but one of the elections for the new Legislative Council, and in March of 1961, Nyerere accepted his post as Prime Minister of Tanganyika. The concentration on independence, unity, and equality within TANU brought their leadership to the national

²²⁸ Duggan and Civile, *Tanzania and Nyerere*, 52.

²²⁹ Rodger Yeager, *Tanzania: An African Experiment*, 2nd Edition (Boulder: Westview, 1989), 22.

stage, and it was under their guidance that Tanganyika became an independent state on December 9, 1961.

A State, Not a Nation

Despite Tanganyika's independence in 1961, it was still essentially a colonial construct, albeit with nationalist leadership. The political, economic, and social structures of the state remained essentially unchanged from under British auspices. Developmentally, the new state was impoverished, with low education, poor agricultural production, and little industrialization. Beyond this, it had emerged as an independent state in the midst of a global Cold War, where the developing world was caught in between two powerful ideological blocs. The new state, therefore, was in a precarious position domestically and internationally. Despite TANU's triumph in gaining the 'political kingdom' the nationalists, led by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, felt that the state needed to undergo a radical transformation to truly be self-reliant within the bipolar, post-colonial world in which they found themselves. As Nyerere put it, "We must run while they can walk." To affect this change, Nyerere and TANU set out to change the foundations of the state, altering the very political, social, and diplomatic structures that had formed the colonial existence. The new nation was built around the practice of *ujamaa*, the ideological identity that Nyerere constructed from traditional African practices.

The Foundations of *Ujamaa*

After independence, Nyerere and TANU were left with a conundrum: with the political kingdom attained, what was the next step for Tanganyika? As noted, the goal was not simply the transference of the territory of Tanganyika from one flag to another, but a complete transformation of the state. Even within his inaugural address President, Nyerere boldly made the pronouncement, “The Tanganyika we have inherited is a very different Tanganyika from the one we are setting out to build and bequeath to our children.”²³⁰ This transformation was intended to take a unique form. While Nyerere believed that western colonial society and culture was alien to Africa and therefore could not serve as the foundation for an African nation, he also understood that it would be counterproductive, if not impossible, to cast off eighty years of western political and economic influence. Tanganyika still needed to exist within the context of global modernity, but Nyerere felt that as a country it could not exist effectively with an acquired western outlook socially, culturally, or economically. For Nyerere, the answer to this conundrum was to build on the foundation of traditional African values. As early as 1961, Nyerere was already speaking of the ideology of *ujamaa*, the “synthesis of what was considered to be the best Africa could learn from modern industrialized states and the best traditions of African societies.”²³¹

In terms of the “best Africa could learn from the modern industrialized states,” Nyerere envisioned the advances in science, technology, education, and agriculture brought by western industrial capitalist modernity. For the nation of Tanganyika to

230 Julius Nyerere, “President's Inaugural Address,” *Freedom and Unity, Uhuru na Umoja* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966), 181.

231 Donatus Komba, “Contribution to Rural Development: Ujamaa and Villagization,” in Colin Legum and Geoffrey Mmari, eds., *Mwalimu: The Influence of Nyerere* (London: James Currey, 1995), 36.

develop economically, socially, or culturally within a global context it could not turn its back on the methods of production and preservation brought by the Europeans to Africa. However, these advancements had been accompanied by a capitalist system that created an incentive for individual development and social stratification. Nyerere felt that this concentration on the individual and the fracturing of society by class divisions were antithetical to an African way of life and a path to development for African states.

As such, the technological and organizational advances that had been imported by the colonizers would need to be used in a different, traditionally African context. Nyerere saw this context as one that had grown out from the traditional extended-family village methods of production and relation in Tanganyika. By Nyerere's belief, these families held a common set of values and practices that could form the basis of the development of the nation:

The traditional African family lived according to the basic principles of *ujamaa*. Its members did this unconsciously, and without any conception of what they were doing in political terms. They lived together and worked together because that is how they understood life, and how they reinforced each other against the difficulties they had to contend with.²³²

In Nyerere's ideology, the practices of *ujamaa* were socialistic in nature but distinct from the scientific socialism taught in the West. Instead, it was a traditional practice that effaced class distinctions and formed a pragmatic basis for organizing society and economic production. His conception of *ujamaa* had three main pillars at its base, which guided the transformation of the political, social, and diplomatic practices of Tanzania.

The first pillar was equality. Nyerere felt that the subsistence societies of Africa served as an excellent analog for the current poverty felt within the new state. Tanzania

²³² Julius Nyerere, "Socialism and Rural Development," *Freedom and Socialism, Uhuru na Ujamaa* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968), 355.

had little domestic industry and its export crops were not those that brought in a premium price. The state itself was impoverished and much like the analog to subsistence existence, this meant that one could only gain a surplus of basic commodities by denying them to another. In traditional societies, this had meant that cooperative action and equal sharing of the production had been an essential facet of survival, and the accumulation of a personal surplus within the community was incomprehensible:

But although the head of the family, and the hunters or warriors or some other group, may get larger portions of food or prior right in shelter, the inequalities between family members will never be great. There can be, by the nature of the common ownership, no question of one being satiated or hoarding while another member of the society starves.²³³

Nyerere believed that this ideal of equality should be applied to the new state of Tanzania, where each member was equal in terms of their right to a share of the production but also in their common duty to provide for the rest of society:

Some may work in the fields while others hunt or cook; the amount of work expected of an individual varies and some will be recognized as lazy while others will be praised for their energy. But the obligation to work is a recognized part of society, as unquestioned as the right of sharing... And he will accept, at least in theory, that without this universal acceptance of an obligation to work the social unit itself, and he as a member of it, will suffer.²³⁴

While Nyerere accepted that complete equality might never be fully achieved, he argued that the acceptance of this structure of production and distribution would keep the development of a dichotomy of 'haves' and 'have nots' as fostered by the imported capitalist system.

It is worth noting that this equality was not intended to only exist in an economic sense. The labor required was the defining factor, not the individual who toiled, and as

233 Julius Nyerere, "Introduction," *Freedom and Unity, Uhuru na Umoja* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966), 10.

234 *Ibid.*, 11-12.

such this fostered equality along other lines. While there would be an effacement of class, this also led into an expected effacement of race and gender. The Tanzania that Nyerere, and by extension TANU, envisioned did not divide themselves along lines of African, European, and Asian, and production was production regardless of gender. TANU itself could boast of several high profile Asian and female members, with perhaps the most famous of the latter being Bibi Titi Mohammed, who gained renown for rallying thousands of women to the TANU banner. While there would still remain cultural barriers to the actual practices of production in terms of race and gender, to TANU and Nyerere all members of the new state were equal in their participation in its development.

This equality of participation also extended to the political realm, where Nyerere and TANU espoused democracy. However, this did not necessarily mean multipartyism or Westminster parliamentary procedure. Democracy was, at its heart, “a form of government whereby the people—ALL the people—settle their affairs through free discussion.”²³⁵ This was the heart of the traditional African system of governance, where “The Elders sit under the big tree and talk until they agree...”²³⁶ However, it was also understood that direct democracy would be far too unwieldy at the national level. Representative democracy still allowed for the participation of all citizens in the political workings of the state, while at the same time allowing for a manageable number of discussants at the national level.

Despite the acceptance of representative democracy, Nyerere and TANU felt that multipartyism, unless expressing deep ideological differences, was harmful to the fabric

235 Julius Nyerere, “Democracy and the Party System,” *Freedom and Unity, Uhuru na Umoja* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966), 195.

236 Ibid.

of society and would simply lead to factionalism.²³⁷ For a small and still growing society—one currently in the process of recreating itself following colonialism—this was not an effective option. Instead, the ideal was again drawn from subsistence societies, where private interests must categorically be sublimated to the collective requirements of society. The representation of the people's interests and the discussions were to build consensus towards the needs and goals of the new society. Since TANU had already formed the basic conception of the needs of the new state (the economic and social development to overcome ignorance, poverty, and disease),²³⁸ the only remaining questions were those of the methods to meet those needs. This process could more easily be achieved within the party, where a consensus could be met and the division between politics and government would be removed, as it had been in the traditional societies of Africa.

The final ideological pillar of the development of the Tanzanian nation was socialism. While this may seem redundant in the wake of the definition of equality above, the two are expressly distinct within the ideology that Nyerere enunciated. While equality was indeed about production and redistribution, as most conceptions of socialism are as well, Nyerere did not see socialism as a necessarily economic or production-centered philosophy. Instead, it was a moral philosophy, “true socialism is an attitude of the mind,”²³⁹ where one rejected personal advancement for any reason and instead looked to serve the society. For Nyerere:

237 Ibid., 196.

238 Yeager, *Tanzania*, 33.

239 Julius Nyerere, “Ujamaa—The Basis of African Socialism,” *Freedom and Unity, Uhuru na Umoja* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966), 167.

We, in Africa, have no more need of being "converted" to socialism than we have of being "taught" democracy. Both are rooted in our own past—in the traditional society which produced us. Modern African socialism can draw from its traditional heritage the recognition of "society" as an extension of the basic family unit. But it can no longer confine the idea of the social family within the limits of the tribe, nor, indeed, of the nation. For no true African socialist can look at a line drawn on a map and say, "The people on this side of that line are my brothers, but those who happen to live on the other side of it can have no claim on me." Every individual on this continent is his brother.²⁴⁰

The ramifications of this socialism as the central tenet of the *ujamaa* ideology took effect both in domestic policies and within the complex global situation Tanzania found itself.

These three ideological pillars formed the core of the national identity that TANU attempted to build within the state of Tanzania. From the independence of the state in 1961 until the eventual failure and dismantling of the *ujamaa* policies by Nyerere and CCM in 1985, these ideals would inform and direct all initiatives the government pursued in the political, social, and diplomatic realm.

The Building of the Political Nation

Politically, there was a series of crises and consolidations that formed the central political construct of Tanzania. Despite the overwhelming electoral representation afforded to TANU at its emergence in the independence era, there was still political opposition within the state. In addition, there were several crises that presented themselves within the political sphere that needed to be addressed by TANU and the nation throughout its first decades of existence. The first several years saw amendments (in 1962 and 1965) to the constitution that in theory promoted democratic and socialist

240 Ibid, 170.

values.²⁴¹ However, it was also in these years that the Preventative Detention Act was passed, giving the government the ability to detain any person considered harmful, or potentially harmful, to the state.²⁴² This gave the government significant discretion to detain dissidents, especially given the lack of a Bill of Rights within the Tanzanian constitution.²⁴³ While one could assume this would immediately be used to suppress the dissident parties within the state, this was not even considered given their weakness and complete lack of power.²⁴⁴ The hold of TANU increased in 1963 with the additional reorganization of the local governments in Tanganyika. The old colonial authorities were done away with and replaced by district councils. While this was intended to promote local participation in the government, there remained a critical connection to the centralized authority of TANU.²⁴⁵ This contradictory combination of the consolidation of TANU authority while attempting to promote popular involvement remained a hallmark of creation of the political state.

The first two major crises that rocked the domestic political landscape of Tanganyika happened in rapid succession in 1964. The first was the Zanzibari Revolution. Zanzibar had been a British Protectorate since 1890 and had served as a naval base on the Indian Ocean through the Second World War. The hereditary monarchs

²⁴¹ Yeager, *Tanzania*, 65.

²⁴² “Act to Provide Preventative Detention,” South African Legal Information Institute, http://www.saflii.org/tz/legis/num_act/pda1962244.pdf, accessed March 21, 2012,

²⁴³ James S. Read, “Human Rights in Tanzania,” in Colin Legum and Geoffrey Mmari, eds., *Mwalimu: The Influence of Nyerere* (London: James Currey, 1995), 128-29.

²⁴⁴ James R. Brennan, “The Short History of Political Opposition and Multi-Party Democracy in Tanganyika, 1958-1964,” in Gregory Maddox and James Giblin, *In Search of a Nation: Histories of Authenticity and Dissidence in Tanzania* (Oxford: James Currey, 2005), 250.

²⁴⁵ In this case, the local TANU government representative could veto the bylaws and their finances were open to scrutiny of central commissioners. Yeager, *Tanzania*, 67.

of the archipelago, descended from the royal house of Oman, served with a British resident essentially directing the government policy. However, the 1960s wave of decolonization also reached the islands, and in 1963 Zanzibar divested itself of its coastal territories in Kenya and became an independent constitutional monarchy under the Sultan and an elected parliament. However, in the 1963 elections the minority Arab populations retained a majority in the parliament,²⁴⁶ irritating the majority African population, who supported the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP). On January 12, 1964, a large number of disaffected and angry ASP Youth attacked the police station on Zanzibar Island, appropriated the weaponry within, and overthrew the constitutional monarchy. Initially, the revolution was under the guidance of John Okello, a Ugandan itinerant laborer who claimed service with the Mau Mau,²⁴⁷ but the situation quickly became fluid. There were several brutal attacks on the islands' Arab population while other groups of revolutionaries occupied the government offices and the radio and telegraph stations. At the end of 12 hours of street fighting the former government had been toppled, the Sultan and his ministers had fled, and nearly 300 were killed or wounded in the attacks.

A Revolutionary Council was formed to take control of the archipelago, headed by Ali Abeid Karume, the head of the ASP. Continued attacks and massacres of the Arab and Asian populations took place, although estimates of the killed are hard to verify due to the unreliability of the quoted figures. By February 3, the remaining populace was settled under the rule of the ASP-Umma Revolutionary Council, who continued to

²⁴⁶ This was possible through an alliance between the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (12 seats) and the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (6 seats), which forced the Afro-Shirazi Party (13 seats) into the opposition despite winning 54 percent of the vote.

²⁴⁷ See John Okello, *Revolution in Zanzibar* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967). Okello is an unreliable narrator, but his narrative is one of the few primary sources of the Zanzibari Revolution.

consolidate their control by trying a number of political prisoners. They also took the step of removing Okello,²⁴⁸ whose violent acts and increasingly provocative behavior was destabilizing the new government. To further increase their power, the Soviet Union and China recognized the ASP-Umma alliance and agreed for technical advisers from the Soviet Union to come to Zanzibar. It was at this point that the western powers became extremely alarmed. While the massacre and overthrow of a regime was not popular, the installation of Soviet and Chinese personnel on an island in the Indian Ocean was even less acceptable. Both the United States and Britain were wary of the new powers on the coast and prepared responses for this “African Cuba.”²⁴⁹

It was at this point that Nyerere and Tanganyika stepped in. The increasing specter of foreign intervention just off of their coast cast a long shadow over the East African state, especially in the aftermath of the Tanganyikan Rifles Mutiny. Already smarting from the need for British help, the TANU government did not want an additional British or American outpost across from their capital. As such, the government of Tanganyika entered into negotiations with the ASP government in Zanzibar. By April, Tanganyika and Zanzibar had come to an agreement: they would join into the United Republic of Tanzania,²⁵⁰ with Zanzibar serving as a semi-autonomous region but also having positions within the Tanzanian government. The agreement was formally ratified

²⁴⁸ Okello, *Revolution in Zanzibar*, 194 and Paul Bjerck, “Julius Nyerere and the Establishment of Sovereignty in Tanganyika,” (PhD Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 2008), 1.

²⁴⁹ This was a common phrase describing the worries of the West towards Zanzibar. See Ian Speller, “An African Cuba? Britain and the Zanzibar Revolution, 1964,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 35 (2): 1.

²⁵⁰ A portmanteau of “Tanganyika” and “Zanzibar.” John Lamphear tells a story of his students entering a contest for the naming of the new state, with his favorite entry being “Tangobar.” I believe I prefer that as well.

on April 26, 1964, and 32 members of the Revolutionary Council were given seats in the Tanzanian National Assembly. This lowered the anxiety of the western powers, which saw Nyerere as a moderating influence on the Zanzibari government.²⁵¹ This union continues to have effects on Tanzania until the present day. The interests of Zanzibar—politically, socially, and economically—were and are different from those of Tanganyika, and the programs that TANU would promulgate consistently needed to take Zanzibari interests into account.

The second of the two crises has already been discussed within this work: the Mutiny of the Tanganyikan Rifles. However, while the protest has been discussed in terms of the dismantling of the military, it also had severe ramifications for the legitimacy of the TANU government. The eruption of the military on January 20 could have seriously undermined the international standing of the new nation or even plunged it back into a neocolonial relationship with its former British colonizer. It was the remarkable decisive action of Nyerere in calling in the British troops, despite his distaste for the move, which managed to spare TANU and the new nation the worst of the effects of the revolt of their security apparatus. As Bjerck notes, “The final blow that ended the Tanganyika Rifles mutiny came at the hands of a British commando, not as an invasion, but as a spectacular demonstration of power by a sitting head of state, exercising sovereign authority both within the nation and as a member of the international community.”²⁵²

²⁵¹ Bjerck, “Julius Nyerere and the Establishment of Sovereignty,” 2.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, 317.

The following year saw this domestic consolidation continue for TANU as Nyerere and his party finally formalized what had been the de facto existence of the one-party state. Since 1963, the membership of TANU had pushed for a single-party system. In 1964, Nyerere set up a presidential commission to study the situation and the viability of a one party state in Tanganyika. By 1965, the commission revealed its findings, recommending a transition to a single party state. The recommendations of the report were as follows:

1. Open TANU membership to all Tanzanians who adhered to the party's principles;
2. Alter the methods of electing the National Assembly to closer adhere to the National Executive;
3. Recommended that all members of the Assembly be TANU members;
4. Put forward three candidates, chosen by the district committee, for office;
5. All members of Parliament would also serve as delegates to the annual party convention;
6. All ministers and junior ministers would be made members of the National Assembly;
7. The National Executive and the Afro-Shirazi Party would put forth candidates for presidents of their respective governments on the day of elections. These would be approved by a yes or no vote;
8. Presidential and parliamentary elections would follow the dissolution of any government;
9. Upon the death of the president, a new president would be selected with the

- National Executive serving as an Electoral College;
10. Civil servants would be permitted to join TANU and become members of the National Assembly if so chosen by the president;
 11. Work and membership of the National Executive and local authorities would be coordinated, but each held to be distinct bodies;
 12. Relations between the Party and Trade Unions would be coordinated, but decree that Unions were subordinate to both the Party and the Government.²⁵³

These recommendations were accepted and incorporated into a new constitution on July 5, 1965, formally making Tanzania a one-party state under Nyerere and TANU. This had extreme effects on the development of future social and economic patterns, as it gave TANU unitary powers within the government. While the first elections, from September 21-26, 1965, saw a significant turnover in national representation this did little to change the fact that the spectrum of government opinion was essentially controlled by TANU, which now had the power to continue to pursue their nation-building program with little to no domestic political interference.

However, despite their consolidation of power and attempts to promote the overall development of an African socialist state,²⁵⁴ 1967 saw little development made towards the goals of an *ujamaa* society. The central party had become increasingly entrenched but had used this time and these advances to simply separate themselves further from the working poor. This was the opposite of the effect that Nyerere wanted and pointed to a

²⁵³ Duggan and Civile, *Tanzania and Nyerere*, 87.

²⁵⁴ More information on these attempts will be given under the “Building the Social Nation” section to follow.

need for a change in policy direction. This, along with several changes in the social ideals of the nation, was encompassed within his famous Arusha Declaration, which directed the governing of Tanzania until the 1980s.

In terms of government policy, the Arusha Declaration reaffirmed its commitment to the idea of African socialism for the development of Tanzania. However, it also redefined the role of TANU and TANU leadership in the development of *ujamaa* in Tanzania. In terms of TANU's role in the development of African socialism in the Nation, Nyerere pronounced:

NOW, THEREFORE, the principal aims and objects of TANU shall be as follows:

- (a) To consolidate and maintain the independence of this country and the freedom of its people;
- (b) To safeguard the inherent dignity of the individual in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- (c) To ensure that this country shall be governed by a democratic socialist government of the people;
- (d) To co-operate with all political parties in Africa engaged in the liberation of all Africa;
- (e) To see that the Government mobilizes all the resources of this country towards the elimination of poverty, ignorance and disease;
- (f) To see that the Government actively assists in the formation and maintenance of co-operative organizations;
- (g) To see that wherever possible the Government itself directly participates in the economic development of this country;
- (h) To see that the Government gives equal opportunity to all men and women irrespective of race, religion or status;
- (i) To see that the Government eradicates all types of exploitation, intimidation, discrimination, bribery and corruption;
- (j) To see that the Government exercises effective control over the principal means of production and pursues policies which facilitate the way to collective ownership of the resources of this country;
- (k) To see that the Government co-operates with other states in Africa in bringing about African unity;
- (l) To see that Government works tirelessly towards world peace and security through the United Nations Organization.²⁵⁵

²⁵⁵ Julius Nyerere, "The Arusha Declaration," *Freedom and Socialism, Uhuru na Ujamaa* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968), 232-33.

While one can easily dismiss much of this as a simple restatement of the same objectives that Tanzania had failed to apply for the previous six years, it was the redefinition of the relationship of TANU leadership to the state and society that would in theory drive its implementation:

1. Every TANU and Government leader must be either a peasant or a worker, and should in no way be associated with the practices or capitalism or feudalism.
2. No TANU or Government leader should hold shares in any company.
3. No TANU or Government leader should hold directorships in any privately owned enterprise.
4. No TANU or Government leader should receive two or more salaries.
5. No TANU or Government leader should own houses which he rents to others.
6. For the purposes of this Resolution the term 'leader' should comprise the following:
Members of the TANU National Executive Committee; Ministers; Members of Parliament; senior officials of organizations affiliated to TANU; senior officers of para-statal organizations; all those appointed or elected under any clause of the TANU Constitution; councilors; and civil servants in the high and middle cadres.²⁵⁶

With the implementation of the Arusha Declaration, the political class of Tanzania was now bound to what Nyerere saw as the foundation of the nation: the peasants. The new strictures were intended to avoid a class rupture that Nyerere saw as an unavoidable possibility without government intervention. While the enforcement of these strictures would always be difficult, and in fact would not be effectively pursued for several years, the intentions of the pronouncement were clear, and from 1967 on the Arusha Declaration served as a roadmap for the political and social direction of *ujamaa*.

In 1971, TANU released another pronouncement, the *Mwongozo wa TANU*, or the TANU Guidelines of 1971. This short pamphlet, a mere 64 pages, redefined the relationship between the party and the government. While TANU was at this time the

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 249.

sole party in the government, the two still existed separately, with the government being the law of the land and TANU simply supplying the legislators and civil-servants who did the work of the state. The Mwongozo, however, changed this relationship:

The responsibility of the Party is to lead the masses. The duty of a socialist party is to guide all the activities of the masses. The government parastatals, national organisations, etc., are all instruments for implementing party policies. Our short history of independence reveals problems that may arise when a party does not guide its instruments. The time has now come for the party to take reins and lead all the people's activities.²⁵⁷

From this point on, TANU had supremacy over even the government of Tanzania; it was the de jure government as opposed to the de facto one. Given the centrality of TANU policies to the state and the changes that they would insist on over the next several days, this was an important change.

The new supremacy of the TANU government was recognizable in the 1972 implementation of 'decentralization' by the party. The *ujamaa* villages, the centerpieces of the Tanzanian ideological project, were still a remote experiment due to the concentration of TANU power in the urban areas, specifically Dar es Salaam. Nyerere and TANU, now having essentially unchecked legislative power, sent cells of TANU administration out to the localities of development to provide semi-autonomous oversight.²⁵⁸ This meant that TANU continually had an active hand in the growth of the villagization projects, which were the heart of the transformation of Tanzania. Mass participation in these regions was encouraged by the local councils, which were in turn directed by district and regional TANU executive committees. All existing government

²⁵⁷ TANU, *Mwongozo wa TANU* (Dar es Salaam: Government Print Office), paragraph 11.

²⁵⁸ Reginald Herbold Green, "Vision of Human-Centered Development," in Colin Legum and Geoffrey Mmari, eds., *Mwalimu: The Influence of Nyerere* (London: James Currey, 1995), 87-88.

structures were replaced with this government hierarchy under the tacit direction of the central party. While this often encouraged local participation as hoped, it also meant that local initiatives were generally endangered or shut down due to their independence from government oversight.²⁵⁹

The final major political initiative to be discussed is the final 1974 merging of the Tanzanian African National Union with the Afro-Shirazi Party. The ASP had become the singular party in Zanzibar at the same time that TANU declared the one-party state in 1965. However, despite the Union of the countries a year earlier, the ASP continued to insist on autonomy for its domestic decision-making. The major driver behind this policy was Abeid Karume, the first president of Zanzibar, who pushed forward his own development ideology on the archipelago.²⁶⁰ However, Karume was assassinated in 1972 and was succeeded by Aboud Jumbe, who was much more sympathetic to Nyerere and TANU's projects on the mainland. Jumbe exhibited his changes in policy by directing a sizeable portion of Zanzibar's clove proceeds towards development projects during his first year of governance,²⁶¹ as well as opening relations with the western democracies.²⁶² Karume had not taken either of these steps during his eight years of rule and the volte face of the new ASP leadership was a clear signal of the change ruling philosophy. Jumbe and Nyerere both wished to strengthen the ties within the United Republic and in 1975 a

²⁵⁹ An example was the Rovuma Development Agency, which was an efficient and effective cooperative that was shut down due to its autonomy from TANU. John S. Saul, "Julius Nyerere and the Theory and Practice of (Un)Democratic Socialism in Africa," in David MacDonald and Eunice Njeri Sahle, eds., *The Legacies of Julius Nyerere: Influences on Development Discourse and Practice in Africa* (Asmara: Africa World Press, 2002), 23.

²⁶⁰ Yeager, *Tanzania*, 80.

²⁶¹ Cloves were the most profitable commodity of Zanzibar's spice trade and had been the cornerstone of its economy since the Omani takeover of the island in 1698.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, 80.

referendum was held between the two dominant parties to discuss a formal merger. The referendum illustrated overwhelming support, leading to a union of the two parties in 1977. There was no longer a TANU or an ASP, there was now the Chama Cha Mapinduzi, or the Party of the Revolution.

The Building of the Social Nation

When Tanganyika declared its independence, the vast majority of the populace was involved in agriculture as its main economic sector. While there were small enclaves of industry and service, the largest part of Tanganyika was rural and agrarian in nature. Nyerere and TANU did not shy away from this heritage. In fact, they promoted it, with Nyerere agreeing that the normal acceptance of industrialization as a pathway to development was generally a trap for the newly independent nations. What Nyerere saw as the greatest threat to the full development of *ujamaa* was the development of class distinctions. To him, the social structure of traditional African societies had been an exceedingly egalitarian one. However, the increasing industrialization and urbanization that took place in the independence nations of Africa simply created divisions within society between city and country, divisions deepened by the substantially higher wages available in the cities. As such, the vast majority of the social transformations in Tanzania were geared towards maintaining a traditional egalitarian society through rural development and increased educational opportunities.

As early as his inaugural address, Nyerere stressed the central role of the agrarian sector in the future of Tanganyika: “Tanganyika is, in fact, a country of peasant farmers. We have proportionally very few wage-earners. For this reason, in drawing up our three year Development Plan, Government decided to lay the greatest emphasis on

agriculture.”²⁶³ Central to this plan was the Department of Development Planning, which Nyerere announced in this same speech. The role of the Department of Development Planning (DDP) was to help direct the peasant farmers to work together and foster agrarian and even urban cooperatives. TANU felt that the agrarian farmer would never be an effective producer using traditional methods and tools of farming and so the DDP was intended to help organize the farmers so they could afford to purchase tractors and other machinery as a community. The development of these communal farming communities was seen as the central proposition of the initial Three Year Development Plan (1961-1964):

And if you ask me why the government wants us to live in villages, the answer is just as simple: unless we do we shall not be able to provide ourselves with the things we need to develop our land and to raise our standard of living. We shall not be able to use tractors; we shall not be able to provide schools for our children; we shall not be able to build hospitals, or have clean drinking water, it will be quite impossible to start small village industries, and instead we shall have to go on depending on the towns for all our requirements; and even if we had a plentiful supply of electric power we should never be able to connect it up to each isolated homestead.²⁶⁴

As seen, TANU and Nyerere connected rural development and the socialization of rural production as the key to the continued growth of other critical facets of development and encouraged its growth above all other things. That is not to say that there were no other means of constructing the nation’s society. Nyerere also mentioned an area critical to the continued development of the nation: the reformation of education.

²⁶³ Julius Nyerere, “President’s Inaugural Address,” *Freedom and Unity, Uhuru na Umoja* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966), 183.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 184.

In 1961 there were only 490,000 children in primary schools, and before independence these schools were segregated by race.²⁶⁵ Perhaps even more critically in Nyerere's eyes, the education was decidedly European in flavor. The schools taught British and European history, European dances, and European literature, all imported pieces of culture that Nyerere saw as creating "black Europeans" as opposed to Africans. Beginning in the first year of independence, the segregation of education was removed, the teacher training program was rapidly expanded, and a Ministry of National Culture and Youth was created to promote the indigenous culture of the people of Tanganyika.²⁶⁶ The educational system was already finding itself transformed within the Three Year Development Plan.

In 1964, Tanzania began the Five Year Plan, pursuing two distinct paths to rural development. The first was a small extension of the Three Year Plan, called the "Improvement Approach," which continued the improvement of existing forms of agriculture by the introduction of more modern tools and methods. This was seen as the initially preferable method of rural transformation: the building of traditional capacity without any large-scale changes to the legal or social structure of the farmers. The other plan was far more radical, aimed at intensive resource direction to promote modern techniques of farming to radically increase production in newly created village

²⁶⁵ Julius Nyerere, "Education for Self Reliance," *Freedom and Socialism, Uhuru na Ujamaa* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968), 270-71. In terms of secondary schooling, there were only 11,832 students.

²⁶⁶ Julius Nyerere, "President's Inaugural Address," *Freedom and Unity, Uhuru na Umoja* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966), 186. Other important but subtle changes made were the short listing of the Form IV examinations and the termination of the standard 10 testing system. See A. G. Ishumi and T. L. Maliyamkono, "Education for Self Reliance," in Colin Legum and Geoffrey Mmari, eds., *Mwalimu: The Influence of Nyerere* (London: James Currey, 1995), 49.

settlements. This “Transformational Approach” was begun with a limited reach and guided by a “Village Settlement Agency,” which TANU created independent of the Ministry of Agriculture.²⁶⁷ While still limited in its application, the “Transformational Approach” was the beginning of experimentation with large scale villagization. However, the plan was terminated when it became apparent that neither approach seemed to be addressing the root issues of rural poverty and the increasing societal gap between the urban and rural sectors of the state. This was exacerbated by local party committee members abusing their authority to purchase the produce of local farmers and cooperatives at a discounted price and then reselling it at a considerable markup.²⁶⁸ It was these practices that led to Nyerere’s passages in the Arusha Declaration that decried the separation of the party from the people and forced the reconnection of the two.

This led to the formation of the first formal *ujamaa* villages in 1967. These cooperative villages embodied Nyerere and TANU’s expectations that the traditional structure of labor and production were the method by which an African modernity could be created. Given the less than egalitarian results of the previous attempts at villagization, it was decreed that the villages must be under the supervision of the villagers themselves.²⁶⁹ Popularly elected councils would decide what was to be grown and how to distribute the shares. Co-operative structures and communal labor were encouraged in the new locations and the promise of schools, medical facilities, and other infrastructure was

²⁶⁷ Donatus Komba, “Contribution to Rural Development,” in Colin Legum and Geoffrey Mmari, eds., *Mwalimu: The Influence of Nyerere* (London: James Currey, 1995), 34-35.

²⁶⁸ Irene and Roland Brown, “Approach to Rural Mass Poverty,” in Colin Legum and Geoffrey Mmari, eds., *Mwalimu: The Influence of Nyerere* (London: James Currey, 1995), 18.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 19.

intended to both draw in the peasant farmers and serve as the method to pull them more fully into the new Tanzanian society. While there were often less-than optimal results, the *ujamaa* villages became the signature structure of the First Five Year Plan and of Nyerere and TANU's attempts to create a new Tanzania based on a shared African culture.

In terms of the reformation of education, the Five Year Plan continued its expansion of the school system. By the end of the first decade of independence, "pupil enrollment had increased by a factor of 1.9 in primary schools and by 2.6 in secondary schools."²⁷⁰ Beyond this, it was during this period that the curriculum underwent major revisions. The European and Euro-centric histories were replaced with African and Afro-centric courses. Western literature, for instance, was replaced with African literature.²⁷¹ New approaches to math and science were introduced, such as the New Science and Modern Math movements, which had been founded in the United States and Europe but had shown excellent results in transferring the concepts of the disciplines to new learners.²⁷² It was a period of educational vibrancy in Tanzania, a period intended to aid the society as a whole and allow for an egalitarian outcome.

Much as the Arusha Declaration's implementation of the *ujamaa* villages can be considered the signature aspect of the economic transformation of the First Five Year Plan, Nyerere's 1967 policy of "Education for Self Reliance" was the blueprint for the educational transformation of the new state. The policy of "Education for Self-Reliance" (ESR) was intended to "inculcate a sense of commitment to the total community, and help the pupils to accept the values appropriate to our kind of future, not appropriate the

²⁷⁰ A.G Ishumi and T.L. Maliyamkono, "Education for Self Reliance," 49.

²⁷¹ Although it may be safely assumed that Nyerere's translations of *Julius Caesar* and *the Merchant of Venice* were still taught.

²⁷² A.G Ishumi and T.L. Maliyamkono, "Education for Self Reliance," 50.

colonial past.”²⁷³ The syllabi, curricula, and books of all grades were reviewed and new versions were created that were seen as appropriate for Nyerere’s goals. These new guidelines and materials were implemented at all levels and regions and were intended to produce a new generation of educated and vocationally trained citizens. While the actual results were often haphazard, the peasant children that were the primary targets did in fact receive an education.²⁷⁴

The next stage of development saw significant setbacks even as Tanzania attempted to consolidate the transformative aspects of the social policies already pursued. The Second Five Year Plan (1969-1974) continued to place self-reliance as the central goal for Tanzania. While the *ujamaa* villages, which were seen as the driving force behind the socialist and egalitarian society, were performing passably well, there was still a widening gap between the urban and rural sectors of the nation. This fracturing led to an increasing internal debate about development policies, those favoring economic growth regardless of sector or those reaffirming equality amongst the population. While productivity in the industrial sector was important, the prime concern remained transforming the society. As such, the priority remained with the *ujamaa* villages.

In 1973, TANU announced a policy of forced villagization. Large swathes of the populace were removed to communal villages to be integrated into socialized agricultural production.²⁷⁵ While the theory behind this transformation was solid, the planning behind it was flawed, at best. While between 1968 and 1974 the number of *ujamaa* villages rose from 180 to 5,556, demonstrating the attempts at social transformation, only 342 of the

²⁷³ Julius Nyerere, “Education for Self Reliance,” 273.

²⁷⁴ A.G Ishumi and T.L. Maliyamkono, “Education for Self Reliance,” 54

²⁷⁵ Green, “Vision of Human-Centered Development,” 92.

total villages met the cooperative goals of the state.²⁷⁶ The state had transformed the social structure from small peasant farmers to collective living, but it had failed to completely transform the structures within the villages. This, combined with the declining production of food and an increasing dependence on cash crops, led to greater economic disadvantage.

Despite villagization becoming increasingly untenable as an economic plan, Nyerere and TANU kept the policies essentially the same for the remainder of the 1970s. While it did not create economic equality and left the national economic structures dangerously exposed following the 1973 global upheavals, the change was intended for ideological reasons. In the end, the economic failings doomed attempts to formulate social equality, but the earlier years of the programs, specifically the Three Year and First Five Year Plans, made incredible strides in creating a society that matched Nyerere's ideas of equality. The agrarian sector, so central to the development of the African modernity that Nyerere hoped for, underwent incredible growth during these transformative years. In 1964, at the start of the Five Year Plan, there were 29 million acres under cultivation. By 1970, there were 39 million acres being farmed.²⁷⁷ In 1961, there were three Ministry of Agriculture training centers to educate peasant farmers in modern farming techniques. By 1971, the state had added four centers for training field assistants, seventeen farmers' training centers, agricultural faculty in the universities, and several technical centers for more specialized aspects of agriculture and animal

²⁷⁶ Komba, "Contribution to Rural Development," 40.

²⁷⁷ Julius Nyerere, "Ten Years After Independence," *Tanzania Notes and Records*, No. 76 (1975), 29

husbandry.²⁷⁸ The changes saw a concurrent drop in subsistence agriculture from 59.5 percent of total agriculture to 53.2 percent over the same period,²⁷⁹ a monumental change given the size of the populace engaged in agricultural production.

Educational policy bolstered this transformation, which created a comparable social change. In 1961, there were approximately 486,000 students enrolled in primary education. By 1971, this number stood at approximately 828,000, marking a 6.4 percent growth annually over the period.²⁸⁰ An even greater change occurred thanks to TANU's insistence on universal participation in the building of the nation—the percentage of women enrolled in primary education rose from 35 percent of the total student body to 40 percent.²⁸¹ While still not entirely representative, the increase reflected the enhanced educational opportunities for women even as the nation was increasing its own educational base. Beyond this, secondary education underwent a significant expansion during this first decade. The number of students entering Form I grew from 4,196 to 7,570, while those attempting the more advanced level of Form V rose from 236 to 1,608.²⁸² Finally, it was during this period that the University of Dar es Salaam was formed and grew into the eminent institution it remains today. Opening its doors as the University College of Dar es Salaam in 1961, the school had only one program with seven students. By 1970, the now-renamed University of Dar es Salaam had Faculties of Arts and Social Sciences, Law, and Sciences, as well as several side institutes for more

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 29.

²⁷⁹ T. J. Aldington, "Tanzanian Agriculture: A Decade of Progress in Crop Production," *Tanzania Notes and Records*, No. 76 (1975), 58.

²⁸⁰ O. B. Mapunda, "Educational Progress in the First Ten Years of Independence," *Tanzania Notes and Records*, No. 76 (1975), 119.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*

²⁸² *Ibid.*, 120.

specialized programs.²⁸³ Tuition for those accepted was covered by the state, further driving the educational reforms and growth within the nation.

The attempted social transformation of Tanzania featured as many bold initiatives as the political transformation. The support of cooperatives and later forced villagization were just as radical as the creation of a one-party state and the insertion of TANU into all levels of the government. However, where the reforms of the political state in search of modernity were in support of the over goals of mass political participation, those reforms of the social state were intended to address the issue of equality amongst the populace. While the political changes had an immediate and noticeable effect across all spectrums, social changes were far more subtle. However, while they did not bring immediate wealth to Tanzania, they were not intended to do so.²⁸⁴ Rather, these transformations were intended to bridge the gap between the rural agrarian majority and the urban industrial and governmental minority to prevent the splintering that Nyerere felt was at the heart of all capitalist development. In this regard, the programs were largely successful. The party was decentralized, the people were given overt control of their own development, and the growth in education helped keep social mobility an attainable goal for all. The social transformation, despite its faltering in the mid and late 1970s, altered the societal dynamics of the state and placed them more in line with Nyerere and TANU's vision for what a modern African society should be.

The Transformation of the Diplomatic Nation

²⁸³ Ibid., 124.

²⁸⁴ Although, of course, the economic development of the state was also a priority.

While Nyerere and TANU's visions for a modern African nation primarily concerned the internal dynamics of the state and a drive for self-reliance, they were aware that the new nation existed within a complex global system. Even more distressing, it was a global system with several dynamics that would by necessity need to be reckoned with. The independent states that had been part of Britain's East African bloc emerged with very different political and economic visions than Tanganyika's. While Britain, France, and Belgium released their colonies in response to nationalist pressure, the Portuguese refused to relinquish control of their colonies and the settler states of Rhodesia and South Africa remained under the control of a small minority white populace. Finally, all of these difficulties were taking place within the context of a global Cold War, with those newly-decolonized states being trapped between capitalist and communist blocs in an international struggle. While Tanganyika/Tanzania emerged with historic ties to Kenya, Uganda, and the British Empire, Nyerere's socialism created significant alterations to the international context in which Tanzania would place itself. As Nyerere said, "But it can no longer confine the idea of the social family within the limits of the tribe, nor, indeed, of the nation. For no true African socialist can look at a line drawn on a map and say, 'The people on this side of that line are my brothers, but those who happen to live on the other side of it can have no claim on me.' Every individual on this continent is his brother."²⁸⁵

In terms of its immediate neighbors, Kenya and Uganda, Tanganyika had made part of its decisions even before it was formally independent. Nyerere had offered for

²⁸⁵ Julius Nyerere, "Ujamaa—The Basis of African Socialism," 170.

Tanganyika to delay its own independence so that all four British colonies²⁸⁶ could become independent together as an East African Federation. While this delay in independence did not come about, by 1963 Nyerere and the other heads of the East African states had appeared to be of one mind in the conception of an East African Federation. On June 5, 1963, the three nationalist leaders released a statement in Nairobi, broadcasting their intention of pursuing federation upon the independence of Kenya. The summit's declaration stated boldly that "...we believe a political federation of East Africa is desired by our peoples. There is throughout East Africa a great urge for unity and an appreciation of the significance of federation."²⁸⁷ Nyerere himself was in favor of the scheme, seeing it as a chance to be involved with the greater integration of East Africa:

[A] federation of at least Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika should be comparatively easy to achieve. We already have a common market, and run many services through the Common Services Organisation—which has its own Central Legislative Assembly and an executive composed of the Prime Ministers of the three states. This is the nucleus from which a federation is the natural growth.²⁸⁸

However, despite the enthusiasm of Tanganyika and the generally supportive attitude of Kenya, the full integration of the three major East African nations never occurred. Milton Obote, the president of Uganda, wished for more time to get his own nation in order before attempting federation.²⁸⁹

Nyerere and Tanzania continued their efforts to create a larger community of East African states at a meeting in Kampala in May of 1964. At this stage, with formal

²⁸⁶ Tanganyika, Uganda, Kenya, and Zanzibar

²⁸⁷ See East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), *Report of Select Committee on East Africa Federation (Munanka Report)*, (Arusha: East African Community, Undated).

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 31.

²⁸⁹ D. Wadada Nabudere, "The Role of Tanzania in Regional Integration in East Africa—Old and New Patterns," in K. Matthews and S. S. Mushi, eds., *Foreign Policy of Tanzania, 1961-1981: A Reader* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1981), 131.

Federation being a distant goal for Uganda, the Kampala Agreement instead formed an economic agreement between the states in an attempt to deal with the economic imbalances between them. Specifically, the Kampala Agreement bound the East African states to:

1. Immediate action with certain interterritorially connected firms to increase production in a deficit country and thereby reduce imports from a surplus country.
2. Agreement as to the immediate allocation of certain major industries.
3. The application of a system of quotas and suspended quotas whereby exports from surplus countries would be progressively reduced, and local production increased in the deficit countries according to the building up of the productive capacity of the deficit country.
4. Increased sales from a country in deficit to a country in surplus.
5. Early agreement within the East African Common Market on a system of inducements and allocations of industry in order to secure the equitable distribution of industrial development as between the three countries.²⁹⁰

While not a political document per se, it was an attempt by Nyerere and his neighbors to address the economic and trade inequality within the region. This echoed at a regional level the equality that Nyerere had already begun to stress at home, even if the political structures he had hoped for had not come to fruition. However, despite the efforts undertaken to keep the Kampala Agreement in force, it would last scarcely a year before Kenya abrogated it.²⁹¹ The destruction of even this straightforward trade treaty left a lasting scar on the East African relationship.

Nyerere and Tanzania participated in one more attempt at a regional federation in 1967. Starting with the failure of the Kampala Agreement, the three states had again

²⁹⁰ “Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda: Kampala Agreement on Redressing Trade Imbalance,” *International Legal Materials*, Vol. 3, No. 6 (November 1964):1106.

²⁹¹ In this case the violation was the granting of landing rights to Pan-Am Airlines in Nairobi, which undermined the East African Airlines that was attempting to solidify its position in East Africa.

come together, this time in Mombasa. The result was the 1965 Philip Commission, overseen by Kjeld Philip, the former Finance Minister of Denmark. While again the idea of Federation was off the table, there was hope that a renewed agreement on trade would foster regional economic cooperation again. At the end of two years the work of the Philip Commission culminated in the formation of the East African Community (the EAC) in 1967. The EAC featured the coordination of industries within the three countries, the creation of a communal tariff system for goods originating outside of the Community, and an East African Development Bank used to foster the economic capacity of the region as a whole.²⁹² However, despite efforts to harmonize the domestic policies of the three states, the EAC only lasted a decade. The rise of Idi Amin and his imposition of ‘economic warfare’ upon the Asian population of Uganda crushed the Ugandan economy while rapidly expanding black market trade between Uganda and Kenya. Tanzania was constantly provoked by Amin’s regime and saw little reason to engage economically with his imploding state, and by 1977, the EAC collapsed, marking the end of regional economic cooperation right before the outbreak of armed conflict. While Tanzania had consistently attempted to form a regional partnership within East Africa, its partner states did not cleave to the agreements that were made. However, Nyerere’s desire for pan-African solidarity would have better results outside of his geographic region.

Nyerere’s Pan-Africanism would find more agreeable dynamics on a continent-wide scale with the formation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963. Tanganyika had not been well-represented at any of the previous congresses of the African nations

²⁹² Nabudere, “The Role of Tanzania in Regional Integration in East Africa,” 142.

before 1945, despite Nyerere's interest in securing relations with all other African states. However, the absence actually worked to Tanganyika's benefit upon the formation of the OAU, as this meant Nyerere's government was not tied to any of the previously existing power blocs and could act independently of the Casablanca, Monrovia, and Brazzaville groups to work more towards its own goals. Of course, initially, Nyerere's ideas of pan-African solidarity were in line with the goals of the OAU itself, whose purposes were listed as:

1. To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;
2. To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
3. To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;
4. To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
5. To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.²⁹³

These purposes were well in line with the socialist model Nyerere was already espousing and offered his country a chance to push for a substantial agenda on the continent of Africa.

Within the first several years of its membership, Tanzania was already creating controversy. Nyerere and TANU's beliefs in expelling all forms of colonialism placed them squarely against the Tshombe government during the Congo crisis. Despite the general international acceptance of Tshombe's rule, Tanzania offered support to the breakaway Stanleyville government, which gained it the ire of the OAU.²⁹⁴ This would not be the only time that Tanzania and the greater African community would be at odds,

²⁹³ "Organization of African Union Charter, Article II, Section 1," accessed March 21, 2011, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/OAU_Charter_1963.pdf

²⁹⁴ E. J. Kisanga, "Tanzania and the Organization of African Unity," in K. Matthews and S. S. Mushi, eds., *Foreign Policy of Tanzania, 1961-1981: A Reader* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1981), 99.

although the common theme was Nyerere's taking an ideological stand against a perceived wrong, leaving his state isolated from the other actors in the region. In 1965 Tanzania was the only one of nine African states that followed through on the OAU's threat to end diplomatic relations with Britain following the Universal Declaration of Independence of white-dominated Rhodesia.²⁹⁵ In 1968, Tanzania's recognition of Biafra caused a firestorm of condemnation, especially given that such recognition ran counter to the OAU Charter's demand that the territorial integrity of member states be respected.

Nyerere also felt uneasy with the seating of several undemocratic leaders within the OAU. In 1966, he refused to meet with the delegation of the military junta that had overthrown Kwame Nkrumah.²⁹⁶ When Milton Obote was removed from power by Idi Amin in a military coup, Nyerere offered support and a home for the exiled Obote.²⁹⁷ This act touched off a firestorm of retaliation with Amin's Uganda that resulted in a general loss of faith in the OAU when the members refused to condemn Amin or his provocative actions against Tanzania. Even during the Kagera War, the OAU refused to censure Amin and even called for a ceasefire while Amin's soldiers were still in possession of Tanzanian territory.²⁹⁸ By the end of the War, Nyerere had lost all faith with the OAU as a whole.

While the 1960s and 70s saw Tanzania often at odds with the OAU, Tanzania never flagged in devotion to its goal "To eradicate all forms of colonialism from

²⁹⁵ Ibid., 100.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, *War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin* (Westport: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1982), 33-34.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., 77.

Africa.”²⁹⁹ In 1963, at the same time that the OAU was founded, a separate sub-committee was formed, the OAU Liberation Committee. The Liberation Committee was formed by the independent African countries to coordinate independent Africa's policy on the process of liberation for the rest of Africa. In support of this mission, the OAU Liberation Committee would mobilize moral and material support for existing liberation movements in the still existing colonies. This Committee was placed in Dar es Salaam due to its proximity to the still-colonized regions of Portuguese Africa and the white settler states of Rhodesia and South Africa. As an additional adjunct to these efforts, Tanzania formed the Front Line States, a collection of African countries who dedicated themselves to the process of decolonizing the remaining white-dominated states of Africa.³⁰⁰

Tanzania’s dedication to the OAU Liberation Committee was without question. By 1970, the Liberation Committee was regularly holding meetings in Tanzania. Reports filed within the Tanzanian Archives show the true extent of Tanzanian involvement with a variety of the liberation fronts. At a base level, Tanzania and Zambia were the point of contact for the liberation fronts in terms of military hardware, with the archives noting that a new system Tanzania had implemented in 1969 made the transactions much smoother between the state and the fronts.³⁰¹ In addition, there are references to several

²⁹⁹ OAU Charter, Article II, Section 1.

³⁰⁰ By the end of the decolonization struggles in 1994, members had included Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, and Lesotho.

³⁰¹ TNA Acc 592, Second Vice President’s Files, 1970, “Report of the Executive Secretary to the Sixteenth Session of the OAU Liberation Committee, 19 January 1970.” These arrangements included Tanzanian maintenance of several trucks that carried significant amounts of the armaments for these fronts. See TNA Acc 592, Second Vice

liberation front summits within Tanzania, specifically noting a meeting of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) and an attempt by the OAU to get them to join a united front against the South Africans that occupied Namibia.³⁰² This is backed up by a further mention of the Tanzanians coordinating the security of the leaders of the liberation forces while they were visiting Tanzania.³⁰³ Finally, Tanzania even served as the primary base for *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO), the liberation front for Mozambique. Archival documents confirm the already common knowledge that FRELIMO installations existed on the Tanzanian side of the border, a step that placed Tanzania and its citizens in harm's way in pursuit of Mozambican liberation.³⁰⁴ Essentially, Nyerere and Tanzania remained central figures in the pan-African struggle for decolonization and this served as the greatest expression of their belief that socialism did not end at arbitrary borders.

Of course the issues of pan-Africanism and decolonization did not occur in a vacuum. The Cold War was an ongoing concern and the struggle of the superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union formed a bipolar world dominated by capitalist and communist blocs. For Tanganyika, emerging as it did in a difficult international climate and being sorely dependent on external relations for economic reasons, either of the two major blocs would limit the internal autonomy Tanganyika desired to pursue its developmental goals. However, a third path was available, that of non-alignment. The

President's Files, "Report of the Secretary of the Standing Committee on Defense, January 1970," 1970.

³⁰² TNA Acc 592, Second Vice President's Files, 1970, "Minutes of the Standing Committee on Information Administration and General Policy, 6 January 1970."

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ TNA Acc 592, Second Vice President's Files, 1970, "Report of the Secretary of the Standing Committee on Defense, January 1970."

Non-Aligned Movement had been created following the Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. The conference featured twenty-nine states, most of them newly-independent, and revolved around the participants' desire to avoid neo-imperial and neocolonial entanglements by either of the two ideological blocs that were spanning the world. Finding that their interests coincided, these states met again in 1957 in Cairo and 1961 in Belgrade. It was after the meeting in Belgrade that the Non-Aligned Movement was formally incorporated. The date of the Belgrade conference was just a few months before the December date of Tanganyika's independence. When Nyerere ascended to his position as Prime Minister of Tanganyika in that same year, he drew Tanganyika into the Non-Aligned Movement, seeing the move as making sense for a number of reasons.

The first was the very real danger of neocolonial entanglements with Britain. The British still had a significant presence in Tanganyika in terms of administration, technical support, and economic aid. While Tanganyika was still dependent on these factors, non-alignment was the only way to reduce those ties without crippling the new country. If Tanganyika were to join the capitalist bloc to retain these ties it would be almost impossible to avoid neocolonial entanglements. On the other hand, if Tanganyika chose to side with the communist bloc, either this support would be entirely withdrawn or be used to overthrow Nyerere's government.³⁰⁵ Non-alignment offered Tanganyika a

³⁰⁵ The overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966 by his British-trained army following Nkrumah's leftist turn certainly bears out the possibility of this series of events.

chance to concentrate on its domestic programs towards self-reliance and equality while gradually removing the possibility of neocolonial influence.³⁰⁶

The second was that Tanganyika was still an export-driven market; its primary source of income was the sale of cash crops in the world market. To continue its agrarian-driven development, Tanganyika needed to be able to court every available market for its products. In addition, given Tanganyika's needs for development, there was the hope that innovation could be gained from both sides of the Cold War divide. As Nyerere would put it:

Tanzania's objectives, therefore, mean that she wants to adapt to her own needs some of the institutions from each side. Clearly she can best do this by having friendly relations with each side of the divided world. Indeed, it is impossible to carry out our economic policy unless we do have relations with both East and West, and unless we attract some economic investment from both. For it is unrealistic to expect the private enterprise systems of the West to understand the needs of publicly owned industries here, as it is to expect the public ownership systems of the East to establish private firms here.

Thus—given the fact that we are trying to create a society based on human dignity and equality—the economic grounds alone should lead us support a policy of non-alignment.³⁰⁷

Thus, both politically and economically, non-alignment offered the best and most sustainable path for the initiatives of TANU. Beyond this, it kept open the bonds of cross-border friendship and aid that Nyerere believed were the essence of socialism.

The pursuit of non-alignment was not always successful for Tanzania. Perhaps the most notable of the difficulties involved was during the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The Federal German Republic (West Germany) had promised a significant

³⁰⁶ Nyerere held forth on this topic in his 1966 memorandum "Principles and Development." See Julius Nyerere, "Principles and Development," *Freedom and Socialism, Uhuru na Ujamaa* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968), 193.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 192-93.

technical aid package for the developing nation of Tanganyika. However, revolutionary Zanzibar had recognized only the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and brought that recognition with them to the new United Republic of Tanzania. To assuage West Germany, Tanzania followed a path that had been implemented by another non-aligned state, Egypt. West Germany would be the only Germany recognized diplomatically with an embassy, while East Germany would make do with a Consulate General's office, much as was accepted in Cairo by both German states. However, in this particular case, the Federal German Republic continued to demand the expulsion of the GDR staff from Tanzania. Nyerere and TANU would not budge from their stance of friendship for both blocs and refused to remove the East Germans. In response, the West Germans withdrew their funding and technical support from Tanzania, a significant loss so early in its independence. However, Nyerere maintained "that to have agreed with the West German demands would have been to nullify our real independence."³⁰⁸

Non-alignment served Tanzania extremely well. As late as 1978, on the first anniversary of the union of TANU and ASP into the Chama Cha Mapinduzi, states of every ideology wrote to acknowledge the date's importance to Tanzania. Other non-aligned nations, such as Algeria and Mozambique, wrote with their own warm regards for the celebration, noting, "the assurances of their highest consideration."³⁰⁹ Further communiqués from friendly non-aligned states like Egypt also are present throughout the archives.³¹⁰ Relations with the First World are also in evidence, celebrating the

³⁰⁸ Ibid., 190.

³⁰⁹ See TNA Acc. 600 FA/U.60/5 Part D 1978 doc. 139 and TNA Acc. 600 FA/U.60/5 Part D 1978 doc. 138.

³¹⁰ TNA Acc. 600 FA/U.60/5 Part D 1978 doc. 160.

formation of the CCM or even just in diplomatic telegrams. Italy in particular echoed Algeria and Mozambique's warm regards and notes from other states such as Sweden and Japan are present throughout the files.³¹¹ Finally, Tanzania still retained close relations with the Communist bloc, with delegations to Romania and Poland being sent abroad as late as 1979.³¹² As such, it is evident that Nyerere and Tanzania pursued their policy of non-alignment and international friendship even long after independence had been secured and a firm foundation for African socialism had been laid. The foreign policy of the United Republic of Tanzania remained firmly rooted in the idea of cooperation and brotherhood even across borders, in line with the definition of socialism that Nyerere placed as one of the pillars of *ujamaa*.

Nation Building and the New Army

The years of 1961-1979 were the heyday of nation building for Tanzania. Nyerere and TANU had won the political kingdom in 1961, but found that their work had only begun. Tanganyika was still a colony in all but name, a disparate collection of over 120 peoples with a fractured economy that was still dependent upon their colonial power. The job ahead of Nyerere and TANU was to take the state they had won and transform it into a nation. For an ideological base of this new national identity, they chose Nyerere's conception of *ujamaa*, with its foundation of equality, democracy, and socialism based on traditional African societies. What followed over the next 19 years was an intense period

³¹¹ See TNA Acc. 600 FA/U.60/5 Part D 1978 doc. 137; TNA Acc. 600 FA/U.60/5 Part D 1978 doc. 158; and TNA Acc. 600 FA/U.60/5 Part D 1978 doc.152, respectively.

³¹² TNA Acc. 600 FA/U.60/5 Part D 1979 doc. 230A and TNA Acc. 600 FA/U.60/5 Part D 1979 doc. 230C.

of reforming the political, social, and international contexts of the state to fully create the nation of Tanzania.

The emergent state of Tanganyika had also inherited a colonial military, the Tanganyika Rifles. While initially the armed forces were ignored in favor of concentrating on the nation building efforts in the political and social realms, the mutiny in 1964 forced the issue of a colonial structure within the envisioned state into stark focus. The response of Nyerere and TANU was to reduce the military to a bare foundation and rebuild it, integrating the new military into the nation building ideology and structure itself. The new Tanzania People's Defense Force (TPDF) would be fully integrated into the political, social, and international context of the new nation. The social transformation of the nation was embedded within the military by the precondition of National Service for all members of the military. The political transformation of Tanzania was fostered in the military by the explicit politicization of the army. Finally, the diplomatic agenda of non-alignment was maintained within the military by the non-alignment of military training and the formation of a unique Tanzanian doctrine for its armed forces. Over the fifteen years of the TPDF's existence, from 1965-1979, the new armed forces were fully integrated into the values, practices, and ideology of the nation of Tanzania itself.

Chapter Five:

Jeshi La Kujenga Taifa: The National Service

The Tanzanian National Service (in Swahili, *Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa*, JKT) served as a central pillar for the building of Tanzania's new military and harnessing it to the nation-building project of Nyerere and TANU. When the Tanganyikan Rifles mutinied, it was the National Service that helped provide the initial cadres for the Tanganyikan Youth League, who were recruited for the new military. It only took another year before the JKT became the central recruitment pool for the United Republic Military Forces and then the TPDF. This followed along with Nyerere's insistence that "It is the government's intention that everyone shall go through National Service. In the future the National Service will serve as the main gate. One will not proceed to any other profession without passing through the National Service."³¹³ From this point on it was intended that any government bureau or service could only be accessed by first serving the nation, including serving in military service: "In the future, no one can join the army without first going through the National Service first."³¹⁴

This pronouncement ensured that every member of the military underwent the intensive experience of National Service before they even joined the ranks of the TPDF. This included training in construction and farming, militia instruction, political education, and even adult literacy classes. Throughout the training, the future members of the TPDF were exposed to new aspects of the country they were to serve while being instructed in a

³¹³ Julius Nyerere, "Address to the New Military at the National Stadium," September 1, 1964. Personal Manuscript, gifted by Nestor Luanda.

³¹⁴ Ibid. This is backed up by numerous telegrams telling seekers of recruitment in the TPDF that they must first pass through the National Service. See TNA Acc. 562 M.3/22 Doc. 141 1965.

shared Tanzanian identity. Individuals from every region of Tanzania served and the semi-military structure of National Service effaced the regional and ethnic differences of each. By the time a prospective member entered service with the Tanzanian People's Defense Force, they had already undertaken the task of building the nation, a task that would continue in their own military service. In turn, this military service reflected both National identity fostered by the JKT and ensured the safety of the nation itself.

The Founding of Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa (1963-1966)

Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa was founded in July of 1963. Nyerere and TANU, looking for a way to harness the large number of unemployed and underemployed youth, created the Service as a way to fulfill several central goals of the TANU administration. The TANU Youth League, which had been a driving force behind some of the more aggressive initiatives in the struggle for independence, now found its ardor cooling. In addition, while TANU remained a unifying force amongst the populace, geographic and social isolation still kept segments of the populace apart. Finally, with Nyerere and TANU increasingly looking towards a transformation of the economy into a more socialist model, there was a need for a large labor force to help transform sectors of the economy. All of these factors pointed towards the need for a new organization to help build the state and its national infrastructure. The idea had already been broached once at the 1962 TANU Youth League Summit and the idea was finally implemented a year later under the auspices of the National Party.

In July 1963, the new National Service recruited eleven youths to serve as its first group of trainees. These were distributed as one per district of Tanzania to allow for equal representation and each recruit had been hand-picked by the TANU Youth League

District Secretary. Five more recruits joined the initial eleven in August, bringing the initial recruitment up to sixteen. At this point, they were joined by three seconded military personnel from the Tanganyika Rifles. These individuals were intended to offer military discipline and training, since the National Service was to be organized along semi-military lines and also serve as a possible militia source. The JKT continued to take on a semi-military form as it acquired four senior members of personnel from the police force, including its earliest director and quartermaster. By September of 1963, the personnel was in place to handle a far more expansive formation and one hundred youths were enrolled.

The one hundred volunteers were placed under the previous sixteen recruits, who served as officers for what became known as Company A upon their enrollment on September 30, 1963. Their training centered on core military training, instruction in discipline, and cultural education. By January of 1964, Company A was undergoing a Junior Leaders Course in preparation for the further expansion of the JKT. However, the sudden mutiny of the Tanganyika Rifles wreaked havoc with these plans and the dissolution of the Rifles left the Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa with a questionable future. The earliest members were badly needed to fill the training gap for the presumed new military and were dispatched to provide cadre to the early 1000 recruits for the new military from the TANU Youth League. To make up for the loss of this veteran leadership, in National Service the group sent two groups of recruits to Israel for command training, hoping the 48 members would be able to sustain the core of the service. These changes came at the same time as several new initiatives were being implemented. The National Service, despite its early militarization, was not intended to simply be an adjunct militia.

The formation was intended to serve Tanzania in a variety of capacities, including that of collective labor. Having already determined that Tanzania was a nation of peasant agriculturalists, TANU felt that it was necessary for its recruits to learn the practice of agriculture. As such, several new camps were opened to accommodate the training of the servicemen and women in various aspects of farming and herding.

The renewed emphasis came at the same time as TANU was struggling with defining the membership of the National Service. While initially it had been an all-volunteer force, there were questions about who the force was intended to include. While Tanzania had hoped for a force that would represent all walks of life,³¹⁵ its initial recruitment belied those hopes. Those citizens of Tanzania that were undertaking or had completed secondary education rarely joined the National Service. These Tanzanians generally already had employment or were almost assured it upon their completion and so saw little reason to join an experimental group geared towards the military and agriculture.³¹⁶ However, this went counter to Nyerere's vision of the National Service as a "huge melting pot where all youths of various characters and qualities were to be moulded into one strong nation."³¹⁷ Accordingly, during the 1965 National Service Summit, Nyerere revealed intentions to direct the entire nation's youth through the JKT to undergo training. By 1966, the TANU government had amended the National Service Act to include compulsory recruitment for all University graduates, Form VI leavers,

³¹⁵ See for example TNA Acc 562 M.3/11/17, Rashidi Kawawa, "Notice on National Service," 1965

³¹⁶ Andrew Ivaska discusses the long term goals of those Tanzanians at the University and their perceived future positions in an Africanized Civil Service. See "'Nizers,' and the Struggle over Youth: Tanzania's 1966 National Service Crisis," *Africa Today*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Spring 2005):89.

³¹⁷ United Republic of Tanzania, *Ten Years of National Service* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzanian Publishing House, 1973), 7.

non-graduates who had attended University, and the graduates of selected trade schools.³¹⁸ Their service would include a two-year commitment that was intended to teach these educated youth “bravery, toughness, obedience, and perseverance and this could not be done in the classroom alone.”³¹⁹

Nyerere’s plan ignited an immediate controversy. While Nyerere and the TANU government felt that the educated youth had been shunning the National Service, the most educated youth felt that making service compulsory was a violation of their rights as citizens of Tanzania. Following the passage of the bill that amended the National Service Act and created compulsory service, 393 students of the University of Dar es Salaam went on strike and marched in protest against the new provision.³²⁰ The students carried signs stating “Kawawa Must Quit” and “Terms Harsh- Colonialism Was Better,” loudly proclaiming what they saw as an injustice, especially given that the provision was passed while they were on vacation.³²¹ In response, Nyerere and his cabinet, including Kawawa, met the students at the State House and listened to their demands. Nyerere then responded forcefully, arguing that their education would be complete before their induction and that the original figure of compensation, 40 percent of the labor cost, had already been altered and raised to the minimum wage of Tanzania. It was this question of compensation that inflamed Nyerere, who proclaimed, “This is rubbish when we are

³¹⁸ Special Correspondent, “Compulsory Rural Service for University Students,” *Africa Today*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1967):28.

³¹⁹ Ali Mazrui, “Anti-Militarism and Political Militancy in Tanzania,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (September 1968):280.

³²⁰ Special Correspondent, “Compulsory Rural Service,” 29. Ivaska puts the numbers at 412. See Ivaska, 99.

³²¹ Ivaska, “Nizers,” 84. The sign “Kawawa Must Quit” references Vice President Rashidi Kawawa, the politician who suggested the new law and shepherded it through parliament.

talking about National Service. The nation says to its youth ‘We want your service.’ And the Youth does not then turn to the nation and say, ‘For how much?’³²² This was followed by Nyerere decrying the salaries of civil servants in Tanzania, including his own, declaring that he and the students belonged so an “exploiting class” in such a poor country.³²³ His response was completed with a demand that the students go home. Whether they had realized it or not, the students had just been expelled from the University.

The repudiation of the students’ position continued with the summoning of the TANU Youth League and cadres of the National Service, who marched from the State House to the University grounds in an inversion of the students’ protest.³²⁴ The media lined up behind TANU’s stance that the students were being selfish and unreasonable and the country accepted that the National Service would become truly national and compulsory for many classes of individuals. As a final note, the students that had been dismissed wrote an eventual apology for their actions, which Nyerere and the government accepted and the students were allowed to return to the University under the condition they would take part in the National Service.³²⁵ The protest was well and truly over and the National Service now encompassed all of Tanzania with a significant compulsory element.

Structure and Terms of Service (1963-1974)

³²² William Edgett Smith, *Nyerere of Tanzania* (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1973), 29.

³²³ *Ibid.*, 29.

³²⁴ Ivaska, “Nizers,” 99.

³²⁵ For an example of the apologies offered to Nyerere, see TNA Acc 562 M.3/22 Doc. 250, 1966. Documents showing the consideration of re-admittance can be found at TNA Acc 562 M.3/22 Doc. 23, 1966.

The National Service from the beginning always had a paramilitary structure to it; in fact, the name *Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa* literally means “Army for the Building of the Nation.” As such, when a recruit was entered into service he found himself almost immediately under the supervision of a superior officer within the hierarchy of the National Service.³²⁶ Their introduction to the routines and training took on a military caste, with actual ranks within the National Service denoting a hierarchy that had to be followed. These ranks included non-commissioned members of the JKT, Junior Officers, and Senior Officers, complete with insignia denoting the standing of the wearer.³²⁷ Drill was emphasized, especially after the creation of a formal militia reserve in 1965, and as military hardware became more available more complex military movements became the norm and standard military training was undertaken.³²⁸ Adding to the military feel, uniforms were compulsory as long as the recruit was under the supervision of the JKT.

The terms of service varied depending on the route through which a recruit entered the National Service. Three separate classifications were created within the first ten years of the existence of the JKT and each had its own requirements. The first category, which existed from the outset, was those that volunteered for National Service when the program was created. At this point the members had to be between 18 and 35

³²⁶ In fact, in the earliest iteration these officers were seconded officers from the Tanganyikan Rifles and then the TPDF.

³²⁷ Junior Officer ranks were (from lowest to highest) Guide, Senior Guide, and Chief Guide. Senior Officers were Assistant Master, Master, Senior Master, Assistant Director, and Director of the National Service. See TNA Acc 562 M.3/22 doc. 55B, “Circular Order No. 7/65,” 1965

³²⁸ The role of the National Service in the Militia/Reserve Forces will be dealt with later in this chapter. Examples of training include drilling in bayonet combat, as seen in TNA Acc 562 M.3/22 Doc. 165, 1965

years old, unmarried, members of TANU, and registered as fit by a doctor.³²⁹ These members would serve for two years, during which food, clothing, and medical care was free. In addition, they would be given 20 shillings a month for support and incidental expenses.³³⁰ These two years of service were broken down into an initial three months of training, education, and drill at the National Service Training Schools. This would be followed by two months of working on nation building projects and then eighteen months working at the various camps and farms that were under the supervision of the JKT. The final month was then used to help supervise the incoming recruits and to reinforce their militia training.³³¹ If a volunteer wished to remain in the National Service, he could apply for an extension and most likely remain with the JKT beyond his two years.

The second category was created in 1966 and consisted of compulsory recruits who were leaving their secondary education. These members had to fulfill all of the recruitment requirements of the volunteers but had been drawn into service to offset the cost of their education, which was borne by the state.³³² This group served the same two year term as the volunteers but in a different capacity. Their first five months of training were identical to the volunteers: three months at the National Service Training School and two months on nation-building projects. This time was spent in common with the volunteers and was seen as a socialization period to mix the educated classes with the general population of Tanzania. However, once this period ended, it was followed by

³²⁹ TNA Acc 562 M.3/11, "Uandikishaji wa Vijana," 1966

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ TNA Acc 562 M.3/22 Doc. 154, "General Implications of the National Service (Amendment) Act 64/66 (Non-Government Candidates)," 1966

³³² This was estimated at approximately £1000 a year, totaling ~£4000 per student, which was borne by the state. See Special Correspondent, "Compulsory Rural Service," 29

eighteen months of the educated JKT recruits being released to go work whichever career they had chosen to enter upon their release from school. While initially this was accompanied by a 60 percent cut in their wages, which went to the National Service,³³³ this was revised to allow for a minimum wage for the workers.³³⁴ The final month of service saw these members return to the National Service camps to perform the same tasks and undergo the same training as their volunteer brethren.

The final category had also not originally been in existence. Initially, the National Service had been presented as a central component of Tanzanian citizenship. However, the requirements for entrance to National Service excluded a very key component: those citizens of Tanzania above 35 years of age. As such, a “Mature Age” category of servicemen was opened to instruction, although with a ceiling of 60 years of age. It was through this process that several cabinet members and ministers entered the National Service.³³⁵ These “Mature Age” recruits were only required to undergo the first three months of service at the Training Camps and shared these common experiences with the other two categories of youthful recruits.

What is perhaps also extremely notable is that gender was not a discriminator in selection for National Service. Nyerere and TANU made female participation within the public sphere a priority in Tanzania: If the state was to be a self-reliant and egalitarian construct, then women must be involved at all levels of it. This led to a comparatively large number of women volunteering for national service. In addition, women graduating

³³³ Ibid., 29.

³³⁴ Smith, *Nyerere of Tanzania*, 28. See also TNA Acc 562 M.3/22 Doc. 154, “General Implications of the National Service (Amendment) Act 64/66 (Non-Government Candidates),” 1966

³³⁵ United Republic of Tanzania, *Ten Years of National Service*, 16.

from secondary school were also liable for compulsory service. Every level of National Service was available to women, including training in the engineering and leadership branches of the service, with women making up approximately 20-30 percent of the total membership.³³⁶ This had the effect of granting access to higher government posts and military service to women while at the same time reinforcing women as equal citizens of the nation as they toiled beside their men at the same training.³³⁷

The Work of National Service (1963-1974)

With National Service established as a truly national undertaking, it could then achieve its fully mature form. Given the initial undertaking of National Service as a labor pool for driving forward TANU's nation-building policies, it is not surprising that a great deal of National Service took the form of work on various parastatal enterprises. However, there also were significant educational and social elements involved with the experience of National Service and these proved just as decisive in the formation of the Tanzanian national identity.

In terms of labor, a significant amount of production was undertaken in several state-run enterprises. These were often seen as doubling as vocational education for the large number of unemployed or underemployed youth of Tanzania. Central to the early iterations of the JKT was the practice of agriculture. Nyerere had always cast the African peasant farmer as the driving force behind development and self-reliance in Tanzania and so it is not surprising that the earliest elements of National Service involved agricultural pursuits. As early as 1964, the Ruvu camp was growing rice and rearing cattle. In 1966, the camp produced 800 bags of rice in its harvest and was rearing 103 head of cattle. The

³³⁶ TNA Acc 562 M.3/22 doc. 30, "Monthly Programme, 2/65," 1965

³³⁷ Interview with Gen. Lilian Kingazi, Dar es Salaam, December 23, 2010.

25 milk cows produced approximately 221 pints of milk a month, further increasing the outlay of the camp.³³⁸ By 1972, the recruits had managed to introduce a new irrigation system that was intended to increase production to 1000 acres, the very first irrigation system created by the National Service.³³⁹ However, the cattle rearing remained problematic throughout the first ten years of the camp's existence. Other camps quickly found their own specialties in terms of crops grown. The Oljoro camp grew corn and beans while the National Service recruits at Mafinga grew wheat.³⁴⁰ Makutupora camp raised grapes, the only one of the camps that cultivated vineyards within its collection of crops.³⁴¹ Coffee and tea were grown at Mbeya and Bukoba, respectively, providing an excellent basis for Tanzanian consumption. Even fishing was considered an important agricultural activity and it was taught to the recruits at Kigoma and a few other select National Service camps.

In total, by 1973, the National Service camps brought 2294 acres of land under cultivation, which the United Republic broke down into 810 acres of corn, 593 acres of wheat, 228 acres of cashews, 150 acres of rice, and 126 acres of coffee, with the remainder being given to other produce.³⁴² In addition, the animal husbandry of the camps had seen a boom in animals under the care of the National Service. By the same time, there were 300 head of cattle, 155 goats, 71 pigs, and approximately 3950 chickens

³³⁸ TNA Acc 562 M.3/22 Doc. 233, "Summary of Monthly Progress Reports August 1966," 1966

³³⁹ United Republic of Tanzania, *Ten Years of National Service*, 32.

³⁴⁰ The Oljoro camp actually also produced wheat (763 bags) and beans (60 bags), although the beans were retained for the rations of the servicepersons. TNA Acc 562 M.3/22 Doc. 233, "Summary of Monthly Progress Reports August 1966," 1966

³⁴¹ This camp also raised chickens, although less than the Ruvu camp. TNA Acc 562 M.3/22 Doc. 233 "Summary of Monthly Progress Reports August 1966," 1966

³⁴² United Republic of Tanzania, *Ten Years of National Service*, 32.

under the care of the National Service recruits at the various camps.³⁴³ Given that these camps had begun from essentially nothing, this was a remarkable achievement for Tanzanian agriculture with the training of countless recruits in skills they would take back to the *ujamaa* villages being founded.³⁴⁴

Construction was also a key part of the work being accomplished by the members of the National Service. Given the growth of the National Service and consequently its needs for expanded facilities, the JKT formed what became known as the Builders' Brigade in 1967. Staff was pulled from various ministries that had expertise in building and volunteers were taken to flesh out the group. By September 1969 their work was underway on the National Service camps, where they were building the permanent facilities for the expanded JKT.³⁴⁵ This included 24 dormitories, six classrooms, a six-roomed store, and several other extant buildings.³⁴⁶ Considerable work was undertaken in the Ujamaa villages as well. The Builder's Brigade worked hand in hand with the local populace to build the village of Chamwino near Dodoma. In four months in 1971 the construction group built a state health center, 66 houses, a community center, and electric and water facilities.³⁴⁷ This feat was followed by further work at the village of Butiama.

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ For example, out of 129 recruits referenced in the 1967 document "Watu Wanaolazimika Kujiunga Na Jeshi La Kujenga Taifa" all except a small minority had agricultural, forestry, or veterinarian duties attached to their service. See TNA Acc 562 M.3/11 doc. 6A.

³⁴⁵ In 1964-65 Camps had been constructed by a combination of several youth groups, including some National Service members. Acc 562 M.3/1 doc. 16 "Youth Camp Works" 1965

³⁴⁶ United Republic of Tanzania, *Ten Years of National Service*, 49. For a more detailed idea of the buildings constructed, such as cow shacks and latrines, see TNA Acc 562 M.3/22 Doc. 233, "Summary of Monthly Progress Reports August 1966," 1966

³⁴⁷ United Republic of Tanzania, *Ten Years of National Service*, 50

From November 1971 to March 1972 they undertook the construction of a hospital, a community center, a primary school, homes, and utility services.³⁴⁸ These projects continued in *ujamaa* locations across Tanzania. Labor was also utilized to improve the infrastructure of the state, specifically in the building of roads to connect the various *ujamaa* villages and existing urban centers.³⁴⁹ By the mid-seventies the Builders' Brigade had grown to the point that it had two divisions: one for national state projects and the other for private contract work.

Finally, there was a great deal of vocational training that found itself into workshops as well. Often the point of these workshops was to provide essential goods for the National Service itself while training service people for future employment. In 1971, the JKT opened a shoe factory at Mgulani and within two years was producing approximately 15,000 pairs of shoes for the nation.³⁵⁰ A year later, a uniform factory was opened and immediately began producing the necessary clothing for members of the National Service. By the end of its second year of existence the factory had produced 24,000 pairs of trousers, 56,448 shirts, 8,448 skirts, and 12,000 jungle hats for all members of the JKT.³⁵¹ Finally, the JKT established a furniture factory that produced both the necessary furniture for the National Service facilities but also additional pieces for commercial sale. All of these ventures pushed the National Service closer to its goal of self-reliance and nation-building.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ TNA Acc 562 M.3/22 Doc. 233, "Summary of Monthly Progress Reports August 1966," 1966

³⁵⁰ United Republic of Tanzania, *Ten Years of National Service*, 43.

³⁵¹ Ibid., 43.

Beyond factory production, other vocational courses were offered through National Service. This training served two purposes:

- i. To get a satisfying number of technically skilled workers for our industries and factories and to promote experience to indigenous workers, who would eventually replace the foreigners and non-citizens occupying high position [*sic*] them.
- ii. To meet the need of skilled technical workers in the National Service Industries³⁵²

In the earliest period of the training, the students were taught only a few trades such as welding, blacksmithing, and soap making. As the training expanded and more recruits were drawn in, the vocational aspects were expanded. Students were evaluated through a series of tests and those who scored highest were given their preference in training. Those who scored lower were generally passed instead into whatever trade their instructor felt best. These students were then placed within companies and working groups that taught those trades, and that paid the National Service for the labor being done by the recruits. This took the place of the 18 months work being done by the volunteers and at the end of the training it was generally accepted that the recruit could be expected to be hired by the firm.

These expanded programs focused on the trades needed by industrial firms. Training in fields such as vehicle mechanics, tin-smithing, blacksmithing, and welding were common. However, by 1970 the focus had shifted from the industrial vocations to those needed in the *ujamaa* villages where so many of the volunteers would be returning. The selection of skills was transferred to the members of the villages they were being stationed at and reflected the skills needed in these new facilities. The listing of trades still included some of the industrial pursuits, but now included skills like masonry,

³⁵² Ibid., 34.

plumbing, carpentry, domestic science, and weaving. As the *ujamaa* villages remained the presumed central drivers of the economic development of Tanzania and the National Service was supposed to integrate itself fully with the state, these skills remained the central training for the large number of volunteers.

The Educational Aspect of National Service (1963-1974)

Vocational training was not the only education undertaken by the JKT. Given the large number of volunteers from the countryside, general adult education was undertaken to support those who undertook service to the nation. In 1964, a formal education officer was seconded to the National Service in an attempt to officially create an educational program within the JKT. This officer came from the Ministry of Education and by 1965 the first formal education programs were underway at the training camps.³⁵³ The initial program began as an adult literacy course, which was seen as essential for a healthy public society in Tanzania. This steadily grew into a more formal program within the next few years.³⁵⁴ By 1973, there was a complete catalog of courses for National Service members. The JKT members had several courses within the liberal arts presented to them, including the continuance of the literacy classes, international and African foreign affairs, geography, history, and Swahili. The Fine Arts were not neglected either, with recruits being taught music, drama, dance, and traditional arts and crafts. These added a cultural element to the education that molded the common Tanzanian identity that the

³⁵³ The initial legislation creating the National Service allowed for the President to appoint any member of the civil or military service into a commissioned position in the JKT. These individuals could also volunteer to be seconded and upon acceptance be given positions of no lower rank than those they held in the military or civil serve. See sections 4.1 and 6.2 of the 1964 National Service Act.

³⁵⁴ TNA Acc 562 M.3/22 doc. 37A, "National Service General Order 3/65," 1965

National Service was intended to foster.³⁵⁵ Finally, physical education was offered, with sports classes included within the academic sphere. While these programs were intended for those volunteers that had only attended and perhaps finished primary education, the benefits were felt throughout the National Service.

Political education was also considered a central goal of the National Service with the hopes that the graduates would all be motivated by the shared goals of TANU in their future pursuits. For the first three years, political education was not included, although so called “Cultural Activities” were presented to the recruits. Finally, in 1966, the National Service implemented formal political education under the auspices of an appointed Chief Political Education Officer (CPEO) for the whole of the National Service. This coordinated almost perfectly with the first batch of recruits following the protests at the University. This first class, of which many were volunteers, underwent several lengthy political discussions about the goals and programs of National Service, Tanzania, and TANU. Several leading government and party members were brought in to lead these discussions. With the increase in membership in 1967 thanks to the introduction of compulsory service, several new camps needed to be opened. The corresponding strain on the political education meant that new commissars needed to be recruited and trained to continue the program for the incoming JKT recruits. Stopgap measures of bringing members of related ministries and party posts were attempted, but this could not meet the total need for political educators.³⁵⁶ This was exacerbated later that year through the opening of several agricultural camps, which also required their own TANU commissars.

³⁵⁵ TNA Acc 562 M.3/22 doc. 37A, “National Service General Order 3/65.” 1965

³⁵⁶ Members of the TPDF, Police Forces, and Prisons Services were already liable to be drafted into JKT Service by the founding documents. See Section 6.1 of the 1964 National Service Act

More politically motivated students were drafted into these roles, but the solution was a weak one and would not be effectively dealt with for the next two years.

By 1969 Ngombale-Mwiru, a tutor at Kivukoni College and the Secretary General of the Pan-African Youth Movement was appointed CPEO. His educational and political credentials injected enthusiasm and structure into the prosecution of the political education goals of the JKT. That April, a seminar was held at Mgulani for School and Regional Leaders in the National Service to formalize the political education procedures. This was done in concert with the coordinated search for properly qualified political instructors from all the government ministries, who were seconded to the National Service to help fulfill the needs of the program. These political instructors then were placed in charge of large group seminars where they would impart the prescribed political knowledge to National Service people of all ranks. These courses included concepts such as the principles of politics; the political history of the Tanzanian government; socialism and the economics of independence; and the history of TANU. For all those that wished further instruction, additional seminars and courses were available at Kivukoni College and these were often attended for refresher courses by higher ranking party members.

Additional Aspects of the National Service (1963-1974)

The National Service did not just exist to provide education and labor for the state of Tanzania though. As Nyerere had noted, it was intended to serve as a melting pot for people from all walks of life. This could not solely be accomplished by labor, although the shared experience as such certainly played a large part. What also brought the shared experience of National Service together was an emphasis on the cultural aspects of Tanzania. Several branches of the JKT were intended to bring together the recruits for

shared experiences of a common Tanzanian culture and these were just as critical to the functioning of the Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa as any other aspect of the service. Given Nyerere and TANU's emphasis on the melding of traditional African culture and ideas with the needs of the modern era, there should be no surprise that these cultural activities included traditional activities. Although the activities started much earlier, the Traditional Dances and Choir group were officially recognized in 1969. The group preserved and performed traditional songs and dances from across Tanzania. Performances were given to various official visitors and domestic groups. By the mid 1970s, the group had over 14 types of traditional dances in its repertoire and it was considered one of the cornerstones of spreading TANU's message of self-reliance and socialism.

Beyond the Traditional Dance and Choir Group, the JKT fostered the creation of two separate bands. A Jazz Band was formed following the 1965 donation of musical instruments from the German Democratic Republic. The band served as popular entertainment for the JKT camps and the *ujamaa* villages alongside the TDCG and even travelled to Kenya to record several of its tracks. The recordings were released as two albums under the title *Zilizo Pendwa* (Tanzania Kiswahili) Parts One and Two, which can still be found and heard today online.³⁵⁷ The National Service also created a Military Brass Band in 1965. While recordings of this group are not generally available, the band played in a variety of ceremonial and official capacities. Finally, in terms of other cultural and social activities, the National Service held a variety of sporting events to keep the

³⁵⁷ Examples include the song "Esta Nilipokuaga," National Service Jazz Band, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c8crl8k-6ny>, accessed February 21, 2012; and "Baba Mkwe" National Service Jazz Band, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-3llcq16_cc, accessed february 21, 2012.

members of the JKT entertained and to encourage teamwork and collective achievement. Given its overall popularity within the Tanzania, football was a popular activity. Beyond this, other team sports such as volleyball and basketball were incorporated. Finally, even individual events, such as boxing, were included within the scope of the National Service sporting calendars.

The National Service, the Militia, and the Reserves (1963-1973)

The Tanzanian militia had been created prior to the formation of the National Service. With Nyerere having made his dedication to the liberation of Southern African clear, the border with Mozambique became an area of concern, one that needed a constant watch. As such, the militia was founded to provide basic security along the border. Initially, the militia was trained by detachments of the Tanganyikan Rifles, but this practice ended with the Rifles' disbandment in 1964. The National Service immediately filled this gap, since the JKT already had a military structure and training at their core. While initially the militia training offered by the National Service was sparse, mainly due to the lack of actual military hardware, it rapidly gained in complexity. This was aided and abetted by the initial Israeli instructors who formed the original core of the trainers.³⁵⁸ However, with the increasing capability of the TPDF the new military slowly took over the role, and by 1968 National Service instructors and the TPDF had wholly taken over the military training aspects of the National Service. This occurred in tandem with Tanzania gaining a more reliable stream of modern armaments and therefore

³⁵⁸ Abel Jacob, "Israel's Military Aid to Africa, 1960-1966," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (August 1971):173-74. Israel apparently had also been interested in providing direct military aid but Tanzania was not interested in Israeli aid in this capacity. See BNA, File DO 185.42 Doc. 6, "Tanzania People's Defense Force," 1965 for the British understanding of Israeli involvement.

allowing the militia training to involve actual military equipment as opposed to stopgap measures. Instruction with light machineguns, submachine guns, rifles, and bayonets had begun at an early stage along with basic field craft.³⁵⁹ However, given the amateur level of those being trained, the more experienced personnel always kept the tightest of precautions during instruction.³⁶⁰

As noted earlier, the transition from theoretical militia training to formal tactical and strategic exercises began in 1965. The catalyst for this change was the 1965 Reserves Forces Act. With the 1964 founding of the new Tanzanian People's Defense Force on the basis of a popular military structure, it was only logical that a broad-based reserve be created to support the active military structure. The consequent Act was intended "To provide for the raising and maintenance of a Volunteer Military Reserve, to constitute certain other Disciplined Forces and Services as further Military Reserves, and for connected purposes"³⁶¹ in response to the perceived need. The first section of the Act describes the creation, maintenance, and structure for the establishment of a volunteer reserve from citizens of Tanzania. However, the Reserve Forces Act specifically noted in Part III that the National Service, along with the Police Force and Prison Service, would now be considered a part of the national military reserves. This meant that the compulsory military training of the National Service also took place as a requirement of the Reserves Act and made them liable for military service at the command of the President.

³⁵⁹ TNA Acc 562 M.3/22 doc. 38, "Circular Order No. 3/65," 1965

³⁶⁰ TNA Acc 562 M.3/22 doc. 47, "General Order No. 4/65," 1965

³⁶¹ Southern African Legal Information Institute, "Reserves Forces Act, 1965," http://www.saflii.org/tz/legis/num_act/rfa1965166.pdf, accessed February 24, 2012.

The result of this activity was that by 1965 the militia, the Reserves, and the National Service were all tightly intertwined. The militia was at this point trained through the National Service, but militia training was also available to all citizens regardless of membership in TANU.³⁶² Meanwhile, all members of the National Service formed a considerable part of the Reserves, which would fill out the ranks of the TPDF in situations where a larger defense establishment was required. However, this intertwining at the same time had the effect of avoiding the political instability that often follows the establishment of parallel forces within a republic, instead creating a relatively unified system under the Minister of Defense and National Service, who already oversaw all aspects of this system. The logical end of the structure was finally reached in 1974, when the National Service was brought under the direct control of the Tanzanian People's Defense Forces and their command structures were unified.

The Unification of the JKT with the TPDF (1974-1979)

Throughout the first decade of the National Service's existence, it had operated under its own jurisdiction despite working closely with the newly formed TPDF, the Department of Education, the Prisons Services, and the Police Force. However, by 1974, the JKT had evolved into its own parallel structure, with ranks for its officers, intensive militia training, and a strong economic base concentrated within the parastatal farms and workshops under its control. It was at this point that the decision was made to integrate

³⁶² Although of course command in the militia was still contingent upon party membership. See Casta Tungareza, "The Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Tanzania," in Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily, eds., *The Military and Militarism in Africa* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1998), 303.

the National Service with the military establishment.³⁶³ The Ministry of Defense was transformed into the Ministry of Defense and National Service with administrative and legislative activities rolled into that ministerial portfolio. Those individuals who were officers in the National Service were transferred to the Tanzanian People's Defense Force and given commissioned ranks equivalent to their standing in the JKT. The JKT was now formally part of the defense establishment even as there were discussions to reduce its military role. However, this is not to say that the National Service now became part and parcel of the TPDF. While the officers now held ranks within the TPDF, recruits to the National Service were not considered part of the military. Their terms of service remained roughly the same, with the later amendment of the National Service Act making a few specific changes. The first notable amendment eventually reduced the service of those subject to compulsory service to one year while increasing the duration of volunteer service to three years.³⁶⁴ The second notable amendment is the replacement of earlier sections on workers' compensation and medical needs with a notice of complete absorption of the system into the TPDF structure.³⁶⁵

Aside from these notable changes, the National Service continued in its assigned role for the duration of its existence. Thanks to its positioning under the National Defense structures, it played a worthwhile and strong role during the Kagera War against Idi Amin. In order to repel the forces of Amin, Tanzania needed to expand its own armed forces. To do so the TPDF underwent an extremely rapid expansion in 1978, including

³⁶³ Herman Lupogo, "Tanzania: Civil-Military Relations and Political Stability," *African Security Review*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2001): 8

³⁶⁴ "The National Service Act," Cap 193 R.E. 2002, Personal Manuscript gifted by Nestor Luanda.

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

calling for two thousand volunteers from each of the twenty regions in Tanzania with the requirement that the recruits would have finished militia training. Given that militia training remained a central portion of the National Service training, the expansion of the TPDF had an extensive pool of possible recruits. This was underscored by anecdote of the flood of recruits from the Mara region, which actually serves as an academic intersection between the colonial military tradition of Tanzania and its new military construct. The Mara region had been a hotbed of ‘martial race’ recruitment under both the Germans and the British, and, in the absence of the colonial recruiting policy, the poverty of the region left a large number of underemployed citizens jumping at the new opportunity to join the military. The resulting rush for recruitment caused consternation within the TPDF headquarters, who wished for a balance to the recruitment to avoid any particularly dominant group or region in the military. In the end, double the quota were allowed to be enrolled, but under stricter guidelines than the other recruiting areas.³⁶⁶

The JKT and National Identity (1963-1979)

The Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa’s stated goal for serving the nation rang true on a variety of levels. At its very base level, the JKT provided the training and labor that would be required to create the self-reliant nation that Nyerere and TANU envisioned. The basic education that was lacking amongst so much of the populace was offered to all who entered the National Service. Vocational training gave much-needed skills to all those who would go on to work in the parastatal factories or the *ujamaa* farms. Even on the level of security, the militia training created a wide recruiting base in the instances of

³⁶⁶ Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, *War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin* (Westport: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1980), 72.

emergencies for the nation, which appeared more and more possible with the Cold War heating up and Tanzania remaining committed to its Frontline role.

The more critical role the National Service had to play was in the construction of a national identity. All of the activities involved, from collective labor in *ujamaa* villages to the creation of sports leagues and bands, were done without reference to any identity except that of a shared Tanzanian one. Swahili from the coast mixed with Wachagga from the interior during militia training. The Wanyamwezi met the Wagogo on *ujamaa* farms. Throughout this educational and instructive process every step was built towards collective experience and practices. In the end, this finally effaced the ethnic difficulties that would plague so many other African nations.

The Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa's Legacy with the TPDF

JKT'S central legacy on the TPDF has been the creation of a gateway to the military that completely deconstructs the formidable colonial issue of the 'Martial Races' and instead created multiple connections with the social fabric of Tanzania. While Tanzania underwent incredible social transformations at the ground level with the introduction of *Ujamaa* villages, the collectivization of labor, and the attempts to promote an ideology that encouraged socialized labor and a social morality, the imposition of National Service as a necessary stepping stone for military service meant that all members of the military had direct experience with the new obligations and responsibilities of the transformed society. This grounded the military socially and gave them a direct connection to the nation-building process, a stark difference from the previous colonial model, where the martial races shared no social or cultural connections

with the people they secured. As such, the TPDF became irrevocably connected to the new society developing while the nation of Tanzania was being constructed.

Chapter Six:

A Politicized Military

Tanzania and the Tradition of an Apolitical Military

As Tanzania had inherited a military and history and tradition from Great Britain, it also inherited civil-military relations. Specifically, Tanzania inherited a non-political military. Following Britain's transformation into modernity in the late 17th century, the military as a social and political institution had been subordinated to the political and economic power of the state. As such, officers and men were supposed to be apolitical in their outlook, their role solely being to obey the political apparatus of the state and protect the populace. However, colonial militaries lacked this tradition. The political apparatus they obeyed was that of an alien authority and they protected the colonial privilege of the European regime and their colonial collaborators. This meant that in the absence of the colonial regime they had no populace that held their allegiance, leading them to simply look out for their own values and thereby participate in praetorian behavior.

This was the problem confronting Tanzania and Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) upon the dissolution of their military. While Tanzania's commitment to the liberation of Portuguese Africa had made it critical that a new military be raised in its place, the question remained as to how to construct these forces in such a way as to protect the nation but not threaten the continued transformation of the Tanzanian state. While the apolitical model theoretically could work for the Tanzanians, this model had no

tradition in Africa. The apolitical model was the end result of a modernizing project in Europe, which Africa had not undergone and that Tanzania also sought to distance itself from. Instead, Tanzania followed a path that was antithetical to the western tradition. In the Tanzanian plan of development, all levels of society were connected to the political life of the country. TANU, therefore, existed from the village to the National Assembly and was the guiding force behind the nation-building process for Tanzania. As such, in the newly constituted military, the Tanzanian People's Defense Force (TPDF), the military would be explicitly politicized, with TANU/CCM's formal existence within the military, commissioned officers officially allowed to serve in political positions, political education for all ranks, and even with commissars existing within the formations of the armed forces. This directly connected the military to the party and the political aspects of the building of the nation, ensuring its loyalty to the project and regime that were explicitly a part of.

Political Education for the Military

The initial step taken within the new military was political education. Since the first wave of recruits were TANU Youth and already politically active, this was not necessarily aimed at them, but rather was a plan to focus on future growth within the military. This also would be an opportunity to set an early and small precedent for the political sphere to intrude into the military one. As such, the provision within the 1964 National Defense Act, which established the Department of Political Education within the army, was the first and initially restrained step towards the politicization of the

military.³⁶⁷ Given the fact that in 1964 even the more radical of the independent African nations still embraced the idea of the apolitical military this was still a bold step.³⁶⁸ The Department of Political Education allotted up to 25 percent of the training time of the new military towards political education for both the current military and its future iterations.³⁶⁹

By 1965, the army, although not explicitly political, was from top to bottom members of TANU. The initial 1000 members of the military that were passed out were members of the TANU Youth League, an organization whose members were party stalwarts by even the standards of a politicized and somewhat revolutionary state. Any further recruits from the army came through the National Service, all of the members of which were required to be TANU members and who had undergone significant political education even before entering the military.³⁷⁰ Given that from 1965 on the National Service was a precondition to service in the TPDF and that TANU membership was a precondition to joining the National Service, all members of the military were necessarily TANU members. This pattern of education and service was maintained until the 1992 Nyalali Commission and establishment of multipartyism.

The Army and the 1971 TANU Guidelines

³⁶⁷ Casta Tungareza, “The Transformation of Civil-Military Relations,” in Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily, eds., *The Military and Militarism in Africa* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1998), 293.

³⁶⁸ Even Nkrumah in Ghana cleaved to the apolitical military model, although this was to have grave consequences.

³⁶⁹ Stefan Lindeman, “Civilian Control of the Military in Tanzania and Zambia: Explaining Persistent Exceptionalism,” (Working Paper, Crisis States Research Center, 2010), 6. Tungareza sets the minimum at 20 percent of training time. See Tungareza, “The Transformation of Civil-Military Relations,” 293.

³⁷⁰ As noted in the previous chapter.

In 1971, TANU released the *Mwongozo wa TANU*, the new guidelines for the Party and its role within the nation. These guidelines established the party's supremacy over all aspects of government. While TANU had already held every elected post since 1965, the new publication was more explicit about the symbiotic role between the party and the government. In this case, the *Mwongozo* specifically noted, "But the charting of objectives and policies does not by itself constitute good leadership. Leadership also means organizing the people. It is the party which decides on the structure of government, various institutions, the army, etc."³⁷¹ The guidelines continued in a more explicit manner about the supportive relationship between the party and the army and their shared mission to the nation of Tanzania: "TANU's relations with the TPDF should be those of a people's party and a people's army. It is up to the party to ensure that the people's army is the army for both the liberation and the defense of the people. It is TANU's responsibility to ensure that the army's main task in peace time is to enable the people to safeguard their independence and their policy."³⁷² Finally, it also established the formal relationship between the party, the army, and the militia, which had existed since the 1960s but was not effectively part of the army or the party:

Our army must be the peoples' army, used in teaching the people how to defend themselves and their localities and to enable them to report on matters of national security. Therefore it is imperative to start training a militia for the whole country. Since the militia will spread throughout the country, in co-operation with the regular army, they will have the duty to defend our territorial borders, our air space and to expose traitors and enemies. The registration of militia and the army must be scrutinized carefully and supervised by the party. Ensuring co-operation between the army and militia, and providing for political education of both, must be a prime responsibility of the party. The party must establish a

371 Tanzania, *Mwongozo wa TANU* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1971), paragraph 13.

372 Ibid., par. 22.

subcommittee of the Central Committee to look into defense and security.³⁷³

With the establishment of the party as paramount and the army as part of the subordinate government, structural changes were made within the army itself to deal with the newly established formal relationship. Specifically, the military now actually functioned as a formal part of TANU. As such, each company now served as a cell of the party, with the company commander serving as the party chairman for his company and the executive officer serving as the secretary. This structure then worked its way up through battalion, brigade, division, and army levels, with the commander at each level serving as the political head of the party organization of his command.³⁷⁴ While it took until 1978 for this party structure to be formally recognized by the National Executive Committee, by that point it had been functional for seven years. As Nyerere put it when addressing an incoming class to the Monduli Military Academy in 1975:

Army officers are simultaneously leaders of the party. We want our army officers to understand this. It is true we did not fight a war. However, the military belongs to the Party. I do not have to say this to FRELIMO. FRELIMO knows this to be the case. One does not need to tell the Chinese that the military belongs to the Party. It would be like telling them that these are my eyes! My eyes are mine, who else's can they possibly be? The military is an instrument of the Party.³⁷⁵

The insertion of the party into the military also opened the door for another connection between TANU and the TPDF. Although the military was already following the single-party path of the state, given the critical importance of loyalty within the armed forces it

373 Ibid., par. 27.

374 Abillah Omari, "Civil-Military Relations in Tanzania" in Rocky Williams, Gavin Cawthra, and Diane Abrahams, eds., *Ourselves To Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2003), 100.

375 President Julius Nyerere, *Speech Addressing the Beginning of a Nine Months Officer Course, Monduli Military Academy*, December 13, 1975. Personal Manuscript, gift from Nestor Luanda.

should not be surprising that TANU also placed political commissars within the ranks. These were specific TANU-appointed officers who were responsible for the creation of a “new, correctly politicized military establishment,”³⁷⁶ such as the commissars of the Soviet or Chinese Armies. The first wave of commissars consisted of a number of political appointees that had been sent to China for training and returned with a fierce desire to educate and reform the military.³⁷⁷ These efforts had mixed results at best, although the project was never abandoned. In later years, these commissars developed a mixed reputation, with many of them politicians or party members who had been given a commission and appointed as a commissar to burnish their credentials. Others took to their roles in an overzealous manner and thereby gained the enmity of their units and the regular officers who served with them, usually leading to a correction in behavior.³⁷⁸ However, despite any objections to their presence, the commissars remained a part of the TPDF until the formal de-politicization of the force.

Officers and the Body Politic

When the Tanzanian People’s Defense Force was created in the aftermath of the 1964 mutinies, its rank and file members were recruited from the TANU Youth League. These young and enthusiastic members of the party were politically engaged and motivated to help build the nation. However, for all their enthusiasm, these youth were not military leaders. They lacked skills and experience in the military profession to take

376 D. Zirker, “The Preservation of Civilian Rule in Tanzania,” in C. P. Danopoulos, ed., *Civilian Rule in the Developing World. Democracy on the March?* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 112.

377 Tungareza, “The Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Tanzania,” 295.

378 Interview with Major General (ret.) Herman Lupogo, December 2009.

over the command of the new forces. Therefore, now that Tanzania had a new army, it needed to find leaders for their military.

A solution was found in the form of the still loyal Tanganyikan Rifles officers. None of the African officers serving during the mutiny of 1964 took part in the disturbances willingly. Captain S. M. A. Kashmiri, a Tanganyikan of South Asian descent, was taken hostage by the mutineers upon his return to Colito in the early morning of January 20³⁷⁹ Lieutenants Kibagiri, Kibasa, and Kirahi were all incarcerated by mutineers that same night.³⁸⁰ Even those at Colito who were forced to elevated rank, like Captain Alec Nyirenda and Lieutenant Mwita Marwa, only did so essentially at gunpoint and were subsequently cleared of any charges of mutiny.³⁸¹ Given these circumstances, it made sense that these officers were allowed to remain within the military as long as they adhered to the new conditions of service: membership in TANU and accepting the structure of the new military.

These individuals formed the heart of the initial officer corps of the new military. When one looks at the known senior members of the military, even as late as the 1978-79 Kagera War, a great number of the members had been professional officers even before the Mutiny. Major General Mirisho Sarakikya, who had served under the British for years before independence and was present at the Tabora mutiny,³⁸² became the first Commander of the Tanzanian People's Defense Force. His successor, Major General

³⁷⁹ Luanda, *Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny: January 1964* (Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam Press, 1993), 86.

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 87.

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 91-92.

³⁸² *Ibid.*, 100.

Abillah Twalipo,³⁸³ was a lieutenant within the Tanganyika Rifles, but was in Kenya at the time of the Colito Mutiny. Major General General David Msuguri, who commanded the main attacking force in the Kagera War, had served in the King's African Rifles during the Second World War and then been accepted for a commission while still a member of the Tanganyikan Rifles.³⁸⁴ Before the end of his career he succeeded Twalipo to become the third Commander of the Defense Forces.

Even beyond these future commanders of the military there were several other officers that remained attached to the TPDF. Lieutenant Mwita Marwa, who was forced to accept a promotion by the mutineers, later formally rose through the ranks of the military until he was commanding one of the brigades in the Kagera War.³⁸⁵ He became famous amongst journalists for his expansive presence and his signature pipe. The notable Captain SMA Kashmiri remained within the TPDF until 1973, when he left military service and began employment as a civilian purchasing agent for the TPDF in the United Kingdom.³⁸⁶ This early generation of officers remained a central pillar of the new military and also remained politically loyal even past the 1992 advent of multipartyism. Of course, the imposition of political objectives and considerations also occasionally hurt this generation. The need to expand representation within the officer corps while rebuilding the military often wreaked havoc on the careers of these early officers. For example, S. M. A. Kashmiri left the military when his career stalled, which was attributed

³⁸³ Twalipo was the Commander of the Defense Forces at the time of the Kagera War, see Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, *War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1982), 62.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 79.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 69.

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 76.

to his South Asian heritage.³⁸⁷ In addition, General Msuguri remained stuck at his divisional command for an extended period due to his being from Nyerere's home village, Butiama.³⁸⁸ The government thought the promotion of a member of Nyerere's own ethnic group to high command might look biased to the military and the populace in general. It took Msuguri commanding the main thrust through Uganda and emerging as the hero of the first major war in Tanzania's history to overcome that stigma and ascend to overall command.

However, given the small numbers of Tanganyikan officers already serving at the time of the mutinies, as well as the assumed expansion of the military forces, there was a question of recruiting new candidates for commissions. While TANU ministers such as Oscar Kambona had not appreciated the tight control that the senior British officers had exerted upon the officer candidate selection process, there was still no desire to open the floodgates to all applicants when a call went out on June 18, 1964 about vacancies within the commissioned ranks of the military.³⁸⁹ The process of selection was certainly not easy even in these earlier days of the TPDF—in fact it was essentially patterned after the previous model of selection through the Tanganyika Rifles. The first step within the initial 1964-65 period was informing the Ministry of Education that you wished to be considered for the United Military Forces.³⁹⁰ Only those students finishing secondary education were eligible for this process at the time and so one could apply through their school.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ Ibid., 79.

³⁸⁹ TNA Acc 493 M.3/1 Doc. 215 1964, "The United Republic's Military Forces—Permanent Commissions."

³⁹⁰ See "Further Education and Training, Secondary Schools, 1963" for reference. TNA Acc 493 M.3/1 Doc. 159 1963.

Once the potential candidate had expressed interest in attaining a commission in the TPDF, they were issued a comprehensive form to fill out. This form included basic information, such as the applicant's name and home region, but also went into fuller detail regarding their educational attainment and which schools they attended, the languages the applicant spoke, their hobbies, any previous positions held within the government, and finally a statement of good character by a Minister, Magistrate, Senior Civil Servant, or similar person holding a similar position.³⁹¹ This form had to be completely filled out, with each section answered, before a candidate could be accepted. At this point the candidate would be called before the Permanent Commissions Selection Board in Dar es Salaam during the new year.³⁹² This board evaluated the applicant and decided on the suitability of the candidate based on their application, their presence, and a confidential report forwarded from their headmaster commenting on their character and capacity for leadership.³⁹³ Much like the previous iteration of officer commission selection, the selection committee was very stringent in its standards, but did not have the high number of rejections that its forbear did. In one example, out of 22 candidates three were earmarked for further training at Sandhurst (pending test scores at the end of term), eleven were selected for the shorter training course at Mons, four were found unsatisfactory but offered positions as enlisted men in the army, and three were rejected

³⁹¹ TNA Acc 493 M.3/1 Doc. 260C, "Application for Appointment to a Commission in the United Republic Military Forces" 1964.

³⁹² TNA Acc 493 M.3/1 Doc. 264, "Application for Commission in the United Republic Military Forces" 1964.

³⁹³ Ibid.

outright.³⁹⁴ Other forms show members being selected for Officer Cadet Training in Canada.³⁹⁵ Assuming selection, the candidates were expected to begin basic training immediately and advised to be prepared.³⁹⁶

This process changed little once the TPDF got onto a more formal footing. The first notable change occurred when Nyerere and TANU made the National Service the gateway to all further government service. With this initiative, it now became necessary to complete one's term in the *Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa* before an applicant could apply for a commission in the Tanzanian People's Defense Forces. However, this also served to draw secondary school leavers into the TPDF as they were already being funneled through the JKT before entering into their formal careers. This funneling also allowed the TPDF to target specific demographics as it wished to add to its ranks. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, TANU wished to increase female participation in the military and therefore targeted recruiting with female secondary school leavers in the National Service. This led to an increase in the female membership within the officer corps and continued the hoped-for tradition of universal participation in all levels of government.

Another notable change occurred in 1974 following the absorption of the JKT into the structure of the TPDF. The military no longer wanted to concentrate on just those who had completed secondary school, feeling that the selection process was open to charges of elitism. As such, the military identified three separate, but desirable, paths to

³⁹⁴ TNA Acc 493 M.3/1 Doc. 249 "Minutes of the Meeting of the Tanganyika Rifles Permanent Commissions Selection Board, held in the Committee Room of the Speaker's Office at 0800 Hours on Wednesday 16 Sep 64," 1964.

³⁹⁵ TNA Acc 493 M.3/1 Doc. 238 "Minutes of the Meeting of the Tanganyika Rifles Permanent Commissions Selection Board, held in the Committee Room of the Speaker's Office at 0900 Hours on Wednesday 26 Aug 64," 1964

³⁹⁶ TNA Acc 493 M.3/1 Doc. 248 "Application for Commission in the United Republic Military Forces," 1964.

officer recruitment. First, it reopened the path for senior Non-Commissioned Officers to attend a junior officer course. Those secondary school leavers wishing to be commissioned would now serve a year as a private soldier before being selected for officer training. Second, professionals such as doctors and engineers wishing to enter the TPDF could enter officer cadet training immediately and gain their commissions in six months.³⁹⁷ This diversified the military without removing the high standards involved in the selection of the leadership.

These processes of selection meant that throughout the TPDF's history the officer corps was a singularly formidable part of the populace. No longer were long-service colonial warrant officers selected for their loyalty and endurance, the new generations of officers were citizens of Tanzania that were educated, upwardly mobile, and selected for their intelligence and leadership abilities. The screening process was so rigorous that three sons of presidents have been denied commissions throughout the history of the force.³⁹⁸ This also meant that as the military itself became politicized, these individuals became savvy and desirable political actors and the state of Tanzania accepted their integration into the political life of the state. With their membership in TANU a necessary part of their service, it was already possible for these new leaders within the military to be powerful members within the regional or national party structure. It was theoretically possible that a newly-minted lieutenant was a district commissioner or similar, giving him a considerable amount of power within the party in addition to his military authority. This role within the party only intensified with the establishment of the

³⁹⁷ Tungareza, "The Transformation of Civil-Military Relations," 293.

³⁹⁸ Herman Lupogo, "Tanzania: Civil-Military Relations and Political Stability," *African Security Review*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2001): 6.

Mwongozo wa TANU, where now the ranks within the military corresponded with power with the political party.

The education and discipline of the officer corps did not only make them effective members of the party, but also desirable members of the formal government of the state of Tanzania. Whereas in most modern democracies a serving army officer must resign his commission before standing for election or accepting a position within a civilian governmental organization, after 1971 and the formal acceptance of the army as part of TANU, this restriction did not exist for the TPDF officer corps. Any commissioned officer of the TPDF, as a member of the ruling party and a participant within the Tanzanian democracy, could stand for election.³⁹⁹ A 1972 law established that if the officer won the selected election he would have to place his commission on hold, essentially taking indefinite leave from his command.⁴⁰⁰ However, at any time the officer could choose to return to the army with no loss of position or prestige; in fact, often a period of governmental service was seen as a possible means to burnish one's career. This also worked in the reverse, where politically ambitious members of the party would serve briefly in the military to increase their own profile within the structures of the government, the party, and the army.⁴⁰¹

The practice of electing or appointing members of the military became increasingly commonplace following its legalization. Tanzania was divided at that time into 25 administrative regions that in turn were subdivided into districts. The regional and district commissioners were essentially the 'heads of government' in their respective

³⁹⁹ Lupogo, "Tanzania: Civil-Military Relations and Political Stability," 9.

⁴⁰⁰ Omari, "Civil-Military Relations in Tanzania," 101.

⁴⁰¹ This remains true to this day; for example, the past two presidents of Tanzania both took part in military service for a period during the political careers.

areas, serving as the central civil government authority.⁴⁰² These positions, along with cabinet posts and ministerial jobs, increasingly fell to members of the military either through election or appointment. Within the first three years of the policy, from 1972-1975, five positions were filled by military members—one by election and four by appointment. In the next five years, from 1975-1980, these numbers grew by almost 400 percent.⁴⁰³ By the end of this period there were 29 members of the military serving in civilian posts. While six of these were elected, the remaining twenty-three had been appointed by TANU.⁴⁰⁴ While periods past 1979 are not specifically covered within this study, by 2002, a full 45 percent of the regional commissioners and 20 percent of district commissioners had a military background, even if by that point they were required to leave their military careers.⁴⁰⁵

By the end of the first fifteen years of the TPDF, its officer corps had made the transition from long-service members of the previous colonial administration to a group of young, educated, and politically active Tanzanians. The selection process essentially ensured that an officer had at least a secondary, if not an even greater degree of, education; was considered an excellent individual by their seniors; was a practicing member of TANU; and had often gained significant international experience.⁴⁰⁶ Upon his ascension to command, he gained rank within the party and therefore representation on the regional and national level that most private citizens could not attain. The officer

⁴⁰² Lupogo, “Tanzania: Civil-Military Relations and Political Stability,” 9.

⁴⁰³ Lindeman, “Civilian Control of the Military in Tanzania and Zambia: Explaining Persistent Exceptionalism” (Working Paper, Crisis States Research Center, 2010), 8.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁵ Omari, “Civil-Military Relations in Tanzania,” 101.

⁴⁰⁶ The international experiences of the officer corps will be discussed in depth in the next chapter.

could then also choose to stand for elected office and thereby embody all three pillars of the nation of Tanzania: the state, the party, and the military. These structures integrated the officer corps of the nation into the body politic even more fully than the process undertaken by the enlisted men and women of the force.

The Political Army

The binding of the military to the political structures of the new nation of Tanzania did not take the same form as the integration of the military into the nation's social structures. While the National Service was a massive organization that created direct and concrete connections between the military and the society it served, there was no similar initiative for combining the party and the army. Instead, from its outset the military was intended to be politically active and so TANU membership was a precondition of service. Political education and commissars insured the continued ideological education of the rank and file and reinforced their connection to the political aspects of their citizenship. By the time of the *Mwongozo*, the military was already essentially an entirely TANU affair and the sublimation of the army into the party did not take an external service, but simply a legal precedent and the formal establishment of party structures within the army.

The integration of the party into the army played an amplified role for the officer corps. The leadership of the army had already taken on TANU membership and the later generations had undergone National Service like their rank-and-file counterparts. However, with the formal establishment of the *Mwongozo*, each officer found themselves an officer within both the army and the party. This opened up the possibility of direct government service as well. By the end of the first decade of the *Mwongozo* reforms,

which integrated the army into the party, a significant number of officers were also high ranking political party officers and government representatives. This led to a fully integrated and educated ruling class, one that was bound to the political party and the national government.

Chapter Seven:

The Non-Alignment of Doctrine

While the personnel decisions made in the formation of the TPDF were a vital part of creating the stability of the force and fostering a Tanzanian identity, these were essentially internal decisions that started and ended at the borders of Tanzania. However, Tanzania did not exist within a vacuum: the Tanzanian People's Defense Force was constructed during the global Cold War. Independence came as the decolonizing world was caught between the Superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union. Nyerere and the TANU government chose non-alignment as the keystone of their foreign policy. Already strongly anti-colonial, the feelings of the Tanzanian government hardened further against the First World with the interference of the United States in Zanzibar and the 1965 arrest and expulsion of American agents for subversive activities. However, despite these provocative incidents, Nyerere and his government neither cut off their relations with the capitalistic West nor fully embraced the Communist Bloc, preferring to keep both at arms' length. As noted, Nyerere's initial address at the United Nations as the President of Tanganyika had him declaring, "The automatic assumption that one or other of contending major groups of states is always right, or always wrong, cannot bear examination."⁴⁰⁷ This found fuller exposition at the 1967 Bi-Annual TANU National Conference, where Nyerere stated boldly, "We shall not allow any of our friendships to

⁴⁰⁷ Julius Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity, Uhuru na Umoja* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966), 155.

be exclusive; we shall not allow anyone to choose any of our friends or enemies for us.”⁴⁰⁸

However, while non-alignment was a laudable and ultimately sustainable goal in terms of general foreign policy and in economic matters, the question remained how it could possibly take root in military matters. At the time of decolonization, there were no military academies in Africa; no military technical schools; no large scale military industry; and few African officers, much less those that had the experience or training to instruct their own officer class or make large scale doctrinal decisions. For those African states that retained their colonially structured militaries, the decision was invariably made to keep ties with the former colonial power to retain the necessary expertise and hardware. The primary example of this model was Nigeria, where the officer corps kept its British framework of war and essentially its entire officer corps was educated at Sandhurst or Mons. While there, the officer candidates absorbed British values and identity.⁴⁰⁹ Therefore, when called upon to fight in the Civil War, both sides tried to use basic British doctrine to prosecute their struggle. Kenya followed the same example, retaining their ties with Britain, the seconded British personnel, and their inherited military doctrine.⁴¹⁰

However, in the eyes of the Tanzanians this remained unacceptable for two major reasons. The first was the primacy that this structure would grant the former colonial power. The efforts to gain independence in the first place and the embarrassment

⁴⁰⁸ Julius Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism, Uhuru na Ujamaa* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968), 369.

⁴⁰⁹ Robin Luckham, *The Nigerian Military: a Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960-1967* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 132.

⁴¹⁰ Timothy Parsons, *The 1964 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2003), 169.

generated by the need to ask for assistance following the mutinies had already made this a difficult proposition. With the rapidly increasing role of Tanzania in the struggle against the “White Redoubt” of Southern Africa through the 1960s, accepting the primacy of a former colonial power became impossible due to the disagreements between Britain and Tanzania on the matters of Rhodesia and South Africa.⁴¹¹ The second major reason was that this would simply retrench the same model it had already rejected. Tanzania saw the colonial model as one that was inherently praetorian and therefore a threat to the independent civil society of the new state. For Nyerere, the actions of the British-trained Ghanaian military in overthrowing Kwame Nkrumah validated his decision. While the Afro-Socialist model that Tanzania espoused was not the same as Nkrumah’s initiatives in Ghana, there were enough parallels to permanently dispose of any chance of a return to a purely British model. Simply put, Tanzania did not want its former colonizer having any role or influence upon its military or any foreign policy that might require the involvement of its armed forces.

Tanzania was not the only state to reject its former colonial power as a military patron. For many African countries the emergence as an independent state led to a full replacement of their military patron. Almost without exception their new benefactor was the Soviet Union, who burnished its anticolonial credentials while expanding its influence in Africa. Egypt under Nasser accepted Soviet support almost immediately after its independence from British control. Even more African states made the switch after internal revolutions brought new governments to power. The Sudan replaced its British

⁴¹¹ Nyerere and the Tanzanian government had already dealt with a degree of these tensions during 1963, when Tanzania declared its intention to support the liberation struggles while British officers still commanded the Tanganyikan Rifles.

military advisors and trainers with Russian and East German ones in the mid-1960s during its First Civil War against the South. Even more notably was the Soviet aid to Ethiopia following the 1974 Revolution that brought Mengistu and the Derg to power. While initially Mengistu's regime kept its close ties to the United States,⁴¹² in 1977, it signed an arms deal with the Soviet Union. By July 1977, over \$500 million worth of Soviet Arms flooded into Ethiopia, dwarfing the previous United States aid.⁴¹³ Beyond the military hardware, which included everything from MiG-21 fighters and SAM-7 anti-aircraft rockets, military personnel from the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact nations, Cuba, the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen, and Libya arrived to bolster and train the Ethiopian Army.⁴¹⁴ Given the scale of the aid given, it is obvious that the Soviet Union could offer immediate and sizable support in both military hardware and doctrine.

Despite the size and eagerness of the aid offered by the Soviet Union and its Communist Bloc allies, Tanzania did not accept it. While Nyerere and the TANU government had sympathy for the Soviet Union and its satellites, they remained committed to non-alignment. Those states who accepted the offered aid invariably found themselves within the foreign policy orbit of the Russians. To the Tanzanians, if the TPDF were trained solely by the Russians, how would the end effect be any different from if it were trained by the British? The same dangers and questionable loyalties would remain, simply with a different foreign state as the threat. Even beyond doctrine, there remained the question of the Soviet methods of hardware provision and maintenance.

⁴¹² The United States had historic ties to Ethiopia, having helped rebuild their army in the late 1940s and early 1950s in return for the allowance of the vital Kagnew Listening Station in Ethiopia.

⁴¹³ Richard Sherman, *Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1980), 90.

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 90-91.

While the Ethiopians gained a massive amount of advanced hardware and the training to use it, this only served to inextricably bind them to the Russians.⁴¹⁵ By the late 1980s, Ethiopia was completely beholden to Soviet foreign policy demands due to the massive amount of military debt it had accrued.⁴¹⁶

This rejection of doctrinal training from the First or Second Worlds was taken to insure the independence of both the state and the military of Tanzania. However, the question remained of how the military was to be trained given the insistence on non-alignment. Most of the Third World did not have the international influence necessary to threaten the autonomy of the TPDF, but this also meant that their ability to directly aid the nascent military was extremely limited as well. Conversely, those members of the Third World that did have the capability to directly help also were those who could influence the TPDF beyond what Nyerere and TANU felt was acceptable. Therefore, to fully maintain the independence and loyalty of its forces, Tanzania attempted several radical programs to acquire and promulgate a neutral military doctrine, one that would see Tanzanians trained and equipped without subsequent worries about divided loyalties. This would first see its iteration in hopes for training from neutral powers, then from balancing the influence of smaller friendly forces, and finally in the development of a program that would see an international search and synthesis, producing a uniquely Tanzanian doctrine and training base.

⁴¹⁵ Current research shows that they gained more than 300 aircraft, 17 naval vessels, 1700 tanks, 2975 armored personnel carriers, 41740 light and heavy machine guns, 1172 cannons, and 1.5 million assault rifles, along with other sundry items. See Gebru Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 134.

⁴¹⁶ At the fall of Mengistu's regime in 1991, the military owed Russia approximately US\$4.5 billion, a sum they could never hope to pay. Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution*, 135.

The First Steps (March to September, 1964)

After the dissolution of the Tanganyika Rifles, the country still had need of defense while waiting on the formation and passing-out of the first company of the new military. Eager to remove the British troops as quickly as possible, Nyerere arranged for elements of the Nigerian Army to garrison the country. The Organization of African Unity set out the initial plan, recommending that three battalions of African troops could serve as a garrison for Tanganyika and aid in the training of the 1500 TANU Youth league volunteers that would serve as the core of the new military. These battalions were supposed to come from Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria.⁴¹⁷ However, the initial efforts of Oscar Kambona only yielded the 3rd Battalion of the Nigerian Army who landed in Dar es Salaam in April of 1964. There was hope amongst the Tanganyikans that the African troops could help nationalize the army and remove the barriers that had traditionally been set between the civil and military society.⁴¹⁸ Nyerere feted the Nigerians, noting:

This is indeed a matter for gratification. For the presence of the Nigerian troops amongst us is a visible demonstration of the efficacy of the OAU. A token of the spirit of the Addis Ababa conference of the African heads of states, a symbol of brotherhood towards which we are all striving in Africa.⁴¹⁹

However, the stay of the Nigerians would be short lived. Six months later, the new Tanganyikan recruits completed their training at the hands of the Nigerians and marched out to be reviewed by Nyerere, the TANU ministers, and the people of Dar es Salaam. The marching out of the Tanganyikan troops marked the definitive end of the Nigerians

⁴¹⁷ N. J. Miners, *The Nigerian Army 1956-1966* (London: Methuen and Co., 1971), 89. See also British National Archives (BNA), File DO 185.47 Doc. 206, "Mutiny of the Tanganyikan Rifles," n.d.

⁴¹⁸ Miners, *The Nigerian Army*, 89.

⁴¹⁹ Julius Nyerere, *Speech to the 3rd Battalion of the Nigerian Army*, April 9, 1964. Personal Manuscript gifted by Nestor Luanda

in Tanganyika. On September 21, the 3rd Battalion departed Dar es Salaam. While Nyerere lauded their efforts as having “served the cause of African Unity,”⁴²⁰ the Tanganyikan military would never call on the Nigerians again to aid in training. Instead, the next experiment in the creation of a training program for the nascent Tanzanian People’s Defense Force had already begun.

The Search for a Permanent Alternative (1964-1969)

Tanzania and Nyerere admitted to searching for alternative sources of training throughout early 1964. Their reasons for not retaining the services of the Nigerians or even accepting the presumed later detachments from Ethiopia and Algeria remain unclear. Perhaps the best hypothesis is that in 1964 no African military was structured in such a way to provide the TPDF with the training that TANU wished it to have. Nigeria had inherited a well structured army and Africanized its officer corps in the years leading up to their own independence. However, despite this, their military had little capacity for larger strategic planning, little organizational staff training, and limited technical branches. It was essentially an understaffed infantry force with little large-scale strategic use.⁴²¹ Given this, there was little need at the time for further interaction with the Nigerian military, as the projected needs of the new TPDF went well beyond what the Nigerians or any other contemporary African military could provide. For full modernization and training, the Tanzanians had to look outside of Africa.

Nyerere revealed early on where his hopes had first lay. At a press conference held on August 30, 1964, he noted that his initial outreach for training on a technical level

⁴²⁰ Julius Nyerere, *Speech upon the departure of the 3rd Battalion of the Nigerian Army*, September 21, 1964. Personal Manuscript gifted by Nestor Luanda

⁴²¹ Luckham, *The Nigerian Military*, 101.

had been to Sweden.⁴²² Nyerere reiterated Tanzania's fears at reaching out to a large power and so he had hoped that the Swedish, who were known as being a smaller power committed to international peacekeeping,⁴²³ would be willing to offer a technical mission to help train the TPDF. However, Sweden refused, as it had a policy to only give military aid through the United Nations and would not provide it directly.⁴²⁴ While disappointed, Nyerere noted his appreciation for the policy and for the country of Sweden.

However, the press conference was far more notable for why it had actually been called. A news report had gone out declaring that Tanzania had just accepted military aid from China and the press was in an uproar. Nyerere called the press conference to both confirm the report and angrily explain the reasoning behind it. Having just dealt with the Revolution in Zanzibar, the creation of the United Republic of Tanzania, and the creation of a new army, Nyerere found himself bereft of the technical assistance he felt the nation required. China offered seven instructors for no more than six months to help build the Tanzanian military, and Nyerere, having little success with other non-aligned nations, agreed. This caused a panic amongst the western press, which saw this as the next step in Communist domination in East Africa and that the Chinese would foment a revolution against the Tanzanian government. In response, Nyerere dryly noted that his previous military had already revolted and that the Chinese could not possibly do worse. He followed this by arguing that China had asked nothing in return and that it was frankly

⁴²² The British also make mention of Yugoslavia and Israel. Although Israel was central to the creation of the National Service, the presumed military mission never came to fruition. There are no records of a Yugoslav military mission on Tanzanian soil. BNA, File DO 185.47 Doc. 257, "Mutiny of the Tanganyikan Rifles," 1964.

⁴²³ Sweden provided one of the largest contingents to the UN Forces trying to contain the Congo Crisis from 1961-1965.

⁴²⁴ Julius Nyerere, Press Conference on August 30, 1964. Personal Manuscript gifted by Nestor Luanda

humiliating to have to hold a press conference to explain his prerogatives as the national executive of a sovereign state.⁴²⁵

While Britain and the United States stood at the forefront of the First World, neither could serve as a counterweight to what they saw as Communist infiltration. The United States still cleaved to its policy that former British colonies were within the British sphere of influence. Meanwhile the British remained unwelcome in Nyerere's Tanzania due to their colonial history. The answer the West's worries about Chinese involvement would take an unexpected form: Canada.

Canada in the Cold War

In 1964 Canada was in a unique position amongst the NATO powers. It had emerged into the post- Second World War world with an unprecedented amount of military power. In 1945 alone Canada had 1,086,771 citizens serving in their armed forces.⁴²⁶ Canadian soldiers, sailors, and airmen fought in all the major theatres of the War, earning distinction for their efforts in the Normandy landings and the fighting in France. While their budget called for an immediate draw down of their forces following armistice, Canada still searched for a lasting security instrument. From 1947 to 1958 Canada committed itself to the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). However, while Canada deployed its troops to Germany to aid NATO and maintained a strong air wing to support NORAD, its main post-War efforts came as part of their commitment to the

⁴²⁵ Julius Nyerere, Press Conference on August 30, 1964. Personal Manuscript gifted by Nestor Luanda

⁴²⁶ Christopher R. Kilford, *The Other Cold War: Canada's Military Assistance to the Developing World 1945-1975* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defense Academy Press, 2010), 55.

United Nations. Canada took part in the peacekeeping in Palestine and India in the late 1940s and then reversed its disarmament to take part in the Korean War.⁴²⁷ While the 1953-1955 exercises with NATO began to threaten these priorities, the Suez Crisis of 1956 threw Canada's foreign policy ideology into a sharp re-evaluation. It was Canada's Secretary of State Lester Pearson that managed to negotiate the placement of the United Nations peacekeeping force in the Suez, pre-empting more aggressive U.S. or Soviet intervention.⁴²⁸ A Canadian contingent of 900 soldiers took part in this deployment, which lasted until 1967.

Although in 1957 Pearson's Liberal Party lost the election, the new government under Diefenbaker retained its commitments to the United Nations while also becoming close to the British Commonwealth and adopting a more proactive foreign policy. This led to further deployments to Cyprus and then Canada's first major intervention in sub-Saharan Africa as part of the UN mission to the Congo in 1960. Further Canadian intervention took place in the form of a small training mission to Ghana in 1961 that lasted a full twelve years. By the advent of the 1964 mutinies in Tanganyika, Canada had already been militarily present in several peacekeeping capacities and now had shown its abilities in creating a limited military mission to Nkrumah's Ghana. While the nation had links to the West through the Commonwealth and NATO, it was increasingly a neutral player in the United Nations and had shown itself to be anti-imperialist in the Suez Crisis. As such, it was uniquely qualified as a counterweight for China. A Canadian military mission had already been requested by Tanzania before the mutinies and the Tanzanians renewed their request following the formation of the Tanzanian People's Defense Force.

⁴²⁷ Ibid., 58.

⁴²⁸ Ibid., 59.

This time, acting on their desire to continue their outreach to the Third World and under pressure from their two closest strategic allies,⁴²⁹ the Canadians accepted. Following an initial survey of the Tanzanian's needs, the Canadian military began to assemble the Canadian Armed Forces Advisory and Training Team Tanzania, or CAFATTT.

CAFATTT (1965-1970)

The Canadian military training mission, led by Colonel H. E. C. Price and Lt Col J. C. Gardner, landed in Tanzania in January of 1965.⁴³⁰ It was a modest effort, consisting initially of twelve officers (including the command) and twelve sergeants, but these instructors were seen as a vital effort towards producing a stable and reliable Tanzanian military.⁴³¹ Upon their arrival, the advisory and training team was placed at Colito barracks, which had formerly housed the mutinous Tanganyikan Rifles. Each man was given his own accommodations and there were separate messes provided for senior officers, junior officers, and NCOs. Provisions were made for after-hours enjoyment, including travel, sports, and fishing, which were popular due to the ending of the military training duties at 1400 because of the equatorial heat.⁴³² From May to December, the CAFATTT team constantly ran training programs to bring the TPDF into a state of

⁴²⁹ Both the United States and Britain placed considerable pressure on the Canadians before the deployment, but questions remain as to the decisiveness of this pressure. See Kilford, *The Other Cold War*, 183. The British were extremely concerned about the Chinese presence, as can be seen in BNA, File DO 185.42 Doc. 7A, "Tanzania People's Defense Force," 1965

⁴³⁰ This relationship was formally signed into existence eleven months later with the "Agreement concerning the provision of military training and advisory assistance. Signed at Dar es Salaam on 4 November 1965." See UN Treaty Series, No. 12481.

⁴³¹ Kilford, *The Other Cold War*, 193. Godefroy quotes a number of the 30 personnel, see Andrew Godefroy, "The Canadian Armed Forces Advisory and Training Team Tanzania 1965-1970," *Canadian Military History*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Summer 2002): 34.

⁴³² David H. Kelly, "CAFATTT," *Canadian Military Mail Study Group Newsletter*, No. 162 (November 2003): 711.

readiness. Over the course of these initial seven months the team ran 21 courses on various aspects of military service and the military art. These programs resulted in 232 graduates, a massive number given the initial size of the TPDF, which at the time of its formation was approximately 1300 soldiers and 53 officers.⁴³³

The program was supplemented by additional training for TPDF officers, deemed necessary due to difficulties in early evaluations. Initial field exercises conducted in the Fall of 1966 showed significant deficiencies in command and control.⁴³⁴ This was exacerbated by the mixture of officers serving within the TPDF, which by this time was a combination of those who rose through the ranks in colonial service and had little formal command training and those commissioned within the TPDF and who therefore had no direct experience in the field. However, despite these divisions within the command structure, the CAFATTT team saw definite potential and highlighted several simple solutions for the difficulties the Tanzanians faced, such as remedial training courses in map reading and increased drilling of field craft fundamentals. Unfortunately, these field exercises also highlighted other, far more significant divisions within the TPDF.

During the exercises, several TPDF officers proved themselves to be very critical of the Canadian instruction and methods. These officers invariably were from the contingent provided from Zanzibar, which remained a strong advocate of Communist

⁴³³ The Tanzanian press claimed 1500 recruits, Kilford claims 1300 members, and Godefroy quotes a figure of 2000 men. This remains unresolved, although Godefroy's 2000 members includes a quoted 1000 raw recruits, which brings his numbers more in line with Kilford's.

⁴³⁴ Godefroy, 39

intervention within the Tanzanian military.⁴³⁵ While initially the Zanzibari Revolutionary armed forces had been trained by Soviet instructors, following the 1964 Act of Union these forces had begun to be integrated formally into the TPDF. This meant that their contact with Soviet training was necessarily limited. In the absence of the Soviets, the TPDF quickly found a replacement patron in the Chinese training mission in Tanzania and became enthusiastic supporters of the People's Liberation Army methodologies within the Tanzanian military. This in turn translated into hostility towards CAFATTT, which was seen as the main rival for military doctrine. It must also be understood that while the Zanzibaris were certainly the most easily identified of the officers that felt this way, there was also significant support for the Chinese throughout the TPDF command structure. It was common for those officers that had risen through the ranks of the old Imperial formation to remain stalwarts for the British system and Canadian instruction, but the younger guard saw opportunities with several different doctrinal systems. This in turn reflected the TPDF's desire to find its own way in the military world.

It was this desire for military expansion and exploration that would eventually lead to the CAFATTT program's cancellation. With Tanzania's independence, Nyerere's government saw the need for military formations beyond the light infantry and support units of the past. The TPDF had a desire for armor and artillery, which it saw as necessities on the modern battlefield. These desires were sharpened by Tanzania's increasing engagement in the liberation struggles of Southern Africa. However, CAFATTT had no ability to furnish this military hardware and given their rivalry with

⁴³⁵ The cited example was Lt. Col. Mafunde, the second in command of the Zanzibari forces. See British National Archives, File DO 185.42 Doc. 31A "Tanzania People's Defense Force," 1965, which is also established in Godefroy, 39.

the emergent Chinese faction in the Tanzanian military, this was a crucial deficiency.⁴³⁶ While the training of CAFATTT was of a high quality and certainly appreciated by the TPDF, the Chinese began to gain ground simply through their willingness to provide the military hardware that Tanzania required. In 1965-1967, the Chinese mission gave gifts of trucks, tanks, artillery, and small arms. As the Chinese became the dominant supplier of military hardware, their instruction became ever more crucial to the fledgling Tanzanian military.⁴³⁷ The number of Chinese advisors had already grown from the initial seven rifle instructors to include eight additional trainers for reserve troops and numerous support weapons trainers scattered throughout the country. In addition, ten TPDF officers and sixty enlisted men were sent to China for training in the light tanks that China supplied. Even as Chinese influence grew, Colonel Price, the commander of CAFATTT, had to agree that the standardization of hardware would most likely have to come from the ever increasing Chinese stocks, which in turn meant that Chinese instruction was further prized.⁴³⁸

By 1968 the mission was encountering serious difficulties. While CAFATTT continued to provide excellent training courses, its budget had grown far beyond that originally anticipated and it waned in influence. The former was exacerbated by the anticipated costs of providing half the funds for a new military academy in Tanzania at a cost of US\$2.6 million.⁴³⁹ Meanwhile, the Chinese military continued to supply tanks and other military hardware to the Tanzanian land forces, increasing their interest and

⁴³⁶ Kilford, *The Other Cold War*, 198.

⁴³⁷ Anecdotal evidence has the Canadians actually creating the manuals for the Chinese hardware since there were no English-language manuals in existence at the time. See Godefroy, "The Canadian Armed Forces," 40 and Kilford, *The Other Cold War*, 197.

⁴³⁸ Godefroy, "The Canadian Armed Forces," 40.

⁴³⁹ Kilford, *The Other Cold War*, 198.

prestige in the country. By 1969 both Tanzania and Canada had come to the general agreement that CAFATTT should not be renewed. For Nyerere's government, Canadian assistance within Tanzania had run its course and while Nyerere himself made a very agreeable and grateful statement for the efforts of CAFATTT, there was little left for the Canadians to do in East Africa. Meanwhile, new Prime Minister Trudeau found himself very conscious of any potential difficulties with the People's Republic of China due to his desire to establish formal relations with the PRC. As such, he was more than happy to end a program that saw Canadian interests in competition with Chinese interests for no appreciable gain. In 1970, the CAFATTT program was discontinued and the members of the military mission were quietly brought home.

Parallel to the development of the CAFATTT efforts with the TPDF land forces was the unexpected and fruitful Canadian engagement with the fledgling Tanzanian Air Force. Upon the formation of the new Tanzanian armed forces, the Tanzanian high command called for the provision of an air force. Requiring an international partner, the TPDF made an agreement with the Federal German Republic to provide planes and training for a new air wing.⁴⁴⁰ However, this agreement fell into jeopardy as Zanzibar and Tanganyika united as Tanzania. Zanzibar had been an enthusiastic supporter of the German Democratic Republic and the GDR maintained an embassy within Zanzibar. With the new union, preparations were made to move the diplomatic facilities of the East Germans to the United Republic's capital of Dar es Salaam. West Germany protested the move and although Nyerere tried to minimize the diplomatic damage, in 1965, less than a

⁴⁴⁰ Julius Nyerere, Press Conference on August 30, 1964. Personal Manuscript gifted by Nestor Luanda.

year after its inception, West Germany abrogated its agreement with Tanzania and abandoned the few planes it had already provided for the nascent Air Force.⁴⁴¹

Given the currently ongoing preparations for a Canadian military mission, Tanzania suggested that Canada might become involved with the proposed air wing as well. Canada accepted the proposal in theory and in 1965 agreed to provide transport and liaison aircraft to the Tanzanian defense forces.⁴⁴² These took the form of four Caribou transport planes and eight small Otter planes. In addition, the Canadians agreed to train approximately 400 ground crew members that would be required to maintain and fly the aircraft.⁴⁴³ While an exploratory group landed in Tanzania in 1965 and the aircraft themselves were quickly readied for delivery, the treaty allowing the sale of the aircraft was only signed in April of 1966, marking the formal beginning of the Tanzanian Air Wing. This was accompanied by the delivery of the first aircraft in May with full pomp and circumstance.

However, the establishment of the Air Wing followed much the same pattern as the establishment and eventual dissipation of CAFATTT. While the transports and training were appreciated, Tanzania found itself more and more involved in the frontline struggle for the liberation of Mozambique, Rhodesia, and South Africa. These struggles and their threat to widen into a significant conflict meant that by 1968 Tanzania was searching for military aircraft that could serve in an offensive capacity. As Canada partnered with the TPDF with the understanding that the outlay in men and material

⁴⁴¹ Godefroy, "The Canadian Armed Forces," 35.

⁴⁴² "Agreement Between The Government Of Canada And The Government Of The United Republic Of Tanzania Concerning The Provision Of Military Transport And Liaison Aircraft To Tanzania," Canada Treaty Information, <http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=103419>, accessed February 14, 2012.

⁴⁴³ Godefroy, "The Canadian Armed Forces," 35.

would be limited, it was simply not prepared to provide Tanzania with the jet fighters it now sought. As such, Tanzania needed to again search for other defensive partners. Now it was Russia's turn to curry favor with the Tanzanians, offering them a gift of MiG 15s and MiG 21s, an offer that the Canadian Armed Forces could not match.⁴⁴⁴ While the airmen and technical advisors of Canada did their best to offer continued aid to the new Air Wing of the TPDF, they too were withdrawn with CAFATTT in 1970.

The Foundation of a Military Academy (1965-1972)

Tanzania had always made it a priority to train its own officers within Tanzania. To do this it required a domestic military academy that could espouse a Tanzanian doctrine that could then be passed down through the ranks. The initial hopes for an academy were raised with the arrival of the CAFATTT mission. An initial military survey carried out by Brigadier General Love had recommended that Canada be responsible for the construction of a military academy for the instruction of the TPDF.⁴⁴⁵ Until such an academy could be constructed, he recommended that fifty surplus military huts be provided as a stopgap measure so that the academy could be an identifiably Canadian project. While the Department of Finance criticized the overall report of Brigadier Love, the resultant budget contained US\$182,500 for the surplus huts and US\$1,000,000 for the construction of a permanent academy.⁴⁴⁶

Upon the arrival of the CAFATTT team in 1965, the temporary Tanzanian Military Academy was set up with a staff of 250.⁴⁴⁷ Its instruction was divided into five wings: administration, basic training, officer training, battalion training, and technical

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid., 44.

⁴⁴⁵ Kilford, *The Other Cold War*, 188.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid., 190

⁴⁴⁷ BNA, File DO 185.42 Doc. 18, "Tanzania People's Defense Force," 1965.

training.⁴⁴⁸ Each wing was under the supervision of two of the Canadian officers, and, as mentioned, the instruction managed to pass out over 200 graduates in its first year of operation. The results had been so positive that in 1966 the Canadians expanded their original US\$1m in funds dedicated to the creation of a permanent academy to US\$2.6m, fully half of the estimated cost of the new facilities. It was hoped that the construction would be well underway by the end of the first five year mission, leaving a concrete reminder of the Canadian efforts and goodwill towards the TPDF.⁴⁴⁹

However, as with all the other Canadian initiatives, the increasing influence of the Chinese caused severe tensions. By 1968, the waxing Chinese presence caused doubts to emerge within the Canadian defense establishment. With the increasingly probable removal of the CAFATTT mission in 1970, there was every chance that the new academy would end up being used by the Chinese for its own instruction of the Tanzanians. With its military assistance budget already strained, it was not a difficult choice for Canada to abandon its plans to build the academy. As such, at the time that the Canadians formally withdrew in 1970, Tanzania still had no military academy to train their armed forces.

Nyerere did not give up on the Tanzanian Military Academy as a priority. With the withdrawal of the Canadians the only partner left that expressed willingness to help fund the permanent facility was China. Accordingly, the Chinese became Tanzania's partner and in 1974 the Monduli Military Academy for the TPDF was opened.⁴⁵⁰ However, while the Chinese had become a partner in the construction of the Monduli

⁴⁴⁸ Godefroy, "The Canadian Armed Forces," 35.

⁴⁴⁹ Kilford, *The Other Cold War*, 197.

⁴⁵⁰ Nestor Luanda, "A Historical Perspective on Civil-Military Relations: 1964-1990," in Martin Rupiya, Jonathan Lwehabura and Len le Roux, eds., *Civil Security Relations in Tanzania: Investigating the Relationship Between the State, Security Services and Civil Society* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2006), 19.

Academy, the Tanzanians still did not wish for any dominant influence within their military establishment. With the loss of the Canadian mission, it became even more important for Tanzania to create and promulgate its own Tanzanian military doctrine to avoid that dominant influence. With this in mind, the Tanzanians looked to unconventional and even generally unaccepted methods to remain non-aligned and self-reliant within the education of their military.

The Creation of the Tanzanian Doctrine (1964-1979)

Since the inception of the TPDF, Tanzanians had been ranging across the world looking for acceptable military doctrines. While the Canadians and Chinese were both early and important partners in the process of building the Tanzanian military within Tanzania, what would prove to be the more important process was taking place outside the borders of Tanzania. Beginning in 1964, Tanzanian officers were sent across the globe to learn as many aspects of the military art as they could and bring their knowledge back to their home country. However, it was rare for an officer to undergo all of his training in a single country as this would have simply reinforced the influence that country might have upon him or her. Instead, officers underwent training in different aspects of warfare in different countries. As one unnamed officer notes in Avirgan and Honey's volume on the Kagera War, "I was taught guerrilla warfare in China and counter-guerrilla warfare at Sandhurst."⁴⁵¹ This was aided by Nyerere's insistence on non-alignment and his accurate observation that "You never get a country refusing to give military aid. If you say you want military aid you easily get."⁴⁵² Once this overseas

⁴⁵¹ Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, *War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill and Co., 1982), 63.

⁴⁵² Julius Nyerere, Press Conference on August 30, 1964.

training was complete, the officers in question returned to Tanzania and pooled their knowledge to create an overall “Tanzanian” doctrine. Despite the admonishments of the early Canadian and Chinese military missions that this mixing and matching of doctrine would not create a functional core of military practices,⁴⁵³ the eventual product worked well in its limited application in the Kagera War.⁴⁵⁴ This philosophy, combined with the Tanzanian practice of acquiring military hardware from whomever could offer the best product at the best price, assured the attainment of the Tanzanian goal of remaining non-aligned in their military entanglements and becoming self-reliant in terms of basic military practices. In the end, Tanzania accessed military doctrine from the First, Second, and Third Worlds to construct its military training regimen.

Despite Nyerere's worries about Sandhurst Military Academy in Great Britain, which after the difficulties in Ghana and later Nigeria was seen as fertile ground for the creation of a dangerously independent officer corps, it remained a very common destination for Tanzanian officers in need of training. By 1965, 61 of the 91 Tanzanian officer cadets were training in the United Kingdom in one capacity or another.⁴⁵⁵ The British reported 40 officers having undergone training at Mons and 12 trained at Sandhurst between 1964 and 1965.⁴⁵⁶ These officers were listed as having undergone training in infantry leadership, artillery, engineering, signals, and several other disciplines. Even after the rupture of Anglo-Tanzanian relations due to the Tanzanian denouncement of the Rhodesian Universal Declaration of Independence later that year,

⁴⁵³ Avirgan and Honey, *War in Uganda*, 63.

⁴⁵⁴ The success of the TPDF in the Kagera War will be briefly addressed in the conclusion of this work. Further information at this time is only available through the work of Avirgan and Honey.

⁴⁵⁵ Kilford, *The Other Cold War*, 193.

⁴⁵⁶ BNA, File DO 185.42 Doc., “Tanzania People’s Defense Force,” 1965.

Tanzanian cadets continued to venture to England for training. Journalistic accounts have cadets placed there as late as the 1970s, learning counter-insurgency tactics to supplement their earlier international training.

Beyond this, documentary evidence draws a complicated picture of officers taking extended trips to the British academy to complete their previously begun training. Of course, Sandhurst was not the only destination for members of the Tanzanian military. By the 1970s a good number of Tanzanian military physicians were being trained in their craft at hospitals based in Great Britain, notably in specializations such as psychiatry and internal medicine.⁴⁵⁷ British records even point towards Tanzanian military physicians undergoing both military training and medical training in Britain.⁴⁵⁸ Military training in the United Kingdom continued to take place until past the cessation of this study. Documents from the late 1970s show a continued interest in British training for Tanzanian officers, including a leadership course for squadrons of the Scorpion light tanks, which Tanzania acquired for its military.⁴⁵⁹ However, it was also at this time that severe disorganization seems to have come over the exchange program, leading to less than satisfactory results.⁴⁶⁰

Britain was not the only First World state that the Tanzanians drew expertise from. A multitude of Tanzanian personnel were sent to Italy over several years. The primary purpose of these trips seems to have been to expand their knowledge of the newly established airpower of Tanzania. No less than four large group trips in late

⁴⁵⁷ Tanzania National Archives (TNA), Accession 600 File M.30/1 1976.

⁴⁵⁸ BNA, File DO 185.42 Doc. 4, "Tanzania People's Defense Force," 1965.

⁴⁵⁹ BNA, File FCO 31.2641 Doc. 13, "Military Training for Tanzanians in the UK," 1965.

⁴⁶⁰ BNA, File FCO 31.2641 Doc. 13 and Doc. 9, "Military Training for Tanzanians in the UK," 1965.

1976/early 1977 were made to Italy, featuring a mixture of enlisted men, non-commissioned officers, and officer cadets.⁴⁶¹ All of these trips featured helicopter training or jet aircraft training and maintenance as their goal. Other locales in Western Europe were locations of training as well. Despite the earlier diplomatic break with West Germany over recognition of their Eastern counterpart, documentation shows several TPDF officers as having traveled to Hamburg for a joint mission to both inspect the arms that Tanzania was purchasing from the Federal Republic of Germany and to set up a training regimen within the state for future visits.⁴⁶² Finally, the international connections between Canada and the TPDF remained firmly in existence despite the non-renewal of CAFATTT. Along with the provision of the training team within Tanzania, the initial agreement in 1965 stipulated that Canada would open 25 slots in various training programs in Canada for Tanzanian officers.⁴⁶³ During the five years of CAFATTT's existence, 25 new slots a year were opened for use by the Tanzanians and from 1968 on the majority of these slots were filled.

Even after the CAFATTT program was discontinued, Tanzanians continued to seek training in Canada. Beginning in 1970, Tanzania began to accelerate its international training for all its officer cadets, in its attempt to create a domestic doctrine. However, throughout these efforts, the Canadian Forces remained a privileged partner in Tanzania's attempts to mold its military while remaining non-aligned in its international relations. A treaty signed between the two countries in 1974 formally defined the roles and responsibilities for the Canadian Forces in regards to its visiting Tanzanian

⁴⁶¹ TNA, Acc. 600 File M.30/1/345 1976 and TNA, Acc. 600 File M.30/1/268 1976.

⁴⁶² TNA, Acc. 600 File M.30/1/269 1976 and TNA, Acc. 600 File M.30/1/218 1976.

⁴⁶³ "Agreement concerning the provision of military training and advisory assistance. Signed at Dar es Salaam on 4 November 1965," UN Treaty Series, No. 12481.

trainees.⁴⁶⁴ Additional archival documents show multiple Tanzanian trainees travelling to Canada in 1975 to undergo schooling in a number of military disciplines. A single authorization shows ten Tanzanian officers travelling to Ottawa to learn logistics and transportation methods, while another memorandum recounts the departure of two TPDF majors to Canada to undergo Command and General Staff training.⁴⁶⁵ Even in oral interviews, the influence and appreciation of Canadian training stands out. Retired Major General Herman Lupogo, the former commander of the 205th TPDF Brigade remembered his training in Kingston, Ontario fondly and cited it as the most memorable of his cadet training locations.⁴⁶⁶

The same process continued for the Air Wing as well. While the Russians continued their provision of MiGs, other, more utilitarian, aircraft continued to be acquired from Canada. During Tanzania's 1978-79 War against Idi Amin it pressed for the delivery of the DeHavilland Buffalo transports that it had acquired from Canada. Training as aircrews and pilots continued in Canada as well.⁴⁶⁷ By 1974 treaties assigning liability in air accidents during Tanzanian training in Canada had been signed, showing the continued relationship between the two countries.⁴⁶⁸ In addition, the same archival

464 "Agreement concerning the training in Canada of personnel of the Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces. Signed at Dar es Salaam on 6 September 1975," UN Treaty Series No. 17684.

465 TNA, Acc 600 file M.30/1 1975.

466 Oral Interview, Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Herman Lupogo, June 26, 2011.

467 Avirgan and Honey, *War in Uganda*, 76.

468 See "Exchange Of Notes Between The Government Of Canada And The Government Of The United Republic Of Tanzania Concerning Liability For Damages In Connection With A Programme For Flight Training In Canada Of Pilots Of The Tanzania People's Defence Force" Canada Treaty Information, <http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=103418>, accessed February 14, 2012; and "Agreement Between The Government Of Canada And The Government Of The United Republic Of

documents mentioned previously confirm the continued large scale training of pilots in Canada by as late as 1975. In fact, given the archival documentary record, it is evident that the prolific international training of Tanzanians in Canada continued for at least another decade and Canada remained a central destination for Tanzanian officers and cadets.⁴⁶⁹ Canadian efforts were by far the most successful of any of the First World nations in shaping the Tanzanian military training.

Of course balancing out the influence of the First World was a sizeable investment by the Second World, most notably by the Soviet Union. The USSR's commitment became far more concrete with the unification of Tanzania in 1964, as it had already invested heavily in the Island of Zanzibar following its revolution. Following the upheaval in 1964, the world scrambled around the former Sultanate, with the newly Marxist isle dubbed another Cuba by the international press. However, Zanzibar would only remain independent for approximately three months, and when it joined with Tanganyika it brought with it a Soviet basis for its armed forces. While this was not the sole inroad of the USSR into Tanzania's military forces, the extended struggle to integrate the Zanzibari forces into the new TPDF certainly offered a compelling argument for continued relations. As early as 1968, the Soviets made their presence noticeable with their offer of training in MiG-21 fighters and air defense systems.⁴⁷⁰ Nyerere's Tanzania lacked both of these components and in the increasingly charged region of the Front Line states both were seen as increasingly necessary. With Tanzania's acceptance of this offer,

Tanzania Concerning The Training In Canada Of Personnel Of The Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces,” Canada Treaty Information, <http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=103421>, accessed February 14, 2012.

⁴⁶⁹ TNA, Acc 600 file M.30/1 1975.

⁴⁷⁰ Godefroy, “The Canadian Armed Forces,” 44.

Soviet supervision and training allowed the Tanzanian forces to establish their air defense program. This foreign training gradually escalated into a formidable program, which put them in good stead by the 1978-1979 Tanzania-Uganda War. In July of 1975 alone the Tanzanian command sent 219 officers and enlisted men to Russia for training in Air Defense doctrine and practices.⁴⁷¹ These soldiers were drawn from essentially every branch of the TPDF, including its Navy.

Documentation of visits by officers to other Communist states is not nearly as abundant. There are archival documents that point towards travel to the German Democratic Republic. However, despite their mention of an artillery school, they offer very little in the way of actual confirmation of direct training. There is, however, an equal amount of space dedicated to the discussion of solidarity with the students within the GDR as well. Given the continued relations the TPDF had with West Germany, these links were most likely limited at best. Bulgaria is also listed as a destination, but the objective of the trip was listed as a simple “government business,” which given the propensity for TPDF officers to also be members of the government of Tanzania means any number of activities could have been pursued.⁴⁷²

However, despite the strong ties that the Tanzania People's Defense Force established with both the Western and Eastern Blocs, it was with those nations that had declared themselves non-aligned that Nyerere felt most comfortable. A key tenet of his ideology had always been a strong conception of global South to South cooperation, and during the period of the establishment of the TPDF, there was no shortage of nations to which Tanzania could turn for military aid. Indonesia, that most venerable of all non-

⁴⁷¹ TNA, Acc. 600 File M.30/1/44 1976 and TNA, Acc. 600 File M.30/1/338 1976.

⁴⁷² TNA, Acc. 600 File M.30/1/303 1976.

aligned nations, hosted Tanzanian trainees in the 1970s including Lt. Col. Mussa Maisara Kheri. The Lieutenant Colonel traveled to Bandung in 1975 to attend the Army Command and Staff College in Jakarta, Indonesia.⁴⁷³

India also proved to be a preferred training location for the TPDF. Much like in Indonesia, many Tanzanian officers attended the Staff College there. For example, Captain PEK Mnzava attended a Staff Officer's course in Long Gunnery (artillery) in New Delhi in April of 1975. Two Majors, E. D. Maingu and A. S. Mazora attended courses beginning in December of 1976, while a lengthy list of officers and NCOs attended a diverse number of courses from 1976 to 1977.⁴⁷⁴ These courses included signaling, junior command of artillery, surveying, and an ordinance course, all of which were under the auspices of the Indian military. Of special interest is a report from the Commonwealth Defence Science Organisation describing the function of India's Defense Research and Development Organisation.⁴⁷⁵ It details that "It was, however, realized that Science and Technology have a vital role in Defense and that efforts, therefore, have to be made to develop our own resources so as to achieve self-sufficiency in Defense needs in as great a measure as possible." Given the fact that this cuts to the heart of the problem that faced Tanzania and the seemingly inevitable need to become entangled with other power blocs, it is interesting that India would share this plan with Tanzania as well as the path they took to achieve it.

India's rival Pakistan also served as a central area for the creation of Tanzania's integrated doctrine. The Staff College was a popular destination, with documentary

⁴⁷³ TNA, Acc. 600 File M.30/1 1976.

⁴⁷⁴ TNA, Acc. 600 File M.30/1/20, M.30/1/29, M.30/1/43, and M.30/1/310.

⁴⁷⁵ TNA, Acc. 600 File M.30/1 1976.

evidence pointing towards an eleven month training course for the cadets there. Specifically, a Major D. N. Mshimanyi appears several times in the archival records, having undergone this particular training.⁴⁷⁶ The staff work was not the only program offered within the borders of Pakistan. The archives reveal TPDF members of all ranks having undergone a variety of training, ranging from avionics to account management all the way to ammunition inspection. Apparently, the Pakistani training was held in high enough regard that the students there would be checked up on by a ranking officer at least once or twice a year.

The final major destination for training was the first power to offer Tanzania its aid: China. China had claimed the mantle of the Third World upon its re-emergence as a world power, but the involvement of the second-largest Communist country in the world still remained controversial for Tanzania's other partners. The arrival of seven Chinese military advisers during the reconstruction of the Tanzanian army caused such an uproar that the normally phlegmatic Nyerere felt obliged to convene a furious press conference to address the issue:

*This Chinese Problem, do you know the risk you are taking Mr. Nyerere? What are the risks I am taking? The maximum risk a government takes with an army is the army might revolt. But my army revolted in January. It was not trained by the Chinese... I have an agreement which is public property. I have an agreement with West Germany, another friendly country which is public. No body has questioned me on this. No Body.*⁴⁷⁷

This protest set the tone for the ensuing close relationship with China. In 1966, China increased its local presence in Tanzania, offering training in armor and artillery—training to which the TPDF had not previously had access. While Chinese advisers expanded their

⁴⁷⁶ TNA, Acc. 600 File M.30/1/328 1976.

⁴⁷⁷ Julius Nyerere, Press Conference on August 30, 1964.

training of local instructors, later that year ten officers and sixty enlisted men were sent to China to train specifically in the tanks which were being supplied to Tanzania.⁴⁷⁸

Although there would continue to be a local presence of Chinese military advisers, increasingly the pattern would be one of training within China for instructors. In Avirgan and Honey's journalistic account of the TPDF in action in the war against Uganda, there are numerous references to Chinese training.⁴⁷⁹ The increase of overseas training in China is corroborated in the archival record, where two of the prominently featured officers in the journalists' narrative, General Musurugi and Colonel Msuya, can be placed in China for training by archival documents.⁴⁸⁰ In addition, the importance of China as a source of training is underscored by the fact that China was the only country that Tanzania had a documented military attaché within the first decade of reconstruction. This military official was intended to aid the cadets training in China in their studies and to study the governmental and military structures of China itself, regularly reporting on these matters back to the Tanzanian government.⁴⁸¹ As a coda to the Chinese connection, when it became time for Tanzania to consolidate the two separate academies it had built to spread their amalgamated doctrine, it was China that helped build it, putting an exclamation point on the most influential of all of Tanzania's military relationships.

Conclusion of the Doctrine

By 1978-1979 Tanzania had its doctrinal practices aligned with its ideological goals. While initially simply hoping to remain non-aligned in the context of the Cold War, the TPDF managed to emerge from a bipolar series of military missions into an

⁴⁷⁸ Godefroy, "The Canadian Armed Forces," 40.

⁴⁷⁹ Avirgan and Honey, *War in Uganda*, 63.

⁴⁸⁰ TNA, Acc. 600 File M.30/1 1976.

⁴⁸¹ TNA, Acc. 600 File M.30/1/28 1976.

international effort to create a combined doctrine that left it beholden to no particular state. At the same time, it pursued funding and instruction to build its own military academy to allow the building and promulgation of its own military practices. Following several false starts, by the middle of the 1970s, Tanzania managed to achieve its goals. Its officer corps and even many enlisted personnel were traveling across the globe to learn as much military knowledge as possible. This knowledge was then returned to Tanzania where it was added to the greater body of knowledge being constructed at the new military academy. This led to the Tanzanian People's Defense Force entering into the Kagera War beholden to no singular state and with a military doctrine that would manage to effectively defeat a menacing external foe.

Chapter Eight:

Conclusions and Coda

Military Performance

While it is certainly possible that the Tanzanian People's Defense Force could have been an effective nationalizing force without ever dealing with the larger issues of national defense, this work would be remiss if it ignored the actual military actions in which the TPDF took part. Simply put, while civil-military relations are a prime concern for the armed forces of Africa, militaries of any stripe still exist as organizations that project violence as part of the foreign policy of a state. While Tanzania wished to be a pacific nation, the very existence of the TPDF pointed towards their need for military force on occasion and it is therefore not only germane, but necessary, to discuss their military accomplishments as part of their overall legacy. Although the TPDF certainly cannot claim as august a list of campaigns and battles as its King's African Rifles ancestors could, it did play an active part in the liberation struggles of Southern Africa and later in repelling the aggression of Idi Amin and the eventual overthrow of the murderous dictator's regime. While this certainly will not be an exhaustive account of the service of the TPDF, this section will hopefully illustrate its success as tool of foreign policy as well as nation-building.

The OAU Liberation Committee

As has been noted earlier, upon the creation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963, the member states of the OAU committed themselves to the decolonization of

Africa. Nyerere, as a strident Pan-Africanist, immediately lent the weight of Tanganyika behind the cause of full decolonization in Africa and this policy did not change with the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. However, while the majority of colonies were able to negotiate with their metropolises to gain autonomy and finally independence, much as Tanganyika did, there remained several territories where due to the metropole's intransigence or an entrenched minority rule negotiation would not yield self-determination for the Africans. The Portuguese refused to accept the idea of decolonization, claiming that their holdings in Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Angola, and Mozambique were not colonies at all, but were instead overseas provinces of Portugal itself. As such, the call from the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity for decolonization did not apply to these territories and they remained bound within a Lusotropical Bloc. Beyond the Portuguese there were the white settler states of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, which, despite being majority black African, denied them any substantive political role and so were seen as being 'internally colonized' and in need of liberation from white rule. Namibia was included within this group, as they were held as a "Trustee Territory" under the South Africans following their conquest of it during the First World War.⁴⁸²

In response to the refusal of these regions to decolonize, the OAU created a Liberation Committee, devoted to supporting any and all action to hasten the self-determination of the Africans still living under colonial rule. Nyerere's support for this effort was total, as evidenced by his basing of the Committee in Dar es Salaam. Tanganyika also took the initiative in forming the Front Line States, or those states that

⁴⁸² Namibia had formerly been known as German Southwest Africa.

shared proximity with the colonized territories and a fierce will to support the liberation of those same regions. Local connections for the various resistance groups were established and some were even allowed to create base areas within Tanganyika. However, this support would have important ramifications for the security of Tanganyika on a variety of fronts.

For the Tanganyikan Rifles, the support offered to the resistance groups, specifically *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) along the southern border of Tanganyika, was extremely problematic for several reasons. To begin with, the Tanganyikan Rifles' ranking officers were still wholly British Army personnel seconded to the Tanganyikan Army. For these men, being placed in a situation where they might be called upon to take part in an international incident against Portugal, the oldest of all of Britain's allies, was extremely troubling. This was exacerbated by the fact that the Tanganyikan Rifles were almost certainly going to be called upon to offer expertise or training to the various liberation organizations, which at that time included the Zimbabwean African National Union, the Zimbabwean African People's Union, and the African National Congress. These three fronts were engaged in struggles against the governments of Southern Rhodesia (ZANU and ZAPU) and South Africa (ANC), both of which still had substantial connections with Britain itself. Southern Rhodesia was a self-governing colony under the Crown and South Africa had just declared itself a Republic and exited the Commonwealth two years earlier. In either case, the British personnel were certainly concerned that the military forces under their command would be placed in a position opposed to British interests.

The second major tension within the Tanganyikan security forces was due to the small size of their standing military. The two battalions of the Tanganyikan Rifles were not adequate to provide security to the entire state and at the time rarely saw movement outside their base regions of Colito and Tabora. Given that the southern border was now the scene of several clashes between FRELIMO and the Portuguese colonial forces, it became necessary to form the militia to provide local security. The militia, formally raised in 1963, served until well past the Kagera War as an excellent adjunct to the military. However, at the time, the new militia was simply intended to offer a small amount of security within the country due to the small size of the professional forces.

Of course, the existence of a hostile border with Portuguese Mozambique also had a direct effect following the 1964 Mutiny. While Nyerere considered remaining without a military, it was the direct threat posed by Tanganyika's involvement with the Front Line States that convinced him that the state needed an armed forces to maintain the territorial integrity of Tangayika. With the creation of the TPDF, there was now a popular armed force within the state that did not need to worry about a conflict of interest within its officer corps. From 1964 on, the TPDF offered training and support to a variety of liberation fronts within Tanzania. While FRELIMO had the highest profile amongst the guerrilla fronts within the country, evidence shows Tanzanian support for ZANU, ZAPU, the African National Congress, the *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* (PAIGC), and several other far less known guerrilla fronts.

The withdrawal of the Portuguese from Mozambique did not end the struggle for Southern African liberation. Post 1974 the struggle shifted to the border between Mozambique and Rhodesia, where the white Rhodesian forces fought the increasingly

strong liberation fronts of ZANU and ZAPU. FRELIMO, now the ruling party of Mozambique, simply did not have the military training or strength to continually repel the Rhodesian incursions into their territory. The TPDF continued to engage with the FRELIMO armed forces and offered extensive training and support capabilities to their ally. These included several military missions sent in the mid 1970s to increase the logistic and transport capability of the Mozambican army. In addition, the TPDF deployed troops on Mozambican soil specifically to aid them in defensive struggles against Rhodesian incursions throughout the 1970s, with there being a full battalion of TPDF forces serving on the border in 1978.⁴⁸³ However, these troops were intended to only be used in a defensive measure and only fought in self-defense.⁴⁸⁴

The Kagera War (1978-1979)

The Kagera War, also known amongst Tanzanians as the War against Idi Amin, was the result of a long series of provocations on the part of that infamous individual. Amin, formerly a Non-Commissioned Officer in the King's African Rifles during the Mau Mau crisis, had risen to command of the Ugandan Army in the aftermath of independence and Uganda's own mutiny of 1964. Despite doubts amongst his former officers towards his intelligence, he was elevated as an officer throughout his tenure in the colonial forces and rose even higher under the regime of Milton Obote in Uganda. Amin gained particular acclaim amongst Obote and his allies for his 1966 attack on the followers of Edward Mutesa II, the Kabaka of the Buganda, the traditional leader of one

483 Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, *War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1982), 66

484 J. K. Cilliers, *Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia* (Kent: Crook Helm, 1985), 182.

of the strongest of the native kingdoms in Uganda. Kabaka Mutesa had opposed Obote's political agenda, but was forced into exile in London following Amin's aggressive actions. For this deed, Obote promoted Amin to Colonel and head of the armed forces of Uganda. Amin immediately began a recruiting drive to fill the military with Kakwa and other Nubian ethnic groups, eroding the strength of Obote's own Acholi, who had been a dominant force in the ranks up until that point. By 1970, Amin and Obote had fallen out, and on January 25, 1971 Amin seized power in a coup while Obote was attending the Commonwealth Summit in Singapore.

Amin's reign, which lasted from 1971-1979, remains infamous throughout the world. He suspended large swaths of the Ugandan constitution, established military tribunals as the law of the land, and filled all levels of the government with his own Nubian supporters. He purged the military of any vestiges of the Langi and Acholi that had formerly been the majority of its members, fearing that they would support Obote if he chose to return. Amin's new formations massacred over 5000 soldiers in or near their barracks. Police forces, both overt and secret, began to proliferate and periodic purges of the police and military at all levels kept these services docile. In 1972, Amin even moved against the South Asian population that formed a vital part of the middle class of the state. Declaring it an "economic war," Amin demanded that all non-citizen South Asians remove themselves from the country within 90 days. This led to the Asian population, citizens or not, leaving Uganda en masse. The goods and businesses remaining after their departure were divided up amongst Amin's supporters in the military and police. Despite numerous coup attempts and several hostile exile groups in both Tanzania and Kenya, Amin held on to power. His support base remained the military, which he kept loyal

through ethnic connections and a patronage network lavishly supplied first by the British and Israelis and later the support of the Soviet Union and Qaddafi's Libya. The civilian population suffered through imprisonment and random murders as Amin and his control apparatus suppressed any dissent.

Nyerere had earned Amin's ire from the outset by harboring Obote after the former Ugandan president returned to East Africa. By late 1971 several anti-Amin groups had established base areas within Tanzania. Throughout the next few years, Nyerere and Amin traded provocations. In 1971, Amin's troops twice invaded Tanzania and his planes dropped bombs in the Kagera region. In return, the following year, Ugandan exiles launched an invasion attempt with the quiet blessings of Nyerere. However, this failed when the presumed popular uprising failed to materialize and Amin took vicious reprisals against the local population. While the two states signed an agreement to halt their provocations in 1973, Amin continued to accuse Tanzania of invading Uganda throughout the rest of the decade and sponsored Oscar Kambona in his exile activities against Nyerere. Nyerere maintained distaste for the Ugandan dictator, but ignored the worst of the provocations until 1978.

On October 9, 1978, Amin's force formally crossed the border into the Kagera region of Tanzania. Tanzanian artillery responded, destroying an armored personnel carrier, but despite this early success the TPDF was completely unprepared for Amin's invasion. The next day Ugandan jets began bombing and Ugandan artillery fire began to proliferate along the border. While no ground troops had crossed the border and remained, the TPDF had no response to the ordinance that the Ugandan military was dropping on its territory. As Avirgan and Honey put it, "If an army's primary duty is to

defend the national boundaries, the Tanzania People's Defense Forces (TPDF) failed miserably the first time it was called on to do so."⁴⁸⁵ The TPDF had not even reinforced its border by the time that several strong armored columns assaulted the Tanzanian border posts and overran them on October 25. However, Amin's own forces quickly slowed and then stopped, giving the local TPDF commander an opportunity to re-establish themselves, and their artillery fire managed to convince the tentative Ugandans to withdraw, despite there still being only minimal Tanzanian troops in the region. However, Amin's forces returned in an even stronger push on the 30th, finally driving the Tanzanian forces south of the Kagera River before halting yet again.⁴⁸⁶

Finally convinced of the seriousness of the incursion, Nyerere ordered a full mobilization of his armed forces and began transferring the Southern Brigade, the most battle ready of the four current formations, to the front. To aid the war effort, the government began to increase production in all needed goods as all 20 regional commissioners were told to harness their resources for the war effort. Government and private transportation was commandeered to aid in the mass movement of troops to the front. Amin continued his provocations, challenging the slight Nyerere to a boxing match in lieu of the war, all the while maintaining it had been Tanzania who had invaded Uganda.⁴⁸⁷ While Nyerere ignored the dictator, his troops established themselves in ever greater numbers on the south bank of the Kagera River and prepared a counter-attack to reclaim the strip of Tanzanian territory occupied by Amin's forces.⁴⁸⁸ On November 14,

485 Avirgan and Honey, *War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin*, 53.

486 Associated Press, "Uganda Says It Has Seized Section of Tanzania, Declares River Is New Border," *Los Angeles Times*, November 2, 1978, B18.

487 Avirgan and Honey, *War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin*, 67.

488 Amin meanwhile had declared that his troops had left the area, which the Tanzanians

small TPDF attachments crossed the river with no resistance and returned. The main assault waited until the arrival of a Chinese pontoon bridge, which was finally constructed on the 19th. Tanzanian forces immediately crossed the river and within three days their patrols were already at the Ugandan border, having encountered no resistance. Amin's army had withdrawn, but only after devastating the Kagera region. A large percentage of the Tanzanian populace in the region had been killed or kidnapped while their homes and businesses had been looted. Tanzanian troops continued to put into the region, but none crossed the border as Nyerere and his government made up their minds on the next phase of the conflict.

The decision was not an easy one. If the TPDF continued on, they would invade Uganda with no realistic goal short of toppling Amin's regime, which would most likely draw the widespread condemnation of the OAU.⁴⁸⁹ In January they authorized a small invasion to drive the Ugandan Army away from Mutukula, a small town overlooking the Kagera Salient, on the supposition that the town remained too dangerous as a staging point for an invasion. On the 21st the TPDF launched a diversionary attack, while another formation flanked the Ugandan troops, driving them from the town. However, now that the TPDF stood on Ugandan soil, the decision weighed even heavier on the government. Before Mutukula it had acted in self-defense. It had liberated its territory and then taken

refused to believe. Times Wire Service, "Amin Says He's Ordered a Pullout; Tanzania Calls Statement a Lie," *Los Angeles Times*, November 15, 1978, 10.

489 Nyerere remained incensed that the OAU had called for a ceasefire earlier in the conflict with Uganda troops on Tanzanian soil. This was doubly insulting to him as the Organization refused to condemn Amin's actions. However, the significance of the action was not lost on the World Press. See David B. Ottoway, "Tanzanian Action to Unseat Amin Sets African Precedent," *The Washington Post*, March 31, 1979, A22 and John Darnton, "A Victory for Tanzania, A Worry For Africa," *New York Times*, April 16, 1979, A8.

actions to secure it from further invasion. After Mutukula, the objectives became much more difficult. If the government chose to move forward, then Tanzania was already well on its way to being on a war footing. The militia was called up and a call for volunteers went out. Regional commissioners were given a quota of 2000 recruits for induction into the army and some regions, such as Mara, provided even more. While there was some trepidation at using these part-time soldiers, they acquitted themselves well throughout the conflict. The TPDF was undergoing rapid expansion and now only the question of invading Uganda remained.

Nyerere threaded the political needle by declaring that the Ugandan exiles would be the ones to invade, albeit with 'support' from the TPDF. He called upon Obote, Colonel Tito Okello, Lt. Colonel Oyite Ojok, and a young guerrilla named Yoweri Museveni, among other exile leaders, to assemble their fighters for the liberation of their country. This yielded mixed results, with groups ranging from 800 members to a mere two dozen, but after being fashioned as members of the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA) they were dispatched to the front to serve as a fig leaf to the Tanzanian offensive aimed at the heart of Uganda. These UNLA fighters would be the vanguard for the third stage of the conflict: the fight for Southern Uganda, which began with the advance on Masaka and Mbarara, the two largest Ugandan towns near the border.

Three full Tanzanian brigades (the 201, 207, and 208) were the main weight behind the thrust into Ugandan territory towards Masaka. While several small outposts and airstrips needed to be taken along the way, in each of these occasions the Tanzanians were able to use their weight of firepower to drive back the Ugandans, with few of Amin's units putting up anything but token resistance. The only major losses before

reaching Masaka itself were taken by the 207 Brigade, which had waded through 36 km of swamp to reach their assigned position. The trek itself took over sixty hours total and at the end left around 200 TPDF soldiers ill and unable to continue the campaign. In return, through the course of the drive to the outskirts of Masaka, Amin's forces were disintegrating and hundreds were killed in desultory struggles after being cut off from lines of retreat.⁴⁹⁰ Meanwhile, the 206 Brigade was the sole TPDF formation heading to Mbarara. Their offensive, while as successful as the Masaka drive, walked into an ambush against Amin's forces and lost two dozen men before retreating and regrouping.

Masaka was known as the headquarters for Amin's elite Suicide Battalion and as such the TPDF assumed that the assault would be costly in any event. However, the usual pattern emerged again and after a night-long bombardment by Tanzanian artillery, the TPDF stormed the town on February 24 to find Amin's forces gone. In revenge for the harsh treatment of Kagera, the Tanzanian forces leveled all the remaining buildings in Masaka, one of the few times the Tanzanians were reported acting directly against Ugandan property.⁴⁹¹ The following day, 80 Ugandan guerrillas led by Museveni and supported by the TPDF completed the process of driving out the remaining Ugandan soldiers in Mbarara and the allied forces leveled the base with dynamite.

Following the capture of the two towns, the Tanzanian forces rested and reorganized as the next phase of the war was planned out. Two distinct commands emerged, with the 20 Division (the three brigades that had taken Masaka) remaining

490 A good part of this disparity in casualties is the reported ignorance of basic field craft in the Ugandan forces and their willingness to flee rather than face the UNLA and TPDF invaders.

491 Reuters, "Tanzanian Units Said to Advance Within Uganda," *The Washington Post*, February 24, 1979, A28.

under their commander General Msuguri while the 206 was joined by a formation to become a command called the Task Force under General Silas Myunga. By March, the two commands were moving again, but the Mbarara Task Force continued to encounter resistance. One of the few steadfast formations of Amin's army, the Simba Battalion, remained in the struggle, and while they could not repulse the TPDF/UNLA offensive, they maintained cohesion and continued to fight the invaders each step of the way. Meanwhile the 20 Division advanced towards Lukaya, the bridgehead of one of the few sturdy causeways through the swampy regions around Lake Victoria. The taking and holding of the causeway remained a necessary step in advancing towards Kampala. While the town was taken with little resistance, Amin was already in the process of playing what he considered his trump card. More than 1000 well-equipped Libyan soldiers had been airlifted in by Qaddafi, who cast the conflict as a Muslim nation reeling under a Christian invasion. A large number of these troops, including several multi-barreled mobile rocket launchers, had quietly advanced on Lukaya, supported by a significant number of Uganda troops. Their assault, launched on the March 11, fell directly on the 201 Brigade, who were mostly Tanzanian militia and had not seen the same combat as the rest of the 20 Division. They responded by breaking and running, leaving the road to Masaka wide open to the joint Libyan-Ugandan forces and marking the possibility of a serious reversal for the Tanzanian military.⁴⁹²

Despite the rare opportunity in front of them, Amin's forces did not advance. Their commanders simply took Lukaya and remained within the town while trying to make sense of the recent events. The battle lines ended up snarled in the night as both

⁴⁹² Times Wire Service, "Invaders in Uganda Reported Repelled," *New York Times*, April 1, 1979, 4.

forces tried to reorient themselves and Ugandans, Tanzanians, and Libyans were scattered throughout the immediate environs of the town. Things were not stabilized until the 208 Brigade returned 60km to take the Ugandan forces in the rear. Caught between the reorganized 201 and 207 in front and the 208 from behind, over 400 of the Ugandan forces (including 200 Libyans) had been killed. Despite the disastrous possibilities of the Libyan force's arrival, the Tanzanians had managed to recover the initiative with only a slight loss of time and men. This victory was followed closely by a victory over Amin's elite Tiger Regiment by the 205 Brigade, who after some initial difficulties managed to drive the Ugandans away from Sembabule, 60km northwest of Masaka.

From this point on the Tanzanians never lost the initiative. They continued to drive towards Kampala, destroying small detachments of Ugandans and Libyans along the way. In late March, the 208 Brigade under Mwita Marwa advanced to Entebbe and was shelling the town and its airport.⁴⁹³ With Tanzanians closing in and the main regional airport now under fire, the remaining Libyans made a break for the capital. This column of soldiers ran straight into a prepared TPDF ambush and was wiped out, effectively ending the Libyan involvement with the war.⁴⁹⁴ On April 8, Entebbe was invested by the Tanzanians and they were now prepared to finish their drive for Kampala, where they expected to meet Amin and strong resistance from his armed forces. Plans were made for attacks from the south and west by the 208 and 207 respectively, while the 201 remained in the north to prevent Amin or his men from escaping that direction. After several small

⁴⁹³ David Lamb, "Amin Reported Trapped as Rebels Lob Artillery Shells into Entebbe's Airport," *Los Angeles Times*, March 27, 1979, B4.

⁴⁹⁴ Those Libyans remaining in the capital fled around this time as well. John Darnton, "Libyan Troops Supporting Amin Said to Flee Kampala, Leaving It Defenseless," *New York Times*, April 6, 1979, A9.

skirmishes along the way, the word was passed to the 19th Battalion of the 208 Brigade on April 10, 1979: “Shika Kampala” (“Take Kampala”). Despite the concerns of the TPDF command, there was no apocalyptic battle for Kampala. The 19th Battalion under Colonel Ben Msuya encountered scattered individual resistance but no organized attempt to drive the TPDF away.⁴⁹⁵ By 11 pm that day the TPDF was toasting the taking of Kampala. Although the war raged on, a new government could begin in Uganda.

The last major hurdle of the campaign was the taking of Jinja in East Uganda. Jinja had held a large military installation and the Owen Falls Dam, which provided Uganda and parts of Kenya with electricity. Amin had retreated there and was still making pronouncement of a “Last Stand,” and given the threat posed by his remaining military and the possibility of destroying the vital dam, it was a necessary target.⁴⁹⁶ Four thousand TPDF soldiers and one thousand UNLA Ugandans left Kampala in late April to deal with Amin.⁴⁹⁷ The drive towards Jinja was a pacific one; not a shot was fired between Kampala and the Owen Falls Dam. Jinja itself fell after an artillery bombardment and an assault by the TPDF forces.⁴⁹⁸ The final major stronghold of Amin and his regime had been taken. Even as the Task Force group advanced in the west it encountered scant resistance through its capturing of Masindi and Gulu. The 201 Brigade, after screening Kampala, advanced north and captured several more Amin bases. From

⁴⁹⁵ Times Wire Service, “Idi Amin Reported Fleeing: Tanzanians at Capital's Outskirts,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 29, 1979, A1.

⁴⁹⁶ Jonathan C. Randal, “Amin Forces Appear Set for Last Stand at Jinja,” *Washington Post*, April 21, 1979, A23.

⁴⁹⁷ David Lamb, “Anti-Amin Forces Push Out From Uganda Capital on Two Fronts,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 18, 1979, B7 and Jonathan C. Randal, “Tanzanians Renew Offensive in Eastern Uganda,” *Washington Post*, April, 19 1979, A20.

⁴⁹⁸ Times Wire Service, “Amin Foes Seize Key Jinja Bridge,” *New York Times*, April 18, 1979, A11.

late April on, the TPDF was simply mopping up the remainders of Amin's forces while the dictator himself fled first to Libya and later Saudi Arabia.⁴⁹⁹

In only six months, the TPDF, with the support of the Ugandan exiles, had managed to mobilize over 45,000 troops, drive invaders out of the Kagera Salient, invade Uganda, defeat Amin's Libyan allies, and topple the regime of a belligerent dictator, all with minimal casualties and having never lost more than two dozen soldiers in any given engagement. While one can make the argument that Amin's forces were weak and decadent by the time that the Tanzanians fought them, the fact that they were armed with the most current equipment and backed up by well-equipped Libyan troops made them a formidable force for sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1970s. Beyond this, the sheer scale of the Tanzanian victory, the minimal number of their losses, and the distances traveled while still maintaining cohesion, order, and high fighting spirit, certainly point to the TPDF being a successful model for a military force, whether for defending a nation or acting as an extension of its foreign policy. While the force remained part of the monolithic nation that Nyerere and TANU built, it also proved itself a first class military construct by the measures of the developing world.

Summation

Tanganyika became an independent state in 1961 under the nationalist flag of Julius Nyerere and his TANU party. Over the next nineteen years, the state was centralized under the control of TANU, unified with Zanzibar, and turned towards

⁴⁹⁹ The TPDF and allies drove all the way north to the Sudanese border to secure the West Nile regions, which were considered a danger due to the possible resistance of Amin's homeland. Times Wire Service, "Anti-Amin Forces Reach Sudan Border," *Los Angeles Times*, June 4, 1979, B5.

ujamaa socialism under the Arusha Declaration. The ideals behind these initiatives were those of traditional African communal life and what Nyerere saw as the necessary steps for a self-reliant nation to emerge. By their conclusion, Tanzania was a unified state, where local identity was effaced and national goals and development were paramount. While some of the steps taken were unpopular, such as compulsory National Service for secondary school graduates or the forced villagization of 1973, the state and party rode these out to create a nation that was unified.

Tanganyika did not emerge fully as a new and independent nation on December 9, 1961. While Nyerere and TANU took initiatives to reform the political and social organization of the state over the next nineteen years, they also inherited a distressing colonial legacy. As Weber argues, the state is that organization that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.⁵⁰⁰ For all post-colonial African states this meant the military, and for the vast majority of former British colonies, this meant an inherited colonial military. Tanganyika, along with Uganda and Kenya, inherited those parts of the King's African Rifles that had been raised in their territories for their new militaries. While Britain had hoped that the three would share a federated military power and therefore maintain the consolidated forces, Tanganyika was the first to defer, refusing to rely on others to help determine its strategy of defense. However, despite the sterling service the KAR had offered throughout two World Wars and the diversification of the forces during the Second, the colonial system had retrenched itself by the late 1950s and the Rifles remained at their heart an alien construct of empire within Tanganyika. Although there was the hope that the transformation of the state under the new nationalist

⁵⁰⁰ Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1947), 154

government could proceed without the military due to the traditions of a non-political military, this tradition was simply not in existence in the KAR due to the existing politics of ethnicity and citizenship in the new state of Tanzania.

These existing politics came to a head for a variety of reasons. The 'martial races' that had existed within the military for decades were now marginalized in the new nationalist government. Their pay stagnated, their privileges disappeared, and their hoped-for advancements failed to materialize as the British officers that directed them rejected applicant after applicant for commissions. Even attempts to sidestep the bottleneck of promotion by sending promising youth to Israel for training came to naught. The tensions between the remaining colonial institution and the new revolutionary state finally burst in to violence on January 20, in a mutiny that would mark the end of the KAR traditions within Tanganyika. After its suppression, the new TANU government, shaken by the challenge to its sovereignty and nationalizing programs, needed to reassess its own relationship with the military. While some consideration was given to leaving the state with no formal military, the final decision was made that a military was necessary. However, this led to an essential question: how could the state create a military that would not only safeguard the nation, but continue the process of nation-building?

The answer came in the threefold solution. The new military had to be inextricably tied to the political system of Tanzania to maximize the constructive interaction of the military with the government. The military also needed to be tied to the new national society that was being built in Tanzania so that it could serve as a representative institution and reinforce the social structures being built in the new nation. Finally, this new military needed to be free from outside interference, at least to the

extent that could be achieved in the midst of decolonization and the Cold War. All three of these objectives would be achieved.

In terms of the tying of the military to the government, this was achieved through a variety of methods. These all began with the necessity of TANU/CCM membership for all members of the military. However, this membership would not simply be a ceremonial requirement; the party was firmly ensconced within the military as a part of Mkoa wa Majeshi. Companies were transformed into party cells with their officers as the party officials. Beyond this formal incorporation, it was also possible for these officers to stand for political office in elections or by appointment. While the officer in question would have to set aside his commission while he served, this still gave the upper echelons of the military an unheard of access to direct political power that they had not had before. Finally, the imposition of commissars within the TPDF finished the process of welding the TPDF to TANU by enforcing political education and discipline upon all ranks.

The connection of the military to the new Tanzanian society was created by the previous foundation of National Service (Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa or JKT) and the establishment of National Service as a precondition to military service. National Service created a system by which the regional and ethnic identities of Tanzanians were effaced through education and communal public works. The JKT explicitly took part in the creation of *ujamaa* villages, public facilities, and other nation-building activities. By making service within its ranks a necessity for service within the TPDF, these same characteristics of national service and communal identity were carried forward into the ranks of the military itself. This was aided by the continued practice of all rank and file only serving for three years within the TPDF, meaning that then those who had served

and not attained rank were placed back into society (albeit in the reserves), which allowed them to recirculate throughout society. Due to this process, service to the TPDF became a common practice within society and its members were firmly grounded in the new Tanzanian nation.

Finally, while complete self-reliance and separation from international influences were impossible, the TPDF managed to effectively wall itself off from excessive outside interference through a variety of initiatives. Although the initial hopes of gaining experience from both the Canadians and the Chinese did not work out, these two parties set the foundation for both the future doctrine of the military while also establishing the domestic military academy. This was followed by an intensive process of international training for its officer corps, with training taking place in countries as diverse as Britain, Russia, Canada, China, India, Pakistan, East Germany, Bulgaria, and even Israel. This expansive body of doctrine was sought out to avoid any singular power gaining too much influence over the military and was later synthesized by the JWTZ into a domestic doctrine. This practice created a centralized body of military practice that was Tanzania's alone and allowed the nation to retain its commitment to non-alignment while still pursuing the military liberation of Southern Africa.

TANU and Nyerere managed to recreate the military while making certain that it avoided all of the flaws of the colonial system. It was politicized, connected to the society of the state, and international in outlook, all steps that managed to weave the military into the warp and weft of the new nation of Tanzania. By the late 1970s, the military had become indivisible from the political state and civil society and as such served as a buttress for the transformation of Tanzanian society under Nyerere's national initiatives.

Its final role before the coming of the 1980s and the decline of the revolutionary state of Tanzania would be to fight for the protection of the state against the aggression of Idi Amin, where it would serve with distinction. Through its first nineteen years of existence, the Tanzanian Peoples Defense Force became a firm pillar in the process of nation-building while serving to defend the nation against its reactionary neighbors. It, more than any other African military, was truly a national force and its engagement of the process made its success possible.

Coda

The years following the Kagera War were initially a heyday for the TPDF. The Tanzanian armed forces had performed admirably in a war against a well-equipped and on-paper formidable military. Beyond the actual maneuvering and fighting during the war against Idi Amin, the military had accomplished an even more impressive feat: it had more than doubled its size within a few short months at the outset of the conflict with little change in the appreciable fighting ability of the army. Even after Amin had been expelled from the country, the TPDF managed to maintain security within Uganda for the next two years.⁵⁰¹

However, this expenditure could not last forever. Starting in the 1980s, the central structures of Nyerere's state were crumbling. The villagization schemes of *ujamaa* had failed to create the economic advances that had been hoped for and dissent was rising. In 1985, Nyerere resigned his position as president, feeling that his policies were no longer working and that new leadership was needed. That same year, Tanzania began to

⁵⁰¹ David Lamb, "Tanzania Keeps Strong Voice in Uganda: Post-Amin Regime Forced to Accept Plans for Sizable Army," *Los Angeles Times*, May 11, 1979, D1.

liberalize its economy under the auspices of the IMF. The villagization schemes were dismantled and the large centralized government bureaucracy was broken up. The National Service was reduced and finally removed as a compulsory practice in 1994. Beginning in 1991, the Nyalali Commission polled the nation to check popular support for an opening of the political system. The commission found widespread support for a multiparty system within Tanzania and in 1992 the nation again became a multiparty democracy. For the first time since 1965 more parties than the Chama Cha Mapinduzi were represented on the ballot and by 2006 there were more than 17 registered parties in the state. While the CCM remained the dominant party in that election, the liberalization of the state was no longer to be denied.

The effects this had on the military were immediately apparent. The economic downturn meant a reduction in the size of the military, which had already reduced its ranks following the Kagera War. These steps were seen as even more necessary since the cost of the Kagera War itself was seen as a driving force behind the economic collapse that Tanzania was undergoing.⁵⁰² While the military rapidly contracted, political liberalization fundamentally altered the nature of the military. It was no longer possible to maintain the political structures of the military. Instead the military was divested of all its political structures and troops were instead simply given instruction in the constitutions of Tanzania and Zanzibar and their duties to safeguard the traditions of the state. Those

⁵⁰² Gregory Jaynes, "Uganda War Broke Tanzania's Treasury but Not Its Spirit," *New York Times*, Dec 20, 1979, A2 and Reuters, "War Effort Overloads Tanzania Economy," *Los Angeles Times*, June 24, 1979, H8. This view was driven home by economist Gary Helleiner, "An Economist's Reflections on the Legacies of Julius Nyerere," in David MacDonald and Eunice Njeri Sahle, ed., *The Legacies of Julius Nyerere: Influences on Development Discourse and Practice in Africa* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2002), 54.

officers who were serving as elected or appointed officials had to make a choice for their careers: they could serve as an officer or an official, but not both.

In the end, the structures that connected the TPDF so strongly to its state and thus assured its civil-military relations were dismantled as part of the country moving into the post Cold War economic and political order. However, pacific civil-military relations remained within the state; even a feared coup on February 17, 2011 turned out to have been an accidental explosion due to improperly secured ammunition. Of course, if the structures this work argues were responsible for the harmonious nature of the military no longer exist, but the peace does, what does this mean for the argument itself? The answer remains relatively simple: the formal divestment of the formal structures that tied the military to the political and social structures of the government did not mean the loss of the informal networks that maintained these ties. While the military was no longer formally part of the Chama Cha Mapinduzu following 1992, the command structure remained almost uniformly members of CCM and endorsed its goals. Beyond this, those members that had chosen to leave the military to remain in political life often remained popular politicians and maintained social and often economic ties to members of the military. While there were no longer formal connections between the dominant party and the military, the single degree of separation in no way removed the stabilizing effect between the two.

In terms of the social aspects, the political clout that could often still be wielded by former members of the TPDF could also be translated into social capital. Former officers of the army often found their way into the new social services and foundations within the state. For example, Major General Herman Lupogo remained a politician for

his district until the late 1990s, when he no longer wanted to run for reelection. However, he remained in the social services and now is the Chairman of the Benjamin Mkapa AIDS Foundation in Dar es Salaam.⁵⁰³ Other individuals have found their way onto fishery boards and other public and private foundations that help maintain the social fabric of the state. In addition, the National Service was reintroduced in 2001 and it remains a wildly popular institution. The JKT is now seen much as it used to be: an organization where the unemployed and underemployed youth of the nation can learn career skills while rebuilding the social and economic infrastructure of the state.

Finally, while Tanzania no longer has to worry about a bipolar world, it has generally still wished to remain beholden to no particular nation in terms of its doctrine. Tanzania still teaches the vast majority of its basic doctrine domestically while still sending its officers abroad to offer them new perspectives. In recent years, events have led to a new influence in the region. Following the 1998 Embassy Bombings in Dar es Salaam, the United States began taking a much closer interest in Tanzania and increased attempts to cooperate with the TPDF. This accelerated with the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City, which were connected to the same group responsible for the Embassy bombings. Since then, the continuing War on Terror and the struggle against the Somali Pirates have kept the American efforts in Tanzania at an all time high. More and more TPDF officers are coming to the United States for training and more efforts are being made for joint exercises and training.⁵⁰⁴ This has reached the point that apparently there is now a new rivalry within the ranks echoing the original one from 1964. The 1964

⁵⁰³ Interview with Major General Herman Lupogo, December 26, 2008.

⁵⁰⁴ For an example, see Brigadier General Lilian Kingazi, who completed her master's degree at the United States Navy Post-Graduate School.

doctrinal split saw the old guard remain attached to the Canadian military mission while the newer officers cleaved to the Chinese instructors. The new dynamics see the TPDF old guard remaining connected to the Chinese ways while the ambitious new guard sees opportunity with the American overtures. Regardless, the TPDF remains equally open to all potential sources of aid and still refuses to cede control to any other nation.

Despite all the changes made in the thirty years following this study, the TPDF remains a strong and centralized military force. While there is still sympathy for the older structures of Tanzania within the former members of the military, there is a realistic understanding of the changed circumstances of the TPDF. This understanding in turn saw the members of the TPDF adapt to the changing context of their world and still continue the practices that maintained their unique record and place in Africa. While no longer officially a political or social force, the JWTZ remains a safe and stable institution that continues its roles in building the nation of Tanzania in a new era.

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