**The Dissertation Committee for Daniel Thomas Sternemann Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:**

# Bureaucratic Access Points and Leverage

**Committee:**

Bryan D. Jones, Supervisor

Janet M. Dukerich

Robert G. Moser

Bartholomew H. Sparrow

Samuel G. Workman

# Bureaucratic Access Points and Leverage

**by**

**Daniel Thomas Sternemann, B.A.; M.A.; M.P. Admin.**

**Dissertation**

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

**Doctor of Philosophy**

**The University of Texas at Austin**

**August 2013**

# Bureaucratic Access Points and Leverage

Daniel Thomas Sternemann, PhD

The University of Texas at Austin, 2013

Supervisor: Bryan D. Jones

This project studies how bureaucratic behavior influences policy implementation. It presents a novel bureaucratic access points and leverage theory, which help us understand how policies are successfully implemented in the midst of bureaucratic challenges resulting from organizational roles and responsibilities and contrasting assessments. The concept of access points has traditionally involved lobbyists and interest groups accessing elected officials and their staffs. I ask what is the effect of bureaucrats accessing bureaucrats directly in the policy implementation process and its subsequent evaluation. I argue that bureaucrats leverage other bureaucrats during policy implementation proceedings, which adds the notion of power to access points theory. The focus of this investigation is the relationship between humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) agencies and associated Department of Defense (DOD) components, particularly DOD medical components providing wellness intervention. Bureaucratic access and leverage enables a more unified implementation of over-arching HA/DR policy by disparate agencies with unique missions, resources, capabilities, and assessment measures. The existing literature does not fully capture how such agency differences are mitigated and overcome in implementing policy that spans multiple entities. Bureaucratic access points and leverage theory offers bureaucrats the analytical

capability to know who is controlling policy implementation. It also presents a tool they can use to maintain and increase their own influence and power within a policy domain.

## Table of Contents

## List of Tables

# List of Figures

# Chapter 1: Bureaucratic Access Points Matter

## Introduction

This project studies bureaucratic access points theory, and an emerging theory of leverage, which help us understand how policies are successfully implemented in the midst of bureaucratic challenges resulting from organizational roles and responsibilities and contrasting assessments. It focuses on the relationship between U.S. Government (USG) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) agencies (i.e., United States Agency for International Development and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance) and associated Department of Defense (DOD) medical components, particularly from U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), that respond to HA/DR events. Bureaucratic access and leverage enables a more unified implementation of over-arching HA/DR policy by disparate agencies with unique missions, resources, capabilities, and assessment measures. The existing literature does not fully capture how such agency differences are mitigated and overcome in implementing policy that spans multiple entities. This study is valuable because it helps to fill important gaps in the implementation and policy change literature.

Bureaucratic access points allow communication of vital information at the time of HA/DR events. This access and associated leverage, coupled with the common end state goal of assisting peoples who have experienced disasters, helps create the notion of one common mission. Bureaucratic access points and leverage are the key components to HA/DR policy implementation, and the resulting theory is generalizable to other policy domains.

Interagency challenges are largely due to different missions and different assessment measures carried out by agencies within a policy domain. Therefore, access is an important idea in this study. The notion of access points has traditionally involved lobbyists and interest groups accessing elected officials and their staffs. I ask what is the effect of bureaucrats accessing bureaucrats directly in the policy implementation process and its subsequent evaluation. More importantly, I argue that bureaucrats take advantage of access points to other bureaucrats in the form of leverage during policy implementation proceedings. This study offers the novel perspective that access points for HA/DR bureaucrats, to include those in the DOD, are readily available during the punctuating event (i.e., the natural disaster itself) and may be evaluated through the notions of information, resources, and capabilities they possess and can leverage during these punctuations.

The HA/DR policy domain offers a descriptive, puzzle-driven case to study these various phenomena. How do street-level, or in this case, "disaster-level" bureaucrats in a minuscule office found deep within an independent, sub-cabinet-level agency come to dictate the role and resource expenditures of the massive Department of Defense? Carpenter's notion of "bureaucratic autonomy" begins to explain this phenomenon.[1] Some agencies are politically differentiated or insulated from those who may wish to control them because they possess the unique capacities to assess and analyze, and to

[1] Carpenter, Daniel. 2001. *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovations in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

solve problems by developing new ideas and efficient programs.[2] Carpenter argues that these agencies are able to escape congressional oversight due to this autonomy, particularly when "bureaucrats take actions consistent with their own wishes, actions to which politicians and organized interests defer even though they would prefer that other actions (or no action at all) be taken."[3] Politicians defer to autonomous agencies because failing to do so would sacrifice the public's – in this case, the world's – benefits of agency competence, and the agency has partnership building ability that would make confrontation politically dangerous or untenable for the politicians.[4] In sum, "bureaucratic autonomy requires political legitimacy, or strong organizational reputations embedded in an independent power base."[5]

While the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is granted the authority of being the USG's lead federal agency (LFA) for HA/DR efforts, the DOD and the Department of State (DOS) could choose to ignore and shirk their responsibilities. The LFA mandate gives OFDA the authority, but bureaucrats accessing and leveraging one another is how it becomes reality that an obscure office of less than 350 bureaucrats dictates the use of resources commanded by the behemoth DOD and other USG agencies. The overarching case study used to evaluate the bureaucratic access and leverage theory is the HA/DR policy domain with the associated OFDA and DOD personnel as the particular actors being investigated.

---

[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid., p.4.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., p.14.

The findings and emerging theory from this project are important. Bureaucratic access points and leverage will play a larger role with regard to who gets what, when, and how in the fiscally-constrained and uncertain future of USG budgetary policy. More efficient policy initiatives and implementation measures are needed now more than ever. Bureaucratic access points and leverage theory offers bureaucrats some analytical capability in terms of knowing who is controlling policy implementation, and it also presents a tool they can use to maintain and increase their own influence and power within a policy domain.

This study augments the fields of political science and, to a lesser extent, public administration. Having established the purpose, frame, and value of the project, the following literature review provides this study's foundation based on organizational structure, mission, conflict, and goal assessment. Chapter Two delves into the HA/DR agencies focusing on their structures and roles. It also presents the foundation for the bureaucratic access points and leverage theory and the research questions that guide the project. Chapter Three discusses the research design and explains why qualitative methodology is used to investigate the bureaucratic access points phenomena and associated research questions. Chapter Four offers an analysis of HA/DR bureaucrats' interview data. Chapter Five augments the interview findings with applicable HA/DR missions case studies and formalizes the bureaucratic access points and leverage theory. The final chapter discusses what the results mean from a theoretical and practical perspective. In particular, the bureaucratic access points and leverage theory is shown to

be highly generalizable to other policy domains. Policy recommendations, project limitations, and ideas for future research conclude the study.

**Policy Implementation**

Policy implementation enjoys a vast literature. This project is interested in policy outputs, organizational assessments, and the bureaucrats in the HA/DR policy domain. Therefore, a brief review of implementation literature covering outputs and outcomes and bottom-up and top-down theoretical approaches follows. Organizations literature and access points theory literature will be discussed after this foundational perspective.

Policy outputs are the means by which policy is implemented. For the bureaucrat, outputs are the task environment results of the policy. Policy outcomes are the results of what happens when a given policy is implemented. These may be viewed as the goals of the politicians legislating the policy. While bureaucrats can play the latter role, as well, this study will focus more on the former role of the bureaucrat in terms of outputs. Literature discussing regimes and subgovernments[6] and formal implementation game theory informs the output versus outcome perspective. Of particular relevance to outputs and outcomes is Bardach's ideas on resources (i.e., how they are distributed), goals (i.e.,

---

6 Stoker, Robert. 1989. "A regime framework for implementation analysis: Cooperation and reconciliation of federalist imperatives." *Policy Studies Review*, 9(1):29–49.
McCool, Daniel. 1990. "Subgovernments as determinants of political viability." *Political Science Quarterly*, 105(2):269–293.
Worsham, Jeffrey. 1998. "Subsystem dynamics and agenda control." *American Politics Quarterly*, 26(4):485–512.
May, Peter. 1991. "Reconsidering policy design: Policies and publics." *Journal of Public Policy*, 11(2):187– 206.
May, Peter. 1995. "Can cooperation be mandated? Implementing intergovernmental environmental management in New South Wales and New Zealand." *Publius*, 25(1):89–113.
May, Peter, Joshua Sapotichne, and Samuel Workman. 2009. "Widespread policy disruption: Terrorism, public risks, and homeland security." *Policy Studies Journal*, 37(2):171–194.

how they gain support and evolve), administrative challenges (i.e., policy control and management), agency reputation, and delay.[7] Bardach's game consists of at least a provider and solicitor, and the delays in policy implementation with two actors occur with the number of decision points and transactions and issues of project management. When additional players are involved the delays occur with the onset of different goals (i.e., brought by each actor), uncertainty, and negotiations. This is very similar to what Pressman and Wildavsky found in their study of the Economic Development Administration's failed employment effort in Oakland.[8]

Moving on to the theoretical approaches to studying policy implementation, a brief description of the bottom-up and top-down evaluations follows. A bottom-up approach focuses a lens on the actors in the implementation process. It concerns itself with the influence of multiple actors, mission conflict, organizational structure, and the compromising of and within the legislative process. A top-down approach is policy centered. The legislation itself provides the central decision maker structure and uniformity, degrees of control (i.e., monitoring the policy and its implementation), authority and coordination (i.e., federalism and policy coherence on federal, state, and local levels), legitimacy (i.e., internal checks, such as bureaucratic professionalism, norms, and rules), and coordination. These lenses yield very different "results" in terms

---

[7] Bardach, Eugene. 1977. *The Implementation Game*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
An example of the HA/DR formal game may be found in the Appendix of this paper.

[8] Pressman, Jeffrey, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1973. *Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It's Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

of evaluating policy implementation. Which viewpoint one takes – the street-level bureaucrat's or the central decision maker's – results in different perspectives of what is policy success, efficiency, and effectiveness. Much literature has been devoted to these two approaches[9] with Sabatier providing a unique "best of" compilation.[10] Elmore may provide the most succinct top-down, bottom-up combination with his authority down and expertise up idea.[11] In summary, the myriad literature on implementation evaluates policy from the following perspectives: evaluation and success; goals and goal conflict; a causal model; and trade-offs (i.e., goals are interdependent and who gets what is always at the cost of something or someone else). With this implementation literature covering outputs and outcomes and bottom-up and top-down theoretical approaches as a foundation, we now turn to how organizational mission affects policy implementation.

---

[9] Top-Down theory led by (small sampling only):
Mazmanian, Daniel, and Paul Sabatier, Paul. 1983. *Implementation and Public Policy*. Chicago: Scott Foresman and Co.
Pressman, Jeffrey, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1973. *Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It's Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Van Meter, Donald, and Carl Van Horn. 1975. "The Policy Implementation Process: A conceptual framework." *Administration and Society*, 6:445-488.
Bottom-Up theory led by (representative sample only):
Elmore, Richard. 1979. "Backward mapping: Implementation research and policy decisions." *Political Science Quarterly*, 94:601–616.
Lipsky, Michael. 1971. "Street Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform." *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 6:391-409.
Berman, Paul. 1978. "The study of macro- and micro-implementation." *Public Policy*, 26:157-184.

[10] Sabatier, Paul. 1986. "Top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation research: A critical analysis and suggested synthesis." *Journal of Public Policy*, 6:21–48.

[11] Elmore, Richard. 1979. "Backward mapping: Implementation research and policy decisions." *Political Science Quarterly*, 94:601–616.

**Organizational Mission and Policy Implementation**

An organization's mission is its purpose or why it exists. When Congress creates legislation, they necessarily create an entity to accomplish their goals with that legislation. The goals of legislation may be specific or assumed from the mandate itself or by the means by which Congress empowers the responsible agency(ies) to account for its plans, procedures, and performance in the achievement of those goals. There are two general schools of thought on the interplay between organization and mission. One school, led by Moe, argues that organizational structure largely determines mission.[12] March leads the other school of thought that posits mission largely dictates an organization's structure.[13]

The mission and structure theories are rather limited in their ability to explain institutions and organizations and be practically applied by bureaucrats. New, more diverse theory is needed in both political science and public administration literature. This project's emerging leverage theory, stemming from the novel use of access points in investigating bureaucratic behavior and policy implementation, answers this demand for more explanatory theory and practical application. Beyond the structure or mission argument, it is the current environment that most assuredly plays a vital role in the determination of policymakers' goals and sets the organization's mission.

---

[12] Moe, Terry. 1980. *The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. And Moe, Terry. 1984. "The new economics of organization." *American Journal of Political Science*, 28:739– 777.

[13] March, James, ed. 1965. *Handbook of Organizations*. Chicago: Rand McNally. And March, James, and Roger Weissinger-Baylon, eds. 1986. *Ambiguity and Command: Organizational Perspectives on Military Decision Making*. Boston: Pitman. And March, James, and Herbert A. Simon. 1958. *Organizations*. New York: Wiley. And March, James, and Johan Olsen. 1984. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life." *The American Political Science Review,* 78 (3):734-749.

The context of the policy arena and policymakers' and groups' ability to frame their issue and target certain audiences is a common theme in works by Jones, Baumgartner, and Wilkerson, to name but a few.[14] Jones and Baumgartner base much of their work on bounded rationality. Their concept of maximization of returns (2009) argues that the policy agenda space is finite due to our cognitive limits (i.e., rather short attention spans). The implications of a finite space in which only a certain number of policies can be dealt with at a given time even though many policy areas exist relates to the formulation of policy and, by extension, the organizational missions they inform and empower. More vital to this paper's focus on HA/DR agencies and policy implementation, May, Workman, and Jones discuss bureaucratic attention as a function of elites and elite agenda control rather than having a reliance on public attention in the policy making process.[15] In summary, the preceding literature provides a foundation that places the HA/DR policy domain in a finite space where mission, influenced by organizational structure, matters and elites control the agenda. The next step is to determine the latitude the HA/DR agencies may have within that finite space. Wilson's four political environments provide an informative context for the notion of agency latitude.

Wilson attributes bureaucratic inefficiency to rules, standard operating procedures

---

[14] Baumgartner, Frank, and Bryan Jones. 2009. *Agendas and Instability in American Politics, 2nd Ed*. University of Chicago Press.
Jones, Bryan and Frank Baumgartner. 2005. *The Politics of Attention*. University of Chicago Press.
Jones, Bryan, Heather Larsen-Price, and John Wilkerson. 2009. "Representation and American Governing Institutions." *Journal of Politics*, 71:277-90.

[15] May, Peter, Samuel Workman, and Bryan Jones. 2008. "Organizing Attention: Responses of the Bureaucracy to Agenda Disruption." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 18:517-541.

(SOPs), norms, goals, incentives, constraints, culture, and values.[16] In other words, context matters. Wilson's work offers a few key ideas about the context of the HA/DR policy arena. First, bureaucrats are likely more concerned with processes than outcomes.[17] The different assessment measures used by the HA/DR agencies are an example of this observation. Next, agencies often have many bureaucrats responsible for and performing similar tasks (i.e., much similar, overlapping responsibility).[18] The overlapping DOD and USAID responsibilities, coupled with the separate assessment and accountability measures of the HA/DR agencies, are clear illustrations of this idea. Finally, various agency constraints may increase the prevalence and power of outside influences.[19]

Wilson posits four political environments that capture the effects of outside interests on an agency. His notion of outside interests is what we typically understand as interest groups. This study replaces interest groups with other agencies (or bureaucrats within those agencies) and elected officials as the outside interests in these environments. The first environment involves a "client agency," and this occurs when an agency favors and supports another agency's goals.[20] For example, the DOD supports the goals of HA/DR efforts and responds to OFDA requests.

The second political environment relevant to the HA/DR arena is that of an

---

16 Wilson, James Q. 1989. *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*. New York: Basic.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.

"entrepreneurial agency" in which an agency is created to solve a particular problem.[21] OFDA's role as LFA for HA/DR missions may be an example of this environment. The "problem" (i.e., the disaster) is very specific and only OFDA maintains the experts to address it.

Wilson's third political environment involves competing agencies that vie for influence over the "interest group agency."[22] Because HA/DR efforts offer an occasion for public attention and praise, the DOD and the State Department may view their supportive roles as opportunities to leverage success and relevance when it comes to budgetary considerations. They may compete for roles and responsibilities deemed necessary by OFDA.

The fourth relevant political environment is referred to as a "majoritarian agency," in which no particular outside agency attempts influence.[23] As long as OFDA performs its duties to everyone's satisfaction, the DOD or other agency will likely not attempt to influence or possibly wrest its authority as LFA during HA/DR events. If OFDA fails in its mission, the DOD or other agency may view it as a liability to their missions or an opportunity to expand their missions. These four political environments offer a context within which to place the notion of latitude.

Latitude, or discretionary autonomy, begins with focus – a clear understanding of what an entity brings to the table in terms of responsibility, resources, information,

---

[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.

capabilities, and reputation. Focus enables strategic planning,[24] which allows the possibility of control of future interactions, a key ingredient in autonomy. An organization's strategic planning helps identify its policy niche and advantages it may enjoy in strengthening its position.[25] If "policies are inherently unstable and transitory" as Peltzman[26] asserts, their associated goals and the missions of the agencies employed to accomplish those goals must be unstable and transitory, as well. Alford argues that the mission (and purpose) of organizations is largely determined by exchange, cooperation, and compliance (i.e., in terms of the customer, but his overall point is the key here).[27] In other words, an organization's mission is not necessarily static because the goals may be adjusted, allowing the organization to anticipate different ways of implementing the legislation, or goals, that they are charged with accomplishing. Thus, we have our basis for HA/DR agency latitude in a fixed policy space. As will be discussed in Chapter Two, this flexibility or fluidity opens access points within the bureaucracy and the legislature. But first, an introduction to the HA/DR agencies is in order.

---

24 Birnbaum, Bill. 2004. *Strategic Thinking: A Four Piece Puzzle*. Costa Mesa, CA: Douglas Mountain Publishing

25 Fairholm, Matthew, and Gilbert Fairholm. 2009. *Understanding Leadership Perspectives: Theoretical and Practical Approaches*. New York: Springer Publishers.

26 Peltzman, Sam. 1989. "The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation." *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Microeconomics*, 1-59.

27 Alford, John. 2002. "Defining the client in the public sector: A social-exchange perspective." *Public Administration Review, 62*(3):337-346.

## Chapter 2: The Agencies, Bureaucratic Access Points, and Research Questions

Figure 1. The Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Bureaucracy




### The Agencies

#### *The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)*

> carries out U.S. foreign policy by promoting broad-scale human progress at the same time it expands stable, free societies, creates markets and trade partners for the United States, and fosters good will abroad… to promote broadly shared economic prosperity; strengthen democracy and good governance; improve global health, food security, environmental sustainability and education; help societies

> prevent and recover from conflicts; and provide humanitarian assistance in the wake of natural and man-made disasters (USAID, 2011).

With a budget of thirty billion dollars and 8,000 personnel, USAID is the independent and principal federal agency that extends assistance to countries recovering from disaster, attempting to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms.[28] It receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State but, importantly, is an independent, sub-cabinet-level executive agency.[29] USAID "supports long-term and equitable economic growth and advances U.S. foreign policy objectives by supporting economic growth, agriculture, and trade; global health; and democracy, conflict prevention, and humanitarian assistance."[30] The agency plays a critical role in U.S. national security and foreign policy. USAID's development efforts address poverty in foreign nations caused by insufficient economic opportunity, a fundamental cause of violence.[31] Foreign development joins diplomacy and defense as one of three components of the nation's foreign policy triad. USAID "promotes peace and stability by fostering economic growth, protecting human health, providing emergency humanitarian assistance, and enhancing democracy in developing countries… to improve the lives of millions of people worldwide, represent U.S. values, and advance U.S. interests for peace and prosperity."[32]

Assistance and development is provided in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Near

---

28 USAID, 2012.
29 Ibid.
30 U.S. Military Joint Publication 3-08, 2011, p.A-M-1.
31 USAID, 2012.
32 Ibid.

East, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe and Eurasia.[33] U.S. strength and diplomacy is projected through its many field offices throughout the world and presence in nearly 100 developing countries. Examples of the assistance USAID provides include: technical assistance and capacity building; training and scholarships; food aid and disaster relief; infrastructure construction; enterprise loans and funding; budget support; and credit.[34] USAID's authority and responsibility includes managing a network of foreign nation programs for economic and policy reforms that encourages sound economic growth, political freedom, and good governance.[35]

One of USAID's primary missions is serving as the lead agency responsible for coordinating the USG response to declared disasters and emergencies worldwide.[36] Through its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), USAID carries out the President's authority to provide emergency relief and long-term humanitarian assistance in disaster relief efforts as declared by the ambassador within the affected country or higher DOS authority.[37] Important to this study is the authority USAID/OFDA has in expediting "interventions at the operational and tactical levels through NGOs, IGOs, and other sources of relief capacity," which includes the DOD.[38]

---

[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] U.S. Military Joint Publication 3-08, 2011.
[36] USAID, 2012.
[37] U.S. Military Joint Publication 3-08, 2011.
[38] U.S. Military Joint Publication 3-08, 2011, p.A-M-1.

***The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is***

> the office within USAID responsible for facilitating and coordinating U.S. Government emergency assistance overseas. As part of USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), OFDA provides humanitarian assistance to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the social and economic impact of humanitarian emergencies worldwide (OFDA, 2011).

When a disaster is declared, OFDA has primary responsibility for initiating and coordinating the USG response.[39] "The Administrator of USAID, as the Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance, has delegated the authority to coordinate response to international disasters to OFDA, which is organized under USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA)."[40] With a budget of eight hundred million dollars and a staff of 350 personnel (150 of whom are contractors),[41] OFDA is responsible to: "1) Organize and coordinate the total USG disaster relief response; 2) respond to embassy and/or mission requests for disaster assistance; 3) initiate necessary procurement of supplies, services, and transportation; and 4) coordinate assistance efforts with operational-level NGOs."[42] It is organized into three divisions.[43] The Disaster Response and Mitigation Division coordinates the provision of HA/DR supplies and provides region-specific technical assistance. Within the Disaster Response and Mitigation Division, the Technical Assistance Group provides scientific,

---

[39] USAID, 2012.

[40] U.S. Military Joint Publication 3-08, 2011, p.A-M-2.

[41] USAID, 2012.

[42] U.S. Military Joint Publication 3-08, 2011, p.A-M-2.

[43] OFDA. 2012. "Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2011." Retrieved on April 2, 2013, at http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crises-and-conflict/crisis-response/resources/fy-2011-annual-report.

technical, and analytical knowledge and skills in specific areas (e.g., agriculture and food security, natural resources, nutrition, public health, etc.) to make OFDA's activities and decision making processes more effective and efficient. The Operations Division is responsible for developing and managing logistical, operational, and technical support for OFDA field offices and disaster responses. The Program Support Division provides administrative support, such as budget and financial services, procurement planning, contracts and grants administration, training, information management and technology services, and communications support.

OFDA is the USG lead federal agency (LFA) for HA/DR events and formulates U.S. HA/DR policy in coordination with other USG agencies.[44] "OFDA works with national and international foreign affairs agencies, DOD, DOS, UN agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector in disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and rehabilitation… funds and procures relief supplies and administrative support for short- and long-term disaster situations and provides humanitarian relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance to foreign disaster victims."[45]

Finally, and most important to this study of bureaucrats accessing bureaucrats, USAID/OFDA calls on the aforementioned agencies and organizations to coordinate and accomplish the USG's response to HA/DR events. These agencies and organizations rely on USAID/OFDA for advice and assistance in accomplishing their assigned responsibilities. USAID/OFDA currently has agreements with the DOD "for matters

---

[44] Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC), 2011.

[45] U.S. Military Joint Publication 3-08, 2011, p.A-M-5.

concerning defense equipment and personnel provided to the affected country and for arranging DOD transportation."[46] DOD Directive 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief*, establishes the interagency relationship between the DOD and USAID/OFDA.

***The U.S. Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM) HA/DR***

> missions and programs are central to efforts to enhance security and stability in Central America, South America and the Caribbean. Humanitarian assistance focuses on the provision of health care, infrastructure improvements and aid to populations temporarily or chronically underserved. Disaster relief is the response to reduce human suffering associated with natural disasters that cause the disruption of normal transportation and commerce and destroy infrastructure" (USSOUTHCOM, 2011, "Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief"). (Note: "The U.S. Southern Command Area of Responsibility encompasses 31 countries and 15 areas of special sovereignty… includes the land mass of Latin America south of Mexico, the waters adjacent to Central and South America, [and] the Caribbean Sea (USSOUTHCOM, 2011, "Area of Responsibility").

In its entirety, the DOD has a budget of over six hundred billion dollars and nearly three million personnel (i.e., military members, civilian employees, and contractors). The authority for the provision of U.S. military foreign assistance is a product of various pieces of legislation beginning in 1949. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (MDAA) resulted from the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The MDAA stated, "[I]n view of the coming into force of the North Atlantic Treaty…, "the President is hereby authorized to furnish military assistance in the

---

[46] U.S. Military Joint Publication 3-08, 2011, p.A-M-7. OFDA maintains agreements with following USG agencies, as well: USDA's U.S. Forest Service and the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management for emergency managers, logisticians, communicators, and firefighting experts; Commissioned Corps of the U.S. Public Health Service and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for health assessment and to provide medical personnel, equipment, and supplies; U.S. Geological Survey for notification and assessment of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions; NOAA for typhoon, hurricane, and cyclone reporting and assessment; and FEMA for training in disaster management, emergency preparedness, and relief for HN disaster specialists (U.S. military joint publication 3-08, 2011, p.A-M-7).

form of equipment, materials, and services to such nations as are parties to the treaty and have heretofore requested such assistance."[47] Further, the MDAA granted the President the use of the vast USG resources in these assistance missions stating in, "[T]he President may exercise any power or authority conferred on him by this Act through such agency or officer of the United States as he shall direct."[48]

The Mutual Security Act of 1951 was enacted to "maintain the security and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly countries."[49] The act created the Mutual Security Agency and the office of Director of Mutual Security, which was responsible for coordinating and supervising the military, economic, and technical assistance allowed in the act. The President was given the authority to appoint the director and the U.S. military carried out the operations. However, the Mutual Security Agency was soon abolished, and the Foreign Operations Administration assumed its foreign assistance mission. Nearly as quickly, in 1955, Executive Order 10610 abolished the Foreign Operations Administration and transferred its responsibilities to the DOD *and* the DOS.[50] This constitutes an important shift from foreign assistance being an executive office function to that of an executive agency function. It also created the interagency dynamics we see today by sharing the responsibilities between the DOD and the DOS, albeit for only six years (1955-1961).

---

47 Public Law 81-329, 1949.
48 Ibid.
49 Public Law 165, 1951.
50 USAID History, 2012, and Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2011.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (i.e., U.S. Code 22) granted "continuous supervision and general direction" of U.S. foreign assistance to the DOS and created USAID.[51] That authority has rested in the DOS under the direction of USAID for the last 50 years due to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA 1961). But the initial shared responsibilities between the DOD and DOS and the FAA 1961 have continued to create interagency conflict and points of contention as we see in the following discussion.

According to FAA 1961, the President is authorized to provide military assistance by "acquiring from any source and providing (by loan or grant) any defense article or defense service; [and] assigning or detailing members of the Armed Forces of the United States and other personnel of the Department of Defense to perform duties of a noncombatant nature."[52] The FAA 1961 makes the Secretary of State responsible for the "continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs, including but not limited to determining whether there shall be a military assistance (including civic action)."[53] In the eventuality of military assistance, the act stipulates the following responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense: the "determination of military end-item requirements; the procurement of military equipment in a manner which permits its integration with service programs; the supervision of end-item use by the recipient countries; the supervision of the training of foreign military and related civilian personnel; the movement and delivery of military end-items; and within the Department of Defense, the performance of any

51 USAID History, 2012, and Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
52 Foreign Assistance Act, Section 503, 1961.
53 Foreign Assistance Act, Section 622, 1961.

other functions with respect to the furnishing of military assistance, education and training."[54] Furthermore, the "establishment of priorities in the procurement, delivery, and allocation of military equipment" is a responsibility of the Secretary of Defense.[55] These rather imprecise responsibilities and overlapping jurisdictions are manifested in interagency tension and have spawned various acts and attempted clarifications by Congress.

For example, the 1968 Foreign Military Sales Act, which increased congressional oversight of such sales, resulted from a congressional report that was concerned about the ramifications of a large military sales program.[56] The concerns included the possible development of regional arms races that could shift economic resources from other needs and thereby create regional tensions.[57] A more lengthy evolution of a facet of the FAA 1961 concerns peacekeeping operations.

In 1974, the policy on foreign police training[58] was amended. Peacekeeping operations funds could only be spent on police training in order to assist and augment military peacekeepers in particular foreign assistance operations. President Kennedy had established a public safety program to train foreign police and gave responsibility for the program to the Agency for International Development, now known as USAID.[59] The program was in response to growing concerns over the spread of communism. The U.S.

---

54 Foreign Assistance Act, Section 623, 1961.

55 Ibid.

56 House of Representatives Report Number 1641, 1968.

57 Ibid.

58 This prohibition did not allow police training – or related advice – in foreign countries to be paid for by foreign assistance funds. It was formally added in Section 660 of the updated 1973 FAA.

59 Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2011.

was funding such police training in 34 countries to the tune of 60 million dollars per year by 1968.[60] Congress became involved in the early 1970s when questions regarding insufficient public safety program policy guidelines and the use of funds to support countries known for human rights abuses surfaced.[61] The updated FAA in 1973 effectively ended the public safety program. Multiple amendments to the FAA since 1974 have allowed exceptions to the funding rule. For example, since 1985 funds are allowed for foreign police training "with respect to a country which has a longstanding democratic tradition, does not have standing armed forces, and does not engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."[62] Additionally, since 1996 funds can be used "to reconstitute civilian police authority and capability in the post-conflict restoration of host nation infrastructure for the purposes of supporting a nation emerging from instability, and the provision of professional public safety training, to include training in internationally recognized standards of human rights, the rule of law, anti-corruption, and the promotion of civilian police roles that support democracy."[63] An interesting side note is that the President maintains waiver authority "under 22 USC § 2364 when '…important to the security interests of the United States.'"[64]

The preceding examples illustrate the evolving nature of the FAA and the HA/DR policy arena. They also point out the fact that little guidance is provided for the

---

60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.

humanitarian assistance portion of the term "security assistance" in this policy[65]. But a more encompassing, if still unclear, piece of guidance added to the security assistance policy in 2004. The notion of "security cooperation" sheds light on the HA/DR policy and mission.

DOD Directive 5105.65 delegates "administration of security cooperation programs in whole or in part to the Military Departments and Combatant Commands" (e.g., USSOUTHCOM). Furthermore, the directive granted the military departments and combatant commands the authority to "oversee formulation of security cooperation programs in accordance with approved guidance and policies." However, it did not define "security cooperation."

A 2004 DOD publication defined security cooperation as all "DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation."[66] Further elaboration of the term security cooperation was offered in 2008 in DOD Directive 5132.03, which states that such activities include "all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DOD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships

---

65 Security assistance is defined by U.S. military joint publication 1-02 as a "group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives."

66 U.S. Military Joint Publication 1-02, 2004.

that promote specific U.S. security interests…; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations…" While not overly precise, these guidelines generally place U.S. military-related HA/DR missions and capabilities within the security cooperation construct. One matter that is clear, however, is that the lack of specific HA/DR guidance in DOD policy places USAID and OFDA firmly in control of those missions. This calls for more interagency communication and agreed upon assessment measures.

Table 1. Major Types of Security Assistance Programs[67]

| Type of Security Assistance Program | Administered by |
|---|---|
| Foreign Military Sales | DOD |
| Foreign Military Construction Services | DOD |
| Foreign Military Sales Credit | DOD |
| Leases | DOD |
| Military Assistance Program | DOD |
| International Military Education and Training | DOD |
| Drawdown | DOD |
| Economic Support Fund | DOS |
| Peace Keeping Operations | DOS |
| International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement | DOS |
| Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, & Related Programs | DOS |
| Commercial Export Sales Licensed Under Arms Export Control Act | DOS |

The interagency challenges associated with this responsibility sharing have become a concern. Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified before the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on House Appropriations stating, "[I]n recent years we have struggled to overcome the patchwork of authorities and regulations that were put in place during a very different era – the Cold War – to confront a notably

67 Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2011.

different set of threats and challenges."[68] And then Under Secretary of Defense Eric Edelman commented, "[W]e need new, more responsive authorities enabling us to expedite the training and equipping of partner nations" in a hearing before the Committee on House Armed Services.[69] The DOD clearly wants more authority and opportunities to be valuable in this time of budget cuts and agency scrutiny. And it is not only the DOD that sees the need for new policy. The following examples of authority changes have been recommended by the DOS: allow DOD assistance to non-military security forces; single-year security-related appropriations should be expanded to multi-year periods; repeal or amend the ban on assistance for civilian law enforcement units with regard to peacekeeping operations (PKO) funds (i.e., the previously mentioned Section 660 of the 1973 FAA).[70]

It has been argued that new authorities are needed for faster and more accurate budgetary funding and accounting. According to the current congressional budget cycle, the Executive begins planning for the allocation of foreign and military assistance a full two years prior to the fiscal year in which the funding will be used.[71] The DOS and USAID face the same foreign assistance budget-allocation dilemma, but their difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that nearly all of their funding is controlled by earmarks and

---

[68] Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2011. (Testimony: March 29, 2007.)

[69] Ibid. (Testimony: April 7, 2006.)

[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid. In the case of foreign military financing, funding to deal with emergencies may not be available for up to four years in the future. Of the $4.6 billion FMF account, only $80 million was available for discretionary use by the DOD (Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2011).

various other legislative limitations.[72] Congress has, at the same time, lauded and expressed concern regarding calls for increased DOD authority. Then-Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Ike Skelton (Dem., MO) praised the DOD's effort to "jumpstart, and take responsibility for resourcing, an interagency process" but was concerned with "what appears to be the migration of State Department activities to the Department of Defense."[73] Then-Secretary of Defense Gates responded to Rep. Skelton's concern by positing, "building partner capacity is a vital and enduring military requirement – irrespective of the capacity of other departments – and its authorities and funding mechanisms should reflect that reality."[74] Once again we see that the interagency challenges and responsibilities are points of contention – even when one agency is willing to cede some authority to the other.

**Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief**

Humanitarian assistance in the USG HA/DR agency context refers to relief, not development.[75] The Foreign Assistance Act (September 4, 1961) created USAID and OFDA.[76] It was due in large part to the Marshall Plan (June 5, 1947), which outlined the need and purpose of the U.S. providing humanitarian aid and specifically by President Kennedy's inaugural speech (January 20, 1961). While an important humanitarian responsibility and diplomatic tool, less than one percent of the USG budget goes toward

---

72 USAID, 2012, and Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2011.

73 Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2011.

74 Ibid.

75 Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC). USAID/OFDA produces and presents an educational workshop to prepare DOD personnel to work collaboratively with OFDA during HA/DR operations. I attended one of these workshops July 28-29 in San Antonio, Texas.

76 USAID, 2011.

foreign aid, yet over 50 USG agencies are involved with the delivery of foreign aid (including HA/DR efforts) with the Departments of State, Agriculture, and Energy mainly responsible.[77] The State Department, USAID/OFDA, and the DOD are the main agencies involved in HA/DR-specific missions.[78] This project will focus on USAID, generally, and OFDA and USSOUTHCOM, specifically.[79]

USAID is a sub-cabinet level position and is not a part of the State Department. USAID does not report to or through the DOS, and its budget is separate from the DOS (i.e., "administratively" its monies flow through the DOS, but the DOS does not determine how or where those monies are spent).[80] USAID and DOS, jointly, promote peace and security, support democratic government, invest in people (e.g., health/wellness, education, etc.), and support local economic growth and humanitarian assistance when required.[81] Specifically, USAID provides humanitarian assistance in the form of: 1) recovery from disaster; 2) escaping poverty; and 3) engaging in democratic reforms.[82] In keeping with these responsibilities, OFDA is charged to: 1) save lives; 2)

---

77 JHOC, 2011.

78 Ibid.

79 USSOUTHCOM was chosen as the subject DOD entity in order to provide more specificity and nuanced observations rather than studying the entire DOD. This combatant command is representative of the DOD in that it includes a joint (i.e., Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine forces) perspective and its readiness and training and real world missions are HA/DR related. The command has a long history of such missions, dating back to its origin as the Caribbean Defense Command, 1941-1947 (USSOUTHCOM, 2012). And although the command honorably served the efforts of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, its geographic location and mission mitigate, to a larger degree than that of similar commands, the influence those wars had in terms of responding to HA/DR events.

80 JHOC, 2011.

81 Ibid.

82 USAID, 2011, and JHOC, 2011.

alleviate human suffering; and 3) reduce the economic and social impact of disasters.[83] The third charge includes mitigation and pre-disaster planning and preparation (e.g., table-top exercises; building up and storing resources, supplies, and other capabilities in specific areas of the world).[84] And USSOUTHCOM is one of nine unified combatant commands within the DOD (i.e., a joint command including Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine personnel and resources) and is "responsible for providing contingency planning, operations, and security cooperation for Central America, South America, the Caribbean (except U.S. commonwealths, territories, and possessions)… [and] the defense of the Panama Canal and canal area."[85] Its specific HA/DR mission is described above.

The organizational structures of these agencies resemble most USG bureaucracies in that they are vertical and hierarchical. OFDA, however, is more flat due to the fact it has only about 350 personnel, roughly 150 of whom are contractors.[86] (Please see USAID and OFDA organization charts in Appendix.) Once a disaster is declared by the U.S. ambassador or her/his designee (e.g., Chief of Mission) or the Assistant Secretary of State for the region (i.e., located in Washington D.C.; this is the case if the U.S. does not have an embassy in the country affected) OFDA becomes the LFA and coordinates all

---

83 JHOC, 2011.

84 Ibid.

85 USSOUTHCOM, 2011.

86 JHOC, 2011. Notes: The $800M figure may seem small for an agency with such responsibilities, but OFDA does not need to "own" the resources as it has all of the USG HA/DR capabilities and resources at its beck and call as LFA. Mitigation efforts account for ten percent the OFDA budget, and it is estimated by OFDA that those pre-disaster efforts save seven dollars in response dollar spending for every dollar spent for mitigation. USAID includes roughly 8,000 personnel and a budget of $30B for FY2011.

foreign disaster assistance efforts to include requesting support from other USG entities.[87] In other words, this *office of 350 controls the vast HA/DR resources of the USG, including the DOD*. This incredible power is discussed more fully in the forthcoming interagency discussion, but the ramifications of this phenomenon cannot be overstated. The host, or affected, country is in charge of the relief effort – certainly to varying degrees – and the U.S. ambassador is the U.S. lead in the country, but OFDA is in a dominant position because of its LFA status, vast expertise and information, and control of myriad USG resources. Its small size in terms of personnel is a bureaucratic challenge as more USG agencies become involved.

May (and Winter) in their work on domestic disaster policy discuss this paradox that OFDA faces.[88] Their observation involves the effect of multiple agencies and entities having a responsibility in the response – the more entities involved, the greater the dispersion of control and accountability and the more difficult it is to centralize a response. Organizational and, in some sense, policy domain structure changes come with opportunity costs due to the fact that centralization creates difficulties with disparate sources of information and expertise. Therefore, the substance of the policy matters in terms of the information coming from entities who are not experts, and this creates a fog of command and control and, ultimately, implementation.

---

87 JHOC, 2011.

88 May, Peter. 1986. *Disaster Policy Implementation: Management Strategies Under Shared Governance*. New York: Plenum Press. And May, Peter, and Walter Williams. 1985.*Recovering From Catastrophes: Federal Disaster Relief Policy and Politics*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. And May, Peter, and Søren Winter. 2009. "Politicians, Managers, and Street-Level Bureaucrats: Influence on Policy Implementation." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,* 19(3): 453-476. And May, Peter, and Søren Winter. 2007. "Collaborative Service Arrangements, Patterns, Bases, and Perceived Consequences." *Public Management Review,* 9(4): 479-502.

The perplexing result of this fog is that the conflicts and problems with information confuse what could be a synergistic relationship that could effectively respond to multiple policy goals at one time. For example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) transitioned to a terrorism focus after 9/11 and nearly eliminated the natural disaster response or relief verbiage in their policy hearings.[89] In various ways the response to a terrorist act and a natural disaster – as far as what FEMA would be responsible for – would likely be similar. The idea that both responses can be handled similarly is how the DOD often addresses the dual roles of readiness and HA/DR efforts. Section 401 of the Title 10 U.S. Code, DOD Directive 2205.2 (October 1994), and DOD Instruction 2205.3 (January 1995) dictate that military resources and funds be used for training and readiness. But funds are authorized for military forces to engage in HA activities if they help obtain and advance the security interests of the U.S. and the host nation and enhance the operational readiness skills of the military members performing the HA mission.[90]

The training and readiness exercises that prepare and assess military resources for fitness and competence for duty in war and other conflict is used as humanitarian assistance that also prepares military resources to respond to disaster relief efforts. Moynihan discusses the Incident Command System (ICS) and its use in crisis response

---

[89] May, Peter, Joshua Sapotichne, and Samuel Workman. 2009. "Widespread policy disruption: Terrorism, public risks, and homeland security." *Policy Studies Journal*, 37(2):171–194. And Workman, Samuel. November 2, 2011. Note: Former citation, generally; latter citation, specifically.

[90] U.S. Code: Title 10, Chapter 20, Section 401.

efforts that require a temporary hierarchical structure among the associated agencies.[91] The ICS attempts to address the coordination difficulties stemming from disparate views and the compilation of multiple entities identified by Wildavsky and Pressman and, more recently, May, et al. The manner in which authority is shared and contested, and the importance of trust in determining and maintaining control are key components of the ICS.[92] Having discussed the missions and organizations of USAID/OFDA and USSOUTHCOM and the fog of multiple entities combining to address the disaster, we now turn to the interagency conflicts associated with assessment measures and how they affect HA/DR policy implementation.

**Interagency Conflicts and Bureaucratic Challenges**

Interagency conflicts and bureaucratic challenges affecting implementation are largely due to different missions and different assessment measures. As mentioned, OFDA, an agency with 350 individuals, in many ways controls DOD resources in these HA/DR situations. That in and of itself is unique in terms of mission and implementation. Assessments of what is required to meet the disaster event's needs and differences in how those assessments are measured are the prime reasons for conflict in the HA/DR policy domain.

---

91 Moynihan, Donald. 2009. "The Network Governance of Crisis Response: Case Studies of Incident Command Systems." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 19(4): 895-915.
92 Ibid.

We begin with the categorized types of disasters. The HA/DR community places disasters into three main categories:

1) Rapid Onset (e.g., earthquake, volcanoes, tsunamis depending on time/warning);
2) Slow Onset (e.g., drought);
3) Complex Emergency (CE), which have elements of conflict associated with them (e.g., the recent situation in Libya and many of the disasters in Africa).[93]

There are three main criteria for determining when disaster relief will be offered by the USG. They include the following with a fourth criterion that may play a larger role in the future:

1) The host, or affected, country must ask for or be willing to accept USG assistance.
2) The disaster is of such magnitude that it is beyond the host country's ability to respond adequately (i.e., therefore, most USG efforts will be in developing nations).
3) It is in the interest of the USG to provide assistance. Note: OFDA has always responded with DR efforts when #1 and #2 have been met; but a disaster in Venezuela, for instance, may be an example in which #3 changes the overall decision to provide DR. Other countries may view U.S. relief efforts in Venezuela (or a similar situation) as a "way in" politically to change that country's political course, and "ulterior motives" of DR must be kept to a minimum if U.S. assistance is to be accepted in the future.
4) Only #1-3 are "official" USG criteria, but a fourth may be resources and, in particular, money. Will budget cuts begin to dictate US involvement, and should

[93] JHOC, 2011.

they? This, in conjunction with #3, introduces the idea that morality trumps practicality in many cases in U.S. policy.[94]

OFDA responds with relief efforts that include funding, humanitarian commodities, and personnel. Most of the USG funding for particular DR efforts goes to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the United Nations (UN). As an aside, the Stafford Act, which deals with monies for DR causes, does not impact OFDA because it addresses domestic disasters only. Humanitarian commodities include plastic sheeting, water treatment units, blankets, etc.) but not food or specific medicines (i.e., other agencies are responsible for these). OFDA offers much expertise and its personnel offer specific HA/DR knowledge and lessons learned and are aware of cultural issues and sensitivities, are familiar with the region's disaster profile, and have vital relationships and contacts in every region.[95] Unfortunately, the way OFDA divides the globe into regions does not align with the DOD combatant commands' (e.g., USSOUTHCOM) areas of responsibility. Therefore, OFDA may be dealing with multiple combatant commands simultaneously. One policy suggestion would be to streamline communication and interagency coordination by aligning OFDA regions with DOD areas of responsibility.

---

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid. OFDA personnel are included in the following: Assessment teams, which are sector specialists/experts (i.e., medical, water, sanitation, health, food, shelter) who provide the right resource, at the right place, at the right time; Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), which are the least used response option, but have the highest visibility and expertise and manage USG relief efforts on the ground for the Ambassador (under Ambassador's authority); Response Management Team (RMT), which are initiated if a DART is placed and serve as liaisons for the DART and deals with the political/information (i.e., at the strategic level) requirements from Washington D.C. and allows the DART to do its job on the ground without having to "feed the information beast" consisting of politicians and the media.

**Assessments**

With these foundations of what constitutes a disaster, how the decision to provide relief is assessed, and the components of the relief we can turn to the assessment measures of what constitutes "need" in DR situations. Again, this is the main point of conflict in this interagency amalgam. First, and foremost, the DOD still does not have measures of effectiveness; they assess based on what they *can do* (i.e., what they can bring to the table in terms of capabilities). OFDA assesses on *needs*, not what could be done, but what needs to be done to return the host nation back to the state it was in one minute before the disaster occurred. This is a very important distinction, and it is not merely semantics – "assessment" means something very different to the DOD than it does to OFDA and other relief agencies. In addition to the DOD *pushing* (i.e., in assessment and its capabilities) while OFDA *pulls* (i.e., determines needs first, then requests capabilities), the U.S. military tends to plan for worst case scenarios, while OFDA looks at the particular need for the particular incident or event. These are important differences that can cause friction between the agencies.

The friction created by different assessment measures not only thickens the fog of DR implementation in the immediate response, but it makes it difficult to transition from relief to plans for development and effectively, efficiently transitioning out of the country. The "simple" question of what constitutes success and mission accomplishment is therefore skewed by the differences in the initial assessments and what they are based upon. This conflict has much to do with measures. If the USG HA/DR policy goal is to get the host nation back to its pre-disaster level or state of functioning, why is this a

difficult transition? International organizations (IOs)[96] and NGOs play a role in the conflict, but the cultures, goals, rules, and norms[97] that inform the assessments employed by the USAID/OFDA and DOD bureaucracies are of particular interest to this discussion.

The following table offers organizational differences between humanitarian and military entities.

Table 2. Humanitarian and Military Cultures: Differences[98]

| HUMANITARIAN | MILITARY |
|---|---|
| Independent | Highly disciplined |
| Decentralized authority | Hierarchical command |
| On-the-job training | Extensive training |
| Few field manuals/guidance | Rules and regulations abound |
| Long-term perspective | Immediacy (accomplish mission and leave) |

But these groups are alike in more philosophical ways. Both groups are motivated by service and a desire to improve a situation. Both spend much time away from their loved ones often and for extended periods. Both are selfless and understand the intrinsic benefits of being a part of something larger than themselves. The differences and commonalities are generalities, but few would argue the overall ideas presented here.

---

96 Examples: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which focuses on conflicts/complex emergencies; the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), which is the "traditional" Red Cross most think of; the International Organization for Migration, which deals with anyone who voluntarily moves across a border in search of economic gain; and, of course, the UN and its subgroups (e.g., the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the UN's equivalent to OFDA), all of which is large and decentralized resulting in command and control issues that affect coordination and collaboration.

97 Please see previous literature review for references.

98 JHOC, 2011.

Yet, conflict remains in this policy domain and steps have been taken to mitigate the deleterious effects.

DOD and USAID/OFDA efforts are coordinated by the "Oslo Guidelines." These guidelines provide non-binding guidance for the use of foreign military and civil defense assets in disaster relief efforts.[99] For example, the military is only to be used when a civilian asset cannot perform the task and the military provides that unique, critical tool or capability. An important point here is that OFDA objectives and definitions of humanitarian action are couched by an emphasis on humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence.[100] These ideals variously espouse the notion that humanitarian action should do no harm, that allocation of resources should be based on need, and that the goal is to strengthen the host country's capacity so it can move forward and recover on its own. Under these conditions, neutrality may be the most important concept because USAID/OFDA (and NGOs) cannot be seen as favoring the military or acquiescing to other-than-humanitarian goals or objectives. The humanitarian aspect can also come into conflict with the purpose of DOD involvement in pre- or extra-disaster relief efforts, which is to train U.S. troops and prepare them for deployments, not necessarily for the delivery of wellness or medical services to the host nation (i.e., Title 10 stipulations). Finally, assessments of the type of required assistance is guided by whether the need calls for direct, indirect, or infrastructure support.[101] Direct assistance entails the military

---

99 "Guidelines On the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief - "Oslo Guidelines." 2006. (Revision 1.1 November 2007)

100 JHOC, 2011.

101 Ibid.

providing a capability no other entity can provide (e.g., aeromedical evacuation). An example of indirect assistance would be the provision of DOD equipment for use by relief workers (i.e., U.S. military provides assets such as trucks, tents, etc.). Infrastructure support sees the U.S. military providing the means for the accomplishment of some task (e.g., air or sea transportation, expertise, etc.).

In summary, this interagency conflict section has focused on the assessment differences leading to potential civil-military issues and confusion in HA/DR efforts. The following is a brief list of the important components to avoid, or at least lessen, this conflict:

- The USG HA/DR policy goal is to bring the host nation back to the level of pre-disaster status (not improve it);
- Know the context;
- Know the priority needs;
- Be sensitive to partner concerns;
- Do not duplicate efforts;
- Do not compare living conditions to U.S. standards;
- Focus on institutional support (i.e., institutions, not people) and help the system to help the populace.

These are important fog of friction points to ponder because the U.S. military is used more often in these situations, and the military is inviting itself to help in HA/DR efforts besides being asked or requested by OFDA/USAID. Finally, actors in this policy domain would do well to remember that OFDA is LFA and is responsible for determining the appropriate USG HA/DR contributions and validates the humanitarian requirement (i.e., needs assessment) and the following keys to OFDA and DOD coordination.

- Communication;
- Exchanging/embedding liaisons;

- Sharing information;
- Understanding the mission and the unique capabilities at appropriate levels (i.e., needs/pull, rather than capabilities/push);
- Right resource, at the right place, at the right time;
- Validating the mission;
- Understanding local capability;
- Transition and phase-out (i.e., mission accomplishment);
- One team, one fight;
- *Managing expectations* is very important (i.e., again, return to pre-disaster conditions only, not improving the host nation's situation beyond that criterion).[102]

Please see Appendix for more information on the criteria for DOD involvement and how OFDA requests DOD resources.

The preceding sections have provided a foundation based on organizational structure, mission, conflict, and goal assessment. The next step is determining the access points that may be the bureaucrats themselves or available to the bureaucrats and agencies. To Hammond, structure is the agenda.[103] Which actor makes a decision and at what level that decision is made is what matters. Span of control is an issue in terms of what is delegated and what is reported directly, and that is based on the structure of the organization. The structure is determinative of the agenda and the outcome is based on what information is paid attention to, again, based on what level and which actor is making the decision. Importantly, Hammond's theory assumes that structure is malleable and can be adjusted. This provides the opportunity for access points to appear in the implementation process. Bureaucrats may be points of access themselves, and bureaucrats may be accessing other bureaucrats in this construct.

---

[102] JHOC, 2011.

[103] Hammond, Thomas. 1986. "Agenda control, organizational structure, and bureaucratic politics." *American Journal of Political Science*, 30(2):379–420.

**Access Points Theory**

Interest group politics literature provides a foundation for the notion of access points. The literature discussing interest group influence can be divided into two camps: 1) interest groups dominate and elected officials acquiesce to their demands; and 2) interest groups' influence is limited by the information sought by elected officials, and the limited time and attention of elected officials regarding specific interests further mitigates groups' power and influence. The first camp consists of various scholars generally following Schattschneider's early argument that well organized groups control legislators and that the latter then ignore everyone else.[104] They include Truman and Lowi to name two of the more notable contributors.[105] Bauer, de Sola Pool, and Dexter are the forerunners of the second camp that finds business is more constrained than is generally thought.[106]

Lobbying activity exhibits immense skewness.[107] Few issues enjoy massive amounts of activity; the majority are specialty, or niche, issues that receive activity from only a few groups (i.e., which tend to be business groups).[108] In nearly all cases,

---

[104] Schattschneider, E. E. 1935. *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff: A Study of Free Private Enterprise in Pressure Politics, as Shown in the 1929-1930 Revision of the Tariff*. New York: Prentice-Hall.

[105] Truman, David B. 1971. *The Governmental Process; Political Interests and Public Opinion*. New York: Knopf. And Lowi, Theodore J. 1979. *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States*. New York: Norton.

[106] Bauer, Raymond, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Dexter. 1963. *American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade* (New York: Atherton Press).

[107] Baumgartner, Frank, and Beth Leech. 2001. "Issue Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics." Journal of Politics. 63:1191-1213.

[108] Ibid.

government attention leads to lobbying and largely dictates lobbying activity.[109] And the status quo prevails in most policy domains.[110] While these broad perspectives provide a general foundation, Baumgartner and Leech argue that interest group literature fails to cumulate existing approaches, theories, and frameworks.

The lack of accumulated knowledge about interest groups stems from narrow, poorly generalizable studies.[111] It also results from an absence of a clear, set definition for terminology, the lack of large, comprehensive data that would allow for the formulation and testing of larger theories, and a failure by scholars to include context into their models and theories.[112] In other words, we need to know the systematic causes of interest group politics. These arguments and realizations reveal other important contributions of this project. Bureaucratic access points and leverage theory is generalizable across policy domains. At the same time, the study reveals deep contextual features within the subject HA/DR policy domain. Therefore, we turn to the concept of access points theory.

According to Ehrlich, access points theory espouses that

> a single underlying feature of many different types of political institutions provides answers to both the questions of whom policy favors and whether policy is complex or simple across a wide range of different policy areas. The central

---

[109] Leech, Beth, Frank Baumgartner, Timothy La Pira, and Nicholas Semanko. 2005. "Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government Activity and the Demand for Advocacy." *Political Research Quarterly* 58:19-30.

[110] Bachrach, Peter, and Morton Baratz. 1962. "Two Faces of Power." *American Political Science Review* 56:947-952. And Bachrach, Peter, and Morton Baratz. 1963. "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework." *American Political Science Review* 57:632-642.

[111] Baumgartner, Frank, and Beth Leech. 1998. *Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

[112] Ibid.

> insight…is that the more points of access provided to interest groups, the more complex policy will be, and if one side of the debate has an advantage in lobbying, the more biased policy will be toward the side with the advantage (p.5).[113]

A subtle, yet key, nuance in Ehrlich's definition and my theory of access points is that he considers as an access point every policymaker who can be lobbied and who has influence in a policy domain.[114] This stems from economic theory that holds the greater number of access points, in this case, the less cost to the interest groups to get their message heard because the increase in the supply of access points (i.e., again, policymakers) increases the demand for the resources (e.g., information, campaign contributions) provided by the groups. The notion of access points has traditionally involved lobbyists and interest groups accessing elected officials. I reason that bureaucrats may be seen as quasi-policymakers in how they implement policy and are, therefore, access points. Furthermore, and most importantly, I argue that bureaucrats use other bureaucrats as access points in a similar fashion as do interest groups and their lobbyists when accessing elected officials and their staffs.

The notion of bias in Ehrlich's definition is an important aspect of access points theory, and three works from the early 1960s inform my interpretation and expansion of the theory. Schattschneider introduced the "mobilization of bias" idea (i.e., dominant values, beliefs, and institutional procedures put in place to benefit certain persons or groups at the expense of others) in describing how groups attempt to influence policy

---

113 Ehrlich, Sean D. 2011. *Access Points: An Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity*. New York: Oxford University Press.

114 Ibid., p.6.

(outputs) and thereby garner benefits (outcomes).[115] Schattschneider also argues that when an interest group sees itself at some disadvantage, it will want to expand the conflict.[116] Such expansion creates more access points.

Bachrach and Baratz add control of the policy process through power to the mobilization of bias theory.[117] They focus on the dynamics of nondecision making, or the continuance and maintenance of the status quo by limiting the scope of decision making to only "safe" issues and policies. Control of the agenda is crucial, and it relies on the mobilization of bias. This bias is sustained through nondecision making (i.e., by force or threat of sanctions; norms, values, rules, procedures, etc.), thus assuring certain persons or groups and their perspectives and issues are kept off of the policymaking agenda and not heard. Agenda limitation or constraint is accomplished through what they refer to as the restrictive face of power. The strength of Schattschneider's and Bachrach and Baratz's analytical framework is that it is simple and direct. Its weakness is the lack of applicability for policymakers in terms of access points that in turn affect policy implementation. Tangentially related to this discussion is Olson's work on the collective action problem faced by groups within a policy domain.[118]

---

115 Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

116 Ibid.

117 Bachrach, Peter, and Morton Baratz. 1962. "Two Faces of Power." *American Political Science Review* 56:947-952. And Bachrach, Peter, and Morton Baratz. 1963. "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework." *American Political Science Review* 57:632-642.

118 Olson, Mancur. 1971. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Press. And Olson, Mancur. 1982. *The Rise and Decline of Nations*. New Haven: Yale Press.

Bias may be viewed as Laswell's "who gets what, when, and how" definition of politics[119] and, especially, the amount one side gets of the "what" in relation to the amount received by the other side.[120] The benefits of the mobilization of bias lead to access points in a quid pro quo arrangement between the seekers of access and the access points themselves. Bureaucrats, lobbyists, and interest groups offer similar benefits to their sought after access points: information, expertise, and the ability to stir media and increase the public's intensity of interest (Dahl[121]). But, bureaucracies have the legitimacy of the state behind them, interest groups do not and there are no policies without bureaucracy.[122]

**Accessing Bureaucrats**

Croley argues that it is the value of the information bureaucrats possess that is vital to their rule making power, which, in turn, enables the aforementioned autonomy[123] enjoyed by the HA/DR agencies. Bureaucrats make the rules as to how the legislation will be implemented. This power is nearly as important as the power to make the legislation in the first place.

Agencies lead the policy rule making process due to Congress delegating much authority to them without guidelines and standards in what Lowi described as interest

---

119 Laswell, Harold. 1958. *Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How*. New York: Meridian Books.

120 Ehrlich, Sean D. 2011. *Access Points: An Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity*. New York: Oxford University Press.

121 Dahl, Robert. 1956. *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago. (p.113)

122 Workman, Samuel. 2 November 2011.

123 Croley, Steven. 2007. *Regulation and Public Interests: The Possibility of Good Regulatory Government*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Note: Croley argues that the agency's administrative law function (i.e., the legal decision making procedures that determine regulatory processes and the associated regulatory environment of the agency) determines its autonomy.

group liberalism where "[L]iberalism replaces planning with bargaining."[124] Well funded and better organized interest groups are able to take advantage of this situation by bargaining and influencing agencies during the rule making phase. The 1946 Administrative Procedure Act "states that a rule means the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect intended to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy."[125] This broad power allows agencies the capacity to, in effect, make policy and makes rule making a vulnerable, fertile access point of opportunity for other bureaucrats to influence policy.

I have established a causal theory in terms of why bureaucrats are access points themselves. But, more important to this study is whether bureaucrats see and use other bureaucrats as access points and when they may seek to access them. The following section and its novel theory of bureaucratic access points is informed by the preceding organizational mission and structure, implementation assessment, and "traditional" access points literatures.

**A Theory of Bureaucratic Access Points**

As I have postulated, bureaucrats take advantage of access points, especially during policy implementation proceedings. This study offers the novel perspective that access points for HA/DR bureaucrats, to include those in the DOD, are readily available during the punctuating event (i.e., the natural disaster itself) and may be evaluated

---

124 Lowi, Theodore. 1979. *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States, 2nd Edition* (New York: Norton), p.67.

125 Kamieniecki, Sheldon. 2006. *Corporate America and Environmental Policy: How Often Does Business Get Its Way?* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press) p.106.

through the notions of timing and the information and capabilities they possess and can leverage during these punctuations. The following framework of HA/DR policy implementation and the associated access points research questions help frame the investigation.

Policy implementation can be framed in terms of governmental performance or democratic accountability.[126] For HA/DR policy, the attention is decidedly on governmental performance in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation stages. In many ways it is "given" that the U.S. will assist other nations dealing with natural disasters, so the democratic accountability aspect only comes into play in which nations the U.S. would not assist and for what reason and the effective, efficient use of resources in disaster relief efforts as determined in the evaluation stage. Policy outputs are key at the time of the disaster relief effort. Policy outcomes are the focus in the evaluation process.

Table 3. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Policy Implementation

| | Governmental Performance | Democratic Accountability |
|---|---|---|
| Outputs | ***During Event*** | ("Given") |
| Outcomes | ***During Evaluation Stage*** | (Use of taxpayer dollars) |

[126] Workman, Samuel. October 26, 2011.

**Research Questions: Bureaucratic Access Points**

- Assessment Measures, Policy Implementation, Mission, and Structure:
    - Interagency conflicts and bureaucratic challenges are largely due to different assessment measures and missions carried out by the agencies.
    - Policy implementation and mission assessment influence interagency relations in terms of tension and/or cooperation between bureaucrats. How are mission requirements and success assessed?
    - Does mission drive structure, or does structure drive mission? How does this understanding influence policy implementation?
- Bureaucratic Access Points:
    - HA/DR agencies' bureaucrats have the unique opportunity for access points to other bureaucrats during the disaster event itself and at times of policy implementation (e.g., lead agent responsibilities, humanitarian assistance missions).
    - Timing (in terms of opportunity for the HA/DR agency and criticality of the response time itself in saving lives and property) creates an access point for HA/DR bureaucrats based on their information, resources and capabilities, and leverage.
    - Information is key to interagency relations when those agencies have different missions and assessment measures but are responsible for implementing over-arching or over-lapping policy.

- The capabilities and resources that agencies possess create opportunities for bureaucratic access at times of policy implementation (e.g., lead agent responsibilities, humanitarian assistance missions).
- Bureaucrats leverage information (including timeliness of information) and resources and capabilities in order to access other bureaucrats and maintain their own information, resources, and capabilities.

Baumgartner and Jones develop the theory of punctuated equilibrium and policy monopolies.[127] Periods of stability are punctuated by rapid change. In the agenda setting stage changes occur incrementally (i.e., Lindblom's "muddling through"[128]) or rapidly (i.e., Kingdon's multiple streams[129]). According to punctuated equilibrium theory, both stability and rapid change are the result of the interplay within and among subsystems. The subsystems are representative of the incremental agenda setting process, but this theory moves well beyond that idea and is a counter to incrementalism. The macro level represents the more dramatic changes in agenda setting. A policy monopoly occurs when the subsystem is dominated by a particular interest that has a "monopoly" on a popular or powerful belief or image that translates well into policy. Such a monopoly maintains the status quo. Policy monopolies are generally very stable. But, if external pressure (i.e., exogenous shocks that redefine the policy issue) is applied at a high enough level the

---

127 Baumgartner, Frank, and Bryan Jones. 1993. *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

128 Lindblom, Charles. 1959. "The Science of 'Muddling Through.'" *Public Administration Review* 19:79-88.

129 Kingdon, John. 2003. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd Edition*. New York: Longman.

equilibrium or status quo may be punctuated and bring in other actors. By definition, natural disasters would be considered exogenous shocks, but not for HA/DR agencies. It is why they exist and their express mission is to provide relief in those situations.

Access points for bureaucrats during the punctuation (i.e., the disaster itself) are more available than in other policy domains because *timely information* – information held by the HA/DR agencies before anyone else has access to it because they are on the ground and at the site of the disaster relief efforts – will be demanded by other bureaucrats and elected officials, alike. A quid pro quo, of sorts, is thus created in which the politician or other bureaucrat wants information and the HA/DR bureaucrat wants additional resources and autonomy. Money, in terms of a relief budget, is not the main issue, for it will flow in most cases, regardless. Furthermore, HA/DR bureaucrats do not need to seek relevance or credibility because they are the only ones who can perform the job. Therefore, armed with the resources, the credibility as experts and the sole source, and the information, HA/DR bureaucrats possess what is being sought at the time. Put another way, they have leverage, which equates to access points and more demands that will likely be met.

But with most political matters, it is not that simple. Information about the HA/DR event is demanded from elites in Washington D.C., to include the Pentagon, almost immediately. The demand for information should not be discounted. It takes valuable time and resources to answer myriad questions, many of which cannot be answered quickly. This immediate demand for information and inevitable delay in answering creates friction between elites and the HA/DR agency representatives on the

ground and in Washington, D.C. The friction can influence policy implementation by delaying resources, challenging lines of authority, and shifting focus, goals, and definitions of mission and success.

In this chapter, I have presented the case that bureaucrats take advantage of access points to other bureaucrats during policy implementation proceedings. Access points for HA/DR bureaucrats, to include those in the DOD, are readily available during the punctuating event (i.e., the natural disaster itself) and may be evaluated through the notions of timing, information, and the resources and capabilities they possess and can leverage during these punctuations. This discussion was a practical presentation of how bureaucratic behavior influences policy implementation.

The following chapter discusses the research design and explains why qualitative methodology is used to investigate the bureaucratic access points phenomena and associated research questions. I use the findings from interviews of HA/DR bureaucrats to study the bureaucratic access points and emerging leverage phenomena in detail.[130] The coding scheme below is presented here to link the forthcoming interview data and HA/DR missions case studies with the emerging theory.[131] My coding approach is generally similar to the coding scheme developed by Dutton and Dukerich[132] but uses the categories of mission and structure (i.e., does mission determine structure, or does

---

130 Please see the interview questions in the Appendix.

131 I tested two computer-assisted analysis of qualitative data (CAQDAS) packages, *Ethnograph* (http://www.qualisresearch.com/) and *NVivo* (http://www.qsrinternational.com/), and did not find additional themes or uncategorized phenomena. To be fair, I was testing free versions of the software; the for-purchase software may have provided more capabilities. However, for my purposes, CAQDAS packages do not appear to be beneficial.

132 Dutton, J.E. & Dukerich, J.M. 1991. Keeping an eye on the mirror: Image and identity in organizational adaptation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 34(3):517-554.

structure determine mission), policy implementation and assessment (i.e., interagency relations and bureaucratic challenges), and the overarching investigation of bureaucratic access points (i.e., access points for HA/DR bureaucrats are readily available during the punctuating event and other times and may be evaluated through the notions of timing and the information and capabilities they possess and can leverage during these natural disaster events).[133]

***Coding Scheme***

- Mission versus Structure
    - Simple tally of where interviewees situated themselves on whether mission drives structure or structure drives mission
- Implementation and Assessment
    - Code comments dealing with interagency relations
    - Code comments regarding how mission requirements and success are assessed
    - Evaluation of the tension and/or cooperation between HA/DR bureaucrats

[133] I also used Miles and Huberman's (1994) "start list" (p.58), and a combination of their "pattern codes" (p.69) and "pre-structured case" (p.83). Furthermore, I considered their discussion of data reduction, data display, conclusion drawing, and verification in developing this coding scheme (1994). In addition, Corbin and Strauss (2002) explain how patterns, themes, and processes are revealed through coded categories' frequency and strength.

- Access Points
    - Simple tally of those who experienced bureaucrats accessing bureaucrats and those who did not during the punctuating event/natural disaster or at other times
    - Code the incidences of timing of access during the punctuating event/natural disaster or at other times
    - Code the incidences of information being accessed or provided during the punctuating event/natural disaster or at other times
    - Code the mentions of capabilities that HA/DR entities possess in terms of a resource that create opportunities for access during the punctuating event/natural disaster or at other times
    - Code the leverage HA/DR bureaucrats express they have and employ (i.e., based on timing, information, and capabilities, or other variable) during the punctuating event/natural disaster or at other times

The project's research design helps to explain naturally occurring phenomena in a naturally occurring state. This approach understands relationships as interconnected parts with the whole being greater than the individual parts. Change in one leads to changes among all parts and the bureaucratic system. This design will answer how and why the HA/DR system functions as a whole, regardless the differences between OFDA and the DOD. Furthermore, the coding scheme allowed the themes of bureaucratic access points, leverage, and assessment measures to emerge. The following chapters provide strong

interview and case study evidence of these themes and create tight linkages between the findings and the emerging theory.

# Chapter 3: Research Design

Bureaucratic access points theory, and an emerging theory of leverage, help us understand how policies are successfully implemented in the midst of bureaucratic challenges resulting from organizational roles and responsibilities and contrasting assessments. Bureaucratic access and leverage enables a more unified implementation of over-arching HA/DR policy by disparate agencies with unique missions, resources, capabilities, and assessment measures. The existing literature does not fully capture how such agency differences are mitigated and overcome in implementing policy that spans multiple entities. This project helps to fill important gaps in the implementation and policy change literature.

I use qualitative methods because I want to study the access and leverage phenomena in detail. I am able to access in great depth a precise case in Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and DOD interagency relations. And, in this particular case, qualitative methods will help us learn more about this topic than quantitative methods (e.g., budget data does not allow me to investigate why or how bureaucratic access influences interagency relations). I have focused my project by establishing limited research problems geared to specific features of the instrumental case study (i.e., to provide insight into access point theory and apply it in a novel approach). This project is valuable because it reveals a gap in the grounded theory of policy implementation and change, bureaucratic information, and organizational structure and mission – bureaucrats accessing and leveraging bureaucrats. I am using the qualitative

data (e.g., interviews, reports, and seminars) to show this accessing not only occurs, but it has a unifying influence on policy implementation.

**Qualitative Methodology**

This study uses qualitative methodology to investigate bureaucratic access points in the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) arena. HA/DR policies, actors, and organizations are viewed as being in a fluid state. Therefore, qualitative methods are better suited for my purposes. Quantitative methods are appropriate when viewing the social world as a fixed, or concrete, structure.[134] Morgan and Smircich argue that social scientists who manipulate data through quantitative approaches are "in effect attempting to freeze the social world into structure immobility and to reduce the role of human beings to elements subject to the influence of a more or less deterministic set of forces," and that "once one relaxes the ontological assumption that the world is a concrete structure, and admits that human beings, far from merely responding to the social world may actively contribute to its creation, the [quantitative] methods become increasingly unsatisfactory, and indeed, inappropriate."[135] Furthermore, they argue "narrow empirical snapshots of isolated phenomena at fixed points in time, does not do complete justice to the nature of the subject."[136] None of this is to suggest that one method is superior to another method, generally. In this study, however, qualitative

---

134 Morgan, G. and Smircich, L. 1980. "The case for qualitative research." *Academy of Management Review*, 5(4): 491-500. And Gephart, R. 2004. "What is qualitative research and why is it important?" *Academy of Management Journal*, 47(4): 454-462.

135 Morgan, G. and Smircich, L. 1980. "The case for qualitative research." *Academy of Management Review*, 5(4): 491-500, p.498.

136 Ibid., p.498.

methods are more appropriate for various reasons.

I study the bureaucratic access phenomena in which they naturally occur – in the HA/DR policy implementation environment (e.g., USSOUTHCOM headquarters) – and use the bureaucrats' actions and meanings to understand the phenomena. Qualitative methods emphasize qualities of actors and the processes, actions, and meanings that occur naturally.[137] Qualitative research builds social science constructs and develops theory from actors' meanings and actions. It focuses on the socially constructed nature of reality and naturally occurring meanings that are difficult for quantitative research to access and capture.[138] Vital to this study of bureaucratic access is the understanding that qualitative research can "rehumanize research and theory by highlighting the human interactions and meanings that underlie phenomena and relationships among variables that are often addressed in the field."[139]

Qualitative research is not easily accomplished. I have addressed the following challenges presented by Gephart.[140] First, my dissertation is a project within a larger program of study that will continue in the future. In particular, the findings in the HA/DR policy domain may be highly generalizable to the environmental policy domain, as will be discussed in the final chapter. Second, this paper's literature review is not only thorough and relevant to the topics within the study, it provides a foundation for offering

---

137 Denzin, N. K., and Lincoln, Y. S. 2000. "Introduction: The discipline and practice of qualitative research." In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2nd Ed*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

138 Gephart, R. 2004. "What is qualitative research and why is it important?" *Academy of Management Journal*, 47(4): 454-462.

139 Ibid., p.455.

140 Ibid.

new theory (i.e., bureaucratic access points and leverage). Third, I clearly state explicit goals, objectives, and research questions that call upon the existing literature, frame the study, guide data collection and analysis, and present findings in a manner that allows me to develop new theory and discuss the implications of my research findings. Fourth, the concepts underlying my questions are grounded in existing literature and well defined. They are precise and clearly relate to the methodology used and guide data analysis. Finally, the methodology is specific, and the discernment of themes from the data is precisely described. Data are analyzed and interpreted, not merely presented, and linked directly to the research questions and provide the foundation for future investigation.

**Methods**

This project's methodological approach follows that of Barker's in his study of "concertive control."[141] Barker found that self-managed teams developed a value system that controlled their work and norms, with the value system (i.e., consensus) becoming the normative rules for existing and new workers.[142] He uncovered the phenomenon of rationalized control without the previous hierarchy (i.e., peer control was more subtle, more effective, and more coercive than supervisory control; and workers policed one another in accordance with, and deference to, the organization's goals and objectives).[143] His stated goal (in a later writing) was to create or provoke debate about the value and

---

141 Barker, J.R. 1993. "Tightening the iron cage: Concertive control in self-managing teams." *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 38(3): 408-437.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.

effectiveness of teams.[144] He was questioning an existing, readily accepted theory, that of concertive control in self-managing teams. I found a similar gap in the access and bureaucracy literature in regards to why – with such different organizations, resources, and measures of mission success – the HA/DR entities are able to work together and mitigate interagency conflict.

I began my research at the time the Obama Administration announced efforts to reduce future USG annual budgets. President Obama had tasked the U.S. national security apparatus to reduce its budget by 400 billion dollars through fiscal year 2023. At present, the armed forces are facing budget and personnel cuts. Based on personal experience, U.S. military medicine helps to increase national security and offers unique diplomatic tools and should not suffer budget reductions in the general area of HA/DR. The DOD and USAID are striving to capture the effects of their HA/DR efforts, and measures of effectiveness are actively being sought in order to quantify those efforts with designs on ensuring their slice of the budgetary pie.

My interest in HA/DR efforts came from my own experiences in Iraq and other locations in the Middle East. I have served as a Medical Service Corps officer specializing in aeromedical evacuation and medical logistics. Prior to returning to graduate school, I was involved with "Iraqi Engagement" efforts in 2010 in the area north of Baghdad, Iraq. My responsibilities gave me a well-informed perspective on initiatives similar to HA/DR efforts and associated bureaucracies (e.g., Department of State,

144 Barker, James. 2004. "A Rhetorical Critic of Organization." *Electronic Journal of Radical Organizational Theory*, Volume 8, Number 1.

USAID, NGOs, and host nation). My first interaction with OFDA personnel was at a seminar and conference they conducted in San Antonio, Texas, in 2011, called the Joint Humanitarian Operations Course.

**Data Collection**

I traveled to various OFDA and DOD locations in 2011 and 2012 for research and then to conduct thirty-three interviews to augment and provide the reality of the HA/DR bureaucrats' perspective to the myriad reports, documents, and other information gathered through data collection and conferences. The interviews and related data collection were conducted in August through December 2012 in San Antonio, Texas, and at USSOUTHCOM headquarters in Miami, Florida. The majority of my interactions with HA/DR bureaucrats occurred at USSOUTHCOM headquarters and with U.S. Army South, the Army service component command for USSOUTHCOM in San Antonio.[145] I completed follow-up interviews when necessary.

The HA/DR bureaucrats I interacted with represented both genders and multiple races or ethnicities (i.e., white, Hispanic, Latin American, African American, etc.). However, only seven of the thirty-three bureaucrats I interviewed were female. The interviewees ranged in age from 25 to 61 years. All had earned at least an undergraduate degree from a college or university, and nearly one-third of those I interviewed held a

---

145 "U.S. Army South, as the Army Service Component Command for U.S. Southern Command, conducts Theater Security Cooperation in order to enhance hemispheric security and stability. On order conducts contingency operations as directed by U.S. Southern Command. Vision Statement: A flexible, proficient Army Service Component Command capable of simultaneously conducting Theater Security Cooperation, Contingency Operations, Title X support and Executive Agency for U.S. Southern Command and Department of the Army. Area of Responsibility: U.S. Army South is the Army Service Component Command of U.S. Southern Command." (from http://www.arsouth.army.mil/mission-and-vision.html).

graduate degree. Over eighty percent were active duty military or had served in the U.S. military in some capacity (i.e., retired, Guard member or Reservist, served and left military service prior to retirement). Their HA/DR experience ranged from 1 to 29 years, but most had been in their present job for less than two years. That fact that nearly half of those I interviewed were active duty military or Reservists certainly accounts for the high number of those who had only a year or two worth of experience in their current positions. I chose a purposeful sampling strategy in order to learn a vast amount of in-depth information about the issues of bureaucratic access (i.e., in terms of communication, timing, resources and capabilities, and leverage), mission and structure, and assessments and how these issues influence HA/DR policy implementation. "Studying information-rich cases yields insights and in-depth understanding rather than empirical generalizations."[146] In purposeful (or purposive or judgment) sampling, the researcher decides what purpose respondents will serve and finds the appropriate, specific group of respondents.[147]

The preceding demographical information is offered to provide context. This project does not consider gender-, race-, ethnic-, or education-specific ramifications to the central question of bureaucratic access. However, future research may be valuable in the areas of communication patterns in a predominantly male-dominated environment and the fact that the education level of the actors is rather high. (Note: More detailed demographic information is not available due to attempts to ensure the anonymity of the

---

[146] Patton, M.Q. 2002. *Qualitative research and evaluation methods, 3rd Ed*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, p.230.
[147] Ibid.

interviewees, and, again, those data have nothing to do with the study at hand.) My interactions with HA/DR bureaucrats in San Antonio occurred outside of their place of work. I met with these bureaucrats individually at such locations as coffee shops, restaurants, and the conference center of the aforementioned OFDA seminar. Due to the fact that most of my interactions occurred at USSOUTHCOM, the following discussion focuses on those experiences.

Through my connections within the U.S. Air Force, I found an excellent active duty officer who became my point of contact at USSOUTHCOM. This officer, who will remain anonymous due to IRB stipulations, was a tremendous resource in terms of reports, networking (i.e., snowball sampling for interviews, the OFDA seminar, etc.), and personal experience in various HA/DR capacities in the past decade.

When I first arrived at USSOUTHCOM, I was introduced as a graduate student interested in writing about interagency relations in the HA/DR arena and between OFDA and the DOD, specifically. Although I was in uniform and hold the appropriate security clearance to have gone almost anywhere in the headquarters, I was a visitor and therefore had to be escorted at all times. I had no issues with this and, in many ways, appreciated the constant interaction and benefits of being escorted by people familiar with many others – people I would have passed with a nod or a "hello" but not talked with – throughout the headquarters. Being escorted was an unforeseen benefit that enabled more discussion and interaction than I would have otherwise experienced. I could not carry a cell phone, electronic tablet, or laptop. Instead, I used pencil and paper and jotted field notes in a notebook and on summary sheets I had developed. (Please see the

summary sheet in the Appendix.) I talked with members from the medical, planning, programming and budgeting, humanitarian assistance (which houses the OFDA liaisons), partnering, and foreign disclosure directorates, or departments, to name the most relevant sections to my study.

**Interviews**

I chose qualitative interviewing as a means for data collection because I wanted to investigate bureaucratic access and HA/DR policy implementation through the bureaucrat's perspective. Qualitative interviewing assumes that the "perspective of others is meaningful, knowable, and able to be made explicit."[148] I wanted to solve the cognitive problem of finding out what policy implementation, access, mission and structure, and assessment are about, beyond the level of espoused theory.[149] The establishment of the access storyline introduces some ambiguity to the HA/DR policy arena and creates the need for sensemaking.[150] The sensemaking implications found in this study are discussed in more detail in the final chapter. Standardized interviews assist with bringing clarity to the ambiguous setting.

I developed a standardized, direct interview approach that consisted of a set of questions carefully worded and arranged for the purpose of taking each respondent through the same sequence, asking the same questions, and using essentially the same

---

148 Patton, M.Q. 2002. *Qualitative research and evaluation methods, 3rd Ed*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, p.341.
149 Alvesson, M. 2003. "Beyond neopositivists, romantics, and localists: A reflexive approach to interviews in organizational research." *Academy of Management Review*, 28(1):13-33.
150 Ibid.

words.[151] This helps ensure that each interviewee receives the same stimuli in the same way and order. Please see the interview questions in the Appendix section.

This approach limits flexibility in probing, but I wanted to minimize variation in the questions posed to interviewees in order to increase validity. I understand the danger of being too deductive (e.g., my directed questions). But I was looking for particular themes, ideas, and experiences rather than soliciting a free flow of ideas and then "discovering" those common themes in a more inductive approach. Because I knew the structure of the answer (i.e., because it is specific to access, mission, etc.), I could be more deductive and specific with my questions and what I analyzed from the interviews. My project is more a matter of being precise, but I also left enough room in the questions to discover other issues and phenomena that I may not have been aware of through the literature review or have not yet experienced in my professional career.

The benefits of a standardized, direct approach are substantial. The exact instrument of evaluation (i.e., the list of questions) is available to anyone who wishes to use the findings of the study. Similarly, critics and evaluators of this study know precisely what is *and is not* asked in each interview. This reduces the likelihood of the data being questioned later because certain questions were omitted or asked in the wrong way.[152] This approach also makes data analysis easier.[153] For example, and as will be discussed in greater detail below, clustering or factoring techniques uncover themes in the data quickly and accurately because each respondent's answer to the same question

---

151 Patton, M.Q. 2002. *Qualitative research and evaluation methods, 3rd Ed*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
152 Ibid., p.346-347.
153 Ibid.

may be found easily. Organizing questions and answers that are similar is also made more efficient and useful for comparison purposes. Furthermore, the focused nature of this interview approach ensures interviewee time is used efficiently.[154] And due to the fluid nature of the HA/DR bureaucrats' schedules and deployments to HA/DR event locations (i.e., it may only be possible to interview participants once for a short, fixed time[155]), the standardized approach established priorities for the interview.

I attempted to strike a balance between an insider (emic) perspective and an outsider (etic) perspective in my interviews and interactions with HA/DR bureaucrats.[156] After general pleasantries, I focused the interview by explaining my purpose. I explained that I was investigating how organizations and their employees influence policy implementation. Referring to them as employees allowed each individual to decide how to self-identify (i.e., as a bureaucrat, as a military member, as a government employee, as an HA/DR expert, etc.). I further explained that my focus was on the relationship between U.S. HA/DR agencies and associated DOD medical components that have responsibilities with HA/DR events and other efforts. Further, I stated that of particular importance were interagency relationships and how bureaucracy may influence implementation. I theorize that interagency conflicts and bureaucratic challenges are largely due to different missions and different assessment measures carried out by the agencies and the DOD components.

I am not concerned about the framing and priming implications because I am

---

154 Patton, M.Q. 2002. *Qualitative research and evaluation methods, 3rd Ed*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.

familiar with the HA/DR medical field due to my responsibilities as a healthcare administrator specializing in aeromedical evacuation and understanding medical logistics in the U.S. Air Force. Also, the HA/DR bureaucrats I interviewed may be considered "elites" or "experts" due to their intimate knowledge of HA/DR policy and mission planning and outcomes. Most were leaders and managers (i.e., field grade officers, branch chiefs, coordinators, directors, etc.) of departments or groups. "In working with elites, great demands are placed on the ability of the interviewer, who must establish competence by displaying a thorough knowledge of the topic or…by projecting an accurate conceptualization of the problem through shrewd questioning."[157] The benefits of a direct purpose statement not only narrows the focus of the interview saving my and their time and elicits particular information and data, but it also offers me credibility with the respondents.

Table 4. Summary Description of Interviews

| Type | Total Number | Time: Average & Range | U.S. Military Experience* | Education Level |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Standardized, Direct | 33 | Average: 25 minutes Range: 10-105 minutes | 27 (>80%) | Undergraduate Degree: 33 Graduate Degree: 10 |

*Active duty, retired, Guard or Reserve member, or left military service prior to retirement.

[157] Rossman, G. B. and Rallis, S. F. 1998. *Learning in the Field. An Introduction to Qualitative Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, p.134.

The thirty-three interviews ranged from ten minutes to 105 minutes, with the average being twenty-five minutes from start to end. The relative brevity was largely due to my direct questions and familiarity with the topic, the acronyms, and general vernacular of the interviewees. The interviews were efficient as a result of having gathered information from the OFDA seminar and the myriad DOD and USAID reports. Conducting interviews and having time to analyze the data in conjunction with finding and being given new reports enabled an effective and efficient iterative process. I analyzed data, wrote, revised research questions, studied new reports, and conducted more interviews. I repeated this process for the better part of nine months. A qualitative methods course taken in the fall semester of 2012 provided the tools to not only hone my qualitative research design but also allowed me to revisit my previously collected data from a fresh perspective. The timing and content of the course could not have been better in terms of this project's development and focus.

When my data collection ended, I had accumulated 115 research hours, not including associated literature reviews. Even with the constraints of voluntary participation, anonymity, and limited time in Miami, the interviews produced valuable data. During all phases of my data collection, my informed observer role with the HA/DR bureaucrats did not change. I informed everyone with whom I came into contact that I was an active duty Air Force officer studying and writing about HA/DR policy and its implementation. They were very cooperative and exceedingly gracious with their time and expertise.

This chapter has presented the rationale for using qualitative methods and

interview techniques. Chapter Four builds on this thorough background and offers an analysis of the accumulated data. Applicable HA/DR missions case studies provide clarity and further expound upon the data in Chapter Five.

## Chapter 4: Interview Data Analysis

My analysis began with my basic questions, "are bureaucrats accessing bureaucrats, and what are the policy implementation implications?" These basic questions allowed specific themes about access (i.e., leverage, information, timing, resources and capabilities), structure and mission, and assessment to emerge from my data. While I found few themes of timing and structure and mission, an unforeseen theme that I refer to as "semantics" did emerge. I compared, revised, and refined my ideas as I gathered more data and became more familiar with my study.

The particular themes and data analyses I present here stem from my use of ideas presented by Miles and Huberman, Dutton and Dukerich, and Silverman and Marvasti and the various theories covered in my extensive literature review.[158] From this analysis I developed an analytical understanding of the general character of leverage, information, resources and capabilities, assessment, and semantics as it became apparent during my interviews and research of HA/DR agencies and bureaucrats. To help ensure the validity of this analytical conceptualization and its associated claims, I cross-checked my interview data with my field notes, contact summaries, and relevant reports and information gleaned from the OFDA seminar. Finally, I reviewed my analysis and ideas with colleagues not familiar with or participating in the study and had an associate independently code twenty-five percent of the interviews to ensure validity and

---

158 Miles, M.B. & Huberman, A.M. 1994. *Qualitative data analysis, 2nd Ed*. Thousand Oaks: Sage; Dutton, J.E. & Dukerich, J.M. 1991. Keeping an eye on the mirror: Image and identity in organizational adaptation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 34(3):517-554; and Silverman, D. and Marvasti, A. 2008. *Doing qualitative research: A comprehensive guide*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

reliability.[159]

Table 5. Coding Scheme: Categorical Counts

| Category | Incidence Rate as Mentioned by Interviewees |
|---|---|
| 1) Mission or structure | Mission drives structure: 33<br>Structure drives mission: 0 |
| 2) Implementation and Assessment | Interagency relations: 28<br>Mission requirements and success assessed: 31<br>Tension: 16<br>Cooperation: 24<br>Notion of "healthy tension": 22 |
| 3) Access Points (including the emerging notion of leverage) | Bureaucrats accessing and being accessed: 33<br>Timing: 10<br>Information: 33<br>Capabilities/resources: 25 |

The result of my analysis focuses on the following discussion of access in terms of information, timing, resources and capabilities, and assessment in regard to measures of effectiveness, and the unforeseen semantics theme. The interesting findings regarding structure and mission are also discussed. The weaker themes, including timing and resources and capabilities, will be addressed in the discussion portion of the final chapter. I begin by offering the relevant findings of access and leverage, assessment, and semantics, describe the structure and mission curiosity, and conclude with an assertion of internal and external validity.

**Factoring and Semantics**

I noticed recurring comments about roles and responsibilities, improving HA/DR planning and policy, and communication. I coded the data according to the coding

[159] Please see earlier discussion of the project's coding scheme at the end of Chapter Two.

scheme and developed these three factor clusters (i.e., overlapping variables that exhibit communal aspects[160]). Through these factor clusters, I found patterns and themes.[161] These factor clusters are discussed in higher-level constructs below and in the final chapter.

The HA/DR bureaucrats had developed a common language that I refer to as "semantics." The semantics used to describe roles and responsibilities included, "checks and balances," "dovetail" efforts, "[OFDA] is there for the party, not the cleanup," and "end state." The checks and balances refer to OFDA's role as the USG's lead agent in disaster relief events and the DOD's responsibilities once OFDA requests assistance. The OFDA *and* DOD personnel regularly commented that OFDA's lead agent designation was vitally important in terms of command and control of the event. One comment succinctly addressed this concern (from both OFDA and DOD perspectives): "the DOD will overwhelm you" in terms of capabilities and taking control when given the opportunity. Therefore, dovetailing HA/DR efforts is important. OFDA is aware of other nations' and NGOs' initiatives and can inform the DOD of any duplication of effort and make suggestions regarding the role the DOD may fill in humanitarian assistance

---

160 Miles, M.B. & Huberman, A.M. 1994. *Qualitative data analysis, 2nd Ed*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, p.256.

161 Ibid. I also consulted Communications literature for information on conducting keyword searches after reviewing Downs' 1972 article "Up and Down with Ecology: The Issue Attention Cycle." Many authors present various views and procedures, which are defensible. I chose to use the work of Roderick P. Hart, *Political Keywords: Using Language That Uses Us* (2004) and *Modern Rhetorical Criticism* (1990), as my guide. The former work delves into keywords as a "cultural barometer" (p.5) and presented instructive methods to uncover meanings of words based on context. The latter work's "Word Choice" chapter in which style was an important aspect was helpful. Hart has also developed a powerful search tool called DICTION that uses over 30 dictionaries, or "word-lists" to search text for five distinct qualities including certainty, activity, optimism, realism, and commonality (DICTION website). The categorization and nuanced meaning of words based on context was a fascinating concept and helped me choose meaningful words with which to search for themes in the interviews and other articles. How the words are used is the key component added by Hart's work.

situations, especially. Finally, OFDA's mandate is to return the host nation or region to the condition it was in one minute prior to the disaster, not to improve its lot or nation-build. Both OFDA and DOD personnel regularly made comments about this end state, noting that reduced budgets would not allow nation building. OFDA and DOD will monitor the affected region and may choose to conduct humanitarian assistance in it, but NGOs and the host nation are clearly responsible for future progress.

Discussion of improving HA/DR efforts and policy included comments such as, "clearly express [to decision makers] what we do," "proactive," and "steady glide pattern." The vast majority of these comments were in response to a question asking what, if anything, they would change about their HA/DR mission. Assessment and measures of effectiveness are hot-button issues for both USAID/OFDA and the DOD. The budget concerns demand accountability, in some sense. OFDA and DOD personnel lamented the difficulty in capturing, or quantifying, the benefits of their HA/DR efforts. Merely telling decision makers and budget managers that "good" was done is no longer enough. Measures of effectiveness are being developed, with the proactive approach (i.e., every dollar of training and prevention equates to seven dollars of disaster relief expenditure[162]) drawing much attention. But the validity of those measures is difficult to specify. Therefore, a common theme emerged from the interviews that called for sticking with a plan or initiative for more than a couple of years in order to evaluate its success or failure (i.e., a "steady glide pattern"). Much frustration in these interviewees was evident due to the lack of measurable data and what HA/DR efforts truly wrought. (Note: In

[162] Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC), 2011.

what may be related to these assessment and measurement concerns, USAID has selected The University of Texas at Austin to be a partner in a five-year, 25 million dollar grant to develop tools to more effectively target, monitor, and evaluate foreign aid globally.)

Not surprisingly, all respondents reported that they had accessed or been accessed by other HA/DR bureaucrats through various communication mediums (e.g., face-to-face, telephone, and electronic mail conversations, and shared databases and electronic information systems). The semantics influencing communication included words and phrases such as, "funneling information," "information conduit," and a "healthy tension" between OFDA and their DOD counterparts. A pattern for use of the word "communication" in terms of clear articulation of resources, processes, and capabilities was a cluster-factoring theme. Again, OFDA, as lead agent, was the funnel or conduit for information during HA/DR events. That lead agent role and the vast capabilities of the DOD created what nearly all interviewees referred to as a healthy tension between the two entities. So long as each stayed in its proverbial lane, the tension remained beneficial. The push (i.e., DOD) and pull (i.e., OFDA) approaches maintain the aforementioned checks and balances, as well. But, according to the interviewees, the tension becomes counterproductive when OFDA is perceived as not filling its lead agent responsibilities or the DOD oversteps its responsibilities beyond those that OFDA has requested. The "healthy" adjective is extremely reliant upon access and open lines of communication.

A few interviewees noted the importance of OFDA liaisons being embedded in DOD organizations. Interestingly, it was during an interview at USSOUTHCOM that I

discovered that it was the first DOD combatant command to have an OFDA liaison. It was in response to 1998's Hurricane Mitch relief efforts and the associated communication issues between the responding agencies, in particular USAID/OFDA and the DOD. According to those at USSOUTHCOM at the time, it was a difficult and, at times, contentious relationship that had its growing pains. But, nearly all said that the relationship has been running smoothly with only slight missteps over the past few years. Every interviewee reported that the OFDA liaison is a "must have" and a benefit in nearly every situation. And each interviewee stressed that communication between the OFDA liaison and her or his DOD counterparts was personality dependent and driven. This general comment harkens back to the healthy tension that various interviewees mentioned, as well.

Finally, the communication semantics pattern revealed that the HA/DR bureaucrats I spoke with were, in many ways, describing communication as a resource. In other words, the actions of bureaucrats are choices – in this case choosing to work together (i.e., personality dependent). Human actions and choices determine how, or if, information is shared. That critical information may well determine the outcome of HA/DR events and be a measurable phenomenon that determines mission success or failure. For example, future research could include a longitudinal study of those combatant commands with or without an OFDA liaison and the institutional history of the relationships between OFDA liaisons and DOD personnel through the years and the associated success or failure of ensuing HA/DR events and efforts. The following tables provide examples of the more telling findings from the interviews.

Table 6. Bureaucratic Access Points – Evidence from Interviews

| Type of Access | Example Comments | Meaning or Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| Timing | (When a disaster occurs) we all need information yesterday…in five minutes is too late.<br><br>The systems (i.e., data clearinghouses and depositories) must be real-time so everyone is on the same page. | Timeliness of information and data is critical when carrying out planned response activities; HA/DR bureaucrats must be able to access the current, accurate data provided by other bureaucrats concurrently from multiple locations. |
| Information | Sharing information – accurate information – is the key to a successful response.<br><br>They (i.e., other HA/DR bureaucrats) better come to me! I have information they need to make the right decisions. | Communication during HA/DR events is critical; the ability to access other bureaucrats and share the right information at the right time enables effective and efficient mission response. |
| Resources and Capabilities | They know what we bring to the table, and we know what they bring to the table. They need us, and we need them.<br><br>Our relationship and, ultimately, mission success is predicated on knowing who to reach out and touch (i.e., request particular resources and capabilities) and get what is needed when it is needed. | HA/DR bureaucrats must be aware of other entities' resources and capabilities; they must be able to access other bureaucrats when necessary in order to obtain the required resources and capabilities. |

Table 7. Bureaucratic Leverage – Evidence from Interviews

| Type of Leverage | Example Comments | Meaning or Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| Organic | The whole thing (i.e., the HA/DR policy domain and policy implementation) works a lot better when OFDA is *the* lead federal agent. | The HA/DR policy domain needs OFDA to be the LFA; efficient, effective policy implementation occurs when OFDA provides expertise and responsibility in a closed circuit construct. See urban policy case study on page 112. |
| | OFDA brings a lot of experts to bear on an HA/DR event…and does a good job when left to it (i.e., without outside influence). But it gets muddy fast when (outside influences) think they know best or someone wants some attention. | Outside influences undermine OFDA's ability to serve as LFA; confusion occurs in an open circuit construct in which outside influences begin to adjust HA/DR policy implementation. See international commerce policy case study on page 113. |
| Purposive | The DOD will overwhelm you, when given the opportunity… if OFDA doesn't (act as LFA), the DOD will. | If OFDA fails to act as LFA for whatever reason, other entities within the HA/DR policy domain will attempt to fill that role and responsibility in a closed circuit construct. See economic (security) policy case study on page 114. |
| | Big HA/DR events, like Haiti (i.e., the Port au Prince earthquake), draw a lot of interest. It makes it really difficult to do our job when they (i.e., outside influences) get involved. | Outside influences compromise the ability of the HA/DR policy domain actors to carry out their responsibilities in an open circuit construct. See energy and defense policy case study on page 116. |

Table 8. Assessment Measures – Evidence from Interviews

| Type of Assessment | Example Comments | Meaning or Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| Push (DOD) | The DOD brings a lot (to HA/DR responses)…sometimes too much. Best intentions aside, making a mountain out of a molehill is not the way to go.<br><br>(The DOD) tends to see them (i.e., HA/DR events) as opportunities to make things better in the end state when that's not the goal, in most cases. | The DOD assesses based on what it *can do*, not necessarily what is needed. |
| Pull (OFDA) | OFDA is there for the party, not the clean up.<br><br>As LFA, OFDA must coordinate the response in the most efficient way possible. Time is of the essence. Only tapping (the resources of other entities in terms of) what is needed is the key. Too much is not always a good thing. In fact, it can turn into a mess. | OFDA assesses on *needs*; what needs to be done to return the host nation back to the state it was in one minute before the disaster occurred. |

**Mission and Structure**

Professional or self-identity was an unanticipated theme that became very apparent with every interview. *Every* interviewee answered the mission and structure question with the understanding that mission drove structure. Nearly one-quarter of the way through the total number of interviews I began handing the participant a piece of paper with a single box on it (i.e., the start of a box diagram for showing their understanding of how organizational structure and mission may be related). I asked them to fill in the relationship between their mission and the structure of their organization. I

also alternated the order of "mission" and "structure" in my request so I was not inadvertently priming the interviewees by stating "mission" before "structure" in each interview. Interestingly, the interviewees I asked to fill in the blank box diagram recreated their organizational structure in the typical hierarchical construct that is associated with U.S. military organizations, yet each of them stated that the mission was the driving factor. The comment, "mission comes first" was a common response from interviewees. A few commented that they did not understand what organizational structure had to do with HA/DR policy implementation, that it was their mission and the organization was constructed to accomplish that mission.[163] The results were not what I anticipated; yet this is an interesting observation in terms of bureaucrats' behavior.

There are various questions stemming from this finding. Is this strict adherence to a "mission first" mindset and the inherent formality of organizational structure a product of their environment in a military setting? Is their professional identity based on a hierarchical structure in which "mission comes first?" What explains the OFDA

[163] Nearly halfway through the total number of interviews I handed the participant a blank sheet of paper and asked them to draw their understanding of how organizational structure and mission may be related. I thought the box diagram might be limiting their conceptual understanding. Again, recreations of their organizational structure were produced, and every interviewee stated that mission drove the entire process and organization. With the final five participants I turned the paper over and asked them to write "Disaster Event" on the far left side of the paper and "Lessons Learned" on the far right side. Then I asked them to fill in the "timeline." Each of these interviewees filled out the timeline with the process itself – bureaucrats following SOPs and rules. None wrote of a "real world" example or recounted a particular experience although each made a comment similar to "this is how it's supposed to work, but each event is different." Four of these final five participants happened to be civilian employees, rather than uniformed military members, but I have no reason to believe that made a significant difference in the findings. I considered giving the participants the piece of paper with the single box on it with instructions to place themselves, their agency, or whatever entity they chose in it and then draw lines and other boxes or circles, placing other entities or agencies in those figures, to show how they saw the relationships. I chose against this plan because I felt it was too leading. I wanted them to have the freedom to recreate their understanding of mission and structure as unencumbered as possible, rather than dictating or forcing a relationship between mission and structure upon them.

personnel who responded in the same manner? Are all of these participants self-identifying as bureaucrats in a hierarchical setting with rules and SOPs that guide their understanding of their roles and responsibilities? If so, are they unaware of how the structure has come to define them and their thinking, and does it matter in terms of HA/DR policy implementation? All of these questions could be considered moot to an observer who believes the approach was flawed. However, I am confident that requesting the participants to "[T]ell me about the relationship between your mission and the structure of your organization" and then handing them a piece of paper with a box on it and, later, a blank piece of paper is an open-ended approach. More on the implications of these findings will be discussed in the final chapter.

The HA/DR bureaucrats I spoke with largely resembled a team who were socially constructed by the HA/DR system itself, one created with humanitarian goals and intrinsic values at the forefront. Although a few mentioned that access and communication was at times personality driven, they willingly accept their roles and appeared willing to sacrifice their own power and authority within the system if it were for the good of the given HA/DR effort. This symbiotic relationship may be a manifestation of the typical philosophies and personalities that are drawn to such endeavors as HA/DR work and that were discussed in Chapter Two. It seems natural, then, that they would list the mission as the driving factor, rather than organizational structure. They work effectively because of the common goal, not the rigid structure typical of USG entities. The common goal may be the most important factor in the interagency relationships I observed. Finally, the underlying current running through

these interview data reveals bureaucratic access and leverage to be across-structure and across-mission phenomena. That bureaucrats in the line of authority access one another is obvious; that they cross organizational boundaries and leverage other bureaucrats is a novel idea.

The multiple incidences of HA/DR bureaucrats mentioning a "healthy tension," or words to that effect, between OFDA and DOD employees were not lost on the respondents. They expressed the understanding that these questioning and evolving relationships were good for them and their work. Those who mentioned the interagency relations expressed the need for constant and open communication. They referenced communication problems during 1998's Hurricane Mitch and the understanding that when it comes to an HA/DR event and response it is "one team, one fight" and the provision of assistance and relief for the affected peoples is the bottom line. This is certainly a telling example of bureaucrats accessing bureaucrats at work and the positive benefits of the phenomenon. The preceding data analysis offers the conceptual variables regarding mission and structure and, especially, "semantics" from the meanings and verbiage presented by the respondents, as discussed. These higher-level constructs will be addressed further in the final chapter.

Table 9. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Policy Domain's Key Traits

| **Characteristic** | **Percentage of Interviewees Who Mentioned Characteristic** | **Examples of Relationship to Leverage** | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Outputs* | *Outcomes* |
| 1) Mission and Structure | 100% (33) | Mission-driven approach | Organic leverage, rather than purposive leverage |
| 2) Policy Implementation and Assessment | 94% (31) | DOD pushes<br>OFDA pulls | Lack of clear requirements and end-state; varying effective, efficient use of resources |
| 3) Bureaucratic Access Points | 100% (33) | Varying resources and capabilities combined through LFA direction and expertise | Unified mission across multiple agencies, roles, and responsibilities |

**Internal and External Validity**

Internal validity concerns are mitigated through various methods. An additional benefit to my deductive approach is that the direct questions allow me to avoid asking open ended questions that, as a novice interviewer, could have introduced validity issues. I asked the same questions in the same order to the participants.[164] Furthermore, I devised a contact summary form for key interview findings.[165] I used factoring and clustering techniques to identify themes.[166] I developed a coding scheme for coding the interview data onto those themes and followed the process throughout the data collection

164 Patton, M.Q. 2002. *Qualitative research and evaluation methods, 3rd Ed*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

165 Dutton, J.E. & Dukerich, J.M. 1991. Keeping an eye on the mirror: Image and identity in organizational adaptation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 34(3):517-554.

166 Miles, M.B. & Huberman, A.M. 1994. *Qualitative data analysis, 2nd Ed*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

and analysis.[167] I had an associate code twenty-five percent of the interviews, and our individual coding was over ninety-five percent compatible or in agreement based on the coding scheme. The coding scheme was reliable based on this similar coding. Finally, I also used my personal knowledge of the military environment and familiarity with the HA/DR system from a professional standpoint.

Data from interviews, agency reports, and educational seminars provide convergent validity through triangulation and address external validity concerns.[168] Aside from, possibly, the mission and structure findings, there are no issues with explicitly poor theory, research questions, or methodology. The HA/DR policy domain and associated OFDA and DOD interagency relationship and environment are generalizable to other policy domains. The generalizability of this study's findings will be discussed in the final chapter. Regarding the mission and structure findings, it may be that the hierarchical organizational structure of this project's setting and participants placed a boundary on that theory.

In conclusion, the interviews' findings begin to address this project's research questions. Interagency conflicts and bureaucratic challenges appear, in many cases, to be due to different assessment measures and missions carried out by the agencies. Policy implementation and mission assessment influence interagency relations in terms of tension and cooperation between bureaucrats. Again, the mention of "healthy tension"

---

167 Ibid. And Dutton, J.E. & Dukerich, J.M. 1991. Keeping an eye on the mirror: Image and identity in organizational adaptation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 34(3):517-554.

168 Silverman, D. and Marvasti, A. 2008. *Doing qualitative research: A comprehensive guide*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

illustrates this concept. Common concerns about the need for better assessment measures, clearer mission requirements, end-state goals, and more efficient and effective use of limited resources were also found in the interviews.

Other findings reveal that HA/DR bureaucrats not only leverage their expertise, resources, and capabilities in order to gain access to other bureaucrats, but they maintain and increase their own information, resources, and capabilities through strategic communication. A unified HA/DR goal across multiple agencies, roles, resources, capabilities, and responsibilities can be accomplished when OFDA uses its LFA authority and associated expertise, according to the interviewees. In other words, the "one team, one fight" attitude reveals the positive influence of bureaucratic access points and leverage on HA/DR policy implementation.

The unanimous finding that mission dominates the HA/DR bureaucrats' approach to policy implementation has far-reaching implications. The evidence from the interviews, coupled with tangible illustrations from the forthcoming HA/DR missions case studies, provides strong linkages to the emerging leverage theory and construct. The mission-driven approach to policy implementation provides a more nuanced and specific understanding of bureaucratic leverage, as will be discussed in the next chapter. The following HA/DR missions case studies show how bureaucrats cross organizational boundaries and leverage other bureaucrats in this policy domain.

## Chapter 5: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Missions Case Studies

The overarching case study used to evaluate the bureaucratic access and the emergent leverage theory is the HA/DR policy domain with OFDA and USSOUTHCOM as the particular actors being investigated. It is informative from a structural and practical perspective to briefly look at specific HA/DR missions case studies, as well. The following missions cases help to apply the bureaucratic access and leverage theory. The following discussion of the value of case studies clarifies the overarching case study, the HA/DR missions case studies, and the generalizability examples in the final chapter in which I use examples of "other OFDAs" in four unique policy cases to show how the bureaucratic access points and leverage theory may be applied to other policy domains.

Case studies provide a "roadmap" for building grounded theories.[169] They extend previous theories' constructs, provide validity through triangulation, offer within-case and cross-case analyses, and clarify the role of existing literature.[170] The triangulation made possible by the multiple data collection methods I used provides stronger validation of constructs and my research questions. Case studies also help place the developing theory into the larger context of political science and public administration research.[171]

Theory generation and building are the most valuable contributions case studies

---

169 Eisenhardt, Kathleen. 1989. "Building theories from case study research." *Academy of Management Review*, 14(4): 532-550.
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid.

make.[172] A priori specification of bureaucratic access points – based on existing access points theory – helped shape the initial design of my bureaucratic access and leverage theory-building research. Using the notion of access, I was able to focus on pertinent reports and other data, attend specific seminars, develop accurate interview questions, and identify the most appropriate HA/DR bureaucrats to interview. As the leverage construct emerged, I was able to identify its causes and implications more readily. This process also provides a strong empirical grounding for the bureaucratic access points and leverage theory. Furthermore, because the access constructs were explicitly measured in the interview protocol and conversations with specific HA/DR bureaucrats, the emergence of the leverage phenomenon is based in defensible, triangulated measures on which to ground the emergent theory.

Early identification of the access research question enabled the precise measurement that allowed the subtle shift to discover the leverage construct. Random case selection was unnecessary and, in fact, not preferable. I chose the HA/DR policy domain because it was likely to replicate and extend the emergent bureaucratic access points theory.[173] The novel bureaucratic access points and leverage theory resulted from the choice of this specific, transparent case and the ability to interview the most appropriate HA/DR bureaucrats. My approach allowed an iterative analysis of the data

---

[172] Gersick, Connie. 1988. "Time and transition in work teams: Toward a new model of group development." *Academy of Management Journal*, 31: 9-41. And Harris, Stanley, and Robert Sutton. 1986. "Functions of parting ceremonies in dying organizations." *Academy of Management Journal*, 29: 5-30.

[173] Eisenhardt, Kathleen. 1989. "Building theories from case study research." *Academy of Management Review*, 14(4): 532-550.

that helped guide subsequent interviews and other data collection. I was able to make adjustments during the data collection process, particularly using theory-building case research. This design helped to shape my research questions and refine the definition of the access and emerging leverage constructs as evidence that measured the constructs accumulated. The iterative process of constant comparison between data and constructs allowed this evidence from diverse sources to converge on a single, defined construct[174] of bureaucratic leverage.

The linkage of bureaucratic access and leverage with a variety of bureaucratic, organizational structure, and access points literature in other contexts increases confidence that I have observed a valid phenomenon within the HA/DR policy domain. It also allows me to elevate the conceptual level of my findings to the more fundamental level of bureaucratic access and leverage. Furthermore, it strengthens the theory's likely generalizability to other policy domains. My positivist approach enabled a successful process "directed toward the development of testable hypotheses and theory which are generalizable across settings."[175] The addition of the following missions case studies further elucidates the bureaucratic access points and leverage theory.

**HA/DR Missions Case Studies**

As discussed in Chapter 2, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 created USAID and established that U.S. military forces will assist in HA/DR responses as requested by USAID/OFDA, and subsequent policy has further defined that notion of security

---

[174] Ibid.

[175] Ibid., p.546.

cooperation. DOD entities are also allowed to plan and carry out HA[176] projects as part of readiness and training operations overseas. In particular, these projects (i.e., military deployments) are designed to provide the necessary training that ensures operational readiness in times of HA/DR responses and wartime. They also help to maintain a U.S. military presence in certain regions, which provides access to partner nations' militaries and defense apparatus, civilian ministries, and local populations. Again, these HA projects are governed and authorized by Title 10 of U.S. Code Section 401.[177]

HA deployments serve as relatively low cost (in terms of money, time, and medical resources), impactful projects that promote the security interests of both the U.S. and the host countries and enhance the U.S. military's operational readiness. The State Department approves these HA projects, and OFDA liaisons offer knowledge and suggestions in order to complement, not duplicate, similar social or economic assistance efforts provided to the host nation by other USG entities, NGOs, IGOs, etc. Examples of HA projects include medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural host nation areas, potable water well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities, basic construction and repair of public facilities, and other such medical and engineering

---

176 The acronym HA/DR is used to refer to U.S. humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts in response to a natural disaster, and in some potentialities a man-made disaster, in which OFDA is the lead federal agency for USG involvement; the use of humanitarian assistance (HA) alone is used to differentiate U.S. military projects designed for operational readiness and training that are undertaken often in coordination and conjunction with OFDA projects, but not led or determined by OFDA. U.S. military documents often refer to the humanitarian civic assistance (HCA) program, funded by Congress through Title 10 Section 401, when discussing what I term HA projects.

177 Also, DOD Directive 2205.02 (December 2008).

projects.[178] Beyond the positive influence on the educational and medical facilities and general quality of life of a HA project's beneficiary population, these initiatives help to advance U.S.-host nation engagement and provide U.S. forces with valuable readiness and training opportunities.

HA medical deployments are collectively known as medical readiness training exercises (MEDRETEs). Medical readiness exercises involving teams consisting of doctors, nurses and dentists provide general and specialized health services to host nation citizens requiring care. The two main types of medical training exercises are general MEDRETEs, which are two week deployments that provide outpatient medical, dental, veterinary care and public health education to remote or rural regions, and Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAPs) projects, which are 3-5 days deployments that provide basic medical and dental care, dispense prescriptions, issue glasses, and administer vaccinations. The primary objective is to enhance U.S. military operational readiness skills, and an associated benefit is the increased quality of life for the host nation's civilian populace. U.S. medical personnel benefit by training to provide medical care in challenging environments, partner nation medical professionals learn from and share medical treatment and modalities with U.S. medical personnel, and the local populace receives free, quality medical care. In fiscal year 2011, U.S. military medical personnel conducted 88 MEDRETEs and MEDCAPs in 19 countries, treating nearly a quarter

[178] This discussion of HA projects and the subsequent HA and HA/DR missions case studies are informed by USSOUTHCOM and USAID/OFDA websites (please see bibliography for addresses and dates retrieved), conversations with HA/DR bureaucrats, and my personal experiences while serving as a healthcare administrator in the U.S. Air Force.

million people.

In addition to the MEDRETEs, USSOUTHCOM plans and executes specific HA/DR preparedness exercises and conferences to "improve the collective ability of the U.S. and its partner nations to respond effectively and expeditiously to disasters" during deployments to rural, underprivileged areas that last for several months.[179] The Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias (Allied Humanitarian Forces) exercise is designed to improve regional information sharing and capability by enabling U.S. and partner nation security forces to train together in preparation for natural disasters. HA exercises such as the annual Beyond the Horizon and New Horizons programs provide the aforementioned engagement opportunities through construction efforts and medical assistance to communities throughout the region. For example, over 85,000 partner nation patients were treated, and over 6,000 U.S. military, 500 USG personnel, and nearly 350 partner nation personnel were trained through fiscal year 2011 New Horizons and Beyond the Horizon exercises.[180]

Problems in the HA and HA/DR exercises program that relate to this study, specifically, include: inadequate pre-deployment training to prepare U.S. military medical personnel to deliver care that is appropriate for the environment, inadequate documentation of care delivered, and lack of appropriate assessments of activities. These shortfalls undermine the goal of capacity building. In other words, these HA projects do not always increase the host nation's – and U.S. military's – capability to provide for

---

[179] USSOUTHCOM. 2013. "Missions – Training and Exercise" and "Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief." Retrieved on March 20, 2013, at http://www.southcom.mil.
[180] Ibid.

basic social and economic needs of the populace. This capacity building ideal is important in terms of mitigation of myriad deleterious effects arising in the aftermath of potential HA/DR events. Again, OFDA estimates that those pre-disaster, capacity building efforts save seven dollars in response dollar spending for every dollar spent for mitigation initiatives. The following HA/DR missions provide brief case studies of the impact the discussed training and mitigation initiatives have on USG disaster response efforts and augment the interviews' findings by providing tangible examples. They are provided as illustrative examples of the HA/DR policy domain and how the associated policy is implemented. Implications of the bureaucratic access points and leverage theory will be presented. Suggestions on how to improve the planning and assessment of these missions will be discussed in the final chapter.

*Hurricane Mitch*

The Hurricane Mitch case reveals profound confusion regarding the LFA and interagency relations. This problem led to the establishment of an embedded OFDA liaison in USSOUTHCOM and, eventually, other U.S. military combatant commands. The inclusion of an OFDA liaison in U.S. military headquarters has greatly improved communication and knowledge sharing as evidenced by interview comments such as "sharing information – accurate information – is the key to a successful response" and "our relationship and, ultimately, mission success is predicated on knowing who to reach out and touch (i.e., request particular resources and capabilities) and get what is needed when it is needed." Please see table on page 73 for more examples.

Hurricane Mitch, in 1998, was one of the worst natural disasters to occur in the western hemisphere in the past two centuries. It swept through Central America (i.e., in particular, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador) causing tremendous loss of life and damage to the nations' infrastructure. It is estimated that the death toll was over 18,000, with over five billion dollars in property damage, conservatively estimated.[181] Beyond the sheer size and scope of the disaster in terms of devastation and geographical area, USSOUTHCOM did not have a pre-existing medical plan, information was nearly nonexistent from the affected regions and no common assessment strategy was in place, and what little information was available was compromised by a lack of communication between governmental agencies.[182]

The response to Hurricane Mitch revealed the need for embedded OFDA personnel in DOD combatant commands. Various reasons for the convoluted disaster response include ill-defined training strategies, frequent turnover in personnel at both the strategic and operational levels creating a lack of standard operating procedures (SOPs), norms, and empirical knowledge, and the vertical organizational structures, cultures, and assessment measures. The latter problem concerned how – and by whose assessments – information was observed, analyzed, and used. Disparate organizations faced the preceding challenges without a common link. The mechanism for improving interagency

---

181 "Hurricane Mitch" from History.com, retrieved on March 20, 2013 at http://www.history.com/topics/hurricane-mitch.

182 In addition, most cargo aircraft were diverted to respond to Iraqi aggression in the Desert Fox mission. Therefore, most of the disaster response for Hurricane Mitch was accomplished by naval vessels, which increased the delay of humanitarian assistance.

relations and information sharing became OFDA's humanitarian assistance advisor position embedded in USSOUTHCOM.

The embedded OFDA liaison in DOD combatant commands is the personification of a bureaucratic access point. The liaison's express purpose is to be a conduit for knowledge sharing during response preparation and communication during relief efforts. The liaison alternately leverages and is leveraged by other HA/DR bureaucrats, as a lynchpin of sorts, which enables HA/DR policy implementation. The interview comments included in the table on page 73 provide examples of this access and leverage.

There are various benefits to having an OFDA liaison in DOD combatant commands. The challenges associated with having one entity in charge is mitigated when communication is improved. An OFDA-DOD relationship is better clarified, with OFDA as the LFA, when representatives from each organization form professional relationships by working directly with one another in a common environment. Unity of effort and familiarity lead to more effective and efficient preparation and relief response. Better preparation and relief response is achieved through mutual planning and resource and capability awareness and sharing. Common assessment measures may be realized through this unity of effort when policy implementation focuses on a mutually agreed upon outcome. Recommendations for improved planning, response preparation, and assessment will be discussed in the final chapter. All of these benefits from embedding OFDA personnel in DOD combatant commands stem from better information management and sharing that is developed through the liaison relationship.

*Port au Prince, Haiti, Earthquake*

The Port au Prince earthquake HA/DR response is an example of how timely medical, logistical, and engineering assistance was provided under the overall direction of OFDA. The lack of coordinated assessment measures created interagency challenges as evidenced by interview comments such as, "the systems (i.e., data clearinghouses) must be real-time so everyone is on the same page." But the central control, coordination, and effective communication realized through a common mission goal and the expertise exhibited by OFDA as the LFA led to a more efficient HA/DR response. One interviewee commented, "the whole thing (i.e., the HA/DR policy domain and policy implementation) works a lot better when OFDA is the lead federal agent."

The most significant recent HA/DR mission was Operation Unified Response in 2010. A 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti on January 12, 2010, destroying much of the nation's capital, Port au Prince, killing an estimated 230,000 persons, trapping tens of thousands in the wreckage, and leaving over two million without shelter. A U.S. military force of nearly 22,000 troops, more than 30 ships, and 300 aircraft responded to OFDA's call for assistance. Together with other USG entities, NGOs, IGOs, and other nations' militaries, it provided medical services and delivered and distributed millions of pounds of food and water over the following weeks.[183]

From its inception on January 14, Joint Task Force – Haiti (JTF-H) exercised command and control over U.S. military assets in support of USAID/OFDA and the

---

183 Information about the 2010 earthquake in Haiti case study is from USSOUTHCOM's "Operation Unified Response: Support to Haiti Earthquake Relief 2010" webpage, retrieved on February 27, 2013, at http://www.southcom.mil.

government of Haiti to provide emergency disaster relief. JTF-H coordinated its efforts with U.S. embassy staff and OFDA, focusing on the immediate need of search and rescue, medical care, and humanitarian assistance. This collaboration led the USG response through the emergency phase and into the relief phase of the mission. By the end of January, 16 different distribution sites had been established providing food and water and continuing to provide medical care. The transition from emergency, to relief, to end-state phases was delayed due to complications surrounding the rainy season and the thousands of displaced persons who were vulnerable to flood- and water-related shelter and medical dangers. USSOUTHCOM's New Horizons exercises provided the transition to HA projects in Haiti and are an example of the potential benefit of such missions.[184]

When HA/DR efforts ended in May, 2010, more than 9,000 patients, including 1,025 surgeries, were cared for, and over 250 were evacuated to higher echelons of medical care. Over 4.9 million meals and 2.6 million bottles of water had been delivered, and more than one million people received emergency shelter. Finally, JTF-H, in conjunction with OFDA, planned for Haitian reconstruction and HA relief efforts in the form of New Horizons exercises and other medical readiness training exercises.[185] OFDA successfully leveraged its HA/DR expertise and network of HA entities to reduce by 55 percent the number of displaced persons less than one year after the earthquake. Furthermore, it successfully lessened the potentially devastating cholera outbreak in Haiti

---

[184] Ibid.
[185] Ibid.

in late 2010 by again leveraging its authority as LFA to coordinate among various USG agencies critical education activities for the susceptible populace.[186]

The immense public and political interest in the disaster created a large influx of persons from outside of the HA/DR policy domain, each with their own opinions and desires regarding how HA/DR policy should be implemented in this case. An interview elicited this comment: "big HA/DR events, like Haiti, draw a lot of interest…it makes it really difficult to do our jobs when they (i.e., outside influences) get involved." The large U.S. military response provided the conditions in which the DOD could have overwhelmed USAID/OFDA responsibilities as the USG lead agency – and some of the HA/DR bureaucrats I spoke with suggested it did in various ways. And the fact that the Haiti relief efforts occurred in such close geographical proximity to the U.S. and that it became the largest HA/DR mission in modern U.S. military history certainly added to the stress within this policy domain creating many implementation challenges. But, the overall effectiveness of HA/DR policy and its implementers' understanding of their roles and profound knowledge were evident amid the fog of confusion and challenges.

The coordination between the DOD and USAID/OFDA allowed for each to leverage one another and for them to collectively leverage those on the outside of the policy domain who wanted to influence implementation. This case reveals how policy is implemented through bureaucratic access points and leveraging. This leveraging enabled lives to be saved and suffering to be relieved in a country devastated by a natural disaster.

---

[186] OFDA. 2012. "Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2011." Document provided by OFDA representative. Also available at http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crises-and-conflict/crisis-response/resources/fy-2011-annual-report.

*El Salvador Mission*

An example of an HA missions case study in which training and mitigation efforts were a mission priority follows.[187] This capacity building initiative illustrates the positive influence leverage can have in HA/DR policy implementation and reveals how limited military resources and funding, governed by Title 10 stipulations, may be used for efficient and effective training and readiness missions. Along these lines, one interviewee commented, "only tapping (the resources of other entities in terms of) what is needed is the key…too much is not always a good thing."

Members of U.S. Army South and the Army Reserve provided specialized and general medical care to more than 5,100 patients in El Salvador over a nine-day period in 2010 as part of a MEDRETE. The effort was coordinated with the help of OFDA liaisons embedded with USSOUTHCOM.[188] Collaboration with Salvadoran military members and physicians, dentists, and pharmacists built relationships for better communication for future HA missions and possible HA/DR efforts. This is another example of the potential benefits of training and mitigation efforts (i.e., the estimate that every pre-disaster, capacity building dollar spent saves seven dollars in HA/DR spending). Again, OFDA is able to leverage its corporate knowledge and status as LFA to help ensure useful HA missions and results for DOD readiness and the beneficiary population.

In light of reduced USG budgets, the capacity building efforts discussed above are

---

[187] USSOUTHCOM. 2013. "U.S. Soldiers treat more than 5,100 patients in El Salvador." Retrieved on February 27, 2013, at http://www.southcom.mil.

[188] Interview with HA/DR bureaucrats in November 2012.

more vital than ever. Improving partner nations' ability to confront and deal with their own HA/DR challenges will not only improve their peoples' quality of life before and after a disaster, it will offset the reduced humanitarian and civic assistance activities that the USG has traditionally accomplished. HA missions such as New Horizons, Beyond the Horizon, Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias, and MEDRETEs are implementation means to this policy end.

However, going too far with HA efforts can create real problems, as well. This observation is illustrated in the interview comment, "(the DOD) tends to see (HA/DR events) as opportunities to make things better in the end state when that's not the goal, in most cases." For example, the provision of U.S. style medical care can undermine the host nation's ability to provide care due to different expectations after the U.S. leaves. U.S. and partner nation military forces have the unique capability to respond within life saving time requirements with unmatched logistics capacity and trained and equipped personnel.[189] Coordination with OFDA as the LFA will help improve knowledge management, regional information sharing, and more efficient interoperability among relief entities during disasters. As these brief HA and HA/DR missions case studies have shown, OFDA's leveraging capabilities are key to responding more effectively and efficiently to future humanitarian crises in the face of budget constraints.

---

189 Department of Defense. 2012. "Western Hemisphere Defense Policy Statement." Retrieved on April 2, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/news/WHDPS-English.pdf.

***Bureaucratic Access Points and Leverage Theory***

As I interviewed and talked with the HA/DR bureaucrats and read the reports and researched the disaster relief case studies, I found that the bureaucrats generally "stay in their lanes" and rarely deviate from the overall policy rules, regulations, and SOPs. But once outside influences, such as elected officials, become interested, the policy domain can lose coherence and ignore HA/DR policy. Policy is implemented effectively and efficiently in most HA/DR responses and HA missions. But SOPs, communication, and actual humanitarian assistance and disaster relief on the ground begins to break down in those cases in which outside influences insert themselves and affect the domain.

It is likely that this is a complex system. This approach understands complex interactions and positive feedback in terms of change leading to, or creating, more change. It also investigates complex interactions through the notion of negative feedback, or the idea that change in one direction stimulates counteracting change.[190] Internal policy domain dynamics together with external influences (i.e., inputs) create system outputs. The HA/DR policy domain cycles and implements and creates policy within itself, and the disaster response is successful in most cases. But, in those few instances, negative feedback loops are created when outside influences insert themselves and desire outputs outside of the policy rules, regulations, and SOPs. The bureaucrats may feel powerless and threatened causing the agencies to diverge from policy and stop communicating with one another and become concerned only with the outside influences, not their fellow HA/DR bureaucrats.

---

190 Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 2002. "Positive and Negative Feedback in Politics." In *Policy Dynamics*, eds. Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Figure 2. Model I: Closed Circuit with little to no outside (e.g., elected official) influence. Green lines and arrows represent positive feedback between and among the HA/DR agencies.



Figure 3. Model II: Open Circuit with outside influence. Red lines and arrows represent direct outside interference and negative feedback between and among the HA/DR agencies (i.e., loss of coherence, coordination, and control by lead federal agency OFDA).




The novel bureaucratic access points and leverage theory is this project's most valuable contribution to political science and public administration literature. The notion of leverage connotes power[191], but it can be organic or purposive. The organic leverage idea is that power in this construct that I have described is naturally occurring through the

191 The traditional theory of power as described in Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Bachrach, Peter, and Morton Baratz. 1962. "Two Faces of Power." *American Political Science Review* 56:947-952. And Bachrach, Peter, and Morton Baratz. 1963. "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework." *American Political Science Review* 57:632-642.

structure of the organization and the policy domain, rather than specifically sought, manipulated, or even fully cognitively realized by the agencies and bureaucrats. It occurs through the inherent authority that comes from policy and implementation expertise, formal responsibilities (e.g., lead federal agent, rulemaking ability, sole inspection or evaluation control through assessments, and final arbitration power), and deference paid by potential outside influences and fellow policy domain entities. Organic leverage occurs when the entity employing it is left to its own devices and allowed to implement policy as it deems appropriate based on its expertise.

Purposive leverage shares similar attributes with organic leverage. However, it is the leverage mechanism that is realized, sought, and used during those times when outside influences inject themselves into the implementation or policy change process or when one entity sees an opportunity to better its position within the policy domain. In this way, it has some relationship with Carpenter's notion of autonomy, but it is a unique theory unto itself. A large caveat to the purposive leverage construct is that the "OFDA-type" entity has much difficulty being able to use its leverage because the other entities question, undermine, or simply ignore its authority. Because nearly every policy domain has its own OFDA-type entity, this study and the emerging leverage theory is particularly valuable in that it ties the aforementioned authority to observable actions and practical application.

The HA/DR policy domain models above, henceforth referred to as the "OFDA"

models for descriptive purposes,[192] hold according to the explanatory chart of the typologies of bureaucratic leverage below. A 2x2 may be used to compare several categories at once and to move to a uniform guideline, which permits clearer modeling and generalizability. The HA/DR policy domain study and its emerging leverage theory are generalizable to other policy domains, particularly environmental policy, as will be discussed in the final chapter.

Table 10. Organic and Purposive Leverage

| | Organic Leverage | Purposive Leverage |
|---|---|---|
| *Closed Circuit* | A | B |
| *Open Circuit* | C | D |

A: Organic Leverage / Closed Circuit: natural state is lack of interference (i.e., trust and reliance on expertise); "OFDA" leverage is expertise- and LFA-based; rules and SOPs are of less concern and importance due to recognized and accepted expertise; efficient, implicit and explicit power in ideal construct

B: Purposive Leverage / Closed Circuit: "OFDA" exerts and exercises LFA power and authority; other actors acquiesce to "OFDA's" expertise or authority; rules and SOPs are formalized and dictate roles; efficient, explicit power

C: Organic Leverage / Open Circuit: unstable "OFDA" construct due to outside influence and lack of LFA adherence and accepted expertise; rules and SOPs are ignored and other actors' desires take precedence; inefficient, little power or autonomy

D: Purposive Leverage / Open Circuit: "OFDA" construct is compromised due to inability to maintain LFA status, power, and authority due to outside influence and other entities' desires; rules and SOPs are ignored while other actors' desires are considered; inefficient, no power or autonomy

[192] The term "OFDA" connotes the bureaucratic agency or entity within a policy domain that has the inherent authority that comes from policy and implementation expertise, formal responsibilities, and deference paid by potential outside influences and fellow policy domain entities. It is the term for the agency or entity employing organic or purposive leverage.

The interviews yielded the unanimous finding that mission dominates the HA/DR bureaucrats' approach to policy implementation. The evidence from the interviews, coupled with the illustrations from the preceding HA/DR missions case studies, provides strong linkages to the emerging leverage theory and construct. The mission-driven approach to policy implementation provides a more nuanced and specific understanding of bureaucratic leverage. It appears that organic leverage is available and used in mission-driven environments, while purposive leverage may be sought and employed in structure-dominated constructs. For example, a mission-driven approach may rely on expertise and a more fluid interaction among bureaucrats during policy implementation. This harkens back to the realization that HA/DR bureaucrats share similar attributes even though they come from disparate agencies. On the other hand, structure-dominated constructs may see bureaucrats relying on the formality of rules, SOPs, and regulations to implement policy. This study's mission versus structure findings may be unique to the HA/DR policy domain as discussed here, but they may be generalizable to other policy domains and, at a minimum, offer interesting future research opportunities.

In conclusion, the Hurricane Mitch case is an example of purposive leverage in an open circuit, structure-driven construct. It exhibited much confusion regarding the LFA and interagency relations. This problem led to the establishment of an embedded OFDA liaison in USSOUTHCOM and, eventually, other U.S. military combatant commands. The inclusion of an OFDA liaison in U.S. military headquarters has greatly improved communication and knowledge sharing within the HA/DR policy domain. A comment

from one of the interviewees sums this up nicely, "they know what we bring to the table, and we know what they bring to the table…they need us, and we need them."

The Port au Prince earthquake HA/DR response is an example of organic leverage in an open circuit, mostly mission-driven construct. Timely medical, logistical, and engineering assistance was provided under the overall direction of OFDA. The lack of common assessment measures created interagency challenges. And as one interviewee revealed, "OFDA brings a lot of experts to bear on an HA/DR event…and does a good job when left to it (i.e., without outside influence)…but it gets muddy fast when (outside influences) think they know best or someone wants some attention." But the central control, coordination, and effective communication realized through a common mission goal and the expertise exhibited by OFDA as the LFA led to a more efficient HA/DR response.

The MEDRETE mission to El Salvador is an example of organic leverage in a closed circuit, mission-driven construct. Training and mitigation efforts were a mission priority. Effective planning enabled necessary training and resulted in wellness being delivered to a beneficiary population in need of medical care. This capacity building initiative illustrates the positive affect organic leverage can have in HA/DR policy implementation. Furthermore, it reveals how limited military resources and funding,

governed by Title 10 stipulations, may be used for efficient and effective training and readiness missions.[193]

Table 11. Summary of Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief Missions Case Studies

| Case Study | Leverage Type | Circuit Model | Mission or Structure | Outputs or Outcomes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hurricane Mitch (1998) | Purposive | Open | Structure-dominated | Much confusion regarding LFA; lack of common assessments and goals; poor communication and knowledge sharing; led to embedded OFDA liaison in USSOUTHCOM |
| Port au Prince (Haiti) Earthquake (2010) | Organic | Open | Mostly mission-driven, with some structure-dominated elements | Medical, logistical, engineering assistance provided under the overall direction of LFA OFDA; lack of common assessment measures created interagency challenges; central control of LFA and effective communication led to more efficient HA/DR response |
| Humanitarian Assistance MEDRETE (2010) | Organic | Closed | Mission-driven | Training and mitigation efforts; medical care delivered to beneficiary population; capacity building initiative |

[193] U.S. Code: Title 10, Chapter 20, Section 401. Funds are authorized for military forces to engage in HA activities if they help obtain and advance the security interests of the U.S. and the host nation and enhance the operational readiness skills of the military members performing the HA mission.

The evidence from the interview data and HA/DR missions case studies demonstrates that bureaucratic access points and leverage are key to interagency relations and policy implementation. In particular, leverage is crucial when those agencies have different missions and assessment measures but are responsible for implementing over-arching or over-lapping policy. The common theme throughout these interview data and missions case studies is that bureaucrats cross organizational boundaries and leverage other bureaucrats. The emergent theory helps explain why, when, and how bureaucrats leverage one another in their policy implementation efforts.

Table 12. Organic and Purposive Leverage Evidence from Interviews and Case Studies

| Organic | Purposive |
|---|---|
| 1. Mission-driven | 1. Structure-dominated |
| 2. Expertise-based | 2. Rules- and regulations-based |
| 3. Overall mission and goal the same | 3. Disparate agency missions and roles |
| 4. OFDA as Lead Federal Agent | 4. DOD can "overwhelm" other entities |
| 5. Implicit power (understood, respected) | 5. Explicit power (sought, formal, dictated) |
| 6. Cooperation ("healthy tension") | 6. Tension |
| 7. Autonomy | 7. Dependency |
| 8. Little interference | 8. More interference |
| 9. Communication and knowledge sharing | 9. Restricted access |
| 10. One team, one fight | 10. Different assessments |
| 11. Shared resources and capabilities | 11. Title 10 funds restrictions |

The final chapter discusses what the preceding findings mean from a theoretical and practical perspective. In particular, the bureaucratic access points and leverage theory is shown to be highly generalizable to other policy domains. Policy recommendations, project limitations, and ideas for future research conclude the study.

# Chapter 6: Theory, Policy Recommendations, Project Limitations, and Future Research

The final chapter revisits the study's research questions and explains how they were answered. The broader implications and importance of the findings are the key contributions of this study. After a review of the research questions, the first part focuses on the novel theory of bureaucratic access and leverage. It presents brief case studies that reveal the generalizability of the leverage theory to other policy domains. It concludes with an explanation of how the ideas of bureaucratic access and leverage are missing in the implementation and policy change literature. The significant contribution this project makes is filling that gap in the existing literature with the innovative theory, which generates exciting opportunities for future research in my larger program of work. The second part of the chapter offers policy suggestions and practical application ideas for bureaucrats and for the political science field. The third part makes known the limitations of the project and offers ideas for improving my future research designs. The fourth part expands upon the lessons learned from the limitations by discussing future lines of investigation in my larger program of work and other research ideas. Finally, a brief conclusion sums up the important implications and contributions of this project.

## Research Questions Revisited: Bureaucratic Access Points and Leverage

Bureaucrats access bureaucrats directly in the policy implementation process (i.e., in terms of outputs); therefore policy outcomes and subsequent policy assessment will be affected. The evidence from the myriad reports, seminars, interviews, and HA/DR missions case studies certainly reveal that bureaucrats access one another directly during

the implementation stage. Access and the emergent leverage phenomenon are vital to successful HA/DR efforts as seen in the Hurricane Mitch and Haiti earthquake cases. The semantics finding (e.g., "checks and balances," "dovetail" efforts, "end state") and further evidence from the interviews (i.e., tables on pages 73, 74, and 75) provide tangible examples of bureaucrats accessing and leveraging one another, as well.

*Interagency conflicts and bureaucratic challenges are largely due to different missions and different assessment measures carried out by the agencies. Policy implementation and mission assessment influence interagency relations in terms of tension and/or cooperation between bureaucrats. How are mission requirements and success assessed?* The evidence from the interviews and cases studies show that the missions, while somewhat different, are not the larger cause of interagency conflicts or bureaucratic challenges. The goal of delivering life saving care and humanitarian assistance is the same for all of the HA/DR agencies, and it creates a rather uniform mission across entities. The assessment measures, as noted earlier, are a source of conflict and challenges, however. Part two of this chapter will offer various assessment measure suggestions and evaluation of what is success in the HA/DR policy domain.

*Does mission drive structure, or does structure drive mission? How does this understanding influence policy implementation?* The mission versus structure construct was not found to be a factor in this study, but it led to other important findings. All of the HA/DR bureaucrats that I interviewed expressed the idea that mission drove structure. As was thoroughly discussed in the two previous chapters, there are various possible reasons for this finding, but it does not appear to have negatively impacted this study. In

fact, the mission-driven and structure-dominated notions help to further define and articulate what is organic leverage and purposive leverage. The limitations portion below will investigate the initial research question further.

*HA/DR agencies' bureaucrats have the unique opportunity for access points to other bureaucrats during the disaster event itself and at times of policy implementation (e.g., lead agent responsibilities, humanitarian assistance missions). Timing (in terms of opportunity for the HA/DR agency and criticality of the response time itself in saving lives and property) creates an access point for HA/DR bureaucrats based on their information, resources and capabilities, and leverage*. The evidence from the reports, seminars, interviews, and case studies all reveal that access points are readily available during the disaster event and policy implementation. Communication of vital information is crucial to successful HA/DR responses and HA missions. The inherent communication creates access points, and those HA/DR bureaucrats I interviewed expected and sought to be access points and conduits of communication. The implication of timing appeared to simply be a part of the disaster response, rather than a separate, observed phenomenon. The time-sensitive nature of HA/DR responses makes this research question largely moot.

*Information is key to interagency relations when those agencies have different missions and assessment measures but are responsible for implementing over-arching or over-lapping policy*. Similar to the previous interagency relations research questions, the assessment measures play a large role in implementing over-arching and over-lapping policy. And, similarly, the shared goal of delivering life saving care and humanitarian

assistance is the same overall mission for all of the HA/DR agencies. This shared goal has a unifying influence when it comes to implementing over-arching or over-lapping policy in this domain.

*The capabilities and resources that agencies possess create opportunities for bureaucratic access at times of policy implementation (e.g., lead agent responsibilities, humanitarian assistance missions).* The evidence from the interviews and case studies yielded a connection between sought after capabilities and resources and access and, more apparently, leverage. As discussed earlier, when OFDA needs an agency's resource or capability as LFA, they necessarily become an access point. The bureaucrats' semantics and the comments that the DOD can "overwhelm" a situation or environment also reveal the leverage opportunities presented by prized capabilities and resources. The expansive DOD response – in terms of personnel and capabilities, but also command and control – to the earthquake in Haiti is an example of leverage in this particular area.

*Bureaucrats leverage information (including timeliness of information) and resources and capabilities in order to access other bureaucrats and maintain their own information, resources, and capabilities.* The emerging leverage theory is the most valuable contribution this study makes. Accordingly, the discussion portion of this chapter is devoted to the theory.

**Discussion**

Bureaucrats directly access other bureaucrats in the policy implementation process, and the subsequent leverage that is brought to bear on the actors and agencies is the instrument by which governance is accomplished. This project presents a novel

bureaucratic access points and leverage theory that not only explains this mechanism but how bureaucrats may recognize and use it in policy implementation proceedings. This new theory augments existing public administration literature and fills a critical gap in policy implementation and change literature in the political science field. It is the descriptive theory that helps to explain the HA/DR policy domain, and it is highly generalizable to other policy domains.

The notion of leverage is different from that of coordination. Leverage connotes the idea that bureaucrats manage or manipulate other bureaucrats, agencies, and actors, along with their resources, capabilities, missions, and priorities. Coordination is the design of hierarchy within the policy domain – the organizational structure of the domain, if you will. Leverage goes beyond coordination to address resources, capabilities, and information and how those tools at the bureaucrat's disposal are used to manipulate other bureaucrats and agencies in order to implement policy according to the intentions and interests of the policy domain actors.

Policy is frequently developed and written in a way that undermines the bureaucratic entity's authority and constrains its ability to address the beneficiary's actual needs or requirements. This project offers a different way to understand outputs and outcomes. The outputs generated by manipulating the written policy are the result of bureaucratic access and leveraging. The outcomes, in terms of what policymakers "really" intended or wanted from the policy, are garnered through manipulation of the written policy during the implementation process through leverage. In this way, leveraging is a pooling of resources, capabilities, and information. It goes well beyond

coordination and draws out what is needed from everyone within the policy domain, providing a compass and building synergy, allowing the bureaucrat to see all of this and manipulate it to an effective end of policy implementation.

Furthermore, leverage theory would help a bureaucrat answer questions about the value and importance of an OFDA-type agency or entity. The conception of management or manipulation afforded by leverage theory helps answer those questions while theories of coordination fail. For example, an upper-level manager may ask a mid-level niche expert about a particular agency or entity in terms of what it provides, what it is responsible for, and whether to support it at a budget hearing. Would it be more advantageous for that bureaucrat and her agency if the OFDA-type entity was better funded or eliminated? This can be evaluated on the tactical level (e.g., the street-level bureaucrat) and the strategic level (e.g., upper management and decision makers). Leverage theory is extremely flexible in terms of how it can be employed and used as an evaluation tool. In terms of the practical implications of the theory, understanding the power of leverage, who holds it, and how, when, and why it is used provides great advantage to bureaucrats in this and similar policy and public administration examples.

Traditional public administration organizational process models are based on bureaucrats following SOPs, rules, and system norms. In conjunction with the aforementioned bounded rationality phenomenon, these mechanisms largely determine organizational decisions. For instance, preference or utility theory helps explain individual and organizational attitudes about risk. Bureaucratic access points and leverage theory may help explain when bureaucrats are willing to take more risk. An

OFDA bureaucrat may be willing to move outside of her proscribed SOPs and leverage her expertise in a closed circuit construct. Conversely, she may be more risk averse in an open circuit construct in which outside influences are trumping her expertise.

The decision process is further influenced by the structure of the organization. For example, a hierarchical or vertically structured organization will likely produce centralized decisions from the top down, whereas a flatter organization structure may generate more diffuse participative decisions from the bottom up. The decision making process is also based on bureaucrats' experience, experimentation, and research and analysis. The personal differences (i.e., experience, perceptions, and personalities), knowledge, expertise, and institutional components (i.e., structure, mission, SOPs) influence decision making. Vital sources of bureaucratic decision making power are delegated authority and administrative discretion.[194]

Congress grants bureaucrats vast responsibility and authority for making decisions it cannot or will not make itself about policy implementation. Beyond this delegated authority, bureaucrats exercise administrative discretion when they decide how to implement policies among various options. When it comes to policy implementation decision making, bureaucratic authority and discretion may be explained by organic and purposive leverage. Organic leverage shifts power and the authority to perform assessments and implement policy to expert and street-level (i.e., disaster-level) bureaucrats from policymakers, planners, and programmers during HA/DR training and

---

[194] Rosenbaum, Walter. 2008. *Environmental Politics and Policy, 7th Edition*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

response activities. Purposive leverage explains power and authority resting with policymakers, planners, and programmers who introduce and embed standard operating rules into the management systems governing what the HA/DR agencies and street-level bureaucrats do during training and response activities. Four distinct policy examples spanning environmental, urban, economic, international commerce, energy, and defense policy are offered as examples of this theory's generalizability and explanatory capability. Please refer to the organic and purposive leverage table and open and closed circuit models in Chapter Five.

***Brief Policy Case Study Examples***

*Urban Policy and Environmental Policy*

An example of an "organic closed" construct involves the urban policy and environmental policy domains. Boston's urban renovation and environmental justice[195] case saw the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) organization exercise its organic leverage in a closed circuit construct to implement a positive policy outcome.[196] The OFDA-like DSNI worked within the existing policy and SOPs and viewed the Dudley Street community and environment as a collective entity, which yielded considerable organic leverage over elected officials and the property developers. In fact, the DSNI was the first community group in U.S. history to be granted the power of imminent domain, which was granted by the Boston Redevelopment Authority through

---

195 Environmental justice includes eliminating environmental hazards, enforcing environmental regulations equitably, and developing safe, affordable housing and clean jobs.

196 Layzer, Judith. 2006. *The Environmental Case: Translating Values Into Policy, 2nd Ed*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

the support of the Boston mayor and his Public Facilities Department.[197] The DSNI achieved urban renewal due to its recognized and accepted expertise. This case study presents an organic closed construct and shows that the "OFDA" entity does not necessarily need to be a governmental entity.

Few urban renewal initiatives have an OFDA-like DSNI exercising organic leverage, and they generally do not attain their goals as a result. Two examples are the Pruitt-Igoe housing project in St. Louis and the Cabrini–Green and Robert Taylor Homes public housing developments in Chicago. While much of these housing projects' failure were the result of a volatile combination of racism, white flight from inner cities, and the movement away from an urban industrial economy,[198] the fact that a public or private organization similar to the DSNI did not exist in the St. Louis and Chicago renewal initiatives reveals the influence of bureaucratic leverage, or lack thereof.

*Economic (Security) Policy and Environmental Policy*

A "purposive closed" construct example involves the economic (security) policy and environmental policy domains. The controversy surrounding drilling for oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) in Alaska provides an example of how a U.S. House or Senate committee could be an "OFDA" attempting to wield purposive leverage in a closed system. While the policy being implemented remains the status quo, which is

---

197 Ibid. Also, the DSNI eventually formed the Dudley Neighbors, Incorporated, an urban redevelopment corporation and community land trust, in 1988.

198 Cohen, Adam, and Elizabeth Taylor. 2000. *American Pharaoh*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company.

not drilling, two Alaskan representatives attempted in 1995 to use their respective committee's leverage to open up ANWR for drilling.

Senator Frank Murkowski, chairman of the Senate Environment and Natural Resources Committee, and Representative Don Young, chairman of the House Resources Committee, attached ultimately unsuccessful drilling provisions to the omnibus budget bill.[199] The environmental-conscious policy is still being implemented mainly because it is difficult to reverse policy, but politicians – especially from Alaska and the energy committees – are dominating the policy discussion based on extra-environmental issues and desires. In this case, partisanship is the reason the OFDA-like committees were not successful in changing the policy. Purposive leverage in a closed system helped the pro-drilling bills reach floor votes.

*International Commerce Policy and Environmental Policy*

An example of an "organic open" construct involves international commerce policy as it relates to the environmental policy domain. The issues of climate change and international trade as it pertained to the protection of dolphins and turtles in the tuna fishing and shrimping industries, respectively, provide examples in which the OFDA-like entities are interest groups and think tanks.[200] The interest groups and think tanks are

---

199 Layzer, Judith. 2006. *The Environmental Case: Translating Values Into Policy, 2nd Ed*. Washington, DC: CQ Press. And Murkowski introduced similar bills as recently as 2012.

200 Ibid. This case study also includes a governmental OFDA-like entity, the Commerce Department's National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). The NMFS was charged with carrying out the mandates of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972. The MMPA provided the NMFS with the authority to ensure the maintenance of "optimum sustainable populations" (p.318) of marine mammals through various regulatory tools, such as setting fishing practice standards, issuing permits, and conducting inspections.

experts, but only for one side of the issue. This enables the policy makers (i.e., the Bush and Clinton Administrations in this case) to choose a particular policy implementation strategy based on a side, rather than consideration of all of the evidence. The construct is organic in that the implementation follows precisely a line of thinking with little problem when only looking at the issue from that particular perspective. It is an open circuit because it is only considering one perspective, therefore, the disconnect is that the other side is not heard or considered.

Environmental groups such as Greenpeace and Environmental Defense along with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change were on one side of the climate change debate, while business interest groups and the George C. Marshall Institute were on the other side of the dispute.[201] The Bush Administration used the arguments and data from the latter OFDA-like entities to formulate and implement policy. The Clinton Administration then did the same with the arguments and data from the former entities. Similarly, environmental groups such as the Earth Island Institute and Humane Society raised awareness regarding the slaughter of dolphins and turtles, while tuna fishing and shrimping industry interest groups along with the world leaders who administered the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (i.e., the predecessor to the World Trade Organization) were on the trade side of the issue.[202] All of the interest groups and think tanks used organic leverage based on their particular expertise, not any formal authority, in an open system to persuade policy makers according to their desires.

---

[201] Ibid.
[202] Ibid.

*Energy Policy, Defense Policy, and Environmental Policy*

An example of a "purposive open" construct involves the energy policy, defense policy, and environmental policy domains. The Department of Energy's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) dominated the nuclear energy and weapons development policy and, specifically, administered Colorado's Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant. The AEC was initially effective in blocking attempts by Rocky Flats citizens, environmental interest groups, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to address environmental issues.[203] However, due to its attempts to wield purposive leverage in an open system, the AEC could not maintain its LFA status, power, and authority. The outside influence and other policy domain entities' desires and mandates (e.g., the EPA is charged with protecting the environment and seeking punishment of those who contaminate it) undermined and ultimately eliminated the AEC's policies and authority. The preceding case studies reveal the bureaucratic leverage theory's generalizability. The following discussion places the theory within the existing policy process literature and fills gaps within that literature.

---

[203] Ibid. The environmental issues included dumping chemicals and radioactive plutonium waste contaminate the soil and groundwater surrounding the Rocky Flats plant.

Table 13. Summary of Bureaucratic Access Points and Leverage Theory Case Studies

| Case Study | Leverage Type | Circuit Model | "OFDA-like" Entity | Outputs or Outcomes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Urban Policy and Environmental Policy | Organic | Closed | Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) | Urban renewal due to recognized and accepted expertise; "OFDA" does not need to be a governmental entity |
| Economic (Security) Policy and Environmental Policy | Purposive | Closed | U.S. Senate and House Committees | Power of committee chair controlling policy efforts through mobilization of bias |
| International Commerce Policy and Environmental Policy | Organic | Open | Interest groups and think tanks | Policy implementation strategy based only on one perspective; efficient, but one-sided policy |
| Energy Policy, Defense Policy, and Environmental Policy | Purposive | Open | Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) | Outside influence and other policy domain entities usurped lead federal agency's policies and authority |

***Policy Process Frameworks and Theories***

The policy process includes problem definition, agenda setting, formulation, implementation, analysis, evaluation, and feedback. While this study of the HA/DR policy domain deals with the implementation stage, in particular, it reveals a vital gap in policy implementation and change that is now filled by bureaucratic access points and leverage theory. The study of policy processes includes the advocacy coalition framework, the institutional analysis and development framework, multiple streams approach, punctuated equilibrium theory, and the social construction theory. Each

framework or theory is briefly discussed below with specific attention paid to the advocacy coalition framework, which has particular relevance to the leverage theory.

The frameworks and theories are generally grounded in the bounded rationality[204] approach in which humans are perceived to be adaptable to changes in information and to consider outcome uncertainty. Decision makers reduce uncertainty by using heuristics to inform their behavior and choices. Humans also make trade-offs in which they weight some information to a greater degree than other information, or they weight some choices more than other choices. This is all due to human cognitive limits.

Serial processing is a vital phenomenon due to the premise that bounded rationality assumes cognitive limits determine how humans process information, choices, and tasks. Humans engage in serial processing but do not possess the ability to engage in broad parallel processing. Humans are capable of focusing on only one or a few pieces of information at a time. Organizational decision making is based on this foundation, as well. Therefore, organizations use heuristics and engage in serial processing, resulting in similar decision making patterns as do individuals. The brief discussion of the policy process approaches are grounded in this understanding.

The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) deals with problems of goal conflicts, multiple levels of government and the associated actors, and technical concerns.[205] Policy actors choose from and position themselves into subsystem advocacy coalitions based on belief systems. Elites form these coalitions. Members gain access to resources

---

[204] The bounded rationality discussion is informed by various works from Herbert A. Simon and Bryan D. Jones.

[205] Sabatier, Paul, ed. 2007. *Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd Ed*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

and allies and develop strategies that transform their shared beliefs into collective policy change before their opponents (i.e., "devil shift"). ACF coalitions are generally mature due to their elite composition, but new coalitions appear with new subsystems. Policy learning and exogenous shocks change beliefs and policy within the ACF. Policy learning[206] results from the actors' experience and familiarity with the policy, and incremental changes in the policy provide new information. Exogenous shocks are natural disasters, regime change, and market failures, to name a few.

The institutional analysis and development framework (IAD) focuses on how a community's rules, conditions, and attributes influence individual's incentive structures and subsequent outcomes.[207] This framework understands institutions as sets of rules and norms that guide individuals, rather than as governmental entities of authority. It focuses on how these institutions utilize and address common pool resources. Self-organization and repeated interactions within the same environment enable individuals to learn, adapt, and ultimately mitigate some of their cognitive limitations. The IAD approach provides much opportunity for comparative evaluation, enables multiple levels of investigation, and can reveal causal relationships. Furthermore, in common pool resource division environments, self-organization leads to more optimal use of common resources than when organization and rules are imposed by a central authority. Communication among members is key; learning, adapting, and reducing the negative affects of cognitive limitations leads to shared norms, trust, and more favorable outcomes for those involved

---

206 May, Peter. 1992. "Policy Learning and Failure." *Journal of Public Policy*, 12(4):331-354.

207 Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

(or potential failure). Due to these shared values the need for self-maximization decreases and the needs and collective good of the community is paramount. As a result of this coordination and self-organization, an apparently inefficient system may actually be structured and efficient when viewed from the ends rather than the means. Policy change occurs as different norms and rules take effect over time and changing information.

The multiple streams approach focuses on the conditions of policy change through the interaction of the policy stream, the political stream, the problem stream, policy entrepreneurs, and windows of opportunity.[208] Policy entrepreneurs "couple" the streams during windows of opportunity by matching their politically tenable policy solution to an important policy problem (i.e., national or public "mood"). Policy change occurs when policy entrepreneurs are able to capitalize on windows of opportunity, combining dynamics of the policy and political environment to garner attention and support for their preferred policy solution.

The punctuated equilibrium (PE) approach seeks patterns within agenda setting and policymaking. Baumgartner and Jones[209] expand upon Shattschneider's[210] work regarding the difficulty of achieving large change and conflict expansion. They argue that policy change follows observable patterns over time (i.e., periods of stasis

---

208 Kingdon, John. 2003. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd Ed*. New York: Longman.

209 Baumgartner, Frank, and Bryan Jones. 2009. *Agendas and Instability in American Politics, 2nd Ed*. University of Chicago Press.

210 Schattschneider., E.E. 1957. "Intensity, Visibility, Direction, and Scope." *American Political Science Review*. 51: 933-42. And Schattschneider, E.E. 1975 (1960). *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press.

interrupted by large punctuations). They find that policy change occurs through the break down of policy monopolies caused by new information and policy image shifts. The underlying processes of punctuations are associated with the limitations of boundedly rational individuals and organizations and issues related to institutional friction.[211]

As seen with the ACF, social construction (SC) theory places much importance on individual belief systems. SC posits that policies determine or dictate how individuals see their situation within the system and act according to their interests.[212] Political participation is determined by how the individual understands her or his position within the system. This is true for those making policy and those affected by that policy. Policymakers view groups as either worthy or unworthy, deserving or undeserving. Their policy will be influenced by those beliefs. Those affected by the subsequent policy will believe they are part of the system and participate or feel ostracized and not participate. All of these conditions help inform and solidify beliefs and identities, similar to the ACF construct.

While all of this literature does not account for the leverage phenomenon, the ACF approach may have the strongest ties to this emerging theory. ACF focuses on particular subsystems, individual beliefs and identities, and policy change. The ACF generally maintains that individuals' normative beliefs are transformed into rational participation in coalitions and other collections, and desired policy changes are realized.

---

211 Jones, Bryan D., Frank R. Baumgartner, and James L. True. 1998. Policy Punctuations: US Budget Authority, 1947-95. *Journal of Politics* 60(1): 1-33.

212 Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram, eds. 2005. *Deserving and Entitled: Social Construction and Public Policy*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

The ACF and multiple streams theory share the attribute of linking decisions and actions in various stages of the policy process in explaining new policy and policy changes. But while the multiple streams theory has remained rather consistent after being developed from the garbage can model, the ACF has altered its framework quite often through the years. An evolving framework may be better able to incorporate the latest theories and realizations within the policy process field, such as the notion of organic and purposive leverage. For example, the ACF struggles to articulate why one advocacy coalition finds success and another fails. The common, yet unsatisfying, conclusion in ACF is that of timing – one coalition simply transforms its beliefs into actionable and attainable goals by organizing and acting before another. Adding the leverage theory helps explain why and how advocacy coalitions find success or meet with failure.

Identifying the commonalities within the theories helps to give shape to the overall policy process field and unites the seemingly disparate theories and frameworks into a coherent collection of fields. It also reveals gaps in the literature. The novel organic and purposive leverage theory not only helps to fill the gaps in implementation and policy change literature, but it augments it. In particular, the ACF can benefit from the inclusion of the notion of leverage. The next portion of this chapter offers policy suggestions and additional practical application ideas for bureaucrats and for the political science field.

**Recommendations**

The following section discusses the study's findings from a more application based approach. Actionable suggestions accompany the lessons learned from the

interviews and case studies. It is important that political science offers possible solutions after discovering issues in a policy's development and implementation. The importance of standardized assessment measures cannot be overstated, and I offer suggestions for more effective measures of evaluation. The need for more developed "cultural awareness training" and a more uniform approach to DOD HA/DR capabilities across branches is presented. The concept of "diplomatic currency" is offered to help explain the value of HA/DR efforts in terms of national security. Finally, findings regarding policy efficiency and learning lead to suggestions for political science applications.

***Assessment Measures***

Efficiencies come from precise assessment measures. Effective, efficient disaster response that saves lives and offers humanitarian assistance in the most expeditious manner is the goal of HA/DR policy. Wisely expending limited resources is the second part of that goal. Therefore, if the OFDA claim that every dollar of prevention and preparation saves seven dollars in response is remotely accurate, measures of evaluation are the key to assessing the success of that two-part goal. Assessments should be standardized so all entities have a clear understanding of the measures that determine the relief end-state goal.

Examples of what is assessed in HA/DR efforts include disease surveillance, vector control, sanitation, food and water safety and quality, restoration of general public health programs, post-traumatic stress, and provision of health services after the U.S.

leaves. Examples of measures of effectiveness for HA/DR events[213] include: mortality and morbidity rates, patient evacuation times, outpatient and inpatient statistics, area coverage, rate of post-traumatic stress, medical equipment and supplies used, and nutritional status of the affected populace.[214] While these assessments are valuable and the associated measures are standardized across global HA/DR entities, they do not go far enough nor ask the right questions in many cases. And the U.S. HA/DR actors must develop standardized U.S.-specific assessment measures in conjunction with those of the international community.

Assessment of what is needed in terms of prevention, preparation, and actual HA/DR response should guide policy and its implementation. For example, the number of washing stations and latrines placed is not the key, but rather, the assessment of whether the sanitation needs of the distressed populace are being met is the important measure. Whether the need for adequate shelter is being met is the important measure, not the number of tents erected. And difficult resource expenditure questions need to be addressed by elected officials in the military-civilian construct. Should assessment be based on humanitarian needs or the amount of strategic access to the host nation it affords (i.e., national security interests)? Should the latter assessment determine DOD involvement in HA/DR efforts? Building partner nation capacity helps to answer part of these questions, but better assessment measures that lead to more efficient and effective use of resources is vital in the face of reduced budgets.

---

213 Compared to rates prior to the disaster.

214 The Sphere Project. 2011. "Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response." Retrieved on March 11, 2013, at http://www.SphereHandbook.org.

The following are possible measures of DOD-specific HA/DR missions success. They could be used in conjunction with the international and U.S. HA/DR policy domain evaluation measures. Please see appendix for additional information on coding and scoring schemes for these measures.

| |
|---|
| The greater the success of individual USSOUTHCOM military medical missions (HA),<br>- the lower the crime rate in the area receiving HA;<br>- the higher the productivity rate in the area receiving HA;<br>- the greater the willingness to work with the U.S. in the area receiving HA;<br>- the greater the indices of wellness in the area receiving HA. |
| The greater the success of USSOUTHCOM military medical missions (when requested by USAID/OFDA humanitarian assistance needs), the greater the increase in its proportion of defense funding. |

Existing literature is scant on this topic and measurement is accomplished in a rather haphazard manner in terms of compiled data. There is no "clearinghouse" entity managing and analyzing all of the data from HA/DR efforts. For example, the National Center for Medical Intelligence, the World Health Organization, the Center for Disease Control, the Pan American Health Organization, and USAID/OFDA track the after, or secondary, effects of what USSOUTHCOM missions do in terms of wellness results. However, these data and systems are not integrated and some information and data are not releasable from USSOUTHCOM or the other organizations. There is no comprehensive way to see and evaluate data from the results of these missions. While there is much literature on environmental and domestic healthcare policy measures, there is none on military medical capabilities and the provision of healthcare in association with environmental challenges policy. This is one of the important holes in the policy literature that future iterations of this study could help to fill.

The need for better assessment measures has been established. Suggestions for more effective and efficient measures of evaluation have been presented. The following ideas for correcting the assessment measures and implementing the suggested measures of evaluation may help to develop new HA/DR policy. Returning the host nation to its preexisting state (i.e., conditions immediately prior to the disaster) is a guiding principle in the U.S. HA/DR policy domain that must be followed for clear end-state goals and outcomes. Training HA/DR entities on how to conduct the standardized assessments is crucial to moving the implementation process forward. Sharing information, developing medical plans for dealing with disasters, identifying entities with particular knowledge of specific geographical locations and types of HA missions, and establishing pre-disaster logistics' support systems are important preparatory steps for mitigating initial confusion and delivering assistance quickly. All of these initiatives can be accomplished by continuing to develop information-sharing tools such as the (Global) Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS)[215] and other data systems for storage, analysis, and accessibility of HA/DR information. These data should include human resources and capital, such as nation, region, and HA/DR subject matter experts. Finally, similar to an OFDA liaison embedded within DOD combatant commands, a DOD medical liaison with administrative expertise and HA/DR policy knowledge should be placed in the OFDA headquarters on a full-time basis.

---

[215] The (Global) Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS) is a DOD database accessed through an Internet portal that is a clearinghouse and depository of worldwide TSC activities. It includes such data as population vulnerability and capabilities and disaster resource management information.

***Cultural Awareness and Shared Capabilities Within the DOD***

The need for more developed cultural awareness training was discussed by a few of the HA/DR bureaucrats. Guatemala is different from Chile. Venezuela is different from Colombia. These are obvious observations, but HA/DR planning has a tendency to rely on a "cookie cutter" approach in that successful efforts in one area can be duplicated in another without taking into account the differences between the areas. It would behoove the U.S. HA/DR community to stop viewing host nations, disasters, and quality of life conditions from an American perspective, understanding that each country is different culturally, economically, socially, and that they are not the United States. Awareness and understanding lead to respect and clearer measures of what is success.

Cultural awareness training would also improve the previously discussed ability to perform quality assessments. The provision of U.S. style medical care can undermine the host nation's ability to provide care due to different expectations after the U.S. leaves. Similarly, U.S. building codes and education standards cannot be the measure. Rather, the local codes and standards must be how assessments are performed. Future training should include a much larger focus than just assessment, however. The idea that a host nation can simply reject the medical care, construction, or education the U.S. is offering if they do not agree with how the U.S. is doing it is not only short sighted, but dangerous. That type of disrespect can lead to restricted access to the country and, possibly, an antagonistic relationship with what was once a partner nation.

The need for a more uniform approach to DOD HA/DR capabilities across branches is another finding from the reports, seminars, and interviews. The "purple suit"

idea, in which the capabilities and resources from the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marines may be used interchangeably in an organization or mission, would be highly effective in the HA/DR arena. For example, a "universal" deployable field hospital can be staffed by medical personnel from all branches rather than each one being different and unique to a particular branch. Making resources more "mix and match" and universal would be cost effective and provide greater flexibility. This suggestion will be difficult to implement, however, because each branch will likely want to maintain its own niche capabilities so as to not lose funding and relevance in a particular skill set.

***Diplomatic Currency***

The concept of "diplomatic currency" reveals the value of HA/DR efforts in terms of national security. No one else – no other public or private entity – can perform U.S. military medical functions demanded during environmental challenges or in austere conditions. This diplomatic tool of goodwill and healthcare delivery is a real currency that demands coherent policy. The benefits of this diplomatic tool are extensive. HA/DR efforts in Pakistan helped open up more basing and airfield opportunities for the prosecution of war in Afghanistan. The strategic island of Guam and other Pacific islands could be easier to access after future HA/DR efforts led by the U.S., especially in light of the new defensive strategic policy focusing on the Pacific region. These are but two examples of how diplomatic currency can be utilized in U.S. national security policy.

The world changed on September 11, 2001. The events of 9/11 may be seen as ushering in a new chapter in the nation's defense and a new, yet familiar, diplomatic role for the U.S. military. President Bush stated, "America is no longer protected by vast

oceans. We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home."[216] Not only did the role and mission of the military change, but the way in which it is used was open for change. As this change relates to military medical capabilities, the last decade has seen medical resources being used as a currency for greater participation and cooperation with those affected peoples in Iraq and Afghanistan in efforts to "win the hearts and minds" of the populace. Wellness is an intimate commodity; if you are unwell, no amount of security will matter. Beyond money, healthcare delivery is the currency used to garner support of a wanting, needing people.

The U.S. military medical service is charged with facilitating joint (among the branches) interagency strategies to address regional health risks and challenges in every part of the world. The goals and objectives of U.S. national security strategy speak to denying terrorists access to a willing population of future terrorists. What better way to deny them safe havens and willing recruits than to provide the most valuable of all nonmaterialist needs – wellness? OFDA also engages in diplomatic currency efforts. For example, its hazard mapping initiative has helped Afghanistan mitigate and prepare for disasters, such as flooding and associated food shortages.[217]

Although 9/11 showed the U.S. is not as secure as once believed, there is a lingering perception that it faces few, if any, challenges in the Western Hemisphere. This

---

216 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. 2003. Retrieved on March 11, 2011, from http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/govt_docs/public_health_prep/whitehouse/whitehouse_national_strategy_for_combating_terrorism.html.

217 OFDA. 2012. "Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2011." Retrieved on April 2, 2013, at http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crises-and-conflict/crisis-response/resources/fy-2011-annual-report.

is simply not the case, and a policy of diplomatic currency is indeed necessary to maintain U.S. security interests in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility. The key to new policy is that intellectual and philosophical elites must lead the way, but how they translate the currency into something tangible for the accountants and isolationists will be a bureaucratic challenge (i.e., measures of success and productivity balanced by practicality). The notion of diplomatic currency has the potential to redefine the military's role in diplomatic efforts from one of (nearly always) last resort to one that is called upon before potential conflicts flare up.

Wellness as a diplomatic currency involves when, how, and where to use military medical capabilities for nation stabilizing and nation enabling. What the U.S. does now is nation *re*building. Diplomatic currency goes beyond winning the hearts and minds of suffering peoples. The idea is that providing wellness to affected persons empowers, engages, and enables them in the process of helping themselves and being productive and self-sufficient on their own. In other words, capacity building.

The provision of healthcare to increase wellness and productivity in host nations is the appropriate policy approach and use of U.S. military medical capabilities in simple cost-benefit, economic terms. The U.S. is spending valuable resources – military members' lives and taxpayer monies – on these missions. What is the nation getting in return for its investment? Smaller DOD budgets and fewer resources demand intelligent, clearer policy for the most benefit. Again, empirical measures rather than notional feelings that the U.S. are "helping for helping's sake" and living up to its moral responsibilities are needed now. Beyond the cost-benefit ratios and morality, the values

informing these medical mission policies must include a practical approach. It is not only acceptable to have ulterior motives that benefit U.S. interests, it is imperative. Theoretical implications of this approach will be discussed in the future research section of this chapter.

***Policy Efficiency and Learning***

Findings regarding policy efficiency and learning lead to political science applications. Policy studies often focus on how well the implemented policy attains its proscribed goals. In most cases, policy efficiency is best accomplished through early planning and preparation. Although the mitigating effects of planning and prevention in the HA/DR policy domain have been well documented, it is interesting to note that waiting until the punctuating event (i.e., the disaster) may create less uncertainty and possibly increase efficiency in terms of only asking for and using what is needed. The realization that OFDA pulls and the DOD pushes resources and capabilities makes this an interesting study in contrasting organizational behavior and the subsequent policy implementation ramifications. If funding and other resource allocation decisions are decided at the time of the natural disaster event, then the subsequent implementation of HA/DR policy may very well be more efficient in terms of providing resources based on actual assessed needs rather than projected needs. This is a unique, dichotomous phenomenon that may further policy studies research by investigating a policy domain that often has two implementation outcomes.

There is not the impetus to learn in this construct, however. The immediacy of the relief response (i.e., the event itself, the need to respond quickly for preservation of

life, and the desire to affect a positive difference or change in the situation quickly) may result in different policy implementation "learning" occurring in this policy area. May's policy learning categories – instrumental learning, social learning, and political learning – are an excellent rubric with which to analyze policy.[218] However, they struggle to place HA/DR policy because the domain may be more about leverage, adaptation, or advantage than learning.

There appears to be little instrumental and, especially, social learning occurring in this domain because the expertise is housed within the relief agencies and is only "tested" or evaluated by outside entities at the time of the disaster event. And any political learning appears to be rather fleeting because each disaster is unique and, again, demands new information. Whether or not the legislators or president "forget" from disaster to disaster is largely a moot question. The fact that each natural disaster event is distinctive and can only be addressed by those agencies with the expertise and capabilities unique to them provides the agencies more autonomy, importance, and latitude. Instrumental learning would be helpful with regard to what the HA/DR agencies ask for (i.e., each disaster is an opportunity for more resources, acclaim, autonomy, importance, status). More efficient use of resources may result from more instrumental learning.

But, the immediacy of the event can help with efficiency, too. Heimer argues that efficiency is fundamentally different from reliability.[219] If HA/DR agencies are acknowledged as reliable and capable of implementing the relief policy it is still not a

---

[218] May, Peter. 1992. "Policy learning and failure." *Journal of Public Policy*, 12(4): 331–354.

[219] Heimer, Carol. 2008. "Thinking about how to avoid thought: Deep norms, shallow rules, and the structure of attention." *Regulation and Governance*, 2: 30–47.

given that efficiency follows or is assumed by legislators. Waiting until the punctuating event occurs before doling out resources creates less uncertainty that the resources will be managed and used efficiently. Waiting until the event also increases efficiency in terms of only requesting, receiving, and using what is needed to provide the relief.

A valuable extension to the leverage theory and its association with the push (i.e., DOD) and pull (i.e., OFDA) assessment criteria is a "capacity" versus "mobilization" approach to understanding bureaucracies and policy domains. A bureaucratic entity's (excess) capacity to perform a task other than its primary mission is on one side of the ledger. An OFDA-type entity's mobilization ability in taking that other entity on a new or separate mission is on the other side. The diagram below illustrates this leverage idea by showing how the OFDA-type entity can "move the median" or "shift the compromise point" similar to a negotiation setting in which one side offers extreme proposals so as to shift the other's perspective and make what the offering side really wants more palatable and, thus, create the new "median" or "compromise point."

Figure 4. Leverage in a Capacity Versus Mobilization Construct




In this example, the DOD's primary purpose is national defense. Its focus is largely one of preparing for and prosecuting wars. Thus, the one-way arrow begins at "National Defense, War" to denote the locus of the DOD's attention, as it views its primary purpose (i.e., the solid arrow reaching from the DOD to its mission of National Defense, War). OFDA uses leverage to shift the DOD's attention in the direction of HA/DR efforts (i.e., the dashed arrow pointing between OFDA and the DOD and the DOD and the HA/DR mission). The leverage shifts the DOD's attention to a new locus, or compromise point, that sees DOD resources, capabilities, and information gathering focused on HA/DR efforts in addition to its primary purpose of preparing for and winning wars. The new attention point entails a compromise between those competing missions of national defense and HA/DR efforts and the utilization of DOD resources.

OFDA's ability to leverage the DOD and shift its compromise point is contingent upon the DOD having excess capacity to address the HA/DR efforts. In other words, this shifting can only occur if the leveraged entity can accomplish its primary mission and maintain additional capacity to address another mission. OFDA can and does leverage the DOD to perform a mission (i.e., HA/DR) outside of its primary purpose (i.e., national defense), and that shift can only occur with excess capacity within the capacity versus mobilization construct. The DOD's capacity to perform a mission other than wage war is on one side of the ledger, and OFDA's mobilization ability – through its leverage power as LFA – in taking the DOD on a separate mission is on the other side. The preceding discussion ties to assessment, and OFDA's needs based assessment is particularly useful under the policy efficiency and learning lenses and the capacity and mobilization construct.

**Limitations**

The limitations of this project caused issues with the structure versus mission research question and prohibited the emergence of the idea that timing and resources and capabilities are leverage-creating phenomena. While these were disappointing results, they do not lessen the importance or value of the overall study or the other findings. They did, however, provide very useful lessons learned that will improve future research projects within this program of work and beyond.

It was important to understand that organizational mission and structure may not be related in an adversarial way. And it was not the appropriate framing device for the project, but it was integral in developing the frame that was eventually used. The

structure and overall mission of the HA/DR agencies and how that influences the implementation of HA/DR policy and its assessment evolved as the frame for this project.

The frame developed intuitively through questions such as, "what if mission and structure are not related, or what if there is a third variable?" This understanding refutes March and Moe, and thereby further develops organizational and bureaucratic theory. Beyond the obviously related bureaucratic access points and leverage theory and policy assessment, the third variable may be the self- and professional-identity of the HA/DR interviewees.

Strict adherence to a hierarchical structure can stifle critical and creative thinking and thereby limit every participant in the system to what is his or her particular role in the overall construct. While self- and professional-identity can produce a feeling of coherence and direction, it frames the way interviewees define themselves and their environment.[220] This sensemaking activity guides responses based on the identity the interviewee assumes and necessarily influences the findings derived from the interviews.[221] Furthermore, humans lack direct introspective access to most of their cognitive processes, which can lead to potential problems with self-report methods.[222] Interviewees may tell the investigator something they could not be expected to know about themselves.[223] These phenomena are not a weakness in the interview methodology,

---

220 Alvesson, M. 2003. "Beyond neopositivists, romantics, and localists: A reflexive approach to interviews in organizational research." *Academy of Management Review*, 28(1):13-33.
221 Ibid.
222 Nisbett, Richard, and Timothy Wilson. 1977. "Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes." *Psychological Review, 84,* 231-259.
223 Ibid.

but they must be considered and their possible effects mitigated.

In this case, they may help to explain the findings from the mission versus structure research question. For example, did the interviewee self-identify as a bureaucrat or an HA/DR problem solver and expert? If it was as the latter, one can cull out the bureaucrat-accessing-bureaucrat and leveraging themes from that position of authority and expertise. If the interviewee self-identified as a HA/DR expert, his or her responses will likely elicit greater pride or sense of importance and value than if they think of themselves as a bureaucrat (i.e., possibly a more pejorative term in today's parlance). Also, the symbiotic relationship between HA/DR bureaucrats discussed earlier may be a manifestation of the typical philosophies and personalities that are drawn to such work. The idea that they would list the mission as the driving factor, rather than organizational structure, is more than plausible. They work effectively because of the common goal and professional-identity, not the rigid structure typical in USG entities.

My two questions that were attempts to uncover the timing as a leverage-creating phenomenon did not elicit definitive findings.[224] I addressed the responses to these questions in the previous chapter and think they reveal enough to keep timing as a possible, if not well documented or explicitly found, access point and leverage-creating opportunity. It is possible, too, that timing as an opportunity for access and leverage is a

---

[224] Question 3: "If other HA/DR bureaucrats tried to access, what agencies did they represent, when did they try, what did they want for the military? How did they gain access?" The "when" was an attempt to uncover timing, the "what they want" addresses capabilities and resources, and the "how" attempted to find whether they tout their success, information, and fact that they are the only ones who could accomplish the HA/DR mission – capabilities – as credibility.
Question 5: "Did HA/DR (and DOD medical) bureaucrats provide relevant information in a timely manner?" This question was for the timing of access and availability of information during the punctuating event.

given in that when a HA/DR event occurs policy implementation occurs of its own volition.

For example, the earthquake off of the Guatemalan coast on November 7, 2012, occurred while I was at USSOUTHCOM conducting interviews. The HA/DR bureaucrats immediately transitioned into their roles and began accomplishing their responsibilities without the need of another entity leveraging them or their resources. Again, it appears to be a well-oiled machine that is switched on the moment a possible HA/DR event occurs. Either way, timing as a leverage-creating opportunity is likely to be found in future lines of investigation with more effective interview questions and hypotheses.

Similar to the timing phenomenon, the lack of findings concerning resources and capabilities may be a product of the effective policy domain. However, it could also be considered a given in that OFDA has an understanding of what the DOD brings to the table – especially air lift and transportation capabilities – so a more precise research question would benefit future studies. The limitations did not negatively affect this project, but the lessons they provide will be invaluable for future investigations in the larger program of work. It will take multiple research projects and much hard work to hone the skills of developing theoretically sound interview questions and conducting effective interviews.

**Future Research**

Beyond the promising generalizability of organic and purposive leverage, open and closed circuits, and assessment measures and how all of these help to investigate a

policy domain, future lines of research are available from this project. A few, general questions may help guide those studies. How does the availability of bureaucratic access points relate to and influence responsibility and practicality in public policymaking? Do more access points lead to more responsible bureaucrats, more responsible policy, and more practical and efficient policy implementation? Does the type of leverage and form of policy domain have an effect on these outputs? Do assessment measures play a large role in other policy domains? The following examples are possible directions for research and may have application for policy makers as well as political science and public administration.

There may be an opportunity to study how attention and feedback influence policy implementation during large, media-intensive events. As was seen in a few of the HA/DR missions case studies and the generalizability case studies, outside influences can have dramatic effects on policy implementation and change. On the other hand, if an event does not rise to elected officials' attention or public concern, bureaucrats tend to stay in their lanes and implement policy according to the established rules, regulations, and SOPs, relying on their expertise. Because attention and feedback have been studied extensively, findings along this line of investigation would not be overly interesting or valuable. But it could shed new light on policy studies if the OFDA-type entity's attention was found to be what "mattered" in a particular policy domain. The organic or purposive leverage that it applied to other actors within the policy domain would likely stem from this heightened attention.

The diplomatic currency idea, presented earlier, brings in the importance of values and morality as they relate to responsibility and practicality in the national security policymaking arena. The idea of responsibility is missing in much of this literature. Just as the legislator and voter are responsible for whom they listen to, bureaucrats are responsible for being informed and for their sources of information. Bertelli and Lynn attempt to justify the managerial function, given the inevitability of managerial discretion over crucial public tasks. "Managerial responsibility depends, in a constitutional sense, on official respect for the separation of powers and commitment to specific public service values: judgment, balance, rationality, and accountability."[225] The hopeful idea is that bureaucrats know a sense of responsibility and will temper the information they receive with the best interests of their constituents or clients. The contribution of the HA/DR policy investigation helps to shed light on the effectiveness of the medical outreach missions in terms of what the policy intends for the missions and how effectively they were carried out, as previously discussed. A "values and responsibility versus practicality" study concerning healthcare policy may be further clarified using "promethean" and "hippocratic" categories in future lines of investigation.[226]

---

[225] Bertelli, Anthony, and Laurence Lynn, Jr. 2006. *Madison's Managers – Public Administration and the Constitution*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, p.X. Note: Their idea combines the personnel function (i.e., constitutionally qualified public servants recruited, hired, and maintained) and administrative law (i.e., collection of rules regarding admin practice within the separation of powers).

[226] Layzer, Judith. 2006. *The Environmental Case: Translating Values Into Policy, 2nd Ed*. Washington, DC: CQ Press. The Hippocratic and Promethean framework borrows from the Environmentalist and Promethean framework used extensively in environmental policy studies. Layzer uses the term "cornucopians" interchangeably with prometheans. Beyond placing more value on economic growth, cornucopian connotes abundance, which is in opposition to an environmentalist perspective.

The competing values of healthcare as a right or as a privilege fall under the inherent tension between responsibility and practicality. Approaching them as two categories offers clarity: hippocratic (i.e., right) and promethean (i.e., privilege). Hippocratic is simply based on the (modern) Hippocratic oath that variously states "I will prevent disease whenever I can," "[my] responsibility includes these related problems [those in which the wellness of one impacts the person's family and economic stability]", and "I will remember that I remain a member of society, with special obligations to all my fellow human beings." Please see index for the entire oath.

Promethean, on the other hand, is the idea that technological advances in pharmaceuticals, genetically modified foodstuffs, disease prevention, etc., will answer wellness issues better than – or at least more efficiently than – hands-on treatment. A Promethean's regard for individual freedom makes personal or national decisions important in that those decisions carry ramifications that may make healthcare provision a privilege in terms of "deserving" nations and peoples. In this construct, Prometheans view themselves as rational and logical, while they view Hippocratics as irrational and something of sentimentalists. Privilege may be seen in valuing some human lives as more important than others. The translation of this tension into diplomacy and national security policy balances the humanitarian and "higher calling" approach with the U.S. safety and security – in the midst of reduced budgets – approach.

Wilson argues that human beings have a moral sense that is not entirely determined by culture,[227] an important argument with regard to the military as an organization. He describes moral sense as an "intuitively or directly felt belief about how one ought to act when one is free to act voluntarily (that is, not under duress)".[228] Wilson's description is similar to definitions of integrity. Integrity of the bureaucratic policymaker is another key component in this perspective. Wilson includes sympathy (i.e., as a basis for altruism), fairness (i.e., equity, reciprocity, and impartiality), self-control (i.e., future or larger goals trump current, less important ones), and duty (i.e., one's conscience or responsibility) as examples of shared moral sense.[229]

A couple of points need to be explained more thoroughly. Altruism, as it is used in Wilson's work, may be viewed from the hippocratic perspective. An important divergence from traditional political theory in Wilson's work is that our shared idea of fairness does not demand equal distribution.[230] Although his notion of fairness refers to property, it can easily be transferred to provision of wellness or healthcare from a promethean standpoint. Wilson's ideas about duty align with the hippocratic motivations of many military members and policy makers and, in particular, healthcare providers' sense of responsibility. Finally, Wilson delves into the evolutionary underpinnings of modern moral sense arguing that various factors have led to a universal understanding that everyone – not only those of a specific race, culture, or nation – deserve fair

---

227 Wilson, James Q. 1993. *The Moral Sense*. New York: The Free Press.
228 Ibid., p.xii.
229 Ibid.
230 Ibid.

treatment. Hippocratics would laud this understanding in terms of providing healthcare because it is the fair, equitable policy choice according to their universal beliefs. These concepts are examples of how morality very often trumps practicality in policy making, a subtle yet crucial phenomenon that could be a valuable contribution of future projects.

There may also be an opportunity to evaluate how variations in incidences of wellness and crime rate patterns in Latin American and South American countries affect HA/DR mission selection and their measures of success. Using each country as a unit of analysis one could test this theory with an adequate number of observations.[231] This design may yield valuable information that would support the causal inferences between wellness and crime rate and mission selection and success.

Beyond the hippocratic and promethean ideas with regard to wellness, the crime rate study has unique ties to the promethean approach. For example, Prometheans view themselves as rational and logical and value individual freedom. Crime has no place in a promethean perspective as it is anathema to individual freedom. However, a Promethean may be convinced to rehabilitate the criminal by integrating him into a society that fosters personal strength of character, self-control, and self-awareness. A reduced crime rate that could be a result of healthcare provision would be welcomed from a promethean perspective. A crime rate that did not change or, perversely, increased after U.S. military healthcare was provided to a country would likely lead a Promethean to denounce such involvement and policy design.

A promethean approach speaks to humans' ability to use technological advances

[231] Please see assessment measurement scoring examples in Appendix.

to balance or mitigate resources shortfalls.[232] This approach works with the HA/DR policy study in terms of prevention and preparation (HA) missions that help extend and better use limited resources. Schattschneider's idea that the outcome of every conflict is determined by the extent to which the audience becomes involved in it[233] helps explain this construct. The HA/DR policy domain actors are the audience in this case, and an extension of Schattschneider's idea is that the actors' perceptions and beliefs can make a difference in the implementation of said policy. If the actors are promethean, they will follow the budgetary line of thinking and can be swayed by the OFDA claim that every dollar of preventive measures spent saves seven dollars of disaster relief. The hippocratics would follow the humanitarian line of thinking that humans can make the world a better place and wellness and security go hand-in-hand. Both lead to better training opportunities, which increase readiness and wartime capabilities, and greater access to possibly strategic benefits in particular host nations.

A variation of clinical pathways explains how both the hippocratic and promethean approaches lead to better training opportunities. The assumption may be that while each lead to better opportunities, these opportunities may differ in form and/or outcome. But this may not necessarily be the case. Better training and HA outcomes will result from better planning based on a clinical pathway approach in which a range of proscribed practices and modalities will likely result in more favorable outcomes for

---

232 Layzer, Judith. 2006. *The Environmental Case: Translating Values Into Policy, 2nd Ed*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

233 Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

patients and trainees, following a hippocratic perspective. These practices would use prospectively defined resources to minimize costs, following a promethean perspective. This form of planning and implementation must be based in research, literature, and well-defined evaluations of previous HA/DR efforts. A standardized algorithm of the best way to manage particular HA/DR events would emerge from this approach, and it would incorporate both the hippocratic and promethean perspectives. And it could produce new policy initiatives and implementation tools.

Table 14. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Consequences of Hippocratic and Promethean Approach to Training and Capacity Building Policy

| | Hippocratic | Promethean |
|---|---|---|
| Attributes | - Provision of healthcare is an obligation, responsibility<br>- Healthcare is a right<br>- More reliance on hands-on care and assistance | - Provision of healthcare through rational, most efficient means<br>- Healthcare is a privilege<br>- Technology-based delivery of care and assistance |
| Implementation | - Shift limited resources to critical wellness initiatives, rather than war-making<br>- Humanitarian approach: wellness and security are related<br>- Clinical pathway approach leads to better patient and training outcomes<br>- Improved HA/DR training and response through effectiveness | - Balance/mitigate budget shortfalls through technological advances<br>- Cost-benefit analysis: one dollar of prevention saves seven dollars of disaster relief<br>- Clinical pathway approach minimizes costs through efficient delivery of healthcare<br>- Improved HA/DR training and response through efficiency |

The key is knowledge management and sharing. Precise assessments and data collection before, during, and after an HA/DR effort or training mission can lead to

thoughtful planning and cost effective use of resources for future HA/DR responses. The design and implementation of such an approach must be based on an adaptive planning and decision support system that can suggest likely outcomes and alternatives and learn quickly to produce more effective solutions. The system should be interactive and web-based to facilitate the greatest amount of information sharing and data mining. Because training entails more than refining tactics and operations, the new policy and associated system would enable the testing of new ideas to improve HA/DR training and response.

Finally, the advocacy coalition framework is useful to this line of investigation. The HA/DR policy domain can be divided into coalitions who focus on the provision of hands-on healthcare and humanitarian assistance (i.e., Hippocratics) and technology-based, capacity building efforts (i.e., Prometheans). The core beliefs of each dictate the range and type of policy instruments put forward for a means to achieve the HA/DR ends. The preceding section reveals how this project's theories and research design have broad applications to future lines of study.

**Conclusion**

My analysis suggests that the phenomena associated with bureaucrats accessing bureaucrats are valuable findings and, collectively, yield an important theory to add to the policy implementation, policy change, and assessment literatures. Bureaucratic access points and leverage theory helps us understand how policies are successfully implemented in the midst of bureaucratic challenges resulting from organizational roles and responsibilities and contrasting assessments. Access points allow communication of vital information at the time of HA/DR events. And just as critically in terms of

interagency relations, bureaucratic access and leverage enables a more unified implementation of over-arching HA/DR policy by disparate agencies with unique missions, resources, capabilities, and assessment measures.

The existing literature does not fully capture how such agency differences are mitigated and overcome in implementing policy that spans multiple entities. Instead, an ironic paradox occurs: the "healthy tension" between OFDA (i.e., minuscule in size and resources) and DOD (i.e., massive in size and resources) bureaucrats allows communication and an understanding of roles and responsibilities in implementing policy that governs both entities. This access and leverage, coupled with the common end state goal of assisting peoples who have experienced disasters, helps create the notion of one common mission. Bureaucratic access points and leverage are the key components to HA/DR policy implementation.

The findings and emerging theory from this project matter. In March 2013 the DOD was facing a nine percent budget cut across all programs due to sequestration. Budget cuts not only mean doing more with less, but they demand that only those product lines that offer the most value and benefit for the money will escape future cuts. Bureaucratic access points and leverage will play a larger role with regard to who gets what, when, and how in the fiscally-constrained and uncertain future. More efficient assessment measures and focused capacity building (i.e., mitigation and preparation) initiatives are needed now more than ever. It is paramount that military medicine is used appropriately and the skills and capabilities that only it possesses are maintained. Bureaucratic access points and leverage theory offers bureaucrats some analytical

capability in terms of knowing who is controlling policy implementation, and it also presents a tool they can use to maintain and increase their own influence and power within a policy domain.

# Appendix

USAID Organization Chart. Note "Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance" which includes OFDA. (USAID, 2011, retrieved on November 20, 2011, from http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/orgchart.html.)




Headquartered in Washington, D.C., USAID's mission is carried out through four regional bureaus: Africa, Asia and the Near East, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe and Eurasia. These are supported by three technical (or pillar) bureaus that provide expertise in democracy promotion, accountable governance, disaster relief, conflict prevention, economic growth, agricultural productivity, environmental protection, education reform, and global health challenges such as maternal/child health and AIDS (U.S. Military Joint Publication 3-08, 2011).

OFDA Organization Chart. (USAID/OFDA informational compact disk provided at JHOC, July 29, 2011.)



Criteria for DOD involvement and flow chart of how OFDA requests DOD resources. (JHOC, 2011.)

1) Must be specific, clear mission;

2) Cannot hinder primary DOD mission/responsibilities;

3) DOD has the ONLY resource/entity that can accomplish the task and at the appropriate level.



Game Theory Example

A formal model is useful for this project. We have an interesting theory (i.e., bureaucrats accessing bureaucrats) with a difficult to explain phenomenon (i.e., how do street-level, or in this case, "disaster-level" bureaucrats in a minuscule office found deep within an independent, sub-cabinet-level agency dictate the role and resource expenditures of the massive Department of Defense?) and very little specific literature to explain either. There is freely communicated information in this construction because USAID/OFDA wants and needs particular resources for HA/DR responses and the DOD does not hide what it wants and needs in their training missions. The following game combines a stag hunt game and an asymmetric game.

Agency Strength/Weakness Influence on Bureaucrats Accessing Bureaucrats




| Strong – Stag Hunt | | |
|---|---|---|
| X/Y | Cooperate | Defect |
| Cooperate | 4,4 | 1,3 |
| Defect | 3,1 | 2,2 |

| Weak – Asymmetric | | |
|---|---|---|
| X/Y | Cooperate | Defect |
| Cooperate | 4,2 | 3,3 |
| Defect | 2,1 | 1,4 |

The bureaucrat(s) in the miniscule office (i.e., OFDA, "Bureaucrat A") is either strong/respected or weak/not respected, and the DOD bureaucrat(s) ("Bureaucrat B") must decide whether the OFDA bureaucrat is approaching the scenario from a position of strength or weakness. Respect (and autonomy, credibility, etc.) makes a difference in this game of bureaucrats accessing one another and obtaining and providing resources. The stag-hunt game models a respected agency, and an asymmetric game models an agency that is not respected.

*Actors*: strong/respected or weak/not respected OFDA bureaucrats and DOD bureaucrats
*Actions*: freely provide accurate information and/or resources/assistance (cooperate) or do not provide accurate information and/or resources/assistance (defect)
*Payoffs*: traditional prisoners'dilemma-based payoffs[234]

"Nature" determines the type of OFDA ("Bureaucrat A") from a set of types i ($i \in T$, in which T is {weak, strong}, and $\theta i > 0$ and $\theta T = 1$). OFDA (A) understands i and chooses an action from {cooperate, defect}, in which cooperate is freely providing accurate information and/or resources and assistance and defect is not providing accurate information and/or resources and assistance. The DOD ("Bureaucrat B") receives OFDA's (A) choice and chooses an action from {cooperate, defect}, with the same definitions as above. The DOD (B) makes its choice with incomplete information (i.e., only OFDA knows i) and uses Bayes' rule to update its beliefs about OFDA's (A) type.

Backwards induction can be used in this game. The DOD only knows if OFDA has defected or cooperated; it does not know how OFDA views itself (i.e., strong/respected or weak/not respected). In the event OFDA defects, the DOD would also defect. For example, if OFDA defects and is strong/respected, the DOD will realize a payoff of 2. If OFDA defects and is weak/not respected, the DOD will realize a payoff of 3. Either way, the DOD's best response is to defect. However, if OFDA cooperates the DOD has no dominant strategy. If OFDA cooperates and is strong/respected, the DOD will realize a cooperation payoff of 4 and a defection payoff of 3. If OFDA cooperates and is weak/not respected, the DOD will realize a cooperation payoff of 2 and a defection payoff of 4. In this case Bayes' rule can be used.

---

234 Gates, Scott, and Brian D. Humes. 1997. *Games, Information, and Politics: Applying Game Theoretic Models to Political Science*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
Morrow, James D. 1994. *Game Theory for Political Scientists*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Osborne, Martin J. 2004. *An Introduction to Game Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Rasmusen, Eric. 1994. *Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory*. Cambridge, MA: B. Blackwell.
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Mark S. Bonchek. 1997. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997.
Sloof, Randolph, and Frans VanWinden. 2000. "Show Them Your Teeth First!: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Lobbying and Pressure." *Public Choice*, 104(1):81-120.

Probability U-DOD(strong|action):
U-DOD(action|strong)(strong) / U-DOD(action|strong)(strong)+(action|weak)(weak)

Probability U-DOD(strong|cooperate):
U-DOD(cooperate|strong)(strong) / U-DOD(coop|strong)(strong)+(coop|weak)(weak)

The DOD's expected utilities for cooperating or defecting are determined by multiplying its beliefs about what type of OFDA it is facing with the associated payoff contingent on each branch of the game tree. The stag-hunt game has an equilibrium of mutual cooperation.

Moving up the game tree, OFDA knows what type it is and knows that if it defects (i.e., not providing accurate information) the DOD will defect regardless if OFDA is strong/respected or weak/not respected. This is where the asymmetric information comes into play. When OFDA is strong and defects and the DOD, in turn, defects, OFDA realizes a payoff of 2. When OFDA is weak and defects and the DOD defects, OFDA realizes a payoff of 1. But if OFDA cooperates the worst payoff it can realize is 2.

The following scenarios depend on the DOD's beliefs about OFDA's type. A {cooperate, cooperate} equilibrium exists when the DOD's expected utility for cooperating is greater than for defecting. A {cooperate, defect} equilibrium exists when the DOD's expected utility for defecting is greater than for cooperating. A {defect, cooperate} equilibrium exists when the DOD believes OFDA is weak and defects. There is no {defect, cooperate} equilibrium with the DOD cooperating based on the backward induction discussed above. A mixed strategy equilibrium exists when cooperating and defecting are equal to the DOD as illustrated here.

Expected utility for DOD cooperating:
EU-DOD(cooperate): (strong|coop)(4) + (weak|coop)(2)

Expected utility for DOD defecting:
EU-DOD(defect): (strong|coop)(3) + (weak|coop)(4)

The portion of time the DOD would have to believe OFDA is strong for it to be indifferent between cooperating and defecting can be found by setting these equations equal to each other. By simplifying the above equations, it is apparent that U-DOD(strong|cooperate) is equal to 2/3. In other words, the DOD would believe it is facing a strong OFDA two-thirds of the time given OFDA's choice to cooperate. Therefore, OFDA has a weakly dominant strategy to cooperate, and the DOD will cooperate or defect half of the time given that it believes that OFDA is strong two-thirds of the time.

This game demonstrates the puzzle of why street-level bureaucrats in a minuscule office found deep within an independent, sub-cabinet-level agency can dictate the role and resource expenditures of the massive DOD (i.e., mutual cooperation). In this

scenario, beliefs and information are vital in showing how mutual cooperation may be realized between two seemingly disparate (i.e., in terms of resources) bureaucratic agencies.

Contact Summary Sheet

Name (Pseudonym) and Role _____ Date _____

**Main Themes or Issues (Highlights)**

- *Access*:

- *Mission/Structure*:

- *Implementation/Assessment*:

- *OTHER (new research questions, speculations, or guesses)*:

**Specifics (Central Interpretation/Definitions)**

- *Access*:

    - *Information*:

    - *Timing*:

    - *Resources/Capabilities*:

    - *Bureaucratic Leverage*:

- *Mission/Structure (i.e., what do they see?)*:

- *Implementation/Assessment (i.e., how is HA/DR policy carried out?)*:

**ROEs/SOPs/Process/Bureaucracy (Note: sheet of paper with a square/blank sheet of paper; ask them to "diagram" the HA/DR process as they see it)**

- *Evaluation of the HA/DR bureaucratic process*:

    - *Key words/ideas (e.g., "effective/ineffective," "efficient/inefficient")*:

**Follow-up**

*Areas to refocus future interviews?*

*Another session with interviewee?*

U.S. Military's Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Efforts in Haiti, 2010

Support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

- U.S. Military personnel (peak level): 22,268
- U.S. Navy ships: 23
- U.S. Coast Guard ships: 10
- Fixed-wing aircraft: 264
- Helicopters: 57
- Liters of water distributed: 2,600,000
- Humanitarian rations packages distributed: 2,900,000
- Bulk food delivered (pounds): 17,000,000
- Meals-Ready-to-Eat delivered: 2,700,000
- Emergency radios distributed: 73,300
- Hours of emergency radio broadcasts: 660
- Supported distribution of emergency shelter to 1,170,000 people
- Supported 16 World Food Program distribution points.
- Supported development of 2 transitional camps and improvements in 9 camps

Logistical Assistance

- Internally displaced persons (IDP) relocated from high flood risk areas: 3,884
- Number of DoD-coordinated flights into Haiti and neighboring Dominican Republic from January 12 to March 15, 2010: 3,989
- American citizens transported out of Haiti: 16,412
- Air delivered relief (pounds): More than 36 million

Medical Assistance

- U.S. government medical personnel in Haiti (peak level): 1,100
- Number of hospital beds provided (peak level): 1,400
- Number of patients aboard all ships (peak level): 543
- Pounds of medical supplies delivered: 149,045
- Surgeries performed by U.S. military: 1,025
- Medical evacuations: 343
- Patients treated by U.S. military: 9,758

Engineering Assistance

- Number of Haitian engineers trained: 160
- City streets cleared of rubble (cubic yards): 12,724
- Number of structures assessed: (Current as of 23 April 2010): 25,522
- Seaport Flow: Port re-opened on January 22, 2010 with U.S. Military assistance
- Ship containers off-loaded: Twenty-foot Equivalent units (TEU): 8,867

Source: USSOUTHCOM "Operation Unified Response: Support to Haiti Earthquake Relief 2010" webpage, retrieved on February 27, 2013, at http://www.southcom.mil.

Interview Questions

1. What and/or who are the most important influences on resource/budget decisions? What were the most important issues, topics, concerns, capabilities to ensure?

2. In your experience, do other bureaucrats (outside of the DOD or OFDA) try to access you/your organization and decisions? If so, with what are they concerned?

3. If other HA/DR bureaucrats tried to access, what agencies did they represent, when did they try, what did they want for the military? How did they gain access? (NOTE: The "when" gets to timing, the "what they want" addresses capabilities and resources, and the "how" finds whether they tout their success, information, and fact that they are the only ones who could accomplish the HA/DR mission – capabilities – as credibility.)

4. In your experience, did the access provide information that you wouldn't have otherwise received? IF SO: What was its impact; or how would you characterize this access? (NOT if it was helpful or a hindrance, as that is too leading/dichotomous.)

5. Did HA/DR (and DOD medical) bureaucrats provide relevant information in a timely manner? (NOTE: This question is for the timing of access and availability of information during the punctuating event.)

6. In your experience, what were examples of successful (and unsuccessful) access? IF ANSWERED: Were resourcing/budget decisions changed due to them? IF SO: What were those resourcing/budget decisions? (NOTE: The resourcing questions address capabilities.)

7. In your experience, is there the right amount, too much, or too little access from other bureaucrats? IF THE ANSWER IS "TOO MUCH": How would you "check" access, if needed?

8. Would more bureaucratic access be a positive influence for creating better policy, budgets, or ensuring medical response capabilities? (NOTE: I use the word "better" here to discover whether the subject believes improvements can be made; I am not concerned with what "better" entails or how s/he defines it. It also primes question 9.)

9. What, if anything, would you change about the HA/DR mission? And how do you see budget cuts impacting that mission and the implementation of HA/DR policy?

10. Tell me about the relationship between your mission and the structure of your organization. (NOTE: This relates to whether the HA/DR mission defines the agencies (including the DOD components) or do the agencies (structure) define the mission?)

11. What are the measures of mission success? Are they different from bureaucrat to bureaucrat? Does assessment of the situation (i.e., punctuating event) or mission success matter in terms of how much access is granted or denied? Does the assessment, including who performs the assessment and with what measures, matter in terms of HA/DR policy implementation? (The second-to-last question attempts to discover inter-agency relationships and how they may be leveraged. The last question speaks to the implementation and assessment relationships, if any.)

12. That covers what I wanted to ask. Is there anything you care to add?

Scoring of Assessment Measures

If a medical humanitarian relief or readiness training mission provides a benefit in terms of decreased crime rate, increased productivity, increased cooperation, and improved indices of wellness it would be coded as a success for those four measures.

| |
|---|
| 1. Does crime (e.g., crimes associated with lack of resources and productivity) decrease in the area after a medical readiness/outreach mission? |
| 2. Does productivity (e.g., agrarian, industrial, etc.) increase after the medical readiness/outreach mission due to a more well population that is able to be more productive after receiving healthcare? |
| 3. Is there increased willingness to work with U.S. forces in security efforts after a medical readiness/outreach mission? |
| 4. Do the measured incidences of wellness (e.g., recurrence rate of disease, number and type of treatments) in a "traditional" patient care construct improve after a medical readiness/outreach mission? |

For example, if the crime rate is reduced after a HA mission it will be coded according to the scale in the following table. Similar scoring and coding will be used for the other three measures of success.

MEASUREMENT SCORING

| **USSOUTHCOM Mission** | Pre-Mission | Post-Mission |
|---|---|---|
| Success | 1 - Crime rate a concern (i.e., security, U.S. national security interests)<br>2 - Productivity rate a concern (i.e., unable to produce on their own due to wellness issues)<br>3 - Willingness to work with U.S. a concern (i.e., security, U.S. national security interests)<br>4 - Indices of wellness a concern (i.e., general humanitarian relief concerns) | 1 - Crime rate reduced<br>2 - Productivity rate increased<br>3 - Willingness to work with U.S. increased in terms of greater security (as measured by U.S. military indices)<br>4 - Improved indices of wellness (i.e., as measured by a traditional patient care construct) |
| Failure | 1 - Crime rate not a concern (i.e., security, U.S. national security interests)<br>2 - Productivity rate not a concern (i.e., wellness not affecting productivity)<br>3 - Willingness to work with U.S. not a concern (i.e., security, U.S. national security interests)<br>4 - Indices of wellness not a concern (i.e., general humanitarian relief concerns) | 1 - Crime rate same or increased<br>2 - Productivity rate decreased<br>3 - Willingness to work with U.S. decreased in terms of greater security (as measured by U.S. military indices)<br>4 - Worsened indices of wellness (i.e., as measured by a traditional patient care construct) |

MEASUREMENT SCORING EXAMPLE – CODING FOR CRIME RATE

| Scale | Success Based on Percentage of Improvement (or Failure to Improve Crime Rate) |
|---|---|
| 4: | >15% decrease in crime rate after medical readiness/outreach mission |
| 3: | 11-15% decrease in crime rate after medical readiness/outreach mission |
| 2: | 6-10% decrease in crime rate after medical readiness/outreach mission |
| 1: | 1-5% decrease in crime rate after medical readiness/outreach mission |
| 0: | No decrease or an increase in crime rate after medical readiness/outreach mission |

Hippocratic Oath: Modern Version (italics added)

I swear to fulfill, to the best of my ability and judgment, this covenant:
I will respect the hard-won scientific gains of those physicians in whose steps I walk, and gladly share such knowledge as is mine with those who are to follow.
I will apply, for the benefit of the sick, all measures [that] are required, avoiding those twin traps of overtreatment and therapeutic nihilism.
I will remember that there is art to medicine as well as science, and that warmth, sympathy, and understanding may outweigh the surgeon's knife or the chemist's drug.
I will not be ashamed to say "I know not," nor will I fail to call in my colleagues when the skills of another are needed for a patient's recovery.
I will respect the privacy of my patients, for their problems are not disclosed to me that the world may know. Most especially must I tread with care in matters of life and death. If it is given me to save a life, all thanks. But it may also be within my power to take a life; this awesome responsibility must be faced with great humbleness and awareness of my own frailty. Above all, I must not play at God.
*I will remember that I do not treat a fever chart, a cancerous growth, but a sick human being, whose illness may affect the person's family and economic stability. My responsibility includes these related problems, if I am to care adequately for the sick.*
I will prevent disease whenever I can, for prevention is preferable to cure.
I will remember that I remain a member of society, with special obligations to all my fellow human beings, those sound of mind and body as well as the infirm.
If I do not violate this oath, may I enjoy life and art, respected while I live and remembered with affection thereafter. May I always act so as to preserve the finest traditions of my calling and may I long experience the joy of healing those who seek my help.
- Written in 1964 by Louis Lasagna, Academic Dean of the School of Medicine at Tufts University. Retrieved from: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html#modern, March 11, 2013.

## References


Alford, John. 2002. "Defining the client in the public sector: A social-exchange perspective." *Public Administration Review, 62*(3):337-346.

Alvesson, M. 2003. "Beyond neopositivists, romantics, and localists: A reflexive approach to interviews in organizational research." *Academy of Management Review*, 28(1):13-33.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, John de Figueiredo, and James Snyder, Jr. 2003. "Why is there so Little Money in U.S. Politics?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*. 17(1):105-130.

Bachrach, Peter, and Morton Baratz. 1962. "Two Faces of Power." *American Political Science Review* 56:947-952.

Bachrach, Peter, and Morton Baratz. 1963. "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework." *American Political Science Review* 57:632-642.

Barabasi, Albert-Laszlo. 2005. "The Origins of Bursts and Heavy Tails in Human Dynamics." *Nature* 435 (12 May): 207-211.

Bardach, Eugene. 1977. *The Implementation Game*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Barker, James. 1993. "Tightening the iron cage: Concertive control in self-managing teams."
*Administrative Science Quarterly*, 38(3): 408-437.

Barker, James. 2004. "A Rhetorical Critic of Organization." *Electronic Journal of Radical Organizational Theory*, Volume 8, Number 1.

Bauer, Raymond, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Dexter. 1963. *American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade*. New York: Atherton Press.

Baumgartner, Frank, and Bryan Jones. 1993 (2009). *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Baumgartner, Frank, and Beth Leech. 1998. *Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Baumgartner, Frank, and Beth Leech. 2001. "Issue Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics." Journal of Politics. 63:1191-1213.

Baumgartner, Frank, and Bryan Jones. 2002. "Positive and Negative Feedback in Politics." In *Policy Dynamics*, eds. Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Berman, Paul. 1978. "The study of macro- and micro-implementation." *Public Policy*, 26:157-184.

Bertelli, Anthony, and Laurence Lynn, Jr. 2006. *Madison's Managers – Public Administration and the Constitution*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Birnbaum, Bill. 2004. *Strategic Thinking: A Four Piece Puzzle*. Costa Mesa, CA: Douglas Mountain Publishing.

Buccola, Steven, and James McCandlish. 1999. "Rent Seeking and Rent Dissipation in State Enterprises." *Review of Agricultural Economics*. 21(2): 358-373

Carpenter, Daniel. 2001. *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovations in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Cohen, Adam, and Elizabeth Taylor. 2000. *American Pharaoh*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company.

Corbin, J. & Strauss, A. 2008. *Basics of qualitative research, 3rd Ed*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Croley, Steven. 2007. *Regulation and Public Interests: The Possibility of Good Regulatory Government*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Dahl, Robert. 1956. *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Denzin, N. K., and Lincoln, Y. S. 2000. "Introduction: The discipline and practice of qualitative research." In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2nd Ed*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Department of Defense. 2012. "Western Hemisphere Defense Policy Statement." Retrieved on April 2, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/news/WHDPS-English.pdf.

Dutton, J.E. & Dukerich, J.M. 1991. "Keeping an eye on the mirror: Image and identity in organizational adaptation." *Academy of Management Journal*, 34(3):517-554.

Ehrlich, Sean D. 2011. *Access Points: An Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Eisenhardt, Kathleen. 1989. "Building theories from case study research." *Academy of Management Review*, 14(4): 532-550.

Elmore, Richard. 1979. "Backward mapping: Implementation research and policy decisions." *Political Science Quarterly*, 94:601–616.

Fairholm, Matthew, and Gilbert Fairholm. 2009. *Understanding Leadership Perspectives: Theoretical and Practical Approaches*. New York: Springer Publishers.

Gates, Scott, and Brian D. Humes. 1997. *Games, Information, and Politics: Applying Game Theoretic Models to Political Science*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.

Gephart, R. 2004. "What is qualitative research and why is it important?" *Academy of Management Journal*, 47(4): 454-462.

Gersick, Connie. 1988. "Time and transition in work teams: Toward a new model of group development." *Academy of Management Journal*, 31: 9-41.

"Guidelines On the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief - "Oslo Guidelines." 2006. (Revision 1.1 November 2007)

Hall, Richard, and Frank Wayman. 1990. "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees." *American Political Science Review*. 84(3): 797-820.

Hammond, Thomas. 1986. "Agenda control, organizational structure, and bureaucratic politics." *American Journal of Political Science*, 30(2):379–420.

Hansen, John Mark. 1991. *Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Harris, Stanley, and Robert Sutton. 1986. "Functions of parting ceremonies in dying organizations." *Academy of Management Journal*, 29: 5-30.

Hart, Roderick P. 1990. *Modern Rhetorical Criticism*. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman/ Little Brown.

Hart, Roderick P., Sharon Jarvis, William Jennings, and Deborah Smith-Howell. 2004. *Political Keywords: Using Language That Uses Us*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hart, Roderick P. 2013. "DICTION." Retrieved on November 10, 2012, from http://www.dictionsoftware.com.

Heimer, Carol. 2008. "Thinking about how to avoid thought: Deep norms, shallow rules, and the structure of attention." *Regulation and Governance*, 2:30–47.

*Hurricane Mitch* from History.com, retrieved on March 20, 2013 at http://www.history.com/topics/hurricane-mitch.

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 2011. "SFA-Related Authorities: Past and Present DoD/DoS Roles in Foreign Assistance, Current Legislation, and Restrictions" presentation.

Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC). 2011. Produced and presented by USAID/OFDA. Attended July 28-29 in San Antonio, Texas.

Jones, Bryan D., Frank R. Baumgartner, and James L. True. 1998. Policy Punctuations: US Budget Authority, 1947-95. *Journal of Politics* 60(1): 1-33.

Jones, Bryan and Frank Baumgartner. 2005. *The Politics of Attention*. University of Chicago Press.

Jones, Bryan, Heather Larsen-Price, and John Wilkerson. 2009. "Representation and American Governing Institutions." *Journal of Politics*, 71:277-90.

Kamieniecki, Sheldon. 2006. *Corporate America and Environmental Policy: How Often Does Business Get Its Way?* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Kingdon, John. 2003. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd Edition*. New York: Longman.

Krueger, Anne. 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society." *American Economic Review*. 64(3): 291-303.

Langbein, Laura. 1986. "Money and Access: Some Empirical Evidence." *Journal of Politics*. 48(4): 1052-1062.

Laswell, Harold. 1958. *Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How*. New York: Meridian Books.

Layzer, Judith. 2006. *The Environmental Case: Translating Values Into Policy, 2nd Ed*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Leech, Beth, Frank Baumgartner, Timothy La Pira, and Nicholas Semanko. 2005. "Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government Activity and the Demand for Advocacy." *Political Research Quarterly* 58:19-30.

Lindblom, Charles. 1959. "The Science of 'Muddling Through.'" *Public Administration Review* 19:79-88.

Lipsky, Michael. 1971. "Street Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform." *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 6:391-409.

Lowi, Theodore. 1979. *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States, 2nd Edition*. New York: Norton.

March, James, and Herbert A. Simon. 1958. *Organizations*. New York: Wiley.

March, James, ed. 1965. *Handbook of Organizations*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

March, James, and Johan Olsen. 1984. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life." *The American Political Science Review,* 78 (3):734-749.

March, James, and Roger Weissinger-Baylon, eds. 1986. *Ambiguity and Command: Organizational Perspectives on Military Decision Making*. Boston: Pitman.

May, Peter, and Walter Williams. 1985.*Recovering From Catastrophes: Federal Disaster Relief Policy and Politics*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

May, Peter. 1986. *Disaster Policy Implementation: Management Strategies Under Shared Governance*. New York: Plenum Press.

May, Peter. 1991. "Reconsidering policy design: Policies and publics." *Journal of Public Policy*, 11(2):187–206.

May, Peter. 1992. "Policy Learning and Failure." *Journal of Public Policy*, 12(4):331-354.

May, Peter. 1995. "Can cooperation be mandated? Implementing intergovernmental environmental management in New South Wales and New Zealand." *Publius*, 25(1):89–113.

May, Peter, and Søren Winter. 2007. "Collaborative Service Arrangements, Patterns, Bases, and Perceived Consequences." *Public Management Review,* 9(4): 479-502.

May, Peter, Samuel Workman, and Bryan Jones. 2008. “Organizing Attention: Responses of the Bureaucracy to Agenda Disruption.” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 18:517-541.

May, Peter, Joshua Sapotichne, and Samuel Workman. 2009. “Widespread policy disruption: Terrorism, public risks, and homeland security.” *Policy Studies Journal*, 37(2):171–194.

May, Peter, and Søren Winter. 2009. "Politicians, Managers, and Street-Level Bureaucrats: Influence on Policy Implementation." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,* 19(3): 453-476.

Mazmanian, Daniel, and Paul Sabatier, Paul. 1983. *Implementation and Public Policy*. Chicago: Scott Foresman and Co.

McCool, Daniel. 1990. “Subgovernments as determinants of political viability.” *Political Science Quarterly*, 105(2):269–293.

Miles, M.B. & Huberman, A.M. 1994. *Qualitative data analysis, 2nd Ed*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Moe, Terry. 1980. *The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Moe, Terry. 1984. “The new economics of organization.” *American Journal of Political Science*, 28:739– 777.

Morgan, G. and Smircich, L. 1980. “The case for qualitative research.” *Academy of Management Review*, 5(4): 491-500.

Morrow, James D. 1994. *Game Theory for Political Scientists*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Moynihan, Donald. 2009. “The Network Governance of Crisis Response: Case Studies of Incident Command Systems.” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 19(4): 895-915.

Mutual Defense Assistance Act, 1949. Public Law 81-329, 1949.

Mutual Security Act, 1951. Public Law 165, 1951.

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. 2003. Retrieved on March 11, 2011, from http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/govt_docs/public_health_prep/

whitehouse/whitehouse_national_strategy_for_combating_terrorism.html.

Nisbett, Richard, and Timothy Wilson. 1977. "Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes." *Psychological Review, 84,* 231-259.

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). 2011. "Disaster Assistance." Retrieved on November 18, 2011, from http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_ assistance/.

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). 2012. "Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2011." Retrieved on April 2, 2013, at http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/working-crises-and-conflict/crisis-response/resources/fy-2011-annual-report.

Olson, Mancur. 1971. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Press.

Olson, Mancur. 1982. *The Rise and Decline of Nations*. New Haven: Yale Press.

Osborne, Martin J. 2004. *An Introduction to Game Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Patton, M.Q. 2002. *Qualitative research and evaluation methods, 3rd Ed*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Peltzman, Sam. 1989. "The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation." *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Microeconomics*, 1-59.

Pressman, Jeffrey, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1973. *Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It's Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Rasmusen, Eric. 1994. *Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory*. Cambridge, MA: B. Blackwell.

Rosenbaum, Walter. 2008. *Environmental Politics and Policy, 7th Edition*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Rossman, G. B. and Rallis, S. F. 1998. *Learning in the Field. An Introduction to Qualitative Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Sabatier, Paul. 1986. "Top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation research: A critical analysis and suggested synthesis." *Journal of Public Policy*, 6:21–48.

Sabatier, Paul, ed. 2007. *Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd Ed*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Schattschneider, E. E. 1935. *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff: A Study of Free Private Enterprise in Pressure Politics, as Shown in the 1929-1930 Revision of the Tariff*. New York: Prentice-Hall.

Schattschneider., E.E. 1957. "Intensity, Visibility, Direction, and Scope." *American Political Science Review*. 51: 933-42.

Schattschneider, E.E. 1975 (1960). *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press.

Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram, eds. 2005. *Deserving and Entitled: Social Construction and Public Policy*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Mark S. Bonchek. 1997. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997.

Silverman, D. and Marvasti, A. 2008. *Doing qualitative research: A comprehensive guide*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Sloof, Randolph, and Frans VanWinden. 2000. "Show Them Your Teeth First!: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Lobbying and Pressure." *Public Choice*, 104(1):81-120.

Stoker, Robert. 1989. "A regime framework for implementation analysis: Cooperation and reconciliation of federalist imperatives." *Policy Studies Review*, 9(1):29–49.

Stratmann, Thomas. 1991. "What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects of Money and Votes." *Southern Economic Journal*. 57(3): 606-620.

The Sphere Project. 2011. "Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response." Retrieved on March 11, 2013, at http://www.SphereHandbook.org.

Truman, David B. 1971. *The Governmental Process; Political Interests and Public Opinion*. New York: Knopf.

Tullock, Gordon. 1967. "The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft." *Economic Inquiry* 5(3): 224-32.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 2011. "About USAID." Retrieved on November 18, 2011, from http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 2012. "USAID History." Retrieved on March 7, 2012, from http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html.

U.S. Army South. 2012. Retrieved on October 11, 2012, from http://www.arsouth.army.mil/mission-and-vision.html.

U.S. Code: Title 10, Chapter 20, Section 401.

U.S. Military Joint Publication 3-08, 2011. "Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations." DOD publication.

U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). 2011. "Area of Responsibility." Retrieved on November 18, 2011, from http://www.southcom.mil/aboutus/Pages/Area-of-Responsibility.aspx.

U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). 2011. "Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief." Retrieved on November 18, 2011, from http://www.southcom.mil/ourmissions/Pages/Humanitarian%20Assistance.aspx.

U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). 2013. "Missions – Training and Exercise" and "Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief." Retrieved on March 20, 2013, at http://www.southcom.mil.

U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). 2013. "Operation Unified Response: Support to Haiti Earthquake Relief 2010." Retrieved on February 27, 2013, at http://www.southcom.mil.

U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). 2013. "U.S. Soldiers treat more than 5,100 patients in El Salvador." Retrieved on February 27, 2013, at http://www.southcom.mil.

Van Meter, Donald, and Carl Van Horn. 1975. "The Policy Implementation Process: A conceptual framework." *Administration and Society*, 6:445-488.

Welch, William. 1982. "Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting: Milk Money and Dairy Price Supports." *The Western Political Quarterly*. 35(4): 478-495.

Wilson, James Q. 1989. *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*. New York: Basic.

Wilson, James Q. 1993. *The Moral Sense*. New York: The Free Press.

Worsham, Jeffrey. 1998. "Subsystem dynamics and agenda control." *American Politics Quarterly*, 26(4):485–512.

Wright, John. 1990. "Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives." *American Political Science Review*. 84(2): 417-438.

# Vita

Daniel Thomas Sternemann served as an assistant professor at the United States Air Force Academy from 2007-2010. His research interests include environmental policy, healthcare policy, and genetically modified organisms foodstuff policy. The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Permanent email: dsternemann@gmail.com

This dissertation was typed by Daniel Thomas Sternemann.