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Thinking Through Partition

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Partition for India's Muslims was a profound national trauma, an extraordinary disruption of "the institutional underpinnings of the social order" (Neal 1998, xi). In Pakistan today, even in families directly affected by their partition move, many people choose not to speak of Partition at all. Those who do often describe the extent of Pakistan's disadvantage relative to India in 1947. There is a common narrative about how poorly Pakistan fared in the division of assets that established Pakistan's history in direct opposition to India's. The oppositional aspect of this narrative is part of the triumphal story of the establishment of the nation-state as the culmination of the Pakistan movement. In the popular imagination, this national story must reconcile the intellectual antecedents of the Pakistan Movement with the demand for statehood and the competing calls of non-territorial and territorial nationalism. It is, as such, a fragmented tale stitched together by a series of myths and teleologies. For a particular group of Pakistani narrators, recounting their personal relationship to Muslim nationalism means developing a narrative in which they can emphasize their connection to institutions in India, without acknowledging India's role as a space which contains Muslim history, houses important Muslim monuments and in which the Muslim dynasties flourished for hundreds of years.[1] These narrators, all men old enough to remember the events of 1947, are Aligarh educated professionals. They migrated to Pakistan during the period of the Partition and have built their lives there. They have used the national narrative to redefine India in officially acceptable ways, but by localizing their memories they have not fully allowed that national narrative to redefine their own stories.

[1] These narratives do not illuminate the experiences of other marginalized communities, women or the poor. In fact, the narrators are myopic in their treatment of their own community, and this narrow view is a distinguishing feature of many of these interviews. This exploration, therefore, is similarly narrow, an exploration of narratives collected in interviews with a dozen people in the Pakistani cities of Lahore, Karachi, and Islamabad in the summers of 2005 and 2006.

The exchange below, which took place during an interview in Lahore, Pakistan in July 2006, reveals the disruption in one narrator's family as a result of their decision to migrate to Pakistan. This narrator, Major General Wajahat Husain (Ret'd) of the Pakistan Army, chose to move because, as a recently commissioned army officer, he expected the move to benefit his career. His family, however, made their decision in haste, in the middle of the night, and under threat. In trying to locate his relationship to Aligarh, the city in which his family had lived for generations, and a center of Muslim cultural and intellectual life, I asked:

> AA: Do you ever miss India?
>
> WH: No.
>
> AA: I just wonder [because] Muslims gave up a lot to come to Pakistan.
>
> WH: Especially my family… They gave up a lot and all said and done, it was our childhood. We were very happy. We were very well brought up, very well brought up, we were well educated, we had excellent friends… The fact is that I had made up my mind when Pakistan was established. My mind was oriented towards going to Pakistan and joining the Pakistan Army. I have never regretted it.
>
> AA: Do you think your parents ever missed it?
>
> WH: No… All they were concerned with was the well-being of the children—there were nine of us. The main reason why my father left was when he realized there was no future for us in India. Whatever they had was worthless because [there was no opportunity] for all these children. (personal interview, July 11, 2006, Lahore)

In his critique of Partition historiography, Gyanendra Pandey establishes Partition as a "limit case" of historiography, a moment so colored by horror that it is unique (Pandey 2001, 45). But he challenges historiography that treats Partition violence as a "problem of origins." The problem of origins is insufficient to explain the trauma, disruptive as it is, of the pre-existing situation, that is, of the origins themselves (*ibid*., 49-50). What interests me about narratives of origins is not how I might use them to explain or understand the violence of partition. Rather, I can use them to understand how a community remembers its origins to create continuities in the midst of

trauma that allow it to survive that trauma. As David Gilmartin has suggested, the problems with narrating Partition should encourage historians to "place the tension between multiple realities and the production of shared moral meaning at the very heart of the partition story" (Gilmartin 1998, 1070).

To explore these tensions and to look for historical continuities in what has been characterized as a moment of rupture is to complicate a view of history that has become codified in official and collective memory. I suggest that Partition is more than a moment, and that if, as historians, we can treat it as ongoing then we can in fact address the multiple realities of the Partition story. By expanding the chronology of partition, the event itself can incorporate the narratives of community and change that are excluded by a more limited historical approach. This move creates space for a long- term understanding of Partition as it exists in narrative today. To me, Partition is a process of unhitching communities from their pasts, the physical, spiritual and emotional ties that bind them to space and to chronology. The stories told by the several narrators I have interviewed have shown me how their community reconnected those ties to build (they actually said, "reestablish" or "recreate") their future in a new space: Pakistan.

A natural entry point for me into the rich traditions of North Indian Muslims is the powerful educational institution of the Aligarh Muslim University and the vision of its founder, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, whose vocabulary and priorities occupied a prominent place in the drive for Muslim statehood in the twentieth-century. Sir Sayyid certainly recognized the importance of institutional continuity as he sought to restore status to the Muslim community in North India. Emerging out of another national crisis of enormous importance, the rebellion of 1857— what Pakistanis today call the First War of Independence— Sir Sayyid embarked on a mission "to restore continuity to the social realm" of Muslims by defining them as a "moral community" (Neal 1998, 21 & 33). Disruptions to everyday life, such as the events of 1857, and of course Partition, become points of coherence in the collective memory of that community. As people understand and narrate the history of their community, they use these moments to anchor their narrative in the community and to describe how the community has experienced and survived trauma. These provide "a close link between self-identity and national identity"(Neal 1998, 37). In this case, as long as Muslims could look to the nominal leader of the Mughal Empire, Bahadur Shah, being Muslim entailed a special relationship to power. With the demise of that institution (symbolic as it was) the Muslim community lost its institutional focus. Sir Sayyid sought to relocate this focus through his educational movement. With the intention of creating a specialized education tailored to the needs of his community and their aspirations to be eligible for government service, to

maintain some place for religious education, and to "live according to their station in life," Sir Sayyid recommended English medium education for professional mobility and western scientific education for social capital (Malik 1989, 167). Sir Sayyid used the Urdu word *qaum* to define this community, and though its meaning in different contexts has been contentious,[2] for him it connoted the Muslims of India who were differentiated from the greater body of Muslims worldwide by their unique interaction with the Indian situation (Malik 1989, 144 & 231). His was not a territorial nationalism, not linked to a specific geography, but to shared experience; it was sustained by Indian Muslims who voluntarily subscribed to this theory, and worked to support the community's sustenance through their actions and priorities.

The students of the Aligarh Muslim University were on the front lines of the movement to consolidate Muslim nationalism. During the period of 1875-1947, when the leaders of the Muslim community sought to unify Muslims in opposition to British and Hindu domination, the needs and values of the elite were broadly interpreted and portrayed as the values of the community as a whole. Aligarh students saw, in their community, Muslims from all over India living together. As General Ghulam Umar told me,

> Mohammed Ali Jinnah visited Aligarh and I was a student there. He addressed the students and during his address he used the words 'Muslim India.' One of the students got up and asked him, 'Where is Muslim India? There are some provinces where Muslims are in the majority, four or five provinces, but otherwise, Muslims are in Bengal, in Madras, everywhere. What is this Muslim India?' And [Jinnah] said, 'There is not a corner of India from which a Muslim student is not present here. This is Muslim India.' (personal interview, Aug 8, 2006, Karachi)

Jinnah thus taught them that they represented India's Muslims, and hence that India's Muslims were like them, regardless of their regional or linguistic origin. The Urdu speaking elites subscribed wholeheartedly to the idea that Jinnah inherited from Sir Sayyid, that the Muslims were a united moral community—a nation—because when they looked at its values, they saw themselves reflected.

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[2] For a history of the transformation of the idea of *qaum* to communalism see: Ayesha Jalal, *Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam Since 1850* (London, New York: Routledge, 2000).

Aligarh boys took this to heart and now in Pakistan speak passionately about the solidarity of Muslims, the inevitability of the partition and the establishment of the Pakistani state. The family-like grouping of Aligarh students facilitated a powerful collective experience in which Aligarh memories are localized. Maurice Halbwachs, in his work *On Collective Memory* describes how our memories help us to perpetuate identity (Halbwachs 1992, 52-53). The identity of these narrators is based on their centrality in a teleological narrative of statehood. Yet, their stories reveal slippages in their efforts to sustain a sense of nationhood and to use it to create a continuous narrative for Pakistan that links the intellectual and cultural history of Muslims in India with the narrative of the nation-state. They are representative of that class of Muslims that Sir Sayyid sought to reach; their fathers were, to a man, employed as servants to the Raj and most were also graduates of Aligarh and had been raised on Sir Sayyid's loyalism and spirit of Muslim revival.

They speak with pride of their association with the university and tell of the disruption that Partition caused in their community, as General Wajahat, an Aligarh native and "day scholar" recalls:

> All the people in Aligarh knew us. So this was the feeling which one naturally missed. No one knew us [in Pakistan]. But, after eight to ten years we settled down in Lahore, got to know the people, got round and established some sort of—I wouldn't say roots—but some kind of establishment… [In Aligarh] there was the University, the relationship we had with the University… Then the cultural and educational association with the University, with [the] professors… So these things one missed a lot, one still does, I suppose. We were very proud of our association and our cultural heritage, family heritage and the way we were brought up. (personal interview, June 27, 2005, Lahore)

We can hear in General Wajahat's remembrance that he and his family suffered a deeply felt loss when they abandoned the community that had nurtured them and that they had supported for generations. In this narrative we hear the first hint that Pakistan, filled with Indian Muslims, did not have the same sense of community as the one that existed in Aligarh. Pakistan was not a place that an old family could establish "roots." The fulfillment of the Pakistan Demand meant that Aligarh, its "emotional center," would have to be abandoned (Mirza 1989, preface). Perhaps more than any city in North India, Aligarh embodied the critical aspects of Sir Sayyid's *qaum* and it was his intellectual legacy that strengthened Muslim institutions there. Although Sir

Sayyid's was not a "territorial" nationalism in its original form, the concentration of leadership in Aligarh, and the association with Aligarh Muslim University effectively grounded Muslim nationalism there. This grounded community of Muslims later became the leaders of a territorial demand for statehood, one linked not just to shared experience, but to the specific geography of North India in which Muslims mobilized in pursuit of common interests.

This Muslim identity developed in large part around the idea of Hindu oppression. According to these Pakistani narrators, in post-1857 India the British favored the Hindu majority and Muslims, the former owners of power, were sidelined in the official arena and in education. This impression is grounded less in evidence than in the perception that Muslim civilization was in decline, an idea that Sir Sayyid himself was instrumental in advancing as an argument for loyalty to the British. This idea was re-deployed by the Muslim League to prove collusion between the British government and the Hindu majority. Each of the narrators recounts Hindu abuse of Muslims, a central argument used to justify the inevitability of Pakistan. Aligarhians, in particular, describe the lack of opportunity for educated young Muslims.[3] General Wajahat remembers:

> My father was in the civil service but the first Congress government came in 1937 and they treated him badly. That was happening all over India. All higher appointments and things were denied to the Muslims. Although there was a quota [for the] Hindu to Muslim ratio, they very cleverly used to fill up the quota by giving very low, menial jobs to the Muslims and keeping all of the good higher jobs for Hindus. I thought this would continue and it did continue. (personal interview, July 21, 2006)

Whereas non-Aligarhian narrators describe physical abuse, particularly at the hands of Hindu schoolteachers, Aligarhians are concerned with the lack of educational and career opportunities for Muslims and often use this as an explanation for their decision to migrate to Pakistan (personal interview, July 21, 2006). Because their families had served the government in India for generations, their particular concern was that they would be abused by a Hindu government, or "Hindu Rāj." Therefore, when they remember India, they remember these abuses, these relationships.

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[3] Evidence to the contrary is presented in Anil Seal, *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968) 298-306.

As narrators try to reconcile the dual nature of their relationship to Aligarh, located squarely in India, and their belief in the inevitability of the establishment of the Pakistani state, they inadvertently force Aligarh out of the India that they remember and re-locate it in their own vision of Pakistan. Narrators cannot hold too tightly to a narrative of Pakistan's history that denies them what they gained from their association to the university, (a narrative that, for example insists that Pakistan's history begins in 1947); but they cannot let go of the Muslim nationalism that they believe brought Pakistan into being. Their responses to questions of loss about Aligarh and about India reveal this slippage and the force of the collective impulse to transform their memories into ones that support their loyalty to progressive Muslim ideals and Pakistani statehood.

When speaking of Aligarh the narrators describe a utopian world in which there was no sectarian or communal strife. As Zakir Ali Khan, General Secretary of the Pakistan Aligarh Old Boys' Association told me, "Aligarh never had any factionalism… In Aligarh we never knew... [who was Shī^{c}a]" (personal interview, August 10, 2006, Karachi). There was only one mosque on the campus and it was used for both Sunni and Shī^{c}a prayers. General Wajahat, whose father was Shī^{c}a says:

> In the University there was not much distinction between Sunnis and Shī^{c}as … Aligarh Muslim University had a very fine mosque, a beautiful mosque and we all used to offer our prayers, especially Friday and ^{c}*Īd* prayers… The students used to say, 'Which session are you attending? Are you going to the first show or the second show?' The first show used to be the Sunni congregation and the second show used to be with the Shī^{c}a congregation. (personal interview, June 13, 2005, Lahore)

Similarly, the Hindu-Muslim strife that often resulted in riots in Aligarh and other cities and that colors histories of the freedom movement in the 1940s is conspicuously absent in these narratives. Ghulam Umar asks me:

> Did you know there was a special hostel at Aligarh for Hindus? They dressed exactly the same as I dressed… One of the things was, if you found a Hindu student and myself, you could not distinguish. He was wearing the Turkish cap, he was wearing that sherwani and he was behaving exactly [as we were]. He was given vegetarian food… There was no fighting, there was no prejudice, there was nothing. (personal interview, August 8, 2006, Karachi)

Aligarh's culture, for these narrators, made it a unique institution, bound by the edges of the campus. Though they remain loyal to their experience in Aligarh, their memories are localized. They can remain true to Aligarh without betraying their loyalty to Pakistan as a state or as an idea.

Scholarly work on Aligarh, including that of David Lelyveld and Gail Minault, reveals a more contested political environment.[4] In fact Nasim Ansari, an Indian Muslim graduate, describes a university where amongst the students there were "representatives of every province in India and followers of every party…whether the differences between them were based upon class or upon theories, they were not concealed in any way" (Ansari 1999, 41-42). Although tolerance was an ideal of the student body, the Pakistani narrators have chosen to collapse the differences, both religious and sectarian. By advancing a unified Muslim identity at Aligarh that unequivocally supported the Muslim League, these narrators align themselves with the movement that fulfilled the demand for statehood that they accept as inevitable without complicating their own relationships to an institution firmly grounded on Indian soil. This triumphal narrative that denies Aligarh's relationship to Indian space and any heterogeneity within the Muslim community, is an essential component of their sense of citizenship. In this conception Muslims were oppressed, Muslims unified and resisted injustice by mobilizing the progressive values of the elite, and they established a state in which those values would be safe and where their status would not be threatened. That the Pakistani state has not fulfilled its role in this image causes some anxiety for the narrators. The problem with the state, they say, is that it has rejected the values on which Muslim identity in Aligarh was based and has hence descended into factionalism. Interviews with non-Aligarhian narrators reveal a recognition of a more complex Muslim (now Pakistani) identity connected to regional and linguistic ties. Aligarians, however, do not recognize the legitimacy of more localized identity markers that link Muslims to regional geography. They insist on setting themselves up as the standard of Muslim identity that developed in a straightforward and uncomplicated way at Aligarh and led to the establishment of the Pakistani state. At the same time, their own identity is localized by their association with the Aligarh Muslim University. Divorced from that spatial identification in Pakistan, their identity has failed to be the one that defines Pakistani citizenship as a whole. In other words, the image of Muslim identity that survives in their collective memory—one that

[4] See: Gail Minault and David Lelyveld, "The Campaign for a Muslim University, 1898-1920," *Modern Asian Studies* 8(2) (1974): 145-189, and David Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

collapses difference—is constantly in conflict with the reality of Pakistani selfhood, which is much more aggressively diverse.

Ironically it was the establishment of a territorially defined nation-state, designed to ensure the political survival of the Muslim nation conceived of by Sir Sayyid, that forced the profound disruption of this Muslim institution. In relocating the Aligarh community outside of the physical space in which its values were embodied, the "dense networks of interrelationships that defined the particularities of place" were dislocated and de-emphasized (Gilmartin 1998, 1090). And yet when asked if they felt any loss associated with leaving India, each of these narrators answered without hesitation, "No." India, for them, has become the object of opposition so well established in the official narrative of the Pakistan Demand and of the nation-state.

For them, India is fully established as the source of Pakistan's ills. For them, it was the mistreatment by Hindus in India that forced Muslims to seek political independence. For them, it was the Indian National Congress who refused to agree to the Cabinet Mission plan and thus forced the partition, and then failed to fairly divide the assets. India is not the home that these men left behind, it is not the home of Indian Islam's greatest monuments, not the home of Urdu, nor of a rich intellectual tradition that led to the differentiation of the Muslim political community. Pakistan is home for them now. Though they have elaborated eloquently on the special qualities of Aligarh, of the University, of the unique community that developed there, when I spatially relocated Aligarh inside India, they treated it as a mere artifact, left behind with the houses and utensils, and non-Muslim friends. As General Wajahat poignantly describes, "I remember when we were leaving, [my mother] was very upset. She couldn't make up her mind what to take and what not to take, so we just left everything. We never talked about it, we never talked about it. [My parents] always looked forward" (personal interview, July 11, 2006, Lahore).

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Comparison of Tamil Political Movements in India and Sri Lanka

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Last year, the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu was marked by demonstrations and marches against what protestors claim are targeted attacks by the Sri Lankan military against Sri Lankan Tamils. In late August 2006 parties from across the political spectrum – including the two largest Dravidian parties, the DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) and the AIADMK (All India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) as well as the Communist Party and the Dalit Panthers – observed a minute's silence in the state assembly to protest the killing of 51 school girls by Sri Lankan air force jets. The alleged victimisation of Sri Lanka's Tamil minority became an issue of public protest and concern in Tamil Nadu following the anti-Tamil riots of July 1983 when an estimated 3,000 Sri Lankan Tamil civilians were killed in over six days of organized rioting. Since that time, Tamil Nadu's apparent sensitivity to the plight of Sri Lankan Tamils has led political actors and observers in India and Sri Lanka to ponder aloud about the dangerous ethnic affiliations that might carry the separatism of Sri Lanka's restive Tamil minority to their ethnic brethren across the Palk Straits in India.

Despite the political attention that is often devoted to the Sri Lankan Tamil question by politicians and activists in Tamil Nadu, the issue has never dominated political competition within the state. For example, bread and butter issues of prices and subsidies were at the centre of Tamil Nadu state assembly elections of 2006, and the Sri Lankan Tamil issue was not included in the platform of either the DMK or the AIADMK coalitions. Indeed Sri Lankan Tamil and Indian Tamil political movements and ideologies have unfolded along starkly different, almost diametrically opposed trajectories over the past fifty years. Tamil nationalist movements in India have moved from an early antagonism to the Indian National Congress and its ideals towards a peaceable accommodation within the Indian Union. In the same period Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism has escalated from a strategy of "responsive cooperation" with Sinhalese leaders within a unitary state to the

current demand for a maximalist form of territorial autonomy, even perhaps a separate state.

In the 1920's and early 1930's the anti-colonial Congress party's claim to represent the Indian nation was challenged in the Tamil speaking areas by the Dravidian movement. The movement suggested that south Indian society was characterized by a fundamental racial antagonism between the Dravidian Tamils and the minority of Tamil-speaking Brahmins, who were racially allied to the Aryan north Indians. Claiming that the Congress represented only the interests of the Aryan north Indians and their Brahmin south Indian descendents, the Dravida Kazhagam (DK) demanded a separate Dravidistan in 1931, echoing the demand for a separate Pakistan. Dravidistan, however, proved to be less appealing than Pakistan to its potential inhabitants and the Congress gained one of its most convincing victories in Madras during the 1935 Provincial Council Elections. The Congress went onto win all of the state assembly elections in Madras until 1967, when it lost power in states across India primarily as a result of general economic disaffection.

Upon coming to power in 1967, the DMK, a far less radical offshoot of the DK, renamed Madras as Tamil Nadu, but gave up the demand for a separate state and settled down to consolidating its position within the federal structures offered by the Indian constitution. Since 1967 power has alternated between the DMK and the AIADMK, or alliances led by these two parties. Although retaining in their names the shared ideological roots in the radical DK, both parties have been careful not to challenge the legitimacy of the Indian Union. In their electoral strategies the parties combine populist promises, on issues such as food and subsidies, with a form of Tamil cultural nationalism that is stressed as compatible with a larger Indian nationalism.

From the mid to late nineteenth century there were clear connections between Tamil politics and cultural life in Sri Lanka and India. In the mid nineteenth century the Tamil religious and literary revivalist movement was active in India and the predominantly Tamil Jaffna peninsula in Sri Lanka. Arumugam Navalar (1822-1879), a Jaffna Tamil, played an important part in the revivalist movement in both countries. Fearful of the influence of Christian missionaries in Jaffna, he established a printing press in south India and produced printed versions of important Saivite texts. He also contributed to the literary revival by establishing a Tamil prose style and by printing Tamil literary works (Wilson 2000). Sri Lankan Tamil politicians and activists were deeply influenced by these shared ideological currents, and early political leaders like the two Ponnambalam brothers – Ponnambalam Ramanathan (1851-1930) and Ponnambalam Arunachalam (1853-1924) – who promoted south Indian classical dance and music in Sri Lanka, and also visited south India regularly. The idea that Tamils are descended from an

ancient Dravidian race was also influential, and Sri Lankan Tamil politicians referred to this alleged heritage in debates and campaign speeches in the 1930's and 1940's (Russell 1982, 149). By the early 1970's, however, just as the Dravidian parties were becoming stably incorporated into the Indian Union, militant Tamil movements were beginning to take up arms as a means of carving out a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka.

It is widely acknowledged that during the early 1980's the Indian government supported the Sri Lankan Tamil militants with weapons and training (Krishna 1999, 114-115). As the civil war between the Sri Lankan military and the Tamil militants in the north-eastern Tamil speaking areas intensified, the Indian government intervened citing the dangers posed to the Indian Union by spiraling Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka. By 1987, however, the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka (IPKF) and the largest of the Tamil militant groups, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were at war. The LTTE had rejected as inadequate the proposals for territorial devolution contained in the Indo-Lanka peace accord. By 1991 the IPKF had withdrawn, and after a short interval the war resumed between the Sri Lankan military and the LTTE. Following the LTTE's assassination of the former Indian Prime Minister and Congress Party leader Rajiv Gandhi during an election campaign in 1991, Indian involvement in Sri Lanka has been more circumspect and restrained. In recent months, the Indian position has been limited to stressing the need for a negotiated solution, whilst emphasising commitment to Sri Lanka's territorial integrity.

There have been close and often complex connections between Tamil politics in India and Sri Lanka. These connections must be seen in the larger context of ongoing social, political and economic interactions between the two countries. Sinhalese as well as Tamil politicians in Sri Lanka were influenced by the Indian National Congress. During the 1920's and 1930's prominent Sri Lankan politicians, including the future Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, attended the annual sessions of the Indian Congress (Russell 1982, 44). Despite the reticence that followed the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, India has become a major international player in Sri Lankan political and economic life, and Sri Lanka is said to receive a large share of Indian foreign investment. Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict also continues to affect India through a steady stream of Tamil refugees that try to escape the fighting in the north-east by making the hazardous crossing of the Palk Straits to reach Indian shores.

These important connections are, however, overshadowed by the very different dynamics of Tamil politics in India and Sri Lanka. This paper will argue that these differences are best explained by placing Sri Lankan and Indian Tamil politics, political party development, and competition within

their respective states. It will be argued that even the occasional salience of Sri Lankan Tamil issues in Tamil Nadu politics is driven as much by the exigencies of Tamil Nadu party politics as by a shared sense of "Tamilness."

WHY DO POLITICAL PARTIES MATTER?

A number of scholars have examined the role that political parties can play in stabilizing democratic mechanisms in the ethnically diverse countries of South Asia. In a recent review of decolonisation and democratization in South Asia, Katherine Adeney and Andrew Wyatt suggest that the structural features of political parties are key to explaining the different trajectories of democratic politics in India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan (Adeney 2004). They suggest that parties with stable institutional structures that are open to diverse groups and interests can play an important role in accommodating different ethnic groups and ensure a stable transition to democracy. For the purposes of this argument, the comparisons they make between India and Sri Lanka are telling. Between its formation in 1885 and independence in 1947, the Indian National Congress transformed from an elite and amorphous institution into a broad-based political party with inclusive social links. From the 1920's onwards it was able to organize anti-colonial protests that elicited widespread participation across the country, and from 1935 Congress politicians and party activists participated in electoral campaigns and the activities of government. For Adeney and Wyatt, the experience, legitimacy and organizational infrastructure that Congress had gained during these years gave Congress leaders, particularly Nehru, the authority to establish a federal, majoritarian democracy as the "rules of the game" that could include a diversity of ethnic groups within an overarching territorial and civic conception of nationhood.

In contrast, Sri Lankan political competition at the time of independence was not structured by well-institutionalized, inclusive parties. Although Sri Lanka held its first all-island elections with universal franchise as early as 1931, neither of the two largest parties – the United National Party formed in 1947 and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party formed in 1952 – developed widespread and stable institutions with robust and inclusive social links. Adeney and Wyatt argue that both were formed "to extend the ambitions of members of the already existing political elite" (Adeney 2004, 13). Without either a robust organizational infrastructure or inclusive social links, neither party was able to contain the anti-Tamil thrust of the rising tide of Sinhala Buddhist mobilization that from 1956 onwards became a dominant electoral force. Although Sri Lanka's ethnic balance, with a small, territorially concentrated Tamil minority, made ethnic conflict more likely, Adeney and

Wyatt suggest that with effective party organizations political leaders may have been better able to accommodate Tamils within the Sri Lankan polity.

Kanchan Chandra has used a rational actor model to refine the insight that inclusive political parties can accommodate different ethnic categories in multiethnic societies (Chandra 2000). Assuming that ethnic elites tend to draw the majority of their support from their own ethnic categories and that political power is sought by elites from ethnic groups that modernize at different times, she identifies a collective action problem in the inclusion of new elites. Although the incorporation of new elites would widen a party's support base and therefore increase the chances of electoral victory, the possibility of existing elites winning important positions is reduced by the entry of new elites into the party structure. Therefore, what is good for the party as a whole is not good for any of the individuals seeking power within the party. Chandra suggests that parties that use competitive elections with open party memberships to choose candidates and distribute positions within the party circumvent the collective action problem. Existing elites in such parties have an incentive to widen their support base by recruiting rising elites from other ethnic groups. Newly recruited elites not only widen the support base of existing elites during intra-party elections, but also extend the party's constituency during elections. In Chandra's model the newly recruited elites take up middle ranking positions within the party and climb their way up the party hierarchy as spaces open up at higher-level positions, enlisting in the process elites from previously un-mobilized ethnic groups. Parties that rely on competitive elections will therefore be composed of multiethnic factions that compete for positions and influence within the party structure. Furthermore, in an open and competitive party displaced leaders and new entrants alike can form reliable expectations about their chances of winning important positions in future elections, thereby reducing the chances of defections and splits.

Within a centralized party, however, existing elites have no incentive to widen their support base by recruiting elites from different ethnic groups, as party positions and candidacies are solely the gift of the leader or a small coterie around the leader. A small and centralized leadership that is interested as much in its own survival as in assuring the party's victory will inevitably distribute candidacies and party positions in an arbitrary and unpredictable manner. As such elites from ethnic groups not represented in the party, unable to form reliable expectations about securing powerful positions, are unlikely to join the party.

In relation to Sri Lanka, James Manor has argued that the organizational weakness of the two major parties, the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), is a part of a wider failure of "political integration" that has hindered a solution to the ethnic problem (Manor 1979).

Manor quotes Myron Weiner's use of the term "political integration" to refer to the means of bridging the gap between "the elite and the mass" (Manor 1979, 22). Manor contends that in India this bridge is filled, however imperfectly, by a chain of local governance that links the village *panchayat* (village council) to the state assembly and the central government. From the Montague Chelmsford reforms of 1919, local government institutions in India have been steadily given greater powers and opened up to the elective principle. Although the powers of these institutions were initially limited, local notables began to see the value and importance of extending their influence from village and district levels to the provincial legislatures.[5]

In Sri Lanka there was no comparable development of local government organizations, and power remained heavily centralized in the national government. As such there are very few institutions linking ordinary citizens with the activities of government, thereby "nullifying the influence upon the political process of the great mass or rural dwellers, except on election day" (*Ibid.*, 22). The concentration of power within parliament means that villagers and local councils have to petition the MP or a cabinet minister for even the smallest concessions and grants. As villagers have little or no experience of practical politics, during general elections "expectations about the possibilities offered by a change of government rise to wildly unrealistic heights" (*Ibid.*, 37). Manor quotes the work of W. H. Morris-Jones to suggest that villagers in India, who have a closer relationship to local levels of governance, have more realistic expectations of government: "What the villager expects of government tends to be very tangible, material, and local – a school, a well, a road. (What he fears from government has the same quality of particularity)" (*Ibid.*, 38).[6]

Reflecting the centralization of power in the national government, political parties in Sri Lanka are also very poorly developed at the local levels. At the time of its electoral victory in 1956, the SLFP had not established a branch network, did not collect subscriptions from its members, and was funded almost entirely from the pocket of its founder leader, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike. Manor suggests that the SLFP's victory was based not on organizational strength, but on tactical alliances with smaller parties, the ineptness of the previous UNP government, and the "emergence of forces

[5] "The development of these attitudes simplified the task of those operating at or above the provincial level who sought to cultivate networks of supporters among people close to the local level. The institutional network of the local government system served as a framework which gave shape to the organizations of provincial and national political parties – most notably the Indian National Congress" (Manor 1979, 23).

[6] The quotation is originally from: Morris-Jones, W. H. *The Government and Politics of India* (London: Hutchinson, 1971).

which turned to the SLFP without enthusiasm and out of exasperation with the UNP" (*Ibid.*, 32). The new Prime Minister refused to institutionalize a party organization through which to standardize the distribution of patronage, arguing that this would limit his "freedom to manoeuvre" (*Ibid.*, 33). Following his assassination, his wife Srimavo Bandaranaike led the party to a second electoral victory in 1960, and also refused to standardize and rationalize the party organization, claiming that this would mean extending power "to a lot of people we don't know" (*Ibid.*, 34). Manor suggests that although the UNP's 1977 electoral victory was the result of a fairly broad and robust party organization, the party organization has since deteriorated as many of its key organizers entered government. Since then the "party's effectiveness as an instrument for recruitment and participation has clearly declined" (*Ibid.*, 36).

According to Manor, the weakness of party organizations has undermined Sinhalese leaders' efforts to agree on a political settlement with Tamil politicians. Without a robust and reliable support base, Sri Lankan leaders are particularly sensitive to dissension from the opposition and from within their own parties. Attempts by leaders of both the UNP and the SLFP while in government to reach an agreement with S. J. V. Chelvanayagam, the leader of the largest Tamil party, the Federal Party, were abandoned in the face of mounting opposition from their own backbenchers and the opposition party. Manor contends that without strong and stable links with party supporters as well as robust intra-party discipline with which to contain dissent, the party leaders were unable to contain opposition from within their own parties, from the opposition, and from extra-parliamentary groups. Party leaders' weakness has meant that small "ad hoc interest groups – usually springing up on single, narrow issues – have often frightened governments into abrupt changes of course" (*Ibid.*, 37).

The above discussion suggests that political parties can play an important role in accommodating the interests of different ethnic groups. Key to this is the extent to which open competitive methods are used to choose candidates and distribute party positions. In Katherine Adeney and Andrew Wyatt's terms, a party with intra-party democracy is more likely to have inclusive social links and be able to integrate different ethnic groups. James Manor's analysis suggests that leaders of parties with stable institutional structures through which to distribute the loaves and fishes of government are also more likely to be secure about their positions and the support of their constituencies. Such leaders will therefore be able to enter into negotiations on behalf of their ethnic constituencies. It will therefore be important to examine the relationship between the positions adopted by Indian, Sri Lankan and Tamil

political leaders, in both states, and the stability and security of their respective support bases.

COMPARATIVE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TRENDS IN INDIA AND SRI LANKA

There are important similarities and strong connections between many of the social and political trends that have shaped the processes of Tamil accommodation and secession in India and Sri Lanka respectively. The Tamil, Buddhist and Hindu revivalist movements that emerged in the mid to late nineteenth century in India and Sri Lanka made comparable ideological claims, and there was often a great deal of contact and exchange of ideas between revivalists from the three movements. All three movements claimed that their respective religions and languages had undergone a period of decline that had to be arrested and reversed if Tamil, Buddhists and Hindus were to make progress in the conditions of the modern world.

The Buddhist revivalist movement is often seen as an important precursor to Sri Lanka's later ethnic tension and consequent civil war. It began in the late nineteenth century as a reaction to the Christian missionary activity and gained its fullest expression in the life and work of Anagarika Dharmapala (1864-1933). In many ways adopting Christian missionary condemnations of "heathen beliefs and practises," Dharmapala sought to purify Sinhala Buddhist society through a process of reform that has been labelled "Protestant Buddhism" (Tambiah 1992, 6-7). He produced a code for the lay conduct that outlined a puritanical and austere life "suited for the emergent Sinhalese urban middle class and business interests," whilst rejecting popular village level practices and beliefs in favor of a return to canonical norms. Most importantly Dharmapala revived and popularized the *Mahavamsa*, a medieval chronicle that celebrated the ancient Sinhala Buddhist civilizations on the island. According to Stanley Tambiah, Dharmapala's revival of the chronicles was important in "infusing the Sinhalese with a new nationalist identity and self – respect in the face of humiliation and restrictions suffered under British rule and Christian missionary influence" (*Ibid.*, 7). The chronicles were used to support the claim that the Sinhala Buddhists were the original inhibitors of the island and its true inheritors, with the minorities seen as more or less deserving later immigrants. This claim lay behind the 1956 mobilization demanding that Sinhala be made the only official language of the country, and has subsequently been used to resist efforts to resolve the ethnic conflict through a devolution of power to the north-eastern Tamil speaking areas of the island.

Although Sinhala Buddhist revivalism was of singular importance in Sri Lanka's political history, many of the movement's ideological concerns and claims are comparable to the Indian Hindu revivalist movements that were emerging at roughly the same time. One of the most popular of the Hindu revivalist movements, the Arya Samaj, which numbered half a million adherents by the 1921 census, identified Hinduism as the legitimate source and core of Indian civilization and culture (Sarkar 1989, 74-75). Like Dharmapala it combined an attack on allegedly obscurantist practices, including child marriage and the taboos on widow remarriage, with a defence of what it claimed was Vedic orthodoxy. In 1909 Lajpat Rai and Lala Lal Chand echoed Dharmapala's efforts to foster a religious and ethnic consciousness amongst the Sinhalese in an article attacking the Congress claiming that the "consciousness must arise in the mind of each Hindu that he is a Hindu, and not merely an Indian" (*Ibid.*, 75). Interestingly the social bases of the Hindu and Buddhist revivalist movements were also comparable. According to Sumit Sarkar, the Arya Samaj had its principle support base amongst urban trading castes in north India while revivalists' attempts to purge Hinduism of superstitious practices tied them to "an emerging code of middle class respectability" that in Sri Lanka translated into Dharmapala's code for lay conduct (*Ibid.*, 76).

A similar set of concerns animated the Tamil revivalist movements in both Sri Lanka and India. Like Anagarika Dharmapala and the Arya Samajists, the Sri Lankan Tamil Saivite revivalist Arumugam Navalar (1822-1879) sought to excise syncretic and populist practices from Tamil Saivism and return it to its textual roots. A distinct strand of the Tamil revivalist movements promoted a revival of Tamil literature and south Indian classical music and dance. Although the Saivite movement addressed itself particularly to the Hindus, the revival of music, dance and literature involved Tamil Christians. Christian missionaries working in south India had led the study of Tamil grammar. One in particular, Robert Caldwell, first argued that Tamil was a Dravidian language, autonomous from Sanskrit in its development and grammar. In Sri Lanka there were many Jaffna Tamil Christians who became prominent in activities to promote and revive Tamil literature and culture, and as A. J. Wilson argues: "[the] movement for Tamil cultural awakening did not become segmented or sectarian" (Wilson 2000, 30).

Although the Hindu, Sinhala Buddhist, and Tamil revivalist movements were motivated by similar concerns and made comparable ideological claims, their political consequences have been very different. While the Indian Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, was able to become the single biggest party and lead a full term coalition government from 1999-2004, it has not been able to overcome the divisions of caste and region within the Hindu fold.

Furthermore, none of the BJP's coalition partners shared its ideological project of transforming India into a Hindu state and it appears that the BJP may well have reached the limits of its expansion. In Sri Lanka, however, the claims of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism define the political mainstream, and all of the mainstream Sinhala parties have to reaffirm their commitment to the ideals of a majority Sinhala Buddhist state.

Caste is also a common factor that continues to influence social and political dynamics in both India and Sri Lanka. It is difficult to discern a single organizing principle that governs the social reality of caste; occupational, religious and social distinctions have all shaped caste as a social hierarchy in Tamil, Sinhalese, and Indian societies. In India, caste has become a singularly important factor in both national and regional politics. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries non-brahmin castes mobilized in Maharastra, Madras, and Mysore against what was claimed to be brahmin or upper caste dominance in the bureaucracy and in the Congress party. During the 1920's and 1930's A. M. Ambedkar, a constitutional lawyer from the untouchable Mahar caste led movements to end the social and political oppression of untouchables, and also challenged Gandhi's claim to be the sole representative of India's Hindus.

The Indian constitution implicitly recognizes caste as an important source of social disadvantage, and allows for positive discrimination in public sector institutions in favor of formerly untouchable castes. The provisions apply to tribal groups and formerly untouchable castes listed in a schedule of the Indian constitution, and therefore known as Scheduled Castes and Tribes. The constitution also makes reference to a wider category of "socially and educationally backward classes of citizens" that could be eligible for the types of benefits that were extended to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. South Indian states, including Tamil Nadu, extended reservations for this category of "other backward classes," or OBC's in the early 1950's (Corbridge 2000, 127). During the 1980's and early 1990's, north Indian caste groups that are classified in the OBC category began mobilizing for an extension of these reservations in north Indian states and in central government institutions. Unlike south India, which had an early history of caste-based mobilization, north Indian states and the central government have resisted the implementation of these provisions.

Although caste norms and values are used to define social hierarchies and groups in both Sir Lankan Tamil and Sinhala societies, caste has not become an explicit category of political mobilization. While caste often seems subsumed by ethnic mobilization, it can be characterized in Uyangoda's terms as falling within the "inner courtyard" of both Tamil and Sinhalese politics (Uyangoda 2000). The British commission that arrived in Sri Lanka in 1928

to inquire into constitutional reform recommended universal franchise as a means of empowering the masses against the Tamil and Sinhalese elites (Russell 1982, 15). They were particularly concerned by the monopoly of wealth and education enjoyed by the Tamil land owning caste, the Vellalas, and the social and educational discrimination the Vellalas exercised over the other Tamil castes (*Ibid.*, 16).

Caste based social discrimination continued in post independence Tamil society. In the early 1960's lower caste leaders led temple entry campaigns and protested against what they saw as upper-caste demands for a greater devolution of power to the Tamil areas (Pfaffenberger 1994). In the Sinhala areas, where caste based social exclusion and discrimination is less marked than in Jaffna, caste has played an important role in electoral mobilization. Jane Russell notes that candidates' caste identity was an important factor in deciding electoral outcomes during the 1930's (Russell 1982, 85-86). It has also been suggested that the UNP's landslide victory in the 1977 general elections resulted in part from a careful choice of candidates based on a close reading of the caste demography of each constituency.[7] In the next section I will explore why caste remains secluded in the inner courtyard of Sri Lankan politics whereas in India it is brazenly flaunted in both political conflict and mobilization.

Soon after independence, language became an important issue of political mobilization and conflict in India and Sri Lanka. In 1920 the Congress accepted the principle that provincial boundaries should be re-drawn along linguistic lines, and reorganized the party structure into linguistic units. Linguistic reorganization was accepted as the necessary means through which meaningful political participation could be extended to the masses. It was also important for developing India's vernaculars into modern administrative languages. Although Nehru supported this policy during the anti-colonial movement, following independence he became more reticent, as movements for the creation of linguistic states emerged in southern, western and northern India. According to Robert D. King, Nehru's reticence stemmed in part from the need to concentrate on the more important problems facing India and also because the linguistic boundaries were not as easy to draw as had once been thought. For example, both Tamil and Telugu speakers claimed Madras city as the capital of the polyglot Madras presidency. Nehru was also deeply concerned by the potentially divisiveness of the language issue. In response to a parliamentary question Nehru stated that the overriding concern in the states' reorganization was Indian unity: "Finally the most important factor, the overriding factor, is the unity of India" (King 1998, 63). In December 1953

[7] Conversation with Sri Lankan journalists.

Nehru finally agreed to appoint a commission to consider the reorganization of Federal states. In 1956 the commission's recommendations for linguistic states were accepted. Amongst the new states created was the south Indian Tamil-speaking state of Madras, later renamed Tamil Nadu. While linguistic states had been supported by Congress leaders as a force for greater democratization and vernacular development, King notes that many of the linguistic demands were being made by dominant caste groups in search of greater employment and educational opportunities. King quotes K. Mukerji who argues:

> Let us be frank and accept the Dal-Roti basis of this enthusiasm. It is the middle class job hunter and place hunter and the mostly middle class politician who are benefited by the establishment of a linguistic state, which creates for them an exclusive preserve of jobs, offices and places by shutting out, in the name of the promotion of a culture, all outside competitors. (*Ibid.*, 73).[8]

A second major language problem was that of determining a national or official language for the Indian Union. A version of Hindi or Hindustani was spoken by at least 35 per cent of the population and was understood by many others who spoke one of the north Indian languages (*Ibid.*, 135). Many of the Congress MP's from the north Indian Hindi speaking states were strong advocates for Hindi to be made the official language of the Indian Union. This was firmly resisted by south Indian Congressmen and women who feared that this would close off employment opportunities in the central government for non-Hindi speakers. Nehru was resolutely opposed to the imposition of Hindi and eventually agreed a compromise in which Hindi would become the official language of the Indian Union, but English would continue to be used for all official purposes for fifteen years past ratification of the constitution. As the fifteen year time limit of 1965 approached, there were serious disturbances across the country, particularly in Tamil Nadu.

In 1963, despite pressure from Hindi advocates demanding a switchover from English, both houses of parliament passed the Official Language Bill that provided for English to be used, alongside Hindi, for all official purposes of the Union. Nehru defended the continued use of English on pragmatic grounds, arguing that without it India would be cut off from the world. He also said that the "overriding reason for it is the necessity of not encouraging any disruptive tendencies in India" (*Ibid.*, 131). Repeatedly through debates

[8] Original quote from: Mukerji, K. *Reorganization of Indian States* (Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1955).

on the linguistic reorganization of states and on the question of the official language, Nehru stressed the importance of Indian unity as an overriding factor that would determine any decision. As King notes: "Unity first, unity all the time; never yield on unity. 'My profession,' he once said, 'is to foster the unity of India'" (*Ibid.*, 132).

While the language question in India was to some extent settled in a way that did not disrupt the political unity of the Indian Union, the language question in Sri Lanka in many ways presaged the escalation of the ethnic conflict. The language question was frequently discussed in Sri Lanka's state council during the 1930's and 1940's. There was a general agreement amongst the English educated elite that both Sinhala and Tamil should be official or national languages (Russell 1982, 270). As with the Congress, use of the vernaculars was seen as necessary to bridge the gap between the elite and the masses, and to develop Sinhala and Tamil into modern administrative languages. There was also some popular support for this position from teacher associations, in both the Tamil-speaking north and Sinhala-speaking south of the island. However, by the 1956 elections the pressure for "Sinhala Only" had built up and was initially adopted by the SLFP and then by the UNP. Not only was the timing of the Sinhala Only movement contemporary with events in India, the social groups that mobilized behind the SLFP campaign were comparable to the forces that were demanding linguistic states in India. According to Kenneth D. Bush, without a party structure to spread its message and mobilize support, the SLFP relied on five principle groups: "local-level government officials; ayurvedic practitioners; vernacular teachers; the youth with limited prospects; and bhikkus (Buddhist monks) – groups which, by virtue of the UNP's neglect, constituted willing and able conduits for Bandaranaike's political message" (Bush 2003, 89).

The "Sinhala Only" demand stemmed from a particular ideological universe in which the Sinhala Buddhists were the rightful inheritors of the island. The Tamils were at best a politically subservient minority, or at worst threatening invaders from India. In this universe, placing Tamil on an equal footing to Sinhala was seen as an act that threatened the very survival of the unique Sinhala language and people. Although the zero sum logic of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, and later Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism, are often blamed for the intractability of Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict, the structural similarities with the Indian language movements are worth noting. The 1956 elections also saw the emergence of the Federal Party as the principal vehicle of Sri Lankan Tamil political mobilization. According to A. J. Wilson the Federal Party's principal supporters were public sector employees whose jobs and positions were threatened by the possibility of a switch from English to Sinhala only (Wilson 1994, 66). In many ways, both the Sinhala Only victory

and the growth of the Federal Party were propelled by the same "Dal and Roti" "middle class job hunters and place hunters" derided by Mukerji. In the next section I will explore how political party structures and political institutions in India and Sri Lanka have shaped similar social trends towards ethnic accommodation and ethnic conflict respectively.

THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AND THE TAMIL NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

In 1888, three years after the first Congress met in Bombay, the then Viceroy Sir John Stratchey dismissed the Indian National Congress as nothing more than a "microscopic minority". He went onto assert: "there is not, and never was an India, or even any country of India…no Indian nation, no 'people of India' of which we hear so much…that men of the Punjab, Bengal, the North-West Provinces and Madras, should ever feel that they belong to one great Indian nation, is impossible" (Sarkar 1989, 2). The development of the Indian National Congress from a small annual meeting of the English educated elite into a mass nationalist party, and the evolution of a civic, territorial nationalist ideology, expressed in the Indian constitution, can be seen as the result of the anti-colonial struggle in which the Congress sought to prove that it was indeed representative of the Indian nation.

Sumit Sarkar has argued that the compulsions of the nationalist struggle, particularly the need to widen participation and politically unite the plurality of religions, castes, ethnicities, languages and regions shaped India's post-colonial politics in important ways (Sarkar 2001). He suggests that the contours of India's post-colonial politics, particularly when compared to other post-colonial South Asian states, reminds us "that a reasonably stable, democratic, federal, and secular resolution of the colonial legacy was hardly inevitable" (Sarkar 2001, 23). Sarkar links Congress' commitment to democracy to the "plunge into country-wide mass anti-colonial politics after the First World War" (*Ibid.*, 28). Gandhi's reorganization of Congress at the Nagpur session in 1920 opened up the party to mass membership, reorganized the party into linguistic units, and opened up party positions to competitive elections. Congress' notions of democracy were sharpened not only by the need to build a mass membership party, but also by the enlargement of aims from greater Indian representation on the executive and in the civil service to the demand for complete independence in 1929. The demand for universal franchise without qualifications for gender, literacy and property made explicit in the 1928 Nehru Report represented "the sharpest possible break with colonial Indian theory and practice" (*Ibid.*, 28).

The call for democracy was central to rebuffing claims that Congress represented a "microscopic minority" that could not speak for the mass of the Indian population. In claiming to represent the Indian nation as a whole, mainstream nationalism also had to address the tension between its assertion of political unity and India's social heterogeneity. Sarkar suggests that the Constitution's special provision for minorities and the commitment for federalism result from the exigencies of mobilizing a mass anti-colonial struggle. Assertions that Congress could not speak for the minorities, particularly Muslims and the Untouchables, led to the Lucknow Pact with Muslim leaders in 1916 and the Poona Pact of 1932 that provided reserved seats for scheduled castes. Likewise India's federal constitution is not a simple inheritance of the federal structure of the 1935 Government of India Act. As early as 1905 the Bengali nationalist Bipinchandra Pal was arguing that "autonomy for India…Presupposes the autonomy of every race and community" (*Ibid.*, 31). Although nationalists saw federalism as a way of augmenting Indian unity, the federal principles of the 1935 Government of India Act were designed to fragment Congress into provincial units, whilst retaining the princely states as a countervailing pro-British balance to nationalist aspirations. According to Sarkar, federalism stems from the need to create a unified nationalist struggle from a highly heterogeneous population.

> A discourse of 'unity and diversity' became standard in mature Indian nationalism, particularly in the context of deepening Hindu–Muslim conflicts. This was often vague, platitudinous, and open to diverse interpretations, yet it did involve a recognition of plurality of religions, languages, and cultures that logically favoured federalism rather than any totally centralised polity. (*Ibid.*, 31)

The strong and important connections between the compulsions of the Congress-led anti-colonial struggle and the contours of India's post-colonial politics do not support the conclusion that Congress was actually the mobilized expression of mass nationalist sentiment. As Cambridge school historiography has shown, nationalist mobilization relied on factional patron client networks and did not challenge the feudal- and caste-based power of Congress' rural patrons. Congress' post-colonial electoral dominance continued to rely on the same rural patrons who mobilized their vote banks in return for state patronage. As Sudipta Kaviraj has argued, the continuation of patron client politics and the indirect mobilization that this supports reflects the nationalist elite's failure to create "a popular common sense about the political world, taking the new conceptual vocabulary of rights, institutions and impersonal power into the vernacular everyday discourses of rural or

small town Indian society" (Kaviraj 1991, 90). Although Congress may have failed to create a popular common sense around the language of rights and impersonal power during the 1950's and 1960's, it was the only party with a national organization. Indeed Nehru's reluctance to pursue a more radical economic agenda that would antagonize the conservative coalitions that controlled Congress committees was due to his unwillingness to jeopardize the unity of Congress. For Nehru, the unity of Congress was central to the state and nation building project: "The Congress is the country and the country is the Congress" (Corbridge 2000, 49).

While the anti-colonial movement may not have lived up to its promise of freedom and equality, the ideological and organizational development of the Congress party had important, if unintended consequences, which have accommodated Indian Tamil nationalism within the Union's federal boundaries. Intra-party democracy, the federal devolution of power, provisions for caste-based affirmative action, and the constitutional provision for further federal reorganization have all shaped the development of Indian Tamil politics. During the 1930's Congress' intra-party democracy was critical to undermining and undercutting the strength of non-brahmin opposition in the Madras Presidency. The widespread participation that Congress had been able to mobilize during the Non Cooperation and Civil Disobedience campaigns convinced many of the ambitious rural magnates and middle class professionals that Congress represented the best possible chance of gaining power. The Dravida Kazhagam's charge that Congress represented only brahmin interests was undermined by the entry of many non-brahmin politicians and activists including S. Ramanathan, who had formerly been a close associate of the Dravida Kazhagam leader, E. V. R. Periyar (Arnold 1977, 159). Because of Congress' use of competitive intra-party elections, non-brahmin political leaders could form stable expectations about their chances of becoming Congress candidates or securing positions within the Congress organization. Following its victory in the 1935 elections, Congress won a convincing majority in every state assembly election until 1967, when the Tamil Nationalist Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam displaced it from power.

The DMK's electoral victory in 1967 is a consequence of its own organizational strength and all-India trends that led to Congress defeats across many other states in the same year. Two severe droughts in 1965-66 and 1966-67 had led to spiralling prices that were further compounded by the 1966 decision to devalue the Indian rupee. Indeed, part of the DMK's success in 1967 was its slogan of "two measures for one rupee" through which it promised to reduce the price of rice if elected (Barnett 1976). Alongside Congress failures, the DMK's assertive Tamil nationalism and its organizational strength also contributed to its electoral victory. Whereas the

Congress used patron client networks to mobilize elites and their dependent vote banks, the DMK directly mobilized intermediate caste groups. Margueritte Ross Barnett has shown that the DMK's electoral growth is related to increasing voter turnout, indicating that the DMK mobilized groups excluded by Congress' electoral alliances. According to Narendra Subramanian the appeal of the DMK's ideology rises not from an appeal to ethno-nationalist sentiments, but from an expression of anti-elite populism. In the context of its appeal to intermediate groups, the DMK's Tamil nationalism works as a re-evaluation and affirmation of the cultural norms and values of lower status groups against the claims of the English speaking Congress elites. Subramanian also stresses the DMK's robust organizational infrastructure that allowed it to spread its message and work closely in each constituency to mobilise its core voters (Subramanian 1999).

The DMK abandoned its demand for a separate Tamil state as early as 1961, partly as a response to a central government directive that secessionist parties would be proscribed. While the threat of central government repression is clearly important in explaining the DMK's decision, there are also other institutional factors that worked to check the growth of secessionist tendencies in Tamil Nadu. Since the DMK's victory in 1967, the Tamil Nadu polity has become increasingly fragmented, so much so that in the last elections the DMK was unable to form a majority government alone. James Manor has argued that the federal provisions of the Indian constitution have undermined secessionist tendencies by bringing to the fore conflicting heterogeneous interests within linguistic groups. "New Delhi's most important initiative, which was not a response to separatist demands, was (as we noted above) the decision to redraw state boundaries roughly along linguistic lines. By bringing nearly all Tamils together in a single state, this compelled Tamils to confront all of the things which divided them. Given the heterogeneities within heterogeneities that existed within this and other regional societies, these were immensely formidable" (Manor 2001, 90).

Contrasting his observations on Sri Lankan political integration, Manor also notes the importance of the myriad of formal and informal political institutions that all wield a little power. He argues that these institutions have nurtured "a small army of political activists and 'fixers' that constitute a major national resource, which is unavailable to most other countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America" (*Ibid.*, 82). These political fixers create and sustain a culture of political bargaining that prevents the socio-cultural heterogeneities that exist within states and between the states and the centre from unraveling completely. Opportunities for power exist not only at the national parliament and state assembly, but also through the multiple layers of the local governance of *panchayat raj* system, numerous quasi-official and non-official

boards, and cooperative societies. “The existence of so many opportunities to capture at least some power tends to persuade parties and politicians to remain engaged with the politics of elections and bargaining, even when they suffer defeats in some contests” (*Ibid.*).

By the time the legislation to proscribe secessionist parties was introduced, the DMK had already experienced some success in municipal board elections, including in Madras city. The DMK’s decision to abandon secession was motivated as much by the desire to protect its organization and the gains it had already made as by the fear of government repression. Echoing Manor’s observations on the internal heterogeneity of ethnic and linguistic groups, Kanchan Chandra has argued that the Indian constitution’s recognition of multiple social identities has undermined the possibility of ethnic polarization (Chandra 2005). Constitutional provisions for caste based affirmative action policies and the recognition of new states on a regional, linguistic or tribal basis has meant that multiple categories of ethnic identity become possible bases for political mobilization. As each individual has multiple identities, each individual can also find themselves in a majority language group—but, in a minority caste group within that language group. A party that mobilizes a particular language group could find that another party acting in the name of a caste or regional group will attract not only speakers of the minority language group, but also some speakers of the majority language.

The fragmentation of the DMK’s support base and the Tamil Nadu electorate as a whole is partly a result of the constitutional recognition of cross cutting caste cleavages. During the late 1970’s and early 1980’s the DMK support base was fractured by the emergence of the Patali Makal Katchi (PMK), a party representing the Vanniyars, an intermediate caste group concentrated in the northern districts of Tamil Nadu. The PMK claimed that educationally “forward” castes were monopolizing access to the jobs and educational places reserved for the OBCs. The party demanded that a portion of the OBC reservation be allocated for especially backward castes. Having secured this demand, it has since successfully mobilized the Vanniyar vote and entered into coalitions both at the state and national level.

It is also worth noting the contexts in which Tamil Nadu parties have taken up the Sri Lankan Tamil issue. Sankaran Krishna’s analysis of India’s intervention in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict shows convincingly how Tamil Nadu political leaders’ advocacy of the Sri Lankan Tamil issue was guided by the central government’s changing policy. During the 1970’s, as the confrontation between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil representatives escalated, the Indian government pursued a policy of non-intervention and kept up cordial relations with the Sri Lankan government. By the early 1980’s, however, India was increasingly concerned by the growing

United States influence in Sri Lanka, particularly in relation to the strategically valuable Trincomalee harbour. According to Krishna, Indira Gandhi's government decided to use the Tamil issue to intervene and followed a twin track policy to destabilize the Sri Lankan government. Tamil militants, armed and trained by India, would be used to militarily undermine the Sri Lankan government, while diplomatic pressure would also be exerted to force Sri Lanka into accepting a political solution to the ethnic conflict that would serve India's interests as well.

Krishna notes that while India was following a policy of non-intervention, Tamil Nadu's two major political parties, the DMK and the AIADMK, treated the Sri Lankan Tamil issue with caution. In 1981, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister MGR Ramachandran rebuked Appapillai Amirthalingam, the leader of the largest Sri Lankan Tamil Party, for raising the anti-Tamil violence and discrimination of the Sinhalese government at an international Tamil Research conference being held at Madurai in Tamil Nadu. The Chief Minister reminded Amirthalingam that the Conference was an inappropriate place to raise political issues and expressed the Tamil Nadu government's desire to maintain friendly relations with all neighbouring countries and governments (Krishna 1999, 95). By 1984, however, when India was actively training Tamil militants, the leaders of the DMK and AIADMK were publicly courting Tamil militant leaders. Following the LTTE's assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, both the DMK and the AIADMK have adopted a neutral, if at times hostile, attitude towards the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Tamil issue as a whole. In recent years, however, smaller parties like the MDMK and the PMK have become outspoken champions of the Sri Lankan Tamil issue. According to Narendra Subramanain, both parties took up the issue as a way of differentiating themselves from the mainstream DMK, and their postures "seem more likely to underscore their claims to revitalize assertive populism than to promote a sharply exclusionary or irredentist politics" (Subramanian 1999, 222).

PARTY POLITICS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ETHNIC POLARIZATION IN SRI LANKA

Unencumbered by the compulsions of mobilizing and sustaining an island-wide anti-colonial campaign, Sri Lankan political leaders fell naturally into courting specifically ethnic constituencies. As in India, general election campaigns in the colonial period relied on the particularities of the candidates' caste, religion and local connections. Unlike in India, however, there was no overarching political program or party through which local magnates could pursue his or her political ambitions. As such, politicians at the national level

aggregated themselves into more or less fractious ethnic groups that congealed in the years before independence into Sinhalese, Tamil and a less cohesive Muslim group. The apparent ethnic cohesion was undermined by continuing disputes between Kandyan and Low Country Sinhalese, between eastern and northern Tamils, and between Colombo and eastern Muslims to name but a few of the divisions that cut across each of the groups. There was, however, a conflict between representatives of Tamils and the Sinhalese in Jaffna that in many ways prefigured the later ethnic conflict.

In the colonial period, Sri Lanka's Jaffna Tamils were over-represented in the colonial administration. A scarcity of land on the peninsula, along with relative wealth and the presence of American Missionaries gave the peninsula an early lead in English education. Tamils from the peninsula found their way in large number not just into the Ceylon civil service, but also migrated to Malaysia where they were employed as white-collar workers in the British administration until the program of Malaysianization began in the 1930's. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Sri Lankan Tamil representatives thought of themselves on equal terms with the Sinhalese as one of the founding races of the island. This resulted partly from their over-representation in the civil service, but also because of the system of "communal representation." Following the administrative unification of the island in 1833, the British introduced wide-ranging reforms including a central Legislative Council that would include some native representatives. The representatives were chosen to represent each of the major communal groups – Low country Sinhalese, Kandyans, Ceylon Tamils, Muslims, Burghers and the local British – rather than territorial units.

During the 1920s it became clear that there would be a change towards territorial representation with an extension of the franchise. From this point onwards, Ceylon Tamil representatives became aware of the political implications of their numerical minority and pressed both the British and their Sinhalese counterparts for a greater weighting to be given to minority representatives. Just before independence, a Sri Lankan Tamil leader, G.G. Ponnambalam, made a demand for a complex set of constitutional safeguards and vetoes that would give the combined minorities and the majority equal representation. Although the proposal won some support in the Jaffna peninsula, most Tamil representatives, especially those from the eastern province, rejected the demand. In 1947, representatives from all communities voted to accept a unitary, majoritarian constitution that contained some provisions to safeguard minority rights.

In 1956, as previously discussed, Sri Lankan politics was overtaken by a majoritarian Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. Although caste mobilization and patron client networks continued to shape electoral behaviour, the claims of

Sinhala Buddhist nationalism became the dominant rhetoric through which mainstream Sinhala politicians mobilized support. Just as caste was subsumed by the rhetoric of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, the Federal Party's construction of a defensive Tamil nationalism also subsumed the socially significant differences of caste and region. The arguments developed by James Manor and Kanchan Chandra are helpful in understanding the political consolidation of the Tamil and Sinhala ethnic identities. Political power is effectively centralized in the central government, while the unitary constitution recognises only the Buddhist identity. As such, the central political question facing Sri Lankan voters and political actors regarding Sinhala and Tamil ethnic groups relates to the extent to which power is centralized. While Sinhala political actors and voters have material and ideological interests in a centralized and unitary state, Tamil actors can only reliably access state patronage within an autonomous Tamil unit. Regional and caste interests within both ethnic communities are effectively subsumed as they cannot be pursued outside of the larger ethnic group.

CONCLUSION

The present paper represents the outlines of my work so far in tracing the very different trajectories of Sri Lankan and Indian Tamil nationalisms. It is clear that weak party structures are central to explaining the escalation of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Nehru's management of the language question depended on his secure hold over the Congress party and a developed ideology of civic nationalism that allowed him to contain the opposition of Hindi advocates. The groups demanding "Sinhala Only" were very similar to the middle class job hunters and place hunters, who were behind the demands for linguistic states and for Hindi in India. To some extent, the Congress party could contain and manage these demands, while federal structures later worked to undermine the unity of linguistic groups. In Sri Lanka, however, weak, undisciplined, and disorganised parties undermined Sinhala party leaders who tried to accommodate both Tamil and Sinhala demands. Sinhala party leaders who tried to reach an accommodation with Tamil leaders were vulnerable to dissension from within their own parties and from the opposition benches. The failure to reach an accommodation with the Tamil leaders further consolidated the overarching Tamil identity at the expense of smaller caste and regional identities.

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Women, Rice, and Ritual

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As early as the 1960's researchers began to ask why Southeast Asian women enjoyed such a high degree of gender equality compared to the women of other Asian countries. Many have responded citing wet rice agriculture and the equal division of labor between men and women in rural Southeast Asia as the primary reason for the differing levels of equality seen across Southeast Asia. While this is a well-supported argument, ethnographic evidence collected by anthropologist Jane Hanks in the 1950's suggests that Thai gender equality is more than a product of divided labor, and may be due to the animistic worship of the Rice Goddess and her importance in Southeast Asian rice cultivation. Hanks' data illustrates that the rites and rituals associated with the Rice Goddess mirror the acts and services done for women during pregnancy and birth, and that Thai farmers believe women embody the Goddess' powers of soul restoration and nourishment. This paper will argue that these similarities and the respect that they invoke from the male community have been reflected in the treatment of Thai women throughout the twentieth century and are a significant causal factor in Southeast Asian gender roles.

Jane Hanks, now ninety-eight years old, has been one of the predominant anthropologists and contributors to our knowledge of Thai culture. While working with Jane over the last few years – helping her to organize her fieldnotes and records, she and I spoke at length about the women in her work. Her manuscript, *Maternity and its Rituals in Bang Chan*, documents many of those same women and the very real link between wet rice agriculture and gender relations in Thailand. This paper is written in tribute to Jane for her dedication to the women of Thailand and academia.

Across Southeast Asia, rice cultivation is a predominantly peasant occupation. In a cross-cultural study of peasant societies, Goldschmidt and Kunkel concluded that while male dominance is a general feature of peasant societies, it is relatively absent in Southeast Asia (Goldschmidt 1971, 563).[9]

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[9] For further discussion of the comparatively high degree of gender equality in Thailand see: Pongsapich 1975, Hanasuta 1975, Meesook 1976, and Prachuabmoh 1986.

The authors attribute this to the availability of new land and the absence of strong, traditional, central governments. Mick Moore, however, has refuted this conclusion, arguing that it was the physical environment and prevalence of wet rice cultivation that resulted in the relatively equal status of men and women in Southeast Asian societies. Labor contributions from men and women in rice agriculture, Moore argues, are more equal and therefore result in a higher degree of sexual interdependence than in the case of other grains, where heavy plowing, which is always men's work, amounts to a larger portion of the total labor inputs (Moore 1995).

Still others have argued that women were economically active in farm labor because it allowed them to tend to domestic responsibilities at the same time. Men were less burdened with domestic responsibilities and free to work further from home (Meesook 1976, 18). On orchards and plantations, women were responsible for tending to the trees, as well as for all clearing and trimming. In fishing communities, women collected the fish after the boats returned and were responsible for the proper storage of the catch. Even among the upper classes women made frequent financial contributions to the family through crafts and artwork. They also acted as the "landladies" of their husbands' properties, managing all expenses and repairs, and collecting all the returns (Bunlu'a Thepphayasuwan 1976, 5).

While the cooperative nature of wet rice cultivation and labor may have contributed to the relatively high degree of gender equality in Thailand, labor equity alone cannot adequately explain why Thai women are more highly regarded and well treated compared to women of many other wet rice cultivating Asian countries (Bunlu'a Thepphayasuwan 1975, 4; Hanks 1963; Hanks, personal communication). However, when the theory of labor equity is combined with the reverence for the Rice Goddess evidenced in Thai culture, there emerges a more direct link between wet rice cultivation and contemporary Thai gender roles. This is supported by the fact that Thai women occupy the highest status and receive the greatest reverence during pregnancy and childbirth. Coincidentally, these are also the times in which they are said to be most akin and attuned to the powers of the Rice Goddess and offer the greatest benefit to the society as a whole.

THE ROLES OF RICE AND THE RICE GODDESS

The fact that women are most highly regarded during these periods lessens the likelihood that their status resulted merely from their workload, for these life events emphasize female attributes and abilities extraneous to agricultural productivity. Rather, the status held by women on a daily basis likely results from the unique powers that women are believed to possess as a result of their

fertility. It is during pregnancy and childbirth that women are believed to gain the ability to nurture souls in the manner that the Rice Goddess cares for rice, and during which they enter a pristine state of beauty and sensitivity that requires tending, care and respect (Howe 1991; Nakornthap 1990; Hanks 1963). The connection between women and the Rice Goddess, and its influence on gender relations, is even more viable when we consider the overwhelming importance of rice and the Rice Goddess in the history of Southeast Asia.

Historically, rice has been the primary food source throughout Southeast Asia and its cultivation has had a significant influence over the lifestyles, belief systems, and social hierarchy of the region's peasant populations. Justus M. van der Kroef noted that in Java rice was not only the most loved food, but that the "tradition, religion, and law of many ethnic groups were inextricably intertwined with it" (van der Kroef 1952, 49). Because of its revered place in Javanese life, he argues it is understandable that many Indonesians regard rice as a miraculous gift from the gods (*Ibid.*, 49). Many researchers of Thai peasants have remarked on the fundamental beliefs among Thai citizens that rice possesses a life spirit, that man's body is itself rice, and that eating rice directly renews the body (Hanks 1972; Goldschmidt 1971; Tambiah 1970; Hanks 1963).

In addition to sowing, reaping and threshing the rice crop, the female is in control of the agricultural rites associated with the Rice Goddess (Bunlu'a Thepphayasuwan 1975, 5; Hanks 1963). Though men are required to make offerings, it is the women who are directly responsible for the *khwan* (soul) of the Rice Goddess (Hanks 1963). Belief in the Rice Goddess, called Me/Ma/Mae Posop (Thailand) or Dewi Sri (Indonesia), is an animist belief that originated in early Southeast Asian peasant societies before the introduction of Buddhist, Hindu, or Muslim doctrines. The Rice Goddess is believed to be the guardian of mankind and one of the spirits associated with agriculture that farmers must venerate to ensure harmony and avert disaster. In both Thailand and Indonesia the Rice Goddess cares for mankind and rice alike, just as human females protect children, rice crops, and the elderly, through their nourishment, nurturance, and by recovering souls lost during times of crisis (Howe 1991; Hanks 1963).

During her fieldwork in Bang Chan, Jane Hanks gathered first hand accounts documenting the link between women, the Rice Goddess and rice agriculture. In 1953-54 Bang Chan was a small rice-farming village of about 1700 people, in which Buddhism, Hindu, Islam and spiritual myths from China and India had been consistent sources of influence. One of the predominant beliefs that Hanks found in all areas of Thai life was the notion that the human body, along with every animal, plant, mineral and, therefore,

every food, was made up of four elements: earth, fire, water, and wind (Hanks 1963, 19). Rice, however, was the most important food for sustenance, strength and spiritual safety (Hanks 1972; Hanks 1963).

According to Hanks' discussions with Thai rice farmers, one's diet did more than sustain them; it became them (Hanks 1972; Hanks 1963). The body itself was believed to be made from rice and babies were believed to grow in their mothers' stomachs, eating the food that their mothers had eaten. As a result, the tissues, skin and all parts of the human body are, in fact, rice (Hanks 1963, 31). Unlike other foods that affect the balance of the four essential elements, rice was safe and had no disturbing effects. Above all things, however, rice nourished the human soul (*khwan*), because each grain contained a part of the *khwan* of the divine Rice Mother (*Ibid.*, 20).

Rice, like the woman, was never more important than during the birth cycle; and likewise the Rice Mother was never more important than during the rice cycle (*Ibid.*). According to Hanks' informants conception occurred when the *khwan* flew into the womb of a woman during intercourse (*Ibid.*, 30). A priest in Bang Chan emphasized to Hanks that during this time a father and mother are equally important "because there is no birth in the world without both. An infant is the product of both sexes" (*Ibid.*, 30). Following this implantation of the soul, the food eaten by the mother is believed to be "transformed into blood" and begins to build the baby who "sits on the mother's feces while her newly eaten foods packed closely on its head" (*Ibid.*, 31).

Hanks illustrates that during pregnancy, women are treated with extreme care and compassion. Particular attention is paid to women's food cravings lest she eat anything that could disturb the *khwan* of the baby. According to the Bang Chan peasants, during pregnancy a baby's skin is as soft as cotton. To prevent burning the baby, the mother must resist cravings for hot-tasting, sweet, or peppery foods (*Ibid.*, 32). In a similar manner residents believed that when the grains in the rice stalks begin to fill out in the fields, Me Posop is "pregnant" and must be "weak, hungry and uneasy" (*Ibid.*, 35). Furthermore they believed that she must also be "eager to taste sour and sweet foods" because she "is a woman and beautiful in her pregnancy" (*Ibid.*, 35). To satisfy the Rice Goddess the farmers of Bang Chan brought her the foods safe for a pregnant woman to eat, such as bananas, sugar cane, young taro, cakes and citrus fruit. Furthermore they brought "things dear to women" such as new clothing, perfume, face powder, hair lotion and a mirror (*Ibid.*, 36).

As Hanks' research illustrates, the Rice Goddess and women shared tastes, desires and attributes during their respective pregnancies. However, the female's role in guarding the *khwan* of the Rice Goddess changed during and after her pregnancy in part because of the envy that the power and beauty of

pregnant women evoke in Thai society. In the annual harvest ritual, when women ritually escorted the goddess from the field to the rice bin, Hanks notes that participation was forbidden to a pregnant woman because it was believed that the Rice Goddess would be inevitably jealous of the woman's heightened beauty and would be malevolent (*Ibid.*, 36). The villagers worried also that being "emotionally weak and easily upset, the pregnant women might be frightened by seeing the Goddess and therefore lose her own *khwan*" (*Ibid.*, 36). While this jealousy may be a reflection of the high esteem that Thai peasants have for pregnant women and fertility, it also indicates that pregnant women have not yet reached their full potential as mothers and nurturers for they still have to undergo childbirth and the fire-rest.

The fire-rest is a significant ceremony following childbirth during which a woman ritually transitions from a young woman to a mother. Thai peasants believed that this process is the same undergone by rice during the cooking process when it becomes capable of nourishment (*Ibid.*). The fire-rest is one of the series of rites in the life cycle that marks the course of an individual from birth to death. During the fire rest the female was required to lie next to a fire for a predetermined number of days. This ritual traditionally followed childbirth to assure that the uterus was dry and that the woman was fully prepared to enter the next stage of her life (*Ibid.*, 71-72). According to a Bang Chan midwife it is only through the consecrated fire that a woman can formally achieve full maturity, and it is only then that she is believed to become s*uk* (cooked, ripe, mature) (*Ibid.*, 75). The fire strengthens and perfects the woman as a compassionate being, enabling her to assume the responsibilities of true womanhood and making her the nourisher that she was born to become.

The new powers bestowed upon the woman by childbirth and the fire make her the potent guardian of both children's souls and those of rice. This is why mature women are responsible for conducting the rites for the maintenance of the immature *khwan* of both children and rice (*Ibid.*, 75). The following is taken from Hanks' notes:

> A woman handled a rice *khwan* by inviting the young Rice Goddess to stay and grow in the field, and by transporting to the house the child-like seed that only next year would grow to maturity. For these rites a woman used an incantation if she knew one. That she could handle the rice *khwan* by speaking "extemporaneously" indicated that her mere words were enough. If no one else were available, a non-*suk* woman could call the *khwan* of a child or of the Rice Mother by reason of her in-born female potency…

As noted by Hanks, the Thai saw women and fertility, as well as the crucial role that women play in the survival and growth of children, as essential to the fertility of the fields. Their maternal behavior served as a model for the type of care that should be extended to young rice, in order for it to growth healthy and strong. Finally, a woman's needs during pregnancy revealed the secret needs of the Rice Goddess as she bore her own young. As a result, both women and the Rice Goddess were creatures deserving of care and respect.

CONTEMPORARY THAILAND

According to Thailand's National Culture Commission, the rites and rituals associated with rice cultivation have yet to completely disappear from popular practice (Nakornthap 1990). As late as the 1990's many Thai peasant farmers still insisted that the times when the rice "begins to be pregnant," as well as when it begins to seed, are the times of greatest crisis in the life of the plant (Nakornthap 1990, 28). To appease the shock, farmers continue to conduct a ceremony (*tham khwan)* to strengthen the soul of the plant. During this ceremony a ripe banana cut up into small pieces, an orange (or any citrus fruit for it is believed that women in early pregnancy crave citrus fruit), and a few pieces of sugar cane are placed in a small leaf cup (*krathong*) (*Ibid.*, 28-29). The cup is put into a course bamboo basket along with a tray where a comb and toilet powders are placed. Peasant farmers hang the cup on the end of a flag post in the field as an offering to the Rice Goddess (*Ibid.*, 29). Then the peasant farmer takes a small offering of the toilet powder and some perfumed ointment and smears them on a leaf of the rice plant. He then proceeds to comb the plant as if he were dressing the hair of the Rice Mother. In conclusion, the farmer makes a wish that the Rice Mother will thrive free of danger by his offerings (*Ibid.*, 29).

A number of post-harvest rituals still persist in rural Thailand to honor the Rice Goddess. The ears of paddy that remain in the field after harvesting are always gathered, for they are believed to represent the spirit of the Rice Mother. The gathering is called "the invitation of Me Posop" (*Ibid.*, 29). Before picking the remaining ears the gatherer says:

> O! Me Posop, please come and stay in the barn. Don't stay in the field to be gnawed by mice or pecked by birds. Please go to a happy place to nourish your children. Please come, dear Me Posop, kooh.

This invocation is followed by offerings to Me Posop of boiled rice, boiled duck eggs, sweets and fruits – food typically prepared for a holy or ordained

person who is not, necessarily, a monk. All of the rice remaining on the threshing floor is then picked up and referred to as Me Posop's rice or the spirit of rice (*Ibid.*, 29). A doll is then made from the rice straw and mixed with ears of paddy that have been gathered from the field. When the sowing of the rice begins in the rainy season, the doll is ceremoniously destroyed and the rice from the ears of the paddy in the doll and Me Posop's rice are mixed nominally with the other paddy that is to be sown. Modern Thai peasants believe that by preparing this mixture, the seeds sown will thrive (*Ibid.*, 29).

CONCLUSION

In Thailand, rice cultivation represents a cooperative endeavor between the people and the gods, the material and the essence, and ultimately the male and the female. Each party in these dichotomies has separate but equally valuable duties in the ritualistic and agricultural processes of rice cultivation. While there is less evidence of gender equality outside of Thailand, the historically widespread nature of similar agricultural rites and traditions surrounding the Rice Goddess, which also seem to have promoted equality, corroborate their historical significance. Furthermore, the continued practice of these rites suggests that their influence may have been powerful enough to establish the gender equality remarked upon by scholars of Thai culture.

However, in order to accept the hypothesis that traditional beliefs and agricultural rites underlie the modern social structure and that regard for human females was reinforced by the worship of the Rice Goddess, we need to find direct references in popular culture to traditional life and belief systems. This evidence might lie in consumer markets, popular music, artwork, literature, or perhaps simply colloquial sayings and references. Further research in these fields is necessary in order to substantiate the claims made here that the status of females in Southeast Asia originated in the world of wet-rice agriculture, where the Rice Goddess reigned supreme, and fertility, nurturance and nourishment were the greatest goods a community could possess.

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Freedom in the Suicidal Act: A Political and Gendered Reading of Two Kabuki Plays

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On the surface, ritual suicide in Japanese theatre seems to be a highly codified and controlled presentation in which the ultimate end is the same for any character. Yet, underneath, a complex nexus of signs play out upon an actor's body engaged in *seppuku* or *jigai* (ritual suicide). Scholarship on kabuki has traditionally focused on the male samurai version of ritual suicide, but an examination of how kabuki depicts female suicide is equally insightful. In its multitudinous presentations on the Japanese stage, ritual suicide provides a stable platform from which one can draw comparisons concerning class, gender and even sexuality. In these contexts, suicide in kabuki functions ironically as both the supreme punishment and ultimate escape.

Two traditional kabuki plays serve as the basis of my comparative analysis: *Kanadehon Chushingura* (1748)[10], a classic samurai story, and *Mirror Mountain: A Women's Treasury of Loyalty* (1782)[11], sometimes problematically referred to as "the female *Chushingura.*" Drawing primarily on the works of James Brandon, Jennifer Robertson, and Samuel Leiter, I consider the following questions: 1) Is there any equality, both in terms of class and gender, to be found in suicide that is not available in life? 2) How

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[10] *Kanadehon Chushingura* was originally conceived for the puppet theatre. Its immense popularity ultimately led to several versions of the play for the kabuki stage. The English-language text analyzed in this paper is titled *The Forty-Seven Samurai*. It was created collaboratively by James Brandon and several other scholars during a special year-long program at the University of Hawaii from 1978-1979. For more information on the *Chushingura* story, its importance to the kabuki, and puppet theatre tradition and the formation of this particular version, see James Brandon's comprehensive book, *Chushingura: Studies in Kabuki and the Puppet Theater* (1982).

[11] *Mirror Mountain* was also originally created for the puppet theatre in 1782 by Yo Yotai. It was adapted for the kabuki stage the following year.

does suicide on the kabuki stage challenge or re-inscribe gender norms? I argue that although women did not share the same status as men in the text of these plays (or in the audience, for that matter), the end of life marks a transcendence of the physical and social mores governing a corporeal body. Thus, in death, on a purely physical level, a certain type of equality is possible or even sought after. However, separate, gendered treatment of suicide is not ultimately equal. The survivors both onstage and off are left with a potential political message from the dead, but no voice or body to instill that message with additional strength.

Jennifer Robertson notes that using suicide as a political message has a historical tradition in Japan (Robertson 1999, 30). Much of what Robertson ascribes to the political power of the suicide notes left by lesbian suicide participants is equally applicable to the plays analyzed here. She describes the suicide letters of lesbian partners as pleas for "sexual citizenship" (*Ibid.*, 12-13). I maintain that the performance and text of kabuki plays depicting suicide are imbued with a similar power. The call for justice and equality in the plays may not be as overt or distinctly sexual, but they can be read as similarly potent messages. Granted, the specific political intentions of the playwrights and theatre owners who staged the plays can never be ascertained. However, the political *effects* and gender messages of suicide onstage call for further examination. *Chushingura* and *Mirror Mountain* provide constructive foci for such an analysis.

Samuel Leiter characterizes the treatment of women in kabuki as surprisingly fair and respectful (Leiter 2002). Although his conclusion is certainly subject to debate, Leiter's subsequent analysis is relevant. He attributes such fairness to the need to appease audiences. According to his reasoning, kabuki audiences, a majority of which were made up of women during the Edo period, demanded fully-rounded characters onstage. Presented with such mirrors of themselves onstage, Leiter posits that female audience members were more likely to appreciate characters with whom they could empathize (*Ibid*., 212). If Leiter is correct, and these characters were worthy of an audience's empathy in life, would they not also be worthy in death?

Hence, a close reading of *Chushingura* and *Mirror Mountain* requires that one consider the potential link and political significance between the suicides depicted onstage and occurrence of suicide in real life. Leiter provides some sense of the environment at the time these plays were first performed. He states: "The feudal society that produced kabuki was a pressure cooker that often drove people to kill themselves when they could not abide by strict ethical standards" (*Ibid.*, 111). Of course, any speculation on the after effects of a performance enters the thorny territory of audience reception. Those audience members who might have emulated what they saw could not express their opinion on the matter unless they happened to leave a suicide

note. But an empathetic audience at least begs the question of who was imitating whom. The Tokugawa shogunate (1603-1867) seems to have been motivated by similar questions when it banned all depiction of double-suicide plays in 1723 (Shively 1982, 25).

James Brandon notes in his analysis of kabuki that, "past events are merely used as starting points in the creation of theatrical fantasies" (Brandon and Leiter 2002, 59). Indeed, the plays analyzed here are said to be inspired by actual events (Shively 1982, 33-44; Brandon and Leiter 1982, 174). In *Chushingura*, audiences learned from the play that to sacrifice one's life can be beautiful – enacting onstage what Brandon has referred to as the mixture of the cruel and beautiful that is uniquely kabuki. This aesthetic appreciation and empathetic response on the part of the audience, translated - at least in part - into a tacit social acceptance of suicide.

In the case of *Chushingura*, the events onstage have been linked directly to what has been called the Ako Vendetta of 1701-1703. The narrative of the play closely follows the structure of a typical revenge story. Lord Hangan, a samurai, is provoked into an altercation with his rival of higher rank, Moronao, after Moronao failed to seduce Kaoyo, Hangan's wife. As fighting within the palace walls is prohibited, Moronao now has the grounds to charge Hangan with a capital offense, a situation Moronao quickly exploits. The appropriate means of punishment for a samurai is *seppuku*. Thus, Hangan is to take his own life in the presence of Moronao's underlings as a result of his behavior. Absent from this ritual until the last moment is Hangan's loyal retainer, Yuranosuke. Yuranosuke appears only in time to see his master die and infer from Hangan's last gasps that Yuranosuke should avenge his death. Ultimately Yuranosuke achieves this end, plunging the same dagger his master used for *seppuku* into the breast of Moronao. Moronao is subsequently decapitated and the retainers revel in the "mingled happiness and grief" that the cycle of death and revenge has induced (Brandon et al. 1982, 221). *Chushingura* upholds the theme that duty (*giri*) is to come before human life and feeling (*ninjo*). This coupling of the tropes of suicide and duty-bound vengeance was common within kabuki plays, and is also explored in *Mirror Mountain*.

The popularity of the play is attributed to its unabashed praise of the samurai ideal. The code of behavior (*bushido*) that had lost its luster by 1748 was restored to prominence through the actions of the characters in *Chushingura*, who reinforced the interconnection between drama and society. In his essay about the variations of the *Chushingura* story, Donald Keene stresses the important effects of the play in imperial Japanese society. "For [the audience] *Kanadehon Chushingura* was the grand summation of ideals which even the most unmartial Japanese of the Tokugawa period felt were *his* own. The annual performances of the play strengthened this conviction: faith

in the samurai ideals was renewed by ritual participation in this massive ceremony" (Keene 1982, 11; italics added). Along with other codified behaviors, suicide was depicted as a real option when duty called for it. Significantly, it was not only a behavior for members of the samurai class, but due to its dramatic presentation in a public forum open to people of various classes, suicide was presented as a viable choice for men and women of all societal distinctions.

Keene's use of the male pronoun in the quote above is not incidental. The patriarchal attitudes often displayed by the characters onstage can be linked to yet another aspect of kabuki – the lack of equal consideration of women in kabuki scholarship. Although this trend has been somewhat abated more recently by Keene himself and others, it seems prevalent in earlier publications. Thus, I propose an important variation on Keene's statement: that the female characters portrayed in *Chushingura* and *Mirror Mountain* were a rich source of ideals that a female audience member might feel were *her* own.

Within the Brandon translation of *Chushingura*, Lady Kaoyo, Hangan's wife, lacks the agency that her husband and other male characters possess. As a widow, she is condemned to a life of religious contemplation. The play informs the reader that "she will pray as a nun, till her end" (Brandon et al. 1982, 196). Like Hangan, Lady Kaoyo also conducts a ritual of loss upon learning of her husband's death, but she is only to cut her hair in preparation for the nunnery, not her own throat. Yet when, in spite of her assigned fate, she moves to grab the dagger that killed her husband and take her own life, the stage directions characterize her impulse as rising "as if to follow her husband" (*Ibid.*, 197). Even here, at her moment of greatest autonomy, the agency of her action is further undermined by Yuranosuke's "commanding gesture" to which she "falls back weakly" (*Ibid.*, 197). What audiences of the Tokugawa era might interpret as an expression of her fidelity to her husband, serves as a stark reminder of her lack of status within the samurai world.

Female characters also functioned as convenient scapegoats for the ruling order when trouble descended upon the kabuki world. This trope is echoed specifically within the text of both *Chushingura* and *Mirror Mountain*. Just prior to her banishment to the nunnery, Lady Kaoyo exclaims, "I think of why my husband had to die, and that I was the cause" (*Ibid.*, 196). Similarly, *Mirror Mountain* reminds the audience of gender inequalities in the words of Lady Onoe. She complains to her maidservant, "Obviously since your master is a woman, you feel that there is no need to respect her orders" (Oshima 2002, 200).

Ironically there is a certain type of gender equality not available in life that is made manifest in death. The strictures of the samurai code, though in operation during suicide, could not fully contain the moment of self-inflicted

death. There is, of course, the biological finality to consider. Simply put the person, male or female, ceases to exist. Of course in performance an actor returns home at the end of the play in which he/she commits suicide. But insofar as art imitates life, these same choices were made available to real Japanese men and women, many of whom witnessed suicide as a legitimate and sometimes justified option in kabuki performances.

The death of Lady Onoe in *Mirror Mountain* is an explicit expression of the desire to escape the constraints imposed by feudal society. In what has come to be called the female *Chushingura*, *Mirror Mountain* is also centered on a rivalry between members of unequal status and features a similar plot to *Chushingura*. However, the moniker for the play is troubling in that it reinforces the notion that Japanese women are passive or somehow derivative from male initiators. A closer reading of *Mirror Mountain* reveals that simply re-gendering the more famous *Chushingura* title elides the innate complexity and potential significance of the play.

Unlike *Chushingura,* the action of the play takes place entirely within the ladies' court. It clearly portrays a female-dominated world in which even male gender privilege can be trumped by class distinctions given the appropriate circumstances. The sole male present at the outset of the play, Motome, objects to the brewing altercation between two of the lead characters of the play, Lady Iwafuji and Lady Onoe. Yet despite his vocal opprobrium, Motome is quickly put in his place by Lady Iwafuji. She tells him in no uncertain terms: "The women's quarters are the responsibility of the chief-lady-in-waiting and, with all due respect, this is not your domain" (Oshima 2002, 180). Thus, the power of a discrete homosocial space is invoked, and Motome wisely refrains from further comment.

Some parallels to *Chushingura* can be drawn from the remainder of the narrative structure of *Mirror Mountain*. Lady Onoe is a commoner put into the care of the court to improve her marriage prospects. Lady Iwafuji, the "senior lady-in-waiting to the clan," resents Onoe's encroachment into a world inhabited mainly by women from samurai bloodlines (*Ibid.*, 176). Iwafuji's displeasure peaks when she strikes Onoe with a dirty sandal, an attack on strict standards of cleanliness and dignity that Onoe cannot bear. When Onoe is also blamed by Iwafuji for the theft of a sacred Buddhist image, Onoe is driven to suicide. Just before committing the act she proclaims: "I may be a woman, but I serve in a samurai mansion and must live by its values" (*Ibid.*, 203). Here Onoe calls attention to her two most distinct class and gender markers in the same sentence. Implicit in her statement is an acknowledgement of the lesser strength and status of women and a reconfirmation of the privilege of the samurai class.

Mirror Mountain echoes Yuranosuke's role in *Chushingura* by presenting a female protagonist in the character of Ohatsu, Onoe's loyal maidservant.

Upon witnessing Onoe's death, Ohatsu, like Yuranosuke, swears to seek revenge. The play implies that these noble sentiments are the natural by-product of her birth into a samurai family. The plot culminates in Iwafuji's death at the hands of Ohatsu and her ascension to Onoe's former place in the household.

The absence of patriarchal characters in the major onstage conflict of *Mirror Mountain*, however, does not negate their ultimate effect. In fact, their lack of equal representation in terms of stage time makes male interference more pronounced when it occurs. For example, it is Danjo, Iwafuji's evil-plotting brother and emissary from the samurai lord, who instigates Onoe's beating and humiliation at the hands of Iwafuji. He pronounces: "This incident is all Onoe's responsibility. Iwafuji should act accordingly and as emissary *I will supervise*" (*Ibid.* 190; italics added). The female characters also directly refer to the *Chushingura* story as a guide for their decisions (*Ibid.*, 198). When Ohatsu fears that Onoe is contemplating suicide, the maidservant references Hangan of the famous play *Chushingura* to ascertain if Onoe intends to imitate his fatal action.

Perhaps the most significant effect of the patriarchal samurai code on the women of *Mirror Mountain* is also the least obvious. Despite her suspicion that Onoe is about to kill herself, Ohatsu leaves her only when Onoe invokes the master/servant dichotomy that is the law of the samurai world. Onoe threatens to dismiss Ohatsu from her service unless she will deliver a suicide letter to Onoe's mother. Though Ohatsu's asides to the audience indicate that she fears for Onoe's life, she acquiesces to her lady's demands and reassumes her designated role in the feudal hierarchy. Here again, as in *Chushingura*, an adherence to duty prevails over any allegiance to human emotion.

Similar to Lady Kaoyo's suicide attempt in *Chushingura*, Ohatsu's wish to "follow [Onoe] in death and be [her] servant in the world beyond" is thwarted by a protective male character – the formerly disgraced Motome in this instance (*Ibid.*, 211). Although a traditional interpretation might allow that Motome "saves" Ohatsu's life, one must ask if she needs saving? In *Chushingura*, Lord Hangan certainly did not receive the same consideration. It is also noteworthy that, through his gallant action, Motome is restored to proper status after his earlier humiliation in the ladies' domain.

The reestablishment of feudal order also serves as the resolution to *Mirror Mountain*. By decree of the ruling samurai, Ohatsu becomes Onoe II and attains her former master's status. Though Ohatsu rises in rank, her ascension is subject to multiple interpretations. On the one hand, she becomes a member of a privileged class seemingly by virtue of her noble actions – her revelation of Lady' Iwafuji's wrongdoing and the revenge taken on Onoe's behalf. On the other hand, her actions alone were not the agent of change. Rather, the validation of that behavior by the patriarchal order assures her

good fortune. One must also wonder if Onoe II, as Ohatsu comes to be known, must now assume the passivity of her former master. Does a more traditionally feminine code of conduct necessarily accompany her new name?

Three distinct oppositional relationships become evident as a result of this gendered comparison between *Chushingura* and *Mirror Mountain*: those of the state versus the individual, emotion versus stoicism, and the public versus the private. First, one might question at whose discretion the suicides take place. Is it the state or the individual that makes the final decision? While the answer may seem self-evident in the case of Hangan, it is much more complicated in the case of Onoe. In *Chushingura*, Hangan's *seppuku* is witnessed and legitimized by representatives of the shogunate, while in *Mirror Mountain* Onoe is begged to reconsider her choice by Ohatsu. Thus, Hangan's suicide is inscribed within a ritual air of inevitability and honor to which Onoe does not have access. Yet, in a society which demands that individuals succumb to the dictates of rank and decorum, can Onoe's action be read as any more or less of a choice?

Second, Hangan's stoicism in death is honored by characters who express their approval within the play and, as noted above, his behavior was also highly respected by audiences in attendance. Brandon's stage directions reiterate this reverent attitude: "Although the pain is excruciating…, Hangan maintains the stoic decorum expected of a samurai" (Brandon et al. 1982, 194). These clues stand in stark contrast to what the narrator tells the audience about Onoe in her last moments of *Mirror Mountain*: "Despite herself, Onoe lets out a cry. She covers her mouth with her sleeve to muffle her voice. For a time, she weeps in secret" (Oshima 2002, 199). While stoicism is not inherently gendered, within these two plays it is clearly coded as masculine. Onoe's tears are depicted as signs of inevitable femininity in the face of adversity. However, it is not so simple to assign positive and negative value to these readings. Onoe's emotion serves multiple functions. It is simultaneously a blatant re-inscription of gender roles, yet it might also operate as a source of empathy for a largely female kabuki audience. Her tears and subsequent suicide certainly provide a complex feminine context in which to read Onoe's death, one in which the audience might just have uncovered the subtle precursors of what Robertson later deemed as cries for "sexual citizenship."

Lastly, the distinction of the public or private nature of the suicides in both plays should be examined. In *Chushingura*, it is the very presence of the state witnesses that validates Hangan's action. His honor in death is assured by following a codified procedure under the careful watch of his enemies. Paradoxically, although at the moment of Hangan's death Moranao gets exactly what he wants, in a way so too does Hangan by adhering to tradition. He insures his obedience to the samurai code and an honorable death by

invoking the name of his witness: “Lord Ishido, I ask that you witness and report my death” (Brandon et al. 1982, 190).

Conversely, Onoe shuns all attention and deflects Ohatsu’s concerned inquiries for the express purpose of maintaining her solitude. Immediately before her final act, “She looks out to make sure no one is around” (Oshima 2002, 207). The lack of witnesses upon death strips her suicide of the state legitimacy that is granted to Hangan. According to the samurai code, her death is no less justified than Hangan’s, for it follows in the aftermath of unbearable shame. Significantly, no character or scholar questions the morality of Onoe’s choice in the aftermath of her *jigai*. Yet her suicide is certainly not exalted as the paragon of virtue, as is Hangan’s, by fellow characters, audiences and scholars alike.

As a theatrical norm in Tokugawa Japan, suicide was a viable and honorable “choice” in response to variety of situations onstage. Audiences of *Chushingura* and *Mirror Mountain* were presented with male and female characters that made such choices. Thus, these kabuki plays depicted a degree of gender equality in the physical ending of life. Yet when considered in a context beyond the physical dimension, these acts were far more complex and much less equal. In *Mirror Mountain*, an inherent, if paradoxical, political message was relayed to the audience. The characters of Onoe and Ohatsu simultaneously accepted and transgressed the constraints of the samurai code inscribed in plays like *Chushingura*. By witnessing and perhaps empathizing with these characters and their choices, audience members were prompted to reconsider their own conditions.

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From Family Planning to Family Reunification: Reproducing Indian Diasporas

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Considering India's recent coverage on the cover of such widely-circulated magazines as Newsweek and TIME, it seems that India's star is rising, at least in the United States' public eye. In 2006, both magazines featured India-centered lead stories. On the cover of both magazines are images of Indian women, dressed in saris and inviting the reader to experience "the new India." On the cover of Newsweek, we have a flame-engulfed, sari-clad Indian beauty greeting the reader. TIME showcased a traditionally dressed Indian woman, replete with gold nose-ring, red and white sari, and *bindi*, wearing a telephone headset. Here, the Indian nation is represented as female, educated and Hindu (both in the Newsweek *pranaam*, the religiously-inflected greeting with folded hands, and the TIME bride). What is striking about these two magazine covers is the marriage of India's depiction as a site of culture and exotic religiosity with the markings of technology, modernity, and global mobility. Indeed, the TIME photo displays marriage quite literally, featuring a young woman dressed as a possible Hindu bride working as a telephone operator, presumably as an outsourced technical or customer service worker. In contrast to the media attention paid to the plight of the "missing" girl child in India, the declining status of women's health and the growing numbers of suicides by farmers, one might ask how this particular representation of not just India, but *Indian women* comes to capture popular Western imagination.

In a partial response prompted by these popular media depictions, my paper examines how gender and class mediate relationships in India's rise to "superpower status" and how they have shaped Indian diasporas in the United States. Such a perspective is an essential corrective to the much-publicized coverage of India's economic successes and global integration that takes both neo-liberal development and its growing exportable workforce into account without giving corresponding attention to the margins produced by these same processes. In particular, I am concerned with the ways in which women's bodies, through the politics of reproduction, have become the terrain on which

struggles over culture and national belonging are played out. To that end, I examine how the small family unit has emerged as both the site of female sexual regulation and as a marker of modernity. My analysis is drawn from examining two seemingly disparate sites: Indian population control policies that prioritize two-child families and the United States' immigration laws that privilege family-based migration. Both of these sites underscore the importance placed on the "new Indian woman," in contrast to the backward and illiterate Indian woman or the illegal and unproductive immigrant woman. Despite her modernity, this woman is still embedded in specific forms that have repercussions for the privileging of some women over others.

I therefore track representations of the valiant small family by drawing on Indian and American newspapers and immigration laws in the United States to argue that the focus on family planning embedded in India's development practice reflects the Indian state's intention to create "modern" citizens. In turn, traces of these intentions can be seen in the United States' immigration policies, which privilege those Indian bodies that add to the growth of a seemingly modern, productive, and global diaspora. I use a transnational feminist lens to argue that family planning in India is more than a state-led project aimed at controlling population pressures, but is also grounded in the politics of reproduction, with implications for gender, sexuality, and class that transcend national boundaries. Transnational feminism's focus on social and economic flows across geo-political entities breaks with existing conceptualizations of ideologies, cultural forms, and relationships of power within discrete national societies. Thus a transnational feminist analysis is particularly useful in pointing to how the overriding emphasis on small families in development and immigration policies can work to conceal inequalities rooted in class, caste, race, and gender.

While arguments linking women's bodies to achieving national objectives are not new, I am more interested in considering recent arguments in cultural and diaspora studies about the importance of sexual bodies in the maintenance of a middle-class, heterosexual, mobile Indian family unit (Parker et al. 1992; Radhakrishnan 1992; Yuval-Davis 1997; Werber and Yuval-Davis 1999). I argue that we must carefully examine how the modern family is reproduced, as it emerges both in the adoption of small family norms in India and through the social reproduction of the Indian diaspora entering the United States. By doing so, it is possible to gain insight into how transnational inequalities along lines of gender, class, caste, and race are produced and maintained. Inequalities continue even in the very sites celebrated as successes of neo-liberal modernity, such as India's decentralized family planning program and increased exportation of skilled workers to the United States.

In India as well as in the United States, prioritizing particular family forms works to obscure fractures along lines of caste, class and race. Such an exploration of how sexual reproduction shapes representations of so-called modern Indians becomes imperative in this historical moment of increasing connection between the United States and India. This is particularly important as the elevated profile of educated Indians as ideal workers, both as immigrants and outsourced labor, works to elide class differences within India as well throughout the diaspora. Moreover, much of the attention paid to these workers has focused on Indian men as primary H1-B visa holders, which are temporary technical work visas, or as tech workers in India. While women have played important roles as workers in both India and abroad, their role as both workers and reproducers of Indian culture and nationalism outside of India needs closer examination.

In order to foreground how women's bodies have become part of not just national discussions of development, but an important part of defining the "modern citizen" itself, I will first discuss how reproduction and sexuality have figured into the project of Indian modernization through a persistent focus on controlling population. Kalpana Ram's concept of "modern reproductive consciousness" is useful here (Ram 2001). Ram argues that when thinking about reproduction in India, we must examine the rhetoric and performance of reproductive control that not only affects marginal groups, but also produces new subjects of Indian modernity. These subjects of modernity include the "new Indian woman," as described by Rajeswari Sunder Rajan (1993) and Sangeeta Ray (2000). In particular, I argue that the modern reproductive consciousness of the Indian state works in part by drawing on the transnational diasporic subject as the imagined model for its development outcomes, at the expense of more marginal women and men.

In the second part of this paper, I examine how the reproduction of families reappears in United States immigration policy. Examining these points of discursive overlap between these two sites is crucial to theorizing how Indians are understood as productive and disciplined citizens, especially as they enter as temporary workers into the United States context of institutional inequalities affecting people of color and low-income communities. These immigration policies produce "model" United States immigrants through selective screening and restrictive visa regulations for Indians, which favor highly educated and skilled workers. I argue that this ideal Indian migrant is drawn from a similar set of discourses that shape what it means to be a developed subject in India, both of which rely on the reproduction of a particular family form. However, the increasingly diffuse "below the radar" forms of migration, which include domestic workers, family members on temporary visas, and undocumented migrants, have

challenged how difference is suppressed in the production of a family-centered, well-educated, middle-class Indian diaspora.

THE GENDERING OF DEVELOPMENT: FAMILY PLANNING AND REPRODUCTION IN INDIA

Since the turn of the twentieth century, population pressures have been central to India's political and social welfare objectives even before achieving its independence. Moving from British rule and through the work of neo-Malthusian groups during post-independence, the regulation of women's reproduction has been central to national development, particularly through family planning policies promoting contraceptive use (Srinivasan 1995; Anandhi 1998; Byres 1998; Visaria and Vijaylaxmi 1998; Tharu and Niranjana 2004). The link between population pressure and government investment in the prevention of food scarcity drove much of India's early development policy. The launch of the national family planning program in 1951 and the emphasis on smaller families in the five-year plans demonstrate the high political priority placed on population control. More recently, this ideal family has been reflected in the two-child campaign launched by national health officials starting in the 1970's, which reached particularly authoritarian heights during the Emergency Period of 1974-75, under the auspices of Indira Gandhi.

Following the backlash generated by the Emergency Period, the national government began a series of measures to reinvigorate the family planning program while attempting to distance itself from the repression recalled by the earlier policies. The Indian state's desire to create national subjects – rather than sectarian subjects divided along religious or caste lines – has come into conflict with those families that continue to have more than the prescribed two children. The state has tried to exercise reproductive regulation of these groups through upholding exclusions from government jobs and subsidies and encouraging cash incentives for sterilization. Through these measures the state has underscored its own investment in assuring that this marker of modern development, or small families, should be practiced by *all* citizens regardless of caste or creed. We might view this aspiration on the part of the state as a form of modern reproductive consciousness, which links discourses of fertility with larger discourses of state and citizenship, and "conflates the state's particular vision of reproduction and fertility with modernity itself," (Ram 2001, 84). Ram argues that this conflation works to disadvantage groups that do not conform to the family planning norm by marking them as not just "backwards," but as a threat to goals of the nation itself.

Such a reading of modern reproductive consciousness, or the promotion of smaller families orchestrated through individual decision-making rather than through measures to alleviate poverty and provide increased access to safe and reliable reproductive healthcare, must be read within the context of increasing neo-liberalization. The shift in state provision of welfare to the private sector comes as a result of economic reforms that followed the balance-of-payments crises of 1990-1991. Writing in Economic and Political Weekly, Raja Chelliah recounts the efforts of India's Prime Minister from 1991-1996, Narasimha Rao, to replace the state-led development model with reforms "that would transform India from a controlled closed economy into a fairly open economy in which not only would the private sector have a much enhanced role, but the market would be given the prime role in the allocation of resources" (Chelliah 1999). The reform efforts, ranging from the acceptance of structural adjustment programs with corresponding cuts in social service provisioning to the loosening of tariff and trade regulations, are based on the notion that liberalizing the economy will naturally lead to increased standards of living for all people, and generally emphasize private solutions over formerly state-led development. This change not only impacts the realm of economics, but is also seen in attending political and social forms of neo-liberalism whereby the state moves family welfare away from the public domain into the realm of the private (Harvey 2005). Here reproduction is tied not just to becoming a developed, nationally minded subject, but also to technologies of the self as modern and self-regulating (Spivak 1996).

Two relatively recent incidents point to the implications of the state's modern reproduction consciousness today: (1) the outcry over the release of the 2001 Indian Census results; and (2) the 2003 court decision regarding fertility-based restrictions on government jobs. First, Alaka Basu's examination of the furor over the release of the 2001 Indian Census results, which indicated a slightly higher fertility rate for Muslim populations than for Hindu, shows that despite calculation errors in the population tabulations, Hindu nationalists have been using the figures to condemn Muslim "over-fertility" as a threat to Hindus and other native "Indian" religious identities (i.e. those religious traditions that are not derived from Christianity or Islam) (Basu 2004). Due to in part to media misrepresentations of census data and the release of a report by demographer P. H. Reddy on behalf of the government-sponsored Population Research Center, which directly indicted Muslims for causing excess population growth, this focus on women's fertility and the reproduction of a minority group has provided ample fuel to the burning of Hindu nationalist sentiments in national and local debates. Here the reproduction of marginal groups has created dissonance within the project of nationalism and modernization, complicated by the state's intention to

create a national Indian identity (by promoting particular norms achieved most readily by the middle and upper classes) while also claiming to protect marginalized cultures.

Second, in July 2003 the Supreme Court of India upheld a Haryana law that restricts anyone with more than two children from holding particular positions in local government and abridges their right to run for such posts. Mohan Rao's editorial in the Economic and Political Weekly recounts the court decision which held that "disqualification on the right to contest an election for having more than two children does not contravene any fundamental right, nor does it cross the limits of reasonability. Rather, it is a disqualification conceptually devised in the national interest" (Rao 2003). Rao argues that this ruling follows in the spirit of restrictive policy measures enacted during the Emergency period under Indira Gandhi's regime. He argues that "indeed it is thoughtless folly that laws to empower precisely dalits, adivasis, and other sections of the poor, including women, are being circumvented by these imaginatively anti-democratic population policies" (Rao 2003). Both of these cases point to how the Indian state's agenda of modern reproductive consciousness operates through controlling women's reproduction and encouraging small families at any cost. "Non-acceptance" of family planning has been used to condemn and, in some cases, disenfranchise particular groups who are depicted as opposed to the progress of the modern nation-state through their reproductive practices. While seemingly outwardly centered on population and fertility as components of poverty alleviation, the Indian state extends much farther into the space of social and national reproduction of neo-liberal subjects.

In pursuit of this individualized neo-liberalism, a new figure of interest is emerging through Indian and Western media sources: the globally competitive worker, who is increasingly able to take advantage of burgeoning economic opportunities in India and abroad (Kripalan and Engardio 2003; Zakaria 2006; Elliott 2006). This (usually male) worker is correspondingly accompanied by the equally modern and responsible new Indian woman. The new Indian woman is marked through her education, urban lifestyle and employment. She represents a modern Indian nationality that, on the surface, is not rooted in caste, linguistics, or region, yet does not succumb to Westernization. Most importantly she is also represented as a socially aware, diligently attentive mother of a small family. Images of this new woman represent not only an attractive and modern self-image for a wider audience, but also as Rajeswari Sunder Rajan notes, "a normative model of citizenship that is, significantly, now gendered female," created by bringing together consumption with responsible motherhood (Rajan 1993, 131). Her very modernity, and her cultural legitimacy marked through her focus on family and retaining a non-

Western identity, make this new Indian woman part of India's imagining of the ideal delegate through which to stake a claim toward a global, cosmopolitan citizenship. At the same time, she serves as a foil against which the failures of modernity (i.e. women who do not live up to this ideal) are measured.

Thus this new Indian woman plays an important role in considering not just the desired outcomes of development by the Indian state, but also in how the Indian diaspora in the United States is cultivated. This modern, educated woman, partnered with the skilled and mobile male migrant worker, becomes the target for family reunification policies and technical visas. Thus the family emerges as the site where the United States' demand for cheaper skilled labor collides with Indian desires for greater integration into global capitalist alliances through the movement of labor. I turn now to the question of how reproduction and the middle-class family unit is embedded within the formation of Indian diasporas in the United States. Here, the family re-emerges as the central site through which to claim belonging in the United States, while also becoming a site of regulation by the state. The stakes for such a discussion become increasingly urgent as the entry of larger numbers of educated Indians and their families has implications for understanding the relationship between race, nationalism and belonging in the United States.

REPRODUCING INDIAN DIASPORAS

In the last part of this paper, I argue that it is possible to excavate links between how the small, modern, heterosexual family is discursively created through Indian development policy and how it is advantaged in United States immigration policy. Examining these links helps us theorize how Indians come to be welcomed as productive and disciplined immigrants, albeit temporary ones, set against the backdrop of institutional inequalities affecting people of color and the criminalization of so-called undesirable forms of immigration. These immigration policies produce "model" United States immigrants through selective screening and restrictive visa regulations, which favor highly educated and skilled workers.

The landmark Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 opened the possibility for increased and sustained migration from India and South Asia more generally. The 1965 act specified preferences for immigrants: professionals and scientists; workers in occupations for which labor was in short supply in the United States; and family members of currently residing immigrants. With the passage of the Family Reunification Act of 1986 and the 1990 Immigration Act, which increased the allocation of family-related visas, the numbers of both skilled and unskilled laborers entering the United States

has grown. At the same time, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, combined with the Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, effectively barred immigrants from receiving any means-tested federal assistance such as Medicaid, food stamps, or Social Security for the first five years of their residency. With the retreat of the American state in providing public support during the same period of expanded immigration, welfare has been primarily restricted to the private realm for newly arrived immigrants. The recent debates over President George W. Bush's guest worker program, along with state-level initiatives to cut social services and spending on immigrants and their families, point to a crisis in the country's ability to balance its need for immigrant labor with the provision of social welfare benefits to immigrant workers.

The contradiction between the state's aspiration to attract certain types of migrants, while disavowing social responsibility for them, helps explain the importance of family-based migration and labor among Indian diasporic communities. From 1980 to 2000, the United States Census reported an increase of people of Indian origin from 360,000 to 1,900,000, of whom over half are foreign born (United States Census Bureau 2004, 9). In addition to family reunification, this population boom has been attributed to the increase in H1-B visas, which are aimed at creating a pool of highly-skilled temporary workers. Along with these, the more restrictive H4 dependent visas have also been issued to the spouses and families of these workers, mostly women and children. H4 visas carry work prohibitions and are issued only in relation to the primary visa holders, thus reinforcing the priority of the "legitimate" (heterosexual, married) family with a traditional gendered division of labor. Over 40% of H1-B visas are given out to Indian nationals alone, underscoring the link between U.S. immigration laws and the creation of desirable and seemingly self-sufficient communities based on individual family units.

Thinking back to the Newsweek and TIME magazine covers, we see how the success of Indian immigrants since 1965, including the more recent influx of technical workers has been celebrated. At the same time much less attention has been given to non-professional immigrants entering through family-based sponsorship or other temporary worker visas. While the Immigration Act of 1990 extended only 10,000 visas annually to unskilled workers, it allotted 480,000 visas to family-based immigration, which increased spouses' and children's migration to the Unites States through the H4 visa (Reddy 2005). The recent increase among low-income workers and family members make up the 10% of the Indian population that lives below the poverty line in the United States. Although this number is significantly lower than other minority groups, such as Hispanic or Vietnamese, the public focus on the visible successes of the middle-class Indian diaspora conceals the

growing group of low-income immigrants. Recalling how representations of the new Indian woman echo Indian state discourses of nation-building that occlude non-modern or minority identities, new marginalities emerge within the diaspora. Family reunification laws and technical visas prioritize middle-class, educated and independent families over the laboring bodies of undocumented, uneducated immigrants in the United States.

In addition to obscuring these more marginal immigrants, the position of non-working women in the Indian diaspora has been similarly muted in public discourses. South Asian American domestic violence advocates have been instrumental in bringing to light the dangers posed by the dependent visa status of women on H4 visas (Abraham 2000; Bhattacharjee 2002; Das Dasgupta 2005). Spouses on H4 visas, who are overwhelmingly women, are unable to be employed outside of the home and find their own visa status contingent on their relationship to the primary visa-holder. In situations of domestic violence, such a scenario can prove to be insurmountable for women seeking assistance in leaving violent marriages.

CONCLUSIONS

I have argued that a transnational feminist perspective accounts for how actual policies and practices of nation-states are mediated through bodily processes, such as the reproduction of families. By looking at the emerging importance placed on the ideal Indian diasporic family, we can see how it is drawn from a set of discourses that shape what it means to be a developed subject in India. These discourses also appear in immigration policies intended to create desirable immigrants in the U.S. What these discourses do not reveal, however, are how the categories of difference such as class, gender, sexuality, and race mediate and shape this figure. Thus, reading social formations like the Indian diaspora in the context of policies and practices of both the home and host nations reminds us that the power of the state is far from diminishing. Instead, it seems that it continues to strengthen its role in creating new inequalities and maintaining old ones.

In order to foreground how women's bodies have become central to not just national discussions of development, but also to the definition of the modern citizen itself, I have discussed how reproduction and sexuality have figured into the project of controlling population. These subjects of modernity include the middle-class, urban, working woman who plans her two-child family, as well as the jet-setting diasporic woman, who comes to the United States as either as a wife or a high-tech worker. What these two figures obscure, however, are the range of identity formations that are occluded in the celebration of such gendered modernity

Rather than reading the priority of small families as an inscription of an unmarked and universal patriarchy regardless of differences in location or histories, I use transnational feminism to attend to the fissures that other cross-national and international feminisms do not address. Grewal and Kaplan argue that "transnational is a term that signals attention to uneven and dissimilar circuits of culture and capital. Through such critical recognition, the links between patriarchies, colonialisms, racisms, and other forms of domination become more apparent" (Grewal and Kaplan 1994, 17). Thus it is important to trace how the Indian woman is constructed as a figure of modernity through links between family planning policies in India and immigration policies in the U.S. Rather than view the Indian woman as an individual simply making choices, as in making the decision to have fewer children or taking advantage of an opportunity to move to America, we must continually situate the agency of individual actors within the framework of cross-cutting and interlinking axes of neo-liberalization and global capitalism. Such a project grows necessary in a historic moment where increased mobility and flexible working patterns are touted as the wave of the future. This adulation ignores the deep crises in adequate provisioning for those groups left out of the narratives of unfettered global integration. At the same time, it raises questions about how the positioning of these new Indians as self-sufficient and family-oriented complicate histories of racial discrimination against communities of color and low-income communities in the U.S. by in-sourcing labor rather than investing in building skilled, higher paid domestic labor pools. Thus, transnational feminism provides a useful frame that helps us track how modern subjects and correspondingly modern margins are being produced as the Indian diaspora in the West continues to grow.

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Voters' Ethnicity and National Identity: in the Case of Taiwan

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Democratization of Taiwan reached a milestone when Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was elected as the tenth president in 2000. It was the first time that political power had been peacefully transferred from one political party to another at the national level since the Komintang Party (KMT) occupied the office in 1947 (Wang 2005, 5).

In Taiwan's society, Native Minnanese, Native Hakkas, Aborigines, and Mainlanders are the four major ethnic groups. Native Minnanese and Mainlanders tend to hold opposite views in politics, while Native Hakkas usually find their views fall between them. For instance, when referring to national identity Native Minnanese usually identify themselves as "Taiwanese," while Mainlanders usually identify themselves as "Chinese." This difference mainly comes from division of power. Native Minnanese have always constituted the largest proportion of the whole population, but since the beginning of the KMT government's retreat to Taiwan, Mainlanders have held most public offices and the Peking dialect was made the only official language. These events aroused Native Minnanese resentment.

Due to these political circumstances, ethnicity and national identity came to play important roles during the democratization of Taiwan (Wang 1993, 1998; Hawang 1995; Sheng and Chen 2003; Chang and Wang 2005; Hsieh 2005). Decades passed and the effect of ethnicity on Taiwan' politics has influenced the political sentiments of the public. National identity is a part of this trend. National identity denotes a person's belonging to a certain group in a political sense; namely with which label of country one psychologically identifies.

However, changes of environment complicate the effects of ethnicity on national identity in Taiwan. Inter-ethnic marriage has occurred between ethnic groups due to the demographic distribution (Wang 1993). There were more male Mainlanders at the time than female. Furthermore, one would expect more communication and interaction across ethnic groups and contextual changes to facilitate correct understanding and diminish the hostility between these two biggest ethnic groups. For example, more and more Native

Minnanese have taken over offices both within the KMT and the central government in past decades. Native dialects are no longer forbidden in public occasions. These facts show that Native Minnanese have gained more respect, and Mainlanders, especially officers of higher levels, are more open than before. Do these changes and gradual assimilation of successive generations since 1947 imply a weakening effect of ethnicity on politics? Wang's answer is negative (1993 & 2002). He finds that political competition among ethnic groups offsets the effect of assimilation. Among children of parents from different ethnicities, ethnicity still plays an important role in their national identities and other political attitudes. But whether this outlook still holds true after more than a decade requires reexamination.

From the perspective of political socialization, Campbell et al. found that a majority of Americans tend to follow their parents' party identification (1960, 147-8). Hickey (2006) further examines parental influence on voters' party identification. He finds that among those whose parents identify with different major parties, males tend to follow father's party identification and females tend to follow mother's party identification. In the case of national identity, do children also follow their parents' identities? In other words, do parents' ethnicities matter for voters' national identities? Those of whom the parents have different ethnicities would have more accesses to both ethnic groups. What will be the content of their national identities? Does the gender of voters and their parents play a significant role in the process of formation of their national identities? These are questions this paper attempts to answer.

POLITICAL CLEAVAGE

During election campaigns, candidates and parties highlight their differences in an attempt to stimulate members' group consciousness. By doing so they offer cues to voters and help them differentiate between candidates (Berelson et al. 1954 & 1986, 213). To some extent the ethnic cleavages are synonymous with "issue conflict" in campaigns. Candidates and parties try hard to identify and mobilize their potential supporters (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). To this end they will call voters' attention to ethnic differences. Such group consciousness and awareness of difference between ethnic groups can help voters more easily develop an attachment to certain candidates or parties, which saves voters' time and energy when making a voting decision.

According to Lipset and Rokkan a social cleavage is both a demographic division and a psychological division (Lipset and Rokkan 1985). A cleavage includes three dimensions: social division, consciousness of collective identity, and organization. If a cleavage exists between two or more groups, it

implies that those groups diverge on specific social characteristics, for example their race. Members within different groups identify themselves as "we" and other groups as "they." Most of the time members will form organizational institutions to express and protect their own interests against other groups (Gallagher et al. 1995, 210-211). Such psychological affiliations shape their emotions. In the long term, national identities may emerge from this separation (Smith 1995, 122).

Each social cleavage will not necessarily result in a political cleavage. Only when a social cleavage is utilized and highlighted by political elites in the political arena does it become a political cleavage. A political cleavage refers to persistent and frequently intense issue conflicts that define a political system (Manza and Brooks 1999, 32). This political division is based on a long-standing social division. It is the result of the politicization and polarization of such a social division. Therefore, when scholars use the term "political cleavage," it implicitly refers to social cleavage and its political importance.

Group attachments, animosities, and conflicts are likely to occur during political campaigns because candidates and parties attempt to build winning coalitions (Valentino 2001, 145-146). When social environments change, the symbol and content of the most important political cleavage can change. To solidify and maintain winning coalitions, political leaders may react to supporters' new demands and adopt different strategies to mobilize their present supporters. Thus, politicians utilize group identity to form winning coalitions.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ETHNICITY IN TAIWAN'S POLITICS

The political difference between Native Minnanese and Mainlanders springs from the political developments in Taiwan. In 1895 the Qing dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan in the Treaty of Maguan. Thus, Taiwan existed under Japanese colonial rule until 1945. Towards the end of the period of Japanese governance, the Japanese government gradually allowed a certain degree of self-governance among island residents. After Taiwan was returned to China in 1945, Hsieh explains, "Mainlanders, along with some Taiwanese with mainland experiences, ruled Taiwan. The inefficiency and corruption of the new regime led to conflicts between Mainlanders and local Taiwanese" because local Taiwanese were influenced by the experiences of previous Japanese governance (Hsieh 2005, 15).

Not long after, a number of Mainlanders poured into Taiwan as the Communists defeated the KMT government in 1949. The KMT government

retreated to Taiwan and appointed a great number of Mainlanders to fill major governmental and military offices of Taiwan. There was a feeling among local Taiwanese that they were discriminated against by the KMT regime. In addition, the brutal use of force by the KMT government invoked anti-Chinese sentiments among local residents compared to the relative benign colonial rule of Japanese government.

These historical experiences eventually pushed Taiwan toward democratization. The tragic incident of February 28th, 1947 has been frequently evoked by Taiwanese activists as a symbol of Taiwanese resistance against Mainland rule.[12] Thereafter, ethnicity explicitly became a strong rallying point for Native Minnanese calling for independence from China. People began saying "we Taiwanese," "you Mainlanders," and vice versa in everyday lives. There was a clear boundary between these two ethnic groups. In other words, ethnic divisions had risen to the political level. Native Minannese and Mainlanders encountered conflicts of political powers.

THE ROLE OF ETHNICITY IN TAIWAN'S POLITICS

Politics in Taiwan has tended to structure itself along ethnic cleavages, several structural changes and social developments basically followed the division of ethnicity in Taiwan politics. Native Minnanese tend to identify with Pan-Green parties, identify themselves as "Taiwanese," support independence from China, and vote for Pan-Blue candidates in elections (Wang 1998, 3-12). Over the past decades ethnicity has influenced voting behavior and issue opinion – for example, opinion on the national identity and the unification-independence issues (Sheng and Chen 2003, 30).

Sheng and Chen categorize the political development of Taiwan into four stages of political cleavage and party competition. The first stage was before 1969, and the main division between parties was ethnicity. After moving into Taiwan, the KMT government initiated land reforms to develop the economy. By doing so they tried to eradicate the country gentry, their main opposition. At this stage, ethnicity had not yet fostered political divisions. Nevertheless, different historical backgrounds implicitly shaped two groups: Native Minnanese and Mainlanders. Most Mainlanders moved into Taiwan with the KMT government, occupying higher and central public offices, while most Native Minnanese worked in the private sector, most of them being farmers.

[12] It began with officers' improper handling with the inspection of private tobacco products in Taipei City. Gradually, it became conflicts between officers and citizens. Moreover, it became severe conflicts between Mainlanders and Native Minnanese.

Land reforms subsequently cost many Native Minnanese their property and exacerbated the gap between Native Minnanese and Mainlanders.

The second stage occurred in 1970s and 1980s. The divisions focused on ethnicity, authorization and democratization, and stabilization and reform. New social problems accompanied economic development, but the KMT government could not solve them. There were more and more social movements at this time. The central appeal of the KMT was democratic reform. During campaigns, there were more non-KMT candidates than before. However, they were still the minority and the KMT still controlled most posts in the government. Ethnicity gradually played an important role in the mobilization of the opposition. Thus, it became politically important for dividing the ruling and the opposing forces.

The third stage occurred in the 1990s. In addition to existing divisions, the salience of "cross-strait relations" or the so-called unification-independence issue increased. The political structural changes in the 1980s elicited some democratic progress in the 1990s. For example, the public formation of the DPP in 1986, the abolishment of new political parties in 1987, the repeal of Martial Law in 1991, and reelection of all legislators in 1992. "Taiwanese independent sovereignty" that DPP highlighted in their doctrine in 1991 explicitly proclaimed the appeal of being independent from China. This was the first time that the unification-independence issue appeared concretely in public. From then on the unification-independence issue showed up in every election. The most important thing was that the hegemony of the KMT was threatened by the opposition, especially DPP.

The fourth stage occurred after 2000, when the DPP won the presidential election for the first time. During this campaign some political elites within the KMT dropped out and established the People First Party (PFP) after the election. However, in 2004 the KMT and PFP temporarily cooperated by supporting the same candidate. Sheng and Chen raised this question: what other new divisions will emerge in Taiwan in twenty-first century (Sheng and Chen 2003, 11-14)? The latest stage is yet unsettled; therefore, scholars are trying to identify patterns in this dynamic.

In the process of party system formation in Taiwan ethnicity has played a decisive role. The early party system followed the ethnic cleavage line and spawned two opposite parties which represented two opposite groups. After the economic and political developments, especially democratization, there is heterogeneity within each side, even though the party system is dominated by two alliances.

In national elections, the consolidation of parties within one camp plays an important role. In 2004 the KMT and PFP together nominated one candidate, though Pan-Blue did not win this time. Nevertheless, Pan-Blue

ticket (Lien and James Song) got 49.89% of votes, while Pan-Green (Chen and Lu) got 50.11% of votes[13]. This narrow victory and the Pan-Blue majority in the legislature created turmoil. The pivotal variable behind these coalitions is ethnicity. Two camps appeal to two major ethnic groups that possess very different political views. These numbers, again, highlight the importance of ethnicity in Taiwan's politics.

Berelson et al. point out that people who have group interests in common represent convenient blocs for political appeal and mobilization (Berelson et al. 1986, 71-75). Besides an economic division, a physical separation, or a social differentiation, a necessary condition for the persistence of political difference is transmission to succeeding generations. The conditions underlying persistent voting cleavages include initiating social differentiation, transmissibility, and continued social and physical contacts.

Hawang (1995) applies mobilization theory to voters' electoral participation in the 1994 Taipei mayoral election and finds ethnicity was highly polarized at the time. The participation of Mainlanders was higher than Native Minnanese in the 1994 election. Although the proportion of Mainlanders in Taiwan compared to Native Minnanese was smaller, since DPP had gradually grown and occupied more public central offices than before, the group consciousness of Mainlanders had intensely grown as well. Most Mainlanders felt pressured by native social movements and became more politically motivated.

As Taiwan democratized in past decades, local Taiwanese took over most major positions in the government and in the long dominant party – the KMT. Ethnicity per se is no longer the most salient factor on Taiwan's politics (Hsieh 2005, 15). However, the effect of ethnicity has permeated into other political attitudes of the public, for example national identity. Chen and Chen point out that social contact and network mediate structural factors in creating political attitudes and political behaviors. Communication among voters broadens the concept "I" to "we" and confirms the content of "we." Cheng and Chen find that Native Minnanese rely heavily on such interpersonal networks to successfully transmit their group consciousness (Cheng and Chen 2002, 122-155). Since more communication and mobility across ethnicities has occurred in the past years, including inter-ethnic marriages, I suspect the importance of ethnicity has declined. I also doubt whether this difference decreases the political gap between Native Minnanese and Mainlanders.

The role of national identity in Taiwan's politics is divided along ethnic lines. People who identify themselves as "Taiwanese" tend to favor independence and support the Pan-Green parties led by the DPP, while people

[13] http://vote.nccu.edu.tw/engcec/vote4.asp

identifying themselves as "Chinese" tend to favor unification and support the Pan-Blue parties led by the KMT. As the salience and direct effect of ethnicity on Taiwan's politics decline, the prominence of national identity on public opinion develops (Wang 2005, 5; Hsieh 2005, 13). Although ethnicity and national identity are two different concepts, they are related. Ethnicity is a given condition while national identity is a subjective identification. Due to the traditional values of patriarchal societies, Taiwan's Census Bureau uses the father's ethnicity to define individual's ethnic background or category. Survey questionnaires also follow this philosophy by assuming a respondent's father's ethnicity defines his or her ethnicity. National identity, on the other hand, is a self-reported answer. Respondents are asked: "In our society, some people think they are Taiwanese. There are also some people who think that they are Chinese. Do you consider yourself as Taiwanese, Chinese or both?"

Campbell et al.'s (1960) findings about the effect of political socialization on party identification in the case of the United States show that the process of socialization creates a sizeable degree of stability for the distribution of party identification. National identity, another psychological and emotional attachment to a specific group, is also a political attitude in Campbell's terminology. Young adults learn about politics in part from their parents. Ware sees "a dual connection between parties and existing voters, and between the latter and their children" across generations (Campbell 1996, 223). Similar to party identification, voters identify with a particular label of nation, and children will identify with their parents. This can be easily understood among those whose parents have the same ethnicity. What about those whose parents have different ethnicities? This is the question that I intend to answer in the remainder of this paper, but first it is necessary to explain my methodology.

DATA AND METHOD

Data analyzed in this paper were collected by the research project Taiwan's Election and Democratization Studies, 2001, 2003 and 2004 (TEDS 2001, 2003 and 2004), directed by Ji Huang, Yun-han Ju, Siou-Duan Huang, and I-chou Liu. The 1996 data was directed by John F. Hsieh and conducted by the Election Study Center of National Cheng-Chi University. National random samples were drawn from the voter population. These surveys were conducted by face to face interviews.

The dependent variable, Taiwanese (the label value: 1) /Both(2) /Chinese(3), has three non-ordered categories. Hence I use a multinomial logit model to analyze the effects of parents' ethnicities and the interaction between

gender and parents' ethnicities on voter's national identity, controlling for other demographic variables. Specifically, the regression model is of the form:

$$\ln \Omega_{m|b}(X) = \ln \frac{\Pr(y = m \mid x)}{\Pr(y = b \mid x)} = Z_i = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \, father's \; ethnicity_i + \beta_3 mother's \; ethnicity_i + \beta_4 gender_i \times father's \; ethnicity_i + \beta_5 gender_i \times mother's \; ethnicity_i + \beta_6 gender + \beta_7 age_i + \beta_8 education \; level_i + \beta_9 residence_i$$

for *m*=l to *J*-l, where *b* is the base category for comparison, here, it is the identifiers of "both." *J* is the number of categories of the dependent variable, which is three here.

Ethnicity is defined by respondent's father's ethnicity, and national identity is self-reported by respondents. Important demographic variables include gender, age, education level, and area of living (Wang 1998; Sheng and Chen 2003; Chang and Wang 2005; Hsieh 2005). All explanatory variables are coded as dummy variables. In addition, I created a dummy variable indicating whether both parents have the same ethnicity. Because I am more interested in the difference between Native Minnanese and Mainlanders, rather than four major ethnic groups, I specified the base category as "both." I excluded Aborigines and Native Hakkas from the data for two reasons. First, Aborigines only take a small portion of the population. For instance, in the 2000 Census Aborigines accounted for only 1.78 percent of the total population (Census 2000). Secondly, Native Hakkas usually take positions on political issues between Native Minnanese and Mainlanders'. Therefore, this paper focuses on the analysis comparing Native Minnanese and Mainlanders. The interaction term between respondent's (father's) ethnicity and whether both parents have the same ethnicity examines the effect of ethnicity among those whose parents have the same ethnicity. In other words, it tells what different effects ethnicity has on national identity between those whose both parents are Native Minnanese and those whose both parents are Mainlanders, holding other variables constant.

Chang and Wang (2005) argue that the segment of voters who identify with a dual identity is increasing. More citizens tend to identify themselves as "both" Taiwanese and Chinese (or Chinese and Taiwanese) among younger generations. Additionally, they ascribe the significant negative effect of education level on Taiwanese/Chinese identity to "the emphasis of 'greater Chinese nationalism' in the island's educational curriculum in the past" (*Ibid*.

2005, 37). Lin et al. (2006) apply a spatial regression to examine neighborhood influence on national identity. They find that "voters of the same sub-ethnicity who reside in different geographic location can have different levels of national identity. Therefore, these demographic variables are included in the multinomial model to control their effects (*Ibid*. 2006).

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

From previous research, I expected to find that the effects of ethnicity are significant on votes' national identities. Voters whose parents are Native Minannese will tend to identify as Taiwanese, and voters whose parents are Mainlanders will tend to identify as Chinese. For those voters with parents from different ethnicities (Native Minannese father and Mainlander mother, or Mainlander father and Native Minannese mother), the effect of parents' ethnicities on their children's national identity will depend on gender. Males' national identities will be affected by fathers' ethnicities, and females' national identities will be affected by mothers' ethnicities.

Explanatory variables respectively have significant association with the dependent variable, national identity, according to chi-square tests. In addition, the distribution of national identity significantly changes from year to year (see Table 1 at end of paper). In general, the percentage of voters who identify as Taiwanese increased about ten points, while there were fewer voters identifying as Chinese. Compared to 1996, the percentage of Chinese identifiers decreased more than half. About half of the electorate identifies as "both Taiwanese and Chinese," and each year this was the largest group of respondents.

To eliminate the impact of every present context for each election, the data is separated by year while running multinomial logit models. Table 2 shows results of the multinomial logit models of national identity from 1996 to 2004, including interaction terms.

The comparison base category for the results in Table 2 is those who identify as both nationalities. Therefore, when the effects of each variable are calculated, they are relative to identifiers of both national identities. In other words, such effects are not absolute values. Each column implies an equation which contains a dependent variable with two values: Both and Taiwanese or Chinese. The fist column compares national identity between Taiwanese (1) and Both (here, the equation assigns this group 0 as a comparison base), while the second column compares national identity between Chinese (here, the equation assigns this group 1) and Both (0 as a comparison base). Therefore, in the first column, positive signs of coefficients denote positive contributions to identify as Taiwanese, while negative signs denote negative contributions

to identify as Taiwanese. In other words, negative signs mean "less likely to identify as Taiwanese."

The constant term (-1.80,) in the first column denotes the likelihood of identifying as Taiwanese, for a female whose parents are both Native Minnanese, 60 years old or older, having at least a degree of college, and living in the area of Yi, Hua, Dong. The negative sign means that she would be less likely to identify herself as Taiwanese, compared to Both. In contrast, the constant term of the second column, 1.18 means that she would tend to identify as Chinese given the same conditions, compared to Both. Coefficients in Table 2 are odds ratios. Odds ratio is the ratio of odds of probabilities. Thus, the number of a coefficient means that when the variable changes from 0 to 1, the expected value of the probability will change exp{the coefficient} times controlling other variables.

Taking the first column as an example: controlling other variables, the effect of father's ethnicity on voter's national identity is equal the differentiation of the equation given above on page 76. Thus, the effect of father's ethnicity on individual's national identity is 0.91 (=0.62 + 0.29) when the individual's mother is also a Native Minnanese and the individual is female. In other words, when her parents are both Native Minnanese, holding other variables constant, she will be more likely to identify as Taiwanese, and such probability (when father's ethnicity=1) is 0.91 times of the probability when her father is a Mainlander (father's ethnicity=0). However, such effect is statistically insignificant.

Applying the same logic to other cells, controlling other variables, the main effect of the father's ethnicity is only significant in 2004. When one's father is Native Minnanese, the individual will likely identify as Taiwanese comparing to Both. In short, if an individual's father is Native Minannese, the individual will be more likely to choose Taiwanese when making a choice between Taiwanese and Both, but the individual will be less likely to identify as Chinese when making a choice between Chinese and Both. When the individual's mother is Native Minnanese, this individual will be significantly less likely identify with Chinese, compared to Both. The main effects of parents' ethnicities basically correspond to my expectations.

Nevertheless, the interaction terms between the father's and mother's ethnicity and between voters' gender and parents' ethnicities are statistically insignificant in each year. This suggests that there is no interaction between respondent's gender and their parents' ethnicities. In other words, the effect of parents' ethnicities is straightforward, and there is no significant indirect effect of ethnicity on voter's national identity.

To testify to the impact of interaction terms, I modified the models by removing these terms. Table 3 shows the results of multinomial logit models

without interaction terms. The goodness of fit (log likelihood) increases in Table 3 compared to Table 2. Another plausible explanation for this phenomenon is multicollinearity. There is a certain correlation between explanatory variables. In other words, when the value of one variable increases, the value of another variable correspondingly increases or decreases at the same time. Standard errors of estimated coefficients tend to be large. As a result, values of estimation cannot be precise. Interaction terms in Table 2 cause some degree of multicollinearity, which decreases the ability of estimation from those models. Additionally, parents' ethnicities have significant effects on national identity, which corresponds to my earlier hypothesis. A Native Minnanese father will have a positive contribution to the voter's Taiwanese identity, but a negative contribution to voter's Chinese identity comparing to Both. This is similar to mother's ethnicities, but this effect is only significant in 1996 (Chinese), 2001 (Taiwanese) and 2004 (Taiwanese). In general, the father's ethnicity has more effect on voter's national identity than the mother's. However, tests which examine whether the effect of the father's ethnicity is equal to the mother's show that significant differences only appear in two years while comparing identities between Taiwanese of Both: 1996 (chi square: 3.42, $p < 0.1$) and 2004 (chi square: 3.91, $p < 0.05$). For gender, males tend to identify with Chinese comparing to Both.

To focus on voters whose parents have different ethnicities, Table 4 shows the result of applying the model in Table 3 to this group. Since the mother's ethnicity is definitely different from the father's, the mother's ethnicity is eliminated from this model. This group only takes proportion about five percent of the full sample in each year, so I pooled them together. The result confirms the results in Table 2 and Table 3. Among this group, parents' ethnicities do not have a significant effect on voters' national identity. What does affect these voters' national identity are gender and education. Controlling other variables, males are more likely to identify with Chinese comparing to Both. This might be associated with the traditional value of patriarchic society. Males are held to higher social expectations from the society. These voters may link such value and expectations to Chinese traditions, and thus to patriarchy. However, this model cannot verify if this explanation is true. Voters with an educational level lower than college are more likely to identify with Taiwanese or Chinese comparing to Both, when controlling other variables. How do gender and education affect these voters' national identities? To investigate the psychological mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper. This finding also confirms the author's anticipation. Though generally when parents are Native Minnanese, voters are more likely to identify with Taiwanese comparing to Both, or less likely to identify with

Chinese comparing to Both, such effect does not exist among voters whose parents have different ethnicities. This may be because voters in inter-ethnic families are more confused taking cues of national identity from their parents.

CONCLUSION

This paper re-examines the effect of ethnicity on national identity in Taiwan. After more than one decade, Wang's argument is still holding true (Wang 1993). The effect of ethnicity on national identity maintains its importance and inter-ethnic marriages contribute little to ethnic assimilation. In terms of political socialization, there is no significant interaction between parents' ethnicities and voter's gender. Being a fraternal society, the father's ethnicity pervasively has impact on voter's national identity, while the mother's does not. The intimacy between children and mother does not trump the father's authority within a family. In other words, fathers still have more authority within families than mothers.

Inter-ethnic marriages do not cancel out the political opposition between Native Minnanese and Mainlanders. In families where both parents are from the same ethnic group, parents' ethnicities can reinforce voters' national identity. However, in families where parents are both Native Minnanese and Mainlander, parents' ethnicities have no significant effect on voter's national identity. Instead voters formulate their national identity through formal education.

Do these findings imply that inter-ethnic marriages can effectively mitigate political conflicts between Native Minnanese and Mainlanders? To answer this question, researchers need to continuously observe the dynamics. Besides, how does education effectively alleviate the intension among ethnic groups in democratizing countries? Answering these questions is beyond the scope of this paper. However, this paper does point out the importance of education on national identity, especially for those whose parents have different ethnicities.

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Table 1: National Identity by Year: 1996-2004

National Identity	1996	2000	2001	2003	2004
Taiwanese	35.81	42.98	37.79	45.12	46.27
Both	46.48	45.70	53.42	48.33	47.61
Chinese	17.71	11.32	8.78	6.55	6.12
Total %	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
(N)	(1321)	(1140)	(1958)	(1649)	(4184)

Note: 1. person chi-square: 225.64, $p < 0.001$.

Table 2: Multinomial Logit Models of National Identity: 1996-2004 (including interaction terms)

	1996		2000		2001		2003		2004	
	Taiwanese	Chinese	Taiwanese	Chinese	Taiwanese	Chinese	Taiwanese	Chinese	Taiwanese	Chinese
	β (s.e.)	β (s.e.)	β (s.e.)	β (s.e.)	β (s.e.)	β (s.e.)	β (s.e.)	β (s.e.)	β (s.e.)	β (s.e.)
Father's Ethnicity										
(Mainlander=0)										
Native	.62	-.61	.03	-.24	.22	-.98	-.05	-1.38	.50*	-1.35*
Taiwanese	(.54)	(.65)	(.61)	(.71)	(.38)	(.63)	(.42)	(.88)	(.21)	(.58)
Mother's Ethnicity										
(Mainlander=0)										
Native	-.42	-1.33*	-.17	-.77	.48	-.001	.30	.11	.02	-.34
Taiwanese	(.46)	(.54)	(.43)	(.57)	(.30)	(.41)	(.32)	(.46)	(.19)	(.34)
Father's ×										
Mother's	.29	.76	.58	-.61	.12	-.28	.36	.23	.21	.79
Ethnicity	(.56)	(.63)	(.63)	(.75)	(.39)	(.60)	(.43)	(.88)	(.23)	(.58)
Father's										
Ethnicity ×	-2.55	-.37	-.50	-.56	.20	.54	.34	1.05	-.07	.09
Gender	(.53)	(.60)	(.54)	(.66)	(.35)	(.52)	(.38)	(.70)	(.21)	(.42)
Mother's										
Ethnicity ×	.13	.38	.21	.98	-.12	-.42	-.23	-.73	.25	-.02
Gender	(.55)	(.61)	(.57)	(.67)	(.38)	(.53)	(.40)	(.70)	(.22)	(.43)
Gender										
(Female=0)										
	-.002	.48$^{\$}$	.16	.21	-.12	.39	-.15	-.27	-.30*	.29
Male	(.32)	(.29)	(.30)	(.34)	(.25)	(.28)	(.25)	(.33)	(.15)	(.22)
Age										
(above 60=0)										
<30	-.80**	-.74	.23	-.24	-.08	-1.55***	-.24	-1.50***	-.03	-1.47***

	(.24)	(.29)	(.25)	(.36)	(.18)	(.32)	(.21)	(.43)	(.13)	(.28)
	-.33$	-.59**	-.07	-.66*	-.38*	-.88***	-.29$	-.90**	-.38***	-.92***
30~59	(.18)	(.23)	(.19)	(.28)	(.15)	(.23)	(.16)	(.28)	(.10)	(.18)
Education level										
(college and up=0)										
Below high school	.62**	.31	.90**	.42	.67**	.01	1.07***	.36	1.13***	.81***
	(.23)	(.30)	(.22)	(.33)	(.16)	(.28)	(.18)	(.35)	(.11)	(.23)
High/ Vocational school	.18	.59*	.23	.16	-.09	.05	.16	.37	.21	.35$
	(.23)	(.28)	(.20)	(.30)	(.15)	(.25)	(.16)	(.31)	(.09)	(.21)
Area (Yi, Hua, Dong=0)										
Big Taipei Circle	1.24	-1.59*	.46	-.41	.03	.01	.04	-.02	-.20	.87*
	(1.14)	(.65)	(.38)	(.51)	(.19)	(.30)	(.26)	(.51)	(.16)	(.40)
Big Kaohsiung Circle	1.17	-1.35*	.80*	-.42	.10	.20	.06	-.08	-.02	1.12*
	(1.15)	(.69)	(.40)	(.57)	(.23)	(.38)	(.30)	(.60)	(.18)	(.44)
Taipei County and Kilung	.36	-2.74**	.18	-.60	-.22	-.56	.02	.003	-.26	1.03*
	(1.23)	(.99)	(.40)	(.54)	(.23)	(.47)	(.29)	(.60)	(.18)	(.44)
Tao, Chu, Miao	.75	-1.63*	.58	.04	.05	-.49	-.20	.50	-.30	.83*
	(1.14)	(.64)	(.42)	(.52)	(.22)	(.34)	(.30)	(.51)	(.17)	(.41)
Chung, Chiang, Tou	1.11	-1.24$	.33	-.31	.09	.26	.43	.46	.02	.68$
	(1.14)	(.65)	(.38)	(.51)	(.20)	(.32)	(.26)	(.51)	(.16)	(.41)
Yun, Chia, Nan	1.33	-1.63*	.52	-.38	.02	.12	.34	-.24	-.02	.77$
	(1.14)	(.66)	(.38)	(.51)	(.20)	(.34)	(.27)	(.59)	(.16)	(.42)
Kao, Ping, Pong	1.77	-1.75*	.92*	-.80	.39$	.29	.65*	1.09*	.19	.92*
	(1.15)	(.69)	(.42)	(.59)	(.23)	(.38)	(.30)	(.53)	(.19)	(.46)
	-1.80	1.18	-1.34***	-.12	-1.02**	-.52	-.95**	-1.08$	-.66	-2.16***
Constant	(1.18)	(.74)	(.48)	(.60)	(.295)	(.42)	(.34)	(.60)	(.21)	(.47)
N	1321		1140		1958		1649		4184	
Log likelihood	-1252.30		-1036.59		-1675.28		-1342.16		-3395.01	

1. The comparison base: Identifiers of Both.
2. *** indicates p<.001, ** indicates p<.01, * indicates p<.05, $ indicates p<.1.
   Entries are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3: Multinomial Logit Models of National Identity: 1996-2004 (no interaction terms)

	1996		2000		2001		2003		2004	
	Taiwanese	Chinese	Taiwanese	Chinese	Taiwanese	Chinese	Taiwanese	Chinese	Taiwanese	Chinese
	β (s.e.)	β (s.e.)	β (s.e.)	β (s.e.)	β (s.e.)	β (s.e.)	β (s.e.)	β (s.e.)	β (s.e.)	β (s.e.)
Father's Ethnicity (Mainlander=0)										
Native Taiwanese	.70** (.27)	-.32 (.28)	.23 (.26)	-.99** (.35)	.40* (.18)	-.89** (.27)	.39* (.19)	-.73* (.34)	.62*** (.11)	-.67** (.20)
Mother's Ethnicity (Mainlander=0)										
Native Taiwanese	-.26 (.29)	-.83** (.29)	.09 (.28)	-.37 (.37)	.46* (.19)	-.30 (.27)	.30 (.20)	-.14 (.34)	.23* (.11)	-.19 (.20)
Gender (Female=0)										
Male	-.11 (.13)	.48** (.17)	-.06 (.13)	.44* (.21)	-.06 (.10)	.43* (.17)	-.08 (.11)	-.17 (.22)	-.16* (.07)	.33* (.14)
Age (60 and up=0)										
<30	-.82*** (.24)	-.78** (.28)	.21 (.24)	-.21 (.36)	-.09 (.18)	-1.51*** (.31)	-.26 (.21)	-1.50*** (.42)	-.03 (.13)	-1.50*** (.28)
30~59	-.34$^{\$}$ (.18)	-.62** (.22)	-.08 (.19)	-.63* (.28)	-.38** (.15)	-.86*** (.22)	-.29$^{\$}$ (.16)	-.90*** (.28)	-.38*** (.10)	-.94*** (.17)
Education level (College and up=0)										
Below high school	.62** (.23)	.32 (.30)	.90*** (.22)	.38 (.33)	.68*** (.16)	.01 (.28)	1.07*** (.18)	.37 (.35)	1.13*** (.11)	.82*** (.23)
High/Vocational school	.18 (.23)	.58* (.28)	.23 (.20)	.14 (.30)	-.08 (.15)	.05 (.25)	.17 (.16)	.38 (.31)	.21* (.09)	.35$^{\$}$ (.21)
Area (Yi, Hua, Dong=0)										
Big Taipei Circle	1.28 (1.13)	-1.53* (.64)	.43 (.38)	-.39 (.51)	.03 (.19)	.02 (.30)	.05 (.26)	.01 (.51)	-.20 (.16)	.87* (.40)
Big Kaohsiung Circle	1.20 (1.15)	-1.30$^{\$}$ (.68)	.80* (.40)	-.45 (.57)	.10 (.23)	.22 (.38)	.08 (.30)	-.04 (.60)	-.02 (.18)	1.12* (.44)
Taipei County and Kilung	.41 (1.23)	-2.65** (.98)	.18 (.40)	-.57 (.54)	-.21 (.23)	-.55 (.47)	.03 (.29)	.02 (.60)	-.26 (.18)	1.04* (.44)

Tao, Chu, Miao	.77 (1.14)	-1.57* (.63)	.55 (.42)	.06 (.52)	.06 (.22)	-.49 (.34)	-.19 (.29)	.52 (.51)	-.30$ (.17)	.83* (.41)
Chung, Chiang, Tou	1.15 (1.14)	-1.17$ (.64)	.32 (.38)	-.29 (.51)	.09 (.20)	.25 (.32)	.45$ (.26)	.49 (.51)	.01 (.16)	.68$ (.41)
Yun, Chia, Nan	1.37 (1.13)	-1.56* (.65)	.51 (.38)	-.34 (.51)	.02 (.19)	.13 (.34)	.36 (.27)	-.21 (.58)	-.02 (.16)	.77$ (.42)
Kao, Ping, Pong	1.81 (1.15)	-1.67* (.69)	.93* (.42)	-.83 (.59)	.40$ (.23)	.30 (.38)	.67* (.30)	1.12* (.53)	.19 (.19)	.92* (.46)
Constant	-1.79 (1.16)	1.10 (.71)	-1.25** (.45)	-.25 (.58)	-1.07*** (.26)	-.54 (.39)	-1.03** (.31)	-1.18* (.59)	-.76*** (.20)	-2.20*** (.46)
N	1321		1140		1958		1649		4184	
Log likelihood	-1253.46		-1039.76		-1676.16		-1343.91		-3397.09	

1. The comparison base: Identifiers of Both
2. *** indicates p < 0.001, ** indicates p < 0.01, * indicates p < 0.05, $ indicates p < 0.1.

Entries are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

Table 4: Multinomial Logit Models of National Identity: 1996-2004 pooled (only voters whose parents have different ethnicities; no interaction terms)

	Taiwanese	Chinese
	β (s.e.)	β (s.e.)
Father's Ethnicity		
(Mainlander=0)		
Native Taiwanese	.10	-.33
	(.16)	(.27)
Gender		
(Female=0)		
Male	-.23	.53*
	(.14)	(.23)
Age		
(60 and up=0)		
<30	.28	-.06
	(.34)	(.63)
30~59	-.10	.20
	(.31)	(.59)
Education level		
(College and above=0)		

Below high school	1.19***	.73$
	(.22)	(.41)
High/ Vocational school	-.01	.86**
	(.17)	(.30)
Area		
(Yi, Hua, Dong=0)		
	-.23	.51
Big Taipei Circle	(.30)	(.52)
	-.15	-.57
Big Kaohsiung Circle	(.36)	(.71)
	-.24	.20
Taipei County and Kilung	(.38)	(.61)
	-.08	.41
Tao, Chu, Miao	(.31)	(.54)
	.13	-.06
Chung, Chiang, Tou	(.32)	(.60)
	-.32	.63
Yun, Chia, Nan	(.36)	(.57)
	.01	.72
Kao, Ping, Pong	(.39)	(.61)
	-.77$	-3.14***
Constant	(.45)	(.84)
N	1058	
Log likelihood□	-899.52	

1. The comparison base: Identifiers of Both
2. *** indicates $p < 0.001$, ** indicates $p < 0.01$, * indicates $p < 0.05$, $ indicates $p < 0.1$.
   Entries are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

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