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**The Satiric Effect in Horace's *Sermones* in the Light of His Epicurean Reading Circle**

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Reading Circle**

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# **The Satiric Effect in Horace's *Sermones* in the Light of His Epicurean Reading Circle**

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Scholarship on Roman satire has been dominated for nearly fifty years by a rhetorical approach that emphasizes the artifice of the poet. Consequently, it has been unsure what to do with the philosophical material in Horace's *Sermones*. In my dissertation, I argue for the importance of Epicurean philosophy in the interpretative scheme of Horace's satiric *oeuvre*. Epicurean ideas appear prominently and repeatedly, mostly in a positive light, and respond to the concerns and philosophical prejudices of Horace's closest friends.

In the prologue, I explore how Horace himself inscribes the process of interpreting and responding to a satire into S. 2.8. He frames his reading circle as key observers in the satiric scene that unfolds before them, suggesting the importance of the audience to satire. Chapter one builds upon this vision by emphasizing reader response as a key element of satiric theory. Satire, as a participant in the cultural debates of its day, orients itself toward a like-minded group of readers who are expected to grasp the

satiric thrust of the text and understand its nuances. It orients itself against outsiders who respond seriously to the text in some fashion, often failing to realize that satire is even occurring. I term this process the satiric effect.

Chapter two demonstrates that Horace's closest friends in his reading circle share connections to Epicureanism. The social dynamics of reading circles reinforce my theoretical emphasis upon the satiric audience. Vergil, Varius, Plotius Tucca, and Quintilius Varus studied with the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus whose treatises also offer insight into the social dynamics of an Epicurean circle.

Chapter three explores how *Sermones* I articulates itself toward Horace's reading circle. Given the Epicurean biases present within Horace's reading circle, I explore an interpretation through the lens of these Epicurean preferences.

Chapters four and five emphasize that the philosophical themes initiated by Horace in the first book also run through the second, making it more cohesive than previously thought, but only become apparent when we consider them from the particular mindset of the reading circle. I conclude by noting possible extensions for my literary theory in other authors.

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## Prologue

I begin my study of Horace's *Sermones* by turning to the final satire in his two volume collection. It may not have been the last satire that he wrote, but it is certainly the last satire that we read in sequence.<sup>1</sup> It has sometimes been considered anticlimactic and a "poor" finish to his two books of satire (Horace would not return to satire as a genre throughout the rest of his life).<sup>2</sup> But perhaps Horace's satirical subtlety has eluded us, for 2.8 functions as a microcosm of one of the central features of satire, the framing of audience perspective.

S. 2.8 tells the story of the disastrous dinner party of Nasidienus. Horace has not been invited, and so he does not narrate the events in his own voice. Instead, he inquisitively seeks details from his friend, Fundanius. Nor does Fundanius, the comic poet, disappoint, but he relates the entire scene in true comic fashion.<sup>3</sup> Nasidienus, a known acquaintance, has invited Maecenas to a dinner, largely as an attempt to impress him, perhaps to obtain his patronage, and ultimately to improve his station with the rising star, Octavian. But the dinner party goes awry. The dinner starts with exotic delicacies served in strange fashion; all the while Nasidienus prattles on about their preparation. The

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<sup>1</sup> For the purpose of my argument, the exact order of composition of the individual poems is not important. I am more interested in their structure as a completed unit and specifically in the effects of their sequential presentation in performance.

<sup>2</sup> For 2.8 as a poor conclusion see the treatment of Rudd, *Satires of Horace* 213-223.

<sup>3</sup> S. 1.10.40-50 contains the fullest reference to the many members of the reading circle. Fundanius is the first mentioned, and he includes reference to his role as a comic poet within the reading circle. The notion of using Fundanius to narrate what happened at Nasidienus' dinner party also has some important parallels to Plato's *Symposium* which we shall explore in chapter five.

canopy crashes down upon the food, spreading dust everywhere and contaminating the meal (2.8.54-56).<sup>4</sup> Then two of Maecenas' henchmen pour ridicule upon the host, and the guests themselves finally make good their escape as the host tries to stem the damage.


Horace's treatment of this dinner party provides a rare glimpse at the specific seating arrangement of the guests. The participants rested on their sides on the couches around a central table. The table itself had three positions to a side with the fourth side open so that food could be brought. But seating was never haphazard. The host had a customary seat, as did the guest of honor. What is curious about Nasidienus' party is that he has given up the traditional seat of the host to Nomentanus, a lower member of his entourage and hardly worthy of the station (See diagram 1).<sup>5</sup> While most commentators beginning with Rudd have seen this as contributing to Nasidienus' boorishness, I argue for a deeper significance.<sup>6</sup> Because each member of the table lay on his side, each member faces in a particular direction which makes viewing in that direction easy. A participant could easily see across from his place by turning his head only slightly. The seating arrangement creates viewing angles that the host can exploit.

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<sup>4</sup> S. 2.8 has its antecedents in a dinner of Grannius by Lucilius and was one of the most important influences on Petronius' dinner of Trimalchio. For the relationship between Horace S. 2.8 and Petronius, see Petersmann "Maecenas, Nasidienus und Trimalchio," and Coccia "Cena di Nasidieno e cena di Trimalchio." Parallels have even been seen between Horace S. 2.8 and Juvenal 5, see Gosling "By Any Other Name."

<sup>5</sup> On the oddity of the seating practices, see Lejay 583-4, Muecke, *Horace Satires II* 232.

<sup>6</sup> Rudd, *Satires of Horace* 221-22. Muecke, *Horace Satires II* 228.



The poets Varius, Viscus, and Fundanius occupy the three seats on the *summus lectus*. Maecenas is seated with a pair of his ‘shades’ (*umbrae*, members of his retinue who serve as ‘filler’ guests, in Victorian fiction called ‘buffers’) behind him (2.8.22-24). Nasidienus and his associates occupy the *imus lectus*, with Nomentanus whose job is primarily to announce the different varieties of food placed directly in front of Maecenas. The seating arrangement neatly divides Maecenas’ associates from those of Nasidienus. More importantly, the cross-corner interaction between Nasidienus and Maecenas is in full view of the poets reclining opposite on the *summus lectus*. The poets are in a clear position to see everything that happens on the *imus lectus* and *medius lectus*. The poets become viewers (and ultimately the interpreters) of the comic scene between Maecenas with his shades and Nasidienus and his associates, a point that becomes doubly important when we recall that the events themselves are narrated to Horace by Fundanius, one of

the comic poets who sat on the *summus lectus*. Horace's poet-friends find themselves the critics of the dinner, whose applause or ridicule decides the night. The notion of the poets as audience is further emphasized by the fall of the canopy, which, as Caston has rightly showed, can also refer to the lowering of the curtain in a dramatic contest (233-256). In 2.8.54-56, the fall of the canopy leads directly into the critical comments by the guests and their final judgment is expressed through their quick departure. The poet-friends, however, serve as more than mere critics to the events within 2.8. Just as they were introduced during the course of *S.* 1.10 at the close of the first book of satires, they reappear here to approve and commend Horace's satiric enterprise. The judgment of this satiric dinner, and ultimately of Horace's entire poetic oeuvre, by his friends summarizes Horace's satiric enterprise in *Sermones* II and establishes the philosophic and poetic continuity between the two books.

I will argue, then, that satires like 2.8 have special meaning for Horace's immediate circle. This conclusion is built upon my central theoretical claim, that satire orients itself toward an internal audience who share cultural, social, philosophic and/or aesthetic values. It is easy to forget about Horace's poet-friends while reading his satiric works given the complicated array of poetic information that Horace spins into his masterpiece and manages simultaneously. Nevertheless they remain important characters throughout his satiric work, present both within the satires but also outside of them as the initial audience. In the *Sermones*, they are explicitly represented as people who share Horace's outlook on poetry and life and approve his work (1.10.40ff especially).

Moreover, they share important educational similarities with Horace that suggest a like-minded camaraderie.<sup>7</sup> Nasidienus and others like him are outsiders who do not grasp the intricacies of Maecenas' circle.<sup>8</sup> While Maecenas and Nasidienus may share some cultural and social knowledge, at stake is precisely an internal set of cultural and social assumptions that Nasidienus does not fully share (or possibly understand) with the circle of Maecenas. These assumptions form a core part of the social knowledge required to move properly within the social circle of Maecenas.

This more particularized notion of satire better explains how Nasidienus is satirized in 2.8. Scholars have previously expressed puzzlement over the exact moral target, disagreeing over which qualities of Nasidienus are targeted, and sometimes suggesting criticism of Horace's own friends.<sup>9</sup> While a reader-response approach allows

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<sup>7</sup> The closest friends, Vergil, Varius, and Plotius Tucca, were all trained by Philodemus of Gadara. For further elaboration, see chapter two below.

<sup>8</sup> The precise identity of Nasidienus is difficult to piece together. Roos noted that the name appears to be real, and thus opens the possibility that he is, in fact, a real person. Yet, none of the historical figures match our Nasidienus. Another possibility is that the name is in fact genuine, but acts as pseudonym for a recognizable historical figure. Lambinus advanced this theory, suggesting Q. Salvidienus Rufus, initially friendly with Augustus and Agrippa as early as 44, but ultimately put to death in 40 (see Wiseman, *New Men* 258 and Palmer 368-9). I agree with Muecke's assessment that a revival of one so long dead seems odd (*Horace Satires II* 227-28). That leaves one final possibility, championed by Rudd (*Satires of Horace* 222) and Muecke (*Horace Satires II* 227-228), who both ultimately settle on a fictitious character invented particularly for this satire. Nasidienus would therefore be more generally indicative of the kinds of individuals within Roman society that Horace and his compatriots may perceive as outsiders to their group. Also interesting is Berg's suggestion that the mystery gourmand of 2.4 is the same as Nasidienus in 2.8 (141-52), though if her argument is correct, I do not see how it has any significant bearing on Muecke's suggestion whether Nasidienus was a real person or simply a "type." Nor do I think it makes a large difference in how 2.8 works its satiric effect whether Nasidienus were a real person or not. It may also be true that he ideologically represents a viewpoint that is more broadly shared and could thus implicate others within the satire.

<sup>9</sup> Rudd argues that the real point is Nasidienus' vulgarity, stupidity and social ambition (*Satires of Horace* 216ff). Baker argues that the guests' behavior is out of line and is a possible target for the satire (212-32). Duane Smith extends Baker's argument to include not only Nasidienus and Horace's friends as dinner

for several different responses within Roman society, it is difficult to imagine that Horace's own reading circle suspected the poem primarily of criticizing themselves at its first performance. The interpretation of satiric discourse, more than any other kind of discourse, is so grounded in its reception by its audience that it is possible to find numerous targets within a given satire, depending upon which frame we apply in interpreting the work.<sup>10</sup> The question that the interpreter must raise is precisely which frame to emphasize. Satire is a critique of human beliefs and behavior and particularly emphasizes the inconsistency thereof.<sup>11</sup> "To write any kind of literature that argues for 'attractive or even achievable ends for human thought and conduct' presupposes an audience generally agreed on what in human conduct is 'attractive,' as Horace apparently did in aligning himself with 'the great'" (Sibley 66-67). The shared social views of Horace and his reading circle, then, offer a frame from which we can view the poem.

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guests, but also Horace himself and even the reader of the satire as objects of criticism (127-137). I deem this a possibility on some level, as the rest of the dissertation will show. Muecke focuses upon the role of Horace in the satire and its conclusion as a way of clearing Maecenas and his friends of rudeness, but not altogether removing our discomfort (*Horace Satires II* 228).

<sup>10</sup> One generally expressed sentiment is that satire is much like a high pressure fire-hose that someone has turned on but then let go of. The stream flows in a clear direction toward a discernible target, but it may wave about in the process, with plenty of other targets becoming wet incidentally, and it may very well jump entirely from one clear target to the next in very short fashion.

<sup>11</sup> I do not have much to say about the "definition" of satire other than the proverbially dodge common to all scholarly works on satire. Rosenheim's characterization of satire, as an indirect attack on historical particulars, is among the most frequently cited definition in studies on English satire (31-34). Charles Knight states most clearly the basic problem of satiric definition (1, 13). The more specific and detailed a definition, the more reductive, fallacious and incomplete it becomes. A general definition, on the other hand, may incorporate many kinds of satiric discourse, but seem superficial and disconnected from actual texts. Like Knight, I find it more helpful to start with Rosenheim's general definition and then work toward the satire's specific articulation within the texts of Horace. See Brian Connery and Kirk Combe for the diversity of approaches and definitions in recent years (1-15).

How then might Horace and his circle of friends interpret the character of Nasidienus? Nasidienus and presumably many others like him formed their own group dedicated to fine dining that exhibited contrasting customs to Maecenas' and Horace's circles.<sup>12</sup> Supporting the notion that Nasidienus had his own group in just such a fashion is Berg's thesis regarding the mystery gourmand described by Catus in 2.4, namely that it, too, is Nasidienus. Catus and perhaps others are attending a lecture on one set of preferences concerning dining that differ from Horace's and his own reading circle. Nasidienus and those like him are targets at precisely those points where he differs from Horace's circle. This is far more than simple boorishness. The full effect of satire occurs in its relationship to different audiences, who, while sharing some cultural similarities, disagree on other matters, and, in this case, upon dining.

This approach to the satiric interrelations between Horace, his reading circle, and others in their contemporary society represented by Nasidienus requires a nuanced understanding of culture. Culture is not merely the sum of basic knowledge that each member of a society is expected to have, which is so thoroughly ingrained that a given member of the society feels no need to call attention to it. Most works of Classical scholarship analyzing the culture of the Augustan age are interested in the broad contours of culture (Galinsky's *Augustan Culture*, Griffin's *Latin Poets and Roman life*, and even more specifically literary works such as Fantham's *Roman Literary Culture*); these works

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<sup>12</sup> Although many of the details of these customs have since been lost to us, the argumentative structure of book two, which we shall explore more thoroughly in chapter five, suggests that Nasidienus and those like him focus especially on the food itself. The supporting conversations are directed toward the peculiar environments in which the food was caught or upon its obscure preparation. Horace represents an Epicurean position focused upon simple fare and profound philosophical conversation.

strike at such a broad definition of culture that it is frequently not very useful in explaining the nuances of what happens within satire. This basic definition of culture may be the first that springs to mind when scholars far separated from Greece and Rome explore those cultures for their unique qualities. It is, however, for our purposes, an incomplete picture. Defining culture is more than merely making a distinction between Roman or non-Roman. Certainly some of the material in Horace's *Sermones* was broadly accessible to nearly all Romans, but to interpret the satires in terms of a singular unified and homogenous Roman society elides the most important operative effects of the satire. Satire loses its potency if Romans are merely poking fun at foreigners who may never get the chance to interact with the satire. Rather, I build upon Lotman's definition of culture as "the totality of non-hereditary information acquired, preserved, and transmitted by the various groups of human society."<sup>13</sup> These various groups within the same culture can interpret the same set of non-hereditary information differently, thus generating disagreement within the culture itself. Satire participates in the debates through which a culture works out its disagreements; its main targets are not exotic foreigners but different groups within its own society that have processed their inherited wisdom differently. This view of culture is more closely expressed in James Davidson's *Courtesans and Fishcakes*, whose own interest in the consumptive habits of Athens is based on the premise that people talk the most about those issues that are, in fact, the least settled and thus over which the culture has some kind of disagreement. Satire and

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<sup>13</sup> Lotman, "Problems in the Typology of Culture" 213.

aggressive comedy such as we find in Aristophanes' plays exploit this disagreement within society by taking a stand for one set of cultural positions against others.<sup>14</sup>

A further parallel can perhaps be illustrated in the debates that happened over the centuries between philosophy and rhetoric, as demonstrated, for example, in Michele Ronnick's treatment of "Substructural Elements and Architectonic Rhetoric and Philosophical Thought in Fronto's Epistles." She notes that Plato had associated rhetoric with sophistry in the *Gorgias*. Yet rhetorical training based on Greek learning became a major part of serious Roman schooling while philosophical training was somewhat suspect (131), although it did encourage members to study philosophy in order to appear cultivated (132). Cicero acts as a bridge-point in encouraging a study of both, which offers his own unique contribution to the multi-century-long debate about the appropriate place of both in first Greek society and then later in Roman society. Although Ronnick, like Davidson, does not articulate an idea of "culture" as a form of conflict, the idea of defining culture in terms of the debates between its members is nevertheless latent within her presentation and gestures toward the more explicit articulation that I offer here.

Within a given society, different groups process cultural values differently, thereby creating different sub-cultures.<sup>15</sup> Culture can thus be seen more dynamically as

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<sup>14</sup> Another interesting parallel is Andrew Dalby's *Empire of Pleasures*, which analyzes luxury in the Imperial period along many of the same lines as Davidson's *Courtesans and Fishcakes*. Although Dalby's work is useful for hypothesizing some of the cultural background that an ancient Roman reader may have had in mind while approaching Horace's second book of *Sermones*, I found its approach theoretically less useful than Davidson's.

the intense debates that occur within a society as a result of disagreement over the proper interpretation of the conflicting mass of “non-hereditary information,” in Lotman’s definition above. What most succinctly and best characterize a culture are the fiercely raging debates, whether cultural, social or philosophical. Cultural knowledge is not stable, but under fierce negotiation by various members of its society. The term “culture wars,” although originally and recently used to characterize the differing positions on social issues in contemporary American society, aptly characterizes the ongoing debates of any society and age. The debated subjects change from culture to culture and from epoch to epoch, but within each culture and epoch such debates happen universally. Satire operates within a cultural framework as a participant in those debates.<sup>16</sup>

This is perhaps easiest to see in our own contemporary society and in particular in how contemporary satire operates. We do not write satires today criticizing foreigners from the isolated hills of some Pacific island, or the deep jungles of South America, or the African safari. There is simply no stake there, nothing to gain by making such a

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<sup>15</sup> I derive this notion from Gutleben, who is more concerned with diachronic cultural changes and their implications for the genre of satire, but nevertheless remains useful for understanding how satire participates in society’s broader cultural disputes (see especially 153-4).

<sup>16</sup> A good example comes from Juvenal’s third satire. The vehement criticism of the infiltration of Greek customs into Rome is not necessarily about being anti-Greek so much as reflecting one side of an ongoing argument within Roman culture over its relationship to Greek influence and ideas. As such, it participates in one of the most virulent cultural arguments in Roman antiquity: to what degree can those who are truly Roman accommodate Greek influences and yet remain Roman? While foreign influences are deprecated, it is primarily about Romans and Roman cultural phenomena; the insiders and outsiders are participants *within* Roman society, but whose positions are mutually exclusive. Gay Sibley analyzes Varro and Lucilius as satiric counterweights to an advancing Hellenism. Thomas Habinek also discusses “culture wars” in the first century B.C.E., but he analyzes them solely from the perspective of the Italian question (*The Politics of Latin Literature* 88-102).

criticism. What we do satirize are those sub-groups of our own society who share similar kinds of cultural values but who process, organize, and align those values somewhat differently from ourselves and with whom we see ourselves in direct competition.

Certainly some aspects of culture are fixed and everyone accepts them. Cultural codes include a framework of rules that operate in the background, and according to which one must act in order to be taken seriously. A politician, for example, cannot say that s/he would like to ditch the constitution entirely as a basis for adjudicating American political life. What they can do within that frame of values is provide alternative and disagreeing interpretations; thus the core value of the constitution cannot be disputed, but one can endeavor to show that one's political affiliation is most in accordance with it and that one's opponent's viewpoints are inconsistent with the values expressed therein.

Although some fringe elements may exist, they rarely have such currency that we bother satirizing them. More frequently, we criticize other members of society whose viewpoints contribute to those debates that we deem most important. Each historical epoch has had one or more groups in direct competition for power in a society, and some of the important "values" of the culture were subject to fierce debate. The values themselves remained in the background, unquestioned, but what they did seek to show was that their own group was most consistent with this set of values. Although this detour has taken us far afield from Horace, it is helpful to examine contemporary satire and its relations, since much of the context of performance and function still remain visible. It is fair, then, to raise the question of how exactly these features of performance

may have manifested themselves in the past where the context of performance and much of the intensity of the cultural debates has been lost to us.

The same kind of phenomenon can be demonstrated with respect to the very traditional Roman society, which showed enormous respect for the *mos maiorum*. The *mos maiorum* provides the summation of the values of Roman society and the contours in which debate can and must occur.<sup>17</sup> A Roman politician cannot credibly ditch the *mos maiorum*; they have to show themselves to be in accordance with it. The stories which comprise the *mos maiorum* are, however, nebulous enough to allow quite a range of interpretation and repositioning among the major participants in broad Roman culture. Returning to 2.8 momentarily, Horace criticizes Nasidienus not only for simple ignorance of how to please Maecenas, but he further indicts many others in his contemporary Roman society who differ on what constitutes a good meal. Nasidienus is not a really weird foreigner. He may be exaggerated into such a picture within the confines of satire, but there is no stake in criticizing a foreigner to Roman society. Rather, he represents a viewpoint within Roman society that has gained enough cultural power that Horace can expect his audience (at least his close inner reading circle, but perhaps others beyond it as well) to recognize it and to laugh accordingly. This does not mean that Nasidienus' view on dining was, by any means, a dominant viewpoint, but merely one that had a significant following that it could be recognized distinctly among the cultural elite of Horace's day.

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<sup>17</sup> For elaborate treatment of the place of the *mos maiorum* within Roman society, see Hölkeskamp. The *mos maiorum* had a strong enough cultural hold upon the Romans that Augustus chose to frame his own comprehensive reforms as a form of piety. See Thornton and Thornton 106, Kenny, *Age of Augustus* 42, and Jones and Sidwell 132 for further elaboration of this process.

As I will reiterate throughout, 2.8 achieves its fullest resonance when we consider that its first audience consisted of Maecenas and his literary circle. This circle possessed an important place in the political landscape of the late Republic and early Empire through close political connections to Augustus through Maecenas. Thus, these men have clear stakes in the cultural debates of the day and in negotiation with the other parties for leveraging their cultural power over broader Roman society. Although Nasidienus may seem trivial today, his triviality may stem from our own reductive tendency to view Roman society through the lens of power, which does leave behind substantial evidence, and through which Nasidienus appears a “nobody” (Cf. Freudenburg, *Satires of Rome*). This view would seem to demolish much of the expressive potential of satire, which may contribute to our later evaluations of *Sermones* II as less successful than *Sermones* I, and 2.8 as an ill-fitting conclusion not only to the second book but to Horace’s satiric oeuvre.

That satire is thoroughly grounded in the particulars of a unique historical and cultural context is a dominant theoretical belief in current satire studies.<sup>18</sup> I contend, however, that previous research has missed the fullest significance of a reader-oriented, culturally-embedded approach to satire. It is not my purpose here in the prologue to sketch out this theoretical formulation, as that will have to wait until chapter one. A brief

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<sup>18</sup> Keane’s *Figuring Genre* is an excellent example of a study that closely examines the embeddedness of different cultural institutions within satire. Her study focuses upon how satire postures itself from the perspective of these cultural institutions (teaching, law courts, and drama) in order to more effectively deliver its critique. Consider also Edward Rosenheim’s definition of satire cited above as an attack upon cultural particulars.

history of scholarship will suffice for now. Most serious studies of satire today acknowledge the importance of the poet's *persona*.<sup>19</sup> The poet does not make factual statements about his life and may only incidentally give his own personal opinions. Rather, he speaks through a fabricated character and delivers a biased critique of society from within the confines of that fabricated character. *Persona* theory arose in response to earlier biographical approaches that showed no such distinction between the poet's statements and his real opinions.<sup>20</sup> The one glaring weakness of *persona* theory is the tendency to stop at merely identifying the *persona* without making any further critical reevaluation of what it adds as an element of satire.<sup>21</sup> More significantly, the tendency to push against earlier forms of criticism is so strong in studies on Classical satire that we have no clearly articulated theory that explains how a satiric author can both have a *persona* and speak seriously.<sup>22</sup>

Recent work has begun looking beyond *persona*. Most studies, shying away from a comprehensive theoretical formulation, have traced a particular theme or concept

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<sup>19</sup> First introduced by W.S. Anderson "The Roman Socrates: Horace and His *Satires*."

<sup>20</sup> Rudd's *Satires of Horace*, and even Courtney's recent "The Two Books of Satires" have little to say about the *persona* and frequently veer into biographical territory. Courtney in particular cites Rudd and Fraenkel with much praise. He offers as an assessment of current literary theory of satire, "Nowadays it is inevitable that there has been an efflorescence of manic, undisciplined, self-indulgent over-interpretation (through 'interpretation' is hardly the right word); no space is wasted on this." Courtney's article does have significant merit in illuminating much of the historical context that surrounds and informs Horace's *Sermones*.

<sup>21</sup> Freudenburg ("Horatius Anceps") makes this criticism as well, and meditates on one possible path forward. I suggest another in this dissertation.

<sup>22</sup> Ralph Rosen's *Making Mockery* argues for an interpretive scheme that privileges fictionalized mockery as non-serious and non-hurtful. I will more to say about his approach in chapter one.

through satire, such as freedom (Freudenburg, *Satires of Rome*),<sup>23</sup> power relations (Schlegel, *Satire and the Threat of Speech*),<sup>24</sup> humor (Plaza, *Function of Humour in Roman Verse Satire*),<sup>25</sup> or have applied a heavy external theoretical lens not necessarily with a goal of deriving a theory of satire (Sharland, *Horace in Dialogue*).<sup>26</sup> In analyzing the ambiguity of satiric humor, Plaza observes that humor can powerfully cement bonds within a community. Ultimately, the operative effect of satire in articulating itself towards an internal like-minded audience is parasitic on the basic nature of a humorous

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<sup>23</sup> Freudenburg offers a comprehensive treatment of all three verse satirists (Horace, Persius, Juvenal) from the standpoint of free speech. Increasing totalitarian constraint influences what they can say. Each also has a “Lucilian” problem in that Lucilius could deliver his critiques openly and bluntly while they remain limited in some fashion. While I do not doubt that these perceptions are resonant within the texts, the entire approach only seems possible from within our own two-thousand year detachment from those satires. It seems unlikely that many (if any) ancient readers of satires would view them in quite this way.

<sup>24</sup> Schlegel examines violence as a satiric paradigm within Horace’s first book of *Sermones*. The satirist is an inverse praise poet. Problematic, however, is her conceptualization of the theory of satire. She posits an antagonistic relationship to the audience that sets the satirist apart from the community. Distinguishing the satiric speaker from the poet too sharply, she creates confusion in her understanding of “audience.” The satiric speaker certainly does posit a much more antagonistic relationship with the audience than the satire imagines for itself. But this audience may differ from both the author’s intended and the poem’s actual audience. The study as a whole strikes one as highly reductionist, a trait shared with many scholarly studies of satires. She does, however, correctly note that the weakness of earlier *persona* studies is that it is entirely too easy to see the work of satire as fraudulent.

<sup>25</sup> Plaza does not concern herself with a theory of humor or of satire, but merely to describe the different kinds of humor employed in satire. She lays out several theories of humor, ultimately agreeing with an “Incongruity” theory of humor, in which humor resides in mismatching two components. The incongruity in Horace appears chiefly in his presenting a warm and friendly surface with a more serious and sinister aggressiveness lurking beneath it, a position also supported by Freudenburg (*Satires of Rome*) and Oliensis (*Horace and the Rhetoric of Authority*), and which I also support. Plaza attributes the inability of scholars to agree on the moral message of satire to the ambivalence implicit within humor. Humor often clouds, and sometimes undercuts the message of a satire.

<sup>26</sup> Sharland’s Bakhtinian reading has some useful parallels for the theory that I will develop here in that Bakhtin focuses upon dialogism and the polyphony of voices contained within a work. Each satire contains within it several competing voices, or perspectives. It is altogether possible that a diverse audience could select and emphasize different parts of these competing voices. I believe my own emphasis on reader response and performativity is complementary with Sharland’s approach.

joke. Closest to my own theoretical views is the work of Keane, who focuses upon satiric performance, a key trait shared with contemporary studies on English satire (e.g. C. Knight, *The Literature of Satire*; Rabb, *Satire and Secrecy*). She laments that, at this time, *persona* theory is the only theoretical approach used to discuss the entire genre in all its phases, thus echoing the need for further theoretical work that can be critically applied to all satiric texts (137). The satirist is an “observer” of human behavior and in society, whose role is largely passive (8-12).<sup>27</sup> This satirist, then, participates in the major institutions of his day, such as teaching, law and drama. The implications of satiric performance, however, extend even further. Whereas Keane’s satirist is passive, I see the poet-satirist as active within the cultural debates of his own society. Rather than merely observing and commenting upon society around him as a passive member who reflects the cultural disagreement around him, I prefer to explore the poet as a participant in societal debates.

My dissertation consists of closely examining the literary circle of poets that surrounded Maecenas, their interactions, influence and mutual relationships, especially as concerns philosophy as one of the most basic aspects of a human being. I am not using philosophy in the sense of a rigorous system of carefully constructed arguments, but as the framework in which worldview is produced and understood. Each human being possesses a worldview, whether rigorously and intellectually examined, or subconsciously imbibed from our historicized situation, or most likely, a combination of

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<sup>27</sup> Keane shares with Schlegel the tendency to force a sharp distinction between the poet and the satiric speaker. “Satirist” here refers to the poet as speaker.

the two, as all knowledge is in some sense socialized knowledge. The philosophical preferences of Horace and his reading circle form a key part of their worldview.

The first chapter explores the history of Classical scholarship on Roman satire and Horace more particularly. Here, I examine the theoretical framework that undergirds much of the present scholarly work on satire. Much as Anderson sought inspiration from Kernan in studies upon English satire, I, too, have turned to contemporary scholars on English satire to apply new theoretical perspectives to the study of Roman satire. The tendency to push against biographical criticism is so strong that we may, in fact, be in danger of becoming mired in the opposing vice. Although recent studies have started to shake free from this trend, more must be done to return us to a mean in our interpretive approach to satire. Thus, I incorporate much of the theory that animates scholarship on English satire in the present day in my presentation for chapter one. I argue for a theory based on reader response and performativity.

This intersection between literary reading circle and philosophic worldview is explored in chapter two. Here I build the social argument for reading the satiric work in precisely the fashion spelled out by my theory in chapter one. First, I examine the notion of a reading circle, especially literary circles in Horace's day and those members who are known and close to Horace. Philodemus, whose unique Epicureanism was influential upon Horace and Maecenas' literary circle, provides important and critical background that links the notion of a reading group to that of serious philosophy. I also address the attitude frequently taken toward philosophy, namely that Romans were relatively non-

serious in their application of it. Philosophical references from Cicero's speeches and correspondence provide evidence for social perceptions of philosophy within Roman culture as well as their actual practices.

Chapter three turns to Horace's first book of *Sermones*, which more directly and openly orients itself as a conversation with Maeceans and the literary circle. Epicurean ideas are introduced periodically and typically praised, while several other philosophical schools, especially Stoics, are denigrated. Much more work has been done on *Sermones* I, and thus much of this chapter surveys previous work with my own brief contributions for how an Epicurean insider of Maecenas' circle might have read these satires as opposed to a Stoic, or even the general upper-class Roman male.

The final two chapters turn towards the less appreciated book two. One of the more difficult problems with the satires of Horace is the shift in tone, feel, *persona* and style from book one to book two. Yet in the midst of these shifts, I argue that the orientation of the satires remains toward Horace's reading circle. Thus, book two crystallizes the themes developed in book one. Chapter four focuses on 2.1, 2.3, 2.5 and 2.7. *Sermo* 2.1 emphasizes the continuity with book one, while the two so-called diatribe satires (2.3 and 2.7), delivered by new interlocutors, not Horace himself, are thoroughly drenched in the social perceptions of the philosophical schools. Philosophical ideas are not explicit in 2.1 and 2.5, but neither are they entirely absent. The primary question involves discerning how an early Epicurean-leaning audience would have approached these poems.

Chapter five focuses upon the so-called food satires of book two, the even numbered satires (2.2, 2.4, 2.6, 2.8). Food is a central topic in morality, but also necessary for the continuation of human life, so that even a small dinner has significant cultural and philosophical overtones. Appropriate dining is a culturally constructed value category; thus Horace is not merely dabbling in trivial matters when he addresses the subject of dining through these satires. The satires themselves present a myriad of perspectives, with Horace's own voice barely present except for short spurts. Two of the presentations, 2.2 and 2.6, comes across more favorably and are contrasted with the the vision of dining shown in 2.4 and 2.8 where outsider to Horace's reading circle offer presentations on their own dining preferences. Fine dining becomes the tangible visible embodiment of the philosophical values promoted by the speaker, and criticized by the satirist in support of his own preferences.

I conclude the dissertation by summarizing my findings and making suggestions for how this methodology is widely applicable, not merely for Horace but for Persius and Juvenal as well. Indeed I contend that the theory can broadly be applied to any text that is in some sense satirical. Through my methodology, I hope to show that philosophical ideas assume a greater prominence in Horace's text than scholars have given them credit for, and that they were vital to the first audience's understanding. All readers, including ourselves, read with certain presuppositions and biases in mind. Indeed, we cannot read any other way than to incorporate the sum of what we know into the process of deciphering what the text before us means. Horace's early audience knew philosophy

well, even schools with which they had little agreement, and were therefore capable of recognizing the transference of those philosophical ideas into a literary text, into a character and story where they are more accessible to the lay person of those days than they are to many experts today.

# **Chapter 1: The Nature of Satire in the Scholarship of Classical and English Satire, and the Theoretical Case for Pursuing Epicureanism as a Central Feature of the Interpretation of Horace's *Sermones***

## **Introduction**

In the prologue, I noted that though satire is regarded as thoroughly grounded in the particulars of a unique historical and cultural context, previous research has missed the fullest significance of this approach. It is my purpose in this chapter to sketch out the history of scholarship on satire in order to elaborate the current *communis opinio* on satiric theory, to provide some comparison with studies on English satire for their different emphases and tone, and to explain how my own formulation, to be employed in this study, builds upon the work of both Classics and English satire.

The most central question to theoretical studies on satire is what exactly is it? Yet this question has no easy answer, and most studies on satire shy away from directly engaging it. Satire is complex enough that the study of it bears certain similarities to the parable about blind men groping an elephant.<sup>28</sup> One blind man put his hand to the elephant's flank and claimed it was like a wall. The second grasped the tail and claimed it was like a snake. A third grasped the trunk and thought it was a tree branch. The fourth touched a leg and claimed it was like a pillar. Satire may very well be complex enough that we see only a portion of the truth at any given time. As we shall see in the survey to follow, our vision as scholars has frequently been myopic, focusing on one or two crucial aspects while neglecting or ignoring others. While such studies often yield

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<sup>28</sup> The parable originated on the Indian sub-continent and has since been told in numerous versions to illustrate several different points concerning the nature of truth.

helpful observations, they may remain partial nonetheless. How we answer preliminary questions about the nature, scope, and purpose of satire ultimately determine how we interpret a satirical text. We can only arrive at theories by comparing notes. The best theory will be the one that explains the most features satisfactorily.

In the first portion of this chapter, I undertake a survey of the history of scholarship on satire. First, we look at one critical early question that carries implications to this day: Is satire a purely artistic or “aesthetic” exercise, or does it have serious social, moral or political implications as well?<sup>29</sup> I then examine the history of *persona* theory, the dominant theoretical viewpoint in classical scholarship on satire for the past fifty years. *Persona* theory was originally intended to address two problems. First, rather than seeing satire as a purely aesthetic exercise, or conversely, purely as a moral/political exercise, it was intended to resolve that dilemma by allowing a serious critique of society made through the lens of rhetorical techniques and sophistication. Second, it offered a necessary corrective to biographical criticism, a natural yet potentially naïve way of reading satire. Biographical criticism takes the words of a satiric text at face value, expecting them to reflect the genuine attitudes and beliefs of the speaker. It seeks to reconstruct the author’s personal life and attitudes from the text itself, as if the poet’s real self were actually recoverable in some sense in the text. It is my contention that *persona* theory, at least in studies in Classical satire, has frequently

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<sup>29</sup> Because the notion of “aesthetic” readings, especially of poetry, may have different senses, we shall need to define this usage further later.

led to falling back into an aesthetic approach.<sup>30</sup> Much in scholarship examines the rhetorical and poetic effects of a satire, while little progress has been made in linking the gains of rhetorical analysis and the aesthetic approach through *persona* theory into a comprehensive theory of how satire functions seriously in society. The demon of biographical criticism lurks in the background, threatening any interpretation that touches too closely on material reality.

In the second portion of this chapter, I illustrate some of the limitations in the present application of *persona* theory by focusing on contemporary and historical satires where more of the context of performance and reception is available. Recognizing the *persona* is critical to understanding all of these satires. For contemporary satire, we do this effortlessly and unconsciously. No one seriously troubles themselves with merely identifying the *persona* of a contemporary satire. Rather, the *persona* is part of the key to unlocking and decoding the message. I also explore how these satires also prompt a variety of “serious” responses from their audiences, including potential misrecognition that satire is even happening. This feature of satire requires an explanation. Although a few scholars have noted places where a satirist seems to be playing an interpretive game of misrecognition with the audience, none have offered a systematic and comprehensive theoretical explanation of how this phenomenon functions or why it works as it does. Meanwhile recent scholarship on English satire has attempted to explain this

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<sup>30</sup> Notable exceptions include Gowers “Fragments of Autobiography,” and Armstrong “Social Foundations,” and even Anderson “Horace’s Friendship.”

phenomenon through some theoretical advances in performance and reader response criticism.

In the third portion of the chapter, I develop a theory of satire to answer these problems and apply it to Horace's *Sermones*. Scholarship on Classical satire has focused on a single idealized reader of the text, thereby missing what is perfectly obvious from the reception of more recent satires, namely that one of satire's critical effects is the play that goes on between potential audiences that make different (and usually mutually contradictory) responses to the text. The target of a satire is not merely the particular actions that are being satirized directly in the course of the poem. Also satirized are the possible responses to a satire that are effected through misdirection. Hence, my theory attempts to incorporate multiple views in that it integrates *persona* theory and rhetorical sophistication with the concepts of performance and cultural theory. In other words, by taking "reader response" more seriously, it argues for a layered reading of the ancient text with both social reality and aesthetic effect in view. Culture is not fixed, but under negotiation, as I argued in the prologue. Satire participates in those debates and orients itself toward an internal and like-minded group. Philosophy is one such aspect of culture that offers quite a bit of disagreement and range for response. In the end, I propose that this type of dynamic reading can better explain the role of Epicurean philosophy within Horace's text.

### **History of Scholarship on Roman and English Satire**

Satire started to come into prominence as a topic of literary study in the nineteen-fifties and sixties. Early theorists concerned themselves with the basic question of whether satire was a moral and/or political exercise or purely artistic achievement. This first position sees a more serious role for satire to play in society, directly engaging the morals of the day and participating in the political process. The second dismisses the moral critique and prefers to examine the satire primarily as comedy with intent to generate laughter through the poet's artistry. Where a scholar sides on this dilemma is important for determining the kind of interpretative work that scholar will carry out and ultimately in pre-determining many of their final conclusions. Tornskaya and Highet championed the seriousness of the moral and political comments provided in a satire, while Worcester and Frye argued for satire as an artistic and aesthetic enterprise.<sup>31</sup> One path out of this polarized position emerged in the work of Lionel Duisit and Michael Seidel who emphasized satire as a mode of discourse. It can thus be literary and more aesthetic at one time, and more non-literary and serious at another time.<sup>32</sup> A second resolution to the dilemma emerged in the work of Alvin Kernan, whose influential work, *The Cankered Muse*, argued that satire's focus upon moral questions is paradoxically an essential element of its artistry.

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<sup>31</sup> Tornskaya, *Die deutsche Prosasatire der Aufklärung*. Highet, *The Anatomy of Satire*. My survey of the history of satiric theory in studies of English satire follows closely the work of Stephanie Hammer 3-12.

<sup>32</sup> The distinction between satire as a genre and as a mode of discourse has been particularly influential throughout English studies of satire, but rarely receives any comment by scholars of Classical satire. This seems logical, however, in that much of what we typically call Classical satire is also clearly conceptualized as the genre satire.

Literary studies on Classical satire also struggled through the same problem of weighing the aesthetic (humorous) and moral/political (serious) concerns of satire, though they have shown a much stronger tendency to push against serious interpretations than scholarship in English satire. Biographical critics emphasized the formalistic elements of satire, as if it had a clear generic structure. Moreover, by emphasizing the seriousness of the critique, it was easy to see the speaker as sincere and impassioned. The real target of the satire was whatever vice the satirist was attacking, and there was little need to look beyond it. Satire itself was a “low” genre, an impression garnered from Horace himself, whose fourth satire in *Sermones* I put forth the proposition that satire might not really be poetry, as its diction is consistently pedestrian (cf. 2.6.17), a far cry from the high-sounding idiom of Vergil’s *Aeneid*. The colloquial diction only further reinforced its sincerity. Rudd’s *Satires of Horace*, the first modern book-length critical study of Horace’s *Sermones*, offered much insight into the Roman society beyond the text but reflected many of the biographical concerns and showed little interest for any criticism beyond that offered by the speaker in each poem. This approach, based on the seriousness of the satiric critique, led Hight in particular to explain Juvenal’s rage in his poems on the basis of personal life experiences.

The first major step in the process leading to the theoretical climate of the present day came through the work of W.S. Anderson, who imported the study of the poet’s *persona* from Kernan’s *Cankered Muse*, and thereby salvaged scholarship from the superficiality of biographical criticism. Anderson was the first modern representative in

Classical scholarship to view satire as having an extraordinary and carefully polished literary artistry. While the poet claims to speak plainly, simply and sincerely, his discourse is, in fact, characterized by a high degree of rhetorical sophistication. One such aspect of rhetorical sophistication is the poet's *persona*, or mask. Rather than speaking sincerely and delivering his own thoughts, the poet displaces them onto a fabricated character who delivers the critique of the poems. This fabricated character need not represent the actual beliefs of the poet.

Anderson's work created an opportunity for extensive study of Roman satire as a more respectable and highly intelligent genre and not merely a low genre which could be read for its Classical heritage but little else. No longer would scholars try to explain the hatred of Juvenal through his past experiences, but they would understand him as constructing a particular kind of *persona* that would be effective at critiquing vices. Anderson identified Horace's *persona* as that of the Roman Socrates.<sup>33</sup> In contrast to Juvenal, Horace is more detached and seems content to poke fun at human foibles rather than ranting, much as Socrates twisted the words of his interlocutors until they contradicted themselves, and thus came to see morality clearer. By identifying Horace as a kind of Socrates, a serious moral figure in his own right, Anderson follows Kernan's assumption that satire's serious moral and aesthetic components need not be mutually exclusive. Horace, like Socrates, promotes upright behavior, but mediates it through an apparently detached philosophical critique.

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<sup>33</sup> "The Roman Socrates," was first published in 1963, though I refer throughout to the collection of Anderson's previous articles contained in his 1982 book, *Essays on Roman Satire*.

Where Anderson saw a consistent *persona* cultivated by Horace, Zetzel (“Horace’s *Liber Sermonum*”) noticed differences in the performance from poem to poem and interpreted these differences as a progression in Horace from one satire to the next in sequence. The same *persona* seems to make the critique of 1.1-4, but 1.5 features a different *persona*; then a new *persona* delivers each of 1.6-1.8. Here, the primary implication of his focus upon multiple and different *personae* is the realization that none of them can ever provide a complete picture of Horace. Following Zetzel, Freudenburg focused primarily upon the first four satires in book one, where Horace plays an inept peddler of philosophic wares, straight from the tradition of the Stoic-Cynic diatribist. “The Satirist is a philosopher, but not a philosopher who demands respect for being original, well read, or polished” (*Walking Muse* 11). Like Anderson, Freudenburg’s study emphasizes the rhetorical sophistication of Horace in constructing his *personae* and satiric critiques, but unlike Anderson, he sees no real didactic intent or ethical mission. The criticism is not directed so much at the greedy or sexually devious as against the ineptitude of the satiric speaker. While this approach has borne much fruit, Freudenburg would later note, “The idea of writing as performance has to be taken the whole way--- Satire’s enactment happens at the point of reception” (“Introduction” 29).<sup>34</sup>

More recently Freudenburg has noted that one of the major weaknesses of *persona* criticism is that it has frequently stopped at merely identifying the *persona* (“Horatius Anceps” 271-272). In much satire criticism, the *persona* is justifiably seen as

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<sup>34</sup> Keane (*Figuring Genre*) also moves in the direction of integrating performance, *persona* and the cultural situation of satire.

being ridiculous or an object of derision.<sup>35</sup> Thus scholars frequently stop their criticism at the point of identifying what kind of *persona* the poet is playing, as if the entirety of what makes a text satirical has been fully explained.<sup>36</sup> This eminently reasonable observation carries an important side effect. By emphasizing the rhetorical sophistication of the poet, one can easily be swept into dismissing any serious intent or effect altogether, as if the ultimate goal of the satire is simply to laugh at the *persona* and then proceed upon our merry way.<sup>37</sup> This application of *persona* theory may result in minimizing or dismissing any real effects of a satiric text upon the society around it. These are standard features of the aesthetic approach outlined earlier. Christiane Bohnert laments that “today’s scholarship on satire tends to turn the aesthetic approach into a universal imperative valid for every text supposed to be a satire wherever and whenever it may have been composed.”<sup>38</sup> She is, of course, speaking of some of the trends within English

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<sup>35</sup> Juvenal seems to attract this kind of attention much more than Horace, but it has been equally easy to see many of Horace’s *personae* as the primary butt of a given satire. For example, consider that Turpin identifies the speaker in the first three satires as an Epicurean parasite, which invites us to consider the comic overtones, potentially laughing at the Epicureans and their ideas rather than considering how Epicurean ideas in the text may interact with a broader Epicurean audience.

<sup>36</sup> Braund’s *Roman Satirists and Their Masks* represents an important early work incorporating *persona* analysis; it advanced our understanding of *persona* theory by grouping the various potential masks of all four verse satirists (Lucilius, Horace, Persius, Juvenal) according to type. Yet this type of analysis is too general and does not go far enough, as Freudenburg (“Horatius Anceps”) generally suggests. Freudenburg is also careful to note that his own *Walking Muse* falls into the same trap at times and that he will even fall into the trap within the same article in which he makes this confession (“Horatius Anceps” 271-72)

<sup>37</sup> While Ralph Rosen’s *Making Mockery* is revolutionary in its attempt to present a systematic account of ancient satiric theory, it nevertheless operates under the assumption that satire exists merely to generate a laugh. This theoretical assumption, I suspect, is what drove Silk, in his review of Rosen’s book, to lament the “Andersonization” of the scholarship on Roman satire (10).

<sup>38</sup> 151-172. I cite Bohnert to illustrate that my concern is more widely echoed concerning English satire. In general, I find the polemic between rhetorical and biographical criticism to be less pronounced in

satire of her time (1990s), but the same contention is more broadly true of scholarship on Classical satire.

Thus, despite Kernan's intent to present *persona* theory as a path through the dilemma between the serious and aesthetic approaches to satire, in fact, scholars have been quick to use the emphasis upon the artifice and rhetorical sophistication of the poet to minimize any kind of relevance outside of the text itself. The fixation upon the aesthetic approach in Classical satire is at least understandable. The few extant satirical texts and the dearth of information about their original performances and effect upon society make it easier to focus on classical satire as excellent poetry divorced from any other concerns. But several observations complicate our understanding of the *persona's* function within a satire and consequently the goal of producing merely laughter.

First, Western civilization has been dominated by the common-sense notion of a unified and indivisible self. A strong sense of unity impels us to seek unity in our literary texts and in other individuals. Thus Anderson pursues the idea of a single *persona* and even Zetzel prefers to see progression and development within Horace's satires.<sup>39</sup> A unified personality yields a unified *persona*. Modern cognitive psychology has shown, however, that this unity is largely illusory (cf. Lakoff 14-15). Individual humans perceive themselves as holding a consistent set of beliefs from one minute to the next, upon which they act in a rational fashion. Coincidentally, it is everyone else who

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scholarship on English satire. Nearly every contemporary study on Classical satire pushes against the notion of biographical criticism.

<sup>39</sup> The assumption of a unified rational human being in the present day is not even remotely close to dead.

acts inconsistently and irrationally. Instead of this consistency of thought and action, Lakoff notes that specific cognitive frames of reference drive our actions in particular situations. These frames derive from larger cultural forces within society.<sup>40</sup> Applying a particular frame happens effortlessly, instantaneously and subconsciously, thus giving the individual the illusion of acting consistently. Moreover, an individual may apply one particular frame in one situation and an opposing frame in the next. Others in society might perceive this as an inconsistency, despite the protestations from the individual that the two are non-contradictory.

But inconsistency is precisely what satire exposes best. When scholars attempt to drive a sharp wedge between *persona* and poet, an important aspect of satire is lost. After all, Highet responded to Anderson that the inconsistencies in Juvenal's *persona* might be nothing more than inconsistencies in Juvenal himself, a perceptive comment that reflects (perhaps accidentally) the present state of cognitive psychology ("Masks and Faces in Satire" 321-37).

At stake is the degree to which the fabricated self can and should be disentangled from the real person, especially when it is also an object or creation of artistic expression. The concept of the *persona* need not be applied solely to literature; each human being can

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<sup>40</sup> Lakoff is interested in analyzing the subconscious structures of contemporary American politics and is concerned with two overarching themes which he terms the "strict father frame" and the "nurturant parent frame." Underneath these frames, he subsumes many sub-frames, which would correspond to the hierarchy of values in each over-arching frame. For Lakoff, it is entirely possible that an individual conducts his/her home life in one frame, their work life in another, and their political views as a mixture of the two. A possible avenue for future research would include analyzing the relationship between Roman political structure and Roman family values according to the template that Lakoff has offered, especially with the purpose of drawing out the contrasts with those today.

be seen as constructing a series of *personae* as they move through life.<sup>41</sup> Each situation requires a culturally appropriate role to be played, yet we do not dismiss everyone as mere *personae*.<sup>42</sup> Freudenburg's main point in his most recent theoretical assessment of *persona* theory echoes my concerns here, by noting emphatically throughout his piece that Horace (and other poets as well) can hardly be anything other than a mask, and that the ultimate problem with the term *persona* or "mask" is the implicit assumption that the mask can be taken off to reveal the poet's true appearance ("Horatius Anceps" 284). Such is not possible, especially within poetry, and for a scholar to approach the *persona*/mask of the poet with the intent of unmasking them is to miss something critical and also very basic not only about poetry, but also about human existence.

On the other hand, I wish to extend Freudenburg's observations by making reference to the masks we wear in real life (if it can even be called that). The observation itself is not too difficult to grasp, as in our times, novels, movies, and other basic "story" material frequently use the mask as a symbol for the degree to which ordinary humans cover up parts of ourselves, often in a self-protective fashion, in a myriad of situations. Wear a mask for long enough, and you run the risk of becoming the mask. At some level, the problem of the mask can be taken too far, such that we are left without the possibility of knowing anything reliably about anyone we encounter, whether it be those

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<sup>41</sup> This is most apparent to the academic mind when one enters the classroom and assumes a role in front of the students while teaching.

<sup>42</sup> Indeed, there is quite the range of responses to the masks that others present to us. Satire provokes an equally diverse range of responses.

around us or those we encounter in a text, whether Horace or Swift. Yet, we can also observe that the vast majority of people move through life unbothered by such distinctions. Although we can sometimes notice when another person is putting up a front, and we are highly sensitive to those we think are being phony, it is simply impossible to discount every other human being as merely a mask and still function properly. And even if they are putting up a front, projecting a role, or being phony, that too has a way of becoming part of their overall public perception.

Yet satire offers a peculiar window into this problem. For in satire, particularly when a poet plays a character by the same name, some personal information must, of necessity, be conveyed. Thus, satire depends upon displaying a mask that is at times more distant from the historical author and at others much closer. The tools of critical scholarship determine the extent to which that knowledge can be certain.<sup>43</sup> Just as in real life, the poet takes a risk in assuming any mask. An audience may potentially perceive that mask too strongly. The individual poet, then, *becomes* the mask in the eyes of others. It may be far less important what Horace actually thinks about a situation, idea,

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<sup>43</sup> An excellent example of where some biographical information can be gleaned is Armstrong's "Horatius: *Eques et Scriba*: Satires 1.6 and 2.7." We need not assume that the poems tell us all that we need to know about the poet. Armstrong more recently has reinforced the idea that the laws of literature forbid the assumption of status one does not have in constructing a *persona*, no matter how imaginative, in which one speaks as oneself. *Equites* have a conventional role to play not merely in literature but in society as well, and the *persona* must fulfill those expectations as well ("Social Foundations").

or problem, than what others (Horace's contemporaries, his first audiences, scholars today) think that Horace thinks.<sup>44</sup>

Recent work on ancient satire is starting to look beyond *persona*, yet comprehensive theoretical formulations have been infrequent.<sup>45</sup> The most systematic approach to satire is provided by Ralph Rosen's recent work, *Making Mockery: The Poetics of Ancient Satire*. Rosen attempts to provide a set of criteria by which all satiric discourse operates. His concerns extend beyond the usual Roman verse satirists to broader kinds of texts, especially earlier Greek texts that employ mocking humor. While Rosen has little to say about Horace, he intends that his theoretical insights apply to Horace, Persius, and Juvenal, although he only covers Juvenal in detail. Rosen subscribes to the aesthetic and rhetorical approach to satire. The chief goal of mockery in performance (and satire is essentially mockery in poetic form) is to produce laughter. Any didactic content of satire bears little importance. Scholars, he claims, have not pursued the consequences of using such terms as genre, tradition and tropes, their origins, their operative effects, and how they augment our understanding of poetry (8ff). Concerned with mockery as it occurs in performance, not as it may have occurred in real life, Rosen asserts that mockery in an oration is intended to do harm, whereas the same

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<sup>44</sup> McNeill (*Horace: Image, Identity and Audience*) even goes so far as to suggest that Horace is carefully aware of how to manipulate how his audiences think about him; and I agree. Oliensis (*Horace and the Rhetoric of Authority*) also raises the same issue with a *persona*, and opts instead for the term "face." In her assessment, the Horace of *Sermones* II already wears the "face" of the Horace who published book one. When Horace writes the *Odes*, he already carries the "face" of the one who wrote the *Sermones*.

<sup>45</sup> See Prologue fns, 23-26 for a survey of the range of current interpretive works on Roman satire. Cf. C. Knight's *Literature of Satire* and Melinda Rabb's *Satire and Secrecy*, both of which push against the limitations of *persona* theory within English studies and represent possible paths forward.

cannot be said about poeticized mockery. The audience of a poeticized contest can grasp a satire as satire and will naturally assume that the mockery is fictionalized, and therefore, avoid taking offense at it or interpreting it as intending to do harm.

I am not so certain that mockery in performance can easily be separated from that in real life. Audiences for later satires and even contemporary satire certainly have not always made the distinction so clearly, whatever the performer may have intended. Moreover, satire may intend to confuse the audiences more than Rosen allows. Horace begins his own satiric enterprise with three examples before clarifying in his fourth, programmatic satire that he is indeed attempting to write the same kind of literature as Lucilius. An audience hearing these four satires performed in sequence for the very first time might not know entirely what to make of the first three satires until Horace clarifies his aim in 1.4.<sup>46</sup> I would agree with Rosen that a sympathetic audience is essential for the success of satire and moreover, that satire cannot exist without an audience. What I propose to add to Rosen's perspective is an examination of the possibility for different segments of the original audience arriving at different understandings of the satiric performance and what this kind of interpretation might mean. Some of the problem with both the dismissal of serious intent/effects and *persona* theory more generally can best be illustrated by referring to contemporary satire, where the reception of the satire has received better documentation, and where the effect of the performance across multiple audiences can be weighed.

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<sup>46</sup> Armstrong ("Horace Satires 1.1-3: A Structural Study") makes this point rather emphatically.

### **Persona: an Element in Satire, not *the* Element of Satire**

“My name is Stephen Colbert, but I actually play someone on television named Stephen Colbert, who looks like me, and who talks like me, but who says things with a straight face that he doesn’t mean.”<sup>47</sup> Thus, the comedian and host of *The Colbert Report* introduced himself to the audience at the Knox College commencement address.<sup>48</sup> The comment unapologetically calls attention to the *persona* that stands at the heart of all satire, yet it also reveals two things that are helpful for considering the role of the *persona* in ancient satire: 1. The *persona* is merely an element necessary to produce satire, not the final element. 2. The context of performance, where one may also observe the dynamics of audience reception, shows some important difficulties in treating satire as merely generating a laugh. An examination of these two features reveals possible implications for ancient satire where the original performance and much of the cultural context is more distant and less clear.<sup>49</sup> *The Colbert Report* stands as one sparkling example in the vein of the witty, subtle and erudite satire produced by Horace himself.

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<sup>47</sup> I fully admit that any use of contemporary satire both dates the document and provides pathways of inaccessibility to some potential audiences. An honest theoretical application of the theories we use to study ancient authors to our own research reveals that it too is historically and culturally conditioned, which makes any work of scholarship not a testament of timeless truth but a reflection of the values, concerns, and debates about those values within its own historical time.

<sup>48</sup> <http://www.alternet.org/mediaculture/37144>

<sup>49</sup> My interpretive approach here is intertextual. Whereas Classical scholarship has always shown a predisposition toward discussing the sources behind a text and showing how they illuminate that text, it has not quite gotten around to determining the acceptable parameters by which a later text may be used to illuminate an earlier one. Yet this second possibility seems like a natural and intuitive element of a reader-centered approach.

*The Colbert Report* is a thirty-minute segment broadcast on Comedy Central. The show features Stephen Colbert as its host and is delivered in the form of a political commentary. The show plays off of the genre of news commentary. We might say that it derives its satiric resonance from this contemporary news climate. This news climate is characterized by intense competition between news networks in the face of a twenty-four hour news cycle. Since not every moment can be filled with a program that might be traditionally and typically thought of as a news broadcast, such as when a person watches the ten o'clock news broadcast from one of their local network providers, the larger cable news providers (e.g. CNN, MSNBC, FOX NEWS) have turned increasingly to news commentary to help fill out the time. The Colbert report then more generally plays off all these programs, and his *persona* is a caricature of the news commentator, though he acknowledges a greater debt to Bill O'Reilly.<sup>50</sup> In interviews, Colbert has described his character thus, "I think of him as a well-intentioned, poorly informed, high-status idiot."<sup>51</sup> The show criticizes contemporary events, largely from a right-leaning perspective and much of the satirical force derives from the preponderance of right-wing commentary shows.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Colbert refers to Bill O'Reilly in-character as "Papa Bear." This seeming term of endearment is meant to suggest the way in which Colbert's character and program derive from Bill O'Reilly. But an added layer of irony is also present in that Colbert's character is afraid of bears.

<sup>51</sup> [http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/25/magazine/25questions.html?\\_r=1&oref=slogin](http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/25/magazine/25questions.html?_r=1&oref=slogin)

<sup>52</sup> Especially in the years around the show's inception, the ratio of news commentary shows (especially talk-radio) from a right-leaning perspective comparatively dwarfed those from a left-leaning perspective.

In the light of the *Colbert Report*, we can reevaluate the claim that satire is merely about producing laughter, particularly laughter directed toward the satirist himself. When we recognize the features of Colbert's on camera *persona*, namely that he is a pompous, narrow-minded idiot, who believes strongly in his ideological cause, does it follow that the sum of the program is merely to laugh at the character himself? Rather than speculating about the response of the average audience member, as is the case when we interpret any ancient work, we have the benefit of looking at what kinds of responses have actually been produced. For example, even during the interview segment of the show, the guests themselves are sometimes unaware of the nature of the show as satire. Thus in the preparation time beforehand, Colbert commonly coaches the interviewee on his character. David Sirota writes, shortly after he was interviewed,

Before the show, Stephen came by the green room to say hello and chat. He's much different off the air than on, in that he's not in character. The first time I went on (2 years ago) he made sure I understood his character is satirical (apparently, some guests - mostly conservatives - don't get the joke). This time around we just chatted about other things, and traded a few stories about living in the Willard dorm at Northwestern, where we both went to college.<sup>53</sup>

Sirota's description was echoed in a more recent study done at the Ohio State University on biased message processing, which suggests that one's political ideology strongly correlates to whether one will identify the *Colbert Report* as satire and the degree to which one will take his statements seriously (Cf. Lamarre, Landrevill and Beam). Stand too far away from the perspective of the satire and you are not likely even to recognize it

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<sup>53</sup> [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-sirota/did-colbert-really-just-c\\_b\\_104281.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-sirota/did-colbert-really-just-c_b_104281.html)

as satire. When those on the outside fail to recognize *The Colbert Report* as satire, they implicate themselves as objects of that same satire, for it is the insider audience who then laughs at them for failing to recognize that satire is, in fact, happening.<sup>54</sup> The correlation seems more generally true of all satiric discourse, though it has received little notice in the secondary literature on satire and no extensive discussion when it is noticed.

In Classical scholarship, Thomas McGinn comes the closest to identifying misrecognition as a feature of satire. McGinn (“Satire and Law”) notices that frequently the joke in a satire is upon the reader, particularly when the reader accepts the satirist’s view at face value. McGinn’s approach reminds us of Jonathan Swift’s famous description of satire as a mirror in which people see every face but their own (Preface to *The Battle of the Books*). McGinn’s analysis focuses on the one-sided possibility of a single unified audience misrecognizing the satire. I argue that such misrecognition is an inherent feature of satiric discourse, but I would extend McGinn’s basic premise to apply to multiple audiences. I do not mean this in the general sense of posterity or wide dissemination, but within the confines of the text’s original cultural performance. Some of the audience is not supposed to understand the text, and in failing to understand, they become “butts” of the discourse beyond the initial performance of the satiric texts.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Colbert the character repeatedly refers to his audience as the “it getters,” which I see as having a double reference. Within the logic of the show, Colbert means that his audience (those like-minded with the character, not the real life person) really understand the nature of America and what will make it great. Within the logic of satire, the term refers to its primary audience, which is, in fact, slanted largely in the other direction who recognizes the satirical qualities of the show and responds appropriately; they “get it”.

<sup>55</sup> Although it is misrecognition of a different variety, biographical interpretation is, in fact, reflective of a fairly natural way to read satire and a way in which many people still read satire. Scholars writing much

Misrecognition seems to fall along two lines, depending upon what attitude the *persona* takes toward the material (e.g. endorsement, subversion) and what the audience's own relationship to the material is (e.g. agree, disagree). Thus, someone might respond to a satirical argument with a lengthy argumentative critique, as if the satire were an formal argumentative essay. Alternatively, we find those who stand up and proclaim what a great argument the proponent (but in this case the satirist) has made, failing to recognize both the satirist's *persona* and his relationship to the material.

The phenomenon of misrecognition is not limited to *The Colbert Report*, but is evident in other works of satire. Jonathan Swift's *A Modest Proposal* with its infamous proposal to eat babies, was taken as a serious proposition by some of his audience (Rabb 148ff). An even more bizarre reception of Swift's satire was the response to his *Secret Life of Dr. Swift*. Following his death; three of his friends published different editions. Alexander Pope and William King expunged lines that made Swift look vain, while Faulkner in his Dublin edition included more lines and edited them differently. Three men who knew Swift well disagreed over the "truth" of the friend they shared. While each of them surely recognized the satiric potential in the *Secret Life of Dr. Swift*, they also recognized the implications of the potential audience to take these satires seriously

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after the initial production of a satire may not misrecognize the work itself as satire, since they can be told by others, and the tradition itself accords some works the status of satire, but they can misrecognize the interaction between the satirist's rhetorical sophistication and the cultural institutions and beliefs that give his/her statements context and meaning. When the cultural context is lost, it is even possible for a satire to shift genres entirely, as in the case of Swift's *Guilliver's Travels*, which was turned into children's literature in the 1800s (Bohnert 154). Petro notes that even with our own scholarly sophistication, many satires go unrecognized as such and are consequently not criticized as satires; even obvious satires are only reluctantly criticized as satires if at all (3).

(Rabb 148ff.). Pope honestly expected his adversaries to misread the *Dunciad*, so he published a key to it in the form of his own absurd political interpretation (Rabb 139-144). Swift even commented to Pope that few would understand the allusions in the *Dunciad* and that satire is mainly “friends laughing in a corner” (Rabb 12-14). This last observation of Swift is, in fact, a key theme in my own satiric theory explored throughout this dissertation, that satire is primarily about orienting itself toward a group of like-minded insiders who are meant to understand the nature of the poet’s *persona* and the criticism itself, and against those who stand outside, who frequently cannot recognize either the *persona*, the nature of the work as satire, or both, and who thereby implicate themselves as part of the satiric criticism through their act of misrecognition.

Generally, then, a serious response to satire as a comedic form is both a medium and goal of its comedic effect. Satire has been one of the most frequently censored types of literature. Censorship itself is a “serious” response, as if the ultimate effect of a satire is much more than provoking laughter.<sup>56</sup> If according to an aesthetic approach, satire is really about producing a laugh, then it cannot explain why so much of satiric history contains so many serious responses to satire and so many failed attempts to recognize the nature and character of satire as it is happening in its own historical and cultural context. Although the misrecognition and multiple reception of satire is a phenomenon that is easier to describe in more recent satires, I believe the feature is common enough to qualify as a universal feature of satire, true in all places and all times for literature that

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<sup>56</sup> See Kinservik for a detailed treatment of censorship. The ability of satire to accomplish real change in the world remains an open question that has not adequately been explored in studies on satire.

qualifies as satire, even if a given culture does not use the term satire for it. Thus, I aim to return to Horace's satires and explore the way his satires interact with multiple audiences, postulating who these audiences might be, and examining what possible responses they might have to these satires.

*The Colbert Report* shares some features with Horace's style of satire. Stephen Colbert plays a character by the same name. Similarly, we could imagine Horace saying to his reading circle, "Hello, tonight I am going to present a set of poetic conversations between our "friend" Horace and some others." In most of the *Sermones*, Horace appears as himself.<sup>57</sup> The *persona* is not the entirety of the real Horace or Colbert, but there is a definite collusion of the real man and his *persona*. In both *The Colbert Report* and Horace's *Sermones*, a *persona* is involved, yet in using a *persona* that reflects the real man, there is something of the real man that cannot be removed from the text, no matter how hard he tries. Somehow that *persona* occupies the double status of being Horace, yet not being Horace.<sup>58</sup>

Scholars of English satire show fewer propensities to push against the demon of biographical criticism.<sup>59</sup> Knight even expresses amusement at the much stronger

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<sup>57</sup> The only exception in book one is 1.8, where Horace speaks in the guise of Priapus. Even in that poem, some allege that Priapus is not very far from the *persona* that Horace cultivates for himself elsewhere and is thus a kind of a stand-in (Habash 285-97).

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Oliensis (*Horace and the Rhetoric of Authority*) who uses the word "face" instead of *persona*. Freudenburg prefers the term "Horatius Anceps" to signify the double-sided nature of Horace's own self-presentation. Even Sharland's *Horace in Dialogue* makes a similar evaluation of Horace's *persona* (59-66).

<sup>59</sup> Hammer's treatment of "Verses on the death of Dr. Swift" explores its own numerous autobiographical references which in turn function as part of a more complex poetic strategy. The most recent attempt in

tendency in scholarship on Classical satire to present reductive readings of the poet's *persona*. Knight counters, "if we exculpate the poet by inventing a mediating figure or mask, what prevents us from performing a similar exercise on the satiric target?"<sup>60</sup>

Entertainment value aside, there is not much point in a literary construct attacking a completely fictional victim. Satire is a communicative utterance and the very fact that it is being written at all suggests a problem, external to the text, that the satire seeks to redress. "Satire is ultimately a product of a particular person writing at a particular time for a particular audience within a particular society. If we lose sight of this, we have lost sight of satire, and perhaps of literature as a whole" (Sibley 74).

It may be helpful at this point to reexamine the notion of constructed "masks" in real life that we discussed earlier. The reason why we do not tend to have a problem with the series of constructed "selves" that those around us project is that we recognize that language has more important duties than simply communicating facts that reflect a reality somehow out there. Instead, much of language is bent upon achieving ends, and the use of language for performance, for not merely reflecting meaning but "accomplishing"

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Classics to push against the demon of biographical criticism comes in the work of Schlegel ("Horace and the Satirist's Mask"). She notes that admiration of Horace's poetry tends to stir up the reader's desire that they offer unmediated reality (255). Perhaps this position is warranted since Courtney's "The Two Books of Satires" published at approximately the same time as Schlegel's ignores theoretical scholarship altogether and hearkens back to Rudd's *Satires of Horace* and Fraenkel's *Horace* as the best treatments of Horatian satire. Courtney and Rudd aside, my sense is that biographical criticism is frequently a straw-man for scholars to push against rather than a position that numerous scholars take seriously.

<sup>60</sup> C. Knight 157. The *persona* offers the reader a "safety valve" for displacing the criticism contained in the poem, thus making the poem safer, and the poet more of a friend on our own side. Frederick Bogel also notes that the implicit cultural characteristics of our post-modern age invite us to question whether the speaker has the right and authority to offer such damaging criticisms of his contemporaries ("The Difference Satire Makes," and also his follow-up book on the same topic, *The Difference Satire Makes: Rhetoric and Reading from Jonson to Byron*.)

meaning, had its inception in performance studies (Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*). If I am called to teach a class, I do not merely adopt a *persona* for no apparent reason, but because that *persona* is specifically appropriate for a context in which I want students to relate to me in a particular fashion and, more importantly, to accomplish some additional tasks. Thus, the *persona* is less about presenting an authentic self, and much more about accomplishing particular goals in any setting, including literature itself. Some of those goals pertain to areas outside of the text itself, and in Horace's case, may pertain to his relations with his reading circle, his relationship to Maecenas, his relationship to potential critics, or more distant readers of his work both in his present day but also across posterity. The *persona* must be seen as in service of such goals that are necessarily outside of the text; otherwise, we lose sight of satire, as Sibley suggests above. My study grounds the "meaning" of Horace's satires not in some figure "Horace" whom we can know but in the way the text relates across multiple audiences. I want to emphasize at this juncture that the advent of *persona* theory has borne much interpretive fruit and was a huge breath of fresh air compared to the dismal state of studies on satire prior to its arrival. Yet in reacting against one extreme, we should be mindful of an opposing extreme. Reader response and performance theory are now the logical and natural successors (cf. Connery and Combe 1-15).

While many studies on English satire, especially earlier works (Petro, Guilhamet), are concerned with the generic status of satire, they nevertheless show awareness of the

basic problem of recognizing satire.<sup>61</sup> Petro notes that satire, in fact, appeals to a limited audience, as if it should appeal to a broader audience (3). Rarely mentioned in studies of Classical satire is the distinction between satire as a genre and as a mode of discourse, a distinction that I believe is important for understanding the problem of recognizing satire.<sup>62</sup> Satire is not strictly a genre, since it can adopt numerous other genres as part of its literary fiction. Thus, it is more of an “effect” created through genre and *persona*, all of which must “fit” together in some way to create the comedic effect. Of course, most work in Classical satire concerns itself with works that clearly articulate themselves as generic satire, but our best chance of explaining the satiric features of texts that lie outside the traditional canon of satirists is by focusing upon this genre/mode distinction. I adopt here the position of Guilhamet, who sees modal satire as a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for generic satire.<sup>63</sup> But beyond generic satire, many different comic

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<sup>61</sup> It is customary in any scholarly work on satire to make a statement concerning the inability to say concretely and clearly what exactly satire is. Likewise, most works in English satire also acknowledge the genre/mode distinction as another case of our inability to state precisely and clearly the difference. Hammer notes, “Satire is not a genre in the usual sense of the word” (10), but she feels content enough that the scholarly audience will accept the statement at face value that she does not discuss the term further. Almost all of the authors in Connery and Combe’s *Theorizing Satire* make brief mention of the genre/mode distinction.

<sup>62</sup> The distinction between satire as mode and genre would be extremely useful in examining Aristophanes and Greek Iambus and is therefore a useful supplement to Rosen. Cf. Herrnstein-Smith (*On the Margins*) which distinguishes natural discourse from fiction discourse. Natural discourse is the normal kind of communication on a daily basis where both speaker and listener make assumptions about the truthfulness, accuracy and intent of the communication. Fictive discourse is the representation of such discourse in literature, such as poetry, which may have goals that far exceed the truth function. Misrecognition in satire occurs precisely because it is fictive discourse masquerading as natural discourse. At least some of the audience will interpret it as natural discourse and respond in a fashion appropriate to natural discourse, failing to recognize features such as the poet’s *persona* and his rhetorical artifice.

<sup>63</sup> Horace, Persius and Juvenal then employ modal satire, but play according to the pre-established rules for the genre initiated by Lucilius and carried on by each of their respective predecessors.

works, such as Aristophanes and much Iambic poetry, display modal satire while not formally written according to their respective culture's established generic rules for satire. I locate the satiric effect, which prompts misrecognition, in the modal aspects of satire.

The immediate reception of ancient satire is not easy to study due to the lack of sources.<sup>64</sup> But our ancient satirists were keenly aware of their audiences, both the literate public and individual addressees where there are such.<sup>65</sup> Previous work on readership in Classics has noted the possibility of multiple audiences, but the distinction between an internal audience, who understands the criticism of the poem and its operation as satire, from an external audience, who may misrecognize it or respond “seriously” to it, has not yet been addressed. Barbara Gold, for example, distinguishes four layers of audience in her assessment of 1.1 and sees our task as differentiating these audiences if we are to

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<sup>64</sup> I do not mean here the more extended reception much beyond the initial point of reception. Even the *scholia*, who stand among the first interpreters of many ancient works, are over a century removed from the text and historical context of Horace's text itself. Their concerns in examining a satirical text such as Horace's tends to focus more upon elaborating details of the text that were quickly becoming lost or obscure than upon correctly identifying how satire works through its *persona* and across multiple audiences. The best and most recent volume to explore the extended reception of Horace is the edited collection of papers by L.B.T. Houghton and Maria Wyke, *Perceptions of Horace, A Roman Poet and His Readers*. Feeney's paper in that volume (“Becoming an Authority”) examines how Horace represents reactions to his poetry and how he represents his responses to those reactions. In the final analysis, Feeney is more skeptical about being able to recover any aspect of who Horace's reader's were or how they were reading him (17). Although I agree with the caution, we can know some information about some of the readers, which leads to some plausible and meaningful comprehension of their possible horizon of expectations.

<sup>65</sup> Feeney's recent contribution to *Perceptions of Horace* posits the useful idea that Horace himself constructs his own version of idealized and “unidealized” readers within the text (25). He cautions against reading too much into these accounts as representing actual readers in real life, though I am content to think that they may more generally reflect a type of real reading that Horace is concerned to address. On the whole, Feeney's contribution to the reception of Horatian satire is relatively short (approximately six pages), and he is more content to summarize reception across Horace's career.

understand the programmatic nature of 1.1 (“Openings in Horace’s *Satires* and *Odes*” 161-185). Maecenas, in the form of addressee, is the first audience she names (1.1.1). The narrative of 1.1 quickly shifts to a generic second person (1.1.14). This is the internal audience of the poem, an audience that does not exist outside of the poem or correspond to any particular person in real life. Beyond this group is the authorial audience, the generic upper class writers and politicians, who become the idealized and generic reader, whether every member of this class ultimately heard the performance or not. Finally, she posits the actual audience, corresponding to whoever hears the performance at any given moment. While much merit exists in presenting these particular audiences, I am most concerned with the interactions at the third and fourth levels. Although Classical scholarship has a strong tendency to construct an idealized audience, these enormously broad groups lacked that kind of homogeneity. Thus, these diverse groups selectively emphasize different aspects of these satiric performances, receive them, interpret them, and ultimately respond to them differently.

A simpler approach is followed by Muecke, who distinguishes between one or more fictitious audiences versus the actual audience(s) (“The Audience of/in Horace’s *Satires*” 34-47). Muecke rightly suggests that the very nature of satire itself might require an awareness of the audience within the poems (35). She then focuses upon the way that satire effects a confusion between the internal fictitious audience of the satire and the actual audience who is listening to the speaker repeatedly say, “you...you...you” (37). The actual audience is intended to recognize a wider intertextual nexus of style and

thought that supplies hints at how to interpret the satirist's moral argument and style (41). I agree. In Muecke's framework, this actual audience remains a singular entity, and she seems aware of the possibility that this actual audience may consist of diverse responses but leaves room for me to add to her analysis. Furthermore, she is unsure how Horace was influenced by his audience or the degree to which it occasioned the shift in book two ("The Satires"), a point I hope to explain in my own formulation of satire.

The most recent to explore Horace's audience is Randall McNeill, who sees many "Horaces" on display, not a readily encompassable personality.<sup>66</sup> Horace's self-image is neither wholly revelatory nor wholly artificial, but instead part of a carefully managed self-presentation designed to appeal to multiple audiences, with different degrees of access to Horace himself. Unlike Gold and Muecke, who explored audience internal to the satire itself and their possible relationship to an actual audience, McNeill is focused solely on the possible real audiences, which he sees expressed in concentric rings. Maecenas stands at the center, and just beyond him, Horace's other personal friends. Further removed are the Senators and *Equites*. Beyond them stand the non-elite social climbers, and finally everyone else who may have an opportunity to hear Horace's work. McNeill is then interested in how Horace manipulates his self-presentation so that each group sees only what Horace wishes them to see. The genius of Horace is in shaping the perceptions of his different audiences within the span of a few thousand lines of poetry. I

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<sup>66</sup> Similar to McNeill's approach is C. Knight's *The Literature of Satire*. McNeill owes a debt to Oliensis' approach in *Horace and the Rhetoric of Authority*, which shifts away from the notion of *persona* to the concept of Horace presenting many different "faces" to the public across all of his work. Paul Hay has recently applied this concept to the *Odes* in determining that Horace does in fact present several different sexual *personae*, all with different and sometimes conflicting goals.

applaud McNeill's willingness to push past *persona* theory and to see the rhetorical and biographical as inextricably linked. Yet he, too, has left room for us to explore the possibility that some of the audience may completely mistake the point of a satire.<sup>67</sup> Each level of readership within his concentric rings is an idealized reader. What I add is an exploration of the degree to which portions of one or more of these groups may implicate themselves as a target of the satires through their responses to Horace's satires.

### **The Satiric Effect and Horatian Satire**

My theory of satire sees the *persona* as the key mediating figure of satire, recognizable to a specific audience (and perhaps to some beyond it) based on shared cultural and societal norms. If one lacks the necessary shared norms, then one fails to understand the *persona* and therefore misunderstands the satirical nature of the work itself; this manifests potentially in one or more types of "serious" responses. Satire does not merely reflect the shared cultural and societal norms of its time; it participates in the debate over what those cultural and societal norms should be. It orients itself towards an "internal" audience, a particular group that has committed itself to one set of cultural and societal norms. The internal audience are the only ones who can be reasonably expected to "get" the *persona* in the text and to understand the main targets of the joke. Set against these insiders are those outside, who may fail to grasp the subtleties of satire. I see *misrecognition* as an inherent aspect of how satire operates. Some of the audience will take the argument of the satire seriously, as if it were a normal kind of communication.

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<sup>67</sup> Moreover, McNeill's purpose is to address Horatian self-presentation across all of his genres and not merely the satiric literature, thus leaving room for exploring in greater depth how his concentric layers of audience may function in Horace's *Sermones*.

The earlier and much maligned biographical criticism is, in fact, a perfectly natural way to read satire and a way in which many people still read satire when confronted by it. To respond seriously to a satire is to misunderstand it and to implicate oneself as part of the joke.

In acknowledging these serious responses as possible interpretations, I do not endorse or propose returning to an earlier biographical form of literary criticism. The history of the reception of satire is full of serious responses and misrecognitions. We must recognize them for what they are and understand that they are just a normal part of the satiric process. In many ways, Freudenburg has pushed scholarship beyond attempting to look behind the *persona* to a real poet, noting that Horace taunts his audience in a kind of “catch-me-if-you-can” game in which success at pinning Horace down counts as a loss (“Horatius Anceps” 285). I see this as another kind of misrecognition.<sup>68</sup> Moreover, this phenomenon of “serious” response transcends educational boundaries. It is not merely a problem of not having enough education to recognize that satire is occurring. Intellectually rigorous and highly educated people frequently fail to recognize satire even today, as Sibley explores in her study on the reception of Joe Bob Briggs (68-9).<sup>69</sup> The frequent and consistent misrecognition

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<sup>68</sup> Schlegel (“Horace and The Satirist’s Mask” 268 fn 8) also notes that as readers have become more aware of the role of the *persona* within satire, especially Horace’s warm *persona*, they have tended to turn more negative against the man himself, citing Henderson’s *Writing Down Rome* and Gower’s “Restless Companion.”

<sup>69</sup> The frequency in which satire has been censored suggests that some feel it is threatening to whatever values they hold, regardless of their educational status.

requires an explanation. Here, I am more concerned about the first reception of a satire within its original context. The scholarly view of satire is typically much more detached. It is based on cultivating numerous readings of the original texts along with many other satirical texts that make up the tradition of satire and that act as a lens through which it is seemingly easy to criticize the works of Horace, Persius and Juvenal as satire. Yet this view stands little chance of replicating how an original audience, steeped in the ideological debates of their day and possessing an entirely different set of cultural horizons than our longstanding tradition, may perceive them.

The reception of more recent satires suggests that ideological tendencies affect how a given audience interprets the work (e.g. my earlier discussion of Colbert, and Sibley's discussion of Joe Bob Briggs above), including whether they will even recognize that satire is being written. An inner circle of readers, who share social and cultural assumptions with the author, recognize the work as satire. The *persona* is a tool that the satirist uses to help him enact satire, but also allowing him a kind of two-pronged critique. This fake *persona* is usually a target of ridicule on some level, even if minor and less restrained and not the main target of the poem. Yet this fake *persona* can also serve to offer vehement and what many may feel is legitimate criticism of society's ills.

This view of satire follows trends in recent literary studies that focus on the role of the reader (e.g. Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in this Class?*). *Persona* theory can be integrated into reader-centered criticism in that *persona* theory pushes away from an authoritarian view of interpretation whereby the author stands behind the text telling us

exactly what it means. Yet, the author has been replaced largely with an idealized reader, who possesses the knowledge necessary to discern the text.<sup>70</sup> In Classical studies, one may speak of a generic “Roman” audience, but not every Roman would have understood a text in the same way. The idea of interpreting literature from the standpoint of an idealized reader is so dominant that it frequently lurks in the background of our interpretative assumptions and is rarely openly acknowledged.

Even more perilous is the degree to which the ideal reader must be reconstructed. The more searching one does for this mythical ideal Roman audience, the more it becomes a construct of our own idiosyncrasies, more reflective of the concerns and biases of our own age than their own.<sup>71</sup> In the case of satire, the pitfall is doubly dangerous because constructing a generic ideal Roman reader elides the cultural, societal, philosophical and aesthetic conflicts that characterized the satirists and their victims. Understanding Horace’s *Sermones* requires an examination of his inner circle for their own peculiarities within Roman society, and not merely as general idealized readers.

### **The Satiric Effect and Epicurean Friends**

It will be argued in the remainder of this study that Horace’s satiric effect is predicated on two key features of his inner audience that allow his *personae* to operate.

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<sup>70</sup> Iser, *The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett* and *The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response*. Timothy Johnson (*The Symposium of Praise*), in his introduction to Horace *Odes* 4, claims the nail is in the coffin of authorial intent and attributes to Stephen Hinds (*Allusion and Intertext*) the notion of grounding interpretation in the original reception of the first audience.

<sup>71</sup> See Bohnert 153 for an elaboration of this problem within English studies on satire.

They are, first, the character of this inner circle of audience, and second, the role of Epicurean ideas as their “insider cypher” on social and moral judgments. Horace explicitly and clearly articulates himself to his literary circle, including Vergil, Varius and other friends along with Maecenas.<sup>72</sup> While one can approach Horace’s satires from the standpoint of a single idealized reader, usually a male member of the Roman upper class, I propose that much interpretive fruit can be gathered by focusing upon the shared characteristics between Horace and his reading circle. The reason why scholars have disagreed on the central message of the satires is because central messages are processed within different frames of reference (cf. Lakoff). Depending upon what frames of reference a scholar decides to employ with respect to the typical upper class Roman male audience, entirely different responses to the text can and have been theorized.<sup>73</sup> Understanding a significant portion of what Horace’s satires may have meant in their original context requires understanding the shared frames of reference of Horace’s initial audience, Maecenas and his reading circle, and many other potential contemporary readers.

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<sup>72</sup> S. 1.10.81ff. is the most exhaustive list of Horace’s friends in his *Sermones*.

<sup>73</sup> Compare, for example, Schlegel’s recent evaluation of Horace’s relationship to Lucilius. She explains that she prefers to think of Horace’s “real” views as closer to Cicero’s own positive evaluation of Lucilius, but that he had rhetorical and strategic reasons for wanting to assert himself so aggressively against Lucilius. Although this is a reasonable hypothesis, we have simply no way to know one way or another, and only Schlegel’s own combination of historically and culturally conditioned frames of reference can lead to this conclusion. The processes of interpretation are just as much about us as they are about a “them” that we can somehow grasp, and much more theoretical work needs to be done concerning the “us” part of that interpretive equation.

The full effect of Horace's satire is negotiated within that reading circle. It appeals to their shared cultural and social outlook and the group has a stake in the cultural arguments of the day. While Horace and his inner circle undoubtedly share many similar viewpoints, I wish to focus upon Epicureanism as a significant feature of this shared outlook and in a much broader way than the laundry list of mainstream Epicurean ethical values previously established by DeWitt.<sup>74</sup> Here, we have the advantage of Philodemus' texts and recent research, which greatly expands our understanding of Roman Epicureanism beyond mere superficial Epicurean precepts. Aesthetic concerns and the proper composition of poetry are also important topics that Epicureans debated and on which Philodemus and ultimately Horace's fellow poets took sides.<sup>75</sup> The primary targets of satire are in fact outsiders to the group, such as certain Stoics who object on both ethical and aesthetic grounds to Horace's work.

In limiting myself to Epicureanism, I acknowledge that Horace shares many points of cultural similarity with both his central reading circle and more generally with other members of his society. My selection of Epicureanism is not haphazard. Satire is characterized by its moral critique of human behaviors, not merely by the jokes and parodies. Some behaviors are inappropriate or inconsistent, but the implication of

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<sup>74</sup> DeWitt, "The Parrhesiastic Poems of Horace" 312-319; "The Epicurean Doctrine of Gratitude" 320-28; "Epicurean Doctrine in Horace" 127-34. The presence of philosophy in satire has generally been underestimated. Mayer, for example, sees satire and philosophy as uneasy bedfellows that can barely coexist with each other ("Sleeping with the Enemy: Satire and Philosophy" 146-159).

<sup>75</sup> See Obbink, *Philodemus and Poetry* 15-68, 210-254.

critiquing behavior is that a recognizably appropriate behavior does exist.<sup>76</sup> This appropriate behavior stems from one's culturally derived worldview, of which philosophical preferences are a part. Horace's reading circle shows strong connections to Epicurean philosophy: Many of Horace's friends were trained by Philodemus, and many other upper-class Roman males studied Greek philosophy extensively enough to engage in sophisticated arguments over the correct moral actions in their lives.<sup>77</sup> Thus, philosophy and the debates between schools become focal points of intellectual sparring.

It is common fare these days to deconstruct a text by showing how the various ideological tensions embedded in the argument, in fact, undercut the central argument. Sometimes it is alleged that the author intended such effects and that this ideological tension contributes significantly to the meaning of the text.<sup>78</sup> I do not doubt that deconstructing a text offers some valuable insight into the nature of a text itself, but that particular kind of reading is a peculiarity of post-modernity, but by no means a composite of all readers. The polar nature of satire as a participant within societal debates, where the satiric point is often the inconsistency that is effected between belief and action,

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<sup>76</sup> Plaza suggests that this may even be deeper than satire itself, but a foundational aspect of a joke. A joke implies a transgression of a societal norm, which the audience is supposed to recognize in order to get the joke.

<sup>77</sup> For example, Armstrong et al. *Vergil, Philodemus and the Augustans*, Obbink's *Philodemus and Poetry: Poetic Theory and Practice in Lucretius, Philodemus and Horace*, Braund and Gill's *The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature*, and Griffin and Barnes *Philosophia Togata I-II*.

<sup>78</sup> This is Bogel's approach in English scholarship on satire ("The Difference Satire Makes"), and to a lesser extent represented by Oliensis (*Horace and the Rhetoric of Authority*). Even Knight (*The Literature of Satire*) occasionally asserts this point. My main point is that this particular kind of reading happens to be fashionable and enjoyable to many today, and thus it is altogether too easy to retroject it back into our ancient authors and audiences.

between speaker and content, lends itself easily to deconstructive readings. Satiric speakers frequently undercut their earlier arguments at later points in the text. This is one of the pure delights of satire.

While I do not deny that this provides a particularly stimulating reading of satiric texts, my own approach aims for recreating meaning from within the biased standpoint of the initial audience. Instead of deconstructing the various tensions in the text, I am looking at how a biased audience might approach the text without any particular inclination to deconstruct the argumentative polarities. An audience interprets a poem from a particular point of view, which dictates what information is fore-grounded and what information is back-grounded, despite whatever larger deconstructive forces might be at work within a satire. An audience-focused interpretative scheme moves behind the *persona* into the engagement and negotiation of meaning that occurs between author and audience. If this seems especially novel, it is because it has not been tried with regards to the Roman verse satirists. The tendency to divorce the author from the *persona* in the text is strong, but one possible way for moving behind the *persona* can be found in Conte's approach to Petronius in *The Hidden Author*.

Petronius' *Satyrica* poses similar problems to those encountered in satire studies and indeed is often included in volumes on satire, such as the recent *Cambridge Companion to Roman Satire*.<sup>79</sup> The *Satyrica* is narrated by one of its principal characters,

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<sup>79</sup> The status of the *Satyrica* is one of the perpetually argued questions of Classical literary studies. Whatever genre we decide to call it, be it satiric novel or something else, it still contains important parallels. Satire is the perennial poster child of defiance to genre, just as there is no inarguable classification that fits the *Satyrica*. Perhaps the best way to advance the argument that the *Satyrica*

Encolpius, who does not share the perspective of the author. As a character within the story relating that story to an audience, Encolpius is analogous to the speaker of a satiric poem. Or alternatively put, the novel concretizes the notion of the poet's *persona* in the form of a character within the story. No one confuses the opinions of Encolpius with those of the author, Petronius. Likewise, in satire, even if the author takes a *persona* by the same name, he is still somewhat hidden by the *persona* itself. The speaker poses an interpretive dilemma, stemming from the fact that all that we know is mediated through a single character, whose reliability is in question.<sup>80</sup> Yet Conte finds the author peeking through the text in places where his choice of narrative technique increases the ridicule of Encolpius and may suggest a larger purpose for the work. Likewise, in our Roman verse satirists, the author's presence behind the *persona* becomes clearer in the negotiation between the rhetorical strategies of the speaker and the prevailing assumptions of the initial audience(s).

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contains the satiric mode of discourse is to build on the work of Conte while identifying the kinds of cultural assumptions that might have been shared between the author Petronius and his initial audience. For the status of the *Satyrica*, see Sandy, "Satire in the Satyricon," Schmeling "Genre and the Satyricon : Menippean Satire and the Novel," "Petronius: Satirist, Moralizer, Epicurean, Artist," "The Satyricon: Forms in Search of a Genre," Beck "The *Satyricon* : Satire, Narrator and Antecedents," Grafton "Petronius and Neo-Latin Satire. The Reception of the *Cena Trimalchionis*," Highet "Petronius the Moralizer," and Holzberg "The Genre: Novels Proper and the Fringe."

<sup>80</sup> On the question of Encolpius' reliability see Schmeling "Confessor Gloriosus: a Role of Encolpius in the *Satyricon*," Gonoji "Encolpius, the Unreliable Narrator of the *Satyricon*," Jones "The Narrator and the Narrative of the *Satyrica*," Knight "Listening to Encolpius: Modes of Confusion in the *Satyricon*."

Where we know little for certain about Petronius the author and his social circle,<sup>81</sup> substantially more evidence exists about Horace and his reading circle.<sup>82</sup> It is possible then to study the whole of the corpus, not just a single poem in isolation, to discover an overarching coherent orientation of the poems with respect to that audience. If a consistent string of ideas or values emerge, these values might, in fact, be the moral and philosophical framework which authorizes the satire itself. By teasing out the places in the *Sermones* which orient themselves towards Maecenas' literary circle and by exploring the expectations of that audience, I offer an alternative approach to the satires that illuminates areas that have remained dark in previous studies.

More importantly, my theory of satire offers a pathway to appreciate not only the prominence and importance of philosophy within Horace's texts, but also the relationship between the two books of satires. One can find numerous articles exploring the much-loved first book of satires, but far fewer on any given poem in the second book. Frequently denigrated, most of the poems in book two are infrequently studied or read with the exception of the programmatic 2.1 and the highly noteworthy 2.6. It is my contention that a reader-centered approach to satire can show that the same satiric processes that we know and enjoy in the first book of satires are equally apparent in the

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<sup>81</sup> For what we do know about Petronius see Bagnani *Arbiter of Elegance*, Corbett, *Petronius*, Grafton, "Petronius and Neo-Latin Satire. The Reception of the *Cena Trimalchionis*," and Rose, *Date and Author of the Sayricon*.

<sup>82</sup> The natural starting place is Suetonius' *Life of Horace*. Horace himself also has much to say about his relationships to his poet-friends and contemporaries. We are also fortunate enough to have some of their own literature as well, especially Virgil. Most of the remaining authors survive in fragmentary form.

second book of satires. More importantly, the second book offers many representations of possible responses to Horace's satires. He had at least five years to survey the public response to his work, and much of book two bears the effect of responding to concerns about his audience. Thus, I will devote much more space to the exploration of audience and philosophy in book two than I will focus on book one.

In conclusion, the dominance of an aesthetic approach to satire has developed quite naturally in the history of scholarship, but it is now time that the sun set on this approach. We need not return to biographical criticism, but by focusing upon peculiar historical and cultural particulars that comprise the setting of a given satire, including how the satires orient themselves to multiple audiences, some of whom failed to grasp the nature and argument of the satire, we can illuminate some of the argumentative workings in the text. Our satiric texts contain arguments that develop for different purposes and different contexts that are fully relevant to their original contexts. They are not mere artifacts of humor, but fully participative in real debates and societal issues that were relevant at the time of their production and about which members of society were likely to have differing opinions. We shall see this quite clearly with the case of philosophy in Horace when we approach the first book in chapter three, and the second book in chapters four and five. First, however, we must more thoroughly ground the place of philosophy in Horace's work by examining the nature of reading circles more generally and the wealth of knowledge that Philodemus' texts and connections offer about the background of Horace's literary life.

## Chapter 2: Epicureanism and the Social Context of Horace's

### Intellectual Circle

"I do not see what Horace can be said to have received specifically from Epicureanism. Dogmatism is the most striking trait of the sect, and Horace abominated it."---Jacques Perret, *Horace*, 1962: 64  
*Epicuri de grege porcum.* Horace, *Epistles* 1.4.16  
*Nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri.* Horace, *Epistles* 1.1.14

Scholars have had much difficulty in assessing Horace's relationship to philosophy, largely stemming from the complicated and ambiguous picture that he presents in his texts. Perret's quote is typical in two respects. First, Horace uses philosophical material from nearly every philosophical sect, and his use of nearly every philosophy contains a mixture of positive elements along with negative ones. Thus, Horace frequently finds himself labeled "eclectic."<sup>83</sup> Second, Perret has a rather typical evaluation of Epicureanism itself, seeing inflexibly through the lens of our many ancient sources that were openly hostile to Epicureanism. Roman Epicureans were a weird bunch; this has led to skepticism toward the sincerity of even those whom we know openly professed Epicureanism or who walked in Epicurean circles. If we cannot find comfortable scholarly grounds for believing that Cassius, Trebatius and many others could legitimately and seriously commit themselves to Epicureanism when our evidence is largely based on non-poetic texts, self-representations in letters, or representations by third parties in letters or courtroom speeches, how much more of a problem will we have evaluating Horace's relationship to Epicureanism in his much more complicated poetry?

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<sup>83</sup> Gowers' recent commentary (*Horace Satires I*) follows this trend with only a brief treatment of philosophy.

Both paucity of evidence and conflicting self-representations are also a problem; the two quotes above from Horace's *Epistles* represent this nicely. Not only does Horace continue to be self-contradictory throughout his life, but he publishes over a wide career, and one can hardly be sure that his philosophical proclivities remained the same throughout his life. Using otherwise complicated literary texts to evaluate the poet's philosophy in some sense results in a circular fallacy, as Perret notes.<sup>84</sup>

This chapter is not primarily about what Horace actually believed. In my first chapter, I noted that satire by its nature plays to an audience which shares a broadly constructed "world" of knowledge. It is thus both time- and culture-specific, and the audience must participate in and share most (if not all) of those cultural realities. But I argue further that with satire, unlike other forms of literature, there is an audience within the broader audience or readership. Satire then plays to an "in-group" who view reality in a way that others in society do not; these members are the primary audience for the humor and social critique we associate with satire. In the case of Horace's satires, especially the first book, there was what we shall call an Epicurean reading circle, consisting of Horace's closest friends including his literary patron Maecenas.

My first goal then is to build a nuanced picture of Horace's reading group around Maecenas. Who are the members? What do they do when they meet? Although recent work on reading circles has demonstrated the degree to which they are amorphous and nebulous, I hope to show that from those whom Horace depicts in the satires, including

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<sup>84</sup> 33. "...I wonder if one does not become the dupe of too easy a method: abstracting the work and its author from their whole environment, planting them face to face in an ideal solitude, and then explaining the work by a picture of the author that is derived from the work."

Maecenas, a core group of Epicureans emerge. More importantly, since this is the primary group whose opinions matter the most to Horace, their Epicureanism informs his presentation of Epicurean ideas within the satires. Horace wants to appeal to them, to show that he fits in as a true member of Maecenas' group, and therefore he has an incentive to stitch prominent Epicurean ideas into the fabric of the *Sermones*. Thus my evaluation has less to do with biographical criticism about Horace the author, and more to do with taking what we already factually know from other sources about Horace's audiences. I am simply asking what kind of interpretation we arrive at in his satires if we attempt to privilege Epicurean ideas in the satires in a fashion that is roughly consistent with how the most important members of his reading circle might have done.

### **Horace's Reading Circle as Revealed in the *Sermones***

Horace carefully mentions many of the people around him. I will explore many of these references in more detail in chapter three, but it is useful at this stage to gather a general picture of the frequency of the names and the settings in which Horace depicts them. Maecenas, his literary patron, appears nine times (1.1.1, 1.3.64, 1.5.27, 31, and 48, 1.6.1 and 47, 1.9.43 and 1.10.81) in remarkably different settings. Two have the sense of a skillfully and artfully woven dedication (1.1.1 *Qui fit, Maecenas,...* and 1.6.1 *Non quia, Maecenas,...*). The former opens the book and the latter comes at the exact midpoint in the book. They also convey the impression of the character Horace engaging the character Maecenas in conversation within the text, an interpretation that I believe Horace wants as a possibility for some of his audience and which reinforces the concept

of satire as *sermo*, “conversation.”<sup>85</sup> This interaction is even more apparent in 1.3.64 where Horace half apologizes to Maecenas for interrupting him during his reading activities and for being too out-spoken.

Simplicior quis et est, qualem me saepe libenter  
obtulerim tibi, Maecenas, ut forte legentem  
aut tacitum impellat quovis sermone molestus:  
Or perhaps someone is rather frank, the sort which I would hope I  
have rather often presented myself to you, Maecenas, so as to interrupt  
you by chance while you are reading or silent, me bothersome with  
conversation. (1.3.63-65)

Here, Horace suggests that he was in a position on at least some occasions to meet with Maecenas and actually interrupt him. What contexts and occasions these might be are left to our own imaginations as readers and scholarly critics. Although Horace is using this event as part of his rhetorical pose that reinforces and carries his argument forward in 1.3, he must stitch his rhetorical constructions together out of legitimate factual occurrences that at least some in his audience would be able to discern and on which they could conceivably correct him.<sup>86</sup> Horace approaches Maecenas during a time of private reading and reflection. Horace is not merely meeting with Maecenas at an official occasion such as a dinner party, poetry recital, or on official state business. The setting is more personal and intimate and unofficial, thereby reinforcing the quality and depth of their friendship.

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<sup>85</sup> Gold’s *Literary Patronage in Greece and Rome* is useful for considering the ways in which poets interact with their patrons more generally throughout Augustan literature. I will explore the multiple senses of interaction more thoroughly in chapter three. See also the series of works by Bowditch on patronage.

<sup>86</sup> Compare the structural argument that David Armstrong makes in “The Biographical and Social Foundations of Horace’s Poetic Voice,” and “Juvenalis Eques: A Dissident Voice from the Lower Tier of the Roman Elite.”

A more extensive venue for the association of Horace's circle is the trip to Brundisium in 1.5. Maecenas makes three appearances at 27, 31, and 48, but just as important is the fact that this poem is one of three major places in the first book of *Sermones* where Vergil, Varius, and Plotius Tucca make an appearance. All three appear at 1.5.40, while Vergil makes another appointment at 1.5.48 where Horace presents the two departing for an afternoon nap because the ballgame was not appropriate to them for health reasons. Horace then calls attention to Varius' departure in 1.5.93. The more specific literary critique will have to wait until chapter three, but the setting in which those around Horace appear again reinforces the casual friendships. They are close enough friends to each other and to Maecenas to keep him company on his journey to Brundisium. Courtney has recently made an intriguing suggestion that when Horace meets Plotius, Varius and Vergil at Sinuessa, these three members of the circle may in fact be travelling from their studies with Philodemus at Piso's villa in Herculaneum ("The Two Books of Horace's Satires" 97). The names appear in exactly the same order as we have them in several dedications in the treatises of Philodemus.<sup>87</sup> This might very well suggest their close connection to each other and Philodemus. We might imagine other such trips in which members of a reading circle might travel with each other or a patron.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> *On Virtues and Vices*. P.Herc. Paris , and also at P.Herc 1082 and 253.

<sup>88</sup> What is interesting about 1.5 is the political nature of the trip which receives almost no focus at all in the text. That certainly makes this trip very unusual and possibly atypical, but we can imagine poets as traveling companions also on trips of a less serious nature.

Maecenas, Vergil, and Varius yet again make an appearance in 1.6, where Horace narrates his formal introduction into the company of Maecenas. After the dedicatory introduction, Maecenas appears in narrative at 1.6.47 where Horace describes himself as *convictor*, someone who lives and/or dines with Maecenas (Brown 156). The subjunctive *sim* suggests the material in the text is being viewed through the lens of potential outsiders, making this comment something that the general public would not factually dispute. Vergil and Varius carry out the formal introduction in line 55, providing a glimpse into how a literary circle might induct new members. Horace does not have immediate access to Maecenas, but his close friendship with Vergil and Varius helps pave the way for friendship with Maecenas. Vergil and Varius (and perhaps Plotius Tucca as well, though he does not appear here) are among Horace's closest friends in the circle, and thus he highlights them for special treatment.

Maecenas' appearance in 1.9 also hints at a potential induction into the reading circle. At line 43, the grasping outsider inquires of Horace where he stands with Maecenas. If 1.6 narrates Horace's journey into the circle, 1.9 narrates some of the insecurity that he feels as a part of it ("Am I really like this pesky bore?") and some of the troubles that he now faces by those who want to join the circle. I do not find in this passage any new information about the operation of social circles that was not already present in the information contained in 1.6. The fact that the line comes from an outsider helps reinforce the idea that what we find constructed in 1.6 bears some truth about the process of induction into a literary circle.

Horace brings together not only Maecenas, Vergil, and Varius, but the whole extended coterie in the closing satire of the first book, 1.10. Starting in line 40, Horace introduces a few of his associates and their genres: Fundanius in comedy; Pollio in tragedy; Varius in epic; Vergil in bucolic literature. We will see both Fundanius and Varius again in 2.8. Noteworthy in this list is that Varius and Vergil are mentioned in close proximity and succession. This list is not exhaustive, but rather suggests that each member of the circle has a proper place in the poetic landscape. The fuller list begins in line 81, where Plotius, Varius, Maecenas and Vergil appear prominently in the first place, perhaps representing his closest friends of all. The list of names has no formal setting, but this broad range of associates is consistent with those who may have been regularly invited to poetic recitations. For the larger group, we lack a clear impression of their philosophical preferences, though they are clearly among those to whom Horace wished to appeal. I suspect they do share some similarities with Horace and Maecenas on the broader cultural issues that form satire. I emphasize, however, the prominent place that Horace's Epicurean friends have on the list.

The second book of *Sermones* has far fewer of these associations, but one context where members of the reading circle likely met seems to be repeatedly emphasized: the dinner party. From the first book, Fundanius, Varius, and Viscus Thurinus reappear at the dinner party of Nasidienus. Horace's opening lines (2.8.2) acknowledge that he was searching for Fundanius on the previous day in order to invite him to his own dinner party. The setting of the dinner party is reinforced as well at 2.7.33 where Davus accuses

Horace of getting into a tizzy over a late dinner invitation from Maecenas. Clearly Horace is still dining with Maecenas somewhat frequently and desires to make appearances at his table. A more subtle reference to Horace's associates occurs at 2.6.65-76 where Horace imagines those associated with him as discussing high philosophy at his table. Presumably, the guests have the ability to discuss deep philosophy, specifically on virtue, friendship, happiness, and the highest good (2.6.73-6).

In summary then, book one reveals Horace associating with Maecenas on a casual basis, perhaps living with him for periods of time, and perhaps making one or more trips. They also seem to have gathered for specific literary activities, though these are only vaguely alluded to through the poetic induction ceremonies in 1.6 and 1.9. Horace is clearly well known enough to the bore as a poet that the bore could think Horace might be able to introduce him into the circle. Book two reveals the dinner party as a potential locus in which Horace and his reading circle met. The dinner party was not without its problems. It could create additional stress, as it seems to do in Davus' description of Horace, or it could fail entirely as it does with Nasidienus. It could also be idealized in the quaint idyllic setting of Horace's Sabine farm, far from the cares of the city and focused on the philosophy that matters the most. Despite the fact that representations in poetry are rhetorically stylized, I believe we are justified in taking these instances as depictions of real situations in which poets could interact with each other and their patrons.

### **Elite Networks and the Dissemination of Literature**

Horace's relationship with Maecenas affords him the opportunity to associate more broadly with an extended coterie of followers, poets, and friends. Although we frequently use the term reading circle to designate this amorphous set of connections, that term is far too imprecise. No formalized institutional structure existed under the category "reading circle." Scholars use the term "reading circle" as shorthand to designate the plethora of connections between poets and their patrons. Yet the term is used inconsistently as scholars have analyzed the ancient world. Peter White has noted that we hardly ever speak of a "circle of Cicero." Cicero corresponds with a diverse group of figures in the late Republic, and many of these may not have associated with each other much (White, *Promised Verse* 36). Horace's connections to many in his so-called circle may be no more deep than among many with whom Cicero corresponded. Anderson has recently applied this observation to the study of Horace ("Horace's Friendship"). He sees little value in creating for Horace a parallel to an earlier Scipionic circle in which Lucilius operated. Instead, he opts for speaking only of a circle of Horace, and not of Maecenas. It was altogether too common for poets associated with different patrons to freely overlap and interact with each other (White, *Promised Verse* 37). Thus, Horace's connections might have extended far beyond those associated with Maecenas and he need not have shared as many similarities with all of them as he did with Vergil, Varius, Plotius Tucca, Quintilius Varus and Maecenas.

A more precise way of getting at the problem of clarifying these associations is to speak in the language of elite networks.<sup>89</sup> Horace, Cicero, and perhaps most figures of note in the late Republic and early Empire are connected to a dizzying array of figures in society. If we had fuller knowledge of Maecenas' connections in the same way that we have of Cicero, we would likely see a similar amount of diversity. Such connections were rarely homogenous, though friendship could develop beyond the standard patron-client relationship. Peter White notes that it would be uncharacteristic and rare for a patron to select these friends unless they had at least one similarity (and probably more than just one) in background, social origin, or philosophic outlook (*Promised Verse* 35). This last point deserves particular emphasis since it helps build my notion of a like-minded inner circle of poets to whom Horace could orient the philosophical, aesthetic and cultural dimensions of his satire. Although the group associated with Maecenas was hardly homogenous, it certainly featured important shared viewpoints between at least some members to whom Horace felt inclined to appeal. Within the broader network, some members may have felt a stronger pull toward each other, thus allowing deeper friendships to form. Thus Horace and Vergil met, developed a friendship through their preferences for Epicureanism and poetry, and remained friends throughout their lives.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> For background and overview of the theoretical concept of elite networks, see L.M. White's *Social Networks*.

<sup>90</sup> Horace dedicates *Ode* 1.24 to Vergil on the death of Quintilius as a strong Epicurean consolation. Vergil is mentioned again in *Ode* 4.12, and suggests even many years after the death of Vergil, he remains on Horace's mind.

What exactly happened in these reading circles? What did access to the associates of Maecenas provide Horace or any other poet? What kinds of activities and interactions might we find among these men? We are limited in this respect by relatively few texts that speak clearly about the activities of any reading circle, let alone Horace's. One important function is that the reading circle gave poets access to other people who had a serious interest in the production and consumption of poetry.<sup>91</sup> Poets seek recognition for their work, and in a culture with a strong oral component, easy access to an audience was crucial. The patron's connection also brought the poet into contact with an ever widening circle of potential readers, through whom they could further whatever personal goals they may have set for themselves.

The notion of an elite network also helps in identifying the kinds of interactions among Maecenas' associates through parallels with other networks that we can see throughout Roman history. Perhaps the most recent scholar to explore the nexus of elite reading communities is W.A. Johnson.<sup>92</sup> In particular, his emphasis on the sociological dimension of a community dedicated to exploring written texts is more broadly applicable to any reading group. He identifies four distinct qualities that a reading circle

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<sup>91</sup> White adds that the reading circle provided the poet not only with access to other individuals with tastes for literature, but also other potential benefactors as well (*Promised Verse* 40).

<sup>92</sup> "Toward a Sociology of Reading in Classical Antiquity" rather decisively argues that the primary way that poets intended their work to be received was through reading, and that scholarship has overemphasized the oral component (cf. Quinn *Texts and Contexts: Roman Writers and their Audience*, and "Poet and Audience in the Augustan Age" and the derivative Cavallo, Fedelli, Giardina *Lo Spazio Letterario di Roma antica Volume II, La circolazione del testo* and Cavallo "Between Volumen and Codex: Reading in the Roman World"). Johnson's "Constructing Elite Communities" explores the characteristics of the reading circle of Gellius, while his book, *Readers and Reading Cultures in the High Empire*, expands the concept to include the nature of reading communities throughout the High Empire.

possesses (“Constructing Elite Communities” 327). First, it undertakes a negotiation of authority with reference to a particular group of texts. Second, it seeks to address the question of who can properly comment about these texts. Third, it is concerned with the right ways of speaking and thinking. Finally, the circle itself acts as gatekeepers, admitting only those who possess the ideologically correct Roman way of speaking, thinking, behaving, and remembering the past. W.A. Johnson takes the antiquarian interests of the group around Gellius as an example. Those who wish to belong to the in-group must demonstrate that they understand the proper way of speaking about these texts. Those who do not or cannot speak appropriately find themselves excluded and marginalized. We might expect similar kinds of processes to be happening among the audience of Horace’s day, as they compete for making appropriate comments about new literary texts in the context of their in-group. Johnson correctly notes that the group is exclusionary by nature, and that its entire *raison d’etre* revolves around playing a sort of learned game, an equally true description of the poetic activities in Horace’s own day. This extends to producing the right kind of poetry relative to the group’s values and interests. Poets desire esteem for their poetry, and their context naturally constrains how their poetry will be received and influences how they will shape their poetry to meet that context.

The poet’s literary circle was directly influential on several of his possible venues for disseminating his work. Holt Parker has recently identified four primary ways that a poet could disseminate his work: *Convivia*, professional readers, recitation, and private

reading (“Books and Reading Latin Poetry” 186).<sup>93</sup> He agrees with Johnson (“Toward a Sociology of Reading”) that the first three are ultimately ancillary or supplementary to the final option of private reading. Of these four, the *convivium* probably contained the option of the poets discussing their poetry, but would have been a rare venue for personal performance (“Books and Reading Latin Poetry” 205). Yet poetry is rarely mentioned as the entertainment option of choice, falling a distant third behind drama and music. Parker emphatically offers, “. . .nowhere in Catullus, Horace, Propertius, Tibullus, or Ovid do we find a single suggestion that the poets ever performed at their own or anyone else’s *convivia*” (206). Although the poet may hire professional readers to extend the reach of their poetry, we have little evidence on how the reading circle may have interacted with them. Rather, Parker emphasizes the *recitatio* and private reading as the primary means of dissemination, and the reading circle participated in both.

The *recitatio* afforded the poet the opportunity to present some of his work before a live audience. Fantham suggests rather tentatively that the poets could invite their own audiences (71) while Peter White strongly asserts that the poets did decide whom to invite (and by implication whom to exclude) to their poetry recitations (*Promised Verse*

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<sup>93</sup> The standard treatment of literary audience and the possible venues for encountering a literary work are the two works of Kenneth Quinn, *Texts and Contexts: Roman Writers and Their Audience*, and “Poet and Audience in the Augustan Age.” Both Johnson (“Toward a Sociology of Reading”) and DuPont (“*Recitatio* and the Reorganization of Public Discourse”) have convincingly challenged Quinn’s notion that the oral performance was the most significant aspect of encountering a literary text. I believe “Toward a Sociology of Reading” is the starting point here, but Johnson has since applied and extended his concepts more pragmatically. See “Reading Cultures and Education,” “Books,’ ‘Literacy,’ ‘Readers and Reading,” “Constructing Elite Communities in the High Empire,” and *Readers and Reading Culture in the High Empire*, as well as his jointly edited volume with Holt Parker, *Ancient Literacies: The Culture of Reading in Greece and Rome*.

60). DuPont adds that the *recitatio* is distinctly a private event, an idea that I agree reinforces the notion that the poets did in fact have control over who attended (“*Recitatio and the Reorganization of the Space of Public Discourse*” 45, 48, 49). The poets do not seem to be forced to present their poetry prematurely. The *recitatio* instead focuses upon the penultimate draft, representing anywhere from a single *Sermo* or *Ode* of Horace, and probably a presentation of the full poetry book itself when length permitted (White, *Promised Verse* 59-60). Larger works such as the *Aeneid* were read in book length segments, though not likely ever read from start to finish.<sup>94</sup> On the social function of the *recitatio*, Johnson again is useful (*Readers and Reading Culture in the High Empire* 55-56). He notes that the *recitatio* was first a proposal for circulation, since it happens exclusively prior to formal publication.<sup>95</sup> Second, it functioned as an adjudication of value within the literary community. Third, it was itself a type of circulation, and therefore offered social validation to the poet. Fourth, it acted to poll the circle of *amici* regarding the poetry itself, but also displayed the poetic performance to others outside the group. The gathering was probably widely known throughout the literary community. Fifth, the *amici* make a statement through their presence about their allegiance to the circle and its values. Sixth, the *recitatio* brings validation to the circle as a whole and the leaders of the circle in particular. Seventh, the *recitatio* validates the great man who

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<sup>94</sup> Aelius Donatus in his *Life of Vergil*, of course, mentions that Vergil presented readings of books two, four and six at various points throughout the 20’s BCE. The readings could perhaps also reflect episodes within the books rather than complete books, but likely represent substantial presentations.

<sup>95</sup> Holt Parker (194) adds that we have no evidence of a poet presenting their work via *recitatio* after publication.

oversees the circle. I find Johnson's scheme useful, even if some of the criteria seem to overlap. Together, they build toward an image of a powerful exclusive group that mutually reinforces their own social capital within upper-class Roman society at the same time as they reinforce the social capital of the member who is presenting. The group is always exclusionary, generally coalescing along both an ideological statement and an aesthetic statement ("Constructing Elite Communities" 329). These cultured people buy into a central idea of Romanness, and through this they assert a gatekeeper role that maintains their exclusivity. Horace's group was no less exclusive and likewise had ideological (Epicurean and Pro-Caesarian) and aesthetic commitments (Callimachean) to which Horace appealed to show his in-group membership.

The competitive nature of the *recitatio* is also evident in Roller's analysis of Pliny's recitation of Catullan poetry ("Pliny's Catullus"). Although this postdates Horace by more than a century, the social functions remain parallel and are clearly visible. Roller notes that Pliny performs poetry in an attempt to move it out of a largely concealed role that it occupied earlier (289). In the Imperial era where many of the traditional Republic venues of competition were extinct, Pliny sought to open up a new area for aristocratic competition. The implication, of course, for Horace's day is that it was a more exclusive and private event that only later widened to encompass more of upper class society. Roller notes that *recitatio* is inherently competitive, involving the opportunity to build status not only for the reciter but also for members of the audience (290-1). All members can gain and lose status based on the reception. In this respect, he

echoes the social functions of the *recitatio* that Johnson identified above. Even in Pliny's day, Roller emphasizes that Pliny only seeks praise when his poems are published and that recitation also exists to provide the poet with a glimpse of how future audiences are likely to receive his work.

Johnson's and Roller's observations have important implications for the operation of Horace's circle as well. The associates that Horace knew through Maecenas were likely among the first people that he considered inviting when he gave a recitation. His closest friends, Vergil, Varius, and Plotius Tucca, would appear first. It is entirely unclear how large an audience may have appeared or what pressures Horace may have experienced to include the broader literary community. Since one of the purposes was to solicit audience feedback and to gauge the reception, it would be fitting if he had a broad cross-section of the literary community even if some of those came from outside his closest friends. The circle of Maecenas provides support to Horace, lending esteem to him within the broader community, but also deriving esteem from his success as a poet. Moreover, many of the satiric effects that characterize modal satire would be most apparent in a performative context where the satiric text can prompt the kind of verbal sparring that characterizes competition for social status. Roller even suggests that the competition for status within the poetic community would be even more intense and serious among poets than it was for Pliny as an upper class aristocrat with significant political responsibilities (291-2). Thus the latest poetic production from Horace and others in his circle might set off a veritable firestorm in the literary community as

different members jostled for status within their respective sub-communities by offering praise or blame.

Once the poet completed the *recitatio*, he then made any final revisions to his work prior to publication. Johnson (*Readers and Reading Communities* 53) notes that publication is rather simple: Do you allow others to make copies of your work? Publication and dissemination of the final manuscript was not a simple organized matter. If Vergil wanted a copy of the work, then Horace authorized someone to make a copy by hand. Publication was then irregular. Literary circles helped make their protégés known more broadly through the process of disseminating manuscript copies more broadly (Johnson, *Readers and Reading Communities* 48). Although we know of libraries and bookstalls, we do not know much about the route that Horace's manuscripts might have taken to get there. Horace disavows that one will find his *Sermones* at a bookstall (1.4.71) and that may very well be a truthful statement.<sup>96</sup> DuPont rightly emphasizes that a poet has more glory through a private dedication of a copy of their work to their patron and literary friends than through the bookstall ("The Corrupted Boy" 145). She also rightly emphasizes that the key readers in libraries are the other writers and literary critics, who no doubt had a good chance of reading a copy of Horace's work or making a copy for themselves ("The Corrupted Boy" 146). Although Horace meekly presents himself as writing only for a small audience under compulsion (1.4.73), this is part of his pose that slowly becomes more comical as the work gains wider distribution. In any

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<sup>96</sup> I suspect Horace's works eventually made it to a bookstall, but the work of Johnson, Dupont, and Parker strongly suggest general antipathy from the educated upper class toward the kind of popular literature that would more typically appear in a bookstall.

event, those poets and friends closest to the poet had a chance to acquire a physical copy of the new poetry book first, and we can easily imagine Horace authorizing a broader dissemination to those interested in literature more generally. Much of the satiric bite in Horace's work gains meaning when the work becomes exposed to a broader audience.

**Horace's Friends: Vergil, Varius, Plotius Tucca, Quintilius Varus, and Maecenas**

We have seen how the broader literary circle functioned to support Horace, to promote his work, to create public esteem for him, and to derive esteem from his successful participation in the broader sphere of poetry. In our discussion of literary circles, we noted that these associations tend to form around some commonalities, whether they be geographical, ideological or aesthetic. Yet many of those individuals mentioned the most in Horace's satires are not merely associates through the literary circle of Maecenas; they are also friends. Horace names Vergil, Varius, Maecenas, Plotius Tucca and Quintilius Rufus frequently in his poetry, and they form a kind of inner circle among those associated with Maecenas more generally. This friendship is based on shared philosophical and poetic interests. Upper-class Romans rarely establish friendships with intellectuals or artists whose formation and background differ radically from their own. Peter White describes this process as an "ethical congruence," implicit in the notion of choosing worthy friends (*Promised Verse* 14). A literary circle does not merely provide a willing audience and a pathway to prestige through association with other great men in Roman society; it also provides an opportunity to meet others who share important social and intellectual similarities. These men function as a smaller

group among those associated with Maecenas who may very well have the harmonious identity that Horace seems to describe in *Sermo* 1.9.48-52.

... 'non isto vivimus illic  
quo tu rere modo: domus hac nec purior ulla est  
nec magis his aliena malis; nil mi officit, inquam  
ditior hic aut est quia doctior, est locus uni  
cuique suus.' 'magnum narras, vix credibile' ....  
"We do not live in that way in which you imagine. No house is more  
Free from any of this nor more removed from these evils; I am not at all  
Bothered, I say, that one person is wealthier or more learned, and each one  
Has his own place." "You tell a great story, hardly believable!"

The bore can hardly believe that Horace's group possesses unanimity of spirit. Given the number of associates whom Maecenas likely had, or who likely participated in literary discussions and recitations more generally, he is probably correct. But within the circle of Maecenas, Horace represents himself along with Vergil and the others as having a prime place, developed through a friendship that transcended patronage. It is entirely possible that the harmony that Horace depicts is possible within just these few friends, with friendship itself guarantying their equality. These few men represent the relatively few close friendships that are possible for any human being to cultivate at a particular time. Horace cares the most about them, and his poetry reflects the special concerns and biases of this particular group.

One key commonality that Vergil, Varius, Plotius Tucca and Quintilius all share is that they are connected to the Epicurean philosopher, Philodemus of Gadara. The four

names are grouped together as addressees of at least one of Philodemus' treatises.<sup>97</sup> They were probably students of Philodemus, which suggests that their own preferences for Epicureanism might be more relevant than is frequently given credit in scholarship. Although this connection to Philodemus was published some time ago, the significance of Philodemus' Epicurean influence upon the Augustan poets has only recently begun to be explored and remains an important neglected area of study.<sup>98</sup> Their association with each other seems to predate their association with Maecenas. Perhaps Maecenas' own interests in Epicureanism helped cement the bond between them and prepared for the close friendship that was to come between themselves, Maecenas, and the young budding Epicurean poet Horace, who was first discovered by Vergil, who then together with Varius introduced him formally to Maecenas.

Vergil's Epicureanism extends beyond his possible education with Philodemus. The Vergilian tradition associates him early in his life more closely with Siro, an associate of Philodemus.<sup>99</sup> The *Catalepton*, though skeptically associated with Vergil's

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<sup>97</sup> P. Herc 1082 and 253, also in P.Herc Paris2. For elaborations see Gigante "Atakta," "Vergil in the Shadow of Vesuvius," and Armstrong "Introduction" in *Vergil, Philodemus and the Augustans*. Connections between the men are also explored in what remains an extremely useful article by Körte, "Augusteer bei Philodemus," which has been supplemented by Gigante and Capasso, "Il Ritorno di Filodemo a Ercolano." Armstrong ("Horace's Epicurean Voice in the Satires") even speculates that the repeated use of the names in this order may in fact be a running inside joke that Horace chose to exploit in the *Sermones*.

<sup>98</sup> See Armstrong et al. *Vergil, Philodemus and the Augustans*, Armstrong "The Biographical and Social Foundations of Horace's Poetic Voice," and Kemp "The Philosophical Background to Horace's Satires," "Irony and Aequabilitas" and "A Moral Purpose, A Literary Game."

<sup>99</sup> For what little can be known about Siro, see Gigante "I Frammenti di Sirona." The key piece of evidence in the Vergilian tradition is the life of Vergil by Probus who links Vergil, Varius, Tucca and Rufus to Epicureanism throughout their lives. No mention is made of Philodemus, so it is unlikely that this assessment has been garnered from Philodemus' own dedications and probably represents some earlier

early career, includes two poems, 5 and 8, that are formally dedicated to Siro. We need not accept them as genuine in order to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion about Vergil's Epicureanism, for even if they are not genuine, as Armstrong notes, they still represent early biographical tradition about Vergil's studies with Siro ("Introduction" 2). Catherine Castner, in her *Prosopography of Roman Epicureans*, lists Vergil among the certain Epicureans (77-79).<sup>100</sup> Whatever Vergil may have actually believed, the evaluation of the role of philosophy in his works is just as complicated as in Horace's; he also makes frequent use of elements from many different philosophical traditions, and offers considerable difficulty to scholars appraising a work such as the *Aeneid* as "Epicurean" in any meaningful sense of the word.<sup>101</sup> Part of a philosophical education, of course, included studying all of the great thinkers, not merely one's own preferred tradition. This training provides content from which poets can stitch together their intricate masterpieces. In any event, epic and bucolic poetry are entirely different genres from satire, and although I see the philosophical ideas present within Vergil's works as important for assessing them, I see no need to run to the opposite extreme of attempting

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form of independent attestation of their Epicureanism (cf. Armstrong "Horace's Epicurean Voice in the Satires").

<sup>100</sup> "No single piece of evidence proves his adherence, but the preponderance of the evidence, when literary and biographical testimony are taken together, confirms that Virgil was at some time a former member of the sect in whose doctrines his poetry have been steeped" (Castner 78).

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Polleichtner "Aeneas' Emotions in Vergil's *Aeneid*." The philosophical schools all have quite a bit to say about the role of the emotions. Castner indicates that like Horace, Vergil may have undergone a gradual weakening in his Epicureanism throughout his life. His early phase reflected in the *Eclogues* is much more strongly Epicurean (Cf. Rosenmeyer's *The Green Cabinet*), while the *Georgics* remain significantly Epicurean, while the *Aeneid* has a much broader spectrum of philosophies integrated into the text.

to make these works more Epicurean than they are. In the final analysis, Vergil has some rather strong connections to two major Epicurean philosophers, and as Horace's closest friend, it may have been in Horace's interests and preferences to attempt a more direct appeal to this Epicureanism through his satires.

Varius Rufus and Plotius Tucca are probably best known for being assigned the task of editing the *Aeneid* following the death of Vergil. The fact that they earned this role can only be assigned to their continuing close friendship with Vergil, a friendship that was likely long-lasting and stemmed from their days together under Philodemus. Castner lists both of them as certain Epicureans (Varius 73-74, Plotius Tucca 45-46). Horace describes Varius as an epic poet in S. 1.10, and among his works was a hexameter poem *De Morte*, whose title sounds suspiciously as if it was intended to free people from the fear of death in line with Epicurean teaching. It may also have reflected ideas contained in Philodemus' own treatise *On Death*. The *De Morte* also included unflattering lines directed toward Mark Antony, and may suggest a further political alignment within this small Epicurean coterie that made joining Maecenas' literary circle and ultimately Augustus' camp a natural maturation of their earlier tendencies.<sup>102</sup> We know far less about Plotius Tucca other than his association with Vergil, Varius and Quintilius. Horace says nothing about his status as a poet even when he identifies Vergil and Varius as such. Clearly he had some literary acumen, or he would not have won the

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<sup>102</sup> For the fragments of *De Morte*, see Hollis "L. Varius Rufus, *De Morte* (frs. 1-4 Morel)" and Courtney *The Fragmentary Latin Poets*. For general background on Varius Rufus see Hollis "Virgil's Friend Varius Rufus" who provides the most extensive survey of Varius' life and fragmentary works, and see also Bickel "Varii Carmen Epicum de Actis Caesaris et Agrippae."

privileged position of editing the *Aeneid* with Varius, but just as Vergil's fame ultimately eclipsed Varius, whose poetry has been very nearly washed from history, so too are the accomplishments of Plotius Tucca.

Quintilius Varus was not a poet but a literary critic. As with Plotius Tucca, we have scant evidence about him. His most noted appearance in Horace's poetry is *Ode* 1.24 upon the event of his death. Horace addresses the ode to Vergil, another close friend, and seems to chide him for excessive weeping. Vergil is parallel to Orpheus (lines 11-13), who failed to win back his love from death and who figures prominently in Vergil's works.<sup>103</sup> The poem makes sense in Epicurean terms, where death is not something to be feared. That Horace would chide Vergil in language consistent with Epicurean approaches to death suggests an Epicurean connection between Horace, Vergil, and Quintilius as late as 23 BCE, when the *Odes* were finally published.<sup>104</sup> Later in life, Horace chose to remember him in the *Ars Poetica* 438-44 as a helpful critic of poems in progress. How would Quintilius have known these poems thus, if it were not through recitation? Castner adds that Quintilius Varus himself wrote two treatises on Epicurean topics, *On Flattery* and *On Greed* (62), and includes him among her certain Epicureans. Although we may know nothing of these works or other facets of his life,

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<sup>103</sup> Cf. *Georgics* 4. Lee's *Vergil as Orpheus* is helpful for understanding how Horace picks up on the theme in *Ode* 1.24.

<sup>104</sup> Jerome also dates Quintilius' death to 23 BCE, possibly making it a late addition to the collection just ahead of publication. E.T. Merrill (*Catullus* 11) notes Quintilius' possible appearance in Catullus 66, 10 and 22, though nothing of Quintilius' Epicureanism can be made from this passage. His connections to Vergil, Philodemus and other Epicureans may not have developed or were only in the process of developing when Catullus was writing.

Horace chooses to remember him in contexts that suggest his literary ability and his Epicureanism.

I take the connections between these men and Philodemus along with potential Epicurean themes throughout their early works to suggest that we should take seriously the idea that Horace's own early work, the *Sermones*, may also resonate with prominent Epicurean ideas. Since Horace was running primarily among this circle, it is only natural that he would use Epicurean themes to appeal to this group of insiders who share poetic, philosophical, and political interests over and against the divergent poetic and philosophical interests of those more distant within Maecenas' circle and especially those outside of it. None of these men seem to be doctrinaire or highly evangelical in their Epicureanism; Epicureans were known to blend into their society at large.<sup>105</sup> Yet philosophy in the sense of "worldview" always reveals itself. The Epicurean preferences of this small literary group repeatedly surface in the early years of Vergil, Horace, and the others.

The most important person in Horace's *Sermones* is his patron Maecenas. Castner lists him among her "uncertain" Epicureans (87-88), largely because her most important evidence is self-confession and direct testimony of contemporaries. Both of these are lacking for Maecenas. Of course, given the paucity of the evidence, we cannot rule out the possibility of Epicureanism as well. Although Maecenas' life seems to comport well with an Epicurean preference, Castner does not see him as a strict adherent

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<sup>105</sup> Cf. Asmis "Epicurean Economics"

(88). Castner is right to acknowledge that Horace's poetic interactions with Maecenas reflect Epicurean coloring, but if we depend upon Horace to argue for Maecenas' Epicureanism, we introduce a circular fallacy into our argument that is best avoided. The most comprehensive approach to Maecenas' Epicureanism is the work of André (*Mécène. Essai de Biographie Spirituelle*) who examines the extant fragments of Maecenas' poetry and the vague facts of his life such as his disdain of honors and cultivation of friendships. He ultimately concludes that Maecenas is a failed Epicurean. This reasoning actually comports well with how Horace interacts with him throughout his career. If Maecenas were only a loose adherent, as Castner and André postulate, then Horace's use of Epicurean frank speech becomes all the more fitting because it affords the opportunity for a philosophically learned Horace to impart moral wisdom to his friend and patron. It may be that the best place for identifying Maecenas as an Epicurean is in his association with the aforementioned members of the circle. Even a loose adherent of Epicureanism is still conversant with important concepts and terminology and may have a desire to see and hear more. In this way, Epicureanism can still be a focal point around which Maecenas can sympathize with Vergil, Varius, Plotius Tucca and Quintilius Varus. In relating to them, Epicureanism then becomes for Horace part of the insider cypher.

### **The Importance of Philodemus in the Late Republican Literary and Political**

#### **Landscape**

Philodemus of Gadara, an Epicurean philosopher, had immigrated to Rome from the east and eventually came to enjoy the favor, protection, and friendship of the

noteworthy Pisones.<sup>106</sup> L. Calpurnius Piso became his patron, and likely hosted him at the magnificent villa at Herculaneum, where portions of Philodemus' library have been recovered for us, thereby offering a wealth of knowledge concerning the nature of Epicurean circles, philosophical instruction, and the relationship between Greek philosophy and Roman government during this time. The real significance of Philodemus is only now coming into view, as his texts receive renewed focus and scholars carefully mine them for their relationship with some of the most important and powerful political figures of the day (Piso was the father-in-law of Julius Caesar), and several important poets as we have just seen. In the case of my own study, Philodemus' importance is more than the fact that several of Horace's friends studied closely with him. His own network of relationships provides a useful parallel for how Horace's circle of friends may have interacted with each other. Philodemus, Piso and others form an "intellectual" circle of sorts built around Epicurean ideas with a concern as well for appropriate literary production.

Just as Horace enjoys a unique relationship with his own patron, Maecenas, so also does Philodemus enjoy a unique relationship to Piso.<sup>107</sup> In *AP* 11.44, Philodemus' most celebrated epigram, he calls him "dearest Piso," suggesting a touch of friendship and no hint at all of servility in their relationship.<sup>108</sup> The celebration is to occur on

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<sup>106</sup> The most exhaustive treatment of the background and history of Philodemus is Gigante's *Philodemus in Italy*.

<sup>107</sup> First noted by Gigante, *Philodemus in Italy*, 88-89.

<sup>108</sup> *Epigram 27* in Sider.

Epicurus' birthday, the twentieth of the month.<sup>109</sup> The dinner will be simple; no sow udders, a Roman delicacy, nor any Chian wine will be served. Instead, Philodemus merely offers to Piso that faithful friends will discuss something truly sweeter than anything in Phaeacia's land. The truth of philosophy contrasts with the alluring falsehood of poetry signified by Phaeacia, where Odysseus once told the stories of his adventures. Horace himself no doubt saw this invitation as a masterpiece and his depiction of the dinner at his own Sabine farm in *Sermo* 2.6 certainly owes some inspiration to the Epigram (Gigante *Philodemus in Italy*, 86; Armstrong "Horace's Epicurean Voice in the Satires"). The poem celebrates Epicurean simplicity of living, intentionally avoiding the luxurious life, while celebrating the true pleasures of life that can only be known through walking in friendship with others.

Piso also hosted Philodemus at a villa in Herculaneum, much as Maecenas later bestowed upon Horace the Sabine farm. The villa contained a full philosophical library, the foundation for a circle of philosophers. Gigante notes the wide range of texts that have been recovered there, including four books of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*, a pythagorizing Ennius, and Stoic texts, mostly from Chrysippus (*Philodemus in Italy*, 3-4). The diversity of philosophical viewpoints shows that philosophical education included knowledge of the viewpoints of other schools as well. The Stoic texts, in particular, are interesting to note, because Stoicism was one of Philodemus' favorite targets, just as it is in Horace's *Sermones*.

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<sup>109</sup> Cf. Gigante, *Philodemus in Italy*, 79-89.

Philodemus' relationship to Piso can also be seen in the prose treatise, *On the Good King According to Homer*, which Philodemus formally dedicates to Piso.<sup>110</sup> Piso was widely known to be an Epicurean, as Cicero makes clear in his attacks upon Piso in the *In Pisonem*. The treatise examines the proper relationship between the monarch and the sage, and stands metaphorically for the relationship between the Roman statesman and the philosophical adviser. Piso had served as consul once, and was connected politically to Julius Caesar through marriage. He was thus expected to fulfill duties to the Roman state. Philodemus addresses Piso exclusively throughout *On the Good King*. The text is more than just a generic work of philosophy; it is intended to be relevant for Piso in the exact moment and to have practical significance for his life. Perhaps one goal was to examine how a Roman Epicurean statesman could be involved in politics despite the Epicurean preference for *ataraxia* and simple apolitical country living.<sup>111</sup> The presentation of the wisdom through the lens of Homer allows Philodemus to combine moral seriousness with poetry, a pattern which I believe has relevance for Horace's own approach in the *Sermones*.

In addition to internal evidence for the relationship between Piso and Philodemus, we also have external and hostile evidence in the form of Cicero's speech

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<sup>110</sup> See Jeffrey Fish "Philodemus' *De Bono Rege Secundum Homerum*: a Critical Text and Commentary (cols. 21-39)" for the most recent systematic exploration of the text. Also relevant is his article ("Not all Politicians are Sisyphus") in *Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition*.

<sup>111</sup> Cf. Roskam, *Live Unnoticed*; Fish "Not All Politicians are Sisyphus."; Armstrong "Epicurean Virtues, Epicurean Friendship." I will have more to say on this point in the final section of this chapter since Philodemus' texts help us combat the nonsensical notion that the Romans just did not take their philosophical beliefs seriously.

against Piso. Piso had denounced Cicero after the illegal execution of Catiline's conspirators. Cicero's response, which Nisbet famously called a "masterpiece of misrepresentation," presents Piso as a decadent and disgusting Epicurean, and not even a good Epicurean at that.<sup>112</sup> Pamela Gordon has recently shown that many of Cicero's criticisms stem from popular caricatures of Epicureans which we should not take too seriously.<sup>113</sup> The relationship between Piso and Philodemus comes up rather briefly at *In Pisonem* 68-72, where Cicero introduces "a certain Greek who lives with Piso." Clearly Cicero expected his audience to understand this circumlocution. Philodemus had his own positive stature in society, and thus according to Gordon, Cicero's presentation of him is mostly restrained (171). The problem according to Cicero is that Piso's mind simply cannot grasp the intricacies of true Epicureanism. The most serious criticism that Cicero levels against Philodemus concerns his poetry. Cicero acknowledges that Philodemus' poetry (*In Pisonem* 79) is witty, graceful, elegant and surpassingly clever, yet he also performs an intentionally insensitive poetic interpretation by seeing the poetry as presenting Piso's true self in a mirror (*In Pisonem* 29). Most of Philodemus' poetry focuses on love, wine, and song, all well-worn commonplaces. Despite Cicero's contention that the entirety of Philodemus' collection of epigrams depict Piso's wild debaucheries, only one of them, the dinner invitation, mentions Piso directly. Although I

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<sup>112</sup> Nisbet, commentary on *In Pisonem* xvi. See also DeLacy.

<sup>113</sup> Gordon, *The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus* 163-168. Gordon's work is in line with a number of works that seek to examine how our own perception of Epicurus and Epicureans has been controlled largely by non-Epicurean and hostile witnesses such as Cicero. See in addition, Fish and Sanders, *Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition*.

suspect we can take little of factual value in Cicero's criticism of Piso and Philodemus, we can see that Philodemus' poetry was well known at Rome, and that Cicero can expect his audience to be aware of Philodemus and his relationship to Piso, and to have at least a passing knowledge of Piso's interest in Epicureanism.

As we touched upon Philodemus' dinner invitation to Piso and Cicero's representation of Philodemus' epigrams, it is worthwhile now to turn to Philodemus' written works, including the epigrams, as they reveal the character of an Epicurean society. In contrast to his philosophical prose, Philodemus' epigrams are not direct attempts to proselytize for Epicureanism or to display complex philosophical concepts. Instead, we find exactly the kind of light trivial poetry on love, wine, and dining that Cicero portrayed. The dinner invitation to Piso may suggest that this Epicurean circle often gathered around meals. David Sider offers that the poetry was "almost certainly recited by Philodemus during dinner parties to a group of like-minded Greek and Roman friends in the vicinity of Naples,..." ("How to Commit Philosophy Obliquely" 86). Young poets such as Vergil and Varius and literary critics such as Quintilius Varus were perhaps attracted to the combination of interest in both poetics and philosophy. Philodemus' treatises *On Poetry*, *On Music*, and *On Rhetoric*, all suggest that the intersection between philosophy and literature was an important topic that he had addressed and suggests an appropriately Epicurean way of doing literature.

The nature of philosophy within Philodemus' epigrams is more difficult to treat. Although some poems such as the dinner invitation to Piso are consistent with an

Epicurean vision of society, the rest are more subtle in their portrayal of Epicurean ethics. David Sider offers one possible approach to some of those poems by noting that Philodemus could engage in philosophy obliquely (“How to Commit Philosophy Obliquely” 85-101). The epigrams are not merely consistent with Epicurean philosophy, “but are intended to illustrate doctrines found in his prose...” (85). One key way that this happens is by the creation of a narrator who falls short of Epicurean goals. In both *Epigram 3* and *29*, Sider notes a remarkably similar form and content where the narrator Philodemus drifts from Epicurean orthodoxy on the subject of death only to be corrected by a friend from within the poem (89-90). The language and approach is the frank speech (*parrhesia*) associated with true Epicurean friends in relationship to each other. Instead of abstract and esoteric philosophical concepts, we get a pragmatic application of the principles depicted in the context of characters experiencing real challenges that life can offer.

In accordance with his own views in *On Poetry*, Philodemus avoids any explicit formulation of philosophical ideas, which he sees as doomed to failure. But philosophical ideas need not be absent entirely in good poetry, as if to reduce poetry to mere aesthetics. Sider is right to emphasize that Philodemus himself suggests that excellent poetry relies both upon its aesthetic properties and its main ideas. Thus, the content and flow of Philodemus’ poetry require an audience that is well versed in philosophical ideas. Philodemus does not aim to convert people to Epicureanism, but rather offers a parallel situation in the poem where he can indirectly teach (in the case of

*Epigram* 3 and 29) the appropriate position on the fear of death by criticizing himself. This method is less threatening, and more importantly suggests that even in ordinarily playful moments an individual can take their philosophy seriously.

I emphasize Sider's point about these poems being originally delivered in the context of a dinner party among *like-minded Epicureans*. These epigrams carry their deeper philosophical implications only when those well-versed and agreeable with Epicurean philosophy hear and recognize the connections. For outsiders, they may have aesthetic value. No doubt some in Rome enjoyed them for their poetic value without having to engage directly with the way in which Epicurean ideas are at play within the texts. This is an important methodological point for exploring the subtle way that any kind of philosophy might appear in literature, and it offers some useful parallels in applying my own theory to Horace's satires. Although scholars have generally been good in recent years at analyzing rhetorical structures, the flow of the argument, and the aesthetic dimensions of satire, we have been less good at appreciating the role of philosophy within satire. Sider's experiment in oblique philosophy is a useful avenue for exploring how an Epicurean audience might have read Horace's own philosophical texts and gotten something deeper and more meaningful out of them while allowing other audiences to enjoy them as mere poetry.

As we turn to examining Philodemus' prose works, perhaps the most important for the purposes of understanding Horatian satire is the treatise *Peri Parrhesias* (*On Frank Criticism*). Although the text is only in a fragmentary state, it is clear that it is a

“how to” book for the practice of criticizing one another in an Epicurean circle. Frank criticism refers primarily to the “personal candor prized between true friends” (Konstan et al. eds. *Philodemus on Frank Criticism*, 3). It is thus a moral duty of true friends and specifically of a philosophical teacher to his disciples. Members are to admonish one another, as proper Epicurean *psychagogy* depends upon all members actively participating in the mutual correction of each other.<sup>114</sup> Equally important is that friends do not conceal their faults, but bring them into the open. As we shall see, at least some of what happens in the *Sermones* is Horace’s own private confession of weaknesses and mistakes, albeit of a lesser variety (1.3.20). Philodemus’ treatise goes into considerable detail, even analyzing particular personality types and the appropriate kinds of frankness to use when interacting with them. A gentle personality will crumble under excessive harshness, while a stubborn personality requires a firm and more direct challenge. Teachers are to be aware of their own dispositions as well, and how those dispositions interact with their students. In addition to the basic role of self-correction through confession and frank correction from others, the treatise encourages members to report the ethical failures of others. All of their ethical interactions occur very much in the context of community, even if our own spirit of individualism today may find these actions shocking or even repulsive social behavior. Additionally, the wise teachers are also not exempt from frank criticism, but are encouraged to correct each other.

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<sup>114</sup> Cf. Clarence Glad’s application of these principles to Pauline literature and for the use of the term *psychagogy* in *Paul and Philodemus*. Also relevant are the articles of Konstan and Glad in Fitzgerald’s volume, *Friendship, Flattery and Frankness of Speech*.

What Philodemus' treatise offers for our exploration of Horace is a window into the functioning of an Epicurean circle, where discussions about morality, virtue, and appropriate behavior are mixed with confession of one's own faults and frank criticism of the faults of others. Since several of Horace's closest friends belonged to this Epicurean circle, it is hardly a surprise that the society that Horace creates within his *Sermones* frequently displays frank criticism on ethical matters.<sup>115</sup>

### **Did Roman Epicureans Take Their Beliefs Seriously?**

Philodemus' texts have been at the forefront of resolving another important scholarly dilemma: Did the Romans take their beliefs seriously? What I take to be the prevailing opinion, termed the "frivolity theory" by Miriam Griffin ("Philosophy, Politics and Politicians") is that the Romans generally dabbled in philosophy as a hobby, but that philosophy had no larger impact on their daily lives or in their political actions.<sup>116</sup> A popular view sees the Romans as generally eclectic in their beliefs with a strong penchant

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<sup>115</sup> One additional and more restrained view of the interaction between individuals in elite networks comes from Peter White's recent work on *Cicero in Letters*. In a chapter titled "On Giving and Receiving Advice" (117-36), White notes the social dynamics at work between how one Roman gives advice to another. "In friendship, the authority of friends who urge well should have the greatest scope, and should be deployed in advising not just unabashedly but even sharply, if circumstances require" (122). White's work helps locate Philodemus' Epicurean more generally in the landscape of how late Republican elite networks operate with respect to advice. The act of giving advice is broader than merely instructing on ethical matters, yet many of the principles remain the same. The fact that many letters include the phrase *sed haec coram* "but more on this when we meet" (117) suggests that advice (including potentially moral advice) was a regular element at many types of face-to-face encounters. That advice is occurring in letters allows for a more formal extension of the concept into works of literature such as Horace's *Sermones*, and his later adaptation of the epistle for literary and ethical purposes to which he appends the same descriptive title, *Sermones*, as he does to his satirical literature.

<sup>116</sup> See also the work of Brunt and Fowler in *Philosophia Togata I*. Even Castner's *Prosopography of Roman Epicureans* takes a skeptical approaching, doubting the sincerity of any Roman Epicureans who showed involvement in politics.

for ethics, but that they naturally blended wisdom from each philosophical tradition along with the Roman *mos maiorum* as they applied their beliefs pragmatically to their lives within the Roman state.<sup>117</sup> The frivolity theory is based on what Griffin identifies as a kind of compartmentalization of Roman society (“Philosophy, Politics and Politicians” 15-18). Philosophy, politics, and other spheres of life simply occupy different and unrelated compartments. When an ancient Roman therefore thought about philosophy, they did so under the guise of philosophic discourse, but when they stepped into the political arena, they simply turned the philosophical circuits in their brains off and proceeded in an ordinary and typically Roman fashion. Her argument is understandable in the sense that few instances can be found where the origins of a policy can be directly traced to a particular philosophical tenet. Most philosophical tenets are simply too general to be of use in applying to specific policies, while much political work is pragmatic in nature (Griffin, “Philosophy, Politics, and Politicians” 32-37). Even if some politician had considered the philosophical ramifications of his actions, they may not have bothered to articulate them in explicitly philosophical terms, and such instances may not have survived the transmission process. Griffin rightly sets a high bar in determining when a philosophical belief was relevant to a specific policy, but in setting

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<sup>117</sup> See especially Jocelyn “The Ruling Class of the Roman Republic and Greek Philosophers.” Griffin, Fowler and Brunt in *Philosophia Togata I*. Fowler takes the same line throughout *Roman Constructions*, 138-155. The same trend is reflected earlier by Earl and Stanton. Even Shackleton-Bailey takes a light-hearted attitude toward Atticus’ Epicureanism (*Letters to Atticus* 1965), and so does Nicholas Horsfall (i.e. *Cornelius Nepos: a Selection*, but note Armstrong criticisms in “The Biographical and Social Foundations”); compare Brunt’s ambiguous appraisal of Arrian’s Stoicism, which is apparently Stoic enough to like Epictetus, but not Stoic enough to subject Alexander to a rigorous critique based on Stoic standards (“From Epictetus to Arrian”).

that high bar, we equally have no ability to prove that Roman philosophical beliefs had no influence over a particular Roman's conceptualization of policy.

The same current of scholarly opinion is also represented in studies on satire, most recently by Roland Mayer ("Sleeping with the Enemy: Satire and Philosophy"). On this belief, the role of philosophy in satire is simply mere decoration that can generally be ignored in favor of the real business of examining poetry as poetry. Scholars can acknowledge that philosophical ideas may be present in a text such as Horace's *Sermones*, but their significance is either unrecognized or underemphasized. Instead, they contribute to the mish-mash of intertextuality.<sup>118</sup> But part of the point of intertextuality is to recognize that within the complex web of interlacing ideas, some strands are more important than others and contribute more significantly to the overall picture. I simply argue that the philosophical thread woven through the garment of the text should assume greater importance, especially in a philosophically trained and exceptionally knowledgeable author such as Horace writing to an equally well-trained circle of friends.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> See in particular Don Fowler's work on Lucretius ("Lucretius and Politics" and *Roman Constructions*, 138-155.). As a student of literary theory, I have a firm appreciation for his approach and his theoretical contributions.

<sup>119</sup> If we limit ourselves simply analyzing the text itself as is typical in many literary studies that emphasize a close reading of the text, we are probably left with assessing Horace as "eclectic" just as Emily Gowers does in her recent commentary on *Sermones* I (20). She cites Rudd "Horace as Moralist," Mayer "Sleeping with the Enemy" and Moles "Philosophy and Ethics" as good short introductions to the topic, while pointing to Kemp's string of works for more detail. Postmodern literary theory has made us increasingly aware of our own subjectivity as readers, and therefore what we bring to the text potentially matters just as much as what is actually in the text itself. The same is true when considering our ancient works in the context of their ancient readers, all of whom will bring different sets of philosophical expectations and cultural biases to the texts.

Perhaps the whole concern over the seriousness of someone's beliefs is less serious and important than has often been made out. If we applied the same kinds of arguments about the "seriousness" of the Romans' beliefs to our own beliefs today, would we not come to a similar kind of conclusion about our commitments to the very ideas that we passionately debate in society on a daily basis? Do we not have just as many disputes about the relationship between a person's religious, philosophical, and moral convictions and their actions? Is it not then a surprise that scholars would debate this very same issue when applied to people for whom we have only a small portion of the context which informed their viewpoints? The question of how seriously someone took their beliefs is ultimately unanswerable. What I can note is the degree to which philosophical language plays an important role in the intellectual and social vocabulary with which the educated Roman elite form and articulate the thoughts that appear in their speeches, letters, and literary texts. I take the very depths that the Romans went to in arguing about philosophical ideas as indicative of the degree of seriousness with which they took their *debates* about those beliefs.

Part of the problem also is that we tend to approach the subject from the expectation of seeing clear, explicit and overly formal philosophical statements, when in fact, we need a more general approach that recognizes that all human beings possess a worldview, whether carefully calculated in the terms of formal philosophical garb or merely superficially imbibed from the culture. More likely a given individual expresses conscious awareness of some parts of their worldview while being relatively unaware of

others. This worldview permeates and colors all aspects of our daily decision-making process. How many beliefs and practices must one have to properly be called an Epicurean or a Stoic? Do we fault someone for attempting to fulfill certain philosophical ideals but failing?<sup>120</sup> In our detached viewpoint of several millennia beyond, it is easy to read philosophical ideas in the texts of our authors, and then dismiss their beliefs as superficial when we notice discrepancies between the lives and actions of an adherent. Numerous authors self-identify as Epicurean, Stoic, Academic, and we should perhaps be more willing to grant them their self-identification and attempt to understand the complex ways in which they attempted to rationalize the apparent contradictions between their lives and philosophical beliefs. I am most certain that were I important enough to have written transcriptions of my thoughts survive for the next two-thousand years plenty of ink (or pixels, or whatever comes after pixels in the technological sequence) would be spilled over what exactly my beliefs were and whether they measured up to my self-identification. This logic should caution us against too eagerly dismissing philosophy as an important and integral part to ancient Romans, at least of the educated elite.

One key area which has received critical reevaluation in recent years is in the Roman Epicureans' relationship to politics. Naturally, we expect them to fulfill the Epicurean maxim "live unnoticed," which would seem to preclude them from entering politics. Yet on the other hand, we see many in the Caesarian camp who express serious and earnest commitments to Epicureanism, yet engage in political activities that seem to

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<sup>120</sup> Cf. André's earlier description of Maecenas as a "failed Epicurean."

go against the basic Epicurean tenet.<sup>121</sup> Even more telling is the case of Cassius, who converts to Epicureanism and quickly decides upon tyrannicide as an appropriate course of action.<sup>122</sup> Surely if any action is bound to lead to the disturbance of one's tranquility, then tyrannicide qualifies. This is in part what has led many to assume that Roman Epicureans in particular merely dabbled in their philosophy. To be sure, many other Epicureans intentionally refrained from politics and seem to have interpreted the "live unnoticed" maxim in precisely the way that scholars do today. Yet I believe another explanation is possible. When two beliefs seem to contradict one another (in this case, the maxim "live unnoticed" and the duties that a typical elite Roman felt toward the state), this conflict creates cognitive dissonance, a kind of pain that forces the individual to reconcile the two beliefs in some way, either by dismissing one of them, or by arguing through the difficulties in some fashion that resolves the contradiction.

If we evaluate solely on the basis of the dichotomy created by cognitive dissonance, then only those who withdrew from politics are the real Epicureans. Those who participated in politics must have dismissed their Epicureanism. Yet we see evidence that philosophical Romans actually engaged in the process of arguing through the apparent contradictions into a state of harmonized beliefs, just as Piso continued to be active in the Senate while simultaneously sponsoring the Epicurean circles in Rome and Herculaneum. Part of this process is built into the nature of the philosophical schools by

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<sup>121</sup> For a long list of Epicureans involved in politics, see Momigliano, "Review" 152. The most authoritative Epicureans supported Caesar in 45, though some like Cassius apparently entered the camp of the conspirators.

<sup>122</sup> Cf. Momigliano "Review," and Sedley "The Ethics of Brutus and Cassius."

the time that they reach Rome. They had largely decentralized and devolved into various groups interpreting the words of the school founders while doing little traditional work that expands the bounds of the philosophical systems.<sup>123</sup> The cult of the school founder becomes prominent as each philosophical teacher seeks the most faithful rendition of the founder's teaching while only expounding upon that teaching in pragmatic ways that reflect the philosophical schools' encounter with new political and social situations. The commitment to the founder is virtually religious, especially in the case of Epicureanism, where the majority of the philosophical system was spelled out in Epicurus' teachings and far fewer gaps existed for later teachers to fill in.

In order to justify their involvement in politics, an Epicurean could make several claims. Momigliano argues that Cassius rationalized his involvement in the conspiracy by viewing the existence of a stable state as a necessary condition for his own internal peace ("Review" 156). Sedley has furthered this argument by noting that the two conspirators most prominent, Brutus and Cassius, are depicted in Plutarch asking philosophically loaded questions ("The Ethics of Brutus and Cassius"). The questions were general enough that adherents from any philosophical school could provide an

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<sup>123</sup> See especially Sedley "Philosophical Allegiance in the Greco-Roman World," and "Lucretius and the Decentralization of Philosophy." The decentralization is also evident in that some of the material in Philodemus reflects the tendency of Philodemus to argue with the interpretation of other Epicurean groups. *On Household Management*, for example, argues that it is acceptable for the philosopher to own a large estate to support himself. In doing so, it may respond to criticisms from competing Epicurean groups who were jealous of Philodemus' connections with Piso and the many pleasures that he enjoyed through that association, including the villa at Herculaneum. The implication is that Philodemus may even have been in violation of Epicurus' call to simple living. Philodemus' response in *On Household Management* is to show in a sophisticated fashion that what he does is acceptable in Epicurean terms. See Voula-Tsouanas' recent edition.

answer that was consistent with their own philosophy. Yet the questions were also controversial enough that more than one orthodox answer was possible.<sup>124</sup> As Brutus examined political conspirators, he searched for those who had managed to come to a definite conclusion about whether tyrannicide was an appropriate action. Although the Epicurean in Plutarch's account is dismissive of the possibility of getting involved politically, Sedley sees a real possibility that an Epicurean could have answered the question differently in a way that allowed the potential for tyrannicide while staying true to one's internal Epicurean beliefs.

The most recent and fullest exploration of the relationship between the maxim "live unnoticed" and politics is Geert Roskam's monograph, *Live Unnoticed*. Perhaps the most significant contribution of Roskam is in identifying the term "conditional qualifying" (35). By this he means that few things in life are actually absolute, but nearly all are subject to qualification and nuance. This approach to the Epicurean's relationship to politics is not a recent addition, but in fact goes all the way back to Epicurus' principle of a rational calculus as expounded in the *Letter to Menoecus* 130. All that we do in life should be evaluated by the pleasure it gives, but each decision is subject to critical evaluation. Not all pleasures are unconditionally good, and not all pains should be avoided. Some pleasures lead to greater pains in the end, while some pains produce greater pleasures in the future. In other words, the maxim "live unnoticed" is not an Epicurean moral law to follow absolutely, but an ideal to which one

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<sup>124</sup> Sedley suggests that Brutus may even have been a virtual Stoic, adding support to the belief that philosophical beliefs did in fact matter to many of these conspirators.

must aspire and weigh against the other terms. Armstrong, building on Roskam's analysis, notes that Philodemus' *On the Good King* allows that great Romans born into certain responsibilities cannot merely abandon them for Epicurean quietude.<sup>125</sup> If Piso were to abandon politics entirely, this could create far more pain for him than what he might endure in the political arena. Of course, a good Epicurean who is not born into this heritage should not mindlessly dive into politics, nor should one who has no chance of succeeding at politics enter the sphere.<sup>126</sup> Thus, a Piso or Maecenas might be seen as resisting their "natural" role (and thus not fully at peace) by trying simplistically to retire from political responsibilities.

The contention of both Armstrong and Fish in *Epicurus and the Epicurean tradition* is that previous scholarship has failed to take these Epicureans and their Epicureanism seriously precisely because scholarship itself relies too much on Cicero and Plutarch, both of whom are hostile witnesses, for our appraisal of Epicureanism. In fact, Cicero's criticisms of Cassius (*Ad. Fam.* 15.16-18) only make sense if he (Cicero) intentionally interprets Epicurean philosophy in a superficial way and ignores the qualifying conditions postulated by Roskam.<sup>127</sup> Cicero suggests through these letters, much as modern scholarship has speculated, that Epicureans do not really believe their

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<sup>125</sup> Armstrong "Epicurean Virtues, Epicurean Friendship" 117. Roskam treats Philodemus extensively (101-128).

<sup>126</sup> Cf. Fish's reevaluation of Lucretius' argument against striving for politics, limiting its application to those Romans who were perennial candidates for office with no chance of achieving that office whatsoever ("Not all Politicians").

<sup>127</sup> This is the same Trebatius that we will see reappear in S. 2.1.

own doctrines, or at the very least, they act differently in practice. Cassius' response to Cicero's criticism (*Ad. Fam.* 15.19), as Armstrong shows, displays exactly the kind of qualifying conditions that Roskam identified ("Epicurean Virtues" 115-119). Moreover, the exchange between Cassius and Cicero demonstrates that the normal upper-class Roman aristocrat understood his doctrines well enough to construct a thoughtful and intelligent response to criticisms of his beliefs.

One final point to stress in arguing that the Romans did take their philosophy seriously is the degree to which philosophical language and references pervaded much other discourse. Cicero's *Pro Murena* includes an extended indictment of Cato's Stoicism, suggesting that he expected his audience to understand at least the rudimentary principles of Stoicism. The same is true of his treatment of Piso and Philodemus explored earlier in the *In Pisonem*. The success of Cicero's speech requires that the audience be conversant enough in the philosophical doctrines so that they can buy his argument that Piso is a bad Epicurean who fails to live up to the teachings of his master. Philosophical treatises abound as well. The exchange between Cicero and Cassius criticizes a certain Catus for using an obscure and odd Latin word (*Ad. Fam.* 15.16). Yet Cassius responds that he can cite an equal number of poor Stoic stylists (*Ad. Fam.* 15.19). Cicero eventually chose to write some philosophical treatises of his own, of which the *De Finibus* is perhaps the most relevant to the present discussion as it shows the complexity

with which an upper-class Roman could navigate the Epicurean, Stoic, and Academic philosophies through its presentation of an advocate and a critic for each philosophy.<sup>128</sup>

The evidence here relates rather importantly to Horace's *Sermones* in that Horace's extended audience, including his reading circle, included many who belonged to a philosophical camp. Many others would have been conversant with the finer points of philosophical debates between the schools and could grasp not only the obvious references on the surface of one of Horace's satires, but also the more obscure ones latent within the text as well. Lejay's demonstration (357-360) from the language of Stertinius that Horace knew the basic structure of Stoic logic is just one illustration that most of his audience could be expected to understand, and which, furthermore, may have had special inside meaning to those with Epicurean preferences in Horace's reading circle.

### **Conclusion**

I opened this chapter by calling attention to the frequent term "eclectic" that is applied to classify Horace's philosophy. If one means simply that many different types of philosophy appear in his texts, then yes, Horace is an eclectic. If one is simply using the term as a cop-out to avoid tangling with the role of philosophy in one of Horace's texts, then the label is superficial and inaccurate. Although we may not know precisely what Horace's own personal beliefs were, I have presented evidence in this chapter that he wrote specifically in the context of several Epicurean friends. Horace is careful to

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<sup>128</sup> Armstrong's contention in "Epicurean Virtues" is that Cicero missteps in his use of Torquatus as a spokesman for the Epicureans, offering a character whom he (Cicero) believes offers a contrast to the values of Epicureanism (Torquatus had a family legacy of duty to the state) and he is at points represented as unclear on how to handle some of the criticisms.

mark out Maecenas and his reading circle within his satires. These form his first and most important audience, those who are expected to understand the complexity of the presentation of his poetry and the thought behind it. I then noted that several of the important recurring names (Vergil, Varius, Quintilius Varus) also congregate around Philodemus, who had his own Epicurean intellectual circle in the late Republic. It is reasonable that Horace knew the inner workings of an Epicurean circle and wrote Epicurean ideas into his text that Vergil, Varius, Quintilius Varus, and possibly many others could have directly appreciated and enjoyed. Philodemus' own texts suggest a more complicated relationship between Epicureans and their place in Roman society, offering the possibility that good Roman statesmen could both take their beliefs as Epicureans seriously while also fulfilling social obligations. Therefore any attempt to dismiss the importance of philosophy by using the term eclecticism or by arguing that members of Horace's circle could not take their philosophy seriously is doomed to failure. Horace's reading circle as a social reality behind the text is the nexus in which the satiric effect that I outlined in chapter one occurs. As we turn to textual analysis of Horace's *Sermones* in chapters three, four, and five, we will consider how the mixture of philosophical ideas at work in the *Sermones* might have struck Horace's close friends, many of whom would have had a strong bias to read Epicurean ideas positively.

## **Chapter 3: Audience and Philosophy in Horace *Sermones* I**

### **Introduction and Background to *Sermones* I**

Chapter one presented a theory of satire which privileged a select group of readers who form the initial audience of a satire, and whose presuppositions predetermine how they view a particular satiric text. Chapter two examined the social foundations for this theoretical view by showing that the activities that characterized upper-class intellectual reading circles were conditioned upon the social dynamics of competition. It also emphasized the Epicurean background that animated Horace's most important relationships. In the present chapter, I delve into the text of the first book of *Sermones*, to show how Horace appeals to the philosophic proclivities of his reading circle. After some preliminary background about the first book of satires, I first examine how Horace orients his text toward Maecenas and his reading circle and against those outside of it.

Throughout the first book of satires, Horace frequently reminds us of his connections to Maecenas, Vergil, Varius, and others in the reading circle, and invites us to imagine them hearing the satires on the first occasion of their performance. These men formed the first audience of the satires and function as an audience internal to Horace's thought-processes, who are intended to get the jokes and laugh against any outsiders depicted either literally or symbolically in the text itself. Horace accomplishes this through the way he handles Epicurean ideas in contrast to those of other philosophical schools (specifically the Stoics), which I treat in the second and final portion of the

chapter. Horace uses philosophy to reflect upon the dynamic of his inner poetic circle of close friends as well as to appeal to their shared cultural and social values.

Horace published the first book of *Sermones* in 36/35 BC.<sup>129</sup> He was only a recent acquaintance of Maecenas, and had been introduced to Maecenas, as we see reflected in 1.6, through his relationship with Vergil. Maecenas, Vergil, and others in the literary circle are linked through their preferences for Epicurean ethics and aesthetics, particularly through Philodemus of Gadara as we saw in chapter two. As a new member of the reading circle, Horace's place among them is not so clearly defined, and thus throughout the first book of satires, Horace endeavors to show himself as a proper member of the circle.<sup>130</sup> We might also envision Horace as showing off a bit as the new poet in the circle, and performing through his poetry the justification for his inclusion.

Book one of the *Sermones* consists of ten poems in a manner typical of the Augustan poetry book.<sup>131</sup> The order and selection of the poems were carefully arranged

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<sup>129</sup> Muecke, *Horace Satires II* 1, Brown, *Horace Satires I* 3. Earlier scholarship tends to focus on the approximate composition date of individual poems based on evidence internal to the poem (cf. Rudd, *Satires of Horace* and Fraenkel, *Horace*). As a distinct unit, 36-35 remains the best estimate for final collection and publication of the first book of satires. See H. Ludwig, Rambaux, Van Rooy's series of articles entitled, "Arrangement and Structure of Satires in Horace..." and "Horace's Sat. 1.1 as Prooemium and Its Relation to Satires 2 to 10," and Muecke, "The Satires." Biography and chronology of Horace in the thirties can be found in Shackleton Bailey's *Profile of Horace*, Levi's *Horace: A Life*, Jasper Griffin's "Horace in the Thirties," and *Latin Poets and Roman Life*, Gregor Maurach's *Horaz: Werk und Leben*, and most recently in R.G.M. Nisbet's "Horace: Life and Chronology." For an elaboration of how Horace's satires fit into the development scheme of Augustan poetry see Zetzel, "Dreaming about Quirinius." Useful commentaries include Palmer, Lejay, Kiessling and Heinze, Morris, Palmer, and Brown.

<sup>130</sup> The anxiety of Horace as a proper insider is most elaborately explored in Oliensis, *Horace and the Rhetoric of Authority* 17-63.

<sup>131</sup> Zetzel ("Horace's Liber Sermonum: The Structure of Ambiguity") profoundly reads the satiric speaker of Horace's first book of satires as becoming increasingly more developed as the book progresses. For the treatment of the poetry book more generally see Zetzel, "Dreaming about Quirinus," 38-52. Cf. Van Rooy,

so that the audience gains insight into the meaning of the whole by proceeding in this linear fashion. As a foundational assumption of my own reading of Horace, I approach it from the standpoint of an audience hearing these satires performed *in sequence on a set occasion and for the first time*, and I am most interested in the interpretative assumptions available to his audience in their initial act of reception.<sup>132</sup> I grant that there may have been variety in how different individuals encountered Horace's works (chapter two). But by attempting to reconstruct an imagined initial moment of reception along with the possible audience assumptions, I aim to tease out some important nuances of audience interaction and interpretation that can be more easily observed in satirical discourse in other areas of history (chapter one) but which have gone unnoticed in Horace.

### **Insiders, Outsiders, and the Conceptualization of Audience in *Sermones* I**

The notion of a satire's audience is decidedly complex. Although questions about a work's audience or audiences are among the first and most important questions we ask

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"Arrangement and Structure of Satires in Horace, *Sermones* Book I, with More Special Reference to Satires 1-4" 38-72, Leach, "Vergil, Horace, Tibullus. Three Collections of Ten," and Lowe. Parallels between the structure of *Sermones* Book one and the *Eclogues* are explored by Rambaux. More recently, Ortwin Knorr convincingly and exhaustively argues that both books of *Sermones* must be understood sequentially and in the order of their presentation and makes by far the most compelling case for reading all of the Satires as a distinct unit and not merely as a collection of individual poems. Ortwin Knorr's most significant achievement seems to be in collecting all of the cross-references and internal allusions within Horace's *Sermones* which suggest that Horace has carefully crafted both books in their final form (*Verborgene Kunst*). Freudenburg argues for a mosaic approach to the first book of *Sermones*, with each poem taking meaning from the other poems around it in sequence, and offering back further meaning to those poems as we reread them (*The Walking Muse* 198-211).

<sup>132</sup> In this respect, I am concerned with the difference between a deeper, thought-provoking style of reading, such as the kind done in the typical work of literary criticism, and a more shallow form of reading that occurs at the initial reception of a work, where uncertainty about what is coming next, and the need to pay attention to next few lines in performance means that one makes quick decisions about what information to place in the foreground and the background. Thus, I carefully emphasize *initial* act of reception.

about a literary work, satire has historically produced rather diverse reactions, making it difficult to pin down the meaning of the text. Horace, as early as he comes in the long history of satire, proves no exception. The simplest formulation of audience in Horace's *Sermones* is offered by Frances Muecke ("The Audience of/in Horace's Satires"), who posits two general audiences.<sup>133</sup> The satiric speaker addresses an audience within the fictions of the poetry itself. Then, a second audience encounters the satiric poem, either in performance, or through their own reading. These two audiences need not coincide, but in complex Horatian satire the two layers frequently slide together and are not easily disentangled.<sup>134</sup> For example, Horace's satiric *persona* frequently addresses Maecenas and his literary circle, whereas Horace himself is reading these satiric poems to the same literary friends. The Maecenas in the text is part of the literary fiction but corresponds in some ways with the fellow by the same name in society. Because of the slippage

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<sup>133</sup> I think this formulation is more broadly true of satire itself. See Chapter 1 for an evaluation of the material with respect to general satiric theory. In the present chapter, I more thoroughly engage those insights relevant for understanding audience in *Sermones* I. Barbara Gold ("Openings in Horace's Satires and Odes") also provides a more elaborate version of the analysis of audience, distinguishing between Maecenas as dedicatee, an internal audience consisting of the imaginary interlocutor with whom the satirist shadow-boxes, an authorial audience consisting of the upper class writers and politicians, and the final actual audience. On whether to read Maecenas as an ornamental decoration in the text or as a real addressee, see Dalzell, Reckford, "Horace and Maecenas," Andre, Nisbet and Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace: Odes Book I and Odes Book II*, Lefevre, "Horaz und Maecenas", Brown, *Horace Satires I* 90.

<sup>134</sup> Muecke maps audience onto a narratological scheme, which is more elaborate than I employ here. Satire contains a real author, an implied author, a narrator, all of whom can become conflated in the course of a satire. Gold notes that the poet and *persona* blend together as well as the patron and his *persona* within the confines of the plot (*Literary Patronage in Greece and Rome*, XIII). It also contains a narratee, implied reader and real reader, who also can likewise become conflated. Quinn (*Texts and Contexts*, "Poet and Audience") focuses extensively on the detailed contexts of performance and is thus less helpful for a formal literary analysis, as does Gustav Seeck. Gowers notes that one can look for biographical fragments in examining Horace in the *Sermones* without performing strict biographical criticism ("Fragments of Autobiography in Horace Satires 1"). Keane argues that autobiography is an important tool of the poet to construct the genre itself ("The Critical Contexts of Satiric Discourse").

between the layers of the audience, the audiences addressed within the poems are relevant to our understanding of Horatian satire when the satiric poems are directly addressing those who were probably also among the actual audience. Horace uses these audience members to help dramatize the diverse reception of his satire. For example, this is more particularly telling in the companion programmatic pieces 1.4 and 1.10. In 1.4, Horace facetiously argues that satire is not poetry, meanwhile undercutting that argument through the poetic effect of placing poem and poet repeatedly at line ends, and concluding with a great band of poets that will come and convince you of these matters. In 1.10 we find out exactly who the great throng of poets are. Thus, Horace's poetic circle is directly addressed within the poems, but was also among the very first to hear these poems in performance; their appearance in the text helps dramatize one of the many possible receptions to Horace's satires. Moreover, where an audience within a poem overlaps with one in real life, it is perfectly plausible and natural for the real life audience to identify themselves with the one in the poem and for other readers to make the same association.

The actual audience of Horace's satires consists first of Maecenas, his literary patron, along with Vergil, Varius and others in his literary circle, the broad sweep of senators and *equites*, along with the general public who may have heard a performance of Horace's *Sermones* at some point. McNeill has organized these audiences into a series of concentric rings based upon their proximity to Horace. Maecenas stands in the inner circle, followed closely by the general group of poets who surround him. Senators and

*Equites* stand further removed from Horace and Maecenas' group. Furthest from Horace are the generic uneducated human beings who may have encountered his satires by chance. While I find this model useful, I wish to focus on the diversity of the group(s), especially as they increase in distance from Horace himself. The general lot of senators and *equites* share some social experiences and cultural values both with Horace's literary circle and with each other. But they also have their own personal, political, moral, and philosophical agendas and allegiances, all of which shape their perception of Horace's *Sermones*.<sup>135</sup> I aim to push beyond the work of McNeill by dividing the audience into two specific camps, the first consisting of Maecenas and Horace's reading circle, and the second consisting of "outsiders." This second group consists of all of those who may be in some way opposed to the intellectual and cultural orientation(s) of the satires themselves. This does not suggest that this group of outsiders is homogeneous. Some of these upper-class Roman readers will be more or less sympathetic with the orientation expressed by the satires and may even be Epicureans outside of Horace's own circle. Others will be more or less opposed, thus sorting themselves along cultural lines into insiders and outsiders of various degrees.<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> Selective perception causes us to notice what most specifically concerns ourselves and our projects, while confirmation bias is a tendency to remember what confirms our pre-existing beliefs. "Most of what we speak of as beliefs (commonsense notions, personal assumptions, political, philosophical, and religious convictions, and so forth) can be seen to operate not as discrete proposition-like statements about the world, but, rather, as more or less continuously shifting-strengthening, weakening and reconfiguring-elements of larger systems of linked perceptual-behavioral dispositions." (Herrnstein-Smith, *Natural Reflections* 13-14)

<sup>136</sup> Van Rooy notes, "In so far, then, as the author is part of a community, and desirous of gaining the acceptance of his work by the community, he will be bound to take into consideration their interests and convictions, or at any rate, those of a considerable or important section of his community." The author's work "is nonetheless determined partly by the actual circumstances in which, and the controversies among

Both Horace's insiders and outsiders are named frequently in the satires. The ten poems that comprise book one achieve two important effects on the audience. First, the poems explicitly name some insiders and outsiders. Second, they also contain performative effects, where the content of the argument and the rhetoric of the presentation will affect the audience differently depending upon their philosophical orientation. An individual's culturally constructed and personally biased framework of ideas necessarily dictates how one will respond. Freudenburg reflects this in discussing 1.1, "By this, I do not mean to suggest that scholars are in the habit of seeing allusions and then finding ways to deny them. Rather I think that the activity of picking up on allusions and admitting their relevance always depends first on the reader's field of view" (*Satires of Rome* 35).<sup>137</sup> In the light of this insight, I argue for a greater relevance of Epicurean and Lucretian intertexts deriving from the inner circle of Horace itself.<sup>138</sup> Horace links morality with aesthetics, Epicureanism with Callimachean poetics, Stoicism with Lucilian abundance, and through these collocations, orients his satires toward his reading circle and away from his competitors and critics in Roman society.

#### Audience in the Programmatic *Sermones* 1.4 and 1.10

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which, he lives" (*Studies in Classical Satire and Related Literary Theory* 31). And likewise, Henderson sees satire operating within a set of values that it proposes to judge, not outside of them as an objective observer, but as a participant within the controversies of the potential audiences (*Writing Down Rome* 30).

<sup>137</sup> One of the principal claims of Edmunds is that an allusion can be missed (*Intextuality and the Reading of Roman Poetry*). As a highly elusive genre, satire possesses an enormous potential for one or more audiences to miss key allusions.

<sup>138</sup> Fowler speaks of a matrix of possibilities when examining references ("On the Shoulders of Giants" 14). We hold in our mind a checklist of possibly relevant texts that fixes our attention in certain directions.

*Sermones* 1.4 and 1.10 most explicitly articulate Horace's satiric program, including the role of his audience, and as such, are a fitting place to start in examining the audience. Curiously enough, Horace does not begin his collection with a programmatic piece explaining how he intends to write satire.<sup>139</sup> Instead, he postpones such a programmatic explanation until his fourth poem, and then returns to his programmatic musings in his concluding poem of the collection (1.10). In 1.4, Horace explores the theme of satiric aggression and its relationship to Lucilius the founder of Latin verse satire, his father, and his friends. One concern of Horace is to address the notion that a satirist necessarily gets carried away with criticism and turns it upon his friends too fiercely (*dummodo risum//excitiat sibi, non cuiquam parcat amico*. 34-35). Throughout his satiric enterprise, Horace will display the fierceness of satiric criticism through the notion of Epicurean frank speaking among his circle of friends.<sup>140</sup> Horace's criticism is mostly tame, with occasional one-off barbs directed at individuals such as Fannius in 1.4.21-22, which are hardly picked up and sustained throughout the course of an entire poem (1.9 being a major exception). This kind of direct criticism is not much like satire under my own definition, and may very well be typical light mockery thrown into the midst of the discourse to help secure the identification with Lucilius. But underneath this

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<sup>139</sup> For an elaboration of how 1.1 incorporates many programmatic elements, see Hubbard. The ability of a reader to see programmatic elements in 1.1 depends, in my estimate, more upon our ability to read and reread the entire collection with the programmatic elements becoming more apparent through subsequent readings.

<sup>140</sup> Cf. Freudenburg, "Introduction: Roman Satire" 9-10, Kemp, "The Philosophical Background to Horace's Satires, "Irony and *Aequabilitas*," "A Moral Purpose, a Literary Game."

vener of Epicurean friendship is a more subtle and aggressive humor directed against those outside of Maecenas' circle of Epicurean friends.<sup>141</sup>

Eupolis atque Cratinus Aristophanesque poetae  
atque alii quorum comoedia prisca virorum est,  
si quis erat dignus describi quod malus ac fur,  
quod moechus foret aut sicarius aut alioqui  
famosus, multa cum libertate notabant.

Eupolis, Cratinus, and Aristophanes, and the other old comic poets, if anyone was worthy of being described because he was a wicked person or a thief, because he was an adulterer or a cut-throat or otherwise infamous, they repeatedly exercised much freedom of speech in censuring him. *Sermo* 1.4.1-5

Horace opens the fourth satire by grounding the aggression of Lucilius in the work of the Old Greek Comic poets, Cratinus, Eupolis and Aristophanes (1.4.1-2).<sup>142</sup>

Comic poets provide the notion of free speech (*parhesia*//*libertas*), so essential to good satire (1.4.3-5). This level of free speech, however, is in the past. The constraints of Horace's own age, do not permit him to deliver the same kind of free speech as

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<sup>141</sup> A consistent theme throughout Freudenburg's works (*Walking Muse, Satires of Rome, Cambridge Companion to Roman Satire*), and also shared by Keane (*Figuring Genre*) and Plaza (*Function of Humour*) is that the nice friendly *persona* that Horace cultivates, in fact, hides underneath it a much more aggressive form of humor. Keane in particular depends upon Freud, noting that aggression is turned into wit, adding a bond between teller and audience which is based on mutual hostility toward the joke's victims (*Figuring Genre* 23). Satiric attack is a vehicle for marking out groups that may in fact be close to the satirist. See Bogel, *The Difference Satire Makes* and Richlin on aggressive humor.

<sup>142</sup> General treatments of *Sermo* 1.4 include Hendrickson, Hadas, Rudd "The Poet's Defense" and "Had Horace been criticized?", Van Rooy "Horace, *Sermones*, Book 1: Satires 1.4 and 1.10", Leach "Horace's *pater optimus* and Terence's *Demea*", Krenkel, Classen "Horace's Satire on Satire" and "Die Kritik des Horaz in den Satiren 1.4 und 1.5", Muecke "Horace the Satirist", Duret "La comédie des Adelphe", Mueller "Aristophanes und Horaz," Schrijvers, Cecchin, Armstrong and Oberhelman, Keane "The Critical Contexts of Satiric Discourse," Hooley "What? Me a Poet?" Braund "*Libertas* or *Licentia*." On the relationship between Horace and Lucilius see Fiske. The relationship of Horatian satire to comedy is discussed by Fairclough.

Lucilius.<sup>143</sup> Those coming into the programmatic 1.4 could well perceive this. Horace himself could no doubt anticipate the comparisons with Lucilius that his new satire would raise among his broader audience, and he thus in part aims to forestall this criticism through his satiric display in 1.4. Given his inability to be Lucilius amidst at least some who expected him to be, Crispinus comes to challenge Horace to a writing contest (1.4.14). He represents the typical Stoic outsider, carefully deployed to link Stoicism to Lucilius and anti-Callimachean verbosity.<sup>144</sup> Crispinus stands as a symbol for generally hostile approaches to Horace's satiric work. Horace preempts their criticism by painting them ridiculous here, fully aligned with Lucilius, full of Stoic bile and longevity, and lacking in the proper stylistic subtlety that Horace and his reading circle prefer.<sup>145</sup> His specific criticisms presuppose some knowledge of Horace's satiric enterprise, which raises the further question of whether the criticism is, in fact, real, in response to performances of some collection of Horatian satire presented to date. The structure of the poetry-book, with three satires appearing before Horace clearly announces his generic

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<sup>143</sup> Freudenburg argues that as the republic shifts into an empire and becomes more totalitarian in nature, the satiric poets who follow Lucilius slowly withdraw their own authoritative and critical voices, starting with Horace himself, who attacks no one of political consequence (*Satires of Rome*). Cf. Momigliano "Freedom of Speech," 252-63.

<sup>144</sup> Crispinus wrote a long-winded collection of maxims on virtue of the Stoic persuasion. He appears at 1.1.21, 2.7.45, 3.139, and 4.14. See Brown 100.

<sup>145</sup> Scholars have generally adopted a range of positions. Frankel, Rudd (*Satires of Horace*), and earlier authors read the poems as responses to real criticisms that have already been made. With the advent of *persona* criticism, the tendency to read the text as a genuine response to equally genuine criticisms has lessened. Freudenburg sees potential and ongoing interaction with various literary critics of Horace's own day, without assuming any specific criticism or person has occasioned the particular passage (*Walking Muse*). Ruffell argues that satirists were engaged in dialogue not only with other literary genres but also with subliterate traditions of verse as well, such as popular invective poetry. Ruffell's point goes back to T.P. Wiseman's work on popular poetry.

allegiance to Lucilius, suggests Horace is aware of how revolutionary his satire will be when compared to Lucilius, and decides to preempt this criticism. Thus, Horace employs caricatures of outsiders like Crispinus who find his satiric poems too un-Lucilian.<sup>146</sup>

But the criticism runs deeper than merely the volume and style of Horace's poetry. Crispinus argues that the satiric poet (at least as characterized by New Comedy) cannot restrain his criticism. He will do anything for a laugh, and therefore must inevitably turn upon his friends (1.4.34-38).<sup>147</sup> Horace replies in lines 40-105, by arguing facetiously, as Armstrong and Oberhelman have shown, that satire is not poetry.<sup>148</sup> The facetious argument is subverted at the end of the poem when a band of poets comes to Horace's aid against his detractors (1.4.140-41).<sup>149</sup> The question of whether satire is

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<sup>146</sup> Some critics saw Lucilius as the preeminent stylist of all, preferring him not merely to all other satirists but over all other figures in Latin literature (Quintilian *Inst.* 10.1.93-95). Moreover, we know of several imitators of Lucilius prior to Horace. Coffey (68ff.) mentions Servius Nicanor, Terentius Varro, M. Terentius, and informs us that L. Abucius is mentioned in *De Re Rustica* 3 for writing in Lucilian style. He goes on to note that the case of Trebonius, executed by Dolabella after writing a piece worthy of Lucilius, suggests a bad end for those writing Lucilian satire. Horace expected to confront critics who saw his own work as deficient in comparison to the greats of the past and appears to have struggled against this view much of his life, as one of the central arguments of *Epistles* 2.2 is that present literature is not valued as much as the literature of the past.

<sup>147</sup> Cf. Ronnick "Horace, *Satires* 1.4.34." Horace's approach here is a commentary on the goal of comedy as such (including satirical comedy) and to some extent his poem answers this criticism by performing for us what Horace sees as the real object of satire versus other more comic material more generally.

<sup>148</sup> Armstrong and Oberhelman 233-54, contra Fraenkel (126-7), Grube (232), Rudd (*Satires of Horace*) 92, who all argue that Horace's argument that satire is not poetry should be taken at face value. See also Hendrickson and Williams (*Horace*) who anticipate Armstrong and Oberhelman's position. Brown sees the real point of the passage as a contrast between grand poetry like epic, and less grand poetry like satire and comedy (130-1). Kemp takes the argument much more seriously and argues specifically against Armstrong and Oberhelman ("A Moral Purpose, a Literary Game").

<sup>149</sup> Cf. Daube.

poetry is postponed at line 65, and ultimately settled only in 1.10.<sup>150</sup> Instead, as Horace addresses the question of whether fear of the satiric poet is justified, the distinction between insiders and outsiders is most pronounced. No shop or pillar displays Horace's books (71), and the friends appear only here within the poem (73) where they represent Horace's preferred exclusive hearers. They may also appear in the guise of the band of poets (141) in the closing lines of the poem. Lucilius and the Greek Comic poets had established satire as a genre of *parrhesia*, but Horace deploys a form of *parrhesia* that reflects its migration over the previous three hundred years into the philosophic domain of friendship (lines 79-103).<sup>151</sup> In particular, the more vehement poison, identified here in 1.4.101 as a vice (*vitium*) of the satiric poet shall be far removed from his pages (101-103), though in fact Horace is quite content to make fun of the truly vicious outsiders to his literary circle. This notion of *parrhesia* pushes against the dominant Lucilian model repeatedly throughout the remaining satires and helps establish for us an internal audience of friends, to whom the satires are primarily oriented.

Whereas Horace's friends are only briefly mentioned and not named in 1.4, they are finally paraded beginning at 1.10.40, emphasizing the notion of a limited readership. While I do not doubt that this limited readership is part of Horace's pose, and that

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<sup>150</sup> Rudd (*Satires of Horace*) thinks that 1.10 directly answers the question. But in addition, I think 1.4 also answers the question in a more round-about way. General treatments of *Sermo* 1.10 include Barr, Nemeç, Duret "*Nullius Addictus Iurare*," Godel, Riu, Rothstein, and Scodel.

<sup>151</sup> cf. Konstan "Patrons and Friends," *Friendship in the Classical World*, "Philosophy, Friendship and Cultural History," "Greek Friendship," *Philodemus on Frank Criticism*, Momigliano "Freedom of Speech," Fitzgerald *Friendship, Flattery and Frankness of Speech*, Michels, Scholz, and Hunter.

Horace's satiric poems certainly reached more broadly, a wider audience could not always be trusted to grasp the same meaning as Horace's own reading circle, and moreover, end up as targets frequently enough in Horace's satires.<sup>152</sup> The list of poets concludes in lines 81ff, as the true insiders welcome Horace's poetic talent into their midst and validate him.

Both 1.4 and 1.10, as programmatic satires, serve to contrast numerous outsiders. Crispinus and Hermogenes Tigellius (1.10.18, but also his funeral at the opening of 1.2, and a more extended criticism at the opening of 1.3, as well as 1.4.72) receive some of the most frequent criticism.<sup>153</sup> Both seem to be real individuals, and reinforcing the notion of interrelated circles of readers, many of these outsiders are, in fact, connected to each other. Tigellius was a Sardinian by birth, on familiar terms with Caesar and Octavian, quarreled with Cicero and was also lampooned by Calvus. He is connected to the Stoics in 1.3.130 where he is called *optimus modulator*, and makes another appearance in 1.3.3-19. Associated with Hermogenes Tigellius is Fannius (1.4.21), driven by a desire to publish; at 1.10.80 he is a dinner companion to Hermogenes, and also a favorite of the Stoics. Ps.-Acron suggests he had criticized Horace once and had

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<sup>152</sup> The widest audience and the most strongly criticized is simply the common crowd corresponding to McNeill's fourth circle of audience. Fannius is criticized in 1.4.21 for bringing out his books while Horace claims that no one reads his own writings and the common crowd (*vulgo*) will thus not recite them. The *vulgus* is again denigrated in 1.4.72. In 1.10.72, Horace again sees it as unworthy to please a crowd (*turba*), and instead is *contentus paucis lectoribus*, content with a few readers.

<sup>153</sup> On Hermogenes Tigellius see Brown 101, Rudd (*Satires of Horace*) 299ff, and Duquesnay 56.

anti-Caesarian sentiments (Frank 72-4). Freudenburg concludes after examining all of the critics:

“Concerning those whom we have been able to define in fuller terms, many similar tendencies have been noted. Though beyond proof, their shared sentiments in literature, philosophy and politics suggest the cohesiveness of a literary circle. That these men were renegade poetasters who applied to no critical standards accepted in their day is dubious at best. They certainly had some fellow feeling among themselves in this regard.” (*Walking Muse* 118)

All of these poet-critics are interested in the Stoic ethical theory of Chrysippus, and all are well educated from good families and aligned with anti-Caesarian interests. Perhaps the most important contribution of Freudenburg’s *Walking Muse* is in establishing a number of literary rivals to Horace within the text; *Serm.* 1.4.71-6 suggests their works are read widely and thus a literary *koine*. “In spite of their flippant dismissal in the diatribe satires, it is clear that Horace’s distorted view of his literary rivals belies the real validity and intensity of the contemporary debate to which his criticisms refer” (*Walking Muse* 11). Horace’s satires are not merely making an isolated moral and cultural point against generic and culturally ignorant outsiders, but are participating in a legitimate and broader cultural disagreement among active participants within the culture.<sup>154</sup> This

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<sup>154</sup> *Sermo* 1.10 seems to address critics who see Horace’s 1.4 speaking to Lucilius more generally. No criticism occurs for Lucilius’ tone in 1.10, only for his style. Freudenburg notes that all of the critics in 1.10 belong to the anti-Caesarian camp: Laberius’ mimes had offended Caesar. Ptholauus wrote lampoons against Julius Caesar. Bibaculus in line 36 wrote harsh iambic verses against Octavian. The Monkey of line 18 is a fan of Calvus and Catullus, both of whom wrote bitter invective against the Caesarians. “They adhered to standards of style perfectly acceptable within their own group but radically different from those cherished by Horace and the friends of Maecenas.” (*Walking Muse* 100-1) Style is simply one dimension of cultural disagreement that Horace uses to frame insiders and outsiders in his *Sermones*. Most significantly for a reading-oriented approach, Freudenburg summarizes, “All told this is entirely the wrong audience to address with criticisms of Lucilian *libertas*” (103). *Libertas* has clear political connotations in the 40s/30s, see Syme and DuQuesnay.

disagreement causes them to respond to the satire in inappropriate ways, creating a failure to understand what Horace hopes to accomplish in his satire, which Horace dramatizes most decisively in 2.1.1-4 where these outsiders are presented as opposing camps of critics who fail to grasp the golden mean of Horace's poetry.

### Audience in *Sermones* 1.1-3

We turn from the programmatic satires of 1.4 and 1.10 to the first three satires of book one, which form a unique set delivered by the same bumbling philosopher.<sup>155</sup>

Maecenas appears at the beginning of 1.1, and his name prompts a deliberate confusion.

Is he the target of the *persona*? Or is he merely addressed out of convention?<sup>156</sup>

Ultimately, we must recognize that scholars come to different assessments of Maecenas' role because those options are all open to any reader, and a reader may choose to read it in a particular way for reasons that have nothing to do with the poem. Maecenas is not named again until 1.3.64, where his appearance again imposes the same interpretative problem. Horace deploys him to introduce his theme of friendship, so important to his own conceptualization of satire. In this case, it works much better if Horace is directly

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<sup>155</sup> For overview of *Sermones* 1.1-3 see Armstrong "Horace, Satires 1.1-3: A Structural Study." For more specific treatments of aspects of *Sermo* 1.1 see Herter "Zur ersten Satire des Horaz," Gercke, Dufallo, Dyson, Hubbard, Minarini, Nakayama, and Van Rooy "Horace's Sat. 1.1 as Prooemium." For the relationship of satire to pastoral poetry, see Van Rooy "Imitatio of Vergil, Eclogues in Horace, Satires, Book 1," Putnam, and Harrison, *Generic Enrichment*.

<sup>156</sup> Freudenburg (Walking Muse) and Oliensis (*Horace and the Rhetoric of Authority*) see Maecenas as a target of the *persona*. Gold ("Openings in Horace's Satires and Odes") sees Maecenas as an ornamental convention. Gowers ("Horace Satires I and II" 51) sees Horace representing himself and Maecenas together looking down on everyone else. For Horace's relationship with Maecenas, see Reckford "Horace and Maecenas," and Evenpoel.

addressing Maecenas and offering frank speech. If the internal audience sees a direct address to Maecenas and reads it through an Epicurean lens, then Horace's small criticisms of Maecenas throughout *perform* not only the objective of his argument in 1.3, but also the very friendship itself.

By lecturing Maecenas gently, Horace shows that he has a stable friendship with Maecenas rather than necessarily being an anxious newcomer needing to prove himself. When Horace allows his own examination (1.3.19-32), a possibility that is more fully explored in book two where he comes under attack from several bumbling speakers, he also makes himself appear more magnanimous to all his audiences and demonstrates his inner qualities for inclusion within a circle characterized by Epicurean utilitarian tolerance.

#### Friendships in Satire: Horace's Pivot from 1.3 to 1.6 to 1.9

Maecenas is again addressed in 1.6.1, a fitting place that divides the collection into two groups of five.<sup>157</sup> Virgil and Varius appear briefly (1.6.55). This satire appears to be the most intimate of all satires, as if it were privately addressed to Maecenas and the audience only apparently overhears. Yet the intimacy of this satire is one of its illusions, as McNeill suggests.<sup>158</sup> Like 1.4, the poem seems to forestall the jealousy and objections

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<sup>157</sup> Scholars have divided the structure of the first book of *Sermones* in a myriad of ways, none of them exactly neat. *Sermones* 1-3, 4-6, and 5-9 are grouped with 10 as a conclusion (cf. Armstrong "Horace, *Satires* 1.1-3: a Structural Study," Rudd, *Satires of Horace* 1-35, Rambaux, and H. Ludwig), while 1.6's inclusion of Maecenas allows for a neat division into 1-5 and 6-10. See Knorr for an elaborate treatment of structure in both of Horace's books of satires.

<sup>158</sup> McNeill 30-31. On Horatian self-presentation and control of his image throughout his career, see Harrison "Horatian Self-representations." General treatments of 1.6 include Armstrong "Horatius: *Eques et*

of those outside the circle. The insiders can all nod knowingly to themselves as they encounter the poem in performance, recognizing what is concealed within the text that is held back from general outsiders such as us today. Part of the satiric effect of the poem is upon us as the reader for wanting to see more of Horace and Maecenas than Horace chooses to present. Whether scholars today, the common crowd in antiquity, or those more hostile to Horace, the outer audience will certainly arrive at a different appreciation of Horace's Epicurean maxims within the poem than a typical friend of Horace.

*Sermo* 1.9 reverses the situation in 1.6 but remains connected to it through its overarching concerns and emphasis upon friendship and detachment from politics.<sup>159</sup> The prominent interlocutor with Horace is the bore, an outsider to the circle of Maecenas who desperately wants to get inside. While the bore's identity is unclear to us, it is quite possible that his real identity may have been known to at least some of Horace's inner circle of poets, as Fuscus knows him in line 61.<sup>160</sup> The bore is an outsider par excellence in Horace's satiric corpus, in particular as a poet who fails to understand the Callimachean literary aesthetic that animates Horace's reading circle. He boasts (1.9.23-

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*Scriba*," Mackay, Williams "Libertino Patre Natus," Gowers "A Cat May Look at a King," Rudd "Horace, Satires I.6," Konstan "Patrons and Friends," and Highet "Libertino Patre Natus." Woodman ("Horace and Historians") notes that Horace's claim to be a freedman's son echoes its critical use of Cn. Flavius by his contemporaries.

<sup>159</sup> General treatments include, Van Rooy "Arrangement and Structure of Satires in Horace, *Sermones*, Book 1: Satires 9 and 10," Anderson "Horace the Unwilling Warrior," Cavarzere, Hering, Musurillo, Paratore, Rudd "Horace's Encounter with the Bore," Salmon, Cairns "*Antestari* and Horace, Satires 1,9," Henderson "Be Alert," and Mazurek.

<sup>160</sup> Freudenburg (following Armstrong and Oberhelman 247-248, and Van Rooy "Arrangement and Structure: Satires 9 and 10" 41-45, 51) calls the pest an anonymous neoteric poet (*Satires of Rome* 65 and *Walking Muse* 210). Modern scholars no longer entertain the nineteenth century proposal of Propertius.

34) of his ability to churn out verses quickly and in large quantities, for which Horace has previously criticized Lucilius in 1.4. The bore also represents himself favorably to Hermogenes, yet Horace criticizes him elsewhere (1.2.3, 1.3.4, 1.4.72, 1.10.80). In contrast, Horace portrays the group as being free from class anxiety where each has his own place (lines 48-52).<sup>161</sup> We, like the bore, can hardly believe it either, but these lines form part of the frustration of the outsider, as Horace locks away meaning from the majority of us today but retains it for those who are clearly among his internal audience.

#### Friendship in a Travel Narrative: *Sermo* 1.5

This same process of frustrating the external audience happens as well in 1.5, where Maecenas and Vergil also make an appearance to close out the first half of the book and to anticipate the second. This poem seems more directly oriented toward the outsiders, taunting them by substituting banal details of a journey for what could be interesting political information about the reconciliation between Antony and Octavius in 39 BCE.<sup>162</sup> Coming in the wake of 1.4, where Horace criticizes Lucilius severely, S. 1.5 directly alludes to Lucilius in the form of a journey poem. It provides a performed demonstration of Horace's anti-Lucilian stance immediately upon concluding Horace's programmatic stance on satire. Moreover, the scenes within this satire can be read as a microcosm of satiric interpretation. The emphasis on friendship throughout (lines 41, 93) hints at the Epicurean theme of friendship that will animate Horatian satire. Horace uses

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<sup>161</sup> Cf. McNeill on selectively controlling what is revealed about the circle in a typical Horatian poem.

<sup>162</sup> Cf. Lejay 135-144. For the political background of the satire, see DuQuesnay 19-58.

the different displays of conversation throughout, displaying different types of conversation as a medium of exchange, critique, and most importantly, bonding in friendship. The polyvalent ambiguity inherent in conversation (and ultimately *sermo*) presents a complicated picture of Horace's unique contributions to satire. Through friendly conversation in particular, satire becomes not merely a genre, but the embodiment and performance of real Epicurean tenets (lines 100-104). Potential readers desperately want some privileged insider information on the substance of the meeting between Antony and Octavian, but Horace chooses to display trivial aspects of his friendship in order to frustrate our expectations about what he surely must know.<sup>163</sup>

*Sermo* 1.5 also dramatizes the reception of satiric humor.<sup>164</sup> Many outsiders (slaves, a boatman, Aufidius Luscus, Apella the Jew) are ridiculed by both the narrator

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<sup>163</sup> Cf. Charles Knight and Herrnstein-Smith *On the Margins of Discourse*. Part of the frustration lies in the illusion that satire offers. In this respect, Herrnstein-Smith contrasts what she terms fictive and natural discourse. In the natural discourse of daily life, we expect to glean some factual information that can help us through our tasks. Thus, if I want to get directions, or instructions, then I expect them to have a high degree of correspondence to the physical reality in which I must operate. If I want to inquire about a subject matter, my primary expectation is that the person I ask will attempt to provide factual information to the best of their ability. Fictive discourse, in contrast, is the stylized language of poetry whose aims are not necessarily to communicate facts or accomplish tasks. If a piece of poetry happens to include factual information that is incidental to the fact that it is poetry first, and that poetic effects are primary. When an educated person approaches a piece of poetry, the first inclination is not to pick apart the piece for the factual content that it communicates, but to appreciate how the poetic effects render a particular thought-provoking meaning in a beautiful way. What makes satire complicated is that it is fictive discourse, masquerading as natural discourse. In *Serm.* 1.5, the report of the journey itself seems to convey factual information, along with any factual information the audience desires to glean about the reconciliation of Antony and Octavian. For whatever reason when confronted with satirical texts, we have a hard time turning off the portion of our brain that operates when confronting natural discourse, and thus have a tendency to make demands of a satirical text that are improper and inappropriate to it. This is of course a recapitulation of what I deemed the satirical effect in chapter one. The tendency to read satire as natural discourse can generate misunderstandings about what is happening within a satire, and at its extreme, can involve a failure to recognize that modal satire is happening at all.

<sup>164</sup> General treatments of 1.5 include Paul Allen Miller, Barnes, Van Rooy "Arrangement and Structure: Satires 5 and 6," Tennant, Goins, Casson, Cavarzere, Cucciarelli "Iter Satiricum," Gowers "Horace, Satires

and the larger structure of the poem. In line 36, Aufidius Luscus, a trivial person of little consequence, finds ridicule for his swagger.<sup>165</sup> Interspersed between these minor criticisms and the coming tour-de-force in lines 53ff. is a quaint Epicurean moment as Horace finally catches up with his friends.

...namque  
Plotius et Varius Sinuessae Vergiliusque  
occurrunt, animae qualis neque candidores  
terra tulit...

For Plotius, Varius and Vergil meet us at Sinuessa.  
Nor has the earth produced brighter souls...(1.5.-39-42)

These friends in turn watch a performance of the *scurra* Sarmentus and Cicirrus, a satiric parody of sorts about Lucilius' own bloviated nonsense.<sup>166</sup> Within the text, Horace and his friends find them humorous, suggesting the bonding of insiders generated through the laughter at all layers of this satiric discourse. In the context of Horace reading his work in performance to his literary circle, Sarmentus and Cicirrus are outsiders and objects of ridicule, despite their entertainment value and kinship with the figure of the satirist. By laughing both at these men and their content within the text, the text performs the same notion of insiders laughing at outsiders that occurs outside of the text itself in satiric contexts more generally.

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1.5," and "The Ends of the Beginning," Reckford "Only a Wet Dream," Desy, Radke, and Sallmann "Die seltsame Reise nach Brundisium."

<sup>165</sup> Cf. Lejay 154-5 on Aufidius Luscus.

<sup>166</sup> Habinek notes that the *scurra* is a professional entertainer, quite similar to the satirist, and a man about the town ("Satire as Aristocratic Play" 182). *Sermones* 2.1.22 and 2.7.15/2.7.36 compare Horace to a *scurra*, reinforcing a possible connection. The best overview of the *scurra* is Corbett's *The Scurra*.

Similar to the treatment of Sarmentus and Cicirrus is the entirety of 1.7.<sup>167</sup> Admittedly, it seems at first a more difficult poem to fit into the frame of a reader oriented satire.<sup>168</sup> *Sermo* 1.7 features two figures, Rupilius Rex and Persius, who have come before Brutus' court in Asia. Epic analogies (cf. 1.5.53 and 1.7.12) are present as each episode is introduced. The reference to Brutus' court has important ramifications for Horace's own situation, and draws upon S. 1.6.45-64 for context, where Horace is formally introduced to the company of Maecenas including his service to Brutus at Phillipi (*at olim//quod mihi pareret legio Romana tribuno*. "But once upon a time, a Roman legion obeyed me as tribune." 1.6.47-48). The court case in 1.7 involves open insults between the two characters, just as in the case of Sarmentus and Cicirrus. In large part, what casts this vignette in a more satirized mode arises from the perspective from which it is told. The court-case itself is reported only second-hand as a common joke in the barber and eye-ointment shops throughout Rome. Throughout the satires, references to barbers and razors occur repeatedly in the context of the Stoics (cf. 2.3.16), who cultivated a philosophical beard. Meanwhile, eye-ointment shops might be particularly frequented by Horace given his eye condition and his propensity to invoke his eye

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<sup>167</sup> General treatments include Schroter, Van Rooy "Arrangement and Structure: Satire 7," Henderson "On Getting Rid of Kings," Kraggerud, Schlegel "Horace Satires 1.7," Buchheit, and Gowers "Blind Eyes and Cut Throats."

<sup>168</sup> *Sermones* 1.7 and 1.8 have always been the most difficult poems to fit critically into the larger collection. Coffey sees 1.7 as filler while 1.8 serves generally to illustrate the nature of satire as miscellany (77). Even Henderson considers it a blot on the book (*Writing Down Rome* 91).

problem as an act of concealment (e.g. 1.5.30).<sup>169</sup> Additionally, both of the participants of the court case possess Lucilian (anti-Callimachean) qualities.<sup>170</sup> Thus, the particular Horatian telling of the joke functions on two levels. On the first level is the pun itself and the potential humor of the insults. Although we sometimes groan at the pun today, and while many groan at puns in general, puns can clearly be funny on occasion and we do not know precisely how much humor Horace's original audience, or the Roman public more generally might have found in this pun. Additionally, the basic humor of each character flinging barbs at the other remains present in Horace's own text. Horace does nothing in his text to blunt this artifact of the original joke. But on a second level with respect to the values of Horace's own insider audience, Horace has compressed this potentially bloated poem into a crisp Callimachean 35 lines.

If 1.7 required more nuance to fit into a frame of insider/outsider reader response criticism, 1.8 offers even fewer clues.<sup>171</sup> The principal speaker is not Horace (the only poem in book one of its kind), but the trunk of a tree, fashioned into the image of Priapus

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<sup>169</sup> Horace invokes his eye condition in 1.5.30 at exactly the point where we might expect him to comment in more detail upon the political overtones that surround his journey with Maecenas. On Horace's eye condition, see Cuchiarelli, *La Satire e il Poeta* 66-70. Oliensis (*Horace and the Rhetoric of Authority*) sees this as an essential aspect of the power relations between satirist and patron.

<sup>170</sup> 1.7.1-6. Persius is a half-breed (*hybrida* cf Lucilius' penchant for mixing Greek and Latin words, criticized by Horace in 1.10), also *durus*, *confidens*, *tumidus*, and speaking with *sermonis amari*. 1.7.28-34 features both of their speeches in court being described in Lucilian terms.

<sup>171</sup> General treatments include Hallet, Edmunds "Horace's Priapus," Sharland "Priapus' Magic Marker," Hill, Habash, Anderson "The Form, purpose, and position of Horace *Satire* I.8," Henderson "Gendersong," 60-62, Braund *Roman Verse Satire* 21, Felgentreu, Welch, and Schetter.

and guarding a graveyard.<sup>172</sup> The ostensible targets of the story are the witches, Canidia and Sagana.<sup>173</sup> Witches appear frequently as cultural outsiders in the literature of many different cultures as is already well noted in the extensive secondary literature on witches and can be perhaps most readily appreciated by us today through fairy tales such as those collected by the Grimm brothers. They are, however, located so far outside that they possess little real cultural or political power.<sup>174</sup> *Sermo* 1.8 makes no direct mention of Maecenas or Horace's literary companions either. An oblique reference exists in that the graveyard itself has been transformed into a more pleasant garden, thanks to the actions of Maecenas, where eventually both Maecenas and Horace will be buried.<sup>175</sup> The garden itself may also represent a further side reference to the garden of Epicurus, the philosophy that interests Horace, Maecenas, and many in the circle. In this respect, perhaps the references to Canidia, the graveyard and the Priapus statue form a kind of inside-running joke, which carries greater significance inside the circle, while still

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<sup>172</sup> The poem bears comparison with the *Priapea*. See W. H. Parker, Goldberg, Uden, and Herter *De Priapo*.

<sup>173</sup> Few other characters are even named, and then only in passing, such as Pantolabus and Nomentanus in line 11.

<sup>174</sup> For general discussion of witches and witchcraft in the ancient world see Schons, Stratton, and Briggs. For the connection between satire and magic, see Elliott. For more general discussion of Canidia and Sagana who appear frequently in the Epodes and again in *Sermo* 2.8, see Oliensis "Canidia, Canicula, and the Decorum of Horace's *Epodes*," Manning, Bain, Barchiesi "Ultime Difficoltà nella Carriera di un Poeta Giambico: l'epodo XVII," and "Poetica di un Mito Sessuale: la Strega Giambica." Freudenburg "Canidia at the Feast of Nasidienus," Hahn, Maurizio, Paschoud, Porter, and Mankin.

<sup>175</sup> Cf. Brown 170, Lejay 223, Schlegel, *Satire and the Threat of Speech* 92-4. The cemetery in which the events of the poem take place has been restored thanks to Maecenas' garden project on the Esquiline hill. For the background on Maecenas' garden on the Esquiline, see Hauber "Zur Topographie der Horti Maecenatis," "Horti Maecenatis" in *Lexicon Topographicum Urbis Romae* 3, Wiseman "A Stroll on the Rampart." Maps can be found in Hauber "Das Archäologische Informationssystem "AIS ROMA."

carrying some meaning for the general reader of the poem. While I do not propose any radical ideas that would transform our appraisal of 1.7 and 1.8 into the greatest in the collection, the potential for them to function as inside jokes to the inner circle makes their appearance less baffling even if some of the meaning has been lost on critics today.

This brief summary of the function of audience in some of the poems in the first book should provide an excellent foundation for understanding how audience is dramatized within the first book of satires, and therefore how we might interpret their philosophical content.

### **Philosophy and Horace's Literary Circle in *Sermones* Book I**

We must now broadly survey the major Epicurean ideas present within the satires and show how frequently those ideas are privileged. I will not cover every satire or every idea, but the ideas herein are intended to give a general impression of the range and type of Epicurean inflections within the satires. The speaker does not criticize them, though he does not raise them to a pedestal. The presence of Epicurean ideas is more subtle, thereby complicating efforts to examine the dominant philosophical viewpoint in Horace's satire.<sup>176</sup> Moreover, analyzing the speaker's *persona* and determining what

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<sup>176</sup> Colish, who works primarily on the history of philosophy itself and without literary training refers to Horace as a Stoic. The best study of the formal elements of Stoicism is Motto. The relationship of satire to philosophy has always been complicated with interpreters deciding to weigh different elements of philosophy or all philosophy differently. Satire certainly embodies popular philosophy, as Mendell noted. Anderson dubbed Horace the Roman Socrates ("The Roman Socrates: Horace and His Satires"). Moles, however, downplays the role of philosophy within Horatian satire ("Philosophy and Ethics"). Cf also Schrijvers and Tate. Lucretius and Philodemus certainly also influenced Horace (cf. Monet "Pratiques exégétiques au sein de l'école épicurienne : le corps et le visible," Tait, Murley, and Merrill). The diatribe satires in particular invite comparison with Lucretius' own diatribe material, as explored by Erler (147-162). Bond ("The Ethical Imperative in the Satirical Entertainments of Horace") explores the extent to which ethics are implied and necessary for Horace's satiric enterprise. For the philosophy of Horace as it

interpretation to place upon it adds to the complications. If the speaker is a bumbling Epicurean parasite in the first three satires, do we interpret the general course of the satire as being critical of the Epicurean ideas themselves, or is the speaker simply there to provide some general humor while reinforcing those philosophical ideas?<sup>177</sup> How we answer the question of who we are in relation to the speaker determines exactly how we interpret the attitude of the speaker in these passages as well as how much weight to give philosophical content.<sup>178</sup> Freudenburg acknowledges this complication throughout much of his *The Walking Muse* before concluding, "...nowhere does the satirist give us to suspect his lessons in morality, though trite and, at times, inept, are somehow extraneous to his satiric mission" (192). We cannot simply dismiss the philosophy in our attempts to enjoy the humor of the frequently inept speaker.

Like most commentators, I consider Horace as having a form of Epicurean eclecticism.<sup>179</sup> Horace is not prone to proselytizing about his philosophy, at any point in

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relates to later religious conscience see Jedrzynski. On the political dimensions of Epicureanism, see Momigliano's review of Farrington's *Science and Politics in the Ancient World*. The main difficulty of interpreting the philosophy within Horace's satires concerns the humor that it is mixed with. Plaza has already noted how humor creates ambiguity for the interpreter, making it difficult to determine whether to take a criticism harshly or softly, seriously or just in passing. Relevant in this respect is the notion of Roman *urbanitas* discussed by Ramage, Barbieri, Ramage, Sigsbee and Fredericks, and Anderson "Rustic Urbanity: Satirists in and out of Rome." This form of urbane joking remains quite culturally removed from any that I have experienced and thus is quite difficult to grasp within the text.

<sup>177</sup> Freudenburg sees the bumbling parasite of Turpin as a legitimate object of ridicule (*Walking Muse* 109-128, *Satires of Rome* 22-23). Kemp has recently argued against Turpin's view, arguing instead that Horace deploys Stoic *aequabilitas* against the more extreme Stoic inflexibility ("Irony and Aequabilitas: Horace, Satires 1.3").

<sup>178</sup> Cf. Freudenburg *Satires of Rome* 15.

<sup>179</sup> Rudd calls Horace the "least doctrinaire of men," never committed to any orthodoxy, and is most pessimistic about tracing the poet's philosophy (*Satires of Horace* 20). Coffey claims that Horace shows

his literary career, but throughout, he shows a strong, yet not rigid, preference for Epicurean thought. Scholars have had a reluctance to classify Horace as properly belonging to a philosophic school, and I suspect the general tenor of our contemporary culture, which is radically resistant to any form of dogmatism is partly to blame. Certainly, Horace reflects a number of issues that would have been common to several of the philosophical schools as well as common forms of moral instruction and exhortation. How many schools have a serious problem with greed, adultery, and other general social disorders that form the primary content of satire? Certainly the Cynics developed the diatribe, but into nothing more than a general form that was copied by several philosophical schools. Despite this general overlap, throughout his career Horace frequently returns to Epicurean ideas as an important aspect of his worldview.

As I will show throughout, Horace colors these satires as Epicurean in at least two ways. First, he includes numerous cosmetic effects that were either part of Philodemus'

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no doctrinaire viewpoint of a philosophical system within his satires (90). Mayer echoes Coffey (153). Merlan and DeWitt ("The Parrhesiastic Poems of Horace" and "Epicurean Doctrine in Horace") argued for a strongly Epicurean Horace while Maguinness ("Horace and His Friends" and "Friends and the Philosophy of Friendship in Horace") argued for an eclectic Horace, followed by Gantar who saw Horace's eclecticism split somewhere between an Epicurean and an Academic position. Hendrickson proposes an Aristotelian Horace and is ahead of his time in seeing 1.4 as a fictional apology for his program. Certainly Aristotelean compositional influences are present within Horatian satire (cf. Lejay 191, Puelma-Piwonka and Alison Ruth Parker). In contrast, Hunter and Dickie see the old comic and iambic elements of composition predominant. Freudenburg (*Walking Muse*) brings these two nearly irreconcilable compositional traditions together (52-96) in the most detailed treatment of Horace's compositional style. Moreover, he notes that even the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus had some Aristotelian leanings in his treatise (89), calling it "very Aristotelian" (90). Philodemus' own compositional preferences call arrangement the essential and unique criterion of poetry, and is strongly critical of those who try to separate them. (Freudenburg, *Walking Muse* 139-145, and Armstrong and Oberhelman 210-232). These compositional proclivities indicate the way that Horace has drawn from many different systems, though his primary ethical interests seem to lean Epicurean. Freudenburg sees the Epicurean tenets of 1.3 as glibly tossed about, though according to my formulation here that is a plausible "outsider" reading (*Satires of Rome* 16). He goes on to argue that the speaker straddles the domain of serious philosophy and comic nonsense (23).

poetic theory, or unique stylistic features of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*. Second, Horace has his satiric speaker refer to several philosophical positions, and throughout these opening satires, Epicurean positions are emphasized and privileged. Even if Horace's treatment of Epicurean ideas seems to be "lowkey," he strengthens it further by his denigration of the Stoics.<sup>180</sup> While Horace is careful not to push Epicureanism too strongly, he has no qualms about using his satires to criticize the Stoics. Anti-Stoicism is one of the most consistent features of Horace's satires. Both the *persona* himself and the overall argument of the poems consistently portray Stoics negatively. And this anti-Stoicism becomes a major angle through which Horace frames outsiders within the *Sermones*.

### **Diatribes Satires: Horace's *Sermones* 1.1-3**

The first three satires in Horace's collection have typically been labeled the diatribe satires, in that they share certain common traits with other ethical lectures that are also labeled diatribes.<sup>181</sup> Philosophical discourse is especially and explicitly present

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<sup>180</sup> These two schools were strongly opposed to one another throughout the Hellenistic and Roman era. *The Cambridge Companion to Hellenistic Philosophy* (Algra et al. Eds.) provides excellent elaboration of the viewpoints of each of the philosophical schools and their consistent interaction with one another on all points of philosophy.

<sup>181</sup> The diatribe as a "potential" literary form seems to suffer from as much ambiguity if not more than the term satire itself. The word's most basic meaning, "a way of spending time," allows it to be used in a wide variety of circumstances, and examples are infrequent enough that scholars debate whether it should count as a literary genre. With respect to Horace's own satires here, which he will later refer to as sermons in the style of Bion, I believe we have the same basic parallel in the diatribe between *Sermones* 1.1-3 and Bion as we do between Horace's satiric genre more generally and Lucilius. Thus, for my purposes here, I do not technically need to answer whether the diatribe is a literary form or not. Instead, I simply note that one previous example of what Horace had intended to do was available as a reference for his potential audience and that Horace had expected them to recognize this parallel. On the diatribe see Lejay xiv-xvi, Mayer 149-150, Oltramare, Schmidt, Pennacini, Murley, and Nisbet and Hubbard *Odes I*: 376-379. The most significant work on the diatribe is Stowers. Wallach covers Lucretius' diatribe against the fear of death in

in these first three satires. The topics themselves are explicitly moral (greed, sexual excess, moderation in treating friends) and the arguments for and against actions are suffused with popular philosophy. Elsewhere in the first book, philosophical dicta may appear for a line or two, but in no place are they so critical to the argument as in the first three satires.

*Sermo* 1.1, fashioned as a private conversation with Maecenas, focuses on the topic of greed, through a discussion of discontent in one's life. Greed itself is a major moral concern to all of the philosophical schools, so by itself, it does not indicate any particular philosophical preference; but Horace jabs at the Stoics in lines 13-14 by noting that while more examples of the discontented exist, he has provided enough for the loquacious Fabius.<sup>182</sup> The example of Fabius links Stoicism to loquacity, a pattern Horace will repeat elsewhere to denigrate both Stoic philosophers more generally and their stylistic preferences. Horace disagrees most fiercely not only with Stoic moral

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*DRN* 3: 830-1094. On the relationship between the diatribe and the later sermon, see Jocelyn. On Bion's diatribes, see Kindstrand. Freudenburg mentions the connections to the diatribe among Epicureans, including portions of Philodemus' *De Ira* and *De Morte*, and notes that the influence of the diatribe portions of the *DRN* on Horace is obvious throughout, but both Horace and Lucretius also had recourse to Bion, as well as other satirists such as Lucilius and Varro (*Walking Muse* 18-19). Keane sees diatribe as a didactic model that Horace uses to shift between roles, as a student to his father, but a teacher to others (*Figuring Genre* 107). Brown notes that the *mempsimoiria* and habitual discontent are well attested in Greek diatribe, ultimately going back to Teles' *peri autarkeias* and letter 17 of pseudo-Hippokrates [Hense *Teletis Reliquiae*, 10-11, Fraenkel 92-4](89). Rudd sees diatribes as essentially sermons as we know them today, with frequent appeal to common sense. But since the poems are conversation pieces and not dissertations, we need not require a detailed and exacting philosophic presentation. Schlegel (*Satire and the Threat of Speech* 28) claims they are probably milder than Bion. Grilli (8-18) notes the presence of the cynic diatribe, but claims it is never dominant, with Horace establishing a balance between it and his larger moral points.

<sup>182</sup> The scholiasts (Botschuyver *Scholia in Horatium* 258) note that Fabius wrote several volumes of Stoic philosophy and was also a Pompeian. See also Brown 91.

points, but also the compositional techniques. The Stoics are excessively wordy and thus make an excellent foil for the compositional and philosophical preferences of Horace's reading circle.<sup>183</sup> In contrast, he uses *praeterea* in line 23 in the same fashion as Lucretius (e.g. 1.120, 1.174 and 16 additional times just in the first book alone).<sup>184</sup> This is a small secret handshake for the group of Epicurean-leaning and Philodemian educated poets.<sup>185</sup>

Praeterea ne sic ut qui iocularia ridens  
percurram : quamquam ridentem dicere verum  
quid vetat? ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi  
doctores, elementa velint ut discere prima:

Meanwhile, may I not run through the matter thus as one laughing at the jokes. What stops me from telling the truth with a smile? As wise teachers give cookies to children in order to get them to learn their letters... (1.1.23-26)

From here, it is possible to watch Horace work the philosophical and moral vices through his *sermo*. Horace lays out his principle of humorous satire.<sup>186</sup> In verse 24, he does not wish to run through the subject matter, as if someone were running through a series of jokes. This anecdote is designed to remind us of the careful organization and craftsmanship that Horace invests in his poetry, part of his careful Callimachean literary

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<sup>183</sup> Cf. the prolific output of Chrysippus.

<sup>184</sup> See Muecke, *Horace Satires II* 92 and Lejay 14.

<sup>185</sup> Horace himself does not appear to have studied directly with Philodemus. His Epicurean preferences in the first book of satires may stem primarily from the fact that his target audience includes several members of the circle directly trained by Philodemus. Horace is more strongly Epicurean earlier in his career precisely because of his inner circle of friends.

<sup>186</sup> Cf. Giagrande 1972.

aesthetic. Here we receive one of the most important aesthetic principles in Horace's poetry and throughout verses 24-40 we find the careful linkage of aesthetics to ethics. Horace compares the image of a teacher giving cookies to the school children to his method in satire, and one can hardly escape noticing the similarities to Lucretius' famous metaphor of his poetry as honey rimming the cup of his bitter philosophical medicine (*DRN* I.936ff). Verses 24-40 contrast the notion of sufficiency, that enough has been acquired in life, with the general theme of greed that will occupy the remainder of the poem.<sup>187</sup> The speaker suggests that the farmer, innkeeper, soldier, and sailors have a central goal: to secure retirement: *cum sibi sint congesta cibaria*. The goal of piling up (*congesta*) food for oneself to provide for old age is noble in itself, as represented by the ant (1.1.33), which heaps its huge loads into a pile in preparation for the winter season. But the greedy man, unlike the ant, fails to stop with the winter season. The ant is even described as *sapiens* (1.1.38), the typical word for a sage. In contrast, envy (1.40-41) drives human beings to continue to pile up wealth so as to surpass his neighbors. Then in verses 42-3, the greedy man is criticized for digging up the earth (which also creates a pile) in order to deposit his silver and gold. The pile is emphasized again in verse 44, which concludes emphatically on *acervus*. The speaker suggests that the pile holds psychological power. The mere act of taking from the pile diminishes its value to the owner and so the owner is reluctant to part with it. Furthermore, if the pile were to

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<sup>187</sup> Freudenburg has already shown how the image of the pile serves as a metaphor in establishing the philosophic theme of sufficiency within the poem itself. Freudenburg, *Satires of Rome* 27-32. Brink links Chrysippus to the Sorites paradox and notes that it was well known in Horace's day (*Horace On Poetry, III: Epistles, book ii.* 81). On the philosophy of Chrysippus, see Gould and Brehier.

consist of grain, whose true value is in the nourishment it provides, the owner of a large pile is not better off than the owner of a small one, so long as their stomachs are full. So while ethically we find criticism of the greedy person building a pile, the aesthetic implication is that it is possible to be greedy about our poetry as well, piling up too many words and oversatiating the audience.

In verses 49-50, the speaker turns to his next question, in the attempt to persuade his imaginary interlocutor: *vel dic quid referat intra naturae finis viventi, iugera centum an mille aret?* “Or tell me what difference it makes to a man living within the bounds of nature, whether he ploughs a hundred or a thousand acres.” Grain was perhaps the most common commodity and reflects an Epicurean plea for simplicity of living, reflected in the claim that one should live within the bounds of nature. Moreover, it evokes Epicurus’ classification of desires into three groups: natural and necessary, which must be satisfied; natural but unnecessary, to be satisfied with caution; and unnatural and unnecessary, to be completely avoided.<sup>188</sup>

The objection comes at line 51, *at suave est ex magno tollere acervo*, “but it is sweet to draw from a big pile.” The primary reward is psychological, rather than the bare necessities of life, carried in the metaphor of the larger granaries (*granaria*) and smaller storage bins (*cumeris*) (ln 52). But Horace builds a further connection into the notion of granaries through his elegant metaphor in lines 56-61, *magno de flumine malleum quam ex hoc fonticulo tantundem sumere*, “I’d prefer to draw from a great stream than from this

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<sup>188</sup> Brown 93. Limits are also mentioned in 57, 59, 92ff, and 101-7, though Horace refrains from specifying an exact limit in line 52.

little fountain.” This reference to Callimachus’ own clear silver spring in the prologue to the *Aetia* will also appear in Horace’s description of the font of Brundisium and the small fountain in the meadow of his Sabine farm, a bold statement of the kind of poetry he prefers (*Ode* 3.13).<sup>189</sup> These lines crystalize a merger of literary aesthetic demonstrated through social and philosophical terms. We see the literary aesthetic demonstrated in the morally bankrupt person whose words overflow their muddy banks and find themselves carried along by the rushing flow of verbosity in much the same way that impassioned fools are carried along in their folly. And immediately upon delivering this strong Callimachean suggestion, Horace reinforces Lucretius as well, as lines 59-60 reflect Lucretius 3.38-40.

Lines 60-63 shift the emphasis to the notion of “sufficiency”. How much is enough? To a greedy man, nothing is enough, *nil satis est* (ln 62), largely because of faulty scales, *quia tanti quantum habeas sis*, “because how much you have, so much do you value yourself.” Line 69 features a thirsty Tantalus grasping after the rivers, a mythological reference characteristic of the arguing style of the Cynic-Stoic street speakers and of philosophical discourse more generally. But what is the precise connection of Tantalus to the preceding text? The speaker first criticizes a mean rich man at Athens who is technically miserable but hordes his gold anyway, congratulating himself against all the idiots in the world (lines 64-65). Tantalus is introduced as the

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<sup>189</sup> On the relationship of Horace to Callimachus more generally see Cody and Crowther. Hubbard explores some connections between the *Sermones* and Callimachus’ *Hymn to Apollo*. Even Lucilius seems to have been influenced by Callimachus as noted by Puelma-Piwonka.

mythological type, and the comparison focuses on his thirsty desire that compels him. In lines 69-70, *quid rides? Mutato nomine de te fabula narratur*, “what are you laughing at? Change the name and the story is told about you,” Horace captures the significant danger of moral thinking. It is easy enough for each of us to think that we are not greedy, or that our actions are perfectly innocent and normal. The task of the moral teacher is to create a mirror for the audience through historical or mythological examples in which they can recognize themselves.<sup>190</sup> Moreover, Tarrant has recently noticed that 1.1.69-70 has an important parallel to Lucretius 3.978-1023 (68-69). The parallel is more indirect, but probably correct.

Indeed, the caricature of the greedy man strikes one as being excessive, but the ridiculousness of his actions drives home the point. The greedy man is thought of as not knowing the true purpose of money, of hoarding it, and failing to buy basic essentials (73-75), which may lead to the dire situation where the greedy man’s wife and children hate him so much that they wish he did not recover from deadly illness (84-6). The basic essentials of lines 73-75 correspond with the Epicurean requirements for the avoidance of bodily pain: a modicum of substance in the form of clothing and shelter, each natural and necessary, and reflected in Lucretius 2.16ff. The greedy man is so overtaken by his desire that he forsakes his normal relationships and all other good things in life in exchange for money. The moral lesson comes in line 92: *denique sit finis quaerendi*, “let there be a limit to your seeking.”

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<sup>190</sup> Cf. Bartsch. On the use of mythology in satire more generally see, Sandro Romano Martin.

A final important theme is momentarily introduced, only to be delayed until the following satire.

quid mi igitur suades? Ut vivam Naevius aut sic  
ut Nomentanus? Pergis pugnantia secum  
frontibus adversis componere: non ego avarum  
cum veto te fieri vappam iubeo ac nebulonem.  
est inter Tanain quiddam socerumque Viselli.  
Est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines,  
quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum. (1.101-107)

What are you persuading me to do then? To live like Naevius or Nomentanus? You bring together things that are in head to head conflict with each other. When I order you not to become a greedy man, I don't order you to become a wastrel or a good-for-nothing. There is a certain range between Tanais and Visellius' father-in-law. There is a mean in things, there are then fixed limits, beyond which the upright course is not able to lie.

In these lines, Horace reflects the golden mean, where virtue is posited as the midway point between two vices. He will consistently employ the golden mean throughout his career (e.g *Ode* 2.10). As a philosophical point, the golden mean is best known today through Aristotle, but it exists much more broadly in Greek philosophy including the Epicureans.<sup>191</sup>

Verse 109 returns to the main theme of the poem, greed, which impedes the happy life. The truly blessed one departs from life like a satisfied banqueter. To reinforce his point, Horace closes the satire by hurling yet another barb at the Stoics in the form of the bleary-eyed Crispinus, whose works had apparently rambled onward in typical Stoic

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<sup>191</sup> See fn. 180 for an elaboration of potential Aristotelian influences upon the Epicurean Philodemus.

fashion.<sup>192</sup> Horace concludes his poem by powerfully recalling Lucretius 3.938-43 in the form of the satiated dinner guest who leaves the table. Freudenburg here notes that the allusion is deeper, "...even more, those who know their Lucretius well, remember not only that the dinner guest metaphor of book three is assigned to the title-character but that he casts the fool's demand for more life in terms of his failure to 'finish his labor' *finem facis atque laboris*."<sup>193</sup> Certainly Horace's literary reading circle knew their Lucretius well and would applaud the fitting end of the satire that shows that Horace knows how to put a crisp Callimachean finish on his satire with an Epicurean flair (*Iam satis est...verbum non amplius addam...*"That is enough...not a word more will I add," 1.1.120-21). Thus, the quick succession of the Lucretian allusion and the barb at the Stoic establishes quite firmly the lines between Stoic outsiders and Epicurean insiders in Horace's first *sermo*.

Horace uses a twenty-five line opening in the second satire to reestablish the theme of the golden mean, but this time applied to sexual excess.<sup>194</sup> Some love to chase after Roman matrons. Others spend their entire family estate on expensive courtesans or in brothels. One can hardly fail to call to mind Lucretius's description of enslavement to a particular woman (4.1058-1287). The argument is conducted on the grounds of self-

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<sup>192</sup> Freudenburg sees Crispinus as a cryptogram for Chrysippus and objects that while Horace has not ransacked Crispinus, but he has done so to Lucretius, Virgil, and Callimachus (*Satires of Rome* 40). The problem in my estimation is not the act of ransacking but who precisely gets ransacked.

<sup>193</sup> On the Lucretian concept throughout Horace's satires, see Glazewski.

<sup>194</sup> General treatments of *Sermo* 1.2 include Lefevre "Nil Medium Est: Die Fruheste Satire des Horaz (I, 2)," Curran, Warren Smith, Bushala, Cataudella, Hooley "Horace's rud(e)-mentary Muse: Sat. 1,2," and Schlegel "Horace's Satires 1.2: taste and translation."

interest, and sexual drives are to be satisfied with casual promiscuity, but only within certain class lines (64-124). In lines 47-49, *insanit*, representing extreme infatuation starts to get more philosophical. Lines 49-53 establish limits through reason, and reflect more general philosophical language, culminating in line 56 when Marsaeus bestows a paternal hearth upon a mime actress, indicative of insanity reaching its conclusion in disaster.

One curious instance of philosophy is placed into the mouth of the prick itself. The natural inclinations of the offending body part suggest that nature itself knows how to manage its resources properly and so should this rational human being. The problem is not the prick then, but the man's mind, which perverts the natural inclinations of the prick into an unholy lust for matrons. In line 74, it invites the person to whom it is attached to consider the advice of nature, and again at line 112, where the adulterer is asked to consider what limits nature sets for desires. All of this is consistent with Epicurean advice to satisfy the natural but unnecessary appetites of the body with caution. Then line 113 continues the Epicurean coloring by employing *inane* and *soldus*, terms from Epicurean physics.<sup>195</sup> Similarly, Lucretius 3.931ff also appeals to nature in this same fashion, and Brown calls the terms essentially Epicurean in both places, reflecting the distinction between natural and necessary desires, natural but unnecessary, and unnatural and unnecessary desires (101). Basic needs are to be satisfied easily (see Epicurus' *KD*

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<sup>195</sup> Atoms and void in Epicurean physics, corresponding to solid and empty desires in Epicurean ethics. Brown claims that the punning here acknowledges an Epicurean source that is now lost to us (112). See also Rudd, *Satires of Horace* 24-25.

26). Hunger and thirst in lines 114-16 are both natural and necessary, while the swelling loins in 116-118 are reminiscent of Lucretius 4.1063-72 where sight feeds passion. Sexual desire is natural since it causes pain when unsatisfied, but specific partners are unnecessary. Horace then cites Philodemus (120-122) to reinforce the notion that one should seek an easy Venus, reflecting the term *euporistos* in Epicurean teaching (Epicurus' *KD* 15 and 21).<sup>196</sup> And this is precisely where a full-on rejection of the *persona* becomes somewhat difficult and we have to imagine that Horace and the *persona* are inextricably bound up. Horace has offered the preferred solution of freedwomen as the true mean, but he now cites Philodemus favorably, certainly something that the early Epicurean circle, many of whom were trained by Philodemus could appreciate. Horace appeals to his audience through this approving citation beyond simply making fun of his *persona*. In fact, Philodemus' preferred girl does not violate the principles of nature itself (125) by altering her complexion or height. She simply is as nature has made her. The poem concludes by taking a shot at Fabius, who is not mentioned as being specifically a Stoic, but in the philosophically alert circle of Horace, must undoubtedly have been well known. The particular jab (*Fabio vel iudice vincam*) addresses the Stoic school's apparent rigor for logical argument. And thus, the poem concludes by using the rigor of the Stoic arguments to reinforce the final summarizing point: it is a miserable thing to get caught (134). The point is so obvious and would hardly have required sufficient rigor even to a Stoic, as they also object to adultery, but

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<sup>196</sup> Sider *Epigram* 38 is a possible candidate for the epigram mentioned here (200-202). *Epigram* 38, however, may be the incorrect epigram as scholars have doubted its authenticity.

disagree that fear of punishment is the best reason for avoiding it. The principal arguments against adultery are all framed from an Epicurean perspective, of disturbing one's *ataraxia* and internal pleasure by messing around in activities that far exceed nature. The overall tenor and tone of the satirist here is much more strongly Epicurean and could be appreciated by an audience knowledgeable and favorably disposed toward Epicurean thought.

*Sermo* 1.3 introduces Horace's friendship with Maecenas and includes perhaps the most exhaustive and technical Epicurean argument in the corpus.<sup>197</sup> The theme is acceptance of friends despite their defects. Maecenas is only named in line 64, but the lengthy emphasis upon friendship suggests the presence of Horace's literary friends beyond the poem itself.<sup>198</sup> The main target is the Stoic view that all faults are equal.<sup>199</sup> The poem creates meaning by instituting the clash of two opposing messages. First, Horace possesses the conceit to instruct Maecenas concerning friendship, which was an important aspect of the philosophical concept of friendship.<sup>200</sup> More importantly, the

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<sup>197</sup> General treatments on 1.3 include Horsfall "Horace, Sermones 3," Knapp, Ruch, Woodcock, and Kemp "Irony and Aequabilitas." Brown notes that the argument is much more technical here, especially in the closing lines, and is among the most exhaustively critical of Stoic doctrine (122).

<sup>198</sup> Epicurus' *KD* 21 notes that friendship is not a competitive involvement: a pleasure to us is a pleasure to others as well.

<sup>199</sup> For perceptions of the Stoic rigidity elsewhere, see Terence Irwin.

<sup>200</sup> I am employing the reading of Armstrong (*Horace* 38-39). Brown sees an imaginary opponent (117). In fact, this disagreement in interpretation reflects the difference in how potential audiences could interpret the poem, with some of them reading a more personalized Maecenas, and some of them seeing him as a more generic listener who overhears the satiric speech. Having both interpretations as an option fits well with my own interpretative theory of multiple readership though in the case of Armstrong's interpretation, the door is open to a more personal and direct Epicurean interpretation. Frank speech is a "mean" in social

treatise of Philodemus on the topic advocates a regular “diet” of frank criticism as a feature of Epicurean social congress.<sup>201</sup> The Epicureans, in particular, praised friendship as the highest pleasure. The criticism that Horace offers toward Maecenas should not be read harshly and aggressively, but rather as an appropriate speech between friends. By his small criticisms of Maecenas, Horace does not merely add a few delicate flourishes to the larger argument of his poem, but he also performs the very friendship itself which seems so unsure on the surface of the poem. Only a true friend can criticize. The act of criticism here performs Horace’s own inclusion within the circle of Maecenas.

*Sermo* 1.3 opens with barbs at inconsistent outsiders who do not understand proper social custom, including the singer Tigellius, who waves so widely that he fails to find his golden mean. Friendship is hinted at in line five, where even Caesar himself, who could use his *potestas* to silence Tigellius, could not silence him on the basis of friendship alone. But the real point is only introduced in lines 19-20: Satire, by its very nature, criticizes faults through exaggeration and caricature. Thus, someone might rightly turn the tables on Horace himself, who sees his own faults as smaller and less serious than the faults he is criticizing (1.3.20), a distinction not permitted under Stoic

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behavior, between flattery and nastiness. Additionally on frank speech, see Glad, Fitzgerald Holland and Obbink, Konstan et al. 1998, and L.M. White “A Measure of Parrhesia: The State of the Manuscript of P.Herc. 1471” and “Ordering the Fragments of PHerc. 1471. A New Hypothesis” on the new reconstruction of the text.

<sup>201</sup> Philodemus *On Frank Criticism*, see especially fragment 2 in Konstan et al.

doctrine but perfectly at home in an Epicurean friendship.<sup>202</sup> Such minor faults include his eye condition (1.3.25), anger (29), a bad haircut, a toga that trails along and loose-fitting shoes (31-32). Horace may even have heard comments on these traits from time to time, but his friends are eager to pardon him on the grounds that he is a good man, a friend, and has a talent (32-33).<sup>203</sup> *Sermo* 1.3 is the first hint that Horace will allow his own self-examination, a point that becomes both more prominent and more important in the second book of *Sermones* where Horace yields its voice to a series of outsiders who have not grasped the true thrust of his first book of *Sermones* but whom Horace permits to make their moral critiques of himself.

Horace pleads that we apply the same values to friendship that fathers apply to sons, or lovers to their beloved. Faults are overlooked. First come the physical defects (44-48): a cross-eyed son, a midget, a son with distorted legs, and one with raw bones. Then come some faults in the social graces (49-52): Is this man who lives a meager existence really careful instead? Does the fellow who lacks tact really exist as good company? Or perhaps the outspoken and aggressive man is frank and fearless. And the hot-headed man is enthusiastic. Each of these faults skirts the precipitously thin line between vice itself and mere social problem. Which of them are fair criticisms in satire?

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<sup>202</sup> The Stoic sage is not permitted to have any faults. He is completely without faults, and moreover, there is no distinction between the size of the various faults. The Stoic sage goes instantaneously from a state of vice into a state of virtue.

<sup>203</sup> The eye problem may have been a real physical problem, but within his poetry itself, it becomes a symbol for Horace's own choice in what to see and avoid. Horace will play this to great effect in 1.5, where the ointment prevents him from seeing the interesting political events on the journey to Brundisium. See Freudenburg, *Satires of Rome* 52-53, especially fn 60 and Ehlers 71.

In line 77, the poem becomes more explicitly anti-Stoic in its formulation and favorably slants to the Epicureans. In addition to a formal Epicurean argument, Brown notes stylistic features of the argument such as *denique* in line 76 that reflect Lucretian style (122). If one really does not want to experience these social slights, one method of dealing with the problem is to deter the activity in question (line 78).<sup>204</sup> To deter an activity is to target the pleasure that one gets from the activity, and to increase the pain to the point that the activity is ceased. Stoics, in contrast, simply aim to eliminate the behavior in question. Moreover, Horace strongly objects to the notion that all vices are equal and should be punished accordingly. Six vices broadly divided into two categories of differing degrees of severity appear (1.3.90-93). In the first, the guest wets the couch, or he knocks off a valued bowl, or he helps himself to a piece of chicken at an inappropriate moment (90-93).<sup>205</sup> On the other hand are three much more serious actions: theft, betrayal of confidence, and failure to fulfill a pledge. If you punish the first set of faults severely, what shall you do about the second set of faults? Replacing the Stoic belief in moral absolutes is an Epicurean view with justice as conventional and utilitarian (1.3.96-98).<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> See Lucretius 3.307-22, especially 310.

<sup>205</sup> While today I seriously doubt that a person who wet a couch would get a return invite, the friendship here is apparently so strong that even a strong social offense would not damage the friendship. And we cannot deny that our perception is skewed by the differences in income between ourselves and the level of friends that are spoken of here.

<sup>206</sup> Rudd notes that *utilitas* in 1.3.98, and *sensus* and *mores* in 1.3.97 all have strong Epicurean associations (*Satires of Horace* 20). Keane adds that this utilitarian justice has evolved to include satiric texts among the new weapons to repress violence (*Figuring Genre* 52).

Starting at line 96, Horace adapts Lucretius to explain the origin of the universe (5.783ff), which is then elaborated at length before the Stoics return as outsiders in line 125.<sup>207</sup> Armstrong and Freudenburg both see this as a mock history of the social contract. The coarse language of satire is certainly not going to elevate it to the realm of lofty and precise philosophy, but the mere presence of it appeals to a limited audience who has some sympathy with Epicurean viewpoints. Horace mocks the idea that the wise man is the only truly rich man, particularly because this wise man can become an expert cobbler even though he has never made a shoe in his life.<sup>208</sup> The Stoic coloring is emphasized by invoking Chrysippus in line 128 and the Stoic beards in line 134. The Stoics are finally dismissed in line 140 when a kind friend pardons the lesser offenses and becomes happier as a result. Happiness is the ultimate goal of ethical philosophy, and for the Epicurean, this is the maximizing of pleasure, the greatest of which is friendship. Thus the final picture of *Sermo* 1.3 is of the Stoic and his solitary escort set against Horace and his circle of tolerant friends.

### **Sermones 1.6, 1.9, and 1.5: The Nature of Friendship Within the Circle**

*Sermo* 1.6, the most intimate of all the satires in the first collection, sprinkles Epicurean ideas throughout as a customary secret insider hand-shake to Maecenas and the

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<sup>207</sup> Line 99 echoes Lucretius 5.808ff. 100-2 echoes 5.1011-27 and 1105-8. Line 107 introduces Helen, also in Lucretius 1.473-7 along with the destructive nature of Paris' passion. Line 109 echoes Lucretius 5.962. *fateare necessesit* in line 111 is used 10 times by Lucretius, e.g. 1.399. Line 114: echoes Lucretius 2.75. In lines 115-17 *vincere* is a particularly Lucretian usage at 5.735. See Rochette.

<sup>208</sup> The Stoic paradox also makes appearances in *Epistles* 1.1.106, *Pro Murena* 61, *De Finibus* 3.75 and 4.74, Varro *Menippean Satires Cebe* 245, and even makes an appearance in Lucilius Warmington 1189-90.

other members of the literary circle. The theme of friendship is carried forward from 1.3, but how does a friendship between Maecenas, with his noble birth duly emphasized in 1.6.1-3, and Horace, the son of a freedman (1.3.6) work? Bridging the concerns of friendship and status is the question of whether Horace can and should hold public office. Naturally lurking behind any possible offer of public office is Horace's performance of his own Epicurean detachment from politics by noting the problems that it poses to his *ataraxia*.

Horace is an *eques* and suggests that he is content with that status. He is not a member of the common herd, on one extreme, nor is he a senator and one consumed with passion for glory (1.6.23). Instead, the *eques* represents the golden mean between a senator and a commoner, a more subtle exposition of the theme than occurred in the blunt diatribe satires. When Horace claims that his status as a freedman's son prevents him from undertaking this role, it is a feint designed to draw off attention.<sup>209</sup> Instead, Horace enjoys enough security within his friendship that he can comfortably reject a promotion to senator. Maecenas was a powerful man, capable of moving friends and clients into powerful positions if they so desired, and such a position was likely to be available to Horace, should he have desired it.<sup>210</sup> This poem then does not simply rebuff Maecenas'

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<sup>209</sup> The classic appraisal of Horace's status as freedman's son and *eques* is Armstrong "Horatius: *Eques et Scriba: Satires* 1.6 and 2.7." Williams ("Libertino Patre Natus: True or False") notes that Horace's father was probably only temporarily enslaved as a result of Venusia's taking the losing side in the Social War.

<sup>210</sup> See Armstrong's "Horatius: *Eques et Scriba: Satires* 1.6 and 2.7" on Horace's potential for advancement and the rhetoric of the argument in S. 1.6.

approach and assert Horace's disavowal of ambition. It embodies their friendship beyond mere patronage.

The argument goes like this: while some could begrudge Horace an office, they cannot begrudge him a friendship. Offices are secondary to friendship, and only follow through an extension of friendship.<sup>211</sup> Horace's own appeal to Maecenas is based on character. In line 65, his nature itself is presented as sound, marred by a few not too serious faults, reinforcing the same argument that he presented in 1.3. He furthermore lacks avarice, the theme of 1.1, and does not visit brothels, hinting at the theme of 1.2. The lunch in 62-63 is a meager philosopher's lunch, barely enough to ward off hunger. As we move forward in Horace's collection, the references to earlier poems reinforce and amplify the moral worth of Horace in 1.6.

Horace boasts in line 93 that he would choose his own father again if he were offered a chance to select his own parents; it perhaps reflects the choice of Odysseus in

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<sup>211</sup> The typical thought is that Epicureans avoided political offices in particular because it would interfere with one's own *ataraxia*. On the other hand, numerous political figures seem to have Epicurean sympathies. It seems, as David Sedley has argued, that there was debate among the Epicureans over how much involvement one could have in political offices ("The Ethics of Brutus and Cassius"). This left an opportunity among Roman Epicureans to be true to their political and social obligations of *amicitia* while still considering themselves practicing Epicureans. More recently Roskam has extended the idea further by noting that Epicureans employed qualifying conditions in evaluating how to balance pleasure versus pain in a given situation where both are likely to be present. They merely rationalized political offices as a subset of friendship, and thus while they had the potential to destroy their *ataraxia*, we must remember that the Epicurean conceptualization of *ataraxia* is centered around maximizing pleasure while minimizing pain. In considering a course of action, one must weigh the pain that might be incurred by the office against the pleasure of maintaining a steady friendship. Clearly some Epicureans such as Atticus, and perhaps Horace himself, preferred to abstain from politics, while the Caesars and Cassiuses of the world got themselves involved in horrific situations that surely made Epicurus shudder in his grave.

the myth of Er.<sup>212</sup> Horace then rejects the extra duties associated with a senator's life: morning calls, one or two companions, feeding more horses, and a whole wagon entourage. In contrast, his golden mean, the *eques*, can travel peacefully to Tarentum, embodying his Epicurean *ataraxia*.

*Sermo* 1.9 features the bore as outsider par excellence, who does not understand the inner social workings of Maecenas' literary circle.<sup>213</sup> He is an outsider who wants inside, and as with the rest of the *Sermones*, Horace is careful about what he reveals of the inner workings of the circle to outsiders.<sup>214</sup> Horace's Epicurean philosophy in this

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<sup>212</sup> Plato's *Republic* book X: 614-621. All those coming up from the underworld are offered a choice of the life that they should have. The first among them choose the biggest tyrannies without regards to the consequences. Meanwhile, Odysseus, who picks last, makes the same choice that he would have had he picked first, the peaceful and pleasant life of an animal. This choice that is offered teaches a moral lesson in Plato which Horace has chosen to echo here in 1.6. His own father, in the present life, was more than sufficient as a moral instructor and preserver of station. Thus, Horace would make the same choice again. Likewise, just as the masses might dismiss the choice of Odysseus, Horace represents the masses as viewing himself as crazy. Indeed, perhaps many reading this satire could not help but marvel at the choice that Horace seems to be making and would take him seriously at his word. But Horace represents himself as sensible to Maecenas, a man of judgment, who understands the inner character of Horace.

<sup>213</sup> Cf. McNeill. Welch and Henderson (*Writing Down Rome* 315-20) see the ridiculous outsider as an alterego to Horace.

<sup>214</sup> Patronage in Rome used the term *amicitia*, the same word for friendship, as an innocent circumlocution to talk more pleasantly about relationships that had a much more strongly quid-pro-quo element, and which would not pass for friendships in the usual sense of the word. Horace stands as a true friend to Maecenas in the satires. He represents himself as an insider friend who is capable of performing the role of a friend to Maecenas, and not a mere sycophant, such as the bore, who perhaps wishes to enter the circle for profit and personal gain. It is doubtlessly true that Horace had to fend off accusations of social gain throughout his early life and especially as the new up-and-coming insider within the Maecenas literary circle. We should think of the psychology of this situation as less of Horace's anxiety about his station with respect to the circle and more of a way of dealing with criticisms leveled against himself and against the circle from outsiders. Horace was a client of Maecenas, and this relationship should not be hidden by their apparently deeper friendship. Maecenas did eventually gift him the Sabine farm, though not by the time of composition of *Sermones* 1. Certainly Maecenas made requests that wore upon the psyche of Horace. Gifts and requests are present in most relationships, as Phoebe Bowditch has recently explored (*Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage* and "Horace and Imperial Patronage"). Relationships involve exchanges and even the best of relationships see the individuals offering what they can in return for the other's assistance. See also Gold *Literary Patronage*, and White *Promised Verse* and "Friendship,

poem is apparent in his excuse, going to meet a friend unknown to the pest (lms 16-17), and his claim to know nothing of juries or law (ln 39). And when Aristius Fuscus departs from him on the excuse of observing the thirtieth Sabbath, Horace fortifies himself in good Epicurean fashion against such superstitious nonsense (lms 70-1). In the context of S.1.9, Horace's Epicureanism does not allow him to escape the bore, but he must even follow him back to court.<sup>215</sup> Beyond these few points, philosophy is hardly explicit within the satire, and insiders/outsideis are much more strongly distinguished in the way the aesthetic elements of their poetry intermingle. In line 24, the bore elaborates on his poetry, claiming that he can write more verses, and more quickly than others, in addition to claiming that he dances and sings well. Horace himself has already been critical of Lucilius for the volume of his poetry and the speed by which he produces his verses (1.4). The Callimachean aesthetic that dominated the literary circle favored highly refined polished verses that were fewer in number.

The bore continues by acknowledging the judgment of Maecenas (44) and inquires as to what terms Horace is on with Maecenas. More importantly, he accuses Horace of exploiting his luck (45), a point that was refuted in 1.6. The bore attempts to bribe Horace by offering himself as an assistant who can help Horace's own advancement. The bore simply has not read, heard or understood 1.6, and implicates himself as an outsider in 1.9, something that should be obvious to many readers

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Patronage, and Horatian Socio-poetics." See also Konstan's analysis of patronage in the context of *amicitia* (*Friendship in the Classical World*).

<sup>215</sup> See Mazurek for elaboration on the "mime" rescue here. For the role of the law and law courts in Horatian satire, see Cloud, LaFleur and especially McGinn.

progressing from 1.6 to 1.9 in the collection. Horace kindly explains that the bore as outsider does not understand the system of status within Maecenas' circle (49-52). Each person has his place without envy. The bore simply cannot believe that life is really such inside the circle of Maecenas (53). The bore is left on the outside looking in, much as the outsider audience is in 1.5 and 1.6, and he stands as a more general type of outsider who does not understand Maecenas' circle, the literary aesthetic or the moral values appropriate for that circle. Horace is comfortable enough with his Epicureanism and his position in the circle that he even allows the joke to fall somewhat upon himself, as he struggles with this stranger even when Aristius Fuscus, who knows him better than Horace himself, feigns ignorance in order to leave Horace struggling with the fellow. While the non-member of the circle could find points of human nature to laugh at within the poem, just as many generations of students have done, the outsiders remain locked out of the inner workings of the circle, as we saw in 1.6 and will see presently in 1.5.

*Sermo* 1.5, like 1.9, depicts a journey, and thus it is an excellent poem to pivot to as we shift from the friendship poems of 1.3, 1.6, and 1.9 into a poem that features Horace's treasured friends more prominently. The journey to Brundisium depicts Vergil, Varius, and others of the Maecenas literary circle (lms 31, 40).<sup>216</sup> Yet it tantalizes us by purporting to depict an important historical moment, the peace mission from Octavian to

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<sup>216</sup> For the exact route in 1.5, see Mazzarino, Desy, and Radke. Ehlers notes that this typically five day journey turns into fifteen in the text (70).

Anthony at Brundisium.<sup>217</sup> *Sermo* 1.5 plays against expectations, through allusion to Lucilius's own journey poem.<sup>218</sup> Coming on the heels of 1.4, 1.5 is a performed demonstration of Horace's anti-Lucilian qualities. In contrast to the much longer poem by Lucilius, Horace's poem is a mere hundred lines, or fairly close to his 100 line average throughout the first book and similar to the rest of his Augustan poets.<sup>219</sup> This Callimachean delivery of a bloated Lucilian discourse appeals to the inner circle by reinforcing the dominant literary aesthetic that they all share.

The travel narrative allows Horace to poke fun at the various locales as well as his own minor faults as he makes his journey towards Brundisium. At each point, the social and cultural differences and the perceptions of those differences are primarily what drive the satire forward.<sup>220</sup> The insiders are prominently placed. Maecenas appears in line 28 and is a constant travelling companion. By introducing Maecenas in his capacity as

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<sup>217</sup> The frustration of the audience over intimate political details is perhaps only the first of many confusions possible in the text. Gowers notes that Horace's companion Heliodorus in line 2 has two possible identities: a rhetor of the day, and thus a real person, or Heliodorus could represent the author of an ancient travel guide ("Horace, *Satires* 1.5: an Inconsequential Journey" 54).

<sup>218</sup> Fragments of the Lucilian *Iter Siculum* contained in Warmington 94-148. How much longer it ran than Horace's poem is subject only to a wild guess, but we have to imagine that Lucilius poem was substantial. See Sallmann "Die seltsame Reise nach Brundisium," 200-6, Reckford "Only a Wet Dream?" 538-43, Cuchiarelli "Iter satiricum." Connors discusses the epic allusions in 1.5, and in particular note that the epic allusions contrast heroic and national with the everyday and inconsequential, and notes (134) that Octavian is building a world in which men can enjoy friendships instead of civil war (123-145).

<sup>219</sup> See Dilke and also Leach "Vergil, Horace, Tibullus."

<sup>220</sup> The effect is not all that entirely different from that achieved by Jonathon Swift himself in Gulliver's travels. The oddities of the people that he meets allow for unique commentary on the part of Gulliver, the *persona* adopted in Swift's text and allows for satire on two levels: 1. Gulliver's critique of each group that he meets. 2. Gulliver's gullibility in critiquing each group. Perhaps Swift was participating in a much longer tradition of travel narrative within satire dating back to Horace and ultimately the fragments of Lucilius. Travel narratives offer richly rewarding opportunities for social and cultural critique.

reconciler of estranged friends, Horace reminds us of the occasion, the peace treaty of Octavian to Anthony, but also links this poem to his previous discussion of friendship in 1.3. The literary circle itself expands, however, only at line 40/41 where Plotius Tucca, Varius, and Vergil join Horace, among the most prominent Epicureans of the reading circle itself. By pausing to praise friendship, Horace adds a sly wink towards his inner circle.<sup>221</sup> Varius departs at line 93, again with a lament for the value of friendship that leads eventually into the Epicurean dictum of line 103, where the gods lead a life free from care, another gesture towards the shared Epicurean values. A few other Epicurean references such as 1.5.9-10, sounding much like Lucretius 5.777, and 97-103, sounding like 6.864, add more Epicurean flavoring to the text. In line 57, Horace is *intra fines naturae*, as every good Epicurean should be. Even the “wet dream” in line 85 recalls Lucretius 4.1030-6. But perhaps most importantly, Horace’s political detachment in the poem embodies the Epicurean principle of detachment from politics.

The sexual dalliance in lines 81-85 is also a point in which we can consider the possible reactions of the inner circle and the outsiders. That Horace experiences a wet dream perhaps makes him look bad, but no more so than he represents himself elsewhere in the first book of *Sermones*, such as 1.3. This is just yet another one of his minor faults that he chooses to bring to light in the text. That he does so through allusion to Lucretius helps to reinforce his own Epicurean connections and emphasize his own personal limitations that are acceptable within Epicureanism. He was not out chasing matrons, as

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<sup>221</sup> Cf. De Witt “Epicurean Doctrine in Horace” 134.

was criticized in S. 1.2, and his choice of potential partner, frustrating himself within the text, was perfectly in line with the Epicurean recommended remedy, and the experience of a wet dream, while undoubtedly embarrassing and probably comically so, is still a natural bodily function. A more banal reading of the satire can certainly find humor in this scene at Horace's expense, but will fail to catch the particular appeal to the inner circle through Epicureanism, and fail to consider that the image is perfectly consistent with Horace's deflating Epicurean self-presentation throughout the *Sermones*.

In this chapter, I have explored the notion of audience first as it is depicted within the satires and for the way in which it represents the difficulties that an audience faces in encountering and interpreting a satire. I then focused upon the internal reading audience of Horace, many of whom have Epicurean sympathies, and explored the frequency and repetition of Epicurean ideas for how they articulate a central Epicurean point throughout the satires. Horace uses both Epicurean ideas and criticism of Stoics to assert a spirit of unity with those in his reading circle, who come to laugh at the outsiders, both within and outside the texts as the primary butts of the jokes. Moreover, as we move from our brief survey of book one into the more extensive treatments of book two. I hope to show that the same dynamic of insiders and outsiders present in book one allows for philosophical continuity between the two books of *Sermones*.

## Chapter 4: Horace's *Sermones* Book II: Consultations and Stoic

### Sermons: A Reading of *Sermones* 2.1, 2.3, 2.5, and 2.7.

#### Introduction and Background to *Sermones* II

When turning to the second book of the *Sermones*, the reader is immediately struck by the different approach and content from the first book of *Sermones*.<sup>222</sup> Although both books have a similar economy of length, a fact that can hardly be accidental, the second book features several contrasting stylistic features.<sup>223</sup> In the first book, Horace presents us with a series of satires, apparently in his own voice and *persona*, directly highlighting numerous vices and social problems. In book two, Horace retreats in favor of a series of other interlocutors or secondary *personae*, who take on the primary conversational role. Horace makes no appearance at all in 2.5, and he has to interrogate a fellow poet in order to gather the information that forms the content of 2.8. In 2.4, he quizzically prods Catus onward, while in 2.3 and 2.7, he is the mostly passive recipient of long speeches by Damasippus and Davus. Thus, Horace himself is not the principal and ostensible “satirist.” Horace assumes a bigger role in satire 2.2 and 2.6, but much of those satires are attributed to other characters, Ofellus in the case of 2.2 and Cervius’ story on the city and country mouse in 2.6. Horace plays his most prominent

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<sup>222</sup> Cf. Oliensis, *Horace and the Rhetoric of Authority*. The Horace we see in book two is always the Horace who has already composed his first book of *Sermones*, and this is a key component of the “face.” How we read Horace presumes and requires our basic understanding and consideration of what we thought he meant in the first book of satires. The audience brings something to the text already that shapes their understanding of the new text. Freudenburg also thinks that the contrast is critical to our understanding of book two, provoking questions in “us” as outsiders by baffling our expectations (*Satires of Rome* 73).

<sup>223</sup> Cf. Ramage, *Roman Satirists and their Satire* 76.

role in the opening programmatic satire of 2.1; his consultation with Trebatius, however, provides a different satiric feel from what we experienced in the first book.<sup>224</sup> In fact, the new role for Horace springs from the fact that he borrows the philosophical dialogue as a means of delivering his satire in the new book (Fraenkel 136-7). Anderson terms Horace the “Roman Socrates,” though that mainly reflects the tone and tenor of the entire second book as it shifts into a Socratic mode of argumentation.<sup>225</sup> Moreover, the philosophical content of these dialogues is far less straightforward than in the first book of the satires. Much of the criticism now falls upon those who are dogmatic in some cultural aspect, whether it be the philosophical beliefs of Davus and Damasippus, or the attitudes toward food and dining of Catus and Nasidienus. The dogmatists and ideologues are given space to air their ideas, and in doing so become objects of criticism and contempt.

Five years separate the publication of the two books of *Sermones*. The world around the satires has changed much since the first book, and it is only right to expect these changes to influence Horace’s outlook. Indeed, Freudenburg’s thesis of increasing totalitarian control seems to be reflected in Horace’s reluctance to be a frequent primary speaker in the second book (*Satires of Rome*). In the first book, Octavian was still consolidating power in Italy, and the war with Sextus Pompeius (36BC) was looming in the background. By the time the second book has been published, Octavian is now

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<sup>224</sup> See Plaza 88-91 on the role of secondary *personae* in book two. Horace is only a “primary *persona*” in her categorization in 2.1 and 2.6.

<sup>225</sup> Anderson sees the radically different conversation as much closer to Plato than Xenophon (1963).

supreme, triumphing over Antony at Actium.<sup>226</sup> Moreover, at some point between the publication of the two books, Maecenas has presented Horace with the Sabine farm that would come to delight him so much. This Sabine farm plays a prominent role in 2.6, while the introduction of 2.3 alludes to the fact that it is set at the Sabine farm as well, though this requires additional knowledge from the audience. The use of the Sabine farm to represent the countryside is in keeping with a more general contrast between city and country, a theme which dominates both 2.2 and 2.6 and surfaces throughout both 2.3 and 2.7. Epicureanism is easier in the *rus* where fewer activities complicate the pursuit of *ataraxia*, whereas it is tougher in the *urbs* where the busy work of life creates more tension between belief and action that the Epicurean must resolve.<sup>227</sup> But if political references were sparse in the first book of satires, and as we saw, several poems specifically seem aimed to frustrate any desire by an outsider for more intimate information, the second book contains even fewer direct references and focuses on even more banal topics.<sup>228</sup>

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<sup>226</sup> The latest datable reference is 30BC in 2.6.55ff. The earliest datable reference is the aedileship of Agrippa in 33BC.

<sup>227</sup> See for example Tsouna's recent edition of Philodemus' *Household Management*, which for the first time definitely reinforces the ownership of a country estate as an appropriate locus of activity in which the philosopher can make money. This is echoed by Elizabeth Asmis' "Epicurean Economics," and "Philodemus' Epicureanism." Geert Roskam explores how the Roman Epicureans resolved the tensions between the injunction to "live unnoticed" and their public and civic duties through something called qualifying conditionals, as explored in chapter two.

<sup>228</sup> Horace avoids mentioning Actium in 2.1.10-15 where it might make the most obviously panegyric topic on which he could praise Octavian. *Sermo* 2.2 alludes to the process of the proscriptions and land resettlement that had developed over the previous years of civil war.

Scholars have been baffled by the shift from the first to the second books, and this is most seen in the quantity and quality of the treatments that book two has received. Fraenkel devotes separate treatment to all ten satires in the first book but only covers 2.1 and 2.6 from the second book.<sup>229</sup> Additionally, one finds nearly five articles covering some topic pertaining to the first book for every article pertaining to the some topic of the second book. One standard view is that Horace may have reached the end of his ability in the second book of *Sermones* and already was anticipating the greener pastures of other literary genres.<sup>230</sup> In many respects, these scholars are right. The first book does a much better job of capturing the malaise of general human folly and graphically depicting general social and cultural complaints that many different generations and cultures of human beings have found satisfying and interesting. Much of the satiric content of book two depends more strictly upon contested cultural norms and ideals that are directly relevant to Horace's own generation, but which we only appreciate with some difficulty today.

It is my contention that book two remains philosophically and culturally consistent with the main themes that dominated the first book of *Sermones*. Moreover, this can best be seen by considering the cultural values of Horace's inner circle and how Horace deploys the satiric argument throughout the poems in book two to appeal to and reinforce those cultural values. The reading circle is nearly absent, at least as characters

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<sup>229</sup> Cf. Fraenkel 136-153. He treats 2.6 in 138-144 as the best satire in the second collection and reviews the entire work briefly at 144-145, before focusing again upon the programmatic satire 2.1 in 145-153.

<sup>230</sup> Cf. Freudenburg, *Satires of Rome* 117-124, and "Playing at Lyric's Boundaries."

in the *Sermones* themselves; Fundanius, Varius, and Viscus Thurinus are the only ones named other than Maecenas, and only appear in 2.8. We might see them lurking in 2.6 as well, when Horace retreats to the Sabine farm, but the names themselves are lacking. Muecke has speculated, I think correctly, that Horace is merely more secure in his position, but also that their absence is a function of the more detached *persona* (*Horace Satires II* 1). Gold meanwhile observes in the context of the political detachment throughout book two that only outsiders, who fail to understand Horace's attitude toward politics, even bother mentioning Maecenas.<sup>231</sup> The reading circle, including Maecenas, seems far away in the depicted world of the conversations. Book two has a shift of character, from the frequent I/we passages that we saw from the majority of the poems in the first book, where Horace speaks primarily from his own *persona*, and is frequently inclusive and presented with his inner circle, to the "they" that we see in book two, when outsiders such as Damasippus and Davus can only point out Horace's reading circle from a distance, and even then, just barely. Nevertheless, they are not far when we consider each poem from the standpoint of how Horace's literary circle might have understood a poem such as 2.3. This shift in *persona* from book one to book two is largely about how Horace creates the moment of interface between the text as we have it and his reading circle which remains at the moment of performance its primary audience. As we shall

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<sup>231</sup> *Literary Patronage in Greece and Rome* 117. Damasippus mentioned Maecenas specifically at 2.3.312. In 2.6.30, the reference to Maecenas is framed in the words of a rude fellow objecting to Horace., while 2.6.38 is a request to Horace from a business official. 2.6.41 directly and favorably refers to Maecenas in the context of giving Horace the Sabine farm. Davus speaks of Maecenas in 2.7.33 while the numerous references in 2.8 come in the context of the dubious dinner hosted by Nasidienus.

see, Horace's careful depictions and interactions in the text continue to reinforce the exclusivity of the circle and are necessary to generate the satirical effect of the literature (cf. Braund, *Roman Verse Satire* 22).

In addition to the less frequent depictions of the reading circle throughout the second book, we also find far fewer named characters than we did in the first book (Van Rooy, *Studies in Classical Satire and Related Literary Theory* 70). The majority of those are clustered in 2.1, which Freudenburg notes is a bridge between the two books of *Sermones* (*Satires of Rome* 71-72). We are struck by the differences between 2.1 and the first book, but those differences are only accentuated as we move from 2.1 to 2.2 and into the rest of the book, becoming far less like the first book as we step away from 2.1. The real outsiders of the second book include several of the frequently inept speakers, who seem to have learned Horatian satirizing from his first book, but have not quite gotten all the lessons correct. The comic effect is heightened by the fact that each interlocutor represents a Menandrian type, as Haight has noted.<sup>232</sup> Horace himself becomes both a satiric target and a functional audience member. His own reactions become a guide for how a more general and detached audience views the series of speakers. Book two dramatizes the reception of Horatian satire, not just by revisiting lessons but telling the

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<sup>232</sup> Cf. 2.3, Horace brings Plato and Menander to the Sabine farm in his book bag. For example, Catus is a glorified cook. C. Knight offers a different classification system (156-202). Horatian speakers fall into 5 types: 1. Mediating speaker such as Ofellus or Cervius, who pass on good advice more or less straightforwardly (other examples include Fundanius or Catus). 2. Saturnalian speaker: Davus and Damasippus launch direct attacks on Horace, but also self-parody Horace's own earlier diatribes. 3. Mock heroic: 2.5 is the prime example here, pitting an heroic Odysseus versus an unheroic Tiresias. Advice could have been written without Homeric setting, but its heroic context supplies values that make it comic. The remaining two, the Shifting scene (e.g. 1.5) and the Shifting speaker (e.g. 1.1-3) are more relevant for the first book of *Sermones*.

story of their absorption by a portion of Horace's audience (Keane, *Figuring Genre* 114). Horace has had several years to consider reactions to the first book of *Sermones*, though I agree with Muecke, that we cannot be sure how Horace was influenced by his larger audience including the public response to the first book, or even what significance it might have had in the shift of book two (*Horace Satires II* 43-44).<sup>233</sup> These secondary *personae* do not appear merely for aesthetic reasons of audience pleasure, but also for a socio-psychological one; as Plaza notes, the secondary *persona* appearing next to the satirist "stabilizes the moral perspective of the satire by upsetting the stereotype of the righteous truth-telling I-figure, and so making for a more ironic, open satire" (91). Thus, within book two, we have both Horace as an audience member amidst a series of potential satirists, but we also have a series of potential satirists who are reacting to the first book and can be read against what we have learned about Horatian satiric values, and what Horace's inner circle certainly knew much better than our scholarly attempts can recover. Book two therefore features a much more subtle interaction between Horace and his potential audiences.

Book two has always had a simpler, more ascertainable dyadic structure than the first book of satires.<sup>234</sup> Two clear symmetric cycles balance against each other.

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<sup>233</sup> I see the shift in book two as best explained by an "all of the above" approach. Despite our preferences for simple causation, almost all important events in life are determined by several causes, not all of which we may even be consciously aware of. I simply don't see how Horace's motivation and decision-making with respect to the second book of *Sermones* is any less complex in this respect. Gowers calls the second book "attuned" to the reactions of its touchy audience (*Horace Satires I and II* 57).

<sup>234</sup> Muecke has an excellent summary (*Horace Satires II* 8-9), but the most exhaustive account of the complex structure is Ortwin Knorr, whose main benefit is in establishing the textual interplay between all

*Sermones* 2.1 and 2.5 are both different kinds of consultations. *Sermones* 2.2 and 2.6 both treat the topic of food favorably, praising rustic simplicity. *Sermones* 2.3 and 2.7 are both Stoic sermons delivered against Horace as a target, while *Sermones* 2.4 and 2.8 address subtle cultural problems with food and dining. Every satire in book two mentions food in some way, thereby creating a thematic unity to the entire corpus, while four poems (2.2, 2.4, 2.6, 2.8) have a clear emphasis on food and act as contrasting pairs (Cf. Ludwig 304-335). I see food as so integral to book two that I will devote the entirety of the next chapter to examining these four satires that emphasize food. For the present chapter, I aim to explore the remaining satires, focusing first on the programmatic 2.1, where I will show that Horace's discussion with the Epicurean Trebatius is tinged with reflections of Epicurean thought in addition to his legal counsel. The satire is concluded in a favorably Epicurean way. I then turn to the 326 line behemoth, S. 2.3, the longest satire that Horace includes in his collection. It is the first of two Stoic sermons, the first based on the paradox that all fools are insane, while 2.7 shifts to the more manageable Stoic paradox that only the wise man is free while all fools are slaves. Rather than reflecting support of the Stoic view, these two satires ultimately target them through the lowliness and inconsistency of the characters espousing these positions (a bankrupt art collector and Horace's own slave). I treat these two poems as a unit due to their similarities and thematic links before turning to the unusual 2.5, another consultation of sorts, though the parallels with 2.1 are more superficial than significant.

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the satires that create the sequence and organization that has already been well established in the previous scholarship.

### **Sermo 2.1: Epicurean Safety in the Consultation with Trebatius**

For those readers who have been following closely from the first book of satires, *Sermo 2.1* opens with two clear differences. First, we find ourselves in the midst of a dialogue and not the expected monologue delivered from the standpoint of Horace's own *persona*. Second, we find that the first character introduced is not the Maecenas we saw in 1.1, but instead the lawyer Trebatius. These differences are the first hints to potential audiences of the remarkably different approach that Horace will undertake in the second book of *Sermones*. The first satire of the second book is a programmatic recapitulation and extension of the theme previously discussed in 1.4 and 1.10, while simultaneously using the dialogue form to anticipate the rest of the satires in the second book. Through the consultation with Trebatius, Horace reintroduces the theme of freedom and free speech in satire as well as his general indebtedness to Lucilius. The issue of audience, however, is clear from the first lines of the poem.

Sunt quibus in satira videar nimis acer et ultra  
legem tendere opus, sine nervis altera quidquid  
composui pars esse putat similisque meorum  
mille die versus deduci posse. Trebati,  
quid faciam?

There are some to whom I seem overly fierce, and  
to stretch my work beyond the law. Another group thinks that  
what I compose is slack, and that a thousand verses similar to mine  
could be spun out in a day. Trebatius, what should I do?

(*Sermo 2.1.1-5a*)

Two respective hostile audiences have already examined the first book of *Sermones*, combining stylistic criticism with more general disdain for Horace's satiric barbs.

Muecke sees these faults as different yet compatible, but I think this misses a crucial aspect of the two separate groups that Freudenburg has successfully isolated.<sup>235</sup> *Acer* (hostile, fierce, cutting) suggests that Horace has been too aggressive, that he has called out too many named people, even if none of them were of note or political consequence, and is used in 1.10.14 in the same critical sense.<sup>236</sup> But it can also be used stylistically to refer to the grand style, such as its use in 1.10.43 to describe the epic poet Varius.<sup>237</sup> Horace does not mean that Varius is abusive in his epic poetry, but merely that he writes in the grand style. In contrast, *sine nervis* (“without sinews,” or perhaps “gutless” or “unmuscular”) suggests at first impression that Horace’s critique lacked the aggressive backbone necessary for true satiric attack, but the term is a common compositional metaphor for a simple style.<sup>238</sup> Freudenburg sees these opposing critiques as a Horatian argument demonstrating that he, in fact, inhabits the medium point between two vices on opposite extremes (“Horace’s Satiric Program” 192). As an additional point, one pair of oppositions is an issue of literary criticism, while the second is potentially reflective of the appropriate place of frank speech, and Epicureans had plenty to say about both

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<sup>235</sup> See Freudenburg, “Horace’s Satiric Program and the Language of Contemporary Theory in *Satires* 2.1.” See also Muecke, *Horace Satires II* 101. Kenney following Morris sees the two criticisms as genuine opposites (“The First Satire of Juvenal” 35).

<sup>236</sup> LaFleur (1813) and Rudd (*Satires of Horace* 118) also take the term as referring to excessive abuse. Critics here potentially come from the public at large, but more probably from among the supporters of Lucilius that Horace has already engaged in 1.4 and especially in 1.10.

<sup>237</sup> Freudenburg, “Horace’s Satiric Program” 189. Muecke, *Horace Satires II* 101 also notes S. 1.4.65 and *Epod.* 6.11-14 for the aggressive sense, and 1.4.46 as a comparison for the stylistic sense.

<sup>238</sup> See *Ad Her.* 4.16, *Cic Orat* 62, and Brink (*Horace On Poetry, II: The Ars Poetica*) on *Ars Poetica* 26.

literary criticism and frank speech.<sup>239</sup> From this, I interpret Horace as having no serious fear himself from the challenges posed by either of the critics in these camps. But this opening passage is just the first hint of many that we shall see throughout the second book of *Sermones* that the problem of who is reading Horace and how they are interpreting his work is a major poetic concern, foreshadowing the coming compositional and philosophical extremes.

One central interpretative concern of 2.1 is just how seriously we should take Horace's consultation of Trebatius. Of course, as a literary poem, the court case is part of the literary fiction, postulating how, if he were called into court, Horace might defend himself. But part of the reader's interpretative task is at least to ask the question of how much emotional anxiety might extend into Horace's own life, even if that question cannot fully be answered. Does Horace have a legitimate fear that legal action could be taken against him, or is he merely deploying the consultation for other poetic ends? Are these two possibilities mutually exclusive? Let us not forget that satire has been among the most frequently censored genres throughout human history and still to this day occupies a nebulous legal category with regard to when it crosses the line from being a purely artistic critique to being subject to our own slander and libel laws.<sup>240</sup> *Sermo* 2.1 seems to be an early reflection of satire's nebulous and difficult legal status. Lejay sees a real

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<sup>239</sup> See Philodemus *On Poetry* and *On Frank Speech* respectively for examples of Epicurean commentary upon the topics of literature and frank speaking.

<sup>240</sup> It is worth noting that Domitian (Suetonius' *Domitian* 8) came down heavily on authors who published lampoons against distinguished men and women, though this is much more relevant for Juvenal than for Horace.

possibility that Horace could face legal action (287). Fraenkel and LaFleur both take the claim seriously (cf. Fraenkel 147). But more recently, Freudenburg, along with Anderson, Harrison and Clauss, has challenged the traditional notion that Horace is in fact being serious in his fear of detractors and in his consultation with Trebatius, and even has gone so far as to suggest that our uncertainty about how to take Trebatius is actually the sharp side of the joke.<sup>241</sup> Freudenburg has answered something deeply important for how the satire plays toward an external audience, unfamiliar with the immediate relations or dynamic of Horace's reading circle. It is we, as outsiders, two-thousand years removed from the incident, as well as the outsiders of Horace's day who ask such serious questions. Horace himself develops this same point later, when Damasippus' critique of Horace's literary output in 2.3 echoes the critique of 2.1.4. Then in 2.1.21-24, Trebatius strongly cautions against the extremely critical verse typical of *acer* in 2.1.4, though Horace cannot help himself. A little later, Horace acknowledges that his poetry is, in fact, an appropriate retreat (2.1.28-29) for such critique, paying homage to Lucilius as his model. He must include at least some criticism or he will not be writing satire. In the olden days, Lucilius had entrusted his secrets to his books, as though to faithful friends (2.1.30-31), reflecting the notion that satirical literature plays directly to a sympathetic internal audience who are intended to get the jokes at the expense of outsiders. Thus, by

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<sup>241</sup> Freudenburg, *Satires of Rome* 74. There is a real serious concern that Horace seeks to address through his consultation with Trebatius, but it is stylistic, not legal. See also Anderson "Rustic Urbanity," Ramage, *Roman Satirists and Their Satire* 77, Harrison "The Confessions of Lucilius," Clauss "Allusion and Structure in Horace, *Satire* 2.1," Freudenburg "Horace's Satiric Program," and Rudd who correctly characterizes 2.1 as "shadow-boxing" (*Satires of Horace* 128).

extension, the immediate reading circle of Horace, familiar with Horace's social ties to no less than Maecenas along with Horace's more general stylistic and philosophical concerns, can wink and nod to themselves as the outsiders find themselves framed as the butt of that joke.

But confusion on the part of readers is also possible in line 17. To the advice of Trebatius that he should sing of Octavian's positive civil qualities, Horace responds by uttering, *haud mihi deero*, the same words used by the pest in 1.9.56 when he was desperately seeking an audience with Maecenas. The reader is left with a decision on how seriously to take this allusion, whether to interpret it seriously as equating Horace with the pest, or to interpret it as mere background noise. Freudenburg notes that, "perhaps the point of the allusion is to make us adopt an alien, unsettling perspective on someone we thought we knew quite well: this is what Horace looks like, what he has to look like, in the eyes of an envious *outsider*" (*Satires of Rome* 95, emphasis mine). Freudenburg, then, hints at the complex possibilities that will baffle an external reader, but I see this as part of the inherent satiric effect that Horace perhaps even wants his text to accomplish. He is altogether too happy to allow outsiders to see potentially unflattering descriptions of himself. Particularly those hostile to Horace's reading circle may have been altogether too ready to entertain the implications of such unflattering allusions. On the other hand, the continuation of lines 17-20 features Horace demonstrating an awareness of timing in offering praise to Octavian.

Cum res ipsa feret. Nisi dextro tempore Flacci  
verba per attentam non ibunt Caesaris aurem,

cui male si palpere, recalcitret undique tutus.

(I shall hardly at all come up lacking) when the opportunity presents itself. Unless the time is right, the words of Floppy-ears will not pass into Caesar's attentive ears. If you flatter him badly, he will kick out all around to stay safe. (2.1.18-20)

Horace does not merely wish to offer up superficial flattery, which might merit a negative response. Clauss, in particular, has offered a particularly compelling argument that the image of Caesar kicking out as a horse is an allusion to Callimachus' *Hymn to Apollo* that furthers Horace's own interest in a Callimachean literary aesthetic.<sup>242</sup> Caesar becomes Apollo, an arbiter of fine poetry, while *Phthonos* also returns later in Horace's poem (2.1.76-77). Moreover, Caesar's appearance in 2.1.17-20 parallels his appearance at the end of the poem (2.1.84-85) where Horace introduces him as a judge of his poetry, offering praise and dismissing the court-case with his laugh. Instead of flattery from which Caesar may wish to shield himself, Horace offers his satires, which can win the admiration of Caesar. In both cases, poetry prompts a reaction from Caesar, one positive, and the other negative. A positive panegyric poem will not necessarily win the praise of Caesar, while a negative satiric poem need not necessarily cost Horace any anxiety, thanks to his proximity to the great.

Horace's reading circle could easily grasp all these Callimachean references in the context of the argument of the entire poem, and they would interpret these references

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<sup>242</sup> Clauss 201-202. This interpretation does not exclude earlier interpretations. Bauman sees the metaphor as referring to Octavian's Tribunician sacrosanctity (133), while Langford suggests the image may come from an animal fable (102). On the connections of Apollo to Octavian Augustus, see John F. Miller's recent work *Apollo, Augustus, and the Poets*.

appropriately since they already embrace the basic Callimachean literary aesthetic. Through Maecenas they were tied closely to Octavian himself. But in addition to this layer of literary concerns is a deeper layer of philosophic viewpoints that suggest a closer interconnection between Trebatius, Horace, and the reading circle.

Philosophy at first seems to be far removed from this satire. The argument is not philosophical, and moreover, the philosophical allusions and argumentative structure that governed the diatribe satires in the first book are absent. Lines 50-56 are the closest to any kind of strict philosophical argument. Muecke correctly notes that the Lucretian parallel (5.1033ff) is a commonplace analogy and sees most other commentators as seriously fishing for deeper philosophical parallels.<sup>243</sup> I suspect that Horace need not be overly philosophical in every satire; he can deploy a brief Lucretian reference to reestablish the general Lucretian intertextual play that he displayed so prevalently throughout the first book of *Sermones*. But more importantly, I see a thread of concerns throughout the consultation of Horace with Trebatius that suggests that the Epicurean concept of “safety from hostile men and animals” is lurking behind several of the comments that they make throughout.<sup>244</sup> This argument depends upon the

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<sup>243</sup> Muecke, *Horace Satires II* 109. She is rightly critical of Kiessling-Heinze’ proposed comparison with Cic. *Off.* 1.110, which, despite some vague verbal agreement, treats an altogether different topic.

<sup>244</sup> What is good is easy to get: food, water, shelter from the elements, and safety from hostile animals and people (*asphaleia ex anthropon*). In Epicurean terms, the entire discussion hinges around the threat from hostile outsiders. See for example, Epicurus *Ratae sententiae* 7, 13-14, 28 in Arrighetti 121-137.

acknowledgment that Trebatius himself was an Epicurean, and connected to Caesar.<sup>245</sup> Therefore the consultation itself has characteristics of two insiders discussing matters politely and somewhat subtly between them, and it opens the possibility for Epicurean meaning that may be missed by outsiders.

Trebatius, one of the most accomplished jurists in his day, eventually helped Maecenas with his divorce from Terentia and even advised Octavian on legal matters.<sup>246</sup> Many aspects of Trebatius' character and history can be determined by the series of letters that Cicero exchanges with him in *Ad Fam.* 7.6-22. Their relationship was serious enough that Cicero even dedicated the *Topica* to him in 44 BCE (See 7.19 and *Top* 1-5).<sup>247</sup> Cicero had even recommended him to Caesar, and Trebatius served with Caesar in 54. In 53, Trebatius converted to Epicureanism, which Cicero teases him about in 7.12, though Lejay calls it a temporary infatuation (288). The posture of 7.12 is sarcastic from beginning to end, as Cicero criticizes Trebatius for his failure to write, as if the moment one becomes an Epicurean, one is suddenly too lazy to answer letters. His interaction with Trebatius in 2.1 is quite cordial. While there's no evidence that Trebatius persisted in his Epicureanism, we also have no evidence that he ever gave it up either. The paucity of evidence makes it difficult to evaluate just exactly how serious a practitioner he might

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<sup>245</sup> Armstrong more recently has noted the connections between Trebatius and Epicureanism in "Epicurean Virtues, Epicurean Friendship."

<sup>246</sup> For overview, see Lejay 287-88. Bauman notes that Trebatius' good standing with Octavian enhances both the warning in the initial consultation as well as the significance of his final concession in the closing lines (123-36). On Trebatius, see Rudd, *Satires of Horace* 130-131, Anderson, *Essays on Roman Satire*. 43-44, Shackleton-Bailey, *Cicero* 99-104, Fraenkel 145-7.

<sup>247</sup> Fraenkel sees the letters to Trebatius as the happiest series in the large epistolary output of Cicero (66).

have been. The very minimum that can be said is that Horace never copies Cicero's flippant dismissal of Epicurean beliefs that appears both in his letters and his philosophical discourses.<sup>248</sup>

Elsewhere, in 7.5.3 Cicero praises Trebatius' excellent memory, which could be a generic praise, but is also reflective of the fact that Epicureans prized an excellent memory for literary and philosophical texts.<sup>249</sup> The frequency of puns and lawyer jokes in the series of letters that Cicero and Trebatius exchange make it clear that Trebatius himself could both take a joke and was perhaps a joker himself.<sup>250</sup> He is thus a fitting character for Horace to deploy in his satire, and perhaps got a laugh out of reading the exchange between himself and Horace.

The theme of safety from mankind first emerges in Trebatius' description of Horace's earlier poetry in lines 21-24.

Quanto rectius hoc quam tristi laedere versu  
Pantolabum scurram Nomentanumve nepotem,  
cum sibi quisque timet, quamquam est intactus, et odit!

How much more correct that would be than abusing the scurra  
Pantolabus or Nomentanus the wastrel with harsh verse, when each one  
fears for himself, and although he has not been injured, he hates you!

2.1.21-24.

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<sup>248</sup> Cf. *Ad. Fam* 15.16 to Cassius, *Ad Fam* 15.19, and the tone of the presentation of the Epicurean beliefs in bks 1-2 of the *De Finibus*. Cicero's *In Pisonem* additionally is a scathing invective against Calpurnius Piso, the patron of the Epicurean Philodemus, though Philodemus is only mentioned briefly and respectfully.

<sup>249</sup> See DeWitt, *Epicurus and His Philosophy*.

<sup>250</sup> Shackleton-Bailey notes that Cicero always used legal language facetiously when engaging Trebatius (*Cicero* 99-104).

Pantolabus and Nomentanus are both mentioned together in 1.8.11, connecting 2.1 to the frequent names of the first book of *Sermones*.<sup>251</sup> Trebatius here gives an example of the kind of named attack that may prove offensive to someone and also echoes 1.4.33, where the common crowd hates abusive poets. The warning itself is picked up again in lines 60-61 where Trebatius responds to Horace's bold and Epicurean assertion in the preceding lines that death truly is nothing to him.

Horace: "Ne longum faciam: seu me tranquilla senectus  
expectat seu Mors atris circumvolat alis,  
dives, inops, Romae, seu fors ita iusserit, exsul,  
quisquis erit vitae, scribam, color."

Trebatius: "O puer, ut sis  
vitalis metuo et maiorum ne quis amicus  
frigore te feriat."

Horace: I won't go on long: whether peaceful old age awaits me  
Or death hovers over me with black wings. Rich, poor, at  
Rome, or if chance has thus decreed it, in exile, I will write,  
whatever the color of life is.

Trebatius: Young man. I fear that you won't be alive long, and that  
someone well connected with the great will strike you with  
a chill.

(2.1.57-62)

Trebatius amplifies his earlier concern for Horace's safety. Perhaps someone like Nomentanus or Pantolabus is better connected and may come to harm Horace, though I suspect a significant amount of irony is present from the perspective of Horace's inner circle, and perhaps even well beyond it, given the fact that Horace criticizes no one of

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<sup>251</sup> Pantolabus and Nomentanus symbolize here all of those whom Horace may have skewered with his verse in the first book, and may function as well as cyphers for more specific objects of Horace's criticism.

political or social note in either book of *Sermones*. Despite the fact that I do not consider Horace entirely serious in his consultation, Horace uses the argument of the poem to dismiss any potential legal repercussions because of his powerful connections, both within his poetic circle, and through them to the person they are ultimately connected to, Octavian.

This is apparent in line 20 where *tutus*, the Latin equivalent of *asphales*, is placed in an emphatic position in the line and characterizes Octavian. Octavian, at the pinnacle of power and authority, is supremely positioned to render himself safe on all sides, and through his safety is able to confer it upon others as needed. *Tutus* resurfaces with more explicitly Epicurean tone in line 42.

Sed hic stilus haud petet ultro  
quemquem animantem et me veluti custodiet ensis  
vagina tectus; quem cur destringere coner  
tutus ab infestis latronibus?

But this pen will not attack any living person without cause  
and it will protect me just as a sheathed sword. Why should I  
try to draw it, safe from dangerous thugs? (1.4.39-42)

Surely dangerous thugs qualify as among the most important categories of pernicious men from whom one needs safety. Horace's satire is deployed as a defensive and potentially threatening weapon against them, but he sees no point in being excessive in his application of aggression. The implication here is that Horace's present position within his reading circle and his connections to Maecenas and Octavian offer him the genuine security that he needs to fulfill his basic Epicurean desires. Most interesting of all, Horace fashions his satire as a potential weapon in promoting and maintaining his

*asphaleia*, suggesting very nearly the opposite of what a consultation with Trebatius might imply about the dangers of writing satire. Horace will continue to write the seemingly tame kind of satire (in comparison with Lucilius), but could always at a moment's notice deploy it more aggressively to confront the enemies of Octavian and Maecenas. Reinforcing the power of Octavian and Maecenas, the theme again resurfaces in lines 76-77 where envy seeks to harm Horace. But because of Horace's Epicurean security (...*me cum magnis vixisse*, "(that) I have lived with the great"), envy will bite against something solid instead. The initial consultation with Trebatius over fears of legal action has been redeployed to reinforce the Epicurean security that Horace now holds with his reading circle, Maecenas, and their ultimate patron, Octavian.

While the question of Horace's security from men is central to the argument, several other phrases can be potentially read with Epicurean overtones. Trebatius' initial advice is to take a rest (*quiescas*), something that surely any Epicurean could see as contributing to their *ataraxia*.<sup>252</sup> We might expect an Epicurean Trebatius to prescribe something like this to a fellow Epicurean Horace. Yet, Horace cannot remain silent because his poetry gives him pleasure, the supreme Epicurean value (line 28: *me pedibus delectat claudere verba*). A second intriguing reference (lines 44-45) features Horace threatening to use his satire more aggressively should he be roused (*qui me commorit*), and he even includes a parenthetical warning to emphasize this potential aggression

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<sup>252</sup> Synonyms to *quietudo* such as *tranquilitas* and their Greek equivalents such as ἡσυχία also reflect the virtue of the philosophical life.

(*melius non tangere, clamo!* “Leave well enough alone, I shout!”).<sup>253</sup> Epicureans have no problems with anger in self-defense.<sup>254</sup> Horace adds another delicate Epicurean nod at line 74 when he has Lucilius, Scipio and Laelius playing around pleasantly while the vegetables cooked. This simple kind of diet that Epicureans liked to eat combines with the Epicurean propensity to form intimate circles of friends and is written back onto the relationship of Lucilius, Scipio and Laelius. This is not to suggest that any of the three were actually Epicureans, but to emphasize the intimate friendship, appropriate meal, and safety, paralleling Horace’s own relationship with his reading circle and the great Maecenas.

*Sermo* 2.1, despite having no direct philosophical argument, remains colored by Epicurean terms that enhance the meaning of the satire and that reflect the special concerns and preferences of Horace’s own reading circle. Horace’s fellow poets can appreciate the careful and delicate picture of friendship and the protection it offers from dangers, while also arguing for their preferred aesthetic and compositional values (Freudenburg “Horace’s Satiric Program,” *Satires of Rome*, Claus). Outsiders

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<sup>253</sup> Muecke notes that *melius non tangere* is a threat formula also found at Ter. *Ad.* 180 and Livy 3.48.3 (*Horace Satires II* 108).

<sup>254</sup> Cf. Philodemus’ *De Ira*. “Anger, when it is *physike orge*, that is, an emotion that springs up for a legitimate reason and is *bracheia kai me syntonos* (“brief and not impetuous”), is a *pathos* (“emotion”) to which even the wise man can be subject (cols. Xli. 30-31, xlvi.11-13, xlvii.36-37, xlix 19-22);” Indelli 2004: 104 summarizing the Epicurean position on anger. Provided the anger is not long-lasting and has not become ingrained into the nature of the man, anger can be an acceptable emotion for the wise man to express, and those wise teachers can reproach their disciples fiercely or correct errors in competing philosophers while seeming angry to those in attendance. Anger is potentially natural and rationally controllable, contrasting with *thymos*, which is fundamentally irrational. We may also contrast the Stoic attempt to avoid emotion entirely as a motivation for action.

meanwhile find themselves curiously asking misleading questions about Horace, his satirical program, and his relationship with the great.

### **Stoic Sermons: Damasippus and Davus in *Sermones* 2.3 and 2.7**

Although I have argued for a privileging of the Epicurean viewpoint and for Horace's ardent anti-Stoicism throughout the *Sermones*, Horace is also not afraid to give the Stoics a voice in his poetry. Thus, we find in 2.3 and 2.7 two Stoic sermons delivered by two equally dubious and ridiculous interlocutors, the bankrupt speculator Damasippus and Horace's own slave Davus.<sup>255</sup> In each case, the occasion is the Saturnalia, complete with the role-reversals common to it. In each satire, an associate tries to enlighten Horace with second-hand Stoic doctrine, and both satires conclude with lively passages of direct speech between Horace and his interlocutor that ultimately rejects the doctrine itself and poses a legitimate question to the reader over how to evaluate any claims made against Horace. These parallels make it appropriate here to treat the two poems together rather than in their order of appearance in the poetry book. Their commonality also hints at some of the subtle themes and structures of Horace's second book of conversations (*Sermones*).

Although the Stoics are allowed to speak in the satires, Horace is ultimately in control of the pen and his anti-Stoicism in these satires is much more subtle than the more obvious attempts that we saw in the first book of *Sermones*. Stoics are among the most important outsiders in Horace's satires, connected to Lucilius on the aesthetic level

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<sup>255</sup> On thematic consistencies between the two satires, see Ramage, *Roman Satirists and Their Satire* 80-82.

through their voluminous works, reflected ultimately in the monstrous 326-line third satire of the second book.<sup>256</sup> Damasippus has been accosted and converted by the wordy Stertinius, (dubbed “Professor Snore” in Suzanne Sharland’s excellent article),<sup>257</sup> while Davus has been getting free lessons in philosophy from Crispinus’ janitor (2.7.45).<sup>258</sup> Additionally, the circumstances by which they have taken up the Stoic “faith” elicit smirks. Bores, snores, janitors and slaves are hardly the marks of an elite school of philosophy. Yet they are now presented as criticizing Horace’s poetry through the lens of school doctrines. Moreover, Davus claims he has been listening for a long time (*ausculto iam dum dum* 2.7.1), we presume at Horace’s preceding satires. The occasion of the Saturnalia allows for an inversion, here of poet and target, where the slave Davus and the avaricious low-life Damasippus can turn the tables on Horace and show what they have learned about Horatian satire. Horace uses them to stand in for potential objecting

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<sup>256</sup> Diogenes Laertius’ *Life of Chrysippus* notes that Chrysippus wrote approximately 705 books, and approximately 500 lines per day (Cf. Horace claiming Lucilius wrote two-hundred lines an hour standing on a single foot). For his awkward and clumsy style, see Long and Sedley 32 I and 37B, *SVF* 2.3.3-205, Gould and Brehier. For the potential antagonism between Lucretius and Chrysippus, see Sedley’s *Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom*.

<sup>257</sup> “Soporific Satire.” The pun on *stertere* “to snore” can hardly be accidental, and Sharland goes so far as to suggest that the unusual silence of Horace over the course of the poem stems from the fact that he has actually fallen asleep during the lecture.

<sup>258</sup> Both Stoic speakers in *Sermones* II are second-hand and novice expositors of Stertinius and Crispinus, thus adding “Platonic” distance to their Stoicism. Stertinius may also have been the real name of a minor Stoic in much the same way as we will see with Catus in 2.4 as perhaps reflecting the real name of a minor Epicurean. Lejay notes that Stertinius surely existed in reality, and perhaps wrote 220 books of Stoic philosophy in Latin, if Acro can be believed. Lejay offers that he was at least a prolific writer and probably one of the popular street speakers around Rome. He is likely different from the rhetorician described by Quintilian *Inst.* 3.1.21 and Stertinius Maximus named by Seneca the Elder *Contr.* II.1.36, and certainly not the medic named by the elder Pliny 29.7, who was a contemporary of Claudius. The name is exceedingly rare. Damasippus, on the other hand, is mentioned in the correspondence of Cicero (Att. 12.29.2, and 33.1), as a collector of objects of art, and Horace most likely refers to the same person.

listeners to his previous satires, and in both cases shows that they have gotten some things wrong about how to perform Horatian satire.

*Sermo* 2.3 is Horace's second longest poem and the longest of his satires, which typically range from 35 to 143 lines and average much closer to 100 lines a poem.<sup>259</sup> By contrast, the behemoth third satire is a startling 326 lines and may in fact account for the fact that *Sermones* 2 curiously contains eight poems, if we consider it the equivalent of three separate poems of around one-hundred lines each (Gowers, "Horace Satires I and II" 58). The length of 2.3 violates Horace's typical Callimachean aesthetic and more closely approximates the kind of satire that we find in Lucilius and which the Stoics are alleged by implication to have preferred. Since every poem in book two in some sense responds to the aesthetic dilemma at the opening of 2.1, Damasippus can be read as among those who see Horace as being too soft. The sermon that Damasippus delivers in 2.3 (approximately 290 lines) is exactly the kind of satire that he wants to hear: Lucilian, Stoic and harsh.

The structure and tone of 2.3 make quite clear how detailed Horace has been in painting Damasippus ridiculous. Damasippus and Horace speak directly with each other at the beginning and end of the poem, thus framing Damasippus' new-found Stoicism that dominates the center of the poem. Bond's detailed work has already shown that even

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<sup>259</sup> Dilke first noted the tendency in Augustan poetry to write one-hundred line poems. Vergil's *Eclogues*, for example, contain ten poems of approximately one-hundred lines each (shortest 63, longest 111), and likewise Tibullus' first book of *Elegies* (shortest 64, longest 100), and Horace's first book of *Sermones* (shortest 34, longest 143). For general treatments of 2.3, see Anderson "Horace's Siren (*Serm.* 2.3.14)," Frischer, Freudenburg "Verse-technique and Moral Extremism," Heyworth, Morgan, Marchesi, Verboven, Wendell Clausen, Armisen-Marchetti, Brind'Amour.

before the diatribe begins, the reader has been made aware of Damasippus' Stoicism and thus prepared to be skeptical of his claims.<sup>260</sup> Irony is directed first against the bombastic Stoic diatribe, and second against the rigid Stoic doctrines themselves. But not all the content comes in for a rough treatment, since avarice, luxury, ambition and superstition are general faults that many philosophical schools viewed negatively. Horace therefore uses the Stoics to deliver a few licks against the general lot of mankind, just as he railed against similar vices in *Sermones* 1.1-3. But in addition to this general feature of satire to criticize broadly, Horace is more specifically and carefully critical of the rigidity of the Stoic doctrine and its general inability to correct the problems of vice and passion.

The opening lines of the poem make it clear that Damasippus is an outsider who has failed to understand the satiric enterprise of Horace.

Sic raro scribis ut toto non quater anno  
membranam poscas, scriptorum quaeque retexens,  
iratus tibi quod vini somnique benignus  
nil dignum sermone canas. Quid fiet? At ipsis  
Saturnalibus huc fugisti sobrius. Ergo  
dic aliquid dignum promissis: incipe! Nil est.  
culpantur frustra calami immeritusque laborat  
iratis natus paries dis atque poetis  
atqui vultus erat multa et praeclara minantis,  
Si vacuum tepido cepisset villula tecto.  
Quorsum pertinuit stipare Platona Menandro,  
Eupolin Archilocho, comites educere tantos?  
Invidiam placare paras virtute relicta?  
Contemnere miser. Vitanda est improba Siren  
Desidia, aut quidquid vita meliore parasti  
ponendum aequo animo.”

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<sup>260</sup> See “The Characterization of the Interlocutors in Horace Satires 2.3” and “Horace on Damasippus on Stertinius on...” The Stoics are known for cultivating a “philosophical” beard, and thus Horace’s suggestion that Damasippus find a razor in line 17 already alludes to Damasippus’ philosophical eccentricity.

Di te, Damasippe, deaeque  
verum ob consilium donent---tonsore! Sed unde  
tam bene me nosti?"

"You write so rarely as not to call for parchment four times in a single year, reweaving what you have written, angry at yourself because lavish with wine and sleep, you sing nothing worthy of conversation. What will become of this? You fled here, sober on the Saturnalia. So, speak something worthy of what's been promised! Begin! There is nothing. The pens are faulted in vain, and the wall born under the wrath of gods and poets labors undeservedly. You had the face of one threatening many outstanding things, if only your little Sabine farm would receive you under its warm roof with some free time. What was the point behind stuffing Plato with Menander, and Archilochus with Eupolis, to take such companions with you? Are you prepared to pacify envy by leaving behind what you excel at? You'll be despised as a wretch. The siren sloth must be avoided, or whatever you've prepared in a better life, you must put aside with equanimity.  
"May the Gods and Goddesses give you a razor, on account of this true counsel! How do you know me so well? (2.3.1-18)

Damasippus is immediately critical of the infrequency and volume of Horace's satiric output, putting him squarely in the camp of those who think that a thousand such verses could be crafted in a single day (2.1.4). Horace himself appears to be laboring over his manuscript, "reweaving it."<sup>261</sup> This is nothing more than Horace's typical Callimachean care for highly crafted and artistic poetry, but Damasippus sees it as entirely a bad quality. *Canas* in line four suggests that Damasippus further attempts to pin Horace to the wall by attributing the notion of internally directed anger, drunkenness and laziness to Horace's own conscience.<sup>262</sup> Line five establishes the Saturnalian context, while *huc*

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<sup>261</sup> The metaphor stems from Penelope reweaving her shroud in the *Odyssey* (Muecke, *Horace Satires II* 132).

<sup>262</sup> See Freudenburg on *canas* (*Satires of Rome* 113)

*fugisti* and *vilulla* suggest a retreat from the city to the Sabine farm. Lurking behind line nine is a frustration on the part of those whom Damasippus represents as a reader. Horace's satire has not been nearly as threatening nor as voluminous as they had desired. In fact, the present poem is just about to be Crispinus' or Lucilius' length, a certain joke that is ultimately at their expense. The Stoic context is first made clear in Horace's invitation that the gods give Damasippus a razor (*tonsor*, ln 17), a reference to the philosophical beard that was common among dedicated philosophers. We may even see a joke in the reference, in that Horace invites Damasippus to cut off his beard, symbolizing his dedication to Stoicism, but also potentially and comically suggestive of the need for Damasippus to cut short his discourse as well. Ultimately, Horace will have to take the initiative to cut off Damasippus' speech. These opening lines already predispose us to consider that the kind of satire that Damasippus will deliver is actually more in line with the muddy Stoic and Lucilian satire that Horace despised in book one and in *Sermo* 2.1.

The brief exchange between Horace and Damasippus ends at line thirty-one, and from that point on, Damasippus completely dominates the conversation by giving Horace an earful of Stertinius' teaching. The diatribe establishes the theme that all fools are mad, and then illustrates it through the presentation of four vices: *avaritia*, *ambitio*, *luxuria*, and *superstitio*.<sup>263</sup> Each vice is illustrated in turn through various examples drawn from

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<sup>263</sup> Graver lists avarice (φιλαργυρία), ambition (φιλοδοξία, δοξομανία), and several traits that comprise luxury (φιλογυνία, γυναικομανία, όψομανία, φιλοινία, φιληδονία) as Stoic sicknesses and

history or mythology. Damasippus comes in for ridicule through the progressive “windedness” he experiences as he moves through the presentation of these vices. Damasippus is merely a Stoic neophyte, not a trained preacher, though he does appear to have taken detailed notes from Stertinius (ln 34). If indeed Stertinius, Fabius, Crispinus and Chrysippus could prattle on forever, then Damasippus has not learned quite enough yet from them. He treats *avaritia* from lines 82-157 for a total of 76 lines. *Ambitio* is slightly shorter, but still respectably close at 66 lines (158-224). *Luxuria* trails off still further, 57 lines from 224 to 280. But the most pronounced drop comes at the end where *superstitio* is treated in a mere fifteen lines (281-295). Lejay notes that Damasippus has not carefully thought out his speech (357). Surely the master Stertinius suffered no such problem. Not even the ardent passion of a Stoic neophyte can help him imitate his masters correctly.

In addition to the decreasing length, even the structure of these sections enhances the ridiculousness of Damasippus’ delivery. Damasippus sets out in lines 77-81 that he will address *ambitio*, *avaritia*, *luxuria* and *superstitio* “in order” (*ordine*) with ambition clearly first on the list. But then curiously enough, he turns first to *avaritia*, perhaps because it most clearly reflects his own disorder as a bankrupt art collector. That he would be drawn to treat *avaritia*, and then be unable to treat vices other than his own adequately might also be typical of his neophyte status. Metrical reasons no doubt play a

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infirmities (143). The Stoics also divide their emotions into four types: delight, desire, distress, and fear (2007: 56). Superstition (δεισιδαιμονία) is classified under the genus fear. See also SVF 3.391 repeated in Long and Sedley 411.

role in this outcome, but perhaps Horace also foreshadows the coming verbal confusion (Lejay 357). Additionally the diatribe is laid out in strictly formal terms that Lejay sees as atypical of Horace, and more typical of Stoic organization (356). Damasippus clearly marks the introduction and conclusion to both *avaritia* and *ambitio* (82-3, 158-9, 159-167, 220-3). Given the slight reduction in lines in the treatment on *ambitio*, Damasippus is presently doing very well at imitating Stertinius. He introduces *luxuria* at line 2.3.224, but we begin to see him getting winded when he ends rather abruptly in line 280 and fails to transition to the brief fifteen line segment on *superstitio*. The entire sermon receives no conclusion at all. As a neophyte, Damasippus has forgotten that the purpose behind Stertinius' teaching was his own moral improvement, and instead wields it as a weapon in line 296 to ward off those who would insult him.

But Horace does not stop with order and structure in making Damasippus look ridiculous. Freudenburg has shown that the versification of 2.3 reflects many oral qualities that an ancient audience may have detected easily ("Verse-technique and Moral Extremism" relying on Nilsson). *Sermo* 2.3 contains the highest elision rate in all of Horace's poetry, nearly approaching the rate for Lucilius, and doubling his rate elsewhere.<sup>264</sup> Moreover, a large number of these elisions were extraordinarily rough such as an elided vowel immediately preceded by another vowel, creating a virtual hiatus

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<sup>264</sup> Horace's elision rate is also typical of his reading circle such as Vergil, but still greater than the elision rate among the neoterics (Freudenburg "Verse-technique and Moral Extremism" 199).

across these vowels (81, 83 (twice), 86, and 92).<sup>265</sup> These metrical and versification effects are the antithesis of Horatian literary aesthetic. While I expect that a large number of the general audience of Horace's satires would find Damasippus a laughable character, the length, structural deficiencies, and extreme versification are all characterizations that acquire further meaning when set against Horace's own preferred Callimachean literary aesthetic and his previously stated compositional values in 1.4, 1.10 and 2.1. The performative effect of versification is one that is not easy for any outsider audience to grasp. An outsider audience that is not familiar with or even antithetical to Horace's stylistic preferences loses something of the meaning that lies behind Horace's characterization of Damasippus. The effects of versification are one subtle way that Horace has nodded to those in his inner circle, offering more satirical value than perhaps the face value of the sermon suggests.

Beyond his ridicule of the Stoic neophyte Damasippus, Horace takes great care to emphasize the Stoic qualities of the speech. Most of these are general touches not explicitly designed to prompt ridicule, and Horace even has no problems in using the Stoics to criticize general human folly.<sup>266</sup> Damasippus introduces the question of definition: *primum nam inquiram quid sit furere*, "First I will inquire into what exactly it means to be mad". This question of definition is unusual in Horace, but common to popular Stoic sermonizing (Lejay 356). Stoic principles of definition include an

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<sup>265</sup> Freudenburg "Verse-technique and Moral Extremism" 201. Freudenburg also notes a large number of blurred caesura weakened through elision, included lines 134 and 180 which lack all the normal *caesurae*.

<sup>266</sup> See Lejay 357-59 and Bond "The Characterization of the Interlocutors," 3-11 on the general Stoic traits.

enumeration of characteristics, building up a series of examples inductively so that the audience accepts the definition.<sup>267</sup> Moreover, Stoic argumentation is typified by appeals to popular opinion reflected in *dicatur* (108), *videatur* (120), *habebitur* (209), use of questions (65, 89, 97, 99, 102, 162, 166, 200, 203) to make a point, and the use of extended conditionals in lines 104-130 and lines 208-18 (Lejay 359). Chrysippus is invoked as an authority at lines 44 and 287. In fact, Damasippus' own conversion experience remarkably parallels that of Chrysippus, who turned to Stoicism upon having his property confiscated by the state.<sup>268</sup> Meanwhile, *capiet* in line 208-9 is used in an obscurely philosophical sense to describe the mind grasping images, as Lejay notes (424-5).<sup>269</sup> None of these features of the text come in for any explicit ridicule, but they do help convey an authentic sense of Stoicism lurking behind the *sermo*.

But Horace does invest considerable effort in undermining the ridiculousness of the Stoic paradox at the heart of the satire, namely that all fools are mad. In fact, a prime example of a modern “outsider” missing the point of the satire can be found in Rudd's assertion that 2.3 is simply not Horace's best poem, directing his own criticism toward Horace himself instead of Damasippus (*Satires of Horace* 187-88). He correctly asserts that the paradox lacks profundity and is incapable of supporting the whole poem

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<sup>267</sup> Lejay elaborates that this is because Stoics do not believe in essence, and as such cannot define madness as a state. Damasippus' definition is remarkably close to Chrysippus' definition. See Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.68.18, *SVF* III, p 166, 27, (Lejay 376).

<sup>268</sup> Bond “The Characterization of the Interlocutors,” 7 and Diogenes Laertius 7.181.

<sup>269</sup> Muecke even notes that technical philosophical language is rare in the *Sermones* or *Epistles* (*Horace Satires II* 154).

underneath it, but he attributes the fault to Horace instead of counting the point against the Stoics.

Stoic criticism is perhaps also suggested in the pile of grain at 2.3.112, where it is deployed to argue that accumulated material is folly (Morris 182.) But I think more particularly it recalls the argument of the pile and the *Sorites* argument deployed in 1.1, which we already explored via Freudenburg as representing the kind of satire that Horace sees as antithetical to his program (*Satires of Rome* 27-39). Chrysippus studied the *Sorites* considerably and was even commonly associated with piling up arguments in his philosophical treatises (Freudenburg, *Satires of Rome* 30). In the context of potential readers of the poem, the mention of the pile here recalls for the insiders the aesthetic problems that Horace found in Stoicism. Damasippus' sermon is the largest pile of satirical words that Horace ever allowed to accumulate.

As insiders united through their Callimachean literary aesthetic and anti-Stoicism, Horace's reading circle could appreciate the depth to which Horace has gone to undermine the satiric speech of Damasippus and make him appear ridiculous. Damasippus' admission in line 296 that his speech is a weapon designed to aggressively ward off those who would insult him recalls Horace's own plea to use his satire purely defensively in 2.1.43-44, and this links the speech of Damasippus as a kind of satire opposed to Horace's own program. But the criticism does not stick. The general reader is immediately struck by the fact that Damasippus has merely decided to blather on about the teachings of Stertinius without trying to match the sermon to Horace's own context

(Sharland “Soporific Satire”). This acts as a more general indictment of Stoic rigidity, because it has failed to make Damasippus into a better person. Thus after the long speech of Damasippus that seems well-wide of the mark of Horace, we find Horace asking the very question that we long to ask,

“Stoice, post damnum sic vendas omnia pluris,  
qua me stultitia, quoniam non est genus unum,  
insanire putas? Ego nam videor mihi sanus,”

Stoic, as you intend to sell everything for a profit after your loss,  
by what foolishness do you think me afflicted, since there is not one type?  
For I seem sane to myself.

Horace simply cannot figure out what Damasippus wants him to get out of the preceding verbal diarrhea, verbalizing what every non-Stoic reader of the satire must surely also be thinking. Damasippus claims that Horace is building, and thus imitating the higher powers when it is not his place to do so (308-321) and includes critical references to ridiculous figures such as Turbo and an allusion to fable which is not at all consistent with the satiric attack of the Horace we have seen thus far (Lejay 385-6). Damasippus piles on two more charges in lines 322-23, Horace’s poetry and his temper, both of which have been admitted previously in the first book of *Sermones* as lesser faults.<sup>270</sup> Horace emphasizes this in the concluding line of the poem, *O maior, tandem parcas, insane, minori!* “O great one! Spare your lesser madman!” Stoicism does not admit degrees of insanity, and the paradox itself sees all fools as equally insane. Horace was ready to

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<sup>270</sup> *Sermones* 1.3.29, and 1.4.139-140.

admit his madness in line 305, but his concluding jab undercuts the Stoic paradox of the poem and reinforces his own Epicurean position of lesser tolerable faults in 1.3.

Given the degree to which Horace and Damasippus jab back and forth at each other, we would not be surprised at all to find quite different reactions among insiders and pro-Horatian readers, who can see Damasippus as ridiculous and quickly dismiss any criticism of Horace, versus anti-Horatian readers and outsiders who might not object at all to Damasippus' speech and may find it to be an excellent satire while enjoying the licks and barbs that Damasippus delivers against Horace.<sup>271</sup> No culture is purely of the same position on every issue, but competing cultural voices can come to different interpretations about the same textual event. The possibility of these divergent and distinct reactions is what makes satire so powerful and enticing, and 2.3 accomplishes this effect magnificently.

As in 2.3, *Sermo* 2.7 also features a Stoic sermon on the theme of a Stoic paradox, but switching instead to a much more manageable paradox, namely that only the wise man is free and all fools are slaves. An equally dubious character delivers the main speech, Horace's own slave Davus. The setting is the Saturnalia, when roles were reversed and slaves could speak freely to their masters, adding an extra ironic twist to the poem's satire. Davus' source, the doorkeeper to Crispinus, whose name we have seen previously mentioned and criticized elsewhere in Horace's collection (1.1.120, 1.4.14),

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<sup>271</sup> One curious "outsider" reading is that of Coffey (84), who sees the entire speech by Damasippus as well-constructed and carefully arranged, and rationalizes the treatment of *superstitio* because it leaves less scope for righteous indignation. He concludes that there is no overt parody of the sermon. If you are not looking for parody or Stoic criticism, you are unlikely to see it at all.

makes the approach in 2.7 even more dubious than what we have just seen in 2.3. Despite this distance from the original Stoic source, *Sermo* 2.7 is a much more satisfying Horatian satire, providing much more coherence between the setting (Saturnalia), content (paradox about freedom and slavery), and character (the slave Davus versus Horace).<sup>272</sup> Indeed, Evans has called this satire, “Our most fully developed Horatian satire on satire itself” (307). The lecture is much more personalized than the one we found in 2.3, with far fewer verses devoted to the Stoic paradox and sermonizing, and much more devoted to a general interaction between Davus and Horace. This blend of sermonizing with dialogue makes the poem a fitting summation of Horace’s satiric work across both books of satire. Davus is a close listener of Horace, in a unique position to provide seemingly unqualified access to the intimate details of Horace’s life. Horace deploys Davus as a critic of himself, even as Horace has already been open to reviewing his own faults in 1.3. *Sermo* 2.7 encapsulates Horace’s poetic experience, alluding to many of the preceding satires, while Davus as a prior listener of Horace who has imbibed his lessons, attempts to deliver his own version of Horatian satire.

Stoicism is carefully deployed throughout the poem. Some of the elements are easy to identify, such as the name of Davus’ source, Crispinus and the Stoic paradox that all fools are slaves. But more subtle characterizations also abound.<sup>273</sup> The Stoic paradox stems from fragments of Zeno in *SVF* I, n219, 222, and 226. Further comparison is

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<sup>272</sup> Cf. Stahl 42-53 and Fraenkel 137.

<sup>273</sup> See Lejay on the extra care required here (539).

possible in Cicero's own *Paradoxa Stoicorum* 33-41, where the movement from the topic of love to that of artistic curiosity parallels Davus's own treatment here (95-101). The treatment differs, however, as Davus turns next to the gourmand (101-115), completely unmentioned in Cicero.<sup>274</sup> Additionally, the very abrupt treatment of these themes (6-35 on inconsistency, 46-94 on the passion of lust, 95-101 on the pretensions of the art gawker, 102-111 on the gourmand, 111-115 on inner disquiet suggest that Davus, like Damasippus, simply has not learned how to present a good Stoic sermon, and more importantly, does not seem to have learned much from the moral content. The Stoic notion of building a definition through examples is present in the Stoic definition of the sage here in 2.7. Moreover, 2.7 is characterized almost entirely by interrogation, a common form of Stoic argumentation as previously noted by Lejay (lines 42-3, 53-56, 58-61, 61-63, 70-71, 75-77, 78-80, 88-89, 102-103, 104, 109-111). Four of these questions differ slightly in reflecting the Stoic dialectic. Lines 95 and 105 are introduced by *qui*, where Lejay notes that *qui* replaces a conditional proposition and that the *quis* of lines 46-7 is of the same type (545). Lejay also identifies some characteristic Stoic language such as *formido* (77), *miser* (81), *pessime* (22), and *peccare* (47, 62, 64, 96, 109), which appears abundantly in the lecture by Davus, but is usually banal elsewhere in Horace (545). Additionally, the speech by Davus reflects a number of concrete expressions that characterize Stoic preaching, such as *mancipium* (3), *clavum* (10), *cheragra* (15), *mercede condustum* (17-18), *caeno evellere plantam* (27), *holus* (30),

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<sup>274</sup> See Lejay on the differences between the subdivisions in Horace and Cicero, and on general comparisons with the treatment in Horace to those before and after (541-3)

*potandum* (32). While none of this vocabulary is necessarily unique to the Stoics, the plethora of vivid examples clarifies the Stoic nature of the sermon. In fact, the preponderance of characteristic Stoic sermonizing is so abundant that Campbell noted that Davus does not talk like a slave at all, but like a more formal Stoic preacher.<sup>275</sup> Additionally, Davus uses the fictive interlocutor to good effect, and Lejay sees the second person starting at line 46ff. as indeterminate. Horace here offers some genuine confusion to exploit the satiric effect of his poetry. The reader has to make a tough choice in the central section on sexual excess over how literally to apply it to Horace.<sup>276</sup> Muecke has also noted that the extended discussion of the Stoic sage in lines 83-8 also features some technical Stoic vocabulary. The wise man is characterized as an impenetrable sphere, thus extending the Stoic teachings on the nature of the cosmos and the divine.<sup>277</sup> Furthermore, *externi* in line 87 refers to those qualities outside of what the sage needs to

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<sup>275</sup> Campbell, *Horace, a New Interpretation* 82, and McGann 73. For all of his slave qualities, Davus' speech style is atypical. Lejay sees Davus as a good example of a Stoic preacher, but also more violent and gross, identifying many more obscure words that Horace does not typically use, and sees a sharp contrast between the treatments of sexual excess in both 2.7 and 1.2 (550).

<sup>276</sup> Lejay sees the second person singular as an indefinite fictitious interlocutor (550). Coffey sees Horace as neither a knight nor an adulterer (89). Many scholars consider it plausible that Horace could have been a knight (Taylor "Horace's Equestrian Career" and "Republican and Augustan Writers," Armstrong "Horatius: *Eques et Scriba*," Wiseman *New Men*, and Nicolet). Fraenkel is silent (14-15), and Rudd sees Horace's knight-hood as probable (*Satires of Horace* 278). Muecke wisely cautions that regardless of the biographical truth, "we should not ignore the methodological paradox of the relation of biographical 'truth' and fiction in a literary work," (*Horace Satires II* 220). Cf. Chevalley and Favrod, and Bond "A Discussion of the Various Tensions in Horace, *Satires* 2.7." More recently, Armstrong reinforces the same point recently in "The Biographical and Social Foundations." Horace cannot claim to be a Knight in his poetry without social consequences. Armstrong makes the same point with respect to Juvenal's Equestrian *persona* in "Juvenalis Eques."

<sup>277</sup> Muecke, *Horace Satires II* 223. cf. *SVF* II 1009, Cic. *Nat. D* 1.18, 2.45-9, and Marcus Aurelius 12.3 and 8.41.

maintain his virtue (See SVF III: 96-97, Cic. *Tusc.* 5.25f, *Off.* 1.66 and 3.21, Lejay 542). Although Davus is off in his characterization elsewhere, he apparently possesses the knowledge to deploy Stoic ethical commonplace characterizations of the sage.

Also interesting is the contrast between the treatments of similar topics by Davus and Horace in his previous satires. For example, Davus reprises parts of the argument of 1.3 in discussing the theme of inconsistency. His method is characteristically Stoic and methodical, laying out a general proposition in lines 6-7. Davus also mismanages his treatment by noting that the man consistent in his error is more foolish than the one who wavers back and forth. Since Stoics see the transformation from virtue to vice as instantaneous and admit no degrees of foolishness, this is partly the effect of the neophyte Davus being unable to match his Stoic masters in their teaching.<sup>278</sup> Moreover, the speech against adultery is entirely different from what we previously encountered in 1.2, being much more focused on adultery itself. Line 71 refuses to allow Horace an out by immediately addressing his potential objection in purely Stoic terms. Horace receives no credit for his failure to be an adulterer because he only does so out of fear of punishment, a perfectly appropriate argument to a Stoic, but in stark contrast to the argument of 1.2.134 where the threat of punishment forces the Epicurean sympathizer to satisfy his natural but unnecessary needs on a casual basis with freedwomen. Finally, lines 102-111 condense the speech of Ofellus, though Lejay calls it more Roman than Stoic (558).

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<sup>278</sup> Not all Stoics are as rigid in their assessment of moral progress as the more traditional Stoics, and perhaps Epictetus 4.2.4 echoes this.

Stoic criticism of Epicureanism perhaps lies behind the diatribe beginning at line 46 and occupying the bulk of the poem. Attack on the Epicurean day was a *topos* at the time, as Armstrong has already noted (“Horatius: *Eques et Scriba*” 278). Stoics have few doubts that Epicurean leisure-artists such as Horace might have nights out on the town that are not really as innocent as they pretend. This prompts the Stoic-colored attack from Davus, despite a seeming acknowledgement in line 71 that it does not apply to Horace in a purely literal sense. Davus claims his master refrains from adultery because of fear (2.7.72-7), shameful for a Stoic, but not an Epicurean.<sup>279</sup> As Armstrong notes, much of what Damasippus and Davus say about the Epicurean man of leisure reflects what Epictetus will later say about them, situating the sermons in a broader antagonistic discourse between Stoicism and Epicureanism (“Horatius: *Eques et Scriba*” 279). This anti-Epicurean antagonism allows for a sharper distinction between the pro-Epicurean sympathizers among Horace’s reading circle and his frequently Stoic critics.

The character of Davus poses an interesting question for how we interpret his role in the poem, and how insiders and outsiders might interpret his role in the poem (Evans 310ff; Bernstein 455ff). Davus as well as Damasippus are such ridiculous characters that we are left wondering how seriously to take their accusations. Davus is a neophyte Stoic

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<sup>279</sup> See Plaza 211-216, who sees the Epicurean Horace as nearing his limits of Epicurean wisdom and tolerance, and ultimately Horace chooses to sacrifice the demands of his philosophy to the demands of the genre.

but receives the usual characterization of the stereotypical slave in Roman comedy.<sup>280</sup> He seems to attack Horace, while also not aspiring to any of the kinds of good living that his precepts would seem to require. Davus is an outsider of sorts, but he possesses more personal information about Horace than a typical outsider might, which makes him more ambiguous to outsiders such as us today. But I see this inherent difficulty in the character of Davus as Horace's final act of locking out outsiders, almost enticing and therefore misleading us to ask serious and personal questions about Horace's own biography. While the outsider is busy seeking answers for these misleading questions, Horace calmly recapitulates the main themes of his satiric enterprise and creates a compact Callimachean and anti-Stoic satire to remind us of the past connections as he prepares to say goodbye to satire as a genre. *Sermo* 2.7, like *Sermo* 2.3, responds fundamentally to the question of how properly to do satire. No programmatic discussions are needed here, as the poem is a performed summation of Horace's satiric accomplishments.

In contrast to the general way in which the poem potentially misleads outsiders, Horace's own Epicurean circle are going to side with Horace as insiders laughing at Damasippus and Davus as outsiders, as this inner circle of poets is going to know much more about Horace's own life and whether the accusations of Davus and Damasippus are true or not. Even if these accusations do prove true, however, it is hard to see how a little self-irony is going to overpower Horace's basic portrayal of the Stoics in general as going over the deep end.

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<sup>280</sup> He is loquacious, insolent, gluttonous, thieving, sexually coarse, lazy. He even uses words that are typical of comedy such as *ausculto*, *narra*, *furcifer*. Muecke *Horace Satires II* 212, Stace 64-77, Bradley *Slaves and Masters* 26ff.

### **Becoming Odysseus: The Consultation with Teiresias in *Sermo* 2.5**

Balancing the diatribes contained in *Sermones* 2.3 and 2.7 is the consultation of Teiresias in *Sermo* 2.5. My treatment here will appear comparatively brief for two simple reasons. My focus has largely been philosophical, and both 2.3 and 2.7 are meaty philosophical diatribes, full of interplay with larger philosophical themes, whereas the philosophical ideas in 2.5 are less overt, but once identified do not require elaborate explanation. Secondly, the unusual length of the third satire provides an added incentive to address it at comparatively suitable length. Horace himself does not appear in 2.5; the primary target of the satire is the violation of friendship represented in the form of legacy-hunting.<sup>281</sup> Odysseus has gone to consult Teiresias exactly as he did in book eleven of the *Odyssey*, but the entire tone of the Homeric passage is deflated when Teiresias advises Odysseus to give up his dreams in Ithaca and regain his fortune through the *captatio*.<sup>282</sup> Teiresias has managed to systematize this behavior into a set of precepts that could be taught, marking the poem with a clear didactic style.<sup>283</sup> Odysseus is initially stunned at such advice, and incredulously implores Teiresias onward in this humorously subversive Homeric scene. The alternation between the Greek and Roman

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<sup>281</sup> For general background on *Sermo* 2.5, see Roberts, Sallmann, and Zoccali. McGinn notes that Horace's point here is ethical rather than legal, and thus no real discussion of the law occurs in the context of this satire (84). On the general practice of the *captatio*, see Champlin "Why the Romans made Wills" 211ff. and *Final Judgments* 101-2, Corbier, Higuchi, Hopkins 238ff, Mansbach, Rudd *Satires of Horace* 224, and Tellegen. On the flatterer as a character, see Arist *Eth.Nic.* 1108.26, Theoph *Char* 2, Gnatho in Terence's *Eunuchus*, Cic. *Amic* 88-100, and Plut. *Mor* 48E ff.

<sup>282</sup> On the many treatments of Odysseus in literature, see W. B. Stanford.

<sup>283</sup> Cf. the didactic approach of *Catius* in 2.4.

world offers plenty of room for satiric humor, but also raises the question of how exactly we are to fashion this satire as appealing to insiders and outsiders (Ramage, *Roman Satirists and Their Satire* 79). Roberts' notion that we are intended to respond with *indignatio* to the advice of Teiresias presupposes that those practicing *captatio* are among the primary outsiders intended by the poem (426-33).<sup>284</sup> Moreover, Horace had his own problem with how to return to the game of high society post-Philippi, mirroring Odysseus' search here and leaving an eerie opening for hostile outsiders to potentially read the satire against him.<sup>285</sup> Certainly we could imagine that those practicing *captatio* or those advising others much like Teiresias might interpret the satire as a serious didactic piece, or respond to the advice seriously, without seeing any satiric humor or intent, but this group is so far removed from Horace and even most Romans that it is hardly the most interesting group of outsiders. In any event, that approach leads absolutely nowhere with regards to Horace's reading circle.

I see two deeper levels of criticism within the satire itself, one Epicurean and one Stoic. First, the practice of *captatio* depends upon a notion of abusing friendship for personal gain linking the poem here to the abusive bore in 1.9 who attempts to overpower Horace and act as his assistant for self-promotion within Maecenas' circle. The one

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<sup>284</sup> Lejay notes a sharp contrast between Horace's ironic tone and the serious indignation of Cicero, Seneca and Juvenal (482).

<sup>285</sup> Cf. Plaza 72-77 and Freudenburg, *Satires of Rome* 99.

engaged in *captatio* is a flatterer, one of the extremes with respect to friendship.<sup>286</sup> *Sermo* 2.5 then contrasts with the peaceful depiction of friendship within Maecenas' circle that Horace has already portrayed elsewhere in the first book of *Sermones*, and again with the depiction that follows at his Sabine farm in 2.6.

A second potential link is that Odysseus is one of the main mythological types of the Stoic sage. The plethora of possible depictions of Odysseus allows the Stoics to treat him as a model of courage, wisdom, and perseverance, though Horace uses no language typical of the depiction of the Stoic sage.<sup>287</sup> But this notion of Odysseus as the Stoic sage forms part of the intertextual matrix of possible meanings that would be available to an ancient audience, especially one as philosophically sophisticated as Horace's reading circle. Horace can exploit the mess of contradictory interpretations to taint the image of the Stoic sage with the more deviant image of Odysseus as trickster. In this sense, it is possible to read the Odysseus of our passage against all of the other possible ways that Odysseus could have been depicted. Indeed, we are not even sure whether to see criticism of Teiresias for offering such heinous advice, or criticism of Odysseus for naively failing to recognize that Teiresias is playfully teasing him through this odd banter (Langford 94 and Muecke, *Horace Satires II* 178). In either case, the Odysseus of our passage looks ridiculous when compared to the Stoic sage, characterized primarily by his

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<sup>286</sup> See especially Philodemus' *On Frank Speech* by Konstan et al., and Plutarch's *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend*. See also Engberg-Pedersen 61-82 (and other articles in Fitzgerald's *Friendship, Flattery and Frankness of Speech* more generally), and Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World*.

<sup>287</sup> Lejay 475-476. See Arnim III: 623, Stobaeus *Ecl.* 2.95.9. Plaza in contrast seems to understand the intertextual possibilities latent in the passage, and suggests Stoic *virtus* is formally attacked in verse 33.

long-suffering in the face of the many threats to his return home. A naïve Odysseus looks especially demeaning in the context of a reader-oriented satire, dramatizing within the passage the notion that the Stoics have failed to recognize when a clever funny trick has been foisted upon them.

### **Conclusion**

The preceding analysis has shown that despite some significant differences in the location and method of satire from the first book, the two consultations and the two Stoic diatribes remain satirically consistent with the satiric enterprise first expounded in the first book of satires. The philosophical and compositional preferences that dominated the first book of satires have not gone away, despite the significant change in style and structure. Instead, Horace's satire has morphed to articulate those themes in a new way, perhaps also reflecting the change in circumstances and elapsed time since the publication of the first book of *Sermones*. Although Horace's reading circle is less apparent, satiric receptions, particularly of the first book of the satires, are dramatized through Horace's interactions with the various characters. Trebatius' colorful dialogue is not the subject of direct criticism of the satire, but its occasion is the problems that may arise and possibly have arisen from the reception of Horace's previous book of satire. The two Stoic outsiders, Davus and Damasippus, find themselves ridiculously presented despite their pretensions to imitate and outdo Horace in his own brand of satire. Finally, the outlandish consultation of Teiresias and Odysseus features a double criticism of inappropriate social climbing and the abuse of friendship, so antithetical to Horace's own

preferences and those of his reading circle. More subtly, this satire undercuts the presentation of Odysseus as an archetype of the Stoic sage by presenting him as failing to live up to the Stoic ideals of the sage. This consistent thread of anti-Stoicism is prominent throughout the second book, marking these Stoics off as outsiders to the circle of Horace, and reinforcing their own Epicurean camaraderie in the face of criticism of their poetic output.

## Chapter 5: The “Food” Satires

### Introduction to Food and Dining in Satire

The four remaining satires in Horace’s second book, 2.2, 2.4, 2.6, and 2.8, include food and/or dining as a topic of major interest within the course of the satire. Ofellus in 2.2 offers us a diatribe that promotes steering a middle path between meanness and tasteless extravagance in our eating. Then we encounter Catus as he obsessively rattles off some recipes from the recent lecture of an epicure. The famous and well-loved 2.6 weaves into its tapestry the pleasant meal among friends at Horace’s Sabine farm and then reflects on two contrasting meals that the city and country mouse share at each other’s respective places of residence. Horace concludes his work by detailing the dinner party of Nasidienus, at which he was not present, where the host’s obsessions with minutiae turn into disasters and the guests, Horace’s friends, eventually leave the unusual feast and its unusual host. Each of these poems offers considerable difficulty to scholars; each has prompted numerous interpretations which disagree with each other not merely on minor issues, but major ones as well; and several have prompted considerable criticism from scholars as among the worst of Horace’s entire collection.<sup>288</sup> Even the much praised 2.6 still poses a major difficulty in understanding how the poem can even be conceived as satire. Most frequently, it is simply enjoyed as a beautiful work of

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<sup>288</sup> Fraenkel only treats 2.1 and 2.6 in his *Horace*, arguing that the poems deviate too far from the recipe for satire that made the first book a success. Rudd’s *Satires of Horace* also takes a dim view of Horace’s development in the second book.

poetry.<sup>289</sup> Lurking behind many of these aesthetic appraisals is the difficulty in appraising and appreciating the treatment of food. Generations of readers have felt more comfortable in the first book of satires where they can appreciate the general human foibles. Because many of these foibles are still present in those around us today, the first book of satires has an impressive ability to reinvent itself as excellent poetry to a new culture in a new place and time. Such is not the case with those elements in the satires that represent more specific Roman cultural constructions. Food (and dining) is one such element.

That food should be an important topic to Roman satire is most manifest in the derivation of the term *satira*, which conveys the basic idea of sausage, a food stuffed full of all kinds of scraps and pieces from everything else.<sup>290</sup> All aspects of the consumption and enjoyment of food form the critical subject matter of satire. Recipes for food are recipes for satire; the right way to present and consume food also stands as a metaphor

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<sup>289</sup> Representative are the monumental efforts of Brink (*On Reading a Horatian Satire*) and West (“Of Mice and Men”), both of whom excellently treat the complex interplay of poetic motifs in the poem and even suggest some broader connections to the rest of the satires, but offer little in the way of how the poem functions satirically.

<sup>290</sup> Van Rooy’s *Studies in Classical Satire and Related Theory* has the most extensive discussion on the etymology of satire. See also Gower’s discussion of the possible perceptions available to the Romans (*The Loaded Table* 166ff). Gower’s work remains one of the most important to treat food systematically throughout the Roman world. She devotes an entire chapter (109-219) to food as depicted in Roman satire with some overlap with comedy, especially emphasizing the deformed and grotesque in the representations to food (121). She devotes significant analysis (126-179) to the treatment of food in Horace emphasizing somewhat interestingly along the lines of my own proposed theory that food in the second book has become an instrument of power and exclusion (131). She does argue that Horace has rejected all the philosophies of living he has encountered, with the resultant message in the second book that he can find no socially compatible dinner partner (132). My analysis offers a more nuanced view of Epicurean simplicity of living throughout the second book of *Sermones* in the light of looser, less Lucretian and therefore less “fundamentalist Epicurean” viewpoint of Horace’s inner circle.

for the right way to carry out satire. Throughout the second book Horace meditates on the meaning of the two most frequent words used to describe satire, the basic word *satira* itself, which refers to stuffed foods, and the more general *sermo*, which carries the idea of conversation. Food and conversation are mixed together throughout the book. Horace does not merely seek a mean between mean and stingy food; nor does he merely seek appropriate balance in matters of conversation. He also seeks the appropriate balance between food and conversation itself, so that we do not experience meals that are entirely about the food but with little conversation, nor meals that are entirely about the conversation but with no appropriate food. Characters like Damasippus talk too much and not in the spirit appropriate for a dinner party. Catius talks far less than Damasippus but exclusively about food itself, to the detriment of more friendly dinner conversation. Meanwhile Horace serves dinner at the Sabine farm that is distinctly not worth conversing about; it is purely nourishing, with notable parallels to Ofellus' simple diet. Then Nasidienus closes out the book with a dinner served from the Catius cookbook. The dinner setting brings all these elements of satire together.

Nothing is more basic in any culture than the consumption of food, and few subjects are more carefully encoded and laden with hidden cultural meaning than all aspects of the consumption of food.<sup>291</sup> In a series of satires where food is a critical subject, nothing inhibits our reading of the satire more than the fact that we simply no

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<sup>291</sup> See Bradley, "Roman Family" 36, and White, "Regulating Fellowship" 178 for an explicit articulation of this point. More generally useful are Beer's *Taste and Taboo* and Garnsey's *Food in Classical Antiquity*, and Dalby's *Empire of Pleasures*.

longer share the same set of cultural prescriptions that would have been obvious to Horace and his readers. This is even more the case when some of those cultural prescriptions are not fixed but under debate.<sup>292</sup> Our own scholarly readings of these satires, specifically when they focus on the topic of food, frame us most completely as outsiders to the text, bound to miss the most important nuances and much of how the text operates as a performative entity, engaging in debates in its own present that are none too settled. I cannot hope to rectify this completely in this chapter. Despite our best scholarly efforts, I remain fully convinced that we will remain a considerable distance from Horace's reading circle or any of the possible contemporary audience on the appraisal of food and dining. But since this dissertation is focused more upon the philosophical leanings of Horace's closest friends and the privileging of Epicurean ideas within their reading frame, I can hope to explore how these various satires use food and dining to frame Epicurean ideas positively and sometimes even criticize certain Epicureans for their misinterpretation of Epicurus' precepts and their excess in handling food. The outsiders that Horace targets need not always be the Stoics that we saw in 2.3 and 2.7 and frequently in the first book of satires. They need not even be the more traditional scum that all of society might expect to ridicule. Epicureans had a particular interest, both social and philosophical, in their dinners. Thus Horace as a satirist gains credibility by showing a willingness to criticize even those from his own camp who carry those teachings to an extreme. As I shall show, by including some Epicureans among

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<sup>292</sup> The *tour-de-force* on this point for Classical studies is, of course, Davidson's *Courtesans and Fishcakes*, as articulated significantly for our own study in the prologue and chapter one.

those ridiculed within his satiric discourse, Horace acts defensively (S. 2.1.40-41) in separating himself and his more enlightened peers within Maecenas' literary circle from the less enlightened followers of Epicurus who have overemphasized his teachings on food.

I will first survey the basic content of the satire before turning to the typical scholarly appraisals. I will then re-examine the satire from the perspective of how Horace's own reading circle might use biased-message processing to read a privileged set of Epicurean ideas and capture Swift's notion of satire as friends laughing in a corner at the expense of many outside targets.<sup>293</sup>

### *Sermo 2.2*

The ancient audiences of Horace, upon completing 2.1 and 2.2 in sequence, were likely to be struck by both the sharp continuity and the not-so-subtle differences between them and the first book of satires. I include both the insiders and outsiders in this evaluation because I see these features as fairly basic and inherent in the text. It is what the audience does with this set of features that determines their status as insiders and outsiders. This ultimately depends upon how many poetic, philosophical, aesthetic, political, and culinary beliefs they share with Horace and others in Maecenas' company and whether they would even grasp the significance of the collocation of these ideas within the satire itself. *Sermones* I opened with three diatribe satires, and the fourth programmatic satire continues to share features with the diatribe as Freudenburg has

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<sup>293</sup> On biased-message processing, see LaMarre, Landreville and Beam, discussed in chapter one.

shown (*Walking Muse*). Although the audience has already gotten a “different” kind of a satire in the programmatic 2.1, they may sense that they are on more comfortable ground in 2.2, a diatribe of sorts where Horace once again speaks as himself, just as he did throughout much of the first book. The first book acts as a foil, creating a set of expectations about what Horace might do that he can play against as he develops the second book into an entirely new entree. The theme of 2.2 is clearly articulated in the first verse: *quae virtus et quanta, boni, sit vivere parvo...* “What a virtue and how great a virtue there is in living on little.” This is already different from the first three satires of the first book, where the theme was delayed for nearly twenty lines. It signals directly the philosophical nature of the satires, much as the original diatribe satires provided philosophical moralizing. Horace, however, immediately distances himself from this apparent moralizing in the second line by attributing the thoughts to a country farmer named Ofellus. Horace claims to know him from his younger days (2.2.111), a fact that only becomes clear at the end of the satire, where we discover that Ofellus now works as a tenant farmer on the land he once owned. Ofellus’ personal history may also reflect the history of many in the region of Apulia, including Horace, of being displaced from their land during the social wars.<sup>294</sup> This tiny detail reinforces the dominant message of the satire by showing that Ofellus is not a mere peddler of popular philosophy but one who has been forced to live his message.

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<sup>294</sup> Horace’s loss of his Father’s farm may have come after Philippi, but given the time period in Horace’s youth Ofellus may easily have been indentured in the same social circumstances that resulted in Horace’s father becoming first a slave and then a freedman. See Armstrong “Horatius: Eques et Scriba” and “Biographical and Social Foundations,” and Williams “Libertino Patre Natus.”

Scholars have presented numerous and contradictory interpretations of this satire. The key question is in discerning the relationship between Horace and Ofellus. The difficulty is immediately present at the start of the poem where Horace distances himself (or does he?) from Ofellus: *nec meus hic sermo est, sed quae praecepit Ofellus//rusticus, abnormis sapiens crassaque Minerva*,...“This is not my speech, but what Ofellus taught, that rustic and what an unusual philosopher, of homespun wisdom.” Does Horace mean to endorse the message of Ofellus? Or is Ofellus a kind of ridiculous figure whose message we are meant to ridicule and ultimately reject? How readers answer those questions depends mainly upon their pre-existing biases toward Horace and the material in question.

While the formula in verse two may provide Horace a way of distancing himself from the material, there is no clear certainty that any particular audience is going to interpret in precisely that fashion. Parallels have long been noted between Horace’s second book of satires and the Platonic dialogues, and in particular to the complex distancing formulas that appear in the *Symposium* (Anderson, *Essays* 42ff). Horace is the “Roman Socrates,” closer to Plato in book two, while the satirist of book one, Anderson deems closer to Xenophon (42). Anderson then likens 2.2 to the *Symposium*, and 2.4 to the *Phaedrus* (44-46). Freudenburg even echoes these comparisons, noting the complex narratological and Platonic complexity of 2.2 along with a parody of the Phaedrus in 2.4 and the *Symposium* in 2.8 (*Satires of Rome* 111, 116). The relationship of Horace to Ofellus, as Freudenburg notes, is just as complex as that of Socrates to Diotima in the

*Symposium*, the closest dialogue in parallel to 2.2 (*Satires of Rome* 112). Narratological traps are unavoidable and confounding; and Freudenburg correctly notes that the layering is so deep that we forget which layer we are in. Thus we slip into hearing what one of the other various layers of narrators happens to be saying without noticing what particular layer we happen to be on. A reader must concentrate to maintain awareness of the present narrative layers (*Satires of Rome* 111). Speakers blur together. Horace the satirist and Ofellus merge in this respect. The audience determines whether they want to preserve a stronger separation between Horace and Ofellus, or whether they will permit that merger, much as they decide when and where they will permit Horace the satirist and Horace the historical figure to merge, and when they will accept a more stringent separation and differentiation.

In my own satiric theory, narrative tricks such as this are useful for generating the satiric effect of separating insiders from outsiders. Some of the audience is supposed to forget about what narrative layer they are in as the poem progresses. We can never know how Plato or Horace relates to the ideas he has his characters consider, and attempting to filter them out is a notoriously difficult and perhaps misleading problem. As readers, we make choices regardless of the difficulty, in full conformity with pre-conceived ideas about how we are supposed to relate to the author, and how we think his satire is supposed to work.

Scholarly reception of this satire has shifted in several directions as a result of this confusing twist of narrator. Anderson (*Essays on Roman Satire* 44) sees Ofellus as the

target of the satire for his excessive zeal. Rudd (*Satires of Horace* 71) sees it as a feeble attempt at satire, though Muecke (*Horace Satire II* 114) disagrees that such an evaluation is necessary.<sup>295</sup> Instead, and in contrast to Anderson, she sees the main point as “the revelation that the wisdom of a Socrates, seen as the founder of Hellenistic ethics, can actually be lived by an Italian farmer” (115). Horace may present us with some narrative confusion much like Plato, but he ultimately remains the one holding the pen, and this offers him the advantage of being able to say and unsay something at the same time, a strategy which Freudenburg sees as generating minimal risk.<sup>296</sup>

Perhaps the most direct evidence for interpreting Ofellus as a target of ridicule comes from his characterization. Early critics see an inconsistency in having an Italian farmer spout Greek philosophical tenets.<sup>297</sup> Bond draws the conclusion that Horace intends to criticize Ofellus through this inconsistency (“Characterization of Ofellus” 117). In particular, she focuses on lines 2-3, noting correctly that the impression that Ofellus makes on us here determines our attitude later. *Rusticus* is not normally a positive word, especially given the urbanity of the city where satire finds its home and the

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<sup>295</sup> Rudd seems more intent on appraising the overall value of Horace. I have no doubt that many readers have enjoyed these satires much less than book one, but Rudd seems to impose the literary standards and tastes of his time in evaluating the quality of Horace’s satires and his expectations seem to prevent him from even understanding what Horace is attempting to accomplish. Perhaps he also did not even notice the complexity of reactions to satiric discourse in his own contemporary community.

<sup>296</sup> *Satires of Rome* 112. Though the kind of strategy that Freudenburg alleges for Horace here does not seem to work out very well for Ovid, who in the second *Tristia* argues that he cannot be held responsible for what readers do with his texts. Apparently he can. We might see a contrast with the safety of Horace in his relationship to Octavian through Maecenas in S. 2.1, and the later Ovid.

<sup>297</sup> Lejay 311-327. Rudd, *Satires of Horace* 171. Fiske 156. Coffey 83. Bond notes that none of these authors draw any conclusions from this apparent inconsistency, and rebuffs Bowie 1959: 85 who attributes the inconsistency to the ineptitude of the poet (“Characterization of Ofellus” 112).

overall sophistication of the Roman upper class. *Abnormis* only appears here in Classical Latin and we might curiously wonder whether it, too, was meant to create a negative impression. *Crassus* also suggests the dullness and stupidity of Ofellus. That characterization may be true but the reader is also measuring that characterization against new information and constantly reevaluates prior thoughts. The ironic and incongruous juxtaposition of these negative adjectives with *sapiens* ought to raise questions of the reader concerning Ofellus. The adjective/noun combinations might perhaps suggest that Ofellus is unexpectedly philosophical and crassly wise, and therefore an appropriate person to be spouting off the wisdom that follows. Moreover, Ofellus' status as a tenant farmer suggest that although he is poorer than he was, he is not completely destitute. He does occupy a kind of Epicurean middle ground in his present station of life. Moreover, as a tenant farmer, he is parallel to the neighbors that visit Horace in 2.6 for philosophical conversation.

Although directly positive or negative evaluations have often driven previous interpretation, Horace uses this incongruity to exploit different audience responses. Outsiders are quick to jump to one interpretation or the other, and in turn, allow that position on Ofellus to guide their interpretation of the rest of the work. The wise reader of satire perhaps remains baffled until new information comes. Satire, by its very nature, forces us to reconsider our initial impressions. Much humor in satire depends just upon such ironic incongruous juxtaposition. Although Ofellus may be a country tenant farmer, he is also a philosophical sage bringing finely wrought Greek wisdom. Both words are

operative in the introduction and the effect is comical. The tenant farmer is even using philosophy to justify his own, inherently mean/frugal state. The overall message of the poem is fairly commonsensical and easy to embrace. If what follows is a bumbling narrative that undercuts its principal message, that is not at all apparent. Instead, we find an exquisite and sophisticated exposition of fine philosophical principles. The incongruity is between the background and characterization of Ofellus and the philosophical precepts which he offers, and which Horace, holding the pen, actually seems to embrace. Humor's ambiguity offers the reader the chance to make a choice about how critically to read Horace's attitude toward Ofellus.<sup>298</sup> Do we merely get a good laugh at verse two, or at least a smirk at the clever juxtaposition of terminology? Or do we read the characterization of Ofellus in verse two as controlling how we respond to all of the material that he presents and therefore determining how the author imagines that we might respond to his text? Humor's ambiguity leaves room for both possible interpretations and therefore for the satiric effect as I outlined in chapter one to operate between insider and outsider audiences. The knowing hearer/reader now knows also to watch for further hints and cues.

An Epicurean perspective predominates throughout, and previous scholarship has already established its presence. Epicurus' *Letter to Menoeceus* (*Ep* 3.130-1) introduces five points from which Horace draws to flesh out his own satire (*S.* 2.2.9-21, 71-77, 80-

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<sup>298</sup> Humor's ambiguity in Horatian satire is the central theme of Plaza.

81, 82-88, 107-11).<sup>299</sup> None of this would have been obscure to an Epicurean, especially those in Horace's inner circle. It is not likely that they would see Epicureanism as the principal butt of the joke even if the particular source of the utterance (Ofellus) is potentially suspect. It is additionally less clear how much direct criticism of Ofellus they would perceive. Ofellus may be from the lower strata of society, but his peculiar position of being a tenant farmer who has lost ownership of the ground that he farms also puts the audience in a position of sympathy toward him. Moreover, it also makes him more credible in his attainment of *ataraxia* despite suffering hardship. This natural sympathy makes the entire speech that Horace relates all the more persuasive and endearing. The principal targets are namely those who cannot live like Ofellus in the face of uncertainty and shifting fortunes, against which Epicurean simplicity is capable of buttressing our lives.<sup>300</sup> The fact that Ofellus may not be the spitting image of perfection actually places him parallel to Horace's own *persona*, who was quite up-front in the first book of satires in admitting his defects as something lesser and trivial, which could be forgiven, thus garnering our sympathy and increasing our susceptibility to his satiric message.

This important appraisal of the ambiguity inherent within humor and within any satiric *persona* is shared throughout with the other key satirical figures of the second

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<sup>299</sup> Muecke (*Horace Satires II* 115) also notes Plutarch's *Advice about Keeping Well*, Cic. *Fin* 2.90, *Tusc.* 5.89-100 echoing Lejay 314-6. See Diog. Laert. 10.131.

<sup>300</sup> A useful parallel is Cicero *Tusc* 3. One of the key philosophical concepts, the ideal of self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*), is shared by Stoics and Epicureans alike. Ofellus' simple life has prepared him to endure shifting fortunes, making him a symbol of this important virtue. His similarities are closer to the Epicureans than the Stoics, however. He does not represent intense self-denial, as he purports to be against the stingy diet as well. Instead, he aims to be satisfied only with what Epicurus sees as natural and necessary (*Ep.* 3.134)

book. Trebatius may interpret Horace's questions literally, providing the occasion for the satire and perhaps even provoking some audience laughter at his own expense. This hardly makes him ridiculous in the context of his entire presentation within the satire. Damasippus and Davus may be the most strongly ridiculed Stoic interlocutors, but Horace can certainly endorse their more general points about vice as fitting criticisms within satire as a moralizing discourse that targets vice. Ofellus may be the most exemplary case where over-emphasis on the *persona* has led us to misappraise the entirety of the satire, as if laughing at Ofellus is supposed to lead to us laughing at the kinds of things that he says. This reductionist reading of satire, where one important element assumes the central role, is to be avoided.

If the prominent and positive display of Epicurean philosophy seems to fit well with the Epicurean leanings of many within Horace's reading circle, we can reconsider the claims of Anderson, who sees the argument of the satire as leading both the satirist, and by extension us, to reject the "harsh ways of Ofellus" (*Essays* 44). What exactly about them makes them harsh? Much of it is just normal common sense living even if colored from an Epicurean perspective. That would be like rejecting some satirical figure in our own society for saying "eat your veggies." In the absence of the performative context of the satire and with only limited access to the social and cultural values that are attached to the appreciation and consumption of food, we must beware the danger of

simply imposing our own contemporary viewpoints about food upon the text itself.<sup>301</sup>

Perhaps today we might find the prescriptions of Ofellus harsh. As Horace relates the wisdom of Ofellus, he does treat the contemporary gourmet with much contempt (especially 2.2.23-52, 94-111) and we might be tempted to find his zeal excessive.

Perhaps some of the ancient audience would as well, particularly those who think of themselves as gourmets and those sympathetic to the viewpoints of the gourmets. The fact that conversation is even happening at all concerning matters of food and dining shows that the cultural values attached to them are not fixed, but rather fluid and open to negotiation. Fierce disagreement about such matters suggests that the culture as a whole is preoccupied on some level with concerns about how properly to dine and how to eat. In this respect, Horace's borrowing from Ofellus participates in those debates and stakes out a position that will necessarily exclude some as "outsiders" to the text. So perhaps some ancient readers would in fact view the satire much as Anderson has speculated. Yet this kind of interpretation is permitted under my larger umbrella of how outsiders may view the satire. To interpret the entire satire in precisely this fashion is to miss a portion, perhaps even a significant portion of what the satire (or any satire for that matter) is accomplishing.

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<sup>301</sup> As avid readers of literary theory are well aware, we always do this at least a little bit, since no such thing as pure objectivity exists, and we always view a text somewhat through the constraints of our historical and cultural situation. This is frequently a strength when it enables us to see and expose new meanings in the text for the enjoyment of others. It can also be a detriment when we are seeking what the language might have meant to its first audience, and what effects the textual strategy might have had on them, and this is frequently our goal.

Anderson's interpretation is also revealing for one other aspect: our tendency as quite distant readers to align ourselves with the satirist in some fashion and to see ourselves as laughing at whatever we imagine him to be laughing at. "...it soon becomes apparent that *neither he nor we* can fully accept the harsh ways of Ofellus" (*Essays* 44, emphasis mine). After coming through a full book with Horace and being reintroduced to his satire in the first satire of the second book, perhaps we find ourselves tempted to side with Horace himself. We imagine him comfortably as our close buddy laughing at all those ridiculous figures that surely existed in his day and may have parallels in our own without recognizing that our own misinterpretation may have in fact made us a butt of the joke. Just as Horace took great care in the first book of *Sermones* to lock the outsiders out of the juicy details of his life, constantly teasing us with banal and trivial information in the face of contexts such as 1.5 where important political ramifications are at stake, Horace further cements that tendency here in the second book. In fact, Horace carries that project even further, for by focusing on the banal aspects of food and dining and by creating new speakers and distancing figures such as Ofellus, Horace retreats even further from the dangers of offering up too much information.

Perhaps we also detect a tendency in the scholarship to focus too much on Ofellus and not enough on Horace. Unlike 2.3 and, as we shall see, 2.4, where the words are fitted very carefully to the mouth of the respective speakers, Damasippus and Catius, Horace merely attributes the material to Ofellus without shaping any of the material as if Ofellus himself were speaking. The substance of the satire may have derived at one point

from Ofellus, but the articulation and organization belong to Horace himself. Our satirist then seems to endorse the material here and embraces the character of Ofellus. In the grand scheme of the entire book of satires, 2.2 contrasts most strongly with 2.4 and 2.8, while finding some parallels in the more positive 2.6. The kind of meal that Ofellus proposes as the right one is exactly the kind of meal that leads to the elegant conversation at Horace's Sabine farm. And this again suggests to us a positive recommendation of the material here in 2.2.

A further dimension of the satire is the degree to which the presentation of the position on food and dining reflects Horace's own struggle to maintain balance within his satires. As we saw in 2.1, Horace appears to have gotten criticism from those on either extreme, and his consultation with Trebatius at least pretends concern about what political and civil pains might bring him. Ofellus' fortitude in the face of disaster seems to parallel one possible future that Horace faces. Despite Octavian's victory at the battle of Actium, the memories and tensions over two decades of political turmoil, lost farms such as Horace's own following Philippi, proscriptions, and other similarly horrible outcomes were certainly not lost on Horace.<sup>302</sup> Although he enjoyed a prized position next to Maecenas and ultimately Octavian, it would be quite some time before the world was stable enough for Horace to relax, as he seems to have done by the time he published the fourth book of *Odes* in 13 BCE. Ofellus' fortitude is a model for Horace, and his method of maintaining a lean, but not stingy diet is also a recipe for the lean, modest style

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<sup>302</sup> Cf. Suetonius' *Life of Horace* for the basic outline of these events, and even Horace's own narration of some of them in the *Epistle to Florus*.

that Horace employs throughout his satires, not appearing to give too much offense, but neither engaging in frequent and unnecessarily harsh criticism with the most important political figures of his day.<sup>303</sup> His rejection of bloated and ornamental food is also a rejection of satire with too much embellishment, such as Damasippus' bombastic presentation in 2.3. He rejects the superficial notion that satire is good simply because there is more of it. Likeminded insiders who understand Horace's literary aesthetic see a lean recipe of satiric composition that can ultimately offer good health (2.2.71), whereas a poor mix of ingredients can lead one into quite poor health. Health may be a stand-in for the quality of one's life outside of the satires; a poor mix of satiric ingredients could quickly find Horace's own circumstances reversed. Insiders who know something of the aesthetic balance that Horace seeks to achieve can see these points and appreciate the ways in which the aesthetic arguments about the nature of satire that Horace has carried in the programmatic satires of the first book and in the programmatic 2.1 are then reinforced and demonstrated in his subsequent poems.

The ultimate danger in the second book of satires is in aligning us too closely with the satirist and too quickly expecting ridicule of direct outsiders. Anderson has gotten right the notion that Horace's satire moves in a more Socratic/Platonic direction in the second book of satires, using irony obliquely to criticize vice in poems such as 2.2, and inviting the reader to engage in more self-examination.<sup>304</sup> The criticism in 2.2 is indirect

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<sup>303</sup> Cf. H.J. Mette "'Genus Tenue' and 'mensa tenuis' bei Horaz."

<sup>304</sup> I see David Sider's discussion of Philodemus' epigrams, "How to Commit Philosophy Obliquely," as providing a distinct parallel between Horace and Philodemus.

and requires more playful attention to the overall structure of the poem and the possible positions on philosophical, aesthetic and culinary matters available to potential audience members. Nevertheless, Horace's use of irony to veil his criticism may in fact have additional roots in Philodemian Epicureanism. Finding the mean between two extremes on any matter is not easy, as even a casual reading of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* reveals what difficulty Aristotle saw in holding to his own prescribed middle course. In this respect, Ofellus' diatribe (ultimately delivered by Horace) can appeal to everyone. Horace's sympathetic and enlightened Epicurean friends can nod knowingly. Despite his rusticity, Ofellus is "wise" (*sapiens*) precisely because he offers a middle course between the extreme pretentiousness of Nasidienus or the extreme obsession of a Cadius on the one side, and the extreme austerity of the Stoics, who think you have to avoid all kinds of foods at all times in order to buttress yourself against the whims of fortune.<sup>305</sup> This allows the Epicureans a degree of pleasure so long as they avoid the excesses of the gourmets.

Perhaps even a tinge of Epicurean frank criticism lies behind Horace's words. What might a rich Epicurean such as Piso or Maecenas think of Ofellus? Departing from the middle course for extravagant dining is altogether too easy when you possess great wealth and you entertain guests as part of your station in society. Horace's use of Ofellus is not without this subtle snare. In true Socratic fashion, perhaps a few outsiders can conduct the self-examination that the satire invites and which is necessary to find the

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<sup>305</sup> Horace has little to say about Stoic austerity concerning food. I see the various possible attitudes toward the consumption of food as very much part of the intertextual matrix within the minds of ancient audiences.

middle course. More distant outsiders casually dismiss the advice, particularly if they hold no stake in the cultural debate about philosophy and dining. Just as Swift characterized satire as a mirror in which people see every face but their own, the casual outsiders who fail to know themselves through self-examination glibly toss the advice aside, “That does not apply to me.” Two other kinds of outsiders receive the main brunt of satiric criticism, acting as extremes on either side of the path that Ofellus and Horace walk. Gourmets can implicate themselves by responding “seriously” to the satire in some fashion. Rather than seeing the architecture of a poem that invites ridicule, they see a serious argument that requires serious rebuttal, just as they might rebut a philosopher on the street with whom they disagreed. They come in for direct criticism through Ofellus/Horace, and even Stoic outsiders can see and agree upon the correctness of criticizing them. A Stoic outsider may object to the way that Horace/Ofellus allows for at least some pleasure in dining, yet they in turn are implicitly criticized when Ofellus distinctly separates the stingy diet from his lean diet (53-69).<sup>306</sup> Those who differ from Horace on aesthetic or compositional grounds may see this poem making no strong criticisms, offering yet another pathway to outsider interpretation and ridicule.<sup>307</sup>

*Sermo* 2.2 inaugurates the serious discussion of culinary practices that will pervade half of the second book of satires, conditioning at least some of the audience’s

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<sup>306</sup> Epicurean discourse on riches and poverty is always distinguished between the merely poor but respectable (πένης, *pauper*, πενία, *paupertas*) and the miserably poor (πτωχός, *egens*, πτωχεία, *egestas*). The former is fine. The latter is like being sick, endurable but bad.

<sup>307</sup> Damasippus himself may represent one such figure who offers a more direct criticism that is Stoic, Lucilian, harsh, and verbose, and in contrast to the shorter and more simple 2.2 that Horace has interwoven subtly into the tapestry of book two.

responses to the satires that follow. After the presentation of Ofellus/Horace, how could any sane author think that extravagant dining is satisfactory? Yet that is exactly what we find not once but twice in future satires.

### Sermo 2.4

Horace has taken us from the programmatic consultation with Trebatius into the sympathetic and commonsensical philosophy of Horace/Ofellus, and from there into the radically enthusiastic ramblings of the Stoic convert Damasippus. We have met a dizzying array of characters, all of them with some faults, and all offering different solutions to the ills of society. S. 2.4 introduces yet another new character, Catius, and his finely spun recipes, as if to prompt in response to 2.2, “But who can live without fine dining?” The criticism is more direct and easier to access, as Catius and his misplaced enthusiasm receive harsher treatment and Horace’s tone is clear throughout. Horace catches Catius at a bad time, as he is rushing home from a lecture. His enthusiasm is readily apparent from the beginning: he alleges that his own precepts will outdo Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato. Such a boast raises our expectations for a profound display of philosophical erudition, especially after encountering the windbag Damasippus and his Stoicism, and seeing Horace/Ofellus’ homespun Epicureanism. Catius is in a hurry to write the precepts down before he loses them from memory.<sup>308</sup> The source of the *praecepta* is kept concealed, and we may see this feature functioning at a double level: Catius himself within the rhetoric of the poem takes care to protect his source; then

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<sup>308</sup> We might also see a parody of the *Phaedrus* here, which makes the argument that writing is derivative and of secondary importance to the proper spoken speech.

on a second level, Horace the architect places these lines prominently early in the poem. We may strongly suspect that the real identity, whether a specific individual or several individuals who are represented by type, was fairly obvious to Horace's contemporaries, especially those in his inner reading circle.

Starting in line 11, Catius bursts into his memorized discourse of finely spun recipes, confounding any expectations of erudite philosophy. The recipes themselves seem to be a mixture of ordinary, hardly impressive recipes with more bizarre concoctions of the "expert."<sup>309</sup> Since much humor rises from incongruity, the juxtaposition of these must surely have provided a good laugh to many of the original audience. Horace's own ironic prodding of Catius is an important clue that we are to take Catius as a ridiculous figure.

Catius then offers some direct contrasts with our earlier appraisal of Ofellus. Although I accept the scholarly consensus that Catius is mocked in the course of 2.4, I had earlier suggested that scholarly interpretation of the poem mockery of Ofellus seemed to rely on an overemphasis of the *persona*. Perhaps the key point of contrast is seen in the fact that Ofellus is from the lower strata of society, and Horace had set us up in the opening lines to expect something far less sophisticated than what we discovered. Catius is utterly convinced that he can outdo Pythagoras and Plato, yet offers mere trifles on cooking. In the former case, a lower character is ennobled and enlarged through what

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<sup>309</sup> Anderson notes that the recipes do not violate good taste (*Essays*, 45). Lejay notes consistently that none of the foods described are imported, making them simple yet elegant (456-473). Muscles and shellfish (2.4.28), for example, are inexpensive and grown all over (Muecke, *Horace Satires* II 171).

he says. In the latter, a boastful character is brought low. This is reinforced through the fact that Catus is unaware of how absurd he sounds, and the character Horace within the poem goads him on into further embarrassment. When 2.4 concludes at 88-95 with Horace's own appraisal of Catus' teaching, we sense an ironic twist of insincere condescension as Horace makes a claim on their friendship and overeagerly and enthusiastically pretends that he is actually interested in the man's teaching. The content of Catus' speech is therefore a subject of ironic criticism. In contrast, 2.2 is spoken entirely by the character Horace and only at the end do we get the sense that Ofellus is speaking directly through Horace in 115-135 where he delivers the punchline. Although we are left with some undercutting of Ofellus' social status, at no point are we given the impression that the criticism extends to the message itself. In one satire then, the message seems to be endorsed by the character Horace, while in the other the message provokes subtle sneering. These contrasts are even more apparent when we consider the possibility of multiple audiences with their own biases and prejudices with respect to the characters and their messages.

S. 2.4 represents a new step in how Horace frames insiders and outsiders. First and most noteworthy, Catus appears to be an Epicurean. Early commentary on Horace's satires speculates that Catus may in fact have been the author of four books of Epicurean philosophy.<sup>310</sup> Catus' concepts and teachings are not, of course, the most central pivotal

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<sup>310</sup> The speculation stems from Porphyrio, which Classen has revived (343ff.). Identification of Catus is ultimately inconclusive. The evidence only provides us with possibilities, all of which have problems. Muecke cautions us that we need not accept the identification as the Catus who wrote four books of philosophy, and raises the more important point that the satire "indirectly parodies Epicureanism"

teachings of Epicurus. They are, however, perfectly compatible with Epicureanism and probably represent common misapplication and overemphasis of Epicurus' instruction concerning food.<sup>311</sup> Even if this identification is not exact, simply mentioning the name Catus creates a matrix of possibilities that includes this particular Epicurean Catus, adding to the Epicurean characterization of the main speaker. If we read 2.2 against 2.4, the contrasts become sharper as we see a criticism of a kind of naively superficial Epicureanism, one that overemphasizes food and which Horace sees as raising food to the level of serious philosophical discourse. Superficial Epicureans did not make it any easier for those who showed far more concern for living out the entirety of Epicurus' philosophy. Opponents of a creed typically do not care to make a distinction between the superficial and more enlightened practitioners of opposing viewpoints. Weak, naïve, superficial, and simply plain wrong fellow partisans are just as much a threat to one's beliefs as detractors because they open a door for criticism. Thus, Horace takes aim at such unenlightened Epicureans in the form of Catus.

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regardless (*Horace Satires II* 167). Another possibility is T. Catus, an Insubrian Gaul from Northern Italy who died in 46 or 45, though that possibility presents Horace satirizing a man long dead. A third possibility is C. Matus, on friendly terms with both Julius Caesar and Trebatius Testa, and a fourth is a gourmet mentioned by Columella in *Rust* 12.4.2 and 12.46.1. Naturally, we cannot exclude Rudd's possibility that Horace is using pseudonyms, but neither can we prove it (*Satires of Horace* 147). The evidence is inconclusive in my opinion, and I agree with Muecke above that the force of the satire against a particular kind of Epicurean excess is apparent regardless.

<sup>311</sup> Scholarly response to 2.4 has been more consistent, seeing Catus as a clear target of the satire. Classen concludes that Horace is warning his friends against misrepresentations of Epicurus' teaching ("Horace – A Cook?" 346-7). *Cic. Fam* 15.18.1 criticizes Cassius' philosophical choice of Epicureanism by calling it a philosophy of the kitchen. Opponents of Epicureanism persisted in misunderstanding its relationship to the table.

Potential outsiders to this satire include other groups of Epicureans, distinct from Horace's own group, plus the usual critics who find fault with all Epicureans. The sum effect of including Epicureans among the outsiders in this poem is that Horace's satiric *persona* seems more reasonable. Rather than being purely partisan, Horace's satiric *persona* criticizes others in the Epicurean camp who miss the most important central tenets. The effect is somewhat parallel to the examples we find of Horace poking fun at his minor defects in 1.3, which ingratiate us to the satirist as his personality appears much more fully human, humble, and realistic.

Horace's opening question identifies a certain Catius, and by the time Horace's question-and-answer session reaches verse ten, his inner circle of poet-friends are likely trained into his identity even if we are not. Catius' response in lines 1-3 clarifies the character of Catius as one with philosophical leanings. Memory, which Epicureans were quite skilled at and well known for, is emphasized first in the words of Catius as he struggles to "*ponere signa*," attach these notes to a memorizing device (Muecke, *Horace Satires II* 168, Lejay 457). He has not gotten them memorized yet, but realizing their importance, he wishes to work on them much as Epicurus instructed his followers in memorizing his *Kuria Doxai*. Horace reinforces this in his own ironic apology in lines 4-7, encouraging him that he will be able to remember these teachings even if he pauses right now to tell Horace. He even offers that Catius has an amazing ability to retain information, perhaps an aspect of the real Catius' character that was reasonably well known to Horace's first audience. Although the *auctor* is hidden in line 11, once the

audience is locked into some particular Cadius, his associates may also have been apparent.<sup>312</sup> These ironic clues help guide the reader in how to approach Cadius as a ridiculous figure, and we are well prepared when Cadius begins to elaborate upon the various meals and their preparations to be on the edge for the humor in them. The satire may even have taken on a personal feel among Horace's inner circle if they were familiar with Cadius, his master, and others who represent these teachings. If we consider that teaching about food reveals the enormous cultural complications and debates within a society, then it is entirely plausible that Horace's reading circle frequently encountered outsiders who promoted teachings quite similar to those and who found the dinner habits of those following them to be quite ridiculous, which might very well be represented in the thematically similar 2.8.

Outsiders to 2.4 include those who support the position of Cadius himself. Responding to the satire with a serious argumentative discourse would further cement them as a butt of the joke, failing to recognize that a different kind of discourse, namely satire, is happening. Equally noteworthy are those who do not necessarily share the position of a Cadius or his master on the matters of fine dining, but who are nevertheless distant from Horace and his circle, unaware of the debates themselves. They struggle to place the satire within the confines of Horace's satiric work; perhaps they hold to their Lucilian expectations of a harsh and bloated kind of satire; perhaps they expect that

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<sup>312</sup> Caston rightly identifies many of the recipes in 2.4 as reappearing in 2.8. This potentially makes Nasidienus the unnamed gourmand, or perhaps suggests that Nasidienus and Cadius share a common master. Whoever he was, he seems to be part of a dining tradition that Horace has chosen to satirize repeatedly throughout the food satires of book two.

Horace must surely have more important information to reveal about matters of state; or perhaps guided by the excellent first book of satires, they have come to expect something entirely different out of Horace and cannot let the second book be what it is. In this respect, 2.4 begins more from a position of straight out parody of Catus, in contrast to the presentation we received in 2.2 where Horace's relationship to Ofellus was more ambiguous. Underneath this more direct parody lies a potentially sharp satiric edge that more specifically engages those who stand against Horace's own recipe for satire. Freudenburg, for example, has already noticed how Catus carefully balances against Damasippus in the previous poem ("Verse-technique"). Whereas 2.3 is the longest poem in the entire satiric collection, 2.4 is the second shortest in book two (199). The bloated style of Damasippus contrasts with a neoteric style of Catus, who makes use of short pithy statements and frequent end stops (203). As Horace seeks the balanced mean, he presents two stylistically opposite characters, one who rambles excessively, and one who is much more abrupt but whose excessive preoccupation with food and dining makes him among those who found Horace's work to stretch beyond the limits (2.1.1-2). In fact, the satiric recipes of 2.3 and 2.4 seem to represent two different aspects of *sermo/satira* that Horace seeks to balance. Damasippus' presentation overemphasizes the conversational aspects, the *sermo*, what we might think of as the argument and moral point that drives satire against a target. Catus, meanwhile, is entirely about the foodstuffs. He has little to say about the quality of the conversation between friends. He comes from a one-sided lecture and has emphasized the precepts to such an extent that Horace notes that he forgot

to mention the man's appearance and expression (2.4.91-92) largely because he esteemed them of little value. This subtle barb may be indicative of some more important aspects of life and dining that Catus has forgotten, and in terms of compositional preferences, may suggest a correction to Catus' extreme style. By juxtaposing 2.3 and 2.4, Horace oscillates between the two extremes while parodying both recipes of satire.<sup>313</sup>

Those outsiders who deem Horace's poetry either too ferocious or too slack would be disappointed with Horace's presentation across these satires, if they could even recognize themselves as objects of satire. Perhaps some would even say, "I think that is how it should be done," a serious response based on their own failure to see the middle course that Horace is attempting to steer and the ironic presentation of both characters. Disappointment may, in fact, be one thing that marks the outsiders, compelling them (us?) to criticize the quality of Horace's poetry, or to criticize his loss of satirical talent. Catus, then, like many of the interlocutors in the satires, is a foil to our own outsider expectations. We may want some enemy of public importance, but we find ourselves confronted by Catus.

I conclude this section by noting that the secondary scholarship is in agreement in treating Catus as a kind of ridiculous interlocutor and equally in agreement that his overemphasis on food is the primary culprit, representing a kind of rare triumph of accord

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<sup>313</sup> An additional layer of ironic juxtaposition comes when we consider the study bag that Horace brings to the Sabine farm, as reported by Damasippus in 2.3. *Quorsum pertinuit stipare Platona Menandro, // Eupolin Archilochum, comites educere tantos.* Horace very explicitly says that Plato (dialogues) and Menander (New Comedy with lots of cooks and dinners) will form his model. Fraenkel, Classen, and others have already noted well the connection to Plato, while Ruth and Berg have made the comedic connection more explicit. Philosophy and food are thus incongruously mixed in a yet another truth-telling Horatian smirk.

for the scholarship of Horatian satire. I have built upon this reading by considering the performative context of multiple audiences, each with their own preconceived agendas that in turn frame how they might respond to the different aesthetic, ethical and satiric concerns expressed within 2.4 and its relations back to the previous food satire, 2.2, and its immediate predecessor 2.3. These preconceived ideas are a destabilizing agent amidst a network of relationships historically and culturally grounded in different societal opinions about what counts the most in life. S. 2.4 engages directly in debates about compositional practices and the appropriate way to write satire and on appropriate dining practices. Horace's inner circle of friends can grasp the compositional proclivities and recognize what Horace is in fact attempting to accomplish along with the general criticism of some excesses to which fellow Epicureans may, in fact, succumb. But the argument of the entire book is not yet completed; this is simply one tile in a mosaic that provides a contrast against which we can read what is perhaps Horace's most important food satire.

### **Sermo 2.6**

Perhaps the best received and most famous satire of the second book is the sixth satire. It was the only satire outside of 2.1 that Fraenkel bothered to treat, so negative was his view of everything else in the book (138ff). S. 2.6 is also among the most personal and intimate of the satires, as Horace thanks Maecenas for the gift of the Sabine farm and reveals his personal struggles with balancing the demands of his position in the city with his desire for the Epicurean *ataraxia* that the rural countryside provides for him,

including the leisure to pursue his own poetry. Equally memorable is the powerful retelling of one of Aesop's fables, the story of the city and country mice, as a conclusion to the satire. Readers have been quick over the years to proclaim the merits of the poem and to express delight at its content, but much of that praise depends more upon the allure of Horace's humility and the heartfelt depiction of the city and country mouse and less upon an appraisal of the work as satire.

One of the central questions that has never been solved adequately is, in fact, precisely how this poem works as a satire. Two of the most famous interpretations, those by D. West ("Of Mice and Men") and C.O. Brink (*On Reading*), focus extensively on interpreting the difficult 2.6 as a poem, but offer only a few ideas how the poem may act as a satire. These kinds of interpretations seem perfect if we want to remove 2.6 from the *Sermones* and slide it into place somewhere in the *Odes*. No doubt Horace has matured as a poet in the years between *Sermones* 1 and *Sermones* 2, as already we see him experimenting with a new genre, the *Epodes*, and it is conceivable that he has already tried his hand at some of the poems that would eventually form his collection of *Odes*.<sup>314</sup> It is a cop-out to speculate that Horace had to include this poem in the satires due to its meter. Horace was too talented for such a lazy approach to his content. Rather, Horace included the material in the satires because it fits thematically with the rest of the poems in the collection and because it contributes to his satiric mission in the second book. We might translate Ofellus' cookbook into the simple cheap paperback with black and white

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<sup>314</sup> Freudenburg ("Playing at") explores the tensions already expressed within Horace's satires as he looks beyond the Satires to new genres of literature, specifically the *Epodes*.

photos entitled *Epicurean Cooking for the Happy Farmer*, and a cover price of 4.95. Meanwhile, Catius' cookback (per Ruth and Berg) is [*Nasidienus*'] *Epicurean Le Fin Gourmand*, retailing for 39.95 with color photos. The former results in a country mouse dinner at the Sabine farm, while the later results in a city mouse dinner that causes its participants to run away. *Sermo* 2.6 is bridge that interconnects with the other satires on food throughout book two. In the final analysis, both West and Brink's readings have extensive merit, but a closer examination of the performative context and the way the complex web of meditations that form 2.6 might have played on the expectations of various audiences will illuminate how and why this poem functions as a satire within a collection of satirical poems.

Horace opens 2.6 with a fifteen line intimate prayer, thanking the gods for his Sabine farm. This heartfelt introduction sets the stage for the personal relationships that will follow throughout the rest of the poem and suggests connections to the other intimate satires of the first book, especially 1.6. If critics and outsiders were confused and disappointed about the content of the first few satires, then 2.6 is already nodding to the inside circle to expect more of the same here. The intimate prayer offers some satirical function as well, fitting nicely with the defensively minded Horace of the second book of satires, for the content of the prayer answers some potential moral objections. The gods have offered even better than Horace had prayed for (2.6.5), which creates the image of a Horace with modest expectations rather than a greedy grasping Horace who has used his relationships for personal advantage. Horace is content (4-5), and prays for nothing more

to Mercury, the god of business and therefore the appropriate god to petition if indeed he were interested in gaining more. These verses serve to refute potential criticisms of Horace that may come from jealous outsiders, just as Davus and Damasippus more directly represent external criticism, which our insider circle knows to be excessive.

Horace transitions out of his opening prayer in lines 16-17, meta-poetically calling attention to the fact that he is writing satirical literature, (*Quid prius illustrem satiris Musaque pedestri?*), but again his rejection of the first two potential topics, ambition and greed (2.6.18), suggests a defensive strategy on his part.<sup>315</sup> Although we might expect Horace to rail against such greed and ambition, the intrapersonal self-examination fits nicely with the Socratic allusions in the second book of satires and Horace's defensive posture, disavowing any criticism that his relationship with Maecenas is driven by a sense of personal gain, whether politically (ambition) or monetarily (greed). What Horace instead offers might be characterized as another of his so-called minor faults, consistent with his self-presentation in 1.3. Horace then closely contrasts the tensions between his city life (23-39), full of busy crowds and annoying people, and his country life where he can enjoy his Epicuran *ataraxia* among friends (60-76). Horace's life fails to match the perfect ideal, but at least it includes some key pleasures. I agree with West that the tensions between city and country within Horace are ultimately unresolved ("Of Mice and Men" 67-80). Horace cannot be the country mouse all of the time, no matter how much he might long for it, because he has duties and obligations to

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<sup>315</sup> Cf. Lucretius 2.11-14 on contending for nobility. To criticize the striving for place in society is very Epicurean. Conversely, Horace's defense reaction against such claims is also fitting.

Maecenas. In fact, this may not be clearly a bad thing for the Epicureans; as we saw in chapter two, a significant part of what it means to be Epicurean in Rome concerns the creation of a viable middle path between politics and duty to society on the one hand, and commitment to Epicurean *ataraxia* on the other. Thus, one of the goals is to discern how to retain that sense of *ataraxia* even while engaged in city life. By presenting this close personal self-examination, Horace invites any potential readers to perform the same kind of close personal self-examination. Hidden underneath this veneer of Socratic and Epicurean self-examination is a criticism of outsiders, those who fail to examine themselves and who are unwilling to know themselves. Some of these outsiders are those who miss the point of the philosophy, food and dining, and friendship, exploiting them for political gain while failing to see how they cohere into a lifestyle that promotes a public and balanced *ataraxia*. When they criticize Horace bluntly or fail to understand the significance of Horace's tight themes in 2.6, they implement themselves as objects of ridicule.

Several kinds of outsiders are dramatized in the course of 2.6. As Horace roams the streets of the city with his pedestrian muse, he inevitably encounters the citizens of Rome. He wrestles with the crowd (28) and even must injure the slow in the course of his duties. People curse at him for it, and moreover, he enjoys it (32). Horace illustrates the frustrations that the city brings him in lines 33-39 where he takes business requests. None of these outsiders are directly criticized. Line 40 begins the personal discussion, picking up where the meditations of 1.6 left off and informing us that seven to eight years

have passed since the events described in 1.6. The friendly relationship that Horace describes is typical of what we saw represented in 1.5, where Horace formally travelled with Maecenas to Tarentum. The trivial conversation that characterizes good friendship and not mere business acquaintance predominates, and more importantly, frustrates outsiders who desperately seek to use Horace to find out the affairs of the Roman state. In line 50, these outsiders confront Horace about the Dacians. In fact, Horace seems to dramatize potential responses to the first book of satires when he responds, “*nil equidem,*” and his imaginary interlocutor offers, “*ut tu semper eris derisor!*” (2.6.53-54). This outsider can find Horace funny as a satirist, but still be frustrated at the paucity of serious information.

Such relationships are a waste to Horace.<sup>316</sup> Thus in line 68 he wishes for his Sabine farm. The picture here shifts toward a controlled presentation of his inner circle. Food appears in 63-70, much of the modest sort recommended by Horace/Ofellus in 2.2. The meal that Horace serves at his Sabine farm, along with the two respective meals that the city and country mouse partake in are what leads me (and others) to classify this poem among the food satires. Food may not be mentioned from beginning to end in the same fashion as 2.2, 2.4, and 2.8, but it is central to the argument and structure of the satire. The primary focus is upon the conversation that arises, and in fact Horace uses the same nebulous word *sermo* that describes the genre of satire, suggesting a link between the dinner conversation and satire more generally. The conversation is not about

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<sup>316</sup> A good Epicurean does fulfill the duties as well as enjoys the pleasures of friendship.

the upper class competition associated with town houses, or those of low consequence such as Lepos, but relatively high-brow philosophy. What makes men happy, wealth or virtue? (74) What leads us to friendships, utility or rectitude? (75) What is the nature of goodness and its highest form? (76)<sup>317</sup> These are not merely second tier philosophical questions that an average passersby might have a casual acquaintance with; they are the very questions that divide the philosophical schools from each other. The formulation of the question is the Aristotelian definition picked up in turn by both the Stoics and Epicureans. Horace and his merry friends aim to fish the wisdom of the philosophical depths. The *fabellae* of line 78 reflects general moralizing common to philosophical discourse and thus they too are part of the philosophical banter that animates the conversation at Horace's dinner table.

Horace develops the conversation further by noting that his neighbor, Cervius, can add old fables that bear directly on these questions, again showing the kind of philosophical interconnectedness between the Roman countryside and Greek philosophy that we had previously seen in Ofellus. At the same time, Cervius is not really like Ofellus, as his *fabellae* are part of a learned philosophical discourse told through their moralizing *exempla*. The fables that Cervius narrates are *ex re*, which Muecke so excellently translates "to the point," (*Horaces Satires II 79*, cf. Lejay 534). Cervius is not just mindlessly rattling off stories that lack any moral coherence. On this occasion, Cervius' tale directly addresses yet another philosophical topos: "Is vast wealth really

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<sup>317</sup> Cf. Cicero's *De Finibus*, the proud fulcrum of ethics.

worth its attendant anxieties and evils? (79)” The use of *fabellas* in the plural (78), even though only one such tale fits the form, argument and purpose of 2.6, conveys the impression that these were repeat occurrences. Cervius could tell many such tales at other dinner parties as similar philosophical questions arose.

As we saw in 2.4 and as we will see in 2.8 shortly, at stake within the fable are two variants of Epicureanism. The country mouse can easily be recognized as the “privileged” mouse within the context of the story, the one with whom we seem most intended to identify, who recognizes in the end that some benefits are simply not worth the hassle that they bring and returns to the countryside content with his lot in life. Both mice can be recognized as Epicurean in some sense. The city mouse’s speech in lines 90-96 evokes Epicurean themes, noting that we earthly creatures are mortal and need to be mindful of that brief lifespan.<sup>318</sup> The city mouse seems particularly stuck on the pleasures of the stomach, a particular emphasis among the followers of Epicurus, but as we have seen with the treatment of Catius, also one that can easily slide out of balance. In my estimate, we get hardly enough of a picture of the city mouse to conclude that we are meant within the argument of the poem and the satires as a whole to take him as an excessive type like Catius. Rather, he is more the kind of Epicurean who knows how to navigate the city-life. In this respect, we might return to Roskam’s proposal that Epicureans use qualifying conditions to evaluate the balance of pleasure and pain, sometimes intentionally choosing paths that might seem on the surface to conflict with

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<sup>318</sup> See West’s more extensive discussion (“Of Mice and Men” 90-97).

preserving their *ataraxia*. It is the country-mouse that complains about being chased by the hounds, while the city mouse seems perfectly content to accept that risk. As anyone who owned dogs can attest, dogs are not exactly best at hunting mice. In fact, a dog is more likely to catch a mouse in an open field where there are fewer places to hide and where his superior speed can easily overtake the mouse, than in a house where a mouse can quite easily dart between small objects and escape.

The country mouse privileges the Epicurean *ataraxia* of the countryside in his concluding remarks. He rejects the banquet in the city precisely because the dogs provide too much of a scare (they are unfamiliar to him and he cannot quite recognize that they pose no serious problem) and thus disturb his *ataraxia*. The two mice then represent two potentially distinct Epicurean paths.

As other scholars have noted, the tension between city and countryside in the fable of the mice mirrors the earlier tensions within Horace himself (cf. West, “Of Mice and Men” and Brink, *On Reading*). He longs for his country estate but is tied up in business frequently in the city. The two mice are effectively parts of the personality of Horace that have been separated for dramatic effect (West, “Of Mice and Men” 105). The tension between city and country offers Horace a way to perform the golden mean once again. He is not a country mouse that can exclusively hide from the city; he likes it too much, even if there are some hassles (2.6.32). The company of Maecenas and the connections that these relationships bring are a pleasure that Horace refuses to give up. Meanwhile, Horace values his Sabine estate as a place of rest, relaxation, leisure and

poetic composition, where the more serious philosophical questions of life can be discussed. The city mouse fails to appreciate this. As a meditation, Horace offers that he is, in fact, the golden mean between the extremes offered by these two mice. By bringing together both perspectives, he is better able to maintain the complex and sometimes competing elements of Epicurean pleasure.

The food and conversation presented in 2.6 are presented as the satisfactory balance between the two metaphors of satire as “*satira/sausage*,” and “*sermo/conversation*.” Throughout the poem, balance is emphasized again. Horace’s parcel of land is just right (*non ita magnus*, 2.6.1); his garden produces basic foods (2.6.2); and his timberland is also modest (*paulum silvae*). His prayer then again reinforces the balance of keeping it the same size. The city and country are balanced in the presentation, as Horace moves from city business to country retreat and the city mouse and the country mouse travel back and forth. The meal at the farm is modest (62-70) and likewise the conversation arises (*sermo oritur*, 71) about the things that matter most in life. Although grand important topics are treated, Cervius’ fable (to the point, *ex re*) is suggestive of Horace’s own compositional predilection for using allusive resonance in the style of Callimachus to amplify, reinforce, and “saturate” his satiric verse with polyvalent yet deep meaning. *S.* 2.6 then dwells upon Horace’s own satirical balance over and against the excesses in the preceding four poems (2.2-2.5). Horace’s internal audience could certainly get and appreciate his own poetic aesthetics while outsiders merely find themselves led astray by one formal detail of the poem or another. To

dramatize those outsiders and to offer yet one more glaring portrait of their inconsistency and failure to recognize his poetry, Horace introduces Davus immediately on the heels of 2.6 listening at the door (2.7.1 *iamdudum ausculto*), who immediately accuses Horace of being a city mouse and therefore a hypocrite based on his recent lessons in Stoicism from Crispinus' doorman.

Additionally, 2.6 enlightens and reframes our interpretation of Ofellus in 2.2. Ofellus and the country mouse are both privileged in their respective discourses, not extreme objects of ridicule. Rather, in the meditative and self-reflective spirit of Socrates, we the audience are invited to contemplate the differences in situation between Horace himself and Ofellus. This is more than what Muecke notes in contrasting the two, where in 2.2 a farm is lost and in 2.6 a farm is gained (*Horace Satires II* 196). Although Ofellus had the fortitude to face the loss of his farm with happiness through homespun philosophical wisdom that includes important parallels to Epicureanism, and while he is held up as a model in this respect, it is still far better not to lose the farm in the first place, or to have some means of replacing it. Much like the country mouse who retreats from his friendship with the city mouse as he leaves the poem, Ofellus' naturally acquired beliefs mirror Epicureanism, but he is presented without any friends. Horace, Maecenas, and their cohort of friends stand in stark contrast to Ofellus; and although Horace the country mouse must endure the trials and hassles of the city, these friends prove critical in conferring on him a rural country estate in the Sabine country that could bring much peace to him.

Outsiders and critics of Horace are too locked into their own philosophical tenets, or too concerned about the politics and political relationships of the day, to tease out these nuances. By creating this elaborate poetical masterpiece where self-reflection is the order of the day and where the ideas that are privileged elsewhere in Horace's satires must necessarily come to the fore and aid the reader in interpreting the difficult tensions in the text, Horace necessarily locks up meaning for the select few: those that are either part of his close intimate circle or those willing to work extensively from within a similar intellectual framework. The two more virulent critics of Horace in the second book reflect the tension between city and country as well. Davus criticizes Horace the city mouse for hypocrisy at Rome, while Damasippus storms all the way out to the Sabine farm to criticize Horace the country mouse for idleness.<sup>319</sup> This is what truly makes 2.6 a satire and not merely an excellent piece of poetry. The meaning is textured, acquiring additional meaning within its place in the satires and through its interconnectedness to its neighboring satires. The satire meditates upon the difficulties of living a life of the fullest pleasure in a commitment to Epicurean *ataraxia* and is thus compatible with those larger philosophical questions that arise during the course of dinner conversation, or *sermo* (satire), at the table in the Sabine farm. The entirety of 2.6 is one such conversation, a self-examination in the spirit of Socrates that aims to maximize Horace's pleasure. Maximizing one's pleasure is not merely the case of eliminating all pain; it is about recognizing that some pains are necessary in order to experience greater pleasures. The

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<sup>319</sup> This is also yet another way that Horace situates himself as a golden mean between two different kinds of criticisms, both of which come from Stoics. It might have an additional point of suggesting that the Stoics cannot get straight the kind of criticism they want to level at Horace.

price that Horace pays in the city for his relationship with Maecenas is in the end an acceptable pain in the face of the increased pleasure that he derives from their company and for the time that he spends at the Sabine estate. Even the hassles of the city, Horace confesses in line 32, are sweet to him: “*hoc iuvat et melli est, non mentiar,...*” If similar philosophical reflections arose from time to time at Horace’s dinner table, then surely the entire poem can appeal to his close friends, who can nod knowingly and appreciatively at their difficulties, even though Horace is the one who meditates on them the most and has passed his poetic experience of those difficulties down to us.

### **Sermo 2.8**

In the prologue, I offered an interpretation of 2.8 as a microcosm of the very process of satire itself. S. 2.8 dramatizes the satiric effect in framing outsiders as those who seemingly fail to understand their circumstances, and even what exactly is happening in a satiric text, while insiders can nod knowingly to each other. For Horace, this most specifically applies to his reading circle, including three poets who are present and hardly say a word at the party, yet witness everything quite closely and who can hardly contain a laugh. Nasidienus and Nomentanus are directly in their line of sight. The action occurs right in front of them, framing them as audience, much as they were among the audience who heard this satire performed. Dolts like Nasidienus simply fail to recognize when it is time to shut up; when their efforts have failed, they frame themselves as objects of ridicule by misunderstanding the situation and the speech of some of the participants. Although I focused in the prologue upon the microcosm that

2.8 creates, here I explore the performative qualities of the satire. Rather than focusing upon how satiric reception works within this satire, I aim to step outside this satire and look at how its argument and progression may suggest philosophical connections between Horace and his reading circle, and how it may also help frame people similar to Nasidienus, but clear outsiders to Horace's group outside the confines of this satire.

Since this is the last satire of the book and the final one that we read before progressing into the *Epodes*, *Odes* and *Epistles* of Horace's later years, our expectations are rightly high. Many scholars have expressed much disappointment in 2.8 as a concluding work to the collection, largely because as mostly outsiders themselves, they have wanted the satire to be something other than what it in fact is.<sup>320</sup> I suspect that every time a satire has been produced in history, there have been some that have been disappointed in it in some way, and this is one of those clear "outsider" reactions that form part of the satiric effect. Even Freudenburg more recently sees a parallel between the guests getting up at the end of the satire and the audience of Horace getting up at the end of the satire and walking out in the middle of his satiric banquet (*Satires of Rome* 117-124). I agree that Freudenburg has clarified a key aspect of the text that Horace had intended to convey. Satire is a banquet of sorts and etymologically connected to the food that forms a key theme in the second book. Horace links his conclusion in this fashion with his first poem, S.1.1, which meditates on the theme of sufficiency in the context of

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<sup>320</sup> No doubt 2.8 was among those that led both Rudd (*Satires of Horace*) and Fraenkel to hold a negative view of the second book of satires. Morris comments that this is not one of Horace's best satires (244). O'Conner notes that it is frequently seen at its best as a slight entertainment, but sees the poem as a puzzle capable of decoding the complex arrangement of all the satires in book two (23-24).

greed and concludes with knowing precisely when his satire has also reached the point of satiety and is fully “enough.” As we have seen throughout the other food satires, each is a kind of recipe for satire itself, sometimes at an extreme, as is the case of Catus, and sometimes closer to the golden means as we saw in 2.2 and 2.6. The significance of these metaphors is lost on outsiders such as the Stoics, and thus the “food satires,” despite the frequent criticism and disappointment that they provoke from scholars, serve as a commentary of sorts on the very nature of Horatian satire itself. Despite all these crisp connections that meta-poetically meditate on the nature of satire and bring a sense of ring composition to the book, I still sense a tinge of disappointment in even framing the commentary in this fashion. Disappointment is precisely one of the “outsider” responses that this satirical text is intended to produce. Horace has all along been emphasizing that he will perform a different kind of satire, quite different from Lucilius, and in book two he has performed yet again a different kind of satire than what he delivered to us in book one. This perhaps represents the ultimate laugh against those who want to pin down Horace as something that he is not, who constantly expect him to deliver vehement satire in the manner of Lucilius.<sup>321</sup> The stronger that expectation, which Horace has partly encouraged and teased throughout, the more likely a potential reader, ancient or modern,

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<sup>321</sup> In modern scholarship, perhaps we do not read Horace against Lucilius as Freudenburg’s *Satires of Rome* postulates, but we may very well read him against the ever popular Juvenal. Moreover, our own “horizon” of expectations includes the many other works of satire that comprise our experience of Western Civilization and even other popular works of satire that comprise our contemporary civilization. Critics are equally grounded in the particulars of our own historical circumstances, and these circumstances cannot help but shape how we perceive Horace. Cf. Freudenburg’s “*Horatius Anceps*,” which argues that Horace plays an interpretive game with his readers through his *persona* in which a reader who actually pins Horace down in some fashion actually ends up losing this game.

low-born or educated, is likely to miss entirely the force of 2.8. One can easily imagine Horace's inner circle sitting in a corner snickering, just as they do at Nasidienus in 2.8, at all the mischievous (mis)interpretations that they have encountered.<sup>322</sup>

Audience in 2.8 takes a double role from the start. Horace himself chances upon Fundanius, whom we have already met in 1.10.40-42, prominently displayed as a comic poet. This satire, then, is not just about Horace's inner reading circle as characters within the architecture of the story, but also as audience members and the first major recipients of his satiric performances. The close relationship of Horace to Fundanius is hinted in lines 2-3 where we find that Horace had been searching for Fundanius as a dinner guest for his own party, presumably one that may have gone down much like 2.6. Other members of Horace's reading circle certainly knew quite a bit more about the personality, habits, mannerisms, and poetic tendencies of Fundanius far more than we, and likely than many members of the ancient audience. This discrepancy in knowledge already paves the way for the insiders to nod at each other knowingly as the satire progresses. The exchange also leaves us reading it against our similar experience in 2.4, where Horace had accosted Catus, perhaps as he is coming from a lecture given by Nasidienus (cf. Berg). Catus had kept the name of his auctor hidden in 2.4, but in 2.8, Horace knows the identity of Nasidienus from the start. Just as Horace played dumb in 2.4 to goad Catus into revealing his recipes, an ironic exchange ensues between Horace and Fundanius. Fundanius offers that he had never enjoyed himself better. We are set up to

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<sup>322</sup> "Sitting in a corner" is an allusion to Jonathan Swift's famous dictum of satire as "friends laughing in a corner."

take Fundanius' reply more literally, since he had accepted Nasidienus' invitation instead of Horace's own. Thus Fundanius' apparent enthusiasm in lines 3-4 might at first seem genuine, and that impression is allowed to continue. This view then makes Horace's initial reply seem either dismissive or jealous, with the irony only becoming clearer later. The sum effect of this is to introduce a new pitfall that some of the audience can manage while others do not. Insiders who have followed Horace closely through his tricky satire are much more prepared to accept a cheeky tone out of Fundanius, thus providing an extra layer of foreshadowing for the disastrous dinner to come. When Horace pries into details of the meal, Fundanius immediately obliges him in lines 6-16. Horace's own reply to this excess '*Divitias miseras!*' in line 17 establishes further irony that will continue to mirror the feigned pleasure of the dinner guests later in the passage.

Ever interested in company and friendly camaraderie, Horace's second inquiry concerns the dinner companions (18-19). Fundanius obliges by offering the full details of the seating arrangement (20-24). Fundanius transitions from the seating arrangement into Nomentanus' role of pointing out and explaining all of the delicacies (25-53). Fundanius cannot go into too much detail about Nomentanus' role, as the wall hangings fall rather quickly (54), at which point the criticism and satire turns much more acerbic. Philosophical discourse does not appear until the satire's closing section. Here, Caston has rightfully articulated how this particular satire serves to close off not only the second book of satires, but both books of satires, as Horace makes his exit from the genre.

S. 2.8 connects to and summarizes the previous treatment of food and philosophy in book two. In the first satire, Lucilius and Scipio eat an Epicurean diet of greens (2.1.74). A positive impression of this lean Epicurean diet appeared through the figure of Ofellus in 2.2, along with criticism of those committed to excessive display. S. 2.4 featured an unnamed gourmet, whose many recipes actually make an appearance in 2.8. This either makes Nasidienus the unnamed gourmet, as Berg has argued, or at least someone relatively close to him and a practitioner of these same fine arts. The word *beatus* in the last line of 2.4 is repeated of Nasidienus in the first line of 2.8. S. 2.6 extended the food analogy by treating us to the two mice in a kind of unresolved tension, with the country mouse seeming to get the more prominent support, though the tensions between town and country in Horace's own life make it difficult for him to fully embrace the country life that he desires. Davus, listening to this fable and probably other such stories, even confronts his master on this point, accusing him of hypocrisy and exposing his weakness, so that our satirical Horace becomes a more sympathetic human character, much in the style of 1.3. But then at precisely the moment when we might expect Horace to do exactly as Davus suggests and run off to a dinner party for finer fare, we find Horace absent from the party itself in 2.8. Read against the criticism of Davus, the absence of Horace proclaims his own confidence more boldly than any other satire in the collection, as Baker has argued ("Maecenas and Horace"). After eight years, Horace now has the confidence both to be absent from some of the gatherings of the group and to depict himself as such. Baker interestingly notes a possible outsider interpretation of the

text, since we, the reader, do not precisely know what our attitude should be toward the behavior of Maecenas, his shades and the poets. Are they really justified in the departure or are they rude? Baker goes too far in suggesting that his reading is “the” correct reading of the satire, but he does correctly identify a set of reading possibilities latent in the text. In fact, if his contention that Horace is also casually and ironically chiding Maecenas and company for their disproportionate treatment of the minor goofiness of Nasidienus is correct, then perhaps an element of Epicurean frank speech shines through that satiric criticism. Since we already saw some of this Epicurean frank speech directed toward Maecenas in 1.3, its presence here should not surprise us. I remain more cautious than Baker that Maecenas and the circle would have taken this criticism as the main point of the satire, and Baker’s own piece predates the work of Caston and Berg, both of whom note the frequent connections with both the philosophy of dining and the food items themselves in the previous satires. These later connections argue for a much more direct criticism leveled against Nasidienus or whoever in contemporary Roman society his viewpoints represent. Just as Horace had not been invited to the lecture of 2.4, his absence here establishes the close parallel between the two poems, their themes, content, and ultimate path of satiric criticism. The typical reader will see criticism of Nasidienus from the start, conditioned as it were by the presentation in the previous satires and well before the criticism becomes acerbic following the crash of the curtain.

The light-hearted presentation of philosophy is consistently tinged with irony and perhaps much more easily available to Horace’s Epicurean friends. Nomentanus blurts

out at line 61, blaming fortune for the crazy human affairs. The attribution seems doubly out of place, first because after taking so much care for the dinner itself, one would think that the host could have taken enough care to prevent the tapestry from falling. Second, the term fortune carries significant meaning among the Epicureans, being something like a god to them; fortune contrasts with the wisdom of the Epicurean Ofellus in 2.2.116-136, who proposed the fortitude of the lean diet of greens as the best way of being *beatus* in the midst of adversity.<sup>323</sup> So Nasidienus and Nomentanus are phony Epicureans, marking themselves outside Horace's preferences. Their outsider status is reinforced in line 63 where Varius is forced to conceal his laughter in a napkin. Nomentanus is completely unaware of how ridiculous he sounds, and Varius' gesture is meant to avoid giving much immediate offense in the wake of the tragedy.

The mixture of food and conversation in the final satire offers an interesting glimpse into both as metaphors of Horace's poetry. As a parallel figure to Catus in 2.4, Nasidienus has gotten the mixture of food and conversation all wrong. The recipes are odd, overdone concoctions, and the conversation is so bad that the guests can only snicker. Modesty in dining and satiric performance is suggested by the fact that Horace's own dinner party apparently started later in the day. We know only of Fundanius as a potential dinner guest, which may suggest Horace's own dining moderation. Their mutual friendship suggests no ambition or gain and stands in stark contrast to whatever Nasidienus hoped to gain should he succeed in impressing

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<sup>323</sup> Consider the ironic juxtaposition of *Ode* 1.34 where Horace pretends to give up Epicureanism with the emphatic praise of fortune in *Ode* 1.35.

Maecenas. The satiric “meal” then is unpleasing to Maecenas and company, and more importantly, Nasidienus handles the fall of the curtain poorly. Nomentanus attempts to cheer him by appealing to fickle fortune, which is so horribly misapplied that it provokes laughter from the audience. The laughter inside the play may also help cue laughter outside of the play. Nasidienus could not master a simple disaster at a dinner party, in contrast to the country bumpkin Ofellus who had lived through the misfortunes of having his land appropriated and had survived through his home-spun naturally acquired philosophy built upon maxims that are similar to Epicureanism. Fortune, too, is something that Horace may potentially face, and pursuing a balanced more modest role both in life and in his satires is much more likely to steer him clear of the worst of the dangers and prepare him for any inevitable harm that should occur.

Balatro, the buffoon and one of Maecenas’ henchmen, immediately launches into his own philosophical interpretation of events, providing banal line after banal line stolen from the scripts of popular philosophy, we suspect feigning a kind of consolation toward Nasidienus (64-74). This particular speech reflects some of the most complex layers of audience.<sup>324</sup> As Balatro confronts a dejected Nasidienus, the deeper meaning hidden in the irony recapitulates the satiric effect. Ultimately four layers are present: 1. The basic content of Balatro’s speech which Nasidienus interprets literally; 2. The guests within the satire note the irony, forming a second parallel layer of audience; 3. A level of comedy marks the whole scene, as Fundanius the comic poet relates the entirety of this

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<sup>324</sup> This sentiment and the following elaboration owe an enormous debt to O’Connor 123-34.

episode to Horace, who in turn (4) shapes the entirety of the text as we have it for his own audience. This complex narratology reminiscent of Plato, as is much of the narrative technique within the second book of satires, offers much potential for interpretative missteps especially for outsiders, as the track record of diverse scholarly (outsider) appraisals indicate. Within this frame, a literal insider misinterprets the basic speech of Balatro, while smiling and nodding insiders look on, many of whom formed the first insider audience outside the text as well, providing a double layer of insider and outsider within the satire and beyond it. As D'Arms 1990 (312) notes, "we can safely assume that then, as now, gossip about dinner parties was a way of building and reinforcing the cohesion of self-defining social circles, just as failing the test of host or guest results in exclusion from them." As Horace concludes his work, it is only natural that his text revisits Maecenas and his literary circle, that they may once again reinforce their spirit of camaraderie as a group and ultimately end the day laughing together as Horace closes a chapter in his career.

### **Conclusion**

We can see that even in these food satires, the basic satiric effect of excluding outsiders and appealing to a group of like-minded insiders still operates. Our general focus in this chapter has not been so much the basic deployment of the food motifs, which if we had not lost so much information that informs the cultural perceptions of food in Horace's day, would ultimately demonstrate the satiric effect a great deal more. Instead, we can see that the basic philosophical outlook even in these food satires remains

consistent from satire to satire, presenting a case for the Epicurean *holus* diet, first in the favorable adaptation of the country sage, Ofellus, presented in the voice of Horace's own satiric authority, then counterbalanced against the ironic criticism of Catus in 2.4, then balanced yet again with the highly artistic and masterfully constructed 2.6 where Horace meditates upon the difficulty of fully embracing the rural country lifestyle that he desires. Our satirist is not perfect, but the idealized conversation and simple diet of the country meeting of friends is mirrored by the promotion of the much preferable simple and un-entangled Epicurean *ataraxia* of the country mouse. Horace concludes by more ironic criticism of Nasidienus and the contrasting diet that he represents with its emphasis upon the food and its origins. Although we need not accept that Maecenas and his group always preferred a simple Epicurean *holus* diet (their reputation in Suetonius for luxury is well known), we can recognize that as men with Epicurean sympathies, they would be intimately familiar with dictates and benefits of an Epicurean diet. No one truly holds his/her ideals to the fullest extent possible and all of us are hypocritical to some extent. Satire is the edge that artfully exposes those inconsistencies between belief and character. It simply tends to work by identifying those inconsistencies primarily in others, even if a few of our own preferential group are exposed in the process. This is the case in the second book of satires, where scholars have frequently noted the complexity with which Horace artfully exposes his weaknesses, many times, I suspect intentionally with the goal of gaining audience sympathy, but also perhaps at times unintentionally. One Epicurean diet is preferred. One Epicurean diet is criticized. In the end, we find Swift's notion of

satire as “friends laughing in a corner,” ever present throughout the satires, and tied closely to the Epicurean teaching that marked many within the circle.

## Epilogue

Horace concluded his own satiric oeuvre by narrating a failed dinner party, arising from satire's banquet to pursue the *Odes*, the monument for which he is most remembered today.<sup>325</sup> My own goal here is certainly more modest than Horace's, although aiming for something higher than Nasidienus' failed dinner party. My study has involved several different complicated and interwoven aspects of Horace's satiric artistry. Although some scholars will no doubt quibble with one portion or another of my work, as is typical in the reception of all scholarship, and while the literary theory of satire here will no doubt see much fuller formulation in the future (As in Cicero's evaluation of the style of Cato: nothing is ever novel and perfect at the same time), I extend our knowledge of Horatian satire in four distinct areas, each of which can be explored, entertained, and embraced independent of the others. They are ultimately interlocking within my own study. I summarize these here as first a theoretical contribution to satire built around an in-group effect that depends on shared values with insiders and points of difference with others. Second, I emphasize Horace's reading group as these insiders and the role of Epicurean philosophy in establishing their shared views and their critiques of others outside of the circle. Third, I use the theory in conjunction with Horace's Epicurean proclivities to argue for a stronger relationship between the first and second book of *Sermones*. Although quite different in structure and approach, the second book actually

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<sup>325</sup> I have always found it fitting to note that when Horace compares his *Odes* to the Egyptian pyramids in *Ode* 3.30, many of these pyramids had been around for approximately 2000 years (give or take a few centuries), and that Horace's own work now stands over 2000 years removed from the day of its production, a testament to Horace's vatic power.

extends the same themes present in the first book while simultaneously appealing to Horace's inside reading circle. Fourth, I offer a greater appreciation for the second book of *Sermones* as a sophisticated book of satire and poetry.

In my first chapter, I offered a more comprehensive theory of satire that incorporates predominant model of the past, *persona* theory, as well as recent trends toward examining the context of performance, performance theory, and reader response. It consists of several components. First, what separates satire from mere comic efforts is in what I call the *satiric effect*, enabled at the point of performance through the way that satire participates in the cultural assumptions and disagreements, including points of contestation/conflict within its localized historical environment. By definition, cultures are built around a system of shared norms and values, some of which are shared by all or most, and others the object of debate. In effect, only those things that are not questioned or debated go without significant discussion. Conversely, the most fragile or contested values typically receive the most attention, both pro and con, to shore them up or toss them out. Often changing values create the locus of new questions and debates. Some of these contested cultural values include the appropriate relationship to Greek culture among those in Rome, and the appropriate relationship to philosophy or dining. The cultural window for satire occurs within the context of appealing to a group of like-minded individuals on one or more points of cultural debate, over and against those who disagree. Although we may have difficulty teasing out of the historical record the particular unstated assumptions that undergird a culture, we have a great deal of evidence

for their points of disagreement and debate, and as James Davidson emphasizes in his landmark work on Greek culture, the points of disagreement are precisely those matters on which cultural production tends to speak the most, and which are mostly not settled or deemed absolute or common sense (*Courtesans and Fishcakes*). We do not need to debate matters on which everyone agrees, and neither did Horace waste his time on points of little consequence, though he certainly pretends to treat trivial topics, or perhaps treat topics that scholars have judged trivial from their comfortable armchairs, removed over two thousand years from the fact. The mere presence of an attempt at communication presupposes a speaker who believes he has something important to say, that he is the appropriate person to deliver that communication, and that his audience is the appropriate person to receive that communication. This view is commonplace, but in my experience, the pursuit of deep meaningful scholarship sometimes blinds us to the most basic and obvious facets of human life.<sup>326</sup> The satiric effect happens through the fact that satire appeals to at least two separate audiences in precisely two different ways. First, it is oriented toward a group of like-minded individuals who share the majority of the same cultural assumptions as that of the satirist. Here, *persona* theory is integrated into my own system in that I do not mean the cultural assumptions of the speaker himself, who may very well be a bumbling idiot, but of the live person behind the text who is

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<sup>326</sup> In my personal opinion, some of the best scholarship that is produced addresses matters that I deem obvious upon completing my reading of their work, but which had up to that point been unnoticed in scholarship. I am well aware of some who deem the word “obvious” to imply that the work should not be written, and I hope they would not openly denigrate such a work, but I deem the importance of such scholarship as analogous to the announcer who described the baseball player with the term, “he made that play look easy!” It most certainly was not easy, but it remained necessary, and the scholarship offers some of the most important correctives in restoring us to balance and keeping our lofty thoughts in check.

communicating in his/her cultural context for very specific objectives and goals, and who expects his primary audience to identify and understand the *persona* as a feature of intense literary artistry. *Persona* theory has not been mistaken, simply incomplete. Each satire includes an argument and multiple points of ridicule (which may include the speaker), but an overall trajectory of ridicule that slants the criticism in one direction. Although satire may, indeed, be a high-pressured water hose in which everything gets wet in the process, the presence of a clearly discernible stream suggests some specific target which absorbs the brunt of the satiric force. Second, the satiric effect is achieved by orienting the satire against at least one target group within society, and in Horace's case, against Stoics especially and competing Epicurean groups secondarily. Since satire is a modal effect with no distinguishable literary form of its own, it is always possible for an external audience to mistake the satire for a real utterance and argument that deserves serious response on its own merit. We can see these serious responses all around us today whenever satire has been produced, and through much of its history. Although we possess only a small fraction of the reception of Horace's satire in his own day, I have few doubts that the same kind of process was operative then, and argued as much in my treatment of Horace's second book which reflects on these associations.

A second area of contribution concerns the treatment of Horace's reading circle as the inner circle of Horace's readers, several of whom are linked to the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus. In emphasizing Epicurean philosophy as one avenue of cultural debate, I do not limit the satiric potential of the text to just philosophy. I have no doubts

that the satiric effect was achieved in many other aspects of Horace's satire that have now been lost to us. Philosophy was a simple choice designed to limit the contours of my study. No doubt Horace's relationships with Maecenas, Vergil, Varius, Plotius Tucca, Quintilius Varus, and the rest shared many congruities on matters of culture, and all of these remain possibilities that satire could exploit. I strongly suspect the vast majority of these have now been lost irrecoverably to us, and that Epicureanism remains our best avenue for finding similarities between them.

My view of satire makes more sense of the disparate streams of philosophy contained within Horatian satire. Although Horace sometimes quibbles with Epicurean philosophy, he for the most part avoids undercutting it directly throughout the text. Stoics, in contrast, come in for the harshest and roughest criticism. In fact, Epicurean philosophy seems to be a running theme throughout much of the text, and the more we discover of the texts of Philodemus and of Roman Epicureanism, the more scholars have come to realize how frequent and important Epicurean philosophy is throughout the satires. Make no mistake, Horace is not writing philosophical treatises. Rather, his satiric work shows parallels with the oblique philosophy (Sider) contained in several of Philodemus' epigrams. I do not believe that Horace set off with the intent to write an Epicurean treatise, but I do believe that perhaps Horace's own proclivities and certainly the psychological need to appeal to his friends who were connected to Philodemus led to the positive infusion of Epicurean material in the text. In this way, my view is consistent with scholars who do not want to see an overly preachy proselytizing Horace.

Epicureanism rose out of the needs of the context, not because he was trying to be the next Lucretius.<sup>327</sup> The prominence of Epicurean philosophy not only fits well with my satiric theory, it also provides further evidence and support for that theory itself. The recognition that Horace's reading circle shares some important Epicurean tendency enhances both the importance of my satiric theory and in turn enhances our appraisal of Epicurean philosophy in the text.

A fuller appraisal of the philosophical elements of Horace has been sorely lacking, not only in Horace's satires but across literature in general. Chapter two surveyed many efforts to correct this, and acknowledged much work that has been done to correct these deficiencies. Literary critics may dislike philosophy themselves and the kind of work that is typically found in a philosophy department, and this can easily carry over into their literary evaluations. The Roman Epicureans certainly did not help us, seeming to disavow politics in favor of Epicurean tranquility, but at the same time, participating in many activities that seem to us today as if they would disturb that tranquility. As I noted in chapter two, they rigorously worked out their actions in the

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<sup>327</sup> Two more recent comparisons spring to mind. Tolkien frequently disavows attempting to write a Christian work, but he also explicitly acknowledges that his own worldview could not help but seep into the text, thus coloring and texturing the work from that perspective. Likewise, the satirist John Stewart always claims to be a comedian first, yet he does not deny that he does have a political perspective that shines through his presentation. My approach to Horace is much the same. Moreover, it is completely consistent with both Philodemus' poetry and how Philodemus articulates that one should do poetry as an Epicurean. One does not set off to write explicitly Epicurean poetry, one simply sets off to write good poetry that sounds good, observes good form and is pleasurable. Only secondarily do Epicurean perspectives seep into the text. Often I get the impression when reading scholars such as Mayer who disavow a significant role for philosophy in the text that they are approaching "philosophy" from the plastic inflexible viewpoint of the stuffy philosophical treatises, and not from a more generic standpoint of "worldview." We all have a worldview, whether we acknowledge that or not, and it colors everything we do, whether we admit it or not. In this respect, it is not hard to say that Horace is in some meaningful sense Epicurean.

light of their Epicurean commitments; and thus it is not appropriate to think of their Epicureanism as superficial, or to casually dismiss them with respect to the interpretation of literary texts. These philosophical commitments form part of their interpretative framework of dispositions that will inform how they receive a literary text. It should be clear now that my literary theory is integrated into my assessment of Epicureanism. Without that theory, it is always possible for a literary scholar to dismiss my interpretation as my own fanciful delight in philosophy. My literary theory is utterly necessary to my study of philosophy in that it shows the extent to which the philosophical presentation and argument is perhaps the most important aspect for understanding how the text is “satiric” at all. Without an assessment of philosophy, and especially of the audience’s probable attitude toward it, our interpretations of Horace’s satires arrive at entirely different conclusions, undoubtedly quite far from what might have happened at the moment of reception. By embracing my theory of satire, the philosophical dimension of Horace’s satires is far more illuminated than it would be in a more simplistic catalogue of the philosophical ideas. The philosophical contributions are more modest then, offering another in a series of studies that further advances our understanding of the place of philosophy within literature.

A third contribution addresses the question of how the two books that comprise Horace’s satiric work relate to one another. Book one has historically been well received, and continues to see numerous articles, approximately five times as many per poem as book two. But how do we read the second book in the light of the first? What is

the relationship between the two books? Here, I have shown that a combination of my satiric theory and my prioritizing of the philosophical beliefs reveal the continuity between the two books. A realization of this continuity leads me as well to the fourth contribution of my study, a greater appreciation for the poetic and satiric qualities of the second book of *Sermones*. The first book may poke fun more generally at human foibles to which many generations have sensed that they could relate. We have all been in the position of Horace with the bore, of having someone nearby who simply would not leave despite our best efforts to remove ourselves from their company. Thus, even though some of the historical particulars that undergird the cultural and satiric dynamics in the original context have been lost, the enduring human quality remains present and even neophytes can appreciate that. The same cannot be said of many of the satires in the second book. We may perhaps see Damasippus as a type who bursts into our room and delivers a harangue that we did not want to hear, but the rest of the poem is suddenly lost on anyone who is not an expert in the cultural and historical particularities of Horace's day. Tremendous work is required to make the second book appreciable to a non-Roman audience, and this work impedes later appreciation of it. Although no study can overcome these factors, we can at least see why the second book can be deemed satiric, and how that satire may have operated in the context of Horace's first audience. That is no small contribution, as poems such as S. 2.6 have been appraised and appreciated largely as if they were contributing delight in the same way that many of the *Odes* do. The philosophical, aesthetic, and satiric continuity continues unbroken from the first

book to the second. If Horace takes shots at Stoics frequently in the first book, he addresses them more particularly through the form of Davus and Damasippus in the second, and perhaps more obliquely through the figure of Odysseus in 2.5. The emphasis on dining may be new to the second book, but it remains integral in the tradition of satire as sausage and its image as a banquet. The critical food poems in the second book actually seem to present and address at least two competing Epicurean theories on the appropriate kind of dining and taken together, present an approval of one cultural position over and against a second which is denigrated. Meanwhile, Horace's programmatic 2.1 establishes the continuity quite clearly through its appeal to the Callimachean literary aesthetic and its use of the Epicurean Trebatius, who gives advice to Horace in Epicurean terms and is answered in turn in a way that Horace deems consistent with Epicurean teaching and which enables his further satiric production.

The entirety of the second book also builds on the themes of the first book in playing to the shared prejudices of Horace's inner circle of poets. Although Maecenas and the poets are not named nearly as frequently, nor are they named so prominently in the same way as the defining satires of 1.4 and 1.10, they are lurking in the poetic background to 2.1 as well as poems on dining such as 2.2 and 2.4. Maecenas appears again in the language of Damasippus, yet Horace himself, holding the pen, is fully aware of how Maecenas and the others in the poetic coterie lurk behind the text's immediate reception. A satire such as 2.5 may have the same kind of "inside joke" quality that we noted were present in 1.7 and 1.8, while 2.6 explicitly names Maecenas and more

explicitly responds to the concerns of the circle, discussing philosophy in Horace's idealized conversation at the Sabine farm. It also has parallels with the more intimate poems of book one such as 1.3, 1.6, and 1.9 that each dwell more thoroughly upon friendship. Davus in 2.7, much like Damasippus, mentions Maecenas and company, and like the parallel poem in the second book, Horace remains in control of the pen and his own self-presentation in the light of Maecenas and company. Finally, much as Horace concluded the first book with a tour-de-force of his poetic friends, his poetic friends are no less present in the final satiric poem, 2.8. Although they judge the dinner party of Nasidienus as an utter disaster and quickly make their escape from him in humiliation, this act of departure may not in fact perform their own walk-out of Horace and his poetic genre, but reflect an appropriate reinforcement of camaraderie and group solidarity in the face of those groups in society who do not share the social positions of Maecenas and company. The act of criticism of Nasidienus is an act of praise and acceptance of Horace, who, as it turns out, was right not to be there in the first place.

In addition to these conclusions, I believe the literary theory that I have offered here and applied to Horace shares broader application to other Roman verse satirists. Persius, as a Stoic and disciple of Cornutus, generates the same satiric effect, by orienting his first reception to an insider group of upper-class Romans who surround his teacher, Cornutus, and who could more easily grasp the Stoic criticism in the satire. Although I find less antagonism with other philosophical schools in his group, there may be more opportunity to explore political like-mindedness among the group. Meaning is

potentially locked up for the insiders in his satire, as he speaks his words into a hole in the ground which he then covers over, and the satiric effect can be seen in the way that outsiders, past and present alike, have difficulty penetrating the incredibly concentrated concoction of satire that Persius has brewed.

Juvenal represents another intriguing application. The strong thread of philosophy is not present from beginning to end, but we can still detect within individual satires that they appeal to particular debates within Roman society. In *Satire 3*, Umbricius leaves Rome, cursing the Greek city that he has just left, repeatedly emphasizing its Greek qualities throughout the poem. As such, it participates in broader Roman cultural debates about the appropriate place of Greek learning and culture within Roman society, a debate that we have seen continually rage from Scipio's day much longer. Such cultural debates are rarely settled, but are merely forgotten or superseded by an alternative set of debates that fit a new cultural context. Finally, and most interestingly, this theory also provides a framework for understanding works that are typically not labeled as satire, and offers a vantage point for analyzing Greek works that precede Quintilian's assessment of satire being entirely Roman.

Beyond the Roman satirists themselves, we can also consider the way the theory operates with any text that we deem satiric. Aristophanes, for example, occupies a particular social place as an aristocrat in his Athenian society, with antipathy toward Cleon. As such, he appeals to like-minded groups within Greek society who may share his viewpoints; his criticism implicitly and satirically derides not merely the public figure

of Cleon, but also by implication those who hold favorable impressions of him. Serious responses to the arguments that he presents, along the lines of the satiric effect that I have articulated here, are then possible. Less political plays, such as the *Frogs*, offer insight into how the culture has received their great tragic poets, and again the satiric humor plays off of how potential fragments of Athenian culture may have received those poets in entirely different ways. These are just a few possible areas in which I believe my theory can be extended rather clearly.

I have woven together four distinct contributions to Horace: a literary theory that depends upon the Epicurean relationships of Horace's most trusted friends, which enables me to place philosophy prominently within Horace's work and helps to explain the satiric consistency between the two books. Each of these elements offers independent contributions in their own right for scholars who are more interested in one aspect or the other of Horace's work, making my research here generally useful to many different kinds of scholars, and especially offering up a new mine of research for those willing to pursue the extension of this kind of literary theory of satire.

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