**The Dissertation Committee for Chang-Ho Lee Certifies that this is the
approved version of the following dissertation:**

**News Coverage of U.S. War With Iraq: A Comparison of *The
New York Times*, *The Arab News*, and *The Middle East Times***

Committee:

James W. Tankard, Jr. Supervisor

Maxwell E. McCombs

Stephen D. Reese

Charles Whitney

Karin G. Wilkins

News Coverage of the U.S. War with Iraq: A Comparison of *The New York Times*, *The Arab News*, and *The Middle East Times*

by

Chang-Ho Lee, B.A., M.A.

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

May, 2004

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, who have supported me for a long

time.

Acknowledgements

I express my sincere thanks to supervisor Dr. James W. Tankard, Jr. for his helpful guidance and comments on dissertation. My thanks also go to other committee members, Dr. Maxwell McCombs, Dr. Stephen D. Reese, Dr. Charles Whitney and Dr. Karin Wilkins. I want to express my sincere thanks to Inho Cho and Kyunghee Cho for their help in coding. I cannot forget Jane Park's help in copyediting not only the dissertation but also many conference papers.

News Coverage of the U.S. War with Iraq: A Comparison of *The New York Times*, *The Arab News,* and *The Middle East Times*

Publication No._____

Chang-Ho Lee, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2004

Supervisor: James W. Tankard, Jr.

This dissertation investigated how *The New York Times*, *The Arab News*, and *The Middle East Times* reflected their national interests in their coverage of the Iraqi War. It was assumed that *The New York Times* and Arab newspapers would express different attitudes toward the war since the former belonged to a country supporting the conflict and the latter to countries that opposed it. Based on the indexing hypothesis and existing literature on war coverage, it was expected that the media would reflect their respective national perspectives on foreign policy in such a crisis. To test this hypothesis, articles, editorials and opinion pages between the start of the war on March 20, 2003 and the official declaration end of the war on May 1, 2003 were sampled. In total 502 stories were used for content analysis. Overall, the results satisfied the initial expectations of the study. *The New York Times* emphasized U.S. war efforts, citing primarily U.S. officials while the Arab newspapers devoted more space to antiwar voices, citing primarily Arab

sources. These papers were slightly more critical of U.S. interests in the Gulf region than *The New York Times*. The coverage of *The New York Times*, however, was more thematic than that of Arab newspapers. In describing Hussein image, *The New York Times* emphasized his negative image slightly more than the Arab newspapers. It also carried more stories describing the purpose of the war according to the U.S. administration whereas the Arab papers more often emphasized the aggressive and illegitimate aspects of the war. Overall, these results suggest that *The New York Times* took a more prowar tendency while Arab newspapers reflected a more antiwar stance. Thus, national interest became an important factor influencing media coverage of conflicts. Considering overall findings, *The New York Times* followed the interests of an attacking country whereas Arab newspapers reflected the interests of an attacked country. Thus, the former emphasized the process of combat, U.S.-led construction of post-war Iraq, military operation, and war victims of coalition forces. On the other hand, the latter devoted more space to antiwar demonstrations or responses, war effects on society, and Iraqi victims.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction

War, crisis, and conflicts such as the Salvadoran Conflict (1980) and the Gulf War (1991) have provided some of the main topics of news coverage. Media analysts and critics have pointed out that U.S. mainstream media coverage of these issues has been flawed due to problems such as journalists' ethnocentric biases, press control by military forces, heavy dependence on official sources, and lack of critical reporting (see Downing, 1988; Hallin & Gitlin, 1993; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Iyengar & Simon, 1994; Kellner, 1993; Mowlana, 1992; Pedelty, 1995; Reese & Buckalew, 1995).

Despite this media attention to war, few studies have compared the ways in which these conflicts are portrayed in the press of different countries (Kaid et al., 1993). In particular, scant attention has been paid to the responses of the governments and media in non-English-speaking Western states or Third World countries which do not share or oppose the U.S. perspective (Paletz, 1994). For instance, analyses of the media of an attacked country or its neighbors seldom have been conducted. Thus, in the critical literature, the Arab voice, in most cases, is missing in analyses of Middle Eastern conflicts in which the United States has been strongly involved.

This dissertation examines news coverage of the Iraqi War, which began on March 20, 2003, in the media of countries that neighbor Iraq, the country that was under attack. It focuses on *The Arab News*, *The Middle East Times*, and *The*

New York Times. The latter is included for purposes of comparison. Coverage

will be examined on several dimensions, including the extent of emphasis on the

war effort, the effects of war on society, the antiwar voice, and the war victims.

Also compared are the primary sources from which these media got their news,

whether these sources are favorable or unfavorable toward the war, and to what

extent the coverage is episodic or thematic. Next, the symbolic terms and

expressions used in descriptions of Saddam Hussein and the war are examined.

Finally, the dissertation investigates the attitudes that these three newspapers

show in relation to the Arab satellite news channels and embedded journalists,

which are important aspects of the war differentiated from Gulf War.

   The New York Times was selected for its reputation as one of the most

influential newspapers in the United States and the important role that it plays in

forming public opinion. In addition, it is considered the paper of record especially

in regard to foreign news coverage (Dickson, 1994). Two Arab English-language

papers were chosen to see how longtime U.S. allies Saudi Arabia and Egypt

responded to the Iraqi War. As will be discussed in detail, these two countries

actively assisted the United States in the Gulf War in 1991. It should be noted

here that the selection of English-language newspapers rather than Arab-language

media in Saudi Arabia and Egypt is related to the researcher's inability to

understand the Arab language. *The Arab News* publishes news from many Middle

East countries and has the largest circulation of English-language newspapers in

the Middle East.[1] Although the newspaper is oriented toward English speaking expatriate workers in the Middle East, it offers regional news not only from Middle Eastern countries but also those in Europe, America, India, and Pakistan. From its initiation, the paper has been serving the interests of both Saudis and a large expatriate community in the Gulf region. *The Middle East Times*, a weekly paper published in Egypt, is also targeted to businessmen, intellectuals, and the expatriate community in Egypt.

Given that there are few studies on the Arab media coverage of the Iraqi War, this dissertation hopes to provide a better understanding of Middle Eastern countries' response to international conflicts in this region.

The dissertation is an extension of earlier research that compared how *The New York Times* and *The Arab News* covered the U.S. attack on Afghanistan, which occurred as a response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States (see Lee, 2002). The study consisted of a computer-aided content analysis based on VBPro, which was complemented by textual analysis. The qualitative analysis focused on finding social contexts in which *The New York Times* and *The Arab News* emphasized different positions on the war. The researcher found *The New York Times* displaying a more prowar position and *The Arab News*, a more antiwar one. Articles in the former focused on military

---

[1] Most countries in the Middle East have their own English-language newspaper such as *Kuwait Times* (Kuwait)*, Jordan Times* (Jordan)*, Gulf News* (Qatar), and *The Egyptian Gazette* (Egypt). Their circulation ranges between 5,000 and 50,000. Most papers were founded in the 1960s and 1970s (see Rugh, 1987).

operations and war-supporting nations. Those in the latter raised strong opposition to the civilian deaths that had been caused by U.S. bombings on Afghanistan and to the U.S. effort to extend the war to Arab countries. The two papers showed a contrasting attitude in citing officials. *The New York Times* depended on Northern Alliance officials -- allies in the U.S. initiative against the Taliban government -- as sources more often than did *The Arab News.* On the other hand, *The Arab News* cited Taliban officials more frequently than did *The New York Times*. Unlike the earlier project, this dissertation depended heavily on human coding.

The dissertation is composed of six chapters. Chapter 1 describes the background and purpose of the dissertation. Chapter 2 introduces a theoretical framework addressing international conflicts such as the indexing hypothesis, exploitation model, propaganda model, and the "our v. their" war principle. In addition to these theories, responses of American, Saudi, and Egyptian government to the war are described. Chapter 3 deals with previous studies on war including Arab media coverage of the Gulf War. Fundamental characteristics of Arab media such as their role in relation to political power and their readership are explained in detail in this chapter. Chapter 4 suggests research questions and hypotheses based on theories including the indexing hypothesis and several themes commonly found in previous studies dealing with war. In addition, the research method including sampling and coding procedures is described in detail. In particular this chapter is devoted to existing discussions about a framing

approach, which has been commonly used in communication research. Chapter 5

presents the results of quantitative content analysis and qualitative analysis. It

examines the extent to which the research hypotheses suggested in this

dissertation were supported or not supported. Chapter 6 summarizes the results

and analyzes their implications. It discusses why some hypotheses were supported

weakly and certain hypotheses were not confirmed. In addition, this chapter

describes in detail why an American newspaper and two Arab newspapers

displayed contrasting attitudes toward the war. Finally, this chapter points out the

limitations of the dissertation and suggests directions for future research.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

Many scholars have suggested that national interest plays a central role in affecting media accounts of international conflicts (see Dickson, 1994; Herman & Chomsky 1988; Kim, 2000; Lee & Yang, 1995; Yang, 2003). National interest is "the set of shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world" (Nye, 1999, p. 23). It includes economic and humanitarian interests and values such as human rights and democracy. Scholars have pointed out that the mainstream media have a tendency to legitimize the foreign policy of its government in covering international conflicts (see Bennett, 1990; Dickson, 1992, 1994). As Yang (2003) notes, journalists select and prioritize the flow of international news events from the standpoint of their country, ultimately framing these events on the basis of their own country's ultimate interest (p. 234). In this way, of all news values, ethnocentrism appears most clearly in war coverage (Gans, 1979).

NATIONAL INTEREST AND MEDIA COVERAGE OF CONFLICTS

Media analysts have found that U.S. news coverage of conflicts involving the U.S. military forces especially tends to propagate the policy of the U.S. administration. According to O'Heffernan (1993), American television coverage of the Gulf crisis in 1991 showed jingoism in its unquestioning coverage of U.S. military operations and policy. U.S. television coverage of the Gulf War was nationalistic, overwhelmingly relaying the perspectives of the Bush administration and the Pentagon (Paletz, 1994). The coverage overemphasized the

6

precision of the bombing while underemphasizing the suffering that was inflicted on innocent Iraqi civilians and the destruction of nonmilitary targets (p. 282).

National interest also became an important value that influenced the framing process of the Kosovo crisis, which began in March 1999 with NATO air strikes on Kosovo (Yang, 2003). Yang (2003) compared how U.S. and Chinese newspapers covered the crisis by analyzing the framing devices embodied in the sources, topics, and symbols of the news narrative. The results showed a contrasting attitude between two media systems toward the crisis. While the Chinese newspapers framed the NATO air strikes as an intervention in Yugoslavia's sovereignty, thereby challenged the legitimacy of using force to solve the Kosovo crisis, the U.S. newspapers framed the strikes as a humanistic aid to Albanians to stop the ethnic cleansing initiated by Serbians. The former used anti-strike terms such as "inhuman bombing" and "NATO's brutal attack" more frequently than the latter. The U.S. newspapers devoted much space to topics of air war updates and refugees depending on U.S. and NATO sources whereas the Chinese newspapers devoted almost half of their coverage to protests and condemnations of the air strikes, citing Chinese and Russian sources. According to Yang, this contrasting coverage of two media systems reflects the two nations' different national interests in Kosovo. China has held the belief that the Kosovo issue should be resolved in a reasonable way with respect for its sovereignty and the rights of all ethnic groups in Kosovo (p. 234). On the other

hand, the United States considered keeping Kosovo's peace or providing humanistic aid to the Albanians, which is indispensable for Europe's security as well as its own (p. 235).

Downing (1988) compared Soviet media coverage of its intervention in Afghanistan to U.S. media coverage of the El Salvador war in the 1980s. His study found that both media systems tended to neglect the death squads and destructions caused by the armed forces. Land reforms enacted by regimes that the Soviet Union and the United States supported were trumpeted as major progressive steps despite the low enthusiasm for these reforms by the public. In addition, the United States and the Soviet Union accused each other of orchestrating the subversion of client governments through proxy nations (the former through Pakistan and China, the latter through Cuba and Nicaragua).

By investigating news narratives, Entman (1991) analyzed how the U.S. media covered the Soviet shooting down of Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight 007 in 1983 and the U.S. Navy downing of Iran Air Flight 655 in 1988. *Time*, *Newsweek*, and CBS news defined the former incident as an attack on innocent civilians and a callous act of violence on the part of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the latter incident was framed as human failure to cope with a technological tragedy. The KAL victims were humanized in the verbal and visual messages, evoking the audiences' empathy whereas the Iran Air victims were rendered much less visible (p. 15). The contrast in the media framing of these two

incidents affected the U.S. public's response. Rather than causing a decline in the support of the Reagan administration, the Iran Air case was followed by a high percentage of public support for the administration's Gulf policy and the worst ranking of the Soviet Union in American opinion since 1956 (p. 23). The author attributes this contrasting national response to the ethnocentric bias of the U.S. journalists in their news coverage.

Pan et al. (1999) analyzed how the media from the People's Republic of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong constructed their respective narratives about the handover of Hong Kong to China in June 30, 1997. Borrowing from Gamson, the authors employed a form of framing analysis to deconstruct the media stories and then reconstruct them into what Gamson calls discursive 'packages' (p. 101). Each package is a conceptual scheme that threads the observable signification devices into a coherent whole (p. 101). The authors unpacked the rules or conventions that structure textual units such as words, images, and sources into a coherent narrative. According to the results, Chinese media celebrated the handover through four major discursive packages -- national achievement, national festival, national family and a bright future. While showing a 'national achievement' package in its coverage, the Taiwan media credited Hong Kong's return to the Chinese people, not to the Chinese Communist Party. In particular the Taiwanese media rejected China's effort to extend the Hong Kong handover to its own country and refuted China's 'one country, two systems' policy to

promote its 'one country, one system' -- meaning Taiwan's flourishing democracy. Hong Kong media coverage displayed four discursive packages: the 'one country, two systems' model, the quest for democracy, the British legacy, and mixed feelings of hope and fear. They reported that Hong Kong people were not optimistic about the future of democracy, freedom, human rights, and the economy after the handover. With pubic polls, the media showed the public fear that China's People's Liberation Army (PLA), which had suppressed Tiananmen protesters in 1989, might upset sociopolitical stability in Hong Kong. Based on these results, the author concluded that the media tended to selectively domesticate an event like the handover of Hong Kong in consonance with the national interests and foreign policy agendas of their home countries.

The Tiananmen movement of China in 1989 also was covered differently according to the national interest of different countries. Lee & Yang (1995), who compared the Associated Press (AP) and Kyodo News Agency in Japan, found that the former emphasized the movement's ideological aspirations such as freedom of speech and principles of democracy while the latter focused on the Chinese leaders and their responses. Because of the economic concerns and interests of Japan in China, the Japanese news agency was reluctant to challenge the authority of the Chinese government. On the other hand, the American news agency focused on the demonstrators and their slogans because of the ideological construction of China by the U.S. as a communist country threatening a free

democracy. Kim (2000) examined how *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* covered two similar democratic movements in Asia: the Tiananmen movement and the Kwangju movement of South Korea in 1980. The results showed that the papers portrayed the former more positively than the latter. Kim argued that the two newspapers were influenced by the U.S. government's response to the respective movements and its foreign policy. The U.S. government provided military support to suppress the Kwangju demonstrations for fear of their effects on South Korean national security and U.S. political investments in that region (p. 24). Thus, the government supported the Korean government's forceful repression of the demonstrators instead of critical responses to the massacre (p. 25). On the contrary, after the Tiannamen massacre, President George Bush supported the demonstrators in Tiananmen as advocates of basic human rights and freedom (p. 24).

Similarly, national interest plays an important role in directing media coverage of international conflicts. How then do the media of different countries reflect their national interests and justify the foreign policies of their governments?

INDEXING HYPOTHESIS AND EXPLOITATION MODEL

One of the theories used for explaining why the mainstream media pursue the foreign policies of their countries is the indexing hypothesis developed by W. Lance Bennett (1990). According to Bennett, "mass media professionals, from the

11

boardroom to the beat, tend to 'index' the range of voices and view points in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic" (p. 106). Thus, when open conflict or political division occurs among decision makers such as members of Congress and the president, the news media tend to reflect a broader range of social voices from grassroots to interest organizations (Bennett, 2003, p. 4). To test this hypothesis, the author examined news articles and op-ed pages of *The New York Times* dealing with U.S. funding for the Nicaraguan contras between January 1, 1983 and October 15, 1986. During this period, the Reagan administration made much effort to support the Contras, but a majority in the House of Representatives raised questions about the legality and efficacy of this military solution. In late 1986, the White House won its lengthy battle with Congress and secured authorization for a $100 million military aid for the Contras. The results showed that the opinions voiced in news stories came overwhelmingly from government officials. Public concerns about "another Vietnam" and "U.S. disregard for Nicaraguan sovereignty" were nearly neglected in the coverage (p. 118). The newspaper seldom reported the results of the public opinion poll, which averaged almost 60 percent of opposition to the U.S. funding for Contras. Opinion on the op-ed pages was indexed to levels of Congressional opposition reported in the news pages. Thus, as the ratio of voices in Congress opposing administration policy increased, so did the ratio of opposing opinions on the op-ed page. On the

contrary, when there was no Congressional activity, the number of oppositional

voices reflected in the newspaper was very low. The correlation between levels of

official opposition to the contra policy in the news and levels of opposition on the

op-ed and editorial pages was high. Based on these results, the author concluded

that "*Times* coverage of Nicaragua was cued by Congress, not by the paper's own

political agenda or by a sense of 'adversarial journalism'" (p. 121). Thus, the

author argued, "the indexing hypothesis offers a point of departure for thinking

about a general theory of the press and the state in the United States" (p. 123).

This hypothesis might be applicable in issues such as military decisions, foreign

affairs, trade, and macroeconomic policy (p. 122).

The theoretical implications of the indexing hypothesis can be found in

Hallin's analysis of coverage on the Vietnam War (Hallin, 1986). According to

Hallin,

> In situations where political consensus seems to prevail, journalists tend to
> act as "responsible" members of the political establishment, upholding the
> dominant political perspective and passing on more or less at face value
> the views of authorities assumed to represent the nation as a whole. In
> situations of political conflict, they become more detached or even
> adversarial… (p. 10).

As the news deals with issues on which consensus is weaker, the principle of

balance is emphasized, and the adversarial ideal of journalism as a checker of

power abuse is reinforced. According to Hallin, before the Tet Offensive[2], which

---

[2] The incident meant simultaneous attacks of Viet Cong on more than 100 sites – almost every
city, town, and military base in South Vietnam. Although the offensive was a failure, it damaged

occurred in January 1968, most U.S. media coverage of Vietnam War lay in the

"Sphere of Consensus," which was highly supportive of U.S. intervention in

Vietnam (p. 9). Within this sphere, the journalist's role is to serve as an advocate

or celebrant of consensus values (p. 117). After that incident, the U.S. media

became more negative toward the war and took a more skeptical stance toward

the administration policy, highlighting the costs of the war and focusing more on

civilian casualties. At this point, coverage of the Vietnam War entered the

"Sphere of Legitimate Controversy" (p. 162). This is the region of electoral

contests and legislative debates of political issues. Within this region, objectivity

and balance reign as supreme journalistic virtues (p. 116). Hallin attributes this

change in coverage approach to the following three elements: growing divisions

among political elites in Washington over the war, declining morale among

American troops in the field, and the spread of the antiwar movement to sectors of

the political mainstream (p. 163). Thus, as the war continued and divisions among

political elites increased, journalists shifted "from a more cooperative or

deferential to a more 'adversarial' stance toward officials and their policies" (p.

9).

The mainstream media, however, do not always follow the viewpoints of

U.S. government in the coverage of a government policy with bipartisan

consensus in Washington (see Mermin, 1996). In his study Mermin examined

---

the credibility of the Johnson administration and shocked the American public, who had believed

14

news coverage in *The New York Times*, ABC's *World News Tonight*, and ABC's *This Week with David Brinkley* on the following three events: the invasion of Panama in 1989, the deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia in 1990, and the ground war phase of the Gulf War in 1991. According to Mermin, the U.S. media held a critical stance on the performance of the U.S. president in their coverage of the U.S. invasion of Panama and the deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia. Although the media did not question the legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy, they questioned the ability of the president to execute this policy successfully in their reportage of these events. However, in reports on the ground war phase of the Gulf War in 1991, the media did not show this critical angle. Instead, articles on this event were almost always celebratory and uncritical (p. 189). Thus, the author argued,

> If the Gulf War coverage appears uniquely uncritical, even for a military action with bipartisan support in Washington, it is in part because reporters, vigilant for signs that American policy might not work as designed, found instead that the president's plan had been executed to perfection (p. 190).

Based on these results, the author contended that when there is no policy debate in Washington the reporters present the ability of the government to achieve the goals it has set concerning an international event (p. 182). Therefore, journalists can show a critical angle although officials are united. Thus, "When conflict is not found among official sources, reporters try to fulfill the idea of independent,

---

the military victory to be imminent (Streitmatter, 1997, p. 193).

balanced coverage by finding conflicting possibilities in the efforts of officials to achieve the goals they have set" (p. 191). The author concludes, "The argument here is not a challenge to the indexing hypothesis, but an amendment" (p. 191).

To explain the relationship between the press and the government, O'Heffernan (1994) suggested a mutual exploitation model in which the media and the government manipulate each other for its own advantage. According to O'Heffernan,

> This model does not see the cooperative symbiosis of a "subtly composite unit" but a dynamic of two very desegregated, aggressive ecosystems constantly bargaining over a series of "wants" while they manipulate both the structure and output of the other for their own advantage. Sometimes the result is mutually beneficial and sometimes it is not (p. 233).

During the Gulf War, the media pursued audience appeal and ratings while the government got public support for the war by controlling the media with overt censorship and secrecy systems (pp. 243-244).

Similarly, theoretical controversies exist concerning the relationship between the press and the government. Bloch & Lehman-Wilzig (2002) summarize the role of mass media in foreign policymaking as an empirical and normative approach (pp. 156-157). The empirical approach, which is based on a libertarian philosophy of government/press relations, sees the mass media as an independent and adversarial watchdog of government actions. On the other hand, the normative one also categorized as "mobilization" (p. 156), views the media as vehicles for supporting the authorities and reinforcing the national consensus in

16

conduct over a crisis. By analyzing commentaries and editorials in *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post* and governmental documents (Presidential documents and State Department press releases) dealing with Bosnian crisis (1992-1995), the authors found that the media played different roles according to the phase of the crisis. In the pre-crisis period (April 6, 1992 ~ February 1, 1993) during which the U.S. did not offer to intervene diplomatically or militarily, the media performed the watchdog role. In the escalation phase (February 10, 1993 ~ June 1994), the media performed the mobilization function, rallying the public around the flag and supporting the government policy. Throughout the crisis, the media used the humanitarian frame. Thus, the authors concluded that the U.S. elite press helped to articulate a rational for humanitarian, military intervention (p. 168).

Accordingly, the relationship between the mass media and the government and the role of media in foreign policymaking can change as the phases of conflicts and issues change. What seems evident from these controversies is that the mass media depend on the voice and agenda of the government in national crises such as a war in which the political consensus is strong.

PROPAGANDA MODEL: "WORTHY VICTIMS" VS. "UNWORTHY VICTIMS"

The "propaganda model" suggested by Herman & Chomsky (1988) describes how the U.S. media served its national interest in covering conflicts. The model "traces the routes by which money and power are able to filter out the

news fit to print, marginalize dissent, and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their messages across the public" (p. 2). Essential elements of the "propaganda model" include concentrated ownership, advertising, reliance of the media on government information, flak as a means of disciplining the media, and anti-communism as a control mechanism.

This propaganda system of U.S. media tends to concentrate on the victims of enemy states ("worthy victims"), while victims of friendly states ("unworthy victims") tend to be neglected in the coverage (pp. 35-37). Thus, the authors suggested the hypothesis that worthy victims would be featured prominently and humanized to appeal to readers' interests and emotions whereas unworthy victims would merit only slight details and little context (p. 35).

This hypothesis was confirmed through several cases. For example, the Soviets shooting down the Korean airliner KAL 007 in 1983 led to an extended campaign denigrating the Soviets and remarkably advanced the Reagan administration's arms plan, whereas Israel shooting down a Libyan civilian airliner in 1973 led to no denunciations from the West (p. 32). The U.S. mass media devoted much attention to the coverage of Jerzy Popieluszko, a Polish priest murdered in 1984. On the contrary, dozens of priests murdered in Latin America in the 1980s received little attention from the U.S. media. In the former case, the coverage described the details regarding the background of the murder, the profound shock of WHOM, and possible links to the Soviet Union. In the

latter cases, coverage of the murders was carried out without detailed

investigation, and the murders were described as remote events in a distant world.

According to Herman & Chomsky (1988),

> While the coverage of the worthy victim was generous with gory details
> and quoted expressions of outrage and demands for justice, the coverage
> of the unworthy victims was low-keyed, designed to keep the lid on
> emotions and evoking regretful and philosophical generalities on the
> omnipresence of violence and the inherent tragedy of human life (p. 39).

Similarly, the propaganda model describes in detail how the U.S. media cover

other countries according to their extent of friendliness to the United States.

However, this model is restricted to describing the performance of mass media in

the United States.

"OUR" WAR VS. "THEIR" WAR

In his study Liebes (1992) discovered that journalists' treatment of their

own country's wars ("our" war) was different from the way they handled wars in

other countries ("their" war). According to the author, Israeli television coverage

of *intifadeh* ("our" war) did not mention the toll of Palestinian deaths and injuries

and contained interviews conducted only with Israeli soldiers and officers, which

blatantly excluded Palestinian spokesmen and participants. Israeli television

demonized Palestinian fighters, labeling them "face-covered," "lawbreakers," and

"Molotov-cocktail throwers" (p. 53). Israeli victims had names and ages; their

deaths or injuries were reported in detail in Israeli television. Social and historical

context was minimized in "our" war. Thus, in the coverage of *intifadeh*, Israeli

television presented the war episodically as if each outbreak were an accident or a surprise (p. 53). On the other hand, the coverage of American networks ABC and NBC of the Palestinian uprising ("their" war) provided a cumulative account of Palestinian victims and showed viewpoints of both Israeli and Palestinian officials. U.S. network television presented *intifadeh* as the continuation of centuries of violent struggle between Arabs and Jews, providing more contexts for the conflict than did Israeli television.

Like Israeli television coverage of *intifadeh*, the CNN coverage of Gulf War represented "our" war principle. Therefore, CNN paid much attention to the losses of U.S. soldiers and ignored those of Iraqi civilians or soldiers. In addition, its coverage of Gulf War was pervaded by the language of good and evil (p. 52). While the U.S. president's rhetoric of a just war fought on moral grounds was emphasized in CNN, Saddam Hussein was portrayed as a threat to the entire free world. CNN coverage also personalized only "our" side:

> While the Iraqis were nowhere in sight, Americans were everywhere: soldiers in tearful farewell scenes; personnel in the desert of Saudi Arabia; families conducting split-screen conversations between desert and home; pilots expressing emotion before and after their missions. Our side was not only the central presence; it was the only side personalized and thus humanized (p. 52).

Accordingly, "our" war coverage tends to excise and demonize the opposite side and to decontextualize aggressive actions taken by both sides.

This argument suggests that journalists tend to report more impartially the conflicts that are not directly related to the interests of their country. Meanwhile,

their coverage of the conflicts involving their own country tends to be biased, demonstrating patriotic or ethnocentric attitude. As Carruthers (2000) notes, journalists often jettison norms of objectivity, detachment and neutrality and redefine their self-image to permit open partisanship when their own country is at war (p. 197).

In summary, media coverage of conflicts is likely to be influenced by national interests including economic and military interests. This was reflected in the heavy dependence of media on government officials and in the neglect of public concerns about government policy. With regards to the arguments mentioned above, *The New York Times* coverage of the Iraqi War takes the approach of "our" war while *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times* coverage of the same war takes the one of "their" war. Thus, it is expected that American and Arab newspapers will reflect different attitudes about the war in their coverage. The expectation for the media tend to follow the foreign policy of their government in times of international crisis can be tested by seeing how the U.S., Saudi, and Egyptian government responded to this war.

RESPONSES OF COUNTRIES TO IRAQI WAR

When the Iraqi War broke out, the Bush administration emphasized that the goal was to oust Saddam Hussein from power and liberate the Iraqi people. President Bush also pledged that America would do its best to spare innocent lives. Prime Minister Tony Blair justified the war by announcing that Iraq

21

threatened freedom and democracy with their weapons of mass destruction and extreme terrorist groups (see Tagliabue, 2003). Most of the U.S. public favored the war although many people around the world opposed it. According to a Gallup survey, about 70 percent of respondents favored the Iraqi War.[3] This figure is a little less than that of respondents who supported the Gulf War: about 80 percent of Americans approved of former president Bush's decision to begin the ground war against Iraq (see The *Gallup Poll Monthly*, 1991, p. 16). Accordingly, the current Bush administration entered the war with much public support and emphasized its humanitarian purposes.

On the contrary, many nations including Russia, China, and France and antiwar demonstrators around the world opposed the war by arguing that it had been initiated without the consent of the United Nations. President Jacques Chirac of France and Russia President Vladimir V. Putin called for an immediate halt to the American-led assault and said that the military action could not be justified in any way (see Tagliabue, 2003). Malaysia and Indonesia, Muslim nations, also condemned the war.

The Saudi Arabian government expressed concern and regret over the U.S.-led military attack on Iraq and requested a diplomatic solution rather than a military war (see Ghafour, 2003). Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal

---

[3] To gauge the U.S. public's attitude to the war, Gallup conducted its survey six times (March 23, March 25, March 30, April 6, April 9, April 10, 2003). Those who favored the U.S. War with Iraq ranged from 67 percent to 72 percent.

warned that the war could fuel Arab hatred for the United States and Britain as

long as it continued (see Hasan, 2003a). He called the attack a "mistake" and

"outside of the framework of international legality" (see Morello & Wax, 2003).

The Consultative Council[4] called for an immediate end to the U.S.-led war on

Iraq and accused the United States and Britain of undermining international law

("Top Saudi body calls for immediate halt to Iraq war," 2003). The Jeddah-based

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)[5] also called for an immediate end

to the war and emphasized a diplomatic solution. This antiwar sentiment was

shown among many Saudi people as well. According to AFP, many Saudis felt

that the war with Iraq would be the first U.S. step toward controlling the entire

Arab world, especially the oil-rich Gulf region (see Abu-Nasr, 2003). AFP

reported, "In the minds of many Saudis the war on Iraq has become intertwined

with Israeli-Palestinian violence, with many parallels between Bush's Iraq

policies and those of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's government toward the

Palestinians" (Abu-Nasr, 2003). Like Saudi Arabia, the Egyptian government

opposed the military solution and requested a peaceful solution. Egypt president

Hosni Mubarak called for a cease-fire in a phone conversation with Bush (see

Morello & Wax, 2003) and said Egypt would take efforts to end the war through

diplomacy (see Nisrawi, 2003). In Cairo about 5,000 demonstrators clashed with

---

[4] This is a 120-member appointed body that advises on proposed laws and government policies in
Saudi Arabia.

police when the war broke out. They directed their anger at the United States and Israel, saying Washington had turned a blind eye to Israeli aggression against Palestinians (see Morello & Wax, 2003).

Accordingly, many nations in the Middle East including the Saudi and Egyptian governments opposed the U.S.-led military attack on Iraq and expressed their concern about instability in the Gulf region that might arise from the war. They feared that the conflict between Arab world and Israel might worsen because of the U.S. war with Iraq. The Saudi government especially was afraid that their country could be the next military target of the United States.

When coalition forces occupied Baghdad in April 10, 2003, the United States and the Arab states showed contrasting attitudes toward the construction of post-war Iraq. The U.S. administration argued that the United States should play a central role in the reconstitution of Iraq's government. To exercise authority on programs involving Iraq, President Bush called on the UN to lift economic sanctions that were first imposed on Iraq in 1990 (see Barringer & Bruni, 2003). In fact, the Iraqi economy has operated through the oil-for-food program under UN supervision since 1995. European leaders, however, did not endorse President Bush's call for the United Nations to lift economic sanctions against Iraq. Arab states including Saudi Arabia and Egypt and Western nations, which were opposed to the war, objected to the U.S.-led construction of the Iraqi government

---

[5] OIC was set up by Islamic states and governments in 1969 to strength Islamic solidarity and

and emphasized the active role of the UN in constructing an independent and sovereign democratic Iraq (see Barringer & Bruni, 2003; Hassan, 2003b). They argued that the future of Iraq should be decided by the Iraqi people themselves with respect to territorial integrity. They rejected the appointment of a U.S. military ruler for a new Iraqi government.

This antiwar attitude on the part of the Saudi and Egyptian governments contrasts starkly with their favorable response to the Gulf War in 1991 when they actively participated in the efforts of U.S.-led coalition forces to liberate Kuwait. During that time, Saudi Arabia played an important role in providing bases and air support to coalition forces. During the Afghanistan War in 2001, the United States was allowed to use the command and control systems at Prince Sultan Air Space in al-Kharj, south of Riyadh ("Saudi Arabia sends strong antiwar message to US," 2002).

Similarly, this Iraqi War brought different responses from the Saudi and Egyptian governments. Despite their favorable diplomatic relationship with the United States for a long time, the countries criticized the United States for its military solution to the Iraqi crisis. These different responses to the Iraqi War by the U.S. and Arab governments provide a background for understanding the attitude of the three newspapers toward the war.

---

cooperation among 56 member states.

Chapter 3: Literature Review on War and Arab Media

Although most analysis has been restricted to U.S. mainstream media, scholars' diverse approaches to war coverage reveal a rich literature on the relationship between the press and the national interest of the countries engaging the war. For Hallin & Gitlin (1993), war is "the ultimate expression of 'purposive-rational' action: that form of human activity that involves the rational mobilization of means to achieve a given end" (p. 414). They analyzed U.S. network evening news, local television news, and CNN coverage of the Gulf War and found that media coverage of the war focused on American prowess, the potency of American technology, and the bravery of American soldiers (p. 414). Their content analysis found that images of tanks, planes, missiles, and U.S. soldiers took up the most percentage of television time. In particular local television promoted support of American troops by broadcasting activities such as wearing yellow ribbons, giving blood, and attending prowar rallies. Thus, the war also was portrayed as a ritual that celebrated and affirmed the unity of the community (p. 420). On the other hand, antiwar rallies seldom appeared in CNN/network or local television coverage.

Reese & Buckalew's study (1995) examined the reasons that the antiwar frame was excluded from mainstream news. Their investigation of the ways in which a U.S. local television covered the Gulf War linked the coverage to the media routines of television news work. Reese & Buckalew used conflict frame,

control frame, and consensus frame to construct a coherent body of coverage. According to their analysis, conflict frame placed antiwar protest in opposition to patriotism for pro-American troops (p. 47). The control frame placed antiwar dissent as a threat to the existing order: dissenters were placed in the same category as terrorists and other criminals. Reporters used the consensus frame to emphasize community solidarity (p. 48). These frames, they concluded, weakened antiwar voices and contributed to supporting U.S. administration policy.

According to Kaid et al. (1993), military action and the commentary of government and military officials occupied almost half of the themes found in five newspapers' coverage of Gulf War: *The Washington Post*, *The London Times*, *Le Monde*, *The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, and *The Asahi*. In contrast stories dealing with war protest and civilian casualties caused by military action occupied less than ten percent of total themes.

The pro-American slant of U.S. mainstream media also was reflected in U.S. intervention in Latin America in the 1980s. As Solomon (1992) pointed out, critical reporting that questions U.S. policy and interests is rare in cases involving U.S. national security (p. 65). He noted that U.S. news magazines portrayed U.S. policy on El Salvador as honorable and well-meaning. On the contrary, the media deprecated the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front), depicting it as a violent, communist group. This anti-communist control mechanism was also used in the cases of U.S. subversion of Guatemala (1947-1954) and U.S. military

attacks on Nicaragua (1981-1987) (see Herman & Chomsky, 1988). The U.S. media likewise portrayed Grenada as a "hotbed of communist insurgents hatching terrorist plots and jeopardizing American lives" (Iyengar & Simon, 1994, p. 183).

This anti-communism is the product of Cold War ideology. During the Vietnam War, U.S. journalists themselves were deeply steeped in this ideology (Hallin, 1986, p. 52). Thus, *The New York Times* often used phrases such as "the Communist threat" and "Red advance" (p. 53). As a result, the war was described as a conflict between a Western-backed regime and communist guerillas although it could just as easily have been described as a war of peasant revolutionaries against a feudal social order or a nationalist struggle against colonial rule. As for the guerillas, nothing was said about their history, organization, or politics (p. 55). Therefore, the progress of U.S. military efforts to block communist expansion was considered more important than the grievances of peasants against their landlords (p. 58). This Cold War ideology made the fundamental questioning of U.S. policy unthinkable (p. 110).

Anthropologist Mark Pedelty conducted an ethnographic study on the culture of foreign correspondents based on his participation in the Salvadoran Foreign Press Corps Association, which covered U.S. intervention in El Salvador in the 1980s (see Pedelty, 1995). The author argued that military press controls, the hierarchical structure of the corps, elite sources, and reporting conventions and rituals heavily influenced reportage of the Salvadorian war. These practices,

28

in conclusion, precluded the U.S. mainstream press from closely examining the purpose, history, and depth of U.S. military intervention (p. 175).

Overall, these analyses suggest that mainstream media coverage of war is influenced by the national interest and foreign policy of the dominant countries, which are engaged in that conflict.

WAR AS PROPAGANDA

Propaganda has always been a part of war (Hiebert, 1993). According to classic definition of Lasswell, it refers to the control of opinion by significant symbols and is used to mobilize hatred against the enemy or to demoralize the enemy in wartime (see Severin & Tankard, 2001, p. 109). By 1990 the U.S. military had developed a new warfare model characterized by PR and psychological operations (Louw, 2003). The media in particular are seen as an important mode of propaganda, which helps mobilize political action through rhetoric and symbolism. In the Gulf War, U.S. and Iraqi governments tried to manage the words and images used to represent the battlefield. In his analysis of the Gulf War, Shaw (1996) argued that coalition governments against Iraq won not only a victory in the military campaign but also in the virtual realm of television:

> The war appeared to be virtually bloodless; fewer than two hundred coalition troops had been killed and the killings of tens or even hundreds of thousands of Iraqi soldiers had been conducted almost entirely out of sight. Propaganda had been largely successful, even if some of the claims for bombing accuracy were later shown to have been misleading (p. 77).

Iraqi soldiers and civilians killed by coalition attacks received little Western media attention.

The Taliban and U.S. officials continually disagreed over the amount of damage caused by the attacks throughout the Afghanistan War. When a U.S. helicopter was found shattered, Taliban officials said that their fighters had shot down the helicopter with anti-aircraft fire (see Shanker & Myers, 2001). U.S. officials argued that it had accidentally crashed while landing in Pakistan. The U.S. Defense Department denied the charge when Taliban Information Ministry official Abdul Hanan Hemat claimed the U.S. forces were using chemical and biological weapons (see Sadik, 2003).

Symbols and rhetorical strategies controlled by the U.S. government and military served as public relations during the Gulf War. According to Cheney (1993), military officials emphasized technical achievement in battle over issues of policy and strongly linked support for the troops and support for U.S. war policy. To legitimize and gain support for the military attack, they highlighted that this war would not be another Vietnam (p. 67). Another important message from Bush was the notion that U.S. fought for a "New World Order," which functioned as a universal value or symbol to provide the rationale for military sacrifice (p. 68). According to Frank (1992), two propaganda blitzes dominated the Gulf War: it was valiantly waged against "the world's fourth largest army" with a high trained "elite Republican Guard"; coalition forces therefore had to put on

history's first high-tech 'Nintendolike" electronic war with "smart bombs" (p.

10). U.S. military commands neglected to show the inaccuracy of many bombings

in which the bombs missed their targets, killing innocent civilians.

During the U.S. War on Afghanistan in 2001, the Pentagon attempted to

make media events appear as bloodless as possible, excluding images of dead

bodies and brutality to show the acceptability of the war (Louw, 2003). This

strategy was used in order not to repeat mistakes made in the Vietnam War,

during which televised image of blood caused the U.S. public to swing in favor

against the war. A 'villain/victim' dichotomy was a widespread discursive

strategy (p. 222). Thus, U.S. coverage of the war focused on its goals not only to

destroy terrorists' networks but also to liberate Afghanistan citizens from the

repressive Taliban regime. Dropping food into Afghanistan played a role in

softening the American image and the purported aim of liberating women in

Afghanistan became another important component of the PR repertoire for the

war.

RESPONSES OF MEDIA IN OTHER COUNTRIES TO THE GULF WAR

The Gulf War was an international incident, which brought global interest

and concern. One commonality found in the literature is that media in other

countrie s were heavily dependent on Western news agencies and CNN in the

coverage of the Gulf War (see Corcoran, 1992; Nain, 1992; Sahin, 1992; Sainath,

1992). The direction of reporting in many other countries was different, reflecting the social and historical conditions of the countries' media.

Like U.S. media, British media emphasized smart weapons and their effectiveness in advancing ground forces while ignoring their effect on the Iraqi civilian infrastructure (Corcoran, 1992; Shaw & Carr-Hill, 1992). There was also little speculation about the numbers of Iraqi military casualties until the war was over. Opinion polls in Britain showed that the majority of the British public was for the war (Shaw & Carr-Hill, 1992, p. 146). According to a survey conducted in Britain during the Gulf War, 68 percent of respondents found television coverage to be "patriotic" and only 2 percent saw television as "too critical of the war" (p. 149). Accordingly, the British media showed a prowar frame, reflecting the political and historical situation of Britain's longstanding initimacy with the United States.

The response of the Turkish media to the Gulf War was mixed (Sahin, 1992). Turkish Radio and Television (TRT), run by the state, presented the official position of Turkish government, which favored a Turkish policy against Saddam Hussein and remained in close touch with George Bush. On the other hand, the printed press in Turkey assumed a critical stance on Turkey's active involvement in the war.

The Indian press denounced the war when the Gulf War broke out and criticized the United States for pushing the world to a needless war (Sainath,

1992). This antiwar reporting, however, was suffused with prowar news reports that came from Western news agencies. In India, foreign news published in major Indian newspapers mostly come from Western news agencies. Sainath, a journalist in India, attended several meetings organized by Indian journalists' unions to examine Gulf War coverage. Indian journalists expressed the romanticizing of the technologies used in the war, the vicious demonization of Arabs and Iraqis, and the lack of context to the war as main concerns of war coverage (1992, p. 72).

The Malaysian press linked the Gulf War to the increasing might of Israelis, the corresponding loss of power by the Arab nations, and Western interference in West Asia (Natin, 1992). The religious implications of the war were heavily covered by these newspapers. Thus, the scene of Saddam at prayer regularly accompanied news items, and the presence of U.S. forces in the Gulf was seen as an attempt to split up the Muslim community (p. 83). This antiwar reporting might reflect the historically close relationship that the government has maintained with the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) and the fact that about half of the population in Malaysia is Muslim.

In summary, these results suggest that the media coverage of international crisis is determined by the extent of the political and cultural proximity to regions or countries engaging the conflict. The ownership structure to which the media belong was another factor influencing coverage. The heavy dependence of media

in developing countries on Western news agencies indicates that Western political and cultural influence is still immense in these countries.

RESPONSES OF ARAB MEDIA TO GULF WAR

Few studies have been conducted on Arab media coverage of the war; however the ones that exist provide illuminating perspectives on the responses of the Middle Eastern press to the Gulf War.

Mowlana et al. (1992) qualitatively analyzed 250 editorials from respected Iranian, Egyptian, and Jordanian newspapers. The Iranian press criticized Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the role of Saudi Arabia in the buildup of U.S. military forces in the Gulf region. The editorials also expressed a strong opposition to U.S. motives for interfering in the Persian Gulf crisis and to the threat of Saddam Hussein acting against Islamic interests (p. 168). The United States was described as "leading a Western conspiracy to gain control of the economic and political climate of the Middle East for its own gains and prestige" (p. 170). Especially, the control of oil resources and the breakdown of Arab unity were portrayed as two main goals of U.S. intervention. This anti-U.S. atmosphere and anti-Saddam Hussein sentiment, which appeared in Iranian press coverage of the Gulf War, was also supported by the study of Motamed-Nejad et al. (1992), who analyzed how two major Tehran dailies, *The Ettelaat* and *The Kayhan*, covered the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war. They argued that the Persian Gulf War provided Tehran journalists with a special case because of

Iran's previous war with Iraq (1980-1988), Iran's geopolitical situation in the region, and the impact of the Islamic Revolution on other Islamic countries (p. 99). The results showed that anti-U.S. and anti-allied forces stories accounted for almost half of those stories reported by the two papers during the Gulf War. In reporting the war, the papers were heavily dependent on Iranian news agencies, whose stories were mostly translations of stories from major international news agencies. Anti-Iraq and anti-Saddam Hussein stories made up 41.8 percent of the total stories, which appeared during the Iraqi aggression on Kuwait (p. 101).

In addition to showing a strong opposition to the war, the Jordanian press connected the Gulf crisis to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reflecting the stance of a national population largely composed of Palestinians (Mowlana et al., 1992, p. 171). Its editorialists criticized the West's culture of violence and attempt to control oil resources.

While most editorials from the two countries took an antiwar or anti-United States position, Egyptian editorials showed mixed responses to the war due to the split between a government policy that supported U.S.-led coalition forces against Iraq and civic groups that opposed U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf crisis. The editorialists who aligned with the Egyptian administration criticized Iraqi aggression on Kuwait and supported the use of military force as a solution to the aggression, emphasizing the military superiority of the coalition forces (p. 172). In contrast a group of intellectuals expressed their antiwar attitude

in editorials and stated their concern over the exclusive supremacy of the United States in the Gulf region.

Overall, these results suggest that the press in Iran, Jordan, and Egypt showed a strong opposition to U.S. strategic interests in the Gulf region in covering the Gulf War although the press supportive of the Egyptian government showed a favorable response to the war. The presses reflected the fear of many Arab nations that the United States would increase its influence on the Gulf region militarily and politically by engaging in the war. At that time, these papers depended heavily on the Western international news agencies for information about the war. As will be discussed later, this dependent situation currently is changing due to the growth of Arab-owned satellite news channels.

The Arab News **Coverage of the Afghan War**

As noted earlier, *The Arab News* presented a more antiwar position than *The New York Times* in covering the U.S. War on Afghanistan, which began on October 8, 2001. More so than the latter, the former tried to represent what Taliban officials had said and to report the damage caused by U.S. bombing on Afghanistan. *The Arab News* coverage of Afghan civilian and Taliban military casualties was strongly based on the information provided by Pakistan-based Afghan Islamic Press (AIP). It is a news agency close to the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The analysis showed that *The Arab News* mentioned AIP 29 times whereas *The New York Times* did so only 4 times (Lee, 2002).

The newspaper also urged the U.S. effort to solve the Israel-Palestinian conflict as soon as possible before engaging the war because it considered the continued U.S. support of the Israeli government to be an important cause of the 9.11 terrorist attacks. In fact, the Arab media have been critical of U.S. support for Israel positions for a long time. The Arab-Israeli conflict has been the major political preoccupation in the Arab world since the late 1940s (Rugh, 1987, p. 7). Most Arab governments have declared their support for the struggle against the Israeli army. According to Ayish (2002), Arab television including the Syrian Satellite Channel and Abu Dhabi and Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel were supportive of Palestinians in their struggle for independence, *intifadeh*. On the contrary, three broadcasters showed a negative attitude toward Israel and United States. The United States was presented as "unjustly accusing the Palestinians of inciting violent actions against Israel and as callously oblivious to the high number of Palestinian deaths resulting from Israeli overuse of force" (p. 147). All broadcasters used the term "martyr" to refer to Palestinians killed by Israeli forces while referring to Israelis as "aggressors" (p. 150). The author argues that this pro-Palestinian attitude reflects Arab television's commitment to enhancing Palestinian national interests as a pan-Arab cause (p. 147).

Similarly, *The Arab News* like some other Arab media was critical of U.S. engagement in war. Although *The Arab News* is published in Saudi Arabia, which has maintained a close relationship with the United States especially since the

Gulf War, the newspaper showed a negative response to the conflict engaging the United States and represented a pro-Palestinian tendency. From this, we can infer the editorial policy of the newspaper toward the United States and Palestinian issue.

CHARACTERISTICS OF ARAB MEDIA

What are the characteristics of the Arab media and what role do they play in Arab society? Rugh (1987) lists strong political influences, weak economic base, and the absence of an independent "Fourth Estate" concept as main characteristics of Arab media (p. 11). Thus, the Arab media are characterized as a system close to an authoritarian press system (Siebert et al., 1956) in which the media support and advance the policies of the government in power and service the state. Such presses are prohibited from publishing or broadcasting criticism of the state national system, military officers, and Islamic religious leaders (Amin, 2002). The government has complete control over the authorization, renewal, and revocation of licenses. Strong censorship is one of characteristics of Arab media, which obstructs freedom of expression (Amin, 2002). Journalists continue to be victims of harassment and political pressures, which include restraints on travel, physical assault, arrests, detention, exile, and so on (p. 127). Freedom of speech is restricted in almost the entire Arab world (Hafez, 2001). This Arab press environment is differentiated from social responsibility system on which the U.S. press is based. The Arab press has also strong ties to Arab culture and Islamic

traditions historically. Therefore, readings from the Koran are broadcast regularly

by stations all over the Arab world. Rugh (1987) divides Arab newspapers into

three types: mobilization press, loyalist press, and diverse press. The mobilization

press[6] is highly respectful of the national leadership and usually owned by agents

of the ruling group. This press system has emerged in countries where the ruling

group was actively dedicated to revolutionary change for modernization. The

regimes in these seven countries regard the press as an important tool for the

mobilization of popular support for its political programs (p. 33). Because the

head of the national ruling group is usually head of the political party or other

agency which owns the press, the regimes can exercise direct censorship over

newspapers. Although the function of the loyalist press[7] is similar to that of the

mobilization press, the former is mostly owned by private individuals, families,

and groups (p. 72). This press system exists in countries where a more traditional

system like monarchy prevails. In the loyalist press, the government is a major

source of revenue in the form of government advertisements, direct subsidies, and

subscription for government employees (p. 79). Government officials often

contact newspaper personnel informally to clarify specific government policy

issues and to advise personnel on emphasizing and keeping sensitive certain

information (p. 88). While the mobilization press and loyalist press similarly

---

[6] Daily newspapers in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya, South Yemen, and the Sudan belong to
this type.

39

support the policies of their regimes and political leaders, the diverse press[8] is characterized by a variety of viewpoints. This press system allows for public expression of a variety of opinions and viewpoints including criticism of government.

Similarly, most Arab newspapers have been supportive of governments and dominant elite groups. The strong political influence on the media made the press conductive to non-diverse, relatively passive, and politically conformist status. This also hindered the development of a free press.

The readership of newspapers in the Middle East is restricted because the illiteracy rate in the Arab world is quite high (Amin, 2001). Whereas people in most Arab countries have relatively easy access to radio and television, which are mostly owned by the government, newspapers are consumed by elite groups (Rugh, 1987, p. 4). Newspaper readers in the 1980s comprised under 10 percent of the total population in the Arab world (p. 5).

In addition to authoritarian elements, the Arab press is characterized by much shorter and more opinionated stories. Arab daily newspapers average eight to ten pages in length; news stories tend to be shorter and headlines bolder and longer than in the Western press (p. 16). In addition, the Arab media are active in their opinion function with the exception of rarely being able to criticize the

---

[7] This type appears in six Arab countries—Jordan, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

[8] The example of this press system can be found in Lebanon, Kuwait and Morocco.

government. Thus, there is scarcely any distinction between news stories and editorials. According to Rugh (1987),

> Specific opinions, attitudes and articulation of goals which are expressed in Arab media are usually those of a small elite group, but there is not much two-way exchange. Letters to the editor are rarely published. Non-governmental sentiment is sometimes expressed, but it is filtered through a few editors, so the flow of opinions is rather restricted (p. 17).

Therefore, the ideal of American journalism, which is to strictly separate news and commentary, is seldom found in Arab newspapers. Arab journalism also suffers from low pay and a shortage of trained professional journalists. This has led to many part-time journalism jobs, which are common in most Arab societies. For these reasons, as Napoli (2003) notes, most journalists in Egypt stick more closely to their religious, political or personal loyalties than to professional principles. It should be noted, however, that a great deal has changed since the Rugh's study (1987). As will be discussed later, the growth of Internet and satellite television in the Arab world beginning in the early 1990s is reshaping the environment of Arab media, reducing the ability of governments to control the flow of information and providing Arab people with diverse source of news (see Amin, 2002; Ayish, 2002; Ghareeb, 2000). Regional competition has also contributed to the alteration of ownership, accelerating the privatization of Arab media. As Amin (2002) notes, Arab press syndicates as well as the Union of Arab journalists have begun to take significant efforts toward greater press freedom, especially in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt (p. 134).

Media Environment in Saudi Arabia and Egypt

Saudi Arabia is a major owner of Arabic-language print and electronic media both in and outside the Arab world (Boyd, 2001). Members of or those close to the royal family, Al Saud, own London-based MBC, *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, Rome-headquartered Orbit, and Jeddah-located ART. Among dozens of daily newspapers published in the country, *Al-Riyad* and *Al-Bilad* are the most popular Arabic newspapers. Saudi Arabia has two English-language newspapers: *The Saudi Gazette* and *The Arab News. The Saudi Gazette*, published by Okaz, is targeted to foreign workers, most of who come from India and Philippines (Wright, 2004). *The Arab News* began as the first Saudi English-language newspaper in 1975 (see its Web site, www.arabnews.com). It is a paper owned by Saudi Research & Publishing Co. (SRPC) with a circulation of 51, 768 (ABC, January~June 1998). The SRPC, owned by Saudi princes, is the publisher of leading newspapers and magazines in Kingdom including *Asharq Al-Awsat*. According to its Web site, 85% of its audience is non-Arab and 15% is Arab. Its readership consisted primarily of people engaged in business and management. The newspaper is distributed in many countries, including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Europe and the USA. There are 16 staff writers including correspondents in Washington, most of who are educated in the United Kingdom and the United States.

The country also provides the most widely distributed private pan-Arab newspapers, *Al-Hayat* and *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*. Saudi Arabia, however, has the most controlled media system in the Gulf region. A censorship committee with representatives from different government ministries monitors all local and foreign publications (Amin, 2001, p. 27). Because members of the royal family own or control most of the Saudi press, nothing provocative can be said about Islam, the official religion of Kingdom, the royal family, headed by King Fahd, and the government, led by Crown Prince Abdullah (see Wright, 2004). Even editor-in-chief of a newspaper is ultimately approved by the Minister of Interior, who is also in charge of the country's secret police.

Compared with tightly controlled media environment in Saudi Arabia, Egyptian media are less restricted. The Egyptian press is one of the most advanced in the Arab world with Cairo, the capital of Egypt, considered the largest publishing center in the region (Amin, 2001). The press is dominated by four publishing houses: Al-Ahram, Dar Akhbar Al-Yum, Dar Al-Tahrir and Dar Al-Hilal (p. 25). The three most influential dailies are *Al-Ahram*, *Al-Akhbar*, and *Al-Jumhuriya*, which are controlled by the government. Egypt has three English-language weekly papers: *The Al-Ahram Weekly*, *The Cairo Times*, and *The Middle East Times*. *The Al-Ahram Weekly*, owned by the Al-Ahram organization, was founded in February 1991 to provide English-language readers with in-depth coverage of Egyptian and Arab society (see its Web site, weekly.ahram.org.eg).

The Cairo Times first appeared in March 1997 and has featured hard-hitting news and business reporting, as well as commentary and insightful looks at issues and personalities in Arab world (see www.cairotimes.com). According to the editor, Grahame Bennett, *The Middle East Times* was established in 1983 and has a print readership of about 10, 000 (email to the author, February 11, 2004). It's privately owned and located in Nicosia, Cyprus. It is distributed mainly in Egypt and United Kingdom. Staff writers vary from 6 to 12 depending upon circumstances. Its online version (www.metimes.com) records over five million hits per month. Recently Egypt has introduced private newspapers such as *Al-Usbua* and *Alam Al-Yum*.

In summary, the Arab media are characterized by strong governmental control, a weak economic base, a strong opinion function, and many part-time journalists. These characteristics provide fundamental background for understanding the story format, tone, and composition of *The Arab New*s and *The Middle East Times*.

Chapter 4: Research Questions and Method

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

As discussed before, media coverage of conflicts may be determined by the journalists' ethnocentric bias and the national interests of the country to which they belong as well as the ownership structure or editorial policy of the media. As the literature showed, the institutional media in the United States engaging a war seldom reported the purpose of the crisis and the damage of an attacked country caused by bombings. On the other hand, the Arab media, which belonged to countries opposed to U.S. perspective, represented antiwar or anti-United States voices, and criticized U.S. strategic interests in the conflict region.

Absence of Critical Reporting

One of the main criticisms of U.S. media war coverage is that they seldom question U.S. policy in the conflict region. As Kellner (1993) pointed out, the U.S. mainstream media failed to inform the public about the consequences of the Gulf War, alternatives to a military solution, and the people who would primarily benefit from the war (pp. 38-39). Large antiwar movements and opinions were ignored. Although U.S. mainstream media reported criticism of the Bush administration frequently during November 1990, much of the reported criticism was procedural rather than substantive (Entman & Page, 1994). Therefore, few fundamental criticisms of administration policy including war costs and

justifiability of U.S. policy appeared. In particular the links between the Iran-Iraq

War and the Gulf War, and the economic motives underlying the Gulf War were

not reported by the mainstream media (Corcoran, 1992, p. 110). As Frank (1992)

pointed out, the most obvious economic reason for the Gulf War was oil. Frank

also argued that Bush and Hussein started the war to manage their domestic

economic problems in the face of a worldwide economic recession (p. 5).

Mowlana (1992) pointed out three major reasons underlying the Persian

Gulf War which were ignored by Western media: the sales price of oil; the capital

flow from the Gulf region; and the U.S. drive for a new world order (p. 36). That

is, the political and military access to the region by coalition forces was necessary

because U.S. allies such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were able to control the oil

production and guarantee low price levels for the West. In fact, after the Iran-Iraq

cease-fire, Kuwait increased its oil output in violation of an OPEC agreement.

This move had the effect of driving down the price of oil (Corcoran, 1992).

Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were major sources of global capital flow

with huge amount of investments abroad. Since the early 1970s, the United States

and Europe have profited substantially form the Arab investment cache abroad as

well as from military orders and the luxurious lifestyles associated with the

princes of the Gulf region (Mowlana, 1992, p. 39). Another reason for the United

States to intervene in the Gulf region was to "have the leading role in determining

the political and security arrangements in this region by protecting its old Arab

allies and Israel" (pp. 39-40). This was an attempt to test the new world order concept echoed by President Bush in light of the declining influence of Russia in the region.

U.S. network television news coverage of the Gulf War was heavily episodic or event-oriented (Iyengar & Simon, 1994). Consequently, analyses of historical antecedents for the conflict and information about the social and cultural makeup of Iraqi and Kuwaiti society were provided rarely. Especially coverage of the prewar situation obscured the historical background of the Bush and Reagan administrations' support for Saddam Hussein (Paletz, 1994). The U.S. press did not inform the public of the U.S. role in aiding Saddam Hussein throughout the eight-year Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). The background of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict was also neglected (p. 283). This episodic news programming strengthened public support for a military resolution to the crisis (Iyengar & Simon, 1994).

Due to the absence of social and historical context for the Gulf War in the media coverage, most people knew little about many critical aspects of the background of the war. In a survey conducted in Denver, Colorado between February 2 and 4, 1991, only 2 percent of respondents identified Kuwait's insistence on lowering oil price as a reason for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Morgan et al., 1992). Most people (80 percent) were aware that Hussein had used chemical weapons against Iran or members of his own population although this

fact had been questioned by reports (p. 221). About half of the respondents stated that the United States should intervene with military force to restore the sovereignty of any illegally occupied country (p. 220). The public's knowledge level on the basic facts of the political situation in the Middle East was low. Only 15 percent were able to identify the Palestinian protest against Israeli occupation, the *Intifada* and just 3 percent were aware of Syria's occupation of Lebanon in 1976. The authors concluded that the U.S. media failed in their role as information providers and in their duty to be objective. The media communicated facts that supported the administration policy and ignored those that did not. Their message, the authors argued, consisted of three claims: (1) "The enemy is pure evil incarnate," (2) "We are winning," and (3) "God is on our side" (p. 230).

This absence of critical perspective in reporting the war also characterized U.S. mainstream news magazines' coverage of U.S. intervention in Panama. Gutierrez-Villalobos et al.'s study (1994) demonstrated that *Time* and *Newsweek* offered little strategic opposition to the U.S. administration policy in their coverage of the conflict. Here strategic critique means questioning "the underlying assumptions and worldview of U.S. foreign policy" (p. 618). On the contrary, *The Nation*, a left-oriented publication, was vehemently critical of the U.S. administration policy. For *Time* and *Newsweek*, the five dominant positions were following according to Guiterrez-Villalobos et al.: Noriega is unpopular in his own country; Noriega is a smuggler of drugs; Noriega's government is

undemocratic; Nonspecific support for the Bush administration; Nonspecific

opposition to the Bush administration. *The Nation*'s five most common positions

contain nonspecific opposition to the Bush administration, nonspecific opposition

to the invasion, opposition to U.S. policy, the United States violating Panama's

sovereignty, and Panama as a case of North-South conflict (pp. 623-624).

On the whole, these results suggest that the U.S. mainstream press did not

provide sufficiently the social and historical background of the crises and their

impact on society. As Dickson pointed out, the press tended to serve the U.S.

government line in a foreign policy crisis (1994, p. 817). It failed to reflect

diverse viewpoints, to question the U.S. policy goals and to fulfill its mission as a

watchdog of the government (Dickson, 1992, p. 571).

Based on such reporting routines and practices often found in U.S. media

coverage of a crisis and the critical literature on Arab media, the researcher

suggested the following research questions and hypotheses:

RQ 1: What aspect of war is emphasized?

H1a: *The New York Times* is more likely to emphasize war efforts than

Arab newspapers; the latter will devote more space to the antiwar voice

than the former.

H1b: Compared with *The New York Times*, Arab media will place more

emphasis on the critique of U.S. strategic interests.

Dependence on Official Sources

As discussed previously, mainstream media tend to depend on official sources when they report crises. As Bennett's indexing hypothesis (1990) suggests, the mass media are likely to marginalize public opinion and to conform to contours of debate found among political elites. In particular the U.S. media have formed symbiotic relationships with White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department in Washington, D.C. out of economic necessity and reciprocity of interest (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Cook (1994), who analyzed U.S. network news coverage of the first two months after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, found that these three newsbeats were responsible for half of the overall airtime from domestic newsbeats and about 80 percent of the domestically derived lead stories on the Gulf crisis. Although the crisis was international in nature from the beginning, the news was reported more heavily from domestic newsbeats than from foreign ones. During the earlier phase of Vietnam War (1961-1965), *The New York Times* tied the news closely to official sources and the Washington agenda; likewise U.S. network television coverage was highly dependent on official sources in Washington and on military sources in Vietnam (p. 110). As is well known, the media had extraordinary freedom to report the Vietnam War without direct government control. This was the first and last American war with no military censorship (Streitmatter, 1997, p. 189).

Although the case of the Vietnam War was exceptional, the heavy dependence of the press on officials is related to media control by the administration managing the conflict. For example, news about the Gulf War was carefully managed by the U.S. government and military (Hiebert, 1993). There were security guidelines about what kind of news was too sensitive to be covered. Thus, journalists could seldom cover stories dealing with troop movements or military operations. In addition, all reports had to be submitted to a Joint Information Bureau of the military forces in Saudi Arabia, which reviewed them for sensitive security information (p. 31). Reporters were only able to visit troops when escorted by public affairs officers. During the war, journalists had few other sources of information with access to the front, which was limited both by military restrictions and by the technological nature of the war. Reporters were integrated with the military in a "newspool" system where they were fed selected information in briefings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (Shaw, 1996, pp. 73-74). The military gave uninformative or guarded briefings, and these tactics deprived the American public of detailed knowledge and understanding of the war (Paletz, 1994). The public had little opportunity to discuss the pros and cons of the military option because of news media's dependence on officialdom (Cook, 1994).

According to Pedelty (1995), the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador, the Salvadoran government press office, and the Armed Forces Press Service became

51

important news sources for foreign correspondents covering the conflict in El Salvador. The U.S. mainstream newspapers, *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, were heavily dependent on U.S. officials in their coverage of the U.S.-Nicaragua conflict (Dickson, 1992). Reporters rarely turned to the Contras, the major opposition to the Sandinista government, and Nicaraguan officials. Furthermore, the majority of news stories about the conflict were reported by the staff of both papers. Less than a fourth of the stories were reported by the papers' correspondents based in Nicaragua or Latin America (p. 565). In covering the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989, *The New York Times* relied heavily on Washington political elites and Latin American officials (Dickson, 1994). Thus, the comments and opinions of Panamanians on the conflict were rarely reflected in the newspaper. More importantly, the heavy dependence of the U.S. elite newspaper on officials brought U.S. government agenda to the fore. Sixty-one percent of all themes found in the newspaper were those that the U.S. government used to legitimize the intervention whereas 39 percent were nongovernmental themes which were contrary to or critical of the invasion (p. 813). The former included Noriega as drug-trafficker (21%), the triumph of democracy in Panama (9%), and invasion as an act of self-defense to save Americans in danger (7%) while the latter contained condemnation of the invasion by other countries (10%), invasion as a violation of international law (9%), and longstanding U.S. support for Noriega (6%). Therefore, Dickson

argued, *The New York Times* rarely questioned U.S. justification for the invasion of Panama (p. 817).

Based on the indexing hypothesis and heavy dependence of the media on their official sources which is often found in the coverage of war the researcher suggested the following research questions and hypotheses:

RQ 2: What sources do the three papers depend on most heavily?

H2a: *The New York Times* will be more dependent on U.S. officials while Arab newspapers will cite Arab officials more.

H2b: *The New York Times* will be more dependent on sources favorable toward the war than Arab newspapers.

Episodic vs. Thematic Framing

According to Iyengar & Simon (1994), the television network news organizations frame issues in either episodic or thematic terms. The former depicts public issues from the standpoint of concrete instances or specific events whereas the latter places public issues in some general or abstract context, highlighting the historical background and interpretive analysis of the issues. According to Iyengar (1991), event-oriented report such as the plight of a homeless person, a teenage drug user or the bombing of an airliner belong to the former while changes in government welfare expenditures, congressional debates over the funding of employment training programs, and the social or political grievances of groups undertaking terrorist activity belong to the latter (p. 14).

53

As discussed earlier, the U.S. network television coverage of the Gulf War was heavily episodic. This episodic framing was also dominant in the coverage of terrorism, election campaigns, and mass-protest movements (Iyengar, 1991). According to Iyengar's analysis of U.S. network television coverage of terrorism (1981~1986), 74 percent of all news stories consisted of live reports of some specific terrorist act, group, victim, or event (episodic) while 26 percent consisted of reports that discussed terrorism as a general political problem (thematic) (see Iyengar, 1991). In another example of episodic framing, the networks also framed election campaigns as a horse race, not focusing much on the ideological stances of the candidates and their policy platforms (p. 15). In covering labor disputes and antiwar demonstrations, the media emphasized the specific acts of protest rather than the causes that gave rise to the protests.

The use of either episodic or thematic news framing affected how individuals assigned responsibility for political issues. According to Iyengar, "the episodic framing tends to elicit individualistic rather than societal attributions of responsibility, while thematic framing has the opposite effect" (1991, pp. 15-16). Thus, exposure to episodic news made viewers attribute the cause of social issues to individual rather than to broader societal forces.

As discussed earlier, the U.S. media lacked critical reporting in the coverage of war. This is because the media were heavily episodic and did not focus much on the social and historical background of the war. On the other hand,

54

the Arab media were more concerned with U.S. strategic intervention in the Gulf region and so focused heavily on U.S. intentions behind the war. Thus, the researcher suggested the following research question and hypothesis:

RQ 3: To what extent is the coverage episodic or thematic?

H3: Compared with that of *The New York Times*, the coverage of Arab newspapers will be more thematic.

Dehumanization of an Oppositional Leader

When a war begins, oppositional leaders are often dehumanized. The regime of the military target is destabilized and made to look unreasonable and irrational through political and diplomatic manoeuvres (Louw, 2003).

This dehumanization of the enemy appeared in the U.S. network television coverage of the Vietnam War. According to Hallin (1986), the North Vietnamese and Vietcong were portrayed as "fanatical," "suicidal," "savage," and "halfcrazed" (p. 158). Television coverage highlighted their terrorism and atrocities against civilians. Thus, this "had the important effect of putting them outside the political realm, making them appear more as criminals than as a political movement or rival government" (p. 158). Meanwhile, stories dealing with the political tactics or history of North Vietnamese and Vietcong seldom appeared in U.S. media.

During the Gulf War, the U.S. mainstream media aided Bush by using popular culture to demonize Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis. Saddam Hussein was

portrayed as brutal, dictatorial, and merciless (Cheney, 1993). He was depicted as

a modern Hitler, eager to annex Kuwait and control the world's supply of

petroleum (Iyengar & Simon, 1994). Hitler was the symbol that the U.S.

government used in the press to establish a case for military action (Bennett,

2003). An example that shows the demonization of Saddam Hussein and Iraqis in

the Gulf War was the charge against Iraq that 312 premature Kuwaiti babies were

torn from incubators that were then shipped to Baghdad. This account was based

on the testimony of a young Kuwait girl before U.S. Congress. The story,

however, was disputed by Kuwaiti doctors and nurses (see Corcoran, 1992, p.

108). Long after the war, it was revealed that the girl was the daughter of

Kuwait's ambassador to the United States and that her testimony had been part of

a publicity effort by Hill & Knowlton, a Washington public relations firm (see

Bennett, 2003, p. 55). The Kuwait government and its royal family paid the

company $11.5 million to conduct a campaign that would drum up U.S. support

for a war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi invasion. In the end, the testimony then

proved to be false (p. 56).

Political cartoons in U.S. newspapers reinforced this negative image of an

Iraqi president. Conners's analysis (1998) showed that the representation of

Saddam Hussein as an aggressor was the most prominent of all images followed

by representations of Hussein as criminal, greedy, bestial, etc.

A similar process of villainization also appeared in the 1989 Panama operation to remove General Noriega from power (see Louw, 2003). As discussed before, the most dominant theme found in *The New York Times* coverage of U.S. invasion of Panama was a description of Noriega as a drug trafficker (Dickson, 1994).

Similarly, the tendency to treat one person as the repository of evil is widespread in the discourse of war. By casting Hussein as Hitler, the Bush administration placed the origins of the Gulf conflict in an individual's villainy rather than as the outcome of its foreign policy (Dorman & Livingston, 1994). As Cheney (1993) notes, focusing the conflict on the person of Saddam Hussein tended to blind people to the death of Iraqi soldiers and civilians during the war (p. 71). This negative framing of Hussein and the Iraqis excluded a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the crisis (Kellner, 1993).

In the more recent Iraqi War, the Bush administration emphasized that Saddam Hussein harbored international terrorists including Al-Qaeda, repressed Iraqi people with ethnic cleansing and torture, and defied the UN resolution requesting inspections for weapons of mass destruction.

Based on the fact that the U.S. mainstream media highlighted a negative image of Hussein during the Gulf War and often followed the dictates of U.S. foreign policy, the researcher presented the following research question and hypothesis:

RQ 4: How is Saddam Hussein portrayed?

H4: *The New York Times* is likely to describe Saddam Hussein more negatively than Arab newspapers.

Description of War

To analyze how the war is described in both papers is another way to compare the newspapers' positions on the war. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld outlined the objective of the war as 1) ending the regime of Saddam Hussein, 2) identifying and eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, 3) driving out terrorists from that country, 4) delivering much needed humanitarian aid to Iraqi citizens, and 5) helping the Iraqi people create conditions for a transition to representative self-government (see Cordesman & Burke, 2003). In 'the national address,' President Bush also highlighted that the war aimed to help Iraqis achieve a united, stable and free country. He said,

> Our nation enters this conflict reluctantly -- yet, our purpose is sure. The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder. We will meet that threat now, with our Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard and Marines, so that we do not have to meet it later with armies of fire fighters and police and doctors on the streets of our cities (The White House, March 19, 2003).

He added, "We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people." This indicates that the Bush administration emphasized that the war was initiated for humanitarian and moral purposes rather than out of interventional and occupational intentions.

58

As the literature showed, the U.S. mainstream press closely followed the U.S. government officials in transmitting their images and viewpoints of the war. On the contrary, the Arab media were critical of civilian damage caused by bombings and of U.S. strategic interests in the Gulf region.

Thus, the researcher brought the following research question and hypothesis:

RQ 5: How is the war described?

H5: Compared with Arab newspapers, the descriptions found in *The New York Times* will be likely to reflect the war discourse of the U.S. administration.

In addition to these categories, the researcher analyzed story type, story byline, and story origin through content analysis. While the quantitative method focused on identifying how the newspapers framed the war, the qualitative analysis was centered on the following two themes: the portrayal of Arab satellite news channel and the frame of embedded journalists.

The Growth of Arab Satellite News Channels and Their Portrayal

As the literature demonstrated, the CNN and Western news agencies played an important part in transmitting war information to people in developing countries during the Gulf War. However, the remarkable growth of Arab media in the past few decades is changing this dependent relationship. As Ayish (2002)

explained, "The 1990s are viewed as a formative decade for the development of a new Arab world television system characterized by media abundance, diversity, and globalism" (p. 138). In 1991 London-based Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC)[9] went on the air, followed by Arab Radio and Television Network (ART)[10], Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel[11], and Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International (LBCI).[12] Ayish (2002) attributed this growth of commercial or private Arab satellite news channels to the effect of CNN coverage of the Gulf War on Arab governments and the emergence of new Arab journalists who have been trained in the United States. The author argued that CNN's live coverage of war events and its worldwide news services had a large impact on Arab media environment and Arab television news formats (p. 139). This growth also suggested that the Arab world had its own means to expand its voice and identity. According to Ghareeb (2000), these new media have broken the monopoly of Western control over sources of information. Second, they have transformed the way many Arabs receive their news as well as entertainment programs and reduced the ability of Arab governments to control the flow of information. The

[9] MBC was owned by Shaykh Salih Kamil and Shaykh Walid bin Ibrahim al-Ibrahin, who had close ties to the Saudi Royal Family (Ghareeb, 2000, p. 402). The channel carried credible news programs with Western-style reporting but avoided sensitive issues, especially those dealing with Saudi Arabia.

[10] Shaykh Salih Kamil pulled out of MBC in 1993 and launched ART, mainly an entertainment channel, offering movies, children's programs, and Islamic culture (p. 403).

[11] Begun in November 1, 1996, this channel has become the most widely viewed news network in the Arab world for its independence and willingness to break taboos imposed by Arab governments (Ghareeb, 2000, p. 405).

author argued that the popularity of new media in the Arab world is a reflection of Arab dissatisfaction with both Western and governmental media coverage of the Arab region and its issues (p. 400).

Of these channels, Al Abu Dhabi and Al-Jazeera are the leading television news and public affairs service (Ayish, 2002, p. 142). Al Abu Dhabi, a government-operated service based in the United Arab Emirates, has recently recruited many talented television staff with experiences in major media organizations around the Arab world. It has dozens of correspondents stationed in major Arab and international cities and reaches not only the Arab world but also Europe and North America. Al-Jazeera, a liberal and commercial television based in Qatar, has won a reputation for "independent reporting that sharply contrasts with the state-sponsored news coming from other media outlets in the Arab world" (p. 143). Most news staff have been trained or have worked in Western media organizations, especially BBC broadcasting. Thus, its coverage of pan-Arab and international politics follows Western style journalistic practices and professionalism. According to Ghareeb (2000), Al-Jazeera "covers Arab issues in depth and with passion, by offering guests who include government and opposition figures, and who debate taboo issues such as secularism and religion" (p. 406). These discussions included Kurdish nationalists and their opponents,

---

[12] This channel launched in 1997 is well known for its entertainment programs including Mexican soap operas and American comedy and drama.

feminists and traditionalists, Arab nationalists and local or regional nationalists, and human rights issues.

However, the channel's daring handling of issues in Arab world and provocative political talk shows have been sometimes criticized by many Arab governments. One criticism against Al-Jazeera is that it will not delve deeply into sensitive issues affecting the Qatar (p. 409). In fact, the Qatar government used $150 million to subsidize the channel for five years after its initiation. Thus, there is a suspicion that a strong connection may exist between the Qatar government and Al-Jazeera. The attempt to invite Israeli politicians and experts as guests has been criticized as favoring normalization with Israel. Despite these criticisms from Arab governments, the channel has attracted millions of views because of its objective and balanced reporting. It is well known that its exclusive airing of videotaped statement made by Osama Bin Laden after September 11th terrorism has received worldwide attention.

During the Iraqi War, even U.S. network television aired war scenes transmitted by these two Arab satellite news channels. In particular Al-Jazeera has received international attention for airing images of U.S. prisoners of war, dead coalition soldiers, and damaged Iraqi civilian facilities caused by bombings. To analyze how these channels are evaluated or treated by a U.S. newspaper and Arab newspapers, the researcher suggested the following question:

RQ 6: How are the Arab satellite news channels portrayed?

62

Framing Embedded Journalists

In the Iraqi War journalists, embedded in the coalition forces, transmitted

their military progress to Baghdad, introducing the function of weapons and

describing the combat process in more detail. As Terence Smith (2003), the media

correspondent and senior producer for *The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer*, argued,

> Embedding – assigning 700-plus U.S. and foreign reporters to train, travel,
> and share danger and hardships with American military units – was the
> most innovative aspect of the coverage of the second gulf war. It made
> possible a kind of intimate, immediate, absorbing, almost addictive
> coverage, the likes of which we have not seen before…It is impossible to
> imagine a future U.S. military campaign without reporters embedded in
> frontline units… (p. 26).

The military realized that it might be advantageous to have more reporters

embedded in military units "both to document the heroic efforts of US troops and

to counter a strong Iraqi propaganda effort" (Neelamalar et al., 2003, p. 155).

This so-called embedded journalism elicited controversial discussions

about the role of journalists in war coverage. Smith argued that the positive aspect

of this strategy was that embedded journalists tended to get the story straight

instead of depending on briefings offered by the press center in Doha, Qatar.

Thus, they got to view the difficulties that the military face and could transmit

more vividly described military action. Bob Arnot (2003), an embedded journalist

for MSNBC News, agreed to this positive role of embedded journalists. He

argued that thanks to television pictures sent by embedded reporters, viewers

could observe for themselves how strong the Iraqi resistance was and how the

U.S. forces were trying to protect their soldiers and marines. John Burnett (2003),

a correspondent for NPR, who was embedded in the U.S. Marines, contended that

being embedded with the troops allowed him to tell remarkable stories from the

trenches describing the bravery and courage of soldiers.

On the other hand, embedded journalists may identify too closely with

military units and lose journalistic objectivity (Neelamalar et al., 2003). Thus,

they could become spokespeople for U.S. military units and officers due to their

close proximity to the source. As Neelamalar et al. (2003) notes, embedded

reporting meant that the journalists became emotionally and psychologically as

well as physically embedded with the military forces (p. 157). Although John

Burnett (2003) admitted a positive side of embedded reporting, for him the

embedding was "a flawed experiment that served the purpose of the military more

than it served the cause of balanced journalism" (p. 43). He argued that embedded

reporters lived exclusively within the reality of the U.S. military because they

lacked transportation and translators that could provide a means to find out what

the bombing had hit. This inability to verify the military target, he argued, made

for one-sided reporting, which cheered the U.S. military. He confessed that much

of the Marine command he met saw embedded reporters, "not as neutral

journalists who had a job to do, but as instruments to reflect the accomplishments

and glory of the United States Marine Corps" (p. 43). As Neelamalar et al. (2003)

pointed out, embedding in a way brought journalists much closer to the war but probably took them further away from the big picture.

Assigning journalists to military units can be a new kind of censorship by the military for reporters because the Pentagon provided journalists with guidelines for war coverage to censor the news. According to *The New York Times*,

> The Pentagon's guidelines, signed by each attached journalist, allow reporting of general troop strength and casualty figures, confirmed figures of enemy soldiers captured and broad information about previous combat actions, Reporters are barred from divulging specifics about troop movements and locations, unless authorized. The identities of wounded or killed Americans may not be reported for 72 hours, or until next of kin can be notified, and local commanders may impose embargoes to protect operations (Purdum & Rutenberg, 2003).

Thus, journalists could not give details about military missions or future operations in their reports. Because of these rules, Fox News war correspondent Geraldo Rivera was removed from his posting with troops in Iraq when he drew a map in the sand during live coverage of the war (Neelamalar et al., 2003, p. 157).

In fact reporters of *The New York Times* and *The Arab News* were embedded in the 3rd Infantry Division of U.S. forces and in U.S. marines while those of *The Middle East Times* were not. To understand more deeply how the three newspapers cover embedded journalists, the researcher suggested the following research question:

RQ 7: How did the three newspapers frame the embedded journalists?

In summary, the research questions and hypothesis suggested here are the following.

RQ 1: What aspect of war is emphasized?

H1a: *The New York Times* is more likely to emphasize war efforts than Arab newspapers while the latter will devote more space to antiwar voice than the former.

H1b: Compared with *The New York Times*, Arab media will place more emphasis on the critique of U.S. strategic interests.

RQ 2: What sources do the three papers depend on most heavily?

H2a: *The New York Times* will be more dependent on U.S. officials while Arab newspapers will cite Arab officials more.

H2b: *The New York Times* will be more dependent on sources favorable toward the war than Arab newspapers.

RQ 3: To what extent is the coverage episodic or thematic?

H3: Compared with that of *The New York Times*, the coverage of Arab newspapers will be more thematic.

RQ 4: How is Saddam Hussein portrayed?

H4: *The New York Times* is likely to describe Saddam Hussein more negatively than Arab newspapers.

RQ 5: How is the war described?

H5: Compared with Arab newspapers, the descriptions found in *The New York Times* will be more likely to reflect the war discourse of the U.S. administration.

RQ 6: How are the Arab satellite news channels portrayed?

RQ 7: How did the three newspapers frame the embedded journalists?

A FRAMING APPROACH

In recent years, framing has been an important approach for explaining communication phenomena. According to Tankard (2001), media framing is important because it helps to identify the ideology or media hegemony and has powerful effects on the audience. Much of the strength of framing comes from its ability to define the issues and to set the terms of a debate (p. 96). Framing has been useful in understanding the media's role in political life (Reese, 2001).

What is a Framing?

Scholars have suggested diverse definitions of a framing. Tankard and his associates define a framing as "a central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration" (cited in Severin & Tankard, 2001, p. 277).

According to Entman (1991), "the essence of framing is sizing—magnifying or shrinking elements of the depicted reality to make them more or less salient" (p. 9). News frames exist as mentally stored principles for

information processing and as attributes of the news text. They can be detected by examining particular words and visual images that appear consistently in a narrative and thematically convey meanings (p. 7).

Reese (2001) defines framing as "organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world" (p. 11). He argues "framing is concerned with the way interests, communicators, sources, and culture combine to yield coherent ways of understanding the world, which are developed using all of the available verbal and visual symbolic resources" (p. 11). Framing is organized cognitively and culturally. Cognitively organizing frames make us consider social phenomena by appealing to basic psychological biases (p. 12). Cultural frames appeal to a cultural understanding of social reality (p. 13).

Pan & Kosicki (2001) see framing as "'strategic actions' in public deliberation" (p. 36). By framing an issue, one strategically participates in public deliberation for one's own sense making and for contesting others' frames (p. 39). By using diverse resources, political actors form a "web of subsidies" to disseminate and package information for their benefit (p. 44). Thus, framing is "a discursive means to achieve political potency in influencing public deliberation" (p. 59).

Hertog & McLeod (2001) approach frames as cultural phenomena rather than as cognitive processes. They view frames as "relatively comprehensive

structures of meaning made up of a number of concepts and relations among those concepts" (p. 140). Some of the most powerful concepts are myths, narratives, and metaphors that resonate with culture (p. 141). These frames are embodied in the deep structure of a culture and provide a significant portion of the shared meaning among society's members. Therefore, frames are part of a larger set of beliefs. In this respect, frames and ideology are related to each other. Dominant frames, like dominant ideology, reflect and support the major institutions of society and are shared among individual members of society. Framing, however, places greater emphasis on the nature of the organizing structures in which meaning is produced and how such structures get established (Reese, 2001).

McCombs & Ghanem (2001) argue that framing shares a common ground with agenda-setting theory. They argue that frames are macro-attributes containing cognitive and affective elements of objects (p. 78). They contend that the second level of agenda setting which involves attribute salience from the media to the public incorporates many aspects of framing studies. An attribute is a frame only when it is a macro-attribute subsuming other lower order attributes (p. 74).

Overall, these diverse approaches to framing can be summarized in two ways: through psychological and social traditions (Iyengar & Simon, 1994). The former focuses on the change of individuals' cognitions of social events which is caused by the emphasis of certain aspects of those events in the media. For

example, Iyengar (1991) found that people tend to assign responsibility to individuals when they are exposed to stories which are depicted without contexts by the media. On the other hand, the sociological perspective focuses on the use of storylines, symbols and stereotypes in media representations (Iyengar & Simon, 1994, p. 171). The perspective highlights ideological and structural factors which affect the production of media messages. According to Gitlin (1980), media frames are important media practices through which hegemony is produced and dominant ideology is legitimized. Thus, media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpreting, and presentation of selection, emphasis, and exclusion by which media practitioners organize dominant discourse. The process of framing, which is practiced in the routines of media professionals, serves to sustain the legitimacy of the economic and political system as a whole.

Various Approaches to Measuring Framing

Tankard (2001) suggests three empirical approaches for identifying media frames: the "Media Package" Approach, Framing as a Multidimensional Concept, and the "List of Frames" Approach.

The media package approach, developed by Gamson & Modigliani (1989), assumes "media discourse can be conceived of as a set of interpretive packages that give meaning to an issue" (p. 3). The packages offer many different condensing symbols that imply the core frame. The packages succeed in media discourse through a combination of cultural resonance, sponsor activities, and a fit

70

with media routines and practices (p. 9). The authors used "cultural resonance" to connect symbols on a specific issue with cultural system (p. 5). The idea is that certain packages have an advantage because their ideas and language resonate with larger cultural themes. Packages are often sponsored by agents interested in promoting their interests or collective agenda. For example, public officials including the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Energy were sponsors of a pronuclear package while environmental groups such as Friend of the Earth and Critical Mass were sponsors of an antinuclear package. Packages are presented as indented quotations, which are a combination of paraphrasing and direct quotes obtained from pamphlets and other writings of sponsors (p. 4). The authors suggested five framing devices (metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, visual images) and three reasoning devices (roots, consequences, appeals to principle) as elements of a package (pp. 3-4). They traced discourse on nuclear power from 1945 to Chernobyl disaster in 1986. The *progress* package remained dominant throughout the 1950s and 1960s. This package included categories such as "Nuclear power is necessary for maintaining economic growth and our way of life," and "Underdeveloped nations can especially benefit from peaceful uses of nuclear energy" (p. 11). This dominant package lost its hegemony with the Three Mile Island accidents in 1979 and the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. Consequently, antinuclear packages such as *soft paths* supported by Friends of the Earth and *public accountability* suggested by Critical Mass have

71

surfaced. During the period of these two accidents, the *runaway* package was the most prominent in the discourse of U.S. network television and newsmagazines. This package is displayed through two central ideas: (a) the overconfidence theme: officials in charge of nuclear power may think they control it but they really do not, and (b) the hidden danger theme: radiation effects are invisible and delayed, so that people may not know the harm until many years after the incident (p. 24). Although the *runaway* package has an antinuclear flavor, its position on nuclear power is fatalistic and resigned more than opposed (p. 20).

Another approach to measuring framing is to find framing devices involving various elements or dimensions of stories such as the gender of writer, placement of the article, terms used to refer to a particular frame, and so on (Tankard, 2001, p. 100).

The third approach, developed by Tankard, identifies the frames by conducting a content analysis of categories listed as frames. This approach focuses on how the issue is defined by the inclusion and exclusion of frames including certain symbols and keywords. Tankard identified 11 framing mechanisms for identifying frames: headlines, photographs, leads, selection of sources, and so on.

The choice of language and careful examination of word choices are important framing mechanisms (Bantimaroudis & Ban, 2001; Miller & Riechert,

2001). Thus, frames are found in the choice of terms or words that provide the context in which issues are interpreted and discussed.

Bantimaroudis & Ban (2001) examined the extent of word frequency to explore how *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* framed the Somalia crisis. The words "peacekeeper(s)" and "humanitarian" represented the humanitarian nature of the operation while "military" and "intervention" addressed the military aspect of the operation (p. 181). The results showed that two newspapers mentioned the latter more than the former. Thus, Operation Restore Hope, they concluded, was "framed more as a military operation than as a mercy mission" (p. 182). No striking difference was found between two newspapers in framing the crisis.

Mark Miller uses the VBPro computer program to analyze how often terms appear in news articles or press releases and groups them by using VBMap. The map presents the relationships among sets of terms visually, so terms that tend to co-occur appear close together whereas those that do not tend appear far apart (Miller & Riechert, 2001, p.116). Miller & Riechert call their approach "frame mapping" (p. 115). The approach relies on multidimensional scaling techniques that result in spatial representations of issue frames. The researchers examined the choice of words used in news releases and news stories to determine how different interest groups define an issue and to what degree they succeed in placing their agenda in the media. Miller et al. (1998) applied the program to

examine how the 1996 Republican presidential candidates framed themselves in press releases and how elite newspapers covered them. Terms appearing in the candidates' press releases and primary campaign news articles were ranked in order of frequency of occurrence using the alphabetizing and ranking procedures in the VBPro computer program. Substantive terms that appeared frequently were submitted to mapping procedures in VBMap to generate coordinate values, which were submitted to SPSS for hierarchical cluster analysis. The results showed that the media did not reflect the images that the candidates were trying to project in the press releases.

To investigate frames, Hertog & McLeod (2001) recommended a combination of text analyses, review of writings or discussions, focus interviews, and ethnography (p. 147). According to them, the first step in finding a frame is to identify the central concepts that make up varied frames. The second step is to look for a narrative, which organizes a large amount of disparate ideas and information. Finally, the last step is to identify the repetition of terms indicating a certain frame. Usage can be employed to induce frames in text. Miller et al. (2001) focused on the study of social protest and the media. By analyzing anarchists' demonstrations in Minneapolis, they identified five frames: riot, confrontation, protest, circus, and debate (p. 156). Among these, riot and confrontation frames were most common in the news accounts. The former was organized around a conflict between anarchists and society. The latter revolved

74

around the conflicts between the anarchists and the police. The protest frame, centering on the conflict between anarchists and powerful institutions within society, made fewer appearances. Thus, the coverage treated the anarchists as combatants and failed to focus on their social critique such that it was downplayed or absent.

Accordingly, there are many theoretical and methodological differences in understanding a framing process. As will be discussed later, this dissertation is based on a quantitative approach to framing.

CONTENT ANALYSIS

To address research questions (RQ1~RQ5) and hypotheses (H1a~H5), the researcher conducted quantitative content analysis. According to Riffe, Lacy, & Fico (1998), "Quantitative content analysis is the systematic and replicable examination of symbols of communication, which have been assigned numeric values according to valid measurement rules, and the analysis of relationships involving those values using statistical methods, in order to describe inferences about its meaning, or infer from the communication to its context, both of production and consumption" (p. 20).

Because using archive materials is possible, the content analysis is also suitable for longitudinal studies (p. 31). In addition, quantification by coding permits reduction to several categories of large amount of information or data. Because of these strengths, content analysis has been widely used in communication research.

Time Period and Sampling

This dissertation is focused on the period from the start of the U.S. War with Iraq on March 20, 2003 to the official declaration of the end of war by the Bush administration on May 1, 2003.

In sampling *The New York Times* and *The Arab News*, the researcher found all the articles, editorials, and opinions or guest columns by sampling systematically every fourth day starting from March 21, 2003. Thus, 11 sampling dates were produced (March 21, March 25, March 29 … April 26, and April 30). To find stories in *The New York Times*, the researcher used the Lexis-Nexis database program. A search using the key words "Iraq or War" resulted in 297 stories. To find stories in *The Arab News*, the researcher used the archives on its Web site and downloaded all the stories dealing with the war,[13] which produced 159 stories. To balance the stories between two newspapers, half of the stories (149) in *The New York Times* were chosen. In the case of *The Middle East Times*, all the stories carried in the edition during the time period (March 21, March 28, April 4 … and May 2) were analyzed, which resulted in 194 stories. The researcher found those stories by getting access to its archives on the Web (www.metimes.com). Unlike *The New York Times*, stories found in Arab newspapers did not provide page numbers. Thus, all the stories of two newspapers are cited without page numbers.

Unit and Category of Content

Unit of content is a discretely defined element of content which can be a word, sentence, paragraph, story, image or symbolic meaning. In this research, the researcher used the story as a unit of analysis. Thus, although several themes or sources are found in one particular story, only the dominant theme or source was selected. The headline, lead, and first several paragraphs helped coders make a decision about the dominant theme or source. The headline is an influential framing device that summarizes and contextualizes news reports (Pedelty, 1995, p. 92). The lead also conveys the most important information in the story and signals what is coming in the rest of story (Brooks et al., 1999, p. 124). In the case of the image of Saddam Hussein and the portrayal of war, a symbolic meaning or description was coded whenever it was found in one particular story. When a certain symbolic meaning or description appeared several times in one particular story, it was counted only once.

The framing approach to war was based on the list of frames suggested by Tankard (2001). As discussed earlier, this method identifies the frames by conducting a content analysis of categories listed as frames (for detailed description of categories, see appendix). Overall, categories were divided into four frames: war efforts, war effects, antiwar voice, and war victims. Heavy dependence of the media on war efforts indicated that they reported the war more

---

[13] The researcher tried to use Lexis-Nexis database to identify stories, but this method failed. The

favorably toward U.S.-led military actions whereas efforts of the media to transmit antiwar demonstrations or antiwar voice suggested that they held a more antiwar position in covering the war. The war victims on which they focused and official sources on which they depended showed how much the media were ethnocentric or biased in their coverage of the international conflict.

Episodic vs. thematic framing was measured with the method suggested by Iyengar (see Iyengar, 1991; Iyengar & Simon, 1994). Stories only describing the war process or war victims were categorized in the episodic category. On the other hand, stories explaining the social and historical background of the war, analyzing U.S. strategic interests or its foreign policy in the Middle East in-depth, and describing Arab countries' political interests in the conflict zone more analytically were classified in the thematic category. When stories contained both episodic and thematic elements, they were coded according to the degree to which they fit one category.

The analysis of images of Saddam Hussein and the war was conducted by finding not only the symbolic terms and expressions used in the newspapers but also those that were quoted in the story.

Three coders coded 502 stories during December 2003 and January 2004. Two coders were graduate students majoring in each communication studies and

---

program carried only a few stories.

journalism, and the other coder was a former graduate student who majored in telecommunication.

Reliability Test

Reliability is a matter of whether a particular technique, applied repeatedly to the same object, would yield the same result each time. Reliability in content analysis is defined as agreement among coders about categorizing content. Overall, 10 to 20 percent of randomly selected samples were tested to measure the intercoder reliability (Riffe et al., 1998). One of the most frequently used reliability tests is Holsti's reliability coefficient, which measures the agreement among categories. Scott's Pi computes the agreement expected by chance by looking at the proportion of times particular values of a category are used in a given test and then calculates the "expected agreement" based on those proportions (p. 129). In this study, the researcher used Holsti's reliability coefficient.

To determine coder reliability, three coders coded 12 percent of total stories. Using Holsti's formula, the agreement for the coding ranged from .85 to 1.00. More concretely, the category agreement was .99 for story type, 1.00 for byline, for .99 for story origin, .89 for main topics, .85 for source, .87 for source direction, .94 for episodic vs. thematic framing, .95 for Hussein image, and .87 for war portrayal. These figures exceed a minimum level of 80%, which is usually the acceptable level of agreement among coders (Riffe et al., 1998, p. 128).

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

To address how the media portrayed Arab satellite news channels and framed embedded journalists, the researcher analyzed all the stories dealing with Arab satellite news channels and embedded journalists, which were found during the entire time period between March 20 and May 1, 2003. The analysis included all the related articles, editorials, and opinions including guest columns because stories about Arab media and embedded journalists were scarce in *The New York Times* and *The Arab News* during the sampling period. As a result, seven stories in *The New York Times*, eleven stories in *The Arab News*, and three stories in *The Middle East Times* were used for the analysis of newspapers' portrayals of Arab satellite news channels. For the analysis of newspapers' framing of embedded journalists, seven stories in *The New York Times*, seven stories in *The Arab News*, and three stories in *The Middle East Time*s were investigated.

Before performing the qualitative analysis, the researcher identified the extent to which the three newspapers depended on Arab media, especially satellite news channels and topics with which the embedded journalists dealt. Then the researcher investigated how newspapers portrayed Arab satellite news channels and how they framed embedded journalists. The analysis focused on finding whether newspapers emphasized the positive or negative side of the role of Arab media or embedded journalists in war coverage.

Chapter 5: Results

This chapter reports data showing the fundamental characteristics of stories and testing the seven hypotheses. In addition, it shows how the media portrayed Arab satellite news channels and framed embedded journalists.

COMPOSITION OF STORIES

As shown in Table 1, most stories in three newspapers were composed of articles (89.8%). The editorials (3.2%) and opinions/columns (7.0%) occupied about 10 percent of the total stories.

Table 1 Story Type

	NY Times	Arab News	ME Times	Total
Article	134 (89.9%)	142 (89.3%)	175 (90.2%)	451 (89.8%)
Editorial	11 (7.4%)	5 (3.1%)	0 (0.0%)	16 (3.2%)
Opinion/Column	4 (2.7%)	12 (7.5%)	19 (9.8%)	35 (7.0%)
Total	149 (100.0%)	159 (99.9%)	194 (100.0%)	502 (100.0%)

Almost 90 percent of articles in *The New York Times* were written by its staff writers whereas 88 percent of articles in *The Middle East Times* depended on European news agencies such as AFP and Reuters (see Table 2). More than half of the articles in *The Arab News* (57.0 percent) came from European news agencies including AFP and Reuters, Saudi Press Agency, and British newspapers such as *The Guardian* and *The Independent*. This heavy dependence of Arab

newspapers on news agencies or syndicated papers can be attributed to the small

number of staff members.

Table 2 Byline of an Article

	NY Times	Arab News	ME Times	Total
Embedded journalist	12 (9.0%)	5 (3.5%)	0 (0.0%)	17 (3.8%)
Staff writer	121 (90.3%)	56 (39.4%)	21 (12.0%)	198 (43.9%)
News Agency	1 (0.7%)	81 (57.0%)	154 (88.0%)	236 (52.3%)
Total	134 (100%)	142 (99.9%)	175 (100%)	451 (100%)

$\chi^2 = 234.4$, d.f. = 4, $\rho < .001$

Table 3 shows the origin of an article by newspapers. Almost half of the

articles in *The New York Times* (48.5%) came from U. S. regions while more than

half of the articles in Arab newspapers were based on Arab nations including Iraq

(*The Arab News*, 69.0%; *The Middle East Times*, 52.6%). This difference by

newspapers was statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 81.2$, d.f. = 6, $\rho < .001$).

Table 3 Origin of an Article

	NY Times	Arab News	ME Times	Total
United States	65 (48.5%)	14 (9.9%)	35 (20.0%)	114 (25.3%)
Iraq	37 (27.6%)	32 (22.5%)	33 (18.9%)	102 (22.6%)
Arab nations	21 (15.7%)	66 (46.5%)	59 (33.7%)	146 (32.4%)
Other	11 (8.2%)	30 (21.1%)	48 (27.4%)	89 (19.7%)
Total	134 (100.0%)	142 (100.0%)	175 (100.0%)	451 (100.0%)

$\chi^2 = 81.2$, d.f. = 6, $\rho < .001$

WAR FRAMES

As shown in Table 4, *The New York Times* devoted more than half of its stories (53.7%) to war efforts led by U.S. administration and military whereas

Table 4 Main Topics

	NY Times	Arab News	ME Times	Total
War efforts	**80 (53.7%)**	**40 (25.2%)**	**64 (33.0%)**	**184 (36.7%)**
- Process of combat	43 (28.9%)	19 (12.0%)	24 (12.4%)	86 (17.1%)
- Mass destruction	4 (2.7%)	1 (0.6%)	4 (2.1%)	9 (1.8%)
- Soldiers and family	2 (1.3%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.5%)	3 (0.6%)
- Military operation	8 (5.4%)	5 (3.2%)	3 (1.5%)	16 (3.2%)
- Diplomatic efforts	4 (2.7%)	4 (2.5%)	13 (6.7%)	21 (4.2%)
- Post-war Iraq	15 (10.0%)	9 (5.7%)	8 (4.1%)	32 (6.4%)
- Other	4 (2.7%)	2 (1.2%)	11 (5.7%)	17 (3.4%)
War effects	**13 (8.7%)**	**34 (21.4%)**	**28 (14.4%)**	**75 (14.9%)**
- Economic effect	5 (3.4%)	14 (8.8%)	13 (6.7%)	32 (6.4%)
- Environmental effect	0 (0.0%)	4 (2.5%)	4 (2.0%)	8 (1.6%)
- Security	4 (2.7%)	4 (2.5%)	5 (2.6%)	13 (2.5%)
- Other	4 (2.7%)	12 (7.6%)	6 (3.1%)	22 (4.4%)
Antiwar voice	**14 (9.4%)**	**32 (20.1%)**	**50 (25.8%)**	**96 (19.1%)**
- Demonstration	6 (4.0%)	26 (16.4%)	32 (16.6%)	64 (12.7%)
- U.S. strategic interest	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.6%)	3 (1.5%)	4 (0.8%)
- U.S.-Israeli relation	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.6%)	1 (0.5%)	2 (0.4%)
- Post-war critique	4 (2.7%)	4 (2.5%)	7 (3.6%)	15 (3.0%)
- U.S. foreign policy	1 (0.7%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (0.2%)
- Other	3 (2.0%)	0 (0.0%)	7 (3.6%)	10 (2.0%)
War victims	**15 (10.1%)**	**19 (11.9%)**	**14 (7.2%)**	**48 (9.6%)**
- Coalition forces	4 (2.7%)	3 (1.9%)	2 (1.0%)	9 (1.8%)
- Iraq soldiers/civilians	4 (2.7%)	6 (3.8%)	6 (3.1%)	16 (3.2%)
- Coalition POW	4 (2.7%)	2 (1.3%)	0 (0.0%)	6 (1.2%)
- Iraqi POW	0 (0.0%)	3 (1.9%)	1 (0.5%)	4 (0.8%)
- Refugees	1 (0.7%)	1 (0.6%)	3 (1.6%)	5 (1.0%)
- Other	2 (1.3%)	4 (2.4%)	2 (1.0%)	8 (1.6%)
Other	**27 (18.1%)**	**34 (21.4%)**	**38 (19.6%)**	**99 (19.7%)**
Total	149 (100.0%)	159 (100.0%)	194 (100.0%)	502 (100.0%)

By Main Topics ($\chi^2 = 41.0$, d.f. = 8, $\rho < .001$)

The Arab News and *The Middle East Times* each carried a quarter (25.2%) and a third (33.0%) of their total stories addressing that topic. Out of stories about war efforts, those dealing with the process of combat (28.9%), post-war Iraq construction (10.0%), and military operation (5.4%) attracted most of the attention of *The New York Times* while weapons of mass destruction (2.7%) and soldiers and their families (1.3%) received the least attention. The latter topics were not salient in Arab newspapers either. The Arab newspapers, *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times* (each 20.1% and 25.8%) reported stories dealing with antiwar voice over twice as much as *The New York Times* (9.4%) did. These findings strongly support H1a, which proposed that *The New York Times* is more likely to emphasize war efforts than Arab newspapers while the latter will devote more space to the antiwar voice than the former.

Although Arab newspapers (each 0.6% and 1.5%) were more critical of U.S. strategic interests than *The New York Times* (0.0%), the former did not place much emphasis on that topic. This finding weakly supports H1b, suggesting that Arab media will place more emphasis on the critique of US. strategic interests compared with *The New York Times*. Also, Arab newspapers were not so critical of U.S.-Israeli relations: *The Arab News*, 0.6%; *The Middle East Times*, 0.5%. Rather, they devoted a considerable amount of space to antiwar demonstrations or responses (each 16.4% and 16.6%). Their criticism of U.S.-led construction of post-war Iraq was not very strong (each 2.5% and 3.6%), compared to *The New*

York Times (2.7%). The latter carried only one article criticizing U.S. foreign policy. These results suggest that Arab as well as U.S. media seldom investigated deeply U.S. military and economic interests in the Gulf region.

In covering war victims, *The New York Times* and Arab newspapers showed different emphases. While the former emphasized war victims of coalition forces (2.7%) and their POW (2.7%), the latter highlighted Iraqi soldiers/civilian damage (each 3.8% and 3.1%) and Iraqi POW (each 1.9% and 0.5%) more than the former did (each 2.7% and 0.0%). War victims, however, did not receive much media attention (total 9.6%). The three newspapers most emphasized the economic effect of the war. Because the war was engaged in Iraq which contains the second largest oil reserve, oil prices and OPEC meetings were often reported. While *The New York Times* did not deal with the environmental effects of war at all, Arab newspapers each carried four stories addressing that topic.

Accordingly, *The New York Times* devoted significant space to the U.S.-led war efforts while *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times* emphasized antiwar voice and war effects more than *The New York Times* did. This difference in main topics by newspapers was statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 41.0$, d.f. = 8, $\rho <$ .001). The war effort, however, was the most salient topic not only in *The New York Times* but also in *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times*. Overall, these findings suggest that Arab newspapers showed more balanced reporting.

Some subtopics were different before and after the occupation of Baghdad
although the change in main topics was not statistically significant (see Table 5).

Table 5 Main Topics Before/After Baghdad Occupation   (Percentages)

	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
	NY	*NY*	*Arab*	*Arab*	*ME*	*ME*
War efforts	**43(48.3)**	**37(61.7)**	**18(19.4)**	**22(33.3)**	**38(32.0)**	**26(34.7)**
- Process of combat	27	15	8	11	13	11
- Mass destruction	0	4	0	1	1	3
- Soldiers and family	1	1	0	0	1	0
- Military operation	5	3	4	1	2	1
- Diplomatic efforts	2	2	3	1	8	5
- Post-war Iraq	4	11	1	8	4	4
- Other	4	0	2	0	9	2
War effects	**11(12.4)**	**2(3.3)**	**21(22.6)**	**13(19.7)**	**14(11.8)**	**14(18.7)**
- Economic effect	5	0	13	1	6	7
- Environmental effect	0	0	1	3	3	1
- Security	3	1	3	1	3	2
- Other	3	1	4	8	2	4
Antiwar voice	**9(10.1)**	**5(8.4)**	**25(26.9)**	**7(10.6)**	**30(25.2)**	**20(26.6)**
- Demonstration	5	1	24	2	24	8
- U.S. strategic interest	0	0	0	1	0	3
- U.S.-Israeli relation	0	0	0	1	1	0
- Post-war critique	1	3	1	3	2	5
- U.S. foreign policy	0	1	0	0	0	0
- Other	3	0	0	0	3	4
War victims	**7(7.9)**	**8(13.3)**	**12(12.9)**	**7(10.6)**	**11(9.2)**	**3(4.0)**
- Coalition forces	1	3	2	1	2	0
- Iraq soldiers/civilians	1	3	6	0	4	2
- Coalition POW	3	1	1	1	0	0
- Iraqi POW	0	0	2	1	0	1
- Refugees	1	0	1	0	3	0
- Other	1	1	0	4	2	0
Other	**19(21.3)**	**8(13.3)**	**17(18.2)**	**17(25.8)**	**26(21.8)**	**12(16.0)**
Total	89	60	93	66	119	75
	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)

The difference in main topics before and after the occupation in *The New York Times* ($\chi^2 = 7.0$, d.f. = 4, $\rho = .136$), *The Arab News* ($\chi^2 = 9.4$, d.f. = 4, $\rho = .052$), *The Middle East Times* ($\chi^2 = 4.2$, d.f. = 4, $\rho = .38$)

In the case of *The New York Times*, stories dealing with U.S.-led construction of post-war Iraq increased significantly from 4 to 11, and weapons of mass destruction, which provided justification for war by the U.S. government, began to surface (from 0 to 4). On the other hand, stories concerning war effects on society (from 12.4% to 3.3%) and the antiwar voice (from 10.1% to 8.4%) decreased as U.S. forces occupied Iraqi capital with little resistance. Surprisingly, *The Arab News* tremendously dropped its coverage of antiwar demonstration from 24 to 2, decreasing its antiwar tone from 26.9% to 10.6% whereas *The Middle East Times* increased its antiwar voice from 25.2% to 26.6% even after Baghdad was occupied. Like *The New York Times*, *The Arab News* increased its coverage dealing with post-war Iraq construction from 1 to 8. Overall, these results suggest that Baghdad occupation became an important turning point in the changing of some subtopics and tone, especially in *The Arab News.*

SOURCES AND THEIR DIRECTIONS

As Table 6 shows, *The New York Times* (32.9%) depended heavily on U.S. officials, compared with *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times* (each 13.2% and 17.5%). Although Arab newspapers depended much more on Arab officials (each 16.4% and 18.6%) than *The New York Times* (4.0%) did, *The Arab News* most cited Arab non-officials (23.3%). Thus, H2a which suggested that *The New York Times* would be more dependent on U.S. officials while Arab newspapers would cite Arab officials more is supported somewhat weakly. Arab newspapers

(each 39.7% and 33.0%) depended on Arab sources including officials and non-

officials much more than *The New York Times* (15.4%) did. On the other hand,

the latter (57.7%) cited U.S. sources much more than Arab newspapers did (each

18.2% and 26.3%). The difference in the primary source of newspapers was

statistically significant (χ^2 = 112.2, d.f. = 14, ρ < .001).

Table 6 Primary Source

	NY Times	Arab News	ME Times	Total
U.S. officials	49 (32.9%)	21 (13.2%)	34 (17.5%)	104 (20.7%)
Arab officials	6 (4.0%)	26 (16.4%)	36 (18.6%)	68 (13.5%)
Officials	6 (4.0%)	10 (6.3%)	32 (16.5%)	48 (9.6%)
U.S. non-officials	37 (24.8%)	8 (5.0%)	17 (8.8%)	62 (12.4%)
Arab non-officials	17 (11.4%)	37 (23.3%)	28 (14.4%)	82 (16.3%)
Non-officials	3 (2.0%)	17 (10.7%)	21 (10.8%)	41 (8.2%)
Arab media	0 (0.0%)	8 (5.0%)	0 (0.0%)	8 (1.6%)
Other	31 (20.8%)	32 (20.1%)	26 (13.4%)	89 (17.7%)
Total	149 (99.9%)	159 (100.0)	194 (100.0)	502 (100.0)

χ^2 = 112.2, d.f. = 14, ρ < .001

It should be noted, however, that *The Arab News* and *The Middle East*

Times (each 13.2% and 17.5%) depended on U.S. officials quite a bit whereas *The*

New York Times cited only a few Arab officials (4.0%). Only *The Arab News*

(5.0%) used Arab media as a primary source. The 'Other' category was pretty

high because stories that are largely based on the analysis and standpoint of

reporters themselves were often found.

Table 7 shows whether the source is favorable toward the war or not. *The New York Times* (38.3%) carried sources favorable toward the war much more than Arab papers (each 18.2% and 20.1%) did while the latter (each 28.9% and 33.5%) depended on sources unfavorable towards the war much more than the former (10.7%).

Table 7 Direction of Sources

	NY Times	*Arab News*	*ME Times*	Total
Favorable	57 (38.3%)	29 (18.2%)	39 (20.1%)	125 (24.9%)
Neutral	76 (51.0%)	84 (52.8%)	90 (46.4%)	250 (49.8%)
Unfavorable	16 (10.7%)	46 (28.9%)	65 (33.5%)	127 (25.3%)
Total	149 (100.0)	159 (99.9)	194 (100.0)	502 (100.0)

$\chi^2 = 34.6$. d.f. = 4, $\rho < .001$

This result strongly supports H2b which suggested that *The New York Times* would be more dependent on sources favorable toward the war. The difference by newspapers was statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 34.6$. d.f. = 4, $\rho < .001$). The three newspapers, however, mostly carried sources neutral toward the war (49.8%).

EPISODIC VS. THEMATIC FRAMING

As shown in Table 8, the coverage of the three newspapers was heavily episodic (88.4%). Compared with that of Arab papers, the coverage of *The New York Times* was more thematic. Therefore, H3 which suggested that the coverage of Arab newspapers would be more thematic than that of *The New York Times*

Table 8 Orientation of News Coverage

	NY Times	*Arab News*	*ME Times*	Total
Episodic	122 (81.9%)	144 (90.6%)	178 (91.8%)	444 (88.4%)
Thematic	27 (18.1%)	15 (9.4%)	16 (8.2%)	58 (11.6%)
Total	149 (100.0)	159 (100.0)	194 (100.0)	502 (100.0)

χ^2 = 9.1. d.f. = 2, ρ < .05

was not supported. This difference by newspapers was statistically significant (χ^2 = 9.1. d.f. = 2, ρ < .05).

HUSSEIN IMAGE

As Table 9 shows, about 11 percent of the total number of stories contained symbolic terms or expressions representing images of Saddam Hussein as authoritarian, cruel, and brave. The difference by newspaper, however, was not statistically significant (χ^2 =1.87. d.f. = 2, ρ = .39).

Table 9 Story Containing Words Reflecting an Image of Saddam Hussein

	NY Times	*Arab News*	*ME Times*	Total
Yes	16 (10.7%)	22 (13.8%)	18 (9.3%)	56 (11.2%)
No	133 (89.3%)	137 (86.2%)	176 (90.7%)	446 (88.8%)
Total	149 (100.0)	159 (100.0)	194 (100.0)	502 (100.0)

χ^2 =1.87. d.f. = 2, ρ = .39

Table 10 shows which personal characteristics of Saddam Hussein the three newspapers emphasized. On the whole, they all focused heavily on the negative images rather than the positive ones. Comparatively, *The New York Times* (94.1%) devoted its space a little more to negative images than *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times* (each 88.9% and 86.4%) did.

Table 10 Image Characteristics of Saddam Hussein

	NY Times	*Arab News*	*ME Times*	Total
Positive	**1 (5.9%)**	**3 (11.1%)**	**3 (13.6%)**	**7 (10.6%)**
- Obedient	0	0	0	0
- Merciful	0	0	1	1
- Brave	1	2	1	4
- Truthful	0	0	0	0
- Non-Authoritarian	0	0	0	0
- Good	0	1	1	2
Negative	**16 (94.1%)**	**24 (88.9%)**	**19 (86.4%)**	**59 (89.4%)**
- Disobedient	2	4	1	7
- Cruel	6	7	5	18
- Cowardly	0	0	1	1
- Deceiving	0	3	1	4
- Authoritarian	7	10	11	28
- Evil	1	0	0	1
Total[*]	**17 (100%)**	**27 (100%)**	**22 (100%)**	**66 (100%)**

Note: Total exceeds the number of stories containing Hussein image because coders coded all the relevant images whenever they were found. Chi-square was not computed because of small frequency.

Therefore, H4 which suggested that *The New York Times* was more likely to describe Saddam Hussein negatively than Arab newspapers is supported weakly. Of negative images, an authoritarian image (28) was found most often in the newspapers followed by a cruel (18), a disobedient (7), and a deceiving (4) image. That is, the papers mostly emphasized Hussein's dictatorship and his cruel oppression of Kurds or Iraqi people during his presidency. On the contrary, those expressions characterizing him as evil (1) were seldom found. Although images portraying Saddam Hussein positively were rarely found in the newspapers, his bravery (4) in confronting American forces fearlessly received the most media attention. On the other hand, the three newspapers did not describe his obedient, truthful, and non-authoritarian characteristics at all.

Table 11 shows how images of Saddam Hussein changed after Baghdad occupation. Interestingly, unlike *The New York Times* and *The Middle East Times*, *The Arab News* increased its use of negative images of Hussein from 10 to 14 after this incident. It especially increased the number of stories portraying his authoritarian image from 1 to 9. In contrast, *The New York Times* and *The Middle East Times* decreased the negative images (each from 9 to 7 and from 14 to 5).

	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
Table 11 Image of Hussein Before/After Occupation					(Number of stories)	
	NY	*NY*	*Arab*	*Arab*	*ME*	*ME*
Positive	**1**	**0**	**2**	**1**	**3**	**0**
- Obedient	0	0	0	0	0	0
- Merciful	0	0	0	0	1	0
- Brave	1	0	2	0	1	0
- Truthful	0	0	0	0	0	0
- Non-Authoritarian	0	0	0	0	0	0
- Good	0	0	0	1	1	0
Negative	**9**	**7**	**10**	**14**	**14**	**5**
- Disobedient	2	0	4	0	1	0
- Cruel	4	2	3	4	3	2
- Cowardly	0	0	0	0	1	0
- Deceiving	0	0	2	1	1	0
- Authoritarian	2	5	1	9	8	3
- Evil	1	0	0	0	0	0
Total	**10**	**7**	**12**	**15**	**17**	**5**

Note: Chi-square was not computed because of small frequencies in some cells.

WAR PORTRAYAL

Of the total number of stories, more than a third (37.6%) contained descriptions or expressions portraying the war as liberation or invasion, legitimate or illegitimate, and moral or immoral (see Table 12). The difference by newspapers was not statistically significant (χ^2 =2.2. d.f. = 2, ρ = .33).

Table 12 Presence/Absence of War Portrayal

	NY Times	Arab News	ME Times	Total
Yes	49 (32.9%)	65 (40.9%)	75 (38.7%)	189 (37.6%)
No	100 (67.1%)	94 (59.1%)	119 (61.3%)	313 (62.4%)
Total	149 (100.0)	159 (100.0)	194 (100.0)	502 (100.0)

χ^2 =2.2. d.f. = 2, ρ = .33

As Table 13 shows, *The New York Times* (61.3%) carried remarkable stories describing aspects of the war defined by U.S. administration compared with Arab newspapers (each 26.3% and 23.3%). On the other hand, Arab newspapers reported more negative aspects of the war (each 73.7% and 76.7%)

Table 13 Portrayal Of War

	NY Times	Arab News	ME Times	Total
Positive	**38 (61.3%)**	**20 (26.3%)**	**21 (23.3%)**	**79 (34.6%)**
- Liberation war	35 (56.4%)	20 (26.3%)	20 (22.2%)	75 (33.0%)
- Legitimate war	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (1.1%)	1 (0.3%)
- Moral war	3 (4.9%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (1.3%)
Negative	**24 (38.7%)**	**56 (73.7%)**	**69 (76.7%)**	**149 (65.4%)**
- Military invasion	10 (16.1%)	39 (51.3%)	50 (55.5%)	99 (43.4%)
- Illegitimate war	4 (6.5%)	15 (19.7%)	15 (16.7%)	34 (14.9%)
- Immoral war	10 (16.1%)	2 (2.7%)	4 (4.5%)	16 (7.1%)
Total[*]	**62 (100.0)**	**76 (100.0)**	**90 (100.0)**	**228 (100.0)**

Note: Total exceeds the number of stories containing war descriptions because of multiple coding. By liberation/invasion (χ^2 = 30.13, d.f.=2, ρ <. 001). Chi-square for the other categories was not computed because over 20 percent of cells have expected count less than 5.

than *The New York Times* (38.7%) did. Therefore, H5 which suggested that *The New York Times* would be more likely to reflect the war purposes of the U.S. administration than Arab newspapers is supported strongly.

Those voices emphasizing the purpose of war as one aimed to liberate Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein were more salient in *The New York Times* (56.4%) than in Arab newspapers (each 26.3% and 22.2%). The former, however, did not quite reflect the legitimate and moral aspect of war, which was also highlighted by the U.S. military during the war. The illegitimacy of the war in not observing international laws and norms received more attention from Arab newspapers (each 19.7% and 16.7%) than from *The New York Times* (6.5%). In contrast, those expressions or quotations arguing that the war would cause civilian damage were found more in *The New York Times* (16.1%) than in *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times* (each 2.7% and 4.5%).

Overall, these results suggest that *The New York Times* cited the purpose of the war as defined by the U.S. administration more often than Arab newspapers while the latter reflected many antiwar voices criticizing the U.S. purpose of war more than the former did.

PORTRAYAL OF ARAB SATELLITE NEWS CHANNELS

As Table 6 showed, only *The Arab News* used Arab media as a primary source in reporting the war. Of eight stories in the former, only two articles cited Al-Jazeera television as a primary source and the other six articles depended on Arab-language newspapers including *Al-Hayat* and *Al-Madinah*. Of two articles

using Al-Jazeera as a main source, one introduced its videotape showing two Iraqi women, who set off a suicide bombing against U.S. soldiers ("Al-Jazeera Shows Iraqi Women Suicide Bombers' Videotape," 6 April 2003), and the other described its footage airing Saddam's last abode in Baghdad and his speech ("Fresh Clues Emerge in Hunt for Saddam," 18 April 2003).

Although *The New York Times* did not depend on Arab media at all as a main source like *The Middle East Times*, the former evaluated the channel, Al-Jazeera, more positively than the latter did. This favorable attitude also appeared in *The Arab News*. Especially, Al-Jazeera's footage of U.S. and British soldiers dead or captured during the war received heavy attention from the two newspapers. They also emphasized the growth and impact of Arab satellite news channels on the Arab public, who did not depend on Western networks any more for war information thanks to the development of Arab-owned satellite news channels. *The New York Times* reported, "Against the backdrop of the real war, another battle is shaping up across the Arabic-speaking world among television broadcasts vying for an audience addicted to news. Gone are the days when the region had to tune to Western networks" (MacFarquhar, 2003). *The Arab News* portrayed Al-Jazeera and Abu Dhabi television as channels widely seen and most active in Arab regions. In particular their bold, brash, and Western style coverage attracted attention. For example, one article in *The Arab News* stated,

> Al-Jazeera has taken the Arab world by storm since its launch in 1996, with its reporting and brash, Western style drawing an audience of more

than 35 million. After making its name in the Afghan war with exclusive
footage of Osama Bin Laden, the Qatar-based channel has also had
success in Europe, with viewers doubling since the start of the Iraq war
("Al-Jazeera Calls on US to Ensure Free Press," 28 March 2003).

Nevertheless, the context in which the emphasis was placed was different. *The New York Times* evaluated highly the objectivity and independence of Al-Jazeera while *The Arab News* highlighted its coverage focusing on civilian damage caused by the bombings, which Western media neglected. Thus, *The Arab News* was overwhelmingly supportive of Arab satellite news channels, in contrast to Western media. On the other hand, *The Middle East Times* carried just a few articles dealing with Al-Jazeera, and its portrayal was seldom found except for the quotation of the U.S. governmental evaluation of Al-Jazeera, which was negative.

In its editorial, *The New York Times* portrayed Al-Jazeera as "the only independent broadcasting voice in the Arab world" and "the only uncensored Arabic television" ("Why Al Jazeera Matters," 30 March 2003; "Covering the War," 10 April 2003). According to the editorial, Al-Jazeera is the television station that should be encouraged and supported for its free, objective, and uncensored characteristic ('Why Al Jazeera Matters"). Its regular interviewing of Israeli officials and American officials was highly evaluated. The editorial stated, "The energetic if somewhat tendentious broadcasts of Al Jazeera will seem, in comparison, like the nuanced objectivity of the BBC" ('Why Al Jazeera Matters"). Quoted in an article, a general manager of Al-Jazeera emphasized its objectivity, saying, "Al-Jazeera is not with or against any party or country"

97

(MacFarquhar, 2003). Another article described the response of Arab governments to Al-Jazeera, which stated that it is widely considered by Arab audiences to be credible (Sachs, 2003). Al-Jazeera was also seen as a vital source of information about Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden.

Accordingly, *The New York Times* evaluated highly the independent and objective element of Al-Jazeera and its strong influence on Arab society. The evaluation, however, was not totally positive. The newspaper carried articles reporting criticisms of Arab channels, which came from Arab governments including Syria and Kuwait. For example, the Syrian government viewed Al-Jazeera as insufficiently antiwar and Kuwait demanded that all networks sign a pledge not to share images with Al-Jazeera (see MacFarquhar, 2003). Kuwait even refused visas to the network's correspondents and Libya and Tunisia complained that it gave too much airtime to oppositional leaders ("Why Al Jazeera Matters"). Also pointed out was the network's anti-American and pro-Iraqi bias. An article quoted critics who argued that Al-Jazeera's repeated broadcast of Iraqi civilian victims and its gentle treatment of Iraqi officials might fill Iraq's propaganda needs (MacFarquhar, 2003).

While *The New York Times* emphasized the democratic values of the Al-Jazeera channel, *The Arab News* highlighted its coverage of the war as opposed to that of Western media. Thus, Al-Jazeera's focus on civilian damage was highly evaluated in contrast to neglect of this topic by Western media:

> Of all the major global networks, Al-Jazeera has been alone in proceeding from the premise that this war should be viewed as an illegal enterprise. It has broadcast the horror of the bombing campaign, the blown-out brains, the blood-spattered pavements, the screaming infants and the corpses (Bodi, 2003).

This focus on Iraqi civilians who suffered from the bombings was compared to the U.S. mainstream media's coverage of war, which primarily transmitted the voice of the Bush administration and did not deal with Iraqi civilian deaths or the destruction of civilian facilities (see Mroue, 2003). One article argued that Al-Jazeera and Abu Dhabi were "given credit for transmitting images that many American networks refused to air, such as footage of buildings destroyed by US bombs and the innocents flooding Iraqi hospitals from the bombardments" (Qusti, 2003b). Another article cited one worker from a local English radio station in Saudi Arabia who said that CNN had lost its credibility whereas Arab channels like Al-Arabiya, Al-Jazeera, and Abu Dhabi gained it by presenting factual information objectively (see Akeel, 2003).

This contrasting comparison of Arab channels and Western media was also reflected in the coverage of the Basra uprising. In relation to that incident, an article in *The Arab News* which depended on Arab satellite channels as a main source, said there were no signs of unrest in the southern Iraqi city of Basra ("Arab journalists, TV deny Signs of Uprising in Basra," 27 March 2003). This article cited Al-Jazeera's Basra correspondent, who denied British reports that an uprising against Saddam Hussein had started in Basra in March 26, 2003. Another

article described the British media, which condemned Al-Jazeera's decision to broadcast two dead British soldiers, as "simple hypocrisy" (Bodi, 2003). This article pointed out that British media have shown images of dead or captured Iraqi soldiers from the outset of the war.

While *The Arab News* carried few articles reporting the Arab governments' criticisms of Al-Jazeera unlike *The New York Times*, one opinion criticized its favorable attitude toward the Qatar:

> This channel sheds light on the negative aspects of Arab countries in general while abstaining from any talk about the negative aspects of life in Qatar. Al-Jazeera does not discuss the deterioration of public utilities in Qatar nor does it talk about the rise of unemployment or the families which are approaching the poverty line (Hefni, 2003).

Quoting Colin Powell and Mohammed Said Al-Sahhaf, the Iraqi Information Minister, another article stated that Al-Jazeera's coverage of the war has been criticized by both Washington and Iraq ("US Troops Shot at Our Car Near Baghdad: Al-Jazeera," 8 April 2003). Powell was quoted as saying that the channel portrayed U.S. war efforts in a negative light and Al-Sahhaf that it was marketing for the Americans.

Accordingly, Al-Jazeera received diverse responses and evaluations from the officials of U.S. and Arab governments. Comparatively, *The Arab News* was more positive of Al-Jazeera's role and impact than *The New York Times*. While *The New York Times* and *The Arab News* devoted much space to Al-Jazeera, *The Middle East Times* carried only a few articles, which cited the negative response

of the U.S. government to Al-Jazeera. An article quoted Colin Powell, saying that

Al-Jazeera tended to portray U.S. efforts in a negative light and had an editorial

line appealing to the Arab public (Slaney, 2003). Another article also cited U.S.

officials, who railed against Arab journalists' bias in the Iraq War and pointed out

that Al-Jazeera television lacked objectivity (Roquefeuil, 2003). In relation to Al-

Jazeera's footage of dead U.S. and British soldiers, an article described its

criticism in detail:

> Al-Jazeera news channel has come in for severe criticism for broadcasting
> images of both dead and wounded US and British soldiers. Both
> Washington and London have said such pictures violate the Geneva
> conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war ("Blair correct over
> British soldier's execution: spokesman," 28 March 2003).

Accordingly, *The Middle East Times* did not devote much space to the growth and

impact of Al-Jazeera television: its portrayal centered on negative responses of

U.S. officials to the channel. Thus, the newspaper's portrayal of Arab news

channels was not as positive as the ones found in *The New York Times* and *The

Arab News.*

In summary, for *The New York Times* and *The Arab News*, the growth and

growing influence of Arab satellite news channels on Arab society was welcome.

The former described these news channels in terms of Western democratic ideals

and values while the latter focused on their coverage of the war as a refreshing

contrast to that of Western media. Unlike *The New York Times* and *The Arab

News*, *The Middle East Times* was not very dependent on Arab news channels and

depiction of Al-Jazeera was restricted to its negative aspects which came from

U.S. officials' criticism.

FRAMING EMBEDDED JOURNALISTS

As Table 2 showed, 9 percent of articles in *The New York Times* and 3.5 percent of articles in *The Arab News* were written by its embedded journalist. As can be seen in Table 14, the topics covered by embedded journalists were not

Table 14 War Topics Covered by Embedded Journalists   (Number of stories)

	The New York Times	*The Arab News*
War efforts	12	3
War effects	0	0
Antiwar voice	0	0
War victims	0	1
Other	0	1
Total	12	5

much different. They were heavily focused on U.S.-led war efforts. More concretely, 11 subtopics covered in *The New York Times* were related to combat, and one subtopic dealt with weapons of mass destruction. An embedded journalist in *The Arab News* wrote three articles describing U.S. military progress in Iraq, one dealing with U.S. military victims caused by coalition forces' friendly fire, and one interviewing a U.S. soldier from Muslim. Accordingly, embedded

journalists in both newspapers described in detail U.S. forces' move to Baghdad, their battle with Iraqi soldiers, their hardships, etc.

Despite this commonality in topics, overall framing of embedded journalists and their role identified qualitatively in *The New York Times* and *The Arab News* was different. While *The New York Times* highlighted both their advantages such as greater access to battlefield and intense coverage of war process and disadvantages like Pentagon's strategy to make use of the media, *The Arab News* framed embedded journalists totally as a military strategy to control the media, emphasizing that they might lose objectivity.

An editorial of *The New York Times* called the Pentagon's strategy to let journalists travel with the armed forces a 'win-win' story ("Covering the War," 10 April 2003). That is, the media have been able to provide war coverage more immediately and intensely than ever before. Also, the military learned that embedded reporters better understood the perspective of the men and women on the front. One opinion emphasized that viewers and readers would get a much better sense of soldiers' lives and generals' strategies thanks to journalists who were embedded in the troops (Vernon, 2003). Citing Bryan G. Whitman, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for media operations, one article described in detail how the Pentagon had devised this new policy on media (Purdum & Rutenberg, 2003). According to Whitman, Pentagon officials wanted Americans

to see by reports from embedded journalists how well trained, dedicated, and professional their military forces were.

Accordingly, the newspaper devoted its space to highlighting how journalists could better transmit news from the battlefield and descriptions of the coalition forces' experiences by being close to military units. In addition to this positive role of embedded journalists, *The New York Times* carried stories emphasizing their negative aspects. For example, one article described the Pentagon's policy of assigning journalists to troops as a "method to manage the news and restore the sympathy between reporter and the soldier" (Salamon, 2003). The policy was seen as an effort by the Pentagon to "'weaponize' the press, to make it a cheerleader again for American soldiers and to demoralize an enemy with live pictures of American might" (Salamon, 2003). Furthermore, it helped create empathy between reporters and their subjects which would make it easier for the Pentagon to communicate what it was trying to do (Purdum & Rutenberg, 2003). According to one opinion,

> …from reporters inhaling the exhaust of infantry units to bleary-eyed New York anchors spellbound by squads of generals analyzing the data stream, the news media have marched practically in lock step with the military…In Iraq, the Bush administration has beaten the press at its own game. It has turned the media into a weapon of war, using the information it provides to harass and intimate the Iraqi military leadership (Truscott IV, 2003).

The response of *The Arab News* towards embedded journalists was centered on the contradiction between their reporting and objective reporting. For

example, one article noted that embedded reporters propagated the American and British points of view and could not question the legitimacy of the war even when weapons of mass destruction were not found by coalition forces (Haider, 2003). Thus, according to this article, with embedded journalism the media have abandoned the cardinal principle of journalism – unbiased and unprejudiced reporting. Another article introduced the story of an embedded journalist from Syria, who escaped after being captured by Iraqis (Jayaram, 2003). This journalist, who was embedded in the 3rd unit of the U.S. Marine Corps, described the U.S. military censorship on reports filed by the embedded journalists. Because of this restriction on reporting, the journalist argued, embedded journalists did not focus on the Iraqi people and lost their objectivity: they simply followed what the U.S. and allied troops told them. The journalist also said that the military never told the truth about how many of their soldiers had been killed. In an article from *The Independent*, a British journalist described the personal experience of being embedded with the British army as the one of the most exasperating but also fascinating experiences of his career (Judd, 2003). The journalist also articulated the restrictions on reporting:

> Censorship was obviously a big fear, with the insistence that all copy be checked by assigned media officers in case information should jeopardize operations. However, my "minder" never once asked me to delete anything he considered negative, although I understand other embeds were not so lucky. The frustration lay in simply accessing information in a rigid system. Details of attacks were initially drip-fed, deadlines ignored and perfectly reasonable questions left unanswered (Judd, 2003).

The reporting of embedded journalists was compared with that of unilateral journalists, who were not assigned to military forces. The latter could report realities and war purpose in ways deeper than the fleeting images transmitted by embedded journalists (Solomon, 2003).

Like *The Arab News*, the response of T*he Middle East Times* to embedded journalists centered on their military control. For example, one article argued that embedded journalists were held hostage by the military (Slaney, 2003) while another described their role as one of bringing the heroism of Anglo-American troops from the battlefield into homes (Nanjundiah, 2003). Reporters Without Borders, an international media watchdog group, urged U.S. military not to obstruct journalists, including embedded journalists, in their reporting of the Iraqi War ("Watchdog urges US not to obstruct reporters, " 21 March 2003). The group asked U.S. officials not to enforce strict rules that spelled out what embedded journalists were allowed to report.

In both quantitative and qualitative analyses, the response of *The New York Times* toward embedded journalists was more favorable than that of *The Arab News.* Although an embedded reporter in *The Arab News* focused on U.S. war efforts and victims, the newspaper highlighted negative aspects of embedded journalists such as loss of objective reporting and military censorship. *The Middle East Times*, which did not assign journalists to military forces, emphasized the manipulative and ideological aspect of the use of embedded journalists.

Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion

This dissertation investigated whether and how *The New York Times*, *The Arab News*, and *The Middle East Times* reflected their national interests in their coverage of the Iraqi War. Fundamentally, it was assumed that *The New York Times* and Arab newspapers would follow different principles of war because the former belonged to a country supporting the conflict and the latter to countries opposed to the war. Based on the indexing hypothesis, journalistic practices of opening or closing news gates to a broader range of views according to the levels of conflict among public officials (Bennett, 2003), and existing literature on the Gulf War, it was expected that the media would reflect the voice of officials and their foreign policy in such a crisis. Overall, the results supported this expectation.

As discussed before, *The New York Times* emphasized U.S. war efforts and depended heavily on U.S. officials. On the other hand, Arab newspapers devoted a significant amount of space to the antiwar voice and cited more Arab sources. These papers were a bit more critical of U.S. interests in the Gulf region than *The New York Times* was. The latter depended more on sources favorable toward the war than Arab newspapers did. The coverage of *The New York Times*, however, was more thematic than that of Arab newspapers. In describing Hussein's image, *The New York Times* emphasized his negative images a bit more than Arab newspapers did. The former carried many more stories describing the purpose of the war according to the U.S. administration whereas the latter more

107

often emphasized the aggressive and illegitimate aspects of the war. Therefore, of the seven hypotheses, six hypotheses were supported, and one hypothesis was not.

Overall, these results suggest that *The New York Times* took a more prowar tendency while Arab newspapers reflected a more antiwar one in their coverage of the war. This result is consistent with that of the researcher's analysis of the Afghanistan War (Lee, 2002), which showed *The New York Times* assuming a prowar tendency and *The Arab News* a more antiwar tendency.

It should be noted, however, that *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times* devoted the most space to war efforts and frequently cited U.S. officials while *The New York Times* cited Arab officials rarely. Therefore, the coverage of *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times* was more balanced, compared with that of *The New York Times*, which supported the argument of Liebes (1992) that journalists' treatment of war in their own territory is different than the way they cover war that occurs in other countries. This more balanced reporting of *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times* also may be due to their target audience. As mentioned before, the main readers of these papers are expatriate workers working in the Gulf region. Thus, it is probable that for this reason, they transmitted American along with Arab responses to the war.

The contrasting reporting of *The New York Times* and Arab newspapers was also reflected in their approach to embedded journalists, whose presence brought about many controversies concerning the role and responsibility of

108

journalists. Compared with *The New York Times*, Arab newspapers emphasized the manipulation of embedded journalists by U.S. military, which ultimately served the U.S. government and its propaganda. *The Middle East Times*, however, did not highly evaluate the role and impact of Arab satellite news channels, unlike *The New York Times* and *The Arab News.*

Although six out of seven hypotheses were supported, H1b assuming that Arab newspapers will place more emphasis on the critique of U.S. strategic interests, H2a expecting that three newspapers will depend on their officials sources significantly, and H4 assuming that *The New York Times* is more likely to describe Saddam Hussein negatively were only supported weakly.

As the literature on Arab media coverage of Gulf War showed, the Arab press demonstrated a strong opposition to U.S. interests in the Gulf region and took a pro-Palestinian tendency. Nevertheless, *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times* were not as critical of U.S. interests in the Gulf region and the U.S.-Israel relationship as expected. Their somewhat mild attitude toward U.S. interests in the Middle East can be attributed to the audience they target. These papers again serve a predominantly expatriate community in the Gulf region whose members are accustomed to Western culture. Thus, it seems that their tone most likely would be somewhat different than that of Arab-language newspapers published in the Middle East whose audience is mainly Arabs. In fact, Arab-language newspapers such as *Al-Ahram* and *Al-Raya* used a more cynical and

critical voice in covering the war. For example, they described Iraqi civilians'

deaths as "murder," "massacre," and "American war crimes" and portrayed

American troops as "crusaders," alluding to the European armies in the Middle

Ages who tried to take control of the Middle East (see Coker, 2003). *Al-Ahram*,

the largest official newspaper in Egypt, accused the United States of mounting a

"colonial war," calling it unnecessary and irresponsible (see Huggler, 2003). *Al-*

Bayan in Dubai said that the war spelled the death of international law, calling it

"a sad day for Arabs" ("Gulf papers denounce war," 21 March 2003). Even in

Qatar, which supported the war and allowed the U.S. military to use its bases,

state-run daily *Al-Raya* argued that the United States wanted to control the oil of

Iraq and reshape the Middle East to serve the American and Israeli interests (see

Huggler, 2003). When the Iraqi War broke out, a commentator in *Al-Rai* in Jordan

contended that Iraq would become an American and Zionist base controlling the

entire region and that the war opened the doors for Israel to control Arab oil (see

Huggler, 2003).

Especially, *The Arab News* abruptly dropped its antiwar tone after

coalition forces occupied Baghdad in April 10, 2003. It decreased reports dealing

with antiwar demonstrations and instead increased coverage of the U.S.-led

construction of post-war Iraq without much questioning it. In contrast, *The Middle*

East Times was more critical of the post-war Iraq construction led by the U.S.

administration and of U.S. strategic interests after the fall of Baghdad. This

weaker antiwar voice in *The Arab News* as compared to pre-Baghdad occupation

is also reflected in its somewhat mixed attitude toward the U.S. military. For

example, one editorial argued that those who were against the war needed to

double their protests against American occupation although Baghdad had fallen

("Against the Occupation," 10 April 2003). The editorial continued, "The Iraqi

people, like everyone else, deserve to be the masters of their own destiny. *Arab*

News and other publications which took a largely antiwar stance did so in the

belief that a U.S-led invasion of Iraq was not the best way of bringing liberty to

the people who live in that country." This anti-U.S. attitude, however, soon

changed into a somewhat favorable attitude toward the U.S. military. For

instance, one article described the United States and the United Kingdom as big

winners of the war for their contribution in toppling Saddam Hussein's

dictatorship (Taheri, 2003). Another article quoted the new chief of police in

Najaf city, Iraq who said, "We have come back to Najaf to bring peace and

prosperity to the people who need it so badly after the tortuous years spent under

the iron fist of Saddam Hussein. This new hope for freedom and democracy

would not have been possible if it had not been for the coalition forces" (Al-

Ghalib, 2003). Accordingly, *The Arab News* became somewhat favorable toward

U.S. military after the Baghdad occupation because it considered highly the role

of coalition forces in ending the long dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein.

Furthermore, the censorship by Saudi government worked in relenting the antiwar

tone of *The Arab News.* The Saudi media have criticized the intention of U.S. intervention in the Middle East at the outbreak of the Iraqi War, but soon moderated its position on the war because all the editors-in-chief in the Kingdom had been ordered to drop their anti-American tone (see Wright, 2004). They were told not to carry pictures of dead Iraqi babies caused by bombings and not to call the war an invasion.

Considering these findings, overall *The Middle East Times* voiced antiwar tone more strongly than *The Arab News.* Although there was not a significant difference in main topics between two newspapers ($\chi^2 = 7.7$, d.f. = 4, $\rho > .05$), the former (25.8%) devoted more space to antiwar voice than the latter (20.1%) did. Also *The Middle East Times* (33.5%) carried more sources unfavorable toward the war than *The Arab News* (28.9%). This difference can be probably accounted for by the environment in which each newspaper operates. As noted before, compared with Egypt, Saudi Arabia has more controlled media system and a stronger censorship on coverage threatening its state and royal family. Although the Saudi government condemned U.S. military solution to Iraqi crisis officially, it has been also criticized for its mild attitude toward the United States. Despite its promise not to provide air base to U.S. forces, the Saudi government allowed them to use Prince Sultan air base for control of military flights (Kelley, 2003). Therefore, it seems that the Saudi government did not want to break completely a long-kept favorable relationship between its country and the United States. Thus,

it is probable that it tried to lower antiwar tone in Saudi media to maintain a close relationship with the United States.

As discussed earlier, Bennett's indexing hypothesis (1990) argued that mass media news is indexed to the dynamics of governmental debate. This hypothesis and the symbiotic relationship between the press and the state, often found in war coverage, brought about the expectation that all three newspapers would depend largely on their official sources. This expectation, however, was not satisfied in the case of *The Arab News*, which devoted the most space to Arab public responses to the war. Thus, the case shows that the media do not always follow their governmental voices and agendas totally. Nevertheless, the findings, overall, suggests that the indexing hypothesis is still influential in explaining the relationship between the press and state in the United States in a situation like Iraqi War in which bipartisan consensus was strong. [14]

The New York Times depended on U.S. sources including U.S. officials and non-officials much more than *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times*, while the latter cited Arab sources much more than the former. In addition, sources that favored the war were much more cited in *The New York Times* than in Arab newspapers. In contrast, sources opposed to the war occupied more space in the latter than in the former. This difference which was shown in the selection

---

[14] The Senate approved the use of military force in Iraq unanimously and the House voted for the resolution overwhelmingly (392 to 11). On April 3, 2003, the U.S. Senate and the House almost unanimously agreed on U.S. government's spending nearly $79 billion for the Iraq campaign (see Firestone, 2003).

of sources can be an important reason why the coverage of *The New Times* is quite different from that of Arab newspapers.

The New York Times was expected to report more stories portraying Saddam Hussein negatively than Arab newspapers. As the results showed, this expectation was not supported strongly. There was not a big difference in the negative description of Saddam Hussein among the three newspapers, and these descriptions did not occupy much space. This remarkable absence of negative images in *The New York Times* can be attributed to the fact that the paper often used neutral titles, such as Mr., Iraqi president, or Iraqi leader in describing Saddam Hussein. That his negative images were often found in *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times* like *The New York Times* indicates that Saddam Hussein was a "worthy victim" (Herman & Chomsky, 1988, p. 34) not only in America but also in Arab nations such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This anti-Saddam Hussein tendency which is reflected in the coverage of *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times* is consistent with the results of previous studies (Motamed-Nejad et al., 1992; Mowlana et al., 1992) discussed earlier. *The Arab News*, in particular, increased its coverage of negative images of Hussein after the Baghdad occupation. As Table 11 shows, the paper greatly emphasized his authoritarian image. Discussing winners and losers of the war in Iraq, one article welcomed the removal of Saddam Hussein from his brutal dictatorship: "The biggest winner is, by far, the Iraqi people, now liberated from the worst regime in

114

its contemporary history. The biggest loser, of course, is the Baathist gang that had brutalized Iraq under Saddam Hussein" (Taheri, 2003). An editorial described Saddam Hussein as a "dictator" who was hated by most of his people ("Against the Occupation," 10 April 2003). This editorial described the images of Iraqi people dancing on the fragments of Saddam Hussein's statue during the occupation of Baghdad as ones welcomed by the entire civilized world. All three newspapers, however, did not place much emphasis on the description of Hussein's positive images, indicating that Saddam Hussein was not respected in Saudi Arabia and Egypt as well as America.

As discussed earlier, the use of either episodic or thematic news framing affects how individuals attribute the causes of social issues. Thus, individuals exposed to episodic news coverage are likely to hold individuals responsible for social problems while viewers of thematic news framing tend to see the more fundamental social, political, or economic causes around problems and conflicts (Iyengar, 1991). As the results showed, the coverage of all three newspapers was heavily episodic, which supported previous studies (e.g. Iyengar, 1991). Therefore, they did not explore the origins of the war sufficiently, failing to take into account the larger social, economic, and political contexts in which the war occurred. Nevertheless, thematic framing was found in *The New York Times* (18.1%) almost twice as often as in *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times* (each 9.4% and 8.2%). This result suggests that the former was more analytic in

115

addressing the social and historical background of the war than the latter. As Table 4 showed, Arab newspapers were not so active in criticizing U.S. strategic interests and U.S.-Israel relationship. This result can be one of many reasons the coverage of Arab newspapers was not as thematic as expected. A shorter story length and a strong opinion element in articles, elements often found in Arab press, can be another reason why the coverage of *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times* was not very thematic. More thematic framing identified in *The New York Times* can be a consequence of the 'new long journalism' found in American newspapers for the past few decades (see Barnhurst & Mutz, 1997). According to Barnhurst & Mutz (1997), stories in American newspapers including *The New York Times* gradually shifted toward a long format, including more interpretation and context. Thus, coverage has become more oriented toward analysis, answering such as how and why (p. 34).

Overall, these results suggest that not only American media but also Arab press are heavily event-oriented in covering international conflicts. Thus, it is probable that Iyengar's episodic vs. thematic news framing, which mainly derives from the analysis of U.S. network television, can be extended to media coverage of conflicts in other countries.

DIFFERENT NATIONAL INTERESTS AND VOICES

As discussed earlier, national interest became an important factor that influenced media coverage of conflicts. Considering the overall findings, *The New*

116

York Times followed the interests of an attacking country whereas Arab

newspapers reflected the interests of an attacked country. Thus, the former

emphasized the process of combat, U.S.-led construction of post-war Iraq,

military operation, and war victims of coalition forces. On the other hand, the

latter devoted more space to antiwar demonstrations or responses, war effects on

society, and Iraqi victims.

    As stated earlier, the prowar voice of *The New York Times* first came from

its heavy dependence on U.S. officials. Thus, it transmitted war purposes

announced by the U.S. administration and seldom represented antiwar voices.

Also since most of the U.S. public favored the war, the newspaper reflected a

prowar atmosphere in its coverage of the war. According to a Gallup poll

conducted in March 30, 2003, most people in the United States said that making

the United States safer from terrorism (87.28%), destroying Iraq's capabilities of

producing weapons of mass destruction (87.93%), and freeing the Iraqi people

from the rule of Saddam Hussein (82.08%) were goals over which it was worth

going to war. About 57 percent thought that the war would pave the way for a

peace agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians. A survey conducted by

Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll in April 22-23, 2003 also shows that 76

percent of U.S. people supported military action to disarm Iraq and remove Iraqi

President Saddam Hussein (see www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm). This prowar

attitude in *The New York Times* can be found in its minimal attention to criticism

of U.S. foreign policy and its implication. The paper carried only one article criticizing U.S. foreign policy historically on its front page (see Apple, 2003). According to that article, U.S. foreign policy based on military rearmament and aggressive policies since the Reagan administration has not always been successful. Particularly, the Iraqi War itself tarnished the American image in the Middle East due to American alliances with Arab governments that were considered corrupt or tyrannical by their own people and due to strong American backing for Israel. The article also argued that the triumph in Iraq was incomplete because allied forces did not find any evidence of weapons of mass destructions or Saddam Hussein. Accordingly, *The New York Times* did not devote much space to critical analysis of U.S. foreign policy, especially in the Middle East. This absence of critical reporting in the U.S. mainstream medium supports previous studies (e.g. Dickson 1994; Kellner, 1993), which showed that the U.S. media lacked critical perspectives when they reported international conflicts in which the United States was strongly engaged.

The antiwar voice of Arab newspapers may reflect the fear of people in Arab regions that their countries could be military targets of the United States next to Iraq. For example, slogans of antiwar demonstrations in Cairo expressed the fear that after Iraq, Syria would be next on the target list followed by Egypt (see Cartier, 2003). Young Saudis agreed that Saudi Arabia could be a target for America in the near future (see Qusti, 2003a). They argued that the seizure of

Iraq's oil fields and tightening of U.S. control in the Gulf region were the main incentives for the war. In addition, in the mind of many Saudis, the Iraqi War was intertwined with the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the feelings that they could not endure two wars simultaneously going on in the Middle East (Abu-Nasr, 2003). Thus, most Arab people believed that the Bush administration attacked Iraq for oil and for Israel's security (Horrock, 2003). Many Arab nations including Saudi Arabia and Egypt also feared that the change of political power in Iraq might cause political instability in their own country. Especially the possibility that the war might cause division in Iraq between Sunnis and Shiites and give birth to an independent Kurdish state was burdensome to them. This anti-U.S. atmosphere has spread in the Arab world, especially since the Iranian revolution of 1979, which rejected U.S. influence and defended Islam culture (Kahn, 2003). In addition, the terrorism of September 11, 2001 reinforced this anti-U.S. attitude in the Middle East. As Khan (2003) argues, a significant portion of the Muslim population believed that the "war on terror is not only a war on Islam but an unjust effort by a 'Crusader-Zionist' entity to destroy the Muslim world in order to advance the interests of Israel and fundamentalist Christians" (p. 87). This sentiment adds to the strong suspicion of U.S. policy and its role in the Middle East that the Arab world has expressed in the past few decades. In fact, the advocacy of human rights and the alleviation of humanitarian disasters have long been important aspects of U.S. foreign policy (Nye, 1999). In this war, the Bush

administration utilized the promotion of democracy and the liberation of Iraqi people from repressive Hussein regime as justification for its intervention in Iraq. These goals, however, brought about suspicions or skepticisms toward U.S. policy among many Muslim nations, which considered control of oil resources in the Middle East and support of Israel interests as main goals of U.S. war with Iraq.

In summary, *The New York Times* and Arab newspapers showed contrasting views on the war because they reflected different national interests and public opinions. The former emphasized the legitimacy of war aimed to destroy weapons of mass destruction and liberate the Iraqi people. Thus, in this coverage the U.S. military forces served as a hero and liberator to the Iraqi people. In contrast, *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times* devoted much space to describing the Arab public who were afraid of U.S. control of the Gulf region and increasing Israeli influence in the Middle East. Therefore, in this coverage the war was described as a military invasion which ignored international law, and the U.S. forces were portrayed as occupants to the Arab people. These findings support the result of previous studies (e.g. Entman, 1991; Yang, 2003) that news media are seldom free of their national interests. The heavy dependence of *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times* on European news agencies such as AFP and Reuters, which showed more critical responses to war, can be a consequence of the difference in war reporting between these newspapers and *The New York Times*.

ARAB SATELLITE NEWS CHANNELS AND EMBEDDED JOURNALISTS

As discussed before, the growth of Arab-owned satellite news channels

and their role in the war received much attention in *The New York Times* and *The*

Arab News. Especially, the former placed strong emphasis on the objectivity and

independence of the Al-Jazeera channel. In fact, such objectivity has been one of

the primary journalistic norms that American journalists have long pursued in the

profession (Gans, 1979). Thus, it seems that *The New York Times* highly

evaluated the expression of this norm in the channel. The description of Al-

Jazeera as an uncensored and independent channel can probably be accounted for

by the fact that the newspaper sees most Arab media except for Al-Jazeera as

strictly controlled by their governments:

> The government control of the media is not the issue in any case, since
> nearly all newspapers in the Arab world, including those with most savage
> coverage of the American invasion, publish at the pleasure of the
> governments. In most countries, the government appoints all newspaper
> editors, including the so-called opposition press. Even a privately owned
> paper like Al Watan in Saudi Arabia must toe the government line in
> reporting on domestic politics and personalities (Sachs, 2003).

Unlike *The New York Times*, *The Arab News* greatly emphasized Al-Jazeera's

focus on civilian damage. This difference in perceptions of Al-Jazeera may be due

to the difference shown in the coverage of the war by the papers: *The New York*

Times took a prowar tendency while *The Arab News* showed a more antiwar

attitude. Thus, it seems that *The Arab News* was more favorable toward Al-

Jazeera's coverage of Iraqi civilians and of facilities destroyed by bombings. This

favorable response to Al-Jazeera, however, did not appear in *The Middle East Times*, which did not carry many articles dealing with Arab satellite news channels. This is probably a consequence of the tension between Qatar and other Arab countries including Egypt, which has been caused by Al-Jazeera's bold reporting of news and its provocative political talk shows. According to Ayish (2002), governments in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia have been infuriated by Al-Jazeera's critical discussion of their domestic political affairs and have closed down some of its regional bureaus. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak frequently attacked Al-Jazeera as it aired programmes criticizing the Egyptian government for its violations of human rights and suppression of democracy (Miladi, 2003, p. 157). The Egyptian media also openly blamed Al-Jazeera as a channel spreading enmity and instability among Arab nations.

Although *The New York Tim*es and *The Arab News* stressed that embedded journalists could lose their objectivity and be manipulated by U.S. military, their own staff writers who were embedded in the U.S. military focused primarily on U.S. war efforts rather than on the damage of civilian facilities or Iraqi victims in their coverage. This result suggests that embedded journalists in both newspapers did not play their role sufficiently, considering both papers' negative responses to embedded journalists. This also indicates that the U.S. military strategy to control the media was somewhat successful although this judgment is based on embedded reporters' coverage in only two newspapers.

LIMITATIONS OF THE DISSERTATION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This dissertation is one of few attempts to analyze the Arab voices, which often have been excluded from research on international conflicts in which the United States is involved. Although it was restricted to English-language newspapers in the Middle East and countries neighboring Iraq, this dissertation provides rich insight into the contents of Arab newspapers and their attitudes toward Saddam Hussein and the Bush administration. Nevertheless, it has many limitations.

First of all, this dissertation did not provide sufficient explanations for the organizational structure or editorial policy of *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times*. Because there were few studies dealing with English-language newspapers published in the Middle East, the researcher's description of *The Arab News* and *The Middle East Times* was limited. More importantly, the analysis of the dissertation was restricted to one Arab newspaper in Saudi Arabia and one in Egypt, along with only one newspaper in the United States. Thus, there is difficulty in generalizing the results. Comparing more Arab-language newspapers with more U.S. newspapers might produce better results in the comparison of the media of the Arab and U.S. regions. In this respect, comparisons of U.S. network television including CNN and Arab satellite news channels such as Al-Jazeera is recommended for a future research. As mentioned earlier, hundreds of reporters

were embedded to cover the Iraqi War. Thus, it would be interesting to compare the coverage of media that assigned reporters to coalition forces with that of media that declined to embed them in the military. Moreover, to investigate deeply what topics and concerns that these embedded journalists covered is suggested for a future research. The dissertation analyzed only a short period of conflict phase between the start of the war and official declaration of victory by U.S. administration. Given that the role of media is different according to the phases of crisis (Bloch & Lehman-Wilzig, 2002), more extensive study on the war situation before March 20, 2003 or after May 1, 2003 is also suggested for future research.

Although there are many studies addressing the recent growth of new media in the Middle East and their impact on Arab society (e.g. Ghareeb, 2000; Huff, 2001; Wheeler, 2001), research showing how Arab media frame specific issues like the Iraqi War is scant. On the contrary, studies addressing how the U.S. media cover issues related to the Middle East or how they portray Arab-Americans is abundant. Especially *intifadeh*, the Palestinian uprising for independence, has received much attention from scholars (e.g. Noakes & Wilkins, 2002; Zelizer et al.; 2002). Since the terrorist attacks in 2001, scholars have focused on images of Arab-Americans portrayed in U.S. media (e.g. Brennen & Duffy, 2003; Weston, 2003). To learn more about Arab voices, more extensive research on Arab media should be conducted.

Appendix

v1. Story identification number

v2. Newspaper name

     1 = *The New York Times*

     2 = *The Arab News*

     3 = *The Middle East Times*

v3. Story type

     1 = Article

     2 = Editorial (go to v6)

     3 = Opinion or Guest column (go to v6)

v4. Story byline: Code if v3=1

     1 = Embedded journalists

     2 = Staff writers including correspondents

     3 = News agency or syndicated papers

v5. Story origin: Code if v3=1

     1 = United States

     2 = Iraq

     3 = Arab nations (not including Iraq)

     4 = Other

v6. Focus of Story

    1 = War efforts (go to v7)

    2 = War effects (go to v8)

    3 = Antiwar voice (go to v9)

    4 = War victims (go to v10)

    5 = Other

v7. Aspects of war efforts: Code if v6=1

    1 = Process of the combat

    2 = Weapons of mass destruction

    3 = Stories about soldiers and their family

    4 = Analysis of military operation

    5 = Diplomatic efforts for war

    6 = Post-war Iraq construction

    7 = Other

v8. Aspects of War effects: Code if v6=2

    1 = Economic effect

    2 = Environmental effect

    3 = Security

    4 = Other

v9. Aspects of antiwar voice: Code if v6=3

    1 = Antiwar demonstrations or responses

    2 = Critique of U.S. strategic interest (e.g. control of oil resource)

    3 = Critique of U.S. –Israel relation

    4 = Critique of U.S.-led construction of post-war Iraq

    5 = Critique of U.S. foreign policy

6 = Other

v10. War victims of: Code if v6=4

    1 = Coalition forces

    2 = Iraqi soldiers or Arab civilians

    3 = Coalition prisoner of war (POW)

    4 = Iraqi POW

    5 = Refugees

    6 = Other

v11. Primary source

    1 = U.S. officials

    2 = Arab officials

    3 = Officials (excluding 1 and 2)

    4 = U.S. non-officials

    5 = Arab non-officials

    6 = Non-officials (excluding 4 and 5)

    7 = Arab media

    8 = Other

v12. Direction of source

    1 = Favorable toward the war

    2 = Neutral

    3 = Unfavorable toward the war

v13. Orientation of news coverage

    1 = Episodic

    2 = Thematic

v14. Does the story refer to images of Saddam Hussein?

    1 = Yes (go to v15-20 and mark all the relevant image whenever found)

    2 = No

v15. Characteristics

    1 = Obedient   2 = Disobedient

v16. Characteristics

    1 = Merciful   2 = Cruel

v17. Characteristics

    1 = Brave   2 = Cowardly

v18. Characteristics

    1 = Truthful   2 = Deceiving

v19. Characteristics

    1 = Non-Authoritarian   2 = Authoritarian

v20. Characteristics

    1 = Good   2 = Evil

v21. Does the story have symbolic terms or expressions describing war?

    1 = Yes (go to v22-24 and mark all the relevant description whenever found)

    2 = No

v22. Description

        1 = Liberation war   2 = Military invasion

v23. Description

        1 = Legitimate war   2 = Illegitimate war

v24. Description

        1 = Moral war   2 = Immoral war

DEFINITION OF CATEGORIES

1. Story origin: Story origin indicates regions from which stories come.

                Mostly it is identified by regions following dateline.

2. Focus of story

- War efforts: Stories describing the process of combat and the function of weapons used in the war, dealing with weapons of mass destruction or interviewing American soldiers in the operation and showing their bravery are included in this category. Analysis of military operation, the diplomatic negotiations of the U.S. government for war, and discussion about the construction of post-war Iraq belong to this category.

- War effects: This contains stories describing the economic, environmental or other effects of war on society. Stories dealing with consequences of the war such as changes in oil prices, slowdown of the economy, the

129

decline of visitors to Arab nations, or environmental damage belong to this category. Security concerns and reinforcement brought by the war are classified in this category.

- Antiwar voice: This includes stories covering collective behaviors, voices, or opinions, which demonstrate antiwar or anti-United States attitudes. The critique of U.S. strategic, diplomatic, and national interest in the war and of U.S.-led construction of post-war Iraq concern this category.

- War victims: Those who suffered from the military attacks are included in this category. Prisoners of war or refugees are also grouped in this category.

3. Primary source

- U.S. officials: This category includes President Bush, military officials,[15] the FBI, CIA, Congress leaders, and anonymous government sources such as administration officials or authorities.

- Arab officials: This contains officials of Arab nations.

- Officials: Officials outside the United States and Arab nations are included in this category.

- U.S. non-officials: This includes U.S. citizens, experts, civic groups, economic organizations, victims of war and their families, etc.

---

[15] Military officers who are not in the position of military control and command are classified as U.S. non-officials.

- Arab non-officials: This contains Arab citizens, experts, civic groups, economic organizations, victims of war and their families, etc.

- Non-officials: Non-officials outside the United States and Arab nations are included in this category.

- Arab media: The Arab media include all kinds of media based in Middle Eastern countries.

- Other: Stories whose sources are not identified are included in this category. For example, stories that are largely based on the analysis and standpoint of reporters themselves are grouped in this category. Survey data or research results also belong to this group.

4. Direction of source

- Favorable toward the war: Sources expressing positive or favorable opinions about the war make up this category.

- Neutral: Sources expressing opinions neither favorable nor unfavorable toward the war are included in this category.

- Unfavorable toward the war: Sources expressing negative or unfavorable opinions about the war constitute this category.

5. Orientation of News Coverage

- Episodic: This frame depicts issues in terms of concrete instances or specific events (Iyengar & Simon, 1994, p. 171). For example, stories just describing what has occurred at the battle are classified in this category.

131

- Thematic: This news frame places issues in some general and abstract context (Iyengar & Simon, 1994, p. 171). Stories focusing on interpretive analysis of war such as the explanation of the social and historical background of war are included in this category.

6. Portrayal of Saddam Hussein

- Positive: The positive portrayal of Saddam Hussein includes descriptions showing a merciful, brave, truthful, and good Iraqi leader. For example, one article reported that Saddam Hussein has obtained much support for hading out millions of dollars to families of suicide bombers and families of Palestinians killed by Israeli forces. This story constituted a merciful image of Saddam Hussein. Those phrases describing his willingness to confront the American forces courageously are grouped in a brave image.

- Negative: The negative portrayal of Saddam Hussein contains terms or expressions that constitute a cruel, disobedient or authoritarian image. The expressions showing Hussein repressing Iraqi people, emphasizing his connection with terrorist groups and his possession of weapons of mass destruction, and highlighting his use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war were grouped as constituting a cruel image. Those terms or expressions describing his character refusing to obey UN inspectors or international law constituted a disobedient image. The expressions

comparing him to Hitler and describing him as a tyrant constituted an authoritarian image.

7. Description of war

- Positive: The positive portrayal of war includes descriptions such as a liberation war or a legitimate and moral war. Those expressions emphasizing that the war began to drive Hussein from power or to liberate the Iraqi people from the oppressor concern the liberation war. When the expressions describing the war observing international law were found, they were categorized as legitimate war. Those descriptions highlighting that the war does not cause any civilian damage were grouped as a moral war.

- Negative: The negative portrayal of war contains descriptions such as a military invasion, an illegitimate war or an immoral war. When paraphrases or terms describing the war as a military invasion to control the Arab regions were found, they were coded as a military invasion. Those expressions describing the war as illegitimate, unjust, or unjustified and arguing that the war was conducted without U.S. consent concern an illegitimate war. When paraphrases or terms emphasizing that the war cause much civilian damage were found, they were coded as an immoral war.

References

Abu-Nasr, D. (2003, March 29). Saudis Protest Iraq War. AFP.

Against the Occupation (2003, April 10). *The Arab News.*

Akeel, M. (2003, March 25). Arab Satellite & TV Channels Live Up to Their Responsibilities. *The Arab News.*

Al-Ghalib (2003, April 10). Najaf Leaders Vie for Control, Power. *The Arab News.*

Al-Jazeera Calls on US to Ensure Free Press (2003, March 28). *The Arab News* (from Reuters).

Al-Jazeera Shows Iraqi Women Suicide Bombers' Videotape (2003, April 6). *The Arab News* (from Reuters).

Altschull, J. H. (1995). *Agent of Power: The Media and Public Policy* (2nd ed.). New York: Longman Publishers USA.

Amin, H. (2001). Mass Media in the Arab States between Diversification and Stagnation: An Overview. In K. Hafez (Ed.), *Mass Media, Politics, and Society in the Middle East* (pp. 23-41). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Amin, H. (2002). Freedom as a Value in Arab Media: Perceptions and Attitudes Among Journalists. *Political Communication*, 19, 125-135.

Apple, R. W. (2003, April 9). A NATION AT WAR: NEWS ANALYSIS; A High Point in 2 Decades of U.S. Might. *The New York Times*, p. A1.

Arab Journalists, TV Deny Signs of Uprising in Basra (2003, March 27). *The Arab News.*

Arnot, B. (2003). Embedded/Unembedded I. *Columbia Journalism Review*, May/June, 42-43.

Ayish, M. I. (2002). Political Communication on Arab World Television: Evolving Patterns. *Political Communication*, *19*, 137-154.

Bantimaroudis, P., & Ban, H. (2001). Covering the Crisis in Somalia: Framing Choices by *The New York Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*. In S. D. Reese, O H. Gandy, & A. E. Grant (Eds.), *Framing Public Life:*

Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World (pp.175-184). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Barnhurst, K. G., & Mutz, D. (1997). American Journalism and the Decline in Event-Centered Reporting. *Journal of Communication*, *47*(4), 27-52.

Barringer, F.,& Bruni, F. (2003, April 17). A NATION AT WAR: DIPLOMACY; U.N. and European Union Consider the Future of Iraq. *The New York Times*, p. B7.

Bennett, W. L. (1990). Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States. *Journal of Communication*, *40*(2), 103-125.

Bennett, W. L. (2003). *News: The Politics of Illusion* (5th ed.). New York: Longman.

Berkowitz, D., & TerKeurst, J. V. (1999). Community as Interpretive Community: Rethinking the Journalist-Source Relationship. *Journal of Communication*, *49*(3), 125-136.

Blair correct over British soldier's execution: spokesman (2003, March 28). *The Middle East Times* (from AFP).

Bloch, Y., & Lehman-Wilzig, S. (2002). An Exploratory Model of Media-Government Relations in International Crises: U.S. Involvement in Bosnia 1992-1995. In E. Gilboa (Ed.), *Media and Conflict: Framing Issues Making Policy Shaping Opinions* (pp. 153-173). Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers.

Bodi, F. (2003, March 29). Al-Jazeera – A Threat to Western Media. *The Arab News*.

Boyd, A. (2001). Saudi Arabia's International Media Strategy: Influence through Multinational Ownership. In K. Hafez (Ed.), *Mass Media, Politics, and Society in the Middle East* (pp. 43-60). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Brennen, B., & Duffy, M. (2003). "If A Problem Cannot Be Solved, Enlarge It": an ideological critique of the "Other" in Pearl Harbor and September 11 *New York Times* coverage. *Journalism Studies*, *4*, 3-14.

Brooks, B. S., Kennedy, G., Moen, D. R., & Ranly, D. (1999). *News Reporting and Writing* (6th ed.). Boston & New York: Bedford/St. Martin's.

Burnett, J. (2003). Arnot, B. (2003). Embedded/Unembedded II. *Columbia Journalism Review*, May/June, 43-44.

Callahan, C. (2001, November). Anatomy of an Urban Legend. *American Journalism Review*, 46-48.

Carruthers, S. L. (2000). *The Media At War*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Cartier, C. (2003, April 4). American is not God. *The Middle East Times*.

Cheney, G. (1993). We're Talking War: Symbols, Strategies and Images. In B. S. Greenberg & W. Gantz (Eds.), *Desert Storm and the Mass Media* (pp. 61-73). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, INC.

Coker, M. (March 30, 2003). Arab media offer their own slant on war. *The Austin-American Statesman*, p. A19.

Conners, J. L. (1998). Hussein as Enemy: The Persian Gulf War in Political Cartoons. *Press/Politics*, *3*(3), 96-114.

Cook, T. E. (1994). Domesticating a Crisis: Washington Newsbeats and Network News after the Iraq Invasion of Kuwait. In W. L. Bennett & D. L. Paletz (Eds.), *Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in Gulf War* (pp. 105-130). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Corcoran, F. (1992). War Reporting: Collateral Damage in the European Theater. In H. Mowlana, G. Gerbner, & H. I. Schiller (Eds.), *Triumph of the Image: The Media's War in the Persian Gulf – A Global Perspective* (pp. 106-117). San Francisco: Westview Press.

Cordesman, A. H., & Burke, A. A. (2003, April). The Iraq War: A Working Chronology. Retrieved November 15, 2003, from http://www.csis.org/features/iraq_chronology.pdf

Covering the War (2003, April 10). *The New York Times*, p. A26.

Dickson, S. H. (1992). Press and U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua, 1983-1987: A Study of The New York Times and Washington Post. *Journalism Quarterly*, *69*, 562-571.

Dickson, S. H. (1994). Understanding Media Bias: The Press and the U.S. Invasion of Panama. *Journalism Quarterly*, *71*, 809-819.

Dorman, W. A., & Livingston, S. (1994). News and Historical Content: The Establishing Phase of the Persian Gulf Policy Debate. In W. L. Bennett &

D. L. Paletz (Eds.), *Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in Gulf War* (pp. 63-81). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Downing, J. D. (1988). Troubles in the Backyard: Soviet Media Reporting on the Afghanistan Conflict. *Journal of Communication*, *38*(2), 5-32.

Entman, R. M. (1991). Framing U.S. Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents. *Journal of Communication*, *41*(4), 6-27.

Entman, R. M., & Page, B. I. (1994). The News Before the Storm: The Iraq War Debate and the Limits to Media Independence. In W. L. Bennett & D. L. Paletz (Eds.), *Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in Gulf War* (pp. 82-101). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Ferguson, B. (2003, April 23). Everyone is Homesick as War Winds Down. *The Arab News.*

Firestone, D. (April 3, 2003). A NATION AT WAR: PAYING FOR WAR; House and Senate Approve Bush's Wartime Spending Request. *The New York Times*, p. B9.

Frank, A. G. (1992). A Third-World War: A Political Economy of the Persian Gulf War and the New World Order. In H. Mowlana, G. Gerbner, & H. I. Schiller (Eds.), *Triumph of the Image: The Media's War in the Persian Gulf – A Global Perspective* (pp. 3-21). San Francisco: Westview Press.

Fresh Clues Emerge in Hunt for Saddam (2003, April 18). *The Arab News* (from Reuters & Agence France Presse) .

Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, A. (1989). Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach. *American Journal of Sociology*, *95*, 1-37.

Gans, H. J. (1979). *Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time.* New York: Pantheon Books.

Ghafour, P.K. A. (2003, March 21). Kingdom Expresses Deep Concern. *The Arab News.*

Ghareeb, E. (2000). New Media and The Information Revolution in the Arab World. *Middle East Journal*, *54*, 395-418.

Gitlin, T. (1980). *The Whole World is Watching: mass media in the making & unmaking of the new left*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Gulf papers denounce war. (2003, March 21). AFP.

Gutierrez-Villalobos, S., Hertog, J. K., & Rush, R. R. (1994). Press Support for the U.S. Administration During the Panama Invasion: Analyses of Strategic and Tactical Critique in the Domestic Press. *Journalism Quarterly*, *71*, 618-627.

Hafez, K. (2001). Introduction. Mass Media in the Middle East: Patterns of Political and Societal Change. In K. Hafez (Ed.), *Mass Media, Politics, and Society in the Middle East* (pp. 1-20). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Haider, S. (2003, April 11). Media Somersault. *The Arab News.*

Hallin, D. C. (1986). *The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hallin, D. C., & Gitlin, T. (1993). Agon and Ritual: The Gulf War as Popular Culture and as Television Drama. *Political Communication*, *10*, 411-424.

Hasan, O. (2003a, March 27). Saudi Arabia caught between calming home front and preserving US ties. AFP.

Hasan, O. (2003b, April 18). Iraq's neighbors divided as they meet to have say on political future. AFP. Carried in *The Middle East Times*.

Hefni, Z. (2003, April 22). Media Should Stop Feeding Arabs on a Diet of Illusion. *The Arab News.*

Herman, E. S., & Chomsky, N. (1988). *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Hertog, J. K., & McLeod, D. M. (2001). A Multiperspectival Approach to Framing Analysis: A Field Guide. In S. D. Reese, O H. Gandy, & A. E. Grant (Eds.), *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World* (pp. 139-161). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Hiebert, R. E. (1993). Public Relations as a Weapon of Modern Warfare. B. S. Greenberg & W. Gantz (Eds.), *Desert Storm and the Mass Media* (pp. 29-36). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, INC.

Horrock, N. (2003, April 10). Critic Warns of post-war Shia uprising. *The Middle East Times* (from UPI).

Huff, T. E. (2001). Globalization and the Internet: Comparing the Middle Eastern and Malaysian Experiences. *Middle East Journal*, *3*, 439-458.

Huggler, J. (2003, March 20). The Iraq Conflict: Bahrain Offers Saddam Exile While Arab World Condemns Colonial War. *The Independent*, p. 7

Iyengar, S. (1991). *Is anyone responsible? How television frames political issues.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Iyengar, S., & Simon, A. (1994). News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion. In W. L. Bennett & D. L. Paletz (Eds.), *Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in Gulf War* (pp. 167-185). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Jayaram, P. (2003, April 7). Escaped Arab Journalist Questions Western Media's War Coverage. *The Arab News.*

Judd, T. (2003, April 22). In Bed With the Army. *The Arab News.*

Kaid, L. L., Harville, B., Ballotti, J., & Wawrzyniak, M. (1993). Telling the Gulf War Story: Coverage in Five Papers. In B. S. Greenberg & W. Gantz (Eds.), *Desert Storm and the Mass Media* (pp. 86-98). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, INC.

Kelley, M. (2003, April 29). U.S. moves air operations center in first major shift in Persian Gulf. The Associated Press.

Kellner, D. (1993). The Crisis in the Gulf and the Lack of Critical Media Discourse. B. S. Greenberg & W. Gantz (Eds.), *Desert Storm and the Mass Media* (pp. 37-47). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, INC.

Khan, M. (2003). Prospects for Muslim Democracy: The Role of U.S. Policy. *Middle East Policy*, *10*(3), 79-89.

Kim, S. T. (2000). Making a Difference: U.S. Press Coverage of the Kwangju and Tiananmen Pro-Democracy Movements. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, *77*, 22-36.

Lee, C. (2002, August). News Coverage of the U.S. Attack on Afghanistan: A Comparison of *The New York Times* and *The Arab News.* Paper presented at the annual meeting of Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Miami, FL.

Lee, C., & Yang, J. (1995). Foreign news and national interest: Comparing U.S. and Japanese coverage of a Chinese student movement. *Gazette*, *56*, 1-18.

Liebes, T. (1992). Our War / Their War: Comparing the *Intifadeh* and the Gulf War on U.S. and Israeli Television. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, *9*, 44-55.

Louw, P. E. (2003). The 'War Against Terrorism': A Public Relations Challenge for the Pentagon. *Gazette*, *65*, 211-230.

MacFarquhar, N. (2003, March 25). A NATION AT WAR: THE ARAB MEDIA; Arabic Stations Compete for the Attention of a Riveted Audience. *The New York Times*, p. B15.

Malinkina, O. V., & McLeod, D. M. (2000). From Afghanistan to Chechnya: News Coverage by Izvestia and the New York Times. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, *77*, 37-49.

McCombs, M., & Ghanem, S. I. (2001). The Convergence of Agenda Setting and Framing. In S. D. Reese, O H. Gandy, & A. E. Grant (Eds.), *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World* (pp. 67-81). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Mermin, J. (1996). Conflict in the Sphere of Consensus? Critical Reporting on the Panama Invasion and the Gulf War. *Political Communication*, *13*, 181-194.

Miladi, N. (2003). Mapping the Al-Jazeera Phenomenon. In D. K. Thussu & D. Freedman (Eds.), *War and The Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7* (pp. 149-160). Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Miller, M. M., & Riechert, B. P. (2001). The Spiral of Opportunity and Frame Resonance: Mapping the Issue Cycle in News and Public Discourse. In S. D. Reese, O H. Gandy, & A. E. Grant (Eds.), *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World* (pp. 107-121). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Miller, M. M., Andsager, J. L., & Riechert, B. P. (1998). Framing the Candidates in Presidential Primaries: Issues and Images in Press Releases and News Coverage, *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, *75*, 312-324.

Morello, C., & Wax, E. (2003, March 23). Arabs Make U.S. Object of Anger; Officials and Protesters Criticize War. *The Washington Post*, p. A31.

Morgan, M., Lewis, J., & Jhally, S. (1992). More Viewing, Less Knowledge. In H. Mowlana, G. Gerbner, & H. I. Schiller (Eds.), *Triumph of the Image: The Media's War in the Persian Gulf – A Global Perspective* (pp. 216-233). San Francisco: Westview Press.

Motamed-Nejad, K., Badii, N., & Mohsenian-Rad, M. (1992). The Iranian Press and the Persian Gulf War: The Impact of Western News Agencies. In H. Mowlana, G. Gerbner, & H. I. Schiller (Eds.), *Triumph of the Image: The Media's War in the Persian Gulf – A Global Perspective* (pp. 99-103). San Francisco: Westview Press.

Mowlana, H. (1992). Roots of War: The Long Road of Intervention. In H. Mowlana, G. Gerbner, & H. I. Schiller (Eds.), *Triumph of the Image: The Media's War in the Persian Gulf – A Global Perspective* (pp. 30-50). San Francisco: Westview Press.

Mowlana, H., Vierling D., & Tully, M. (1992). A Sampling of Editorial Responses from the Middle Eastern Press on the Persian Gulf Crisis. In H. Mowlana, G. Gerbner, & H. I. Schiller (Eds.), *Triumph of the Image: The Media's War in the Persian Gulf – A Global Perspective* (pp. 166-172). San Francisco: Westview Press.

Mroue, B. (2003, March 24). Arabs Don't Depend on CNN Anymore. *The Arab News.*

Nain, Z. (1992). In H. Mowlana, G. Gerbner, & H. I. Schiller (Eds.), *Triumph of the Image: The Media's War in the Persian Gulf – A Global Perspective* (pp. 75-87). San Francisco: Westview Press.

Nanjundiah, S. (2003, April 11). Living in fear in Iraq, US. *The Middle East Times*.

Napoli, J. J. (2003). Journalistic Professionalism and the American Image: The Press in Egypt and France. Paper presented at the Global Fusion Conference, October 24-26, Austin, TX.

Neelamalar, M., Viswanathan, D., Saran, P., & Mangaladurai, S. (2003). Embedded Reporting: War Against Truth? *Media Asia*, *30*(3), 156-160.

Nisrawi, S. (2003, March 28). Egypt Vows to 'End' War. United Press International. Carried in *The Middle East Times*.

Noakes, J. A., & Wilkins, K. G. (2002). Shifting frames of the Palestinian movement in US news. *Media, Culture & Society*, *24*, 649-671.

Nye, J. S. (1999). Redefining the National Interest. *Foreign Affairs*, *78*(4), 22-35.

O'Heffernan, P. (1993). Sobering Thoughts on Sound Bites Seen 'Round the World. In B. S. Greenberg & W. Gantz (Eds.), *Desert Storm and the Mass Media* (pp. 19-28). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, INC.

O'Heffernan, P. (1994). A Mutual Exploitation Model of Media Influence in U.S. Foreign Policy. In W. L. Bennett & D. L. Paletz (Eds.), *Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in Gulf War* (pp. 231-249). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Paletz, D. (1994). Just Deserts? In W. L. Bennett & D. L. Paletz (Eds.), *Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in Gulf War* (pp. 277-292). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Pan, Z., & Kosicki, G. M. (2001). Framing as a Strategic Action in Public Deliberation. In S. D. Reese, O H. Gandy, & A. E. Grant (Eds.), *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World* (pp. 35-65). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Pan, Z., Lee, C., Chuan, J. M., & So, C.Y.K. (1999). One Event, Three Stories: Media Narratives of the Handover of Hong Kong in Cultural China, *Gazette*, *61*, 99-112. Pedelty, M. (1995). *War Stories: The Culture of Foreign Correspondent*s. New York & London: Routledge.

Pedelty, M. (1995). *War Stories: The Culture of Foreign Correspondents.* New York & London: Routlege.

Purdum, T. S., & Rutenberg, J. (2003, March 23). A NATION AT WAR: THE NEWS MEDIA; Reporters Respond Eagerly to Pentagon Welcome Mat. *The New York Times*, p. B3.

Qusti, R. (2003a, March 21). Kingdom Could be a Future Target for US, Say Young Saudis. *The Arab News.*

Qusti, R. (2003b, April 13). Credibility of Arab Satellite Channels Among War's Casualties. *The Arab News.*

Reese, S. D. (2001). Prologue—Framing Public Life: A Bridging Model for Media Research. In S. D. Reese, O H. Gandy, & A. E. Grant (Eds.), *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World* (pp. 7-31). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Reese, S. D., & Buckalew, B. (1995). The Militarism of Local Television: The Routine Framing of the Persian Gulf War. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, *12*, 40-59.

Reisner, A. E. (1992). The News Conference: How Daily Newspaper Editors Construct the Front Page. *Journalism Quarterly*, *69*, 971-986.

Riffe, D., Lacy, S., & Fico, F. G. (1998). *Analyzing Media Messages: Using Quantitative Content Analysis in Research*. London, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Roquefeuil, C. D. (2003, March 28). US officials find Arab media biased but necessary. *The Middle East Times*.

Rugh, W. A. (1987). *The Arab Press: New Media and Political Process in the Arab World*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Sachs, S. (2003, April 4). A NATION AT WAR: MIDEAST COVERAGE; Arab Media Portray War as Killing Field. *The New York Times*, p. B1.

Sadik, M. (2003, October 23). 100 Slaughtered in hospital bombing. *The Arab News*.

Sahin, H. (1992). The War Close to Home: The Turkish Media. In H. Mowlana, G. Gerbner, & H. I. Schiller (Eds.), *Triumph of the Image: The Media's War in the Persian Gulf – A Global Perspective* (pp. 96-98). San Francisco: Westview Press.

Sainath, P. (1992). The New World *Odour*: The Indian Experience. In H. Mowlana, G. Gerbner, & H. I. Schiller (Eds.), *Triumph of the Image: The Media's War in the Persian Gulf – A Global Perspective* (pp. 67-74). San Francisco: Westview Press.

Salamon, J. (2003, April 6). A NATION At WAR: THE NEWS MEDIA; New Tools for Reporters Make War Images Instant But Coverage No Simpler. *The New York Times*, p. B13.

Saudi Arabia sends strong antiwar message to US. (2002, November 5). AFP.

Servaes, J. (1991). European Press Coverage of the Grenada Crisis. *Journal of Communication, 41*(4), 28-41.

Severin, W. J., & Tankard, J. W. (2001). *Communication Theories: Origins, Methods, and Uses in the Mass Media* (5th ed.). New York, NY: Longman.

Shanker, T., & Myers, S. L. (2001, October 23). A NATION CHALLENGED: MILITARY; Rumsfeld Says Attacks Seek to Help Rebels Advance. *The New York Times*, p. A1.

Shaw, M. (1996). *Civil Society and Media in Global Crises: Representing Distant Violence*. New York & London: Pinter.

Shaw, M., & Carr-Hill, R. (1992). Public Opinion and Media War Coverage in Britain. In H. Mowlana, G. Gerbner, & H. I. Schiller (Eds.), *Triumph of the Image: The Media's War in the Persian Gulf – A Global Perspective* (pp. 144-157). San Francisco: Westview Press.

Siebert, F. S., Peterson, T., & Schramm, W. (1956). *Four Theories of the Press : The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility, and Soviet Commmunist Conceptsof What the Press should Be and Do*. Urbana, IL : University of Illinois Press.

Slaney, C. (2003, April 3). War with many faces. *The Middle East Times*.

Smith, T. (2003). The Real-Time War : Hard Lessons. *Columbia Journalism Review*, May/June, 26-28.

Solomon, N. (2003, April 10). The Thick Fog of War on American TV. *The Arab News*.

Solomon, W. S. (1992). News Frames and Media Packages: Covering El Salvador. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, *9*, 56-74.

Streitmatter, R. (1997). *Mightier than the Sword: How the News Media Have Shaped American History*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Tagliabue, J. (2003, March 20). A Nation at War: World Reaction; Wave of Protests, From Europe to New York. *The New York Times*, p. A1.

Taheri, A. (2003, April 18). The Iraq War: Winners and Losers. *The Arab News.*

Tankard, J. W. (2001). The Empirical Approach to the Study of Media Framing. In S. D. Reese, O H. Gandy, & A. E. Grant (Eds.), *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World* (pp. 95-106). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

The *Gallup Poll Monthly*, February 1991.

The White House (2003, March 19). President Bush Addresses the Nation. Retrieved on November 15, 2003 from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html

Top Saudi body calls for immediate halt to Iraq war. (2003, March 2003). AFP.

Truscott IV, L. K. (2003, March 25). In This War, News is a Weapon. *The New York Times*, p. A17.

Tumber, H. (2002). Sources, the Media and the Reporting of Conflict. In E. Gilboa (Ed.), *Media and Conflict: Framing Issues Making Policy Shaping Opinions* (pp. 135-151). Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers.

US Troops Shot at Our Car Near Baghdad: Al-Jazeera (2003, April 8). *The Arab News.*

Vernon, A. (2003, April 7). A Strange but Familiar War. *The New York Times*, p. A19.

Vincent, R. C. (1992). CNN: Elites Talking to Elites. In H. Mowlana, G. Gerbner, & H. I. Schiller (Eds.), *Triumph of the Image: The Media's War in the Persian Gulf – A Global Perspective* (pp. 181-201). San Francisco: Westview Press.

Wasserman, E. (2001, November). The Videophone War. *American Journalism Review*, 22-23.

Watchdog urges US not to obstruct reporters (2003, March 21). *The Middle East Times*.

Weston, M. A. (2003). Post 9/11 Arab American Coverage Avoids Stereotypes. *Newspaper Research Journal*, *24*(1), 92-106.

Wheeler, D. L. (2001). The Internet and Public Culture in Kuwait. *Gazette*, *62*, 187-201.

Wilhoit, G. C., & Weaver, D. (1983). Foreign News Coverage in Two U.S. Wire Services: An Update. *Journal of Communication*, *33*(2), 132-148.

Wright, L. (January 5, 2004). The Kingdom of Silence. *The New Yorker*. Retrieved on March 24, 2004 from http://www.lawrencewright.com/art.html

Yang, J. (2003). Framing the NATO Air Strikes on Kosovo Across Countries: Comparison of Chinese and US Newspaper Coverage. *Gazette*, *65*, 231-249.

Zelizer, B., Park, D., & Gudelunas, D. (2002). How bias shapes the news: Challenging *The New York Times'* status as a newspaper of record on the Middle East. *Journalism*, *3*, 283-307.

Vita

Chang-Ho Lee was born in Hadong-gun, Korea on October 3, 1969. He is the eldest son of Jaekyu Lee and Isoon Im, who is a farmer in Hadong. He completed his B.A. and M.A. at Seoul National University, majoring in sociology. He then completed his two-year military service in Chunchon, Korea and worked for almost two years as a staff reporter at *The Segye Times* in Korea, covering mainly police stations and universities. He entered the School of Journalism at the University of Texas at Austin in 1999. His interests include online journalism, international communication, intercultural communication, alternative media, Arab media, and global media. His articles have appeared in *Sungkok Journalism Review* (2002), *Southwestern Mass Communication Journal* (2002), *Newspaper Research Journal* (2003), *Asian Journal of Communication* (in press), and the *Atlantic Journal of Communication* (in press).

Permanent address: 311 Akyang-myeon, Hadong-gun, Korea, 667-810

This dissertation was typed by the author.