

Copyright
by
Margaret Peacock
2008

**The Dissertation Committee for Margaret Elizabeth Peacock Certifies that this is
the approved version of the following dissertation:**

**CONTESTED INNOCENCE: IMAGES OF THE CHILD IN THE
COLD WAR**

Committee:

Joan Neuberger, Supervisor

Mark Lawrence

Charters Wynn

David Oshinsky

Julia Mickenberg

**CONTESTED INNOCENCE: IMAGES OF THE CHILD IN THE
COLD WAR**

by

Margaret Elizabeth Peacock, B.A., M.S.I.S., M.A.

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

December, 2008

Dedication

For my husband, D.Jay Cervino

Acknowledgements

I owe a great debt of gratitude to many people for making this project possible. I received financial support from the U.S. State Department as a Fulbright-Hays scholar, the Society for the Historians of American Foreign Relations, and the Department of Education. I also received a number of grants from the University of Texas at Austin, including the Gardner F. Marston Fellowship, the Alice Jane Drysdale Sheffield Fellowship, and a Continuing Education Grant, all of which were granted through the Department of History.

Several librarians and archivists, crossing two continents and eleven archives, were crucial to the success of this project. I owe special thanks to Galina Mikhailovna Tokareva at the Russian State Archive of Political Science, who took me under her wing and gave me access to Pioneer materials. She was herself a Komsomol leader and provided valuable insights for my research during our daily breaks for tea. Other women who were former Pioneers or Komsomol leaders gave their time to help me. Of particular note was Marina Strikalova, who also helped me translate documents when they were written in seemingly illegible handwriting. Zaour Ismail-zade assisted me in “reading” some of the more obscure films of the Thaw period, providing cultural and linguistic insights that I might have otherwise overlooked. In the United States, Wendy Chmielewski at the Peace Archive in Swarthmore was very helpful in directing my research, as was Steven Price at the Boy Scout Archive in Irving, Texas. The archivists running the Vietnam archive in Lubbock, Texas are also to be commended for their

professionalism and willingness to talk at length with me about digitizing and declassifying documents.

My most supportive reader was Joan Neuberger, my dissertation advisor. This project would not have been possible without her sound advice and constant encouragement. In the early stages of this project, support and advice were also given by Josephine Woll, Kate Brown, Catriona Clark, and Deborah Field. I cannot express how thankful I am to Joan Neuberger, Charters Wynn, and Mark Lawrence, my mentors in the history department at the University of Texas, who guided me through graduate school. Karl Brown, Mary Neuberger, and Paul Rubinson were very helpful in the weeks building up to the defense. The other members on my committee, Julia Mickenberg, Mark Lawrence, Charters Wynn, and David Oshinsky, provided sound editing and advice as well.

To my family I owe my greatest debt. My husband, D.Jay and my three daughters, Amelia, Sylvia, and Mira, have experienced this dissertation with me. They travelled with me for my research year in Moscow, braving the cold and the unfamiliar schools and language, so that I could do this. My mother has provided constant encouragement, has asked a number of important questions about my argument at key moments in my writing, and has offered financial help. My father was also an important driving force in this project. He passed away while it was being written, and I like to think that he was a part of it as well. Finally, I must thank my husband, who listened to me talk through this dissertation and wail and moan for the past three years. He has been a constant source of strength and inspiration, a great reader and an even greater listener. I could not have accomplished this without him.

CONTESTED INNOCENCE: IMAGES OF THE CHILD IN THE COLD WAR

Publication No. _____

Margaret Elizabeth Peacock, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2008

Supervisor: Joan Neuberger

Abstract: This dissertation examines the image of the child as it appeared in the propaganda and public rhetoric of the Cold War from approximately 1950 to 1968. It focuses on how American and Soviet politicians, propagandists, and critics depicted children in film, television, radio, and print. It argues that these groups constructed a new lexicon of childhood images to meet the unique challenges of the Cold War. They portrayed the young as facing new threats both inside and outside their borders, while simultaneously envisioning their children as mobilized in novel ways to defend themselves and their countries from infiltration and attack.

These new images of the next generation performed a number of important functions in conceptualizing what was at stake in the Cold War and what needed to be done to win it. Politicians, propagandists, and individuals in the Soviet Union and the United States used images of endangered and mobilized children in order to construct a particular vision of the Cold War that could support their political and ideological

agendas, including the enforcement of order in the private sphere, the construction of domestic and international legitimacy, and the mobilization of populations at home and abroad. At the same time, these images were open to contestation by dissenting groups on both sides of the Iron Curtain who refashioned the child's image in order to contest their governments' policies and the Cold War consensus.

What these images looked like in Soviet and American domestic and international discourse, why propagandists and dissent movements used these images to promote their policies at home and abroad, and what visions of the Cold War they created are the subjects of this dissertation. This project argues that the domestic demands of the Cold War altered American and Soviet visions of childhood. It is common wisdom that the 1950s and 60s was a period when child rearing practices and ideas about children were changing. This dissertation supports current arguments that American and Soviet parents sought more permissive approaches in raising children who they perceived as innocent and in need of protection. Yet it also finds substantial documentation showing that American and Soviet citizens embraced a new vision of idealized youth that was not innocent, but instead was mobilized for a war that had no foreseeable end. In the United States, children became participants in defending the home and the country from communist infiltration. In the Soviet Union, the state created a new vision of idealized youth that could be seen actively working towards a Soviet-led peace around the world.

By using the child's image as a category for analysis, this project also provides a window into how the Cold War was conceptualized by politicians, propagandists, and private citizens in the Soviet Union and the United States. In contrast to current scholarship, this dissertation argues that the Soviet state worked hard to create a popular

vision of the Cold War that was significantly different from the “Great Fear” that dominated American culture in the 1950s and 60s. While in the United States, the conflict was portrayed as a defensive struggle against outside invasion, in official Soviet rhetoric it was presented as an active, international crusade for peace.

As the 1960s progressed, and as the official rhetoric of the state came under increasing criticism, the rigid sets of categories surrounding the figuration of the Cold War child that had been established in the 1950s began to break down. While Soviet filmmakers during the Thaw created images of youth that appeared abandoned and traumatized by the world around them, anti-nuclear activists took to the streets with their children in tow in order to contest the state’s professed ability to protect their young. In the late 1960s, both the Soviet Union and the United States struggled to contain rising domestic unrest, and took the first steps in moving towards *détente*. As a consequence, the struggle between East and West moved to the post-colonial world, where again, the image of the child played a vital role in articulating and justifying policy. Visual and rhetorical images like that of the child served as cultural currency for creating and undermining conceptual boundaries in the Cold War. The current prevalence of childhood images in the daily construction and contestation of public opinion are the legacies of this era.

Table of Contents

List of Illustrationsxii

Introduction1

Chapter 1 Fighters for Peace: The Soviet Cold War Child, 1945-1965.....25

 Stalinism and the Cold War Child28

 Khrushchev, Youth, and the New Cold War Vision.....39

 Artek and the Pioneers.....60

 Images of the “Other” Child.....72

 New Images: The Threatened Child.....83

Chapter 2 The American Cold War Child and the Great Fear, 1945-1965.....96

 The Communist Menace and the American Child.....99

 Threats from Within.....110

 The Boy Scouts and the Construction of a New Cold War Child.....134

 Conclusion.....164

Chapter 3 Revising and Ideal: Alternative Images of Children in Soviet Film During the Thaw, 1956-1964.....166

 Children of War, Then and Now.....170

 Abandoned Children in the Khrushchev Era.....191

 Children of the Corn: Delinquent Youth Takes the Party to Task.....208

 Conclusion.....220

Chapter 4 “Dr. Spock is Worried:” The Image of the Child in the American Test Ban Movement, 1957-1965.....223

 SANE and the Image of Threatened Youth.....226

 Women Strike for Peace and Visions of Maternalist Politics.....253

| | |
|---|-----|
| Conclusion..... | 274 |
| Chapter 5 Clashing Visions: Images of Children in American, Soviet, and National Liberation Front Propaganda to to Vietnam, 1966-1968..... | 279 |
| The American Message..... | 282 |
| The Soviet Message..... | 304 |
| The NLF Message..... | 323 |
| Conclusion..... | 341 |
| Conclusion Samantha Smith and the Endurance of the Cold War Child..... | 343 |
| Bibliography..... | 351 |
| Vita..... | 365 |

List of Illustrations

| | |
|--|----|
| Illustration 0.1: 1964 Democratic National Campaign Spot, “Peace, Little Girl” (Daisy Spot)..... | 3 |
| Illustration 1.1: Nina Vatolina, “Spasibo rodnomu za schastlivoe destvo!” (<i>Thank you comrade Stalin for a happy childhood!</i>), 1950..... | 31 |
| Illustration 1.2: Boris Vladimirsky, “Rozovy za Stalina” (<i>Roses for Stalin</i>), 1949..... | 32 |
| Illustration 1.3: “Papa i mama! Vylezhaite, ia uzhe poigral! (<i>Papa and Mama! Come out, I am done playing!</i>), <i>Komsomol’skaia Pravda</i> , September 4 1949, 4..... | 33 |
| Illustration 1.4.: “Vospitaniia Novogo Cheloveka” (<i>The Education of the New Man</i>), RGASPI f.m6, op.4, d.111, l.1..... | 44 |
| Illustration 1.5: “Na Shkol’noi Skam’e” (<i>At the School Desk</i>), <i>Krokodil</i> , December 10 1958, 4..... | 50 |
| Illustration 1.6: “V SSSR: V SShA” (<i>In the USSR: In the USA</i>)” RGASPI f.m6, op. 14, d.57, l. n/a..... | 54 |
| Illustration 1.7: Mezhdunarodnaia Festival’ “Mir i Druzhiba” (<i>The International Festival of Peace and Friendship</i>), RGASPI f. m3, op. 15, d. 23, l. 3..... | 56 |
| Illustration 1.8: “Prepiatstviia na Marshrute” (<i>Obstacles on the Route</i>), <i>Voennye Znaniia</i> , 7 (July 1969), 2..... | 60 |
| Illustration 1.9: “Pionerskaia Lineika” (<i>The Pioneer Line-up</i>), <i>Krokodil</i> , June 20 1961, 3..... | 61 |
| Illustration 1.10: “Risunok Irzhi Kotorucheka po teme Emilia Gokola dlia “Krokodila” k Mezhdunarodnomu dniu zashchity deteia” (<i>Illustration by Irzhi Kotoruchek on a</i> | |

| | |
|---|-----|
| <i>theme by Emilia Gokola for Krokodil for the International Day of the Defense of Children</i>), <i>Krokodil</i> , May 30 1958..... | 66 |
| Illustration 1.11: “Pionier Express” (<i>Pioneer Express</i>), RGASPI f.m2, op. 1, d. 17, l. 69..... | 68 |
| Illustration 1.12: “Shkola” (<i>School</i>), <i>Krokodil</i> , September 30 1956, 16..... | 76 |
| Illustration 1.13: “KKK,” <i>Krokodil</i> , November 1 1966, 9..... | 77 |
| Illustration 1.14: "Vsegda Gotov!" (<i>Always Prepared</i>), RGASPI f. m6, op. 14, d. 57, n/a..... | 87 |
| Illustration 1.15: "Lishnii Rot" (<i>Extra Mouths</i>), <i>Krokodil</i> , June 10 1956..... | 80 |
| Illustration 1.16: “Ruki Zaniaty” (Busy Hands), <i>Krokodil</i> , December 20 1958, 5..... | 90 |
| Illustration 2.1: <i>Teach on Communism</i> (Washington, D.C.: Department of Education), 1954, 3..... | 102 |
| Illustration 2.2 “I Don’t Want my Children to Grow up in Soviet Russia,” <i>Liberty</i> , June 7 1947, 18..... | 106 |
| Illustration 2.3: “Can Russia Bury Our Children Thru Education?” Chicago Public School System, 1962..... | 113 |
| Illustration 2.4: “Who are America’s Real Santa Clauses?” <i>Look</i> , November 29 1955, 94..... | 127 |
| Illustration 2.5: “The Orphan,” <i>Shock Suspenstories</i> , EC Comics, Issue 14, 1953..... | 130 |
| Illustration 2.6: “Serving You in Time of Emergency,” Boy Scouts of America, 1956. | 138 |
| Illustration 2.7: “Your Welfare is Being Overshadowed,” <i>Boys’ Life</i> , September 1956, 5..... | 145 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| Illustration 2.8: “Interracial Activities,” 1965, Boy Scouts of America Archive, Irving, Texas..... | 156 |
| Illustration 2.9: Norman Rockwell, “Breakthrough for Freedom,” 1967..... | 161 |
| Illustration 3.1: Film still, “Dva Fedora” (<i>Two Fedors</i>), 1958 (Director, Marlen Khutsiev)..... | 173 |
| Illustration 3.2: Film still, “Ivanogo Detstvo” (<i>Ivan’s Childhood</i>), 1962 (Director Andrei Tarkovsky)..... | 180 |
| Illustration 3.3: Film still, “Obyknoveny Fashizm” (<i>Ordinary Fascism</i>), 1965 (Director Mikhail Romm)..... | 188 |
| Illustration 3.4: Film still, “Serezha”, 1960 (Directors Daniela and Talankin)..... | 193 |
| Illustration 3.5: Film still, “Zvoniat, Otkroite Dver”’ (<i>Someone is Ringing, Open the Door</i>), 1965 (Director Alexander Mitte)..... | 200 |
| Illustration 3.6: Film still, “Chuzhie Deti” (<i>Someone Else’s Children</i>), 1958 (Director Tengiz Abuladze)..... | 206 |
| Illustration 3.7: Khrushchev as the grandmother of the corn, <i>Krokodil</i> , June 10 1956...212 | |
| Illustration 3.8: Film still, “Dobro Pozhalovat’, ili Postronnim Vkhod Vospreshchen” (<i>Welcome, Or No Trespassing</i>), 1964 (Director Elem Klimov)..... | 218 |
| Illustration 4.1: “Atomic Age—Alamogordo to Sahara,” Correspondence Related Papers 1959-60, February 1960, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series B-4, Box 31..... | 234 |
| Illustration 4.2: “Dr. Spock is Worried,” Literature 1957-62, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series A, Box 10..... | 242 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Illustration 4.3: Department of Defense, “Outside Semimounded Plywood Box Shelter: Family Shelter Series,” PSD F-61-4 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office)..... | 245 |
| Illustration 4.4: “11/4 Children Will be Born,” Washington Office 1960-1963, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series B, Box 34..... | 247 |
| Illustration 4.5: “Your Children’s Teeth Contain Stronium-90,” <i>The New York Times</i> , April 7 1963..... | 248 |
| Illustration 4.6: “Is This What it’s Coming to?” <i>New York Times</i> , July 5 1962. Also see SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series A, Box 16..... | 250 |
| Illustration 4.7: Dagmar Wilson, WSP Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series E, Box 34..... | 255 |
| Illustration 4.8: “Mothers Hike for Peace,” <i>San Diego Evening Tribune</i> , February 1 1962..... | 263 |
| Illustration 4.9: “Nuclear Tests Cost Lives,” September 1961, Literature 1962, WSP Papers, Peace Archive, Swarthmore University, DG 115, Series A2, Box 1..... | 267 |
| Illustration 4.10: Women Strkie for Peace attends a HUAC hearing, December 11 1962..... | 270 |
| Illustration 5.1: “Your Family Awaits You, Chieu Hoi,” National Catalog of PSYOPS Materials Second Edition, 1970, Folder 18, Box 14, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Insurgency Warfare, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.. | 294 |
| Illustration 5.2: “The Returnee,” <i>Vietnam Bulletin</i> , November 1 1969, 34..... | 296 |

Illustration 5.4: Photograph of Nguyen Van Be, VA008996, No Date, James Ridgeway
Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.....339

Introduction

In the fall of 1964, the advertising firm of Doyle, Dane and Bernbach set out to persuade the American people to vote for Lyndon Johnson in the upcoming presidential election. They first proposed an advertising campaign that would focus on Johnson's recent passage of the Civil Rights Act, but quickly scrapped the idea after realizing that Civil Rights was far too volatile an issue for voters in the already-divided Democratic Party. So, the intrepid advertisers returned to the drawing board and after much brainstorming had a golden idea; they would lionize Johnson as the defender of the nation's children, focusing specifically on his record with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the War on Poverty, and Social Security. In the process, they would paint Johnson's opponent, Barry Goldwater, as a warmongering maniac.

A number of memorable thirty-second television spots resulted from the work of Johnson's ad-men. One featured a photo montage of poor children in various locales across the country, accompanied by the narrator's reminder that "poverty is not a trait of character. It is created by circumstances. Thirty million Americans live in poverty. So will their children unless the cycle is broken."¹ Another spot centered on an elderly man who pulled from his wallet two small pieces of paper: a photograph of his grandchildren and his tattered social security card.² In dejection over the difficulties that he and future generations faced without support in their old age, he was shown tearing both cards into shreds. This was the vision of life that Johnson presented to the American public if they voted for Goldwater and his campaign to dismantle Social Security.

¹ Video Recording NLJ Ref# MP 983, "Poverty :60," Fall 1964, Records of the Democratic National Committee, 1964 Democratic Presidential Campaign Spots, Video Tape Record (VTR) 4568, Audio-Visual Collection, Lyndon Johnson Library, Austin, TX.

² Video Recording NLJ Ref# MP 999, "Social Security :60," Fall 1964, Records of the Democratic National Committee, 1964 Democratic Presidential Campaign Spots, Video Tape Record (VTR) 4568, Audio-Visual Collection, Lyndon Johnson Library, Austin, TX.

While Johnson's television spots concerning the war on poverty and the future of Social Security were well-received by the American public, the ads that had the most impact and received the most attention from the press focused on the threat of nuclear war. The most memorable ad, and the one that people remember to this day, was the "Daisy Spot," which only aired once but was seen by millions when it was replayed on the nightly news.³ In the television spot, which aired during an NBC telecast of *David and Bathsheba*, viewers received a vision of their future if left in the hands of Barry Goldwater.⁴ "One, two, three, four, five, six, seven...six," a young girl counts as she pulls the petals from a big, yellow daisy. Moving up from her chest, to her face, to the blackness of her pupil, the camera freezes as her voice is replaced by the countdown for a nuclear attack. "Ten, nine, eight, seven..." At "one," the landscape is consumed by the familiar mushroom cloud, while the girl, along with the daisy and everything around her, are presumably destroyed. Quoting W.H. Auden, Johnson's voice intones, "These are the stakes—to make a world in which all of God's children can live, or to go into the dark." Finally, the narrator repeats the slogan for the campaign. "Vote for President Johnson on November three. The stakes are too high for you to stay home."⁵

³ Video Recording NLJ Ref# MP 1001, "Peace, Little Girl (Daisy Spot)," Fall, 1964, Records of the Democratic National Committee, 1964 Democratic Presidential Campaign Spots, Video Tape Record (VTR) 4568, Audio-Visual Collection, Lyndon Johnson Library, Austin, TX.

⁴ "Memorandum for the Record," June 1992, Daisy Ad, Reference File, Lyndon Johnson Library, Austin, TX.

⁵ Video Recording NLJ Ref# MP 1001, "Peace, Little Girl (Daisy Spot)," Fall, 1964, Records of the Democratic National Committee, 1964 Democratic Presidential Campaign Spots, Video Tape Record (VTR) 4568, Audio-Visual Collection, Lyndon Johnson Library, Austin, TX.



Illustration 0.1: 1964 Democratic National Campaign Spot, “Peace, Little Girl (Daisy Spot)”⁶

Johnson presented the American public with an ultimatum: each voter could choose either to save the next generation by voting for him or to endanger the country’s children by choosing militarism, war, and eventual death. Bill Moyers would claim in later life that the ad was never meant to vilify Goldwater. Nonetheless, he made it clear to the president at the time that “Daisy,” had done its job by portraying Goldwater as “a reckless man.”⁷ Images of the nation’s children functioned as signifiers for Johnson’s assumed identity as an advocate for peace in the Cold War, and for Goldwater’s designated persona as a proponent of war.⁸ The centrality of youth in Johnson’s

⁶ Video Recording NLJ Ref# MP 1001, “Peace, Little Girl (Daisy Spot),” Fall 1964, Records of the Democratic National Committee, 1964 Democratic Presidential Campaign Spots, Video Tape Record (VTR) 4568, Audio-Visual Collection, Lyndon Johnson Library, Austin, TX.

⁷ Six days after the ad ran, Moyers also reminded the president that “while we paid for the ad only on NBC last Monday night, ABC and CBS ran it on their news shows Friday. So we got it shown on all three networks for the price of one.” Memorandum, “Letter from Bill Moyers to President Johnson,” September 13 1964, Daisy Ad, Reference File, Lyndon Johnson Library, Austin, TX.

⁸ Jane Hall, “Bill Moyers Holds a Mirror Up to America,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 12 1989, 4. Memorandum, “Letter from Bill Moyers to President Johnson,” September 13 1964, Daisy Ad, Reference File, Lyndon Johnson Library, Austin, TX. “Scenes from the Political Playground: An Analysis of the Symbolic Use of Children in Presidential Campaign Advertising,” *Political Communication*, 16:45-59, 1999.

advertisements points to the significance of childhood in public rhetoric during these years: as a visual and textual manifestation of larger Cold War fears, as a focus for popular mobilization, and as a tool for the construction of political and moral legitimacy.

This dissertation examines the visual and textual images of children that appeared in the propaganda and public rhetoric of the Cold War from approximately 1950 to 1968. It focuses on how Soviet and American officials, along with their supporters, depicted children in film, television, radio, and print as objects of Cold War anxiety and as symbols of collective mobilization. It is interested in what functions these images performed in the 1950s as tools for the legitimization of state policy and the creation of a Cold War consensus at home and abroad. It considers how non-governmental movements on both sides of the Iron Curtain created their own images of threatened and mobilized youth in the 1960s in order to challenge their governments' policies and establish a political voice of their own. Finally, it explores how the Soviet and American governments used the image of the child as they moved the Cold War battle to the post-colonial world in the late 1960s.

The Cold War was a conflict unlike any before it. Its geographic boundaries were expansive, incorporating Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia. It offered no physical battlefields where American and Soviet soldiers could line up against each other to determine a winner or loser. As such, it provided no foreseeable means of achieving a decisive victory. Instead, it was an indecisive and circumscribed conflict waged through “proxy-wars” between communist and capitalist systems in the post-colonial world, through economic and cultural competition, and through each side’s ability to win the “hearts and minds” of global audiences.⁹

⁹ Christian Appy, ed., *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain:*

In their attempts to meet the unique challenges presented by the Cold War, the Soviet and American governments called upon their respective populations throughout the 1950s and 60s to mobilize in new ways. No American men were sent off to fight the Russians in the Cold War (although they were drafted to fight communism in Korea and Vietnam, which many believed was financed from Moscow). Similarly, no Russian soldiers were ordered to move against American infantry (although they did occupy Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan). No one on either homefront was asked to darn socks or ration meat or leave their homes to work in armaments factories as they had been during the First and Second World Wars. Instead, war preparedness entailed a periodical willingness to fight to limited ends on distant battlefields. It meant accepting the argument that enemies were not only difficult to identify, but could be anywhere, including the school and the home.¹⁰ It demanded that each citizen develop a new level of personal, daily vigilance against ideological weakness and enemy infiltration in order to protect himself or herself from predators. It meant preparing for a war against which there was no real defense, or in the Russian case, rejecting nuclear preparedness altogether while accepting the quixotic claim that in the event of nuclear war, the Soviet Union would not be destroyed.¹¹ It also meant accepting the self-professed legitimacy of the state and its policies as the primary means of ensuring the country's protection.

Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1997), Stephen Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), Shawn J. Parry-Giles, *The Rhetorical Presidency: Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955*, Praeger series in presidential studies, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002).

¹⁰ Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*.

¹¹ The question of the Soviet role in a nuclear stand-off was one of the causes of Georgy Malenkov's fall from power in 1955, when he made a speech to the Politburo claiming that a nuclear war would mean death for everyone. Khrushchev was quick to retort that the Soviet Union would survive such an attack. After consolidating power, Khrushchev embraced the ideas that Malenkov had asserted concerning a nuclear future. Stanley Sienkiewicz, "SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine," *International Security* 2, no. 4 (1978): 86.

When the Soviet and American governments set out in the late 1940s and early 1950s to articulate their new programs for mobilization to their domestic and international audiences, they turned to the image of the child. There was nothing particularly new about the use of the child's image as a means to rally populations to war. Whether it was the 1917 U.S. resolution to join the British in the struggle against the Germans, the 1938 Nazi declaration of sovereignty over the Sudetenland, or the Soviet decision to march into Eastern Europe in 1945, government actions had often been portrayed by state propagandists and politicians as motivated by a desire to defend the innocent.¹² Hungry, dirty, orphaned, and defenseless—no other image, except perhaps that of the raped woman, could generate the revulsion and rage required to compel a population to support its government's decision to go to battle in the face of assured horror. As the Cold War began in earnest in the late 1940s, the Soviet Union and the United States appropriated the same tactics in a war of words and images; they used images of threatened children to manipulate and mobilize their domestic populations.

Yet because of the unique nature of the conflict, images of endangered youth in the 1950s and 60s looked markedly different from earlier depictions of imperiled children in wartime. In previous wars, propagandists customarily portrayed youngsters as the victims of direct, physical attack in the form of beatings, abandonment, killing, and rape. During the Cold War, Soviet and American politicians and propagandists argued instead that their countries' children, and the children of the world, were being exposed to a new set of dangers that threatened both the child and national security. In the Soviet Union, Party leaders and propagandists portrayed Russian children as imperiled not by bayonets and storm troopers, but rather by domestic hooliganism, bad parenting, poor education,

¹² See, for instance, Nicholas Cull's analysis of the British campaign to solicit American support in the Second World War. Nicholas Cull, *Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign against American "Neutrality" in World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), ———, *Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003).

and later during the Thaw, by the lasting traumas of Stalinism and the Second World War. Meanwhile, in the United States, political leaders and their supporters depicted the young as threatened by communist ideological infiltration, nuclear attack, delinquency, overcrowded schools, indulgent parents, media overload, and excess materialism. Many of these threats had been identified in the past as dangers to the welfare of the young (particularly delinquency, bad parenting, and poor education), but it was not until the Cold War that these crises among the populations' youngest demographic were portrayed as menaces to national security. It was not until the Cold War that they were seen as factors that could significantly impact the next generation's ability to engage the enemy and defend the homeland in a war that had no foreseeable end.

Soviet and American propagandists and politicians not only created unique images of threatened youth, they also conjured new, idealized visions of childhood, mobilized in the home, the school, and on the street to fight the Cold War. Whereas earlier depictions of mobilized children in war had focused on their ability to provide rear support (and in the Soviet case, to fight as partisans), during the Cold War, mobilization became a daily responsibility that every Soviet and American child was expected to embrace—not through military training, but through education and a commitment to maintaining domestic order. In the Soviet Union, the Pioneer organization after 1956 portrayed the idealized Soviet child as one who had discarded the rote learning of the Stalinist era in exchange for the creativity and independent thinking that was needed to compete with the United States in the sciences and the arts. They depicted the young as integral workers in the campaign to “catch up and move past” the United States in economics and culture. They also envisioned their children as committed advocates for world peace who were struggling on a daily basis to counter American imperialism, racism, and economic exploitation around the world. On the other side of the Iron

Curtain, the Boy Scouts of America symbolized a new ideal for the American child. Scouts were depicted in national rhetoric and propaganda as physically and emotionally mobilized to defend the United States and its friends from the onslaught of aggressive communism and from the threat of nuclear annihilation. They were presented as ideologically and physically capable of resisting communist attack, while appearing actively committed to social equality and the maintenance of domestic tranquility.

State leaders and their supporters in the Soviet Union and the United States used these new images of youth to create two different visions of the Cold War for their domestic and international audiences. On the Soviet side, state depictions of Russian children engaging in economic and cultural competition with the West helped portray the Soviet Union as a country that was catching up to the United States in science, economics, and culture. They provided visual proof that the Soviet Union was making great strides in recovering from Stalinism and the Second World War. They projected a vision of the communist model as a successful alternative to the exploitation of American capitalism. They testified to the Soviet Union's commitment to "peaceful competition" with the West and "liberation" for the post-colonial world. In contrast, U.S. depictions of American children as threatened by the Soviet menace and mobilized for national defense against communist aggression allowed the state, and arguably much of the general populace, to envision America as inherently innocent, defensive, unmotivated by imperial designs, and under attack from an implacable Soviet assailant. Such images supported the long-held belief in American society that the United States had been historically, and remained, a target of outside aggression. As Tom Engelhardt has argued, from the settlement of the West to the involvement of the United States in world affairs at the turn of the twentieth century, the "circling of the wagons" had been the primary way of

viewing America's defensive relationship with its enemies.¹³ During the Cold War, the image of the child under communist attack upheld the idea that America's policy-makers were being forced to act, both at home and abroad, out of a compelling need to defend freedom from tyranny. The child served as a signifier for each state's particular vision of its role in the Cold War and of its assumed identity as the sole force capable of providing a viable and morally-upstanding path to political and economic stability.¹⁴

Visions of endangered and mobilized Cold War youth also justified the increased legal and professional surveillance of domestic populations. In both countries, educators published an extraordinary quantity of materials on the need for increased federal intervention in educating the young. In both countries, law makers passed new regulations that more carefully monitored the child and its daily activities. Russian and American sociologists, politicians, and psychiatrists discussed new ways to ensure that children were being brought up by law-abiding and non-spoiling parents who understood their obligations to raise patriotic children. For both superpowers, the need to defend threatened children and mobilize youth for national defense opened the private lives of individuals and their families to increased state regulation and surveillance.¹⁵ More than ever before, the child became a tool for the construction of a Cold War consensus that defined and imposed normative behaviors upon domestic populations.

Yet, despite their best efforts, those who supported the Cold War consensus were ultimately unable to control how the child's image was rendered or the meanings that it conveyed. For many Russians and Americans in the 1960s, official claims of concerned patronage toward the young increasingly rang false. In the Soviet Union, artists, writers,

¹³ Tom Engelhardt, *The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation* (New York, NY: BasicBooks, 1995), 239.

¹⁴ Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

¹⁵ Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1988).

and filmmakers used the period of The Thaw to voice their opinions on the legacy of Stalin, the difficulties of mobilization, and the terror of atomic attack. They created new images of youth who appeared abandoned, traumatized, and unwilling to mobilize for the ongoing conflict with the West. Across the Atlantic, American anti-nuclear groups like the Organization for a Sane Nuclear Policy and Women Strike for Peace took to the streets with their children in tow to protest atomic testing, the arms race, and the escalating war in Southeast Asia. Both of these groups voiced their opinions by manipulating the meanings of the child's iconic image and by redefining the source of the Cold War threat as the state itself. Not only did they bring into question the state's ability to protect the young, they undermined the Cold War consensus altogether – transforming enemies into victims, victorious memories into shameful episodes, and establishing themselves, not the state, as protectors of the children. Donna Haraway has argued that the most powerful figures are those that “resist representation, resist literal figuration, and still erupt in new tropes, new figures of speech, new turns of historical possibility.”¹⁶ The image of the child not only resisted representation. It also revealed the contradictions and ambiguities within the states' official images of youth. In the words of Anne Higonnet, children became figures that even in innocence “stow away a dark side: a threat of loss, of change, and, ultimately, of death.”¹⁷ In the end, the state could not control how the image of the child was created, what meanings it carried, or how it would be interpreted.

As the 1960s came to an end, few on either side of the Iron Curtain could ignore the stalemate that the Cold War had become. Both sides embraced détente and a balance of power that would hopefully preclude any further brinksmanship over the fate of

¹⁶ Donna Haraway, "Ecce Homo, Ain't (Ar'n't) I a Woman, and Inappropriate/d Others: The Human in a Post Humanist Landscape," in *Feminists Theorize the Political*, ed. Judith Butler and Joan Scott (New York: Routledge, 1992), 86.

¹⁷ Anne Higonnet, *Pictures of Innocence: The History and Crisis of Ideal Childhood* (New York, N.Y.: Thames and Hudson, 1998), 28.

Europe. Yet the Cold War continued, with renewed focus on foreign interventions in the post-colonial world. Indochina, in particular, served as a showcase for each side's professed ability to provide safety, wealth, and ideological leadership to previously non-aligned countries around the globe. Many of the visual tropes that had been used to mobilize domestic populations for the Cold War in the 1950s and 60s were subsequently employed by American and Soviet propagandists in their efforts to win the hearts and minds of Vietnam's Northern and Southern citizenry. As in previous years, they conjured images of threatened and mobilized youth, often with limited success, in order to conceptualize the Cold War for their audiences as an ideological struggle over the freedom and liberty of the non-Western world.

This dissertation is about the relationship between images and the functions they perform in society. As such, it is a topic that borrows its methodology from post-structural semiotics and the study of how coded images can define, calcify, undermine and traverse people's understandings of the world around them. Just as Roland Barthes interrogated the meanings of wine in France to expose how bourgeois societies assert their collective values upon each other, this project explores childhood as a cultural myth, or signification, tied not to a real object, not to children themselves, but to a set of constructed cultural beliefs that can be used to support and undermine the status quo.¹⁸ As the first two chapters of this dissertation show, the Soviet and American governments, along with their supporters in the public sector, mobilized the image of the child in order to shape a particular vision of the Cold War. For example, when Soviet radio broadcasters described American children as being uniformly jealous of Soviet youth in 1955, they were making a number of arguments concerning the relative material comfort of Soviet society in relation to the United States, the lack of concern that American adults

¹⁸ Roland Barthes, *Mythologies* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), 58.

ostensibly felt toward their children, the success of the Marxist/Leninist system, and the ability of the Communist Party to provide the leadership and support that Russia's population needed.

Yet, as Barthes would agree, images could also be used to subvert the Cold War consensus, even in the most "bourgeois" and "totalitarian" societies.¹⁹ For instance, when the Soviet filmmaker Tengiz Abuladze, created child protagonists on the big screen who had no adult supervision and were forced to survive on their own, he was challenging the idealized vision of the contented, prosperous, and mobilized Soviet child that was being created at the time by the Party. In his films, Abuladze presented the state as a distant force that had abandoned the Soviet child while rendering parents incapable of caring for their young. These many images represented what the semiotician Yuri Lotman might call a "semiosphere" of childhood, made up of multiple voices, expressed in many languages, spanning international borders and ideological boundaries, at times reflecting the intersecting beliefs of large groups, at other times expressing the ideas of only a few or one, often assuming new meanings through the process of production and reception.²⁰

Of the possible images that could have been examined as a key to understanding the varying conceptualizations of the Cold War, the image of the child demands attention. As Phillippe Aries pointed out forty years ago, the variegated meanings of childhood disclose the beliefs and fears of the society around it.²¹ This study argues that these contested images of the child represented differing fictions about what the Cold War meant for society—what threats it posed and what obligations it created. As such, it

¹⁹ Barthes would make this argument later in life. See Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography* (New York: Noonday, 1981).

²⁰ Iu. Lotman, "O Semiosphere," *Sign Systems Studies* 17 (1984). Iuri Lotman, Boris Andreevich Uspenskii, and Ann Shukman, *The Semiotics of Russian Culture*, Michigan Slavic Contributions; no. 11 (Ann Arbor: Dept. of Slavic Languages and Literatures, University of Michigan, 1984).

²¹ Philippe Aries, *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962).

provides a window into how the Cold War was conceptualized by politicians, propagandists, and private citizens in the Soviet Union and the United States. Much scholarship has been devoted in recent years to examining how the Cold War was imagined by domestic populations, particularly in the United States. Norman Graebner, David Cate, Elaine Tyler May, Stephen Whitfield, Margot Henriksen, and Tom Engelhardt have all chronicled how the Cold War was understood and experienced by many Americans in the 1950s and 60s as an “us or them” struggle, a drive to stop “alien conspirators and foreign invasion,” and a call-to-arms to halt “Soviet expansionism.”²² As May has argued, “The worst-case scenario was Communist takeover, and the defeat of the United States in the Cold War.”²³ Yet, surprisingly little work has been done on how the Cold War was conceptualized in other countries and for other audiences. As Rana Mitter acknowledges, current examinations of the “cultural and social impact of the Cold War” have been “very largely focused on the United States.”²⁴ This has led some historians to conclude either that the Cold War was conceptualized in the rest of the world the same way that it was in the United States or that it actually had little daily impact on populations outside of America. Such assumptions have been noted by Susan Caruthers, who argues that current cultural studies of the Cold War have presented the war as “a one-sided phenomenon,” to which the Soviet population appears largely oblivious.²⁵

This examination of the Cold War child reveals that the Soviet state did in fact work hard to create its own vision of the Cold War for both domestic and international

²² Engelhardt, *The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation*, 10, 98, Norman Graebner, "Myth and Reality: America's Rhetorical Cold War," in *Critical Reflections on the Cold War*, ed. Martin Medhurst and H.W. Brands (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University, 2000), 20.

²³ May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*, xviii.

²⁴ Rana Mitter and Patrick Major, eds., *Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Soviet History* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), vi.

²⁵ Susan Caruthers, "Review of American Cold War Culture," *Modernism/modernity* 13, no. 1 (2006): 956-58.

consumption. In contrast to the United States, however, by the 1950s the Soviet leadership under Stalin and Khrushchev had ceased to identify ideological infiltration by the enemy as a real threat to the country's children. It also shied away from portraying nuclear attack as a potential danger. Instead, Cold War threats appeared to come from domestic weaknesses born from the destruction of the Second World War, and later, the legacy of Stalinist repression. This meant that the "Great Fear," as David Caute re-coined it in 1978, was not supported in the Soviet Union like it was in the United States.²⁶ Although the Soviet leadership increasingly worried about the power of underground western music and media on their young, fear of capitalist ideological infiltration in the schools and the homes was not a part of official Soviet rhetoric. Moreover, whereas the United States presented a vision of its population mobilizing for defense against communist aggression, Party leaders and propagandists in the Soviet Union portrayed the Soviet populace as crusaders for "peaceful competition" with the West and the promotion of revolutions around the world.

Despite these differences, there were also some similarities between the two sides' visions of the Cold War. In Sarah Davies' recent study of Soviet cinema in 1945-46, she argues that the "common challenges" that were faced by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War led both sides to pursue similar domestic policies, particularly in their efforts to maintain "social control through surveillance...and the use of technologically sophisticated mass media."²⁷ She notes that the Cold War "inclined the Soviet Union towards increasing state intervention in cultural policy and state censorship."²⁸ This observation is important for two reasons. First, it posits that the Soviet populace did encounter the Cold War in their daily lives in the form of state

²⁶ David Caute, *The Great Fear* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978).

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Sarah Davies, "Soviet Cinema and the Early Cold War: Pudovkin's Admiral Nakhimov in Context," in *Across the Blocs*, ed. Rana Mitter and Patrick Major (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 49.

monitoring and censorship. Second, it points to a shared experience of “domestic containment” where governments and independent groups in the United States and the Soviet Union turned to the home as a place where “potentially dangerous social forces of the new age might be tamed.”²⁹ Although Davies’ analysis is limited to the mid-1940s and to the role of film in enforcing a new Cold War consensus, she nonetheless is going in the right direction. This dissertation expands upon her observations by showing the similarities between the efforts made by the Soviet and American governments in the late 1950s and early 1960s to impose normative behavior upon the young and to promote domestic “containment,” while at the same time pursuing differing visions of what the ideal, mobilized Cold War child should look like.

This project also reveals the extent to which Soviet and American elites were unable to control how the Cold War was conceptualized by domestic and international audiences, particularly as the 1960s progressed. Seconding the arguments made by Jeremi Suri in his examination of domestic protest and the rise of détente, this dissertation traces the process by which social categories began to break down on both sides of the Iron Curtain in the face of rising nuclear fear and cultural unrest.³⁰ The extensive and effective use of the child’s image by critics of Soviet and American policy reflects the difficulties that politicians and propagandists faced in imposing the rigid social ideals of the the 1950s upon skeptical populations in the 1960s. The Cold War stalemate and the rise in domestic dissent led leaders in the Soviet Union and the United States not only to normalize direct relations with each other, but to refocus their attention on winning the hearts and minds of the post-colonial world. Thus, we see the image of the idealized child transported to wide-reaching propaganda campaigns in places like

²⁹ May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*, xxiv.

³⁰ Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003)

Vietnam. By 1968, the image of the well-appointed, well-educated, and “contained” domestic child became an exported commodity, meant to prop up each side’s wavering political authority in the new, so called “third world”, Cold War battlefield.

While this dissertation uses the image of the child as a category of analysis for understanding changing conceptualizations of the Cold War, it also traces shifting ideas about childhood itself in both the Soviet Union and the United States in the 1950s and 60s. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the idea of the child as innocent and in need of protection spanned American and Russian culture. The child became a focus for increased public surveillance and in the West, for an emerging middle class that sought to protect its property through rights of inheritance.³¹ By the beginning of the twentieth century, childhood had moved into what Karin Calvert has called its “third phase,” which reflected not only an increasing appreciation of children by adults, but recognition that childhood was “sacred” and should be prolonged and sheltered as much as possible.³² Over the years, the writings of men like Jean Jacques Rousseau and Leo Tolstoy created a “myth of childhood,” that ceased to be a literary allusion and became a socio-cultural reality.³³

The trope of childhood innocence then underwent a transformation in Russia at the hands of early communist revolutionaries. Some of the Communist Party’s greatest thinkers found their voices in the fields of pedagogy and experimental child-rearing, as education was thought by many to be the most singular variable that would allow for the

³¹ Linda Pollock, *Forgotten Children: Parent-Child Relations from 1500 to 1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

³² Karin Calvert, *Children in the House: The Material Culture of Early Childhood, 1600-1900* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992), 152.

³³ Leo Tolstoy, *Detstvo* (Moscow: Russkyi Iazik, 1990), Andrew Wachtel, *The Battle for Childhood: Creation of a Russian Myth* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), 10. Tolstoy’s ideals of childhood were further developed over the years in fiction and in social thought by writers like Maxim Gorky, Anton Makarenko, Korneii Chukovskii, Nadezhda Krupskaiia, and Lev Vygotskii, all of whom sought to create “literary romanticizations of childhood.”

creation and future construction of the Communist utopia.³⁴ As Lisa Kirshchenbaum has noted, the Soviet child represented the possibility of creating a new society that would “break the cycle” of class exploitation that had perpetuated for centuries.³⁵ Idealized Soviet children became the “sharp eyes” for the regime, functioning as defenders of the revolution and as willing accomplices to the state’s designs.³⁶ In later years, during the Five Year Plans of the 1930s, the Soviet child became an active participant in the programs for collectivization, industrialization, and the Terror. They exposed lazy workers, collected seed, and occasionally were used to endorse the arrest of parents and friends.³⁷ This image of the child as a revolutionary and activist carried over into the Cold War, as it was refashioned to encompass a vision of youth that could meet not only the political needs of the era, but the cultural and economic challenges as well. At the same time, children became emblems of increased Soviet wealth and consumer comfort following the Second World War and the death of Stalin.

³⁴ Maxim Gorky, *Childhood* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), Anton Semenovich Makarenko, *The Collective Family*, 1st ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967), Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaja, *Vospitanie Molodezhi v Leninskom Dukhe* (Moskva: Pedagogika, 1989), Clementine G. K. Creuziger, *Childhood in Russia : Representation and Reality* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1996), Lev Vigotsky, *Thought and Language* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962). For a study of the construction of children’s homes in the post-revolutionary and civil war periods, see Alan M. Ball, *And Now My Soul is Hardened: Abandoned Children in Soviet Russia, 1918-1930* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Also see Lynn Mally, *Culture of the Future: The Proletkult Movement in Revolutionary Russia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), Elizabeth A. Wood, *The Baba and the Comrade : Gender and Politics in Revolutionary Russia*, Indiana-Michigan series in Russian and East European studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997). Elizabeth Wood’s study of gender and politics in revolutionary Russia, *The Baba and the Comrade*, does something similar as it examines the difference between the imagined woman and the signified woman. She argues that “the history of the woman question in Russia has usually been written as if it were about real women ... it is really about myths,” 10. She makes a compelling case for understanding the rhetoric of women’s emancipation as primarily a way of talking about social transformation and as “only partially about women themselves.”

³⁵ For an examination of the early Bolshevik image of the ideal child, see Lisa A. Kirshchenbaum, *Small Comrades: Revolutionizing Childhood in Soviet Russia, 1917-1932* (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2000).

³⁶ Petr Ionovich Iakir, *A Childhood in Prison*, [1st American ed. (New York,: Coward, 1973).

³⁷ The most famous of child activists was Pavel Morozov, who was fabled to have been killed by his family for turning in his father to the state. Iuri Druzhnikov, *Informer 001: The Myth of Pavlik Morozov* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997). Later on, mobilized heroes emerge during the Second World War as child partisans. See Alexander Fadeev, *The Young Guard*, trans. Volet Dutt (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2000).

In contrast, American childhood retained its sense of innocence until the Cold War arrived in the late-1940s.³⁸ At the beginning of the twentieth century, Progressive-era child experts like William Forbush argued that children were “like wild creatures of the woods,” while G. Stanley Hall wrote that “childhood is the paradise of the race from which adult life is a fall.”³⁹ In the post-war period, federal support rose for programs like the Boy Scouts and YMCA that could foster childhood development and protect the next generation. Decades later, as Vivian Zelizer argues in her study of the post-war era, the notion of childhood innocence fostered a new, permissive approach to the raising of children. Seconding the claims made by Mary Wolfenstein in the 1950s, Zelizer contends that parental permissiveness in America arose in response to rising affluence and a desire to reject the strict rules that had regulated life during the Second World War.⁴⁰

This dissertation supports Zelizer’s argument: it finds plenty of evidence that American parents were seeking a more permissive approach in raising children who they perceived as innocent and in need of protection. Yet it also finds substantial documentation showing that American citizens embraced a new vision of idealized youth that was not innocent, but instead was mobilized for war and was calmly aware of the dangers around it. This kind of child, who rejected permissive parenting, bad schooling, violent media, delinquency, and communist ideological infiltration, was seen by

³⁸ May Niall Mitchell, “‘A Good and Delicious Country’: Free Children of Color and How They Learned to Imagine the Atlantic World In Nineteenth-Century Louisiana,” *History of Education Quarterly* 40, no. 2 (2000), Shelby Anne Wolf and Shirley Brice Heath, “Living in a World of Words,” in *The Children's Culture Reader*, ed. Henry Jenkins (New York: New York University Press, 1998). Selma Berrol, *Growing up American: Immigrant Children in America Then and Now*, ed. Joseph Hawes and N. Ray Hiner, Twayne's History of American Childhood (New York: Twayne, 1995), Priscilla Ferguson Clement, *Growing Pains: Children in the Industrial Age, 1850-1890* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1997), William Tuttle, *Daddy's Gone to War: The Second World War in the Lives of America's Children* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

³⁹ William Forbush, *The Boy Problem* (1909) as quoted in Steven L. Schlossman, “G. Stanley Hall and the Boy’s Club,” *Journey of the History of Behavioral Sciences* 9, no. 2 (1973): 140-147 and in Henry Jenkins, “Childhood Innocence and Other Modern Myths,” in *The Children's Culture Reader*, ed. Henry Jenkins (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 19.

⁴⁰ Viviana A. Rotman Zelizer, *Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value of Children* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).

politicians and parents alike as the ticket to American survival in the Cold War. Henry Jenkins has argued that the popularity of parental permissiveness in postwar America “seems all the more ironic when read in relation to the militarization of American science and education, the Cold War, and McCarthyism.”⁴¹ How could parents have been so permissive, he asks, when the rest of the nation was struggling to counter the communist threat? Yet upon closer inspection, we find that the management and figuration of childhood played a vital role in the struggle against the Soviet Union. It did not just symbolize innocence in the 1950s and 60s; it also symbolized a new vision of youth that was prepared for the militarization that the Cold War demanded.

This project has intentionally avoided establishing a set age-range for identifying and defining “the child.” While most adults in the West would agree that people under the age of twelve or thirteen should be classified as children, it nonetheless must be remembered that such categorizations are not “natural” or even commonly shared across societies.⁴² For instance, groups that some cultures would designate as “children” might still be tried as “adults” in many western and non-western courts. Laws on statutory rape often argue that a person is a child until he or she turns eighteen. Those who were aged

⁴¹ Jenkins, "Childhood Innocence and Other Modern Myths," 21.

⁴² There is a difference between how “childhood” as an idea and how the lived experiences of children are studied. The field of children’s history (the history of understanding children’s lives and experiences) has advocated (rightly so) increasing separation in analysis of childhood stages. Their projects are different from mine, however, in that they are interested in understanding children as actors with relative agency functioning and making decisions in their own worlds. My dissertation acknowledges the value in studying the question of child agency and experience, but is more interested in adult representations of the child, which, barring the rare exceptions like Sally Mann, tend to view the child as a receptacle, open to figuration by the outside world. See Joseph M. Hawes, *Children Between the Wars: American Childhood, 1920-1940*, Twayne’s history of American childhood series (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1997), Calvert, *Children in the House: The Material Culture of Early Childhood, 1600-1900*, Allison James, Chris Jenks, and Alan Prout, *Theorizing Childhood* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1998), Carolyn Steedman, *The Tidy House: Little Girls Writing* (London: Virago, 1982), Mitchell, "'A Good and Delicious Country': Free Children of Color and How They Learned to Imagine the Atlantic World In Nineteenth-Century Louisiana.", Shelby Anne Wolf and Chirley Brice Heath, "Living in a World of Words," in *The Children's Culture Reader*, ed. Henry Jenkins (New York: New York University Press, 1998), Berrol, *Growing up American: Immigrant Children in America Then and Now*, Clement, *Growing Pains: Children in the Industrial Age, 1850-1890*, Tuttle, *Daddy's Gone to War: The Second World War in the Lives of America's Children*.

eighteen and older who fought in Vietnam in the late 1960s were often called “children” and “boys” despite the fact that we might otherwise see them as adults. Moreover, the gaze of the West upon its colonies and its racial minorities has a long history of infantilizing entire populations, regardless of their age.⁴³ In short, what defines age limits for “the child” is not stable. Incorporating those groups who were designated as “children,” regardless of their age, is an important part of this project, as it lends deeper context to our polyphonic vision of the child. The designation of “child” upon a figure (regardless of whether or not he or she is three, eighteen, or fifty-years-old) should be enough to open the doors for analysis.

One last clarification is necessary concerning the use of the word “image” in this dissertation. Throughout this work, I explore government speeches, presidential memos, films, radio broadcasts, domestic and international publications, reports on audience reception, billboards, protest manifestos, and news programs. I view all of these materials as rich media containing both visual and textual depictions of youth and frequently refer to these portrayals of children as having created an “image” of the child. As such, I am not using the term “image” simply to describe a physical likeness or representation of the child in visual form. I am instead using the secondary definition of the word to denote a mental representation, an idea, or a concept that can be conveyed through text, speech, symbol, as well as visual capturing and rendering. Just as René Magritte and Michel Foucault argued that the picture of a pipe and the word “pipe” can both create an image of a pipe (but are not a pipe), so too am I exploring the photos, illustrations, and texts that describe and create an image of childhood.⁴⁴

⁴³ See Christina Klein, “Family Ties and Political Obligation: The Discourse of Adoption and the Cold War Commitment to Asia,” in Appy, ed., *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966*. Also see Mark Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919-1950* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

⁴⁴ Michel Foucault and Richard Howard, “Ceci n'est pas une pipe,” *October* 1 (Spring, 1976): 6-21.

The first chapter of the dissertation, “Fighters for Peace: The Soviet Child in the Cold War Universe,” examines how Party members and propagandists in the Khrushchev era created new images of children as activists for peace and crusaders in the economic and cultural competitions of the Cold War. I argue that they used these images in order to conceptualize the Cold War for domestic audiences as a “Peace Offensive” that required active participation by the population and solidarity with nationalist and socialist movements in the post-colonial world. At the same time, state propagandists created a second set of images of the Soviet child that appeared threatened by the traditions of rote learning from the Stalinist era, hooliganism, and poor parenting. These images became the legitimating force behind a movement in the late 1950s to assert state control and surveillance over the private lives and education of Soviet citizens who had largely moved out of the Stalin-era communal apartments where they could be easily monitored, and into the individual *Khrushchevka*. Based on materials found in the Pioneer archives in Moscow, this chapter presents the Cold War as a phenomenon that looked markedly different in the Soviet Union than it did in the United States. It also shows how the Cold War changed the way that the state defined threats to, and mobilization for, the young.

Chapter Two, “Duck and Cover: The American Cold War Child and the Great Fear,” examines the perceived international and domestic threats that surrounded children in the United States in the 1950s and 60s. It shows the extent to which fear of communism was far more prevalent in the United States than capitalism was in the Soviet Union. This collective fear fostered the notion that America was in the midst of a communist assault. It also helped to justify the careful monitoring of families and individuals in these years. Based on research done at the Boy Scout archives in Irving, Texas, this chapter explores how the Boy Scout came to embody the idealized image of defensively mobilized American youth. Far from innocent, the Scouts were envisioned as

being acutely aware of the horrors of nuclear attack and the dangers of communist ideological infiltration. They were portrayed as prepared for atomic assault, dedicated to education in the sciences, sexually straight, non-racist, and committed to establishing a defensive pact against communism with other troops around the world.

Chapter Three, “Revising an Ideal: Alternative Images of Children in Film during the Soviet Thaw,” complicates the image of the child and the vision of the Cold War that was being established by the Soviet state in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Based on research done in the Art and Literature archive in Moscow, this chapter explores how filmmakers of the Thaw used the image of the child to interrogate the state’s idealized vision of youth and its Cold War politics in general. This work adds to current scholarship by Josephine Woll and Alexander Prokhorov on the phenomenon of the child in Thaw film by placing these images and their meanings within the context of the Cold War.⁴⁵ The chapter argues that by creating images of youth that were destitute, unprotected, and unable to mobilize, filmmakers like Andrei Tarkovsky and Mikhail Romm found a visual vocabulary that could engage the Soviet state in a debate over its past and its future.

Chapter Four, ““Dr. Spock is Worried:” The Image of the Child in the American Test Ban Movement,” then moves back across the Atlantic to explore how different voices competed, in the words of Paul Boyer, to “articulate the realities of the post-nuclear world” to American audiences.⁴⁶ While extensive work has been done on the meanings of the Bomb in American society and on the anti-nuclear movement itself, no one has yet explored the ubiquitous image of the child as a rallying point for protest and

⁴⁵ Alexander Prokhorov, "The Unknown New Wave: Soviet Cinema of the 1960s" (paper presented at the Pittsburgh Russian Film Symposium, Pittsburgh, PA, May - June 2001), Josephine Woll, *Real Images: Soviet Cinema and the Thaw*, KINO, the Russian cinema series (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000).

⁴⁶ Paul Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age* (New York: Random House, 1985), 32.

as a symbol for contested political legitimacy in the struggle to ban the Bomb.⁴⁷ This chapter's research is based on previously unexplored materials from the Peace Archive at Swarthmore College as well as new analysis of well-known anti-nuclear advertisements of the era. It shows how groups like SANE and Women Strike for Peace sought to create a new vision of the Cold War that redefined the parameters of the conflict not as a struggle between East and West or between conflicting ideologies, but as a battle between peace and war, between health and disease, and between those who ostensibly cared about the fate of the young and those who were labeled as insouciant victimizers of the next generation.

Finally, Chapter Five, "Clashing Visions: Images of the Child in American, Soviet, and North Vietnamese Propaganda to Vietnam, 1964-1969," examines how Soviet, American, and National Liberation Front (NLF) Cold War agendas clashed in Vietnamese foreign propaganda over the image of the child. Based on archival transcripts of radio broadcasts from the United States, the Soviet Union, and North Vietnam, this chapter shows how American and Soviet propagandists used their own established visions of idealized youth in their programs to Vietnam. The United States depicted its children as affluent, non-racist, and prepared at home to protect their country from communist invasion. Meanwhile, Soviet propagandists presented a vision of its children as mobilized to actively support the North Vietnamese crusade to expel the American invaders. Yet while these images were meant to convey assurances of Soviet solidarity and American security, they were often undermined by conflicting messages coming

⁴⁷ See, for instance, Robert Divine, *Blowing On the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), John Lewis Gaddis, *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945* (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), Greg Herken, *The Winning Weapons: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950* (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), Van Gosse, *Rethinking the New Left* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), Peter Kuznick and James Gilbert, eds., *Rethinking Cold War Culture* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), Amy Swerdlow, *Women Strike for Peace: Traditional Motherhood and Radical Politics in the 1960s* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), Milton Katz, *Ban the Bomb* (New York: Praeger, 1986).

from the enemy and from the North Vietnamese themselves, who presented an image of their own youth fighting for national independence outside the control of the superpowers.

By the end of the 1960s, the child had become a contested figure whose identity had transformed significantly. On the one hand, it remained a symbol of innocence and victimization, at times demanding the protection of the state and at other times seemingly indicting the state for its failure to provide security. On the other hand, it became a vision for a new level of mobilization, either as an advocate for the state, or as a crusader against it. This complication of the child's image was caused by the Cold War and the unique demands that it placed upon the next generation.

Examining how the image of the child changed in the Cold War – and how the Cold War was conceptualized for various audiences in terms of the child – gives us a far more nuanced understanding of both the image and the event. It gives historians a clearer view of how visual and rhetorical images like that of the child served as cultural currency for creating conceptual boundaries in the Cold War. It illustrates the connections that persist between the expression of policy and the utilization of symbols that carry cultural weight.

Chapter 1

“Fighters for Peace:” The Soviet Cold War Child, 1945-1965

“The capitalists will stop at nothing to strengthen their influence on Soviet youth. For this reason, the need to make children stronger, fitter, and ideologically resilient is more important than ever before.”¹

On February 15 1956, ten days before delivering his now famous Twentieth Party Congress speech, Nikita Khrushchev laid out in an address to the Komsomol a vision for the Soviet Union and its future role in the Cold War. Borrowing from the rhetoric of Georgii Malenkov, Khrushchev argued that the Soviet nation and the world faced two alternatives, “either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history. There is no third option.”² In his words, peaceful coexistence would “develop into peaceful competition for the purpose of satisfying man’s needs.”³ Over the next eight years, Khrushchev continued to argue that Soviet Cold War policy was motivated by a desire to compete economically and culturally with the United States, while at the same time promoting peace around the world.⁴ He, along with Party officials and propagandists

¹ “Nekotorye Voprosy Vospitaniia Molodezhi,” K XIV s’ezdy VLKSM,” 1962. Russian State Archive of Social Political Science (hereafter referred to as RGASPI) f.m6, op.14, d.111, l.50.

² *Pravda*, February 15 1956.

³ Nikita Khrushchev in P. E. Mosley (Ed.) ‘The Soviet Union 1922-1962, A Foreign Affairs Reader’ cited in Joseph Noguee and Robert Donaldson, eds., *Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 30.

⁴ Much ink has been spilled over Khrushchev’s Cold War policy from 1956 to 1964. John Gaddis has called him “obsequious” and “bibulous,” portraying him as a reluctant and uncertain leader, driven to erratic behavior. Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, 205-11. Walter LaFeber has characterized him as a “shrewd” and “subtle” man, who attempted to use economic aid to the post-colonial world in order to win hearts and minds. Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2002*, Updated 9th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 170-71. Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov have characterized him as a man who understood the “ultimate limits imposed by nuclear weapons,” but was

conceptualized the Cold War for their domestic and international audiences as a struggle that required the active mobilization of an entire nation, not for military victory but for economic and cultural preeminence over the West and for the pursuit of a Soviet led “Peace Offensive” around the world. Only by casting off the Stalinist legacy, by maintaining domestic order, and by adopting creative approaches to education and the arts as well as consumer and agricultural production did Khrushchev and his supporters contend that these lofty goals of “peace” and economic/cultural victory over the United States could be achieved.

Domestic portrayals of children and youth during the Khrushchev era offer a particularly revealing view of how the Party leadership conceptualized the Cold War for its domestic and international audiences in the late 1950s and early 1960s. State propagandists working in the press and radio deployed two primary visions of children in their struggle to engage their viewers and listeners for the larger Cold War crusade. First, they portrayed the next generation in an idealized form as actively mobilized for a new kind of war, not as soldiers taking up arms to defend their nation, but as crusaders for a “peace offensive” around the world. They depicted youth as innovative builders of an economically and culturally strong Soviet society and as a generation that had renounced the Stalinist inheritance. Without question, these images shared many traits with earlier Soviet representations of children: they appeared hard-working, peaceful, with a commitment to ideological and scientific education and a deep sense of patriotism. Yet they were also markedly different from earlier Stalinist depictions of idealized youth. In

also aware of how useful the “nuclear bluff” could be. Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: from Stalin to Khrushchev*, 180-90. Interestingly, no one has labeled Khrushchev’s policy as peaceful.

earlier years children had been presented as willing vessels for traditional rote learning and as the joyous recipients of Stalin's care with little connection to the outside world. By revising the Stalinist image of the child, officials and propagandists in the Khrushchev era hoped to present a vision of Soviet progress that would reflect the Party's ideological aims for the Cold War, would incite the population to accept Khrushchev's reforms, and would anathematize the United States while obscuring the Party leadership's more troublesome (and less peaceful) Cold War policies.

State propagandists after 1956 also created a second image of Soviet children as threats to society and as victims of it. Whereas during the late Stalinist period, children had been portrayed as primarily happy and protected under their leader's watchful gaze, under Khrushchev, youth appeared threatened by a new set of dangers that appeared to put the future of the nation at risk. Party leaders, journalists, and teachers contended that youth faced internal threats not only from the debilitating restrictions of the Stalinist inheritance and out-dated educational practices, but from negligent and coddling parenting in the home. Many politicians and youth leaders argued that increased management of the private sphere was required in order to stop bad parents from creating hooligans out of the country's children. In the context of the Cold War, they argued that these internal weaknesses threatened the ability of future generations to confront the West and undermined the Soviet Union's projected image as the cultural and economic victor over the capitalist world. These articulations of threat reflected, on the one hand, real perceptions of increasing domestic instability in the country, and on the other hand, justification for continued state surveillance and intervention into the private lives of

Russia's citizenry. As happened in the United States, Cold War "containment" became a vital domestic policy.

In all of their renderings, images of children evolved to meet the specific Cold War needs of the Soviet leadership and its propaganda arm. They provided legitimacy to those individuals who chose to present themselves as the protectors of the young. On a larger scale, they helped to conceptualize and legitimate the Soviet Cold War mission at home. What those images looked like, what functions they performed, what policies they were intended to promote and conceal, and what they have to say about the Soviet leadership's domestic packaging of the Cold War, are the topics of this chapter.

STALINISM AND THE COLD WAR CHILD

On December 18, 1949, thousands of people across the Soviet Union and the communist world gathered to celebrate Stalin's seventieth birthday. Farm and factory workers pledged to double, triple and quadruple their production levels as a sign of gratitude to Stalin, while communist parties around the world sent lavish gifts. For twenty-two months following the celebration, the pages of *Pravda* were filled with birthday greetings. At the event itself, a seemingly endless array of Party, Komsomol, Young Pioneer and international delegates rose to salute the leader and his legacy. Molotov hailed Stalin as "teacher, leader, and favorite friend." Bulganin praised him as the "friend of the world's peoples." The newspaper *Pionerskaia Pravda* heralded the leader as the "first defender of world peace" while the Central Committee declared that he had transformed the country into "a great and invincible power."⁵ Meanwhile, the

⁵ *Pionerskaia Pravda*, December 24 1949. *Izvestiia*, December 22 1949.

Academy of Sciences declared that “Stalin’s statements,” in regard to “the case of capitalist encirclement, [had given] to the Bolshevik party, to the working class, to all toilers of the Soviet country a great perspective and clarity of goals.”⁶ Children standing in long lines around the central podium delivered flowers to Stalin and Molotov, while *Komsomol’skaia Pravda* reported that two thousand Pioneers, aged nine to fifteen had organized a ball with the theme “Thank you, Comrade Stalin, for our happy childhood.”⁷

Stalin’s birthday celebration provides a window into how the party leadership, the press, and sizable portions of the population publicly articulated not only their relationship with Stalin but their government’s official approach to the Cold War. Amidst their sweeping declarations of fealty to the leader, they depicted the Cold War as a conflict that required Stalin’s leadership as the teacher and humble mentor of a grateful population. They presented the ongoing struggle with the West as a process that demanded the participation of the Soviet people as defenders against bourgeois aggression.⁸ Khrushchev put it succinctly when he announced that, “the great Stalin,” while educating his cadres, “has taught us a sharp intransigence toward the slightest appearance of alien bourgeois ideology.”⁹ Not only did these depictions of Soviet society codify the relationship between Stalin and the citizenry, they also functioned as the building blocks for the party’s public conceptualization of the Cold War. For everyone in the Soviet Union, the state and its supporters argued, uncritical loyalty to the leader

⁶ "70th Anniversary of Stalin's Birth," (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk, 1949).

⁷ *Komsomol’skaia Pravda*, December 20 1949, 2.

⁸ A discussion of the official “performance” of gratitude that was delivered by the Soviet populace to Stalin has been discussed in Jeffrey Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).

⁹ *Pravda*, December 21 1949, 4.

coupled with continuous mobilization against the West would provide the key to future national security.

Officially produced images of children in the Stalinist era functioned as visual and rhetorical signifiers for the population's apparent defensive mobilization and loyalty to Stalin. These images followed two primary archetypes. Either they were depicted as joyous, protected, and grateful to Stalin, who had ostensibly made their "happy" lives possible, or they appeared physically and ideologically mobilized for the defense of Russia.¹⁰ These visions of happy and mobilized children were used by propagandists in the early years of the Cold War to contrast the lives of the young with the harshness and cruelty of capitalist life. They promoted an image of the Soviet Union as physically and ideologically strong while at the same time presenting the country as non-aggressive in the face of apparent American warmongering.

One of the most prominent depictions of the child during the late Stalinist era was of the unthreatened and happy youngster who had been ostensibly granted a joyous life thanks to Stalin's care and concern. In works like Boris Vladimirsky's 1949 painting, "Rozy dlia Stalina" (Roses for Stalin) and Nina Vatolina's 1950 poster, "Spasibo rodnomu Stalinu za schastlivoe detstvo" (Thank you dear Stalin for our happy childhood"), renditions of Stalin standing amongst happy children created what Rachel Rosenthal has called "a comforting intimacy between the leader and his proletarian body

¹⁰ I do not discuss here the image of the child in the early years of the Revolution, which was arguably quite different from the one I am presenting here. Alan Ball and Lisa Kirshchenbaum have both explored the meanings of childhood in these earlier years, when they were viewed by revolutionaries as the hope and the burden of the cause. By the time my analysis begins, the world of childhood had returned to its traditional conceptualizations, with the family positioned as a necessary force in the child's life and experimental child-rearing and pedagogy already abandoned. Kirshchenbaum, *Small Comrades*:

politic.”¹¹ Often basking in light and surrounded by flowers, Stalin assumed a new identity in the late 1940s, not as an ardent revolutionary or totalitarian leader, but as a kindly father to pleasant and adoring children. As Jeffrey Brooks has shown, such expressions of love participated in a “performance” of gratitude that stretched across demographic and geographic borders.¹²



Illustration 1.1: Nina Vatolina, “Spasibo rodnomu za schastlivoe detstvo!” (Thank you comrade Stalin for a happy childhood!), 1950.

Revolutionizing Childhood in Soviet Russia, 1917-1932. Ball, And Now My Soul is Hardened: Abandoned Children in Soviet Russia, 1918-1930.

¹¹ Rachel Rosenthal, "Visual Fiction: The Development of the Secular Icon in Stalinist Poster Art," *Zhe: Stanford's Student Journal of Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies* 1 (Spring, 2005): 1.

¹² Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War*, 219.



Illustration 1.2: Boris Vladimirsky “Rozovyi za Stalina,” (Roses for Stalin), 1949.

On their own, these depictions of the joyous Stalinist childhood appear to have little direct connection with the Cold War. The children seem insulated and happy, with little concern for the outside world. Yet such images did speak to how the Party packaged the Cold War for its domestic audiences, if only because they sat in contrast to another prominent and frequent image of the child in the Soviet press: that of the violent, poverty-stricken American youth. This was particularly apparent when images of Soviet childhood were printed next to depictions of impoverished and violent American children. For instance, on September 4, 1949, *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* published a report on the Soviet air force and its work with the young alongside a drawing of an American child wielding a gun. In contrast to the joy expressed by the Komsomol and Pioneer members, who, in their words, “were forever grateful to Stalin,” an American boy, aged seven or eight, is depicted in the adjacent story, standing in the middle of a destroyed

room, wielding a gun (See Illustration 1.3). His grandmother sits on the floor holding her bleeding head. A dog lies on the ground with a knife in its belly while his parents hide under the kitchen table. In the foreground sits a gun box with the text “Made in the USA” prominently displayed. The caption reads, “Papa and Mama, come out, I am done playing!” For the viewer, the juxtaposition between the epistles on page one and the illustration on page two would have been hard to ignore. Taken in context, not only do these contrasting images compare the lives of Soviet youth to that of American children, they also attribute that discrepancy to the careful supervision provided by Stalin.



Illustration 1.3: “Papa and Mama! Come out, I am done playing!”¹³

Much scholarly attention has been given to images of children in the 1940s and 50s who were rendered as indebted to Stalin for their “happiness” and “joy.” Jeffrey

¹³ “Kinopovest’ o Stalinskikh Sokolakh,” and “Amerikanskii Igrushchki,” *Komsomol’skaia Pravda*, September 4 1949, 4. In the article about the Air Force, at one point where the young man is chronicling his experience during the celebration he says, “As the plane climbed higher and higher, “Glory to Stalin!” we cried to the heavens!”

Brooks has viewed them as emblems of the High Stalinist Project and the population's shared sense of indebtedness to their leader.¹⁴ Susan Reid has seen them as symbols for the stale predictability of Socialist Realism.¹⁵ Rachel Rosenthal has argued that they reflect Stalin's changing personas over the course of his regime.¹⁶ When examined alone, the image of the joyous, admiring child certainly appears to achieve these objectives as it reflects the ideas of Stalin's ascendancy to power, the calcification of a "symbolic order" that placed Stalin in a ritualized, beatified space, and the consummate happiness of the larger, national family that was supposed to be flourishing and peaceful as a result of the country's turn toward Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism.¹⁷ However, when viewed from the perspective of the larger visual environment in which these images would have been seen, where counter images of distraught American children could also be viewed, one observes how the image of the happy and joyous child also reflects a larger Cold War mindset that sought to define Soviet identity in terms of its western counterpart. The lesson conveyed in these images was that only by embracing a carefully prescribed array of attributes and behaviors as defined by Stalin himself could the nation avoid the apparent destitution that characterized life in the capitalist world.

In addition to presenting a vision of the young as indebted to Stalin for their "happy" and joyous" childhoods, propagandists in the late 1940s and early 1950s also

¹⁴ Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War*.

¹⁵ Susan E. Reid, *Khrushchev in Wonderland: The Pioneer Palace in Moscow's Lenin Hills, 1962* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh, 2002).

¹⁶ Rosenthal, "Visual Fiction: The Development of the Secular Icon in Stalinist Poster Art."

¹⁷ Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War*, 59. Brooks argues that the "charismatic aura of Stalin's manufactured persona anchored the new order." This wasn't an easy thing to manufacture, since Stalin had failed to distinguish himself during the revolution of the civil war. His transition to charismatic leader was "somewhat of a ruse." Thus, a monopolization of the press was necessary in order to "put himself in the center of a new symbolic order."

depicted the Soviet child in the press and in official literature as physically fit, disciplined, and respectful of authority while at the same time avoiding any visions of the next generation as militarized for actual war or for activism abroad. On the one hand, propagandists continued the long tradition of arguing that Soviet youth was prepared to defend Russia against capitalist encirclement. Thus, in March, 1949, *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* published no less than ten articles that mentioned the struggle of Soviet youth for “defense against the United States.” Articles and speeches constantly called upon children and adolescents to join in the campaign to “defend the democratic world against warmongering.”¹⁸ As Cold War tensions rose in the summer of 1949, *Pionerskaia Pravda* informed its readers that Soviet children, as the “builders of peace and culture,” would “stand against the aggressive plans of those who would wage war.” They promised that they would “defend the Soviet Union from capitalist encirclement.”¹⁹

At first glance, such declarations seem to reflect a widespread enlistment of Soviet youth for military defensive training and for the promotion of Soviet interests around the world. It was this rhetoric that sent many in the U.S. State Department and in the press scrambling to their typewriters with apparent proof that the Red Menace was indoctrinating Russian children to be soldiers and was spreading the communist message abroad.²⁰ As many Americans and Western Europeans would argue in the early 1950s, Soviet led “peace” meant war for everyone else. Yet the visual evidence that is attached to official Soviet rhetoric reflects a far more complex vision of what “mobilization for

¹⁸ “Za Demokraticeskii Mir, Protiv Podzhigatelei Voiny,” *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, March 27 1949, 4.

¹⁹ “V Zashitu Mira Protivnodzhigatelei novoi voiny!” *Pionerskaia Pravda*, July 7 1949, 2.

²⁰ See, for instance, J. Edgar Hoover, *Masters of Deceit: The Story of Communism in America and How to Fight it* (New York: Holt, 1958).

defense and peace” actually meant for Stalin and his supporters in these years. The seemingly aggressive language that described youth as prepared for war and the active pursuit of Soviet policy abroad was not coupled with images of military training or activism in the international sphere.²¹ Instead, it was attached to pictures of physical non-aggression in the young who in fact appeared heavily insulated within the borders of the Soviet Union. While for readers in the United States, stock rhetorical descriptions of Stalinist children committed to “defense and peace” seemed to imply that the next generation was manning the ramparts, these images help us to see that in the Stalinist context, calls to mobilize for “defense and peace” against capitalist encirclement did not mean that the Soviet leadership sought real military preparedness for the next generation. Instead it reflected the mandate to create physically fit and disciplined youth at home who could promote an image of the Soviet Union as primarily happy, well-ordered, and peaceful.

Stalinist portrayals of mobilized children can be seen most clearly in the literature produced by The Voluntary Society for the Assistance of the Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF), which was the organization most responsible for mobilizing the nation’s youth militarily against potential western aggression. The organization had been founded in 1927 to train reserves for the armed forces. Twenty years later, it boasted a membership of over thirteen million children and adolescents, all of whom ostensibly

²¹ “Tematika politicheskikh zaniatii s chlenami DOSAAF v uchebnykh organizatsiakh Obshchestva,” Nachal’nik upravleniia organissogoi raboty i propagandy TsK DOSAAF SSSR, State Archive of the Russian Federation (Hereafter referred to as GARF) f. 9552, op. 1, d. 159, l. 72. I am obviously not discussing the image of the mobilized child during the Great Patriotic War, which did not always depict children as mobilized only for defense. As members of the fabled “Molodaia Gvardiia,” youth could be seen in literature and in film as partisan heroes in their own right, undertaking dangerous missions to weaken the German lines.

received varying levels of military training in state-of-the-art aerodromes and archery ranges. From its inception, one of DOSAAF's primary responsibilities was to publicize images of Soviet children receiving training in orientation and survival skills as well as lessons in providing rear support in times of war.²² To this end, DOSAAF published pamphlets and newspaper articles in the early years of the Cold War that provided instruction on a variety of conventional civil defense topics. Bearing titles like "Always at Your Post," "The Infantry Battalion," and "Defending the Front," DOSAAF brochures argued for the continued vigilance of each child against capitalist encirclement. They generally featured images of children aged approximately eight to thirteen wearing uniforms, bearing compasses and maps, seen hiking and skiing across difficult terrain.²³ In one such three-page pamphlet entitled "The Insidious Methods of the Secret Service of the Imperialist Governments and the Problems of Raising the Vigilance of Soviet Children," boys and girls aged approximately eight to fourteen were depicted sitting in the classroom, digging ditches, and hiking on a trail.²⁴ In the accompanying text, young readers were reminded of the role that Soviet children played in ensuring the "defense of the motherland." They were then directed to "listen to the lessons of Stalin who instructs us to remain vigilant and to strive for victory."

This pamphlet and many reports like it seemed to argue that American imperialism around the world could be combated only through the mobilization of the

²² Predislovie, GARF f. 9552.

²³ Predatelia Tsentral'nogo Kommiteta DOSAAF SSSR, March 16, 1937, GARF f. 9553, op. 1, d. 23, l. 1-32. Predatelia Tsentral'nogo Kommiteta DOSAAF SSSR, "Predsedateliyam komitetov DOSAAF Coiozhykh i Avtonomnykh respublik, natsional'nykh oblastei i okrugov," February 8 1950, GARF f. 9552, op. 1, d. 159, l. 11-72.

country's youth for the causes of national defense and Soviet military preparedness, all under the guidance of Stalin and the Party leadership. Yet despite this rhetoric, among the hundreds of images of seemingly mobilized children created by DOSAAF from 1946 to 1953, seldom do boys and girls appear in the company of weapons.²⁵ Moreover, despite claims of "preparedness" for a conflict with the United States, the Party leadership heavily censored discussions of nuclear war and did not enact programs for nuclear civil defense. While American children in New York City were receiving dog tags and pamphlets on how to build a bomb shelter, Soviet children and their families appear to have had almost no official exposure to the nuclear question. Instead, images of Soviet children appear disciplined, fit and well-supervised at home while at the same time having no skills that might improve their chances of survival in the event of a war with the United States. This absence of nuclear preparedness training (or at least images of nuclear training) further reinforces the idea that the widespread mobilization of the young, which received significant attention throughout the late Stalinist period, did not actually reflect a tangible desire to mobilize children for war. On the contrary, they seem to reflect a desire to maintain social order, to avoid uncomfortable questions related to the arms race and the realities of a western nuclear attack, and to eschew any image that might be construed as projecting Soviet aggression abroad.

These images of children, rendered as both the beneficiaries of Stalin's care and as disciplined, non-militarized citizens, present a vision of how the Cold War was

²⁴ Nachal'nika upravleniia orgmassovoi raboty i propagandy Tsentral'nogo Kommiteta DOSAAF SSSR "Predsedateliam Respublikanskykh, Kraevykh, Oblastnykh Komitetov DOSAAF," GARF f. 9552, op. 1, d. 159, l. 17.

²⁵ DOSAAF literature was examined at GARF f. 9552. The newspapers examined included *Pravda*, *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, and *Pionerskaia Pravda*.

packaged by the Party and by Stalin for the general populace as well as international audiences. They promoted a vision of Stalin as the single most important factor in providing the Soviet people with a life that was comparatively better than what was experienced by populations in the West. They argued that the mobilization of the country's children for "defense and peace" against the United States did not entail military preparedness or the active promotion of communist movements abroad. In later years, Khrushchev would continue to argue that the Soviet Union had no desire to confront the United States militarily, also largely avoiding the issue of nuclear civil defense. These Stalinist depictions of protected and non-militarized youth were joined in the Khrushchev era by new images of children taking a far more active role in mobilizing for peace abroad.

KHRUSHCHEV, YOUTH, AND A NEW COLD WAR VISION

On June 26, 1960, the Soviet government marshaled the schools, the Pioneers, the Komsomol, and workers across the country to gather for the first annual "Day of Soviet Youth." On this, the anniversary of the famous International Festival of Peace and Friendship that had been held in Moscow three years earlier, writers and editors in the Russian press argued that this upcoming holiday was being held in order to honor the peace-loving children of the nation who were diligently pursuing a better and brighter life for themselves and their compatriots around the world.²⁶ "This day has been established," announced one radio reporter, "in commemoration of the huge service that our boys and girls give to their motherland. One generation, known for its faithful service to the

people, has handed the baton to the next. They will face the challenges ahead as fighters for peace.”²⁷ Throughout the day, adults gathered with children in parks, in stadiums, and on the streets—finally meeting, 100,000 strong, in Red Square, where they marched past the Lenin Mausoleum. “The Soviet children not only express their greetings, but are gladdened by their international peers, who study in the Soviet Union,” one Russian reporter announced over the radio.²⁸ Continuing, he described the young people around him on the streets of Moscow,

Our children devote their talent and their abilities to their work and their studies... [They] think about peace, about friendship, about the future. Every day, [they] convey (*prinocit*) proof of the vitality and rightness of the politics of the Soviet Union and its leadership in strengthening peace and friendship around the world.²⁹

Standing in Red Square as the evening sun began to wane, the Vietnamese delegate, Nguyen Van Ty, announced that the “boys and girls of Vietnam are happy that together with their Soviet friends they can struggle for peace and higher human ideals.”³⁰ The evening ended with a stirring speech from Khrushchev, who declared that “youth and peace are inseparable. We must have peace in order to work, to dare (*derzat*’), to love, and to dream.”³¹

²⁶ The holiday was being planned even before the 1957 festival had even happened. See “Khorosho Pdgotovimcia k Vstreche Druzei,” January 24 1956, RGASPI f. m3, op. 15, d. 2, l. 135.

²⁷ Glavnaia redaktsiia propagandy na zarubezhnye strany, radio show entitled, “Otdel zhizni SSSR,” report entitled, “Den’ Sovetskikh Molodezh’,” June 26 1960. GARF f.6903, op.23, d.7, l.2.

²⁸ Ibid, l. 65.

²⁹ Ibid, l. 68.

³⁰ Ibid, l. 67.

³¹ Ibid, l. 68.

At first glance, little about this holiday appears to be new. As events like Stalin's seventieth birthday party reveal, the Soviet leadership had constructed many similar performances over the past forty years.³² Yet in some probative ways, this celebration, like the larger international youth festival that had come before it, was markedly different from earlier Stalinist celebrations, not only in terms of how it presented the nation and its Cold War mission to its domestic and international audiences, but in how it depicted children as well. With dove-shaped pins on the lapels of their Pioneer ties, with the flags of the Soviet Union's favored countries flying in Red Square, and with no images of Stalin on display, these children represented a new way of conceptualizing the Cold War. They conveyed the message that it would no longer be sufficient for the population to mobilize at home without taking international action. They reinforced Khrushchev's argument that the nation's domestic development as well as its waging of the Cold War abroad would no longer be undertaken on Stalin's behalf. Instead, they promoted a revised imagining of the Cold War as a new crusade for cultural and economic supremacy over the West and for the promotion of national liberation movements around the world who were struggling against perceived American imperialism.

As a part of this larger re-envisioning of the Cold War for Soviet audiences, official images of children under Khrushchev assumed an array of both old and new

³² For an examination of the use of spectacle and the ritualization of space in early Soviet history, see Katerina Clark, *Petersburg: Crucible of Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995). Also see Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War*, Karen Petrone, *Life has Become More Joyous Comrades: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), James Von Geldern, *Bolshevik Festivals, 1917-1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). These works largely examine the Stalinist era, while my work looks at the Khrushchev period. As this chapter will show, the codification of images for the construction of legitimacy, while borrowing heavily from the Stalinist period, was nonetheless different in its renderings and in its intent.

traits. As in years before, educational, political, and sociological literature of the post-Stalinist period portrayed youth as physically and ideologically “fit,” with a commitment to non-aggression, a self-sacrificing love for the motherland, unflinching courage, modesty, purposefulness, and “heroism in work.”³³ Yet in this era of great change, the image of the child also took on new forms, representing a moderate but deliberate cultural transformation that presented the child as the recipient of Khrushchev’s turn toward increased consumer production, who was committed to creativity and personal responsibility in the individual towards work and education, actively embraced “peaceful competition with the West,” believed in the international promotion of Soviet-led “peace” abroad, consciously rejected the fraudulence of the Stalin regime.³⁴

These new images of Soviet children as well provided-for, hard-working, well educated, international activists played an important role in defining what Susan Reid has called “the visible face of Khrushchevism.”³⁵ Commenting on the power of the young to help re-imagine the nation and its international role in the world, the pedagogue M. Bozhig exclaimed in 1956, “It is no accident that children themselves are now our most important image of hope. It is no accident that in recent times in the Soviet Union so many have spoken about the young generation, which must carry on its shoulders the principal weight of the new struggle for the construction of communist society.”³⁶ Through the process of acquiring a new identity that had been built and fostered on the shared visions of Lenin and Khrushchev, the children, in Khrushchev’s words, would

³³ “Dokumenty XIV vsesoioznogo s’ezda VLKSM,” 1962, RGASPI f.m6, op.14, d.111, l.2-3.

³⁴ “Materialy otdela shkolnoi molodezhei TsK VLKSM k dokladu na XIV s’ezde VLKSM,” RGASPI f.m6, op. 14, d.115, l. 9.

³⁵ Reid, *Khrushchev in Wonderland: The Pioneer Palace in Moscow's Lenin Hills*, 1962, 9.

“manifest the new communist morals of the Soviet people.” They would “find their place in life, and combine their fate with the fate of the country.”³⁷

Khrushchev’s project of re-imagining Soviet society in 1956 was partially concerned with building up images that had been deemphasized during the Stalinist era and partially related to tearing down old tropes that were thought to be “inauthentic” or contrary to Lenin’s original vision for the country. One of the first images to disappear after 1956 was that of the happy youngster who felt gratitude to Stalin for his or her joyous childhood. In the place of works like those created by Vladimirsky and Valotina, the press consciously worked to produce depictions of Khrushchev standing amidst the nation’s children, participating in their lives in a manner that would seem more intimate and familiar than had been possible under the grandiose iconography of the late Stalinist period. Take, for instance, a photograph of Khrushchev that was reproduced in *Komsomol’skaia Pravda* on June 23, 1958 (see Illustration 1.4) In contrast to Valotina’s and Vladimirsky’s paintings, Khrushchev is surround both above and below by people. All of them are looking at the camera, not at the leader, who in previous years would have served as the point of reference for everyone else in the piece.

³⁶ RGASPI f.m1, op. 31, d.38, l.44.

³⁷ Nikita Khrushchev, “Vospitaniia Novogo Cheloveka – Bortsa i Stroitelia Kommunizma: k XIV s’ezdu VLKSM,” RGASPI f.m6, op.4, d.111, l.1.



Illustration 1.4: Khrushchev poses with officers of the Air Force and with young DOSAAF members.³⁸

Unlike in the Stalinist period, Khrushchev is not depicted in a particularly beautiful pose; he has a strange smirk upon his face and is in many ways overshadowed by the far more handsome officer to his left. Moreover, it is worth noting that this is a photograph, not a painting. It is rare to find photographs of Stalin that are not posed down to the last detail. Indeed, the Stalinist era is known for its legacy of falsifying photographs when the details did not fit state requirements. Yet in this picture of Khrushchev, it appears as though this shot required only one take; the youngsters in the foreground of the photo are not well ordered and instead give off a feeling of being comfortable and relatively unintimidated by their illustrious guest. One child even appears to be showing off, with his hands placed jauntily on his hips. Khrushchev, in

³⁸ *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, June 23 1958, 1.

contrast, looks uncomfortable, and, for lack of a better word, surprisingly common. These images of both Khrushchev and the children around him, which arguably defined Khrushchev's public persona, suggest a marked change from the Stalinist era in the figurative relationship between the leader and the population. Although images of popular indebtedness to the Party and to its General Secretary would remain in place until the mid-1980s, no longer would the leader be placed in the beatified space that had been the standard visual practice before 1956.

The visual and rhetorical rejection of Stalin's benevolent image and the tempering of depictions of the population's indebtedness to its leader were only a small part of a much larger re-imagining of the Soviet child in the late 1950s. Khrushchev, along with the press and large portions of the population also constructed a new image of Soviet children as individual, responsible workers who could provide a blueprint for the love of labor that had ostensibly deteriorated under Stalin's coercive rule. As discussed in the previous section, an integral component of the "High Stalinist Project" had been the idea that the Soviet people as a whole owed their comfort and their happiness to the gifts given to them by their leader. During the Stalinist period, the causal connection between the population's labor and its means of livelihood (the connection between the value generated by labor and the goods that can be purchased with that value) had been effectively severed. In its place had emerged the idea that the population's material existence was made possible from gifts generously given by Stalin himself.³⁹

³⁹ This is discussed in detail in Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War*.

In the years following 1956, many leaders in the Pioneers and the Komsomol expressed worry that the idea of personal indebtedness to Stalin had inculcated in the next generation a culture of meek compliance, conformity and “know-nothing-do-nothing-ism.”⁴⁰ For instance, in 1957, an article in *Molodaia Gvardiia* addressed the issues of independence and self-sufficiency that had ostensibly deteriorated under Stalin’s watch. “In the ranks,” the article argued, “the Pioneers and the school children sit under the petty guardianship of the teacher and the counselors (starshikh bozhatykh), and often do only the minimum work that is required of them.”⁴¹ Khrushchev would express his own opinion on the subject at the Fourteenth Komsomol Congress in 1962 when he stated that, “We must direct our attention to the development of young boys and girls, so that they do not become thoughtless drone workers, mere followers, passive observers, or simple well-wishers (*dobrozhelatel’em*) of communism, and instead become the right-flank of the army that is building a new society and is facing the challenges to come.”⁴²

In response to this seeming passivism among the young, children’s work campaigns sprang up across the country in 1956 and 1957. These included nation-wide programs to collect scrap metal, to clean up urban spaces and parks, and to gather newspaper subscriptions and monetary donations for a variety of domestic and international causes. In addition to calling upon the next generation to fulfill its duty as young communist workers, children and youth were also solicited to work in order to

⁴⁰ Rezoliutsii XX s’ezda KPSS, “Po Otchetnomu dokaldu Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS,” cited in *KPSS v resoliutsiakh i resheniakh s’ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK*. Moscow: Politizdat, 1983, 8. This is also cited in Melanie Ilic, Susan Reid, Lynne Attwood (eds), *Women in the Khrushchev Era* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

⁴¹ "Postanovlenie Vos'mogo Plenuma Tsk VLKSM." *Molodaia Gvardiia*, November 28 1957: 3-15.

⁴² “Vospitaniia Novogo Cheloveka – Bortsa i Stroitelia Kommunizma,” K XIV S’ezdu VLKSM, RGASPI f. m6, op. 14, d. 111, l. 33.

learn what one Komsomol leader called “the science of personal responsibility.”⁴³ As *Pionerskaia Pravda* put it in 1957 while discussing a recent project for the collection of scrap metal, “When *you* are older, maybe *you* will choose to work in a metal factory. When *you* collect scrap metal, *you* prepare *yourself* for the future.”⁴⁴ This appeal, which spoke not in abstract terms about the “youth of Russia” doing their duty for their nation, but instead to the individual child-reader, the “you,” offered a personal reward in the form of training and future employment to those who chose to participate. Statements like this represented a tentative, but nonetheless markedly new approach to envisioning the child worker not simply as a part of a larger collective fulfilling state quotas, but as an active, individual participant, pursuing a common goal for personal as well as communal reasons.

This new image of the individual worker, Khrushchev and the Party leadership believed, would provide proof that the Soviet Union was capable of competing economically with the United States, while at the same time motivating the domestic population to mobilize for the massive work campaigns that the Party had planned. As a Pioneer group from Pskov put it in its annual report to the CPSU in 1958, “In response to the directive of the party to catch up to and surpass the United States in the production of meat, butter and milk, we each commit ourselves to helping. We each hope to be an example for the country and for the world.”⁴⁵ Such declarations promoted an image of the

⁴³ “Tol’ko v trude vmeste s rabochimi,” S’ezd Komsomola May 17-21 1966. RGASPI f.m6, op.15, d.139. The emergence of the idea of independence and personal responsibility for work, as well as for one’s actions, is discussed in Elena Zubkova, *Obshchestvo i Reformy, 1945-1964* (Moscow: Moscow Izd., 1993), 67.

⁴⁴ *Pioneerskaia Pravda*, June 15 1957. Italics added by the author.

⁴⁵ Spravka dlia sovetskikh delegatsii, v’ezzhaishchikh chertoi deiatel’nosti pionerskoi organizatsii,” RGASPI f. m2, op. 1, d. 57, l. 4.

independent child, who was nonetheless committed to a shared goal, who hopefully would revitalize a country that was at risk of losing its love of labor. It is also worth noting that these highly-publicized projects were undertaken as much for international causes, like the construction of a Pioneer center in North Vietnam, as they were for domestic causes, like the construction of housing in Kazakhstan for the Virgin Lands project. As we will see in Chapter Five, visions of children working to provide aid to national liberation movements abroad were staples of Soviet foreign propaganda. They provided seemingly tangible proof that each citizen of the Soviet Union, unlike its American counterpart, felt a personal and voluntary obligation to help the less fortunate abroad. This message ultimately hinged upon the idea that these children were pursuing personal labor for personal reasons that were good for the world, good for the state, and good for the individual.

The initiative to re-invigorate the value of personal labor among the young subsequently influenced the world of Soviet education, where major overhauls in the national curriculum introduced vocational training and pedagogical reform into the school system. Teachers and politicians argued in the late 1950s that early training was required in order to teach a personal work ethic to the young. They contended that too many students were going to the universities without hope for future work, and that too few students were choosing practical careers that were needed for the nation's economic growth.⁴⁶ Using a vocabulary that would have been familiar to many contemporary educators and politicians in the United States, there arose among many party leaders and

⁴⁶ Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, *Lecture, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., Twentieth Congress* (Moscow: 1956), 95.

social experts a growing fear that the Soviet child was insufficiently prepared for the challenging future ahead. Khrushchev expressed these fears most clearly during his 1956 speech at the Twentieth Party Congress, when he angrily listed the shortcomings of the traditional Stalinist education and the national threat posed by poorly educated, poorly trained children. With his typical frankness, he accused the schools of failing to teach “life” and giving students “insufficient preparation toward practical work.”⁴⁷ What was apparent to many by 1956 was that certain core competencies were lacking in those who were entering university, high school, and even secondary school. Educators and sociologists increasingly argued that few students possessed modern technical knowledge and many appeared not to care about the project to revitalize the country economically. As the sociologist A. Alpatov wrote in 1958,

A one-sided education cannot in this stage of national development meet the needs of our society. Now the school has to fulfill the new tasks decided upon by the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party. Our children must develop a Communist attitude toward work, and the entire standard of education and upbringing in school must be elevated further.⁴⁸

Toward these ends, in January, 1957, the Communist Party and the Institute of Education initiated a 10-year secondary program which mandated that up to fifty percent of the daily curriculum be devoted to practical, hands-on instruction. Senior classes began spending a day each week in factories and school workshops. Nine months later, the

⁴⁷ N.I. Alpatov, Myaskovskaia, N.A., Spiryn, L.F., and Shagova, A.Y., *School Internat* (Moscow: Uchpedgiz, 1958), 3-50.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 217-23.

program was declared a success and it was announced in *Pravda* that it would be extended to encompass 13,000 schools and approximately two million students across the country.⁴⁹



Illustration 1.5: The caption reads “At the school desk.” Note how the child is depicted working simultaneously at his school and vocational work. This image could be interpreted as a vision of the ideal child, or it could be interpreted as a statement on how seemingly overloaded the young were with work, school, and service.⁵⁰

In addition, residential schools, called *Internats*, began to spring up throughout the urban centers of the country.⁵¹ Beginning in 1956 with 184 schools and 35,000 students, these boarding programs, which were founded on the idea that students should work as much as they should learn, spanned the first through tenth grades, sometimes including a creche or a kindergarten. Over the next six years, the government spent 61 million rubles on

⁴⁹ *Pravda*, October 15 1957.

⁵⁰ “Na Shkol’noi Skam’e,” *Krokodil*, December 10 1958, 4. The question of how children were being portrayed in order to make measured criticisms of the state is discussed in Chapter Four.

⁵¹ Khrushchev, *Lecture, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., Twentieth Congress*. Cited in Helen B. Redl, *Soviet Educators on Soviet Education* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

dormitories alone, housing and educating 2.5 million students by 1962.⁵² In these places where the “sprouts of Communism could grow,” these new programs were intended to serve as an example of how the state could raise new individuals to become what Evgenii Afanesenko, the Minister of Education, called “fighters and workers, active participants in the life of the community, potential builders, activists for peace, and citizens of a new Communist society.”⁵³ While many parents argued that such a program threatened to transform the schools into technical training centers, Afanasenko responded in an editorial in *Vechernaiia Moskva* in 1957 that the new program was “fundamentally aimed at a more resolute use of student youth in the national economy.” He argued that these youth were needed “in order to compete in the modern world” and to improve “their [own] welfare through individual labor.”⁵⁴

In addition to promoting a vision of Soviet youngsters as motivated and responsible workers, party leaders and educators also increasingly depicted children as creative thinkers capable of original thought. Many argued that the schools had, up to that point, inadequately fostered imagination and ingenuity among their students. This threat of a “one-sided education,” challenged not only the country’s economic development, they argued, but also the ongoing efforts of the state to imagine its children, and itself, as powerful, adaptable agents in the Cold War crusade. A country of dogmatically-educated

⁵² Alpatov, *School Internat*, 3-50, 217-23.

⁵³ E.I. and Kairov Afanasenko, I.A., *School Internats After Five Years* (Moscow: Izd-vo APN, 1961), 5-41.

⁵⁴ Afanasenko, E.I., *Vechernaya Moskva*, February 26 1957.

children presented a problematic image for a nation that was struggling to present itself as culturally and scientifically “forward” and “modern.”⁵⁵

In their search for the causes of this seeming deficiency in Soviet education in the late 1950s, educators and party officials argued that the tradition of rote learning under Stalin had hindered creative thought and invention among the young.⁵⁶ The historian, Boris Kagarlitsky, has argued that the Stalinist past, wrought with heavy controls and poor cultural production, left the country in a condition of real worry over the ability of the next generation to be forward thinking and culturally creative.⁵⁷ Pedagogical documents from the state archives support this contention, although it is important to remember that in the wake of the anti-Stalin campaign, insufficiencies in almost all fields, from biology to machinery to literature were blamed at least somewhat on the Stalinist past. “The remnants of bourgeois ideology,” which had traditionally served as the culprit for substandard performance and educational insufficiency throughout Soviet history, was replaced with “the remnants of Stalinism” as the corrupting force in national education. Not only did this tactic of blame provide an easy scapegoat for unsolved problems in the nation’s educational system, it also offered a means through which educators could express their support for reform and even, at times, use these new criticisms in order to enact significant changes.

⁵⁵ See, for instance, “Nekotorye Voprosy Vospitaniia Molodezhi,” K XIV s’ezdy VLKSM,” 1962. RGASPI, f.m6, op.14, d.111, l.50. F.F. Korolev, *Razvitie Osnovnikh Idei Sovetskoi Pedagogiki* (Moscow: Znanie, 1968).

⁵⁶ For more on this debate, see also Pechernikova, I.A. *Vospitanie Poslushaniia i Trudoliubii i Detei v Sem’e* (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1965), 7.

⁵⁷ Boris Kagarlitsky, *The Thinking Reed: Intellectuals and the Soviet State, 1917 to the Present*, Rev. ed. (London ; New York: Verso, 1989).

Arguments for the creative re-fashioning of Soviet education were stated most clearly by the well-known philosopher and writer, Lydia Novikova, who, in the wake of the Thaw, prescribed for the next generation a change in the methods of instruction that would not only allow for creative thought and expression, but would also foster the kind of imaginative thinking that was necessary for success in the modern sciences. She argued that due to many years of rote learning and heavy-handed indoctrination, schoolchildren were “exhibiting inadequacies in abstract thinking,” which prohibited them from mastering contemporary knowledge.⁵⁸ These inadequacies, she believed, were associated directly with a “poorly developed imagination and an underdeveloped ability to operate with symbols and symbolic descriptions.” “What will the country do,” she asked, “if every year we create highly-developed people that are all of the same type? Socialist society must be interested in original individuals capable of revolution in the spheres of science, technology, and the organization of production.” Not only would such a change satisfy the pressing need to produce smart, innovative scientists, she argued, it would also permit the “realization of a person’s individual potentialities.”⁵⁹ This recognition that Soviet children had new, cognitive and creative needs in effect justified the country’s departure from the traditional pedagogical methodologies that had been embraced under Stalin, and a revival of older approaches to teaching and learning that drew at least partially from the experimental projects of the 1920s. Novikova’s argument was quickly embraced by Khrushchev who took her conclusions one step further by declaring that educating the nation’s youngsters to be effective workers and creative

⁵⁸ Novikova, L.I. "Vospitanie Lichnosti v Kollektive." *Sovetskaia Pedagogika* 40, no. 3 (1967), 109-115.

thinkers in the sciences would create a generation capable of matching or even surpassing American technological development in agriculture, industry, and in the military. With these objectives in mind, he declared in 1957 that, “the current challenges faced by the Soviet Union place before the schools a new, great demand. School must commence with speedy and creative development of modern science and industry.”⁶⁰



Illustration 1.6: “V SSSR: V SShA” ⁶¹

⁵⁹ Ibid. See also her earlier work, L.I. Novikova, *Iskusstvo i Vospitaniia Novogo Cheloveka* (Moscow: Izdvo, 1964).

⁶⁰ N.S. Khrushchev, “Polozhenie TsK VLKSM,” February 19 1963. RGASPI f.m2, op.1, d.339, l.1.

⁶¹ The promise of Soviet education is contrasted with American schools in this poster from 1957. The top caption reads, “In the USSR: During the period 1951 to 1955 the

By 1963 the campaign to bring gifted children into advanced science programs was in full swing. While the majority of students were receiving increasing amounts of vocational training, legislation enacted in 1958 directed the most gifted students into university to study physics and mathematics.⁶² The Pioneer organization set up an All-Russia Physics and Mathematics Olympiad in that same year to provide development for children who showed real aptitude, and to help them decide on a specialty that appealed to them.⁶³ Meanwhile, educators and Pioneer leaders began to publish papers and articles that acknowledged the need to reach children at as young an age as possible. A directive sent out from the Central Committee of the Komsomol in February, 1963, for instance, instructed educators to only use toys in the classroom that were “collapsible, built from various elements, or built from many parts that allow the student to construct different systems and shapes in creative and individual ways.”⁶⁴ Through this approach, many child experts believed that the formation of a creative, even self-directed learning environment could contribute to the larger cause of building a generation of people who were capable of original invention.

Images of individual, hard-working, creative youth were also joined in the years following 1956 by a vision of Soviet youth visualized as active advocates for

number of rural and city schools will increase by approximately 70% when compared to the previous five year period.” The bottom caption reads, “In the USA, 1% of their budget is spent on education and 74% on military spending. There are more than 10 million illiterate children.” “V SSSR: V SShA,” RGASPI f.m6, op. 14, d.57, l. n/a.

⁶² Vyacheslav Yelyutin, "Adapting Higher Schools to Contemporary Demands," *School and Society* (Feb 14, 1959): 68. Khrushchev emphasized that society must “re-shape the system of higher education, draw it closer to production, and link it up with production directly.” Khrushchev, “Strengthening the Ties of the School with Life,” p. 3-4, 6-7, 11, 12, cited in George Z. F. Bereday, William Brickman and Gerald Read eds., *The Changing Soviet School* (Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press, 1960), 92.

⁶³ RGASPI f. m6, op.14, d.111, l.93.

⁶⁴ “Polozhenie TsK VLKSM,” February 19 1963. RGASPI f.m2, op.1, d.339, l.1.

international peace abroad. Across the country, in towns as well as cities like Moscow and Leningrad, children could be seen and heard in the press, the radio, and in official speeches working to support foreign children in the post-colonial world, often tying them together as future revolutionaries for the larger communist cause. Beginning in 1956 children can be seen collecting donations for the children of Hiroshima, writing letters to American politicians for the cause of nuclear disarmament, enrolling in Vietnamese language programs after school, and expressing their solidarity with children in Latin America, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe.



Illustration 1.7: Chinese, African, and presumably Indo-Chinese children can be seen standing with a benevolent “Mother Russia” (we can tell this by the insignia on her crown which is the symbol for “peace and friendship” that was created at the 1957 Youth Festival of Peace and Friendship). She holds a Russian child who is in turn holding a laurel branch – the international symbol of peace. This is taken from a pamphlet associated with the 1957 Festival.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ *Mezhdunarodnaia Festival' "Mir i Druzhiba,"* RGASPI f. m3, op. 15, d. 23, l. 3.

This was most evidenced in domestic children's radio broadcasts related to the plight of Vietnamese children and their need for Soviet support. One memorable broadcast was recorded at a session of the International Democratic Federation of Women in Salzburg, in 1956, when Thi Bun' Nyugen, a Soviet-sponsored South Vietnamese delegate gave a moving speech on the increased suffering of children in her home country. In her report to the delegation, Nguyen described the American bombing of schools and daycares by chemical weapons. "The children who had been burned by the chemical weapons cried, "Mama, I am so hot... mama, please help me!... But the dead mothers could not help them." After she had finished speaking, the Russian broadcaster who was narrating the speech to the children of the Soviet Union added, "And to all of us sitting in the room, it seemed as though those were our children who had been burned."⁶⁶ Broadcasters mixed these stories and exposes with the reading of letters from Vietnamese children, often *by* Vietnamese children who spoke Russian, in order to create a real sense that the two nations (Vietnam and the Soviet Union) were inextricably bound together.⁶⁷ In one letter read by Hang, a ten-year-old girl from Hanoi, the solidarity between the two nations' children was embedded in their shared membership in the Pioneer organization.

My dear friends, the Pioneers of Vietnam are very thankful for your help, for your support, for your brotherly aid in our struggle against the Americans, and for your rescue of our motherland (*spasenie nashei rodiny*). We know that the American imperialists have brought great unhappiness to our land. In the south and the north

⁶⁶ Gostelradio broadcast, June 25 1956. GARF f.6903, op.16, d.472, l.4-5.

⁶⁷ There was never a distinction made between the North and South Vietnamese in any Soviet propaganda – all were portrayed as being under attack from the United States and its puppet government.

of our country, they bomb the schools, hospitals, and daycares, even using chemical weapons to kill our friends and brothers in the south.⁶⁸

In addition, the Vietnamese child expressed how she was herself becoming revolutionized to fight the imperialist threat. American aggression would finally be answered, she argued, by the retaliation of a generation of oppressed children not only in Vietnam, but around the world and at home in the Soviet Union. “We Vietnamese Pioneers,” continued Hang, “will give all our strength in the struggle for the freedom of our country. We will help our parents and brothers and sisters in the battle against the aggressors, and we will be victorious.”⁶⁹ Keeping in mind that these were domestic broadcasts aimed specifically at Soviet citizens, we can see how the images of these beleaguered children, given solace by a concerned population of Soviet children, attempted to reinforce the Soviet argument that its foreign policy, not the United States’, was motivated by a desire for peace. This was a message that helped to form the image of the Soviet Cold War child as free from terror, hard working, well-educated, and committed to peace.

This image of the child as an advocate for international peace was accompanied at the beginning of the decade by a small but noticeable increase in portrayals of children as mobilized for conventional combat. In 1960, DOSAAF began re-introducing weapons training into its programs, and the Pioneers and Komsomol pledged to “raise war

⁶⁸ Gostelradio broadcast, June 25 1956. GARF f.6903, op.16, d.472, l.4-5.

⁶⁹ Gostelradio broadcast, June 10 1966. GARF f.6903, op.16, d.525, l.1-3.

preparedness, and to strengthen war discipline.”⁷⁰ This almost certainly came as a result of the rise in Cold War tensions in Germany and Latin America during these years. That said, it is important not to overstate this change, as Khrushchev and Brezhnev both embraced the image of the child as a symbol of peace activism far more than they did as a fighting force. This is supported by the fact that despite the build up of conventional training among the young, nuclear civil defense remained a taboo subject throughout the Cold War period. Although Malenkov, and later Khrushchev did eventually acknowledge the obvious threat that nuclear weapons posed to the communist world, they, as well as Brezhnev, were unwilling to present any image of the country that might make the outside world think that they condoned, or were even preparing for a nuclear confrontation. Although the reason why nuclear civil defense was ignored in official Soviet rhetoric throughout the Cold War is beyond the purview of this dissertation, these sources suggest that such debates would ultimately have gone against the prevailing image of Soviet society as peaceful and unconnected to the dirty business that was the arms race.

⁷⁰ “Raport po porucheniiu voinov PVO goroda Leningrada delegaty XV s’ezda VLKSM,” RGASPI, f. m6. op. 15, d. 70, l. 2.




Illustration 1.8: “Prepiatstviia na Marshrute.”⁷¹

Independent, creative, and peaceful - this revitalized envisioning of the Soviet child under Khrushchev served a number of Cold War purposes both domestically and internationally. It helped to conceptualize the Cold War for its audiences as a conflict that pitted a peace-loving Soviet Union against a United States that aggressively sought war. It contributed to the message that the struggle with the United States was both economic and cultural and that the Cold War required a refashioning of the individual to be a responsible, creative, volunteer citizen. It also strove to present a positive, almost reassuring picture of Soviet society for domestic audiences in the Cold War world.

ARTEK AND THE PIONEERS

The idealized image of the Cold War child was arguably best presented in stories and accounts surrounding the hugely popular Pioneer summer camp, Artek. Nestled on the banks of the Black Sea and heralded as the dream summer-spot for all Soviet children

⁷¹ Images like this one begin to reappear in DOSAAF and military literature on children in 1962, although the movement to teach conventional civil defense had started as early as 1960. A noticeable increase in these images can be seen in 1967 and 1968. Khitin, V. “Prepiatstviia na Marshrute,” *Voennye Znaniia*, July 1969, 2.

aged eight to fifteen, Artek, and the many camps like it, symbolized the future of the post-Stalinist ethos. It was a place where children could learn the value of hard work and creativity while living amidst nature under the careful supervision of the state. When Artek opened its doors to international visitors for the first time in the late 1950s, the camp became a public showcase for the Communist Party's avowed success in raising hard-working, well-educated children, and in its seeming commitment to promoting Soviet led peace around the world. Just as the image of the ideal Soviet child could be constructed for the purposes of packaging the Cold War to meet the state's needs, so too could the representation of an entire camp, with its participants, leaders, and even its buildings, establish the role of the Soviet Union in its struggle with the West.




Illustration 1.9: This picture from *Krokodil* presents a vision of young Pioneers heading off to camp. The caption at the top reads, “The Pioneer Line-up.” The caption at the bottom reads, “We are prepared to leave!” This is a play on the Pioneer motto, “We are Prepared.”⁷²

⁷² “Pionerskaia Lineika,” *Krokodil*, June 20 1961, 3.

Since its inception, Artek had stood as a model for the Soviet leadership in its search to create the ideal child. Founded in 1925, the first camp had accommodated eighty children with four buildings and a running track. By 1957, its yearly population totaled twenty-seven thousand. Its grounds covered an area of three square miles, consisted of 150 buildings, 3 medical barracks, a school, a film studio (Artefilm), three swimming pools, a sports stadium that sat 7,000, and numerous playgrounds.⁷³ Children swam, studied music and art, learned animal care, canoeing, archery, and in many ways had a camp experience that was not unlike those enjoyed by young people around the world.

One of Artek's main priorities was to reinforce an individual work ethic among the young. Artek children organized and participated in weekly and sometimes daily meetings with workers, collective farm workers, teachers, sailors, and young soldiers of the Crimea who were housed in local sanatoriums. There they learned many skills, including rudimentary training in driving a tractor (a relatively prestigious career) and the basics of sailing. On a daily basis, the camp was broken up into smaller cadres of eight-to-ten children, who then worked at the camp for small monetary recompense. This activity exhibited many of the most core beliefs of the Soviet system – that physical labor and hard work were vital in the construction of a well-rounded citizen, and that work had value, no matter what kind of work it was.⁷⁴ Yet, as in earlier examples, this activity also

⁷³ Artek was actually a group of ten smaller camps, each with its own name: "Lazurny", "Kiparisny", "Morskoi" etc. Four of the smaller camps, "Rechnoi", "Ozyorny", "Lesnoi" and "Polevoi") made up the "Pribrezhny" complex that was built in 1960-1964 by a group of architects lead by Anatoly Polyansky. They were awarded the USSR State Prize in architecture in 1967 for their work. RGASPI, f.m2, op.1, d.57, l.16.

⁷⁴ As Lenin stated, "All citizens are here transformed into hired employees of the state, which is made up of the armed workers... All that is required is that they should work equally, should regularly do their share

reflected the new work priorities that were beginning to emerge in Soviet society as a whole – the idea that individual work is worth individual pay and that satisfaction can be derived not only from a job well done, but also from the personal gain that it generates. In 1957, for instance, the secretary of the Komsomol argued for the continuation of the work-for-pay plan at Artek. “In the end,” he argued, “the child will see that earning ten to fifteen rubles is not easy. In this way we can show them how much their clothes cost, their bedding and other items.”⁷⁵ The notion that the population owed its material happiness to the gifts of the state, while certainly still in place, was nonetheless under revision as children were taught that personal gain could be derived from personal work.

Artek’s biggest contribution to the Cold War effort was in its promotion of the child’s image as an international activist for peace around the world.⁷⁶ In June 1958, five hundred children from Eastern Europe arrived by train for the first official international visit to the camp. During their visit, they took courses in science, nature, art, and a class called, “Learning about our Motherland.”⁷⁷ Like their Soviet counterparts, they slept in well-appointed barracks and awoke each morning to a flag-raising ceremony that placed the Soviet flag above their own national flag on the flagpole. The food ranged from sufficient to “delightful.” The days were filled with instruction in outdoor sports and

of the work, and should receive equal pay.” Vladimir Il’ich Lenin, *State and Revolution* (New York: International Publishers, 1932). Also see ———, *The Tasks of the Youth Leagues*, 4th rev. ed. (Moscow: Progress, 1968).

⁷⁵ “Sekretariu TsK VLKSM, RGASPI, f.m2, op.1, d.18, l.57.

⁷⁶ Documents found at the Komsomol / Pioneer archive (RGASPI) that were published in 1960 say that the camp became international in 1958. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia also makes this claim. I found documents in the archive dating to 1955, however, that describe the activities of international visitors from both Eastern and Western Europe. What is most likely is that while the camp was made officially international in 1958, it did have international visitors as early as 1955. I will reserve judgment, however, until further research can be done.

occasionally in history and current affairs, and the evenings consisted of sing-a-longs, talent shows, and movie nights.⁷⁸ International visitors and their adult chaperones were usually housed with Soviet youths and Pioneer leaders, who worked and played as one group.

By opening its doors to foreign campers, Artek and the Pioneer organization envisioned numerous benefits for the Soviet Union and its international image. The first and certainly most frequently stated reason was simply “to strengthen friendship between children of different countries.”⁷⁹ From the flying of various national flags to the constant international invitations that the camp issued to well-known personalities, Artek and its residents arguably made a sincere effort to welcome foreign children and to make them feel comfortable.⁸⁰ Former Pioneer and Komsomol leaders who attended Artek in these years argue to this day that the camp was a place of great happiness and excitement, where foreign children were welcomed openly and were provided with the best materials and teaching that the Soviet Union could offer. These are the claims made by the three women whom I interviewed in the winter of 2004 concerning their experiences at Artek. Two of them had been Pioneer leaders and Komsomol members at the time, and one of

⁷⁷ “Otchet sovetskoi delegatsii na mezhdunarodnom seminare “Destskie i iunesheskie dvizheniia,” v Brioccele,” June 16-21, 1958. RGASPI f.m2. op.1, d.58, l.5.

⁷⁸ RGASPI f.m2. op.1, d.58, l. 64.

⁷⁹ “Primery Polozhenie,” RGASPI f.m2, op. 78.

⁸⁰ Among its illustrious guests were Yuri Gagarin, Indira Gandhi, Urho Kekkonen, Nikita Khrushchev, Jawaharlal Nehru, Otto Schmidt, Lidia Skoblikova, Mikhail Tal, Valentina Tereshkova, and Lev Yashin. Perhaps Artek’s most famous visitor was Samantha Smith who, in 1983, wrote a letter to Andropov asking him to do what he could to stop the nuclear threat. Andropov responded by inviting Samantha and her parents to the Soviet Union to see for herself that it was a lovely, peaceful place. She was decorously received, with parades in Moscow and St. Petersburg and a visit to Artek, where she met children her age and posed for many photographs. American diplomats and policy-makers were furious at the propaganda windfall that Samantha’s visit provided, and Samantha and her parents were portrayed in the American press as Soviet dupes.

them was a camper. One of the women was a self-professed “child of the Thaw,” who contended during the interview that she was never a supporter of the Soviet regime and had only joined the Komsomol for career purposes. Yet despite her seeming antagonism toward the state, she nonetheless had only positive things to say about her experience as a camp counselor at Artek.⁸¹ “Culture nights” were often held at the camp, where visitors could exhibit the songs and dances from their home countries. Bulgarian visitors were evidently pleased during a visit in 1960 to find that the kitchen staff had prepared yogurt and Kebabcheta for dinner one night.⁸² Hundreds of “Thank You” letters can be found in the Pioneer archives expressing what appear to be sincere feelings of appreciation by visiting children towards the Soviet Union for allowing them to come to camp. The genuineness of these letters is of course, difficult to assess, as they were almost certainly solicited by their teachers and parents. That said, the preponderance of letters, combined with the general feelings of fondness that former campers continue to profess for the camp, do seem to substantiate the idea that the camp leadership, staff, and campers for the most part worked hard to make their visitors feel welcome. Regardless of the potential array of motives that may have ultimately lay behind the rhetoric of friendship that was generated by the Soviet leadership and press when speaking of these foreign visitors, it would be a mistake not to recognize the feelings of international brotherhood and excitement at the camp level that were often generated when these youngsters visited.

⁸¹ This is not to say that there were not problems at the camp or at any of its affiliates around the country. As we will see in Chapter Three, the Pioneer summer camps were also satirized during the Thaw for being too regimented and poorly managed.




Illustration 1.10: This picture from *Krokodil* depicts children of many races and nationalities playing while the Soviet satellite pushes away the nuclear cloud.⁸³

That said, one cannot ignore the fact that there were strong political reasons for the opening of Artek to the world. While the camp provided comfort, instruction, and arguably a lot of fun to the children of Europe, Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, it also garnered their public expressions of gratitude and indebtedness in the domestic and international press. This was evidenced in the visits of Polish, Czech, German, and Bulgarian children who in addition to arguing that they had enjoyed themselves at camp, also brought with them generous and constant promises of their nations' solidarity with the Soviet Union. In July, 1958, for instance, the Central Soviet

⁸² I am extrapolating here from an interview held with Marina Strikalova, who was a Pioneer leader at Artek in 1960. She did not know the name of the Bulgarian dish, but she described long, hot dog shaped sticks of mince meat. This was most likely the dish known as Kebabcheta.

⁸³ "Risunok Irzhi Kotorucheka po teme Emilia Gokola dlia "Krokodila" k Mezhdunarodnomu dniu zashchity deteia (syntax error in original)," *Krokodil*, May 30 1958.

of the Polish Pioneer Organization sent a letter with its young delegates. In it, the organization reiterated its loyalty to the Polish worker's party and its commitment to "educate the children in the spirit of socialism and internationalism, to not organize under religion, but instead to educate its members in the path of freedom and peace through persuasion and tolerance."⁸⁴ Likewise, Bulgarian delegates professed their "shared target – to educate the citizens of socialist society."⁸⁵ Unlike the letters written by children that often began with sentences like, "I had such a good time at camp! I really loved the swimming and the shows at night," the official letters, which were obviously written by adults, were political in nature.⁸⁶ They positioned the camp as a locus for political education and as an opportunity to exhibit their own official compliance with Soviet policy. They also substantiated the idea that the Soviet Union could provide the leadership needed to create "free" and "peaceful" children, not just in Russia proper, but abroad as well.

⁸⁴ "Otchet o komandirovke delegatsii tsentral'nogo soveta pionerskoi organizatsii imeni V.I. Lenina v soioz Khartserov Pol'shi." RGASPI f.m2, op.1, d.58, l.69.

⁸⁵ "Slovo predstavliaetsia rukovoditelei gruppi Bolgarskikh Pionerov Ivanu Iovchevu." RGASPI f.m2, op.1, d.58, l.82.

⁸⁶ "Pis'ma detei," RGASPI f.m2, op. 1. d. 59.



Illustration 1.11: Images of happy German children headed to Pioneer camp. On the train reads, “Always ready for the victory of socialism.”⁸⁷

Artek was also politically useful as a location where Soviet children could be publicly contrasted to children from capitalist countries. One camp leader, in his report to the Komsomol in 1957, described the “barbaric” behavior of capitalist children upon arriving at camp.

Literally not one of the children from the capitalist countries knew how to tie their tie or put on their clothes. Our children tried to teach them how to make their beds, but they were unable. Then one morning, when one foreign child ran out of the tent, forgetting as always, to make his bed, the Soviet Pioneers made his bed without a word. This action embarrassed the foreign children and their leaders, and they tried much harder to stop their poor behavior.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ “Pionier Express,” RGASPI f.m2, op. 1, d. 17, l. 69.

This letter, which was presented to an open session of the Komsomol at the end of the summer in 1957, painted a vivid picture of two very different kinds of children at the camp. On the one hand, there were the Pioneer youths who exhibited decorum, order, and responsibility. On the other hand, there were the Western children (nationality unspecified), who were not only disrespectful towards the camp and its generosity, but were more like apes or infants in their mental and physical ineptitude. In another report, a counselor recounted how Western children “absolutely were not trained in physical work and were untidy.” “Young women,” she claimed, “are only attracted to fashion, paint themselves with different rings and beads, while boys are only concerned with sports.”⁸⁹ In contrast to the Soviet child, western children appeared in these reports as oversexed and disorganized. We cannot know why the counselors chose to tell these particular stories of their foreign visitors before the open session of the Komsomol, or if these slights in decorum even happened at all (the fact that the nationalities of these foreign children are omitted leaves one skeptical). We do know that these particular leaders had been assigned to work with international visitors that summer, and that their mandate from the Komsomol had been to agitate (or propagandize) “not through words, but through actions and personal behavior.”⁹⁰ The first quote given above seems to exhibit this mandate, as the Soviet Pioneers silently chastise their foreign visitors for not cleaning up after themselves. Equally obvious is the fact that these leaders were participating in a much larger cultural practice of contrasting Soviet children with foreign youths as a way

⁸⁸ T.T. Koskinen, “Kharakteristika raboty s gruppami inostrannykh druzei po otriadam,” RGASPI f.m2, op.1, d.17, l.19.

⁸⁹ Ibid, l. 27.

⁹⁰ Ibid, l. 14.

to legitimate the Soviet system as a whole. Regardless of whether or not these events actually happened, the performance of constructing these children as emblems of socialist success and capitalist decay certainly did.

Artek was not only used to compare western children to their Russian counterparts, it was also envisioned as a place where capitalist children could be converted to supporting the socialist project. One Komsomol leader concluded in the summer of 1957 that campers, regardless of nationality, “within three to four days, all want very much to wear the Pioneer tie.”⁹¹ This was especially true, the leader argued, for visiting children from the post-colonial world who were perceived as being susceptible to American influence and at the same time open to the message that the Soviet Union supported their pursuit of peace and national liberation and was not concerned with racial difference like the United States was. Beginning in 1955, groups from Angola, Nigeria, and Uganda began arriving. In August 1960 a delegation of Guinean children became what one leader characterized as “deeply acquainted” with the experience of a working camp, with its traditions and its rituals. They took part in the mass ceremonies. They played and worked in the carpentry rooms, the libraries, and the “rooms of the heroes of Artek.”⁹² They also shared barracks with Soviet children, swam with them, and ate with them.

These visitors ultimately served important propaganda functions, as their presence in the camp articulated the Soviet official position on colonialism and race. Images of happy African children playing with Soviet youths were widely featured in the Soviet

⁹¹ “TsK VLKSM vnosit na rasмотрenie vopros o lagere “Artek.” RGASPI f.m2, op.1, d.17, l.13.

domestic and international media, and were usually accompanied by a discussion of the dire domestic situation in each respective country and the exploitation of post-colonial children by the capitalist world over many centuries. They also served as testaments to the ostensible absence of racism in the camp and in Russia as a whole. While organizations like the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Information Agency were struggling to counter the growing image of a racist America, the Soviet press continued to publish articles depicting Russia as the one nation that had given black, African children, a chance to play and enjoy western comforts without facing the possibility of racial assault. “Camp is full of color,” one young Pioneer was quoted saying in an international radio broadcast to Angola in 1961, “but race is one color we do not see.”⁹³ Artek ostensibly offered the youths of the under-developed world an opportunity to witness the benevolence of their Russian benefactor and to rethink their previous “incorrect” assumptions about communism and the Soviet Union. Thus, when a Pioneer counselor assigned to work with African visitors testified to the Pioneer and Komsomol panel in 1957 that “unbridled American propaganda hides the truth about the Soviet Union” she was nonetheless able to comfort the panel by showing that “after Artek, none of the campers wanted to return to Africa.”⁹⁴ While the intent of this statement certainly was to exhibit Artek’s success in winning the loyalties of these visitors, we must also remember that few children ever want to leave summer camp and that these visitors in particular may have felt love for Artek not for ideological reasons, but because the

⁹² Io. Kolotilov, “Spravka o prebyvanii v sovetskom soioze delegatsii pionerskikh rabotnikov Gvineiskoi respubliki,” RGASPI f.m2, op.1, d.155, l.46.

⁹³ “Radiosbornik “Sto Voprosov i Otvetov o Sovetskom Soioze,” March 16 1961, GARF f. 6903, op. 23, d. 43, l. 116.

facility and its staff offered safety and previously unknown material comforts. Regardless of these visitors' real reasons for enjoying the camp, for Soviet propagandists at least, these children stood as incontrovertible evidence of Soviet progress in a Cold War struggle where the battle lines were increasingly being drawn along a racial and colonial divide.

IMAGES OF THE “OTHER” CHILD

The descriptions that Komsomol and camp leaders gave of capitalist children at Artek were instances of a much larger discourse of “Otherness” that helped to identify Soviet youth as *not* American, *not* plagued by material want and poverty, *not* lost in an ideological vacuum, and *not* impoverished by violent, racist, bourgeois imperialism. By contrasting positive images of the lives of Soviet children and their allies with representations of the destitution of America's youth, domestic propagandists, party members, and educators engaged in a campaign to differentiate themselves from the West. While this program was certainly not new in the late 1950s, it did receive increasing attention in the Soviet domestic and international media as the 1960s dawned. The persistent portrayal of American children as either exploiters and racists or as victims of poverty and racial violence can be seen as a part of the Party's efforts to make life in the United States look relatively worse than life in the Soviet Union. It can also be viewed as a methodology for strengthening the dependance of the domestic population upon the state that ostensibly made their lives more livable.

⁹⁴ “Kharakteristika raboty s gruppami inostrannykh družei po otriadam,” RGASPI f.m2, op.1, d.17, l.19.

The official Soviet image of the capitalist child in the 1950s and 60s was based largely on historical perceptions dating back to the *Communist Manifesto*. To Marx and Engels, child labor, having emerged from the Industrial Revolution, was an integral part of the capitalist drive to exploit labor whenever possible. They contended that this exploitation had created generations of children who had no hope for the future and faced continued violence and destitution.⁹⁵ In the Soviet Union, in 1937, Sergei Ostriakov wrote that “in bourgeois society, the human being absorbs with the mother’s milk a consciousness that either you rob another, or he robs you; either you are the slave-owner or the slave.”⁹⁶ By the time Khrushchev took office, the image of the capitalist child had become an integral part of the larger Soviet Cold War effort to convince the nation and its neighbors that capitalism was detrimental to the well-being of the young. Labeling the children of the western world “The Lost Generation,” the Soviet press as well as the Komsomol, the Pioneers, and the Party leadership argued that the children of America were being raised in a way that would lead inevitably to a loss of interest in life, with, as one Komsomol leader put it in 1958, “existence seeming to them instead to be reactionary, dirty, base, and aimless.”⁹⁷ In stark contrast to idealized images of the Soviet child, a variety of groups and individuals both in the press and in official Party meetings described American children as having a hatred for work, an education focused on violence and militarization, with no belief in friendship, love, or the possibility of peace.

⁹⁵ Eric Edmonds, "Child Labor," in *Handbook of Development of Economics*, ed. T.P. Schultz and J. Strauss (Amsterdam, North-Holland: Elsevier Science, 2007), 3.

⁹⁶ Sergei Ostriakov, *Chto trebuet komsomol ot komsomol'tsa* (Moskva: Molodaia Gvardiia, 1937), 68.

⁹⁷ “Soobshchenie,” RGASPI f.m6, op.13, d.57, l.89.

One pamphlet released by the Komsomol in 1958 for national distribution depicted the children of America thusly:

They have no idealism, no target which would inspire them. They are indifferent to the future of their country, and nothing, aside from their own fates, interests them. Everyone is deeply bogged down in a quagmire of drunkenness, criminality, debauchery, and moral wildness (*odichanie*). Unrestrained, predatory exploitation, unemployment and lack of faith in their future, characterize the complete indifference of capitalist society towards the future of the young.⁹⁸

By painting a picture of American youth as aimless and disillusioned, the Komsomol simultaneously rendered them both as victims and as objects of scorn. These reports also articulated to the public the hedonism of American children, with their loud music and seemingly uninhibited behavior. Speaking of the American child, one Komsomol leader declared in 1958, during the Thirteenth Komsomol Congress that under the constant onslaught of western propaganda, the “process of disintegration and demoralization of the youth of capitalist countries and especially the U.S.A. is quickly spreading wider and deeper.”⁹⁹ This idea of western contagiousness and of the threat that it posed to Soviet youth would receive increasing attention in the 1960s, as it became clear that many Soviet youngsters were attracted to the image of American intemperance, and as the issue of domestic delinquency came to the fore.

⁹⁸ “Otchet ot dela propagandi i agitatsiei TsK VLKSM o rabote materialii k nemy, 1954-1958,” RGASPI f.m6, op.13, d.57, l.91.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

While these official campaigns focused on the ideological and material emptiness of white children in America, there also existed a completely separate body of literature and propaganda concerning the lives of African-American children.¹⁰⁰ In a discussion of the events in Little Rock in October, 1960, for instance, domestic broadcasters at *Gosteleradio*, the Soviet state radio service, phrased the conflict in terms of American hypocrisy towards its own citizens.

The dear uncles from the state departments of the United States appear very anxious about the fate of their black students and their preparations to hospitably open the doors of their institutions to them. They are convinced that the young black cannot find a more inviting place than America. Especially in the United States, they believe that the Negro can freely receive an education. But where in the United States can we really discover such celebrated freedom for the Negroes while still not forgetting the facts of the past few years? Last summer twenty-one Negro students were denied entrance into a school in Little Rock. This past fall two young Negro students were lynched. Not long ago the home of a Negro family in Chattanooga, Tennessee was burned down, while in the town of New Orleans, members of the school union decided that they would close the state school in order to stop integrated education between whites and blacks.¹⁰¹

Subsequent publications in *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* and *Izvestiia* further indicted the U.S. government and its continued violence against black children. One article entitled,

¹⁰⁰ This dissertation discusses the use of the image of the black child in Soviet international propaganda in Chapter Five.

¹⁰¹ A. Putko, October 14 1960, "Novaia provokatsiia gosdepartementa SShA," GARF f. 6903, op.23, d.10, l.200-202.

“Troops Advance against Children!” reported to its Soviet readers that national guardsmen were physically forcing African-American girls away from the high school in Little Rock.¹⁰² Another article claimed that the Ku Klux Klan was organizing a “savage hunt for Negro children because they plan to attend classes with white boys and girls.” Similarly, *Izvestiia* reported that black children were being barred from entering school, threatened with bayonets, and tear bombed.”¹⁰³ These attestations of white American barbarity in newspapers, journals, and radio broadcasts argued to their Soviet audiences that children in America were suffering, impoverished, and far from free.



Illustration 1.12 The Caption reads “School.”¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Article cited in Mary Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race, Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 121.

¹⁰³ *Izvestiia*, September 13 1957, 4.

¹⁰⁴ “Shkola,” *Krokodil*, September 30 1956, 16.



Illustrations 1.13 and 1.14: The image of the American child raised in the KKK contrasted with the Soviet child who, in the words of the Pioneer photo on the right, “makes friends with children of all countries of the world.”¹⁰⁵

The party, as well as the Soviet domestic press, did not fail to point out the dire international ramifications of such inhuman policies towards both white and black children in America. Because of their racist upbringings and their ideological vacuity, the press and the party argued that white children in the West were failing to receive the instruction necessary in order for them to serve as future emissaries of peace alongside Soviet youth. On May 22, 1961, for instance, the lives of two American children were highlighted in a broadcast to young Soviet listeners entitled, “Your young American contemporaries.” In his first exposé, the broadcaster chronicled the life of a white boy whose childhood was marked by disillusionment and apocalyptic resignation. Born from “a hopelessness and catatonic nuclear fear,” his life had begun with the “division of the

¹⁰⁵ The photo of the children in the KKK costumes appeared in *Krokodil*, November 1 1966, no. 32, 9. The illustration of the Pioneer children is from RGASPI f.m6, op. 14, d.57, l. n/a.

world into two hostile camps. From the newspapers of his country, from the screens of the cinema and the television, from the radio, in school and in his family they say, scream, and prophesy that his happy [life] will unavoidably perish (*pogibnet*)." But this was only the beginning, according to the broadcast. "What has been the effect of the Cold War on the children of the West?" the broadcaster asked. "How has the culture of materialism and emptiness led the children to accept the rhetoric of doom that surrounds them?" To answer these questions, the reporter turned to his second subject, a young girl who in his words "[was] no less cynical" than the boy who came before her. "But she is not angry at the world because she simply doesn't know it and she doesn't want to. In contrast to the heroines of other eras, she is attracted neither by the revolutionary struggle, nor great love, nor motherhood, nor the family hearth, nor art. She is constantly bored, bored until such time as she is distracted. She strives for nothing, she searches for nothing."¹⁰⁶ Note in this poetic language that the traits used to describe these children are similar to the traits used to describe problem children in larger rhetoric of the era. This broadcast almost certainly would have had a dual purpose: to create a sad image of American life and to prevent Soviet children from falling prey to such vices themselves.

Directionless and bereft of lofty sentiment, the children of America were portrayed as being alone in an aggressive world. The Soviet media from these years returned again and again to the image of the solitary American child who had been left to fend for him or herself with no help from the poorly organized and inherently corrupt youth organizations of America. Instead of providing needed direction, they argued that American youth organizations (seldom did they specify which youth organizations -

¹⁰⁶ "Tvoi molodoi amerikanskii svestnik," May 22 1961. GARF f.6903, op.16, d. 368, l. 1-3.

occasionally mentioning the Boy Scouts but otherwise leaving it ambiguous) “busied themselves with rock-n-roll” and with seemingly frivolous activities like “hunting butterflies and turtles,” but were unable or unwilling to address not only politics, “but the defense of the rights of the young.”¹⁰⁷ Because organizations were not state-sponsored, the Komsomol argued, they had no rights and received no attention from the government. Instead, children and students were portrayed as being forced to recite loyalty oaths in order to receive education.¹⁰⁸ These messages largely ignored the contentious debates happening at the time between the Komsomol and the Communist Party concerning the lack of power that many in the Komsomol felt in determining their own policies. Instead, the Soviet media presented an image of the Komsomol and Pioneer organizations as unified behind the larger Party. In contrast, they argued that American children had been abandoned by their government. Either they were heading down the low road toward criminality and debauchery or they had discovered the communist alternative and were seeking real change from within.

With all its wealth, America was also portrayed as having failed to provide the necessary physical care that children required. This was the message of a 1955 domestic broadcast on the anniversary of the International Day for the Defense of Youth, which reported to its young listeners on the quality of life that proletarian children faced each day. “You live in Soviet society,” the broadcast began, “where the government constantly worries about its children. Everyone here can study and become what they want to be. Right now it is summer and almost all Soviet children are vacationing either at the

¹⁰⁷ Pioneer groups did, in fact, also hunt turtles and butterflies. We can only assume that some distinction existed in the eyes of the Soviet press between the American and Soviet hunting of turtles and butterflies.

Pioneer camps, at children's sanatoriums, or at their dachas." In sharp contrast to this idyllic life, stood American children, whose parents were portrayed as being deeply impoverished. "My family is hungry," an American father, Dale Wanson, was reported saying. "My children are sick, but we cannot go to a doctor." Not only were American children presented as being unprotected from hunger and destitution, they were also depicted as being envious of the Soviet system and the lives its population enjoyed. The report continued: "Many children of capitalist countries know about the Soviet Union and dream about the life that you children lead. They strive to have a life similar to yours." Citing an interview that he had with a young American boy in Washington, the broadcaster reported that the boy only wished "to be the same as a Soviet boy – to be loved, to be smart, and to be healthy."¹⁰⁹ Such depictions of ideological and physical weaknesses on the part of the West distinguished the children of the Soviet Union as viable alternatives to the capitalist option.



Illustration 1.15: This *Krokodil* article from 1956 pictured a destitute American family and carried the sub-text, "I couldn't bring in enough money to pay the shopkeeper for the apartment, for the electricity, and to keep the children fed."¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ RGASPI f.m6, op.14, d.111, l.25. See this entire opis for such examples.

¹⁰⁹ "Peredacha dlia shkol'nikov, posviashchennaia Mezhdunarodnomu Dniu zashchity detei," May 31 1955. GARF f.6903, op.16, d.288, l.1-6.

¹¹⁰ N. Lisogorskogo, "Lishnii Rot," *Krokodil*, June 10 1956.

It was not just the American child, however, whose life was portrayed as being comparatively sadder and less fulfilling than that of Soviet youth. Komsomol leaders as well as domestic propagandists also focused their attention on the suffering of children in the less-developed parts of the world. Not by accident, the suffering countries that the domestic press highlighted were often the same countries in which the party had vested international interests. A broadcast on Chilean children in 1959, for instance, focused on their exploitation for labor at the hands of American-supported capitalists.¹¹¹ The inability of Cameroonian children to study their own history was the subject of a report held on the International Day of the Struggle against Colonial Regimes in 1958.¹¹² Similarly, a subject of steady concern was the lives of South Korean children who had been left abandoned and homeless in the aftermath of the Korean War. “Hard and joyless is the life of the young Koreans who find themselves under the yoke of the ROK. Two million people have become vagrants in the search for a morsel of bread. Approximately forty thousand homeless orphans have been left by parents who died from hunger.”¹¹³

These domestic broadcasts concerning the young of the post-colonial world not only depicted the children as victims of western exploitation, they also explored the volatile topic of the child warrior who was at times envisioned as having been given a gun by adults and forced to fight. For instance, in the same broadcast on the Korean War mentioned above, the reporter argued to his listeners that “with the support of the

¹¹¹ “Peredacha Antifashistkogo komiteta Sovetskoi Molodezhi,” July 1 1959. GARF f.6903, op.16, d.308, l.1.

¹¹² “Peredacha Antifashistkogo komiteta Sovetskoi Molodezhi,” February 12 1958. GARF f.6903, op.16, d.303, l.4-5.

¹¹³ *Ibid*, l.5.

American government, South Korean children find themselves under the constant threat of being mobilized into the ROK army. Those who do not wish to put on the uniform are heatedly pursued... with twenty-thousand, five-hundred and thirty-six young people being arrested for refusing to fight... some of them as young as seven.”¹¹⁴ While the question of whether or not seven-year-old children were actually mobilized into the South Korean army is beyond the scope of this dissertation, there can be no doubt that the image of the violent, “Third-World” child, forced into warfare by an exploitative capitalist empire, was vital in the Soviet campaign to demonize the West. At the same time, images of youngsters mobilized to fight for communist causes abroad proliferated in the Soviet media. During the Vietnam War in particular, reports on children fighting in the North Vietnamese army were compared to tales of Soviet youth rising up against their German invaders during the Second World War. In both cases, young heroes, pictured struggling against overwhelming assault, became icons of communist survival and resilience, driven by the heroic call to arms of Lenin and Ho Chi Minh, happily willing to sacrifice their small bodies for the sake of their nation’s future.

Depictions of ideologically vacuous, materialistic white American youth, besieged black children in the American South, and war-torn youngsters in the post-colonial world all worked in the Soviet media to contest the claims being made by American broadcasters and publishers that the United States was the defender of freedom and liberty at home and abroad. They also stood in stark contrast to the life that the Communist Party purported to offer its own people and particularly its children, who appeared to have been transformed in the post-Stalinist years into hardworking, creative,

¹¹⁴ Ibid, 1.5.

well-educated advocates for peaceful competition and the promotion of national liberation abroad.

NEW IMAGES: THE THREATENED CHILD

Beginning in the mid-1950s, the vision of the independent, hard-working, creative, and international activist-child was increasingly joined by another image of Soviet youth that would be the focus of much consternation and debate among Party officials, parents, and educators. Amidst rising evidence that the nation's youth were falling prey to delinquency, American music, and western dress, and that respect for authority was waning, members of the press, the Party, as well as parents and teachers argued that children as well as adolescents were at risk of "falling under the radar" and ultimately putting the nation's security at risk.¹¹⁵ In their search for the sources of this apparent decay in youth culture, they increasingly found that it was not possible to blame all these problems on the Stalinist inheritance alone. Instead, they argued that coddling and negligent parenting provided an explanation for the apparent deterioration of discipline among the nation's children—a conclusion that would be made at the same time by adults in the United States. The identification of these culprits ultimately opened the door for a new cadre of social and legal authorities to determine normative private behavior not just for children in the home, but for parents as well.¹¹⁶ They provided

¹¹⁵ "XIV s'ezd' VLKSM," 1962, RGASPI f.m6, op.14, d.115, l.78.

¹¹⁶ I am aware that parents were relying on the normative advice of experts well before the 1950s. For a good history of the efforts of child experts to help parents raise their children over the past century, see

justification for a state-led overhaul of the nation's child-services infrastructure, including new initiatives in the fields of pedagogy, sociology and psychology, and the re-definition of petty offenses as criminal hooligan acts – all focused on the welfare of the modern child and resulting in the increased intervention by social experts into the private lives of children and their families.¹¹⁷ As the Khrushchev era dawned, not only did the Communist Party and its supporters argue that a revitalized child was required to effectively face the West, they also contended that new levels of state intervention into domestic life were needed in order to combat troublesome social trends like delinquency and bourgeois behavior.

Rumors of rising hooliganism in the Soviet Union began to spread as early as September of 1953, when a group of teenagers occupied sections of the town of Lodz in Poland after hearing rumors that policemen had been beating students.¹¹⁸ By 1956, convictions for hooliganism in Russia had risen to 200,000 annually from their already-high number of 70,000 ten years earlier.¹¹⁹ This number would more than double in the following year, after the Council of Ministers and the CPSU Central Committee strengthened penalties for petty hooligan crimes.¹²⁰ By 1962, the reforms enacted by Khrushchev had created what Vladimir Kozlov has called the “Crisis of Liberal Communism,” where the loosening of censorship during the Thaw and rising

Svetlana Boym, *Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).

¹¹⁷ Brian LaPierre, "Making Hooliganism on a Mass-scale: The Campaign against Petty Hooliganism in the Soviet Union, 1956-1964," *Cahiers du Monde Russe* 47, no. 1-2 (2006), Boym, *Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia*.

¹¹⁸ Vladimir Kozlov, *Mass Uprisings in the USSR: Protest and Rebellion in the Post-Stalin Years* (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 144.

¹¹⁹ GARF, f. R-9401, op. 1, d. 4320, l. 48; f. R-8131, op. 32, d. 5602, l. 37-42. Cited in *Ibid.*, 138.

dissatisfaction with the pace of reforms led to mass uprisings of young people first in Krasnodar in January of 1961 and then famously in Novocherkassk in the summer of 1962.¹²¹

It was against the backdrop of that summer, when adolescents were quoted by informants as “cursing Khrushchev as a traitor to the cause of communism,” that the 1962 Komsomol Congress was held. As happened in major cities around the world in this decade, delegates from around the country gathered in Moscow to address what they perceived to be a delinquency crisis. Whereas anti-social behavior among the young had been a point of discussion at all the previous thirteen Komsomol Congresses, this one witnessed a seven-hundred percent increase in references to troubled youth from a decade earlier, not just by Party members, but by teachers and concerned parents as well.¹²² On the issue of children, one speaker after another reported that fewer Pioneers were showing interest in the Komsomol, while increasing numbers were joining street gangs that delighted in American music, dress, and language.¹²³ The impact of juvenile

¹²⁰ LaPierre, "Making Hooliganism on a Mass-scale: The Campaign against Petty Hooliganism in the Soviet Union, 1956-1964."

¹²¹ Kozlov, *Mass Uprisings in the USSR: Protest and Rebellion in the Post-Stalin Years*, 173.

¹²² For the Twelfth Komsomol Congress that took place from March 19-26 1954, see RGASPI f.m6, op. 12, d. 1, 40, 56, 57, 61, 62. For the Thirteenth Komsomol Congress from April 15-18 1958, see RGASPI f.m6, op. 13, d. 57, 59. For the Fourteenth Komsomol Congress from April 16-20 1962, see RGASPI f.m6, op.14, d.111, 115. Also worth looking at are the documents from the Fifteenth Congress from May 18-21 1966 at RGASPI f.m6, op.15, d.70, 139, 143, 147.

¹²³ There were two different kinds of gangs in this era. The *stiliagi* (also called *shtatniki*) consisted of young men who were mostly from affluent families of the new elite. They emerged in the last years of the Stalinist era and became a common fixture in the cities by the late 1950s. They defined themselves through the wearing of clothes that were initially borrowed from Western trends (although they certainly fashioned their own unique look), listening to jazz music, knowing all the latest dances, and being more committed to leisure than to work. Hooligans on the other hand, were criminal youths, who had a long history in Russian society. The term “hooligan” was first categorized in the 1924 RSFSR Criminal Code as a “crime against the individual.” It was defined as “the commission of mischievous acts, accompanied by explicit disrespect for society.” – “Ugolovnyi kodeks RSFSR.” (Moscow: RSFSR, 1924), 42. In 1937, it was re-categorized as a “crime against administrative order,” thus turning the act of hooliganism into an offense against the state

delinquency on the country's youngest children was one of the main focuses of these speeches, which claimed that unruly adolescents inhabiting the mean streets were capable of spreading their disorder into other parts of society. "Among the young people, the parasites constitute a negligible number, but the threat they pose is huge, especially for the youngest and most vulnerable of society" one speaker warned. Viewing the crisis as a problem that begins even before birth, this speaker (whose name is unknown) pictured this "parasitism" as a virus that infects the unborn child and then threatens to spread to others around it; "The parasites and spongers are created as fetuses.... like poisonous bacilli they take advantage of the unstable parts of our youth."¹²⁴

For adults like those who spoke at the Komsomol Congress in 1962, the threat of hooliganism to the country's children challenged national security not only because it endangered children themselves, but because it represented a weakness in the country's ability to manufacture a specific self image as capable of raising the next generation of citizens and warriors. As one distraught Komsomol leader announced, "If children, who maintain their spiritless disinterest towards the activities of school and the Pioneers do not take part, and instead disturb the rules of social order, they will become hooligans who threaten our nation and our battle with the capitalist world."¹²⁵ At least two educators at the Congress reported that between fifteen and thirty percent of youths between the ages of eight and eleven were showing dropping marks in most subjects.

instead of one against an individual. – "Ugolovnyi kodeks RSFSR." (Moscow: RSFSR, 1937), 44. Then in 1960, it was again redefined in the Criminal Code (article 206) as a crime against society (a crime against "social order"). – "Ugolovnyi kodeks RSFSR ." (Moscow: RSFSR, 1960), 76

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ "O rabote pionerskoi organizatsii na sovremennom etape kommunisticheskogo stroitel'stva." RGASPI f.m2, op.1, d.321, l.18. This is not the only instance where the state is blamed at least partially for the

“This will lead to delinquency if we do not stop it now,” one particularly concerned speaker commented.¹²⁶ For those in the Soviet Union who were aware of the rising juvenile delinquency rates in Europe and the United States, such statistics made these countries uncomfortable bed fellows to say the least.

In their search for the causes of hooliganism, Party officials and social experts looked to its beginnings in childhood, and in the process, began to point out what they perceived to be new problems in the Soviet home.¹²⁷ In particular, they looked to rising evidence of spoiling and neglectful parents who were failing to raise their sons and daughters to respect authority and to believe in Khrushchev’s vision for the future. These fears were born largely from an emerging belief in many social, political, and academic circles that a certain population of parents had developed bourgeois sensibilities in exchange for tacit acceptance of the communist system. Many social experts argued that Soviet parents had “softened” their children as a result of their desire to enjoy some creature comforts in the wake of the Great Patriotic War. Others contended that Khrushchev’s turn to consumer production and his increased emphasis on meeting the needs of the individual had led to selfishness and a failed sense of communal destiny among the young. To make matters worse, they argued, the modern family, where the problem youth were born and nurtured, had moved out of the communal apartments and into single-family homes where they could be closeted from public gaze.¹²⁸ These

emergence of hooliganism and criminality in the young. It appears in 1962 in documents related to the 14th Congress of the Komsomol.

¹²⁶ RGASPI. f.m6 op.15, d.139, l.10.

¹²⁷ T.S. Atarov, *Voprosy Polovogo Vospitaniia* (Moscow, 1959), l.5.

¹²⁸ Deborah Field, "Mothers and Fathers and the Problem of Selfishness in the Khrushchev Era," in *Women in the Khrushchev Era*, ed. Melanie Ilic, Susan Reid, Lynne Attwood (New York: Palgrave, 2004).

concerns over the “softness” of the next generation were duplicated not only in the United States in the 1950s and 60s, but in Europe as well, where for some at least, economic recovery implied social delinquency.

Many experts blamed the coddling mother and father for the seeming rise in delinquency. In 1959, the pedagogue and Pioneer leader Irina Petchernikova described the spoiling and pandering that she was witnessing among parents in the Soviet Union. Using a language that would have been familiar to American writers like Philip Wylie, who was famous for coining the term “momism” in 1942, Petchernikova argued that “some parents try to obtain the love of their children by catering senselessly to their whims, by forgiving everything and not demanding anything.” This kind of parental “love,” she contended, “can produce nothing but harm.” She warned that as a result of this indulgence, children would develop into “egotistical despots, accustomed to a life of idleness and loafing.”¹²⁹ Later Komsomol documents concurred with Petchernikova’s assessment, claiming that such “moods of dependency” (*nastroenie izhdivenstva*) among children led inevitably to a loss of desire to attend university or work, a failure to defend the nation and remain ideologically strong, and to the idea that life is “gifted – based entirely on the hard-earned money of their parents.”¹³⁰

Not only did spoiling parents produce lazy children, sociologists and party members contended, they also threatened to produce a generation that had no discipline and could not control their own impulses. This was the argument made by Tigran Atarov,

¹²⁹ Irina Alekseevna Pechernikova, *Pooshchrenie i Makazanie Detei v Sem'e* (Moscow: Uchpedgiz, 1959), 3-87.

¹³⁰ “Nekotorye Voprosy Vospitaniia Molodezhi.” RGASPI f.m6, op.14, d.111, l.41. Ehernburg wrote of the world around him, “I see communal apartments painted in gold, workshops in factories looking like

a sociologist and expert on sex education, who stated in 1959 in a widely disseminated Komsomol document that the tendency of parents to “satisfy their children’s wishes immediately,” had rendered children from a very young age incapable of controlling their sexual urges. In a fashion similar to other contemporary reports on hooliganism and parasitism, Atarov was forced to look not only to bourgeois influence, but also to rising consumerism and bad parents within the nation for the causes of the deviant conduct that he witnessed. “Since [these youths] never lived under a capitalist system,” he reasoned, “their undesirable behavior can only be explained by incorrect education and bad influences in the home and in the adult environment.”¹³¹ This assertion reflected a new-found willingness among sociologists, child experts, censors, and even party leaders to see the causes of delinquency as coming from home-grown weaknesses and inefficiencies. Similar concerns were expressed in the re-printing in 1962 of Nadezhda Krupskaja’s *Pis'ma Pioneram* (Letters to Pioneers). In his introduction to the book, Dmitri Mochalskov harkened to Krupskaja’s prosaic words for leadership and inspiration in tackling the issues facing modern Pioneers. Citing her letter “*Ne v brov', a v glaz'*” (loosely translated, “Get straight to the point”), he expressed his deep worries that in modern schools there did not exist “real, comradely attitudes between young men and women.”¹³² Instead, they appeared to “seek each other physically without concern for spiritual connections.” What is most surprising about Mochalskov’s otherwise standard

laboratories, Kolkhoz clubs resembling political mansions – a world of state properties, of tinsel trinkets inhabited by primitives or model children made of wax.” *Ogonek*, vol. 9 (1967): 27-31.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

¹³² Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaja, *Pis'ma Pioneram* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Detskoi Literatury, 1962), 5.

pedagogical introduction was the fact that he blamed bad parents for the wayward behavior that he saw in the young people around him.



Illustration 1.16: The caption from this *Krokodil* illustration reads, “Busy Hands... As soon as our Sasha has grown up, we are going to vote wholeheartedly for the reform of the school. This is a play on Khrushchev’s push to rebuild the schools, and the perceived damage that the country’s coddling parents were doing to that program.”¹³³

Just as destructive as spoiling parents, many child-experts argued in the early 1960s, were adults who chose to avoid their parenting responsibilities either because of drunkenness or general apathy. This problem was of particular concern to Soviet youth leaders, who, in the wake of World War II, were faced with a vast shortage of able-bodied men in the nation who were physically and emotionally capable of mentoring the next generation. For instance, in 1963, Stal' Anatol'evich Shmakov focused on the lack of

supervision and parenting that the young faced at home. “So many of our boys are developing without supervision or a father figure and, while they require care, love, and attention, what they need most is firmness, reasonable demands, and courage. The Pioneers of today are tomorrow’s adolescents who have a harder task to face while actively participating in new endeavors.”¹³⁴ Party newspapers like *Komsomolskaia Pravda* and *Pionerskaia Pravda*, as well as the satirical newspaper *Krokodil*, constantly highlighted children and teenagers being indulged or abused by over-protective mother hens and drunken violent fathers. In almost all of their articles, the suffering or delinquent child was a young boy who had either been transformed into a weak, feminized baby, or had been abandoned, made drunk, or beaten by a father who was often pictured in a uniform and sick with alcohol. Not only did the popular press portray the mother as refusing to allow her son to grow up because of her constant spoiling, but the father, regardless of his own suffering, was refusing to play his role as the shaper of the next generation. As a result, boys in particular were portrayed as either weak and sickly - reliant too much on the comforts of their mothers’ care, reluctant to work, and uninterested in the affairs of state, or they were, in the words of the sociologist, Liudmila Kovaleva, violent and chaotic – inhabiting the “sad streets that reverberate with the cries of hurt children, cursing, police whistles, and the sound of running feet.”¹³⁵

This emerging literature that increasingly blamed rising delinquency rates on negligent parenting ultimately helped to justify a new form of state intervention in the private sphere just at a time when de-Stalinization was expected to decrease state

¹³³ “Ruki Zaniaty,” *Krokodil*, December 20 1958, 5.

¹³⁴ Stal’ Anatolevich Shmakov, *Vnushit’ Detei* (Moscow: Pedagogika Izd-vo "Znanie", 1963), 39.

interference in everyday life. Because of Khrushchev's plan to revitalize the nation through mass participation, and because society's emerging disorder in the early 1960s seemed to have its roots in the home, Pioneer leaders, educators, as well as law makers concluded that increased governmental involvement would have to be pursued behind the closed doors of the *Khrushchevka* (the standardized single-family flat that was mass produced in the late 1950s).¹³⁶ State directives regarding the raising of children in the home increased dramatically beginning in the mid-1950s, as mothers and fathers became themselves criminals when they failed to provide the specific kind of upbringing that the nation needed in its children.¹³⁷ From far-reaching civil laws that criminalized petty crimes and domestic disturbances by re-defining them as hooligan acts, to parenting manuals giving instruction on how to provide an orderly personal space to one's child (even in the smallest apartment), to camping instructions on how fathers should test their sons by pushing them physically, to directions on how to talk about peer pressure with a

¹³⁵ Liudmila Kovaleva, *Otsi i Deti, Seriia 11* (Moscow: Pedagogika Izd-vo "Znanie", 1963), 3.

¹³⁶ Susan Reid, a historian of domestic and private space in the Khrushchev era, does a good job of describing how the standardization of architecture allowed for public control over the private individual and the way he or she lived his or her life. She states that modern faith in the "regulatory potential of housing" was not "the unique preserve of Soviet planners: the invasive role of architects and other specialists in defining people's everyday lives was part of the modernist project in general, which sought to shunt the messiness of people's lives into a hygienic, rational, manageable, and visible order." Susan E. Reid, "The Meaning of Home: "The Only Bit of the World You Can Have to Yourself", " in *Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia*, ed. Lewis Siegelbaum (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

¹³⁷ The punishment of bad parents as hooligans in the home became a phenomenon that was locally-enforced although not officially sanctioned in the Soviet Union in the Khrushchev era. See Brian LaPierre, "Private Matters or Public Crimes: The Emergence of Domestic Hooliganism in the Soviet Union, 1939-1966," in *Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia*, ed. Lewis Siegelbaum (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

budding adolescent, the state, and its various subsidiary organizations, sought to gain a foothold in the private home through the image of the threatened child.¹³⁸

The state's increased management of the nation's children and parents in the home was a part of what Russian historians Oleg Kharkhodin and Victor Buchli have called "a period of intense state and Party engagement with the terms of domestic life, one that was highly rationalized and disciplined."¹³⁹ Whether it concerned "voluntary" enlistment of citizens into housing committees and comrades' courts or instructions on appropriate fathering, the state sought to maintain its hold over the lives of its citizens and, in the words of Elizabeth Wilson, to pursue the "state organization of domestic life."¹⁴⁰ The American historian, Elaine Tyler May, has argued that public control over the domestic realm in the United States became a vital part of a collective effort in the 1950s to engage each and every citizen in the Cold War struggle.¹⁴¹ Recent examinations of Soviet life in the Khrushchev era have revealed how similar these two countries were in expressing the need for domestic order or "containment," as May put it, as an integral

¹³⁸ Ibid. Many historians have worked to show that parents and local groups of friends found ways to resist these efforts towards homogeneity. See Field, "Mothers and Fathers and the Problem of Selfishness in the Khrushchev Era." and Julaine Fürst, "Friends in Private, Friends in Public: The Phenomenon of the *Kompaniia* Among Soviet Youth in the 1950s and 1960s," in *Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia*, ed. Lewis Siegelbaum (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

¹³⁹ Victor Buchli, *An Archaeology of Socialism* (Oxford: Berg, 1999). As Kharkhodin points out, 'private' is an inexact term in Russian. It encompasses the ideas of *lichnoe* (the individual) and *chastnoe* (personal property). Kharkhodin suggests that it might be more accurate to focus on the collective and the individual instead, with the term *byt*, or "everyday life" in the place of the term "private." Kharkhodin, "Reveal and Dissimulate: A Genealogy of Private Life in Soviet Russia," in Jeff Weintraub and Krishan Kumar, ed., *Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 303-32, 33-63. See also, Oleg Kharkhodin, *The Collective and the Individual in Russia* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), 300.

¹⁴⁰ Elizabeth Wilson, *Women and the Welfare State* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1977), Susan E. Reid, "Women in the Home," in *Women in the Khrushchev Era*, ed. Melanie Ilic, Susan Reid, Lynne Attwood (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

¹⁴¹ May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*.

part of their Cold War mobilization.¹⁴² By issuing directives on previously private matters like how to decorate one's apartment or how to provide a study space for one's children, Party leaders, educators, and private citizens endeavored with uncertain success to impose normative behaviors upon a population that had increasingly become atomized and more difficult to monitor.¹⁴³ One question that the recent works of Kharkodin, Buchli, and Reid have not addressed, a question that May has made the focus of her work, is to what extent the Soviet state sought to lay claim to the management of the private home and its residents for reasons related to the pursuit of a domestic Cold War agenda. Most Russian historians have viewed the Soviet state's continuing efforts to normalize and monitor private life in the 1950s and 60s as a core element of state socialism – a trait endemic to the totalitarian model.¹⁴⁴ While this certainly serves as a partial explanation for the invasive domestic policies of the Khrushchev era, there can be little doubt that the push for “containment” at home also emerged as a popular response to perceived challenges and threats presented by the conflict with the United States.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has argued that the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 60s created new images of the Soviet child to meet the needs of the Cold War. Khrushchev and his

¹⁴² See collected articles in Lewis Siegelbaum, ed., *Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia* (New York: Palgrave Mcmillan, 2006). Ilic, *Women in the Khrushchev Era*. Buchli, *An Archaeology of Socialism*. Jeff Weintraub, ed., *Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

¹⁴³ Vladimir Shlapentokh, *Public and Private Life of the Soviet People: Changing Values in Post-Stalin Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 153-59.

¹⁴⁴ The 1991 *Philosophical Dictionary*, for instance, defines totalitarianism as “the socio-political system characterized by an all-embracing despotic interference of the state in all manifestations of life or the social

supporters portrayed the young as individualized, responsible workers who were capable of creative thought, and actively involved in the promotion of world peace. They also depicted the Soviet child as threatened by new internal risks that endangered national security. These images were vital in the state's pursuit of its Cold War objectives—objectives that included the enforcement of domestic stability and normative order, the establishment of the population's support for a variety of social and economic transformations, and the creation of a national self-image as strong, committed to a shared crusade for the promotion of peace, and far happier than the capitalist world.

Domestic images of the Soviet child bore striking resemblances to contemporary visions of youth being created in the United States. Like their western counterparts, the Soviet leadership identified domestic weaknesses like hooliganism, bad parenting, and substandard education as risks to national Cold War strength and security. As we will see in the next chapter, the two sides also shared an interest in projecting a new image of the next generation that symbolized the ideological and physical strength of the country for generations to come. Yet at the same time, there were also acute differences between Soviet and American depictions of children in official rhetoric. These differences reflected each side's opposing public conceptualizations of the Cold War. While the conflict was articulated as a crusade for peace in the Soviet Union, it became a struggle against invasion in the United States.

organism and the life of individuals.” Cited in Siegelbaum, ed., *Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia*, 2.

Chapter 2

Duck and Cover: The American Cold War Child and the Great Fear, 1945-1965

In the years following the Second World War, a number of U.S. representatives from across the political spectrum argued in their public rhetoric that the next generation was poised to enjoy a higher quality of life than any previously known. The same war that had demolished Europe had transformed the United States into a superpower of unprecedented strength and wealth. As Oscar R. Ewing, the Federal Security Administrator, reported to President Truman in October 1950, it had been “a year of hard-earned progress in most of the things that make life worth living.” The United States was functioning at “peak prosperity.”¹

America’s newfound affluence was best reflected in the image of the post-war child, whose face splashed across the country’s newspapers and magazines with unprecedented frequency. Boys and girls, who, like their parents, had been forced to economize in the days of war and rationing, could now be seen enjoying new toys and entertainment with increasing amounts of money put at their disposal.² Such affluence helped to create an idealized image of a wealthy and happy America, defined by the microcosm of the family and the child, whose parents could ensure the safety and

¹ “Letter from Oscar Ewing to President Truman,” 1950; WHCF: OF Reel 3, 0086; Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.

² For a history of the child’s experience in World War Two see Tuttle, *Daddy’s Gone to War: The Second World War in the Lives of America’s Children*, William Tuttle, “The Homefront Children’s Popular Culture,” in *Small Worlds*, ed. Elliott West and Paula Petrik (Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas Press, 1992).

comfort of the next generation. “Culture, cars, and kids—they are the symbols of the new American society,” the foreign correspondent William Attwood wrote in *Look Magazine* in 1955.³

Yet lurking just beneath these visions of comfort and wealth were other images of the American child that appeared threatened by a number of new and seemingly uncontrollable forces. Beginning in the late 1940s, many politicians, private individuals, and members of the press portrayed the country’s children as potential victims of atomic attack and communist ideological infiltration in their classrooms, textbooks, and homes. These depictions were quickly joined by visions of innocent youth seen as compromised by declining education standards and rising delinquency rates. For many in the U.S. government and in the private sector, these apparent crises with the young lay the country prone to external and internal attack.⁴

In response to these many perceived threats to America’s young, Republican and Democratic politicians and their constituents worked increasingly in the 1950s and 60s to construct a new model of the ideal American child that could meet the country’s Cold War needs. Arguing that children had a role to play in the ongoing struggle with the Soviet Union, they created a new vision of youth that, far from being innocent, was mobilized on an unprecedented level to defend the country against perceived communist aggression. As Ellsworth Augustus, the president of the Boy Scouts of America, put it in 1955, “Our children cannot be protected anymore from the threats they face around them

³ William Attwood, “A New Look at Americans,” *Look*, July 12 1955, 50.

⁴ Douglas Field, ed., *American Cold War Culture* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 6.

everyday...Preparedness is more important today than ever before.”⁵ At the forefront of the effort to rebuild the American child sat organizations like the Scouts and the YMCA. These groups created a new image of the ideal American youngster who was not just patriotic, physically fit, God-fearing, and respectful of authority, but was also well educated in the sciences, devoutly anti-communist, defensively mobilized for nuclear disaster, committed to capitalist humanitarianism, unperturbed by the eschatological significance of the atomic bomb, dedicated to the maintenance of domestic order, and capable of leading the world someday in the ongoing struggle to stop communist aggression.⁶

This chapter considers the rhetorical and visual construction of the American child during the 1950s and 60s. It examines what these images of threat and mobilization looked like and what functions they performed in defining a Cold War consensus for mainstream American society. The first two sections of this chapter will be familiar to readers who have read the current scholarship on the Red Scare and its impact on education and the space race.⁷ The congressional sources examined here are new, however, revealing the role that the child played in the state’s public conceptualization of the Cold War. The last section of this chapter analyzes the image of the Boy Scout as a

⁵ Press release from the 49th Annual Meeting of the National Council of the Boy Scouts of America, which was held at the Curran Theatre and Civic Auditorium, San Francisco, Calif., June 5 and 6 1959, Boy Scouts of America Archive, Irving, TX.

⁶ Bernard Wishy, *The Child and the Republic: The Dawn of Modern American Child Nurture* (Philadelphia: 1968), viii.

⁷ Stuart Foster, *Red Alert! Educators Confront the Red Scare in American Public Schools* (New York: P. Lang, 2000), Divine, *Blowing On the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960*, Paul Dickson, *Sputnik: The Shock of the Century* (New York: Walker Pub., 2001), Mathew Brzezinski, *Red Moon Rising: Sputnik and the Hidden Rivalries that Ignited the Space Race* (New York: Times Books, 2007), Peter Dow, *Schoolhouse Politics: Lessons from the Sputnik Era* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), Barbara Clowse, *Brainpower for the Cold War: The Sputnik Crisis and national Defense Education Act of*

new vision of idealized American youth. Such depictions of children helped to create a particular conceptual framework of the Cold War for American domestic audiences that was markedly different from the one being created in the Soviet Union. Politicians, propagandists, and private citizens used these images in order to portray the conflict not as an active crusade to topple communism or to promote an American-led peace around the world, but as a defensive response to perceived external and internal attack. These images helped to establish a generalized vision of the Soviet Union as a “hydra-headed super enemy” against whom the United States was all but compelled to react.⁸ They also worked to conceal the more aggressive elements of American Cold War foreign policy, and as in the Soviet Union, they helped to justify the state’s increased involvement in monitoring and supervising the private lives of America’s children and their families.

**“THE COMMIES ARE COMING! THE COMMIES ARE COMING!” THE COMMUNIST
MENACE AND THE AMERICAN CHILD**

At the Mid-century White House Conference on Children and Youth, held in Washington, D.C. on December 5, 1950, President Truman promised American parents that if they supported his foreign and domestic policies, their children would “live in the most peaceful times the world has ever seen. We cannot insulate our children from the uncertainties of the world in which we live or from the impact of the problems which confront us,” he admitted to parents, but with a “good home” and “a better understand[ing of] our democratic institutions,” he assured his audience that their

1958 (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1981), Andrew Hartman, *Education and the Cold War: The Battle for the American School* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

⁸ Engelhardt, *The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation*, 3.

children would be safe and happy in the years to come.⁹ Yet under this veneer of promised security for the young, new threats quickly arose from the rising specter of the Soviet Union. Many conservative American politicians argued in their speeches and publications that communists were in the process of making a heated appeal to America's youngest citizens for the purpose of promoting a communist conspiracy. While Soviet official rhetoric by this time had largely stopped conjuring images of Soviet youth threatened by capitalist infiltrators, in the United States, the communist menace took center stage.

Many of America's political leaders articulated a general sense of attack upon the young in their official rhetoric. J. Edgar Hoover, the self-appointed protector of American youth, reported to the Senate in 1959 that, "Today's youth are tomorrow's future. No one is more acutely aware of this fact than are the Communist conspirators—and no one is more eager to exploit them."¹⁰ Many other state leaders chimed in with the same message. Eugene Anderson, the former ambassador to Denmark, lamented at the Seventh Annual Convention of Americans for Democratic Action that "the fundamental threat to us all, and to our children, is and remains aggressive Soviet communism."¹¹ Likewise, in what was perhaps the most vitriolic articulation of generalized communist threat to the young to come from the U.S. government, Frederick Brown Harris, the chaplain for the Senate, warned his flock on March 1, 1954 that:

The hideous face of atheistic world communism at long last is unveiled for all who have eyes to see. It is the most monstrous mass of organized evil

⁹ "Conference on Children and Youth," *New York Times*, March 16 1950, 11.

¹⁰ J. Edgar Hoover, "Youth Communist Target," *Our Sunday Visitor*, January 18 1959, 1.

that history has known. It is the sum of all villainies. The idealist mask which, from the genesis of this deceptive revolution, covered its cruel sadistic countenance, now has been torn to shreds by heartless policies and designs upon humanity's most innocent and most helpless.¹²

For Hoover, Harris, and numerous others, innocent youth were posited as the most vulnerable of the community and as the primary targets for communist attack.

In the early 1950s and 60s, the most commonly cited locus for suspected communist infiltration among the country's children was in the schools. For instance, during the now famous 1952 trial, *Adler v. Board of Education* where eight suspected teachers sued the state for losing their jobs due to suspected communist affiliation, the presiding judges conjured an image of a victimized child, under-siege in the very place where sanctuary was supposed to be guaranteed, as justification for indicting the accused teachers. In writing the majority appellate decision for the case to the Court of Appeals of New York in 1952, Associate Justice Sherman Minton argued that, "A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in which they live. In this, the state has a vital concern." He, along with a majority of his colleagues, concluded that "New York has a legitimate police power to protect the schools from pollution."¹³ A decade later, the Republican representative Karl

¹¹ Eugene Anderson, "The Threat of Aggressive Communism," cited by Hubert Humphrey (MO), *Congressional Record* (April 15 1954) p. A2861.

¹² Frederick Brown Harris, "The Truce of the Bear," cited by Matthew Neely (WV), *Congressional Record* (March 1 1954) p. 2390. This language can be found throughout the press and in speeches made by politicians. See Constantine Brown, "Communist Subversion of Youth," *The Evening Star*, July 26 1960, Valerie McNees, "Communism Needs You," cited in the *Congressional Record* (January 16 1961) p. 76.

¹³ Justice Sherman Minton, *Alder v. Board of Education of City of New York*, 342 US 485 (1952).

Mundt argued that communists were “openly teaching subversion in the United States.”¹⁴ Such accusations, which were leveled by Hoover, by the Judiciary, and by the Senate, portrayed accused teachers as predators of children, and attempted to cast them as a source of threat and danger for the country.



Illustration 2.1: An educational comic from the Department of Education presents an image of communist instruction in America’s schools. It reflects an assumption that Soviet education promised happiness, which was projected to be a particularly dangerous promise to make.¹⁵

Following the lead set by Congress, private organizations also portrayed American youth as threatened by subversive teachers. Throughout the 1950s and 60s, the American Textbooks Publishers Institute warned parents to be on the watch for “whisperings that your child’s textbooks are subversive.”¹⁶ Similarly, a number of conservative activists, namely Lucille Cardin Crain, who issued the newsletter *The*

¹⁴ Karl Mundt, “America’s Little Red Schoolhouse,” *Mechanix Illustrated*, March 1964. Reprinted in the *Congressional Record* (March 2 1964) p.4089.

¹⁵ *Teach on Communism* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Education), 1954, 3.

Educational Reviewer, and Allen Zoll, who was a prolific pamphleteer and the head of the National Council for American Education, took it as their mandate to weed out “subversive” material from public school textbooks and to take aim at progressive education in the United States. Zoll’s popular pamphlets carried titles like “The Commies are After Your Kids,” and “Progressive Education Increases Juvenile Delinquency.” Craine and Zoll actively campaigned against texts like Frank Magruder’s *American Government*, which they argued promoted communism by supporting the United Nations Charter and by stating that the U.S. Postal Service was an example of a working socialist system. Such groups were consistently successful in impeding the distribution of so-called “subversive” books across the country, including works by Mark Twain, Bertrand Russell, and George Bernard Shaw. They undertook these crusades in order to ensure, in Craine’s words, that the “historical narrative presented to the child” not only complied with the country’s larger views on communism, but also helped to create for its youth an “ideological base that could withstand Soviet influence.”¹⁷

Of course, not everyone in the U.S. government and in the American public condoned these tactics. Those who disagreed with the likes of Hoover, McCarthy, and Zoll argued that the current “witch hunt” bore a striking resemblance to the Soviet police state. In William Douglas’ 1952 dissent to the Feinberg Law, for instance, he argued in his usual pithy manner that “the law inevitably turns the school system into a spying project. The principals become detectives; the students, the parents, the community become informers...What happens under this law,” he continued, “is typical of what

¹⁶ *The Current Magazine for Youth*, January 15 1953, cited in Albert Kahn, *The Game of Death: Effects of the Cold War on our Children* (New York: Cameron & Kahn, 1953), 78.

happens in a police state: their pasts are combed for signs of disloyalty; their utterances are watched for clues to dangerous thoughts.”¹⁸ He warned that such a school system would produce “students trained as robots.” The same argument was made by a select group of congressmen and senators, led by William Fulbright, who told his colleagues on the Senate floor in April 1953 that “with the growth of fear of free discussion in the schools, I am not at all sure but that we grow progressively more ignorant and blind as to our real situation in the world.”¹⁹ Such arguments presented an alternative image of the child and an alternative way of viewing the dangers of the Cold War. They made the argument that the very hunt for communists was itself a danger to the welfare of the next generation, and they provided a platform on which these politicians could distance themselves from their more conservative colleagues. Although many citizens in the United States agreed with Fulbright and his compatriots, the record shows that at least until the mid-1960s, such voices were largely drowned out by a majority in the Senate and the House who regularly voted for measures intended to increase the state’s monitoring of communist influence on the young.

Children were also envisioned in American popular rhetoric as endangered by communism outside the school. Leftist parents, the most famous being Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, were portrayed in governmental rhetoric as child abusers who willingly sacrificed their children’s safety and welfare for the communist cause. In an approach

¹⁷ *The Educational Reviewer*, Vol. 4:2, 13. Lucille Cardin Crain Papers, Box 61, Folder 10, University of Oregon Libraries.

¹⁸ Justice William Douglas, *Alder v. Board of Education of City of New York*, 342 US 485 (1952).

¹⁹ Fulbright speaking during a fourteen hour filibuster against the Holland joint resolution to table the Hill Amendment, *Congressional Record*, (April 21 1953) p.34. Other senators and representatives who joined him included Vera Buchanan from Pennsylvania, Hugh Addonizio and Frank Thompson from New Jersey, Albert Gore from Tennessee, Herbert Lehman from New York, and Paul Douglas from Illinois.

similar to that taken by the Soviet Union, American politicians and propagandists created a terrifying vision of Soviet childhood under communist parenting and state management. This was the image created for instance, in a widely-published article by the Russian émigré, Nina I. Alexeiev, whose testimony on living conditions in Russia was published in *Liberty Magazine* on June 7 1947, was later picked up by the Associated Press, and then republished in numerous sources including *Reader's Digest* and the Congressional Record throughout the 1950s.²⁰ Bearing the title, “I Don’t Want my Children to Grow up in Soviet Russia,” the article told the story of how Alexeiev and her family had refused to go back to Russia after serving out their term as commercial attachés to Mexico. The front page carried a photograph of a small blonde child smiling as she shook hands with her Soviet teacher (Illustration 2.2). In the background, a banner read in Russian, “Welcome New Students.” Beneath this happy image, Alexeiev painted a rhetorical picture of her children’s lives that seemed to contradict the happiness portrayed in the front page photo. In describing living conditions in Russia, she stated that as a young person, she had seen “how forcible collectivization wrecked family life and turned innocent children in once fat and smiling villages into homeless beggars.”

Hundreds of thousands of “wild children” – dirt crusted urchins in shredded rags, most of them diseased and depraved – roamed the land, begging, robbing, dying like flies... In the years that followed, I could never accept the propaganda about the “happy Stalinist life” while all

²⁰ Nina Alexeiev, “I Don’t Want my Children to Grow Up Communists,” *Liberty*, June 7 1947, 18 and *Reader's Digest*, June 1947, 11. Perhaps not surprisingly, when *Reader's Digest* reproduced the article they took out the picture of the smiling child and replaced it with an illustration of a scared baby’s head hovering over the Kremlin skyline.

around me I saw half-starved children, their minds and souls maimed by abnormal conditions.²¹

Alexeiev then described the way in which the young of the Soviet Union had ostensibly been implanted “almost from babyhood” with contempt for their own parents. After recalling an incident where a “hoodlum” turned his parents in to state authorities for hiding religious icons, she asked, “What if my own children had been infected with that kind of “vigilance?”²² Her question appeared also to be asking American parents what they would do if such “vigilance” was taught to their children.



Illustration 2.2 Nina Alexeiev, “I Don’t Want my Children to Grow up in Soviet Russia”²³

Central to the fear surrounding Alexeiev’s missive was the commonly cited threat of children being “snatched away” from their parents by the state. Further into the article,

²¹ Nina Alexeiev, “I Don’t Want my Children to Grow Up Communists,” *Liberty*, June 7 1947, 18.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

Alexeiev recalled the “annual mobilization of children from [the age of] twelve [and] up. Millions of boys and girls have been torn from their families and apprenticed as miners or factory hands... In these little slaves, each of us saw our own children.” Alexeiev concluded that “as a mother,” she would not be able to “subdue [her children’s] natural instincts for truth and beauty in order to fit them into the police state.”²⁴ Alexeiev’s words seemed to encapsulate both the physical and psychological threat that communism apparently held for everyone, both inside and outside the Soviet Union. When we re-examine the photograph of the smiling child at the beginning of the article, we are left to wonder if we are seeing a vision of joy at the first day of school or an example of state coercion. In contrast to Soviet-produced images of mothers, who were frequently pictured as grateful to the state for the amenities provided to their children, this article produced a vision of Russian women rendered incapable of defending their own young from Soviet perfidy.

These many expressions of predation reveal the extent to which the perceived danger of communism was enmeshed in a vocabulary of disease, as the epidemiology of one reflected the fears of the other.²⁵ Recall, for instance, Alexeiev’s words in worrying that her children might become “infected” by Soviet “vigilance.” Similarly, Howard McGrath, who served as attorney general from 1949 to 1952, was known for his remarks

²⁴ Ibid. Referenced also in Michael Barson, *Red Scared! The Commie Menace in Propaganda and Popular Culture* (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2001).

²⁵ Jacqueline Foertsch, "A Battle of Silence: Women's Magazines and the Polio Crisis in Post-war UK and USA," in *American Cold War Culture*, ed. Douglas Field (2005). See also Francis Beer, "The Epidemiology of Peace and War," *International Studies Quarterly* 23 (1979), David Ogden, "Cold War Science and the Body Politic: An Immuno/Virological Approach," *Literature and Medicine* (2000), Foertsch, "A Battle of Silence: Women's Magazines and the Polio Crisis in Post-war UK and USA.", Robert Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001), G. Lakoff, "Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf," *Peace Research* 23 (1991), N.

concerning the “plague of communism” upon American society. Each communist member, he remarked in a 1950 speech to members of Congress, “carries in himself the germ of death for our society.”²⁶ According to Hubert Humphrey, the Communist Party represented “a political cancer in our society” that threatened to “grow unseen until it was too late to stop it.”²⁷ Likewise, to Adlai Stevenson, communism was “worse than cancer, tuberculosis, and heart disease combined.”²⁸ One disease threatened the physical body while another menaced the body politic.

Articulations of the communist threat shared a particular affinity with popular rhetoric on the equally frightening menace of childhood polio. Both threats manifested initially in innocuous ways; polio could look like a simple cold, while communism might be spread through seemingly innocent petitions and causes. Both “diseases” could be anywhere, a danger unseen and undetectable. Moreover, both crises received incredible amounts of public attention and were prone to panic, with the tempered voices of experts like Dr. Spock (who reminded his readers of the statistical unlikelihood of their children contracting polio), and Edward R. Murrow (who rejected the Red Scare) often being drowned out by sensationalist headlines. Finally, in seeming to attack anyone, regardless of class or status, both of these “diseases,” in the words of David Oshinsky, “mocked the

Alcock, *The War Disease* (Oakville: CPRI Press, 1972), Keith L. Shimko, "Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decision Making," *Political Psychology* 15, no. 4 (1994).

²⁶ Howard McGrath (RI), speech before Congress, *Congressional Record* (April 19 1950) p.130.

²⁷ Hoover, testimony HUAC, March 26 1947, cited in Ellen Schrecker, *The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2002).; Hubert H. Humphrey statement “Hearings before a Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on Communist Domination of Unions and National Security,” *Congressional Record* (March 17 1952) p.75.

²⁸ Cited in Ellen Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), 144.

dreams of middle-class culture.”²⁹ As Barbara Holland put it in her autobiography, communism “was more dangerous than Hitler because it was invisible, and everywhere, like polio. Your next-door neighbor might be pretending to be an ordinary person, with kids and a lawn-mower, when he was really a Communist in disguise, and simply living next door to him might infect you, invisibly.”³⁰

The construction of the American child as a victim of communist attack was central in the public articulation of what David Caute labeled in 1978, “The Great Fear”—a term originally used to describe the ransacking of the French countryside by peasants in the summer of 1789, but in recent decades a term that also encompasses the Red Scare that touched so many aspects of life in 1950s America.³¹ Without question, the vision of American homes and schools under attack helped to build personal careers, from Hoover to McCarthy to Zoll. But these images of impending assault upon the young arguably performed a larger function than simply enabling the accumulation of personal power and the justification of conservative policies. They also attempted to establish in the minds of the American public an image of the United States as a non-aggressor country that was under siege by an unstoppable menace. These images established what would become a national mandate to defend the country, its children, and its friends from the perceived deceptions of world communism.

²⁹ David Oshinsky, *Polio: An American Story* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 69-72, 161-64.

³⁰ Barbara Holland, *When All the World Was Young: A Memoir* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2005), 212. Arlene Skolnick, *Embattled Paradise: The American Family in an Age of Uncertainty* (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 66-7, 71-72.

³¹ Caute, *The Great Fear*.

THREATS FROM WITHIN

Joining the threat of communist ideological attack on the nation's young was a growing fear in the 1950s and 60s that America's children were receiving poor educations, bad parenting, and were at risk of falling into delinquency. Educational reports from across the country revealed disturbing statistics on the decline in American learning standards and the proportional rise in Soviet scholastic levels. Added to this was the fear that permissive parents were failing to raise their children to be patriotic and strong, that wealthy suburban children were becoming lazy and decadent, and that inner city youth were adopting dangerous criminal behaviors. All of these fears surrounding America's children reflected, for many, a dangerous weakness in the country's projected ability to fight communism in the future. As happened in the Soviet Union, America's gaze turned inward, increasingly viewing its troubled children in Cold War terms.

In the first few months of 1950, Dwight Eisenhower, then president of Columbia University, sent out feelers to a group of prominent professors and economists in the country with a plan to examine the causes of the poor education levels and "manpower wastage" that he had witnessed on the European front during World War Two.³² Working with a \$100,000 per annum budget, the group of researchers set out on a five-year project to determine why five million draftees had been turned away from service because of "physical, moral, emotional, or mental deficiencies." Their conclusions, which were printed in every major newspaper in the country in 1954, and were read aloud on the floor of Congress, sent a shockwave around the country that would not abate for two

decades. The study reported that twelve percent of males in the United States had less than five years of schooling at the time of the war. The American South, in particular, appeared to be significantly behind western standards. The report then declared that Russia had “apparently made substantial strides within its borders in eradicating illiteracy.”³³

Largely in response to Eisenhower’s Commission, a cadre of activist politicians, led by William Fulbright and Lister Hill of Alabama, began to lobby for the allocation of federal money “exclusively for the purpose of promoting the national defense and national security through aid to education.”³⁴ In what would amount to a fourteen-hour argue for the Hill Amendment, which was intended to allocate more federal money to public education, Fulbright remarked to his colleagues in July of 1954 that the nation was spending twice as much on “liquor, race-horse betting and cosmetics” than it was on schools.³⁵ Meanwhile, Earle Clements, the Democratic whip from Kentucky, would point out to his colleagues in 1954 that students were “attending school on split shifts” in “hallways, basements, makeshift, and often unsafe and unsanitary buildings.”³⁶

These expressed anxieties over illiteracy and overcrowding were simply preambles to the education crisis that began in earnest in 1955. In January of that year, Donald Quarles, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, published an article in *Planes*

³² Kalman Seigel, “Two and One-Half Million Illiterates in United States Held Undermining Defense and Economy,” *New York Times*, March 21 1953. Also see “Eight Million Illiterates in United States are Deployed,” *Washington Post*, July 1 1954.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Congressional Record* (March 1 1954) p. 2426.

³⁵ *Congressional Record* (July 6 1955) p. 4567. Similar points were made by J. Lister Hill when arguing for the oil-for-education program in 1953.

³⁶ Earle Clements, “Federal Assistance for School Construction,” *Congressional Record* (August 20 1954) 15392.

magazine arguing that the United States was encountering a “critical shortage of engineers” that was “potentially a greater threat to national security than are any weapons known to be in the arsenals of aggressor states.”³⁷ Allen Dulles, the CIA director, quickly picked up this issue, pointing out during his honorary PhD acceptance speech at Columbia University that in ten years, “the Soviets would graduate 1.2 million scientists and engineers, compared to 900,000 in the United States.”³⁸ As “T. John” Lesinski, the Democratic congressman from Michigan, put it in a speech on the floor of congress in February 1955, “We ought to know by now that nothing is accomplished by sacrificing the future of our children on the altar of our shortcomings.”³⁹ These men all presented the American child as a victim of illiteracy and overcrowding, phrasing the loss of education not simply as an individual problem for each child, but as a national crisis as well. Then, on the fateful morning of October 4, 1957, the Soviets launched their first satellite, Sputnik I.

³⁷ Donald Quarles, “Scientist Shortage Major Peril to United States,” *Planes*, January 1955, 1.

³⁸ *Congressional Record* (June 7 1955) p. 7817.

³⁹ T. Earle Lesinski, *Congressional Record* (February 8 1955) p. 1333.



Illustration 2.3 This matchbook was created and distributed by the Chicago Public School System as a part of a campaign to prevent children and teenagers from dropping out of school. On the back of the matchbook it reads, “Nikita Khrushchev can be right, about burying our children, because of the drop-out problem.”⁴⁰

As Robert Divine has chronicled in his study of the crisis that struck America in the summer of 1955, most Americans had previously felt relatively comfortable in the knowledge that their science was the best in the world.⁴¹ Most believed that the Soviets would never have been able to detonate an atomic bomb in 1949 had it not been for the work of Soviet spies like Klaus Fuchs, Judith Coplon, and Julius Rosenberg. This time, however, there was no espionage behind the scientific breakthrough that was Sputnik. Few could deny that the satellite was a testament to Soviet ingenuity, and that it represented a direct affront to the common belief that creative, original thought in both the sciences and the arts was only possible under “democratic” governments.

⁴⁰ “Can Russia Bury Our Children Thru Education?” Chicago Public School System, 1962, from the author’s personal collection.

⁴¹ Robert Divine, *The Sputnik Challenge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

The launch of Sputnik had a significant impact upon American images of Soviet children. Just as the Soviet leadership had sought in its own rhetoric to create a vision of the impoverished, aimless American child as a means to identify Soviet youth, so too had American portrayals of robotic state-controlled Soviet children historically provided a discursive “Other” for envisioning the American child as *not* robotic and *not* under the control of an all-present state. As in Nina Alexeiev’s portrayal of Soviet children, this image conveyed the message that Soviet youngsters were to be pitied for their lack of freedom and also feared as emissaries of the communist state.

Yet while it was true that the image of the Soviet child garnered abhorrence and pity, it also received increasing amounts of respect from many parts of American society. While Soviet children might seem robotic, they also appeared to be disciplined learners. While they might seem to be terrified into obedience, they also appeared deeply patriotic and well-behaved. As the renowned psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner warned, “Soviet children of the future will continue to be more conforming than our own. But this also means that they will be less anti-adult, rebellious, aggressive, and delinquent... The streets of Moscow and other Soviet cities [are] reasonably safe for women and children, by night as well as by day.”⁴² Unlike the state-created images of American youth being created in the Soviet Union, the image of the Russian child was able to assume a variety of identities in the United States—not all of which were abhorrent to the American public and its leaders.

⁴² Urie Bronfenbrenner, *Two Worlds of Childhood: U.S. and U.S.S.R* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), 90.

In an effort to understand how the Soviets had been able to make such apparent pedagogical leaps in such a short amount of time, large numbers of American educators travelled to Russia in 1958 and 1959 in order to study the education system of their communist counterparts and to assess the extent to which the Soviets had moved ahead of the United States. ⁴³ What these educators found led to many sleepless nights for American educators, politicians, and parents. Not only did the young of Russia appear well educated in these reports, they also seemed far less robotic than many had expected. In one of many highly-published reports, Dr. Edward Litchfield, chancellor at the University of Pittsburgh, concluded in 1958 after one year of study that unlike in the United States, where athletes received the nation's admiration, in the Soviet Union, it was the superior student who was "regarded as a hero, not as a grind."⁴⁴ The Litchfield Report argued that far from being brain-washed, Soviet students read Russian and Western literature, spoke at least one other language, were involved in extra curricular activities like theatre and sports, and were interested in world events. Perhaps most disturbingly, he claimed that parts of the new Soviet empire were showing exponential improvements in education. In Kazakhstan, for instance, Litchfield reported that the country's population, which only forty years earlier had been almost completely illiterate with no universities, by 1958 had almost eliminated illiteracy and had built twenty-seven universities

⁴³ Between June of 1958 and May of 1959, the Department of Education, the National Science Foundation, the Rockefeller Fund, as well as many universities, sent their respective directors to do comprehensive studies of Soviet education. People who travelled to the Soviet Union in order to study its education system included Lawrence Derthick, United States Commissioner of Education, Dr. Alan T. Waterman, Director of the National Science Foundation, and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

⁴⁴ Dr. Edward H. Litchfield, "Text of Preliminary Report on Higher Education in the Soviet Union," *New York Times*, July 14 1958.

educating sixty thousand students.⁴⁵ The barrage of statistics did not end there. In June of 1958, Fulbright reported to Congress that the U.S.S.R. had graduated seventy thousand engineers while the corresponding figure in the United States had been only thirty thousand.⁴⁶ Likewise, Dr. Lawrence Derthick, the United States Commissioner of Education, returned from his study of the Russian system to report that "We were simply not prepared for the degree to which the U.S.S.R., as a nation, is committed to education as a means of national advancement. [It is] a total commitment. We witnessed an education-centered economy. The privileged class in Russia is the children."⁴⁷ The Soviets seemed to be getting better at everything, Derthick argued, and he argued that it was largely because their culture prioritized education in a way that America did not.⁴⁸ "In the U.S.S.R., enthusiasm for education is taken for granted," he lamented in *Look* magazine in October of 1958.⁴⁹ These reports also had some disturbing things to say about the relative state of American education. While Soviet students appeared to be tackling difficult subjects like physics and calculus, Litchfield argued that American students were choosing to study "life adjustment education," which included courses in marriage, choir, and driver's education. The novelist Sloan Wilson, famous for writing *The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit*, argued in 1958 after serving on the National Citizens' Commission for Public Schools that while eight million Russians were learning English,

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ William Fulbright *Congressional Record* (June 16 1958) p. 11244.

⁴⁷ Speech by Dr. Lawrence Derthick to the National Press Club on June 13 1958. Reproduced in the *Congressional Record* (July 13 1958) p. 11075.

⁴⁸ Various portions of the Derthick report were reprinted no less than seven times by a variety of congressmen and women from both sides of the political spectrum.

⁴⁹ Lawrence Derthick, "The Frightening Challenge of Russia's Schools," *Look*, February 14 1958.

only eight thousand Americans were learning Russian.⁵⁰ Hubert Humphrey seconded Wilson's observations in 1960 when he commented to his colleagues that "The real threat to America's world leadership comes not from Soviet rockets, but from Soviet schools."⁵¹

Such revelations were understandably very upsetting both to American politicians and to the general public. They implied that the Russians were tapping into a large pool of potential scientists and thinkers. Not only did it appear to many Americans that the Soviet Union was indoctrinating vast populations within its own empire to follow communist teaching, it was also evidently creating a massive brain trust that could rally around the hammer and sickle when needed. The news of Russian successes in areas like Kazakhstan also seemed to increase the possibility that the postcolonial nations of the world might choose the Soviet model as a means to speed up their own development and industrialization. If the Soviets could teach Kazakhstan to read in forty years, imagine what they could do for Angola and Guatemala. Where was the American example of such pedagogical beneficence, Derthick and Litchfield both wondered?

Without a doubt, such widespread praise of the Soviet education system and subsequent condemnation of the American system was neither honest nor realistic. As we have seen, the Russians were not nearly as successful or as confident as they appeared to be in educating their constituents. Schools in Central Asia suffered significant shortages. Statistics were inflated and corruption was rampant. Thanks to careful control over the American expeditions to Russia, however, the message that came back to the home front was one of astonishing Soviet success, stretching from Belarus to Siberia. Moreover, it is

⁵⁰ Sloan Wilson, "It's Time to Close Our Carnival," *Life*, March 24 1958.

important to remember that the groups sent to evaluate the Russian schools were all life-long advocates of education spending in the United States. By portraying the education of Soviet children in the most glowing (and dire) of lights, they transformed the troubled American classroom into a problem that was as relevant for the Department of Defense as it was for the Department of Education. This in turn increased the odds that the United States government would allocate more funding to education programs.⁵² Thus, as JoAnne Brown has noted, by capitalizing on Truman's earlier proclamation that "Education is our first line of defense," educators gained the legitimacy that such a responsibility afforded them.⁵³

While the Soviet Union experienced similar concerns, the breadth and depth of American rhetoric on the problem child in the 1950s and 60s was larger by many degrees. Not only did the panic over American education receive significantly more attention from politicians, educators, and parents, the perceived threat of delinquency upon national security became a crisis that was unparalleled in the Soviet Union. As J. Edgar Hoover would put it in 1954, "I see in the juvenile delinquent a threat to the very core of what it

⁵¹ Hubert Humphrey, "The Soviet Education Challenge," *Congressional Record* (August 17 1960) p. 18020.

⁵² In these years education advocates turned up the heat on the debate for more federal funding for education with the argument that education spending *is* defensive spending. See speeches made by Fulbright, Mansfield, Sparkman, Clark, Teller, and Gwinn in the month of January, 1958 alone - especially see the debate that they had on the Congressional Floor on January 15 1958, *Congressional Record*, p. 496. By 1965, American perspectives on Soviet education were more tempered. Translations of Pravda and Isvestia revealed that the Soviets were not completely satisfied with their own education system, that the push for polytechnization had resulted in fewer students successfully finishing high school, and that although they had succeeded in producing a population of qualified engineers, they still were behind the U.S. in the fields of physics, chemistry, and the natural sciences. "A Personal Report: The Teachers and the Taught in the U.S.S.R.," by William Benton, former Assistant Secretary of State and U.S. Senator, U.S. Ambassador to UNESCO and U.S. member of its executive board, publisher and chairman of Encyclopedia Britannica. First Published in the Encyclopedia Britannica Yearbook, 1965. Cited in the *Congressional Record* (May 17 1965) p. A2423.

⁵³ JoAnne Brown, "'A is for Atom, B is for Bomb': Civil Defense in American Public Education," *Journal of American History* 1 (1988): 74.

means to be American...Dangerous parts of the next generation have lost all respect for law and decency.”⁵⁴ Unmotivated and unsupervised, problem children were often depicted as inhabiting the outskirts of mainstream society where their actions appeared to encourage domestic decay and to threaten the nation’s future.

Whether or not America actually experienced a rise in childhood delinquency rates in the 1950s remains a topic of debate among historians. As James Gilbert points out, the statistics seem to argue that the country did experience a real increase in juvenile and childhood crime from the early 1950s to the mid-1960s.⁵⁵ For example, the New York City Police Department reported a four hundred percent increase in arrests of children under sixteen between 1950 and 1964.⁵⁶ Similar national reports presented a twenty-nine percent rise in criminal cases for children between the ages of ten and fourteen.⁵⁷ In 1966, James Symington, the chair of the President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, argued that “17 percent of today’s 10-year-old boys will be brought before juvenile court...That estimate reaches 40 percent in some urban ghetto areas.⁵⁸ Yet it is worth keeping in mind that these numbers did not always reflect changes among a controlled group. Thanks to the baby boom, youth populations were on the rise all over the country. Thus, while criminal cases for children rose twenty-nine percent between 1950 and 1964, the population of children overall grew by thirty three percent. Moreover,

⁵⁴ J. Edgar Hoover, “Who is to Blame for Juvenile Delinquency?” *Scouting*, January, 1954. Also cited in the *Congressional Record* (February 12 1954) p. A1127.

⁵⁵ James Gilbert, *A Cycle of Outrage: America's Reaction to the Juvenile Delinquent in the 1950s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

⁵⁶ New York City Police Department, *Annual Reports* (1950) and *Statistical Reports* (1959, 1964) published by the State of New York, NY.

⁵⁷ Results reported by the Senate District of Columbia Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, 1953, *Congressional Record* (January 6 1954) p. A633.

in a fashion similar to the Khrushchev-era's redefinition of petty crimes and delinquency in the late 1950s, law enforcement agencies in the United States frequently changed the standards by which delinquent behavior was measured, thus criminalizing acts that were once classified merely as status offenses.

Regardless of whether or not childhood criminality actually was on the rise, we can be certain that many people from across the social spectrum believed that it was. As a consequence, they spent countless hours trying to decipher the causes of what they perceived to be a crisis in America. As Sidney Yates, a democratic congressman from Illinois would state in 1954 while speaking at the annual meeting of the Young Men's Jewish Council, "The nation has a real problem on its hands, for which the causes are many and for which there is no single remedy."⁵⁹ Whereas in the Soviet Union, the causes of internal disorder among the young had been largely blamed on indulgent and negligent parenting, in the United States, poor parental leadership was only one of many causes that were identified as the culprits for childhood apathy and hooliganism. Additional causes (which were unidentified in the Soviet Union largely because they did not, or were not supposed to exist in communist society) also included violent media, conspicuous consumerism, and the psychological "fallout" of the atomic threat. Each of these apparent threats contributed to the popular perception that America's children were under siege not only by communist ideological infiltration and an over-extended education system, but by larger societal problems that threatened the country and its future.

⁵⁸ James Stymington, "Youth, Crime, and the Great Society," *Congressional Record* (March 2 1966) p. 4657.

As in the Soviet Union, politicians, sociologists, and writers attributed one of the primary causes of childhood complacency in these years to coddling and negligent parents who were failing to do their part in raising the next generation to meet the rising Cold War challenge. In the words of J. Edgar Hoover, many of America's children had "been pawns in the buck-passing tactics of those parents who shirk their responsibilities to the country's youth."⁶⁰ Over-indulgent mothers were depicted increasingly throughout the 1950s in the press as "nagging nannies" who smothered their boys and girls with material goods while ignoring their children's ideological needs. While psychiatrists had been making such arguments since the turn of the century, the image of the spoiling mother did not become popular until 1942, when the writer Philip Wylie coined the term "Momism" in his bestselling book, *Generation of Vipers*. Wylie argued that frustrated, smothering mothers were making their sons weak and passive while encouraging their daughters to emulate them and their overbearing mannerisms.⁶¹ Using a language that would have seemed familiar to many social scientists on the other side of the Iron Curtain, Wylie championed the belief that the best mothers were the ones who remained detached from their children's lives and instead allowed them to be hardened by their fathers and by the world around them. He in turn combined his belief in the weakening of the next generation with his virulent hatred of communism to build the popular argument

⁵⁹ Sidney Yeats, "Help for a Child or Punishment for a Delinquent," speaking at the annual meeting of the Young Men's Jewish Council, January 20 1954, *Congressional Record* (January 6 1954) p. A633.

⁶⁰ J. Edgar Hoover, "Who is to Blame for Juvenile Delinquency?" *Scouting*, January 1954.

⁶¹ Phillip Wylie, *Generation of Vipers* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942). As William Tuttle has argued, at the center of the dialogue about how children were suffering was the idea that their mothers were at work during the war and that male power was compromised. "Many saw the entry of millions of women into the paid labor force as threatening to the patriarchal goal of relegating women to the lifetime performance of unpaid, largely domestic tasks." Only ten years later, the role of the mother and the domain of the woman in the home would again be devalued as her ability to parent came into question. See Tuttle, *Daddy's Gone to War: The Second World War in the Lives of America's Children*.

that the “debilitating effects of Momism, particularly upon boys, [would] seriously weaken the nation and make it vulnerable to enemy takeover.”⁶² By the 1950s, in the words of Erik Erikson, there had developed “a manifest literary sport in books decrying the mothers of this country as ‘Moms.’”⁶³

Fathers fared no better in popular assessments of their child-raising abilities. Instead of portraying American fathers as neglectful, drunk and deformed by war (as in the Soviet Union), sociologists, psychiatrists, judges, and the popular press often portrayed the traditional patriarch as soft and weak, made apathetic by post-war affluence, overbearing wives, and the emasculation of the modern workplace.⁶⁴ Such men were frequently identified as the causes of the apparent apathy and disrespect that the next generation seemed to exhibit towards its elders. In December 1957, for instance, the well-known Brooklyn judge Samuel Liebowitz (famous for his defense of the Scotsboro Boys in the 1930s) made a direct connection between the impotence of fathers in the home and the increase in childhood delinquency that he witnessed everyday in his court.

How many parents have stood before me after I have sentenced their children to prison and asked, “Judge, what did I do that was wrong?” I sacrificed for home. I gave him a good life, put him through school.” It’s not what they did, it’s what they did not do. They did not put father in charge of the family but let him

⁶² May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*.

⁶³ Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: Norton, 1993), 288.

⁶⁴ As early as 1948, the anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer had noted that in “few societies is the father more vestigial than in the United States.” Geoffrey Gorer, *The American People: A Study in National Character* (New York: Norton, 1948), 54.

surrender his rightful and needful leadership to mother. They did not teach their child discipline.⁶⁵

For Liebowitz, American fathers had become “losers in one of our greatest tragedies,” and along with spoiling mothers, had created a home environment that was conducive to delinquency.

Tied closely to these condemnations of spoiling and negligent parents were additional concerns about threats to traditional gender roles in American society. For children, aggressive female sexuality and “momism,” coupled with emasculated male figures in the home were presented as direct threats to the creation of heterosexual boys and girls in America. This was not a new argument; the psychologist, nursery school teacher, and writer, Helen Thomson Woolley had argued in 1922 that there was a direct connection between strong mothers, weak fathers, and “sissy” boys.⁶⁶ Yet in the 1950s, this fear was compounded by the threat of communism and its perceived relationship with out-of-control sexuality and homosexuality. As Elaine Tyler May and Robert Dean have shown in their studies of gender during the Cold War, many people in the government and in medicine “believed wholeheartedly that there was a direct connection between communism and sexual depravity.”⁶⁷ During the Red Scare, homosexuals were frequently suspected of communist affiliation because they were perceived to be participating in an activity that not only disrupted the social and sexual order, but

⁶⁵ Samuel Liebowitz, “Judge Liebowitz on Juvenile Delinquency,” *This Week*, December 15 1957, 56.

⁶⁶ Helen Thompson Woolley, “The Pre-Kindergarten Child,” paper given to the Michigan Teachers Association, November 3 1922, Box 117, File 5, Merrill-Palmer Institute Papers, Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University, cited in Julia Grant, “A “Real Boy” and not a Sissy: Gender, Childhood, and Masculinity, 1890-1940,” *Journal of Social History* 37, no. 4 (2004): 850.

⁶⁷ May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*, 82.

required that they live a secret life that was susceptible to blackmail.⁶⁸ Homosexuality was believed by many to lead to communism, while communism itself became something that was somehow less masculine. This is reflected in Arthur Schlesinger's description of communism as "something secret, sweaty and furtive like nothing so much, in the phrase of one wise observer of modern Russia, as homosexuals in a boys' school."⁶⁹

Just as Tigran Atarov was pointing to the seeming inability of Soviet children to control their sexual urges, so too were psychologists, politicians, and private citizens arguing in the United States that the threats of sexual promiscuity and deviance among the young, which were being fostered by the rise in delinquency and bad parenting, presented a viable threat to national security. As the historian John D'Emilio has pointed out, many conservatives in the United States believed that the very same leaders in the American government who had allowed the West to "lose" China and Eastern Europe to Russia had been "sissies" as children.⁷⁰ Just as these men had "feminized everything they touched," and had "sapped the masculine vigor that had tamed a continent," so too did the current generation of boys threaten to endanger the country if they were allowed to become weak and feminine. These joint threats of homosexuality and communism were thought by many to endanger girls as well as boys. As one group of ministers and parents wrote to the Johns Committee in Palm Beach Florida in 1963, "Lesbianism, which has been promulgated and perpetuated by many female teachers, has now infiltrated, or is now being practiced by school girls aged 12-18...Certainly, this is not only fertile ground

⁶⁸ Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood*.

⁶⁹ Arthur Schlesinger, *The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom* (Cambridge, MA: Riverside Press, 1962), 3.

⁷⁰ John D'Emilio, *Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940-1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 42-43.

in which to breed communism, but it's also against the very grain of marriage, normal life, and manhood."⁷¹ Girls and boys who were not given explicit instruction on how to fulfill their traditional gender roles were seen to be placing "the security of the nation at risk."⁷²

There were also a number of domestic risks that appeared to endanger American children, while receiving little to no attention in the Soviet Union. One of these threats centered on the impact of American wealth upon the country's children.⁷³ While the unprecedented affluence of the post-war world stood for most in the American government as a testament to the success of the capitalist system, it also left some with lingering anxieties about the effects of such prosperity upon a generation that had not experienced the trials and scarcities of the Great Depression and the Second World War. As Jacob Javits and Harry Gideonse, the president of Brooklyn College, put it in the spring of 1954, "Freedom is not a byproduct of the conveyor belt and the advertising business." Gideonse would lament that the country had forgotten the lessons of America's founding fathers who had prioritized the life of the mind and a commitment to moral growth over the accumulation of wealth (which was, of course, something that both men already had in abundance). Such an "exclusively economic view of freedom," Javits contended, hindered and ultimately threatened the ability of the nation to remain

⁷¹ Unsigned Letter, Records of the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 1963, cited in Stacey Braukman, "Nothing Else Matters but Sex: Cold War Narratives of Deviance and the Search for Lesbian Teachers in Florida, 1959-1963," *Feminist Studies* 27, no. 3 (Autumn, 2001): 553.

⁷² May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*, 87.

⁷³ Thomas J. Lane, "Juvenile Delinquency," Radio address, WMEX, Boston, MA, June 19 1954, *Congressional Record* (June 17 1954) p. A4531.

“inner directed” and committed to a free society.⁷⁴ Similarly, J. Spencer Gray, a member of Eisenhower’s Committee on Youth Fitness asked his readers in 1960, “Can it be that we as a people have put too much stock in material success for its own sake, and that our offspring today reflect this worship of success to the exclusions of countless other values many of us of an earlier generation were taught to venerate?”⁷⁵ Not only did this preoccupation, as Gray and Javitz argued, potentially obscure the priorities of patriotism and free thought, it also threatened to create a generation of youth who did not understand the nature of personal sacrifice and had instead grown “soft” on the fruits of their parents’ labor.

⁷⁴ Jacob Javits and Harry Gideonse, “Ideals and Goals of Citizenship Education,” *Congressional Report*, (March 5 1954) p. A2478.

⁷⁵ J. Spencer Gray, “Have our Children Forgotten or did they ever Learn?” *Herald of Winchester*, May 5 1960.



Illustration 2.4: This image of children preparing for Christmas, which was featured in *Look Magazine* in November, 1955, served as a source of pride for the goods that American families and businesses could produce for their children, yet it also became a focus for worry over the possibility that such affluence could be spoiling the young.⁷⁶

As a part of their concern over American materialism, politicians and members of the American public turned their attention to the rising influence of media and popular culture upon the next generation.⁷⁷ Certainly, concerns over uncontrolled media were not new in the United States in the 1950s. They had a way of erupting whenever popular culture underwent changes that seemed to differentiate the generations. This was the case

⁷⁶ "Who are America's Real Santa Clauses?" *Look*, November 29 1955, 94.

⁷⁷⁷⁷ The Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency was headed first by the Senator Robert Hendrickson but became famous under the leadership of Senator Estes Kefauver who was eventually responsible for making the comic book industry adopt a self-regulatory ratings code. See Bart Beaty, *Fredric Wertham and the Critique of Mass Culture* (Oxford, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2005),

during the silent film craze of the 1920s, and when the popularity of dime novels took off in the 1930s.⁷⁸ Yet for many in the post-war era, the press, the radio, and the television presented threats to children that the country had never seen before. As Congressmen from both ends of the political spectrum would argue throughout the 1950s, the media had the potential to present a negative image of the United States abroad and it ran the risk of corrupting the minds of the young at a time when shoring up national patriotism and maintaining domestic order were more important than ever.

The impact of media on children was the subject of Fredric Wertham's 1953 bestselling book, *Seduction of the Innocent*, where he chronicled his efforts over the course of three years to "trace some of the roots of the modern mass delinquency."⁷⁹ Wertham's sensationalist book documented case after case of child-delinquents who seemed to be mimicking actions that they had seen on the television or, in particular, in comic strips. Horror comics, which were widely popular from 1948 until 1954, showed images of children killing their parents and peers, sometimes in gruesome ways – framing them for murder – being cunning and devious, even cannibalistic. A commonly cited story by concerned adults was that of "Bloody Mary," published by Farrell Comics, which told the story of a seven-year-old girl who strangles her mother, sends her father to the electric chair for the murder, and then kills a psychiatrist who has learned not only that the girl committed these murders, but that she is actually a little person in disguise.⁸⁰

Amy Kiste Nyberg, *Seal of Approval: The History of the Comics Code* (Oxford, MS: University of Mississippi Press, 1998).

⁷⁸ Robin Anderson, *A Century of Media, A Century of War* (New York: Peter Lang, 2006).

⁷⁹ Fredric Wertham, *Seduction of the Innocent* (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1953), 1.

⁸⁰ This story was recounted in detail by Senator William A. Purtell on the floor of the Senate on February 16 1954, p. A1196. Purtell was himself working from an article he had read by Irving M. Kravshaw in the *Hartford Courant* entitled "Depravity for Children—10 Cents a Copy," February 14 1954.

Another story that was cited frequently by congressmen was entitled “The Orphan,” (Figure 2.5) which featured a similar girl-child who kills her father and then sends her mother and her mother’s boyfriend to the electric chair for the crime. Wertham’s crusade against horror comics was quickly joined by two Senate Subcommittees in 1954, at the heads of which sat Estes Kefauver and Robert Hendrickson, who argued to their colleagues that the violence and destruction to the family in these comic books symbolized “a terrible twilight zone between sanity and madness.”⁸¹ They contended that the comic books provided children with models of behavior and that they encouraged violence among youngsters who would otherwise be law-abiding. Even J. Edgar Hoover chimed in to comment that “a comic which makes lawlessness attractive...may influence the susceptible boy or girl.”⁸²

⁸¹ Estes Kefauver, “The Menace of Comic Books,” *Congressional Record* (May 28 1954) p. A3999.

⁸² Robert Hendrickson quoting J. Edgar Hoover while speaking to the president on the upcoming Philadelphia hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency, *Congressional Record* (April 1 1954) p. 4857.



Illustration 2.5: “The Orphan”⁸³

Such depictions carried two layers of threat. First, as Wertham, Hoover, and Kefauver argued, they reflected the seeming potential of modern media to transform “average” children into delinquents.⁸⁴ Although the causal connections between childhood criminality and violent media remain open to debate, the fact that numerous congressional committees took up this question throughout the 1950s implies that numerous people both in the government and in the private sector believed at the time that the nation was facing a real crisis. As Alex Drier, the popular NBC newscaster argued in May, 1954, “this continuous flow of filth [is] so corruptive in its effects that it

⁸³ “The Orphan,” *Shock Suspenstories*, EC Comics, Issue 14, 1953.

⁸⁴ Comic books had served as potential sources of blasphemy as far back as the broadsheets of the 1750s and the disturbing images of Hogarth’s *A Rake’s Progress* and *Four Stages of Cruelty*. See David Kunzle, *The History of the Comic Strip: The Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

has actually obliterated decent instincts in many of our children.”⁸⁵ Yet perhaps more tellingly, the comics, as well as the heated response that they engendered, also reflected larger anxieties about what identities children should assume in contemporary America. As in the case of Bloody Mary and the Orphan, these comics presented an image of apparently sweet youths who were in actuality driven by violent impulses and were not children at all. “How can we expose our children to this and then expect them to run the country when we are gone?” an agitated Hendricksen asked his colleagues in 1954.⁸⁶ Bloody Mary, like the uneducated dolts of the Litchfield report and the spoiled boys of Wylie’s work, presented an alternative identity for American youth that seemed to embody a new and dangerous future for America that threatened its ability to face the communist menace one generation hence.

Also in contrast to the Soviet Union, a number of politicians and individuals in the 1950s and 60s argued that the presence of the atom bomb had the potential to create a population of terrified and traumatized youth who would become “nervous” adults, incapable of leading the country or surviving in a post-nuclear world. As Dwight Eisenhower stated in 1949, “East-West tensions will ... keep the world in a state of Cold War for years to come...Our children will continue to live under an oppressive shadow of fear.”⁸⁷ *Today’s Woman* put it even more succinctly when it declared in 1951 that, “our children are scared.”⁸⁸ By 1952, a National Committee on War Tensions in Children had

⁸⁵ Alex Dreier, “Special Report,” Broadcast by the National Broadcasting Co., May 3 1954, cited by Congressman Edward Rees (KA) *Congressional Record* (June 15 1954) p. A4412.

⁸⁶ Philadelphia hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency, *Congressional Record* (April 1 1954) p. 4857.

⁸⁷ Educational Policies Commission, *American Education and International Tensions* (Washington: U.S. Gov. Printing Office, 1949), 1.

⁸⁸ “Nuclear Fear,” *Today’s Woman*, June 1951.

been formed by private individuals and government representatives in Washington, D.C. with the stated mission to “assess the damage being done to children by nuclear fear.” At its first annual meeting, delegates brought with them reports of children refusing to leave their homes without a first aid kit, refusing to take off their head handkerchiefs, and clinging to their identification dog-tags (which were issued in 1951 to all children in the New York public school system) as “talismans insuring physical safety.”⁸⁹ “The proof is in the pudding,” one agitated delegate remarked to her colleagues at the first committee meeting after reviewing the evidence of childhood trauma. “The bomb is creating fear and the fear is having a big effect.”⁹⁰

What would be the long term effects of the nuclear arms race on the nation’s children, many individuals and organizations from across the political spectrum worried during these years? They expressed anxiety over the possibility that the sheer presence of the bomb could create a generation of youth who were made anxious and nervous by the looming threat, with the potential of becoming disillusioned with their government’s promise of safety. As the writer Doris Kearns Goodwin would remember in later years, “Our generation was the first to live with the knowledge that, in a single instant, everyone and everything we knew – our family, our friends, our block, our world – could be brought to an end.”⁹¹ While almost everyone in the government agreed that childhood awareness of the bomb’s destructive capabilities was potentially dangerous to the

⁸⁹ Dorothy Barclay, “Group Plans to Study the Effects of Defense Activities on Children,” *New York Times*, March 7 1952, 16.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Doris Kearns Goodwin, *Wait Till Next Year: A Memoir* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 158. For an examination of the impact that the bomb had on children’s lives, see the politically-charged Kahn, *The Game of Death: Effects of the Cold War on our Children*. For a more balanced view, see Brown, “A is for Atom, B is for Bomb’: Civil Defense in American Public Education.”

psychological health of the next generation, not everyone was in agreement about what to do to mitigate the problem. As we will see later in this chapter and then again in Chapter Four, the question of how to save youth from the bomb divided American society between those who argued for the value of civil defense in providing a sense of safety and defensibility to the young, and those who contended that civil defense was not only useless, but actually did immeasurable damage to the young by reminding them of the futility of nuclear security. Others still would argue that the only way to prevent psychological trauma among the children was to do away with the bomb altogether.

In the early months of 1954, Robert Hendrickson argued to his colleagues that “the strained international and domestic situation makes it impossible for young people of today to look forward with certainty to higher education, to entering a trade or business, to plans for marriage, a home, and family...Neither the media, nor modern consumerism, nor the threat from outside our borders creates a problem child. But they do add to insecurity, to loneliness, to fear.”⁹² For Hendrickson these domestic trends, along with what he called “deficient adults,” seemed to have created a new population of troubled and victimized children who were “beyond the pale of our society.”⁹³ These images of children, envisioned as threatened by communism, by poor education, bad parents, excess consumerism, the bomb, sexual deviance, and delinquency persisted into the 1960s. The widespread expression of these fears by government officials, educators, and parents would lead, as in the Soviet Union, to a massive overhaul in the country’s education program and to increased state intervention into the lives of America’s young. It also led

⁹² Robert Hendrickson speaking before the Pennsylvania Citizens’ Association of Pennsylvania, January 20 1954, *Congressional Record* (January 24 1954) p. A471.

to a nation-wide movement to revise the image of the ideal American child to accommodate the challenges presented by these modern threats. For both Khrushchev and for Kennedy, the mobilization of youth for a new kind of war became a national priority.⁹⁴

THE BOY SCOUTS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A COLD WAR CHILD

As in the Soviet Union, American leaders and private citizens argued that significant changes would have to happen in American society in order to defend the young and the country from the many threats that surrounded them. JoAnne Brown has argued in her study of civil defense in American schools that previous methods of mobilization for war were deemed inadequate to face the Soviet challenge.⁹⁵ Instead, a new kind of mobilization of youth was embraced by politicians, propagandists, and children's organizations that centered on the education and ideological training of the young as much as it did on physical preparedness. By mobilizing the American child against threats at home and abroad, America's leaders and their supporters hoped to strengthen the country ideologically against communist influence, project an image of the United States as the once and future leader of the "free world," protect themselves from what Elaine Tyler May has called the "potentially dangerous social forces of the new age," and in the end make themselves feel "better about [their] place in the world."⁹⁶

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ann Hulbert, *Raising America: Experts, Parents and a Century of Advice About Children* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), Kuznick and Gilbert, eds., *Rethinking Cold War Culture*.

⁹⁵ Brown, "'A is for Atom, B is for Bomb': Civil Defense in American Public Education," 69.

⁹⁶ May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*. On how difficult the containment of children continues to be, see Kathleen Jones, *Taming the Troublesome Child: American Families, Child Guidance, and the Limits of Psychiatric Authority* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), Barbara Finkelstein, *Regulated Children/Liberated Children: Education in Psychohistorical Perspective* (New

At the Boy Scout national conference held in the second week of June, 1959, the president of the Boy Scouts of America, Ellsworth Augustus laid out a mandate for the nation to intervene on behalf of the next generation:

The nation's youth must be prepared to withstand the ideological, physical, and economic pressures of Communism... Never before has it been more important to develop men who will be physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight and committed to their duty to God and their country.⁹⁷

As the 1950s waned, Augustus provided a possible answer for legislators and private individuals who were searching for ways to save what they perceived to be a generation in crisis. With an active combined membership of eight-and-a-half million by 1962 and a budget of thirteen million dollars, the Boy Scouts of America responded to the popular image of the threatened child by creating alternative identities for America's youth.⁹⁸ Instead of symbolizing innocence and protection, and instead of representing, as in the Soviet context, an aggressive mobilization for the pursuit of "peaceful competition" and economic development, the Boy Scout organization created a new vision of the American child that was prepared to defend the nation against communist attack, was well-educated in the sciences, devoted to capitalism without being consumed by it, decidedly masculine, well-supervised, was non-racist, committed to the preservation of domestic order, and

York: Psychohistory Press, 1979). J. Edgar Hoover, in a speech before the Daughters of the American Revolution in 1954 in Washington, D.C. said, "In protecting the home, women are also protecting the security of our nation." Cited in the *Congressional Record* (April 26 1954) p. A2989.

⁹⁷ Press release from the 49th Annual Meeting of the National Council of the Boy Scouts of America, which was held at the Curran Theatre and Civic Auditorium, San Francisco, Calif., June 5 and 6 1959, Boy Scouts of America Archive, Irving, TX.

actively involved in projecting a positive image of America abroad. Such images helped to conceptualize the Cold War for the American public as a defensive struggle that, while daunting, could nonetheless be won through mobilization at home and in the community.

Although any comparison between the work of the Pioneers and the Boy Scouts will be necessarily inexact, there were, nonetheless, some similarities between the two groups that make this analysis possible. Like the Pioneers, the Boy Scouts of America had historically envisioned itself as a group that supported the policies of its government and specifically its president. In fact, the organization maintained the president of the United States as its chief executive, and delivered its yearly reports on the floor of Congress. Although its policies were decided upon by an independent board of directors, it nonetheless undertook campaigns, whether for hygiene or for increased racial integration, that consistently followed larger, governmental initiatives. Moreover, while the organization was privately funded, it also received substantial tax breaks and incentives and was allowed to use large public lands without paying remuneration to the government.

Throughout the 1950s and 60s the Boy Scout organization played an important role in mobilizing American boys for the defense of the United States against communist attack. This was particularly true in its national campaigns to prepare the country's young men for nuclear assault. Scouts were depicted in national civil defense magazines and pamphlets as well-prepared defenders of American homes and towns who ostensibly had the skills necessary to survive a nuclear attack and could do so without suffering undue

⁹⁸ Jay Mechling, *On My Honor: Boy Scouts and the Making of American Youth* (Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

psychological trauma. As representative Peter Rodino remarked to his colleagues in 1954, “Scouting has the ability to teach a boy how to take care of himself and how to not be afraid, even in the most unimaginable circumstances.”⁹⁹ In 1959, Boy Scouts handed out over 3,750,000 home emergency handbooks across the country in an effort to keep the populace “up to date” on its civil defense policy.¹⁰⁰ With the addition of the Emergency Preparedness merit badge in 1962 (a little late by many people’s standards), boys were given specific instructions on what was required in order to “prepare for emergencies, both conventional and nuclear.”¹⁰¹ The obligations for the badge included participation and leadership in local civil defense exercises and the spreading of awareness of civil defense issues among members of the community.¹⁰²

As in the Soviet Union, scouts participating in civil defense exercises could only seldom be seen bearing weapons (while riflery remained an important skill in scouting, it never appeared as a part of military training and was instead seen as a sport or a hunting skill). Yet unlike their counterparts in the Soviet Union, scouts did appear to be familiar with the possibility and the consequences of nuclear attack.¹⁰³ These images of mobilized boys reflected the nature of Cold War mobilization in America. First, they implied that while the expectation of nuclear attack was real, the expectation of conventional invasion

⁹⁹ Peter Rodino, “The Boy Scouts of America,” *Congressional Record* (February 12 1954) 150.

¹⁰⁰ Over the course of fifteen years, the American public was at varying times told to evacuate the cities upon attack, to stay in the cities and run to a shelter, to go to open spaces, and to stay at home inside bomb shelters of varying sizes, shapes, and strengths.

¹⁰¹ The pressure to create a badge for civil defense began in the early 1950s, but it was not voted into the list until 1962. “Emergency Preparedness,” 1962, Boy Scouts of America (hereafter referred to as BSA) Archive, Irving, TX. Citations from the BSA Archive generally include the title, organizational section, date, and page number for the document in question. The indexes for the archives are in the process of being re-written, thus the documents do not have specific call numbers associated with them. Instead, they are stored in the archive according to date and the section of the organization that produced the document.

¹⁰² Victoria Sherrow, *Encyclopedia of Youth and War* (Phoenix, AZ: Oryx Press, 2000).

¹⁰³ Paul Rodino, “The Boy Scouts of America,” *Congressional Record* (February 12 1954) p. 150.

was not. Second, they reflected the nation’s apparent willingness and ability to defend itself from atomic assault; they helped to create the sense that a sizable portion of the next generation was well-informed, well-trained, and not traumatized by the possibility of a nuclear emergency. “A good scout is a prepared scout,” one 1959 pamphlet on civil defense declared. “If we all work together, we can help our families and our communities to be prepared as well.”¹⁰⁴ The Scouting motto to “be prepared” had now been re-fashioned as a motto for Cold War preparation.



Illustration 2.6: This poster was released during National Civil Defense week in 1956. At its base it reads, “Distributed as a Public Service by the Boy Scouts of America.”¹⁰⁵

Perhaps most importantly, images of scouts participating in civil defense drills provided a vision of nuclear survivability to the nation – a vision that largely ignored the existential

¹⁰⁴ “Train in Family Preparedness and Emergency Living,” Ready Unit 3, 1959, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

¹⁰⁵ Illustrator unknown, “Serving You in Time of Emergency,” National Civil Defense Administration, 1956.

issues presented by the threat of a thermonuclear holocaust. For example, in a 1962 directive to scouts on how to prepare for a nuclear emergency, the authors informed their readers that “No one can predict the future or control how other countries or political leaders might use their weapons. There is no need to be especially alarmed. There is a need for preparation and awareness.”¹⁰⁶ The booklet went on to instruct scouts on the varieties of warning signals, the importance of learning evacuation routes, the need for fallout shelters, and the importance of storing sufficient supplies in case of attack. “Such measures will help to create a safer environment for you and your family,” the pamphlet concluded, thereby making the argument that collective mobilization could lead to collective safety. In scouting literature, generals like Lewis Hershey spoke of civil defense as a means for career advancement. Others conceptualized it as a kind of sport as when Terry Brennan, who was then the head football coach of the University of Notre Dame, explained the need for nuclear civil defense in a speech to scouts at the Philmont camp in the summer of 1956.¹⁰⁷ He argued that “scouting, football, and civil defense have a lot in common. And, as everyone knows, it is a good defense that wins the game.” With no further explanation offered about what “offense” would entail in a nuclear attack or how his envisioned “defense” would work, Brennan strove to do exactly what the now-famous nuclear preparedness film, “Duck and Cover” had tried to achieve. He made nuclear defense seem tangible, animated, and sporting.¹⁰⁸

The Scouts also made efforts to create an image of the American boy that appeared to be empowered to defend himself against other forms of communist attack at

¹⁰⁶ “Nuclear Awareness,” 1962, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

home and abroad, instead of being the victim of assault and infiltration. This image was highlighted in press stories like “Mission to Siberia,” which was published in *Boy’s Life* in two parts over the summer of 1960. “Mission to Siberia” told the tale of a young free-lance pilot named Everett Kris who is covertly contacted by the American government to fly an old surveillance plane over Siberian airspace. Everett, who is described as “an expert in aviation detective work,” is told by his anonymous, paramilitary contact, that while the work may not be legal, it is “vital to this country.” He is enlisted by the fictitious World Intelligence Service (WIS), which consists of a private network of observers behind the Iron Curtain that funnels information to American governmental and industrial organizations. Unfortunately, as the story goes, because the government will not officially recognize Everett’s mission, and because the WIS has to “watch expenses,” they equip him with an old surplus jet trainer. They then inform him that one of his three partners is a known Soviet agent (although they do not know which). On his first test mission, the plane’s equipment fails and Everett is only able to save himself through ingenuity and sheer grit. After returning, he realizes that the plane had been sabotaged. This does not deter him as he makes it his personal mission to make the trip to Siberia and to take the necessary aerial photographs that the government requires. Everett finally comes face to face with his saboteur and is able to complete his reconnaissance flight and deliver the needed pictures.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Major General Lewis B. Hershey, “My Country,” *Boy’s Life*, July 1956. Speech given by Terry Brennan to scouts at Philmont, June 5 1956, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

¹⁰⁸ Terry Brennan, “Civil Defense and You,” *Boy’s Life*, September 1956.

¹⁰⁹ The story published in two parts, William F. Hallstead, “Mission to Siberia,” *Boy’s Life*, August 1960, 11, 42-43 and September, 1960, 23, 58, 60.

This story, which was published in August and September 1960, bore an eerie resemblance to another spy plane that had ventured over Soviet airspace only three months earlier. Unlike Everett, however, Gary Powers had not been able to save his plane from being brought down or to prevent the international scandal that ensued. “Mission to Siberia” offered a literal recasting of the Frances Gary Powers story, complete with a young hero who proved capable of defending himself against Soviet trickery while completing his mission. Eschewing Powers in exchange for a smarter, more resourceful pilot, the story imbued Everett with a seemingly extra-sensory ability to detect problems with his plane and to identify the liars in his midst. Also unlike Powers, who had a questionable flying record and was shunned by many in the military and the press for failing (or refusing) to press the self-destruct button in his U-2 while going down, Everett understood his duty. As he tells his superior officer before taking off on the final mission, “I know what to do and I will do what it takes, sir.” Moreover, in “Mission to Siberia,” the question of how Gary Powers could have failed was subtly re-evaluated. Because Everett’s plane was nearly brought down by a saboteur (not by any fault of his own), the young readers of the story were able, by proxy, to raise the question of who, exactly, was to blame for Gary Powers’ icarian fall. How could old Soviet anti-aircraft weapons have shot down a plane as advanced as the U-2 jet? Perhaps someone at home was helping the Soviets track the plane, the story suggested. Perhaps Powers simply had not been as lucky as Everett in detecting sabotage. Most importantly, “Mission to Siberia” also provided a means by which the U-2 event could be explained and made justifiable to young boys who perhaps needed reassurances that such an event was necessary and not as shameful as many in the press had made it out to be. Boys who read “Mission to Siberia”

experienced the U-2 event the way it was supposed to have happened. It was so close to the Gary Powers story that boys who read it could easily have muddled the two.

“Mission to Siberia” was a part of a much larger national effort that became increasingly popular in the late 1950s to educate children on the apparent deviousness of communists in their midst and to mobilize against them. In 1955, representatives like Daniel Flood, the flamboyant democratic congressman from Pennsylvania, introduced a joint resolution in the House as a part of his duties in the newly formed Institute of Fiscal and Political Education “to promote the teaching in American schools of the differences between the theories and practices of the American way of life and the theories and practices of atheistic communism.”¹¹⁰ The resolution argued that whereas the “atheistic communist system forcibly takes the children from their parents at an early age and places them in state-controlled schools...our youth will be better prepared to withstand the cruel and inhuman treatment they can expect to receive at the hands of their captors if they should become prisoners of war.”¹¹¹ Less hyperbolically, civic leaders like John S. Gleason, the head of the American Legion, and Cardinal Cushing, the Archbishop of Boston, argued to their constituents that “no matter what current settlements may be negotiated with Soviet Russia as the ‘other’ world power, our children and grandchildren will have to face the challenge of Communist competition throughout their lives. If we have been deceived and bamboozled in the past, it is because, as a nation, we did not take

¹¹⁰ Carroll Reece, “The Institute of Fiscal and Political Education,” *Congressional Record* (February 17 1955) p. 1693.

¹¹¹ Daniel Flood, “Joint Resolution to Provide for a Commission on Communism,” *Congressional Record* (January 31 1955) p. 1008.

enough trouble to learn about communism.”¹¹² “Americanism” programs, which included “educational articles” like “Mission to Siberia” subsequently sprouted up all over the country, sponsored not only by local veterans organizations and the Bar Association, but by public schools like the one in Los Angeles county where the school board resolved in 1962 to “emphasize [in its curriculum] the positive side of our way of life as well as the dangers facing it.”¹¹³ The superintendent argued that the schools had a legal responsibility to develop programs for teaching citizenship and patriotism. Even *Junior Scholastic* got on board with a twelve part series entitled, “What You Should Know About Communism – and Why,” where they promised to “drop the bomb of truth” upon the next generation, thereby protecting it from “dangerous mental fallout.”¹¹⁴

Reflecting this larger trend, the Boy Scouts were lauded increasingly throughout these years for providing the kind of training that would prepare the scouts to counter communist influence at home and in the schools. This is reflected in the themes that the national organization adopted throughout these years. Beginning in 1956, themes included, “Onward for God and Country,” where the main objective was to “fill the hearts and minds of American boys with a consciousness of their American heritage and of the dangers that face them today.”¹¹⁵ “Strengthen America’s Heritage” was adopted as the national theme in 1964, which was committed to “preserve[ing] our freedom through

¹¹² John S. Gleason, “We Must Teach the Truth About Communism,” *Washington Post*, March 2 1958. Cardinal Cushing’s talk, which garnered a huge response on the floor of congress from at least five representatives, was delivered on June 21 1959 over TV channel 4 in Boston. A copy of his talk can be found in the *Congressional Record* (June 24 1959) p. A5468.

¹¹³ Letter from C.C. Tillingham, Superintendent of Los Angeles County Schools to Congressman Clyde Doyle of California, March 3 1961, republished in *Congressional Record* (April 10 1961) p. A2365.

¹¹⁴ “Facts for Youth,” *Junior Scholastic*, February 2 1962, 3.

¹¹⁵ Francis J. Geiger, “Onward for God and My Country,” *The Scout Executive*, January 1956, 1, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

reverent, resolute, responsible patriotism.”¹¹⁶ This was followed by the theme of “Boypower” in 1969, where the organization admitted that “America is a disturbing land that seems to be beset with dangers inside and out” and resolved to “help the families and institutions of the Nation prepare a new generation with the skill and confidence to master the changing demands of America’s future.”¹¹⁷ In each of these programs, citizenship and awareness of communist influence assumed increasing importance as a priority for scouting instruction. As Arthur Schuck, the Chief Executive put it in 1960, “The Boy Scouts is a citizenship-training and character-building organization. We are committed to meeting the nation’s challenges, communism included.”¹¹⁸

In addition to courage, unwavering patriotism, and the ability to detect communists in his midst, Everett’s character in “Mission to Siberia” had one other skill that countered common perceptions of youth in these years. Not only was he a pilot, he was also a scientist who could diagnose what was wrong with his plane simply by listening to the whir of its engines. “Mission to Siberia” was but one example of how the Scouts responded to the education crisis. *Boy’s Life* published articles on the topic of education in almost every edition. The push to address education began in earnest in September, 1956 with an article entitled, “Your Welfare is Being Overshadowed” (Illustration 2.7).¹¹⁹ “The critical shortage threatens our future security!” it warned in bold letters. Below this caption there appeared a drawing of four American boys bent

¹¹⁶ “Nationwide Impact – 1964,” Program of Emphasis, 1964, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

¹¹⁷ “Highlights in 1968,” Boypower, Manpower, 1969, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

¹¹⁸ Arthur Schuck, “Sharply Conflicting Philosophies of Life,” 1962, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

¹¹⁹ “Your Welfare is Being Overshadowed,” *Boy’s Life*, September 1956, 63. Also see articles on how to get to college for free and another direct solicitation for engineers entitled, “Wanted: More Engineers,” both in *Boy’s Life*, December 1956, 11. It states, “You will have the satisfaction of knowing that your

over a drafting table holding a model rocket and engineering tools. Their bodies and faces were obscured, however, as a towering shadow of two massive Soviet boots threw them into darkness.¹²⁰ The boots, which were as large as the boys' bodies, marched forward, preparing to squash the children beneath their unstoppable weight.



Illustration 2.7: “Your Welfare is Being Overshadowed!”¹²¹

Such harbingers reinforced the messages of educational insufficiency that were being presented by legislators like Fulbright and Hill during these years. They implied that the young were the only ones who could carry on the struggle to win the space race and they put into stark relief the extent to which America’s children were physically

efforts are keeping our nation strong and free through technological progress.” Unlike previous years, “being prepared” now included being prepared for going to college.

¹²⁰ Boys, in particular, were thought to have the natural ability for math that the nation needed. See “Man and Mathematics,” *Boy’s Life*, September 1960, 20.

¹²¹ “Your Welfare is Being Overshadowed,” *Boys’ Life*, September 1956, 5.

threatened by the Soviet space and science program. It is interesting that the illustrators of “Your Welfare is Being Overshadowed” chose to draw a Soviet boot as the source that threatened these boys. Why not a Soviet satellite, rocket or bomb? While bombs and rockets implied immense destruction, they also signified something against which man could not really fight. Four boys standing at a drafting table cannot stop a satellite or a nuclear missile. But people *can* stop other people. And now America’s boys needed to stop the men in those boots – the Soviet scientists who were bent on creating objects of indefensible destruction. Those boots left a mandate for every American who worked in children’s services to rally all their forces in the human struggle against Soviet technological power.

Within the Scouting organization, programs to promote science education came in the forms of official badges, in outreach projects, and even in the organization’s comic strips, which, as the leadership claimed in 1960, “never found it necessary to resort to stories of misadventure, crime, sex, or any questionable material to build its reader clientele.”¹²² A new Atomic Energy Badge was created in 1958, in the same year that the National Defense Education Act was passed. Its requirements were rigorous, demanding that boys understand the meanings and functions of beta particles and neutron activation, that they illustrate the process of nuclear fission and critical mass, and that they construct a homemade radiation gauge, dosimeter, Geiger counter, and cloud chamber.¹²³ In the same year, new programs were begun including after-school science clubs in low-income neighborhoods, adopted as a means to reach bright children who might otherwise be

¹²² Comic Books and the Boy Scouts, 1960, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

¹²³ Badge Requirements, Atomic Energy Badge, 1958, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

overlooked. Each week, *Boy's Life* featured a new installment in the comic sagas of “Albert Einstein” and “Space Conquerors,” where engineering lessons were mixed in with stories of “atom rays” and alien life forms on distant planets. In the words of one troop leader, speaking at the 1961 National Jamboree, “It is our duty to do all we can to help American education get back on its feet.”¹²⁴

The Boy Scout organization, like its Pioneer counterpart, also made an attempt to address the nation’s delinquency problem by “installing, replacing, and fortifying the core of values,” that they believed all children needed to have.¹²⁵ They ventured into parts of the nation that they identified as hot beds for the growth of delinquency. These areas were marked by substandard, overcrowded housing, low income and single-parent homes, cultural and linguistic barriers, high population transience, lack of residential leadership, and no organized recreation for communities’ children. In other words, they made their way out of the suburbs and back into the cities where predominantly African American and immigrant children resided. J. Edgar Hoover, a long-time advocate of the Scouts, argued in 1954 that the organization had a mandate to translate “a boy’s idle time into constructive channels.”¹²⁶ Labeled as “vulnerables,” inner-city boys were offered the kind of training that the organization hoped would not only keep the boys out of jail, but would also represent a first step in the struggle to create the right kind of American child.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ “Education and Scouting,” National Jamboree, 1961, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

¹²⁵ BSA Research Service Studies 1958, “Scouting in Highly Congested Urban Areas,” Completed October 1958, 48, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

¹²⁶ J. Edgar Hoover, “Who is to Blame for Juvenile Delinquency?” *Scouting*, January 1954, 1.

¹²⁷ BSA Research Service Studies 1958, “Scouting in Highly Congested Urban Areas,” Completed October, 1958, 42-45, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

It is worth noting that the Boy Scouts largely reserved its identification of “delinquents” to boys living in the inner-cities, despite the fact that American public rhetoric usually expanded that definition to encompass troubled kids in suburbia as well. It is also worth commenting that many in the Boy Scout organization were well aware that defending the nation by reaching its inner-city boys was no easy task. Solutions often required new approaches that meant adopting non-traditional forms of enlistment and communication in order to avoid alienating potential members whose belief systems were different than those of the suburban, white, middle-class. For instance, one pack leader in New Jersey wrote in the in-house publication *Scouting Executive*, that his group was serving as a ready-made gang for the “lost boys” of his community. In order to reach these troubled children, he had turned his scouting program into a “manly one so that it will appeal to a boy who wants to show others what he can do.”¹²⁸ Often inner-city packs would play down the role of the adult leader and instead allow older Explorer scouts to run the group. Others would simply abstain from talking about personal development, leadership, moral values, and achievement in order to avoid scaring off boys who had learned to reject such notions. Interestingly, while these values were deemed dispensable (at least temporarily), the teaching of citizenship remained a top priority and a core requirement for any scout, as well as a kind of common ethos that would bond all boys together against the shared communist enemy. As the 1960s progressed and the crisis of delinquency persisted, the organization became a standard fixture in America’s growing

¹²⁸ Charles Houston, Superintendent, State Home for Boys, Jamesburg, New Jersey, “What Scouting Means to Us,” *The Scout Executive*, May 1961, 1, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

public housing. Troops cropped up in the basements of city churches. They found their way into reformatories and juvenile prisons.¹²⁹

By positioning itself as a solution to delinquency in America, the Boy Scout organization pursued its larger mandate to create orderly and patriotic citizens while also opening its doors for increased membership and revenue. Unlike the Pioneers, who were largely funded by the state, the Boy Scouts of America was a private organization, which while receiving large subsidies from the U.S. government nonetheless had to find substantial revenue in the private sector. In addition, the Scouts had always struggled with the need to increase membership, a fact that is reflected in the massive amount of literature that was devoted to enlisting boys at all ages and cutting down on attrition rates. Scout leaders and Den mothers were continually instructed to be alert to evidence of any boy with declining interest. As one program quarterly stated, “Den Mothers should be asked to report such cases at once, so that pack leaders can take action. Such action would center around individual parent conferences or special parent meetings designed to strengthen their understanding of Cub Scouting and the opportunities they have to maintain the interest of their sons.”¹³⁰ Membership was such an issue that scout leaders were instructed to use school and county-nurse directories in order to call on boys to join. Constructing the image of the Boy Scout as an alternative to that of the childhood delinquent was vital to the survival of the scouts not only because it responded to the larger needs of the nation, but because it gave parents a concrete reason to keep paying their dues and buying their uniforms and working in their fundraisers.

¹²⁹ “Reaching Boys in Public Housing Projects,” *The Scout Executive*, August 1961, 8, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

The Scouting organization's efforts to create a model American boy who could channel his energies away from delinquency were accompanied by a similar project to either reform America's negligent and indulging parents or provide a viable substitute for them in the form of the Scoutmaster. Aged between 35 and 45, with a personal past as a scout, an above-average income, a wife and children of his own, a good education and a steady church-going record, the model Scout leader was envisioned as one who could assume responsibility for a boy's maturity into manhood when the mother and the father were not willing or able to do it.¹³¹ Articles called upon boys to "Take Dad Along" on Father's Day hikes and camping trips.¹³² Lord Baden Powell was set up as the ultimate father against whom "regular" dads were to be judged. He was described by his son as a man who took his family camping on summer holidays, travelled the world with his children, and maintained humility and dignity despite his fame.¹³³ At the same time, scouting literature, both public and private, warned repeatedly of the dangers posed by "Dominating Delilahs." One particularly concerned leader wrote in to the main office in 1962 about a mother who had an "aggressive, ambitious, mutinous tendency to try to take over any project."¹³⁴ The Scouting organization's response was a "get tough" policy that required having a frank conversation with the mother about her expected role in the troop. A similar story of scouting intervention was told by President Eisenhower at the commemorative dinner of the Boy Scouts of America fiftieth anniversary in Washington,

¹³⁰ "Program Quarterly," Winter, 1964-65, 24, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

¹³¹ Amos Shields, "The Men in Your Life," *The Scout Executive*, October 1960, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas. G.R. Pirrung, "Building the Image of the Scoutmaster," *The Scout Executive*, January 1961, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

¹³² "Take Dad Along," *Boy's Life*, June 12 1960.

¹³³ Lord Baden-Powell, "The Father I Knew," *Boy's Life*, February 1961, 47.

¹³⁴ "Dominating Delilah," *Scouting*, October 1962.

D.C. on June 1, 1960. He recounted how he had stepped in to stop his wife and mother-in-law from packing a lunch and setting up emergency transportation for their son when he had resolved to take a solo hike in fulfillment of a badge. “It was important that he do this one on his own,” Eisenhower commented to a rapt audience. “Sometimes you have to step in.”¹³⁵

These efforts were tied closely to a program that sought to teach boys appropriate sexual behaviors. As we have seen, sociologists by the 1950s had begun to view the young boy’s liminal sexual body as something that required supervision and control.¹³⁶ This initiative to watch and manage the bodies of the country’s youth that developed in the years following the Second World War is supported by the dearth of Boy Scout literature that devoted itself to teaching boys to seek male, not female guidance, to “roughen themselves up,” to develop a health sexuality, and to treat their mothers and girlfriends appropriately. Through officially-sanctioned activities, as well as informal, sexually suggestive rituals, Boy Scout troops worked to instill and codify in each of their members a sense of masculine power that was closely bound to issues of national security and strength.

In particular, the ideal scout was envisioned as a rough and physically strong by who also understood the limited ways in which men could display their power in 1950s America. The organization worked to create a new population of boys who would grow to become men capable of putting on the “gray flannel suit” to join the “lonely crowd” at

¹³⁵ Remarks by President Eisenhower at the Fiftieth Anniversary Commemorative Dinner of the Boy Scouts of America, Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, D.C. June 1 1960, 1, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

¹³⁶ Jay Mechling, *On My Honor: Boy Scouts and the Making of American Youth*.

work, while still maintaining their physical strength and adventurous spirit.¹³⁷ This program of sexual acculturation was pursued by the Scouts through its efforts to decrease female influence in boy's lives and to emphasize the importance of fathers and leaders. These fathers and leaders were expected to teach boys how to control their sexual appetites in managed, heterosexual ways. As the 1968 Boy's Handbook made clear to its readers, "the morally straight boy will become a heterosexual man."¹³⁸ It was the boy's duty to remember the power for good that was possible if his sexuality was channeled towards reproduction in wedlock. "As a young man, you are capable of becoming a father," the handbook instructed. "God has given you this very high trust...When you live up to the trust of fatherhood your sex life will fit into God's wonderful plan of creation. It will ensure that you and your children will grow up in freedom and honor."¹³⁹ Just as Cold War culture hounded homosexuality as an invitation for communist infiltration, so too did it demand heterosexual behavior from the next generation of young men.

As with the Pioneer organization, these visions of intelligent, non-delinquent, straight boys worked to create a new kind of American child that could not only cure the troubles of the next generation, but could also stand as an international icon of American democracy and national defense. For the Scouts this meant countering images of American racism while projecting a vision of global defensive mobilization with the non-communist nations of the world. Not surprisingly, for many in the U.S. government, the childhood image that was most damaging to American prestige abroad was that of racist

¹³⁷ May, *Homeward Bound*, 166.

¹³⁸ Boy Scout Handbook, 1968, Boy Scout Archive, Irving, Texas.

American youth, which as we have seen, the Soviet Union was more than willing to exploit in its own domestic rhetoric. Despite the many efforts that were made by politicians in the North and the South to prove that the civil rights movement was infiltrated by communists and that the Soviets had their own troubled race record, a number of senators and congressmen argued that the slow pace of race reform was destroying America's image abroad. For instance, Marlon Wright argued in 1960 that the names of Little Rock, Arkansas, and Tuscaloosa, Alabama, now evoked "sordid memories. In all countries the names are familiar. They and the train of ideas of which they are the core contribute to the picture we present to the rest of the world... You may be sure that the peoples of Asia and Africa know what is happening to their brethren in this country. The Russian propaganda machine sees to that."¹⁴⁰ In a similar vein, Jacob Javits argued in the *New York Times* in 1963 that the whole world had stood witness when "mounted State troopers in Little Rock, electric cattle prodders in hand, rose headlong into a crowd of Negro demonstrators, trampling children in the process."¹⁴¹ In these descriptions of African American youth, the physical threat, which came from anti-segregation forces within the country, translated into a threatening image for the nation as a whole, which bore the brunt of responsibility for the fate of its children in the court of international opinion.¹⁴²

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Address by Marlon A. Wright before the 1960-61 Leadership Clinic, November 17 1960, Detroit Michigan. Marlon Wright was a member of the Board of Directors and chairman of the Southern Regional Council, and member of the North Carolina Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. *Congressional Record* (March 24 1961) p. 4755.

¹⁴¹ Jacob Javitz, "Disgracing America," *New York Times*, September 3 1963.

¹⁴² The impact of the image of a racist America, and the efforts made by the United States to counter that image in its international propaganda, are discussed in Chapter Three.

Like Wright and Javitz, the Scouting leadership argued that the image of the ostracized, segregated, African American boy projected a damaging vision of America abroad and also posed a grave threat to the maintenance of order at home. Many feared that African American boys, if not correctly socialized and integrated into society, could be lost to the chaotic and angry side of the civil rights movement – or even worse – succumb to the attractions of socialism. The majority of segregationists and integrationists in America agreed that a violent path towards integration would lead to national weakness and disorder. But while the segregationist solution to this threat was to scrap integration altogether, integrationists made a powerful argument that the only way to avoid violence, and even leftist influence among the African American population, was for the country to guarantee civil rights for all. For the Scouts, “creating a smoother path” for the most part became policy, as the organization worked to create a socio-cultural map for how integration could be handled without violence, and to rebuild the image of American humanism abroad.¹⁴³

In the end, international, political, and moral pressures drove the organization to take a deliberate, if slow, approach to including African Americans into the Scouts. This was not an easy task and the Boy Scouts had a lot of catching up to do. In 1945, there were only twenty thousand African American scouts out of a total membership of two million. Integrated troops and packs did not exist in either the North or the South, and African American membership was dropping each year. In 1947, the National Council was not able to meet the goals of its “Thousand for One” Campaign, which had set a

¹⁴³ Annual Report: Interracial Relationships Service, 1959, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas

target to enlist thirty thousand African American boys by the end of the year.¹⁴⁴ By 1958, as the slow rate of school desegregation in the south sparked widespread unrest in the civil rights movement, the Boy Scouts struggled to project a moderate voice for progress and reform. Boys like Marvin Higgins, who was awarded the God and Country Medal for religious work in Athens, Alabama were highlighted in Scouting magazines. Photographs of troops often included both African-American and white boys. Scouting publications also paid particular attention to the patriotic duties being performed by black troops in their communities.¹⁴⁵ And in a massive campaign that included the creation of a full staff trained in “ethnic recruiting,” scouting representatives from the National Interracial Service travelled among the nation’s twelve regions working to make connections with the black community through churches, schools, the National Urban League, and the Frontiers of America.¹⁴⁶ Their efforts to reach out to the country’s African American children reflected a desire to protect and indoctrinate the young from the threat of communism and radicalism while simultaneously pursuing a path to integration that did not threaten the maintenance of domestic order. As one annual report noted, “the harmony of the races and the usefulness of the Negro of tomorrow very largely depends on the leadership of the scouts.”¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ “Scouting for Negro Boy’s in the Tennessee Valley,” *Speakin’ Out*, March 7-13 1990, 11, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas. This article tells the history of black scouting over the span of fifty years. Also see the un-catalogued folder in the Boy Scout Archive labeled “African-American History: Involvement with Scouting.”

¹⁴⁶ Annual Report: Interracial Relationships Service, 1959, 4-25, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

¹⁴⁷ Report of Committee on Interracial Activities, 1950. In folder marked “African-American History: Involvement with Scouting,” BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.



Illustration 2.8: This image of an interracial troop is taken from a 1965 report entitled “Interracial Activities in the Scouts.” In this photograph, the four Explorer Scouts appear to be in the same troop.¹⁴⁸

Yet despite these improvements, integrated troops remained few and far between well into the 1970s, and while the Scouts made admirable efforts to provide an example of how integration was possible, underlying racist assumptions also persisted. One report in 1950, for instance, issued by the Committee on Interracial Activities, made explicit efforts to impose “white” levels of hygiene on African American recruits. “Sanitation and health of one group vitally influences the health of every other,” it argued. “The Negro needs to be taught all we know about how to live.”¹⁴⁹ The Boy Scout organization’s efforts to write a map for integration faced the same quandaries that the rest of the nation

¹⁴⁸ “Interracial Activities,” 1965, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

¹⁴⁹ Report of the Committee on Interracial Activities, 1950. In folder marked “African-American History: Involvement with Scouting,” BSA Archive, Irving, Texas. Speaking at the Sixth National Jamboree in Valley Forge. Marie C. McGuire, Commissioner of the Public Housing Administration, 1965, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas. “Proceedings of the 55th Annual Meeting of the National Council of the Boy Scouts of America, Miami Beach, FL May 20-21 1965, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

did – how to transform the idea of equality into a functioning reality and how to project an image of racial fairness in the midst of increasing tension.

Where the Boy Scouts were far more successful in projecting a positive mobilized image abroad was in its program for World Scouting. While the Pioneers brought international delegates into Artek as a symbol of Soviet generosity and communist solidarity, the Boy Scouts established the “World Brotherhood” program in order to create for American boys, for the general public, and for the world the sense that they were part of a much larger effort to uphold the ideals of capitalism and western democracy. Domestically, world scouting fostered the idea that the United States was not alone in its Cold War efforts. Internationally, it attempted to establish America as a part of a global consensus committed to a shared cause.¹⁵⁰

World Scouting has a history as old as Scouting itself. It began in 1910 when Scouting in Britain was adopted by a number of countries in Europe and the Americas. The first official international scouting event was held in 1920 with the first World Jamboree in Kensington, England. The event hosted eight thousand scouts from thirty-four countries. Lord Baden-Powell, who was declared the Chief Scout of the World, articulated the mission of world scouting when he said, "If it be your will, let us go forth from here fully determined that we will develop, among ourselves and our boys, a

¹⁵⁰ “Membership Continues to Grow,” Yearly Program Report, 1958, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas. The perceived power of the Scouts to build friendships around the world was evidenced by the many ways in which the U.S. government latched itself onto the efforts of the Scouts. In May of 1959, the work of Scouting was acknowledged when Arthur Schuck, the Chief Scout Executive, received the Freedom Foundation’s highest award for “helping to bring about a better understanding of the American way of life.” Schuck joined J. Edgar Hoover and Herbert Hoover as the third recipient of the award, which carried with it a mandate to “continue to strive to make this a world of peace and happiness.” “Dr. Schuck Given Freedom Foundation’s Highest Award,” *Boy’s Life*, May 1959, 28.

comradeship through the worldwide spirit of the Scout brotherhood."¹⁵¹ International connections between the scouts were severely tried during the Second World War but were re-established in 1947 with the American creation of the World Friendship Fund, a sort of corollary to the Marshall Plan where three hundred thousand scouts collected nickels and dimes for the purpose of assisting Scouting organizations in war torn and underdeveloped countries.¹⁵² By 1957, the World Friendship Fund, working under the theme "Good Turn with the Long Reach," was delivering an average of \$50,000 per year to the development of Scouting outside the United States.¹⁵³ Funding drives like I.C.B.M, which stood for "Intercontinental Brotherhood Missile Envelopes," received heavy press within the Boy Scout Organization as a means to promote scouting abroad.¹⁵⁴ Similar efforts were made to promote international connections through individual scout projects and pen pal exchanges. In 1952, the World Brotherhood Badge was established, which required the aspiring scout to draw a map of the nations in the world where scouting existed, to describe how one might identify another scout while in another country, to learn the stories of at least three national heroes of other lands, to carry on a five minute conversation with a native speaker in a foreign language, and to correspond with a scout from another country.¹⁵⁵ As with the internationalization of Artek, such actions not only created bonds between Scout troops, they ostensibly connected together their countries of

¹⁵¹ Baden Powell, *International Scouting Yesterday and Today*, 1958, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

¹⁵² Jean R. Bader, Director of the International Relationships Service, "Thanksgiving and World Friendship," *The Scout Executive*, October 1961, 1, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

¹⁵³ J.A. Brunton, director of the Division of Relationships, "1957 World Friendship Fund International: Good Turn with the Long Reach," *The Scout Executive*, December 1956, 1, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

¹⁵⁴ "World Friendship – 1959," Program Directive, 1959, 4, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

¹⁵⁵ "Merit Badge Requirements," 1954, 534, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

origin in a pact of shared moral belief and practice. The support or rejection of scouting in a nation literally drew the line between communism and capitalism.¹⁵⁶

The event that best signified the international bonds of world scouting was the World Jamboree, which was held in the United States for the first and only time in 1967, in Farragut State Park, Idaho. A record number of 12,017 Scouts and leaders from 107 countries participated in the weeklong event, which received widespread international attention, including the issuing of Farragut Park Jamboree postal stamps in countries as far away as Mozambique and Liberia. With the U.S. Department of Defense providing free visas to all attendees, the delegates arrived on the first of August to find that the entire park had been transformed from what was once a training station for the U.S. navy into a world village, complete with barracks for each delegation, the flags of each scouting country flying at the center of the camp, and a menu that included Midwestern staples like brisket and potatoes, but also bratwurst and corned beef hash. Daily activities included a “skill-o-rama” intended to test boys’ acuity in riflery, orienteering, and survival skills. They participated in aquatics lessons and competitions on the banks of Lake Pend Oreille. They undertook a conservation program for thinning underbrush and clearing trails in the surrounding Coeur d’Alene Mountains, participated in mixed-troop adventure trails, saw what one boy from Abilene Texas called a “real old west rodeo,” and played the “friendship game,” which had been popular at the previous world jamboree in Greece and involved every camper attempting to match his own lettered

¹⁵⁶ The line was also drawn by the communists. For instance, Nadezhda Krupskaja, Lenin’s wife and a founder of the Pioneers, said of the Boy Scouts, “When we speak of boy-scout activity, we all understand very well, of course, that however attractive it may be, it is meant to bring up the growing generation as loyal servants of kings and capitalists.” Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaja, *On Education : Selected Articles and Speeches* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957).

placard with other scouts' placards to spell out a phrase and then march into the main arena together as a group.¹⁵⁷

The aims of the Boy Scout organization at the World Jamboree were not unlike those expressed by the Pioneer leadership at Artek. In the months before the event, Gerald Speedy, the national director for the Scouts, argued to his colleagues that

all we do and say there [in Idaho] will be a kind of definition of freedom for some countries which have long had it, and still others which may be about to lose it. It is not too idealistic to expect that several hundred boys encamped at the jamboree will one day become the leaders of their countries.¹⁵⁸

Reflecting the idea that the Scouts were a kind of greenhouse for the development of democratic leadership, and making indirect reference to Vietnam, which was, in his opinion, on the verge of losing its “freedom,” he continued to argue that “the world’s future rests in the hands of its youth. We must understand with increasing clarity and intensity of feeling our awesome potential to influence the way in which tomorrow’s men will think and act as we influence the qualities of mind and spirit of today’s youth.”¹⁵⁹ Speedy and his colleagues sought to position the Jamboree as a testament to American benevolence and brotherly love for the people of the world, and perhaps to promote a vision of the entire “free world” standing behind the United States and its policies in Southeast Asia.

¹⁵⁷ “The World Jamboree is Remembered - The Year in Review,” 1968, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

¹⁵⁸ Gerald Speedy, “Meeting the Challenges of a Changing World,” a speech given at a meeting of the home office staff, published in *Scout Executive*, March 1967, 11.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*



Illustration 2.9: Norman Rockwell, “Breakthrough for Freedom,” 1967.¹⁶⁰

Hoping to reflect these ideas in visual form, the Boy Scouts of America commissioned Norman Rockwell to paint a commemorative work for the Jamboree. Having begun his career as an illustrator for *Boys Life* in 1912, Rockwell had spent his lifetime painting Boy Scouts. Although he is rumored to have struggled with finding a subject and composition for the painting, he finally settled on representing the moment when six boy scouts have successfully matched their placards during the Friendship game and are marching into the arena. In the painting, an American Explorer Scout occupies the foreground of the painting as he walks a half-step ahead of his international peers, one of whom is wearing the South Vietnamese scouting uniform. Similarly, behind the group,

¹⁶⁰ Reproduced with permission from the Norman Rockwell Estate, Niles, IL.

the American flag is also positioned closest to the viewer, followed by the flags of America's neighbors and allies. Entitled "Breakthrough for Freedom," the painting simultaneously encapsulated the idea that scouting transcended national borders without eradicating them, and that the United States had a leadership role to play in the "march" being undertaken by these boys and by their countries.

The message of world brotherhood and shared mobilization that was conveyed at the World Jamboree was also articulated in the forms of myth making and story telling. Young "freedom fighters" in Eastern Europe were common subjects of Boy Scout stories and publications—first coming from Czechoslovakia in 1952 and later in Poland and Hungary in 1957 and 1968. For instance, a commonly told and frequently repeated story of international brotherhood emerged in 1952 and '53 around the life of Richard Frantisek Hrdlicka, called Dick by his American friends, who allegedly joined the anti-fascist underground in Czechoslovakia in 1943 at the age of ten and then the rebellion against the Soviets at the age of twelve. In this story, which appeared in *Boy's Life*, but was also referenced in campfire-story booklets given to troop leaders throughout the 1960s, Dick was defined not by his nationality, but by his status *as a Scout*, and by his actions taken in the face of communist aggression.¹⁶¹ As the story went, on a March night in 1939, just after the Nazis had rolled into Prague, Dick joined his underground troop in the lighting of night campfires that "burned in the mountains and glens of Czechoslovakia, as thousands of Scouts, forbidden to wear their uniforms, and ordered to fly the Nazi flag, renewed their Scout oath." In February 1948, Dick was again involved in skirmishes between the Communist "hoodlums" and the 20,000 freedom fighting

students who had come to Prague to protest repression under Soviet rule. Dick took to the mountains, as Scouting, and the freedom that it represented, again went underground. After returning to Prague under the condition that he join the Komsomol, Dick again put himself at great risk by passing out anti-communist literature in his school. Finally he was able to escape to France and then to Kansas, after the American Scouts of Region 8 secured his airfare and tuition at Friends University in Wichita, Kansas. It is difficult to verify whether or not the details of Dick's story are true, although Friend's University does verify that Richard Hrdlicka did attend some time in the 1950s. But perhaps the story's veracity is not of real importance. Even if this is but a campfire story, Dick's apparent arrival and integration into America nonetheless functions as an integral component to Boy Scout mythmaking. It presented the boy as someone who spent his lifetime struggling against oppression and it portrayed the United States as a facilitator in his struggle. The vision of the Scout and of what it meant to be mobilized in the Cold War served as a constant force in the development of this one boy who was portrayed as having defied the Communist system for what he believed in.¹⁶² Dick's story represents the culmination of scouting's Cold War purpose. Through training and moral instruction, Dick (who not only had adopted western ways of thinking but a western name as well) was imagined as having received the tools necessary to counter communist influence. Despite his nationality, Dick was a member of the world brotherhood and embodied the vision of the ideal scout because he had overcome such odds as a child and because he had utilized the lessons learned through scouting in order to gain his freedom.

¹⁶¹ "Campfire Stories for Troop Leaders," 1961 and 1967, BSA Archive, Irving, Texas.

¹⁶² Tom MacPherson, "Soon I can Vote!" *Boy's Life*, March 1952, 13.

CONCLUSION

Images of American children in the 1950s and 60s reflect the larger contradictions of the Cold War world; while the future promised for the young was unprecedentedly bright, it was also fragile and out-of-control, menaced by the largely invisible and indefensible threat of communism, by poor education, lousy parenting, media overload, and delinquency. As a result, the image of the American child assumed new identities both as a symbol of threat and as a model for mobilization. In the words of the children's historian, Joe Austin, the contradictions presented by the image of the child highlighted "the bifurcated social identity of youth as [both] a vicious, threatening sign of social decay and [as] our best hope for the future."¹⁶³ But these two images were more than bifurcated, they were also bound together in a causal relationship where one necessitated the other, one cured and fixed the other, and in so doing, supported the social system that enabled that cure. In short, while the Pioneers and the Boy Scouts represented social order and preparedness, the hooligans and the children threatened by communism, capitalism, bad parenting, substandard education, and nuclear attack necessitated them.

These visions of besieged and mobilized children helped to establish a conceptual framework for the Cold War at home that lasted well into the 1960s (and arguably into the 1980s). They positioned the United States as a country under siege by forces both inside and outside its borders. They legitimated the argument that the defensive mobilization of the entire population was required in order to stave off decline and defeat. In this period of uncertainty, a new image of the ideal child represented all that could

¹⁶³ Joe Austin, "Introduction," in *Generations of Youth: Youth Cultures and History in Twentieth-Century America*, ed. Joe Austin and Michael Nevin Willard (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 2.

save the nation from disarray. In this period of great threat, the specter of the problem child symbolized America's greatest potential for failure.

And so, by the late 1950s, the semiotic barricades had been manned. Images of ideal children, whether as Pioneers or Boy Scouts, stood as living examples of two systems that were both ostensibly focused on building a positive future for their children, were committed to the security and defense of their country and their allies abroad, and were prepared to continue mobilizing for generations to come. Just as the image of the ideal child, seen as law abiding, fair-minded, and committed to education, provided a model for a mobilized nation, the icon of the problem child, envisioned as uneducated and delinquent, substantiated the efforts of government officials and private citizens on both sides of the Iron Curtain to influence the upbringing and supervision of the next generation. In the next three chapters we will examine how these images were transmitted, consumed, and refashioned by state actors and by individual groups who sought to use the image of the child as a means to redefine the Cold War struggle and to contest their governments' domestic and international policies.

Chapter 3

Revising an Ideal: Alternative Images of Children in Film during the Soviet Thaw, 1956-1964

From 1956 until roughly 1967, the Soviet Union experienced an unprecedented opening in the arts known as the Thaw. During these years, Party leaders urged artists, writers, and filmmakers to discard some of the more onerous shackles of Socialist Realism and to explore the “unvarnished” realities of Soviet life.¹ They gave tacit approval to works that highlighted the complicated experiences of ordinary citizens while rejecting the formulaic tropes of the Stalinist epic. Previously banned writers like Mikhail Zoshchenko and Anna Akhmatova were re-introduced to the Soviet public. Evgenii Yevtushenko was able to publish his controversial poem, “Stalin’s Heirs,” while Khrushchev personally consented to the publication of Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*. Sculptors, painters, and filmmakers like Oleg Vassiliev, Anatoly Basin, and Andrei Tarkovsky produced works that in earlier years would have solicited staunch criticism or arrest.

Khrushchev initiated the Thaw for a number of reasons. He viewed it as an important vehicle through which the country could rebuild its creative strength after years of imposed artistic mediocrity. He hoped that it would garner the support of the population while destabilizing conservative elements in the Party. He envisioned it as a program for reform that would help the country decrease bureaucratic corruption.² He also saw the Thaw as a way to recast the Soviet Union’s image abroad not as a bastion for

¹ Woll, *Real Images: Soviet Cinema and the Thaw*, 3.

² GARF f.6903, op.23, d.41, l.57.

ensorship, but as an advocate for human rights and individual expression.³ Khrushchev directed filmmakers, in particular, to lead the world in making movies that excelled not only in their “wealth of content,” but also in their “artistic power and execution.”⁴

Yet Khrushchev was not prepared for how filmmakers used the relaxed censorship of the Thaw to contest the Soviet leadership’s domestic and international policies.⁵ In the process of turning away from the Socialist Realist narrative towards a more authentic and individual voice, directors touched on larger themes that had previously gone unmentioned. They tackled many of Khrushchev’s dearest policies by exploring the social impact of his agricultural reforms, the Virgin Lands project, his educational initiatives, and Soviet involvement in the Cold War.

Filmmakers pursued these new themes by turning their attention to images that carried weighted meanings in the lexicon of Soviet iconography. As the film scholar Alexander Prokhorov has noted, “two heroes dominate the films of this period: the adolescent and the child.”⁶ In contrast to the idealized vision of mobilized and peaceful childhood being created in official rhetoric during these years, directors constructed young characters that showed little in the way of ideological conviction. They depicted youngsters who prioritized their own desires and the needs of their families over their obligations to the state. They showed visions of youth who at times appeared abandoned

³ In a radio broadcast to the nation on November 2 1961, Khrushchev said of the Thaw, “The people are waiting and are certain, that the writers and filmmakers in the arts will create a new kind of production in which they will adequately articulate our heroic epoch of revolutionary transformation of society.” Khrushchev, “S’ezd s Troitelei Kommunizma,” in a show narrated by P. Brovka called, “Radiozhurnal Komiteta Molodezhykh Organizatsii Sovetskogo Soiuz,” GARF f.6903, op.23, d.41, l.57.

⁴ Institut Marksizma-Leninizma pri Tsk KPSS, *KPSS v Rezoliutsiakh i Resheniakh S’ezdov, Konferentsii i Plenum Tsk: 1898-1971* (Moscow: Izd-vo, Politicheskoi Literatury, 1971), 164.

⁵ Priscilla Johnson, *Khrushchev and the Arts: The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962-1964* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965), Iurii Aksiutin, *Khrushchevskaia "Ottepel" i Obshchestvennye Nastroeniia v SSSR v 1953-1964 gg* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2004), Fedor Mikhailovich Burlatsky, *Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring: The Era of Khrushchev Through the Eyes of his Advisor* (New York: Scribner's : Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991), Valeri Fomin, ed., *Kinematograf Ottepli* (Moscow: Materik, 1998).

⁶Alexander Prokhorov, "The Adolescent and the Child in the Cinema of the Thaw," *Studies in Russian and Soviet Cinema* 1, no. 2 (2007): 115.

by the adult world around them. They presented children struggling to survive in a harsh and unforgiving environment.

These images both supported and at times subverted the Soviet Cold War consensus. On the one hand, many reviewers and filmmakers contended that the youngsters in these films symbolized the Soviet awareness of war's destruction and the population's commitment to peace in the Cold War. They viewed these children as testaments not only to the strength and resilience of the Soviet people in the face of hardship, but to the country's commitment to artistic openness. On the other hand, these new images of youth raised unavoidable questions about the country's strength and willingness to mobilize for the Cold War. They showed the damage that could be done when state priorities superseded the needs of the individual and the family. They envisioned a society that had been seriously damaged and disillusioned by the ravages of Stalinism and the Second World War. They depicted a populace that was in no position to assume a new "peace offensive." The multiple meanings that these images carried reveal an era of contested perspectives on Soviet society and its future. They also provide a window into the often unspoken anxieties that the Cold War engendered in Soviet filmmaking during these years.

Manifestations of the Cold War in Thaw film are subtle and often hidden. Any historian searching for the Soviet equivalent of *Dr. Strangelove* is certain to be disappointed; such films were simply not possible in the carefully censored environment of Soviet movie making. Yet, upon careful examination, Cold War resonances do reveal themselves in films of the Thaw. As Peter Biskind has argued in his examination of American film in the 1950s and 60s, "it is in [the] "everyday films, which seem to shoulder no ideological burden," that evidence of Cold War thinking is best disclosed.⁷

⁷ Peter Biskind, *Seeing is Believing: How Hollywood Taught Us to Stop Worrying and Love the Fifties* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1983), 3.

Just as American westerns like *Red River* and science fiction dramas like *The Thing* could mirror popular ambiguities concerning the battle against communism in the United States, so too could Soviet films reveal underlying dilemmas about the ability of Soviet society to succeed in its struggle with the West and the heavy price that it was paying for mobilization.⁸

This analysis of the Cold War in Thaw film is concerned not simply with the intentions of the filmmakers, but with how these films assumed new meanings through the processes of production and reception. As the famously strong-willed director, Andrei Tarkovsky himself admitted, the audience plays an important role in “bringing an image into being” and determining the meanings of what they see.⁹ Even when directors saw no Cold War significance in their work, reviewers often did. Moreover, when we come to these films from a contemporary perspective, with an understanding of how the Cold War was conceptualized officially in the Soviet Union during these years, new messages materialize that we might have previously missed.

This chapter attempts to decode the Cold War cultural messages of Thaw film by examining them from a new analytical perspective. It “excavates the hidden and not-so-hidden” meanings buried beneath the surface of these movies.¹⁰ It confirms the significance of the Cold War in shaping how filmmakers and critics viewed the world around them. It also shows how the party leadership’s official conceptualizations of the Cold War, and of the ideal child, were open to revision.

⁸ Mark Lacy, “War, Cinema, and Moral Anxiety,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 28, no. 5 (2003): 611, Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, 220.

⁹ Andrei Tarkovsky, *Sculpting in Time* (London: The Bodley Head, 1986), 20.

¹⁰ Biskind, *Seeing is Believing: How Hollywood Taught Us to Stop Worrying and Love the Fifties*, 3.

CHILDREN OF WAR, THEN AND NOW

The changes triggered by the Thaw first manifested in films that re-examined the Soviet experience of the Second World War. In earlier years, Stalinist films on the war had adhered to a carefully monitored set of themes. Popular movies like Mikhail Chiaureli's *The Fall of Berlin* (1949) had focused on the heroic legacy of the Soviet army to repel the Germans out of Russia and on Stalin's personal role in ensuring victory. These early works presented images of Soviet men, women, and children as noble fighters, willing martyrs, and loyal Stalinists. In the words of Denise Youngblood, such films attempted to "cement Stalin's regime," and reflected the Soviet Union's return in the late 1940s to "strict cultural and social control."¹¹ By largely ignoring the gruesome realities of the battlefield as well as the physical and psychological trauma that the war had wrought upon the Soviet populace, these films worked to create a mythologized memory of the war that testified to the heroic feats of Stalin, to the role of the Soviet Union in bringing peace to Europe and the world, and to the country's quick return to superpower status.

When Khrushchev initiated the Thaw in 1956, filmmakers immediately began making a new kind of war film. They made movies that took an unflinching view of the war experience and its long-term effects on the population. They created characters that were deeply flawed and traumatized by the brutality around them. They largely ignored Stalin's role in the war and instead focused on the personal stories of families and individuals struggling to survive. At a time when western filmmakers were still producing their own set of myth-making movies about the heroic American and British

¹¹ Denise Youngblood, "A War Remembered: Soviet Films of the Great Patriotic War," *The American Historical Review* 106, no. 3 (Jun., 2001), Nina Tumarkin, *The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia* (New York: Basic Books, 1994).

war experiences,¹² Soviet filmmakers forced the camera's eye to explore the war as a brutal event that left an entire continent in ruins. They depicted children, in particular, as traumatized, hungry, vengeful, abandoned, disillusioned, and deeply cynical about the world around them. They portrayed youth as functioning outside of the state's control. They showed the next generation as motivated not by ideological or patriotic convictions, but by fear, vengeance and personal desires. For some filmmakers and viewers, these images supported the state-sponsored view of the Soviet Union as a strong, peace-loving country. They represented the sacrifices that were made by the population during the war to protect the world from Nazi tyranny. They testified to the Soviet Union's commitment to peace, and they stood as testaments to the strength and resilience of the population in the midst of incredible loss. Yet for others, these images carried meanings that seemingly undermined the contemporary image of the Soviet Union as a powerful defender of peace. They raised questions about the ability of the generation that grew up during the war to mobilize again against the West. They showed children who carried little to no ideological conviction. They depicted youth who were far from protected and nurtured, instead appearing abandoned by the adult world. They also provided a searing statement about the terror of war in general that hinted at the dangers of Soviet Cold War brinksmanship while also indicting the warmongering of the West. At a time when images of strong, peace-loving children were being manufactured to support the state's official conceptualization of the struggle with the West, these alternative visions of Soviet youth as disillusioned, exhausted, vengeful, and unprepared for modern mobilization stood out as challenges to the Cold War consensus.

¹² Such films include J. Thomson's 1961 film, *The Guns of Navarone*, Darryl Zanuck's 1962 film *The Longest Day*, and John Sturges' 1963 film *The Great Escape*. See, for instance, T. Pollard, "The Hollywood War Machine," *New Political Science*, 24, no. 1 (March 2002): 121-139. Biskind, *Seeing is Believing: How Hollywood Taught Us to Stop Worrying and Love the Fifties*, 52.

The first film to reconceptualize the child's image in war was Marlen Khutsiev's *Two Fedors* (1958). It told the story of a young soldier and a boy who struggle to build a family in the wake of the Second World War. Without question, the film stood as testament to the sacrifices made by the Soviet populace and to the country's amazing efforts towards recovery. Yet at the same time, the movie's images of destroyed children in the late 1940s also raised important questions about the state's projected image of the mobilized Cold War child in the late 1950s. In an age when hopeful, prepared Pioneers embodied the idealized image of Soviet youth, Khutsiev's film presented a picture of a generation that had no ideological certainty, was traumatized, embittered, and struggling to find a home in a destroyed world.

The film begins as the war is ending. A young soldier is heading home when he meets an orphaned child hiding in his boxcar. During their train ride, the two characters realize that they have much in common. Aside from sharing the same name, they are both survivors of the war, completely alone, incapable of sentimentality, and, as one reviewer phrased it, "removed from society through their shared attitudes of loneliness."¹³ At a crucial point in the film, the young Fedor gets off the train to meet his "aunt" who ostensibly lives in a nearby town. The older Fedor guesses that there is no aunt and that the boy actually has nowhere to go. As the locomotive begins to pull away, the older Fedor runs after the child, sweeps him up in his arms, and returns him to the train, thereby committing himself to the care of his namesake. As the two characters begin to settle down in their new home, they quickly switch roles: the boy's dirty, almost wrinkled face reflects a practical knowledge and cynical acceptance of the world around him. He cooks, cleans, and makes sure that his older companion gets his vitamins. Meanwhile, the

¹³ Ia. Varshavskii, "Nado Razobrat'sia," *Iskusstvo Kino* 5 (1959): 62.

older Fedor loses their ration cards and decides to buy ice cream instead of potatoes (an action that receives a scolding from his young ward).



Illustration 3.1: Two Fedors (Director Marlen Khutsiev)

Big Fedor is not only child-like in his habits, he also carries a sense of ethics that is naive and out of place in the rubble of the post-war world. This realization is brought home when the young Fedor, in an attempt to find food after the ration cards have been lost, steals a chicken for them to eat. When the older Fedor realizes that the bird is stolen, he admonishes the boy for his dishonesty and forces him to throw the uneaten chicken away. In the young Fedor's eyes, and in the eyes of the viewer, this waste of food is more shocking and somehow more morally reprehensible than the theft itself. The established parameters of right and wrong, which the older Fedor couches in terms of communist obligations to the needs of the collective, make no sense to the young boy. While big Fedor holds on to older, Soviet morals, the child carries with him a different moral compass that places the needs of the family and the self over those of the country and the communist ideal.

For the majority of the film, the older Fedor appears incapable of creating a world that is physically and psychologically safe for his adopted son. On the boy's first day of school, the soldier forgets to pick up young Fedor in the afternoon, leaving the child alone waiting vainly for someone to retrieve him. Little Fedor finally gives up on waiting for his new father. He wanders the streets, staring into shop windows filled with happy mannequins holding hands and laughing. The soldier's reason for missing the pick-up time is that he has met a long-haired girl and has chosen to spend his evening with her instead. Not only does the older Fedor make a choice that compromises the fragile happiness of his younger namesake, but he again takes on the role of child and adolescent as he puts his own desires over those of his family. As a symbol of the country's efforts to reconstruct and remobilize, he conveys the message that before the Soviet Union can make a home safe for its children, the country must first let go of the traumas of the war and assume its responsibilities to the next generation. Yet such a transformation remains elusive for Big Fedor through much of the film, reflecting the difficulties that the entire population is experiencing in meeting the demands to rebuild the country.

The climax of the film occurs when the young Fedor runs away, again to "see his aunt." Again the older Fedor chases after him and again he brings him home. This time, however, the roles of the two Fedors do not seem as ambiguous. Upon the boy's retrieval, it appears as though they are a family now. The younger Fedor has a mother and a father. The film seems to promise that the boy will now go to school, that he will fit into the community and into his appropriate persona as a Soviet child. This redemptive ending seemingly sets a path for Soviet reconstruction from the rubble of the war. It seems to argue to viewers at home and abroad that despite the great losses wrought by the war, the country has indeed recovered. As one reviewer wrote in the months after the film's

release, *Two Fedors* had shown to the world the “strength of the Soviet people” and their “great capacity for sacrifice and kindness.”¹⁴

Yet the Cold War resonances in *Two Fedors* were ultimately not all positive. As some critics noted at the time, instead of providing a hopeful image of Soviet communist reconstruction after 1945, *Two Fedors* showed to its viewers a generation of traumatized, non-ideologically driven children and adults for whom current Cold War mobilization seemed highly unlikely. For instance, in the months following the Hungarian Revolt in the fall of 1956, conservative reviewers of the screenplay accused the film of being too “dark” and inappropriate for the times.¹⁵ The Kiev Ministry of Culture argued that “the film does not depict our reality, it is pessimistic and uninspiring. You can’t tell what country it’s set in. If it’s ours, then why don’t the school children wear ties? And what sort of hero is this – sullen, taciturn, unsociable? That’s not what our people are like.”¹⁶ Such accusations reflected anxieties not about the state of the country in 1945, but about how *Two Fedors* might impact the Soviet Union’s image in the eyes of contemporary viewers in 1956. Despite its seemingly normative ending, the fact that the film showed children without their Pioneer ties who were “sullen” raised for these critics questions about the strength of the country’s ideological convictions and the ability of the state to foster appropriate behavior in the young. As Victor Nekrasov reminded his readers in his review of the film, there had been an entire generation that had left the schools for the front during the 1940s and had returned to find nothing but ashes. He described boys who had spent their childhoods learning to kill and be killed. “And how are they to live now,

¹⁴ Vitalii Gubarev, “Dva Fedora,” *Literaturnyi Kinostsenarii*, November 3, 1958, RGALI, f. 2453, op. 4, d. 1626.

¹⁵ Marlen Khutsiev, “Ia Nikogda ne Delal Polemichnykh Fil'mov,” in *Kinematograf Ottepli*, ed. V. Troianovskii (Moscow: Materik, 1996), 195.

¹⁶ Cited by Miron Chernenko, *Marlen Khutsiev: Tvorcheskii Portret* (Moscow: 1988), 9. Also cited by Woll, *Real Images: Soviet Cinema and the Thaw*, 93.

when such skills are not needed?" he asked his colleagues.¹⁷ In the opinions of these critics, such images questioned the idea of this child becoming the foundation upon which a new Soviet future could be built.

The question of what would become of the children of war was also tacitly approached in the film itself. At one point after the young Fedor has run away for the second time, the soldier turns in anguish to his girlfriend and says, "What can I do? How can I make a future for him?" On the surface, the film seemed to answer the question by showing the reunion of the two Fedors and the construction of their new family. Yet the question that the older Fedor asks is an important one. As Nekrasov noted, it applied not only to the young Fedor, but to all of the children that experienced the war, including the ones who were not lucky enough to be adopted by generous strangers. For those children, survival alone appeared to be a great accomplishment, while the prospects of future mobilization seemed distant indeed.

The Cold War issues that were alluded to in Khutsiev's *Two Fedors* were re-examined in a more penetrating way in Andrei Tarkovsky's 1962 masterpiece, *Ivan's Childhood*, which also set out to portray the terrible realities of war from the perspective of the child. The film, which received awards at the Venice film festival, provided the era's most poignant image of lost and unprotected youth. In the form of the twelve-year-old Ivan, Tarkovsky created a child who, while heroic, was nonetheless a far cry from the positive and hopeful image of youth that was so central to Socialist Realist film and to contemporary images of Soviet childhood. He was a youngster who had no future, no ideological belief, and no hope for salvation. Ivan, like Fedor was seen by some contemporary critics as a symbol of the country's inability to reconstruct and remobilize for another war. His disturbing lack of ideological belief was similarly problematic in the

¹⁷ Victor Nekrasov, "Slova 'velikie' i 'prostye'," *Isskustvo Kino* 5 (1959): 58. Cited in Woll, *Real Images: Soviet Cinema and the Thaw*, 94.

late 1950s, as it raised questions about the willingness of the next generation to engage in the contemporary struggle with the West. Ivan also became a focus for heated debates regarding the failure of adults to protect the young from war and how that reflected upon the ostensible commitment of the communist state to defend its children.

Ivan's Childhood tells the story of a young boy who works as a scout in the no-man's land between the German and Russian fronts during the Second World War. The film begins with remembered visions of a happy and healthy Ivan running through a field of butterflies to join his mother. This fantasy is quickly wiped away by the awakening sounds of gunfire. In muted grays and low contrasts, the image of a boy with torn clothes and sunken cheeks is revealed. From his darkened hiding place in the interior of a windmill, the frame opens to a desolate panorama of dead bodies and hulking tanks. Ivan silently wades alone, chest-high, into the frigid waters of the no-mans-land. Finally he finds refuge in a Russian army bunker.¹⁸

Ivan is a child whose body has been destroyed by war. In the dim light of a single lamp, he disrobes to reveal a small, scarred form attached to the face of a world-worn adult. The camera encourages the viewer to be shocked by Ivan's body, just as the ranking lieutenant in the bunker is stopped short by the sight of the boy. "What's that on your back?" he asks as Ivan removes his shirt. Ivan turns as the camera catches a glimpse of a large scar, half covered in shadow. "Answer me!" the lieutenant orders. "It's none of your business. And don't shout at me!" the clearly exhausted Ivan retorts. As one member of the filmmakers' union stated in 1962, the most striking scene of the film came for him when Ivan was first presented to the screen. "He bears upon his skinny, shivering, hungry, unfortunate shoulders such drama that we need not know how his mother or father died. We are instead confronted immediately with the reality of children and

¹⁸ Ibid, 31 and Maia Merkel', "Snimaet Vadim Iusov," *Iskusstvo Kino* 1 (1963): 104.

war.”¹⁹ Similar scenes are repeated throughout the film in long close-up shots that linger on Ivan’s ribs, his arms, and his neck. The camera becomes a witness to the physical manifestation of war upon the child.

Ivan’s bodily destruction is compounded by the fact that he is orphaned. Like Khutsiev, Tarkovsky focuses his attention on the uncertain obligations of adults to care for the next generation and the effects of such uncertainties upon the young. With his family long since dead, Ivan spends the majority of the film in the company of the young Lieutenant Galtsev and his ranking officer, captain Kholin. The two men engage in an ongoing debate over what should be done with the boy. At first, their concern for Ivan appears almost parental. For instance, when Ivan arrives in the bunker at the beginning of the film, Galtsev draws him a bath, provides him with dry clothes, and tenderly carries him to bed. Later, when Ivan is met by the older officer, Kholin, he is showered with kisses and expressions of concern over his diminishing weight. Later in the film, when the men decide to send Ivan away from the front to a military school where he can be safe, Ivan runs away in protest and leads the men in a search to find him. Like the older Fedor’s rescue in Khutsiev’s film, Galtsev and Kholin retrieve Ivan from the rubble of a burned out village. They attempt to express to him why he must leave the front. Kholin says to him, “Can’t you understand, silly, that war is for grown men?” Yet Ivan provides a number of reasons for why he should not be sent away. He argues that he is useful in the field. He reminds the men that adult scouts have been killed in the past because they were too big. “Besides,” he states, “I’m alone. You know I have no family left.” When Kholin announces that Ivan must go nonetheless, the boy yells, “You’re not my dad to decide!” After a long pause, Kholin retorts, “Shut up, or I’ll spank you. You’re my pain in the neck.” Such fatherly words bring a smile to Ivan’s tear soaked face. They imply

¹⁹ “Pervoe ob’edinenie. Stenogramma zasedania Khudozhestvennogo Soveta. Posmotr i obsuzhdenie fil’ma “Ivanogo Detstvo” Predsedatel’stvuet – L.R. Sheinin, May 1 1962, RGALI f.2453, op.4, d.261, l.19.

that Kholin is perhaps beginning to see himself as a guardian for the boy and they give the viewer a sense of security in knowing that Ivan will be cared for, even if he doesn't want it.

Yet unlike the young Fedor, no adult ultimately intervenes on Ivan's behalf. Kholin's and Galtsev's parental desires are subsumed beneath the need for Ivan to perform another mission, thus transforming the boy from a symbol of salvation into an image of abandonment. Near the end of the film, while the men and Ivan wait in a ruined church for nightfall in order to begin their mission, Galtsev again makes the argument that Ivan should go to school. This time, however, Kholin provides the arguments against Ivan's departure from the front. He admits openly that he himself is still a child and will not be able to adopt the boy, thereby denying his responsibility as father. "And besides," he argues, "All [Ivan] can think of is vengeance." These arguments are seconded by Ivan, who reminds the men that children are an integral part of the war. When Galtsev again asserts that the boy should leave, Ivan yells at the lieutenant for forgetting about the concentration camps and the suffering of children there. "What are you *talking* about? What?" Ivan cries at Galtsev, his face only inches from the screen.

Ivan eventually returns to the no-man's land, fading back into the muted grays of the frigid swamp where we first met him. At the end of the film, Galtsev is seen sorting through German paperwork on Soviet casualties in the rubble of Berlin. He comes across Ivan's photograph next to a report that the boy has been captured and hung.



Illustration 3.2: Ivan's Childhood (Director Andrei Tarkovsky)

The image of Ivan carried different meanings for different people. According to some reviewers, Ivan was a lasting testament to Soviet military might and was representative of the population's willingness to sacrifice everything in defense of freedom. This was the argument made by the film critic and screenwriter Nikolai Kovarskii (who would later write the screenplay for the 1966 film *Vystrel*). He declared during the review meetings for the screenplay that the themes introduced in *Ivan's Childhood* attested to the "magnificent character of the Soviet people. It is a theme of [the] gigantic responsibility that the boy takes by working on the same level as the adults... It is a theme that touches on the need for calm nerves, a theme of how war can be fought without bullets... a theme of how character can win a war."²⁰ Such an

²⁰ N.A. Kovarskii, "Stenogramma zasedaniia Khudozhestvennogo Soveta 1-go Tvorcheskogo ob'edineniia – Obsuzhdenie postanovochnogo stsenariia (Ivan)," August 1 1960. RGALI f.2453, op.4, d. 208, l.37.

interpretation attempted to fit Ivan into the contemporary heroic war myth that acknowledged the valiant efforts of the Soviet people and de-emphasized the image of Stalin altogether. It also attempted to see Ivan as a lasting testament to Soviet strength in the contemporary era.

Other reviewers and critics also saw the film as a testament to the Soviet pursuit of peace around the world. Neia Zorkaia has argued, for instance, that Ivan reinforced the state's public image as a crusader for peace. She contends that in the context of the Cold War, Tarkovsky's Ivan can be seen as a well-placed testament to the Soviet desire for peace. "Andrei Tarkovsky always resented political time-serving;" she comments, "but he had an acute sense of time, which prompted his new interpretation of a wartime story."²¹ Similar sentiments were expressed at the time by American reviewers of the film, who acknowledged its artistic merits but argued that it was, nonetheless, a piece of Soviet propaganda meant to fit into the larger officially-promoted image of the Soviet Union as a defender of peace in the world.²² These interpretations provided by Kovarskii and Zorkaia undoubtedly help to explain why this film made it past the censors and onto the world screen. For many in the Soviet Union, *Ivan* provided a means for remembering the heroic Soviet past and for casting the Soviet role in the Cold War as an ongoing and heartfelt crusade for peace.

Nonetheless, these were not the only meanings that Ivan's image carried. Whereas for some reviewers, Ivan's destroyed psyche and body represented the spirit of Soviet strength and sacrifice, for others, it was an image that questioned the presumed concern of the Soviet system for its youth, that exposed the destruction of a generation that had been lost to war, and that revealed the horror of war in general. Just as the positive meanings of Ivan's image seemed to support the state's official conceptualization of the

²¹ Neia Zorkaia, *The Illustrated History of the Soviet Cinema* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1989), 32.

²² Lee Atwell, *Film Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Autumn 1964) 50.

Cold War as a struggle for peace, so too did the more disturbing meanings of Ivan's form seem to question this view by presenting a destroyed and unprotected generation that had no hope for reconstruction and no commitment to peace.

One of more troublesome aspects of the movie for members of the filmmakers' union in the early 1960s arose during debates over Ivan's abandonment and the decision of the two officers to send the boy back to the front near the end of the film. A number of members worried that this action would not be understood correctly by contemporary viewers who would not understand why the Soviet Union had allowed the young to participate in war. One union member lamented to his colleagues and Tarkovsky that the film had made every adult in the room feel as though he needed to apologize for what had happened to the country's children. "Yes, it happened," he admitted,

It was so brutal! At the front there were even organizations of school children who, after three or four weeks of preparation, we threw over to the other side [*perebrasyvalis*'] and were used for reconnaissance. We knew it was wrong, and yet we did it. But did we have a choice? And how can we convey this to the people now?²³

For all of the union members, this film touched upon the rawest of feelings. It harkened to the terrible things that had been done out of necessity for the sake of victory. It also presented an image of adult Soviet behavior that many feared would be misinterpreted by foreign audiences as evidence of Soviet brutality against its own children.

Worries about contemporary misinterpretations of the film also centered on the Ivan's terrible fate and what that might say to audiences about the Soviet Union's ability

²³ N.A. Kovarskii, "Stenogramma zasedaniia Khudozhestvennogo Soveta 1-go Tvorcheskogo ob'edineniia – Obsuzhdenie postanovochnogo stsenariia (Ivan)," August 1 1960. RGALI f.2453, op.4, d. 208, l. 39.

to recover in the aftermath of the war.²⁴ Some members of the union seriously urged Tarkovsky to rethink Ivan's tragic death. "It would be possible to save the boy!" N.A. Kovalski pleaded in 1960, while the script was still under revision. He argued that such an action would carry an "enormous contemporary subtext." By this he presumably meant that Ivan's survival, like that of the young Fedor's, would provide evidence to modern audiences of the Soviet Union's ability to survive and save its children, even in the wake of unfathomable terror. But the film's screenwriter, Andrei Bogomolov, refused to adopt the redemptive ending. He retorted that such a subtext would not be compatible with his intentions in writing the script. "What were we trying to say in the end?" he asked himself and the others at the union meeting where the ending was discussed. "We wanted to say that people who have survived much become dear to each other, and yet because it is war, they do not ever really meet and are left wishing that they could have connected."²⁵ Bogomolov's comment, although vague, speaks to the inability to recover from such an event. He wants to avoid any subtext that might provide a hopeful vision to the Soviet war experience or to the possibilities for recovery. In May 1961, Bogomolov again declared to the members of the filmmakers' union that it was his direct intention in writing the screenplay "to show that in all wars, childhood is not possible and that love is not possible. Sometimes, there can be no reconstruction."²⁶ Writing a heroic narrative of Soviet national strength and vigilance was not Bogomolov's intent. Instead, he and Tarkovsky sought to use the figure of Ivan to reveal the permanent and unrecoverable damage done by the war. They also hinted at the potential for similar destruction in future

²⁴ "Pervoe ob'edinenie. Stenogramma zasedaniia Khudozhestvennogo Soveta. Posmotr i obsuzhdenie fil'ma "Ivanogo Detstvo" Predsedatel'stvet – L.R. Sheinin," May 1 1962. RGALI f. 2453, op. 4, d. 261, l. 14.

²⁵ "Stenogramma zasedaniia Khudozhestvennogo Soveta 1-go Tvorcheskogo ob'edineniia – Obsuzhdenie postanovochnogo stsenariia (Ivan)," August 1 1960, RGALI f. 2453, op. 4, d. 208, l. 40

²⁶ "Stenogramma zasedaniia khudozhestvennogo stsenariia (Ivanogo Detstvo)," May 31 1961, RGALI f.2453, op.4, d.232, l.7.

wars. In the final scenes of the film, where Galtsev's voiceover is heard, he asks the viewer, "Won't this be the last war on earth?" On the screen, the records of the dead are pulled from the rubble. The camera pans back to reveal a room filled with records. Black ash, fallout from the bombing of Berlin, descends from the sky and covers the floor as Galtsev is revealed to be the only survivor of the group.

For some reviewers of the film, Ivan's character and motivation proved even more disturbing than his abandonment and death. Ivan is revealed as a child consumed not by a desire for peace, but by a lust for vengeance that supersedes even his own need for survival. In addition to wanting to do his patriotic duty for the war effort, his refusal to go to military school is also explained by his deep and abiding need for revenge. This motivation is revealed in a memorable scene set in the ruined church before the final reconnaissance mission. Standing alone in the darkened room, the young Ivan fantasizes about bringing his wrath upon the German men who killed his mother and friends. Through the beam of his flashlight, he finds writing on a wall written by eighteen Russian soldiers waiting to be shot by the Germans. In their short message, they call upon those still living to avenge them. The boy becomes enraged. Light and dark flash across the screen, revealing Ivan's contorted face, a knife in his hand, a glimpse of his mother, a German army coat hanging on the wall. These images are made more chaotic by the loud sounds of a weeping woman. "You must stand trial!" Ivan calls out into the darkness before collapsing in tears. Scenes like this one showed the extent of his destructive passion and the traumatic effects of the war upon his psyche. They presented a vision of a generation that had become lost, not only through its inability to move beyond the traumas of the war but through its absence of hope. As Josephine Woll has noted, Ivan is a child who cannot be saved.²⁷ Shots near the end of the film show documentary footage

²⁷ Woll, *Real Images: Soviet Cinema and the Thaw*, 141.

of Goebbels' poisoned children, suggesting the "twin motifs of vengeance and of ravaged childhood." They attest to the fact that "not only our Ivan (and his Russian peers) have lost their [hopefulness and innocence] to war: all children have."²⁸

The Cold War meanings conveyed in these images were unavoidable for some reviewers. As one critic put it in 1962, Ivan represented a "violation both of normal psychological upbringing and of the world of the child." He argued that "this is not a view of Soviet childhood that we want to promote now...What does this say about the beliefs of our youth and about their ability to build a future?"²⁹ Such criticism reveals the extent to which Cold War concerns colored the viewing experience at least for conservative reviewers and state censors. Many reviewers watching this film were acutely aware of the subtexts that such images could carry for contemporary audiences. They were pointing out the extent to which *Ivan's Childhood* had rejected the image of the peace-loving and hopeful Cold War child. These contrasting perspectives on the meanings of Ivan's story constituted opposing views on how to remember the war itself and arguably on the role that the Soviet Union was playing in the current crisis with the United States—either as an advocate for peace or as a player in a dangerous game that threatened everyone. On the one hand, the film seemed to support Khrushchev's argument that "peaceful coexistence" was the only possible alternative for the world. Yet, while Khrushchev was arguing to his population that Soviet children would "manifest the new communist morals of the Soviet people" and would "find their place in life, and combine their fate with the fate of the country," Tarkovsky was creating an image of childhood that was identified not by peaceful mobilization and the construction of a

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ "Pervoe ob'edinenie. Stenogramma zasedaniia Khudozhestvennogo Soveta. Posmotr i obsuzhdenie fil'ma "Ivanogo Detstvo" Predsedatel'stvet – L.R. Sheinin," May 1 1962. RGALI f. 2453, op. 4, d. 261, l.1.

national future, but by vengeance, destruction, chaos, and death.³⁰ Moreover, while Khutsiev in *Two Fedors* had created an image of a generation whose mobilization for the Cold War was questionable, Tarkovsky created a vision of youth that was destroyed completely. The form of the lost child became a visual manifestation of unspoken fears about the future of Russia's youth and the permanent damage that had been done by the war.

These same images and ideas were revisited again, three years later, when Mikhail Romm directed his pseudo-documentary, *Ordinary Fascism*. Romm's work represented the first attempt in the Soviet Union to provide a documentary on fascism, and implicitly, on totalitarianism. It did not tell a story in any conventional sense, although it carried narrative components through its organization of particular images throughout the Nazi period.³¹ The film instead analyzed "the instincts and motives of people who ceded their individuality to become part of a mindless social mass."³² While on the surface the movie served as a statement against the "psychological vulnerability of the German petite bourgeoisie," *Ordinary Fascism* also made unmistakable references both to the capacity for similar "group think" during the Stalinist era, and to the presence of comparable dangers in the nuclear age.³³

Romm set out in 1960 to analyze the fascist experience using only real footage drawn from two million meters of seized Nazi film, which was then supplemented with still photographs taken from Hitler's personal photographer, Heinrich Hoffman, as well as regular photographs taken by German soldiers, by Romm, and by other Soviet

³⁰ Nikita Khrushchev, "Vospitaniia Novogo Cheloveka—Bortsa i Stritelia Kommunizma: k XIV S'ezdu VLKSM," RGASPI f. m6, op. 4, d. 111, l. 1.

³¹ L.I. Belova, *Besedy O Kino* (Moscow: Izd-vo, 1964), 108.

³² Josephine Woll, "Mikhail Romm's Ordinary Fascism," in *Picturing Russia: Explorations in Visual Culture*, ed. Valerie Kivelson and Joan Neuberger (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 224.

³³ *Ibid.*

cinematographers in the last months of the war.³⁴ After sorting his vast materials into 120 piles separated by theme, he sat down to build a series of episodes that would show the process by which a country of seemingly moral, God-fearing citizens could become agents of genocide. He then combined these images with his own commentary, which used irony, humor, and outright anger to guide his viewers through a maze of visual allusion and parallel. Like Khutsiev and Tarkovsky, Romm's work in many ways revolved around contested images of children. By showing the dual capacities of adults to both care for and destroy youth, Romm explored the potential for collective brutality in all people. Whereas Tarkovsky's *Ivan* had provided a specific portrayal of war's impact upon one fictional child, Romm took the same themes of the "lost generation" and the creation of vengeful youth and applied them to hundreds of portrayals of real children both during the Second World War and in the years of rising Cold War tensions.

Romm's film in many ways reads like an academic essay. It presents its primary argument in the first ten minutes of the film by pointing out the contradictory identities that human beings are capable of assuming. In the first several scenes of the film, viewers are shown an array of children's drawings of cats. They see footage of students preparing to take exams, mothers pushing baby carriages and more endearing drawings by children of their mothers. Such images reflect the collective humanity and shared love of family that spans humankind. Then, Romm cuts from a photograph of a Soviet mother holding her child while crossing a Moscow street, to a still of a Jewish mother shielding her child as they are both shot by an SS agent. (See Illustration 3.3) The camera dwells silently on piles of children's potties that were brought to the concentration camps by mothers who thought there would be a need for them. These images present to the viewer the film's primary questions: What is the process that transforms loving individuals into soldiers

³⁴ Mikhail Romm, *Montazhnaia Struktura fil'ma* (Moscow: Vses. Gos. In-t Kinematografii, 1981), 301.

capable of shooting and burning the innocent? How is it that children can be the focus of deep love and also be targets for extermination?



Illustration 3.3: Ordinary Fascism (Director Mikhail Romm)

For the remainder of the film, Romm sets out to explore how such contradictory identities are possible. He focuses his attention first on the rise of Hitler's cult of personality, spending almost ten minutes chronicling the meticulous binding of a leather-bound copy of *Mein Kampf* as a reflection of the leader's deification in the late 1930s. He then turns to examinations of "ordinary life" in Nazi Germany, looking there for the origins of Nazi behavior. Books are burned at Berlin University. Academics are transformed into soldiers in uniform. Romm's voice intones, "These are humans too. But yet they are not really human. They are a mass." Romm's image of the transformed child then hits the screen. In these segments, which are taken from Nazi propaganda films, German children appear cared for; they are well nourished and happy, they are shown playing hopscotch to the theme of the National Socialist Party. Yet in contrast to the drawings shown at the beginning of the film, these children display illustrations of tanks, swastikas, and knives. They work diligently to draft a birthday card for Hitler. The child now becomes not just an object of contested concern and destruction, but the first step in

creating the fascist identity. These are children who are learning to kill and be killed. These are children driven by hate who will soon become adults.

The culmination of Romm's study into the fascist transformation comes to a head in the final chapter, where he shows images of goose-stepping Hitler youth followed by scenes of young, growling American soldiers armed with bayonets. "This is the final product," Romm announces. These images and this statement convey two messages. First, they represent the end of the transformative path that Romm has been tracing from the joyful drawings of cats and loving parents to the unimaginable acts of the SS. Second, they make an explicit link between the transformation of youth under the Nazis and the transformation happening among the young in the modern Cold War world. At the end of the film, a nuclear bomb explodes, standing as a terrifying portent of what horrors are possible when such transformations are allowed to occur.

But the transformations that Romm sought to trace were not simply relegated to the "bourgeois world." At a Mosfilm viewing of the work in 1963, for instance, Sasha Bovin referred directly to the "Ordinary Stalinism" that was also inferred in the film.³⁵ More than this, for some critics of the film, Romm's message failed to adequately differentiate between the upbringings that Soviet and Western children were receiving. Not only did it present children who were destroyed and incapable of contemporary mobilization (as Khutsiev and Tarkovsky had), it also seemed to argue that the capacity for brutality was present in the Soviet system as well as the capitalist one. "Where is the Soviet Union in this film to stand apart from these examples?" one member of the filmmaker's union asked Romm in 1962. "You should be clearer in showing that this is not possible here."³⁶ In some ways, Romm answered this question in the film when he

³⁵ Fedor Burlatskii in an interview with Grigorii Durnogo on January 21, 2008. Cited in Maia Turovskaia, "Some Documents from the Life of a Documentary Film," *Studies in Russian and Soviet Cinema* 2, no. 2 (2008): 157.

³⁶ "Stenogramma Zasedaniia," RGALI, f. 2453, op. 4, d. 2785, l. 4.

tied pictures of snarling boys with bayonets to his commentary: “You think you know war? You don’t know war. Here are the children. What do they know about war?” Romm was reminding his viewers that the dangers of transformation into the life of “ordinary fascism” are easily forgotten by the young, both in the East and the West. He was also making it clear that the consequences of such transformations were nothing less than a nuclear holocaust.

Khrushchev’s subsequent criticism of Romm’s film testifies to the power of the director’s critical vision in speaking to modern issues surrounding the Cold War and the arms race. In 1963, Khrushchev stated at a speech before government officials that “there are certain twisted and wrong views on the role of the cinema among screen people. This applies, in particular, to so well-known and experienced a film maker as Mikhail Romm.”³⁷ Khrushchev’s criticism of the film was not directed towards Romm’s representation of German barbarity. Instead, he found issue with the film’s larger message, which spoke to the Soviet role in the Cold War.³⁸ Romm’s film served not only as powerful documentation of the horrors of the Holocaust, it also provided a stinging commentary about the world’s current path towards increased Cold War aggression.

By recasting the image of the child as embattled, destroyed, and made violent by war, Khutsiev, Tarkovsky, and Romm not only created a new set of parameters for remembering the Great Patriotic War, they also presented a vision of youth that was strikingly different from the one that was under state-production during these years. Far from being mobilized for peace and economic competition, these children appeared to be prepared only for disillusionment and death, with no hope for a future that only promised more war. In many ways, these images fit into the larger message being generated by the

³⁷ Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, "Vysokaia Ideinost' i Khudozhestvennoe Masterstv'e - Velikaia Sila Sovetskoi Literaturyi i Iskusstvo," *Pravda* 69 (1963): 4.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

Pioneers and the Party leadership in these years—that the Soviet Union sought peace because it had experienced the horrors of war and sought never to encounter them again. Yet in other ways, they stood as new and remarkably persistent reminders that the population had been permanently impacted by their experiences, that childhood itself was not possible in war, and that such horror could happen again.

ABANDONED CHILDREN IN THE KHRUSHCHEV ERA

The image of the suffering child was not restricted to the war story. Thaw films set in the 1950s and the 60s also used visions of abandoned and disillusioned children to talk about problems that existed in current Soviet society. They explored the legacy of fear and secrecy from the Stalinist era, the suffering of individuals and families at the expense of state policies, and the loneliness and disillusionment of youth. They also became, as Alexander Prokhorov has argued, a way to focus their attention away from grandiose stories about the collective Soviet family, with its national crusades for mobilization and competitive co-existence, towards the single family, with its personal dramas and its individual dreams.³⁹ Like Fedor and Ivan, children in these films represented a counter-image of youth who, instead of being educated, protected, and prepared by the state for the furthering of the country's Cold War interests, were left without state and parental guidance, had a cynical view of society, and were dependent largely upon themselves to carve their own destinies.

The themes of individual drama and abandonment were central to Georgii Daniela and Igor Talankin's 1960 film, *Serezha*. The movie tells the story of a young boy who is adopted by his kind stepfather, a Party official, and is faced with abandonment when his family must relocate to Siberia without him. Unlike the propaganda films that the boy

³⁹ Prokhorov, "The Adolescent and the Child in the Cinema of the Thaw."

watches in the movie theatre on the success of collectivization, Serezha's life is, in the words of Josephine Woll, "far more complex and absorbing than the artifice of the so-called "actuality" that is presented in Soviet propaganda.⁴⁰ On the surface, this film's story of a father who must leave his little boy in order to save a distant communal farm adhered to the basic tenets of the traditional Socialist Realist narrative by highlighting the sacrifices made by Soviet citizens in order to forward the communist cause. Yet because the movie sought to tell the story from the perspective of one solitary child, it revealed the heart-wrenching and personal consequences of such sacrifices upon real families. This re-telling of the Socialist Realist narrative dramatized the conflict between the family and the state and ultimately questioned the value of such heroic sacrifices when they led to the abandonment of children and the destruction of families.

Serezha begins with the addition of a new father into the family of a widowed mother and her young son. Suspicious at first, Serezha is soon won over by the man when they go into the city to buy a new bicycle. Serezha quickly decides that, like his father, he wants to be a farm director when he grows up. He is filled with pride when he sees the man on an official newsreel documenting the successes of the farm. He is later tempted to become a sailor when he sees the amazing tattoos on the back of his friend's father (he even tries to get a tattoo on his own hand), but soon realizes that while the sailor may be adventurous, he is also brutish and not nearly as good a father as his own.

⁴⁰ Woll, *Real Images: Soviet Cinema and the Thaw*, 115. Richard Stites also comments on the contrast between the newsreel and the real village. "The cyclical, unchanging nature of the farm life is gently but sadly illuminated in the self-referential scene in which the farmers watch themselves over and over in a documentary production film. The contrast between the bubbling total idyll depiction in *Kuban Cossaks* and the bleakness of *Serezha* is a striking instance of the new quest for cinematic truth." Richard Stites, *Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society since 1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 140.



Illustration 3.4: Serezha (Directors Daniela and Talankin)

Serezha's hope and innocence are made all the more poignant when the boy realizes that he is soon to be left behind. His father has become so successful as a farm director that he now is being ordered to move to Siberia to fix a failing farm. The parents have decided to leave Serezha because he has a cold and would be difficult to care for in the distant steppe. Late in the evening before the rest of the family is due to leave, Serezha runs into the room where his father is working and begs him to let him come along. With tears streaming down his face, he pleads, "Please do not go! Please take me with you! I beg you, please!" In the dark of the night, the father takes Serezha on a walk through the woods and attempts to explain to the boy why the family must go.

FATHER

There's such a word as "must" my boy. Don't go thinking that we like
going to Kholmogori. But we must, and we go.

SEREZHA

But why papa?

FATHER

Such is life.

At the climax of the film, Serezha stands in the glare of the car's headlight as it prepares to leave. The boy's mother orders him to move out of the way so that the car can pull off. Serezha then steps out of the light and into the dark shadow of the empty house, thereby mirroring his movement away from innocence and hope towards abandonment and loneliness. Serezha's face reflects a deep grief wrought from his realization that he is now alone and that the dreams he had held for his new family had been fantasy. While such separations were a reality for many Soviet citizens throughout these years, never before had the personal tragedy of such an event been captured with so much pathos. The little, resigned boy standing in the snow represented a transformation of youth that was different from the one observed by Romm, but was no less poignant. Instead of symbolizing the change from innocence to violence, the film captured the boy's metamorphosis from innocence to disillusionment, resignation, and awareness of loss.

At the film's end, Serezha turns his back on the camera and begins to walk away. The visual chaos created by the white snow on the screen is amplified by the loud sounds of the car. Then, just as all appears lost, the father stops and yells out to the boy, "You are coming! Get your things!" The joy on Serezha's face reflects the relief felt by every viewer sitting in the theatre. As he runs frantically through the house gathering his things, his mother yells to her husband, "What are you doing! We cannot bring him!" But the father cannot bear to leave him behind. "It doesn't matter. I can't do it!" He yells back at her. Serezha and his father tearfully embrace as the car pulls away into the white snow, but not before we, as spectators, have been allowed to feel the profound sense of abandonment that Serezha felt as he stood alone. What we are left with is a sense that in

the end, the boy's abandonment was only prevented by the fact that the farm director was willing to put the needs of his own, individual family over those of the state.

In a period when the mobilization of the family and the child was presented as a popular imperative by the state, *Serezha* stood as an example of what state directives could do to the family, and how families ultimately could choose a different path. As one union member put it in 1958, "Serezha's father makes a choice that we all approve of, but it is a difficult choice that will have an impact upon his ability to do his job in Kholmogori. There is a contradiction here."⁴¹ Such contradictions reflected unspoken anxieties about the role of the individual in performing his or her prescribed obligations to society while still living an authentic life that included a devotion to family.

Moreover, *Serezha* presented an image of youth that was different from the ideal vision being created by the Pioneers and the state. While he appeared innocent and hopeful at the beginning of the narrative, by the final shots, he has experienced disillusionment, abandonment, and suspicion of the older generation. It is worth noting that the film's release came during the 40th anniversary of the Komsomol, when *Iskusstvo Kino*, along with all of the mainstream newspapers, printed articles in almost every edition praising the power of youth and the next generation's role in creating a new, mobilized Soviet future. As Lev Karpinskii wrote, "Soviet youth always were at the frontlines where they struggled for revolution and communism...They have been loved and educated like no children in history."⁴² Yet *Serezha* presented an image of youth that challenged the ideal portrait painted by Karpinskii and numerous others. *Serezha* is almost abandoned by his family, and the love that is finally shown to him emerges only when the directives of the state are set aside.

⁴¹ "Stenogramma Zasedaniia," RGALI, f. 2453, op. 4, d. 2785, l. 33.

⁴² L. Karpinskii, "Prazdnik Molodosti," *Iskusstvo Kino*, October 10 1958, 1.

Serezha's near abandonment is made all the more poignant by the behavior of the mother, who scolds her husband at the end for choosing to bring the boy along. Daniela and Talankin's depiction of Serezha's aloof and sometimes unfeeling mother constitutes a regular theme in films of this period. Consistently, the image of the nurturing mother is absent in films that use the child as the main protagonist. In addition to *Ivan's Childhood*, *Two Fedors*, and *Serezha*, other films such as Alexander Mitte's *Someone is Ringing*, *Open the Door*, Sergei Bondarchuk's *The Fate of a Man*, Tengiz Abuladze's *Someone Else's Children*, and Sergei Paradzhanov's *Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors*, all involve the story of the motherless child. Again and again, children simply have no protection from the outside world and are even betrayed at times by the one person that was supposed to defend them. In *Serezha*, it is the step-father, not the mother, who finally capitulates and insists on taking the weeping boy with them to Kholmogori. In *Ivan's Childhood*, the mother represents a memory of a happier time that has been violently and senselessly ripped away. In Abuladze's *Someone Else's Children*, the real mother is never mentioned and is instead replaced by a reluctant babysitter.

The vision of the absent mother in Thaw film reflected the inability or unwillingness of Soviet women to be both mothers and mobilized citizens in the Soviet world. The trope of the fertile Soviet woman-as-worker and as domesticated-mother had, under Socialist Realism, represented the achievement of communism in the Soviet Union. Women in Thaw films often contradicted that traditional image through their voluntary barrenness and absence. Not only were they torn from their children by fate and obligation, they also at times could be seen rejecting the possibility of children altogether. At times, their absence was attributable to their perceived obligations to the Revolution, as in Askoldov's *The Commissar*. More frequently, their failure to be adequate mothers appeared to emerge from a recurring sense of emotional emptiness. In films of the Thaw,

mothers often seem to have given up on the possibilities of family and children, either because they have been traumatized by the Stalinist legacy or because they have put their obligations to the state over their personal needs. This resignation is reflected in the childless school teacher in *We'll Survive Till Monday* who confesses to her young colleague through her tears, "Don't wait too long to have children...If you delay, you will end up like me—talking about someone else's happiness." The same sentiments are expressed by the lonely waterworks supervisor in *Brief Encounters*, who, when asked if she should have a child, merely quips, "I should have everything." The absence of the family – of children and love, are a common focus of female regret in Thaw film. They often seem consumed by a morose lethargy, driven by bitterness and a resignation concerning that which is unattainable. In a period where "the family served as a master signifier for the construction of national identity," this open statement about the incompatibility of the family, the child and the woman who has devoted herself to work and the socialist cause, was bold indeed.⁴³ In the words of Lev Anninsky, these women conveyed their "anticipation of catastrophe," for their culture and for the future of the Soviet Union through their inability or unwillingness to usher the next generation into the world.⁴⁴

The image of the abandoned child also resonated in unique ways for the Soviet populace and particularly for its artists. Just as the children in Thaw films could be seen having been left behind by their mothers, so too were the people of Mother Russia envisioned as having been discarded by their assumed protector, the state. As Evgeny Dobrenko has argued, protagonists had traditionally assumed in the course of a standard Socialist Realist narrative, a position of submission to the system's larger ideological model, in effect becoming infantilized first as socially immature personalities, unready to

⁴³ Prokhorov, "The Unknown New Wave: Soviet Cinema of the 1960s".

⁴⁴ Lev Anninsky, "Hello? Adieu?," *Soviet Film* (1990): 29.

be “free, rational, and objective,” and then later, as “Socialist Realist heroes return[ing] from the world of childhood” only to remain children as lifelong disciples of socialism.⁴⁵ By restricting both content and style over the years, the Party had unnaturally attempted to enforce a permanent state of infancy in its artists, writers, and filmmakers.⁴⁶ In the words of Eric Naiman, the Socialist Realist narrative became a “screen for a dynamic of infantilization.”⁴⁷ By exploring the experiences of the motherless child, artists were able to talk about their own status within Soviet society, their position as “childish” artists made “mature” only through the parental direction of the state. By creating child characters that faced such desolation, they spoke to the artistic frugality offered by Socialist Realism.

The issue of child abandonment and maternal absence was perhaps best explored in Alexander Mitte’s film, *Someone is Ringing, Open the Door*, which was released in 1965 to much acclaim. It told the story of a young girl named Tania who struggles to make a life for herself while living alone in Moscow in the early 1960s. She finds herself alone, not simply in her apartment, but in her pursuit of a communist ideal that the people around her appear to have discarded. In the mid-1960s, the film raised concerns for many reviewers because it seemed to create an image of contemporary adults as potential deserters of children. Although they saw Tania as an ideal protagonist, and the film as a way to focus the attention of Soviet youth away “from the western influences of *Dartagnan* and *The Magnificent Seven*,” others viewed it as a troubling indictment of Soviet society and its failure to protect and raise the next generation.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Evgenii Dobrenko, “Sotsrealizm i mir detsva,” in *Sotsrealisticheskii Kanon*, ed. Hans Gunther and Evgenii Dobrenko (Saint Petersburg: Akademicheskii Proekt, 2000), 33.

⁴⁶ Thomas Slater, *Handbook of Soviet and East European Films and Filmmakers* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), 1.

⁴⁷ Eric Naiman, “Children in *The Master and Margarita*,” *SEEJ* 50, no. 4 (2006): 656.

⁴⁸ V.N. Khuravlev, “Stenogramma zasedaniia khudozhestvennogo Soveta Obsuzhdeniia literaturnogo tsensurarii, “Zvoniati, Otkroite Dver,” February 3 1964, RGALI f. 2453, op. 4, d. 1420, l. 28.

In the opening shots of the film, a young girl walks alone in the dark snow to the accompaniment of staccato music. This audio-visual image sets a tone of quiet isolation for the rest of the film. For the first ten minutes, the child consumes the shot. Alone and parentless, she climbs the stairs to her apartment, undresses, sits quietly as she listens to a musical recording, and puts herself to bed. As the camera pulls away, she is seen huddling in a dark room. We learn later that Tania's mother has gone to be with her father, who is a geologist working in the field. Neighbors tend to the child, but for the most part, she is alone.

The film's plot centers on Tania's school project to find old Pioneers from the 1920s, to record their stories, and to have them talk at a meeting. Tania travels from apartment to apartment, searching for people who can talk to her about the past. She is mostly unsuccessful in her search. In a veiled reference to the damage of the Stalinist purges and the Second World War, one woman tells her "So many people have left. You won't find anyone here." Another man, who was supposed to have been a Pioneer, turns out to be a drunk (played by the rising star Oleg Yefremof) and slams the door in her face. Finally, Tania arrives at the apartment of her friend, Gennady, whose step-father Pavel, played by Rolan Bykov, decides to help the children in their search. Although he himself was never a Pioneer, Pavel is the only adult willing to help Tania. He asks the ladies in the coat room, the woman who sells sausage and the traffic cop if they know where old Pioneers might be found, but none have an answer. As the film progresses, it becomes increasingly clear that the past is going to be impossible for Tania and Pavel to locate. Finally they do find a former Pioneer, who is now a famous violinist. Unfortunately, he proves to be a terrible narcissist who has no memories of the past beyond how amazing he was in it. When he fails to show up at the children's ceremony to talk about his experiences and to perform, Pavel saves the day by mounting the podium to

describe a Pioneer that he once knew. He then plays a short, sad song on his trumpet in tribute to the long-lost and absent Pioneer.



Illustration 3.5: Someone is Ringing, Open the Door (Director Alexander Mitte)

Someone Else is Ringing is, in many ways, a prototypical Thaw film. It tells the story of characters that are not perfect, but are fundamentally good people living authentic and messy lives. As Alexander Prokhorov argues, Tania is a “hero-profit.”⁴⁹ She silently perseveres despite her loneliness, becoming a symbol of survival and uncharacteristic maturity. Likewise, Pavel does not fit the mold of the traditional Soviet hero. Despite the fact that he is responsible, humble, generous, and kind, he nonetheless is not a Party member and was never a Pioneer.

Through their journeys, Tania and Pavel come into contact with other, less savory characters who impede their work and serve as a source for disillusionment and betrayal. These characters reveal a society that has little ideological belief, has no concern for the

⁴⁹ Prokhorov, "The Adolescent and the Child in the Cinema of the Thaw."

upbringing of the young, and has fostered a new generation that cares not for the Soviet past or future. As Tania and Pavel move through the streets looking for old Pioneers, they repeatedly encounter strangers who mock their project or are simply too busy with their personal lives to hear their questions. The fact that no older Pioneers can be found constitutes a direct statement on the devastation of the past and the lack of revolutionary leadership in the present. When Tania and Pavel finally do find an old Pioneer, he is the opposite of all that they are looking for. He is vain and forgetful, and the embarrassment caused by his failure to appear at the meeting is only mitigated by the intervention of Pavel himself. Pavel's replacement of the Old Pioneer at the meeting brings into question the officially promoted idea that the Pioneers, the Komsomol, and the Party are the creators of society's heroes. Ultimately, a non-party member seems to be the only one who can speak on the revolutionary activities of the Pioneers—and he does so by telling an absent man's story. In 1962, during reviews of the screenplay, Alexander Khmelik, the author and playwright (and father of the screenwriter, Maria Khmelik who later wrote the film, *Little Vera*) strongly criticized Mitte for de-emphasizing the value of the Pioneers "at a time when their role in society is so important."⁵⁰ He suggested that Mitte rewrite the script so that Pavel himself would become the old Pioneer that Tania eventually finds. "This film does not adapt well to current thinking," he argued. Yet Mitte did not significantly rewrite the script. In a period when Pioneers had become icons for Soviet development and peace activism, such a repudiation of the heroic identity of the Pioneers helped to complicate the idealized vision of a mobilized society.

Tania's betrayal by her own family also provided a commentary on the modern deterioration of the family. In many ways, this film provides an alternative continuation to the *Serezha* story. This time the child *has* been left behind while the rest of the family

⁵⁰ A. Khmelik, "Zakliuchenie," October 16 1962, RGALI f.2453, op. 5, d. 1162, l. 17.

travels for the father's work. Reviewers of the film were understandably bothered by the mother's abandonment of her young daughter. Unlike in *Serezha*, where the family plans to leave the boy behind because of his health, Tania's story is far more complicated. As Khmelik asked Mitte during a review of the screen play, "How can the mother leave? She has no compelling reason to go with her husband. Or, they should take the child with them."⁵¹ Mitte's explanation for why the mother has gone remains ambiguous in the film. In a touching scene, Tania comes to Gennady's home for dinner. Pavel says to Tania, "You must not be mad at your mother. She cannot live without your father. Life is not an easy endeavor. You are already an adult." As in *Serezha*'s rude awakening, Tania must come to terms with the fact that her mother chooses to leave her alone in a cold apartment. Better explanation for her abandonment is perhaps given by Gennady's mother (Pavel's wife), who, although physically present, is equally absent in terms of the attention she gives to her family. She comes home late at night "too weary to greet or smile at her son, let alone embrace him."⁵² The absence of both women suggests that they have reached a point where they are incapable of extending love to their own children.

The abandonment is made all the more problematic by the fact that Tania's father is a geologist. In Socialist Realist film and literature, geology, along with piloting, was one of the most common occupations for male heroes. Such men were portrayed as possessing both scientific acumen and physical virility. They travelled to the far reaches of the Soviet Union ostensibly for the sole purpose of furthering the nation's scientific knowledge, economic prosperity, and territorial acquisition. They were presented as adventurers who were also bound forever within the borders of the Motherland.⁵³ Yet, as in *Serezha*, in order to do his job the father in *Someone is Ringing* is seen having to

⁵¹ Ibid, l. 18.

⁵² Woll, *Real Images: Soviet Cinema and the Thaw*, 214.

⁵³ Lilya Kaganovsky, *How the Soviet Man was Unmade: Cultural Fantasy and Male Subjectivity under Stalin* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2008).

divide his family – a fact that is brought home by the father’s complete absence from the film. All that remains is a solitary girl, no more than ten-years-old, left on her own by a father whose work for the state compels him to leave and by a mother who chooses to be with her husband in the field instead of her daughter at home.⁵⁴

In her life as a Pioneer, Tania also encounters the cynicism, individualism and distrust that characterize the actions of the young people around her who do not help with the program to find the old Pioneers and instead pursue romantic relationships with each other. Her expectations are focused specifically on her Pioneer leader, Petia, for whom she bears a secret fancy. Yet he also betrays her when he skates with another girl his age and when he does poorly in school and misses his fencing lessons. These children, who range in age between ten and fifteen, about whom many Party leaders and educators were busy worrying and writing in these years, present an alternative vision of youth culture and of the adults around them. Far from embodying the collective mobilization that was so central to Khrushchev’s image of the Cold War child, these youths are not only left with little parental direction, they show no interest in furthering the socialist cause on their own. The behavior of Tania’s friends was particularly problematic for some filmmakers. As the union member Mikhail Korshunov put it during his review of the film, “So much of what the Pioneers do in this film appears sad. They have none of the hope and energy that characterizes our youth.”⁵⁵

Similar expressions of contemporary abandonment and childhood disillusionment also appeared a few years earlier, in Tengiz Abuladze’s groundbreaking 1958 work, *Someone Else’s Children*. Whereas Serezha’s father’s departure for Kholmogori had been

⁵⁴ Throughout the film, Tania’s Pioneer tie is constantly tied the wrong way, which would have not been allowed. Although this might have simply been a mistake on Mitte’s part, it is likely that the mis-knotted tie carried some meaning. Perhaps it symbolized further commentary on the lack of parenting that Tania received, or perhaps it carried with it a commentary about the Pioneers and their rules in general.

⁵⁵ M.P. Korshunov, “Stenogramma zasedaniia khudozhestvennogo Soveta Obsuzhdeniia literaturnogo stseneriia, “Zvoniati, Otkroite Dver’,” February 3 1964, RGALI f. 2453, op. 4, d. 1420, l. 1.

presented as needed for work, and whereas Tania's father's absence as a geologist had provided some justification for her isolation, the children in Abuladze's film are not abandoned for "noble" reasons. Instead, they find themselves incapable of securing parents because the adults around them are too concerned with their own interests to take responsibility for raising them. As such, Abuladze's children represented a direct affront to the assumed stability of Soviet society, they provided an honest examination of the messiness of personal relationships even under developed socialism, and they constituted yet another image that countered Khrushchev's vision of mobilized and protected youth in the late 1950s.

The film was based on a true story reported in *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* in 1956 which chronicled a fateful love triangle in Tbilisi that left two children orphaned. In the opening scenes, the children's father is seen arguing with his girlfriend who is in the process of leaving him. The father begs her not to leave, but she retorts that "your children need a mother, and I can't be that. They won't be happy with me and neither will you." The film then jumps to a few weeks later, with the children running wild and unsupervised on the busy city streets. The two children meet a young woman nicknamed Nato, who saves them from a collision with a car and takes them back to their apartment. She soon learns of the sad situation in which these children are living. "Who is watching you?" she asks. "No one," they reply. The house is in disarray. The brother and sister look unkempt and poorly fed. Feeling sorry for the children, Nato cleans the apartment and cooks a good meal for them. The idea then sprouts in the minds of the children that they can solve their father's loneliness and their own need for a mother by working as matchmakers. A large portion of the film is spent on the children's attempts to bring their father and Nato together. The children recycle bottles in order to save money for a gift for the young woman. They drag their father to places in the city where Nato is likely to be.

Eventually the father and Nato do find each other, and against the advice of her aunt, Nato agrees to marry the man and assume responsibility for his two children.

The story seems to end well, when suddenly the old girlfriend re-appears. The camera jumps into a montage of shots first of the father's shocked face, then to Nato, to the image of a doll left drowning in the bathtub, to the children, and finally back to the old girlfriend. As the girlfriend realizes that the father has remarried, she says flatly, "It doesn't matter what we say to each other. Your children have a mother now and this is what matters most." With that, she turns to leave. The father and the young son follow her out as Nato, the daughter, and the camera wait nervously in the apartment for the men to return. Finally, the door opens and the lone boy walks slowly into the apartment. From this point on, the two children carry the narrative of the film, with little dialogue coming from the adults around them.

BOY

Papa has left. The woman got on the train and waved as the train pulled away.

Papa ran after her and jumped on the train.

GIRL

He didn't say anything?

BOY

No.

Silence follows as Nato and the children begin to realize that their father is not coming back. Later that evening the boy approaches the shocked Nato. Speaking from his own fears of abandonment, he pleads, "Father hurt you. Father hurt your heart. May I call you mama?" But Nato does not answer. Remembering her aunt's words of warning, she runs crying from the house towards the train station, leaving the children alone and orphaned in the apartment. In the next scene, Nato frantically boards a train, obviously with the

intention of leaving the children behind. The train pulls away. The children run over the tracks after her, yelling her name. In a final, dramatic motion, Nato decides to jump off the now-quickly moving train and return to raise the children that have been left to her.



Illustration 3.6: The two children can be seen running down the railroad tracks after the fleeing Nato, *Someone Else's Children* (Director Tengiz Abuladze)

The father never returns, and the film ends with many questions left unanswered. Nato is a young woman who has no money, no career, and no way to tend to these children alone. She has left her own family to be a mother for these youngsters and will not be able to work and take care of them at the same time. They, in effect, will return to the unsupervised state that they were in at the beginning of the film. Like the final scene in *Serezha*, the father's and Nato's initial abandonment of the children are enough to convey the deep sense of betrayal and fear that these children feel towards their world and the adults in it.

Someone Else's Children received the prize for the best debut film at the 1960 London Film Festival but was panned by Soviet reviewers. *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*

found it to be too pessimistic and spiritually debilitating.⁵⁶ While reviewers were willing to admit that the film captured “the real face of children,” they, along with the state censors ultimately declared that the film was a fraudulent imitation of the Soviet socialist world.⁵⁷ This image of Soviet life, which was created through the vision of the child, stood in stark contrast to the world being conceptualized by the state. Youth appeared unsupervised, unparented, uneducated, with concerns that revolved completely around their personal desires for family.

Like Tarkovsky’s Ivan, Khutsiev’s Fedor and Mitte’s Tania, it is also worth noting that the children in *Someone Else’s Children* are survivors, who remain, at least to some extent, committed to living their lives by their own standards. All of them carry a poignant awareness of the cruelty around them. They understand that their chance to be children has been taken away from them. They are often defenseless and victimized. Yet they also carry with them a great sense of agency. Ivan tenaciously holds onto his desire for vengeance in the face of adult pressure. Fedor steals a chicken and breaks the law in order to feed his family. Tania remains committed to her Pioneer projects regardless of her loneliness and the ridicule that she receives from her peers. Similarly, the children in Abuladze’s film work diligently to form a family for themselves when the adults around them are incapable or unwilling to do it for them.

Ivan, Fedor, Tania, and Abuladze’s young protagonists reflected the altered priorities of the next generation, not towards the dictates of the state, but towards the pursuit of family and personal security. When viewed in the context of the extensive Pioneer efforts that were being made in these years to position children as domestically “contained” and mobilized for “peaceful competition,” the absence of such children in

⁵⁶ S. Gerasimov, "Razmishleniia o molodikh," *Iskusstvo Kino* 2 (1960): 22. Also see Louis Harris Cohen, *The Cultural-Political Traditions and Developments of the Soviet Cinema, 1917-1972*, The Arno Press cinema program (New York: Arno Press, 1974), 274.

⁵⁷ S. Gerasimov, "Podel'noe i podlinnoe," *Iskusstvo Kino* 5 (1960): 19.

Thaw film reflects an alternative conceptualization of Soviet society and of its questionable mobilization for the pursuit of state directives.

CHILDREN OF THE CORN: DELINQUENT YOUTH TAKES THE PARTY TO TASK

Given the predominance of child protagonists in Thaw film, it is perhaps not surprising that the era's most scathing critique of Soviet domestic and Cold War policies centered on the lives of youth. Elem Klimov's 1964 comedy, *Welcome, Or No Trespassing*, was a seemingly lighthearted film about a boy's adventures in a Pioneer summer camp. When the film hit the big screen, it provided one of the era's clearest commentaries on Soviet life and on Khrushchev's leadership. This was an amazing feat, considering that nine months earlier, Khrushchev had delivered a searing reprimand to hundred of artists, condemning them for creating generational tensions and for airing the country's "dirty laundry." Klimov's work presented an image of a delinquent, unsupervised youth who rejected the Soviet self-image of collective mobilization and yet at the same time was likable, heroic, and received support secretly from the majority of the camp's staff. The film celebrates the actions of the irreverent boy and his friends who subvert the efforts of the camp leader to maintain order and to present a positive image of the camp to visiting dignitaries. In the process, the piece addressed controversial domestic issues concerning Potemkinism, bureaucratic sycophancy, as well as Khrushchev's foreign and agricultural policies. It also recast the image of the hooligan child, not as an agent of chaos and unlawfulness, but as a force for reason and sanity in a world obsessed with rules.

In the opening shots, the camera reveals a large panorama of a beautiful lakeside. A camp counselor blows his whistle and the children race into the water. As the camera pans out, we realize that although the lake is very big, the children have been cordoned off into such a small piece of beach that they can only stand still and mildly splash each

other. In humorous scenes, the grimacing camp counselors and frantic leader attempt to count and re-count the children to make sure they stay inside the swimming space. Out of the mass of crowded children emerges the film's young hero, Kostia, who has broken out from the ringed section of beach and has swum to the other side of the lake. The children yell in admiration, but his actions are enough to have him expelled from the camp and sent home.

Klimov's image of the Pioneer camp stood in stark contrast to that being created in official Soviet rhetoric in the 1960s. Instead of providing a place where the Cold War mobilization of the young could be exhibited for the world, this camp was re-invisioned as a locus for mind-numbing bureaucratic formality and shallow ideological platitudes. Compare, for instance, the description that Gosteleradio gave to its German listeners of a beautiful day at a Pioneer summer camp in 1960 to that described by Semion Lungin, the film's screenwriter in 1965:

Following the old traditions of the god of the sea and lakes, Neptune, there will be held today, a great holiday by the beach. There will be music on board our Pioneer ship "Freundschaft" (friendship), with swimming and games, and sunny weather and of course, lots of happiness. All of this will be done so that that the children will remember this day and so that they will become acquainted with events at the camp.⁵⁸

And Lungin's description:

The place for swimming was completely roped in. They counted the children before letting us swim, while we were swimming, and after we were done. They counted us by voice, by our swim suits, by our shoes. If the count of our shoes did not come out right, they counted again. They let

⁵⁸ Iu. Kolotilov, "Information: Internales Sommerlager für den Frieden und die Freundschaft der Kinder aller Länder," Gostelradio broadcast, 1960. GARF f. 2, op. 1, d. 155, l. 7.

us go out into the water in rows with a leader at the head. And for each three rows, there would be another older leader at the head of that.⁵⁹

Lungin's memories of his camp experience made their way into the opening shots of the film. They set the stage for the movie's larger commentary on the constructed nature of official Soviet rhetoric and on the altered priorities of Soviet children in the 1960s.

This scene, as well as many that followed, faced intense criticism while under production and official review by the Filmmakers' Union. In his original screenplay, for instance, Lungin had, in the opening scene at the beach, placed a group of local, "uncultured," children on the other side of the bank who Kostia then befriends. The scene was removed completely by the Filmmakers' Union because it was too problematic to have the hero of the film be represented by a group that was *outside* of the camp – and therefore outside of the Party's control. The decision to make the change was actually made by a group of Komsomol representatives, who were put on the film's review board. Throughout their review, the Komsomol representatives stated repeatedly that the camp's portrayal "blatantly ignored" the fact that the Komsomol organization had already assiduously "addressed the question of establishing formal methods for raising children so that it will be implemented in the camps."⁶⁰ A camp like the one created by Lungin "simply does not exist here," they argued. Bureaucratic and verbose, comments like this one would have fit well into Klimov's larger effort to expose the nonsensical and over-formalized elements of modern Soviet society. Although Lungin and Klimov would eventually give in and remove the outside children from the distant beach, they did, nonetheless, succeed in having Kostia escape from the cordoned space and thus break free, both literally and metaphorically, from the confines of the camp's control.

⁵⁹ Semion Lungin, "Avtorskaia Zaiavka," *Dobro Pozhalovat*, RGASPI f. 2453, op. 4, d. 1475, l. 1.

⁶⁰ N.A. Rudakova, "Stenogramma sovместnogo zasedaniia Khudozhestvennykh Sovetov Tvorcheskogo ob'edineniia pisatelii i kinorabotnikov i tvorcheskogo ob'edineniia "Iunost'" June 7 1963. RGALI f. 2453, op. 4, d. 1403, l. 10-31.

The film's message revolved around three controversial characters—the first of which was Kostia himself. After his unfortunate expulsion, little Kostia sits at the train station, imagining the sorrow that his forced departure will cause his grandmother back home. He envisions her on her deathbed repeating the phrase, “You’ll be the death of me. You’ll be the death of me.” In his mind’s eye, he sees her being carted off in a visually hectic funeral procession as the rest of his town’s older community looks condemningly towards the guilty boy. This procession, with its hyperbolic imagery reminiscent of Fellini’s *8 1/2*, almost led to the film being shelved in 1963, largely because the editor of the film thought that the dead grandmother resembled Khrushchev.⁶¹ Although Klimov denied the similarity (of course), one can see how such an allusion would have carried serious implications for the film’s larger message. Instead of seeing a grandmother who had been brought to her deathbed by her precocious grandson, we would instead have to gaze upon the figure of Khrushchev, who was brought to his grave by the exploits and irreverence of the younger generation.

⁶¹ It was no coincidence that these scenes harkened to *8 1/2*, considering that the film had been made less than a year before Klimov tried his hand at *Welcome, Or*. This point is made by Ian Christie, “Unauthorized Persons Enter Here,” *Monthly Film Bulletin* July (1987): 200.



Illustration 3.7: Khrushchev as the grandmother for the corn. *Krokodil*, June 10, 1956.⁶²

These scenes from the grandmother's death also subverted the official Soviet vision of childhood by questioning the constructed reality around little Kostia. In disjointed sequences, the viewer sees the grandmother's coffin lined with small papier-mâché figures of elephants - the symbol of Soviet kitsch, while the funeral procession forms the shape of a question mark as it moves down the street. In Kostia's imagination, the child is no longer flanked by the real world that is supposed to define his culture. Kostia is instead a child located outside the "transcriptions" of the established world—a child whose environment is created by him alone, and which no longer supports the pre-established reality of the Soviet world. Roland Barthes has argued that the believability of an image is contingent upon its ability to include references that the viewer perceives as conventional and normal. Realistic décor, appropriate dress, a believable physical

⁶² This rendering of Khrushchev-as-grandmother was published in *Krokodil* in 1956. Notice that it renders Khrushchev as the caretaker of his corn, who wears nuclear strength on his/her lapel and has clothed his child in an endless quantity of Party protocols, feeding it from a bottle of milk (perhaps referencing Khrushchev's failed promises that the corn would actually be used to feed the cows, not the other way around). The caption reads, "Corn, with such a nanny you will not soon grow up." Compare this image to that of the corn at the end of Klimov's film (see below). Think also of the illustration's indictment of Khrushchev as a spoiling parent. "Kukuruzza," *Krokodil*, June 10 1956.

environment and dialogue will all verify for the viewer the veracity and social appropriateness of the child in the frame.⁶³ By creating a reality that repeatedly does not support the viewer's pre-established notions of what the Soviet world looks like, Klimov questioned its construction altogether and brought into stark relief the cultural and social assumptions that the viewer had towards the life and identity not only of the child, but of Soviet culture as well. While sitting on the bench, waiting for the bus, Kostia decides that in order to save his grandmother from certain death, he must go back to the camp and hide there until the session is over. He finds a perfect hiding place underneath the main podium in the center of the camp, and by the next day, a group of his friends have found him and have decided to help him in his deception.

Kostia spends much of the remainder of the film avoiding view. His concealment offers a place for childish creativity, hope, and imagination, as the podium is transformed from a center of power to a locus for the subversion of official culture. From this location, he carries out his various pranks, which include the destruction of facilities, the apparent spreading of poison ivy to the entire camp population, and the halting of the end-of-summer festival. Kostia's imagination and hope, which spreads contagiously to his peers and is born at least partially from his status as a fugitive, is directed not at socially constructive activities, but towards disruption of the status quo and the open humiliation of the camp's leader.

Next to the irreverent Kostia stands the second controversial child in the film, who listens in on the schemes of the other children and then reports back to the autocratic camp leader throughout the film. By the 1960s, the icon of the "sharp eyed" child had assumed a hagiographic character in official Soviet culture. Beatified by the story of

⁶³ Barthes calls this the "emanation of reality," while Umberto Eco calls it a "transcription." Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*. Umberto Eco, "Critique of the Image," in *Thinking Photography*, ed. Victor Burgin (London: Macmillan, 1982), 32-38.

Pavel Morozov, the child who is driven to tell the truth and to report on others regardless of who they are, had become an almost mythical figure in official Soviet culture. Yet Klimov's portrayal of the child-mole is far from idyllic, converting the act of informing into a betrayal driven not by ideological belief but by selfish interests. Notably, the child informant's face is never displayed on screen, attaching a sense of shame to an act that had traditionally been portrayed as noble and patriotic by the Party.⁶⁴ In his screenplay, Lungin named the conspirator "Sandals" because his or her feet are the only part that we are allowed to see clearly. His description of Sandals' actions after hearing a particularly juicy piece of information is notably germane in that it reflects larger changes in Soviet society's perspectives towards the virtue of betraying one's personal relationships for the sake of the state.

Sandals jumps up like a toad. We first see the owner of the sandals' face, but it is so dirty with watery mud and duckweed, that it is impossible to discern its identity. You cannot even tell if it is a boy or a girl. The child informer begins to whistle and call out like a cuckoo bird. Only the soles of the sandals glimmer, while the path beneath remains dirty."⁶⁵

Following Lungin's description, Klimov shot only the informant's dirty, unrecognizable face and immaculate feet. Sandals' visage is metaphorically disfigured by treachery and lies, while his or her feet, which presumably must be washed repeatedly throughout the day, remain "clean." Again, the Komsomol had serious issues with Sandals' characterization. "Is Kostia not breaking the rules and creating disorder?" a Komsomol representative asked at a meeting of the Filmmaker's Union, "And do we not want to

⁶⁴ Lungin i Klimov, "Stsenarii Fil'ma" RGALI f. 2453, op. 4, d. 1476, l. 53.

⁶⁵ Ibid, l. 57.

encourage our youth to speak out when their peers are being dishonest or insincere?”⁶⁶ Indeed, these were the messages being conveyed by the state in these years, that children had a role to play as crusaders for the construction of social order at home and peace abroad. Klimov’s decision to shoot the informant in such an unflattering light condemned that message and revealed its moral ambiguities.⁶⁷

The final, and most controversial character in *Welcome, Or* is the camp’s dictatorial director, whose sole concern is that the camp be ready to put on a good show for the parents and Party officials who are coming to visit at the end of the summer. In a letter from the leader of the Repertory Union in 1963, A. Groshev wrote, “The film discredits the older generation and has no positive educational meaning.” While the images of the unruly Pioneers needed to be revised, most bothersome in the eyes of the Union was the image of the director, Dinin, who “embodies the grotesque characteristics of the bureaucrat.”⁶⁸ Committed to his production goals,⁶⁹ Dinin can be seen forcing the children to play their violins instead of sleeping and to repeat recitations without water. Most bothersome to many Union members during the film’s review was the fact that the director of the Pioneer camp stood as an icon of the Party leadership as well as an object of mockery. In the opinion of Alexander Khmelik, the figure of Dinin implicated the entire Komsomol organization because his foibles were not caused by his own stupidity, but by his dogmatic commitment to outdated and nonsensical Party rules. “He understands,” Khmelik argued, “that he does what he must do – not for the children, but

⁶⁶ N.A. Rudakova, “Stenogramma sovmešnogo zasedaniia Khudozhestvennykh Sovetov Tvorcheskogo ob’edineniia pisatelii i kinorabotnikov i tvorcheskogo ob’edineniia “Iunost”” June 7 1963, RGALI f. 2453, op. 4, d. 1403, l. 10-31.

⁶⁷ N.A. Rudakova, “Stenogramma sovmešnogo zasedaniia Khudozhestvennykh sovetov Tvorcheskogo ob’edineniia pisatelii i kinorabotnikov i tvorcheskogo ob’edineniia “Iunost”” June 7 1963, RGALI f. 2453, op. 4, d. 1403, l. 10-31.

⁶⁸ A. Groshev, “Pis’mo iz Predsedatelei Reperaturnogo Soveta,” May 10 1963, RGALI f. 2454, op. 4, d. 1483, l. 47.

⁶⁹ There is an interesting pun on words here, as the two words – *postanovka* (stage production) and *produksiia* (manufacturing production) are used interchangeably.

because he has instructions. It shows that the fault is not Dinin's – the fault is with the actions of the Pioneer organization.”⁷⁰ This comment sparked such a heated debate at the meeting of the Filmmakers' Union that was held to discuss the film in June of 1963, that Khmelik was forced to backtrack on his analysis of the Pioneer organization's culpability in the film. At issue was what the writer A.G. Zarkhi called a “problematic contradiction” in the figure of Dinin. If the director was simply stupid and personally incapable of leading these children appropriately, then the state should be held culpable for allowing such a man to climb the bureaucratic ladder to this high level of leadership. If he is not stupid, however, as Khmelik concluded, that meant that he was not only following the moronic instructions of a Pioneer organization that had no connection with the real world, but the simple fact that he was blindly following these ridiculous instructions reflected on the poor job that the Pioneers, the Komsomol, and the Party were doing in raising intelligent, independent thinkers for future leadership. While Khmelik's subsequent responses sought to mitigate his earlier comments by claiming that Dinin was an exceptional character (that in fact, the whole thing was simply farcical), Klimov made it clear in the end that Dinin *was* a bureaucratic middle-aged man and that he was “*not* a stupid man.”⁷¹

The entire film combines slap-stick humor with open mutiny to create a situation in which the children slowly wrest power from Dinin's clutch. They feign disease in order to prevent the summer production, which itself is being organized from illegible directions. The children use a pig to dig Kostia out from inside the podium where he has been accidentally locked. Although the pig fails to set Kostia free, it does manage to run

⁷⁰ Khmelik, A.G. “Stenogramma sovместnogo zasedaniia Khudozhestvennykh sovetov Tvorcheskogo ob'edineniia pisatelii i kinorabotnikov i tvorcheskogo ob'edineniia “Iunost’,” June 7 1963. RGALI f. 2453, op. 4, d. 1403, l. 19-23.

⁷¹ Elem Klimov, “Stenogramma sovместnogo zasedaniia Khudozhestvennykh sovetov Tvorcheskogo ob'edineniia pisatelii i kinorabotnikov i tvorcheskogo ob'edineniia “Iunost’,” June 7 1963. RGALI f. 2453, op. 4, d. 1403, l. 19-23.

wild through the camp with muddied children shrieking after it. As they chase the pig, that snorts and grunts around the center of the camp, the children cry out in an obvious reference to a common saying from the Stalinist era, “Now we are full of joy! Now we have a happy life!” Instead of paying homage to the great leader, the children have now shown that the same kind of “happy life” may be accessed simply by chasing a pig. Moreover, while the Filmmaker’s Union made no remarks on the resemblance of the pig to any previous leaders (as they had on Khrushchev’s unerring resemblance to Kostia’s dead grandmother), certainly they all understood who the pig was referencing.

The voice of the children only gets louder as they revolt openly against Dinin, who barges into the camp’s movie theatre and stops the film that they are watching in order to look for the fugitive Kostia. While Kostia hides, having left the podium for the shelter that is provided by the theatre’s darkness, the children chant “Kino! Kino!,” for the film to be restarted. In this metaphorical image of the film, the movie being watched by the children represents a point of contention and expression, just as the larger movie does for the filmmaker.



Illustration 3.8: Kostia emerges from the corn cob. Welcome, Or No Trespassing
(Director Elem Klimov)

At the movie's climax, the parents and party officials arrive for the camp's long-awaited production. The day ends with a parade of the symbols of the Soviet Union's agricultural accomplishments. As custom dictated for a harvest parade, the prettiest girl would have been chosen to be the Queen of the Fields. In earlier years, her royalty would be symbolized by images of great Russian wheat. In this parade, however, she was to be the Queen of the Corn. In a direct reference to Khrushchev's short-sighted agricultural initiative to bring corn to the Soviet Union, the children erect a great parade float in the shape of a corn cob. Of course, it is the young Kostia who pops up out of the top of the corn cob at the end of the parade, after hiding there all day.

Klimov's openly irreverent use of the corn cob represented many levels of dissent within Soviet society over the ways in which Soviet policy, and particularly the Cold War, had impacted the country over the past decade. In May of 1957, Khrushchev had initiated a campaign to overtake the United States in the production of meat, butter, and milk. After seeing the flowing fields of corn in the American Mid-West, he had decided

to fix the problem of fodder production for livestock by growing corn, especially since capital investment was unavailable. Traditional crops were stopped. Climate restrictions and silage requirements were ignored. Quotas were imposed. Private lots were taxed and restricted in order to encourage communal production. By 1960-62 it had become obvious that the corn project had failed. In some places, as much as 70-80 percent of the land did not come to harvest. Herds were actually cut and meat production declined sharply. These lean harvests led to mass, grass-roots revolts across much of Russia through the 1950s and 60s. Spurred on by the need for “meat, milk, and butter,” peasants from Grozny to Krasnodar rose up in revolt.⁷² While political dissatisfaction and anti-communism were seldom the reasons for these uprisings, because of the antagonism between capitalism and communism these strikes were nonetheless often interpreted by the state as “a direct attack on the Soviet system.”⁷³ Klimov’s harkening to the corn cob, especially as its head was split open by Kostia’s triumphant arms, represented an explicit criticism not only of Khrushchev’s agricultural program, but of his willingness to let the Cold War negatively impact his domestic responsibilities to the people.

In the end, the high-ranking party official who comes to witness the camp’s summer production proves to be thoughtful, balanced, and aware of the deficiencies in Dinin’s leadership. He saves Kostia from humiliation in front of his family and friends and allows for Dinin’s exceptionalism as a single “bad seed” in what is otherwise a sound program. Interestingly enough, the original screenplay did not include these redemptive scenes. The positive party leader, as well as the old Pioneers who accompany him to the show, were included at the behest of the Filmmaker’s Union and the Moscow film studio. Klimov’s intended ending had instead involved a basic overthrow of Dinin’s leadership

⁷² Kozlov, *Mass Uprisings in the USSR: Protest and Rebellion in the Post-Stalin Years*.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 12.

by the camp members themselves and Kostia's departure from the camp with a family that is none the wiser.⁷⁴

Even without the original ending, Klimov's film posed serious, prescient questions to both the party and the population. How are we raising our children? What are bureaucracy and the culture of conspiracy doing to our hopes for a brighter future? How can we expect to raise a population of strong, forward looking children when we have no understanding of their real lives and opinions? And in what ways is Cold War competition hurting the population on a daily basis? Klimov's message was not only intended as a criticism of individual, dogmatic leaders; it was a commentary that focused its eye on the entire population and the culture that had bred such inanity.

CONCLUSION

Khrushchev's crackdown on the Thaw is thought to have begun with his visit in 1962 to an abstract art exhibit at the Manezh gallery in Moscow. In a public debate with Ernst Neizvestny, Khrushchev reiterated the Socialist Realist argument that the function of art in society was to depict a "higher reality," that would provide inspiration and guidance for the population.⁷⁵ His focus quickly turned to film. In a meeting with Party officials in 1964, he expressed his increasing displeasure over what films were doing to the image of the child and the family.

Sons are being told that their fathers cannot teach them how to live and that there is no point seeking their advice.... Well, that is a pretty clear

⁷⁴ "Pis'mo iz Direktorov Rukovoditel'ia IV Ob'edineniia" and "Plan Dorabotki tsenariia "Dobro Pozhalovat'." RGALI f. 2453, op. 4, d. 1483, l. 23-31. The directors of Mosfil'm also wanted Kostia to be caught and reprimanded by the younger counselors, but Klimov refused and maintained that the students and the counselors will "maintain the secret of Kostia" – thus spreading the conspiracy to protect Kostia into the lower administration of the camp. Elem Klimov, "Pis'mo General'nomu Direktoru Kinostudii "Mosfil'm" Tovarish V.N. Surinu," RGALI f. 2453, op. 4, d. 1483, l. 43.

⁷⁵ Joseph Bakshtein, "A View from Moscow," in *Nonconformist Art: The Soviet Experience 1956-1986*, ed. Alla Rosenfeld and Norton T. Dodge (London: Thames and Hudson, 1995), 332.

expression of the authors' attitude. But haven't you gone too far? What do you want to do – incite the youth against the older generation, set them at ends, sow discord in the friendly Soviet family, which unites both young and old in the common effort to build communism?⁷⁶

Khrushchev reminded his listeners that “the press, radio, literature, fine arts, music, cinema and the theatre are a sharp ideological weapon of our party. And the party is concerned that its weapon should always be in battle readiness and allow no one to blunt its edge, to weaken its effects.”⁷⁷ As this quote points out, the critiques being made during the Thaw did not just pose a threat to domestic stability. Khrushchev also feared the critical openness of the Thaw as something that would “delight” enemies of the Soviet Union abroad. In August, 1963, at a meeting with a group of prominent Soviet writers, he stated that “peace is one thing, writing quite another. There can be compromises for peace, but none in the war of words and ideas.”⁷⁸ Khrushchev's feelings about the Thaw had changed, thanks in part to the increasingly important role of culture in the Cold War. The arts in the Soviet Union could no longer be a place for experimentation, as the two superpowers sought to engage each other in a battle of images and cultural identifiers.

Throughout the Thaw, the contested image of the child served as a reflection of Cold War anxieties in Soviet society. As we have seen, in official Soviet rhetoric, the image of the mobilized, peaceful, and well-ordered child symbolized the nation's ability to rebuild itself for the future, to stand as a shining example of communist success for the rest of the world, and to compete culturally and economically with the West. In the

⁷⁶ Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, *The Great Mission of Literature and Art* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), 150.

⁷⁷ Khrushchev, "Vyisokaia Ideonost' i Khudozhestvennoe Masterstve - Velikaia Sila Sovetskoi Literaturyi i Iskusstvo," 4.

⁷⁸ Anonymous, "What Khrushchev Told the Writers," *The Observer*, Aug 19 1963.

struggle for domestic Cold War mobilization and international credibility, the successful construction of the Soviet child was crucial. Yet because the image of the child was tied so closely to the country's positive image of itself, the alteration of that vision through the portrayal of cynical, victimized, and irreverent youth represented an affront to the nation's ability to create and support a stable world for its population, and for international socialism.⁷⁹ While Klimov confronted Khrushchev's myopic Cold War policies through his parody of the children's camp, Tarkovsky, Romm, Talankin, Mitte, and Abuladze took a more circumscribed path through their explorations of the troubled and un-mobilized state of Soviet society. They showed adults who had abdicated their responsibilities as parents, and youth who had become ideologically disillusioned, abandoned, and devoted to the pursuit of personal goals over the needs of the state. They in turn provided an alternative conceptualization of the Cold War in the Soviet Union, not as a rallying point for an entire generation, but as a contributing factor to society's ailments that was worthy of parody and rejection.

⁷⁹ Although the role of the child as witness is not dealt with in detail in this chapter, the child does play an important role as the seer. We watch the child witnessing the world, and we function as children watching the world through the child's perspective.

Chapter 4

“Dr. Spock is Worried:” The Image of the Child in the American Test Ban Movement, 1957-1965

In the fall of 1961, while Andrei Tarkovsky was busy putting the final touches on *Ivan's Childhood* and *Serezha* was still in the Soviet theatres, the mathematician James R. Newman made a novel suggestion in the pages of the *Washington Post*. “I make a modest proposal,” he began, “Let the children go.”¹ Instead of arguing that the children should be eaten as Jonathon Swift had done two hundred and thirty-two years earlier, Newman posited that America's children be summarily relocated to the southern hemisphere where their chances of survival from an atomic attack were significantly improved. After conceding that national suicide through nuclear war had become an acceptable option for many Americans, he declared sarcastically that children nonetheless were “too innocent and foolish to realize that death is preferable to life under alien creeds.” He contended that without children around it would be “unnecessary to yield to niceties, to observe amenities, to nurse the sick, to shield the weak, to spare the infirm.” Instead of paying for the upbringing of the country's children, he argued that a small sum could be spent to transport and establish the young at their destinations, while the remainder of the money could be used “in vigorous prosecution of the war.” “I am anxious that Wise men consider my proposal,” he declared, pointing his literary finger at Kennedy's administration. “Is it feasible? (Less feasible, say, than a journey to the planets?) Is it visionary? (More visionary than the preservation of Freedom by a nuclear

war?)” Finally he asked, “Is a country without children worth living in? Perhaps not. In which case some better course must be found.”

Newman’s satirical essay captured the sense of worry and frustration that was felt by many Americans in the late 1950s and early 1960s over what they perceived to be an escalating nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union. Like many of his friends in the anti-nuclear movement, and like the Soviet filmmakers working in studios nine thousand miles to the east, Newman conjured the victimized image of the child in order to bring attention to the nuclear threat and to emphasize the suicidal nature of the arms race and American foreign policy. In contrast to the prevailing views of the time, he envisioned the child not as a victim of communist infiltration, delinquency, and poor education, not as a citizen mobilized to defend the U.S. from invasion, but as a likely casualty of nuclear attack who was endangered by the foreign policies of the American and Soviet governments.² Newman’s worries were seconded by prominent scientists, humanitarians, religious leaders, and concerned citizens who issued urgent demands in the late 1950s and early 1960s for an end to atomic testing and war planning. They formed a number of organizations whose goals were to halt nuclear testing, to push for the normalization of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and to pressure governments on both sides of the Iron Curtain for the passing of a test ban treaty.

In their attempts to reach a wide audience with their message of needed change in Soviet and American Cold War nuclear policy, national activist groups like the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) and Women Strkie for Peace (WSP)

¹ James R. Newman, "A Communication," *The Washington Post*, September 25 1961, A13.

created images of America's youth in their publications, rallies, and speeches that appeared diseased, disillusioned, and defenseless against the threats of nuclear attack and fallout. Although many groups and individuals had previously viewed the child as imperiled by the atomic threat, the anti-nuclear movement was the first to argue that the source of the danger came not just from Soviet nuclear brinkmanship, but from the myopic and paranoid policies of the U.S. government as well. For the sake of the country's children, they argued that responsible, non-radical, middle-class adults were obliged to act against the interests of America's foreign policy makers. And as scientists and mothers, they presented themselves as the "natural" leaders of the crusade to ban testing around the world.

In addition to portraying children as threatened by the very government that was supposed to be protecting them, the anti-nuclear movement also created a vision of mobilized youth that was markedly different from that being disseminated by supporters of the American Cold War consensus. Instead of arguing that children had a role to play in defending the United States from communist infiltration and attack, some in the movement contended that youngsters needed instead to defend themselves and their future by becoming activists alongside their parents. This was particularly true for Women Strike for Peace, which was famous for bringing large numbers of children to its rallies and Senate hearings. By taking their children along with them, these women not only blurred the lines between their own domestic and public obligations, they also created a revised image of the mobilized American child, prepared not for a war against

² Lawrence Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).

communism, but for a struggle against internal governmental forces that had ostensibly put them at risk. Like the filmmakers who were working in the Soviet Union during these years, anti-nuclear groups in the United States used images of threatened and mobilized children in order to complicate and at times subvert government policy and authority. They showed youth who had prioritized their own safety and the needs of their families over the directives of the state.

SANE AND THE IMAGE OF THREATENED YOUTH

In the spring of 1957, Norman Cousins, a well-known advocate of liberal causes, joined a small group of prominent pacifists in an effort to make American citizens aware of the dangers of continued atmospheric nuclear testing. Cousins and his friends were shocked by the seeming complacency of the American population to the threat around them. As Erich Fromm, the psychoanalyst would argue, America's behavior seemed downright "pathological."³ Years earlier, much of the American liberal population had rallied behind the prospect of ceasing nuclear development, testing, and proliferation. They had thrown their weight behind the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan, which had proposed methods for the international control of atomic weapons and the avoidance of future wars. Yet the plan was ultimately defeated, as the Soviet refused to agree to unrestricted inspections. In the United States, the Plan's defeat had led many anti-nuclear activists to stop believing in their ability to effectively influence American foreign policy.⁴ By the late 1950s, Cousins and Fromm had concluded that this sense of collective resignation

³ Minutes of the Committee to Stop Nuclear Tests, September 24, 1957, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series A.

towards the Bomb and its use had led to a lull in activism and a return to the escapes of daily life in American society.⁵ We now know that the state of the American progressive movement was not as abysmal as Cousins and Fromm thought. As Julia Mickenberg has shown in her study of children's literature in the 1950s, liberals in the United States did find "circumscribed" avenues for expression, even at the height of the McCarthy Era.⁶ Nonetheless, for Cousins and his colleagues who remembered a time when the progressive movement had enjoyed widespread public influence, it seemed to them that the country had given up on the possibility of influencing state policy and was in denial over the potentially life-threatening effects of the nuclear arms race.

Amidst this sense of liberal resignation in the late 1950s, Cousins and his friends also sensed that change was in the air. For many in America, the promise of safety provided by civil defense was not as easy to believe as it had been in earlier years. The creation of new bombs and new tests increasingly revealed that even in deep shelters, the occupants would be "quickly barbecued."⁷ And even if survival were possible, the realities of shelter living seemed decidedly uncomfortable in the baby boom era, as American adults contemplated life below ground with their growing families. Thus, while *Life* was publishing articles on the joys of newlywed honeymoons spent in a fallout shelter (now made famous by Elaine Tyler May), the *New York Times* was providing far more troubling accounts of entire families trying to survive in shelters for a week

⁴ Larence Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Disarmament Movement* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 251.

⁵ Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age*, 295. Also see Margot A. Henriksen, *Dr. Strangelove's America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), Spencer R. Weart, *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).

⁶ Julia L. Mickenberg, *Learning from the Left: Children's Literature, the Cold War, and Radical Politics in the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 8.

(complete with annoying, accordion-playing husbands and unruly children).⁸ The image of a post-nuclear existence was itself complicated by the presence of so many families and so many children.

Fears about the effects of nuclear fallout were also heightened in the late 1950s through the increased publication of reports from the scientific community. In 1956 a report by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission had demonstrated that radioactive fallout was causing milk to be contaminated with the element Strontium-90, a known carcinogen that threatened children whose bones mistook the element for calcium in the growth process. These reports, which came from both governmental and private sources, informed the public that the U.S. government had conducted 119 above-ground tests between 1951 and 1958. Such tests had led to strange and disconcerting events as when “blue-colored snow” fell for two days in 1954 over the skies of New Mexico and Nevada causing children to develop reddened faces and swollen tongues.⁹ In 1958, children living near the Hanford Lab in Washington were found to have been exposed to 740,000 curies of radiation (about 30,000 times that of Three Mile Island).¹⁰ Scientists then began linking these tests to rising incidences of thyroid cancer, leukemia, and heart disease.

As Cousins and his colleagues believed correctly, the potentially harmful impact of nuclear testing on the next generation was an issue that resonated with the American public. No longer did these detonations seem like a distant military practice carried out in the deserts of Nevada and the far reaches of the Pacific. Their effects were immediate and

⁷ Newman, "A Communication," A13.

⁸ “Bill Huebner Discusses Fallout Shelter,” *New York Times*, September 16 1961. May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*, ix. “Their Sheltered Honeymoon,” *Life*, August 10 1959, 51-52.

⁹ Ralph Lapp, “Fallout—Another Dimension in Atomic Power,” *New Republic*, February 14 1954.

local. They impacted the young. Based on their belief that the American public was ready to rally behind the cause of a nuclear test ban, Cousins and his colleagues founded the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, which was supported by a long roster of prominent academics, psychologists, and nuclear scientists, all committed to the idea that a “halt [to testing] now [was] not only possible, but imperative for survival.”¹¹ They took it as their mandate to increase awareness of the dangers of testing among the American public through a wide-reaching information campaign that would hopefully drive the population to public activism.

From its inception, SANE based its propaganda approach on the image of the victimized American child left physically and psychologically damaged by U.S. and Soviet nuclear testing. In its third major full-page ad in the *New York Times* in the spring of 1958, entitled “Nuclear Tests are Endangering Our Health Right Now,” SANE argued that “We must stop the contamination of the air, the milk children drink, the food they eat.”¹² These sentiments were restated both in internal policy documents and in public statements throughout the late 1950s. At the 1957 Third World Conference against A- and H-Bombs held in Tokyo, one SANE representative announced that she was collecting pictures of babies, asking parents to write on the back of each photograph: “stop nuclear tests for my child’s sake.” One copy of each photo (200 in all) was then

¹⁰ David Myers, *New Soviet Thinking and U.S. Nuclear Policy* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 25.

¹¹ Minutes of Organizing Committee, October 1 1957, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series A.

¹² “Nuclear Tests are Endangering our Health Right Now,” *New York Times*, April 11 1958.

sent to Eisenhower, Macmillan, and Khrushchev.¹³ SANE also organized a project where five thousand children delivered C.O.D.s to the White House on Mother's Day, 1958, all the while singing "Sometimes I feel Like My Genes have Gone Wrong" to the tune of "Sometimes I feel like a Motherless Child."¹⁴ When the SANE student office of Cooper Union College in New York gathered in Manhattan on May 23, 1958 to release a giant "mushroom cloud of dark blue balloons" over the Manhattan skyline, they stated that they were organizing in order to "remind adults everywhere of the dangers to their children inherent in the continued testing of Hydrogen bombs."¹⁵ Similarly, a year later, at a national meeting in Boston, a SANE speaker argued to his listeners that

There is such a thing as innocence. Children, in general are innocent. That is why, even in war, it is most difficult to justify the killing of children... [Yet] now there is a new massacre of the innocents. Without war, without anger, without intention, atomic tests are gradually destroying their health and their posterity's.¹⁶

Later that spring, the physicist Linus Pauling argued that current levels of Strontium 90 would result in 100,000 deaths and 140,000 "gross mental and physical defects" in the next generation.¹⁷ "There is no way of washing the sky," Cousins himself argued in 1959,

¹³ Conference Notes from Anti Atom—the Third World Conference Against A- and H-Bombs and for Disarmament, Tokyo, August 1957, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series E, Box 34.

¹⁴ "SANE Mother's Day Project," May 7 1958 SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series B-3, Box 12.

¹⁵ "New York Students Dedicate Balloons," Releases: 57-58, May 23 1958, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series A, Box 11.

¹⁶ "National Meeting, Boston, MA" May 1959 SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series A, Box 11.

¹⁷ "Toward a SANE Nuclear Policy," Literature: 1957-62, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series A, Box 10.

“no way to keep the strontium and cesium from falling like rain; no way to keep it from getting into food and milk and thence into the bones of children...”¹⁸

SANE quickly learned that its child-centered approach to the test ban problem was reaching its audience. Letters flooded into the SANE national office beginning in 1957, applauding the organization for taking the necessary steps to protect the next generation. “The government is like a father who, observing a hawk in the sky, holds his children’s heads beneath the water [until] it goes away and they are drowned,” one father wrote to SANE in March 1958.¹⁹ “I feel like you are the only ones who are talking about my kids as if they matter,” a mother from Illinois wrote in.²⁰ A couple of months later, a father from Kansas City wrote that, “murder smells in any language. Some ancients propitiated the gods by sacrificing the life of one of their children or one of their neighbors. We sacrifice many of our children and many of our neighbors with each major bomb that we explode.”²¹ Such missives reflected the impact that SANE’s message was having on the general public as well as the centrality of the child in defining how Americans thought about the nuclear arms race at the end of the decade.

Other responses to SANE’s tactics were not as supportive, but were equally vehement. For instance, a lengthy conversation was conducted over letters between Adelaide Baker, a representative of SANE, and Lewis Strauss, who was the chairman of

¹⁸ *New York Times*, April 29 1959. Norman Cousins, “The Debate is Over,” *Sunday Review*, April 4 1959, 26.

¹⁹ Letter from John Bessor to SANE, March 21 1958, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series B-3, Box 7.

²⁰ Letter from Mary Kirkpatrick of Tuscola, IL, Feb 2 1958, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series B-3, Box 7.

²¹ Letter from James E. Amick of Kansas City, MO, April 24 1958, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series B-3, Box 7.

the Atomic Energy Commission between 1953 and 1958. Citing a renowned pathologist, Strauss wrote to Baker:

We have a choice of a very small risk from testing or a risk of the catastrophe which might result from a surrender of our leadership in nuclear armament. I have a wife, a son, and three happy young grandchildren. Yet I subscribe completely to our policy. I could not do so if I thought the welfare of my family was threatened more by fallout than by possible nuclear war.²²

Baker responded:

You told me before in your letter about your “happy young grandchildren.” I know they are as lovely as mine, as lovely as the Russian children Bob Hope pictured when he went on an American-sponsored goodwill tour to Moscow to “relieve tension.” I don’t want any of yours or mine or theirs or the millions of others the world round to be the victims of our stubborn and willful idea of defense for ourselves.²³

Both Strauss and Baker articulated their perspectives on nuclear testing in terms of the child and its welfare. Strauss made what was a common argument against those who supported a nuclear test ban: he contended that the cessation of testing would lead to a loss of leadership in the nuclear arms race and the subsequent loss of deterrent against the Soviets. Only by building and testing the weapons, he contended, could the United States prevent them from being used and thus protect the country’s children from annihilation.

²² Letter from Lewis Strauss to Adeliade Baker, Mar 29 1958, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG, Series B-3, Box 7.

Baker's response contested Strauss' assumption that a deterrent was needed in order to prevent the Soviets from attacking. She did this by acknowledging the Russian love for their children and by recognizing that Soviet youth were also threatened by the effects of atomic fallout. In this historically recurrent debate over means and ends, Strauss and Baker had latched onto the image of the threatened child as a moral constant from which state policies could be either justified or rejected.

By presenting the child as a victim of nuclear attack, people like Norman Cousins and Adelaide Baker identified a new source of threat for the young. They re-conceptualized the Cold War in America not as a struggle against communist infiltration, emotional lassitude, delinquency, bad parenting and poor education, but as a battle against deadly radioactive elements and those who authorized their creation. Moreover, they challenged the established idea that children were capable of defending themselves from nuclear attack and fallout. As we saw in Chapter Two, the American population had been presented over the years with an idealized vision of the mobilized child who seemed capable of defending itself and its country from nuclear assault and communist infiltration. In contrast, SANE portrayed youth as having no capacity to mobilize against the invisible attacks of strontium-90, cesium, carbon-14, and iodine-131. This depiction of children reconfigured the child's relationship with the Cold War, with the Bomb, and with the American government, presenting the child as a symbol not of national strength and defensibility, but of suicide and betrayal by the state.

²³ Letter from Adelaide Baker to Lewis Strauss, April 7 1958, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG, Series B-3, Box 7.



Illustration 4.1: From a SANE document entitled “Atomic Age—Alamogordo to Sahara,” chronicling the life of the bomb from its first detonation in 1945 to the French explosion of the fission bomb in Sahara in 1960.²⁴

The child had not always been a symbol for nuclear annihilation. In the early-1940s, those who knew about the Bomb’s existence had argued that the weapon posed the same threats to children as did any similar device. In fact, as Spencer Weart has observed in his examination of the Bomb as a cultural artifact, the weapon was consistently envisioned by scientists and politicians as a new and child-like discovery. This is evidenced in the fact that the bomb was couched in a “vocabulary of birth” by the atomic scientists who brought it into the world.²⁵ Thus, the first sustained chain reaction was described as a “miracle, the birth of a new era.” Neutrons were said to “reproduce” in successive “generations.” Even the Bomb itself was codenamed “Little Boy,” and when it was first tested successfully in Alamogordo, New Mexico on the morning of July 16,

²⁴ “Atomic Age—Alamogordo to Sahara,” Correspondence Related Papers 1959-60, February 1960, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series B-4, Box 31.

1945, news was sent to the Secretary of Defense that the “‘Little Boy’ is ... husky.”²⁶ In these early years, the Bomb itself had been viewed as a child, utilizing the adjectives of youth, symbolizing novelty and hope.²⁷

The era in which the child and the Bomb shared the same conceptual vocabulary was short-lived, however. After Hiroshima, images of dying and mutilated children became the world’s most pervasive symbol of atomic victimization. Survivors’ groups like the Hiroshima Maidens and the Keloid Girls represented for many around the world the irreparable damage that had been done by the Bomb.²⁸ International attention was given to the 12-year-old girl, Sadako, who attempted to fold a thousand paper cranes in order to counter the fatal effects of radiation poisoning.²⁹ While American official rhetoric continued to present atomic science as a positive force in the lives of America’s young (primarily as an abundant and clean source of energy) and to argue that mobilization against nuclear war was indeed possible, the child also became a symbol of the debilitating effects of nuclear fear and fallout on the nation. For many, including the members of SANE, the Bomb had created a new sense of global terminality that specifically targeted the nation’s children. It had created a new way of looking at the next generation not only as symbols of the future, but as emblems of the nuclear holocaust.³⁰

²⁵ Weart, *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images*, 87.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 92.

²⁷ This trend has been noted by the anthropologist Hugh Gusterson in his book, *People of the Bomb: Portraits of America’s Nuclear Complex* (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2004).

²⁸ Not surprisingly, it was Norman Cousins who spearheaded American programs to provide plastic surgery and vocational training in the United States for these groups of girls.

²⁹ Sadako completed 644 cranes before dying. SANE commented in their internal documents that Sadako’s plight had garnered “much comment.” SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series A, Box 18.

³⁰ Henriksen, *Dr. Strangelove’s America*.

By the end of the 1950s, SANE's prestige and influence was on the rise, thanks in large part to its ability to capitalize on the image of the endangered child. It ran nationwide ad campaigns with titles like "No Contamination without Representation" and "H stands for Humanity," which declared that "because of fallout from the tests that have already taken place no child anywhere on this planet can today drink milk that is uncontaminated by Strontium-90."³¹ It staged major rallies in New York in the spring of 1960 to mark the planned summit between Eisenhower and Khrushchev, with marches and speeches on the nuclear threat to the world's young. Although the U2 incident prevented the summit from happening, the rally for it was very popular, drawing twenty-thousand participants and illustrious personalities like Norman Cousins, Eleanor Roosevelt, Albert Schweitzer, and Max Born. As Clarence Pickett would write to Cousins on child-centered approach that SANE had adopted, "we seem to have struck a nerve here."³² The safety of the children was, by 1960, an issue that many in America felt they could not ignore.

Despite, or perhaps because of, their newfound prestige and popularity, SANE's New York Chapter soon became the target of suspicion for communist infiltration in the late spring of 1960. The conservative senator Thomas J. Dodd leveled serious accusations of communist infiltration at the organization in the days leading up to a scheduled May 19 rally in Madison Square Garden. "I believe that the heads of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy have a serious contribution to make to the great debate on national policy," he told the Senate. "But they can only make this contribution effectively if they

³¹ "H Stands for Humanity," SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series A, Box 11.

purge their ranks ruthlessly of Communist infiltration.”³³ The National Chapter of SANE then faced a choice; to defend those who had been implicated or to dismiss them from the organization in the hopes of mitigating the disaster.

A number of SANE members were called before a Senate Subcommittee hearing under suspicion of membership in the communist party. Henry Abrams, who was a former member of the American Labor Party and was serving as the co-chairman for the West Side New York Branch of SANE, cited the Fifth Amendment in response to every question asked of him. Although Abrams never made the argument that his activism was inspired by a desire to protect the young (as Women Strike for Peace did when they were called before HUAC two years earlier), the image of the child was introduced in the form of Abram’s thirteen-month-old granddaughter, who had died the night before. In the forty-five minutes before Abrams swore in, he and his lawyer, Louis Boudin, made the argument that the hearing should be postponed. “The basis of this request,” Boudin stated, “[is] the death of Mr. Abrams’ grandchild on Monday.”³⁴ Boudin produced a doctor’s note which stated that Abrams was “at present under the most extreme emotional tension because of the death of his grandchild yesterday.” This tension, the doctor claimed, was almost certain to “aggravate” Abrams’ own heart condition. It was then made clear that Abrams’ wife was also at the hearing, sitting in the audience, thereby implying that neither grandparent was able to be at home with their daughter and her

³² Clarence Pickett to Norman Cousins, October 27 1960, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series B, Box 9.

³³ Thomas Dodd, “The Communist Infiltration in the Nuclear Test Ban Movement,” *Congressional Record*, March 8 1961, 3465.

³⁴ U.S. Congress, Senate, Internal Security Subcommittee on the Judiciary, *Communist Infiltration in the Test Ban Movement, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess, Testimony of Henry Abrams of the Greater New York Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy*, May 13 1960 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 4.

family, who were left mourning the child's death alone. Although neither Abrams nor Boudin ever explicitly accused Senator Dodd, the subcommittee chair, and his council, J.G. Sourwine, of being insensitive bullies, the effect of the debate over Abrams' grandchild was to present an image of Abrams and his wife as loving grandparents forced to be away from their family at its darkest moment by men who had no sympathy for their loss and were in fact, comfortable splitting up the family at a moment of crisis. This point was made even clearer by Dodd's unwillingness to even mention the granddaughter in his decision to decline Abrams' motion to postpone the hearing.

Abrams' hearing was followed in August, September, and October by more investigations of the New York Chapter of SANE. By the fall, Cousins and his colleagues, perceiving that they had no real alternative against the powerful forces of the Senate Subcommittee and arguing that the hearing was impeding their ability to do their work, asked Abrams to resign and then issued a new directive barring members of the Communist Party from holding office in the organization. They then revoked the charter of the Greater New York SANE Committee. By the end of the year, Thomas Dodd could be heard on the Senate floor complimenting SANE "on the measures it ha[d] taken to fight communist meddling."³⁵ Yet the organization was deeply shaken by the experience, leaving a number of members "disaffected" by SANE's willingness to dismiss members who had been victims of red baiting.³⁶ Membership subsequently declined both because suspected communists were asked to leave and because many resigned in protest, including Linus Pauling and Bertrand Russell.

³⁵ Thomas Dodd, "The Communist Infiltration in the Nuclear Test Ban Movement," *Congressional Record*, March 8 1961, 3465.

As 1961 began, the organization was weakened but nonetheless hopeful that it had finally weathered its internal crisis and would now be able to take action in encouraging the signing of a test ban treaty at an upcoming conference in Geneva. Large demonstrations were held in major cities across the United States, with a record 25,000 attendees at a rally on the fifth of March. Similar demonstrations were held at the United Nations Plaza in New York as well as in Seattle, Chicago and Washington, D.C.

Yet just as SANE was beginning to recover from its encounter with the Senate Subcommittee, world events seemed to conspire against it. In June, Kennedy returned from unsuccessful talks with Khrushchev in Vienna and promptly pushed through a massive supplemental military spending bill along with a tripling of the draft call. Then, responding to the hemorrhaging of personnel from East Germany and to constant pressure from Walter Ulbricht, Khrushchev authorized the construction of the Berlin Wall. Three weeks later, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union would resume atmospheric testing. A similar U.S. announcement quickly followed. The Soviet Union subsequently detonated a 58-megaton weapon that was 30,000 times more powerful than the bomb that had destroyed Hiroshima. The United States, meanwhile, tested a number of weapons underground. The situation only appeared to worsen as 1962 began. Kennedy, who had been under increasing pressure by military and civilian advocates of testing, announced that American atmospheric tests would resume on March 2. The Geneva talks seemed to be dead in the water and the hopes that SANE had held for the completion of test negotiations were lost. "It is natural that many of us should have the

³⁶ Barbara Deming, "The Ordeal of SANE," *The Nation* (March 11 1961). Also see Schreker, *Many are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America*, 379.

most anguished sense of disappointment and foreboding,” Norman Cousins wrote in a letter to Homer Jack, SANE’s executive director, “Our principal objective has been shattered.”³⁷

Yet although they were disheartened, SANE leaders nonetheless decided to undertake a massive campaign to make the American people aware of what awaited them if and when Kennedy resumed atmospheric testing. In January 1962, SANE created a Public Information Committee, whose purpose was to organize a national campaign that would reach the American middle-class. In attendance at the Committee’s first meeting were Homer Jack, Robert Gurney who sat on the Board of Directors, and a staff member named Ross Goddard. As they discussed the upcoming ad campaign, the following conversation transpired:

Dr. Jack: We could put an H-Bomb over Columbus Circle.

Mr. Goddard: For brutality, let’s have two-headed babies, pictures of actual areas of devastation. No point in mincing words.

Dr. Jack: The child approach seems to have [a] big effect.

Mr. Gurney: Maybe we could draw the bomb with concentric circles. Why can’t we take and map and humanize: ground zero, pick out SANE supporters in that area, and get Polaroids of actual families living in these areas?³⁸

The three men worked late into the night planning for a deluge of visual and verbal messages on the dangers of Kennedy’s decision to resume atmospheric testing. From

³⁷ Norman Cousins to Homer Jack, March 7 1962, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series B, Box 12.

these conversations emerged a number of ads that did indeed attempt to “humanize” the nuclear threat. Although they eventually chose to leave the image of the two-headed babies out of their ads, the Public Information Committee did not abandon the image of the child. They quickly turned to the one man that they believed could best reach the American public and incite it to action, Dr. Benjamin Spock. Spock had become famous in 1946 with the publication of *The Common Sense Book of Baby and Child Care*.³⁹ Whereas his work had been considered too liberal and out of the mainstream at the time of its publication, by 1962, the pediatrician’s advice to mothers that “you know more than you think you do” had become a mantra for modern parenting. Spock would later claim that his movement into SANE was precipitated by a realization that he had a responsibility as a public figure to think and speak about “all the children who would die of leukemia and cancer, and of the ultimate possibility of nuclear war.”⁴⁰ After securing Spock’s much-coveted membership, SANE and its Public Information Committee quickly offered the pediatrician a chance to express his views on nuclear testing in a full-page ad in the *New York Times*. Following months of revisions, Spock and numerous editors pared his 4,000-word “manifesto” down to 250 words that epitomized the organization’s view of the child in the nuclear age.⁴¹

The finalized ad, which was published one day before the United States resumed atmospheric tests in the Pacific, featured a large picture of a concerned Spock looking down upon a small child playing before him. “Dr. Spock is worried,” was written in bold

³⁸ First Meeting of the Public Information Committee, January 5 1962, SANE Publicity Campaign Notes, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series A, Box 8.

³⁹ Benjamin Spock, *Baby and Child Care*, Cardinal ed. (New York,: Pocket Books, 1957).

⁴⁰ Interview of Benjamin Spock by Milton Katz, March 6 1972, cited in Katz, *Ban the Bomb*, 72.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 75.

letters at the bottom of the photograph, while “A Message from Dr. Spock” was featured below.⁴² In the message, Spock wrote, “I am worried. Not so much about the effect of past tests, but at the prospect of endless future ones. As the tests multiply, so will the damage to children—here and around the world.” The ad was reprinted in 700 newspapers in Europe and the United States. It was reproduced in doctor’s offices, in shop windows, and on baby carriages.⁴³ Twenty thousand copies of it were sent to President Kennedy’s office in 1962 alone.




Illustration 4.2: “Dr. Spock is Worried”⁴⁴

⁴² “Dr. Spock is Worried,” *New York Times*, April 24 1962, Literature 1957-62, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series A, Box 10.

⁴³ Letter to Dr. Spock published in the periodical “SANE Action,” May 1 1962, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series A, Box 17.

⁴⁴ “Dr. Spock is Worried,” Literature 1957-62, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series A, Box 10.

Spock's ad presented a perspective on the country's nuclear future that was significantly different from that being propagated in conservative American rhetoric. In the photograph, the doctor consumes the majority of the image and serves as its focal point. Having recognized the famous doctor, the viewer's eyes are drawn to replicate his gaze as it looks down to the small child below. While the ad was ostensibly about the child, the fact that the girl only occupies one-tenth of the frame suggests that the ad was really about the adult looking at the child and about what the adult (in this case the most esteemed expert on child rearing in the country) was thinking about her. Like SANE's many other ads, this photograph was carefully constructed and posed, with the child very clearly becoming a metonymic symbol for all vulnerable children, and with Spock in effect becoming a mirror for the viewer and an epistemic model of what the viewer should be seeing and thinking as he or she ponders the fate of the world's young.

The prescribed view of the child presented in the Spock ad was reinforced in SANE's construction of a "Peace Shelter" built in the center of Times Square on the same day the ad was released.⁴⁵ The shelter was constructed to replicate the semi-mounded civil defense shelters that had been recommended to New York residents by Nelson Rockefeller for the past few years, and would have been recognizable to viewers by its unmistakable rectangular shape and low ceilings.⁴⁶ As a physical structure placed prominently in Times Square, the shelter required that passers-by negotiate themselves around its space, thereby forcing them to acknowledge it on some tacit level. Before

⁴⁵ Meeting of Public Information Committee, March 9 1962, SANE Publicity Campaign Notes, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series A, Box 8.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

entering the structure, viewers' expectations would certainly have been mixed. Those who knew of SANE's mission might have expected to see statistics on fallout and the futility of civil defense. Others might have expected to see a stocked shelter, replete with canned peaches and a make-shift ventilation system. What they saw instead upon entering the shelter was a continual loop of projected pictures of children killed in Hiroshima. By placing these images within the physical confines of the very structure that was supposed to provide safety from such horrors, SANE prompted the viewer to see the child, the shelter, and themselves in a new way. Not only was the viewer forced momentarily to think about what his or her life would be like within the cramped walls of the structure, they were also compelled to ponder the shelter's ineffectiveness and the physical horrors of the nuclear firestorm. During the rally, forty-two protesters were arrested as demonstrators and bystanders began to jostle and block traffic.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ "42 Arrested in Times Square in Clashes at Peace Rally," *New York Times*, March 4 1962: 1.




Illustration 4.3: The shelter that was erected in Times Square would have looked something like this, with the entrance on one end.⁴⁸

While the public’s reaction to the “Peace Shelter” has been lost amidst reports of the larger demonstrations that were held during that week in March, the national response to Dr. Spock’s ad was overwhelming, ranging from positive support to vitriolic criticism. In one letter to the editor in the national tabloid *Star*, an irate reader accused Spock of “exploiting the fears of the fathers and mothers of the country over atomic testing.” Whereas Spock had argued in the ad that the cessation of testing did not leave the country prone to Soviet attack, the reader stated that the risks of not providing a strong deterrent against the Soviets “endangered the lives and futures of every American boy and girl. They are risks involving the future freedom of American mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters.”⁴⁹ In contrast, Neil Lee Litvak, SANE’s Public Information Director, contended that the ad had “captured the imagination of the people everywhere and is

⁴⁸ Department of Defense, “Outside Semimounded Plywood Box Shelter: Family Shelter Series,” PSD F-61-4 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office).

literally sweeping the country.”⁵⁰ One local chapter leader of SANE wrote into the national chapter in late April that “his whole neighborhood [was] full of Spock-lovers as there were many, many children.”⁵¹

The power of the Spock piece was also made apparent by the number of similar advertisements published by SANE in the following months. In 1962, Dr. James V. Neel, Professor and Chair of the Department of Human Genetics at the University of Michigan, underwrote a SANE ad projecting that 38,400,000 children with severe defects would be born if 40,000,000 adults should manage to survive a nuclear war.⁵² Another advertisement from August 1962 showed a silhouette of a pregnant woman appearing somber and reflective next to the words, “[1.5] million unborn children will be born dead or have some gross defect because of Nuclear Bomb testing” (See Illustration 4.4). This ad in effect solicited two perspectives: one of the woman herself worrying over the fate of her unborn child, and one of the viewer and SANE members, collectively worrying over the mother and the baby before them. This ad’s popularity was so great that it appeared on subway and train platforms. It was also featured in the United States Information Agency Graphic Arts exhibit to the Soviet Union in 1963 as a last-minute example of how Americans disliked nuclear testing. Ironically, although SANE had created the ad in order to criticize both American and Soviet testing, in the hands of the USIA, it transformed into a critique of Soviet nuclear escalation intended for Soviet

⁴⁹ “Is This Really SANE?” *Star*, August 1962, Washington Office, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series E, Box 34.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹ SANE Publicity Campaign notes, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series A, Box 8.

⁵² Dr. James V. Neel, “The Effects of Nuclear War, Literature 1960-1962, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series A, Box 10.

audiences.⁵³ Its meanings were altered from their original intent to convey the message that the United States government was actively seeking a cessation to nuclear testing.




Illustration 4.4: The small text lists the types of deformities that are possible, including “blindness, deafness, feeble-mindedness, muscular dystrophy, hemophilia, and mental diseases.”⁵⁴

As the push for a nuclear test ban treaty increased in the offices of SANE, another ad was created in January, 1963 that showed a picture of three laughing children, smiling brightly above text that read, “Your children’s teeth contain Strontium-90” (See Illustration 4.5). As with previous pieces, this ad called upon the viewer to assume the role of concerned adult. The ad was printed in the *New York Times* in the spring of 1963

⁵³ “Seven Years for a SANE Nuclear Policy,” *SANE World* 3, April 15 1964.

⁵⁴ “1 1/4 Children Will be Born,” Washington Office 1960-1963, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series B, Box 34.

and was sponsored by the Dentists' Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. It delivered a message that would have appeared familiar to most readers of the paper by then, as it presented statistics on the rise in strontium levels among the nation's young and concluded with the statement that "as dentists, our responsibility to promote life and health compels us to make this public appeal to all governments to cease nuclear weapons tests." Who could argue with the conclusions made by dentists on the troublesome fate faced by America's children's teeth?



Illustration 4.5: "Your Children's Teeth Contain Strontium-90,"⁵⁵

All of the men who underwrote these ads, from Spock to Neel to the Dentists' Committee were presented as experts in their fields, whose credibility was beyond reproach. As such, the authority of these figures to provide expert advice on the raising and protection of children was also difficult to question. This helps to explain why SANE regularly devoted half of its ad space to listing the names of its sponsors, who included such illustrious men as James Baldwin, Harry Belafonte, Harry Fosdick, Ray Bradbury,

and Arthur Penn. At the same time, the ability of each of these ads to place the viewer in the position of solemn, concerned citizen created a sense that this was not a worry that should be reserved for the country's greatest thinkers. Instead, they attempted to compel every adult to assume the same position as SANE's members, regardless of their education or social status.

Central to many of the appeals that were made in SANE's ads (and in the appeals of the entire anti-nuclear movement) was the issue of how children consumed radioactive materials, with particular focus on milk. While Spock's ad was accused of emotional manipulation from some parts of America and deep admiration from others, an equally controversial ad featured little more than a milk bottle with a picture of a skull and crossbones pasted to its front. "Is this what it's coming to?" the July 1962 ad asked its readers in bold letters.⁵⁶ In the text below, it read, "Milk is the most sacred of all foods. It is the food of infants and children. No one in the world has the right to contaminate it... The time has come for mothers and fathers to speak up in no uncertain terms... Raise hell; it's time you did." It then suggested to parents that they serve powdered or evaporated milk to children in areas where the fallout of Iodine-131 had been particularly heavy. Milk in effect became a signifier for the child, who was thought to be its main consumer. It also became an emblem for the environmental impact of testing and its immediate connection to the health of the population.

⁵⁵ *The New York Times*, April 7 1963.

⁵⁶ "Is This What it's Coming To?" *New York Times*, July 5 1962. Also see SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series A, Box 16.



Illustration 4.6: "Is this what it's coming to?"⁵⁷

Given milk's importance as a symbol of public and environmental health, it comes as no surprise that SANE's ad garnered severe criticism across the country. Five days after the ad ran, Norman Myrick, the Director of Public Relations for the Milk Industry Foundation, wrote a scathing letter to Norman Cousins and Clarence Pickett expressing his dismay "at the terrible prospect this advertisement affords."⁵⁸ "[This advertisement] is clearly a violation of the law," he declared. Citing the Federal Trade Commission's guidelines for advertising fallout shelters, he reminded Cousins and Pickett that:

Scare tactics, such as the employment of horror pictures calculated to arouse unduly the emotions of prospective shelter buyers, shall not be

⁵⁷ "Is This What it's Coming to?" *New York Times*, July 5 1962. Also see SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series A, Box 16.

⁵⁸ Letter from Norman Myrick to Clarence Pickett and Norman Cousins, July 10 1962, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series A, Box 16.

used. I submit that the picture of a bottle of milk carrying the skull and cross bones which is a universal symbol for poison is a “horror picture” used in order to arouse the emotions of prospective supporters of your organization.⁵⁹

Through “fear, innuendoes, half truths and sly suggestions,” he wrote, “you have led people to see our product as harmful to their children, which is completely false.” But this was ultimately what SANE was attempting to accomplish; they were searching for ways to revise the public’s view of its children and its environment. They were working to redefine what was at stake in the president’s decision to resume nuclear testing. Myrick was certainly shocked by this tactic, but it was surprisingly effective as is evidenced by the subsequent milk boycotts that happened throughout the country that summer.

As the path to the Test Ban Treaty appeared to bog down in the spring of 1963, Secretary of State Dean Rusk asked Norman Cousins to meet directly with Khrushchev and to inform the premier that Kennedy was being transparent in his desire to reach a settlement. Cousins had met with Khrushchev a year earlier in a successful effort to secure the release of a Ukrainian Cardinal held in prison since the Stalin era. His efforts on behalf of the Test Ban Treaty were equally fruitful. Khrushchev agreed to return to the negotiating table. A month later, Kennedy gave a groundbreaking commencement speech at the American University in Washington, D.C. where he stated his desires not for a

⁵⁹ Ibid. Emphasis in the original.

“Pax Americana,” but for a peace that “enables men and nations to grow and to hope and to build a better life for their children.”⁶⁰

By July, the path to the Test Ban Treaty had been mapped and approved by both Kennedy and Khrushchev. All that remained was ratification by the Senate. SANE worked intensively to gain the two-thirds approval that was necessary to pass the Treaty. In their advertisement, “Now it’s up to the Senate...and You!” SANE reminded its readers that through this treaty, “Present and future generations [would] be spared additional reproductive damage and bone cancer.”⁶¹ The campaign, which included a nation-wide program of radio, press, and television appeals, was ultimately successful. Whereas public opinion had been at almost twenty to one against the treaty at the beginning of the summer, by September, the majority of the American population backed the limited Treaty. The Senate easily ratified it by a margin of eighty to nineteen.⁶²

Through its first five years of existence, SANE had leaned heavily on the image of the child as a means to re-envision both itself and the world’s youth. In contrast to the images of imperiled and mobilized children that were being created in other parts of American society, SANE depicted the next generation as victimized by the state in a way that made all other dangers seem inconsequential. Health risks, they argued, came before ideological ones. By reconfiguring the stakes of the nuclear arms race, SANE redefined the nature of the conflict altogether. Instead of seeing the Cold War as a struggle between East and West, or between Communism and Capitalism, they conceptualized the struggle

⁶⁰ John F. Kennedy, Commencement Address, American University, Washington, D.C., June 10 1963.

⁶¹ “Now it’s up to the Senate...and You!” *New York Times*, August 2 1963.

⁶² Katz, *Ban the Bomb*, 86.

as one that pitted the American and Soviet leadership against a globally endangered populace.

From SANE's example, another organization arose in the late 1950s that also portrayed its members as authority figures on how best to protect the young: the nation's mothers. This time, however, they would go one step farther than putting children in their ads and rhetoric. This time, they brought their children along.

WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE AND THE IMAGES OF MATERNALIST POLITICS

On May 19, 1959, a group of white, middle-class mothers, many holding babies in their arms, staged a protest at a meeting of a Senate appropriations subcommittee where federal money was being allocated for research on the health hazards of radioactive fallout. "I can assure you," Mrs. Robert H. Harris was quoted as saying in the *Washington Post* the next day, "that a pregnant woman's normal fears are multiplied by the thought that her unborn child might be deformed by invisible particles coming from bombs manufactured and tested by her fellow men."⁶³ Mrs. Harris and her fellow protesters, who were all members of the Washington Chapter of SANE, justified their presence on Capitol Hill in terms of their maternal concern for their children. "I can't tell you what a mother goes through," Harris said to the reporter while holding her eight-month-old daughter on her hip, "when she worries whether she is poisoning her child with radioactivity every time she gives him a glass of milk or a piece of bread."⁶⁴

One month later, the same women again made their way to the Senate building, this time to urge the passing of a bill that would transfer radiation safety controls from the

⁶³ "Mothers Urge Expanded Study of Fallout Peril," *Washington Post*, May 19 1959.

Atomic Energy Commission to the Public Health Service. Dressed in fine clothes indicative of their social status, with numerous children in tow, the women filed into the Senate building to present a petition arguing for more transparency from the government on the effects that nuclear testing was having on the nation's young. "We are here to express our alarm at the genetic effects of nuclear tests," Mrs. Robert F. Steiner told a reporter for the *Washington Star*.⁶⁵ A couple of weeks later, another young mother who was a well-known illustrator of children's books, presented a drawing of the petitioning women to the Senate subcommittee chairman, Lister Hill, in commemoration of the event (See Illustration 4.7). In the drawing, a group of apparently well-dressed, white, middle-class mothers could be seen standing outside the doors of the Senate subcommittee meeting wiping their children's noses, talking with each other, and presenting their petition to a clerk who was apparently peeking out the door to invite them in. The illustrator of the drawing was none other than Dagmar Wilson, who would soon become the public face of Women Strike for Peace.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ "Mothers' Lobby," *Washington Star*, June 17 1959.



Illustration 4.7: Dagmar Wilson, “Presented to Senator Lister Hill by the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, Jan 16, 1959”⁶⁶

Although drafted two years before WSP’s inception, Wilson’s drawing provides a window into the maternalist logic of the organization’s founders. These women appear well-dressed and well-mannered, with far more attention shown to their children than to the clerk at the door. In an era where the “cult of motherhood” and ideas of domestic, “feminine fulfillment” still held sway, these women presented themselves as housewives and mothers who had been compelled to leave the confines of the home for the sake of their children.⁶⁷ They stressed, in the words of Adrienne Harris and Ynestra King, “the rights of ordinary mothers to protect children from nuclear death over the rights of

⁶⁶ Dagmar Wilson, WSP Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series E, Box 34.

⁶⁷ Seth Koven, *Mothers of a New World: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 6, Blanche and Carol Hurd Green Linden-ward, *American Women in the 1960s: Changing the Future* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1993), xi, Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique* (New York: Norton, 1963).

governments to kill them.”⁶⁸ As such, their presence in the hallways of Congress simultaneously solidified their connection to the world of children and domestic life while also providing justification for their movement into politics and the public sphere.⁶⁹ As Jean Bethke Elshtain has argued, their maternal pursuit of peace became “a crucial trope in [their] construction of identity” and provided a ticket into the world of governmental politics.⁷⁰ Although in later years the “motherist” approach posed a number of problems for feminists who argued that such tactics were based on an assumed subordinate role for women in society, in the 1960s, Women Strike for Peace felt itself to be participating in an effective and well-tested tradition of female activism.⁷¹

Like SANE, Women Strike for Peace presented children as symbols of nuclear threat and as rallying points for anti-nuclear activism. Yet they also took an approach in depicting youth that was markedly different from that seen in SANE’s nation-wide advertisements. Unlike SANE’s ad-men, who uniformly placed children in carefully constructed photographs taken in studios in front of blank or abstracted backgrounds, the mothers who would soon form Women Strike for Peace presented their children marching and standing alongside them in real-world environments that sometimes

⁶⁸ Adrienne Harris and Ynestra King, ed., *Rocking the Ship of State: Toward a Feminist Peace Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 234.

⁶⁹ Swerdlow, *Women Strike for Peace: Traditional Motherhood and Radical Politics in the 1960s*, 3.

⁷⁰ J.B. Elshtain, *Women and War* (New York: Basic Books, 1987). See also Helen Laville, “Positive Peace’: American Womens’ Response to the ‘Peace Offensive’,” in *Cold War Women: The International Activities of American Women’s Organizations*, ed. Helen Laville (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 124.

⁷¹ See, for instance, William Ladd, *On the Duty of Females to Promote the Cause of Peace* (Boston: American Peace Society, 1836), Julia Ward Howe, *Reminiscences, 1819-1899* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1899), Marie Louise Degen, *History of the Women’s Peace Party* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1916), Judith Papachristou, “American Women and Foreign Policy, 1898-1905: Exploring Gender in Diplomatic History,” *Diplomatic History* 14 (1990): 493-509, Jodi York, “The Truth About Women and Peace,” in *The Women and War Reader*, ed. Lois Lorentzen and Jennifer Turpin (New York: New York University Press, 1998).

included policemen, bad weather, and social disorder. This image of youth in many ways conveyed a far more challenging message than that being created by the SANE national office. Returning to Wilson's 1959 drawing; these youngsters on the one hand appear to be well cared-for and sheltered by their mothers; they are uniformly happy as they skip, read and ask to be picked up. On the other hand, their presence in the hallway (and at the various rallies and public appearances that the organization would produce over the years) also conveys the message that these children, like their mothers, have been compelled to enter the public sphere and to risk the dangers that exist there because the bomb has rendered the home unsafe. Their presence brings into question the state's ability to protect the home and symbolizes the threat of invasion, not from communism or delinquency, but from nuclear attack, radioactive fallout, and state policy itself.

Moreover, the children who participated in WSP protests altered the physical world around them in ways that the SANE advertisements never did. The local Washington SANE chapter and Women Strike for Peace frequently made specific requests to participants to "bring their kids along." As one member wrote to Dagmar Wilson in later years, the presence of the children was undoubtedly instrumental in "making the Senators sit up and listen."⁷² But it was not just the simple presence of the children that made the Senators "sit up and listen;" it was also the children's behavior. Although there is no evidence showing that these women openly decided to allow their children to make a ruckus while protesting, what transpired at these events seems to suggest that many of them implicitly agreed to let their children "act up" in order to

⁷² Eleanor Garst to Dagmar Wilson, Washington, D.C., September 1962, WSP Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 115, Series A-2, Box 1.

create a certain amount of chaos and to subvert the ordered world around them. These women and their children can be seen acting, in the words of James Scott, “at the very perimeter of what the authorities are obliged to permit or unable to prevent.”⁷³ Thus, in Wilson’s drawing, children are not portrayed standing obediently by their mothers’ sides in the halls of Congress. Instead, they can be seen turning cartwheels. They skip and crawl on the floor; this is a noisy hallway. When the *Washington Star* reported that a group of mothers and children had “turned a congressional hearing into a nursery,” one gets the sense that the day’s regular schedule of business was significantly altered by the children. Through their presence and their irreverent behavior, these children effectively participated in a “ritual of reversal.”⁷⁴ They transformed the congressional environment from a male-centric forum into a nursery, which was perceived by many to be the heart of the home and the world of the child. To be sure, these children and their mothers never sought to break any explicit rules. In later years, they obeyed the police and heeded barricades. Yet through their “childish antics,” they transgressed the rules and expectations of the official world around them (to be quiet, to sit still), while at the same time having little fear of punishment or social scorn.

The creation of Women Strike for Peace can be traced back to SANE’s decision to purge its communist members in 1960 and to its strict hierarchical structure. However, it was not until SANE refused to take direct action when the eighty-nine-year-old Bertrand Russell was arrested on September 5, 1961, that Dagmar Wilson, Eleanor Garst, and six other members of the Washington branch of SANE officially decided to break

⁷³ James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 139.

away. Russell had been arrested after refusing to leave an anti-nuclear protest rally in England. At a late-night meeting, Wilson and Garst resolved to stage a one-day peace strike on November 1 that would involve the nation's women forgoing their daily chores, "on behalf of all the world's children" for "an end to the nuclear arms race." The following day, they issued an announcement asking women everywhere to suspend "the regular routine—home, family, job," and to "visit their elected representatives, and the UN delegates from other countries, to appeal for the future of mankind."⁷⁵ In the weeks building up to the protest, the members made thousands of phone calls and wrote numerous letters to friends and to famous personalities asking for their support. In their letter to Jacqueline Kennedy, for instance, they asked the First Lady to "think what hope would gladden the world if women everywhere would rise to claim the right to life for their children and for generations yet unborn."⁷⁶ Meanwhile, some 500 Marin County women in California prepared to forego housework and "participate in a mass mailing of pro-peace letters to government officials."⁷⁷

At its inception, the organization could be seen reprioritizing the duties of the middle-class, American mother by linking the need for a test-ban with their obligations to the home. "None of our children's problems matter if we can't get this one solved," one mother at the November march was quoted as saying.⁷⁸ By redefining their obligations to the child, these mothers were building a new mandate for themselves in the public sphere.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 172.

⁷⁵ "Appeal to All Governments," September 21 1961, Literature 1961, WSP Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 115, Series A-2, Box 1.

⁷⁶ "Letter to Mrs. Kennedy," November 1 1961, Literature 1961, WSP Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 115, Series A-2, Box 1.

⁷⁷ "Women plan 'Strike for Peace'," *News-Call Bulletin*, October 25 1961.

⁷⁸ WSP Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 115, Series A-2, Box 1.

While on the surface they seemed to embrace their stereotypical identities as mothers devoted first to the family, they also represented a part of white, middle-class American female culture that, in the words of Joanne Meyerowitz, “was neither wholly domestic nor quiescent.”⁷⁹ Marriage and family not only failed to impede these women’s involvement with the anti-nuclear cause, they became the primary justification for their movement away from the home.

National participation in the strike and in subsequent rallies and gatherings was surprisingly large considering the decentralized nature of the organization and the short amount of time that the women gave themselves to mobilize. During the November march, women in Detroit exhibited pictures of their own children while pushing baby carriages and holding placards saying “Testing Damages the Unborn,” and “Save the children.” Some eight hundred women, children, and a dog marched in front of the White House.⁸⁰ Four thousand women assembled in Los Angeles, while six hundred women gathered in Cambridge, with one little girl wearing a sign that read, “I want to be a mommy someday.”⁸¹ Similar protests happened in numerous cities around the country, leading the organization to claim that a total of 50,000 women had participated.⁸² Although the accuracy of that number is impossible to verify, there can be no doubt that the perceived success of the November strike led to many more over the course of the next year. In December, pamphlets were published presenting new statistics on the levels

⁷⁹ Joanne Meyerowitz, ed., *Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945-1960* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1994), 2.

⁸⁰ *Newsweek*, November 13 1961, 21-22.

⁸¹ *The Los Angeles Times*, November 1 1961,

⁸² “Report to Women around the United States of America on the Women Strike for Peace, November 1961,” November 25 1961, Washington, D.C., mimeographed flyer, WSP Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 115, Series A, Box 3.

of Strontium in the nation's milk supply. A memorandum was issued to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare containing recommendations for health protection, while a letter was written to President Kennedy declaring that "the women of America are concerned about the contamination already in our children's milk."⁸³ In January, women and their children marched in front of the White House in the pouring rain, while others took up banners on the west coast and in the mid-west.

From its inception, Women Strkie for Peace took an approach in its marches and rallies that was non-confrontational and yet surprisingly blunt in its criticisms of American and Soviet nuclear policies. Members maintained that their credibility was dependent upon their ability to look middle-class, ordinary, and lady-like. As Dagmar Wilson noted, it was their intent to emphasize that they were well behaved women who "did not usually resort to this kind of activity."⁸⁴ Their children always appeared with combed hair and appropriate attire. They marched quietly as a rule. Yet at the same time, there can be no doubt that their approach was also remarkably aggressive. For instance, while they always marched in their finest clothes and with their children, they often did so in difficult environments, thereby bringing attention to their plight and to the difficulties they were enduring for the sake of nuclear disarmament. This was the case when two thousand mothers and their children picketed the White House in a massive thunderstorm on January 15, 1962. The image of cold, drenched mothers and children marching resolutely in the rain was difficult for the press and the government to ignore.

⁸³ Letter to President John F. Kennedy, December 1 1961, Literature 1961, WSP Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 115, Series A2, Box 1, Report on Health Hazards, Literature 1961, WSP Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 115, Series A2, Box 1.

⁸⁴ *London Times Mirror*, October 4 1979.

On this particular day, Kennedy himself attempted to disperse the women by sending a message to them that he had “understood what they were trying to say, and therefore, considered that their message was received.”⁸⁵

WSP also delivered some fairly scathing messages to the government in the form of placards that were frequently reproduced in national and local newspapers and stood in stark contrast to their apparently modest demeanor. In a January march in Boston, for instance, one child carried a sign reading “Civil Defense: the Grand Illusion.”⁸⁶ Another child in Austin carried a placard shaped like a milk bottle with a skull on top of it that said, “Death, Disease, Deformity.”⁸⁷

⁸⁵ “Message Gets Across,” *Washington Post*, January 16 1962.

⁸⁶ “Women for Peace,” *Boston Herald*, January 16 1962.

⁸⁷ “Skull Capped,” *Austin American Statesman*, January 3 1962.



Illustration 4.8: The Child’s sign reads, “I Want my Children Active not Radioactive”⁸⁸

This approach received a mixed response from the American public. A policeman present at a Washington D.C. march commented to a reporter that “They all want peace. You can’t argue with that.” Another paper in San Diego simply wrote that “the demonstration was orderly.”⁸⁹ Yet while the women received support from some circles, others argued that Women Strkie for Peace was turning mothers and children into communist dupes. As one flyer that was circulated in Portland, Oregon in January 1962

⁸⁸ “Mothers Hike for Peace,” *San Diego Evening Tribune*, February 1 1962.

declared, “Many innocent and well-meaning people—including MOTHERS, God bless them—are being duped by communists and Soviet apologists...we must all remember that CHILDREN UNDER COMMUNISM ARE THE PROPERTY OF THE COMMUNIST STATE.”⁹⁰ For many, the veracity of this argument was supported by the heavy coverage that the various marches received in the Soviet press, which envisioned the women and their children as mobilized for peace alongside the Russian population.⁹¹ Despite the fact that Women Strkie for Peace uniformly gave equal amounts of protest time to both Soviet and American testing, the Soviet Union’s endorsement for their marches left many in the American public uncomfortable.

Others criticized the organization on the grounds that it was endorsing inappropriate behavior among otherwise respectable women and children. In a particularly angry letter to the editor published in the *White Plains Reporter* in February 1962, one housewife named Frances Strong declared that “women have always used their sex for these silly ‘marches’ on Washington, as if being a woman or a mother somehow set them apart from the general American public.” Of course, that was the argument being made by WSP, an argument which this housewife disregarded, instead labeling the women as “chronic complainers who are always ‘off’ on any subject which makes news.” Continuing, she declared that the organization was handing out false information, did not “trust the government, the experts, or anybody,” was being laughed at by American men, and was putting the “American peace effort at risk.” “I find any public means of getting

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ “The Proposed Mother March,” September 1961, Literature 1961, WSP Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 115, Series A2, Box 1. Emphasis in original.

⁹¹ See for instance, “U Monumenta Vashingtonu,” *Trud*, March 8 1963.

attention to be embarrassing and in very bad taste,” Strong concluded.⁹² This article, which was replicated in less vitriolic terms in other letters to the editor across the country, displayed the risks that WSP was taking in moving its members and their children to the picket lines. These women’s embracing of their maternal obligations and their rejection of their government’s expert assurances opened the door for critics who questioned the use of motherhood as grounds for public protest. Women instead became purveyors of “bad taste,” based on the argument that no cause justified a woman stepping out into to public and drawing attention to herself.

Yet despite these criticisms, the protests continued. In fact, as the threat of resumed American atmospheric testing rose in the spring 1962, the rallies took on a more serious tone. For instance, they joined SANE in New York in March with their children in tow, chanting in unison “Shame, Shame, Shame!”⁹³ A photograph in the *Springfield Ohio News* shows a well-dressed woman holding her child while she “awaited her turn as police lifted demonstrators into patrol wagons.”⁹⁴ At the same time, a number of WSP delegates prepared to travel to Geneva in an attempt to convince the Soviet and American negotiators to settle on a Test Ban Treaty. They issued statement after statement, declaring that they had “one great concern, our children.”⁹⁵ “We women,” another press release argued, “who are a part of the creative force of the world and who are representative of different ideologies and social systems, [gather] to express the hopes

⁹² “Says ‘Women for Peace’ Movement is ‘Getting More Ridiculous Daily,’” *White Plains N.Y. Reporter-Dispatch*, February 14 1962.

⁹³ *New York Times*, March 4 1962.

⁹⁴ *Springfield Ohio New Sun*, March 16 1962.

⁹⁵ “Women Hold ‘Peace Talks,’” *Tulsa Oklahoma Tribune*, April 4 1962.

and fears of all women in their deep concern for the survival of our children.”⁹⁶ After they returned to the United States, they intensified their picketing, joining forces with SANE and Linus Pauling to stage nation-wide marches. After American atmospheric testing resumed, WSP responded by calling on the nation’s mothers to boycott milk, declaring in a press release that “Thousands of American mothers will boycott fresh milk after every atmospheric nuclear test.” As we have seen, what resulted was an ad-war that pitted Women Strkie for Peace and SANE against the milk industry. In their efforts to assure the American public that their milk was not contaminated, the milk industry had been publishing articles since January quoting the promises of Kennedy that “the milk supply offers no hazards” and of Edward Teller who had declared that “fallout from nuclear testing is not worth worrying about.”⁹⁷

⁹⁶ *London Evening Press*, London, Ontario, April 5 1962.

⁹⁷ *Washington Post*, Jan 26 1962, *New Jersey Herald*, April 19 1962.




Illustration 4.9: Nuclear Tests Cost Lives⁹⁸

Then, on December 5, 1962, Women Strike for Peace received a summons to appear before the House Committee on Un-American Activities under suspicion of communist infiltration. In the week before the hearing, WSP made careful plans to manage their encounter with HUAC differently than SANE had handled it two years earlier. In public statements, they presented themselves as simple women who were being subjected to “interrogation” and “fear tactics” by a committee that “imperils democracy

⁹⁸ “Nuclear Tests Cost Lives,” September 1961, Literature 1962, WSP Papers, Peace Archive, Swarthmore University, DG 115, Series A2, Box 1.

itself.”⁹⁹ They released a statement to the press one day before HUAC’s announcement of the subpoenas, declaring that “with the fate of humanity resting on a push button, the quest for peace has become the highest form of patriotism.”¹⁰⁰ They then wrote an editorial in the *Washington Post* where they conceded that “it was probably inevitable that this would happen...as soon as [we] won any degree of notoriety,” but argued nonetheless that they accepted the “responsibility of the individual in a free and democratic society.”¹⁰¹ They stated explicitly that they had never screened their members according to race, religion, or politics, and had no intention of doing so in the future. Surprisingly, they made no mention of their children or of the damage that this hearing might do to their young. Privately, however, they were making plans that explicitly included their youngsters as a part of their strategy to counter HUAC’s accusations. At an emergency meeting of around fifty women from the New York and Washington Chapters, members decided unanimously that Women Strkie for Peace would stand behind every subpoenaed woman at the hearing, regardless of her ideological beliefs and affiliation. This included providing access to WSP’s lawyers and funding. They then distributed a letter to every member of WSP in the United States proposing that each woman send a request to her congressman asking to be subpoenaed as well. They argued that such an act would not only “dramatize the fact that rather than fearing investigation, we welcome it,” but would also “give the press just what they need,” and might even

⁹⁹ Editorial, *Washington Post*, December 6 1962.

¹⁰⁰ “Women Strkie for Peace statement on House Un-American Activities Committee Subpoenas to WSP Participants in New York,” Literature 1962, WSP Papers, Peace Archive, Swarthmore University, DG 115, Series A2, Box 1.

¹⁰¹ Editorial, *Washington Post*, December 6 1962.

“result in having the hearings called off.”¹⁰² Although no new women were subpoenaed as a result of the letter writing campaign, the program did succeed in making their position known to every congressman and woman, as well as the general press. The decision was also made at the emergency meeting to include children in the hearings. Largely through word of mouth, the women who were scheduled to attend the hearings made plans to arrive with their youngsters in tow. They would, in the words of Amy Swerdlow, transform the hearing into a test of patriotism, waged over each side’s “commitment to the survival of the planet and its children.”¹⁰³ Youngsters would be physically present, thereby creating an environment that would undermine the authority of the Senators at the hearing and provide living examples that could be referenced as the reason for the women’s activism. Eric Bentley has argued, in *Thirty Years of Treason*, that this approach finally succeeded in ushering in the “fall of HUAC’s Bastille.”¹⁰⁴

When the HUAC hearings began on December 11, 1962, all of the open seats in the Old House Office Building were occupied by members of WSP. The hearing began with a long opening statement from the Presiding Chair, Senator Clyde Doyle who argued that:

Excessive concern with peace on the part of any nation impedes or prevents adequate defense preparation, hinders effective diplomacy in the national interest, undermines the will to resist and saps national strength.

For this reason, in today’s world, intense peace propaganda and agitation

¹⁰² “Letter to WSP Members,” Literature 1962, WSP Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 115, Series A2, Box 1.

¹⁰³ Swerdlow, *Women Strike for Peace: Traditional Motherhood and Radical Politics in the 1960s*, 100.

¹⁰⁴ Eric Bentley, *Thirty Years of Treason: Excerpts from Hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1938-1968* (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2002), 951.

in non-Communist nations obviously serves the aggressive plans of world communism.¹⁰⁵

Quoting the U.S. Communist Party leader Gus Hall, Doyle reminded those in the audience that “it is imperative [for communists] to bring everyone—men, women, youth, and yes, even children—into the struggle.” Amidst vague allegations concerning the women’s loyalties and the exploitation of their children for the communist cause, the hearing began.



Illustration 4.10: This image was reproduced in newspapers across the country.¹⁰⁶

For the remainder of the day, WSP worked effectively to gain control over the hearings. When Doyle acceded that not all peace activists were communists, the women rose and cheered. He then asked the women not to cheer during the hearing, only to see

¹⁰⁵ *Congressional Record*, January 17 1963, 524.

them applaud and stand when the first witness was called. After Doyle asked the women to please not make a “ruckus” (a request that he would make many times through the course of the day), Blanche Posner, a retired school teacher, took the stand. Above the objections and interruptions of the men in the Committee, Posner declared resolutely that “this movement was inspired and motivated by mothers’ love for children...This is the only motivation.”¹⁰⁷ After resorting to the Fifth Amendment forty-four times, Posner left the stand in good spirits. Doyle thanked her for her testimony and she replied like only a school-teacher could, “You are welcome, Mr. Doyle. And thank you. You have been very, very cooperative.”¹⁰⁸ The audience broke into laughter as women and children rose to hug her and give her roses. Numerous witnesses followed, all making the same claims to have been drawn to the peace movement out of concern for their children. On the third day, Dagmar Wilson took the stand. While on the way to her seat, Wilson was stopped by a young woman with a baby on her hip who handed her a bouquet of flowers. Without citing the Fifth Amendment, Wilson presented herself merely as a figurehead for a group of unorganized women who had been drawn together out of outrage and fear over the fate of their young. When asked if she would be willing to admit communists or fascists into the organization, she stated, “If we could only get them on our side.” Wilson received a standing ovation. After this, the questioning was quickly adjourned and the hearing officially ended. Amidst the cheering and standing ovations, other moments of chaos ensued, as the former FBI agent Jack Levine, dashed down the center aisle shouting, “Mr.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ House on Un-American Activities, *Communist Activities in the Peace Movement (Women Strike for Peace and Certain Other Groups)*, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, December 11-13 1962 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office), 2074.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

Congressman!...I petition you to discontinue these proceedings before you heap disgrace on the American people.”¹⁰⁹

The role played by children at the hearing has been largely overlooked in previous examinations of this event. In every picture of the women that was distributed to the national press, children can be seen talking, playing, and crying. Outside the hearing room, baby carriages sat parked near the waiting television cameras.¹¹⁰ James McCartney wrote in the *Chicago Daily News* that “babies bawled, women cheered. There were hoots and laughs [in] the normally austere, marble columned hearing room.”¹¹¹ Similarly, Mary McGrory, a reporter for the *Washington Evening Star*, described how the courtroom had been transformed by the children’s presence: “the young crawled in the aisles and noisily sucked on their bottles during the whole proceedings...while the ladies used the Congress as a baby-sitter.”¹¹² One newspaper showed a picture of a young toddler being helped out of his coat by his mother. Below the image were the words, “Babies—something HUAC wasn’t prepared for.”¹¹³ WSP’s tacit acceptance of the children and the disruption that they created, represented a careful and deliberate delegitimation of the entire proceedings. The presence of the women with their children openly questioned the ability of the Senators to protect the young or gauge their needs, instead equating them with the nuclear dangers that they indirectly condoned by prosecuting the women. This connection was made explicit by Bill Galt of the *Vancouver Sun*, who reported that Blanche Posner

¹⁰⁹ “Ladies’ Day,” *Newsweek*, December 24 1962.

¹¹⁰ William May, “Who’s Running the Show,” *Detroit Free Press*, December 13 1962.

¹¹¹ James McCartney, “It’s Ladies Day at the Capitol: Hoots, Howls—and Charm,” *Chicago Daily News*, December 14 1962.

¹¹² Mary McGrory, “Peace Strike Explained: ‘Nobody Controls Anybody,’” *Washington Evening Star*, December 14 1962.

¹¹³ “Peace Women Baffle HUAC’s Masculine Minds,” *Pennsylvania Guardian*, December 21 1962.

had managed during her testimony to link Senator Doyle with “Strontium 90 in babies’ milk, leukemia, birth deformation and nuclear holocaust.”¹¹⁴ Moreover, by presenting themselves as motivated primarily by a desire to protect the children in the room, the women redefined the criteria that determined their own guilt or innocence. The trial transformed from a hearing concerning suspected communist influence into a competition over who most loved their children. Once parental concern became the point of debate, the mothers had little trouble gaining the upper hand.

Over the spring of 1963, Women Strkie for Peace worked avidly towards the passing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Photographs of children playing in an open fire hydrant in the street were accompanied by the message that this was “the right kind of fallout.”¹¹⁵ A *Disarmament Coloring Book* was distributed to mothers across the country that made the connection between government defense spending and the dilapidated condition of the nation’s infrastructure.¹¹⁶ When the Test Ban Treaty was up for ratification in the Senate, Aileen Hutchinson, a WSP member, pleaded for the “health, safety, and survival of the world’s children.”¹¹⁷ Her sentiments were seconded by Senator Maurine Neuberger who declared that a vote for the treaty would be a vote “that flows from the rational concern of any mother for the welfare of her children.”¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ “It’s Not Un-American to Giggle,” *Vancouver (B.C.) Sun*, December 14 1962.

¹¹⁵ “The Right Kind of Fallout,” April 1963, Literature 1963, WSP Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 115, Series A2, Box 1.

¹¹⁶ “The Disarmament Coloring Book,” Literature 1963, WSP Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 115, Series A2, Box 1.

¹¹⁷ U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Underwater*, 88th Cong., 1st Session, August 12 1963 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), 744.

¹¹⁸ Maurine Neuberger, *WSP of New York, New Jersey, Connecticut*, Literature 1963, WSP Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 115, Series A2, Box 1.

Through the course of WSP's struggle to influence American nuclear policy, images of the threatened and mobilized child had played a central role in the organization's articulation of anti-nuclear dissent. Children provided a source of legitimacy to women who had previously found themselves relegated to the domestic sphere. They redefined the source of the Cold War threat for many Americans and they identified a new set of national priorities according to which citizens could orient themselves politically and ethically, namely the welfare of the young and the need to protect the next generation from fallout and shortsighted governmental policies.

CONCLUSION

Some telling correlations can be identified between the images of children that were being produced by the American anti-nuclear movement and Soviet filmmakers during the 1950s and 60s. While there can be no question that a myriad of discreet and individual forces drove these seemingly disparate groups to use the child's image, we can nonetheless see how they were also driven to create alternative visions of their countries' youth for similar reasons and to similar ends. For instance, both groups existed in an environment where overt criticism of state policy could present great risks. While filmmakers in the Khrushchev era faced the prospect of having their films rejected by censors or even losing their jobs, white, middle-class Americans who were intent on opposing nuclear testing faced the prospects of social scorn and Senate investigations for communist affiliation. While the level of risk on each side is hardly comparable, there can be no question that both groups nonetheless felt compelled to express themselves in

ways that could slip by the censors or be viewed as apolitical. By presenting the child as their primary protagonist and focus for concern, these groups were able to position themselves as loyal citizens whose actions were motivated by a simple and “natural” desire to protect the next generation.

There are also some striking similarities between these two groups’ depictions of youth. Both provided a vision of childhood that appeared threatened in ways that the world had never seen before. For Mikhail Romm and Benjamin Spock, the looming threat of the mushroom cloud permanently altered the assumed innocence and hopefulness of youth. Childhood instead became a symbol of potential loss, destruction, and disease. Even the space that children inhabited was changed drastically. Childhood had traditionally been perceived as occupying what Gaston Bachelard would call the “felicitous spaces” of the home—the loved, nostalgic spaces that society deemed important to defend against threat.¹¹⁹ Not only did these groups envision the child as endangered by the menace of nuclear death, they also altered the space that childhood inhabited, transforming it into a location that promised only false security or even abandonment and death. In the process, they re-identified the source of the threat, not as the enemy outside their borders against whom peace had to be wrested or defense had to be ensured, but as the state itself, whose policies of brinksmanship had created a world that was unsafe for the young.

In addition, each group to varying extents used the image of the child as a way to protest the weakened ability of the parent to protect its young. This was made explicit in the films of the Thaw, where characters like Ivan and Fedor are orphaned and where

Serezha and Gena have to reconcile themselves to the fact that their parents' obligations to the state come first. Certainly this is not how children are portrayed in the ads and rallies created by the anti-nuclear movement. These youths are never portrayed alone and are always surrounded by concerned parents. Yet, when Women Strike for Peace took their children to the streets, they were in effect making the same statement that Tarkovsky and Klimov were making: that their government's policies had rendered them incapable of fulfilling their domestic obligations to protect their children and had instead drawn them into the dangers of the outside world.

Moreover, both of these groups contested the notion that the act of mobilization, either for a Soviet-led peace or for an American-led defense against communist attack, provided an effective means to wage the Cold War. They portrayed their children as mobilized in ways that were explicitly different from that proposed by the state. They showed children who were focused on the needs of the family and the individual over that of their governments. They presented visions of youth who could be seen actively rejecting their leader's policies, whether they were related to the arms race, to agriculture, or to civil defense. They portrayed the young instead as advocates for alternative policies that would ostensibly lead to a brighter future for themselves. Both sides rejected the ideological boundaries of the Cold War consensus by redefining what was at risk in the conflict and by providing new ideas about what needed to be done in order to mitigate the threat.

Returning to the United States and the work of SANE and WSP, the passage of the Test Ban Treaty in 1963 did not deter either group's efforts to re-conceptualize the

¹¹⁹ Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), xxxi.

Cold War in terms of the child's contested image. Their focus did change, however, as SANE and WSP recognized that a crisis was in the making in Southeast Asia. After Johnson's bombing campaign began in February 1965, anti-nuclear activists resumed their use of the familiar image of the victimized child, no longer envisioned as a casualty of American and Soviet atomic brinkmanship, but as a victim of U.S. imperialism and paranoia in Vietnam. For anti-war activists in the United States, as well as in the Soviet Union and in North Vietnam, the image of the napalmed child became the era's most pervasive symbol of American irresponsibility and brutality in the war. This was reflected in WSP slogans like "Not Our Sons, Not Your Sons, Not Their Sons," "War is not healthy for children and other living things," and the more incendiary slogan, "Hey, Hey, LBJ, How many kids did you kill today?"¹²⁰ Meanwhile, SANE, which was now under the leadership of Benjamin Spock and would soon split over the question of how to find a settlement in Vietnam, led high-profile programs to save war-burned and war-injured Vietnamese children.¹²¹ The centrality of the child's image in public debates about the war was also reflected in the efforts that the U.S. government made to cover up statistics on childhood casualties and in the heated arguments that ensued on the floor of Congress over the extent of childhood injuries and deaths in Vietnam. While the Democratic Senator William F. Ryan from New York spoke no less than ten times in 1967 on the "plight of these children," the Republican Senator Jack Miller from Iowa argued to his colleagues that recent visits to Vietnam had "not turned up a single case of a

¹²⁰ Melvin Small, *Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the Battle for America's Hearts and Minds* (Wilmington, D.E.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2002), 56.

¹²¹ "Agony of Vietnamese Civilians," 1967, Washington Office: Vietnam, SANE Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, PA, DG 58, Series E, Box 52.

child burned with napalm.”¹²² Embedded in these debates lay questions concerning American culpability and obligation that had been in place since the late 1950s. As we will see in the following chapter, the struggle over the child’s image in the Cold War became a struggle for victory in Vietnam.

¹²² See, for instance, William Ryan’s statements on the Congressional Floor, “Vietnam – Suffer the Little Children” *Congressional Record*, January 17 1967, A139. Ryan cites an article by Martha Gellhorn by the same name that was published in *Ladies’ Home Journal*, January, 1967. Miller, “Vietnam Myths,” *Congressional Record*, April 3 1967, 8024. Miller cites an article written by Dr. Howard Rusk’s article, “Reports of Many Children Burned by American Napalm are Challenged.” Citation information for Rusk’s article is not given.

Chapter 5:

Clashing Visions: Images of the Child in American, Soviet and National Liberation Front Propaganda to Viet Nam, 1964-1968

From 1964 to 1968, the Soviet Union and the United States increasingly turned their attentions to the post-colonial world as the new battleground for the Cold War. As the domestic unrest arose in both countries, and as the stalemate in Europe increasingly precluded direct confrontation, the Soviet Union and the United States embraced a renewed crusade to rebuild the “underdeveloped areas” of the so called “third world” in their own images. For the United States, Viet Nam became the testing ground for the pursuit of what Jeremy Suri has called “liberal imperialism” and the establishment of a democratic regime that could counter the spread of communism.¹ For the Soviet Union, Viet Nam served as seeming proof of capitalist aggression and as a location where Moscow could exhibit its ability to lead the communist world (over Beijing). Meanwhile, the diplomats in the National Liberation Front (NLF) struggled to wrest control of the war from their larger neighbors and to carve out a national path that rejected both American and Soviet guidance.

In their efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Viet Nameese people, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the NLF all prioritized the role of propaganda, and in so doing, turned to the image of the child. Information brokers at the U.S. Joint Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), the Soviet State Service for Television and Radio

(Gosteleradio), and the NLF Propaganda Service (COSVN) generated incredible numbers of pamphlets, television shows, films, and radio reports that focused on the lives of Soviet, American, and Viet Nameese children.² Soviet and American propagandists borrowed heavily from the images of children created in their respective countries in order to present a portrait of themselves as concerned and mobilized for war-ravaged populations in Southeast Asia. They portrayed Viet Nameese children as innocent victims of enemy barbarity, as grateful recipients of Soviet and American care, and in the Soviet Union, as trained revolutionaries prepared to fight and die for national liberation. They were joined by propagandists in the NLF, who argued that their own children were capable of fighting off the American menace with or without Soviet help. All of these programs harnessed the image of the child in the hopes of legitimating their policies with Viet Nameese audiences and justifying their own dominant ideologies in the war.

Propagandists in the United States, the Soviet Union, and the NLF took markedly different approaches in their depictions of children. Beginning in 1964, workers at JUSPAO portrayed American youth as examples of the wealth, education, and racial equality that were ostensibly made available to citizens in the United States and to America's allies. As the war progressed, they increasingly positioned South Viet Nameese children as victims of NLF atrocities and as beneficiaries of American modernization and benevolence. In contrast, Russian propagandists working at Gosteleradio used the

¹ Suri, *Power and Protest*, 131

² In his examination of the NLF and its diplomatic efforts during the war, Robert Brigham has made the argument that COSVN was largely perceived by the United States to be a well-managed propaganda program, when in fact it was far less centralized. This chapter does not attempt to argue that COSVN represented the only propropaganda program being organized by the NLF. It does, however, see COSVN as an example of the larger NLF program to control the conceptual boundaries of the war. See Robert

dominant domestic image of the idealized Soviet child in order to show Viet Nameese audiences that the Soviet population was actively mobilized to support its allies in their nationalist/communist struggle. They depicted the United States as a land racked by racism, and, like their VC counterparts (working under the COSVN Office), they constructed an image of the Viet Nameese child as a trained revolutionary, driven to take up arms against the American invader.

Yet while these national images of defense and activism were meant to convey promises of Soviet solidarity, American protection, and NLF indomitability to embattled audiences, they also displayed a variety of conflicting messages about each side's commitment to the war. Visions of mobilized Russian children standing at the ramparts with the North Viet Nameese, which fit so nicely into the domestic visual paradigm of the ideal Soviet child, nonetheless could not conceal the unavoidable message that despite Soviet support, the youth of Viet Nam, like their parents, were going to have to fight this war without Russian help. Similarly, JUSPAO's decision to portray children (and women) as passive victims of the VC compromised their argument that populations in the South were capable of liberating themselves from Northern invasion. JUSPAO's message of American humanitarian concern and defense for Viet Nam was made even more problematic by depictions in the world-wide press of lynched children in Mississippi and slaughtered infants in My Lai. Instead of pursuing an aggressive propaganda campaign, the American program ultimately found itself struggling *not* to appear racist, *not* to look like an empire, and *not* to seem like it was running a war that had no grass-roots support.

Brigham, *Guerilla Diplomacy: The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).

Not surprisingly, the NLF made it a practice to highlight all of these contradictions in their own propaganda.

Youth, which played such a central role in articulating the semiotic battle lines of the Cold War for American and Soviet audiences, took on different meanings when contextualized by the moral and political ambiguities of the Viet Nam War. As Soviet and American propagandists would quickly learn, manufactured images of mobilized Cold War youth, which seemed to support state policy, were open to alternative interpretations by their intended audiences. By exploring the simultaneously constructed manifestations of youth in Soviet, American, and NLF propaganda, we can see how these images became problematic when placed in the larger, international web of political and social contestation.

THE AMERICAN MESSAGE

In 1964, JUSPAO launched a campaign to sell the American message to its Viet Nameese audience. Twenty new officers joined the Viet Nam office while funding for propaganda to the region increased by three quarters of a million dollars. As Carl Rowan, president of the United States Information Agency (under the jurisdiction of JUSPAO), would remark to President Johnson later that year, he sincerely hoped that with this new surge in personnel and funding, they would, “carry the Information/Psychological program down to the village and hamlet level.”³ Over the next year, broadcasting hours in Viet Nameese increased from one and a half hours to six hours daily - placing it on par

with Russian and Mandarin broadcasting.⁴ The American program in Viet Nam quickly became the largest propaganda program in American history, requiring vast expenditure, the attention of thousands of workers, and the use of all possible psychological tactics in the relentless pursuit of Viet Nam's "hearts and minds." By 1967, Voice of Freedom and Voice of America broadcasts were transmitting seventy hours a day to audiences in Viet Nam and Cambodia and, according to a 1967 survey, were listened-to by sixty-two percent of the population.⁵

The message that the workers at JUSPAO sought to deliver to its audiences consisted of three main arguments. First, they informed their Viet Nameese listeners over the course of the war that humanist ideals drove the United States to stop the NLF and their communist beliefs from spreading into the South. Second, they conveyed the message that the United States was a wealthy and generous country, willing and able to provide a path towards modernization as well as material and military support. Third, they contended that the South Viet Nameese people required American support in order to counter the northern threat and should rally behind the leadership of the South Viet Nameese government and its American supporters. These three arguments persisted throughout the tenure of the American propaganda effort in Viet Nam and worked to

³ Memorandum for the President from Carl Rowan, Director of the USIA, December 1 1964, FG 296 U.S. Information Agency (1964-1966), Confidential File, FG266-1-1, Box # 33, 126, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Archive, Austin, Texas.

⁴ Memorandum for George Reedy, Press Secretary of the White House from the USIA, July 22 1964, FG 296 U.S. Information Agency (1964-1966), Confidential File, FG266-1-1, Box # 33, 132, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Archive, Austin, Texas.

⁵ W.W. Rostow to President Lyndon B. Johnson; Nationwide Hamlet Survey, October 25 1967, Folder 10, Box 02, Veteran Members of the 109th Quartermaster Company (Aid Delivery) Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas.

establish the United States as a benevolent provider and protector of the South Viet Nameese people.

One of the ways in which USIA and JUSPAO sought to deliver this set of messages was through the presentation of the ideal American child as a symbol of wealth and generosity and as a promise of future prosperity to America's allies. Using images that closely resembled those being created by the Boy Scouts, JUSPAO envisioned America's children as economically comfortable while also being committed to racial equality, global awareness, and progressive capitalism. Such programs were intended to provide a "real" glimpse into the lives of American children who ostensibly enjoyed the benefits of modernization. They were meant to counter falling approval ratings and to fulfill the mandates of the VOA's new director, John Chancellor, who in 1965 argued that the organization needed to "swing a little" by producing livelier and more creative programs.⁶

A typical radio broadcast on American children was produced in 1965 under the title, "A Visit to an American School," which took its Viet Nameese listeners on a tour through the hallways and classrooms of a middle-school in Maryland.⁷ Through the course of the broadcast, the narrator attributed the traits of intelligence, economic fairness, and a belief in racial equality to the American child. On his first stop into a Spanish class, which was filled with state-of-the-art audio facilities, he asked his listeners, "Why study Spanish? Because 148 million people speak this proud language.

⁶ Memo from Donald M. Wilson to George Reedy: Meeting of July 22 1964, Folder 03, Box 01, Larry Berman Collection (Presidential Archives Research), The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University. "Foreign Polls, [2 of 2]," 1965, Folder: Office Files of Frederick Panzer, Box 218, 1, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Archive, Austin, Texas.

Because courtesy and common sense suggest that we make every effort to guarantee that communication among us be easy and pleasant.” Subsequent visits to Latin, German, Italian, and French classes worked to create the impression that students in America were receiving educations focused on increasing global awareness among the young. The broadcast then travelled down the hallway to a “hands-on” course where children could be heard participating in “American private enterprise.” In this course, children as young as twelve were described as learning to run a bank, which, according to the narrator, managed the school’s real discretionary funds. In an effort to contest the Soviet image of exploitative American capitalism, these young people, like the Boy Scouts at home, appeared to be participating in an exercise in which “the fruits of capitalism are enjoyed by everyone.” By making no mention of the personal gain allowed by profit, the broadcast effectively transformed wealth into a means to manage and support society, both rich and poor. It provided a promise to its Viet Nameese listeners that children under American care not only received the fruits of capitalist modernization, they also learned how to use it wisely and fairly.

The connection between capitalism, social equality, and charity was further reinforced in the broadcast through a visit to the school’s cafeteria. “The food is good here,” the narrator asserted in a triumphant voice, “plentiful and cheap.” Dispelling Soviet claims that poor children go hungry under capitalism, the broadcast described the process through which the state intervened to make lunch available to every child.

⁷ “A Visit to an American School,” National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter referred to as NARA) 306VOA.ENO T-8151. All quotations are from this recording.

A fulfilling, nutritious, hot lunch, which costs nearly half a dollar to prepare is served to the student at the cost of twenty-seven cents. In some areas, where the student cannot afford to pay, this lunch, which is designed to provide one-third to one-half of a child's daily dietary needs, is provided free. By whom? The United States Department of Agriculture, which last year spent two hundred eighty million dollars to provide hot lunches to more than 14 million American children from kindergarten through high school!⁸

In both the class and the cafeteria, the management and dispensation of money became a shared endeavor. Far from forcing poor workers to hand over their wages and the means of production to a rich one-percent of the population, capitalism allowed each citizen a chance to own a piece of the wealth. Everyone in the school worked for money (through study and eventual internship). Everyone managed the money (at the bank). And everyone reaped the benefits (at lunch).

In addition to appearing economically just, the American child was also depicted as racially unbiased. "Any discussion of public education in America must also examine the progress of the integration of Negro students with white students, as ordered by the United States Supreme Court in 1954," the narrator intoned in a solemn voice. Leaving the issue of states' rights aside, the broadcast painted a generalized, positive picture of Negro life in America. Like numerous other VOA broadcasts, it endeavored, in the words of Mary Dudziak, to "turn the story of race in America into a story of the superiority of

⁸ Ibid.

democracy over communism.”⁹ “How well integration is proceeding can best be told by Silas Craft,” the narrator continued, “who is assistant principal and, a Negro.” Mr. Craft could then be heard explaining the success of integration in America’s schools. He informed his listeners that in Maryland, “All negro teachers and faculties were transferred pretty much in accord with our request to formerly all-white school facilities.” As proof, he noted that in an enrollment of 2600 students, the school had a population of twenty-six African American students and three African American teachers. Although this number was low, he argued that it was not a sign of lingering segregation, but instead reflected the area’s small Negro population. Mr. Craft described a school where black and white children carried on relations that, in his words, were “completely normal” – the best evidence being that the quarterback of the football team was African American. For the teachers at this “typical” American school, and for the VOA broadcasters who chose this place to mediate such controversial topics as education, economics, and race, the successful black football player stood as a counter to disturbing reports coming from Little Rock and as a shining example of the progress made possible by democracy’s steady growth.

As the radio show neared its end, the school’s principal brought all of these arguments to their conclusion with a commentary on the connections between education, peace, and the importance of modernization for the protection of the “free world.” “We feel that there is more power in knowledge than there is in thermonuclear bombs,” she argued to her foreign listeners. “We have felt this way throughout this country’s history.”

⁹ Mary Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 15.

Ignoring the questions posed by Jim Crow, she continued, “For more than a hundred years, we have made education available to all children regardless of race, creed, color, or economic status. We believe that the wisest decisions are made by people who have been trained to think clearly about public affairs and to judge carefully the actions and politics of their leaders.” These statements reinforced the new domestic image of the American Cold War child as educated, independent-thinking, and mobilized within the home and the school. They presented the American interpretation of what was at stake in the current conflict; a conflict that threatened not only thermonuclear attack, but psychological assault as well. They drew a portrait of the United States as a bastion for progressive democracy. At the same time, they presented a clear set of instructions to foreign listeners on how to pursue progress, education and modernization in their own countries. As the principle’s speech made apparent, “clear thinking” ultimately required becoming a “citizen in a democracy.”

Similar depictions of American children followed throughout the 1960s. The 1965 USIA films, *Eulogy to 5:02* and *Blueprint of Terror* also drew upon the iconic implications of the child in order to point out the advantages provided by capitalism and the dangers offered by the communist alternative. Bruce Herschensohn’s *Eulogy to 5:02* chronicled the lives being led by the non-communist people of the world during one minute in time.¹⁰ Tellingly, the opening shots highlighted none other than children in a long, moving shot running across an open field. In another shot, American youths work diligently in the Peace Corps while young school kids dance to rock and roll. Children

¹⁰“Eulogy to 5:02: A Memorial to a Forgotten Minute,” 2-26-65, MP#: 702 Date: 65 Director/Producer: Bruce Herschensohn. Narrated by Richard Burton, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Archive, Austin, Texas.

play by a canal in Scandinavia as an American woman appears to deliver a baby painlessly (with the husband smoking a cigarette in the waiting room). The cumulative effect of these images was to provide proof that the “free world” was affluent, booming with commerce, and safe for the next generation. By claiming that these were the daily, mundane activities of the non-communist countries, these films also ostensibly illustrated what the people in the “non-free” world were *not* doing: not painting, not dancing, and not enjoying painless child-birth.¹¹

Similarly, in radio broadcasts, American children appeared in a number of long-running series that focused on youth and the promises of capitalist affluence and equality. Voice of America transmitted programs with titles like “Young Worlds ’65” and “Teenagers’ World.” They travelled to integrated elementary schools, interviewed children visiting from abroad, and initiated lecture series by some of the nation’s top psychiatrists and sociologists on the topics of modern children’s culture.¹² The image of the educated, wealthy, fair-minded child served as a symbol for all that was made

¹¹ Many similar pieces of film and radio were also produced by the USIA. Copies of these films are available at the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Archive in Austin, Texas. See *America Chooses a President* (today #88), MP#: 179 Date: 1964 Producer: Allegro Film Productions. *The President*, which was intended to introduce the world to Johnson after Kennedy’s assassination, had an estimated viewership of 16,175,000, was produced in 39 languages and distributed to 111 countries. See *The President*, Producer: unknown, MP#: 194 Date: 1964 and “Memorandum to LBJ from Carl Rowan,” May 19 1964, “United States Information Agency, 1964,” Confidential File, Agency Reports, U.S. Information Agency, Box 135. Also see “The Office Files of Lee C. White: Civil Rights – Miscellaneous 1964,” Files of Lee C. White, Box 6, *Asian Journey* (VP Johnson Six Nation Tour, 5-1961), MP#: 641 Date: 1961 Producer: USIS, *Blueprint for Terror*, Date: unknown, Producer: USIA, MP#: 708, *Pursuit of Peace*, Date: 1966, Producer: USIA, MP#: 751, all located at the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Archive, Austin, Texas.

¹² “Child Files,” 1958, National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter referred to as NARA) 306VOA.ENO T-2645 R-1 of 4. “Young Worlds ’65,” NARA 306VOA.ENO T-6989 3-12-65, 306VOA.ENO T-3125 1-18,21-65, ENO T-3826 1-25,28-65, 306VOA.ENO T-6509 3-22-65, 306VOA.ENO T-6277 date unknown, 306VOA.ENO T-7534 4-5,8-65 pt. 1, 306VOA.ENO T-7534 4-5,8-65 pt. 2, 306VOA.ENO T-8151 4-25-65.

possible by the American political and cultural system. It provided a promise to “share the blessing of freedom and democracy” with all who wanted it.¹³

When viewed in the context of the larger propaganda battle going on in Viet Nam, programs like “A Visit to an American School” provide compelling insights not only into the intended traits and functions of the image of the American child, but also into the attributes that the American propaganda program (JUSPAO) conspicuously chose not to give to its domestic youth. Obviously absent in all of these broadcasts, as well as in most domestic portrayals of American children, is the Viet Nam War and the relationship that America’s children have with this conflict. Unlike the Soviet Union, which, as we will see, portrayed its children as actively united with the North Viet Nameese in their crusade for national liberation, “A Visit to an American School,” as well as numerous broadcasts like it, failed to show any direct connection between America’s seemingly well-educated, wealthy, non-racist youth and the struggling children of South Viet Nam. Neither in radio nor in print was mention made of any concern or solidarity that America’s children might have felt for the people of Southeast Asia.¹⁴ Instead, American youth in JUSPAO broadcasts to Viet Nam consistently appeared insulated, wealthy and contained at home, while remaining a safe distance both physically and psychologically from the fighting abroad.

¹³ Christian Appy, ed., *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966*.

¹⁴ In all of my research, I did not find one report, broadcast, or publication highlighting efforts made by American children in the United States to support the struggle of the South Vietnamese people. This observation is made based on the radio broadcasts of VOA and VOF, the leaflets dropped by JUSPAO, and the films made by USIA that were available to me through the National Archive in College Park, Maryland, the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech University in Lubbock, Texas, and the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Archive in Austin, TX. Despite the abundance of materials examined here, there is always a chance that I have overlooked such expressions of solidarity between American and South Vietnamese children were expressed and propagandized.

Archival records do not reveal why the JUSPAO leadership chose not to convey a sense of solidarity between American and South Viet Nameese youth in their broadcasts and publications. Considering the extensive Soviet use of children as icons of international solidarity with the Viet Nameese, it is surprising that they did not attempt to build up a connection between American and Viet Nameese youth. Perhaps JUSPAO chose to omit expressions of solidarity between American and Viet Nameese children because American opinions on the war were so diverse and difficult to articulate in a uniform way.¹⁵ Perhaps they avoided making these connections because their domestic perceptions of who their children were (as educated, wealthy, and mobilized domestically for defense) precluded them from presenting their children as activists for a foreign cause. Perhaps they were unaware of the alternative approach being taken by the Soviet Union and simply did not think there was much value in establishing cultural connections between the civilian populations of Viet Nam and the United States. Perhaps racial considerations impacted their decisions on such matters. Whatever the cause, the absence of apparent solidarity between the youth of these countries, which becomes apparent when compared to the Soviet Union, established a cultural distance between these populations that arguably hindered the American effort.

The value of the Viet Nameese child was officially recognized and debated by JUSPAO. In July 1965, for instance, the planning staff put together a set of recommendations for how the U.S. propaganda effort should exploit NLF atrocities among its listeners and readers. After discussing the effects that various kinds of

¹⁵ Unfortunately, JUSPAO does not appear to have discussed why it chose *not* to take this tack in their propaganda to Vietnam. The sources do give us room to draw some tentative conclusions.

atrocities could have upon audiences, the authors came to two conclusions. First, listeners and viewers had to be made to understand that VC brutality was “inseparably linked to the communist system.” Second, the most “effective” atrocities were the ones where the “number of “innocents” slaughtered is significant or if the slaughter is by its very nature particularly abhorrent.” As one JUSPAO writer put it, “the demolition by a VC mine of a bus carrying children is exploitable.” Such actions would, in his words “instill fear for the purpose of controlling people’s behavior” and would “generate hostility” towards the agents of such “indiscriminate targeting.”¹⁶ Other meetings discussed the value of children as tools for evoking homesickness and worry among NLF troops. As a part of what Barry Zorthian, the head of JUSPAO, called the “Born in the North, die in the South campaign,” the American propagandists endeavored to convince its VC and NVA readers that their children were suffering without them, that they were certain to die far from the homes of their ancestors, and that the only way to survive was to rally to the South.¹⁷

One of the most prominent ways that these images of atrocity and defection manifested to Viet Nameese audiences was through the Chieu Hoi program, a campaign meant to encourage the VC and NVA to defect. Propaganda for Chieu Hoi was conveyed primarily through the dropping of leaflets over the skies of NLF-held territories. Between 1964 and 1968, images of children appeared in an average twenty-seven percent of Chieu Hoi leaflets dropped by JUSPAO over Viet Nam.¹⁸ Considering that over five thousand

¹⁶ JUSPAO Planning Staff, “Exploitation of Vietnamese Efforts and Successes,” JUSPAO Guidances Issue Number 6, June 2 1965, 14, in Consolidation of JUSPAO Guidances 1 thru 22 Compiled June 1 1967 Volume Number 1, June 1 1967, Box 13, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Insurgency Warfare, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

¹⁷ Personal correspondence with Barry Zorthian, Chief of JUSPAO from 1964 to 1968, September, 2007.

¹⁸ Study conducted at the Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas. Every leaflet held by the archive was examined for visual or textual references to children. The percentage change in the

different types of leaflets adding up to 50 billion total were dropped by the Americans though the course of the war, this represents a significant visual occurrence for audiences in Viet Nam.¹⁹ Two kinds of leaflets consistently featured images of children: those based on what JUSPAO called the “fear appeal” and those founded on the “family appeal.” The “fear appeal” involved showing the bodies of dead women and children in order to convince soldiers who sided with the VC that they were inviting the deaths of their families by remaining on the side of the North. As a second and subsequent tactic, leaflets promised that if a soldier reported voluntarily to the ARVN, he would receive medical care, rehabilitation, and would be able to reunite with his family, thereby constituting the “family appeal.”²⁰ Hundreds of pictures and illustrations depicted families pleading to their fathers to come home, where their own survival was made tenuous by the absence of their main wage-earner. The United States regularly offered families as much as 300 piastras to make such appeals.²¹ Other images depicted the bucolic happiness of rural life, with children rejoicing at their father’s return home.

appearance of images of children can be attributed to the change in approach that was adopted by the leaflet program after CORDS took over in 1967, where appeals to homesickness and nostalgia were supplemented by increased promises of gainful employment and safety to defectors (called *Hoi Chanh*). The Leaflet campaign stopped above the twentieth parallel in the spring of 1968 and stopped altogether in November of 69’, due largely to North Vietnamese pressure. See The Case for Psychological Warfare Against North Vietnam, no date, Folder 14, Box 13, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Insurgency Warfare, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

¹⁹ This averages to more than 1,500 leaflets per person in both the north and south. Robert W. Chandler, *War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 3. That said, a nurse who was stationed in Quang Ngai, which was thought to be a hotbed of VC activity, has little memory of the pamphlets. When asked about them in an interview, she commented that she was “reminded of the “Outdoor Latrine” around the helicopter pad and the Vietnamese penchant for using US paper. Could these have been leaflets? We all knew not to be out there when a helicopter landed or you would be in a whirlwind of toilet paper. I saw Ted Kennedy do this on his fact finding mission.” Interview with Dorothy Peacock, September 18 2008.

²⁰ Propaganda leaflet – The Diary of a Returnee in Khien Phong Province, October 1967, Folder 08, Box 01, Gary Gillette Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

Others offered visions of American soldiers providing medical care to soldiers and their young, kept safe within the confines of the strategic hamlet.



Illustration 5.1: Chieu Hoi Leaflet. The caption reads, “Your family awaits you, Chieu Hoi”²²

Unfortunately, both the “fear appeal” and the “family appeal” had their problems. As one 1965 report on propaganda tactics would attest, atrocities often created more fear than hostility among their readers.²³ Instead of driving the population to rebel against the VC in moral indignation, these images encouraged them to side with the enemy in order to improve their odds of surviving. In addition, as many JUSPAO workers would admit privately, the promise of family reunion was often an empty one. In reality, the United States and the Government of Viet Nam (GVN) were largely incapable of reuniting soldiers to their families located in the North. Even worse, a soldier’s defection might put

²¹ Consolidation of JUSPAO Guidances 1 thru 22 Compiles June 1 1967 Volume Number 1, June 1 1967, Folder 12 Box 13, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Insurgency Warfare, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

²² “Your family awaits you, Chieu Hoi,” National Catalog of PSYOPS Materials Second Edition (changes, deletions, and additions), 1970, Folder 18, Box 14, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Insurgency Warfare, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

²³ JUSPAO Planning Staff, “Exploitation of Vietnamese Efforts and Successes,” JUSPAO Guidances Issue Number 6, June 2 1965, 14, Box 13, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Insurgency Warfare, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

his family in danger of VC retribution.²⁴ Also troubling was the possibility that these leaflets might encourage South Viet Nameese ARVN soldiers, as well as VC soldiers, to desert their posts for the comforts of home.²⁵ While it was easy enough to produce these images, it was almost impossible to control the meanings that such images carried once they reached their audiences.

By 1967, as the war became more desperate for both the North and the South, images of the child-soldier, depicted as brainwashed or kidnapped into forced conscription also emerged in American propaganda. JUSPAO reported on parents in villages cutting off their children's trigger fingers in order to avoid their being drafted by the VC.²⁶ South Viet Nameese audiences were often told that youth in the North were being effectively brainwashed to kill Americans. This was the argument made in an interview with a North Viet Nameese refugee and mother that aired on USIA television in 1967. By her account, children in Hanoi spent their school days cutting-out block letters that read, "Death to the Ky lackeys of the imperialists," and "Down with the American invaders." Similar broadcasts argued that even in their math lessons, North Viet Nameese children were forced to solve word problems that involved "the number of cattle killed or the number of people killed and wounded by U.S. military action."²⁷ As one parent

²⁴ JUSPAO Field Memorandum Number 42 Lessons Learned from Evaluation of Allied Psyop Media in Vietnam, December 13 1967, Folder 14, Box 13, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Insurgency Warfare, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

²⁵ "Exploitation of Vietnamese Efforts and Successes," JUSPAO Guidance Number 6, July 2 1965, Folder 12, Box 13, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Insurgency Warfare, the Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

²⁶ Analysis of VC Propaganda Activities in Long An Province, 1964, Folder 13, Box 16, 3, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 05 – National Liberation Front, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

²⁷ "Parents Flee Viet Cong to Safeguard Children's Education," March 1967, Office Files of Fred Panzer: USIS Articles on Vietnam, Box #422, 2, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Archive, Austin, Texas.

declared, “Under the Viet Cong our children learn only hate and war.”²⁸ A common image for JUSPAO publications was the photograph of young Hoi Chanh soldiers, boys and girls who had been conscripted into the VC army at a very young age and had subsequently defected to the South through the Chieu Hoi program. As one issue of *Vietnam Magazine*, a monthly publication published by the Vietnam Council on Foreign Relations, declared in 1969, “We have welcomed little boys and girls of 12, 13, and 14 who have returned fully armed...Abducted, rounded-up, and forced into armed conflict,” these children represented “the unspeakable terror and human suffering” that the Vietnamese people were being forced to endure.²⁹ The NLF act of militarizing the young, both mentally and physically, was portrayed by JUSPAO as a damning indictment of the communist system. This would stand in stark contrast to the heroic image of the child warrior in Soviet and NLF propaganda that in their viewing represented all that was positive and strong about the socio-political system that fostered it.

²⁸ Ibid, 5.

²⁹ Vietnam Bulletin – The Returnee, November 1 1969, Folder 13, Box 14, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 02 – Military Operations, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.



Illustration 5.2: “The Returnee,”³⁰

The cumulative effect of JUSPAO’s work was to construct an image of America protecting and aiding a largely passive Viet Nameese populace from the brutal actions taken by the VC. They established a causal relationship in their broadcasts and publications between the acts of the VC upon the young of Viet Nam and the responses of American troops, who provided aid through the pacification program and the corralling of villagers into strategic hamlets. As one leaflet from 1965 argued to its Viet Nameese readers, in contrast to the VC, who “will bring you to their secret zones and kill you brutally,” the U.S. army would instead “take care of your health, cure your sickness, and give you remedy.”³¹ Victimized and in real need of care, the people of Viet Nam, symbolized by the child with arm outstretched, appear grateful for the care provided.

³⁰ “The Returnee,” *Vietnam Bulletin*, November 1 1969, 34.

³¹ Propaganda Leaflet with translation – About VC Crimes, No Date (1967?), Folder 08, Box 01, Gary Gillette Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

Perhaps the most memorable articulation of these themes came early in the war, in 1964, when the USIA (working under JUSPAO) teamed up with director/producer Richard Heffron to make the film *Night of the Dragon* for global distribution. The piece was often played before the feature showing of George Cukor's film *My Fair Lady*, and received wide distribution not only in Southeast Asia, but also in Europe, America, Africa, and Latin America.³² It told the story of the South Viet Nameese and their protracted struggle to wrest freedom from the NLF. By combining the resonant narration of Charlton Heston with graphic montages of the dead and protracted shots of the brave South Viet Nameese, some of which were staged, Heffron was able to portray the United States as resolutely bound to the cause of South Viet Nameese freedom, while communism was rendered as an anathema.³³ In the words of Carl Rowan, this film sought "to evoke sympathy and support among world-wide audiences for the Viet Nameese cause."³⁴

In Heffron's hands, the Viet Nameese child became an icon of suffering and hope. In a striking montage at the film's beginning, Heston observes, "Many of the victims did not die from the accidents of war, they were selectively murdered for political example."

³² "Memorandum from Leonard Marks to LBJ," October 19 1965, "United States Information Agency, 1965," Confidential File, Agency Reports, U.S. Information Agency, Box 135, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Archive, Austin, Texas. *Night of the Dragon*, 1964, Directed by Richard Heffron, MP#103, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Archive, Austin, Texas. Joan Neuberger has suggested the interesting implications of showing Heffron's film before that of *My Fair Lady*. What would the impact be of watching a film like Heffron's, which made promises of American aid, care, and culture, just before watching a film that actually showed the process of turning a lower-class person into a respectable member of society? Would the cumulative lesson for the "Third-World" viewer be that "*even you can be a European princess*"? Interestingly, a book entitled *Air War – Vietnam* was later penned by Frank Harvey where, in a chapter entitled, "Night of the Dragon," he chronicled an air raid on a Vietnamese village from a Dragon ship whose purpose was to work at night. See *Air War – Vietnam* by Frank Harvy, July 1967, Folder 04, Box 01, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 3 – Technology, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

³³ "Film and US Foreign Policy: USIA Documentaries in the 1960s," Presentation by Nicholas Cull at the 2006 Conference of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations, Lawrence, KS.

A collection of photographs follows: a young man on the ground, his throat slit, his elbows bound behind him, a child atop a pile of rubble next to a burned-out bus, a woman's face framed by bangs of blood, a girl's head only tenuously connected to what might be a body, twisted to the verge of decapitation, a mother and child lying dead together. Pausing, the camera finally settles on the dead bodies of two children clumped together in the dirt - their elbows bound as in the first photo. Taken from a distance far beneath the boys, the shot replicates visually the explanation that Heston gives for these deaths: "because they were in the way."

Heffron's film produced for its unsuspecting viewers seeming verification that American policy in Southeast Asia was, at its most basic level, about resisting blind violence and inhuman barbarity, that without American involvement, chaos would reign and the innocent would become fodder for communist warmongering. The film also endeavored to justify the American policies of pacification of the population and modernization of the country with a series of scenes from a strategic hamlet. During the day, children can be seen receiving schooling and medical care. At night, Heffron captures the happiness of a festival inside the hamlet with youngsters laughing and dancing. This festival and the manifest joy of the children are unfortunately cut short by a VC attack, which draws the children under cover and places the men on the ramparts. As in "A Visit to an American School," the children of Viet Nam appear as the recipients of American wealth and protection. Just as American youth appeared defended and

³⁴ Memorandum for the President from Carl Rowan, Director of the USIA, December 1 1964, FG 296 U.S. Information Agency (1964-1966), Confidential File, FG266-1-1, Box # 33, 3, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Archive, Austin, Texas.

insulated from the world outside their borders, Viet Nameese children emerged as innocent figures bound by the safe confines of the strategic hamlet.³⁵

Works like *Night of the Dragon*, as well as the pamphlets of the Chieu Hoi program and the radio broadcasts made by VOA, not only established the United States as the necessary protector of Viet Nam's children (thereby justifying its policies in the region), they also reflected what Mark Bradley has called, "the powerful influence of a wider European colonial discourse and cultural attitudes toward morality, poverty, and race."³⁶ The question of racial perspective appears repeatedly in JUSPAO's portrayals of both American and Viet Nameese youth, presenting a cumulative image of the United States as the parent of a juvenile, and at times defenseless, Southeast Asian populace. For instance, in *Night of the Dragon*, during a staged shot of South Viet Nameese soldiers crossing an open field, Charlton Heston informs his viewers that the American captain supervising them came to Viet Nam because he "can't see a decent future for his children if aggression is allowed to succeed."³⁷ As the American captain gazes out over his advancing South Viet Nameese troops, the viewer is left to wonder which children the captain is referring to: his own young ones back in America or the "children" who he is supervising on this open field. Arguably, he is referring to both groups. To the extent that

³⁵ In contrast to *Night of the Dragon*, Dorothy Peacock, a nurse anesthetist working in Quang Ngai for the International Rescues Committee, retells a story of Christmas, 1967, when "a group of beautiful young girls dressed in white Ao Dais were singing "Oh Holy Night" in front of the U.S. Chapel where the Jewish Star of David was in clear view. A happy-go-lucky bird-dog pilot chose to fly by with streaming cans of green and red smoke from each wing. To the Vietnamese this was a marker that a 750 pound bomb air strike from a B52 would follow within minutes. The girls ran for cover, dirtying their dresses in the filthy bunkers and trenches. Needless to say, the humor experienced by the Americans stood in tragic contrast to the fear and horror of the Vietnamese youth." Interview with Dorothy Peacock, September 18 2008.

³⁶ Mark Bradley, "Culture, Diplomacy, and Cold War in Vietnam," in Appy, ed., *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966*. Also see Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919-1950*.

he is concerned for his own children, the global spread of communism presents the most serious risk to the promise of a “decent future.” More immediately, however, it is the men walking before him, the “children” of American generosity, whose future is most vulnerable. The sentiments of the exasperated parent towards its unruly, post-colonial brood were voiced perhaps most clearly by Stanley F. Reed, President of the Reed Research Foundation who commented to the House of Representatives in 1963 concerning the work of American broadcasting:

These nations remind me of children with their alternating friendships, jealousy of possessions, continual truculence, and petty quarrels. I would like the rest of the world to think we could help each other in the ages to come to give our “children” a feeling of security and belonging and that our children would grow strong and healthy and that none would die... I would like the infant nations to know that we think we can help them to institute the first steps in their development to mature into responsible states with a proper economic reward for citizenship therein.³⁸

These expressions of parental frustration served an important purpose, both for policy makers in Washington and for propagandists on the ground in Viet Nam. They not only reinforced the American self-image of international benevolence (later shots depicted American soldiers, Australian carpenters, and Philippino doctors combating the ravages of the North Viet Nameese invasion, struggling to defend a largely passive population),

³⁷ *Night of the Dragon*, 1964, Directed by Richard Heffron, MP#103, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Archive, Austin, Texas. Emphasis added by the author.

³⁸ Testimony of Stanley F. Reed, President of the Reed Research Foundation and President of Technology Audit Corp., Washington, D.C., Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the

they also further justified for many in the United States the heavy-handed policy of pacification, which required that villagers leave their homes for the safety of the American-defended strategic hamlet. The provision of security and aid to the Viet Nameese population spoke first to the wealth and relative generosity of the United States, second to the inability of the Viet Nameese to take care of their own, and third to the subsequent need for America-as-parent to step in and provide.³⁹ This dynamic becomes even more pronounced when the recipient is a child, whether rendered literally or figuratively.

Despite its colonial undertones and its visual omissions, it would be a mistake to ignore the measure of success that JUSPAO did enjoy among its target audiences. Captured NLF documents attest to the demoralizing effects of the Chieu Hoi program as well as the power of high-budget films like *Night of the Dragon*. As one VC report declared in October 1966, “Enemy activities have an effect on the spirit of the people, cadre and village guerillas, and demoralize the village and hamlet cadre.”⁴⁰ Perhaps not surprisingly, in numerous captured documents dating from 1965 until 1968, VC propagandists and officials argued that JUSPAO’s most effective appeals were those which encouraged soldiers through fear and homesickness to surrender and rejoin their families. As one VC propagandist put it, “the most common weakness is the ideology of

Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, *Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive*, First Session, March 28, 29, April 2, 3 1963.

³⁹ Andrew Rotter, “Class, Cast, and Status in Indo-U.S. Relations,” and Christina Klein, “Family Ties and Political Obligation,” in Appy, ed., *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966*, 69.

⁴⁰ “Psyops in Vietnam: Indications of Effectiveness,” Consolidation of JUSPAO Guidances 1 Thru 22 Compiled June 1 1967 Volume Number 1, June 1 1967, Folder 12, Box 13, Douglas Pike Collection: Unite 03 – Insurgency Warfare, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, p. 4.

the family and of pacifism.”⁴¹ They pointed out that this was a particular problem during holidays, especially Tet, when JUSPAO would increase its leaflet and broadcasting programs in order to exploit feelings of homesickness among the NLF rank and file.⁴² The potency of these programs is also evidenced by VC efforts to halt defections, by their admission in 1966 that they had not adequately addressed the Chieu Hoi campaign in the early years, and by the strict rules that the NLF imposed on their soldiers in regards to accessing outside information and entertainment. Cadres were forbidden to listen not only to spoken enemy broadcasts, but to music and theatrical programs as well.⁴³ For those who did show “defectionist” tendencies, re-indoctrination or execution was the only remedy.⁴⁴

Yet while these images supported JUSPAO’s campaigns to encourage enemy defection, to justify the policy of pacification, and to bolster the idea that America was needed in South Viet Nam to protect the innocent, they also compromised the important

⁴¹ “Pacifism” is the word used in the document. “From a report by the Propaganda and Indoctrination Section of the Ba Ria Province Party Committee, March 13 1966, Consolidation of JUSPAO Guidances 1 Thru 22 Compiled June 1 1967 Volume Number 1, June 1 1967, Folder 12, Box 13, 13, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Insurgency Warfare, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University; See also in this consolidated document, “From a directive against desertion, from the Truong Cien Current Affairs Committee to local units, September 25 1965, 17, and “Document 2: Secret (VC Classification), South Vietnam Liberation Army, Tan Uyen District Unit, Communique, 21, 28.

⁴² “From a top secret directive on enemy espionage and intelligence activities and secrecy preservation activities during the first six months of 1966,” dated July 20 1966, and signed by a North Vietnamese Political Commissar, Consolidation of JUSPAO Guidances 1 Thru 22 Compiled June 1 1967 Volume Number 1, June 1 1967, Folder 12, Box 13, 11, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Insurgency Warfare, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

⁴³ “From a Circular issued by the Political Staff Department, South Vietnam Liberation Army, on increasing base defense measures,” Consolidation of JUSPAO Guidances 1 Thru 22 Compiled June 1 1967 Volume Number 1, June 1 1967, Folder 12, Box 13, 8, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Insurgency Warfare, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

⁴⁴ “Document 5: Confidential (VC Classification), South Vietnam Liberation Army, Political Department, Reference Document on Counter Measures Against Enemy Psywar and Chieu Hoi Activity, August 1966,” Consolidation of JUSPAO Guidances 1 Thru 22 Compiled June 1 1967 Volume Number 1, June 1 1967, Folder 12, Box 13, 31, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Insurgency Warfare, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

American message that the Viet Nameese should take up arms on their own behalf for the sake of their own national liberation. The Soviets and the VC would repeatedly argue to their Viet Nameese audience that the American presence in Viet Nam was one of “reactionary aggression”—a position that exploited its self-designated role as defender of the innocent in order to justify an aggressive foreign policy.⁴⁵ The dependency of the South Viet Nameese was arguably useful to JUSPAO and U.S. policy makers in the short term; it justified American military and psychological operations in the region. It nonetheless did little to establish this war as a crusade for national liberation in the South. While U.S. propaganda certainly encouraged South Viet Nameese men to fight for their independence against communist encroachment, their message was ultimately muddled by recurring images of Viet Nameese dependence on American aid and passivity towards the threat of war. “The enemy... makes [individuals] dependent upon his handouts and money,” one security directive from the NLF Central Office for South Viet Nam (COSVN) argued in January, 1967.⁴⁶ As we will see in the next section, while JUSPAO embraced this approach in order to justify America’s presence in the war, Soviet broadcasters would take a completely different tack in their own propaganda as they portrayed Viet Nam’s children not simply as recipients of Soviet aid, but as activists for communist / national liberation.

⁴⁵ “Document 6: Confidential (VC Classification), South Vietnam Liberation Army, Political Department, Reference Document on Counter Measures Against Enemy Psywar and Chieu Hoi Activity, no month 1966” Consolidation of JUSPAO Guidances 1 Thru 22 Compiled June 1 1967 Volume Number 1, June 1 1967, Folder 12, Box 13, 31, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Insurgency Warfare, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

⁴⁶ “From a security directive of the COSVN Current Affairs Committee on the “Mission, Policy and Methods of Operation in Counter-Espionage Activities,” dated January 11, 1967, Consolidation of JUSPAO Guidances 1 Thru 22 Compiled June 1 1967 Volume Number 1, June 1 1967, Folder 12, Box 13, 16, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Insurgency Warfare, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

THE SOVIET MESSAGE

In contrast to JUSPAO's constructed images of youth, the Soviet State Television and Radio Service (*Gosteleradio*) constructed a series of counter-images of Soviet, American, and Viet Nameese children that embodied the Soviet promise for progress, the horror of the American presence in Viet Nam, and the professed belief in the ability of the Viet Nameese people to gain freedom on their own. Borrowing from the same domestic rhetoric that constructed the image of the Soviet child at home, *Gosteleradio* positioned its own wealthy, educated, activist youth as brothers and sisters of the North Viet Nameese. In later years, when it became clear that the Soviet Union would not be sending troops to aid its communist ally, *Gosteleradio* turned its attention away from expressions of direct solidarity with the Viet Nameese people toward a renewed effort to portray the children of Viet Nam as active revolutionaries who did not need Russian help to win this war. This was joined by an all-out condemnation of America and its treatment of both African American and Viet Nameese youth. Yet despite *Gosteleradio's* efforts to demonize the American presence in Viet Nam as racist and imperialist, and despite its campaigns to show the connections between Soviet and Viet Nameese youth, expressions of undying solidarity between the children of these two countries became subject to questioning and revision, especially as the war dragged on and the NLF became increasingly aware of how little the Russians actually were willing to help. As was the case with JUSPAO, *Gosteleradio* found itself creating images of children that were unable to mask the complexities of their country's agenda towards Southeast Asia.

Since the Bolshevik Revolution, propaganda had served as an important tool in the international expression of state policy. Although there were exceptions, Soviet broadcasting and the press had become by the 1960s, in the words of Jeffrey Brooks, an

entrenched “hegemon of information.”⁴⁷ The Soviet propaganda effort in Viet Nam began as a part of a larger program in the late 1950s to reach audiences in Southeast Asia. Throughout 1956, the Soviet ministers of culture and the radio-technical industry sent regular letters to Khrushchev informing him that current levels of broadcasting, while impressive, were nonetheless “insufficient.” They argued that what the Soviet Union needed was “smarter” propaganda geared at reaching the cynical ears of populations significantly different from those who inhabited Europe and the West.⁴⁸ These warnings did not fall on deaf ears. By 1960, broadcasters were transmitting exclusively in the native languages of their listeners while new programs like “Peace and Progress,” which were targeted at Southeast Asia, grew by more than 250 percent to a total of 2032 hours per week.⁴⁹ In “simple and easy to understand” terms, the internal politics, economics, and culture of the Soviet Union were to be taught to listeners through “radiouniversities” that broadcasted for one hour each night.⁵⁰ In general, Gosteleradio officials were directed to convey information about Soviet national politics, American colonial interference into local affairs, the success of the Cultural Revolution, and the “steady help of the Soviet Union to the “young” nations of the world.”⁵¹ They all delivered the

⁴⁷ Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War*, xiv.

⁴⁸ N. Mikhailov, Ministr kul'turyi SSSR, N. Psturtsev, Ministr svyazi SSSR, and V. Kalmyikov, Ministr Radiotekhnicheskoi Promyshlennosti, v Sovet Ministrov Soioza SSSR, “General'noe Pis'mo,” March 1956, GARF f. 6903, op. 1, d. 495, l. 20.

⁴⁹ TSK KPSS. Otdel Propagandyi i Agitatsii, *Sovetskaia pechat' v Dokumentakh: Sbornik Podgotovlen Otdelom Propagandyi i Agitatsii TSK KPSS po Soiuznyim Respublikam* (Moskva: Gos. Izd-vo Polit. Lit-ryi, 1961), 50. Jennifer E. Turpin, *Reinventing the Soviet Self: Media and Social Change in the Former Soviet Union* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), 19. Barukh Hazan, *Soviet Impregnational Propaganda* (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis Publishers, 1982), 64-70.

⁵⁰ C. Kaftanov, Predseditel' Gosudarstvennogo Kommiteta po Radioveshchaniiu i Televideniuiu pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, “O Khode Vypol'neniia Postanovlenii TsK KPSS “ob uluchshenii Radioveshchaniia na Sovetskii Soioz i Zarubezhnyye Strany,” October 29 1960, GARF f. 6903, op. 1, d. 624, l. 25-26.

⁵¹ Doklad: Gosudarstvennogo Komitet Soveta Ministrov SSSR po Radioveshchaniiu i Televideniuiu o Proizvodstvenno – finansom deiatel'nosti za 1962. GARF f. 6903, op. 1, d. 774, l. 20.

message that the Soviet Union was wealthy, willing to defend the non-European world from colonialism, and deeply opposed to American racism and class difference.⁵²

Gosteleradio's depictions of Russian youth in their broadcasts to Viet Nam were similar to those of the Cold War child created for Russian domestic audiences. Soviet youngsters appeared prosperous and educated, with a deep commitment to equality between classes and races. Like at home, where Russian children embodied the progress of the Soviet state to catch up and move past their capitalist foes, so too did Soviet youth symbolize the promise of revolutionary development to the Viet Nameese people. These shared images created a sense of continuity between domestic and international propaganda (which were run by the same umbrella organization) and reflected the extent to which the revolutionary image of the child-as-activist permeated the way that Soviet politicians and propagandists articulated policy.

The message of egalitarian wealth for Soviet children and their families pervaded broadcasts to Viet Nam throughout the 1960s. Proof of prosperity, intended to counter stereotypes of Russian "backwardness" often came in the form of domestic showcases highlighting the advantages of socialist industry. As one radio broadcast in 1966 declared, modern, "well-lit" apartments were being built at a break-neck pace, "planned with an eye for spaciousness; with a bed set up in the living room for little Katia."⁵³ In interviews, mothers and children spoke glowingly of the toys and the new washer and dryer now housed in their individual flats - all at the behest of the state. Mom had even received a full-length coat for her birthday, bought at a low price with the money that the family would have been forced to spend on rent if they lived in the West.⁵⁴ Steadily, as

⁵² See repeated demands to include broadcasts about and for children in the administrative policy documents of Gostelradio, especially in 1962. GARF f. 6903, op. 1, d. 495, d. 624, d. 472, d. 774.

⁵³ "Teksty peredach napravlennykh v gosdepartament SShA," GARF f. 6903, op. 2, d. 335, l. 23.

⁵⁴ Radio Peredach, "Zavtra Mamin Den' Rozhdeniia," January 16 1960, GARF f. 6903, op. 23, d.43, l. 152.

each broadcast attested, standards of living were improving. Not only were material goods available, Gosteleradio argued to its Viet Nameese audiences, produce, bread, meat, and butter were provided at heavily subsidized prices.⁵⁵

Fundamental to these broadcasts was the message that Soviet affluence was different than American abundance—not a form of economic imperialism but a means to gain independence and resist American hegemony. In a fashion similar to VOA’s depictions of American economic fairness in “A Visit to an American School,” Gosteleradio broadcasters argued that Soviet youth learned at a young age to use goods in a measured and peaceful way. Widely disseminated broadcasts repeatedly argued that the underlying belief structures in the Soviet system enabled youth living under communism to acquire material wealth while avoiding the selfish, apathetic, apolitical consumerism that plagued the western world.

Economic competition was the topic of discussion on May 27, 1964, when Gosteleradio set out to explain to its Viet Nameese audience the larger issues at stake in the Cold War. “Across the dial, we are recounting to our listeners news about this great competition which has captured the focused attention of the world.”⁵⁶ Thus began the radio show “Campfire,” which was targeted at children and broadcasted every evening by Soviet-paid Viet Nameese commentators through transistors located in Hanoi.⁵⁷ “In this competition are the Soviet Union and America – the mightiest socialist state and the

⁵⁵ Radio Sbornik, “Sto Voprosov i Otvetov o Sovetskom Soioze,” February 7 1961, GARF f. 6903, op. 23, d. 43, l. 12. Of course this was far from true, as riots over basic shortages happened across the Soviet Union during these years - from Krasnodar to Novocherkassk. These mass riots (which themselves used the image of the starving, neglected child in order to articulate their dissatisfaction with the Soviet leadership) were kept completely out of Soviet foreign and domestic broadcasts – such to the extent that even the American government did not pick up on the extent of the unrest and did not use these riots as a propaganda tool. Kozlov, *Mass Uprisings in the USSR: Protest and Rebellion in the Post-Stalin Years*.

⁵⁶ “Oдно muzhestvo ili dva?” Radioveshchaniia dlia detei i ionoshestva, May 27 1964, GARF f.6903, op.16, d.354, l.5.

⁵⁷ These transcripts were written first in Russian, then translated into Vietnamese and read aloud. My quotes here come from the Russian transcripts, not the Vietnamese ones.

richest capitalist country.” After a pause (the pause was written into the transcript of the broadcast), the speaker then asked his listeners, “who will be victorious in this competition?” With no direct talk of leaders, world politics, nuclear weapons or balances of power, the broadcaster made it clear that the competition between these great powers (which indirectly manifested itself in Viet Nam) was based on two contests: economic supremacy and the relative commitment of each country to share its wealth. As examples, he cited the affluence that Soviet children enjoyed thanks to the nation’s big factories and mills, its steel plants and oil refineries. More than this, the commentator argued, this wealth was given to the young of the communist world without design. “We say *pause* that socialism will be victorious. We are sure of this. This is what we are working for.”⁵⁸ Through a careful accounting of the economic/cultural systems of the United States and the Soviet Union (discussing the free medical care available under the Soviet system, the nation’s rising production levels, and the use in Russia of atomic energy for constructive purposes only), the piece finally concluded that “the capitalists have only one dream – the dream to gain more profit. Children suffer when countries function in this manner.” In contrast stood the Soviet nation, whose dream was positioned as one and the same with the dreams of both its own citizenry as well as the people of Viet Nam; to build new factories and new mills, to invent new machines, and to settle new lands “so that children can live even better... even happier...Not only in our country, but in all the world.”⁵⁹ Fundamental to this message was the idea that monetary gain in the Soviet system was not an exploitative endeavor. Although advances in industry ultimately equated to the production of income, Gosteleradio portrayed this wealth not in relation to the accumulation of “profit” in the pejorative sense – because all the wealth would ostensibly

⁵⁸ Ibid. Italics included in the original text.

⁵⁹ “Oдно muzhestvo ili dva?” Radioveshchaniia dlia detei i ionoshestva, May, 27 1960, GARF f.6903, op.16, d.354, l.5.

be distributed. Even more important, however, was the message that this kind of economic egalitarianism was only possible in a cultural/political system that fostered these traits in its population and especially in its young.

More than emblems of material wealth, Soviet children also played a central role in Gosteleradio's efforts to establish Soviet solidarity with the Viet Nameese people as a whole. As early as 1959, Viet Nameese citizens could hear Soviet children expressing their friendship and support for independent nationalist movements. "Dear children of Viet Nam – our distant friends," one broadcast began. "I am happy that I can send to you my warmest greetings over the radio. Many of my friends and I have over the past year been exchanging letters with Viet Nameese Pioneers. We have learned from them how you live, study, and how you help your elders with their work."⁶⁰ As American involvement in Viet Nam increased, so too did the volume of such broadcasts. These programs worked diligently to create the impression that Soviet citizens were not far away and not different from their Viet Nameese listeners. While they certainly spent time proving Soviet wealth and progress, they also endeavored daily to cut the political, economic, and social distance between the two countries. As one boy in 1961 proclaimed, "We are happy that the youth of Viet Nam are moving as one unified rank with the freedom-loving youth of the socialist countries who are all striving to create peace on earth."⁶¹ Five years later, in a radio show entitled "Always Together," Gosteleradio travelled to five schools collecting audio recordings of Pioneer organizations as they collectively expressed their solidarity with the "heroic children of Viet Nam."⁶² In contrast to the approach taken by JUSPAO,

⁶⁰ V. Karpov, "Nasha Dela," March 24 1959, GARF f. 6903, op.24, d. 138, l. 58.

⁶¹ D. K. Khran, "Kadr v Voskresenoe Obozrenie," March 24 1961, GARF f.6903, op. 24, d. 910, l. 29.

⁶² The Peace Corps, of course, was an exception to this rule, as it represented America's willingness to send its own young people to help in economic and agricultural development. The Peace Corp was a common USIA topic, as the Komsomol was for Gostelradio. The difference here is that the USIA did not endeavor to make the kind of emotional connection between American children at home and Vietnamese children that the Soviet Union did with its youngest citizens. N. Osipov, "Reportazh: Vsegda Vmestse," March 5 1966, GARF f. 6903, op. 24, d. 2495, l. 68.

Soviet youth, in the words of one Gosteleradio report, “assumed as its international duty the obligation to provide concrete help to help the youths of nations engaged in nationalist struggles.”⁶³ Under Soviet care, at the hands of Gosteleradio’s spin-doctors, aid was rendered as more than a geo-strategic action and instead was portrayed as an emotional event, born from an ingrained concern for the plight of the common person.

Gosteleradio carried broadcasts almost daily on a wide array of children’s activities engineered to show the population of Viet Nam the extent to which the Soviet Union was raising youngsters devoted to peace and the eradication of colonialism and racism. Pioneer groups and classrooms constructed “Viet Nam Corners” like the one built by School Number Nine in Odessa in October of 1966. Just as students had created “Red Corners” and “Pioneer Corners” in past years, they set aside a semi-permanent space in their classrooms for materials and documents about the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, with photographs of Haiphong, Odessa’s sister city, and the children who lived there. As one reporter marveled, “Here they exhibit letters and gifts. On the table lie books by Viet Nameese writers and poets as well as works by Soviet authors about Viet Nam.”⁶⁴ Similar reports highlighted Viet Nameese language programs, the publication of a Viet Nameese-Russian textbook, and campaigns like “Young Pioneers of the USSR aid Viet Nam,” which was run by the International friendship clubs of Kiev, Ivanovo, Sverdlovsk, Moscow, and Artek.⁶⁵ Pioneers in these locations collected pens, pencils, textbooks, picture books, drawing paper and paints and sent them as gifts, with no distinction ever made between North and South Viet Nam.⁶⁶ Pioneers also initiated a

⁶³ “Maiak,” Glavnaia redaktsiia propagandy na zarubezhnye strany, June 22 1964, GARF f. 6903, op. 23, d. 174, l. 33.

⁶⁴ S.S Talitskii, “Druzhiba Sovetskikh i Vietnamskikh Rebiat,” October 11 1964, GARF f.6903, op. 24, d. 915, l. 46.

⁶⁵ E.V. Kobolev, “Peredacha: Na Ucheby vo V’etnam,” February 27 1966, and V.I. Potapovskii, “Zametka Novye Knigi,” March 9 1966, GARF f. 6903, op. 24, d. 910, l. 23, 62.

⁶⁶ Andrei Loskutov and Peter Tempest, *The World Shall not be Blown Up! : Soviet Youth and the Peace Movement* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Pub. House, 1983), 7.

program called “Medicinal Herbs for the Hanoi Children’s Hospital” as well as a “Solidarity” movement where schoolchildren delivered thousands of pounds of collected herbs and three million rubles to Viet Nam to build a Young Pioneer palace in Hanoi. Meanwhile, Gosteleradio argued that these Soviet children, who had worked on Saturdays and Sundays collecting plants from the forests as well as waste paper and scrap metal, were funding these projects on their own. In stark contrast to the constructed image of the American child in JUSPAO broadcasting, Soviet youth appeared not only to be the recipients of the gifts provided by a highly developed and prosperous society, but also socially-conscious citizens willing to work on Saturdays doing dirty jobs not for themselves or for anyone within their national borders, but for the sake of their less-fortunate brothers and sisters abroad.⁶⁷

Moreover, the ideal Soviet child also provided a model for how the Viet Nameese should frame their own resistance. Based on their history of sacrifice and heroism during the Great Patriotic War, Gosteleradio argued that Russia’s children were living examples for the Viet Nameese of how the youngest in society can contribute to the war effort.

Soviet youth experienced the burdens and difficulties of the struggle against foreign imperialists, during the Revolution, the Civil War, and the Second World War, when they heroically fought against the foreign aggressors and gave all their strength in the name of the motherland. This is why the Soviet youth, and all the Soviet people, decidedly and uncompromisingly come forward in support of the

⁶⁷ This, of course, is how they were portrayed. The extent to which they actually did this work on their own is open for debate.

young of South Viet Nam, who are needed to stop the American aggressors and expel the American forces from their home.⁶⁸

Gosteleradio promised that the Soviet Union not only stood behind the South Viet Nameese struggle to wrest freedom from America, but that it would also provide a model for the children in Viet Nam in their battle against foreign aggression.

Positive representations of Soviet children supporting the Viet Nameese cause became a part of a much larger propaganda campaign aimed at contrasting communist success and ideological constancy with American exploitation and apathy. Many broadcasts attacked America's leaders with accusations of racism, hypocrisy, and imperialism born upon the shoulders of the "Third World."⁶⁹ Unlike JUSPAO, which seldom took focused shots at the Soviet leadership or at its youth, stock representations of "ideologically-degenerate" American children were common components of Soviet foreign broadcasts to Viet Nam. The poverty-stricken American child whose father has no money to buy food, the racist, spoiled, white child and the destitute, dirty, terrified black child were all standard icons of American barbarity. "If you want to be healthy, you have to pay. If you want to learn, you have to pay," one broadcaster announced to his listeners while giving a lesson on American healthcare and education in 1965.⁷⁰ Such representations of poor

⁶⁸ E. Kaznina, "Dobro Pozhalovat, poslantsy geroicheskoi molodezhi Iuzhnogo V'etnama!" April 11 1964, GARF f. 6904, op. 24, d. 2080, l. 19.

⁶⁹ Kevin McKenna has noted that while Khrushchev's policies of peaceful relations with the U.S. can be seen in his decision to retreat during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the number of anti-American images in the Soviet press increased dramatically in these years. Why propaganda did not reflect policy is unclear. Two possible answers that are provided in this chapter are first that Soviet propaganda was functioning as a smoke screen for what had become fairly impotent foreign policy position by the time Khrushchev was finally ousted in 1964, and second, that the nature of the Cold War conflict had changed to one based significantly on cultural competition and on the battle for the "hearts and minds" of country's where the Cold War could be fought by-proxy. Kevin J. McKenna, *All the Views Fit to Print: Changing Images of the U.S. in Pravda Political Cartoons, 1917-1991* (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 112.

⁷⁰ "Sotsializm otkryl narodu put' k obrazovaniu," March 7 1965, GARF f. 6903, op. 23, d. 3, l. 214.

American children made claims about the apparent cruelty of the U.S. government towards its own population while still affording the children themselves some sympathy for being born in a capitalist world. Other images of American children were not so forgiving, however, as the young were often portrayed as uncontrollably violent and spoiled. This was not a new tactic, of course. As early as 1949, Ilya Ehrenburg had described American youth as “obsessed with war” and this was a common claim in official Soviet domestic rhetoric.⁷¹ Similar claims would be made by Gostelradio broadcasters claiming that “from childhood, Americans are taught the inevitability of war. The children are unable to draw a clear, sunny sky ... They always draw the mushroom-shaped cloud of an atomic explosion.”⁷² This kind of violent upbringing, Soviet broadcasts argued, not only impacted the decisions of American politicians (who had themselves grown up spoiled and cruel), but also carried dire consequences for the future of the world.

Some of the most damning images of American children in Soviet broadcasts to Viet Nam came from the American South, where the upheaval of the civil rights movement commanded international attention.⁷³ Needless to say, Gostelradio broadcasters delivered these images to Viet Nam with the express purpose of altering public opinion in favor of Soviet patronage. In a 1964 broadcast, for instance, one Soviet announcer reminded his Viet Nameese listeners that, “The Governor of Alabama (Wallace) and his

⁷¹ Ilya Ehrenburg, "Prolonged Hysteria," *Pravda*, September 9, 1949, 4.

⁷² Leonard Marx, the director of the USIA, reported that 2,500,00 copies of a tear-leafed calendar sporting claims like these were distributed to Soviet children in December of 1965. “Memorandum for the President from Leonard Marx,” February 1 1966, “United States Information Agency, Vol. 6 12/1/65 [2 of 2], National Security File, Agency File, Box # 75, 40, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Archive, Austin, TX.

lackeys, from the height of their official posts, are openly instigating pogroms against innocent children in the American South.”⁷⁴

Are these men the only buttresses of racism and its greatest inspiration?
No! Those who are the guiltiest of racist excesses, those who are the biggest pillars of racism are those who stand even higher [than Wallace]. It is they who for a hundred years spoke so loftily about the “rights” of the negro, while all the time doing everything to withhold from the negroes their rights and to profit from their slave labor. The guiltiest is the privileged class of capitalist America that has all the power.⁷⁵

According to the Soviet media, racism was a problem endemic to capitalism – a founding element of America’s degenerate society. In contrast to the assurances made by Voice of America and JUSPAO that racism was a dilemma specific to dwindling populations in the South, Gosteleradio provided an image of an entire nation racked by hatred and controlled by a violently enforced caste system. “Who are these child-killers [*detoubiitsy*]?” one broadcaster asked his listeners in 1965. “The semi-official American press asserts that they could be simply renegades of society, moral freaks, but doesn’t it seem as though there are a lot of these renegades being allowed in “civilized” American society?” Broadcasts like these were quick to list the “renegade” actions of America’s

⁷³ By the early 1930s, the depiction of social injustice in the United States had become a regular theme in Soviet new media, with specific attention devoted to charges of racial discrimination. McKenna, *All the Views Fit to Print: Changing Images of the U.S. in Pravda Political Cartoons, 1917-1991*, 40.

⁷⁴ In the Russian context, the term *pogrom* is a reference to large-scale, targeted, and repeated anti-Jewish rioting that began in the nineteenth century and continued into the twentieth. See Charters Wynn, *Workers, Strikes, and Pogroms: the Donbass-Dnepr Bend in Late Imperial Russia, 1870-1905* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).

⁷⁵ Erik Alekseev, “Rasizm – Pozor Kapitalicheskoi Ameriki i Vietnam,” September 1963, GARF f.6903, op.23, d. 136, l.14. Similar reports were aired to Vietnam in September alone on the fifth, sixth, tenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth.

racist population: George Wallace's election, the survival of Jim Crow, the murder of Medgar Evers, and finally the "six negro children who wanted only to pray."⁷⁶ What emerged was a picture of a sick, amoral American society, littered with the bodies of dead black children.

From the beginning, Soviet accusations of American racism were used to substantiate allegations of U.S. colonialism in Southeast Asia. Images of black children suffering at the hands of American racists were joined by a vast visual and audio record of the United State's abuse of children abroad. As one Soviet broadcaster commented in 1965,

Racist Americans are produced at a young age... When [American children] are ten-years-old they are intentionally taught not to see Negroes as human. And today, [U.S. leaders] are sending American soldiers nine thousand miles from their country. Official America commands them: Kill! Kill in the name of the "higher" interests of the United States. And they do kill. They kill hundreds of South Viet Nameese only because [these people] are demanding for themselves freedom and independence. It is a terrible, inhumane [*chelovekonenavistnicheskaia*] logic. But isn't it such a "logic"... which inside America defends racism and outside of it – imperialism – [and the] politics of enslavement of other peoples?⁷⁷

According to Soviet broadcasts, racism was a necessary prerequisite for America's capitalist agenda in the post colonial world. They argued that racism was the vehicle by

⁷⁶ E. Alekseev, "Rasizm-Pozor Kapitalicheskoi Ameriki," September 19 1963, GARF f. 6903, op. 23, d. 23, l. 12-14.

which countries like the United States could pursue their neo-colonial programs without facing the moral ramifications of their actions. This could, and did, mean real danger for the nations like Viet Nam, Gosteleradio contended. If children in America were being raised to hate a significant portion of their own citizenry, what hope was there for the children of Viet Nam?⁷⁸

The barrage of American racist and imperialist images in the Soviet media was staggering. In the large sample of Soviet foreign broadcasts examined at the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) spanning the years between 1960 and 1968, reports devoted to the United States and to its racial and colonial policies increased dramatically. For instance, in January 1960, foreign broadcasts to Viet Nam devoted twenty-five percent of their reports to the subject of the United States and its racial and colonial history around the world.⁷⁹ The remaining seventy-five percent of broadcasts to Viet Nam in that month focused on the Soviet Union's lasting friendship with Asia, its

⁷⁷ E. Alekseev, "Rasizm – Pozor Kapitalicheskoi Ameriki," from the show "mezhdunarodnyi dnevnik," October 20 1965, GARF f.6903, op. 23, d. 123.

⁷⁸ A significant amount has been written on the connections between economic imperialism and racism in the history of American foreign policy. See Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919-1950*. Gail Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). Penny Von Eschen, *Race Against Empire* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997).

⁷⁹ The majority of the Soviet foreign broadcasts that I examined came from the 24th and 25th *opisi* in the Gostelradio fond (f.6903) of the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF). These *opisi* contain transcripts of Soviet broadcasts to the far reaches of the world – grouped by countries: Western Europe, America and England, Central Europe, Latin America and South America, the Baltics, the Scandinavian countries, the Middle East, and the Far East. By 1953 different management hierarchies had been set up for the broadcasting to each of these groups. The sample of broadcasts that I examined ran from 1956 to 1968, looking mostly at a random sampling of broadcasts sent to Vietnam (I also looked at programs sent to the United States, Hungary, Cuba, India, and Iran, although my sampling of those countries was not random and was instead used to examine Soviet coverage of specific events). In the Soviet broadcasts to Vietnam, I did both broad and detailed sampling of each year; I looked at every broadcast that was sent on twenty-four randomly-chosen dates in each year. Then I looked at every broadcast that was sent in one complete, randomly-chosen month of each year. This was done in order to hopefully give me a sense of change over time as well as the ability to do detailed content analysis.

commitment to cultural exchange, its willingness to share Soviet wealth, and its ability to help Viet Nam rebuild through agriculture and industry. In contrast, in January 1968, Soviet broadcasts to Viet Nam focused sixty-three percent of their attention exclusively on American racism and colonialism in South East Asia (an increase of almost one hundred and fifty percent), while the remaining thirty-seven percent of broadcasts referred implicitly to the American “invasion” of Viet Nam by dwelling on the efforts being made by the Soviet Union to help those under siege. Of course these were not always discreet categories, as broadcasts would often cover many subjects at once.

In response to what it considered a fairly clear American imperialist agenda, Gosteleradio used images of dead Viet Nameese children in order to solicit revulsion among its listeners, to demonize America’s role in the Cold War, to legitimize its own actions against American aggression, and to provide a common enemy against whom Soviet broadcasters and their listeners could unite. Common exposés focused on the bombing of Viet Nameese children’s schools and hospitals by reckless American bombardiers.

During a regular flight of American pilots over the territory of the DRV, barbaric bombing destroyed a children’s school in the area of Let-hu, near Kuang Bin. They killed ten children from the ages of three to six years old and two teachers. Many similar schools have also been destroyed. There are no words that can explain in full measure the sadistic actions of the American imperialists, who

have lost all notions of human honor, morality, and conscience, who have lost their humanity.⁸⁰

Indictments of American barbarity in Viet Nam became even easier when the United States undertook campaigns like Operation Ranch Hand, which involved the spraying of toxic chemicals like Agent Orange and Agent Blue over hundreds of thousands of acres of Viet Nameese farm land.⁸¹ As one Soviet broadcaster stated to his listeners in 1964, “In the ‘dirty war’ against South Viet Nameese patriots, American warmongers and their friends, while presenting themselves as agents of ‘freedom,’ again resumed the dropping of poisonous chemical gas over the land of Kai Tau... American pilots hit peaceful populated areas with chemical bombs and bombarded them with chemical bullets. It has been reported that as a result of these barbaric flights, around a thousand peaceful citizens, including about 500 children, have been killed.”⁸² Just as in its coverage of the American south, Gosteleradio portrayed U.S. involvement in Viet Nam as a rape of innocence.⁸³ Harrowing photographs and reports coming from the world-wide press were reprinted and even described over Soviet foreign radio. “Anyone who looks at these photographs,” one reporter declared in March of 1964, “cannot ignore the feeling of hatred towards these American executioners, who are committing this bloody injustice

⁸⁰ H. Osipov, “Proklatie Ubiitsam!,” March 4 1966, GARF f. 6903, op. 24, d. 2245, l. 33.

⁸¹ Paul Frederick Cecil, *Herbicide Warfare: The Ranch Hand Project in Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1986).

⁸² N. Sontsev, “Novye Prestupleniia Amerikanskikh Zakhbatchikov v Iozhnom V’etname,” January 1 1964, GARF f.6903, op. 24, d. 2075, l. 25.

⁸³ In 1964, words like “weak,” “soft,” and “impotent,” start to show up as descriptors of American involvement in Vietnam. The war is now always called a “dirty war,” both because of the use of dirty weapons and because of the violation of international rights agreements signed by the UN in 1960 guaranteeing self-determination to the post-colonial world.

upon defenseless children.”⁸⁴ Because Soviet broadcasts seldom differentiated between North and South Viet Nam in their reports, the entire population appeared to be under siege by American forces intent on denying them their much-desired re-unification. In stark contrast to Heffron’s images of the American captain leading South Viet Nameese forces across an open field, Soviet broadcasters painted South Viet Nameese soldiers either as traitors or as men forced into conscription, while the citizens of South Viet Nam became full supporters of communist liberation against unwanted American pillaging.

In addition to portraying Viet Nam’s children as unwitting victims of U.S. aggression, Gosteleradio also depicted them as martyrs and warriors facing an ideologically and militarily weak American foe. This message was best summed up in a poem read during a 1965 broadcast to Viet Nam:

The Americans go to Viet Nam
They are headed for some unpleasant work.
They have children to shoot, villages to seize
And in the nooses people to string up
...
But for freedom, the young will continue to fight
Viet Nam will not bow its head
It will tear away the hydra’s tentacles
And it will call to them in Washington
As the people of the world will all sound the alarm
And their word will be heard triumphantly and terribly

⁸⁴ T. Biriokova, “Svobodu Narodu V’etnama,” March 24, 1964, GARF f. 6903, op. 23, d. 227, l. 49.

To not return to the history of yesterday!

To remember, now not later (*poka ne pozdno*)⁸⁵

In Soviet broadcasts, the children of Viet Nam were not simply depicted as victims. They were envisioned as agents for change. Such children subsequently joined the terrifying mythos of Viet Nameese insurgency in the American press. Just as Viet Nameese prostitutes could be rumored to carry antibiotic-resistant gonorrhea for the infection of GIs, so too could the most innocent-looking of children be hiding a machine gun.

By all accounts, the Soviet propaganda attack overwhelmed JUSPAO. As one American official would admit as early as 1964, the United States had “come out second best in the ideological struggle with Moscow.” The most lamentable reason for this discrepancy, he argued, was the fact that “the United States has not attempted to win support abroad for its objectives by matching the Communist effort in the field of political persuasion.”⁸⁶ Few in the state department and in the upper-echelons of JUSPAO were blind to the information crises produced by American race violence and fighting in Viet Nam. As Carl Rowan would inform Johnson in 1965, America now had the image of having built itself on the bodies of innocent victims. In the eyes of many around the world, dead women and children had become “the steel and concrete” of buildings and bridges bombed by American planes.⁸⁷ Two years later, a Republican-

⁸⁵ I. Lashkov, Untitled, April 12 1965, GARF f. 6903, op. 24, d. 2245, l. 71.

⁸⁶ Ideological Operations and Foreign Policy, Report #2 on Winning the Cold War: The US Ideological Offensive, April 27 1964, Folder 03, Box 13, 6, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Insurgency Warfare, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

⁸⁷ “Peking and Hanoi reported in May of 1965 that the “U.S. bombings in North Vie-Nam are directed at civilians and claim the destruction of hospitals, schools, and churches by “American bombers which the American President said were only destroying bridges.” The propaganda, which Moscow is just beginning to pick up, asks whether “the dead women and children are the steel and concrete the American President talked about.” Memorandum from Rowan to LBJ, May 25 1965. “United States Information Agency,

dominated coordinating committee that had been set up to examine the effectiveness of JUSPAO (and USIA in particular) labeled the organization's approach to propaganda as "timid, and at times apologetic." Arguing that they were throwing money at a losing cause, the admittedly partisan committee declared that "our informational efforts may in time have every weapon except the indispensable one, credibility."⁸⁸ In 1968, American propagandists could only look on in dismay as violence erupted in the streets of Detroit and Saigon. Leonard Marks, then president of the USIA, informed Johnson that ultimately America's racial upheavals had forced much of the world "to question the stability of the American form of government and to cast doubt on our position as the leaders of the free world. Instead of an "anti-America" feeling, "there appear[ed] to be a loss of respect in the same way that a child is shaken when he discovers that his parents are fallible."⁸⁹ Literally and figuratively, the idea of America-as-parent, as benevolent caretaker, had been compromised by an effective Soviet propaganda assault and by its own morally-troublesome domestic and international policies.

The aggressive Soviet propaganda program in Viet Nam did more than put a dent in JUSPAO's armor. It also played an integral role in the pursuit of Soviet foreign policy vis-à-vis the NLF. These images attempted to conceal the Soviet Union's unwillingness to fight the United States directly while hopefully retaining a degree of influence over the

1965," Confidential File, Agency Reports, U.S. Information Agency, Box 135, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Archive, Austin, Texas.

⁸⁸ "United States Information Agency, 1967-," FG 296 U.S. Information Agency (1967-), Confidential File, FG266-1-1, Box 33, 25, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Archive, Austin, Texas.

⁸⁹ "United States Information Agency, 1967-," April 30 1968, Confidential File: Agency Reports, U.S. Information Agency, Box 135, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Archive, Austin, Texas.

communist leadership in North Viet Nam.⁹⁰ Gosteleradio believed that this program, which used visions of children to such advantage, would provide a carefully-crafted image of the Soviet Union that could condemn the enemy and provide personal legitimacy without demanding real military intervention in the process.

Unfortunately for Gosteleradio, masking the Soviet Union's unwillingness to fight with expressions of solidarity only lasted for so long. In 1967, a U.S.-captured VC document revealed the extent to which the NLF understood the limitations of Soviet as well as global communist support. While appreciating Russia's support, the executive for COSVN nonetheless remarked to his colleagues that up to that point, they had "fail[ed] to see all the difficulties and complexities in the relations with socialist countries, thinking that these countries will readily and wholeheartedly support the Front policy."⁹¹ As the NLF leadership learned, what drove Soviet policy in Viet Nam was only partially related to the cause of national liberation and was equally concerned with Russia's desire to avoid direct confrontation with the United States and to mediate its contentious relationship with China, and Korea, whom it saw as a threat in the struggle for power in the communist camp. When the NLF turned to build their own propaganda campaigns, they reflected this growing awareness as they increasingly portrayed themselves not as victims or beneficiaries of either American or Soviet meddling, but as self-sufficient warriors driven to defend their homeland.

⁹⁰ Research Analysis Corporation (John R. Thomas), *The Soviet Union and the Vietnamese Conflict: Some Factors Affecting the Soviet Attitudes*, September 1 1967, Folder 03, Box 08, 5, Glenn Helm Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University; *Sino-Soviet Competition in Hanoi*, March 9 1966, Folder 13, Box 06, 1, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 06 – Democratic Republic of Vietnam, The Vietnam Archives, Texas Tech University.

⁹¹ *Viet Cong Foreign Affairs And Propaganda Activities*, April 14 1967, Folder 18, Box 01, 2, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 06 - Democratic Republic of Vietnam, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

Despite these setbacks, Soviet-constructed images of children went a long way in substantiating the alternative voice of Soviet patronage and solidarity over that of the United States. Victimized by American racism and imperialism, and mobilized by Soviet and NLF revolutionary fervor, these images navigated the path between the expression and obfuscation of public policy.

THE NLF MESSAGE

Any examination of propaganda during the Viet Nam War would be incomplete if it did not address the massive campaign undertaken by the NLF to solicit the loyalties of populations in the North and the South. Like their American and Soviet counterparts, the image of the child was central to COSVN's propaganda approach.⁹² While at the beginning of the war, reports of American atrocities against children were common, by the middle of 1966, COSVN constructed only one image of the child: that of the warrior. This child, in the words of one NLF representative (speaking over the Russian airwaves), represented "the spirit of the Viet Nameese people to sacrifice anything for the cause of freedom."⁹³ More than this, it reflected the specific agendas of the NLF during the war: to inculcate a feeling of hatred among the populace for America and its soldiers, to show the United States the lengths to which the VC were willing to go in order to win this war, to establish their crusade first as an inevitable fight for nationalist freedom and only second

⁹² Although the documentation for North Vietnamese broadcasting and publishing is limited to those documents seized by American and Soviet soldiers during the war, they do nonetheless, reveal an image of the Vietnamese child that should not be overlooked.

⁹³ T. Biriokova, "Svobodu Narodu V'etnama," March 24 1964, GARF f. 6903, op. 23, d. 227, l. 49.

as a communist class struggle, and to construct a vision of the revolutionary child that rivaled (and maybe even shamed) those images presented by the Soviet Union and China.

The NLF began their propaganda effort in 1954 when they formally established the Central Propaganda Office for South Viet Nam (COSVN) after the signing of the Geneva Agreement. From its inception the NLF leadership, and especially Ho Chi Minh, considered propaganda to be a “key factor” in their victory over French and later American “colonial” rule.⁹⁴ COSVN initially used the airwaves and the publishing houses to attack the corruption of the Diem regime. After Diem’s assassination on November 1, 1963, COSVN turned its attention to the rising American commitment in the region, claiming to be the sole representative of the South Viet Nameese people and the leading force against renewed western intervention. By the summer of 1965, COSVN was conducting daily news broadcasts in Viet Nameese, Khmer, Mandarin, French and English as well as special programs for American troops in the South.⁹⁵ They established publishing branches in every major city. They distributed bulletins and leaflets in Viet Nameese, Chinese, French, and English and placed correspondents in Havana, Prague, Algiers, and East Berlin. At their South Viet Nam Liberation Film Studio they produced feature films with titles like “Telling Blows and the U.S. Imperialists Certainly Will Be

⁹⁴ The Vietnamese Communist Agit-Prop System: A Short Study (1967), 1967, Folder 12, Box 16, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 05 – National Liberation Front, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University. I recognize that there was a difference between the propaganda efforts made by the government in Hanoi and the National Liberation Front led by the North Vietnamese. The sources that I have, which were mostly taken off of VC soldiers and defectors by American soldiers, are all products of the VC / COSVN propaganda effort. A number of American communiqués reflect the belief among U.S. leaders that Hanoi was directly responsible for leading and shaping the VC propaganda effort. This connection seems accurate but is ultimately unverifiable due to the lack of access to the North Vietnamese archives.

⁹⁵ Viet Cong Foreign Affairs And Propaganda Activities, April 14 1967, Folder 18, Box 01, 2, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 06 - Democratic Republic of Vietnam, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

Defeated,” and “The Viet Nameese People Will Certainly Win.”⁹⁶ All of these programs received significant funding and attention from the higher echelons of the party leadership. They were distributed widely throughout Viet Nam as well as the global socialist camp. They presented well-coordinated messages to their audiences and constructed a markedly different set of images and messages than either their American enemies or their Soviet compatriots.

Images of and ideas about children were visually and descriptively central to NLF publishing, radio, and film. In one U.S. analysis of COSVN propaganda in October 1965, for instance, evaluators noted that three of the nine geographic areas covered in their study had employed propaganda that “appeared aimed particularly at youth” and the use of children as soldiers and “martyrs” for the VC cause.⁹⁷ These statistics are arguably under-representative of the real saturation that the child’s image maintained in VC publishing and broadcasting. Although records are incomplete, the available samples reveal that in almost every VC propaganda document, some kind of reference, whether visual or textual, is made to the cause of youth and to its role in engineering the liberation of the populace.

While the image of the child may have been ubiquitous in NLF propaganda, it was by no means static, as it assumed changing traits depending on the purpose of the message and the time in which it was being presented. The most notable transformation

⁹⁶ Diplomatic and Psychological Offensive of the National Liberation Front, February 2 1966, Folder 06, Box 06, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 05 – National Liberation Front, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University. Unless otherwise noted, all translations of COSVN broadcasts were done by South Vietnamese and American military personnel after these documents were captured or handed over. For the most part, the specific names of translators are not included in the documents cited here.

⁹⁷ Analysis of Vietcong Propaganda for October 1965, November 11 1965, Folder 06, Box 13, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Insurgency Warfare, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

in COSVN's depictions of children happened in 1966 when images of young victims were largely replaced by representations of youth as revolutionary fighters well-trained in the art of combat, imbued with independent agency, driven by hatred for the enemy, willing to take up arms, separated from Soviet and Chinese patronage, and ready to sacrifice themselves for the nationalist cause. Broadcasts like the one sent out in September of 1965, which declared that U.S. troops had "indiscriminately bombed ... our kindergartens, schools, and hospitals, and declared war even with the infants and the dead," were rare by 1967.⁹⁸ Similarly infrequent by this time were broadcasts which in earlier years had heralded the gratefulness and love felt by the Viet Nameese people toward the Soviet populace.⁹⁹ Instead, the vision of youth that emerged out of COSVN's broadcasts and publications in the heavy years of the war embraced the idea that children should function as "combatants" who understood, in the words of one captured VC document from 1969, "the value of a bullet and a grain of rice."¹⁰⁰ As active participants in the war, children were portrayed not only as watchdogs for their villages and as support personnel, but "as liaisons and reconnaissance agents" who, as COSVN declared, were now "tak[ing] part in the revolution while still in the womb."¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Against the U.S. "Psychological Warfare," September 1965, Folder 06, Box 13, 5, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Insurgency warfare, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

⁹⁹ Captured Documents (CDEC): VC Propaganda, September 23 1966, Folder 1252, Box 0029, Vietnam Archive Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University. Interestingly, talk of enemy troops raping or prostituting young girls continued in Cambodian communist propaganda, while it largely disappeared in VC propaganda. We can only surmise that while the VC did not find it useful to portray their young women as sexual victims, this was still perceived as a useful tactic in Cambodian appeals. See, for instance, Cambodian Liberation Front Propaganda leaflet, May 1970, Folder 06, Box 02, 3, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 15 – Cambodia, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

¹⁰⁰ Youth Urged to Emulate Revolutionary Heroes, October 15 1969, Folder 09, Box 17, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 05 – National Liberation Front, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, "Document 3: Directive on Measures Against the Enemy Chieu Hoi Policy," Consolidation of JUSPAO Guidances 1 thru 22 Compiles June 1 1967 Volume Number 1, June 1 1967, Folder 12, Box 13, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Insurgency Warfare, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

COSVN derived its image of the warrior child from a number of different cultural and political sources. To some extent, it was drawn from “Uncle Ho’s” famous five teachings, which were (and continue to be) memorized by school children across North Viet Nam. They commanded first that children love their country and their people, second that they study, third that they remain cooperative and disciplined, fourth that they keep good hygiene, and last that they be “modest, honest, and courageous.”¹⁰² These traits sound strikingly similar to those propagated by the Soviets and the Americans concerning their own children in the Cold War. Unlike the United States and the Soviet Union, however, the image of the Viet Nameese child also drew from the unique circumstances of war and from an evolution of the North Viet Nameese Government’s policies toward their more powerful occupiers and allies. For COSVN, this conflict required more than envisioning the young as ideologically, academically, and domestically prepared. It also demanded that the young appear militarily indomitable and independent, with gun in hand.

Regardless of its origins, the vision of the child-as-fighter performed a number of important functions for COSVN’s propaganda effort. First, by creating an independent, nationalist, militarized image of the Viet Nameese child, COSVN attempted to depict the Viet Nameese crusade, both in the North and the South, as unavoidable. A well-trained, politically-conscious population of young people had no choice but to take up arms in response to clear aggression, they argued. “Youth of the South,” one publication noted in 1969, “in the face of the extremely savage crimes committed by the American aggressors and the clique of their lackeys, realized that there was no other way than taking up arms

¹⁰² Catherine Crystal, “Searching for Excellence in Education,” *The Quarterly* 24, no. 1 (Winter, 2002): 4.

to fight and save their country, homes, and their happiness.”¹⁰³ COSVN strove to unite Viet Nameese youth across borders for a shared battle that, thanks to the indomitable spirit of the South Viet Nameese, NLF and NVA fighters, was not only inevitable but was unwinnable by the United States. One of COSVN’s most popular types of publications was that which recounted the heroic stories of youth willing to fight to the death for the cause of national liberation. Through breathtaking tales of childhood heroicism and self-sacrifice, COSVN sought to present a vision of an entire population, from the youngest toddlers to the oldest women, which would never submit to American and South Viet Nameese preeminence. Thus, while telling the story of an “indomitable youth” named Tran Quan Doc in 1969, COSVN informed its readers that this “child,” this “son of the rear,” had become “seriously wounded” yet “continued to fight until he ran out of ammunition.”

Captured by the enemy who grilled and barbarously tortured him, he remained true to his righteous spirit, attacking the enemy with all his remaining energy, shouting in his face: “I am a liberation soldier. The only think I know is to kill you; I will never surrender.” The cowardly enemy killed him but was afraid of him and respected him. The people in the vicinity of Loc Ninh and Hon Quan highly admired him and grieved over his death. ¹⁰⁴

In this story and in hundreds like it, the life and death of Tran Quan Doc is portrayed as a noble event which led the American and South Viet Nameese occupiers to do more than

¹⁰³ Youth of the South Resolve to be Heroic, June 6 1969, Folder 09, Box 17, 101, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 05 – National Liberation Front, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

¹⁰⁴ Youth Urged to Emulate Revolutionary Heroes, October 15 1969, Folder 09, Box 17, 9, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 05 – National Liberation Front, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

surrender. Instead, it led them to the realization that this *child* deserved respect for his convictions and military constancy, that this child, like the rest of the Viet Nameese population, could not be swayed.

In addition to using images of youth to present the war as inevitable and insurmountable by the West, COSVN also used images of youth in the pursuit of concrete military campaigns. Most glaring in this respect are their portrayals of South Viet Nameese children as vital players in the effort to undermine the American strategic hamlet program. In southern villages like Long An and Quang Da, they claimed that “100 percent of the youth, both male and female, joined the guerillas.” These troops, using the slogan “turn strategic hamlets into combat villages,” ostensibly contributed “tens of millions” of working days to the replacement of strategic hamlets with their own version of pacification, called the “combat village.”¹⁰⁵ Needless to say, such portrayals of Viet Nameese children destroying American hamlets seriously complicate Richard Heffron’s vision of the contained, passive youth that we saw in *Night of the Dragon*. Instead of being the recipients of western care, Viet Nameese children become active and mobilized, moving outside of the boundaries established for them by their protectors. They become the very saboteurs whom the hamlet was originally built to repel. The problems inherent in the strategic hamlet project are suddenly brought into stark relief, as they appear to be defending children...from themselves.

An additional function that the child’s image played for COSVN, especially in the later years of the war, was to portray the North Viet Nameese as working independently

¹⁰⁵ Youth of the South Resolve to be Heroic, June 6 1969, Folder 09, Box 17, 100, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 05 – National Liberation Front, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

from their more powerful communist neighbors to the north. Noticeably absent from COSVN propaganda are references to their communist allies, who are mentioned only when foreign delegates visit Hanoi. Instead, national defense dominates as the prime motivator for Viet Nameese intransigence. Ironically, despite their professed independence, it is hard to ignore the extent to which COSVN's portrayals of its own youth were drawn from, or at least strikingly similar to, traditional Soviet revolutionary rhetoric. Just as Stalin had called upon Soviet youth to function as the "sharp eyes" for their communities and parents, so too did the NLF solicit their young to be the watchdogs for ideological deviance in their homes and schools. Similarities also existed in Soviet and VC descriptions of heroicism among the young. Compare, for instance, an account of the trials and eventual death of a young hero by COSVN in 1969 to that of the famous Soviet writer Alexander Fadeev describing the trials of a young hero in 1942:

Indomitable youth Le Van Loi resolutely fought against the enemy all day long to protect the wounded soldiers. With both legs broken and his ammunition exhausted, Loi was about to be captured by the enemy, but he managed to smash the skull of one of them with his rifle butt, then wrestling with two other bandits he shouted, "I annihilate you both; long live the National Liberation Front" while setting off the last grenade, killing them both and wounding eight others. He thus gloriously sacrificed his life to save his comrades and protect the wounded soldiers.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ Youth Urged to Emulate Revolutionary Heroes, October 15 1969, Folder 09, Box 17, 9, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 05 – National Liberation Front, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

Vanya Zemnukhov stood swaying before *Meister* Brückner, blood was pouring down his face, his head drooped helplessly, but he was doing his best to hold it upright, and finally he succeeded. Then for the first time in all the four weeks of silence, he spoke. “You can’t do it, can you? He said. “You can’t [defeat us]! You’ve seized so many countries... all the honor and conscience you have rejected!... and yet you can’t do it. You’re not strong enough!” And he laughed in their faces.¹⁰⁷

Despite the political distance maintained by COSVN from their Soviet neighbors, the impact of the Soviet victory over the Germans does appear to have provided a rhetorical foundation for the articulation of their own struggle. Both figures are young heroes (Le Van Loi is described as being fifteen-years-old and Vanya Zemnukov is between fourteen and sixteen), who are beaten and eventually killed, yet at the same time remain personally undefeated by the beatings and torture to which they are subjected. While both youngsters speak on their own, without prompting from adults around them, they also articulate a particular, state-sanctioned “dominant fiction” that presents the Viet Nameese and Soviet victories as the inevitable outcomes of popular resistance to outside invasion. Moreover, both figures, in the words of Lilya Kaganovsky, are models of “bodily obligation,” driven to assume tasks that destroy their bodies for the sake of the revolution and the building of the state.¹⁰⁸ As propaganda products,¹⁰⁹ both of these representations of compromised youth feed into the mythos of the socialist state—a narrative that is based on the sacrifice and subsequent heroization of the mutilated male body as an

¹⁰⁷ Fadeev, *The Young Guard*, 701.

¹⁰⁸ Lilya Kaganovsky, “How the Soviet Man was (Un)Made,” *Slavic Review* 63, no. 3 (2004): 577.

idealized form. Both provide examples of how the human body (and the human spirit) can be molded through ideological training, surveillance, and disciplinary power.

The best example of the constructed image of the heroic Viet Nameese child can be seen in the stories surrounding the young hero Nguyen Van Be, who became the focus for debates on youth, heroism, and the conceptualization of state policy throughout the course of the war. As the COSVN-generated version of the story goes, the young Nguyen Van Be was born to a poor farmer some time in the early 1950s. Having grown up in the midst of war, in the words of one VC retelling, Be “joined the Revolution and stood with his friends and relatives to free himself and offer his enthusiastic heart to the task of liberating his country.”¹¹⁰ He joined the People’s Revolutionary Youth Movement and became a part of a fighting unit. Although “he wished to use a rifle to shoot directly at the heads of his enemy, the US invaders, because of his youth, ”he was nonetheless assigned the much less heroic task of transporting weapons to troops at the front. He approached his work with enthusiasm, however, and was “always considered [by comrades and civilians] as one of their children.” Be’s heroic moment came in 1966, when a fierce battle erupted between two weapons transportation teams and the “American invaders and the flunkeys” (meaning the South Viet Nameese soldiers). Despite the best efforts of Be’s team, they were eventually overwhelmed by the American forces as each of his comrades were “killed one after the other and he found himself in a very dangerous and

¹⁰⁹ Fadeev’s work *Molodaia Gvardiia* was not a piece of direct propaganda but was nonetheless used as such in the context of Socialist Realism.

¹¹⁰ This Document was captured in the vicinity of Quang Tri and was published by the People’s Revolutionary Youth Party of the VC 5th Military Region. This document was intended to be used as study materials for cadres, party members and youths. Cadres, Party Members & Youths are Determines to Live and Fight Like Our (Dead) Hero Nguyen Van Be, 1967, Folder 03, Box 17, 1, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 05 – National Liberation Front, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

desperate situation with thousands of enemy guns pointed at him.” He, too, was eventually captured along with his weapons cache, and, as COSVN reported, was subjected to “all possible savage means to torture him.” He remained constant, nonetheless, and, as one report phrased it, “all the [Americans’] endeavors were just like bubbles of soap that were washed away by the flow of a great river.” Finally, Be and a fellow ploughman were brought to a central location near My Ann, where “the US invaders and flunkeys soon gathered with real proud expressions on their faces.” In a moment of seeming heroism, Be signaled to the ploughman to run just as he, “with flashing eyes” and “hateful iron arms,” lifted ten kilos of Claymore mines over his head. Shouting, “Long live the NLF and down with the US imperialists!”¹¹¹ he smashed the mine on the hull of the armored vehicle and created an explosion that lit all the other cached bombs, “causing a burst of thunder that shook the world.”¹¹² According to initial COSVN reports, sixteen Americans and ten “flunkeys” were killed in the ensuing chaos, while a number of additional Americans were also killed by friendly-fire that erupted in the aftermath.

Almost from the moment that the story hit the press, the tale of Nguyen Van Be’s heroism became a point of focus for COSVN, as it initiated classes and meetings across the north to study Be’s example. According to COSVN, Be represented “the bright example” that could be admired “not only by our youths but by young men throughout the world.” As one report phrased it, “Be had offered his youth to the noble revolutionary ideal and the common task of liberating our people.” What lessons did COSVN and the

¹¹¹ The translation of this document uses the term “NFL” but is most likely referring to the NLF.

NLF ideological training section derive from Be's tale? First, COSVN argued that Be had "known how to feel hateful and refuse to share the same sky with the US invaders and their flunkys." Second, he had "shown his loyalty to the party and to his people." Third, he had "always been on the offensive against the enemy." And fourth, he had "trained his revolutionary thoughts and his nature to be a fighter" above all else.¹¹³ Militarized, independent, and self-sacrificing, Be's actions took on mythical qualities. While one account described him with "hateful iron arms," another granted "genius arms" to the young man. Young drama groups re-enacted the story of Nguyen Van Be in their local theatres, complete with simulated torture and portrayals of the bloody aftermath of the bomb's explosion.¹¹⁴ One report released in May 1967 told its readers that while "the mine Nguyen Van Be exploded was an ordinary one," it was, nonetheless, "empowered by magical forces." Because of this empowerment, this mine, COSVN argued, "not only destroyed almost one hundred enemies and colossal tanks in a second and made a hero out of Nguyen Van Be, it also helped to create a chain reaction which exploded hatred and thunder" that had led to the rise of similar "copy-cat" heroes around the country.¹¹⁵ Note the rise in casualties in this report, a phenomenon that is relatively standard in the

¹¹² Study of the example set out by Nguyen Van Be, an extremely gallant, loyal, and unyielding youth league member, February 4 1967, Folder 03, Box 17, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 05 – National Liberation Front, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

¹¹³ "This Document was captured in the vicinity of Quany Tri and was Published by the People's Revolutionary Youth Party of the VC 5th Military Region, Study Materials to be Used for Cadres, Party Members and Youths and for propaganda purposes with the wave of political general mobilization." Cadres, Party members and Youths are Determined to Live and Fight Like Our Dead Hero Nguyen Van Be, 1967, Folder 03, Box 17, 2-4, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 05 – National Liberation Front, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

¹¹⁴ It is Bound to Achieve the Greatest Results in Thoughts and Actions, May 21 1967, Folder 05 Box 17, 2-3, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 05 – National Liberation Front, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

re-telling of war stories. Moreover, as the years passed, Be became increasingly younger in VC accounts of the story: initial reports put him at sixteen-years-old, while later reports claimed that he was thirteen or fourteen.

Unfortunately for COSVN, there were numerous problems with the story of the young hero Nguyen Van Be, not the least of which being that the young man did not appear to be dead and did not appear to be thirteen, or even sixteen-years-old. A damning photo of Be hit the JUSPAO presses almost at the same time that the heroic version of the story was published by COSVN. In it, Be supposedly sits with a copy of the COSVN newspaper article that recounts his death. Carefully positioned so that his profile can be compared to that of the photograph (see Illustration 5.3 below), the seemingly alive Be is seen reading about his own demise. In the process of creating this pseudo-Drotse effect, JUSPAO sought to impose a new image of Be upon the one disseminated by COSVN; to create a context in which the “heroic” tale of Be’s sacrifice could be exposed and mocked as fraudulent. As many JUSPAO analysts would note internally throughout the war, much weight was given to the veracity of vision and sight in Viet Nameese culture. For a population that had not yet become disillusioned with the seeming objectivity of photography, seeing was still believing.¹¹⁶ Here apparently sat visual proof that the entire Be mythos was a product of VC trickery. No longer a child, JUSPAO listed Be as twenty-four-years-old, thereby removing from him the heroic valences of the “child-warrior” and in effect normalizing him as yet another North Viet

¹¹⁵ Radio Hanoi: First we invite you to listen to an article on Hero Nguyen Van Be, May 30 1967, Folder 04, Box 17, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 05 – National Liberation Front, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

Nameese soldier whose only desire was to defect to the south and settle down with his family away from VC control.



Illustration 5.3: The caption reads, “The ‘Late Hero’ reads about his own death.”¹¹⁷

JUSPAO articles told their viewers a counter-story of the young Be, who had apparently surrendered to South Viet Nameese forces of his own free will and was now participating in the Chieu Hoi program. Interviews with Be’s cousin, who defected later in 1966, reported that within days of Be receiving the posthumous title of “hero” by the NLF, his mother had been invited by GVN forces to visit her son in jail. Fearing for her life, the mother kept her son’s existence a secret from her neighbors, only telling her

¹¹⁶ “Exploitation of Vietnamese Efforts and Successes,” JUSPAO Guidance Number 6, July 2, 1965, Folder 12, Box 13, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Insurgency Warfare, the Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

nephew and her husband. The nephew's initial reaction was disbelief, especially since his aunt had apparently only been allowed to see her son from ten meters away. He became convinced, however, when he learned that Be had called his mother and his younger brothers by their pet names. His beliefs were further confirmed when his uncle, Be's father, under orders from the VC, visited his son and returned to report that he was alive.¹¹⁸ Rumors quickly spread throughout the Central Nam Bo district where Be's family lived, while the GVN prepared to distribute photographs of the living Be and the NLF mobilized its propaganda network to support its own version of the story. According to the nephew, Be's mother and father were ordered to say nothing and were relocated to another district. When the GVN returned Be to his hamlet for a "visit" later in 1966, many villagers apparently recognized him but because of fear, told the VC that they either had not seen him or had not known him.¹¹⁹ Counter-theatre groups, funded by the United States, toured the villages, carrying with them 10,000 song sheets entitled "The Truth about Nguyen Van Be." Leaflets were published with photographs of Be's mother and the caption, "I Ought to Know my Own Son."¹²⁰ According to Robert W. Chandler, by July 1967 JUSPAO had distributed information on Nguyen Van Be's existence through more than thirty million leaflets, seven million cartoon leaflets, 465,000 posters,

¹¹⁷ Reprinted with the permission of SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Ret.).

¹¹⁸ The story that the nephew tells of his father's visit to see his son is fascinating. He told JUSPAO that before leaving to see Be, the father had been told by his cadre leader to report back to him in a frank manner on what he sees. When the father returned, the cadre leader was not there, so the father gave his frank report (that it was his son) to another officer. He returned the next day and gave the same report to the cadre leader, who summarily asked him, "Why do you insist on propagating such lies? Are you a spy?" The father was ordered to never speak again of his son and was then instructed to take his wife and leave his village.

¹¹⁹ From an interview with Nguyen Van Be, former platoon leader, political officer and cousin of Nguyen Van Be, May 30 1967, Folder 04, Box 17, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 05 - National Liberation Front, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

a special newspaper in 175,000 copies, 167,000 photographs, 10,000 song sheets, motion pictures, “and radio and television programs featuring Be, his family, and his Hoi Chanh friends.¹²¹



Illustration 5.4: Be is seen sitting on the back-left of the photo during an interview with JUSPAO.¹²²

The response of the NLF and the Party Cadres to the Be controversy was to initiate “indoctrination classes” for each individual hamlet. They told their audiences that Be’s mother had never actually seen her son and that American plastic surgeons had re-fashioned a new Be in order to deceive the population. In July 1967, the Lao Dong Party offered a two-million piaster reward for anyone who killed the false Be. Internally, they agreed that they would avoid “talking much about Be’s family in order to minimize the

¹²⁰ Thomas William Hoffer, “Nguyen Van Be as Propaganda Hero of the North and South Vietnamese Governments,” *The Southern Speech Communication Journal* 40 (1974).

¹²¹ Chandler, *War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam*, 45.

¹²² Photograph VA008996, No Date, James Ridgeway Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

damage already done by the enemy in case they succeed[ed] in ‘buying over’ this family.”¹²³ Yet despite the continued JUSPAO attack on the tale of Be’s sacrifice, and despite the fact that Be (or the Be pretender) was carted from one press conference to another throughout 1967, ‘68, and ‘69, COSVN nonetheless maintained that Be *had* died on that fateful day, and that he was the child-hero against whom all young people should judge themselves.¹²⁴

What is most striking about this story for the purposes of this dissertation is the centrality of this child/man in the North Viet Nameese and American struggles to (re)fashion their own images for an uncertain, rumor-heavy population. For COSVN, Be represented the idyllic child-warrior who is driven to make the ultimate sacrifice for the cause of national liberation. As such, his story substantiated their conceptualization of the war as a crusade for which the young were willing to sacrifice their own lives. In contrast, for JUSPAO, the image of Nguyen van Be, pictured in the exact same pose and the exact same expression as that rendered by COSVN, symbolized delegitimation, not simply of the North Viet Nameese Government and their propaganda effort, but of the imagined child-warrior as well, who was in their eyes, not a child, and not a warrior. In Be’s tumultuous story, we can also see the presence of a third group; the non-state agents in the North Viet Nameese villages who are responsible for the spread of rumors about Be’s survival. They chose to witness his return to their village and to discuss it among themselves while simultaneously concealing their true opinions from the authorities. For

¹²³ “Captured April 24 1967 – Dinh Tuong Province, Subject: Counter measures against the enemy’s intent to spread distorted propaganda about Nguyen Van Be,” Folder 03, Box 17, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 05 – National liberation Front, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.

¹²⁴ The quantity of COSVN materials printed on Be is astonishing, including 265 records from the Vietnam Archive alone.

this group, Be's death and rebirth provided a contested visual and verbal space where they could participate in the telling of a story that both defined and at times undermined NLF legitimacy. Be's mythologized form became open to revision not only by the United States and the GVN, but by the very populations for whom it was supposed to provide inspiration. As was the case for JUSPAO and Gosteleradio, COSVN found that the construction and dissemination of power can become compromised through the inversion of images and narratives, through rumor, and because it is ultimately impossible to maintain control over the flow of information between propagandists and their audiences.

CONCLUSION

Instead of displaying a uniform policy towards the people of Viet Nam, these images of children conveyed contradictory American, Soviet, and NLF policies. By depicting their children as educated, wealthy, and distant from the fighting, American propagandists missed the opportunity to establish the same national solidarity with the South Viet Nameese that the Russians were showing with the North. By portraying the children of South Viet Nam as passive victims of brutality and as beneficiaries of American aid, JUSPAO created a vision of South Viet Nam as unable or unwilling to rally its entire population for the cause of freedom (this in contrast to the Soviets and the NLF who were quick to illustrate the mobilization and active sacrifice being made by the young of the North). Similarly, despite their projections of solidarity between the Russian and Viet Nameese people, Soviet propagandists were unable to avoid the rising awareness

on the part of the NLF that no Russian help was forthcoming. When the Soviet Union continued to express its solidarity with the communist cause, archival documents suggest that the VC took these promises lightly and instead did their best to play the Russians and Chinese against each other. Likewise, for COSVN, the campaign to create an image of the Viet Nameese child as independent, militarized, and self-sacrificing came under great debate when faced with counter images that questioned the role of children in the war and questioned the state's claims to ideological and military legitimacy.

These varying constructions of the child's image, viewed in the context of the Viet Nam War and the larger Cold War, provide insight into how the domestic ideals of childhood permeated the international propaganda efforts of American and Soviet broadcasters and publishers. They show how these domestic images were coupled with constructed visions of the Viet Nameese child, who, either as a victim, as a communist warrior or as a nationalist liberator, worked to justify American, Soviet and NLF policies in the war. At the same time, however, these images were not free from inversion and debate. They questioned the motivations of the various state-powers involved in the war by assuming traits that did not fit their intended mold.

Conclusion

Samantha Smith and the Endurance of the Cold War Child

This dissertation has sought to answer two questions: First, what did the image of the child look like in the Soviet Union, the United States, and in the post-colonial world during the first two decades of the Cold War? Second, what functions did those images perform?

In answering the first question, this project has shown how children on both sides of the Iron Curtain could be conjured, disseminated, and consumed in a wide variety of ways. They were portrayed in rhetoric, in the press, and in film as threatened by new dangers that put their futures and the welfare of their countries at risk. The threats that they faced differed depending on who was conjuring the child's image. For the Soviet state under Khrushchev, risks to the child's future came from the legacies of Stalin and the Second World War, from spoiling and neglectful parents, poor education, and delinquency. In contrast, threats to the American child appeared to come from communist infiltration and nuclear attack in addition to a myriad of domestic crises. These images of threat were then joined by visions of endangered children created by Soviet filmmakers and American anti-nuclear activists who presented a vision of youth that was either abandoned or poisoned as a result of short-sighted state policies.

Not only did images of threatened children transform in these years, prevailing ideas about what defined the ideal child also changed significantly during the first two

decades of the Cold War, both in the Soviet Union, and to a greater extent, in the United States. Whether they were depicted as crusaders for a peace offensive or as defenders of national security against communist attack, mobilized children became the ideal. The Cold War, with its increasing need to suspend innocence and to mobilize the next generation, was one of the factors that led to the collapse of older ideals concerning childhood. In creating contested visions of innocent and mobilized youth, the Soviet Union, the United States, and dissenting movements on both sides of the Atlantic, changed childhood itself.

In answering the second question, this dissertation has shown how supporters and transgressors of the Cold War consensus in both the Soviet Union and the United States used images of children as mechanisms of legitimation. They harnessed portrayals of threatened and mobilized children in order to convey the message that they alone were best suited to protect and prepare the next generation for the challenges ahead. More than this, they conjured these images in an effort to build a conceptual framework for what was at stake in the Cold War and what needed to be done in order to win or at least survive the conflict. In the Soviet Union, depictions of youth mobilized for peace and economic growth helped to conceptualize the war as an international crusade for peace against American warmongering. In contrast, in the United States, images of youth as mobilized for defense created a portrait of America struggling against Soviet attack and infiltration. And while both Soviet and American politicians and propagandists used threatened youth in order to justify increased state interference into the private lives of individuals and families, voices of domestic dissent created a picture of the Cold War as a battle for individual safety and expression against the heavy-handedness of the

government in the populations' lives. By examining these images and the functions they played, we see that the Cold War was not an event that was conceptualized in the same way around the world or even within the same national borders. The many contested visions of the child open the doors for seeing the many contested visions of the Cold War as well.

One last example illustrates how the image of the child was both open to contestation and vital in the process of building particular visions of the Cold War. On November 28, 1982, an eleven-year-old girl named Samantha Smith sent a letter to Yuri Andropov from her home in Manchester, Maine. In her letter, Samantha Smith asked the Premier, "Why do you want to conquer the world or at least our Country?"¹ A few months later, as the winter turned to spring in both Moscow and Manchester, Samantha received a response. Andropov's words were carefully chosen. "It seems to me that you are a courageous and honest girl," the letter began.² In response to Samantha's question regarding his desire to conquer the world, Andropov stated, "Today, we very much want to live in peace, to trade and cooperate with all our neighbors around the world...The Soviet Union will never, never be the first to use nuclear weapons against any country." At the letter's end, he reiterated his message: "We want peace for ourselves and for all people of the planet, for our own kids and for you, Samantha."³ Andropov then invited Samantha and her parents to come to the Soviet Union as guests of the Union of Societies of Friendships with Peoples of Foreign Countries.

¹ "Samantha's Letter," Samantha Smith Papers, Samantha Smith Foundation, Boothbay, ME.

² "Andropov's Response," Samantha Smith Papers, Samantha Smith Foundation, Boothbay, ME.

³ Ibid.

That July, Samantha and her parents boarded a jet bound for Moscow. Upon arrival, they were picked up by a Chaika limousine and driven to the Sovietskaia Hotel. They visited the Kremlin, the Lenin Mausoleum, and the monument to the war dead. From there, they travelled by train to Artek, where 1,000 Pioneers greeted Samantha with offerings of bread and salt. In *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, she was pictured eating with Soviet Pioneers in the cafeteria, sleeping in a cabin, and swimming on the shores of the Black Sea. Photographs of the laughing and comfortable American girl were captioned with excerpts from Andropov's letter: "When you come to Artek, you will see for yourself that "everybody in the Soviet Union stands for peace and friendship among nations."⁴ In the Soviet Union, Samantha became a symbol for Soviet peace and openness towards the United States.

Meanwhile, in America, the State Department argued in official releases that the Soviets were using Samantha as a pawn to cull popular protest abroad and at home against American nuclear policies. As Richard Pipes put it at the time, "It's nothing but a propaganda play."⁵ The American press then used the Soviet coverage of Samantha's letter to point out the manipulative aspects of Soviet propaganda and the censorship of the communist state. As Nicholas Daniloff of *U.S. News* reported during Samantha's visit in the Soviet Union, the "Russians will see and hear as much or as little of Samantha as the tightly controlled Soviet news media decide." In the United States, Samantha became an icon for Soviet aggression and the destruction of civil rights under communism.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Jennes, Gail, "Main's Samantha Smith has a red-letter day when Andropov becomes a pen pal," *People Weekly* 19 (May 16 1983): 40(2).

Samantha's life changed drastically after she got home. Over the next two years, she interviewed Democratic presidential candidates on television. She appeared on every American talk show. She wrote a book about her experience called *Journey to the Soviet Union*, which was translated into Russian. She was then cast alongside Richard Wagner on the ABC show *Lime Street*. Tragically, she and her father were killed in a plane crash on August 25, 1985, while returning from filming in England.

Samantha's death sharpened the divisions between her American and Soviet identities. In the Soviet press, she was envisioned as a child who had spent the past three years of her life raising awareness about "the innermost wishes of the Soviet people...to preserve peace."⁶ *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* stated that Samantha had given numerous interviews and television appearances attempting to "bring to grownups the truth about the Soviet people, about their love of peace."⁷ In the weeks and months following her death, the Soviet Union dedicated to Samantha a new strain of orchid, a five-kopek stamp, a rare Siberian diamond, and a mountain. Meanwhile, the Soviet press completely ignored Samantha's budding television career in its obituaries, portraying her instead as a person who had devoted her short life to campaigning on behalf of the Soviet Union.⁸

In contrast to the Soviet coverage of Samantha's death, American politicians and the press focused their attention on retelling the details of her accident (*People Magazine* reported that her father had held her as the plane was going down, because when they

⁶ Martin Ebon, *The Soviet Propaganda Machine* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987), 362.

⁷ "Samanta Smit, Mertva" *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, August 27 1985.

⁸ Serge Schumemann, "Girl who Visited Soviet Mourned in Moscow," *The New York Times*, August 28 1985.

found her remains, “she was pretty much together”),⁹ on her budding acting career, on the sadness and resilience of her mother, on Robert Wagner’s response, and on the uncertain future of *Lime Street*. The press mentioned her role as a peace advocate only as a list of other attributes. Her obituaries always included Samantha’s first question to Andropov and her fear that he might “conquer” the world. At the hands of the American press, Samantha was portrayed not as a martyr for peace, but as a normal American girl who had largely left her peace activism behind for the trappings of television and Hollywood.

Two distinct stories emerge when we examine the life and death of Samantha Smith. The first story is of an individual girl, with friends and family, who led an amazing life and died far too soon. The second story concerns her image, or rather, her images, that were created and contested by the Soviet Union and the United States in the waging of the Cold War. It is towards an understanding of this second story that this dissertation has provided tools for analysis. On the one hand, when we look at Samantha’s projected image in the U.S. press, we see that she exemplified the traits of an ideal American child who had written a letter to the Soviet premier asking him flatly why he sought to conquer the United States. This question identified Samantha as a youngster who was aware of the threats presented by the communist menace. Moreover, in writing the letter, she appeared to be a child who had acted independently in defense of national security. On the other hand, when Andropov responded to Samantha’s letter, he constructed a new image of the girl, seeing her in many ways as an ideal Russian child. In his letter, he depicted her as a youngster who was threatened not by Soviet aggression,

⁹ David Wallace, “Still Mourning Samantha Smith, Robert Wagner Decides that his Lime Street Show Must go on,” *People Weekly* 24 (November 11 1985): 81(2).

but by American Cold War policies. He envisioned her as a child who was taking action, in contrast to the American government, in pursuit of peace.

These contested images had uses on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In Russia, Andropov's response that the Soviet Union would "never, never" attack presented a vision of the Cold War that pitted the peace-loving populations of the United States and the Soviet Union against Reagan's escalating arms race. Meanwhile, in the United States, Samantha's letter presented the Soviet Union as an aggressive menace that threatened the next generation. Even Samantha's journey to the Soviet Union served the purpose of contrasting the young, and ostensibly free, American girl with the children that she encountered behind the Iron Curtain whose freedoms and access to information were severely censored.

These two images of Samantha Smith as an advocate for peace and as a symbol of Soviet repression and aggression reflect how conflicting visions of the Cold War continued to be waged over the image of the child well into the 1980s. They show how politicians and propagandists in the Soviet Union and the United States could use the same image of the same child to construct opposing conceptualizations of youth and of the Cold War itself. At the same time, the fact that Samantha's image was so permeable and open to revision also reflects both sides' ultimate inability to control the child's figuration and to construct a particular Cold War reality.

On April 25 1996, exactly thirteen years after Samantha Smith received Andropov's invitation to come to Russia, Geoff Williams of *Entertainment Weekly* interviewed Robert Wagner on the legacy that Samantha had left behind. After retelling the amazing story of her tour in Russia, her television show, and her untimely death,

Wagner confessed to Williams that he had tried to make a movie about Samantha's life. "Unfortunately," he stated, "The networks weren't interested. They didn't think there was enough conflict in it."¹⁰ But the networks were mistaken. They had been looking at the wrong story. Samantha Smith was in fact a part of a long-standing conflict going back to the 1950s between how children were seen and used in the variegated realities of the Cold War universe.

¹⁰ Geoff Williams, "The Littlest Diplomat," *Entertainment Weekly* (April 25 1996): 72(1).

Bibliography

Russian Archives

- Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), Moscow
f.6903, Gosudarstvennyi komitet SSSR no televideniiu I radioveshchaniiu
(GOSTELERADIO)
op. 1, d. 495, 624, 774,
op. 2, d. 335
op. 23, d.3, 7, 10, 23, 41, 43, 43, 123, 136, 174, 227
op. 24, d. 910, 915, 2075, 2080, 2245, 2495
op. 16, d. 288, 303, 308, 354, 368, 472, 525
f. 8131, Prokurata SSSR
op. 32, d. 5602
f. 9401, Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh del SSSR (NKVD SSSR)
op. 1, d. 4320
f. 9552, Tsentral'nyi komitet I organizatsii tsentral'nogo podchineniia vsesoiuznogo
dobrovol'nogo obshchestva sodeistviia armii, aviatsii I flout SSSR (DOSAAF SSSR)
op. 1, d. 159
f. 9553, Gosudarstvennyi komitet SSSR no Trudu I sotsial'nym voprosam
(GOSKOMTRUD SSSR)
op. 1, d. 23

Rossiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Literaturnoi i Iskusstva (RGALI)

- f. 2453
op. 4, d. 208, 232, 261, 1403, 1420, 1475, 1476, 1483, 1626, 2785
op. 5, d. 1162

Rossiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial'no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI)

- f. m1, Tsentral'nyi komitet VLKSM
op. 31, d.38, 144
f. m2, Tsentral'nyi covet vsesoiuznoi pionerskoi organizatsii im. V.I. Lenina
op. 1, d. 17, 18, 57, 58, 59, 78, 155, 321, 339
f. m3, Komitet molodezhnykh organizatsii (KMO) SSSR
op. 15, d. 2
f. m6, Vserossiiskii pionerskii lager' "Artek" im. V.I. Lenina
op. 12, d. 1, 40, 56, 57, 61, 62
op. 13, d. 57, 59
op.14, d. 57, 111, 115.
op.15, d. 70, 139, 143, 147

American Archives

Boy Scouts of America Archive, Irving, TX

Administrative Papers, 1950-1968
Annual Reports, 1950-1968
Arthur Schuck Papers
Committee on Interracial Activities Papers
Ellsworth Augustus Papers
International Relationships Service Papers, 1958-1964
Marlon Wright Papers
Merit Badge Requirements and Handbooks, 1950-1968
Program Directives, 1950-1968
Program Quarterlies, 1950-1968
Public Documents, 1950-1968
In-house Journals
Speakin' Out,
The Scout Executive, 1950-1968

Lyndon Johnson Library, Austin, TX.

Audio-Visual Collection
MP 103, 179, 194, 641, 702, 708, 751
Carl Rowan Papers
Office Files of Frederick Panzer, Box 422
Records of the Democratic National Committee, 1964
U.S. Information Agency (1964-1966)
FG 296
Box 6, 33
FG 266-1-1
Box 75, 135

National Archives and Record Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C.

Voice of America, Audio Visual Collection
306VOA.ENO
T-2645, 3124, 3826, 6277, 6509, 6989, 7534, 8151

The Peace Archive, Swarthmore College, PA

SANE Papers
DG 58
Series A, Box 1, 8, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18
Series B, Box 12, 34
Series B-3, Box 7, 9, 12
Series B-4, Box 31
Series E, Box 52
In-house journal
SANE World
Women Strike for Peace Papers
DG 115
Series A, Box 3

Series A2, Box 1
Series E, Box 34

Samantha Smith Foundation, Boothbay, ME
Samantha Smith Papers

Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Truman Papers

The United States Congressional Record, Washington, D.C., 1949-1968

Vietnam Archive, Lubbock, Texas
Douglas Pike Collection
Box 1, 6, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17
Gary Gillette Collection
Box 1
James Ridgeway Collection
VA008996
Larry Berman Collection
Box 1
Veteran Members of the 109th Quartermaster Company (Aid Delivery) Collection
Box 02

Russian Newspapers and Journals

Izvestiia
Iskuustvo Kino
Komsomol'skaia Pravda
Krokodil
Ogonek
Pionerskaia Pravda
Pravda
Sovetskaia Pedagogika
Voennye Znaniia

American Newspapers and Journals

Boy's Life
Chicago Daily News
Detroit Free Press
Film Quarterly
Junior Scholastic
Liberty
Life

Look
New Republic
New York Times
Newsweek
Monthly Film Bulletin
Our Sunday Visitor
Pennsylvania Guardian
Reader's Digest
Scouting
Soviet Film
Sunday Review
The Educational Reviewer
The Evening Star
The Nation
This Week
Today's Woman
Vancouver (B.C.) Sun
Washington Evening Star
Washington Post

Other Published Sources

- "70th Anniversary of Stalin's Birth." Moscow: Akademiia Nauk, 1949.
- Afanasenko, E.I. and Kairov, I.A. *School Internats After Five Years*. Moscow: Izd-vo APN, 1961.
- Aksiutin, Iurii. *Khrushchevskaia "Ottepel'" i Obshchestvennye Nastroeniia v SSSR v 1953-1964 gg.* Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2004.
- Alcock, N. *The War Disease*. Oakville: CPRI Press, 1972.
- Alpatov, N.I., Myaskovskaia, N.A., Spiryn, L.F., and Shagova, A.Y. *School Internat*. Moscow: Uchpedgiz, 1958.
- Anderson, Robin. *A Century of Media, A Century of War*. New York: Peter Lang, 2006.
- Anninsky, Lev. "Hello? Adieu?" *Soviet Film* (1990).
- Anonymous. "What Khrushchev Told the Writers." *The Observer*, Aug 19 1963.
- Appy, Christian, ed. *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000.
- Aries, Philippe. *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life*. New York: Vintage Books, 1962.
- Austin, Joe. "Introduction." In *Generations of Youth: Youth Cultures and History in Twentieth-Century America*, edited by Joe Austin and Michael Nevin Willard. New York: New York University Press, 1998.
- Bachelard, Gaston. *The Poetics of Space*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1994.
- Bakshstein, Joseph. "A View from Moscow." In *Nonconformist Art: The Soviet Experience 1956-1986*, edited by Alla Rosenfeld and Norton T. Dodge. London: Thames and Hudson, 1995.

- Ball, Alan M. *And Now My Soul is Hardened: Abandoned Children in Soviet Russia, 1918-1930*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
- Barson, Michael. *Red Scared! The Commie Menace in Propaganda and Popular Culture*. San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2001.
- Barthes, Roland. *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*. New York: Noonday, 1981.
- . *Mythologies*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1995.
- Beaty, Bart. *Fredric Wertham and the Critique of Mass Culture*. Oxford, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2005.
- Bederman, Gail. *Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
- Beer, Francis. "The Epidemiology of Peace and War." *International Studies Quarterly* 23 (1979): 45-86.
- Bentley, Eric. *Thirty Years of Treason: Excerpts from Hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1938-1968*. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2002.
- Berrol, Selma. *Growing up American: Immigrant Children in America Then and Now*. Edited by Joseph Hawes and N. Ray Hiner, Twayne's History of American Childhood. New York: Twayne, 1995.
- Biskind, Peter. *Seeing is Believing: How Hollywood Taught Us to Stop Worrying and Love the Fifties*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1983.
- Borstelmann, Thomas. *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- Boyer, Paul. *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age*. New York: Random House, 1985.
- Boym, Svetlana. *Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994.
- Bradley, Mark. *Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919-1950*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.
- Braukman, Stacey. "Nothing Else Matters but Sex: Cold War Narratives of Deviance and the Search for Lesbian Teachers in Florida, 1959-1963." *Feminist Studies* 27, no. 3 (Autumn, 2001).
- Brigham, Robert K. *Guerilla Diplomacy: The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Bronfenbrenner, Urie. *Two Worlds of Childhood: U.S. and U.S.S.R.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972.
- Brooks, Jeffrey. *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Brown, JoAnne. "'A is for Atom, B is for Bomb': Civil Defense in American Public Education." *Journal of American History* 1 (1988).
- Brzezinski, Mathew. *Red Moon Rising: Sputnik and the Hidden Rivalries that Ignited the Space Race*. New York: Times Books, 2007.
- Buchli, Victor. *An Archaeology of Socialism*. Oxford: Berg, 1999.

- Burlatsky, Fedor Mikhailovich. *Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring: The Era of Khrushchev Through the Eyes of his Advisor*. New York: Scribner's : Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991.
- Calvert, Karin. *Children in the House: The Material Culture of Early Childhood, 1600-1900*. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992.
- Caruthers, Susan. "Review of American Cold War Culture." *Modernism/modernity* 13, no. 1 (2006).
- Castigliola, Frank. "The Creation of Memory and Myth: Stalin's 1946 Election Speech and the Soviet Threat." In *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History*, edited by Martin Medhurst and H.W. Brands. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000.
- Caute, David. *The Great Fear*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978.
- Cecil, Paul Frederick. *Herbicide Warfare: The Ranch Hand Project in Vietnam*. New York: Praeger, 1986.
- Chandler, Robert W. *War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981.
- Christie, Ian. "Unauthorized Persons Enter Here." *Monthly Film Bulletin* July (1987).
- Clark, Katerina. *Petersburg: Crucible of Cultural Revolution*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995.
- Clement, Priscilla Ferguson. *Growing Pains: Children in the Industrial Age, 1850-1890*. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1997.
- Clowse, Barbara. *Brainpower for the Cold War: The Sputnik Crisis and national Defense Education Act of 1958*. Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1981.
- Cohen, Louis Harris. *The Cultural-Political Traditions and Developments of the Soviet Cinema, 1917-1972*, The Arno Press cinema program. New York: Arno Press, 1974.
- Commission, Educational Policies. *American Education and International Tensions*. Washington: U.S. Gov. Printing Office, 1949.
- Creuziger, Clementine G. K. *Childhood in Russia : Representation and Reality*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1996.
- Crystal, Catherine. "Searching for Excellence in Education." *The Quarterly* 24, no. 1 (Winter, 2002).
- Cull, Nicholas. *Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003.
- . *Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign against American "Neutrality" in World War II*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- D'Emilio, John. *Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940-1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
- Davies, Sarah. "Soviet Cinema and the Early Cold War: Pudovkin's Admiral Nakhimov in Context." In *Across the Blocs*, edited by Rana Mitter and Patrick Major. London: Frank Cass, 2004.
- Dean, Robert. *Imperial Brotherhood*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001.
- Deming, Barbara. "The Ordeal of SANE." *The Nation* (March 11 1961).
- Dickson, Paul. *Sputnik: The Shock of the Century*. New York: Walker Pub., 2001.

- Divine, Robert. *Blowing On the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.
- Dobrenko, Evgenii. "Sotsrealizm i mir detsva." In *Sotsrealisticheskii Kanon*, edited by Hans Gunther and Evgenii Dobrenko. Saint Petersburg: Akademicheskii Proekt, 2000.
- Dow, Peter. *Schoolhouse Politics: Lessons from the Sputnik Era*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.
- Druzhnikov, Iuri. *Informer 001: The Myth of Pavlik Morozov*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997.
- Dudziak, Mary. *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Ebon, Martin. *The Soviet propaganda machine*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987.
- Eco, Umberto. "Critique of the Image." In *Thinking Photography*, edited by Victor Burgin, 32-38. London: Macmillan, 1982.
- Edmonds, Eric. "Child Labor." In *Handbook of Development of Economics*, edited by T.P. Schultz and J. Strauss. Amsterdam, North-Holland: Elsevier Science, 2007.
- Ehrenburg, Ilya. "Prolonged Hysteria." *Pravda*, September 9, 1949.
- Elshtein, J.B. *Women and War*. New York: Basic Books, 1987.
- Engelhardt, Tom. *The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation*. New York, NY: BasicBooks, 1995.
- Erikson, Erik H. *Childhood and Society*. New York: Norton, 1993.
- Eschen, Penny Von. *Race Against Empire*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997.
- Fadeev, Alexander. *The Young Guard*. Translated by Volet Dutt. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2000.
- Field, Deborah. "Mothers and Fathers and the Problem of Selfishness in the Khrushchev Era." In *Women in the Khrushchev Era*, edited by Melanie Ilic, Susan Reid, Lynne Attwood. New York: Palgrave, 2004.
- Field, Douglas, ed. *American Cold War Culture*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005.
- Finkelstein, Barbara. *Regulated Children/Liberated Children: Education in Psychohistorical Perspective*. New York: Psychohistory Press, 1979.
- Foertsch, Jacqueline. "A Battle of Silence: Women's Magazines and the Polio Crisis in Post-war UK and USA." In *American Cold War Culture*, edited by Douglas Field, 2005.
- Fomin, Valeri, ed. *Kinematograf Otteveli*. Moscow: Materik, 1998.
- Foster, Stuart. *Red Alert! Educators Confront the Red Scare in American Public Schools*. New York: P. Lang, 2000.
- Foucault, Michel, and Richard Howard. "Ceci n'est pas une pipe." *October* 1 (Spring, 1976).
- Friedan, Betty. *The Feminine Mystique*. New York: Norton, 1963.
- Fursenko, Alexandr and Timothy Naftali. *Khrushchev's Cold War*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2006.
- Fürst, Julaine. "Friends in Private, Friends in Public: The Phenomenon of the *Kompaniia* Among Soviet Youth in the 1950s and 1960s." In *Borders of Socialism: Private*

- Spheres of Soviet Russia*, edited by Lewis Siegelbaum. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*. New York: Vintage Books, 1999.
- . *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Gerasimov, S. "Podel'noe i podlinnoe." *Iskusstvo Kino* 5 (1960).
- . "Razmishleniia o molodikh." *Iskusstvo Kino* 2 (1960).
- Gilbert, James. *A Cycle of Outrage: America's Reaction to the Juvenile Delinquent in the 1950s*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- Goodwin, Doris Kearns. *Wait Till Next Year: A Memoir*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997.
- Gorer, Geoffrey. *The American People: A Study in National Character*. New York: Norton, 1948.
- Gorky, Maxim. *Childhood*. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- Gosse, Van. *Rethinking the New Left*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Graebner, Norman. "Myth and Reality: America's Rhetorical Cold War." In *Critical Reflections on the Cold War*, edited by Martin Medhurst and H.W. Brands. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University, 2000.
- Grant, Julia. "A "Real Boy" and not a Sissy: Gender, Childhood, and Masculinity, 1890-1940." *Journal of Social History* 37, no. 4 (2004).
- Hall, Jane. "Bill Moyers Holds a Mirror Up to America." *Los Angeles Times*, November 12 1989.
- Haraway, Donna. "Ecce Homo, Ain't (Ar'n't) I a Woman, and Inappropriate/d Others: The Human in a Post Humanist Landscape." In *Feminists Theorize the Political*, edited by Judith Butler and Joan Scott. New York: Routledge, 1992.
- . *The Haraway Reader*. New York: Routledge, 2004.
- Hartman, Andrew. *Education and the Cold War: The Battle for the American School*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- Hawes, Joseph M. *Children Between the Wars: American Childhood, 1920-1940*, Twayne's history of American childhood series. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1997.
- Hazan, Barukh. *Soviet Impregnational Propaganda*. Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis Publishers, 1982.
- Heath, Shelby Anne Wolf and Chirley Brice. "Living in a World of Words." In *The Children's Culture Reader*, edited by Henry Jenkins. New York: New York University Press, 1998.
- Henriksen, Margot A. *Dr. Strangelove's America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- Herken, Greg. *The Winning Weapons: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950*. New York: Vintage Books, 1982.
- Higonnet, Anne. *Pictures of Innocence: The History and Crisis of Ideal Childhood*. New York, N.Y.: Thames and Hudson, 1998.
- Hixson, Walter L. *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945-1961*. Houndmills: Macmillan, 1997.

- Hoffer, Thomas William. "Nguyen Van Be as Propaganda Hero of the North and South Vietnamese Governments." *The Southern Speech Communication Journal* 40 (1974).
- Holland, Barbara. *When All the World Was Young: A Memoir*. New York: Bloomsbury, 2005.
- Hoover, J. Edgar. *Masters of Deceit: The Story of Communism in America and How to Fight it*. New York: Holt, 1958.
- Hulbert, Ann. *Raising America: Experts, Parents and a Century of Advice About Children*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003.
- Iakir, Petr Ionovich. *A Childhood in Prison*. [1st American ed. New York,: Coward, 1973.
- Ilic, Melanie, Susan Reid, Lynne Attwood (eds). *Women in the Khrushchev Era*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
- James, Allison, Chris Jenks, and Alan Prout. *Theorizing Childhood*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1998.
- Jenkins, Henry. "Childhood Innocence and Other Modern Myths." In *The Children's Culture Reader*, edited by Henry Jenkins. New York: New York University Press, 1998.
- Johnson, Priscilla. *Khrushchev and the Arts: The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962-1964*. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965.
- Jones, Kathleen. *Taming the Troublesome Child: American Families, Child Guidance, and the Limits of Psychiatric Authority*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.
- Kaganovsky, Lilya. "How the Soviet Man was (Un)Made." *Slavic Review* 63, no. 3 (2004): 577-96.
- . *How the Soviet Man was Unmade: Cultural Fantasy and Male Subjectivity under Stalin*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2008.
- Kagarlitsky, Boris. *The Thinking Reed: Intellectuals and the Soviet State, 1917 to the Present*. Rev. ed. London ; New York: Verso, 1989.
- Kahn, Albert. *The Game of Death: Effects of the Cold War on our Children*. New York: Cameron & Kahn, 1953.
- Katz, Milton. *Ban the Bomb*. New York: Praeger, 1986.
- Kharkhodin, Oleg. *The Collective and the Individual in Russia*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999.
- Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich. *The Great Mission of Literature and Art*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964.
- . *Lecture, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., Twentieth Congress*. Moscow, 1956.
- . "Vyisokaia Ideonost' i Khudozhestvennoe Masterstve - Velikaia Sila Sovetskoi Literaturyi i Iskusstvo." *Pravda* 69 (1963): 4.
- Khutsiev, Marlen. "Ia Nikogda ne Delal Polemichnykh Fil'mov." In *Kinematograf Otpepli*, edited by V. Troianovskii. Moscow: Materik, 1996.
- King, Adrienne Harris and Ynestra, ed. *Rocking the Ship of State: Toward a Feminist Peace Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989.

- Kirschenbaum, Lisa A. *Small Comrades: Revolutionizing Childhood in Soviet Russia, 1917-1932*. New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2000.
- Koven, Seth. *Mothers of a New World: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States*. New York: Routledge, 1993.
- Kozlov, Vladimir. *Mass Uprisings in the USSR: Protest and Rebellion in the Post-Stalin Years*. London: M.E. Sharpe, 2002.
- KPSS. Otdel Propagandyi i Agitatsii, TSK. *Sovetskaia pechat' v Dokumentakh: Sbornik Podgotovlen Otdelom Propagandyi i Agitatsii TSK KPSS po Soiuznyim Respublikam*. Moskva: Gos. Izd-vo Polit. Lit-ryi, 1961.
- Krupskaia, Nadezhda Konstantinovna. *On Education : Selected Articles and Speeches*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957.
- Krupskaia, Nadezhda Konstantinovna. *Vospitanie Molodezhi v Leninskom Dukhe*. Moskva: Pedagogika, 1989.
- "Kukuruza." *Krokodil*, June 10 1956, 1.
- Kumar, Jeff Weintraub and Krishan, ed. *Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.
- Kunzle, David. *The History of the Comic Strip: The Nineteenth Century*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
- Kuznick, Peter, and James Gilbert, eds. *Rethinking Cold War Culture*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001.
- Lacy, Mark. "War, Cinema, and Moral Anxiety." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 28, no. 5 (2003).
- LaFeber, Walter. *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2002*. Updated 9th ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004.
- Lakoff, G. "Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf." *Peace Research* 23 (1991): 25-32.
- LaPierre, Brian. "Making Hooliganism on a Mass-scale: The Campaign against Petty Hooliganism in the Soviet Union, 1956-1964." *Cahiers du Monde Russe* 47, no. 1-2 (2006).
- . "Private Matters or Public Crimes: The Emergence of Domestic Hooliganism in the Soviet Union, 1939-1966." In *Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia*, edited by Lewis Siegelbaum. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Latham, Michael. *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.
- Laville, Helen. "'Positive Peace': American Womens' Response to the 'Peace Offensive'." In *Cold War Women: The International Activities of American Women's Organizations*, edited by Helen Laville. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002.
- Leffler, Melvyn. *The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1994.
- Lenin, Vladimir Il'ich. *State and Revolution*. New York: International Publishers, 1932.
- . *The Tasks of the Youth Leagues*. 4th rev. ed. Moscow: Progress, 1968.
- Linden-ward, Blanche and Carol Hurd Green. *American Women in the 1960s: Changing the Future*. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1993.

- Lisogorskogo, N. "Lishnii Rot." *Krokodil*, June 10 1956, 10.
- Loskutov, Andrei, and Peter Tempest. *The World Shall not be Blown Up! : Soviet Youth and the Peace Movement*. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Pub. House, 1983.
- Lotman, Iu. "O Semiosphere." *Sign Systems Studies* 17 (1984): 5-23.
- Lotman, Iuri, Boris Andreevich Uspenskii, and Ann Shukman. *The Semiotics of Russian Culture*, Michigan Slavic contributions; no. 11. Ann Arbor: Dept. of Slavic Languages and Literatures, University of Michigan, 1984.
- Makarenko, Anton Semenovich. *The Collective Family*. 1st ed. Garden City, N.Y.,: Anchor Books, 1967.
- Mally, Lynn. *Culture of the Future: The Proletkult Movement in Revolutionary Russia*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
- Mastny, Vojtech. *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- May, Elaine Tyler. *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*. New York: Basic Books, 1988.
- McKenna, Kevin J. *All the Views Fit to Print: Changing Images of the U.S. in Pravda Political Cartoons, 1917-1991*. New York: Peter Lang, 2001.
- Mechling, Jay. *On My Honor: Boy Scouts and the Making of American Youth*. Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
- Merkel', Maia. "Snimaet Vadim Iusov." *Isjusstvo Kino* 1 (1963).
- Meyerowitz, Joanne, ed. *Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945-1960*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1994.
- Mickenberg, Julia L. *Learning from the Left: Children's Literature, the Cold War, and Radical Politics in the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Mitchell, May Niall. "'A Good and Delicious Country': Free Children of Color and How They Learned to Imagine the Atlantic World In Nineteenth-Century Louisiana." *History of Education Quarterly* 40, no. 2 (2000): 123-44.
- Mitter, Rana, and Patrick Major, eds. *Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Soviet History*. London: Frank Cass, 2004.
- Myers, David. *New Soviet Thinking and U.S. Nuclear Policy*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990.
- Naiman, Eric. "Children in *The Master and Margarita*." *SEEJ* 50, no. 4 (2006): 655-75.
- Nekrasov, Victor. "Slova 'velikie' i 'prostye'." *Isskustvo Kino* 5 (1959).
- Newman, James R. "A Communication." *The Washington Post*, September 25 1961.
- Nogee, Joseph, and Robert Donaldson, eds. *Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II*. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Novikova, L.I. *Iskusstvo i Vospitaniia Novogo Cheloveka*. Moscow: Izd-vo, 1964.
- Nyberg, Amy Kiste. *Seal of Approval: The History of the Comics Code*. Oxford, MS: University of Mississippi Press, 1998.
- Ogden, David. "Cold War Science and the Body Politic: An Immuno/Virological Approach." *Literature and Medicine* (2000): 241-61.
- Oshinsky, David. *Polio: An American Story*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Ostriakov, Sergei. *Chto trebuet komsomol ot komsomol'tsa*. Moskva: Molodaia Gvardiia, 1937.

- Papachristou, Judith. "American Women and Foreign Policy, 1898-1905: Exploring Gender in Diplomatic History." *Diplomatic History* 14 (1990).
- Parry-Giles, Shawn J. *The Rhetorical Presidency: Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955*, Praeger series in presidential studies,. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002.
- Petrone, Karen. *Life has Become More Joyous Comrades: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000.
- Pollock, Linda. *Forgotten Children: Parent-Child Relations from 1500 to 1900*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Prokhorov, Alexander. "The Adolescent and the Child in the Cinema of the Thaw." *Studies in Russian and Soviet Cinema* 1, no. 2 (2007).
- . "The Unknown New Wave: Soviet Cinema of the 1960s." Paper presented at the Pittsburgh Russian Film Symposium, Pittsburgh, PA, May - June 2001.
- Redl, Helen B. *Soviet Educators on Soviet Education*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.
- Reid, Susan E. *Khrushchev in Wonderland: The Pioneer Palace in Moscow's Lenin Hills, 1962*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh, 2002.
- . "The Meaning of Home: "The Only Bit of the World You Can Have to Yourself"." In *Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia*, edited by Lewis Siegelbaum. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- . "Women in the Home." In *Women in the Khrushchev Era*, edited by Melanie Ilic, Susan Reid, Lynne Attwood. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
- Romm, Mikhail. *Montazhnaia Struktura fil'ma*. Moscow: Vses. Gos. In-t Kinematografii, 1981.
- Rosenthal, Rachel. "Visual Fiction: The Development of the Secular Icon in Stalinist Poster Art." *Zhe: Stanford's Student Journal of Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies* 1 (Spring, 2005).
- Schlesinger, Arthur. *The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom*. Cambridge, MA: Riverside Press, 1962.
- Schrecker, Ellen. *The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents*. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2002.
- Schreker, Ellen. *Many are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998.
- Scott, James C. *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990.
- Sherrow, Victoria. *Encyclopedia of Youth and War*. Phoenix, AZ: Oryx Press, 2000.
- Shimko, Keith L. "Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decision Making." *Political Psychology* 15, no. 4 (1994): 655-71.
- Shlapentokh, Vladimir. *Public and Private Life of the Soviet People: Changing Values in Post-Stalin Russia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Siegelbaum, Lewis, ed. *Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia*. Edited by Lewis Siegelbaum. New York: Palgrave Mcmillan, 2006.
- Sienkiewicz, Stanley. "SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine." *International Security* 2, no. 4 (1978).
- Skolnick, Arlene. *Embattled Paradise: The American Family in an Age of Uncertainty*. New York: Basic Books, 1991.

- Slater, Thomas. *Handbook of Soviet and East European Films and Filmmakers*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1992.
- Small, Melvin. *Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the Battle for America's Hearts and Minds*. Wilmington, D.E.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2002.
- Spock, Benjamin. *Baby and Child Care*. Cardinal ed. New York,: Pocket Books, 1957.
- Steedman, Carolyn. *The Tidy House: Little Girls Writing*. London: Virago, 1982.
- Stites, Richard. *Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society since 1900*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Swerdlow, Amy. *Women Strike for Peace: Traditional Motherhood and Radical Politics in the 1960s*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
- Suri, Jeremy. *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.
- Tarkovsky, Andrei. *Sculpting in Time*. London: The Bodley Head, 1986.
- Taubman, William. *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2003.
- Tolstoy, Leo. *Detstvo*. Moscow: Russkiy Iazik, 1990.
- Tumarkin, Nina. *The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia*. New York: Basic Books, 1994.
- Turovskaia, Maia. "Some Documents from the Life of a Documentary Film." *Studies in Russian and Soviet Cinema* 2, no. 2 (2008).
- Turpin, Jennifer E. *Reinventing the Soviet Self: Media and Social Change in the Former Soviet Union*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995.
- Tuttle, William. *Daddy's Gone to War: The Second World War in the Lives of America's Children*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- . "The Homefront Children's Popular Culture." In *Small Worlds*, edited by Elliott West and Paula Petrik. Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas Press, 1992.
- Varshavskii, Ia. "Nado Razobrat'sia." *Iskusstvo Kino* 5 (1959).
- Vigotsky, Lev. *Thought and Language*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962.
- Von Geldern, James. *Bolshevik Festivals, 1917-1920*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
- Wachtel, Andrew. *The Battle for Childhood: Creation of a Russian Myth*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990.
- Weart, Spencer R. *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.
- Weintraub, Jeff, ed. *Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.
- Wertham, Fredric. *Seduction of the Innocent*. New York: Rinehart & Co., 1953.
- Whitfield, Stephen. *The Culture of the Cold War*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.
- Williams, William Appleman. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. New York: Norton, 1959.
- Wilson, Elizabeth. *Women and the Welfare State*. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977.
- Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. *Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive*, First Session, March 28, 29, April 2, 3 1963.

- Wishy, Bernard. *The Child and the Republic: The Dawn of Modern American Child Nurture*. Philadelphia, 1968.
- Wittner, Lawrence. *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997.
- Wolf, Shelby Anne, and Shirley Brice Heath. "Living in a World of Words." In *The Children's Culture Reader*, edited by Henry Jenkins. New York: New York University Press, 1998.
- Woll, Josephine. "Mikhail Romm's Ordinary Fascism." In *Picturing Russia: Explorations in Visual Culture*, edited by Valerie Kivelson and Joan Neuberger. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008.
- . *Real Images: Soviet Cinema and the Thaw*, KINO, the Russian cinema series. London: I.B. Tauris, 2000.
- Wood, Elizabeth A. *The Baba and the Comrade : Gender and Politics in Revolutionary Russia*, Indiana-Michigan series in Russian and East European studies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- Wylie, Phillip. *Generation of Vipers*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942.
- Wynn, Charters. *Workers, Strikes, and Pogroms: the Donbass-Dnepr Bend in Late Imperial Russia, 1870-1905*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992.
- Yelyutin, Vyacheslav. "Adapting Higher Schools to Contemporary Demands." *School and Society* (Feb 14, 1959).
- York, Jodi. "The Truth About Women and Peace." In *The Women and War Reader*, edited by Lois Lorentzen and Jennifer Turpin. New York: New York University Press, 1998.
- Youngblood, Denise. "A War Remembered: Soviet Films of the Great Patriotic War." *The American Historical Review* 106, no. 3 (Jun., 2001): 839-56.
- Zelizer, Viviana A. Rotman. *Pricing the priceless child: the changing social value of children*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Zorkaia, Neia. *The Illustrated History of the Soviet Cinema*. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1989.
- Zubkova, Elena. *Obshchestvo i Reformi, 1945-1964*. Moscow: Moscow Izd., 1993.
- Zubok, V. M., and Konstantin Pleshakov. *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: from Stalin to Khrushchev*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996.
- Zubok, Vladislav. *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War From Stalin to Gorbachev*. Chapel Hill: University of Chapel Hill Press, 2007.

VITA

Margaret Peacock graduated from Indian Springs School in Birmingham, Alabama in 1991. She received her B.A. degree from Loyola University – New Orleans in 1994. She then completed a M.S. in Information Science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1997 and moved to San Jose, California to work as an enterprise database replication specialist for Nortel Networks. In 2000, she moved to Austin, Texas where she began her graduate study in history at the University of Texas. She received her M.A. degree in 2002. She worked as a Fulbright-Hays scholar in Moscow, Russia, in 2004-2005. She then returned to Austin and finished her Ph.D. in Russian/Modern European History in 2008. She is currently a lecturer at the University of Texas and a visiting professor at St. Edward's University.

Permanent Address: 6712 Oasis Dr. Austin, TX 78749

This manuscript was typed by the author.